GUIDE TO THE AL1 SOUTHEAST ASIA FILE

[The term "Southeast Asia" may be variously defined depending upon the criteria utilized. The OWC file unit, AL1, does not specify any areal boundaries, but an examination of the sources processed for this file reveals a rather clear areal delimitation based on conventional geographical grounds. This conforms to the definition given in 6: Fisher (p. 12-B), namely that Southeast Asia "covers the area lying east of India/Pakistan and to the south of China, i.e., Burma, Thailand, Indo-China, Malaya, British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines." A somewhat different conception of Southeast Asia is set forth by LeBar, Hickey, and Musgrave in their basic handbook, Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia (1964). They state that: "Ethnologically speaking, northern Southeast Asia does not stop at the China border; centuries of migrations, trade, and political relationships link the peoples of Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam with the southern provinces of China — Yunnan, Kweichow, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung. This entire region, which might be termed greater mainland Southeast Asia, forms an integrated whole for purposes of the study of racial and linguistic history, ethnic distributions, and cultural evolution" (p. vi). Furthermore, LeBar (Personal Communication, 1970) thinks Assam and East Bengal should be included in this region, and, on the basis of similar criteria, he would expand the scope of island Southeast Asia to include the Formosan Aborigines, the coastal areas of west New Guinea, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and probably Madagascar.

An outstanding characteristic of the entire area is a high degree of linguistic, ethnic, and cultural diversity. Thus the majority of the peoples of Southeast Asia speak languages which may be classified among four major language stocks: Sino-Tibetan, Austroasiatic, Tai-Kadai, and Malayo-Polynesian (LéBar, Hickey, and Musgrave, 1964: xi-xiii). The peoples range in culture from simple hunters and gatherers to large literate civilizations. Nevertheless, there are a number of widespread traits which, collectively, provide a unifying element. These include aspects of family organization, a respected position for women, the propitiation of malignant spirits, the

use of iron for tools, and other minor traits (cf. Robbins Burling, Hill Farms and Padi Fields, 1965: 1-7). Also, one of the outstanding features of the human geography of the area throughout historic times has been the much lower density of population which it has supported, in comparison with the two neighboring areas of South (Indian) and East (Sino-Japanese) Asia (6: Fisher, p. 12-C).

Finally, and paradoxically as Burling points out, it is one aspect of the area's very diversity that provides the most important unifying theme: nearly every country in Southeast Asia has both hill people and plains people, and the contrast — and sometimes conflict — between the two ways of life constitutes a fundamental sociopolitical pattern. The nucleus of plains people forms in each case a relatively homogeneous and dense population, each speaking a single dominant language, and each characterized by adherence to one of the world's great religions and subsistence based upon intensive wet rice agriculture. On the other hand, in most countries there is also a minority of hill people who are always far more heterogeneous. They speak a multitude of languages, have had no political unity among themselves, and until the last century have never had more than tenuous political ties with the plains. The hill people usually practice shifting agriculture, and tend to retain longer their localized traditional religions (cf. Burling, 1965: 4-6).

The Southeast Asia file may be viewed both as a contextual file and a "holding" file. It is a contextual file in the sense that some of the sources (e.g. 6: Fisher; 14: Heine-Geldern; and 18: Firth) present general data pertinent to much or all of the area, and which provide a background or setting for more specific files on particular countries or peoples. By a "holding" file is meant that many of the sources processed contain specific data on several or many countries or peoples, and the source as a whole could not, therefore, be processed for any of the more narrowly delimited files; but these sources can be included in a general file

such as AL1, and the pertinent sections marked for other more specific files.

The file contains 22 sources (no source was processed for code no. 3). These sources may be grouped into several main categories for purposes of discussion. The first category is a miscellaneous one in that, except for 6: Fisher, which attempts to define "Southeast Asia" from several different viewpoints, the other sources are highly specialized studies providing a variety of anthropological perspectives on the area. 19: Sneath presents a blood-group analysis of 100 samples from each of four tribes in Malaya and Borneo, while 13: Sebeok delineates the languages and dialects of Southeast Asia and their relationships. 23: Benedict is a major study focusing on the reconstruction of Sino-Tibetan kinship systems through the phonological and semantic analysis of the Karen, Chinese, and Thai languages, and 14: Heine-Geldern constitutes a valuable interpretation of conceptions of state and kingship in Southeast Asia, indicating the influence of religious and cosmological beliefs on political institutions and practices.

The second category deals with geography, demography, and the economy with particular reference to land utilization. The basic work is 5: Dobby, which sets forth an excellent, detailed geographical account of the area. 16: Fryer and 17: Ginsburg survey and discuss the major urban centers, whereas 18: Firth deals with the peasantry, analyzing both the factors influencing their economy, and their interrelations with the larger society. 1: Pelzer focuses on modes of land use for food production, with a detailed presentation of agricultural colonization and settlement programs in the Philippines and the Netherlands Indies. 15: Adams and 10: Thompson are narrower studies, the first presenting a review of the anthropological and botanical literature on rice cultivation, the second being a survey of labor conditions in each country.

The third category deals with colonial policies and colonial administration. The major source is 7: Furnivall, a comprehensive comparative study of political, economic, and social developments in Burma

under British rule and the Netherlands Indies under Dutch rule. This is complemented by 4: Cady, an analysis of policies followed by the British and American governments in fostering the development of self-government and independence in Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines. Also relevant is 8: Furnivall, a description of the history of the educational systems in each country, including the influence of different government policies. Finally, 9: Christian is concerned with the Anglo-French commercial rivalry in the area during the 17th and 18th centuries.

The fourth category contains two sources on the Chinese minority in Southeast Asia. 2: Purcell remains the key comprehensive account of this subject, while 11: Kinnersley is a rather fascinating description of the Chinese lottery called Hua-Hoey, which is based on 36 mythical personages, and involves dream interpretation.

The fifth and final category consists of 4 sources by Sherborn (numbers 12, 20, 21, and 22) containing a total of about 2,900 bibliographical sources on the area, mostly in Dutch, covering the period from January 1888 to June 1894, and dealing with the natural and social sciences, commerce, and travel accounts.]

Processed in 1955-1956

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

[p.3]

Chapter I

FROM HUNTING AND GATHERING TO AGRICULTURE

Hunting and Gathering

101 174 222 105 In Southeastern Asia today there are peoples of different cultural levels carrying on some of the major economies that man has developed in the course of time. The first people to invade the tropical forest regions around the South China Sea were alithic, or prepalaeolithic, food gatherers,[1] who obtained their food by collecting edible wild plants and by hunting and fishing. Today geographically separated peoples are still living in a prepalaeolithic or palaeolithic food-gathering and hunting stage.[2] In Southeastern Asia they are represented by the Semang of the Malay Peninsula, the Andaman Islanders, and the Aeta of the Philippines—all of whom are Negritos, or dwarfed Negroids—the Kubu of Sumatra, the Sakai of the Malay Peninsula, the Toala of Celebes,[3] and the Punan of Borneo.[4]

222 462 105 The degree to which collecting, hunting, or fishing contributes to the food supply varies with the season; it also varies with different peoples, depending upon the resources of the region, the type of equipment the people may possess, and the skills they may have acquired. Food-gathering and hunting peoples have a division of labor under which the men hunt while the women and children gather vegetable matter and catch insects and small animals. The men may lend a helping hand, however, in digging up some of the very deep-growing yams. Men will also participate in the 621 picking of fruits, especially when it is necessary to climb tall trees. The food gatherers and hunters of Southeastern Asia are nomadic in the sense that they do not remain long in one place. However, they do not wander aimlessly through the jungle. Each group has its definite territory—among

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Note: The titles of the works here cited in footnotes have been abbreviated, whenever possible. The full titles may be found in the Bibliography, p. 269 ff.

1 Nippold (Rassen- und Kulturgeschichte der Negrito-Völker, 1936, pp. 253–255 and 398–400) considers the alithic wood culture of the Negritos of Southeastern Asia to be older than palaeolithic culture. These people use wood rather than stone as raw material for their tools. Because of the perishable nature of wood, archaeologists and prehistorians have not yet been able, so far as I know, to go farther back than the palaeolithic age and therefore have not been able to confirm the hypothesis of an alithic age. Menghin (Weltgeschichte der Steinzeit, 1931, p. 91) believes that, from an archaeological point of view, an alithic wood culture may be regarded only as a possibility, but Kern (Die Anfänge der Weltgeschichte, 1933, p. 35), who compared pygmy culture with palaeolithic cultures, comes to the conclusion that alithic wood cultures probably preceded palaeolithic culture.

2 By divesting the word "palaeolithic" of its specific chronological connotation the term may be used for present-day peoples who have a food-gathering and hunting culture.

3 The racial affinities of the Kubu, the Sakai, and the Toala are not clear; by some they are called Veddoids, by others, Australoids.

4 They are considered to be Proto-Malays.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL4

During untold centuries in which they collected plant matter, women acquired an intimate knowledge of vegetable life. Eduard Hahn and others have therefore reasoned that women were the inventors of the cultivation of plants and hence were the first food producers. Hahn has given the name *Hackbau* (hoe culture or hoe tillage) to primitive cultivation, and maintains that the hoe is woman's implement; he draws a sharp distinction between Hackbau and more advanced cultivation, which he calls *Pflugbau* (plow culture or plow tillage) and ascribes to men.[9] It is indeed true that men generally farm with plows and that many examples may be cited of women using hoes; nevertheless, there are so many instances of male primitive cultivators employing hoes or similar instruments that Hahn's classification should be modified. While there seems to be no reason for abandoning his theory of the invention of plant cultivation by women, the classification of cultivation by tools, such as the hoe and the plow, ascribed to one sex or the other, is unsatisfactory. For, in spite of the fact that the collection of vegetable matter is almost exclusively the woman's task in the gathering economy, among primitive cultivators men either assist women in the cultivation of plants or entirely take over this activity whenever hunting or fishing become less important than soil tillage. Furthermore, many primitive cultivators do not use the hoe, but continue to employ the digging stick, characteristically used by the food-gathering women. From Formosa southward throughout the Malay Archipelago, as well as on the mainland of Southeastern Asia, the digging stick, also known as the dibble stick or planting stick, is frequently used by the primitive cultivator. On the other hand, there are advanced cultivators who till their land intensively with hoes; they use manure, rotate their crops, terrace fields that lie on slopes, and practice irrigation, yet they do not use plows drawn by draft animals (however, in some instances they have livestock). In other words, advanced agriculture does not depend upon the animal-drawn plow nor does primitive agriculture depend upon the hoe.

A more fundamental distinction between primitive and advanced agriculture may be made in terms of land use rather than of tools. Primitive cultivators, with the possible exception of those living in arid regions, raise one or two crops on a given plot of land, then abandon the plot and make a new field, preferably in the forest, so that the old plot lies fallow sometimes for many years and may itself revert to forest; in short, primitive cultivators shift the place of their agricultural activities with regularity. The crop land consists of small patches scattered throughout the forest; these patches are extremely ragged in appearance and do not look at all like fields. A primitive cultivator would never think of removing stumps and fallen trees; instead, he deliberately raises his crop among them. This kind of cultivation is best described as shifting-field, or shift-

[9] Hahn: Das Alter der wirtschaftlichen Kultur, 1905; idem: Die Entstehung der Pflugkultur, 1909; idem: Von der Hacke zum Pflug, 1914; Kolff: "Hahn's hypothese," 1926, pp. 884–907.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
[Filed in category 253.-- Analyst]
[see p. 11, category 116.-- Analyst]

suffer a certain amount of damage. The seedlings must therefore be given time to grow strong enough to endure the temporary uprooting. They usually need from 30 to 40 days before they are ready for transplanting. Whenever early transplanting is necessary a technique is employed which is known in the Philippines as *dapog*. The puddled seedbed is completely covered with banana leaves, which are pressed slightly into the mud so that a thin layer of mud spreads over the leaves. On top of this is placed a layer, an inch thick, of rice hulls or finely cut straw. The whole is thoroughly soaked and sown with seeds. The banana leaves prevent the roots of the seedlings from growing into the ground and suffering the usual damage when transplanted, but the seedlings must be transplanted within two weeks after the sowing of the seed. 243

In the riparian marshes of Sumatra and Borneo—the *lebak* areas—all the land is flooded at the time when the rice seed should be put into the ground. The inhabitants of these districts, however, have found an ingenious solution to their problem: the floating seedbed. They build small rafts of bamboo, reed, banana stems, or the leaf-ribs of the sago palm, on which they place a layer of rush, or some other aquatic plant, and then a thick layer of fine mud. As the water level rises and falls the seedlings have a chance to develop on the float unharmed.

Numerous also are the techniques employed to supply wet-rice fields with the necessary water (see pp. 47–51). These reflect the nature of the terrain, the social organization, and the stage of technical development of the inhabitants. For it is obvious that the cultivation of wet rice on the plains of the Red River in Tongking would require very different techniques from those required on the steep mountain slopes of northern Luzon.

Culture, Types of Land Use, and Population Pressure

One of the most striking characteristics of Southeastern Asia is the great variation in the density of the population (Map, Fig. 1B). This variation reflects differences in culture as well as differences in physical environment. The culture and social organization of a people are intimately linked to their technique and the intensity of their land use, which in turn guide the people in their selection of new land when it becomes necessary for them to seek new homes. The Cambodians, for example, when living in an environment similar to that of the Annamese, do not create the large rural settlements characteristic of areas inhabited by the latter.[28] Likewise, the Madurese prefer to settle in small hamlets or in isolated homesteads (*Einzelhof*) and to till unirrigated land, whereas the Javanese live in large villages and are by preference wet-field cultivators. Again, while the Bontocs and Ifugaos of northern Luzon build terraces and cultivate wet rice as their primary crop, the neighboring Apayaos, most of the Kalingas, the Tinggians, and the Gaddangs have so far resisted all attempts on the

101 161 361 000

[28] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, p. 94.

1: Peizer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia H-1

lanzones, papayas, and chicos, which find a good market in Manila, but on the whole we rarely meet in the Philippines such intensive garden culture as in Java. The diet of the average Filipino is not well balanced and is particularly deficient in fruits and vegetables. In recognition of this fact the Bureau of Education and the Bureau of Plant Industry have both done much to impress the peasants with the need for fruit and vegetable gardens. Although the situation has improved during the past forty years and a large variety of fruits is now produced, the country still depends upon imports, whereas with a little effort most of the imported fruits could be produced locally and would furnish an additional source of income. It would be well to encourage the peasants to grow more fruits and to advise them on the most suitable varieties. In the other countries of Southeastern Asia, also, with the possible exception of Java, such advice would be valuable. 245 [654]

The published material available on the importance of gardens in Indochina is similarly limited in quantity. Even Gourou in his study of land utilization restricts himself chiefly to listing the fruits and vegetables found in the gardens and to stating that certain districts are renowned for the quality of their garden fruits. Gourou's list of fruits and vegetables is as varied and extensive, however, as similar lists for any of the other countries of Southeastern Asia. 114

Wet Fields

Throughout the countries bordering the South China Sea most of the cultivated land is used for the growing of lowland, or wet, rice. For this purpose the fields must be leveled and surrounded by earth dams to impound rain water during the rainy season or to confine the water that is carried to the fields through irrigation canals or lifted to the fields by mechanical means. If a field is properly leveled the surrounding dyke will keep the water everywhere at the same depth. The size of the wet-rice, or paddy, fields, and the amount of labor that is required to make them, depend upon the topography of the region. In the lowlands, where no terracing is required, there is relatively little labor involved in the making of paddies, which are frequently large. A hilly, or mountainous, terrain necessitates terracing, which demands greater effort and reduces the size of individual fields; the steeper the slope, the narrower the paddies. We have only to see the rice terraces of the mountains of northern Luzon, southern Bali, the Preanger districts of West Java, or Sumatra's West Coast in order to realize how much effort has been expended in building these terraces and how much energy must be devoted to their upkeep. The terraces, as well as the wet-rice fields of the plains, represent the accumulated efforts of generations of peasants, each of which has helped to extend the area devoted to the cultivation of wet rice (Figs. 50–58).[1] 101 243 312

Not all people show the same skill in the making of paddies. According to Credner, the Thai are quite helpless on sloping land that requires terracing before wet rice may be planted. They would prefer to migrate to a 243 184

[1] [See pp. 115 ff. category 116. -- Analyst]

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

A NOTE ON NOMENCLATURE AND SPELLING

THE nomenclature of areas, countries, towns, peoples, &c., is constantly changing to meet the requirements of politics or the caprice of fashion. The word 'Indonesia' seems to have been used for the first time in 1850 by J. R. Logan to describe the Malay Archipelago, and in recent years it has been appropriated by both the Indonesian nationalists and the Dutch to describe what, before the Second World War, had variously been known in English-language books and journals as the Dutch East Indies, Netherlands India, and the Netherlands Indies.[1] Siam in 1939 changed its name to Thailand; in 1945 it changed it again to Siam, and in May 1949 back to Thailand once more. Since in this work the period covered is mostly the time when Siam was officially correct as the name of the country, 'Siam' and 'Siamese' have been retained throughout. 'Malaya' was coined well over a century ago but has come into general use only in the present century. The name 'Straits Settlements' is obsolete; the 'Malayan Union' lasted for less than two years: 'Insulinde', once a popular literary name for present-day Indonesia, is almost forgotten.

National, racial, or regional feeling influences usage greatly. At one time the principal people of the Madras Presidency were known generally as 'Klings' (from the ancient kingdom of Kalinga), but objection by this people to the name because of its modern associations led to its replacement by 'Tamils'; later still the preferred name was 'South Indians'. 'Asiatic', for so long universal, is now disliked in Asia and 'Asian' is taking its place.

Southeast Asia is in many ways an unsatisfactory term. It is cumbersome, inaccurate, and indefinite in its scope. 'It is hardly (says the Secretary of the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names) a geographical name.' Yet the region is becoming more and more a political and economic entity and a name is badly needed to describe Burma, Siam, Indochina, Malaya,

[1] Nederlandsch Indië was the Dutch official name. Amry Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies* (1944) p. 1, says, 'About seventy-five years ago, a German ethnologist by the name of Bastian applied the term "Indonesia" (realm of the Indian Islands) to all the islands of the region, including the Philippine Islands, Formosa, British Malaya, and Madagascar, as well as the Dutch East Indies.' But J. R. Logan, in his article 'The Ethnology of Indonesia,' in the *Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia*, vol. iv (1850) p. 343, says: 'The Indian Archipelago must remain, but the shorter form Indonesia may be usefully employed on several occasions.' The *Oxford English Dictionary*'s first reference to 'Indonesian' is from *Nature* (1881). A. Bastian's use of the term is in the form, *Indonesien oder die Inseln des Malayschen Archipel* (Berlin, 1884), and he almost certainly got the term from Logan, or Logan's copiers. An article (in Chinese), 'Explanation of the Term "Indonesia" ', by Lin Hui-hsiang, *Journal of the South Seas Society*, vol. iv, pt. i (March 1947) p. 18, ascribes the original use of the word to Logan, and it was, indeed, this article which prompted me to the investigations here summarized.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

101 British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines collectively. Will the in-
103 ventors of names turn their minds to it? For my part, I offer for considera-
tion the name INDOSINESIA.

Spelling is often more fluid even than place-names. It has varied astonishingly in European works in the last century. (Who, for example, would recognize Kabaw (the valley near the Chindwin river bordering on Manipur) as Kubo, or Mengoon as Ming'un?)

Wishing as far as possible to follow authority in nomenclature and spelling, I ascertained the general policy of the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names. This committee accepts the official forms of all foreign names which are written in the Roman alphabet, but with all the diacritical marks in use in the foreign alphabets. (This last usage I have not attempted to adopt.) Names officially written in other alphabets are transliterated according to established tables. Any names officially written in non-alphabetical script are transcribed by the committee according to established systems.

As regards transliteration and transcription there is, apparently, a large measure of Anglo-American agreement. During the last two hundred years a conventional Roman alphabet has developed until now, under the name of the R.G.S. II alphabet, it is used by the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names, the United States Board on Geographical Names, the Canadian Board on Geographical Names, and the corresponding New Zealand Board. During the war the British and American staffs agreed to use the modernized Hepburn system (Romaji) for Japanese, the modified Wade system (later Giles (H.A.) as modified by Lionel Giles), and the General System of the Siamese Royal Institute. The Permanent Committee issues a number of publications giving guidance in the matter. Generally speaking (the secretary of the committee states), we should be safe in accepting the official map of a foreign country provided that we know that it is accepted in most of the country's departments of government, and provided that the latest edition is available to us. This is the procedure I have endeavoured as far as possible to follow, but I have made some exceptions in deference to common usage.

So far so good, but there remain many problems still to be solved. There is, for example, no international, or even national, agreement on the spelling of 'Southeast Asia'. In this name Southeast is variously written South East, South-East, Southeast, South-east, and even southeast or south-east. The British Admiralty continues to use the hyphen and has issued sailing directions for 'South-East Alaska' and for the 'North-East Coast of Siberia'. SEAC, on the other hand, referred to itself as the 'South East Asia Command'. American usage favours Southeast Asia and this form, pending international agreement on the subject, I have decided to adopt throughout. I have also, following contemporary French diplomatic usage, adopted 'Indochina' (Indo-China should be reserved for the whole peninsula) and also (with less certain authority) 'Cochinchina' and 'Vietnam'. But in the last case I have omitted both the circumflex and the hyphen used by Viêt-Nam.

A special difficulty arising in the course of this work has been that many

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

of the authorities quoted or followed use obsolete forms of place or personal names (e.g. Sooloo for Sulu; Theebaw for Thibaw). I have usually (but not invariably) retained the spelling of the original in quotations and often, in order not to lose contemporary colour, in the ordinary text, but where necessary the modern form has been inserted in brackets. 101 103

In the romanization of Chinese names (other than place-names in China) I have allowed myself some latitude. For example, I have dispensed with the circumflex in Chêng Ho, though I have kept the sign over the 'u' in citing the *Tsŭ Erh Chih* of Sir Francis Wade. I have also used diacritical marks in certain Vietnamese proper names. The personal names of Chinese have been hyphenated as a general rule (e.g. Chiang Kai-shek); but if I have lapsed occasionally into Tan Kah Kee, &c., it is because I have seen it spelt thus for a whole generation. Moreover, many Chinese prefer to romanize their names in their own way. I have, in fact, followed diplomacy and convenience rather than consistency. In the case of romanization of Chinese dialect forms I have relied mainly on my own knowledge. 104

The names of Siamese persons offer a special difficulty. Luang Pradist and Pibul Songkram have half a dozen romanized forms as well as alternative names which conceal their identity from the ordinary European reader. (I have endeavoured to ascertain official Siamese usage, but there has been inconsistency in the replies.)

Throughout I have endeavoured to follow the rule of universal good manners—to call a country or a person what they prefer to call themselves. Because of ever-changing usage this is not always easy. Moreover, national, racial, or regional sensitiveness is such that to defer to it one would often have to sacrifice accuracy. For example, it has been suggested to me that I should eliminate the word 'China' in such combinations as 'Kapitan China' for the reason that it is obnoxious to the Chinese, especially in Indonesia, where the Japanese during the occupation represented it by Sino-Japanese characters of derogatory meaning. But in this instance I could not sacrifice historical fact to contemporary resentment. 103 104

The long and the short of it is that after a manful attempt to be logical and consistent I have given up the struggle. Having made a ruling, I found myself reversing it half-way through, and sometimes being reconverted to my original position later on in the book! The result is that the survey is bristling with inconsistencies. In my disgust I feel very much as T. E. Lawrence did when in the preface to *Seven Pillars* he wrote, 'I spell my names anyhow, to show what rot the systems are'.

S: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

Chapter One

THE NATURAL LANDSCAPE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

101 131 103 SOUTHEAST ASIA is a term which became popular during the Far Eastern War 1941-45, to describe those territories of Eastern Asia which lie south of the Tropic of Cancer (Burma, Siam, Indochina and Malaya) and the nearby islands spreading eastwards from the Asiatic continent towards New Guinea. The archipelago section merges eastwards into island groups of the West-Central Pacific, for which reason New Guinea itself may best be considered outside the definition "Southeast Asia," an exclusion justified (*a*) by its closer physical association with the Australian Continent, (*b*) by its sparse population of distinctive anthropological type now found principally in Australia, and (*c*) by the close affinities of its flora and fauna with those of Australia. The northern limit of Southeast Asia extends beyond the Tropic of Cancer to include Upper Burma on the western side, and withdraws south of the tropic to the political boundaries of Siam and Indochina farther east. By this definition, "Southeast Asia" and its off-lying islands sprawl asymmetrically across the Equator and cover a zone not far short of 1,500 miles in radius from a point off the mouth of the Mekong, an area comparable to all Europe and its seas north of the African coast. Thus isolation by great distances, as well as by physical obstructions, is a constant factor in the geographical relation between the various parts of Southeast Asia.

133 In Southeast Asia, that which forms its core and constitutes the geological link between its chief parts is the Sunda Platform, the southernmost continental block of Asia, whose integrity as a land mass has continued, with only minor tectonic disturbances on its fringes, through such long geological periods that it may be compared with those other "permanent" massifs, the Deccan, the Arabian Block and the Laurentian Shield. It is this physical feature which underlies Borneo, Eastern Sumatra, Northern Java and Malaya.

A somewhat similar platform is the common physiographic basis of Australia and New Guinea, forming what is known as the Sahul Shelf, to the east of the East Indian Archipelago.

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

Chapter Twenty-five

PEOPLES, POLITICS AND PROSPECTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

101 184 361 105

THE setting of Southeast Asia may be summed up as one of extremes of relief (deltaic plains and mountains) and a climate mostly approaching the wet limit for plant life but merging into monsoonal types. To this setting the people have made varying responses, ranging from migrant food gatherers and hunters in the jungles, to subsistence farmers in the plains, but all turning upon woody materials for weapons, implements, house-structures and domestic utensils, upon rice, the cereal of the wet extreme, and upon social systems of communal help. The whole social and economic life has been galvanised over the past century or two by being more and more drawn into commercial and industrial activities developed in response to and on the basis of external needs for the minerals and agricultural products of Southeast Asia, whereas prior to that time the region was touched only by a trickle of traders moving between India and China.

FACTORS IN THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY

174 177 311 175

Several factors account for the difficulty of obtaining firm data to fill in our general picture of the historical geography of Southeast Asia. In the first place, there grew up no strong literary tradition to last through the centuries and record the past in a form other than mythical. Here tradition is largely oral and literature essentially Indian rather than indigenous. And whatever there was of local record and history has rotted away quickly, the climate, the ants, insects and moulds soon destroying anything on wood, paper, leather or cloth. Moreover, in this setting of swamps and forest, the most easily available material is wood, and artistic tradition expressed in wood, whether in carvings, buildings or tools, rapidly disintegrates, leaving little of that sort of evidence which is the basis of our facts about early periods in other regions. Buildings and carvings on stone were not normal expressions of Southeast Asia people where over large areas stone is not easily come by and where

6. Fisher U-3 (no date) 1953 All Southeast Asia All

101 DURING the past decade the term "South-East Asia" has figured increasingly in the literature of international affairs but there is still a surprising lack of agreement over its exact meaning. Many writers apparently continue to use it as a synonym for the whole vast area stretching from Pakistan in the West to Manchuria and Japan in the north-east, which S. K. Datta once called 'Asiatic Asia' and geographers have more usually referred to as Monsoon Asia. The very existence of these alternatives is, however, an argument against using the term South-East Asia in this way and, in the writer's opinion, there are very strong grounds for restricting its meaning to cover simply the area lying to the east of India/Pakistan and to the south of China, i.e., Burma, Thailand, Indo-China, Malaya, British Borneo, Indonesia and the Philippines. For, clearly, this area, and this alone, seems entitled on purely geographical grounds to be regarded as South-East in relation to the rest of the continent and, more important, there is an obvious need for a collective term to embrace these seven lands which have so much in common with each other.

Lying as it does between the Indian sub-continent (South Asia) and the Sino-Japanese realm (East Asia) which together constitute the two great cultural and demographic foci of the continent as a whole, South-East Asia has always been in some degree overshadowed by these neighbours. In a sense, indeed, that very fact lends it a measure of unity, for its civilizations are essentially derivative and, indeed, colonial in origin, and the region as a whole may not unfairly be regarded as transitional, both in its physical and human characteristics, between India and China. If, ethnically, its peoples are in general more closely related to the Chinese, Indian strains are nevertheless present, while, conversely, except in Annam, the Chinese element in South-East Asian culture is far less evident than the Indian, though both are usually recognizable.

[p. 12(B)]

101 Perhaps the outstanding feature of the human geography of South-East Asia throughout historic times has been the much lower density of population which it has supported, in comparison with the two neighbouring subcontinents already noted. In the main this must be attributed to the great difficulty of entry overland, through the mass of lofty jungle-covered plateau in the north, to the predominantly mountainous character of South-East Asia itself, and to the prevalence of tropical diseases which are endemic in such conditions. So far as available records can be trusted, the population of South-East Asia has never exceeded a third of that of either the Indian subcontinent or China proper, and today its average density of about 90 to the square mile compares with 275 for India, 285 for the former eighteen provinces of China, and over 500 for Japan.

This state of affairs, both past and present, taken in conjunction with the political fragmentation of South-East Asia which has been fostered by its physical division into a maze of islands and peninsulas, goes far to explain the extent to which it has fallen under the shadow of both India, China and, in more recent times, Japan. Thus, during the early centuries of the Christian era, nearly the whole of South-East Asia, apart from Annam which formed part of Imperial China, came under the influence of southern Indian colonization. This has left as its memorials not only the glories of Angkor and other monuments, but also the Buddhist religion of the mainland and the surviving Hinduism of Bali and Lombok. Likewise from India, through the intermediary of Gujarati spice traders, came Islam which, after the 13th century, established itself in the greater part of Malaysia but achieved no lasting foothold in the Buddhist lands farther north.

In the meantime, however, commercial ties had been slowly developing between many parts of South-East Asia and the Chinese empire. At least from the 8th century A.D. onwards there are records of missions arriving in

[p. 12(C)]

● 101 China from Java and elsewhere in the Nan Yang ('southern seas'), bringing with them specimens of their countries' produce. Although these were apparently intended to promote trading relationships between the lesser lands of South-East Asia and the great empire to the north—a design in which they were usually successful—the Chinese frequently chose to interpret such missions as evidence of submission and to regard the goods brought by the foreigners as tribute. Thus there grew up an established tributary relationship between many countries of South-East Asia and Imperial China. By an extension of the Confucian family code into foreign affairs the former lands came to be styled the younger brothers and China the elder brother and, notwithstanding the severance of these links by the European powers in modern times, this attitude is by no means forgotten even today.

Despite these very ancient links of both its great neighbours with South-East Asia, however, it was not until the area had begun to pass under European control that really extensive Chinese or Indian settlement took place within its borders. To be more precise, although the Dutch found many Chinese, as also a handful of Japanese, in Indonesia even in the early 17th century, it was not until the latter half of the 19th century, when the completion of the Suez Canal led to rapid economic development in South-East Asia, that Chinese began to pour into almost every part of the region. Meanwhile, and more especially in the present century, Indians, though on a smaller scale, have emigrated to those areas, notably Burma and Malaya, which were under British influence or control. Taken as a whole, this migration, which has provided South-East Asia with a population of over eight million Chinese and nearly two million Indians at the present day, must be regarded as second only to the great European exodus to the Americas during the same period. And, like it, the incentive was primarily economic. The relatively unoccupied pioneer lands in both cases provided far greater opportunities than the congested home-lands of the peoples in question. Just as the youth of Europe was advised to "go west," so to the Southern Chinese and Indians opportunity beckoned towards the south and east respectively.

The resultant plural societies, which are a feature of every country in South-East Asia, form yet another distinctive characteristic which marks out the latter as something different from either of its great neighbours. Yet the parcelling out of the region, with the solitary exception of Thailand, into a series of western-controlled dependencies, each subjected to different methods of administration in accordance with the particular colonial philosophy of the respective metropolitan power, served steadily to obscure the overall unity of South-East Asia as a whole. Indeed, it was not until the Japanese overran the entire region after 1941, thereby depriving the West of invaluable supplies of rubber, tin, and both vegetable and mineral oils, and creating a vast series of problems, many of which still defy solution, that the West first began to think in terms of South-East Asia as an entity.

[p. 13(A)]

●101 The primary problem at this juncture was, of course, to expel the Japanese from the area, and it was with this in mind that SEAC, which first publicised the new regional name, was established. Of necessity SEAC had initially to be based outside the region, since the latter lay entirely in enemy hands. Unfortunately, the habit has consequently grown up of regarding Ceylon and often, by association, both India and Pakistan as well, as integral parts of South-East Asia, and this has undoubtedly led to much confusion and muddled thinking. More recently, several writers have attempted to perpetuate this use of the term on the grounds that, under the aegis of the Colombo Plan, a new economic alignment is developing between South and South-East Asia. Thus, for example, Mr. Woodrow Wyatt* has stated that the formerly accepted definition of South-East Asia in its narrow sense is out of date since it is impossible to dissociate the countries to which it refers from India, Pakistan and Ceylon. While one may in large measure agree with many of his conclusions, this particular argument would appear to lead logically to such absurdities as including the United States in a definition of Western Europe or the Soviet Union as part of Eastern Germany.

The usage should, however, be criticised for more fundamental reasons than this. In the first place the problems of South Asia are by no means the same as those of South-East Asia. Thus, whereas in South Asia the outstanding problem is posed by over-population, only a few parts of South-East Asia are so affected and the region as a whole could undoubtedly support many more people without fundamental changes in techniques. Indeed, although its immediate preoccupation is with economic and political rehabilitation after the disruption and devastation of Japanese rule, which South Asia did not experience, South-East Asia may well in the near future come to regard the existence of so much relatively sparsely peopled land as its greatest source of weakness. Already since 1945 the Japanese have again several times raised the matter of emigration to such under-developed lands as eastern Indonesia and, with mounting population pressure in India, Pakistan and China also, it is by no means impossible that Japan's lead may later be followed by others of South-East Asia's neighbours.

This, in turn, leads to a further criticism of the extended use of the terms South-East Asia to embrace South Asia as well. Granted that the ties between India, Pakistan and Ceylon on the one hand and South-East Asia on the other are both strong and of deep historical significance, it still remains an open question whether they will prove tougher and more permanent than those which bind the latter to East Asia.

In the days before the war, when the modern concept of South-East Asia had not won general acceptance, two alternative names for the area were sometimes used, *viz.* Further India and the Far Eastern Tropics. Both of these terms enshrine important elements of truth, and both implicitly suggest that South-East Asia, on account of its

* *Southwards from China*, Hodder and Stoughton, 1952.

[p.13(B)]

● 101 inherent weakness, must be thought of in relation to one or other of its Asian neighbours.

Such is clearly the case today. The ties binding South-East Asia to India (and to a lesser extent to Pakistan) are based largely on personal respect for India's leaders and a common experience of breaking free from political dependence on the West. In this respect India is, in effect, the elder brother to the newly-independent States of South-East Asia and has effectively championed their cause both at the United Nations and elsewhere. Thus India has taken over the rôle which was formerly, though hardly disinterestedly, played by Japan as champion of "Asia for the Asiatics"* until the experiences of 1942-5 revealed her true intentions.

Certainly today there is far less affection in South East Asia for Japan than for India, but, thanks to the rapacity of many Chinese middlemen, local feeling towards China is even more hostile throughout the region. Thus, on grounds of sentiment alone, the alignment of South-East with South Asia appears to be eminently secure.

Unfortunately, however, this is by no means the whole story and two other factors weigh heavily on the opposite side of the balance. Economically speaking, the interdependence of temperate and tropical lands, at least in the present stage of Asian development, affords a firmer basis for trade between South-East and East Asia than anything existing in the relationship between the former

* The term "Asians" had not then come into general use.

[p 14(A)]

•101 and India. This interdependence, which has in some degree underlain the economic geography of the Far East from the days of the early tribute-bearing missions to the time of Japan's short-lived Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, is likely to be exploited still further in future. Certainly, so long as Japan is cut off from trade with China she has no option but to pursue such a course, and it is by no means unlikely that China herself, once industrialized, will follow a similar policy. And, if such should indeed prove to be the case, the presence of a vast Chinese commercial community scattered throughout South-East Asia would be a formidable asset, quite apart from its even greater potential significance should an attempt ever be made to create by force a new Co-prosperity Sphere under Chinese auspices.

In short, the conclusion seems inescapable that the alignment between South and South-East Asia, desirable though it undoubtedly is from the standpoint of all free men, is by no means assured for the years that lie ahead. On the contrary, the possibility of new association with East Asia, with all the formidable consequences which that implies, cannot be ruled out. Indeed the dominant theme in the oriental history of the second half of the 20th century may well be the struggle of both South and East Asia for paramount influence in the area which lies between them. Greater East Asia we have known in our lifetime; it remains to be seen whether Greater South Asia can capture the minds and energies of men sufficiently to prevent a further relapse into barbarism and exploitation.

[p. 14(B)]

15:Adams E-4 (no date)1948 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

RICE CULTIVATION IN ASIA

By INEZ ADAMS

243 THE terminology employed by writers discussing Asiatic rice agriculture has raised a problem: are the cultivated varieties of rice distinctly separable into one group that will grow under none but irrigated conditions, and another that demands moderate amounts of moisture but is successfully produced only by dry farming? The terms used in the literature frequently bear this implication. They include references to "wet" and "dry," "dryland," "lowland," "upland" and "mountain" rice. In anthropological studies whose purpose is merely descriptive this creates confusion. When extended to comparative studies and historical reconstructions, with the two methods of cultivation treated as distinct for the conclusions reached, it becomes necessary to examine the distinctions that might justify such use.

101 171 243 184 As early as 1820, John Crawfurd, writing his "History of the Indian Archipelago," observed that rice is known as "padi . . . in all languages and dialects from Madagascar to the Philippines."[1] He distinguished in Java a "marsh" rice, sown in nurseries and transplanted to flooded fields, and a "mountain" or "dryland" rice, grown on arable uplands. These terms remain current. Lowie defines them thus:

243 The innumerable variations of the plant fall broadly into two categories, with corresponding techniques of husbandry. "Swamp" rice can be grown only in marshes or under irrigation. "Mountain" rice yields smaller crops, but can be grown anywhere with normal precipitation.[2]

Wilhelm Wagner[3] speaks in a similar sense of "den gewöhnliche Wasserreis" and "den sogenanten Bergreis," in his account of Chinese agriculture. C. Daryll Forde makes the same general differentiation of cultivated rices falling[4] into two groups due to the physical requirements of the plant. Wissler[5] mentions "The cultivated varieties known as 'hill,' 'upland,' or 'dryland' rice," in contradistinction to the "aquatic varieties." Keesing,[6] in one work on the Philippines, employs "wet" and "dry" rice; elsewhere[7] he speaks of "dry agriculture" in Indonesia, as distinguished from the practice of terracing with irrigation.

E. M. Loeb,[8] in his general ethnography of Sumatra, notes rice raised in both flooded and dry fields by the Bataks; in the Minangkabau, . . . "wet and dry rice fields are worked together by the men and women . . . ";[9] in Nias, . . . "both the wet and dry variety are grown . . . ";[10] in Atjeh, "Rice is of both the wet and dry variety. The wet rice fields, when not laid in swamps, are irrigated

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[1] Crawfurd, 1820, Vol. I, p. 358. [2] Lowie, 1938, p. 294. [3] Wagner, 1926.
[4] Forde, 1934. [5] Wissler, 1946. [6] Keesing, 1937. [7] *Idem.*, 1934.
[8] Loeb, 1935. [9] *Ibid.*, p. 101. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 132.

• 102



FIG. 1A—Orientation map of Southeastern Asia. The 100-meter contour line (omitted for the smaller islands) brings out the small extent of lowland areas in Southeastern Asia. The 100-meter bathymetric line shows the extent of the continental shelf. Notice especially the distribution of volcanoes. Recent territorial changes, allotting parts of Indochina, Burma, and Malaya to Thailand, are indicated by shaded areas numbered 1 to 5. The spelling of place names on the original map does not follow the recommendations of the U. S. Board on Geographical Names, as the map was drawn before the publication of the Board's most recent recommendations. The spelling of additional place names has been kept consistent with that on the original map. (Reproduced through the courtesy of the *Geographical Review*).

2: Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

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

[end map B]

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A NOTE ON NOMENCLATURE AND SPELLING

THE nomenclature of areas, countries, towns, peoples, &c., is constantly changing to meet the requirements of politics or the caprice of fashion. The word 'Indonesia' seems to have been used for the first time in 1850 by J. R. Logan to describe the Malay Archipelago, and in recent years it has been appropriated by both the Indonesian nationalists and the Dutch to describe what, before the Second World War, had variously been known in English-language books and journals as the Dutch East Indies, Netherlands India, and the Netherlands Indies.[1] Siam in 1939 changed its name to Thailand; in 1945 it changed it again to Siam, and in May 1949 back to Thailand once more. Since in this work the period covered is mostly the time when Siam was officially correct as the name of the country, 'Siam' and 'Siamese' have been retained throughout. 'Malaya' was coined well over a century ago but has come into general use only in the present century. The name 'Straits Settlements' is obsolete; the 'Malayan Union' lasted for less than two years; 'Insulinde', once a popular literary name for present-day Indonesia, is almost forgotten.

National, racial, or regional feeling influences usage greatly. At one time the principal people of the Madras Presidency were known generally as 'Klings' (from the ancient kingdom of Kalinga), but objection by this people to the name because of its modern associations led to its replacement by 'Tamils'; later still the preferred name was 'South Indians'. 'Asiatic', for so long universal, is now disliked in Asia and 'Asian' is taking its place.

Southeast Asia is in many ways an unsatisfactory term. It is cumbersome, inaccurate, and indefinite in its scope. 'It is hardly (says the Secretary of the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names) a geographical name.' Yet the region is becoming more and more a political and economic entity and a name is badly needed to describe Burma, Siam, Indochina, Malaya,

[1] Nederlandsch Indië was the Dutch official name. Amry Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies* (1944) p. 1, says, 'About seventy-five years ago, a German ethnologist by the name of Bastian applied the term "Indonesia" (realm of the Indian Islands) to all the islands of the region, including the Philippine Islands, Formosa, British Malaya, and Madagascar, as well as the Dutch East Indies.' But J. R. Logan, in his article 'The Ethnology of Indonesia,' in the *Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia*, vol. iv (1850) p. 343, says: 'The Indian Archipelago must remain, but the shorter form Indonesia may be usefully employed on several occasions.' The *Oxford English Dictionary*'s first reference to 'Indonesian' is from *Nature* (1881). A. Bastian's use of the term is in the form, *Indonesien oder die Inseln des Malayschen Archipel* (Berlin, 1884), and he almost certainly got the term from Logan, or Logan's copiers. An article (in Chinese), 'Explanation of the Term "Indonesia" ', by Lin Hui-hsiang, *Journal of the South Seas Society*, vol. iv, pt. i (March 1947) p. 18, ascribes the original use of the word to Logan, and it was, indeed, this article which prompted me to the investigations here summarized.

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101 British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines collectively. Will the in-
103 ventors of names turn their minds to it? For my part, I offer for considera-
tion the name INDOSINESIA.

Spelling is often more fluid even than place-names. It has varied astonishingly in European works in the last century. (Who, for example, would recognize Kabaw (the valley near the Chindwin river bordering on Manipur) as Kubo, or Mengoon as Ming'un?)

Wishing as far as possible to follow authority in nomenclature and spelling, I ascertained the general policy of the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names. This committee accepts the official forms of all foreign names which are written in the Roman alphabet, but with all the diacritical marks in use in the foreign alphabets. (This last usage I have not attempted to adopt.) Names officially written in other alphabets are transliterated according to established tables. Any names officially written in non-alphabetical script are transcribed by the committee according to established systems.

As regards transliteration and transcription there is, apparently, a large measure of Anglo-American agreement. During the last two hundred years a conventional Roman alphabet has developed until now, under the name of the R.G.S. II alphabet, it is used by the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names, the United States Board on Geographical Names, the Canadian Board on Geographical Names, and the corresponding New Zealand Board. During the war the British and American staffs agreed to use the modernized Hepburn system (Romaji) for Japanese, the modified Wade system (later Giles (H.A.) as modified by Lionel Giles), and the General System of the Siamese Royal Institute. The Permanent Committee issues a number of publications giving guidance in the matter. Generally speaking (the secretary of the committee states), we should be safe in accepting the official map of a foreign country provided that we know that it is accepted in most of the country's departments of government, and provided that the latest edition is available to us. This is the procedure I have endeavoured as far as possible to follow, but I have made some exceptions in deference to common usage.

So far so good, but there remain many problems still to be solved. There is, for example, no international, or even national, agreement on the spelling of 'Southeast Asia'. In this name Southeast is variously written South East, South-East, Southeast, South-east, and even southeast or south-east. The British Admiralty continues to use the hyphen and has issued sailing directions for 'South-East Alaska' and for the 'North-East Coast of Siberia'. SEAC, on the other hand, referred to itself as the 'South East Asia Command'. American usage favours Southeast Asia and this form, pending international agreement on the subject, I have decided to adopt throughout. I have also, following contemporary French diplomatic usage, adopted 'Indochina' (Indo-China should be reserved for the whole peninsula) and also (with less certain authority) 'Cochinchina' and 'Vietnam'. But in the last case I have omitted both the circumflex and the hyphen used by Viêt-Nam.

A special difficulty arising in the course of this work has been that many

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

of the authorities quoted or followed use obsolete forms of place or personal names (e.g. Sooloo for Sulu; Theebaw for Thibaw). I have usually (but not invariably) retained the spelling of the original in quotations and often, in order not to lose contemporary colour, in the ordinary text, but where necessary the modern form has been inserted in brackets. 101 103

In the romanization of Chinese names (other than place-names in China) I have allowed myself some latitude. For example, I have dispensed with the circumflex in Chêng Ho, though I have kept the sign over the 'u' in citing the *Tsŭ Erh Chih* of Sir Francis Wade. I have also used diacritical marks in certain Vietnamese proper names. The personal names of Chinese have been hyphenated as a general rule (e.g. Chiang Kai-shek); but if I have lapsed occasionally into Tan Kah Kee, &c., it is because I have seen it spelt thus for a whole generation. Moreover, many Chinese prefer to romanize their names in their own way. I have, in fact, followed diplomacy and convenience rather than consistency. In the case of romanization of Chinese dialect forms I have relied mainly on my own knowledge. 104

The names of Siamese persons offer a special difficulty. Luang Pradist and Pibul Songkram have half a dozen romanized forms as well as alternative names which conceal their identity from the ordinary European reader. (I have endeavoured to ascertain official Siamese usage, but there has been inconsistency in the replies.)

Throughout I have endeavoured to follow the rule of universal good manners—to call a country or a person what they prefer to call themselves. Because of ever-changing usage this is not always easy. Moreover, national, racial, or regional sensitiveness is such that to defer to it one would often have to sacrifice accuracy. For example, it has been suggested to me that I should eliminate the word 'China' in such combinations as 'Kapitan China' for the reason that it is obnoxious to the Chinese, especially in Indonesia, where the Japanese during the occupation represented it by Sino-Japanese characters of derogatory meaning. But in this instance I could not sacrifice historical fact to contemporary resentment. 103 104

The long and the short of it is that after a manful attempt to be logical and consistent I have given up the struggle. Having made a ruling, I found myself reversing it half-way through, and sometimes being reconverted to my original position later on in the book! The result is that the survey is bristling with inconsistencies. In my disgust I feel very much as T. E. Lawrence did when in the preface to *Seven Pillars* he wrote, 'I spell my names anyhow, to show what rot the systems are'.

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

Chapter One

THE NATURAL LANDSCAPE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

101 SOUTHEAST ASIA is a term which became popular during the Far
131 Eastern War 1941-45, to describe those territories of Eastern Asia
103 which lie south of the Tropic of Cancer (Burma, Siam, Indochina and Malaya) and the nearby islands spreading eastwards from the Asiatic continent towards New Guinea. The archipelago section merges eastwards into island groups of the West-Central Pacific, for which reason New Guinea itself may best be considered outside the definition "Southeast Asia," an exclusion justified (*a*) by its closer physical association with the Australian Continent, (*b*) by its sparse population of distinctive anthropological type now found principally in Australia, and (*c*) by the close affinities of its flora and fauna with those of Australia. The northern limit of Southeast Asia extends beyond the Tropic of Cancer to include Upper Burma on the western side, and withdraws south of the tropic to the political boundaries of Siam and Indochina farther east. By this definition, "Southeast Asia" and its off-lying islands sprawl asymmetrically across the Equator and cover a zone not far short of 1,500 miles in radius from a point off the mouth of the Mekong, an area comparable to all Europe and its seas north of the African coast. Thus isolation by great distances, as well as by physical obstructions, is a constant factor in the geographical relation between the various parts of Southeast Asia.

133 In Southeast Asia, that which forms its core and constitutes the geological link between its chief parts is the Sunda Platform, the southernmost continental block of Asia, whose integrity as a land mass has continued, with only minor tectonic disturbances on its fringes, through such long geological periods that it may be compared with those other "permanent" massifs, the Deccan, the Arabian Block and the Laurentian Shield. It is this physical feature which underlies Borneo, Eastern Sumatra, Northern Java and Malaya.

A somewhat similar platform is the common physiographic basis of Australia and New Guinea, forming what is known as the Sahul Shelf, to the east of the East Indian Archipelago.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

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1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

Chapter I

FROM HUNTING AND GATHERING TO AGRICULTURE

Hunting and Gathering

101 In Southeastern Asia today there are peoples of different cultural levels
174 carrying on some of the major economies that man has developed in the
course of time. The first people to invade the tropical forest regions around
222 the South China Sea were alithic, or prepalaeolithic, food gatherers,[1] who
105 obtained their food by collecting edible wild plants and by hunting and fishing. Today geographically separated peoples are still living in a prepalaeolithic or palaeolithic food-gathering and hunting stage.[2] In Southeastern Asia they are represented by the Semang of the Malay Peninsula, the Andaman Islanders, and the Aeta of the Philippines—all of whom are Negritos, or dwarfed Negroids—the Kubu of Sumatra, the Sakai of the Malay Peninsula, the Toala of Celebes,[3] and the Punan of Borneo.[4]

222 The degree to which collecting, hunting, or fishing contributes to the
462 food supply varies with the season; it also varies with different peoples,
105 depending upon the resources of the region, the type of equipment the people may possess, and the skills they may have acquired. Food-gathering and hunting peoples have a division of labor under which the men hunt while the women and children gather vegetable matter and catch insects and small animals. The men may lend a helping hand, however, in digging up some of the very deep-growing yams. Men will also participate in the
621 picking of fruits, especially when it is necessary to climb tall trees. The food gatherers and hunters of Southeastern Asia are nomadic in the sense that they do not remain long in one place. However, they do not wander aimlessly through the jungle. Each group has its definite territory—among

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Note: The titles of the works here cited in footnotes have been abbreviated, whenever possible. The full titles may be found in the Bibliography, p. 269 ff.

1 Nippold (Rassen- und Kulturgeschichte der Negrito-Völker, 1936, pp. 253–255 and 398–400) considers the alithic wood culture of the Negritos of Southeastern Asia to be older than palaeolithic culture. These people use wood rather than stone as raw material for their tools. Because of the perishable nature of wood, archaeologists and prehistorians have not yet been able, so far as I know, to go farther back than the palaeolithic age and therefore have not been able to confirm the hypothesis of an alithic age. Menghin (Weltgeschichte der Steinzeit, 1931, p. 91) believes that, from an archaeological point of view, an alithic wood culture may be regarded only as a possibility, but Kern (Die Anfänge der Weltgeschichte, 1933, p. 35), who compared pygmy culture with palaeolithic cultures, comes to the conclusion that alithic wood cultures probably preceded palaeolithic culture.

2 By divesting the word "palaeolithic" of its specific chronological connotation the term may be used for present-day peoples who have a food-gathering and hunting culture.

3 The racial affinities of the Kubu, the Sakai, and the Toala are not clear; by some they are called Veddoids, by others, Australoids.

4 They are considered to be Proto-Malays.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

During untold centuries in which they collected plant matter, women acquired an intimate knowledge of vegetable life. Eduard Hahn and others have therefore reasoned that women were the inventors of the cultivation of plants and hence were the first food producers. Hahn has given the name *Hackbau* (hoe culture or hoe tillage) to primitive cultivation, and maintains that the hoe is woman's implement; he draws a sharp distinction between Hackbau and more advanced cultivation, which he calls *Pflugbau* (plow culture or plow tillage) and ascribes to men.[9] It is indeed true that men generally farm with plows and that many examples may be cited of women using hoes; nevertheless, there are so many instances of male primitive cultivators employing hoes or similar instruments that Hahn's classification should be modified. While there seems to be no reason for abandoning his theory of the invention of plant cultivation by women, the classification of cultivation by tools, such as the hoe and the plow, ascribed to one sex or the other, is unsatisfactory. For, in spite of the fact that the collection of vegetable matter is almost exclusively the woman's task in the gathering economy, among primitive cultivators men either assist women in the cultivation of plants or entirely take over this activity whenever hunting or fishing become less important than soil tillage. Furthermore, many primitive cultivators do not use the hoe, but continue to employ the digging stick, characteristically used by the food-gathering women. From Formosa southward throughout the Malay Archipelago, as well as on the mainland of Southeastern Asia, the digging stick, also known as the dibble stick or planting stick, is frequently used by the primitive cultivator. On the other hand, there are advanced cultivators who till their land intensively with hoes; they use manure, rotate their crops, terrace fields that lie on slopes, and practice irrigation, yet they do not use plows drawn by draft animals (however, in some instances they have livestock). In other words, advanced agriculture does not depend upon the animal-drawn plow nor does primitive agriculture depend upon the hoe.

A more fundamental distinction between primitive and advanced agriculture may be made in terms of land use rather than of tools. Primitive cultivators, with the possible exception of those living in arid regions, raise one or two crops on a given plot of land, then abandon the plot and make a new field, preferably in the forest, so that the old plot lies fallow sometimes for many years and may itself revert to forest; in short, primitive cultivators shift the place of their agricultural activities with regularity. The crop land consists of small patches scattered throughout the forest; these patches are extremely ragged in appearance and do not look at all like fields. A primitive cultivator would never think of removing stumps and fallen trees; instead, he deliberately raises his crop among them. This kind of cultivation is best described as shifting-field, or shift-

[9] Hahn: Das Alter der wirtschaftlichen Kultur, 1905; idem: Die Entstehung der Pflugkultur, 1909; idem: Von der Hacke zum Pflug, 1914; Kolff: "Hahn's hypothese," 1926, pp. 884–907.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

taro had been cultivated on permanent flooded fields earlier than had rice. Another possibility would be that taro, together with the technique of irrigation, was introduced into Oceania later than were the yams and alocasia, and the Polynesians' more important fruit trees.

A folktale of the Bontocs in the mountains of northern Luzon furnishes us with another clue. According to Bontoc lore, their hero, Lumauig, taught them agriculture in a tiny irrigated garden, which is still tended from generation to generation by a special priest. The crop of this garden is taro and not rice.[15] This would seem to lend support not only to the thesis that the cultivation of root crops preceded that of grain but also to the thesis that terracing and irrigation were already being practiced by cultivators of root crops.

A beautiful example of sedentary cultivation with root crops as a staple has recently been discovered in the remote Grand Valley of the Balim River in the highlands of Netherlands New Guinea. On the valley floor of the Balim and its tributaries neolithic people practice intensive cultivation, including such techniques as the use of green and animal manure, deep tillage with stone adzes, the digging of ditches to improve the run-off and drainage of swampy land, and the construction of terraces.[16] On the slopes they practice shifting cultivation. In both their shifting and their sedentary agriculture the staple crop is the sweet potato, while taro is a secondary crop. Also subsidiary are bananas, sugar cane, and pandanus.

In most parts of Southeastern Asia, however, root crops have been replaced by such cereals as millet, Job's tears, upland and lowland rice,[17] and maize. There seem to be good reasons to believe that the first cereals cultivated in Southeastern Asia under the system of shifting cultivation were foxtail, also known as Italian millet (*Setaria italica* Beauv.), and Job's tears (*Coix lacryma-jobi* L.). Before their domestication these grasses, like the root crops and fruit trees of Southeastern Asia, had been used by alithic and palaeolithic hunting and gathering people. Shifting cultivators succeeded in domesticating these plants by selecting over the course of years the species most valuable to them. Although foxtail and Job's tears have largely been replaced by the more valuable grains, rice and maize, there are still shifting cultivators in India, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya, the Indies, and the Philippines who raise the former cereals. Burkill says of foxtail,

> Such a crop as this probably came into cultivation before man had settled enough to grow the better cereals. Its grain ripens in even as little as two months and a half from sowing, and the wandering tribes of the Malay forests are able to remain in one neighbourhood long enough to catch a crop: but the usual duration of the crop seems to be four months.[18]

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15 Keesing and Keesing: Taming Philippine Headhunters, 1934, p. 56.

16 Brass: "Stone Age Agriculture in New Guinea," 1941, pp. 555–569.

17 Upland rice is also known as hill, mountain, dry-land, or dry, rice; lowland rice is also known as irrigated, wet-land, or wet, rice.

18 Burkill: *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 1999.

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

Chapter Twenty-five

PEOPLES, POLITICS AND PROSPECTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

101 THE setting of Southeast Asia may be summed up as one of
184 extremes of relief (deltaic plains and mountains) and a climate
36 mostly approaching the wet limit for plant life but merging into
105 monsoonal types. To this setting the people have made varying responses, ranging from migrant food gatherers and hunters in the jungles, to subsistence farmers in the plains, but all turning upon woody materials for weapons, implements, house-structures and domestic utensils, upon rice, the cereal of the wet extreme, and upon social systems of communal help. The whole social and economic life has been galvanised over the past century or two by being more and more drawn into commercial and industrial activities developed in response to and on the basis of external needs for the minerals and agricultural products of Southeast Asia, whereas prior to that time the region was touched only by a trickle of traders moving between India and China.

FACTORS IN THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY

174 Several factors account for the difficulty of obtaining firm data
177 to fill in our general picture of the historical geography of South-
311 east Asia. In the first place, there grew up no strong literary tradi-
175 tion to last through the centuries and record the past in a form other than mythical. Here tradition is largely oral and literature essentially Indian rather than indigenous. And whatever there was of local record and history has rotted away quickly, the climate, the ants, insects and moulds soon destroying anything on wood, paper, leather or cloth. Moreover, in this setting of swamps and forest, the most easily available material is wood, and artistic tradition expressed in wood, whether in carvings, buildings or tools, rapidly disintegrates, leaving little of that sort of evidence which is the basis of our facts about early periods in other regions. Buildings and carvings on stone were not normal expressions of Southeast Asia people where over large areas stone is not easily come by and where

1: Pelzer, Karl J. Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics: Studies in Land Utilization and Agricultural Colonization in Southeast Asia. New York: The Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945.

Pp. xviii, 290, 172 illustrations, 47 tables, bibliography; appendices; index.

HRAF copy

/In Part I, "Land Use", Pelzer describes the manner in which the indigenous populations make use of the land for food production, using the conventional terms "hunting and gathering", "shifting cultivation", and sedentary cultivation". In Part II, "Agricultural Colonization in the Philippines and the Netherlands Indies", Pelzer describes the plantation systems introduced by the Dutch, Spanish, and Americans, which existed side-by-side with the native agriculture. Pelzer then describes the process of the native's becoming land-less, of the economy of these colonies changing to one based on money, and the resulting tenancy. The several re-settlement plans which were instituted by the colonial governments, and the subsequent results are discussed in detail. Appendices A, B, and C are additional

111 --2 ALl Southeast Asia

1: Pelzer

notes and statistics on the land settlement programs which were in progress before World War II. Chs. IV-V have been processed for Philippines OAl, and Chs. VI-VII, for Indonesia OBl--Analyst/

Field date: 1940-41
Analyst: W. Carr.

Evaluation: Social Scientist-5
Processed in 1956

2: Purcell, Victor. The Chinese in Southeast Asia. London: Oxford University Press, 1951.

Pp. xxxvii, 801; note on nomenclature and spelling; abbreviations and notes; 5 appendices; postscript; list of authorities /bibliography/; index; 2 end maps.

HRAF copy.

/This source is a comprehensive account of the Chinese minority in Southeast Asia by a recognized authority on the subject. It contains much historical material and close attention must be paid to the time periods dealt with in the text. The book includes data on demography, the immigration and distribution of the Chinese; economy; government of the several Southeast Asian countries and the relationship of the Chinese to the national contexts; and the socio-cultural position of the Chinese. The appendices include notes on Chinese dialects, Chinese boats, and the Indians in Southeast Asia. The source is divided into 8 main parts which have been processed as follows: Part I (pp. 1-53) has been filed in AL1 Southeast Asia. Part II (pp. 55-101) has been filed in AP1 Burma. Part III (pp. 103-208) has been filed in AO1 Thailand. Part IV (pp. 209-268) has been filed in AM1 Indochina. Part V (pp. 269-414) has been filed in AN1 Malaya. Part VI

2: Purcell, Victor.

(pp. 415-439) has been filed in OC4 British Borneo. Part VII (pp. 441-568) has been filed in OB1 Indonesia. Part VIII (pp. 569-655) has been filed in OA1 Philippines. The conclusion, appendices, and postscript have been marked for AF1 China as well as the Southeast Asia file already cited. The complete text will be found in category 116 of the AL1 Southeast Asia file. --Analyst/

Field date: none
Analysts: W.K. Carr, M. Coughlin, B.P. Emerson, M. Lechter, F.K. Lehman, W.W. Stein, G.S. Vescelius.

Evaluation: Government Official-4
Processed in 1956

111 ALl Southeast Asia

4: Cady, John F., Patricia C. Barnett, and Shirley Jenkins. The Development of Self-Rule and Independence in Burma, Malaya, and The Philippines: An interim report in a study of progress toward self-government and independence in Southeast Asia. New York. American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948.

Pp. iv, 104.

Yale: Ota51+948a copy 2

/"The present volume dealing with Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines provides a useful comparative sketch of the policies followed by the British and American Governments in fostering the development of self-government and independence under markedly differing conditions. The three essays do not claim to be comprehensive inquiries into the political development of the three areas, but it is hoped that they will serve a useful purpose in providing a concise comparative survey of the main lines of policy followed in three areas where the development of self-rule has proceeded in a more peaceful and orderly fashion than in such areas as Indochina and Indonesia." Part I will be found in the Burma APl file, Part II in Malaya ANl, and Part III in Philippines OAl. .---Analyst/

Field date: none
Analysts: F.K. Lehman, B. Emerson, and G.S. Vescelius

Evaluation: Historian and Social Scientist-4
Processed in 1955

111 AL1 Southeast Asia

5: Dobby, E. H. G. Southeast Asia. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1950.

Pp. 415; 118 text figures; bibliography; index; end paper maps.

HRAF copy

Omitted from Files: end paper maps

/The author, a professor of geography in the University of Malaya, gives a detailed and exact account of the topography, vegetation, climate, food resources, soil types and fertilities, population distribution, agricultural practices, and the industrialized processing of raw materials in both a general fashion for the area of Southeast Asia as a unit, and in a specific fashion for each of the several political districts. Chapters 19 and 20, on Indochina, have been processed as 66: Dobby, AM1 Indochina. Chs. 6-8 have been processed for Malaya AN1; Chs. 9-11, for Burma AP1; Chs. 12-16, for Indonesia OB1; Chs. 17-18, for Thailand AO1; and Ch. 21, for Philippines OA1--Analyst./

Field date: none
Analyst: W. Carr

Evaluation: Geographer-4
Processed in 1956

111 ALl Southeast Asia

6: Fisher, Charles A. The Concept of South-East Asia. Eastern World, Vol. VII, pp. 12-14. London: Eastern World Ltd., 1953.

Yale: Bjla Ea7 7

[The term "South-East Asia" is defined here from the geographical, economic, ethnological, political, and historical view-point. The concepts correspond generally with those applied by HRAF to the ALl Southeast Asia file. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: W. Carr

Evaluation: Unknown--3
Processed in 1956

7: Furnivall, J. S. Colonial Policy and Practice, A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India. Cambridge, England: The Cambridge University Press, 1948.

Pp. xiii, 568; 2 appendices; list of references; 1 map.
Yale: Oyb24 948f

[This is a very comprehensive and well documented study of political, economic and social developments in Burma under British rule and in Netherlands India under Dutch rule. The larger part of the source consists of the author's analysis of the differences in theory and practice between the British and Dutch colonial administrations and their impact on native culture and economy. This impact is evaluated in specific areas such as land and labor, health and education, welfare and autonomy. The final section indicates the directions which the author believes economic, social and political reintegration must take to prepare the tropical dependencies for self-rule. There is throughout the source considerable ideological discussion and analysis leading toward a general theory of colonial policy and administration. Supplementary references are made in the discussion to colonial rule in Malaya, Siam, Cochin China, Africa and British India. The author spent more than 20 years in Burma in the Civil Service and in business and educational activities. He has had the assistance of Dutch and Indonesian authorities in his study of Netherlands India, has visited

7: Furnivall, J. S.

Malaya, Siam and Cochin China and has personal acquaintance with administration in British India. The sections on Burma and Netherlands India respectively have been categorized for the Burma and Indonesia files only. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Beverly Calsoyas

Evaluation: Government Official-4, 5
Processed in 1956

111 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

8: Furnivall, J. S. Educational Progress in Southeast Asia. New York: The Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943.

Pp. xiv, 186

Yale: Lav 943f

[The educational systems of each of the Southeast Asia countries are presented for the time period "pre-European contact to 1941." However, the educational systems and methods are discussed in terms of the several governments which existed during that period, in as much as the "purpose" of education varied with government policy. Furnivall also demonstrates the effect of the policies of the colonial governments in terms of the social unrest of the 1930's. Bruno Lasker supplements this with a discussion entitled "Training for Native Self-Rule" in an attempt to predict post-World War II "problems", and "solutions". Documentation is by textual footnotes. Due to the diverse nature of the material, this source has been marked only for the categories 871 and 177 of the Southeast Asia ALl file. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: W. Carr

Evaluation: Government Official--4
Processed in 1956

9: Christian, John L. Anglo-French Rivalry in Southeast Asia: Its Historical Geography and Diplomatic Climate. The Geographical Review, Vol. XXXI, pp. 272-82. New York: The American Geographical Society, 1941.

1 map

Yale: E10 G132 v. 31

[Christian describes the Anglo-French rivalry over trade routes, and other commercially important areas in peninsular Southeast Asia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In so doing, he also describes many of the trade and transportation routes, with their advantages and shortcomings. It is because of this second aspect that the article has been selected - the geographical features mentioned still obtain. The author served as principal of the Meiktila Technical School in Burma for eight years during the 1930's. He has written many articles on the history of Burma, (see Pacific Affairs, June 1940). ----Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: W. Carr

Evaluation: Foreign Resident, Historian--3
Processed in 1956

10: Thompson, Virginia. Labor Problems in Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947.

P Pp. xix, 283; index.

Yale: Ndv96 947t

/This is a careful and detailed presentation of the labor situation in Southeast Asia by one well acquainted with the politics and history of the area. It is based on a study of existing records and publications and visits to the countries in question. The author discusses the situation as regards labor in the area in general and then that of each of the countries in particular: Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Indochina, and Siam, including in each case postwar developments. She adds as a supplement notes gleaned from a visit to the area in 1946-47. For each country she takes up the general labor situation, types of labor, immigrant labor, labor legislation and conditions, and labor organization. This is one of the few studies of its kind available to date and provides useful information on many problems related to labor. --Analyst/

Field date: no date
Analyst: Margaret Coughlin

Evaluation: Social Scientist-4
Processed in 1956

111 ALl Southeast Asia

11: Kynnersley, C. W. Sneyd. A Description of the Chinese Lottery Known As Hua-Hoey. Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, No. 16, December 1885, pp. 203-46. Singapore, 1886.

Yale: Fd12 R825 v. 15-16.

[Hua-Hoey is a form of lottery known in China from at least the time of the second Han dynasty (ca. 25-200). The game is based on thirty-six mythical personages, and involves dream interpretation. The author states that Hua-Hoey is played "wherever the Chinese settle", and therefore it is assumed that this text applies to the entire Southeast Asia area. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: W. Carr

Evaluation: Unknown--3
Processed in 1956

12: Sherborn, C. Davies. A Bibliography of Malaya, From January, 1888, To June, 1890. Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Number 22, December 1890, pp. 349-428.

Yale: Fd12 R825, v. 21-22.

["By 'Malaya' is here meant that part of the Archipelago enclosed in a line drawn round the North of Siam and the Philippines, through Macassar Strait between Lombok and Bali, round the outlying Islands of Java and Sumatra and to the East of Nicobar and Andaman Islands." This bibliography consists of some one-thousand entries of both books and articles, neither selected nor annotated, and most of the references are in Dutch. The subjects cover many aspects of the natural and social sciences, commerce, and travel accounts. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: W. Carr

Evaluation: Natural Scientist--4
Processed in 1956

13: Sebeok, Thomas A. The Languages of Southeastern Asia. The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. II, pp. 349-56. Ithaca: Far Eastern Association, 1943.

Yale: Bjl 52 2

[Sebeok lists the names of the several languages and/or dialects which exist, or have existed in the greater Southeast Asia area. He briefly notes the relationships where these are generally agreed upon, or points out the breaches in knowledge, where appropriate. This article is well documented with references to recent studies. ---Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: W.K. Carr

Evaluation: Linguist--3
Processed in 1956

14: Heine-Geldern, Robert. Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia. The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. II, pp. 15-30. Ithaca: Far Eastern Association, 1942.

Yale: Bjl 52 2

[In Southeast Asia, there has been a traditional practice of organizing the institution of kingship as an image, or replica of the universe, according to the cosmological system. Harmony between the empire and the universe is achieved by having the former approximate the latter. Heine-Geldern describes the relevant aspects of the religious and cosmological beliefs held in the area, and then demonstrates how the kings, the location and plan of the capital cities, and the many political machinations are related to these beliefs. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: W.K. Carr

Evaluation: Ethnologist--4
Processed in 1956

15: Adams, Inez. Rice Cultivation in Asia. American Anthropologist, Vol. 50, pp. 256-82. Menasha, Wisconsin: American Anthropological Association, 1948.

Yale: Nk10 Am37 II. 50

[This article is a review of the anthropological and botanical literature on rice cultivation in Asia generally, with the major portion dealing with the Southeast Asia area. The author begins by indicating the varied uses of the terms "wet", "dry", "lowland", etc. as applied to rice. She then reviews the technical botanical literature, and presents a classification of the several types of rice based on agronomic definitions. As this article deals with rice cultivation per se, there is little information on the attendant social and economic institutions. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: W. K. Carr

Evaluation: Ethnologist--4
Processed in 1956

16: Fryer, D. W. The "Million City" in Southeast Asia. The Geographical Review, Vol. XLIII, pp. 474-94. New York: The American Geographical Society, 1953.

5 figures.

Yale: E10. G132 43

[Mr. Fryer, a lecturer in economic geography in the University of Melbourne (Australia), makes some general characterizations about the cities in Southeast Asia. The location, plan, and population of each of the major cities have attributes in common which set them apart from those of the West. A brief historical sketch is given for each of the five cities of the area with a population of at least one million. The economic significance of these larger cities, both to the countries to which they belong and to international trade, is discussed. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: W. K. Carr

Evaluation: Geographer --3
Processed in 1956

111 ALl Southeast Asia

17: Ginsburg, Norton S. The Great City in Southeast Asia. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LX, pp. 455-62. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955.

Yale: Nml0 Am37 60

[The purpose of this brief article is to demonstrate that several generalizations may be made concerning urbanization in Southeast Asia. With two minor exceptions, there is one great metropolis in each of the countries of the region. The location, populations, and sociological roles of these cities are reviewed in such a way as to demonstrate common characteristics. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: W. Carr

Evaluation: Sociologist--4
Processed in 1956

111 A L1 Southeast Asia

18: Firth, Raymond. The Peasantry of South East Asia. International Affairs. Vol. XXVI, pp. 503-14. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950.

Yale: Oz10 B77e 26

[A peasant is defined here as "a countryman - a man engaged in rural pursuits, primarily agriculture, with a comparatively simple technology and a special interest in the land he works." Firth relates the peasant economy of Southeast Asia to the economic institutions of colonialism, and to the Chinese merchant-middleman. The economic conflicts caused by Islamic diet restrictions are also discussed. The peasantry of Southeast Asia is an ethnic class and economic entity which exists within a larger social frame. Firth demonstrates the mutual effects of the larger and smaller units, as well as the aspects in which the two exist separately. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: W.K. Carr

Evaluation: Ethnologist--4
Processed in 1956

19: Sneath, P.H.A. Anthropological Blood-Grouping in South-East Asia. Man, Vol. LIV, p. 28. London: The Royal Anthropological Institute, 1954

Yale: Nk 10+ M31 54 [HRAF pages 1-3]

["Four aboriginal tribes in Malaya and Borneo were studied in association with Dr. I. Polunin of the University of Malaya, as part of the program of anthropological blood-grouping organized by Dr. A.E. Mourant. Blood samples were collected from the settlements and were tested for the ABO, MNS, Rhesus, P, Lutheran, Kell and Duffy groups and for the sickle-cell trait. Specimens of saliva were also tested for ABH secretion. The more important results are summarized in the table, in which the salient blood-group features of the main racial types of man are noted for comparison. About 100 samples from each tribe were tested." The four groups referred to are the Negritos of Malaya, the Malayan Senoi, the aboriginal Malays, and the Land Dayaks of Borneo. The text has been retyped from the original for technical reasons. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: W. Carr

Evaluation: Unknown--4
Processed in 1955

20: Sherborn, C. Davies. A Bibliography of Malaya, From July, 1891, to June, 1892. Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Number 26, pp. 219-66, Singapore, 1894.
Yale: Fd12 R825 v. 25-27.

/"By 'Malaya' is here meant that part of the Archipelago enclosed in a line drawn round the north of Siam and the Philippines, through Macassar Strait, between Lombok and Bali, round the outlying islands of Java and Sumatra, and the east of Nicobar and Andaman Islands." This bibliography consists of about seven-hundred entries of both books and articles, neither selected nor annotated. Most of the references are in Dutch. The titles cover the natural and social sciences, commerce, and travel accounts. On page 263, there is a listing of maps, and "books published in the vernacular". For additional bibliographies of this series, see 12, 21, and 22: Sherborn, AL1 Southeast Asia. --Analyst/

Field date: none
Analyst: W. Carr

Evaluation: Natural Scientist--3
Processed in 1956

21: Sherborn, C. Davies. A Bibliography of Malaya, From June, 1892, to July, 1893. Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Number 27, pp. 135-75, Singapore, 1894.

Yale: Fd12 R825 v. 25-27.

/"By 'Malaya' is here meant that part of the Archipelago enclosed in a line drawn round the north of Siam and the Philippines, through Macassar Strait, between Lombok and Bali, round the outlying islands of Java and Sumatra, and the east of Nicobar and Andaman Islands." This bibliography consists of about six-hundred entries of both books and articles, neither selected nor annotated. Most of the references are in Dutch. The titles cover the natural and social sciences, commerce, and travel accounts. On page 173, there is a listing of maps. For additional bibliographies of this series, see 12, 20, and 22: Sherborn, AL1 Southeast Asia. --Analyst/

Field date: none
Analyst: W. Carr

Evaluation: Natural Scientist--3
Processed in 1956

22: Sherborn, C. Davies. A Bibliography of Malaya, From July, 1893, to June, 1894. Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Number 29, pp. 33-74, Singapore, 1896.

Yale: Fd12 R825 v. 28-30.

["By 'Malaya' is here meant that part of the Archipelago enclosed in a line drawn round the north of Siam and the Philippines, through Macassar Strait, between Lombok and Bali, round the outlying islands of Java and Sumatra, and the east of Nicobar and Andaman Islands." This bibliography consists of about six-hundred entries of both books and articles, neither selected nor annotated. Most of the references are in Dutch. The titles cover the natural and social sciences, commerce, and travel accounts. On page 69, there is a listing of maps. For additional bibliographies of this series, see 12, 20, and 21: Sherborn, ALl Southeast Asia. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: W. Carr

Evaluation: Natural Scientis-3
Processed in 1956

23: Benedict, Paul K. Kinship in Southeastern Asia. Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1941.

Pp. x, 526; abbreviations of titles, linguistic map; bibliography.

Peabody Museum, Harvard University AS B434 k case 8

/The Sino-Tibetan kinship systems which are presented here were reconstructed on the basis of a phonological and semantic analysis of the Karen, Chinese, and Thai languages. The material in Section A has been arranged in such a way that the linguistic and kinship systems of the several societies under discussion follow a geographical distribution which begins with the important Tibetan group and its aberrant dialects, and then proceeds to the south to the sub-Himalayan area, from west to east, ending with the Ao group in northern Assam. The main divisions and approximate positions of some of the key languages are indicated on the language list and map on pages 10A and 10B. This list includes only those languages for which kinship material is given. In view of the peculiar linguistic position occupied by Thai, the kinship terminologies of the several Thai languages have been omitted. Section B is devoted to a discussion of kinship terminology found in Karen and in "ancient Chinese." This source has been marked almost entirely for categories 197 and 601. The text contains much ethnography, but as it is sporadically interwoven between

23: Benedict, Paul K.

linguistics and kinship terminology, no attempt was made to keep it separate.

Benedict, an anthropologist and physician, became interested in doing this linguistic reconstruction of kinship systems while engaged in investigations on the phonological systems of the Tibeto-Burman languages during his association with a Work Projects Administration Project in Berkely, California, from 1937 to 1940. The author is presently the Chief Psychiatrist and Director of the Diagnostic Center, Department of Correction of the City of New York.

The text has been processed for the following files: INTRODUCTION and SECTION A, Chapter 1 - Southeast Asia AL1; Chapters 2, 3, and 4 - Nepal AK1; Chapter 5 - Lepcha AK5; Chapter 6 - Miri AR11, Mishmi AR12, and Kachari AR6; Chapters 7 and 8 - Kachin AP6; Chapter 9 - Burmese AP4; Chapter 10 - Naga AR13; Chapter 11 - Garo AR5, and Kachari AR6; Chapter 12 - Mikir AR10; Chapter 13 - Meithei AR9; Chapter 14 - Chittagong AR4; Chapter 15 - Kuki-Lushai AR8; Chapter 16 - Naga AR13; Chapter 17 - Southeast Asia AL1 and Sino-Tibetan Border Peoples AE3; SECTION B, Chapter 1 - Sino-Tibetan Border Peoples AE3, Karen AP7, and Shan-Thai AL3; Chapter 2 - Karen AP7; and Chapter 3 - Sino-Tibetan Border Peoples AE3. For specific pages, see Table of

111

ALl Southeast Asia--3

23: Benedict, Paul K.

Contents, category 116. There is a bibliography at the end of each chapter--Analyst/

Field date: none
Analyst: W. Carr

Evaluation: Ethnologist-5
Processed in 1956

113, 241, 171 Southeast Asia AL1

[For comparison of systems of land tenure in Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Sumatra, Java, Borneo and of the hill tribes of India with that of Malaya, see Source 58: Maxwell, pp. 82-89, category 116, AN1 Malaya. --Analyst]

113, 648, 721, 175, 563 Southeast Asia AL1

[For information on the history of the distribution of peoples and political entities in Southeast Asia, and for the history of relations amongst the states of Southeast Asia and the relations between the French in Indochina and the states of Southeast Asia, see 115: Le Boulanger, AM1, Indochina, category, 116. --Analyst]

113, 563, 575 Southeast Asia AL1

[For information on the origin of the Thien-Ti-Hui Society and the traditional happenings on which the ceremonies are based, see 39: Pickering, AN1 Malaya, category 116.--Analyst]

113, 563, 575 Southeast Asia AL1

[For information on the initiation ceremony and meeting house of the Ghee Hin Society in Singapore, see 41: Pickering, AN1 Malaya, Cat. 116. --Analyst]

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ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTES

113 *BEFEO* = *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient*
JASB = *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*
JBRS = *Journal of the Burma Research Society*
JRAS = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*
JRASSB = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Straits Branch*
JRASMB = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Malayan Branch*
JRASNCB = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, North China Branch*
JRGS = *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*

The *Journal of the Indian Archipelago* is sometimes referred to as *Logan's Journal*.

128 CURRENCY

435 The Spanish dollar varied in value, according to the price of silver, between 3*s*. 6*d*. and 4*s*. 6*d*. 4*s*. can be taken as a mean.

436 The rupee = 1*s*. 6*d*. sterling. On 1 April 1947 the currency of Burma ceased to be linked to that of India.

In 1906 the Straits Settlements dollar was fixed at 2*s*. 4*d*. The Straits Settlements dollar was later replaced by the Malayan dollar with the same value, but the sign SS$ is still sometimes used for convenience. M$ is now usual.

At parity there are 11 Siamese bahts (ticals) to the pound sterling.

The official buying rate of the Indochinese piastre in 1949 was 12·55 to the United States dollar.

The official rate of exchange for the guilder (Indonesia) is 10·691 guilders = one pound sterling.

The peso (Philippines) = 50 United States cents.

804 WEIGHTS

128 One picul = 133⅓ lb.[1]
One catty (kati) = 1⅓ lb.
One tahil (tael) = 1⅓ oz.

MEASURES

1 hectare = 2·471 acres.
1 mow = ⅙ of an acre.
1 orlong = (about) ⅔ of an acre.

[1] But the *Statesman's Year-Book* (to which reference should be made for up-to-date information regarding currency, weights and measures, &c.) states that in the Netherlands East Indies 1 picul = 136·16 lb. avoirdupois.

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From a superficial examination of the Chinese provincial and district histories (copies of which are in the British Museum and the Library of Congress), the author is of the opinion that a great deal of material useful for the study of the overseas Chinese is available therein.

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A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MALAYA,*

FROM JANUARY, 1888, TO JUNE, 1890.

BY

C. DAVIES SHERBORN, F.Z.S., F.G.S.

IN compiling this Bibliography, all sources of information have been utilized. In inserting, therefore, every publication that has come under his notice, the compiler hopes that the entries will prove of considerable assistance; but, as a large proportion of the literature of this district, either never reaches England at all, or else arrives so long after as to be too late for examination for this purpose, he begs the reader's indulgence for any error that may be present. His thanks are are due to M. Martinus Nijhoff of The Hague for information as to some of the more recent books.

ABDOELLAH BIN ABDELKADIR MOENSJI.—Verhaal van de reis van Abdoellah naar Kalantan en van zijne reis naar Djeddah, in het Maleisch, voor de lithogr. pers geschreven en van aanteek. voorzien door *H. C. Klinkert.* 4to. *Leiden,* 1889, xii, 407 pp.

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* By "Malaya" is here meant that part of the Archipelago enclosed in a line drawn round the North of Siam and the Philippines, through Macassar Strait between Lombok and Bali, round the outlying Islands of Java and Sumatra and to the East of Nicobar and Andaman Islands.

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14: Heine-Geldern E-4 (no date) 1942 All Southeast Asia All

000 possibility of this same conception becoming the basis of future constructive developments. The question is difficult to answer. Orientals with western education, and above all the leaders of nationalist movements, tend to disregard and to despise the "superstitions" which governed their nations in the past. Yet, there is the vast mass of the common people, grown up in the old traditions, people to whom the modern ideas of democracy and representative government mean little or nothing and who cannot be educated overnight. A sudden complete break of cultural traditions has almost always proved disastrous to national and individual ethics and to the whole spirit of the peoples affected. A compromise between old and new conceptions therefore would seem desirable. Many, at least, of the outward expressions of the old ideas could easily be kept intact and gradually filled with new meaning, without in the least impairing educational and material progress. After all, the case of Japan shows that an idea decidedly more primitive than that of the cosmic state and less adaptable to ethical reinterpretation than the latter, the belief in the descent of the Mikado from the Sun Goddess (or at least the fiction of such belief) may very well survive and coexist with all the refinements of modern science and technique. The current problems of Southeast Asia hitherto have been discussed almost exclusively from the point of view of economics and of political science. It would be a grave mistake to disregard the importance of native culture and tradition for a future satisfactory reorganization of that region.

A FEW BOOKS AND ARTICLES PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT

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243 dung which is covered with grass and branches, then with fine dust, and on top of this with liquid manure. This preparation is made to ensure slow combustion. Then the whole field is fired in April or May, and is ready for sowing. The nursery is hastily plowed before the rains set in, and the seed is broadcast on it. If the monsoon rains hold off, the plot is irrigated. With regular rains, the plants are a foot high in two weeks. The main fields are prepared by several light plowings, and after they are flooded the seedlings are transplanted to them. The plant tops reach above the water, and their roots become established in about two weeks. The fields are drained occasionally and weeded, and by harvest time are drained completely dry.

Ethel Simkins,[142] in a geographical survey of rice cultivation on the coastal plains of south India, finds that on the western coasts rice is grown the year around, as it is in Java. This does not hold true for the Madras coast, though the spring rains there do allow an early-season crop to be cultivated. The west coast, having dependable rains, needs little irrigation, whereas a large percentage of the east coast is irrigated. In the deltas, rice is grown on "wet paddy" land. Where the fields are irrigated, three crops a year are sometimes grown The main crop relies on rains.

> The "lowland" varieties are always transplanted; the "upland" rice is sown broadcast . . . [it is] a poor and coarse-grained variety, usually grown unirrigated.[143]

Wickizer[144] likewise remarks great variety in Indian agricultural practice.

In Asia the descriptions of rice cultivation have been over-simplified in the literature. Actually no sharp division in agronomic practices exists between the more and the less sophisticated peoples. The transitions between the methods employing irrigation and dry farming are too numerous to justify the continued use of "wet" and "dry." Classifications according to habitat, as "upland," "lowland," "mountain," and "swamp" are useless because the plant adapts so readily to varied environments. In comparative work and historical reconstructions such terms alone are inadequate.

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[142] Simkins, 1933.
[143] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[144] Wickizer and Bennett, 1941.

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162 369 361 Standards for defining urban populations differ, but it can be assumed safely that no more than 15 per cent of the 175 million people of Southeast Asia belong in an urban category.[2] In contrast, in the United States, with a population somewhat smaller than that of Southeast Asia as a whole, over 64 per cent of the population is classified as urban.

Estimates for 1952 indicate only 30 cities or urban agglomerations with populations of 100,000 or more.[3] In the United States, however, there are 160 such urban areas; in the Soviet Union, with a population of 200 millions, there are about 120; and in Japan, with one-half the population of Southeast Asia, there are 64. In Southeast Asia only an estimated 7 per cent of the total population lives in cities of 100,000 or more; less in Burma, Indochina, Thailand, and Indonesia; somewhat more in the Philippines. Only Malaya, including Singapore, departs

[1] Revised from a paper read before the Far Eastern Association in Spring, 1954.

[121] As used here, "urbanization" connotes not only mere numerical increases in the population of cities but also the development of an urban way of life and the accompanying changes in value orientation (cf. Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1938).

[2] Census data for Southeast Asia are notably incomplete. In Burma, Thailand, and the Associated States of Indochina the "urban" population is estimated to be little more than 10 per cent of the whole; in Indonesia still less; but in the Philippines some 24 per cent of the population is classified as urban; and in Malaya, including the Crown Colony of Singapore, about 35 per cent. Without Singapore, only 27 per cent of the Malayan population is classified as urban.

[113] [3] *United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1952.*

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significantly from the norm, with 18 per cent of its population living in large urban clusters. In the United States, on the other hand, nearly 30 per cent of the population lives in such large cities.

Southeast Asia retains many characteristics of a frontier region, with large areas of sparse population, and so it seems paradoxical that its population density is 95 per square mile, as compared with 50 in the United States, 23 in the Soviet Union, and 617 in Japan. Clearly there is no single correlation between densities and urbanization. The explanation lies in the structure of the urban hierarchy within the region. Whereas in the United States there is a notable gradation of cities from larger to smaller, and only 18 per cent of the urban population lives in cities of one million population or more, in Southeast Asia the urban population is most clearly associated with the largest cities. For example, in Thailand, half of the urban population lives in one metropolis, Bangkok, and the rest is distributed among a large number of smaller cities and towns, the largest of which contains no more than 35,000 people. Bangkok, therefore, may be regarded as a true Primate City, that is, a city with many times the population of the next largest city and a multiplicity of functions and attractions which give it dominance.[4] The Primate City is characteristic of the so-called "great cities" in Southeast Asia, with few exceptions.[5] Such are, in

[113]

[4] Mark Jefferson, "The Law of the Primate City," *Geographical Review*, April, 1939.

[5] For an excellent description of several of these great cities upon which this paper is based in part see D. W. Fryer, "The 'Million City' in Southeast Asia," *Geographical Review*, October, 1953.

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162 Burma, Rangoon; in Thailand, Bangkok; in
369 the Philippines, Manila; and in Malaya,
Singapore. In Indochina, however, there are
two major core regions, each with its region-
361 al capital, but Saigon is clearly dominant
over Hanoi, which for reasons of population
size alone must be regarded as a lesser city.[6]
In Indonesia densely populated Java has
two large cities, Jakarta and Surabaya, the
first only twice the size of the second, but
Jakarta is the Primate City, if less clearly
than Bangkok or Rangoon. In each case,
other than Indonesia, the Primate City is
from five to ten times as large as the next
largest city, and there is no such graded
hierarchy of urbanization as in the United
States and to a considerable degree in West-
ern European countries and Japan. Second-
ary cities, such as Mandalay in Burma,
Makassar and Jogjakarta in Indonesia, and
Cebu in the Philippines, tend to be regional
capitals subordinate to a great metropolis.
178 The rapid population growth of the six
greatest metropolitan centers—Rangoon,
162 Bangkok, Saigon, Manila, Singapore, and
369 Jakarta—suggest that national urbanization
may be proceeding as rapidly in Southeast
361 Asia as in any other part of the world.[7] This
may be true, but it can be argued also that
the overwhelming dominance of the Primate
City inhibits the growth of lesser cities and
that the largest cities will expand more
rapidly than the lesser ones.[8] There are in
effect only a limited number of services to be
performed by cities within a predominantly
village and folk society, although it may be
industrializing slowly, and the great cities
continue to possess a virtual monopoly of
these services. Thus, even as a society
changes, new and increasingly complex func-
tions tend to be performed by institutions

[13]

[6] According to the *Annuaire statistique du Vietnam, 1949–50*, the population of Hanoi was 216,900 in 1950. Its port, Haiphong, had a population of 146,000. The total population of the two is only about one-fifth that of the twin cities of Saigon-Cholon.

[7] Between 1939 and 1948 the population of Greater Manila increased by 55 per cent. Between 1931 and 1947 the population of Singapore Town (now City) increased by 52.5 per cent.

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178 already established in the Primate cities. So,
162 to a very large degree, in Southeast Asia
369 growth is primarily in the great cities,[9]
361 whereas in the United States in the last three decades at least growth has been more rapid in the small and intermediate cities.

Although the rates of urbanization are high, being, in the case of the Philippines nearly twice the rate of population growth,[10] no sudden transformation to an urbanized society can be envisaged. The percentage of total population classified as urban is in general so low and the normal rates of population increase so high that the growth of urban population *as a percentage of total population* has not been spectacular. In the Philippines, for example, the urban population increased merely from 23.3 per cent in 1939 to 24.1 per cent in 1948, largely in the Manila area. The apparent positive correlation between social change and rates of urban population growth also is exceptionally high. To illustrate with a negative example, in Thailand, where recent social change has been minimal, the rapid population growth of Bangkok has been equaled and even exceeded by that of a number of rural *changwats* in the central and southeastern parts of the country. Under at least two conditions, however, the great cities have increased their populations enormously and at shocking rates: (1) where enlarged political functions have been acquired since the war and (2) where rural unrest and insecurity have

[113]

[9] The only apparent major exception to this generalization is Singapore and Malaya, where the lesser towns have tended to increase their populations equally rapidly since 1931. This situation may be explained by the special political and economic status of Singapore, the entrepôt for much of archipelagic Southeast Asia, and the exceptional degree of commercialization in the Malayan economy as a whole (see M. V. del Tufo, *A Report on the 1947 Census of Population* [*Malaya, Comprising the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore*] [London, 1949]).

[9] E.g., Greater Manila accounted for 89 per cent of the 1939–48 growth of the seven largest cities in the Philippines.

[10] Between 1939 and 1948 the approximate rate of total population growth was 20 per cent; that of urban population growth, nearly 40 per cent.

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Suez Canal in 1869, and the consolidation of Western control, direct or indirect, over most of Southeast Asia in the 1890's, followed by American acquisition of the Philippines at the turn of the century.

More important, the great cities were, and to a large degree still are, foreign creations, essentially alien to the Southeast Asian landscape. Although several began as native settlements, they developed as foreign exclaves on the margins of Asia, in much the same way as did the plantation system and mining operations. With the exception of Bangkok, they represented and functioned as the overseas appendages of Western, not indigenous, interests, being what Spate has called "head-links"—the gates by which Western concepts entered to destroy and build and in which a new system of economic organization evolved.[13] Indeed, the concept of the Asian plural society was inspired by the contrast between the basically foreign great city and the indigenous agricultural village. The ties of the great city with its hinterland were primarily commercial and associated with foreign-controlled mining and plantation interests and with Chinese-dominated rice trade. Such direct political-administrative ties as did exist were restricted primarily to indigenous elites, small in number, which allied themselves with Western interests. Where the indigenous rural populations were affected by these urban-rural relations, it was primarily through the plantation or the mining system, both of which needed a large labor force, or through Indian or Chinese intermediaries.

On the other hand, the relations between an indigenous capital, like Bangkok in its earlier period, or Kyoto or Peking, and the agrarian society upon which it was based were of quite a different order. In these cases the capital represented the culmination of what might be termed a national *ethos*, the epitome of what Redfield has

[13] O. H. K. Spate, "Factors in the Development of Capital Cities," *Geographical Review*, October, 1942, p. 628.

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called the "Great Tradition" in an agrarian society.[13] 361

The links between country and city in this basically feudal relationship were clear, consecutive, and relatively simple to define. To be sure, the villager would regard the capital as a different world from his own, but it was nevertheless a largely comprehensible world, if associated with abstractions and refinements beyond his immediate ken.[14] 369 184 181

The modern great city of Southeast Asia, however, not only was different but was also incomprehensible to the child of the folk society, who came to regard it not merely as strange and foreign but also as hostile. The "foreignness" is reflected in their ethnic composition. Until the second World War at least the largest population group in Rangoon was Indian; Singapore is primarily a Chinese city; Bangkok is very largely Chinese, as is Saigon if Cholon, its twin city, is included; both Manila and Jakarta have large foreign and Chinese elements. To this extent the great city is more metropolitan than national. Each has its Chinese, European, and native quarters, for example, although in many instances the lines of division have become blurred, especially since the close of the war.[15] Furthermore, wherever Chinese populations are large, a predominant type of house is the so-called "shophouse," a two-or-more-story building with shops on the first floor, built to a standard width originally dictated by the length of the average fir-log lintel as used in South China, and with residential flats and 621 361 369 184 578 162 563 342 347 563 369 184

[13] See Robert Redfield and Milton Singer, "A Cultural Role of Cities," a working paper for the Conference on the Role of Cities in Economic Growth and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, May 24–26, 1954. [113]

[14] Cf. J. M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian City: Its Culture and Evolution," *Asia*, March, 1953.

[15] In Singapore the Chinese are localized according to the various so-called "clans," e.g., Hokkien, Cantonese, Tiuchiu, Hailams, and Hakka (see B. W. Hodder, "Racial Groupings in Singapore," *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, October, 1953).

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342 cubicles behind and above.[16] Usually con-
347 structed in continuous rows and back to
back, this type of tenement is among the
563 more conspicuous evils in Southeast Asian
cities. On the urban peripheries and wher-
369 ever interstices appear in the modern street
184 and housing pattern, slum villages appear
which consist of house clusters usually con-
structed of bamboo and *atap* palm, highly
inflammable and unsanitary.[17] These also
are found in and on the margins of the lesser
cities but are most striking in juxtaposition
to the sleek boulevards of Singapore, Bang-
kok, and Jakarta.

184 A further index of the cultural and eco-
369 nomic pluralism of the great cities is their
361 frequent division into old and new towns.
In China, especially in the treaty ports, this
distinction is usually between an old Chinese
and a modern foreign city. The same is true
of India. In Southeast Asia the contrast is
most often between an old and a modern
town both of Western origin, as in Jakarta,
Manila, Singapore, and Rangoon. To a not-
able degree each of these is also a planned
city. In Saigon the contrast is between pre-
dominantly Chinese Cholon and Saigon it-
self. In Bangkok, however, there are the old
Siamese castle town, a new town of indig-
enous origin, though of European design,
and a Chinese town or quarter nearly as old
as the castle town itself. Pluralism is seen
not merely in the division of a city into old
and new parts or into quarters but also in
the separation of the predominantly out-
ward-oriented great city from an up-coun-

[113]

[16] For a description of the "shophouse" see R. H. Hughes, "Hong Kong: An Urban Study," *Geographical Journal*, March, 1951, pp. 9–10.

[17] These areas, the so-called "kampongs," are historically enclaves of the countryside within the city. They form small social cells which together cover most of the surface area in and on the margins of the great cities. Separately, they constitute the rural villages, which in the densely settled portions of Java, for example, are so closely spaced that they collectively exhibit population densities as high as those in many cities (see photographs in J. M. Fraser, "Town Planning and Housing in Singapore," *Town Planning Review*, January, 1953).

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A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MALAYA,*

FROM JULY, 1891, TO JUNE, 1892.

BY

C. DAVIES SHERBORN, F.G.S., F.Z.S.

113 In compiling this Bibliography all sources of information have been utilised. In inserting, therefore, every publication that has come under his notice, the compiler hopes that the entries will prove of considerable assistance; but as a large proportion of the literature of this district either never reaches England at all, or else arrives so long after as to be too late for examination for this purpose, he begs the reader's indulgence for any error that may be present. His thanks are due to M. Martinus Nijhoff, of the Hague, for information as to some of the more recent books.

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*By "Malaya" is here meant that part of the Archipelago enclosed in a line drawn round the north of Siam and the Philippines, through Macassar Strait, between Lombok and Bali, round the outlying islands of Java and Sumatra, and to the east of the Nicobar and Andaman Islands.

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FROM JUNE, 1892. TO JULY, 1893.

BY

C. DAVIES SHERBORN, F.Z.S., R.G.S.

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IN compiling this Bibliography, all sources of information have been utilized. Inserting therefore, every publication that has come under his notice, the compiler hopes that the entries will prove of considerable assistance; but, as a large proportion of the literature of his district, either never reaches England at all, or else arrives so long after as to be too late for examination for this purpose, he begs the reader's indulgence for any error that may be present. His thanks are are due to M. Martinus Nijhoff of The Hague for information as to some of the more recent books.

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BY

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In compiling this Bibliography, all sources of information have been utilized. In inserting, therefore, every publication that has come under his notice, the compiler hopes that the entries will prove of considerable assistance; but as a large proportion of the literature of this district, either never reaches England at all, or else arrives so long after as to be too late for examination for this purpose, he begs the reader's indulgence for any error that may be present. His thanks are due to M. Martinus Nijhoff of The Hague for information as to some of the more recent books.

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* By "Malaya" is here meant that part of the Archipelago enclosed in a line drawn round the North of Siam and the Philippines, through Macassar Strait, between Lombok and Bali, round the outlying islands of Java and Sumatra and to the East of the Nicobar and Andaman Islands.

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ABBREVIATIONS OF TITLES

113

AA	American Anthropologist
AM	Asia Major
AO	Acta Orientalia
ASB	Academia Sinica, Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology
BEFEO	Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient
BSOS	Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies
CR	China Review
HJAS	Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies
IA	Indis Antiquary
IAE	Internationales Archiv für Ethnographie
JAOS	Journal of the American Oriental Society
JASB	Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal
JBRS	Journal of the Burma Research Society
JRAI	Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
JRAS	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
JRASB	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal
JSS	Journal of the Siam Society
LSI	Linguistic Survey of India
MAAA	Memoirs of the American Anthropological Society
MASB	Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal
MI	Man in India
MS	Monumenta Serica
MSOS	Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen

B

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NTF	Nordisk Tidskrift for Filologi
SAJS	South African Journal of Science
TP	T'oung Pao
UCJDL	University of Calcutta, Journal of the Department of Letters
ZDMG	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft
ZE	Zeitschrift für Ethnologie

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Kinship Notation

121 A aunt
128 B brother
197 C cousin
601 Ce cousin (male)
Ci cousin (female)
Ch child
D daughter
(ds) (different sex from speaker's)
F father
g grand-
l -in-law
M mother
N nephew or niece
Ne nephew
Ni niece
(os) (older than speaker)
p parallel
P parent
S son
Sb sibling
Si sister
Sp spouse
(ss) (same sex as speaker's)
U uncle
x cross
(ys) (younger than speaker)

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128 Mikir, and Meithei, round out our picture of Tibeto-Burman
197 kinship terminology as a whole. As new material is presented in connection with each group taken up for discussion, recapitulatory remarks are added to tie the argument together, and a general summary is offered at the end.

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Produced on Work Projects Administration Project #665-08-3-30, Unit A-16. Supervised by Robert Shafer and Paul K. Benedict. Berkeley, 1937-40.

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Sino-Tibetica.

Edited by A. L. Kroeber. Written by Robert Shafer.

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SA 197 601 ST 197 601 luk-k'i, id. (from Shan). All three languages have distinct Sl terms applied under normal conditions. Contrast Garo nok-rong "Sl living in Fl's house" (native term), cowari "Sl other than above" (from Indic); note that among the Garo the nok-rong is a formalized institution in a matrilineal society. It would be difficult to find a more ideal illustration of the mirroring of sociological features in linguistic phenomena.

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

•114 For a number of years I have been deeply interested in problems of pioneering, especially of pioneering in the tropics. My earlier studies were concerned with the possibilities of settlement in the tropics by peoples of other latitudes, both Westerners and Asiatics. In the course of these studies I became more and more interested in the fact that in many parts of the tropics, above all in the Asiatic tropics, there has been a great need for alleviation of the pressure of population. Occasionally this has led to spontaneous pioneering by small groups of settlers, but more frequently to the encouragement and support of pioneering by governments.

121 It was my original plan to visit all of the countries around the South China Sea and to study government-sponsored settlement activities in the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, Malaya, and Indochina at first hand. The war, however, prevented me from visiting the mainland of Southeastern Asia; instead, I had to limit myself to the island world of the Philippines and the Netherlands Indies. From May 1940 to May 1941 I traveled throughout the islands of Luzon, Negros, Cebu, Mindanao, Java, Sumatra, and Bali. The war has also made impossible a rechecking of many of the references.

000 In the field I enjoyed the generous help of a large number of government officials as well as of private persons. In the Philippines I turned frequently for advice and assistance to Mr. Arthur F. Fischer, then President Quezon's adviser, who, as former Director of the Bureau of Forestry, has an unrivaled knowledge of the Philippine Islands. I am especially grateful to the staff of the National Land Settlement Administration.

In the Netherlands Indies I found the officials of the departments of Economic Affairs and of the Interior most kind and helpful. I wish to express thanks especially to Dr. H. J. van Mook, then Director of the Department of Economic Affairs, and to Messrs. A. Luytjes, J. J. Ochse, E. de Vries, A.M.M.P. Scheltema, A. K. Pringgodigdo, Th. J. Odenkirchen, P. Creutzberg, J. C. L. Götz van der Vet, J. F. Dekker, H. A. A. M. Wirtz, L. Gonggrijp, J. F. Kools, W. F. H. van Ameron, L. H. Vreeling, H. Loos, and W. E. K. Baron van Lynden, all of the Department of Economic Affairs. I am also greatly indebted to Governors C. O. van der Plas and L. Adam and to the following members of the Department of the Interior: Messrs. C. C. J. Maassen, J. M. Pieters, H. J. Friedericy, A. Jonkers, J. van der Zwaal, A. Deelemen, G. Ijsselstijn and G. de Lassequere.

To my wife, who accompanied me, I am deeply indebted for inspiration and encouragement as well as for keen criticism of the manuscript. Dr. Robert Bowman read the first part of the book with painstaking care; his criticism and suggestions were of great value to me. The late G.H.C. Hart read and criticized the chapters on the Netherlands Indies. I wish also to express my gratitude to Professor Leo Waibel, Dr. George F. Carter, and Messrs. Bruno Lasker and Philip Lilienthal for their helpful suggestions and to the editors for their work. The guidance of the U.S. Board

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During untold centuries in which they collected plant matter, women acquired an intimate knowledge of vegetable life. Eduard Hahn and others have therefore reasoned that women were the inventors of the cultivation of plants and hence were the first food producers. Hahn has given the name *Hackbau* (hoe culture or hoe tillage) to primitive cultivation, and maintains that the hoe is woman's implement; he draws a sharp distinction between Hackbau and more advanced cultivation, which he calls *Pflugbau* (plow culture or plow tillage) and ascribes to men.[9] It is indeed true that men generally farm with plows and that many examples may be cited of women using hoes; nevertheless, there are so many instances of male primitive cultivators employing hoes or similar instruments that Hahn's classification should be modified. While there seems to be no reason for abandoning his theory of the invention of plant cultivation by women, the classification of cultivation by tools, such as the hoe and the plow, ascribed to one sex or the other, is unsatisfactory. For, in spite of the fact that the collection of vegetable matter is almost exclusively the woman's task in the gathering economy, among primitive cultivators men either assist women in the cultivation of plants or entirely take over this activity whenever hunting or fishing become less important than soil tillage. Furthermore, many primitive cultivators do not use the hoe, but continue to employ the digging stick, characteristically used by the food-gathering women. From Formosa southward throughout the Malay Archipelago, as well as on the mainland of Southeastern Asia, the digging stick, also known as the dibble stick or planting stick, is frequently used by the primitive cultivator. On the other hand, there are advanced cultivators who till their land intensively with hoes; they use manure, rotate their crops, terrace fields that lie on slopes, and practice irrigation, yet they do not use plows drawn by draft animals (however, in some instances they have livestock). In other words, advanced agriculture does not depend upon the animal-drawn plow nor does primitive agriculture depend upon the hoe.

A more fundamental distinction between primitive and advanced agriculture may be made in terms of land use rather than of tools. Primitive cultivators, with the possible exception of those living in arid regions, raise one or two crops on a given plot of land, then abandon the plot and make a new field, preferably in the forest, so that the old plot lies fallow sometimes for many years and may itself revert to forest; in short, primitive cultivators shift the place of their agricultural activities with regularity. The crop land consists of small patches scattered throughout the forest; these patches are extremely ragged in appearance and do not look at all like fields. A primitive cultivator would never think of removing stumps and fallen trees; instead, he deliberately raises his crop among them. This kind of cultivation is best described as shifting-field, or shift-

[9] Hahn: Das Alter der wirtschaftlichen Kultur, 1905; idem: Die Entstehung der Pflugkultur, 1909; idem: Von der Hacke zum Pflug, 1914; Kolff: "Hahn's hypothese," 1926, pp. 884–907.

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lanzones, papayas, and chicos, which find a good market in Manila, but on the whole we rarely meet in the Philippines such intensive garden culture as in Java. The diet of the average Filipino is not well balanced and is particularly deficient in fruits and vegetables. In recognition of this fact the Bureau of Education and the Bureau of Plant Industry have both done much to impress the peasants with the need for fruit and vegetable gardens. Although the situation has improved during the past forty years and a large variety of fruits is now produced, the country still depends upon imports, whereas with a little effort most of the imported fruits could be produced locally and would furnish an additional source of income. It would be well to encourage the peasants to grow more fruits and to advise them on the most suitable varieties. In the other countries of Southeastern Asia, also, with the possible exception of Java, such advice would be valuable. 245 [654]

The published material available on the importance of gardens in Indochina is similarly limited in quantity. Even Gourou in his study of land utilization restricts himself chiefly to listing the fruits and vegetables found in the gardens and to stating that certain districts are renowned for the quality of their garden fruits. Gourou's list of fruits and vegetables is as varied and extensive, however, as similar lists for any of the other countries of Southeastern Asia. 114.

Wet Fields

Throughout the countries bordering the South China Sea most of the cultivated land is used for the growing of lowland, or wet, rice. For this purpose the fields must be leveled and surrounded by earth dams to impound rain water during the rainy season or to confine the water that is carried to the fields through irrigation canals or lifted to the fields by mechanical means. If a field is properly leveled the surrounding dyke will keep the water everywhere at the same depth. The size of the wet-rice, or paddy, fields, and the amount of labor that is required to make them, depend upon the topography of the region. In the lowlands, where no terracing is required, there is relatively little labor involved in the making of paddies, which are frequently large. A hilly, or mountainous, terrain necessitates terracing, which demands greater effort and reduces the size of individual fields; the steeper the slope, the narrower the paddies. We have only to see the rice terraces of the mountains of northern Luzon, southern Bali, the Preanger districts of West Java, or Sumatra's West Coast in order to realize how much effort has been expended in building these terraces and how much energy must be devoted to their upkeep. The terraces, as well as the wet-rice fields of the plains, represent the accumulated efforts of generations of peasants, each of which has helped to extend the area devoted to the cultivation of wet rice (Figs. 50–58).[1] 101 243 312

Not all people show the same skill in the making of paddies. According to Credner, the Thai are quite helpless on sloping land that requires terracing before wet rice may be planted. They would prefer to migrate to a 243 184

[1] [See pp. 115 ff. Catagory 116. -- Analyst]

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Chinese

and they are now less than one and a half million compared with the Chinese eight and a half or so in a total population approaching one hundred and sixty million. Nor can they compare with their fellow immigrants in wealth and influence. The Chinese in Southeast Asia are of the greatest political, economic, and social significance to the region and, indirectly, to the world as a whole, but until now no comprehensive study of them has been attempted. The considerations that have led me to venture to provide what is at least an outline of the subject are as follows.

To carry out the research necessary for an adequate history of the Chinese in the seven countries of the region (counting 'British Borneo' as one), together with a basic study of Chinese emigration into Southeast Asia and its causes, to collate the material, and to write the work itself would, in all reasonableness, take some seven or eight years. Moreover, the qualifications for embarking on such an enterprise should include, first, an extensive background knowledge of China and the Chinese, secondly, a close acquaintance with the several countries of Southeast Asia and their histories, and, thirdly, at least a working knowledge of a score of languages and dialects. Since no person of the necessary qualifications, leisure, or ambition appeared to be forthcoming, and the need for a primer on Chinese affairs in this region was urgent, I decided to be greatly daring and to try my hand at a single impressionistic volume. My qualifications fell far short of the desideratum, but among them were two years of study in Canton, a period of attachment to the Hong Kong Government, and an intimate contact with the Chinese in Malaya, as a Colonial official, for over a quarter of a century.[1] I had visited the countries themselves at different times (the last occasion being as consultant to the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in 1947), and I had an acquaintance with the Chinese written language and the Cantonese and Mandarin dialects as well as a working knowledge of French, Spanish, Italian, and Malay, with some German, Portuguese, and Dutch. I had also served an apprenticeship in the subject by writing a study of the Chinese in one country of the area.[2]

[1] Many appointments, held during this period, included those of magistrate, Protector of Chinese, Assistant Director of Education (Chinese), and Director-General of Information. Under the British Military Administration (1945–6) I was Colonel, Principal Adviser on Chinese affairs.

[2] *The Chinese in Malaya* (London, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948).

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121 however, one obvious difficulty. The officials for whom the original note was written shared with the writer a common knowledge of Burma and its administration. For readers without such special knowledge it was necessary to trace the course of development more closely and to illustrate the results more clearly, even at the risk of multiplying tedious detail. Another difficulty, still more formidable, may be less obvious. For undesirable features of British rule in Burma, British officials, conscious of their good intentions, naturally tend to blame the Burman; Burmans, no less naturally, blame the British. Similarly in Netherlands India we find mutual recriminations between Dutch and Indonesians. Only by eliminating so far as possible all personal and local factors can one arrive at a just estimate of any particular experiment in colonial rule. It seemed necessary therefore to frame the comparison between Burma and Netherlands India in a general survey of colonial policy and practice. For such a survey, however, they provide a convenient introduction by presenting respectively extreme types of the alternative systems of direct and indirect rule.

114 In venturing further afield one was inevitably treading on uncertain ground. I was at home in Burma. After more than twenty years in the Civil Service, I was occupied for some time in business and in the direction of an agricultural bank, and also had the privilege of being associated with the University of Rangoon and the Education Department in various educational experiments. With the ready assistance of Dutch and Indonesian authorities I have made some study of Netherlands India, and I have visited Malaya, Siam and Cochin China. I also have some personal acquaintance with administration in British India. But of Africa, the other great field of colonial rule, I knew nothing at first hand. Fortunately it was possible to turn for information to Lord Hailey's great *African Survey*, and the extent of my debt to it will be readily apparent. It would be hard to say how much I owe to the voluminous writings of Dutch colonial experts, but among them I must mention in particular Dr J. H. Boeke, Professor of Tropical Economy in Leiden University, and Mr Meijer Ranneft, formerly Vice-President of the Raad van Indië. It is impossible for me to express adequately my gratitude to my friend Mr G. E. Harvey, for the care with which he read the first proofs of this book and for his

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generous comments and criticisms, and also for allowing me to use his unpublished extracts from the records of early British rule in Arakan. 114

The book was written during the late war, and completed early in 1945. The delay in publication has been due partly to the difficulties of the present time, partly to imperfections in the original script; and in this connection I must gratefully acknowledge the help and patience of the University Press. During the interval there have been great changes but, as the Japanese invasion of the Tropical Far East must certainly mark a turning-point in colonial rule, and subsequent events are still too close to be reviewed in due perspective, it seemed expedient merely to revise the tense in references to the war. 000

One change however calls for comment. Britain has granted Burma independence. On both parts this may seem bold even to the point of rashness. Some contend that we have been too ready to throw off the responsibilities of Government and Burmans over-ready to assume them. It is a tumbled house that they inherit, and there is urgent need to repair the damage, moral and material, inflicted on Burma in a war during which it was twice invaded. Exports have fallen by two-thirds of the pre-war figure of £37 million. The annual revenue covers only one-third of the current expenditure, and the national debt of over £110 million, about seven times the revenue, is rapidly increasing. Despite the general inexperience of Burmans in modern industry and commerce, their new leaders must enable Burma, so far as national interest allows, to make a due contribution to world welfare by the development of its resources. Moreover, in a country where the tradition of military service has long been suffered to decay, they must train the people to defend their freedom. Now also it will fall on them to deal with problems long-standing and hitherto insoluble: to adapt western institutions to an eastern people, provide remedies for agricultural debt and land alienation, reduce litigation and crime to healthy proportions, restore order among the Buddhist clergy, and purify the administration of corruption. In a troubled world, though less acquainted with affairs than their old rulers, they face a situation far more difficult. In these circumstances it is impossible to contemplate the future without misgivings, and we may well regret that in the past more was not done to equip the people and their leaders for the responsibilities of independence. 727 642

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THIS BOOK constitutes a report of a longterm project in the international research program of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The disturbed conditions in Southeast Asia have made it impossible to deal as fully as had originally been hoped with the wartime and postwar labor problems of the area. Many of these more recent developments, however, will be discussed in the author's forthcoming study of the effects of the Japanese occupation in Southeast Asia. This new study will probably be published under the auspices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations during 1948.

Thanks are due to Mr. Bruno Lasker for editorial and other assistance in the preparation of the supplement to the book, and also to Mr. Wilfrid Benson for his Preface. Although the book is issued under the auspices of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the author alone is responsible for statements of fact or opinion presented in it.

William L. Holland
Secretary-General

New York
July 1947

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In this general problem of Southeast Asia, it would be dangerous to neglect the contributing problems of labor standards and labor policies. It is true that the population is predominantly peasant, that the wage earner usually comes from and returns to his land and that wage standards must remain low so long as peasant standards of living are low. Yet with all this, a social revolution was taking place during the colonial period and will spread if the expanding population is to live. In Southeast Asia, as in the rest of the world, this will involve an exodus from the country to the town and to a certain extent, from agriculture to industry. In the country, it will involve the acceleration of the change from subsistence to cash farming, an increase of wage earning as a normal means of making a living, and the penetration of the effects of employment to villages which are as yet remote. And neglect is more than possible. Whereas under colonial rule indigenous leaders were being increasingly associated in the political functions of government, their participation in and training for the complexities of modern production were hopelessly inadequate. Now, not only are the trained technicians scanty, but it is possible that the feudal, static traditions of the countries will leave local opinion indifferent to the lot of the men and women laboring outside the established practices. 121

Miss Virginia Thompson's studies on labor problems in Southeast Asia are therefore not merely of value to the labor expert and the sociologist; they are of political importance. Despite the difficulties of research when many of the detailed reports were unobtainable and few persons could be consulted on practical conditions, so that some of her statements may be open to question, she has been able to present a valuable synthesis of labor laws and of the problems confronting the administrations, managements and workers in Western undertakings. She has also sketched with skill the postwar developments which appear to be of greatest significance. Whether or not the future will bring out other changes than those she indicates, it seems certain that throughout the period of settlement there will be a close connection between political peace and progress and labor peace and progress. Therefore, that she has political opinions which color her judgment on labor conditions is not a criticism. Without political opinions, any survey of the labor situation would be merely academic. 114

As Miss Thompson indicates, in many respects the labor policies of the colonial powers were progressive. For some time attention was confined to the regulation of plantation and mining labor, but from the late thirties the importance of a comprehensive labor policy was receiving increased recognition. It could no longer be thought that the administrations' chief responsibility was for conditions of employment on the estates and mines in respect of which they controlled the labor supply. Problems of modern employment were being tackled through minimum wage 466

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a thousand Communists into exile to the Digeol Internment Camp in New Guinea. There had remained, it is true, some forty unfederated unions, but these were almost all made up of government employees and at that time had a combined membership of only thirty thousand.

In its present reincarnation, the Indonesian labor movement has been greatly influenced by European and Australian examples. It may be dated from August 17, 1945, when Ir. Soekarno proclaimed the republic —with constitutional provisions favoring the organization of genuinely autonomous trade unions. In the autumn of 1946, the two branches of the movement—comparable with the AFL and CIO in the United States—combined into one central organization, called SOBSIE. Like the Republican Government which encourages it, this federation is orientated toward socialism and under strong Western influence. Communist influence appeared to be small in the spring of 1947, although Communists were known to have infiltrated, particularly into the unions of petroleum workers. The closed-shop question had not yet arisen.

INDOCHINA [4]

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The effect of the war and of the Japanese occupation on the labor situation in Indochina resembled more that in Malaya than that in Indonesia. On the one hand, the influence of the great European enterprises still was dominant; on the other, the trade union movement had tended to assume a more political coloration and, indeed, had to some extent been organized for political purposes through the medium of strikes. The President of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, Ho Chi Minh, is credited (or charged) with having called into being nominal trade unions which actually are little more than instruments of political action. He formed a central organization which he called Confédération Générale de Travail (CGT) after the French prototype and for the purpose of international affiliation.

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It has been said that "l'Annamite est un monsieur qui adore les associations—plus elles sont secrètes, plus il les aime"; but it does not follow that the wide network of unions that has sprung into being with the Republic's encouragement is so organized that it can effectively serve the social welfare in general and the improvement of working conditions in particular. The sudden transplantation by the government of large numbers of laborers from the Tonkin delta area to malaria-infested inland areas in need of development is cited as the sort of measure which was neither well planned nor carried out by means of a democratic procedure,

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[4] This section is based to a large extent on an interview with M. Guiriec, Directeur de l'Action Sociale et du Travail, Saigon, on May 28, 1947. M. Guiriec has spent many years in Tonkin as an Inspector of Labor, and has been charged with the drafting of a trade-union law for the whole of French Indochina.

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The need for a reorientation in kinship theory was first expressed by Kroeber in a classic article that appeared over thirty years ago (1909). This analysis led to much controversy on the general topic of sociological vs. psychological causation, with Radcliffe-Brown joining in the chorus, and the "eight categories" set up by Kroeber have exerted some influence, e.g. they have been applied by Feng to the Chinese terminology system. The theoretical implications were developed much later, and along altogether different lines, by Davis and Warner. Kroeber himself, building on an earlier analysis by Opler, has reconstructed the main features of the Athabascan kinship terminology, while Shimkin, one of his pupils, has made a more intensive study of the Uto-Aztecan system. Insofar as the writer is aware, none of the remaining American language groups has received similar attention, despite the fact that ample material, and in some instances linguistic studies, are available. Aside from the above, only Seligman's review of the Semitic terms, and Milke's analysis of the Melanesian and Polynesian sibling terms, have come to the writer's attention.

In the above studies by Kroeber, Shimkin, Seligman, and Milke, the historical relationships of the terms themselves are considered and some use is made of linguistic generalizations. Shimkin in particular has profited from Sapir's and Whorf's work on Uto-Aztecan phonology, and has thus been able to incorporate a fair body of linguistic information into his work. Seligman's article is deficient from the linguistic

121 point of view, and it is apparent that the author lacks
114 even a partial command of comparative Semitic philology. Milke's work shows the same shortcoming, despite the availability of Dempwolff's epoch-making studies on Austronesian phonology. Kroeber has stressed the point that even non-specialists can profitably engage in comparative studies of this type, and the point is well taken. There remains, however, the fact that the risk of grievous misinterpretations is greatly heightened under these conditions, and that many fine points, often of crucial importance, must be missed altogether.

121 The writer has attacked his problem from the same general linguistic angle but in a somewhat different [illegible] A vast and sprawling linguistic structure such as Tibet[illegible] Burman cannot successfully be attacked simply by seizing upon a few roots, or upon a few English equivalents, and tracing their vagaries from language to language. This methodological eclecticism might prove to be 'convenient', but would be about as effective as delapidating a skyscraper with the aid only of a pickaxe. Again, one might compile interminable lists of terms for some two hundred Tibeto-Burman languages and dialects, which would be unintelligible to everyone with the possible exception of the compiler. Once more, one might draw up elaborate maps showing the distribution of certain roots for kinship terms, or of certain terminological features, and attempt to derive various conclusions therefrom. This last approach, at any rate, is not to be

121 The exclusive emphasis on marriage as a causative factor
114 in kinship terminology, found both in Rivers and Aginsky though in different form, appears to be losing ground steadily; cf. the excellent studies by Tax, Eggan, McAllister, Opler, and Gilbert (in Eggan, 1937) and Opler (1937).

121 No use has been made of the terms "classificatory" and
128 "descriptive", each of which has acquired so wide a range of
601 connotations as to have lost all preciseness. The term "analytical" is used in its basic linguistic sense, e.g. "father's brother" is an analytical term, whereas "uncle" is a primary term. Note that a term may be only partly analytical, e.g. "uncle's son", where the fully analytical term would be "father's brother's son" or "mother's brother's son".

Three types of terminological equations are distinguished, as follows:

1. Categorical equation: equation of members of the two different categories of kin (consanguineal and affinal), e.g. "mother's brother"= "father-in-law".

2. Lineal equation: equation of members of two different lines of descent, e.g. "brother"= "father's sister's son", "son"= "brother's son".

3. Serial equation: equation of members of two different generations, e.g. "son"= "grandson".

These terms are to be regarded as convenient tags of some use in describing patterns of nomenclature, e.g. the Omaha and Crow types are characterized by serial equations in the cross collateral lines. The equation may rest on the extension

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I am most grateful to those who have assisted me in this way, and I am flattered that persons of eminence should have considered my text worth the trouble they have bestowed upon it. My thanks are due to Mr B. R. Pearn for reading the entire work, and to the following who read one or more parts of it—Mrs Patricia Barnett, Sir Paul Butler, Mr Chu-pei Chen, Mr Richard Couglin, Mr F. S. V. Donnison, Miss Cora Du Bois, Professor J. J. L. Duyvendak, Professor Raymond Firth, Mr Tom Harrisson, Mr J. D. Higham, Sir Robert Holland, Mr A. F. P. Hulsewé, Mr N. R. Jarrett, Mr George McT. Kahin, Mr Paul Kattenburg, Professor Raymond Kennedy, Professor R. D. Kollewijn, Dr K. P. Landon, M. Roger Lévy, Sir Raibeart MacDougall, Mr J. V. Mills, Mr R. S. Milward, Mr O. H. Morris, Professor Karl Pelzer, Miss Catherine Porter, Mr Ifor B. Powell, Mr W. A. C. Smelt, Sir Robert Smith, Mr R. T. Tan, Professor Arnold Toynbee, Dr B. M. Vlekke, and Mr W. A. Ward. I am indebted also to Mr R. A. D. Forrest, lecturer in Tibeto-Burman languages in the University of London, for writing an appendix on the dialects of South China especially for this work, to Dr Janus Poppe for considerable help with Dutch texts, to Miss A. C. J. Willems of the Netherlands Information Bureau in London for assistance of a similar kind, and to Mr Leonard Unger and the American Geographical Society for permission to reproduce the map showing the distribution of Chinese in Southeast Asia. I have also to thank Mr Richard Adloff, Dr Virginia Thompson Adloff, Mr Leonard Aurousseau, Professor C. R. Boxer, Mr R. S. Busuego, Mr H. M. Cheng, Mr I. C. Cheng, Mr J. S. Furnivall, Miss Ellen Hammer, Mr Edwin Haward, Mr Cecil Hobbs, Dr Arthur Hummel, Mr G. W. Irwin, Mr Loke Wan-tho, Mr J. N. McHugh, Sir Frederick Maze, Dr Lennox Mills, Dr Th. Moll, Mr A. S. B. Olver, Mr E. Osborn, Mr H. T. Pagden, Mr L. N. Palar, Mr Harry Price, Mr Tan Cheng-lock, Mr Tan Siew-sin, Mr G. G. Thomson, Dr Tjoa Sik-ien, Mr M. V. del Tufo, Dr H. van der Valk, Dr Wabeke, Sir Richard Winstedt, and Mr Guy Wint for assistance of several kinds. My indebtedness to libraries is, of course, great, and in particular I would mention the courtesy and help I received from the staffs of the New York Public Library, the Library of Congress, Washington, the British Museum Reading Room, and the respective libraries of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Royal Asiatic Society, the Middle Temple,

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Chinese

115 and the Colonial Office, and, notably, from Miss Barbara Kyle, 127 librarian of Chatham House, and her staff who seemed never at a 122 loss to produce the most out-of-the-way books and periodicals, and from Miss K. M. L. Simpson, press librarian of Chatham House, whose staff were unfailing in providing cuttings on all sorts of subjects and at the shortest notice. The entire work has been edited by Mrs Dorothy A. Cannell with a care that has increased its precision and improved the diction.

Finally I should thank Miss Margaret Cleeve, the Research Secretary of Chatham House, and Mr W. L. Holland, the Secretary General of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, for their invaluable assistance. Without them and the machinery of their institutions I should have been unable to solicit the help of the above-mentioned experts and the project would have been stillborn.[1]

In order to bring the survey as up to date as possible, a Postscript is added, written in the course of a visit to all the countries of Southeast Asia in the second half of 1950. This visit was made possible by a grant for the purpose from the Rockefeller Foundation to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

August 1950 VICTOR PURCELL

121 [1] Since the main object of this study is to throw light on contemporary happenings, more attention has been paid to the history of the past two or three hundred years than to the earlier Chinese contacts with Southeast Asia. Indeed, as in my work on the Chinese in Malaya, interest in the Chinese begins in earnest from the time when they formed more or less settled communities in the region, and minor account is taken of trading voyages or isolated travellers.

The story is brought up to the moment of writing, which differs, of course, in the several parts. The section on Indonesia, for example, stops just before the second Dutch 'police action'; for Malaya the narrative is taken to February 1949.

That the authorities are mostly European rather than Chinese is due to the fact that the analytic and descriptive habit is of only recent growth among the Chinese of Southeast Asia.

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PIONEER SETTLEMENT IN THE ASIATIC TROPICS

Studies in Land Utilization and Agricultural Colonization in Southeastern Asia

KARL J. PELZER
The Johns Hopkins University

AMERICAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY
BROADWAY AT 156ST STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y.
1945

[Title page]

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This study has been made with the cooperation of the
Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations
and constitutes a report in its

International Research Series

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AMERICAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY

SPECIAL PUBLICATION NO. 29

EDITED BY KATHARINE M. WRIGHT AND DOROTHY GOOD

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FOREWORD

000 Victory over Japan will establish a wider range of American interest in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia. To deal with that interest we shall need a larger fund of knowledge than we have been able to draw on in the past; and the fund will have to be continuously replenished by workers in the field. The provision of factual knowledge alone will require a larger number of Americans than have ever before worked on the problems of tropical and subtropical areas and of colonial and dependent peoples.

We shall need, however, more than additional facts and additional investigators. The differences between the world before Pearl Harbor and the world after victory over Japan will demand of us a new approach to the problems of peoples and politics, based on a new integration of the technical study of soil, climate, land utilization, extraction of minerals, and creation of industries, and the social study of the structure and functioning of human communities—families, tribes, villages, peoples, and nations—and of cultural complexes which extend over or into more than one kind of community, and of the relations between different kinds of units.

A fresh integration is demanded of us because of the historical juncture. Of all the phases of history, the phase that immediately follows a great crisis is the one that demands the most subtle analysis of the way in which change works, and the most delicate handling of the process of change. In such a phase new problems appear that make an appeal to innovation, but at the same time old problems reappear that make an appeal to precedent. Most intricate of all is the old problem that reappears in a new guise, defying simple classification.

An analogy drawn from Dr. Pelzer's data may be used to illustrate the complex problem as a whole, though solution of the problem, or any part of it, will require more than analogy. Dr. Pelzer has shown what great effect the actions even of primitive men can sometimes have in changing the geographical environment. Doubtless the intention of primitive man is merely to *use* the environment, over and over again in the same way, rather than to *change* it. Nevertheless, in using it he may also change it. When the primitive shifting cultivator burns a tract of forest in order to grow a crop, it is because "things have always been done that way." As far as his intention reaches, the forest may recover that tract when he has abandoned it and moved on to burn a new tract.

But, as Dr. Pelzer shows, it is not always the forest that recovers the burned area. Grass may take over, delaying the appearance of second-growth forest and the regeneration of the original soil fertility. The shifting cultivators may be limited to a smaller range of territory by the spread of a sedentary people whose higher agricultural technique enables them to cultivate permanent fields. If so, the burned fields of the shifting cultivators lie fallow for a shorter period, because they have to be burned over more often. The change of environment is then accelerated; the character of wide landscapes is altered; some kinds of trees and other vegetation prove

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to have a greater survival value than others, or erosion and impoverishment of the soil may become very rapid.

In an analogous way we may study changes of the very greatest importance taking place in societies whose rulers direct their intentions toward maintaining continuity rather than toward initiating change. In the very maintenance of continuity changes are inadvertently encouraged which in time develop to such importance that they affect the old methods of administration—and administration may be called the "farming" of a society. Thus Dr. Pelzer describes the land policy of the Dutch in Indonesia as directed toward the maintenance of the old landholding systems, including communal village landownership; in particular, the "grain values" of the old agrarian society were to be protected against the "money values" of the Dutch themselves by an ordinance forbidding the purchase of agricultural land by any but Indonesians. Yet the pressure of money values could not be prevented from working; through such indirect channels as cash loans, it affected the lives of people who had the legal status of landowners in such a way that in practice they became tenants working for outsiders who had lent money to them. To continue the analogy, one may say that here and there in the "forest" of the pre-Dutch Indonesian society there began to appear gaps of "grassland" resulting from the Dutch methods of "cultivating" the society. Comparable changes may be studied in the Philippines; comparable, but different, partly because of differences between the pre-Dutch economies and societies of the Indies and the pre-Spanish and pre-American economies and societies of the Philippines, and partly because of differences in the Dutch impact, the Spanish impact, and the American impact.

Problems of this kind, problems of transformation, demand recognition when we come to study the alternative systems of trusteeship now being proposed for subject and dependent peoples. Change will be induced by any system that we impose. The question is whether change is to be planned and directed in each area and under each administrative authority, and coordinated as between areas and authorities, or whether it is to be allowed to overtake us as an unplanned consequence of undirected, uncoordinated policy.

The chief gap is between the American standard of planning for freedom and the colonial standard. Under the American standard freedom is planned as the outcome of trustee administration, standards of self-government are planned adequate to cope with the problems that confront a newly independent nation, and the problem as a whole is coordinated by setting in advance a date that synchronizes the *termination* of trusteeship and the *completion* of preparation for self-government. Under the colonial standard demands for freedom arise spontaneously and sporadically, and have to be deferred, fenced with, and temporized with, because they are inadvertent consequences of social changes that are not the aim of the colonial system but are inevitable by-products of it.

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Dr. Pelzer has provided invaluable materials for the study of all these interacting problems. It is encouraging that his book should be the result of farsighted support for fact gathering in the field and directly in the tradition of the American interest in wanting to find out how things work. We need more of such studies, and we should look upon the need as a challenge.

OWEN LATTIMORE

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

114 For a number of years I have been deeply interested in problems of pioneering, especially of pioneering in the tropics. My earlier studies were concerned with the possibilities of settlement in the tropics by peoples of other latitudes, both Westerners and Asiatics. In the course of these studies I became more and more interested in the fact that in many parts of the tropics, above all in the Asiatic tropics, there has been a great need for alleviation of the pressure of population. Occasionally this has led to spontaneous pioneering by small groups of settlers, but more frequently to the encouragement and support of pioneering by governments.

121 It was my original plan to visit all of the countries around the South China Sea and to study government-sponsored settlement activities in the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, Malaya, and Indochina at first hand. The war, however, prevented me from visiting the mainland of Southeastern Asia; instead, I had to limit myself to the island world of the Philippines and the Netherlands Indies. From May 1940 to May 1941 I traveled throughout the islands of Luzon, Negros, Cebu, Mindanao, Java, Sumatra, and Bali. The war has also made impossible a rechecking of many of the references.

000 In the field I enjoyed the generous help of a large number of government officials as well as of private persons. In the Philippines I turned frequently for advice and assistance to Mr. Arthur F. Fischer, then President Quezon's adviser, who, as former Director of the Bureau of Forestry, has an unrivaled knowledge of the Philippine Islands. I am especially grateful to the staff of the National Land Settlement Administration.

In the Netherlands Indies I found the officials of the departments of Economic Affairs and of the Interior most kind and helpful. I wish to express thanks especially to Dr. H. J. van Mook, then Director of the Department of Economic Affairs, and to Messrs. A. Luytjes, J. J. Ochse, E. de Vries, A.M.M.P. Scheltema, A. K. Pringgodigdo, Th. J. Odenkirchen, P. Creutzberg, J. C. L. Götz van der Vet, J. F. Dekker, H. A. A. M. Wirtz, L. Gonggrijp, J. F. Kools, W. F. H. van Ameron, L. H. Vreeling, H. Loos, and W. E. K. Baron van Lynden, all of the Department of Economic Affairs. I am also greatly indebted to Governors C. O. van der Plas and L. Adam and to the following members of the Department of the Interior: Messrs. C. C. J. Maassen, J. M. Pieters, H. J. Friedericy, A. Jonkers, J. van der Zwaal, A. Deelemen, G. Ijsselstijn and G. de Lassequere.

To my wife, who accompanied me, I am deeply indebted for inspiration and encouragement as well as for keen criticism of the manuscript. Dr. Robert Bowman read the first part of the book with painstaking care; his criticism and suggestions were of great value to me. The late G.H.C. Hart read and criticized the chapters on the Netherlands Indies. I wish also to express my gratitude to Professor Leo Waibel, Dr. George F. Carter, and Messrs. Bruno Lasker and Philip Lilienthal for their helpful suggestions and to the editors for their work. The guidance of the U.S. Board

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on Geographical Names has been used whenever possible in the spelling of place names.

My field work was done under the auspices of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations and The Johns Hopkins University. I cannot express thanks in terms that completely convey my feelings of gratitude to Mr. W. L. Holland, formerly Research Secretary of the International Secretariat, and to Dr. Isaiah Bowman, President of The Johns Hopkins University.

Finally, I should like to acknowledge my indebtedness to the American Geographical Society for opening the Special Publications Series to this study. It should be pointed out that although the book is being published under the auspices of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations and of the American Geographical Society, the Secretariat, the Institute's National Councils, and the American Geographical Society assume no responsibility for statements of fact or opinions. The author alone is responsible for these.

KARL J. PELZER

Washington, D.C.
May 1, 1945

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Part I

LAND USE

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Chapter I

FROM HUNTING AND GATHERING TO AGRICULTURE

Hunting and Gathering

101 In Southeastern Asia today there are peoples of different cultural levels
174 carrying on some of the major economies that man has developed in the
course of time. The first people to invade the tropical forest regions around
222 the South China Sea were alithic, or prepalaeolithic, food gatherers,[1] who
105 obtained their food by collecting edible wild plants and by hunting and fishing. Today geographically separated peoples are still living in a prepalaeolithic or palaeolithic food-gathering and hunting stage.[2] In Southeastern Asia they are represented by the Semang of the Malay Peninsula, the Andaman Islanders, and the Aeta of the Philippines—all of whom are Negritos, or dwarfed Negroids—the Kubu of Sumatra, the Sakai of the Malay Peninsula, the Toala of Celebes,[3] and the Punan of Borneo.[4]

222 The degree to which collecting, hunting, or fishing contributes to the
462 food supply varies with the season; it also varies with different peoples,
105 depending upon the resources of the region, the type of equipment the people may possess, and the skills they may have acquired. Food-gathering and hunting peoples have a division of labor under which the men hunt while the women and children gather vegetable matter and catch insects and small animals. The men may lend a helping hand, however, in digging up some of the very deep-growing yams. Men will also participate in the
621 picking of fruits, especially when it is necessary to climb tall trees. The food gatherers and hunters of Southeastern Asia are nomadic in the sense that they do not remain long in one place. However, they do not wander aimlessly through the jungle. Each group has its definite territory—among

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Note: The titles of the works here cited in footnotes have been abbreviated, whenever possible. The full titles may be found in the Bibliography, p. 269 ff.

1 Nippold (Rassen- und Kulturgeschichte der Negrito-Völker, 1936, pp. 253–255 and 398–400) considers the alithic wood culture of the Negritos of Southeastern Asia to be older than palaeolithic culture. These people use wood rather than stone as raw material for their tools. Because of the perishable nature of wood, archaeologists and prehistorians have not yet been able, so far as I know, to go farther back than the palaeolithic age and therefore have not been able to confirm the hypothesis of an alithic age. Menghin (Weltgeschichte der Steinzeit, 1931, p. 91) believes that, from an archaeological point of view, an alithic wood culture may be regarded only as a possibility, but Kern (Die Anfänge der Weltgeschichte, 1933, p. 35), who compared pygmy culture with palaeolithic cultures, comes to the conclusion that alithic wood cultures probably preceded palaeolithic culture.

2 By divesting the word "palaeolithic" of its specific chronological connotation the term may be used for present-day peoples who have a food-gathering and hunting culture.

3 The racial affinities of the Kubu, the Sakai, and the Toala are not clear; by some they are called Veddoids, by others, Australoids.

4 They are considered to be Proto-Malays.

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Semang AN7

621 Each group has its definite Territory—among the Semang, for example, each band roams about in an area of from 15 to 20 square miles,[5] and its territorial claims are recognized by its neighbors. The habitations of these semi-nomads are usually crude, temporary shelters—sometimes an overhanging rock or cave.

222 251 These primitive food gatherers have acquired an amazing knowledge of the flora of their habitat[6] and have learned to make use of the leaves, flowers, seeds, nuts, berries, fruits, bark, tubers, and roots. Some have not only found ways of making poisonous vegetable substances edible but have also developed elaborate techniques of food preservation. For instance, at certain times of the year the Semang live largely on the poisonous seeds of the *Piah* tree (*Elateriospermum tapos* Blume), which contain hydrocyanic acid.[7] If the seeds are needed immediately they are boiled or roasted; otherwise they are pounded in water or rasped, packed into bark cloth or bamboo tubes, buried in wet earth for a month or more, and allowed to ferment. This treatment not only removes the poison but also preserves the food for several weeks.[8]

[137]

Primitive and Advanced Agriculture

262 245 221 There are practices among contemporary gatherers that can be regarded as contributing the link between their economy and primitive cultivation. The Semang, who are especially fond of durians, will camp under, or near, a durian tree in order to prevent monkeys or wild pigs from getting the ripe fruit. It is reported that they may even cut down a ring of forest around these trees during the fruiting season to eliminate the competition of other forest vegetation. This procedure represents a form of husbandry. The Semang will also put the tops of wild yams back into the ground after they have cut off the tubers, so that the plants may continue to grow and produce new tubers. Such practices are but one step short of primitive cultivation.

---

[5] By way of contrast, the territory of an Australian group may include as much as 8,000 or 10,000 square miles of arid country.

[6] Milsum (Fruit Culture in Malaya, 1919) lists as many as 30 wild trees of which the fruits are collected and eaten by food gatherers and others.

[7] Burkill: A Dictionary of the Economic Products of the Malay Peninsula, 1935, Vol. 1, p. 905.

[8] This technique of burying a paste, or dough, and allowing it to ferment seems to be one of the oldest and most primitive ways of preserving a surplus supply of food. The method described above is applied to the seeds of *Pangium edule* Reinw. The boiled seeds are buried with ashes and allowed to ferment, a process which requires about 40 days. It is possible to shorten the process by digging up the buried mass after 15 days. It is then boiled again, soaked in running water, and left for another 4 days of fermentation. When needed immediately the seeds are crushed, boiled, and put into running water for a day, after which they are boiled once more and are then ready for consumption.

[137]

The Polynesians pack breadfruit into pits and cover them with earth. Fermentation will turn the fruit into a soft cheese-like mass from which cakes are baked. This practice enables the Polynesians to keep a supply of breadfruit after the fruiting season is over. See Burkill: *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 1652–1653, and Vol. 1, p. 250.

Food-gathering people in semi-arid and arid regions preserve food by drying it in the sun, but this technique cannot be used in the tropical rain forests of Southeastern Asia.

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During untold centuries in which they collected plant matter, women acquired an intimate knowledge of vegetable life. Eduard Hahn and others have therefore reasoned that women were the inventors of the cultivation of plants and hence were the first food producers. Hahn has given the name *Hackbau* (hoe culture or hoe tillage) to primitive cultivation, and maintains that the hoe is woman's implement; he draws a sharp distinction between Hackbau and more advanced cultivation, which he calls *Pflugbau* (plow culture or plow tillage) and ascribes to men.[9] It is indeed true that men generally farm with plows and that many examples may be cited of women using hoes; nevertheless, there are so many instances of male primitive cultivators employing hoes or similar instruments that Hahn's classification should be modified. While there seems to be no reason for abandoning his theory of the invention of plant cultivation by women, the classification of cultivation by tools, such as the hoe and the plow, ascribed to one sex or the other, is unsatisfactory. For, in spite of the fact that the collection of vegetable matter is almost exclusively the woman's task in the gathering economy, among primitive cultivators men either assist women in the cultivation of plants or entirely take over this activity whenever hunting or fishing become less important than soil tillage. Furthermore, many primitive cultivators do not use the hoe, but continue to employ the digging stick, characteristically used by the food-gathering women. From Formosa southward throughout the Malay Archipelago, as well as on the mainland of Southeastern Asia, the digging stick, also known as the dibble stick or planting stick, is frequently used by the primitive cultivator. On the other hand, there are advanced cultivators who till their land intensively with hoes; they use manure, rotate their crops, terrace fields that lie on slopes, and practice irrigation, yet they do not use plows drawn by draft animals (however, in some instances they have livestock). In other words, advanced agriculture does not depend upon the animal-drawn plow nor does primitive agriculture depend upon the hoe.

A more fundamental distinction between primitive and advanced agriculture may be made in terms of land use rather than of tools. Primitive cultivators, with the possible exception of those living in arid regions, raise one or two crops on a given plot of land, then abandon the plot and make a new field, preferably in the forest, so that the old plot lies fallow sometimes for many years and may itself revert to forest; in short, primitive cultivators shift the place of their agricultural activities with regularity. The crop land consists of small patches scattered throughout the forest; these patches are extremely ragged in appearance and do not look at all like fields. A primitive cultivator would never think of removing stumps and fallen trees; instead, he deliberately raises his crop among them. This kind of cultivation is best described as shifting-field, or shift-

[9] Hahn: Das Alter der wirtschaftlichen Kultur, 1905; idem: Die Entstehung der Pflugkultur, 1909; idem: Von der Hacke zum Pflug, 1914; Kolff: "Hahn's hypothese," 1926, pp. 884–907.

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241 311 ing, cultivation. In contrast to this method, advanced agriculture is practiced year after year on the same well tended plot, the fertility of which is maintained by manuring, crop rotation, intensive cultivation, terracing, and often the regular addition of mineral matter in the form of silt deposited on the land by irrigation water. Only occasionally may the land be allowed a short fallow period. This type of tillage may be called permament-field, or sedentary, cultivation.[10]

Shifting cultivation and sedentary cultivation are generic terms used to describe fundamental differences in land use, differences that find their outward expression in the cultural landscape created by those who maintain these economies.[11] Can there be a greater contrast than that between the shifting cultivators' small, irregular, temporary clearings with their chaotic jumble of fallen and half-fallen tree trunks and stumps, on the one hand, and, on the other, an irrigated plain, subdivided into small fields, each surrounded by a dyke—or a steep slope where a succession of beautifully built terraces leads up for several hundreds or even thousands of feet? These kinds of landscape are physical expressions of totally different economies, or modes of life, with different cultural patterns, concepts of land tenure, attitudes toward the soil, and material equipment.

Historically, shifting cultivation without doubt antedates sedentary cultivation, which requires among other things more elaborate techniques and deeper insight into the relationships between soil, tillage, and yields.

241 Shifting and sedentary cultivation may each be further classified in terms of tools, as we have seen, or in terms of crops, systems of rotation, and the like.[12] For instance, in terms of crops, we may distinguish between grain and grainless culture. Of the two, grainless culture is generally conceded to be the older. One argument for this thesis is that fruits and many of the root and leaf crops may be eaten raw or simply prepared, whereas [184] cereals require more elaborate preparation. The fact that grainless agriculture is largely confined to the fringes of Southeastern Asia also supports the thesis that, at least in this region, grainless agriculture preceded the 174 cultivation of cereals. Still further substantiation is found in Polynesia, where the inhabitants cultivated no cereals when they were first visited

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10 Although sedentary cultivation is commonly practiced by people who use plows drawn by animals, there are large areas where it is practiced with little or no use of the plow. Such areas are found in parts of the Philippines, Java, Sumatra, and southern China, where steep hillsides have been terraced and where the nature of the terrain makes the use of work animals impossible. Sometimes individual farms or patches of land are so small that they must be tilled with hoes, even though plows may be used on adjacent farms. In places custom and religious tradition forbid the use of plows and draft animals.

11 Waibel: Probleme der Landwirtschaftsgeographie, 1933, p. 11.

12 For example, we may distinguish: (a) shifting dibble cultivation, shifting hoe cultivation, and shifting plow cultivation; (b) grainless shifting cultivation and shifting grain cultivation; (c) shifting field-forest cultivation and shifting field-grass cultivation; (d) permanent plow cultivation and permanent planting-stick cultivation; (e) permanent four-field cultivation, and so on. Not all of these are found in Southeastern Asia.

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by Westerners. This may be explained by the assumption that the ancestors of the Polynesians migrated from Southeastern Asia to the islands of the Pacific before cereals had replaced root crops as dominant plants.[13] 174

In Southeastern Asia we find both shifting and sedentary cultivators who depend exclusively upon root crops as a source of starch. The Nias, Mentawei, and Engano islanders off the western coast of Sumatra grew no grains until recently. Beside such root crops as taro (*Colocasia esculenta* Schott), yams (*Dioscorea* sp.), and *bira* (*Alocasia macrorhiza* (L.) Schott), they cultivated such other foods as bananas (*Musa sapientum* L.), sugar cane (*Saccharum officinarum* L.), and coconuts (*Cocos nucifera* L.). In the eastern parts of the Malay Archipelago and New Guinea the inhabitants depend chiefly on the starch of the sago palm (*Metroxylon sagu* Rottb.) which they either plant or collect in the wild state. Here, again, taro, yams, and bira are other sources of starch, as are such imported American plants as cassava (*Manihot utilissima* Pohl) and sweet potatoes (*Ipomoea batatas* Poir.). The folklore and religious practices of many tribes in Borneo and Celebes who today grow cereals recall the time when these tribes had only root crops. 241 137 262

In many parts of the Pacific taro is grown by sedentary cultivators on terraced, flooded fields.[14] We do not know whether the techniques of terracing and irrigation developed independently in Oceania and on the mainland, or whether the ancestors of the Polynesians brought their techniques with them from Southeastern Asia. If the latter be true, they must have left before the cultivation of rice was known to them; otherwise rice would have been among their crops. That it was not among them suggests that 000

[13] Forde: Habitat, Economy and Society, 1934, pp. 428–430. In remote centuries the Polynesians lived in the Malay Archipelago, where they cultivated such root crops as taro, yams, "arrowroot" (*Canna orientalis* Rosc.), and turmeric (*Curcuma* sp.), in addition to bananas and plantains (*Musa paradisiaca* L.), breadfruit (*Artocarpus communis* Forst.) and coconuts, all of which, according to the botanists, are natives of the forest regions of Southeastern Asia, whether the mainland or the Malayan Archipelago. All these plants were probably carried to Polynesia, either via a northern route through Micronesia or by a more southerly course through New Guinea and Melanesia. See Buck: Vikings of the Sunrise, 1938, pp. 305–309. The names of these plants were also carried into the islands of the Pacific. Variants of the names "taro" and "bira," to mention two examples, range from the Malay Archipelago far into Oceania. *Colocasia* is *talo* in Nias, *talos* in Sundanese, *tales* in Javanese, *dalo* in Fiji, *talo* in Samoan, *kalo* in Hawaiian, *taro* in Maori. *Alocasia* is known as *birah* or *bira* in Batak, *bira* in Madurese, *biga* in the Philippines, *piga* in Guam, and *via* in Fiji. Later, the Polynesians, following the example of other peoples of the Pacific, were quick to adopt such New World crops as cassava and sweet potatoes as well as American fruit trees into their economy because these are closely related to their customary crops, but they still remain most reluctant to change from roots to grains as staple, possibly because "the cultivation of roots and fruit trees has little technical relation to the raising of grains, for they are not grown from seed but from eyes and cuttings." See Forde: *op. cit.*, p. 380. Another illustration of the fact that a plant, the introduction of which involves a change in methods of cultivation, is accepted only under pressure, is found in the history of the introduction of the potato into Europe. [137]

[14] Krämer: "Der Taro und die Nasskultur," 1928, pp. 165–172; Rivers: "Irrigation and the Cultivation of Taro," 1926, pp. 262–287.

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000 taro had been cultivated on permanent flooded fields earlier than had rice. Another possibility would be that taro, together with the technique of irrigation, was introduced into Oceania later than were the yams and alocasia, and the Polynesians' more important fruit trees.

173 A folktale of the Bontocs in the mountains of northern Luzon furnishes us with another clue. According to Bontoc lore, their hero, Lumauig, taught them agriculture in a tiny irrigated garden, which is still tended from generation to generation by a special priest. The crop of this garden is taro and not rice.[15] This would seem to lend support not only to the thesis that the cultivation of root crops preceded that of grain but also to the thesis that terracing and irrigation were already being practiced by cultivators of root crops.

241 A beautiful example of sedentary cultivation with root crops as a staple has recently been discovered in the remote Grand Valley of the Balim River in the highlands of Netherlands New Guinea. On the valley floor of the Balim and its tributaries neolithic people practice intensive cultivation, including such techniques as the use of green and animal manure, deep tillage with stone adzes, the digging of ditches to improve the run-off and drainage of swampy land, and the construction of terraces.[16] On the slopes they practice shifting cultivation. In both their shifting and their sedentary agriculture the staple crop is the sweet potato, while taro is a secondary crop. Also subsidiary are bananas, sugar cane, and pandanus.

243 105 [137] In most parts of Southeastern Asia, however, root crops have been replaced by such cereals as millet, Job's tears, upland and lowland rice,[17] and maize. There seem to be good reasons to believe that the first cereals cultivated in Southeastern Asia under the system of shifting cultivation were foxtail, also known as Italian millet (*Setaria italica* Beauv.), and Job's tears (*Coix lacryma-jobi* L.). Before their domestication these grasses, like the root crops and fruit trees of Southeastern Asia, had been used by alithic and palaeolithic hunting and gathering people. Shifting cultivators succeeded in domesticating these plants by selecting over the course of years the species most valuable to them. Although foxtail and Job's tears have largely been replaced by the more valuable grains, rice and maize, there are still shifting cultivators in India, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya, the Indies, and the Philippines who raise the former cereals. Burkill says of foxtail,

> Such a crop as this probably came into cultivation before man had settled enough to grow the better cereals. Its grain ripens in even as little as two months and a half from sowing, and the wandering tribes of the Malay forests are able to remain in one neighbourhood long enough to catch a crop: but the usual duration of the crop seems to be four months.[18]

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15 Keesing and Keesing: Taming Philippine Headhunters, 1934, p. 56.

16 Brass: "Stone Age Agriculture in New Guinea," 1941, pp. 555–569.

17 Upland rice is also known as hill, mountain, dry-land, or dry, rice; lowland rice is also known as irrigated, wet-land, or wet, rice.

18 Burkill: *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 1999.

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Probably the grain known as Job's tears was originally domesticated 243
somewhere in the area between India and southern China, and it is still of importance in this area, although maize has competed with it since the latter's introduction into Southeastern Asia in the sixteenth century.[19]

Rice, The Basis of the Agricultural Economy of Southeastern Asia

By far the most important grain of both shifting and permanent cultivators in Southeastern Asia is rice, which occurs in the wild state in Africa as well as in various parts of southern Asia. The cultivated species (*Oryza sativa* L.) is probably descended principally from two Asiatic wild rices, *Oryza fatua* Koen. and *Oryza minuta* Presl. *Oryza fatua* is thought to be the dominant ancestral strain. These two ancestors are found in moist places from the Himalaya Mountains to Ceylon and from southern China through Indochina, Thailand, Burma, and Malaya to Java, Borneo, and the Philippines.[20] Rice was probably first domesticated in northeastern India, somewhere north of the Bay of Bengal, whence the domesticated varieties have spread in all directions: southeastward through Burma into the Malay-inhabited areas, eastward and northward into Farther India, China, Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines, and westward into the Near East and beyond. 243 [137] 000

The remarkably large number of distinct varieties of cultivated rice[21] has been interpreted as evidence of the great antiquity of its domestication. In the course of thousands of years of selection, varieties have been developed that are adapted to a wide range of natural conditions and especially to varying amounts of water. These varieties may be divided into two main classes: upland, or dry, rice and lowland, or wet, rice. The division, based on the two main types of agronomic practice, is not a very sharp one. Some upland varieties can be grown in flooded fields, and some lowland varieties can be grown in dry fields; however, it is said to be easier to grow dry rices in water than to grow wet rices on dry land.[22] In general, the areas suitable for the cultivation of upland rice are much more limited than those suitable for lowland rice, which can be grown outside the regions of assured rains, provided that water is available for irrigation; whereas upland rice must be grown in a humid atmosphere with an assured rainfall over a three- to four-month period.[23]

Upland rice is grown by the shifting cultivator, into whose economy it

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19 *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 629–631.

20 *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 1593–1595.

21 According to Copeland (Rice, 1924, p. 131) some 3500 varietal names are known in the Philippines; these may be presumed to describe more than 2000 different varieties; in India, where conditions seem to favor mass mutation, some 8000 varietal names have been recorded, but we do not know how many distinct varieties these represent.

22 Burkill: *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 1595.

23 Lacking direct evidence, students of rice and its cultivation have frequently speculated on the comparative age of the two types. Some argue that the cultivation of wet rice preceded that of dry rice. They maintain that rice is, by nature, an aquatic plant. There are, however, grounds for thinking that the cultivation of dry rice is the older form. For one thing, there are wild varieties of upland rice.

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

FIG. 1A—Orientation map of Southeastern Asia. The 100-meter contour line (omitted for the smaller islands) brings out the small extent of lowland areas in Southeastern Asia. The 200-meter bathymetric line shows the extent of the continental shelf. Notice especially the distribution of volcanoes. Recent territorial changes, allotting parts of Indochina, Burma, and Malaya to Thailand, are indicated by shaded areas numbered 1 to 5. The spelling of place names on the original map does not follow the recommendations of the U. S. Board on Geographical Names, as the map was drawn before the publication of the Board's most recent recommendations. The spelling of additional place names has been kept consistent with that on the original map. (Reproduced through the courtesy of the *Geographical Review*).

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

FIG. 1B—Population Density in Southeastern Asia. This map, like the one opposite, was originally prepared for Professor Jan O. M. Broek's article, "Diversity and Unity in Southeast Asia." He has described his method of compiling the data on densities as follows: "In order to present a comparable picture for the whole of Southeast Asia, the year 1940 or 1941 was chosen, and densities were calculated for administrative districts. This use of administrative districts for the sake of uniformity explains, for instance, the rather low density of the Annam coastal region, where the districts include large areas of sparsely settled uplands adjacent to the crowded coastal strip. The scale of the map required, of course, some generalizations where there were many small districts with differing densities (Tongking, Cochinchina, Java). Cities, where they formed separate census units, were included in the adjacent districts." A list of the sources used and further notes about the compilation are given by Professor Broek in his article (p. 180). (Reproduced by courtesy of the *Geographical Review*).

[p. 11]

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fits perfectly, for it does not require a permanent field but can be grown anywhere, on flat land or steep slopes, provided that the rainfall is sufficiently heavy and the temperature and soil are suitable. In contrast, the cultivation of wet rice requires a sophisticated technique. To adapt to agriculture in Southeastern Asia Owen Lattimore's remark on the place of irrigation in Chinese agriculture,[24] we may say that the cultivation of wet rice lies at the core of agriculture in Southeastern Asia but not at the very roots.[25]

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The sedentary cultivators of Southeastern Asia have developed not only a notable range of varieties of wet rice adapted to varying natural conditions but also many differing techniques of rice culture, which embody the experience of generations of cultivators. Every important phase of the cultivation of wet rice has many variants. The reasons for these are often hidden to the casual observer, but Western agricultural specialists after painstaking research and experimentation have been forced to concede their value.

The ordinary varieties of wet rice differ greatly in respect to the time required for maturing and the amount of water needed. Selection has led to such remarkable achievements as the development of floating rice and of salt-loving varieties. The floating rice of Thailand and Cochinchina can be grown on land subject to prolonged high floods, a condition that ordinary varieties of wet rice do not tolerate. The growing plants are able to keep up with the rising floodwater; in extreme cases, the stems may reach a length of as much as 12 or 15 feet.[26] Salt-loving rices, which can be grown on saline soils or in brackish water, are cultivated along coasts or estuaries.

The raising of seedlings in seedbeds, after which they are transplanted to the field, is the main characteristic of most Oriental wet-rice culture. This practice has given Oriental rice relatively high yields. The preparation of the seedbed itself varies considerably.[27] The commonest method of raising rice seedlings is to make the seedbed on thoroughly soaked and puddled ground. Frequently the seed is soaked and allowed to germinate before it is sown in the bed. In the northern Philippines the seedlings are raised in seedbeds that are not flooded and puddled but are left dry. When the seedlings are pulled up from either a wet or a dry seedbed their roots

[24] Lattimore: Inner Asian Frontiers of China, 1940, p. 312. Elsewhere (p. 29) he says, "To assume the working out of such a technique [irrigated rice-growing] at the earliest stages of cultural and social development implies the ability to take a second major step forward at a time when the first tentative step had barely become possible."

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[25] In Java, for example, the cultivation of wet rice has spread only relatively recently into Sundanese territory and did not reach northern Bantam until the sixteenth century. Even today the Badoei of West Java have religious scruples against the planting of wet rice as well as against the use of the hoe or of the plow and carabao. Notwithstanding strenuous efforts on the part of the government to induce the Badoei to adopt a more intensive form of agriculture they continue to practice shifting cultivation and in the main to plant upland rice, using the dibble stick. See Kools: Hoema's, 1935, pp. 22–23.

[26] Tran-van-Huu: "Note sur la culture du riz flottant en Cochinchine," 1920, pp. 46–54.

[27] Copeland: *op. cit.*, pp. 226–229.

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[Filed in category 253.-- Analyst]
[see p. 11, category 116.-- Analyst]

suffer a certain amount of damage. The seedlings must therefore be given time to grow strong enough to endure the temporary uprooting. They usually need from 30 to 40 days before they are ready for transplanting. Whenever early transplanting is necessary a technique is employed which is known in the Philippines as *dapog*. The puddled seedbed is completely covered with banana leaves, which are pressed slightly into the mud so that a thin layer of mud spreads over the leaves. On top of this is placed a layer, an inch thick, of rice hulls or finely cut straw. The whole is thoroughly soaked and sown with seeds. The banana leaves prevent the roots of the seedlings from growing into the ground and suffering the usual damage when transplanted, but the seedlings must be transplanted within two weeks after the sowing of the seed. 243

In the riparian marshes of Sumatra and Borneo—the *lebak* areas—all the land is flooded at the time when the rice seed should be put into the ground. The inhabitants of these districts, however, have found an ingenious solution to their problem: the floating seedbed. They build small rafts of bamboo, reed, banana stems, or the leaf-ribs of the sago palm, on which they place a layer of rush, or some other aquatic plant, and then a thick layer of fine mud. As the water level rises and falls the seedlings have a chance to develop on the float unharmed.

Numerous also are the techniques employed to supply wet-rice fields with the necessary water (see pp. 47–51). These reflect the nature of the terrain, the social organization, and the stage of technical development of the inhabitants. For it is obvious that the cultivation of wet rice on the plains of the Red River in Tongking would require very different techniques from those required on the steep mountain slopes of northern Luzon.

Culture, Types of Land Use, and Population Pressure

One of the most striking characteristics of Southeastern Asia is the great variation in the density of the population (Map, Fig. 1B). This variation reflects differences in culture as well as differences in physical environment. The culture and social organization of a people are intimately linked to their technique and the intensity of their land use, which in turn guide the people in their selection of new land when it becomes necessary for them to seek new homes. The Cambodians, for example, when living in an environment similar to that of the Annamese, do not create the large rural settlements characteristic of areas inhabited by the latter.[28] Likewise, the Madurese prefer to settle in small hamlets or in isolated homesteads (*Einzelhof*) and to till unirrigated land, whereas the Javanese live in large villages and are by preference wet-field cultivators. Again, while the Bontocs and Ifugaos of northern Luzon build terraces and cultivate wet rice as their primary crop, the neighboring Apayaos, most of the Kalingas, the Tinggians, and the Gaddangs have so far resisted all attempts on the

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[28] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, p. 94.

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000 part of the government and of missionaries to introduce terracing and wet-rice cultivation but, instead, continue to practice shifting cultivation and to depend upon dry rice as their staple food.

161 241 311 Wherever we find shifting cultivation the density of population is low; on the other hand, permanent cultivation provides the basis for higher densities. The higher the density, the greater is the care bestowed upon the cultivation of the soil. The development of permanent-field cultivation, the construction of terraces on mountainsides and hillsides, the dyking and draining of plains, and other complex techniques associated with wet-rice cultivation are but expressions of a population density that demands an intensive utilization of the soil and a maximum production of food crops.

000 The areas where wet rice was first cultivated were probably hollows and small valleys and the well watered slopes of low hills rather than the great plains and wide valleys that are today the rice granaries of the world. The utilization of extensive plains and broad river valleys for the cultivation of wet rice requires a social organization unknown to the peoples who first began wet-rice culture.

243 231 It is thought that the cultivation of wet rice originated in days when the hoe and the dibble stick were the only agricultural tools, that is, before the animal-drawn plow reached Southeastern Asia. The broadcasting of seeds is held to be characteristic of plow culture, whereas the cultivators of wet rice in Monsoon Asia generally plant their rice seedlings in the manner of shifting cultivators,[29] a circumstance that would seem to support the hypothesis that the carabao and the plow were not a part of the original technique but were adopted later. Even today wet rice is raised in some parts of Southeastern Asia without the use of the plow. For example, peoples in central Celebes prepare their fields for cultivation by driving carabaos back and forth until the fields are thoroughly puddled.[30] In other areas where wet-rice fields are built on such steep slopes that it is impossible to get carabaos to the terraces, farmers are frequently obliged to till their land entirely by hand—employing only such tools as wooden spades and sticks, which may be shod with iron. The Ifugaos of northern Luzon, for example, have terrace walls reaching, in some cases, heights of 60 feet or more that can be scaled only by means of rocks jutting out from the faces of the walls.

000 Although most sedentary cultivators in Southeastern Asia make use of

[29] Although rice growers in other parts of the world generally use the broadcast method of sowing, one finds it in Southeastern Asia only as a rare exception. According to Copeland (*op. cit.*, p. 224) the *sabog*, or broadcasting method, is used in the Philippines over a rather limited area. This method produces lower yields but its advantages are "some saving of time, saving the labour of transplanting, and the possibility of maturing a crop with less water; rice grown directly in its place can get along with less water than transplanted rice." According to Kruyt (" De To Rongkong in Midden-Celebes," 1920, p. 380), the To Rongkong of central Celebes transplant their wet rice only in exceptional cases but usually broadcast it.

[30] Kruyt: "De To Seko in Midden-Celebes," 1920, p. 409.

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Although most sedentary cultivators in Southeastern Asia make use of the animal-drawn plow, in the densely populated regions the parcelling of land has proceeded so far that many peasants, whose fathers, or ancestors, owned draft animals (carabaos or oxen) and used plows, have farms so diminished in size that they cannot afford to keep draft animals and therefore must till their fields entirely with hand tools. In spite of the fact that they often make very intensive use of their fields, still they are not able to produce enough to meet the modest needs of their families. 241 231 311

In nearly all instances, however, where the governments concerned have attempted to solve this problem by opening up land suitable for sedentary cultivation to settlers coming from problem areas, the governments have been confronted by the fact that these districts, which might offer outlets for the congested areas, are inhabited by shifting cultivators or in some cases by food gatherers. The danger is then that the proposed migration may infringe upon the rights of the indigenous peoples, whose economy and mode of life, as we have noticed, require considerably more land than those of the incoming settlers, who are accustomed to permanent-field cultivation. It is, therefore, necessary for us to understand the various forms of land use in Southeastern Asia and their peculiar exigencies in order rationally to approach the problems of pioneering in the countries around the South China Sea. 311 241 166

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[See pp. 35 ff., category 241 or 116. -- Analyst]

Chapter II

THE SHIFTING CULTIVATOR [p. 16]

241 361 311 The field of the shifting cultivator is known by various local terms. It is called *caiñgin* in the Philippines, *humah* in Java, *ladang* in the Indies as a whole and in Malaya, *taungya* in Burma, *tamrai* in Thailand, and *rây* in Indochina.[1] Practically without exception, it is a clearing in either primeval or second-growth forest. The use of grassland is so unusual that we shall limit the following discussion to shifting cultivation on forest land.

As his name indicates, the shifting cultivator does not use the same piece of land every year; instead, he kills or cuts down at regular intervals —every year, every other year, or every third year—the trees of a small forest patch. He burns as much of the woody growth as is possible or convenient. Among the charred stumps and half-burned tree trunks he plants his favorite crops, be they cereals such as millet, upland rice, or maize; or tubers such as yams or sweet potatoes (Figs. 4–10). The latter are planted extensively by the *caiñgero*, the shifting cultivator in the Philippines. In planting cereals it is usually the men who take the planting stick to make little holes and the women who drop in a few seeds, using their feet to cover the seed with soil (Figs. 11–13). As forest land is generally free from weeds or grasses and the soil is usually rich in humus and well supplied with the ash of burned plant matter after clearing, it produces a very good, or even excellent, first harvest; the second harvest begins to show a decline in yield, and thereafter the returns diminish rapidly.[2] Grasses and weeds invade the clearing. Rather than battle these, the peasant abandons his old ladang and cuts and burns a new patch of forest (Fig. 15). The old plot reverts, under favorable conditions, to second-growth forest, the so-called *blukar* of the Malays, and is not cleared again for a period, the length of which may vary from 8 to 15 years, or more.

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Shifting cultivation is characterized by a lack of tillage; the soil is hardly disturbed, as no plow turns it. There is less labor involved than in other methods of cultivation, and the work is more evenly spread over the year—an advantage where labor is relatively scarce. The tasks involved are cutting, burning, and planting; sometimes simple fencing of the field against animals, guarding—especially before the harvest and usually by women and children—and, finally, harvesting. In addition, there may be some weeding in the first year and certainly during the second.

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1 In British India *jhum*, *kumri*, *dhya*, *bewar*, or *dullee*; in Ceylon *chena*; in Japan, Korea, and Formosa *karen* (a Japanese term); in Central America *milpa*; in parts of Africa *chitemene*.

2 Danhof reports for parts of the Lampoeng Districts that a ladang will produce from 15 to 25 quintals of rice in the first year and approximately 5 in the second year. In areas where the second yield shows such a serious decline the peasants usually prefer to make a new ladang—Danhof: "Bijdrage," 1940, p. 199.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
1 [See pp 37 ff., category 241 or 116. -- Analyst]

Shifting cultivation, the most primitive type of agriculture, may be briefly defined as an economy of which the main characteristics are rotation of fields rather than of crops; clearing by means of fire; absence of draft animals and of manuring; use of human labor only; employment of the dibble stick or hoe; short periods of soil occupancy alternating with long fallow periods. Other terms for shifting cultivation are field-forest economy and field-forest rotation. 241 361 311

Shifting cultivators prefer flat land, but in Formosa, the Philippines, Indochina, and Thailand they have been forced back into the hills and mountains and must often be content with fields on steep slopes (Figs. 16, 17). This has led some observers to believe that shifting cultivation is exclusively practiced in hilly or mountainous regions, or that such regions are preferred in this economy. However, in the Outer Islands[3] of the Netherlands Indies, one frequently finds ladangs in flat country (Fig. 18). If the ladang is very steep it is rarely used for more than one crop, so that new clearings must be made every year.

Many shifting cultivators no longer change their dwellings when they turn to new land; they have become sedentary at least as far as their houses are concerned. They may build a hut in the ladang if it is too far away from their village and may occasionally live in such a shelter, especially at the time when the ripening crop has to be guarded against animals, but they will return with the harvest to their permanent houses in the village (Figs. 10, 19–21).

Ladang culture, as is frequently true of any form of agriculture, is intricately interwoven with religion. Magic practices and sacrificial offerings must accompany every step in the culture, even if the people are no longer pagans but, for example, Mohammedans. Friedericy has made a careful study of these magical-religious customs in the Ponre mountains at the head of the Gulf of Bone in southern Celebes.[4] In this region the people live in small permanent villages. Whenever they are in need of new ladangs—every second year—the heads of the families meet to choose new locations. At this stage they try to find out from the spirits if these agree to the clearing of the land that was selected. For this purpose the village headman (*dukun*), or somebody else who is familiar with magic, is sent out to the part of the forest that has been chosen. Here the delegate places betel leaves (*Piper betle* L.), each with a small slab of lime and a piece of areca nut (*Areca catechu* L.), under a tree and expresses the desire of his community to cut the trees and to use the soil. He ends with the wish that the betel leaves and the areca nuts be scattered should the choice 241 787 [361] [824]

[3] I have used the term "Outer Islands" to denote all the islands of the Netherlands Indies not comprised in the jurisdiction of Java and Madura (Madoera). The Dutch administrative term is *Buitengewesten*.

[4] Friedericy: "Ponre," 1932, pp. 1–34; idem: "De taak van het bestuur," 1937, pp. 488–501. For an excellent description of the magical-religious rites that are associated with the agricultural efforts of the Bemba of Northern Rhodesia, see Richards: Land, Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia, 1939, pp. 351–380.

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of the new ladang be a poor one. After three days the same person returns, and if he finds that the offerings have been scattered a new location is chosen and a new attempt is made to get a favorable answer from the spirits. In case the betel leaves have been found undisturbed, all male members of the village have a meal on the chosen land. Then the area is divided among the villagers by the headman. Each individual appeals to the spirits by placing a betel leaf with lime and areca nut on the ladang that has been turned over to him. If the answer is unfavorable he tries again. The betel leaf may be placed three times. If the offering is disturbed each time, the headman turns over a part of his share, which is considerably larger than any of the others, to the less fortunate villager. Throughout the following agricultural year with its stages of clearing, planting, and harvesting, the peasant repeatedly requires the services of the dukun, or *shaman*, as well as the betel leaf.

In other regions details differ, but the essential fact remains that the social-religious life and thinking of the shifting cultivator is bound up with his characteristic form of cultivation.

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Shifting cultivators have no concept of private land ownership. The land belongs to the community, the tribe, or the village, and each member has the right to use as much land as he needs and can cultivate. The location of the land that he is to use may be decided upon by the village council or the headman. The person who clears the land and plants the crop gets the produce. Nobody has the right to plant a plot that has been cleared by someone else. As soon as the land is abandoned all rights are forfeited, except the right of the community. However, if trees have been planted, the ownership of the trees and their produce remains with the person who planted them, and he is given preference when the land has had a sufficient fallow period and can again be cultivated.

The Effect of Shifting Cultivation on the Land

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As has been stated above, ladangs decline in fertility after the first crop, and obnoxious grasses and weeds appear among the stooling tree stumps. As long as there is an abundance of forest land at his disposal the cultivator prefers to abandon the ladang. Under favorable conditions the grasses will, in turn, give way to second-growth forest. In the course of centuries this second-growth forest may develop into a climax forest, that is, a forest having the same composition as the primeval forest. In any case, when tall forest growth again occurs, the land will have had time to recover its original fertility.

Unfortunately, however, conditions are often not sufficiently favorable for a regeneration of soil fertility and the development of a good second-growth forest. As a matter of fact, the practice of shifting cultivation has altered the character of vegetation beyond recognition over wide areas in Southeastern Asia. Instead of a dense primeval rain-forest, we now find

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extensive open grasslands resulting from the most important tool of the shifting cultivator, fire. 241 134 311

Generally, the fallow period allows time only for the evolution of mediocre second-growth forest, for the shifting cultivator usually returns to an old ladang before even a small percentage of those tree species that made up the original stand have had a chance to come back. Repeated cultivations further impoverish the forest and reduce the number of species. Certain light-loving trees that played a minor role in the climax forest will spread rapidly and dominate, together with those species that show a resistance to fire and those that are capable of sending new sprouts out of the old stumps.[5]

If fire repeatedly invades an abandoned ladang, the tree flora is reduced until finally only grasses and herbs survive. These persist because their root systems, tubers, or bulbs send out new shoots after the fire. The [137] more important grasses and herbs that finally triumph over forest vegetation are *Imperata cylindrica* Beauv., *Imperata constricta* Hitchc., *Saccharum spontaneum* L., *Themeda gigantea* Hack, and *Eupatorium odoratum* L. These burn very rapidly and with a hot flame, even when still green. After they are well established they catch fire or are set afire every year, almost without exception; this prevents natural reforestation. Furthermore, the fire will also invade the neighboring forest and force it gradually back, so that the grass area steadily increases. This is especially true in hilly or mountainous country. In the Philippines about 18 per cent of the total area is covered with grass vegetation as a result of shifting cultivation and fires. These grass areas are known locally as *cogonales*. In the Indies, where they are called *alang-alang*,[6] they are also extensive, as in southern Sumatra. While I was traveling through southern Sumatra by rail during the dry season I counted twenty grass fires started within the space of an hour by sparks from our locomotive. In Thailand there is as yet very little cogonal land, according to Pendleton.[7] In Indochina culturally induced grasslands, either pure or with scattered trees—the latter called by the French *forêts claires* or *savanes-parcs*—are very extensive[8] (Figs. 23, 24).[1]

Once the vegetation of an area has been changed from forest to grass, [224] the land is of no more agricultural use to the shifting cultivator. The only benefit that he then gets out of the land is for hunting. For this, too, he often utilizes fire—either to drive wild animals out of hiding or to get a growth of young grass to attract his prey.

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[5] In Malaya and Sumatra the spread of such bushes and trees as *Lantana camara* L., *Schima bancana* Miq., *Peronema canescens* Jack, *Vitex pubescens* Vahl, *Melastoma malabathricum* L., and *Lagerstroemia speciosa* Pers. is due to the cutting of clearings.

[6] *Imperata* (both *constricta* and *cylindrica*) is known in the Philippines by the Spanish term *cogon*, in the East Indies as *alang-alang*, and in Malaya as *lalang*. The last two are Malay words.

[7] Pendleton: "Some Interrelations between Agriculture and Forestry," 1939, p. 41.

[8] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 368–372.

[1] [See p. 38, cat. 241 or 116 -- Analyst]

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When fires no longer ravage the grasslands, however, trees return and finally drive out the grasses completely, for the latter cannot stand shade.[9]

The spread of grass is especially rapid in regions with a long, pronounced dry season, whereas reforestation is more likely to take place in areas with a well distributed, high annual rainfall. This may explain why the Philippines and Indochina have a larger percentage of open grasslands than do Malaya and the Netherlands Indies.

A relatively high density of population is an important factor in preventing successful reforestation and encouraging grasses. In a thinly settled forest area there is sufficient land to allow for a long rest period, but an increasing density of population results in the shortening of the fallow period to such a degree that the soil is given insufficient time to recover its fertility. The shorter the fallow period the poorer the succeeding forest —if any—and the poorer the following crop yields, until finally the land can no longer satisfy the needs of the shifting cultivator.

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Pendleton believes that this cycle may have contributed materially to the downfall of the Khmers in Cambodia (Cambodge). He states that although the Khmers used the plow on very limited areas of wet riceland, they had largely to depend on the planting stick and shifting cultivation for their food supply. As the demands for more food arose from the rapidly increasing population concentrated in the city of Angkor, the fallow period granted to the uplands had to be progressively shortened. At the same time fires became so frequent that culturally induced grasslands spread while the cultivable area decreased, thus further diminishing the food supply available to the people of Angkor. "While the actual fall of Angkor is ascribed to the superior military power of invaders, the resistance of the inhabitants was doubtless much less than it would have been had the lands been productive and they had had adequate supplies of food."[10]

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Declining crop yields and the spread of grasses have been advanced as important reasons for the breakdown of the Mayan civilization,[11] and Pendleton further raises the question "whether the development of cogonals might not have been an important contributing factor in the dying out of some of the other civilizations of the tropics, notably that of Anuradapura, in Ceylon."[12]

Today the ruins of the Mayan cities, as well as those of Angkor, are surrounded by relatively luxuriant forest vegetation, which has had time to displace the pernicious grasses since man and his tool, fire, have abandoned the inhospitable grasslands.

Not only does shifting cultivation alter the character of the vegetation,

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[9] When an old ladang remains unburned for several years the following trees spring up in addition to those already mentioned in footnote 5: *Erechthites hieracifolia* Rafin., *Blumea balsamifera* DC., *Peltophorum dasyrachis* Kurz, *Macaranga tanarius* Muell. Arg., and *Piper aduncum* L.

[10] Pendleton: *op. cit.*, pp. 46 and 47.

[11] Cook: "Milpa Agriculture," 1921, pp. 307–326.

[12] Pendleton: *op. cit.*, p. 47.

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Not only does shifting cultivation alter the character of the vegetation, but also it may induce soil erosion, especially when it is practiced on slopes. Forest vegetation keeps the soil from being washed or blown away, but at the end of the dry season, when the trees have been cut and burned, the soil lies exposed. Consequently, during the early days of the rainy season large quantities of topsoil are washed downhill and carried by rivers to the plains. Erosion, by lowering the moisture-holding capacity of the soil as well as the rate of absorption, may thus cause further acceleration of run-off and lead finally to destructive floods on the plains. Such floods are frequent in the Philippines and parts of the East Indies. Pendleton points out that in Thailand the main rivers receive their great load of silt from the more steeply sloping mountains of northern Thailand where shifting cultivators have started the forces of accelerated erosion.[13]

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The large quantities of valuable timber destroyed year after year by the shifting cultivators in virgin areas and the prevention of reforestation by the fires that spread through the abandoned fields (Fig. 22) cause the forester to regard the shifting cultivator as his enemy. In the Philippines the forester has for many years been pleading for strictly enforced laws and severe penalties against shifting cultivators.

> The greatest enemy of our forest is caingin making. It is to the persistent practice of this crude form of agriculture from time immemorial that the existence of vast areas of denuded waste lands is attributable. Much of our valuable timber has been and is still being wasted by this illegal form of forest clearing. There are actually over five and a half million hectares of open lands that are practically idle. Due to continued caingins and the recurrence of fires on these open lands, the forest area is decreasing year after year. . . . Destructive floods in various parts of the Islands and the yearly appearance . . . of locust pest, the extermination of which is costing the Government hundreds of thousands of pesos yearly, are chiefly the direct results of this obnoxious practice.[14]

Conflicting Views on the Merits of Shifting Cultivation

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Judgments on the merits of shifting cultivation have been rather contradictory since the practice first came to the attention of scientific observers. During the past century the Dutch in Java spoke of it as *Raubbau* (robber economy), and one still finds the expression used. Sauer protests against this term. According to him, shifting cultivation is a "primitive economy, in which the per capita area of land needed for a community is rather large and in which the forest growth is to be considered as a part of a long term rotation of fields." He is of the opinion that it is "an excellent device for maintaining permanent productivity."[15]

Lord Hailey calls shifting cultivation "less a device of barbarism than a concession to the character of a soil which needs long periods for recovery and regeneration; and the trekking habit, whether of Dutch farmers

[13] Pendleton: "Soil Erosion in the Tropics," 1940, p. 757.

[14] Letter of the Director of the Bureau of Forestry to the Secretary of Justice, September 10, 1934.

[15] Sauer: "Destructive Exploitation," 1938, p. 496.

[See p. 38 cat. 241 or 116 -- Analyst]

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[in South Africa] or African tribes, has been due to the requirements of that 'extensive' system of occupation which the character of the soil has seemed to demand."[16] But he knows from his African experiences that shifting cultivation has there reached the point where it has become the source of problems that tax the ability of the colonial administrator. "The problems which arise today are mainly due to the changes forced on this system by the restriction of land, the stabilization of populations . . . and the extension of cultivation in order to produce crops for sale."[17] He considers shifting cultivation, or *chitemene* as it is called in parts of Africa, "most wasteful, but, as experience has taught the African that burnt forest land is particularly suited to the staple crop of small millets, it is practised throughout the forest areas of Africa, and in some areas all high forest has already disappeared."[18] Worthington thinks that "shifting cultivation is admirably adapted to the needs of primitive peoples, provided there is sufficient land available"; but he also states that "after a long period of shifting cultivation the whole character of the vegetation may be altered beyond recognition. In countries with an equatorial climate, without a dry season, shifting cultivation usually changes virgin forest into secondary forest and thence to a kind of bush vegetation."[19]

The growth of population and the change from a subsistence to a money economy have increased the land requirements of the African hoe-culture peasant to such an extent that shifting cultivation has led to large-scale deforestation and has brought soil erosion, which today is recognized as one of the main problems of agriculture, in its wake. Deforestation and soil erosion have forced the colonial administrators of Africa to study shifting cultivation carefully in an attempt to find a solution to the problem. The Council of the Royal African Society passed the following resolution on October 20, 1937:

> That this Council views with the gravest concern the widespread destruction of the African soil by erosion consequent on wasteful methods of husbandry [shifting cultivation] which strike at the basis of rural economy and Native welfare, and is of opinion that immediate steps should be taken for the adoption of a common policy and energetic measures throughout British Africa in order to put an effective check upon this growing menace to the fertility of the land and to the health of its inhabitants.[20]

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Shifting cultivation has been practiced on hilly land for countless centuries in India, where examples are found in Bengal and Assam, and in the northern parts of Burma; but because of disease and feuds, there was

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16 Hailey: An African Survey, 1938, p. 1. We refer especially to shifting cultivation in Africa because there it has attracted much more attention than in Southeastern Asia. In the greater part of Africa it is the only form of agriculture, whereas in Southeastern Asia it takes a minor position.

17 *Ibid.*, p. 879.

18 *Ibid.*, pp. 879–880.

19 Worthington: Science in Africa, 1938, pp. 376–377.

20 Land Usage and Soil Erosion in Africa, 1938, p. 3.

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always sufficient land for the population without undue pressure on the forests. A result of British rule has been to increase the population and correspondingly to reduce the rest period of the soil. The consequences have been deforestation and soil erosion. For that reason the authorities have attempted to stop this mode of land use. 241 [185]

In Java shifting cultivation attracted the attention of the government as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century. It was practiced especially in the mountains. The fact that a shifting cultivator required more land than a peasant who cultivated the same piece of land year after year made shifting cultivation extremely undesirable to a colonial administration that wanted to use all available land for the production of cash crops—either under the "forced culture system" of 1830 to 1870[21] or under the private plantation system that has existed since 1870. This circumstance, together with an alarming increase in population, prompted the government to do everything possible to stop the practice of shifting cultivation in Java, and today it is found only in the quite thinly settled residency of Bantam in West Java.[22] In the Outer Islands, with their sparse population and large forest areas, it is widely practiced. But, in contrast to their predecessors, Dutch officials of recent times rarely use the term *Raubbau* for shifting cultivation. Instead they consider this form of land use justifiable if the abandoned fields revert to forest and have the possibility of regaining their former fertility. In the past fifteen years, however, warning voices have pointed out that in large parts of the Outer Islands ladang culture has become a source of destruction, for the forest is no longer being given an opportunity to recuperate.[23] Both agricultural and forestry officials have consequently become concerned over shifting cultivation. In 1930 Hagreis presented a paper on ladang culture before the congress of officials of the Agricultural Advisory Service in the Netherlands Indies.[24] At that time it was decided to appoint a special commission to study ladang culture.[25] The foresters, also, devoted a good deal of attention to the problem during their congress in 1937. In 1940 Van Beukering of the Department of Economic Affairs summarized the result of the ladang *enquête*.[26] He came to the conclusion that shifting cultivation is a logical and economically justifiable form of land use wherever there is a large amount of land available and a primitive economy exists. From a social point of view no objection can be raised if, after each occupation, the fertility of the soil is regained. There is no reason to insist upon more intensive forms of land use so long as the population density does not increase beyond 50 persons per square kilometer, or 130 persons per square mile. If at this density we

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[21] From 1830 to 1870 the peasants of Java were forced, under the notorious "culture system," to devote part of their land and labor to producing crops for the government.

[22] Kools: Hoema's, 1935.

[23] Gonggrijp: "Soil Management," 1938, pp. 397–404.

[24] Hagreis: "Ladangbouw," 1930, pp. 43–75 and 629–642.

[25] "Enquête betreffende het ladangvraagstuk," 1931, pp. 1022–1033.

[26] Van Beukering: Het ladangvraagstuk. Unpublished typescript, 1940.

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allow for five persons per family and assume that the family shifts its cultivation plot annually but returns to the same plot after an average period of 10 years, each family could occupy annually one hectare, or 2.47 acres. This is the amount of land that an average shifting cultivator in the Indies needs in order to cover the food requirements of his family.

This calculation does not make any allowance for permanent forests. Actually, however, the land requirements are not quite so high, because very often the same land is used for two years instead of one, which would either allow for a longer period of fallow or keep a part of the virgin forest intact. The latter is improbable because of the shifting cultivator's preference for virgin forest.

To summarize these opinions, shifting cultivation from the agricultural point of view is not considered objectionable so long as vegetation and the fertility of the soil are restored by nature. The opinion of those who regard it as a fatal agricultural system under all circumstances is widely felt to be unjustified. From the silvicultural point of view, shifting cultivation is held to be objectionable if it destroys timber that would otherwise be exploited by the forest service or by private concessionaries.

Supplementing Shifting Cultivation With Cash Crops in the Netherlands Indies

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The products of the typical shifting cultivator never reach a distant market. There is seldom any surplus, for the shifting cultivator is a subsistence farmer who lives from hand to mouth. In the Outer Islands of the Netherlands Indies, however, the shifting cultivator has been drawn into modern economy and has modified this age-old system. In parts of Sumatra and Borneo he has begun to diversify his economy by planting tree crops on the ladang among his rice or maize. After one or two harvests the fields are abandoned and left to the trees that have been planted. The trees then furnish an additional source of income as soon as they reach the bearing stage. Pepper has been raised as a ladang crop for many centuries, especially in the Lampoeng Districts. Coffee was introduced in the days of the Dutch East India Company and adopted as a commercial crop by the peasants. Benzoin (*Styrax benzoin* Dryander), also, has long been grown in this manner. More recently coconuts and, since about 1905, rubber have become ladang crops (Figs. 25–33).[1]

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A shifting cultivator may, over a period of years, convert his old ladangs into rubber gardens, for example, until he is assured of a sufficient income from his permanent tree crop to buy his food from the outside and no longer requires a ladang for the production of food. This process has led to the creation of the large native rubber areas in Borneo and Sumatra, where some shifting cultivators have become dependent upon the market price of rubber and upon the policy of the government in regard to taxation and export control. In times of low prices and export restrictions they may suffer severe economic setbacks and even hardship. In Bengkalis

[1] See p. 39 ff, cat. 241 or 116 -- Analysis]

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in the East Coast of Sumatra a few years ago,[27] rubber gardens occupied so large an area that there was actually a scarcity of land suitable for the making of new ladangs for food crops, and rubber trees had to be cut down. So long as the Indonesians[28] had their rice ladangs the market quotations of New York and London meant nothing to them; but as cash-crop producers they began to feel the effect of every fluctuation on the world market.

Although this modification of the old economy has led to permanent gardens of rubber, coconut, and benzoin trees and thus to a partial abandon-

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TABLE I—SCHEME OF OPERATION OF SHIFTING CULTIVATORS RAISING COFFEE AS A CASH CROP IN LADANGS, IN TERMS OF HARVESTS

YEAR	LADANGS				
	FIRST	SECOND	THIRD	FOURTH	FIFTH
1st	rice				
2nd	rice				
3rd	coffee	rice			
4th	coffee	rice			
5th	coffee	coffee	rice		
6th	coffee	coffee	rice		
7th	coffee	coffee	coffee	rice	
8th		coffee	coffee	rice	
9th		coffee	coffee	coffee	rice
10th			coffee	coffee	rice
11th			coffee	coffee	coffee
12th				coffee	coffee
13th				coffee	coffee
14th					coffee
15th					coffee

ment of shifting cultivation, where pepper and coffee supplement the traditional crops of the shifting cultivator no fundamental change takes place, because these gardens are not permanent. The cultivation of coffee, especially, on ladangs without shade trees or other protective measures, such as terraces, causes erosion and exhausts the soil very rapidly. The lifetime of coffee bushes on ladangs is only from 3 to 5 years once they have started to yield berries—much shorter than that of those on well-managed European estates.[29] The lifetime of a pepper garden is considerably longer, perhaps 15 years. On the slopes of Mt. Dempo and in other parts of the residency of Palembang, shifting cultivators plant coffee bushes 1½ to 2 meters apart in the midst of upland rice fields during the first year that they occupy a ladang. In the following year the bushes are still small enough to permit the growing of a rice crop among them. In the third year a new ladang is made and planted with rice and coffee, while a coffee harvest is gathered from the first ladang. In the fourth year the first ladang produces an excellent crop of coffee. In the fifth year the

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[27] Van Suchtelen: "Parallelen," 1938, pp. 575–584.
[28] Native inhabitants of the East Indies.
[29] Vonk: "Systematisch beheer van het ladangareaal," 1937, p. 621.

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first ladang yields its third coffee harvest and the second its first coffee harvest, while rice and coffee are planted in a third ladang. In the seventh year the cultivator may have as many as four ladangs, the first producing

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

FIG. 2—Sakai ladangs in the midst of the forest in the Tasek (Lake) Bera region, Pahang, Malaya. (Reproduced through the courtesy of the *Geographical Review*.)

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FIG. 3—Small ladangs in the forest, Kedah, Malaya. (Reproduced through the courtesy of the *Geographical Review*).

its last coffee crop before it is abandoned because of declining yields, the second yielding its third coffee harvest, the third just entering the bearing stage, while the fourth ladang supplies the shifting cultivator with rice grown among young coffee bushes.

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The Areal Extent of Shifting Cultivation in Southeastern Asia

It is difficult to form an idea of the areal extent of shifting cultivation because of its migratory nature and the fact that it is often practiced in remote regions. The only country of Southeastern Asia in which an attempt has been made to estimate the area used for shifting cultivation is the Netherlands Indies, but even there it was not possible to include all

Table II—Philippine Islands: Illegal Caiñgins Detected, 1914-1940

Year	Illegal Caiñgins Number	Illegal Caiñgins Area in Hectares
1914	895	....
1915	1 198	....
1916	845	....
1917	665	....
1918	776	....
1919	603	....
1920	721	....
1921	1 602	1 429.48
1922	3 110	2 803.55
1923	1 759	1 516.33
1924	1 753	1 396.90
1925	1 762	1 391.29
1926	1 829	1 476.61
1927	2 002	1 743.92
1928	1 774	1 602.95
1929	1 312	1 370.41
1930	3 227	3 279.77
1931	2 534	3 345.74
1932	2 547	5 586.27
1933	2 427	2 831.38
1934	3 207	3 215.46
1935	2 631	2 455.73
1936	2 314	2 510.59
1937	1 967	2 308.24
1938	1 766	2 029.68
1939*	906	1 331.12
1940†	2 646	4 416.56
Total	48 778	48 071.98

Source: Data supplied by the Bureau of Forestry, Manila.
*Six months only, ending June 30, 1939, because of change of fiscal year.
†From July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1940.

parts of the Outer Islands in the estimate. Van Beukering concluded that one-third of all food consumed in the Outer Islands was grown on ladangs; this would require a total of 1,100,000 hectares of land. If we assume that all ladangs are occupied for 2 years and lie fallow for 12 years, the shifting cultivation system would need seven times 1,100,000, or 7,700,000, hectares. This estimate does not include the ladang area under coffee and pepper cultivation. (Rubber, coconut, and benzoin cannot be considered because they are, for practical purposes, permanent crops.)

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
1 [See p. 26, category 241 or 116. -- Analyst]

241 311 134 361

Van Beukering allowed an additional 200,000 hectares for coffee and pepper ladangs; so that the total area amounts to about 8,000,000 hectares. If we assume that the population of the Outer Islands increases at the rate of 1½ to 2½ per cent each year, it would double in from 29 to 47 years. This would mean that after about 30 to 50 years 16,000,000 hectares would come within the scope of shifting cultivation.

In Malaya ladang cultivation is illegal, but it is practiced in the hinterland well away from roads and railways, in eastern sections of the peninsula. Dobby recently described it in Pahang and northeastern Kedah, near the Thai border.[30] The Sakai of Pahang regularly abandon their primitive huts as well as the clearings when they shift to a new field (Map, Fig. 2). 1 The Malays of northeastern Kedah, on the other hand, as a rule live permanently in one place and change only their fields (Map, Fig. 3). 1 There are no statistics available on the areal extent to which shifting cultivation is carried on in Malaya, but according to Dobby the system gives way to permanent culture "as the standard of cultivation rises and as the effect of law becomes stronger."[31]

In Thailand shifting cultivation is extensively practiced by the tribes of the mountains of the north and west, on the eastern part of the Khorat Plateau, and on the peninsula. Probably about 1,000,000 people depend upon it. According to the same kind of calculation that Van Beukering made for the Indies, a total of 1,400,000 hectares would be required, or 200,000 hectares annually, if we allow five persons per household and consider that one hectare covers the needs of a family for 2 years.[32]

[162]

In Indochina only the tribes of the mountains of Tongking, Laos, and Annam now practice rây, or shifting, cultivation. The people of the plains, Annamese and Cambodians, who represent 84 per cent of the population, practice a more intensive form of agriculture. Gourou has estimated the areal extent of shifting cultivation in Indochina. He states that a rây is used for 2 years and has to lie fallow for at least 20 years, which seems a rather long period as compared with other countries. In addition to its extensive plains, Indochina has a mountainous or hilly area of 580,000 square kilometers. Only one per cent of this land is permanently cultivated. Gourou estimates that about 40 per cent of the mountainous country is suitable for rây cultivation and he assumes that one-tenth of this, or 4 per cent of the total mountain land, is under rây cultivation in any one year.[33] If this calculation is correct it would mean that 23,200 square kilometers, or 2,320,000 hectares, are occupied annually by shifting cultivators. The numerical strength of the shifting tribes shows, however, that this estimate cannot be correct. Their number is not much greater than

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30 Dobby: "Settlement Patterns in Malaya," 1942, p. 222.

31 *Ibid.*

32 For an excellent description of the life of the shifting cultivators in Thailand, see Credner: Siam, 1935, pp. 148–173.

33 Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 177–182, especially pp. 180 and 182.

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[See p. 27, category 116. -- Analyst]

1,500,000, or at the most 2,000,000, which would mean about 300,000 to 400,000 households. This number of households could hardly occupy such a large rây area as Gourou assumes. 241 311

In Formosa only the Malay tribes of the mountains in the eastern half of the island practice shifting cultivation. They number, according to estimates, about 150,000. From this we may assume that not more than 30,000 to 50,000 hectares are occupied annually by shifting cultivators. 134

In the Philippines it is unlawful to make caiñgins on public land without the permission of the Bureau of Forestry.[34] Permission will be given if the forest on the land involved is of no commercial value and if the caiñgero accepts the obligation to reforest his patch with seeds supplied by the forest service. Several hundred caiñgeros are brought annually before the justices of the peace, who in the past, because their sympathy was with the caiñgeros, were usually rather reluctant to fine the culprits (Table II). Nobody knows, of course, how many illegal caiñgins escape detection, but it is certain that they greatly outnumber those that are made with the permission of the foresters added to those that have been brought to the attention of the courts. Special consideration is given to the "non-Christian" tribes, for whom tracts of land have been set aside within which they continue their age-old system of cultivation. In Mindanao probably three-fourths of the population, from the primitive Manobos to the more advanced Moros, practice the caiñgin system of cultivation. Other regions where this system is practiced extensively are Mindoro, Cebu, southern Negros, and parts of Luzon—the central and eastern cordillera and the Camarines. About 10 per cent of the population of the Philippines obtain a part or all of their food from caiñgins, most of which are made either on private land or on land that belongs to non-Christian tribes who know no other form of agriculture. [162]

Methods of Eliminating the Undesirable Aspects of Shifting Cultivation

In regions where the density of population exceeds 50 persons per square kilometer, shifting cultivation becomes wasteful and destructive. It is imperative in such areas that the system be either modified or else replaced by more conserving and, where possible, more intensive forms of land use. For most backward tribes this involves fundamental changes in their mode of life, religious ideas, and concepts of land rights. 241 311 161

In some instances it should suffice to adopt measures that eliminate the harmful or wasteful after effects of the system without requiring that this kind of land use be given up completely. Let us assume that we have a somewhat thinly settled region containing a forest that is not particularly valuable and the exploitation of which is impracticable or at present inexpedient. Deforestation and the spread of grasses are undesirable aspects 185 241 311

[34] Nano: "Kaiñgin Laws," 1939, pp. 87–92.

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241 311 185 of shifting cultivation in the area. In such a case reforestation would be assured by keeping fire out of the old clearings. This could be done by leaving relatively non-inflammable forest belts at least 60 feet wide between individual clearings. These forest belts would offer some protection against the spread of grass fires and at the same time would be a source of seed for further reforestation. Reforestation under such circumstances would be much easier and cheaper than if large contiguous areas were to be cleared and used.

245 185 [137] Where natural reforestation is particularly slow, cultivators should be required to practice artificial reforestation. In scattered regions in Southeastern Asia tribesmen do this on their own initiative. Pendleton reports such a case in Burma.[35] Certain Dyak tribes in Borneo plant seeds of the candlenut tree (*Aleurites moluccana* Willd.) about 3 meters apart in a freshly cleared ladang before it has even been burned. In the eastern part of the Malay Archipelago shifting cultivators plant such trees as *Aleurites moluccana* Willd., *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Hibiscus similis* Bl., *Casuarina equisetifolia* L., *Macaranga* species, *Euphorbia* species, *Sesbania grandiflora* Pers., and *Desmodium timoriense* DC. for the purpose of restoring the forest.

In Sumatra Deli tobacco planters initiated artificial reforestation after alang-alang had regularly invaded their fallow fields and caught fire so frequently that second-growth forest could not get a start. In Deli the tobacco fields are in use only 1 year and lie fallow 7 to 10 years. They should be protected by forest growth during that period. Therefore, in order to make this possible, the planters controlled fires by planting belts of teak along the highways and roads. These belts served as fireguards [137] and at the same time provided lumber for tobacco-drying sheds. On the tobacco fields themselves they planted especially *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Cassia siamea* Lam., *Pithecellobium saman* Benth., and *Leucaena glauca* Benth., which drive out the alang-alang[36] (Figs. 34–39).

Another way of speeding up reforestation is to spare a few of the larger trees at the time of the clearing. This is done by the Malays of [137] Sumatra. They do not cut down *Koompassia parvifolia* Prain, *Arenga saccharifera* Labill., *Durio zibethinus* Murr. (durian), *Parkia* species, or *Garcinia grandifolia* Pierre.[37] The last three are fruit trees that are numerous [314] in the forest, whereas the second is a palm whose flower stalk is tapped for its sugary sap and the first is preferred by bees as a hiving tree, which gives it its name, "bee-tree." This tree is preserved because the people want the honey. Worthington reports that in Africa "some tribes appear to realize the necessity of maintaining tree growth on their clearings and merely top the trees and lop the branches, so that the trees are enabled to

[35] Similar cases are known in the residency of Benkoelen in Sumatra, in central Celebes, and in Flores. See Hagreis: "Ladangbouw," 1930, p. 631.

[36] Jochems; "De begroeiing der tabakslanden," n.d., pp. 77–89.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 30–32.

[See p 40 ff, cat 116 -- Analyst]

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recuperate quickly when the area is again allowed to revert to bush."[38] 245

Several of the forest services of Southeastern Asia have made a rather [654] successful use of the shifting cultivator in their endeavor to reforest the land. They have combined shifting culture and silviculture by hiring shifting cultivators to cut mature trees and to sow or plant new trees on cut-over or burned-over land. For this the cultivators are paid a small wage. 185 In addition they are allowed to grow their own crops for one or two years between the rows of young trees. This system, known as the "taungya forestry system," was developed in 1856 by the German forester, Dietrich Brandis, while he was Superintendent of Forests in Pegu, Burma.[39] It is ingenious in that it recognizes the habits of the shifting cultivator and fits them into a modern forest economy instead of persecuting the cultivator and forcing him to give up his traditional culture. This system has been used in the teak forests of Java since 1871. The forest service makes a contract[40] with the peasants of Java according to which the peasants are to prepare the land and plant and take care of teak trees (*Tectona grandis* L.) in return for a small sum of money and the right to plant such crops as maize and red pepper (*Capsicum annuum* L.) between the rows of teak. The cultivation of upland rice is discouraged, and the planting of cassava, peanuts, castor beans, and tobacco usually is not allowed (Figs. 40, 41). 1/A

The taungya forestry system is an excellent way of getting pure stands [313] of commercial timber. The typical forest of the tropics is expensive to exploit because of the large variety of trees which it contains, many of which have little or no commercial value.[41]

As important as reforestation is soil erosion control. Where shifting 134 cultivation is practiced in mountainous regions it often causes such accel- 133 eration in the rate of erosion that the rivers are choked with sediment and periodically do great flood damage. Flood control could be achieved in 185 most cases by completely closing the headwaters and watershed areas to cultivators. On more gentle slopes the clearings should be rather narrow, should parallel the contours, and be separated by belts of forest. If at the same time the forest uphill were protected by fireguards, the clearings would have a chance to close quickly again so that the soil would be

[38] Worthington: Science in Africa, 1938, pp. 378–379.

[39] *Taungya* is the Burmese term for the temporary field of the shifting cultivator, a term that the foresters have adopted. E. P. Stebbing in his work, The Forests of India, Vol. 1, 1922, p. 376, writes:

"Brandis, moreover, recognized that the very system which, till then, had destroyed teak forests might be utilized to produce them, . . . and as early as 1856 an attempt was made in Prome district to sow teak in regular rows, together with the rice scattered by the toungya [*sic*] cutters. Twenty years afterwards this attempt had grown into a regular system, by which areas were being annually stocked with teak at a cost far below that of regular plantations." See also *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, 1926, pp. 415–428.

[40] Becking: "De djaticultuur op Java," 1928, pp. 50–52.

[41] Heske: "Der tropische Wald," 1939, p. 414. Heske's article gives an excellent short account of the forests of Southeastern Asia and points out that they are on the whole much easier to exploit than are the forests of tropical America because of the abundance of cheap labor.

1/A [See p. 41, cat 116 -- Analysl]

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185 134 138 protected against abnormal erosion. Terracing would be the most effective method of checking soil erosion, but this requires a good deal of labor, which is scarce in areas of shifting cultivation.

654 134 185 133 The Forestry Service of the Indies started an interesting soil-erosion experiment near Tjiwidej in the mountains south of Bandoeng at an elevation of 1800 meters. Two adjacent parcels of forest land, lying on rather steep slopes, are drained separately—out of each parcel comes a little brook—and thus form separate drainage units. Both parcels were used by shifting cultivators who had cut and burned the forest. In one case the slope was left undisturbed; in the other the slope was terraced. At the foot of each slope catch basins were constructed to retain the sediment that was washed down by rain water and transported by the brooks. The amount of water that drains out of each unit was measured and the sediment weighed. The purpose of this experiment was to get quantitative measurements of the amount of erosion that is caused by shifting cultivation and to study the effect of terracing in reducing soil loss. During the first year both parcels lost very little soil, because the humus layer protected it; but in the second year the unterraced parcel lost 5.065 kg. of silt per square meter whereas the terraced parcel lost only one-half as much, or 2.524 kg.[42] (Figs. 42–45). 1

Under the conditions that we have discussed so far, no radical change in the system of cultivation is required. If, however, the population increases to such an extent that there is no longer enough available land to allow for a sufficiently long rotation cycle, more drastic remedies are necessary.

654 185 245 134 Such a situation arose in parts of the Outer Islands and attracted the attention of government specialists. Legal experts familiar with Indonesian customary law, foresters, and agricultural advisers collaborated to seek a solution.[43] Realizing that shifting cultivators are usually reluctant to give up their traditional form of land use, the specialists approached the ladang problem by searching for means of reforesting ladangs quickly. Experiments were made with the planting of quick-growing leguminous and non-leguminous trees, bushes, and shrubs to shorten the fallow period, restore the humus, protect the soil against accelerated erosion, eliminate the grasses, and, in the case of leguminous species, improve the soil by adding nitrogen.[44] We have already seen, however, that artificial refor-

[42] I was able to visit the Tjiwidej experiment with Mr. L. Gonggrijp, under whose supervision the work was carried out. For a detailed report on the project see Gonggrijp: "Het erosie-onderzoek," 1941, pp. 200–220.

[43] H. J. Friedericy of the Department of the Interior and H. Vonk and E. J. Wind of the Department of Economic Affairs, for example, worked together on the problem of ladang culture in the residency of Palembang.

[137] [44] Experimental plantings included, among others, *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., a light-loving tree which is typical in Southeastern Asia of dry, rather open climax forests and of second-growth forests; *Hibiscus tiliaceus* L.; *Albizzia falcata* Backer, one of the fastest-growing trees of Southeastern Asia, used widely as a shade tree on coffee plantations; *Aleurites moluccana* Willd., a tree at home in the drier parts of the East Indies; *Leucaena glauca* Benth.; *Pterocarpus indicus* Willd., a large tree frequently used along roadsides as

1 [see p. 42, category 116 -- Analyst]

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estation is not a discovery of Western-trained scientists but has long been practiced by certain groups in Southeastern Asia. It was the plan of the government to spread and enforce this practice of artificial reforestation wherever advisable. This practice, whereby the cultivator determines the vegetative cover during the fallow period instead of abandoning the ladang to chance growth, brings him to a transition stage between shifting cultivation and permanent cultivation. From there the step to permanent cultivation with crop rotation is but a short one.

Permanent cultivation requires repeated tilling and therefore more labor and tools than the shifting cultivator is accustomed to. Work animals are also desirable. An important obstacle to intensification of agriculture in wide areas of Southeastern Asia, however, is the fact that hill and mountain regions [up to about 1500 meters in elevation] are frequently infested with malaria so that the energy of the people is greatly reduced.[45] Moreover, the acquisition of such implements as plows, harrows, and hoes, and especially of work animals, calls for financial resources or credit, both of which the average shifting cultivator lacks. Some shifting cultivators do own livestock, such as cattle or carabaos, but utilize neither their labor nor their manure. Groups of the Mois in the mountains of Annam have carabaos, but they do not use the animals in their agricultural activities because they "cannot talk" to them.[46] On the Lesser Sunda Islands livestock is kept because it gives social prestige to the owner. Overstocking of the pasture areas on these islands has led to overgrazing and has cut into the forest area until there has developed a scarcity of land suitable for ladang cultivation. The same has happened in large areas in Africa. There it has been necessary to teach the native peasant the use of cattle and make him familiar with the plow. This was done successfully in northern Nigeria by combining the animal husbandry of the nomadic Fulani with the indigenous shifting cultivation of the Hausa peasant, thus developing "a system of permanent farming whereby a man with cattle of his own, say two working oxen and a few cows, can plough and maintain in fertility an area of land sufficient to supply all the requirements of himself and his family, and to obtain a surplus balance as a return for his labour. . . . Thus mixed farming represents a gradual evolution from the shifting methods of cultivation to a static type of agriculture, by the introduction of animal husbandry, and with the use of animal cultivation."[47] Above all, the peasant learns to preserve the animal manure and

a shade tree; *Dolichos lablab* L., a climbing herb which is valuable as a vegetable; *Crotolaria anagyroides* H.B. and K., a bush of vigorous growth which attains a height of from 12 to 14 feet and forms an excellent green manure; *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., low shrubs useful as green manures; and *Mimosa invisa* Mart., a leguminous creeper which suppresses grasses.

[45] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 181 and 350.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 354.

[47] King: "Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1939, p. 271. See also Faulkner and Mackie: West African Agriculture, 1933; and by the same authors: "The Introduction of Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1936, pp. 89–96.

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241 to apply it regularly to his fields in order to keep up the fertility which
231 formerly was restored through long forest fallow. This animal fertilizer
185 is more important than the help the peasant gets from his animals in the way of labor. Thus the area to be cultivated may be limited by the amount of manure available, rather than by the extent of land that can be plowed.

Van Beukering, in his summary of the results of the ladang *enquête*, is of the opinion that similar practices should be introduced in the Outer Islands of the Netherlands Indies; but the pasture problem must first be carefully studied before mixed farming can be widely established in the Indies. Where animal manure is not available, the composting of vegetable waste, or even of crops grown for this specific purpose, supplies an excellent fertilizer.

The intensification and modification of shifting cultivation are less difficult in flat country than on sloping land where there is the hazard of soil erosion. Perhaps the most obvious solution would be to move the population from mountainous land to the plains and valley floors, but this can be done only in areas where population density is low. In Southeastern Asia [62] the density of population on the plains is usually so high that, should it be possible to bring malaria under control, a movement from the plains to the uplands and mountains would be desirable rather than a migration in the opposite direction. Another solution would be to have the shifting cultivator plant permanent tree crops to protect the soil against accelerated erosion. Steep slopes which now produce but a single moderate rice crop every few years could be made more productive if planted with perennials. The cultivator could then buy his staple food with the money obtained from the sale of the crops harvested from his trees.

000 The speed with which the change from shifting cultivation to permanent cultivation may be made will depend both on the geographical environment and the cultural level of the community. Shifting cultivators with permanent villages and a regularly established rotation of fields will respond much more readily to a reform brought from the outside than a group that is always ready to abandon its dwellings and move to a new locality.

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

(Note—All the photographs in this book except those for which acknowledgement is made were taken by the author.)

Fig. 4 (upper left)—*Caiñgin* freshly cut and burned in second-growth forest. Cagayan Province, Luzon. (Courtesy of the Bureau of Forestry.)

Fig. 5 (upper right)—Cutting down the larger trees has been avoided by girdling. The caiñgin is ready for planting. Bataan Province, Luzon. (Courtesy of the Bureau of Forestry.)

Fig. 6 (center left)—Burning a freshly cut caiñgin. Cotabato Province, Mindanao.

Fig. 7 (center right)—Burning *ladangs*. Residency of Palembang, Sumatra.

Fig. 8 (lower left)—Ilongot's caiñgin planted with upland rice. Nueva Vizcaya Province, Luzon. (Courtesy of the Bureau of Forestry.)

Fig. 9 (lower right)—Ladang planted with upland rice. The second-growth forest in the background will be cut in a year or two. Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra.

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FIG. 10 (upper left)—The temporary tree-house in this *caingin* provides an excellent lookout as well as protection against wild animals. Cotabato Province, Mindanao.

FIG. 11 (upper right)—Shifting cultivator in a *ladang*, about to plant upland rice seeds. Residency of the Lampoeng Districts, Sumatra.

FIG. 12 (center left)—The man on the right is driving a planting stick into the ground, while the man on the left plants the upland rice seeds.

FIG. 13 (center right)—The holes made with the planting stick are ready for seed.

FIG. 14 (lower left)—Abandoned caingin invaded by *cogon*. Bukidnon Province, Mindanao.

FIG. 15 (lower right)—Abandoned ladang. Residency of the Lampoeng Districts, Sumatra.

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



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[illegible] (upper left)—New *ladangs* planted with upland rice and maize on a steep slope. Notice the young second-growth forest on the second slope and the older forest in the background. Residency of Tapanoeli, Sumatra.

[illegible] (upper right)—New *caingins* on slopes in second-growth forest. West of Baguio, Mountain Province, Luzon.

[illegible] (center left)— Ladang of upland rice and maize on level land. Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra.

[illegible] (center right)—New caingin ready for the first planting. The flimsy hut will be abandoned, together with the caingin, after one harvest. South of Sagnay, Camarines Sur Province, Luzon.

[illegible] (lower left)—Guarding the ripening rice against birds from a temporary shelter in a ladang. The man has a permanent house in the village. Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra.

[illegible] (lower right)—Well built village house of a shifting cultivator who raises pepper in his old ladangs. Residency of the Lampongs Districts, Sumatra.

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

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FIGS. 22 and 23 illustrate undesirable conditions that may result from shifting cultivation.

FIG. 22—*Caliguin* cut and burned out in a valuable commercial forest before the holder of the timber concession had a chance to exploit it. Negros Occidental Province, Negros. (Courtesy of the Bureau of Forestry.)

FIG. 23—*Cogonales* in the foreground and patches of second-growth forest in the hills. The *cogon* is gaining the upper hand because of repeated fires, which prevent natural reforestation. Near Port Banga, Zamboanga Province, Mindanao. (Courtesy of the Bureau of Forestry.)

FIG. 24—Filipino foresters investigating the extensive cogonales of eastern Nueva Ecija Province, Luzon. (Courtesy of the Bureau of Forestry.)

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FIGS. 25 and 28 (upper left and upper right)—Pepper vines growing in an old *ladang*. Residency of the Lampoeng Districts, Sumatra.

FIG. 26 (center left)—Young rubber tree planted in a rice ladang. No more rice will be planted after the second rice harvest. Western Bali.

FIG. 27 (lower left)—Young rubber trees in an old ladang that has produced two rice crops. Residency of Palembang, Sumatra.

FIG. 29 (lower right)—Closer view of a young rubber tree in the ladang shown in Fig. 27.

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

FIG. 30 (upper left)—Batak benzoin collector beside a benzoin tree planted in an old *ladang*. Residency of Tapanoeli, Sumatra. (Courtesy of the Department of Economic Affairs.)

FIG. 31 (upper right)—Peasant-owned rubber garden. Residency of Tapanoeli, Sumatra.

FIG. 32 (center left)—Houses abandoned by shifting cultivators in an exhausted coffee garden. Residency of Palembang, Sumatra. (Courtesy of the Department of Economic Affairs.)

FIG. 33 (center right)—Rubber mangles and sheets of rubber drying in a peasant-owned rubber garden. Residency of Djambi, Sumatra.

FIG. 34 (lower left)—Teak logs lining the road through a tobacco plantation. Between Medan and Arnhemia, Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra.

FIG. 35 (lower right)—Teak logs partially cut down to prepare for a tobacco crop. Between Medan and Arnhemia.

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



36 (upper left)—Eight-year-old second-growth forest on a tobacco plantation, being cleared for the raising of a single tobacco crop. Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra.

37 (upper right)—After the tobacco crop has been harvested the local population is allowed to raise one upland rice or maize crop. Notice the bushes and trees, which the rice-growers must not destroy lest reforestation be retarded. In the background a tobacco-drying shed. Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra. (Courtesy of the Experiment Station of Deli Planters Vereeniging.)

38 (center left)—Upland rice following a tobacco crop. In the background a second-growth forest consisting of *Albizzia falcata* and in front of it a strip of *Leucaena glauca*. Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra. (Courtesy of the Experiment Station of Deli Planters Vereeniging.)

39 (~~center right~~)—Two-year-old second growth on a tobacco plantation. Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra.

40 (lower left)—A section in a teak forest which has been cut by shifting cultivators working under the *taungya* forestry system. Residency of Madioen, East Java.

41 (lower right)—Maize and vegetables between pine trees planted at an altitude of 1900 meters by shifting cultivators working for the Forestry Service. Slope of Goenoeng Tangkoebanprahoe, Residency of Batavia, West Java.

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



This group of photographs was taken at the Soil Erosion Experiment Station near Tjiwidej, Residency of Priangan, West Java.

FIG. 42 (upper left)—Unterraced slope under cultivation.

FIG. 43 (upper right)—Terraced slope under cultivation.

FIG. 44 (lower left)—View of the catch basins.

FIG. 45 (lower right)—Closer view of the upper catch basin shown in Fig. 44.

[p. 42]

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Chapter III

THE SEDENTARY CULTIVATOR

241 Sedentary, or permanent, cultivation of land is much more vital to the economy of the countries of Southeastern Asia than is shifting cultivation. The majority of peasant cultivators obtain their livelihood by tilling the same piece of land year after year. The continuously utilized arable land, however, is not all cultivated in the same way throughout Southeastern Asia. We may distinguish three main categories of arable land: garden land, surrounding the houses and villages; wet land; and dry land. These three classes of land are devoted to different crops and vary so much from one another in size and reliability of yields, and therefore in value that in Java, for example, the social status of a man depends upon the type of land that he cultivates. There are districts in Java where only those peasants who own wet land, houses, and garden land have the full rights of a villager.

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The Garden Plot

244 Garden culture on land surrounding peasant houses in Java is devoted to a large variety of crops, ranging from fruit trees to plants that are not required in large quantities but only to supplement the diet and add flavor to the daily rice meal. Ochse and Terra, who have made exhaustive studies of garden culture, are of the opinion that it is a remnant of "primitive grainless hoe culture," in which all the useful plants found in the forest were concentrated in plots near the dwellings. Originally, the number of plants grown in the garden was greater than it is today, for some plants have been taken out of this economy to be grown on a larger scale in fields. The origin of garden culture explains, according to Ochse and Terra, the truly amazing variety of plants that are found on garden land.[1] Sollewijn Gelpke, a leading expert on native agriculture in Java during the past century, remarked on the richness of the gardens:

> Whoever strolls around a compound and takes things in with a botanical eye will see before him a variety of plants of which the uninitiated can have no conception. . . . Such wealth of vegetation is still more impressive to him who approaches it from an economic point of view. He sees palms, bamboo, bananas, and other trees that resemble each other closely, bearing fruit and giving support to various climbing plants.[2]

244 137 Often one is able to distinguish three levels, or stories, in a garden. The ground story consists of low-growing plants, especially tuberous plants that tolerate shade, such as elephant yam (*Amorphophallus campanulatus* Bl.), white arrowroot (*Maranta arundinacea* L.), "purple arrowroot" (*Can-*

[1] Ochse and Terra: "Het onderzoek," 1934. See also Terra: "De voeding der bevolking," 1932, pp. 552–593.

[2] Sollewijn Gelpke: Naar aanleiding, 1901, p. 203.

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244 137 *na edulis* Ker), sweet potato (*Ipomoea batatas* Poir.), taro (*Colocasia esculenta* Schott), *Curcuma* species, Goa bean (*Psophocarpus tetragonolobus* DC.), bitter cucumber (*Momordica charantia* L.), snake gourd (*Trichosanthes anguina* L.), Lima bean (large) (*Phaseolus lunatus* L.), Goa potato (*Dioscorea aculeata* L.), wild yam (*Dioscorea hispida* Dennst.), and sweet yam (*Dioscorea alata* L.). The middle story contains taller-growing plants, such as cassava (*Manihot utilissima* Pohl), citrus varieties such as *Citrus nobilis* Lour. and *Citrus aurantifolia* Swingle, papaya (*Carica papaya* L.), banana (*Musa* species), rose apple (*Eugenia aquea* Burm.), and soursop (*Anona muricata* L.). The upper story is formed by tall fruit trees, such as coconut (*Cocos nucifera* L.), jackfruit (*Artocarpus integra* Merr.), sapodilla or chico (*Achras zapota* L.), pomelo (*Citrus maxima* Merr.), of which numerous forms, differing in size and color, are known in the Indies, *belinju* (*Gnetum gnemon* L.), mango (*Mangifera indica* L.), durian (*Durio zibethinus* Murr.), candlenut tree (*Aleurites moluccana* Willd.), tamarind (*Tamarindus indica* L.), *pete* (*Parkia speciosa* Hassk.), stinkbean tree (*Pithecellobium lobatum* Benth.), and *santol* (*Sandoricum koetjape* Merr.).

This list does not by any means include all the plants that appear in the gardens. The plants vary in number and type from region to region in accordance with differences in soil, climate (elevation), and the taste of the owners.

311 244 161 369 Estimates indicate that about 15 per cent of the cultivated land in Java and Madura is taken up by gardens. Unfortunately, there have been no detailed studies of garden culture outside of Java, although the products of the garden play an important role in the diet of all the peoples of Southeastern Asia. Terra, who compared garden culture in various districts of Java, found that the share of land allotted to gardens, together with the intensity of their cultivation, increases as the total amount of crop land per head decreases, down to the point where the average amount of crop land per head is only 0.15 hectare. Where the amount of land is even less than this the share of garden land decreases, although there is a tendency at first to increase the intensity of the garden culture. Close to the larger cities, the amount of crop land per person, together with the amount devoted to gardens and the intensity of the latter's cultivation, falls off to a minimum since the population here has supplementary sources of income.

With the development of a money economy appears a specialization that is directed toward the urban centers. There has always been some natural specialization inasmuch as some plants do not grow well everywhere. The coconut, for example, does best in the lowlands. But the new specialization depends not only upon such natural factors as soil and climate, but also upon economic factors such as marketing facilities and the development of communications. This specialization can be observed generally in Southeastern Asia.

146 244 Ochse and Terra found that in calories of food value the returns of the gardens proved to be slightly higher per hectare than those of the irri-

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gated fields. One of the great advantages of garden culture over field culture is that there is always something ready to harvest from the former and therefore something to sell when money for daily household needs becomes scarce. Another advantage is that the garden supplies the family with a great variety of side dishes rich in vitamins; the vegetable proteins of the garden produce are also of high value. 146 244

As to the possibilities of improving garden culture, these two authors state: 000

> It is very evident that an improvement of the compound horticulture is a very difficult problem through the highly varied and dense planting of these compounds as a result of which they come to resemble a very complicated symbiosis. But for all this it must be possible by systematic investigation to improve not only the quality but also the quantity of the production. It may be said that the compounds with their story or layer formation superficially considered will find no favour in the eyes of western agriculture, but they are an essential link in the native production apparatus.[3]

The alarming decline in the welfare of the people of Java in the face of a mounting population prompted Netherlands Indies officials to examine every possibility of improving the peasants' condition. This accounts for the studies of Ochse and Terra. Lacking detailed studies outside Java, we are obliged to depend upon scattered references of uneven value. 654 241

Credner states that in Thailand practically every house has a few trees on the lot, and the villages are often hidden by tree clusters. The greatest intensification of garden culture is found on the right bank of the Mae Nam Chao Phraya (the Menam) in Bangkok Noi, just opposite Bangkok. Here irrigation is employed in garden culture, a technique not usually found in Southeastern Asia. The gardens are surrounded by walls 1 meter high and are traversed by trenches 2 meters apart. The beds between the trenches are elevated. The trenches work both as drains and as irrigation ditches. Small sluices control the water. In the gardens there is a great variety of fruit trees and palms which climbers, such as *Piper betle* L., use as supports. In the trenches the peasants grow lotus and water chestnut (*Trapa natans* L.).[4] Zimmerman, in his survey of rural Thailand, points out that in most regions the peasants rely too much on one crop, rice, and he recommends in several instances improvements in the cultivation of the home lots so that families may have a better supply of fruits and, above all, of vegetables. In the Khlong Rangsit section he observed that "on account of the lack of homestead and village sites among the people there is no gardening and home production of food."[5] This observation may be applied to Southeastern Asia in general. Wherever the dominant form of land tenure is tenancy the flimsy shack of the tenant has no mixed fruit and vegetable garden around it, for his status is much too uncertain. A tenant 244 312 [137] 244 427

[3] Ochse and Terra: *op. cit.*, pp. 371–372.
[4] Credner: Siam, 1935, p. 246.
[5] Zimmerman: Siam, 1931, p. 307.

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who does not know where he will be the next year cannot be expected to plant fruit trees. Under these conditions the diet is reduced to the simplest foods and is usually deficient.

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Zimmerman criticizes some of the characteristics of garden culture in the Thai part of the Malay Peninsula. The improvements that he recommends show that he has approached the gardens with a Western eye, looking for fruit trees "in rows at proper spaces, not scattered as is the case now." [6] He notices lack of tilling, an observation that could be duplicated in every country of Southeastern Asia. As a matter of fact, it is fortunate that the gardens—especially those that have many fruit trees and palms—are not clean-cultivated; otherwise erosion would have caused the same damage here that it has caused in the Westerners' rubber, tea, and coffee plantations—these were planted in rows and kept clean until the discovery was made that soil erosion is extremely severe under such conditions. Pendleton remarks:

> The average Occidental, accustomed as he is to clean cultivated orchards and vineyards in temperate zones, is inclined to keep a plantation in the tropics likewise cultivated. This is now quite generally recognized as a mistake. . . . Near Songkla [in southern Thailand] . . . are considerable plantings of fruit trees, planted as if they were forest trees. . . . Annually, before harvesting the fruit, the undergrowth is slashed and left on the ground, but there is no stirring of the soil or other cultivation. The results are excellent, and there is no soil deterioration, no catastrophic erosion, no expense for cultivation.[7]

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There is little literature on the importance of garden culture among the Malays of British Malaya. According to Grist,

> fruit cultivation is of little more than local importance. The total area under fruit, other than pineapples, is estimated to be 63,000 acres. . . . This area does not take into account the numerous small compounds surrounding Malay homesteads, in which a few fruit trees are planted and which, in the aggregate, must amount to a very considerable area. Although certain fruits acquire a reputation in particular localities, the distribution of the fruits is scattered throughout the country. For instance, North Johore is noted for its durians, Malacca for dukus [*Lansium domesticum* Jack], Penang for rambutans, but in point of fact, equally good quality fruit of these kinds can be found in other areas.[8]

Malaya lacks the detailed information about gardens and their economic importance that is found in Java, for instance, where the garden area of each village is known, because in Malaya there is no population pressure and therefore no need for exact field studies and careful inventories of the source of food supply.

The Philippines are like Malaya in respect to garden culture. Some districts around Manila Bay have specialized in such fruits as mangoes,

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 163.
[7] Pendleton: "Some Interrelations," 1939, p. 50.
[8] Grist: An Outline of Malayan Agriculture, 1936, p. 228.

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lanzones, papayas, and chicos, which find a good market in Manila, but on the whole we rarely meet in the Philippines such intensive garden culture as in Java. The diet of the average Filipino is not well balanced and is particularly deficient in fruits and vegetables. In recognition of this fact the Bureau of Education and the Bureau of Plant Industry have both done much to impress the peasants with the need for fruit and vegetable gardens. Although the situation has improved during the past forty years and a large variety of fruits is now produced, the country still depends upon imports, whereas with a little effort most of the imported fruits could be produced locally and would furnish an additional source of income. It would be well to encourage the peasants to grow more fruits and to advise them on the most suitable varieties. In the other countries of Southeastern Asia, also, with the possible exception of Java, such advice would be valuable. 245 [654]

The published material available on the importance of gardens in Indochina is similarly limited in quantity. Even Gourou in his study of land utilization restricts himself chiefly to listing the fruits and vegetables found in the gardens and to stating that certain districts are renowned for the quality of their garden fruits. Gourou's list of fruits and vegetables is as varied and extensive, however, as similar lists for any of the other countries of Southeastern Asia. 114

Wet Fields

Throughout the countries bordering the South China Sea most of the cultivated land is used for the growing of lowland, or wet, rice. For this purpose the fields must be leveled and surrounded by earth dams to impound rain water during the rainy season or to confine the water that is carried to the fields through irrigation canals or lifted to the fields by mechanical means. If a field is properly leveled the surrounding dyke will keep the water everywhere at the same depth. The size of the wet-rice, or paddy, fields, and the amount of labor that is required to make them, depend upon the topography of the region. In the lowlands, where no terracing is required, there is relatively little labor involved in the making of paddies, which are frequently large. A hilly, or mountainous, terrain necessitates terracing, which demands greater effort and reduces the size of individual fields; the steeper the slope, the narrower the paddies. We have only to see the rice terraces of the mountains of northern Luzon, southern Bali, the Preanger districts of West Java, or Sumatra's West Coast in order to realize how much effort has been expended in building these terraces and how much energy must be devoted to their upkeep. The terraces, as well as the wet-rice fields of the plains, represent the accumulated efforts of generations of peasants, each of which has helped to extend the area devoted to the cultivation of wet rice (Figs. 50–58).[1] 101 243 312

Not all people show the same skill in the making of paddies. According to Credner, the Thai are quite helpless on sloping land that requires terracing before wet rice may be planted. They would prefer to migrate to a 243 184

[1] [See pp. 115 ff. category 116. — Analyst]

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243 184 region where level land is available rather than undertake the terracing of a hillside; on the other hand, they have been successful in building innumerable canals to tap rivers and spread the water over the plains.[9] However, they do not seem to be able to fight great floods. In contrast, the Annamese of Tongking have built huge dykes against destructive floods and the attack of the sea.

243 The problems presented by the cultivation of wet, or lowland, rice change from country to country, from region to region, and sometimes even from village to village. Lowland rice demands a soil thoroughly soaked with water and worked into "a fine soft mud by hoeing, plowing, trampling, or harrowing, and . . . free from weeds." [10] The field must remain under water until the ears of rice begin to fill and harvest time approaches. The amount of water required to grow lowland rice depends upon the variety of rice, the length of its growing period, and the nature of the soil. There are innumerable varieties of lowland rice. One way of grouping them is according to the number of days they take to mature, which ranges from 60 to 300 days. In the Philippines varieties that require less than 150 days are considered early maturing, those that need from 150 to 190 days medium-late maturing, and those needing more than 190 days late maturing.[11] The longer the growing period, the greater the water requirements and, generally, the higher the yields. Normally the water covering the field has a depth of from 10 to 15 centimeters. But "floating rice" can keep pace with a slowly rising flood and reach the amazing height of 4 meters or more. The stems settle on the mud when the water recedes, and new roots start at the upper nodes, while the lower parts of the stems rot away. Floating rice is especially well known in Cochinchina, and I have [654] seen it in the Philippines. In 1939 the Department of Economic Affairs in Batavia sent a rice expert to Cochinchina to study floating rice and the possibility of introducing it into southern Borneo.

Lowland rice can be grown on many types of soil as long as a heavy clay subsoil is present to prevent the loss of water through percolation. Copeland states that lowland rice does best in heavy soils that hold water securely, and he adds that it is desirable "that there be, at a depth below the reach of the roots, but not too much further down, an impervious substratum-subsoil or hard-pan." [12] We distinguish between two main types 243 312 of wet-rice fields: those that depend exclusively upon the rain that is impounded by their dykes, and those that are supplied by an irrigation system and are therefore no longer subject to the irregularities of rainfall.[13]

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9 Credner: Siam, 1935, pp. 203 and 217.

10 Wickizer: "Rice and Wheat," 1941, p. 272.

11 University of the Philippines: Handbook of Philippine Agriculture, 1939, pp. 7–11.

12 Copeland: Rice, 1924, p. 45.

13 An important variation of the second type is the cultivation of wet riceland that has been flooded by rivers rising above their natural levels. This mode of cultivation, which is found especially in the residency of Palembang in Sumatra, in southeastern Borneo, in Thailand, and in Indochina, is not so dependable as irrigation because of the irregularities of the river floods.

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Irrigation systems also fall into two categories: peasant irrigation works and technical irrigation works. The former have existed throughout Southeastern Asia for more than a thousand years. In recent times scientifically trained engineers have designed large-scale systems with concrete weirs and locks. Fields solely dependent upon impounded rain water produce one rice crop a year, whereas irrigated fields often yield two crops. If even with irrigation only one crop can be produced, yet the irrigation system assures proper water control, whereas without it irregularities in the course of the rainy season may damage, or destroy, the crop. 243 312 [177]

Wet fields are protected against erosion by leveling, terracing, and dyking. But how does continued cropping affect the fertility of wet-rice fields? Diverse environments and cultural practices in Southeastern Asia create considerable differences in this respect. Much of the paddy land of the Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, and Burma has lost a good deal of its original fertility because the peasants have not used manures, fertilizers, or crop rotation. In many instances, however, soil fertility has been preserved by the mineral matter dissolved in the irrigation water and by the silt deposited on those fields that are supplied with irrigation water coming from streams. The value of the water and silt depends, of course, upon the nature of the parent material from which it is derived. Rivers from a young volcanic region supply much richer water and silt than do those that drain a mountain region consisting of sedimentary rock or granite. For this reason, the Irrigation Service of the Netherlands Indies before making final plans for a new irrigation system takes samples of water and silt carried by rivers at different times of the year. The samples are analyzed in order to determine their influence upon the soil to be irrigated. A river found to be carrying water and silt that would lower the value of paddy land would be eliminated as a source of irrigation water, or its use would be limited as much as possible. 243 134 312 [654]

Irrigated fields of which the water supply does not contain minerals in quantities necessary for continuous satisfactory plant growth and paddy land that depends exclusively upon rain, both require other techniques for maintaining fertility. In many regions cultivators cut the rice stems just far enough below the ear to allow bundling. This practice makes possible the return of the rest of the plant matter to the soil. From this it is only one more step to work household refuse into the ground together with ashes of burned rubbish, rice husks, leaves, and manure.

As stable manure is not available in adequate quantities, intensive studies of the application of green manures to the cultivation of rice have been made in a number of countries of Southeastern Asia. A recent article by W. Bally reviews the results of these studies.[14] In a few rice-growing regions the peasants, on their own initiative, have learned to use legumes to improve rice soil. In wet fields the decomposition of green manure takes place under anaerobic conditions, and the final product is ammonia. Since 243 134 292

[14] Bally: "The Employment of Green Manures," 1936, pp. T10–T31.

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rice takes up nitrogen in the form of ammonia, the value of green manures on wet-rice fields is apparent.[15] In the Indies, *Crotolaria* species are the most frequently used green manures, the favored one being *Crotolaria juncea* L.; but *Phaseolus lunatus* L., *Dolichos lablab* L., and *Pachyrrhizus erosus* Urban are also used. The peasants of the Red River delta in Tongking are in the habit of working into the ground the wilted matter of a number of legumes that have been grown primarily for seed. The peasants of the province of Nam Dinh have developed a technique that may be unique. They push handfuls of indigo branches into the ground between the rows of rice a few days after the latter has been transplanted, for they believe that indigo is superior to pig manure or human excreta. In Indochina rice-growers frequently cultivate green manure, especially *Crotolaria* species, on dry fields and carry it to the rice fields at the time when these fields are being prepared for the seedlings. A green manure used exclusively in a few districts of the delta land of Tongking is the small aquatic plant, *azolla*.[16] Certain villages, thanks to favorable circumstances, have specialized in the growing of azolla to sell to the surrounding country, while other villages reproduce the plant until sufficient quantities of green manure have been obtained to cover all needs. The life cycle of azolla is completed in the months from November to April or May. Only the villagers of LaVan know the secret of maintaining and multiplying the plant during the hot season. They guard this secret jealously since it is the basis of their livelihood.

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Further studies are needed to establish which varieties of green-manure plants are best suited to the various environmental conditions. It is important to find plants that grow rapidly and can be sown when the rice is still on the field, just after the water has been drained off to allow the grain to ripen. Experiments should also be made in the timing of the application of green manure. Should it be early, or just before the transplanting of the seedlings? Should it be on dry or on wet land?

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Crop rotation also has its place as a means of keeping up the fertility of wet-rice fields. This practice seems to be better developed and more prevalent in Java than in any other country of Southeastern Asia. Extensive areas of *sawah*, as the Javanese call their wet riceland, are planted with dry-field crops such as maize, legumes, and other vegetables during the dry season, a practice that has a beneficial effect upon the soil. This form of double cropping is probably better than raising two rice crops in one year, because—although a different variety of rice is chosen for each season—both make essentially the same demands upon the soil; whereas a peanut crop, for example, grown during the dry season will enlarge the nitrogen content of the soil. In some areas of Java lowland rice is rotated

[15] Imperial Bureau of Soil Science: Tropical Soils in Relation to Tropical Crops, 1936, p. 11.

[16] For a map showing the extent of the use of azolla, see Gourou: Les paysans, 1936, p. 392. For further discussion see Nguyên-cong-Tiêu: "L'azolle," 1930, B, pp. 335–350 (also in *Proc. Fourth Pacific Science Congress, Java, 1929*, Vol. 4, 1930, pp. 355–370).

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with sugar or tobacco grown under plantation management. But is the high fertility of the soil due to this crop rotation, or is it rather the result of the heavy application of commerical fertilizer and the thorough cultivation of the soil under Western management? 242 134 249

In no country of Southeastern Asia is there so great a variety or so intensive a use of commercial fertilizers as in Japan.[17] In general, the peasants of Southeastern Asia lack money for commercial fertilizers. In Indochina local phosphates are within reach of some of the Annamese, but the costs of imported fertilizers are prohibitive. In Java, although attempts to make possible the use of fertilizers through the agency of public credit institutions were successful in some special instances, not more than one per cent of the cultivated area received any commercial fertilizer in 1939. On the other hand, estimates indicate that more than 1,000,000 hectares of sawah have a phosphate deficiency and that a moderate application of phosphate would augment the yield by 25 to 50 per cent.[18] 242 [654]

The Agricultural Advisory Service was able to raise the productivity of wet-rice fields in West Java by about 10 per cent. It encouraged the peasants to use fertilizer on seedbeds, to sow rice more thinly on the beds (thus producing stronger seedlings), and to plant the seedlings in rows so that weeding could be done with a special instrument, the *landak* (Fig. 59).[1] This weeder was developed in Japan. During the years immediately preceding 1939, these improvements in West Java resulted in an increase in output of unhusked rice amounting to 300,000 quintals, or 30,000 metric tons, with a value of nearly 1,000,000 guilders. This shows that some improvements in cultivation may increase production without a great capital outlay.[19] 242 243 [412]

Java may be compared only with southern China and with Japan in the cleanness of its rice fields. The Filipino does not pay much attention to weeding. The Malayan, Thai, Cambodian, Cochinchinese, and Filipino rice farmers have more flooded riceland per capita at their disposal than the people of Java and can thus afford to cultivate their land less intensively. 243

Irrigation Problems

Peasant irrigation works usually take care of the fields of only one village or of a small group of people who have joined together for the specific purpose of building and maintaining an irrigation system. These works consequently are small and usually inadequate, but nevertheless they de- 312 [476] 243

17 "The chief commercial fertilizers used in Japan are pressed herrings, pressed sardines, dried sardines, other fish cakes, bone meal, soybean cake, rapeseed cake, cottonseed cake, other vegetable-oil cakes, ammonium sulphate, calcium cyanamide, calcium phosphate, and potassium phosphate. Calcium phosphate and ammonium sulphate are probably the most representative chemical fertilizers."—Wickizer and Bennett: The Rice Economy, 1941, p. 252, footnote 33.

18 Departement van Economische Zaken: Voedselproblemen, 1940, p. 28.

19 *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28.

1 [See p. 117, category 116. -- Analyst]

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mand respect and admiration for the ingenuity displayed.[20] "The serious imperfections which characterize native irrigation works and make rice culture uncertain, particularly in the plains, can assuredly not be charged to the account of these who constructed them." [21] The weirs, by means of which the peasants raise the water of small rivers, are especially weak. The construction material consists of bamboo, trunks of coconut and other trees, and boulders. At times great bamboo baskets are filled with heavy stones and placed in the river, or large stones are laid loosely across the channel. Where the rivers are wide the people drive two rows of tree trunks into the river bed and fill the space between the rows with whatever debris they have at hand. These weirs frequently break because of river floods as they have no provision for allowing passage of flood waters; yet repair is often impossible for the duration of the rainy season, so that the crop is ruined. Another constructional disadvantage is the open intakes. During floods large quantities of water flow through these and cause an excessive soaking of the fields and damage to the canals. Wherever a canal has to cross a depression, a road, or another watercourse, bamboo or hollowed tree trunks are used to carry the water overhead. This often leads to large losses of water, especially during floods. Poor drainage is another weakness of peasant irrigation systems.

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Scientifically trained engineers have come to the aid of peasant communities in Southeastern Asia and have designed irrigation systems based on technological principles and free from the weaknesses of peasant irrigation works. One of these technical irrigation systems may take care of tens of thousands of hectares of riceland belonging to hundreds of villages. In many instances the engineers have improved existing peasant irrigation works; more often they have made irrigation possible where peasant communities did not have the financial and technical resources to overcome natural obstacles. Technical irrigation works are usually government-financed.

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In the Philippines most of the wet-rice fields are dependent exclusively upon the rain that falls directly on them. One centimeter of rain a day is said to be necessary for a healthy rice growth. But there is always the possibility that, particularly in the months of May and June, there may be so little rain that the peasants cannot prepare their fields. A shortage of rain in October is also dangerous as it may seriously damage, or even destroy, the crop, even though the precipitation during the rainy season may have been enough for the production of a satisfactory crop. To guard against an insufficiency of water for the wet-rice crop, therefore, the fields should be supplied by irrigation systems. The Philippines, however, do

312 243 P [616]

[20] The *subaks* of Bali are agricultural cooperative societies that have been formed to construct, maintain, and administer irrigation systems. The achievements of the Balinese subaks are very remarkable in a number of ways. Thus, the men of certain villages are especially skillful builders of irrigation works and are able to construct long canals and even tunnels of considerable length. These men are hired by the subaks and help them to solve their irrigation problems.

[21] Van der Meulen: "Irrigation in the Netherlands Indies," 1940, p. 146.

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not have adequate irrigation facilities, although in certain localities the peasants have built systems and the importance of irrigation is generally recognized. In Spanish times the irrigated area was estimated at 170,000 hectares.[22] Some of these irrigation systems were constructed by friars on their estates, but the works eventually fell into disrepair and only a few of them can still be used. 312 243

Not until 1922 did the government start a campaign of irrigation-system construction. In that year the Philippine Legislature authorized an issue of bonds amounting to 20,000,000 pesos. A survey at the time estimated that a total area of 560,000 hectares could be brought under technical irrigation. By 1938 the Bureau of Public Works had supplied about 75,000 hectares of land with irrigation water at a cost of 17,000,000 pesos. The expansion of irrigation was very slow, "owing to the difficulty of collecting charges, to complaints of unsatisfactory services, and to the low price of rice, which offered no inducement to incur the added expense."[23] The costs were to be charged against the land and were supposed to be paid by the owners over a period of from 20 to 40 years. They average 195 pesos per hectare. Miller wrote in 1932: 312 243 652

> The annual charge for the redemption fund and interest, as well as the maintenance of the irrigation works, is from ₱8.72 to ₱22.06 per hectare, depending upon the per hectare cost of the particular irrigation works and the number of years over which the cost is amortized. After the irrigation works have been paid for, a charge of about ₱3.00 per hectare for maintenance will accrue annually.[24]

After 1932 changes were made in the terms of the financial settlement. Payments were reduced, and it was suggested that the government remain owner of the systems. In 1934 the Philippine Economic Association stressed the need for an enlargement of the technically irrigated area, but it did not offer any suggestion as to how the costs of construction, maintenance, and operation might be recovered should the farmers insist upon very low charges.

In addition to the irrigation systems operated by the Bureau of Public Works, other government agencies controlled an irrigated area of 7,900 hectares. The *hacenderos*, private companies, and municipalities brought another 200,000 hectares under technical irrigation, thus raising the total area of land under this form of irrigation to about 300,000 hectares. If we subtract this figure from the total irrigated area, which the census of 1939 put at 670,000 hectares, we find that approximately 370,000 hectares were cared for by peasant irrigation systems. 310

It is generally estimated that about 80 per cent of all rice is grown on wet fields. Therefore, if we take 80 per cent of the total rice area of 1,936,200 hectares given in the census of 1939, and subtract from it the 243 312

[22] Miller: Principles of Economics, 1932, p. 182.
[23] Dawson: "Philippine Agriculture," 1940, p. 408.
[24] Miller: *op. cit.*, p. 183, footnote 1—all figures as of 1932.

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total irrigated area, we find that some 880,000 hectares depend exclusively upon impounded rain water.

In Java and Madura the possibilities of extending the sawah[1] area are strictly limited. In 1936 the Spit Commission estimated that another 300,000 hectares of hitherto uncultivated land could be brought under cultivation, but most of that land would have to be converted into *tegalans* (permanent dry fields), and not sawahs. From 1928 to 1938 the sawah area increased from 3,253,878 to 3,367,879 hectares, or by 114,001 hectares. Most of this new sawah area had formerly been tegalan area. But at the same time the latter, despite the fact that it had lost some land to the sawah area, grew by 193,000 hectares as a result of new clearings. Thus the cultivated area of Java and Madura between the years 1928 and 1938 was enlarged by 307,000 hectares. If the cultivated area should continue to expand at the same rate, the remaining cultivable land on these two islands would be exhausted by 1948.

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Netherlanders, experienced in the handling of difficult water problems in the mother country, were well prepared to help the Indonesians with their irrigation problems. They were able to harness the larger rivers of Java, a feat for which the engineering skill of the peasants was inadequate. The Indonesians had been unsuccessful in the irrigation of wide plains. The first European irrigation system was laid down in Buitenzorg during the regime of Governor-General van Imhoff (1743–1750). In the early days of the culture system, two irrigation projects were built in the delta of the Brantas River to supply water for sugar and indigo crops, both grown for export. The first project designed by Western engineers to benefit the peasants of Java was built in the 1880's in the residency of Semarang, where famines had been frequent. Since then the irrigation systems of Java have been steadily enlarged. There have been periods when it seemed as if the costs were greater than the benefits and progress was consequently slowed down. From 1893 to 1898 some 17,000,000 guilders were spent on the Solo River irrigation project, which finally had to be abandoned. A period of great expansion began in 1910 and was interrupted only by the economic depression.[25] By the end of 1939 the government had spent 250,000,000 guilders on irrigation construction and flood protection, of which only 42,000,000 guilders represented expenditure before 1900. These sums do not include outlays for the repair and maintenance of existing systems or for the salaries of the government personnel. Nor do they include the cost of irrigation systems constructed by sugar plantations, especially in the principalities of Soerakarta and Jogjakarta.

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At the end of 1938 the total wet-rice area of Java and Madura amounted to 3,368,000 hectares. Of these, 1,204,000 hectares were technically irrigated, an additional 1,500,000 hectares were cared for by peasant irrigation works, and the remaining 664,000 hectares depended upon rain water

[25] See the graph presented by Van der Meulen: *op. cit.*, p. 149.

[1] [i.e., wet rice land — Analyst]

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impounded on the fields.[26] The construction of technical irrigation systems had required an average investment of 190 guilders per hectare. This expenditure has greatly benefited the peasants of Java and the European planters who rented land from Indonesians. Yields were increased; two rice crops could be raised where formerly only one could have been raised. Unfortunately, the possibilities of extending technical irrigation by means of large projects were becoming fewer; for the difficulties and the costs were increasing. 243 312 311

In recent years a number of great reservoirs (*waduks*) have been built to store excess water during the rainy season for irrigation during the dry season. Most of these waduks were constructed in sugar-raising areas, since the value of the sugar crop justified a large expenditure. The distribution of water is controlled by the authorities in order to prevent disputes between cultivators. In the past, difficulties arose over the conflicting needs of the European sugar estates and the peasants whose rice fields adjoined these estates. Sugar cane is irrigated not by flooding but by scooping the water out of the ditches and pouring it on the plants by hand —something that can be done only by daylight. Whenever there was not sufficient water to take care of both enterprises at the same time the peasants were allowed to direct the water into their rice fields only at night. Under pressure of severe criticism from fair-minded persons this partiality was done away with; small field-reservoirs were filled with water during the night, and the water was discharged into the rice fields in the daytime. 312 249

The costs of constructing and maintaining these irrigation works are not charged against the fields, as the government in the Philippines tries to charge them, nor are there any water charges. According to Netherlands Indies law, however, the government, and not the Indonesian, is the owner of the land. The latter pays a tax for the use of the land, the amount of which is determined by the land's productivity. At regular intervals the fields are reassessed, and any improvements, especially the introduction of technical irrigation, put the field into a higher class and thus raise the tax. In this way, "expenditure on irrigation works is more or less off-set by an increase in receipts from land taxes due to improved results obtained by cultivators, and by more revenue from general taxes owing to enhanced general prosperity." [27] 312 423 651

In contrast to Java and Madura, the Outer Islands present possibilities for greatly increasing the area of wet riceland, either by the clearing and cultivating of virgin forest land or by the converting of dry fields into sawahs. In 1910 the government began the construction of irrigation works in the Outer Islands; but between 1910 and 1938 a total of only 17,000,000 guilders was spent there. In recent years expenditures have been greatly increased in conjunction with the migration of Javanese. Im- 654 243

[26] These statistics exclude the principalities of Soerakarta and Jogjakarta.
[27] Van der Meulen: *op. cit.*, p. 159.

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portant projects were started in the residencies of Palembang and of the Lampoeng Districts of southern Sumatra and in the Celebes.[28]

British Malaya is the only country in Southeastern Asia that depends heavily upon rice imports for the feeding of its inhabitants. The greater part of the population is made up of immigrants who normally do not raise food crops but work in plantation or mining industries or live in cities. Rubber and tin enterprises producing for distant markets completely overshadow the cultivation of food crops for local consumption, just as the immigrants greatly outnumber the native Malays.

As early as 1896 Sir Frank Swettenham called attention to the desirability of expanding rice cultivation by constructing irrigation works "to free us from our dependence on foreign countries for the supply of our staple food," [29] and in 1897 he wrote:

> Above all things I should like to see a vastly increased area, under a well-devised system of irrigation, yielding a rice crop sufficient, not only for the people of the Malay States, but also for the large native population of the neighbouring Colony [Straits Settlements]. We have the land and the water, and what we want is a scientific distribution of the water over the vast uncultivated areas that would unquestionably produce a rice crop more than sufficient for all our needs, provided we had the funds necessary to construct the irrigation works.[30]

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Shortly afterwards, the rubber boom hit Malaya. Within a few years hundreds of thousands of acres of potential riceland were planted with rubber. Even land used for rice cultivation was turned over to King Rubber when the Malay peasant found it more profitable and easy to grow rubber and buy his rice. Increasingly large quantities of rice had to be imported for the rapidly growing population. During the World War of 1914–1918 this extremely vulnerable food position of Malaya brought hardship to the people and a great financial burden to the government. Little was done, however, to improve Malaya's agriculture or to increase the production of rice, since the difficulties were forgotten as soon as there was an improvement in the rubber market.

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The depression of 1929, however, forced the authorities to give serious study to the food-production problem. In 1929 a trained agriculturist became Director of Agriculture, a post previously held by a member of the administrative service. In 1930 the government appointed a committee to study the possibility of extending rice cultivation. The committee reported that the country had 600,000 to 1,000,000 acres suitable for rice growing, over and above the 700,000 acres already devoted to it. As a considerable part of the potential riceland was already planted with rubber, the committee recommended that the government prevent any further expansion of the rubber area on land suitable for rice. It also recommended

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28 *Jaarverslag van het Departement van Verkeer en Waterstaat over 1939*, 1940, pp. 243–248.
29 Quoted in Haynes: "Memorandum," 1933.
30 *Ibid.*

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the establishment of a Drainage and Irrigation Department in place of the old Hydraulic Branch of the Public Works Department. This new department began to function in 1932. Its main tasks were to help the Malay peasant with his problem of maintaining proper drainage and irrigation systems, to open new areas, and to distribute them among Malay pioneers. According to Grist, 654 243 134 312

> Malay *padi* growers have an inherent gift for water control, so that dams and irrigation channels devised and constructed by the local community are a common feature of the smaller *padi*-growing areas.[31]

Drainage and Irrigation Department engineers revealed, however, that in spite of this skill the Malay peasants downstream from the tin mines or rubber plantations were having increasing difficulties in keeping their rice fields in production, and year after year many hectares of riceland were going out of cultivation. The tin mines added their discharge of solid matter to the silt already carried by the rivers, and the development of rubber plantations led to accelerated erosion, especially in the days of clean weeding, so that the rivers of Malaya became choked with enormous quantities of silt.

> The pollution of a river by mining is very obvious in the discolouration of the water by the suspended solids of the mine effluent; the rise of a river bed by the uncontrolled discharge of tailings from hill mining and its disastrous effect on the valley is spectacular, but the silting of a river from soil erosion is not so obvious. The advance of the swamp as it spreads up the valley is so slow that it often takes on the appearance of a natural phenomenon of which man is the innocent victim.
>
> In the Malacca River valley, some 7,000 acres of *padi* land have gone out of cultivation from this cause. It is perhaps within living memory that most of this area was planted; to-day it has the appearance of a primitive swamp, but remove the reed cover by draining the swamp and there are the *batas* [little field dykes] of the old cultivators. [311]
>
> To them the deterioration of their *padi* lands appeared as an act of God if they thought about it at all. Their loss came upon them very slowly, they found year by year how much more difficult it was to build their bunds to keep out the river, their crops were more frequently destroyed, the results of their labour got poorer and poorer. . . .[32]

Some thirty years ago Balun Bidai was a thriving village near the junction of the Kinta and Perak rivers.

> It is said that more than 2,000 people had their homes there and cultivated extensive *padi* lands. . . . The progressive silting of the Kinta River in its lower reaches gradually blocked up the mouth of the Sungei Tumboh and its waters found their way through the jungle and by swampy channels and lagoons reaching the Kinta at various points. The result was that the Balun Bidai *bendang* [rice

[31] Grist: An Outline of Malayan Agriculture, 1936, p. 121.

[32] *Annual Report of the Drainage and Irrigation Department of the Federated Malay States and the Straits Settlements 1937*, 1938, p. 95.

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fields] became subject to severe flooding and some were permanently under water. The natural access to the area by water became so difficult that only small *sampans* could negotiate it whereas formerly there was a service of river steamers . . . and the population drifted away till it was reduced to less than 400.[33]

Extensive agricultural development for rubber planting in the beginning of this century caused the Batang Padang River to silt and by the year 1920 it had risen above the surrounding land in Lower Perak; its waters poured over the country far and wide to the valleys of the Kroh and Chikus rivers. The coarse silt blocked the mouths of its tributaries . . . it could no longer maintain its channel which became choked up with elephant grass growing prodigiously in the silt and this fine river with a normal channel 100 feet wide became so overgrown that it was impossible to pass down it even in a small boat.[34]

The Drainage and Irrigation Department undertook a great number of projects designed to prevent further excessive silting of rivers, to clear up silt-choked river channels, or to prevent destructive floods. In addition, it improved existing irrigation systems by cleaning and correcting drainage canals and by replacing the short-lived brushwood dams of the Malays with modern permanent dams which include provisions for the passing of floods. The department also opened up new lands and divided them into small rice farms. In the Sungei Manik Irrigation Scheme, for example, each settler received four acres of irrigated land and two acres of *kampong* (village) land. A very large number, if not the majority, of the new settlers were immigrants from Sumatra and Java. These immigrants are racially and culturally so close to the Malays of Malaya that they do not encounter the hostile attitude that Chinese and Indians experience when they attempt to acquire riceland in the Malay States.

Despite the efforts of the Department of Agriculture and of the Drainage and Irrigation Department to expand rice production during the 1930's, at the outbreak of the war in 1939 Malaya was still depending for two-thirds of its rice consumption upon the neighboring rice granaries: Burma, Thailand, and Indochina. During the season of 1932–1933 Malaya's rice area had amounted to 767,000 acres, compared with 753,000 acres during the season of 1938–1939. This slight decrease in rice area between 1932 and 1939, which occurred in spite of the establishment of new irrigation projects, was probably due not only to a shift of Malay peasants from marginal riceland to newly irrigated areas, but also to some degree to an improvement in rubber prices which once more lured the Malay away from rice cultivation. It is easier to tap rubber than to cultivate rice. It is estimated that 93 per cent of the Malay rice area produces wet rice and 7 per cent produces dry rice. The bulk of the wet-rice land is served by unimproved peasant irrigation systems or else depends upon rain falling directly on the fields; in 1939 only about 160,000 acres belonged to government-constructed irrigation projects.

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[33] *Ibid.*, p. 87.
[34] *Ibid. 1936*, 1937. p. 17.

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When the outbreak of the war in 1939 brought the rice problem of Malaya again to the fore, the government proposed that Chinese and Indians be permitted to grow rice. Sir Shenton Thomas, the Governor and High Commissioner, took the stand: "Rice production in Malaya must now be considered in terms not of Malay nationalism, but of national emergency." [35] Over the protest of Malay nationalists, a small amount of land in the states of Johore, Selangor, Perak, and Pahang was actually settled by Chinese.[36] The government furthermore attempted to make rice cultivation on new land more attractive by paying for the clearing and planting and by guaranteeing a minimum rice price.

M [563]

Notwithstanding the abundance of the country's potential riceland, all the attempts of the government to make Malaya self-supporting in food were bound to fail because of the ratio of Malays to non-Malays in the population. As long as there is no substantial reduction in the Chinese and Indian populations of Malaya, and as long as the Malays successfully object to the establishment of Chinese and Indian communities engaging in rice cultivation, Malaya will continue to depend upon imported rice.

M 243 131

Whereas the riceland of Malaya is broken up into patches scattered along the coasts of the peninsula and the alluvial banks of its short rivers, the rice area of Thailand is concentrated in two great plains. The mighty Mae Nam Chao Phraya, with the Mae Nam Mae Klong, the Mae Nam Tha Chin, and the Mae Nam Bang Pakong, forms one enormous alluvial plain suited to the cultivation of lowland rice. This area has somewhat the shape of a triangle whose base at the head of the Gulf of Thailand is about 160 kilometers wide. Some 160 kilometers inland it is 80 kilometers wide, but northward it fingers out into narrow bands between the mountain chains of northern Thailand. The second important rice area is found upon the Khorat plateau along the rivers of the Mae Nam Mun system draining into the Mekong (Mae Nam Khong).

T 243 132

Thailand's economy rests almost exclusively upon the cultivation of lowland rice. Only a small part of the country receives a sufficient amount of rain (1800 millimeters or more during the rainy season) to grow lowland rice on fields that are dependent upon rain water falling directly on them. At most observation points of the central plain the average annual rainfall is from 1,000 to 1,500 millimeters. Therefore irrigation is required to produce one satisfactory crop a year. The additional water is supplied by rivers coming out of the mountains of northern Thailand and by those that drain the Khorat plateau. These rivers rise during the rainy season and almost every year flood wide sections along their banks. However, the floods depend upon rainfall in the headwater areas. Insufficient rain in the mountains means inadequate flooding or none at all and, consequently, a poor harvest. Exceptionally heavy or prolonged floods, on the other hand, can be just as disastrous for the rice crop. The Thai have long

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[35] Quoted in Barber: "British Malaya," 1940, p. 3.
[36] Thompson: Postmortem on Malaya, 1943, p. 37.

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312 been very skillful in harnessing these floods in a network of canals that distribute the water throughout the plains. From these canals the water either enters the fields by gravity or is lifted into them by human power or, occasionally, by mechanical power. But without technical irrigation the success of the harvest is always at the mercy of the height of the flood. A record of the flood levels of the Mae Nam Chao Phraya at Ayutthaya (Ayutia) for a period of 99 years shows that in only 32 of these years were the levels entirely satisfactory; in 22 years the levels were barely satisfactory; and in 30 years they were much too low. In 15 of the years the flood level was so high that the crops suffered from too much water. These figures indicate clearly the necessity for technical irrigation in Thailand,[37] which has been generally recognized since the turn of the century.

Because of the Thai peasants' limited financial resources and their lack of technical facilities it has been necessary for governmental or private agencies repeatedly to come to their aid. In 1892 the Siam Canals, Land and Irrigation Company obtained a concession to develop the Khlong Rangsit area, an extensive swamp region northeast of Bangkok between the Mae Nam Nakhon Nayok and the Mae Nam Pa Sak. The company dug the Khlong Rangsit, which is wide enough for boat traffic, in order to drain the swamp, and this canal also served for irrigation purposes when necessary. The flow of water and boat traffic is regulated by locks. The [654] company failed, and the government called in a Dutch irrigation engineer, [645] Homan van der Heide, who remained in Thailand from 1899 until 1909. [177] He drew up plans for an extensive irrigation system, but, because of the expense it would entail, this was not constructed. However, Van der Heide supervised the building of a number of long canals that run in east-west lines from the Mae Nam Bang Pakong to the Mae Nam Mae Klong. Like the Khlong Rangsit, these canals are shut off from the rivers by locks. They serve as traffic arteries, as well as irrigation canals.

654 Van der Heide was succeeded by Sir Thomas Ward, who suggested a 312 comprehensive irrigation system, consisting of several projects to be un- [645] dertaken by the newly formed Irrigation Department "only as Siam ac- [177] quired a population sufficiently numerous to occupy all the land thus made available."[38] The cost of the projects was estimated at 150,000,000 ticals. Ignoring Ward's proposal suggesting the Mae Nam Suphan Project (Map, Fig. 46)[1] as the starting point, the government began with the South Pa Sak (sometimes called Prasak) Project, adjacent to the old Khlong Rangsit Project and forming a unit with the latter. This disregard of Ward's proposal was due to political pressure exerted by landlords who had interests in the Khlong Rangsit area. The South Pa Sak Project was finished in 1924 and entailed an expenditure of 15,780,768 ticals. The

[37] Credner: Siam, 1935, pp. 213–218 and map 4 opposite p. 72.

[38] Thompson: Thailand, 1941, p. 517. See also *Ibid.*, pp. 514–520, and Credner: *op. cit.*, pp. 218–222, for the following discussion.

[1] [See p. 61, cat. 11e -- Analyst]

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The irrigable area amounts to 83,000 hectares, of which some 60,000 to 70,000 hectares are actually under cultivation. The Chiang Rak-Bang Hia Project also has been completed. When the Nakhon Nayok Project is finished, the whole plain between the Mae Nam Chao Phraya in the west, the

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

FIG. 46—Irrigation systems of the Mae Nam Chao Phraya Plain, Thailand. (Based on Credner: Siam, 1935, Fig. 26, p. 216.)

Mae Nam Pa Sak in the north, and the Mae Nam Bang Pakong in the east, embracing a total area of 540,000 hectares, will be under technical irrigation. This region should then be safe from destructive floods and also will be supplied with shipping facilities vital to rice export. Practically no development work has been done west of the Mae Nam Chao Phraya; only a part of the Mae Nam Suphan Project has been finished. The main

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task of this project is to canalize the Mae Nam Tha Chin, or Mae Nam Suphan, an old branch of the Mae Nam Chao Phraya that has silted up. The plain of the Mae Nam Suphan was once an important rice-producing region, which, in the fourteenth century, supported the capital of the state of U Thong. Apparently opportunities for cultivation have diminished in this district.

T 133

The silting of canals and rivers is a serious problem in Thailand. On the peninsula most of this silting has been due to tin mining. On the plains, however, much of it is the result of deforestation, while shifting cultivation has been the principal factor in the mountain regions.

T 243 311

Ninety-four per cent of the cultivated area in Thailand is devoted to rice. Twenty per cent of this is now under technical irrigation.

I 243 133

In Indochina the cultivation of lowland rice presents each geographical region with its own particular set of problems. The wide delta lands of the Red River (Song Ka) and the Mekong form the two chief rice-producing areas of Indochina, in comparison with which the small deltas and coastal plains of central and southern Annam—squeezed between the Annamese mountains and the China Sea—and the old alluvial plains of Cambodia southeast of the Tonle Sap (Grand Lac) are of only secondary importance.[29]

I 243 312 731

The life of the Tongkingese peasant is profoundly influenced by the torrential character of the Red River. Every year the level of the river rises rapidly during the summer months and endangers man and his work with widespread and destructive floods. The only means by which the inhabitants of the delta land are able to defend themselves and their fields is by constructing dykes to keep the Red River and the other rivers of Tongking within bounds. These dykes must be so long and firm that their construction and maintenance is possible only under the supervision and with the support of a well-organized state. The earliest records show that during the Trân dynasty, in the thirteenth century, the state was in control of dyke construction, but it is quite certain that dykes were built even before that time. From the Trân dynasty onward Annamese rulers and their officials paid a great deal of attention to the defense of the lowlands against river floods.

I 134 312

The delta land must be protected not only from the rivers but also from the sea and its tides. The Red River and the other rivers that cross the plains of Tongking carry enormous quantities of sediment and are extending the delta farther into the Gulf of Tongking. As soon as the slowly growing mud flats attain a height suitable for cultivation, they are protected from the sea by dykes. Though the system is similar to that practiced in

[29] For detailed information on the distribution of wet-rice fields see: "Carte d'ensemble des rizières d'Indochine, 1:2,000,000"; this map accompanies Henry and De Visme: Documents de démographie, 1928. The map is not quite up to date because of the extensive improvements that have been made since 1927, but it can be supplemented by using Robequain: L'évolution économique, 1939, and Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940.

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the Netherlands, the danger of submersion is not so great in Tongking as it is in the polder areas of the Netherlands, for these lie below sea level, and furthermore the tides are less strong in the Gulf of Tongking than along the coasts of the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the tides are noticeable in the rivers far inland. The land along the sea shore and along the lower courses of the rivers, unless protected from salt water, becomes unsuitable for the cultivation of rice, except for salt-loving varieties. 134 312

Although the Annamese state had concentrated its efforts for centuries on the construction of dykes, the French found grave weaknesses in the system when they occupied Tongking in 1885. The Annamese flood control and irrigation systems represented an intermediate stage between local peasant and modern technical irrigation. The dykes were usually no higher than 9 meters, although floods of 11 meters and more are not exceptional. The dykes were irregularly designed and formed salients and coves, which prevented an even flow of floodwater. Frequently they were badly constructed. As the Annamese lacked the technical knowledge and facilities that would have enabled them completely to master the rivers, they could not prevent breaks in the dykes, and these developed annually in some parts of the delta. 312 731

The French continued the work of the Annamese emperors. At first the colonial administrators thought that a strengthening of the large dykes of the Red River and its effluents would suffice to control the flood waters. But despite the improvements, breaks continued until 1926. In the province of Hung Yen 26 breaks occurred between 1806 and 1900, destroying the crop in each instance. Since 1900 this province has experienced 13 dyke ruptures in a period of 26 years. In 1926 the Inspector General of Public Works, Albert Pouyanne, started a large-scale program of dyke construction, which follows a master plan covering the whole delta. In 1885 the dykes had a volume of about 20,000,000 cubic meters; by 1915 it had grown to 32,000,000, by 1926 to 48,000,000, and by 1938 to 87,000,000 cubic meters. The dykes along the Red River can now hold the highest floods. The highest recorded level reached by the river at Hanoi is 11.93 meters, and the dyke there is 13 meters high. The alignment of the dykes has been improved, and they have been strengthened to such a degree that there have been no breaks since 1926, although the floods of 1936 and 1937 reached record heights. 653 312

The dykes prevent floods, but they also make drainage of the excess water difficult. The Red River, the Canal des Rapides, and the Canal des Bambous, the three principal channels, contribute but slightly to the drainage of the delta. Because of the excess of rain water during the wet season, drainage canals had to be constructed. The canals lead into the Thai Binh and smaller rivers. Near the coast, the drainage is further regulated by a series of floodgates that allow an outflow at low tide. Before the construction of the drainage systems, much of the land was so flooded during the rainy season that it could be cultivated during the dry season

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653 312 only. This was true in the section from Ha Dong to Phu Ly, south of Hanoi, which today, with proper drainage, produces two crops.[40]

The third water-control problem that had to be solved in the Tongking delta region was complex. There are three types of riceland—high, middle, and low fields—and there are two possible crops, those of the fifth and of the tenth months of the Annamese calendar. The crop of the fifth month is the dry-season crop, which is harvested in June, and the other is the wet-season crop, harvested in November. The latter does not require irrigation. During the rainy season there is an abundance of water in little brooks, ponds, and depressions, from which the peasants can lift it into their fields should there be a lack of rain water. But this water is usually stagnant and not sufficiently rich in oxygen; furthermore, it does not [823] contain silt, which would enrich the field. Yet, although a technical irrigation system would improve even the wet-season rice crop, the peasants might be reluctant to pay for irrigation water, as they consider water to be a gift from heaven, a gift of which there is an abundance around them. During the dry season, irrigation is necessary in many parts of Tongking if a second rice crop is to be grown. The advantage of a technical irrigation system is obvious when it makes possible cultivation of land that would otherwise lie fallow during the dry season. The desirability, however, of establishing irrigation on land that is now planted with dry-field crops during the dry season is debatable since the peasants require these dry-field crops for a more balanced diet. Furthermore, the soil profits by crop rotation; as soon as rotation is abandoned in favor of two rice crops, the yields from the November rice harvest decline.

The French administration has invested large sums in irrigation systems, and doubt has been expressed as to whether in some cases the increased yields justify the expenditure, above all since the money was advanced by the French and is supposed to be paid back with interest.[41]

243 311 Gourou estimates that the Tongking delta region contains 1,100,000 hectares of irrigated land, of which 250,000 hectares produce only a dry-season rice crop and 350,000 hectares only a wet-season rice crop, whereas 500,000 hectares of the delta produce two crops a year. Thus the harvested area amounts to 1,600,000 hectares.

133 312 311 In Annam the plains are small, with the exception of those in the province of Thanh Hoa which is crossed by the Song Chu and Song Ma. The rivers of Annam, like those of Tongking, are subject to annual flooding, but, because of their small drainage basins, their floods cannot compare with those of the Red River. It is relatively easy to construct storage dams at points on the rivers just within the mountains and thereby to facilitate irrigation during the dry season. Such dams and irrigation canals have been built in the deltas of Thanh Hoa and Nghe Tinh in northern Annam and of Phu Yen and Phan Rang in southern Annam. A total of

[40] See Robequain: *op. cit.*, pp. 249–253 and especially the map on p. 251.
[41] Gourou: Les paysans, 1936, p. 107.

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90,000 hectares is irrigated by these systems. Further projects are under consideration.[42] Gourou estimates that Annam has 560,000 hectares of irrigated land yielding one crop and 246,400 hectares yielding two crops. The area devoted to wet rice amounts to nearly 807,000 hectares and the harvested wet-rice area to about 1,050,000 hectares.[43] 311 133 312

Water control in Cochinchina, the delta land of the mighty Mekong, presents different problems. Here the peasant does not require the shelter of strong dykes, for the annual floods of the Mekong come very slowly and are never as high as those of the Red River. Furthermore, there is only one rise, after which the water recedes, whereas the Red River may have three or four high floods during the course of the rainy season. Each year the Mekong covers vast stretches of the delta with a sheet of water and turns into swamps those parts that have poor drainage.

When the French took over Cochinchina the delta was very thinly settled, although Annamese had already started to come in as colonists. Recognizing the possibilities of large-scale rice cultivation in Cochinchina and the need for better drainage, the French began to construct a system of canals which became the decisive factor in the development of the country. These rectilinear canals serve at the same time for drainage, navigation, and irrigation. 653 312

This irrigation is helpful in Cochinchina since the rainfall, although generally sufficient for rice growth, is extremely variable. The tide makes itself felt throughout the delta region, in the river as well as in the canals. The automatic oscillation of the water level allows drainage at low tide and irrigation of the fields at high tide. Unfortunately, but a small portion of the riceland profits from this daily rhythm, for Cochinchina has only primary canals and lacks the subsidiary canals that would bring the advantages of the system into all corners of the plains. Now, only the riceland along the main canals is irrigated. The government expected that the landowners would graft upon these a system of secondary and tertiary canals, but this has been neglected by the great landowners "in that haste to produce and that fever of speculation which has characterized the history of western Cochinchina for 50 years."[44] [32]

Thanks to large-scale canal digging and dredging, the area of wet riceland in Cochinchina increased from 522,000 hectares in 1880 to 1,175,000 hectares in 1900, and 2,200,000 hectares in 1937.[45] [311]

Three types of rice cultivation may be distinguished in Cochinchina: rice that is transplanted once, rice that requires two transplantings, and floating rice.[46] These three types are adaptations to environmental conditions and differ in labor requirements, length of growing season, and 243

[42] Robequain: *op. cit.*, p. 250.
[43] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, p. 255.
[44] Robequain: *op. cit.*, p. 125.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 243.
[46] For a map showing the geographical distribution of these three types, see Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, p. 290.

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yields. On the whole, the farmers of Cochinchina cultivate their fields much less intensively than do those of Tongking and Annam. Hardly any double cropping of rice is practiced in Cochinchina, nor is much of the riceland cultivated during the dry season.

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In 1941 changes in the political boundary between Thailand and French Indochina reduced the importance of Cambodia as a rice-surplus region of Indochina. Cambodia lost the Battambang area, west of the Tonle Sap, which in recent years had developed into a prosperous rice-growing district, possessing one of the most modern rice mills of Indochina.[47] The province of Battambang has a rice area of 134,000 hectares, whereas Cambodia, before the boundary change, had about 800,000 hectares of riceland.[48] Most of this is cultivated during the rainy season and depends entirely upon the rain caught in the fields. Around the Tonle Sap and along the Mekong a good deal of floating rice is grown, and some riceland is planted after the summer flood has receded. The crop from this land is harvested in the dry season and may be considered a dry-season crop, although it begins to grow during the latter part of the rainy season and profits from the floodwater that has spread over the land.

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The deltas of the Red River and of the Mekong, the two "rice baskets" of Indochina, differ greatly when it comes to the final disposal of the crop. The contents of the Tongkingese basket barely meet the needs of the local population, whereas a large part of the Cochinchinese rice may be exported, since the production far exceeds the local consumption. The delta of the Red River is densely settled; but Cochinchina, especially the western part, is still a pioneer country with a relatively low population density. The importance of Indochina as a rice-exporting region is based entirely on the production of rice in the south, particularly in Cochinchina and, to a lesser extent, in Cambodia.

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Dry Fields

Dry fields[49] represent the third type of land under permanent cultivation in Southeastern Asia. The steady increase in the foreign demand for tropical products raised on dry fields, combined with the growth in local food requirements, has led to a great expansion of the area under permanent cultivation. The continuous use of unirrigated land, however, offers one of the most troublesome problems of tropical agriculture, because of the difficulty of preventing soil depletion. Erosion is especially active in a

[47] Thompson: "War and Further India's Rice," 1941, p. 185.

[48] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, p. 309.

[49] In the following discussion we shall exclude non-irrigated or dry land that comes under the regime of shifting cultivation. Sometimes a non-irrigated field lying fallow may have the same appearance as a recently abandoned ladang. But the essential difference is that under permanent culture land tenure is more highly developed than under shifting culture; so that a permanent field lying fallow belongs to an individual who, after a short period, will again cultivate it, whereas an abandoned ladang gives the former cultivator no claims for the future.

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climate characterized by heavy rainfall often concentrated in one season, and it will, unless checked, lead to the exhaustion of the fertility of the soil at a comparatively rapid rate in the tropics. In Southeastern Asia permanent dry fields are usually found on sloping ground exposed, much more than in the case of garden or wet-rice land, to the danger of erosion. Garden land is protected by dense stands of perennials, while terracing and dyking guard wet fields against destructive erosion. The terracing of dry fields is one of the most effective ways to control the loss of soil, but, since terracing requires so much labor, we find terraced dry fields only in densely settled regions, and even there the peasants often will not undertake this additional labor unless they are urged to do so by the authorities. As long as there is enough land available, the peasants prefer to let dry land recuperate by lying fallow for short periods rather than to protect it by terraces; but with the increasing density of population and the consequent shrinkage in the size of individual farms this practice is no longer possible (Figs. 61–64).

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As early as the second half of the nineteenth century, K. F. Holle, the agricultural adviser in the Netherlands Indies, constantly stressed the need of controlling erosion on dry fields. Following his advice, the government, in Article 5 of the 1874 Ordinance on Alienation of Domain Forest Land, stipulated that permission to clear domain land on sloping terrain be given to the peasants only on condition that they terrace the slopes and thus control erosion.[50]

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The need for the terracing of slopes became especially apparent in Java in the coffee lands that the peasants had to plant under the forced-culture system. Many of these lands were completely exhausted after a few years, and Holle showed that this rapid exhaustion occurred because the topsoil had been washed away by heavy rains. In 1873 he wrote detailed instructions for the terracing and cultivation of coffee lands.[51] However, Holle's instructions and the stipulations of the Ordinance of 1874 were subjected to criticism and often ignored. In 1889, therefore, the Government of the Indies asked Forester Berkhout to investigate the practical results of the application of terracing to tegalans. Berkhout's report summarizes the arguments for and against terracing; these still make interesting reading.[52] The arguments against terraces on tegalans were put forth as follows:

1. The people are not used to terracing dry land.
2. Terracing demands more labor.
3. It reduces productivity in the first year if the land is rather steep and the humus layer thin.

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[50] Article 5 reads: "Dat bij hellend terrein zoo er gevaar bestaat voor afspoeling van de bouwkruin, de aanleg geschiede terrasgewijze, en voorts onder zoodanige voorwaarden als plaatselijke omstandigheden wenschelijk maken." Ontginnings-Ordonnantie, *Staatsblad 1874*, No. 79.

[51] Nederlandsch-Indische Maatschappij: Handleiding, 1873.

[52] Berkhout: "Terrassenaanleg," 1892, pp. 139–141.

[See p. 117, cat. 116 --Analyst]

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4. It ties the native more to the soil; so that he can less easily escape the Treasury and the control of native officials. (This is a disadvantage for the individual but an advantage for the government.)

Berkhout lists as arguments in favor of terracing:

1. Terracing makes permanent cultivation of the land possible—because the soil is not washed away—and tillage becomes easier.

2. If the terraces are made narrow at the start and are widened each year, until on steep slopes they have reached a width of from 3 to 4 feet and on less steep slopes of from 5 to 6 feet, the increased labor will be compensated for by the advantage of easier tillage of the land in following years than would be the tillage of virgin soil.

3. The cultivation of crops is much easier on land that is under permanent culture than on land that has been lying fallow for several years and has been invaded by malignant weeds such as *alang-alang* (*Imperata* species).

4. The people do not have to move constantly. Whereas non-terraced land has to be abandoned nearly every year, well terraced land can be utilized for from 10 to 20 consecutive years and even for much longer if fertilization and crop rotation are applied.

5. The deep tillage and increased airing of terraced soil improve its physical condition and raise productivity.

6. The rental and sales value of the land rises.

7. The land will be fenced and the peasant will build a simple hut on it, something that would not be profitable if the land were used for only one year. This reduces the danger that the crop will be damaged by wild animals.

8. The land can be manured without danger that the manure will be washed away before it has had time to be effective.

9. The people learn to appreciate the land and to till it better.

10. More perennials—such as areca-nuts and sugar-palms—are planted on terraced land than on land that requires fallowing every so often and on which the fruit trees would have to struggle with alang-alang.

11. The Treasury finds it easier to collect taxes from a sedentary, stable population than from a people that is constantly moving.

. . . . . .

14. It considerably reduces the land requirements of the native population in the mountains. It is therefore easier to expand private plantation agriculture and governmental coffee cultivation.

15. It reduces the difficulties of forest conservation. Forests whose conservation is not necessary for climatological reasons can be released for cultivation in accordance with the increase of population and of land requirements.

16. Terracing breaks the force of rain water. The tilled soil absorbs more water. Thus terraced land regulates the flow of the rivers and reduces the violence of floods.

17. It reduces the silting of rivers and their estuaries.

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In a study published in 1894, Holle reports actual cases from the regency of Soekaboemi that clearly prove the advantages of terracing tegalans.[53] Nevertheless, the government did not require the peasants of Java to terrace tegalans already in use before the Ordinance of 1874, although officials in some districts, by bringing pressure to bear upon the peasants, compelled them to terrace. For several decades following the early 1890's, the authorities paid less attention to soil erosion. In many districts the terraces were not kept in good condition, and so much soil was washed away that in more recent years the authorities have become alarmed over the increasing signs of exhaustion of the tegalans and their decline in yields. A recent study states: "Another problem which on sloping dry land demands attention is the erosion of the soil. Terracing of these lands

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TABLE III—JAVA: GROWTH OF THE TERRACED TEGALAN AREA IN THE RESIDENCY OF PRIANGAN, 1937–1941

DATE	TERRACED TEGALAN AREA IN HECTARES
1937 (December)	1,370
1938 "	4,290
1939 "	12,880
1940 "	14,950
1941 (May)	16,930

Source: Joosten: Ontwikkeling . . . van den Landbouwvoorlichtingsdienst, 1941, p. 1067.

should be forcefully recommended, as otherwise the soil will become completely sterile." [54]

Holle was especially familiar with the Preangers, and many of his illustrations are taken from this part of West Java. I had the good fortune to spend some time in the field with H. A. A. M. Wirtz, the adviser for Indonesian agriculture in Priangan (formerly Middle and East Preanger). Mr. Wirtz was trying to improve the fertility of tegalans by means of terracing. In Priangan tegalans represent more than half the area cultivated by Indonesians. At the end of 1937 there were 1,370 hectares of terraced tegalans in Priangan, and by May 1941 this figure had increased to 16,930 hectares (Table III). Wherever possible Wirtz recommended building up the faces of the terraces with stones. Where stone is not available the faces of the terraces can be sufficiently protected by a grass such as buffalo grass (*Paspalum conjugatum* Berg.), which at the same time supplies a good cattle fodder. It is extremely important to protect the faces of the terraces with a cover of vegetation; otherwise erosion is accelerated through the increased cultivation of the soil, and the terraces will be washed away within one or two rainy seasons. Where *Paspalum* had not yet been established as a cover crop on the fronts of the terraces, the cover very often consisted of a spontaneous growth of common weeds and grasses. Unfortunately, the peasants like to dig out these weeds in order to pre-

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[53] Holle: "Eenige gegevens omtrent den inlandschen landbouw," 1894.
[54] Departement van Economische Zaken: Voedselproblemen, 1940, p. 29.

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vent their spread over the fields. Wirtz opposed this removal of weeds and grasses. Because of its deep roots, *Leucaena glauca* Benth. is an excellent protector of terrace banks when planted as a hedge along the edge of the terraces. It can be kept low so that it will catch the soil that otherwise might be washed down (Figs. 65–70).

two instances during my stay in Priangan I saw remarkable proof of the extent of recent erosion on sloping unterraced land. The peasants of this region frequently grew tea on their tegalans. They kept the ground so free of weeds that the soil between the bushes was unprotected, and erosion had been so extensive that the roots were exposed for as much as a foot and a half, leaving the bushes standing upon "stilts." This was in all likelihood a repetition of what had occurred during the past century in the coffee lands. Had these tea lands been terraced, as Holle recommended, they would not have lost so great a quantity of soil in the 10 or 15 years that they were in production.

The work of the Agricultural Advisory Service in encouraging the terracing of tegalans in West Java has had pronounced effects. It has led to a rise in land prices—even of tegalans not yet terraced—for the farmers began to realize the potentialities of dry land. As soon as the danger of erosion has been conquered, the peasants have begun to apply more stable manure and green manure to the land and to plant cash crops such as tobacco, onions, and tomatoes. The building of terraces has also created employment for men especially skilled in terracing. Whereas formerly a good deal of the tegalan area had been leased, now the owners have started to cultivate a greater portion of the land themselves.[55]

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The island of Madura is probably the most remarkable area in Southeastern Asia in respect to the cultivation of tegalans.[56] The island is very densely settled, but the natural resources are rather limited. Because of the topography and soil, over 80 per cent of the arable land consists of tegalans, mostly on slopes. The tegalan area has been extended to such a degree that the island is practically deforested. A large part of the tegalans is terraced, including much land that from the viewpoint of agricultural economics has not been worth the labor that went into the construction of the terraces. A portion of the dry land, however, was left unterraced after the forest was cut down, and its cultivation resulted in such severe erosion that the land has become worthless for farming. Even terracing and other methods of soil improvement could not rehabilitate this land. The agricultural officer of Madura told me in 1940 that he believed some 120,000 to 150,000 hectares of tegalan area should be bought from the Madurese and reforested by the forest service. However, there is no doubt that the situation would be much more serious today had the Madurese not done his best by terracing and other soil-saving methods of cultivation to pre-

[55] Joosten: Ontwikkeling . . . van den landbouwvoorlichtingsdienst, 1941, p. 1071.
[56] I spent two days on the island with J. F. Dekker as my untiring guide and interpreter.

[See p. 118, category 116 -- Analyst]

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vent erosion and rapid exhaustion of the land. Otherwise practically all the tegalans would now have been washed into the sea, and many of the people would have been forced to abandon the island (Figs. 71, 72).1

The Philippines supply us with a striking contrast to Madura in the island of Cebu, which, like Madura, consists largely of limestone. Cebu, too, is densely settled. The island has the highest density of population of any province in the Philippines, that is, 219.4 persons per square kilometer in 1939 (as compared with 357 per square kilometer in Madura in 1930). Cebu is also very mountainous. As the population increased, more and more mountain forest was cleared, and the land was planted with annual food crops. However, the Cebuanos, in contrast to the Madurese, did not terrace their dry fields. Erosion ran its course, with the result that today in many parts of the island there is no longer any soil covering the limestone, while over wide areas the layer of soil has become so thin that terracing would no longer be possible. The peasants try to retard erosion by laying dry cornstalks across the slope—futile attempts. The continued cultivation of annual crops on the steep hill slopes of Cebu will finally destroy what remains of the dry fields and force the Cebuanos in increasing numbers to migrate to the neighboring islands, especially to Mindanao and Negros (Figs. 73–76).1 Years ago C. F. Baker, Dean of the College of Agriculture, University of the Philippines, recommended combining forestry with agriculture by planting narrow belts of trees along the contours between parallel wider strips of crop land, but so far no steps have been taken to test the value of this suggestion.[57]

A beginning in reforestation was made in Cebu when, in 1916, the Bureau of Forestry was given jurisdiction over a tract of about 4,000 hectares of mountainous land to the west and northwest of Cebu City. During the following years reforestation was carried out with *Tectona grandis* L., *Vitex parviflora* Juss., *Aleurites moluccana* Willd., *Aleurites trisperma* Blanco, and *Leucaena glauca* Benth. Wherever the plantings could be protected against firewood-seekers and against fire they did well on these steep hills, with their thin soils, and sent their roots into the crevices of the limestone. By 1928 the older plantings were supplying wood and oil-seeds. An economic survey of the land revealed that 95 per cent of the reforested area should be considered as permanent forest land, unsuited to agriculture. In spite of this the Bureau of Lands, under political pressure from the local population, demanded and obtained control over the land, with the exception of the forest experiment station and its seed plots at Camp 7 on the road from Cebu City to Toledo (Figs. 77, 78).1 Soon thereafter the reforested land was sold to Cebuanos on liberal terms, which required only a small first payment. As soon as the down payments had been made the new owners cut the trees and sold the timber and firewood, the value of which was estimated in many cases to be over 100 pesos per

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[57] Pendleton: "Glimpses of Hinterlands," 1935, pp. 831–832.

1 [See p. 119, category 116 -- Analyst]

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654 242 185 hectare. In many instances the land was abandoned as soon as the forest crop had been harvested; in others the land was cultivated for a short period. The soil that had formed during the time the land was being reforested eroded away. Granted that the population pressure in Cebu is great, it was nevertheless shortsighted to give way to local politics and allow the destruction of the new forest. The best course for Cebu would probably be for the peasants to give up growing three maize crops a year on steep slopes and to plant instead perennial tree crops such as kapok, mangoes, rimas, and other fruit trees.

[647] In Cebu the Bureau of Forestry lost control to the Bureau of Lands. Even in Madura the forest service found that reforestation plans were not especially favored by officials of the Department of the Interior, who would have preferred an increase in the crop area to a decrease.[58]

241 134 242 So far we have discussed only one aspect of dry-field cultivation, the need for erosion control through terracing. In addition to erosion we also face the problem of a decline in fertility because of the fact that each crop takes away a certain amount of mineral matter vital to the growth of plants. Thorough tillage, crop rotation, the application of stable manure and commercial fertilizer, the growing of green manure, and mixed cropping—that is, the growing of more than one crop on the same soil at the same time—are some of the means by which the peasants of Java try to prevent depletion of soil fertility on their dry fields. The method, or methods, used depends upon the local environment, local tradition, the industriousness of the people, and the degree to which they must rely upon crops coming from the dry fields. In many regions of Java the peasants are accustomed to plowing their land from six to nine times and then harrowing it several times before they plant. Crop rotation is generally practiced. The peasant, when asked why he practices crop rotation, says that a living crop does not like to smell anything of its kind that has died, and for that reason he changes the crop from season to season. The use of animal manure is limited by the small number of livestock. In many parts of Java the density of population is so high that peasants have to use most of the land for the growing of food crops rather than for the production of fodder with which to feed animals. But aside from this, peasants in some districts are not used to preserving animal waste. Although the application of commercial fertilizer has given good results in many districts, the peasants are slow to change, either because of their conservatism or because they do not have the capital for this intensification of agriculture. However, in districts where such commercial crops as tobacco and sugar cane are raised, too much fertilizer may be used. I found this excessive use of fertilizer in a tobacco-growing district of Madura, where the peasants apply fertilizer as late as two weeks before the crop is harvested. In such districts agricultural advisers were endeavoring to bring about a reduction in the quantity of fertilizer applied and a better timing of its use.

[58] Mijers: "Herbebosching," 1941, pp. 909–942.

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The Agricultural Advisory Service of the Netherlands Indies for many years carried on experiments with green manures and recommended a variety suitable for different conditions, but the main obstacle to the application of their research was the difficulty of introducing green manure into a crop rotation. Some of the green manures used in Java are *Crotolaria anagyroides* H. B. and K., *Crotolaria usaramoensis* Baker, *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., *Calopogonium mucunoides* Desv., *Centrosema pubescens* Benth., *Centrosema plumierii* Benth., and *Mimosa invisa* Mart. Green manure requires a relatively large amount of water in order to produce the desired foliage. If there is sufficient water, the peasants can also grow other crops such as legumes, which supply food as well as fertilizer. Most of the peasants of Java have so little land that they cannot afford to sacrifice a single food crop from a field in spite of the probability of an increased yield after the green manure has been plowed under. Although it is preferable to grow green manure unmixed with other plants, the planting of a green manure crop among the food crops is recommended where land is scarce. This is done in Java, especially in maize and cassava fields. The specific green manure that is chosen should meet the following conditions:[59]

1. It should have a rapid growth,
2. An abundant production of leaves,
3. No excessive development that might harm the main crop,
4. An absence of climbing or trailing stems;
5. The plant should have deep roots with many nodules;
6. It should not become woody too easily—as herbaceous plants decompose much more quickly; and
7. It should be immune from the diseases and insects that attack the main crop.

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Another agricultural practice common to many parts of the world, especially the tropics, is mixed cropping, which seems to bring in its train some of the advantages of rotation.[60] Nicol stresses the great importance of having leguminous plants grown among non-leguminous plants. He points out that the legume component in the mixture provides nitrogen to the non-legume.[61] In various parts of India—for example on the Bombay Deccan—bulrush millet (*Pennisetum typhoideum* Rich.) is grown with various legumes. This can be done year after year without greatly affecting the fertility of the soil. No crop rotation is practiced here. The proportion of bulrush millet to legumes varies according to the quality of the land; the poorer the land, the smaller the proportion of millet and the larger the proportion of legumes. Wallace wrote in 1887:

> The growth of mixed crops is a widespread practice which is well worth consideration and study. . . . The advantages . . . are distinctly great. . . . There is

[59] International Institute of Agriculture: Use of Leguminous Plants, 1936, p. 60.
[60] Willis: Agriculture in the Tropics, 1914, p. 29.
[61] Nicol: "Mixed Cropping," 1935, p. 189.

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but one explanation of the existence of these practices, viz., that they have been found advantageous after long experience and much careful consideration on the part of a body of workers who, for power of observation and an intelligent interest in and knowledge of every day occurrences, would put to shame those classes which hold a corresponding position in educated Europe.[62]

Well known is the American Indian's practice of interplanting maize, beans, and squash. Chinese and Japanese peasants practice mixed cropping widely, and we may observe it almost everywhere in Southeastern Asia. Intensive mixed cropping in the garden culture of Java has already been described (see above, pp. 43–45), but there is relatively little interplanting of legumes with non-legumes. On dry fields the peasants of some parts of Java are accustomed to interplant cassava and maize—both, however, non-legumes. Whereas maize can be harvested after 100 days, cassava needs up to a year or more of growth. Cowpea (*Vigna sinensis* Savi), Goa bean (*Psophocarpus tetragonolobus* DC.), Lima bean (large) (*Phaseolus lunatus* L.), and hyacinth bean (*Dolichos lablab* L.) are also interplanted with cassava. On tegalans in Bali, in 1941, I observed the following crops grown with upland rice: *Eleusine indica* Gaertn., sesame (*Sesamum indicum* L.), and pigeon pea (*Cajanus cajan*). This last enriches the soil as a result of its large production of leaves as well as by the nitrogen in its nodules.

Kaserer has noted that there is little or no interpenetration of plant roots of the same species when they are grown together, whereas a significant degree of root interpenetration takes place when two different species are grown in close association, the degree of interpenetration increasing with the degree of dissimilarity. In one experiment, for example, a legume and a non-legume showed the maximum amount of root interpenetration, the explanation apparently being that one plant takes up the nutrients produced, or made available, by the other.[63] If these observations are correct we have here a scientific argument for the value of mixed cropping. Further studies are needed to determine the desirability of improving and extending it in specific areas.

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Another important method of improving the fertility of dry fields is the use of compost. Vegetable composts are employed extensively in India and Africa. The masters at making compost from household refuse, vegetable waste, and human excreta are the Chinese, who cling to this method of fertilization wherever they practice truck farming in the neighborhood of urban centers in Southeastern Asia. Fungi and bacteria are used to break down suitable mixtures of vegetable and animal wastes. A method that was developed in India is the "Indore process" in which, "by arranging these mixtures in the proper way, and by watering and turning them, to supply moisture and air, the waste materials are transformed in about ninety days into a finely divided humus rich in the foods required by grow-

[62] Wallace: India in 1887, 1888, pp. 196 and 198.
[63] Kaserer: "Beobachtungen," 1911, pp. 1022–1030.

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ing crops. The process can be adapted to climate by manufacture either in shallow pits or low heaps."[64] 241 242

Dry-Field Crops Cultivated by Peasants

The list of dry-field crops cultivated in Southeastern Asia is rather large, but there are regional variations. Cassava, for example, is commonly grown on tegalans in Java (2,300,000 acres), whereas it is unimportant in Sumatra, Borneo, the Philippines (40,000 acres), Malaya (24,000 acres), and Indochina (75,000 acres). The most important dry-field crops are up- 241 311

TABLE IV—CHEMICAL COMPOSITION OF CASSAVA AND IMPORTANT CEREAL FLOURS [146]

	CASSAVA (PER CENT)	MAIZE (PER CENT)	WHEAT (PER CENT)	RICE (PER CENT)
Moisture	10.75	13.41	13.65	13.12
Protein	0.87	7.56	12.35	9.85
Crude fat	1.19	2.79	1.75	0.88
Ash	1.24	1.78	1.81	1.51
Crude fiber	6.12	3.19	2.53	0.63
Carbohydrates	79.83	71.27	67.91	74.01

Source: The Cassava Industry in the Philippines, 1939, p. 7.

land rice, maize, cassava, sweet potatoes, peanuts, soy beans and other pulses, tobacco, and sugar cane, all of which are annuals. Of the first four, only upland rice is a native of Southeastern Asia, whereas the other three are natives of the New World and were introduced into Southeastern Asia by the Spaniards in the sixteenth century.

The inhabitants of Southeastern Asia have long relied upon root crops, fruits, leaves of various plants, and wild roots and tubers gathered in the forests, as well as upon rice. Scheltema refers to a number of early statements which indicate that "rice was not yet the principal food for a large portion of the native population [of Java] as late as the first part of the 19th century and that the rice diet has become much more important in the course of the past hundred years" as a result of the great extension of the cultivation of irrigated rice fields.[65] If it is correct that the rice consumption per capita increased during the past century, the opposite trend has been evident during the present century. For a while the increase in the area of irrigated land was great enough to allow for a larger rice production, but with the steadily increasing pressure of population the peasants now have to depend more and more upon unirrigated land. Thus the production of dry-field crops is gaining in importance. 241 262

Authorities in Southeastern Asia have been especially worried over the increase of cassava production and consumption. Because of the exhaustion of the soil fertility on many dry fields, the growing of upland rice and 241 134

[64] Worthington: Science in Africa, 1938, p. 387.
[65] Scheltema: The Food Consumption, 1936, p. 10.

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241 134 [146] maize has become unprofitable, and many peasants have changed over to cassava, which makes lesser demands upon soil fertility. The per acre yields of cassava are high, and the plant is a source of carbohydrates, fat, and protein. From the standpoint of dietary needs, however, the ratio between carbohydrates on the one hand and protein and fat on the other is unfavorable. People who live on cassava merely fill their stomachs. The insufficiency of protein intake is detrimental to their health. Table IV compares the chemical composition of cassava, maize, wheat, and rice.

243 146 262 Maize, as the table indicates, compares quite favorably in protein content with wheat and rice and is especially rich in fat. It has gained an important position in the diet of the people of central and eastern Java, Madura, the island of Cebu, and the Cagayan Valley in the island of Luzon. Both maize and cassava are easy to store and therefore have a great advantage over sweet potatoes, which must be consumed soon after they ripen.

241 In Thailand maize is an important crop on the Khorat plateau and in other regions where dry land is available. Among the root crops cassava has gained a greater importance than taro and yams. The last two are grown mainly by Chinese gardeners in the neighborhood of large towns. Cassava, too, is grown commercially by Chinese, especially near the railroad on the peninsula.

Most of the so-called dry-field crops are grown in Indochina during the dry season on land that is flooded during the rainy season and at that time [311] produces rice. Gourou has estimated that in Tongking 100,000 hectares of land are used exclusively for the production of dry-field crops and that 350,000 hectares of irrigated land are occupied by such crops during the dry season.[66]

This practice of growing dry-field crops on irrigated land during the dry season is especially widespread in Java, where population pressure is so great that the peasants have to use every possible means to enlarge their food supply. If there is not enough water available to grow a second wet-rice crop, they will always try to get a second harvest of quick-growing dry-field crops during the dry season.

In contrast to the peoples of Java, the Filipinos do not, as a rule, go in for the raising of dry-field crops on wet riceland during the dry season, although this should be possible if the land were cultivated. There is enough water in the soil a short distance below the surface for the growing of crops practically everywhere during the dry season. Repeated tilling would keep the soil soft and fine so that water could move upward by capillary action to replace that which is lost through evaporation. Cultivation would enable plants such as maize, peanuts, and soy beans to grow on land that otherwise would be baked dry and hard. Although the ratio between cultivated land and population in the Philippines does not make a dry-season crop a necessity in most regions, there are a number of districts where the peasants traditionally raise a dry-season crop on irrigated

[66] Gourou: Les paysans, 1936, pp. 407–408.

1 [see page 75 cat 116 -- Analyst]

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land. An example is *mongo* (*Phaseolus mungo* L.), grown in Pangasinan and Batangas. Alarmed by the poor rice crops in 1940 and the difficulty of importing rice from Indochina and Thailand, the Philippine Bureau of Plant Industry, early in 1941, started to distribute seed of quick-growing dry-field crops, especially maize and legumes, in order to supplement the nation's rice bowl. But the average Filipino farmer is reluctant to accept this new practice, because "it is not the custom"—a powerful argument not to be easily overcome.

[249] [654] 241

Dry-Field Crops Cultivated by Plantations

The discussion thus far has been limited to the native cultivation of dry land and to annual crops. However, extensive areas of non-irrigated land are occupied by perennial crops that are grown on plantations owned by Westerners. The crops produced include tea, coffee, cacao, quinine, rubber, palm oil, coconuts, kapok, sisal, and other fibre plants. Some of these crops were cultivated for a long time without the proper measures being taken to protect the soil against accelerated erosion. Although the detrimental effects of plantation agriculture in Ceylon and southern India are notorious in the plantation history of southern Asia, results were just as disastrous in Malaya and in the Netherlands Indies. Westerners, accustomed to clean cultivation or clean weeding in the temperate zone, carried this practice over into the tropics, with the result that soil erosion was very severe on steep slopes and led to great losses in soil fertility. Today, however, these mistakes have been recognized; there is hardly a plantation that has not adopted measures to protect sloping land against erosion and level land against soil exhaustion. The planters of Java were the pioneers in this field, introducing or developing most of the protective measures. These measures include contour drains, silt pits, contour ridges, terraces, hedges, shade trees, and especially cover crops. The use of these measures varies according to the crop, or crops, produced and according to climate, soil, and slope; but the purpose of all of them is to encourage an effective ground cover and to check the rate of water run-off. The financial depression of the 1930's—resulting in the need for very strict economy and a decrease in production costs—has helped considerably to reduce the amount of clean weeding and to convince conservative planters of the value of preserving a ground cover, litter, and mulch. Such measures help not only to retard erosion but also to enrich the soil. The first Western planter who broke away from the custom of keeping the ground of his plantation free from weeds was L. M. Tyl, who in the years 1890–96 developed the "weed-system" and thus introduced the idea of a ground cover into plantation circles of Southeastern Asia. But it took many years before his idea was generally accepted. It is interesting to note here that the Asiatic-owned plantations and the small holdings producing perennial crops, such as rubber, usually did not practice clean weeding. This, in the early days, was regarded by European observers as a sign of laziness and

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poor management, but, as has been so often the case, the Westerners were finally forced to admit the soundness of Oriental cultivation practices.

As we have seen, there are two principal means of protecting the soil between tree crops: by allowing the growth of indigenous plants or weeds (in other words the development of a natural mixed cover), or by establishing a pure cover of leguminous plants, many of which came originally from the New World. Rubber planters in Malaya seem to have had more success with the first method, which has been called "the forestry method of cultivation" or "rubber forestry." [67] Of course, the growth of indigenous plants or weeds must be controlled, and this is done by slashing the undergrowth from time to time. Frequently it is necessary to practice selective weeding in order to suppress undesirable plants and encourage more valuable ones.

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Much research has been directed toward the study of leguminous cover crops which supply nitrogen, as well as foliage for green manure. This research was started in 1910 in the Botanical Garden at Buitenzorg. Some of the cover crops that have proved especially valuable and are widely used on modern plantations are *Calopogonium mucunoides* Desv., *Centrosema pubescens* Benth., *Centrosema plumierii* Benth., *Desmodium* species, *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., *Mimosa invisa* Mart., *Cassia* species, and *Vigna oligosperma* Backer.[68] Several of these have already been mentioned in the foregoing discussion on the use of green manure crops in native agriculture.

Because a number of perennials such as tea, coffee, and cacao are commonly grown under shade trees, many writers seem to believe that these plants need shade. This may be true in part, but more important is the fact that the shade trees protect the soil against excessive losses of moisture and undesirable changes in soil composition, texture, and structure and thus prevent a reduction of the quantity of humus in the soil. Most of the commonly used shade trees are legumes which, in addition to shade, supply litter and nitrogen and help to increase the moisture-holding capacity of the soil, thus reducing the danger of erosion. *Erythrina micropteryx* Poepp., *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., *Leucaena glauca* Benth., *Albizzia moluccana* Miq., *Albizzia chinensis* Merr., *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Pithecellobium dulce* Benth., or Manila tamarind, and *Peltophorum pterocarpum* Backer are especially useful in this respect.

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[67] Haines: "The Uses and Control of Natural Undergrowth," 1934.

[68] For a very extensive list of cover crops, green manures, and shade trees, see Heyne: De nuttige planten van Nederlandsch-Indië, Vol. 3, 1927. See also International Institute of Agriculture: *op. cit.*

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Part II

AGRICULTURAL COLONIZATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AND THE NETHERLANDS INDIES

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[p. 81]

Chapter IV

LANDLESS FILIPINOS

The Population Problem in Southeastern Asia

162 The population in all the countries of Southeastern Asia is distributed very unevenly. It is concentrated mainly in the lowlands along the coasts, 262 on the plains of great rivers, on intermontane plains, and on certain of the islands in the Philippines and the East Indies. Other large areas, less attractive for various reasons, be they permanent or temporary, have low densities of population. This great concentration is due chiefly to the fact that rice is the staple food. Growers of wet rice prefer extensive stretches of level land. The growth of population in any region leads to an expansion of the area under cultivation as long as there is suitable land available. Thereafter the size of the individual farm decreases. This decrease in the amount of cultivated land per peasant must be compensated for by a greater intensity of land use in order to bring about larger yields. There are limits to this, however, and when the stage has been reached where the agrarian population encounters great difficulties in obtaining subsistence from the land, in spite of the fact that its agriculture is very intensive, then we may speak of overpopulation.

121 There are various ways of relieving the pressure of population, such as emigration, industrialization, and a lowering of the birth rate. The remedy 162 of the population problem that will be examined here is migration to regions with agricultural potentialities.

In Southeastern Asia the Indies, the Philippines, and Indochina are suffering most severely from a maldistribution of population. This and the following chapters deal specifically with the Philippines and the Netherlands Indies, where I was able to study the problem at first hand.

Density and Distribution of Population in the Philippines

161 The last census of the Philippines,[1] taken in 1939, showed a total popu- 162 lation of 16,000,000, more than twice the number (7,635,000)[2] recorded in 1903. The density of population amounted to 53.8 persons per square kilometer in 1939, but there was, as has been already indicated, a great

[1] The statistical data in this chapter for which the sources are unspecified were obtained chiefly from the *Census of the Philippines 1939*, the annual reports of the Philippine Commission and later of the Governors General, and unpublished material supplied directly by government departments. The text of the acts and proclamations referred to may be found in the following compendiums: U. S. Statutes at Large, Vol. 32, 1903; Public Laws Enacted by the Philippine Legislature (31 vols.), 1903–1937; Public Laws of the Commonwealth (5 vols.), 1935–1939; and Messages of the President (5 vols.), 1935–1941.

[2] It should be pointed out that the census of 1903 was not so complete as that of 1939; so that the increase between 1903 and 1939 was probably not quite so large as the census figures indicate.

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

FIG. 47—Provinces of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

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

FIG. 48—Density of population in the Commonwealth of the Philippines, by provinces, as recorded by the census of 1939. (The map does not show the province of Manila.)

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1/n [See p. 83, category 116. -- Analyst]

161 162 unevenness in distribution (Map, Fig. 48). 1/n Of the ten largest islands of the Philippines, Cebu had the highest density with 214.8 persons per square kilometer, followed by the rest of the Visayan group of Bohol, Leyte, Panay, and Negros; while Luzon, the largest of the islands, had a density of 70.4 persons per square kilometer. In contrast to these islands,

TABLE V—AREA, POPULATION, AND DENSITY OF POPULATION OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH AND OF THE TEN LARGEST ISLANDS, 1939

ISLAND	AREA (SQ. KM.)	POPULATION (THOUSANDS)	DENSITY PER SQ. KM.
Philippine Is.	297,410	16,000	53.8
Luzon	104,688	7,375	70.4
Mindanao	94,630	1,828	19.3
Samar	13,080	471	36.0
Negros	12,705	1,219	95.9
Palawan	11,785	44	3.7
Panay	11,515	1,292	112.2
Mindoro	9,735	117	12.0
Leyte	7,214	836	115.8
Cebu	4,410	947	214.8
Bohol	3,865	450	116.3

Source: *Census of the Philippines 1939*, Vol. 2, p. 42.

where the density considerably exceeded the average density of the Philippines, Mindanao, the second largest of the islands, averaged only 19.3 persons per square kilometer, Samar 36.0, Palawan 3.7, and Mindoro 12.0 (Table V).

A study of densities by provinces, excluding Manila, shows that Laguna (in Luzon) had the highest density in 1939, with 232.2 persons per square kilometer, followed by Cebu (the province of Cebu includes some smaller islands besides Cebu) with 219.4 and Rizal (in Luzon) with 217.1. In Luzon the provinces around Manila Bay, those in the central plain, the Ilocano provinces (La Union, Ilocos Sur, and Ilocos Norte), and those of the Bicol region (Sorsogon, Albay, and Camarines Sur) are the most densely settled. In the Visayas—in addition to Cebu—Iloilo (in Panay) and Bohol are very congested, and Leyte and Negros Occidental are less so. In Mindanao only one province, Misamis Occidental, has a density higher than 100 persons per square kilometer.

Figures for the density of population based on total land area are not particularly satisfactory. More significant is the ratio between population and cultivated area. This is certainly true in the Philippines, where most of the peasants cultivate small farms rather intensively and are, on the whole, crowded on plains and in valleys, while extensive areas of hinterland—lowlands, uplands, or mountain country—remain thinly settled or empty. The average density per square kilometer of cultivated land in the Philippines was 404.7 persons in 1939. However, in such provinces as

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Ilocos Sur, Ilocos Norte, and Cebu, provinces that have little urban concentration, the densities were considerably higher: 804.3, 666.5, and 767.5 persons, respectively. As only a part of the arable land is used agriculturally, the ratio of population to cultivated area for the Philippines as a whole is not alarming, being considerably lower than that of Java and

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TABLE VI—PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE CULTIVATED LAND ACCORDING TO THE SIZE OF FARM AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS ACCORDING TO SIZE, 1939

SIZE OF FARMS	PERCENTAGE OF CULTIVATED LAND	NUMBER OF FARMS	PERCENTAGE OF ALL FARMS
Less than 1 hectare	4.8	368,903	22.5
1–1.99 hectares	15.5	489,053	29.9
2–2.99 "	16.4	306,496	18.7
3–3.99 "	12.2	164,458	10.1
4–4.99 "	8.7	94,106	5.8
5–9.99 "	18.3	142,587	8.7
10–19.99 "	9.7	48,367	3.0
20 or more "	14.4	20,756	1.3
Total	100.0	1,634,726	100.0

Source: *Census of the Philippines 1939*, Vol. 2, pp. 927 and 928.

Madura or of Japan. Although more than half of the land in the Philippines is considered cultivable, only 13.3 per cent of the total area was actually under crops in 1938, with 22.4 per cent of the total belonging to farms. The difference between the area under crops and the farm area was made up by idle, pasture, forest, and "other" land.[3] In the mountainous Ilocano provinces, in Cebu, and in Bohol, however, practically all cultivable land is in use.[4] Moreover, the peasants of these provinces use a good deal of land on steep slopes that, since no safeguarding measures have been taken, are exposed to severe erosion (Figs. 73, 74). It is clear that the provinces with the highest densities per unit of cultivated land, far from having possibilities of expanding their crop area, are really in need of reducing the area under cultivation and carrying out a reforestation program to prevent further deterioration of their soil resources. There is already a constant stream of migrants from the Ilocano provinces and the crowded Visayan provinces to adjacent, or even to distant, parts of the country. This migration started in Spanish times but received its strongest impetus during the American regime, when extensive road building opened up areas that had been inaccessible.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

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The population problem in certain parts of the Philippines is consider-

[3] "Other" land signifies waste land or land occupied by houses, buildings, or improvements.

[4] In Cebu 28.6 per cent of the total area was under crops in 1938, in Ilocos Sur 12.6 per cent, in Ilocos Norte 10.5 per cent, in La Union 24.2 per cent, and in Bohol 23.6 per cent.

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241 311 ably aggravated by such economic factors as land-tenure systems, widespread tenancy, usury, poverty combined with indebtedness, and the uneconomical size of many of the farms.

On nearly one-fourth of all farms in the Philippines less than one hectare of land was cultivated; these accounted for less than one-twentieth of the total cultivated area. On more than half of all farms less than two hectares

[427] TABLE VII—LUZON: PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL FARM AREA AND OF ALL CULTIVATED LAND OPERATED BY SHARE, CASH, AND SHARE-CASH TENANTS IN CERTAIN PROVINCES, 1939

PROVINCE	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FARM AREA OPERATED BY TENANTS	PERCENTAGE OF CULTIVATED LAND OPERATED BY TENANTS
Bulacan	60.5	76.5
Nueva Ecija	57.3	67.8
Pampanga	52.9	67.0
Cavite	54.7	58.5
Tarlac	45.3	52.4
Laguna	41.3	44.3

Source: *Census of the Philippines 1939*, Vol. 2, pp. 983–984.

were cultivated, and these occupied only one-fifth of the country's cultivated land. On the other hand, on slightly less than one-twentieth of all farms 10 or more hectares were cultivated, but these farms included about one-fourth of the area under cultivation (Table VI).

243 476 One of the characteristics of Philippine agriculture, and of Oriental agriculture in general, is that land devoted to rice culture is worked in small units, each usually requiring the regular labor of not more than one family. Whenever the labor demand exceeds the capacity of the family unit, neighbors cooperate.

427 Although the Philippines have many small farmers who own the land they till, the proportion of landless farmers is astonishingly high for a tropical country. According to the census of 1939, only 49.2 per cent of all farmers were owners of the land they worked; an additional 15.6 per cent owned a part of the land; whereas more than one-third (35.1 per cent) of all farmers were tenants, the great majority of them being share tenants.[5]

The various provinces differ widely in the degree to which the land is worked by tenants. The map in Fig. 49 shows the percentages of cultivated land farmed by tenants. Comparing the number of tenant farmers, i.e. share tenants, cash tenants, and share-cash tenants, with the total number of farm operators, we find that in 1939 the percentage of tenancy ranged all the way from 1.8 to 70.4 per cent. Seven out of the 49 provinces had had a tenancy rate exceeding 50 per cent, 16 had a rate of more than 40 per cent, and 25 one of more than 30 per cent.[6] The prevalence of

[5] *Census of the Philippines 1939*, Vol. 2, p. 968.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 970.

1/1 [p.85 cat.116 Analyst]
2/1 [p 87 cat 116 Analyst]

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

FIG. 49—Percentage of cultivated land farmed by tenants in the Commonwealth of the Philippines, by provinces, as recorded by the census of 1939.

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427 tenancy in certain provinces in Luzon can be seen in Table VII,[1] which gives the percentages of total farm area and of cultivated area operated by all types of tenants.

The percentage of tenants was low in La Union (17.7 per cent), Ilocos Norte (19.5 per cent), and Ilocos Sur (24.2 per cent), provinces that are among those having the highest ratios of population to cultivated area.[7] The explanation for this may be found in the character of the Ilocanos, who are notably industrious, thrifty, and attached to their land.

Historical Development of Land Tenure

Caciquism

427 175 621 565 567 361 In order to understand the land-tenure conditions of today in the Philippines one has to go back to early Spanish and pre-Spanish times. In those days, as now, the inhabitants of the lowlands and coastal regions of Luzon and the Visayas lived in villages. Each village, or *barangay*, as the Tagalogs called it, had its own chief, or *dato*. Under the aristocracy, which was represented by the dato and his family, there were three classes of people: free men, serfs, and slaves. The free-born members of a barangay usually paid no taxes or tribute to the dato but were obliged to follow him in war and to help with the cultivation of his land, the harvesting of his rice, and the construction of his house. In a tropical climate this last task is repeated every few years. The serfs were obviously what today we should call tenants or *aparceros*. They had their own houses and turned over to their masters the yield of half the land that they cultivated. The slaves lived in quarters provided by the master, could not marry without his permission, and could be sold at any time.

[423] The cleared land of a barangay was divided among the free-born, each one recognizing the rights of the others. There were no titles. The forested land was not divided but was held by the barangay. No one could cultivate the land of any barangay other than his own unless he had purchased or inherited the right to do so. The position of dato was usually held by one family through hereditary right. This gave the family definite economic and social advantages over the other families of the barangay.

175 177 427 565 When the Spaniards established themselves in the Philippines they claimed ownership of all land for the Crown, but they recognized the rights of the native peasants to the land they were actually working. This was only a small fraction of what it is today. In order to attract Spanish settlers to the colonies, the Crown divided the conquered land into grants, or *encomiendas*, and forced the native population to pay tribute to the *encomenderos*. The encomenderos abused their power, exploited the people, and interfered with the religious work of the early missionaries, thereby arousing the enmity of the Church.

The encomienda system went out of existence at the beginning of the

[7] Ibid.

[1] [P 86 cat 116 Analyst]

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seventeenth century, and the country was then governed by colonial government officials who, in the political sphere, took the place of the datos of pre-Spanish days. The Spaniards were careful, however, not to disturb the social structure of the villages or the social and economic position of the datos.[8] The datos became known as *cabezas de barangay*. Several barangays made up a pueblo or municipality, headed by the *gobernadorcillo*, who originally was elected by all the household heads of a municipality, but later, in the nineteenth century, by the cabezas de barangay. The families from whom the gobernadorcillos and cabezas de barangay were drawn constituted the aristocracy and enjoyed special political and social privileges. The Spaniards introduced the term *cacique*, or chief, into the Philippines from Haiti and applied it to the datos, or cabezas de barangay, and the other leading families of a community. By recognizing them, the Spaniards helped the caciques to preserve their power over the people and gave them the opportunity of getting more and more land into their hands, of making more and more people financially dependent upon them (inasmuch as they were the tax-collectors), and of reducing freeholders to the status of tenants. Thus many of the leading families of pre-Spanish days kept their favorable social and economic position, and often strengthened it by intermarriage with the Spaniards.

This same group retained leadership after the coming of the Americans because it was the educated element in the country. It was able to monopolize most of the advantages derived from the American regime and to obtain control over national as well as local political life. Hence these caciques, the landed aristocracy of the Philippines, having all the privileges that the possession of money and land may give in an agrarian community, are today in a position to exploit a large part of the rural population. In some provinces this part amounts to more than half of all the farming families.

Although both Spanish and American authorities in the Philippines were aware of the pernicious hold that the cacique class had on the less fortunate part of the population, neither took effective measures to break it. Caciquism became deeply ingrained in the life and thinking of the Filipinos; and as long as the mass of the people remained illiterate and ignorant, it was relatively easy for the caciques to regulate affairs in the rural communities according to their own wishes. The Spanish Government made several half-hearted attempts to systematize land tenure by issuing land titles. As late as the second half of the nineteenth century two royal decrees were issued, one in 1880 and a second in 1894, urging land-

[8] "The king . . . has ordered . . . that the honors of the chiefs be preserved to them as such; and that the other natives recognize them and assist them with certain of the labors that they used to give when pagans. This is done with the lords . . . of barangays, and those belonging to such and such a barangay are under the chief's control. When he harvests his rice, they go one day to help him; and the same if he builds a house . . ." Blair and Robertson: The Philippine Islands, Vol. 16, 1904, p. 155. Briefer and more recent studies covering the historical material in this chapter are Benitez: History of the Philippines, 1940, and Miller: Principles of Economics Applied to the Philippines, 1932.

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holders to secure titles. The decree of 1894 granted a term of one year during which claims for free titles could be filed. After the expiration of that term all land not covered by title was to revert to the Crown, and no longer would it be possible to obtain a title free of charge. Only a few made use of this offer. To the great majority of peasants, accustomed to unwritten rules of land tenure, the land law was too involved, the idea of a land title too strange. In the opinion of the Spaniard and the American, most Filipinos were without individual legal rights to the land, but in their own opinion they were the actual owners of this land that their forefathers had cleared and that had been in constant use by their families. The comparatively few people who acquired legal titles were mostly persons belonging to the cacique group, and these often laid claim to more land than actually they had a right to. Thus in many cases peasants who had felt secure in the possession of their land and had not known or cared about titles were suddenly confronted with the fact that a wealthy person, with the law behind him, was claiming their land. These peasants were then driven from it or forced to become tenants.

The American administration inherited the results of the defective Spanish land system, which had been so unintelligible to the majority of the peasants and had encouraged land grabbing by a relatively small group of unscrupulous individuals. At the time of the American occupation the number of Filipino peasants without titles was estimated at 400,000. There existed no complete records of the issued titles, nor were these based on clear and accurate surveys. It is therefore no wonder that land disputes and agrarian troubles have persisted.

Friar and Church Lands

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One of the most difficult problems facing the Americans concerned the large estates in the hands of religious orders, the so-called friar lands, which for more than 200 years had been a source of conflict and repeated revolts. During the centuries that the Roman Catholic Church and such orders as the Dominicans, Augustinians, and Recollects had spent in the Philippines, they had come into possession of large areas of the best agricultural lands, mainly in the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, Rizal, and Bulacan, that is, in provinces close to Manila. Most of this land was covered by titles issued in 1880 and 1894, although a part was covered by titles dating from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In many instances the claims of the friars conflicted with the claims of those who were living on the land and who insisted that they were the true owners.[9] In such cases the tenants paid rent, or *canon*, to the administrators of the estates, but only under pressure.

During the Philippine Revolution the Malolos Government confiscated

[9] *Fourth Annual Report* [of the Philippine Commission], 1904, Part 1, pp. 189 and 191.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia
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all the friar estates. But the United States Government was bound by the Treaty of Paris to protect the property interests of the friars. Knowing that a return to the old relation between the friars, or their representatives, and the tenants would cause continual agrarian conflicts, the Philippine Government decided to buy the estates belonging to the Augustinians, Dominicans, and Recollects. After long-drawn-out negotiations, the government, on December 22, 1903, agreed to pay $7,239,784.66 for 23 estates aggregating about 165,000 hectares. The contract stipulated that the sum was to be reduced if surveys should reveal that the estates were actually smaller than they had been assumed to be. When the negotiations between the government and the friars were finally concluded on October 20, 1905, the purchase price was set at $6,934,433.36, a sum that was raised through the sale of Philippine government bonds authorized by the United States Congress.[10] This transfer brought the greater part of the friar lands with their tenants, estimated at more than sixty thousand persons, under direct control of the government. The friars, however, were not willing, in 1903, to sell all of their land; moreover, the Church itself also possessed a number of estates; so that, in spite of great efforts on the part of the American administrators, the question was not completely solved.

According to the census report, Roman Catholic religious organizations owned 41,782 hectares of land in the Philippines on December 31, 1938. It is doubtful, however, whether this figure is complete, since the four Church- or friar-owned estates of Buenavista, San Pedro Tunasan, Lian, and Dinalupihan alone account for a total of 41,618 hectares[11] and the Church owns other estates as well. There is a possibility that the census excludes the 27,408 hectares of the Buenavista Estate since it was leased in 1939 by the government for a period of 25 years with an option of purchase. The American administration, inheriting this difficult friar- and Church-land problem from the Spaniards, has done much, especially through the labors of the Taft administration, to alleviate it.

Land Tenure Conditions at the Outbreak of War in the Pacific

At the beginning of the twentieth century the Church and the friars, together with the caciques, were the great landowners; today this group is enlarged by private corporations, which own more land than the Church and the friars ever did. In the sugar-producing areas especially, land has been concentrated in the hands of corporations. On December 31, 1938, business corporations owned 346,017 hectares of land: of these, 121,096 hectares belonged to Filipino, 106,473 to American, and 70,981 to Spanish corporations. A good deal of this land is worked by cash tenants, the remainder by laborers under farm managers.

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10 U. S. Public Act, July 1, 1902, Secs. 63, 64, and 65.
11 Allen: "Agrarian Tendencies in the Philippines," 1938, pp. 54–55.

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The census[1] does not reveal to what extent land is owned by caciques, but it is known that a great deal of the riceland of the central provinces, 471
the sugar land in the various sugar-producing regions, and the coconut 427
and abaca land is owned by caciques, who divide their estates, or *haciendas*, 311
into small units and have them worked either by *inquilinos* (cash tenants) or *kasamas*[12] (share tenants). The great majority of the cacique holdings comprise less than 100 hectares each; only a relatively few exceed 1,000 hectares. Since the Spanish days, these holdings have grown steadily and the percentage of tenant families has correspondingly increased. This is evident in the province of Nueva Ecija, which in large part was opened up and developed after 1918. In 1935 Nueva Ecija had 15 holdings of more than 1,000 hectares in extent; another 50 were from 500 to 1,000 hectares and about 2,000 were from 24 to 100 hectares.

Under the *inquilinato* system, which exists in all the provinces of Luzon 427
and also in some of the other islands, an agreement is made between landlord and inquilino whereby the former turns his land over to the latter for a stipulated amount of annual rent, in cash or kind, called canon. The inquilino has his own animals and agricultural implements and must himself finance his agricultural operations. In densely populated provinces there is such a demand for land by people with the necessary funds to work as inquilinos that the landowners auction off the right to cultivate their land to the highest bidder, who must often pay the canon in advance. Local conditions, the pressure of population, the quality of the land, the type of crops to be raised, and other factors determine the amounts bid by the inquilinos. The cash rent therefore varies greatly from province to province and even within provinces.

Often an inquilino leases land without intending to work it himself. Instead he enters into an agreement with a share tenant who does the actual cultivation. Landlords, especially big absentee landlords, prefer to lease their land to a few inquilinos instead of to thousands of kasamas, for in the inquilinato system no labor or supervision is required of the landlord. It is of no practical concern to the landlord how good or how poor a crop the inquilino raises, since the former receives his fixed amount of canon, preferably before the beginning of the agricultural year. The Church and the friars used, and still use, the inquilinato system in preference to the kasamas system. Modern corporations have followed their example.

In recent years there have been frequent conflicts between landlords 578
and inquilinos because, as the pressure of population increases—creating 427
a scarcity of good riceland—the landlords repeatedly raise the canon and refuse to renew the leases if the inquilinos will not pay the higher amount. For a time inquilinos may submit to successive increases in the canon, but finally they decline to agree to a new raise. They may have put a great deal of improvement into the land. Often they, or their forefathers, actu-

[12] Also known as *aparceros*.

1 [Census of the Philippines, 1939 - - Analyst]

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ally cleared the land and then leveled and dyked it so that it could be used for the cultivation of wet rice. It is natural that an inquilino should hate to give up the farm that he or his family has worked for a long time, and that he should refuse to leave the land if the landlord is unwilling to recompense him for the improvements he has put into it. 578 427

In a region where the competition for land is sharp the landlord has every opportunity to raise the canon and force the inquilinos to do extra work for him. According to a survey made by the Department of Labor, the *hacenderos* "oblige the inquilino to construct camarines [store houses], houses, dikes . . . without compensation. When a hacendero believes that it is necessary to construct a road within the hacienda, build a bridge and other improvements, he asks contributions from his inquilinos. . . . Those who do not give the contribution are expelled from the hacienda." [13] In 1939 there was a dispute between the owners and inquilinos of Hacienda Esperanza in Pangasinan Province. One of the complaints of the dismissed inquilinos was that

> some years ago they contributed towards the construction of a concrete dam which has cost ₱12,000.00. The contributions ranged from ₱7.00 to ₱10.00 a hectare. . . . The condition was that the contribution in question would be returned to them at the rate of ₱1.00 a year after the dam had begun operating. It was to be deducted from the canon they were to pay. Likewise, they were made to understand that if they contributed they would be allowed to remain on the land as long as they wished, if they paid the corresponding canon then prevailing. The dam began operating in 1935, but no refund to the inquilinos has ever been made. Not only this, but now [in 1939] they are being driven away.[14]

Such complaints have been frequent.

In 1939 the actual number of farms run by cash tenants (inquilinos) was small (17,111) as compared with the number worked by share tenants (547,933) and constituted only one per cent of all the farms in the Philippines. The percentage of farms run by inquilinos in the Luzon rice provinces of Cavite, Rizal, Pampanga, Pangasinan, and Tarlac exceeded this average, however.

Thus the prevailing form of tenancy, especially on riceland, is the kasama, or share-tenancy, system, which resembles the share-cropping system of the cotton-producing regions of the United States. The kasama system has a number of variations. Under a common form the landowner is obliged to furnish land, seed, and the cash needed for transplanting and harvesting the rice, while the kasama does the labor with his own work animals. The crop is divided equally, after the kasama has paid in kind half the expenses for transplanting and harvesting. The kasama will receive two-thirds, and the landlord one-third, of the crop if the former owns 427

[13] Commonwealth of the Philippines Labor Department: Fact-Finding Survey Report, (Ms. dated 1936), p. 37.

[14] Memorandum by Modesto Villalobos, executive officer of the Anti-Usury Board, to the Secretary of Justice, Manila, April 26, 1939.

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[i.e., share tenancy. -- Analyst]

427 the work animals and pays for seed, transplanting, and harvesting. Under still another arrangement, the owner furnishes the tenant with land, work animals, and seed. The harvest is divided equally, after the costs of the seed and the planting and harvesting have been deducted.

427 452 A characteristic feature of the kasama system is that the tenant has no funds and usually no rice for his family at the beginning of the contract. He therefore receives a *bugnos*, or advance, from his landlord. This sum, varying from 25 to 125 pesos, usually bears no interest but is returnable in money or in kind at the termination of the contract. In addition, the tenant is given a weekly or monthly *palay* (unhusked rice) ration to keep him and his family going. The palay received up to the time of planting is usually paid back without interest; whereas the rations delivered after the crop is once planted are subject to high interest, and here the door is opened to usurious practices, which will be discussed later. The kasama is completely in the hands of the landowner, who has to support him until the time of the harvest and the division of the crop. Often the tenants run so deeply into debt that they remain in debt after the crop has been divided and they have turned over their share to the landlord in payment of their loans. Thus, instead of being able to draw upon their own rice during the off-season between February and July, they must ask the landlord for new loans in money or palay and fall even more deeply into debt.

It is to the advantage of the landlord to have the tenant indebted to him, not only because of the high interest rates but also because then the tenant may be forced to do all kinds of extra work and may not leave his holding. [566] The debt binds the tenant to the land and makes him almost a slave of the landlord, who thereupon determines every step to be undertaken—the crop to be grown and the time of planting and harvesting. This control at times goes so far that literate tenants, who have the right to vote, are not at liberty to choose their own candidate but must cast their vote for the landlord's candidate. An investigator for the Department of Labor reported a contract which compelled the tenant to attend the Roman Catholic Church and to work with his family for the landlord at fixed times [686] without pay. Visitors were not allowed to enter the hacienda. Violations of rules listed in this particular contract gave the landlord the right to impose fines of from two to four *cavans* of palay.[15] (One cavan equals 75 liters.)

427 426 Usury, which presents the darkest aspect of the relation between landlord and tenant, is an old institution in the Philippines. Various interest rates are known by specific terms, such as *takipan*, *talindua*, and *terciahan*. Under the takipan rate the tenant pays back two cavans of palay for every cavan that he has borrowed. Should he be unable to settle this debt at the time of the first harvest, it increases to four cavans at the second harvest. The talindua rate demands three cavans for every two borrowed, and the terciahan, four cavans for every three borrowed. In all instances the

[15] Commonwealth of the Philippines Labor Department: *op. cit.*, p. 226.

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rates are exacted on loans over periods of six months and less. If a loan has been made in cash, it is settled in kind, but the landlord subtracts from the market price of palay on the day of delivery as much as 50 to 75 centavos. This arrangement is called *takalanan*. 426 427

Those who defend these interest rates argue that a tenant who borrows, for example, 10 cavans of palay at a time when a cavan costs 4 pesos owes not 10 cavans of palay but 40 pesos. If at the time of the payment of the debt the price for one cavan is only 2 pesos, then the tenant must deliver 20 cavans in order to meet his obligation of 40 pesos. The defenders of this usurious system intentionally overlook the fact that the landlord will not sell his palay when it is cheap but will wait until the price has improved, and thus realize excessive profits. It is evident that in many cases the same rice that was turned over by the tenant will be used to sink him more deeply into debt and to exploit him further. This practice of changing from kind into money and back into kind, in order to make full use of price differences and to force the debtor to pay in kind at what is for him the most disadvantageous moment, has been made illegal in the Philippines through legislation which will be discussed later.

The late Governor General Theodore Roosevelt investigated a case of usury in which a small farmer had borrowed 300 pesos ($150.). He never obtained any more cash. Each year, when the time came to pay his interest, the usurer offered him remission if he would sign a new document substituted for the original one and written in a language he did not understand. At the end of the fourth year he owed 3,000 pesos.[16]

Tenant indebtedness is desired by the landlords, who use various methods to involve their tenants in debt. One way is to force more advance money on the tenant than he actually needs. This procedure is called *pasunod*. Or the landlord may compel his tenant to buy clothing from him at exorbitantly high prices. Under the *cantina* system, common in Negros, tenants and laborers are obliged to make their purchases at the landlord's store, which charges more than other local stores. It is no wonder that kasamas rarely, if ever, have a chance to rid themselves of debt, since their landlords are so anxious to keep them in financial dependence in order to prevent their leaving the land. [437] [566]

If these kasamas, living as they are from hand to mouth and depending upon the landlord for their subsistence, are refused credit and rice rations, they become helpless and desperate. They are, on the whole, poorly clothed, poorly fed, and poorly housed. Very few of them have a chance to secure an education for their children. Hayden gives an excellent description of this section of the Philippine population, [735]

who as tenant farmers, renters or virtually landless workers eke out a miserable living from the rich Philippine soil. These people constitute a depressed minority which has been largely left behind in the march of Philippine progress. Astonish-

[16] Roosevelt: "Land Problems," 1934, p. 200.

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426 427 ingly ignorant, for the most part unable to use effectively any language save their local dialects, and economically helpless, it is they who are the most complete victims of the local *cacique*, the remorseless usurer and the exploiting political or religious charlatan.[17]

735 241 311 427 An important factor in the poverty of the kasama is the smallness of the average kasama farm, which in 1939 covered only 2.88 hectares, including uncultivated as well as cultivated land. Of this average farm the kasama was actually able to cultivate only 2.22 hectares. More than half of the kasamas (53.9 per cent) had farms of less than two hectares. These are averages for the Philippines as a whole. In the more crowded provinces conditions are still more serious. Because of the high percentage (54.8) of kasamas who are on rice farms, the following discussion will be limited to rice tenancy.

241 461 735 427 464 The cultivation of one hectare of riceland requires about 300 hours of man labor in addition to 150 hours of animal labor. The labor requirements are especially high during the planting and harvesting seasons; whereas in the intervals between planting and harvesting and between harvesting the old and planting the new crop the farmer and his family have little work to do unless they are engaged in a secondary industry. A farmer who tills less than two hectares of riceland does not make full use of his working capacity even during the busy season. With some additional help from other members of the family an efficient farmer can handle three hectares of riceland, especially if his land does not depend upon rain exclusively but is supplied by an irrigation system. Here, then, lies one reason for the poverty of the kasama: his labor is only partly employed—the equivalent of 75 eight-hour days a year.

241 735 433 427 Another cause of poverty is to be found in the yields. Most of the Philippine riceland produces only one rice crop and is usually not used for the raising of secondary crops during the dry season. The average yield of rice (both wet and dry) for the Philippines as a whole was 23 cavans per hectare in 1935. Yields vary greatly from province to province and depend upon the fertility of the soil, the weather, the variety of rice grown, and the methods of cultivation. The highest yields for certain lowland rice varieties come to 60 cavans per hectare in the best years. The average per-hectare yield in 1935 of lowland and upland rice for Nueva Ecija was 38 cavans, for Nueva Vizcaya 35 cavans, and for Pangasinan and Bulacan 30 cavans.

Most of the kasamas cultivate lowland rice and may expect an average yield of about 40 cavans per hectare, of which at least half goes to the landlord. Out of his share the kasama has to pay half the cost of transplanting and harvesting the rice, which on a farm of 2 hectares amounts to the equivalent of 5 cavans; thus, in this case, if the price of rice at the time of harvest is 2 pesos per cavan, the kasama's total income will be

[17] Hayden: The Philippines, 1942, p. 378.

[1 [ie share Tenants -- Analyst]

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only 70 pesos. Velmonte reports that tenancy surveys made by the College of Agriculture show that the income of a rice tenant is not more than 130 pesos on a farm three hectares in area. Tenant families try to supplement their meager incomes with work outside the farm during the dry season, but sometimes there is not enough work for all the tenants. 241 735 433 427

TABLE VIII—PERCENTAGES OF FARMS WORKED BY THEIR OWNERS, ACCORDING TO SIZE OF FARM, IN THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH AND IN CERTAIN PROVINCES, 1939

PROVINCE	LESS THAN 1 HECTARE	LESS THAN 2 HECTARES	LESS THAN 3 HECTARES	MORE THAN 3 HECTARES
Philippines	24.6	52.1	68.4	31.6
Cebu	47.8	77.0	87.7	12.3
Ilocos Norte	53.2	85.6	94.3	5.7
Ilocos Sur	51.1	83.9	93.7	6.3
La Union	42.0	75.5	89.0	11.0
Pangasinan	37.2	69.0	84.4	15.6

Source: *Census of the Philippines 1939*, Vol. 2, pp. 975, and 989–995.

Yet if a kasama is fortunate enough to obtain work as a laborer when there is nothing for him to do on the farm, he may, according to Velmonte, raise his annual income to 200 pesos.[18] But even such an income is hardly sufficient to support the average tenant family of five or six members. [H 64]

One way of helping tenants to increase their annual income would be to do away with the old custom of dividing the land into such small farms and instead to give each family at least three or four hectares. The tenant farms of the less congested areas, such as Nueva Ecija, are somewhat larger than the average in the overpopulated provinces of Bulacan, La Union, Ilocos Sur, and Ilocos Norte. In the latter provinces the only way to increase the size of tenant farms would be to encourage large-scale emigration, thus reducing competition for the land of the caciques; this might result in an enlargement of the remaining individual tenant farms. At present, tenants in the crowded provinces practically beg for land to farm, and whenever a cacique dismisses a tenant there are others eager to take his place. 241 427 311

Another way of adding to the income of the kasamas would be to raise the average crop yields through seed selection and to encourage the growing of secondary crops, such as beans, maize, peanuts, and sweet potatoes, during the months between the rice harvest and the next rice planting. The Philippines have extensive areas that can be brought under technical irrigation (see pp. 50–52). In many instances this might enable more farmers to raise a second rice crop and to make fuller use of their working time. 242 427 433

Many farms that are operated by their owners are also uneconomically small, although these farmers are better off than the kasamas since they 427

[18] Velmonte: "Farm Tenancy Problems," 1938, p. 130.

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427 own their whole crop. Slightly more than half of all the farms in the Philippines worked by their owners have less than two hectares of land, and slightly less than one-fourth have under one hectare (Table VIII). Farms operated by peasant owners are especially small in Cebu and in the Ilocano provinces, as Table VIII shows. In Cebu, Ilocos Sur, and Ilocos Norte about half of all the peasant owners have farms of less than one hectare, whereas more than three-fourths cultivate less than two hectares.

The several factors responsible for the low economic level of the major part of the rural population of the Philippines clearly demand special attention if help is to be given to the poor and depressed peasant. Two main types of remedy suggest themselves. The first would be to check such abuses as usury. This would not, however, go to the root of the Philippine problem. The second, and more thoroughgoing, type of remedy would be to effect a redistribution of the population by encouraging migration to hitherto unoccupied lands.

Rice Share Tenancy Act

656 427 579 [664] In February 1933, under the administration of Governor General Theodore Roosevelt, the Philippine Legislature passed "An Act to promote the well-being of tenants (*aparceros*) in agricultural lands devoted to the production of rice and to regulate the relations between them and the landlords of said lands, and for other purposes." [19] This law was to protect the kasamas against abuses by the landlords. The caciques were, however, strong enough to make the law ineffective by inserting the provision that the law should go into effect "only in provinces where the majority of the municipal councils shall, by resolution, petition for its application to the Governor General who shall make the law effective by proclamation." This provision prevented the law from being enforced, since the caciques control the municipalities.

When increasing unrest in the rice regions of the Philippines forced the National Assembly to reconsider the case of the share tenant, it passed Commonwealth Act No. 178 which amends the former act. This act was approved on November 13, 1936. Again the cacique group prevented its general application by inserting the provision, "This Act . . . shall take effect . . . by proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Secretary of Labor, when public interests so require, in the municipalities and on the date designated in such proclamation; and once enforced, its effects may similarly be suspended. . . ." The lawmakers were apparently of the opinion that the kasamas deserved protection only after conditions had become so bad that the kasamas began to disturb law and order and came to open clashes with the landlords.

Hayden observed in 1931 that Philippine government officials were most anxious to prevent an investigation of the Tayug uprising on the

[19] Act No. 4054, Feb. 27, 1933.

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part of American members of the governor general's staff of advisers since "such an inquiry would inevitably be pushed into the whole realm of the oppression of the poor peasant by the local boss [cacique], the usurer, the Constabulary, and the local official." [20]

By issuing a proclamation on January 20, 1937, President Quezon made the Rice Share Tenancy Act effective in the five provinces of Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Pangasinan, and Tarlac,[21] and by February 1941 it had been extended to Albay, Bataan, Capiz, Cavite, Iloilo, Laguna, and six municipalities of the province of Isabela. However, the application of the act to these provinces did not prevent serious clashes and disputes between kasamas and landlords.

The act is rather long and contains so many ambiguous sections that it cannot be understood by a simple, uneducated kasama. Its main provisions are:

1. Contracts between landlord and tenant must be written in the local dialect (Section 4).

2. Contracts are good for one year unless there is an agreement to the contrary (Section 6).

3. The cost of transplanting, harvesting, threshing, irrigation, and fertilizer, if any, are to be borne equally by the two parties. The crop shall be divided equally (Section 8).

4. All advances obtained by the tenant in connection with cultivation shall bear not more than 10 per cent interest per agricultural year. On all loans other than money—such as rice—interest up to 10 per cent may be added to the invoice price of the loan (Section 10).

5. Fifteen per cent of the crop must be left to the tenant regardless of any indebtedness (Section 14).

6. The landlord must not dismiss his tenant except for good reasons. The tenant must not leave the landlord before the expiration of the contract except for good causes (Sections 19 and 25).

In 1938 and 1939 reports reached authorities in Manila that some of the landlords of the provinces in which the Rice Share Tenancy Act was effective threatened to dismiss at the end of the agricultural year any ten-

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20 Hayden: *op. cit.*, p. 380.

21 "Whereas, extensive agricultural lands in the Provinces of Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Pangasinan and Tarlac, are dedicated, under the 'kasama system,' to the rice industry; and

Whereas, time and again serious controversies due to conflicting interpretations of the terms of verbal contracts and other matters affecting the relationship between landlords and tenants in the aforesaid provinces have arisen, thereby menacing public peace and order:

Now, therefore, I, Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, and upon recommendation of the Secretary of Labor, do hereby declare the provisions of Act Numbered Four thousand fifty-four, otherwise known as the Philippine Rice Share Tenancy Act, as amended by Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred seventy-eight, to be in full force and effect . . . in all the municipalities of the Provinces of Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Pangasinan and Tarlac . . ." (Proclamation No. 127).

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ant who dared to demand observance of the act. In order to prevent the wholesale dismissal of share tenants the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 461, approved June 9, 1939, which states that a tenant may be dismissed only for reasons specifically mentioned in the Rice Share Tenancy Act and then only with the approval of a representative of the Tenancy Division in the Department of Justice. This act was replaced on August 22, 1940, by Commonwealth Act No. 608, which also provides compulsory arbitration of all disputes by a representative of the Department of Justice and gives landlord as well as tenant the opportunity of appealing to the Court of Industrial Relations in case either objects to the decision of the Department of Justice.

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The landlords hold that Commonwealth Act No. 461, amended by No. 608, is unconstitutional because it deprives them of their right to dispose of their property as they please.[22] One of them wanted to dismiss three of his tenants. These refused to vacate the land, claiming that they could not be dispossessed or ejected without the approval of a representative of the Department of Justice. Both parties brought their case before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. The plaintiff held that the above-mentioned acts were unconstitutional. But in the court's decision of January 24, 1941, Acts Nos. 608 and 461 were declared valid and constitutional, and the parties were directed to submit their controversy to arbitration before the Department of Justice.

In the summer of 1940 there were a number of serious clashes between tenants and hacienda guards. On June 4, 1940, the *Manila Daily Bulletin*, an American newspaper, stated:

> What had been feared during the past several months has occurred in central Luzon. Bloodshed due to tenancy troubles was reported from Nueva Ecija and Pampanga last night while Bulacan was also seething with clashes threatening in the rice farms.
>
> Fear of famine, actual hunger and the new tenancy law are reportedly largely responsible for all the troubles in the rice region of Luzon. In some towns and barrios people are actually suffering from lack of food with the refusal of many of the landlords to advance money to tenants. In other farms, hundreds of tenants are afraid they would starve during the coming year as the planting season is now upon them and they are still waiting for the definite solution of the ejectment cases filed against them. If they cannot continue tilling the lands they have been working on for many years, their families will have nothing to eat.

This report claimed that Act 608, which forbade landowners to dismiss tenants of long standing without the approval of the Department of Justice, was largely responsible for the unrest among the tenants, who did not know that the landlord had the right to refuse a new contract if the tenants had not fulfilled their obligations under the old one. The leaders of tenant organizations, of which there were several in central Luzon, in-

[22] Ramos: "Discrimination against the Landowners," 1941, p. 7.

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structed their followers to stay on the farms under any circumstances, whether or not their ejection was justified under the very tenancy act which they had invoked for their protection. 656 427 579

Not only private landowners but also the government had difficulties with tenants whom they wanted to dismiss. In 1940 the manager of Buenavista Estate, which was leased by the government, evicted a number of tenants because of their failure to pay the rent. When a lawyer and tenant leader claimed that Commonwealth Act No. 538 prohibited the eviction of a tenant despite non-payment of rent, the Department of Justice ruled that this act affected only estates owned by religious orders and could not be applied to Buenavista since this estate had been leased by the government from the Hospital de San Juan de Dios before the passage of the act. So on June 11, 1940, constabulary soldiers arrested 125 tenants of Buenavista Estate for tilling lots from which they had been ejected.

These cases demonstrate that the Rice Share Tenancy Act, with its numerous amendments, failed to regulate relations between landlord and tenant. The root of pre-war agrarian unrest in central Luzon was not so much the tenancy contract and its stipulations about division of costs and yields of production (although usury and oppression played their role) as the fact that the income of a tenant who worked less than two hectares of land was not enough to give him and his family a bare living and keep him out of debt. There was nothing new in this economic situation. By 1941, however, tenants were organized and led by lawyers, labor organizers, and agitators, who constantly admonished and encouraged them to insist upon their rights granted by law, and who instructed them concerning these rights. In those regions where the tenants were organized in unions the old relationship between landlord and tenant was rapidly disappearing. 668 178

Public statements by President Quezon and other high officials also encouraged the kasamas in their struggle with the caciques. At the first convention of the National Commission of Peasants on July 16, 1939, at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, Quezon declared:

> The rights of the *kasama* are no less sacred than the rights of the landowners. . . . The landlords must realize by this time that the *kasama* is not a slave. The word *kasama* means partner or associate and it is as such that the law contemplates him to be. Under the law, the *kasama* is almost the owner of the land and cannot be ejected except for causes as enumerated in the statute. . . .[23]

After listening to such statements the kasama was apt to remember only that he "is almost the owner of the land and cannot be ejected" and to forget the qualification, "except for causes as enumerated."

Government Purchase of Landed Estates 656 427

In recent years the Commonwealth Government has purchased a num-

[23] Commonwealth of the Philippines Labor Department: *Labor Bulletin*, Vol. 2, 1939, pp. 377 and 378.

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ber of the estates on which disputes were most frequent. Such a policy had been promised in the platform of the coalition between the *Nacionalista-Democrata* party and the *Nacionalista Democrata Pro-Independencia* party in 1935, which stated in Article XI:

> When the resources of the country so permit, we shall begin the expropriation of great estates, so that they may be divided into lots and sold to private citizens, preferably their actual occupants. We shall encourage the formation of small land ownership, which is the bulwark of democracy, the guaranty of public order, and a stabilizing force. It is our desire that every Filipino should own his land, the house in which he lives, and the farm which he tills.

[423]

TABLE IX—HOMESITES UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION, JUNE 30, 1940

NAME	AREA (HECTARES)	FORMER OWNER	DATE OF ACQUISITION	PRICE (PESOS)
Marikina, Rizal Province	108.6731	Angel M. Tuason *et al.*	Dec. 29, 1938	295,791.48
Tunasan, Laguna Province	216.7999	Colegio de San José	Expropriation started Sept. 28, 1936; sale on Aug. 31, 1939	414,855.00
Dinalupihan, Bataan Province	99.6261	Monte de Piedad	Expropriation started Aug. 25, 1937; sale, June 30, 1939	93,250.82
Lian, Batangas Province	36.5212	Colegio de San José	Expropriated Mar. 4, 1937	——
Capellania de Tambobong, Rizal Province	90.0532	Archbishop of Manila and Philippine Trust Co.	Expropriated June 9, 1939	——
Laryuhan, Nueva Ecija Province	1.0565	Cajetano de Borja	Expropriated June 19, 1939	——

Source: Commonwealth of the Philippines Rural Progress Administration: Report of the General Manager on the Progress of its Activities. Unpublished.

This promise in the party platform of 1935 found its way into the Constitution of the Philippines in Article XII, Section 4, which reads: "The National Assembly may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals."

In one of its first acts[24] the National Assembly authorized the President to start expropriation proceedings or negotiations for acquiring those portions of large estates that were occupied as homesites by the tenants. This

[24] Commonwealth Act No. 20, July 11, 1936, authorizing an appropriation of 1,000,000 pesos. To this sum was added another 2,000,000 pesos under Commonwealth Act No. 260, April 18, 1938.

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act was hailed by the press as a definite step that would lead to the breaking up of vast tracts of land formerly owned by a few individuals and would give tenants a chance to become owners, at least of their home lots.

On October 7, 1937, Administrative Order No. 49 of President Quezon created the Landed Estates Survey Committee, which was to work out a long-range program with regard to the future treatment of large estates. This committee apparently was never particularly active. It did, however, recommend the acquisition of Marikina homesite in the municipality of Marikina in Rizal Province.

On August 23, 1938, the President approved Commonwealth Act No. 378, which authorized the leasing of large estates by the government for 25 years. A few months later the Rural Progress Administration (R. P. A.) was organized. This was a government corporation with a capital of 1,500,000 pesos, divided into 15,000 shares of 100 pesos each. All shares were held by the Commonwealth Government, with the exception of six, which were issued in the names of the members of the Board of Directors. The R. P. A. was entrusted with the execution of the policies set forth in Commonwealth Acts Nos. 20 and 378.[25] Homesites which had been acquired after 1936 were transferred from the Bureau of Lands to the R. P. A.

According to the first report of the general manager, covering the period from March 5, 1939, to June 30, 1940, the R. P. A. had control, on the latter date, over six homesite sections of the estates of Marikina, Tunasan, Dinalupihan, Lian, Capellania de Tambobong, and Laryuhan (Table IX). In addition to acquiring the residential parts of these estates, the administration had also leased the large Buenavista Estate, of 27,468 hectares, belonging to the Hospital de San Juan de Dios. The tenants of this estate had been organized into the Buenavista Farmers' Coöperative Association under the management of José G. Sanvictores, one of the six directors holding shares in the R. P. A.

Between June 1940 and the summer of 1941 the R. P. A. acquired the Guadelupe Estate in Rizal and Hacienda Bahay Pare in Candaba, Pampanga. The latter had been the scene of long-standing agrarian unrest. The owner, Don Ramon Santos, had bought Bahay Pare's 2,189 hectares from the Order of the Augustinians in 1926 for 900,000 pesos. Whereas the Augustinians had operated the hacienda under the inquilinato system, Santos changed to the kasama system, with its greater possibilities for exploitation. This created animosity on the part of the tenants.

The surveying and resale of the homesites were not so easy as might have been expected. The government had bought the sites in order to help tenants acquire home lots from which they could not be evicted even though dismissed as tenants from the farmland owned by the estates. Nevertheless, difficulties arose. On the Marikina homesite some *Ganap*[26]

[25] Executive Order No. 191, March 2, 1939.
[26] A peasant organization.

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followers were reluctant to pay for the lots, as they had been led to believe that the government would eventually give them the lots free of charge. The people of the municipality of San Pedro, Laguna, in which the Tunasan Estate is located, were divided on the issue of the survey of the homesite, in spite of their oft-repeated petitions to the government to buy the residential part of the estate. The people obstructed the survey of their lots, refusing either to give their names or to indicate the boundary lines. Finally, the R. P. A. had to call in the constabulary in order to make the survey possible. The R. P. A. and the occupants of the residential lots on the Dinalupihan homesite differed over the value of these lots. The occupants protested in meetings held in the Dinalupihan public plaza.

The cases cited above as well as the difficulties on the government-managed Buenavista Estate show that the Filipino tenant has become more and more conscious of the power that unions give him. This creates new problems. In the words of one Philippine authority: "The forgotten man refuses to be forgotten any longer. He now demands recognition of his rights; in fact, he is demanding more than what is his right."[27]

It is difficult to see how a government policy of buying one hacienda after another can solve the problem of the little kasama, who, because of the great density of population in the rice-growing regions, cannot buy more from the new owner, the government, than he was already farming when his landlords were the friars or the caciques. The government, however, could improve the lot of the kasama if it would construct irrigation systems wherever possible and would develop the hitherto unused parts of the haciendas that it had acquired. But it has not done this. As a matter of fact, as late as December 31, 1940, about one-fourth (22.9 per cent) of the friar land purchased by the government under Taft in 1905 was still vacant.

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Public Land Policy

American Land Policy in the Philippines

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In 1902 the United States Congress granted the Philippine Government power to administer the extensive public lands for the benefit of the Filipinos. These lands had become the property of the United States by the Treaty of Paris.[28] Congress limited to 16 hectares the amount that could be acquired by any one person. This limitation discouraged individual Americans from acquiring public lands in the Philippines. The upper limit for corporations and associations was set at 1,024 hectares. These restrictions were demanded by American Democrats who were opposed to the Philippine policy of the Republican administration.

The defenders of a less restricted land policy argued that the public

[27] Sanvictores: "The Agrarian Problem in Buenavista," 1939, p. 191.
[28] U. S. Public Act No. 235, July 1, 1902, Sec. 12.

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domain in the Philippines was so extensive that it would take the Filipinos hundreds of years to develop their country with their own financial resources. It would therefore be to the advantage both of the Philippines and the United States if outside capitalists could be induced to share in the development of the islands by establishing plantations of tropical crops.

The opposition, however, feared that a policy of giving large grants to individuals or corporations would turn the Philippines into a plantation colony and would be detrimental to the political and economic future of the Filipinos themselves; it would reduce them to a nation of plantation laborers. Large-scale investments of American capital, by impeding the political progress of the Filipinos, would be an obstacle to eventual independence. This view was supported by General Arthur MacArthur. When asked by the Senate Committee on the Philippines about his attitude toward the proposal to sell public land in blocks of 5,000 acres to American corporations, he answered: "I deprecate the idea . . . that we are going to sell public lands there in blocks of 5,000 acres with a view to rapid exploitation. That I should regard as disastrous both to American and Filipino interests absolutely." [29]

On an earlier occasion General MacArthur was asked what effect exploitation of the Philippines would have upon the Filipinos. His answer was: "One of the great apprehensions of the people there is that . . . exploitation will . . . deprive them of their resources and relegate them eventually to a position of social inferiority, about which they are very sensitive." [30]

In its fight against large land grants and extensive franchises the Congressional opposition was strongly supported by a powerful lobby of American beet- and cane-sugar interests, which looked with alarm upon any competition from a modern Philippine sugar industry working with cheap labor. Additional support came from the Anti-Imperialist League, with headquarters in Boston, which fought against a strong entrenchment of American plantation capital in the Philippines since it would operate against the interests of the Filipinos.

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As it turned out, the sugar industry developed in spite of the limitations placed on alienation of public land. The government-owned Philippine National Bank financed several sugar mills, or *centrals*. The rubber industry, however, was virtually kept out of the Philippines, although Mindanao, which lies south of the typhoon belt, is perfectly suited for the growing of rubber. American rubber capital, confronted by the 1,024-hectare limit, turned instead to British Malaya, Sumatra, Brazil, and Liberia, where extensive land tracts were available.

Equipped with the power to dispose of the public domain, the Philippine Government passed the Public Land Act on October 7, 1903. This

[29] Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, 1902, p. 1379.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 876.

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act introduced the homestead system into the Philippines, prescribed regulations for the sale or lease of public lands, and provided for the confirmation of the titles that were still unestablished and the granting of free patents to occupants and cultivators of public land who had cultivated this land for a certain length of time. It permitted the sale or lease of public land not only to citizens of the Philippines and of the United States, including other insular possessions, but also to corporations organized in the Philippines or the United States, regardless of the nationality of the stockholders. It was under this law that Japanese corporations were able to acquire a part of their holdings in the province of Davao.

The Philippine Commission, which had passed the Public Land Act in 1903, was never satisfied with the land law and up to 1913 continued recommending its liberalization to Congress—supposedly in the interest of a more rapid economic development. In his annual reports Dean C. Worcester, a member of the commission and Secretary of the Department of the Interior until 1913, emphasized the harm that was inflicted on the Philippines by the restrictions upon which Congress had insisted in 1902. According to Worcester, 10,000 acres, or nearly 4,050 hectares, was the minimum amount of land upon which a corporation could safely afford to establish an up-to-date plantation equipped with modern machinery and implements. Others clamored for 25,000-acre tracts. But neither the President nor the Congress of the United States ever responded favorably to the insistent recommendations of the American administrators in the Philippines. One advocate of a more generous attitude toward capitalist interests called the reluctance of Congress "a pernicious interference in a matter which is of purely local interest, which should be left to the discretion of those on the spot who are familiar with the local conditions." [31]

In some other colonies, however, too much was left to those "on the spot who are familiar with local conditions," and the result in those places was that Western capitalistic enterprises overshadowed everything and reduced the local people, if they were willing to work for wages, to the status of agricultural laborers. If they were unwilling, labor was obtained from the outside, as in Malaya, which came to depend almost entirely upon Chinese and British-Indian laborers. Large-scale importation of Chinese labor into the Philippines was proposed in 1902 but was forbidden by Congress.

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The first really important change in the Philippine land law came in 1919 when the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2874. Filipinos consider this law as the first important step toward the nationalization of their land resources, since it limited the exploitation and utilization of public lands to Filipino and American citizens, except in the case of citizens of other countries whose laws give the same rights to Filipinos as to

[31] Ireland: The Far Eastern Tropics, 1905, p. 214.

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their own citizens. Such people were also permitted to acquire public lands in the Philippines; but no foreigner was able to take advantage of the reciprocal provision of the law. These restrictions were directed especially against Chinese and Japanese. The act further provided that at least 61 per cent of the capital stock of corporations must belong to citizens of the Philippines or the United States.

The new law thus made it virtually impossible for aliens to acquire public lands legally; at the same time it tended to relax the restrictions on individual holdings. By the new law individuals could obtain 24 instead of only 16 hectares through homesteading procedures, and 100 hectares instead of 16 through purchase. Later amendments of Act 2874 increased to 144 hectares the amount of public land purchasable by an individual. At no time, however, was the Philippine Legislature willing to raise the limit for corporations above that originally set by Congress in 1902. As late as 1928, 1929, and 1930 various governors general appealed to the Philippine Legislature to encourage the investment of American capital in the islands. On July 16, 1928, Governor General Henry L. Stimson in his message to the legislature said:

[425]

> I believe that the chief obstacle to our development has lain in certain unwise limitations of law, most of them introduced here a generation ago from the United States under the influence of the theories then prevailing but which have long since been exploded in the land of their origin. . . .
>
> I believe that American capital has learned the unwisdom and the danger of attempting unfairly to exploit the land in which it enters. . . .
>
> I, therefore, recommend . . . a thorough revision of your laws governing the creation of corporations and the regulation of their activities, including the control over your public utilities and including a wise and conservative revision of your land laws . . . [32]

But in his final report covering his term in the Philippines, Stimson had to admit that the resentment against large landholdings "is one of the strongest political sentiments" of the average Filipino.

> The existence of this native sentiment has not been generally recognized in the United States, but the events of my own year's experience brought it to my attention as one of the deepest and most controlling currents of public opinion in the islands and one which it would be folly to disregard or attempt to defy. . . . The existence of this strong feeling against land monopolization added to the ever-present racial sensitiveness toward foreign exploitation, whether American or Mongolian, tends to make the problem of stimulating the introduction of the much needed capital for economic development from America a very delicate one. . . .[33]

Governor General Dwight F. Davis complained about the tendency of Filipinos to "raise the bogey of 'exploitation' " as soon as the words "eco-

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[32] *Annual Report of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands 1928*, 1930, pp. 41–42.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

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nomic development" were used.[34] Yet in spite of all arguments put forward by Americans interested in attracting capital to the Philippines, the Filipino remained firmly convinced that it was better for his country to be developed slowly and gradually by small farmers than to be rapidly and efficiently exploited by a few large companies working the land with tenants or hired laborers.

Governor General Theodore Roosevelt, Davis's successor, praised the Philippine Legislature for having "very wisely prohibited individuals from acquiring" public land in large blocks.[35] Frank Murphy, the last American governor general in the Philippines, summarized the American land policy: "The public domain has not been exploited. Large estate grants —a sore spot in other days—have not been tolerated. The natural inheritance of the Filipino as the owner of his fatherland has not been violated." [36]

Filipinos have frequently expressed their gratitude for the conservative land policy initiated by Congress at a time when they themselves were not yet in a position to prevent the exploitation of the natural resources of their islands.

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What would have been the result for the Philippines if Mindanao, for example, had been turned into one large plantation worked by laborers imported possibly from China, Java, or southern India, if the supply of Filipino labor had proved inadequate? Would American capital have been willing to consent to the independence of the Philippines as a whole, or would it have insisted on a separation of Mindanao from the rest of the country? It was certainly fortunate for the development of Philippine unity that the American people were very much aware of the danger of the monopolization of the public domain by powerful corporations. Had these been allowed to open up the islands, the pace would have been much too rapid for the Filipinos. The country had suffered severe losses of population in the fighting against Spain and the United States, and these had resulted in the abandonment of agricultural land. At the same time rinderpest had wiped out a large number of the carabaos needed to cultivate the soil. In the early years of this century the Filipinos were not yet ready to move as pioneers into hitherto unused land.

The Problem of Land Titles

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One of the most difficult problems that faced the early American administration was to determine the extent of public domain and of private holdings. Only a relatively small number of persons held Spanish land titles. American officials were convinced that clear titles, guaranteed by the government, were absolutely necessary to stabilize conditions and prepare the way for economic improvements.

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[34] *Ibid. 1929*, 1931, p. 22.
[35] *Ibid. 1932*, 1934, p. 12.
[36] *Ibid. 1935*, 1937, p. 14.

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In 1902 the Philippine Commission passed a law providing for the registration of land ownership under the Torrens system, which grants government-guaranteed titles after the land has been surveyed and ownership proved in court. As this procedure was as foreign to their way of thinking as the Spanish land system had been, Filipinos were extremely slow to make use of it. During the first seven years after the passage of this law, only about 4,000 Torrens titles were issued, almost all of them covering large and valuable private holdings. The ordinary peasant did not know about the law and, if he had known, could not have afforded to apply for a Torrens title because of the incidental costs of surveys, attorneys, and court fees. While only a few individuals obtained titles, the number of occupied lots, which was estimated at 2,300,000 on January 1, 1903, increased annually by 20,000 during these first seven years. Thus the government was not making any headway.[37] 423 656

In order to speed up the registration of titles, a new system was developed in 1910 to provide for cadastral surveys of whole municipalities. For three years the two houses of the legislature could not agree on the Cadastral Act, but it was finally passed in February 1913. In accordance with this act all the parcels of a municipality were surveyed and then presented to the court in groups of 1,000 as one case. Here the government brought *pro forma* suit against the occupants because they lacked titles, and ordered them to vacate the land. If the occupants could prove their claim of ownership to the satisfaction of the court and if their claim was not contested, they received the necessary titles.

The advantages to the government of these cadastral surveys were immediately apparent. The receipts from land taxes increased by an average of 25 per cent, much of this increase being undoubtedly due to the fact that the people could no longer underestimate the amount of land they were occupying as had previously been the case. The possession of these Torrens titles, on the other hand, made it possible for the owner to borrow money from banks at reasonable interest rates, whereas without titles they had had to go to usurious moneylenders. [651] [426]

However, the cadastral survey, the hearing of the cases, and the issuing of titles did not always progress as rapidly as had been hoped. Cases piled up in the courts because of lack of personnel. Moreover, the owners of land which had been surveyed and for which titles had been prepared, often refused to call for the papers because of the payments that were required for the certificates. On December 31, 1932, for example, there were 159,230 duplicates of original certificates of title awaiting delivery. As a total of 500,210 decrees had been issued between 1903 and the end of 1932, it is clear that nearly 32 per cent of all certificates had failed as yet to reach the hands of the landowners. [691]

Between 1909 and June 30, 1937, the Bureau of Lands made cadastral

[37] *Annual Report of the Philippine Commission . . . 1910*, 1911, p. 10.

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surveys for 1,040,793 lots, amounting to 3,105,763 hectares; and an additional 93,261 lots, amounting to 248,358 hectares, were surveyed by private surveying companies. It was estimated at the same time that there were also 4,096,974 parcels, amounting to 25,708,136 hectares, awaiting cadastral surveys.[38] They could be handled by 30 cadastral survey parties in the course of about 60 years. These figures indicate that the cadastral survey of the Philippines was still far from complete before war broke out.

Filipino Response to American Land Policy

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What was the attitude of the Filipino to the homestead system—a system that leads to a form of dispersed settlement, the isolated farm, which has become the prevalent type in the United States and Canada? There was no common reaction, for the homestead system was only one of several settlement patterns in the Philippines. Where wet rice is grown in old, densely settled areas, the peasants live in hamlets and villages. Some of the non-Christian folk in the mountain and forest areas live in scattered dwellings; and the Christian Filipinos who grow such crops as maize, coconuts, or abaca also frequently prefer to live in isolated houses on their land rather than in villages. But, on the whole, villages predominate, certainly in those regions that need relief from population pressure. The Spaniards had a great deal to do with the concentration of the population in large villages, but they did not introduce the village system into the Philippines. The Malay inhabitants of the islands were already living in hamlets, or barangays, at the time of the arrival of the Spaniards. The Spaniards did, however, encourage this tendency to settle in groups rather than on isolated farmsteads, as they found that the work of Christianization and supervision was much easier when people were brought together in large villages "under the bells."

This colonizing technique happened to harmonize with the Malay custom of congregating in villages on higher ground and turning all the irrigable low-lying land into rice fields. The village system facilitates group work and cooperation, which are essential in the cultivation of wet-rice land, in the construction of irrigation dams and canals, and in the performance of other tasks that require the labor of more than one family. Thus custom, together with the close ties of relationship among families, the gregarious nature of the people, their agricultural technique, and the Spanish influence, built up a preference for the village system that is difficult to overcome.

The average Filipino of the central provinces, accustomed to the comforts of village life and to a dependence upon the help of his family, friends, and neighbors, was reluctant to move out into a pioneer region where he would have to live alone. Hence, to the surprise of American officials in the Philippines, who had expected a ready response, Filipinos applied for

[38] Mills: Planned Surveys, 1937, pp. 172, 196, and 297.

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homesteads only in small numbers during the early years. In 1912 the *Cablenews-American* commented editorially on this failure of the Filipino to take up public land: 166 361 425 423

> The framers of the homestead law took it for granted that the agricultural people of the Philippines were accustomed to settle on isolated farms and live in dwellings far removed from their neighbors. They ignored the very patent fact that the Philippine farmer does not live on the land he tills and cannot be persuaded to do so. The folly of this assumption has been abundantly proved during the years that the homestead law has been on the books by the very few entries that have been made under it.[39]

In his report of 1911 Worcester argued that formerly the Filipinos had had to settle in villages because of the lack of security for life and property, but that this could no longer be the reason for their reluctance to move out to homesteads, since order had been established. He blamed the caciques for trying to prevent the landless from applying for homesteads through fear of losing them as tenants.

After 1912 the number of homestead applicants grew slowly but steadily. In the period from 1912 to 1925 there was an annual increase ranging from 5,000 to 10,000. From 1926 to 1930 an average of about 12,000 persons a year filed applications. After that the number declined slowly to about 7,000 in 1934, the last year before the inauguration of the Commonwealth Government.

From July 26, 1904, to November 14, 1935 (the end of the American regime), a total of 212,094 homestead applications had been received by the Bureau of Lands, of which 81,086 were rejected and 21,577 cancelled. Thus 48.4 per cent of all applicants had failed in their attempts to get homesteads. Another 19,160 cases were still pending in November 1935; in the whole period 55,450 had been approved and only 34,821 applications, or 16.4 per cent of the total number, had been patented.[40] 656 425 423

This large number of rejections and cancellations of homestead applications is surprising and indeed alarming in a country like the Philippines where there is so great a need for a better distribution of the population. Why did nearly half the persons anxious to acquire homesteads fail in their attempt? A lack of surveys of the public domain was chiefly to blame for the rejections. For years homesteaders were not guided in their search and had to decide for themselves on the location of the land for which they wished to apply. Only upon receipt of the application did the Bureau of Lands determine whether the land belonged to the public domain, whether the Bureau of Forestry considered it to be agricultural rather than forest land, and whether the land was free from other claims. Even an approved claim did not protect an applicant from losing the results of

[39] *Cablenews-American*, May 9, 1912, quoted in Forbes: The Philippine Islands, Vol. 1, 1928, p. 325, footnote.

[40] *Annual Report of the Director of Lands 1935*, 1936, pp. 66–67.

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his labor if some other claimant came forward after the former had already worked for a period on the land; for the government did not clear the title on public land in a court procedure until it was applied for by homesteaders.

The failure to meet certain requirements regarding residence and cultivation likewise led to the cancellation of applications. If a homesteader was unable to cultivate at least one-fifth of his land within 5 years, he lost his claim and it could be given to another applicant. In such cases it would have been more humane to have reduced the homestead to correspond to the amount actually cleared rather than to deprive the peasant completely of the fruits of his labor.

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Not only did the attachment of the Filipino to the village type of settlement, the machinations of caciques, and the lack of organization that prevented thousands of would-be homesteaders from reaching their objectives constitute obstacles to a more rapid settling of the public domain by homesteaders, but the lack of roads was also a serious obstacle. Without roads it was practically impossible to reach those districts where most of the public land was located. Whenever a road was to be constructed through an undeveloped section, homesteaders flocked in rapidly, to find only too often that influential persons who had been privately informed of the construction even before it was begun had taken up the choice land on both sides of the road. These people then held the land for speculative purposes, using hired labor to meet the bare minimum requirement for improvements. Recognizing this abuse, Governor General Theodore Roosevelt issued an executive order in 1932, providing "that for two kilometers on either side of any new road that might be opened through the public domain no tract of land of more than 350 acres could be taken up [through purchase or lease], that tracts of that size must be only sparingly granted, and that they could not have more than a limited frontage on the road. Under no circumstances were they to be contiguous." [41]

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That the evil nevertheless persisted was admitted by the former Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, Benigno S. Aquino, who told the Convention of Bureau of Lands Officials in November 1940: "When I travelled through the provincial roads from Davao to Cotabato and thence to Bukidnon I was shown those extensive parcels of land which have been registered in favor of rich people from the Visayas and Luzon." [42]

In the absence of feeder roads that would make it possible for them to market their surplus products, small homesteaders find it difficult to develop land 10 or 15 miles or more from the highways. It is therefore important that they should have a chance to settle near such highways. Wealthy individuals who are farming extensive areas can more easily overcome the transportation problem. They have the means to cut roads

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41 Roosevelt: "Land Problems," 1934, p. 202.
42 *Proceedings of the Convention of Bureau of Lands Officials*, 1940, p. 85.

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through to the highways, and it is profitable for them to use trucks to market their crops. 656 425

Malaria, together with the lack of medical care, represents another grave obstacle to homesteaders, many of whom come from parts of the islands where malaria is practically non-existent, as on the low coastal plains. In such regions as the interior of Mindoro, Mindanao, or the foothills on both sides of the Cagayan Valley, the homesteaders are exposed on arrival to this disease at a time when they must work hard and live under pioneer conditions and their resistance is lowered. The practice of clearing the banks of little streams benefits certain species of anopheles; this results in a rapid spread of malaria, which is found throughout the Philippines in elevations that are above the coastal plain and below 2,000 feet.[43] During a visit to the Mallig plain in the province of Isabela in 1941, I met settlers who belonged to a group of some 60 Ilocanos, including women and children. Since their arrival in this section two years before, a third had died of malaria. Malaria is without doubt the greatest scourge of the homesteader who moves from the coastal plain into the hilly interior anywhere in the Philippines. [164] 423

In certain parts of the islands the local non-Christian tribes resent the infiltration of lowland Filipinos and attack the settlers. Like all primitive communities they claim exclusive rights to the territory they inhabit. Any invasion of it is considered by them a violation of their sovereign rights and is answered by the killing of the trespassers.[44] Between 1938 and 1940 the Ilongots of the Sierra Madre along the boundaries of Tayabas, Nueva Vizcaya, and Nueva Ecija killed about 30 persons in an attempt to prevent Christian settlers from invading their hunting and gathering grounds. These killings resulted in a withdrawal of the settlers who had pushed farthest into the territory of the Ilongots.[45] Where such troubled situations exist, the government might set aside reservations for groups like the Ilongots and then prevent settlers from encroaching upon these reservations. [628 563]

In spite of all the defects of the homestead system, the voluntary extension of agricultural settlement in Luzon progressed, even though haltingly. The homesteaders moved from the Ilocos coast and from the densely settled parts of the central plain into the provinces of Camarines Norte and Sur, Tayabas, Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela, and Cagayan. The development of a net of trunk highways in Luzon, especially from the central plain across the mountains of Nueva Vizcaya into the valley of the Cagayan River, and from Ilocos Norte along the north coast to Aparri, brought thousands of Ilocanos into Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, and the two provinces of the Cagayan Valley. Now Nueva Ecija, with the exception of the mountainous part, is fairly well settled. At the time of the out- 166 656 425

[43] Holt and Russell: "Malaria," 1932, pp. 305–369.
[44] Thurnwald: Economics in Primitive Communities, 1932, p. 189.
[45] *Manila Daily Bulletin*, March 19, 1941.

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break of the Pacific war the movement into Nueva Vizcaya was still going on, although this province lacks the extensive ricelands that are characteristic of Nueva Ecija. Migration into the Cagayan Valley was also in full swing.

On the other hand, spontaneous, large-scale migration of homesteaders to Mindanao proved impracticable in the early days. Their lack of funds for the long sea trip, their desire to remain in touch with the home province and village, and their fear of Mindanao's Moro population were strong deterrents to the migration of land-seeking peasants from Luzon. From the most crowded parts of the Visayas, however, people had been migrating of their own initiative to the northern coastal regions of Mindanao ever since Spanish times. But this movement was insufficient to relieve the population pressure in the Visayas, and by 1913 the Philippine Government had recognized the necessity for providing financial assistance in the colonization and development of Mindanao.

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

FIG. 50—Ifugao rice terraces near Banaue, Mountain Province, Luzon.

FIG. 51 (lower left)—Section of the Ifugao rice terraces. Note the height of the terrace wall as compared with the man on the ladder. Banaue. (Courtesy of the Bureau of Forestry.)

FIG. 52 (lower right)—Rice terraces in central Bali. In the foreground a rice seedbed.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia
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

The shape and size of wet-rice fields may be determined by topography.

FIG. 53 (upper left)—Hoe-tilling on rice terraces in central Bali.

FIG. 54 (upper right)—Rice terraces in the Priangan Mountains, east of Garoet, Residency of Priangan, West Java.

FIG. 55 (center left)—Leveling a rice field with a carabao team, south of Buitenzorg, Residency of Buitenzorg, West Java.

FIG. 56 (center right)—Rectangular fields surrounding a Toba-Batak *huta* (village), near Lake Toba, Residency of Tapanoeli, Sumatra.

FIG. 57 (lower left)—Minangkabau women planting rice near Fort de Kock, Residency of Sumatra's West Coast.

FIG. 58 (lower right)—Weeding a rice field in the plains of southern Bali.

1: Palmer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia
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

FIG. 59 (upper left)—Peasant using a *landak* (a weeder developed in Japan) in a wet-rice field. East of Tjirjalengka, Residency of Priangan, West Java.

FIG. 60 (upper right)—Javanese girls harvesting rice with the *ani-ani* (a small knife blade attached at a right angle to a short stick). The harvesters cut only enough of the stalk to permit the grain to be tied in bundles. South of Jogjakarta, central Java.

FIG. 61 (center left)—Unterraced *tegalans*, seriously eroded and exhausted, on the slopes of Goenoeng Haroeman, north of Garoet, Residency of Priangan, West Java.

FIG. 62 (center right)—Belated terracing of tegalans on outworn soil. Slope of Goenoeng-Kidoel, southeastern Jogjakarta, central Java.

FIG. 63 (lower left)—Carefully terraced tegalans on slopes in Madura.

FIG. 64 (lower right)—Peasant plowing his terraced tegalan, Madura.

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1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia
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



These photographs illustrate aspects of dry-field terracing.

FIG. 65 (upper left)—Newly constructed terraces; the faces of the terraces not yet protected. Desa Rantjapoeroet, Residency of Priangan, West Java. (Courtesy of the Department of Economic Affairs.)

FIG. 66 (upper right)—Four-year-old terraces, perfectly constructed. Notice *Lemnaea glauca* on the edges of the three upper terraces. Desa Rantjapoeroet. (Courtesy of the Department of Economic Affairs.)

FIG. 67 (center left)—*Paspalum conjugatum* planted along the edge of a terrace. Desa Tjikonde, Residency of Priangan, West Java. (Courtesy of the Department of Economic Affairs.)

FIG. 68 (center right)—Terraces with stone retaining walls give excellent protection against erosion to *tegalans* on slopes. Desa Tjikonde. (Courtesy of the Department of Economic Affairs.)

FIG. 69 (lower left)—Steep slope completely protected against erosion by well built terraces with stone retaining walls. Desa Tjikonde. (Courtesy of the Department of Economic Affairs.)

FIG. 70 (lower right)—Terraced tegalans on slopes near Desa Leles, Residency of Priangan, West Java. (Courtesy of the Department of Economic Affairs.)

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1: Palmer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia
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

FIG. 71 (upper left)—Terraced dry fields on a limestone ridge in western Madura.

FIG. 72 (upper right)—Deforested and badly eroded section in central Madura.

FIG. 73 (second row, left)—Unterraced dry fields on a limestone ridge, central Cebu.

FIG. 74 (second row, right)—Gently rolling dry fields planted with maize and upland rice, central Cebu.

FIG. 75 (third row, left)—A Cebuano immigrant has plowed a *cogon*-covered slope on the Bukidnon Plateau. Notice the signs of erosion. Terracing and contour plowing are needed. Bukidnon Province, Mindanao.

FIG. 76 (third row, right)—Cebuano immigrants in Negros have planted recently deforested steep slopes with maize. Near Vallehermoso facing Tañon Strait between Negros and Cebu.

FIGS. 77 and 78 (lower left and right)—Deforested and eroded sections of central Cebu along the road from Toledo to Cebu City. Notice the newly planted patch in the center of Fig. 77.

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FIG. 79—Looking toward the Roxas Range from a point west of Tupi, Middle Koronadal, Mindanao. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 80—Bilaan chief and his servant on their way to a hunt. Lagao, Southern Koronadal.

FIG. 81—Bilaan shifting cultivators on the way home from their *caingin*. The women and children carry the harvest. Notice the high *cogon* grass and scattered trees. Frequent fires damage the trees regularly and prevent the elimination of the grasses by the forest. A point 3 km. east of Marbel, Northern Koronadal.

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





FIG. 82 (upper left)—Interisland steamer disembarking a new group of settlers on the beach at Dadjangas, Southern Koronadal, Mindanao. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 83 (center left)—Group of newly arrived settlers going by truck from Dadjangas to Tupi, Middle Koronadal.

FIG. 84 (lower left)—New homes being erected in front of temporary bunkhouse in *Barrio No. 3*, Marbel, North Koronadal.

FIG. 85 (upper right)—Settler constructing his house with timber found on his lot, *Barrio No. 3*, Marbel.

FIG. 86 (lower right)—Prize house, built of bamboo by a settler in Tupi.

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FIG. 87 (upper left)—Water jars to be delivered to settlers in the Koronadal Valley, Dadjangas beach, Mindanao.

FIG. 88 (upper right)—N.L.S.A. truck delivering rations to settlers living in a temporary bunkhouse in Polomolok, Middle Koronadal, Mindanao. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 89 (center left)—N.L.S.A. store at Marbel, North Koronadal. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 90 (center right)—Cement boundary markers at Mallig, Isabela Province, Luzon. Mr. Bernardo Torres, former secretary-treasurer of the N.L.S.A., on left; on right, Dr. Sumonte, in charge of N.L.S.A. project at Mallig.

FIG. 91 (lower left)—Drawing of first farm lots in Lagao, Southern Koronadal. Seated at the right of the table is General Paulino Santos. First on the left is Prof. M. B. Raymundo, agricultural adviser of N.L.S.A. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 92 (lower right)—Settler delivering his first peanut crop at the N.L.S.A. warehouse in Lagao, Southern Koronadal. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

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FIG. 93 (upper left)—Overseer meeting settlers of Polomolok to discuss the lay-out of a new *barrio*, Middle Koronadal, Mindanao. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 94 (upper right)—*Barrio No. 4*, Marbel. Some houses are already occupied; others are still under construction. Northern Koronadal. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 95 (lower left)—*Barrio No. 3*, Lagao. Mt. Matutum in the background. Notice the *buri* palms. Southern Koronadal. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 96 (lower right)—Building the Alunan Highway at the prospective site of Tupi, Middle Koronadal. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

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1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 All Southeast Asia
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



FIG. 97 (upper left)—Machine park of the N.L.S.A. in Lagao, Southern Koronadal, Mindanao. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 98 (center left)—Tractors on the march from Lagao to Tupi, in Middle Koronadal, and Marbel, in Northern Koronadal. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 99 (lower left)—Bulldozer at work on the irrigation canal that was to tap the Silway River, Lagao. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 100 (upper right)—Drilling a well in Polomolok, Middle Koronadal. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 101 (center right)—Second plowing of land that had been covered by *cogon*. McCormick-Deering Diesel pulling a six-disk plow. Tupi. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 102 (lower right)—Uprooting a tree with a Cletrac Diesel. Koronadal Valley. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

1: Palmer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia
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







FIG. 103 (upper left)—Women settlers in Marbel pulling rice seedlings from a seedbed. Northern Koronadal, Mindanao.

FIG. 104 (upper right)—Harvesting maize in Tupi, Middle Koronadal. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 105 (center left)—Planting germinated rubber seeds in the N.L.S.A. nursery near Kipalig, Middle Koronadal. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 106 (center right)—Cowpeas on the administration farm in Lagao, Southern Koronadal. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 107 (lower left)—Budded rubber trees in the N.L.S.A. nursery near Kipalig. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 108 (lower right)—Watering Bermuda onions on the administration farm in Lagao. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

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







FIG. 109 (upper left)—Administration headquarters of the N.L.S.A. in Lagao, Southern Koronadal, Mindanao. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 110 (upper right)—Administration building in Marbel, Northern Koronadal. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 111 (center left)—School in Marbel. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 112 (center right)—Hospital in Marbel. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

FIG. 113 (lower left)—N.L.S.A. Hog Farm in Lagao.

FIG. 114 (lower right)—Homemade carabao cart in Lagao. (Courtesy of the National Land Settlement Administration.)

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia
Philippines OA1
Mindanao

Chapter V

MINDANAO, THE FRONTIER

162 654 311 241 Mindanao, the second largest island of the Philippines, has been looked on by both the government and the public as the land of promise and unlimited opportunity, the frontier of the Philippines. Such a view is supported by the fact that Mindanao includes about 32 per cent of the country's territory but has today only 11 per cent of the population. With the exception of the two small coastal provinces in the north, its population densities are low (Maps, Figs. 48 and 115). The public and many government officials do not realize, however, that considerable areas of the island are unsuited for large-scale agricultural development because of the roughness of the topography. This unsuitability was brought out in a survey undertaken in 1939 by the Mindanao Exploration Commission on behalf of the Refugee Economic Corporation and is indicated on the accompanying map (Fig. 116).[1]

Government-Sponsored Agricultural Colonization Prior to the Establishment of the Commonwealth

Except in a narrow strip of Visayan settlements on the northern coastal plain of Misamis Oriental and Misamis Occidental, there were hardly any Christian Filipinos in Mindanao at the beginning of the American regime in the Philippines, in 1900. Mindanao's population consisted primarily of various indigenous Moslem groups—called *Moros* (Moors) by the Spaniards—such as the Magindanaos and the Lanaos, who live in the Cotabato Valley and around Lake Lanao, and of pagan mountain tribes, such as the Bagobos, Manobos, Bilaans, and Bukidnons, in the interior and in the eastern part of the island. These pagans were, and most of them still are, shifting cultivators, whereas the Moros practiced both shifting and sedentary agriculture. At that time Mindanao's population was not yet half a million, and the density was but five persons per square kilometer. Forest or grass covered most of the land, which amounts to 95,000 square kilometers. The grass areas were the result of shifting cultivation. There were no roads on the island so that travelers had either to go along the coast and up the rivers by boat or to walk along narrow trails. During the period of administration by the American Army in Mindanao a few roads were constructed along the coast or inland for short distances.[2]

[563]

313 654 311 Mindanao's wealth in timberland, as well as in undeveloped agricultural land, was recognized as soon as the island had been pacified by the Amer-

1 Pendleton: "Land Utilization and Agriculture of Mindanao," 1942, pp. 180–210.

2 When the administration of Mindanao was taken over by the Philippine Government in 1913, the island had a total of 339.6 kilometers of roads: of these 80 kilometers were first-class, 153.6 kilometers second-class, and 103 kilometers third-class (*Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province for the year ended June 30, 1913*, pp. 26–27).

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1: Palmer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia
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

FIG. 115—This map is based on tabulations of the 1939 census. Each dot represents 500 people. The dots have been distributed with reference to locations of towns and *barrios*, cultivated lands, fisheries, etc., as shown on existing maps. (Reproduced through the courtesy of the *Geographical Review*.)

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia
Philippines OA1
Mindanao

313 ican Army and administrative control had been established. In pursuit of
654 the land policy discussed in Chapter IV, the Filipino-controlled Insular
311 Government was most anxious to prevent large-scale American invest-
[166] ment and wished instead to direct homesteaders from the congested areas of the Visayas into the interior and the southern parts of the island. It also hoped that such a large-scale migration of Christian Filipino settlers from

TABLE X—PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: AGRICULTURAL COLONIES ESTABLISHED BY THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, 1913–1917

COLONY	YEAR ESTABLISHED	AREA (HECTARES)
Pikit, Cotabato	1913	2,720
Silik, Cotabato	1913	2,708
Peidu-Pulangi, Cotabato	1913	1,360
Pagalungan, Cotabato	1913	4,475
Glan, Cotabato	1913	1,272
Momungan, Lanao	1914	2,344
Abulug, Cagayan	1914	2,677
Carmen, Bohol	1915	2,464
Talitay, Cotabato	1917	1,720

Source: Sitchon: Land Settlement Policies. These figures differ slightly from those given in Philippine Islands Bureau of Labor: The Activities of the Bureau of Labor, 1930, p. 75.

the north would lead to an amalgamation and a Filipinization of the Moros and pagans and thus remove the danger of a possible separation of Mindanao from the rest of the Philippines. Such a separation had been suggested repeatedly by Americans interested in plantation development who played up the differences and antagonism between Christian and non-Christian Filipinos.[3] In 1913 the government therefore adopted the policy of actively encouraging migration by establishing agricultural colonies.

166 Between 1913 and 1917 a total of seven agricultural colonies was founded in Mindanao, six in the province of Cotabato and one in the province of Lanao. Two additional colonies were established on other islands: one on Bohol and one in the Cagayan Valley in Luzon (Table X).

166 In all the colonies the settlers were grouped together in small towns in-
361 stead of being compelled to live on their farmsteads. Each settler received his home lot of from 800 to 900 square meters in the town (plan of Peidu-Pulangi, Fig. 117) and, at some distance, his farm land, which was surveyed in blocks of 8 or 16 hectares.

166 In the Cotabato colonies the government intentionally mixed Christian
563 and Mohammedan (Moro) settlers in an attempt to show that the two
311 could work and live together peaceably.[4] This is why Moros were found

[3] As late as 1926, Representative Bacon introduced such a proposal in the U. S. Congress (*69th Congr., 1st Sess., H. R. 12772*, introduced on May 6, 1926, and *69th Congr. 2nd Sess., H. R. 15479*, introduced on December 20, 1926).

[4] *Report of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of War 1917* 1918, p. 39.

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

FIG. 116—Land-use classification: *a*, *b*, *c*, hot and humid lowlands: *a*, low plains not w[illegible] rice land and lower, gentle slopes of hills, not more than a few hundred feet above sea level; *b*, paddy land, partly cultivated; *c*, swampy and poorly drained land; *d*, land at intermediate elevations: generally rough topography, steep slopes, and shallow soil, suitable mainly for hoe culture or tree growths; *e*, high and rough mountainous regions: forested, not useful for cultivation; *f*, higher lands topographically and climatically suited for white settlers: slopes and valley floors from about 1000 feet to 5000 feet high: probably half the area is arable, much is now in pasture under leases: about Lake Lanao this land fully occupied by Moro farmers. The subdivisions of *f* are: 1, Bukidnon uplands; 2, Maapag plain; 3, Marasmag-Kitaotao plain; 4, Wao-Banisilan region; 5, Buldun-Barira region; 6, Kidapawan region; 7, Upper Pulangi River Valley. (Reproduced through the courtesy of the *Geographical Review*.)

Compare with the population density map (Fig. 115), on which province names are given.

1 [See other section on p 131 Analyst]

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Mindanao Agricultural Topography



1 [For legend and other section of map, see p. 130 -- Analyst]

[p. 131]

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in the colonies even when there was no need for them to seek land. The social goal of the colonization program, generally considered the primary objective, seems to have been attained. From the economic point of view, however, the colonies were a failure. Late in 1928 a survey showed that there were only about 8,000 colonists, including dependents, in the Cotabato colonies founded by the Insular Government between 1913 and 1917 inclusive. Half of the settlers were Moros; the other half were Christian Filipinos. They owed the government approximately 372,000 pesos, most of the sum being uncollectible.[5]

The migration to these colonies remained small for a number of reasons. A lack of funds was chiefly instrumental in limiting the number of settlers; the sites for the colonies were ill-chosen; and the settlers were unwisely selected, many of them having come, without farming experience, directly from the water fronts of Cebu City or Manila. The recruiting agents, in view of the reputation of the Cotabato Moro, had not been too particular. In the colonies a system of uniform administration and supervision was lacking, and little was done to solve the transportation and marketing problems, with the result that the settlers had to depend upon government support much longer than had been expected. Irrigation and drainage problems were neglected, and crops failed repeatedly because of droughts or floods.

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In December 1917 the Insular Government, discouraged by the high costs and limited results of the first experiment discontinued its policy of founding agricultural colonies and of making loans to colonists who lacked funds and, in 1919, decided to encourage actively the migration of only those homeseekers who had funds sufficient to tide them over the first year.[6] Under no circumstances were they to receive loans. The Bureau of Labor, delegated to carry out this new policy,[7] established the Interisland Migration Division, which functioned from 1918 to 1939. The work of this division consisted of recruiting homeseekers and sending them usually to Mindanao but occasionally to thinly populated provinces in other islands, such as Mindoro. In order to qualify as a homeseeker entitled to the support of the Bureau of Labor, the prospective settler had to be the head of a family, or at least 18 years of age, and to possess the necessary agricultural implements, a carabao, and, most important of all, 250 pesos. A qualified homeseeker was advised about regions with settlement possibilities and was furnished free transportation from his home town to his destination.

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[5] *Annual Report of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands 1928*, 1930, pp. 204–205.

[6] The establishment of these colonies was authorized by Act No. 2806, Feb. 28, 1919. Between 1919 and 1926 a few provincial governments established agricultural colonies on their territories: the province of Zamboanga founded Lamitan on the island of Basilan; the province of Sulu founded Tawi-Tawi on Jolo; while in Mindanao Mailag was founded in Bukidnon province and Sarunayan and Magonoy were founded in Cotabato province. These, however, proved to be even less successful than those sponsored by the Insular Government.

[7] Act No. 2727, Dec. 20, 1917.

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destination. After this the government assumed no further obligation, and it was up to the settler to overcome the initial difficulties of his pioneering venture.

The Bureau of Labor directed a number of homeseekers to the agricultural colonies of Cotabato, where they took up lots that either had never been occupied or had been abandoned by the original colonists. As



FIG. 117—Plan of the townsite of Peidu Pulangi, Cotabato: based on a blueprint plan of the Bureau of Public Lands, Philippine Commonwealth. See map, Fig. 118, for the location of Peidu Pulangi. For Cotobato, *read* Cotabato.

there was additional free land in the neighborhood of the colonies, these became the nuclei of slowly expanding settlements. Between 1918 and 1934 inclusive the Bureau of Labor supplied transportation to 6,080 homeseekers (31,408 persons), most of whom went to Mindanao. The average number of families a year to receive government support in their migration was thus only 357 (1,846 persons).[8]

Because a good deal of money seemed to have been spent inefficiently during the first years, when appropriations were relatively large, Governor General Wood cut the appropriations drastically during the years from 1923 to 1925. After 1925 the appropriations were slightly increased, but they never again reached the 1918–1922 level. Another restriction upon settlement was that the homeseekers, with the exception of those who were placed in the old agricultural colonies, came under the homestead system and so had to meet residence requirements in order to get titles to their land. This obligation was always considered burdensome. This was especially true in Mindanao because of the Christian Filipino's fear, hidden or open, of attack by the Moros and pagans. Delays both in road development and in the surveying and subdividing of the public land by the Bureau of Lands were another obstacle to a rapid influx of settlers. Also, many homeseekers became the victims of usurers and land-grabbers,

[8] The migration of homeseekers was continued under the Commonwealth Government until June, 1939. A total of 9,172 families (46,712 persons), or an annual average of 417 families (2,123 persons), migrated during the years from 1918 to 1939 inclusive.

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who deprived them of the fruits of their labors.[9] Reports of such experiences traveled quickly to the home communities and deterred others from following these homeseekers, for it is everywhere true that nothing can retard migration more effectively than discouraging reports about economic and social conditions in the pioneer land.

Since the activities of the Bureau of Labor were limited to aiding persons able to qualify for support, as time passed, increasing numbers of settlers who could not qualify for government help went to Mindanao at their own expense. They became homesteaders, squatters, tenants, or agricultural laborers, depending upon the area to which they went and the opportunities which they found there. Unfortunately, no numerical data are available on this spontaneous, unsupported, and unguided migration; observations indicate, however, that it was greater than that of government-sponsored homeseekers.

So it was that up to the year 1935 the development of Mindanao had not been very great. Although from 30,000 to 35,000 persons had been sent there under the auspices of one government agency or another, in addition to those who had migrated on their own initiative, the island was still without adequate highways and much of the land was unsettled. Yet enough had been accomplished by the colonists and homeseekers to demonstrate that Filipinos are capable of pioneering even amidst a population not over-enthusiastic about their coming.

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In the province of Davao, adjoining Cotabato, in the meantime, the Japanese had established a large colony engaged especially in the growing of abaca. When Japan became politically menacing, the dangerous potentialities of this colony brought the settlement of Mindanao by Filipinos once more to the forefront. Investigations revealed that Japanese agricultural companies were occupying considerably more land than they had a right to. The total area owned or controlled by Japanese in 1935 amounted to 57,350 hectares, of which 28,098 had been acquired legally; the other 29,252 hectares comprised public land, which had been alienated to Filipinos and Americans, who then turned it over to Japanese under lease or

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[9] Land-grabbers exploited the fact that "the bureau of lands based priority of claim upon priority of filing instead of priority of occupancy, as in the United States. This enables the shrewd late-comer to appropriate the land of . . . settlers by making a paper filing upon cleared and planted land" (*Annual Report of the Governor General . . . 1930*, Washington, 1932, p. 17). The members of the Mindanao Exploration Commission, which investigated refugee settlement possibilities in the Philippines, wrote in a letter dated Manila, July 7, 1939: "With the brisk demand for the subdivision of public lands now taking place all over the Islands, the Bureau of Lands is not always able to take care of all applicants as rapidly as might be expected or as the Bureau itself would like to do. They are greatly handicapped by the lack of sufficient experienced personnel. Unfortunately, as so frequently happens in such cases, it is the little fellow or the man without any influence, and who really can least afford it, who has to bear the brunt of such delays. The man of means or with good political affiliations always has access to the seats of the mighty. It, also, has often happened that in disputes over the occupancy of public land between the lowly and the politically powerful, the small man has in the end lost many years of hard work."

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some other form of contract.[10] Although the government contended that most of these contracts were voidable since they violated public land laws, nothing was done to cancel the illegal contracts, probably because most of them would soon expire in any case, and the government wished to avoid a conflict with Japan. Instead, steps were taken to make further expansion of Japanese settlements impossible. Land surveys and road construction were undertaken to encourage the migration of Filipinos into Davao in order to block such encroachment.

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The Commonwealth Opens Mindanao

In February 1935, just before the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the legislature passed the Quirino-Recto Colonization Act,[11] which represented the first link in a new chain of legislative and executive actions to speed the development of Mindanao. The act called for elaborate undertakings designed to avoid past mistakes in the field of agricultural colonization; but before it could be put into operation the Commonwealth was established.

The Commonwealth Government, also recognizing earlier mistakes, decided to concentrate first on a program of extended road-building and public-land surveying before again attempting to establish government-supported agricultural colonies. In January 1936 it therefore diverted the funds that had been set aside for colonization to the construction of roads.[12] During the years from 1936 to 1941 the road-construction program was carried through rapidly (Map, Fig. 118). The important towns on the northern coast were connected with each other and with Cotabato and Davao on the southern coast, and Cotabato was linked with Davao. Homesteaders in unknown numbers,[13] coming at their own expense, took up the

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10 Pelzer: Population and Land Utilization, 1941, p. 40.

11 Act No. 4197, Feb. 12, 1935.

12 Commonwealth Act No. 18, Jan. 2, 1936.

13 In the office of Survey Party 24-C in Buluan, Cotabato, I found a record that gives an indication of how rapidly the settlers were coming. Between 1938 and July 1940, 927 homeseekers and immigrants—coming at their own expense—registered with this office and applied for lots.

Dr. Stanton Youngberg, a member of the Mindanao Exploration Commission, wrote in a letter dated Davao, May 29, 1939: "My last previous visit to the island of Mindanao was almost six years ago. The changes that have taken place here during that period are really astounding. Then there were only disconnected strips of road in the different provinces, most of which started on the coast and ended nowhere in particular. Now one can travel by automobile from Surigao at the northeastern tip of the island through Agusan, Oriental Misamis, Lanao, Cotabato, and Davao to this rapidly growing town on the Gulf of Davao, a distance of seven hundred kilometers. In other words, road building has been rapid during the past five years but, fast as it has been, land settlement has been faster. People push on ahead and settle along the projected highways. The loud complaint of the Bureau of Lands personnel is over the fact that the people squat on the land and begin cultivation before they can get around to subdivide the areas that have been released by the Bureau of Forestry for agricultural purposes. Lands that were absolutely uninhabited two and three years ago are now occupied by settlers who are in the process of clearing the cut-over or non-commerical timber land and planting corn between the stumps. These people come from Luzon as well as from the heavily populated islands of the nearby Visayan group."

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

FIG. 118—Roads in Mindanao. The roads are of varying quality (none are cement highways). Most are usable by automobiles during the rainy season, but some only during the dry season. This map is based on official maps of the Bureau of Public Works and on commercial maps.

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land along the new highways as soon as it was surveyed; sometimes they preceded the construction and survey crews, even though it was no longer possible to file applications for unsurveyed land.

While Mindanao was being opened up by the highway-building program, a number of government agencies and experts studied the problem of government-sponsored land settlement for those unable to migrate because of a lack of funds. The most important proposals to be submitted were the Silayan Plan,[14] developed by Hilarion S. Silayan, Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry, who had prepared it as the basis for the Quirino-Recto Colonization Act, and the plan advanced by Frederic Howe, economic adviser to President Quezon.[15] As a result of the various plans submitted, the National Land Settlement Administration was set up, answering the need for a better conceived and more completely integrated colonization procedure, particularly in Mindanao. (The activities of the N. L. S. A. in northeastern Luzon are discussed in Appendix A.)

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The Filipinos themselves had been aware of the shortcomings of the government's earlier efforts. This is evidenced by the report by Manuel Roxas, Chairman of the National Economic Council, that was submitted to President Quezon on October 22, 1938, in which he stated:

> In no instance had there proceeded a careful study and selection of land to be settled nor of the people that were to be given State help to settle on those lands. No thought was apparently given to the important question of marketing the products of new settlers, neither was there any well-thought-out plan of assisting them to become efficient producers by providing for them demonstration and experimental stations or equipping them with modern tools and implements.[16]

Roxas felt that only communities with a measure of public order, sanitation, and education, and some means of transportation and communication could be expected to succeed. He had therefore proposed the organization of the National Land Resettlement Corporation, later renamed the National Land Settlement Administration, and listed four objectives,[17] the main parts of which were later adopted.

Upon receipt of the recommendations, President Quezon had appointed a special committee, composed of the Secretaries of the Interior, Finance, Agriculture and Commerce, to organize the National Land Settlement Administration. In order that work might be started immediately and that

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[14] Silayan: "Organized Land Settlement," 1938.

[15] Howe: "Philippine Homestead Settlement Plans," 1938.

[16] From an unpublished report.

[17] Roxas' four objectives were: (1) the settlement of young reservists in unpeopled regions in order to strengthen the defense of the thinly settled parts of the islands; (2) the movement of tenant farmers in order to improve conditions in those provinces where agrarian disputes and unrest were most frequent; (3) the Filipinization of non-Christian Filipinos and their amalgamation with Christian Filipinos; (4) the development of new export crops in order to insure the country against economic reverses that might otherwise result from independence. (From an unpublished report).

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the first crops might be planted in the spring, a working capital of 200,000 pesos was borrowed from the National Development Company on January 5, 1939, as the legislature had not yet passed the bill creating the N. L. S. A. On June 3 of that year, President Quezon signed the bill, which had meanwhile been passed by the National Assembly.[18]

The Organization of the National Land Settlement Administration

Objectives

The objectives of the N. L. S. A., following closely the lines that Roxas had suggested, were formulated by the law as follows:

(a) To facilitate the acquisition, settlement and cultivation of lands whether acquired from the Government or from private parties;

(b) To afford opportunity to own farms to tenant farmers and small farmers from congested areas, and to trainees who have completed the prescribed military training;

(c) To encourage migration to sparsely populated regions, and facilitate the amalgamation of the people in different sections of the Philippines;

(d) To develop new money crops to take the place of the present export crops, which may suffer from the loss of preferences which they enjoy in the American market.[19]

In order to attain these objectives the corporation was empowered to hold public agricultural land for 25 years, with the possibility of obtaining a renewal for another period of the same length. Furthermore, it could recommend to the President the reservation of public land suitable for settlement projects. Such land was to be surveyed, cleared, prepared for cultivation, and assigned to settlers in parcels not exceeding 24 hectares. The corporation was empowered to establish and operate electric-light and water-supply plants, irrigation systems, and trading stores, and to engage in manufacturing, milling, lumbering, and other enterprises considered necessary for the success of its activities.

Administrative Organization

The N. L. S. A. was a government corporation composed of five persons who acted as members of the Board of Directors charged with its management. The members were appointed by the President, with the consent of the National Assembly, for terms of 3 years.[20] The directors appointed Major General Paulino Santos, formerly Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, as manager. Santos is a man of great energy, with experience in the

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18 Commonwealth Act No. 441, June 3, 1939. For the full text of the act, see Appendix A.

19 *Ibid.*, Sec. 2.

20 The first Board of Directors was composed of Rafael R. Alunan, Secretary of the Interior, as chairman; Manuel Roxas, Secretary of Finance; Benigno S. Aquino, Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce; José Avelino, Secretary of Labor; and Ramon Roces, Manila publisher.

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handling of problems related to agricultural colonization. Formerly, as the Director of Prisons, he had been especially successful in the development of agricultural penal colonies. As Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, he had introduced vocational training, including modern farming technique for young recruits.

The manager in turn appointed the technical, clerical, and other personnel. All appointments to positions with salaries exceeding 2,400 pesos required the approval of the President—an illustration of the manner in which the long arm of the President of the Philippines reached down to control even minor appointments in the Commonwealth. After 2 years of operation the staff of the N. L. S. A. had grown to about 170 persons, including scientific agriculturalists, animal husbandmen, engineers, surveyors, mechanics, craftsmen, doctors, dentists, nurses, accountants, clerks, and recruiting officers. The central office was in Manila, and another large office was maintained in Lagao, the administrative center in Mindanao.

The capital of the N. L. S. A., amounting to 20 million pesos, was to be supplied from the coconut-oil excise tax fund in appropriations not exceeding 4 million pesos annually. The manager had to submit an annual report on the activities and progress of the N. L. S. A., as well as a balance sheet, to the President and the National Assembly.

Requirements for Settling

The act creating the N. L. S. A. laid down specific requirements for the people who were to be accepted as settlers. They must be Filipino or American citizens, of legal age, preferably not over 40, married and with children. They, and their dependents, should be healthy and fit for a pioneering life, should have had some agricultural experience, and should be of good character and reputation. The act further stated that settlers must be persons qualified to apply for public land under the Public Land Act.

However, in practice many of these requirements were disregarded. When the story of the work of the N. L. S. A. spread through the Philippines many families, both from other provinces of Mindanao and from other islands, moved to the settlement districts at their own expense. This made a careful examination of the settlers difficult if not impossible; yet many had to be accepted because of verbal instructions from the President that all persons presenting themselves as settlers in any of the settlement districts should be accepted if they seemed to fulfill the qualifications.

Contract Between the Settler and the Administration

As soon as a settler's application was accepted, he signed a contract with the N. L. S. A.[21] His main obligations were: to plant and cultivate the land given to him, using such plants as had been prescribed by the administration; to devote himself to this exclusively and not to engage in any

[21] For the full text of the contract see Appendix A.

[National Land Settlement Administration--Analyst]

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other trade or occupation without the approval of the administration; not to transfer his land in any way, except by bequest, to any other person for the first 10 years after receipt of the title to the land; to reimburse the administration within 20 years, at 4 per cent interest, for the transportation, building materials, food, and clothing that he might have received; to deposit all of his surplus products in administration warehouses for sale through the administration.

The administration's[1] obligations were to advance the cost of transporting the settler, his family, and his belongings; to assign to him a parcel of 12 hectares of agricultural land; to supply him, on a credit basis, with building materials (and, if necessary, skilled assistance for the construction of his house), food until he should become self-sufficient, the use of machinery such as tractors and plows (Figs. 97 and 98), planting material and fertilizer, livestock, and agricultural implements; the administration was to sell, on his behalf, products deposited by him in the administration warehouses (Fig. 92) and to give him full title to the land after all obligations should have been met.

Payments were to begin after the third year and were not to exceed 30 per cent of the proceeds of sales made through the administration. The contract was favorable to the settler, relieving him of most of the usual hazards and burdens of pioneering except for labor—and even that was made much easier because of the availability of modern mechanical equipment beyond the means of the individual small-scale farmer in the Philippines.

Marketing Organization

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The act under which the N. L. S. A.[1] operated called for the establishment of "trading stores or cooperatives to engage in the buying or selling of commodities. . . ." A store was set up in each town to supply the settlers with daily necessities at cost price on either a cash or a credit basis (Fig. 89). It was expected that these N. L. S. A. stores would become cooperatives as soon as the administration should be ready to wind up its work in a district.

In order to help the settlers to market their products the N. L. S. A. established a central marketing organization. Both of these services proved of great value because they protected the settlers from becoming victims of the sharp business practices of predatory merchants and produce buyers.

Health, Education, and Religious Services

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The planners of the N. L. S. A.[1] recognizing the importance of health in a pioneering community, established a Health Division with three sections: medical, dental, and veterinary.

In the Koronadal Valley project (see p. 141, ff.) each one of the settlement districts received its own small hospital (Fig. 112) under the supervision of a physician assisted by two nurses. Each *barrio* had its first-aid

[1] [National Land Settlement Administration--Analyst]

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station with a trained medical attendant. Among the tasks of the medical personnel were those of supplying vaccination against smallpox and inoculation against typhoid, cholera, and dysentery, and of supervising or undertaking suitable measures to control malaria. There was one dentist on the payroll of the project. The veterinary personnel was in charge of the hog and poultry farms of the N. L. S. A. and also cared for any diseases occurring among the settlers' livestock. 654 166 744

A school was built in each of the towns in the Koronadal Valley colony (Fig. 111). The religious needs of the settlers, all of whom were Roman Catholic, were met by American priests belonging to the order of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate (O. M. I.). The settlers built a church in each district out of material furnished by the administration. [871 795]

Settlements in the Koronadal Valley

The Mindanao Reconnaissance Survey

In November 1938 General Santos had made a reconnaissance survey of Mindanao in order to select possible sites for settlement projects. He was accompanied by technical advisers in such fields as agriculture, forestry, livestock industry, soil science, and irrigation.[22] The party gathered in Zamboanga on November 12, 1938, and sailed to Dadjangas, at the head of Sarangani Bay in Cotabato, arriving there on November 14. Between the 14th and 19th the party moved rather quickly from Dadjangas through Koronadal Valley to Lake Buluan. Another 2 days were spent in the Kidapawan district along the Cotabato-Davao highway, and 3 or 4 days in the Compostela-Monkayo region on the upper Agusan River in northern Davao. 654 166 311

In a number of conferences held in Mindanao and on board ship returning to Manila, the possibilities of the various districts visited were discussed, and it was finally decided to recommend the reservation of Koronadal Valley and of the Compostela-Monkayo districts to the President. Koronadal Valley was given first choice because of its convenient location between Sarangani Bay and Lake Buluan. The topography would make road construction easy. Moreover, a large part of the valley's 97,000 hectares was open grassland that would not require costly and time-consuming clearing. These considerations seemed to outweigh doubts about

[22] The party consisted of the following members: Major General Paulino Santos; Lieutenant Colonel Dionisio Gutierrez; Mr. Pablo T. Noroña, Assistant Director of Prisons; Mr. George M. Gondall, Adviser to the National Economic Council; Dr. N. B. Mendiola, Head of the Department of Agronomy, and Dr. A. L. Teodoro, Head of the Department of Agricultural Engineering, both from the College of Agriculture, University of the Philippines; Dr. M. M. Alicante, Chief of the Division of Soil Survey, Bureau of Science; Mr. D. Z. Rosell, Soil Scientist, Bureau of Science; Dr. Pedro S. Sales, of the Bureau of Animal Industry; Professor M. B. Raymundo, of the Bureau of Plant Industry; Forester P. San Buenaventura, of the Bureau of Forestry; Professor J. Elayda, Chief of the Vocational Training Division, Philippine Army; Captain R. T. Salacup, Medical Corps, Philippine Army; and Mr. M. Kasilag, Commissioner for Mindanao and Sulu.

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the fertility, the climate, and the need for irrigation in the southern part of Koronadal.

On December 20, 1938, a week after the return to Manila, the survey party submitted a report on the areas of Mindanao selected as sites for settlement projects. On February 11, 1939, President Quezon signed proclamations nos. 383 and 384 reserving the two recommended districts for the N. L. S. A.[1] Ten days later the first group of settlers, together with a number of employees, sailed from Manila to Koronadal under the leadership of General Santos.

The great haste in getting the project under way was due to the desire of the government to have a start made before the new planting season began. There were many questions that should have been studied before the first settlers were actually moved. Data on climatic conditions were lacking; only general information about the annual distribution of rainfall had been obtained through a questioning of the residents of Koronadal Valley. Specific data on suitable types of crops were scarce, although the experts had mentioned a number of cash crops, such as cotton and rubber, the cultivation of which might prove profitable in certain sections of the chosen sites. Notwithstanding the fact that the experts had pointed out the need for thorough surveys of the water supply available for irrigation and of the water-holding capacity of the light, sandy soils, such surveys were not undertaken until several months after groups of settlers had actually been established.

[5 & 3]

The survey party had found that Koronadal Valley was thinly populated, but nobody knew exactly how many Bilaans (a pagan tribe) (Figs. 80 and 81) and Moros were living in the region, or how much land should be reserved for them. These people were concerned about their land rights in the event of an establishment of agricultural colonies by the N.L.S.A. However, instead of making definite arrangements for the Bilaans and Moros, the members of the survey party merely gave these people oral assurance that their rights would be respected and told them to declare their land for tax purposes and to get tax receipts as evidence of ownership. Such advice was not very helpful, especially to the backward Bilaans.

It would have been better if the area could have been surveyed and sufficient land set aside for Bilaans and Moros. In fact, the lack of surveys slowed down the progress of the first settlers considerably, delaying for 15 months the allotting of their farm land.

The Valley: The Physical Environment

Koronadal Valley, in southeastern Cotabato, which was chosen by the Mindanao Survey Party as the first region of Mindanao to be developed by the N. L. S. A.[1] is a narrow plain flanked by two mountain ranges (Map, Fig. 119). The higher eastern range has been named Quezon Range and the lower western one, Roxas Range (Fig. 79). The plain extends in a

[1] [National Land Settlement Administration - Analyst]

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northwesterly direction from Sarangani Bay to Lake Buluan. About 80 kilometers long, and from 10 to 12 kilometers wide, it includes an area of about 97,000 hectares. The presence of elevated Pleistocene coral reefs, as in the vicinity of Fort Pikit, to the northwest of Lake Buluan,[23] indicates that the area southwest of a line from the mouth of the Mindanao River to Sarangani Bay, was once separated by water from the rest of Mindanao. Coralline limestone has also been found in several places in the hills a short distance north of Sarangani Bay. Geologically recent uplifts raised the shallow channel above sea level, and rivers began to deposit their sediment. The part of the old channel that connects Lake Buluan and Sarangani Bay formerly received considerable quantities of volcanic material erupted by Mt. Matutum (Fig. 95), a Pleistocene volcano in the Quezon Range. Koronadal is thus a raised plain that as recently as the Pleistocene epoch was a shallow sea channel.

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The topography of Koronadal suggests a division into three parts: Southern Koronadal, Middle Koronadal and Northern Koronadal.

Southern Koronadal includes parts of the plains of Buayan and Makar and is bounded on the east by the Buayan River and on the west by the Klinan and Siluay rivers. It rises gently from the shore of Sarangani Bay northward to Napol Hill in front of the Quezon Range and northwestward toward Polomolok. The latter lies within Middle Koronadal at an elevation of about 300 meters above sea level. The soils of Southern Koronadal consist of ash-gray to nearly black, loose, volcanic sandy loam, very fine sandy loam, and coarse silt loam. They range in thickness from 25 to 30 centimeters.

Middle Koronadal is higher than either Southern or Northern Koronadal. As it lies near Mt. Matutum, whose deposits are of great depth, the general elevation (between 300 and 600 meters) is higher than that of Southern Koronadal. The soils have a greater depth, ranging from 30 to 40 centimeters, and consist of dark brown to very dark gray, loose, granular volcanic sandy loam mixed with a considerable amount of organic matter. The subsoil is formed of fine sandy loams and fine sand containing gravel of volcanic material.

Northern Koronadal slopes gently down toward Lake Buluan. Its soils, 30 to 40 centimeters deep, consist of very fine sandy loams and clay loams, dark gray to nearly black, with a clay loam forming the subsoil.

The word Koronadal is believed to be a corruption of two Magindanao words: *koron* or *kalon*, meaning cogon grass, and *nadal* or *dalal*, meaning plain.[24] As the name would seem to indicate, the dominant vegetation consists of grasses such as cogon (*Imperata cylindrica*), *talahib* (*Saccharum spontaneum*), and *silibon* (*Themeda triandra*). The last is especially widespread and makes good pasture when young. It needs less rainfall than

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[23] Smith: Geology and Mineral Resources of the Philippine Islands, 1924, p. 203.
[24] Rosell: "The Koronadal Valley," 1939, p. 493.

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

FIG. 119—Sketch map of the Koronadal National Land Settlement Project, based on a blueprint map of the N. L. S. A. The surveying of the area was incomplete at the time this map was drawn, and therefore the scale cannot be used with precision in measuring distances upon it. For Cotobato, *read* Cotabato.

[p. 144]

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137 cogon or talahib and is frequently an indicator of a hardpan that prevents the free circulation of water.

Southern Koronadal is almost completely covered by grass, although *buri* palms are rather plentiful. It is not known whether this part of Koronadal ever had a forest cover extending beyond the narrow belts along the rivers. In Middle and Northern Koronadal there are occasional limited areas of primeval forest and more frequent patches of second-growth forest, especially along the foothills of the Quezon and Roxas ranges. Bamboos are also common in these parts and offer excellent and cheap building material. They are absent, however, in the southern part of the plain. It is probable that Middle and Northern Koronadal were once completely covered by forest vegetation that has since been largely destroyed by the shifting cultivation of the Moros and Bilaans. According to Dr. E. B. Copeland, Northern Koronadal had a considerable Bilaan population about 35 or 40 years ago, which would explain the extent of the present-day cogonales of Northern and Middle Koronadal. However, wars among various Magindanao *datos* have resulted in serious depopulation. After a siege, the inhabitants of the town of Talik were completely annihilated.

132 There are no statistical data on the climate of the Koronadal plain which, with the possible exception of its northern section, lies in that part of Mindanao that has no dry and no very pronounced rainy season. Rainfall is more or less evenly distributed throughout the year.

Compared with the rest of the plain, Southern Koronadal is considerably drier, as is indicated by the presence of silibon, mentioned above. In the middle of the day a strong, southerly wind blows across the plain of Southern Koronadal from the bay. Since it raises a great deal of dust in the fine loam and sandy soil, the planting of windbreaks would be advisable. In addition to their protective function, these would also supply firewood, of which there is a shortage. Because of its higher elevation, Middle Koronadal is somewhat cooler than the plains to the north or to the south. Here the rainfall is heavier, and rainy days are more numerous. The sky is frequently overcast, as Mt. Maturum gathers a daily cloud cover. It is said that Northern Koronadal has pronounced dry and wet seasons.

131 Koronadal can best be reached by ships approaching through Sarangani Bay. When the Commonwealth Government began its ambitious road-building program the Alunan National Highway was planned from the head of Sarangani Bay past Lake Buluan to Dulawan. By the time the N. L. S. A. began its activities the Bureau of Public Works had just begun construction of this road. In the days before the highway was constructed it was possible, during the dry season, to drive a car that had sufficient clearance over the grassy plains from Sarangani Bay to the shores of Lake Buluan. From there one could proceed by launch to Cotabato.

505 By 1941 there were two or three interisland steamers calling at Dadjangas (Fig. 82) weekly, while others called only at Glan, near the southern

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end of Sarangani Bay, whence Dadjangas could be reached by motor boat.

The Arrival of the Settlers

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Upon their arrival in Koronadal, the settler and his family were assigned to one of the several settlement districts, to which they were transported by truck (Fig. 83). For the first few weeks they were housed in plain, long sheds or bunkhouses (Fig. 84) divided into small sections, each accommodating one family. The administration distributed rations once a week in quantities dependent upon the size of the families (Fig. 88). Rations were modeled on those of the Army. A check was made of the settlers' belongings, especially cooking utensils, tools, *bolos*, lanterns, axes, and farm implements (Fig. 87). Incomplete equipment was brought up to standard. Soon after their arrival all newcomers were examined by a doctor and inoculated against cholera and dysentery. Mosquito nets were issued in malarial districts. The officer in charge of the settlement explained in a public meeting the duties of the new settlers and assigned to each a home lot, usually 2,000 square meters in size.

The first task of the settler was to build a house so that his family could free the bunkhouse space for newer arrivals (Figs. 84–86). If there were no lumber available on the lot or in the neighborhood, the administration supplied the material necessary for a simple, Filipino-styled house, usually built of bamboo and roofed with cogon grass or the leaves of the nipa palm. The settler had full freedom in regard to the design of the house; and it was often possible for an observer familiar with Philippine house types to determine the home province of a settler by the style of his dwelling.

[a41]

As rapidly as possible the home lot was prepared for cultivation and planted with vegetables and fruit trees. Seeds and seedlings were advanced by the warehouses and nurseries of the administration. It was suggested that a model home lot should have 36 banana trees, 12 papayas, a chico, a breadfruit, and a mango, in addition to such vegetables as eggplant, tomatoes, and squashes, and such tubers as sweet potatoes, yams, taro, and cassava. Most of the home lots contained an even larger variety of fruit trees and vegetables, depending upon the taste and industry of the occupants. Settlers were encouraged to keep small livestock, such as pigs and poultry. Breeding-stock came from the piggery and the poultry farm of the administration.

Within the course of a few months the settler was able to obtain from his garden all the vegetables and fruits he needed for his family, together with some eggs and occasionally a chicken. A well built house and a well developed home lot did a great deal to bind the settler to the new district and make him content.

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The assignment of the farm lots was the next step (Fig. 91). At the beginning all farms measured 12 hectares, but in May 1940 it was decided to reduce those along the highway to 6 hectares, since the average Filipino family finds it difficult to cultivate 12 hectares. 654 166 311

In order to help the settler to begin the cultivation of the farm land as quickly as possible, the N. L. S. A. used such mechanical equipment as tractors, disk plows, and harrows to prepare at least 4 or 5 of the 12 hectares for the settler, who was then charged with the actual cost of their use (Fig. 101). Thus he was able to bring a large portion of his farm land under crops during the first planting season. The remainder of the land was broken by the settler with the help of his carabao and iron plow. In Koronadal much of the land was covered by cogon grass that could be burned away and tractor-drawn disk plows could then break this land easily. The cost of preparing cogon-covered land for cultivation was rather low as compared with that of preparing forested land.

In the 3 years of its operation before the war, the N. L. S. A. had no occasion to clear extensive primeval forest. In one or two settlement districts it was necessary to clear some first- and second-growth forest. In these instances mechanical equipment (Fig. 102) was used to pull out the stumps.[25]

It was the plan of the administration that about one-half of the land should be devoted to subsistence crops, such as rice, maize, sweet potatoes, and cassava, and the other half to cash crops, such as rubber, coffee, cacao, cotton, soy beans, peanuts, cowpeas, Bermuda onions, and others for which there was a market in the Philippines. The type of cash crops to be recommended would depend upon conditions of soil and climate in the different settlement districts. At the time of the outbreak of the war the choice of cash crops was still of great concern to the administration which was opposed to the usual cash crops of the Philippines—tobacco, abaca, coconuts, and sugar—as these were grown almost exclusively for the foreign and especially the American markets and were faced by the prospective loss of the latter after 1946. Since the cash crops should enable the settler to pay off his debt to the N. L. S. A., the right choice of these crops was of the utmost importance not only to the administration but also to the settler. 241 654 166 311

[25] In the Compostela-Monkayo area, however, forest clearing would have been necessary on a large scale. The survey party estimated that there was an average of 2,500 trees per hectare in this region. It was decided to have settlers work together in groups of 24 under a foreman. The costs of clearing were to be prorated by farms. It was thought that, once the trees were cut, one hectare could be cleared within a week by three stump-pullers if two carabaos were used on each puller. This estimate seems too optimistic, for it means that each pulling team would have had to remove 17 stumps per hour if it operated for six 8-hour days. The Compostela-Monkayo project had not been started, however, by the time the war broke out, as the road that was to open the region was still unfinished.

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A married settler received a credit of 1,000 pesos and a bachelor one of not more than 600 pesos. This credit was gradually established as the settler gave evidence of making progress. Theoretically the debt was covered by the house and improvements on the land as collateral, so that if the original settler should leave, another could take over the major part of his obligations. The administration could stop issuing credit to a settler whose

TABLE XI—KORONADAL: ACCOUNTS OF TWO SETTLERS WITH THE N. L. S. A., AS OF JULY 26, 1940

ITEM	CREDIT EXTENDED BY THE N. L. S. A. TO— Settler A*	Settler B*
Food	₱174.76	₱142.76
Clothing	27.01	32.59
Construction material and help	197.58	205.79
Planting material	34.32	85.51
Passage to Mindanao	81.60	112.20
Transportation from harbor to settlement region	———	6.13
Farm implements	12.41	19.68
Work animals	73.00	142.34
Miscellaneous	56.05	46.89
Total	₱656.73	₱793.89
Credits (labor)	₱74.70	₱78.60

* Settler A arrived on June 19, 1939, and Settler B on June 12, 1939.
Source: Unpublished records of the N.L.S.A.

account grew faster than his collateral and so could oblige him to work for a daily wage from 5 o'clock in the morning until noon. This left him time to work for several hours for himself but prevented his debt from increasing. He received his wage in the form of rations and not in cash.

In recognition of the absolute necessity for keeping the accounts as low as possible, an attempt was made to calculate the minimum requirement of food, clothing, implements, and other items. Settlers were directed to present written requests for food and other supplies so that these could be checked and approved, or disapproved. The stores sold only inexpensive merchandise to the general public. Canned milk, for example, was kept only for babies, or for medical patients whose need of milk had been certified by the doctor.

The accounts of the first groups of settlers were not carefully supervised and grew relatively large. By June 30, 1940, 30 settlers each had debts exceeding 700 pesos. One had already passed the thousand-peso limit, and two were approaching it. An indication that the settlers' requests for supplies, at least during the first year, were not handled systematically or supervised strictly, may be seen in Table XI, which shows the accounts

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of two typical settlers who had been in Mindanao for just one year. Although Settler A had only two dependents, whereas Settler B had six, the food item was smaller for the larger family.

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The Settlement Districts

The N. L. S. A.[1] divided Koronadal into four settlement districts: Lagao, Polomolok, Tupi, and Marbel. Each of these has one town, for which the district has been named, representing the administrative and economic center around which the villages, or barrios, are located. The first settlers to be sent to a newly opened district were placed within the area set aside for the town. After all the home lots in the town were occupied, the new arrivals were directed to the locations chosen as sites for the barrios. The latter had a smaller number of lots than had the towns. This division into town and barrios was necessary in order to spread out the population so that the individual farmer should not be too far away from his farm land.

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Each district was under an overseer and a staff of assistants. The overseer lived in the town, where he had a small office. The store, hospital, church, school, administration warehouse, tool and machinery sheds, and whatever other buildings were needed either by the community or by the N. L. S. A. were also in the town. Each barrio was under the charge of a barrio lieutenant and an assistant barrio lieutenant, who were chosen by the overseer from the ranks of the settlers on the basis of leadership, intelligence, and industry.

Lagao. This district takes in Southern Koronadal and has a total area of approximately 30,000 hectares, of which only about 10,000 were available for distribution to settlers. The town of Lagao, established on March 3, 1939, lies 3½ kilometers northeast of Dadjangas, the port of Koronadal, and was the administration and distribution center of the whole Koronadal project of the N. L. S. A. Hence General Santos had his office in Lagao (Fig. 109); and a number of other houses there were occupied by employees of the N. L. S. A. As a supply center, it had an especially large warehouse, store, and machine shop. In this shop farm machinery (Fig. 97), trucks, and motor cars were overhauled and repaired.[26] A power plant supplied power for the machine shop and for the maize and rice mills, as well as light for the community. The town consisted of three barrios, closely grouped together (Fig. 95).

Lagao was chosen as the supply, distribution, and administration center for a number of reasons. It is near Dadjangas which, though not included in the settlement district, served as the landing point for settlers and goods and was the terminal of the national highway between Sarangani Bay and Dulawan on the lower Cotabato River. It is free from malaria—which cannot be said of the settlements further inland.

The settlement at Lagao was started by the N. L. S. A. with 62 settlers and 14 employees. But the settlers had been recruited in Manila too quickly. Many of them were unmarried and had had little agricultural experience, having been taxi-drivers, craftsmen, professional workers, or laborers. A few of them soon gave up, discouraged by the dryness of the light soil of Lagao. As has been mentioned, the members of the survey party

[26] At the beginning of 1941 Koronadal had the following mechanical equipment or machinery: 49 tractors, 18 trucks, 9 "pick-up" trucks, 3 passenger cars, 1 motorcycle, 2 station wagons, 25 plows (4, 5 or 6 disks), 16 harrows, 9 planters, 1 thresher, 1 hay-baler, 1 cotton gin, 1 maize mill, 1 rice mill, 1 battery charger, 1 road grader, 2 peanut shellers, 2 light plants and 3 windmills.

[1] [National Land Settlement Administration--Analyst]

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had pointed out the absolute necessity for an irrigation system if the plain of Lagao was to produce crops, but at first this advice was disregarded, so that by June 1939 drought was endangering the gardens started by the settlers. Pessimistic reports reached Manila, and newspapers began to speak of the failure of the Koronadal colony.

General Santos, however, ordered the immediate construction of an irrigation canal large enough to water at least the home lots of Lagao. This canal, which tapped the small Klaja River 9 kilometers north of Lagao, was started on July 3 and finished on August 19, 1939. It had a discharge of 130 liters per second. This small system not only saved the gardens of Lagao but also gave new courage to the settlers, as well as to the administration, and checked the outburst of criticism directed against the N. L. S. A. The Klaja was, however, too small to supply irrigation water for the farm land. Early in 1940 engineers began to survey an irrigation system for distributing the waters of the Siluay River and its main tributary, the Klinan, over this farm land (Fig. 99). The Siluay, according to the records of the engineers, has an average flow of 6,300 liters per second; the maximum observed was 11,250 and the minimum, 4,400. The construction of the main canal was started in July 1940. The system was to begin operation in July or August 1941 and was expected to supply about 4,000 hectares of land with sufficient water to ensure favorable conditions for the growth of cotton, Bermuda onions, soy beans, peanuts, and cowpeas on a large scale.

The experts consulted by the N. L. S. A. considered Lagao especially well suited to the mechanized cultivation of cotton. Experimental plantings of a variety called Batangas White[27] were made from June to December 1939 in order to determine the best time for planting, which was found to be September and early October. During 1940 the cotton area amounted to only 80 hectares, but in 1941 the administration planned to plant as much as 500 hectares of cotton on its own farm and to suggest that each settler in Lagao plant one or two hectares as well.

Agricultural experts of the N. L. S. A. were convinced that Lagao farm lots would bring the highest financial returns of all the farms in Koronadal when the irrigation problem had been solved. Nevertheless, many of the incoming settlers preferred to move to one of the districts farther inland as they were anxious to get land that was suitable for the customary staple crops, such as rice and maize, for which the Lagao soil, although it can support these crops, is not particularly well adapted. In February 1941 Lagao's settlers had increased from the initial 62, who, with 6 dependents, had landed on February 27, 1939, at Dadjangas, to 582, with 1,709 dependents, who were distributed over eight barrios clustered around the new town of Lagao. In addition, 85 employees, with 135 dependents, lived in the town.

Polomolok. The townsite of Polomolok lies 21 kilometers northwest of Lagao. This district was not opened until late in 1940, because the presence of malaria and the lack of easily accessible drinking water made special preparations necessary (Figs. 93 and 100). It includes 18,000 hectares, of which about 13,500 were considered for distribution. According to agricultural experts, Polomolok is especially well suited to upland rice and maize as subsistence crops, and to rubber, cacao, and soy beans as cash crops. By the end of February 1941, 5 months after its opening, the district had 347 settlers with 718 dependents, living in four barrios.

Tupi. About 19 kilometers northwest of Polomolok lies the townsite of Tupi, extending for 3 kilometers on both sides of the new highway. It is the center of the third settlement district. This district comprises 23,000 hectares, of which 14,000 were marked for distribution. The site chosen for Tupi was covered by dense second-growth forest. The first settlers were sent here on July 3, 1939; clearing was begun in September. By the end of 1939 the employees of the Bureau of Public Works, who were constructing the highway, reached Tupi and cleared an additional strip 15 meters wide (Fig. 96).

In July 1940, when I passed through the town, the clearing done by the settlers had made considerable progress. The home lots already contained houses and gardens. The farm lots, however, had not even been surveyed, although settlers had been there a year; for the administration did not have enough surveyors to take care of all the settlers at the rate at which they were coming in. The older settlers of Tupi, whose home

[27] A variety introduced by the Spaniards from Mexico that is similar to the Acala cotton grown in California.

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lots were already developed, were therefore given two hectares of plowed land on a temporary basis so that they might begin field cultivation and become self-sufficient. A report dated February 1941 showed, however, that many of the Tupi settlers were still waiting for their farm land. 654 166

The main subsistence crops of the district are upland rice and maize, the latter yielding two or three crops (Fig. 104). The most promising money crops are rubber, coffee, cacao, black pepper, soy beans, and cowpeas. 311 361

Near the barrio of Kipalbig, established in May 1940 about 9 kilometers northwest of Tupi, the administration set aside 1,000 hectares for a rubber plantation under the management of a young Filipino who had formerly been in the employ of a rubber plantation in Borneo. It was planned, furthermore, that each Tupi settler should plant several hectares with rubber as soon as the nursery could supply him with budded seedlings.

Early in 1941 Tupi had 582 settlers, with 1,891 dependents, and 39 employees of the N. L. S. A., with 58 dependents, living either in the town, in one of the four outlying barrios, or on the rubber plantation.

Marbel. The town of Marbel, founded on January 10, 1940, lies on the highway 27 kilometers northwest of Tupi and about 70 kilometers northwest of Lagao (Fig. 110). The district includes 21,000 hectares, 14,500 of which were to be given to settlers. Because of Marbel's topography and climate, N. L. S. A. officials believed that it would become the rice and maize granary of Koronadal. The district is well suited to both upland and lowland rice (Fig. 103) as well as to maize. At the time of my visit to Marbel the question of additional perennial cash crops had not yet been decided.

This district's population increased much more rapidly than any other in Koronadal; after one year it had 956 settlers with 2,930 dependents and 13 employees with 12 dependents, who were living either in Marbel or in one of the seven barrios located around the town (Fig. 94).

Administration Farms

The administration farms played an important role. They were experiment and demonstration stations as well as seed and livestock farms. Each of the settlement districts was eventually to have one farm on which to grow all crops suited to the particular area, with especial attention given to cash crops (Figs. 106 and 108). The planners hoped that in time the profits from these farms would contribute a large part, if not all, of the administrative expenses. In the early years these farms offered employment to settlers whose credit had to be limited. The main function of the farms was to produce the seeds needed in large quantities by new settlers. Here agriculturists experimented with new varieties of standard crops and with the introduction of new crops before settlers were encouraged to plant them. A promising start was made with a thousand-hectare rubber farm just a year before the Philippines were attacked (Figs. 105 and 107). 654 242 166

The largest hog farm in the Philippines was managed by the N. L. S. A. (Fig. 113). This project, near Lagao, under the supervision of Dr. Gil Pabillo, a veterinarian, was begun early in 1939 with 18 sows and 2 boars bought from the Bureau of Animal Industry and the San Ramon Penal Colony for 1,177 pesos. The objectives of this venture were first to provide each settler with a pair of good breeding pigs and thereafter to produce pigs for the market at the rate of 10,000 a year. After 2 years of operation the farm had 600 pigs of all sizes, excluding those that had been sold to settlers, and the value of the stock had risen from the original 1,177 to 1 232 654 242 166

[National Land Settlement Administration--Analyst]

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about 25,000 pesos. A five-year program was intended to increase the number of pigs to 18,000, worth half a million pesos. It was estimated that the profits of the hog farm alone would be great enough to pay the salaries of the employees of the N. L. S. A. Dr. Pabillo pointed to a number of fac-

TABLE XII—GROWTH OF POPULATION IN THE KORONADAL VALLEY PROJECT FEBRUARY 1939 TO FEBRUARY 1941

		NUMBER OF RESIDENTS*					
YEAR	MONTH	Employees	Dependents	Settlers	Dependents	Total	Monthly Increase
1939	February	14	...	62	6	82	....
	March	14	....	65	8	87	5
	April	18	17	79	61	175	88
	May	21	31	102	80	234	59
	June	21	35	150	148	354	120
	July	21	44	184	203	452	98
	August	23	39	195	227	484	32
	September	26	39	200	246	511	27
	October	28	39	209	259	535	24
	November	29	39	217	282	567	32
	December	29	39	289	576	933	366
1940	January	43	55	419	1,169	1,686	753
	February	43	55	513	1,272	1,883	197
	March	43	55	568	1,473	2,139	256
	April	52	62	607	1,610	2,331	192
	May	62	61	970	3,033	4,126	1,795
	June	72	76	1,221	3,640	5,009	883
	July	72	76	1,574	4,346	6,068	1,059
	August	75	83	1,924	5,046	7,128	1,060
	September	79	142	2,044	6,332	8,597	1,469
	October	82	145	2,134	6,458	8,819	222
	November	88	148	2,151	6,648	9,035	216
	December	118	164	2,410	7,231	9,923	888
1941	January	145	185	2,467	7,248	10,045	122
	February	150	190	2,513	8,163	11,016	971

* This table does not include the following groups:

Hired laborers	239
Dependents	62
Probationary settlers for Ala Valley	1,207
Dependents	389
Total	1,897

The probationary settlers came into the valley in December 1940 and January and February 1941, at their own expense.

Source: Unpublished records of the N. L. S. A.

tors that promised success: absence of animal diseases, suitability of climate, low costs of fodder and building materials, and a good market.

The poultry farm of the N. L. S. A. was not so successful as the hog farm because of diseases. There were further plans calling for a cattle and carabao ranch on which to raise work animals for the settlers. A horse-breeding station, for which high-bred Australian mares and stallions were

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imported, had already been started. Then there were plans for producing large quantities of vegetables, such as tomatoes and cucumbers, for a cannery to be established and operated by the National Development Company.

All of these projects were entirely sound, since the N. L. S. A. was concentrating chiefly on those crops and products that were still being imported into the Philippines.

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Growth of the Koronadal Settlements

The existence of the N. L. S. A. was endangered in July and August of 1939 when critics of the government were speaking of the "failure" of the new colonization project; it weathered the storm, however. As the first year progressed, the staff of the N. L. S. A. learned from its mistakes and worked out a better technique in locating settlers and getting them started. Recruiting officers became more skilled in selecting the right type of settlers. Within the first 12 months the number of settlers grew from 62 to 513. During the second year exactly 2,000 settlers were added. Table XII shows the monthly growth in the number of settlers as well as of employees.

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If the original plan of giving each family 12 hectares had been carried out, the 2,513 settlers present at the end of February 1941 would have occupied about 30,156 hectares of the available 52,500. In May 1940, however, the directors of the N. L. S. A. decided to limit to 6 hectares the land allotted to any settlers whose farms were located along the national highway. It was felt that these farmers had an advantage over those whose farms were less conveniently located. There are no data available on how many additional farms might be located along the highway as a result of this ruling, for the surveys were far from complete when the war interrupted all activities. The total could not, however, have been more than 350 farms, assuming that each highway farm measured 200 by 300 meters, instead of 400 by 300, as formerly. If all farms had been kept at 12 hectares, Koronadal would have had room on its second anniversary for only an additional 1,900 settlers, or less than the number accepted during its second year of operation.

At the end of February 1941 an additional 1,207 settler-applicants had accumulated in the four districts of Koronadal, especially in Marbel. They had come at their own expense and were clamoring for admittance. The N. L. S. A. directors, faced with an urgent need for new settlement areas, decided to expand by taking in the Ala Valley, which runs parallel to Koronadal and is separated from the latter by the Roxas and Matujas ranges. Like Koronadal, the Ala Valley is largely covered with grasses. According to reports, its potentialities are comparable to those of Tupi and Marbel. It has about 50,000 hectares that could be subdivided.

During the first months of 1941 the N. L. S. A. employed the settler-applicants who were waiting in Northern Koronadal to build a road from

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Marbel into the Ala Valley and promised to locate them there under the same conditions as those enjoyed by the settlers of Koronadal.

Home Provinces of the Koronadal Settlers

The realization of one of the main purposes of the N. L. S. A., the reduction of pressure in overpopulated provinces, was hindered by political considerations. Assemblymen who felt that their constituents should receive an equal share in the benefits of the N. L. S. A. wrote the following provision into the law:

> The applicants shall be recruited *from all provinces in proportion to their respective population* [italics are mine], and in case a province shall not be able to fill the quota assigned, the unfilled portion of the quota may be covered from other provinces having greater number of applicants.[28]

Because of this provision and because of political pressure, the recruiting officers at one time concentrated their efforts for several weeks on the province of Tayabas, although Tayabas is an area of immigration rather than of emigration and there is no need for the peasants of this province to turn to Mindanao in search of land. On the whole, however, the administration did not pay too much attention to this provision, knowing it had been inserted purely for vote-getting purposes. Although 41 out of a total of 50 provinces in the Philippines were represented by the settlers in Koronadal, the Visayan provinces of Iloilo, Leyte, Cebu, Capiz, and Bohol furnished nearly 70 per cent of the settlers. The Luzon provinces of Pampanga, Pangasinan, and Tarlac came next in importance. Table XXI[29] shows the home provinces of the settlers in the various settlement districts.

Expenditures of the National Land Settlement Administration

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By December 31, 1940 the government had released 4 million pesos out of the 20 million that had been set aside for the N. L. S. A. According to a statement of the comptroller, the N. L. S. A., by December 31, 1940, had received an income of 89,531.06 pesos from interest charges, electric-light fees, charges for transportation and for preparation of settler farm lots, sales of seeds and seedlings, and various other sources. This increased to 4,089,531.06 pesos the total amount that had been at any time available for expenditure.

Out of this sum, 1,836,616.02 pesos had been expended by December 31, 1940.[30] The main items were: salaries, 202,819.87 pesos; wages, traveling expenses, freight and handling charges, rentals of buildings and offices, postal service, and other miscellaneous expenses, 233,079.90 pesos;

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[28] Commonwealth Act No. 441, Sec. 3c.

[29] Table XXI is found in Appendix C, p. 253.

[30] By March 15, 1941, this amount had increased to 2,233,250.00 pesos. These and the accompanying figures in the text are from an unpublished report, drawn up by the accountant of the N. L. S. A.

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costs of operating the various administration projects such as the piggery, poultry farm, and seed farms, 71,222.16 pesos; buildings, farm machinery, transportation equipment, office furniture, technical and scientific equipment, hospital and dispensary instruments, 534,928.17 pesos; advances to settlers, 794,565.92 pesos.[31]

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On December 31, 1940, the administration had 2,262,049.37 pesos, either in banks or on hand in its offices. To this should be added 138,044.41 pesos, representing accounts receivable and inventories in stores and warehouses. The accounts payable at the same time amounted to 147,178.74 pesos.

For the 17-month period from January 1939 to June 30, 1940, the directors of the N. L. S. A. approved a budget of 1,187,311.00 pesos. The regular budget of the N. L. S. A. for the fiscal year, July 1, 1940 to June 30, 1941, allowed for an expenditure of 813,870.00 pesos; and supplements approved on July 30, September 12, November 16, and December 24, 1940, increased this sum to 2,031,714.28 pesos. The full amount of the appropriation for the 1940–1941 fiscal year is not known, as further additions for projects such as the Siluay irrigation system were necessary. The original estimate of the costs of this irrigation system called for 131,926.00 pesos; but in the spring of 1941 the administration asked for an additional 129,555.74 pesos. This was but one instance of the directors' having to approve an increase in the budget. In the budget for 1940–1941, as drawn up on December 24, 1940, 41.8 per cent was allocated for advances to settlers; 31.3 per cent for the purchase of equipment, construction of buildings, and similar outlays; 12.6 per cent for administrative salaries and wages; and the remainder for operating and general expenses. This distribution of expenditure did not depart greatly from that of the first 23 months.

It is probable that by the outbreak of the war the N. L. S. A. had expended between 4 and 5 million pesos, a great part of which had been advanced to settlers or had been used for machinery, buildings, wells and irrigation systems, and to give the settlers health protection.

The time had, of course, been too short for the N. L. S. A. to receive a return on its investment in the form of payments from settlers on their debts or in the form of large sales of cash crops from administration farms.

Summary and Appraisal of the Work of the National Land Settlement Administration

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The National Land Settlement Administration was one of the many activities of the Commonwealth of the Philippines designed to strengthen the economy and social structure of the Philippine nation. The government was making concentrated efforts to develop Mindanao's resources. An energetic road-building program was begun immediately after the establishment of the Commonwealth. The Bureau of Lands at the same time at-

[31] By March 15, 1941, advances had increased to 967,551.81 pesos.

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tempted to speed up surveys and divide the newly opened territory. This led to increased migration, especially of Visayans. Not content with the progress of settlement in Mindanao, and harassed by agrarian disorder in central Luzon, the government established the National Land Settlement Administration to encourage pioneer colonization and to help solve social and economic problems in central Luzon and the Visayan Islands.

Final judgment and critical evaluation of the activities of the N. L. S. A. are impossible because the work was interrupted by war before the objectives had been reached. It would be unfair to compare the number of settled families with the total amount of money expended, since large sums were spent on heavy equipment and machinery which was to be used in project after project. The N. L. S. A. had initial difficulties—what pioneer undertaking does not experience birth pains? It had, however, acquired valuable experience, developed a working routine, and assembled a staff which had become familiar with the problems of opening up and colonizing pioneer country, when the Japanese invasion disrupted everything.

The venture of the N. L. S. A. was a democratic experiment in a very new country. It profited by the enthusiasm and optimism of a young people enjoying for the first time the privilege of working out their own destiny, but it sacrificed some of the efficiency achieved by the Netherlands Indies for the sake of establishing democratic procedures. Its position in the limelight and its dependence upon the good will of the country's legislators made quick, spectacular results imperative.

The greater part of the N. L. S. A.'s achievements can be credited to the choice of General Santos as manager. This energetic and resourceful personality was a constant inspiration to his all-Filipino staff. Together they devoted all of their energies to making the N. L. S. A. a success.

The goal was to create a class of agriculturists who would be more than subsistence farmers working to cover their barest needs, as is the case with most rural Filipino families. It was to achieve this goal, that the N. L. S. A. allowed each settler a liberal amount of land to enable him to produce, in addition to his own food, cash crops such as cotton, rubber, coffee, peanuts, soy beans, and onions. Recognizing the great need for diversification in agriculture, the administration discouraged the cultivation of the usual Philippine cash crops (abaca, tobacco, sugar, and coconuts), encouraging instead the introduction of products in which the country was deficient.

Centralized marketing was a very important feature in the scheme of the N. L. S. A. This assured the settler much better prices than he could get from the middlemen. Liberal credit, low interest rates, and a long period of amortization effectively protected the settler against moneylenders and land-grabbers. The activities of these last two groups were further discouraged by the stipulation that a settler could not turn over his land to anyone but his descendants for a period of 10 years after he had been granted title. Past experience had shown that many pioneer home-

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steaders lost their land and years of work through their ignorance of land laws and the machinations of the usurers and land-grabbers. 654

Of cardinal importance were the measures taken by the N. L. S. A. to protect the health of its settlers. Success or failure depended largely upon the ability of the medical staff of the administration to fight disease, above all malaria, and to keep the death rate at a normal level. 166 311 241

The bringing together into agricultural villages of people from all parts of the islands served to break down provincial barriers and to create a feeling of nationhood. It was also instrumental in spreading Tagalog as the national language (Tagalog has been declared the national language and will be the language of instruction in schools after independence is achieved). [198]

Many of the difficulties in Koronadal developed from the haste of the N. L. S. A. in rushing the first settlers to Mindanao before the recommendations made by the experts in the survey party that had selected Koronadal could be properly studied. Moreover, no surveyors or road constructors had preceded these settlers. Indeed, when the administrative staff first arrived in Dadjangas it was accompanied by the initial group of colonists.

Glowing accounts appeared in the press about the bright future of the pioneers, and the impatient public in Manila expected dramatic results within a few months. When the reports from Koronadal showed that pioneering in Mindanao was not a bed of roses, pessimists referred to the N. L. S. A. as a failure, before giving General Santos and his men time to become familiar with their new task in Koronadal and with the obstacles that faced them there. [208]

Experts had stressed the absolute need of irrigation in Southern Koronadal; youthful optimism ignored the warning. The first settlers were placed in Lagao and saw their freshly planted gardens suffer severely from drought. At that moment General Santos and his office staff joined the settlers in the field and helped to dig a small irrigation system. Both the settlers and the staff of the N. L. S. A. showed true pioneer spirit! But it might well have been wiser to have placed the first settlers in Middle and Northern Koronadal, where irrigation systems were not required. That would have given an opportunity for an auspicious start there and at the same time in the Lagao district for surveying and for constructing an irrigation system before the first settlers were brought in.

Settlers had to wait so many months for their farm land that they were dependent upon support from the administration much longer than would have been the case had the land been surveyed and subdivided before their arrival. This defect was soon recognized, however, so that in the Mallig project in Luzon (see Appendix A) colonists were not to be admitted until all property lines had been definitely fixed and suitably marked.

The settlers at Lagao were encouraged to build houses larger and more expensive than the usual Filipino ones. In most pioneer communities the

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first houses are not much more than shelters, to be replaced by substantial dwellings once the pioneers have weathered the early years. The administration, however, had to impress visitors, and above all visiting legislators upon whose vote so much depended. Nothing strikes the casual observer so favorably as well built houses. He does not see the account of the settler in the files of the administration! It would, of course, have been more economical to insist upon smaller and less costly houses at the beginning and to leave it up to the settler to make enlargements and improvements when his financial resources would allow him to do so; but in Lagao, the point beyond which visitors seldom venture, political and psychological considerations forced a certain amount of display. In Middle and Northern Koronadal the houses were simpler in style and considerably cheaper.

In Mallig, in Luzon—another spot fairly accessible to visitors—I noticed the same tendency towards showmanship. "We will save on the houses in the barrios off the main highway" was the answer of the administrator there when I asked him if he could allow every settler as much credit for his house as he allowed those with home lots in the direct neighborhood of the administration building.

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The American has inculcated in the Filipino a great admiration for modern technology. In striving for quick results the N. L. S. A. relied heavily on mechanical equipment, all of which had to be imported from abroad. At times it seemed to me that the administration had been the victim of high-pressure salesmanship by agents for American farm machinery. In some instances machinery had been bought which was not even usable in Koronadal. Because of the generally prevailing high prices for imported American machinery, the low prices for Filipino agricultural products, and the low agricultural wages, modern farm machinery was not extensively used elsewhere in the Philippines. In 1941 the N. L. S. A. was without doubt the largest user of modern mechanical farming equipment in the islands. Since the average settler was inexperienced in handling the machines, the administration had to hire outsiders rather than settlers as mechanics and tractor drivers, thus adding to the cost of operation. The geographical isolation of Koronadal also made the machinery division expensive to operate. An unusually large stock of spare parts had to be kept on hand in order to prevent long delays in making repairs and replacements. Indeed, this tendency of relying heavily on imported equipment that could be operated only by specially trained men made Koronadal anything but self-sufficient as far as labor was concerned.

According to the plans of the N. L. S. A., the machinery was to be used only during the initial stage of a settlement project in order to help the peasants bring their land under cultivation. After that the equipment was to be transferred to a new project and the settlers were to rely on the old standby of the Filipino farmer—the carabao. In 1940 and 1941 there was a great demand for carabaos in Koronadal, and it seemed more difficult to purchase good work animals than tractors.

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Although the administration tried to remedy defects in its work wherever it recognized them, in some instances a lack of skilled technical personnel caused bottlenecks that slowed progress. Yet, on the whole, the few defects appear unimportant beside the commendable features of the N. L. S. A.'s activities.

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Chapter VI

OVERCROWDED JAVA

161 Java and Madura suffer from acute population pressure. The latest census of the Netherlands Indies, held October 7th and 8th, 1930, showed 40,891,000 Indonesians[1] on an area of 131,973 square kilometers in those islands. The average density of population was nearly 310 persons per square kilometer, if only Indonesians are taken into account, or 316 persons if non-Indonesian groups are included. A census had been planned for 1940, but it was cancelled because of the war. Having no indication that the rate of growth during the period from 1930 to 1940 would have differed from that of the previous decade, officials estimated that Java's population had probably increased to 48 million by 1940. If this rate of growth had been uninterrupted by war we might assume that there would have been a population of nearly 50 million in 1945, or a density of about 380 persons per square kilometer.

The Growth of Population

During the eighteenth century the population of Java seems to have been kept more or less stationary by internal wars, epidemics, the severe oppression of the people by their own princes as well as by the Dutch East India Company, and the general insecurity.[2] In 1795 the total population was estimated at 3,500,000;[3] in 1815 it had grown to 4,500,000;[4] during the next 30 years it more than doubled and by 1845 had reached 9,400,000. In 1880 it had again more than doubled, approximating 19,540,000, and the estimated total in 1940 is slightly more than twice that of 1880. Table XXII summarizes the population growth of Java and Madura and gives the average rate of yearly increase for the various periods.

This growth of population in Java since the beginning of the nineteenth century has been truly remarkable. Today Indonesians are ten to eleven times as numerous there as they were under the governorship of Sir Stamford Raffles during the British interregnum from 1811 to 1816. The growth set in when some of the repressive factors had been removed and all of Java had been brought under a strong and efficient central government. Boeke points out that the increase in the population of Java under the culture system began after "the last Java war [1825–1830] had been con-

162 Note: Tables XXI–XLVII are in Appendix C, p. 253 ff.

[1] The Indonesians of Java and Madura are composed of three main groups in the following proportions as of 1930: Sundanese (20.7 per cent) principally in West Java, Javanese proper (65.6 per cent) principally in central Java, and Madurese (10.5 per cent) in East Java and Madura. All are often loosely referred to as Javanese.

[2] Raffles: The History of Java, 1817, Vol. 1, pp. 66–73.

[3] Bleeker: Nieuwe bijdragen, 1870, p. 7. In 1802 Engelhardt also estimated Java's population at 3,500,000.

[4] Raffles: *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 65.

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[i.e., growth of Javanese population since the beginning of the 19th century. -- Analyst]

cluded; the Western administration penetrated the interior; the division of the duties in respect to the culture service once more stimulated the desire for larger families."[5] This growth has slowed down somewhat in the present century. The exceptionally low rate of increase in the interval between 1905 and 1920 was partly a result of the bubonic plague but more especially of the influenza epidemic in 1918 and 1919; the latter took the lives of more than a million persons.

A similar increase in population in Western Europe and in Japan arose from changes in the economic and social structure; there the Industrial Revolution led to a growing urbanization and drew an ever-increasing proportion of the population into non-agricultural pursuits. In Java, however, the growth was not accompanied by such changes. Instead, the great mass of the people remained dependent upon agriculture and age-old village industries for subsistence and when the importation of manufactured articles caused a decay of even the native crafts and home industries, the families previously dependent on these skills were forced into agriculture. In recent years, however, Indonesian native crafts and home industries have seen something of a revival.

In 1816 Raffles estimated "the quantity of land in cultivation to be to the land still in a state of nature as one to seven."[6] Since then the forest has shrunk steadily under the axes of increasing numbers of peasants in need of more and more agricultural land. This is revealed in the statistics of the land tax. In 1882 the government collected land taxes on 2,608,054 hectares, in 1922 on 5,967,427, in 1930 on 6,623,638, and in 1938 on 6,942,137 hectares.[7] Yet the fact that the number of landowners who had to pay land taxes increased at a faster rate than the area subject to this tax indicates that the average amount of land per landowner was declining. In 1922 the average amount of land per taxpaying landowner stood at 1.15 hectares, but in 1938 it had shrunk to 0.86 hectare.

During the ten-year period from 1928 to 1938 the total area cultivated by Indonesians was enlarged by 4 per cent, yet between 1930 and 1940 the Indonesian population of Java is estimated to have grown by 20 per cent. In one case, the population of a district, Kebonongan, in the regency of Bantoel, Jogjakarta, is reported to have increased by 15 per cent between October 1930 and January 1940, but the area cultivated by the peasants expanded by only 4.2 per cent. In 1930 Kebonongan had a density of 840 persons per square kilometer and in 1940, of 961 persons.[8] These

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5 Boeke: The Structure of Netherlands Indian Economy, 1942, p. 159.

6 Raffles: *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 71.

7 These data do not include the principalities of central Java. The publications giving the statistics for 1930 and 1938 also report the area subject to the land tax in the principalities, where the totals for 1930 and 1938 are 7,25,,469 hectares and 7,612,188, respectively. The data for 1882 and 1922 are from *Statistisch jaaroverzicht van Nederlandsch-Indië 1929*, 1930, p. 241. The figure for 1930 is from *Indisch verslag 1931*, 1932, Vol. 2, p. 237. That for 1938 is from *Indisch verslag 1939*, 1940, Vol. 2, p. 248.

8 Jonkers: Monographie van het landrentedistrict Kebonongan (ms. dated 1940), p. 22.

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311 figures show that the increase in population is only partly compen-
161 sated for by an expansion in the agricultural area at the disposal of the Indonesian peasant. The disparity in growth was especially great in the days of the culture system, under which the peasants were obliged to cultivate certain crops for the government on one-fifth of their land. At that time the people had no interest whatsoever in enlarging the area under cultivation, since the newly cleared land would also have come under the culture system and would only have increased their burden.

311 There is a limit beyond which the cultivated area cannot be enlarged at the expense of the forest cover without serious consequences. This limit has already been passed in Java, where the natural vegetation consists of forest. Foresters have estimated that 30 per cent of the land should be forest-covered in order to protect the water supply, so vital to the *sawahs* of the island. Instead, forests occupy only 23 per cent of the land. [185] The Forestry Service has found it necessary in a number of instances to take land out of the control of Indonesian communities and under great difficulties to reforest it because it had become subject to serious erosion and a menace to adjacent land.[9]

Densities of Population

161 Java has thus become one of the most densely populated agricultural areas in the world, rivaled in this respect only by some districts in China, parts of the Ganges Valley, and the Nile Valley. There is considerable unevenness in the distribution of population, the densities ranging all the way from 20 to more than 1,600 persons per square kilometer. Table XIII gives the densities in 1930 in the residencies of the three provinces and the two principalities of Java. Most of West Java and East Java is less densely settled than the middle part of the island.

161 The Netherlands colonial administration divided Java into some 400 dis-
311 tricts, for which the census of 1930 gives separate figures of density. These show that there is a close relationship between the type of soil (as well as the climate and the modes of land use) and the density of population. The richer the soil, the higher the yields, the percentage of cultivated land, and the density. Java's most fertile soils are found around young volcanoes: on the slopes, at the bases, and in the basins of the rivers that get water and silt from these volcanoes[10] (Map, Fig. 1A). Volcanic ash soils are so extraordinarily rich that the peasants risk the danger of new eruptions in order to cultivate the slopes as high up as possible. The higher parts of the slopes are less densely settled than the plains below only because of the difficulties in bringing steep slopes under cultivation.

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161 [9] A commission investigating the land rights of Indo-Europeans in 1937 estimated that there were about 300,000 hectares of arable land still available in Java, sufficient to take care of two-fifths of an annual increase in population of 500,000 for a period of 7 years, or of a total increase at this annual rate for 3½ years.

[10] Mohr: "The Relation between Soil and Population Density," 1938, p. 479.

[See p. 10, Cat. 116 --Analyst]

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

Fig. 120 -- Map of Java showing relief. (Reproduced through the courtesy of the Geographical Review.)

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FIGS. 120 and 121—Map of Java showing relief and map showing the residencies and principalities, the important towns, and the chief roads and railroads as of 1925. (Reproduced through the courtesy of the *Geographical Review*.)

[See p. 163(A), category 116 - Analyst]

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As we pointed out in the discussion of the density of population in the Philippines, the ratios between population and cultivated area are of greater significance than are the figures of average density based on the total area. In Java and Madura there was an average of 535 persons per square kilometer of cultivated land in 1930 (Table XIII). With the excep-

TABLE XIII—JAVA AND MADURA: DENSITIES OF INDONESIAN POPULATION, BY RESIDENCIES, 1930

RESIDENCY	DENSITIES Per sq. km. of total area	Per sq. km. of cultivated land*	Per sq. km. of *sawah*
West Java	*244*	*496*	*1,038*
Bantam	130	383	886
Batavia	329	452	784
Buitenzorg	191	551	1,205
Priangan	253	506	1,544
Cheribon	381	569	851
Middle Java	*396*	*570*	*1,261*
Banjoemas	386	562	1,635
Pekalongan	468	759	1,310
Kedoe	457	548	1,485
Semarang	372	537	1,047
Djapara-Rembang	311	466	961
Jogjakarta	*492*	*615*	*2,351*
Soerakarta	*425*	*554*	*1,328*
Klaten	535	769	1,569
Soerakarta	379	475	1,217
East Java	*314*	*531*	*1,364*
Bodjonegoro	291	469	805
Madioen	314	459	1,198
Kediri	351	605	1,597
Soerabaja	540	762	1,198
Malang	310	551	1,769
Besoeki	206	531	1,341
Madura	359	443	2,647
JAVA AND MADURA	*316*	*535*	*1,248*

*This category is described in the source as "Native Lands."
Source: Data for West Java from *Volkstelling 1930*, Vol. 1, Table 8; data for Middle Java and the principalities from *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, Table 9; data for East Java from *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, Table 8.

tion of Bantam, all the residencies in Java had a much larger number of people per unit of cultivated land in 1930 than had the Philippines as a whole in 1939 (405 persons per square kilometer of cultivated land), although no residency in Java had so high a density as the province of Ilocos Sur in Luzon, which claimed 804 persons per square kilometer of cultivated land. Klaten, with a density of 769 persons, came nearest to this in

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Java. All but one of the residencies of Middle Java exceeded the average for Java as a whole; in West Java only two out of five, and in East Java only three out of seven, residencies surpassed Java's over-all average density. 311 161

The ratio of persons to cultivated land varies greatly from district to district; the highest densities in 1930 were found where a large proportion of the area is irrigable and therefore suitable for the cultivation of wet rice and where European plantations regularly leased irrigated land from the peasants for the cultivation of sugar cane and tobacco. Those districts having little irrigable land are usually only thinly settled. Table XXIII lists six rural districts in Java, three of which had the highest, and three the lowest, densities in 1930. A little more than 60 per cent of the cultivated area in the districts of Adiwerno, Ploembon, and Wiradesa was irrigated for the cultivation of wet rice. As we have seen, this type of cultivation requires a great deal of labor and produces comparatively high yields. On the other hand, in Poenoeng, although nearly 93 per cent of the soil was in use, only 5 per cent was irrigated; hence the density was low. In Java the density of population in a district depends to a large extent upon the mode of land use rather than upon the amount of land in use.

Effects of Overpopulation

The extraordinary increase in population was neutralized only in part by various countermeasures: extensive forest clearing and cultivation of virgin land (the *tegalan* area alone increased from 355,000 hectares in 1875 to 4,503,000 hectares in 1938); intensification in land use (i.e., the conversion of tegalans into sawahs wherever possible); improvement of Indonesian-built irrigation systems and the construction of new ones under government auspices; improvement in yields through better methods of cultivation and the use of selected seeds; and employment opportunities offered by Western plantations. In spite of all of these measures, the growth of population resulted in an increased parcelling of the land into dwarf holdings, in the accumulation of large holdings wherever land-tenure practices allowed it, in the formation of a class of landless agricultural laborers, in widespread indebtedness, in the growth of tenancy, in the decline of rural incomes, and in poverty, malnutrition, and food shortage; briefly, in overpopulation with all its frightful implications. 161 311 471 427 511

Since Indonesian society in Java is essentially agrarian, the possession of land, especially of sawah, is of the greatest importance; without land the Javanese villager has no social standing. This emphasis is reflected in the structure of the Javanese *desa*, which includes a number of classes based on landownership. First comes the group of villagers who own both fields and garden land plus a house on the latter. They are known as *gogols*. The gogol is a "full peasant" in the sense that he has all the rights that a member of the desa may have and also shares in all the burdens. In the next lower group are the *stengah gogols*, or "half peasants," who own garden land and houses, but no fields. The *menumpangs* are villagers who own houses, 565 [554] 423 621

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565 which, however, stand on the garden land of others. Still lower in rank are
423 the villagers who live in others' houses and own neither house nor land of
621 any kind. These are called *kumpulans* or *nusups*.[11] The numerical proportion of these various groups is a good indication of the crowded condition of a village. If a desa or a whole district is divided into small holdings and has a large number of setengah gogols, menumpangs, and nusups, we may assume that the population exceeds the carrying capacity of the land. The excess population must rely in part or wholly upon wages for their livelihood.

The Parcelling of the Land

423 Peasant holdings in Java are small. In 1938 the average area was only
511 0.86 hectare per taxpaying landowner. This included both sawah (0.36 hectare), and tegalan and garden land (0.50 hectare). The average size of the holdings, as we have seen, has apparently been steadily declining.

Unfortunately we lack recent detailed data on the size and ownership of peasant holdings in Java as a whole and must rely on general observations and on case studies of specific districts and desas. Investigations held in 1903,[12] however, show that in Java, of all those holding land in individual hereditary possession or having fixed shares of communal land, 70.9 per cent had less than 0.7 hectare, another 18.2 per cent from 0.7 to 1.4 hectares, 7 per cent from 1.4 to 2.8 hectares, and only 3.9 per cent had more than 2.8 hectares. In Bantam and Semarang more than 80 per cent of all peasant holdings were less than 0.7 hectare in size. Table XXIV shows that even in 1903 Java was a country of dwarf holdings. According to a Javanese popular saying, a family requires one *bouw* (0.709 hectare) of sawah or two bouws of tegalan in order to make a fair living without having to look for supplementary income.[13] As early as 1903 a large percentage of the peasants in Java did not have this amount of land, and a sizable landless class already existed. According to a study by Burger comparing conditions in 1868 and 1928, in the desa of Pekalongan, regency of Pati, residency of Djapara-Rembang, the average peasant-proprietor had from about 0.7 to 1.1 hectares of sawah in 1868 but only 0.5 hectare in 1928.[14]

Burger gives the following distribution of sawah area, for 1929, in the desa of Ngablak, also in the regency of Pati, where 63 per cent of all

[11] The terminology is not uniform throughout Java. The gogol, for example, is also known by such terms as *baku*, *sikep*, *kulie*, *kulie kentjeng*, and *wong kentjeng*.

[12] Hasselman: Algemeen overzicht van de uitkomsten, 1914, Appendix R. These figures do not include the principalities of central Java. The Javanese have the following types of land tenure: (a) registered property (*agrarisch eigendom*) (b) individual hereditary possession (*erfelijk individueel bezit*); (c) communal ownership with fixed shares and the same partakers (*communaal bezit met vaste aandeelen en steeds dezelfde deelgerechtigden*); (d) communal ownership with fixed shares but changing partakers (*communaal bezit met onveranderlijke aandeelen maar wisselende deelgerechtigden*); (e) communal ownership with periodic redistribution (*communaal bezit met periodieke verdeeling*); (f) land set aside for village officials (*ambtsvelden*).

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 296.

[14] Burger: "Rapport over de desa Pekalongan," [1929], p. 8.

1 [see p. 255 Category 1/8 -- Analyst

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sawah owners possessed less than about 0.7 hectare and 37 per cent less than about 0.3 hectare:[15] 423 511

Less than 0.142 hectare		22 owners
0.142 or more but less than	0.284 hectare	76 "
0.284 " " " " "	0.426 "	27 "
0.426 " " " " "	0.568 "	19 "
0.568 " " " " "	0.709 "	23 "
0.709 " " " " "	1.42 hectares	46 "
1.42 " " " " "	2.13 "	18 "
2.13 " " " " "	2.84 "	13 "
2.84 " " " " "	4.26 "	11 "
4.26 " " " " "	7.09 "	7 "
7.09 or more	"	1 "
		263 "

In the district of Kebonongan in the principality of Jogjakarta each sawah owner had an average of about 0.3 hectare in 1939.[16] Many villagers possessed garden land only. In 1939 Kebonongan had 17,702 adult men, of whom 10,901 owned land. Of these latter, 6,862 were gogols, 3,706 were stengah gogols, and the remaining 333 had plow land but lived on others' garden land. The respective numbers of menumpangs and nusups were not reported.[17] 423 565 162

Table XIV gives the ratios between gogols and stengah gogols in the districts of the regency of Toeloengagoeng, Kediri Residency, in the province of East Java.

Landless Agricultural Laborers

The census of 1930 gives no data that throw light on the size of the landless population. Hasselman, however, reports the number of landowners and of adult men without land in 1903 (Table XXV). The ratio of landowners to landless men was especially unfavorable in the Preanger highlands, Banjoemas, Pekalongan, Kedoe, and Madioen. Since then the number of viliagers who own no land has grown considerably. In the district of Adiwerno, which in 1930 had the highest population density in Java, only 21.8 per cent of the working population was engaged in native agriculture, 25.5 per cent in industries, and another 28.9 per cent was engaged in "insufficiently described occupation," which in most cases means that the individuals were unskilled laborers who worked wherever they could find employment, usually upon sugar plantations. This part of the rural population has been seriously affected by the decline of Java's sugar industry since 1931. The landowners who could no longer lease their land 423 464 249 [162]

[15] Idem: "De desa Ngablak," 1933, p. 232.
[16] Jonkers: *op. cit.*, p. 22.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 22. In Kebonongan the gogol is known as kulie kentjeng, the stengah gogol as *kulie karangkopek*, and the owner of plow land without garden land as *kulie gundul*.
[see p. 256, Cat. 116 -- Analyst]

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423 to sugar mills have been partly compensated by having all their land at
464 their own disposal instead of having only two-thirds or three-fourths as
249 before; but those Indonesians without land have had great difficulty in
[465] finding other employment. Moreover, the wages paid by the sugar industry decreased markedly from 1929 to 1937. In 1928 the industry paid an average wage bill of 545.14 guilders per hectare of sugar-cane land, but in

[565 162] TABLE XIV—EAST JAVA: NUMBER OF GOGOLS AND STENGAH GOGOLS IN THE REGENCY OF TOELOENGAGOENG, KEDIRI RESIDENCY, BY DISTRICTS, 1939

DISTRICT	GOGOLS (*a*)	STENGAH GOGOLS (*b*)	RATIO OF (*a*) TO (*b*)
Toeloengagoeng	6,910	8,322	0.8: 1.0
Ngoenoet	12,811	7,138	1.8: 1.0
Tjampoerdarat	10,099	4,334	2.3: 1.0
Kalangbret	8,210	5,550	1.5: 1.0

Source: Soenario: "Onderzoek naar de praktische mogelijkheden van schuldbevrijding," 1940, p. 97. Ratios computed by the author.

1937 a bill of only 178.49 guilders. In 1928 the Indonesians received slightly more than 106 million guilders in wages and in 1936 only 7½ million guilders. In 1937 economic recovery brought a sudden extension of the area planted in sugar cane and doubled the total sum of wages paid, although the wage rates were lower than in 1936. Table XXVI[1] shows payments by the sugar industry to the Indonesian population of Java from 1920 through 1938. [1 [see p. 256, cat. 116 -- Analyst]

TENANCY

423 In the Philippines the population problem was aggravated by a marked concentration of landownership in the hands of a few and by widespread tenancy. Java differs greatly from the Philippines as regards both the proportion of the total area owned by large landed proprietors and the size of the areas held by them individually. There are no large contiguous landed estates owned by Indonesians and worked with wage laborers that would correspond to the large *haciendas* in the Philippines. However, in Java, there are persons who, by Indonesian standards, own considerable
[454] quantities of land in scattered parcels. Land is sought as an investment by Indonesians of means, especially government officials and those who live in the urban centers of Java.[18] In villages where communal landownership in one form or another still prevails, there is no possibility of building up large holdings. The same is true of villages that allow the sale of land to outsiders only when no one in the village will buy it. A concentration of land in the hands of wealthy individuals is found in West Java and especially in the former Preanger regencies, where as early as 1903 11.3 per cent of all landowners had more than 2.84 hectares. Of the 150 Indonesians owning more than 25 hectares in 1903, 71 were living in the Preanger regen-

[18] Boeke: The Structure of Netherlands Indian Economy, 1942, p. 42.

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cies. Meyer Ranneft and Huender have compared the number of Indonesian landowners possessing more than 17.7 hectares (25 bouws) in 1905 and 1925 (Table XXVII) and found that there was a great increase, especially in the residencies of West Java and in Besoeki in East Java. 423

The most effective barrier against a concentration of landholding was the Agrarian Decree of 1870, which forbade the purchase of agricultural land by any but Indonesians. This prevented the Chinese and Europeans from becoming landed proprietors living on the labor of Indonesian tenants. The Indonesian, who is always in need of cash, would have sold his land long ago for a mere pittance had it not been for this agrarian legislation. Some non-Indonesians, however, have acquired land in the name of their Indonesian spouses, though such methods are illegal. 423 563 656

As it is, impecunious Indonesians may lose their land to well-to-do Indonesians who make loans against mortgages on sawahs. Interest rates are high, so that frequently the borrowers are unable to repay the loans; then the land becomes the property of the mortgage-holder. 426

Like most large landowners of Southeastern Asia, those of Java lease their land in small parcels to tenants on a share basis. We have no recent data on the extent of tenancy in Java. In 1905, 5.3 per cent of all persons engaged in native agriculture owned no land but, instead, were working the land as tenants. Table XXVIII gives data on the frequency of tenancy at that time in the various residencies. It would appear to have been relatively frequent in West Java and Jogjakarta, but less frequent elsewhere. A survey made in 1926 shows that in the residencies of Bantam, Cheribon, Semarang, Kedoe, Soerabaja, and Madura most of the peasants owned the land they were tilling; in the residencies of Pekalongan, Madioen, Kediri, and Pasoeroean tenancy existed to a moderate degree, and in the residencies of Batavia, Priangan, Banjoemas, and Besoeki it was relatively widespread.[19] 427

The terms of tenant contracts vary greatly and depend upon such local conditions as the pressure of population, the fertility of the soil, and especially upon custom. Frequently the tenant gets one-third of the rice crop if the land produces high yields, one-half if the fertility is only average, and two-thirds if the fertility is low. The Javanese term for the half-and-half division is *maro*, or *maron*, and for the two others, *mertelu*.[20] Contracts vary also in regard to the division of expenses and tax-payments between landowner and tenant. Sometimes the landlord must supply his tenant with seeds, a work animal, and tools, as well as with some cash or foodstuff to be paid back with high interest at the time of the harvest. In such cases the tenant is really a sharecropper. His share is smaller than is that of a tenant who has no such need of backing from the landlord.

In those sections of Java where the sawahs are owned communally one finds a group of tenants under a different form of contract. These work 427 423

19 Scheltema: Deelbouw in Nederlandsch-Indië, 1931, p. 273.

20 For a detailed discussion of tenant contracts see Scheltema's excellent study.

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423

their own land on a share basis for a limited period. The small peasant is habitually in need of cash to pay his taxes or to meet extraordinary expenses. Those who own their land may mortgage it, but those who hold a share of communal land do not have that right. Their only way of raising cash is to lease their land to someone in the village or to an outsider by the

[631]



FIG. 122—Map showing the chief administrative divisions of Java and Madura, Bali and Lombok, and southern Sumatra. The divisions designated by the letters and figures are as follows:

A—PROVINCE OF WEST JAVA
1. Residency of Batavia
2. " " Bantam
3. " " Buitenzorg
4. " " Priangan
5. " " Cheribon

B—PROVINCE OF MIDDLE JAVA
1. Residency of Semarang
2. " " Pekalongan
3. " " Banjoemas
4. " " Kedoe
5. " " Djapara-Rembang
6. " " Soerakarta
7. " " Klaten
8. " " Jogjakarta

(*Continued on the opposite page*).

season or the year for a cash rent paid in advance. The payment is sometimes made one or two years before the land is actually put at the disposal of the lessee. The latter in most cases does not intend to cultivate the land himself but employs the lessor as tenant, or, rather, subtenant—that is, he subleases the land back to the owner on a share basis and takes one-

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half, or even five-sevenths, of the crop. The lessees are usually rice merchants, who by this method assure themselves of a cheap supply of rice, or occasionally individual investors, who in this way obtain high interest rates. The longer in advance the rent is paid, the lower it is.

By this roundabout arrangement the landowner, or to be more correct

[631]



Fig. 132—(*Continued from the opposite page*).

C—Province of East Java
1. Residency of Soerabaja
2. " " Bodjonegoro
3. " " Madioen
4. " " Kediri
5. " " Malang
6. " " Besoeki
7. " " Madura

D—Residency of Bali and Lombok
1. Afdeeling (Division) of Singaradja
2. " " " South Bali
3. " " " Lombok

E—Residency of the Lampoeng Districts (Sumatra)
1. Afdeeling of Teloekbetoeng

Source: Area Designation Map prepared by the U. S. Army Map Service for its Gazetteer to Maps of Java, Madura, and Bali (June 1944). (Reproduced through the courtesy of the Army Map Service.)

the landholder, becomes a subtenant on his own land for a limited period, whereas the lessee—since he leases the land back to the owner—functions as landlord. Like an ordinary landlord, he shares in the risk of a low yield or a crop failure just as much as in the profit of a bumper crop. This system represents a buying in advance of a share of a future crop of which the

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[i.e., contracts whereby a lessor becomes a sub-tenant on his own land.--Analyst]

yield is unknown. Because of the risk involved, the rent is rather low, yet the landholder is forced to accept it because of his need for cash.[21] Contracts of this kind are usually unregistered and therefore escape the knowledge of the authorities unless special surveys are made to investigate the degree of indebtedness of the peasants. Such a survey was made at the beginning of 1939 in the regency of Toeloengagoeng, residency of Kediri, in the province of East Java (Table XXIX); it brought to light the fact that a high percentage of the peasants were in debt. They had leased their land and were working it as subtenants, except when the lessees were tilling it themselves. Out of a total of 2,740 landholding peasants, 74.2 per cent had leased some of their land in order to obtain cash and as many as 33.9 per cent had been forced to lease all of their land. In 3 out of the 21 villages included in the survey every landholder had leased either a part, or all, of his land, and in 9 of the 21 villages 90 per cent or more of all landholders had gone into debt in this fashion.

The Leasing of Land to Sugar Plantations

Similarly in those sections of Java where Western-owned sugar and tobacco plantations operated, the peasants became accustomed to leasing land to them against cash rent payable in advance. In contrast, however, to the Indonesian lessee just described, the plantations themselves made use of the land, although they were willing to hire the peasants as workers. In spite of the fact that the average peasant in Java dislikes to work as a laborer, he was often forced to do so, for the rent that he received a year and a half in advance had usually been spent by the time the plantation began to cultivate his land.

Thus, because of his financial weakness and proverbial need for cash, the peasant was hardly in a position to bargain with the plantation, and as the plantation was ready to pay the rent well in advance of occupation the peasant was confronted with an irresistible temptation. Often the individual peasant had no direct contact with the plantation that leased his land. This was the case in all those villages that still had communal landownership with periodic redistribution of sawahs. In 1932, 8.8 per cent of all sawahs were held in this form of tenure, and it was still found in the sugar districts of Java in 1941, although the government had favored replacing it by communal ownership with fixed shares, or, preferably, by individual hereditary possession; for when the land is redivided every year or every 3 years, as is frequently done, the peasant takes no interest in permanent improvements, since someone else would reap the benefit. But the sugar

[21] The cash rent for 0.7 hectare of sawah paid by the lessee for one wet season averages from 10 to 12 guilders if paid 2 years in advance of the season to which the lease applies, from 16 to 18 guilders if paid a year in advance, and from 20 to 25 guilders if paid at the beginning of the wet season. The average share paid to the lessee may be put at 20 piculs of paddy which has a value of 32 guilders; hence, a lessee who paid a cash rent of 20 guilders at the beginning of the season would receive an increment of 12 guilders, or 60 per cent of his investment, within 6 months.

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But the sugar

plantations preferred to negotiate land leases with one *lurah*,[22] or village head, rather than with several hundred individual peasants, for it saved a great deal of time and, moreover, the cost of such leases was less than that of many individual ones. The peasant who held his land in hereditary possession was often unwilling to lease it at the rate at which a lurah was ready to hand over the village land; the lurah was frequently swayed by the remuneration received from the plantation as a commission for the transaction. In desas with communal landownership the lurahs had great power, abuses of which were not uncommon. It was an easy matter in such desas for a lurah to crush a gogol who in the village assembly opposed the signing of a lease with a sugar plantation. To overcome these disadvantages to the peasant, many Netherlands officials struggled for a change in the system of tenure, but their efforts were openly, or more often secretly, opposed by the administrators of the sugar plantations and their faithful servants, the lurahs, for whom a change would have meant the loss of a good source of income.

427 423 622 661

In spite of this opposition, the Netherlands colonial administration, knowing the respective weakness and strength of the two sides, attempted to protect the peasant against abuses by keeping a watchful eye on all rental transactions. In each residency, in conformity with a government ordinance, the resident from time to time established minimum rent-rates for each class of sawahs. There were usually seven or eight classes, differentiated according to their fertility. Advance payments were subject to restrictive conditions, and the length of the lease was limited. Short leases of sawahs ran for 3½ years, long leases for 21½ years. The lessee could occupy only one-third of the village land at any one time; the other two-thirds had to be at the disposition of the peasants.

427 656 491

This relationship between the peasants and the great capitalistic enterprises was the subject of long and heated controversy among Dutch students of colonial affairs, for, although the plantation industry brought many advantages to Indonesian communities, there were also marked disadvantages associated with it. The government tried to hold the balance by protecting the Indonesian from the Western entrepreneur and at the same time taking measures to give the latter security in his investment. The fact remained, however, that the Indonesian who leased his sawah to the plantation was disadvantaged, since in most cases he could have earned more if he had worked it himself. Why, then, did he lease it? The simple answer has already been indicated: by leasing, he received the rent far in advance of the time when he would have been able to sell his own crop.[23]

The landless agricultural laborers in the sugar districts, on the other hand, benefited when the sugar plantations were working, since the wages

464 465 249

[22] The lurah and the other village officials, such as the *tjarik* or scribe, the *modin* or religious official, and the *kapetengan* or policeman, are elected, usually by the landowning villagers alone.

[23] Gonggrijp: Over de invloed van het westerse grootbedrijf, 1930, p. 14.

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JAVA
MADURA

464 465 249 paid by the plantations were higher than those paid by Indonesian employers.

Efforts to Relieve Population Pressure

168 311 At least 60 years ago Dutch students of colonial affairs began to express their fear of the specter of overpopulation in Java and Madura. It was believed by some even then that Java's soil was producing all that it possibly could. Since those days more intensive methods of land use, large-scale construction of modern technical irrigation systems, and extensions of the agricultural area have greatly enlarged the food production and hence the carrying capacity of the islands. But now the situation has become really serious. There is no longer room for large new irrigation projects that would make further intensification of cultivation possible, nor is there any longer any land to speak of that could be added to the area under cultivation. Double cropping is already being practiced to a remarkable degree: wherever possible, the Indonesian peasant today plants a dry-season crop in addition to the wet-season crop. In 1926 Java's crop area amounted to 131 per cent of the cultivated area (that is, sawahs and tegalans only, with garden land excluded); by 1936, it had grown to 142.4 per cent.[24]

654 262 511 In spite of strenuous efforts by the Agricultural Advisory Service and the Irrigation Service to increase the food production at the same rate at which the population increased, recent investigations reveal that the diet of the people of Java has definitely deteriorated in food value, if not in actual volume, in the course of the past few decades, and one may add that "the Javanese at no time had a diet which allowed of much curtailment."[25] Table XXX shows an irregular decline in the consumption of rice since 1913, and a great increase in that of cassava, which is markedly deficient in nutritive value. [See pp. 258-259, Category 116--Analyst]

168 511 The balance between population and means of support has become so unstable that it is in constant danger of being upset if the islands should experience a bad harvest or other catastrophe. Hart was of the opinion that overpopulation had existed for years in Java, but that at least until the invasion of 1942 the frugality of the people, the intensive and multiple efforts of the government, and good harvests had preserved the precarious balance.

168 654 No wonder that in recent years the Government of the Indies, as well as individual observers, has devoted a great deal of attention to the population problem. Whereas about forty years ago Van Deventer recommended "education, irrigation, and emigration," the remedies suggested today are "intensification of agriculture, industrialization, and emigration." The Agricultural Advisory Service is of the opinion that there is still room for some intensification of agriculture in Java with the help of better selection of seed, the use of green manure, the control of soil erosion, and other means discussed in Chapter III. The possibilities offered by industrializa-

[24] Hart: "Volkstal en bestaansmiddelen," 1937, p. 575.
[25] Idem: "Recent Development in the Netherlands Indies," 1942, p. 94.

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tion lie beyond the scope of this study and have been treated in recent works.[26] In this and the following chapter our principal concern is with the attempts of the Government of the Indies to relieve the pressure of population by the encouragement of migration from the overcrowded to the less densely populated districts within the island, and, particularly, of migration to the Outer Islands. 168 654 [166]

Although the peasants of Java are strongly attached to the soil, they have always migrated when the pressure became too great and when they knew of another area that seemed to offer relief. Raffles spoke of such internal migrations from Bantam, Batavia, Cheribon, Demak, and Banjoewangi to the Javanese native states: 166

> It was fortunate . . . that the native governments were less oppressive than the sway of their European conquerors, and that their states afforded a retreat from a more desolating tyranny. It has been ascertained, that, on the first establishment of the Dutch in the eastern part of the island, the inhabitants of whole districts at once migrated into the Native Provinces. Every new act of rigour, every unexpected exaction, occasioned a further migration, and cultivation was transferred to tracts which had previously scarcely a family on them. . . . During the administration of Marshall Daendels, in the years 1808, 1809, and 1810, nearly all the inhabitants of the province of *Demák*, one of the richest in the eastern districts, fled into the Native Provinces; and when an order was given for the rigid enforcement of the coffee monopoly, every district suffered in its population, in proportion to the extent of service levied upon it.[27]

We know that during the time of the culture system many peasants tried to escape the burden of the forced cultivation of money crops by fleeing into less accessible forest regions.[28] People from Bantam moved across the Sunda Strait into southern Sumatra.

The census of 1930 investigated for the first time the extent of movements of population in the Netherlands Indies and revealed considerable migration within Java as well as movements of people from Java to the Outer Islands. In contrast to the days of the East India Company when people fled from the coastal regions to the interior, recently migration within Java has been from the crowded interior to commercial centers on the coast. The cities of Batavia, Semarang, and Soerabaja in the residencies of the same names attracted large numbers of people because of the employment offered. Among the residencies of Java, Besoeki occupies a unique position, as nearly one-fourth of its population was born elsewhere and migrated to this residency, especially to the regencies of Djember and Banjoewangi. The construction of the railroad between Kalisat and Banjoewangi (about 1901) encouraged the migration from central Java. The

[26] Broek: Economic Development of the Netherlands Indies, 1942; Mitchell: Industrialization of the Western Pacific, 1942; Shepherd: Industry in Southeast Asia, 1942; Sitsen: Industrial Development of the Netherlands Indies, 1943.

[27] Raffles: The History of Java, 1817, Vol. 1, p. 65.

[28] De Vries: Landbouw en welvaart, 1931, Vol. 1, p. 100.

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166 coffee plantations also attracted a large number of people, who settled permanently in this residency. However, it is still thinly settled as compared with central Java.

166 162 The census returns of 1930 brought out the fact that the number of emigrants who had left the heavily populated residencies of Kedoe, Madioen, Kediri, and Madura and the principality of Jogjakarta and had migrated either to other residencies in Java or to the Outer Islands represented in each case 10 per cent or more of the population living in 1930 in those residencies and the principality (Table XXXI). The Madurese migration across the Strait of Madura from the island of Madura to East Java had been going on for such a long time that by 1930 only 45 per cent of the persons of Madurese culture and language were found in their homeland, whereas most of the others lived in the eastern corner of Java.[29] In 1930 Madurese composed 97.8 per cent of the population in the regency of Panaroekan, 98.3 per cent in the regency of Bondowoso, both in the residency of Besoeki, and 94.2 per cent in the regency of Kraksaan in the residency of Malang, all these regencies being located on or near the Strait of Madura. In the residency of Besoeki, as a whole, Madurese composed about two-thirds of the population. The people of Madura, however, have not yet begun to migrate on any large scale to the Outer Islands.

[29] Lekkerkerker: "Java's overbevolking," 1937, pp. 875–880.

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JAVA SUMATRA
[177]
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



An entire Javanese *desa* migrates to Soekadana colony, Residency of the Lampoeng Districts, Sumatra.

FIG. 123 (upper left)—Villagers, old and young, awaiting transportation at a railroad station in Java. (Courtesy of the Department of Economic Affairs.)

FIG. 124 (upper right)—Night on board ship between Java and Sumatra. (Courtesy of the Department of Economic Affairs.)

FIG. 125 (center left)—Approaching Teloekbetoeng at the head of Lampoeng Bay in southern Sumatra. (Courtesy of the Department of Economic Affairs.)

FIG. 126 (center right)—Leaving the South Sumatra Railroad. (Courtesy of the Department of Economic Affairs.)

FIG. 127 (lower left)—Boarding buses that take the migrants to the colony. (Courtesy of the Department of Economic Affairs.)

FIG. 128 (lower right)—Each settler is issued kitchen utensils and a bamboo signal drum. (Courtesy of the Department of Economic Affairs.)

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Indonesia OB1
JAVA
SUMATRA
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

FIG. 129 (upper left)—Rice bundles, earned as *heriam* by newly arrived Javanese colonists, lined up before the house of a prosperous *ama* whom the newcomers assisted. Gedongtataän, Residency of the Lampoeng Districts, Sumatra. (Courtesy of the Central Commission for Migration and Colonization of Natives.)

FIG. 130 (center left)—Cooking pots to be issued to new settlers. (Courtesy of the Department of Economic Affairs.)

FIG. 131 (lower left)—Distribution of seed rice to new settlers. Soekadana colony, Residency of the Lampoeng Districts, Sumatra.

FIG. 132 (upper right)—New settler clearing his farm lot. Belitang colony, Residency of [redacted]

FIG. 133 (lower right)—Weighing seed rice for new settlers. Soekadana colony, Residency of the Lampoeng Districts, [redacted]

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





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

FIG. 134 (upper left)—*Bedengs* (bunkhouses) awaiting new settlers. Soekadana colony, Residency of the Lampoeng Districts, Sumatra.

FIG. 135 (upper right)—Three weeks after arriving in the colony, a settler has made a small clearing and started a simple shelter. Belitang colony, Residency of Palembang, Sumatra.

FIG. 136 (center left)—Settler of one year's residence has started to expand his primitive shelter into a house. Toegoemoeljo colony, near Loeboeklinggau, Residency of Palembang, Sumatra.

FIG. 137 (center right)—One-year-old village, showing gardens surrounding houses; the adjoining forest has not yet been completely cleared for fields. Soekadana colony.

FIG. 138 (lower left)—Settler of two years' residence no longer needs to plant vegetables right up to his doorstep, as his field is now entirely cleared. Notice the bicycle, a luxury which the settler did not enjoy in Java. Toegoemoeljo colony.

FIG. 139 (lower right)—Well built house in old Javanese style with tiled roof, owned by a colonist of 10 years' residence. Gedongtataän colony, Residency of the Lampoeng Districts, Sumatra.

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FIG. 140 (upper left)—Site of a future village. The forest on both sides of the road must be cleared by settlers before they can build their houses and plant their gardens. Soekadana colony, Residency of the Lampoeng Districts, Sumatra.

FIG. 141 (upper right)—Three-year-old village. Settlers have cleared the forest and developed flourishing gardens. Toegoemoelio colony, near Loeboeklinggau, Residency of Palembang, Sumatra.

FIG. 142 (center left)—Clearing a heavily forested area for the *sawah* of a newly arrived Soekadana settler.

FIG. 143 (center right)—Sawahs, villages, and coconut groves have replaced the heavy jungle in the colony of Gedongtataän, Residency of the Lampoeng Districts.

FIG. 144 (lower left)—House of the agricultural adviser in Belitang colony, Residency of Palembang, Sumatra.

FIG. 145 (lower right)—Clinic of the Belitang colony.

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







FIG. 146 (upper left)—Distribution works at Trimoerdjo, the bed of the primary canal in the foreground. The inlets will regulate the flow in the secondary canals. Soekadana colony, Residency of the Lampoeng Districts, Sumatra.

FIG. 147 (upper right)—Argogoeroeh Weir, which dams the waters of the Wai Sekampoeng, the source of irrigation water for the Soekadana colony.

FIG. 148 (center left)—Floating dredge digging the main irrigation canal. The hull is made of cement. Belitang colony, Residency of Palembang, Sumatra.

FIG. 149 (center right)—Constructing an irrigation canal. Soekadana colony.

FIG. 150 (lower left)—Constructing a weir to dam the Soengai Klingi, the source of irrigation water for the Toegoemoeljo colony, near Loeboeklinggau, Residency of Palembang, Sumatra.

FIG. 151 (lower right)—Settlers of the Soekadana colony digging a secondary irrigation canal.

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[65] FIG. 152—Javanese colonists have been called together to witness the payment of the marga taxes. Toegoemoeljo colony, near Loeboeklinggau, Residency of Palembang, Sumatra.

FIG. 153—Panoeh of marga Proatin Lima and Javanese *kurahs* of Toegoemoeljo colony.

FIG. 154—*Desa* officials. The differently colored bands indicate the offices the men hold. The one in front is the kurah. Gedongtataän colony, Residency of the Lampoeng Districts, Sumatra.

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

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

This trail makes the Javanese story (commented).

FIG. 155—Rice stacked in the yard of a rice mill waiting to be threshed and milled. Gedongtataan colony, Residency of the Lampongs Districts, Sumatra.

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FIG. 156—Part of the gamelan orchestra presented to the Gedongtataan colony by His Highness Paku Buwono X, Susuhunan of Surakarta.

FIG. 157—A wayang kulit (shadow play) performance at Gedongtataan colony. The dalang (puppeteer) is a colonist.

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FIG. 158 (upper left)—"Colonization land is fertile" is the text of this postcard given to colonists who wish to send messages to relatives or friends in Java.

FIG. 159 (upper right)—"Migrate to Tanah Sabrang" is the title of a booklet for *lurah*, published in 1938 in an edition of 200,000 copies by the Central Commission. The figure depicts one of the beloved heroes of the Javanese *wayang kulit* (shadow play) dressed as a Javanese official.

FIG. 160 (lower left)—"Javanese People are already in Colonization Areas of Celebes" is the title of a booklet published in 1940 by Balé Poestaka, Batavia, for the Central Commission in an edition of 20,000 copies.

FIG. 161 (lower right)—"Go to the Colonies" is the title of a school booklet published in 1940 by Balé Poestaka for the Central Commission in an edition of 100,000 copies.

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Chapter VII

THE LAND BEYOND

The Outer Islands as Outlets for Java's Surplus Population

000 The overcrowded islands of Java and Madura are surrounded by the sparsely inhabited Outer Islands,[1] and nothing would seem more natural than to attempt to solve Java's problem of overpopulation with large-scale migration.

161 131 162 Demographically the Outer Islands present a sharp contrast to Java. They comprise 1,772,000 square kilometers, or 93.1 per cent of the total area of the Netherlands Indies; but in 1930 they contained only 18,247,000 Indonesians, or 30.8 per cent of the total Indonesian population of the Netherlands Indies. They had an average population density of 10.3 inhabitants per square kilometer, if only Indonesians are taken into account, and of 10.7 inhabitants if non-Indonesians are included.

Lacking data, we cannot trace the growth of population in the Outer Islands as far back as that of Java. Most of these areas came under full Dutch control in comparatively recent times. They were covered for the first time by the census of 1905, which reported a population of 7 million; by 1920 this had grown to about 14 million, and in 1930 to 18,247,000 inhabitants. The enumerations of 1905 and 1920 are not very reliable, however, and for the Outer Islands even the census of 1930 is incomplete, so that it is still too early to make any precise statement about the growth of population in these islands. We do know that between 1920 and 1930 the population there increased faster than that of Java, or at a rate of about 2.5 per cent a year. In 1941 the population was estimated to be 22 million; thus it is likely that the total had more than trebled since 1905.

Yet large sections of the Outer Islands are still thinly settled. Only in a few areas in northeastern Sumatra, Sumatra's West Coast, northern and southern Celebes, Bali, and Lombok is the density of population relatively high, but in none can it be compared with that in Java. About 77 per cent of the area of the Outer Islands has less than the average density of 10 persons per square kilometer. The differences in density of settlement among some of the larger political divisions are shown in Table XXXII and on the map (Fig. 163).

000 What is the reason for this enormous contrast between Java and the Outer Islands? Probably it may be attributed to the same close relationship that was stressed in our discussion of Java in Chapter VI between

NOTE: Tables XXI–XLVII are in Appendix C, p. 253 ff.

631 [1] The Outer Islands are divided administratively into the three "governments" of Sumatra, Netherlands Borneo, and the Groote Oost (Great East), each under a governor. The Groote Oost includes Celebes, the Lesser Sunda Islands, the Moluccas, and Netherlands New Guinea.

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density of population on the one hand and on the other, modes of land use and soil fertility as determined by climate and the type of soil.

In Sumatra only those sections that have soils derived from young volcanoes show a considerable concentration of people, such as the highlands on the border between the residencies of Palembang and Benkoelen, the Padang Highlands, and the Batak country in the neighborhood of Lake



FIG. 162—Location map showing the chief administrative divisions of the Outer Islands of the Netherlands Indies. For those of Java, see Fig. 122. The residencies designated by Roman numerals are as follows:

I—Atjeh
II—The East Coast of Sumatra
III—Tapanoeli
IV—Sumatra's West Coast
V—Benkoelen
VI—Riouw and Dependencies
VII—Djambi
VIII—Palembang
IX—The Lampoeng Districts
X—Bangka and Billiton
XI—West Borneo
XII—South and East Borneo
XIII—Bali and Lombok
XIV—Manado
XV—Celebes and Dependencies
XVI—Timor and Dependencies
XVII—The Moluccas

(Reproduced through the courtesy of the *Geographical Review*.)

Toba (Toba Meer). A similar situation is found in the island of Celebes where densities rise above 100 inhabitants per square kilometer in the young volcanic areas in the southwest, in the Minahasa region in the northeast, and in the country of the Toradjas in the central part of the island; whereas in the less fertile, non-volcanic sections of the island the density is less than 5 inhabitants per square kilometer. Neither Borneo nor New Guinea has a single young and active volcano (Fig. 1A), a fact that is reflected in the low density of population. Bali and Lombok, where there are a number of volcanoes, are the most densely inhabited islands outside of Java and serve as excellent illustrations of the relation between young volcanoes, with the resulting fertility, and concentrations of people.

The amount and distribution of rainfall also greatly affect the fertility of tropical soils, and hence population densities. Heavy rainfall at all times of the year, combined with high temperature, leaches the soil. Such rain-

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falls occur in large parts of Sumatra, Borneo, and New Guinea and help to account for the inferiority of their soils as compared with those of Java, where, especially in the middle and eastern sections, the rainfall is concentrated in the months of the west monsoon.

Since in large parts of the Outer Islands the land is not irrigable, it is unsuited for the cultivation of wet rice; yet it is generally the intensive

TABLE XV—THE OUTER ISLANDS: TOTAL AREA AND FOREST AREA, BY GOVERNMENTS

GOVERNMENT	TOTAL AREA (SQ. KM.)	FOREST AREA (SQ. KM.)	PER CENT OF FOREST AREA IN TOTAL AREA
Sumatra	474,000	292,000	62
Borneo	539,000	416,000	77
Groote Oost	759,000	499,000	66
Outer Islands	1,772,000	1,207,000	68

Source: Schokkenkamp: "De Boschexploitatie in Nederlandsch-Indië," 1941, p. 93.

cultivation of wet rice that supports dense rural populations in this part of the world.

Hence we may conclude that, because of their comparative infertility and limitations in modes of land use, the Outer Islands, except for a few places, will probably never be able to support so large a population per unit of area as Java.

Nevertheless, the Outer Islands have considerable possibilities of agricultural expansion, as much more land is still forest-covered than is necessary for the maintenance of the water supply and the control of soil erosion. The situation is not, however, so favorable as Table XV would seem to indicate. The "forest area" of 1,207,000 square kilometers includes not only primary forest but also extensive areas of *alang-alang*, ferns, second-growth forest, and bush vegetation—which are largely the result of the *ladang* culture discussed in Chapter II. Probably more than 90 per cent of the people inhabiting the Outer Islands are shifting cultivators, who require considerably more land per individual than do the peasants in Java who cultivate the same pieces of land year after year. Shifting cultivation is justifiable as long as the population remains small in numbers, land is plentiful, and the old ladangs have a chance to revert to forest and thus recuperate fully before they are used again for the production of a crop; but with a rapid growth of population and, above all, the introduction of money crops such as rubber, coffee, and coconuts into the economy of the ladang cultivators, the need for land greatly increases. Because of the need for land, the fallow period of abandoned ladangs in many districts has been shortened to such a degree that, notably in the Lampoengs and Palembang in southern Sumatra, exhaustion and erosion of the soil and a rapid spread of alang-alang are constantly reducing the area suitable for shifting cultivation.

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

FIG. 163—Density of population in the Netherlands Indies, by large administrative divisions, as recorded by the Census of October 7 and 8, 1930. Both Indonesians and non-Indonesians are included.

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000vation.[2] The time seems to have come for the shifting cultivators of Sumatra, Celebes, and some of the Lesser Sunda Islands to abandon their time-honored form of land use in favor of a more intensive form. This change becomes all the more urgent if the Outer Islands are to continue to receive a constant stream of peasants from Java.

Persons of Java Ancestry in the Outer Islands as Enumerated by the Census of 1930

166 In 1816 Governor Raffles predicted an overseas migration from Java to the Outer Islands when he wrote,

> Afterwards the immense tracts of unoccupied or thinly peopled territories on Sumatra, Borneo, and the numerous islands scattered over the Archipelago, may be ready to receive colonies, arts and civilization from the metropolis of the Indian seas.[3]

Since the days of Raffles this migration has been considerable. The full extent of the movement is unknown, as the only recorded migration aside from the migrations discussed in this chapter, was that of laborers going from Java to the East Coast of Sumatra or to other parts of the Outer Islands after 1911.[4]

166 The first attempt to obtain data on the extent of interisland migration was made in the census of 1930, which enumerated 825,000 Java-born
162 Indonesians in the Outer Islands. Many of these, especially the wage laborers, were without doubt sojourners who planned to return to the island of their birth. That others had settled down in *Tanah Sabrang*, or The Land Beyond, as the Javanese call the islands across the sea, becomes apparent when one compares the number of Java-born (825,000) with the total number of persons in the Outer Islands for whom Java was the land of ancestry (1,151,000). In 1930, 967,000 Javanese, 129,000 Sundanese, 16,000 Madurese, and 39,000 other Indonesians of Java ancestry were found in the Outer Islands.

In the past Sumatra attracted the bulk of the migrants leaving Java. Of the 825,000 Java-born Indonesians enumerated in the Outer Islands in 1930, 767,570 persons, or 92.2 per cent, lived in Sumatra (Table XXXIII). Of these latter, 462,360 persons, or about 60 per cent, were concentrated in the residency of the East Coast, where they formed 31.4 per cent of the population. So extensive had been the migration from Java to Sumatra that by 1930, among the Indonesian population of Sumatra, the total number of persons for whom Java was the land of ancestry was 1,046,000, or 13.5 per cent. In fact, the Javanese from central Java had become the third largest ethnic group in Sumatra, comprising 11.4 per cent of the total

2 Danhof: "Bijdrage," 1940; Vonk: "Systematisch beheer van het ladangareaal," 1937.
3 Raffles: The History of Java, 1817, Vol. 1, p. 71.
4 Pelzer: Die Arbeiterwanderungen in Südostasien, 19 5, pp. 97–108.

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

FIG. 164.—Agricultural colonies and areas under consideration for settlement in the Netherlands Indies, 1941. The numbered symbols indicate: 1—Agricultural colonies actually existing in 1941. 2—Areas approved by preliminary soil and irrigation surveys. 3—Areas rejected. 4—Areas visited by reconnaissance parties but not yet scheduled for irrigation survey. 5—Areas considered, but not yet surveyed by reconnaissance parties. (Based on data supplied by the Central Commission for the Migration and Colonization of Natives.)

[190]

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166 Indonesian population of that island; they were exceeded in number only
162 by the Minangkabaus (25.6 per cent) and the Bataks (15.8 per cent). On the other hand, the migration of Indonesians from Java to such islands as Borneo, Celebes, or New Guinea, had hardly begun by 1930.

Agricultural Colonization During the Experimental Period 1905–1931

The Founding and Early Development of Gedongtataän, 1905–1911

168 Although individuals had long been pointing out the need for an alleviation of Java's population problem, the situation did not receive official recognition until the beginning of the present century. After it had been admitted in the Speech from the Throne in 1901 that the condition of the native population in Java was unsatisfactory, the Minister of Colonies requested C. Th. van Deventer, whose famous article, "A Debt of Honor,"[5] had called attention to Java's misery, to propose ways of improvement, and it was then that Van Deventer put forward his formula of "education, irrigation, and emigration."

[735] At the same time the Government of the Indies, alarmed by reports of
168 overpopulation and poverty in the residency of Kedoe, authorized Assistant-Resident H. G. Heyting to study the question of the migration of
166 Javanese to the Outer Islands. Heyting began his survey in Kedoe and then, taking two assistant *wedanas*[6] and six villagers from Kedoe with him,
654 he went to Sumatra. For 3 months they traveled in the residencies of Palembang, Benkoelen, Sumatra's West Coast, and the Lampoeng Districts, searching for suitable colonization terrain. In December 1903 Heyting submitted a report in which he proposed five colonization projects in Java and six in the Lampoengs.[7] According to his plan, 22,940 families were to migrate within 10 years from Kedoe to the new colonies at an estimated cost of 7 million guilders. Heyting wanted to start with a nucleus of 500 families in each project. These families would receive full support from the government during the first pioneer year and would be followed in the second year by 100 families and in the third year by 200 families, the settling of which should not be quite so expensive as that of the nuclear families, since the earlier settlers could provide the newcomers with temporary shelter. Heyting also foresaw that each family brought to Sumatra at the expense of the government would attract related families and thus set in motion a spontaneous colonization.

168 The government considered Heyting's plans too ambitious and decided
166 to experiment on a much smaller scale in one area only. The selected
654 locality was Gedongtataän (Map, Fig. 164), a terrain in the Lampoengs
361

[5] Van Deventer: "Een eereschuld," 1899.

[647] [6] Wedanas and assistant wedanas are Indonesian officials of the Department of the Interior.

[7] "Schema van een emigratie-plan," unpublished.

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168 lying south of the Wai (river) Sekampoeng in the vicinity of a highway
166 running from Teloekbetoeng to Kotaägoeng. The area seemed to have
654 ample water and therefore to be suitable for the making of *sawahs*. With
361 an assistant wedana and two *mantris*[8] of the Irrigation Service, Heyting arrived in Gedongtataän in May 1905 to prepare for the first settlers. He had a small clearing made and sheds built to house them until they could construct their own homes.

Late in 1905 Heyting transferred the first group of colonists, consisting of 155 families, from Kedoe to Gedongtataän, where they founded the *desa* of Bagelen. The establishment of Gadingredjo, a second desa of 555 families, was authorized in March 1906. During 1907 and 1908 no new colonists came over from Java, but a third settlement was established in 1909, a fourth in 1910, and a fifth in 1911. Then new colonists were added to one or another of these five settlements.

166 The pioneers who were recruited between 1905 and 1911 received a
465 premium of 20 guilders a family before leaving Java and free transporta-
405 tion, which cost the government about 50 guilders a family, from their
654 homes to the settlement. While clearing the land and preparing the irriga-
tion systems they were paid 0.40 guilders a day for subsistence. In 1909 it was estimated that it cost the government 150 guilders to provide food for one family until it became self-supporting. In addition, the settlers were supplied with building and roofing material for their houses, worth 65 guilders. and tools, worth 13.50 guilders. The financial aid granted by the government thus amounted to approximately 300 guilders a family. Each family received about a hectare of land, made up of 0.7 hectare of sawah and up to 0.3 hectare of garden and dwelling-land in the village. If local
166 circumstances permitted, they were also given some *tegalan*. In his report
624 for 1903 Heyting wrote:
423
461

> Everyone who is familiar with Javanese conditions understands that colonization on a large scale has a chance of success only if the Javanese receive an area where, under their own leaders and administrative systems, they devote themselves quietly to agriculture as the mainstay of their livelihood.

He therefore persuaded village officials also to migrate from Kedoe to Sumatra, promising them that all their Javanese institutions would be preserved and that the sawah area would be held in communal ownership without periodic redistributions. Communal possession was considered by Heyting especially advantageous since it would make cooperation and group work necessary. As remuneration for his work, each village official was given a good-sized piece of land (*ambtsveld*) in addition to the normal amount that each settler received, and until the colonists were able to cultivate the ambtsvelden belonging to their desa officials, the latter were paid a small salary.

000 The colonization experiment was supervised by Heyting until the end

[8] A mantri is an Indonesian technical assistant.

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The colonization experiment was supervised by Heyting until the end of October 1906, when his successor, Van Dissel, continued along the lines that he had worked out. 166 654 165 464

By March 31, 1911, there were 4,818 Javanese in the four desas of Bagelen, Gadingredjo, Poerworedjo, and Wonodadi. According to Van der Zwaal these settlers had cost the government 750 guilders per family of five (or 600 guilders for a family of four). This statistical average cost per permanently settled family is twice that of the government outlay of 300 guilders to each migrating family; death and desertion and the cost of irrigation systems and administration account for the difference. The death rate was very high because of malaria and dysentery. Furthermore, many colonists had deserted to seek employment on plantations in the neighborhood.

Settlement Problems During the Phase of the Lampoengs Credit Bank 1911–1928

During the first 6 years of the colonization experiment the government continued its policy of paying a premium, the costs of transportation and of building material, and living expenses covering 2 years, while the settlers were constructing their homes and clearing the land. In March 1911 the government decided to revise its system of partly supporting settlers, by substituting loans for outright gifts. It established the People's Credit Bank of the Lampoeng Districts, the chief function of which was to finance Javanese colonization. Under the new plan the settlers received a premium of 22.50 guilders a family and free transportation. For the rest, they were entitled to borrow a maximum of 200 guilders a family from the People's Credit Bank at an interest rate of 9 per cent. The borrowed money was to be paid back within 10 years, and repayment was to begin in the third year. This sum was expected to take care of their subsistence during the first 2 years. After they had brought their land under cultivation they could borrow additional sums for the purchase of livestock, seeds, and tools, and for home improvements. This financial policy in the colonization work was continued until 1927. 654 166 425 652 426

One may question whether this departure from Heyting's plan improved matters. Both schemes were too generous with financial support. Moreover, the fact that the first settlers were not required to repay anything may have influenced later settlers not to take their loans too seriously. The Javanese villager was unaccustomed to working with bank credit and must have considered the government a very patient and lenient moneylender. In the first years, especially, the bank gave credit too easily, and the settlers failed to make the best use of it. According to reports, they lived and dressed better than ever before, but the consumption of alcohol spread among them, and 50 of them in 1916 were opium addicts. Unfortunately, no investigation was made as to the number who had been habitual consumers of alcohol, or opium, before their migration. Further reports of those years complain that many colonists had not been *tanis* in Java; they lacked initiative and required constant supervision.

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154 While the settlers were partly to blame for the slow progress of the
166 settlement, the administration, too, had its shortcomings. Although Hey-
312 ting had stressed the importance of irrigation in the early stages, no ex-
178 perienced irrigation engineers had been employed but instead only mantris of the Irrigation Service. Heyting had mistakenly believed that the Javanese were sufficiently skilled and familiar with the methods of irrigation to handle the problem without the help of trained engineers. We may venture the explanation that in the overpopulated areas of Java most of the sawahs had been laid out long ago; hence, although the people of the present generation in such districts may be excellent cultivators of sawah, they have had little or no experience in turning tegalans into sawahs. Because of this lack of expert knowledge, the irrigation system was far from satisfactory. Schalkwijk, the manager of Gedongtataän, reported in 1917 that many fields had too much, others, too little water. Furthermore, several villages had been laid out on low-lying land with the fields on higher ground. As a result, the villages were flooded and unhealthy during the wet season, while the rice fields suffered from a lack of water. It therefore became necessary to change the locations of villages and fields, as was done in the desas of Karanganjer, Tambahredjo, Poerworedjo, and Baledono. Unfortunately, such mistakes in the original planning were costly and retarding.

166 The failure to establish an efficient health service in the early years was
164 also a serious and costly matter. Until the end of 1914 there was only a
165 small, primitive hospital in the colony, and the death rate was high, because
744 of widespread malaria, hookworm, and dysentery. Only late in 1914 did the government appoint a doctor for the colony. He found that the deaths exceeded the births and that the growth of the colony depended entirely upon immigration. As a result of the health measures insisted upon by the doctor,[9] the death rate declined in 1915 and 1916, but during the influenza epidemic of 1918 and 1919 it reached new highs (Table XVI).

000 In the early years the administration tried to persuade other colonists

[9] Schalkwijk: "De kolonisatieproeven," 1918, pp. 423–425. He recommended (1) keeping a systematic death register; (2) arrangements with the Central Hospital at Tandjoengkarang for the hospitalization of all serious cases; (3) vaccination of all new colonists against smallpox, treatment of hookworm, and examination for intestinal diseases, malaria, anemia, tuberculosis, and leprosy—all this to be done before colonists were to be admitted to the settlement; (4) conference with health officials before a decision should be made on the location of a new desa; (5) supervision of the sale of rice (settlers frequently did not keep enough for their own needs); (6) improvement and extension of irrigation; (7) continuation of the anti-hookworm campaign; (8) fight against infectious intestinal diseases by improving the drinking water and insuring a proper disposal of feces: (a) construction of at least one well in each village—up to that time the colonists had obtained drinking water wherever rain water collected in depressions, as it had been the opinion of the European officials that the population did not feel the need of an elaborate and expensive drinking-water supply system and would not use it; (b) transfer to the hospital of all patients suffering from intestinal diseases, in order to prevent epidemics; (9) study of the problem of malaria and the distribution of quinine free of charge through the desa officials; (10) hospitalization of all persons infected with yaws.

[See p. 195; category 11b --Analyst]

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 In the early years 195

the administration tried to persuade other colonists 166
to take over the land and debts of deceased settlers. But this proved to be 426
nothing more than a juggling of the items in the balance sheet, since very

TABLE XVI—GEDONGTATAÄN COLONY: POPULATION AT THE END OF THE YEAR, AND BIRTH RATES AND DEATH RATES PER THOUSAND, 1910–1938 163 165

YEAR	TOTAL POPULATION	BIRTH RATE†	DEATH RATE‡
1910	4,818	*	*
1911	5,099	*	*
1912	6,251	*	*
1913	6,701	*	35.0
1914	6,930	*	43.7
1915	7,327	*	28.7
1916	7,677	*	[illegible].5
1917	7,888	*	[illegible].2
1918	8,903	*	54.3
1919	11,997	*	74.3
1920	16,349	*	42.6
1921	19,251	37.5	41.7
1922	19,554	42.2	31.9
1923	19,823	40.8	40.3
1924	20,144	36.0	27.2
1925	20,650	44.8	38.5
1926	21,234	36.9	25.7
1927	21,827	43.4	26.2
1928	25,090	41.2	23.9
1929	25,889	37.7	27.9
1930	28,345	36.8	19.7
1931	29,863	31.2	23.4
1932	32,465	30.0	37.9†
1933	31,965	30.0	26.5
1934	31,935	33.8	46.1†
1935	32,534	30.6	24.3
1936	33,374	34.9	24.8
1937	34,358	41.1	23.4
1938	35,350	39.3	21.0

* Data unavailable.
† These high death rates were caused by malaria epidemics among newly arrived colonists.
‡ Rates computed by the author.
Source: Data for 1910 through 1932 from Van der Zwaal: "De Javanenkolonies Gedong Tataän en Wonosobo," 1936, pp. 205, 206, and 208. Data for 1933 through 1938 from the second volume of the *Indisch Verslag* for each of the years from 1934 through 1939.

few of the settlers were able to pay off two accounts, and in the end the debts had to be written off.

The recruiting system, which was in charge of Indonesian civil service 000

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system, which was in charge of Indonesian The recruiting civil service officials in Java working through village heads, or *lurahs*, had its faults, especially in regard to the type of colonists selected. Many lurahs used this occasion to rid their villages of undesirable members, and of sick and aged people, who of course make poor pioneers. Believing that better settlers could be obtained by officers who had the interest of the colonies at heart, the manager of the Gedongtataän colony, accompanied by an as-

TABLE XVII—WONOSOBO COLONY: POPULATION AT THE END OF THE YEAR, AND BIRTH RATES AND DEATH RATES PER THOUSAND, 1922–1938

YEAR	TOTAL POPULATION	BIRTH RATE†	DEATH RATE†
1922	2,720	14.7	41.0
1923	4,288	14.0	72.0
1924	5,927	11.5	61.0
1925	5,558	16.6	41.0
1926	3,356	30.1	70.9
1927	3,337	35.4	56.6
1928	3,200	*	33.4
1929	3,310	10.0	22.4
1930	3,414	17.6	23.5
1931	3,438	[illegible]	25.0
1932	3,623	[illegible]	13.0
1933	3,644	30.7	10.1
1934	3,748	32.5	16.5
1935	4,648	34.3	26.2
1936	4,579	12.6	22.3
1937	4,807	30.2	10.4
1938	5,280	29.3	12.1

* Data unavailable.
† Rates computed by the author.
Source: Data for 1922 through 1932 from Van der Zwaal: *op. cit.*, p. 214. Data for 1933 through 1938 from the second volume of the *Indische Verslag* for each of the years from 1934 through 1939.

sistant and several lurahs, went to central Java in 1913 to select colonists. This method of selection was an improvement; the more carefully selected settlers had better gardens, better crops, and smaller debts. The new procedure was apparently not pursued for long, however, for in 1920 Schalkwijk, the manager, reported the unsatisfactory state of recruiting. Thereupon he went to Java and selected 1,500 families within 3 months. He left a mantri, who had worked in the colony of Gedongtataän and knew how to select good, sturdy settlers, to be stationed in Koetoardjo, Kedoe Residency, Middle Java, and to continue recruiting in that province as well as in the principalities.

From 1905 to 1929 the colonization experiment had to compete with the recruiting agencies of great plantation organizations in the Outer Islands, which were almost entirely dependent upon Java for their labor

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166 supply. Their recruiting agents spread many rumors in the desas of Java
464 to discredit Gedongtataän, so that, were it not for the premium, it would
654 probably have been impossible to persuade any Javanese to go to a govern-
249 ment colony in the Lampoengs. For this reason it was necessary to continue
[652] paying the premiums until the depression forced the plantations in the Outer Islands to reduce their labor force and thus temporarily to stop recruiting. Even though the plantations in the Lampoeng Districts, especially the coffee plantations, had found a welcome labor market in Gedongtataän, since the colonists were glad to increase their income by earning supplementary wages, most of the plantations looked on the colonization experiment with displeasure. The government itself showed a vacillating attitude. During periods of great labor demand in Java and the Outer Islands it lost interest and drastically cut the colonization budget. In 1914, for example, the representative of the Ministry of Colonies declared in the discussion of the budget before the States-General in the Hague that the necessity for colonization had been eliminated by the increasing demand for wage laborers. Then between 1918 and 1923 the government again increased the funds so that Gedongtataän grew at a rapid pace; but from 1924 until the depression little was done to further agricultural colonization.
[161] During the second phase of the colonization, between 1911 and the end of 1927, the population of Gedongtataän increased from 5,100 to approximately 21,800 persons, or by a yearly average of 1,000 persons. This increase was the difference between the sum of immigration and births and that of desertions and deaths (Table XVI).[3] [see p. 195, cat. 116--Analyst]

In 1921, at a moment of renewed interest, the government authorized
166 the opening of a colonization terrain at the head of Somangka Bay, west of
161 the town of Kotaägoeng. The project, which was originally named after
654 this town, is now known as the Wonosobo colony (Map, Fig. 164). It comprises about 3,500 hectares. The first group of 870 families, including 2,720 persons, arrived in 1922. Most of the men, having once been contract laborers on plantations in the Outer Islands, were not prepared for pioneer life, since as laborers they had been accustomed to taking orders instead of working on their own initiative. Largely because of this early experience with former contract laborers at Wonosobo, the recruiting regulations in later years closed agricultural colonies to plantation workers. In 1924 the population of the Wonosobo project had increased to 5,927 persons, an all-time record, at least until 1938, the last year for which data
[165] are available. The death rate was shockingly high between 1923 and 1927, because of malaria (Table XVII). Frightened by the many deaths and the unexpected difficulties in connection with irrigation, a great number of the Wonosobo colonists fled, leaving their debts.

The Wonosobo project emphasizes the danger not only of inadequate preparation but also of poor management. The financial policy of the Lampoengs Credit Bank was unfortunate. Credits were given without supervision of the use to which they were put. The first group of settlers

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166 had borrowed about 36,000 guilders from the bank during their first year.
161 Later groups went into debt at a similar rate. This expense, together with
654 the high losses incurred from death and desertion, made the costs of the project very great. It has been estimated that by 1928 the Wonosobo colony had absorbed 630,000 guilders; for each permanently settled colonist the government had spent 200 guilders, or 800 guilders for a family of four persons.[10]

166 In addition to this dubious policy in granting credits, as a result of which
161 the greater part of the debts had to be written off as uncollectible, the
654 Lampoengs Credit Bank had been seriously mismanaged. Fraud, embezzle-
687 ment, and faulty bookkeeping, which were discovered in 1926, had created chaos. Finally, in 1928, the government decided to write off the entire deficit and ended this second phase of the colonization experiment with the liquidation of the Credit Bank.

The Final Phase of the Period of Experimentation, 1928–1931

654 During the years from 1928 through 1931, an interval that may be
166 designated as the third phase of the period of experimentation, the government seems to have had no clear policy regarding agricultural colonization. Officials were discouraged by the fiasco of the Lampoengs Credit Bank and the bad reputation that colonization had earned.

In spite of the general discouragement one important innovation was introduced. Someone noticed that in 1927, 914 persons, including dependents, had migrated of their own accord to the colonies in southern Sumatra. These spontaneous migrants, relatives or friends of colonists, had had no need of the inducements of premiums, free transportation, and other aid from the government, but had been attracted solely by the prospect of getting free land and of being able to support themselves until their first harvest by working for established settlers. The settlers established in Gedongrataän were anxious to see a growth of their desas since each new homestead lightened the burden of upkeep of the roads and other public work that had to be taken care of and in general strengthened the village. The desa officials, too, favored a rapid growth of the village population for personal financial reasons. Despite Heyting's emphasis on the importance of reducing colonization costs by encouraging spontaneous family migration and incorporating it systematically into the colonization scheme, the government had heretofore failed to do so. Instead, the concept had become fixed that each settling family would require the same amount of financial support. Now, however, for the first time the government took cognizance of the possibility of mutual aid between established and incoming colonists and reduced its financial support to the payment of the costs of transportation alone. That the new experiment was successful is shown by the fact that in 1928 as many as 1,693 persons were sent to

[10] Van der Zwaal: "De Javanenkolonies," 1936, p. 214.

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southern Sumatra at a total governmental expenditure of about 25,000 guilders, or not quite 15 guilders a person, for transportation. In the same year an additional 687 persons went to the colonies in southern Sumatra entirely at their own expense.

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But the government did not follow up this important innovation immediately. In 1929 and 1930 the colonies in southern Sumatra received only such colonists as migrated independently of any financial aid from the government. Altogether a total of 3,500 Javanese migrated to these colonies without depending upon public funds during the years from 1927 through 1931. Thus, finally, after 25 years of priming, a small but steady stream of migrants had begun to flow. These new pioneers did not have to be enticed by the 22.50 guilder premium and were definitely of a better type than the earlier colonists. For the premium in the opinion of a Javanese reduced pioneering to the level of selling one's self as a contract laborer to a plantation. These settlers, on the contrary, did not belong to the poorest strata but had sold their meager possessions in Java in order to profit from the greater opportunities awaiting them in the Outer Islands.

While from 1905 to 1931 the main stream of colonists flowed into Gedongtataän and Wonosobo, there was a small trickle directed to the neighboring residency of Benkoelen, where it separated into numerous tiny colonies. During this period two other experiments in colonization were made, in Celebes (1906) and in Borneo (1920); both were failures.

The Costs of Colonization during the Experimental Period

It is difficult to obtain a clear picture of the achievements and costs of colonization because of insufficient data—the government has not opened all of its records—and because of the confusion in the records available, due to the mismanagement of the Credit Bank. According to the annual budgets from 1905 to 1927, the government spent 2,500,000 guilders. To this sum C. C. J. Maassen[11] adds the 1,150,000 guilders that were lost by the bank, which would bring the cost of colonization to 3,650,000 guilders, not including the sums invested in irrigation systems.[12] Subtracting some 140,000 guilders, which were spent on limited experiments in Benkoelen, Borneo, and central Celebes, Maassen estimates that Gedongtataän and Wonosobo together had cost about 3,500,000 guilders. He divides this sum by 24,300, representing the number of persons present in the colonies in 1928, and concludes that each person had cost the government 144 guilders, or 576 guilders a family.

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This conclusion of Maassen's would seem to require qualification. In the first place, the number of families who had been transferred to Sumatra

[11] Maassen: De Javaansche landbouwkolonisatie, 1937, pp. 10–11. Maassen, an official of the Department of the Interior, was in charge of agricultural colonization in the later 1930's.

[12] The irrigation project of Gedongtataän cost 1,486,000 guilders and that of Kotaägoeng, 166,700 guilders.

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166 and thus had profited by the expenditure was considerably larger than the
654 number living in Gedongtataän and Wonosobo in 1928. Many of the former
652 had deserted the colonies and found employment on plantations or with local pepper growers, or had settled in the Lampoengers' villages; in other words, since they had left Java for good, they might well have been included in the reckoning and thus have reduced the estimated cost per individual. In the second place, it seems unsound to include the sum lost by the bank through fraud and mismanagement. If this sum is excluded, Maassen's reckoning would show that each permanent settler represented an expenditure of 100 guilders (400 guilders for an average-sized family).

166 After 1931 agricultural colonization was greatly expanded, so this year
654 may be said to mark the end of the experimental stage. A great deal of experience had been gained by the men actually working among the Javanese in the Outer Islands as social engineers during the years after 1905. The recommendations[13] contained in the annual reports of these col-

[13] The annual reports of Heyting and his successors contain the following recommendations summarized from the annual reports covering the years 1907 through 1915 published in the colonial reports of those years, and also from Schwalkwijk: "De kolonisatieproeven," 1918, and Idem: "De kolonisatie met van Java afkomstige gezinnen," 1921: (1) Select terrain for agricultural colonization that has dry land for the desas as well as extensive areas suitable for the laying out of wet-rice fields. Only such fields allow for the intensive cultivation of rice year after year. Only colonies with ample wet-rice land give a guarantee of success. (2) Make careful surveys of the soil and especially of the possibilities for irrigation. Do not start any new colony without such surveys. (3) Select only forested land. Unless work animals and steel plows are furnished, grasslands are more difficult to cultivate than forest soils. Forest soils, because of their acidity, require 3 to 4 years of use before they can be irrigated. This gives time for the building of irrigation systems. (4) Employ efficient irrigation specialists to construct satisfactory irrigation systems. Attempts to save here lead only to losses. (5) Select large areas that offer space for many villages so that the first settlers, once established, can become a nucleus for new arrivals. The establishment of a nucleus is always expensive; but nuclei cut down the costs of settlement of later colonists who settle in the neighborhood. Older colonists need additional help, above all during harvest time, and such help cannot be found locally. (6) Send new colonists to well established colonies just before the harvest season so that they can earn sufficient rice to carry them over to the time when they can harvest their own first crop. (7) Establish your first villages—the future nuclei—in the neighborhood of existing kampongs. The latter will offer a market for the Javanese and will give them employment at a time when they need money badly. Women, for example, can find employment as rice huskers. (8) Select the colonists with the greatest possible care. Take only strong, young people who are really tanis. Do not take persons who have been laborers on Western plantations: they have lost a great deal of initiative and capacity for working on their own and, above all, have become used to regular weekly or monthly payments of wages, whereas the tani must wait for months before he gets a return for his labor. Take only married people; single men are likely to desert as soon as they are confronted by a difficulty. (9) Do not try to attract settlers by offering them a premium as inducement. This may have been necessary when colonization was in its first stages and had to compete with recruiting for plantations, but is no longer so. (10) Do not offer relatively large money credits to colonists, for they are not accustomed to these, and experience has shown that the credits are frequently used unwisely. (11) Protect the health of the settlers as much as possible during the pioneer stage when conditions are most primitive and the work most exhausting. Efforts to economize here will only cause losses.

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onization officials were based on their practical experience and later formed the gist of the "ten commandments of colonization" drawn up by Maassen (see pp. 209,210). 166 654

Large-Scale Colonization
1932–1941

The pessimism that prevailed in the Government of the Indies over the results of the colonization experiments at the end of the 1920's was based primarily on their costliness. In 1926 it was estimated that future settlements would require an expenditure of 300 guilders per family, apart from the construction of irrigation works, so that for the next few years it was the general opinion that the cost of settling Javanese in the Outer Islands was too high for the country to undertake large colonization projects. As we have seen, this opinion was encouraged by powerful plantation interests hostile to the colonizing efforts of the government, because of the latter's competition with their own recruiting activities. 166 654 471

Then the depression came: the markets for export crops shrank rapidly, and the prices obtainable for the produce declined even faster. The Javanese lost most of their opportunities for employment in Western enterprises in Java at the same time that the plantations of the Outer Islands were sending Javanese laborers home by the thousands.[14] Conditions became especially strained in the districts of Java that had suffered from congestion even during the prosperous years. Relief was badly needed, all the possibilities had to be surveyed, and Gedongtataan was examined once more.

So it came about that the officials in Batavia for the first time saw the possibilities of greatly increasing the scale of the spontaneous migration already taking place, by utilizing the need of the Javanese colonists for 166 654

[14] At various times, especially during the early years of the depression of the 1930's, long negotiations were carried on between the government and the planters about the possibility of establishing permanent Javanese colonies on, or in the neighborhood of, the plantations of the East Coast of Sumatra, in the hope that this would assure the planters a reliable labor force and also prevent the return of thousands of laborers when Java, too, was suffering from a decline in employment opportunities. These negotiations led nowhere. At the time of the granting of agricultural concessions no space had been left even for a growing indigenous population; so that establishment of large-scale Javanese colonies in the immediate neighborhood of the plantations but outside of the concession area was impossible. On the other hand, the planters refused to agree to the founding of colonies on concession land for several reasons, such as that these would require too much land, and that the planters anticipated that their laborers would no longer be at their beck and call if given sufficient land to provide a livelihood. The planters were therefore willing to furnish each laborer of good standing with only a tiny garden plot of one-tenth of a hectare—large enough collectively to provide the atmosphere of a desa but too small to grow enough foodstuffs for the families. At the same time the planters reserved the right to evict a laborer if he did not work regularly. This arrangement did not, of course, merit the name "colonization" and could not forestall large-scale repatriation of Javanese. Additional information on these pseudo-colonies of Javanese on plantations in the Outer Islands may be found in *Verslag . . . betreffende de kolonisatie van Javaansche werklieden* . . . 1920, and in Brokx: Rapport . . . over de randkolonisatie (ms. dated 1933).

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166 654 harvest hands.[15] A routine report coming from Gedongtataän and Wonosobo in November 1931 contained the statement that some colonists had been anxious to have relatives join them for the rice harvest, but that the migration had not materialized because of the lack of money for railroad and steamer fares.

Therefore in December 1931 the government sent an investigator to

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

FIG. 165—The numbers of Javanese colonists in the Outer Islands at the ends of the years, 1936 through 1940. (Based on data supplied by the Central Commission for the Migration and Colonization of Natives.)

Sumatra to determine the number of colonists willing to take relatives into their homes and to employ them as harvesters. More than 1,000 households responded, but most of the relatives whose names had been given to the investigator could not be found in Java or were unwilling to migrate. The colonists then agreed to take unrelated families instead, and some 7,000 such persons were sent in 1932. In accordance with Javanese custom, the new arrivals were paid in a share of the crop, a form of payment called *bawon*. In overpopulated Java the share may be only one-eighth or less of the amount that the harvester reaps; but in Sumatra, where labor is scarce, as much as one-fifth or even one-fourth must be promised to the reapers. Thus the newcomers were able to earn enough rice to carry them through the period of clearing and planting their own land and until the maturing of their first crop.

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[15] To one unfamiliar with Javanese agricultural methods it may come as a surprise that a family having as little as a single hectare (2.47 acres) of land would require help at harvest time. The explanation lies in the fact that in accordance with a custom which the Javanese share with many other groups in Southeastern Asia rice may be cut only head by head. The cutting instrument, called *ani-ani*, consists of a narrow blade, 2 inches long, which is fastened crosswise to a short stick. The use of this instrument is considered the most careful method of harvesting rice, but at the same time one of the least economical from the standpoint of man-hours. The practice is deep-rooted in Javanese tradition, however, and has become a measure of social security on the mother island. Some other provision would have to be made for the poor families of the community and for the widows and orphans, if the more fortunate members should begin to use such labor-saving devices as sickles and scythes.

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Maassen credits the officials of 1931 with discovering the possibility of reducing the government's expenditure per settled family by utilizing the settlers' need for harvest hands.[16] It may be true that it was 1931 or 1932 before the officials in Batavia saw the possibility of building the need for harvesters into the colonization scheme, but for about 25 years the reports from the men in charge of Gedongtataän had been calling attention to it.[17] It is therefore clear that the recommendations of the colonization officials working in the Outer Islands had been largely disregarded in Batavia before 1932 and that the new technique of 1932–1941 consisted fundamentally in putting these suggestions into execution.

Colonization on a large scale was finally made practicable by the incorporation into the government's scheme of colonization of the principle of mutual aid and assistance (*tulung menulung*), requiring established settlers to employ newly arrived colonists as harvesters under the bawon form of payment. The voluntary assistance that some of the colonists had given to spontaneous migrants, in return for their help at harvest time, and which had attracted many uncounted newcomers to the colonies each year, was thus made compulsory. Under the new system the burden of supporting newly arrived colonists was essentially shifted from the shoulders of the government to the shoulders of established Javanese settlers. Whenever possible, settlers were sent just before harvest time to the colonies where they were to work as harvesters. When this was not possible, amounts of rice equivalent to what they would have earned were advanced to them in the form of a loan.

The new system was indeed in striking contrast to that adhered to between 1905 and 1911, when each family was given a cash premium for migration and was paid as much as 150 guilders in cash for clearing its land, as well as being allowed free transportation; or to the system followed between 1911 and 1927 when each family was paid a cash premium for migration and could borrow 200 guilders or more at an interest rate of 9 per cent, again with free transportation. The new system represents an even further reduction from the 1928 practice of limiting aid to transportation cost only. In 1932 and thereafter the colonist was given practically nothing free except his land. He was charged between 22 and 25 guilders

[16] He writes, "In 1932 the authorities noted that the aid needed by the fresh colonists during the first period of their life in the new country *need not all come from the government; that in fact the older colonists could be counted on to supply a large part* of it, so large a part even, *that in certain cases government aid could be dispensed with altogether*, when once the newcomer had safely reached his destination." (Italics mine). See Maassen: "Javanese Agricultural Migration," 1939, p. 187.

[17] As early as 1905 Heyting had pointed out that only the first colonists in each project would require full government support, and that subsequent migrants could be colonized at less cost because of the help they might receive from those already settled. Again, in 1918, Schalkwijk, the manager of the Gedongtataän project, stated that it would be advantageous to bring colonists to Sumatra shortly before the rice harvest because it would give them an opportunity to earn enough food for the first few months of pioneering until their own first crop should be ready for harvesting. See Schalkwijk: "De kolonisatieproeven," 1918, p. 433.

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166 654 for transportation and household utensils and tools, a sum which had to be paid back within a two- or three-year period. The charge for transportation alone was 12.50 guilders per family, regardless of the size of the family or the distance involved.

The Soekadana Colony

Although most of the settlers in 1932 were absorbed by the desas of Gedongtataän, that colony was filling up so rapidly that it could not have continued much longer to supply new colonists with homesteads. A large new district suitable for Javanese colonies had to be found, preferably in the neighborhood of Gedongtataän, so that this well-established colony might continue to function as a nucleus or, rather, as a bridge. The choice fell upon the Soekadana district, northeast of Gedongtataän, and the first colonists were sent there as early as 1932 (Map, Fig. 166). However, the government decided not to proceed with large-scale migration until more detailed surveys and plans should be completed.

Although the colonists of Gedongtataän applied for 2,300 families, or approximately 9,000 persons, whom they wished to employ during the harvest season in the first quarter of 1933, no new colonists were brought to the Lampoeng Districts in that year.[18] In 1934 the migration of prospective settlers was again supported, but their number was kept to the rather small total of 1,375 persons, who were settled on *marga* land (see p. 207) in the neighborhood of Gedongtataän. Four desas were established in the marga of Wai Lima and 10 in the marga of Wai Semah. At the end of 1934 these had a total colonist population of 4,000 persons and at the end of 1935, of 8,700 persons.[19] These desas may be considered an expansion of Gedongtataän, for they were settled principally by a number of young people from Gedongtataän who took land in the new desas because their own villages no longer had any surplus.

In 1935 detailed plans for Soekadana had been perfected and the sending of settlers on a large scale could begin. During that year 5,500 persons were added to the small group that had been established in the Soekadana district three years earlier. Another 8,784 were sent to that district in 1936, 6,715 in 1937, 13,882 in 1938 and approximately 18,000 in 1939. The plans for 1940 and 1941 provided for an annual gain through migration of 6,650 families, or about 20,000 persons. At the beginning of 1940 the Soekadana colony had a population of 47,000, whereas the Gedongtataän colony had only 38,000 persons. Within 7 years Soekadana (see pp. 221, 222) had acquired through the effectiveness of the government's new program a much larger population than had Gedongtataän in 35 years.

[18] Maassen: De Javaansche landbouwkolonisatie, 1937, p. 41. No obstacles were placed in the way of the migration of Javanese who came to the Lampoeng Districts at their own expense, and 827 persons attached themselves to the colonies in 1933.

[19] Van der Zwaal: "Nieuwe Javanenkolonies," 1936, p. 331.

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The Work of the Central Commission for Migration and Colonization

Increased interest in agricultural colonization was manifested by the government shortly after the appointment of Governor General van Starkenborgh Stachouwer in 1936. One of his first acts was to establish the Central Commission for Migration and Colonization of Natives,[20]



FIG. 166—Soekadana Colony, Residency of the Lampoeng Districts, Sumatra. The numbered symbols indicate: 1—Boundaries of the first Soekadana project (7,000 hectares in area); 2—Boundaries of the area added to the Soekadana project (43,000 hectares); 3—Boundaries of the area considered for further expansion (about 21,000 hectares); 4—Area already settled by colonists at the end of 1939; 5—Irrigation canal in operation; 6—Proposed irrigation canal; 7—Roads existing before the Soekadana project was undertaken; 8—Road constructed to serve the project; 9—Proposed roads; 10—Proposed towns. (Based on data supplied by the Central Commission for the Migration and Colonization of Natives.)

comprised of a member of the Council of the Indies, who served as chairman, and the heads of the Departments of the Interior and of Economic Affairs. The Adviser on Agrarian Affairs in the Department of the Interior was to act as secretary of the commission and to supervise its administration. The commission was to direct all the agricultural coloniza-

[20] Government Order No. 30 of January 29, 1937, created the "Centrale Commissie voor Emigratie en Kolonisatie van Inheemschen." Government Order No. 18 of May 31, 1939 changed the name of the commission to "Centrale Commissie voor Migratie en Kolonisatie van Inheemschen."

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tion involving Indonesians[21] and to advise and inform the government concerning it. Maassen, who as Adviser on Agrarian Affairs in the Department of the Interior had been in charge of agricultural colonization, became the first secretary of the commission and remained in office until the end of 1939. The success of the large-scale program was due in great measure to his energy, organizing ability, and firm belief in the importance of colonization in the solution of Java's population problem.

In March 1937 the General Secretariat of the Indies[22] circularized all the leading officials in the Outer Islands, notifying them of the governor general's desire to have a systematic search conducted for areas suitable for agricultural colonization and requesting their recommendations.[23] At the same time the governors of Java were requested to impress upon the members of the European and the Indonesian civil services and upon the lurahs the need of encouraging the migration of rural Javanese. This seems to have been the first occasion on which a governor general urged all the branches of the administration to do their utmost to increase Javanese migration.

Before the establishment of the commission, the 1937 budget had provided only 220,882 guilders for colonization. To speed up migration it was therefore decided to use 3,000,000 guilders out of the 25,000,000 guilder Welfare Fund, a gift of the Netherlands Government to the Indies Government. Additional sums were taken out of the Special Native Rubber Export Tax Fund and were allocated to the construction of such irrigation works in Sumatra as would benefit both the local Sumatran population and the Javanese immigrants.[24] The commission also had access to the Madura Welfare Fund for the migration of Madurese.

The increased activities required a large staff of full-time employees. Before 1937 nearly all the work relating to colonization had been done by personnel whose chief duties were connected with other phases of governmental activity. After 1937 the general management was put in the hands of the secretariat of the commission, which coordinated the work of specialists borrowed from various governmental departments. At the end of 1940 the staff consisted of 369 persons, of whom 88 were drawn from the Department of the Interior, 124 from the Department of Economic Affairs, 129 from the Department of Public Works, and 28 from the Department of Public Health.

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21 The problems involved in the migration and agricultural colonization of unemployed Indo-Europeans and Europeans as well as of Indonesian intellectuals do not come within the frame of this study. These settlers, who numbered at the most a few hundred persons, were under the jurisdiction of the "Kolonisatie Raad," a body created by Government Order No. 23 of January 12, 1937.

22 The General Secretariat conducts the governor general's correspondence and aids him in carrying out his decisions and orders.

23 Circular No. 645/B, March 25, 1937, of the general secretary.

24 For a discussion of the origin of this fund see Vandenbosch: The Dutch East Indies, 1941, pp. 302–303.

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Comprehensive Surveys Initiated

One of the fundamental problems involved in launching settlements on the scale that the government considered absolutely necessary was to select suitable areas. In response to the circular requesting recommendations, the commission received data on a great number of areas that seemed to warrant further investigation (Map, Fig. 164).[1] Sixty-two of these, comprising 1,345,000 hectares, lay in Sumatra; 10, with 297,000 hectares, lay in Borneo; 23, with 438,000 hectares, in Celebes; and an additional 21, with 112,000 hectares, were to be found on various other islands. From among these the commission selected for immediate investigation those areas that seemed most promising with respect to geographical location, soil, and irrigation. Each area was subjected to careful surveys by legal experts, soil scientists, and agricultural and irrigation engineers. The various phases of the investigation were undertaken in the order of the costs involved, starting with the least expensive so that unsatisfactory districts could be eliminated with a minimum of expenditure.

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First, the questions of who controls the land and whether the owners would be willing to accept Javanese colonists were studied by local administrators. The securing of suitable land offers a complex problem, as much of the Outer Islands is occupied, permanently or temporarily, by the indigenous peoples unless, as is the case especially in Sumatra, it is under lease to plantations or is reserved by the Forestry Service.

The indigenous communities of Southeastern Asia, whether single villages, groups of villages, clans, or tribes, claim territorial sovereignty over extensive areas. Large parts of these areas are not actually used for agriculture but are needed as gathering and hunting grounds, as well as for such forest products as rattan, resin, and lumber. No persons, unless belonging to the community that claims territorial sovereignty over such land, may use it in any way without the consent of the community, and for this permission they usually have to pay a nominal fee. However, in the second half of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the present one, when the Dutch extended their control over the Outer Islands, they pushed aside these traditional rights in order to open the way for plantation enterprises. This was done, as in Java, through the Agrarian Decree of 1870, which declared that these hunting and gathering grounds were wild land and therefore state property. According to Van Vollenhoven and his school, this declaration violated the sacred land rights of the indigenous communities.[25]

In southern Sumatra, so far the most important area of Javanese agricultural colonization, the highest indigenous political unit in each district is the marga,[26] which comprises a number of villages, or *dusuns*. The

[25] Van Vollenhoven: De Indonesiër en zijn grond, 1932, pp. 65–82.

[26] For a discussion of the marga in southern Sumatra, see Van der Zwaal: Inlandsch gemeentewezen in Zuid-Sumatra, 1936.

[1] [See p. 190, cat. 116 -- Analyst]

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margas claim territorial sovereignty, and as the marga lands are contiguous there is no unclaimed land in southern Sumatra. However, for decades the Dutch did not recognize the margas—except in the residency of Benkoelen—but only the dusuns. In this way they released a great deal of the area as no-man's land, which they declared to be state property, and which then could be turned over to plantations under long leases or made available to Javanese colonists. But in recent years the margas have been recognized as indigenous communities with rightful claims to all the marga land, excluding that which had in the meantime been leased to plantations. In 1931 southern Sumatra was divided among the margas, except for the areas occupied by plantations, the city of Palembang, the Javanese agricultural colonies of Gedongtataän and Wonosobo, and several good-sized towns, such as Teloekbetoeng, Kotaägoeng, Lahat, Benkoelen, and Djambi.[27] Thereafter no Javanese agricultural colony could be founded in southern Sumatra without the collaboration and permission of the marga on the territory of which the colony was to be.[28] If there should be reasons why the land should be reserved for the marga members, no colonization of Javanese could take place. Marga officials have shown themselves anxious to support Javanese settlement, however, probably because of the financial advantages connected with it.

The land rights of the indigenous peoples often came to light in unexpected ways. For example, in the colony of Loeboeklinggau, in the residency of Palembang, the land had been given to plantations on long leases but had reverted to the government because the leaseholders had not developed it. When the colonization project was being prepared it was discovered that a part of the land was used by the local people. At first the government expected that they could be turned out because of clandestine occupancy, but a closer examination revealed that the people had been on the land before it was leased and that the leaseholders had been expected to buy them out but had neglected to do so. In the colony of Belitang, it was similarly discovered that the authorities in their first survey had not taken the rights of the local population into account.

Under such circumstances it became necessary for the colony to buy off the rights. This had been done in 1930 by the colony of Gedongtataän when it required for further expansion some land that belonged to the marga of Poegoeng. The colony finally paid 600 guilders in recognition of the rights of the marga and as compensation to those marga members who had fruit trees and pepper gardens on the land that was to be occupied by the colony.

The next phase of investigation, after the colonization officials had ob-

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27 *Ibid.*, p. 31.

28 Southern Sumatra, which includes the residencies of the Lampoengs, Palembang, Djambi, and Benkoelen, has a territory of 186,310 square kilometers. There are 382 margas; of these 58 lie in the Lampoengs, 174 in Palembang, 58 in Djambi, and 92 in Benkoelen. The average area of a marga is 500 square kilometers.

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tained the consent of the existing communities to the establishment of Javanese colonies on their land, was a reconnaissance survey by agricultural and soil specialists, which was followed by a survey made by the Irrigation Service. These scientists collected data on topography, geology, soils, climate, drainage, vegetation, transportation facilities, local agricultural practices, planting seasons, yields, the distribution and density of population—in short, on all the questions relating to the suitability of the area for Javanese settlers. The possibility of irrigation is especially important, as the social prestige of a Javanese is based on the ownership of sawah and it is less difficult to persuade him to migrate to a wet-rice-growing region than to one where he could never look forward to having sawahs. If the area under survey was considered to be irrigable from the technical point of view, there followed a cartographic soil survey, an analysis of soil samples, and an analysis of the water and silt carried by the rivers that were to be sources of the irrigation supply. The final phase involved the detailed planning of the irrigation system, the distribution of the future desas, and the network of roads. These various phases required at least 2 years of intensive work before an area could be thrown open for Javanese colonization (Appendix B, pp. 249,250).

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In order to speed up the survey the Department of Public Works made extensive use of aerial photography, employing the services of the Royal Netherlands Indies Airways. The aerial mapping was supplemented with terrestrial measurements of differences in elevation. Only after these, too, had been completed was it possible to decide on the suitability of an area. Table XXXVII[1] summarizes the irrigation engineers' activities in 1939.

Migration Propaganda

One of the most difficult tasks of the commission[2] was to persuade an ever increasing number of Javanese to migrate to the Outer Islands. Each year the number of families who could be obliged to help new colonists to get a start increased. But as long as the readiness of the Javanese to migrate did not keep pace with this absorptive capacity, the commission had to work relentlessly for new recruits. Prospective recruits were systematically approached by both "direct" and "indirect" propaganda. Direct propaganda aimed at immediate recruitment, whereas indirect propaganda strove to call general attention to the colonization enterprise and to put it in the most favorable light (Appendix B, pp. 250,251).

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The Ten Commandments for Selecting Colonists

Although the commission was extremely anxious to settle an increasing number of Javanese every year, it nevertheless attempted to have a rigid selection made. Maassen worked out a set of rules, which he called the "ten commandments of colonization," to guide officials entrusted with the selection. These are based on the recommendations made by Heyting, the

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[1] [see p. 262, Cat. 116 -- Analyst]
[2] [i.e, Central Commission for the Migration & Colonization of Natives -- Analyst]

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166 647 planner of Gedongtataän, and by his successors (see pp. 200,201). The "commandments" are as follows:

I. Select real tanis; non-farmers are a burden for a colony and endanger its success.
II. Select physically strong people; only they can stand the hardships of pioneering.
[168] III. Select young people; by taking them one reduces future population increase in Java.
IV. Select families; families are the foundation of peace and order in the colonies.
V. Don't select families with many young children; the working members of the family cannot carry that burden at the start.
VI. Don't select former plantation laborers; in 90 per cent of all cases they are the cause of discontent in the colonies.
[581] VII. Don't allow so-called "colonization marriages"; they are a source of unrest in colonies.[29]
VIII. Don't accept expectant mothers; the pioneer settler needs the full help of the wife during the first year.
IX. Don't accept bachelors; sooner or later they will become involved with somebody else's wife.
X. Allow desas or kampongs to migrate as a whole; in such a case the first nine commandments may be ignored.

In spite of the fact that the commission tried to impress upon the officials in charge of selection in Java the absolute necessity of adhering as strictly as possible to these rules, the officials in charge of the projects in the Outer Islands found inferior and unsuitable settlers every year among the migrants (Appendix B, p. 251).

Growth of the Colonies

166 647 161 After 1936 migration increased rapidly (Table XVIII). During 1937, the first year that the commission was in charge, it arranged for the migration of approximately 20,000 Javanese. The goal for 1941, set at 60,000 migrants, was probably achieved, since the migration of 1941 should have been completed by the end of September, several months before the Netherlands Indies were drawn into the war against Japan. Table XVIII records the annual totals of Javanese who migrated after 1932 under government auspices. Some of these figures differ slightly from those in the annual *Statistical Abstracts*.

An annual migration of 60,000 persons, or some 16,000 families, would have been indeed a remarkable achievement in view of the difficulties with which the commission had to struggle; yet even a migration of that size was insufficient to solve the population problem in Java, where the population had been increasing annually at the rate of 600,000 persons. Java and Madura would not require an annual migration equal in size to the

[29] Frequently bachelors marry hastily before emigrating, in order to be acceptable. Their wives are known as voyage wives (*bini djalan*) or tow wives (*bini gandingan*).

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annual increase, however, if the migrants were to consist of childless young couples. The Central Bureau of Statistics in Batavia calculated that if Java's rate of natural increase should remain constant at 1½ per cent and if no emigration should take place, the population in the year 2000 would total 116 million and the average density of population would be 879 persons per square kilometer. If, with the same assumption as to

TABLE XVIII—THE OUTER ISLANDS: NUMBER OF JAVANESE SETTLERS TRANSFERRED ANNUALLY WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES GOVERNMENT, 1932–1941

YEAR	NUMBER OF JAVANESE SETTLERS	YEAR	NUMBER OF JAVANESE SETTLERS
1932	7,000*	1937	19,639
1933	751†	1938	32,259
1934	2,756†	1939	45,339
1935	14,710	1940	52,855
1936	13,152	1941	60,000*

* Approximate.
† These figures differ from those given in Maassen: De Javaansche landbouwkolonisatie, 1937, p. 41, to which reference is made on p. 204.
Source: The figures for the years from 1932 through 1938 were given by H. J. Kuneman, chairman of the commission, in a lecture held in Batavia on January 31, 1939, published in *Kolonisatie Bulletin*, No. 4, February 1939. The figure for 1939 is given in *Jaarverslag van de Centrale Commissie . . . 1939*, 1940, p. 13; the figure for 1940 is given in *Nederlandsch-Indische Geografische Mededeelingen*, Vol. 1, 1941, p. 120; the figure for 1941 is an estimate reported in the Netherlands Indies press in January 1941 (for example, *Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad*, January 13, 1941).

natural increase, 80,000 families of 3 persons each (consisting of a couple and one child, the parents' ages being between 15 and 24 and the child's age less than 5 years) should migrate annually, Java's population would reach 74 million in the year 2000. If 120,000 childless couples should migrate annually the population would increase to only 57 million.[30] Although these calculations show how important a role migration can play in population growth, they also show that in 1941 the commission, with its sponsored migration of 16,000 families, was still far below the mark that might represent a solution of Java's population problem.

Fig. 165 depicts the rapid increase in the number of Javanese agricultural colonists in the Outer Islands from 68,600 at the end of 1936 to 206,020 at the end of 1940; while their geographical distribution is brought out in Fig. 167.

During the years 1938, 1939, and 1940 the recruiting was largely limited to central and eastern Java and to Madura; the Sundanese territory in West Java is less densely populated. The leading areas of emigration were the residencies of Pekalongan, Banjoemas, and Kedoe in Middle Java and Madioen and Kediri in East Java, and the two principalities, Jogjakarta and Soerakarta (Table XXXIX). During the same years the commission

30 Maassen: "Javanese Agricultural Migration," 1939, pp. 184–185.

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166 During the same years[1] the commission
647 sent most of the Javanese settlers to Sumatra where the majority were
361 directed to the Lampoeng Districts, particularly to Soekadana, and others to the residencies of Palembang, Benkoelen, and Djambi. It proved more difficult to start a stream of migration to Borneo and Celebes, for, although Javanese villagers had often heard of Javanese desas in Sumatra, Celebes and Borneo were still unfamiliar names to them. Nevertheless, the data as

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

FIG. 167—The distribution of Javanese colonists in the Outer Islands, by residencies, at the ends of the years, 1936 through 1940. (Based on data supplied by the Central Commission for the Migration and Colonization of Natives.)

to destination for the years 1938 to 1940, summarized in Table XL, show a steady increase in the territory in Celebes and Borneo, as well as in Sumatra, that was being drawn into the operational sphere of the commission.

121 In order to give a detailed description of the establishment and early growth of a typical agricultural colony, Belitang has been singled out for a case study (see pp. 215–221). The remaining areas will be only briefly surveyed.

The Consumption of Food in the Colonies

166 During the years from 1931 to 1933 Ochse and Terra made detailed
262 studies of diet in the district of Koetowinangoen in the regency of Keboe-

1 [i.e. 1938-40 -- Analyst]

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men, Kedoe Residency, Middle Java.[81] They concluded that the caloric value of the diet of the persons observed was sufficient, although in a few families the margin between the basal metabolic level and the average caloric value was rather small. Many indications suggest that in the most crowded sections of Java, from which a large part of the colonists come, the average diet is not so good as was that of the inhabitants of Koetowinangoen and that many families do not get the number of calories considered necessary for their well-being. 166 262

In 1938 and 1939 the commission had surveys made of the settlers' diet in several colonies in southern Sumatra, both old and new, and, for comparison, in two villages of the indigenous population (Table XLI).[1] The survey showed that, with the exception of a single village, the average diet in Javanese colonies was considerably better than that in Koetowinangoen in Java. Colonists in well-established villages ate considerably more meat and fish than did the people in Koetowinangoen and also more rice and other starches such as cassava and sweet potatoes; more coconut products; more vegetables. The only important foods that they consumed in smaller quantities were legumes, including such dishes as *tempé* and *tahu*, made from soy beans. The diet in even such a recent settlement as Kalingrenjeng was higher in calories than that in Koetowinangoen, although less rice and more maize and cassava were used. A comparison of the diet in Kalingrenjeng with that in the other colonies indicates that the consumption of rice increased, and that of cassava decreased, as settlers passed beyond the pioneering stage, but in Bagelen the density of population had reached the point where the consumption of cassava was again large. Health officials were especially pleased by the consumption of animal and vegetable proteins in the colonies and the high intake of vitamin A obtained from leafy vegetables. As vitamin A heightens general resistance to infection, it is particularly important that pioneers living under unhygienic conditions should have an ample supply of it. In an examination of the children in the colonies, only a few were found who showed signs of vitamin-A deficiency. 654 647 262 166 46 511

A comparison of the diet of the Javanese in Sumatra with that of the local people, however, shows that the latter had a considerably higher level of living—indicated by the consumption of meat, fish, and rice—than had the Javanese colonists, largely because they had greater resources of land and cultivated such cash crops as pepper and coffee. Yet, in view of the fact, generally accepted by officials concerned with colonization, that the Javanese settlers had not been able to afford a diet even of the moderately good Koetowinangoen standard before their migration to the Outer Islands, it is apparent that colonization improved their nutrition. People having the "Koetowinangoen standard" are not likely to migrate. 249 423

[81] Departement van Economische Zaken: Geld- en producten-huishouding . . . in Koetowinangoen, 1934.

1 [p. 264, cat. 116 -- Analyst]

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The Cost of Colonization, 1932–1940

[458] In 1932 a total of 7,000 Javanese were transported to southern Sumatra
166 at a cost of approximately 48,000 guilders, or an average cost of 7 guilders
654 a person or 28 guilders for a family of four; because of the depression, prices were half what they had been in 1928. In 1935 and 1936 the average cost of moving a family had risen to 30 guilders.

652 After the establishment of the commission in 1937, the costs rose fur-
647 ther as the scale of colonization activities was enlarged; for the extensive surveys greatly increased expenditures. In the years 1938, 1939, and 1940 the commission spent a total of 5,813,006 guilders on colonization (Table XLII), and in the same period it transferred 35,572 families from Java to the Outer Islands. The apparent average cost of 163 guilders a family is misleading, however, for these costs cannot well be allocated on an annual basis. The government's expenditure of nearly 6,000,000 guilders in those 3 years was to prepare the way for the migration of many thousands of families from Java 2 or 3 years later. Moreover, such items in the 1940 budget as the 120,000 guilders for soil surveys and the 905,000 guilders for irrigation surveys and the construction of irrigation works were to benefit not only future colonists but those who had migrated in previous years as well. On the other hand, some of the money spent between 1905 and 1927 on Gedongtataan and Wonosobo also greatly aided the activities of the commission, for by employing new migrants as harvesters these colonies helped to lower governmental costs from 1932 onwards.

[651] The money spent on surveys and on the construction of irrigation systems was to have been recovered in the form of taxes levied on land that had not been subject to taxation before it was brought under permanent cultivation.

166 The calculation of the governmental costs incurred during the period of
654 large-scale colonization is further complicated by the fact that each settler was expected to repay his transportation and initial supplies—valued at
426 from 22 to 25 guilders a family—to the government. As Table XLIII
686 shows, the proportion of these debts that had to be written off because of death or, more often, because of desertion was decreasing noticeably after 1937. It also shows that many of the colonists paid up within a remarkably short period. The improvements in the selection of settlers, in the supervision of health, and in the management of the colonies seem to have been responsible for the reduction in the losses due to death and desertion.

166 It is regrettable that so large a sum had to be spent on propaganda. In
208 1940, for example, expenditures for propaganda accounted for 4.2 per cent of the total budget, thus averaging 7.40 guilders a family. As long as
654 a large percentage of the people of Java remain illiterate and therefore cannot be reached through the printed word, a comparatively inexpensive
212 form of propaganda, it is difficult to see how to reduce this item in the

1 [p.206, cat. 116 -- Analyst]

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budget. It was hoped, however, that the school booklets and visual aids depicting Tanah Sabrang would so familiarize the village youth with the idea of migration that by the time they became ready to establish their own households, they would be more eager to migrate than were their elders.



FIG. 168—Belitang Colony, near Martapoera, in the Residency of Palembang, Sumatra. The numbered symbols indicate: 1—Main roads suitable for year-round automobile traffic; 2—Roads suitable for automobile traffic only during the dry season; 3—Trails. (Based on data supplied by the Central Commission for the Migration and Colonization of Natives.) For Rantoutidjang, *read* Rantautidjang.

THE HISTORY OF BELITANG
A TYPICAL JAVANESE AGRICULTURAL COLONY

Preparatory Surveys

The colonization project of Belitang lies in the division of Komeringhoeloe in the residency of Palembang between the Matja and Belitang rivers (Maps, Figs. 164, 168). Its land belongs to the territories of the margas of Boeaij Pemoeka Bangsa Radja, Madang Soekoe I, Madang Soekoe II, Semendawai Soekoe III, and Belitang. This last marga, the most extensive, has given the project its name. As the members of these margas had no objection to the establishment of a Javanese colony on their land, the marga councils granted their permission in formal resolutions, and at the same time each council made it unlawful for its members to start any new ladangs on land included in the project. The marga of Belitang asked for the right to share in the benefits of the irrigation project by receiving irrigation water for 980 bouws of land to be distributed among the five settlements of Soekadjadi (120 bouws), Tandjoengraja (400 bouws), Rantautidjang (60 bouws), Oelakboentar (180 bouws), and Ramantjondong (220 bouws) (Map, Fig. 168). It was requested that each marga member in these villages be given two bouws of sawah. The government agreed to this in order to enable the local population to intensify its agricultural methods, which until the coming of the Javanese had consisted mostly of shifting cultivation.

Soil scientists found that the extensive clay soils were physically well suited for

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134 sawah culture, although poor in the minerals important for plant growth. An analysis
243 of the silt carried by the Batanghari-Komering River showed that irrigation water taken from that river would add rich fertilizing material to the irrigated fields. The clay soils were reserved exclusively for sawahs, while lighter sandy soils were set aside for desas. The soil experts warned against a leveling of the garden land surrounding the houses because the humus-containing topsoil covered a less valuable layer of soil.

312 The irrigation engineers planned to construct a main canal 40 kilometers in length

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

FIG. 169—Section I of the Belitang Colony, near Martapoera, in the Residency of Palembang, Sumatra. The numbered symbols indicate: 1—*Desas* (villages) founded in 1937; 2—Desas founded in 1938; 3—Desas founded in 1939; 4—Clinic; 5—Branch clinic; 6—Malay *dusun* (village); 7—School; 8—Road; 9—Irrigation canal. (Based on data supplied by the Central Commission for the Migration and Colonization of Natives.) For Sidorahajoe near Soekadjadi, *read* Sidohardjo.

which was ultimately to supply 19,000 hectares of sawahs with irrigation water. Its inlet is located at Koeroengannjawa. The primary canal was dug by three different contractors: the Hollandsche Beton Maatschappij, which had a contract for the first 12 kilometers; Volker's Aannemings Maatschappij, which had a contract for 20 kilometers; and Chinese contractors working with Chinese laborers, who were to dig the remaining 8 kilometers. The Hollandsche Beton Maatschappij used a floating dredge placed on a locally built concrete ship (Fig. 148). The first part of the irrigation project was to be finished by October 1, 1941, that is, 4 years after the arrival of the first settlers, and the remainder was to be completed by October 1, 1943. The total costs were estimated at 2,150,000 guilders, of which 1,150,000 were to come from the Special Rubber Export Tax Fund.[22]

Peopling the Colony

166 Colonists for Belitang were selected in Java on the basis of the so-called "ten com-
654 mandments of colonization." Like the Soekadana colonists, they traveled by rail from their villages to Tandjoengpriok, the harbor of Batavia, then by steamer to Oosthaven, from there inland by the South Sumatra Railway to Martapoera in the Lampoeng Districts, and finally by bus to the colonization project (Figs. 123–127). The first group of colonists arrived on August 17, 1937. During 1937, a total of 250 families was brought to Belitang; in 1938, 550; in 1939, 1,506; and in 1940, 1,550. It was expected that 1,0[illegible] families would come in 1941.

[22] *Jaarverslag van het Departement van Verkeer en Waterstaat over 1939*, 1940, pp. 244–245.

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The Javanese colonists sent to Belitang between 1937 and 1941 received more government help than those who went in the same years to Soekadana, because the Belitang project was near no established colony from which it could receive help through the mutual assistance system. Instead, the Belitang settlers of 1937 to 1941 were intended to become the nucleus for further expansion: they were to become for this part of Palembang what the settlers of Gedongtataän were for the Lampoeng Districts.

The total capacity of the Belitang project was estimated at 20,000 families—a quota that was to have been reached by 1951 (Table XLIV). Of these, 5,500, or 27 per cent, were brought during the initial stage between 1937 and 1941 and formed the nucleus around which the future 14,500 families, or 73 per cent of the estimated capacity, were to group themselves. A family that had lived for 3 years in the colony was expected to be ready to help others under the mutual assistance system, and every five old families were to employ one new family during harvest time (Fig. 129) and to take care of it until it should become established. In 1940, therefore, a first group of 50 families was quartered with the 250 colonist families of 1937 and worked for them as harvesters. By 1942 the number of families to be settled under the mutual assistance system was to have been 460 (had the war not interfered), because by that time 2,300 families would have been on the project for 3 years or more. In 1942, also, Belitang would have outgrown the stage of nuclear formation and thereafter was to have received only as many new colonists as it could absorb under the mutual assistance plan. From then on until 1950 the schedule of migration provided for a steady increase in the number of families that could migrate to Belitang (Table XLIV). In 1951 the project was to receive the number of settlers necessary to bring the total to 20,000 families.

The nuclear migrants of 1937 to 1941, who could not be placed as harvesters, were supplied with rice, which they were to pay back in kind, as they were also to pay for their transportation and other incidentals. Each settler received a rice card on which was indicated the amount of rice he had received at regular ten-day intervals. A total of 5.655 *piculs* of husked rice was considered sufficient for a family of four until their first harvest. By the time the settlers had been on the project for 5 months the new gardens were yielding maize and vegetables, and the daily rice allowance was gradually reduced until the first rice crop had been harvested, when the settler was thrown entirely upon his own resources (Table XLV). In addition to rice, each family received salt, oil, and protein-containing foodstuffs in 1937, upon the insistence of the local medical service. In 1938 and 1939 the distribution of these items was replaced by the payment in small installments of 5 guilders, which was added to the debt account.

The families of 1937 to 1941 that were to form the nucleus of Belitang were housed, upon arrival, in sheds, or *berdengs* (Fig. 134), each accommodating several families, and were given about a month to clear their compounds and build simple houses (Fig. 135). In 1940 and thereafter the families migrating under the mutual assistance system were to be placed in homes of older settlers until they had time to build their own shelters. Good building material in the form of standing timber was plentiful in the forest of the colony. The roofs were covered with alang-alang or other hard grasses. In 1940 I noticed three types of houses in the Javanese colonies, indicating stages in the economic improvement of the settlers. The pioneer first cleared a part of his home lot and built a little shack, sufficient to afford his family a shelter against rain and sun. This had to serve until the field had been cleared and the first crop harvested. Then a second, somewhat larger, house was built, consisting of one or two rooms and a kitchen. The construction of this house might have taken from 2 weeks to a month, depending upon the size of the structure and the skill and care of the builder. This building usually served for a few years, until the settler had saved enough money to put up a better house, of several rooms, with a roof made of wooden shingles (a material not commonly used in Java where wood is scarce and expensive), or of tiles. This third stage had, as a rule, been reached in Gedongtataän (Figs. 135, 136, and 139).

Upon arriving in Belitang each family received free of charge old gasoline cans and empty tin cans and beer bottles and on credit such tools as hoes, axes, *parangs* or *bolos*, cooking pots, and small lamps (Figs. 128 and 130). Groups of several families were given whetstones free of charge and were lent two-man saws and handsaws.[33]

The Belitang project was divided into three sections (Map, Fig. 168). The first 250

[33] Vissers: "De landbouwkolonisatie," 1940, p. 10.

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166 654 families, which arrived in 1937, established the desas of Sidomoeljo and Sidomoekti, near the village of Simpang in the northeastern corner of the southern section (Map, Fig. 169). In 1938 six new desas were formed west of the first settlements, also in the southern section, and received the names Sidodadi, Troekoredjo, Sidohardjo, Wonosari, Wonoredjo, and Karangredjo. All these desas were located along, or near, the road from Tandjoengraja to Soekadjadi and Moentjakkabau. The settlers of 1939, pushing farther into the jungle covering the southern section of the Belitang project, split into two groups of desas; one group was placed immediately south of the desas of 1938 and the other at the southern end of the project. In the first group 1,000 families formed the new desas of Wonotirto, Wonosri, Wonokitri, Wonosigro, Karangtengah, Sidorahajoe, Karanglo, Tjigaboes, and Karangkemiri; in the second group the remaining 500 families made up the desas of Tandjoengsari, Tandjoengmas, and Elingeling. Most of the new desas were located along important roads, then under construction.

In 1940, 500 out of the total of 1,550 families were placed along the highway between Elingeling and Karangtengah to complete the settlement of nuclear families in the southern section. The remaining 1,050 families were to tackle the middle section from two directions: one group, of 500 families, was placed in the northwestern corner of the middle section, near the Malay settlement of Tjajanegeri; and the other group, of 550 families, was settled just north of the road from Simpang to Soekadjadi, that is, at the southern end of the middle section.

166 654 361 The planners of Belitang believed it better to open a pioneer region from several directions rather than from one, in order to secure a larger number of nuclei. This method had the advantage that future settlers could be placed right among, or very close to, their hosts and employers, for whom they could continue to work when the latter needed help, whereas at other times they could work on their own land. This made the construction of bedengs unnecessary. Most of the nuclear desas were filled to not much more than half their capacity, as the rest of the villagers were to come later under the mutual assistance plan.

This system, which may be called the "Palembang system," has one great weakness. Among the various nuclear desas and among the parcels of a single desa patches of forest are left that become the refuge of elephants, wild boars, deer, monkeys, rats, mice, snakes, and other animals that may be destructive or even dangerous. It was in order to prevent this as much as possible that the planners of Soekadana decided against opening their project from various directions; instead of scattering either the desas or the settlers they completely filled a stretch of land, seeing to it that every bit of cultivable ground was cleared during the single season. This "Lampoengs system," however, had the disadvantages that new settlers were eventually located many miles from their hosts and could no longer do occasional work for them, and that a new group of bedengs was required every year.

166 241 476 Shortly after their arrival the settlers of Belitang, like those in most of the other colonization projects of the Outer Islands, received a quarter bouw of garden, or home lot, in a desa and one bouw of irrigable land. This latter they were to cultivate for 3 years in the way that the local population handled their ladangs, planting dry rice, maize, and other crops. In the fourth year the settlers' land was to be irrigated and thus turned from ladang into sawah. Those arriving in 1937 found both home lots and field lots cleared and prepared for planting; those arriving between 1938 and 1941 found that the forest on their home lots had been cut, but not yet burned, whereas their field lots were untouched. This initial aid was given in order to speed up the formation of strong nuclei. Especially during the first years of an entirely new project, time is precious and a great deal may be gained by giving the pioneer a little extra help—so ran the argument of the officials in Palembang. On this point, too, the Lampoeng Districts differed. There the clearing was left entirely to the settlers.

313 Each desa in Belitang had a foreman, one of the local people, who would advise the Javanese about cutting the forest, as jungle clearing is a completely new experience to most Javanese of today. The foreman would designate the trees to be cut that in falling would bring down several others. He would warn the settlers against the *rengas* tree[34] [137] which, when handled without proper precautions, causes severe itching, swelling, and fever.

[34] *Gluta renghas* (*benghas*) L. belonging to the *Anacardiaceae* family.

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The settlers followed more or less the time table of the local people, who practice shifting cultivation and clear forest land fairly regularly. In June they cut the underbrush and in July and August felled the large trees; in early September they began to burn the underbrush and fallen trees and to prepare the land for rice planting, which takes place in late September and early October. Many of the Belitang settlers completed the cutting and burning of their whole field lots during the first year. When the lot was exceptionally heavily forested, the clearing usually took two seasons (Figs. 132, 137, and 138).

After the land had been cleared for cultivation, the staff of the Agricultural Advisory Service (Fig. 144) stepped in to supply the colonists with plant material and advise them on proper methods of cultivation, the timing of farming activities, and all the other problems that might be new to the Javanese, who were accustomed to a different climate and a different soil. Each family was given 5 ears of maize, a can of peanuts, 3 ordinary coconuts, 2 dwarf coconuts, 40 stems of cassava, and 10 young pineapple plants, as well as sweet potatoes, various vegetables, and such fruit-tree seedlings as orange, rambutan, durian, salak, papaya, banana, and others, for the garden. For the field the colonists received an additional five ears of maize and a five-gallon can of seed rice. (In Soekadana the seed rice was still unthreshed—Figs. 131 and 133).

The Agricultural Advisory Service maintained a nursery for fruit trees in Sidomoeljo and seed gardens for maize, cassava, peanuts, soy and other beans, eggplant, red peppers, and other vegetables in Karangredjo. Additional seed material—such as kapok and the variety of peanut known as Schwarz 21, as well as salak from Buitenzorg and tobacco from Magelang—was brought in from Java or other parts of Sumatra.

In 1939 the personnel of the Agricultural Advisory Service carried out experiments with fertilizer and collected data on yields by making a number of test harvests on colonists' fields. Fifty-four tests were made on land planted with rice for the first time and twenty-four on land producing a second rice crop. The yields of the first group were slightly higher than those of the second, as had been expected (Table XLVI). Test harvests made in other projects during the third and fourth year of occupancy showed a considerable decrease in yield and the necessity for irrigation was evident. If for some reason irrigation should not then be available, settlers ought either to be given new fields or to be supplied with fertilizer. In the fall of 1940 the government distributed half a picul of double-superphosphate among the Belitang settlers of 1937 because the irrigation water could not be supplied on time, that is, during the fourth planting season.

Marketing

Considerable trading went on between Javanese colonists and the local people. From the beginning the Javanese women found a good market for the delicacies they are in the habit of preparing. Simpang and the desas of Wonoredjo and Karangtengah developed into active marketing places, the last because of the presence of a number of Javanese from Jogjakarta who traditionally have an excellent business talent. I was frequently amazed at the distances the Javanese colonists carry their surplus produce. I met settlers from Tandjoengsari who told me that they were on their way to Moentjakkabau, a walk of 12 kilometers each way. Judging from observations in Gedongtataän and Soekadana, I feel certain that a lively traffic of trucks and buses will develop in the Belitang colony as soon as the road network is completed.

Health Service

The commission was especially on guard against malaria, dysentery, and intestinal influenza. Moreover, settlers were given a combined cholera-typhus-dysentery injection before leaving Java. Medical field workers (*mantriverpleger*) on the project supervised health conditions under the guidance of an Indonesian government doctor. They were in charge of the clinics, of which there were three in the Belitang project by the end of 1940 (Fig. 145). These received the simpler cases for hospitalization, whereas serious cases were taken to the regular hospital at Batoeradja.

Dutch officials in Sumatra claimed that it was useless to distribute mosquito nets because the Javanese were not familiar with their use, did not handle them properly, and sometimes even cut them up to make garments.[35] The fight against malaria was there-

[35] In Celebes the officials in charge of the projects did distribute mosquito nets and instructed the medical field workers to enforce proper use of them.

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758 fore limited to the proper drainage of the land, the spraying of breeding grounds, and
744 the distribution of quinine. Each desa had its quinine distributor chosen from the ranks of the settlers. It was his duty to visit every house regularly, distribute quinine tablets
164 to all persons suffering from malaria, and report them to the doctor. Sick persons had to be given a prescribed dose at regular intervals. From experience the commission
744 had learned that it was not enough just to distribute quinine tablets, since the Javanese
758 would frequently sell them rather than consume them. For a time the tablets distributed at the cost of the commission were colored black so that their presence could easily be detected in the market places. Even that method did not assure the actual consumption of the quinine by malaria sufferers, and the final solution was found only when the quinine distributors were required to push the tablets down the throats of the sick persons with their index fingers and see that the patients did not cough them up again. The desas established in 1940 suffered severely from malaria, and a second doctor had to be sent to the project.

166 The commission found that health conditions in newly established desas were always
164 worse than in older settlements, because of the unusually heavy physical exertion involved in the task of clearing the land, together with the general undernourishment
146 prevalent to a greater or lesser degree among settlers coming from the depressed regions of Java. The colonists had also to adjust themselves to a climate frequently different in many respects from that of their native islands. In addition, on all the new projects some settlers had to be hospitalized as a result of attacks by wild boars.

Education

166 At the time of my visit to Belitang, the project had only one school, located at Sidomoeljo, but there were plans for two additional schools. The school had three grades and
872 was attended by 30 girls and 91 boys. The commission engaged the teachers in Java.
875 Each received a house and a garden of a quarter of a bouw plus a monthly salary of 11 guilders if he was a *guru bantu*, or assistant teacher, and of 30 guilders if a *guru kepala*, or head teacher.

On August 1, 1940, a two-year teachers' training course that was expected to graduate 15 teachers annually was started in Gedongtataän.

Recreation

166 Javanese are extremely fond of their *gamelan* orchestras and *wajang kulit*, or shadow
534 puppet plays, and are not content without them (Figs. 156 and 157). Each desa received from the commission a set of gamelan instruments and a set of puppets for the wajang
654 kulit, both usually of a cheap type. The colonists of Gedongtataän, however, were proud of their beautiful gamelan instruments, the gift of Paku Buwono X, Susuhunan of Soerakarta. Metro, the administrative center of Soekadana, had received a set of wajang kulit figures from the Sultan of Jogjakarta and a gamelan from the Prime Minister of the same principality.

Village Administration

166 The Javanese desas in Belitang, as in other colonies, are modeled after those in Java.
624 At the head of each desa is a lurah under whom is a *kebajan*, or messenger and policeman, and a *tjarik*, or scribe. A *modin* looks after the religious and spiritual needs of the settlers and gathers them for prayers (Figs. 153, 154).

The whole colony was under an assistant wedana who was brought over from Java. Under him were two *mandurs* and one assistant mandur. The immediate superior of the assistant wedana was the *controleur* in Martapoera.

Debt Payments and Taxes

166 The settlers were obliged to make repayment in the following amounts: 12.50 guil-
426 ders for transportation, 1 guilder for seed rice, 5 guilders for salt, cooking oil, and protein-containing food, 3.50 guilders for tools and household utensils—a total of 22 guilders.[38] They could pay either in cash or in rice. By October 1939 the colonists of
166 1937 had paid 1,254 guilders and those of 1938, 1,453 guilders, totaling 2,707 guilders.
651 All settlers were exempt from government taxes and compulsory labor, or *heerendienst*,

[38] According to the commission's report of 1940, the amount that it collected from each colonist varied slightly but averaged 25 guilders.

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for the first 3 years.[37] In 1940 the first 250 families were obliged to meet this tax obligation. Marga taxes had to be paid after 2 years. All Javanese colonists in southern Sumatra, with the exception of those in the colonies of Wonosobo and Gedongtataän, were members of the margas on the territories of which they had been settled, and they had to pay the same amount of marga taxes as the local population (Fig. 152). Even the village administration was to be fitted into the marga structure. It was planned, for example, to withdraw the assistant wedana when the Belitang project had been completed. The lurahs were then to come under the jurisdiction of the *pasirah*,[38] or head of the marga, and were to have the same rank as the *krio*, or head of the local dusun, or village.

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Other Javanese Agricultural Colonies in the Outer Islands

Other Colonies in the Lampoeng Districts

The largest Javanese agricultural colony is the Soekadana colony located in the Lampoeng Districts, between the Wai Sekampoeng and the highway connecting Teloekbetoeng with Goenoengsoegih and Soekadana (Maps, Figs. 164, 166). Formerly some of this land had been used by the local population for the making of ladangs, but most of it had been forest reserve, which the government released for colonization. The first quick survey in 1932 seemed to indicate that this project could be brought under irrigation through the construction of simple desa irrigation works of the kind the Javanese are capable of building without the assistance of engineers; but a later, more careful, survey showed that the district required large-scale irrigation works that would need to be constructed by the Irrigation Service of the Department of Public Works. In 1934 plans for the construction of irrigation works to supply 7,000 hectares with water were approved. Further surveys showed that 43,000 hectares could be brought under irrigation, and at the time of my visit in September 1940 the engineer in charge of Soekadana was investigating the possibility of additional expansion that would give the colony a total of from 58,000 to 64,000 hectares of irrigated land, thus accommodating some 83,000 families; for each family would receive one bouw of irrigable land.

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The map in Fig. 166 shows the location of the Argogoeroeh weir, which raises the water in the Wai Sekampoeng and leads it into the primary canal, which in turn carries it to the main distribution works at Trimoerdjo. There it is divided among three secondary canals, which finally deliver it to the tertiary canals. The map shows the canals that were in operation at the end of 1939, as well as those that remained to be constructed (Figs. 146, 147, 149, and 151).

Although it had been planned that the irrigation system at Soekadana should supply 7,000 bouws with water during the 1940–41 season, actually only 5,000 to 6,000 bouws received water, according to a statement by the irrigation engineer.

In 1940 the commission settled Javanese colonists in the subdistricts[39] of Teloekbetoeng, Kotaägoeng, Kotaboemi, and Menggala, as well as the subdistrict of Soekadana. According to plans which I was shown at the time of my visit, Soekadana was to receive 6,650 families in that year, whereas the other subdistricts were to receive a total of only 850 families (Table XLVII). Of the 7,500 families to be settled in 1940, 2,292 families were to receive rice on credit and 5,208 families were to come under the mutual assistance system. Of the latter, the small colonies were to employ 841 families, Gedongtataän, 1,750 families, and Soekadana, 2,617 families. As the Soekadana colony was growing so rapidly, it was expected to be able to take care of all the newcomers under the mutual assistance system after 1942. Thereafter Gedongtataän was no longer to be forced to accept harvesters.

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In Gedongtataän the ratio of harvesting families to old settlers was as 1:3 on sawahs and 1:4 on tegalans. From the old settlers' point of view, this compared unfavorably with the Belitang ratio of 1:5 on tegalans. In the Lampoeng Districts a colonist had to

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[37] The land taxes and the heerendienst are discussed in Vandenbosch: The Dutch East Indies, 1941, Chapter 17.

[38] The word pasirah is of Sanskrit origin. It has the same root as the English "sire" and the French *seigneur*.

[39] *Onderafdelingen.*

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166 shoulder his share in the support of newcomers in his second year of residence and reg-
464 ularly thereafter but in Belitang not until his fourth year. In these matters the "Palem-
bang system" (see p. 218) burdens the old colonist less than does the "Lampoengs sys-
654 tem." In the Lampoengs, the absorptive capacity, expressed by the number of families that could be settled under the mutual assistance system, was increasing at so rapid a rate that, had not war interfered, it would have been possible to receive all incoming families under that system by 1943. The rate of increase would have been even greater
[312] than it was had it not been for the bottleneck of irrigation. The absorptive capacity of a colony depends not only upon the number of established families but also upon the time required to construct irrigation systems.

Writing in 1939, Maassen urged that "the settler's need for outside help should be stimulated. . . . This means that each colonist should be granted as much land as possible—so much in fact that he is unable to attend to his crops single-handed, particularly at harvest time."[40] In actual practice, however, each colonist was given only one bouw of land but was nevertheless forced to accept harvester-guests whether or not he needed assistance.

Palembang

166 In addition to Belitang, the residency of Palembang had another colony 20 kilometers
312 from the town of Loeboeklinggau in the subdivision of Moesihoeloe, known as the
654 Toegoemoeljo colony (Map, Fig. 164). Like Belitang, it was established in 1937. Its area comprised 35,000 hectares, of which only 6,575 hectares were irrigable, a small proportion as compared with that of Belitang or Soekadana. Its land, which belonged to the marga of Proatin Lima, was to be irrigated with water from the Klingi River (Fig. 150). The marga population was to receive 2,735 hectares of irrigated land; hence only 3,840 hectares would be available for the Javanese. The main canal, which was to be 3.15 kilometers in length, required a special kind of construction to prevent heavy losses of water in the sandy soils. The whole irrigation system of this colony was to have been completed by the end of 1942 at an estimated cost of 765,000 guilders.

In October 1940 this project had 15 desas, according to an oral statement by the controleur at Loeboeklinggau. Six hundred and fourteen families had arrived in 1937, 859 in 1938, 423 in 1939, and 590 in 1940. An additional 2,500 families would fill the colony completely.

As in Belitang, the Javanese colonists came under the marga laws, although in 1940 the Javanese assistant wedana had not yet been replaced by the local pasirah. Marga taxes, which the settlers had to pay by the beginning of the third year, amounted to two guilders per family, plus one picul of rice, which went to the lurah as his remuneration (Figs. 152 and 153). In other Javanese villages the lurah received a piece of land, the so-called *ambtsveld*, as remuneration, but this system was not carried over to the marga of Proatin Lima.

The colony of Toegoemoeljo was considered a failure by the commission because of the small size of its irrigable area as compared with the total amount of land. The preliminary surveys had led the government to believe that the colony included far greater irrigation possibilities. Moreover, the fact that the local population made rather large demands was disappointing to the commission, which always tried to reserve as much land as possible for the colonization of Javanese. This disappointment might have been prevented if the surveys preceding the initiation of the project had been carried out with greater care.

Djambi

166 In 1940 the residency of Djambi received its first colony. It was established in the
654 subdistrict of Bangko and was named after the Tabir River, which is to become the source of irrigation water for the colony's 17,500 hectares of potential sawah (Map,
[164] Fig. 164). The first group of settlers, comprising 510 families, or 1,955 persons, narrowly escaped a major catastrophe during the first months, for plague was brought into the subdistrict by pilgrims returning from Mecca; fortunately, a rigid quarantine saved the colony from infection. No sooner had this danger passed than the project suffered heavily from a serious drought that destroyed the young upland rice. This meant that the settlers had to borrow rice from the government for a second season.

Benkoelen

Colonization in Benkoelen was started in 1908 but differed radically from that in the

[40] Maassen: "Javanese Agricultural Migration," 1939, p. 188.

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Lampoeng Districts. In the latter, at least until 1932, the government was anxious to prevent close contact between the colonists and either the indigenous people or the plantations. In both Gedongtataän and Wonosobo the Javanese colonies were kept as separate entities and were administered by Javanese officials. In Benkoelen, however, the Javanese colonists at once became marga members. As a matter of fact, the first colony was financed out of marga funds. Only after this experiment had been successful did the government assume financial responsibility for colonization in Benkoelen. From the outset the settlers depended greatly upon employment on local plantations, and as little was done to supply them with sawahs, they had to practice ladang culture in order to raise sufficient food. All of the Benkoelen colonies are considerably smaller than those in the neighboring residencies. Because of its topography, Benkoelen lacks areas that would allow large-scale irrigation systems capable of watering thousands of farms. In 1910 there were 596 persons in its colonies. Fifteen years later, in 1925, the number had increased only to 1,326 persons.[41] 166 654

Sumatra's West Coast

The first colonization project of the residency of Sumatra's West Coast was opened early in 1941 by 500 families, which were brought there in two groups. The colony was named Batahan after the Batahan River that is to supply the irrigation water, and is located near Air Bangis in the district of Ophir in the northern part of the residency.

South and East Borneo

Large parts of southern Borneo are composed of extensive marshes the water level of which is affected by tides or monsoons, or both. The local people of Bandjermasin and Hoeloesoengai in the drainage basin of the Barito River have developed special methods of cultivating rice in these swamps, which they have converted into tidal sawah, west-monsoon sawah, or east-monsoon sawah, according to the source of the water supply. The cultivation methods differ for each type of sawah.[42] 133 243 312

In inland swamps, where the water level is very high during the rainy season and very low during the dry season, the cultivation of lowland rice is a risky undertaking. As the fields are covered by too much water to allow rice cultivation during the rainy season, rice must be planted when the flood water has dropped to a height of from 20 to 25 centimeters. In order to have seedlings ready by the time the water level has fallen sufficiently, the cultivators construct small floating seedbeds. The floats, made of bamboo, thick banana stems, or the leaf ribs of the sago palm, are covered with aquatic plants and mud, and then the seed rice is sown on them. After 3 weeks or so the seedlings must be transplanted. As the water does not usually drop to the proper planting level in all of the fields at the same time, there should then be at least one field where the level has dropped sufficiently to permit the seedlings to be transplanted to it temporarily in thick bunches. The bunches may stay there, if necessary, for another month before they are divided and the seedlings finally transplanted to the field where they are to mature. This planting method enables a family to cultivate two or three bouws of rice without outside help, as the transplanting may be spread over a long period. In Java, on the other hand, one family cannot cultivate much more than one bouw without outside help as the rice there is transplanted only once, and this job must be done within a short time.

The water level of the swamps near the sea is more uniform and is influenced more strongly by the daily tidal movements and prevailing winds in the estuaries than by the monsoons. However, the preparation of seedbeds and the transplanting methods are similar to those inland. Late-maturing varieties that require 7 to 8, or even as much as 10 months, are cultivated near the sea, whereas only early-maturing varieties are used in the inland areas.

Although in recent years more and more swampland has been planted with rice in the region around Bandjermasin and Marabahan east of the Barito River and along the Serapat Canal (connecting the Barito with the Moeroeng River), southern Borneo still has extensive swamps that have not yet been utilized. When the commission's attention was called to these possibilities, it decided to experiment with a small group of settlers in order to find out how rapidly the Javanese, who is not familiar with the cultiva- [311] 166 654 243

[41] Wellan: Zuid-Sumatra, 1932, p. 109.

[42] Beusechem: "De sawahbouw," 1939. See also Schuitemaker: "Korte schets van den landbouw," 1938, and Schophuys: Het stroomgebied van de Barito, 1936.

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tion of rice in tidal swamps, would be able to familiarize himself with this new type of cultivation. Recognizing a similarity between southern Borneo and Cochinchina, the commission sent a rice specialist to Cochinchina in 1939 to study cultivation methods in the swamp regions of the Mekong Delta.

In July 1938, a first group of 95 Javanese families was placed near the kampong of Kertakhanjar to cultivate 100 bouws of swamp sawah that had been leased from the local population. The experiment was successful, and the commission felt sufficiently

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

FIG. 170—Colonization area in central Celebes. The numbered symbols indicate: 1—Areas selected for agricultural colonies; 2—Irrigation dam; 3—Existing roads; 4—Areas already occupied by Javanese colonists in January, 1940; 5—Disembarkation points for colonists; 6—Irrigation canals in operation in January, 1940; 7—Proposed irrigation canals. (Based on data supplied by the Central Commission for the Migration and Colonization of Natives.)

encouraged to send a second group of 106 families in 1939. This group came early enough to help with the harvest, and the settlers of 1938 were then transferred across the Barito River and settled on their own land south of the Serapat Canal and southwest of the town of Bandjermasin. The colony, given the name of Poerwosari, comprises an area of 34,000 hectares (Map, Fig. 164). The second group was brought to a kampong of local people on the banks of the Lauk River to learn the new technique before they joined the settlers of Poerwosari. In May 1940, the third year, a third group of 198 families was added to the Poerwosari project. The planners of this colony estimated that 15 per cent of the land would be occupied by villages, canals, and roads, leaving 28,900 hectares of swamps for the cultivation of rice. This would be sufficient for 19,200 families, as each family was allowed 1½ hectares, or about twice as much as in Sumatra. The colony already had some drainage canals but more were required, and plans had been made to dig them with dredges. The Poerwosari experiment is especially important in view of the fact that southern Borneo has 1,400,000 hectares of swamps that could be made available for settlement by the construction of drainage canals.

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Like Poerwosari, the Madurese colony of Madoeredjo differs fundamentally from the colonies in Sumatra. In Madoeredjo dry land is cultivated exclusively. The colony, located near Pengaron in the Meratoes Mountains, includes 16,000 hectares of cultivable land, none of which can be irrigated. But this is no drawback in the eyes of the Madurese settlers, since the peasants of Madura surpass all other Indonesians in the

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tilling of tegalans. As in their native island, the Madoeredjo settlers terrace their tegalans to protect them against accelerated erosion, and include green manures, above all *crotolaria*, in their crop rotation. Each Madoeredjo family was given two hectares of contiguous tegalan land, whereas the Javanese family in Sumatra was given two separate parcels aggregating 0.9 hectare. The Madurese are excellent stock breeders, also. The goal in Madoeredjo is therefore the establishment of mixed farming. The colony was started in 1938 with 100 families, and these were joined in 1939 by 194 additional families.

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Celebes

In Celebes the commission initiated three colonization projects for Javanese, all following the pattern that had been developed in Sumatra. Two of the projects were small ones located on the Gulf of Mandar; the third and most extensive one, the Masamba-Malili project, lies at the head of the Gulf of Bone.

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When the commission began its work its attention was drawn to the Sadang plain in southwestern Celebes, north of the town of Parepare, where a large irrigation system, designed to irrigate 60,000 hectares of sawah, was under construction. Investigation showed, however, that all of this land was needed for the inhabitants of Celebes itself because parts of that island are already so densely settled that outlets must be created in other parts of the island that are not yet utilized agriculturally. But northeast of the Sadang plain there were two smaller areas available for the settlement of Javanese, the Boengi and the Mapili plains. The fact that both of these were covered, not by forests, but by alang-alang (*Imperata*), necessitated the immediate construction of irrigation systems, as without irrigation water a single bouw of grassland does not produce enough to sustain a peasant family. In the Philippines—where grass-covered areas were used extensively for pioneering—more land was allowed per family, and the National Land Settlement Administration broke the soil with tractors and disk-plows and furnished carabaos and steel plows to the colonists. The Dutch, however, preferred to settle Javanese colonists at the digging-stick and hoe level.

The first settlers were brought to Boengi and Mapili in the summer of 1937. The colony on the Boengi plain—immediately north of the Sadang plain—named Paria (Map, Fig. 164), received 147 families (471 persons) in the first year, another 40 families (112 persons) during the second, and 7 families (28 persons) during the third year. The slow growth of the Paria project may be explained by the fact that drainage and irrigation proved to be more difficult than had been anticipated. As trained surveying personnel was not available the project could not be surveyed and divided into parcels until 1940, and the construction of the required drainage and irrigation works could not be started until 1941. This delay was no excessive handicap for the settlers already located in the colony, as each of them had a good garden plot and some sawah. Moreover, it was possible for them to earn additional rice by working as harvesters for the local Buginese. They also earned cash by helping to construct the Sadang irrigation system.[43] The delay did, however, slow down the growth of this colony to a rate much lower than the usual record of the commission.

The Mapili project, located on the highway between Mapili and Polewali, grew considerably faster than did Paria. It was started with 115 families (380 persons) in 1937. These were joined by 710 families (2,335 persons) in 1938 and an additional 538 families (1,838 persons) in 1939.[44] The Mapili colony received its irrigation water from the Maloso River through a provisional canal for three years. The final irrigation canal was scheduled to begin operation at the end of 1940. [312]

The most extensive settlement areas in Celebes were found north of the Gulf of Bone, where a plain stretches from Malili in the east to Palopo in the west over a distance of nearly 125 miles. It is from 6 to 20 miles wide and comprises 2,000 square kilometers (Map, Fig. 170). Abendanon, a geologist who visited this region in 1909, recognized its potentialities at that early date. He wrote:

> With the exception of a few patches of wet-rice fields it [the Masamba-Malili plain] is not cultivated, although it can compete with the best irrigated plains of

[43] *Jaarverslag van de Centrale Commissie . . . 1939*, 1940, p. 34.

[44] These figures are taken from the annual reports of the Commission and differ slightly from those given in the *Indisch verslag 1939*, 1939, Vol. 2, pp. 50–53.

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166 311 654 Java in respect to the abundance of water courses that come out of the mountains and cross it. It could be turned into the granary of Central Celebes. . . . As the exportation of rice also offers no difficulties, it would be desirable to take earnest and vigorous steps toward this goal, possibly by means of an immigration of Javanese. . . . Immigration seems to me to be eminently desirable for Celebes. Emigration should help Java and immigration should help Celebes. This problem deserves serious governmental consideration and calls for a solution without delay.[45]

Little attention was paid to Abendanon's observations until the governor general's request in 1937 for suggestions of new settlement areas. At that time the Resident of Celebes reported possibilities in two sections of the Masamba-Malili plain, but a pre-

[161] TABLE XIX—CELEBES: GROWTH OF THE JAVANESE COLONIES ON THE MASAMBA-MALILI PLAIN, 1938–1940

AREA	ARRIVING COLONISTS IN— 1938 Families	1938 Persons	1939 Families	1939 Persons	1940 Families	1940 Persons	RESIDENT FAMILIES DECEMBER 31, 1940
Kalaena	477	1,553	1,237	?	1,987	6,769	2,625
Masamba	487	1,569	936	?			2,135
Lamasi	—	—	—	—	249	832	249
Total	964	3,122	2,173	7,359	2,236	7,601	5,009

Source: Compiled from: *Kolonisatie Bulletin*, No. 8, 1940, pp. 21, 22; *Jaarverslag van de Centrale Commissie . . . 1938*, 1939, p. 42; and *Jaarverslag van de Centrale Commissie . . . 1940*, 1941, Table.

liminary survey showed that practically the whole plain might be utilized. It was but thinly settled by Buginese and Toradjas: Malili had a population density of 3.88, and Masamba one of 7.58, persons per square kilometer. A total of 43,000 hectares of irrigable land were finally selected in three different parts of the plain: an eastern part, north and west of Malili, called the Kalaena Area; a central part, south and east of Masamba, known as the Masamba Area; and a western part, north of Palopo, known as the Lamasi Area (Map, Fig. 170). These three parts could accommodate approximately 56,000 families.

As there were no old Javanese colonies in this region, the commission formed two strong nuclei around which later colonists were grouped. In 1938 the two colonies were started, Bonébonné[46] in the Masamba Area, with 487 families (1,569 persons) and Kalaena in the Kalaena Area, with 477 families (1,553 persons), as shown in Table XIX. The colonists made the six-day trip by steamers of the K. P. M.[47] from Soerabaja to the Gulf of Bone, where they were brought ashore in small motor boats. Each settler was given a quarter of a bouw of land for his house and garden and one bouw of irrigable land, which he was to use as tegalan for two years before it was to be transformed into sawah.

166 243 Unfortunately the first settlers lost a great deal of valuable time because, although they arrived in July and were immediately given their garden land, they did not receive their fields until late in September in Bonébonné and the middle of October in the Kalaena project. The clearing of the tegalans was therefore from 1 to 2 months late and the burning was not successful, as the rainy season had already started. Consequently only a small part of the tegalan area was planted with dry rice and maize. The settlers of Bonébonné were able to cut but 83 per cent of their tegalan area, burn 73 per cent, and

[45] Abendanon: Geologische . . . doorkruisingen van Midden-Celebes, quoted in unsigned article entitled "Nieuwe kolonisatiemogelijkheden," in *Kolonisatie Bulletin*, No. 2, 1938, pp. 17–18.

[46] Also known as Tamoekoe colony.

[47] Royal Packet Navigation Company.

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finally plant only 12½ per cent. The yield from even this small cultivated area suffered damage by mice and wild animals. The Kalaena colony did somewhat better. Its settlers brought 56 per cent of their tegalan area under cultivation and had a satisfactory harvest, although the crops here, too, were harmed by animals. 243 166

The progress reports seem to indicate that the personnel in charge in Celebes were still experimenting and had not yet worked out as smooth a working program as that in southern Sumatra where years of experience stood the administration in good stead. Despite the weaknesses in the operations on the Masamba-Malili plain, the commission continued to dispatch large groups of settlers to this project, as may be seen by a comparison of Tables XIX and XL. 654

The Kalaena subdivision (Map, Fig. 170) was to receive its irrigation water from the Kalaena River, which was to be dammed at Laimbo; the Tomoni subdivision was to be supplied with water by the Tomoni River, for which also a dam was planned. The construction of the Laimbo dam was begun in 1940, and the Department of Public Works employed a large number of the colonists as laborers. In Sumatra the employment of settlers for such tasks had been discontinued because tanis who were not accustomed to heavy earth work were less efficient than regular laborers. The local labor shortage in Kalaena and the costs of importing laborers accustomed to earth work from Java must have been the reason for the disregard of the Sumatran experience. The total cost of irrigation works for the Kalaena area was estimated at 1,500,000 guilders or about 75 guilders per hectare of irrigated land, an amount that cannot but be considered a reasonable investment for a hectare of well irrigated riceland. 312 654

The Masamba Area (Map, Fig. 170) is divided into the three subdivisions of Bonébonć, Kandjiro, and Balease, each one named after the river that is to become the source of irrigation water. The dam on the Bonébonć was finished in 1940. The map shows the areas settled from 1938 to 1940. 312

The Lamasi Area (Map, Fig. 170) received its first colonists in 1940. It was estimated that this part of the Masamba-Malili plain included some 13,500 bouws of irrigable land (of which 3,500 bouws were set aside for the indigenous population) and that the irrigation works would involve a cost of about 500,000 guilders.

Summary and Appraisal of the Colonization Work of the Netherlands Indies Government

We have seen that, although the need for measures to relieve Java's population pressure had been clearly recognized as early as the first decade of this century, the government did not give serious attention to agricultural colonization until the 1930's. It had taken about a quarter of a century of halting experimentation to develop a colonization scheme that was workable and promising, and that reduced government expenditure per settled family to the barest minimum. Many mistakes had been made in Gedongtataän, but each one, though costly, proved valuable since it contributed toward the development of a more efficient procedure. 168

The Gedongtataän project had been started without previous systematic surveys or a careful mapping of the land and without a plan as to the location of the future desas, sawahs, and irrigation systems. As a result, a number of desas were laid out on low land that should have been designated for sawahs. It had been assumed that the Javanese would be able by themselves to develop irrigation systems, but this proved to be a more difficult undertaking than had been anticipated. In 1911, six years after the founding of Gedongtataän, the government authorized a survey of the land; however, it was not until 1916 that the survey was actually 166 654

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made. It was also in 1916 that the government decided to finance the construction of the necessary irrigation works. At that time a number of badly placed desas had to be relocated, with the result that the villagers lost their gardens and fruit trees, then several years old. All of this was, of course, a time-wasting and expensive procedure. The growth of the Gedongtataän colony suffered, furthermore, from the poor selection of settlers and from the lack of adequate medical supervision. The costs of the project were increased by a credit policy that was far too liberal—credits were used by the settlers for non-constructive purposes—and by additional expenditures necessary to correct initial mistakes.

The history of Gedongtataän between 1905 and 1932 reflects the attitude of the government during that period. Batavia was not convinced of the feasibility of large-scale agricultural colonization. Instead, it was concentrating its attention on a multitude of measures designed to improve the condition of the masses in Java itself. Among these were attempts to intensify Javanese agriculture by the construction of irrigation systems, the educational work of agricultural advisers, the distribution of selected seeds, and the demonstration of improved methods of cultivation.

Another important factor affected the attitude of the government. During the period from 1910 to 1929 the Indies, on the whole, enjoyed prosperity. The expanding Western plantations gave employment to many tens of thousands of workers both in Java and in Sumatra. The estates in Sumatra depended almost exclusively upon workers coming from Java. Therefore, the government was more interested in encouraging and supervising the migration of plantation laborers than in the establishment of Javanese agricultural colonies. The latter were costly, whereas the employment of Javanese by Western estates in the Outer Islands relieved the population pressure in Java without causing the Treasury any expense. This solution, however, was not permanent; in times of declining prices the planters would dismiss many laborers and send them back to Java, to be reabsorbed in the overcrowded desas.

When the depression of the early 1930's forced great curtailment in the plantation industries and when from all the signs it seemed obvious that some of these would never again employ as many people as they had in the past, the government turned again to agricultural colonization, for the pressure of population in Java had become really dangerous. Gedongtataän, for years considered proof that the government-sponsored agricultural settlement of Javanese was far too costly and slow to contribute substantially to the solution of Java's problem of overpopulation, became once more the subject of examination. The study revealed the mistakes of the past and showed how the work might be organized to keep down the costs per settled family to a minimum and yet achieve satisfactory results. Thus, in the end, the experiment of Gedongtataän proved to have been a valuable testing ground for the government.

The key to the success of the new colonization scheme was the intro-

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duction of preparatory surveys, supplemented by a discriminating selection of colonists, and the abandonment of the attempt to force Western concepts upon the Javanese peasants. Long-term bank loans, for example, were discontinued; instead, the new administrators made a full use of practices, such as mutual assistance and the bawon form of payment, that were in harmony with Indonesian ways of thinking. The government threw a part of the financial burden of settlement upon the colonists themselves. This required of them the utmost in strength, ingenuity, and perseverance, but when they had overcome the worst of the difficulties they became more firmly attached to their new home than if they had not had to work for everything themselves.

Colonization expenses were low between 1932 and 1936, the first years of the scheme's operation, since new settlers could be grouped around existing colonies. By 1937, however, it had become necessary to go farther afield, so that large sums had to be invested in extensive surveys and in the founding of new nuclei. The higher expenditures from 1937 to 1941 were to benefit many more families than were actually settled during that period; therefore it would be misleading to include the entire outlay when calculating the costs per settled family in those years.

The efficiency with which agricultural colonization has been handled since 1937 deserves a full measure of admiration. The procedure was worked out with great care. Each step was planned to avoid unnecessary expenditures of time and money. The officials, both Indonesians and Netherlanders, who were in charge of the work, threw their whole strength behind the task.

The number of Javanese settled in the Outer Islands in the single year of 1941 was three times as large as the entire population of Gedongtataän had been 20 years after its founding. This was indeed a remarkable advance. Nevertheless, in spite of the rapid increase in migration, the movement was still less than one-fourth as large as it would have had to be in order to absorb the increase in Java's population. It is not certain that colonial migration can ever be brought up to the estimated required level of 120,000 childless young couples a year. It is certain, however, that migration on such a scale could not be carried on indefinitely. It would eventually become difficult to find land suitable for the cultivation of rice as well as to find an indigenous population willing to share its land with Javanese settlers. The population of the Outer Islands is also increasing at a rapid rate, and in a number of districts—notably the Toba Batak country, the Padang Highlands, Bali, and parts of Celebes—the density is already so high that migration to neighboring areas has become necessary.

Realizing that agricultural migration has its definite limitations and confronted with the problem of arresting a steady decline in the welfare of the rural population of Java,[48] the government encouraged the growth of

[48] See, for example, the statement made by Resident J. A. Ruys, reported in *Het B. B. Congress 1938*, 1938, p. 51.

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166 654 manufacturing industries producing consumers' goods for the Indonesian masses, which were started in Java between 1934 and 1941. The development and peopling of the Outer Islands, however, is of the utmost importance for these young industries, for the greater the market in the Outer Islands, the larger the number of Javanese who can be employed in the new industries and who therefore are not forced to join the stream of migrants overseas. The value of the flow to Sumatra and other parts of the Indies of goods manufactured in Java increased rapidly after 1935, as can be seen in Table XX. This flow is a profitable one for Java's industries, for the average buying power of the population in the Outer Islands is considerably higher than that of the Javanese villager, who has a cent-and-half-cent economy.

TABLE XX—JAVA AND MADURA: EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURED GOODS TO OUTER ISLANDS

Year	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941
Value of goods in millions of guilders	34	40.1	64.1	54.6	58.6	73.4	96.0

Source: Sitsen: The Industrial Development of the Netherlands Indies, 1942, p. 4.

The level of living of those parts of the Outer Islands, especially in Sumatra, Borneo, and Celebes, that have been drawn into world trade has been considerably higher than that of Java because the farming population on a large scale turned to the production of export crops without, except in some minor instances, neglecting the raising of food crops. Yet, through all the discussion of agricultural colonization in the Indies runs the thought that the ultimate aim should be to create villages and communities in the Outer Islands that would be exact duplicates of those in Java, where the people would behave exactly as they did in the home island, and where they would have the same type of economy. Each colonist is given one hectare of land, on which he grows only food crops. This carries over into the Outer Islands a pattern of living that is far from ideal. The mode of life in Java is, to a large extent, an outgrowth of the great density that has existed there for generations and the result of several centuries of colonial rule. Although in apportioning one hectare of land to a colonist the government improved his economic status over that which he, as an individual, had had in Java, it did not lift him above the level of subsistence farming. He is able to make ends meet and pay the land tax, but his buying power cannot compare with that of the indigenous population.

000 We may therefore raise the question: would it not be preferable to give the Javanese more land so that, in addition to rice and other food crops, he might grow a number of cash crops such as tobacco, coffee, pepper, and rubber, even if this would mean that fewer Javanese could be settled in the Outer Islands? This should forestall the danger of transplanting to the

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Outer Islands those very conditions that have made the situation in Java nearly unbearable.

It should further be pointed out that by giving each family only one hectare of land the government immediately creates high densities of population in the colonization areas. If we assume that in a settlement area a solid block of 1,000 square kilometers is divided into farms of one hectare each, distributed among colonists whose families will ultimately average 5 persons, the density will amount to 500 persons per square kilometer of cultivated land within the boundaries of the colony. In as short a period as a generation such a colony will already be faced with a scarcity of land, and some members of the new generation will have to look for free land outside.

It is argued that any deviation from the Javanese way will endanger the success of agricultural colonization. This assumes, however, that the Javanese is static and has not the capacity to profit from the stimulus of his new neighbors' example; also, this is not a complete deviation, since even in Java itself peasants produce export crops whenever they have sufficient land. It is the increasing population pressure that has forced more and more concentration on the production of food crops for local consumption.

The effect of extensive agricultural colonization on the communities in the Outer Islands is much more immediate, noticeable, and permanent than on the communities in Java. In the latter the gaps caused by emigration are quickly filled up, whereas in the Outer Islands colonization brings radical changes. Land that in the past was either entirely unutilized or was used only occasionally by a hunter, gatherer, or shifting cultivator, is fundamentally transformed. The forest disappears, and in its place, as far as the eye can see, stretch irrigated rice fields, interspersed here and there with villages set among gardens and groves of fruit trees (Figs. 140–143). The colonies are strange isles, microcosms of Java, standing in the midst of a land whose peoples still practice methods of cultivation unknown on the plains of Java for generations.

Colonization has another important effect on the Outer Islands, or rather, on their population. Under the stimulus of the Javanese example, indigenous peoples who heretofore have practised shifting cultivation change over to permanent cultivation. In an increasing number of instances the local communities have been willing to allow the founding of Javanese settlements on their land only on the condition that they themselves receive a share in the use of the irrigation systems to be constructed, so that they may cultivate sawahs instead of ladangs. Such an intensification of land use in the Outer Islands is imperative if immigration of Javanese is to continue for many decades.

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Chapter VIII [p. 232]

CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

I 166 Most of the outstanding differences between agricultural colonization in
P 166 the Philippines and that in the Netherlands Indies derive from the fact that the Philippines is a young nation working out its own destiny whereas the Netherlands Indies have been a colony whose administrators were anxious to maintain law and order and at the same time improve the condition of the peasantry.[1]

P 166 654 In the Philippines colonization was a national adventure. It was one of the first large-scale enterprises undertaken by the Philippine Commonwealth. American advisers had assisted in drawing up the initial plans, and in Koronadal there were two American settlers who were on an equal footing with Filipinos; the execution of the project, however, was entirely in the hands of an all-Filipino staff. All of the participants had a national, as well as a personal, stake in the success of the National Land Settlement Administration. Everyone shared the glory as well as the responsibility. The leading Manila newspapers and magazines carried pictures of the settlers and of the prize-winning houses and gardens. Colonization problems and their relation to the future of the Commonwealth were discussed
I over the radio. All the participants shared also the discomforts and risks.

166 654 511 Javanese colonization in *Tanah Sabrang*, on the other hand, was an experiment within the framework of colonial administration; it was not a people's movement. It was not in any sense a step in self-government for the Indonesian people. The Dutch realized that the *Pax Nederlandia* had removed what Malthus called the "positive checks" and this had resulted in the tremendous population increase in Java; they therefore felt an obligation to remedy the consequent drop in the standard of living. Agricultural resettlement was a project of the Dutch for the Javanese. Although Indonesians participated in the work of the colonization commission the ultimate responsibility was entirely in the hands of Netherlanders.

P 166 701 In the Philippines defense considerations played an important role in the choice of the settlement sites and of General Santos as manager of the National Land Settlement Administration. Young army reservists were given preference over other applicants. The settlement of large numbers of young men with military training in such strategic locations as Cotabato and northern Davao was planned in order to neutralize the Japanese colony
I in Davao, which consisted largely of young men who were reservists of
701 the Japanese Army or Navy. In the Netherlands Indies defense considera-
166 tions did not influence the planning of agricultural settlements, for, although

[1] The colonial character of the Netherlands Indies was not altered by the constitutional change of 1922, which made the Indies an integral part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Despite the new position of the Indies there was, for example, until early in 1945 a Minister of the Colonies.

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the colonists were subjects, they were not citizens of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and therefore were not expected to defend the Indies in case of attack.

P 166 864

For many years the school youth of the Philippines, especially those in agricultural schools, learned about Mindanao and its opportunities and were urged to contribute to the national effort to make this island an integral part of the country. This fact may explain the large number of settlers with more than average schooling. Also, the Filipino press kept Mindanao before the eyes of its readers as a treasure awaiting development but endangered by sinister plans of American imperialists—in the days before the establishment of the Commonwealth—and later by the threat of Japanese expansion. The Outer Islands, on the other hand, traditionally had a bad reputation among the self-respecting villagers in Java. For decades migration to the Outer Islands was tantamount to an admission of being a failure, a misfit, a person without standing. Although the reputation of the Outer Islands was improving as a result of the work of the colonization commission, the stigma had not completely disappeared. Also, no patriotic consideration figured in the decision of the Javanese peasant to move to Tanah Sabrang. Among Javanese villagers the term for government is "Company." The memory of the injustices suffered by their ancestors under the Dutch East India Company and the memory of the hardship of the "forced culture system" of the past century are still alive and account for much of the distrust of the Javanese whenever he knows that the government is sponsoring something. He identifies the government and government officials with fads of cultivation, sanitation, or other aspects of his life, with enterprises which in his eyes are too often either foolish, unreasonable, or just a plain nuisance. One day a high Dutch official, out hiking in mufti through the Javanese countryside, fell into conversation with a *tani* working his ricefield. When the Netherlander asked the Javanese how he liked the local Dutch administrators, the peasant good-humoredly voiced his irritation at their constant interference: "One week they come and tell us to hoe with our backsides toward the sun and the next week they tell us we should be hoeing with our backsides away from the sun." The Javanese tani's wariness of all governmental suggestions was a great obstacle to migration.

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In order to overcome the distrust of the villagers, the colonization commission of the Netherlands Indies had to send colonists back to their home villages as propagandists. In the Philippines this kind of propaganda was unnecessary because of the different relationship between the government and the potential settlers. The Filipino knew that it was his government that was undertaking colonization work, and he was anxious to apply for a share in this work and its benefits. I was in the office of the chief of the N.L.S.A. in Manila when two spokesmen of a tenant organization in the distant province of Tarlac inquired in person about the possibilities of settlement in Mindanao. The chief told them about a settlement project

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to be opened in northern Luzon. But the two expressed their preference for Mindanao because they had read in the press that Koronadal was free from typhoons. Such a scene would have been impossible in the Indies, where a humble Javanese villager would not have access to a policy-making European official in Batavia. Nor would the Javanese tani be accustomed to getting information through the press. Moreover, he would be sent to a place designated by the government and would certainly not be allowed to make his own choice except under very unusual circumstances.

Therefore it is understandable that colonization found a heartier response among Filipino *taos* than among Javanese tanis. The colonization commission was continually faced with the problem of filling the annual quota of settlers, whereas the N.L.S.A. was more concerned with opening up new territory fast enough to take care of those who wished to migrate. Among these latter were a number of graduates of agricultural schools, as well as men who had once worked in the sugar industry of Hawaii or in the fruit orchards and vegetable fields of California but who had found it impossible, upon returning to their home provinces (especially along the Ilocos coast), to acquire land at a reasonable price. Such men readily made use of the offer of the N.L.S.A. and have shown energy and enterprise.

Whereas only migrants from seriously overpopulated areas of Java were recruited for agricultural colonies in the Outer Islands, every province of the Philippines had the right to be represented in the settlement projects of the N.L.S.A. The Dutch method was of course more efficient in relieving pressure in localities where this relief was most needed. The democratic way in the Philippines sacrificed some efficiency for the broader objective of giving citizens from all parts of the Commonwealth the right to share in a national undertaking; at the same time it achieved the goal of breaking down provincialism and promoting national solidarity by bringing together as many divergent groups as possible.

The average sizes of the individual farm holdings in the settlement projects of the two countries were strikingly different. In order to accomodate the largest possible number of families, the colonization commission allowed each settler only a subsistence farm of one hectare, whereas it was the aim of the N.L.S.A. to create medium-sized farms of 6, 8, or 12 hectares on which the owners would grow not only food crops needed by their households but also commercial crops in demand on the domestic market and heretofore imported. The larger size of the farms in the Philippines justified the granting of credits up to 1000 pesos per settler. The N.L.S.A. felt confident that the settlers would be able to meet the payments of both interest and amortization out of the sale of their cash crops. Since the settlers were obliged to sell their crops through the N.L.S.A., the latter had firm control over them and could therefore enforce regular payments. Javanese subsistence farming on a small farm plot, on the other hand, did not justify the granting of large credits, as the

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peasant would not be able to pay off the loan. It was, indeed, hard enough for him to repay the 25 guilders for his transportation and equipment. 166 426

A study of the work of the N.L.S.A. and of the Netherlands Indies Government brings out certain prerequisites for successful agricultural colonization. All settlement projects should be carefully studied in advance by specialists. It is most important to give an adequate amount of time and effort to surveys covering land rights and land requirements of the indigenous population, topography, soil, climate, vegetation, drainage, irrigation possibilities and needs, suitable crops, proper cultivation methods, and necessary soil-conservation measures. In the Netherlands Indies the preparatory studies and surveys for each project have in recent times required approximately two years. 000 166 654

The settlement area should be accessible: if necessary it should be opened by roads. The land should be subdivided and the sites of the future villages and fields should be decided upon *before* the arrival of the settlers; otherwise too much valuable time is lost and the period during which the settler must receive support is prolonged. 000

Great care must be taken to protect the health of the settler at the outset. Malaria, dysentery, and hookworm are especially frequent in tropical pioneer settlements. The last two are most effectively combated by constructing wells and installing pumps for the supply of safe drinking water, by constructing latrines, and encouraging the wearing of shoes. The fight against malaria, one of the greatest scourges of the tropics, is more difficult. Clearing the forest often creates the very conditions under which certain dangerous species of anopheles thrive and causes the outbreak of malarial epidemics. Nothing demoralizes a colonization project more effectively than a high incidence of malaria. Government help is absolutely necessary and the settlers should be supplied with medical care, medicines, and hospital facilities. Wherever conditions permit, the fight by all known means should be directed against the carrier of the disease. In addition, individuals who have contracted malaria must be properly treated. Experience in the Netherlands Indies has shown that the frequency of malarial infection will decline when a colony has passed the pioneer stage and that then the public health personnel may be reduced. 164 166 744

Particular attention should be directed to the selection of settlers. Although the standard of living is low throughout the congested rural regions of Southeastern Asia and although nearly everything in a Philippine *barrio* or a Javanese *desa* can be duplicated in a short time in a pioneer community, yet not every Filipino or Javanese villager has the stamina needed by a settler. Young couples with farming experience make the best pioneers. They must be healthy and energetic.

The amount of financial support given to individual families will depend upon such factors as the size of farm holdings, the amount of cash crops to be grown in addition to subsistence food crops, marketing possibilites, and the education and experience of the settler. A graduate of an agri-

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cultural school in Luzon who comes from a farming family is of course better prepared to work with credit than is an illiterate Javanese tani.

Wherever possible the organizers of colonization projects should encourage the development of cooperatives. These would handle credit requirements, the marketing of surplus crops, and the purchase of seeds, fertilizers, and livestock for breeding purposes. Individual settlers usually have not the funds to buy good breeding animals. Moreover, if these are purchased by a cooperative all members can share in the opportunity of improving their stock. Credit and marketing cooperatives of the type planned in the Philippines would be effective means of protecting the peasants against exploitation by usurers and middlemen.

After the present war both the Indies and the Philippines will have to resume the task of agricultural colonization unless the war and epidemics should so reduce the population that pressure in the congested regions will have been eliminated. When and to what extent the work will be carried on will depend upon financial conditions and upon the priority given to the various reconstruction and rehabilitation tasks. The transfer of large numbers of landless families that have barely been able to make a miserable living, together with the resultant development of untapped material resources, should become an important part of the rehabilitation program in both countries. A long war will create new competing producers of the agricultural export crops of Southeastern Asia and may affect untold numbers of families which in prewar years obtained their livelihood by performing wage labor in agricultural export industries. Many of these laborers will probably have to become subsistence farmers and will therefore have to be settled on suitable land. Fortunately both these countries—as well as Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, and Burma—have considerable possibilities for further agricultural colonization. The settlement regions of the Indies are spread over the Outer Islands from Sumatra in the west to New Guinea in the east. Sumatra, Borneo, and Celebes, because of their proximity to Java, are far more important than New Guinea. The potential settlement area would be greatly increased if non-irrigable, as well as irrigable lands, could be drawn into the colonization scheme. In Java and Madura the *tegalan* area is greater than the *sawah* area. If Javanese and Madurese settlers were to be supplied with work animals and plows they could cultivate tegalans year after year in the Outer Islands, provided that they practiced crop rotation and utilized animal manure. The experimental settlement of Madurese at Madoeredjo in Borneo should supply the necessary experience on which to base large-scale settlement of Madurese and Javanese accustomed to tegalan culture.

In the Philippines the potential pioneer land is located for the most part in the provinces of Cotabato, Davao, Agusan, and Bukidnon in Mindanao and to a lesser degree in southern Negros, Mindoro, Palawan, and the eastern sections of Luzon. In my opinion, it would be desirable to concentrate chiefly on Mindanao after the war, since this island has

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the greatest possibilities of settlement expansion, and also because it lies outside the typhoon belt. The other potential settlement areas have long been receiving a small flow of settlers, migrating of their own accord from nearby communities. A concentration on Mindanao would, moreover, allow a more efficient use of scientific and managerial personnel, which could then divide its time among projects located not too distantly from each other. It would also make the shipment of supplies and the marketing of products considerably easier and would justify the operation of chartered ships between Manila and Mindanao, or even of ships owned by the N.L.S.A., if commercial companies should charge excessive freight and passenger rates. A scattering of projects over the whole Philippine archipelago has the disadvantage that heavy equipment must be transported over great distances when transferred from one colony to another. 000

At the end of the war in the Pacific there will be in the Philippines and other Pacific war zones large quantities of heavy equipment, such as tractors, jeeps, bulldozers, and ships and boats of various types, that the American forces are not likely to transport to the United States again and that could be turned to peaceful and constructive purposes, thus speeding the rehabilitation of the islands.

In the peace settlement after the present war the Philippine Commonwealth will insist upon a considerable reduction, if not the elimination, of the Japanese colony at Davao. The Philippine Government would be more than justified in taking over all those Japanese holdings in Davao that were developed in violation of the Philippine land laws. Such a step would make from 30,000 to 60,000 hectares of productive land available for immediate settlement.

Although the founding of new agricultural colonies on a large scale is an important part of the reconstruction and rehabilitation program both in the Indies and in the Philippines, agricultural colonization alone will not solve the economic and population problems of these two countries. Additional measures will have to be taken.

In the Philippines these will probably be agrarian reform and an industrialization program. Agrarian troubles, signalized before the war by outbreaks among the tenants of large *haciendas* in the crowded provinces of central Luzon, will not end until the large landed estates have been broken up and the land has been divided among the peasants who till it. In many instances the tenants claim that their forefathers were deprived of the land through ignorance of Spanish land laws, through trickery, and through the disregard of the Spaniards for customary land rights. After the American occupation, the Philippine Government bought a total of 410,000 acres of land from the friars in order to eliminate one annoying source of agrarian unrest. It has been reported that the Japanese have appropriated large estates and have turned this land over to the peasants in a move to gain the good will of the Filipino tao. Should this prove to be true the Philippine Government will be practically obliged to purchase the haciendas belonging to the Church, to corporations, and to private individuals. 471 [427] [727]

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to the Church, to corporations, and to private individuals. Thus to acquire the estates and then sell them to the tenants would be a most important step forward in the reconstruction of the Philippines and would remove a constant and serious threat to internal peace. It would be in line with the policy initiated by the Commonwealth in 1937 and with Article XII, Section 4 of the Constitution of the Philippines, which authorizes the National Assembly to expropriate land upon payment of just compensation in order to subdivide it into small lots and sell it to farmers at cost. This would ultimately give the peasants the total yield of their fields instead of the half or even less that they receive under the tenancy system. If at the same time the population in those crowded provinces where most of the landed estates are located were to be reduced by colonization measures, the peasants remaining there could be given more land to cultivate.

A third way of attacking the population problem of the Philippines is through the development of secondary industries. A start was made in this direction between 1935 and 1941. The leaders of the Philippine Commonwealth, foreseeing economic repercussions when political independence should become effective, set out to prepare the nation for the time when, because of the loss of tariff exemption, it could no longer sell its products to the United States.[2] Their goal was to make the country less dependent upon foreign sources of consumers' goods, especially food and clothing. It was realized that many commodities heretofore imported could be manufactured locally from raw materials which were already at hand or which could be produced in the islands. Examples of the latter are rubber and cotton, two products which the N.L.S.A. tried to develop on a large scale. On the one hand, industrialization tends to make the country self-sufficient, at least in those goods which can be produced locally without great effort. On the other hand, each new industry creates new employment opportunities, draws laborers from agriculture, and contributes thereby to the solution of the problem of rural overpopulation and unemployment. Each tenant farmer or sharecropper who becomes a full-time laborer in an industrial enterprise reduces the competition for land. Even if his employment is only seasonal his income and level of living are raised. At the same time those tenants who remain on the land have a chance of getting better terms from their landlords.

The industrialization movement in the Philippines between 1935 and 1941 was characterized by the government's direct participation in the establishment and operation of new industries. Local private capital was mainly invested in land and the production of the traditional export crops of the Philippines. On the whole these producers have exhibited a procrastinating attitude, hoping against hope that somehow an eleventh-hour miracle would preserve the old economic structure. A purchase of landed

[2] For a detailed discussion of the industrialization movement in the Philippines see Shepherd: Industry in Southeast Asia, 1941, pp. 86–122.

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estates by the government would force their former owners to search for new investment possibilities and a carefully planned industrialization program should attract this capital. Thus the same funds would contribute in two ways to a solution of the social, agrarian, and economic problems of the islands. The Philippine Commonwealth will not have the necessary capital for such an undertaking after the war; instead it will have to turn to the United States for the financing of its reconstruction and rehabilitation program. It is this country's moral obligation to give the coming political independence of the Philippines a firm economic basis. 000

In the Indies the customary systems of land tenure, together with Dutch land policy, fortunately prevented a concentration of cultivated land in the hands of a few. There is therefore no need for an agrarian reform of the type that may come in the Philippines. In some regions, however, the Indies Government granted concessions of public land for 75-year periods to individual entrepreneurs as well as to companies, without making sufficient allowance for population growth. In such instances the government may refuse renewal of the concessions after their expiration—some of those in question are expiring between 1940 and 1950—in order to make the land available for an expansion of the peasant crop area and for agricultural settlement. I 471 425

Industrialization has been given a foremost place among the means of alleviating Java's population pressure. In the desire to create as many employment opportunities as possible, the government from 1934 to 1941 encouraged the growth of small-scale industries in rural districts rather than the development of large mechanized plants producing great quantities of goods with a relatively small number of laborers. Whether agricultural colonization or industrialization is the more important measure has been a subject of controversy. My own opinion is that agricultural colonization, although it cannot go on indefinitely, will nevertheless be able to take care of the population increase of Java and Madura for many decades, whereas industrialization possibilities, although important, may more quickly reach the saturation point. During the last decade prior to the war, industrialization surpassed colonization as a means of providing livelihood for needy Javanese. The development of industries in established communities that abound in unemployed labor proceeds much faster than the creation of pioneer agricultural settlements in remote forest areas. During the first years after the war industrialization will probably again be in the lead but, I believe, for only a limited period. When the development of secondary industries has reached the point where it meets the local demand, colonization may come to the forefront. For in all probability the Indies, like the Philippines, will remain primarily an agricultural country with its wealth chiefly in the soil and climate. Many of the natural resources and other requirements for the development of primary industries are lacking, and secondary industries will probably work for the domestic market only I 168 166 464 654 438 000

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and will not be able to compete successfully with other Asiatic manufacturing countries on foreign markets. In the past the purchasing power of the bulk of the domestic population was low. This set the limits for secondary industries.[3] However, extensive agricultural colonization in the Outer Islands should have a stimulating effect upon Java's industries. The more rapidly the landless Javanese are settled in the Outer Islands under conditions that raise their level of living and make it possible for them to buy the goods they had to do without in the home island, the better for the industrialization program of Java. The future of secondary industries will depend also, however, upon the economic policy of the government after the war. These developed under protective measures, and, although they expanded especially during 1940 and 1941 because of the difficulty of obtaining goods from the customary sources, they will continue to require protection against outside competition. The price level of raw materials exported from the Indies, especially of those produced by peasants, will also be of the greatest importance. In recent years the Indies, like all countries producing raw materials primarily, have received low prices for these exports while at the same time they have had to pay comparatively high prices for imported finished goods. Sitsen points out that in 1913, for example, a peasant could obtain a can of imported salmon in exchange for two pounds of copra whereas in 1939 he had to give six pounds. Nobody can now foretell what the future holds in store for the peasant producers of the Indies and other parts of Southeastern Asia. Will there be a market for their rubber, tapioca, kapok, and copra? All planning, moreover, will have been in vain and there will be no improvement in the standard of living among the masses unless the industrial countries are willing to pay a fair price for tropical raw materials. For only if the Indies again export their agricultural and mining products will they be able to continue their struggle to relieve the difficulties of overpopulation in Java at a rate that will keep the balance between population and the means of existence.

In the discussion of agricultural colonization I limited myself to the Indies and the Philippines for two reasons. First, because these were the only countries where agricultural colonization had proceeded beyond the initial stage of experimentation and, secondly, because the war restricted my own field work to these archipelagos. But Indochina also suffers seriously from congestion and maldistribution of population. As its problems bear many similarities to those found in the Philippines and in the Indies, Indochina should be able to profit from Dutch, and in many instances also from Filipino, experience. The delta of the Red River in Tongking, as well as the coastal plains of Annam, are comparable to Java, while the

[3] Hart reports that "already in 1934, however, the rapid expansion in several branches of industry was becoming alarming and there was real danger that within a few years productive capacity would exceed demand with disastrous competition and price cutting as unavoidable consequences" (Hart: Towards Economic Democracy in the Netherlands Indies, 1941, p. 96).

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thinly settled areas of Laos, Cambodia, western Cochinchina, and the mountainous regions of Annam and Tongking are comparable to the Outer Islands. Moreover, the Annamese is as reluctant as the Javanese to leave his native village and settle among people who do not speak his language nor follow his customs. The few colonization experiments[4] that have been made in Indochina in recent years have brought out many of the same lessons as did the early trial period in the Indies.

> The necessity was felt for organizing this movement carefully, preferably by groups of families from the same village headed by their chiefs, who alone are capable of maintaining the cohesion necessary if the Tonkinese are to settle down to their ordinary way of living immediately after their establishment in the settlement areas.[5]

Here, too, the need for population adjustment has become so pressing that resettlement measures will have to be started on a large scale after the war.

Industrialization also has been advocated for Indochina. In contrast to the Philippines and the Indies, Indochina has most of the basic raw materials for heavy as well as for secondary industry. Mercantilistic considerations, however, deterred France from industrializing the country. It was not until 1938 that growing unemployment and population pressure finally led the government to initiate a compromise program of promoting secondary industries.

Migration across international boundaries in Southeastern Asia was, and probably will be, negligible; almost all such migrants who had before the war entered the countries encircling the South China Sea came from China or India, the principal exception being the Javanese in Malaya. Most of the latter entered the country as plantation laborers but ultimately settled on the land and engaged in rice cultivation. This development was beneficial to both countries; on the one hand the laborers and their families did not return to their overcrowded villages in Java and on the other hand they increased the rice production of Malaya. The Malays accept the Javanese readily as both are Moslem and of the same racial stock. There would be no reason to advocate a settlement of Javanese in the Philippines or Thailand or of Annamese in Malaya or Borneo, or of Filipinos in Cambodia or New Guinea so long as there was sufficient suitable agricultural land available within the boundaries of the native countries of the prospective pioneers.

In the past, Southeastern Asia did not to any great extent enjoy a free exchange of ideas and information. Identical problems were often tackled without the benefit of knowledge gained from the experience of a neighbor-

[4] International Labour Office: Labour Conditions in Indo-China, 1938, pp. 216–241. See also Brévié: "Conseil supérieur de la colonisation," 1938, pp. 715–756; and Services du Protectorat: "Activité colonisatrice du Tonkin," 1938, pp. 757–779.

[5] International Labour Office: *op. cit.*, p. 236.

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ing country. However, in the post-war period close collaboration will be desirable to facilitate reconstruction and rehabilitation throughout this area. One way of bringing this about would be by a frequent exchange of officials and technical specialists who could study the problems related to those in their own country and who could also be called upon to give advice. 000

After the war there will be an urgent need for effective measures swiftly taken to ameliorate suffering. At the same time there will probably be, at least temporarily, a scarcity of specialists familiar with problems of tropical agriculture, land settlement, and related fields. A pooling of scientific manpower, as well as of experience, will therefore be beneficial, if not essential, to the whole of Southeastern Asia. Such a pooling could probably be best effected by an international agency, which might take the form of a broadly representative regional council.

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APPENDIX A

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON THE WORK OF THE NATIONAL LAND SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION

Colonization of Northeastern Luzon

Agricultural colonization in northeastern Luzon and in the island of Mindoro was planned to supplement the Mindanao project and to attract settlers from the Ilocos coast and the central plain of Luzon. Although colonization had not been started in Mindoro by the time of the Japanese invasion, President Quezon, upon the recommendation of the directors of the N.L.S.A., had issued proclamation No. 610, on August 29, 1940, reserving the Mallig plain in Isabela province for a settlement project. The area covered by the proclamation embraced 64,597 hectares and included the municipalities of Cabagan, Gamu, Ilagan, and Tumauini. 166 656 361

The Mallig plain is a long, narrow, upland plain in the western part of Isabela province. In the west it borders the foothills of the central cordillera of Luzon and in the east is separated from the Cagayan Valley proper by low ridges. It is about 12 kilometers wide by 50 kilometers long. The plain is crossed by a number of rivers such as the Siffu and the Mallig that come out of the central cordillera and flow into the Cagayan River. The N.L.S.A. planned to utilize these rivers for irrigation systems. 133 312

Although specific climatic data are lacking, it is known that the Mallig plain has a short, dry season from February to April, a season of occasional rains from May to August, and a rainy season from September into the middle of January. The plain is covered with grass, except for thin belts of forest along rivers and creeks. Silibon is the most important of the grasses, and its presence indicates the existence of a hardpan, which is very extensive and lies at a depth of from 15 to 30 centimeters. It developed after the shifting cultivators of Kalinga had deforested the land, thus opening the way for the grasses. It would be necessary to break this hardpan with subsoilers before cultivation on an extensive scale might be possible. The topsoil of Mallig is especially deficient in nitrogen, but this could be rectified with the help of legumes. 132 134

In contrast to the procedure at Koronadal, the Mallig region had already been surveyed by the Bureau of Lands and divided into homesteads of 4, 6, and 8 hectares before the settlers arrived. A large number of these homesteads had been applied for by the time that the N.L.S.A. obtained control over the region. The first settlers had come in 1931, and there had been a second wave after 1938. A check-up in 1941 showed, however, that many of the applicants for homesteads had not yet begun to develop their land, much less to live on it. A number of reasons seem to have been responsible for this situation: the lack of a road, which was finally constructed during 1940 and 1941; the scarcity of easily accessible drinking water, which made deep well-boring necessary; a lack of capital on the part of the applicants; and, last but not least, the prevalence of malaria-spreading anopheles in the streams. Public-health officials found a splenic index of more than 75 per cent in the Mallig region. The entire local population of Kalinga was infected with malaria, and many homesteaders who took up residence there died from the disease. 654 166 655 164

The N.L.S.A. had two objectives in Mallig: first, to help homesteaders who had already made a start, or who had filed applications, to establish themselves successfully, and second, to bring in settlers for those farm lots that were still free. 655 166

In January 1941 the N.L.S.A. set a small group of employees and laborers to work in this region. As a result of its experience in Koronadal the administration did not wish to admit large numbers of settlers until the necessary preparations had been made. For this reason the Mallig project had not been officially opened to settlers at the beginning of April 1941, when I visited the district. Only a small number had been accepted. These pioneers were working for the administration and used their free hours to build their future homes. An administration building, a warehouse, a machine shed, and living quarters for the employees and laborers had been erected; an administration seed farm had been started. Surveyors were laying out the townsite; others were searching for the wooden markers, indicating the boundaries of the individual farm lots to be replaced with cement markers. At the same time surveyors were looking for suitable locations for *barrios*. The drinking-water problem had not yet been solved. A truck had to haul 361 312 000

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A truck had to haul
water from a small spring about 6 miles from the administration center. The drilling of deep wells would be necessary before large groups of settlers could be admitted. 312

To supply Mallig with equipment and provisions was considerably more difficult than to supply Koronadal. Goods could be shipped by water to the latter place, whereas everything had to be hauled to Mallig by truck, either from Manila over a distance of 250 miles, or at least from San José, in the province of Nueva Ecija, at the head of the railroad, a distance of 140 miles. The road leading from Nueva Ecija through Nueva Vizcaya into the Cagayan Valley is mountainous and difficult. 166 464 489

The overseer of the Mallig project, Dr. Samonte, an Ilocano, anticipated a rapid influx of Ilocanos as soon as the district should be opened. Settlers were expected to come especially from Pangasinan, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija, where they were working as laborers or as tenants; but migrants were also expected directly from the crowded villages on the Ilocos coast.

The Text of the Act Creating the National Land Settlement Administration (Commonwealth Act No. 441)

Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:

SECTION 1.

There is created a corporation composed of five persons to be known as "National Land Settlement Administration." They shall act as members of the Board of Directors in charge of the management of the Corporation and shall be appointed every three years by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly. The Corporation shall enjoy the general powers mentioned in the Corporation Law, shall be subject to the provisions thereof insofar as the same are compatible with the provisions of this Act, and, for attaining the purposes of the same, may perform any act which a corporation, copartnership, or natural person is authorized to perform under the laws existing or which may be hereafter enacted. This Corporation shall have its main office in the City of Manila. 655 166

SECTION 2.

The Corporation shall serve as an agency of the Commonwealth Government for the attainment of the following objectives:

(a) To facilitate the acquisition, settlement and cultivation of lands whether acquired from the Government or from private parties;
(b) To afford opportunity to own farms to tenant farmers and small farmers from congested areas, and to trainees who have completed the prescribed military training;
(c) To encourage migration to sparsely populated regions, and facilitate the amalgamation of the people in different sections of the Philippines;
(d) To develop new money crops to take the place of the present export crops which may suffer from the loss of preferences which they enjoy in the American market.

SECTION 3.

To carry out these purposes, the Corporation shall have the following powers:

(a) To hold without limitation as to area public agricultural lands for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable by the President of the Philippines for another period of not exceeding twenty-five years;
(b) To recommend to the President of the Philippines the reservation of public lands, preferably those situated along national highways, and to provide for the clearing, breaking, and cultivation of the lands so reserved for subsistence farming, or for money crops, or for both, on a cooperative basis or under such arrangements as may prove beneficial to the settlers, and for their survey into convenient lots, and to set aside such area or areas as may be deemed desirable for townsites, roads, government building sites, parks, and other public improvements. The expenses incurred in connection with the survey and subdivision of lots for allotment to settlers or for their initial cultivation shall be chargeable to the fund herein appropriated and shall be prorated among the lots of the subdivisions and charged against the corresponding settlers.
(c) To dispose of the lands so reserved, held, surveyed, or subdivided to persons qualified under the Constitution and the Public Land Act and who possess such other qualifications as may be prescribed by the Board of Directors. The dis-

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position and final grant of the land shall be made subject to the limitations prescribed in the Constitution and the Public Land Act and to the compliance of all conditions as may be imposed by the Board of Directors. Within a period of ten years after such final grant, the land shall not, except by inheritance, be encumbered, alienated or transferred, nor shall it become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to the credit agencies created under the provisions of this Act. No settler shall be entitled to hold a lot more than twenty-four hectares, and no officer or employee of the Corporation shall be permitted to acquire, directly or indirectly, any land within the reservation, unless with the specific approval of the Board of Directors in each case. The applicants shall be recruited from all provinces in proportion to their respective population, and in case a province shall not be able to fill the quota assigned, the unfilled portion of the quota may be covered from other provinces having a greater number of applicants;

(d) To acquire from private parties those lands that are necessary to enable it to carry out the purposes for which it is created, for roads, highways, streets, and avenues, or those private lands surrounded by or adjacent to the public land acquired by the Corporation;

(e) To make contracts and enter into such arrangements or contracts as it may consider convenient and advantageous to the common interest of the settlers and the Government for the development, exploitation, and operation of any of its properties;

(f) To establish and operate credit agencies to extend credit to the settlers upon the security of rights acquired by them as settlers on the crops raised or improvements made by them. The rate of interest on such loan shall not exceed six *per centum per annum*.

(g) To establish and operate electric light and water plants, water supplies, irrigation systems, trading stores or cooperatives to engage in the buying and selling of commodities, and other services or improvements which in the judgment of the Board will promote the well-being of the settlers;

(h) To act as agent, broker, commission merchant, or representative of the settlers in the marketing of the products raised or made by such settlers;

(i) To borrow, issue bonds, or otherwise raise funds for carrying out the objects of this Corporation, whenever it is deemed necessary for the interest of the settlers, giving its property as security therefor;

(j) To engage in manufacturing, milling, lumbering, retailing, and in such business enterprises or industries as may be necessary and desirable to insure the success of the land settlement projects;

(k) To adopt such uniform rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act;

SECTION 4.

The Board of Directors shall elect its chairman from among its members. Three members of the board shall constitute a *quorum* for the transaction of business. The members, if not Government officials or employees, shall each receive such per diems as may be determined by the Board, not to exceed thirty pesos for each day of meeting actually attended by them.

SECTION 5.

Subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines, the board shall appoint a manager and fix his compensation, which shall not exceed eighteen thousand pesos per annum. The manager shall, subject to the approval of the board, appoint such technical, clerical, and other employees as may be necessary: *Provided* that all appointments for positions with compensation of two thousand four hundred pesos per annum or more shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines.

SECTION 6.

The capital stock of the Corporation shall be twenty million pesos, to be subscribed by the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

SECTION 7.

There are appropriated out of the proceeds of the coconut oil excise tax or out of any other available funds in the Philippine Treasury such sums as may be necessary to

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pay for such part or parts of the capital as may be required from time to time by the Board of Directors with the approval of the President of the Philippines, but the aggregate value of which shall not exceed four million pesos in any one year. 655 166

SECTION 8.

The Corporation shall submit its annual report and balance sheet to the President of the Philippines and the National Assembly as provided for in sections five hundred and seventy-four to five hundred and seventy-seven inclusive, of the Administrative Code.

SECTION 9.

This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, June 3, 1939.

THE TEXT OF THE STANDARD CONTRACT BETWEEN THE N.L.S.A. AND THE SETTLER

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That the NATIONAL LAND SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION, a Corporation created by Commonwealth Act No. 441, hereinafter called the ADMINISTRATION, through its ..... and ..... of the Municipality of ..... province of ..... of legal age, married /single /widower, a citizen of the Philippines, hereinafter called the SETTLER, for and in consideration of the mutual covenants and benefits hereinafter specified, hereby enter into a contract of agricultural settlement subject to the following terms and conditions:

SECTION I, RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE SETTLER

That the Settler hereby agrees and binds himself:

1. To move to ..... Settlement District in the province of ....., and become a member of the agricultural settlement established therein;
2. To plant and cultivate the land allotted to him to such plants and crops, and to raise and breed such livestock as the Administration shall prescribe;
3. To devote himself exclusively to the cultivation of the parcel of land allotted to him and not to leave the settlement or engage in any other trade or occupation without the approval of the Administration;
4. To comply with all the rules and regulations which the Administration may from time to time promulgate for the settlement, until such time as the Administration shall have withdrawn its control over the settlement;
5. Not to sell, assign, lease, encumber or otherwise transfer, except by inheritance, the land allotted to him, until after the expiration of a period of ten (10) years immediately following the final grant of title to such land. This obligation shall extend to and bind likewise the successors and assigns of the Settler;
6. To pay to the Administration in the manner prescribed in par. 3, Section III hereof, with interest thereon at a rate not to exceed four per cent (4%) per annum, all the advances made by the Administration covering:
   a. The cost of transportation and other expenses incidental thereto for the Settler, his family or dependents, his belongings, work animals and agricultural implements, from his place of residence to ..... Settlement District in the province of .....;
   b. The cost of materials and skilled assistance furnished the Settler for the construction of his dwelling-house and farm structures;
   c. The cost of all assistance rendered the Settler in accordance with par. 4, Section II of this contract; and
   d. The cost of subsistence and clothing furnished the Settler and his household, unless such Settler is employed upon a daily wage basis, in which case the cost of his subsistence and clothing and that of his household shall be periodically deducted from his earnings.
7. To deposit for marketing purposes in a settlement warehouse to be established by the Administration all his agricultural and other products of a non-perishable kind, which are in excess of his needs for subsistence and planting purposes.

SECTION II, RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION

The Administration agrees and binds itself:

1. To assign to the Settler a parcel of twelve (12) hectares of agricultural land within ..... Settlement District in the province of ....., for his occupation and

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cultivation, subject to the condition that full title to such land shall not be granted until after the Settler has fully discharged all his obligations to the Administration and placed the entire land under cultivation;

2. To furnish transportation and advance such expenses incidental to the journey as the Administration may consider necessary, for the Settler and his family or dependents, his belongings, work animals and agricultural implements, from his place of residence to ..... Settlement District in the province of .....;

3. To supply the Settler with the necessary materials and furnish him with skilled assistance for the construction of his dwelling-house and such farm structures as may be necessary, on condition that all such buildings shall conform to the types and dimensions approved by the Administration;

4. To furnish the Settler with:

a. The use of tractors, plows or other mechanical means for the preparation of the land;

b. Manures, seedlings and other planting materials;

c. Livestock, work animals and agricultural equipment, subject to the condition that the Administration shall retain a lien upon such livestock and work animals until the Settler shall have fully discharged his indebtedness to the Administration.

5. To furnish subsistence for the Settler and his household, until such time as he shall have produced and harvested sufficient food crops for his requirements;

6. To sell in behalf and for the benefit of the Settler all the products deposited by the latter in the settlement warehouse established by the Administration, in the most favorable markets, and credit the full proceeds of such sales to the Settler's account after deducting the cost of storage, insurance, freight and handling.

7. To grant upon the Settler full title to the land assigned to him, upon payment of all his obligations to the Administration and after completely cultivating his land.

SECTION III, GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. Within ten (10) years after the final grant of the title under par. 1, Sec. II hereof, the land shall not be liable for the satisfaction of any debt contracted by the Settler prior to the expiration of the said period of ten (10) years.

2. All agricultural tools and equipment, work animals, seeds, fertilizers, and other plant materials, building materials and supplies furnished the Settler by virtue of this contract shall, upon delivery to the Settler, be considered to be completely at his risk, and shall not be transferred, sold or otherwise disposed of by the Settler without the authorization of the Administration.

3. The payment of all the Settler's obligations to the Administration under this contract shall be made in annual amortizations beginning at the end of the third year after his arrival at the settlement and shall be completed before the end of the twentieth year, on condition that:

a. In the fourth year and thereafter, until the Settler's account shall have been fully liquidated and closed, the Administration shall retain and credit to the Settler's account, such proportion of the proceeds of the sales of the products marketed under par. 6, Sec. II hereof, as the Administration may from time to time determine; in no case, however, to exceed 30 per cent of the total proceeds of such sales; and

b. The balance of the proceeds of such sales or any portion thereof may be paid to the Settler in cash, unless the Settler should elect to have the same credited to his account.

4. Failure of the Settler to comply with any of the conditions of this contract shall be a sufficient cause for the forfeiture of all his rights as a Settler in the ..... Settlement District.

5. If after due inquiry by the Administration the Settler should be declared incompetent to perform the work of the Settlement, or if there should exist any other good and sufficient reason, this contract shall be deemed cancelled and all the rights, improvements and interests of the Settler in and to the land allotted to him under this contract shall revert to the Administration, which shall cause such rights, improvements and interests of the Settler to be assessed by a Board of Assessors appointed by the Administration, and shall apply their value thus assessed to the payment of all his obligations to the Administration, any balance in excess of said obligations to be paid to the Settler.

6. Except as provided in the two next preceding paragraphs, this contract shall be effective between the parties for a period of twenty (20) years unless sooner terminated by the early compliance of the Settler with the conditions and stipulations covenanted herein.

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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their hands this ..... day of ....., 194...., at ....., ...

NATIONAL LAND SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION
By:

....
Manager Settler

IN THE PRESENCE OF:

....

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES } ss.
PROVINCE OF .....

Personally appeared before me this ..... day of ....., 194...., ...
.....
..... known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing instrument, and who declared that the same is their voluntary act and deed.

This certifies that the foregoing instrument is a contract of agricultural settlement of a parcel of land and consists of three (3) pages including this one, the first of which has been signed on the left margin by the parties and the witnesses, and the last page at the foot of the deed proper.

Doc. No. .....
Page No. .....
Book No. .....
Series of 194.....

Notary Public
Until December 31, 194....

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APPENDIX B

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION FOR MIGRATION AND COLONIZATION

Surveys

The surveys (pp. 207,209) were primarily the task of soil scientists and irrigation engineers. Each group followed definite time tables that had been worked out in advance. For instance, the soil surveyors' time table for 1940 provided for investigations in 13 districts: 6 in Sumatra, 4 in Borneo, 2 in Celebes, and 1 in New Guinea (Table XXXIV). 654 166 242



Fig. 171—Sections in the southwestern part of Netherlands New Guinea considered for Javanese colonization. The shaded areas on the map include the following: Area A (approximately 1,000,000 hectares); Area B (approximately 360,000 hectares); Area C (approximately 550,000 hectares); Area D (approximately 225,000 hectares). Based on data given in *Nederlandsch-Indische Geografische Mededeelingen*, 1941, p. 190.

In June 1941 the commission sent its soil specialists to southwestern New Guinea to carry out a reconnaissance survey in three areas and map the soils of another that had already been the subject of a reconnaissance survey in October 1940. This work was to be finished by the end of November 1941. The areas to be reconnoitered were (Map, Fig. 171): 1. the land between the Bian and the Merauke rivers, comprising 1,000,000

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hectares; II. the land between Moeting and the Digoel River, about 360,000 hectares; III. the land between the Digoel River and Okaba on the coast, 550,000 hectares. The area to be mapped was: IV. the coastal region from the mouth of the Bian River to the Dutch-Australian border, comprising about 225,000 hectares.[1] Tables XXXV and XXXVI show the amount of work done by the soil surveyors between 1934 and 1940. During these 7 year they approved 970,000 hectares for colonization; because of lack of data it is, however, impossible to say how much of this was also surveyed by irrigation engineers.

If we compare the amount of land approved by the Soil Institute with the expenditure we find that the soil survey alone of one hectare of approved land cost an average of 0.70 guilders in 1938 and of not quite half a guilder in 1939.[2] The irrigation engineers of the Department of Public Works could not keep up with the soil specialists during 1938 because of lack of personnel, but in 1939 they made considerable progress. At the end of 1939 they had investigated 44 out of a total of 140 proposed projects and had recommended 25 areas for further investigation; but of the latter, 5 had to be turned down by soil specialists upon their second survey, while the local population raised objections to the settling of Javanese in 3 others. That left 17 projects in which the surveys could be pursued further. Of the remaining 96 projects, 3 had already been rejected by soil specialists and the survey of 38 more had been indefinitely postponed for various reasons; so that the irrigation engineers had 55 projects on their calendar. In December 1939, the Department of Public Works estimated that all of these could be handled by the end of 1943.

Propaganda

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In order to persuade a conservative and wary Javanese *tani* to leave his native island one must approach him at the psychological moment and in a convincing manner. For this purpose a few successful, well-dressed, and satisfied colonists were brought back to their home districts with samples of soils, agricultural produce, and numerous photographs of life in the colony. With such concrete evidence they often dispelled the fear and scepticism of their former fellow villagers. Peasants who would be too shy to ask questions in a large assembly were given an opportunity to talk confidentially with the visitor over a leisurely smoke or cup of coffee. The visitor was usually accompanied by his wife, who would discuss her experiences with the women of the village. After having selected a satisfied colonist as their propagandist, the officials left him entirely to his own devices. Recruiting by this means met with the greatest success when undertaken shortly before the scheduled date of departure; if it was attempted too far in advance the volunteers might change their minds. It was also important to time the recruitment during *patcheclick*, the annual period of food scarcity in Java, that is, during the last weeks before harvest. Another direct propaganda method was to send Javanese villagers on excursions to the colonies in the Outer Islands at the government's expense.

Methods of indirect propaganda included lantern-slide talks by a professional Javanese lecturer and theatrical performances. There was scarcely a railroad station, pawnshop, or public building in Java that did not display colorful posters inviting the Javanese to "Tanah Sabrang." The work of the commission was kept constantly before all Dutch as well as Indonesian officials by means of beautifully illustrated wall calendars showing photographs of typical scenes in the colonies and memorandum books full of slogans and facts about colonization. Two editions, in Malay and in Dutch, of a quarterly bulletin on colonization were also issued.

Special attention was directed towards familiarizing Javanese village youth with the idea of migration, having in mind that "he who has the young people has the future." The commission presented the pupils of village continuation schools (grades four and five) with textbooks[3] on Tanah Sabrang (Fig. 161). Each village school in central and

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[1] *Nederlandsch-Indische Geografische Mededeelingen*, 1941, pp. 99–100.

[2] In the year 1938, 100,000 guilders were expended and 142,000 hectares were approved; 151,921 guilders were expended and 318,000 hectares were approved in 1939.

[3] Hardjawisastra: Bojong Menjang Tanah Sabrang, 1938; and also Hardjawiraga and Koesrin: Ajo Menjang Kolonisasi, 1940.

[i.e. Central Commission for the Migration & Colonization of Natives -- Analyst]

[See p. 184, category 116 -- Analyst]

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eastern Java received reproductions of three paintings depicting the embarkation of colonists, the clearing of the forest, and a market scene in Gedongtataän. Settlers were constantly urged to keep in touch with their relatives and friends by mail and were provided with photographs, attractive illustrated postcards (Fig. 158), stamps, and, if they were illiterate, with scribes, without charge; during harvest time they were urged to send envelopes with samples of rice. Every month thousands of these messages reached Javanese villages. In 1939 colonists in the Lampoeng Districts sent 28,019 postcards, 1,842 letters, 428 envelopes containing rice, and 12,246 photographs to Java, according to the records of the Commission. The many money orders sent by settlers to their relatives in Java also had propaganda value, as proof that better economic conditions prevailed in the Outer Islands than in Java. The records showed that Javanese colonists in the Lampoeng Districts sent 165,000 guilders to Java during 1935 and 115,000 guilders during the first eight months of 1936.[4]

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The most powerful weapon of modern propaganda, the motion picture, played a prominent part in the program. A. Jonkers, an official of the Department of the Interior familiar with Javanese customs and ideas, supplied the script for a film, "Tanah Sabrang," which was directed by Mannus Franken. As most Javanese villagers had never seen a motion picture, the action is slow and very detailed. The picture shows all the steps in migration, from recruiting to the final well established *desa* where every settler has his own house, garden, and fertile sawah. The picture cleverly portrays a *wajang* play, the traditional Javanese entertainment. Three of the characters are the beloved old wajang figures of Semar and his two sons Petruk and Gareng, to whom the Javanese has been accustomed since childhood. A special point was made in the film of the fact that the familiar characters of the wajang go along to Sumatra, so that the Javanese might feel more at home in the new land. The other characters are modern Javanese villagers and officials who make the journey step by step from central Java to the Lampoengs.

Three trucks with projectors and sound machinery made the rounds of central and eastern Java, presenting the picture each night in a new desa. The performances were held in the open air and were attended by thousands of Javanese of all ages who came in from the surrounding desas. Many saw it several times, delighted at being able to attend a free movie. In this way the film's persuasive powers had a chance to take hold of their imagination.

Recruitment

I was told by a leading official on the staff of the commission that about 30 per cent of the 1938 and 1939 migrants were of "poor quality" and should not have been selected, because they were either too old or too weak to make good pioneers, or they were bachelors accompanied by "voyage wives," or they were not real tanis but former plantation laborers or people who had made their living by doing any kind of work they could find. Half of these turned out well, however, whereas the other half lost courage during the months of clearing and building and deserted the colonies in order to seek work as wage laborers. The main reason for the shortcomings of the selection was that the *lurahs* were asked to supply a certain number of migrants but found great difficulty in filling their quota if they adhered strictly to the rules of selection; they therefore ignored the latter in order to carry out the order. Cases of desertion not only meant a loss for the government because the deserters did not meet their financial obligations, but also slowed down the growth of the projects, for each settled family was expected to help additional families under the mutual assistance system. However, the commission did not persecute the deserters. If they were discovered on a plantation, an arrangement was made with the management for the payment of their debts, but otherwise the deserters were left alone. As long as they did not return to Java, the commission felt that one of its main functions had been fulfilled.

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Migration Timetables

The season for dispatching colonists depends upon the climate of the colonization area, which in turn determines the time of the rice harvest and that for clearing and burning the forest. Colonists destined for the Lampoeng Districts and Palembang must

[4] Rookmaaker: "De Javanenkolonisatie," 1937, p. 427.

AL [See p. 184, category 116 -- Analysis]

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be sent during February and March; for Sumatra's West Coast in April and May; for Djambi in May; for Borneo in June and July; for Celebes in June and July or in November; those for Benkoelen in November. The commission drew up detailed time tables well in advance. For instance, Table XXXVIII, giving a part of the time table for migration to the Lampoeng Districts during February 1940, was prepared during the summer of 1939, long before recruiting had been finished. In each case departure and arrival were so timed that a whole day was available to bring the settlers from their home villages to the steamer and another from the steamer to their destination.

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APPENDIX C

STATISTICAL TABLES

TABLE XXI—THE KORONADAL VALLEY PROJECT: HOME PROVINCES OF SETTLERS, AS OF JANUARY 27, 1941

HOME PROVINCE	NUMBER OF SETTLERS THEREFROM IN— Lagao	Tupi	Marbel	Polomolok	Total
Abra	2	2	—	—	4
Agusan	2	—	—	—	
Albay	3	4	3	3	13
Antique	27	—	9	3	39
Bataan	—	2	—	—	2
Batangas	1	19	—	—	20
Bohol	57	37	11	68	173
Bulacan	11	—	2	1	14
Cagayan	1	—	1	—	2
Camarines Norte	1	—	2	—	3
Camarines Sur	—	1	3	—	4
Capiz	51	59	70	17	197
Cavite	4	4	1	1	10
Cebu	96	48	94	15	253
Cotabato	14	1	5	13	33
Davao	1	—	—	—	1
Ilocos Norte	4	—	3	—	7
Ilocos Sur	—	1	2	1	4
Iloilo	77	179	438	128	822
Laguna	9	11	3	—	23
Lanao	9	3	—	—	12
La Union	7	3	1	3	14
Leyte	61	85	72	42	260
Manila	17	21	6	3	47
Marinduque	1	1	—	—	2
Masbate	1	—	—	1	2
Misamis Occidental	5	—	2	—	7
Misamis Oriental	10	9	—	6	25
Mountain Province	2	—	1	1	4
Negros Occidental	14	15	40	—	69
Negros Oriental	14	4	1	2	21
Nueva Ecija	4	5	26	—	35
Pampanga	27	31	31	11	100
Pangasinan	19	10	68	3	100
Rizal	8	—	1	—	9
Samar	1	1	1	4	7
Sorsogon	3	—	1	4	8
Tarlac	8	23	52	1	84
Tayabas	6	3	—	15	24
Zambales	3	—	3	1	7
Zamboanga	1	—	3	—	4
TOTAL SETTLERS	582	582	956	347	2,467

Source: Unpublished records of the N.L.S.A.

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TABLE XXII—JAVA AND MADURA: GROWTH OF THE INDONESIAN POPULATION, 1815–1930

CENSUS YEAR	TOTAL INDONESIAN POPULATION	AVERAGE RATE OF YEARLY INCREASE	CENSUS YEAR	TOTAL INDONESIAN POPULATION	AVERAGE RATE OF YEARLY INCREASE
1815	4,499,250	——	1890	23,609,312	2.19
1845	9,374,477	2.48	1895	25,370,545	1.45
1860	12,514,262	1.94	1900	28,386,121	2.27
1870	16,233,100	2.64	1905	29,978,558	1.10
1880	19,540,813	1.87	1920	34,428,711	0.93
1885	21,190,626	1.63	1930	40,891,093	1.79

Source: *Volkstelling 1930*, Vol. 8, 1936, Table 3. The data given by J. van Gelderen in his paper "The Numerical Evolution of Population," 1931, vary slightly from the above.

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TABLE XXIII—JAVA: LAND USE AND DENSITIES OF INDONESIAN POPULATION IN SELECTED DISTRICTS, 1930

DISTRICT	AREAS (SQ. KM.) Total	Cultivated by Indonesians	Irrigated Riceland (*sawahs*)	PROPORTION CULTIVATED LAND TO SAWAH*	DENSITY PER SQ. KM. CULTIVATED LAND
West Java					
Ploembon, Cheribon Res.	103.8	92.4	57.9	1.00 : 0.627	1,192
*Percentages**	*100.0*	*89.1*	*55.8*		
Anjer, Bantam Res.	2[illegible].6	236.1	42.7	1.00 : 0.181	200
*Percentages**	*100.0*	*79.3*	*14.4*		
Middle Java					
Adiwerno, Pekalongan Res.	92.8	85.0	54.3	1.00 : 0.639	1,765
*Percentages**	*100.0*	*91.6*	*58.5*		
Wiradesa, Pekalongan Res.	94.6	80.9	49.7	1.00 : 0.614	1,135
*Percentages**	*100.0*	*85.5*	*52.5*		
East Java					
Tegalombo, Madioen Res.	415.9	319.2	51.1	1.00 : 0.160	185
*Percentages**	*100.0*	*76.8*	*12.3*		
Poenoeng, Madioen Res.	357.7	332.4	17.9	1.00 : 0.054	193
*Percentages**	*100.0*	*92.9*	*5.0*		

* Percentages and proportions computed by the author.

Source: Data for West Java from *Volkstelling 1930*, Vol. 1, Table 8; data for Middle Java from *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, Table 9; data for East Java from *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, Table 8.

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TABLE XXIV—JAVA AND MADURA: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF FARMS, ACCORDING TO SIZE, BY RESIDENCIES, 1903

SIZE OF FARMS	Percentage distribution of number of farms in—								
	Bantam	Batavia	Preanger Regencies	Cheribon	Banjoemas	Pekalongan	Semarang	Kedoe	Rembang
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Less than 0.18 hectare	33.2	15.8	18.1	12.9	6.2	8.3	19.6	12.9	18.7
0.18 to 0.349 "	23.3	11.9	13.1	18.3	9.2	15.2	17.8	21.4	18.9
0.35 to 0.529 "	15.0	8.1	11.1	17.5	15.3	15.4	16.3	20.2	10.3
0.53 to 0.709 "	13.2	24.5	15.5	27.4	36.6	27.4	26.5	23.1	20.1
0.71 to 1.419 hectares	11.2	24.8	18.1	17.6	20.7	22.2	14.6	15.0	18.3
1.42 to 2.839 "	3.2	8.1	12.8	4.0	8.4	7.3	3.7	5.3	9.7
2.84 hectares or more	0.9	6.8	11.3	2.3	2.6	4.2	1.5	2.1	4.0
Less than 0.71 hectare	84.7	60.3	57.8	76.1	67.3	66.3	80.2	77.6	68.0

Source: Hasselman: Algemeen overzicht van de uitkomsten van het welvaart-onderzoek, 1914, Appendix R. This gives the actual number in each group, from which the percentages above have been computed by the author.

TABLE XXIV—JAVA AND MADURA: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF FARMS, ACCORDING TO SIZE, BY RESIDENCIES, 1903, *Continued*

SIZE OF FARMS	Percentage distribution of number of farms in—						
	Madioen	Soerabaja	Madura	Kediri	Pasoerocan	Besoeki	JAVA (Exclusive of Madura and principalities)
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Less than 0.18 hectare	16.0	21.6	19.4	9.8	10.0	9.6	15.8
0.18 to 0.349 "	18.5	14.1	17.9	22.8	13.7	14.5	17.0
0.35 to 0.529 "	11.4	8.5	13.9	13.2	13.0	12.7	14.4
0.53 to 0.709 "	22.9	20.2	22.0	24.4	31.4	27.4	23.7
0.71 to 1.419 hectares	20.6	24.1	17.7	18.3	22.1	22.8	18.2
1.42 to 2.839 "	6.9	7.3	6.5	7.7	7.5	9.6	7.0
2.84 hectares or more	3.7	4.2	2.6	3.8	2.3	3.4	3.9
Less than 0.71 hectare	68.8	64.4	73.3	70.2	68.1	64.2	70.9

Source: As given above.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia-
Indonesia 081
Java--Madura

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TABLE XXV—JAVA AND MADURA: NUMBER OF LANDOWNERS AND OF LANDLESS MEN, IN CERTAIN RESIDENCIES, 1903

RESIDENCY	LANDOWNERS (*a*)	LANDLESS MEN (*b*)	RATIO OF *a* TO *b*
*West Java**			
Bantam	157,518	25,851	6.1 : 1.0
Batavia	48,121	23,810	2.0 : 1.0
Preanger Regencies	367,479	303,850	1.2 : 1.0
Cheribon	252,466	109,154	2.3 : 1.0
*Middle Java**			
Banjoemas	178,881	262,186	0.7 : 1.0
Pekalongan	272,925	219,021	1.2 : 1.0
Semarang	421,174	72,762	5.8 : 1.0
Kedoe	356,039	228,065	1.6 : 1.0
Rembang	227,922	76,949	3.0 : 1.0
*East Java**			
Madioen	189,157	109,575	1.7 : 1.0
Besoeki	142,409	35,695	4.0 : 1.0
Madura	317,026	81,961	3.0 : 1.0

*The residencies have been arranged approximately according to their present provincial divisions, although these were not in effect in 1903.

Source: Hasselman: *op. cit.*, Appendix S.

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TABLE XXVI—JAVA AND MADURA: PAYMENTS MADE TO INDONESIANS BY THE SUGAR INDUSTRY, 1920–1938

YEAR	AREA IN SUGAR CANE (HECTARES)	PAYMENTS (GUILDERS) FOR— Wages Total (000's omitted)	Wages Per hectare	Deliveries* Total (000's omitted)	Deliveries* Per hectare	Ground rent (000's omitted)	Indemnities‡ (000's omitted)
1920	156,059	79,270	507.95	7,581	48.58	14,383†	None
1922	160,909	96,970	602.63	7,628	47.41	16,765	"
1924	172,311	92,850	538.85	6,743	39.13	19,927†	"
1926	179,703	94,560	526.20	5,376	29.92	21,064	"
1928	194,937	106,268	545.14	5,008	25.69	22,868†	"
1930	198,642	97,866	492.68	2,986	15.03	25,044	"
1931	201,[illegible]9	83,978	417.47	2,207	10.97	25,026	59
1932	171,003	53,077	309.30	911	5.31	21,703	755
1933	88,635	21,866	246.70	384	4.33	11,854†	2,691
1934	38,811	9,712	250.25	189	4.86	6,526†	2,654
1935	29,453	7,270	246.84	233	7.90	3,811†	2,763
1936	35,880	7,517	209.50	244	6.81	3,183†	1,950
1937	85,710	15,298	178.49	476	5.55	5,531†	721
1938	85,309	16,499	193.41	387	4.54	5,613†	153

*Payments were made by the plantations to the Indonesians for deliveries of all kinds of building material, packing material, animal manure, lime, firewood, bamboo, etc. Such deliveries represented a source of income for the local population in the neighborhood of the plantations.

†In these years the data on ground rent are incomplete. In 1920 and 1924 a single plantation failed to report; in 1928, five plantations failed to report; in 1933, one; in 1934, two; in 1935, two; in 1936, two; in 1937, eight; and in 1938, six.

‡Because of the depression some sugar plantations could not carry out their contracts and so had to pay indemnities.

Source: *Berichten . . . van de suikerindustrie in Nederlandsch-Indië*, No. 33, 1939, p. 110.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia
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Java--Madura

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TABLE XXVII—JAVA AND MADURA: NUMBER OF INDONESIANS OWNING MORE THAN 17.7 HECTARES OF LAND, BY RESIDENCIES, 1905 and 1925

RESIDENCY	YEAR 1905	YEAR 1925	NET CHANGE
*West Java**			
Bantam	5	157	+152
Batavia	7	376	+369
Preanger	556	1,226	+670
Cheribon	18	268	+250
*Middle Java**			
Pekalongan	212	106	−106
Semarang	95	250	+155
Banjoemas	28	207	+179
Kedoe	20	80	+ 60
Rembang	23	43	+ 20
*East Java**			
Madioen	45	78	+ 33
Kediri	25	107	+ 82
Soerabaja	104	79	− 25
Pasoeroean	38	137	+ 99
Besoeki	18	223	+205
Madura	15	50	+ 35
JAVA AND MADURA†	1,209	3,387	+2,178

*The residencies have been arranged approximately according to their present provincial divisions, although these were not in effect until 1927.

†Exclusive of the principalities.

Source: Scheltema: Deelbouw in Nederlandsch-Indië, 1931, p. 275.

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TABLE XXVIII—JAVA AND MADURA: NUMBER OF INDONESIAN TENANTS COMPARED TO THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONS ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE, BY RESIDENCIES AND PRINCIPALITIES, 1905

RESIDENCY OR PRINCIPALITY	INDONESIAN TENANTS Total number	As per cent of all engaged in agriculture
*West Java**		
Bantam	27,411	10.6
Batavia	42,285	11.7
Preanger	66,794	10.0
Cheribon	4,915	1.2
*Middle Java**		
Pekalongan	17,062	4.2
Semarang	12,478	2.2
Rembang	3,492	1.2
Banjoemas	14,594	5.4
Kedoe	33,970	5.3
Jogjakerta	36,304	9.8
Soerakarta	22,773	6.9
*East Java**		
Soerabaja	4,511	0.9
Madioen	3,783	1.3
Kediri	13,195	3.8
Pasoeroean	16,665	3.7
Besoeki	8,804	4.2
Madura	12,074	2.9
JAVA & MADURA	341,110	5.3

*The residencies have been arranged approximately according to their present provincial divisions, although these were not in effect until 1927.

Source: Scheltema: *op. cit.*, p. 272.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia
Indonesia. oB1
Java-- Madura

TABLE XXIX—JAVA: NUMBERS OF PEASANTS HOLDING FIELDS AND OF PEASANT LESSORS, BY SCOPE OF LEASE, IN SELECTED DESAS, IN THE REGENCY OF TOELOENGAGOENG, KEDIRI RESIDENCY, 1939 427 471

DESA	PEASANT HOLDERS: TOTAL NUMBER	PEASANT LESSORS: Total		Leasing entire holding		Leasing more than half of holding	
		Number	Per cent of holders	Number	Per cent of holders	Number	Per cent of holders
Baleredjo	100	76	76.0	18	18.0	50	50.0
Kalangbret	108	56	51.8	30	27.8	14	12.9
Kaoeman	145	85	58.6	5	3.4	70	48.2
Batangsaren	162	113	69.8	29	17.9	22	44.4
Modjosari	111	101	91.0	16	14.4	85	76.5
Sepatan	104	102	98.1	35	33.6	11	15.7
Gondosoeli	143	141	98.6	8	5.6	56	39.1
Modjosroem	131	131	100.0	62	47.3	23	17.5
Notoredjo	193	27	14.0	21	10.9	2	1.0
Djarakan	84	77	91.7	—	—	7	8.3
Sidomoeljo	128	117	91.4	44	34.4	25	19.5
Bendo	129	64	49.6	32	24.8	21	16.2
Poendoengan	131	131	100.0	56	42.7	55	42.0
Redjosari	141	94	66.7	47	33.3	25	17.7
Wonokromo	113	113	100.0	7	6.2	27	23.9
Boengoer	210	135	64.3	87	41.4	19	9.0
Gondanglor	102	97	95.1	94	92.2	—	—
Soekoredjo	75	34	45.3	22	29.3	4	5.3
Soekowijono	162	134	82.7	114	70.4	9	5.5
Babadan	91	68	74.7	68	74.7	—	—
Sembon	177	136	76.8	134	75.7	—	—
TOTAL	2,740*	2,032	74.2	929	33.9	575	20.9

* This total is made up of 260 *bebaus* and 2,480 *gogols*. A bebau is a village official who receives the use of a certain amount of land as remuneration. [624] [565]

Source: Soenario: *op. cit.*, p. 125.

TABLE XXX—JAVA AND MADURA: QUANTITIES OF MAJOR FOOD CROPS AVAILABLE PER HEAD OF THE INDONESIAN POPULATION IN SELECTED YEARS FROM 1913 TO 1940 511 433

YEARS	QUANTITIES OF FOOD CROPS AVAILABLE PER HEAD (KILOGRAMS)					
	Rice (husked)	Maize (husked)	Cassava (fresh)	Sweet potatoes (fresh)	Peanuts (shelled)	Soybeans
1913	102	29	71	25	3.7	4.3
1916–1924*	96	38	134	34	3.7	3.7
1925–1928*	88	45	133	27	2.7	4.4
1933	86	46	125	26	2.4	4.9
1934	78	37	123	24	2.4	4.1
1935	85	42	132	30	2.3	2.9
1936–1939*†	82	41	151	27	2.4	5.4
1940	87	37	159	32	2.7	5.6

* Annual average of quantities available for consumption.

† Exceptionally good rice harvests in 1938, 1939, and 1940, rather than a fundamental improvement in the situation, are reflected in the statistics of these years. The quantities of husked rice, husked maize, fresh cassava, and fresh sweet potatoes available per head in the years from 1936 to 1939 were as follows (kilograms):

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia
Indonesia OB1
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	Rice	*Maize*	*Cassava*	*Sweet Potatoes*
1936	83	45	146	29
1937	78	40	138	26
1938	85	39	160	26
1939	83	39	159	27

Source: Data for 1913, 1916–1924 (the average), 1933, and 1934 from Scheltema: The Food Consumption of the Native Inhabitants of Java and Madura, 1936, p. 16; the averages for 1925–1928 and 1936–1939 from Departement van Economische Zaken: Voedselproblemen, 1940, p. 21; the annual data for the years 1935 through 1939 from *Economisch Weekblad*, Vol. 9, 1940, p. 721; the annual data for 1940 from Verslag van de Commissie tot de bestudeering van staatsrechtelijke hervormingen, 1941, Part I, p. 15.

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TABLE XXXI—JAVA AND MADURA: INDONESIAN INTERDEPARTMENTAL MIGRANTS BY RESIDENCY OR PRINCIPALITY OF BIRTH AND BY PLACE OF HABITATION, 1930

RESIDENCY OR PRINCIPALITY	EMIGRANTS (BORN IN RESIDENCY NAMED; ENUMERATED IN ANOTHER)				IMMIGRANTS (ENUMERATED IN RESIDENCY NAMED; BORN IN ANOTHER)			
	Total		1930 Habitation (per cent of *a*)		Total		Place of birth* (per cent of *e*)	
	Actual number	Per cent of 1930 population in residency named	Java or Madura	Outer Islands	Actual number	Per cent of 1930 population in residency named	Java or Madura	Outer Islands
	(*a*)	(*b*)	(*c*)	(*d*)	(*e*)	(*f*)	(*g*)	(*h*)
West Java								
Bantam	76,777	7.5	39.6	60.4	24,387	2.4	79.4	6.0
Batavia	83,491	3.4	56.5	43.5	273,496	11.2	91.9	5.1
Buitenzorg	131,991	6.1	87.5	12.5	87,982	4.1	94.4	2.6
Priangan	169,053	5.0	77.2	22.8	117,719	3.5	92.0	6.0
Cheribon	83,451	4.1	75.4	24.6	55,921	2.8	96.7	1.8
Middle Java								
Banjoemas	143,994	5.9	49.8	50.2	88,104	3.6	93.5	5.1
Pekalongan	107,169	4.1	69.3	30.7	33,192	1.3	94.5	2.5
Kedoe	333,951	15.9	54.6	45.3	47,827	2.3	80.1	12.1
Semarang	85,705	4.4	68.5	31.5	115,535	5.9	95.0	3.0
Djapara-Rembang	84,407	4.6	71.1	28.9	39,841	2.2	95.8	1.6
Jogjakarta	160,616	10.4	60.2	39.8	38,775	2.5	91.2	4.8
Soerakarta	135,546	5.4	68.1	31.9	66,540	2.6	84.1	1.8
East Java								
Bodjonegoro	122,637	6.2	81.6	18.4	29,648	1.5	93.6	1.3
Madioen	188,948	10.0	77.8	22.2	39,127	2.1	93.1	1.5
Kediri	281,269	11.5	70.5	29.5	150,996	6.2	97.5	0.7
Soerabaja	146,839	8.1	63.9	36.1	155,441	8.6	93.0	3.1
Malang	151,054	5.6	80.1	19.9	216,249	8.0	93.5	2.2
Besoeki	15,203	0.7	68.4	31.6	500,122	24.4	97.5	0.3
Madura	270,826	13.9	96.0	4.0	13,489	0.7	29.2	20.5
JAVA AND MADURA	2,772,927				2,094,391			

* Incomplete, as the census returns in some cases did not give the residency of birth.

Source: The data of columns *a*, *b*, *e*, *f* from *Volkstelling 1930*, Vol. 8, 1936, Table 7. The percentages given above in columns *c*, *d*, *g*, and *h* have been computed from the data given in this source.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia
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RESIDENCY OR GOVERNMENT	DENSITY PER SQ. KM.	RESIDENCY OR GOVERNMENT	DENSITY PER SQ. KM.
Sumatra	17.4	*Borneo*	4.0
Atjeh & Dependencies	18.1	West Borneo	5.5
East Coast of Sumatra	17.9	South and East Borneo	3.5
Tapanoeli	26.7	*Groote Oost (Great East)*	
Sumatra's West Coast	38.4	Celebes	22.4
Djambi	5.5	Celebes & Dependencies*	30.8
Palembang	12.7	Manado	12.8
Benkoelen	12.3	Bali and Lombok	175.2
Lampoeng Districts	12.6	Timor & Dependencies	26.2
Riouw & Dependencies	9.4	The Moluccas	1.8
Bangka and Billiton	16.6	OUTER ISLANDS	10.7

*Southern Celebes.

Source: *Volkstelling 1930*, Vol. 4, Table 9, and *Ibid.*, Vol. 5, Table 9.

162 166 TABLE XXXIII—SUMATRA: JAVA-BORN INDONESIAN INHABITANTS, BY RESIDENCIES, 1930

RESIDENCY	NUMBER OF JAVA-BORN INDONESIANS Male	Female	Total	PER CENT OF JAVA-BORN IN TOTAL INDONESIANS
Atjeh	28,220	19,948	48,168	4.9
East Coast of Sumatra	256,654	205,706	462,360	31.4
Tapanoeli	7,637	5,723	13,360	1.3
Sumatra's West Coast	22,079	12,794	34,873	1.9
Djambi	8,252	4,264	12,516	5.3
Palembang	36,995	23,471	60,466	5.7
Benkoelen	14,634	10,193	24,827	7.8
Lampoeng Districts	46,944	43,927	90,871	25.9
Riouw	7,600	5,338	12,938	5.0
Bangka and Billiton	4,025	3,166	7,191	4.7
SUMATRA	433,040	334,530	767,570	9.9

Source: *Volkstelling 1930*, Vol. 4, 1935, pp. 33, 182, 183.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia
Indonesia. OBI

TABLE XXXIV—THE OUTER ISLANDS: SCHEDULE OF SURVEYS BY THE SOIL INSTITUTE FOR THE CENTRAL COMMISSION FOR MIGRATION AND COLONIZATION OF NATIVES, 1940

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AREA TO BE SURVEYED	TYPE OF SURVEY	MONTHS OF SCHEDULED WORK											
		January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December
Sumatra													
Atjeh: Various Districts	Reconnaissance				x	x							
Atjeh & East Coast of Sumatra: Alas Pamah	Cartographic Soil									x	x		
Sumatra's West Coast:													
Air Bangis	Cartographic Soil		x										
Palembang: Koengkoe	Cartographic Soil						x	x					
Lampoeng Districts:													
North Batanghari	Cartographic Soil				x	x							
Sragi	Cartographic Soil								x	x			
Borneo													
West Borneo:													
Sanggau-Ledo	Cartographic Soil					x							
Sambas Koemba	Cartographic Soil						x						
South and East Borneo:													
Pengaron	Cartographic Soil		x	x									
Rapak Area	Reconnaissance								x	x	x		
Groote Oost													
Manado:													
Paloe	Reconnaissance								x				
Doemoga	Reconnaissance									x			
The Moluccas: Legari, New Guinea	Reconnaissance		x										

Source: *Jaarverslag van de Centrale Commissie . . . 1939*, 1940, p. 19.

TABLE XXXV—THE OUTER ISLANDS: TOTAL AREAS EXAMINED AND APPROVED ANNUALLY BY THE SOIL INSTITUTE, 1934–1940

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YEAR	AREAS (THOUSAND HECTARES)— Examined: Reconnoitered	Examined: Surveyed	Approved
1934		22	22
1935		40	36
1936		58	50
1937		118	79
1938	200	308	141
1939	954	615	331
1940	344	438	311
TOTAL	1,498	1,599	970

Source: *Jaarverslag van de Centrale Commissie . . . 1940*, 1941, p. 20.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia
Indonesia OB1

TABLE XXXVI—THE OUTER ISLANDS: TOTAL AREAS EXAMINED AND APPROVED BY THE SOIL INSTITUTE, BY RESIDENCIES, DURING THE PERIOD FROM 1934 TO 1939

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RESIDENCY OR GOVERNMENT	AREAS (THOUSAND HECTARES)— Examined	Approved
Sumatra		
Atjeh	None	—
East Coast of Sumatra	400	102
Tapanoeli	262	None
Sumatra's West Coast	130	19
Djambi	243	109
Palembang	140	58
Benkoelen	40	40
Lampoeng Districts	112	99
Riouw	None	—
Bangka and Billiton	None	—
Borneo		
West Borneo	72	None
South and East Borneo	230	94
Groote Oost		
Celebes & Dependencies	370	121
Bali and Lombok	None	—
Timor & Dependencies	"	—
The Moluccas	"	—
OUTER ISLANDS	1,999	642

Source: *Jaarverslag van de Centrale Commissie . . . 1939*, 1940, p. 21.

TABLE XXXVII—THE OUTER ISLANDS: COLONIZATION PROJECTS SURVEYED BY THE IRRIGATION SERVICE, 1939

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PROJECT	AREA (THOUSAND HECTARES)*— Surveyed	Tentatively Approved	IMPRESSION
Sumatra			
Atjeh: Alas Pamah	11	11	Favorable
East Coast of Sumatra:			
Loeboe	56	23	Fairly favorable
Sosa	15	7	Unfavorable: practically nonirrigable
Bila	25	25	Favorable as far as irrigation is concerned; rejected because of soil
Natas	22	20	Same as for Bila
Koealoe	25	25	Same as for Bila
Tapanoeli: Natal	25	20	Same as for Bila
Aek Si Oetam	11	?	Not unfavorable
Palembang: Moesi-Koengkoe	100	80	Favorable
Lampoeng Districts: Djapara	17	15	Favorable; reservoir irrigation
Borneo			
South and East Borneo:			
South Serapat	70	30	Favorable; drainage project

* All these areas are rough approximations.
Source: *Jaarverslag van de Centrale Commissie . . . 1939*, 1940, p. 23.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 All Southeast Asia
Indonesia OBI
Java--Madura

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TABLE XXXVIII—TIMETABLE FOR DISPATCHING JAVANESE COLONISTS TO THE LAMPONG DISTRICTS DURING FEBRUARY 1940

Name	Steamship: Maximum capacity Families	Steamship: Maximum capacity Persons	Minimum quota of passengers	Schedule of trips: Departure, Tandjoengpriok Day	Departure Hour	Arrival, Oosthaven Day	Arrival Hour
*Tobelo**	193	543	350	February 11	9 p.m.	February 12	10 a.m.
Rosenboom	90	250		" 12	5 p.m.	" 13	6 a.m.
*Tobelo**	193	543	350	" 13	8 p.m.	" 14	9 a.m.
"	193	543	350	" 15	7 p.m.	" 16	8 a.m.
D. v. Twist	90	250		" 15	5 p.m.	" 16	6 a.m.
*de Waert**	300	838	600	February 16	7 p.m.	February 17	6 a.m.
*Tobelo**	193	543	350	" 17	7 p.m.	" 18	8 a.m.
"	193	543	350	" 19	7 p.m.	" 20	8 a.m.
Rosenboom	90	250		" 19	5 p.m.	" 20	6 a.m.
D. v. Twist	90	250		" 22	5 p.m.	" 23	6 a.m.
*Parvus**	445	1,252	850	February 23	12 noon	February 24	6 a.m.
"	445	1,252	850	" 25	12 "	" 26	6 a.m.
Rosenboom	90	250		" 26	5 p.m.	" 27	6 a.m.
*Parvus**	445	1,252	850	" 27	12 noon	" 28	6 a.m.
"	445	1,252	850	" 28	7 p.m.	" 29	6 a.m.

*Steamship especially chartered; all others listed were regular ships of Line No. 2; which did not require a minimum quota of colonist passengers.

Source: Unpublished working plan.

TABLE XXXIX—JAVA AND MADURA: INDONESIAN COLONISTS MIGRATING TO THE OUTER ISLANDS, BY RESIDENCY OR PRINCIPALITY OF ORIGIN, 1938, 1939, and 1940

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Residency of origin	1938 Families No.	1938 Persons No.	1938 Persons %	1939 Families No.	1939 Persons No.	1939 Persons %	1940 Families No.	1940 Persons No.	1940 Persons %
West Java									
Cheribon	195	589	1.5	60	209	0.5	121	377	0.7
Middle Java									
Banjoemas	743	2,620	8.1	864	3,151	6.9	1,308	5,423	10.3
Pekalongan	1,015	3,702	11.5	1,008	3,714	8.2	715	3,087	5.8
Kedoe	940	3,626	11.2	1,653	6,093	13.4	2,136	8,567	16.2
Semarang	14	55	0.1	313	1,143	2.5	552	1,913	3.6
Djapara-Rembang	45	162	0.5	117	438	1.0	65	240	0.5
Jogjakarta	11,810	6,561	20.3	2,230	8,126	17.9	1,955	7,704	14.6
Soerakarta	877	3,158	9.8	933	3,545	7.8	982	3,880	7.3
East Java									
Bodjonegoro	214	731	2.3	269	889	2.0	789	2,364	4.5
Madioen	679	2,346	7.3	1,084	3,705	8.2	839	2,990	5.7
Kediri	2,132	7,281	22.6	3,443	12,799	28.2	3,179	12,209	23.1
Soerabaja	None	None	—	217	768	1.7	437	1,200	2.3
Malang	226	822	2.5	41	134	0.3	82	287	0.5
Madura	207	606	1.9	194	625	1.4	116	381	0.7
Unspecified	None	None	—	None	None	—	673	2,233	4.2
TOTALS	9,097	32,259	100.0	12,426	45,339	100.0	14,049	52,855	100.0

*Percentages computed by the author.

Source: *Jaarverslag van de Centrale Commissie . . . 1938*, 1939; *Jaarverslag van de Centrale Commissie . . . 1939*, 1940; *Jaarverslag van de Centrale Commissie . . . 1940*, 1941

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TABLE XL—THE OUTER ISLANDS: INDONESIAN COLONISTS MIGRATING FROM JAVA AND MADURA, BY RESIDENCY OR GOVERNMENT OF DESTINATION, 1938, 1939, and 1940

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RESIDENCY OF DESTINATION	COLONISTS ARRIVING IN — 1938 Families No.	1938 Persons No.	1938 Persons %	1939 Families No.	1939 Persons No.	1939 Persons %	1940 Families No.	1940 Persons No.	1940 Persons %
Sumatra	*7,005*	*25,452*	*78.8*	*9,334*	*34,842*	*76.8*	*11,191*	*43,003*	*81.3*
Djambi	None	None	—	None	None	—	510	1,955	3.7
Palembang	1,588	5,726	17.7	2,091	7,761	17.1	2,361	9,296	17.6
Benkoelen	None	None	—	61	240	0.5	145	579	1.1
Lampoeng Districts	5,417	19,726	61.1	7,192	26,841	59.2	8,175	31,173	58.9
Borneo	*220*	*759*	*2.4*	*300*	*1,036*	*2.3*	*339*	*1,310*	*2.5*
Groote Oost (Celebes & Dependencies)	*1,872*	*6,048*	*18.8*	*2,792*	*9,461*	*20.9*	*2,519*	*8,542*	*16.2*
TOTALS	*9,097*	*32,259*	*100.0*	*12,426*	*45,339*	*100.0*	*14,049*	*52,885*	*100.0*

Source: Data for 1938 from *Jaarverslag van de Centrale Commissie . . . 1938*, 1939; data for 1939 from *Jaarverslag van de Centrale Commissie . . . 1939*, 1940; data for 1940 from *Nederlandsch-Indische Geografische Mededeelingen*, 1941, p. 120.

TABLE XLI—SUMATRA AND JAVA: COMPARISON OF AVERAGE DAILY DIETS IN CERTAIN VILLAGES

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VILLAGE	AVERAGE CONSUMPTION PER HEAD PER DAY† By weight (grams) Meat & fish	Grains	Tubers	Legumes‡	Coconut products	Other vegetables	Fruits	Calories (total)	Vitamins (international units) A	B
Sumatra (*Lampoeng Districts*)										
Javanese Colonial Villages	*9.8*	*378.0*	*94.7*	*28.6*	*42.0*	*169.3*	*29.7*	*1780*	*5056*	*236*
Bagelen (1905)*	13.1	345.6	117.2	39.1	70.0	84.4	33.2	1816	2345	230
Pringsewoe (1925)*	10.5	398.7	49.5	27.7	62.5	147.6	7.7	1829	3728	239
Goenoengsari (1931)*	6.9	431.3	81.0	27.7	44.5	129.5	11.0	1970	10160	266
Karangmoeljo (1935)*	13.1	382.4	47.3	33.0	35.5	264.3	66.1	1758	7040	246
Trimoerjo (1935)*	8.9	350.4	77.3	22.7	26.0	95.6	42.4	1567	3303	212
Kalingrenjeng (1939)*	6.4	358.9	196.7	21.6	14.4	125.3	17.7	1740	3672	224
Indigenous Villages	*31.3*	*496.0*	*16.4*	*11.1*	*20.4*	*17.6*	*7.8*	*1974*	*582*	*291*
Menggala	46.5	484.0	15.8	11.6	31.6	43.9	5.0	2062	419	300
Panoemangan	16.2	508.1	17.1	10.7	9.3	28.3	10.7	1886	745	283
Java (*Kedoe Residency*)										
Indigenous Village										
Koetowinangoen	4.5	322.0	50.8	32.2	35.6	57.0	53.7	1561	§	§

* The year in which the village was founded. The surveys in Sumatra were made in 1940, and that in Java was made in 1934.

† The consumption of meat and fish, grains, and tubers was further analyzed as follows:

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Village	Average consumption per head per day by weight (grams) Meat	Fish	Grains Rice	Maize	Tubers Cassava Fresh	Dried	Sweet potatoes	Other tubers
Sumatra (Lampoeng Districts)								
Javanese Colonial Villages	*3.0*	*6.8*	*366.0*	*12.0*	*77.6*	*9.0*	*4.5*	*3.6*
Bagelen (1905)	5.8	7.3	345.2	0.4	102.8	0.8	6.4	7.2
Pringsewoe (1925)	4.9	5.6	397.5	1.2	40.1	0.3	5.0	4.1
Goenoengsari (1931)	1.4	5.5	428.0	3.3	77.2	0.7	2.5	0.6
Karangmoeljo (1935)	2.7	10.4	380.0	2.4	39.0	None	2.6	5.7
Trimoerjo (1935)	2.3	6.6	349.4	1.0	65.2	None	8.8	3.3
Kalingrenjeng (1939)	0.8	5.6	295.0	63.9	141.5	52.7	1.5	1.0
Indigenous Villages	*4.1*	*27.2*	*496.0*	*0.5*	*14.4*	None	*1.8*	*0.2*
Menggala	7.2	39.3	484.0	None	13.7	None	2.1	None
Panoemangan	1.0	15.2	508.0	0.1	15.2	None	1.5	0.4
Java (Kedoe Residency)								
Indigenous Village								
Koetowinangoen	2.9	1.6	322.0	None	— Not analyzed —			

‡ Including young pulses and soybeans.
§ Data unavailable.
Source: Unpublished data of the Central Commission.

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TABLE XLII—NETHERLANDS INDIES: ANNUAL EXPENDITURES OF THE CENTRAL COMMISSION FOR MIGRATION AND COLONIZATION, 1938, 1939, AND 1940

ITEM	EXPENDITURES IN — 1938 Guilders	Percent	1939 Guilders	Percent	1940 Guilders	Percent
General Expenses						
Secretariat	37,080	2.7	39,030	2.1	41,750	1.7
Propaganda	82,553	5.9	69,500	3.6	104,000	4.2
Recruitment in Java	19,715	1.4	22,050	1.2	34,250	1.4
Railroad Transportation	115,087	8.2	164,360	8.6	179,900	7.2
Steamer Transportation	114,170	8.1	174,260	9.1	180,750	7.2
Tools for Settlers			49,160	2.6	81,600	3.2
Soil Surveys	274,660	19.6	132,000	6.9	120,000	4.8
Irrigation	180,508	12.9	474,700	24.9	905,000	36.2
Medical Services	*		*		67,500*	2.7
Local Expenses						
Sumatra						
Sumatra's West Coast	None	—	None	—	8,200	0.3
Djambi	"	—	333	0.0	80,000	3.2
Palembang	177,885	12.7	183,242	9.6	146,500	5.8
Benkoelen	1,252	0.1	8,400	0.4	2,800	0.1
Lampoeng Districts	168,923	12.0	339,560	17.8	262,000	10.5
Borneo						
South and East Borneo	42,500	3.0	68,880	3.6	79,942	3.2
Groote Oost						
Celebes & Dependencies	188,436	13.4	182,970	9.6	207,000	8.3
TOTAL	1,402,769	100.0	1,909,045	100.0	2,501,192	100.0

*Each residency spends a part of its allotted money on medical service. In 1938 and 1939, all the medical expenditures were from these sources.

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Source: Data for 1938 from *Jaarverslag van de Centrale Commissie . . . 1938*, 1939, p. 7; data for 1939 from *Jaarverslag van de Centrale Commissie . . . 1939*, 1940, pp. 7, 8; data for 1940 from *Jaarverslag van de Centrale Commissie . . . 1940*, 1941, p. 7.

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TABLE XLIII—THE LAMPOENG DISTRICTS: THE TOTAL DEBT INCURRED ANNUALLY BY THE JAVANESE COLONISTS IN EACH OF THE YEARS FROM 1935 THROUGH 1940 AND THE YEAR-END STATUS OF THESE DEBTS IN 1940

YEAR OF LOAN	TOTAL DEBT INCURRED IN YEAR (GUILDERS)	STATUS OF THE ANNUAL DEBTS AT THE END OF 1940				
		Written off		Repaid (guilders)		Still owing (guilders)
		Value (guilders)	Per cent of total debt*	Total paid to date	Paid 1940	
1935	42,138.15	16,350.31	38.8	25,684.38	551.14	103.46
1936	45,529.15	17,339.16	38.1	27,865.24	2,073.02	324.75
1937	61,064.97	21,600.85	35.3	36,762.37	10,975.12	2,700.75
1938	93,441.18	19,732.46	21.1	52,335.54	33,155.16	21,373.18
1939	172,456.25	29,063.87	16.8	48,616.07	47,714.07	94,776.31
1940	137,211.24	21,690.81	15.8	828.42	828.42	114,692.01

*Percentages computed by the author.
Source: *Jaarverslag van de Centrale Commissie . . . 1940*, 1941, p. 34.

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TABLE XLIV—BELITANG COLONY: SCHEDULE OF THE NUMBER OF FAMILIES TO BE ADDED TO THE COLONY ANNUALLY IN EACH YEAR FROM 1937 THROUGH 1951

YEAR	NUMBER OF INCOMING FAMILIES		
	Nuclear	Under the mutual assistance system*	Annual total
1937	250		250
1938	550		550
1939	1,500		1,500
1940	1,500	50	1,550
1941	1,700	160	1,860
1942		460	460
1943		770	770
1944		1,142	1,142
1945		1,234	1,234
1946		1,388	1,388
1947		1,616	1,616
1948		1,863	1,863
1949		2,140	2,140
1950		2,464	2,464
1951		1,213	1,213
TOTAL	5,500	14,500	20,000

*For a description of the "Mutual Assistance System" see pp. 202–204 of the text. In 1941 Belitang had 800 families of 3 years' residence. Each five of these families were obliged to take in one incoming family at harvest time. The colony could therefore absorb 160 families under the "mutual assistance system" in 1941.
Source: Unpublished working plan.

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TABLE XLV—BELITANG COLONY: SCHEDULE OF DAILY ALLOWANCES OF RICE TO NEWLY ARRIVED COLONISTS* 262 166

RECIPIENT	ALLOWANCE OF UNHUSKED RICE (KATIS†)						
	March to August	September	October	November	December	January	February
Man	0.90	0.70	0.60	0.50	0.30	0.20	0.20
Woman	0.70	0.50	0.45	0.40	0.25	0.20	0.20
Older Child (3-12 yrs.)	0.50	0.35	0.30	0.25	0.20	0.15	0.15
Young Child	0.30	0.25	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.10	0.10
Average Family of Four	2.40	1.80	1.55	1.30	0.90	0.65	0.65

*Rice rations were distributed every 10 days. The average family received over the year a total of 5.655 *piculs* of unhusked rice. (1 picul = 100 katis).

†One kati is equivalent to 617.613 grams.

Source: Vissers: "De landbouwkolonisatie van Javanen te Belitang," p. 10.

TABLE XLVI—BELITANG COLONY: DISTRIBUTION OF YIELDS OF TEST HARVESTS IN FIRST AND SECOND PLANTINGS ON TEGALANS, 1939 243 166

CLASSES OF YIELDS (PICULS PER BOUW)	NUMBER OF HARVESTS IN FIELDS PLANTED* — For first time	For second time	Total
Less than 15	0	0	0
15 or more but less than 20	0	2	2
20 " " " " " 25	14	3	17
25 " " " " " 30	15	8	23
30 " " " " " 35	6	3	9
35 " " " " " 40	13	6	19
40 " " " " " 45	2	1	3
45 " " " " " 50	2	1	3
50 " " " " " 55	1	0	1
55 " " " " " 60	1	0	1
60 or more	0	0	0
TOTAL	54	24	78

*In the fields planted for the first time the mean yield was 31.46 piculs per bouw; the highest yield was 58.8 piculs per bouw; and the lowest yield was 20.4 piculs per bouw. In the fields planted for the second time the mean yield was 30.76 piculs per bouw; the highest yield was 45.1 piculs per bouw; and the lowest yield was 18.5 piculs per bouw.

Source: Vissers: "De landbouwkolonisatie van Javanen te Belitang," p. 22.

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TABLE XLVII—LAMPOENG DISTRICTS: COLONIZATION PLAN FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES BY SUBDISTRICTS, COLONIES, AND SECTIONS, 1940

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS	NUMBER OF SETTLERS' FAMILIES — Resident in section October 31, 1939	To be added in 1940
Soekadana Subdistrict	*12,955*	*6,650*
Soekadana Colony		
Wai Raman Section		1,233
Gedongdalem Section	12,863	300
Batanghari Section		5,067
Tjandiredgo Colony	92	50
Teloekbetoeng Subdistrict		*150*
Pasisir Barat Colony		
Wates Section		20
Hergodadi Section	235	30
Wai Semah Colony		
Adimoeljo Section		20
Pedjambon Section		20
Kalianda Colony		
Hargopantjoeran Section		15
Pasoeroean Section		20
Sidomoeljo Section		25
Kotaigoeng Subdistrict		*500*
Wonosobo Colony		
Wonosobo Lama Section		50
Srikaton Section	1,850	50
Sripoernomo Section		100
Marga Poegoeng Colony		
Wai Ngison Section	106	100
Tjandiretno Section		50
Oeloe Beloe Colony	192	50
Pampangan Colony	62	50
Antarberak Colony	61	50
Kotaboemi Subdistrict		*79*
Pakoeanratoe Colony		
Gedongmenang Section	218	24
Djabi-Djabi Section		35
Ketopang Colony	86	20
Menggala Subdistrict		*121*
Toeloengboho Colony	54	30
Talangtembosoe Colony	33	16
Karta Colony	53	75
TOTAL		*7,500*

Source: Unpublished working plan.

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/For author's recommendations regarding post-World War II rehabilitation and reconstruction in Southeast Asia and particularly regarding future agricultural colonization schemes, see 1; Pelzer, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 232-242./

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[no textual material on p. i]

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THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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Issued under the joint auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations

GEOFFREY CUMBERLEGE
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

Oxford University Press, Amen House, London E.C.4
GLASGOW NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON
BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS CAPE TOWN
Geoffrey Cumberlege, Publisher to the University

FIRST PUBLISHED 1951
SECOND IMPRESSION 1952

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, OXFORD
BY CHARLES BATEY, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

PREFACE

BEFORE 1941 the countries of Southeast Asia were inward-looking and self-sufficient. The impact of war followed by common problems of reconstruction reminded them that they were fellow components of an entity that was not merely geographical. The growth of nationalism and the outbreak of militant communism have intensified this new awareness. Yet Southeast Asia, new in the consciousness of its component States, is by no means a new creation. It has existed in different cultural syntheses and varying closeness of association for more than a millennium. But the acceleration with which its destiny is now unfolding is turning evolution into revolution, and if we believe that the future of the region will be shaped neither by predestination nor blind chance we must hold that it can be influenced for good or evil by colonial policy, by the national leaders, and by the peoples themselves. How these will direct their thought, their emotions, and their actions will depend greatly on how far their goodwill is informed by knowledge of the immediate and remoter past of the region throwing light on the present and indicating alternatives for the future. To inform is to influence, and while it may or may not be true that *tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner*, the dispelling of ignorance and the establishment of a new sense of proportion are necessary first steps towards the removal of harmful prejudice.

The present state of description of the Far East cannot be compared in depth or extent with that of Europe or America. Popular interest in this technological age tends to focus on the Western centres of research and development and to neglect the rest of the world. In many universities, indeed, the illusion persists that the Far East is treated in their curricula in ratio to its importance. The Scarbrough Commission, appointed in 1944 to examine the facilities offered by universities and other educational institutions in Great Britain for the study of Oriental, Slavonic, East European, and African languages and culture, 'unanimously reached the conclusion that the existing provision for these studies is unworthy of our country and people'.[1] Typical of the situation is the fact that

[1] G.B., Foreign Office, *Report of the Interdepartmental Commission of Enquiry on Oriental, Slavonic, East European and African Studies* (1947) p. 8.

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classicists, who contest with enthusiasm (and sometimes with venom) the latest textual emendation of an obscure Greek or Latin author, are quite content with the latest edition of Gibbon in which the great historian's references to China, based on authorities long obsolete, are uncorrected, and the invention of printing is referred to the Han Dynasty and the Chinese use of the compass in previous centuries is discussed under the heading of A.D. 532! Until the balance is redressed, world history will remain as universal, as accurate, and as up to date as Ptolemy's geography.

Because modern science has developed almost exclusively in the West, many Western humanists, as well as scientists, consciously or unconsciously feel that the East is relatively unimportant. They thus ignore the great contribution that Asia has made to human culture in practical fields as well as in philosophy and aesthetics. Nor will the minutest knowledge of the behaviour of the atom teach a scientist Tamil or Tibetan; an expert acquaintance with the age of Pericles or the Italian Renaissance will not compensate for complete ignorance of the civilizations of T'ang or Angkor, and a mastery of the disciplines of the social sciences, achieved in an alien setting, will not of itself enable a man to form with any reasonable likelihood an idea of what a group of Cambodian peasants, Japanese fishermen, or urban Chinese will think or do in any given circumstance.

In the case of Southeast Asia a large body of literature does exist, much of it of high quality, but the process of comparing and contrasting the histories of the separate countries in the light of world movements and making the results actual in surveys of broad sweep has scarcely begun. The result is that the significance of the region, both actual and potential, is hardly suspected by those who deal in global generalizations and whose eyes in a fine frenzy are rolling (unconscious of colossal blind-spots) east and west from China to Peru.

Among phenomena clamouring for realization in terms of a single comprehensive study is the overflowing from the southern lip of China's vast bowl of population of eight to ten million of its people into Southeast Asia.[1] Indians, too, have overflowed into the region, but since the Second World War their numbers have diminished

[1] Differences of opinion regarding the actual number of Chinese in Southeast Asia are discussed at length in the chapters on demography and the subject is referred to again in the Postscript.

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and they are now less than one and a half million compared with the Chinese eight and a half or so in a total population approaching one hundred and sixty million. Nor can they compare with their fellow immigrants in wealth and influence. The Chinese in Southeast Asia are of the greatest political, economic, and social significance to the region and, indirectly, to the world as a whole, but until now no comprehensive study of them has been attempted. The considerations that have led me to venture to provide what is at least an outline of the subject are as follows.

To carry out the research necessary for an adequate history of the Chinese in the seven countries of the region (counting 'British Borneo' as one), together with a basic study of Chinese emigration into Southeast Asia and its causes, to collate the material, and to write the work itself would, in all reasonableness, take some seven or eight years. Moreover, the qualifications for embarking on such an enterprise should include, first, an extensive background knowledge of China and the Chinese, secondly, a close acquaintance with the several countries of Southeast Asia and their histories, and, thirdly, at least a working knowledge of a score of languages and dialects. Since no person of the necessary qualifications, leisure, or ambition appeared to be forthcoming, and the need for a primer on Chinese affairs in this region was urgent, I decided to be greatly daring and to try my hand at a single impressionistic volume. My qualifications fell far short of the desideratum, but among them were two years of study in Canton, a period of attachment to the Hong Kong Government, and an intimate contact with the Chinese in Malaya, as a Colonial official, for over a quarter of a century.[1] I had visited the countries themselves at different times (the last occasion being as consultant to the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in 1947), and I had an acquaintance with the Chinese written language and the Cantonese and Mandarin dialects as well as a working knowledge of French, Spanish, Italian, and Malay, with some German, Portuguese, and Dutch. I had also served an apprenticeship in the subject by writing a study of the Chinese in one country of the area.[2]

[1] Many appointments, held during this period, included those of magistrate, Protector of Chinese, Assistant Director of Education (Chinese), and Director-General of Information. Under the British Military Administration (1945–6) I was Colonel, Principal Adviser on Chinese affairs.

[2] *The Chinese in Malaya* (London, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948).

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000 The time it was possible to devote to the research, the writing, and the revision has been under two years. I can claim, however, that the application has been intensive.

A survey of this sort accomplished in so short a time had obvi-
127 ously to be in the nature of a *tour de force*. I had, for the most part,
128 to rely on secondary sources and, as was to be expected, there were many gaps in my information. At the best, the impressionism promised to be an imperfect mosaic with some cracked tesserae and blanks ~~in the~~ pattern filled in with the cement of speculation. The information available, too, varied considerably with the countries. However, I hoped to compensate for the limitations of my method as far as possible by obtaining the help of experts in the several countries and fields of knowledge through criticism of the work section by section before publication. This hope proved well founded, for through the good offices of Chatham House and the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and by exploiting my personal friendships, I was able to appeal with success to a number of experts in Great Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, France, Canada, South Africa, and the Far East to scrutinize my first drafts, and to supply some of my deficiencies. The comments and suggestions received were of the highest value. I was relieved to find that, on the whole, the essential structure of my individual studies was not undermined by errors in detail. In two cases, indeed, I had courted disaster by trespassing on ground with which I was acquainted only in the most general and imperfect way, but here I was rescued by timely criticism and advice. (A number of my mistakes proved to be derived from the secondary authorities on which I had relied, and I had in some instances to make a choice when these authorities were in conflict.) I have considered carefully every suggestion received, and in the majority of cases have amended my text in the light of the comments made. When, as infrequently happened, my advisers differed, I had also to make a choice between them or to steer a middle course. If errors remain, they are my own.

000 The brain of the historian (says Edouard Chavannes) is a prism through which are refracted the luminous rays that are the facts; and (he adds) what is important to the reader is to determine the index of refraction of this prism. The above personal details, together with the unconscious self-betrayal of the text, should help the reader in this task.

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I am most grateful to those who have assisted me in this way, and I am flattered that persons of eminence should have considered my text worth the trouble they have bestowed upon it. My thanks are due to Mr B. R. Pearn for reading the entire work, and to the following who read one or more parts of it—Mrs Patricia Barnett, Sir Paul Butler, Mr Chu-pei Chen, Mr Richard Couglin, Mr F. S. V. Donnison, Miss Cora Du Bois, Professor J. J. L. Duyvendak, Professor Raymond Firth, Mr Tom Harrisson, Mr J. D. Higham, Sir Robert Holland, Mr A. F. P. Hulsewé, Mr N. R. Jarrett, Mr George McT. Kahin, Mr Paul Kattenburg, Professor Raymond Kennedy, Professor R. D. Kollewijn, Dr K. P. Landon, M. Roger Lévy, Sir Raibeart MacDougall, Mr J. V. Mills, Mr R. S. Milward, Mr O. H. Morris, Professor Karl Pelzer, Miss Catherine Porter, Mr Ifor B. Powell, Mr W. A. C. Smelt, Sir Robert Smith, Mr R. T. Tan, Professor Arnold Toynbee, Dr B. M. Vlekke, and Mr W. A. Ward. I am indebted also to Mr R. A. D. Forrest, lecturer in Tibeto-Burman languages in the University of London, for writing an appendix on the dialects of South China especially for this work, to Dr Janus Poppe for considerable help with Dutch texts, to Miss A. C. J. Willems of the Netherlands Information Bureau in London for assistance of a similar kind, and to Mr Leonard Unger and the American Geographical Society for permission to reproduce the map showing the distribution of Chinese in Southeast Asia. I have also to thank Mr Richard Adloff, Dr Virginia Thompson Adloff, Mr Leonard Aurousseau, Professor C. R. Boxer, Mr R. S. Busuego, Mr H. M. Cheng, Mr I. C. Cheng, Mr J. S. Furnivall, Miss Ellen Hammer, Mr Edwin Haward, Mr Cecil Hobbs, Dr Arthur Hummel, Mr G. W. Irwin, Mr Loke Wan-tho, Mr J. N. McHugh, Sir Frederick Maze, Dr Lennox Mills, Dr Th. Moll, Mr A. S. B. Olver, Mr E. Osborn, Mr H. T. Pagden, Mr L. N. Palar, Mr Harry Price, Mr Tan Cheng-lock, Mr Tan Siew-sin, Mr G. G. Thomson, Dr Tjoa Sik-ien, Mr M. V. del Tufo, Dr H. van der Valk, Dr Wabeke, Sir Richard Winstedt, and Mr Guy Wint for assistance of several kinds. My indebtedness to libraries is, of course, great, and in particular I would mention the courtesy and help I received from the staffs of the New York Public Library, the Library of Congress, Washington, the British Museum Reading Room, and the respective libraries of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Royal Asiatic Society, the Middle Temple,

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115 and the Colonial Office, and, notably, from Miss Barbara Kyle,
127 librarian of Chatham House, and her staff who seemed never at a
122 loss to produce the most out-of-the-way books and periodicals, and from Miss K. M. L. Simpson, press librarian of Chatham House, whose staff were unfailing in providing cuttings on all sorts of subjects and at the shortest notice. The entire work has been edited by Mrs Dorothy A. Cannell with a care that has increased its precision and improved the diction.

Finally I should thank Miss Margaret Cleeve, the Research Secretary of Chatham House, and Mr W. L. Holland, the Secretary General of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, for their invaluable assistance. Without them and the machinery of their institutions I should have been unable to solicit the help of the above-mentioned experts and the project would have been stillborn.[1]

In order to bring the survey as up to date as possible, a Postscript is added, written in the course of a visit to all the countries of Southeast Asia in the second half of 1950. This visit was made possible by a grant for the purpose from the Rockefeller Foundation to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

August 1950

VICTOR PURCELL

121 [1] Since the main object of this study is to throw light on contemporary happenings, more attention has been paid to the history of the past two or three hundred years than to the earlier Chinese contacts with Southeast Asia. Indeed, as in my work on the Chinese in Malaya, interest in the Chinese begins in earnest from the time when they formed more or less settled communities in the region, and minor account is taken of trading voyages or isolated travellers.

The story is brought up to the moment of writing, which differs, of course, in the several parts. The section on Indonesia, for example, stops just before the second Dutch 'police action'; for Malaya the narrative is taken to February 1949.

That the authorities are mostly European rather than Chinese is due to the fact that the analytic and descriptive habit is of only recent growth among the Chinese of Southeast Asia.

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A NOTE ON NOMENCLATURE AND SPELLING

THE nomenclature of areas, countries, towns, peoples, &c., is constantly changing to meet the requirements of politics or the caprice of fashion. The word 'Indonesia' seems to have been used for the first time in 1850 by J. R. Logan to describe the Malay Archipelago, and in recent years it has been appropriated by both the Indonesian nationalists and the Dutch to describe what, before the Second World War, had variously been known in English-language books and journals as the Dutch East Indies, Netherlands India, and the Netherlands Indies.[1] Siam in 1939 changed its name to Thailand; in 1945 it changed it again to Siam, and in May 1949 back to Thailand once more. Since in this work the period covered is mostly the time when Siam was officially correct as the name of the country, 'Siam' and 'Siamese' have been retained throughout. 'Malaya' was coined well over a century ago but has come into general use only in the present century. The name 'Straits Settlements' is obsolete; the 'Malayan Union' lasted for less than two years: 'Insulinde', once a popular literary name for present-day Indonesia, is almost forgotten.

National, racial, or regional feeling influences usage greatly. At one time the principal people of the Madras Presidency were known generally as 'Klings' (from the ancient kingdom of Kalinga), but objection by this people to the name because of its modern associations led to its replacement by 'Tamils'; later still the preferred name was 'South Indians'. 'Asiatic', for so long universal, is now disliked in Asia and 'Asian' is taking its place.

Southeast Asia is in many ways an unsatisfactory term. It is cumbersome, inaccurate, and indefinite in its scope. 'It is hardly (says the Secretary of the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names) a geographical name.' Yet the region is becoming more and more a political and economic entity and a name is badly needed to describe Burma, Siam, Indochina, Malaya,

[1] Nederlandsch Indië was the Dutch official name. Amry Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies* (1944) p. 1, says, 'About seventy-five years ago, a German ethnologist by the name of Bastian applied the term "Indonesia" (realm of the Indian Islands) to all the islands of the region, including the Philippine Islands, Formosa, British Malaya, and Madagascar, as well as the Dutch East Indies.' But J. R. Logan, in his article 'The Ethnology of Indonesia,' in the *Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia*, vol. iv (1850) p. 343, says: 'The Indian Archipelago must remain, but the shorter form Indonesia may be usefully employed on several occasions.' The *Oxford English Dictionary*'s first reference to 'Indonesian' is from *Nature* (1881). A. Bastian's use of the term is in the form, *Indonesien oder die Inseln des Malayschen Archipel* (Berlin, 1884), and he almost certainly got the term from Logan, or Logan's copiers. An article (in Chinese), 'Explanation of the Term "Indonesia" ', by Lin Hui-hsiang, *Journal of the South Seas Society*, vol. iv, pt. i (March 1947) p. 18, ascribes the original use of the word to Logan, and it was, indeed, this article which prompted me to the investigations here summarized.

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101 British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines collectively. Will the in-
103 ventors of names turn their minds to it? For my part, I offer for considera-
tion the name INDOSINESIA.

Spelling is often more fluid even than place-names. It has varied astonishingly in European works in the last century. (Who, for example, would recognize Kabaw (the valley near the Chindwin river bordering on Manipur) as Kubo, or Mengoon as Ming'un?)

Wishing as far as possible to follow authority in nomenclature and spelling, I ascertained the general policy of the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names. This committee accepts the official forms of all foreign names which are written in the Roman alphabet, but with all the diacritical marks in use in the foreign alphabets. (This last usage I have not attempted to adopt.) Names officially written in other alphabets are transliterated according to established tables. Any names officially written in non-alphabetical script are transcribed by the committee according to established systems.

As regards transliteration and transcription there is, apparently, a large measure of Anglo-American agreement. During the last two hundred years a conventional Roman alphabet has developed until now, under the name of the R.G.S. II alphabet, it is used by the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names, the United States Board on Geographical Names, the Canadian Board on Geographical Names, and the corresponding New Zealand Board. During the war the British and American staffs agreed to use the modernized Hepburn system (Romaji) for Japanese, the modified Wade system (later Giles (H.A.) as modified by Lionel Giles), and the General System of the Siamese Royal Institute. The Permanent Committee issues a number of publications giving guidance in the matter. Generally speaking (the secretary of the committee states), we should be safe in accepting the official map of a foreign country provided that we know that it is accepted in most of the country's departments of government, and provided that the latest edition is available to us. This is the procedure I have endeavoured as far as possible to follow, but I have made some exceptions in deference to common usage.

So far so good, but there remain many problems still to be solved. There is, for example, no international, or even national, agreement on the spelling of 'Southeast Asia'. In this name Southeast is variously written South East, South-East, Southeast, South-east, and even southeast or south-east. The British Admiralty continues to use the hyphen and has issued sailing directions for 'South-East Alaska' and for the 'North-East Coast of Siberia'. SEAC, on the other hand, referred to itself as the 'South East Asia Command'. American usage favours Southeast Asia and this form, pending international agreement on the subject, I have decided to adopt throughout. I have also, following contemporary French diplomatic usage, adopted 'Indochina' (Indo-China should be reserved for the whole peninsula) and also (with less certain authority) 'Cochinchina' and 'Vietnam'. But in the last case I have omitted both the circumflex and the hyphen used by Viêt-Nam.

A special difficulty arising in the course of this work has been that many

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of the authorities quoted or followed use obsolete forms of place or personal names (e.g. Sooloo for Sulu; Theebaw for Thibaw). I have usually (but not invariably) retained the spelling of the original in quotations and often, in order not to lose contemporary colour, in the ordinary text, but where necessary the modern form has been inserted in brackets. 101 103

In the romanization of Chinese names (other than place-names in China) I have allowed myself some latitude. For example, I have dispensed with the circumflex in Chêng Ho, though I have kept the sign over the 'u' in citing the *Tsŭ Erh Chih* of Sir Francis Wade. I have also used diacritical marks in certain Vietnamese proper names. The personal names of Chinese have been hyphenated as a general rule (e.g. Chiang Kai-shek); but if I have lapsed occasionally into Tan Kah Kee, &c., it is because I have seen it spelt thus for a whole generation. Moreover, many Chinese prefer to romanize their names in their own way. I have, in fact, followed diplomacy and convenience rather than consistency. In the case of romanization of Chinese dialect forms I have relied mainly on my own knowledge. 104

The names of Siamese persons offer a special difficulty. Luang Pradist and Pibul Songkram have half a dozen romanized forms as well as alternative names which conceal their identity from the ordinary European reader. (I have endeavoured to ascertain official Siamese usage, but there has been inconsistency in the replies.)

Throughout I have endeavoured to follow the rule of universal good manners—to call a country or a person what they prefer to call themselves. Because of ever-changing usage this is not always easy. Moreover, national, racial, or regional sensitiveness is such that to defer to it one would often have to sacrifice accuracy. For example, it has been suggested to me that I should eliminate the word 'China' in such combinations as 'Kapitan China' for the reason that it is obnoxious to the Chinese, especially in Indonesia, where the Japanese during the occupation represented it by Sino-Japanese characters of derogatory meaning. But in this instance I could not sacrifice historical fact to contemporary resentment. 103 104

The long and the short of it is that after a manful attempt to be logical and consistent I have given up the struggle. Having made a ruling, I found myself reversing it half-way through, and sometimes being reconverted to my original position later on in the book! The result is that the survey is bristling with inconsistencies. In my disgust I feel very much as T. E. Lawrence did when in the preface to *Seven Pillars* he wrote, 'I spell my names anyhow, to show what rot the systems are'.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTES

113 *BEFEO* = *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient*
JASB = *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*
JBRS = *Journal of the Burma Research Society*
JRAS = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*
JRASSB = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Straits Branch*
JRASMB = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Malayan Branch*
JRASNCB = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, North China Branch*
JRGS = *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*

The *Journal of the Indian Archipelago* is sometimes referred to as *Logan's Journal*.

128 CURRENCY

435 The Spanish dollar varied in value, according to the price of silver, between 3*s*. 6*d*. and 4*s*. 6*d*. 4*s*. can be taken as a mean.

436 The rupee = 1*s*. 6*d*. sterling. On 1 April 1947 the currency of Burma ceased to be linked to that of India.

In 1906 the Straits Settlements dollar was fixed at 2*s*. 4*d*. The Straits Settlements dollar was later replaced by the Malayan dollar with the same value, but the sign SS$ is still sometimes used for convenience. M$ is now usual.

At parity there are 11 Siamese bahts (ticals) to the pound sterling.

The official buying rate of the Indochinese piastre in 1949 was 12·55 to the United States dollar.

The official rate of exchange for the guilder (Indonesia) is 10·691 guilders = one pound sterling.

The peso (Philippines) = 50 United States cents.

804 WEIGHTS

128 One picul = 133⅓ lb.[1]
One catty (kati) = 1⅓ lb.
One tahil (tael) = 1⅓ oz.

MEASURES

1 hectare = 2·471 acres.
1 mow = ⅙ of an acre.
1 orlong = (about) ⅔ of an acre.

[1] But the *Statesman's Year-Book* [illegible] which reference should be made for up-to-date information regarding currency, weights and measures, &c.) states that in the Netherlands East Indies 1 picul = 136·16 lb. avoirdupois.

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INTRODUCTION

SOUTHEAST ASIA has known its 'empires' of Sri Vijaya and Majapahit, of wide but indefinite sway, and its great kingdoms of the Khmers and of the Thais; but long before the arrival of the Europeans the peninsula of Indo-China and the Malay archipelago had broken up again into isolated fragments. The Spanish, the Dutch, the British, and the French brought large areas under their control and gave them a political and administrative unity they had never known before. Now, under the pressure of new-born nationalisms, the grip of the Western powers is relaxing, and it seems certain that fragmentation will take place all over again. Yet what is happening is no mere repetition of an ancient sequence; nor is it a reversion to a previously existing state.

Evolution, said Herbert Spencer in his celebrated definition, is a change from a relatively indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a relatively definite coherent heterogeneity.[1] He was thinking primarily of biological organisms but he extended the idea by analogy to human society (an operation with many pitfalls). Yet in some striking way his definition does seem to illuminate what is in process in this Southeast Asia area. Side by side with integration goes differentiation; the scission of wholes into parts, and parts into smaller parts. The old states of East, Central, and West Java and of Sumatra—Jambi, Melayu, Minangkabau—and the Malay kingdom of Malacca were separate, isolated entities with only fitful contacts and associations, yet similarities of race, custom, and language gave

[1] *First Principles*, 6th ed. (London, Williams & Norgate, 1900) pp. 351, 367. Spencer adds, 'accompanied by integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion', but Dr Joseph Needham in quoting this definition ('Integrative Levels; a Revaluation of the Idea of Progress', pp. 233 ff. of *Time: the Refreshing River*) (London, Allen & Unwin, 1937) says that it is important to note that much of Spencer's argumentation depended on assumptions about energy which antedated the modern statistical interpretation of the second law of thermodynamics. Commenting on the definition as a whole, Dr Needham says: 'We may smile at what we may suppose to be the presumption of such a cosmic formula, but we may find ourselves smiling on the wrong side of our faces if, as is not unlikely, Herbert Spencer has hold of the right end of the stick.'

It is perhaps a tactical error to appeal to Herbert Spencer in a period when his ideas are widely regarded as obsolete; but any theory which appears to make some sense of a situation where others fail to do so cannot be disregarded for any such consideration. Spencer derived his definition from the German biologist, von Baer.

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184 them a certain homogeneity:[1] under the Dutch and the British, the
178 Javanese, the Sundanese, the Amboynese, the Achinese, the Peninsular Malays, and some others have become aware of their identities and, while they share the common aim of independence, they have asserted their claims to separate nationhood.

Evidences of scission are patent over all the area, from the Karen and Arakan secession movements to the division between Annam and Cambodia: the higher integrative level to which the area is tending is not so immediately to be seen. Nevertheless, it exists, and is, in the view of the writer, essentially that of Western political, social, economic, and technological ideas. The whole of the Far East, indeed, is asserting its independence of the West in terms of the principles that the West has taught it—self-determination, human rights, democracy, female emancipation, constitutionalism, economic planning, and industrialization, and this is true even when the insurgents appeal to the inverted-Hegelian, Karl Marx, or to the Communism of Mao Tse-tung. It is so in spite of the efforts of these Far Eastern peoples to give such aspirations a local and national appearance. Just as in Rome the new *jus gentium* was eventually hailed as the natural law and Rousseau in France harked back to Man the Noble Savage, so have the Chinese played the same game from the time when Confucius and Mo Tzŭ under traditional appearances introduced ideas that were essentially new. In 1865 Prince Kung relied on historical argument to advocate the introduction of mathematics into the purely literary civil service examinations (mathematics, he said, were a Chinese invention), and in Java the Nationalists interpret each phase of their revolutionary campaign as the realization of the native pro-

[1] Sir Richard Winstedt, in a letter to the writer, classifies the similarities between the peoples of Malaysia as follows:

(*a*) Homogeneity of race modified by different admixture of negrito, Indonesian, and Mongol blood according to the time and place of migration and by geographical isolation in forests.

(*b*) One language family—modified by the same conditions and by acceptance of Hinduism and Islam on coasts.

(*c*) *One identical body of primitive beliefs* brought down from Central Asia where Babylonian influence had introduced cultural features like haruspicy (taking of omens from livers of animals), god-king, respect for the number 7, the incantation, the pyramid, &c.

(*d*) One material culture. (This also was affected by the influences of the Yuës (bringers of bronze), of Chinese of the Chou period (especially in Borneo, *vide* Dyak testiles), Indians, Arabs, Portuguese, Dutch, and British.)

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phecy of Chayabaya.[1] But the fact remains that, in spite of the traditionalist imprint on the revolution, what these peoples are aiming at, consciously or unconsciously, is not the recovery of a fabulous age but the achievement for their country and people of a new integration. The recently independent countries of India, Pakistan, Burma, and the Philippines aim at large-scale development of their resources in terms of Western techniques; they insist on industrialization (especially the establishment of heavy industries as a foundation of political power), and they talk of reconstruction and development and of raising the standard of living for the millions of their population. At every international conference, from Lake Success to Havana and Baguio to Lapstone, this is the burden of the refrain, be the discussion on trade, health, currency, or civil aviation. Nor is it purely on the material level that this revolution is planned; it demands at the same time reforms of political and social organization that will bring the Far Eastern nations into an equality with the West. The long-term question is whether it is possible to graft Western technology and institutions on to Far Eastern society without altering its essential nature.

China Proper and her neighbours—Tibet, Annam, Korea—all belong to the Far Eastern Civilization (Main Body) of which Dr Arnold Toynbee says, 'the moment of the breakdown may be equated with the break-up of the T'ang Empire in the last quarter of the ninth century of the Christian Era'.[2] As the 'universal state' of the civilization he gives the Mongol and Manchu empires, and he speaks of the history of the existence of the civilization after its breakdown as 'the survival of Far Eastern Society in its petrified state'. But at the same time he points out that, in general, the breakdown of the civilization is not necessarily followed by a disintegration that runs into dissolution. This would suggest that China is in a condition when her institutions have not the vitality or resilience to meet the challenge of external forces.

Commenting on this passage in the original draft, Mr Tom

[1] Chayabaya is a legend-prophecy amalgamating legends of Siva, Adam, and Allah (*not* Mohammed) in Java into a single national legend of a Javanese millennium and a prophecy of a return to it. It assumed protean forms each of which is invoked as political expediency demands. So far as I am aware, the only exposition of Chayabaya is that of Dr C. C. Berg, of Leyden University, which in 1950 had not yet been published.

[2] A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1934–46) iv. 86–7. vi. 306. D. C. Somervell's abridgement of the work, 1947, p. 361.

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184 Harrisson (whose approach is primarily that of the anthropologist)
178 remarks that it 'always seems dangerous to equate the culture of the ruling dynasty with the whole of a huge country', and adds that some areas of China have, perhaps, never had a culture at all in the sense intended by Professor Toynbee and they cannot be said to have decayed in the least, but rather to have advanced in historical times. The answer to that is that what is referred to here is a single, integrated culture codified in the ancient canonical writings, permeating the whole of the Chinese people who emigrate overseas (the aboriginal tribes of China do not come within our purview), and expressed down to this very day in the family institutions and moral system of the Chinese both in China and overseas. 'China' in the present text is, however, nearly always the Mangi of Marco Polo, namely South China, and only part of it at that, namely the province of Fukien and Kwangtung and parts of Kwangsi and Kiangsi, and not the Cathay, or North China, of the Venetian traveller. The culture, none the less, is that of China as a whole, and the languages (especially Cantonese) are nearer than those of the north to the ancient language of China.

The reader may feel a protest against the affirmation of the continued advance of the West rising in his mind when he recollects the recent strong, often violent, reaction against the West that is so apparent in Asia—the retreat from the English language as a medium of instruction in post-liberation India, or the cry of 'the West must go' in Burma. The answer is that these incidents are partly the normal 'die-hard' gestures of resistance to change, and partly the expressions of resentment of economic control or political pressure by Europeans as persons, politicians, administrators, or companies. For the revolution set in train by Western ideas is now directed, as we have said at the outset, against Western individuals and nations. The West itself is in a state of flux, shaping its industrial civilization to the standards set largely by America, but challenged by Russia, and the Far East flows willy-nilly with the contemporary current. It is indeed a case, in a special sense, of 'Westward the course of empire takes its way'.[1]

This triumph of the West, however, is affirmed here in no spirit of exultation but with deep anxiety. As there rise up before us the

[1] 'Of all the civilizations, dead or living, of which we know our own is the only one which is possibly still not in decline.' A. J. Toynbee, *The Prospects of Western Civilization* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1949) p. 5.

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symbols of our age—the Petrol Pump, the Pylon, the 'Dust Bowl', 184
the Automat, 'Mass Media', the chilling Neon Sign—there is a 178
shrinking of the soul and a poignant yearning for the glory that was Angkor and the grandeur that was Chang An. Yet it is in its effective organs—the Assembly Line, the Tennessee Valley Authority, 'E.R.P.', and the Research Stations—that our robotic civilization throbs; not in the cult of lost causes or impossible loyalties, nor in our academies, our museums, nor our half-empty cathedrals.

At least it is the material aspects of our civilization which appeal to the awakening consciousness of the peoples of the Far East. Whether they will adopt capitalist, socialist, or communist social organization as a means of securing the coveted gadgets of the West that mean a higher standard of living is another matter. Dr Joseph Needham, for example, says that there is no reason to think that the Chinese will not make as convinced socialists as anybody else, but that there are certain directions in which Chinese thinking might have a profound effect upon the nature of the society of the future, perhaps in the matter of juristic security of the individual, and in the forms which the numinous will take in that society. However, there is far less reason to believe that they will adopt democracy, and Communism, being dictatorial, they will probably find more natural and acceptable than democratic socialism.[1]

This survey is of the Chinese in the regions of Tropical Asia, 121
and often in the course of our narrative the question already posed 177
as to the power of this and other peoples to absorb Western ideas without changing their own essential nature will arise either tacitly or explicitly. In other words, can the basic institutions of these peoples meet the impact of Western industrial civilization or of Marxism without disintegrating?

Chinese civilization is based on ancestor worship, the family 000
system, on Confucianism (which incorporates these principles), and on Buddhism and Taoism. The staunchest supporters of these religions could scarcely deny that Buddhism and Taoism as moral forces are in complete decay in China and have been so for a very long time.[2] Whatever their surviving effectiveness they cannot by

[1] J. Needham, 'Confucianism after 2000 Years', in the *Manchester Guardian*, 29 August 1949.

[2] To realize the formalism and religiosity into which Buddhism had declined by last century, one has only to observe the *chü-jen* (M.A.) of the late Ch'ing dynasty who, to prepare his character for office, suddenly takes an interest in practical benevolence. He ostentatiously burns incense and gives alms. If he sees

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themselves form a pillar of the Chinese social system. This leaves only the family system as a core of resistance, for much of Confucianism, too, has fallen into formalism or, more often, into disuse. While political structures of the wider integration (except, so far, Communism) have in post-revolutionary China shown no great effectiveness, the clan and the family have demonstrated a remarkable resistance to change. Yet even these institutions have undergone considerable modification, especially in south China under the influence of the emigrant communities to the Nanyang.[1] Moreover, the experience abroad of Chinese women has made them discontented with many features of the old marriage system. But the influence of example and sometimes of education, which is operating in Southeast Asia, is of small effect as compared with the impact of militant Communism on these institutions in the Communist areas of China—and before long the Communists may overrun the whole of that vast country.[2] All the evidence from Communist China goes to suggest that the age-old 'familism' of the country is not able in this crisis to withstand the force of Communist propaganda. Take, for instance, what an English university lecturer and his wife from Peking, who escaped from the Japanese in 1941 and spent over two years among the Communists, have to say:

> Most spectacular of all has been the success of the Women's Mass Association. Before 1937 the social status of women in country districts of North China, like the rest of the country, was controlled by patriarchal familism. . . . The liberation movement spread like a forest fire through the villages.[3]

Evidence on every hand confirms this experience: the case of hard-working, filial peasant girls carried off to be 'indoctrinated' at Communist schools and returning a year later with a militant sense

a fish in the markets floundering on the hooks, he pays its price and restores it to its native element; he picks struggling ants out of a rivulet made by a recent shower, distributes moral tracts, or, better still, rescues chance bits of paper inscribed with the sacred written character (be it only a discarded bill) from being trodden in the mire of the streets. W. A. P. Martin, *Lore of Cathay* (London, 1901) p. 317. Analogies could, alas, be found in our Christian civilization.

[1] This word, which will recur often in this survey, means literally 'Southern Ocean', but is applied to the whole area of Southeast Asia and even to Australia and other territories to the southward where Chinese emigrants are located.

[2] Written in February 1949.

[3] Claire and William Band, *Dragon Fangs* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1948) p. 128.

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of equality with their fathers and brothers and refusing to accept a system they had never questioned a year before. On hearing these things we might even inquire whether the intense conservatism of China is not rather the *vis inertiae* of dead or moribund forms and not a force for the renewal and remoulding of living tissue.

Yet many Chinese and several leading European authorities adhere to the belief that the present crisis may bring forth a Confucian revival. Sir John Pratt, for example, tells us that many of the best elements in the Kuomintang, together with the intellectual, industrial, and other leaders, may link with the Communists in finding a way for saving the country from destruction; 'they cling [he says] to the hope that the Confucian harmony, which is still the basis of Chinese thought, would soften the worst features of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and that communism in becoming Chinese would become more human'.[1]

'Confucian harmony', perhaps, will have its softening influence, but can there by any large-scale revival of the teaching of the Sage as a positive movement? There have been attempts to bring this about, but none has succeeded. The Four Books (the Analects, the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and Mencius), which contain the body of the Confucian doctrine and which were the substance of the traditional curriculum, are not taught in the modern educational system and have not been taught for many years. How then is this teaching to be transmitted? Certainly if the Communists can work on the women of China in the mass the whole face of Chinese society will be changed. In such circumstances a Confucian revival would be unthinkable.

Much of what has been said above may sound controversial, but it all turns on the meaning of words. Sir George Sansom in his new book, *The Western World and Japan*, says, 'In a limited sense the Japanese came under Western influence, but . . . what was finally adopted was, if Western in shape, thoroughly Japanese in colour and substance.' If we try to apply this to China in accordance with our own definitions, it is the shape and the colour which remain Chinese while the substance becomes more and more 'Western'. After all, modern capitalistic England has very little in common with feudal England, yet the shape and the colour of the two ages have strong similarities. What matters politically is

[1] 'The Chinese Cauldron', *Everybody's Weekly* (29 January 1949).

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that the Chinese Communists consider the present revolution as an indigenous movement—*not* Russian-inspired—and at the same time they have no difficulty in regarding themselves as orthodox Marxists.

In the area covered by this study the main trend of European colonial policy has been in the direction of encouraging the forces of native conservatism to resist innovation. European colonial administrators frequently evince an affection for feudal institutions, a reverence for Mohammedanism, a respect for *adat* law and for princely succession and privilege in excess of that of the native aristocracies themselves. It happens sometimes that existing institutions which had been crystallized by European intervention are sustained only by foreign authority, and in extreme cases, if the sustentation ceased, would dissolve into nothingness as in Poe's *Case of Dr. Valdemar* when death had occurred but dissolution was temporarily suspended by a hypnotic trance.[1]

So much discussion of the general considerations governing the area of our inquiry has been necessary to give a background for our survey of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. But before proceeding to give an outline of our subject, there is one further observation we should make. This is that the survival of particular forms of organization is one thing; the survival of the race or community is another. It is likely that whatever happens the Chinese, both at home and overseas, will retain considerable social and cultural coherence, besides a strong sense of being 'Chinese'. It is his patience in adversity, his adaptability, his determination, his good humour, and his resilience that makes the individual Chinese, male or female, such an admirable biological specimen, and it is his social qualities (given proper treatment) that make him such a valuable unit in this Southeast Asian society. At the present time the Chinese of the Nanyang are in a dilemma, but this work should show that it is their superiority in resource, ability, and industry to the people among whom they live rather than their vicious propensities that makes them constitute a 'problem'.

The cartoon for our picture stands before us in bold charcoal

[1] Poe's description was more vivid but perhaps a little too strong for the present context. British policy in British India favoured 'modernization (e.g. Dalhousie's policy) while in the Indian States it generally favoured 'traditionalism'.

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strokes. First the genesis of the Sinic culture in the angle of the Yellow River; then its extension to the north and south by debarbarization of the natives; the period of the feudal states; consolidation under the Ch'in and Han empires; the expansion and contraction of China's area with dynastic rises and declensions. There was an overland extension into Tongking well before the Christian era, but this was not a prologue to a reaching forth beyond mountains and seas; the ebb and flow, the *Sturm und Drang* of China's sequence of disorder, reintegration, consolidation, apogee, decline, and disorder again went on for many centuries to come within the limits of the Great Wall and the mountains of Yunnan. China's civilization was self-sufficing, each phase a complete episode, a kind of justification by rhythmic completion like the antithetical periods in her own literary language. Pressures developing within the empire might force internal migration; this migration might set border aborigines on the march; but their traditional manœuvring space was sufficient for the denizens of the Middle Kingdom.

Thus it was that the Chinese as a race were in the first millennium of our era unenterprising, unadventurous; they feared the black gulf of the barbarian outer world as the people of medieval Europe did the unknown oceans with their horrid monsters. Those few Buddhist pilgrims who ventured forth beyond the confines of the Middle Kingdom had, indeed, like Horace's first sailor, hearts 'bound with oak and triple brass'. They were the 'single spies' long before the era of the tribute-missions from abroad. Between the two phases there intervened a long period when it was the Indians, the Arabs, and the Persians who came to China, and Canton had its turbulent foreign quarters in the eighth century A.D.

The tribute-missions began as the gestures of the princes of the countries of the Nanyang sending envoys to the Chinese capital with gratulatory or ceremonial messages to the Chinese court. They were always received as humble emissaries conveying the submission of their masters to the Son of Heaven. They brought presents, of course, usually of native produce, and the emperor, out of the benevolence of his heart, bestowed presents upon them in return. It happened that these return presents were often more valuable than those brought from Java, Borneo, or Malacca, as the case might be; but even if they were only of equal value it was clear that here ready established was an embryonic foreign trade.

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000 So in extending the practice, the kings of Pegu or Ayuthia need not be suspected of mere obsequiousness, although their motives in sending missions were diplomatic as well as commercial. Later (the dynastic histories record) the incursions of the Portuguese and other barbarians into Southeast Asia caused an interruption of the tribute, but before this dilatory vassals had occasionally been reminded of their manners by punitive expeditions from the Dragon Throne.[1]

After the establishment of the Ming dynasty, the emperor Yung Lo[2] and his successor dispatched to the West a series of great expeditions of up to sixty-two ships filled with as many as 37,000 soldiers. They got as far afield as Ormuz on the Persian Gulf, the east coast of Africa,[3] Calicut in India, the east coast of Java, and Ceylon. They went as armadas and returned as argosies. The most famous of the commanders was the Grand Eunuch, Cheng Ho. Either he or his associate Grand Eunuchs carried out seven voyages between 1405 and 1433, bringing the glory and, when necessary, the terror of the Imperial Ming name to all the potentates of the archipelago and far beyond.[4] A prince of Ceylon and a local chief in Sumatra who failed to submit to the Emperor's power were seized and carried off to China; a Chinese pirate with a lair in the archipelago who tried to combine humble submission to the Emperor with theft of the tribute consigned to his Imperial Majesty was run to earth and taken to Peking for a lingering execution.

167 Other, more orthodox, Chinese traders had in the interim been feeling out on their own *in partibus infidelium* in search of gain. They went down to the Nanyang with the northeast monsoon about February and returned with the southwest monsoon in April. From about the thirteenth century they began to form settlements in such places as Tumasik, or Old Singapore, Malacca, and Java. In the earlier days they lived where they chose, but in more modern times these overseas Chinese were relegated, it must

[1] See J. J. L. Duyvendak, *Chinese Discovery of Africa* (London, Probsthain, 1949) (in the press) who says, 'Recognition by the Chinese Court gave "face" to these minor Kings. Also, it was the primitive form in which officially-sanctioned trade could be carried on. As early as the Han dynasty the Chinese sent ships overseas to collect precious objects.'

[2] In Giles's romanization Yung Lê.

[3] Duyvendak, op. cit.

[4] Cheng Ho did not personally take part in all the voyages—certainly not in the second (1407–9).

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be confessed, to what were often sorry ghettoes. Those who settled 167
intermarried with the native women and laid the beginnings of a new race whose culture remained Chinese. Individuals rose to positions of eminence in the native courts, and one Chinese, Peja Jummeraad, was chief justice in seventeenth-century Siam.

It was the arrival of the Europeans, however, which created the conditions favourable to Chinese settlement on a larger scale. The Spanish, the Dutch, and the British subdued large areas and established the security necessary for profitable trade and a bearable life. Nevertheless, friction between themselves and the ruling race in the Philippines and later in Java resulted in Chinese rebellions and the large-scale massacre of this people, showing that the security was only provisional; but they were soon back again in their old numbers as if nothing had happened. Broadly speaking, the Chinese became the middlemen, the intermediaries between the Europeans and the native peoples. Their popularity with the ruling race fluctuated according as they were valued for their services or feared for their political or economic power; the nature of their function was such as to bring them increasingly under native suspicion.

It is here that we should refer briefly to the case of the Chinese 487
in Burma which was apart from the main course of Chinese migration—apart, that is, before the maritime arrivals of the nineteenth century. The trade route by way of the Shan States had been open at least from the time of the Mongol dynasty. The staple import from China for centuries was silk, raw and manufactured, just as the staple import from Burma into China was cotton. The study of the commerce of this route is one of the most fascinating features of this survey, for the change in the nature of the commodities about the middle of last century is a striking index to the advance of the industrial West. Before this time China was the factory of 000
Southeast Asia, and, indeed, of countries far remote. Chinese textiles, destined in great degree for Mexico, poured into the emporium of Manila: not only manufactured silk and cotton nankeens were loaded on to pack-mules and carrying-coolies for transport over the passes of Yunnan, but also iron *quallies*, or pots, and brassware. By the second half of the nineteenth century the flow of goods changes, and it is Manchester cottons, Bradford woollens, and Birmingham pots and pans which go to China, and the flow of nankeens and *quallies* the other way has practically ceased. It is

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000 like watching a stream change its watershed. But remember at the same time that it was a stream, not a river, for the overland route never gained the importance the British hoped and the principal routes of commerce continued to be by sea.

167 We return now to the main story of Chinese migration: the seasonal influx of a few Chinese traders and labourers cannot compare with the mass movement we are about to describe. It needed the nineteenth- and twentieth-century capitalistic imperialism to open up the colonial countries for the supply of raw materials to the Western industrial machine. Chinese labour has now found its fullest scope in the tin mines and the rubber plantations of Southeast Asia; Chinese artisans were in demand for the urban handicrafts; Chinese merchants and shopkeepers flocked in to the centres to expand the retail trade. In some countries the number of Chinese was multiplied several times; in Siam they were said to have passed he two million mark by the 1930s; in Indonesia at this period a million and a quarter were distributed through Java, Sumatra, and the Outer Islands; in Malaya they reached their greatest numbers, nearly two and half millions, by 1941 and outnumbered the Malays for the first time. In bringing in Chinese for Malaya's mines and plantations and opening the doors to Chinese traders, the British had created for themselves a political problem of the first magnitude and one that will loom large in our pages to come. This was the era of the 'battalions' as distinguished from the small expeditions, and, long, long after the 'single spies'.

000 Meanwhile another evolutionary process was at work in the Far East. Peoples were becoming aware that they were separate culture-groups as well as being (as they thought) separate blood-groups—namely, that they were nations. For Japan, insular, centralized, with a compact social system, the transition from race-consciousness to nation-consciousness was not a difficult one: for China it was otherwise. Separated immemorially by mountain and river, by lake or marsh, the prefectures, the districts, and the villages were self-absorbed. At most a common dialect would give them a qualified sense of brotherhood: usually it was the family that was the largest social unit. At the same time they were aware, of course, that they were all members of the Blackhaired Race and not to be confused with the barbarian devils—but that was scarcely more of a bond of union than being human is to the modern world of *homo sapiens*. In 1840 British troops on their way to the 'Opium

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War' with China were camped on the Esplanade at Singapore and not a murmur was heard from the Chinese of the town; seventeen years later Lord Elgin, on his way to Peking to dictate terms to China in the Second China War, was fêted by the Chinese merchants of Singapore; the British advance on Peking in 1860 would have been impossible without the help of Chinese carrying-coolies from Canton. Though the ferment of nationalism had begun to work in the minds of the mandarins of the Ch'ing dynasty, it was not they who were to lead the Chinese into the camp of nationhood.

In October 1911 came the Chinese Revolution.

Although Sun Yat-sen was elected provisional President of the Republic at Nanking in 1912, he had to stand aside for Yuan Shih-k'ai who later attempted to restore the empire in his own person. Sun Yat-sen was for years alternately in uneasy control of Canton and in exile. It was only after his death in 1925 that his Three Principles of the People became the bible of the Revolution. But already in 1909, under the Manchus, the principle of the *jus sanguinis* had been adopted as part of the organic law of China and this was incorporated into the First Principle of the People—Nationalism. The people of China were a single pure race, said Sun Yat-sen. In 1926–7 Chiang Kai-shek made his great drive northward, purging his party of its Communist elements in Shanghai and giving China an apparent unity. China became a San Min Chu I nation, with the Three Principles as the basis of constitution, law, and education.

It was in the Nanyang that the revolutionaries had found much of their early encouragement, both moral and financial. The overseas Chinese supported the Kuomintang and for their educational drive they adopted *Kuo Yü*, the National Language, as the medium of instruction. Everywhere in Indonesia, Malaya, Siam, Indochina, Burma, and the Philippines, Chinese of all ages, but especially the children attending Chinese schools, were reminded day in and day out that they were members of a 'single pure race' and were citizens of *Chung Hua Min Kuo*, the Middle Flowery People's Kingdom.

Though somewhat behind the Chinese, the peoples of Southeast Asia were not slow in discovering that they, too, were ripe for nationhood. It seemed only too clear that a race must consolidate itself as a nation or cease to exist. Japan had given the lead to

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000 Asiatic nations, and as early as the time of the Russo-Japanese War the Annamites had planted lotuses in their fields in her honour. With the Annamites, the Siamese, and the Indonesians the movements were internal and did not at this stage threaten conflict with adjacent peoples of a similar mind. But with the Chinese it was different. They were living in the midst of native peoples, holding fast to economic power and at the same time creating a nationalistic *imperium in imperio*. Hitherto through the centuries there had been no special problem of the Chinese (even though their functions had aroused resentment) and within three generations Chinese settlers had been absorbed into the native community. Now it was otherwise. The increase in immigration, the improved means of transport between China and the Nanyang, the approach to equalization in the sex ratio (more Chinese women were accompanying their men) were key factors in the change. Intermarriage, so far a guarantee of absorption, was decreasing; in Malaya it had practically ceased for more than a generation so that the barrier between the races was complete. It was no wonder that there was now a Chinese problem.

Nor was the problem limited to a single clear-cut issue. Communism had come to China early in the twenties, and its adherents had formed the left wing of the Kuomintang. After the purge of that party by Chiang Kai-shek in 1927 they had split off into their own organizations. Southeast Asia had, besides its merchants and traders, a large proletarian community of Chinese for whom Communism had a promise and an appeal. Wages (though much higher than in China) were low; conditions were far from ideal; trade-union organization was rudimentary and machinery for bargaining barely existent. In Malaya, in particular, land-hungry Chinese squatters with no security of tenure were ready to support any movement which would guarantee them the possession of this land. A determined minority of fanatics, such as the real Communists were, had a great field to exploit.

668 Before the Second World War, Communism in Southeast Asia had been kept in effective check by the Governments; but during the Japanese occupation of the countries of Southeast Asia, Chinese Communists took part in resistance movements, notably in Malaya where they formed guerrilla units. As such, they became the temporary allies of the South East Asia Command, but directly after the Japanese surrender they demonstrated their intransigent

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hostility to the Military Administration and, after it, to the civil 668
Governments of the Malayan Union and Singapore which succeeded it.

Before the war, the Kuomintang had found its chief support in the mercantile class of Chinese. During the Japanese occupation of the Nanyang this class, being urban and static, was an easy prey for Japanese exactions and for this reason its members, after the liberation, were denounced by the Communists as 'collaborators'. They, themselves, had either remained underground and unnoticed because of their lack of property or, in Malaya, in the case of about 3,000–4,000 only out of a total population of over two million, had become guerrillas in the jungle. The post-liberation result of the situation in this country was that many of the old leaders of the Chinese community were, at least temporarily, discredited and the Communists claimed credit for all resistance to the Japanese. After a while, however, the Kuomintang and the San Min Chu I Youth began to reassert themselves, but they had lost much of their pre-war vigour. The course of the civil war in China and the deterioration of the National Government's position had much to do with the change.

In Indonesia and Indochina, where the purely proletarian ele- 609
ment among the Chinese was much smaller, the developments after 186
the Japanese had surrendered placed the Chinese in an unenviable 668
position. In Indonesia the 'middleman' nature of so much of the Chinese activity had made them unpopular with the natives, and during the periods after 1945 when the Dutch were in conflict with the Indonesian Republic neither side was able to afford them adequate protection from the aggression of local communities. Uncontrolled elements in the population (often soldiers) massacred the Chinese in considerable numbers. They were, in particular, accused of espionage for the Dutch. It seems, however, that it was the Dutch who afforded them the best protection and with whom, generally speaking, Chinese sympathies therefore lay. In Indochina, where there was also a considerable animus against the Chinese trader and money-lender (i.e. goods-lender), the community suffered greatly in the disorders and in the civil war which was still continuing in 1949. The French, to afford them protection, and to suit their own strategic dispositions, concentrated them in a few centres, notably in Saigon-Cholon where there was much overcrowding. At the same time many other Chinese

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668 moved to Vietminh-controlled areas, and the Vietminh could
609 claim a considerable number of supporters among the younger Chinese.

186 The advances of militant nationalism in some others of the Southeast Asian countries had made the widespread fear of Chinese economic encroachment a ready source of political capital. In both Siam and the Philippines measures to diminish the Chinese share of the retail trade which had been initiated before the war were now intensified and an anti-Chinese plank was inevitable in the platform of every political party. Chinese Communists were said meanwhile to be actively assisting the Hukbalahaps, the agrarian insurgents in Luzon.

668 This was the dilemma in which the Chinese still found them-
669 selves in the fourth year after the Japanese defeat. But in one country, Malaya, their difficulties as a community became most acute when the Malayan Communist Party, consisting itself mostly of Chinese, decided in June 1948 to start an active terrorist campaign against the British. The constitutional experiment of the Malayan Union followed by that of the Federation of Malaya had left the Chinese generally in a state of political apathy (since the new constitution greatly favoured the Malays at their expense). When the terrorists, who were largely the old guerrillas of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, struck, it was the Chinese themselves who provided most of the casualties on both sides. Many *Towkays* (Chinese business men) were intimidated into contributing to the Communists' funds or supplying them with goods and, being largely isolated, were not in a position to resist these demands. This in turn brought them into conflict with the British authorities. The Chinese squatter community, too, being on the fringe of the jungle was readily utilized by the terrorists and suffered accordingly when British troops and police took reprisals against their villages, burning down their houses and destroying their crops. Many squatters were banished to China. The great
000 danger the British ran was that harsh measures might antagonize large sections of the population, for the government of a great majority by a small minority must ultimately depend upon the consent of the governed. Large-scale measures of varying success were in progress against the terrorists in 1949 when the defeat of the Chinese Nationalist armies by those of the Communists in China and the collapse of the Kuomintang Government gave new

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heart to the terrorists in their 'hide-outs' in the almost limitless 000
jungles of Malaya.

Such is the outline of the story we shall have to tell. What, then, is the philosophy of this Chinese migration?

If they had been called upon to deal with the Chinese of Southeast Asia, the great historians would have treated it according to their enlightenment and the age they lived in. Gibbon, for example, if he were restored from the grave, would assuredly regard the activities of all modern Chinese as a progressive falling away from the Chinese Age of the Antonines, the dynasty of T'ang. It is unlikely that he would show any undue sympathy for the colonists who were so little steeped in the national culture. Mommsen would find no Chinese Caesar overseas, and would assuredly disdain these simple annals. Macaulay, brought back to life, most probably would have dutifully accepted the task of writing the history of the Chinese in the Nanyang were it imposed upon him, and he would assuredly have devoted his opening chapters to describing the squalid sufferings of the pioneer coolie in his blue trousers, rope-soled shoes, and broad-brimmed hat, his naked body sweating under a tropical sun, and more chapters to an imposing picture of his magnificent mansion,[1] his fleet of shining motor-cars, and (maybe?) his bevy of concubines after he had got on in the world.

But we must pass from this diverting speculation to an interpretation of our task stated in our own terms. It is to make actual an important and striking phenomenon of recent times, the overflow of the Chinese in large numbers into Southeast Asia, to demonstrate the problems caused by this overflow, and, if possible, to help place the general historian, the politician, the administrator, the diplomat, and the merchant in a state of mind congenial to a better understanding of the Chinese overseas. This understanding may suggest an approach to the practical questions of the area in the next decade or so which will benefit both West and East. 121 167

If one fact has impressed the writer of this survey more than 000
another in the course of his study, it is the feebleness of the attempt made by the Colonial Powers and the indigenous Governments in this area to understand the overseas Chinese and their problems.

[1] The lesser, but less awestruck, Lytton Strachey would probably make a sly reference to the electro-plated vacuum cleaner or thermos flasks, for ornament and not for use, in the drawing-room of the self-same mansion.

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The Governments, at the best, have left Chinese affairs to small specialist departments. (This may have been excusable to some extent in countries where the Chinese were a small minority, but certainly not in Malaya where the Chinese were the majority community, and yet where 90 per cent., or more, of the officers of the civil service were, and are, without a knowledge of the language and customs of the Chinese.[1]) If in the future any headway is to be made in the understanding of the Chinese, this situation will have to be drastically remedied.

What the writer has said of the Chinese in Malaya is true of the history of their brothers and sisters in this larger area:

> When men are felling trees, draining, breaking the soil, living from hand to mouth, there is no room for the refined and subtle activities which lend themselves so readily to descriptive treatment, to 'flame-pictures', to antithesis, to irony, and satire—the sallies of the council chamber, the fireworks of controversy, the battle of ideas, the excitements of literature and art, which can only spring into being when a long developed economy has brought men leisure to think and to create. The nexus of cultivated influences and the play of personalities are well-nigh absent from the story of Malaya. The main subject matter here is not individuals and doctrines but masses and their behaviour, the movement and interplay of races, tribes, clans, labour forces, and other groups. The drama is the struggle with nature, with the jungle, with malaria, with tropical heat, it is in the rivalries and broils of secret societies, in the competition for life of men with men. . . .

If we except the deified type of the overseas pioneer, Toh Peh Kong, or the similarly deified Cheng Ho of the Ming dynasty, there are no heroes in the story of the Chinese in Southeast Asia and there is no hero-worship. Nor will the reader hear as he reads a muted symphony of passionate endeavour: what harmonic accompaniment there is is in 'The still, sad music of humanity'. Chinese civilization is not Faustian; its ideal is the harmony of society with nature, not the subduing of it. Confucianism, however, insists above everything that the race shall multiply, and this multiplying has compelled the main effort of the races to be the struggle for existence, and has created social disharmony. The question of the hour is whether capitalism or communism will appeal to the Chinese of China and Southeast Asia as the means

[1] The author understands that in 1950 seven out of every ten Cadets of the Malayan Civil Service were learning Chinese. A twelfth-hour reform!

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to survival, and, if the latter is the choice, to what modifications 000
will it be subjected by the genius of the race.[1]

What now follows is a summary of the distribution of the Chinese 121
in Southeast Asia, an account of the earlier contacts, and of some aspects of the subject common to the area. The separate country studies will then ensue followed by a concluding chapter with a summary and a balance-sheet.

[1] In a cable of 6 October to Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Chinese People's Government, thirty Chinese associations, schools, and newspapers in Batavia expressed satisfaction at the formation of the new Chinese central Government and promised it support. *The Times*, 7 October 1949.

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PART I

THE AREA AS A WHOLE

CHAPTER I

THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

162 At the present time the number of persons regarding themselves as of Chinese race in Southeast Asia—Burma, Siam, Indochina, Malaya, British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines—probably exceeds 8½ million in a total population of about 157 million. This means that the Chinese account for only 5 or 6 per cent. of the total, but, as will appear from the following pages, their importance, economically and politically, is out of all proportion to their numbers and is likely to be increasingly great.

The table on p. 2 represents the distribution of the Chinese in this area with what is thought to be a fair degree of probability.[1]

Having committed ourselves to this table, we should now try to justify it. There has been a great deal of loose statement regarding the number of Chinese in Southeast Asia, especially in Siam and the Philippines, which has been due to political motivation as well as to misapprehension. The validity of our arguments in attempting to arrive at something near the real figure will depend rather on a general knowledge of what has been happening in the area in the last few years and a feeling for the probabilities than on an application of demographic equations to statistics of varying value.

The first difficulty arises from the definition of 'Chinese'; the second from the up-to-dateness or otherwise of the censuses or enumerations.

The census officials in Burma, Malaya, British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines have always apparently regarded 'Chinese' in an ethnographical sense, or rather, any person regarding him or herself as a Chinese, or who is so regarded by the head of the household or the enumerator completing the return, is so accounted for
641 in the census. In Siam and Indochina, however, persons born in
162 the country have been regarded as citizens of the country unless

[1] But see discussion in Postscript.

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[644] 162 their births have been registered with the consulates of their country of origin (in Indochina there was no Chinese consulate before 1935 and in Siam before 1946). In Burma the census report for 1931 stated that for some years it had been the custom for the male offspring of unions between Chinese men and Burmese women to assume the race of the father and for the female offspring to assume the race of the mother, so that, if we are to regard all offspring of the second generation of mixed marriages as Chinese, a considerable compensation has here to be made to the existing figures.

Ethnic[1] *Chinese in Southeast Asia*

Census figures in ordinary type: estimates in italics

	Chinese				Total population (all races)	
	1921 or circa	*1931 or circa*	*1937 or circa*	*1947*		*1947*[2]
Burma	149,000	194,000	..	*300,000*	16,824,000 (1941)	*17,000,000*
Siam	260,000[3] (1919)	445,000[3] (1929)	524,000[3]	*2,500,000*	14,464,000 (1937)	*17,359,000*
Indochina	293,000[3]	418,000[3]	326,000[3] *467,000* (1940)	*850,000*	23,030,000 (1937)	*27,000,000*
Malaya	1,172,000	1,704,000	2,379,000 (1941)	2,615,000[4]	5,849,000[5] (1947)	5,849,000
British Borneo[6]	..	..	..	*220,000*	..	*878,000*
Indonesia	809,000 (1920)	1,233,000 (1930)	..	*1,900,000*	60,727,000 (1930)	*69,000,000*
Philippines	44,000 (1918)	*72,000* (1933)	117,487 (1939)	*120,000*[7]	*18,846,800*[8] (1946)	*19,511,000*
			Total: Ethnic Chinese (say	*8,505,000* *8,500,000*)	All races	*156,597,000* (say *160,000,000*)

[1] Except where marked 3 (see below).

[2] In this column all the totals by countries, except for Malaya where the 1947 census is followed, are those of the United Nations Statistical Office for mid-1947, cited at p. 13 of *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1948* (Lake Success, United Nations, 1949).

[3] 'Legal' Chinese (i.e. according to local law), i.e. Chinese citizens, or 'Immigrants from China'.

[4] Federation of Malaya 1,885,000; Colony of Singapore 730,000.

[5] Federation of Malaya 4,908,000; Colony of Singapore 941,000.

[6] 1921 census for North Borneo gave only 38,000; 1931 census gave North Borneo 48,000, Brunei 3,000, Labuan 2,000; an enumeration in 1939 gave 124,000 Chinese for Sarawak; 1947 census gave Sarawak 145,000. (Labuan was returned to North Borneo in 1946. 1941 estimate gave North Borneo Chinese 59,000.)

[7] An estimate of the Immigration Bureau (1948) gave 101,000 but 120,000 is here given to allow for illegal immigration, &c. (see text below).

[8] Estimate of Immigration Bureau.

Let us now consider the situation country by country.

In Malaya, at the census of 1947, 2,615,000 Chinese were counted. In this country 'Chinese' is more ethnographically exact than in any other country of Southeast Asia because since large-scale immigration from China began over half a century ago there has been

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no miscegenation of any importance. Before then it was comparatively small.[1] 162

Siam, which next to Malaya has probably the greatest number of Chinese in the area, offers far greater difficulty. The Siamese census of 1937 placed the *immigrant* Chinese at 524,000. It is common knowledge, however, that the number of persons in the country who in appearance, custom, language, and sentiment are of the Chinese race is far greater than this. Indeed, now that the 'Chinese question' looms large in Siam, it is often whispered (and sometimes in responsible circles) that the number of Chinese in the country is 'over four million'. This figure the writer believes to be a great exaggeration. For one thing, the 1937 figure for 'legal' Chinese was probably not far from the mark,[2] and even if we included all persons of the second and even third generation (at which stage assimilation to the Siamese was usually complete) we should probably not reach a figure for that time greater than two million.[3] Since the census of 1937 the immigration of Chinese into Siam has been strictly controlled and was in 1949 subject to a quota of 200 per annum. Even allowing for a considerable illegal entry and a natural increase of 1·5 per cent. per annum it is not thought likely that the present figure is more than two and a half million—in all probability it is appreciably less. A different test that we may apply is this. For reasons of prestige the Chinese National Government has tended to state the number of its nationals abroad (and China, as we know, follows the *jus sanguinis* and not the *jus soli*) at the highest possible figure, but the official *China Handbook*, 1937–43, compiled by the Chinese Ministry of Information in Chungking, gives the figure as two and a half million for 1943, though the *Chinese Year Book*, 1943, compiled by the Council of International Affairs, Chungking, states it as three million.[4] 162 167

[1] The main reason is the Mohammedan religion with the alternatives of 'pork or no pork', 'dogs or no dogs'. Mr del Tufo doubts whether the number of Chinese Malay 'crosses' exceeds one or two in a thousand of the whole population.

[2] The Siamese census of 1947 gave Chinese in Bangkok, 284,519, Chinese in the provinces, 508,172, total, 792,691. These were Chinese holding aliens' registration certificates.

[3] This is the figure given by Mr Leonard Unger in his article 'The Chinese in Southeast Asia', *The Geographical Review*, vol. xxxiv, no. 2 (1944) p. 199.

[4] Mr Unger (ibid.) reasonably says of the Chinese in Siam: 'If to the immigrants are added a second generation and those individuals in a third generation who still speak the language and keep up the customs of, and main-

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162 In the Philippines Filipino nationalism has for many years
167 tended to magnify the number of Chinese in the islands since this was a matter of political capital, and before the Americans came certain Spanish interests had reasons of their own for stating the number as high as possible. But the numbers undoubtedly decreased during the war with Japan and since the liberation the Philippines Government has refused to allow the return of Chinese displaced persons except as part of a small annual quota.[1] Early in 1948 the Philippine Immigration Bureau gave the total number of Chinese in the islands as 101,000, but although to this figure a certain percentage should be added for illegal immigration (which is much easier to accomplish than in Siam, the Philippines being so near to China) it is thought that by adopting a figure of 120,000 a sufficient allowance has been made both for this and for any error in enumeration.

In Indochina where 'immigrants from China' are the only ones included in the census returns as Chinese, there have nevertheless been partial attempts in 1921 and 1931 to count the number of second generation *métis*, or offspring of Chinese fathers and Annamite or Cambodian mothers, and, making the necessary compensations and adjustments, we get a figure for 1937 of 326,000 'legal' Chinese plus 141,000 *métis* and a total of 467,000. This figure incidentally is about 40,000 in excess of that given by the *China Handbook*, 1937–43. (The official French figure for 1931 had been 418,000 'legal' Chinese, but the numbers had dropped considerably by 1937.) The official estimate by the Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer was 850,000 Chinese in Indochina in 1947.

Other difficulties turn on the variation in the years of the available censuses. Malaya and Sarawak are the only two countries in the area which have taken censuses since the Japanese surrender.[2]

tain a loyalty to, their ancestral homeland, the total rises to about one million. This approaches two million if there are also included those who might be called "ethnic" Chinese—offspring of mixed Chinese and their parentage who show in their physical appearance and cultural characteristics an affinity with Chinese.'

Ta Chen, *Emigrant Communities in South China* (London, Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 264, quotes Lin Yu, 'Twin Loyalties in Siam', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. ix, no. 2 (June 1936) p. 191, as giving 2,500,000 as the number of ethnic Chinese in Siam and adds 'or about one-fourth of the population of Siam'—which involves a considerable under-estimate of Siam's population at the time of writing (1935).

[1] See Appendix III.

[2] A census was taken in Siam in 1947, but the only details of Chinese published so far are those on p. 3, n. 2.

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For the other countries we have only censuses and enumerations of 162
differing stages of remoteness. The problem is how to bring the figures up to date by estimation.

We may take it that in the undoubtedly favourable conditions afforded by Southeast Asian countries generally, a 'natural' Chinese population would increase by 1·5 to 2 per cent. per annum (and, remember, at compound interest). But one has to be careful because these immigrant populations are often not natural, i.e. they may have a lop-sided sex ratio and the age structure might be grossly distorted. Thus, to take an extreme example, you might have 800 men, 100 girls under 10, 50 women between 15 and 45, and no others women over 50—giving a crude birth-rate about 10 per mille—and natural increase nil! The Chinese in Malaya have increased by 1·8 per cent. per annum since 1931, and with a 1:1 sex ratio and settled conditions that figure might pass 2 per cent. But elsewhere sex ratio must be considered. All in all, it seems pretty safe to assume a 1·5 increase. But since the definition of 'Chinese' rules out any close estimation of their numbers, this rough-and-ready formula we have arrived at should be applied only where no estimate based on other considerations is acceptable. This is the case only with Indochina, British Borneo, and Indonesia and here it has, subject to known factors, been utilized.[1]

Mr Unger's map (reproduced as a separate folder)[2] will assist us to gain an idea of 'ethnic' Chinese in the region. It must be kept in mind (a warning repeated in Part VII, The Chinese in Indonesia) that it represents only the chief areas of concentration and has no reference to the comparative numbers of the Chinese and native population—the former being only 5 per cent. of the latter.

In Southeast Asia the Chinese are scattered through the countries 361
in which they live, in large towns, villages, peasant farms, plantations, and mining communities. Sometimes the Chinese have come 162
to an area already well populated and developed; sometimes they have opened up an almost uninhabited region. Java, perhaps the most densely populated area in the world, has at least three-quarters of a million Chinese, if not considerably more; the coastlands of West Borneo, almost uninhabited before Chinese

[1] I am indebted for these views to conversations with Mr M. V. del Tufo, Superintendent of the 1947 Census for Malaya.

[2] By permission of Mr Leonard Unger and of the American Geographical Society.

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361 immigration, are also the site of a large Chinese immigrant com-
162 munity. Burma and Siam exhibit similar contrasts within themselves: between the densely settled delta of the Irrawaddy and the almost uninhabited Northern Shan States (where the Bawdwin mines are located), the two focuses of Chinese settlement in Burma; in Siam, between the thickly populated Menam delta and the Isthmus of Kra, almost empty until the advent of the Chinese.[1] In central Siam the Chinese live closely associated with the Siamese people by whom, until recent decades, they were completely absorbed within a few generations. In Siam about half the Chinese live in the lower delta of the Menam, in the neighbourhood of Bangkok; the remainder of the race are scattered through the country, living in villages and towns rather than rural communities and tending to concentrate in the more commercialized districts. A notable concentration of Chinese, consisting of the more recent immigrants, is to the southwest of Siam, where they work in the mines, on the rubber plantations, and as merchants in the villages.

162 Apart from the concentration in the Kra Isthmus region, the
442 chief occupations of the Chinese in Siam are the various forms of retail and wholesale trade. The Chinese, in fact, control most of
443 the retail trade in the country. In particular they have the lion's share in the rice distribution and milling, and there is scarcely a commodity from pepper to sugar in which they are not interested as middlemen. They also make up a large part of the class of skilled craftsmen.

167 Most of the Chinese in Siam originally came from Hainan, Mei Hsien, and Chao Chou (including the city of Swatow) in east Kwangtung. The last-named group is apparently in the majority, especially those from Chin Hai, Yao P'ing, Chi Yang, and Chao An.

162 In Malaya the Chinese have a special significance in that they are here the majority community and have been so since before 1941. In that year there were for the whole of Malaya 2,379,000 Chinese as compared with 2,279,000 Malays, though, excluding Singapore, which is virtually a Chinese city, the Malays still outnumbered them. By 1947 they had still further strengthened their position so that they accounted for 2,615,000 of the population, whereas the Malays were now 2,544,000. This outnumbering of the native population (though the Malays themselves have multiplied their numbers several-fold within the last few decades by natural

[1] Unger, op. cit.

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increase and by the reinforcement of Indonesians, mostly Javanese) has given rise to one of the most perplexing political problems in the Far East. 162

Malaya's Chinese are largely urban and are occupied in trade, but they also supply the bulk of the labour in the tin mines of which they own about a third. There is a large Chinese labour force on the rubber estates where, however, before the war with Japan, they were outnumbered by the Indians. In addition to these occupations, the Malayan Chinese are actively engaged in every branch of the trades and crafts, from agriculture (squatters) and pig keeping and poultry rearing (which they almost monopolize) to the building and skilled artisan trades, tailoring, dressmaking, and cobbling, and managing or working in oil mills, soap factories, shipping firms, sawmills, and many other undertakings. The pineapple industry is entirely a Chinese enterprise. [361]

Most numerous of the Chinese tribes in Malaya are the Hokkiens, after them come the Cantonese, followed by the Hakkas (Khehs), Tiuchius, and Hailams (Hainanese), and in much smaller numbers by the Kwongsai, Hokchius, Hokchias, and others. The Hokkiens, being the pioneer community in Malaya and the principal merchants, are more numerous in the Settlements of Singapore, Penang, and Malacca, and the Cantonese more numerous in the remainder of the country.

A census was taken in 1947 for the first time since 1931 and tables and abstracts from this census, together with some observations of the Superintendent, Mr del Tufo, are included in Chapter XXV of this survey. The facts revealed are of key importance and those regarding the sex ratio are highly significant.

In Java the Chinese live throughout the island, usually in cities and towns rather than in the rural areas, and they are the middle-class merchants who control much of the wholesale and retail trade. Commerce and transport occupied 61 per cent. of the Chinese in Java in 1930: sugar processing, food industries, and timber were next among their occupations. In Batavia the Chinese formed 15 per cent. of the total population. [361]

The people of south Fukien were among the earliest immigrants to Indonesia, especially Java. Some of the families have been there for almost two centuries (the founder of the Tsai (Tsoa) house landed in Java five generations ago, in 1753).[1] The Hakkas and the 167 162

[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 266.

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167 people from Chao Chou (including the city of Swatow), the Teochius, and from southern Kwangtung, followed the Hokkiens.
162 The Hakkas began to settle in West Borneo between 1740 and 1745, and were followed thither by Teochius. At first they were employed in gold-mining or were agriculturists, engaged in cultivation of rubber, pepper, and tobacco; but towards the end of the nineteenth century, when both plantations and mines grew up under European management, the Teochius and many Hakkas moved on to colonize Bangka, Billiton, and east Sumatra.

162 The Chinese of Indonesia, especially those of Java, have a much more noticeable admixture of native blood than have the Chinese of the other Southeast Asian countries.[1]

167 Chinese immigration into Indochina was directed principally towards Cochinchina and Cambodia and comparatively little towards
162 Annam and Tongking which were already thickly populated, or towards Laos which was hard of access and little developed. In Cochinchina and Cambodia, however, the Chinese pervade every phase of economic life. The largest concentration of them is in the city-continuum of Saigon-Cholon. In these countries they have a virtual monopoly of the rice trade, just as they have in Siam (though attempts have been made to limit their share of the trade in both countries, especially in Siam). They are also engaged in pepper planting and vegetable gardening, but have taken practically no part in the newer estate agriculture of rubber, cotton, tea, and palm oil—indeed as aliens they were barred from the lands most suitable for this purpose.

As in other countries of the area, the trade depression of 1929–32 had a greatly restricting effect on immigration to Indochina, but in the few years before the Allied war with Japan this was recovering.

It has been convenient to summarize the distribution and occupation of the overseas Chinese country by country, but it should be remarked that this distribution is always dictated by economic considerations, as, for example, the belt of mining activity which extends from Burma round about Moulmein to the southward along the west coast of the Malay Peninsula through Siam and Malaya and then crops up again in the Dutch islands of Bangka and

[1] When attending a meeting of the Chung Hua Hui at Leyden in 1946, at which a hundred or so Indonesian Chinese resident in the Netherlands were present, the writer was struck with the dark complexion so common among them which was in marked contrast with the lighter complexion of the Chinese of most of Malaya, except parts of Penang and Malacca.

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Billiton, among the bauxite deposits of the Rhio Archipelago off Singapore, and finally among the oil wells of Palembang in Sumatra. 167 162

The Chinese of the Philippines form a group somewhat isolated from the main body, so to speak. They have traded with and emigrated to these islands for some centuries and they persevered

The Hakkas often inhabit the same areas as the Cantonese, Hokkien, and other tribes.

The following authorities, among others, have been followed: (1) Linguistic Map of China, *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cii, no. 2 (August 1943) p. 5; (2) Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 23; (3) W. J. Cator, *The Economic Position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1936) p. 28 (map).

in their intercourse in spite of the intermittent severity and grudging tolerance of the Spanish. When, however, in 1898 the Americans assumed control of the islands, they extended to them the exclusion laws against Chinese immigration which were already in force in the United States. When the Filipinos took over the administration of their own country the term 'exclusion' (which had been subject at least to some liberal exceptions under the Americans) was more and more literally interpreted. But although 609 167 162

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609 their numbers are at present not very great in comparison with the
167 Filipinos, the economic position of the Chinese in the Philippines
162 based, as ever, on their control of trade (they owned, before 1941 at least, three-quarters of the rice-mills), has been maintained in the face of determined attempts by Filipino Nationalists to oust them from it.

121 So much will serve as a general introductory survey of the distribution of the Chinese in Southeast Asia: in the first chapter of each country study contained in the successive parts of this survey, the subject will be dealt with in much greater detail.

167 The sketch-map of the principal places of origin in China of
162 the Chinese in Southeast Asia, reproduced on p. 9, has been designed by the author and executed by Geographia Ltd., and is subject to the following considerations. The shading indicates roughly the distribution in China of the several tribes represented overseas, but in the case of the Hakkas, of whom small communities are to be found throughout Kwangtung intermingled with the Cantonese,[1] only the areas most densely populated by them are shown in the map. Nor must it be assumed that the overseas Chinese come equally from all over the shaded areas. The fact (as Dr Ta Chen has pointed out) is that the communities from which the emigrants are drawn exist side by side with non-emigrant communities, and enjoy a higher standard of living than the latter.

[1] See L. Richard, *Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese Empire and Dependencies* (Shanghai, Tu-se-wei Press, 1908) p. 207.

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CHAPTER II

EARLY CHINESE CONTACTS WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA[1]

CHINA'S intercourse overland with the countries on her southern border is of a much greater order of antiquity than her contacts by sea. Her soldiers were in Tongking and Annam in the third century B.C.; thereafter they penetrated to Cambodia, then to Siam, the last-named being reached by sea. Here there was a halt for a considerable time before her navigators went on to Malaya, Sumatra, and Java. The process took many centuries, and for long intervals there is a complete lack of information regarding the Southeast Asian countries.[2] Merchants

[1] Much of our information regarding the earlier history of Southeast Asia is derived from Chinese sources, but we should in this chapter be on our guard against identifying Chinese *knowledge* of the region with Chinese *contacts* with it. No doubt, of course, some of the information was obtained from Chinese who had actually visited the countries of the region, but much also was at second-hand and, at that, recorded often a considerable period after the time to which it relates.

In recent years a great deal has been added to our knowledge by the researches of orientalists and archaeologists, but these additions have often been independent and disassociated from one another, and the problem of the identification of geographical names has meant that places—often whole countries—have moved their location all over the map as learned discussion has displaced or refixed them. There has for long been a crying need to systematize the existing knowledge of Southeast Asia and to give more certainty and coherence to the early history, and this is what Sir Roland Braddell has been attempting to do since 1935 in his series of studies on 'Ancient Times in the Malay Peninsula' in the *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*. ('An Introduction to the Study of Ancient Times in the Malay Peninsula and the Straits of Malacca, continued as Notes on Ancient Times in Malaya'; *JRASMB*, vol. xiii, pt. 2, vol. xiv, pt. 3, vol. xv, pt. 3, vol. xvii, pt. 1, vol. xix, pt. 1.) Our concern is not directly with the subject of these inquiries, but we shall keep these studies closely in mind when outlining Chinese contacts with the southeastern areas of the Asiatic continent. What we shall have to say will often be in repetition or in summary of the remarks made in the separate country studies, but this is with the intention of giving the reader at the outset a glance over the entire area.

[2] This seems to be true as a generalization, though the *Han Shu*, vol. xxviii, speaks of voyages in the Han dynasty to Jihnan and Hsüwenhopu taking five months, to Touyüankuo taking four months, and to Ilumeikuo taking about twenty days. See Feng Ch'eng-chün, *Nan Yang Chiao T'ung Shih* (History of Chinese Relations with the Nanyang) p. 1 (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1937). (The place-names are here given in mandarin, but the foreign investigator who endeavours to identify ancient Chinese place-names in Southeast Asia would be well advised first to give the characters their phonetic equivalents in ancient

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from the West passed across Central Asia into China in the Han and later dynasties by routes that skirted the northern and southern slopes of the Tarim river basin, but they also came into the empire by way of the south, up the rivers of what is now Burma and across the hills into the present Yunnan, and by the longer sea route to the south coast. As early as the second century B.C. there appear to have been Chinese trade routes through Yunnan to the Irrawaddy and Salween valleys. For a time the main port in the south was in the future Tongking, and it was not until later centuries that it was supplanted by Canton. It was to Loyang that in A.D. 166 came an embassy of Westerners claiming to be sent by their King, who is supposed to have been the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (An-tun).[1]

Our earliest and surest information is of the Chinese intercourse with the countries sharing a land frontier with China on the south-west, and first of all in point of time comes Annam.

During the Han dynasty there existed a kingdom known as Nan-Yüeh (Nam-Viet) which extended from the region of Canton far into the Indo-Chinese peninsula to the present central Annam.[2] In 111 B.C. this kingdom was conquered by the Chinese and was divided into nine districts, one of which, Chiuchen (Annamese Cu'uchan), corresponds roughly to the present province of Thanh-hoa in northern Annam.[3] It is likely that Chinese suzerainty ex-

Chinese according to Karlgren's *Analytical Dictionary of Sino-Japanese* (Paris, 1923).

[1] See Kenneth Scott Latourette, *The Chinese: their History and Culture*, 3rd ed. (New York, Macmillan, 1946) p. 123.

Among the recent finds at Go Oc Eo was a gold medal bearing an image of Antoninus Pius with a date which corresponds to A.D. 152, showing that at an early date Funan (the ancient State in southern Annam) had connexions, direct or indirect, with the western Mediterranean. See G. Coedès, *Les états hindouisés d'Indochine et d'Indonésie* (Paris, E. de Boccard, 1948) pp. 38–9, 89.

[2] The recently published work of Professor Olov R. T. Janse, *Archaeological Research in Indo-China* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1947), greatly extends our existing knowledge of the Chinese remains in the region. Professor Janse's historical summary is here followed.

[3] Édouard Chavannes, trans., *Les Mémoires Historiques de Se-Ma T'sien* (Paris, Laroux, 1895–1905) i. 87 and ii. 168, cited by Janse, op. cit. p. xvi. And Léonard Aurousseau, 'La Première Conquête des Pays Annamites', *BEFEO*, vol. xxii, pp. 137–264, and vol. xiv, pp. 9, 13. Cited by Janse at same place.

Wang Wen-yuan (op. cit. p. 4), citing Wang Ton-lin, *Histoire du Peuple Chinois* (in Chinese), and H. Maspero, 'Étude d'Histoire d'Annam, III, Commanderie de Siang', *BEFEO*, vol. iii (Hanoi, 1918) pp. 11–28, gives a somewhat different account of this early period. He says that in the year 214 B.C. the first Emperor of the Chin dynasty, Shih Huangti, sent 500,000 Chinese—soldiers,

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tended even farther south, though in an indefinite way. However, to date there has been no archaeological evidence of any Chinese settlement of the Han dynasty farther south than a spot immediately below Thanhhoa in the provinces of Nghean and Hatinh.

After the native chief of Chiuchen had yielded to the Chinese without putting up any resistance, he was retained in his position with the title of T'aishou.[1]

The new masters of the southern territory, the 'Sons of Han' as they called themselves, ruled at first with moderation, allowing to the natives a considerable degree of freedom, but about the beginning of the Christian era they adopted a sterner attitude. At least this was so in the case of Tongking where, according to Chinese records, the Emperor Hsi Kuang (A.D. 1–25)[2] 'transformed the people through the rites and by justice', and it is most probable that the Chinese attitude towards the natives of Chiuchen was the same. It was this heavier hand of alien government, aiming at securing the rapid sinicization of the subdued barbarians, which no doubt aroused the spirit of resistance, for in A.D. 40 Cheng-Tse (Tr'ung-Trac in Annamese), the daughter of a native chief of Tongking from Mileng (Annamese, Milinh), stirred up a rebellion which succeeded temporarily in driving out the Chinese, and the native chiefs of Chiuchen joined in the struggle.

In the present state of knowledge it is impossible to establish with precision the dates of the earlier Chinese settlements in Chiuchen, but Professor Janse thinks it very likely that some pioneers ventured to immigrate thither in the third century B.C., and this is the time when the Chinese began to infiltrate into northern Indochina, especially Tongking. In any case there must have been a considerable intercourse between southern China and Thanhhoa at the end of the third or at least at the beginning of the second century B.C. To a certain extent this supposition can be corroborated by archaeology (e.g. from examples in the 'Huai Valley' style).

peasants, and those condemned to banishment, to take possession of Nam-Viet 'the land beyond the southern border'. After the conquest the country was divided into three commands, that of Nanhai, corresponding probably to the present province of Kwangtung, that of Kweilin in the present-day Kwangsi, and that of Shiang in Tongking and north Annam. These (says Wang Wen-yuan) marked the foundation of the first important Chinese colony in Indochina.

[1] H. Maspero, *BEFEO*, vol. xxxvii, pp. 263, 264, note 5, cited by Janse, loc. cit.

[2] H. A. Giles lists seven Emperors from A.D. 1 to 25, but not this one.

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177 Professor Janse makes the following interesting observations on
175 the period:[1]

> It can be assumed that the first Chinese who ventured into the country and mingled with the natives were journeying merchants or artisans. Even to-day Chinese peddlers are highly regarded among the natives because of their skill in commerce and craftsmanship. As they are generally fairly well-to-do, they are much sought after by the families of the aboriginal chieftains. Thus many of these modern settlers bring with them into Tongking and Northern Annam Chinese crafts and customs. What is happening to-day in this respect has certainly been going on not merely for centuries but for millenia. . . . In the wake of these tradesmen certainly came the civil and military mandarins, accompanied by the less welcome tax-collector, and by political refugees.

At this early time (Henri Maspero points out) the entire territory was covered with marshes and forests in which elephants, rhinoceroses, and tigers abounded and in which the aboriginals lived by hunting and fishing, eating pythons and wild beasts killed by their bone-tipped arrows. To this diet they added small crops from their primitive rice-fields which they prepared by burning down a part of the forest before the rainy season, without cultivating or irrigating the area. Only around the centres of administration, under the influence of the Chinese governors, especially the prefect Jen Yen, had they begun to till the soil in the manner of the Chinese.[2]

Such was the land which the Chinese called the 'Kingdom of the Naked'. It was not until after the victorious campaign of Ma Yuan at the beginning of the Christian era that the Chinese settled on any large scale. Archaeological evidence of this is to be found on the brick tombs of the later Han discovered in Thanhhoa. Among the most fascinating funerary objects unearthed by Dr. Janse are models of farm-houses or, in some cases, probably manor-houses, consisting of quadrangular yards surrounded by walls and a variety of buildings. Some are even provided with furniture, such as ovens, troughs, &c. They give an excellent picture of early Chinese settlements in Annam.

It will be convenient here to discontinue the outline of Sino-Annamese contacts and to resume it in the part of this survey dealing with Indochina, turning our attention to the question of the antiquity of Chinese intercourse with Malaysia far away to the

[1] op. cit. p. xvi.
[2] H. Maspero, op. cit. p. 12, cited by Janse, op. cit. p. xvi.

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south. According to the consensus of opinion, the date of the first Chinese association with these regions goes back to the third and even fourth centuries B.C. Dr Heine-Geldern in 1934 pointed out the stylistic similarities between some of the prehistoric stone sculptures of the Pasemah region in southern Sumatra and those standing at the tomb of the Chinese general Huo K'iu-ping in Shensi province in China, erected in 117 B.C. This, he says, seemed to indicate more or less intimate contacts with China, to be dated probably in the second and first centuries B.C. A decade later the same authority again referred to his own statement and pointed out that since then Chinese objects of the Han dynasty had actually been found in Indonesia. Moreover, a considerable number of Chinese sepulchral pottery vessels of the Han period had been excavated in Sumatra, Java, and Borneo, and one of them, from Sumatra, bore an inscription dating it 45 B.C.[1] From these finds, De Flines inferred, no doubt correctly, that Chinese colonists or merchants must have lived in Indonesia as early as the Han period. Also from Sumatra comes a bowl engraved with designs of persons in Chinese dresses and of horses in Han style, and other pieces of evidence included a Chinese bronze dagger-axe (*ko*) which was said to have come from Sumatra, and another from Java.

Taking all into account [Dr Heine-Geldern writes] one may come to the conclusion that direct Chinese influence in Indonesia goes back at least to the early Han period, that is at the very latest to the 1st century B.C. However, the ornamental designs of the Dyak tribes of Borneo and of the Ngada of Flores are so clearly related to Chinese designs of the late Chou period that one can hardly avoid the inference that Chinese contacts started as early as the beginning of the third century B.C., and probably earlier.

The investigation of this very early period of intercourse is almost exclusively a monopoly of the archaeologist and of the anthropologist, and what conclusions are to be drawn from the finds must remain a matter of some delicacy to the non-expert in these fields. Nevertheless it is important to note the difference of opinion between some of the schools of thought concerning the degree of Chinese influence on the regions of Southeast Asia. Speaking of

[1] R. Heine-Geldern, *Prehistoric Research in the Netherlands Indies* (New York, Southeast Asia Institute, 1945) p. 147. See also the same author, *The Archaeology and Art of Sumatra.*

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177 the intercourse of a much later period, the second Sung dynasty
195 onwards, Fay Cooper Cole remarks:

> These early contacts were primarily for trade and, while they did help to shape the history of Malaysia, they seldom were intimate enough to introduce Chinese methods, such as the potter's wheel; few Chinese words entered the language; and the influence of their political and religious ideas was nil.[1]

To this we may object that Chinese methods of agriculture, at least, through these same contacts had a profound effect on the economy of the Southeast Asian countries. None the less, Hindu influence upon Southeast Asia has been culturally much more important than Chinese, and in the sphere of navigation in the first centuries of the Christian era it was the Arabs, the Indians, and the Persians who made their way to China and the Chinese who, generally speaking, stayed at home. There was a colony of Arabs in Sumatra at a very early date, and they had a counting-house at Canton as early as A.D. 300.[2]

Latourette says that 'Chinese merchants seem not to have ventured very far afield, and to have left chiefly to strangers the initiative in foreign trade, but outsiders found China a profitable country with which to deal'. Lack of enterprise is also attributed to the Chinese by Groeneveldt, the pioneer writer on Chinese intercourse with Southeast Asia, who remarks:

> A careful perusal of the geographical literature of the ancient Chinese has shown that they have not gained their knowledge of Southeastern Asia by bold voyages of discovery: slowly and cautiously they have crept along its shores, probably not venturing to a country before they have become acquainted with it through others.[3]

And Kuwabara (cited by Braddell) says, 'the Chinese trading ships before the T'ang era were inferior in all respects to those of the South Sea countries'. Although it must be conceded that the Chinese were behind the Middle Eastern races in enterprise or curiosity, the remarks of Groeneveldt apply in a measure to all other peoples who have come into Southeast Asia. Were their

[1] Fay Cooper Cole, *The Peoples of Malaysia* (New York, Van Nosstrand, 1945) p. 27.

[2] Braddell, op. cit. *JRASMB*, vol. xx, pt. 2 (1947) p. 8.

[3] W. P. Groeneveldt, *Notes on the Malay Archipelago and Malacca; Miscellaneous papers relating to the Indian Archipelago* (London, Trübner, 1887) i. 126–262.

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explorations of the coasts of Borneo (asks Mr Tom Harrisson) any slower or more cautious than those of the Portuguese? On the contrary there is every indication that there was a regular trade on a mass scale for centuries back. Certainly by the fourth and fifth centuries Chinese ships were feeling their way along the coasts and over the seas to meet the Arabs, Persians, and Indians part way.

The reason for Chinese comparative dilatoriness in utilizing the sea routes on their own account may have been their sense of national sufficiency, and the feeling that they had nothing of great value to obtain from the regions of the south, but none the less their influence spread out over the land routes through the agency of the Arab and Indian traders. 'It is clear that at the time when the European barbarians of the north were conquering Rome, a southward movement in the Far East was taking place—the flow of the cultured Chinese into Malay lands, and the spread of Chinese civilization in Malaysia.'[1] At the same time the main colonizing activity was by Indians. Individual Chinese pilgrims and travellers, such as the Buddhist monk, Fa Hsien (or Fa Hien), went overland to India, visited Ceylon by sea, and arrived in what was either Java or Malaya in A.D. 413, and I-tsing, much later, in A.D. 692, reached Lang-ya-si, identified as Langkasuka, a kingdom in the Malay peninsula. Fa Hsien found no Chinese in Java or Malaya (whichever it may have been), though his eyes filled with tears, he tells us, at the sight of a Chinese taffeta fan, for he had been away from home for thirteen years.[2]

It is not perhaps remarkable that the Chinese of the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries left most of the colonizing initiative to others, for, quite apart from their self-sufficiency, these were the Dark Ages of Chinese history when warfare and foreign invasion were almost incessant. Nevertheless, in the first Sung dynasty (A.D. 420–

[1] G. Nye Steiger, H. Otley Beyer, and Conrado Benitez, *A History of the Orient* (Boston, Ginn & Co., 1926) p. 202 and passim.

[2] *Fa Hsien Fo Kuo Chi*, the record of Fa Hsien's voyages, has been translated by Samuel Beal as 'An Account of the Buddhist Countries' (London, Trübner, 1869), by J. Legge (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1866), and re-translated by H. A. Giles (Cambridge University Press, 1923). Rémusat's French translation is earlier (1836).

Giles gives the track of the voyage of Fa Hsien from Ceylon to China as being via the Straits of Sunda, whereas W. A. Grimes (*JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (February 1941)), a meteorologist, basing his views on a study of the winds near the equator, considers that he went via the Straits of Malacca. This is also the view of Bradden, who thinks that Fa Hsien's *Ye-po-ti* was not Java but Malaya. (*JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (1947) p. 25.)

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79) missions from these southeastern countries made their appearance in China, and after the Liang dynasty (A.D. 502–57) envoys came from over the sea every year for the purpose of getting an almanac and of acquitting themselves of the duty of tribute in greater number than in any former time.[1]

Reference in Chinese history to countries and places in these territories does not necessarily mean that they were known to the Chinese by direct contact. An early voyage, however, was in A.D. 607 when the Emperor Sui Yang-ti sent a mission by sea to Siam to open up commercial relations with that country.[2] But the sprinkling of references to places, probably in this Southeast Asian area, of obscure identity which may be found in the History of the Liang Dynasty (502–57) is succeeded in the History of the T'ang Dynasty (618–907) by information regarding definite countries which has a much surer feel. For example, we hear (and believe) that between 756 and 779 three envoys of Java arrived in China and that in the year 813 further envoys arrived at the capital with presents of four negro slaves, parrots of different colours, pinka-birds (not identified), and other gay trifles. The Emperor honoured the envoy with the title of Left Defender of the Office of the Four Inner Gates, and when the recipient wanted to waive the title in favour of his younger brother, the Emperor praised him for his unselfishness and bestowed a title on both of them.[3]

We are now definitely in the era of the tribute-bearing missions which soon took on the character of trading expeditions since the Emperor invariably presented to the envoys gifts equal to or greater in value than those they had brought. The missions were very numerous and a mere recital of them would not add much to our enlightenment. They had always, of course, a purely diplomatic appearance, especially those sent on the accession of a new Emperor or a new dynasty.

Between 1209 and 1214 a book was written by Chao Ju-kua, a member of the imperial family of the Sung dynasty (960–1280) and superintendent and commissioner of Customs at Ch'üanchowfu, a coast town to the north of Amoy. This book, based on information

[1] Braddell, op. cit. *JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (1941) p. 21.

[2] *Chau* [*sic*] *Ju-kua* (late Sung Dynasty): *His work on the Chinese and Arab trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries*, translated from the Chinese and annotated by Friedrich Hirth and W. W. Rockhill (St. Petersburg, Academy of Science, 1911) p. 8. The name of the work in Chinese is *Chu Fan Chi*.

[3] *T'ang History*, Book 222, Part 2, Groeneveldt, p. 140.

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gained from merchants from India, Persia, Syria, and Arabia, gives facts concerning the countries and peoples of the West, including Spain, and of the Chinese trade with the Malaysian islands. (Some details from this work are cited both above and later in this chapter.)

In the History of the Sung Dynasty we have a detailed account of Java, including the observation: 'Their houses are handsome and are adorned with yellow and green tiles: when Chinese merchants arrive they are received as guests in a public building and what they eat and drink is copious and clean.'[1]

In 1291 Angkor was visited by Marco Polo and the Lady Kutai, whom the Mongol Emperor of China was sending as a bride for the Khan of Persia, there to behold the fast-fading glories of the Khmer empire.[2] Five years later, one Chou Ta-kwan was a member of the Chinese mission sent to acquaint the King of Cambodia with the accession of Yüan Cheng, the new Emperor of China and grandson and successor of Kublai Khan. To this same Chou Ta-kwan we owe a vivid and detailed account of the Khmer empire.[3] What concerns us here, however, is his remarks concerning his own countrymen who visited or were resident in Cambodia. Here are some of them rendered into English from Pelliot's translation.

> The Chinese who follow the sea as a profession take advantage of their being in this country to dispense with wearing clothes. Rice is easy to obtain, women are easy to find, the houses are easy to run, personal property is easy to come by, commerce is easy to engage in. Thus there are constantly those who direct themselves towards this country.
>
> In this country it is the women who are skilful in commerce. Thus a Chinese who arrives down there and take a wife profits in addition by her commercial aptitude.

This Chinese chronicler (says Mr Brodrick), with the typical prejudice of his people against frequent washing, wrote that, 'the people are often ill, owing to their too frequent baths and the incessant wasting of the heat'.

According to Chou Ta-kwan, the embassy to Cambodia in 1296 was entirely successful and homage was rendered to China, but (says Pelliot) '*peut être est-il trop intéressé dans l'affaire pour que nous accordions pleine créance à ses dires. En fait il n'y a aucune trace que des relations officielles régulières aient suivi la mission de 1296*'.

[1] Book 489. Groeneveldt, p. 141.
[2] A. H. Brodrick, *Little Vehicle* (London, Hutchinson, n.d. (1949?)) p. 156.
[3] 'Tcheou-Ta-Kouan, Mémoires sur les coutumes de Cambodge' (trans. by Paul Pelliot), *BEFEO*, vol. ii, no. 2 (1902).

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177 There is certainly no mention of Cambodia in the History of the
175 Yüan Dynasty.

It is first in the Yüan dynasty (A.D. 1280–1368) that action combines with colour to make real the machinations of Chinese imperial politics in these waters. In the year 1292 the Emperor Kublai Khan, no doubt envious of the growing influence of Java in further India and the eastern part of the archipelago, sent an expedition against the Javanese State of Singosari. He ordered the Governor of Fukien to send Shih Pi, Ike Mese, and Hau Hsing to collect from Kiangsi and Kiukiang soldiers to the number of 20,000 who were to be embarked in a thousand ships for the Southern Ocean. Shih Pi sailed with 5,000 men from Ch'üanchow, probably via the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank (to give them their modern names), Annam (Giau-chi), and Champa, encountering bad weather on the way, and in the first moon of the following year they passed the Natuna Islands to a place which was probably Billiton in Java where the fleet stopped to cut timber to make small boats suitable for going up the rivers. An internal feud was in progress between native potentates and in this Shih Pi took sides, routing the army of Daha (Kediri).[1]

But Shih Pi lost 3,000 of his men (largely, it seems, through sickness) and for this he was disgraced and ordered to receive seventeen strokes. But in 1295 he was restored to favour, and he died, high in honours, at the age of eighty-six.

The Ming History records that at this time Java was subdued,[2] but the truth is that the great expedition had failed and no new one was undertaken. The military expeditions of the Mongols had nowhere more than a temporary influence.

The empire of Sri Vijaya, which endured for many centuries, had its capital in Sumatra in the neighbourhood of Palembang. It included the Malay Peninsula under its sway. Eventually it decayed under Chola (Coromandel) raids, the revolt of Melayu (Jambi), and attacks from neighbouring kingdoms. The Sung chronicles have many references to Sri Vijaya's wars. The empire eventually disappeared and was succeeded by Jambi. Jambi in turn (between

[1] For an account of the complex politics and strategy of this expedition see E. S. de Klerck, *History of the Netherlands Indies* (Rotterdam, W. L. & J. Brusse, 1938) i. 139–40.

[2] Book 324. It appears from Chinese records and the account of Marco Polo that Tuban, Sedayu, and Tjanggu were at that time prosperous commercial towns. De Klerck, op. cit. p. 140.

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1338 and 1365) succumbed to Majapahit, whose seat of government was in Java. Majapahit was warlike and destructive: it sacked ports in Borneo, Surabaya, Ceram, and Lombok, and finally subjected Sri Vijaya's colonies in the Malay Peninsula.[1]

Palembang, near the east coast of Sumatra, fell into Chinese hands on the decay of Sri Vijaya and remained under them for about two hundred years. The Chinese who lived there followed piracy as a calling, using the port as a retreat and strongpoint. This town, then, was one of the earliest places in Southeast Asia where the Chinese settled in any numbers. San-fo-ts'i is a rival for the distinction (if, indeed, it were a Malayan territory distinct from Sri Vijaya), and when it faded in importance about the same time as Sri Vijaya, several thousand Chinese from Fukien and Canton who lived there began to govern themselves. In 1377 they had as their leader a man named Liang Tau-ming from Namhoi in Kwangtung.

Meanwhile, in 1349, Wang Ta-yuan, a Chinese merchant, writes of Tumasik, or Old Singapore.[2] His account gives the very definite impression that here also was a fairly large settlement of Chinese. This is the first colony of Chinese in the Malay Peninsula of which we have any record.

In a later chapter in the history of the Chinese in Malaya we shall discuss the question whether the Chinese formed any permanent settlement in the Malay kingdom of Malacca, which was founded about A.D. 1400 and endured until the Portuguese conquest of 1511. The chances are (we shall decide) that the merchants who visited the place were merely seasonal visitors, coming down from China with one monsoon and going back with the other. But it was in the early years of the Malay kingdom that the Emperors of the Ming dynasty began to send expeditions to the Southern Ocean and beyond on a grand scale.[3]

In 1403, says the Ming History,[4] the Emperor sent the eunuch

[1] See Sir Richard Winstedt, *Malaya and its History* (London, Hutchinson, 1948) p. 29 ff.

There are maps showing the probable extent of Sri Vijaya and Majapahit accompanying H. Otley Beyer, 'The Philippines before Magellan', *Asia*, vol. xxi (1921).

[2] See p. 282.

[3] In summarizing the Ming voyages the writer has to be much on his guard. The facts and translations of the authorities of last century, particularly Rockhill, have been subjected to the searching scrutiny of Professor Duyvendak, and many errors and slips have been revealed.

[4] J. J. L. Duyvendak, 'The true dates of the Chinese Maritime Expeditions in the early fifteenth century', *T'oung Pao*, xxxiv (Leyden, 1939).

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177 Yin Ch'ing as envoy to Malacca with presents of silk brocade.[1] But
175 more noteworthy was the visit a few years afterwards by the famous Grand Eunuch, Cheng Ho, later deified as Sam-po-kung.

Altogether Cheng Ho and his colleagues, the Grand Eunuch Wang Chin, and the assistant envoys, the Grand Eunuchs Hung Pao and Yung Chen, together with the Senior Lesser Eunuch Chang Ta, commanding the fleet, made seven voyages, in 1405, 1407, 1409, 1414, 1417, 1421, and 1431 (these being the years in which the expeditions set out).[2] The account published by them in 1431 is in their collective name, but it is not clear which of them took part in the several voyages. The following is abstracted from their account as quoted by Professor Duyvendak:

Voyage I

In the third year of Yung Lo (1405), 'commanding the fleet', we went to Ku-li (Calicut) and other countries. At that time the pirate Ch'en Tsu-yi and his followers were assembled at San-fo-ts'i (Palembang) where they plundered the native merchants. We captured the leader alive and returned in the fifth year (1407).

Voyage II

In the fifth year of Yung Lo (1407), 'commanding the fleet', we went to Kua-Wa (Java), Ku-li (Calicut), Ko-chih (Cochin), and Hsien-lo (Siam). The kings of these countries all presented us as tribute with local products, precious birds, and (rare) animals. We returned in the seventh year (1409).

Voyage III

In the seventh year of Yung Lo (1409), 'commanding the fleet', we went to the countries visited before and took our route by the country of Hsi-lan-shan (Ceylon). Its King Ya-lieh-jo-nai-erh (Alagakkonara) was guilty of a gross lack of respect and plotted against the fleet. Owing to the manifest answer (to prayer) of the divine power (the plot) was discovered and thereupon the king was captured alive. In the ninth year (1411), on our return, he was presented (to the throne as a prisoner). Subsequently he received the imperial favour of returning to his own country.

[1] Ming History, Book 325.

[2] 'What are today called the Indian Ocean or the Nanyang were formerly called the Nan Hai (Southern Sea) or the Nan-hsi Hai (Southwestern Sea). The sea to the south of the Gulf of Siam was given the special name of Ch'ang Hai.' Feng Ch'eng-chün, *Nan Yang Chiao T'ung Shih* (*History of Chinese Relations with the Nanyang*) (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1937) p. 91.

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The fourth voyage (1414) was to Ormuz and other places and the fleet returned in 1415. In that year the king of the country of Man-la-Chia (Malacca) came in person with his wife and son to present tribute. On the fifth voyage (1417–19) the envoys visited Ormuz again and also Aden, Mogadisho, Calicut, &c., bringing back zebras, lions, camels, and ostriches. Ormuz figured once more in the sixth voyage (1421–2) and in the sixth year of Hsüan-ti (1431), 'starting once more for the barbarian (countries) in order to make known the imperial commands', the fleet sailed for the Western Ocean, returning in 1433.

The object of the voyages was to enhance the prestige of the Ming dynasty and, incidentally, to keep a look out for any rebels against the dynasty who might have taken refuge in the Nanyang. 'The Imperial Ming dynasty', proclaimed the high envoys, 'in unifying seas and continents, surpasses the Three Dynasties and even goes beyond the Han and the T'ang. The countries beyond the horizon and from the ends of the earth have all become subjects (of the Imperial Ming). . . . The barbarians from beyond the seas . . ., have come to audience bearing precious objects and presents.'

Says Professor Duyvendak in another place:[1]

> These embassies must have been stupendous undertakings; fleets are described of 62 vessels carrying 37,000 soldiers; more than 20 countries in the Indian archipelago and the Indian Ocean were visited; chiefs and kings, like those of Palembang and of Ceylon, were deposed and sent as captives to China, and members of the expeditions went as far as Aden and Mecca, bringing messages from the Chinese court. Most surprising of all, these fleets were commanded by eunuchs, of whom none is more famous than Cheng Ho, known as San-Pao-T'ai-Ch'ien.

The dynastic histories have a good deal to say of Java during the period of Cheng Ho's voyages. The denizens of the country were divided into three kinds of people—first, the Chinese who resided there temporarily and whose clothes and food were fine and nice; secondly, the traders from other countries, who resided there for a longer time, and who also were quite civilized and clean; and thirdly, the natives of the country, who were very dirty and were fond of eating snakes, insects, and worms, and who slept and ate together with the dogs. From Grissé, in 1411, a Chinese from Canton sent representatives to the Chinese court and a letter offer-

[1] 'Ma Huan Re-examined', *Proceedings of the Royal Academy of Science* (Amsterdam, 1933). (On the *Ying yai sheng lan*, ascribed to Ma Huan.)

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177 ing produce of the country as tribute. Tuban was the native name
175 of a place near Grissé where more than a thousand families lived, all under one chief. Amongst them were many Chinese from Canton and Changchow (near Amoy) who were settled there. Fowls, goats, fish, and vegetables were cheap there. Surabaya was another place where there were many Chinese. Later it seems that Tuban was deserted by them because of its insecurity (there being numerous robbers) and all trade went to a new place, Yortan (situated in the present district of Paduran), but it subsequently disappeared.

There is in the Chinese records a large number of references to the Chinese in Java and Sumatra in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries on the eve of the European incursions into these waters. Many pirates are mentioned, including Ch'en Tsu-yi who was seized by Cheng Ho. Later on, in the reign of Chia Ching (1522–66), another notorious Cantonese robber flourished. Besides his main business of robbery, he had a large commercial establishment in which many Hokkiens were employed.

Regarding the Chinese navigation of these seas, it has been remarked that their junks always sailed with the trade winds, going with the northeast monsoon and returning home with the southwest monsoon. On the outward voyage it was the custom to follow the Asiatic coast, but on the home trip the ships of Amoy probably sailed along the west coasts of Borneo, Palawan, Luzon, and Formosa. Moreover, the sailing directions in Chinese books indicate that ships bound for the Sulu Archipelago, eastern Borneo, and, in later centuries, even for Banjermassin and Java, first crossed over to the island of Luzon and sailed southwards through the Philippines.[1]

This opinion is consistent with that of Sir Roland Braddell who says:

> Summarizing, we suggest that both *a priori* reasoning and such data as we possess lead to a very early knowledge of Borneo on the part of the Indians and Chinese and that in the case of both of them probably, but the latter certainly, they must have been familiar with Borneo before they became familiar with Java, the navigation to which was far more difficult and more dangerous.[2]

[1] G. N. Steiger, op. cit. pp. 202, 203. See also p. 679 of this Survey, and the remarks on Chinese navigation of Southeast Asian waters in J. V. Mills, 'Malaya in the Wu-pei-chih Charts', *JRASMB*, vol. xv, pt. 3 (December 1937).

[2] op. cit. *JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (February 1941) p. 72.

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Let us now go back for a while and consider the early history of the Chinese contacts with Borneo in more detail, keeping in mind the implications raised by Dr Heine-Geldern's revelations of the finds there and in Indonesia. 177 175

The credit for bringing Brunei to the official notice of China seems to have been due to neither the Chinese nor the Borneans, but rather to the enterprising Arab traders of Canton and Ch'üan-chow. It is not known just how early these Arabs began trading in Brunei, but in 977 a certain Abu Ali and two other Arabs came to the Chinese court as envoys from the king of Brunei. From the twelfth to the fifteenth century accounts of Brunei, Sulu, Mindoro, and others of the Philippine Islands became more numerous. Before 1225 Chinese vessels were making trading trips to nearly all parts of the Philippines. Apart from Sulu, which had always maintained closer relations with Borneo than with the Philippines, the most important trade centre appears to have been Mindoro.[1]

The traditions of Borneo and Sulu indicate that a Chinese province was established some centuries ago in the neighbourhood of the Kinabatangan River, and the province had dominion over the Sulu River. It is mainly accepted, too, that a daughter of a Chinese 'prince', who was in all probability the governor of the province referred to, came from the Kinabatangan River to marry the second sultan of Brunei, and from that couple originated the royal family of Brunei of the present day.

The statement that the Dusuns are 'half-Chinese' is frequently made by residents of Borneo. This theory has led to much controversy. In the middle of the last century a traveller in Sarawak, a Mr Witti, expressed himself strongly against any supposed Chinese mixture in the blood of the Dusuns, saying, 'I think no Chinese colonies ever existed in the north of Borneo', but the same traveller in a journey up the Pagalan River speaks of a tribe that was 'probably the result of an infusion of Chinese blood with the aboriginal races of Borneo'.[2] Regarding the Dyaks, Earl remarks that the Chinese of his time supposed them to be descended from a large body of their countrymen left by accident on the island, but this belief, he says, was entertained solely on the basis of the Chinese legend of the Kuni Balu snake whose stone was stolen by the

[1] Steiger, Otley Beyer, Benitez, op. cit. p. 205.
[2] Cited by Ling Roth, *The Natives of Sarawak and British North Borneo* (London, Truslove & Hanson, 1896) i. 24.

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177 Emperor of China by the agency of Chinese who formed a chain
175 from the snake's lair to waiting junks. The stone was recovered by the snake, but the human chain of Chinese remained to colonize the country. Another legend of this nature concerned the origin of the Bolupih race from a Chinese native union. C. A. de Crespigny could see no similarity between the natives and the Chinese except a turning-in of the upper eyelid in childhood, whereas St John observed that the 'features of many are very like the Chinese—perhaps a trace of that ancient kingdom that tradition fixes in this neighbourhood'.[1] In the present century I. H. N. Evans has pronounced strongly against the theory of Chinese admixture with the Dusuns though he admits Chinese admixtures on the Klias Peninsula and the Kinabatangan River.[2]

But whatever the truth regarding the Chinese colonization of Borneo in remoter times, it is certain that by the early nineteenth century a considerable admixture of the races was in progress. Intermarriage between Chinese men and Dyak women was common and St John, at the request of the Raja, opened a school for the benefit of the offspring of such unions.

Truly speaking (St John adds) the Chinese women up here are themselves the offspring of mixed marriages, but having been brought up in all the manners and customs of the Chinese, are looked upon as Chinese. The settled agricultural tribes between the Brunei and Murudu Rivers were considered good examples of Chinese and natives intermarrying.

Of special interest to the students of Chinese contacts with Borneo is the evidence afforded by native agricultural methods and the 'sacred jars'.

Sir Spenser St John describes the methods used by the native

[1] Ling Roth, op. cit. i. 57; ibid. p. 59.

[2] I. H. N. Evans, *Among Primitive Peoples in Borneo* (London, Seeley Service, 1932) p. 274 ff.

Mr Tom Harrisson comments: 'How is it possible to conclude that the theory is not true, while at the same time admit Chinese admixtures on the Klias Peninsula and the Kinabatangan River? Such traditions do not persist unless there is some reason for them. In fact, they are to be found in some form or other, over a much wider area of Borneo, and were recorded by some of the very earliest travellers, such as the anonymous writer in the *Chinese Repository* of 1834, and Earl in 1837. The most that can be said is that the matter is not proven either way. . . . St John in 1858 found remains of extensive pepper gardens in the Madihit, ten days by canoe, through rapids etc., right up the Limbang and right in the interior. The oldest Muruts could then just remember these Chinese. The present inhabitants of the area have *no idea* there were ever Chinese there—a good example of the negative negative.'

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people of Tumposok where he first saw natives ploughing. The plough was of a very simple construction, serving rather to scratch the ground than to turn it over, was entirely of wood, and was drawn by a buffalo, and its action was the same as if a pointed stick had been dragged through the land to a depth of about four inches. After ploughing, they used a rough kind of harrow. 'I think this superior agriculture', says St John, 'is obviously a remnant of Chinese civilization.'[1]

Tangible evidence of Chinese contact with Sarawak is afforded by the 'sacred jars', undoubtedly of Chinese origin. The 'jar cult' played an important role not only in Borneo but also among the Moi of southern Indochina, in the Philippines, in Formosa, and various other parts of the Indonesian region. (Dr Heine-Geldern remarks that Professor Janse's recent discoveries in Indochina may help to solve the origin of this cult.) St John describes the several kinds of jars existing in Sarawak. The best known were the Gusi, the Rusa, and the Naga. The most valuable, the Gusi, was a green colour, about 18 inches in height, and was, from its medicinal properties, exceedingly sought after. One fetched at Tawaran the price of £400 to be paid in produce. The Naga was a jar two feet in height ornamented with Chinese dragons. This was at this time worth only £7–8; while the Rusa, covered with the figures of some kind of deer, was worth £15–16.[2] Another jar, the Ningkah, mentioned in another contemporary account, fetched $150.[3]

These jars were the principal commodity in the Chinese trade with Borneo and other islands. This trade may have been of the 'silent' variety, when Chinese junks, laden with silk, beads, iron,

[1] It is interesting to compare this description with that of a native plough of supposedly Chinese origin in the Philippines (see p. 613), and there is a reference to another plough not of local design in Malaya (see p. 314).

[2] Ling Roth, op. cit. ii. 284.

Every Dyak tribe possessed some jars according to their riches or importance, though, as one European lady remarks, 'no one would suppose from their appearance that they were worth more than the common earthenware water-pots we use in our bath-houses'. They were, in fact (to judge from examples in the Sarawak Museum), of as cheap a quality as the Chinese trader could persuade the natives to purchase. Examples of these jars are illustrated in Plate 159 of N. Ottema, *Ceramiek Handboek*, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam, J. H. de Bussy, 1946).

One special jar, owned by the Sultan of Brunei, was supposed to have magical qualities, and Bisayas used to come with presents for the Sultan to obtain in return a little water from the jar with which to sprinkle their rice-fields to ensure good crops.

[3] L. W. Helms, *Pioneering in the Far East* (W. H. Allen, London, 1882) p. 153, cited by Ling Roth, op. cit. ii. 280.

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177 copper pots, and many kinds of jars arrived off the coast and made
175 their presence known by beating on gongs. The natives would bring to the beach whatever they had to trade and then retire to a distance. The traders would take ashore what they considered the proper equivalent in terms of their own goods, and if this proved satisfactory they took the native articles and moved on to the next settlement.[1] But whether or no this method of trading was usual in later times, it seems that in the time spoken of by Chao Ju-kua (12th–13th centuries) buying and selling were carried on in a more friendly and civilized way. After a ship had arrived and had been boarded by the natives they mingled freely with the ship's folk. The custom was for native traders to assemble in crowds and carry the goods away with them in baskets, 'and even if one cannot at first know them and can but slowly distinguish the men who remove the goods there will be no loss'.[2]

More impressive, aesthetically speaking, than the jars are the pottery and china revealed by the pick and spade in mineral exploration. Mr Helms records that on one occasion his party found a number of paving tiles four inches thick, "beautifully made of pebbles, concrete, quartz, etc. They had been polished, were clearly very old, and made by people of a higher civilization.' Were these, by any chance, relics of Chinese settlement?

The coming of the Europeans caused a break in the trading relations between China, Borneo, and the other Malaysian islands which had gone on for so long. In the year 1530 one of the functionaries in the capital addressed a memorial to the throne respecting the discontinuance of the tribute from Borneo. This memorial says:

> During the period Cheng-tc (1506–1521) the Franks (Portuguese) had been violently spreading their influence and the tribute had ceased. A few years afterwards the natives had tried to begin sending it again, but it was evident that their regard for the Chinese empire had suffered very much.

Finally, let us summarize what is known of Chinese intercourse with the Philippines prior to the Spanish period.

It is at a comparatively late date that the Philippines are first mentioned in Chinese history; and the fact is the more striking (says Laufer) since some of the adjacent isles to the south are touched upon much earlier. In the fifth year of Hung-wu (1372) the first embassy arrived in China with tribute, and the Emperor

[1] Fay Cooper Cole, op. cit. p. 28. [2] G. N. Steiger, op. cit. p. 205.

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reciprocated by dispatching an official with presents of silk gauze woven of gold and coloured threads to the king of the country. But (Laufer warns us) 'From this first mention of the Philippines in Chinese history we should not be so narrow-minded as to infer that Chinese intercourse with the Philippines dates from just the year 1372; on the contrary, the fact that there was a Philippine embassy in that year points to a long commercial intercourse between the two peoples which had escaped the knowledge of the court historiographers at Peking.'[1] The statement made in the Imperial Geography of the Ming (*Ta Ming I Feng Chi*) that no investigation of Luzon had been made by previous generations is contradicted by the fact that Philippine tribes are described in Chao Ju-kua's work of the thirteenth century.

Since Laufer wrote there has been considerable further investigation of the subject, and the present state of knowledge can best be summarized in the words of Dr H. Otley Beyer:

> It is improbable that many Chinese ships were engaged in this trade with the Philippines during the early period (at least before the late 11th–12th century part of it) and it is unlikely that there were any Chinese residents in the islands at that time . . . [re 12th–14th centuries] Chinese merchant colonies began to establish themselves in a few places where a fairly strong or well-organized native government gave prospect of protection. . . . With the death of Cheng Ho, however, and the passing of the Yung Lo regime, this Chinese attempt at dominions overseas also passed away . . . [re A.D. 1430–1450]. As Mohammedan influence spread eastward through the southern Philippines, and northward from Borneo into Luzon, the Siam and Indo-China trade was at first cut off, while the Chinese merchant vessels were forced to seek new trading routes leading around the eastern side of Luzon, and into the eastern Visayan Islands etc., where Islamic beliefs had not yet penetrated. . . . While the Chinese settlers intermarried freely in the country, built good houses, and taught their families better ways of living, they were not otherwise interested in converting or spreading new ideas among the native folk. Their influence was chiefly economic, and aside from the brief period of Yung Lo's empire, made no attempt to meddle or interfere with native political constitutions, social customs, or beliefs. . . .[2]

[1] Berthold Laufer, 'The Relations of the Chinese to the Philippine Islands', *Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections* (quarterly issue), vol. 1 (September 1907) p. 251.

[2] H. Otley Beyer, *Early History of Philippine Relationships to Foreign Countries, especially China* (Manila, National Printing Company for the University of the Philippines Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, 1948).

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121 What has been given above is only a brief outline of a vast sub-
167 ject of which the facts are, for many periods, largely unprecipitated.
177 In an attempt to confine this survey to manageable proportions and to give it a contemporary focus, we have adopted the principle that our interest in the Chinese of Southeast Asia begins in earnest only when they had formed permanent settlements, and it is true to say that the majority of such settlements still remaining, outside Annam and Tongking, were founded within the last 350 years. Nevertheless, we should not forget that the stream of Chinese immigration into the region, swelling into spate in the second and third decades of the present century, was but an expansion of long pre-existing rivulets of intercourse.

167 After the great military expeditions of the early Mings, the urge
175 to imperial expansion overseas appears to have gone out of the
177 Chinese. The self-contained spirit of the Middle Kingdom reasserted itself and the Emperors were content with adventures by land. It would indeed be harder to explain why the urge arose at all than why it subsided so soon. The fact remains that whereas the colonization of the Europeans followed in the wake of their fleets and soldiers or to lands obtained by treaty from the native rulers, the Chinese in the last three and a half centuries have entered Southeast Asia either as visiting merchants or as suppliants for permission to remain from the Javanese Sultans, or from the Spanish, Dutch, British, or French. They came no more as haughty emissaries of the Dragon Throne, armed to the teeth to enforce the imperial will, but as humble and peaceable shiploads of traders, artisans, or coolies, waiting, like Czech or Italian peasants on Ellis Island, for permission to enter the land of promise. But their meekness and peaceableness were in the long run to be far more forceful than the militancy of the Europeans; for where the latter came in their tens the Chinese came in their thousands, and when the Europeans have gone, they will remain.[1]

[1] While this Survey was in the press there appeared 'The Khmer Empire and the Malay Peninsula', by Lawrence Palmer Briggs, *Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. ix, no. 3, May 1950, which adds valuable source material for Sino-Southeast Asia contacts.

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CHAPTER III

EMIGRATION TO THE 'NANYANG'

THE overseas Chinese are almost exclusively drawn from the southeastern provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Kwangsi—the great majority from the first two. This has mainly been due to population pressure and to the contiguity of these provinces to Southeast Asia.[1] This emigration was accentuated by internal troubles in China. In the Ming dynasty there had already been substantial emigration to the Nanyang, but a new wave was set up by the civil strife consequent on the change-over from the Ming to the Ch'ing, or Manchu, dynasty.[2] For example, the anti-Manchu pirate and patriot Koxinga, who had occupied Formosa, made descents on the coasts of Fukien in order to replenish his stores and at the same time embarrass the Manchu Government. Partly to cut off his supplies and partly to intimidate the population of these regions whose sympathies were anti-dynastic, the Manchus made the latter forsake a zone of country from about eight to thirty miles deep on the coasts of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Chekiang. This zone was denuded of its crops and its villages were burnt down. A reference was made to this in the reign of the first Manchu Emperor when governors were ordered to give houses and land to such persons who had moved into the interior 'so that they might be satisfied'. The harsh treatment they received was undoubtedly an encouragement to many in these parts of China to seek refuge overseas.

Contacts with Europeans were also a subsidiary encouragement to emigration. The first European efforts to trade were centred in Kwangtung. In 1516 Perestrello came from Malacca to China; in 1517 de Andrada arrived in Canton and received permission from the viceroy to trade. The attitude of the Portuguese soon aroused the hostility of the Chinese and their trading depot was attacked and destroyed in 1522. They retired to Lampa in Kwangtung where

[1] Population pressure in China, especially in the nineteenth century, is instructively dealt with by G. E. Tyler, 'The Taiping Rebellion, its economic background and social theory', *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. xvi (1933) pp. 545–614.

[2] See J. J. L. Duyvendak, 'Chinese in the Dutch East Indies', ibid. vol. xi. (1927) pp. 1–15.

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they maintained a trading post for the next fifty years. Another expedition reached the coast of Fukien in 1518 and established depots at Ch'üanchowfu, north of Amoy, at Foochow, and at Ningpo in Chekiang. Between 1545 and 1549 an imperial edict for the extermination of the Portuguese was enforced wherever possible. Nevertheless Macao was founded as a trading post in 1557. The Portuguese paid rent for the Macao Peninsula until 1849. During the eighteenth century Macao was the chief port for the Western trade in China. The Spanish next opened up direct relations with the Chinese, using Manila as their base, but the trade between the Philippines and Amoy was almost entirely in Chinese hands. The port of Amoy from 1730 to 1842 was closed to all foreigners except Spaniards. The Dutch made attempts to open up trade at Canton in 1604 and 1607 but were defeated by the Portuguese interests at Macao. Though they eventually occupied Formosa, they were driven out by Koxinga in 1661. Further efforts made by the Dutch to obtain recognition of their trade were without success, and it was not until 1762 that they were able to establish a factory at Canton. The English made their first essay to join in the trade in 1596, but it was a failure. They tried in 1647 to operate under Portuguese auspices, meeting, however, with little success. The East India Company renewed the attempt to trade with Canton in 1664 and 1674, but were foiled, mainly by the Portuguese. The Company did, however, succeed in 1667 and 1670 in trading at Amoy and Formosa, but their factory in the latter place was closed in 1681. In 1685 an imperial decree opened all the ports of China to foreign trade; but Canton and Amoy remained the principal trading entrepôts.

A circumstance which tended towards centring the foreign trade on Canton and eventually confining it to this one port was the establishment of a monopoly by the Chinese Government. In 1702 an official called a Hoppo, or emperor's merchant, was appointed at Canton and became the sole broker for all purchases and sales. Two years later the Hoppo had to admit certain other merchants into a share of his monopoly. Henceforth the trade increased in bulk and flourished, though subject to very severe restrictions and a rigorous disciplining of the foreign merchants, most of whom had to withdraw to Macao in the non-trading season. In 1757 an imperial edict prohibited all foreign trade at any port other than Canton. Attempts to improve the conditions of trade and to establish relations on a proper footing led to the sending of embassies to

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Peking by the Dutch and the British, but without concrete result. The situation continued down to the First China War of 1839–42. 175 167

It will be seen, then, that Chinese contacts with foreign traders were practically confined to the Kwangtung and Fukien ports, though the intercourse was even then a restricted one. It was not the policy of the Spanish or of the Dutch (except at the beginning) to attract the Chinese to their colonies; it was only after 1786, when the British began to make settlements in the Malay Peninsula, that the Chinese found an unqualified welcome. The capitalistic development of colonies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had not yet begun, and there was no demand for coolie labour on a large scale before then. The Americans first traded with Canton in 1784, but it was not until 1848 that the first Chinese immigrants arrived at San Francisco.[1] 441

Such were some of the circumstances which induced, or paved the way for, Chinese emigration to the Nanyang. Our task must now be to investigate the factors which discouraged this emigration.

Ancestor worship was a strong force in discouraging the Chinese from emigrating. The spirits of the dead needed the constant attendance of the living to ensure their welfare, and those who deserted the vicinity of the graves of their ancestors and left their spirits without sacrificial offerings and ritual attention were guilty of unfilial conduct. Thus it was at all times that only those who were forced by dire necessity left their native villages, and they were regarded as outcasts and vagabonds. It was natural, therefore, that a great many refugees and criminals should have been included among the emigrants.[2] 167

Religion was reinforced by Government policy. The Emperors took the view that the loss of subjects was not a loss to be compensated for by any trade advantages. Under the Mings the law was not so strict as it became later under the Ch'ings (the Manchus were also more orthodox Confucians than the Mings—and aliens are frequently more orthodox and conservative than the people

[1] So it is commonly stated, but in the correspondence relating to a project to send Chinese to Trinidad in 1806 ('Notices of Pinang', *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, vol. vi (1852) pp. 145–72) it is mentioned that Chinese had already been taken to Nootka Sound in North America. The writer has so far been unable to discover the facts of this matter.

[2] H. Gottwaldt, *Die Uberseeische Auswanderung der Chinesen* (Bremen, Max Moessler, 1903), insists that 'only the scum of the Chinese go abroad'.

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167 they live amongst). The Laws of the Ch'ing dynasty, section ccxxv, are explicit:[1]

> All officers of government, soldiers, and private citizens, who clandestinely proceed to sea to trade, or who remove to foreign islands for the purpose of inhabiting and cultivating the same, shall be punished according to the law against communicating with rebels and enemies and consequently suffer death by being beheaded. The governors of cities of the second and third orders shall likewise be beheaded, when found guilty of combining with, or artfully conniving at the conduct of such persons . . .

Thereupon ensues a long list of penalties, but the officials who had offended by allowing the emigration to occur were to be pardoned if they afterwards succeeded in securing the offenders and bringing them to condign punishment.

The Manchu policy was dictated largely by the consideration that emigrants from the disaffected south would almost certainly be anti-Manchu and, once out of reach of the Manchu officials, would undoubtedly be plotting among themselves and with their friends inside the country for the overthrow of the dynasty. Those who enlisted under Koxinga would be a case in point. And in maintaining this policy the officials were helped by the sentiment of the Chinese that all beyond the confines of the Middle Kingdom were barbarians and were not to be consorted with. The law could never be enforced because economic stress and hope of gain were the more powerful forces, but the principle was held in theory until 1860 when it was disposed of in the treaties with foreign Powers, though the law was not actually repealed until 1894. The officials reaped a big harvest from it, for they collected large sums from returning immigrants as a price of inaction, and they also made levies on the same account on the families in China of emigrants overseas; for in China responsibility is a very far-reaching principle.

The attitude of the Government being as it was, it can readily be understood that little attention was paid to the misfortunes and persecutions of overseas Chinese. The massacre of the Chinese in the Philippines in 1603 and 1639, and in Java in 1740, caused no great concern to the Chinese Emperors. There are instances of reprisals in the Ming dynasty, but even these are few and far between.

[1] Sir George Thomas Staunton, *Ta Tsing Leu Lee; being the Fundamental Laws of the Penal Code of China* (London, T. Cadell & W. Davies, 1810).

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We shall see how the value of the foreign trade was too great an inducement for officials and others to ignore, and the profits to be obtained by the Chinese themselves when they made trading voyages led to connivance on the part of the Governors: in 1567 the Governor of Fukien allowed his provincials to go abroad to trade with all foreigners except the Japanese, who were the arch-pirates of the period and who ravaged the Chinese coasts. Traders had, however, to get licences to leave the country.

In 1717 the Emperor K'ang Hsi summoned those of his subjects who had been residing in foreign countries to return to their homes, but consented to pardon all who had been abroad since the beginning of his reign some fifty-six years before. His successor, Yung Cheng, allowed the inhabitants of the coast provinces to go abroad to trade under licence on condition that they subsequently returned home; but in 1728 he forbade those who were unlicensed to come back at all.

A proclamation by Ch'en Hung-mou, Governor of Fukien, in 1754, continues the story of the official attitude towards emigration:[1]

> . . . A large proportion of the maritime population of Fukien is beholden for its subsistence to trade beyond the sea. The southern seas having at an earlier period been closed to trade (by a law that) provided that all persons who had gone abroad before its enactment might return home within three years, but that no one should go abroad after its enactment should be allowed to return at all. In the fifth year of the reign of Yung Cheng (1727) this interdict was removed, and there has been, from that time, a movement of traders from the Inner Land abroad unceasing as the welling of a spring. Feeling, however, that there must be some who, with sea upon sea between (China, and) the distant (land where they were), could not have returned home within the appointed time, the late Governor-General, Hao, first in one memorial, and then in a second, moved His Majesty to allow such persons to return; which proposition was sanctioned. But in the 14th year of Ch'ien Lung (1749) there occurred the case of Chen I-lao. . . .

Chen I-lao was a native of the district of Lung-ch'i, who having unauthorizedly proceeded from Kwangtung to Batavia had become headman of the Chinese at that port, and had there collected duties on foreign trade. As he could not belong to the class of honest

[1] Sir Thomas Francis Wade, *Tzû Erh Chih*, Documentary Series (London, Trübner, 1867), gives the Chinese original of the proclamation and a translation on p. 33 of the Key.

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167 trader (says the proclamation), but was the sort of man who would be laying hold of some pretext or other to give trouble, as soon as this came out he was tried (by the Chinese authorities) and sentenced to banishment; and since then such traders who are still detained abroad, being filled by his trial with doubt and fears, have not ventured to return home.

. . . the Governor, humbly reflecting [the proclamation goes on] that it is because of our Emperor's treatment of the natives and foreigners as one, that the trade of the foreigner is enabled to continue, as thread joined to thread, uninterrupted; that alike cherishing those from afar, and benefiting by his bounty the (native) merchant, his Majesty shows a consideration that leaves nothing untouched, did (as the records show) explain the matter in a memorial. . . .

The result of which was that those Chinese residing abroad, providing that their reason for not returning within the allotted time was 'the inability to close their accounts' were to be permitted to return to their homes and to bring with them any wives or concubines they had acquired abroad, together with their children.

This represents the situation until the First China War of 1839–42. The war has been stigmatized as the 'Opium War', and indeed opium was its occasion, but among the objects of the British was to force the Chinese Government to permit diplomatic contacts and to improve the insupportable conditions under which foreigners were required to trade. The Nanking Treaty which followed the war was unilateral; that is to say, the Chinese undertook to make concessions to the British without obtaining corresponding advantages. The Chinese gained no right to send consuls abroad, but at this time they did not want to do so. Treaty ports were established under the treaty, but the determination of the Chinese Government not to allow diplomatic intercourse led to a further war in 1858–60, in which Great Britain was partnered by France.

Morse[1] and MacNair[2] give in detail the history of how the Chinese were eventually brought to recognize the principle that their nationals had a right to emigrate. The Second China War was concluded by the Treaty of Tientsin. The French made their own separate treaty, and the Americans, though not participants in the war, also obtained a treaty of their own. The Chinese recognition

[1] See H. B. Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire. The Period of Conflict 1834–60* (London, Longmans, 1910) passim.

[2] H. F. MacNair, *The Chinese Abroad* (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1925).

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to the three Powers of the right of their people to emigrate took place about the same time (by the two conventions of Peking, 1860), but, owing to some complications and difference in procedure, the first incorporation of the principle in a treaty was in the Burlingame Treaty of 1870 with America when the Chinese Emperor 'cordially recognised the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free migration of aliens and subjects respectively from one country to another for the purpose of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residence'. A similar principle was embodied in agreements with Great Britain and France, but the method of promulgation was to be by imperial decree to the high authorities in every province, who should issue proclamations within their jurisdiction. The first official recognition of the right of the Chinese to leave their homeland is found in these proclamations.[1]

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It was but slowly that the Chinese began to see the advantages of having diplomatic and consular representatives in foreign countries where they had nationals or with which they had trading relations. The first permanent legation was established in London in 1877. The minister was accredited both to London and Paris. A Chinese legation was opened at Washington in 1878, in Tokyo in the same year, and in 1879 at St. Petersburg. Consuls were established at various ports in the next decade or so.

But the sentiment of the Chinese against emigration persisted throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, and it still persists. The popular attitude can well be illustrated by extracts from two American writers—the first referring to about the middle of the nineteenth century and the second to its last quarter:

[1] George F. Seward, *Chinese Immigration* (New York, Scribners, 1881), chap. vi, discusses the emigration of Chinese to the Nanyang and the question of their disposition to emigrate. His thesis is that, through growing northern influences and more amalgamation with northern stock, the people of the southern part of China are losing their migratory tendency. When they are not recruited, as for the more distant continents, they go only to nearby countries. Emigration to California was an episode only; the Chinese naturally go where the native peoples are less vigorous than they. In spite of great inducements held out to them, their numbers in the Dutch East Indies have remained small. During the same period in which Europeans changed the face of America, the Chinese in Java had made a lodgement only. They have not mongolized it.

This was written before the large-scale emigrations of the twentieth century, and the 'loss of migratory tendency' has certainly not been true so far as Southeast Asia is concerned. Nevertheless the thesis is worthy of consideration in the other respects.

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167 . . . if they [the Chinese emigrants] return with wealth enough to live upon, they are liable to the vexatious extortions of needy relatives, sharpers, and police, who have a handle for their fleecing whip in the law against leaving the country, although this clause has been neutralized by subsequent acts, and is not in force, the power of public opinion is against going.[1]

II

To the foreigner, acquainted with the experience of other lands in modern times, the simple, obvious, indispensable recipe for the relief of many of the ills to which the Chinese are subject, is emigration. . . . But this is an expedient which the Chinese themselves will never adopt, for the reason that it will take them away from the graves of their ancestors, to which, by the theory of Confucianism, they are inexorably linked. Generally speaking, no Chinese will leave his home to seek a fortune at a distance unless he is in some way driven to do so. His ideal in life is to be

'Fixed like a plant on his peculiar spot,
To draw nutrition, propagate, and rot.'

Generally speaking, no Chinese leaves his home not intending to return. His hope is always to come back rich, to die and be buried where his ancestors are buried.[2]

But in noting these impressions of competent observers we should bear in mind that they are speaking of China as a whole: the sentiment against emigration in the specifically emigrant communities of the Kwangtung and Fukien seaboard was certainly not great, if it existed at all: indeed there is reason to believe that, in the last few decades at least, they regarded themselves as having a privileged entrée to the good things that came from the Nanyang.

[1] S. Wells Williams, *The Middle Kingdom* (London, W. H. Allen, 1883) i. 279.
[2] A. H. Smith, *Chinese Characteristics* (New York, Fleming H. Revell, 1894) p. 165.

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CHAPTER IV

SPECIAL ASPECTS OF CHINESE SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MOST readers of this survey will be acquainted, at least in a general way, with the problems of China itself and with the direction in which the people of that country have moved in the last fifty years. What will be attempted in this chapter will be to illustrate the way in which the Chinese of Southeast Asia have in some respects deviated from the central pattern under the influence of local conditions. We shall select for this purpose the special aspects of the family, marriage, religion, and education, with some remarks on the opium question. As regards politics, Chapter XXXI, dealing with Chinese political organization in Malaya, brings out the developments which are typical of the area as a whole, and to this the reader is referred should he wish to gain a general impression of the matter before proceeding to the separate country studies.

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The Family. An excellent starting-point for our chapter is the work of Dr Ta Chen, who, in 1934 and 1935 was in charge of a group of investigators studying the emigrant communities in eastern Kwangtung and southern Fukien under the auspices of the International Research Committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations.[1] The area selected for study was a region from which many of the emigrants to the Nanyang originated and where their families mostly live. It is on the sea coast of the two southernmost maritime provinces and consists of ten *hsien* (counties). Roughly speaking, it includes a long strip of territory beginning at Chao An (formerly Chao Chou), passing through Swatow on the Kwangtung border, and through Amoy, and ending at Chuan Chou (Ch'üan-chow) in Fukien. It is an area of a little less than 5,000 square miles with a total population of a little over 4·6 million in 1935.[2]

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[1] Ta Chen (the name is properly Chen Ta, Chen being the surname, and it is thus given in some library catalogues), *Emigrant Communities in South China: a Study of Overseas Migration and its Influence on Standards of Living and Social Change*, English ed. by Bruno Lasker (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940).

[2] Though all the *hsien* have sent emigrants to the Nanyang the area does not constitute the sole source of emigration to the south, even from these two provinces. For example, Mei Hsien and vicinity, the principal home of the Hakkas and the largest source of Hakka emigration, is not included in this area.

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167 591 Here two distinct aggregations of Chinese live side by side—the non-emigrant and the emigrant community—from which a large proportion of the emigrants to the Nanyang are drawn and the income of whose families is (except under unusual circumstances such as the later war with Japan) augmented by remittances from their menfolk overseas. These two communities in a clear way illustrate many of the differences that distinguish the stay-at-home Chinese from those who have sought their fortunes abroad.

Judged from the natural and socio-economic facts, the non-emigrant community was (at the time of Dr Ta Chen's investigations) typical of farm life in south China. The principal occupation was the cultivation of rice, and this was supplemented by many subsidiary occupations, including poultry raising and fruit growing. After the harvest, men and women of the poorer classes picked up fuel and burned charcoal in the mountains for sale in the village market. It was a simple pattern of livelihood not differing in any essential from that of thousands of villages in any other part of rural China. The emigrant community, too, had a variety of occupations, but these did not yield them sufficient income to maintain their present style of living. To quote an experienced physician with Western training who had for many years resided in such a community: 'The children of the well-to-do emigrant families are well fed and clothed. They are easy-going and usually without a definite occupation. If by mischance the family's business in the Nanyang should be bankrupt, these people will be obliged to support themselves by begging.'[1] This statement was thought to be something of an exaggeration, but to bring out the variable factor in the life of an emigrant community. (There were, of course, also families with no sons abroad living in the emigrant community. In these families the pattern of livelihood was much the same as that in a non-emigrant community.)

Before proceeding with a summary comparison of these two sets of families, it is appropriate to remark that those who emigrated from China usually did so to improve their social status. They were, on the whole, therefore, drawn from the less prosperous families, and the process to be described was not merely that of subjecting identical social material to different influences.

In the non-emigrant community, out of 725 families studied, 650 were engaged in growing rice. One hundred and thirty of these owned

[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. pp. 59, 60.

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the land they occupied, 280 owned part of it, and 240 rented all the land they used. Crop sharing was the most widespread form of tenancy, the crop usually being divided equally between the owner and tenant at harvest time. The farm holdings varied in size, a poor family occupying three or four *mow*, a middle-class family from eight to ten, and a well-to-do family about fifteen (2·5 acres). In the non-emigrant community about one-half were engaged in rice growing, 3·6 *mow* (0·6 acres) being the average per family. The poorest tilled one or two *mow*, those of the middle class seven or eight, and the well-to-do about ten. Proprietary farmers constituted about 1 per cent. of the total number of farmers, part owners about 5 per cent., and the remainder were tenants. Crop sharing also was the rule here, from two-fifths to one-half of the crop going to the landlord at harvest time.

Other occupations followed by the non-emigrant community included the timber business and the trade in incense sticks. Income was supplemented in some villages by planting a crop of wheat after the rice harvest, growing vegetables and sugar-cane, and rearing poultry, and the girls and married women spent part time on drawn-thread and embroidery work. Emigrant families added to the remittances they received from overseas in several ways. Trade attracted a great deal of the interest and energy even of families that depended mainly on agriculture for their livelihood. For the returned emigrants, residence abroad had usually meant a change of occupation according to their inclination and the opportunities available in the foreign community. A larger proportion were engaged in trade after their return to China than before leaving for the Nanyang, that is to say about half the total—shop assistants (there were no apprentices among them), merchants, and pediars being added together. This was due to the greater opportunity for trade offered in the Nanyang than at home, and the ambitious Chinese naturally chose the opening with the greatest chances of profit. Nevertheless, there was still a large number of labourers among those who returned home, representing those who were labourers before they left and those who had struggled to emancipate themselves from working with their hands and had failed to do so. Farming showed a startling decline as an occupation among the returned emigrants, having fallen to last place.

Among the subsidiary occupations followed by the emigrant community were those in which women and girls could add to their

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167 incomes by work at home or in local workshops. The drawn-thread
591 and embroidery work engaged in by the girls and middle-aged women in their spare time earned them about twenty cents a day per person. Others wove cloth at small weaving-shops or sewed in tailors'-shops, earning about thirty cents a day. None of these occupations were, in fact, particularly remunerative. Older women were engaged in making joss-paper or in knitting fishing-nets. Apart from farming and trade, the men were engaged in relatively few occupations—there were coolies, barbers, carpenters, school-teachers, and fishermen.

167 We come now to the subject of remittances from the Nanyang
434 regarding which there has been much conflicting evidence. No
591 satisfactory estimate of these remittances has been made for South-east Asia as a whole, and in any case their value has varied greatly with the fluctuation in trade.[1] There had been a time when the ownership of a few rubber-trees had meant affluence, when Chinese importers in the Nanyang could undersell those of all other nationalities and still make a large profit, 'and when they had the native peasants so under control through indebtedness that they could sell them almost anything at any price'.[2]

[464] There had been times when labour was so scarce that Chinese coolies could in a few years accumulate savings enough to start in business, and when employees of Chinese retailers could force up wages to the point where it was more economical for the employer to take them in as partners. But by 1935 all this had changed. New immigration restrictions, motivated by the depression, had cut large numbers of Chinese labourers off from labour opportunities abroad while, at the same time, life had become, perhaps, a little more secure in this time of general débâcle for a certain privileged few—for example, the small retail traders already established in the Nanyang who had less competition to meet from their countrymen and who could circumvent the new head tax on males by bringing women and children from China to take the place of male assistants.

(This investigation, we must remember, dates from a time when Southeast Asia was only just beginning to recover from the trade depression of 1929–32.)

[1] In 1941 about S$ 810 million was remitted to China from Malaya, but there is nothing to indicate how much of this was in the ordinary way of trade.

[2] This is placed in quotation marks to indicate that it represents the views of Dr Ta Chen.

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Dr Ta Chen gives a table (p. 83) of the sources of income of 100 emigrant families from October 1934 to September 1935 which shows that the average monthly remittance per family was 81·4 per cent. of the total income, ranging between 75·5 per cent. for incomes below $20 per mensem, and 84·1 per cent. for incomes between $125 and $250. This enabled the emigrant families to maintain a much higher standard of living as a whole than those families which had no source of assistance from abroad.

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Apart from the purely economic effects of overseas migration upon these communities of east Kwangtung and south Fukien, there is evidence to show that intercourse with Southeast Asia was having a considerable modifying effect on the social institutions, religion, and general outlook both of the emigrants themselves and of the families in China whence they came and to which usually they eventually returned.

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In China the social unit has immemorially been the family, and it remains so except to the extent that it has broken down in Communist areas under the influence of Communist ideology. The system which has as its object the perpetuation of the family tree, to a considerable extent subordinates the individual to its needs. But in these emigrant communities in China and in the Nanyang itself, it has had to undergo a great deal of modification to survive. Where resources permit, a dual family system has grown up, whereby one section lives in China and the other in the Nanyang. This dual, or joint family, takes a number of forms which may vary; in the case of a well-off family (to give an example) the head of the family aged 61 lives in Siam, his wife (aged 58) lives in the ancestral village in China and is the acting head of the family, the first concubine (56) is a Siamese and lives in Siam, the second concubine (44) is in the village, and the third and fourth concubines (both Chinese, aged 30 and 19) are also in Siam, and the children of the unions are, except for the son by the wife who is with his father in Siam, all with their mothers, either in Siam or in China. An example of a middle-class family is of a father aged 77 in the village, his son aged 50, the head of the family, in Singapore, and his wife (the acting head of the family) in the village in China. The head of the family had his concubine in Singapore, and the offspring, either of the head of the family or his brothers (who belong to the family) were either in Singapore or at home. A third case of a lower-class family is a more simple pattern with the head of

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the family in Siam, his wife (acting head of the family) in the village in China, and most of the children of the marriage in China.

Such arrangements obviously call for careful financing. The emigrant abroad, after deducting what he needs to meet his expenses, usually remits his savings periodically to his home in China for the support of the family there and to meet extraordinary expenses, such as of a marriage in the family. At the same time the family home in China is a kind of insurance for the emigrant, for he can always return there if he is unemployed.

The influence of the emigrant on the age-old ideas and customs of his home village has been great. If he has had much foreign experience he almost invariably condemns the traditional family arrangement. In the words of a returned tin-miner from Malaya:[1]

> The joint family is an obnoxious social institution. When a member of such a family earns money he is obliged to support all the rest of it and to carry a heavy economic burden. I have had a very bitter experience and always felt that I am virtually the slave of my family. They are of no help to me at all.

A critical attitude towards the family and marriage systems is very general among returned emigrants. They remark that living in the modern world is a complicated affair, and that the joint family is no longer practicable. Many of them felt (in 1935) that an early disintegration of the family in south China was inevitable. Moreover, many of the emigrants have seen what marriage may mean in modern Western life when love and courtship enter into the marriage preliminaries and the union is (or should be) based on affection. An emigrant inevitably contrasts this with the Chinese system wherein the husband and wife are often unknown to one another before marriage. Stubborn and resistant as the traditional family system is, there is evidence from all over the Nanyang that as regards marriage the traditional procedure is in retreat before the modern marriage, and that the joint family system is being strained in some cases almost to breaking-point. Again, in the Nanyang itself, the increased mobility of members of the family is a force threatening to loosen its bonds.

In spite of these tendencies, marriage custom among the Chinese in the Nanyang at the time of the outbreak of the war between Japan and the Allies in 1941 generally followed Chinese traditional

[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 142.

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custom.[1] All this ceremonial was very expensive and involved the family in a burden of debt. 167

One result of the Revolution in China was to initiate a changing attitude towards family institutions. Books IV and V of the Civil Code of the Republic of China deal with the family and succession. The law was promulgated on 26 December 1930 and came into force on 5 May 1931. Polygamy was abolished, and though concubinage in many cases continued, the concubine was now a mistress without legal rights.[2] According to the new law the parties to a marriage were empowered to make the marriage agreement of their own accord, the sole restrictions being that a man who had not completed his eighteenth year and a woman not yet sixteen must obtain the consent of their parents or guardian. No registration of marriage was provided for. 178 582 593

In the Straits Settlements a Chinese Marriage Committee, appointed in 1925 by the Government, recommended that there should be registration for both new- and old-style marriages.[3] The old-style marriage would be valid if the marriage ceremony was carried out with all the essentials required by custom in the district of China from which the bridegroom and bride or their ancestors came, or by such modified custom as was observed by the Chinese residents of the Colony for that district. The committee found it impossible to submit proposals for legislation as to what forms or ceremonies should constitute marriage, because the evidence disclosed the fact that there were no essentials for Chinese marriages in the old style common to all the districts of south China or to the locally born descendants of emigrants from these districts, while the new style of marriage did not require any particular form.

The evidence taken by the committee revealed a practically unanimous opposition among Chinese residents in the Straits Settlements to any divorce legislation.[4]

[1] For a description of these customs see G.B., Colonial Office, *Report of the Commission on Mui Tsai in Hong Kong and Malaya*, Colonial no. 125 (1937), and Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, pp. 148–50.

[2] cf. M. H. van der Valk, 'The New Chinese Criminal Code', *Pacific Affairs* (1936) pp. 76, 77. Under the new Chinese Criminal Code which became operative in July 1935 husband and wife are equally liable to a year's imprisonment for committing adultery, and moreover the person with whom the adultery is committed incurs the same punishment. Complaint can be laid only by the injured spouse.

[3] *Chinese Marriage Committee*, Singapore 1926.

[4] The position in the Federated Malay States, however, was temporarily revolutionized by the Secretary for Chinese Affairs Enactment which was passed

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167 The new-style marriage, based on the consent of the parties, and
178 often arranged by themselves, has gradually been spreading in
582 popularity among the better educated. The cost of the wedding
593 and its preliminaries has also been much reduced. This is a consequence, too, of the growing equality between the sexes.

871 *Education.* It was only by dint of continual defeat at the hands of
212 foreign Powers that China realized that her traditional literary sys-
167 tem of education, which had endured for over a thousand years, did not fit her to withstand the assaults of her enemies. At long last she decided to adopt an educational system on modern lines. The greatest obstacle in doing this was the classical language. The literary language in which all education was conducted had become completely divorced from the spoken language, and it needed many years of study before a student could obtain anything like command of it. Whilst it remained, a democratic system of education was out of the question.[1] So it was that in 1917 there occurred the most revolutionary happening in the history of Chinese education, the initiation of the *pai hua* movement.[2]

Pai hua, or written vernacular, had existed in China for centuries. Most popular novels were written in it, but it had never obtained the recognition of the literati. Corresponding, as it did, to the spoken language, it was much more easily learnt than *wen li*, the Chinese literary language, though it was clumsier and more discursive. So when Dr Hu Shih maintained that the literary language should be abolished in schools and that *pai hua* should be elevated to the rank of a literary medium, the proposal was considered as threatening the very foundations of Chinese culture. But the movement obtained powerful political support and in January 1920, the Minister of Education ordered that the spoken language should be used in the teaching of Chinese in primary schools. The form of *pai hua* approved for this purpose became known as *Kuo Yü*, or the National Language.[3]

in 1899 and repealed in 1932. By this enactment the Secretary for Chinese Affairs had powers to decide the custody and guardianship of women and children, and to order divorce, separation, adoption, and betrothal.

[1] Dr W. A. P. Martin estimated about 1880 that the proportion of Chinese who could read and understand what they read was about one in twenty.

[2] For a full exposition of the subject see Victor Purcell, *Problems of Chinese Education* (London, Kegan Paul, 1936).

[3] See Hu Shih, *The Chinese Renaissance*. The Haskell Lectures 1933 (University of Chicago Press, 1934).

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The adoption of *Kuo Yü* as a medium of instruction in schools is about one-half of the story of education in China under the Kuomintang: the other half is the adoption in 1928 of the Three Principles of the People of Dr Sun Yat-sen as the foundation of the education system.

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The overseas Chinese of the Nanyang adopted with fervour the new style of education which the Revolution had brought into being. They started and ran their own schools, and the resultant rise of Nationalist feeling made the Governments of the several countries more and more apprehensive of the creation of an *imperium in imperio* in their midst.[1] Such was particularly the case in Malaya and Siam, and the crux of the friction between the China-born Chinese and the local administration has been their differences regarding the aim and control of this education. This will emerge in the course of the individual country studies of our survey.

The majority of the emigrants had little or no schooling before going abroad. It is reasonably certain that until quite recently the average emigrant was not a man of education at all, or at most he had had a very inadequate schooling before emigrating.

Religion. On going overseas to the Nanyang the Chinese took with them their religious beliefs. Be the principle of Buddhism, Taoism, or Confucianism effective or ossified, there can be no doubt at all that the world of spirits, demons, gods, and heroes is still a very real thing to the majority of Chinese and goes with them wherever they go. Dr Ta Chen notes that among the items of household expenditure other than food, clothing, and shelter, that for religious practices predominates over all others both in the emigrant and non-emigrant families of east Kwangtung and south Fukien. ('These expenditures', he says, 'are a good index of the prevalence of religious concern.') Scepticism has assuredly grown with the advance of education, but for the majority it would seem that 'keeping in' with the Great Unseen was as much a matter of insurance as of piety and ethics.

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Broadly speaking, the religion of the villagers of south China consists of the worship of Shen, Fu, and Yao in addition to the cult of their own ancestors. Shen and Fu are spirits from Buddhism and Taoism (especially the popular, corrupted, and confused aspects of

[1] See Cyrus H. Peake, *Nationalism and Education in Modern China* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1932).

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the two religious systems); whereas Yao, a ghost, is from primitive ancestor worship via Confucianism. In one emigrant community in south Fukien Dr Ta Chen's investigators found that of 224 persons questioned, 154 expressed belief in Shen and Fu, 60 had no religious preferences, 5 believed in Christianity, and 5 seemed to be wavering between acceptance and rejection of Shen and Fu. Comparative popularity would, we may be sure, depend largely on results; for, like the Roman gods, a Chinese god is expected to render a return for respect accorded and the offerings made to him. A Roman observed his rites with scrupulous adherence to the letter of the law, expecting that if he did not the gods would make it an excuse to wriggle out of the bargain, and the Chinese regard their gods in much the same spirit.[1]

Amongst the most popular goddesses in the Buddhist pantheon both in China and overseas is Kwan Yin, the goddess of mercy, 'she who hears the sounds (prayers) of mortals—she who looks down on the world and hears its cries'. She is the counterpart of the Taoist goddess T'ien Hou Sheng Mu, Holy Mother, queen of heaven, and she is credited with attributes similar to those of the Virgin Mary. Kwan Yin was originally the Buddhist male god, Avalokiteswara, who changed his sex to female some centuries after his arrival in China.

Another popular god among the overseas Chinese is Kwan Ti, the god of war.

Each craft or guild has its own patron saint—Wu Ku Lao Yeh for farmers, Chiao Sheng Lao Yeh (whose festival is on the 7th of the 5th moon) for carpenters, Shui Hsin Lao Yeh for incense-stick makers, Kwan Ti, the god of war, in his capacity of god of wealth, for tradesmen, and T'ien Hou Sheng Mu, the Taoist queen of heaven, for fishermen and sailors (but overseas her name is changed to Ma Tsu (Ma Chew Poh)), which is also popular in Amoy. In many Cantonese houses the image of the household god of the earth, T'o Yei Shan or Tei Chu, is placed *underneath* a table! The god is not worshipped in Hokkien households.

In addition to the worship of the standard deities of the Buddhist and Taoist cults, the Chinese of the Nanyang have special deities

[1] See Ta Chen, op. cit. chap. x, and Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, chap. vi. There is an instructive article, 'Chinese Contemporary Cults', by Clarence Burton Day in the *Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. vi, no. 3 (May 1947), which covers a number of the gods and heroes worshipped in south China and the Nanyang.

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of their own which are worshipped by them only overseas or in the emigrant communities from which they sprang. The outstanding examples are Sam Po Tai Shan for the Shen, and Toh Peh Kong (Hokkien), Ta Pai Kung (Mandarin), or Tai Pak Kung (Cantonese) for the Fu. 771 167

Sam Po Tai Shan is none other than the spirit of the famous Grand Eunuch Cheng Ho of the Ming dynasty who visited Malacca in the early years of the fifteenth century.[1] He is particularly worshipped in Malacca. Crawfurd remarks, 'Sam Po Kung (Sam Po Tai Shan) is evidently a name to be conjured with among the illiterate classes. The miracles which he performed to save his countrymen from the perils of their travels in unknown lands are among the marvels of romance, illustrating, in a striking way, one of the factors in a genesis of a myth.'

Toh Peh Kong, however, is the most popular hero among the overseas Chinese. But one may search for him in vain in the standard books on Chinese religion.[2] In Siam he is known as Pan Tou Kung. He probably derives from Tu Ti (earth god), but overseas he is primarily the spirit of the pioneers. The Chinese pioneers of the early days suffered terrible hardships and were honoured in memory by those who came after them. Toh Peh Kong seems to be the personification of the pioneer spirit generally and is not the deification of a special person as Sam Po Tai Shan is of Cheng Ho.

A worship of very long standing in Malaya is that of Wang Yeh, who has the spiritual function of visiting the universe as the representative of heaven. The early settlers brought the worship with them from Fukien province.[3]

Opium and other narcotics. The use of the poppy and coca leaf goes back to time immemorial.[4] In 1783 Warren Hastings pro- 276 167

[1] See pp. 22, 23.

[2] In particular the monumental work by Henri F. S. Doré, *Recherches sur les superstitions en Chine* (Shanghai, Tu-se-wei Press, 1911–38).

[3] Wang Yeh was worshipped from early days but the Wang Kang Festival in Malacca wherein five images of this deity were carried does not seem to have originated until 1886.

Chinese Mohammedans exist in the Shan States and in Indonesia, though in the latter country their numbers are not great. Chinese Christians are not very numerous in Southeast Asia, though in Malaya, for example, they increased between 1901 and 1931 by one-half (50·2 per cent.) to 30,738, while during the same period the Chinese population increased by only 45·5 per cent. Among the Churches the Roman Catholic Church has the strongest hold.

[4] Opium comes from a certain variety of the poppy plant grown principally

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nounced opium to be 'a pernicious article of luxury which ought not to be permitted, but for the purposes of foreign commerce only'. A debate in the House of Commons on the eve of the First China War (the 'Opium War') of 1839 showed that the great majority of the members of Parliament were prepared to countenance the opium traffic as a necessary evil, but a few enlightened voices were lifted against it, including that of Macaulay. The fact, however, that opium-smoking was a vice to which the Chinese were addicted made it valuable as a source of revenue to the Governments of Southeast Asia. The usual method of obtaining this revenue was to farm out the sale of the drug to private persons or firms. Administrators (including Raffles) had grave misgivings regarding the effect of opium-smoking on the health of the Chinese community, but it was not until about the beginning of this century that the various Governments began to take steps towards controlling the sale of the drug.

A Commission appointed in 1907 in the Straits Settlements to ascertain the extent to which opium-smoking was indulged in, whether its prevalence was on the increase, and what means should be taken towards its restriction or suppression, made a report to the following effect:[1]

The habit in the case of the majority of smokers in Malaya was acquired during residence in these parts. The labour in Malaya was mostly drawn from the impecunious farmer class, and the ruling price of chandu in China, though low compared with the price in Malaya, was sufficiently high to place it beyond their reach while they were in their native land. Moreover, the influence of the elder over the younger members of the families of China, one of the most striking characteristics of Chinese family life, was removed in Malaya, and thereby a powerful deterrent to the acquisition of the opium habit disappeared. Nor was the view commonly held among the Chinese of Malaya that the habit was injurious—indeed the general sentiment was to the exact contrary. It was regarded as a panacea for many common ailments and was often recommended by Chinese doctors. These facts, in the opinion of the Commissioners, largely contributed to the commencement of the habit.

in India, China, Persia, Greece, and Yugoslavia. Cocaine is derived from an entirely different plant, the coca leaf, grown in South America and Java in particular.

Report of the Opium Commission (Singapore, 1908), vols. i and iii were published as Cmd. 4321 and Cmd. 4322 (1909).

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Those *habitués* who were questioned said that they had started to smoke 'as a remedy for sickness', 'as an antidote to sorrow', or 'from bad example'. Brothels were a common place in which Chinese learned to smoke.

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The Commissioners summed up their views as to the motive for the habit in these words: 'We are firmly convinced that the main reason for taking to the habit of smoking opium is the universal tendency of human nature to some form of indulgence.' Or, less sententiously expressed, they did it because they liked it!

A man was less likely to become an inveterate opium-smoker than a drunkard.

As to the evil results of opium-smoking the Commissioners took a moderate view. As regards the physical evils, with the exception of medical practitioners who held strong views opposed to opium, the medical witnesses were practically unanimous in expressing the opinion that opium-smoking in moderation was relatively harmless. Even if the indulgence were carried to an excess, there was (so said the witnesses) no organic change in the body. The general impression, however, was that in tasks requiring severe physical exertion the smoker was not equal to the non-smoker; in the case of the skilled artisan, opium-smoking made little or no difference to his relative value; opium-smokers and non-opium-smokers in an industry worked the same number of hours and earned the same wages.

These views (in the experience of the writer) represent the general views of European administrators who, on the whole, incline to consider opium-smoking as a symptom rather than a cause of misfortune. Education and improved living conditions in the last forty years have had more effect in decreasing the number of smokers than any other factor.

While the Commission was unwilling to recommend prohibition (which in any case would be possible only by international agreement, as the poppy was then cultivated in India, China, Turkey, and Persia), it recommended the abolition of the opium farmer and the establishment of a Government monopoly for the manufacture and sale of chandu.

The international control of the manufacture and sale of deleterious drugs has a very extensive literature of its own, and all that we need do here is to refer to the main facts.[1]

[1] See Herbert L. May, 'Narcotic Drug Control', *International Conciliation*

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276 At the time of the Hague Convention in 1912, with provision for the gradual and effective suppression of opium-smoking, all the countries where the problem existed, except China and the Philippines, were using some form of Government monopoly. Most of them had advanced through successive stages from partial to complete control. On the other hand, only a few years prior to 1912, China and the Philippines had skipped most or all of the steps and had jumped straight to (theoretical) prohibition. But what stood in the way of giving prohibition any real effect was the failure, so far, to secure effective control of production. The policy in the Dutch and British colonies was a progressive reduction of opium-smoking (and with it the revenues derived therefrom)[1] side by side with improvement of the preventive measures against illicit importation and sale of the drug.

Efforts to solve the problem of opium-smoking in the Far East were accelerated by the pernicious policy of the Japanese in encouraging the habit in the territories which they occupied. In 1943 the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, and in 1945 the French and Philippines Governments, declared their intention to introduce a policy of absolute prohibition. As a result of this declaration, the only countries in which opium-smoking was still not prohibited at the close of the Japanese war were Siam and certain states in India. At its fourth session, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations adopted a resolution inviting all countries in which opium-smoking was still

(May 1948). This pamphlet gives a concise account of the matter and of the progress of international control. The *League of Nations, Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and other Dangerous Drugs; Summary of Illicit Transactions and Seizures*, for successive years, gives data which show the difficulty of preventing smuggling. See also U.N., Economic and Social Council, *Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Limitation of raw materials 6 April 1948* (E/CN/7/107) and of *25 April 1948* (E/CN/7/121).

The first step in the international campaign against narcotics took place in 1909 when an International Opium Commission met in Shanghai on the initiation of the United States Government which was seriously worried by the problem in the Philippines. In 1912 the Hague Opium Convention bound the parties to adopt measures for the control and regulation of raw opium, prepared opium, morphine, heroin, and cocaine. In 1925 the League of Nations appointed an Advisory Committee to exercise general control of the traffic; in 1925 the Geneva Agreement on Opium was signed; the same year saw the Geneva Convention; the Bangkok Agreement on Opium Smoking was signed in 1931.

[1] For the progressive measures taken in Malaya see Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 190–1. Between 1928 and 1933 the Malayan Governments reduced the opium sold from 1,344,000 taels to 612,000 taels.

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permissible to take immediate steps to introduce the necessary measures to prevent the manufacture of and trade in prepared opium for the purpose of smoking. 276

It remains to be seen how far this complete prohibition can succeed. Everything turns on the ability of the Governments to control smuggling and, in the final issue, on the effectiveness of international control of the manufacture and distribution of narcotics. It is not only opium that is the problem, but also an increasing number of even more harmful substitutes.

A number of other matters have strong claims for inclusion as 121
'special aspects of Chinese society in Southeast Asia', but it is thought desirable to limit this chapter to its present dimensions (for enough has been said to illustrate the general nature of the deviations from the central problems in China itself) and to start in the next Part the detailed narrative of the Chinese in Burma, Siam, Indochina, Malaya, British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines.[1] In journeying with them for three centuries or more through jungle and defile, over the mountain passes of the Shan States or through the myriad islands of the Philippines, in sojourning with them in tin mine, on rubber estate, or in godown, in listening to what they have to say and what is said of them, we shall learn much and prepare ourselves better for our final task of assessing the advantage or the detriment of this people to the countries in which they have come to work or trade, and often to settle, and of adumbrating (if we dare) the future of the race in Southeast Asia.

[1] The order is arbitrary.

[p. 54 is blank]

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PART II

THE CHINESE IN BURMA

CHAPTER V

DEMOGRAPHY

162 A CENSUS was taken in Burma in 1941 but the returns were lost during the Japanese occupation of the country and only a two-page statement of the total population by districts has survived. We have therefore to rely mainly on the 1931 census for information regarding the Chinese. Of that race 193,594 were enumerated at the census, 127,049 being males and 66,545 being females. But although these figures account ostensibly for all the Chinese in Burma, it appears necessary to add a certain number, especially of Sino-Burmese, to include all those who are predominantly Chinese in race and characteristics. The census report [144] for 1931 stated that it had been the custom for some years for the male offspring of these unions between Chinese men and Burmese women to assume the race of the father and the female offspring that of the mother, which would mean that many thousand half-Chinese females were counted as Burmese. Moreover, since 1931, in addition to natural increase and migration, other important 162 factors have affected the number of Chinese in the country and the 167 facility of identifying them. One is the displacement due to the war. [722] In 1948 UNRRA reported that of nearly 19,000 Chinese displaced from Burma by the war, 4,652 had been repatriated to Burma by June 1947 and 14,000 odd were awaiting repatriation. Unauthorized infiltration of Chinese into Burma via Bhamo, Lashio, &c., also took place. The opening of the Burma Road in January 1939 was followed by a marked increase in the Chinese population, but this [425] was offset by the exodus of 1942. As regards enumeration or estimation of numbers, the laws passed in Burma since the war prohibiting the transfer of land to aliens have encouraged Chinese to claim 641 Burmese citizenship—indeed many persons of Chinese *race* in Burma had for long regarded themselves as Burmese citizens and had no more interest in China than U.S. citizens of the second or

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641 third generations have in their European ancestral homes.[1] One authority stated in June 1948:[2]

162 . . . The best information based on information given by various Chinese Guilds would place the total number of Chinese through the
441 whole of Burma at approximately 300,000. In the absence of any reliable census, this has generally been accepted as the closest possible estimate.

Another person entitled to speak with authority states:

162 From personal observation in 1946–7, I should say that the Chinese in Burma were no more numerous than they had been in 1939. Most of
167 the racketeers brought in by the Burma Road had gone off to Shanghai. . . . I should think that 19,000 is an underestimate of the numbers that left in 1942. I saw many thousands on all the trains and stations going north from Rangoon to Myitkyina. If 200,000 was a correct figure in the 1930s I should think 300,000 is the top figure in the 1940s.[3]

162 In mid-1948 the Burmese Government announced that the regi-
stration of all foreigners in Burma would shortly begin, but this
609 undoubtedly was held up by the disturbances within the country.
648 Both before and after the Second World War Chinese nationals were asked to register with the Chinese consulate-general in Rangoon. Pre-war registration records were all lost during the Japanese occupation, while the number who had registered with the consulate since it reopened in 1945 did not exceed 30,000 by June 1948.

162 Of the 194,000 Chinese enumerated in 1931, 104,000 were shown as born in Burma and 90,000 in China. There was, according to the 1921 census report for Burma (para. 65), a tendency among the Chinese born in Burma to give their birthplace as China. The author of the report of the 1931 census said it was impossible to estimate the error this produced in the statistics, but it was probably not large. This tendency, however (the writer understands on the best authority), did not survive the troublous times in China in the 1930s.

[641] [1] By the Constitution of the Union of Burma, 1946, Burmese nationality was accorded to all those of whom both parents belonged to an indigenous race of the Union, or who had at least one grand-parent of such race, or who were British subjects claiming at least eight years' residence in the Union and intending to stay there.

[2] Note from the Chinese Embassy, Rangoon, quoted in a letter to the author from Mr J. S. Furnivall.

[3] G. E. Harvey in *British Rule in Burma* (London, Faber, 1946) p. 69 fn., says that there were 'a couple of hundred thousand' Chinese in Burma in 1942.

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The following table shows the number of *immigrants* from China in the two censal years (*but nearly 25,000 were of races other than Chinese*): 167 162

TABLE I[1]

Burma: Immigrants from China 1921 and 1931

Natural division in which enumerated	*1921*	*1931*	*Increase*	
			Actual	*Per cent.*
Total Burma (Province of)	102,344	114,270	11,926	11·7
Burman total	74,282	86,249	11,967	16·1
Delta	40,785	49,181	8,396	20·6
Coast (Arakan)	585	622	37	6·3
Coast (Tenasserim)	7,527	7,626	99	1·3
Centre	5,902	8,267	2,365	40·1
North	19,483	20,553	1,070	5·5
CHIN	23	53	30	130·4
SALWEEN	430	377	−53	−12·3
SHAN	27,609	27,591	−18	−0·1

The total population of Burma according to the 1941 census was 16,823,798, showing an increase of approximately 12 per cent. since 1931. The *Burma Handbook*[2] for 1943 in this connexion states:

> Apart from the increase in areas, it is not safe to assume an increase of 12 per cent. in respect of any particular group or district; it is probable that the number of Chinese has increased more than 12 per cent. as a result of the opening of the Burma road in 1939.... The current situation in 1943 is different again from that of 1941: many of the Chinese have no doubt made their way out of the country in 1942.

The following table is abstracted from the census of 1931: 162

TABLE II

Chinese in Burma in 1931

Total population of Burma	14,667,146
Total Chinese in Burma	193,594

	Total population	*Chinese*
Arakan Division	*1,008,535*	*978*
Akyab	637,580	689
Arakan Hill Tracts	21,418	..
Kyaukpyu	220,292	140
Sandoway	129,245	149

[1] *Census of India, 1931* (Rangoon, Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing and Stationery, 1933), xi, pt. 1, p. 63. See p. 6 of pt. 1 regarding the non-Chinese immigrants from China.

[2] Issued by the Government of Burma (in exile) (Government of India Press, Simla) p. 198–200.

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	Total population	Chinese
162 *Pegu Division*	*2,549,637*	*54,001*
Rangoon	400,415	30,626
Pegu	489,969	7,552
Tharawaddy	508,319	2,687
Hanthawaddy	408,831	5,352
Insein	331,452	5,413
Prome	410,651	2,371
Irrawaddy Division	*2,334,774*	*25,950*
Bassein	571,043	6,280
Henzada	613,280	2,624
Myaungyma	444,784	7,330
Maubin	371,509	3,610
Pyapon	334,158	6,106
Tenasserim Division	*1,872,668*	*27,593*
Salween	53,186	166
Thaton	532,628	4,982
Amherst	516,233	11,287
Tavoy	179,964	3,741
Mergui	161,987	3,835
Toungoo	428,670	3,582
Magwe Division	*1,722,044*	*3,196*
Thayetmyo	274,177	698
Minbu	277,876	627
Magwe	499,573	1,289
Pakokku	499,181	502
Chin Hills	171,237	80
Mandalay Division	*1,696,332*	*6,050*
Mandalay	371,636	3,153
Kyaukse	151,320	347
Meiktila	309,999	384
Myingyan	472,557	727
Yamethin	390,820	1,439
Sagaing Division	*1,918,058*	*11,123*
Bhamo	121,193	2,545
Myitkyina	171,524	4,112
Shwebo	446,790	811
Sagaing	335,965	229
Katha	254,170	2,715
L. Chindwin	383,434	475
U. Chindwin	204,982	236
Eastern States	*1,565,098*	*64,703*
N. Shan States	636,107	60,550
S. Shan States	870,230	3,899
Karenni	58,761	254[1]

According to the census of 1911, there were then 122,000 Chinese in Burma, 1,200 of these being Yunnanese Muslims. During the decade 1921–31 the number of Chinese residents increased by 30 per cent., from 149,000 to 194,000, whereas the Indians increased

[1] Details by race for the Naga Hills and the Wa States were not available.

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by only 15 per cent. There were in 1931, however, 1,018,000 Indians, five times the number of Chinese in Burma. 162

Of the total of 193,594 for 1931, 86,361 were Fukienese or Cantonese, 40,688 Yunnanese (including 685 Panthays), and the remaining 66,445 were from elsewhere in China south of the Yangtze. In 1931, 68 per cent. of the Chinese other than Yunnanese were enumerated in the Delta; most of the remainder were found in the Tenasserim part of the coast area (15 per cent.), and in the centre (9 per cent.). The numbers of Cantonese and the Fukienese recorded were 33,990 and 50,038 respectively, but it was probable that most of the 'other and unspecified' Chinese amounting to 41,875 were also Cantonese and Fukienese.

The Chinese fan out from Rangoon along the railway and steamer lines. Nearly half of the Chinese in Burma are to be found within a hundred miles of the capital city. In 1921 the Irrawaddy delta had 64,276 Chinese residents; in 1931 the number had increased to 86,144. Moulmein had 5,603 Chinese in 1911; in 1935 more than 12,000.[1]

In Burma the overseas Chinese do not occupy the predominant position that they do in Malaya, Siam, Indochina, Indonesia, and the Philippines, and they are decidedly second to the Indians in the commercial life of the country. In 1931 they were classified by occupation as follows: traders and merchants, 41 per cent.; carpenters and workers in metal and leather, 38 per cent.; semi-skilled workers, 9 per cent.; clerical workers, 5 per cent.; miscellaneous, 7 per cent. Only 21,436 (18,802 males; 2,634 females) were shown as engaged in the exploitation of animals and vegetation. (Apart from a few market gardeners, there were no real Chinese employed on the land itself.) Chinese general merchandise shops are found in nearly all cities and towns in Burma, and in many towns the Chinese were the sole agents for the sale of petroleum products. Since the Second World War they have taken the place of many Indian shopkeepers, the number of Indians having greatly diminished. But they do not have a grip of the rice trade as they have in Siam, Indochina, and the Philippines, this being very largely in the hands of Indians—mostly Marwaris, Maimanis, &c. The Chinese are active bidders for fishery and ferry rights in many streams. 162 463 444 366 438

In Rangoon Chinese business men promote their common in- 000

[1] J. L. Christian, *Modern Burma* (Berkeley, University of California, 1942) p. 270.

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441 In Rangoon Chinese business men promote their common in-
terests through a chamber of commerce which before the war
439 elected a member (who had to be a British subject—though the members voting were not necessarily so) to the Burma legislature. The Chinese Overseas Bank, the Bank of China, and Chinese insurance, shipping, rice, and mercantile firms maintained five branches along the Burma Road and the payment of Chinese customs could be made through these branches. No Chinese registered steamers were engaged in the Burma trade.[1]

464 Chinese labour was principally employed in the Shan States and it was largely Yunnanese who came to work here in the dry season.[2]
316 The one occupation in which the Chinese contributed a substantial
465 portion of the labour force and worked for members of another race was mining. In the case of Chinese employed by the Consolidated Tin Company at Hermingyi, Tavoy District, many worked on a piece-work system with a minimum of supervision. The Chinese mining labourers preferred the tribute system by which was paid to the owner of the mine so much for every picul of tin mined by themselves.[3] Agricultural and forest labour accounted for only 6 per
162 cent. of all Chinese employed in Burma at the census of 1931.
463 Chinese and Indian immigrants had a considerable share in certain
464 trades, such as carpentry, furniture-making, and the slipper industry. However, the Burmese craftsman was in the majority and worked also as a cart-maker, goldsmith, worker in lacquer, and—in the Delta—as boat-maker.[4]

'Literacy', said the 1931 census, 'implies being able to write a
212 letter to a friend and to read the answer to it', and by this standard
162 there were 52,000 literate and 75,000 illiterate Chinese males in Burma; for females the figures were 10,000 literate and 57,000 illiterate. As regards literacy in English, 5,000 Chinese males and 936 females satisfied the census test.

There were in 1931 slightly more than two males to every female
162 among the Chinese in Burma proper, and this led to a considerable
144 amount of intermarriage between surplus Chinese men and women of the indigenous races. The fact that the custom was (as stated on p. 55) for the male offspring of such unions to assume Chinese race and for the females to assume the race of the mother would

[1] Ibid., pp. 271, 273.
[2] Virginia Thompson, *Labor in Southeast Asia*, p. 1.
[3] J. Russell Andrus, *Burmese Economic Life* (Stamford University Press for the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1947) p. 275.
[4] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 34.

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account for the number of Chinese males born in Burma being 144 stated as more than the number of females.

Chinese immigration into Burma may conveniently be divided into those who come overland, who may be called Mountain 167 Chinese, and those who come by sea, who may be designated Maritime Chinese. 162 Of the 194,000 total in 1931, more than 60,000 lived in the Shan and Wa States along the Chinese border. Of the total of 114,000 'immigrants from China' in 1931 (as has been noted above), nearly 25,000 represented immigrants from China other than those of Chinese race. Presumably all those immigrants came overland from China, and were mainly Shan-Tayoks and Shans, but a few Maingthas were included. Many of them would be caravan traders who would return to China after the census. [439] In Bhamo district, of the 10,161 immigrants from China, only 1,523 were Chinese, the remainder being mainly Shan-Tayoks.[1] The Yunnanese are mostly found in the northern Shan States. Between 1921 and 1931 they increased by 14 per cent. while speakers of Yunnanese increased by 21 per cent. In 1921 there were 4,382 Yunnanese, or 77 per cent. of the total number, who spoke languages other than Yunnanese; in 1931 there were only 577, or 1 per cent. of the total number.[2] Chinese other than Yunnanese increased by 40 per cent., while [198] speakers of Chinese languages other than Yunnanese by 67 per cent. Taking the Chinese in Burma as a whole, they increased in number by 30 per cent. between the two censuses, while speakers of the Chinese *language* increased by 46 per cent. The big increase in Chinese speakers was due to the reduction of the number of Chinese who spoke other languages from 27,548 in 1921 to 15,957 in 1931. These facts are of some cultural and political interest.

There is no present likelihood that Chinese immigration into Burma will amount at any time to an 'invasion' or a 'flood'. For those Chinese who come by sea, Indochina, Siam, and Malaya are intermediate, or at least nearer, and they have in the past offered greater opportunities to the Chinese immigrants. As for the over-

[1] *Census of India, 1931*, xi, pt. 1, 63.

[2] Yunnanese Muslims are usually called Panthays. They showed a reduction in number at the 1931 census. Most of them were enumerated in the southern Shan States (438), northern Shan States (125), Katha (241), Myitkyina (53), and Rangoon (51); the remainder were scattered. Yunnanese other than Panthays increased by 15 per cent. In the northern Shan States 87 per cent. were enumerated; most of the remainder were in the southern Shan States (1,026); and in the districts of Myitkyina (2,270), Bhamo (2,116), Katha (1,431), Mandalay (549), Shwebo (213), and Rangoon (136).

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162 land route, which has existed from time immemorial, this leads
167 through undeveloped areas of Yunnan, where the Chinese could settle and be within their own country.

The illicit infiltration that took place before 1940–1 was not regarded as a menace in the sense that it would lead to problems such
[275 as exist in Malaya. The administration kept a wary eye on the
276 Chinese because they ran the illicit opium and gambling-dens, tea-
548] shops, liquor-shops, &c. The common folk did not resent them at all. They offered dissipations and they were not so parsimonious as the Indians. It was only in 1940–1, when the Deputy Ministers and
648 other officials of the Kuomintang came into Burma and 'behaved as if they owned the place', that public opinion (including that of
609 the resident Chinese) was aroused. The fear commonly expressed was that, under pressure from the United States, the British Government would force the Burma Government to give virtually independent control of the line of communication through Burma to various Sino-American bodies, and that under cover of this the Chinese would establish permanent control over Burma. One high authority has stated to the writer: 'Nothing made the moderate Burma politician so keen on independence as the way the British and United States Governments compelled Burma to give facilities to a Chinese regime that everyone in Burma knew was rotten.'

When the Chinese armies came into Burma there can be no doubt that they behaved as if they were in a conquered country, and throughout the later campaigns their commanders frequently issued proclamations implying, and sometimes saying openly, that the British were gone for good and that the Chinese were now in control. Without any sanction from the Burma authorities they erected on the recreation ground at Lashio an enormous monument commemorating Chinese victories. Later, in January 1946, after all Chinese troops had been withdrawn, a battalion suddenly appeared at Waingmaw, just across the Irrawaddy from Myitkyina, and it was reported that the rest of the division was marching down from Paoshan. A British brigade, however, was available to counter this move and, after some tense days, the intervention of General Chiang Kai-shek resulted in the Chinese troops being ordered back.

This incident considerably alarmed Burma politicians regarding
648 Chinese intentions. The fear was less of infiltration than of ex-
102 ploitation and conquest. It is noteworthy that schools and training centres in Chungking used maps showing all northern Burma and

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parts of Assam as *China Irredenta*.[1] If China should disintegrate, as most educated Burmans have expected during the previous eight years, then what they feared was an irruption by large fragments of defeated armies, well enough armed and organized to destroy much of the country.

[1] The writer, while on a visit to Chungking during the Second World War, saw a map issued by the Chinese Military Academy at Chengtu showing *China Irredenta* and including Malaya with the date of its loss by China given as 1896! (Why 1896 it is not possible to say. On 1 January that year the Federated Malay States came into being, but that had nothing to do with China. The claim, if tenable, must date from the voyages of Cheng Ho in the early fifteenth century.)

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CHAPTER VI

THE CHINESE IN BURMA PRIOR TO 1850

175 648 THE story of the Chinese in Burma stands apart from that of their fellows in other territories in Southeast Asia. It resembles that of the Chinese in Indochina, or rather in Annam, in so far as the contact with these countries goes back a very long way and, until fairly recent times, the main approach to both of them was overland. But the similarity should not be exaggerated. For one thing intercourse between China and Annam was nearly a thousand years earlier than that between China and Burma; there were no trade routes between China and Annam of anything like as great consequence as those between China and Burma, and while Annam was successfully conquered and occupied for a great part of the first millennium of the Christian era, the invasions of Burma were on the whole a failure. The greater differences in the nature of the Chinese intercourse with Burma and that with the Philippines, Siam, Malaya, and Indonesia will appear in the course of this chapter.

[487] [17] Because of the difficulty of communication between China and Burma their connexion has never been close, despite the racial affinity of their inhabitants. It has been far easier for Burma to communicate by sea with India than by land with China, as is shown by the powerful influence which India has had over Burmese culture over a period of many centuries in contrast to the feeble effect of Chinese culture; thus, although the two countries have a basically common religion, yet the Hinayana Buddhism of Burma is distinct from the Mahayana Buddhism of China, and has been derived from the west and not from the east. Politically and economically Burma has long been more intimately linked with India than with China, and the political relationship between Burma and China has never been satisfactorily defined.

175 167 For the sake of descriptive convenience, the Chinese in Burma can (as has been said in the preceding chapter) be divided into Mountain and Maritime Chinese. The former, sometimes reinforced by military expeditions, made up a greater part of the total for many centuries, and even now there are over 40,000 Yunnanese residing on the Burmese side of the border and these must nearly

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all have come by land. The earlier immigration, however, was very impermanent and largely seasonal, and, numerically speaking, could at no time compare with the later movement of the Maritime Chinese, whose era begins with the extension to Burma of British power in the nineteenth century and the opening up of the country to trade on a scale hitherto unknown. The history of the Mountain Chinese is to a great extent the history of the caravans; that of the Maritime Chinese belongs more to the general development of Southeast Asia.

Burma was the natural bridge for racial migrations and the temporary home of most of the peoples who inhabit the great Indo-Chinese peninsula. The Burmese themselves are believed to have come down from the hills of the northern Shan States into the plains of Burma from A.D. 839 onwards.[1] Even at the present day the Chinese (mostly Shan-Tayoks, Chinese Kachins, and Lishus) are moving southwards into the hill country of north Hsenwi State, though on a small scale as race migrations go. It is recorded that during the T'ang dynasty a Burmese embassy, accompanied by a representative of the Shan kingdom of Nanchao in what is now Yunnan, visited China. Christian supposes that the presence of the kingdom of Nanchao as a barrier State, combined with China's remoteness, accounts for the paucity of China's influence on Burma before the time of Kublai Khan. Burma's racial affinities were with China, but her cultural ties were with India.[2]

For many centuries the bulk of Burma's trade with China had passed along the Taiping river in earlier days through Kaungsin, until the influence of that place was overshadowed by Bhamo from

[1] G. H. Luce, 'Burma's Debt to Pagan', *JBRS*, vol. xxii (1932) pp. 120–7, cited by Christian, op. cit. p. 22.

[2] Christian says (op. cit. p. 22, fn. 20): 'The entire problem of Burma's contacts with China is dealt with in E. H. Parker, *Burma with Special Reference to Her Relations with China*, Rangoon, 1893. See also G. H. Luce, "The Ancient Pyu", *JBRS*, vol. xxvii (1937) pp. 239–53, for sources on Burma's relations with China to the fall of Pagan, 1287. In Kuo Tsung-fei, "A Brief History of the Trade Routes Between Burma, Indochina and Yunnan", *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xii (1941) pp. 9–32, the major emphasis, with reference to Chinese sources, is on Sino-Burmese overland contacts before 1600. A Japanese account of the period before the Manchu dynasty is Jinichi Yano, "Biruma no Shina ni Taisuro Chōkō Kankei ni Tsuite", *Tōyō Gakuho*, vol. xvii (1928) pp. 1–39.'

It is outside the purpose of this study to describe Sino-Burmese contacts except in so far as they bear on the economic and social life of the Chinese community in Burma, but the above note is inserted in deference to those whose interests lie in the field of the historical investigation of the trade routes.

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the fifteenth century onwards.[1] The caravans which passed over this route were essentially the same in the fifteenth as in the nineteenth century.

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In 1284 an army of Kublai Khan marched against Pagan to enforce the payment of tribute refused by the Burmese three years before, when they had put to death the embassy sent by the Emperor of China. In 1287 Pagan was destroyed, and for a time Burma was under Chinese suzerainty. In 1298 there was another invasion, but the Chinese were expelled in that same year.[2] Burmese authorities seem generally to take the view that after 1298 Burma was independent, but a British historian, Mr B. R. Pearn, remarks: 'I do not think that the successor states to the Pagan Kingdom were tributary to China till about 1600; tribute appears to have ceased in the declining days of the Ming dynasty.' A Chinese embassy visited Burma in 1405.[3] In 1449 the Chinese attempted the conquest of Mogaung, but were successfully resisted.[4]

After the Ming dynasty was overthrown in 1644, China became the prey of freebooting armies which ravaged her outlying provinces and made periodic incursions into Burmese territory. Early in the reign of Pindale (1648–61), a Burmese army had been defeated by the Chinese at Wetwun, near the modern hill-station of Maymo, and the invaders had laid waste the country almost up to Ava itself. In 1650, however, the factors of the East India Company at Fort St George received news that the Burmese had 'defeated their plundering neighbours and that the country was likely to be settled and in a peaceful condition'.[5] Yunhli, 'the last of the Mings', proclaimed Emperor of China at Canton, was attacked by the Manchus, but escaped to Burma. Here he met 20,000 men under the Gover-

[1] D. G. E. Hall, *Early English Intercourse with Burma* (London, Longmans, 1928) p. 121.

[2] Khin Maung Gale, *New Times of Burma* (30 November 1947), says: 'In that year Burma went her own way and was after that as little dependent on China as she will be dependent on the United Kingdom after 4 January 1948.'

[3] Henry Yule, *A Narrative of the Mission sent by the Governor-General of India to the Court of Ava in 1855* (London, Smith Elder, 1858) p. 53, says that 'the army sent by the Great Khan to subdue the city of Mien (the Chinese name for Burma) was commanded by a valiant captain, and consisted principally of jesters, with whom the court was always furnished'. The invasions were along the Chinese trade route.

[4] Édouard Huber, 'Une Ambassade des Chinois en Birmanie en 1406', *BEFEO*, vol. iv, no. 142 (January–February 1904).

[5] D. G. E. Hall, op. cit. p. 60, citing Foster, *English Factories*.

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nor of Yunnan, was defeated in 1662, surrendered, and was taken to Peking and strangled.[1]

After the surrender of Yunhli, the Burmese and the Chinese appear to have remained at peace for more than a century, and no sooner was war at an end than the highways from China to Bhamo were frequented by traders and travellers. The Dutch factors in Ava developed a large clandestine trade with the Chinese merchants from Yunnan. It was not long before they came to realize the immense possibilities of opening up trade with western China through Bhamo (in later days to be a focal point on one arm of the famous 'Burma Road'). Out of this project a quarrel arose between the Dutch and the Court of Ava which brought a final breach in 1679 and the closing down of the factories. The Burmese Government prohibited their direct trade with Chinese merchants.[2]

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Immediately before the next war of 1765 the trade seems to have been of considerable importance. We read of large caravans of 300 and 400 oxen, and others of 2,000 ponies, carrying silk and other merchandise between China and Bhamo.[3] About 1750 a large colony was mining silver at Mao-lung (probably Bawdwin) and the chief merchant, visiting Ava, persuaded the King to send to Peking one of those complimentary embassies which the Chinese regarded as tribute bearers. Two hairpins of silver and gold and a gilt pagoda mounted on an elephant were sent as presents. The Emperor Ch'ien Lung entertained their envoy at a banquet and at his departure gave him a gold slab inscribed in the imperial hand, 'Happy Pacification of the Western Jewel'. But the 'Western Jewel' was far from being pacified; the Mao-lung colony was dispersed, the merchants were executed, and the envoy returned to find his King a captive in Pegu and Ava a smoking ruin.[4]

Misunderstanding now arose between certain Chinese traders and the Burmese officials at Bhamo. An enterprising trader, Loli by name, requested permission to throw a bridge across the Taipeng at the village of Namba. The Burmese officials refused to

[1] John Anderson, M.D., *A report of an Expedition into Western Yunnan via Bhamo* (Calcutta, Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, 1871) p. 23.

[2] D. G. E. Hall, *Europe and Burma* (London, Oxford University Press, 1945) p. 34.

[3] Anderson, op. cit., citing Burney, 'Translations of the Burmese Chronicles', *Asiatic Society Journal*, vol. vi, p. 121 ff.

[4] G. H. Luce, 'Chinese Invasions of Burma in the Eighteenth Century', *JBRS*, vol. xv, pt. 2 (August 1925).

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grant the request on their own responsibilities and referred it to the Court of Ava. Loli was annoyed at this and became impertinent, whereupon the Burmese officials seized him on suspicion of being a Chinese officer in disguise. He was taken to Ava as a prisoner, but was later released. He was then told that he could carry on with his trading and build the bridge. On returning to Bhamo, however, he found that his goods had been tampered with. He demanded compensation, which was refused. About this time another Chinese trader at the head of a Shan caravan of 2,000 ponies had sold goods on credit to a Burmese who had refused to pay. These incidents coming together stirred up Chinese feeling which was further inflamed by the intrigues of Burmese refugees in China. A Chinese army thereupon marched into Burma and besieged Kaungton in 1767, but the campaign ended in a Burmese triumph. Another Chinese army dispatched in 1769 suffered a similar fate.[1]

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The utter failure of Ch'ien Lung's Burma campaigns cost him a great deal of treasure and the flower of his generals. We find the Emperor, too, bewailing the cowardice of his Chinese troops.[2]

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The history of the intercourse between Burma and China after 1770 is one of peace, in spite of minor incidents and friction such as when, soon after this date, a party of Shan Sawbwas, sent to Peking in an embassy, were seized and detained until 1778. Another embassy was, however, sent in 1787. In 1790 a Chinese embassy arrived in Burma by the Bhamo and Muangswa (Muse?) route, bringing three Chinese so-called princesses as concubines for the King of Ava. The 'princesses', it turned out, were natives of the town of Malong in Yunnan, and from the circumstance that their feet were not bound after the custom in vogue among Chinese ladies, it was evident that they were ladies of low rank and that the Chinese had 'imposed on the amorous propensities' of the sun-descended king of Ava.[3]

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Father Sangermano, who lived in Ava from 1783 to 1806, speaks of the trade conducted between China and Burma in these terms:

[1] Incidents of the war were the arrogant order of the Emperor Ch'ien Lung for disposing of the Burmese and the taking of Bhamo by Colonel Hung Pang in a surprise attack. See *Ch'ien Lung Cheng Mien Tien Chi*, translated as 'Histoire de la Conquête de la Birmanie par les Chinois', by M. Camille Imbault-Huart, *Journal Asiatique*, sér. vi, xi (February, March 1878). See also G. E. Harvey, *History of Burma*, p. 253. Harvey says that such instances were trivial and could have been adjusted had the two Governments been in communication with each other; but they had no embassy system.

[2] Parker, op. cit. p. 31.

[3] Anderson, op. cit. p. 32.

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The Chinese Junan [Yunnan] coming down by Kuangtaung and along the great river Ava, bring to the Burmese capital in great boats, several of the commodities of their country, as wrought silks, paper, tea, various kinds of fruit, and other trifles, and they return laden with cotton, raw silk, salt, birds' feathers, and that black varnish which, as we have said, is distilled from a tree: this prepared and perfumed, is the celebrated commodity known as Chinese varnish.[1] 175 439

The Chinese (said Captain Cox) thought kindly of the Burma brand of cotton from which they made nankeens. The city of Sagaing was the staple from which the boats carrying cotton started from China. Each boat carried a hundred baskets of a hundred *viss*[2] weight a piece, and late in the eighteenth century the journey took from thirty to forty days.[3] [248]

We are now approaching the period of awakened British interest in China when Burma seemed to offer a short cut to that remote country. Burma at this time was glorying in her defeat of the Chinese in 1765–9, and in her later conquest of Siam, for her era of expansion coincided with the growth of British power in India. Consequently, the stage was set for a clash which came over the ill-defined frontier between Arakan and Bengal and Burmese aggression in Assam.[4] Burma was a medieval State brought up against the modern world; 'failing reformation from within (says Furnivall), foreign intervention was inevitable'.[5] Continual friction led to a series of wars. The first ended in 1826 with the cession of two maritime provinces—Arakan, bordering on Bengal, and Tenasserim reaching down to the Malay Peninsula. The second war in 1852 linked up the earlier possessions through the occupation of Pegu and brought the whole of Lower Burma under British rule. In 1886, after a third war, the absorption of the country within the Indian Empire was completed by the annexation of Upper Burma. Until 1937 Burma remained a province of the Indian Empire. On 4 January 1948 she became completely independent. 175 648

Before these wars of annexation Britain's prestige in Burma was

[1] *The Burmese Empire a Hundred Years Ago as Described by Father (Vincentius) Sangermano, With Notes and Introduction by John Jardine* (Westminster, Archibald Constable, 1893) p. 217.

[2] A *viss* was a hundred ticals in weight, or 3·65 lb. avoirdupois.

[3] D. G. E. Hall, op. cit. p. 82, citing Captain Hiram Cox, *Journal of a Residence in the Burmhan Empire* (London, Warren, 1821) (relates to the year 1797).

[4] Christian, op. cit. p. 26.

[5] J. S. Furnivall, *Educational Progress in Southeast Asia* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943).

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175 not remarkably high. Colonel Michael Symes, who was sent as an envoy to Burma in 1795 and again in 1802, was accompanied on
648 his missions by a splendid suite, but at a function at a Burmese court a Chinese mission which happened to be in Burma at the time were given the front seats while the English were relegated to the back.[1] (One of the objects of Symes's missions was to look into the possibilities of the overland trade.)

The celebrated John Crawfurd, who was sent on a mission to the Court of Ava in 1826, provides us with a wealth of information regarding the Chinese in Burma at this period, but when he deals with the region of the Burma–Chinese frontier he is relying on hearsay evidence and his remarks must be examined with caution.
114 Dr Anderson, for example, refers to Crawfurd's statement that 'the Irrawaddy, the largest river in Ava, is navigable only for canoes at
502 the town of Bhamo', and points out that, on the contrary, the largest river steamers could in the seventies reach that place with ease, and it was probable that the channel of that magnificent river would be found deep enough for them for 150 miles farther. Anderson remarks that Crawfurd unfortunately fell into another error in stating that the goods from Bhamo to the capital were carried overland, and (says Anderson) it is difficult to say whether this mistake which he unwittingly fell into, or the explanation of it, is more opposed to the fact. All the trade from Bhamo to the capital appears to have been conducted by boats from time immemorial.

A present-day authority on Burma comments on this passage:

> *Irrawaddy at Bhamo.* The course of the river changes a good deal, and there have been periods when the steamers have had to moor by the bank some distance away. Also, quite close above Bhamo you enter the Defile, which is navigable only by launches (there are one or two wrecks on the bank at that) during the dry weather, and not at all in the rains except by the occasional reckless youth in a dug-out. Crawfurd may not, after all, have been so wrong as Anderson suggests.

175 Anderson admits, however, that Crawfurd gives a very accurate description of the characteristics of the trade between the capital
439 and China, though he erred in applying it to Bhamo.[2]

Let us see what Crawfurd actually has to say in this regard:[3]

[1] D. G. E. Hall, op. cit. p. 82.
[2] op. cit. p. 50.
[3] John Crawfurd, F.R.S., *Journal of an Embassy to the Court of Ava* (London, Colburn, 1834) ii. 187 ff.

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The Chinese in Yunnan conduct a considerable traffic with the Burman empire, the principal marts of it being the capital, or rather a place six miles to the northeast of it, called Mide, and B'hamo, the chief place of a province of the same name bordering on China. This branch of trade is chiefly in the hands of Chinese, being divided between those residing in the Burman dominions and their correspondents in China. . . . The caravan from China, composed entirely of Chinese, arrives at Ava in the beginning of December, and it is said to take six weeks in travelling from Yunnan. It is possible, indeed, that it cannot quit China until the cessation of the periodical rains in the middle of October, which would limit the journey to the period mentioned. No part of the journey is by water, nor are the goods conveyed by wheel carriage, but by small horses, mules, and asses.

Commenting on this, Anderson (who, after all, knew the situation intimately from personal experience) says:

All the facts in the foregoing are accurate, but I do not think he has rightly interpreted them. The mere circumstance that the caravans arrive at the capital only once a year, seems to me to admit of an altogether different explanation from that given by Crawfurd. It appears that the great distance and the difficult character of the journey travelled, the preparations for the journey there and back, such as collecting the merchandise for the Burmese market, and the disposal of it, and the purchase of goods for the return journey occupy so much time that only one journey can be undertaken, and that the dry months are selected because they are the most convenient. The danger to life, and almost certain loss of property from flood and fell [*sic*] during the rains, would far outweigh all other considerations.

Anderson goes on to say that his remarks apply only to the trade with the capital by the long and difficult route via Theinee (Hsenwi), for small trading caravans which arrived during the dry weather. Bhamo was commercially linked to Yunnan by a chain of Chinese merchants who had settled in this province and in the Shan towns of Manwyne, Sanoa, and Muangla. They maintained a constant but petty trade with the more extensive Momien merchants, who, in their turn, were linked with the growing (*c.* 1870) trading town of Yung-chan, the mart to which the products of western Yunnan found their way. The result was that there was a constant and steady flow to Bhamo of the produce of a part of western Yunnan, largely in excess of the requirements of the inhabitants of that town and district. All the surplus trade therefore found its way down the Irrawaddy to the capital, and the large trading towns along the

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river. The China traffic was entirely in the hands of the Chinese at Bhamo and Mandalay, and from its thriving and contained character and great age, and from the facilities for transport which it could command at all seasons of the year, it was greatly more important in every respect than that which found its way once a year by Theinee to the capital.

All this is by way of comment *circa* 1870 on information culled by the pioneer, Crawfurd, in 1826, but the essential conditions of the trade had not altered in the interval, though there had been a great change in the nature of some of the goods carried and their place of manufacture—as we shall later see. But let us first return to Crawfurd who still has much to tell us.

Crawfurd says that the articles imported from China in his time were copper, orpiment (yellow arsenic), quicksilver, vermilion, iron pans, brassware, tin, lead, alum, silver, gold, silk, velvets and other wrought silks, spirits, verdigris, dried fruits, paper, fans, umbrellas, shoes, wearing apparel, and a few wrought metals—which last, according to the Chinese laws, were contraband. The orpiment from the Yunnan mines was of a very fine quality. A portion of the merchandise exported from Rangoon went to western Asia and Europe via Calcutta. The largest import to Ava, however, was raw silk. From this primarily was manufactured the cloth which was in general use among all classes of the Burmese. Its quality was coarse and it suffered damage due to its long carriage overland.

Articles imported into China via the Burma trade route included cotton, ornamental fabrics, esculent swallows' nests, deers' horns, sapphires and noble serpentine, *with a small quantity of British woollens.*[1] Raw cotton, however, was by far the most considerable article of import. The feathers, chiefly of the blue jay, were intended to ornament the ceremonial dresses of the Chinese mandarins:[2] Burmese hunters went all the way to India in search of them. The sapphires were intended for mandarins' buttons of rank.

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No coin was in use in the Burma trade; gold and silver were the medium of intercourse and had to be weighed, which was a great hindrance to the negotiations.[3]

[1] Commodities whose quantity or nature changed in the period under review are italicized for easy back-reference.

[2] The demand for blue feathers in China was age-old. The principal export from the vanished kingdom of Angkor to China was kingfishers' feathers for bridal coronals (and no doubt for mandarins' coats too).

[3] Crawfurd, op. cit. ii. 187.

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So far our interest has been exclusively directed towards the Mountain Chinese of Burma, largely because for many centuries they were practically the only Chinese to enter the country, but as information becomes available regarding Maritime Chinese we shall more and more be able to bring them into the picture. 175 167

At the end of the eighteenth century, 'the Parsees, the Armenians and a small proportion of Musselmen, engrossed the largest share of the trade of Rangoon'.[1] 'Malabars, Moguls, Persians, Parsees, Armenians, Portuguese, French, English all mingle there,' says the same informant. Most of them were merchants. There is, we note, no mention of Chinese among them, which surely would have been the case had they been at all important. But later on he mentions a deputation of Chinese and the fact that that race was addicted to swine's flesh. 175 167 439

On Crawfurd's arrival at Ava in 1826, two Chinese, natives of Canton, came on board the ship, offering their services as provisioners and brokers. They spoke English and had made several voyages to England, to the principal British settlements in India, and to the European ports in Malaya. 'These industrious people (says Crawfurd) are to be found in every port of the East, where there is room for the exercise of their useful industry, and wherever they are found, are always superior to the inhabitants of the countries in which they sojourn.'[2] 175 439

There were a great many residing in the Burmese capital, and some were natives of parts of China never seen in the European settlements of India. Crawfurd and his companions accepted the service of their visitors but were soon told by the Burmese that they were infringing the laws of the country and the two Chinese were ordered, at their peril, to discontinue their visits until after the English envoys had been presented at court. This was in October 1826.[3] [656]

Howard Malcom, an American missionary (whose book of travels was published in 1839), mentions that in 1823 there had been a dreadful fire at Umerapura (Amarapura), seven miles above Ava, and the town, in which lived many Chinese who carried on trade with their own country by the annual caravans, was almost de- [797]

[1] *Embassy to Ava in 1795*, by Michael Symes, in John Pinkerton (ed.), *A General Collection of the Best and Most Interesting Voyages* (London, 1811), ix. 426–572.

[2] Crawfurd, op. cit. i. 160.

[3] Ibid.

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stroyed. Malcom thought that American missionaries should study Chinese and be prepared at a future date to accompany these caravans to Yunnan. He also mentions that at a few miles from Ava the Chinese had some plantations of sugar-cane and manufactured a large quantity of excellent brown and yellow sugar, 'as good as our best Havanna', at about 4 cents a pound. At Sagaing lived some Chinese who could read tracts and the Bible in their own language.[1]

175 [796]

A peep at the Maritime Chinese in Moulmein is given in March 1836 (as ever, the European reaction to Chinese music is hostile):

> The Chinese have just had their annual ceremonies in memory of deceased ancestors. Hearing, a few mornings since, an uncommon din of gongs and their discordant musical instruments, I went to the veranda, and saw the procession pass to the ceremony. It was a meagre affair as to pomp, but quite as absurd as if it had been in their own country. A succession of tables borne like biers on men's shoulders, were spread with hogs, goats, and poultry, roasted whole, and various other eatables; the horrid music followed; and the procession with streamers, terminated by a man or two with muskets, firing at intervals. A priest, in proper costume, walked on each side of the tables.[2]

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The Mountain and the Maritime Chinese were, of course, mixed up together in parts of the country, and not all Chinese who lived in southern Burma necessarily arrived by sea. Christian says that there is no record of Chinese coming in large numbers to Burma by sea before 1800, except occasionally in coasting vessels along the Tenasserim peninsula. The first Cantonese merchant in Mandalay did not arrive until 1861.[3]

With these fragmentary observations on the Maritime Chinese we will leave them again for a while and return to their relatives on the northern confines of Burma.

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The Burmese Government exercised very little authority over the Singhpos (Jingpaws or Kachins), Theinbuns, and other wild tribes who occupied the country between Assam, Yunnan, and Ava. Even the numerous Chinese caravans were sometimes attacked by the mountaineers, and the Burmese said that the Theinbun always preferred killing a man to cutting down a tree since the possession of a mere common waist-cloth or tinder-box from the man he might kill was wealth to a Theinbun.[4]

[1] Howard Malcom, *Travels in South-East Asia* (London, Tilt, 1839) i, 125.
[2] ibid. i. 58. [3] Christian, op. cit. p. 269.
[4] Captain Burney, *India Political Consultations*, vol. lxix (unpublished India Office records), letter from Calcutta of 14 February 1835, cited by Walter

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In May 1836 Burney heard that the Emperor of China had written to the King of Burma 'remonstrating with the Court of Ava for having allowed an English officer to proceed northward to ascertain the route to China'. Burney questioned the Burmese ministers, who, while admitting that a letter had been received from China, denied that its contents were more than a complimentary communication relative to a new title conferred by the Emperor on his mother. None the less, Burney was inclined to believe the report he had heard earlier, because he was aware that shortly after Captain Hannay had left Ava the previous December, a deputation of Chinese merchants from Ava had waited on Prince Minthagyi to remonstrate against Hannay's mission. They were fearful lest they might lose the monopoly they had so long held in the trade to the north of Ava and that of the produce of the amber and serpentine mines.[1]

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The economist will note with interest the varieties of merchandise carried over the trade routes at different periods. In 1839 the imports from China were copper, iron vessels, silk (raw and manufactured), precious and semi-precious stones, gold and silver thread and lace, musk, walnuts, carpets, and vermilion. The exports to China from the Shan country were cotton, ivory, skins, and horns.[2]

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At this period the caravans assembled at Moung-koo. In 1839 Dr Richardson saw at Zimmay (i.e. Chiengmai in Siam) a caravan of Chinese traders consisting of 200 mules and horses, and 300 more were said to be at Moung-nan where cotton abounded. The two heads of the expedition seemed to be intelligent, enterprising characters. They said they had long entertained the idea of visiting Moulmein, and, now that they were invited and were assured of protection, they would undoubtedly do so the following season, the

Sadgun Desai, *History of the British Residency in Burma* (University of Rangoon, 1939) p. 240.

[1] Walter Sadgun Desai, op. cit., citing a letter of Burney of 9 May 1836, *India Political Consultations*, India Office Range 194, vol. xv. Burney later secured through a secret agent a Burmese version of the Chinese letter in which it said that the British were accustomed to behave like the Pepal (peepul- or Bo-tree) tree (wherever this plant takes root, and particularly in old temples and buildings, it spreads and takes such a firm hold that it is scarcely possible for it to be removed or eradicated). (Burney's own explanation.)

[2] G. B., House of Commons, *Papers Relating to the Route of Captain W. C. M'Leod from Moulmein to the Frontiers of China, and the Route of Dr Richardson on his Fourth Mission to the Shan Province of Burma* (1869), cited by J. Coryton, in 'Trade Routes between British Burma and Western China', *JRGS* (1875). Deer's horn was used medicinally by Chinese, often as an aphrodisiac.

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175 present one being too far advanced to allow of their increasing
439 their distance from home. They requested that an interpreter should then meet them at Zimmay.

[484] The chiefs of the native tribes (says Richardson) were favourable to the passage of caravans through the territory, but even allowing that the members of the trading expeditions ran no danger of attacks from the people of the country, they still had to face the perils of the climate and of accident. If a man fell sick, or was disabled, he was simply left behind. The laws of the trail were ruthless.

[501] Boats used by the Chinese traders on the Irrawaddy below Bhamo
[502] were of the Burmese flat-bottomed kind and were of tolerable size, each accommodating twenty persons. They were particularly well adapted to the navigation of the river, since they did not draw more than eighteen inches.[1]

438 The bazaar at Katha in 1835 was well supplied with good native vegetables of various sorts, and fresh and salt fish was sold by a
435 Chinese. Dried coconuts, sugar, and rice ranging from the coarsest quality to the finest, were also procurable.
439 The best quality rice was sold at 15 ticals a hundred baskets. Stic-lac, however, was very dear. *Even at this remote spot there was a tolerable display of British piece-goods, but not nearly to the extent noticed at Kyundoung.*

Bhamo at this period had (says Hannay) about 1,500 houses; but including the several villages that were joined on to it, it contained altogether 2,000 houses of which at least 200 were inhabited by
[162] Chinese. Besides the permanent population of Burmese, there was always a number of strangers there—Chinese, Shans, and Kachins, who either came to make purchases or to be hired as workmen.[2]

175 The route taken by the Chinese caravans started from modern Bhamo whence the merchandise was taken to old Bhamo, or
439 Manmo, by water, and it then proceeded overland to the *choki* or *ken* of Loahlong near Mowan, which was reached in three days;
487 thence it went to Moung-yen or Tenggyechew in the province of Yunnan, which place was reached in eight to nine days. The principle article of trade, namely cotton, was entirely in the hands of the Chinese, who arrived in Bhamo in the months of December and

[1] Captain R. B. Pemberton, 'Abstract of a Journal of a Route travelled by Captain S. F. Hannay from the Capital of Ava to the Amber Mines of the Hukong Valley in the South-east Frontier of Assam', *JRAS*, no. 64 (April 1835).
[2] ibid.

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January. The greater part of the imports was taken to Ava, since the natives of neither Mogaung nor of Bhamo could afford to purchase them. What were disposed of in these places were copper pots, carpets, and warm jackets which were also in demand all over Burma. Several cotton godowns in Bhamo belonged to the Chinese, 500 of whom were in constant residence in the town, which fact, added to the numerous arrivals from other parts of the country, gave the place a very businesslike air. There was a neat Chinese temple with carvings and where tea was served to visitors. The Chinese of Burma (says Hannay), although differing from the Maritime Chinese in language and features, had the same idea of neatness and comfort, and their manners and their mode of living appeared to be much the same. The temple and the houses were not of a temporary nature but were of brick stained blue.[1]

In the 1830s the only traffic of any consequence in the Hukawng valley was in amber which was sold to a few Chinese, Chinese Shans, and Chinese Singphos (Simphos) who found their way there annually.[2]

Although it is stated above that the tribes of this area were generally well disposed towards the caravans, there was talk in previous periods of the waylaying of the traders, and in 1836 another British traveller mentions the obstructions due to the jungle and to hostile tribes. This same authority says that many of the Chinese made two trips a year—on the second occasion they brought down rock salt from the neighbourhood of Esnuk (the Muangla of the Shans). There was a great demand for English goods.[3]

From the serpentine mines of Mogaung came boats laden with masses of stone so large that it required three men to lift them.

Hannay learnt that although the greater number of Chinese came to the mines via Santa and Tali, they were only the poorer classes that did so; the wealthier came by way of Bhamo, which was the safest and best route. The total number of Chinese who visited the mines in 1836 was 480. The Chinese paid $1\frac{1}{2}$–$2\frac{1}{2}$ ticals for permis-

[1] ibid. p. 258.

[2] The price of amber was $2\frac{1}{2}$ ticals a *viss*, or $4\frac{1}{2}$ rupees for $1\frac{1}{2}$ *seer*, but the best kind, for ornaments, was more expensive. The Chinese sometimes paid in silver for amber, but also in warm jackets, carpets, straw hats, copper pots, and opium. They also bartered their merchandise for ivory and gold dust, but only in small quantities.

[3] Lieut. T. E. MacLeod, Assistant Commissioner of Tenasserim province, 'Abstract Journal of an Expedition to Kiang Hung on the Chinese Frontier Starting from Moulmein on 13 December 1836', *JRAS* (1837).

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sion to proceed to the mines, in addition to a boat tax of 10 per cent. and 10 per cent. of the appraised value of the minerals they took away.

The principal features of the history of the Chinese in Burma in the first half of the nineteenth century are the flourishing caravan routes between Burma and Yunnan, and the beginnings of large-scale immigration by sea which accompanied the establishment of British power. In the year 1826, 14 million lb. of cotton, worth £228,000,[1] was transported to China via Burmese land routes. But by mid-century great changes were impending. One of these was the decline of the overland trade, due in part to the fact that cotton was to be declared a royal monopoly in 1854; another was the Panthay rebellion, which, combined with the vagaries of Burmese policy, brought the trade to almost a complete standstill until the rebellion was suppressed in 1873. A third feature of the period was the substitution of many British-made articles for those traditionally manufactured in China, since Britain, having completed her industrial revolution, was expanding her markets throughout the world.[2]

Yule estimated the value of the trade in 1854 at: exports, £235,000, and imports, £187,000, which was somewhat less than the figures given by Anderson for the same year.

[1] Christian, op. cit. p. 213, citing Crawfurd, *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Court of Ava* (1829) pp. 436–8.

[2] The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 greatly stimulated this process.

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CHAPTER VII

CIRCA 1850–1900

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In the nineteenth century, when China as a Power was in decline, and Burma was being annexed in stages by the British, the history of diplomacy in these regions is mainly one of Anglo-Chinese or Anglo-French relations. But the change in the superstructure made very little difference to the Chinese traders, miners, and labourers in Burma who persevered, as circumstances allowed, in their time-honoured routine and tactics. The British, however, dazzled by the legend of the untapped riches of Cathay, conceived an exaggerated idea of the value of the Burma–Yunnan route as a short cut to China. This route, it was argued, would by-pass the Straits of Malacca and shorten the journey by many hundreds of miles. Experience was to prove to them that the central mass of southern China was barring the way and that the Irrawaddy did not rise, as had been thought, in Tibet. But whilst the illusion was maintained it had almost the hypnotic attraction of the Northwest Passage, and a wealth of enterprise and talent was lavished on finding and unlocking the magic door. The story of the quest of a route to China by the Shan States, by the Salween, by the way of Indochina, and of the rivalry of the British and French to be the first to pave the way by road and railway, is told in the voluminous literature of the times: our business here is to repeat so much of it as will reveal and explain the vicissitudes of the Chinese in Burma.

After the Anglo-Burmese war of 1824 numerous surveys were made from India and Moulmein towards the Chinese frontier. During the interval between the first and second Anglo-Burmese wars comparatively little, however, was done towards promoting the trade by the Bhamo route; the British concentrated their endeavours on reaching China overland from Moulmein. Burma, having lost its sole remaining maritime province to the British in 1852, became an inland State and was opposed to all British efforts to cross its territory to Yunnan.[1] The mission of Sir Arthur Phayre to Ava in 1855 to persuade the King to change his mind and to permit trans-Burma trade with China, was, in this one respect, unsuccessful, though it was brilliantly successful in others.

[1] Christian, op. cit. p. 214.

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175 In 1854 the cotton trade of Burma became a royal monopoly. Previously to this the Chinese merchants used often to make ad-
656 vances to the native cultivators, taking the produce of the cotton
439 harvest in return. After 1854 advances were made exclusively by the King. The rate at which he paid the cultivators was 20 ticals
435 a 100 *viss*, and the rate at which he disposed of the cotton in the
248 capital was from 40 to 50 ticals for the same quantity. (What terms the Chinese merchants had given are not on record, but they are not likely to have been more profiteering than those of the Burma sovereign.) The cotton, cleaned from seed, was transported by boat up the Irrawaddy to Bhamo. This royal monopoly naturally restricted the share of the Chinese in the cotton trade, though they picked up about 150,000 *viss* of this product in the Shan States to which the monopoly did not extend.[1]

609 The Chinese who suffered most from this royal nationalization of the cotton industry lived mostly in the suburbs of Amarapura.
361 They were, in spite of their character of middlemen, instinctively recognized by the Burmese as of close kindred in blood, and were not classified by them with the *Kalas* or other foreigners, though that term included every race of India proper, of western Asia, and of Europe. The Chinese ward (says Yule) occupied a large portion of the main street of the suburb where 'every shop and house exhibited the unmistakable countenance and [pig] tail'. 'Thinking of the Eastern people in the mass (continues the distinguished rediscoverer of Marco Polo) one was apt to class the Burmese and other kindred races with the Chinese, but when one saw the latter in the streets of Amarapura his individuality was just as recognizable as it would have been in Hyde Park.'

563 A large proportion of the dwellings in the quarter inhabited by the Chinese was built of brick.[2] The colony probably amounted
361 to nearly 2,000 families in the capital and neighbouring villages.
341 They had a temple of their own, 'the nationality of which in its bizarre character would be recognized by an English child'.[3]

[1] Captain Henry Yule, *A Narrative of the Mission Sent by the Governor-General of India to the Court of Ava in 1855* (London, Smith Elder, 1858) p. 144.

[2] Raffles (*History of Java*, i. 81) noticed that the Chinese invariably constructed a house of brick and mortar when they possessed the means, and that the Chinese kampongs and wards in the Javanese cities might always be distinguished thus from those of the natives. (Cited by Yule, op. cit. p. 142.)

[3] Yule, op. cit. p. 143. In paying a visit to the temple with some other officers of the mission, Yule was very courteously received by some of the Chinese merchants who were passing their evening leisure there. For the temple served

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While Phayre and Yule were still at Ava, there occurred a happening of even greater gravity for the overland trade than the King's declaration of a cotton monopoly. This was the outbreak of the Panthay (Mohammedan Chinese) rebellion in Yunnan. Yunnan remained under Mohammedan government until 1873. During this rule bands of marauders under petty chiefs desolated the country on the frontier and harried the few unfortunate traders to such an extent that they threatened to annihilate all trade.[1] So the success of Sir Arthur Phayre in 1862 in negotiating a treaty with the King of Ava, restricting the duty on imports from China to 1 per cent. and prohibiting the levy of any tax or transit dues on goods destined for the China overland, was not as effective as it might otherwise have been.

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The struggle that now ensued was between the orthodox Chinese on one side and the Mohammedans on the other. It had the most devastating effect on trade. Large tracts of cotton-growing land to the south of the capital of Burma, and to a still greater extent to the north, were now left uncultivated. Previous to these troubles the Chinese of Bhamo had had large godowns and had dealt in nothing but Chinese goods and those for export to China, but when the route had been for long closed they were forced to become general storekeepers. Whereas in the old days the shopkeepers used to wear cloth jackets which came from Canton overland, now all came by river from Lower Burma. Even the 'lasting' of their jackets (*which were of Leeds manufacture*) now came by ship from Canton. They told Clement Williams that, were the road open, they could sell in Yunnan, in preference to Chinese goods, everything that Birmingham, Leeds, Sheffield, Lancashire, and Yorkshire could produce. Mines in the Burmese Shan territory, formerly worked by Chinese who paid royalties to the Burmese, were for some time left unworked—in consequence, however, of the oppression of the Burmese superintendents rather than of the closing of the trade route.[2]

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But, in spite of the closing of the trade routes, there was a considerable local trade in 1863. *The bulk of the stores consisted of British piece-goods*, cloth, coarse blanketing, long-cloth, muslins,

not merely as a place of worship but also as a house of resort or club for its frequenters. The temple was paid for by a voluntary tax on imports.

[1] J. Coryton, 'Trade Routes between British Burma and Western China' *JRGS* (1875) p. 231.

[2] Clement Williams, *Through Burma to Western China, Being Notes of a Journey in 1863* (Edinburgh, Blackwood, 1868) p. 82 ff.

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175 and cotton clothes, cotton velvets, silk and cotton handkerchiefs,
721 figured and coloured muslins, the lastings of bombazines of which
648 Chinese jackets were made, twists, sewing goods, needles, buttons,
439 &c. *No Chinese goods were seen except for a few medicines.* Some of the Chinese were well dressed; others seemed very poor.

No Chinese goods were to be seen! What a revolution had taken place since 1793 when the Emperor Ch'ien Lung told Lord Macartney that China lacked no product within her borders and had no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians.[1]

A Sino-Burmese was appointed by the Burmese Government as a kind of mayor.[2]

Failing to crush the Mohammedan movement, the Chinese encouraged freebooters to prey on the Panthay kingdom. These freebooters allowed trade to pass only on the payment of heavy blackmail. The intermediate region between Burma and China consisted of hills and valleys occupied by the semi-civilized Kachins and by the Shans. They were 'as credulous as children, but were fully alive to the profits of the carrying trade which had now been brought to an end'.[3]

175 After the suppression of the long-drawn-out rebellion and the
648 pacification of the province, one of the first acts of the Viceroy of
439 Yunnan was to send a letter to the King of Burma announcing the fact and requesting him to assist in re-establishing the trade between the two countries. In response to this letter the King dispatched an embassy to Peking carrying tribute; but so disturbed was the borderland that the ambassador was detained in the hills for a month by the hillmen, who had barricaded the road for the purpose of exacting blackmail. However, he eventually arrived in China and was able to lay before the Emperor a letter which has the merit of affording this study an extra touch of light relief:

Your vassal would, with all humility, set forth that under the universal sway of His Holiness the streams and hills are all objects of his loving

[1] Sir John Pratt, *The Expansion of Europe into the Far East* (London, Sylvan Press, 1947) p. 34.

[441] [2] Williams, loc. cit., remarks: 'the likeness of one Burmese to another is striking, but the absolute sameness of one Chinese shop to another is truly wonderful. Not only are they all of one shape and size, but the various goods seem to be arranged after one set pattern—the money-box, the tobacco-bottle, and all the different articles for sale, occupying the same relative position in every narrow warehouse'.

[3] Lieut.-General Albert Fytche, *Burma Past and Present. With Personal Reminiscences of the Country* (London, Kegan Paul, 1878) ii. 97.

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care, the kingdoms of the distant ocean become converted to his civilizing rule and as the sunflower bows before the sun, so does all mankind turn with adoration towards the Imperial person. . . .

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The King goes on to state that since he has succeeded to the Emperor's 'barren and far-off dependency of Burma', he offers tribute, and remarks that recently, owing to war and rapine on the borders, communication has been interrupted, the horrors of strife are now over, and the universe has returned to tranquillity.[1]

The tribute included five tame elephants.

So say the Chinese accounts of the affair. But listen now to what an authority on Burma's history, Mr B. R. Pearn, has to say:

> There is a complete clash of evidence between Chinese and Burmese accounts. The Burmese deny that in modern times they have ever been tributary to China; they sent friendly gifts at intervals to Peking, but only in response to the prior receipts of gifts from China. Also, their version of the letter which is here quoted is altogether different from the Chinese version: far from being the letter of a vassal to his lord, it uses the language of one independent sovereign to another. . . .

Certainly, in view of the Chinese practice of numbering all foreign countries among tribute-paying countries (e.g. Great Britain), the Chinese account cannot lightly be accepted. Indeed, taking everything into consideration, especially China's weak state as a Power at this time, the Burmese version is much the more plausible.

There is evidence that missions were sent to China in 1787, 1795, 1811, 1820, 1830, 1833, and 1843, and whereas the Chinese claim that these missions were tributary, the Burmese assert that on the contrary they were merely expressive of friendship between independent States and were normally sent only in response to prior missions bearing presents from China to Burma. The truth probably is that 'in nearly every instance the Burmese embassies were preceded by bogus embassies purporting to be from the Emperor of China to the King of Burma but in reality got up to deceive both the Emperor and the King by the Yunnan officials'.[2]

Writing in the period immediately following the suppression of

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[1] Robert K. Douglas, 'China and Burma', *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, vol. i (January–April 1886), citing translation into Chinese of the King of Burma's letter in the *Peking Gazette* for 1875.

[2] E. H. Parker, *Burma, with Special Reference to her Relations with China* (Rangoon, 1893) p. 94.

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175 Writing in the period immediately following the suppression of
the Panthay rebellion, a close observer and authority on the border
167 region speaks of the Chinese in these terms:[1]

> Mingled with the motley population of Shans, in the belt of the country south-west of Yunnan, is one element of which we may regard the increase in the neighbourhood of Bhamo and Mandalay with great satisfaction. I refer to the Chinese who, having left their country as immigrants from the Eastern ports, have gradually established themselves as coolies, cultivators, and traders all along the coast of the Malay Peninsula from Singapore to Rangoon, and so up the Irrawaddy to the very spot to which we are hoping their brethren will come overland to meet and trade with them.

It will be noted that Coryton regards the Chinese in Bhamo as an extension of the Maritime Chinese rather than as Mountain Chinese who had arrived overland. To what extent this was true we have no means of checking, but it seems probable that nearly all Cantonese and Hokkiens came by sea, whilst nearly all Yunnanese came by the land route.

175 The trade was restarted, and during the year ending October
1874 British steamers carried cargo valued at £200,000 to and from
439 Bhamo. But the following year there was a disappointing lull. As
late as 1882 the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi were still in a state of turmoil from the recent insurrections; brigandage was rampant, transport was bad, and there were epidemics of plague, malaria, and dysentry.[2]

[1] J. Coryton, 'Trade Routes between British Burma and Western China', *JRGS* (1875) p. 230.

[2] Archibald Ross Colquhoun, 'Exploration in South-Western China', *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society* (1885). Colquhoun took with him a Mr Hong Beng-kaw, a Chinese gentleman educated in Scotland, and a Cantonese interpreter. Malaria has been suggested as the main reason for the eventual defeat of Kublai Khan's troops in the thirteenth century.

The British surveys and expeditions of the Burma–Chinese routes are noticed by Christian (op. cit. p. 212 ff.), and in the article in the *New Times of Burma* of 30 November by Khin Maung Gale, before cited. Notable among the expeditions of the British was that of Margary who reached Bhamo from Shanghai on 17 January 1875—the first white man to make the trip. Margary, however, was murdered at Manwyne, approximately midway between Bhamo and Tengyueh. (For the repercussions of the murder, see S. T. Wang, *The Margary Affair and the Chefoo Convention* (New York, 1939)). In contrast with this tragedy is the experience of J. McArthy, who travelled on foot from Hankow to Bhamo, arriving there on 26 August 1877. Throughout his journey, extending over eight months, he did not meet with a single act of incivility, was never asked for his passport, and was never refused any assistance or courtesy he desired. McArthy's success was due in great measure to his having travelled in native costume, and

1 [China--Analyst]

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With the accession of King Thibaw in 1878, conditions in what remained of independent Burma became more and more chaotic. Trade declined and in 1879 the British Resident was withdrawn from Mandalay and the British Agent from Bhamo. In 1885 the ultimatum from Britain ending Burmese independence demanded, among other things, the provision of facilities for opening up British trade with China through Burma. Bhamo was occupied in December 1885. For several years after the annexation of 1886 trade decreased owing to the raids of dacoits on both sides of the frontier. Raw cotton was the only considerable export to China but the cost of transport limited its destination to points not more than 250 miles beyond the Chinese frontier. From 1890 there was a British consul stationed at Tengyueh and, for a time, at Szumao, at which places there were also offices of the Chinese Maritime Customs. The Sino-Japanese war of 1894–5 gave the overland trade a temporary impetus, the total for that year reaching Rs. 32 lakhs as compared with 22 lakhs the following year.[1]

During the negotiations which preceded the Convention of 24 July 1886 between Great Britain and China, the former seems to have been labouring under an exaggerated impression of the power of China. The result was that the two following Articles were included in the Convention:

I. Insomuch as it has been the practice of Burmah to send decennial missions to present articles of local produce, England agrees that the highest authority in Burmah shall send the customary decennial missions, the members of the missions to be of the Burmese race.

II. China agrees that, in all matters whatsoever appertaining to the authority and rule which England is now exercising in Burmah, England shall be free to do whatever she deems fit and proper.

The decennial mission, however, was never sent. It was pointed out that the dispatch of such a mission would be construed in China, and perhaps in Burma, as placing the British Government in a position of inferiority. The Chinese pressed on several occasions for the sending of the mission, but finally in 1896 the obligation to send it was repudiated on the ground of 'altered circumstances'.

to his ability to converse with the people in their own language. See J. McArthy, 'Across China from Chin-Kiang to Bhamo', *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society* (1879).

[1] Christian, op. cit. p. 221, citing *Upper Burma Gazetteer*, pt. 1, p. 108.

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175 On 1 March 1894 a treaty was signed between Britain and China
regulating the Sino-Burmese trade. Free overland trade was
439 granted for a term of six years, after which the general tariff of the
648 Chinese Maritime Customs would apply. Chinese vessels were permitted to ply the Irrawaddy on the same terms as British vessels. By the same treaty it was agreed that China might appoint a consul to reside at Rangoon, that Chinese subjects wishing to enter Burma might receive passports from a British consular officer, and that the subjects of the two Powers should each within the territory of the other enjoy all the privileges, immunities, and advantages that may have been, or might thereafter be, accorded to the subjects of any other nation.[1] But the trade was a disappointment to the British and Chinese alike. From 1900 until the opening of the Sino-Japanese hostilities of 1937 onwards, the trade with China was of
[496] minor importance. The railway stopped at Lashio and was not extended to the Chinese frontier.

Sir Charles Crosthwaite, who visited Bhamo in 1887, found it
361 a disappointing place. It was nothing but a very dirty, miserable
364 kind of village, arranged in two streets parallel to the river. Con-
servancy there was none, and the stench from the streets, the
439 lagoon, and even the bank of the river was sickening. The Chinese
175 were the most prominent of the population. They were, it was said, opium smokers almost to a man and seldom moved until midday. They managed, notwithstanding, to make money and retired to China after a few years with fortunes. Crosthwaite anticipated a large increase in the trade with China but doubted whether the town of Bhamo could grow much on its existing site.[2]

The trade, however, could not make much progress on account
175 of the cost of transport between Bhamo and Tengyueh, the risk
439 of attack by Kachins, and the exactions and oppressions by the
Chinese officials who at one time had maintained a *likin* (octroi)
648 station within the British boundary, not far from Bhamo. There was, however, another route used by traders which went by way

[1] Sir E. Herslet and Ed. Parkes, *China Treaties* (London, 1908) p. 99ff.

[2] Sir Charles Crosthwaite, *The Pacification of Burma* (London, Edwin Arnold, 1912) p. 74.

The population of Bhamo in 1891 was 8,048, in 1901, 10,734, and in 1911, 9,762, of whom 3,000 was natives of India. These figures include the garrison. The figures for 1921 and 1931 were, respectively, 7,741 and 7,827 (in 1921 and 1931 the garrison was not included). These totals are sufficiently indicative of the static nature of the trade.

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of Mansi and Namkhan (Namhkam), a Shan town on the Shweli. After the Kachins in the country south of Bhamo had been subjugated, the Chinese preferred the Namkhan route, and though the Kachins had ceased to raid, and much had been done to improve the route to Tengyueh, the trade had not returned to that channel. 175 439 648

The depressing picture given of Bhamo by Crosthwaite refers obviously to the 'off-season', and it is counterbalanced by another belonging to a few years later (*c.* 1895), this time written by an observer with perhaps a more buoyant temperament. It gives a very striking impression of the Chinese caravans and of the races of that border town at the period when the trade was in full swing:

> During the rains Bhamo relapses into a small and unimportant town. . . . But the approach of winter heralds a great change. Over the wild borderland through which winds the Ambassador's Road, roughest of international highways, come the big caravans from China—thousands of hardy mules, hundreds of blue-clad labourers and portly merchants, filled out to abnormal size by dint of satin coats and furs, upon small ponies which amble sturdily along. . . . From the Shan States, north and east, come picturesque crowds of varied nationality, a permutation of Chinese, Burmese and many-tribed Shan, and from the border highways descend the cateran Kachin, to whom the Government now pays a fixed toll in lieu of the income they formerly derived, by robbery and blackmail, from the traders who made their way along this dubious highway. Bhamo now breaks into new life and colour, exchanging its moribund isolation for the concourse of many visitors, like any tourist resort in the season. . . .[1]

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Our authority then describes with Celtic enthusiasm the polychromatic visitors—Burmans in silken kilts and flaming headgear, Shans in loose trousers and big straw hats, Kachins with naked swords, real Chinamen in felt boots and black satin caps, hybrid Chinamen in English hats, came and went in an incessant leisurely stream. And out on the white highroad a British soldier swung by, his shoulders square, his boots creaking, the silver head of his regimental cane gleaming in the light. Along the same highway the trader from Yunnan rode by at a fast amble on his shaggy steed. An almond-eyed porter, a man of thews and sinews, struggled slowly behind with a heavy load on his back.

Outside the market-place the view was across the white and grey walls and distinctive roofs of the Chinese houses. In the space be-

[1] V. C. Scott O'Connor, *The Silken East* (London, Hutchinson, 1904) i. 183 ff.

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[244] tween, in hollows where the river, at its rising, rushed in, Chinese market gardeners were toiling over rows of cabbages and beans. 175 They wore blue clothes and large sun-hats, and carried, slung 439 from poles over their shoulders, cans of water from which the in- genious bamboo spout made the water splash in large silvery jets. 361 'In all that the Chinese does (says O'Connor) there is something distinctive, from the decoration of his house, to the pattern of his pipe and the spray of his water-can.'

439 As for the traders themselves, their dress and trappings had altered scarce a tittle through the centuries—loose coat, trousers 653 bound tightly round the ankles, black silk cap, and white felt shoes. 291 As ever the Chinese trader was 'portly, affable and clean'. His means of transport, like a Canterbury pilgrim, was a stout nag with tas- 492 selled trappings and short high stirrups, but now here in Bhamo [177] in the first decade of the century our informant observes a revolu- [493] tion—*the bicycle had come in!*

If we pay yet another visit to Bhamo thirty years or so later through the intermediary of a woman traveller, we shall find ourselves bewailing with nostalgia the passing of the picturesque in the present humdrum age. She is speaking of the yearly frontier meeting between British and Chinese officials:

> [177] How drab, how un-Oriental, the Chinese officials look, dressed as they are in ordinary Chinese robes of black or dark blue silk topped with a bowler or soft felt hat! How different it must have been twenty years ago when China was still an empire and her officials came to call dressed in gorgeous dragon robes with plumes of peacock's feathers nodding in their 'button' hats.[1]

167 The wealth of literature at our disposal regarding the Burma-Yunnan trade routes and the characteristics of the Mountain Chinese must not distract our attention altogether from their brothers who came into Burma by more peaceful and less romantic routes by way of Canton, Amoy, Swatow, Singapore, and the Burma ports. In 1891 a total of 37,000 Chinese were counted in Burma, more than half of whom had come in by sea routes. These Maritime Chinese did not attract the attention of foreigners to anything like the same extent as did their co-nationals from over the mountain frontier,[2] but there were nevertheless some notes made

[1] Beatrix Metford, *Where China Meets Burma* (London, Blackie, 1935) p. 60.
[2] But it should be mentioned that before the great influx of Indians began, there were fears expressed in some quarters that Burma would eventually be

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by foreign observers. To one such account we are indebted for /167
information regarding the Chinese community as a whole and its influence on the social and economic life of the Burmese which goes much deeper than the impressions of the ordinary traveller, however vivid they may be.[1]

The offspring of unions between Chinese men and Burmese 302
women were thought (say our authors) to have a great future. The 276
sons were brought up as Chinese; the daughters as Burmese. But the men were not suffered to wear the plaited queue of the Chinese; they merely coiled their hair round the unshaven part. These half-breeds were not addicted to smoking opium.

It is interesting to observe the influence of China and Europe on /177
Burmese trades and handicrafts, and vice versa.

The Burmese umbrella (*hti*) was on the Chinese model—a bam- [293]
boo frame with a paper cover. The Chinese umbrella, however, had a thin paper cover, whereas the Burmese had a cover of *bast*-paper which outlasted several of the others. But the Chinese umbrellas were cheaper and better waterproofed. The Chinese blacksmith [326]
had already adopted the European anvil and heavy sledge-hammer [372]
for forging axles and tires, anchors and grapnels. The bench-vice was also universal. At the same time, the Chinese adhered to his horizontal wooden box-blast fitted with valves like a double-acting pump, whereas the Burmese copied the leather double-bellows from the steam-mill workshops. Needles used to be brought to [412]
Burma from China, as well as scissors, though the latter were also [439]
fashioned in Burma. *In the 1890s both were imported from Europe.*[2] The bulk of the tailoring was in the hands of immigrants from [294]
China,[3] but their prejudice against the sewing-machine was helping [462]
to transfer the business to Burmese women. Nearly every well-to-do family in the towns, however, had its sewing-machine.

overrun by the Chinese. See, for example, Sir J. G. (George) Scott, *Burma as it was, as it is, and as it will be* (London, Redway, 1886) pp. 142–3.

[1] Max and Bertha Ferrers, *Burma* (London, Sampson Low, 1900) p. 61 and passim.

[2] ibid. p. 61.

[3] A Burma official of many years' experience comments: 'I doubt if the Ferrers are right in saying that the bulk of the tailoring was in the hands of Chinese immigrants. Chinese tailors were rare, very rare, when I crossed from India in the spring of 1915, and I never heard that they had been numerous in the recent past. The Indian *Durzi* was ubiquitous. But the advent of the sewing-machine certainly encouraged Burmese women dressmakers, and every bazaar had its quota of sewing girls with machines.'

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177 For teak-cutting, the indigenous carpenter's tools were the small
335 adze (*pegot*), chisels and gouges (*sauk*), awls (*lun*), and a rough saw
413 (*hlwa*), besides an axe (*pauksein*). The Burmese adopted the Chinese plane with the Chinese straddle bench. When the impulse to cheap house building was given by the presence of cheap planks, the immigrants from China got the whole work.[1] But by the end of the century the Burmese had begun to oust them from the heavy carpentering and from joinery as well.[2] Ordinary Burmese carpenters earned three-quarters of a rupee a day, the better workmen earned from one to one and a quarter rupees, compared with the one and a half rupees earned by the Chinese carpenter.

[1937 European vehicles built by Chinese were used by the better-off Burmese in the towns.

Such was the state of the Chinese in Burma and their influence
167 on the indigenous people at the end of the nineteenth century.
579 Some observers saw in the Chinese 'a welcome assistant to the British administrator', though they were, unhappily, those who flocked across the frontier and went marauding through the loosely-settled districts. But even these disturbers of the peace eventually married native girls, treating them much better than did either Shan or Burmese husbands, and they remained to multiply and to implant the characteristically Chinese institutions. As a result of Thibaw's misrule the region of the frontier had long been harried by roving dacoits and this afforded to Chinese filibusters a tempting opportunity that they were not slow to exploit.[3]

167 These were days long before the rise of Chinese nationalism and
511 the Chinese was still largely judged on his merits or demerits

[1] The same official also thinks that this must be an exaggeration. It was doubtless true of European-type building in the large towns, but Burmese carpenters and joiners must have done most of the work in the jungle. 'It is fair to say, however,' he adds, 'that where a Chinese carpenter or cabinet-maker did set up in business, he was always heavily patronized.'

[2] A controversy between two of my expert advisers arose over this passage. All I can do is to quote what they say. The first expert remarks, 'Even if (though I doubt it) at the end of the nineteenth century the Burmese had begun to oust the Chinese from the heavy carpentry and joinery industry, this was only a passing phase. By the early 1920s the Chinese had something approaching a monopoly of all forms of such work and their competition had almost destroyed the indigenous craft.' When the second expert replies in the terms of fn. 1 above, the first expert retorts by quoting Christian, op. cit. p. 170, that Chinese and Indian immigrants 'do most of the carpenter work and furniture making'.

[3] F. Wells Williams, 'The Chinese Immigration in Further Asia', *American Historical Review* (April 1900).

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as a colonist. But already there was (at least in the minds of some Europeans) a feeling of apprehension as to the eventual meaning of the intensified immigration of Chinese. The authors whose work has been quoted above inserted a warning regarding the future: 167 511

> The influx of races whose religion it is to multiply, without regard to the prospect of subsistence, must speedily result in lowering the scale of life for everyone in Burma, a country of which now it may be said that 'a large share of the happiness of each individual is derived from the consciousness of the well-being of other individuals'.[1]

[1] Max and Bertha Ferrers, op. cit., quoting Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Ethics*, i. 297.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

To a greater extent than in Siam, Malaya, or Indochina, the Chinese in Burma came to regard the country as their home. They learnt Burmese more readily than the Indians,[1] and all Chinese in the country, except in large towns like Rangoon, and the very recent arrivals and the Yunnanese who lived on the land in the Shan States, spoke Burmese fairly fluently. At the same time they used their native Chinese for communication among themselves, even when they belonged to families who had been in Burma for more than a century.[2]

Despite the anti-Chinese riots of 1931 (in which the Chinese signally defeated their assailants) and the 'middleman' nature of many of their occupations, the Burmese generally had a friendly feeling for the Chinese living amongst them, whom they called *pauk paw* or 'next of kin'.[3] Some villages in Lower Burma had Chinese headmen. In the towns they had a large hold on the catering trade. The opening of the Burma Road in 1939 did something to impair the good feeling towards the race, for it entailed the infiltration into Burma of Chinese contractors and hangers-on of indifferent character, and the behaviour of some of the Chinese soldiers in Burma during the war with Japan and afterwards did not improve relations between the two peoples. (The conduct of

[1] Christian, op. cit. p. 270. Burmese was the lingua franca of the country, spoken even by Chinese ignorant of one another's dialects.

[2] G. E. Harvey in *British Rule in Burma 1824–1942*, p. 69 fn., says that the Chinese 'got on well with the people and intermarriages were frequent, yet they too were sometimes killed in anti-foreign outbreaks'.

[3] John F. Cady, *The Development of Self-Rule and Independence in Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948) (in mimeograph), pt. 1, Burma, p. 11, says that the Chinese in Burma generally kept clear of local politics, though they were disposed to carry on intrigues with rival Burmese parties; but this perhaps understates the case. Two Rangoon Chinese, Aw Yu-wa and Hoke Sein—the latter known as 'king of Chinatown' in Rangoon—were popularly credited with having caused the disintegration of the United Party, once the most powerful Burmese political group. Christian, op. cit. p. 271. It is pointed out, however, by an authority on Burma, that Aw Yu-wa was not interested in politics, but in more dubious matters, that he was due for deportation after conviction, and interested one set of ministers in his fate. The Cabinet split on the question of his deportation, but in any case was already widely split on other issues.

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the Chinese troops in Burma in 1942 was good and discipline, in 167
regard to relations with civilians, was really severe—until defeat 609
came and demoralization set in.)

Some sections of the Chinese in Burma interested themselves 665
in local politics. For instance, for many years Sir Lee Ah Yain and numerous well-to-do Chinese supported the 'Golden Valley' Party sponsored by Sir J. A. Maung Gyi and Oscar de Glanville. Chinese Nationalist politics, which so interested them in other Southeast Asian countries, seemed to the Chinese in Burma to make comparatively little appeal.

As has already been stated (see pp. 59–60), the centre of Chinese 441
business relations was the chamber of commerce, which performed 666
similar functions to those described in the case of the equivalent body in the Philippines.[1]

All members of the chamber, including those who were not British subjects, could, under the British regime, vote for the chamber's representative in the Burma legislature. The candidate, however, had to be a British subject.

A number of Chinese attained positions of prominence under British rule in Burma.[2]

Since the Chinese in Burma are an unobtrusive community tak- 609
ing definitely a second place to the Indians, they have not invited 426
to themselves the same criticism that they have in Siam, Malaya, [114]
Indonesia, Indochina, or in the Philippines. There is, indeed, remarkably little attention paid to them in the standard works on 241
Burma (some contriving to omit reference to them at all), but one leading authority on the country refers incidentally to their record of development in a review of Burmese economics. The Indian and Chinese money-lenders and traders (says Dr Furnivall) were not only middlemen; they were potential rivals of the rice-millers since they bought rice for India and the Straits Settlements. Sometimes, through sympathy for the cultivators, the Chinese were pictured as villains. In 1886 some wealthy Chinese combined to purchase all

[1] See p. 632.

[2] Sir Lee Ah Yain, for instance, the first Chinese to hold high office in the 647
country, served the Government of Burma for several years as Minister of Forests during the governorships of Sir Harcourt Butler and Sir Charles Innes. 648
See Christian, op. cit. p. 273. Another Burma Chinese who deserves mention is Taw Sein-Ko (b. 1864), son of a Chinese merchant, educated at Cambridge, who 175
was Government archaeologist and adviser on Chinese affairs in 1899–1900. In 1899 he was instrumental in keeping the Burma–Chinese frontier quiet during the Boxer rebellion.

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656 the paddy coming in and to hold it up against the millers. Again
276 (as an example of Chinese obstruction of reform), when the British annexed Upper Burma, the Government contemplated retaining
609 the Burmese prohibitions of trade in opium and alcohol, but this
241 was impossible because the demands by Chinese and Indians had to be met. The wiles of Indian and Chinese money-lenders were
426 denounced in Burma as far back as the eighties.[1]

It was estimated from one source that before the war with Japan
433 the Chinese in Burma controlled one-fifth of the country's economy,[2] but this is an exaggeration. Out of the 12 million acres
471 cultivated, 5 million acres were in Indian hands. Over 70 per cent.
504 of the foreign trade was with India, and conducted mainly by Indians. The railways were State-owned. Shipping was mainly British or Indian. The Rangoon Electric Tramway and Supply Company, and the Upper Burma Electric Company were British-owned. Banking was mainly British, with Indian, American, Dutch,
453 and Japanese participating. The Chinese came into the banking business late. The rice crop was financed by Indian chettiars mainly on money borrowed from the banks. Plantations and mines were British-owned, but were inconsiderable. The oil business was British except for one small Indian company. The timber business was mainly British and the chief rice-mills, saw-mills, cotton-mills, and oil-mills were British, though a few were owned by Indians and Chinese. Retail trade in Rangoon and other *large* towns was
444 mainly Indian, with some Chinese participation. Nevertheless, the Chinese had a considerable holding in rice, timber, salt manufacture, and the retail trade.

It was not to be supposed that the Chinese in Burma would have
648 been overlooked in the Chinese Nationalist movement which was
641 fostered by the Chinese Revolution of 1911, and intensified into a campaign after the Kuomintang successes of 1927. For years before the war with Japan the Kuomintang had its branches in Burma, and the Chinese consul in Rangoon (promoted to be consul-general in 1940) held elections among overseas Chinese of Burma to select two representatives in the National Assembly of China. Voting was restricted to Chinese nationals registered at the consulate.

[1] J. S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice in the Far East* (London, Cambridge University Press, 1948) p. 96.

[2] *Christian Science Monitor* (18 December 1947). The estimate of the Chinese one-fifth share in Burma's economy (given by the writer in this newspaper) is considered much exaggerated by at least one Burmese economist.

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Education, as elsewhere, was regarded by Chinese Nationalists as an important instrument of policy. In 1935 there were 12,707 Chinese children of ages between five and ten years. Of these, 837 were in the four Chinese Anglo-vernacular schools and 2,965 were in sixty-five unrecognized Chinese schools. In 1937 the number of pupils in the latter type of school had risen slightly to 3,308. 'The Chinese do not desire government recognition of the private schools (ran the official Government Report); they prefer to run them on independent national lines.' The Report continues:

> Some of the schools receive financial aid from the Educational Association in China, and all are supported by Chinese clubs and associations.... *The bulk of the Chinese schools constitute an independent school system in Burma—a system controlled, inspected, staffed, and financed by a Chinese educational body with a curriculum unrelated to the public service of education.* Approaches have been made to one Local Education Authority for the inclusion of a number of Chinese vernacular schools in the public system.[1]

(The result of the approach to the Local Education Authority does not appear to have been recorded, but we can be sure that nothing came of it. The Chinese vernacular school system was *sui generis* and based on the Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen; it would not lend itself to inclusion in any foreign system of public instruction.)

The Sino-Japanese War. Not until the Japanese had attacked Shanghai and then extended their blockade to the southern ports of China did the Chinese Central Government turn its attention to the possibility of an alternative gateway through Yunnan. The Burma Road was begun late in 1937. It followed the line Lashio–Kyukok–Kunming. A later diversion swung it north from the Chinese frontier through Bhamo to Myitkyina, and thence to join the road from Assam through the Hukawng.[2]

In spite of natural obstacles and the alternation of the wet and dry seasons (part of the road received as much as 200 inches of rain annually), by the use of the *corvée* the Chinese completed the work of opening up nearly 750 miles from Kunming to Lashio. The Chinese people of Yunnan province, with their will, their

[1] *Annual Report on Public Instruction in Burma* (Rangoon, Superintendent of Government Printing and Stationery, 1935–6). The italics are mine. V.P.

[2] See Tan Pei-ying, *The Building of the Burma Road* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1945).

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hands, the *tzow tau* (mattock-like shovel), and the bamboo basket, literally scratched out and filled in the Burma Road, crossing the Kaoli mountains, a 12,000-foot-high span of the Himalayas.[1] The highway was officially opened on 10 January 1939.

Side by side with the Burma Road, the Chinese began the construction of a railway from Kunming to Talifu. The British authorities also began building a railway from the Lashio end.

In 1940, after the fall of France had transformed the political situation in the East, the British Government, temporarily to placate Japan, closed the Burma Road to the transit of war materials for three months from 18 July. The Japanese occupation of Burma closed the road in 1942, but in 1943, when the military situation permitted, reconstruction of the road was begun by the Chinese Government with the advice and instruction of United States engineers.

Only a small proportion of the Chinese population of Burma was able to get out of the country in time when the Japanese invaded it. In April 1947 the new Chinese consul-general to Burma, Mr Shau Chang-hau, said that 14,000 Chinese who had left Burma when the Japanese entered it in 1942 were awaiting repatriation. In 1946, he said, 2,000 had been repatriated.[2]

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After the Japanese occupation of Burma in May 1942, the Chinese residents seem to have kept their political opinions to themselves and to have stayed out of harm's way as much as possible. Their relations with the Burmese continued to be fairly satisfactory, and they gave no positive support to the Japanese war effort. The Japanese-sponsored Overseas Chinese Association aroused little response from local Chinese. A Military Publicity Corps, recruited by the Nanking 'puppet Government' in China, came to Burma in February 1944 for the avowed purpose of promoting more genuine support for Japan's ends on the part of the local Chinese. As the result of the increased pressure, the Chinese business men of Burma contributed 200,000 rupees for the purchase of Japanese planes, and the Chinese farmers subscribed half that sum a few weeks later. The President of the United Chinese Associations explained that it was only right for the Chinese to help at a time when they were 'enjoying normal business while thou-

[1] Public Relations Officer, Y-Force Operations Staff, *Reconstruction of the Burma Road: Operational, Logistical, and Historical Data* (New York, 1944).
[2] *New Times of Burma* (6 April 1947).

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Chinese

sands of Japanese, Indian, and Burmese soldiers are shedding their 722
blood not far away'.

The conclusion of the war with Japan brought to the fore again 722
the question of Chinese immigration. In 1939 the opening of the 648
Burma Road had been viewed with some apprehension by a number of Burmese politicians. The fear was that by opening the road through Rangoon the British exposed the city sooner or later to bombing attack by the Japanese. It was realized that although Japan was not then at war with Britain she was quite capable of bombing Rangoon to bits, and apologizing with compensation afterwards. Fears of an influx of Chinese by this route were not great until a later stage, though they were, of course, present in the minds of some. The political mind was not at that time anti-Chinese so much as apprehensive lest Burma should get mixed up in a Sino-Japanese quarrel. Everybody knew that, owing to their other commitments, the British would reinforce Burma only in the last resort.

A customs wrangle also developed. Goods bought by the Chinese 648
with American credits passing through Burma were charged cus- 439
toms duty, but were given a drawback of seven-eighths when re-
exported. The general view in Burma was that the Kuomintang 651
officials objected to the double scrutiny of the consignments that this entailed: 'they had too much to hide'. The Burmese view also was that Burma was being driven into heavy defence expenditure by the opening of the road—expenditure which might otherwise be avoided—and was in any case entitled to some payment under international law for the permanent services used by the goods in transit and the personnel engaged. (China had not then signed the international agreement on these matters.) A vitriolic press campaign against the duties was started in the United States, and the British Government, for diplomatic reasons, then agreed to pay to the Burma revenues the amount of these dues.[1]

In November 1947, on the eve of Burma's independence, the 167
Burma *Daily Herald* gave editorial prominence to repeated reports 204
that, because of illegal infiltration through Lashio, Bhamo, and other routes, the Chinese population of Upper Burma was increasing at an alarming rate. It must be admitted (the paper pointed out) that such a situation had arisen partly because of the inefficiency or shortsightedness of the immigration officers, and that there were

[1] See *Burma Handbook* (Delhi, 1943) p. 112.

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rumours that admission permits were being issued at 10 rupees a permit. There was also disconcerting news that Shan merchants were being kidnapped by Chinese bandits on the frontiers. The paper urged the authorities to take action.[1]

This immigration question now became involved with a fifty-four-year-old Chinese-Burma border issue pivoting on the triangular northern tip of Burma which at this juncture was reopened by the Chinese Government. The Chinese claim covered roughly 75,000 square miles of territory bordering on Yunnan out of Burma's total area of 262,000 square miles. The disputed area (according to a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Office) had belonged to China as part of a tributary State during the T'ang dynasty in the seventh century. (The spokesman mentioned, in passing, that both Indochina and Siam had once been among China's tributaries.)

The frontier had never been marked on the ground north of 23° 35′. The Wa States, never fully explored, have an area of about 2,000 square miles, and it is along their northern border that Burma's boundary with China was surveyed by the Iselin Commission.

It may be mentioned that American-trained Chinese forces operated in 1944–5 in just the areas to which the Chinese asserted a claim and that they departed thence late in 1945 with evident reluctance; also that in 1946 a Chinese force invaded Burma and camped for over a month on the Irrawaddy below Myitkyina, claiming to be looking for deserters, and left only when threatened with air action.

This claim was answered immediately by an announcement from Rangoon stating emphatically that Burma did not intend to surrender any portion of its territory and would 'defend its integrity without any hesitation'. A suggestion of possible action by the United Nations was declared by the Burmese to be out of the question since Burma's frontiers had been clearly marked on the official maps, and these could not become a subject for dispute.[2]

Though, on the face of it, it was somewhat surprising that the Chinese Government should revive this claim when it was meeting an increasingly grave internal crisis, the political reasons for such

[1] Cited in *The Burman* (12 November 1947).
[2] *Christian Science Monitor* (18 December 1947).

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action are clear enough. The Nanking Government wished to distract attention from its own internal weakness, and at the same time to give moral support to the Chinese scattered throughout Southeast Asia, and even a remote frontier dispute was grist to their mill. At the same time it was not likely that China would push these claims too far, for by so doing it would lend support to the fear (repeated in soft tones from British, French, and Dutch sources) that China might tend to supplant the white Powers in Southeast Asia. The fear, in view of China's then situation, might seem a little unrealistic, but it might have very real cause if a strong united China were to arise in the future.

Burma became independent on 4 January 1948, and Dr George Yeh, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Nanking Government, who attended the independence celebrations in Rangoon, endeavoured to soothe Burmese fears. He declared with emphasis that there was no likelihood of Chinese aggression against Burma. The Burmese, he said, would be inflicting an unnecessary mental strain on themselves if they harboured any such fears. The alleged danger confronting Burma because it was sandwiched between two powerful nations, China and India, was an absurd exaggeration.[1]

When pressed by the newspapermen on the subject of the 77,000 square miles of territory claimed by China, Dr Yeh was more cautious. The claim, he replied, had not been intended as an official statement. There were, however, some portions of the China-Burma frontier which remained undemarcated, but this matter would have to be settled in the traditional way by a joint commission. 'We value friendship more than anything else,' said Dr Yeh, 'and one lesson we have learned as the result of being subject to eight years' aggression is not to be aggressive.'

A further statement made by China's Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs on the same occasion reflects the policy of the Chinese National Government of this period to co-operate with the Govern-

[1] The 'sandwich' idea had been voiced in *Freedom* (Rangoon) as early as 6 May 1946. 'What with their teeming millions and their potential industrial power (the paper said) China and India will sandwich Burma in between them. It is to be feared that circumstances beyond human control will compel the two countries to reach out hands of exploitation to Burma.' A leading authority on Burma comments: 'I cannot but agree with the "sandwich" idea. Even if it takes a long time, the vacant spaces of Burma are likely to attract pressure from both sides. But the fear of this is not common in Burma, though it is one of the factors a statesman would have to take into account.'

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648 ments of Southeast Asia in suppressing Communism. Regarding the Chinese in this region he said:

> They never came out with a mandate for their Government to take part in the politics of these countries. If any country feels that Chinese immigrants impede their political growth and economic development, the Chinese Government is ready to use all its resources to return these nationals to their homeland.[1]

In March 1948 Burma received an ambassador from China. He was Dr Tu Yuen-tan, and, on presenting his credentials to the President of Burma on 3 March, he gave an address in which he recalled that the Chinese were known in Burma by the affectionate name of *pauk paw*, and he referred to the close economic, cultural, and religious ties of the Burmese and Chinese throughout the centuries.[2]

As in the other Southeast Asian countries, both the Kuomintang and the Communists strove to establish a hold on the Chinese community in Burma when the Japanese had surrendered. In some essential ways the Communists had the advantage, since the Kuomintang leaders, being mostly business men, had by the mere fact of continuing to carry on their businesses, and remaining in the towns during the occupation, become tainted with the suspicion of being 'collaborators'. (That most of the Burmese Nationalist leaders had also collaborated with enthusiasm, changing their sides at the appropriate moment, was beside the point.)[3]

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669 Later in the year a rebellion occurred in Burma which threatened to disintegrate the new State. The issue was still not decided in December 1948. Thakin Nu's Government was holding its own militarily, though the administration, economy, and finances of the

[1] *Hindustan Times* (9 January 1948). A historical survey of the China–Burma border question from a Burmese point of view is given by Khin Maung Gale in the *New Times of Burma* for 30 November 1947. Christian, op. cit. p. 262, discusses the question at length.

[2] *Burma Tribune* (4 March 1948).

[3] In September 1946 Mr Lee Sze-yuan, Director-General of Overseas Affairs in the Kuomintang and Chief of the Burma Branch of the Kuomintang, had made a ten days' tour of the Irrawaddy delta to revive the morale of the Party's supporters (*Morning Star*, 25 September 1946). The Kuomintang published a newspaper in Rangoon, the *Kuo Min Yit Pao*, and the Chinese Democratic League (banned by the Chinese Government because of its alleged liaison with the Communists) also published a small newspaper, the *Zin Min Pao*. Although the circulation was probably not more than 500, it called attention to itself by its virulent attacks on the Chinese Government.

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country were increasingly breaking down under the strain. The armed forces of the Government, commanded by a Karen, remained loyal against the 'White Band' Communists and rebellious members of the People's Volunteer Army. The 'Red Flag' Communists remained aloof, while the Karen Movement was generally anti-Communist in nature. 669

This was the situation when the successes of the Communists in China were threatening to alter the entire political balance in the Far East. The Communists in Southeast Asia thereby received encouragement to intensify their efforts. In the comparatively small Chinese community in Burma the number of Communists was not known, but there can be no doubt that they were giving their active support to the Communist rebellion. More important than any other factor in the Burma situation to the other countries of Southeast Asia, especially to Malaya which produced only a third of its rice requirements, was the reduction of rice exports, for Burma was the greatest rice-exporting country in the world. 648 439 243

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PART III

THE CHINESE IN SIAM

CHAPTER IX

DEMOGRAPHY

[121] 128 In this study we are interested primarily in *ethnic* Chinese, and only secondarily in Chinese described according to their national status as interpreted by the various Governments. In Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, British Borneo, and the Philippines our task of investigating the numbers, distribution, civil condition, &c., of ethnic Chinese is simplified by the fact that the census authorities define Chinese by race. In Siam and Indochina, on the other hand, 'Chinese' in official returns means members of the race who are not claimed as citizens of Siam or Indochina. Where these two countries are concerned we are therefore thrown back on estimates to establish our facts, and these estimates are often of the most conflicting nature.

162 128 The conflict of definition may, in the case of Siam, be gathered from the following sets of figures, Siamese and Chinese:

Siam: Population[1]

	B.E. 2462 (1919)	*B.E. 2472 (1929)*	*B.E. 2480 (1937)*
Total population	9,207,364	11,506,207	14,464,105
*Siamese	8,260,217	10,493,304	13,841,304
Chinese	260,194	445,274	524,062
Males	205,470	313,764	335,524
Females	54,724	131,510	188,538

* Inclusive of Chinese born in Siam, whose number in 1919 was 113,050.

As against this, the official *China Handbook* for 1937–43[2] gives the number of Chinese in Siam as 2·5 million, and the almost equally official *Chinese Year Book* for 1943[3] puts the figure at 3 million.

[1] Siam, Central Service of Statistics, *Statistical Year Book of the Kingdom of Siam, B.E. 2476–2477 (1933–5)* English-Siamese ed. (Bangkok, Department of Secretary-General of Council), and the same publication for *B.E. 2480 (1937–8)*.
[2] Compiled by the Chinese Ministry of Information.
[3] Compiled by the Council of International Affairs, Chungking.

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162 Although it cannot be doubted that the number of Chinese in Siam who may be regarded as such by reason of their appearance, dress, language, customs, education, and loyalty is far greater than the number allowed by the official Siamese figures, the exact figure cannot be arrived at. Of this fact the variation of 500,000 in the official Chinese Government figures for roughly the same period is sufficient indication. In the Siamese census of 1937 the number of *legal* Chinese is given as 524,062.[1] A competent observer put the number of *ethnic* Chinese in 1930 at 'at least a million':[2] [242] the Premier, Luang Pibul, in January 1940 said 'of the more than two million Chinese in this country over a million read the Thai language'.[3]

641 According to the Siamese law of citizenship, all children born in Siam were Siamese unless registered by their parents with the 162 legations and embassies of the Powers with which Siam had treaty relations as being nationals of those Powers. China and Siam, however, had no treaty relations until 1946, so that there were no embassies, legations, or consulates where the children could be registered. We find, therefore, that the children of Chinese born in Siam were included among the Siamese population. In B.E. 2472 (1929) the number of these was estimated to be 113,050.[4]

162 Taking the figure of the Chinese in Siam at about 2·5 million (which was probably not so far wrong for 1948), about half a million 361 of these live in Bangkok and its vicinity,[5] and the remainder are 463 scattered through the country, living in the towns rather than in rural communities and tending to concentrate in the more commercialized districts. In more recent times they have penetrated to the north. Some are to be found in the fishing villages along the

[1] The Siamese census of 1947 gave Chinese in Bangkok 284,519, Chinese in the provinces 508,172; total 792,691. These were Chinese holding aliens' registration certificates.

[2] Kenneth Perry Landon, *The Chinese in Thailand* (London and New York, Oxford University Press for the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941) p. 22, citing Reginald le May, *Siamese Tales Old and New* (London, Noel Douglas, 1930) p. 165.

[3] ibid. p. 23.

[4] See *Statistical Yearbook*, Thailand, no. 20. B.E. 2480 (1937–8) and B.E. 2481 (1938–9), p. 47, sect. III A. Population census, table 2, and Landon, op. cit. p. 21 ff.

[5] The 1929 census puts more than half the *legal* Chinese of Siam in this area, so that they made up about 40 per cent. of that city's total population and were said to constitute 76 per cent. of its working class. (See Leonard Unger, 'The Chinese in Southeast Asia', *Geographical Review* (April 1944), p. 205.) For 1947 figures see p. 3 fn. 2.

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coast. Their agricultural activities are largely confined to fruit and vegetable gardening near Bangkok and the cultivation of pepper and sugar in certain localities. In the Malay Peninsula of Siam they own some of the rubber and tapioca plantations.

A notable concentration of Chinese in southern Siam is made up principally of more recent immigrants. Here the Chinese work in the tin and tungsten mines, in the rubber plantations, and as shopkeepers and merchants in the towns and villages.[1] Disregarding distribution by political boundaries, the Chinese miners of southern Siam and of Tavoy constitute an extension of the group in the Malay States and in Bangka and Billiton.

The distribution of Chinese was by no means equal over the country. Already by the 1880s they formed half the population of the delta of the Menam,[2] with a heavy concentration round Bangkok; they were settled along the coasts in southern Siam, as abovementioned, but in most other parts they were extremely sparse. In 1932 there were only 14,933 Chinese (11,340 males and 3,593 females) in the two circles of Nakon Rajasima and Udon (composing northeast Siam), amounting to an insignificant proportion of little more than one-third of 1 per cent. of the total population (total population 3,887,000 for northeast Siam).[3] (Reginald le May in his authoritative book on northern Siam, *An Asian Arcady*,[4] does not mention the Chinese at all.)

The Chinese in Siam are closely associated with the rice industry. Before the war of 1942–5 they were reputed to own 80–90 per cent. of the country's rice-mills:[5] they had brokers and buyers all over

[1] 'This group, like its Chinese neighbours to the south, has been little assimilated by the indigenous peoples, perhaps as much because of the relatively primitive state of these people as of the recentness of the arrival of the Chinese.' Unger, op. cit. p. 205. The improvement of communications, the frequent passing to and from China, the lack of intermarriage, and the growth of nationalism are, perhaps, the more important causes.

[2] Holt S. Hallett, *A Thousand Miles on an Elephant in the Shan States* (London, William Blackwood, 1890) p. 460 (refers to 1884).

[3] *The Economic Conditions of North-Eastern Siam* (Bangkok, Ministry of Commerce and Communications, June 1932) p. 3. (Northeastern Siam covered nearly one-third of the country.)

[4] (Cambridge, Heffer, 1928.)

[5] Unger, op. cit. p. 204.

A list of the principal rice-mills in Bangkok and their owners on p. 90 of the *Commercial Directory for Siam*, 3rd ed. (Bangkok, Ministry of Commerce and Communications, 1929), shows that the 71 mills all have Chinese names, but 14 appear to have been owned by non-Chinese, including 6 owned by the Privy Purse Department. Those having a large capacity were practically all Chinese-owned.

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the rice-growing areas, and their larger buying centres were at the focus of water transport in the Menam delta. Almost without exception, the labour in the mills was also Chinese. There was a regular traffic in coolies between Bangkok and the Chinese port of Swatow, thousands coming and going in a single voyage.[1]

The Chinese had been visiting and dwelling in Siam for centuries, but their immigration in large numbers is a matter of only the last century. In the time of King Phra Narai (1656–88) there were only about 3,000 Chinese permanently settled in the country. They had been coming mostly overland from southern China, but in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries they arrived more and more by sea from Hainan and other adjacent mainland ports. From 1840 to 1850 Chinese immigration averaged 15,000 annually.[2] The increased flow in more recent years may be attributed to the expansion of Siam's export trade, to the Revolution of 1911 and the disordered state of China that ensued from it, and also to the barriers raised against the Chinese in French Indochina. The surplus of Chinese immigrants over emigrants in Siam from 1918 to 1929 was 400,000 and it is believed to have been even larger before the First World War.[3]

Let us now go back again for a century or so and note the estimates (necessarily guesses for the most part) made by foreign observers at various times. Crawfurd in 1821[4] estimated that of a total population of 2·79 million for Siam, 1·26 million were Siamese, 840,000 Laos, 195,000 Malays, 440,000 Chinese, and the remainder Cambodians, Peguans, Indians, and Portuguese. In 1828 Tomlin[5] puts the total population of Bangkok alone at 401,300, made up of 310,000 Chinese (paying tax),[6] 50,000 descendants of Chinese,

[1] *Commercial Directory* (above) p. 38.

[2] Virginia Thompson, Ph.D., *Thailand: the New Siam* (New York, Macmillan, 1941) p. 103.

Crawfurd says that the French writers of the period nowhere estimate the numbers at more than four or five thousand.

[3] ibid. p. 103–4.

[4] John Crawfurd, F.R.S., *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochinchina*, 2nd ed. (London, 1830) i. 224.

[5] Cited in *Journal of Three Voyages along the Coast of China in 1831, 1832, and 1833, with notices of Siam etc.*, by Charles (Karl) Gützlaff, 3rd ed. (London, 1840) p. 23, from p. 21 of Tomlin's *Journal of a Visit to Siam* (1828).

[6] The tax of about $3 'levied on every Chinaman on first entering the country and re-collected triennially exempts them from the half-yearly servitude required by the King from every other oriental stranger resident in Siam'. Gützlaff, p. 23.

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0,000 Burmans, 8,000 Siamese, 7,000 Laos, and various other races in smaller numbers.

Gützlaff says that the natives of China in his time came in great numbers from Chaou-chow-foo, the most eastern part of the Canton province (i.e. Teochius). These were mostly agriculturists; members of another tribe, the Kih or Ka (i.e. Khehs or Hakkas) consisted chiefly of artisans. Emigrants from the Tungan district of Fukien province were few and were mostly sailors or merchants. The Hainanese (Hailams) were chiefly pedlars or fishermen and formed 'perhaps the poorest, yet the most cheerful class'.[1]

According to Landon,[2] in 1890 it was roughly estimated that the total population of Siam was about 10 million, composed of over 3 million Siamese, 3 million Chinese, 1 million Malays, 1 million Cambodians, 1·3 million Laos, and about 400,000 Peguans, Karens, and other tribes. However, these estimates are undoubtedly much exaggerated. The total population of the country is given at a million more than it was by the census twenty years afterwards, and the number of Chinese, given at 3 million, even including every person who had the smallest drop of Chinese blood, must be much in excess of what it was in reality. But the estimate is worth including as a warning of the conjectural nature of most statistics regarding Siam, even in recent times.

Much more reasonable is Léon de Rosny's estimate for about 1884. He puts the total population of Siam at 5·9 million, including 1·6 million Siamese, 1·5 million Chinese, 1 million Malays, and 1 million Laos.[3] To Bangkok he gives a total of 404,000, with 200,000 Chinese and 120,000 Siamese.

MacNair quotes the estimate of more than 7 million total for Siam for 1909, of which 10 per cent. were Chinese. Of these,

[1] ibid. p. 71. Speaking of more recent times, Mr Lin Yu, in 'Twin Loyalties in Siam', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. ix, no. 2 (June 1936), says: 'While an accurate estimate is not possible, it is commonly accepted in Bangkok that 60 per cent. of these families are partly of Fukien stock which provided the earliest Chinese settlers in Siam, while another 10 per cent. trace back in part to the second group of Chinese settlers, the Cantonese. These groups are to be distinguished from the Swatow Chinese who now form the bulk of the Chinese community in Siam.'

See also Crawfurd, op. cit. pp. 221, 222.

[2] p. 21. Dr Landon derives this from M. Gaston Rautier in an article in the *Revue Française*, quoted by Holt S. Hallett, op. cit. p. 461.

[3] Léon de Rosny, *Le Peuple Siamois ou Thai* (Paris, Maisonneuve Frères, 1885) p. 116.

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[161] 200,000 Chinese were believed to have been resident in Bangkok.[1] The same author also gives some immigration figures which are 167 less conjectural. From 1912 to 1914 the inflow from Swatow to Bangkok was 143,957 and the outflow from Bangkok was 110,525; from Kiungchow (Hainan) the inflow was 27,809 and the figure for the reverse direction was 21,970. From Swatow the great majority of immigrants were almost certainly Teochius, and from Kiungchow it is probable that they were mostly Hailams, though there may have been some transhipment from mainland ports.

The whole nature of the Chinese element in Siam was changed by the immigration of Chinese women in large numbers. Up to about 1914 the Chinese male immigrants could not afford to bring their wives and they intermarried largely with the people of the country. In 1910 a Chinese woman was a rare sight in the streets of Bangkok; twenty years later there were hundreds of them to be [162] seen.[2] By 1937 the number of (China-born) Chinese females was, according to the census, 189,000 as compared with 336,000 (China-born) males. Thus in about seventeen years the females of pure Chinese race had risen in number from being an insignificant proportion of the community to more than half that of the males of the same category.

[163] It is interesting to compare the census figure of China-born females in 1937 with the number of Chinese born in Siam in 1929, namely 113,000.

[1] Harley Farnsworth MacNair, Ph.D., *The Chinese Abroad* (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1924) p. 47.

[2] Landon, op. cit. p. 20, citing Reginald le May, *Siamese Tales Old and New*, p. 165.

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CHAPTER X

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HISTORY PRIOR TO 1800

THE early history of the Burmese, the Siamese, and the Annamites is, briefly, that under the pressure of the Chinese they forsook the territory of west and south China and made their way southwards. Eventually the Burmese came to rest (perhaps because they could get no farther) in the valley of the Irrawaddy, the Siamese in the valley of the Chao Phya River, and the Annamites moved along the coast of the China Sea, some settling in present-day Tongking and Annam and others moving on to Cochinchina. By the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of the Christian era the founders of the Thai or Siamese nation had settled in the northern areas of what is now Siam. They found their new home inhabited by the negritos, whom they displaced. Other races they ejected or subjugated were the Khmer, Yuan, Lawa, and the Mon. By the time the Portuguese arrived Siamese influence extended to Singapore. Whether or not the Siamese and Chinese had a common origin is a speculation that does not belong to these pages; but their brothers, or cousins (if such they were), the Chinese, followed in the footsteps of the Siamese 'like their own shadows'[1]. For the 700 years of Siam's history the Chinese have been bound up with the life and trade of the country. 174

When Europeans penetrated the hinterland of Siam north of Ayuthia in the 1830s they found the Chinese overland trade well established there. This was in spite of the formidable natural obstacles—the mountains and the gorges of the Lantsan, the Lu Kiang, and the Lung Kong, which as we approach Shan territory assume the better-known names of the Mekong, Salween, and Shweli. 'With their characteristic churlishness', says Warington Smyth,[2] 'and with that deliberate attempt to hamper trade which these unmannerly rivers betray in all their movements, they stretch their deep valleys athwart the lines of communication. . . . It is curious what an effectual barrier this great river region has proved to communication between the Chinese and the Indian Empires.'[3] 175 439 487

[1] Landon, op. cit. p. 1.

[2] H. Warington Smyth, Director of the Department of Mines, Siam, *Five Years in Siam* (London, John Murray, 1898) ii. 139.

[3] See p. 135 regarding the failure of de Lagrée's mission of exploration of the upper Mekong in 1866.

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175 Yet there were Chinese caravan routes of ancient origin over which
487 the caravans came yearly into what we now know as the Shan
439 States and into Siam. Other routes led to Nan and Lampang in Siam and to Luang Prabang in what was to become French Indochina. The Chinese brought copper pots, silks, rock salt, tinsel, and lace, and took back to China copper, ivory, horns, and tea.

439 Of much less antiquity than the overland route, but dating back, nevertheless, for some centuries, was the seaborne trade. King
175 Phra Narai (1656–88) in his day established a fleet to carry on commerce with China. His junks at one time numbered more than 400, but when treaties began to be made with the European Powers in the nineteenth century, the number was reduced to less than 100 by the competition of European-owned steamers.[1]

175 Except for retrospective flashes in the Chinese dynastic histories, the history of the Chinese in Southeast Asia is, generally speaking, unrecorded until the arrival of the Europeans, and it seems to have lacked incident and even energy until the greedy and rowdy traders and adventurers of the West had arrived to cause a commotion in the languid pool of native life. The Portuguese, as usual in the East, were the first, arriving in 1518; the Dutch followed at a respectful interval in 1598, and the English came a few years after them, in 1612. As Portuguese enterprise and power dwindled, that of Holland waxed great. The Dutch blockaded the mouth of the Menam River to force a favourable treaty from the reluctant Siam. In 1664 the treaty was signed with the Dutch East India Company, but as the century went on the Siamese were alienated by the truculence of the Dutch merchants and after 1706 the Dutch-Siamese trade lapsed.

In the second half of the seventeenth century the Siamese capital, Ayuthia, was regarded as one of the most important trading centres in the Far East. King Phra Narai was himself the principal merchant in the kingdom. The French arrived in 1662, in the shape of a Roman Catholic mission sent with the support of Louis XIV to convert the whole of eastern Asia. Later there was an exchange of embassies between France and Siam. Meanwhile the French cause was aided by the active support of the Minister of Finance and agent in all foreign relations, Constantine Phaulcon, a Greek by birth, who belonged to that order of adventurer-statesmen

[1] Cited by Landon, op. cit. at p. 9 from *Siam*, by W. A. Graham (London, Alexander Moring, 1924) ii. 98–9.

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of alien race of which Marco Polo, John Law, and Disraeli were fellow members. Phaulcon was pro-French and discouraged the Dutch and English trade. This led to trouble and war seemed imminent. To protect Siam from the Dutch and English, the French in 1687 sent six warships and 1,400 soldiers to act as mercenaries in the service of Siam. At the crucial moment, in 1688, the Roman Catholic priests chose to seek the King's conversion by intensive tactics, but Phra Narai had no urge to save his soul. Fearing that the foreigners meant to subjugate their country, some Siamese nobles formed a plot against both the French and their own King. They killed Phaulcon and three possible successors to the throne, but Phra Narai, being on his death-bed, was allowed to die naturally. The *coup* ended in the departure of the French and the closing of the doors to foreign trade. Although individual Europeans continued to reside in Siam, diplomatic relations were not reopened with the European nations until the nineteenth century.[1]

Our knowledge of Siam from the seventeenth century onwards is derived from the accounts of seamen, merchants, diplomats, and missionaries. The first to give any consecutive account of the country is Joost (or Jobst) Schouten, Director of the Dutch East India Company from its establishment at Ayuthia in 1633.[2] On the way thither he passed the site of the future capital city of Bangkok which was to be founded in 1782. Schouten does not specifically mention the Chinese, but their existence in Ayuthia is to be inferred from the context and his description is a useful background to our extracts from other visitors later in the century. He says:

The city of Indica (Ayuthia); the Metropolis of the Kingdom, and seat of the King and the chief nobles, is situate upon the River Menam, in a little round island, encompassed with a thick stone wall, about six English miles round; the Suburbs are on the other side of the river,

[1] Luang Chun Kasikan and others, *Prawat Sat Syam*, 3rd ed. (Bangkok, Sri Heng Press, 1935) pp. 172–4, cited by Landon, *Siam in Transition* (London, Oxford University Press, 1939) p. 5.

[2] *A true description of the Mighty Kingdoms of Japan and Siam, written originally in Dutch by Francis Caron and Joost Schouten; and now rendered into English by Roger Manley* (London, Robert Boulter, 1671). (The account of Japan is by Caron and that of Siam (p. 121) is by Schouten.)

This same Joost Schouten was also at Malacca after its capture from the Portuguese in 1641 and has left an account. See Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 30.

Schouten's account of Ayuthia is at p. 124 of his work above.

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175 closely builded, and full of Temples and Cloysters, lying in a flat and fruitful country . . . there are all manner of China wares, Jewels, Gold, Benjamin, Wax, Sappang, Agerwood, Tin, and Lead, etc., and also a vast number of Hart-skins, one hundred and fifty thousand of these being caught yearly in this countrey, and sold with much profit to the Jappaners. They drive a great trade with all eating provisions, especially Rice, many thousand Tuns being transported yearly by Forrainers. The city by reason of its great traffick, is frequented by several Nations, as the Indians, the more Western Asiaticks, European Moors, and Christian Merchants. The King himself is also a merchant, and hath his own Ships and Factories trading to Choromandel and China, being for that cause more favoured and priviledged than any other Prince; he likewise trafficks to Pegue, Ava, Jogoma, Lans-Jang, and other places, besides his negotiations at home, all of which brings him in incredible profit, and no small disturbance to private Merchants, all of which do manifest the great trade that is carried on in this Countrey.[1]

'We may assume', says Credner, 'that the Bangkok mentioned by Schouten already had Chinese residents.'[2] In support of this he mentions that Engelbert Kaempfer in his map of the Menam of 1690 showed a special settlement of Chinese.[3] Certainly they must have been resident at Ayuthia, for not only does Kaempfer show their settlement in his plan but he also says specifically: 'It must be observed here that the several spots of ground, on which the Malayans, Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, Dutch and other nations live in Siam, and which are more particularly expressed in the annexed Plan of the King's Residence, are called Camps.' The Chinese Camp is in the plan located outside the city to the north-east.

[162] In the last decade but one of the seventeenth century there were probably not more than 3,000 Chinese permanently settled in Siam.[4] (The French observers never put them above 4,000–5,000.)

[1] cf. Sir Maurice Powicke, *Medieval England* (London, Oxford University Press, 1948) p. 120. '. . . the King [of England] tried to raise money by creating a monopoly for himself in the sale of English wool abroad, and from 1337 onwards he summoned assemblies of merchants to arrange in co-operation with them the methods by which the difficult operation could be carried out.'

[2] Wilhelm Credner, *Siam, Das Land der Thai* (Stuttgart, J. Engelhorns, 1935) p. 193.

[3] Engelbert Kaempfer, *The History of Japan. Together with a Description of the Kingdom of Siam, 1690–92* (Glasgow, James Maclehose, 1906).

[4] Cited by Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 104, from O. Frankfurter, *Siam Society Journal* (1904).

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In 1685 and 1686 an embassy from Louis XIV of France came to Siam. The ambassador, the Chevalier de Chaumont, and two others accompanying him, the Abbé de Choisy and the Comte de Forbin, have left accounts of their visit. De Chaumont[1] enumerates the races inhabiting the country—the Laos, eight or nine true Portuguese families but more than 100 *mesties* (Portuguese-Siamese Eurasians); the Dutch had one factory, the English the same, the Cochinchinese had about 100 families for the most part Christian, the Tongkingese seven or eight Christian families; the Malays were there in great numbers but were mostly slaves; there were Macassars, Javanese, Moors, Turks, Mogols, Golcondas, Bengalis, and Armenians. But, in this list, no Chinese! However, in another place the Chevalier says: 'It is only some Moors, Chinese, French, and English who live in the city; all the other nations are lodged in the suburbs by "Camps", that is to say all of one nation together.' The Abbé has nothing to say regarding the Chinese community as such, nor has the Comte de Forbin, the most lively and impressionable of the party, who, however, records a matter of great interest. On his return to France he had an audience of Louis XIV who asked him whether the French missionaries had converted many Siamese, and he had replied, 'Not a soul, sir'. Louis remarked that this did not agree with what Père Tachard had told Père Lachaise. Forbin, having narrated this, continues:

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> While I stayed in Siam several Chinese of great wit and learning confessed to me that they could not comprehend how people of one and the same faith, who had left their native country and made long sea voyages through such vast seas, could propose to convert pagans, while they themselves were not agreed in their conduct, some living with great modesty and charity, and others abandoning themselves to malice and strife, to call it by no worse name. This was the language of all Chinese with whom I talked.[2]

The embassy was received with elaborate entertainment concluding with a Chinese play. (Chaumont says it was a comedy; Choisy says it was a tragedy!) There were actors from Canton and others from Fukien: the Fukienese were the most magnificent and the most ceremonious. The Chinese started their posturing; there

[1] *Relation de l'ambassade de Monsieur le Chevalier de Chaumont à la Cour du Roy de Siam*, Archives curieuses de l'histoire de France, ser. 2.

[2] *Memoirs of the Count de Forbin, Commodore of the Navy of France* (translated from the French) (London, J. Pemberton, 1731) pp. 215, 227, 229, 231.

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were some Siamese also, but the Frenchmen could not understand a word they or the Chinese said. After the comedy there was a play by Chinese marionettes, but they 'did not approach those of Europe'. Regarding the music the Abbé was affected by it very much as Europeans visiting the East have been before and since—'La symphonie détestable, ce sont des chaudrons qu'on bat en cadence'.[1]

De la Loubère who was in Ayuthia about three years afterwards, in 1687 and 1688, during the troubles, also speaks in amusing terms of a theatrical performance:

> The one was a Chinese comedy, which I would willingly have seen to the end, but it was adjourned after some scenes to go to dinner. The Chinese comedians, whom the Siamese do love without understanding them, do speak in the throat. All their words are monosyllables, and I heard them not pronounce one single one, but with a new breath: some would say that it throttles them. One of the actors who represented a Magistrate walked so gravely that he trod first upon his heel, and then successively and slowly upon his heels and toes. . . .[2]

Father Tachard, mentioned above, whose impressions of the Chinese at Batavia are quoted in Part VII of this work, was in Siam with the embassy and has recorded his experiences. In his *Journal* he says:

> Since all the Nations are well received in Siam, and each is allowed to live in the free exercise of their religion, there is scarcely a single Nation that is not found there. The Chinese are the ones who do the most trade; besides that of China they also engage in that of Japan. . . . He [the Siamese King] hath also several Jonkos which are Chinese vessels, and are manned by Chinese. But though that nation brag that they have had the use of the compass for above two thousand years; yet they come very far short of the European in the art of navigation. They have no other instruments for sailing than the Lead or Sound. They keep reckoning as we do, and run some time upon such a point of wind, the currents, mountains, which they discover on Land, the colour, fineness, and mixture of the sand, with other experiences are the rules they go by.[3]

[1] *Journal du Voyage de Siam fait par M. l'abbé de Choisy, en 1685 et 1686* (Trévoux, 1741) p. 286.

[2] *A New Historical Relation of the Kingdom of Siam*, translated from the French of de la Loubère, by A. Gen (London, Thomas Horne, &c., 1693) p. 11.

[3] *Voyages de Siam des Pères Jésuites, envoyés par le Roy, aux Indes et à la Chine* (Amsterdam, Pierre Mortier, 1687) p. 177. Above translation from an English edition (London, 1688).

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According to de la Loubère, the population at this epoch was counted every year, and an exact account was kept of men, women, and children. The population of 1687 is given at 900,000 for all races. 'From which I question not', says de la Loubère, 'that some retrenchment is to be made for Vanity and Lyes; characters essential to the Eastern people; but on the other hand, thereunto must be added the Fugitives, which do seek a sanctuary in the woods against the Government.'[1]

Engelbert Kaempfer's description of Siam refers to the years 1690–2. Between the embassy of the Chevalier de Chaumont and this period there had been, in 1688, a court revolution in Siam with a change of dynasty. Faulcon or Phaulcon (or as he signed himself, Phaulkon), the Greek who had controlled the finances of the kingdom, fell from power and was imprisoned. Having been tortured and starved for fourteen days until he was reduced to a skeleton, he was beheaded. The French, who had under General des Fargues been placed in command of the fortress of Bangkok, were ejected from Siam. King Petracha who succeeded Phra Narai was strongly anti-foreign. About the same time Japan closed her doors to foreign trade, and the Japanese settlement at Ayuthia declined. But these happenings had little influence upon the fortunes of the Chinese resident in Siam.

The prestige of the Chinese civilization had for long been high in Siam, and a number of natives of China had reached important positions. Kaempfer in a list of the 'chief mandarins' mentions Peja Jummeraad, 'a learned Chinese', who was Chief Justice of Siam.[2] (Incidentally, two diverse institutions the Siamese had already adopted from the Chinese were the cangue (a movable pillory) and the cycle of sixty years.)[3]

Siam's history in the first half of the eighteenth century included a succession of plots and counter-plots in the court entourage, the mass elimination of pretenders to the throne and all their relatives, and revolts in the provinces, but at the same time the period was free from serious wars with the country's neighbours. The reign of King Boromakot (1730–58) was called the golden age of Siam. Then war with Burma broke out in 1759 and continued, between monsoon seasons, until 1767 when Ayuthia fell to the Burmese. The city was burned and the written records of Siamese history

[1] op. cit. p. 47.
[2] Kaempfer, op. cit. p. 38.
[3] ibid. p. 70.

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175 were lost. Whilst various aspirants for power struggled for ascendancy Siam remained in a state of disorder. Five years after the sack of Ayuthia, Phya Tak[1] shook off the Burmese yoke and set up his capital at Dhonburi, now a part of Bangkok.

[243] Tak Sin, the first King (1767–82) to unite the Siamese kingdom under his rule after the Burmese had destroyed the ancient capital, was of mixed Chinese-Siamese ancestry, his father having been a Chinese tax-farmer named Hai Hong. Indeed his Chinese blood was one of the factors (said his enemies) that made him unsuitable as a sovereign. A conspiracy was formed against him, he was dethroned, and afterwards put to death. The new King, Chao Phya Chakri (1782–1809), founded the Chakri dynasty, which was still reigning in 1950, and established the city of Bangkok on the site of a Chinese settlement which was removed to Sampeng. He was a son-in-law of Phya Tak and had been given a Chinese name in addition to his Siamese name. It is said that the Chakri family has itself an admixture of Chinese blood, and certainly there were Chinese women in the harems of the later Kings.[2]

In 1733 a Chinese rising had taken place and 300 Chinese had attacked the palace. They were, however, dispersed and forty of their ringleaders were captured and executed.[3] But in spite of this departure from the good manners expected of guests, the Chinese retained their position in Siamese society, so that the French historian Turpin could refer to them in the third quarter of the century in these words: 'The Chinese colony is the most numerous and flourishing by the extent of its commerce, and by the privileges which it enjoys. Its compliance with received customs, a certain conformity of character and manners, seem to ensure it a continuance of its privileges and prosperity.'[4]

[1] He is variously called Pin Tat, Tia Sin Tat, Tay Cheow, or Tak Cheo. His personal name was Sin. He was later called Lord of Tak (a town). (Landon, op. cit. p. 7.)

[2] Landon, *The Chinese in Thailand*, p. 8.

[3] W. A. R. Wood, *A History of Siam* (London, Fisher Unwin, 1926) p. 232.

[4] M. Turpin, *Histoire civile et naturelle du Royaume de Siam* (Paris, Costard, 1771) p. 9.

A translation of the above is in Pinkerton's *General Collection of the best and most interesting voyages and travels* (London, 1808–14) xi. 426–572.

[439] Rice was for very long a staple article of commerce between China and Siam. In 1722 the Emperor ordered 300,000 piculs (18,000 tons) of rice to be imported from Siam. Although the relaxations of the restrictions on the export of copper from China to Siam could not be obtained, the rice trade continued. In 1751 any Chinese bringing 2,000 piculs of rice to China from Siam was rewarded with a

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Turpin's anticipation was justified for at least another century and a half, after which the irony of circumstances arising from the birth of nationalism caused the Chinese to be regarded as a foreign and schismatic element in the Siamese nation. 175

mandarin's button. William Nunn, 'Some Notes upon the Development of the Commerce of Siam', *Journal of the Siam Society*, vol. xv, pt. 2, p. 82.

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CHAPTER XI

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: FIRST HALF

167 As in the other countries of Southeast Asia, the Chinese immigrants into Siam until the beginning of the twentieth century, and even during its first two decades, were mostly males. The majority of them were small traders, and of these a number had been sailors, fishermen, and peasants before their coming to Siam. They owned no land on their arrival—but land or no land they would have found trade more profitable. They were readily assimilated for they married Siamese women and their children were brought up as Siamese. The children of these marriages were called *Lukchin*, and were proud of their Chinese blood. Supplying the energy and the initiative that the Siamese lacked, they were welcomed and received favoured treatment from the Government, especially in the days of intense anti-European feeling among the Siamese.[1] Assimilation, too, was made easier by the racial similarity of the Chinese and Siamese which was greater than that of the Chinese and any other race in Southeast Asia. In the second or third generation the immigrants were completely absorbed and considered themselves as Siamese. Indeed they would have been insulted to have been called Chinese, since the Siamese were the ruling race and the Chinese were their social inferiors. 'The typical merchant of Siam', says Kumut Chandruang, 'usually had Chinese blood, and his grandfather was very likely a pure Chinese. He may still worship his ancestors by burning gold paper, but his sons have gone to Siamese schools and learned to write on their slates in both languages. The third generation do not remember Chinese; many of them have changed their family names and forgotten their family origin.'[2]

In the nineteenth century Siam, 'under a debasing tyranny, destitute of arts and commerce, alike, offered a fair field for the development of their superiority', says Finlayson[3] writing in the 1820s.

From the early 1820s onwards a number of alert European

[1] Landon, op. cit. p. 11; Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 104.

[2] Quoted by Landon at p. 11 from 'Young Siam in the New World', by Kumut Chandruang, *Asia* (May 1939).

[3] G. Finlayson, *The Mission to Siam and Hué* (London, Murray, 1826) p. 167.

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From the early 1820s onwards a number of alert European observers began to penetrate the seclusion of remote Siam and several have bequeathed us their impressions. One of these is Captain Burney who carried out a series of missions to Siam mostly in connexion with the problems of relationship between that country and Britain, arising from the latter's occupation of the island of Penang in 1786 and Singapore in 1819. He was naturally more concerned with southern Siam with its predominantly Malay population than with the north. He found that the Chinese in this region were engaging in the same sort of nefarious traffic that they were carrying on at the same time, or a little later, in the islands and the coastal region of western Sumatra.[1] There were in 1826 in almost every part of the Siamese dominions hundreds of Malays and natives of India who were most anxious, but unable, to return to their countries. Burney found that it was a common practice for the Chinese to seize Malays who happened to be on board their junks at Penang or Malacca, Java, and other places and to bring them to Siam as slaves.[2] He was also concerned with the apprehension of criminals who had fled from Penang to Kedah. One of them, Tucang Chu-koor, the Chinese monopoly farmer at Kuala Muda, against whom the Governor of Penang had preferred a charge, was arrested by the Siamese and confined in a cangue for several months.[3]

There is also included among the Burney papers an appreciation of the Chinese character written by Major James Low. Major Low was closely associated with Malaya and his writings are more than once referred to in Part V of this study, but it will be convenient to insert the character sketch here since it applies as much to the Chinese he met in the Siamese territory of Kedah, &c., as it does to the Chinese in the Straits Settlements.

Low's considered opinion of the Chinese is this:

> They are a time-serving people, and unlike the Indo-Chinese tribes around them, they seem to be very deficient in imagination, and therefore less disposed than these to give way to theoretical impulses. Their understandings are pretty sure guides to their interests, and they perceive at a glance that the latter and any assumption of political power in the countries they have settled in are things at complete variance with each other. But unwilling as they may be to turn Rulers, where nothing

[1] See p. 496.
[2] *The Burney Papers* (Bangkok, Vajiranana National Library, 1910) i. 95. (Originals in the India Office, London.)
[3] ibid. ii. 7.

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18 could be obtained or be put in competition with their mercantile gains, they do not seem to be at all averse to intrigue with one or even with both, so that whatever be the result their interests may continue unaffected. It need not be added that the real leaning in such a case will be to the stronger party, although the weaker will be cajoled by promises and aided by supplies and arms, the sale of which at high profits they can easily effect. I have had personal opportunities of knowing this to be true. Keeping these traits in view as checks to an over confidence in Chinese political fidelity, it may safely be pronounced that as settlers they are eminently valuable in new countries on account of their unceasing and well directed industry, their enterprise as traders, their luxurious habits which swell the revenue by the consumption of taxable commodities, and lastly perhaps because their physical powers of endurance exceed those possessed by the Malays and the other Indo-Chinese people.[1]

A shrewd appraisal if ever there was one, and deficient only in the respect that it is purely an objective one from the point of view of the usefulness or otherwise of the Chinese to the ruling Power, in this case Britain, and takes no account of what the Chinese felt about it all or why they felt it. This limitation we shall find everywhere in perusal of European opinion of the Chinese in Southeast Asia through the course of three and a half centuries.

John Crawfurd, the associate of Raffles, appears a number of times in these pages and whatever his merits as an administrator or diplomat, he was certainly a keen and, usually, accurate observer. The following is his impression of the Chinese in Siam in the early 1820s:

The Chinese settlers in the Siamese territory are chiefly immigrants from the provinces of Canton and Fukien; but there is also a considerable number from the island of Hainan and some from Chekiang and Kiangnan. The few immigrants from Yunnan are confined to the northern parts of Laos. . . . The Chinese resort to Siam and other foreign countries, unaccompanied by their families. They soon intermarry with the Siamese, there being no scruple on either side. They even adopt, whatever may have been their religion before, or whether they had any or not, the Buddhist form of worship, visiting the Siamese temples, and giving the usual alms to the priests. A few even enter the priesthood, although the mode of life is by no means congenial to their industrious

[1] *A Retrospect of British Policy in the Straits of Malacca from the period of the First Establishment of Penang on 17 July 1786 up to April 1842*, by Major James Low, 46th Regt. Madras Native Infantry, printed in the *Burney Papers* (1914) i. 1. 105.

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and active character. What is probably more remarkable, they forego 18
their partiality for costly sepulchral monuments, burying their dead like the Siamese. . . . They invariably dress, however, in the costume of their own country. Every male amongst them above the age of twenty, pays a capitation tax. The number assessed to this tax at Bangkok and its vicinity, was stated to me at 21,000. Indeed it is commonly computed that half the population of the capital is composed of Chinese. . . .[1]

As is usual with foreign observers, Crawfurd is keenly interested [162]
in the statistics of the matter. He was informed that the total number of Chinese in Siamese territory, Malay States excluded, was 100,000. The Chinese settlers within the territory of the Malay States, 'engaged in traffic or in working in gold or tin' were estimated at 20,000. 'An intelligent Chinese' told him that 'pestilence was necessary for keeping down population now that wars had ceased'. 'No other Asiatic but a Chinese', remarks Crawfurd, 'would have thought of expressing himself in such language.' (This early Chinese Malthusian was a trifle optimistic regarding the cessation of wars!) Pestilence certainly was very active in Siam, and in 1849, [165]
for example, 1,500 deaths a day occurred at Bangkok during the cholera epidemic, the river being thick with floating bodies. Siam was in any case a sparsely populated country and what with the ravages of ill-nourishment and disease it would have been more sparsely populated still had it not been for the Chinese. Referring to the number of Chinese, Crawfurd says: 'This shows an extraordinary increase since the close of the seventeenth century, for I find that the French writers nowhere estimate the numbers at more than four or five thousand.'

Crawfurd also affords us a minute on the subject of Siamese- 175
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centuries which throws considerable light on the questions (dis- 139
puted as late as 1917) of imperial suzerainty and a vassal's tribute. The matter was so arranged then that the vanity of the Chinese Emperors gave them the nominal overlordship over the kingdom of the Southern Ocean, whilst the cupidity of the Siamese sovereign was simultaneously assuaged:

The connection of the Siamese with the Chinese nation, although ostensibly political, is in fact purely of a commercial nature. The terri-

[1] *Journal of an Embassy to the Courts of Siam and Cochin-China* (London, 1828), p. 450. [I have modernized Crawfurd's spelling of place-names to avoid confusion. V. P.]

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tories, indeed, border upon each other, but in remote and thinly populated parts of both. These are the Kingdom of Lao on the one side, and the Chinese province of Yunnan on the other. Here some traffic is carried on between them, and a considerable number of Chinese of Yunnan have settled at Lanchang, the capital of Lao, and the other towns in the country. But the great intercourse is generally maritime and such as I have already described. The King of Siam, although the circumstances be not generally known, acknowledged himself a tributary of the Emperor of China. His doing so does not arise from any particular necessity or consideration, or out of any actual dependence of Siam upon China, but altogether from this mercenary motive, that the vessels which carry the ambassadors may, under pretext of doing so, be exempted from the payment of all imposts. With this view two of the largest descriptions of junks, amounting to nearly one thousand tons each, sail annually from Bangkok to Canton loaded with merchandize. They carry ambassadors annually to the Vice Roy of Canton and, once in three years, these ambassadors go to Pekin, an honour, however, of which they are not considered worthy until they receive a title of Chinese nobility from the Vice Roy and assume the costume of the Chinese. They carry the Chinese Emperor a golden flower in token of tribute, but receive in return gifts to a far greater value. The vanity of the one court and the rapacity of the other have long rendered this course a permanent one.[1]

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Our next report on the Chinese is from Karl Friedrich August Gützlaff, the first Protestant missionary in Siam, of whose observations we have already had occasion to make use. Mr Gützlaff, we feel, is not of a particularly tolerant disposition and regards the Oriental races generally with the same distaste as did his notable contemporary, Dr Morrison, in China and Malaya.

The Chinese, Mr Gützlaff informs us,

delight to live in wretchedness and filth, and are very anxious to conform to the servile habits of the Siamese. In some cases when they enter into matrimonial alliance with the latter, they even throw away their jackets and trousers, and become Siamese in every respect. As the lax, indifferent religious principles of the Chinese do not differ from those of the Siamese, the former are very prone to conform to the religious rites of the latter. And if they have children, they frequently cut off their queues and become for a certain time priests. Within two or three generations, all the distinguishing marks of the Chinese dwindle entirely

[1] *The Crawfurd Papers: a Collection of Official Records relating to the Mission of Dr John Crawfurd sent to Siam by the Government of India in the year 1821* (Bangkok, Vajiranana National Library, 1915) p. 147.

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away; and a nation which adheres to its national customs so obstinately becomes wholly changed to Siamese. 18 177

These descendants of Chinese, Gützlaff tells us, usually neglect the literature of their paternal country and apply themselves to that of Siam. To them nothing is so welcome as being presented by the King with an honorary title, 'and this generally takes place when they have acquired great riches or betrayed some of their own countrymen'. From this moment they become slaves of the King, the more so if they are made his officers. No service to them is so menial, so expensive, so difficult but that they are forced to perform it. And in the case of disobedience they are severely punished and perhaps put in chains for the rest of their lives. 'With the exception of the *Hwuy Hwuy*, or Triad Society, implicit obedience is paid to their most exorbitant demands [those of the Siamese] by every Chinese settler.'

In spite of the deliberate refusal of the Chinese to involve themselves in any political responsibility, as Low has described, their 669 policy of subservience and obsequiousness to the ruling race or party, and their passivity under ill usage, there was occasionally a time when they were driven to revolt. There had been one rising, as we have seen, in 1733; in 1824 the Chinese at Chantaburi rebelled, and this was followed by other risings of their countrymen at Nakon Chaisri in 1842 and 1847, at Langsuen, and at Chengsao in 1848;[1] we shall read of another rebellion in 1847 later on. In the 1820s or early 1830s (the date is uncertain) a conspiracy was formed by the Triad Society. Some Chinese of this society seized some native craft at Blampasoi near the mouth of the Menam and 'began to avenge themselves upon their tyrants', but, falling short of provisions, they were chased by a small Siamese squadron, and beset by contrary winds and lacking the necessities of life, they had to surrender. The ringleader escaped to Cochinchina, but his followers were either massacred or sent to prison for life. A great many individuals (says Gützlaff) 'hope that the English (according to their own expression) will extend their benevolent government as far as Siam. Every arrival of a ship enlivens their expectations: every departure damps their joy'.[2]

Our next notable informant is George Windsor Earl who sailed the seas as a merchant from 1832 to 1834. His impressions of the 396

[1] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 32.

[2] Gützlaff, op. cit. p. 73.

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396 Chinese in Borneo and Malaya are mentioned in the appropriate place in this survey.[1] When Earl arrived at Bangkok about an hour before daybreak on 10 March 1833, he found in the lower part of the port that, notwithstanding the earliness of the hour, vast numbers of Chinese blacksmiths were busily employed forging ironwork, probably for the junks that were being built on the banks of the river. He tells us that there were then about half a million Chinese in Siam, and that they 'possess all the mechanical employments' (a locution, by the way, which is often found in books of the period
439 and is enough to date them). They were engaged in junk-building, making *quallies*, or iron pans, which latter were exported in large
396 quantities all over Asia. Chinese junks used in foreign trade were usually built in countries where wood was plentiful. Earl supposed that a junk could be built more cheaply at Bangkok than at any other place in 'India' (in which term he undoubtedly included the whole of Southeast Asia).

000 He remarks, however, that the Siamese empire was 'apparently in a decline', an observation which agrees with that of other visitors to the country.[2]

18 In any anthology of character sketches of the Chinese the vignette of Captain Sherard Osborn would deserve a place. It refers to a visit to Kangar, Perlis, in the late 1830s:[3]

> A few Chinese, the Jews of the Eastern Archipelago, were there also. They were so obsequious, so anxious to attract the attention of a British midshipman, that he, with all the dignity of that proud caste, allowed them to change a dollar for him. The Chinese were mostly money-changers. The insolent contumely they endured at the hands of the Malays struck me very much. The natives when ill-treated, chattered like a nest of rooks. Not so the Chinese: they bore it with cringing and shrinking; one could see, by the twinkle of their little glittering eyes that they only abided their time to bite the heel that bruised them.

But he gives the other side of the medal in a footnote in the shape of the time-honoured tribute to the industry of the Chinese race: 'It is but justice to these industrious emigrants to say that they are invaluable as labourers, agriculturists, artisans, and merchants

[1] See pp. 492, 493.

[2] George Windsor Earl, *The Eastern Seas, or Voyages and Discoveries in the Indian Archipelago in 1832–33–34* (London, W. H. Allen, 1837) p. 159.

[3] Captain Sherard Osborn, *Quedah, or Stray Leaves from a Journal in Malayan Waters* (London, 1855, new ed. 1865) p. 216 ff.

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throughout our colonies; and better conducted subjects Her Majesty Queen Victoria nowhere possesses.' 18

Most of the Chinese who rendered exceptional service to Siam before the middle of the nineteenth century are anonymous, but one exception is Lim Hoi, a Cantonese merchant resident at Thalang in Junk Ceylon. He was returning from Penang where he had been on business when he caught sight of a Burmese sailing vessel. Something about it aroused his suspicion and he attacked and captured it. Whilst examining its contents he came across a Burmese official letter addressed to the Raja of Kedah. He thereupon brought the boat and the crew to Thalang and made them over to the Governor. The official forwarded the letter and prisoners, together with Lim Hoi, to Bangkok. Here the letter was translated and proved to be an instigation by the Burmese of the Raja of Kedah to rebel against the King of Siam. The King suitably rewarded Lim Hoi and appointed him Luang Raja, 'Capitan' of the Chinese, and chief collector of the royalty on tin mines on Junk Ceylon Island. This appointment evidently included not only the tin-smelting monopoly already in existence from the last quarter of the eighteenth century, but also the collection of crown dues on the net produce.[1] 175 [65]

Diplomatic missions to Siam and Burma were fairly frequent during the century, and Crawfurd, Finlayson, Bowring, and Roberts have left their impressions in their reports or memoirs. Mr Edmund Roberts was the American envoy who visited a number of countries on behalf of his Government in 1835, 1836, and 1837. Dr Ruschenberger, his medical officer and historian, gives us a number of interesting facts about the Siam of the period. He notes, as Earl had done, the Chinese junks in the river at Bangkok; a row of these vessels of from 200 to 600 tons burden each were at anchor in the middle of the stream, and the line extended for more than two miles. Here they often remained for months, retailing their cargoes. They were kept, he says, 'in a most filthy condition'. In 1836, Ruschenberger estimates, there were over 400,000 Chinese in Bangkok out of a total population of 500,000. They were chiefly Teochius, but there were also Cantonese and Hailams (Hainanese) and some from Shanghai. About 30 to 80 junks annually visited the port. [66]

Ruschenberger, too, gives us our first glimpse of the education 000

[1] *Journal of the Siam Society*, vol. i, pt. 2 (1904) pp. 202–3.

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871 Ruschenberger too, gives us our first glimpse of the education of Chinese children in Siam, though we can safely assume that the better-off families, at least, gave their boys a grounding in the Four Books, the Trimetrical Classic, &c., just as we know they did in Batavia in the sixteenth century. The schools referred to were almost certainly missionary schools, and Mr Gützlaff no doubt took a leading share in their establishment:

> Two or three schools have been begun here for Chinese children, and are now in operation, but there is much difficulty in organizing and sustaining them, for the reason that Chinamen here have Siamese, Burman, Laos, and even other country women for mothers, whose prejudices are even stronger than that [*sic*] of the Chinese themselves.[1]

291 The same authority describes the Chinese in Siam as easily
302 distinguishable by their complexion, being more yellow than the Siamese, 'but they have generally *docked* the *entail* to their heads, and dress à la Siamese, with a circle of hair on the *roof*. But few of the "long Tails", the distinguishing appanage to a Chinaman's head, are to be seen.' Sandals were worn by the Chinese only.

439 The Bangkok Chinese imported brassware and silk stuffs from
302 China and Surat, and their cotton and woollen goods were princip-
792 ally from Singapore. Even the Talapoys'[2] (Buddhist priests') razors for shaving their heads were imported from Canton. They were made of thin brass of curved shape, two inches wide throughout, and six inches long, fitted with a coarse wooden handle.

651 Except in the case of debt, the Chinese were exempted from labour on the public works by paying the triennial tax of 4½ ticals. Some say (Ruschenberger records) that this tax was collected annually.

525 As at all times in their history, the Blackhaired Race were observed in Siam in the 1830s to gamble to excess.

439 Dr Ruschenberger adds his contribution to the long arraignment of the Chinese abroad for their lack of honesty. The Chinese, says he, 'who are noted everywhere for their villanous tricks', import large quantities of ordinary goods here, as well as good quality goods, including tea. The tea was bought up again after use and 'fired anew'. It was coloured green by the use of smalts and exported.[3]

[1] W. S. W. Ruschenberger, M.D., *Narrative of a Voyage Round the World, during the years 1835, 36, and 37, including a narrative of an Embassy to the Sultan of Muscat and the King of Siam* (London, Bentley, 1838) p. 280 ff.

[2] Sometimes spelt Talapoin.

[3] op. cit. p. 287.

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About 1840 we have another set of statistics of the population of Bangkok offered us, and it seems to have little relation to those of Crawfurd, Gützlaff, &c. The total is put at 350,000 by Mr Neale, with 240,000 Siamese, 70,000 Chinese, 20,000 Burmans, and 20,000 Arabs and Indians. Ruschenberger and Neale must have had a very different eye for counting heads, and a very different notion of what a Chinese was since their estimates of 400,000 and 70,000 refer to periods little removed one from the other.[1] 162

According to Neale, many Chinese who had settled and married in Siam had reaped immense wealth from sugar plantations they possessed in the interior; others were occupied in the cultivation of tobacco and several kinds of cotton, and a few made a living by collecting a gum used as incense. Gamboge, sapan wood, and other valuable products were all brought from the interior to Bangkok where, being weighed and taxed, they were retailed to the more opulent merchants established in the city, and by the latter shipped to Singapore, Bombay, and England.[2] 442 439 463

These impressions of the Chinese in the several countries have a great sameness, but a trend of development is observable through them as the years go on. The diversions and ritual of the Chinese, too, have a strangely static quality; the gambling, the burning of gold paper, the weddings, the funerals, vary scarcely a tittle from country to country and from century to century. Chinese theatricals and music are, of course, uniformly unpleasing to the European ear. As the Abbé de Choisy was affected by these in 1685, and the German, A. Bastian, in 1863,[3] so was Frederick Arthur Neale affected in about 1840. 'The first Chinese play I ever witnessed', he records, 'and certainly the last I should ever wish to see, for methinks a continuation of such noises for a succession of nights would render me unfit for anything but Hanwell, Bedlam always excepted.'[4] 178

Siam, although on the eve of the penetration by the West, was still an isolated State ruled by an absolute monarchy. The Chinese had already got their hands on to a great deal of economic power, but in an absolute State political power prevails over economic in a way that it cannot do in a democratic society. In the latter case, 642

[1] Frederick Arthur Neale, *Narrative of a Residence in Siam* (London, National Illustrated Library, 1852) p. 30 (refers to period *c.* 1840).

[2] Neale, op. cit. p. 69.

[3] Dr Adolf Bastian, *Der Völker der Östlichen Asien: Reisen im Siam im Jahre 1863* (Jena, 1867) iv. 354.

[4] op. cit. p. 95.

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however harshly the Government bears on private enterprise and however great the taxation, the capitalist can nearly always recoup himself, at least in part, for his losses: in an absolute State like Siam, with the monarch not only a ruler but also a monopolist and competitor, the Chinese merchant and middleman was very much at the mercy of the despot's greed or caprice. Thus 'The Chinese cringed before their oppressors, paid a heavy tax for being exempted from military and *corvée* services, and laboured from morning to night to feed their insolent and haughty tyrants, who thought it beneath their dignity to earn their bread by their own efforts'.[1]

The Chinese, as we have so frequently seen, are a long-suffering race but are liable when driven to extremity by an affront to their pride, or (more easily) by an injury to their interests, to riot or even to rebel. We have heard of the insurrection of 1733 and of several other smaller risings, and the Triad disturbances of the early 1830s, and now in 1847 they rose once again against their Siamese oppressors.

The occasion for the rising was the levying of a new tax on sugar refineries (or 'boilers'). The Chinese had created and had come to control a now-flourishing sugar industry. The insurgents seized the Governor of Petriu and decapitated him. Siamese troops sent to subjugate them exhibited great poltroonery against the enemy who were now besieged in a fort at Leukonchesi. The besieged garrisons were wholly ignorant of the art of war and the only ammunition they had to fire at the Siamese troops was *beans*! But notwithstanding the fact that the hardy regulars were for a while demoralized by the shower of vegetables, the gates of the city were finally destroyed. Elephants were sent out, and a general massacre of unresisting men, women, and children took place. 'It is supposed that a general rising was intended; and it is very doubtful whether the Siamese Government could have maintained itself against any very extensive combination.'[2]

The insurrection had failed and soon all was quiet again. The Chinese resumed their wonted air of submission—or at least of bland acquiescence or noncommittal blankness. There were still many compensations left to them for their lack of political power or ability to redress the grievances inflicted by an arbitrary author-

[1] Gützlaff, op. cit. pp. 29, 30.

[2] Sir John Bowring, *The Kingdom and People of Siam* (London, J. W. Parkes, 1857) i. 86.

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ity. A minority identified themselves[1] so successfully with their masters that they achieved noble rank and positions of profit, and a majority were so well off that it could be said of them a few years later that 'they were still the most privileged class in the country, *as was shown by the number of Siamese who had cultivated a queue in order to pass for Chinese*'![1]

[1] M. L. Cort, *Siam, or The Heart of Further India* (New York, Randolph, 1866) p. 33, quoted by Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 106.

1 [i.e, the Chinese -- Analyst]

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CHAPTER XII

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: SECOND HALF

175 OWING to the weakness of China as a Power, her self-centredness and ignorance of the world beyond her frontiers, and her indifference to the fate of her traders and vagrant children beyond the mountains or the seas, the diplomatic history of Burma, Siam, Indochina, and the other countries of Southeast Asia belongs in the nineteenth century to the European nations. All the while that great events were happening, and revolutions taking place in trade and politics, the Chinese in these countries were never making innovations but were ever adapting their behaviour to the changing circumstances of living and trade. So whilst the course of international relations contains scarcely a mention of them, it is necessary to consult the record of the diplomatic weather to understand why and how the Chinese spread or trimmed their sails, dropped anchor, or ran for shelter in the alternations of fair wind, calm, or storm.

648 The history of modern Siam may be said to begin with the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce concluded with Great Britain in 1855. There had been previous treaties, but this one, negotiated by Sir John Bowring, was of key importance and was followed by similar treaties with other Powers. The treaty provided for extraterritorial consular jurisdiction for British subjects and it included commercial regulations that were to transform Siamese [651] trade. Some of these were to affect the Chinese merchants and revenue farmers directly. Previous to the treaty, duties were paid on all imports with the exception of opium, the import of which was forbidden. Opium was now put on the free list, with bullion and personal effects, and a limit of dues of 3 per cent. *ad valorem* was [477] placed on all imports. Monopolies were abolished by the treaty, but that of opium for some reason still remained, as Bowring himself tells us, and this to the great profit of the Chinese who possessed it. Presumably foreign merchants, including British, imported opium and sold it to the monopolist. The effect of the abolition of the other monopolies upon the Chinese is not clear, but they, including the holder of the ninety-odd monopolies mentioned by Bowring, had to find new channels for their energies.

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Whether these new channels were advantageous or otherwise for the people of Siam would depend on the enlightenment of Government policy rather than upon the Chinese, who, having no executive power, felt no political responsibilities and were opportunists. In 1900 the abolition of the revenue farms in the Netherlands Indies led to Chinese capital being employed in constructive rather than parasitic undertakings, but in Siam in 1855 the net result would appear to have been that the import business, previously the monopoly of the King or his farmers, became shared and eventually controlled by British and other European merchants. The Chinese would thus to a further extent be thrown back on their role of middlemen, but they retained the monopoly of rice and, later on, had large holdings in tin and rubber. After the making of the treaties with the European Powers, the China trade did not thrive and, as has been remarked, the competition of European-owned steamers reduced the fleet of over 400 junks to fewer than 100.[1]

In 1828 Robert Hunter, the first British merchant in Siam—the first, at least, for a century or so—arrived in Bangkok. A timely gift to the King of 1,000 muskets earned him the right to remain and trade. For long he was the only European merchant. The native commerce was at that time so completely in the hands of the Chinese that the only profitable business to be done, Hunter found, was with the court. He had sidelines, however, one of which was importing opium for sale to the Chinese.

The historian of the Chinese in Southeast Asia has constantly to be on the look out for contradictions and inconsistencies, apparent or real, in the accounts of contemporary European observers. In describing the character, the virtues, and vices of this race it has been justly remarked that no two writers agree. We can detect discrepancies of a less emphatic sort in the accounts given of the degree and speed of assimilation of the Chinese in Siam to the natives of the country. Sir John Bowring, for instance, remarks that the children of Chinese men and Siamese women are 'invariably educated to the Chinese type', and again 'the father alone seems to model the child's nature and education'.[2] How are we to reconcile this with Gutzlaff's assertion (see pp. 122–3 *ante*) that

[1] W. A. Graham, *Siam* (London, Alexander Moring, 1924) i. 209. Graham says that before 1890 the junks had entirely disappeared, but this is an exaggeration. They survive in small numbers to this day.

[2] op. cit. p. 85.

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114 'within two or three generations, all the distinguishing marks of the Chinese dwindle entirely away; and a nation which adheres to its national customs so obstinately becomes wholly changed to Siamese'?

In attaching a value to the two pieces of evidence, we must remember in the first place that Sir John Bowring (1792–1859), although a polyglot, was fifty-seven before he went to the East and sixty-three when he first visited Siam, whereas Gützlaff (1803–51) went to Siam when he was twenty-five,[1] so his observations were over a longer space of time. Both Bowring and Gützlaff possessed, it appears, a knowledge of the Chinese and Siamese languages. Allowing for this, it would seem that both observers are, according to their perspectives, right. Bowring is quite correct when he notes the dominance of the father's culture over that of the mother, and Gützlaff himself (p. 126 of this survey) admits the difficulty of establishing schools for the Chinese because of the Siamese, Burmese, or Laos wives of Chinese whose prejudices (presumably in favour of their husband's civilization) are 'stronger than that of the Chinese
186 themselves'. It would seem, then, that what we are witnessing is *in the first generation* the obstinate refusal of the Chinese system to
177 yield to the native one, but fighting nevertheless a losing battle: the struggle continues in the second generation, though with diminishing intensity, and finally in the third generation the battle is lost and the native culture prevails.[2]

171 In Malaya and Indonesia we do not witness a similar process. The Babas of Malacca, descendants of Chinese who intermarried
177 with Malays and other Malaysians, retained their Chinese customs and religion whilst losing their language.[3] In Indonesia the Dutch
186 policy of segregation of the races helped the Indonesian-born Chinese to retain their own culture in spite of intermarriage. In Annam the culture was already essentially Chinese in nature so

[1] *Dictionary of National Biography* (London, Oxford University Press, 1891).

[2] A woman of character would be able to influence her husband in either direction. Dr Landon cites *An English Governess at the Siamese Court*, by Anna H. Leonowens (Boston, Fields, Osgood & Co., 1870) p. 247, regarding a Chinese girl of the harem of the fourth king of the Chakri dynasty who was the only woman who ever managed him, 'She was hardly pretty, but well-formed, and of versatile tact, totally uneducated, of barely respectable birth,—being Chinese on her father's side,—yet withal endowed with a naïve intuitive appreciation of character.'

[3] But see Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, pp. 37, 61, &c., and Appendix, 'The Baba Language', pp. 293–5.

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that miscegenation had little effect on the customs and religion of the offspring.

The whole question is of paramount importance to our study and discussion of it will be resumed at a later stage, but as we follow the career of the colonial Chinese in Siam in something approaching chronological sequence it is necessary to be aware of the processes that are in train.

The changes in store for Siam as a country as the result of European encroachment were to affect the Chinese as greatly as, and in some respects more immediately than, the Siamese. A treaty with Britain abolished the whole system of monopolies and established free trade from the month of April 1856. Bowring witnessed the demeanour of a Chinese of enormous wealth among prostrate Siamese nobles when the article in question was read out to the court. He owned the opium and ninety other monopolies. 'He bowed his head in silence, but looked as if a hundred thunderstorms were concentrated in that proud, scornful, yet resigned expression. But as the opium monopoly, the most precious and profitable of them all, was preserved to him, he had the sagacity to feign a willing resignation.'[1]

A foremost quality of the Chinese overseas is adaptability—when their swings are taken away, they are quick to discover some roundabouts.

In the year 1857 it was estimated that the kingdom of Siam had 1·5 million Chinese settlers, 200,000 of whom were in Bangkok and environs. This estimate is Bowring's and is probably much nearer the truth that Ruschenberger's of a generation earlier or Gaston Rautier's of a generation later.[2] Nine out of ten of the floating bazaars which lined for miles the banks of the Menam were owned by the Chinese.[3]

'The Siamese keep the Chinese in absolute subjection; and while I was in Bangkok,' says Bowring, 'I saw no instance of resistance to the native authority.'[4]

Most of the European visitors to Siam from the sixteenth to the

[1] op. cit. i. 86 ff.

[2] For examples of estimates of population inspired by hope and faith rather than informed by cold scrutiny see Francis Light's estimate of the Penang population (Purcell, op. cit. p. 40) and Stamford Raffles's regarding Singapore (ibid. p. 71).

[3] Bowring, op. cit. p. 85. The estimate given above is on the same page.

[4] ibid. p. 86. He knew of the rebellion of 1847, but maybe not of the others.

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162 twentieth century confined their observations to Bangkok and neighbourhood and few went any farther afield. Now, however, comes the famous French naturalist and traveller, Henri Mouhot, the discoverer of the ruins of Angkor, who explored both the upper waters of the Mekong, the gem districts of Chantabun (or Chantaburi), and the wilds of Cambodia, some provinces of the last-named being then in Siamese territory. He gives the population of Siam at 2 million Siamese, 1 million Laos, 1 million Malays, 1·5 million Chinese, 350,000 Cambodians, and 50,000 Peguans.[1]

175 Mouhot remarks that Siamese annals relate that in the seventh
133 century Chinese junks used to ascend the Menam as far as Sang Khalak, a distance of 120 leagues from the sea, whereas they now navigate it for 30 leagues at most. He says that Saraburi was a place of some extent, the population consisting of Siamese, Chinese, and Laos agriculturists.

Having decided to visit Cambodia, and finding his little river-boat of no use, Mouhot discovered that the only way of going to Chantabun was by Chinese junk or fishing vessel. On 4 January 1859 he arrived at Chantabun. Christian Annamites formed nearly a third of the population, the remainder being Chinese merchants
538 and some heathen Annamites and Siamese. In spite of its scanty population the province managed to export to Bangkok a great quantity of pepper cultivated by the Chinese chiefly at the foot of the mountains.

000 Every Siamese subject in Battambang on attaining a certain height had to pay the Government an impost or annual tribute equal to 6 ticals (18 francs). The Annamites paid this in eagle-wood, the Siamese in gamboge, and the Chinese paid in gum lac every four years, their tribute amounting annually to 4 ticals.

Most of the Chinese were addicted to gambling and opium-smoking. To record this is to be guilty of monotonous repetition, but it is well to note that however far from their fellows the Chinese remained true to type.

Henri Mouhot found himself installed in the house of a good Chinese, a pepper planter in the hill country of Chantabun, whose name was Taié-ou or, in Siamese, Apait. His son proved a real treasure to Mouhot. The two brothers of Apait were Catholics. Near the mountains 'were scattered the modest dwellings of the

[1] Henri Mouhot, *Travels in the Central Parts of Indo-China (Siam), Cambodia, and Laos* (London, Murray, 1864) i. 61.

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laborious Chinese'.[1] At the Chinese New Year Mouhot sat with Apait while his son played some airs on the bamboo flute.[2]

Miscellaneous information recorded by Mouhot includes the fact that the gall of apes was sold to Chinese doctors in Chantabun; that Siamese and Chinese performed together in theatricals at a funeral; that a magnificent tree called by the Siamese *Mai Jakienne* was much prized by the Chinese for junk masts; and that Chinese and European junks were constantly going up and down the Komput River. At Komput the Chinese shopkeepers sold glass, china, hatchets, knives, and Chinese parasols. The beautiful cardamon of Poursat (an aromatic, pungent spice) was much sought after by the Chinese who paid the best prices for it. Its sale was entirely monopolized by the King and his ministers.

Mouhot did not think that the country (presumably Cambodia) contained above a million inhabitants, and, according to the most recent census, the number of free men fit to carry arms was returned at 30,000, besides a number of Chinese 'relatively great'.[3]

The greater part of the trade of Upper Siam was with Burma and China, the transport to Bangkok being too costly. It was carried in caravans composed of mules, pack-bullocks, and carrying-coolies. The trade with China and Burma in the 1890s was much of the same nature as it had been for many decades or even centuries; the imports from China were brassware, ponies, and silk; walnuts were also largely imported, but rather as ballast than as paying freight as the caravans were usually thirty days *en route*. The imports from Burma were chiefly piece-goods, opium, and ponies. Exports were Chinese sticklac, horns, hides, beeswax, and imported goods.[4]

The French undoubtedly had Chinese trade as their objective when they sent their expedition of exploration, under de Lagrée, up the Mekong in 1866. This expedition proved a failure, the Mekong being found to be of little use for navigation north of the 14th, or at most the 18th, parallel, owing to the presence of rapids. The Menam, however, was vastly superior to the Mekong in this respect, and, with the completion of the railway which already in the 1890s the Siamese were building to the north through central

[1] op. cit. i. 142.
[2] ibid. p. 155. The Chinese flute is in a class by itself and, unlike the other instruments of the Chinese orchestra, is acceptable to the European ear.
[3] ibid. i. 275.
[4] A. Cecil Carter, *The Kingdom of Siam* (New York, Putnam, 1904) p. 33.

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439 Siam, important commercial developments were expected to
496 follow.[1]

[114] The literature of foreign observers of Siam in the nineteenth
651 century is considerable, and in sifting it in search of significant information we light on two books which have the merit of making actual the life of the people they describe. Both of these relate to experiences in the 1890s: one is by a transient;[2] the other by a travelling official.[3]

> There are [says Ernest Young] nearly as many Chinese in the country as there are Siamese. They marry Siamese women and their children make excellent subjects, as they possess both the natural brightness of the mother and the industry of the father. Unless they renounce their nationality they are subject to a poll-tax of about 5 or 6 shillings, payable every four years. At a date made known by proclamation each Chinaman must present himself at the police station and pay the tax. The receipt given is a small piece of beeswax about the size of a threepenny piece. This bears a seal, and is worn on the wrist for a certain time, fastened by a piece of string. The police are very busy at this time, and there is nothing that a Siamese policeman so much enjoys as leading some unfortunate Chinaman to pay the tax. Should the seal be lost, the alien is bound to buy another as soon as he is requested by some officer of the law.[4]

463 First to rise in the morning in Bangkok were the Chinese inhabitants, and on rising they exploded crackers. They were carpenters, blacksmiths, butchers, bakers; they watered, swept, mended, and scavenged the roads; they were wharf coolies, servants, and rickshaw-pullers. No Siamese were to be found among these last. The rickshaws were mostly discarded ones from Singapore and were in a very dilapidated condition. The Chinese rickshaw-men never resented being cut by a driver's whip if caught on the wrong side of the road.

291 Blue, as ever, was the colour of the Chinese workaday clothes.
Other colours were worn only at the New Year when gorgeous
292 heliotropes, lavenders, pale blues, green, and yellow silks made their appearance, having been deposited in the interim in the pawnshops.

[1] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 10th ed. (1902) xxxii. 612.
[2] Ernest Young, *The Kingdom of the Yellow Robe* (London, Constable, 1898).
[3] H. Warington Smyth, Director of Mines, Siam, *Five Years in Siam* (London, Murray, 1898) (refers to 1891–6).
[4] op. cit. p. 9: cf. p. 484 of this survey regarding a similar proceeding in Java in about 1798.

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The only truly native quarter was a long bazaar known as Sampeng. It was about a quarter of a mile in length and contained a mixed population of Indians, Siamese, and Chinese. It somewhat resembled a street in Canton but lacked the wealth of elaborately carved and gilded signboards which give such a distinctive and local atmosphere to a purely Chinese street. Stretched overhead from side to side were pieces of torn cloth and sacking which acted quite as effectively in keeping out the sun as imprisoning the awful combination of foul odours that seems to be the possession of all Oriental thoroughfares. Everywhere were stagnant water and domestic rubbish. The gambling houses, opium dens, and brothels in this quarter were thronged by the lowest of the low. Electric light had already arrived in the city, but in the outskirts the lamplighter was still to be seen wending his way on his evening round, carrying the small ladder, boxes of matches, and bottles of oil that marked the nature of the operation. In some places in the city and in Sampeng little cholera lamps swung aloft at the end of slender poles, swaying backwards and forwards and telling where death had entered on his work of destruction.

At the end of the bazaar was the chief idol manufactory in the country, supplying all the temples of Siam.[1]

The Chinese are seen through the eyes of another contemporary observer of Bangkok thus:

> Bangkok port has no rules but one:—Thou shalt not rebuke or in anyway inconvenience a Chinese coolie whatever he may do! He is the master of the port. He may grapple on to a steamer with his cargo boat when she comes up the river to seek her moorings. He may refuse to cast off when the captain has to change his berth; he may, and probably will, refuse to load the ship in any way but his own, even to the peril of ship and cargo; he may spit and smoke in the poop, and may generally lord it. But he must be allowed his sweet will; and if any officer cuts his rope away, or a quartermaster kicks him over the side, there is a general strike, and the captain is dropped by the agents. For the Chinaman is a privileged person, and the port is run for his private edification and enjoyment.[2]

Warington Smyth is not highly appreciative of the Chinese of Bangkok, but he has humour and buoyancy which atone in some measure for the malice of his abuse, as when he says, comparing

[1] Ernest Young, op. cit. pp. 19, 22.
[2] H. Warington Smyth, *Five Years in Siam*, p. 10.

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the luck of other races who chance to fall or be pushed into the Menam: 'Chinese are different; a tiger will take a Chinaman without provocation, as will a shark; for he is fat and porky, and as unpopular with animals as with men.' Summing up he says: 'This is Chinese Bangkok, malodorous and ill-mannered.'

The widely operating secret societies of the Heaven and Earth or Triad we have encountered before in this part of our survey: we shall read of them again more than once in Malaya, Sarawak, and the other countries of Southeast Asia. They were responsible for riots in 1889 and six years later for fighting with fire-arms from behind street barricades. In the latter year rival factions of the Yee Heng and the Su Lee societies held one Bangkok district in a state of siege for a few days and the battle was stopped only through the intervention of Danish officers. Yet the Siamese Government went so far as to cultivate these secret societies as they were thought to offset the association of native Christians fostered by the French missionaries. The movement was regarded as particularly alarming after a Buddhist priest, who had been chaplain to the late Regent, turned Christian.[1]

With Mouhot we escaped from Bangkok for a spell and visited the confines of the northwest; with Warington Smyth we are able to take another excursion, this time to peninsular Siam of the south and at a period about forty years after the French naturalist.

There was long-standing controversy among British officials of Penang as to whether or not Kedah was subject to Siam at the time of the cession by the Sultan of Kedah of the island of Penang to the British in 1786. On this turned the question whether the British had undertaken to defend Kedah against the Siamese. In any case they did nothing to defend it when it was overrun by the Siamese in 1818. At the time when it was ceded to the British by the Treaty of Bangkok in 1909 Kedah was a border province of Siam. In the 1830s the Chinese were mining tin in Negri Sembilan and Selangor; in the 1850s they were active in the tin-fields of Perak; they had already, it seems, penetrated to the rich mining lands of southern Siam. The Chinese tin-mining community of Siam was in effect an extension of that of Bangka and Billiton. Racially and economically the settlements were connected, though the political jurisdiction over them was divided. As has been said, in Siam the

[1] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 107. Dr Thompson cites the *Bangkok Times* of 8 October 1901 regarding the riots.

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As has been said in Siam the 557
Chinese, usually of mixed blood, sometimes attained to high office under the Siamese with titles of honour attached. More than one of these families retired to Penang and, keeping connexions with the source of their wealth, formed part of the bridge linking the two Chinese communities.

In the 1890s, at the time of Warington Smyth's visit, the Raja 635
of the west coast of the peninsula was a Chinese named Praya 674
Rasada (Phya Ratsdain in Dr Landon's spelling), known familiarly 361
as Simbi (Sim Bee). His two brothers were Rajas of Renawng (Renong) and Langsuan (Lang Suan), 'but neither can equal him in energy, popularity, or good nature'. Of his own initiative he introduced the Burmese village system into his province. In 1892 he moved his capital bodily down the river to be nearer the sea. The old capital, the Khoantani of Major Low, was now being connected with the new one, Kantun, and also with the pepper-planting district of Taptieng, by new roads. Other improvements and reforms were in progress. Dacoity had practically disappeared; even the secret societies, who generally were unmolested in Siam, had received a warning in the form of the suppression of one of their number to whom a murder had been traced. There was a [625]
police force of Sikhs and Siamese. Cleanliness was one of the Raja's hobbies.

This Chinese, Phya Ratsdain, or Kaw Sim Bee, was a member 556
of a family which achieved outstanding success in Siam. Dr Landon gives an extended account of its history and the present writer was for years personally acquainted with some of its members and can confirm that its standing was high both in Siam and in Penang.[1] The founder of the family was a coolie, named Kaw Su Chiang, a native of Ch'angchow-fu in Fukien province, about thirty-five miles from Amoy. He arrived in Penang about 1810 when he was about twenty-five years of age with nothing but his clothes and a carrying-pole. He soon entered the coastal trade in which—subject to the avoidance of pirates—cloth, muskets, &c., were bartered for tin, areca nut, birds' nests, copra, and pepper. Kaw Su Chiang prospered as a trader and extended his interests to tin. This he found in great quantity in the Renong district and he imported Chinese coolies to mine it. He ruled with a patriarchal hand the community

[1] The surname is usually spelt Khaw in Penang. Khaw Su Chiang's name occurs among the subscribers to the reconstruction of the temple of the goddess of mercy in the 1860s (originally built in 1800).

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556 he had created. Later he was given the title of Phra (the third highest of the titles awarded to commoners) and made the Raja of Renong. The carrying-pole he had brought to the country he now had gilded and he showed it to visitors with pride. He had both a Chinese and a Thai wife and of his sons one, Kaw Sim Kong, succeeded his ageing father as Raja of Renong, another became Raja of Lang Suan, a third, Raja of Kra, and 'the youngest and greatest', [635] Kaw Sim Bee, Raja of Trang. In 1892 Sim Bee was appointed High Commissioner of the Western Provinces on the Indian Ocean with a capital at Phuket.

635 In the 1890s the policy of the Siamese Government was to dis-
651 place the Rajas by Governors and to curtail the powers of the
554 Rajas who remained, to rule directly, and to collect the taxes through their own officers instead of farming them. In spite of the administrative reorganization, Sim Bee retained the substance of his power to the end of his days. He was completely loyal to Bangkok. Although he spoke Thai and Chinese fluently he never learned to read Thai. 'Arrogant, choleric, and ambitious, he was so feared by the people that they prostrated themselves when he passed.'[1]

162 Speaking of Taptieng, the centre of the pepper-planting district
in the midst of lateritic soil approved by the Chinese planter,
575 Warington Smyth says that it was a filthy place 'as all Chinese
245 towns are'. There were 10,000 Chinese in the district. The Raja took the Director of the Department of Mines to one of the principal secret societies in the town where he was on good terms with the Chinese officers. The Director was elaborately introduced to the latter, and he confessed that he was favourably impressed by the style and appearance of their hosts as well as by the cleanliness of the place. Referring to the building occupied by the society, Warington Smyth remarks that there is 'something strong and imposing in Chinese architecture and ornament which is certainly attractive'.

162 Topographical information such as this, imparted by a lively writer and a keen observer, amounts to more than a catalogue of

[1] Landon, op. cit. pp. 13–15.

Abjectness was encouraged by the absolute despotism of Siam. Two ambassadors arrived in England from Siam in October 1857 and had an audience with Queen Victoria; 'they brought with them magnificent presents, which they *delivered crawling*, on 16 November.' *Haydn's Dictionary of Dates* (London, Ward, Lock, 1906) p. 1208. (My italics. V.P.)

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impressions, for from it can be gleaned facts that connect up the economic and social history of the Chinese of these parts. For instance, the fall in the price of pepper had halved the population of Taptieng.[1] The roads hitherto maintained by the Chinese had now become obliterated or impassable. At Palean, which was also under the Raja of Trang, there were a few Chinese and a little pepper. Tin mines were scattered through the southern part of the province from the sea to the boundaries of Lakawn. In Takuapa, where the Government was bad, the mines were set deep in the jungle, reached by rough-and-tumble forest paths. The royalties exacted by the Government were high: the communications were poor. Nevertheless, Takuapa exported 600–700 tons of tin yearly. Here the arrival of the party was inopportune. Rice and opium were the chief articles of import, but the stock of these two commodities was now very low, the failure of the former being due to the loss of a rice-laden junk. The coolies were clamorous: the *Towkays*[2] were anxious.[3]

Their itinerary punctuated by the gongs and crackers of Chinese funerals and weddings, the party passed to the east coast. Here there was no place of equal importance to those of the west coast for a long way south. Pran, Kuwi, Bangtaphan, and Patiyu were insignificant villages at the mouths of their streams with a population of fishermen, chiefly Chinese. The population of Champawn was said to have been 30,000 all told, but only the fishing villages on the coast had any large population of Chinese. Paknam, a fishing village, had lately been visited by cholera. 'Its male inhabitants were chiefly Chinamen: everything was consequently filthy.'

Langsuan had a population of 11,000 including 2,000 Chinese. The Raja was a Chinese who was by no means sensible of his responsibilities and exercised practically no control over the Chinese who carried on the government under him. His son was a Penang Chinese 'who needed a good licking'. The mines lay principally in the valleys along the granite outcrops of the main

[1] In Penang, when in 1810 the bottom fell out of the pepper market, there had also been a great misfortune; but here cloves were a second crop which was a mainstay till the blight fell on them in the 1860s. See Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 44.

[2] *Towkay*, meaning head of a business, is a common term among the Chinese of Southeast Asia. Though a Hokkien expression, it is used by all tribes, though the Cantonese also use *Szt'au*, which has the same meaning.

[3] Warington Smyth, op. cit. ii. 20.

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162 range dividing the Raja of Langsuan's territory from that of his
316 brother of Renong. Some 200 Chinese coolies were employed in the mines at wages ranging from $4½ to $8 a month. The methods of mining were primitive.

439 In Bandon (or Kanchanadit in Siamese) the population was
442 about 22,000, of which a large part was Chinese. These were Hainanese, Hokkiens, and Cantonese engaged in the export of
162 timber, rattans, skins, and other jungle produce. Quite a large fleet of Chinese junks was engaged in the trade. The steamers from Bangkok on the whole were successfully boycotted by the Chinese who kept the trade as much as possible in their own hands.[1]

439 Singora (Songkla in Siamese), on the east coast, south of the Isthmus of Kra, was inhabited by a large number of Chinese
662 traders who had a practical monopoly of the local trade and owned
636 many junks. It was seized at the beginning of the nineteenth century by Chinese from Amoy led by the great-grandfather of the present Governor (*c.* 1890), and for a long time they were little meddled with by Bangkok, under which they had placed themselves. There was now a Siamese commissary from the capital in several of the provinces. Bribery played a large part in the Chinese methods of keeping influence.[2]

167 Labour was needed for Singora, for example for the coffee plantations, but the lack of coolie regulations made it impossible
464 to import either Tamil or Chinese labour. The Siamese officials considered that the existing arrangements were good enough and they did not want any more foreign labour in the country.

316 The Lakawn mines were worked by the Siamese before the Chinese arrived some time around 1840, and now in the 1890s there were 350 Chinese men working them, divided into five kongsis, or associations. The blast furnaces were of the Chinese pattern. The output was 800 cwt. per annum with a value of $24,000.[3] The tin was bought by a Government buyer at $30 a
[167 picul. The Chinese miners 'were the wildest Chinamen we had
674] ever met, and had mostly been imported direct by junks from the interior of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Hainan'. They were in
000 the habit of holding folks up to ransom. As a contrast to these

[1] ibid. ii. 84. Warington Smyth mentions that in the 1870s piratical Chinese junks were still not uncommon along this coast.

[2] Warington Smyth, ibid. ii. 106.

[3] The Mexican silver dollar is probably intended in these values. Warington Smyth speaks of the 'currency nightmare'.

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ruffians Warington Smyth met a 'charming old Chinaman', a boat-builder.

It would seem from what has been recorded above that the Chinese in southern Siam fifty years ago were living in a state of semi-independence. Not only were some of the Governors Chinese, but also the secret societies and the kongsis (which probably were to a large extent identical) were allowed fairly complete charge of their own affairs. The Siamese officials were interested principally in tribute and taxation. They were quite content for the hard-working Chinese to produce for them the profit that would not have been forthcoming from their less energetic countrymen.

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CHAPTER XIII

LUKCHIN AND NEW-COMER[1]

IN 1900 the civilization of China was in decay. How long it had been so is hard to decide; but if the arts and crafts are any indication of a healthy society, then the reign of Chia Ch'ing which began in 1796 is as definite a mark as any between a condition of static comeliness at the least and one in which inventiveness and skill were noticeably in decline. The decline of art may well have been an early symptom of political and social senility, of the former more certainly, for within a generation or so China was offering but the feeblest opposition to the onslaught of the West. Yet, convinced of her self-sufficiency and the adequacy of her institutions, she refused for many decades to consider political or educational reform. Arsenals, indeed, were set up in China under foreign engineers and mechanics between the First and Second China Wars, but it was not until after a new defeat by France in 1885 that for the first time history, mathematics, and science were introduced into the public examinations. Up to 1860 China had no Foreign Office, and one was created only at the behest of foreigners by a clause in the Tientsin Treaty. Japan's story was a very different one. Adapting her institutions to receive the sources of Western strength, she administered a crushing defeat to her former teacher, China, who had taught her nearly all she knew. Finally, in 1898, the mandarin Chang Chih-tung, in his *Exhortation to Learning*, issued a warning that China must adopt Western learning at once or be destroyed.[2]

The ferment belatedly generated, as by a kind of yeast which would magically rejuvenate very old and insipid wine, resulted in the rise of nationalism and the Revolution of 1911 and its chequered aftermath.

In 1900 all of this was only dimly foreseen even by the most divining Chinese: to the *Lukchin*, or 'child of a Chinese' in Siam, and to the immigrant coolie on the deck of a ship *en route* from Swatow or Hong Kong to Bangkok it had no meaning at all. They may have heard of the Boxer risings and of the anti-foreign decrees

[1] *Lukchin* = child of a Chinese, and means the Sino-Thais.

[2] Victor Purcell, *Problems of Chinese Education* (London, Kegan Paul, 1936) p. 1 and passim.

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of the Empress-dowager and Prince Tuan, but almost certainly not of K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-chao, the prophets of educational reform, or, possibly, not even of the exiled Sun Yat-sen.

China's claim to suzerainty over Siam was very shadowy (as indeed was the case with her other claims of this sort, Britain was included as a vassal in Chinese records) and had not been asserted for a long time. Tribute, or merchandise masquerading as tribute, had indeed been extremely intermittent for the last century or so, and latterly had ceased altogether, but this was a thing China was used to from her many supposed 'vassals'. After an interval of eighteen years the tribute had been renewed in 1869, but its bearers had been compelled by 'the Chinese to use the route via Canton and were not allowed to come by the Tientsin route which the foreigners used'.[1] China refused to make a treaty with Siam, although at this time her influence in that country was at its height, for the simple reason that she did not want diplomatic relations with anyone. Later on, when China herself desired such a treaty, the Siamese were reluctant to conclude one, and it was not until 1946 that one was signed.[2]

The absence of ambassadors and consuls to whom the Chinese could appeal for protection when their rights or privileges were assailed was now regarded by the Siamese with favour. Immigration from China had greatly increased after the First China War which was concluded in 1842. In the 1840s it was estimated to be at the rate of about 15,000 a year; by the turn of the century about 1,200 a month were arriving at the port of Bangkok in addition to an even larger number in the peninsular States. The great flood of immigrants had not yet begun, but already in the 1880s there was talk in Siam of restriction of Chinese immigration, and in 1888 the establishment of a Chinese Protectorate on the Straits Settlements model was mooted, and abandoned only on the ground of expense.[3] But so long as China had no diplomatic or consular officers in Siam there was no danger of the aliens rallying round them and forming a dangerous opposition to the authority of the Siamese Government.

It was estimated that about 40 per cent. of the new-comers remained in the country, and that of these about half married Siamese women. With improved communications between Siam and China, the proportion of transients was increasing and these were disposed

[1] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 103.
[2] See p. 192.
[3] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 107.

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167 to look upon Siam as a place in which to make money and from which to depart as early as possible. This fact did not escape the notice of the Siamese and they remarked openly upon it. At the same time the peculiarities of Chinese social organization overseas were impressing themselves more and more on the Siamese authori-
575 ties. The secret societies had long before this brought themselves
669 to the very unfavourable notice of the Government of the Straits Settlements and there had been serious battles between rival fac-
579 tions in Singapore in 1854 and in Penang in 1867; but in Siam in the 1880s the Government, as we have seen,[1] encouraged their activities as an offset to the influence of the native Christians. The riots of 1889 and the conflict between the Yee Heng and the Su-lee Ku societies in the streets of Bangkok in 1895 must have convinced the Siamese that these associations were a pest and far more to be feared than were a few docile Christians. In more modern terms, the official cultivation of the Thian Ti Hui had upset the entomo-
[674] logical balance and this must now be redressed. Of illicit organizations the Ang Yee secret societies were the most important. About 1905 Siam was seriously troubled by Ang Yee wars. Legal cases were not taken to the courts but were tried before Ang Yee
[578] tribunals. 'Competition and jealousy set group against group, and the Chinese killed one another without regard to the laws of the land.'[2]

575 A law was passed in 1897 requiring the registration of every
656 society. After two years only two had registered and the Siamese authorities, owing to the lack of the machinery of investigation, were unable to prosecute those societies which had neglected to do so. Without a Chinese Protectorate like the one in Malaya, the police were completely unable to lift the cloak of mystery in which the operations of these societies were wrapped. The Chinese, for their part, were most suspicious of the designs of the Government, imagining the law to be a preliminary to requiring them to do military service, and even the truly philanthropic societies, which had nothing to fear from revealing their existence, neglected to register.[3]

167 We must not, however, exaggerate the causes of friction between
177 the Siamese and the Chinese at this period, for, compared with the situation which developed in the 1930s, complete harmony be-
178 tween the peoples now prevailed. Sir Josiah Crosby, who spent

[1] See p. 138 and Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, chap. viii.
[2] Landon, op. cit. p. 149. [3] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 108.

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most of his long official career in contact with the Siamese, says of the period: 167

In 1904, the Chinese question, although it was already attracting notice, was not a very urgent one, chiefly because in those days a Chinese immigrant usually took to himself a wife from among the women of the country. Children of mixed races born of such unions were brought up as Siamese, regarding Siam as their home and merging themselves readily with the population around them.[1] 177 178

Before the rise of nationalism in China and Siam there seems to have been no problem of assimilation. In three generations, as we have seen, the new-comers were completely absorbed into the Siamese people. During the process of assimilation these people performed a necessary function in Siamese society. They were a source of new energy to a people who suffered from the usual tropical lethargy, and as Siam had been under-populated throughout her history, there was no threat that the natives would be swamped in the flood of immigration.

A combination of factors was to change the situation completely within the next decade or so. The first was the growth of a feeling on the part of the two peoples that they had separate entities, that these entities were threatened by foreign encroachment, and that they must be defended by the encouragement of a sense of apartness, by aggressive activity on the political and diplomatic planes, and by protective legal measures. China was large, unwieldy, and split by tribal and clan divisions: Siam was smaller and compact, and though she had her racial minorities she was able more easily to consolidate herself into a conscious nation. The other important factor was that with an increasing immigration Chinese women were, after 1910, accompanying their men in large numbers and thus creating a wall against assimilation. The feeling of separation on the part of the Chinese was more and more fostered by the policy of the Chinese Government.

The new-found concern of the moribund Manchu Government for the wandering sons of Han—or rather of T'ang[2]—was mani- 648

[1] Sir Josiah Crosby, *Siam: the Crossroads* (London, Hollis & Carter, 1945) p. 71.

[2] The people of north China called themselves the 'Sons of Han' (i.e. of the dynasty which ruled from 200 B.C. to A.D. 220) while the people of the south called themselves the 'Sons of T'ang' (i.e. of the dynasty which ruled from A.D. 618 to 907). The Manchus were far more identified with the north than with

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648 fested in Siam about the same time that it was in the Netherlands Indies. Apart from their increased international awareness encouraged by a succession of defeats, the Government felt, no doubt, that they should show the flag abroad and thus counteract the influence of the revolutionaries who were now plotting against the Ch'ing dynasty with the financial help of overseas Chinese. In 1907 a Chinese commercial commissioner paid a visit to Bangkok accompanied by an imposing suite and escorted by two cruisers.[1] He did not discuss political questions, and acted solely as the head of what came to be called a goodwill mission. There were, indeed, no grievances to redress or protests to be made. At that time the 609 Chinese were enjoying something like an equality of treatment together with privileged facilities for making a good living. That same year King Chulalongkorn made a public pronouncement in which he stated his attitude towards his Chinese subjects:

> It has always been my policy that the Chinese in Siam should have the same opportunities for labour and profit as are possessed by my own countrymen. I regard them not as foreigners but as one of the component parts of the kingdom and sharing its prosperity and advancement.[2]

The sentiment here expressed was reciprocated in the attitude of the Chinese, especially of the second and third generations, until complete merging took place. Dr Landon gives an example of a prominent Chinese merchant whose face was unmistakably Chinese and whose father was a Chinese although his mother was Thai, who took immediate offence when he was playfully charged with being Chinese—'in spite of the fact that his shop signs were in Chinese, that he spoke two Chinese dialects, that he kept his accounts in Chinese, and sent his children to a Chinese school'. He also spoke Thai perfectly in two dialects, regarded himself as a Thai, and patriotically supported the modern Siamese nationalistic movement with large contributions to the defence forces. 'He was typical of an unnumbered host who are,' as Kumut Chandruang says, 'our flesh and blood, because they keep alive our

the south so that their concern for the immigrants from Fukien and Kwangtung had a less genuine and disinterested ring than that of the followers of the Cantonese Sun Yat-sen.

[1] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 108.

[2] Cited by Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 108 from the *Bangkok Times* of 21 February 1935.

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national economy.'[1] This is recounted of a generation later when all sorts of incidents had happened to disturb the harmonious relationships between the races: it must have been doubly true of the earlier period. 609

Mr Lin Yu stresses the great proportion of Chinese blood that must flow in the veins of the more influential classes of Siamese. He tells us that on one occasion when King Vajiravudh (1910–25) commanded those of his courtiers who had Chinese blood in their veins to stand to the right of the room, 90 per cent. of them did so.[2] It was, therefore, one of the ironies of history that the officials who were to pass the immigration, educational, and labour laws which were to operate so to the disadvantage of the overseas Chinese should be Siamese with a large admixture of Chinese. 144 565

Legal Status of the Chinese in Siam. Until 1946 there were no treaty relations between Siam and China. We have seen something of the reason for this. In the first years of the century the Chinese several times approached Siam through Tokyo with a view to establishing diplomatic relations. At one moment a treaty was actually drafted but owing to an anachronistic pride or a clumsy gaffe on the part of the Chinese draftsmen, by which Siam was referred to as China's vassal, the Siamese were enabled to withdraw from the negotiations with an injured look. Similarly at Versailles, overtures on the part of China came to nothing. Later on it will be recorded how the treaty was eventually signed and ratified, but a throng of events demand attention before such a record is timely. 648

Immigrants from China who were not the subjects of a European Power were regarded by the Siamese as being under their jurisdiction and were subject to the laws of the realm. After three years' residence, and at the close of every three years from that date, they had to pay a tax of 4½ ticals, equivalent to 8*s.* 6*d.* in the 1880s and 1890s and to somewhat less in the first decade of the twentieth century. They were exempted from *corvée* labour, and all other Government requisitions, except ordinary taxes. Their children, who as there were no Chinese consuls could not be registered as Chinese, had the option of submitting to the triennial tax or of selecting a Government master and becoming Siamese. The grandchildren of Chinese immigrants were classed and registered as Siamese, and were liable to *corvée* labour as soon as they measured 651 641

[1] Landon, op. cit. pp. 18, 19.
[2] Lin Yu, 'Twin Loyalties in Siam', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. ix, no. 2 (June 1936).

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651 641 2½ sok, or 50 inches, to the shoulder, and were marked to one or other Government master. The mark was tattooed on the back of the right or left wrist, and all persons thus marked were liable to be called out in their master's department.[1]

648 641 Then, in the spring of 1909, the Chinese promulgated a nationality law whereby the *jus sanguinis* was adopted and all persons with Chinese fathers were regarded as Chinese, irrespective of where they were born. Thus there arose from this moment a problem of dual nationality. The new Chinese law, moreover, foreshadowed interference in the affairs of persons of Chinese race born abroad whom China now regarded as her nationals. The actual interference was signalized by the laws and regulations governing the composition and election of the National Assembly on 10 August 1912, by which 6 out of 274 senators were to be elected by 'the electoral college of Chinese abroad'.[2]

Not having any consuls of their own to whom they could appeal, those Chinese who could claim the nationality of countries more favourably placed did so in large numbers. In 1936 there were 55,000 Asiatic subjects of Great Britain residing in Siam, most of whom were Chinese.[3] The status of Chinese born in the Netherlands was uncertain owing to the state of the Dutch law.[4]

648 These problems, however, belong to a later period and the purpose of this section is to make clear the situation existing on the eve of the Siamese-Chinese friction of 1910. In this year, in spite of the civil disabilities due to the lack of a treaty between the two countries, the Chinese enjoyed a favoured position. The China-born could not, indeed, vote or hold any civil office other than that of clerk or interpreter, but that was a small matter compared with the freedom to monopolize the retail and the rice trades and to levy toll through their influence on nearly every business transaction. They were permitted to travel and to live wherever they wished; they had access to the courts and police protection. They might own and lease property and settle in undeveloped areas. On the whole the

[1] Holt S. Hallett, *A Thousand Miles on an Elephant in the Shan States* (London, Blackwood, 1890) p. 460, cited by Landon, op. cit. p. 10.

[2] MacNair, op. cit. p. 25.

The principle here introduced of holding elections for membership of bodies in China among overseas Chinese was to give trouble in the future, particularly in Indonesia, Malaya, and Siam.

[3] Landon, op. cit. p. 27.

[4] Amry Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1942) p. 193.

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Chinese would have agreed with King Chulalongkorn's statement that they had the same opportunities for labour and profit as were possessed by his own countrymen.[1] 648

[1] Dr Virginia Thompson at p. 114 of her work, *Thailand: the New Siam*, states that 'When a Chinese married a Siamese woman, the wife—not the husband—became head of the family and controlled its property and cash.' 641

This gives, I feel, a misleading idea of the situation. The fact is that a Siamese woman married to a Chinese did not take his nationality but remained Siamese. The children, too, were Siamese in the eyes of Siamese law. Since under the new laws of *c.* 1939–40 an alien was restricted in his right to hold land or to acquire it, a Chinese husband would often hold land in his wife's name. This both secured him in his property and protected his wife and children. A Siamese wife practically never accompanied her husband to China where, incidentally, he probably had a wife already. But there was no matriarchal system as suggested by the above statement, and the transfer of any property was entirely at the husband's discretion. 421 592 595

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[p. 152]

CHAPTER XIV

THE GENESIS OF DISCORD

000 THERE is a process known to geographers as 'river capture'. The beds of rivers are continually extending backwards towards the hills or mountains; this is due to soil and rock from the higher slopes at the head of the valley being washed into the river and carried away. In this manner the watershed may be lowered until streams from the other side may find an easier route down the channel of the river which has cut back. Without stretching the metaphor too far, we can say that something like this happened forty years ago to the stream of Chinese immigrants into Siam. Hitherto the stream had flowed into the main river of the Siamese nation, but at this epoch the river of Chinese nationalism cut back and captured the stream. Although this comparison is over-dramatic and incomplete, it should serve to suggest the striking change which took place about this time.

178 Whereas in 1900 the alien Chinese were living side by side with their Siamese hosts without great consciousness of difference on either side, and were being absorbed into the body of the nation by a leisurely and seemly process, in 1920 the two communities were deeply conscious of their apartness, and assimilation had to a great extent been arrested. This we know was due partly to the growth of nationalism in the two countries, especially in China, to greatly increased immigration, and the improvement in transport which facilitated frequent passing to and fro, and if we wish to fix a date, or rather an epoch for this cleavage, we may choose either the Chinese nationality law of 1909 adopting the *jus sanguinis*, or the Chinese Revolution of 1911. In point of fact, however, there is an intermediate date which it would be more fitting to select since it marked a moment when it was brought home to the Siamese that the Chinese among them formed an unassimilated element—or, to resume the metaphor, a stream which had forsaken its bed in their midst to join an alien waterway. Our reference is to the Chinese strike and riots in Bangkok in 1910.

65 We have seen in the preceding chapter that the Chinese in Siam had been paying a poll-tax at the rate of about 1½ baht a year for

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many years.[1] The Siamese, on the other hand, had for the past 651
twenty years been paying about 50 baht a year. A new law now
called for the collection of a capitation tax on all persons resident in
Siam irrespective of race. The tax applied to Europeans as well as [792]
Asiatics, and the only exceptions were priests and ordained minis-
ters. Immediately, serious riots broke out among the Chinese as a 669
protest against the application of the tax to them, and all Chinese [468]
shops were closed in sympathy, causing a complete stoppage of
trade. The riots were soon suppressed and the shops reopened, but
the damage was done. The Chinese stood convicted by the Siamese
as devoid of a sense of fair-play since the new law was merely
intended to place all persons living in Siam on an equality as
regards taxation, and the people realized for the first time the extent
of the Chinese economic grip on the country, and the ability of the
settlers to paralyse at will the life of the nation. From this time for-
ward the dislike and fear of the Chinese long felt by many Siamese
of influence were reinforced by popular sentiment.

A prejudice, however, cannot derive permanent sustenance from 609
a single incident and, to survive, it must be fed with further
grievances. Also it must be demonstrated to the people that such 643
incidents form part of a policy. It happened, then, that a long and
circumstantial indictment of the Chinese was forthcoming from 539
the hand of no less a person than the reigning monarch. There
seems to be no doubt that the series of articles which appeared in 578
the vernacular newspapers in Siam under the pen-name of 'Asava-
bahu' (Pegasus), and which were reprinted in the form of a pamph-
let entitled *The Jews of the East* were written by His Majesty King
Vajiravudh, otherwise Rama VI.

'Asavabahu's' thesis, in condensed form, was this[2]: In Siam and
in Eastern territories under British and American jurisdiction there
exists a situation analogous to the Jewish question in countries of
the West. This is 'The Yellow Peril'. The danger arises solely from
the Chinese from whom the Siamese are even more different than

[1] A baht was worth about one-eleventh of an English pound. Its value dropped [435]
after 1939, and after the Second World War the Siamese currency, in common
with other Far Eastern currencies, suffered great inflation.

Dr Landon's account in chapter ii of his work, *The Chinese in Thailand*, has been closely followed in the present chapter.

[2] The complete translation of the two chapters in the pamphlet dealing with the Chinese, by Margaret D. M. Landon, is given in Dr Landon's *The Chinese in Thailand*, pp. 34–43.

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539 Europeans are from the Jews. The first similarity between the
609 Chinese and the Jews is in the matter of 'racial loyalty'. No matter
643 where they live, what nationality they assume, Chinese remain
578 essentially Chinese. But theirs is race loyalty, not love of country, and, for the sake of convenience, they will register themselves as nationals of foreign countries, even when they are living in China itself. But such registration does not mean that they cease to act like Chinese. They will be loyal to their adopted country only so long as it suits their interests. What makes them undesirable is their racial consciousness; they regard their residence ~~in the~~ country as temporary and are unwilling to become its citizens. The purpose of every Chinese immigrant is to amass as much money as possible and then to depart—the fact that not all of them manage to do this does not alter their common motive.

[593] It is argued that Chinese intermarry with the people of the country: so do the Jews. But when a Chinese man marries a Thai woman, the woman becomes a Chinese and adopts Chinese customs in every detail. Their children become Chinese also. But if a Thai man marries a Chinese woman she continues to be Chinese. The man finds himself adopting Chinese ways and conforming to the Chinese pattern of life. As for the children, even though they are Thai in name they are psychologically Chinese. There are exceptions, of course, but they are few. Our hope was that the Chinese would put down roots in this country: the opposite has occurred.

The Chinese are unwilling to recognize any obligation to the country in which they reside. If there are privileges to which the native inhabitants are entitled, they demand them: if an occasion arises in which they are required to undertake the duties of citizens they evade these duties if possible. No doubt you will all remember the time four or five years ago when the Chinese suspended work. Their object was to protest against paying *the same poll-tax that all pay!*

The second characteristic of the Jews is found developed in the Chinese also. That is, the Chinese, like the Jews, are an ancient race, whose high civilization was developed at a time when our ancestors had not emerged from savagery. They divide the world into two classes—the Chinese and the barbarians (*Huan* [i.e. *Fan*]). Europeans are as much barbarians to them as are other Asiatics or blacks. They are likely to think that we exist only to be robbed

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or cheated. In their contact with the barbarians the Chinese recognize no right or wrong; nor do the Jews in dealing with the Gentiles. 539 609

Chinese are willing to undergo any sort of privation for the sake of money. Anyone who has watched Chinese coolies eat cannot help but feel a sense of revulsion, since it seems that the food they eat would hardly attract the curs which roam the streets. And if one speaks of places where they live, it is amazing that so many persons can squeeze themselves into a space so small that no other race on earth could manage to breathe in it. This being the case, it is not surprising that the Chinese can manage to corner all the available work for themselves. 643 578

The above are the main arguments of the pamphlet but they are greatly elaborated and illustrated by incidents. Mention is made of bogus insurance companies run by Chinese and of bankruptcy which is no shame to a Chinese. It is a smart practice to be used by the clever and knowing. They drain off the money of the Siamese and remit it to China. Friction in the future will almost certainly develop between the Chinese and the natives of Eastern countries. Even though the Jews prosper enormously in the countries in which they reside, they must use their wealth in those countries because they have no homeland to which they can remit it. But the absence of a Jewish national home is something of a liability as well. This arises from the fact that the Jews try to acquire political power as well as wealth in the countries in which they live. The Chinese, having a national home, are not unduly interested in the politics of other countries. Should they lose their national home through some calamity they will become the occasion of serious disorders. 'Therefore it is my profound and earnest desire that China shall continue to exist as a free nation in the midst of the nations forever.'

This pamphlet, *The Jews of the East*[1] and the articles in the Siamese language from which it is a reprint have an interest quite apart from their royal authorship. They set forth in very cogent form the Siamese case against the Chinese, and they belong to an early period in the history of the Siamese-Chinese friction. It is probable that they had an important, if imponderable, part in shaping public opinion if only for an interval. The question for us is whether they state the facts correctly or not. 208 609 578

We can leave aside for the moment the question, so often 000

1[See pp. 153ff, cat. 116 --Analyst]

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18 We can leave aside for the moment the question, so often
177 repeated in Siam and other countries of Southeast Asia, whether the Chinese disposition was an anti-social element in the community or not. The important question here is whether it is true to say that the Chinese are unassimilable. This takes us back to the discussion in Chapter XII as to the comparative merits of Bowring's and Gützlaff's observations on the point in the preceding century. Bowring, we may remember, asserted that the children of Chinese men and Siamese women were 'invariably educated to the Chinese type', and Gützlaff asserted that 'within two or three generations all the distinguishing marks dwindle entirely away'.[1] We decided that Gützlaff's contention represented the true situation after two or three generations, but that Bowring had accurately described the situation as it appeared to be in the first generation, and that the process of assimilation proceeded in a subtle, unseen way.
[162] When 'Asavabahu' wrote, the composition of the Chinese in Siam was beginning to change owing to the arrival of large numbers of Chinese women, though the sex ratio was still less than one woman to four men,[2] and immigration of Chinese was on the increase. But he was not referring to the barriers raised against assimilation by the existence of purely Chinese families within the country but to the resistance to assimilation of the Chinese who married Siamese women. The arrival of these Chinese women was a fact of which he does not seem to have been aware, for otherwise he certainly would have included it as an even more powerful argument against the Chinese race. But taking his case on this one point as it stands, the weight of opinion is against him.

[162] Prince Damrong had stated in conversation with an Italian newspaper correspondent in 1911 that one-quarter of the population of Bangkok was composed of Chinese and, unlike those of British Malaya or Java, they conceived an affection for the country in which they lived.[3] Marrying Siamese women, they became subjects after the third generation and served in the Siamese Army.[3] Later, in 1927, a European authority, F. H. Giles, speaking when the situation had greatly changed, said:

The number of Chinese in this country is considerable, and it might

[1] See p. 122.
[2] See p. 104, table showing *legal* Chinese males and females for 1919, 1929, and 1937.
[3] Salvatore Besso, *Siam and China* (London, Simpkin Marshall, 1913) p. 45. Landon, op. cit. p. 43.

1 [See pp. 153 ff, cat. 116 -- Analyst]

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have been expected that they would have exerted a strong influence on the manners, customs, and culture of the Siamese, but in the main essentials of life, the Siamese have not been affected, they still retain in a marked degree their own customs as well as their own culture which is of Indian origin. In fact, the Siamese have absorbed the Chinese, but there are signs that Chinese in the future will remain a distinct entity within the body politic of this country.[1]

The conclusion to be drawn, then, seems to be this: The Chinese immigrants into Siam were being readily assimilated until greatly increased immigration and the introduction of Chinese women created an enclave the existence of which was fostered by the Chinese Government partly for political reasons and partly for the sake of the remittances from overseas which were to be an important part of its financial strength. This enclave extended its membership from among the *Lukchin*, because many of them sent their children to schools where Chinese was the medium of instruction and they thus absorbed the nationalism taught therein, and because the increasing anti-Chinese feeling among the Siamese forced them more and more into the alien camp.

We now come back to the knotty question of whether the presence or otherwise of Chinese in the community was advantageous or detrimental to it. Those who argue that the Chinese 'drew off wealth' ignore the fact that without the Chinese there would have been no wealth to draw off. They seem to regard the country as a kind of bag containing a fixed number of coins which were never counted but always existed, and once having been removed could never be replaced, like Ricardo's Wages Fund. This notion may be true of mineral industries, such as tin-mining, but it is certainly not true of other forms of wealth. To be wealth at all, Siamese products had to be given a shape, to be gathered, and distributed and sold, and in doing all this the Chinese had the principal role. Sir Frank Swettenham, writing of the Chinese in Malaya, says: 'The reader should understand at once what is due to Chinese labour and enterprise is the evolution of the Federated Malay States.'[2] In endorsing this and other statements of the kind from the same source, Dr Landon remarks: 'What Sir Frank wrote of the contribution of the Chinese to the evolution of Malaya could

[1] *Journal of the Siam Society*, vol. xx, pt. 3 (1927) p. 239. Landon, op. cit. p. 43.
[2] *British Malaya* (London, 1907) pp. 231–3.

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441 be written, almost line for line, of Thailand's economic progress. There would have been no progress without the Chinese.'[1]

434 [1] op. cit. p. 44.

One of the experts to whom this Part was submitted before publication comments: 'This seems to me grossly exaggerated: has there been no progress in Ceylon, Burma, Sumatra, the Philippines? Kelantan has roads, bridges, buildings, etc., all made with local labour; the rubber plantations were largely opened with Indian labour, and in Malaya the public works are maintained by them.'

This comment refers to the Chinese solely as labour; it is the combination of *enterprise* and labour that Sir Frank Swettenham and Dr Landon have in mind.

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CHAPTER XV

CHINESE SOCIAL AND BUSINESS LIFE IN SIAM

[p. 159]

THIS chapter is in the nature of an interlude. While the forces described in the preceding pages are working subtly and inevitably to bring the Chinese question to a head in Siam in the 1930s, we will attempt to take a closer view of the life of this alien community, bearing in mind what we know of the life of the Chinese in adjacent countries so that when the time comes we may compare the similarities or contrast the differences between the two.[1]

The factor dominating the nature of the Chinese organism overseas is the sex ratio. The proportion of women to men had been rising steadily in the 1920s, and in the 1930s this process was accelerated. In 1921–2 females formed 15 per cent. of total arrivals and in 1925–6 21 per cent. In 1936–7 the figure would rise to 27 per cent.[2] But, even in the late 1930s, there was a considerable excess of men over women among the China-born Chinese in Siam. Taking into consideration not only the number of available Chinese women but also other factors such as expense, only about one ethnic Chinese in five could establish a purely Chinese home. Chinese of all descriptions preferred, if possible, to marry pure Chinese females and those of their own tribe—Cantonese, Hokkien, Hailam, &c.—when it could be done, but the cost of these was much greater than of other women, and consequently this was out of the question for the greater number of Siam-born Chinese, or 'Sino-Thai'. The price of the bride, or 'milk-money' as it was called, was from 50 to 200 baht for a Thai peasant girl, from 100 to 300 for a Sino-Thai girl, and from 300 to 500 for a Chinese girl.[3] The effect of all this was that whatever the force of Chinese nationalism in separating

[1] Chapters iii, iv, v, and vi of Dr Landon's work have provided the substance of this chapter, but the selection and compression for the purposes here stated are from the angle of one who has had many years' experience of the kindred Chinese community on the Malayan side of the border.

[2] See p. 103. The official migration statistics did not distinguish between the races of the migrants, but Chinese formed about 95 per cent. of all arrivals and departures, so that the overall percentages may be reasonably taken to apply to the Chinese alone. cf. Landon, op. cit. p. 53 ff.

[3] Landon, op. cit. p. 55.

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177 the two races within Siam, most of the homes were open to native influences. At the same time immigrant Chinese adopted insensibly many Thai attitudes and a selection of Siamese words crept into their vocabulary. Such words were *knanom*, meaning cake, as used by the Thai to refer to the little snacks they bought during the day from hawkers, *snuk*, meaning fun or pleasure, 'which is descriptive of every situation pleasing to a Thai, whether it be related to football or a religious ceremony',[1] or *thiau*, meaning to take a trip, but as used by the Thai meaning everything from a stroll down the street in the cool of the day to a trip to Bangkok or England, and *mai pen arai*—it is of no importance, it does not matter. The last expression is obviously the counterpart of the Malay *tid'apa*, and the two convey that feeling of tropical nonchalance, or languid indifference, which must eventually capture Chinese, Siamese, and Malay alike as they succumb to the influence of the heat. The women, too, were invariably affected by local ideas of cooking, health, education, religion, and so on.

What we observe here among the Sino-Thai is a process analogous to that which created the *Baba* Chinese of Malacca and Penang. This community was the product of the intermarriage of Chinese men with Malay and other Indonesian females, and in Penang there was also an Indian element, and of the intermarriage of the offspring of the mixed blood. The Chinese culture being the dominant, it prevailed in essence, in spite of the fact that the Chinese language itself was lost and a kind of Malay containing Chinese words and locutions was substituted for it.[2] But in the case of the *Babas* the process of racial admixture was complete, while with the Sino-Thai it was only partial. The twentieth-century forces would in all probability prevent the repetition of the *Baba* history from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, and these forces were also battling with the process of complete assimilation which had gone on in Siam for so long.

582 From 1 October 1935 all marriages contracted in Siam had to be
672 registered to be legal. People were very indifferent to this marriage
[585] law and preferred to do as they had always done. The Chinese were even more apathetic than the Siamese towards registration, although it gave the wife and her offspring a legal claim on a deceased husband's estate.

[1] Landon, op. cit. p. 54.
[2] See Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 293, appendix 1, 'The Baba Language'.

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Customs among the Chinese in Siam have been modified partly by native influence and partly by the changes which are going on in China itself. There is also the effect of intercourse with Europeans, which is probably much stronger in the neighbouring British colony and protectorate of Malaya than in Siam, and the Chinese of Siam would copy their brethren over the border with whom they have frequent contact, especially in the south, and some of their children attend schools in Penang and Singapore. This process of adaptation is most noticeable in the change in the nature of wedding ceremonies. Old-Style marriages with the wedding chair, the bride dressed in the traditional red with a veil of beads obscuring her face, and the day after day of ritual, have for many years been giving way to the New Style which ranges from a modification of the old ceremony to an out-and-out occidental wedding. In the case of families long resident in Siam, Thai usage is sometimes followed to some extent. In such a case a chapter of Buddhist monks might be invited to the home, and a ceremony would take place in which the bride and bridegroom prostrated themselves while the guests poured ceremonial water over their hands.

A Chinese teacher who had lived for years in many provincial towns as well as in Bangkok answered a questionnaire put to him by Dr Landon and from his answers a fair summary of the changes going on in Siam in the 1930s and still continuing can be obtained. He said that the greatest numbers of Chinese women arrived in Thailand between 1924 and 1926. About 70 per cent. of the two million-odd Chinese in Siam still adhered to Chinese custom; the unit of kinship was still definitely the clan.[1] Asked whether the clan existed as a 'dynamic social unit', the respondent answered 'Absolutely!' A man was the head of the clan, but should he die

[1] By 'clan', *hsing* is presumably intended, that is to say, persons of the same surname, Tan, Ch'an, Wong, Ong, &c. In English the divisions into Cantonese, Teochius, Hailams, Hakkas, &c., are usually called 'tribes'. Families were subdivisions of the clan. But I am not quite sure how Dr Landon defines 'clan'. He speaks (p. 63) in his questionnaire of the clan, and the 'large family' and the 'small family'. I take it that this is from Dr Ta Chen's use of the terms, but Dr Ta Chen does not himself define their meanings (op. cit. p. 127 ff.). On p. 65 Dr Landon speaks of 'clan halls'. In Malaya the centres of community life are the *wui kwuns* (*hui kwans*) which are named after the districts, &c., in China from which the given group of Chinese originates, e.g. the *Hokkien Hui Kwan* (provincial) or the *Teochiu Hui Kwan* (prefectural), or the *Mui Yüen Hui Kwan* (district). In Penang there are halls or *kongsis* based on the clan surnames of five principal families, Lim's, Chias, Tans, &c., and there is at least one hall, the Chia Hall, in Singapore.

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602 a woman might sometimes become the head. Questions relating to
61 marriage, occupation, business transactions, education, &c., were decided by the head of the clan in consultation with the heads of the large or small families involved. Young men and women now
[593 exercised a great deal of freedom in their choice of a partner, but
584 their profession was usually chosen for them by their fathers. Siamese was spoken only in a few Chinese homes in Siam; in
[198 homes where both parents are Chinese they prefer Chinese even though the Education Act was compelling them to use Siamese. The Chinese family, the respondent thought, would, in spite of everything, tend to maintain itself as a Chinese cultural unit for ever.

602 The person here interrogated, we must bear in mind, was a member of a profession pledged to hand on the torch of Chinese nationalism as well as of Chinese learning, and the chances are that he was himself born in China. His replies would represent his own sentiment rather than the precise facts, for, if he is to be believed in every particular, assimilation of the Chinese into the Siamese community must have entirely stopped. Moreover, the clan which he regards as likely to maintain itself eternally is undergoing disintegration. In China the clan, or the family, is rooted in the soil. Even there its hold is weakened when many of its members take to living in villages and towns. In Siam, as in Malaya, Indonesia, and the other countries of Southeast Asia, this association with the soil is broken; the only link between members of the same clan is common sentiment. As an organization the clan can only maintain itself when there are a sufficient number of its members living in close proximity. At the same time, the pressure from the outside in the form of a campaign by the Siamese authorities to speed up assimilation had the effect of tightening up the Chinese family structure as a measure of resistance.

However, compared with education, all the factors referred to above are of minor effect in shaping the Chinese social organism, and of education we shall speak fully when we come to recite the sequence of events after the *coup d'état* of 1932.

The Chinese in Business

442 The Chinese are the middlemen, the exporters, and the finan-
454 ciers of Siam, but no one knows the exact extent or the value in money of their holdings. Even in countries like the Netherlands

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Indies and Malaya, where statistics of various kinds have been [454] kept for many years, only a rough estimate of Chinese wealth is 442 possible. Mr Callis estimates that in 1938 Chinese investment in Siam amounted to U.S. $100 million as compared with other foreign investment of U.S. $124 million.[1] In Siam not only do the [161] authorities refuse to distinguish between Chinese born in the country and others they regard as Siamese, but statistics in the modern sense of the term have been a matter of only the last few decades, and there was not even an attempt at a complete census of the country until 1909–10. However, there is detailed information on rice, the principal product and the chief export of the country, on teak and forestry products, on maize, tobacco, cotton, peas, sesame, pepper, and coco-nuts, but nothing, for instance, on rubber, certainly one of the chief crops of the country and the third in export value.[2] These details give some assistance in deciding the nature, if not the extent, of Chinese participation in the economic life of the country.

To begin with agriculture, the occupation of 80 per cent. of the [241] people. The rice grower has always remained Siamese, and the Chinese had not by 1930 made any attempt to usurp that position.[3] [463] But as stated in Chapter IX, the Chinese own and operate 80–90 442 per cent. of the rice-mills, the biggest undertaking in Siam, and 256 their industry is not confined to the milling of rice. More often [426] than not the Siamese farmer has to borrow from a Chinese in order to live between sowing time and the harvest, and after the harvest it is the Chinese dealer who buys the paddy and transports it to the mills in Bangkok. After milling again it is the Chinese import and

[1] Helmut G. Callis, *Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia* (New York, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942) (in mimeograph) p. 69. Mr Callis regarded this as a conservative estimate.

[2] Landon, op. cit. p. 119.

[3] Reginald le May, *Siamese Tales Old and New* (London, Noel Douglas, 1930) p. 165.

Soon after this was written, however, a firm of Chinese merchants from Malaya started the cultivation of rice on a large scale by mechanical means in south Siam. The experiment was successful. Thirty men were able to till an area of 600 acres of paddy whereas by ordinary methods about 300 men would be required. Instead of dividing the land into small plots, as was the Siamese method, they worked several hundred thousand acres as a unit. By the end of 1937 two large Chinese rice-owning companies had demonstrated what scientific farming and co-operative effort could accomplish. See *Report of the Rice Cultivation Committee* (Government Printing Office, Kuala Lumpur, 1931). cf. Landon, op. cit. p. 124.

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442 export trader in Singapore, Penang, or Hong Kong who handles
256 three-quarters of the rice exported from Siam.[1]

Fishing is the second item contributing to the Siamese income,
226 most of it being done in inland waters, and the fish are consumed
442 locally. The Siamese are independent of the Chinese in such cases, but where there is coastal fishing carried on by the Siamese the Chinese are the buyers and exporters, and handle the local sales.
231 Most of the pig breeding is done by Chinese. They sell young pigs
443 to Siamese farmers who feed them for a year or two and then sell
[779] them back to the Chinese. Being a Buddhist, the average Siamese does not want to do the slaughtering, and so has to buy his pork from the Chinese butcher.

427 Chinese also figure among the landowners of central Siam. They are usually merchants, and do not farm themselves. As is the case
454 elsewhere when there are absentee landlords, the system has given rise to a great deal of discontent and abuse, but here the Siamese
[331] landlords are more heavily interested than the Chinese. The lack of building materials in central Siam also increased the dependence of the Siamese on the Chinese for such materials and for assisting in the construction of houses.

426 At this point it may be timely to consider the Chinese in Siam as money-lenders and middlemen. An impartial survey by Mr James M. Andrews does not bear out the widespread belief that they are unconscionable usurers.[2] The Thai farmer, and especially his wife, says Mr Andrews, is much more given to money-lending with the hope of high profits than the Chinese. Chinese lent money seldom, but they did advance commodities on credit. When he did lend money, the Chinese insisted on a written contract, security, and interest, but he did not ask for illegal rates of interest as did the Thai. Both Chinese and Siamese often lent money to friends and relatives without asking interest.

It is interesting in this connexion to remark that, whereas in Siam and Indochina the Chinese were prominent as money-lenders (subject to the above considerations), they were not so in Malaya. In Malaya it was the Tamil chetty (chettiar) who did most of the

[1] Lin Yu, op. cit.

[2] James M. Andrews, *Siam, Second Economic Survey* (Bangkok Times Press, 1935) p. 314. This survey was of 41 'sample' villages—10 in northeast Siam, 7 in south Siam, 11 in north Siam, 11 in central Siam, and 2 in southeast Siam. Mr Andrews considered the 'sampling' satisfactory. The printed report covers 396 pages.

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money-lending and second came the Sikh, whose reputation for being a harsh and unfeeling creditor was universal in these parts. The chetty was considered an honest man in comparison with him. The Chinese part in local finance was more in the nature of banking or the advance of goods on credit, as apparently it was in Siam.

Handicrafts were cultivated by Siamese women, but neglected by Siamese men. Siamese weaving could not, however, compete with Chinese-made textiles. Poor-quality *phanungs* (native costumes) were made in Bangkok by Chinese weavers, while good silk *phanungs* were imported from China.[1] Pottery manufacture was largely in the hands of the Mon people who lived not far from Bangkok, and who sold their product to Chinese traders. Most of the tiles used in the larger towns were made by the Chinese. When construction on a large scale was undertaken, Chinese carpenters were called in, and the largest part of the wooden building and fitting in the cities and towns was done by them. Iron-working, too, was done by Chinese in the market centres. The same race had a practical monopoly of the preparation and sale of rice, vegetable, and meat dishes, but the cooking and the sale of fruits, cakes, and various sweet dishes was, on the other hand, almost entirely undertaken by Thai women. In rail and road transport the Siamese held their own, but heavy transport of rice on the rivers (entailing very hard labour) had been taken over by the Chinese.

As has been remarked above, the Chinese did not, except for the recent experiment in scientific farming in south Siam, plant rice, but they went in largely for the growing and marketing of vegetables which was more profitable. But labour other than agricultural was performed by Chinese since they had no objection to long hours and hard work, and it is estimated that they made up roughly 70 per cent. of the non-agricultural labouring population.

Much of the small trade in Siam was carried on by Siamese women who took to the markets fish, fruit, vegetables, spices, and cooked food for sale or barter. But trade on a larger scale developed in the rice-collecting centres, and since the Chinese were the boatmen this trade was in their hands. Having no effective competition,

[1] This statement is questioned by an expert on Siam who read the passage in manuscript. He says, 'The Siamese make beautiful *phanungs* with gold and silver thread or silk in Korat and Chiengmai. Their finest *phanungs* are almost always made in Siam.'

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442 they were able to charge as much as they could persuade the
477 Siamese to pay.

The extent of the Chinese participation in wholesale business is,
442 as has been remarked before, impossible to assess with any accuracy. In the *Directory for Bangkok and Siam* for 1933 in which the larger firms are listed, 112 are shown as European, 61 as Chinese, 38 as Siamese, 16 as Indian, and 8 as Japanese. Many of the businesses with Thai names, however, were owned by Chinese. For 1940 the same authority gave the comparative figures as 103, 98, 56, 35, and 7 respectively. This, of course, does not give any idea of the amount of the capital investment in the firms or of the value of their turnover or profits, but the European Financial Adviser to the Siamese Government, Mr W. A. M. Doll, in 1937–8 remarked that 90 per cent. of all commerce and trade was in Chinese hands alone.[1]

453 The Chinese banks who before the war with Japan were prepared to grant credit for private enterprise were the Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation (capital SS $10 million), the Sze Hai Tong Banking and Insurance Company Ltd., and the Wang Lee Chan Bank Ltd.

465 But information as to the aggregate of Chinese wealth would not
434 convey much of value to the sociologist unless it were accompanied by figures of distribution. The Chinese formed the middle class

[1] W. A. M. Doll, *Report of the Financial Adviser in Connection with the Budget of the Kingdom of Siam, 1938–9* (Bangkok Times Press, 1939) pp. 9, 10. Landon, op. cit. p. 144.

The following figures for Sino-Siamese trade may contribute some light on the subject to those who are in a position to allow for all factors:

[439]

Sino-Siamese Trade

	Imports from Siam		*Exports to Siam*		*Total trade*	
	Haikwan taels	*Index no.*	*Haikwan taels*	*Index no.*	*Haikwan taels*	*Index no.*
1868	615,089	100·0	69,115	100·0	684,204	100·0
1878	314,347	51·1	193,880	280·6	508,227	74·3
1888	54,003	8·8	357,654	517·5	411,657	60·2
1898	206,394	33·6	698,866	1,011·2	905,260	132·3
1908	46,802	7·6	1,938,489	2,804·7	1,985,291	290·2
1918	395,360	64·3	1,972,030	2,853·3	2,367,390	346·0
1928	6,127,987	996·3	6,622,530	9,581·9	12,750,511	1,863·6
1933	39,836,970	6,476·2	3,739,409	5,410·4	43,576,379	6,368·9

From Ho Ping-yin, *The Foreign Trade of China* (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1935) p. 490.

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of the nation, but there were also Chinese workmen who received in real wages only slightly more than did the Siamese peasant. The peasant did not handle as much money (a good part of his income being in the shape of crops), but the 20–30 baht a month received by the Chinese coolie who had to purchase his food and pay for shelter did not make him substantially better off. The Chinese petty tradesmen, rubber-cutters, and skilled workers, and most pedlars and street hawkers got about 50–100 baht a month. These rates compare with the 100 baht received by the majority of Siamese officials. Better-off Chinese, not very numerous, would receive 750 baht a month and upwards, and the income of a tiny minority might reach 3,000 or more baht a month.

Whether or not the Chinese enjoyed more than their fair share of the national income, or whether or not they created more wealth than they consumed, the fact is that their position in the community lent itself to the manufacture of political capital. The Siamese generally felt that the poverty of the peasants was to be blamed in large part on the Chinese money-lender.[1] A Siamese remarked with feeling in a Bangkok newspaper, commenting on some new Government regulations: '. . . the poor peasants are liberated from the bonds of the blood-sucking "shylocks" who used to lend money on exorbitant interests and sell-your-rice-at-our-offer contracts'.[2]

If this chapter has successfully compressed the facts it should help to make actual the position of the Chinese in Siam on the eve of the events of 1932 and onwards. There was nothing particularly glamorous about the lives of the majority of the sons of T'ang. In the country they lived in an *attap* (palm leaf) hut with an earth floor, lit at night by a kerosene or coco-nut-oil lamp, with the animals in an adjoining room; in the mining villages their home would be the cheerless coolie lines; in a town their residence would be over, or part of, the place of business. The urban 'toilet' would be a bucket which was emptied in the canal twice a day. The mansions of the rich Chinese merchant were more obvious and elegant, but less typical. However this might be, even the most humble and 'under-privileged' Chinese was classed by the strong current of Siamese opinion as one of the Jews of Asia!

[1] Landon, op. cit. p. 130.
[2] ibid. quoted from *Siam Chronicle* of 8 April 1939.

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[p.168]

CHAPTER XVI

THE REVOLUTION OF 1932

669 At five o'clock on the morning of 24 June 1932 tanks, machine-guns, and troops were on the move in Bangkok. Prince Nagor Svarga, half-brother to the King and Minister of the Interior, was the first to be visited. By one o'clock in the afternoon forty important persons were held prisoners in the Throne Hall. An ultimatum had been dispatched to the King at his summer palace at Hua Hin. The revolution had begun.

The leaders of the revolution wished, if possible, to retain the reigning King as a constitutional monarch. If he were not amenable, then they would proceed towards their objectives without him. The ultimatum called upon King Prajadhipok to return to the capital again as king under the constitutional monarchy as established by the People's Party. The King accordingly returned to Bangkok on 26 June, and by 1 July the Party was able to announce that his Majesty had consented to their terms. No blood had been shed.[1]

The new dispensation which had thus been ushered in was not the product of a mass movement among the people; it arose in the first place from discontent among that class of commoner which in the previous reign had held most of the important offices of the Government, but which under King Prajadhipok administered only eight of the twelve ministries. A commoner, no matter how high his rank, might be tried by the law courts: royalty, the only other class, were a set apart, and could not be brought to trial without the consent of the King. The shift in the balance of power made commoners feel that they were being ruled without adequate representation. A second reason for the discontent was the secrecy with which the government of the country was conducted, and the lavish, and apparently useless, expenditure of public funds. A third cause, probably as important in its influence, was the dismissal of many officials of the lower rank and the levying of a new salary tax while the royalty remained exempt. A fourth reason was discontent among officers of the Army.

[1] The principal authority followed in this chapter is *Siam in Transition*, by K. P. Landon, chap. i.

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Compared with the violent political upheavals of French and Russian history, the course and the occasion of this transition may seem undramatically mild. But Siam gained much more by its painlessness than she suffered through its lack of drama. The leading figure in the movement was Luang Pradist Manudharm,[1] a young lawyer who had studied in France. His were the brains and the ideas that gave it meaning and direction.[2] 669

Since our concern is to follow the fortunes of the Chinese in Siam, and since they were not involved in any way in the *coup* (save that the blood of their race flowed in the veins of most of its leaders), we need not describe in detail the phases of the situation as it developed. We must watch closely, however, for any of the consequences of the revolution which bear on the interests of our subject.

The new constitutional monarchy experienced no great difficulty until March 1933, when Luang Pradist Manudharm introduced his economic plan. It was discussed in both the People's Assembly and the State Council. Of the changes that it proposed, one of the most important was the purchase of farming land for the nation. The farmers would then become Government employees and would receive salary and pension. The growing and selling of rice, the principal industry of the nation, would thus be nationalized. This would automatically eliminate the middleman, both as buyer and wholesaler, and this middleman was usually a Chinese. 669 185

When the plan was referred to a special Committee of Fourteen the burden of opinion was in favour of giving it a trial. But opposition developed under the leadership of the Premier, Phya Mano, who suggested that the Government should attempt to better the economic situation in a more conservative way. Luang Pradist's

[1] His name is also given in English as Nai Pridi Panomyong. There are two ways of expressing the Siamese name and title in English: both forms have always been used.

[2] Dr Landon's interpretation of the course of events in Siam is here followed, but one person who has read the text is a little dubious about the statement of the causes of the 1932 revolution and the implied denunciation of the old regime. The reduction in official establishments (he points out) and the imposition of the salary-tax were necessitated by the economic depression (cf. the cut in the pay of public servants in Great Britain in the same period). The old regime had its defects but it also had its merits: there has been far more corruption in high circles in Siam since the exercise of power passed from members of the Royal House to the middle class—if only because the members of the former were so wealthy that there was no inducement to indulge in corruption, 'Even the devil should have his due', remarks the critic.

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669 185 proposal was to encourage the co-operative society idea, thus making more capital available to the peasants, to enlarge the credit stores where the peasants could buy their supplies at cost price, to establish granaries at local points and to buy up rice for shipment to Bangkok in order to eliminate the middleman, to establish co-operative rice-mills for the sale of rice direct to foreign countries, and finally to establish a settlement scheme for people who had no land. In the People's Assembly, however, many members agreed with Phya Mano in thinking that the plan was communistic. Difference of opinion became bitter, without hope of reconciliation. Finally, when it was certain that his plan would not be accepted, Luang Pradist left for Europe. After his departure an Act was passed against Communism and was also aimed against the nationalization of land, industry, capital, and labour.

[668 475]

669 A second *coup* of 20 June 1933, when tanks again rolled through the streets of Bangkok, resulted in the arrest of Phya Mano and the resignation of his Government. The charge against the regime was that it had nullified the gains of the revolution, for when Phya Mano had prorogued the People's Assembly, as a result of the differences of opinion over Luang Pradist's plan, it meant that all the powers of the Assembly had been entrusted to the King until such time as the Assembly should be reconvened—which was thought on all sides would be never! But with a few important exceptions the new *coup* put the same elements in power again. The new Premier, Phya Bahol, the friend of Luang Pradist, made it clear that whilst he was in power the Government would never follow Communist ideas. Says Dr Landon:

[423] Phya Mano, shrewd and experienced politician that he was, knew that a peasant's dearest possession is his land. In many districts it is considered shameful to sell a section of rice land; since that land, in peasant thought, is the rightful inheritance of the children, whose very bread and butter it is. Government ownership of rice lands cut across the very fibre of the people's thinking. It could hardly have done anything else than pauperize the country.[1]

The way was now clear for Luang Pradist's recall. He arrived quietly in Bangkok on 29 September 1933, and a commission appointed to investigate his standing with regard to Communism reported early the following year that he, personally, was cleared of suspicion on this count. Luang Pradist had previously persuaded

[1] Landon, *Siam in Transition*. p. 34.

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the commission that the consideration of his plan was irrelevant to any discussion of his personal position. The plan, however, was shelved indefinitely. 669

A royalist rebellion of 12 October 1933 led by Prince Bavoradey was a failure: in March 1935 King Prajadhipok abdicated. These events, however, belong to the political history of Siam, and they had no direct bearing on economic policy or on the fate of the Chinese.

The People's Party, while it was still a secret society, had drawn up a policy of Six Principles which were promulgated by radio, newspaper, and handbill on the day of the revolution in June 1932. These principles were those of equality, liberty, education, maintenance of internal order, independence, and economics. Most of these were implemented one by one, but that of economics was never promulgated though parts of it were gradually adopted.

The principle of independence involved the denunciation of the old treaties with foreign Powers, and paved the way for the negotiation of new ones on a basis of perfect equality of the signatories. 648 186 When eventually a treaty with China was completed in 1946, it was naturally of this same order. In the field of economics the Chinese were to feel the force of modern nationalism, even though Luang Pradist's National Economic Policy was, in the main, shelved; in the field of education the measures of the Government were to bear fruit sooner. Let us consider economics first.

Post-revolutionary Economic Measures and the Chinese

Luang Pradist's plan, though it was not published and the two Bills based on it were dropped, nevertheless embodied the ideas behind the measures which were actually to be brought into effect. 185 444 In essence it aimed to raise the economic status of the Thai as distinguished from the other peoples in Siam, to complete their adaptation to the modern technological world, to provide them with a higher degree of education, and to put them in control of industry, commerce, and agriculture. Commerce, hitherto left to the immigrants from China, was now to be opened up to the Siamese themselves. This meant that the non-citizens controlling so much of the commercial life of the nation would have to be ousted, and since 95 per cent. of these aliens were Chinese it was obvious that they were going to feel the operation.

The question of remittances to their home country called addi- 000

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457 The question of remittances to their home country called addi-
471 tional attention to the Chinese. The European Financial Adviser, Mr W. A. M. Doll, in 1937 quoted a Chinese banker as congratulating his countrymen in 1932 on the fact that all through the depression Chinese immigrants in Siam had not diminished the scale of their remittances home, which he placed at an aggregate of $50 million (Chinese) per annum, a sum equal at the then exchange to 37 million baht. Although this sum, said Mr Doll, might be an over-estimation, careful attention should be devoted to any measure or series of measures aiming at the retention of a larger share of the country's earnings, for attainment of this object would result in building up resources of national wealth available for capital development, which in 1937 were strikingly non-existent.[1] Mr Doll, however, surprised perhaps by the ardent and radical reaction to his remarks, soon reconsidered his figures and decided that the calculation of the Chinese banker was an over-estimate and that the figure of Chinese remittances was really less than 20 million baht.[2] At the same time he issued a warning to the Siamese nation against attempting too fast to gain its economic objectives.

441 One way of altering the existing state of affairs was to encourage the Siamese to engage in trade and commerce; the other was to exercise discrimination against the Chinese. Both methods were tried in turn, or simultaneously. By the beginning of 1939 the trend of events had made the moment propitious for a series of definitive measures and these were guided into law by the versatile and thorough-going Minister of Finance, the brains of the revolution, Luang Pradist Manudharm.

444 First of the series of Government Acts concerned a matter which on the face of it was comparatively trivial, namely the forbidding
656 of Chinese food hawkers to sell their wares in the vicinity of the Ministry of Education. Hawking, as we have seen, was largely in
655 the hands of the smaller Chinese tradesmen. This was followed by measures which probed deeper into the economic system of Siam. From 1936 onwards the Government had entered increasingly into business on its own account—it had established paper-mills, a sugar factory at Lampang, a silk factory at Nagara Rajasima, a tobacco factory at Bangkok, an oil refinery at Klong Toi, a cannery at Pak Chang, a textile-mill, and a soya-bean-oil distillery, and it

[1] Cited in 'The Chinese in Thailand', *The Record*, vol. xvii. no. 1 (July 1937) p. 165. (Bangkok, Department of Commerce.)

[2] op. cit. pp. 39–40; Landon, *The Chinese in Thailand*, pp. 166, 167.

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was planning to engage in the manufacture of cigarettes, leather, and cement, to build rice-mills and a tin-smelter, and to operate tin-mines and co-operative stores. To feed these undertakings with staff it had set up vocational schools and had re-shaped the education system generally to encourage industry as an outlet for Thai energy. Further to guarantee the success of these ventures, the Government in 1939 announced that patriotic Siamese should observe five points—namely, eat food derived only from Siamese produce or Siamese manufacture, wear clothing manufactured by the Siamese, assist one another to enter into commerce, trade, and industry, help all public works and other ventures devised by the Government for the good of the nation, and finally, the supporters of the Government should show themselves worthy of public trust by conducting their businesses in an honest and honourable way. The proclamation was known as *Ratha Niyom*.[1]

Response to this exhortation by the easy-going Siamese not being what had been hoped, a campaign was started in 1940 for the encouragement of Thai merchants and Thai industry.

All this activity was obviously directed towards competing with the Chinese: now in 1940 the Government sought to reinforce its campaign by regulating them more severely. On 21 February the Minister of Finance introduced a new system of taxation. On imports of food, alcohol, and cloth the tariff was to be increased: on farm implements, draft animals, and farm machinery it was to be reduced. The total taxes remitted amounted to over 12½ million baht, but it was intended notwithstanding to raise the Government revenue from 109 to 155 million baht to pay for new social services, including 30 million baht for local improvement and primary schools. This would be done by an income tax, a shop tax, a bank tax, a stamp tax, and an amusement tax. There would also be an increase in the amounts charged for various permits such as for gamblers, prostitutes, opium smokers, &c. By the new code of taxation passed by the National Assembly on 29 March the burden was to be borne by the merchant class, which was, of course, largely Chinese.

In addition to these measures, a new amendment to the Aliens' Registration Act was passed, whereby all aliens were required to pay a yearly registration fee not exceeding 10 baht in addition to the original immigration and certificate of residence fees. For the

[1] *The Chinese in Thailand*, p. 181.

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first year the fee was set at 4 baht and dependants of aliens were not required to pay it. The Chinese being the principal alien immigrants, the fee would amount to a further tax on them.

'As law followed law, dislodging foreign business men from fields of commercial enterprise which they had held, in some cases for centuries,' says Dr Landon, 'the natural tendency among the Chinese was to seek Thai citizenship in larger numbers than previously.' This was a development not entirely welcome to the Siamese, and they met it by raising bars to such naturalization. Amendments to the law now required applicants for naturalization to possess one or other of a number of qualifications—service in the Army or Navy, or in other Government service, an age exceeding fifty years, employment in agriculture, ownership of immovable property for a period exceeding two years at the time when the application for naturalization is made. (In the case of landed property it must be over two rais[1] in cities, or twenty rais up-country.) In all cases where the applicant had to be over thirty years of age, he had to possess a good knowledge of colloquial Siamese; in cases where the applicant was under thirty he must also know how to read and write Siamese. Even then a majority of the applications for naturalization were rejected for various reasons.

The Chinese complaint was that not only were they, a helpless minority, discriminated against in a breath-taking series of regulations and decrees, but also that they were allowed no decent interval to adapt themselves to the new situation. Other aliens, too, were being squeezed out of their occupations, but whereas the Shipping Act directed against Europeans gave a respite of 180 days before it came into effect, the Salt Act affecting the Chinese came into operation immediately, and no time was given to the Chinese in the industry to wind up their businesses, and the regulations against food vendors were also of immediate application.

As the fervour for nationalism grew and highly placed Siamese vied with one another in showing their enthusiasm for the newly proclaimed *Ratha Niyom*,[2] agitation against the Chinese, reinforced by active governmental measures, rapidly approached hysteria:

[1] A *rai* = 1,600 square metres.

[2] The principles of *Ratha Niyom* were announced by the Premier, Luang Pibul Songkram, on 24 June 1939. It was rather like the mixture of the First Principle, nationality, of Sun Yat-sen, with the New Life Movement in China. A first measure was the changing of the name of Siam to Thailand (it was changed back to Siam in September 1945 and back again to Thailand in May

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By the middle of August more than thirty Chinese schools and ten of the eleven Chinese newspapers had been closed, numbers of Chinese had been deported, hundreds were being called in the tong probes, raids on Chinese schools, newspaper plants, and homes were becoming a daily occurrence; several prominent Chinese were in jail for remitting money to China, and the entire Chinese community was in an uproar.[1] 186

Meanwhile the Siamese and their Government, though they must have expected strong reaction to their policy, were satisfied that they were acting within their rights. Indeed it was the Chinese community that seemed to be provocative, and its secret organizations were responsible for a series of murders and other crimes. A newspaper correspondent urged the Chinese to welcome the police drive then in progress against secret societies as a measure towards cleansing the Chinese community of disruptive elements.[2] He argued that the Chinese had been given the same freedom and right to live as the Thais and they even had the right to send good Thai gold out of the country. Let them in return keep the peace and co-operate in making the land a safe and prosperous one. The Government itself felt the situation had become so tense that an official communiqué was issued denying rumours current abroad that Thailand (the new official name of the country) had changed her policy of equal friendship for all foreign nations, and that the recent police campaign against secret-society activities constituted an anti-Chinese move. Thailand's foreign policy (it stated) remained the same as before—offering equal friendship to all—and the recent action against certain Chinese residents had been necessitated by the Government's task of maintaining public safety, peace, and order. Simultaneously the Government broadcast in the Chinese language to the Chinese in Siam, Malaya, and Hong Kong justifying its actions. [648]

On 29 November Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, thinking the time opportune for him to take a hand in the affair, sent a telegram to Luang Pibul Songkram, President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs. He had watched with admiration (he said) the recent accomplishments in Siam which had filled the hearts of 648

1949). The word Thai was extended to all sections of the people. There were regulations, too, for dress and deportment, and insistence on a national moral code which forbade Thais to act in the interests of foreigners as, for instance, by being their agents in the sale or purchase of land, or disclosing any information to them detrimental to the interests of the country.

[1] Landon, *The Chinese in Thailand*, p. 189.

[2] *Thai Chronicle* (16 August 1939) cited by Landon, op. cit. p. 192.

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648 all Asiatic peoples with pride, and, having stressed that the Chinese people were by nature peace-loving and law-abiding and the Chinese residents of Thailand hard-working and conscientious, and had long lived on the best of terms with the Siamese, he requested the Government of Thailand to give full protection to the lives and property of Chinese citizens residing in Thailand and permit them to engage in their lawful pursuits without molestation as heretofore.

722 What was happening within the Chinese community in Siam at this period can be divined by analogy from the simultaneous developments in Malaya. The war with Japan was now in full swing and the Chinese generally regarded themselves as being participants. But the Government of Siam, in the same way as the Government of Malaya, was at peace with Japan and desired nothing to happen within its territory which would prejudice its status. Within the community there was a difference of opinion amounting to a split between the Chinese Nationalists, organized by the Kuomintang, who wished to bring about a complete boycott of Japanese goods, and the non-politically-minded merchants who wished to conduct business as usual, even, in the ordinary way, dealing in Japanese goods. Many of these merchants were otherwise supporters of the Kuomintang and were generous contributors to the funds for relief (*anglice*, the maintenance of the war) in China, but some of them drew the line at sacrificing their businesses in competition with traders of other nationalities who had no scruples regarding trading with the Japanese. Organizations of youths and girls who wished to make the boycott a total one resorted to direct action to enforce it and this, in Malaya, brought them into collision with the police. Pressure amounting to blackmail was at the same time applied in some cases to secure contributions to China relief and for the private needs of these organizations. In Malaya the organizations were known as the Anti-Enemy-Backing-Up Societies and they had close associations with the Communist Party. All this activity, whether of the Kuomintang or of other political societies, was to be distinguished from that of the 'secret societies' who were acting purely for their own profit. In both Siam and Malaya all these organizations were in one sense 'secret societies' since legally they were not permitted to exist, but by long usage the term has become associated with the Heaven and Earth or Triad societies.[1]

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[1] Dr Landon refers to the 'tong probes'. *Tong* (properly 'T'ong') is a Can-

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Discrimination against the Chinese has been analysed by Dr Landon under 'minor industries' and 'major industries'. The former included, for instance, birds'-nests concessions (in which the Chinese were to be completely squeezed out of a business which was one of their traditional occupations), food vending, salt and tobacco, the Signboard Act (taxing signboards in Chinese), the butchering and retailing of meat (also to be taken from the Chinese), domestic shipping, and the Liquid Fuel Act, which threatened the existence of the foreign oil companies and, indirectly, that of their Chinese agents and sub-agents. Under 'major industries' Dr Landon lists rice, tin, rubber, and teak forests. In each case the object was to eliminate the Chinese from the industry. 656

There remains to be summarized action against the Chinese through the Government control of immigration. This dates from 1927. Mr Lin Yu says: 167 651

At that time anyone free from trachoma might land on the payment of a landing fee of 5 ticals and a process fee of ticals 6.50. In 1931 the law was revised. The landing fee was raised to 10 bahts (the new name for tical); a new tax of 30 bahts for the right of domicile was imposed, and a Chinese resident, on leaving Siam, was required to obtain a return passport (valid for two years) at a fee of 5 bahts. In 1933, the domicile tax was increased to 100 bahts and the fee for a return passport to 20 bahts, and the holder of the passport was required to return within one year. A literacy clause was also added, to bar Chinese labourers and women from entering the country. The result was that the first two steamers entering Bangkok from Swatow after the enforcement of the new law carried a total of only 41 passengers, while formerly they had carried hundreds on every trip; and of these 41, over 20 were prevented from landing, under the new act.[1]

Backdoor immigration became a serious problem almost as soon as the law went into effect. One way was to be landed from a junk 167 687

tonese word meaning 'hall', 'court', and in mandarin 'Tang'—not to be confused (as it often is) with 'Tang', a society, as in Kuomin*tang*. It is not used in this sense in Malaya and apparently describes what is known there as a *hui*. Its association, it seems, is with the ancestral hall of a clan. This is its meaning in the United States. 575 668

The whole question of the connexion between huis, tongs, and political organizations needs much more clarifying and I personally feel that there is a closer connexion between the Heaven and Earth Society and modern political societies than is usually thought. Certainly the type of 'hoodlum' who naturally turned to secret societies and extortion finds a modern outlet for his talents in the Communist Party in Malaya and elsewhere. V. P.

[1] Lin Yu, 'Twin Loyalties in Siam', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. ix, no. 2 (June 1936) p. 193.

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in some quiet spot; another was to land in Malaya, paying the landing fee which was only SS $5 (11*s.* 8*d.*), and then to enter Siam secretly by one of the numerous jungle paths over the frontier. The Siamese Government's answer to this was the Registration of Aliens Act of B.E. 2479 (1936–7).[1] No charge was made for the certificates, but each applicant had to supply photographs of himself which were good likenesses and which had to be changed every five years. A widespread check-up was begun with the object of discouraging illicit immigration. A fine of 200 bahts was imposed for failure to produce a certificate on demand.[1]

Even this was not enough to stem the tide of immigration, and the Immigration Act of 1937–8 empowered the authorities to charge the immigrant a fee of 200 bahts. The new law also placed on the carrier a responsibility for the alien, and heavy penalties were provided for a shipping firm or other carrier who, knowingly or unknowingly, brought an illicit immigrant into the country. This last measure had effect, and after the introduction of the 200 baht fee in October 1938 the number of Chinese entering Siam was usually less than the number leaving it. Had it not been for the war in China, which was reducing the power of the country to support its still-increasing population, it seems almost certain that Chinese immigration would have come to a standstill.

We have left to the next chapter an account of the efforts of the Siamese Government to counteract the propaganda of the Chinese Revolution and to force assimilation at an increased rate. As always in Southeast Asia, the field of education is where the most decisive battles are fought. But the evidence above collected and summarized would amount to a complete dossier by itself. Can it be said on the facts set out that the Siamese were justified? One witness, at least, thinks they were, and this is Sir Josiah Crosby, who was British Minister in Bangkok from 1934 to 1941. In a book published in 1945 he says: 'It has been alleged against the Siamese that what they were doing at this time amounted to a persecution of the Chinese community. To this view I am unable to subscribe and I consider such an accusation to be altogether too sweeping.'[2]

[1] For further details regarding the discrimination against Chinese in immigration and labour see Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 115. A law of 1935–6 forcing rice-mills to employ a 50 per cent. minimum of Siamese workers failed, since it was found impossible to carry on owing to the shortage of labour.

[2] Sir Josiah Crosby, K.C.M.G., *Siam: the Crossroads* (London, Hollis & Carter, 1945) p. 75.

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Later he states thus his opinion regarding the future relation of the two countries: 'I see no reason why Siam and China should not get on quite well in future, provided that the Chinese will extend to Siamese national rights and susceptibilities the same recognition which they are so insistently and so understandably demanding for their own.'[1]

A contrary opinion is that of Dr Landon who, writing of the same period but at an earlier date, says:

> Thailand has a right to autonomy. The fact that she is using this right to discriminate against a helpless minority is, however, a sad commentary on the Government. The Government has an honourable record of solid achievement in many fields of endeavour, but a record that is stained now by its treatment of the Chinese.

However, Dr Landon's criticism of the Siamese Government is not so much of what they were doing but of how they were doing it: 'If the Chinese in the salt industry had been given a year in which to wind up their businesses, if the food vendors as well as the Chinese in other industries affected by the new laws had been given the same period, there would have been little if any room for criticism.' The last two passages must be read in juxtaposition. The fault, it seems, lay in *suddenly* depriving thousands of unfortunate human beings of their means of livelihood; not in reserving an industry to the native people.

[1] ibid. p. 76.

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CHAPTER XVII

EDUCATION AND THE CHINESE IN SIAM

869 THE paucity, or absence, of information regarding the instruction of youth within the Chinese community of Siam up to the twentieth century need not deter us from asserting that such instruction existed in every family where there was at least one literate member, and that it bore almost exactly the same form and character as in China itself or in countries of the Nanyang. This assurance derives from the knowledge that there had been no 872 radical change in Chinese elementary education for centuries. If a 779 school existed, it was almost certainly in a temple or matting shed, often ill ventilated and ill lighted. In one corner would be the tablets to Confucius, the 'Teacher and Pattern for all Ages', and to the god of letters. Incense sticks would be burning in front of both. On entering the room the boy would bow to the tablet of Confucius, salute his teacher, and take his seat. The school course would consist in the first stage of committing to memory the canonical books and of writing an infinity of diversely formed characters as a mental exercise. In the second stage, the pupil would translate books into the colloquial language (i.e. 'reading') and he would have lessons in composition. In the third stage, there would be belles-lettres and the composition of essays. Pupils learnt their lessons aloud (a feat of concentration when all the other pupils were doing the same thing with another book or a different part of the same book), and recited them when learnt with their backs to the teacher. There were no graduated classes; in fact, there were as many classes as there were pupils. The books would be the *San Tzŭ Ching*, or Trimetrical Classic (a work of A.D. 1050), then the *Ch'ien Tzŭ Wen*, or Millenary Classic, the Odes for Children, the Canons of Filial Piety (*Hsiao Ching*), &c., and in due course the pupil would pass on to the Four Books, which, from the Sung dynasty, comprised the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, the Analects, and Mencius.

872 There would, of course, be a good deal of variety even within these circumscribed limits, and in a mercantile community such

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as that of the Chinese in Siam the use of the abacus would certainly be added to the curriculum.[1] 872

That, generally speaking, the existence of instruction among the Chinese in the Nanyang attracted such little notice from the authorities of the country in which they dwelt was due to the fact that the instruction was by no means universal, that it was largely domestic, and that when Chinese schools did exist (and the uproar created by pupils 'backing' their lessons or yelling out their tasks would certainly not conduce to secrecy) they were always few and small.[2] Chinese who could afford it (and there were not many) sent their children back to China for instruction.[3] What effect this kind of education had in sharpening or dulling the pupil's intellect is a question with which we are not immediately concerned, but it is certain that it left an indelible mark or *cachet* on its recipient which was as unmistakable as that of Eton or Harrow. In the old days the instruction was not politically suspect for it enjoined obedience to authority and was otherwise ultra-conservative in tone. 871

However this might be, the education of the Chinese by themselves had indubitably the effect of confirming the Chinese in his sense of being one of the Black-haired Race, in his apartness from the native peoples and belief that they were all 'outside Barbarians', and when the spirit of nationalism began to arise in Siam and China it was soon regarded as the essence and the symbol of segregation. But as the age-old Chinese system began at last to meet the modern demands upon it, and to transform itself and cease to be conservative, the suspicion and hostility of the authorities were increasingly directed towards it.

As for Siamese boys, there had also been education of a sort for them, but in the modern sense it came in with the American missionaries in about the 1830s.[4] Progress was extremely slow in the face of the *vis inertiae* of native apathy, so much so that when Prince Damrong was appointed Minister of Public Instruction in 1908, it was still necessary to pay families to send their children to school. The priests, too, resisted the modern ideas of education [197]

[1] For an account of the Old-Style Chinese schools see Purcell, *Problems of Chinese Education* (London, Kegan Paul, 1936) p. 18 ff.

[2] In Batavia the Chinese school in the eighteenth century had only about 400 pupils.

[3] Virginia Thompson, *Thailand: the New Siam*, p. 109.

[4] Landon, *The Chinese in Thailand*, p. 261.

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871 with great determination. Little by little, with much effort, they were converted, and they now conformed to the desire of the sovereign, so that in many *wats* (temples) the teaching was equal to that in the best schools.[1] In 1914–15 there were only 119,000 pupils, with 4,500 teachers: by 1936–7 there were 1,227,000 pupils, with 27,000 teachers.[2]

872 Since 1898 there had been in existence a scheme for national education. In 1919 a law was promulgated making primary education compulsory for all boys and girls between the ages of seven and fourteen. By this private schools and law schools were formally brought under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Instruction, and their heads had to be registered with the Government. The first Primary Education Act was passed in 1921. With the passage of these laws the Government began to undertake the regulation of all schools. All children of compulsory school age had to attend schools run by the Government or private schools which had permits from the Government.[3]

871 So far what has been recounted is the creation of the *machinery* for the control of these private schools: the application of this control had, however, begun to be applied before the Acts of 1919 and 1921, albeit with a gentle hand. In 1918 the law had required that in every Chinese school the principal must have completed at least two years of Siamese schooling, that the teachers must have passed two Government examinations within one year, and that three hours a week should be devoted to the study of the Siamese language. This ruling, which was a shock to Chinese conservatism, provoked protests in Chinese newspapers, and the opposition of the Chinese together with the impracticability of the laws resulted in lax enforcement for a number of years.[4]

Meanwhile a great increase in the number of Chinese schools in Siam had resulted from the zeal for education, which had received a new impulse from the Chinese revolution of 1911, and which was given further momentum by the success of the Kuomintang drive in 1926–7 and the adoption of the Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen as the foundation of Chinese education the following year.[5]

[1] *Statistical Year Book—Siam*, chap. viii, quoted by Landon, op. cit. p. 263.
[2] ibid.
[3] Landon, op. cit. p. 265.
[4] Lin Yu, 'Twin Loyalties in Siam', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. ix, no. 2 (June 1936). cf. Virginia Thompson, *Thailand: the New Siam*, p. 109.
[5] Purcell, op. cit. p. 161.

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Of 1,581 private schools listed for 1935–6, 206 were Chinese, and of the 1,541 listed in 1936–7, 259 were Chinese.[1] 871

Before 1928 the rise of these schools had excited a very general attention to them on the part of the Siamese, and obviously the administration were expecting in due course to find them a cause of embroilment. Writing in 1924 Graham says:

> . . . These schools, which date from shortly after the Chinese revolution, were at first looked upon by the Siamese with suspicion, as it was thought that they inculcated revolutionary principles, and checked the free mixing of Chinese with Siamese blood which had been so much to the advantage of Siam. The suspicion which seemed at one time likely to lead to interference and suppression, though not unreasonable, had apparently faded away, a measure of purely nominal control had been accepted, and the schools in question flourish and increase. They are certainly creating a class with aspirations and ideals largely foreign to, and seemingly incompatible with, those of Siam.[2]

The change of attitude can be traced to the visit of King Prajadhipok to the southern provinces in 1928. His Majesty learned then that many schools were flagrantly ignoring the orders of the inspectors, and his visit was quickly followed by that of the Minister of Public Instruction with the aim of devising a more adequate control of these schools.

This was the beginning of a campaign which was to last for many years.

The promotion of education was an essential plank in the platform of the party which accomplished the revolution of 1932. The aim was to create a population that was 50 per cent. literate within the ten years it had fixed as the limit of its own party control of the country's affairs. The existence of a system of Chinese schools side by side with the native Siamese schools was a grave impediment to this programme. In the words of Dr Landon:[3] [658 665]

> . . . the schools were alien in character and purpose. From the beginning they were founded to preserve the foreign culture of a minority population, to perpetuate the Chinese language and Chinese nationalism. Whenever the law conflicted with their purpose, they got round it if they could—and disobeyed it if they could not.

[1] Landon, op. cit. p. 267. Schools with secondary classes as well as primary were counted as two schools.

[2] W. A. Graham, *Siam* (London [illegible] under Moring, 1924) i. 256–7, cited by Landon, op. cit. p. 265.

[3] Landon, op. cit. p. 269.

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871 To check this process, and at the same time as a measure towards eradication of Communist propaganda in the schools, the law of 1919 was for the first time applied seriously in Bangkok, and affected Chinese schools in particular because of their heavy concentration in the capital.[1] In the past it had been the practice for Chinese to be taught in the Chinese schools in the morning and Siamese in the afternoon. In many cases children did not bother to attend the afternoon session. Government inspectors found that children who had been attending school for three years could not read Siamese. The conclusion to be drawn was that the Siamese language was not being taught.

The response of the Government to this defiance of its decrees took the form of a requirement that in a 28-hour school week, 21 hours were to be devoted to studies in the Siamese language, and one hour was to be given to physical education. Mathematics, science, geography, history, &c., were to be taught in the Siamese language. Foreign languages might be taught in the afternoon only and Chinese might be taught only as a foreign language. If these regulations had been strictly obeyed it would have meant the practical elimination of the teaching of Chinese since this language was much more difficult than Siamese to learn and the time left for its study was quite inadequate.[2]

875 Added to this was the insistence that stiff examinations in Siamese must be passed by teachers in Chinese schools. This measure dated from four years before the Siamese revolution of 1932. Before that it had been possible for teachers from abroad to start teaching in schools in Siam immediately after arrival by obtaining permission from the inspectors to defer their examination in Siamese for six months, which period might in some cases be extended up to four years. The order following on the royal tour in 1928 had made it impossible for anyone to teach who had not passed the fourth primary examination in the Thai language.

871 The new regulations and the strictness with which they were enforced roused the Chinese community of Bangkok to present a petition to the Government asking for more time to be allowed for

[1] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 110.

[2] The writer when Assistant Director of Education in charge of Chinese schools in the Straits Settlements, 1930–2, found that the 5–7 hours a week devoted in most Chinese schools to the learning of English was quite inadequate and the results were, in effect, nil; and Chinese is more difficult to learn than English.

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teaching the Chinese language, and that teachers from China be absolved from passing the stiff examination prescribed. But the Government refused to make any concessions on this score. They insisted, however, that other foreign schools should comply with the regulations in exactly the same way as the Chinese were required to do. 871

If there is one technique in which the Chinese surpass all other races it is that of obstruction, and they now called out their shock troops of passive resistance (if one may so put it) to render the regulations inoperative. Local Chinese qualified to do so passed the examination in Siamese and a stock of certificates to teach was created for the use of newly arrived teachers from China; another plan was to clip ten minutes or so off each hour allotted to the Siamese language, using the gain for teaching Chinese.[1] The Siamese inspectors, though exasperated, maintained their courtesy and calm, and the result was that seventy-nine Chinese schools out of a total of over a hundred were closed.

One more shot, at least, the Chinese had in their locker in this new cultural battle, and that was to pack off their children to school in China or Malaya; this they did with thousands above the age of five.[2] [167]

In view of the indignation aroused and the commotion caused in the Chinese community (and for all their reputation for resigned endurance they are an extremely excitable race), it is a little surprising that the crisis passed off without a boycott, strike, or some incidents of violence. It happened, however, that at this juncture a party led by the Minister of Commerce of the Chinese Govern-

[1] Landon, *The Chinese in Thailand*, pp. 272–3. 'One school in Bangkok used a burglar alarm when inspectors were sighted and teachers without permits would then hide in cupboards while qualified teachers took over their classes.'

[2] Dr Landon says (op. cit. p. 273): 'One of the wildest rumours was that the Government was planning to pass a law prohibiting the return of Chinese children to China for study. Another version of this rumour claimed that the Government was going to collect a tax of two to five hundred baht on every child sent out of the country to study.'

Mr Lin Yu states this rumour as a *fact*—and says that when the Chinese talked of establishing Chinese schools in Malaya, the Siamese Government immediately decreed that any child of school age leaving Siam would be liable to a tax of 500 bahts! 'Twin Loyalties in Siam', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. ix, no. 2 (June 1936) p. 196. [65]

Dr Landon's account is undoubtedly the correct one and Mr Lin Yu's acceptance of the rumour lends support to Luang Pradist's complaints against Chinese newspapers and other manufacturers of rumour.

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871 ment made a tour of Siam and on their return to China they reported that the Chinese enjoyed more freedom under the Siamese Government than under any other foreign Government in the world—in fact that they were in a most favoured position in the country. This, no doubt, had a sobering influence on the Chinese community, though there was nothing in the attitude of the Siamese educational authorities to suggest that they were to be treated more leniently or that they had nothing to fear in the future from even more stringent regulations.

204 The following year, 1934, the conflict was reopened by the publication of a list of fifty banned books. This list was merely a recapitulation at the end of the year of books of a strongly anti-foreign or nationalist nature which had been banned one or two at a time over the years (some of them dated from 1925 onwards when anti-foreignism was deliberately introduced into text-books);[1] but the effect on the Chinese was as if the fifty had been suddenly banned all at once. In 1938 a further forty-three books were banned as containing Communist or other objectionable doctrine (an act, incidentally, that was likely to secure the support of at least the anti-communistic Chinese).

Meanwhile spokesmen for the Chinese stated the Chinese case in foreign periodicals, and the Bangkok newspapers were by no means silent on the subject. One of the latter, the *Bangkok Daily Mail*, owned by Prince Svasti, the father-in-law of King Prajadhipok, and with (usually) an American editor, commented in an editorial,[2] 'it is indeed strange that some kind of compromise measure could not have been arrived at (regarding the time allotted for teaching Chinese) after the Chinese residents here presented their petition'. Nothing happened and shortly afterwards the newspaper ceased publication for good.

648 In July 1936 Luang Pradist himself, now State Councillor for
609 Foreign Affairs, felt impelled to make a public statement on Siamese-foreign relationships in general with a special reference
871 to relationships with the Chinese. This is what he said:

> A word about the relations between China and Siam would not be out of place in the course of this article. Connexions between the Chinese and Siamese peoples date as far back as the beginning of the history of the Thai. China and Chinese have played important roles in all aspects

[1] See Purcell, *Problems of Chinese Education*, p. 165 ff.
[2] 1 July 1933, Landon, op. cit. p. 272.

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of Siamese life and the Chinese immigrants in addition to being afforded the cleanest, widest, and most independent home they have ever acquired abroad, have been amply rewarded for their contribution towards the progress of Siam. It is therefore most regrettable that, of recent date, some subversive elements have been devoting themselves to jeopardizing the friendly relations between the two countries by spreading absurd tales regarding the treatment of Chinese in Siam.

Any misunderstandings between Chinese and Siamese are built up mainly on ignorance of the facts and on prejudice. For instance, Chinese newspapers have reported that 'The Siamese Ministry of Public Instruction forbids the teaching of the Chinese language to Chinese children in Siam.' The Primary Education Law in Siam was enacted years ago, but efficiency in its enforcement is more recent. What the Ministry of Education insists on enforcing, is that a certain number of hours per week be devoted to the teaching of the Siamese language in Chinese and in other foreign-owned and foreign-managed schools. When Chinese immigrants choose to settle down in Siam, it is but natural that their children should be afforded the educational background which will qualify them for their social and political status and responsibilities as sons of the soil. As a nation engaged in developing a democratic form of government in which the people will have a predominant voice in the administration, it is but just and right that every future citizen of the land should be acquainted with the national language, at least up to a certain minimum standard.[1]

Luang Pradist's article announced the firm intention of the new regime to persist in the course it had undertaken, and there was increasing evidence that it was having a great measure of success in securing its aims. More and more Siamese teachers were employed in place of Chinese in Chinese private schools. There was little point in having Chinese teachers now that the time for teaching the Chinese language was so restricted, and, incidentally, the Siamese cost less, a matter of importance now that the Chinese merchants were less disposed than before to contribute to the funds of the schools. In April 1939 there was a new tightening-up of the regulations. Children between seven and fourteen, who hitherto had been allowed to study Chinese five hours a week, were in future to be allowed to study it for only two hours a week, with concessions in favour of the Chinese language for those above that age. At the same time the regulation that in all subjects other

[1] Luang Pradist Manudharm, 'Unimpaired Balance in World Friendships is Watchword of Siamese Foreign Policy', *Siam Today* (Bangkok, Government Publicity Department, July 1936).

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609 than language study Siamese must be used as the medium of in-
871 struction was insisted upon anew. In the meantime the amount of Chinese taught in the Government schools had decreased during the years of the constitutional regime until it was on the point of disappearing altogether.

668 Under the ultra-nationalistic regime of Luang Pibul, action to
871 enforce Siamese education at the expense of Chinese was intensi-
609 fied. From April to August 1939 twenty-five private Chinese schools were closed; in August seven more were closed. The reason given in the latter instances was that the action was in the course of a campaign against Chinese 'secret societies', including the Kuomintang, and in order to forestall plans for organizing sedition and unrest. During the rest of 1939, and throughout 1940 and 1941, the offensive went on and was being vigorously maintained, along with other measures to control the Chinese, at the moment when the Japanese troops landed at Singora.

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CHAPTER XVIII

BEFORE AND AFTER THE SIAMESE-CHINESE TREATY OF AMITY OF 1946

CONSIDERATION for the feelings of a friendly nation had, even before 1942, been of secondary importance to the requirements of Siamese domestic policy; but when, on 25 January of that year, Siam threw in her lot with the Japanese and declared war on Britain and the United States, this factor was altogether removed. China, although not technically at war with Siam, was an ally of the two Western Powers and her nationals were now to all intents and purposes enemy nationals. It cannot be said, however, that the new discriminatory measures introduced were anything more than a continuation of a course already embarked upon. 648 722

By a decree of 10 June 1942, twenty-seven trades and professions were reserved exclusively for Siamese. Aliens were to be allowed a period varying between ninety days and one year to leave the reserved occupations, which were as diverse as hairdressing and brick manufacture. The impediment to making the decree effective proved to be the lack of Siamese competent or willing to fill the vacancies left by the Chinese, and as was the case with earlier similar measures it brought no revolutionary change.[1] Concurrently, however, the pro-Japanese dictator, Luang Pibul Songkram, took other strong measures to keep the Chinese in their 'place', and Chinese of non-Siamese citizenship were excluded from residence in certain Siamese cities.[2] 463 722 656 609

As in other countries of Southeast Asia, the 'iron curtain' descended with the Japanese occupation and cut off Siam from outside view. What came through was mainly sparse intelligence, and since the liberation there has become available very little supplementary evidence. It seems, however, that the main action against the Chinese was as described above. The more dramatic developments were to come only after the Japanese surrender.[3]

[1] P. P. Pillai, ed., *Labour in South-East Asia, a Symposium* (New Delhi, Indian Council of World Affairs, 1947) p. 209. The *New York Herald Tribune* of 14 November 1945 says twenty-one occupations, but the principle is not affected.

[2] *New York Herald Tribune* (14 November 1945).

[3] There is evidence that the Allied cause had support among the Siamese [668]

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609 463 722 656 During the period following Phibun's overthrow in 1944 the Siamese Government which came into power withdrew a number of anti-Chinese regulations, including the one prohibiting the Chinese from following any of twenty-seven stated professions.

727 579 In September 1945, when after the Japanese surrender Allied troops had entered Siam, the Chinese in Bangkok assembled to celebrate the Allied victory. This led to a clash and Bangkok officials had to intervene to end sharp fighting between Chinese civilians and Siamese troops and police.[1] A number of Chinese were reported killed.[2]

According to *The Times* report, one Australian was killed in the disturbance and three others were wounded, among thousands of prisoners of war awaiting repatriation. The Siamese were said to be fighting among themselves and against Chinese in pitched battles. Many of the Siamese engaged were of the bandit type, armed with rifles and grenades obtained from the Japanese. The police attempted to break up a Chinese procession with a bayonet charge which was followed by machine-gunning and bayonet tossing. A curfew was thereupon ordered by the British military and Siamese civil authorities. The immediate cause of the outbreak was said to be the Siamese refusal to allow the Chinese to hoist Chungking flags in celebration of the Allied victory. Intermittent clashes lasted until 28 September.[3]

648 727 609 There was an immediate outburst in the Chungking press. *Ta Kung Pao* demanded that the Siamese Government be forced to go through a surrender ceremony, and that all former collaborationists, including Luang Pibul Songkram, should be punished as war criminals.[4] The incident was cited also in connexion with the

[668] population. For instance, the *Straits Times* of 9 April 1948 reported that Wong Seng Wun (apparently a Cantonese), the leader of the White Star guerrillas, an outlaw band along the Siam-Malaya border, had offered to suppress any agitation which might be 'provoked from outside' in the four Malay-speaking provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, and Setun as a mark of gratitude to the Siamese Government for supplying rice to the guerrillas when they were in the field against the Japanese. This at the same time was a gesture of anti-Malay feeling, for there was at this time agitation among the Malays against Siamese rule. It seems, too, that the White Star guerrillas were Communists who were pro-Ally only during the war with Japan.

[1] *New York Times* (25 September 1945).

[2] ibid. (29 September 1945).

[3] *The Times* (25 September), *Manchester Guardian* (26 September), *New York Times* (28 September 1945).

[4] 29 September 1945.

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anti-Chinese policy generally by the Kuomintang organ the *Central Daily News*,[1] which urged that the Bangkok regime should be compelled to suspend its measures against the 2·5 million Chinese of Thailand, while the *National Herald*[1] demanded action against the 'unmistakable manifestation of a hostile attitude on the part of Siam'. The Chungking newspapers, at the same time, coupled the conduct of the Siamese Government with that of the Government of the Philippines which was then adopting an intransigent attitude to the return of Chinese ex-residents to the country. Simultaneously the Chinese Foreign Office announced that it had instructed the Chinese embassy in the United States to ask the Siamese Minister in Washington for an explanation of the clashes, and to demand that steps should be taken against a recurrence of the incident and also payment of compensation for the victims.[2]

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The disturbance in the Siamese capital had been quietened by the Monday (25 September), although a shutdown of Chinese shopkeepers had paralysed much of the city's trade. Police were reopening the closed streets and the curfews imposed by the Allied occupying forces were lifted.

An official explanation of the cause of the incident was soon forthcoming. A Siamese Government spokesman stated that his Government, insisting on complete sovereignty, could not allow the Chinese in Siam to fly the Chinese flag by itself and that the Siamese colours must be flown beside it. The spokesman pointed out that the law regarding flag-flying was not peculiar to Siam, for the Chinese had one of a similar kind.[3]

The reason for the riots which appears to be accepted in official circles in the United States is that the Siamese were critical of the Chinese community in Siam because it had not participated in the underground Free Thai movement to assist the Allies. The Chinese, on the other hand, were critical of the Siamese because the Siamese Government had declared war on the Allies. Since China was one of the major Allied Powers they identified themselves with China. Each group resented the other's celebrating an Allied victory.

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This view is very plausible, and demonstrates once more the irony of international politics.

However, no settlement satisfactory to both Governments was

[1] 29 September 1945.
[2] *New York Times* (A) (29 September 1945).
[3] *New York Times* (29 September 1945).

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Chinese

648 reached, and we shall observe that at a later date the Chinese pro-
727 tests were renewed. It was against this unsatisfactory background
609 that the Siamese-Chinese Treaty of Amity, so long delayed, was to be negotiated. It was finally signed at Bangkok on 23 January 1946, and since it forms the diplomatic basis of all subsequent relations between the two countries it is desirable that it should here be reproduced in full instead of being relegated to an appendix.

Siamese-Chinese Treaty of Amity[1]

648 *Article I.* There shall be perpetual peace and everlasting amity between the Kingdom of Siam and the Republic of China as well as between their peoples.

Article II. The High Contracting Parties shall have the right reciprocally to send duly accredited diplomatic representatives, who shall enjoy, in the country to the Government of which they are accredited, all the rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions generally recognized by public international law.

Article III. Each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to send Consul-Generals, Consuls, Vice-Consuls, and Consular Agents to the localities within the territories of the other which shall be determined by common accord. Such consular officers shall exercise functions and enjoy the treatment generally recognized by international practice. Prior to their assumption of office, they shall obtain from the Government of the country to which they are sent, exequaturs which are subject to withdrawal by the said Government.

The High Contracting Parties shall not employ persons engaged in industry or commerce in these consular offices.

609 *Article IV.* The nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties
648 shall be at liberty to enter or leave the territories of the other under the same conditions as the nationals of any third country, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the country applied to all aliens.

Article V. The nationals of each High Contracting Party shall receive in the territory of the other the most constant protection and security for their persons and property, and shall enjoy in this respect the same rights and privileges as the nationals of the other High Contracting Party, subject to their compliance with the same laws and regulations.

The nationals of the High Contracting Parties shall receive in the territory of the other in regard to all legal proceedings and in matters relating to the administration of justice and the levying of taxes and re-

[1] *The Siam Directory, 1947 (B.E. 2490)* (Bangkok, the Thai Company) p. B-33 (checked from official version supplied by the Siamese embassy, London). Preamble omitted above.

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quirements in connection therewith treatment not less favourable than that accorded to nationals of the other High Contracting Party. 618

Article VI. The nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to travel, reside, to carry on all kinds of professions and occupations, to engage in industries and trade and, subject to reciprocity, to acquire, inherit, possess, lease, occupy, and dispose of any kind of movable property, throughout the whole extent of the territories of the other, under the same conditions as the nationals of any third country, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the country. 609

They shall also have the liberty to establish schools for the education of their children and shall enjoy the freedom of assembly and association, of publication, of worship, and religion, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the country. [871]

Article VII. Other relations between the two High Contracting Parties shall be based on the principles of international law. 618

Article VIII. The High Contracting Parties agree to conclude as soon as possible a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.

Article IX. The present Treaty is drawn up in duplicate in the Siamese, Chinese and English languages. In any divergence of interpretation the English text shall be authoritative.

Article X. The present Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with the respective constitutional requirements, and shall enter into force on the day on which the exchange of ratifications takes place. It shall remain in force continuously thereafter. Twelve months notice of termination may however be given by either High Contracting Party after a lapse of ten years.

The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Chungking or Nanking.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Dated at Bangkok, etc.

(L.S.) M. R. Seni Pramoj

(L.S.) Li Tieh-tseng.

By a letter dated the same day (23 January 1946) Mr Li Tieh-tseng, the Chief of the Chinese Mission to Siam, confirmed on behalf of his Government, that

The stipulations contained in the said Treaty do not in any way affect, supersede or modify any of the laws and regulations with regard to naturalization, immigration and public order which are in force or which may be enacted in territories of either High Contracting Party, provided they do not constitute measures of discrimination particularly directed against the nationals of the other Party.

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609 In regard to land ownership, the rights already acquired by nationals
648 of either High Contracting Party in the territory of the other, in accordance with the laws and regulations of such territory, at the coming into force of this Treaty shall be respected. In the event of expropriation, an indemnity will be paid, not less favourable than that paid to the nationals of the other Party or the nationals of any other country.

On the same day the President of the Council of Ministers, Mr M. R. Seni Pramoj, addressed a letter to Mr Li Tieh-tseng in exactly the same terms *mutatis mutandis*.

This treaty, which was ratified by both countries at Nanking on 28 March 1946, marked an epoch. Thereafter China would have diplomatic and consular representatives in Siam to safeguard the interests of her nationals, though the practised eye might see in this the possibility also of exacerbating the old conflicts. But although the 'perpetual peace and everlasting amity' in Article I contrasted with the 'twelve months notice' in Article X may cause the moralist to raise a sorrowful eyebrow or the cynic to shrug his shoulders, the treaty as a whole seems at first glance not to impose any conditions incapable of fulfilment. The loophole as before is the conceding to the Chinese in Siam the same rights as any *third* nation, for whatever could be safely imposed on any third nation could safely be imposed on the Chinese. Yet it must seem to the observer that the treaty of itself could not, even if fulfilled to the letter, dispose of the deep differences of attitude of the two Governments. This, however, must appear from the narrative.

Whilst Siam is awaiting the arrival of the first Chinese ambassador and the first Chinese consuls, it will be convenient to discuss two questions involving the Chinese which were agitating the Siamese authorities. One was rice, and the other was immigration.

477 In spite of all the measures devised to prise the rice monopoly
439 out of the grip of the Chinese merchants, the latter in 1946 still
442 managed to retain control of the marketing of that essential commodity. In the post-war Far-Eastern world the food position was critical, verging on the disastrous. The eyes of the deficiency countries were directed towards the only two with any considerable export surplus, namely Burma and Siam. The exporting ability of both these countries had been greatly reduced by the war. The Siamese Government was under an obligation imposed by the peace treaty with Britain to export to Malaya and other countries a given quantity of rice free and a further quantity at a given price,

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but it found all attempts to meet its obligations frustrated by the enormous scale of the smuggling then in progress. It was said that for every two tons produced by the middlemen for Government export at least one ton was smuggled over the frontier or by ship, at a price many times the official one. Moreover, the Siamese Government was unable to obtain revenue on a reasonable scale through the tax on the country's main export, rice, at a time when the trade was the most profitable. In these circumstances resentment of the Chinese stranglehold on rice was naturally provoked anew. 477 439 442

On 22 July 1946 Mr M. L. Kri Dechatiwong, Minister of Commerce, called for the co-operation of every Siamese in preventing rice-smuggling, and threatened to impose the most stringent measures to the same end. The same day the Ministry of Commerce issued the following communiqué: 439 442 656

Whereas the Government is under the obligation to supply rice to alleviate the starvation of the peoples of the world within twelve months from last May, it appears that in spite of the price offered by the Government for the purchase of paddy, a large number of merchants do not give due co-operation to the Government at all, hoping that the Government may increase the monthly offered price. The result has been that for the period May–June this year the Government has been able to ship only 10,000 tons. If this situation is allowed to continue, it will mean a total shipment for the twelve months of only about 500,000 tons which will be some 700,000 tons short of the target tonnage. In terms of money the country will lose 300 million baht. . . . With a view to remedying the situation, the Minister of Commerce finds it imperative to take steps to ensure the smooth supply of rice. This may take the form of compelling the hoarding merchants to sell their stocks at the fixed price within the month.

In commenting on this communiqué, the same Siamese-language paper, *Prachakorn*, said that in other words if Siam could not carry out the terms recently agreed to, the Government would have to supply the rice free of cost to the United Nations according to the financial agreement with them.[1] This would mean that the Siamese nation as a whole would be the injured party because the Government would have to levy additional taxation to pay for the rice supplied free.

[1] *Prachakorn* (24 July 1946). This was included in the Anglo-Siamese Rice Agreement.

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The Minister of Commerce, in pursuance of his determination to end the stoppage in the flow of rice to the Government market, made plans for the entire reorganization of the rice industry. A committee was appointed to consider the appointment of wholesale and retail agents of the Ministry of Commerce under the rice-rationing system planned for the following year. The committee decided that the number of wholesale agents for Bangkok and Dhonburi should be thirty, each catering for the needs of about 4,000 families. Many dealers had also applied for appointment as retail agents, and it was reported that all the retail agents would be appointed from Siamese applicants. The Prime Minister, however, turned down a suggestion that only Siamese dealers should be appointed both as wholesale and retail agents under a rationing system, while Chinese merchants should be allowed to carry on with their existing rice business so long as they did not sell above the controlled prices. This, said the Prime Minister, would be contrary to a promise given to the Chinese ambassador (who had now arrived) that Chinese merchants would be welcomed to help in the rationing plan.[1]

Strong protests from the Chinese merchants were received by the chairman of the committee on the appointment of rice-selling agents, and on one occasion he received a fuseless bomb accompanied by a letter threatening that if he did nothing to assist the Chinese rice merchants he would receive another bomb, this time 'complete with fuse'![1]

The progress in the rice war is described in the vernacular press of January 1948. First of all we learn that of the eighty or so mills in Bangkok, most had had to stop as a result of the new system of rice trading introduced by the Ministry of Commerce. By this system only the Thai Rice Company and affiliated mills were entrusted with the milling and grading of rice. About 10,000 labourers were unemployed as a result of the new measures. But the affected rice-mills had already appointed representatives to negotiate with the Minister of Commerce. Khaung Aphaiwong explained that the new system was introduced to ensure sufficient rice for internal consumption, and to improve the quality through carefully supervised grading.[2]

[1] *Siam Nikorn* (16 December 1946).
[2] ibid. (5 January 1948).
These developments all belong to the period subsequent to Marshal Pibul

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On 18 January, however, a communiqué of the Rice Office of the Ministry of Commerce stated that the Ministry had now accumulated appreciable reserves and that paddy was coming to Bangkok in an even flow. Rice godown and rice-mill owners had promised to improve the quality of the rice, and the Minister had therefore lifted the order to intercept rice and paddy boats along the waterways, in order that rice-mills and merchants might be able to make their usual purchases. 442 656 434

It does not seem that the war against the Chinese rice merchant and mill-owner had been won by the nationalization of the industry, but temporarily, at least, a working compromise had been reached.

Immigration

In the second half of August 1946 some concern over the influx of Chinese immigrants into Siam had been revealed in the Bangkok press as a result of the entry of an additional shipload of over 2,000 Chinese. In a press interview the Minister of the Interior stated that he was informed that there were from 40,000 to 50,000 Chinese in Swatow awaiting transportation to Siam. In June a report had mentioned that there was a rush of bookings in Swatow because of the rumour that the Government would shortly raise the immigration tax. Both the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior assured the public that there was no cause for alarm, that the Chinese were a law-abiding people, that the Government would maintain a policy of magnanimity, and that sympathy was due from the Siamese to the Chinese since the latter were suffering from famine conditions in their own country. At the same time the Ministers assured the public that the Government would repatriate Chinese who were without employment or the means of support. Mention was made of the fact, however, that the Siamese were entitled under a clause of the Sino-Siamese Treaty of Amity to enforce an immigration quota and it was stated that the subject was now under consideration and would be placed before Parliament in due course. 167

Statistics published by the Minister of the Interior showed that

Songkram's new *coup d'état*, but are included here to take the rice story as far forward as possible.

That the quality of rice exported had greatly deteriorated since before the war was the subject of constant complaint in Malaya during 1946–7.

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167 70 per cent. of recent immigrants were women and children, that 10 per cent. had been in Siam before, and that immigration exceeded emigration by only 10 per cent. About 3,000 arrived in June 1946, 4,000 in July, and August expectations were even greater. The pre-war average had been about 30,000 a year, so that, if the Swatow figures were accurate, twice as many Chinese desired to enter Siam as in 1939.[1]

Early in 1947 the immigration question became involved with that of the outbursts of violence laid at the door of the San Min Chu I Youth and other secret societies, amounting to some hundreds, and arrests accounted for the 400 Chinese awaiting deportation in February of that year. It was at this time officially announced that the details of the proposed new immigration regulations had been completed, and that shortly a communiqué could be expected fixing an immigration quota of 10,000 a year for Chinese and 200 for other nationals.[2] The introduction of the new measure coincided with a fresh crop of rumours, including one that Chinese officers as well as Chinese civilians were infiltrating from the famine areas of China.[2]

Finally, in 1948, the immigration quota for Chinese, as well as for other nationals, was fixed at 200. This, of course, was a much more drastic measure of immigration control of the Chinese than any that had been enforced hitherto.

871 *Education*

The eternal dispute as to whether the children of Chinese immigrants should be educated in Chinese or Siamese continued as before, but between the liberation and the *coup d'état* of November 1947 there was no very important development. In November 1946 it was learned that the Ministry of Education would in future in-

[1] About this time a group of Chinese leaders approached the Government with a proposal to establish a Chinese immigrant city along the banks of the Chao Phya River, but Government support for such a scheme was not likely to be forthcoming.

Because there had been several cases of cholera on a ship that had recently arrived, the entire shipload was quarantined in a rice-mill and the Government announced that the necessary inoculation must be secured by the Chinese at the port of embarkation twelve days before sailing. To the group under quarantine the Minister of the Interior made a speech on 27 August advising them as to the friendly relations existing between Siamese and Chinese nationals, and of the laws they were expected to abide by, and concluding with a presentation of powdered milk to the children and expectant mothers.

[2] The *Satcha* (14 January 1947).

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clude the Chinese language in the curricula of the (Government) schools, but at the existing stage it would be taught only in the commercial schools and language courses. Later, however, the teaching of this language might be extended to other faculties.[1] The following week it was reported that some Chinese schools had been opened in Bangkok without proper permission from the Ministry of Education and this breach of the law had been brought to the attention of the Chinese ambassador.[2] The new Chinese ambassador, for his part, as might have been expected, had already been agitating for concessions to Chinese schools, but it appears that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had replied that none of his requests could be complied with, as the regulations applied to American, British, and French schools equally.[3]

If, however, the Chinese daily, *Hua Ch'iao Pao*, is to be trusted, the ambassador's persistency was not altogether without result. The newspaper said that some of the six demands had been agreed to, including the one that Chinese teachers should be exempted from Siamese examinations. Following up this reported success, the paper in an editorial referred to the Compulsory Education Act of 1935 and the People's Schools Act of 1946, insisting that Chinese schools in Siam were greatly affected by these Acts. Freedom of education had been taken away from the Chinese. Chinese children under fifteen years of age were forced to receive Siamese education. Only a few hours were left for Chinese study. In the past Chinese teachers who did not pass the examination in Siamese were not allowed to teach.[4]

Diplomatic and Other Relations. Mr Li Tieh-tseng, the first Chinese ambassador to Siam, arrived in Bangkok on 6 September 1946, and was most enthusiastically received by the Chinese community. But his position was by no means an enviable one. Unlike most ambassadors to a foreign country, he could not in the first place rely on the undivided support of his nationals within the country. The Chinese community was sharply divided into factions, and the ambassador, as representative of the Kuomintang Government of China, would be the natural object of hostility from the Chinese Communists within Siam. Two attempts on his life were reported soon after his arrival. Furthermore, he was beleaguered by hundreds of Chinese pressure groups. In consequence

[1] *Prachakorn* (19 November 1946). [2] *Suparb Burus* (23 November 1946).
[3] *Siam Radsra* (4 December 1946). [4] *Hua Ch'iao Pao* (30 January 1947).

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he was harassed and uncomfortable. Several incidents between Siamese and Chinese a few days before his arrival, possibly due to the heightened sense of national importance felt by the Chinese, caused him to emphasize in a speech during the flag-raising ceremony that he would be of aid and protection only to the law-abiding.

The new claims on the ambassador's attention were myriad. He had to preside over the inauguration of a number of new Chinese consulates in Siam; he had apparently received instructions to press for a settlement in regard to the death and injury of Chinese in the victory celebrations of September 1945; he was soon to submit memoranda to the Foreign Ministry demanding action regarding the teak commandeered from Chinese nationals; he had to request a softening of the conditions of the control of Chinese schools and teachers; he would before long be confronted by a Bill which, if passed, would affect the right of residence and vocation of the Chinese in Siam.[1] These and a hundred other things he had to attend to; and in his spare time he would be expected to travel the length and breadth of the country to the numerous centres to which his countrymen had penetrated. Apart also from his duty to pursue the interests of his country with the Siamese Government, he would have to be ready with replies to the complaints which the Siamese themselves would certainly prefer in return against his Government and the Chinese community within Siam.

One such complaint concerned the taking of votes among Chinese nationals in Siam for the elections which were to be held in China the coming October. This procedure, which had been the cause of friction in other countries in Southeast Asia in the past, was said to be regarded by the Siamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a 'direct violation of Siamese sovereignty'. It was recalled by the Siamese press that when the German residents had voted for the elections in Germany they had gone over three miles from the Siamese coast to do it.[2] The reply by the secretary of the embassy to a press inquiry was that by the rules of the election the embassy had no right to concern itself with the matter.[3]

[1] A Bill for reservation of certain areas for economic and agricultural purposes sponsored by Luang Arthaphorn Phisan, M.P. for Trat, was introduced in the National Assembly in July 1947. The ambassador's contention was that the Bill, if passed, would violate Article VI of the Treaty of Amity. The *Kiatisak* (13 July 1947).

[2] *Nakorn Sarn* (22 August 1947). [3] *Heung Yian Pao* (16 September 1947).

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On 15 October the Chinese ambassador officially informed the Foreign Ministry that his Government had dropped the plan to authorize the consuls to supervise the voting of Chinese nationals in Siam in the forthcoming general election. In announcing this, the Siamese Premier, Mr. Dhamrong Nawasawat, said that this officially closed the issue. At the same time it was officially stated by a spokesman of the Chinese consulate-general that plans were under way for the registration of all Chinese citizens in Siam.[1]

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It must have been a matter of the greatest difficulty for the Chinese ambassador to decide the order of priority for addressing himself to the manifold problems. The Chinese press and the 'pressure-groups' were agitating for action in a hundred different directions at once. At the same time the new diplomatic and consular representatives did not wish to appear to lack initiative on their own account. For example, it was stated on 19 August 1947 that, following the inauguration of the Chinese consulate at Singora, all Chinese consulates would hold a meeting to discuss the conditions of livelihood in Siam and promote a policy for action.[2] Negotiations for the trade agreement foreshadowed in the Treaty of Amity would also come within the sphere of the ambassador.[3] Other questions competing for attention were the border troubles, in which Chinese outlaw bands claiming Kuomintang affiliations were reported to be fleeing into south Siam from Malaya, and the increasing Chinese secret society and mob disturbance in Bangkok and towns in the vicinity.[4]

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In reviewing the first year of diplomatic relationship between Siam and China it could not be fairly said that the innovation had eased the tension between the peoples within Siam. It had indeed intensified the existing feeling. Soon after the arrival of the Chinese ambassador one Siamese newspaper had commented:

Although there is some degree of truth in the old saying about Sino-Siamese relationships, it is not the less a fact that, due to some reason or

[1] *Straits Times* (17 October 1947).

[2] *Hua Ch'iao Pao* (19 August 1947).

[3] It had already been announced that the Chinese Government had successfully negotiated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for permission for Chinese cargo boats to anchor in Siamese waters and trade with Siam, in the absence of mutual agreements to this effect. The *Satcha* (23 August 1946).

[4] When Mr Li Tieh-tseng returned to Bangkok on 26 September from a visit to the south, he stated that during his trips from Singora (Songkla) to Penang he had found peace and quietness. There had been no murder of five Siamese police by Chinese bandits as had been reported.

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other, natural or even blood relationships seemingly have failed to become a guarantee for the good conduct of either party. . . . The establishment of diplomatic relations between Siam and China has become all the more necessary now in order to ensure this natural relationship against unfair play on the part of either the Chinese or the Siamese. . . .[1]

Nor did some sections of the press, especially the Chinese press, tend to unruffle feelings or to allay suspicions. The *Suparb Burus*, for example, on 1 December 1946 complained of an article in the *Hua Ch'iao Pao* calling upon the Chinese community to unite against the Siamese so that 'the influence of China may dominate the whole of the Chao Phya River'. 'No Chinese will believe', comments the Siamese editor, 'that any Chinese newspaper would be permitted to behave in this way in any country other than Siam.'

The happenings above described, though not by any means constituting a detailed history, are enough to indicate the trend between the Japanese surrender and the *coup d'état* of November 1947. The deterioration of the military situation in China to the disadvantage of the National Government, and the increase of Communist activity in Malaya and other adjacent countries, together with the return to power of Marshal Pibul Songkram who had been identified with the anti-Chinese policy of before and during the war, were factors that were bound to influence the fortunes of the Chinese in Siam.

[1] *Naeo Na* (11 September 1946).

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CHAPTER XIX

THE COUP OF 1947 AND ITS SEQUEL

EARLY on the morning of 9 November 1947 Siamese Army units under the leadership of Field-Marshal Pibul Songkram[1] seized control of the Government by a *coup d'état* in Bangkok. The Premier Luang Dhamrong Nawasawat was reported missing and Nai Pridi Panomyong (i.e. Luang Pradist Manudharm) was said to be sheltering in Singapore. 669

Faithful to the historic policy of the Chinese in positions of dependence, important members of the Kuomintang in Bangkok lost no time in calling on the Marshal. They brought with them baskets of flowers. Pibul asked the overseas Chinese to be calm and to adhere firmly to peace, not giving way to fearful expectations. Both sides, it was reported, had a 'sincere talk'. The Marshal assured the deputation that there would not be any anti-Chinese action. In return the Chinese spokesman, Mr Lee Li-yow, promised the Marshal that China and the Kuomintang would support his work until its successful fruition. In conclusion he expressed a hope that 'the sentiments of the Chinese and Siamese would remain for ever as fresh and as beautiful as the garlands of flowers in this basket', and he hoped that the mutual friendship would be eternal.[2] 669 648

Marshal Songkram followed up his assurance to the Kuomintang deputation by a declaration on 12 December in which he said, 'it should be clearly understood that I am in no way involved in politics since I have handed the powers of administration over to the Government, retaining only my military post'. He insisted that the restriction to the areas in which aliens could reside, the reservations of certain trades for Siamese nationals, and other measures he had introduced were *merely a part of his war-time policy to prevent the Japanese from getting full control of the country*. He solemnly asserted that the acts of the past would not be repeated. It was his firm belief, he said, that the Khuang Aphaiwong Government, now in power, composed of discreet and far-sighted gentlemen, would

[1] Luang Pibul Songkram was placed under house arrest in September 1945, but released the following March, the Bangkok High Court having decreed that the War Crimes Act could not operate retrospectively.

[2] *Chong Yuan Pao* (12 November 1947).

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be instrumental in safeguarding and in enhancing Sino-Siamese relations. 'I will give them all the support in my power.'[1]

The Chinese, both diplomats and ordinary civilians, watched the fortunes of the new regime with a strong personal interest. After the bloodless November coup, the monarchists gained the upper hand and in the January elections Aphaiwong's Democratic Party won a majority in Parliament over Pibul Songkram's own Tharmatipat Party. In February Aphaiwong (Khuang Abhaiwongse) accepted the post of Prime Minister, but, like his predecessors, he found the influence of the fighting forces too strong for him, and early in April, when Marshal Pibul again headed a combination against the Cabinet, Aphaiwong was forced to resign in spite of his parliamentary majority. The Regency Council then asked the Marshal to form his new Government, which was thereupon made up of nine soldiers and seventeen civilians of his own choosing.[2]

The United States, Britain, China, and India recognized the Government of Khuang Aphaiwong in March 1948 following popular elections which had returned the Democratic Party to power with a large majority. Pibul (Phibun) came to power in April by theoretically constitutional means. There was, therefore, no question of recognizing him, since theoretically there had been no *coup d'état* but continuity in the Siamese Government. (The United States and the other Powers had for a short time considered a policy of non-recognition (i.e. withdrawing recognition) but did not pursue the idea.)

Before China had recognized the Marshal's regime the flag question had once more come to the fore. Following protests from the Chinese in Siam against the law prohibiting the flying of the Chinese flag over Chinese private schools except on 'special occasions', the Chinese ambassador had referred the matter to Nanking. The Chinese consul at Paknampok about this time ordered all Chinese schools within the consulate area to hoist the Chinese flag alongside the Siamese flag. This led to an incident which a Siamese education officer reported to his superiors. Chinese schools were then instructed that they could fly only the Siamese flag daily, and the Chinese flag in addition to that of Siam only on special occasions under the Flag Act of 1936. When some Chinese schools stopped putting up the Siamese flag they were informed that they were

[1] *Straits Times* (12 December 1947).
[2] *The Times* (1 May 1948); *New York Times* (7 April 1948).

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committing an offence. If they persisted in their action they were warned that strong measures would be taken against them.[1]

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Although the press in China and the Chinese press in Siam made a great deal of incidents such as these, it seemed that Marshal Pibul intended to adhere closely to his promise that the old days of repression would not be repeated. 'They were very angry with me once', he repeated in April: 'I shall take careful steps', he added.[2] It was therefore with some dismay that the Chinese residents of Siam heard on 13 May that the Siamese Government had forbidden new Chinese schools to open, ordering that the number must now be reduced from 490 to 148. This was hailed as the first anti-Chinese action since the Marshal had returned to power.[3]

When the Chinese in Siam realized the full import of this new decree they were filled with consternation. It was much more thorough-going than anything that had been decreed before. For weeks the papers were flooded with arguments pro and con. Meanwhile there was a rumour that the schools had refused to comply with the regulations and were closed, and that all teaching in the Chinese schools had come to a standstill. Actually, as it turned out, only a few schools had closed and these shortly were reopened. Then the Ministry of Education intervened with counsels of moderation. Let the schools reopen, it said, and comply with the Government regulations. Chinese educationists could then seek for changes in the regulations. Only Parliament could alter the regulations, insisted a spokesman of the Ministry. Subsequently more liberal teaching hours were granted to the Chinese schools.

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By the beginning of 1949 agreement between the Siamese and the Chinese Governments had been reached on the daily ceremony of hoisting the Siamese flag and the use of Siamese as the chief

[1] Bangkok United Press message to *North China Daily News* (4 February 1948).

On 14 February 1948 Mr Sahas Mahakhun, President of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and representative of other Chinese associations, called at the Ministry of the Interior and the Foreign Office to present a petition that Chinese schools in Siam be permitted to fly the Chinese flag. *The Standard*, Bangkok (14 February 19 8).

[2] *North China Daily News* (12 April 1948).

[3] *New York Times* (15 May 1948).

General Mankorn Promyodhi, Minister of Education, at a press conference the same day said that the number of Chinese schools in Bangkok would be reduced gradually from 100 to 8 and in the rest of Siam from 390 to 140. Any school which was closed for an infringement of Siamese rules would not be allowed to reopen. ibid.

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648 medium of instruction: on the other points at issue negotiations were proceeding.

All this on the face of it looks like a renewal of the old campaign to insist on the assimilation into the Siamese people of all who made Siam their home. In one sense it was, but a new factor had come to the surface in Chinese affairs in Southeast Asia generally which was to mean a re-ranging of forces, and this we must investigate if we are to make a fair appraisal of the Siamese Government's policy.

186 When the rise of nationalism effected a dichotomy in the Siamese organism, the pull was either towards Siam and her traditions or
668 towards Chinese racialism in its new bourgeois-socialist guise. After the purging of the Kuomintang of its leftist elements in 1927 the Communists had split off and gone underground. Both in Siam, where no political parties were allowed, and in Malaya, where neither the Kuomintang nor the Communist Party were registered societies permitted to operate, the activities of both the parties were illegal. But they were nevertheless in operation and in clandestine conflict with one another. The Chinese Communists, however, in spite of their universal doctrines, were Chinese first and Communist afterwards when it came to an issue where a third party was involved. Moreover, a large proportion of the poorly-paid Chinese teachers who came to the Nanyang were sympathetic to Communism and disseminated its doctrines clandestinely to their charges. When it came to a contest with the Siamese authorities they were naturally wholeheartedly on the side of the Kuomintang even though the Communist Party denounced its members as bourgeois traitors and betrayers of the revolution.

One does not need to have crossed the border into Siam to understand the dilemma in which the Chinese *towkays*, the merchant leaders and members of the committees controlling Chinese schools, found themselves in this long-developing situation. Many of the older ones had had little education themselves, and though they wished their children and grandchildren to share in its blessings they had no desire to have them brought up as Communists. The Kuomintang with many younger and active leaders did its best to ensure that the teachers engaged were orthodox in the faith of Sun Yat-sen, but it was beyond their powers to ensure that even a majority of the 3,000 teachers, paid so little and subjected to all the vexations imposed by Siamese educational policy, were incul-

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cating the doctrines approved by Nanking and nothing else. So it was that many Chinese, though ardent Nationalists, had mixed up with their feelings a secret sympathy for the Siamese Government in its campaign against subversive action.[1]

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Since all political organizations were illegal, the Government was correct in refusing in its campaign to distinguish between Chinese Communists and Nationalists. At the same time it was somewhat ironic that a popular underground movement among the Siamese in furtherance of the Government's aims should also have taken the form of secret societies. Early in May the existence on a large scale of these societies, variously describing themselves as 'Black Siamese', 'Black Elephants', 'Black Tusks', and 'Buddha's Disciples', was disclosed when they splashed the city of Bangkok with posters and leaflets demanding an immediate cessation of Chinese immigration into Siam, and calling on the Government to set up 'Chinatowns' in Bangkok and other major cities in the kingdom. The police were said to be trying to track down these secret societies.[1]

668

Early in June the Chinese Communist terror began in Malaya. Overt war to the death was declared against the Government and capitalists and Kuomintang members alike, without distinction of race. Since the Communist guerrillas in Malaya were Chinese almost to a man, the tendency among Europeans in Malaya was to identify with them the Chinese race as a whole, even though Chinese merchants, shopkeepers, and employees on mines and estates as well as Europeans were being struck down with strict impartiality. In the Siamese Parliament an allegation was made that the Chinese were trying to 'colonize' Siam, and had offered huge bribes to the police authorities in pursuance of this aim. The Deputy Minister of the Interior, replying to a question on the subject, stated that an investigation had been ordered by the Government. At the same time the Siamese authorities ordered a vigorous campaign against all secret societies, and the illegal carrying of arms. They meant to 'crush the Chinese menace', but simultaneously they meant to eradicate all secret societies of whatever colour. 'Black Elephants' or 'Buddha's Disciples' might propagate correct sentiments: in the long run they might prove a double-edged weapon.[2]

At the beginning of 1949 informed opinion inclined to place the number of Chinese Communists in Bangkok at 30,000, this being

[1] *Straits Times* (7 May 1948). [2] ibid. (7, 10 May 1948).

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the estimated number of adult male demonstrators in the May Day procession of 1948. There was a strong branch of the Communist Party with close affiliations with the movement in China, but it was doubtful whether the active members numbered more than a few hundred. Communist influence had been apparent in three spheres—labour, education, and commerce. Shortly after the war the Communists took the lead in forming a Central Labour Union, really a federation of trade unions, but it attained nothing like the same scale as the Malayan General Labour Union, and there was little industrial unrest in Bangkok. There were, however, it was reported, some powerful business interests in Siam which, if not wholly Communist in sympathy, were so hostile to the Kuomintang that they were proving useful allies of the Communists.

By February 1949 the Communist victories in China were already having a noticeable effect. The circulation of the Chinese Communist daily, *Chuan Min Pao*, then estimated at 10,000, was reported to be rising rapidly. In the words of the special correspondent of *The Times* in Bangkok: '*There is no doubt that Chinese opinion here, as in Malaya, will fall into line with whichever political group emerges victorious in China.*'[1]

We will now take leave of the Chinese in Siam for the time being in order to visit their brethren in the eastern half of the great Indochinese peninsula. In the play we shall witness the leading part will again be taken by the overseas Chinese, but the Thais will be replaced by the French, the Annamese, and the Cambodians, and the interaction of a different set of racial characteristics will impart a distinctive quality to the performance.

[1] Against Chinese Communism the Pibul Government up to this time had taken only limited action. Fifty-one Chinese had been deported in 1948.

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PART IV
THE CHINESE IN INDOCHINA
CHAPTER XX
DEMOGRAPHY

659 669 162 POPULATION statistics for Indochina were becoming very much out of date by 1949 as, however, was to be expected in a country so rent by civil strife. The same was true for Indonesia and for Burma; Malaya, Siam, and Sarawak alone had had recent censuses. The last census of Indochina had been in 1937, and from this an abstract is given below. But in considering the figures we must bear in mind that they represent *legal* and not *ethnic* Chinese, as indeed is the case in Siam. According to the *China Handbook* of 162 1937–43 the number of (ethnic) Chinese was 427,000 in 1940,[1] whereas the 1937 census gives a total of 326,000 legal Chinese. Chinese half-breeds, with a Chinese father and an Indochinese mother, were counted fairly completely in 1921, and a less complete estimate was made in 1931. Putting these two together and making allowances for the time interval, we arrive at a figure of about 141,000, which, added to the 326,000, gives 467,000 for 1940, about 40,000 in excess of the estimate from Chinese official sources. The Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer estimated the number of Chinese (ethnic) in Indochina in 1947 at 850,000.[2]

727 178 In the abnormal conditions ensuing after the Japanese surrender in 1945 and the reoccupation first by British and Chinese troops

162 [1] *China Handbook, 1937–43*, compiled by the Chinese Ministry of Information, Chungking (New York, Macmillan, 1943) p. 36. *The Chinese Year Book, 1943* (Chungking, Council of International Affairs) p. 123, gives 400,000 as the number of Chinese in Indochina on the eve of the war with Japan.

The French laws permitted naturalization only to those natives who by their 'education, habits, and general manner of life have assimilated themselves to the French'. The Chinese were legally assimilated to the Annamites, but from 1935 were regarded as 'foreigners with a privileged status'. See J. Frankel, *The Governments of South East Asia and the Chinese*, Ph.D. Thesis, London University, 1950.

[2] The most recent and apparently the most authoritative figures for 'legal' Chinese are given in the *Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochina*, 1948, which gives the total as 633,354. To this we may add an estimate [illegible],000 for Nord-Vietnam (Tongking) as this area is not included in the 1948 figures. This gives a final total of roughly 698,000 'legal' Chinese for the whole of Indochina.

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and then by French, with the complicating factor of the emergence of Vietnam, the Chinese population was, at least temporarily, redistributed. For example, in April 1948 Hanoi was reported to be 'half dead' and its business almost at a standstill, with a population (said to have approached 200,000 before the war) reduced to 110,000, with 5,000 Europeans and Eurasians, 90,000 Vietnamese, and 15,000 Chinese. Saigon-Cholon, on the contrary, had an enormously swollen population. There were said to be 12,000 French, 225 'foreign Europeans', 845,000 Vietnamese, and 310,000 Chinese, where in 1931 there had been a total population for the two cities of 256,000 including 100,000 Chinese.[1] These figures, however, must be accepted with great reserve.

TABLE III

Number of Chinese in each of the Countries of French Indochina and their percentages to the Total Population in 1937.[2]

Country	*Total population*	*Density of total population per square km.*	*Number of Chinese*	*Percentage of Chinese to total*
Cochinchina . .	4,616,000	71	171,000	3·7
Cambodia . .	3,046,000	17	106,000	3·48
Tongking . .	8,700,000	75	35,000	0·4
Annam . . .	5,656,000	38	11,000	0·19
Laos . . .	1,012,000	4	3,000	0·3
Total . . .	23,030,000	31	326,000	1·42

Population pressure developed in the northern plains at an early date. Not only has the entire area there been under cultivation for a long time, but also the people, especially the Tongkingese, have had a gradual admixture of Chinese blood 'and have acquired considerable skill, if not real mastery, of trade and industry'.[3] This fact has limited the opportunities for new immigrants such as the Chinese. The Chinese are also restricted in scope by the fact that the over-population of the Tongking and Annam deltas has meant that there has been only a small agricultural surplus for export, and consequent limitation of the natives' buying power has restricted foreign trade, one of the greatest interests of the Chinese. More-

[1] *France Viet-nam* (15 April 1948).

[2] Charles Robequain, *The Economic Development of French Indo-China* (Oxford University Press, for the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944) p. 34. *Statesman's Year Book* (1948) p. 948.

[3] Robequain, op. cit. p. 35.

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over, Europeans have appropriated most of the control of modern industry, especially mining. In southern Indochina, however, colonization is quite recent and was still going on in the middle of the twentieth century. Here the Chinese managed to establish themselves in Cochinchina by exploiting the Annamite-Cambodian conflict, and they had not to meet the same competition as they had in Annam and Tongking from the less numerous and less industrious native peoples. The coming of the French with their improved techniques, such as dredging, added to the opportunities of the Chinese by extending the cultivation of rice in central and western Cochinchina, in the sale of which the Chinese obtained the leading position.[1]

Let us now look rather more closely into the distribution of Chinese in 1936, province by province.[2]

Cochinchina (171,000). Among the five provinces of the Union of Indochina, Cochinchina, with the smallest area, received more Chinese immigrants proportionately than the others, and accounted for more than half the Chinese total for the whole of Indochina. Between the Gulf of Siam and the China Sea, Cochinchina occupied the best situation in the line of international maritime communications and this favoured the reception of the Chinese who came almost entirely from the southern provinces of China, namely Kwangtung and Fukien. The economic conditions here—with rich alluvial rice cultivation, convenient river communications, and a much more developed domestic and foreign commerce—were also more favourable for the Chinese, who were mostly merchants.

Cochinchina was colonized from the seventeenth century onwards by the Annamites, who form the mass of the population today; but at almost the same time the Chinese flowed in, and to them the Annamites were prepared to relinquish trade since they were so much more experienced in it than they.

Cambodia (106,000). Fourth in population among the provinces of the Union, Cambodia had about one-third of the total number of Chinese. The situation of Cambodia on the Gulf of Siam, near to Cochinchina, explained the important size of the Chinese community, and here again the easy communications and the small aptitude of the natives for commerce have favoured the immigrants,

[1] ibid.

[2] Wang Wen-yuan, *Les Relations entre l'Indochine française et la Chine* (Paris, Éditions Pierre Bossuet, 1937) p. 25 ff. is here followed.

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opening to them an opportunity in the highly developed trade in rice and pepper. A number of Chinese in Cambodia also lived by the actual cultivation of pepper.

Tongking (35,000). Even though Tongking borders on south China and the climate consequently resembles that of China and the other provinces of the Union, and although communication between the two countries by the sea routes is easy, the Chinese in this area are weak in numbers as compared with Cochinchina and Cambodia. Only one-eleventh of the total is to be found here. To the reasons for the sparseness of the Chinese population indicated above must be added a number of others—(*a*) the countries bordering on Tongking are inhabited by little-evolved tribes (Meo, Yao, Lolo) and they supply therefore few Chinese immigrants to Tongking; moreover these half-civilized peoples have been pushed back towards Upper Tongking by Chinese who occupied the conquered territory and had no reason to emigrate; (*b*) the foreign commerce of Tongking is less important than that of other provinces of Indochina; (*c*) in Tongking the retail trade is more in native hands than it is in Cochinchina; (*d*) owing to the frequency of typhoons off the coast it is less accessible than Cochinchina; and finally, (*e*) the overpopulation of the delta of the Song-Ko (namely, 430 inhabitants to the square kilometre, excluding the big towns) deprives the Chinese of room for settlement.

Annam (11,000). From the situation of Annam on the borders of the China Sea, its history, its civilization, and its social customs for a long time derived from China, with which it has lived in close association, one would imagine that the number of Chinese immigrants in the country would be considerable, whereas it is relatively small. Indeed, it is less important than in Tongking, Cambodia, or Cochinchina. The Annamite chain of mountains stretches from north to south; interior communications are difficult and commerce in consequence is much restricted. Besides, the rice which is cultivated for the most part in the coastal plains, far from producing an important export trade for a middleman, is not enough to support the population, maize being grown to help make up the deficiency. To these considerations Annam owes its small population of Chinese.

Laos (3,000). Laos has the greatest area of the provinces of the Union, but the smallest population of Chinese. The reasons for this are a very broken surface, lack of seaboard, the inconvenience

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of internal communications, and lastly, only small commerce is 438
practicable. Laos is a country backward in economic evolution. 133
Hence the Chinese are few.

The following figures for 1921 and 1931 will be useful for comparison: 162

TABLE IV

Number of Chinese in each of the Countries of Indochina

Country	*1921*	*1931*	*Increase*
Cochinchina	156,000	205,000	49,000
Cambodia	91,000	148,000	57,000
Tongking	32,000	52,000	20,000
Annam	7,000	10,000	3,000
Laos	7,000	3,000	−4,000
	293,000	418,000	125,000

Places of Origin in China of Immigrants into Indochina 162

From 1891 for Cambodia, and from 1906 for Cochinchina, the 167
French Government, in order to facilitate its administration, 463
divided the immigrants from China into five groups according to their place of origin or their dialect.[1]

1. Canton group. This group comprises the Chinese originating from the northwest of Kwangtung province, and above all from the delta of the West River. It is principally composed of the commercial element; many among them, however, are equally workmen, artisans, or boatmen.
2. Fukien (Hokkien) group. This comprises the natives of the southern districts, and above all those of the Amoy region. Although less numerous than the Canton group, they have also a great commercial influence.
3. Hainan (Hailam) group. The majority of these come from one of the centres of the west district of Wenching in the island of Hainan. They embark from Hoihow to become pepper planters and domestic servants in Indochina.
4. Teochiu group. This district in Kwangtung province (called Trieu-chau in Sino-Annamite) is one of the cradles of Chinese immigrants. These embark at the port of Swatow, and are notably agriculturists, boatmen, and coolies. They are generally called Hoklos (in Chinese this means 'men of Fukien').

[1] Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 12 ff.

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162 5. Hakka (Kheh) group. The Hakkas, probably in the fourteenth
167 century,[1] emigrated from north China to the northeast of
463 Kwangtung and particularly to the sub-prefecture of Mei-Hsien. They are mostly cultivators and workmen, though some are artisans and even business men (above all tea merchants). They, too, come via Swatow.[2]

162 A large proportion of the Chinese were urban and their numbers in the larger cities in 1931 are given below:[3]

TABLE V

City	Total population	Chinese
Cholon	134,000	66,000
Saigon	122,000	34,000
Pnom-Penh	96,000	29,000
Haiphong	124,000	19,000
Hanoi	128,000	5,000
Namdinh	?	1,500
Tourane	27,000	600

162 Owing to the world trade depression the number of Chinese in
167 Indochina declined between 1931 and 1936. By 1934 the number
458 of Chinese in Saigon and Cholon had dropped to 28,000 and 49,000 respectively. There was, as we shall see, an excess of departures over arrivals for several years, but by 1936 there was once more a net gain.

162 The Chinese are very unevenly distributed throughout the country and are much more numerous in the two southern provinces of Cochinchina and Cambodia than anywhere else. Eighty-

[1] Mr Wang Wen-yuan says 'in the fourth century B.C.'

[2] Mr Wang Wen-yuan does not give the numbers for the several groups and they do not appear to be available from other sources.

[3] Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 35.

An expert, commenting on these figures, says: 'It seems to me that Cholon is closer to ninety per cent. Chinese. Even in 1931 this was probably the case.' Cholon, when I visited it in 1935, certainly appeared to be virtually a Chinese city, but the above figures from Wang Wen-yuan are confirmed by Robequain, op. cit. p. 34–5. V.P.

The following figures of total population were supplied to me by M. Roger Lévy:

	Saigon		Cholon	
	Chinese	Total	Chinese	Total
1932	32,000	104,506	66,000	122,818
1934	28,031	114,945	49,355	106,476

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five per cent. of the total were to be found here. In the six cities, Cholon, Saigon, Pnom-Penh, Hanoi, Haiphong, and Namdinh, there were 126,000 Chinese (38 per cent. of the immigrant Chinese), which figure is about 29,000 less than in 1931 (see Table V above). In 1936, 106,000 were in the three southern settlements, but only 20,000 were in the Tongking delta. 162

Estimates for 1940 showed a total of 380,000 Chinese in Cochinchina, 127,000 of these being in the Cholon area. In 1939 there were reported to be only 15,000 Chinese in Annam.

Immigration and Sex Ratio

In 1889, 57,000 immigrant Chinese were counted in Cochinchina, of whom nearly 16,000 were in Cholon and district, 7,000 in Saigon, 5,000 in Soctrang, 4,000 in Travinh, and approaching 3,000 in Giadinh, Cantho, Baclieu, and Mytho, and in the neighbourhood of 1,500 in both Sadec and Chaudoc.[1] By 1906 the total Chinese population in Indochina had reached 120,000,[2] an increase of 63,000 in the intervening seventeen years. The mean annual immigration was, from the official figures, 3,720. Between 1906 and 1921 there was a further increase of Chinese immigrants in Cochinchina to a total of 156,000. 162 167

It will be remarked that the increase of Chinese in Indochina was greater in the first period than in the second. This was due to the fact that the French colonization of the country attracted a large number of Chinese merchants who benefited from their exemption from taxation. But after 1906 a decree severely restricted the immigration of Chinese into the country, and French policy was subsequently opposed to their entry. The First World War, moreover, slowed up the progress of French colonization and threw the whole system of world commerce out of gear. In the period 1906–21, the Chinese entering the country consisted almost entirely of persons who came to join their friends or families, and no large element without connexions was entering in the hope of bettering their lot.

From 1921 to 1931 there was a great increase in the Chinese population of the Union, from 293,000 (156,000 in Cochinchina and 91,000 in Cambodia) to 418,000. The main reasons for this

[1] *Annuaire de l'Indochine française pour l'année 1889*, p. 530. Cited by Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 16.

[2] Lucien Haudebert, *L'Indochine française* (1909) p. 66. Cited by Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 17.

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162 were the expansion of trade, the construction of railways and roads, and the opening up of land hitherto uncultivated, all result-
167 ing in much more rapid progress than before. This time it was Cambodia that received the largest contingent of Chinese immigrants, making an increase of 57,000 (from 91,000 to 148,000), though Cochinchina with an increase of 49,000 (from 156,000 to 205,000) was not far behind. Tongking received an accession of 20,000 and Annam of 3,000. In Laos alone was there a decrease in numbers of the immigrant Chinese, for here the numbers fell from 7,000 to 3,000.

The Decrease in Chinese Immigration after 1931. In the peak years of Chinese migration between China and Indochina there was a tremendous passing to and fro. From January 1923 to December 1927, 381,000 Chinese entered and left Indochina (a mean of 76,000 annually); in the four years 1928–31 the total reached almost 495,000 (at an annual mean in precise figures of 123,721). Thereafter there was a decrease in both arrivals and departures. In 1927 there was a net gain of Chinese immigrants of 31,000; in both 1928 and 1929 of 30,000; in 1930 of 18,000: but in 1931, 1932, and 1933 these figures became losses of 8,000, 16,000, and 8,000 respectively. The world economic crisis had set in and trade depression was making itself felt among the Chinese in the Indochinese Union.[1]

Recovery in Chinese Immigration after 1933. After the trade depression the number of Chinese passing to and fro between China and Indochina again increased with once more a net excess of arrivals over departures, as shown by the following figures for 1936:

TABLE VI

Migration of Chinese to and from China in 1936[2]

Country	Entries				Departures			
	Males	*Females*	*Children*	*Total*	*Males*	*Females*	*Children*	*Total*
Annam	682	176	203	1,061	619	213	228	1,060
Cochinchina	14,237	11,822	9,668	35,727	8,233	7,129	5,206	20,568
Tongking	11,108	2,696	2,833	16,637	11,033	2,610	2,300	15,943
Total Indochina	26,027	14,694	12,704	53,425	19,885	9,952	7,734	37,571

That is to say, there was a net gain of Chinese of 15,854 in the

[1] Abstracted from Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. table on p. 21. Source, *Annuaire statistique de l'Indo-Chine*, vol. ii, p. 67; vol. iii, p. 57; vol. v, p. 54.

[2] *Annuaire statistique de l'Indo-Chine, 1936–37* (Hanoi, 1938) vol. vii, p. 33.

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year, but even then the gross figures were much less than they had been for the peak years. 167

Sex Ratio. In 1921, of the 285,710 Chinese in Indochina (excepting Annam), 184,320, or 65 per cent., were males, and 101,390, or 35 per cent., were females. In 1929, the peak year of Chinese immigration into the country, the proportion of women to men was its smallest, namely 33 per cent., whereas, in the years 1923 and 1932, when the immigration was at its lowest, the proportion was up to 63 per cent. All this goes to prove that the object of the great majority of the Chinese was not to establish themselves permanently in Indochina but to return to their own country when they had achieved a competence. The adverse sex ratios, however, meant a considerable amount of intermarriage with the Annamite or Cambodian women, a feature, *mutatis mutandis*, common to all countries in Southeast Asia except Malaya. 162

Sino-Indochinese or Métis

The offspring of Chinese-Annamite marriages were known as *Minh-huong*, and those of Chinese-Cambodian marriages as Sino-Cambodians. When mixed with Chinese the Muongs and the Thōs of northern Tongking were known as *Hung-dans*, *Māns*, and *Miens*.[1] 162 144

Since the Chinese male immigrants arrived in Indochina unmarried, they usually took wives among the native population, being influenced, no doubt, not only by the natural desire for a mate but also by the advantage such an alliance would have in trading with the people of the country. Such marriages were very well looked upon by the Annamites and Cambodians, for the Chinese man had the reputation of being sober, industrious, and economical, and he was also esteemed in native circles as being of incontestably superior intelligence. 609 584

It was obviously in Cambodia and Cochinchina that the number of *métis* would be greatest, for it was in these countries that the immigration of the Chinese was most intense. The Minh-huong were strongest in Cochinchina. In 1921 about 64,500 were enumerated, and in 1931, 73,000. (The largest numbers were to be found in six provinces—Soctrang, 13,000, Baclieu, 11,000, Travinh, 8,500, Cantho, 4,000, Rachgia, 4,000, and Hatien, 3,000. In the first three and the fifth of these provinces the number of *métis* was greater than that of the pure Chinese.)

[1] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed. (Cambridge, 1910) xiv. 491.

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144 As for Sino-Cambodians, most of these were to be found (as
609 would be expected) in Cambodia. In 1921, 68,430 were counted.
584 Half of these were in the two provinces of Kampong-Cham (19,000)
162 and Kamdal (18,000), and two-fifths in the following—Takeo (7,500), Preyveng (7,000), Kampong-Thom (7,000), and Battambang (6,000). Only a tenth were located in the provinces Kampot, Pursat, Soairieng, Stungtreng, and Kratie.

The total of these two kinds of half-castes came to 141,430 (figures for 1921 for Sino-Cambodians and of 1931 for Minh-huong); that is to say, six *métis* as against nineteen pure Chinese per thousand inhabitants.[1]

Occupations

463 Trade and kindred occupations absorb the majority of Chinese
244 of Indochina. The Chinese is seldom a rice grower here, though a single group, the Hakkas, are an exception to this rule. A tribe apart from the other Chinese, they crossed the land frontier, pushed back the Annamites and Thai, and settled in the alluvial plains and low hills bordering China between Moncay and Tien-
[361 yen. They live in little villages scattered all over the country and
226] subsist on carefully irrigated farms and on fishing.[2] The Chinese have also specialized in certain highly-skilled cultivation, for example, the market gardens adjoining large cities, especially in the south. They retain, too, the almost complete monopoly of pepper growing, which was already in their hands when the French came, and, with the exception of one French pepper company, all the pepper farms near Tien and Kampot on the Gulf of Siam are owned by Chinese. Here the Chinese are Hailams (Hainanese). A Chinese
[464 coolie is rarely found on European plantations in Indochina, Anna-
] mite labourers from the delta of the north being preferred as being cheaper and more manageable.

463 Chinese labour was used in the construction of the Yunnan rail-
32 way, but was subsequently found less necessary as native labourers
33 were trained. The Chinese were also to some extent employed as
316 skilled workers in modern industry (e.g. as timbermen, carpenters, blacksmiths, mechanics, &c.). The law does not permit them to
656 participate in mining as it does in Malaya.

[1] Wang Wen-yuan adds together figures separated by a decade. All I can do is to point out the fact. V.P.

[2] Robequain, op. cit. p. 36. The author warns that these Chinese in Tongking
226 should not be confused with those who sail every year from the ports of south China to fish in the waters of the Gulf as far south as Vinh.

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participate in mining as it does in Malaya. They, however, operate most of the saw-mills in Indochina, and own sugar refineries on the plains of Cochinchina and one at Tayninh. Chinese own most of the rice-mills in Indochina, as they do in Siam. In urban centres, where it is permitted to be such, they are large landowners.[1]

It is in trade that the Chinese excel. They have developed a comprehensive system of rice purchasing which covers the whole of Cochinchina and Cambodia. They are also prominent in the export trade, such as in fish and hides. By and large, the Chinese are confined to the plains, and are *par excellence* the middlemen of the country. They are not to be found, as was once hoped, clearing the uncultivated lands in the back country.

[1] It was estimated that in 1936 the Chinese owned 62,000 hectares of land (155,000 acres), 46,000 of which (114,000 acres) were in Cochinchina. Thomas E. Ennis, *French Policy and Developments in Indochina* (University of Chicago Press, 1936) p. 125. Robequain, op. cit. p. 37, says that one of the richest Chinese in Indochina is reputed to own half the land in Saigon.

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CHAPTER XXI

THE CHINESE IN INDOCHINA FROM EARLY TIMES

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An outline account of Chinese contacts with Indochina in the earliest times has already been given in Chapter II and the story is here resumed and carried down to the twentieth century.

Several Emperors of the Western Han dynasty deported criminals to the territory of Giaochi, and in the following centuries Indochina became a common place of refuge for the fugitive supporters of fallen dynasties. In A.D. 877 the descent of the pirates under Hoang-chao upon the capital of Kwangtung province forced a large number of Chinese to seek safety in these southern regions, in the train of a hundred thousand Arabs and Persians who were also fleeing from the peril of the invasion.[1]

Indochina forms a geographical barrier between India and China, its lands offering no natural or easy road between the two. Nevertheless, it was to be the meeting-place of the two civilizations. Early in the Christian era priests, merchants, and adventurers came over from India apparently from Bengal and the Coramandel coast, and sowed the seed of the Hindu culture in southeast Indochina. Meanwhile, in the Indochinese peninsula, favoured by the north-south direction of the river valleys, the Chinese pressed down in a spasmodic but unending emigration. With them they brought the essential elements of their own culture, and, although in the tenth century the Annamites threw off the Chinese political dominion, the impress of the Middle Flowery Kingdom on the people of Annam was indelible.

Until about the year 1000 Tongking and the major part of Annam were considered to be part of 'colonial' China.[2] Many centuries later, in 1680, Chinese officers and several thousand men,

[See cat. 116, pp. 11-30 --Analys t]

[1] Wong Shion-fi, *General History of Southeast Asia* (in Chinese) (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1920). Cited by Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 11.

These round numbers must be treated with reserve, being rhetorical rather than statistical.

[2] H. F. MacNair, *The Chinese Abroad* (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1924) p. 49, says that these territories were under the direct rule of China from 36 B.C. to A.D. 968 and that Tongking was regarded by China as a vassal State until 1884.

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supporters of the overthrown Ming dynasty, arrived in Indochina 648
and settled in the Mytho area of Cochinchina. Later, in the eight- [167]
eenth century, other important groups arrived and settled in the
Hatien region of that country. Since that time there has been a 175
steady flow of new-comers, mainly men.[1] Chinese infiltration into 177
the sparsely populated lands of Indochina was by sea as well as by
land, but the French occupation of the country promoted the entry
of Chinese merchants and artisans by the sea routes.

A second period of Chinese immigration into Indochina is 175
marked by the arrival of the partisans of the Sung dynasty, when
the latter were overwhelmed by the Mongol invasion of the thir- 167
teenth century. These partisans were composed of soldiers and 648
civilians who spread out into the regions of Giaochi (in Tongking),
Tenchen (in south Annam), and in Tchenla (in Cambodia).[2] A
third period of large-scale immigration into Indochina was dictated
by a similar set of circumstances when, in 1680, about 3,000
Chinese owing allegiance to the Ming dynasty, which had now
been replaced by the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty, landed at Tourane
and proceeded to the Court of Hué to ask for a grant of land which
they might cultivate in return for the payment of taxes in force.
The Court granted this request and established them in the pro-
vinces of Lower Cochinchina on the plain of Donnai, which had
recently been acquired, namely, at Bienhoa and Mytho.[3]

Finally it should be recorded that in 1715 a Chinese named Mac
Cuu, originating from Lei-Tchou, took possession by surprise of
Hatien belonging to Cambodia, and, as was then the custom, paid
homage for this province to the Court of Hué, on the express
condition of being nominated chief mandarin of this country. In
consequence of this, a thousand or so of his partisans established
themselves in Cambodia.[4]

At the outset the children of Chinese and Annamite mixed mar- 621
riages were considered as Chinese, but from 1829 onwards they 631
were treated as Annamites and grouped in separate communities
in each province. They were given the same protection rights as the 641

[1] Olov R. T. Janse, *The Peoples of French Indo-China* (Washington, Smithsonian Institution, 1944) p. 18.

[2] Wong Shion-fi, *General History of Southeast Asia* (in Chinese) (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1920) p. 43. Cited by Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 11.

[3] Charles B. Maybon, *Histoire moderne du pays d'Annam (1592–1820)* (Paris, Librairie Plon, 1920) p. 119.

[4] ibid. p. 122; Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 11.

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631 Annamites and were allowed to hold office in the kingdom, a right
641 never conferred on their forebears.[1]

Commercial Relations. Commercial relations between China and
175 Indochina go back to remote antiquity. As early as 183 B.C. the
439 Empress of China published an edict forbidding the Chinese people to export iron or metal goods to Nam-Viet and limiting the export
504 of horses, cattle, and sheep to the males of the species. In the T'ang dynasty (618–905) the maritime commerce of southern China became the most important. In the Sung dynasty (960–1226) Chao Ju-kua, the author of *Chou-Fen-Chi* (*History of the Vassals of China*), speaks admiringly of the importance of Chinese trade at Jen-Tchen, Pin-Tung-Lung (in the south of the present Annam), and at Tchen-La in Cambodia.

In the second half of the sixteenth century, at the time when European merchants arrived in Indochina, the King of Cochinchina (the present South Annam) gave permission to the Chinese to choose a convenient site in their territory for building a town where they could hold their fair. This town was called Faifo and was in the centre of present-day Annam. It was divided into two separate quarters—one Chinese and the other Japanese—each ruled by a governor. The opening of the period of trade in this town coincided approximately with the new year. The natives adopted the practice of bringing there the produce of the country—raw and processed silk, ebony wood, eagle wood (much employed as an aromatic in the Far East), sugar, musk, cinnamon, pepper, and rice. The Chinese vessels arrived loaded with porcelain, paper, tea, silver bars, arms, sulphur, saltpetre, lead, and lead oxide. When the trading transactions, which lasted about seven months, were over, the foreign merchants left with their return cargoes.

In the eighteenth century Faifo remained the commercial centre of Indochina. There were in 1768 nearly 6,000 Chinese there who were the most important merchants. The merchandise imported from China consisted of brass, tea, porcelain, raw silk, drugs and medicines of all sorts, paper, paintings, cloth, &c. It came from Amoy and Ningpo and sometimes from Japan.[2]

175 For long the Chinese in Indochina were content with the foreign
439 imports which their compatriots brought. They, for their part, purchased for export to China gold, ivory, areca-nuts, woods for

[1] *Labour Conditions in Indo-China*, p. 244.
[2] Maybon, op. cit. p. 51 ff.; Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 115.

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dyeing, gamboge, pepper, salt fish, birds' nests, rhinoceros horns, and all other Indochinese products cited above. The rivalry of Chinese and European merchants then made itself felt in the Indochinese market, but it could not arrest the progress of the Indochinese commerce. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, when France became established in Indochina, the principal Indochinese commercial centre began to grow up in Saigon-Cholon. France from that time strove to develop the production and the commerce of her colonies, and in 1883 demanded that China should open the towns of Yunnan (Montseu, Tsemao, and Lungchau) to commerce. She undertook the improvement of interior and exterior communications, the exploitation of mines, and the equipment of ports.[1] The city of Cholon, five kilometres from Saigon on the Chinese Arroyo, was founded about 1778 by a group of Chinese immigrants who, having been established at Bienhoa to the north-east of Saigon, by order of the Court of Hué moved to Cholon in order to escape the ravages caused by the revolt of the Tay-Son. Cholon began as a group of villages. To their new residence the Chinese gave the name of Taignon or Tingan. A map of the Saigon citadel of 1795, by M. le Brun, called this agglomeration the Chinese Bazaar. But, in spite of the foresight of the Court of Hué, the Chinese who had fled to Cholon were overtaken by the rebels and massacred. In 1782 the Tay-Son killed 10,000–11,000 Chinese in this town and in Saigon, burning and looting the Chinese shops.[2] Taignon, however, recovered its impulse under the Emperor Gia Long (1775–1820) who, having suppressed the revolt of the Tay-Son in Cochinchina, lived in Saigon from 1789 to 1793.[3]

The Annamite name of Cholon, which signifies 'great market', was given to this town in the time of Le-Van-duyet, the Grand Eunuch of the palace of Gia Long, who was appointed Governor of Giadinh in 1801.

[1] According to Chinese (foreign-directed) Customs statistics, the Sino-Indochinese commerce reached 1,469,000 taels in 1893, 6,670,000 in 1913. In 1868, before the French occupation, the commerce between Annam and the Chinese empire was valued at only 383,000 taels; in 1913 the exports were valued at 4,780,000 taels (13 times the 1868 figures) and the imports at 1,880,000 taels (45 times the 1868 figures). Wang Wen-yuan citing Chao-Zoo-biang, *Étude sur le commerce extérieur de la Chine*. Thesis for a doctorate of the University of Paris (Lyon, Imprimerie franco-suisse, 1936) p. 143.

[2] J. Bouchot, 'Notes historiques sur Cholon', *Extrême Asie* (May 1948).

[3] C. B. Maybon, op. cit. pp. 99–200; Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 59.

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Chinese Communal Organization in pre-French Indochina

In both Annam and Cambodia the Chinese organized themselves into communities called *bangs*, according to their dialect or province of origin. Officers, called *bang truong*, corresponding to the Chinese captains in other Southeast Asian countries, were selected for them by the native authority, and these were responsible to the Government for the good behaviour of their fellows and for the payment of taxes. They enjoyed the same civil rights as Annamites and were exempted from military service and *corvée*. The laws of Annam, which were applied to them on an equality with the Annamites, being derived from Chinese sources, were congenial to their spirit. From time to time the Emperors of Annam, however, entertained doubts as to their bona fides and reminded them of their position as aliens by banishing individuals concerned in commercial fraud or clandestine trade in opium.[1]

A very favourable picture is given of the Chinese in Saigon by a British visitor in about 1822:

> We were absolute strangers who had come to pass a few hours only in the town; yet in almost every street we were invited by the more wealthy Chinese to enter their houses and partake of refreshments. They could not have known beforehand that we were to visit the place, yet some of the entertainments laid out for us were in a style of elegance and abundance that bespoke of affluence, as well as of the hospitality of our hosts. Amongst others, we were invited by three brothers who had been settled in the country for some time. They wore Cochin-Chinese dress, and in appearance differed little from the native inhabitants. Their manners were engaging, perfectly easy and polite; their house was both handsome and spacious, nor did anything appear wanting to render it a very superior mansion, even in the opinion of a European. They received us in a large, well-furnished ante-room; a table was soon covered with a profusion of fruit, the most delicate sweet-meats, and a variety of cakes and jellies. They insisted upon attending us at table themselves, nor could they be induced to seat themselves while we were present.[2]

The Chinese under the French Regime

Christian missionaries were the first Frenchmen to come to Indochina, the most famous of them being Father Alexandre de

[1] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 165.

[2] George Finlayson, *The Mission to Siam and Hué in the Years 1821–2* (London, Murray, 1826) p. 168.

Finlayson mentions that the principal articles sold in the bazaars of Saigon were coarse china, Tongking crapes, silks, and satins, Chinese fans, and porcelain.

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Rhodes, of the Society of Jesus, who arrived in Tongking in 1627. 175
Traders arrived later. In the eighteenth century the French East
India Company, wishing to extend its field of action in the Far 648
East, sent representatives to Indochina to survey the country's 797
resources and to devise plans for their development. But although
these representatives duly submitted their report, no action was
taken. Then, in 1787, Pigneau de Behaine, Apostolic Vicar of Indochina, secured the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles between France and Annam, which provided that, in return for support given the prince against the rebels, France was to obtain the port of Tourane and the island of Poulo Condore off the Cochinchina coast. Owing to the French Revolution this came to nothing, and it was not until 1840 onwards, when the British were smashing open the doors of China, already ajar, that the attention of the French Government was again drawn to Indochina. The persecution of white missionaries by the Annamite Emperors was the [609]
occasion of intervention by France and Spain.

After a fruitless attack on Hué, the Franco-Spanish expedition 175
turned south and captured Saigon in February 1859. By the treaty
of 5 June 1862, the Emperor Tu Duc ceded the three eastern pro- 648
vinces of Cochinchina, Bienhoa, Giadinh, and Mytho, and the
island of Poulo Condore to France. Vinhlong, Chaudoc, and 721
Hatien, in western Cochinchina, came under French tutelage in
1867. In the meantime, menaced by the competitive expansion of both Annam and Siam, Cambodia accepted French protection in 1863, but it was not until 1884 that an agreement was reached which defined the general principles of law and administration for governing the country.[1] There were said to be 56,000 Chinese in [162]
Cochinchina in 1886 out of a total population of 1,745,000.[2]

Having consolidated their position in Cochinchina, the French 175
turned their eyes towards the northern plain of Tongking. It was
chiefly the desire to open a good road to China that prompted them 648
to extend their power in this direction, but the existence of mines 439
of coal, zinc, tin, lead, &c., was also a strong inducement.[3] Lagrée's

[1] Robequain, op. cit. p. 7 ff.
[2] Paul Bonnetin, *L'Extrême Orient* (Paris, Maison Quantin, 1887) p. 109.
[3] After the capture of Hanoi, the French came across some books in Chinese about these mines. Studies were made of these and other extensive material from which it appeared that the Court of Hué had received revenue from 123 mines, of which all but six were located in Tongking. At the time of the conquest the Chinese were still working the coastal mines. Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 114–15.

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expedition of 1867–8 had shown that the route to Yunnan through the Mekong valley was not practicable, and the Red River valley seemed to offer the easiest gateway to the province. The French influence was rapidly expanded by individuals, but French official opinion lagged behind them. A treaty of 1874 acknowledged France's right of protectorate over all the Annamite countries, but its terms were ambiguous and in 1882 the Emperor Tu Duc, in alliance with China, began to make trouble for the French. This time the French responded with action backed by adequate military force and imposed the treaties of 1884 and 1885 which made definite the French control over Annam and Tongking.

Laos was added to the French sphere last, and by the gradual extension of French influence first from Tongking and Annam. Clashes ensued with Siam which claimed suzerainty over all countries where Thai dialects were spoken, and the French protectorate over Laos was not established until the Franco-Siamese treaty of October 1893, under which Siam renounced all claims to territory to the left of the Mekong. Further treaties and agreements finally established the western frontiers of French Indochina, the most important being the Franco-Siamese treaty of 1904, by which Siam renounced all the sovereignty it still retained over Laos and Bassac, and that part of the kingdom of Luangprabang located on the right bank of the Mekong, and a further treaty between the two countries in 1907, by which Siam ceded to France the Cambodian regions of Battambang, Siemreap, and Sisophon. The last-named regions were to be a source of dispute culminating in Siamese action after the fall of France in 1940, and ending with their return to Indochina in 1945.

By 1866 the Chinese centre of Cholon had already 500 tiled houses, two canals made by excavation, and five bridges under construction, including one of iron. The quay along the Arroyo Chinois was covered with warehouses and shipyards. In the centre of the town was placed a fountain of Chinese design, and the streets were lit by reflecting lamps fed with coco-nut oil. In 1870 the town was extended in size. By 1879 there were said to be 44,000 Chinese in all Cochinchina.[1] Cholon in 1889 had a population of nearly 16,000 Chinese and Saigon of over 7,000 in a total of 56,000 Chinese immigrants for the whole of Cochinchina.

[1] International Labour Office, *Labour Conditions in Indochina*, no. 26 (Geneva, 1938) p. 245 (quoting Dubreuil).

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Fear of Chinese machinations among the more docile Annamites, and of being overwhelmed in this region by their numbers, prompted the French to impose a heavy poll-tax on the Chinese resident in Indochina. The Chinese Government protested against an invidious distinction being placed upon its subjects and appealed to the treaty stipulations. The French responded by placing a tax on *all* Asiatics, and inasmuch as the Chinese alone travelled frequently or far, a Service de l'Immigration was established at Saigon to watch them, and, if possible, to control their immigration. The regulations for this were contained in decrees of 1874 and 1876.[1] A Chinese reaching Saigon by sea, unless a contract labourer, had to be registered and receive a card. If he came overland, he had to buy a pass from the administration and exchange this subsequently for a *permis de circulation*, good for one month. For breaking these regulations the penalty was expulsion from Indochina, and if the expelled Chinese was found returning he was sentenced to three years' imprisonment. Exception was made for women and children *who almost never immigrated and whose presence was much desired by the administration.*

Decrees regulating, taxing, and punishing (and, of course, always irritating) the Chinese in the colony followed thick and fast upon one another during a period of twenty years (says F. Wells Williams). The legislation was ever a matter of checks and hindrances, an artificial system which looked splendid in Paris but worked badly in Saigon. An example was the Government order in November 1880 that every Asiatic not a French citizen, unless he be a landowner or an indentured labourer, be required to provide himself with a workman's book containing his name, first names, birthplace, occupation, the names and domicile of his parents if belonging to the colony, his signature, photograph, and number, and the date of issue of the book, with sundry remarks if any room remained for them. For such a book the fee was 2.50 francs and replacement if it were lost cost 2 more francs. The population of this region was roughly estimated at 2 million souls, and if every adult male there got his book it was not strange (says Wells Williams) that the French *fonctionnaires*, though numerous, should complain of being overworked in tropical Asia! Moreover, these attempts at prevention and control were not in the least

[1] Frederick Wells Williams, 'The Chinese Immigration in Further Asia', *American Historical Review*, vol. v, no. 3 (April 1901).

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651 effective in hindering the influx of Chinese into the colony. By
656 January 1885 the notion of this little book was allowed to drop so
167 far as immigrant Chinese were concerned, and they were required to buy a personal identity card at the beginning of every year.

For purposes of taxation the Chinese were divided into three groups—first, indentured labour of the first and second class; second, landlords paying between 60 and 20 piastres in taxes; third, all others—women and those under fifteen and over sixty being exempted. To leave the colony every Asiatic was made to pay 2 francs for a permit.

In spite of the completeness of these arrangements the Chinese were not kept well in hand and the expected prosperity was still somewhat painfully awaited (Wells Williams continues). But the French would not give up their centralized system, their cards of identity, and their classification by category. Regulations at the end of the century (dating from a decree of 19 February 1890) were slightly less severe than of old, but they compelled the incoming Asiatic to go to the capital, register at the Bureau of Immigration, accept a place in one or other of the groups recognized by the Government, obtain a travelling certificate, have his *permis de séjour* renewed each year, and when he departed to receive a passport. The three groups covering all Chinese were now paying respectively 80, 60, and 7 piastres annually in taxes. Anyone found to be associated with a secret society not authorized by law was heavily punished by fine and imprisonment and then expelled.[1]

In Tongking the situation was complicated not only by the existence of a long conterminous Chinese frontier but also by a deep disgust of Frenchmen towards a country which had cost so much blood and treasure and yet had apparently proved of so little worth. Legislation applying to this region was of a rather haphazard sort. Immediately after the conquest the poll-tax already referred to was ordered (in 1885) to be levied on all Chinese alike. In December 1886, after a protest from Peking, the distinction was made less invidious by applying the tax to all Asiatics whether resident or immigrant.[2] The *carte de séjour* and regulation into cate-

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[1] The system described by F. Wells Williams certainly does seem exceedingly cumbersome, but a system of landing permits (exchanged afterwards for certificates of admission) worked very well in Malaya where I had experience of it as Immigration Officer for Malaya 1934–6. V.P.

[2] The writer has followed Wells Williams for this period without greatly questioning his conclusions, but it has been pointed out that the registration of

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gories were also adopted as administrative measures, but here four groups were constituted—those paying 300 francs and more in taxes, those paying 60–300, those owning land, licensed labourers, employees, &c., and lastly, the common workman. The yearly cost of the card was fixed at 300, 100, 25, and 10 francs respectively, according to category. But these terms merely had the effect of stopping the Chinese coming at all! In the 1880s so many restrictions were placed on trade in Haiphong that the Chinese left this prosperous region in order to avoid the excessive taxes.[1]

Here as elsewhere (remarks Wells Williams) the European found himself helpless without the assistance of Chinese in his plantations and mines, his boats and wagons, his ships and houses. The laws were again tinkered with, the categories extended and amended through a long series of changes, the result of which was to let down the barriers almost entirely and to allow the Chinese to enter on his own terms.

By applying for a permit from French consuls in the south China treaty ports, the Chinese could, by a decree of May 1890, travel and trade for two months in Tongking and Annam without any payment at all, while for those who chose to remain the categories were so reduced as to rest very lightly upon the artisan and trading classes.

At the end of the nineteenth century there was still a great wall of prejudice between the French colonials and the Chinese immigrants, but the latter carried on their trade and work, showing little concern: they were able to survive by their supreme adaptability. It is even said that during the first trying years of occupation, when the French had only very uncertain and irregular means of communication between Cochinchina and the world beyond, the Chinese of Saigon maintained and profited by a regular courier service direct to Canton, where they learned the latest market quotations and easily outdistanced all their European commercial rivals.

all Asiatics does not on the face of it seem necessarily anti-Chinese, that there seems to be confusion between registration of population, revenue measures, and immigration controls, and that the poll-tax may have been solely a revenue device. Without more precise information the writer cannot give an opinion on Wells Williams's case; the important question seems, however, to be whether French policy was hostile to the Chinese or not. The answer undoubtedly is that they were rather grudgingly tolerated, and that their immigration was subject to strict control.

[1] Thomas E. Ennis, *French Policy and Developments in Indochina* (University of Chicago Press, 1936) p. 119.

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167 In Cochinchina the Emperor Minh Mang had introduced strict
622 regulations governing the immigration of Chinese. Before being
659 allowed to land, immigrants had to be accepted by the chief of a
167 village or tribal organization and their names were then entered in
[171] a register. This system the French retained and extended. The *congrégations*, as the French called them (they should be distin-
631 guished from commercial syndicates of the same name), appear to have been the same in origin as the *bangs* mentioned earlier in this chapter and as the *huis* and *kongsis* in other Southeast Asian countries; but here in Cochinchina they had a special position because the French, who found them useful instruments in imposing corporate responsibility, gave their headmen wide police and fiscal powers over their members. The *congrégations*, five in number,[1] assisted the French in the assessment of taxes and their collection from the Chinese, and they also assisted the immigration officials. In addition, they carried out the functions of district or clan associations elsewhere, and they managed Chinese schools, temples, cemeteries, hospitals, &c.

The Chinese themselves in course of time found the powers of the headmen oppressive and protested against the insistence on *congregations* as being discriminatory against their race. In the
[648] Franco-Chinese negotiations of 1930 and 1935 their protests were unavailing, but by an agreement of 1948 modifications of the system were obtained. The name *congrégations* (to which the Chinese objected because of its associations in the past) was replaced by *Groupements Administratifs Chinois Régionaux*, and the Chinese consuls were given the right of vetoing candidates for the position of headmen of these bodies.

656 The Chinese had the right of free movement, or trading freely,
671 of acquiring property, or submitting tenders for public contracts,
651 of fishing in territorial waters, and of taking part in the coastal trade in the navigable waters. Their personal and family status
438 were maintained according to Chinese custom. They were subject to the jurisdiction of French tribunals and enjoyed the right of possessing property in common. On the other hand, however, they were subject to certain special restrictions in accordance with the regulations for the *congrégations*. *They were further subject to a special personal capital tax in proportion to profits gained.* In Cochinchina this tax consisted of (*a*) a fixed tax of 15 piastres and (*b*) a

[1] See p. 260, n. 1.

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graduated tax equal to the amount accumulated from the principal of patents, and of credits paid in the different localities where they owned establishments. The effect of this fixed tax was to prevent all but a certain economic élite of the Chinese from re-entering Indochina.[1]

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[1] Étienne Dennery, *Economic Relations of French Indochina* (Institute of Pacific Relations, 1933), Banff Conference Papers, Misc. Papers, vol. xv.

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CHAPTER XXII

THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE CHINESE IN INDOCHINA

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By neither the French rulers nor the people of Indochina generally can the Chinese immigrants be said to have been made welcome. Phrases such as 'the Chinese stranglehold on Indochina',[1] 'the Chinese cyst', and 'the Chinese excrescence' were heard on every side. Regulations imposed upon the Chinese accounted for the comparatively small numbers of immigrants. At one time the Chinese merchants complained of the Government restrictions prohibiting the export of any commodity other than rice. Later they protested against the harsh treatment to which importers of goods had to submit and, above all, against the heavy taxes. Taxes, they claimed, were actually seven times as heavy for a Chinese coolie as for an Annamite. Thus it was impossible for the poor Chinese to get into the country, and life was difficult even for the well-to-do business man. Most of the Chinese entering Indochina in the 1920s were sent for by their families or by Chinese firms who preferred Chinese employees. The extent of the demand for their services was the main check upon the stream of immigrants. There was little of the impulsive or casual in the motives that brought the new settlers. The immigration was conducted on a prearranged system, filling up vacancies in the groups of Chinese, and adding to the communities only as prudence or resources dictated. In the admission of Chinese to Indochina there was nothing of peaceful penetration, no suggestion of a 'Yellow Peril'. The influx was by no means miscellaneous as it had been, for example, in Malaya, but was an immigration very representative of the differing social classes of China.[2]

The Chinese in Agriculture

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The French Government had constantly endeavoured to employ Chinese coolies in the fields. From the earliest days of conquest, the first Admiral-Governors of Indochina had decided that cultiva-

[1] Étienne Dennery, *Asia's Teeming Millions* (*Foules d'Asie*) (London, Jonathan Cape, 1931) p. 130.
[2] ibid.

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tion would benefit from the services of Chinese immigrants, but all to no purpose. Subsequent attempts to induce the Chinese to take to agriculture were equally fruitless. One reason was the fact that no concessions of rice-growing land were made to Chinese immigrants. However, one group, the Hakkas, had managed to establish themselves as rice growers. Dwelling in little villages bordering China between Moncay and Tienyen, and living on rice growing and fishing, they appeared to be firmly-rooted peasants.[1] As has already been stated, the Chinese in other places had specialized in highly skilled cultivations such as market gardens adjoining large cities, and before the arrival of the French they had made a monopoly of pepper planting on the Gulf of Siam. They had also planted mulberry trees. Government regulations practically excluded Chinese from 'red land'[2] grants so that they took small part in rubber cultivation. A Chinese coolie was rare too; on European plantations in Indochina Annamite labourers were preferred.

Chinese pepper and mulberry trees were tended with the same exact care as the market gardens. The time-honoured methods of their tillage might be observed on the banks of the Gulf of Siam. Each tendril of the pepper vine was the product of extraordinary patience—burning endlessly repeated, with the ashes regularly sprinkled round each tree, the soil absolutely levelled, the daily spraying against insects, trenches and ridges constructed so that the seed could be planted at mathematically correct intervals, a tiny stone ledge built under each row, yearly cuttings and harrowings, the frequent renewal of props—'a labour that like some religious rite becomes ever more complicated with the passage of time'.[3]

The reasons for Chinese agriculturists not being in demand in Indochina (which, however, had need of them) were said by Mr Dennery to be four in number: (1) planters of Cochinchina found

[1] Robequain, op. cit. p. 36 ff.

[2] In southern Indochina there are extensive basalts which, as they decompose, produce a rich soil called 'red lands'. Rubber is the leading crop on these lands which also produce coffee and tea. There were seventy small holdings of rubber in Chinese hands in the neighbourhood of Saigon which held a place of only small importance in the total output of the country.

[3] Aug. Chevalier, *Le Poivrier et sa culture en Indochine* (Paris, 1925). Cited by Étienne Dennery, op. cit. p. 136.

Indochinese pepper was exported almost exclusively to France. It reached from 1927 to 1934 an average output of 4,000 tons (worth 40 million francs). Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 48.

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that Chinese labour was too expensive compared with native labour; (2) the conditions of life conceded to Chinese in Indochina were hardly favourable (severe immigration restrictions, heavy taxes); (3) in Indochina concessions on the 'red lands' were not made to foreigners; and (4) (finally and above all) Indochina had in recent years been more a country of rice planters than of plantations, and though a Chinese might have been attached to a rice-field in his own country he was rarely so attached when he quitted his native soil.[1]

Early in the century an article comparing Javanese labour favourably with Chinese had awakened the interest of the Cochinchina planters.[2] The Javanese were good and steady workers, although less robust than the Chinese. Though their labour output was smaller, they readily attached themselves to the soil, were more easily disciplined, and were totally without that commercial aptitude which made the Chinese a problem. The Dutch Government naturally opposed their wholesale migration, but in 1906 Indochina was successful in obtaining the right to import Javanese labour under certain conditions. This experiment proved largely successful; 45 per cent. of the first group and 85 per cent. of the second group renewed their contracts. The First World War, however, changed the willingness of the Dutch to permit labourers to leave Java. The conditions became stricter. Moreover, it was observed that the Javanese were more expensive than Annamites and the fact that they were Mohammedans complicated the problem of feeding them. In 1928 a census of foreign labourers in Indochina showed that of the 12,000 total, the vast majority were Chinese.[3]

Fishing

In fishing the Chinese enjoyed an appreciable role. The inhabitants of the region of Haininh (Moncay) practised not only agriculture but (and as actively) fishing as well. Twenty-one Chinese fishing villages were counted. The produce of their deep-sea fishing was estimated at 5,800 tons of fish in 1929. More productive than this was the fishing carried on in the Gulf of Tongking by the junks coming annually from China to fish from the south China ports. At the customs station at Catba, near Haiphong, figures were

[1] op. cit. p. 131.
[2] *Quinzaine Coloniale* (July 1903). Cited by Virginia Thompson, *French Indo-China* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1937) p. 151.
[3] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 151.

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kept from 1924 onwards for these junks. In 1924–5 there were 407 junks; in 1925–6, 483; in 1926–7, 442; in 1927–8, 246; in 1928–9, 362; in 1929–30, 300.[1]

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The junks engaged in the fisheries were based on Pakhoi and Hoihow and were constructed with solidity to stand up to the worst weather. They ranged between 30 and 100 tons' burden and had two or three masts, and a crew of about fifteen each. They were for the most part armed against pirates who might attack them. On an average, the Chinese from south China who had the right to come down as far as the latitude of Vinh were able to lift up to 6,000 tons of fish from the Tongkingese and Annamite waters.[2]

These Chinese fishermen from their home ports, be it noted, always ventured into the high seas, and were not in competition with the Annamite fishermen who contented themselves with harvesting the coastal waters, and even then in only a half-hearted fashion.

Another fishing-ground, this time within the territorial confines of Indochina, in which the Chinese enjoyed the lion's share, was the lakes of Cambodia. Before the establishment of the French protectorate the King often granted the fishing rights to Chinese who in their turn sub-let them, and the sub-lessees retained the right of negotiating with the actual fishermen. Thus it happened that between the State as the granter of the concession and the real fishermen the old native regime allowed five, and sometimes six or seven intermediaries to reap, without work and without risks, profits that were quite substantial for each of them.[3]

Under the French regime these fisheries were leased every four years by public auction which was the occasion for keen competition among the Chinese or the Sino-Cambodians who kept in their hands the local and export trade in dried fish. The net catch was on an average about forty tons of fresh fish per square kilometre in the southern, middle, and western parts of the Great Lake. In the northwest the exhaustion of certain sills of the lake rendered the

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[1] Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 50.

[2] Pierre Gourou, *Le Tonkin*, published on the occasion of the French International Colonial Exhibition (Paris, 1931) p. 144; Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 50. This apparently refers to fish caught under licence in Indochinese territorial waters.

[3] Loys Petillot, *Une Richesse de Cambodge: la pêche et les poissons* (Paris, Librairie Maritime et Coloniale, 1911) p. 112. Cited by Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 51.

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226 fishing less easy. It was estimated that about 100,000 tons of fresh
656 fish were obtained annually from this one lake.

The Chinese in Trade and Industry

505 The boat traffic on the rivers and streams of Cambodia and Cochinchina (especially the latter) offered the Chinese many opportunities for profit. Their junks and sampans were used in the transport of rice brought by the Chinese rice merchants. These boats, moored along the rivers, served them as dwelling-places. According to the 1921 census, of the 156,300 Chinese in Cochinchina and 91,000 in Cambodia, 5,500 and 2,690 persons respectively were enumerated on board these crafts (that is to say, 35 per thousand in Cochinchina and 28 per thousand in Cochinchina and 28 per thousand in Cambodia). This was itself an indication of the importance of the boat traffic in the economic activity of the country, especially in Cochinchina where the Chinese possessed nearly all the junks, totalling 3,000.[1]

463 The agricultural and other pursuits mentioned above are ones
471 in which the Chinese are actively engaged for the most part with their hands, though even here they have tended towards the role of entrepreneur; but they employed their skill also as artisans and in the handicrafts. Many were in business for themselves as artisans, in some cases employing others as workers and apprentices. In the cities they were tailors, shoemakers, and joiners.

> Particularly in Cholon [says Robequain] the variety of Chinese manufactures is extraordinary. There are buildings divided into seemingly identical compartments which shelter the most diverse manufactures—food pastes, basketry, boots, paper boxes, brushes, candles, &c. Here is a duck-raising establishment where the eggs are put into incubators filled with paddy chaff; when ready to hatch they are set out on a piece of screen where hundreds of ducklings emerge cheeping from their broken shells. In an old shed glass makers are blowing paste through a long tube to make bowls, bottles, and lamps. Elsewhere looms placed side by side operate in crowded rooms.[2]

[167 The influx of immigrants in the last year or two before the
323 Second World War, especially of women, had greatly helped the
392 development of these workshops. Around Moncay the Chinese had
586] set up shops for ceramic making; at Haiphong they were engaged in machine and ship construction. Chinese also owned most of the

[1] Étienne Dennery, op. cit. p. 142; Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 51.
[2] op. cit. p. 37.

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Chinese also owned most of the
saw-mills in southern Indochina and they had a practical monopoly 643
of the mills preparing rice for export. They had sugar refineries on 313
the plains of Cochinchina and at Tayninh. In mining, however (as 256
has already been remarked), the law did not permit them to par- 316
ticipate as it did, for example, in Malaya.

As insecurity in China increased, Chinese immigration into Indo- 167
china was intensified. It was of a type not of special interest to
French colonization as regards labour, nor as regards commerce 463
(for which the French looked largely to France), nor as regards
agriculture. Because, generally speaking, the Chinese who came to
Indochina did so to engage in commerce or to hire their services to
their compatriots already established in the country, it was not
considered necessary to create in this colony a department on
similar lines to the Chinese protectorate in Malaya, where there
were numerous Chinese agricultural and mining labourers in need
of protection.[1]

But in trade, and in all its forms and ramifications as distin- 438
guished from industry, the Chinese found himself in his element.
To begin with, he had at his disposal the network of guild and 441
co-operative organization which enabled him to work with his eyes
and ears open and with the mutual assistance of his fellows and 511
competitors. Secondly, he had opposed to him the Annamites and
Cambodians who almost entirely lacked his qualities of economy 609
and perseverance. At the same time no cultural gulf yawned be-
tween him and the Indochinese: they were (barring the qualities
just mentioned) very similar to him in temperament and attitude
of mind. It was this (says M. Robequain) which gave the Chinese
a big advantage over the European merchant. He could live as the
native did, or on a slightly higher level; he was entirely acclimatized
in the country which adjoined his own, and he did not require the
standards of hygiene and comfort indispensable to the European:
he learnt languages readily and gained an understanding of local
psychology which, although less refined and developed than his
own, was nevertheless similar in character; he never experienced
the feeling of misunderstanding or basic incompatibility which so
often overwhelmed the European in dealing with native behaviour
and reactions. Because the Chinese understood the native, he was

[1] E. Delamarre, Inspector General of Labour in Indochina, *L'Émigration et l'immigration ouvrières en Indochine* (Hanoi, Imprimerie d'Extrême Orient, 1931) p. 45 ff.

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438 441 511 609 better able to gain the latter's confidence and, for the same reason, could deceive him more readily. He also knew how to make himself indispensable between the European and the Indochinese.[1]

Chinese Rice Merchants

256 471 439 The Chinese rice merchants had rice-mills or husking-mills where the paddy was processed—husked, blended, packed—on behalf of the exporters. Often they themselves combined both functions, in which case they were called miller-exporters of rice. The greater part of the rice of Indochina was exported from Saigon, and the miller-exporters were concentrated particularly at Cholon, the industrial and commercial centre adjacent to Saigon. With the exception of three French firms, all the rice-millers at Cholon were Chinese: they owned in 1932 nearly all the seventy-five rice-mills in this city. At Haiphong in Tongking there were two Chinese rice-mills, one capable of dealing with twenty tons of paddy a day, and at Haly, near Haiphong, there were three other mills of, however, much less capacity. This group of rice-mills was the principal one in Indochina.[2]

243 438 Purchase of paddy to feed the rice-mills was not, except to a very limited extent, in the hands of the miller-exporters of rice. The great majority of them bought their paddy from merchants specializing in this trade, of whom in Cholon alone there were about a hundred. In general, these merchants worked with their personal capital and [505] had considerable funds at their disposal. They created buying pools through the intermediary of agents (*ramasseurs*) and they had large fleets of junks available to them, the number of which in Cochinchina alone, as we have seen, was estimated at 3,000.

[439] Accessory to the rice trade was that in jute rice-sacks brought from British India, from which again the Chinese drew the greatest profits. The Chinese paddy merchants were organized into syndicates, which made it impossible for the rice-miller to obtain his paddy direct; he could obtain it from the producer only through the intermediary of the syndicates. At the same time it was difficult for the native proprietor of a rice-field to attempt to carry his grain to the miller at Cholon or any other big town.[3]

[1] op. cit. p. 38.
[2] Henri Yves, *Économie agricole de l'Indochine* (Hanoi, 1932) p. 343; Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 38.
[3] Henri Yves, op. cit. pp. 346, 348; Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 39.

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The whole of this intricate organization was a matter of agency. The Chinese paddy merchants in the great centres of Cholon, Haiphong, Pnom-Penh, and Hanoi did not effect their own purchases of paddy on the spot; they had, as we have said, agents placed at the points of concentration of paddy growing and in the river ports whose role was ordinarily to direct the activities of the *ramasseurs* who were, in turn, under their orders. The functions of the first intermediaries were also nearly always carried out by Chinese. The agents were often simultaneously wholesale or semi-wholesale grocers. The money necessary for the trade was furnished by the employer and distributed to the *ramasseur* by the agent. There were also, however, especially in Tongking, big grocers who bought paddy on their own account, transported it in their junks to the large towns, and there re-sold it to the merchants specializing in paddy buying.

In Cochinchina the agents for paddy buying had warehouses in which they stored the paddy which the *ramasseurs* had bought, or which the great landed proprietors had consigned there on the condition that the paddy should be stored without charge and should be sold at once through the intermediacy of the agent. In Cambodia, where few of these entrepôts existed, the agents took the paddy more often than not by bullock-cart or lorry to a point of embarkation in the river system whence it was transported to Cholon in junks.

The custom was for the agents to trouble themselves only with transactions of 10,000 *gia*[1] and above. Their accountants handled consignments of 5,000 to 10,000 *gia*, their sub-accountants amounts of 500 to 5,000 *gia*; quantities below 500 *gia* were handled by the *ramasseurs*.

We finally come down to those *ramasseurs* of paddy (called *Hang-Sao* in Tongking) whose business it was to buy the paddy in the village markets, either by searching for it among the small farmers (*ta diens*) or the small or medium landowners from whom it had already been bespoken in advance by loans on account of the expected harvest. The *ramasseurs* were usually Chinese who, assisted by their native wives, kept general stores. This was more generally the case in Cambodia than in Cochinchina, there being indeed scarcely a hamlet in the former which had not a trader of this kind. The *ramasseurs* did not work with their own capital but received

[1] A *gia* is an Annamite measure equal to 40 litres.

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423 the requisite money from their superior agents or from the big merchants who carried on the trade in rice in the larger cities as a
438 side-line. These village stores served as banks and their proprietors
442 generally made advances or loans to the peasants.

The credit system (as Mr Wang Wen-yuan puts it) 'descended
452 in a cascade'. The wholesale merchants extended credit to the semi-wholesale merchant of the centre of an area, who in turn delivered merchandise to the retailer, and he in turn gave credit to his customers, the peasants and the small proprietors, all the year round and was repaid only at the harvest, and then usually not in money but in kind.

The role assumed by the Chinese in Cochinchina was to bring
243 together the great native landowners, the chetties (Indian money-
442 lenders)[1] and the European undertakings. The same system as in
426 the rice industry was in force in the cotton and sugar-cane industries.[2]

452 M. Robequain says that the Chinese trader speculated on the peasants' improvidence rather than on the crop yield, and the interest rate he charged was so high and the borrower so indolent that the debt was never fully repaid, and every year the larger part of the crop went to the Chinese as interest payment.[3] Nor did his gain end here. Simultaneously the Chinese trader was making big profits on imported goods; he was also the broker or 'news chronicler' who visited the smallest hamlets; he was the collector who peddled or loaded sacks on carts and junks; he was the owner of the bulging junks.

Other Trades

471 Other trades in which the Chinese were engaged in Indochina were those in cotton, sugar, condiments, silk, and tea. The export
288 of the Mekong cotton-mills was small. Three Chinese cotton undertakings (*trusters*) at Krauchmar (Cambodia), Chiné (Tongking), and Kampong-Cham (Cambodia) carried on business in associa-

[162] [1] In addition to the Chinese there were in 1937 6,000 'Asiatic foreigners' in Indochina. They were mostly Indians who were British subjects, almost all of them residing in Cochinchina and Cambodia where they were brokers or money-lenders. Most came from around Madras, others from the Sind. The chetties specialized in financing the rice harvest, thus competing with the Chinese. See Robequain, op. cit. p. 168. See Appendix V.

[2] Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. pp. 40, 41.

[3] op. cit. pp. 38, 39.

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tion with a Chinese factory in Cambodia which was in direct con- 471
tact with the Chinese and Japanese markets, but while by 1932 the
Chinese association still existed, two French factories had taken 288
the place of the Chinese one. The sugar trade was very prosperous
in Annam but was also distributed in some small measure through- 249
out Indochina. The Chinese again monopolized this trade. They 471
gave loans which were repayable in molasses processed at their central refineries. Their principal refineries were at Thuxa (Quangngai) where about twenty Chinese firms were concentrated and treated the molasses of the region. Also important were Chinese refineries in the Saigon area. In the condiment trade, which was almost entirely in Chinese hands, cinnamon bark and cardamon held an important place in the exports of the country. At Pnom-
Penh, Saigon, and, above all, at Hanoi there were many Chinese [288]
merchants dealing in silk and silk textiles. It was they who introduced Chinese silk culture into Indochina and reanimated the native industry. Finally, a considerable number of Chinese were engaged in the tea trade in the Union, especially in Annam. In Laos some Chinese harvested wild tea in the mountain region of Phousang and prepared it for sale. This was known as Tranninh tea.[1]

Following the example of the Dutch in Indonesia, the French 241
established People's Banks or 'Funds'. Their main purpose was to
supply the funds needed by individuals, small farmers, and crafts- 656
men, who, were it not for the People's Banks, would have to borrow
from money-lenders at very high rates, and further to enable com- 453
munities or hamlets to obtain quickly and on favourable terms the 426
necessary funds to carry out certain undertakings in the public interest. In Cochinchina the People's Banks had another purpose, which was to facilitate redemption or re-purchase of property mortgaged or sold under pressure of circumstances and thus to secure a better distribution of land.[2]

Before 1945 there were:

In Tongking . .	16	Provincial	Funds	and 13	branches
„ Annam . .	10	„	„	„ 6	„
„ Cochinchina .	19	„	„		
„ Cambodia . .	7	„	„		

[1] Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 42–3.

[2] Office of the Special Commissioner in Southeast Asia Social Welfare Conference, 18–23 August 1947, *People's Banks, Measures affecting the Indigenous Population*. Paper no. 9b.

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These 'Funds' and their branches advanced money on a short, medium, or long-term basis, according to the borrower's needs, the amount of the advance, and the value of the collateral security. They likewise financed the operations of agricultural, craftsmen's, and marine co-operative societies. The numbers of these societies in Indochina before 1945 were respectively thirty-two, seventeen, and nine.

The People's Banks and the co-operative societies were controlled by the Office for People's Banks, an autonomous body under Government supervision. But, at any rate in Annam, Tongking, and Cochinchina, these institutions could not hope to be effective in providing credit to peasants on an adequate scale so long as conditions remained as disturbed as they were. Nor is there any evidence to show the effect of these People's Banks on the Chinese or Indian money-lending business. If experience of similar institutions in Indonesia and of co-operative societies in Malaya is any guide, the banks met only a small proportion of the credit needs of the people and the money-lenders had almost as much business as before. One reason for this is that the money-lender did not demand the same security as did the banks, and another is that the money-lender would advance money for purposes which the banks would refuse to recognize, considering them 'unproductive'.

The Trade Depression of 1929–33

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The above description of the Chinese economic activities in Indochina refers for the most part to the period just previous to the great world trade depression of 1929–33. In 1931, 1932, and 1933, as we have seen, the number of Chinese returning to China always exceeded the number of new arrivals in the colony. One of the closest observers of Indochinese economy (says M. Robequain) writing in 1933, remarks, 'In so far as it was in the hands of the Chinese, the whole commercial structure of Cambodia has crashed. There is practically nothing left of it, and the same thing has happened in Cochinchina, although in a lesser degree. . . . With one or two exceptions, the Chinese, who had a virtual monopoly of rice distilling, have disappeared; only one of every four of those who monopolized the sale and purchase of paddy are still in the colony, and nine out of every ten of those engaged in the sale of hardware and fabrics have gone. The fact must be faced that a

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whole generation of Asiatic merchants is on the way to replacing those who have disappeared.'[1] 438

When the trade depression had ended and the new order was established, the Chinese did not regain all the influence they had lost. In the rice-milling trade they now had competition from the French and even from the Annamites who operated a few husking-mills, especially in Cochinchina. Another factor tending to the dislocation and decline of Chinese business was the big increase in trade between Indochina and the metropolitan country, France. Moreover, the training the native was now receiving in public schools and private institutions was making it possible for him to take the place of the Chinese in occupations for which he had hitherto been considered unsuitable. The Chinese 'comprador' in banks and large business firms had declined from his position as a 'universal informer and touter, responsible for his client's solvency' (Robequain) and had become a mere middleman. 471 458 [871]

Extent of Chinese Holdings in Indochina and of Remittances to China

As is the case elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the information under this heading is very scanty.[2] Remer, cited by Callis, placed the value of Chinese remittances from Indochina to China in 1930 at H.K. $5 million. An estimate of the total value of Chinese investments in Indochina has never been attempted, but Mr Callis in 1941 considered that it was safe to place it at U.S. $80 million as compared with a foreign investment of U.S. $384 million.[3] 471

[1] Étienne Dennery, op. cit. p. 157; Robequain, op. cit. p. 43. See also Virginia Thompson, *French Indo-China*, p. 127.

[2] Research work in this field sponsored by the Royal Institute of International Affairs under the direction of Professor G. C. Allen was still in progress in 1949.

[3] Helmut G. Callis, *Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia* (New York, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942) (in mimeograph) p. 84, citing C. F. Remer, *Foreign Investments in China* (New York, Macmillan, 1931) p. 185. (Remer gives the following remittances to Hong Kong in millions of Hong Kong dollars for 1930: Straits Settlements 42·0, Dutch East Indies 29·0, Siam 20·0, Philippines 12·5, Indochina 5·0.) [439]

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CHAPTER XXIII

SINO-INDOCHINESE RELATIONS

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IN view of the contiguity of Annam and China and the intercourse between the two countries extending over more than two millennia, the general reader may be tempted to conclude that Annam was to all intents and purposes an extension of China, sharing its culture in a modified form and with the blood of its peoples inextricably commingled. The truth is, however, that for a number of reasons the two countries have retained individualities which are quite distinct. The temperaments of the Chinese and the Annamites are of a different order in spite of their strong racial affinities. To take one example: 'The Chinese (says Mr Brodrick) have never been able to communicate to the Annamese their cheerful good humour. In his fears, in his hates, in his complicated and baffled spiritual unrest, the Annamese is as unlike the Chinese as it is possible to imagine.'[1] Again, the Annamite culture, though owing so much to the Chinese in every way, had retained its own roots and its own identity.[2]

[1] A. H. Brodrick, *Little China, the Annamese Lands* (London, Oxford University Press, 1942) p. 45.

[2] The writing of the Annamite language is one indication of this relationship, and a note on this subject (based on a section of Mr Brodrick's work above cited) may be illuminating.

Annamite, now mostly written in Latin letters with diacritical marks, called *quoc-ngũ*, was invented in the seventeenth century by Portuguese missionaries. Traditionally, however, it was written in Chinese characters, and was still so written in all formal documents of the Court of Annam.

The language to-day consists of four layers: (1) of pure Annamite origin, owing nothing to Chinese. This does not account for half the whole. It consists of the terms needed by a primitive people. (2) Words derived long ago from Chinese and considerably deformed as compared with modern Chinese pronunciation. (3) Words of Chinese origin which differ in pronunciation or in sense from their Chinese prototypes. (4) Sino-Annamite proper, i.e. Chinese characters read aloud in Annamite. Very often in the olden days Annamite mandarins from all over the country exchanged letters in pure Chinese, intelligible both to Chinese and Annamites, written in Chinese ideograms intermixed with other ideograms made up of Chinese elements but peculiar to Annam. This is the so-called *chũ-nõm*, or Southern Writing. Annamite literature is scanty and its development has been hampered by the existence of the vast majestic body of Chinese classics.

(Mr Brodrick uses 'Annamese' instead of 'Annamite' throughout. The former is apparently formed on the analogy of 'Chinese' and may eventually replace 'Annamite', but I have used Annamite for the sake of consistency. At the present time 'Vietnamese' is replacing both 'Annamite' and 'Annamese'. V.P.)

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Apart from these temperamental, cultural, and linguistic considerations, the nature of modern Chinese immigration into Indochina has decided the quality of the Chinese influence. The vast majority of immigrants (as we have seen in the preceding chapters) came by sea and settled in Cochinchina and Cambodia: they did not filter down over the border into Tongking and Annam. These last two provinces, indeed, have a comparatively small number of Chinese residents. The bulk of the immigrants, too, did not come from the official or scholar classes who had been the main means of cultural transfusion in former periods, but they were, so to speak, an entirely new infusion. Thus it is that although we must look into history for an explanation of the similarities of Annamite and Chinese, we must not attribute more than is justified to their common cultural heritage. 177 167

Opinions on the Role of the Chinese

Cultural influence is at the best hard to describe with exactness; blood admixture of the first generation is a much more definite quantity and can be expressed in statistical terms. 144

In the first chapter of this Part the number of Chinese *métis*, or mixed Chinese and Indochinese, was estimated at about 140,000 compared with 326,000-odd immigrant Chinese (*c.* 1936). The number of Minh-huong and Sino-Cambodians here given does not, of course, account for all the persons in Indochina having some admixture of Chinese blood but only for those with Chinese fathers and Annamite or Cambodian mothers. After two or three generations the half-breeds become amalgamated with the native population, and the process has been going on in varying degrees of intensity for the last 2,000 years. The Chinese heritage is quite obvious in the new provinces of Trans-Bassac and Baclieu in Cochinchina. Many of the half-breeds have taken to agriculture. Such admixture has always been regarded as advantageous to the country, especially where it produces the Sino-Cambodian. [241 609]

This new race [says René Morizon], for it is truly a new race, which is being created, is very robust. It has been observed in the course of the last few years that the annual medical statistics published in Cambodia by race, reveal a mortality that is infinitely less with Sino-Cambodian *métis* than it is with the Chinese and pure Cambodians. The mixed blood offers, in fact, a greater resistance to cholera and to smallpox than does that of their parents. Their coefficient of health would be 144 164

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144 analogous to that of Europeans. It is, indeed, superior, for that of the latter must be attributed less to any particular robustness than to the 164 minute hygienic care which is lacking to the people of the country.[1]

[186] Up to the reign of Minh Mang (1820–41) these half-breeds were regarded as Chinese, but a need to increase the population caused that Emperor to turn them into Annamites.

144 This infusion of their blood into the native population must therefore be counted as a heavy item on the credit side of the 177 Chinese balance-sheet with Indochina, especially as the descendants of the union usually became farmers—an occupation that 186 no one denounced as parasitic or unproductive. Certainly the Sino-Cambodians were regarded as welcome in Cambodia, for as M. Morizon says: 'It is for them (the Chinese) that the Cambodian reserves his sympathy. It is them that they admire and in whom in particular they sense superiority. The Chinese enjoy among the Cambodians the same prestige as the Greeks and Romans did among the barbarians.'[1] Which is prestige indeed!

426 The fact of this prestige is reconcilable with the functions of entrepreneur and usurer which the Chinese simultaneously discharged only because of the very tactful way he went about his business. Says M. Dennery:

> The Chinese (who is known as 'uncle') prefers to remain on good terms with his debtor. After each of his visits he takes something away with him—a measure of paddy, the daughter of the house for concubine, or a new contract. The native is still in his debt, and the Chinese finds the delay convenient. He prefers goods to money down; he is a money-lender because he is a merchant.[2]

426 It is worthy of remark that it is in the part of Indochina where culture has an Indian, not a Chinese, background that the Chinese 442 is more acceptable than he is in Annam which has a Chinese culture. But in spite of the advantage which the admixture of his blood is admitted to be for the native peoples, it cannot be denied that the Chinese in Indochina, as in Siam, Malaya, and the Philippines, constitutes a 'problem'. This has not escaped the notice of the many observant Frenchmen who have been associated with the colony and some of them have expressed their views with great directness. If the Chinese had (let us imagine) been committed for

[1] R. Morizon, *Monographie du Cambodge* (Hanoi, 1931).
[2] Dennery, op. cit. p. 143.

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trial, for example, the case for the prosecution could not be more vehemently put than it is by M. Gourou:[1] 426 442 [249]

The Chinese are masters of the Cochinchinese copra market, and fix prices practically as they wish. Their harmful influence is not limited to displacing the producers. As the Chinese take no interest in the copra's quality, they exert no influence on the producers with a view to leading them to improve their product's appearance, and to this the Cochinchinese copra owes its poor reputation. . . . The role of the Chinese is no less harmful in the fisheries, so important to Cambodia. The owner-captains of the fishing boats are in debt for life to the Chinese moneylenders and, these in fact, extract the largest part of the entire returns from the fisheries. When the time comes to purchase equipment for the fishing season (bamboo, boats, screens, nets, &c.) the owner-captains ask the moneylenders for advances.[2] And the latter multiply their opportunities for profit by getting themselves reimbursed very abundantly in kind for the advances they have made in money—for the market price for fish for export is fixed by a Chinese syndicate—by obliging the owner to equip himself with rice, lines, and sundry materials from the middleman-moneylender's own stock. The fisherman is helpless against this exploitation, because the Chinese assigns a clerk to go with him, watch that he sells his fish to no other buyer than his creditor, and makes no purchases from the shop of another tradesman, and because the only wholesalers are Chinese, who back one another up. The master fishermen are generally Annamese. They sublet from the Chinese lessees, who have secured their fishing lots from auction. (*vide* Chevey and Le Poulain, *Bulletin économique de l'Indochine*, pp. 278 et seq., 1939.) The Government has regulated the sub-leases in order to prevent the exploitation of the worker by the creditor, but in practice, the Chinese get round the rules. The contracts for the sub-leases are correct but, for example, the sub-lessee will agree that the Chinese lessee will be his partner for half shares, which gives the capitalist half the gross profits. . . . The useless and excessively greedy middleman, whose profits do not remain in the country and constitute heavy invisible exports (we are thinking as much of the chetty as of the Chinese) must be eliminated without violence, without specifically hostile measures, but by the mere progress of rural credit organization and of improvement of the general economy. 226 426 442

[1] Pierre Gourou, *L'Utilisation du sol en Indochine française* (Paris, English translation by S. Haden Guest and Elizabeth Allerton Clark for the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, unpublished, 1940) p. 561 of manuscript.

[2] The rate of interest paid by the Cambodian peasant to the Chinese trader is usually 100 per cent. for 6 or 8 months, Gourou, op. cit. p. 386.

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455 M. Robequain, for his part, sets out the charge as he sees it—indeed with a heavy entry on the debit side, but nevertheless with some extenuating items for the Chinese immigrant. He says that the Chinese are often criticized, and frequently with good reason, for their unscrupulousness and their harsh treatment of the natives: their practice of taking advantage of the shortcomings and poverty of the peasants is quite rightly termed hateful, as is their shrewdness in evading the laws and regulations imposed on them, in avoiding all official control, and in working under the cover of unstable and irresponsible associations. They are denounced as parasites who do not create wealth but fatten on the riches created by Indochinese labour, benefiting the while from the security established by Europeans, and the roads and railways which European technical skill and capital have built. The Chinese are branded as speculators shrewdly taking advantage of monetary instability. They send large sums of money annually to China and the Chinese returns shamelessly to his native country as soon as he has made a fortune or, in the event of bankruptcy, he suddenly disappears.[1]

But (says M. Robequain) these criticisms, aggravated at times, should be somewhat tempered. While the shrewdness of the Chinese must be admitted, it cannot be justly claimed that his activities are [177] harmful. In many of their material and spiritual characteristics the native civilizations testify to the age-old influence of the Chinese. Unlike the Westerner, he has not ruthlessly imported the revelations of a new world. His activity, no less influential, has been undertaken gradually. His colonization of Indochina is, therefore, not wholly to be condemned.

168 Although the Government of Indochina took a neutral stand on the Chinese question (the Chinese, after all, paid a considerable 433 portion of the taxes), French unofficial opinion was divided. Some recognized the ability of the Chinese as workers but were alarmed because they discouraged French business and business men. Others considered them a dangerous element because they introduced into Indochina the political controversies of the Kuomintang and other parties. A third group held that they were a counterbalance to the indolence of the Annamites. They would, it was said, cultivate every inch of cultivable land if they were allowed to do so. Those who favoured the Chinese were opposed to their mass immigration but were anxious that the French might benefit from

[1] Robequain, op. cit. pp. 39, 40.

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the steady labours of the Chinese on land unused by the Annamites. They wished, however, that only the 'coolie' class should be admitted. Many colonial experts took this view, recognizing that Indochina was large enough to hold all Chinese moving into it for years to come. Furthermore, it was expected that, once established, they would eventually consume the products of French manufacture.[1]

In the regions opened up by the French Government the Chinese were said to be obtaining a foothold by dint of clever propaganda against all rivals. In the French-leased territory of Kwong-chow-wan, for example, where the harvests were poor owing to the lack of fertilizers, a German firm had, in 1930, established an installation in order to engage in soil chemistry and it offered easy credit to the farmers. The Chinese (it was alleged), in order to undermine the German influence, spread reports that their methods were destroying the plants, ruining the soil, and poisoning all who ate the foodstuffs produced therefrom. Such stories were believed, with the result that the Chinese gained in prestige and the Germans (presumably) lost their trade.[2]

Chinese knowledge of the natives, and their willingness to travel into parts of the interior where the French had never penetrated, were more than a match for the superior French organization of trade. High tariffs protected imports from France (58 per cent. of the import trade was reserved for the metropolitan Power in this way), but as against this the Chinese sold articles such as swallows' nests, Chinese medicines, or joss-sticks which only Chinese manufactured. They even encroached on the French clientele, being willing to take less profit than their foreign trading rivals. Before the depression of the 1930s, a fair balance had been struck, and while the Chinese handled native imports and exports the French did the same for the Europeans.[3]

Another great asset of the Chinese trader was his intimate knowledge of the market and the fact that his accounts were kept in Chinese, a language which no French official could read. In 1927 an edict was published requiring the keeping of commercial books in roman letters and arabic numerals. This edict was criticized by the French as not being strong enough to be effectual and by the

[1] The arguments in this paragraph are from Thomas E. Ennis, *French Policy and Developments in Indochina* (Chicago University Press, 1936) p. 119.
[2] Ennis, op. cit. p. 126. [3] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 174 ff.

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656 Chinese as being highly prejudicial to their business, and in 1930
451 a compromise made the regulation apply only to big businesses
198 which had to be officially registered. By means of this regulation the Government attempted to ascertain the names of the persons who were behind the leading Chinese firms.[1]

Commercial Relations between China and Indochina

439 From 1913 to 1935 inclusive the mean annual Sino-Indochinese trade was valued at 99 million piastres (64 million for exports; 35 million for imports) in a total of 285 million, the mean annual value of the total exterior commerce of Indochina. Averages over the years 1919–35 show that 34·6 per cent. of Indochina's special trade was with China:[2] 34·5 per cent. was with France.

Of the merchandise exported to China (1931–5) 68 per cent. was for foodstuffs, 29 per cent. for raw materials, and 3 per cent. for manufactured articles. Of the merchandise imported from China 44 per cent. were raw materials, 4 per cent. manufactured articles, and 16 per cent. foodstuffs. Rice and its derivatives accounted for 62·1 per cent. of the total exports from Indochina to China direct, oil for 22 per cent. (1931–5), and for 1935 alone the rice figure had risen to 86·8 per cent. of the total. Merchandise imported from China into Indochina included tin (24 per cent. for 1931–5) and raw and manufactured silk (20·3 per cent. for 1931–5).[3]

[1] For an account of a similar controversy in the Philippines see pp. 631–3, regarding the Book-keeping Laws.

[444] Dr Thompson (op. cit. p. 178) says: 'The steps were designed to eliminate the Chinese trick of using names like "Eternal Happiness" and "Springtime of Youth" to prevent the prosecution of the real directors of a bankrupt enterprise who could melt away under suchlike joyous nomenclature. . . . Chinese merchants were henceforth to report their business balance after six months and if they planned to leave the colony, they must announce their departure a month in advance.'

The business signs, or 'chops', under which the Chinese traded undoubtedly facilitated the secrecy they required either for legitimate or other reasons, but they were not invented expressly for the purpose of deceiving foreigners. They were names of firms in the same way as are, say, the Savoy Tailors' Guild or Ardath Cigarettes. In Malaya, opposition to the compulsory registration of the names of Chinese partnerships came not only from the Chinese traders themselves, but also from British import firms who argued that it had taken many years for them to build up their systems of trade information, and they did not see why rivals should profit by the enforced divulgence of trade secrets.

[2] The 'special' import trade comprised merchandise from abroad declared to be for the supply of ships having their base in Indochina, or placed in the category of temporary admission, &c.

[3] Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 117 ff.

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These figures were taken from Mr Wang Wen-yuan's detailed exposition of the subject, but it has been pointed out that being *average* figures they are quite misleading, especially for 1934 and 1935. For 1934–7 the actual figures were: 439

	1934		1935		1936		1937	
	Export	*Import*	*Export*	*Import*	*Export*	*Import*	*Export*	*Import*
France	49·0	57·0	33·3	55·0	55·0	53·0	56·0	53·0
China	5·4	4·0	15·1	7·8	2·9	9·2	5·4	7·2

France's trade policy for Indochina was frankly protectionist; but even as far back as 1892, when the principle was being applied in all its rigour, it was found expedient to make an exception in the case of much of the merchandise imported from China which was necessary to the Indochinese population.

In 1922 recognition by the Washington Conference of tariff autonomy necessitated a new treaty with Indochina. But there were obstacles. First of all the French demanded a *quid pro quo* for the acceptance of Chinese consuls in Indochina and for a diminishing tax on Chinese goods, in the shape of indemnification for the loss of French lives and damage to property in China and a cessation of political agitation among the Chinese in Indochina itself. The delay in ratifying the treaty that had been arranged allowed China to raise her tariffs and to devalue her currency. Eventually the treaty was agreed in principle in 1930,[1] but this fact did not noticeably ease trade relations. Indochina's trade with China fell off perceptibly after 1930, and trade restrictions between the two countries were later intensified by protective measures. The central or provincial Governments replied to increased Indochinese tariffs by raising their duties on coal and (especially) on rice. The Nanking agreement of 1935, however, lowered the rates which had proved the worst trade barriers.[2] These agreements provided for migration between the two countries on reasonable terms, and for the establishment of Chinese consulates in Hanoi or Haiphong and Saigon. (The French agreed to receive Chinese consuls solely to obtain concessions for coal exported to China from Tongking). Most Chinese goods originating in the provinces bordering on Indochina could be exported through the latter country duty free. Munitions 648 439 000

[1] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 178 ff.
[2] Robequain, op. cit. p. 327.

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might be shipped across Tongking at the wish of the Chinese Government free of transit duty. This last provision naturally led to conflict between Japan and Indochina when, in 1937, the blockade of Chinese ports by the Japanese caused the Haiphong–Kunming and Hanoi–Langson railway lines to carry an ever-increasing portion of China's military supplies. As a consequence of Japanese protests, Japan and France agreed in the course of 1938 that the frontier should be open only to goods contracted for before July 1937. The closing of the frontier, subject to this exception, was modified in some cases, but the traffic suffered much interruption and on the whole the railway was grossly inadequate for Chinese requirements. In December 1938, after further Japanese protests, the Indochinese authorities stopped all transit to China over the Yunnan Railway. Following this success, early in February 1938 the Japanese occupied Hainan Island, commanding not only the Shanghai–Hong Kong–Singapore shipping lanes but also large areas of the Gulf of Tongking and the port of Haiphong. In reply the French reopened the Yunnan Railway to Chinese war materials on 20 March.[1] In April 1939 the Japanese occupied the Spratly Islands about half-way between Saigon and North Borneo. In 1940 when the fall of France made it virtually impossible for the colony of Indochina to resist Japan when the latter country renewed its old complaint regarding the shipments of war supplies to Kunming, the French acceded to the Japanese demands.

All these events were bound to affect the fortunes of the bulk of Indochina's Chinese population—the traders. So far as they identified themselves with China they suffered with her in this period of misfortune and their communications with and remittances to their families there were interrupted and diminished, but in a purely material way they had compensations for their hardship. The rice market, in which they were so greatly interested, was saved because conditions in Japan and Japanese-occupied China created a greatly increased demand for the Indochinese product just at the time when the market from Europe and North Africa collapsed. Much of the rice sent to Hong Kong and 'other Chinese ports' was probably shipped to Japan or used to feed Japanese troops in China.[2] In default of restrictions imposed by national authority,

[1] Supplement to Robequain, op. cit., by John R. Andrus and Katrine R. C. Greene, p. 353.

[2] Saigon's rice export totalled 1,681,000 tons in 1939 of which 162,000 tons

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patriotism has small modifying influence on the simple business law of profit making.

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went to Hong Kong, 78,000 to other Chinese ports, 461,000 tons to France, 147,000 to other European countries, and only 8,000 tons to Japan; in 1940 Japan took 476,000 tons, Hong Kong 244,000 tons, other Chinese ports 235,000 tons, French colonies 104,000 tons, France 91,000 tons, and other European countries 49,000 tons.

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[p. 254]

CHAPTER XXIV

ANNAMITE NATIONALISM AND CHINESE POLITICS

668 175 If we were to display the pieces of political fabric representing each country in Southeast Asia one by one there would be a great deal of warp and woof irrelevant to our survey of the Chinese. At the same time it is not always possible to isolate the Chinese theme when it is a mere thread, even a concealed one, without snapping it. In Indochina the Nationalist movement was largely independent of that in China itself, though having contacts with it and in some respects being inspired by it, and with some of its leaders educated in the school at Whampoa or the Chinese political arena. We must therefore aim at sketching in only so much of the Nationalist pattern in Indochina as will serve as background to the Chinese story.

Although the Annamite people were thoroughly sinicized in their beliefs, their habits, and their general cultural patterns, they did not surrender to the invader their sense of being a people distinct and apart. Annam is full of pagodas and temples erected in honour of national heroes who had resisted the Chinese invaders or the Chinese pirates from the south.[1]

After the French invasion of Annam, intermittent fighting between the conquerors and the Annamites continued while the imperial Court of Hué became the scene of anti-French intrigue and palace revolution. But as the Nationalist forces arose and took shape in the first and second decades of the twentieth century there was little co-operation among them and they were united only by their common dislike of French rule.

665 668 175 The early Nationalist associations in Indochina put forward a moderate programme. It was only when lack of any marked success in promoting their aims had discredited them with the bulk of their followers that the more leftist associations or groups robbed them of popular support. Belonging to the category of moderates was the Tongkingese Party of the Pham Quynh and the Constitutional Party of Bui quang Chieu. Their failure led to the rise of

[1] Dang-Chân-Liêu, 'Annamite Nationalism', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. xx, no. 1 (March 1947).

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parties which concentrated upon direct action. In 1927 the New Annam Revolutionary Association (*Tan-Viet-Cach-Menh-Dang*) was established, drawing its membership both from the Nationalist-minded *petite bourgeoisie* and the Communists. It organized a series of strikes in consequence of which it was subjected to severe repression by the Government, and in 1929 was dissolved. The Communist elements of the old Cach-Menh-Dang then joined with the New Annam Revolutionary Youth Association (*Viet-Nam-Cach-Menh-Thanh-Nien-Hoi*) to form the Indochinese Communist Party under Nguyen Ai-quoc[1]—a Party whose ancestry derived from the revolutionary Association for the Restoration of Vietnam which had existed earlier in the century. In 1931, two years after its founding, the Communist Party claimed 1,500 members and some 100,000 peasant adherents.[2]

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The *Viet-Nam-Quoc-Dan-Dang*, founded about 1927 in Tongking, was modelled on the Chinese Kuomintang founded by Dr Sun Yat-sen. It appealed to youth, and from the outset it was a terrorist association. It issued propaganda addressed to students, employees, and the army, and endeavoured to secure feminist support. The year of its foundation is significant, for it was in the same year that Chiang Kai-shek, now on his victorious march to the north, purged the Kuomintang of its Communist elements which had hitherto formed the left wing of the party but which now split off into their own organizations. The attempts of the Quoc-Dan-Dang to link forces with similar groups in Siam came to nothing, but it had succeeded in establishing relations with the Kuomintang and with the Yunnan branches of the same society. Since it did not change its name and continued to exploit its Kuomintang connexion, it seemed that it ignored the purge of 1927. In January 1929 it attempted unsuccessfully to assassinate Pasquier, the Governor-General of French Indochina, and a month afterwards succeeded in murdering Bazin, head of the Labour Recruiting Bureau.

Finding the police hot on the trail, the Quoc-Dan-Dang decided prematurely to launch the next stage of its revolutionary programme—the phase of overt action—and a series of acts of violence resulted. A mutiny took place at Yenbay, at Hanoi bombs

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[1] Who was later to be known as Ho Chi-minh (or Ho Chi Minh).

[2] The exact origins of these parties (says Mr Dang-Chân-Liêu) are as hard to determine as the sources of rivers, but this is not very important since it is the rivers and not the springs with which political history has to deal.

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665 were thrown at the Commissariat, and the sub-prefect of Vinhbao
669 was assassinated. An abortive attempt to set up a revolutionary regime in the three Annamite provinces and to initiate a drive in
175 concert with the Yunnanese supporters of the association ended in the execution of thousands in 1930–1. By 1933 the party was officially reported dead as an organized group.[1]

We have observed so far the alliance of sympathy between the Vietnamese Nationalists, proceeding early from moderate to violent programmes, and the Chinese Nationalists, especially in Canton and Yunnan. But the movements were quite separate from one another and were developing along different lines. The difference is underlined by the contrasting personalities and careers of the two leaders. Those of Chiang Kai-shek are well enough known: those of Nguyen Ai-quoc are less so.

668 Nguyen Ai-quoc (the personal name, Ai-quoc, is apparently a self-adopted one and means 'lover of his country')[2] was born in
665 1892 in Annam. He went to France and in Paris in 1920 he founded the Intercolonial Union of Coloured Peoples: in 1923 he was study-
175 ing in Moscow and in due course he passed on to Canton. Borodin was now associated with Dr Sun during one of his periods of control in the southern capital, and Nguyen Ai-quoc and he are said to have arranged to work in co-operation from both sides of the Sino-Indochinese border, distributing anti-colonial tracts in both China and France. Young Annamites then received instruction at the politico-military school at Whampoa, founded to train leaders for the Kuomintang. Nguyen Ai-quoc's interests were more nationalistic than communistic at this stage. When Chiang Kai-shek's purge got under way, both Borodin and Nguyen Ai-quoc sought refuge in Russia. The Annamite students who had received training in Canton and Whampoa returned to their own country to make use of their new-found political knowledge.

With the Communists made temporarily impotent by vigorous French action, the more moderate Annamite Nationalists were hopeful when the Front Populaire came into power in France in 1936 that this would mean a less repressive policy towards them-

[1] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 489.

[2] Nguyen is apparently the surname. Later on, in 1933, as we shall see, Nguyen Ai-quoc changed his name to Ho Chi-minh (or Ho Chi Minh)—*Ho* characterizes the Annamites just as Han does the Chinese; *Chi* means 'intelligence'; *Minh* means 'bright, brilliant', and in Sino-Annamite is the same as the Chinese *Ming* in Ming dynasty.

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selves, and the replacement of the illiberal Governor-General René Robin and the declaration of an amnesty encouraged this hope. But when the Nationalists in Indochina staged strikes with the idea of forcing even larger concessions, the new regime stiffened up against them. When the Popular Front fell, the Anti-Imperialist Democratic Front which had formed itself in Annam in the optimism of the hour went underground with the rest of the Nationalist parties.[1]

After the acceptance of the Japanese demands on Indochina in 1941 Vichy officials remained in nominal control of the colony. In concert with the Japanese they put down Nationalist risings and pro-Allied sabotage. The Vichy regime suited Japanese purposes until March 1945 when the increasing nearness of the Allies decided the Japanese to take a more direct control of Indochina. On 10 March they announced that 'the colonial status of French Indochina' had ended, and the following day the Annamite Emperor was reported to have declared the independence of the kingdom of Annam. In August he made a declaration uniting Annam, Tongking, and Cochinchina (the three *ky*, which were separate provinces under the French). Later he gave the name of Vietnam to the kingdom in an attempt, no doubt, to suggest that the battle for Annamite independence which had so long been fought under the banner of that name had at last been won. On 18 March the protectorate of Cambodia announced its independence, and on 10 April Laos followed suit.

Meanwhile during the years of Japanese dominance the Vietnamese had not been altogether passive. At Dongdang in Tongking, and at Coalankh in Annam in 1941 they had risen against both Vichy and the Japanese. In 1942 members of the Annamite and anti-fascist groups had escaped to China to form the Viet Minh[2] (League for Vietnam Independence) which was pledged to fight both Vichy and Japan for the independence of a democratic Vietnam. After the Japanese collapse, the Japanese radio quoted Premier Tran Trong Kim as declaring the determination of the

[1] For this period Ellen J. Hammer, 'Blueprinting a New Indochina', *Pacific Affairs* (September 1948), and *The Emergence of Viet Nam* (New York, Institute of Pacific Affairs, 1947, mimeographed) by the same author are mainly followed.

[2] Viet Minh, the abridged title of a group of several Annamite parties, in full the Vietnam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (League for the Independence of Vietnam), Roger Lévy, *L'Indochine et ses traités* (Paris, Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, 1947) p. 10.

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665 people of Vietnam to 'defend their independence'. But his regime
668 came to an end on 22 August when the Viet Minh established a
722 provisional Government under Ho Chi Minh (the name assumed in the war years by the veteran Communist leader, Nguyen Ai-quoc) for the Annamite provinces. Bao Dai abdicated, but preferring, as he said, to be a citizen of a free country rather than the king of an enslaved one, he joined the Viet Minh Government as political adviser. On 2 September the new Government issued its declaration of independence based on that of the United States.

The war-time agreements between the British and the Chinese fixed the sixteenth parallel as the line of demarcation between the British and Chinese troops where they were to be allotted the task of disarming the Japanese—the British to the south of the line and the Chinese to the north. The two forces now duly entered Indochina to carry out their tasks. The British had already announced their intention of before long handing over control of Saigon and of southern Indochina to the French. The intentions of the Chinese, however, remained for the time being obscure.

Before the account of events is resumed in the ensuing chapter, it would be well to summarize and explain developments that have been described.

In the tangle of events and policies a distinction must be made between China as a Power and Chinese nationals in Indochina. The first was a political entity playing of necessity the international game of power politics whilst conducting simultaneously a war of resistance against the Japanese and against the Communists in its midst; the second were a community, very largely bourgeois in composition and interest, which was striving to maintain its existence in the tussle between the conflicting elements in Indochina. For reasons of political prestige the Chinese Nationalist Government did its best to protect the interests of its children in Indochina, but at the same time it had to keep its eye on international and internal developments. With the defeat of the Japanese the game became more complex than ever.

668 We have seen, so far, no fewer than four separate forces of
648 Chinese origin operating simultaneously in Indochina. The first was the ancient conquest and colonization of Annam which had stamped its ineffaceable imprint on the culture of Annam; the second was the influx of immigrants, mostly by sea, which the economic expansion of Indochina under the French regime had made

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possible; the third was the influence of Chinese nationalism on Annamite nationalism bifurcating into left and right; the fourth was China as a Power fighting the Communists in her midst and at the same time struggling to maintain her international position. In the fourth category of action China had to take into account the two forces striving to fill the vacuum left by the Japanese surrender, namely the new-born France reasserting her old claims in Indochina, and the new republic of Vietnam. At the juncture to which we have so far brought the narrative, the Indochinese territory, north of the sixteenth parallel of latitude, including the whole of Tongking, most of Laos, and part of Annam, was still under the control of Chinese troops.

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After the Japanese Surrender

Between September 1945 and January 1946 the French Government was preoccupied with obtaining the evacuation of Tongking by Chinese troops.[1] The negotiations for the evacuation were conducted at Chungking, and the Franco-Chinese agreements were signed on 28 February 1946. The first agreement was concerned with the abandonment by France of the privileges and concessions accorded to her in the past by the 'unequal treaties' (this was following on the renunciation by Britain and America of similar privileges and concessions in 1943). By another agreement the Chinese Government accepted that French troops should relieve the Chinese troops north of the sixteenth parallel and take over their mission of disarming the Japanese. The agreement assured to the Chinese resident in Indochina the maintenance of the territorial advantages of their organization by *congrégations*. It established a customs zone at Haiphong, outlined a future commercial treaty, and fixed the conditions for the re-purchase of the French section of the Yunnan Railway.[2]

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The Franco-Chinese agreement on Sino-Indochinese relations contained the following articles:

Title I

Article I. Chinese nationals shall continue to enjoy the rights, privileges, and exemptions which they have traditionally possessed in Indochina, notably in that which concerns their entry and departure, taxation,

[1] 'Come to disarm the Japanese troops (says M. Roger Lévy, op. cit. p. 17), the Chinese lived on the country and emptied it of its substance.'

[2] The text of the agreements is to be found in Roger Lévy, op. cit., p. 75 ff.

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727 acquisition and possession of immovable property both rural and urban,
entry into commercial contracts (*écritures*), the establishment of primary
648 and secondary schools, the exercise of agricultural professions, fishing,
interior and coastal navigation, and other free occupations.
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Article II. The treatment that Chinese nationals shall enjoy in Indochina as regards the right to travel, to reside, and to engage in commercial, industrial, and mining undertakings, and to acquire and possess immovable property shall not be less favourable than that enjoyed by any third or most favoured nation.

Article III. The taxation applied, in keeping with Article I to Chinese nationals residing in Indochina, and in particular the personal taxation, shall not be heavier than that imposed on Indochinese residing in China.

Article IV. Chinese nationals in Indochina shall enjoy in the matter of procedure in law and the administration of justice the same treatment as Indochinese nationals.[1]

727 Meanwhile, in the northern half of Indochina, despite Chiang
Kai-shek's declaration that China had no territorial ambitions, and
648 despite the French gesture in returning Kwong-Chow-Wan to
China, the influence of the Chinese occupation was in effect in
668 favour of the Vietnam Nationalists. The French in Indochina found that General Lu Han, commanding the Chinese troops in the northern half of the country, was consistently unco-operative. The Chinese had refused repeated requests from the French to be allowed to bring in soldiers and administrators but the Vietnamese, on the other hand, were allowed to keep their weapons. The control remained vitually in their hands, and their flag, a yellow star in a red field, flew from many buildings. The Chinese, too, brought in Annamite Nationalist groups favourable to China. By international agreement they also occupied north Laos.

[1] The *Journal Officiel de l'Indochine* of 7 October 1948 contained Decree No. 272/3416 of 28 September 1948, arising from an exchange of notes in Paris between the French Foreign Minister and the Chinese ambassador. The main provisions of the decree were that the groups known as Chinese congregations should be called Chinese regional administrative groups, that the election of chiefs and sub-chiefs of regional administrative groups should be held and the candidates approved by the Chinese consular authorities, that the term of office of the chiefs and sub-chiefs should be fixed at four years, that chiefs and sub-chiefs might be removed if convicted by the French authorities or Chinese consular representatives of abuse of power, administrative irregularity, insolvency, activities contrary to the interests or security of the French Union, the national Governments, or the Government of the Chinese Republic, and that the chiefs and sub-chiefs were to be the intermediaries for receiving administrative orders addressed to the group.

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By the agreement of 28 February the Chinese were under obligation to withdraw all their troops by 31 March, but there was delay in their evacuating Indochina. There were several clashes between Chinese and French troops, and there was an incident on 6 March 1946 when the French cruiser, the *Emile Bertin*, and auxiliary ships carrying 20,000 troops waiting outside Haiphong for permission to disembark were fired on by shore batteries manned by Chinese. Eighteen men were killed and nearly forty injured in the warships by the firing. It was not until 9 March that the first French contingents landed. There were still 1,200 Chinese troops left in northern Indochina in July 1946. On 4 March the Southeast Asia Command had relinquished authority over south Indochina to the French. 727 648

Detailed description of the fretful course of Franco-Vietnamese relations does not belong here, and all that should be given is a bare summary of developments up to the middle of 1948. A Franco-Cambodian *modus vivendi* was concluded on 7 January 1946 which recognized Cambodian autonomy, but ten French counsellors were to assist the Cambodian ministers in their functions and, in certain cases, these counsellors had to be consulted and had as well the right to make suggestions. On 6 March 1946 an agreement was signed between France and the Vietnamese whereby the former recognized the Vietnam Republic as a free State with its own Government, parliament, army, and finances, forming part of the Indochinese Federation and of the French Union. The French Government pledged itself to hold a referendum in Cochinchina to determine whether it should join the other two *ky* (Tongking and Annam) or not. In return the Annamites would not oppose the French Army taking over from the Chinese. But the March agreement did not bring peace. It turned out to be merely an armistice which could not last because there was no agreement on fundamentals. 648 641 668 635

Analysing the difficulties involved in two years of negotiations between the French and the Vietnamese, M. Jean d'Arcy has pointed out that the fundamental issue was expressed by two questions: what does Vietnam mean by 'independence' within the body of the Indochinese Federation of the French Union, and what does France mean by 'liberty' within the French Union?[1] But what proved the rock on which negotiations were finally wrecked was

[1] Jean d'Arcy, 'Confrontation des thèses françaises et vietnamiennes', *Politique étrangère* (June–July 1947).

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the question of Cochinchina. This territory the Vietnamese regarded as an integral part of their country as it had been under the Court of Hué before the French arrival. The French, however, had turned Cochinchina into a colony and for decades had striven to assimilate it with France. Moreover, it was the richest part of Indochina, contributing the bulk of the country's rice and rubber exports before the war and 40 per cent. of the entire revenue. To the Vietnamese, on the other hand, Cochinchina was essential to their economy, especially as regards rice, and as an outlet for their population. At the Dalat Conference from 19 April to 11 May 1946 they asked for a position for Indochina within the French Union like that of Eire then within the British Commonwealth. The French wanted stronger bonds. Dalat produced very little and the negotiations were resumed at Fontainebleau where the Dalat Conference had left off (July 1946). Meanwhile fighting was continuing in Indochina between the French and the Vietnamese. The French had recognized a 'free republic' of Cochinchina which the Vietnamese regarded as a puppet regime intended to disrupt the union of the three *ky*. A second Dalat Conference summoned at this point by the Governor-General, Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu, with representatives from Cambodia, Laos, and southern Annam alone, cut the ground from under the feet of the Vietnamese delegation then at Fontainebleau. These conferences settled nothing and with a new series of 'incidents' hostilities flared up again into an undeclared war.

In France at the same time as the Vietnamese delegation to Fontainebleau was none other than Ho Chi Minh, the President of the Vietnam Republic. To a newspaper man he is reported to have said: 'If capitalists come to our country, it will be a good thing for them, they will make money, but not as it was made in the old days. From now on it is fifty-fifty.' He also is reported to have remarked that Communism might come to Indochina in fifty years' time, but not now.[1]

All this, of course, was principally of interest to the native peoples of Annam and Cochinchina, but the Chinese who lived among them in such numbers and to a great extent shared their lives could not be indifferent to the turn of events. Moreover, the movement in Vietnam was in some ways parallel to the Communist movement in China, and the two were likely more and more to be

[1] *New York Times* (6 July 1946).

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in concert with the advance of the Chinese Communists towards the Indochinese frontier. 668

With the French and the Vietnamese in a state of hostility, the lot of the Chinese in Indochina was not a happy one. Now that the restraints imposed by the French control had been loosened, the resentment of the ordinary people of Chinese trade monopoly and usury was expressed in many overt ways. According to the Saigon radio, Mr Tai Kwai-sheng, the Chinese Vice-Minister of Overseas Affairs, attributed the anti-Chinese atmosphere widely prevailing in Southeast Asia to Japanese propaganda 'assisted by the varying standards of livelihood in the area'.[1] The previous day he had been quoted by the same source as having expressed satisfaction at the goodwill reigning in Indochina between the French and the Chinese who were, he said, 'traditional friends'. 609

As was to be expected, those Chinese who happened to be in an area in which hostilities were in progress were almost certain to suffer losses both of life and property. In April 1947, according to a protest made by the Chinese consul-general, eighty Chinese were victims of French machine-gunning during operations in the Vungliem area near Vinhlong in the Mekong delta. The French had explained that there were no Chinese flags flying. At Mytho about the same time ten Chinese were reported killed by French bombing and many houses were destroyed.[2] 669

One of the effects of the guerrilla warfare now being conducted against the French by the Vietnamese was (as has already been remarked in Chapter I) the concentration of French and foreign nationals in a few centres. Hanoi had a diminished population, but Saigon–Cholon, on the contrary, were now greatly overcrowded and by April 1948 there were said to be 310,000 Chinese living there, whereas in 1936 there had been only 66,000. The area was said to be defended at this time by 25,000 French troops in a 75-kilometre radius from the centre.[3] [166] [162]

The French and the Vietnamese each claimed to be the protectors of the Chinese from the persecution of the other. It is thus important in recording the events of this period that special account should be taken of the source of the information. It is only occasionally that the statement of a neutral is available, but one such 609 669

[1] Saigon radio in Cantonese (25, 26 February 1947).
[2] A.F.P. (in morse) (23, 24 April 1947).
[3] *France Vietnam* (15 April 1948).

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669 observer has described the situation as it was early in 1947.[1] He says
609 that, according to a report of a committee representing Chinese victims of recent disturbances, a series of night fires in seven separate districts of the Saigon–Cholon area had made 18,720 persons homeless and had destroyed more than $800,000 worth of property in the preceding month. Seven separate districts where thousands of Chinese and Annamites lived in thatched cottages had been razed to the ground since 15 January in more than ten separate fires. These fires, it was believed, were of incendiary origin. (The committee produced samples of crude fire-bombs made of petrol-soaked cotton which, they said, had been hurled into the fragile huts.) The victims included 7,500 Chinese. Mr Tai Kwai-sheng, the Chinese Vice-Minister of Overseas Affairs, who was in the course of making a fact-finding tour of Southeast Asia, said that the losses from the French-Annamite clash were heavy among the 700,000 [*sic*] Chinese residents of Indochina. In all Southeast Asia, he declared, the greatest damage had been done in Indonesia where several thousand Chinese had been killed.

[648 Another of Mr Tai's preoccupations was with the recent tighten-
167] ing up of the Indochinese immigration laws against the Chinese. He proposed to discuss the matter with the French authorities and to point out that few countries had imposed new restrictions since the end of the war.

168 In mid-March the Chinese consul-general in Saigon said that
166 50,000 Chinese were being evacuated from south Indochina. This action, according to the Vietnamese, followed repeated protests
669 from the Chinese consulate over the loss of Chinese lives and property in the fighting between the French and guerrilla forces.

731 The evacuation, said the consul-general, was at the request of the French. Chinese were leaving the rural areas at Camau at the southern tip of Indochina, which the French said was one of the largest areas of guerrilla concentration. The evacuees were moved into either French-controlled zones or to large non-strategic towns in the 'guerrilla-controlled sections'. He expected the evacuation to be completed the following month, despite various problems of transport, housing, and food. The consul-general went on to say that during the previous two years the Chinese had spent some 5 million piastres for food, clothing, and shelter for Chinese displaced by the conflict. Three-fifths of this amount came from the

[1] Robert Trumbull in the *New York Times* (26 February 1947).

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Chinese Government and the rest from Chinese citizens living in 166
Indochina. He said that he was studying the matter of a long-term, 669
low interest loan through local banks to displaced workers to per- 731
mit their re-establishment in new homes.

In May the French authorities in Indochina had allotted 20 mil- 648
lion piastres as a first contribution towards relief of the Chinese in
the country.[1] In August they were reported to have expressed their 731
willingness to accord adequate protection to Chinese nationals re- 609
siding in Indochina, and had added that equitable compensation
would be made to those who had suffered losses in the Franco-Vietnamese hostilities. This followed protests made by the Chinese Government to both French and Annamite authorities over the hardships imposed on Chinese by the fighting. The Chinese Government, the spokesman said, had reasserted its determination to protect the lives and property of overseas Chinese in French Indochina and it had negotiated with the two parties concerned to designate areas with heavy concentrations of Chinese nationals as neutral zones where no fighting should take place. It had also demanded compensation for those who had suffered losses in the conflict.

Meanwhile (according to the same Chinese Government spokesman), relief work for the overseas Chinese in Indochina had been expedited, and the Chinese Government had appropriated 2 million piastres for the purpose, and the Chinese Overseas Affairs Commission Ch. $50 million. In addition, the Government had approved a remittance of Ch. $200 million to the Social Affairs Department of the Yunnan Provincial Government for distribution among Chinese nationals who had escaped from French Indochina to such places as Laokai, Hokow, and Kunming. There were further appropriations for 500 persons who had escaped from Indochina to Kwangtung province and for 1,600 others temporarily living in Ping Siang, Lung Tsin, Cheng Pin, and Min King in Kwangsi province.[2]

Apart from their misfortunes arising from the Franco-Vietnamese 167
clashes, the Chinese had grievances on other counts. One was the
tightening-up of the immigration laws above mentioned, another 651

[1] Nanking Central News in English (8 May 1947).

[2] *Voice of China* (12 August 1947).

It must be remembered that the open market value of the Chinese dollar at this period was in the region of 20,000 to one United States dollar and the Chinese dollar was continuously depreciating. The sums involved were therefore in reality small and not adequate for the purposes for which they were allotted.

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167 was the imposition of new taxes. In March 1946 the French in
651 Saigon had promulgated new regulations whereby immigrant Chinese had to pay a yearly tax of 82.75 piastres, which was an increase of 42.50 on the tax as it was in 1944. The Chinese protested that this was a breach of the newly concluded Sino-French agreement requiring Chinese to be treated on an equality with other nationals.[1] Later on, a 1 per cent. tax was imposed on all Chinese commercial transactions, and in May 1947 we find the Chinese Chamber of Commerce at Cholon asking the Governor-General to intervene with the Hoach Government of Cochinchina to obtain a delay of three months in the application of the tax.[2]

669 The Chinese of Indochina being mostly traders, the prevailing
609 conditions caused them more hardship than if they had been agri-
579 culturists. The Franco-Vietnamese hostilities were causing enormous losses to the Chinese community, the Chinese consul-general, Mr Tse Kin-yen, stated in June 1947. After enumerating the protests he had lodged with the French authorities, he said that he could not but deplore the numerous instances of sabotage perpetrated by the Vietnamese against the Chinese enterprises, the destruction of several hundreds of Chinese shops, and so forth. The Vietnamese attitude, he said, was inexplicable in view of the friendship shown by the Chinese towards the Annamese.[3]

As against this, the Vietnam News Agency reported that the Chinese nationals in Toky prefecture, between Hanoi and Haiphong, had denounced the French Air Force for bombing and 'strafing' the Chinese in this area.[4] Again, according to the Bangkok newspaper *Liberty*, in the Haininh sector of Hanoi the 'French militarists' were forcing Chinese nationals to pay 90 piastres in default of working for the French Army.

669 By November 1947 the Chinese consul-general, on his return
from a tour of inspection of the Haiphong area, was reported as
678 saying that the condition of the Chinese residents in north Indochina was 'on the whole satisfactory', but he remarked at the same time that the outlook was not at all bright since the hostilities had brought about an almost complete paralysis of all economic activity.[5] Of the 100,000-odd Chinese in northern Indochina prior to the

[1] Chungking radio in English (19 March 1946).
[2] A.F.P. (in morse) (14 May 1947).
[3] A.F.P. Saigon (24 June 1947).
[4] 5 August 1947.
[5] 28 August 1947.
The *Sphere*, London, of 27 November 1948 gave pictures of the sabotage at

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conflict, some had returned to China and some were in the area under Vietnamese control. The consul-general had no details regarding the fate of the latter, but he considered that, since they were not being held as hostages, they were probably being accorded freedom of movement and were being relatively well treated by the Vietnam authorities.[1] 669 648

In the interests of its nationals the Chinese Government quite naturally did not wish to appear to be taking sides in the conflict, but with the same interests in view it was willing to convey to either the French or the Vietnamese, according to the territory affected, that its sympathies were not opposed to *de facto* authority. The local Chinese residents seconded their home Government in the latter regard. The pronouncements of Chinese spokesmen must therefore be interpreted in the light of this fact. Moreover, the French or Annamite agencies, as the case might be, would naturally select statements or incidents which supported the case of their Governments. Thus we find the Vietnam News Service in Bangkok relaying the news that the Chinese residents of Namdinh had sent to the Committee of Vietnamese Resistance in that province a present of 100,000 piastres as a contribution to the Vietnamese war effort, together with a letter which said, 'profoundly moved by the effective protection assured to the evacuated Chinese by the Vietnam Government, we have followed the Council of the President, Ho Chi Minh, in reducing our expenses during the Fête du Têt (Vietnam New Year) and have saved 100,000 piastres which we ask you to distribute to the different organizations of the Ambulance Service and other organizations in the public interest'.[2] Other evidence of Chinese sympathy cited was the formation of a cultural group of young Chinese to assert the bonds of friendship between the two peoples and to encourage the Vietnamese in their fight to destroy the French colonial yoke.

At the same time the Vietnamese lost no opportunity of pointing out the injury to the Chinese that was occasioned by French action (as, for example, at Huuling in the province of Langson in July 1947, and in Ben-re province in March 1948). In the latter month the Chinese population of 4,000 was said to have been evacuated

Cholon where five Chinese rice-mills had been burnt down by anti-French guerrillas as part of a campaign to cripple Indochina's export economy.

[1] A.F.P. Saigon (27 November 1947).

[2] Vietnam News Service, Bangkok (29 January 1947).

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669 to areas under Vietnam control following on 'countless atrocities
648 committed against them by French troops'. Nor were the *métis* left out of account. In December 1947 the Vietnamese reported that the Association of Sino-Vietnamese Half-Castes residing in the Nambo had called upon their compatriots from China and Vietnam not to fall into the trap laid by the French colonialists, who, the declaration said, had launched an offensive in the north and were employing every possible means to sever good relations existing between the Chinese and the Vietnamese people.[1]

000 We have followed the Chinese in Indochina through many vicissitudes and must now take leave of them in their hour of greatest trial. In the main issues which are being contested they can take no leading part: all they can do is to await the outcome and in the meantime contrive to adapt themselves to the trying circumstances. As traders and middlemen their sole interest is in peaceful settlement and when that is achieved they will perform whatever function that the regime in power allots to them. A change in the whole political shape of Asia is in the process of taking place, but in whatever state of society emerges from the melting-pot it is likely that for a long time to come there will be a place for the trader and the middleman. In that role the overseas Chinese excel, and it is the one they have filled in the past because it offered the best opportunities and livelihood.

[1] Vietnam News Service, Paris (16 December 1947).

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PART V
THE CHINESE IN MALAYA
CHAPTER XXV
DEMOGRAPHY

[659] 162 MALAYA was fortunate in being in 1947 the subject of the first full-dress census of population which had been taken in Southeast Asia since the surrender of Japan.[1] All that it is necessary, therefore, for the writer to do in order to produce an adequate chapter on demography is to give a very short summary of the material in the census report relating to the Chinese and to insert therein some abstracts made from the census tables.

Taking the two components of Malaya separately, there were in 1947 in the Federation (in round numbers), 538,000 Hokkiens, 484,000 Cantonese, 397,000 Hakkas, 207,000 Teochius, and 105,000 Hainanese, while in Singapore there were 289,000 Hokkiens, 158,000 Cantonese, 157,000 Teochius, 52,000 Hainanese, and 40,000 Hakkas. The other tribes were present in smaller numbers in both the Federation and the Colony.[2]

The Chinese population enumerated at the previous three censuses in what is now the combined territory of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore was made up as follows (p. 270).

The Chinese numbered 2,615,000 in a total population for Malaya of 5,849,000—1,885,000 out of a total of 4,908,000 in the Federation of Malaya, and 730,000 out of 941,000 in the Colony of Singapore. (A table of total population by 'race' or communities is given at the end of this chapter.)

[178] One of the most striking features of the 1947 census is the enormous increase in the proportion of locally born Chinese who now number nearly two-thirds of the whole. In 1931 they numbered less than one-third of the whole. This change, together with the great improvement in the sex ratio of the Chinese, is a fact of high politico-economic significance.

[1] A census of Sarawak was also taken in 1947, but so far only the preliminary report has been published.

[2] Christmas Island (647 Chinese including 382 Cantonese) and the Cocos-Keeling Islands (13 Chinese) were included in the Colony of Singapore.

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Chinese in Malaya

	1921	1931	1947
Hokkien	379,028	538,852	827,411
Cantonese	331,757	417,516	641,945
Hakka (Kheh)	217,697	317,506	437,407
Teochiu[1]	130,026	208,681	364,232
Hainanese (Hailam)	68,200	97,568	157,649
Kwongsai	998	46,095	71,850
Hokchiu	13,821	31,908	48,094
Hokchia	4,058	15,301	12,754
Henghwa	1,659	31,025	17,065
Other tribes	24,496		36,260
Total	1,171,740	1,704,452	2,614,667[2]

The great change is the result of the steady improvement in the sex ratio accelerated as it was in the years 1937 and 1938 by the influx of exceptional numbers of females. The Superintendent of Census considers that the figures are positive evidence, and no mere suggestion, of a general intention amongst the Chinese community to settle in Malaya.

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Chinese born in Malaya

	Number of Chinese born in Malaya			*Percentage of total Chinese population*		
	1921	1931	1947	1921	1931	1947
Federation of Malaya	178,503	383,172	1,196,089	20·9	29·9	63·5
Colony of Singapore	79,686	150,033	437,243	25·1	35·6	59·9
Malaya	258,189	533,205	1,633,332	22·0	31·2	62·5

As in the past, the five chief tribes between them constitute the bulk of the Chinese population, being 92·9 per cent. of the total on this occasion as compared with 92·7 per cent. in 1931 and 96·2 per cent. in 1921, the drop between 1921 and 1931 being largely due to a change in classification.

[1] The spelling was changed to Tiechew in the 1947 census report, but for the sake of consistency throughout this survey the spelling of the 1931 census has been retained.

[2] An American observer comments: 'If I were discussing the 1947 census, I would mention the surprisingly low total. If the natural rate of increase prevailing in any other SEA country is applied to Malaya, the 1947 census total is at least a million too low. It is quite possible that there are 500,000 more Chinese in Malaya than were recorded in the 1947 census, due to various problems of taking the census at that time.'

The Superintendent of the Malayan census, however, is satisfied that the returns are very near the truth.

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The sex ratios of the chief tribes are as follows: 162

Females per Thousand Males

	Hokkien	*Cantonese*	*Hakka*	*Teochiu*	*Hainanese*
Federation of Malaya .	852	888	838	775	553
Singapore . . .	886	1,219	768	825	557
Malaya . . .	864	960	831	797	554
Malaya (1931) . .	620	581	526	472	151

It will be noticed that the Hokkiens who formerly had the highest sex ratio have given way to the Cantonese who, in Singapore, now show the unprecedented number of 1,219 females for every 1,000 males. This is the result of the great numbers of females who arrived in 1937 and 1938 and who (supporting the view that Singapore keeps a larger than average share of the new immigrants) are still there. [167]

The Teochius continue to be the most numerous group in Kedah, the Hainanese (Hailams) the most numerous in Trengganu, while the Hokchius continue to favour Singapore and the Dindings, and the Kwongsai—Lenggong, Kuala Kangsar, and Bentong. 463 162

First of all, and particularly to-day, Chinese of all tribes engage in agricultural pursuits—the Hakkas and Cantonese probably to the greatest relative extent and the Hainanese and Hokchias the least. For the rest: (*a*) the Hokkiens are of an urban habit and have a genius for trade and shopkeeping. That, and their old association with it, accounts for their predominance in Singapore, Penang, and Malacca (over a quarter of a million live in the three municipalities alone); but they are also found in great numbers in Johore, Selangor, and Perak where they are widely engaged in agriculture. (*b*) The Cantonese are rather more versatile. They are strongly represented in agriculture and are also numerous in the towns, but their predilection, if they have one, is for mining in which large numbers of them are employed—for instance in the Kinta valley of Perak. (*c*) The Hakkas, or Khehs, are probably the most rurally inclined of all the tribes and with the Cantonese provide the bulk of the tin-mining population (about 80 per cent. of the Chinese population of the Kinta valley for instance). They are also widely engaged in agricultural pursuits and are found in considerable numbers in non-mining rural districts. (*d*) The Teochius, like the Cantonese, are catholic in their tastes but, apart from the peculiar case of Kedah, seem on the whole slightly to prefer urban occupations. In

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162 Kedah an accident of early association makes them (as they have
463 been since 1921) the most numerous tribe. (*e*) The Hainanese (Hailams) in the towns and villages (for which they show a preference) are chiefly employed in shopkeeping and domestic service, but they are also widely distributed in the rural and in particular the rubber-growing districts.

A great deal of other information regarding the Chinese is included in the census report for 1947 under the various headings, but it is difficult to isolate it without giving a disjointed impression which is not conveyed by the original. The report introduces a number of interesting innovations such as a table showing the comparative strengths of the communities for about the last century and a half (an abstract of part relating to the Chinese is given at the end of this chapter) and figures of inter-territory migration.

[178] The steady increase in the proportion of the Chinese and the sudden fall since 1931 in that of the Indians and the 'Others' are the most obvious changes in the intercensal period of sixteen years. Excluding Trengganu in the case of the Chinese and Perlis in that of the Indians (where, anyhow, the populations of these groups are very small in relation to those elsewhere), the Chinese percentages have increased while those of the Indians and the minority groups combined have declined everywhere. The Malaysian community, on the other hand, shows changes in both directions, having gained ground in Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Perak, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu (in that relative order) and lost it in Pahang, Penang, Johore, Perlis, and Malacca. The Chinese now outnumber the Malays and other Malaysians in Singapore, Penang, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Johore. 'Indeed [says Mr del Tufo] it would seem that it is only by a reduction in their exceptionally high infantile mortality rate and, possibly, by a further immigration from the Indonesian islands that the Malaysian community can hope for a permanent and progressive improvement in its position.'

162 There had been in the intercensal period an all-round and
212 marked improvement in the general literacy rates of the entire population of Malaya. Says the report:

871 This improvement was only to be expected during a period of relatively
727 small immigration for the educational facilities offered in Malaya have latterly been much superior to those generally available in China or South India and certainly to those in the rural areas from which the bulk of the immigrants came. However, the advance would have been even

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more clearly marked had it not been for the occupation for, during that time, schools deteriorated into places where the pupils were wont to sing a Japanese patriotic song, bow towards Tokyo, weed a few rows of vegetables—and 'call it a day'. Parents, naturally enough, soon learnt to keep their children at home or, at any rate, to refrain from urging them to go to school and the education of the young accordingly stagnated all through 1942 to 1945. The phenomenal enrolment of pupils since the liberation has, incidentally, amply demonstrated the pent-up demand among the people for the facilities so long denied them.

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The census tables show that the general literacy rates per mille ('literacy' meant the ability to read and write a simple letter in any language) for first the whole population and then for the Chinese were as follows:

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General Literacy Rates per mille for the Whole Population excluding Nomadic Aborigines (1931 rates are shown in brackets)

	Males		*Females*		*Persons*	
	All ages	*15 and over*	*All ages*	*15 and over*	*All ages*	*15 and over*
Federation of Malaya .	445 (347)	570 (407)	157 (65)	165 (67)	309 (232)	384 (278)
Colony of Singapore	519 (416)	647 (466)	199 (139)	225 (164)	374 (314)	465 (365)
Malaya .	457 (356)	584 (415)	164 (76)	174 (78)	320 (242)	397 (290)

General Literacy Rates per mille for Chinese (1931 rates are shown in brackets)

	Males		*Females*		*Persons*	
	All ages	*15 and over*	*All ages*	*15 and over*	*All ages*	*15 and over*
Federation of Malaya .	495 (431)	637 (486)	193 (94)	215 (97)	359 (321)	454 (378)
Colony of Singapore	483 (390)	610 (441)	176 (113)	194 (125)	339 (285)	417 (333)
Malaya .	492 (421)	629 (476)	188 (99)	208 (105)	354 (312)	443 (367)

The general literacy rates for the Chinese show improvements which, though considerable, are not so marked as those for Malaysians. Moreover, in the better-developed parts of the country the rates for Chinese males are now generally lower than those for Malaysian males and a similar circumstance is observable in the case of the female rates in Penang, Perak, and Singapore.

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162 212 As regards literacy in English, 148,416 Chinese were returned as literate in English and 2,446,251 as illiterate in English. The per mille rates varied greatly (1931 figures in brackets)—Chinese males in Penang 156 (132) and Chinese females in Penang 77 (44); Chinese males in Singapore 145 (117), females 59 (68): the lowest figures being for Johore, namely 30 (8) and 12 (4), and Perlis 17 (?) and 4·7 (?).

Chinese literacy in Malay was very low, the overall rate for the whole country being no more than 9·9 per mille for those over fifteen years old.

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CENSUS OF MALAYA, 1947

Total Population (excluding Transient Categories) by Districts

Statement by States and Settlements

	Males	*Females*	*Total*
Penang			
Malays	65,346	67,859	133,205
Other Malaysians	1,640	1,318	2,958
Chinese	128,079	119,287	247,366
Indians	35,380	21,777	57,157
Europeans	689	550	1,239
Eurasians	1,108	1,304	2,412
Others	1,027	957	1,984
Total all races	233,269	213,052	446,321
Malacca			
Malays	52,918	62,009	114,927
Other Malaysians	3,014	2,386	5,400
Chinese	51,630	44,514	96,144
Indians	11,531	8,187	19,718
Europeans	169	139	308
Eurasians	882	1,096	1,978
Others	494	387	881
Total all races	120,638	118,718	239,356
Perak			
Malays	148,564	152,141	300,705
Other Malaysians	31,029	28,897	59,926
Chinese	242,954	201,555	444,509
Indians	80,782	59,394	140,176
Europeans	1,475	792	2,267
Eurasians	567	615	1,182
Others	2,724	2,449	5,173
Total all races	508,095	445,843	953,938

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DEMOGRAPHY

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	Males	Females	Total
Selangor			
Malays	53,457	52,906	106,363
Other Malaysians	43,560	37,401	80,961
Chinese	196,044	166,666	362,710
Indians	84,089	61,095	145,184
Europeans	1,618	1,167	2,785
Eurasians	1,399	1,417	2,816
Others	5,505	4,464	9,969
Total all races	385,672	325,116	710,788
Negri Sembilan			
Malays	50,430	53,721	104,151
Other Malaysians	3,776	2,633	6,409
Chinese	64,960	49,446	114,406
Indians	22,477	15,605	38,082
Europeans	486	275	761
Eurasians	400	480	880
Others	1,657	1,322	2,979
Total all races	144,186	123,482	267,668
Pahang			
Malays	65,469	66,580	132,049
Other Malaysians	2,216	1,507	3,723
Chinese	56,875	40,454	97,329
Indians	9,269	5,475	14,744
Europeans	483	305	788
Eurasians	43	36	79
Others	850	616	1,466
Total all races	135,205	114,973	250,178
Johore			
Malays	108,872	113,239	222,111
Other Malaysians	55,281	46,288	101,569
Chinese	202,615	152,155	354,770
Indians	34,442	20,602	55,044
Europeans	527	354	881
Eurasians	242	236	478
Others	1,827	1,571	3,398
Total all races	403,806	334,445	738,251
Kedah			
Malays	186,606	186,577	373,183
Other Malaysians	2,244	1,648	3,892
Chinese	65,431	50,497	115,928
Indians	30,062	21,285	51,347
Europeans	182	116	298
Eurasians	82	79	161
Others	4,803	4,829	9,632
Total all races	289,410	265,031	554,441

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	Males	Females	Total
Kelantan			
Malays	203,918	208,563	412,481
Other Malaysians	336	101	437
Chinese	13,031	9,907	22,938
Indians	3,342	1,598	4,940
Europeans	77	37	114
Eurasians	17	8	25
Others	3,783	3,854	7,637
Total all races	224,504	224,068	448,572
Trengganu			
Malays	101,166	106,284	207,450
Other Malaysians	273	151	424
Chinese	9,507	6,357	15,864
Indians	1,433	328	1,761
Europeans	33	27	60
Eurasians	8	6	14
Others	242	181	423
Total all races	112,662	113,334	225,996
Perlis			
Malays	27,456	27,640	55,096
Other Malaysians	59	30	89
Chinese	6,872	4,916	11,788
Indians	1,109	575	1,684
Europeans	6	2	8
Eurasians	4	3	7
Others	903	915	1,818
Total all races	36,409	34,081	70,490
Unlocated			
Malays	272	38	310
Other Malaysians	14	1	15
Chinese	575	207	782
Indians	703	98	801
Europeans	86	12	98
Eurasians	21	8	29
Others	50	2	52
Total all races	1,721	366	2,087
Federation of Malaya			
Malays	1,064,474	1,097,557	2,162,031
Other Malaysians	143,442	122,361	265,803
Chinese	1,038,573	845,961	1,884,534
Indians	314,619	216,019	530,638
Europeans	5,831	3,776	9,607
Eurasians	4,773	5,288	10,061
Others	23,865	21,547	45,412
Total all races	2,595,577	2,312,509	4,908,086

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CENSUS OF MALAYA, 1947, SINGAPORE

Grand Total for Colony of Singapore

	Males	*Females*	*Total*
Malays	38,182	33,972	72,154
Other Malaysians	25,066	18,515	43,581
Chinese	387,883	342,250	730,133
Indians	51,724	17,254	68,978
Europeans	5,182	4,169	9,351
Eurasians	4,445	4,665	9,110
Others	4,033	3,484	7,517
Total all races	516,515	424,309	940,824

Grand Total—Federation of Malaya and Singapore

	Males	*Females*	*Total*
Malays	1,102,656	1,131,529	2,234,185
Other Malaysians	168,508	140,876	309,384
Chinese	1,426,456	1,188,211	2,614,667
Indians	366,343	233,273	599,616
Europeans	11,013	7,945	18,958
Eurasians	9,218	9,953	19,171
Others	27,898	25,031	52,929
Total all races	3,112,092	2,736,818	5,848,910

MALAYA

Chinese Migration, 1931–41

Year	*Arrivals*	*Departures*	*Migrational surplus or deficit*
1931	191,690	304,655	−112,965
1932	138,328	235,846	−97,518
1933	124,460	155,638	−31,178
1934	223,892	162,253	61,639
1935	278,168	187,182	90,986
1936	282,299	206,498	75,801
1937	402,563	222,061	180,502
1938	228,669	175,489	53,180
1939	160,448	146,109	14,339
1940	147,016	143,694	3,322
1941 (Jan. to Oct.)	117,426	110,826	6,600

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Chinese compared with Total Population at various Periods
(From 1947 Census Report)

PENANG

Year	Total population			Chinese		
	Male	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*
1812	..	..	26,107	..	..	7,558
1820*b*	..	..	35,035	..	..	8,595
1820*c*	..	..	6,185	..	..	325
1833	..	..	86,275	..	..	11,010
1842*b*	..	..	40,499	..	..	9,715
1844*c*	..	..	51,479	..	..	4,107
1851	65,755	42,159	107,914	19,750	4,438	24,188
1860	76,339	48,433	124,772	27,050	9,172	36,222
1871	84,149	49,081	133,230	30,347	6,214	36,561
1881*d*	122,656	65,589	188,245	54,851	12,503	67,354
1891	150,445	81,558	232,003	68,672	18,316	86,988
1901	154,190	89,904	244,094	72,926	24,545	97,471
1911	167,535	103,821	271,376	77,401	32,805	110,206
1921	176,942	117,273	294,215	86,113	47,121	133,234
1931	197,487	143,888	341,375	101,429	68,556	169,985

b, figures for Penang Island only.
c, ,, ,, Province Wellesley only.
d, excluding Pulau Pangkor and the Dindings from 1881 onwards.
Note. The census table from which this was taken also gives authorities for the counts.

MALACCA

Year	Total population			Chinese		
	Males	*Females*	*Total*	*Males*	*Females*	*Total*
1750	...	...	9,635	..	..	2,161
1766	..	..	7,216	..	..	1,390
1817	..	..	19,647	..	..	1,006
1827	..	..	33,162	..	..	5,006
1829	..	..	30,164	..	..	4,797
1834	..	..	29,260	..	..	4,143
1842	..	..	46,096	..	..	6,882
1852	35,170	27,344	62,514	7,735	2,873	10,608
1860	36,023	31,244	67,267	7,037	3,002	10,039
1871	41,936	35,820	77,756	9,876	3,606	13,482
1881	52,059	41,520	93,579	15,721	4,020	19,741
1891	50,337	41,833	92,170	14,226	3,935	18,161
1901	51,469	44,018	95,487	15,061	4,407	19,468
1911	75,676	49,276	124,952	29,974	6,120	36,094
1921	90,934	62,757	153,691	33,563	12,290	45,853
1931	105,245	81,632	186,877	42,573	22,729	65,302

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PAHANG

Year	Total population			Chinese		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1891	..	..	57,444*	..	..	3,241
1901	46,746	35,970	84,113	8,225	470	8,695
1911	72,234	46,474	118,708	21,827	2,460	24,287
1921	88,068	58,199	146,267	27,830	6,424	34,254
1931	105,514	74,603	180,117	37,662	14,629	52,291

* an unreliable census.

JOHORE

1911	122,324	58,308	180,632	56,914	6,633	63,547
1921	186,556	96,038	282,594	79,209	18,188	97,397
1931	323,660	181,929	505,589	158,488	56,769	215,257

KEDAH

1911	137,139	108,847	245,986	28,750	4,996	33,746
1921	194,917	143,790	338,707	47,492	11,984	59,476
1931	237,831	191,860	429,691	53,787	24,628	78,415

KELANTAN

1911	144,319	142,432	286,751	7,225	2,619	9,844
1921	157,723	151,851	309,574	9,497	3,378	12,875
1931	184,705	177,812	362,517	12,029	5,583	17,612

TRENGGANU

1911	76,153	77,920	154,073	3,259	910	4,169
1921	77,309	76,670	153,979	6,167	1,158	7,325
1931	92,631	87,443	180,074	10,468	2,892	13,360

PERLIS

1911	16,808	15,938	32,746	1,319	308	1,627
1921	21,236	18,851	40,087	2,701	901	3,602
1931	26,027	23,269	49,296	4,564	1,936	6,500

PERAK

1879	50,658	30,326	80,984	19,114	1,259	20,373
1889	179,590	..	..	107,274	..	..
1891	158,847	59,022	217,869	89,337	5,940	95,277
1901	242,173	91,605	333,778	137,362	13,530	151,192
1911*b*	349,821	152,538	502,359	183,621	35,814	219,435
1921	386,610	224,559	611,169	165,089	62,513	227,602
1931	476,697	308,963	785,660	221,495	111,089	332,584

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SELANGOR

Year	Total population			Chinese		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1884	..	..	46,568	..	..	28,236
1887	..	..	97,106	..	..	73,155
1891	67,051	14,541	81,592	47,610	3,234	50,844
1901	136,823	31,966	168,789	98,212	11,386	109,598
1911*b*	221,360	73,106	294,466	124,638	26,534	151,172
1921	267,256	133,847	401,103	122,001	48,725	170,726
1931	327,721	205,814	533,535	154,456	87,040	241,496

b, including an estimated proportion of the shipping population.

NEGRI SEMBILAN

1891	40,561	24,658	65,219	14,845	546	15,391
1901	64,565	31,463	96,028	31,330	1,601	32,931
1911	87,651	42,548	130,199	36,965	3,878	40,843
1921	119,635	59,193	178,828	53,694	11,525	65,219
1931	148,381	85,418	233,799	68,360	24,011	92,371

SINGAPORE

1821	..	..	4,727	..	..	1,159
1823	7,106	3,577	10,683	2,956	361	3,317
1833	15,181	5,797	20,978	7,650	867	8,517
1836	22,755	7,229	29,984	12,870	879	13,749
1840	..	..	35,389	..	..	17,704
1850	42,107	10,784	52,891	25,749	2,239	27,988
1860	70,122	11,612	81,734	46,795	3,248	50,043
1871	74,348	22,763	97,111	47,104	7,468	54,572
1881	105,423	33,785	139,208	72,571	14,195	86,766
1891*a*	141,619	43,498	185,117	100,446	21,462	121,908
1901	171,874	58,030	229,904	131,007	33,674	164,681
1911*b*	222,760	88,543	311,303	166,057	58,173	224,230
1921	292,353	138,992	431,345	220,307	101,268	321,575
1931	362,882	207,246	570,128	265,618	158,175	423,793

a, including Christmas Island and Cocos-Keeling Islands from 1891 onwards.
b, excluding Labuan from 1911 onwards.

The pre-war political divisions of Malaya were as follows:

644 The Crown Colony of the Straits Settlements comprised Singa-
631 pore, Penang (with Province Wellesley, a strip on the mainland), Malacca, and Labuan, total area 1,366 square miles.

The Malay States were made up of the Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang), and the Unfederated Malay States (Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Trengganu). Total area 50,650 square miles.

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Penang was founded in 1786; Singapore in 1819; Malacca was obtained from the Dutch by exchange for Bencoolen in 1824. Labuan was founded in 1846. 641 631

Perak came under British protection in 1874 (the Dindings and Pangkor Island had been ceded in 1874 to the British as posts for the suppression of piracy, and were returned to Perak in 1935); Selangor in the same year; in 1874 and succeeding years the States afterwards constituting Negri Sembilan were brought under British protection; Pahang likewise in 1888; and Johore in 1914. By the Treaty of Bangkok of 1909 the suzerainty of Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, and Perlis was transferred from Siam to Britain, and the latter entered into treaties of protection with the rulers. 175

In 1895 Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang were federated as the Federated Malay States, and were decentralized in 1935.

A Malayan Union was constituted on 1 April 1946 to comprise all the territories of the Peninsula, and was succeeded by the Federation of Malaya on 1 February 1948. Singapore remains a separate colony.

In 1946 Labuan was returned to North Borneo.

Christmas and the Cocos-Keeling Islands are administratively part of the Colony of Singapore.

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CHAPTER XXVI

TUMASIK AND MALACCA, 1349–1795

175 OUR first undoubted landfall in the history of the Chinese in Malaya is in 1349 when Wang Ta-yuan, a Chinese trader, writes of Tumasik, or old Singapore, the 'Sea Town'. He says that when Chinese junks went to the western sea the people of Tumasik let them go unmolested, but when, on the way back, they reached the Carimon Islands, the crew of the junks got out their armour and padded screens to protect themselves against arrow fire, for it was certain that two or three hundred pirate ships would attack them. Tumasik was besieged in this year by Siamese ships, and according to Wang Ta-yuan, the arrival of the Chinese fleet effected the relief of the city. He further states [167] that 'the people live mixed up with the Chinese' in Tumasik. So here, it seems, we have a more or less permanent settlement of Chinese in fourteenth-century Malaya.

Wang Ta-yuan also visited Trengganu in the same year, but he does not mention any Chinese settlement there.

By 1365 Majapahit, the last Hindu empire of Java, claimed Tumasik as a dependency, but within a few years that medieval haunt of pirates fell under the domination of Siam. It was the murder of Siam's governor of Singapore that drove his guest, a Palembang prince married to a Majapahit princess, to flee up country where about 1400 he founded Malacca.[1] From the beginning the kingdom was a tributary of Siam to which it sent 40 taels of gold annually.

At the beginning of the fifteenth century Malacca began to have close contacts with China. In 1403, says the Ming History,[2] the

[1] Sir Richard Winstedt, *Malaya and its History* (London, Hutchinson, 1948) p. 32. Sir Richard says 'about 1403', but in view of the fact that Yin Ching visited Malacca in that year (though he points out that the Chinese histories can in some cases be wrong) he proposes changing this to the more indefinite 1400 in the next edition of his book.

Godinho de Eredia gives the date of the foundation of Malacca as 1398 in *Meridional India and Cathay* (dedicated from Goa, 1613), translated from the Portuguese with notes by J. V. Mills, *JRASMB*, vol. viii, pt. 1 (1930) pp. 1–288. See also R. O. Winstedt, *The Malay Founder of Mediaeval Malacca*, Bulletin of Oriental and African Studies (University of London, 1948) xii, pts. 3 and 4.

[2] *Chinese Dynastic Histories*, Book 325.

[p. 282]

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Emperor of China sent the eunuch Yin Ching to Malacca with presents of silk brocade. The King, Parameswara, 'was very glad' and in 1405 sent a return mission to China. The Emperor spoke in laudatory terms of his master, appointed him the King of the country of Malacca, and gave him a commission, a seal, a suit of silk clothes, and a yellow umbrella. The King, through his representatives, then 'requested that his mountains might be made guardians of the country, to which request the emperor gave his consent; he prepared an inscription with a piece of verse at the end and ordered a tablet to be erected in these mountains'. In 1407 Parameswara again sent envoys to China.

The dates of Cheng Ho's voyages have been discussed in Chapter II.[1] Whether or not he visited the Malayan kingdom in his earlier voyages of 1405–7 when his fleet passed through these waters, it seems certain that he did go there in the voyage of 1414–15, for he brought back with him the King of Malacca, his wife, and his son to present tribute. Cheng Ho took with him on this third voyage the Chinese Mohammedan Ma Huan, who later wrote a book describing the voyages called the *Ying yai sheng lan* or 'General Account of the Shores of the Ocean'.

Ma Huan tells us that at the time of Cheng Ho's visit the soil of Malacca was barren and saline, the crops were poor, and agriculture was not in favour. He states that it was Cheng Ho who in 1409 gave Parameswara 'a silver seal, a cap, and official robes and declared him king, on which', he remarks, 'Malacca ceased to be a dependency of Siam'. But the Siamese, to judge by their subsequent conduct, did not seem to be aware of this fact!

Ma Huan tells us that Malacca 'is visited by Chinese merchant vessels; whenever these come a barrier is made' and to this Groeneveldt adds a note, 'for the purposes of collecting tolls', which seems the most likely explanation. But it does not appear that there was at this time any permanent Chinese settlement in Malacca.

The *Hai Yü*, or 'Report from the Ocean', published in 1537, but like so many Chinese books referring probably to a much earlier period, tells us that the cost of living in Malacca was high, about five times what it was in China, that fowls, dogs, geese, and ducks were imported, and that pork, a forbidden article of food to the native Mohammedans, was eaten by the Chinese 'who live here'. This suggests that some time previous to the writing of the *Hai Yü*

[1] See pp. 22–3.

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175 the Chinese began to reside in Malacca, but a further reference to the 'merchants of ships who live in an hotel' would seem to point to these, at least, being but temporary sojourners.[1] Book 325 of the Ming History states of Malacca that the men and women wear their hair in a knot, but some are of lighter colour, being descendants of the Chinese.[2]

Now we come to the Portuguese authorities on Malacca, most of whom refer to the Malay period. Among them are d'Albuquerque,[3] the natural son of the conqueror of Malacca, Osorio,[4] Barros,[5] and Eredia,[6] and in 1944 their number was added to by the publication of the *Suma Oriental* of Tomé Pires[7] from a manuscript recently discovered.

175 D'Albuquerque says that before the coming of the Malays Malacca's site was occupied by twenty or thirty persons who lived 439 by fishing and piracy. The place, after the founding of the Malay kingdom, depended on passing Chinese junks for trade. A King named Xaquendarsa,[8] after begetting many sons, went to China

[1] A footnote to the present writer's *The Chinese in Malaya* (London, Oxford University Press, 1948) p. 19, examines the Chinese text of this passage.

According to the *Hai Yü* (cited by Groeneveldt) the King lived in a house of which the fore part was covered with tiles left here by Cheng Ho. The Rev. W. G. Shellabear says that Chinese contacts with Malacca were very early, but that when the Portuguese and the Dutch were fighting for possession of Malacca, there appear to have been few, if any, Chinese remaining there, for Valentijn says that in 1641 the Dutch imported Chinese from Batavia to work in the fields and gardens, and that up to that time the trade seems to have been monopolized by Indian merchants. Up to the end of the sixteenth century (says Shellabear) Chinese immigration into the Malay Archipelago was confined almost exclusively to the island of Java, where they enjoyed the greatest security, and freedom to carry on trade under the protection of the Dutch.

[2] But it is to be remembered that the Chinese dynastic histories were written after the close of the dynasty and by stay-at-home scholars, so that there is little guarantee that facts relating to more recent affairs have not crept in.

[3] *The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque* (compiled by the son), translated from the Portuguese edition of 1774 by Walter de Gray Birch (London, Hakluyt Society, 1880), vol. iii.

[4] Jeronimo Osorio da Fonseca, *The History of the Portuguese during the Reign of Emmanuel*, translated by James Gibbs (London, 1752).

[5] João de Barros, *Da Asia* (see Bibliography).

[6] Emanuel Godinho de Eredia, *Meridional India and Cathay* (dedicated from Goa, 1613), translated from the Portuguese with notes by J. V. Mills, *JRASMB*, vol. viii, pt. 1 (1930) pp. 1–288.

[7] Tomé Pires, *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires* (London, Hakluyt Society, 1944) (written in Malacca and India from 1512 to 1515), translated by Armando Cortesao.

[8] Xaquendarsa (says Winstedt) son of Parameswara (Paramjçura of Pires) was Muhammad Iskandar Shah. *JRASMB*, vol. xiii, pt. 1 (March 1935) p. 25.

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for three years. 'Sri Maharaja' of Malacca went to China in 1424 and sent envoys in 1431 in a Sumatran vessel. These envoys returned with Cheng Ho in that year and were instructed to convey the usual injunctions to the Siamese that they should cease interfering with Malacca. Tribute was sent to China in 1433 and 1435, and in 1445 Malacca sent envoys asking for recognition. There are in these works a number of references to Malacca's Chinese contacts during this century. The second King of Malacca is said to have married a daughter of the King of China's captain (this suggests a more or less settled Chinese community to justify a 'Captain China'). But the impression we receive, nevertheless, is that during this century the merchants of Arab and Indian merchants were more important, at least in the aggregate, than were the Chinese—ships of Cambaya, Chaul, Dabul, Calicut, Aden, Mecca, Shehr, Juda, Coromandel, Bengal, Gores (Liu Chiu Isles), Java, and Pegu are mentioned as coming to Malacca.

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There were four court officials at Malacca during the Malay period, called Shahbandars—one a Chinese, another a Javanese, a third a Cambayan, and a fourth a Bengali. The Malay Temenggong, who was judge of the custom house, was over all these. Malacca (according to d'Albuquerque) was the 'most extensive place in the world for trade'.

[645]

This information is amplified by Osorio and the others. The former remarks that Malacca was about four miles in length, but its breadth was inconsiderable; it abounded with trees which produced excellent fruits, but most of the staple foods were imported. The walls and buildings of the town were exceedingly elegant and magnificent.

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Captain Begbie[1] says that according to the *Malay Annals* one of the five excellent wells at Bukit China was dug by Chinese in the reign of Mansur Shah. Sultan Mansur Shah was (see Winstedt's *History of Malaya*) a young man and reigning in 1459. If this is so, it suggests that there was a Chinese community in Malacca at the time.

In Malacca there is a tablet stating that Captain Li Chi-t'uan was a native of Lu Kiang (Fukien) who left home at the beginning of the Ming dynasty and settled in Malacca. The tablet purports to have been erected in the I Ch'ou year of the Lung Fei reign. There was no such reign in the Ming or Ch'ing dynasties and the

[1] *The Malayan Peninsula* (Madras, 1834).

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invention possibly marks the refusal of the Malaccan Chinese to recognize the new Manchu dynasty.[1] But this tablet is evidence that the early settlers in Malacca came from Fukien province.

[764]

Some of the oldest Chinese relics now extant in Malacca (or indeed in Malaya) are to be found at Bukit China, which, together with Bukit Gudong and Bukit Tempurong, forms an enormous burial ground, said to be one of the largest outside China. A very few old graves with coral tombstones, the inscriptions of which are no longer legible, are still discernible at Bukit China. Some of these probably date back to the sixteenth century, if not earlier. There are about a dozen Chinese graves of the second order of antiquity dating from the last decades of the Ming and the first decades of the Ch'ing dynasty. One or two of them have the words 'Imperial Ming' clearly inscribed on them. The Bukit China cemetery is said to have been bought and donated by Li Kap (i.e. Kapitan Li) in the middle of the seventeenth century.[2]

The Rev. Father Cardon, the outstanding modern authority on the history of Malacca, says that, in spite of the fragments of evidence suggesting the contrary, he is driven to the conclusion that the Chinese began to establish themselves in Malacca only at the beginning of the Portuguese occupation.[3] The traditions of the Chinese of Malacca themselves do not encourage setting a very early date to their settlements. The records of no family go back farther than the first half of the seventeenth century. The Li traditions go back farthest, though those of the Tans and the Tays are not much less ancient.

In the year 1509 Diogo Lopes de Sequiera, a Portuguese commander, arrived at Malacca with the intention of attacking it. When he came to anchor in the port he found there four Chinese ships, the captains of which immediately waited on him. Sequiera was much taken by their polite, friendly behaviour and agreeable manners and was at once at home with them. He paid visits to their junks and was well entertained. Noticing that the Portuguese, thinking themselves secure, walked about the city without fear, the Chinese warned him against trusting to the good intentions of the

[1] A similar device was adopted at the beginning of the present century, when 'Patriotic Debentures' were sold by Sun Yat-sen, for they were inscribed with the name of the T'ien Yun period which had no existence.

[2] Rev. Yeh Fen's article on the Chinese in Malacca in *Historical Guide of Malacca* (Singapore, 1936).

[3] In an unpublished article communicated to the author.

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natives who were, they said, a deceitful, wicked, and perfidious people who would fall on them as soon as they thought it safe. Sequiera disregarded their advice, with the result that a number of his men were seized and imprisoned. He held a council of war at which he said that all ships, except those of the Chinese, ought to be burnt and the city battered down by cannon, but he had not sufficient force to carry out his plans.

Among the instructions given to Sequiera by his superior was one particularly concerning the Chinese. He was to ascertain a whole catalogue of facts concerning them—where they lived and how far away, how often they came to Malacca, whether they were weak men or warriors, whether they were Christians or pagans, and, if the latter, what they worshipped, and many other matters of a similar sort. The answers that Sequiera gave to these questions do not appear to be extant, but it is possible that they may be hidden away in the archives of Portugal.

We now come to the year 1511 when the great Alfonso d'Albuquerque[1] conquered Malacca, professedly in revenge for the treatment of Sequiera, but actually to carry out the project which Sequiera had been unable to accomplish. When the Portuguese fleet announced its arrival with a fanfare of trumpets the Chinese merchants who were at Malacca made their way to present their respects to the commander. There were five Chinese junks in the port and they had been detained there for some days by the King of Malacca who had intended to use them against the King of Daru with whom he was at war. The Chinese were indignant at their treatment and wished to help the Portuguese commander in any way they could, giving him information and placing their junks at his disposal.

The story of the assault on Malacca belongs to the general history of that place, and all that we need do here is to record the fact of the conquest, and to mention that after the city had fallen d'Albuquerque massacred most of the inhabitants without quarter to man, woman, or child. One of the Chinese junks was dispatched with a Portuguese, Duarte Fernandes, to bring the King of Siam news of the event.

Sultan Mohamet fled to Pahang when driven out of Malacca by the Portuguese. He then sent an embassy headed by his uncle, Nacem Mudaliar, to the Chinese Emperor to appeal to him for

[1] More properly Afonso Dalboquerque, but the above form is more common.

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175 help. The embassy was well received, but whether or not the Emperor was sympathetic to the request for help he had his hands full at the time repelling Mongol invaders.

Tomé Pires (whom Sir Richard Winstedt regards as the principal Portuguese authority for the Malay kingdom of Malacca), who was in Malacca very soon after the Portuguese conquest, says of the Chinese as he saw them:

> All the Chinese eat pigs, cows, and all other animals. They drink a fair amount of all sorts of beverages. They praise their wine greatly. They get pretty drunk. They are weak people, of small account. Those who are to be seen in Malacca are not very truthful, and steal—that is the common people. They eat with two sticks, and the earthenware or china bowl in their left hand close to their mouth with the two sticks to suck in. This is the Chinese way.[1]

[651] The Portuguese followed a policy of exclusive monopoly and as far as possible compelled all passing ships to call at Malacca. In 1546 the duty was 10 per cent. on all Chinese goods and 8 per cent. on all Bengal goods, but this did not include the miscellaneous exactions of officials and others. This policy brought the Portuguese into collision with other nations and for the 129 years of the occupation of Malacca they were almost constantly at war, first with the neighbouring Asian countries, and latterly with their European rivals, the Dutch. Malacca was besieged several times, but was not captured until after the Dutch siege of 1640–1.

175 In Portuguese Malacca the Chinese quarter was known as Campon China (Campon, or *Kampong*, being the Malay for village).
162 There is no record of the number of its inhabitants (the Portuguese in their enumerations lumped together all non-Christian Asiatics as 'infidels'), but, to judge from the size of Kampong China as shown in Eredia's map, the population cannot have been very extensive, and we know that there were only 300–400 Chinese in Malacca after the Dutch conquest in 1641.

When d'Albuquerque left Malacca he did not appoint a separate headman for the Chinese, but it would seem that a captain of the Chinese was recognized soon after.

Malacca was a ruined city directly after the Dutch conquest. War and disease had taken their toll. The suburbs were entirely ruined. There was hardly a house standing. The gardens and

[1] op. cit. p. 116. Professor A. C. Moule says that this is the earliest European description of chopsticks.

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orchards on both sides of the city had been destroyed and the beautiful fruit-trees had been hacked down. The total population of Dutch, Portuguese, and slaves and Chinese was counted at 2,150. The contemporary Dutch official, Commissary Justus Schouten, compares this poor total ruefully with the 20,000 he estimated to be the population of the city and environs before the siege.[1] No separate enumeration of the Chinese was made, but Schouten estimates their numbers at 300–400. 'The 300 to 400 Chinese shopkeepers, craftsmen, and farmers should be allowed to settle down at their own convenience, provided that they cultivate the gardens within their territory. They can hire or occupy those empty houses which can be saved from collapse or destruction. As it is dangerous to allow a great number of foreigners to crowd in a weakly garrisoned place, admission within the city walls should be refused to all inhabitants and foreigners.'

Schouten expected the Chinese to figure in the reconstruction of Malacca. He said that to assist in the cultivation of the ruined gardens in the southern suburbs (which later the Dutch East India Company would resume and lease out at a profit) 'some 800 to 1,000 Chinese would be very useful'. But, in spite of the temporary remission of poll-tax to encourage the Chinese to come to the settlement, the Dutch terms for trade were not such as would encourage Chinese or other traders to come in any great numbers.

Governor Balthasar Bort in 1678 made a very exact survey of Malacca.[2] There were then 137 brick and 583 atap houses with a population of 4,884 persons. In the city itself the Chinese had 81 brick and 51 atap houses with 127 men, 140 women, 159 children, 93 male slaves, 137 female slaves, and 60 children of slaves; outside the north suburb there were 324 Chinese; outside the north suburb on the seashore, 24; on the way to Bukit China, 78; together with other small communities. The total was 852 Chinese for all the Malacca territory outside the fortress—not a large number, especially considering that the women were natives, mostly Batak and Balinese slaves. In addition there were 40 Chinese within the fortress.

As a means of securing their monopoly the Dutch from Malacca patrolled the Straits as far as Singapore. The instructions given to

[1] P. A. Leupe, *The Siege and Capture of Malacca from the Portuguese*, translated by Mac Hacobian, *JRASMB*, vol. xiv, pt. 1 (1936).

[2] Balthasar Bort, *Report on Malacca*, translated by M. J. Bremner, *JRASMB*, vol. v, pt. 1 (1927)

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175 the captains of patrol ships in 1667 concerned junks and other vessels manned by Koxinga Chinese.[1] All such vessels were to be regarded as enemies since Koxinga had wiped out the Dutch factory in Formosa, and when sighted were to be overtaken and overpowered. After the capture of such a vessel no more than 'common plundering' was to be allowed to the Dutch crew, the hatches were at once to be sealed, and the complete cargo was to be brought to Malacca and handed over. As regards the Chinese who did not belong to Koxinga's faction, they were to be 'amicably persuaded' to come to Malacca. But if they persisted in going to Johore (with which the Dutch were on terms of hostility) they were not to be obstructed.

[302] The captains were told how to distinguish between the two kinds of Chinese by their mode of doing their hair—the Chinese who had submitted to Tartar rule had their hair shaved or cut to the crown of their head, while the remainder was worn in a long plait or an unplaited tress; very often they wore Tartar (Manchu) caps of plaited rush or straw adorned at the top with a tail of red horsehair or silk. The Koxinga Chinese wore their hair long fastened up at the back, though, to escape recognition, they sometimes dressed their hair in the Manchu fashion—but only at the moment when the Dutch caught up with their ships.

The Chinese of both Dutch and Portuguese Malacca were not prominent in local affairs. Baretto de Resende's 'Account of Malacca' (still in manuscript) written in 1646, but referring to the period *c.* 1638,[2] and Valentijn's *Account of Malacca* published in 1726[3] make practically no mention of the Chinese. Father Cardon says: 'At first sight one is astonished that the Portuguese historians make practically no mention of the Chinese in Malacca, but, on reflection, this silence explains itself. The Chinese, being merchants, were more adept at handling the abacus than the musket.' Even in 1606, 1629, and 1641 there is no mention of any Chinese element in the defence of the city. 'With them Mars yielded to Mercury.' Ruy de Brito says that they are 'a people who exert themselves effectively in commerce; you will get nothing out of their hands without

[1] Koxinga himself had died in 1662. See A. W. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (Washington, Library of Congress, 1943) under Cheng Ch'eng-Kung.

[2] MS. no. 197 Sloane Collection, British Museum. See also G. Maxwell, 'Baretto de Resende's Account of Malacca', *JRASMB*, vol. xx (1911) pp. 1–24.

[3] Translated by Muller, *JRASMB*, no. xiii (1884), no. xxii (1890).

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paying the proper price'.[1] Nor had the Chinese yet begun to supply the artisans for the Peninsula, for after the capture of Malacca in 1641 the Governor is found asking the Laksamana of Acheen to send him 200 Malay carpenters and timber to repair the bridge. 175

Throughout the eighteenth century the Dutch East India Company declined, and the process was accelerated during the latter decades. The English East India Company took advantage of this and built up a flourishing smuggling trade in the archipelago. Gradually the Dutch abandoned their conquests—one group of islands after another. The occupation of Penang in 1786 was a deadly blow to Malacca. By 1795 all that was left of the Dutch East Indian Empire was Java, the Moluccas, Malacca, and a few forts elsewhere. In 1795 England captured Malacca and then the Moluccas. That same year a commission appointed by the States General reported that the Company was bankrupt and its commerce nearly annihilated. In 1798 the charter was annulled by the newly founded Batavian republic and the Government took over the administration of what was left of the Company's possessions.

The conditions in Malacca, as we have seen, were not encouraging to Chinese settlement, but the Chinese population had increased to 2,161 by 1750. How far this increase was due to immigration and how far to natural increase through intermarriage with local women and slaves is not certain. In 1750 the total population of Malacca was 9,635, but by 1760 the Chinese had dropped to 1,390 out of a total population of 7,216. [162]

As a footnote to this chapter we may record that under the more enlightened[2] British administration, immigration revived somewhat, and in the present century rubber has brought a new prosperity. One important fact that hindered Malacca's progress was that its harbour was too shallow for modern ships.

In 1827 the Chinese accounted for 3,989 of the free population and for 521 of the slaves and slave debtors; in 1834 there were 4,143 Chinese in a total population of 29,260; in 1842 the figures were 6,882 in 46,097; in 1860 10,039 in 67,267. In the last year there were only 3,002 females to 7,037 males. [162]

[1] Letter to King Dom Manoel of Portugal, dated 6 January 1514 (Alguns Documentos do Archivo Nacional da Torre de Tombo) (Lisbon, 1892).

[2] 'More enlightened' because it had learnt by experience. In the matter of corruption (as we now understand it) and nepotism there was little to choose between the Dutch and English East India Companies. The difference was that the English knew, just in time, when reform was due.

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CHAPTER XXVII

PENANG AND SINGAPORE, 1786–1900

175 THE British had had a dozen factories in the Malay Archipelago in the early seventeenth century, but, unable to withstand competition backed by the Dutch Government, or, alternatively, to share the cost of Dutch forts, they decided in 1623, after the massacre of their nationals at Amboyna, 'to abandon Malayan spices for the calicoes of India'.[1] They did not, however, withdraw entirely from the Archipelago, holding on at Bantam till about 1683, and at Bencoolen on the west coast of Sumatra until 1824, and they continued to drive a large private trade with Kedah. During the eighteenth century, when the British were frequently at war with the French, the East India Company found the need for a station where its ships could careen and refit during the north-east monsoon. Eventually in 1785 the Company obtained through a young trading captain, Francis Light, a lease from the Sultan of Kedah of the practically uninhabited island of Penang. The British flag was hoisted there on 17 July 1786 and it was soon afterwards named Prince of Wales Island (a name which, however, did not stick). A strip on the mainland named Province Wellesley was added in 1800.

After the foundation of Penang the immigration of the Chinese to Malaya greatly increased.[2] In a letter dated 1 October 1786

[1] Sir Richard Winstedt, *Malaya and its History*, p. 53.

[2] The day after Light had hoisted the flag some Chinese, headed by a 'Captain China', arrived bringing with them a present of some fishing nets. They may have been from Kedah, but Mr W. L. Blythe, formerly Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Malayan Union, thinks that they may have been inhabitants of the island itself—a few tens only, he suggests.

According to Norman Macalister, *Historical Memoir relative to Prince of Wales' Island* (London, 1803), when the island was first occupied there were only two or three individuals there, 'natives of the island, who subsisted on fishing, and extracting from the trees, dammar and wood oil'.

Thomas Forrest, senior captain of the H.E.I.C.'s Marine, who visited Kedah and Perak in 1783 states: 'Pulo Pinang has plains and gently rising hills with a good soil, and was formerly inhabited, as we may judge by the names of places said to exist in those days; but of which no vestige now remains, except perhaps some fruit trees, Batoo fringey, Tellu batang [bahang?], Sungy pinang, Tellu Kumbock, Tellu be lappas, and Sungy karuang. . . .' *A Voyage from Calcutta to the Mergui Archipelago* (London, Robson, 1792) p. 24.

The names given by Forrest are those of places existing to-day. Batu fringey (Ferringhi) means the 'rock of the Franks', i.e. Portuguese.

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Light wrote: 'Our inhabitants increase very fast,—Chooliahs (Tamils), Chinese, and Christians; they are already disputing about the ground, everyone building as fast as he can.' In a letter of 1 February of the following year, he says: 'Did not the Dutch keep a strict watch over the Chinese, most of them would leave Malacca: 40 of them were prepared to come in the *Drake*, but were stopped by the order of the Dutch Government, and not a man allowed to leave Malacca without giving security that he will not go to Peenang [*sic*]—a Macau [Cantonese] ship intended to come here, but the Shabandar called the Captain aside, when he was about to depart, and told him by no means to stop at Peenang for there were 34 prows gone to cut off the Settlement; the contempt and derision with which they treat this place, and the mean dirty art they use to prevent People coming here, would dishonour any but a Dutchman. . . .' In December 1788 he reports, however, 'Our town increases very fast, with some very creditable families of Chinese, Malabars, and Malays'. That year more than 400 acres had been cultivated. 175

Francis Light was eight years in Penang and died there in October 1794. On 25 January of the year of his death he wrote to his superiors in Calcutta an official report giving his considered opinion of the Chinese settlers in which he said:

The Chinese constitute the most valuable part of our inhabitants; they are men, women, and children, about 3,000, they possess the different trades of carpenters, masons, and smiths, are traders, shopkeepers and planters, they employ small vessels and prows and send adventures to the surrounding countries. They are the only people of the east from whom a revenue may be raised without expense and extraordinary efforts of government. They are a valuable acquisition, but speaking a language which no other people understand, they are able to form parties and combinations in the most secret manner against any regulations of government which they disapprove, and were they brave as intelligent they would be dangerous subjects, but their want of courage will make them bear many impositions before they rebel. They are indefatigable in the pursuit of money, and like the European, they spend it in purchasing those articles which gratify their appetites. They don't wait until they have acquired a large fortune to return to their native country, but send annually a part of their profits to their families. This is so general that a poor labourer will work with double labour to acquire two or three dollars to remit to China. As soon as they acquire a little money they obtain a wife and go on in regular domestic mode to 181 175

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the end of their existence. They have everywhere people to teach their children, and sometimes they send males to China to complete their education. The females are always kept at home with the greatest strictness until they are married; then they enjoy greater liberty. They are excessively fond of gaming, there is no restraining them from it. This leads them into many distresses and frequently ends in ruin.[1]

But in spite of the numbers of immigrants that flocked to Penang the settlement's tenure of existence was precarious for many years. The Directors of the East India Company were not entirely satisfied that this was the place they wanted as a naval and trading station and in which to grow spices. Besides, the expense of the settlement made them inclined to abandon it on more than one occasion.[2] The tide of opinion turned at the beginning of the century and by 1805 the Directors' hopes had risen so high that Penang was made the Fourth Presidency of India and given a governor and an expensive staff. The optimism was not justified. The timber of Penang proved unsuitable for shipbuilding; the trade, while giving promise, became stationary about 1810, and in the 1820s the settlement was entirely outclassed by Singapore. The bottom, too, fell out of the pepper market at the end of the first decade of the century, and in 1860, after a chequered success of the crop, blight practically destroyed the nutmegs. But later Penang attained prosperity through sugar-planting, and when the mainland was opened up, and the tin and rubber industries were developed, Penang, like Malacca, shared in the general prosperity.

But this is greatly to anticipate. In the early years the clearing and planting of the island gradually progressed. The Malays cut down the larger trees, and the remainder of the operations necessary for putting the land into a fit state for cultivation was performed by the Chinese at the rate of 20 dollars an *orlong*.[3] But the lack of any systematic encouragement of agriculture by the Government was a great handicap to the progress of the settlement. Among other crops the Chinese were partial to gambier, but this rapidly exhausted the soil. Rice, however, was not a popular crop with them. In the 1830s the Malays outnumbered the other cultivators of paddy in Penang and Province Wellesley by 41 to 4. In the latter

[1] 'Notices of Pinang', *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, vol. v, p. 9 (1850).

[2] For a detailed discussion of the reasons of this and the land muddle, see Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 41 ff.

[3] The *orlong* varied in different parts of Malaya. In Penang it was an acre and a third.

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class were the Indians, Burmese, Siamese, and Chinese. The Chinese, with the exception of the Cantonese, looked down on the paddy planters—a curious fact, 'for what', asks James Low, 'but lack of a paddie-field forced them from their country?'[1]

Other products of the Penang soil were coco-nuts, tobacco (in small quantities, never exported), *sireh* (a leaf with which betel-nut is mixed for chewing), the nipah palm, and indigo. The Chinese were the only real cultivators of indigo, which was not of any importance until after 1822. In the early days, too, they kept orange gardens, but they soon found it more profitable to grow other things instead.

But the crop *par excellence* for the Chinese cultivator proved to be sugar. The Chinese had the monopoly of sugar-planting from about 1800 up to about 1846 when the Imperial Government decided to admit the sugar and rum of Province Wellesley at the reduced colonial duties, while at the same time the same products of Singapore were charged foreign duties. The reason for this was that Singapore was already a great entrepôt for the collection of sugar from China, Java, and Manila, and it would have been very difficult to have distinguished between locally grown and imported sugar. The Government action was a death-blow to Singapore sugar-planting and at the same time gave a great impulse to sugar-planting in the Province. European speculators were not slow to take advantage of the situation. They copied the methods of the Chinese so far as the planting was concerned, but did not imitate their primitive apparatus for manufacturing the product. To their crude methods of extracting the sugar from the canes was due the Chinese failure to build up a big industry.

Penang's agriculture was a disappointment to the Directors and so in the end was its trade. This increased rapidly from 1786 to 1810; it then remained practically stationary, and the establishment of Singapore led to a great falling off in its volume. But by 1840 it had recovered its 1825 figure and there was a steady advance thereafter.

In spite of struggles and setbacks (a big fire had consumed most of the town in 1789), the wealth of the inhabitants, especially the Chinese, increased. This is indicated by the fact that when in 1802 the Lieutenant-Governor proposed to acquire a piece of land for

[1] J. Low, *A Dissertation on the Soil and Agriculture of the British Settlement of Penang* (Singapore, 1836) p. 82–3.

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175 a fort he had to buy it back from a Chinese baker and twenty-five others for $40,885! This was land on an island which fourteen 435 years before had been uninhabited. When Amie, a Chinese baker (probably the same one just mentioned), lost his shop through fire in 1808 and property within a sweep of 250 yards of the port was consumed, a committee estimated the loss at $534,750.

[622] In the early days the Chinese were left very much to themselves. They were governed through their headmen appointed by the 175 authorities. Until the first Charter of Law of 1808 there was no 671 proper legal system and Light had been instructed to act according to 'universal and natural justice' (whatever that may have been).[1] A magistrate, Mr George Caunter, gave his own interpretation of this in 1797 when he sentenced a Chinese man and woman to have their heads shaved and to stand twice in the pillory from four to six in the evening and the man to be imprisoned and then sent off the island. Headmen were appointed in 1792 for each community to administer justice for petty offences.

175 The subject of Chinese associations is dealt with in a later chapter in this section, and all that we need remark here is that in 1799, 575 a few years after the foundation of Penang, the existence of secret societies was manifested in riots, and thereafter at intervals of a 579 few years these riots broke out again. How far these societies were at work and how far the Chinese were exercising their natural aptitude for organizing obstruction as a community is not certain, but it was a common thing for the inhabitants of a district to turn out *en masse* at the sound of a buffalo horn to resist the police who were trying to effect an arrest or perform some other duty. In 1825 the secret societies even conspired with the Siamese to overthrow the Government of Penang. From 1846 to 1885 there were riots in Penang, Malacca, and Singapore of exceptional violence in which many hundreds of Chinese were killed. The Government was slow to deal with this disease of the community—no doubt partly for the cynical reason that the riots affected only the Chinese themselves, but mostly because it was entirely ignorant of the proper way to attack the problem.

175 It will be understood, then, that the police of these early days had a heavy task entrusted to them. The police of Penang were 625 principally drawn from the immigrants from Bengal and Madras,

[1] See Roland Braddell, *The Law of the Straits Settlements, a Commentary* (Singapore, Kelly & Walsh, 1915) p. 7.

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but there were a few Chinese and Jawi Pekan (Malay-Indian half-castes) among them. The police of Province Wellesley were somewhat differently recruited (in the 1830s at any rate). They were mostly ex-sepoys armed with muskets and swords. A third of their total of about seventy were employed in guarding the frontier with Siam. 175 625

The staple article of local commerce was the *sinkheh* (Hokkien) or *sanhāk* (Cantonese), the new recruit from China. Every year the Chinese merchants engaged in the traffic would charter a vessel leaving in April or May with the southwesterly monsoon for Macao. The charterer usually sailed as supercargo in the vessel. When the vessel got to Macao or Amoy the charterer set his agents to work to cajole unsuspecting people by alluring promises of quick fortunes to be made overseas. The bounty money varied according to the respectability of the victims. The agents received a flat rate of a dollar a head. The recruits were herded together on the junk and many had to undergo appalling hardships. In a storm the passengers were nailed down under hatches. 167 472 464 175

In January or February the vessels were back again in Penang. The anchor had scarcely dropped when the prospective buyers flocked on board to buy the *sinkhehs*. The price paid for a master workman—a tailor, goldsmith, carpenter—was 10–15 dollars; a coolie fetched 6–10 dollars; a sickly coolie 3–4 dollars or less. The *sinkheh* then agreed to work for twelve months, receiving food, clothing, and a few dollars for services. If a coolie was not bought and paid for, he was kept on board the junk or in a godown until a purchaser turned up. The *sinkheh* was not well treated. Complaints were on occasion lodged before a sitting magistrate and at his order the *sinkheh* was released on signing a bond to pay his passage money, an agreement which he usually faithfully honoured. 175 466 167

The annual arrivals of *sinkhehs* in Penang in the third and fourth decades of the nineteenth century were about 2,000–3,000 a year. The natives of Kwangtung were considered to be more robust than the Hokkiens and Teochius. They made the best squatters and pioneers in opening up the land for the Hokkiens and Teochius. Unfortunately they had no capital and had to get advances from their friends. The usual purchasers of the land were Hokkiens or Teochius. Most of the plantations which came into the hands of shopkeepers of these tribes, through the default of debtors who owed them money, had been started by Cantonese. All the 175 167 463

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carpenters, blacksmiths, and shoemakers were Cantonese, and so were most of them in the first half of the twentieth century.

But whilst conceding to the Chinese the credit they deserve as pioneers, we must not be guilty of injustice to the other races who in some directions played as important a part in the development of Penang. For instance, most of the public works, bridges, buildings, roads, and the aqueduct were built by Bengal convicts who had been brought to Penang before 1800. The Malays, too, did most of the heavy work of tree-felling.

Before the gates of immigration had been opened up by the modern expansion of industry and by quicker transport, and they had been swamped in numbers by the China-born, the Straits-born Chinese constituted a sort of local aristocracy. Their blood was not pure Chinese, but although they would have Malay, or Malay-Indian or other half-caste mothers, children of the *Babas* (as they were called) were almost all brought up in the ways of their fathers. It was remarkable to consider the tenacity with which Malacca *Baba*, who did not speak anything but Malay, adhered to the Chinese way of life in Penang and Malacca, modified though it was by Malay and other influences. They had a language of their own, and still have, known as Baba Malay. But it differs from Malay in many important respects and is practically a separate language.[1]

Strict adherence to chronological sequence would have brought Singapore into our narrative much earlier than this, for it had been founded in 1819 by Raffles. When he had arrived there on 28 January 1819 the only inhabitants were about 120 Malays and 30 Chinese.[2]

The histories of Penang and Singapore merge into one another officially with the placing of Singapore and Malacca under the control of the former in 1826; in 1830 the three, together forming the Straits Settlements, were made a Residency subject to Bengal. But the immediate success of the younger settlement had almost from the first deprived Penang of its position.

Although it does not seem to be clearly stated anywhere, it is likely that the first Chinese in Singapore came from Malacca and

[1] For a detailed description of Baba Malay see Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 293 ff.

[2] Newbold, op. cit. i, 279. See also W. Bartley, 'Population of Singapore in 1819', *JRASMB*, vol. xi, pt. 1 (1933) p. 177.

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Riau (Rhio), the island nearby which had been occupied by the Dutch shortly before this time. Certainly the most prominent Chinese in the early years were Malaccans. Very soon, however, the news of the establishment of a British settlement in a position so favourable for tapping the trade of the archipelago attracted immigration from China direct. The first junk from Amoy arrived in February 1821.

On 11 June 1819 Raffles wrote to the Duchess of Somerset: 'My new colony thrives most rapidly. We have not been established four months, and it has received an accession of population exceeding 5,000—principally Chinese, and their number is daily increasing.' By August 1820, according to the same authority, it numbered between 10,000 and 12,000, the majority being Chinese. But it is likely that the enthusiasm of the pioneer and his wish to impress the Directors with the rapid success of his settlement led him into exaggeration, for T. Braddell, who went carefully into the matter at a later date, gives the total population for 1821 as 4,727 with the Chinese at 1,159. For 1823 he shows an increase to a total of 10,683 with the Chinese at 3,317.[1]

At the beginning the various races of immigrants settled where they liked, but very soon we find Raffles planning his town and allotting areas to Chinese, Klings, Bugis, Malays, &c. He directed that all Chinese should leave the northern side of the river where they had located themselves and form a new village from the bridge down to the river on the site of the present Boat Quay. By 1821 there were 3,374 yards of road 15 yards wide in Chinatown. Raffles considered that the first in importance among the immigrant peoples was 'beyond doubt the Chinese'. 'From the number of Chinese already settled, and the peculiar attractions of the place for that industrious race, it may be presumed that they will always form by far the largest part of the community.'[2] Raffles continued: '. . . in establishing the Chinese campong on a proper footing, it will be necessary to advert to the provincial and other distinctions among this curious people'.[3]

He said that it was notorious that the people of one province

[1] T. Braddell, *Statistics of the British Possessions in the Straits of Malacca* (Penang, 1861).

[2] Raffles's prediction has certainly not been falsified to date. In 1947 the Chinese accounted for 730,000 out of a total population of 941,000.

[3] 'Notices of Singapore', *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, vol. viii, p. 106

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were known to be more quarrelsome than those of another and that the peoples of the various provinces were liable to quarrel among themselves. A different area should be allotted to resident merchants from that occupied by itinerant traders. The 'Amoi' (Hokkiens from Amoy) claimed particular attention and the committee appointed by Raffles was invited to consider whether it would not be desirable to allot them a separate division 'even to the westward of the Cantonments, beyond the European town and the Sultan'.

The intention of the founder of Singapore was to place the Chinese population in a great measure under the immediate control of their own chiefs, and the committee was instructed to 'fix up such centrical and commanding sites for these authorities and appropriate to them such larger extent of ground, as may tend to render them efficient instruments of police, and at the same time raise them in the consideration of the lower classes'.

As time went on the system of indirect rule which had been adopted in all three settlements was modified and at length virtually replaced by direct rule.

Raffles paid great attention to social distinctions in the communities under his control, though in regarding the merchants as 'the higher and more respectable class', he was ignoring the Confucian teaching which placed the scholar first, the farmer second, the artisan third, and the merchant fourth (not to mention the soldier, whom it placed last). In Singapore there were no Chinese scholars. Farmers were (says Raffles) a third and interesting class, particularly of the Chinese population, 'but as no part of the ground intended to be occupied as the town can be spared for agricultural purposes they will not fall under your consideration, except in as far as it may be necessary to exclude them'. The first two classes mentioned by Raffles were those engaged in mercantile speculation and those gaining their livelihood by handicrafts and personal labour.

The main concern of Raffles and his successors up to the middle of the nineteenth century was to increase the importance of Singapore as a trading settlement. In this they were singularly successful and the annual value of the trade increased in a phenomenal way. The various communities were therefore principally of interest as bringers of wealth to Singapore, and so long as they did not disturb the peace they were left very much to themselves. Thus for a long time no attention was paid to the activities of the *hui*, or secret

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societies, which often operated to the detriment of the Chinese community but did not interfere with other communities. Gambling, another characteristic institution, if it may be so called, that the Chinese had brought with them, created more noticeable disturbances of the communal life and was therefore a matter in which the Government showed an early interest. Raffles had strictly forbidden gambling farms, but Farquhar, his Resident, who had no great moral objection to gambling and saw the advantage of the farms to the revenue, disobeyed Raffles's instructions during his absence and this led to frequent and serious collisions between the two.[1]

A big problem in the early days of Singapore, as in the early days of Penang, was that of law and order. The Chinese, and the same is true of other Asiatic immigrants, were not exclusively composed of enterprising merchants and industrious artisans and peasants: they had brought with them some of the worst characters for whom China itself had no room. There were frequent robberies and murders, even in broad daylight, and most of them went unpunished. Moreover, there was only a handful of police and as yet no code of laws under which criminals could be punished.

The rudimentary police force was augmented in September 1821. A number of European merchants met at the request of the Resident to raise funds by voluntary subscriptions to increase the strength of the existing police force. The meeting decided to suggest to the inhabitants of Kampong Glam and China Town the desirability of subscribing to the fund for the purpose of extending the police systems of their areas, but there was no immediate response. Only when robberies increased did the Chinese begin to realize the necessity of contributing to the Night Watch Fund.[2]

The first riots occurred in 1824, but, according to Song Ong Siang and Buckley, there is no reason to believe that they had any connexion with the operation of secret societies.[3] It was not until 1831 that there was any mention of the existence of these societies. Then Buckley tells us that Singapore was in a very lawless state, several murders being reported in a week, and no proper measures were available to trace the criminals or to secure life and property

[1] See Song Ong Siang, *One Hundred Years History of the Chinese in Singapore* (London, Murray, 1923) p. 17–18.

[2] ibid. p. 25. C. B. Buckley, *An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore* (London, Little, 1903) pp. 165, 212–13.

[3] ibid.

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Chinese

175 579 625 674 [575]

in the outlying parts of the town. While a gang of convicts were working in a road, a number of other Chinese ran out of the jungle and rescued ten of the convicts by carrying them off and knocking off their irons. The whole (local?) police force, *eighteen strong*, was mustered and recovered five of the convicts. There was said at the time to be a secret society of over a thousand men established in the jungle where they actually had an armed fort. Twenty more years elapsed before the next Chinese riot broke out. Then from 1851 to 1854 occurred a series of events which culminated in the great riot of the latter year.

175 575 674 579

The secret societies found that the conversion of the Chinese in the interior of Singapore Island to Roman Catholicism had the effect of creating throughout the island groups of men independent of their protection. They resented this, and in 1851 there was a general attack on the Christian Chinese in the country districts. The disturbances lasted for a week, and when the Indian convicts who had been sent out in gangs to follow the rioters and disperse them failed to do so the soldiers were called out. Over 500 Chinese were killed by the secret societies, including many well-to-do converts who had become planters. The grand jury in 1851 complained against the societies 'whose power was dreaded by the Chinese of all classes and which by their recent destruction of numerous *bangsal* (coolie lines) belonging to the Christian Chinese and by their outrageous attack on the police in the vicinity of Bukit Timur had exhibited a dangerous combination against public security and peace'. In August 1853 the grand jury again drew attention to the necessity for adopting stringent measures to detain witnesses in particularly grave cases until the trial of the prisoners came on (to safeguard the witnesses from intimidation). The Government, however, did not take the situation very seriously. Then suddenly in May 1854 occurred the biggest riots that had ever been known in Singapore. These were *kongsi* riots and for ten days the whole island was the scene of pitched battles between the rival factions. Four hundred Chinese were killed.[1]

In a later chapter of this section[2] the nature of Chinese secret societies in Malaya receives attention and it is sufficient in this

[1] The number has been given in several works as 4,000 and the writer copied this figure in his *Malaya: Outline of a Colony* (London, Nelson, 1946). He is satisfied now, however, that 400 is very much nearer the truth.

[2] Chapter XXIX.

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summarized history of the Chinese in Singapore and Penang to make mention of the successive outbreaks without attempting to go deeply into their causes. Certain it is that the Thian Ti Hui, or Heaven and Earth Society, was the most powerful and dangerous of these subversive societies, and even allowing that the distinction between the beneficent *kongsis*, or district and clan associations, and the malevolent *huis* is largely an arbitrary one we may take it the latter were mainly responsible for the riot outbreaks of 1854.

As early as 1799 secret-society activity caused disturbances in Penang. There was a long period of apparent acquiescence, when the system of extortion worked without obvious friction, but from 1846 to 1885 there was a series of outbreaks in Penang and Malacca, as well as in Singapore. The Government found no effective means of dealing with the menace until 1889, and until then the societies continued their depredations without serious hindrance. That their activities were not entirely anti-social must, however, be admitted in mitigation of their offence. The eventual solution of the problem belongs to a later period. At this time the obstacle to any really effective measures was the lack of any official with a knowledge of the Chinese language and customs.[1]

Even more serious to the Straits Settlements from the point of view of interference with trade was piracy. Pirates swarmed in the waters of the Straits and about the neighbouring islands. They were Malays, Lanuns, and others. Their usual prey were the junks which plied between China and the Straits and the native craft trading between the islands. As late as 1835 attacks were actually made in daylight on boats plying between the shore and ships lying at anchor at the mouth of the harbour. Many vessels were captured when barely out of sight of Singapore town. The Government had only a few armed ships at its disposal and occasional raids by these were powerless to quell the evil. Criticism in the press and representations by the merchants produced no results and in 1832 the Chinese merchants in Singapore obtained the sanction of the Government to equip at their own expense four large trading vessels, each manned by thirty Chinese, well armed and carrying several guns, to go out and attack the pirates lurking just outside

[1] The ingenious device of Colonel Cavenagh, the Governor of the Straits from 1859 to 1867, may here be mentioned. When trouble started the Governor had the known lodge masters of the *hui* patrol the streets under the surveillance of special constables to restore order. See General Sir Orfeur Cavenagh, *Reminiscences of an Indian Official* (London, W. H. Allen, 1884).

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175 Singapore harbour. The vessels went out, attacked two *prahus* and
721 sank one while the other made off. One or two Chinese were killed.
441 The Chinese merchants agreed to pay $200 for every pirate boat
659 attacked, and also $200 to the relatives of any man killed in the expedition. The Government was shamed by this into building two special ships at Malacca for anti-piracy purposes. But measures were still inadequate until in 1836 H.M.S. *Wolf* arrived in response to petitions to the home authorities and the campaign for suppression began in earnest. It was the advent of the steamship which made suppression possible. Between 1835 and 1860 Malay piracy was almost ended and the depredation of Balanini and Lanuns greatly curtailed.

175 The Chinese in Singapore were drawn from the various parts
578 of the southern provinces of China, and though they had in com-
186 mon the same traditional culture and similar customs, this was not enough to fuse them into a whole. Tribes speaking different dialects regarded one another almost as foreigners, as indeed they do sometimes to this day. There was no hint of Chinese Nationalism in its modern sense. In May 1840 British troops intended for use in the First China War arrived and camped on the Esplanade, arousing no manifestation of hostility on the part of the local Chinese. In 1857, at the beginning of the Second China War, some ill will towards the British was shown by a section of the poorer classes, but when Lord Elgin arrived in Singapore on 6 June of that year, on his way to China as British High Commissioner and Plenipotentiary, he was presented with an address by the Chinese merchants in which they referred to the great advantage the Chinese population was enjoying under British rule. Chinese tribes were brought into a proximity unexampled in their native country, and even when they were of the same tribe from the same village they had not the restraining organization of their village headmen.

175 In retrospect it seems clear that many of the difficulties of
609 government of the Chinese in Singapore arose from the fact that
647 the governing officials had little knowledge of the usages of the people whom they had to control. Progress towards harmonious combination had therefore to be made in two different directions—the first was by the Chinese getting used to the laws, the habits, and the prejudices of the ruling race, and the second by the ruling race getting to understand the nature of the people they had to govern. It must be admitted that the Chinese made much greater headway

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in their task than the British, for long, did in theirs. Until the Chinese Protectorate was established in 1877 there was practically no British official who had any knowledge of the Chinese language. Governor Fullerton at one time gave orders that all European officers were to make themselves acquainted with the Chinese and the Siamese languages, but there is no evidence that he was obeyed. Until the transfer in 1867 of the Straits Settlements to Colonial Office jurisdiction the civil servants were from India and were India-minded; after British intervention in the Malay States in 1874 they became Malay-minded (which they still mostly are although the majority race has for a decade been Chinese).[1]

The ambition of nearly every Chinese was to return to China as soon as he had amassed a competence, but only a proportion realized this ambition and the rest remained to settle, making only periodical visits to China. As communications with China improved and passage-rates fell, the tendency to pass to and fro increased. The immigrants did not for long bring their women with them. This was partly because they preferred to keep their wives and children in their native land, partly because most of them could not afford to take their families overseas, and partly because the authorities in China, so lax in preventing the emigration of males, took great precautions to prevent women being taken overseas. Later the prohibition was relaxed and eventually ceased, but up to the 1920s the women of Hainan were not allowed to leave their island.

The result of this attitude was that a large number of Chinese took local wives. This intermixture of races was therefore a factor tending towards settlement, but it was interrupted when emigration of Chinese took place in great numbers and the barriers of race rose up. Many did not go back to China because, as has been said, they were too poor, but some did not return because they were too rich and dared not leave their property and their interests. There were 13 women to 100 males at an early period and as time went on the richer China-born tended to have two wives, one in China and one in Malaya and concubines in addition; but for the majority the sex ratio remained disproportionate.

[1] So ignorant were the authorities of Chinese matters that in the early years of Singapore, after the abolition of the gambling farms, the Chinese were allowed unrestricted gambling for fifteen days at Chinese New Year under the impression that gambling formed part of their religion!

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175 589 The ill-balanced sex ratio of the Straits Chinese had a great effect on their social life. For a section it tended to produce miscegenation which might eventually, had it not been for improved communications and the influx of more Chinese caused by the development of the country, have resulted in the creation of a race with interests identified with Malaya rather than with China. [548] For another, and a larger section, it meant celibacy and with this came the problem of prostitution and the traffic in women and girls.[1]

175 654 241 The class of Chinese most encouraged in the early years of Singapore was the merchant. There was, however, an influx of industrious agriculturists as well. The Europeans were interested exclusively in cloves, nutmegs, and sugar, and, so far as Singapore was concerned, the cultivation of these turned out to be a complete failure. Gambier and pepper planting was left almost entirely to the Chinese who owned large plantations of these crops. There were also numbers of squatters, many of whom had worked off the debt for their passage money in the first year or so and who took to agriculture on their own.

175 311 241 651 It is certain that Chinese gambier and pepper plantations were in the long run an evil for Singapore. Gambier had an exceptional power of denuding the soil, so that it destroyed the cultivable land as the Chinese moved on from plot to plot. There were generally three acres of pepper to thirty acres of gambier and when one of these crops died the other soon followed. The wasteful cultivation had begun to exhaust the richness of the island by 1840 and more and more Chinese deserted it for the mainland of Johore where they restarted the same system.

Of vegetable gardening in Singapore the Chinese had the monopoly, but of pineapples the principal cultivators were the Bugis. There were minor crops, such as *sireh*, and a single acre of indigo cultivated by Chinese. Singapore Island was unfavourable to the growth of rice, which succeeded quite well at Malacca and Penang. But human agency had as much to do with the failure of the rice crop as had nature. By 1831 (says the *Singapore Chronicle*) rice planting had become a thing of the past. The Governor, Mr

[1] For a more detailed discussion of the subject of the sex ratio, &c., see Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 86 ff. The women and girls problem receives attention in Chapter XXIX of this section.

The astonishing improvement in the sex ratio of Chinese as shown by the 1947 census is set out in the tables on pp. 274–80.

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Fullerton, had put on a tax or quit rent of one dollar an acre per month, which completely prohibited the coolies from China taking up any agricultural employment as they found it impossible to make the jungle produce sufficient to meet such a heavy impost, and the gardens which were prospering were neglected.[1]

Chinese squatters and labourers in Singapore Island in the 1830s had to contend with many dangers and hardships. There was malaria, for instance, and in the gambier plantations the coolies clearing the ground often got splinters in their legs which formed ulcers. Besides disease and the hard life they led they suffered greatly from robbery and from the marauding of tigers.

As in Penang, it was rarely the original pioneers who profited from their toil. They were encumbered by advances carrying a crippling rate of interest.

The principal types of Singapore Chinese were, however, the merchant and the artisan. The Chinese were besides everything from actors, acrobats, and musicians to druggists and school masters, from fishmongers to pawnbrokers, and from cartwrights, fortune-tellers, down to *samsengs*, or rascals and thieves.[2] In a community which was exclusively commercial or agricultural there was not much scope for the expression of personality. The important business of life was getting a living or, if possible, amassing a fortune, making regular remittances to the family in China, eating and drinking, placating an unseen world of spirits, and, perhaps above all, getting buried decently. There was no cultivated leisured or academic class. The typical successful Chinese is described by the famous naturalist, Russel Wallace, as he saw him in Singapore between 1854 and 1862:

> The Chinese merchant is generally a fat round-faced man with an important and business-like look. He wears the same style of clothing (loose white smock, and blue or black trousers) as the meanest coolie, but of finer materials, and is always clean and neat; and his long tail tipped with red hangs down to his heels. He has a handsome warehouse or shop in town and a good house in the country. He keeps a fine horse and gig, and every evening may be seen taking a drive bareheaded to enjoy the cool breeze. He is rich, he owns several retail shops and trading

[1] The wages of Chinese agricultural labourers of the period are given in an article by F. L. Baumgarten, 'Agriculture in Malacca', *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, vol. iii (1849).

[2] J. D. Vaughan in *Manners and Customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements*, p. 16, gives about 200 occupations followed by Straits Chinese.

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564 schooners, he lends money at high interest and on good security, he makes hard bargains and gets fatter and richer every year.[1]

441 Yet there were outstanding characters among the Chinese—Tan Che Sang (*c.* 1763–1836), a wealthy Cantonese, who vainly tried to conquer his weakness for gambling by cutting off the first joint [741] of his little finger with an oath never to play any more; Tan Tock Seng who founded the hospital of that name; Dato' Toh Ah Boon of Johore, who created the Toh Ah Boon scholarship, and in more recent times Dr Lim Boon Keng, onetime Principal of the University of Amoy, Sir Song Ong Siang (or Sir Ong-siang Song Tan Cheng-lock, and a number of others. As wealth became consolidated and leisure more common better-off Chinese found an outlet for their released energies in philanthropy, social service, and, later and in less degree, in politics.

[1] *The Malay Archipelago* (London, Macmillan, 1869) i. 32–3.

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[p. 309]

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE MALAY STATES

THE Ming History says that in 1378 the King of Pahang, Maharaja Tajau, sent envoys with a letter on a gold leaf to China, and these brought as tribute foreign slaves and the produce of the country. Cheng Ho or his associates visited Pahang on his fourth voyage (probably in 1414)[1] and in that year we hear of tribute being sent to China again. In 1436 Fei Hsin, a Chinese Muslim and Arabic scholar, mentions another early visit to Pahang. 175

This is practically all we hear of the Chinese in these eastern parts of the peninsula until the visit of an Englishman named Gray in 1827.[2] Gray's journal of 21 January 1827 says: 'I am informed by the merchants that they have discovered a tin mine, near the river Leppa (Lepar), at the distance of two days' pulling from the settlement of Pahang; it is expected to turn out favourably and to be opened in the dry season by about 800 Malays, besides a number of Chinese.' In 1838 Abdullah,[3] on his way to Kelantan, landed at Kuala Pahang for provisions. He sailed up the Pahang River to Kampong China (Pekan Baharu). There he found hundreds of Malays and Chinese, armed to the teeth, awaiting him on the bank. The Bendahara, with the Chinese headman, was away at the goldmines at Jelai. The Chinese at Kampong China were Hakkas and they intermarried with Malays or Balinese slaves. Their children spoke Chinese rather than Malay. [316]

The veil over Pahang is rarely lifted thereafter until Clifford's expedition in 1887. In the intervening years these Chinese were engaged in mining in Pahang, though in what numbers is uncertain. They had the monopoly of mining ingot-money, but were permitted to mint only four times a year and up to a certain value. They had mints at Kuantan, Lepar, Semantan, and Pekan Lama. This monopoly survived until 1893. [436]

[1] See J. J. L. Duyvendak, 'The true dates of the Chinese Maritime Expeditions of the early fifteenth century', *T'oung Pao* (Leyden, 1939), vol. xxxiv.

[2] 'Journal of a route overland from Malacca to Pahang, across the Malayan Peninsula', *Journal of the Indian Archipelago* (1852), vi. 373.

[3] The author of the *Pelayaran*, quoted by Linehan on p. 60 of his *History of Pahang* (*JRASMB*, vol. xiv, pt. 2, June 1936).

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Johore

175 Let us now pass to the south of the Peninsula and remark the progress of the Chinese in Johore.[1]

[439] The Dutch policy of monopoly had caused the Chinese merchants to seek a centre of operations where they were out of their reach. By 1657–61 Johore had become such a centre. By 1661 all Sumatra, Perak, Malacca, and Johore were reported to be overstocked with English and Moorish cloth brought from Surat and Coromandel by Chinese merchants in the Malay Peninsula. Chinese coarse earthenware, tea, and tobacco are also mentioned as articles of commerce at the time. Although threatened with reprisals by the Dutch, Johore traded with and sold produce to the Chinese.

At the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries Captain Alexander Hamilton (quoted by Winstedt) says of Johore: 'The people of Industry are the *Chinese* who inhabit among them in their towns; and there may be about 1,000 families of them settled in the Johore Dominions, besides a much greater number who drive a foreign trade among them!'[2]

On 2 March 1702–3 five Englishmen from Pulo Condore were shipwrecked on the coast of Johore. At New Johore they found '6 great junks and several proes'. They also saw several Chinese who lived and traded there. At some palace revels the shipwrecked Englishmen saw 600 Chinese armed with swords and targets who 'marched with Chinese plays and then fenced'.[3]

In 1784 Johore was engaged in war with the Bugis and was helped by the Dutch. When the Bugis were defeated the Chinese in Johore who helped them were allowed to keep their property, but had to pay a fine of $20,000. An agreement was made by Johore with the Dutch whereby, among other provisions, Chinese native craft might trade at Rhio provided that they did not come from Celebes or Borneo, or carry cloves or mace, and provided also that they did not carry tin from Palembang or Bangka.

It seems clear that the Chinese did not settle in the interior in Johore until after the thirties of last century. Begbie in 1834 gives

[1] Winstedt, 'A History of Johore', *JRASMB*, vol. x, pt. 3 (December 1932) p. 49.

[2] *A New Account of the East Indies* (Edinburgh, 1727) as quoted in *JRASMB*, vol. x, pt. 3 (1932) p. 49.

[3] W. Vaughan, *Adventures of Five Englishmen from Pulo Condore, a Factory of the New Company, of the East Indies, who were shipwrecked in the little kingdom of Johore* (London, 1714).

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the estimated population of the towns of Johore, Pulau Tinggi, Sungai Papan, and Segamat, but does not mention any Chinese. Nor does Newbold in 1839, though he enumerates quite small villages. (Incidentally he estimates the entire population of Johore at 25,000.) But by the late thirties the Chinese squatter from Singapore, whose nature it is to move farther and farther into the interior, had begun the invasion of Johore. 175

At Timiong (Temiang) there were, in 1836, 35,000 Malays and a few Chinese. Newbold does not mention any other Chinese in other parts of the state including Muar and Segamat. Captain MacPherson,[1] who visited Muar in 1857, says of that territory: 'It is useless to hope for energy with the Malay. . . . It wants a strong infusion of Chinese life and skill.'

The British policy until the seventies was strictly one of non-intervention in the Malay States, but long before that the Straits Settlements Government had shown concern for the welfare of the British subjects of whatever race who were living in the Malay States. For example, Cavenagh, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, in his *Reminiscences*[2] tells us that in 1861 he received a complaint against the Temenggong of Johore. The Temenggong's eldest son, a young chief, admitted that his people were in the wrong. 'I then [says Cavenagh] referred to the case of some Chinamen who had been confined on the charge of gambling, remarking that though I did not wish to interfere with his authority, or to prevent criminals from being punished, I could not permit British subjects to be at the mercy of the caprice of any native chief, and, therefore, required them to be sentenced according to some known law. He asserted that the law in force was the Hukum-i-Sharat [Shara'] (ecclesiastical law), according to which the Chinese might have their hands cut off, and he had inflicted a more lenient punishment.' [671]

In 1865 two British men-of-war steamers were sent to Pulau Tinggi to apprehend one Che Bujang, a Malay, who had plundered and murdered a Chinese wood-cutter, a British subject, but he was not traced.

By the early seventies there were twenty-nine Johore rivers with

[1] 'Narrative of a trip to Dok in the Muar territories', *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, new series, vol. ii (1858) p. 299–300.

[2] General Sir Orfeur Cavenagh, *Reminiscences of an Indian Official* (London, W. H. Allen, 1884) p. 312–13.

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Johore
Perak

175 Chinese estates on their banks. By this time the population was growing fast. In 1885 the Duke of Sutherland found at Johore a 'gay little Malay town' where there had been only a little fishing village in 1855.

[423] It was the demand for pepper and gambier that brought the Chinese squatter to Johore. Those who could satisfy the Malay authorities as to their means were allowed to form settlements, up some named river, for the planting of pepper and gambier, and the titles they received from the ruler were called simply 'Surat Sungai' (river documents). This system was called the *kangchu* system (literally 'owner of a river').[1]

The heads of the settlements received lengthy written instructions. Among other things they were responsible for keeping up the supply of opium and spirits to their men. They had the rights of running the gambling, the monopoly of pawnbroking, and selling spirits and pork. The *kangchu* system continued until 1917 when it was abolished.[2]

We now travel up the west coast of the peninsula, going back a good few years, and find that Thomas Forrest, senior captain of the H.E.I.C.'s Marine (whom we have already encountered in a footnote in the preceding chapter and who will turn up again in our account of the Chinese in Indonesia and the Philippines), visited Perak in 1783. His impressions of his visit to Perak are of exceptional interest to us. He says:

[644 177] I went up in a country covered boat from Tanjang Putus, where the vessel lay, to pay my respect to the King of Pera, who received me in a large upper-room house with great state, having about 20 guards in the room, dressed in black satin garments embroidered on the breast with a golden dragon: they wore mandarin caps, and appeared altogether in the Chinese style: some were armed with halberts, some held pikes in their hands, and a few had musquets without bayonets. The King bade me sit in a chair before a sofa on which he sat himself; his courtiers, about 12 or 14 in number, all stood. After some conversation, the King asked me if the Dutch meant to return to Pera: I answered that I believed they did; on which he looked grave: he then withdrew; and his brother entertained me with a cold collation, at which two more per-

[1] See A. E. Coope, 'The Kangchu System in Johore', *JRASMB*, vol. xiv, pt. 3 (December 1936) p. 249.

[2] 'Kangchu Rights Abolition Enactment', *Johore Government Gazette* (1 December 1917). See also J. V. Cowgill, 'Chinese Place Names in Johore', *JRASMB*, vol. ii, pt. iii (1924) p. 221.

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sons sat down. I had presented the King with two pieces of Bengal taffeta, and found when I got to the boat, a large present of jacks, durians, costard apples, and other fruit. I left Pera in December 1783. Much rain fell in November.[1] 175

The dress and regalia of modern Malay royalty are fashioned on an Indian (Hindu) model. This passage from Forrest, however, makes the survival of Chinese influence quite clear. It is only the modern swing away from China which has made the Malay Sultans of the peninsula forget that they were once proud to wear the Imperial Yellow of the Ming. [177]

Newbold's account of the Chinese in Sungai Ujong (later one of the states of Negri Sembilam) is referred to later on in this chapter. He says that the estimated population in 1832 was 3,200 Malays, principally Menangkabaus, and 400 Chinese employed in the mines. [316]

At this time the wages of the Chinese miners were 5–8 dollars a month, as compared with 3–5 earned by Malays. From daybreak till 7 a.m. they were engaged in clearing away water that had collected in the workings during the night. They breakfasted from 7 to 8, worked from 8 to 11, dined from 11 to 1, and worked from 1 to 5 when they ceased for the day.[2] [465] [466]

Anderson tells us that in 1824 Lukut had recently become a great place for tin.[3] Of its 1,000 inhabitants 200 were Chinese miners. It was at Lukut in 1834 that the great massacre of the Malays by the Chinese took place. In 1874 there were about 10,000 Chinese miners there.

Selangor in the first part of the nineteenth century was much more thinly inhabited than Perak. Anderson in 1824 puts the population of the capital at 400, and says that the inhabitants of the villages on or near the Selangor River occupied 975 houses only.[4] There was an influx of Chinese miners to the state after the fifties. By 1871 there were 12,000 Chinese in Selangor (Lukut was then in Selangor) and the output of tin was 3,000 piculs a month.

There can be no doubt that the Chinese contacts with Kelantan

[1] Thomas Forrest, *A Voyage from Calcutta to the Mergui Archipelago* (London, Robson, 1792) p. 28.

[2] 'Account of Sungie Ujong, one of the States in the Interior of Malacca', *JASB*, vol. iv, pp. 538, 540 (1835).

[3] John Anderson, *Political and Commercial Considerations relative to the Malayan Peninsula and the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca* (Prince of Wales Island, 1824) p. 202.

[4] ibid. pp. 191–2, 196.

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175 date from a very early time, but there is no evidence of any settlement except abandoned gold workings. Anker Rentse[1] speaks of one such settlement on the Sokor River. He then refers to the settlement at Pulai, still existing, which he considers to be of a [407] much later date. However, it was very old. The type of plough used by the Chinese there for their rice cultivation is said to be different from the Malay type. Local Chinese tradition credits the foundation of the Pulai settlement to a Hakka chief, one Chong Pah Chai, who about 200 years ago was a notorious robber in South China and fled to Pulai.[2]

In the 1930s Pulai still had its 'Kapitan' who must have been about the last of the Chinese captains in Malaya.

Of the Chinese in Kedah we hear very little before the nineteenth century, but Thomas Forrest who visited it in 1783 gives us a glimpse of the Chinese trade with that State. This is what he says:

[439] The government is monarchichal, under a Malay Mohammedan prince, who like many other Malay princes engrosses almost all the whole foreign trade of the port, excepting that of an annual Chinese junk, which pays *a certain sum only* as duty, and then has leave to trade freely with the inhabitants. This junk imports immense quantities of coarse China-ware, thin iron pans, and many other articles from that country, and exports *biche de mer*, called swallow, sharks fins, edible birds nests, rattans, tin, dammer, tortoise-shell, deers skins and sinews, bullocks and buffaloes hides and horns, and many other coarse articles.

The town contains about 3 or 400 houses, inhabited by Chinese, Telingas [Kalingas?] and Malays.[3]

175 Newbold says that in 1828 the number of Chinese miners on Sungai Ujong was nearly 1,000, divided into nine *Kongsis* chiefly of 575 the Thian Ti Hui, or Heaven and Earth League (or Society). Each 579 was under its respective *Towkay*, or chief. He remarks that their mysterious oaths and secret laws appeared to be not very dissimilar from those which bound the Carbonari of the Europe of his time. Jealousy of their fast-increasing power and numbers, or some alleged offence, but more probably the treasure amassed by the brotherhood of the Thian Ti Hui (whose property was in common), led in 1828 to their massacre by the Malays. But by 1830 the mines

[1] 'History of Kelantan', *JRASMB*, vol. xii, pt. 2 (August 1934).

[2] S. M. Middlebrook, 'Pulai: an early Chinese settlement in Kelantan', *JRASMB*, vol. xi, pt. 2 (December 1933).

[3] *A Voyage from Calcutta to the Mergui Archipelago* (London, Robson, 1792) p. 24.

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were again worked by 400 Chinese, who continued there until the disturbances of 1833, when many returned to Malacca. [579]

We see, then, that wherever the Chinese went they took their secret societies with them. Indeed, these supplied practically the only social organization possessed by the community. In Perak, Chinese miners appeared in Larut from Penang, whence they brought the rival secret societies, the Ghee Hin and Hai San. 175 575

It now becomes necessary to give an outline of the activities of the Chinese miners and their secret societies which in the seventies were to lead to British intervention in the Malay States and thus to transform the whole position in the Peninsula.

Before 1850 the district of Larut was almost uninhabited. About 1840 a Perak-born Malay named Che' Long Ja'afar had married a daughter of the Panglima Bukit Gantang, or keeper of the pass between Larut and Kuala Kangsar, and had settled near the present township of Taiping. There were said then to have been only three Chinese in the whole of Larut. Che' Long Ja'afar discovered a patch of rich mining-land at Klian Pauh, the site of the present Taiping jail, and soon Chinese miners from Penang were flocking into Larut. Later new mining-lands were discovered at Klian Baharu, the present-day Kamunting. 175 575 316 579

In 1850 Long Ja'afar obtained from the Sultan of Perak a title to the district of Larut as his own property. He died in 1857 and was succeeded by his son, Che' Ngah Ibrahim, who was recognized by the Sultan as the ruler of Larut in succession to his father. Swettenham, who knew him personally, says that Che' Ngah Ibrahim was not pure Malay, but partly Indian and of a shrewdness and business capacity foreign to Malays.[1] He became known as the Raja of Larut, or Mentri of Larut, or Tengku Mentri. 5 642 L

Meanwhile the influx of Chinese to the new mining-fields of Klian Pauh and Klian Baharu was so great that it was beyond the capacity of the Mentri to keep order, and the Chinese, free of any control from above, began faction fights among themselves.

It became customary in the records of the period to describe the cleavage as between the 'Four Districts' and the 'Five Districts'. The former were the members of the Ghee Hin and the latter of the Hai San and Toh Peh Kong organization. In fact the divisions of the Larut 'wars' of 1862–73 were precisely those of the Penang

[1] Sir Frank Swettenham, *British Malaya*, revised ed. (London, Lane, 1929) p. 123.

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riots of 1867. The Four Districts were mostly Ghee Hins and Cantonese, and the Five Districts were mostly Hai Sans and Khehs.[1]

But while the fundamental cause of the fighting was the tribal hatred between the Cantonese and the Khehs, the division of forces was not altogether on a tribal basis. Quite often a Hakka would be a member of the Ghee Hin and a Cantonese of the Hai San, or vice versa, and such was the hold of his society on a member's allegiance that it was more powerful than the call of the tribe. As Vaughan and others have pointed out, men of the same tribe, clan, and district of China, even of the same family, might be found ranged against one another in mortal combat through the accident of their secret-society allegiance. This fact will often explain the apparent change of an individual or group from one camp to another as the ebb and flow of power effected new combinations.

In the year 1862 trouble broke out between the Hai San men at Klian Pauh (now Taiping) and the Ghee Hin men at the Kamunting mines, a few miles away. The occasion was a gambling dispute between a party of Ghee Hins visiting Klian Pauh and some Hai Sans. Immediately the cry was raised of 'Kill these interlopers!' Fourteen of the Ghee Hins were seized and thirteen of them barbarously murdered. Only one escaped to tell the tale. Tribal war then broke out between the villages.[2]

Both sides appealed to the Malay head of the district. Ngah Ibrahim was an opportunist. As soon as he saw that the Hai San men (who had begun these disturbances) were the stronger party he threw in his lot with them, put to death the Ghee Hin leader,

[1] The term 'District' as used to refer to the places of origin in China of the rival factions is a very loose one. Skinner, who first uses the expressions in an official document ('Précis of Perak Affairs', 10 January 1874, published in *Perak Papers*, 1874–9), enumerates the See Kwan, or Four Districts, as the Sin Neng, Sin Whee, Seow Keng, and Whee Chew, and the Go Kwan, or Five Districts, as the Cheng Sia, Poon Say, Soon Tek, Lam Hye, and Tong Quan. Kwan is an obsolete term for prefecture or department. The first two of the Four Districts are districts in the Kwang Chau prefecture, while the last two are complete prefectures in the same province. The Five Districts appear to have been districts proper, but Poon Say is not identifiable. The Districts are differently named in another document of 1 January 1847, but the exact territorial identity of the Districts in China is not important if we remember that the people of the first were mostly Cantonese and of the latter mostly Khehs (Hakkas).

[2] For this period see Winstedt, *A History of Malaya* (London, Luzac, 1935) pp. 230 ff.; the same author's *Malaya and its History* (London, Hutchinson, 1948) pp. 62–77; R. J. Wilkinson, *History of the Peninsular Malays*, 3rd ed. (Singapore, 1923).

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So Ah Chiang, and drove his followers out of Larut. The dispossessed miners appealed to the British Government.[1]

The struggle henceforth was between the Ghee Hin and the Hai San for the exclusive possession of the tin-fields of Larut.

At this time most of the Chinese in Perak were regarded as British subjects since the majority claimed to come from Penang, though many of them were professional fighting men especially imported from China. Colonel Cavenagh, the Governor, responding to the appeal of the Ghee Hin,[2] ordered a blockade of the coast, and yielding to the pressure Ngah Ibrahim paid a sum of $17,000 as damages. The dispossessed Ghee Hins returned to the occupation of the Kamunting mines and Ho Ghi Siu was appointed as headman in Larut in succession to the murdered So Ah Chiang.

So ended the first Larut 'war'.

The following years were a period of quiescence in Perak, but the battle of the factions was transferred to Penang where the upshot was the disturbance of 1867. During this period the White and Red Flag Societies, the Malay counterparts of the Ghee Hin and the Hai San, established themselves alongside their respective Chinese allies in the underground of Perak's politics. The Hai San had been defeated by the pressure brought on them by the British in the Larut troubles of 1863, but they were by no means disposed to accept this defeat as final. The Ghee Hin had burnt some Hai San houses at Jelutong in Penang in 1865, but it was not until 1867 that there was a full-scale trial of strength between them.

The two factions used Penang and Perak alternately as a battleground. In Perak the bone of contention was the mining-land, but the actual occasion for the new conflict about to take place was the alleged intrigue between Lee Ah Kun, the head of the Ghee Hin in Larut, and a woman of the Hai San camp who was said to have been a relative of Chang Keng-kwee, then head of the Hai San in Penang. Lee Ah Kun and the woman were seized by the Hai San, carried round the district in pig baskets, and finally drowned in a mining pool. This was the signal for a retaliatory outbreak of the Ghee Hin.

[1] 'History of Perak', *JRASMB*, vol. xii, pt. 1 (June 1934) p. 80.

[2] Winstedt and Wilkinson both say that the claim for damages was by the Go Kuan (Go Kwan) British subjects, but, as Mr W. L. Wynne of the Malayan Police remarked in an unpublished study, 'Triad and Tabut', it was the Ghee Hin (See Kwan) who were dispossessed and who appealed to the Governor for redress.

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175 Meanwhile the Mentri of Larut was in a dilemma. He had, under
the pressure of the British, made his peace with the Ghee Hin and
575 restored them to their holdings, but secretly he remained the ally
of the Hai San. But the Ghee Hin now took the initiative, and,
316 though inferior in numbers to the Hai San, drove them back from
579 Klian Pauh upon the Mentri's fort at Matang. Seeing how things
were going, the Mentri evacuated the defeated Hai Sans to Penang
at his own expense (the junk hire alone cost $15,000) and ~~made~~
overtures to the victorious Ghee Hins. At the same time he addressed the Governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir Harry Ord, explaining what had happened. The dispossessed Hai San also made a report to him just as the dispossessed Ghee Hin had done in 1862. The Governor declined to interfere.

It is at this point that the Chinese faction-fights became mixed up with the question of the succession to the throne of Perak. Rival candidates for the throne which had become vacant by the death of Sultan Ali in 1871 appealed for the support of one or the other of the Chinese factions. The disorder worked itself up to a climax. An attack by the Hai San in October 1872 at Larut on the unsuspecting and unprepared Ghee Hin was completely successful. 'Hundreds perished in the fighting', says Winstedt, 'several hundreds more died of exposure or privation in the jungle.' In this same month 2,000 Ghee Hin refugees found their way to Penang of whom more than 100 were wounded. All the Ghee Hin women fell into the hands of their enemies. A few preferred suicide to dishonour; the rest were divided up between the Hai San headmen and the Mentri's chiefs, for the Mentri had taken up once more the policy of siding with the victors.

In the third phase which followed, the Ghee Hin were for the first time the aggressors. They prepared a fleet of junks and blockaded the coast of Larut and seized Matang. The struggle lasted for a year and led to British intervention in Perak.

175 The detailed history of the British intervention belongs to the
general history of Malaya and has been dealt with by Swettenham,
642 Wilkinson, Winstedt, L. A. Mills, and others. We must content
ourselves here with a relation of the main facts.

In November 1873 the new Governor, Sir Andrew Clarke, arrived in Singapore charged with the task of bringing about 'limited interference in the affairs of the Malay States for the preservation of peace and security, the suppression of piracy, and for the develop-

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ment of roads, schools, and police, through the appointment of a Political Agent or Resident in each State'. This represented a complete change of policy which was defined in a dispatch from the Secretary of State to the new Governor. It included the passage (since famous): '. . . Her Majesty's Government find it incumbent to employ such influence as they possess with the native princes to rescue, if possible, these fertile and productive countries from the ruin which must befall them if the present disorders continue unchecked.'

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After Mr Pickering (later the first Protector of Chinese) had opened up negotiations with the Chinese headmen of Perak, the latter were summoned together with all the major Malay chiefs of Perak to meet the Governor at Pangkor on 4 January 1874. The result was two treaties, one in Malay between the British and the Perak chiefs present, being the Treaty of Pangkor proper, and one in Chinese between the British and the headmen in Penang and Larut of the Ghee Hin and Hai San. By the latter the representatives of the two contending parties agreed on the unconditional submission of their case to the decision of the British Government.

The main provision of the Pangkor Treaty proper was that Raja Muda Abdullah became Sultan and agreed to accept a British Resident 'whose advice must be asked and acted upon on all questions other than those touching Malay religion and custom'. Mr J. W. W. Birch was appointed first British Resident of Perak on 17 November 1874. He attempted to ensure that the revenues of the various districts of Perak, which were a perquisite of the individual chiefs and which they farmed out to the Chinese, were made available for public purposes. His intention was to replace these perquisites by fixed allowances. This, coupled with his interference with religion and custom (especially with regard to slaves) and his generally tactless and pig-headed behaviour, aroused resentment among the chiefs and within a year Birch was murdered. This was followed by military intervention by the British. The campaign was short and decisive. By 17 December 1875 (Birch had been murdered on 2 November) all organized resistance was at an end though guerrilla warfare followed. The British resolved on the continuance of the 'Residential' system and Mr Hugh Low was appointed Resident.

Hugh Low established a State Council for Perak which had four Malay and two Chinese members, in addition to two British official

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[575] members. One of the Chinese members was Kapitan Ah Kwee and the other was Kapitan Ah Yam. Kapitan Ah Kwee was none other 175 than Chang Keng-kwee, who had taken a leading part in the recent disturbances and was now leader of the Hai San in Penang and 642 Larut, while Kapitan Ah Yam had been the leader of the Ghee Hin and White Flag in Penang and Larut ever since the murder of Lee Ah Kun in 1872. Raja Dris (Idris), one of the Malay members, was in sympathy with the White Flag and in fear of the Red Flag,[1] and another Malay member, the Orang Kaya Temenggong, was (says Wynne) probably a member of the Red Flag. So that the first Perak State Council had a decidedly secret-society flavour. But it must be remembered that in those days if you were a Chinese leader at all, it had to be a Triad or Tokong leader. None the less it was clear that the British had very much to learn about the underground machinery of Chinese social life before they could competently govern their newly acquired protectorates.

575 Secret-society activity continued unabated during the first years of the British regime. Crimes of violence were so common that an 175 attempt was made to secure the registration of Chinese coastal 579 workers on the south coast of Larut—woodcutters, sawyers, and fishermen of the *kongsi*—but it was defeated by the impossibility of giving a Chinese a fixed identity; only the fingerprint system, introduced twenty-five years later, finally succeeded in doing this. On one or two occasions the murders instigated by the societies had Europeans for victims. Such was the killing of Captain Lloyd, Superintendent of the Dindings at Pangkor Island, and his wife in October 1878. The next big challenge by the Ghee Hin was an attempt to seize Taiping town, stronghold of the Hai San, in what became known as the Taiping riots in October 1879. A salvo of artillery fire from Walker, the Chief of the Perak armed police, frustrated the attempt and can be said to mark the end of the Larut wars.

175 Apart from the rivalry over the tin-fields, the secret societies had another rich source of profit to quarrel over. This was the 575 monopoly of the revenue farms. The farming system was undoubtedly an unavoidable phase in the transition from the feudal 651 exactions imposed during the Malay period to an orderly system

[1] The White Flag was composed of Malays and Tamils who, in riots, sided with the Chinese Ghee Hin; the Red Flags, also Malays and Tamils, sided with the Chinese Toh Peh Kongs.

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of public finance. The farmer was invariably a Chinese, or a syndicate of Chinese, who by public tender obtained the right to collect the duty or revenue under the various heads. There was keen competition among the syndicates to obtain the farms, and the Government, once the farm was let, was relieved of further responsibility. It received a fixed sum while the farmers extracted as much as they could from the public. The system lingered on in some States well after the end of the nineteenth century, but was eventually abolished.

In the years following the Perak war there was a great influx of Chinese into the State. In 1882 the Resident, then Sir Hugh Low, was becoming apprehensive of the upset of the balance of power and of the ability of the Chinese to combine against the Government. In his report for 1882 he points out that 30,000 Chinese might be assembled in a few hours at Taiping. The number of Chinese miners had increased, he said, from about 9,000 in 1877 to probably 50,000 at the time of writing.

A Secretary for Chinese Affairs was appointed at the beginning of 1884 following on the creation of the post of Protector of Chinese in Singapore in 1877, and Mr C. A. Schultz assumed this appointment. Schultz was inclined to regard the secret societies in a favourable light, believing (like Vaughan in the Straits) that they had and were doing good among their countrymen by assisting them and adjusting minor disputes among members. However, from 1884 to 1889 a series of riots, directly traceable to Triad and Tokong rivalries, was proof of the lawless tendency of these organizations. The facts became too notorious to be ignored. In August 1889 an order in council was issued absolutely prohibiting all Chinese secret societies. The first measures not proving sufficiently effective, a Registration of Societies Enactment was passed on the lines of the Colony Ordinance in 1889, and provided for exemption, registration, and dissolution of societies. This eventually proved an effective piece of legislation.

Perak was the key State, so to speak, for this period, but British intervention was also taking place in the other States one by one. We will shortly review happenings in Kedah, Selangor, and Pahang in the latter part of the nineteenth century in so far as they relate directly to the Chinese.

Little is heard of the Chinese in Kedah during the centuries, but it is clear that Chinese settling in Province Wellesley must have

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[579] spilled over into Kedah from an early date. The riots which took place in Kedah in February 1876 between Ghee Hins and Toh 175 Peh Kongs, just when the Sultan of Kedah had completed arrangements for the deposed Sultan Ismail of Perak, taking refuge there, to give himself up to the British, are attributed by Wynne to the interest of the Ghee Hin in his escape. The Chinese in Province Wellesley threatened at the time to join in the disturbances.[1]

In Selangor a civil war over a disputed succession led to British 175 intervention. Sultan Mohammed had died in 1857 and Sultan 724 Samat succeeded to the throne on a disputed title in 1860. Civil war ensued and to the horrors of internal strife was added that of piracy. Chinese as well as Malay pirates were concerned. Raja [642] Ya'akob, the third son of the Sultan, who had now more or less established his rule, was behind much of the piracy carried on by his followers and for his benefit. British intervention followed, and the Sultan was glad enough to accept the appointment of a British Resident. (One item in Selangor's earliest budget was $300,000 owed to a Malacca merchant for munitions of war!)

175 One of the headmen of the Hai San between 1864 and 1884 was the well-known Yap Tek Loy, a Hakka, who became Kapitan 575 China of Selangor during this same period. In 1884 the acting British Resident referred to Yap Tek Loy as 'the recognized head of the Chinese in Selangor who on this, as on all other occasions, cordially co-operated with the Police in maintaining order in the State'! Actually Yap Tek Loy, being a Tokong headman, was supporting the authorities to the extent of keeping out the Triad influence, which since its collapse in 1880 had been seeking fresh fields of development farther south!

With the progress towards direct government and the blows against the power of the secret societies, the captains became an anachronism. They had, we have seen, already disappeared long ago in the Straits Settlements. In 1901, with the death of the Kapitan China of Perak, Cheang (or Chang) Keng Kwee, who had been an original member of the Perak State Council in 1877, the appointment lapsed.[2]

[1] It must be remembered that Kedah did not come under British protection until 1909 when the suzerainty over the State was transferred from Siam to the British by the Treaty of Bangkok.

[2] G.B., Colonial Office, *Annual Report for the Federated Malay States, 1901*, Cmd. 1297 (1902). But in spite of the official evidence it appears (from information supplied to me by Mr W. L. Blythe) that the appointment was not abolished

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In 1888 Pahang had a population of 50,000 Malays and a few hundred Chinese.[1] The majority of the latter were employed in the tin-mines at Bentong. The Sultan of Pahang, Ahmad, had given large tracts on the Lipis to Europeans, Arabs, Chinese, and Malays without regard to the local chiefs and the small Chinese who had spent $30,000 on prospecting and the small Malays whose gold was taken without compensation. The arbitrary and inefficient rule and prevailing anarchy made the situation ripe for British intervention. The immediate occasion for this arose in February 1888 when a Chinese British subject, Go Hin, was stabbed outside the palace, clearly by the Sultan's orders. The British Government demanded compensation or that the Sultan should accept a British Resident. The Sultan asked for a British Resident to be appointed. In October 1888 J. P. Rodger was appointed as the first British Resident and found himself confronted with the same difficulties that confronted Birch in Perak in 1875. It was years before the Residential system began to work smoothly in the State.

While the field of high politics was monopolized by dynastic wars, and the main forces behind the scenes were the secret societies, wriad and Tokong, Ghee Hin or Hai San, the mass of the Chinese, though they might be members of these organizations, were peacefully occupied in their labour of development. Their progress in opening up the country is readily traceable in the annual reports of the States and of the Federation (since 1896). For example, in 1891 the *Perak Annual Report*[2] states that in Kuala Kangsar a Chinese had tried the experiment of planting rice by Chinese labour and the result was so encouraging that he was formulating a scheme for importing Chinese agriculturists on a large scale. The pepper industry was fairly established in the hands of Malays and Chinese as the result of Government encouragement. Sugar was grown for export by Chinese in Krian. Alluvial tin-mining was still practically in the hands of Chinese, though four or five European and Australian companies had done very well, principally on the

at that time, but remained without a holder until 1921 when Chung Thye Pin was appointed, and was installed by the Sultan of Perak at Kuala Kangsar. After his death no one else was appointed.

[1] Swettenham, op. cit. p. 270.

[2] *Straits Settlements Annual Reports. Annual Report by the Acting British Resident of Perak* (1891) p. 367. The cultivation of rice by Chinese, however, came to nothing owing to the policy of Malay Land Reservations which meant that the good rice-growing land was largely reserved for Malays.

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'tribute' system (i.e. their land was worked by Chinese who paid them a percentage of their output). In 1893 great developments were reported in Kinta. 'The advancement', says the *Perak Annual Report* for that year, 'was almost incredible.' Ten years before it was 'little more than a vast stretch of jungle, unapproachable except by a shallow and rapid river, and possessing not a single mile of first-class road nor a village of any importance'.[1] By 1897 the population of Perak was estimated at 215,000 of whom 100,000 were Malays and 90,000 Chinese.

The record for the other States was different only in scale, not in proportion. The tin industry was expanding; the rubber industry was in process of creation. The revenues of the Federation (which had been formed in 1896 to include Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang) were increasing by leaps and bounds, and were being applied to roads and railways, public buildings, and health measures. Modern Malaya was coming into being.

[1] *Straits Settlements Annual Reports. Annual Report by the British Resident of Perak* (1893) p. 410.

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CHAPTER XXIX

CHINESE SOCIAL LIFE AND EDUCATION IN MALAYA

THE British administrators of the Straits Settlements in the early days were, by and large, interested in the immigrants as traders, artisans, and labourers and were not greatly concerned with their social behaviour so long as they did not interfere with the authorities or with the other communities. They appointed headmen for the Chinese, Chooliahs (Tamils), Bugis, &c., who had powers to deal with minor offences and disputes, and they farmed out the collection of taxes to the highest bidder. The communities were only too pleased to accept this arrangement as it guaranteed them the maximum of freedom to live their own lives with the maximum of protection under the aegis of the British. 175 642

When Penang was founded no system of law existed, and Francis Light and his successors were compelled to act according to the dictates of their consciences. In 1800 Sir George Leith, the Lieutenant-Governor, was instructed to frame regulations that were to be in principle 'the laws of the different peoples and tribes of which the inhabitants consist, tempered by such parts of the British law as are of universal application being founded on the principles of natural justice'. He made no progress towards carrying out these grandiose and impracticable instructions and it was not until 1807 that a Charter of Justice was granted to Penang which introduced English law as it then existed, subject to certain modifications for the native inhabitants, as will be explained below. The law was subsequently modified or added to by statute law. When, however, the Malay States were one by one brought under British protection, the English common law was not introduced. In these States the Indian law was frequently copied (e.g. the Penal Code, the Contract Enactment, &c.). 175 671

The establishment of the Recorder's Court in Penang in 1807 did away with indirect rule through the native Captains, but in Singapore from its foundation in 1819 until the Charter was extended to it in 1826, justice was administered through the headmen (the 'Kapitan China' in the case of the Chinese). In the Malay States the 'Captain' system was continued into the present century,, 175 692 622

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but in its later stages the title became more and more honorary and was finally abolished.[1]

In explaining the first Charter of law, Sir Edmund Stanley, the first Penang Recorder, stated that 'it secures to all native subjects the free exercise of their religion, indulges them in all their prejudices, and pays the most scrupulous attention to their ancient customs, usages, and habits'. The operation of the Charter was, however, soon held not to be unlimited and could not be construed as giving to all inhabitants of the Colony the full benefit of their own laws, religion, and customs. In *Regina* v. *Willans* (1858), Sir Benson Maxwell delivered a judgement of which Dr Withers Payne says:

> This judgment lays down the rules that first the Charters have not in any respect modified the law of England by any exceptional adaptation of it to the religion and usages of the East; and secondly, that such native law as had up to 1858 been recognized in this Colony, had been so recognized not because any of the Charters demands an exceptionally indulgent treatment of such matters but simply because of the general principles of the Law of England.[2]

In the course of a later judgement of 1869 Sir Benson Maxwell, C.J., said:

> In this Colony so much of the law of England as was in existence when it was imported here, and is of general (and not merely local) policy and adapted to the condition and wants of the inhabitants, is the law of the land: and further, that law is subject, in its application to the various alien races established here, to such modifications as are necessary to prevent it from operating unjustly and oppressively on them.[3]

In short, the law of the Straits Settlements was English law modified where necessary by native custom, not the reverse.

An instance of Chinese custom being followed and not English law occurred in 1843 when it was decided that adopted children of a Chinese were entitled to the joint administration of his estate in preference to his nephew. Polygamy was held to be a Chinese institution in a number of cases (the leading one, well known as

[1] For the legal history of the Straits Settlements see Roland Braddell, *The Law of the Straits Settlements, a Commentary*, 2nd ed. (Singapore, Kelly & Walsh, 1931) pp. 80–1 and passim, and C. H. Withers Payne, LL.D., *The Law of Administration of Succession to Estates in the Straits Settlements* (Singapore Printers, 1932) pp. 12–14 and passim.

[2] Withers Payne, op. cit. p. 12.

[3] 1 Kyshe, 216, 221 (cf. Withers Payne, op. cit. p. 8, note (3)).

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the 'Six Widows Case', was in 1908),[1] and in 1867 it was decided 177
that a secondary wife was entitled to a share of the intestate's property. On the other hand, Chinese custom was departed from in a 671
number of instances. In 1868 administration was refused by the 428
court to the adopted daughter of a Chinese, and since that year
until the present time adopted children have not been recognized 58
by the court as entitled to administration or to a share of the estate. Although (says Braddell) by Chinese law and custom adopted children are legitimate and find a most important place in the structure of Chinese family law, in the Colony this is entirely denied to them as the judges felt themselves bound to hold that 'child' in the Statute of Distribution can only mean a child begotten of the body.[2]

The Chinese at least would have retained a virtual *imperium in imperio* for longer had it not been for certain shortcomings of their 175
social system which, when transported overseas, were forced on the 656
attention of their rulers. One of the symptoms of this was the civil 579
disturbance caused by collisions between rival secret societies which
led to riot and bloodshed; another was the disorder and abuse 525
traceable to the Chinese addiction to gambling. The latter received much earlier attention from the authorities because its evils were more obvious, and it was only at long last that any effective notice was taken of the activities of the secret societies.

[1] The Court of Appeal held that all the widows of a Chinese were entitled to share under the Statute of Distribution.

[2] op. cit. p. 88.

I am indebted to Mr J. V. Mills (formerly a judge in Malaya) for the following table of additional cases.

Chinese law and custom followed:

(*a*) Marriage conferred no marital rights on the husband as regards the wife's property. (Withers Payne, pp. 25–7.)

(*b*) A natural child is legitimated by a subsequent legal union of the parents. *Choo Eng Choon* (1911), 12 S.S.L.R. 120, 124.

(*c*) All widows divide equally the one-third share given by the Statute of Distribution. *Choo Eng Choon* (1911), 12 S.S.L.R. 120.

(*d*) Children legitimated *per subsequens matrimonium* divide equally the two-thirds share given by the Statute of Distribution. *Choo Eng Choon* (1911), 12 S.S.L.R. 120.

English law followed:

(*a*) The court declined jurisdiction in (polygamous) matrimonial causes (divorce, &c.). *Meyer* v. *Meyer*, (1927) S.S.L.R. 14.

(*b*) The court refused to recognize legitimation of a natural child by recognition. *Khoo Hooi Leong* v. *Khoo Chong Yeok*, (1930) A.C. 346, 356.

(*c*) Females held to have equal rights of succession with males. *Lee Joo Neo* v. *Lee Eng Swee* (1887), 4 Kyshe 325.

As most of the Malayan Chinese have a Chinese domicile, the law of China has frequently been applied in a determination of their rights and obligations.

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The societies of Malaya are all generally believed to be offshoots of the Thian Ti Hui (the Heaven and Earth League), otherwise known as the Hung (Flood) League.[1] The Hung League was known to itself under the names given above, and also as the Sam Hup (or Three Unities League) or Triad Society.[2] In China they were originally religious or benevolent 'self help' associations, which assumed a political or anti-dynastic character at the time of the Manchu conquest, and later degenerated into organizations of criminals for exploiting and intimidating the community. Their rivalries, especially regarding control and limits of the 'protection areas' into which they parcelled towns and districts, brought them into collision.

Europeans have made a distinction between the *huis* (as the secret societies were called) and the Kongsis, or district or clan associations, labelling the former as secret and subversive, and the latter as open and beneficial. In Chinese usage, however, Kongsi (as Mr Blythe has pointed out) includes *hui*, and no distinction is made between good and bad. In fact, it is likely that the district and clan associations were as much involved in the early disturbances as the *huis*, and it was only when the society legislation towards the end of the century began to separate the sheep from the goats, allowing the registration of the 'beneficial' Kongsis, and making the rest illegal, that this distinction was made, and even then only by Europeans.[3]

[1] Wynne's contention, however, is that the second of the large rival groups into which the secret societies were divided in Malaya was an offshoot, not of the Thian Ti Hui, but of the Han League ('Triad and Tabut', unpublished).

[2] For a fuller treatment of Malayan Chinese secret societies and their activities, see Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, chap. viii.

[3] There has for a long time been a great deal of confusion over this matter—a confusion shared by the author when he wrote the chapter on secret societies in *The Chinese in Malaya*. The above, however, is the opinion to which he now inclines. Certainly since the registration laws were passed the 'beneficial' societies have been encouraged to come into the open and those which have operated underground have invariably been criminal or semi-criminal in nature. All Chinese social organization was necessarily 'secret' whilst it was not recognized or was banned by the Government. The Chinese municipal organizations in Borneo, the Kongsis, were, and are, referred to as 'secret' societies, as are all Chinese political organizations in Siam where they are illegal.

The whole subject calls for a thorough review and for the reconsideration of the terms used. (Perhaps Dr Tien's study in Sarawak will illuminate the situation, see p. 433.) Mr Maurice Freedman is also conducting researches in the field of social anthropology in Malaya. Professor Firth calls attention to the need for further investigation of the Chinese family and Chinese associations a:

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Such was the complexity and the secrecy and intricacy of Triad ritual that not enough was known about it to enable the authorities to set about curbing the League's activities until after the publication of Schlegel's epoch-making work in English at Batavia in 1866. Based on documents seized by the Dutch police, this threw a wealth of light on the Triad Society and is still the standard authority.[1]

As early as 1799 the Kongsis or the *huis* (as the case might be) set the administration in Penang at defiance: in 1825 they actually plotted an insurrection in league with the Siamese to overthrow the Government; in 1826 Newbold notes the Triad Society in Malacca as being 4,000 strong; in Singapore the Triad was certainly established before 1825, and about 1840 the Ghee Hin was strongly suspected of executing the most daring robberies and murders, particularly at Singapore where a large body resided among the jungle and fastnesses in the interior of the island. It was, like the Triad at Malacca, composed almost entirely of Cantonese and there was bad blood between it and the Hokkien society lately established.

The list of riots and other violent interferences with the normal life of the community is a very long one, and some of the incidents have been recorded in the two preceding chapters. They culminated in a series of outbreaks at various periods. The establishment of the Chinese Protectorate in 1877 marked a stage towards an understanding of the problem, for hitherto there had been no officials with an adequate knowledge of the Chinese language.[2] After many abortive attempts to legislate for the situation, the Societies Ordinance was passed in 1889 and came into force on 1 January 1890. The principal provision of this law was that a society of any sort was illegal until it had applied for and had been accepted for registration. Power was given to the Governor-in-Council to order the dissolution of any society. This law did not by any means effect the extinction of the *huis*—they continued to operate underground in a restricted way—but it did mean that powers now existed for dealing with them. China-born Chinese

p. 28–9 of his report on *Social Science Research in Malaya* (Singapore, Government Printing Office, 1948).

[1] Gustav Schlegel, *Thian Ti Huui or Heaven-Earth-League. A Secret Society with the Chinese in China and India* (Batavia, Lange, 1866). See also J. S. M. Ward and W. G. Stirling, *The Hung Society* (London, Baskerville Press, 1925).

[2] Schlegel, op. cit. p. 11, quotes Oliphant, *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan*, i. 20, as saying that at this period there were 70,000 Chinese in Singapore and not a single European understood their language.

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assisting in the management of illegal societies were banished, and deportation to their native land, curiously enough, was something they feared next to death.[1]

It is convenient here to end the reference to the *huis*, for whilst they lingered on into the twentieth century their importance was eventually entirely overshadowed by that of the political associations.

Another specifically Chinese problem in Malaya was the traffic in women and girls. The preponderance of men over women among the Chinese produced a very unbalanced community and this led to the importation of women and girls to be prostitutes.

The policy pursued with regard to the problem of an incoming traffic in Chinese women may be divided into three periods. During the first period up to 1927 brothels were allowed throughout Malaya and Chinese girls were permitted to enter the ports of the Straits Settlements for the purpose of becoming inmates of these (providing that they did so of their own free will; the duty of the Chinese Protectorate was to prevent the *traffic* in women and girls); during the second period from 1927 to 1930 brothels continued to be allowed but no avowed prostitutes were allowed to enter the country; the third period began in 1930, after which brothels were not allowed in the Straits Settlements or the Malay States, nor were avowed prostitutes allowed to enter the Peninsula.

Upon the closing of the brothels the exploiters turned to various other expedients for profiting by the girls. These expedients taxed the ingenuity of the Protectorate and of the police to counter them. On the arrival of each vessel from China all women and girls on board were taken to a depot where they were examined by Protectorate officials. Those whose bona fides were established were immediately released; if there was any doubt the person into whose charge the girl was going could be required to enter into a bond that she would not be disposed of to others or trained or used for the purposes of prostitution. In cases where there was reason to believe that the girl was the victim of traffic, she was committed to an institution known as the Po Leung Kuk by the Protector. Here she would remain until provision could be made for her welfare or she reached the age of eighteen years. Many girls were placed

[1] The imperial authorities in China were indeed, it is said, in the habit of executing persons so deported as undesirables. If this were true then the dislike of banishment was more understandable.

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in the home as the result of raids of Protectorate officers on 548
'sly' brothels, together with others who had been the victims of 656
cruelty.

Many girls were married off to Chinese men who applied to the 583
Protectorate for a wife.

Besides the girls arriving from China who were placed in the 855
Po Leung Kuk for protection there were some cases of *mui tsai* who
had been ill treated. The term *mui tsai* was applied to a girl who 593
had been transferred from her own family, either directly or
through a third party, to another family with the intention that she 357
should be used as a domestic servant, not in receipt of regular
wages, and not at liberty to leave her employer's family of her own 656
free will or that of her parents. In fact, a 'slave girl'—though the
term is too strong. The system was a by-product of conditions in
China where so many families lived on the verge of starvation,
where infanticide was common, and the disposal of a girl as a *mui tsai* was often the only way of saving her from death. The lot of a *mui tsai* was rarely a happy one though her employer had some definite obligations towards her, including that of marrying her off when she reached marriageable age.

In 1936 a Commission was appointed to report on *mui tsai* and 656
in January 1937 it had submitted a Majority and a Minority
Report.[1] It was the Minority Report (by Miss E. Picton Turbevill, 855
O.B.E.) that was adopted by the British Government together with
some recommendations of the Majority Report. The former included the abolition of the status of *mui tsai*.

Among the problems arising among the Chinese in Malaya 276
should be mentioned that of opium, but since it is one common to
all the Chinese communities of Southeast Asia it has been made 655
the subject of notice in Chapter IV of this Survey. All that
need be stated here is that in 1907 a Commission on opium was appointed which made its report the following year, that at midnight on 31 December 1909 the opium farms in Singapore, Penang, and Malacca suspended business and the Government Monopolies Department entered into possession of the premises and reopened them for business as usual the following day; that a policy of gradual suppression of opium-smoking was followed for many years, and that His Majesty's Government on 10 November 1943

[1] G.B., Colonial Office, *Report of the Commission on Mui Tsai in Hongkong and Malaya* (Colonial no. 125, 1937).

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206 adopted a policy of total prohibition of opium-smoking in British
655 and British-protected territories in the Far East then in enemy occupation.[1]

871 The phenomenal growth of Chinese education during the twenty-five years previous to the First World War brought the
178 bulk of the Malayan Chinese within the sphere of influence of the educational movement which started with the revolution in China, and its importance is primarily political rather than cultural.

In 1938 there was a total of 268,007 pupils of all races attending educational institutions of all kinds in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States alone.[2] Of these 204,040 were in institutions maintained or aided by Government funds. Of the latter, 18,522 Chinese boys and 8,452 Chinese girls were in Government and aided English schools; 34,813 boys and 14,458 girls were in aided Chinese schools. The total number of Chinese children in all Chinese schools in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay
[191] States was 91,534 (66,645 boys and 24,889 girls). That is to say that the number of Chinese children attending schools in which Chinese was the medium of instruction far exceeded that of the Chinese children attending schools in which English was the medium.

Including vocational schools, Government and private (1,214 boys and 165 girls), it is estimated that altogether 94,619 boys and 36,347 girls of Chinese race (total 130,966) were receiving an
[212] education of some kind in 1938. This gives a percentage literacy of total population of 44 per cent. male and 10·7 per cent. female (based on the 1931 census figures; the 'general literacy' rates per mille from the 1947 census are given on p. 273).

873 Raffles had in mind an enlightened and far-reaching scheme when in 1823 he set aside a piece of ground for the Singapore
185 Institution and provided an endowment for it. He meant to found a college with 'literary and moral' departments for Chinese, Malays, and Siamese, and with a scientific department attached to the English section but common to all. His intention (so far as we can

[1] See p. 3, *Report of the Opium Commission* (Singapore, 1908). Vols. i and iii were published as Cmd. 4321 and Cmd. 4322 (1909).

[2] Figures for the Unfederated Malay States are incomplete, so those for the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States alone are given here.

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divine it) was to make Singapore a centre for scholarship in these three Eastern languages, with the idea, perhaps, that the cultural creativeness of the three departments would overflow into the others, and that they should have a common ground in English and in science for which English was the natural medium. 873 185

As it turned out, Raffles's scheme came to nothing. His grant was applied in 1827 to elementary schools, and later in 1837 a school was founded with English, Malay, and Chinese classes—the Malay and Chinese failed through the apathy of the pupils, and only the English remained. The school became known as the Raffles Institution. Not until the foundation of the King Edward VII College of Medicine in 1910 did Singapore have any institution of collegiate standing, and it was not until 1928 that Raffles College came into being.

Meanwhile the various races of Malaya, with the active help of the Christian missionaries, were doing their best to educate their children according to their own lights and resources. A select committee of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements, appointed in 1870 to inquire into local education, found a great variety and number of schools in the Colony, some purely educational, others combining charity with education, many under the control of the Roman Catholic clergy, but all, apparently, having a system of their own, unchecked, as a rule, by Government supervision. 871 797

The several Malay Governments took an increasing share in the provision of schools and the control of education. In the 1930s education in English was provided in a number of Government schools and schools conducted by missionary bodies which received grants-in-aid from the Government and were subject to inspection and control. Usually fees were charged, albeit small ones, and there was no approach to free universal education in English. The curriculum led through secondary education for those who could afford it and could profit by it to the Cambridge Examinations and usually to clerical employment in Government service or in private firms. The lucky few were able to proceed to the professions, either through the College of Medicine or Raffles College, or through some university outside Malaya. There were numerous scholarships open to children attending English schools. 871 [797] 658

In the Malay States primary education in Malay was free for all

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871 Malay boys and girls, and compulsory for all boys living within a
658 mile and a half of a Malay vernacular school. Estates employing over a certain number of Tamil labourers had to maintain a school and give free vernacular education to the children of Tamil labourers working on the estate. There were no such facilities for Chinese.

874 The popularity of education in English led to an over-emphasis
658 on literary education and the production of more clerks than employers could absorb. The Government therefore concentrated more and more on technical and vocational training. Technical and agricultural colleges were established and also trade schools in which a boy could learn any trade from tailoring and book-keeping to plumbing and electric welding.

871 Meanwhile the system of English education did not touch the
186 bulk of the Chinese. The fees, though small, and representing only a fraction of the cost to the Government of the pupil, were prohibitive to the great majority, and, quite apart from the question of expense, the migratory nature of such a great proportion of the population meant that many Chinese children arrived in Malaya too old to be received into the English schools. There was also a widespread feeling that English education led only to the 'white-collared' occupations which were already over-crowded. Independent of this was the sentiment which so many Chinese had in favour of education in their own language, a sentiment greatly reinforced by the nationalism fostered by the revolution.

871 By the beginning of the thirties the Malayan Governments were
658 fully aware that the Chinese vernacular schools were claiming the great proportion of Chinese boys and girls at school, and that
186 unless something was done to provide a counter-attraction the Chinese population of Malaya, even including many of the *Baba* families, would irrevocably be drawn within the sphere of Chinese nationalism and would tend to look, not to Malaya as their country, but to China. Such a happening would vitiate the whole declared official policy which was to create a Malayan spirit and sense of common nationality as the prerequisite for self-government within the British Commonwealth of Nations. The proposal of one Governor was to give to all races in Malaya free education in Malay which was to be made the common language of the country, but this was obviously unacceptable to the Chinese, let alone the other non-Malay communities, for Malay education would have led them

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nowhere in this modern world. It was then proposed that there should be universal free education in English. But nothing was done, and the Chinese community was surrendered to Chinese nationalism and, in effect, to Communism, for this was more and more disseminated through the influence of poorly paid (and therefore leftist) teachers, so many of whom were employed in the Chinese vernacular schools. 871 658 186

The Chinese in Malaya had always done their best to educate their children, but facilities were few and teachers hard to come by. The schools were originally, of course, of the Old Style in which the Four Books were learned by rote. The teacher, as likely as not, combined his profession with that of fortune-teller, or geomantic diviner, and general learned odd man of the village, and any man who could read and write fluently was considered as fully qualified to teach. The schools themselves had to be seen to be believed. Most of them were dirty, ill-ventilated, and ill-lighted basements, out-houses, or attics: the sanitation was non-existent; skin diseases were common among the pupils; the hubbub of pupils 'backing' their lessons was deafening to any European who came within range. 871 872 875 876 346

It was in Malaya that the Chinese Revolution of 1911 found some of its principal supporters, and it was natural that the new zeal for education which was born with the Revolution should be shared by the Malayan Chinese. After 1917 when the National Language movement started in China, *Kuo yü* was adopted as the medium of instruction in all public schools.[1] It was only in the private schools that the Old System was retained.[2] 186

While the Governments were preoccupied with education in English or Malay, the Chinese schools were left for some time to their own devices, but in 1920 onwards were brought under Government supervision and inspection. 871

Chinese schools in Malaya fell into the three following categories:

1. Those managed by properly constituted committees. (These might be run by district or surname associations or by Chinese families in a certain town or district.)

[1] See p. 180 for general references to Chinese education.

[2] The number of Old System schools and pupils in the Federated Malay States and Straits Settlements in 1931 was 120 and 2,539: in 1938 the figures were 158 and 4,646 respectively.

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2. Pseudo-public schools, i.e. schools organized by one or more teachers who chose their own 'committee members', i.e. shopkeepers, &c., who had been persuaded to lend their names, the principal teacher running the school to make what he could out of it.
3. Private schools run by teachers who relied on school fees, these schools being usually small and old in type. There were several *ping min* or free schools at which a nominal fee of 50 cents (1*s.* 2*d.*) a month was charged. The fees in the other schools were round about 3 dollars a month.

The main motive of the authorities in bringing the Chinese schools under inspection was admittedly political, but once the inspectorate staff was created and had got going with their work it became clear that political control brought with it some very definite educational responsibilities. In no way were the Chinese schools abreast of the English schools: their methods of instruction, their premises, their sanitation were all inferior to those of their English-speaking contemporaries. This was scarcely to be wondered at when it is remembered that the latter benefited from a system built up in more than fifty years of experience, enforced by a trained staff and supported, or aided, from Government revenue.

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When a system of Government grants-in-aid was introduced for Chinese schools it was not at first received with any great enthusiasm. The teachers felt that their liberty to teach what they liked and how they liked was being encroached on and their influence for long was enough to prevent many school committees from applying for these grants. However, the pressure of economic circumstances (including the trade depression of 1930–2) brought about a change in attitude and most schools eligible for them applied for and received grants. They soon found the advantages of so doing, for the money made it possible to carry on the schools without debt, the good offices of the medical and health authorities and the municipalities and Sanitary Boards were ensured, and the teaching staff benefited from the advice of the inspectors of schools who held qualifications equal, if not superior, to those of any of the Chinese teachers. Light, ventilation, health measures of all sorts, and precautions against fire received an attention they had never had in the past.

In 1938 $341,369 was paid in grants to Chinese schools in the

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Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States. The Unfederated Malay States had no system of grants-in-aid to Chinese schools. The State Governments recognized no responsibility in this regard. Thus, those Chinese who wished to have their children educated in their own language had to maintain their own schools. In Johore alone in 1938 there were 245 Chinese schools with 14,423 pupils.[1]

One problem for the authorities was the subversive teaching of the pupils orally, and another was text-books. Some schools were not educational institutions at all, merely centres of Communist propaganda, especially the Hailam night-schools for adults, where Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other Communist authors were studied by pupils who had not enough general education to understand anything except the message of opposition to the local Government.

Text-books were an almost insoluble problem. Those used in the Chinese schools in Malaya were all printed in China. The two principal firms publishing them were the Commercial Press and the Chung Hua Press, both of Shanghai. After 1925 a great deal of anti-foreign material was introduced into them, intended in particular to stir up hatred of the British. (For example, a drawing in a text-book intended for children of about twelve years of age showed the 'May 30th Incident' at Shanghai in 1925 with British and Sikh policemen in uniform shooting down an unarmed crowd. In the history books much play was made with the 'Opium War'.) That the Chinese school children of Malaya should have race-hatred instilled into them in this manner could not, of course, be tolerated by the Government. The use of these text-books containing seditious matter or matter calculated to incite interracial hatred was forbidden, and the import of such books was prohibited. The outcome of this action was that the two principal Chinese publishing firms each produced a series free from objectionable matter and these were used in Malayan schools.

The solution, however, was a purely negative one. The text-books were about China exclusively: there was no mention in them of Malaya's history, geography, trade, commerce, its mixed population, or interests. It had been found impracticable to produce a series of text-books locally for use in Malayan Chinese schools, though there was an obvious need for one.

[1] But see p. 338 for the astonishing post-war increase in school population.

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871 Concurrently with these difficulties the Malayan Governments had to meet the increasing interest of the National Government of
648 China in the education of overseas Chinese. Applying the Chinese law of nationality, the Chinese Government naturally regarded all
186 Chinese overseas, including the Straits-born Chinese who were British subjects, as a proper object for their official solicitude. The Overseas Affairs Department (later Ministry) wished to bring the education of the children of overseas Chinese into line with home policy. The Chinese Government sent representatives to inspect the schools, requested that returns should be submitted to Nanking, and even instituted a system of grants-in-aid of their own for overseas Chinese schools. Such an attitude could not be viewed by the Malayan Governments with complacency while they regarded so many Chinese attending the schools as British subjects. Nor was it purely a matter of concern to the Malayan Governments. Many of the Chinese who had been born in Malaya, or who regarded Malaya as their home, were jealous of the pretensions of a remote Government in China to concern itself with what they regarded as a purely domestic matter. In race and sympathy they might be Chinese: politically they regarded themselves as Malayans.

871 Altogether the Malayan educational system was not promising to those who hoped for the achievement of a 'Malayan outlook'. The experience of educationists was in favour of educating a child in its own language before allowing it to learn another, but even so it was certain that if there were ever to be any progress towards the creation of a Malayan nation there must first be a move to unify the diverse and conflicting educational systems operating in the country.

871 The years following the Second World War were marked by a really astonishing increase in school population. It seemed as if the
727 Malaysian peoples, made aware by the Japanese occupation of what the absence of education really meant, had decided to make a determined drive to get their children educated. In the Federation enrolment at the end of 1948 stood at 510,000; in December 1941 the figure had been 263,000. In Singapore the figure was 101,000 as compared with 72,000 in 1941 and the former figure did not include about 15,000 in unregistered schools. There is nothing to show what proportions of the increase were Chinese children, but the author would hazard a guess that it was largely accounted for

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by the increased attendance in Chinese vernacular schools paid for in the main by the Chinese community.[1, 2]

871
727

[1] G.B., Colonial Office, *British Dependencies in the Far East, 1945–9*, Cmd. 7709 (1949) p. 42.

[2] The Communities Liaison Committee (with Malay, Chinese, Indian, Ceylonese, and British representatives) on 19 September 1949 passed a resolution that 'every encouragement should be given to the establishment of a steadily increasing number of Government and Government-aided schools where children of all races attend together and the medium of instruction is Malay and English. *As such schools increase communal schools should be progressively reduced.*' *The Times*, 20 September 1949. (The italics are mine, V.P.)

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CHAPTER XXX

THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF THE MALAYAN CHINESE

454 ONE aspect of the share of the Chinese in local industry is the value of their investment and the returns derived from it; the other is the number of Chinese in the labour force of the industry.

Regarding the former only scanty information is available. It is, for example, impossible from existing records to discover with exactness the comparative extent of British, Chinese, and other investments in the basic industries of tin and rubber. However, an attempt has been made by an economist, Mr Helmut G. Callis, to estimate the extent of Chinese holdings in all undertakings in Malaya as they were before the Japanese invasion. In 1937 he estimated that the total Chinese investments in Malaya approximated to U.S. $200 million (approximately £40 million) as compared with other foreign investments of $454·5 million (approximately £90·9 million). The other foreign investments Mr Callis divides into rentier, $82·5 million, and entrepreneur, $372 million, slightly over 70 per cent. of the entrepreneur investment being British.[1]

[457] Chinese family remittances from Singapore and the Federation in 1948 totalled SS $15,422,846. This was a decrease of SS $7,522,287 compared with SS $22,945,133 in 1947. Of the total remittances to China from Malaya in 1948 Singapore accounted for SS $10,228,101 and the Federation for SS $5,194,745.[2]

316 464 Tin was the product of the Malay Peninsula in which the Chinese were mainly interested from the time of their earliest trading contacts. It is likely that they did in some instances superintend the mining of it, and Chinese may have been employed in certain undertakings, but the labour up to the nineteenth century was principally Malay. Towards the end of the eighteenth century the annual output in Perak was estimated at 5,000 piculs (16·8 piculs = 1 ton). The bulk of this tin was mined by Malays in Kinta and Batang Padang.[3] Newbold, as we have seen in a previous

[1] *Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia* (mimeograph) (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942). [2] *Straits Budget* (3 March 1949).

[3] For an account of Chinese mining see A. G. Macdonald and E. S. Willbourn, *Mining in Malaya*, revised ed. (London, Malayan Information Agency, 1940).

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chapter, gives an estimate of the number of Chinese in the various mining areas in the 1830s, but it was not until the discovery of the rich deposits in Larut in the fifties that Chinese miners flocked to the fields in large numbers. [464] 316

The gradual increase in the use of machinery, combined with an ever-growing efficiency, has enabled deposits to be tackled which owing to depth, poverty of content, or wetness, could not be worked at a profit in the past. Electric power was in 1939 rapidly replacing steam and oil in mines. One result of the developing importance of technology has been that the proportion of ore mined by European methods as against Chinese methods has tended to increase. This rise, however, was arrested after 1931 largely owing to the incidence of the tin scheme.[1] The introduction of the dredge in the first years of this century marked a revolution in the history of the industry. The dredges were owned by European companies, though Chinese and others, of course, were free to invest in the shares of these companies, and did so. 402 316

Mining methods of the second quarter of the twentieth century in Malaya were divided into dredging, gravel-pump, hydraulicizing, open-cast, alluvial shafting, lode mining, and *dulang* or panning. Most popular with the Chinese was the gravel-pump method. In this a pressure-pump was generally used to feed monitors which gave jets of water powerful enough to cut and disintegrate the ground. The broken material was washed along a channel in the bottom clay, and water was lifted by the gravel-pump to the head of a *palong*, or flume, which might be anything from 40 to 120 feet above the sump. The heavy tin ore was held in the *palong* by wooden bars, placed one above the other at intervals across the bottom of the flume; most of the lighter sand and clay passed out of the *palong* with the stream of water to be deposited in the allotted dumping space.

In considering the part played by the Chinese in mining in Malaya we must take care to distinguish between ownership and 316 464

[1] Source: *Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics relating to the Mining Industry in the Federated Malay States* (1939) vol. xi, no. 4, p. 11 (Kuala Lumpur, 1939). The following are figures for selected years:

	European (%)	*Chinese* (%)
1920	36	64
1925	44	56
1930	63	37
1938	67	33

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316 methods, and labour. It is the Chinese who provide the bulk of all
[333] the labour. Thus the enormous excavations in open-cast mines
have been made by them—the old mine at Sungai Besi in Selangor
464 is 3,000 feet long and 1,200 feet wide, with a depth of 125 feet, representing 16 million cubic yards of earth, all cut by hand labour using the *changkol* (a form of hoe). An even larger hole is at the Hong Fatt Mines near by, which is 310 feet deep and from which 30 million cubic yards of earth have been removed.

316 Open-cast mining by hand labour is a purely Chinese method.
462 *Dulang* washing, or panning, is a method employed for obtaining tin ore in many parts of the country. The work is done by Chinese women, usually Hakkas. A shallow wooden dish, about 30 inches in diameter and 3½ inches deep in the centre, is dug into the sand of the sluice or stream bed and a quantity of sand and water is scooped into it. The dish is then subjected to a peculiar motion by which the waste material is washed over the edge and the ore remains. *Dulang* washers are a fairly common sight in Malaya and are a striking reminder of the toughness of the Chinese. The
[854] women are bent double for hours in the heat of the sun, often immersed to the knees in water, and often with a baby strapped to their backs.

316 Other kinds of mining in Malaya depend largely on Chinese
464 labour—coal (at Batu Arang in Selangor), gold (at Raub lode mine and, in a minor way, by alluvial mining), wolfram and scheelite, and the pre-war Japanese iron mines in Trengganu and Johore used Chinese labour.

249 While the Chinese predominated in the tin industry the Indian
464 labourers were much more numerous in rubber growing. Chinese were used for the heavier work of clearing and planting and in the general opening-up operations, and they were also widely employed as tappers and their women as weeders. Their industry was greater than that of the Indians, but they were more difficult to
[465] handle. They were intense individualists and would only work satisfactorily as tappers when they were paid by piece work.

249 There were in the Federated Malay States, 84,342 Chinese men
162 and 16,447 Chinese women employed in the rubber industry in 1931 as compared with a total of 131,099 Indians and 27,618 Malays. In the Unfederated States the figures were 61,374 Chinese and 34,776 Malays, while Indians were not separately enumerated.[1]

[1] Figures from the *Census Report, 1931*.

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A table published in 1932 gives the nationality of ownership of planted rubber estates of 100 acres and over in 1931. It shows that the Chinese in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States owned 12·5 per cent. of the total as compared with 84 per cent. owned by non-Asiatics (including British, French, Belgians, Americans) and 2·3 per cent. owned by Indians.[1] In addition to this, Chinese owned many small-holdings. Small-holdings under rubber in the whole of Malaya accounted for 1,215,522 acres as compared with 1,855,797 acres for estates over 100 acres. The statistics do not show the extent of the Chinese ownership, but since a large proportion of the rubber holdings owned by Malays were rented by them to the Chinese to tap, 'ownership' does not convey very much. The production of the estates over 100 acres in 1931 was 239,435 tons for the whole of Malaya, and of the small-holdings, 195,422 tons.

As estate owners the Chinese had the advantage of smaller overhead costs as compared with the European estates, but the latter were worked on more scientific lines.

Since the war rubber production from small-holdings has just about equalled that from estates, and in a period of falling rubber prices the Chinese rubber owner, particularly the small-holder, is in a favourable position *vis-à-vis* the European estate with its higher costs.

Malaya's important and growing secondary industries were largely in Chinese hands. The pineapple industry, a creation of the 1930s, was entirely a Chinese enterprise. Canned pineapples in 1938 accounted for 1·2 per cent. of Malaya's entire export trade. In Singapore, Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Klang, Ipoh, and elsewhere the Chinese owned oil-mills, biscuit factories, rubber works for the manufacture of shoes, tires, &c., iron foundries, saw-mills, and sauce factories; there were Chinese shipping companies; they ran motor agencies and repair shops; the bulk of the retail trade everywhere was in their hands.

It is generally true to say that the Malays are the peasant proprietors and do most of the rice-growing (small though it may be compared with the consumption of the country) and the policy of Malay land reservation keeps the best rice land for the Malays. In the Federated Malay States in 1931 there were 78,009 Malays (44,421 males and 33,588 females) engaged in paddy planting; the

[1] Source: *Malaya Rubber Statistics Handbook* (Singapore, 1932) p. 15.

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243 464 Indian rice-growers were 1,892 (1,689 males and 203 females); the Chinese were only just over a thousand (1,038—including 77 females). In the Unfederated Malay States the proportions were: 159,861 Malays to 5,888 Chinese, while Indians were not separately enumerated. In the Straits Settlements, where the land under rice was small, there were 2,877 Malay, 84 Indian, and 322 Chinese planters.[1]

226 464 Fishing was comparatively a small industry. In the Straits Settlements there were, in 1931, 9,159 Malay fishermen, 335 Indians, and 6,092 Chinese; in the Federated Malay States, 5,717 Malays, 56 Indians, and 7,291 Chinese; in Johore, 2,552 Malays, no Indians, and 2,257 Chinese; in Kedah and Perlis, 2,185 Malays, no Indians, and 522 Chinese; in Kelantan, 6,601 Malays, no Indians, and 15 Chinese; and in Trengganu, 10,204 Malays, no Indians, and 171 Chinese.

[441] The tendency in many regions of Malaya is for the fresh-fish trade to be in the hands of the Malays and the trade in cured and dried fish to be in the hands of the Chinese. Professor Firth says that the reason for this would seem to be that the handling of the latter commodities, particularly in large-scale export trade, demands distant business connexions, and at some stage the capacity to lay out capital and wait some time before it returns. Malays, Javanese, &c., are not necessarily lacking in these respects, but the Chinese commercial pattern is better adapted to take advantage of the situation. The Chinese *Towkay* advances money, or more often goods such as rice and cloth to the fishermen in the slack season against the security of their coming catches, and he also lends money for the purchase of boats and nets, or he may even lend such equipment without charge. In return he contracts with the fishermen to take their fish at an agreed price, or at a price of his own setting, usually rather below the free-market price.[2] The Chinese have also in recent years extended their participation in the actual fishing.[3]

[1] It has often been remarked in Agricultural Department reports that Chinese rice planters get a much higher yield per acre than other planters.

[2] Raymond Firth, *Malay Fishermen: Their Peasant Economy* (London, Kegan Paul for the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1946) p. 13–14.

For a discussion of the economics of Malay fishermen *vis-à-vis* the Chinese see pp. 59–62, 68–9, and 333–8 of the same work. See also p. 247 of this study.

[3] The author well remembers when he was Protector of Chinese in Kedah in 1938 acting as a referee in a dispute between the Malay and Chinese fishermen

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Labour and Immigration

In the first part of this chapter labour has been considered purely in its statistical aspect: it must now be regarded from a more human angle. 167

Collecting-agents for labourers were employed in China in the second half of the nineteenth century 'whose character', says Morse, 'may be fitly expressed by the word "crimp"'. These men were given a capitation fee for every emigrant they brought to the receiving depot, or 'baracoon', at the port of departure. This fee was at the outset 3 dollars a head (figures of 1853) but no check on malpractices was possible, and in addition they appropriated to themselves, on the score of defraying expenses, the money advanced to the immigrants, which at the outset was 8 dollars each, but might, even officially, have been much more, and, in the competition of forwarding agents, might come to 100 dollars a head. With such rewards dangled before their eyes, the reckless and irresponsible crimps lost no opportunity and adopted every known method to draw their fellow countrymen as far as the entrance door of the baracoon—there their responsibility ended. The pledged emigrant was charged with the head-money paid to the crimp, with the advance made (nominally) to himself, and with the cost of maintenance at the depot. Without payment of this charge the emigrant was not free to leave; and as a single dollar was to him a great sum, he ceased to be a free agent from the moment he entered the doors of the depot.[1] 676

The coolie ships were floating hells. Even the modest space—12 square feet (2 ft. × 6 ft.)—allowed by the Hong Kong Ordinance, was provided only in a few ships, and in general the space was only 8 square feet in slow sailing vessels. The mortality was great: suicides (the Asiatic form of ultimate protest) were common. 'But even the timorous rat', says Morse, 'will turn when cornered, and these timorous coolies not infrequently rose in mutiny against their oppressors.' 505

This is only the beginning of the recital of misery and horror which would fully describe the ordinary experience of Chinese

of the State. The former resented the introduction by the latter of 'Siamese' fishing-traps which were much more efficient than those previously in use along the coast and which reduced the catch of the Malay fishermen.

[1] H. B. Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire* (London, Longmans, 1918) ii. 167–72.

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167 coolies enticed or conscripted for labour in the Nanyang, from the beginning of large-scale emigration until measures undertaken by the several colonial Governments began to have some effect.

167 Raffles, as in many other things in advance of his time, had as early as 1823 published an ordinance in which he made provision 656 for the protection of immigrants to Singapore,[1] but this ordinance 175 apparently dropped out of notice and for many decades there is no mention of supervision or control of Chinese immigration. Official attention seems next to have been called to the abuses of the coolie traffic by a petition in 1871 to the Governor from a number of Chinese merchants and citizens who spoke of the cheating and deceiving of the *sinkheh* (new arrival) by vagabonds who boarded the ships and clandestinely dealt in the coolie trade, spiriting away the *sinkheh* who was never heard of afterwards. This was the start of widespread agitation in which the *Straits Times* joined, but when the Government introduced a Bill, and, in spite of considerable unofficial opposition, passed an ordinance to protect the immigrants, it did not obtain public support. A large public meeting of the same year (1873) passed a resolution 'that the proposed Chinese Coolie Immigration Act is both impolitic and unnecessary: impolitic because it never can accomplish the object that it is designed to secure'.

These were the days of militant *laissez-faire* and the ordinance became a dead letter. It was not until the appointment of Mr Pickering as Protector of Chinese in 1877 and he had made a report revealing the scandalous state of affairs—gangs of men for shipment to Sumatra and the like—that a second Chinese Immigration Ordinance was passed. It provided for the regulation of ships engaged in the immigration trade and for the establishment of depots to receive the immigrants, and it made obligatory the registration of all contracts of labour by Chinese immigrants. Further legislation followed at intervals to remedy the defects in the existing law which experience had revealed.

A Protector of Chinese was appointed for Penang in 1880 and gradually a chain of Protectorates was established through the Peninsula.[2]

[1] Ordinance quoted in *Labour Commission Report* (Singapore, 1891) p. 4.

[2] Pickering interested himself in the welfare of *transit* labour as well as that coming into the Colony and thus incurred the criticism of the Deli (Sumatra) Planters' Committee whose position was stated in *The Deli Chinese Question* (1882).

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In Singapore the Protectorate concentrated upon stopping abuses connected with the importation of labour. The standard of accommodation on both junks and steamers was improved. The coolie had his contract properly explained to him and he was told to whom he should apply for his legal rights. The coolie depots were licensed and supervised and care was taken to stop the kidnapping of labourers, both those who had paid their passage and others, for work up country or even outside Malaya. The number of passengers arriving who paid their own fares steadily increased and the presence of these independent men naturally tended to improve the status of the indentured labourers. Some of the more enlightened employers, such as the Penang Sugar Estates and the contractors from the Tanjong Pagar Dock Company, paid the passages from China of men recruited by their agents and employed them as free labourers. 167 656 466

In the meantime an agreement regarding labour had been made between Britain and China. In addition to other matters, the treaty empowered consuls to watch over the interests of the emigrants. [648]

Indentured labour lasted, so far as the Chinese were concerned, until 1914, when it was abolished.[1] Thereafter the law provided that no engagement to labour for a period exceeding one month and no written contract to labour should be entered into.

The Labour Code as it stood at the time of the Japanese invasion was the product of extensive experience. Its provisions which touched the Chinese were numerous and covered everything from the truck system to health and housing regulations. With it went a body of auxiliary legislation such as the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance of 1933, based on English law. Yet compared with the elaborate provisions for Indian labour, which regarded the Tamil labourer as much in need of paternal care, those to protect the Chinese labourer were very sparse. This was due to the belief that the Chinese, as a race, were well able to look after themselves. The inspection of places of labour—estates, mines, &c.—was carried out by Protectorate and health officers, but the duties of the former consisted mostly in mediation between employer and employed. By the thirties the feeling was growing that more should be done for Chinese labour. To this end Mr W. L. Blythe, of the Malayan civil service, was appointed in 1937 to inquire into the 466 656

[1] This voluntary act on the part of the British Government killed the Penang sugar industry, and should be accounted to the British for altruism.

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466 conditions among Chinese labourers, and in due course he submitted an exhaustive report.[1]

656 The Blythe Report concentrated on rubber estates and tin-mines, but investigations were also conducted in other industries—saw-mills, rubber and match factories, and in some of the shop industries such as carpentry, shoemaking, and polishing. The most striking general impression received was of the noticeable change in the outlook of the bulk of the labourers in the preceding few years. Progress in the emancipation of the Chinese labourer from indentured labour and widespread debt slavery had been greatly accelerated. Provision had been introduced into the Labour Code to deal with these abuses and much of the work of the Chinese Protectorate lay in their eradication. Difficulties occurred in the unwillingness of labourers to complain of 'old established customs' and they were more or less bound by ties to the contractor. Ten years previously the system had begun to disintegrate as labourers became increasingly aware of their rights, and the death-blow was given to it by the introduction of the Aliens Ordinance in the Straits Settlements (1 January 1933).

[167] Under this Aliens Ordinance the Governor-in-Council was given power to limit the number of aliens landed in the colony. The immediate result of this enactment had been a big increase in the cost of recruitment of labour from China and higher shipping rates charged by the shipping companies. Consequently it became much cheaper to recruit labour in Malaya where there was already an adequate supply. During Mr Blythe's tour no insistence on the old system was encountered. Recruitment was taking place from the local lodging-houses where labourers lived when unemployed, and there were some squatters living on vegetable gardens.

Concurrently with the development of free labour in Malaya a growing labour emancipation movement had also been taking place in China. The stronghold of the movement was Kwangtung province from whence the majority of labourers on estates and mines in Malaya were drawn. Labour unions had been established in [467] Malaya which were associated with the town industries, but they had had a 'leavening influence throughout the whole of Chinese labour'.

[1] This report was printed in Malaya, but was not published. See also W. L. Blythe, 'Historical Sketch of Chinese Labour in Malaya', *JRASMB*, vol. xx, pt. 1 (1947) pp. 64–114.

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Amongst other developments a change was brought about in labour conditions by the introduction of cheap Japanese bicycles. Squatters rode to work on them, labourers on the mines and estates used them to ride into the villages for supplies, and there was a continuous interchange between labourers and their fellows in the vicinity. Still another development was the extraordinary increase in the employment of Chinese women on the estates. Whole shiploads of Cantonese women had been arriving during the previous few years in search of work. This spate of female immigration was probably due to the slump in the silk industry in China owing to the widespread use of rayon, and because women were exempt from the Malayan immigration quota. Most of the women employed on estates and mines were imported, and it would appear probable that Chinese labour forces were witnessing a transition from male to family labour. Marketing and cooking were being done by the female and by the contractor. Less opium was being smoked and some mines refused to employ smokers.

There appeared to be more direct contact between the management of European estates and their labour force, although this was far from being general. The proportion of the labourers who could speak Malay was increasing and the system of direct employment was being successfully put into practice to the exclusion of the contractor and to the benefit of the labourer and of these estates.

Wages varied according to local conditions from 48 cents on estates in Perak to as high as $1.27 on the Budu estate (Kuala Lipis Road). Weeders' wages varied from 55 to 80 cents per man employed on the *Kungsz-kung* (daily rates) and from 50 to 60 cents for women. The monthly budget of the average tapper, buying his own food, amounted to $11, without leaving provision for amusements, opium, or remittances to China; rice, pork, and fish came to about 45 per cent. of his expenditure.

When the price of rubber fell, the Chinese labourers expected to be paid at lower rates, but they counted on having higher ones when the price rose.

In mines the rates of wages varied greatly owing to the many different classes of labour, skilled and unskilled, and wages varied from $90 to $100 per month in the case of European companies, and from 86 cents to $1 daily paid by contractors. Employees provided their own food; lodging and lighting were provided by the

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316 company. On open-cast and hydraulic mines rates were lower, but
465 food, lodging, and lighting were, in many classes of labour, provided by the companies. Nominal wages for labourers on lode mines were 70 cents a day for Chinese men, 60 cents for Chinese women, and 40 cents for Chinese youths.

[511] A mining coolie's average monthly budget amounted to $9.70, including the purchase of food.

467 In foundries and engineering shops the workers were better
392 organized than in most industries, and matters relating to wages, conditions of labour, holidays, &c., were usually settled with the
466 fitters' and mechanics' associations. An eight-hour day was universal, with an increased rate for overtime. Wage rates varied considerably, a no. 1 fitter receiving from $2.72 to $2.96 daily and a general labourer 80 cents.

466 The Blythe Report recommended a number of alterations and
676 additions to the Labour Code, including a suggestion of making the principal contractor liable for wages in excess of fourteen days to
[468] the labourers employed on the contract. In 1936 and 1937 there had been a good deal of labour unrest. The sub-contractor system[1] lay at the root of many of these troubles.

722 The outbreak of war in 1939 caused a rise in the cost of living.
466 Wages did not rise in keeping with this increase, though labourers were aware that the profits of the industry had risen too. The result was a number of serious strikes and the discontent was, as
468 always, exploited by the agitator. There had been an excess of labour in 1938 which was employed on relief works, but the war changed the situation. Eventually adjustments of wages were made and the labour situation was comparatively settled for the remaining period before the Japanese invasion.

167 Completely free immigration of all races into Malaya had been allowed up to 1929, but the following year an Immigration Ordinance was brought into force as from August. In 1929, the last year of free immigration, the number of Chinese adult male labourers entering the Colony was 195,613, but in 1930 the number dropped to 151,693, and in 1931 to 49,723. The quota for male immigrants from January to September 1931 was 5,238 a month, and from October to December, 2,500. Emigration from China direct to the

[1] By this the person who had obtained the contract let it out piecemeal to sub-contractors. Quite often sub-contractors who had failed to make a profit defaulted in the payment of wages.

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Federated Malay States was stopped altogether. No restriction was 167
placed on the immigration of women and children.

There were a number of considerations influencing the Govern- 167
ment in its decision to restrict immigration. In 1929 the world trade
depression had started and was most felt in Malaya from 1930 to 464
1932. There was great unemployment, especially among the
Chinese, and the Government repatriated many thousands of them
to China at the cost of some millions of dollars. Repatriation was [746]
entirely voluntary, but the great majority of the unemployed
availed themselves of the concession. It was felt by some that it
was a mistake to get rid of labour which might be required again
before very long and that a scheme of relief work on a large scale
should be undertaken; in 1938, before the war absorbed all surplus
labour, the Federated Malay States Governments did indeed adopt
a relief scheme in place of free repatriation. There were some em-
ployers who thought that there should always be a considerable
surplus of labour in order to keep down wages, but the Government
did not accept this view: it believed that labour should be intro-
duced only in such quantities as could be absorbed by the labour
market.

The Immigration Restriction Ordinance was administered for 167
nearly four years and was then replaced by the Aliens Ordinance on
1 April 1933. From January to July 1932 the quota had been 2,500 656
a month and had been reduced to 1,000 a month from August to
December. The quota was fixed at 1,000 from January to the end
of March 1933, and remained at 1,000 to the end of the year. It
remained at this figure when the proclamation was made under the
Aliens Ordinance.

The restriction of immigrants applied to *all* aliens, but since the
Chinese were most affected the measure was represented in in-
terested quarters in China as discrimination against the Chinese
race. This was not the case, and the considerations were purely
economic.

Under the Aliens Ordinance newly arrived immigrants were 167
issued with landing-permits. Certificates of admission were issued
either in exchange for a landing-permit or on payment of a fee of 656
5 dollars. They were valid for two years and renewable for further 505
periods of two years. Possession of a certificate of admission meant
that the holder was not counted against the quota and could there-
fore obtain a passage from China to Malaya at a rate far less than

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167 that payable for quota passages. With restriction the prices of quota
656 passages had soared, and since the sale of these passages was the
506 monopoly of lodging-houses in China it was beyond the power of the Malayan authorities to deal with the 'racket'.

Illegal landings, in particular from junks full of Hailams which
167 landed their passengers usually on the east coast of Malaya during
464 the northeast monsoon, were attempted, but rarely with success
[687 (those who landed illegally, when apprehended, were returned to
656 China), and the machinery of the new Immigration Department which had been created to administer the Aliens Ordinance worked very satisfactorily. But the intention to restrict immigration on a qualitative as well as a quantitative basis turned out to be impracticable. What was wanted in Malaya were agriculturists and labourers: the persons who could afford to pay high fares were traders and shop assistants of whom Malaya had already a sufficient supply.

167 The improvement in the economic situation in Malaya in the latter part of 1933 was reflected in the immigration figures, when the quota of 1,000 which had not been filled during the first nine months in the year was completely taken up during the last quarter. The tide definitely turned in April 1934 and for the year the excess of arrivals over departures was 142,089, whereas the deficit in 1933 had been 38,449.

From January to April 1934 the quota remained at 1,000 a month, was raised to 2,000 for May and June, to 3,000 for July, and to 4,000 from 1 August to the end of the year. It remained at 4,000 until 1 February 1937 when it was raised to 6,000 a month. It was reduced from 6,000 to 3,000 a month as from 1 January 1938, and again to 500 a month from 1 April, at which figure it remained up to the time of the Japanese occupation of 1942.

467 A suitable footnote to this chapter will be a summary of the facts of the organization of Chinese labour up to the Japanese occupation.

The original associations of Chinese engaged in a trade included both master and man. They were like the medieval guilds of Europe. In the early days in Malaya the various lodges of the Triad Society were not illegal and fulfilled some of the functions elsewhere filled by trade associations. They were large mutual-benefit associations, covering between them the whole of the Chinese population. The trade guilds proper had existed in China from

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ancient times, and were particularly common in Malaya among old-established trades, such as tailoring, shoemaking, carpentry, &c. Each type of guild was governed by a committee composed of employers and employees. Rates of wages, hours of work, holidays and terms of apprenticeship were decided by the guilds. In addition they frequently fulfilled the role of friendly societies, providing funeral benefits for the members and accommodation for unemployed. 467 [456]

Legislation providing for the registration of societies was introduced in the Colony in 1889 and in the Federated Malay States in 1895. The organization of societies specifically for employees did not, generally speaking, take place until the 1920s.

The inspiration of the modern labour movement in Malaya resulted from the development of the movement in China. The first National Labour Conference was held in Canton in 1922. In 1927, when the Kuomintang was purged, the Central Government took action which resulted in the suspension of all labour unions and the cessation of all labour activities until the promulgation of the Labour Union Law in 1929. After that the labour movement in China was under the direct supervision of the Kuomintang.

Political and industrial labour agitation in Malaya became more and more intermingled. After the Double Seventh (7 July 1937) when Japan attacked China, the labour organizations were connected with the Anti-Enemy-Backing-up Society, which took direct action against those dealing in Japanese goods.

The shortcoming of these labour associations, which were registered by Government, was that they had no suitable machinery for collective bargaining. The trade-union legislation, brought into force in 1941, was designed to supply this deficiency. The Japanese invasion interposed itself, and the law was never seen in operation. After the surrender, and under the iron heel of Japanese military government, the free organization of labour ceased entirely. The rule was a simple one—either one worked for the Japanese war effort or one did not eat. [468] [722]

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CHAPTER XXXI

CHINESE POLITICAL SOCIETIES IN MALAYA, 1911–41

668 THE first political society with revolution in China as its object was the Hsing Chung Hui, founded by Dr Sun Yat-sen in 1894 in Honolulu, whither he had come to get assistance for his scheme to overthrow the Manchu dynasty. Dr Sun is believed to have visited Singapore first of all in 1900 (the statement that he was arrested there and deported for five years is not borne out by any official record). From 1900 to 1905 the Hsing Chung Hui was responsible for every armed rising in China. In the latter year it was combined with certain other revolutionary societies under the title of Tung Meng Hui, with Dr Sun as president.

The Singapore branch of the Tung Meng Hui was formed in February 1906. There was already in existence in Singapore a political party known as the Chung Hui Tang which had been formed by Yau Lit, an original member of the Hsing Chung Hui in Hong Kong. Dr Sun returned to Singapore in 1906 and proceeded to form another branch of the Tung Meng Hui in Kuala Lumpur. He failed, however, to do the same in Ipoh because of the opposition of the royalist party (i.e. pro-Manchu). Branches were formed later in Penang, Seremban, Malacca, and Kuala Pilah.

668 204 From 1905 to 1909 Singapore was a rendezvous for political refugees from China, prominent among whom were Sun Yat-sen, Wang Ching-wei, and Hu Han-min. In 1907 a Chinese newspaper, the *Chung Hing Yat Pao*, was started with the object of advocating revolution in China. Other revolutionary papers sprang up and these were constantly at war with papers supporting the royalist (imperial) cause, notably the *Union Times* and the *Yat Pau Press*. [618] Dr Sun Yat-sen contributed many articles to the revolutionary papers and he received a warning from the Protector of Chinese about his attitude to the Manchu Government with which Great Britain was on friendly terms.

668 After an armed rebellion in China in 1908, arranged by Dr Sun, 700 rebels had to retreat to Tongking. Some of these were sent by the French to Singapore on Dr Sun's representations. They later

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became connected with gang robberies in Jurong. It is interesting to note that between 1909 and 1911 a Triad society in Malacca carried out a large number of gang robberies, the proceeds of which were sent to China to aid the revolutionary cause! [579] 668

These years saw the birth of many societies, clubs, and reading-rooms which were a cloak for revolutionary propaganda. Prominent amongst these was the Chinese Philomathic Union in Penang which was registered under the Societies Ordinance in November 1908. In 1910 the *Kwang Wah Yat Pao* was founded in Penang by Tung Meng Hui members.

Dr Sun remained in Penang during 1910 and part of 1911, where he made appeals for funds to finance risings in Canton. His activities here led to a warning by the Protector of Chinese that he should leave the country. He left for Europe, later going to America, where he remained until the revolution had succeeded.

As a result of the revolution the Kuomintang came into being in China on 13 August 1912, and was a fusion of five societies including the Tung Meng Hui.

After the formation of the Kuomintang, Lu Chih was sent from China to organize a society, and in 1912 the Straits Settlements Government decided to register it under the Societies Ordinance, taking the view that the activities of the Tung Meng Hui had never been directed against the authority of the Governments of Malaya and that, the revolution having succeeded, the position of the party would be regularized. The first branch was consequently registered in Singapore on 18 December 1912, under the title of the 'Singapore Communication Lodge of the Kuomintang of Peking'. In 1913 of the eight principal office-bearers seven were British subjects, and one of these was Dr Lim Boon-keng. The lodge was closed in 1914. This was due to the discovery of a scheme by which the lodge was ostensibly to be dissolved and to be replaced by a company, the Southseas Industries Co., Ltd., and in part to pressure put on the lodge by the registrar of societies to furnish him with names and addresses of the members. Hereafter the lodge existed in secret. A secret Penang branch also continued to exist. Other branches were registered under the Societies Enactment in the Federated Malay States, all in 1913, but disappeared or went underground, and were declared non-existent by a *Gazette* Notification of 1922. Other branches registered in the Federated Malay States at one time or another were also dissolved. [656]

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668 Let us consider here briefly the subsequent history of the Kuomintang up to 1927, first in China and then in Malaya.

In 1913 the party came into the open again under Yuan Shih-k'ai, but an incipient revolution was suppressed and the Kuomintang proscribed. Yuan Shih-k'ai's subsequent attempt to make himself Emperor was frustrated, however, by the Kuomintang which roused the southern provinces to rebellion. Under Li Yuan-hung, who had a brief period of power, it aroused the opposition of the northern militarists and was dissolved in 1917. Thereupon Dr Sun Yat-sen formed a Kuomintang faction at Canton with assistance from military leaders from Kwangsi, Yunnan, and Fukien. The history of this adventure was most chequered. Dr Sun was driven out by his lieutenant-general, Chen Chiung-ming, in 1921: he returned again in February 1923, taking with him Michael Borodin, the Bolshevik adviser: he left for Peking again in 1924, probably because Canton had become too hot to hold him, and he died there in March 1925.

Dr Sun's teaching became of political importance only when he had been dead for two years. With the coming into power of the Kuomintang from 1927 under Chiang Kai-shek the 'Three Principles' were adopted as the basis of the policy of government. The fundamental law of citizenship, for example, was based on the first principle, 'Nationalism'. This was to have a considerable implication in the politics of Malaya. It is desirable therefore that we should take account of the *San Min Chu I*, which were embodied in a series of lectures delivered by Dr Sun in 1924–5.

The following is a very brief summary of the *San Min Chu I*.

I. *Nationalism*. The Chinese belong to the yellow race because they belong to the blood-stock of the yellow race. China is the only country where 'race' and 'nation' are the same. To save China we must certainly promote nationalism. The Chinese people are of the Han or Chinese race with common blood, common language, common religion, and common customs—a single race. China is in danger of a 'White Peril'. Not only is there a danger of China being swamped by the superior numbers of the white race—there is a more immediate and pressing danger in foreign political and economic domination and oppression. 'Cosmopolitanism' is merely a camouflage for imperialism. Nationalism must precede internationalism. We are the wronged races. To revive China's nationalism we must awaken the people

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to an understanding of China's position. China must recover her ancient morality. We must learn the strong points of the West—scientific knowledge and methods. 668

II. *Democracy*. Human government has passed through three stages—the theocratic, the autocratic, and the democratic. We are now in the fourth period—the era within states when people are battling against their monarchs and kings. The issue is now between good and evil, between might and right. The essential question is this: Is China to-day ripe for democracy? We Chinese must now follow world tendencies; nevertheless we must avoid false theories like Rousseau's 'natural rights'. The watchword of the French Revolution was Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. The Chinese do not yet understand what liberty really is. The Chinese have taken personal liberty for granted always like fresh air. The Western doctrine of liberty is out of place in China to-day, and generally misapplied. The aim of the Chinese revolution should be unity and freedom for the nation. Equality, too, is an artificial, not a natural, thing, and the only equality we can create is equality of national status. Because of the nature of her civilization China does not need personal liberty and equality as Europeans did. We will use our Principle of the People's Sovereignty and re-make China into a nation under complete popular rule, ahead of Europe or America. The machinery of government can be this—the people can use the controlling powers of suffrage, right of recall, right of referendum, and right of initiative. The five administrative powers of the Government are the legislative, judicial, executive, examination, and censorship.

III. *Livelihood*. The principle of livelihood is Socialism; it is Communism; it is Collectivism. The problem is a recent one due to the rapid progress of material civilization all over the world. The introduction of machinery brought unemployment. Although Socialism has been a growing force for several decades, Western nations have not yet found a solution for the questions involved in it. Marx was the first Socialist to rely on the facts. Since the interests of capitalists and workers inevitably conflict and cannot be reconciled, Marx said, struggle ensues and this struggle within society is what makes progress. But the actual facts do not bear this out. Socialized distribution has done much to destroy the monopoly of the tradesman; heavier taxation has

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had results beneficial to the workers. When the capitalists improve the living conditions of the workers, and the workers can produce more for the capitalists, this means both increased production and higher wages. Here surely is a reconciliation of the interests of capitalists and workers. Class war is a disease of social progress. The Kuomintang some time ago settled on its party platform that the principles of livelihood were to be carried out by the equalization of land ownership and by the regulation of capital. If we follow those two methods we can solve the livelihood problem in China. Food is the chief problem of livelihood. China has to import food. Because of foreign economic domination China exports food she needs for herself. We must improve agriculture, use scientific methods, study afforestation. We must create native industries. China must champion native goods and boycott foreign goods . . . [here the lectures break off].[1]

Sun Yat-sen's ideas for the salvation of China were formulated in other works of earlier date than the 'Three Principle' lectures summarized above, but the latter were the most explicit expression of his thoughts. The *San Min Chu I* has subsequently become the Bible of the New China. Mr O. M. Green speaks of the 'almost mystical influence on all classes of Dr Sun's "Three Principles"'.[2] He remarks that it is worth recording that almost from the outset of their career the Communists have clamoured for government 'in accordance with the principles of Dr Sun Yat-sen'. In fact both sides were appealing to the same authority. The question was, 'What did Sun Yat-sen mean?'

This study is concerned with the politics of China only in so far as they are reflected among the Chinese of Malaya. The rift between the Kuomintang and the Communists is a fact well known to the world at large: the controversies over the evolution from party to popular government belong to the history of China itself.

The local Government had suppressed the Kuomintang in

[1] For an extended summary and detailed criticism of the *San Min Chu I* see the present writer's *Problems of Chinese Education* (London, Kegan Paul, 1936).

[2] *The Story of China's Revolution* (London, Hutchinson, 1945). Green says of Dr Sun: 'As a political thinker he was emotional and vacillating. At one moment he is found speaking with glowing admiration of Great Britain and the fruits of her political wisdom and integrity as displayed in Hongkong; at another he denounces her as the World's Public Enemy No. 1; while his famous "Three Principles of the People", the *San Min Chu I*, contain grains of real inspiration overlaid with childish reasoning, absurd inaccuracies and violent anti-foreignism, [illegible] by a farrago of blatant [illegible]'

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Malaya in 1925, since its activities were considered to be subversive of British rule, but it remained well established there. It was the agent for the distribution of a considerable quantity of nationalist propaganda printed in Canton which was strongly anti-British in tone. ('British imperialism feeds on blood . . .' is a quotation from it sufficiently indicating its tone.)

The activities of the Kuomintang in Malaya at this time might be classified under the headings (1) organization, (2) collection of funds, and (3) propaganda. (2) was always an important aim.

There was at this time an endeavour to swing towards the left wing which was issuing increasingly virulent propaganda, and Kuomintang labour organizations began to appear in the country under the name of 'mutual-benefit associations'.

The policy of the Malayan Governments was repressive of the Kuomintang, and a flood of anti-British, anti-capitalist, and anti-imperialist literature was condemned by the censorship. The bulk of the Chinese who took the principal part in this revolutionary agitation were Hailams (Hainanese). In 1926 they organized an association to promote an anti-foreign boycott in Singapore, supported by public disorder.

The Hailams, who provided most of the domestic servants in Malaya, are a race somewhat different from the mainland Chinese and are said to have a good deal of aboriginal blood in their veins. They were the first to take a left line in politics, partly, perhaps, to increase their prestige with the other Chinese by drawing attention to themselves. Later the Khehs (Hakkas) also showed a disposition to leftist politics. They, too, are a type of Chinese distinctly apart from the remainder and with a reputation for impatience of authority and independent views.

Apart from the actual subversive part of the Kuomintang activities, the attitude of the Malayan Governments was decided by the following consideration—that recognition would legalize the position of an *imperium in imperio* and it would legalize a rule of the Kuomintang which provided that in any secret, official or semi-official, non-foreign institutions, such as labour unions, clubs, chambers of commerce, schools, city councils, district councils, &c., the members must conform to Kuomintang organization in order to strengthen the power of the Kuomintang which would give directions to them.

The triumphant progress of the Kuomintang in China in 1926

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and 1927 put the Malayan Governments in somewhat of a quandary. The recognition of the National Government of China, with the Kuomintang in the position of dictatorship, caused the British Foreign Office to consider that non-recognition of the Kuomintang was an anomaly. Thereafter ensued an agitation by the Chinese for the removal of the ban, which the Malayan Governments resisted. The Kuomintang argument was that there was general sympathy among the Chinese in Malaya for the Nationalist cause, and there was no disposition by the headquarters to recognize the extremist branches under Hailam directions. The policy of these elements was to support Dr. Sun Yat-sen's principle to unite Soviet Russia with the Communists and to join with the peasants and labourers. Such a policy found little support among the Chinese middle classes and among Cantonese skilled labour.

The purging of the Kuomintang of its Communist elements by Chiang Kai-shek had its repercussions in Malaya. The situation was reviewed for the first half of 1927 by the Governor, Sir Hugh Clifford. Sir Hugh had not been long in the country and first had doubts as to the wisdom of the current policy, but his views subsequently underwent a marked change. He wished at first to draw a dividing line between the moderate and the extremist branches of the Kuomintang. His opinion was that the moderates welcomed the ban on the Kuomintang in spite of their strong nationalist sentiments. The Straits Settlements Government denied that they regarded Chinese nationalism as a thing to be suppressed. All that the Malayan Government asked for was that when aliens came to Malaya they should leave their domestic policies behind, particularly such manifestations thereof as conflicted with the interests and the ideals of the country in which they were temporary residents.

The purging of the Kuomintang resulted in the extremists splitting off into organizations of their own, such as the Modern Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang of China, the South-seas Provisional Commission of the Communist Party of China, the Communist Youth Party, and the Nanyang Labour Union. These groups, consisting mainly of Hailams, diverted their energy to spreading Communism amongst the Malayan Chinese. The Malayan authorities were influenced greatly in their attitude towards the Kuomintang by the following considerations. They felt that an important objective of the Kuomintang in Malaya was the raising of money. Added to this, it was felt that the Chinese

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Government probably wanted on purely nationalist grounds to extend its influence over any large Chinese communities which had grown up in the countries outside its jurisdiction.[1] Also it was remembered that the Chinese secret societies had always relied upon terrorism to compel adherence to their ranks, and there seemed to be no reason to suppose that the supporters of the Kuomintang would depart from this traditional practice. The Chinese Central Government, feeling in a strong position after its success in China itself, persisted in its endeavours to get the ban removed. It has been mentioned above that the British Foreign Office considered that it was illogical to treat the Kuomintang as a prohibited society in view of the fact that *de jure* recognition had now been accorded to the National Government of China which was founded on and closely interwoven with the Kuomintang. Nevertheless, the reluctance of the Governor, Sir Hugh Clifford, to give way continued. He pointed out that large numbers of leading members of the Chinese community viewed with apprehension the consequences of recognition, and they felt that so long as registration was refused the Chinese would have an excuse for declining to be admitted to membership. If registration were allowed the pressure that would be brought to bear on the local Chinese population by the Kuomintang would be irresistible. He added several other arguments, but running through them was the fear of a highly organized *imperium in imperio*.

We need not pursue in detail the history of the struggle of the Kuomintang for the right to organize in Malaya. The aggressive propaganda policy of the Chinese Government did not improve the atmosphere. For example, in July 1929, they published a list of 'Humiliation Days' together with the alleged facts of the events commemorated. These included the Shanghai and Shameen incidents, and the list was calculated to cause bitter ill-feeling against Britain. It was suspected by the Malayan Governments that the Kuomintang regarded Indochina, Hong Kong, and even Malaya itself as *terra irredenta*. Sun Yat-sen's first principle of nationality which adopted the theory that nationality followed the *jus sanguinis* and not *jus soli*, was always in the minds of the Governments of the countries affected. But the situation was in fact an anomalous

[1] Up to the middle of June 1928 about $2,100 million had been received by the Central Government from the Kuomintang in Malaya, Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines.

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668 one, since the Kuomintang continued to organize in great detail in the Nanyang. Voluminous correspondence passed backwards and forwards between the central party and its Malayan branches. Sir Cecil Clementi, the new Governor, who had taken up his post in 1929, took a strong line with the Kuomintang. He summoned the members of the local executive and supervisory committees and told them that their organization could no longer be permitted and must be dissolved.

In November 1930, owing to the reactions in China to Sir Cecil Clementi's policy, it was considered that the time had come to modify it. Capital was being made out of it by Hu Han-min and others to stir up feeling against the Malayan Governments. Discussions took place between Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister in China, and Mr Wang Cheng-ting, and in consequence of this a compromise was reached whereby the Malayan Governments were to take steps to amend their local legislation, making it clear that the Kuomintang of China was not, as such, an illegal society in Malaya, that there was no objection to any Chinese in Malaya being a member of the Kuomintang of China, and that there would be no interference with the members of the *Tang* so long as their activities were not inimical to the interests of the local Governments and provided no attempts were made to re-establish control over branch *Tangpu* or other form of local *Tang* organization in Malaya.

The amending legislation was passed in Malaya, though it cannot be said that it made any difference to the situation. But it was only after the start of the Sino-Japanese hostilities in 1937 that the Malayan Governments had cause for serious complaint. In the meantime, in 1939, the Chinese Government had organized its Overseas Department.

668 648 457 The situation hereafter turns upon the conflicting policies of the Chinese Government and of the British Government. The Chinese were at war with the Japanese and naturally used every means in their power of consolidating sentiment on behalf of their country among persons of their own race, and of embarrassing the Japanese in commerce. The sums of money remitted from Malaya and elsewhere were also an important factor in their resistance to Japan. Britain, on the other hand, was at peace with Japan, and was therefore bound to suppress any activity within her territory against her. The Malayan Governments, none the less, were not at all unsym-

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pathetic to Chinese nationalism during this period and were as lenient as possible, allowing the remission of large sums of money to China for the China Distress Relief Fund, used to help resistance to the Japanese. [457] 648 668

We have now approached the last phase of the relations between the Malayan Governments and the Kuomintang before the Japanese invasion of December 1941. In June 1941 the activities of the San Min Chu I Youth Corps in Malaya in stirring up feeling against Japan (with which Britain was then at peace) were assuming such alarming proportions since the recent visit of a General Wu that the Governor resolved on action against it. The British ambassador in Chungking, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, suggested a visit of two or three Malayan officers to make contacts with Chinese officials to discuss this and related matters. In consequence of this two officers of the Malayan civil service, and the inspector-general of police, Straits Settlements, visited Chungking. This was a short time before the Japanese invasion, which interrupted negotiations regarding the Kuomintang.

We will now resume the history of the Communist Party in Malaya in pre-war years. 668

Evidence of Communist activity came to light in 1934 in the shape of directions issued by the Comintern Parties in Shanghai to the central committee of the Malayan Communist Party. Mass activities were ordered, to include strikes, sabotage in the naval base, transport boycotts, demonstrations against increased taxation, &c. On receipt of this letter the Malayan Communist Party and the Malayan Communist Youth Corps launched a 'purification' campaign, and a 'rushing' period was started to give impetus to the party's forward march to its final goal, the Malayan revolution. During the Jubilee celebrations in May 1935 the Malayan General Labour Union demonstrated against them, anti-British slogans were posted up, and there was some incendiarism against the decorations in Penang, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore, and a few pamphlets were thrown about in the streets. A recital of these incidents, however, gives a more serious impression than is warranted by the facts.

The central committee of the Malayan Communist Party this time requested a sort of secret liaison with the Third International

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668 and asked for relationships to be established between the Malayan Communist Party and those in India and England. It also recommended that students be sent from Malaya to the U.S.S.R. for training and that an inspector be sent to Malaya to inspect party organizations. In order to co-ordinate and unite the Communist effort a unification committee was formed by the central committee, composed of one Indian, one Malay, and one Chinese.

The Communist Party had some limited success in fostering discontent amongst the Cantonese and Hokkien labourers at the naval base, at the new prison, and at the military barracks. During 1935 anti-Japanese and, at the same time, anti-Kuomintang campaigns were launched and demonstrations occurred outside the Japanese Club, but by December 1935 the activities of the party slumped, though a good deal of anti-war and anti-Japanese propaganda continued to be distributed. During 1936 the party took an active share in organizing strikes.

[468] Following the *coup d'état* in China, when Chiang Kai-shek was captured in Sian by Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang, the National Salvation Movement, which resulted from this incident, was brought prominently before the public, and in Malaya a central committee took advantage of the situation to form branches for raising funds to assist the troops fighting the Japanese in Suiyüan.

The outbreak of war between China and Japan in July 1937 was exploited by the Communist Party, which brought new recruits of its own to the National Salvation Association, and in order to foster anti-Japanese feelings an overseas branch of the association was formed with two committees—underground and open. The former became responsible for recruiting Communists amongst its members, while the latter was designed to attract anti-Communists and members of other party organizations who would not have joined had they been aware of any Communist influence. By 1938 there was an outcry against Trotskyites and a new policy was put into practice with an anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist front for organizing strikes. The organization of the party was very complex with the central committee directing all activities, the Communist Youth Section, General Labour Union, a Picket Corps (used for intimidation purposes), a Special Branch (a sort of Communist Gestapo), and a Malayan Racial Emancipation League, to bring Malays and Indians into the Communist fold. Added to this were an Oversea Chinese National Salvation Association to play on the patriotic

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feelings of young Chinese, and, having brought them under its influence, to teach them the principles of Communism, and a Proletarian Writers' Association. The healing of the breach between the Kuomintang and the Communists in China after the Sian *coup d'état* had further repercussions in Malaya. The names of the various Communist organizations in Malaya were changed to suit the general anti-Japanese policy part, e.g. the General Labour Union, now became the Labouring Classes Anti-Enemy-Backing-up Society. (The complexities of the reorganization at this period are difficult to follow and a mere recital of names would confuse the story.)

After the outbreak of war with Germany in 1939 the Malayan Communist Party began to turn its attention to a possibility of war between Great Britain and Japan, and it eventually issued pamphlets setting forth the terms on which it would be prepared to assist the local Government in such an event. These were similar to those presented by the China Communist Party and the National Government of China, and included (*a*) the abandonment of reactionary policy, (*b*) the adoption of the democratic system, and (*c*) the improvement of the livelihood of the people, in addition to an official expression of willingness to co-operate with the Communists. But, receiving no response from the Malayan Governments, the Communists, notably the Anti-Enemy-Backing-up Society, continued to issue anti-British literature.[1] About the middle of September 1940 the Malayan Communist Party received instructions from the China Communist Party in Hong Kong to the following effect: that all anti-British movements and strike agitations were to cease forthwith in Malaya, and henceforth the party was to concentrate on consolidating an anti-Japanese front and to support the National Salvation Movement in Malaya, and no opposition was to be offered by the party to any campaign initiated by the Chinese community in Malaya to aid the British war-effort. The Malayan Communist Party decided to accept these orders. The movement had been inspired by an agreement reached in 1940 between the Chinese National Government and the Chinese Communist Party in Chungking. But in spite of this the agitation in industry by the party continued.

[1] It is convenient here to mention that the Wang Ching-wei faction, which never obtained any particular hold in Malaya, issued anti-British literature, some of which found its way to Malaya.

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It seems certain that the local Communists were in a dilemma. Between 22 June 1941, when Germany attacked Russia, and 8 December 1941, when Japan attacked Malaya, their position was anomalous. However, after the attack upon Russia by Germany the Communist Party became much less bitter in its attacks on Britain, and after the invasion of Malaya the policy entirely changed. The party now came up wholeheartedly on the side of the local Government.

It was not until the invasion had been in progress for nearly a month that an effort was made to have the Chinese political parties together in a common war front, and at the end of December 1941 the Chinese Mobilization Committee was formed under the chairmanship of Mr Tan Kah-kee. This Committee had the approval of both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and received the blessings of the Governor, Sir Shenton Thomas. Its members took part in resistance to the Japanese in many ways, and they acted as auxiliary police in Johore Bharu, filling in the gap between the departure of the regular police and the arrival of the enemy. On the arrival of the Japanese in the mangrove swamps of Singapore Island a contingent, part of 'Dalforce', fought with considerable bravery. But this was a last-moment development, and was too late to be really effective. The end came with the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942.

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CHAPTER XXXII

THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND AFTER

WHEN the war with Germany broke out in 1939 the function allotted to Malaya in imperial strategy was that of producing rubber and tin to feed the war machine and to enable Britain to obtain the United States dollars so essential to the war effort before the days of Lend-Lease. It had never been the policy to arm the peoples of Malaya or to train them for military service. By the fall of France the whole position was altered, and it was obvious that Malaya must take urgent measures for its own defence.[1] 722

It has often been asked why it was that the Malays and the Chinese were not armed *en masse* in this crisis. The answer was that the supplies wherewith to arm and the personnel to train them did not exist in the country. The only course open was to extend the existing forces as far as possible.[2] [723]

Besides adding to the volunteers and creating the local defence corps, the Government now organized the so-called passive defence services—air raid precautions, medical auxiliary service, auxiliary fire service, and rescue, burial, and demolition squads. In all these services the Chinese were the most numerous race. They were also largely represented in the miscellaneous war services—canteens, blood transfusions and employment in censorship, telephone exchanges, Government offices, and in the departments of the Navy, Army, and Air Force.

Since the outbreak of the war between China and Japan in 1937 the China Distress Relief Fund had been generously supported by the Malayan Chinese, but after the beginning of the war between Germany and Britain in 1939 a Patriotic War Fund was started in Malaya which also received liberal support from the Chinese community. Millions of dollars were raised for the comforts of British 722 431 741

[1] For details regarding the war effort of the several communities in Malaya, see Sir George Maxwell, ed., *The Civil Defence of Malaya* (London, Hutchinson, 1944).

[2] There was one Chinese company of volunteers each in Singapore, Penang, and Malacca with a paper strength of 120 for each company. All the Chinese members were English-educated. There were no Chinese companies in the Federated Malay States. In February 1941 the local defence corps, which until then had for all practical purposes been European, was opened to non-European British subjects and British-protected persons over eighteen.

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722 troops and British people suffering distress in any part of the world.
431 Of this fund, to which the Chinese were the largest subscribers,
741 £375,000 was remitted for the people of London during the German air attacks. In addition to this, £575,000 was raised from local subscriptions for the Malayan Bomber Fund.

722 During the Japanese invasion everything the Chinese community could do to assist the British cause they did. Apart from their
668 contribution to the passive defence and other services, there are numerous stories of the assistance given by Chinese squatters and coolies to British troops at the risk of their lives; there was never a case of a European refugee asking for help in the shape of food or money or active support and being refused it.

722 In the last week of December 1941 the Chinese Mobilization Committee was organized under the chairmanship of Mr Tan Kah-
726 kee for the purpose of recruiting the full man-power of the Chinese community in the defence of Malaya. Many of the recruits were labourers on defence work, but a force of about 1,000, most of whom were Communists, became a part of 'Dalforce', and fought in the mangrove swamps of Singapore Island during the last phase of the campaign. Though inadequately armed, they fought with courage and suffered many casualties.[1]

722 Chinese gangs, on the other hand, were foremost in the looting and then in the rioting and terrorism that took place during the
726 Japanese advance. The advanced parties of Japanese had them-
579 selves engaged in looting and rioting, but when the main body of the Japanese army arrived their treatment of the local looters and robbers was summary and exemplary. Condemned offenders were publicly executed and their heads displayed on poles in the market-places and on bridges. This had a deterrent effect, but the wastage created by the looters was colossal—rice, afterwards to be so preci-

[1] 'Not long after the outbreak of war in the Far East, the Malayan Communist Party had put up a proposal to the Government that the Chinese should be allowed to form a military force to fight the Japanese, and that it should be armed by the British. The Commander-in-Chief at first refused to allow this, but as the war situation rapidly deteriorated he eventually gave permission for the organization [one for training jungle fighters] to train and use a certain number of the Chinese selected and supplied by the Malayan Communist Party. When necessary, sanction for release from gaol for this purpose was also given.' F. Spencer Chapman, D.S.O., *The Jungle is Neutral* (London, Chatto & Windus, 1949) p. 160.

The first batch of Chinese Communists was picked up for training on 20 December 1941.

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ous, was strewn over the roadway and tins of provisions were 722
littered everywhere.[1] Rape, too, was also a real scourge in occupied 726
Malaya. Most atrocious, perhaps, was rape by gangs of armed
robbers, Chinese, Malays, and Indians. But it was the Japanese 579
conquerors who conducted rape on the grand scale.

The Chinese, beyond all others, the Japanese regarded as their 727
implacable enemies, and of the Chinese the Communists stood
first. Soon after the surrender of Singapore on 15 February 1942 668
identification parades were organized to pick out Chinese who had
been active against the Japanese or who were likely to be so. In- 722
formers—men, women, and boys—hooded like members of the
Ku Klux Klan, picked out victims by the hundreds or thousands.[2]
There was mass execution lasting for days. The numbers that
perished in the purge have been variously estimated, even into
the hundred thousand, but from the evidence given at the war
crimes trials in 1947 it would appear that 5,000 or more is nearer
the truth.[3] Eyewitnesses of the murders, Europeans as well as
Chinese, are numerous. Some victims were shot as they stood;
others were tortured to death. Hundreds were put on to lighters,
towed out into the harbour, and forced to jump in the water. From
the launches or naval vessels which towed them Japanese machine-
gunned them as they swam or struggled in the water.

Those Chinese who were particularly singled out for execution were (1) all who had had anything to do with the China Relief Fund, (2) rich men, who, presumably, had given most generously

[1] In this account, *Malaya Upside Down*, by Chin Kee Onn (Singapore, 1946), has been followed and also a manuscript account by Chew Hock Leong.

[2] So say N. I. Low and H. M. Cheng in their book *This Singapore* (Singapore, City Book Store, 1947) p. 18, from which the above analysis of wanted men is quoted. They further give the story of a survivor of the machine-gunning on the beach at Tana Merah Besar, Singapore, in March 1942. The Chinese selected for execution were tied up in bunches of 8, 10, or 12, according to the length of electric wire available. Ordered to move off towards the sea, they were machine-gunned from pill-boxes. 'When the machine-gunning stopped soldiers came running to bayonet us.'

[3] 'Official estimates place the number of Chinese killed in the massacres at 5,000, but this figure is believed to be conservative.' *The Times* (11 March 1947).

A Japanese officer, Lt.-Col. Hishakari Takafumi, gave evidence at a war crimes trial in Singapore in March 1947 that first of all he was told that 50,000 Chinese were to be killed in Singapore soon after the Japanese entry into the town but that later he was told that it had been found impossible to kill all the 50,000 people and that after half that number had been killed an order was received 'to stop the massacre'. Two Japanese officers were sentenced to death and seven to life imprisonment for these massacres. *The Straits Times* (3 April 1947).

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727 to the Relief Fund, (3) adherents of Tan Kah-kee, an indefatigable
668 organizer of the Fund, (4) newspaper men, schoolmasters, and high
722 school students, (5) Hainanese (whom the Japanese regarded as Communists one and all), (6) new-comers to Malaya who presumably had left China because they disliked the Japanese, (7) men with tattoo-marks who, according to the Japanese, were all members of secret societies, (8) volunteers, volunteer reservists, and members of 'Dalforce', (9) Government servants and men such as justices of the peace, members of the Legislative Council, &c., who were likely to have pro-British sympathies.

'Many a wanted whale slipped through the meshes of the Japanese net and many a minnow caught in it were not those the Japanese really wanted,' say Messrs Low and Cheng.

727 Next item on the programme of the 'Liberators of East Asia' and
65 the creators of the 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' was to squeeze every
66 cent they could out of the Chinese community. The leading Chinese were told that a 'gift' from the Chinese of $50 million had been decided upon. This was to be handed over on 20 April 1942, but when the day came the amount had not been fully subscribed. All that could be obtained in actual cash was $29 million. The rest was to be raised by loans from the Yokohama Specie Bank on security furnished by the contributors themselves and guaranteed by the respective Chinese associations in each State or Settlement. When the 'gift' was presented General Yamashita[1] somewhat ungraciously declared that it in no way redeemed the previous action of the Straits Chinese in having supported Britain and Chungking. 'What really matters', he said, 'is the attitude of the Malayan Chinese in the construction of the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia.'

To the insatiable Japanese the 'gift' was, of course, only a beginning. Within five months of the fall of Singapore the economic exploitation of Malaya had fairly begun. The Kaishas arrived; the Mitsui and Mitsubishi were the first in the field in the wake of the conquering army. Lesser Japanese civilian traders came in shoals for what was left of the spoils. They formed *Kumiai*, i.e. syndicates or guilds. They became, in effect, Government-protected compartments of the black market. They held the monopoly to fleece the public, but they were assisted by unscrupulous, get-rich-quick elements among the Chinese.

[1] Afterwards hanged by the Americans in the Philippines.

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The gambling propensities of the Chinese and other Asiatics were obvious sources of profit to the conquerors, and gambling farms, long abolished by the British, were resuscitated in 1943. [525]

It is clear from all the evidence available that the Japanese regime was marked by bribery, corruption, and incompetence. In the planning of the military campaign there was some effective thinking with streaks of brilliance: in their administration of Malaya the Japanese committed a whole series of foolish errors. Some of these were due to a shortage of trained administrators (they had to rely often on ex-barbers, packers, or photographers) and more were due to a peculiar psychological blindness. [661]

Meanwhile the population, and the urban Chinese in particular, were suffering terrible hardship. Those who lived in the country districts and could produce a little for themselves were somewhat better off than the town dwellers, but all over Malaya malnutrition was general. The Japanese had no shipping to spare for the importation of rice from Burma and Siam, even if they had been disposed to allow the expenditure. [511]

Outwardly there was compliance, and Oriental acceptance of the conqueror; inwardly there was an ever-growing hatred. The Chinese have a capacity for subtle obstruction, for appearing to co-operate when they are working in the opposite direction all the time. They used their ingenuity to escape the face-slapping and other indignities which Japanese soldiers were fond of inflicting without any excuse; they kept out of the way of the Japanese as much as possible; they did nothing willingly for the conqueror, and avoided him by all sorts of devices. There was, indeed, a minority who 'co-operated' with the Japanese for what they could get out of them, but there was even among these disreputable Chinese not a man who did not secretly hate and despise the 'barbarian dwarf'[1] for whom he was working. [181] [826]

A campaign was started soon after the capitulation to compel the population to learn the Japanese language. Bonuses were paid to Government and municipal servants who acquired a certain proficiency, while schools discontinued the teaching of English and included Japanese as a compulsory subject. But the campaign was barren of enduring results. [208]

[1] The term (in Cantonese) *wo*, a dwarf, was traditionally used for the Japanese, for the Chinese, conscious of their own good proportions, despised the short legs of the Japanese more than any other of their characteristics.

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727 The general Japanese education policy was that vernacular
671 schools for Malays and Indians should continue as before the occupation, with Japanese teaching added to the syllabus. No Chinese schools were permitted, but Government-managed Nippon Go (Japanese language) schools were instituted and attended by Chinese children and children of other races as well. There was
[191] little enthusiasm for a Japanese course of studies, and, although the teaching of English was theoretically prohibited, it was continued surreptitiously. 'It is interesting to record [says the report of the Malayan Union Education Department for 1946] that the oral examination conducted in Malaya as part of the 1946 Cambridge School Certificate examination, gave results that were surprisingly good in view of the years that had been lost.'[1]

726 Very soon after the Japanese occupation, resistance groups began
668 to be organized in the country. The Chinese were the only ones in the field for the first two years of the occupation, but thereafter Malay groups were formed under British officers in north Perak and Kedah. The Malays also had a resistance group in Pahang from an early period, called the Wataniah.

There were two kinds of Chinese resistance groups. Firstly there were the armed military groups living hidden in the hills and jungles, and secondly there were underground organizations whose members lived openly in the towns or villages and who either assisted the guerrilla groups or resisted the Japanese in some other way. Intermingled with the underground movement was a political association first called the Anti-Japanese Union (AJU) and later the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU), an almost entirely Chinese organization controlled by the Malayan Communist Party. The MPAJU supported the guerrillas, formerly known as the AJA, but later called the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). It was also known as the 'Three Star' Army from its badge—one star for each race—Chinese, Malay, and Indian—but it was in essence a Chinese movement. At the same time Kuomintang branches continued to exist underground. Later on, in 1944, a guerrilla force claiming adherence to the Kuomintang was located on the Siamese border. It was said to owe allegiance to Chungking and to be bitterly opposed to the MPAJU. There were clashes between this and sections of the MPAJA, but Force 136, a British

[1] 'Education in the Malayan Union', *Colonial Review*, vol. v, no. 5 (March 1948) p. 148.

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726 Force operating in the country, was able to localize it and to pre-
668 vent serious fighting. The total armed Kuomintang strength was estimated to be not more than 500.

A small group of Malay guerrillas were raised by Force 136 officers in North Perak and were given the name of Ashkar Melayu Setia (AMS) or Loyal Malay Army.

[579] Lastly there were some small gangs who were later disowned by the MPAJA—professional bandits of pre-occupation days who donned the anti-Japanese cloak only to give cover to banditry.

726 The MPAJA was organized during and after the Malayan cam-
725 paign of 1942 under the direction of the Malayan Communist
668 Party. It was divided into provincial groups, each with its own group leader. The disposition of the groups was: first group, Selangor; second group, Negri Sembilan; third group, north Johore; fourth group, south Johore; fifth group, Perak; sixth group, west Pahang; seventh group, east Pahang; and eighth group, Kedah. The groups themselves were split up into a number of small camps hidden in the jungle. Their food supplies were received from outside, especially from the AJU, and augmented with the produce of their small gardens in the jungle. In some areas they were greatly assisted by the Sakai tribes (aborigines) who gave them more than they could spare from their own stock of food.

There were two or three officers who had remained behind to organize sabotage, and at least one of these, Lieut.-Colonel Spencer Chapman, D.S.O., had made contact with the MPAJA.[1] But it was not until May 1943 that reconnaissance parties of Force 136 arrived in the country by submarine or were dropped from aeroplanes. The leader of the first party was Lieut.-Colonel J. L. H. Davis.[2] He was able to establish relations with the Perak group of the MPAJA. Eventually an agreement was drawn up by which the MPAJA pledged itself to co-operate with and accept orders and instructions from the Supreme Allied Commander during the period of hostilities and in the period of military occupation there-

[1] For a detailed account of the MPAJA during the Japanese occupation see F. Spencer Chapman, *The Jungle is Neutral* (London, Chatto & Windus, 1949). This chapter was written before Colonel Spencer Chapman's book was published. The author spent over three years in close association with the MPAJA and his book provides an invaluable account of the Chinese guerrillas. Colonel Chapman, while having great admiration for the courage and other qualities of the rank and file, considers that the leaders were much more concerned with creating a Communist Republic than with fighting the Japanese.

[2] Afterwards Colonel J. L. H. Davis, D.S.O. (of the Malayan police).

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726 after, in return for arms, ammunition, and explosives, and the equivalent of 150 taels of gold per month (roughly $3,000). The 725 MPAJA were not to be used for political purposes and no politica 668 questions were to be discussed.

The relations between Colonel Davis, Major Broome,[1] who had now joined him, and the guerrillas was excellent. In all the MPAJA camps the discipline was good. All food and material needed for the camps was bought and paid for in the free market, though the raising of funds by the AJU on behalf of the guerrillas was, it seems, by use of the methods of the old Anti-Enemy-Backing-up Societies. The men in the camps were given military [702] training and education in Chinese mathematics. The general atmosphere was almost like that of a Boy Scout camp.

While Malaya was still in the occupation of the Japanese, the 727 Malayan Communist Party published its programme of nine points 668 which were (1) to drive the 'Japanese Fascists' out of Malaya and to establish a republic; (2) to establish a Government with representation from all the nationalities, improve living conditions, and develop industry, agriculture, and commerce; (3) to give freedom of speech, association, &c., and abolish the old oppressive laws; (4) increase wages, abolish high taxation, and money-lending at high interest; (5) reorganize the guerrillas into a National Defence Army; (6) establish free education in the several languages; (7) confiscate Fascist property and restore property confiscated by the Japanese; (8) practise tariff autonomy; and (9) combine with Russia and China to free the oppressed peoples of the East.

After the agreement had been made with the Supreme Allied Commander, the establishment of a Republic was placed in abeyance. The propaganda issued by the MPAJA was not at this time anti-British, but definitely anti-imperialist.

[725] The total strength of the MPAJA proper in 1944 was about 3,000–4,000, and in 1945, before the intended invasion, it had grown to 6,000–7,000. The function allotted to the guerrillas was similar to that allotted to the Maquis in France, but the Japanese surrender changed all the plans, and instead of the invasion there was a peaceful reoccupation.

The British forces of liberation reached Malaya early in September 1945. Forces landed at Penang on the 3rd, at Singapore on the 5th, they reached Kuala Lumpur on the 12th, Ipoh on the 16th,

[1] Afterwards Colonel R. N. Broome, M.C. (of the Malayan civil service).

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but some outstations were not reoccupied until the end of the month. In the interval between the Japanese evacuation of centres to assemble for surrender and the arrival of the British troops the MPAJA came out of the jungle and assumed control. There was a great deal of looting by bandits and others during this same interregnum. 727 668 [579]

Malaya's welcome to the British Services was entirely spontaneous and genuine, but the welcome had been prepared by the Chinese generally on the assumption that the liberating forces would be Chinese, not British. The triumphal arches erected in the towns and villages were inscribed (in Chinese characters) to the 'Allied Armies' and in the interior they were usually inscribed to the various groups or battalions of the MPAJA alone. There is no doubt that many of the guerrillas for years had been so isolated from the world and from all information except what was contained in their own propaganda that they honestly believed that the Japanese surrender had been due to their own exclusive efforts, and this feeling was encouraged in any case by the better-informed leaders of the AJU behind the scenes.

There had been a complete alteration in the political atmosphere of Malaya since 1941. Until then, thanks to British influence, the relations between the Chinese and the Malays, in spite of the conflict of their interests, had been harmonious. The Japanese occupation had changed that. To begin with, the bulk of the Malays were, it seems, not particularly hostile to the Japanese occupation, and many indeed welcomed the change since it promised to put an end to the economic and political encroachments of the Chinese. It was only later that the clumsiness of Japanese methods alienated the Malays as a whole. 668 578 722

Meanwhile, the Japanese were using the Malayan police force, which was composed mostly of Malays, to suppress the Chinese resistance movement. This fact naturally led to strong resentment, and after the news of the surrender there was retaliation against the Malay police. The result was that the latter became demoralized and a complete reorganization of the force became necessary after the reoccupation before it was of any real value again. In the clashes which took place before the Japanese surrender and in November onwards the Malays were, however, the aggressors. In March 1946 the Chinese retaliated on a village on the Perak River and killed thirty or forty Malays. The measures taken by the 625 727 579

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727 authorities to suppress the trouble took the form of military
625 patrols, including tank patrols when feasible, and the sending of
579 propagandist parties of Chinese and Malays to affected areas to keep the peace.

727 At the moment of the British return to Malaya the old Chinese
668 *Towkay* (head of a business) had for the time being entirely lost his leadership of the community. Upon the liberation the leadership passed to the MPAJA leaders who were now converting their union into a 'People's Democratic Movement'. In Singapore and other large towns the Communist Party and the New Democratic Youth Corps were much to the fore. For the time being the Kuomintang and the San Min Chu I Youth were not in evidence. It was clear from the beginning that the leftist leaders were making a determined bid for power. They made it obvious that their promise of 'co-operation' with the British Military Administration was nothing more than a pretence. Colour, however, was given to this pretence by the omission of the first point (a republic) from the now-published Communist Party aims, but it was clear that this was no more than an act of expedience and the original objects were merely in abeyance, not dropped.

[208 Rallies of dozens of leftist organizations, from the General Labour Union (GLU) to the Coffee Shop Workers and the Barbers' Cultural Union, and several women's organizations, were held in strength in open spaces in towns and cities with speeches calculated to stir up the strongest emotion. The serious food situation, the delay in the arrival of rice for relief, and the inflation were exploited to arouse discontent. This led to rice riots in Perak in October. One device used on a number of occasions was to smear banners with the blood of victims—or alleged victims—of 'Fascist terrorism' and to carry them in rallies or in processions, and agitators did their best to work the crowds into a state of vengeful hysteria. When they succeeded there resulted a sound like the snarling of wild beasts. But at the beginning the popular feeling was so favourable towards the British that such incidents could not be developed into an insurrection.

One of the outstanding tasks of the British Military Administration was to disband the guerrillas without incident. The regular Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army numbered now about 3,000–4,000 and to an invitation issued to the remainder of the bona-fide guerrillas to become part and parcel of the MPAJA a couple of

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thousand responded. Then at the beginning of December the MPAJA was disbanded, each man handing in his arms and equipment and receiving a gratuity of $350. Altogether some 6,800 men were disarmed and received gratuities.[1] 727 668

The keynote of British Military Administration policy had been the widest possible tolerance consistent with public safety; complete freedom of speech and association were allowed. Apart from the wish of the administration to give the Communists the fullest opportunity to prove the sincerity or otherwise of their offer of co-operation, it was thought expedient in the interests of the mental health of the people that they should, after their long repression, be allowed to indulge their new-found sense of liberty and to 'blow off steam'. Moreover, the BMA had, in order to conform with the policy of the British Government, to avoid any suggestion that they were interfering with the legitimate activities of organized labour. In those early days the food shortage and consequent inflation caused understandable discontent amongst labourers, and of this the Communist Party was able to make use. In its employment of this freedom the leftist press showed itself quite unconstrained by any considerations of what was either fair or sensible, and the *Voice of the People* and the *New Democracy* in Singapore (both Chinese-language papers) were telling their readers that the 'savage British Fascists were worse than the Japanese', without reference to the fact that when the Japanese were in occupation the writers of this invective had not pursued an equally active line. [435]

Against the BMA the obvious weapon was the strike. Soon after the return of the British a series of strikes occurred which while fundamentally economic in origin were worked up by trouble makers for political ends. Concessions were made and a settlement was reached. Then in January the GLU became more ambitious in its aims. Utilizing the fact that about thirty ex-members of the MPAJA had been arrested for offences which ranged from the possession of stolen property to murder, as well as the fact that a Chinese and three Indian labourers had been arrested for voluntarily causing hurt to a public servant during the troubles in December, the GLU demanded the unconditional release of all 727 668 468

[1] This official figure, however, does not seem to square with the official figures of weapons recovered—i.e. 4,715 dropped and 5,497 recovered, plus 56 recovered from KMT guerrillas. The so-called Kuomintang guerrillas were disbanded in June 1946.

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727 these persons under a threat of a general strike. This challenge the
668 BMA, of course, accepted.

The strike began on 29 January 1946, and it was officially esti-
468 mated that the number of persons who stopped work in Singapore, Johore, Negri Sembilan, and Selangor was over 150,000. About 3,500 intimidators operated with lorries and bicycles and also on foot, even intimidating the servants of BMA officials at their houses or billets. But on the 30th, for some reason which is not yet quite clear, the strike was called off. It may be that the GLU saw that the stoppage was not popular, and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Singapore had told the Principal Adviser on Chinese Affairs that they would get their members to reopen their shops at once if they were afforded protection.

But the fact that they had succeeded in bringing about a stoppage
727 on such a large scale had whetted the appetites of the Communists'
668 organizers behind the scenes for even greater successes. A rumour
579 soon began to circulate that the next move of the GLU would be to declare a public holiday on 15 February 1946, nominally as a day of 'humiliation', but quite obviously to celebrate the defeat of the British by the Japanese when Singapore had been surrendered on that date four years previously. Meetings and processions were to be held all over the country. The rumour turned into a certainty when manifestoes were issued declaring that the British in 1942 had abandoned the people of Malaya in a cowardly manner and that it was resolved to mourn this betrayal on the forthcoming anniversary.

Before the strike of January the GLU had got its bands of intimidators out early, but this time the military authorities and the BMA had taken precautions. The result was that on the morning of 15 February Singapore had every appearance of normality, the buses were running, trishaws and rickshaws were on the road, the markets were open, and all essential services were in operation. This was because cordons placed round the city had prevented the movement of intimidators who on the previous occasion had come in by lorry from Johore. One small party did indeed attempt to hold a demonstration, and participants armed with bottles, crowbars, and sticks came into collision with the police. Being assailed by the crowd, the police were forced to open fire and one Chinese was killed and another died later. Up country, however, in north Johore (a notorious centre of disturbance both before the war and

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during the terror of 1948) a more serious incident occurred when the police had again to open fire and fifteen persons were killed. 727

Once more the Communists had challenged the BMA in an endeavour to bring them into hatred and contempt, and they had completely failed. Ten Chinese who were behind the plot were later expelled to their native China. 668 579

The immediate result of the firm measures taken by the military and the BMA on 15 February was that an almost audible sigh of relief went up from all races throughout the country. Now that the authorities had taken firm action, coolies, shop assistants, vegetable gardeners, squatters in remote districts—the great body of the ordinary people—plucked up courage to resist the demands for 'subscriptions' made by the Communists and their proliferating dependent societies. The membership of the leftist organizations fell off in a spectacular way. But the revolutionary elements were by no means defeated. Henceforth they would have to work more underground than they had since the liberation of Malaya. 727 668

While the battle was in progress between the Chinese Communists and the BMA, which was supported now by both the Kuomintang and the San Min Chu I Youth, now resuscitated, there were some significant developments among the Malays. These had never formed a political party. They were Malays and Mohammedans—nothing more. But in the post-war world when every race and nation had become politically minded, it seemed merely a matter of time before they too would enter the arena. So when on 30 November 1945 the creation of the Malay Nationalist Party was reported at Ipoh many people jumped to the conclusion that the movement had actually started. But it was soon apparent that the new party was under the auspices of the Malayan Communist Party and advocated identification of Malay and Indonesian interests. The eight resolutions passed at the inaugural meeting were very similar to the Communist Party's Eight Points.[1] 727 665 668

The Malay Nationalist Party after some initial success lost ground rapidly, though later on it recovered somewhat. The Malays as a whole were conservative and wanted no affiliation with the Communist Party, nor did they want any identification of the Malays of Malaya with the Indonesian movement. It was not until March of the following year that a really representative Malay party was formed under Dato Onn bin Ja'afar. This was to become

[1] So it appeared at the time, but see p. 412, n. 1.

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727 the United Malay Nationalist Organization, or UMNO, whose object was the uniting of the Malays of Malaya in an effort to 665 secure a reversal of the whole policy of the Malayan Union. (This 668 development is discussed in the following chapter.)

The tactics of the MCP were to watch every new development in Malayan politics. Seeing that there was the beginning of a strong national feeling among the Malays it did its best to anticipate the movement and to get control of it by forming its own Malay Nationalist Party.[1] Similar tactics were employed with regard to the new Malayan Democratic Union whose formation was announced in December 1945. The sponsors were Chinese of the professional class, but the 'guest' speakers included several members of the Communist Party. Since the 'Eight Points' of the manifesto of the MDU began with the key point, Self-government for Malaya within the British Commonwealth of Nations, it was not easy to see what legitimate appeal such a party had for the Communists. Nevertheless, a Communist later joined the committee of the union. But soon after the MDU showed signs of wishing to purge itself of Communist influences and towards the end of the year it took on—at least temporarily—a more democratic colour.

The MDU aimed to be the party of the domiciled non-Malay Communities—Eurasian, local-born Chinese, local-born Indians, and others. In practice, it never became anything more than a small but vocal group in Singapore. The party exercised considerable influence for a time, by reason of the intellectual and professional standing of some of its members. It failed because of its fanatical hostility towards the British regime and its alliance with left wing elements, neither of which was approved by the middle classes of the English-speaking Asian public.[2]

[1] But see footnote on p. 411.

[2] G. L. Peet, *Political Questions in Malaya* (Cambridge University Press, 1949) p. 13.

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CHAPTER XXXIII

CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT

THE historical summary given in Chapters XXVI to XXVIII shows the piecemeal fashion in which the Malay Peninsula came under British protection. With each Malay State a treaty was made whereby the ruler undertook that the advice of the British Resident or Adviser (as the case might be)[1] would be asked for, and acted upon, in all questions other than those touching the Mohammedan religion or Malay custom. Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang were federated in 1896 and decentralized in 1935. Separate treaties were made with the four northern States, the suzerainty over which was transferred from Siam to Britain in 1909. The result of all this was that at the time of the Japanese invasion a country about the size of England had no fewer than ten separate Governments.

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The Federation comprised the four original States that came under British protection. The hope of the British was that the States which subsequently entered into treaties with Britain would join the Federation of their own volition. But for various reasons this did not come to pass. For one thing they observed that the Federation had become very like a Union, and that the sovereignty of the ruler of each State was impaired by the strong central Government that had developed at the federal capital, Kuala Lumpur. Measures taken towards decentralization did not achieve the desired end. In 1909 a Federal Council was created in order to give effect to a desire for the joint arrangement of all matters of common interest to the Federation or affecting more than one State. In 1927 the Federal Council was reconstituted, and the rulers withdrew from active participation in the deliberations of the Council, which was enlarged by the addition of a number of official and unofficial members. In 1936, as a further step towards decentralization, the post of Chief Secretary to the Government was abolished and that of Federal Secretary was substituted, the precedence of which was after that of the four Residents. The intention was to replace the official who had become the virtual

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[1] In Johore the official was called General Adviser, in Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Trengganu, British Adviser. In each of the four Federated States there was a British Resident.

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642 ruler of the Federation by one whose duties were purely those of
645 co-ordination and liaison, and though the machinery of the Federa-
175 tion was retained to facilitate the disposal of business common to the four States, their full sovereignty was ensured to them so that they were on an equality in this respect with the States outside the Federation. At the same time the departmental advisers were concentrated in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore and they were expected to co-ordinate policy throughout the country. But the system did not work well and the States tended more and more to be self-sufficient entities.

642 All these modifications in the existing shape of the Malayan constitutional 'set-up' were argued by the Colonial Office and by the Governors and high officials of Malaya itself as if the only political realities were the States, their Sultans, and the treaties with the King; the interests of the 'immigrant races' (though the immigration may have taken place a century ago or more) were a secondary consideration. The ruling caste (and through its single-minded advice, the Colonial Office) was emphatically 'Malay-minded'. Since, however, our subject is the Chinese in Malaya, let us see how they were affected by the situation.

[644] Having no share in the administration of the country, the Chinese limited their interest in British intervention in the Malay States to security for their trade and persons if they happened to be engaged in commerce or labour within the boundaries of the Malay States. The Straits Settlements Chinese frequently petitioned the British Government to intervene to restore order in the Peninsula, which was in a state of semi-anarchy. When the States one by one came under British protection the Chinese benefited by the establishment of a system of law and by an efficient administration. Their
[646] own part in government was limited to representation on the Federal and State Councils and on various boards and committees. In the Straits Settlements the Legislative Council consisted at the outbreak of war with Japan of 27 members: 13 officials and 13 unofficials presided over by the Governor. Of the 13 unofficials, 6 were Asiatics, of whom 4 were Chinese. The Federal Council in 1940 had 28 members, of whom 12 were unofficials, including 2 Chinese. Each State had also a council which usually included, besides the ruler, 2 Malay chiefs, 2 British unofficial members, 2 Chinese unofficials, and 1 Indian.

Unity in this diversity had been maintained by the guiding

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hand of the British Government acting through advice given to the rulers. Economic and social rivalries had been kept from developing dangerously, and social harmony had prevailed. This was well enough so long as 'government from above'—paternal government—endured: the question was how could the country be made to stand on its own feet when the time came? How could the several elements be fused into a whole? As early as 1880 Sir Frederick Weld, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, had declared that 'nothing we have done so far has taught them [the people of the country] to govern themselves, we are merely teaching them to co-operate with us and govern under our guidance'.[1] Practically all that had been done in this direction up to the Second World War had been to carry out a policy of progressive replacement of European district officers in the Malay States by Malays, but, apart from giving them a few minor legal and other posts in the Straits Settlements, nothing had been done to give the Chinese experience of administration.

This was where the problem rested at the start of the Second World War. Britain was absorbed in her struggle for survival, and it was not until it became likely that the lost dependencies of Southeast Asia might be recovered in the not too distant future that attention was directed towards the question of post-war policy. In July 1943 the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated: 'We are pledged to guide Colonial peoples along the road to self-government within the framework of the British Empire.' The first precise declaration of the policy to be adopted in the case of Malaya came in the form of an answer by the Secretary of State to a question in Parliament made on 10 October 1945. Its gist was as follows:

Careful consideration had been given to the future of Malaya and the need to promote the sense of unity and common citizenship which would develop the country's strength and capacity, in due course, for self-government within the British Commonwealth. The policy of the British Government would therefore call for a constitutional Union of Malaya and for the institution of a Malayan citizenship which would give equal citizenship rights to all who claimed Malaya as their homeland. For this purpose fresh agreements needed to be arranged with the Malay States rulers and fresh

[1] Dispatch of 21 October 1880, cited by Rupert Emerson in *Malaysia: A Study of Direct and Indirect Rule* (London, Macmillan, 1937) p. 131.

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constitutional measures for the Straits Settlements. The Malayan Union would consist of the nine States in the Malay Peninsula and all of the two Settlements of Penang and Malacca. Singapore at this stage would require separate constitutional treatment and, in view of its special economic and other interests, provision would be made for it to be constituted as a separate Colony. But the ties between Singapore and the mainland might well work towards ultimate union. The peoples of Penang and Malacca would lose none of their rights as British citizens. There would also be created a Malayan Union citizenship for which the qualifications would be birth in Malaya or a suitable period of residence.[1]

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Simultaneously with this declaration, Sir Harold MacMichael arrived in Malaya to arrange new treaties with the Sultans. He spent three months in the country and then issued a statement announcing that he had 'successfully concluded with each of the Malay Rulers, after consultations conducted with friendliness and good will, an agreement, which, supplementing the existing Treaties, grants full jurisdiction in each State to His Majesty the King of England'.[2]

A White Paper expanding what had been said in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in October was published on 22 January 1946 when the success of Sir Harold MacMichael's mission was announced.

The White Paper[3] specifically stated the intentions of the British Government. It began by giving an account of the previous position and explained the need for reform. The British Crown (said the Paper) must provide the common link which would draw together the communities of Malaya and promote a sense of common interest and the development of common institutions. To secure jurisdiction for His Majesty in the Malay States, Sir Harold MacMichael had concluded an agreement with each of the Malay rulers, which, supplementing the existing treaties, granted jurisdiction in each State to His Majesty.[4]

[1] 414 H.C. Deb. 5 s, 255–6.

[2] G.B., Colonial Office, Sir Harold MacMichael, *Report of a Mission to Malaya* (Colonial no. 194, 1946).

[3] ibid., *Malayan Union and Singapore*, Cmd. 6724 (1946).

[4] For a detailed discussion of the British proposals see Victor Purcell, 'A Malayan Union: the Proposed New Constitution', *Pacific Affairs* (March 1946); Phyllis Kaberry, *The Development of Self-Government in Malaya* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946) (in mimeograph); and Gerald Hawkins, 'Reactions to Malayan Union', *Pacific Affairs* (September 1946).

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After describing the proposals of the Government for the constitution of Singapore as a separate colony, and the administration of the Settlements of Penang and Malacca with the Malay States in a Malayan Union, the White Paper gave details of the new constitution to be created for governing the country. Singapore (including the Cocos-Keeling Islands and Christmas Island) would be constituted a colony under a Governor and Legislative and Executive Councils. The constitution of the Malayan Union would provide for a central authority consisting of a Governor with an Executive and Legislative Council. Subsidiary powers of administration and legislation would be exercised by a local council for each State and Settlement. These councils would consist of both official and unofficial members, 'but while it is the intention that their constitution shall be broad-based and representative, the final determination of the numbers and of the details of representation will not be decided until there has been consultation with local opinion'. In the initial phase after the termination of the Military Administration, the Governor would be empowered to legislate with the help of an Advisory Council to be selected on a basis as broadly representative as conditions in this phase allowed. 642

In view of the special position of the Malay rulers as traditional and spiritual leaders of the Malay people, it was intended that the ruler in each State should preside over a Malay Advisory Council whose members he would appoint subject to the approval of the Governor. The main functions of these Malay Advisory Councils would relate to matters affecting Mohammedan religion; but they might also advise the ruler on any other matters at the request of the Resident Commissioner acting with the Governor's approval. On matters of Mohammedan religion, excepting the collection of tithes and taxes, each ruler, with the help of his Council, would have legislative powers within his State. [635]

Matters of Pan-Malayan importance such as higher education, immigration, currency, &c., would be matters of common arrangement between the Union and the Colony.

The White Paper went on to lay down the policy for the creation of Malayan Union citizenship. The policy of His Majesty's Government was to promote a broad-based citizenship which would include, without discrimination of race or creed, all who could establish a claim, by reason of birth or a suitable period of residence, to belong to the country. It was proposed, therefore, to 641 185

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create by Order in Council a Malayan Union citizenship: The following persons would acquire this citizenship:

(*a*) persons born in the territory of the Union or of the Colony of Singapore.

(*b*) persons who at the date on which the Order in Council becomes operative have been ordinarily resident in those territories for ten years out of the preceding fifteen. (In calculating the fifteen years' period, the period of the Japanese occupation would be disregarded.)

It would also be possible for persons to acquire Malayan Union citizenship after five years' ordinary residence in the Malayan Union or Singapore.

Save with the consent of the Governor, no person who was not a Malayan Union citizen could be admitted to public office or membership of central and local councils.

Those acquiring Malayan Union citizenship otherwise than by birth would be required to affirm allegiance to the Malayan Union. But citizenship was not to affect nationality.

In a second White Paper of March 1946[1] Malayan Union citizenship was somewhat differently defined, viz.:

The Malayan Union citizenship Order in Council will provide that the following persons will become Malayan Union citizens:

(*a*) Any person born in the Malayan Union or Singapore before the date when the Order comes into force, who is ordinarily resident in the Malayan Union or Singapore on that date.

(*b*) Any person of eighteen years of age or over ordinarily resident in the Malayan Union or Singapore on the date when the Order comes into force, who has resided in the Malayan Union or Singapore for a period of ten years during the fifteen years preceding the 15 February 1942, and who swears or affirms or takes the oath of allegiance (i.e. to be faithful and loyal to the Government of the Malayan Union).

(*c*) Any person born in the Malayan Union after the date when the Order comes into force whose father is a Malayan Union citizen at the time of that person's birth and either was born in the Malayan Union or Singapore or was a Malayan Union citizen under (*b*) above or had obtained a certificate of naturalization. The minor children (viz. children under 18) of persons in categories (*a*) and

[1] G.B., Colonial Office, *Malayan Union and Singapore, Summary of Proposed Constitutional Arrangements*, Cmd. 6749 (1946).

The Malayan Union was created by Order in Council of 27 March (1946, No. 463) and came into being on 1 April 1946.

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(*b*) will also be Malayan Union citizens. [Japanese nationals were debarred from becoming Malayan Union citizens.] 641 185

The Citizenship Order was, however, deferred until full consultation had taken place.

Soon after the announcement of the British Government's policy for Malaya in October 1945 there had been signs that this policy did not meet with the approval of at least a number of ex-Malayan civil servants. On 29 October Sir Frank Swettenham, a former Governor of the Straits Settlements, asked in *The Times*: 'Who has asked for these changes and a Malay Union? Certainly it is not the Malays.' There was no public indication of any opposition until after the publication of the White Paper (Cmd. 6724) in January, but there was then a demonstration of Malays in Kedah, said to be 50,000 strong and carrying banners denouncing the recent agreements. On 3 March a Pan-Malay Congress was convened in Kuala Lumpur to discuss the Malayan Union proposals and the question of sending a delegation to London to explain the Malay viewpoint. At this meeting the Sultan of Selangor urged the Malays to be united, declaring that 'many things can be achieved by unity'. At this meeting Dato Onn bin Ja'afar emphasized that the Malays must play their part while yet the time remained, in 'warding off the devastating ignominy of race extinction'. About this time Dato Onn organized the United Malay Nationalist Organization (UMNO) which he claimed was supported by 70 to 80 per cent. of the Malay population.[1] 642 208 664 665

Meanwhile, in *The Times* of 16 April there had appeared a letter signed by seventeen prominent ex-Malayan civil servants, including two ex-Governors of the Straits Settlements and an ex-Chief Secretary, attacking the Malayan Union (which had come into being on 1 April) and characterizing the MacMichael agreement as 'an instrument for annexation'. The letter said in conclusion: '. . . We have good reason to believe that their Highnesses and the people of Malaya would consider favourably a true federation of the nine states in association with the Straits Settlements.'

The extent of the influence of this letter is a matter of opinion, but there can be no doubt that it powerfully encouraged opposition to the infant Union: it is also reasonable to suppose that it carried considerable weight with His Majesty's Government and strongly

[1] *Sunday Times* (Singapore, 26 May 1946).

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affected public opinion in England as its authors had intended that it should. But there is no reason to believe that the distinguished signatories to the letter ever expected that the agitation would lead to the complete reversal of the constitutional proposals contained in the White Paper or to the abandonment of the principle of equal citizenship. They could not have foreseen that the Government would, in effect, permit the Malays alone to frame a Constitution for the country.[1]

In May two Members of Parliament visited Malaya where they were greeted by widespread mass demonstrations of Malays which were coupled with demands for the repeal of the Union and the 'MacMichael Treaties'. The allegation was that the new agreement had been obtained under duress.[2]

The Sultans had boycotted the installation ceremony of the new Governor of the Union on 1 April when the British Military Administration ceased to exist and civil government was resumed, and Malays refused to serve on any council or board. This deadlock continued until a Federation was substituted for the Union, as we shall see in due course ensued.

To understand how the Chinese in Malaya were affected by these changes we must recall what their position was before the Japanese occupation of 1942.

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Chinese born in the Straits Settlements were British subjects. Since representative government was in a rudimentary state, this did not confer the same privileges that it does in Britain (e.g. there was no franchise). Nevertheless, the status was highly valued by the Straits-born Chinese. They were eligible for seats on the Executive and Legislative Councils and on the municipalities, which later had Asiatic majorities and were virtually self-governing. They could travel on a British passport. No British subject could be banished from the Straits Settlements.

The position of the Chinese born in the Malay States was, on the other hand, very ill defined in law. In practice they were given passports as British-protected persons, but it is somewhat doubtful

[1] As one of the signatories remarked to the writer when the proposals for the Federal constitution was announced—'Now they have gone too far the other way!'

[2] The Malay anti-Union agitation focused on the agreement negotiated by Sir Harold MacMichael, but all that this agreement did was to give power to His Majesty to legislate by Order in Council to create a new constitution. The agreement said nothing about the constitution itself.

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whether they had this status in law. They were not generally regarded by the Sultans as their subjects. Since there was no franchise in the Malay States their position led to no discriminatory disability on this account, but the preference given to Malays in the Government services usually meant that the Chinese were excluded from the higher ranks, though in the Federated Malay States they held the majority of the clerkships. The Malays also had the privileges of the Land Reservations which meant that Chinese were virtually excluded from rice cultivation. But at the same time it must be admitted that the Chinese showed no special disposition to grow rice, much preferring more lucrative employment in commerce or in industry. The creation of a common Malayan Union citizenship would have given them an equal status with the Malays except that the Malay Land Reservations were to be retained.

But, although the Chinese were the race that would gain most by the creation of a common citizenship, it cannot be said that they greeted the proposals with any particular enthusiasm. It seems that they expected many more concessions than were contained in the Secretary of State's announcement. Soon after Sir Harold MacMichael's arrival the *Sin Chew Jit Pao*[1] (an old-established Singapore Chinese-language newspaper) asked why the Sultans had been chosen as the persons with whom arrangements were to be made. The Sultans (the paper said) represented only a small proportion of the Malays and had no claim at all to represent the Chinese. The paper in the same issue said that the China-born Chinese paid rates and taxes and were as much entitled to share in the Government as the locally born. Moreover, the Malaya-born Chinese had only a 'colonial education' and therefore did not understand world tendencies and could not be expected to represent Chinese interests. The leftist papers, of course, pooh-poohed the whole proceedings. The *New Democracy* (*Sin Min Chu*) remarked that the 'feudalistic Sultans should be relegated to the realm of forgotten things'.[2]

As time went on the proposals awakened no more than a lukewarm interest among the Chinese journalists of Malaya. The MCP had endorsed the idea of a unified Malaya but not in the form envisaged by the White Paper; the MDU also favoured union, but was principally interested in the question of democratic

[1] 15 October 1945. [2] 12 October 1945.

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642 208 representation; the Kuomintang was not interested in local politics except in so far as they impinged on the politics of China. Altogether there was apathy among the Chinese regarding the Union. When in April 1946 the Government of the Malayan Union invited the opinion of representative bodies and individuals comment was practically confined to the Communist press.

642 185 [664] Without encouragement from the Chinese to maintain the Malayan Union, the British Government yielded to the pressure of the Malays and their European supporters. On 25 July a Working Committee consisting of representatives of the Malayan Union Government, of the rulers, and of UMNO was appointed to submit agreed views, if possible, for both sides to examine and criticize. (There was, it will be seen, no racial representation except of the Malays on this committee.) The Malay Nationalist Party was excluded from the deliberations. The committee sat at intervals from 6 August to November 1946 and then embodied its proposals in a report containing a draft of a proposed Federation Agreement and a model State Agreement.[1]

The key consideration behind the Working Committee's proposals was the special position of the Malays, and implicated with this were the meaning of 'citizenship' and the policy to be followed [641] for immigration. 'There was a very real fear (the Report said) on the part of the Malays that they may steadily become submerged in a country in which (except for the aborigines) they are the indigenous people unless the categories of persons admissible to citizenship are confined to those who look upon Malaya alone as their homeland.' The Malays (unlike the immigrant races and, by insinuation, the Chinese) had no alternative homeland. The acceptance of the proposals for citizenship must, moreover, be contingent on a strict control of immigration.

The Report of the Working Committee does not here call for a detailed examination since the proposals contained in it were in principle endorsed by the British Government and embodied in a White Paper published in July 1947.[2] This White Paper said:

These proposals, while substituting for the Malayan Union a new constitution in Federal form, appeared to His Majesty's Government to

[1] *Constitutional Proposals for Malaya: Report of the Working Committee appointed by His Excellency the Governor of the Malayan Union, their Highnesses the Rulers of the Malay States, and the Representatives of the United Malays National Organization* (Kuala Lumpur, Malayan Union Government Press, 1947).

[2] G.B., Colonial Office, *Federation of Malaya*, Cmd. 7171 (1947).

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be calculated in general to achieve their own fundamental objects of essential cohesion and a basis for common loyalty. The proposals . . . received the conditional approval of His Majesty's Government. . . . It was made quite clear, however, that there was no question of a final decision until all the interested communities in Malaya had been given a full and free opportunity of expressing their views, *since the proposals had been formulated by the Government and Malay leaders alone.*[1] Accordingly in December the Government of the Malayan Union had appointed a Consultative Committee composed mainly of influential representatives of the non-Malay communities, which was instructed to hold meetings throughout the Peninsula, to receive oral and written representation, to collate the evidence submitted to it and to report the substance of the evidence to the Governor with such comments and recommendations as it should think fit.

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The Consultative Committee[2] consisted of eight members (two of them being Chinese, one of them a member of the Legislative Council) under the chairmanship of the Director of Education, Mr H. R. Cheeseman, C.M.G. (total nine members). The recommendations of the committee (in the words of the White Paper Cmd. 7171), endorsed the retention of the main structure of the Federation proposals recommended by the Working Committee and the greater proportion of its detailed arrangements but recommended an increase in the size of the Federal Legislative Council and an alteration in the terms of Federal citizenship.

The Working Committee had recommended that the Council should consist of the High Commissioner as President with 3 *ex officio* members, 11 official members, and 34 unofficial members to be nominated partly on a direct racial basis and partly as representing various interests, but in such a manner that, excluding *ex officio* and official members, Malays were to include the 9 Malay Presidents of the Councils of State and 1 representative of each of the Settlement Councils. The Consultative Committee, on the other hand, recommended the increase of the official membership to 52, including 1 representative from each Settlement Council, while in addition the 9 Malay Presidents of the Councils of State in the Malay States were to be added as *official* members. The Consultative Committee's net proposals gave 29 seats to the Malays and 29 to the other communities, 3 remaining unallocated.

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[1] The italics are mine. V.P.

[2] *Report of the Consultative Committee* (Kuala Lumpur, Malayan Union Government Press, 1947).

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646 185 The 2 Chinese members of the Consultative Committee wished to include the 9 Presidents of the Councils of State as ordinary Malay members, thus reducing the total Malay membership to 20.

[641] As regards citizenship of the Federation, the Consultative Committee recommended that the following persons should be Federal citizens:

(*a*) Any subject, whether born before, on, or after the appointed day, of His Highness the Sultan of any State.

(*b*) Any person who is a British subject or any person born on any of the Malay States, whether before, on, or after, the appointed day who is permanently resident in either of the Settlements or any Malay State.

(*c*) Any person whose father is, at the date of that person's birth, a Federal Citizen.[1]

The British Government decided to go 'some of the way, though not the whole way, to meet the recommendations of the Consultative Committee'. As regards membership of the Legislative Council it decided to increase the total membership, but it kept a considerable Malay majority. There were to be 50 unofficial seats whose allocation would be likely to give Malays 22 seats and Chinese 14 seats, while Indians would have 5, Europeans 7, Ceylonese 1, and Eurasians 1. While the 9 Presidents of the State Councils would be Malays the 2 representatives of the Settlement Councils might be from any community. This meant that the total Malay unofficial representation would be about 31 as compared with 14 for the Chinese.

641 Malayan citizenship (it should be borne in mind) is not a nationality, and does not affect or impair the status of British or other nationals who become Federal citizens.

The Federal citizenship proposed by the British Government might be acquired either automatically or on application.

The following persons would automatically be Federal citizens:

(*a*) Any subject, wherever born, of His Highness the Ruler of any State.

(*b*) Any British subject born at any time in either of the Settlements who is permanently resident (that is to say has completed a continuous period of 15 years residence) anywhere in the territories to be comprised in the Federation.

(*c*) Any British subject born at any time in any of the territories now to be comprised in the Federation whose father either

[1] *Report of the Consultative Committee* (Kuala Lumpur, Malayan Union Government Press, 1947), p. 11.

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(i) was himself born in any of these territories; or
(ii) has resided therein for a continuous period of not less than 15 years;

(*d*) Any person born at any time in any of the territories now to be comprised in the Federation, who habitually speaks the Malay language and conforms to Malay custom.

(*e*) Any other person born in any of these territories at any time, both of whose parents were born in any of such territories and have been resident in them for a continuous period of not less than 15 years; and

(*f*) any person whose father is, at the date of the person's birth, a Federal citizen.

The expression 'subject of His Highness the Ruler' of any State means
(i) any person who belongs to an aboriginal tribe resident in any State; or
(ii) any Malay born in that State or born elsewhere of a father who was, at the time of the birth of such person, a subject of the Ruler of that State; or
(iii) any person naturalized as a subject of that Ruler.

The provisions regarding *application* for citizenship are as follows:

The High Commissioner may grant a certificate conferring the Status of a Federal citizen on any person who applies therefore and satisfies the High Commissioner—

(*a*) that either
(i) he was born in any of the territories now to be comprised in the Federation and has been resident in any one or more of such territories for not less than 8 out of the 12 years preceding his application; or
(ii) he has been resident in any one or more of those territories for not less than 15 out of the 20 years immediately preceding his application.

(*b*) The applicant must satisfy the High Commissioner that he is of good character, possesses an adequate knowledge of the Malay or English language, has made a declaration of permanent settlement in the prescribed form, and if his application is approved, that he is willing to take the citizenship oath. In accordance with the recommendation of the Working Committee an applicant for citizenship will be required to be of the age of 18 or over.[1]

[1] In the actual Federation of Malaya Agreement (*Malayan Union Government Gazette*, Kuala Lumpur, 22 January 1948 and Supplement of 31 January 1948) the rules were varied from those outlined in Cmd. 7171 in some minor ways. For example, for 'wherever born' in the first (*a*) above, was substituted 'whether born before, on, or after the appointed day', and 'permanently resident' was substituted generally for the continuous period of 15 years' residence.

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642 In formulating this new constitution and citizenship the British Government, it was clear, was endorsing what the Working Committee had declared to be the 'Special Position of the Malays'.[1]

These provisions of the Federation of Malaya which was created by Order in Council on 1 February 1948 have taken up a lot of space, but it is necessary that they should be studied in order to receive an idea of the worlds that separated the principles behind the Union and the Federation. Instead of being relegated to being mere heads of religious councils, the Sultans were now restored to more than their pre-war prestige. Instead of the Union which envisaged proportionate representation for the different communities, the Malays were in the Federation given a large majority without any relation to their numbers. Moreover (and this deserves italics), *the Appendix A of the new White Paper gives a schedule of the subjects for the Central Legislature. The 144 subjects in this schedule do not include the all-important subject of land.*

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641 Under the Federation citizenship rules any subject of a Sultan is automatically a Federal citizen. No definition of 'subject of the Sultan' is given, but it seems that he or she may very well have been born in Java or Sumatra and may have arrived in Malaya only yesterday. The Malay Reservations Enactment of the Federated Malay States 1913[2] says: ' "Malay" means a person belonging to any Malayan race who speaks the Malay language or any Malayan language and professes the Mohammedan religion', and such were always accepted as subjects of the Sultans. On the other hand, the majority of the Chinese born in the Malay States were not automatically Federal citizens unless both their parents were born within the Federation.[3]

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The Union citizenship proposals certainly came nearer the desideratum of justice and equality than do those of the Federation. The error committed, it seems, was in creating the Union

[1] *Working Committee Report*, p. 23.

[2] No. 15 of 1913.

[3] A Malayan Federal Citizen is a British Protected Person under the British Protectorates, Protected States, and Protected Persons Order in Council, 1949. It was officially estimated that of 1,952,682 Chinese resident in the Federation of Malaya at the end of June 1949, 375,000 were Federal citizens by operation of law. After May 1949, however, when registration of Federal citizens by application began, many Chinese applied for Federal Citizenship. During August and September 4,483 certificates of citizenship were issued to Chinese out of a total of 4,708 certificates issued to all races and it is reported that the number of applications after that date greatly increased.

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before an adequate opportunity had been given to the people of Malaya to consider the proposals, and, having frightened the Malays into demanding the repeal of the Union, the next error was to stampede before their demands. The Chinese were no doubt to blame to some extent for their lukewarm attitude towards the Union and their refusal to defend its principles if not the method of its introduction, and they are now suffering politically for the concessions which have been made to the Malays in default of their speaking for their own rights. But if their realization of what was happening was slow, they have since demonstrated that they regard the new Federal constitution with distaste. 641

Chinese reaction to the constitution expressed itself in a number of ways. The action which most impressed itself on the public and the official notice was a 'hartal',[1] or stoppage of work, sponsored by Mr Tan Cheng-lock's Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action, the Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce, the Malayan trade unions, and (of course) the Malayan Communist Party, as a protest against the proposals for a Malayan Federation. On 20 October 1947 virtually all business and transport were at a standstill and Singapore was without buses, trams, or taxis, and no employees of the Harbour Board were at work. Obedient to the request of the organizers, the Chinese community of Singapore as a whole stayed at home.[2] The hartal, however, was not by any means country-wide, and the Government was successful in persuading Chinese to serve in the Councils, &c. There has, indeed, been considerable Chinese co-operation in the working of the Federation. 642 664

Another protest took the form of boycotting the new Singapore Legislative Council elections when in 1947 only about 20,000 out of 100,000–200,000 eligible electors registered themselves for the elections to be held in 1948. The result of this was that in a city predominantly Chinese only one Chinese was elected.[3] [666]

Before concluding this chapter it would be informative for us 000

[1] It is strange that the Indian word 'hartal' should have been adopted for a mainly Chinese occasion.

[2] See *Straits Times* (6 October) and *The Times*, London (21 October).

[3] *British Malaya*, April 1948.

According to *British Dependencies in the Far East, 1945–9* (Cmd. 7709) p. 54, persons eligible to vote were those born in Singapore, the Malayan Federation, or the Borneo territories who had resided in Singapore for three years prior to polling day. Of those eligible some 22,000, or 15–20 per cent. of those eligible, had their names inscribed.

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642 Before conducting this chapter, it would be informative for us
664 to examine the evidence submitted to the Consultative Committee
578 by the various communities.

This evidence was most miscellaneous and various, coming both from individuals and associations. It ranged from mild criticism to downright rejection of the Working Committee's Report. Although the recommendations of the Report were virtually those of the Malay rulers and of UMNO, some diehard Malay associations disapproved of them as being too liberal. For example, the Lembaga Kesatuan Melayu of Johore stated:

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> When we look at the handing over of a Government of Islam to the Government of non-Islam we shall find that the action is against the wishes of Islam (holy Qu'rān [Koran] verse 4: 58, 2: 38, 3: 158) . . . according to Islam there is no separation between politics and religion. It is a great sin for Islamic peoples to transfer the Government of the Malay States to non-Islam. . . .

On the other hand, the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce was 'greatly perturbed by these proposals because Chinese interests were to a large extent ignored', and these views were echoed by the other Chinese Chambers of Commerce in the country. But three Chinese associations of Penang—the Chinese Town Hall, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and the Straits Chinese British Association—in a joint 'petition' to the Secretary of State, expressed the general feelings of their fellows most adequately. 'The proposals (the petition said) are vitiated by an anti-Chinese bias. The provisions for the acquirement and loss of citizenship, the immigration policy contemplated, and the ridiculously inadequate representation of Chinese interests in the Federation Legislative Council are unmistakable indications of anti-Chinese bias.' The petition further remarks:

> THIS COMMITTEE deprecates the animosity of certain persons in England who, even before the reoccupation of the country, have been conducting an anti-Chinese campaign in England. The dual object of the campaign was to stir up ill-feeling against the Chinese on account of their numerical strength and vast economic interests, and to invent a pretext to keep them down. In furtherance of this campaign, the protagonists have stooped to misrepresentation and distortion of facts. Even the Parliamentary debates on Malaya on certain occasions were marred by a deplorable exhibition of ill-will towards the Chinese, who are filled with more sorrow than anger and console themselves with the reflection *magna est veritas et praevalebit*.

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[208] Such, generally speaking, was the frame of mind of the Malayan Chinese on the eve of the terrorist outbreaks of 1948. Malayan 642 politics had been born from Malay opposition to the Union and from Chinese opposition to the Federation. The story of the development of the political parties is taken up again in the next chapter when it becomes the background to the 'Communist Terror'.

Said Mr Peet, the editor of the *Straits Times*, writing in 1949:

> The conditions of political life as known in Western democracies, and in India and Ceylon, do not exist in Malaya. In the Federation nobody has the vote. All members of the Federal legislature are appointed by the British High Commissioner, and the Federal Government is entirely under British control. In theory the unofficial majority on the Federal legislature represents an important modification of the powers of the British administration: in practice the legislature meets only once a month, and its diverse body of nominated officials does not remotely resemble a democratic parliamentary Opposition, so that the British administration carries on at the centre very much as it did before the war, although there has been a shift to Malay authority in the State [665] governments. The normal machinery of party politics is entirely absent in the Federation, except so far as the branches of UMNO keep the Malay members of the Federal legislature in touch with Malay public opinion. In the Colony of Singapore only six seats in a legislature of twenty-three are open to popular election.[1]

However, Mr Peet goes on to point out that the post-war constitutional reforms had provided for wider and stronger public representation in the Malayan legislatures, and the British administration was much more ready to respond to criticism in those legislatures than it used to be in the days of old-fashioned colonial rule. The fact was that the dispute over the constitution had held up progress towards representation on democratic lines, and the outbreak of the terror was to bring matters, temporarily at least, to a standstill.

641 British policy towards the Chinese has for many years been characterized by suspicion verging often on hostility. When 656 Chinese nationalism began to be aggressive, instead of adopting measures to encourage the Malayan-born Chinese to regard them-

[1] G. L. Peet, *Political Questions of Malaya* (Cambridge University Press, 1949).

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selves first and foremost as Malayans, thus raising a bulwark against the pretensions of Chinese imperialism, the Malayan Governments chose instead to dig themselves in on the line of the treaties with the Sultans. The result was that all persons of Chinese race, whether they liked it or not, found themselves classed with the Nationalists of China. This policy has been greatly reinforced since the stampede took place from the principles of Malayan Union citizenship and the relinquishment by the British of much of the control to the Sultans and their Mentris Besar.

Many years before, in October 1932, Mr Tan Cheng-lock, then the senior Chinese representative on the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements, had said at a meeting of the Council:

> I look in vain for any tangible sign or indication of any active interest, practical sympathy, and encouragement that has been shown by the Government of late years towards that body of worthy, staunch, and traditionally loyal British subjects, viz. the Straits-born Chinese who have formed a continuous Colony in this country for more than 500 years, and the locally-born Chinese subjects of the Protected Malay States who have made this country their home. On the contrary, these loyal citizens of Malaya are, practically speaking, not to be allowed in future to own and cultivate rice lands in this country of their birth though foreign Malaysians from Sumatra and Java are granted that privilege; nor have those of them who are unable to find employment as clerks and in other classes of work in the towns been given facilities to go back to settle on the land; their appeal to have representation on the Executive Council of the Colony has been rejected outright; English education for them has been and is to be further restricted by the raising of school fees and the 'over-age' and other rules, while at the same time Government intends to disown, or has now actually disowned, according to this Council paper now laid on the table, all responsibility for giving them any Chinese education at the expense of the State. They are told that if they want free education they can go to the Malay vernacular schools, which it is impossible for them to do and is therefore not a practicable proposition but a useless concession. . . .[1]

It is worthy of note that this same spokesman of the Straits-born Chinese (whose family had been in Malaya since the eighteenth century) spoke at the same Council meeting of 'the hearty support which Your Excellency's recent ban against the

[1] Straits Settlements, *Legislative Council Proceedings* (19 October 1932), cited in part by Rupert Emerson, op. cit. p. 513.

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Kuomintang has received from the majority of the Chinese population in Malaya'. 641 656

Though the opinion may smack of 'hindsight', it seems that a great opportunity was lost in these pre-war years to encourage the Malayan-born Chinese to resist the pretensions of Chinese Nationalism and to regard themselves as Malayans first and foremost.

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CHAPTER XXXIV

THE COMMUNIST TERROR[1]

669 After the set-back received in February 1946, the Malayan Communist Party found it expedient to conduct their main operations underground. They were active in tightening still further their grip on labour and in fomenting strikes. When the Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce organized their 'hartal' as a protest against the proposals for a Federation of Malaya in October 1947, working through the trade unions and directly, the Communists joined in the movement, exploiting, as always, any popular dissatisfaction. Then, it seems, in March 1948 the party decided to stage an armed insurrection. The way for this was to be paved by widespread labour unrest during April, stimulated by the intimidation (and, if necessary, removal) of trade-union leaders who were unwilling to collaborate, the use of arms, and the burning of factories. A great political demonstration was timed for 1 May. Although these preliminaries misfired, it was decided, nevertheless, to adhere to the original programme and to give the order for the outbreak of armed violence in early June.[2]

The intention was that a revolt should start simultaneously in various parts of the Federation. Terrorism directed against Europeans and Chinese was to prepare the way for the revolt in order to create regions which would, in due course, be declared to be independent Communist areas. These should be gradually extended until the whole country was under Communist control. The declaration of a Communist Republic of Malaya was timed for 3 August 1948.

The outbreak in June was really only an accentuation of the violence and lawlessness which were already sporadic. The Commissioner-General, Mr Malcolm MacDonald, in a broadcast from Radio Malaya on 6 June, spoke of Communist agitators making a desperate attempt to impose a rule of gun and knife, and said that the bestial campaign must be struck down. He added that there

[1] This chapter carries events roughly to the end of 1948. Appendix IV, 'The Squatter Problem', deals with the situation up to March 1949.

[2] To what extent the outbreak was directed by external authority, and what connexion, if any, it had with the Communist Party conference at Calcutta in January 1948 had not been established when this was written in January 1949.

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was evidence that leaders of International Communism were resolved on a political offensive in the East if they were checked in Europe. Reports began to come in of shooting, violence, and loss of life on estates in the Federation. The Commissioner of Police reported a vast increase in acts of violence; Perak planters asked for drastic action to curb the outbreak. On 12 June three Kuomintang leaders were shot in daylight in Johore. On 13 June Sir Edward Gent, High Commissioner for the Federation, stated that a policy of banishing undesirable British subjects was under consideration, and a Bill was being rushed through giving extensive powers to the authorities in any area where a public emergency was declared. On 15 June three European planters were killed on estates in Perak, and thereafter these incidents were frequent.[1]

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A state of emergency covering the entire Federation was declared on 18 June and was extended to Singapore on 24 June. The MPAJA issued a manifesto calling on all former comrades to take up arms against the British. On 20 June 4,000–5,000 guerrillas were reported to be massing in the jungle.[2] On the same day the police station at Mentakab, Pahang, was attacked.

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On 23 July the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated in the House of Commons that the MCP had been banned, together with three other satellite bodies which were either involved in the current fighting or were recruiting or supply agencies for the terrorists. The bodies referred to were the MPAJA, the New Democratic Youth League, and a Malay organization of youth, Ikatan Pemela Tanah Ayer (PETA).[3] A large number of persons was detained for

[1] *The Malayan Bulletin*, published monthly by the Association of British Malaya, is mainly followed in this chapter.

In reply to a question in the House of Commons on 16 June, Mr Rees-Williams, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State, stated that there had been at least 13 serious incidents in recent weeks, including 10 murders and 3 attacks on European managers of estates.

The Malayan Monitor, a Communist monthly bulletin issued by H. B. Lim from 132 Fleet Street, London, has appeared since the end of 1947. It publishes an account of the progress of the campaign in Malaya from the Communist point of view, and includes a communiqué of alleged Communist successes—e.g. 2 October, guerrillas blow up railway line near Sungei Siput; 20 October, President of Johore Planters' Association shot dead; 28 October, guerrillas shoot 28 police in Perak—and of alleged crimes against the people of Malaya, e.g. 12 October, burning of Poh Leh Sun village, Johore, by armed forces. It has, obviously, the support and assistance of the British Communist Party.

[2] *Daily Telegraph* (20 June 1948).

[3] 'The PETA represents the most militant sections of Malay youth,' *The Malayan Monitor* (February 1949). The Malayan Communists claim also the

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669 'screening' under the Emergency Regulations, and quantities of
642 arms were captured, including a seizure by the Singapore police
656 and the Netherlands East Indies authorities of a large cargo of arms.

Throughout July and August the terrorism continued, action to check it being tremendously complicated by the nature of the country, four-fifths of Malaya still being under jungle and swamp. At the end of August the General Officer Commanding stated that 'things are improving, and the way in which the bandits are being hit is improving'. This view was endorsed by the *Straits Times* which said that 'the tempo of the onslaught had slowed down'. The successful campaign against the Communists in south Kelantan, where they had been well organized, was a serious defeat for them. Nevertheless, the trouble was by no means over and destructive attacks and wanton murders continued, including the murder of Dr Ong Chong-keng,[1] a Chinese member of the Legislative Council, and other Chinese and Europeans. Chinese bandit gangs on the Siamese border presented another threat to the Federation.
[648] Negotiations were in progress with Siam to facilitate action by the Federation security forces against the gangs, and it had been agreed that police and Government officers on both sides might cross the frontier using special passes and might be accompanied by a small escort of police. A British consul was appointed to Singora who had wireless facilities for communicating with the British Embassy at Bangkok and the Federal Government at Kuala Lumpur.[2]

By the end of October it was felt in circles of authority in Malaya that the situation showed distinct signs of improvement. The policy of keeping the bandits on the move (by the use of 'Ferret Force', &c.) had been successful; it had interrupted their training and there

Peasants' Union, and AWAS (Malay Women's Emancipation Association) as Malay 'democratic' organizations.

[1] Some mystery attaches to this murder, and from information received since the above was written it appears doubtful whether the motive for it was political or that it was committed by Communists.

[2] The Siamese frontier had always been a problem, even in pre-war days, for its thick jungle allowed bandits and others to pass freely to and fro, retreating from either the British or the Siamese authorities. After the liberation the so-
[186] called 'Kuomintang guerrillas' were active here. The problem has been complicated since the war by the recrudescence of the Patani question. Patani is a Siamese State whose population is mainly Malay, and some of these had been conducting an agitation to take Patani out of Siam and to join with their brethren in the British-protected Federation of Malaya. This movement has made the Siamese very guarded in their commitments on frontier matters.

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669 had been a decline in terrorist violence. The latest police and services press conference had a note of 'cautious confidence'. In the 642 Legislative Council at Kuala Lumpur the acting Chief Secretary 656 stated on 5 October that the Federation Government intended to take steps to prevent known Communists from Australia, Siam, and Indonesia entering the country, and no exception would be made for British Communist M.P.s who might want to stay on estates and mines.

[249] In spite of the terror, of which a leading motive was to sabotage Britain's economic recovery plan by cutting off the supplies of tin and rubber so valuable in obtaining dollar exchange, the production figures showed that up to that time these activities had had little effect on rubber production. Estate rubber production for August was 33,727 tons, the fourth largest figure since the liberation, and only slightly less than the exceptional output of [704] July. The London *Times* of 12 October stated that the troops, which had now been reinforced by British units, including a contingent of the Guards, were adapting themselves with great facility to the form of battle in which they were engaged; wherever possible they lived off the country, thus adding to the mobility given them by supplies dropped from the air. Specialized training was in hand and the next move would be an extension of army dispositions under the direction of the police to cover the whole of Malaya.

[727] Most of the 223 civilians who had been murdered up to the end of October were Chinese, whilst the Europeans murdered totalled 17. Of the 343 terrorists officially reported to have been killed, 6 were Malays, 3 Indians, and 2 Siamese. The rest were mainly foreign-born Chinese.[1]

669 At the end of November official statements and private com- 656 munications from Malaya stated that the main purpose of the 642 Communists, namely, the dislocation of the economy of Malaya and the establishment of a Communist regime, had been completely

[1] See *British Survey: Communism in South East Asia*, no. 19 (November 1948) p. 16.

In spite of the greater optimism of official reports, letters from rubber planters in the fighting area continued to give a gloomy impression of the situation up to the end of 1948.

The total number of civilians killed at the end of July 1949 was 508, including five casualties officially listed as accidental. The figure included 318 Chinese, 75 Malays, 43 Sakais, 34 Indians, 29 Europeans, 7 Indonesians, and 2 others. *British Malaya*, September 1949.

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669 defeated. The whole position was said to be better and the morale
656 of the people had improved. Many more troops had been trained
642 and had been rapidly deployed. Estates were better protected and production figures had not flagged. Bungalows in some areas had become miniature fortresses. The terrorists were concentrating their attacks on communications, particularly the railway, and on planters and others on the roads. Despite this, the strain on planters and miners and others in the front line remained severe, and it was clear that, while good results were being obtained, individuals were still liable to murderous attacks, and the time had not yet come to take things easily.

[641 625] As one measure for dealing with the terrorist campaign and its supporters in civilian clothes a scheme of national registration was imposed whereby every person in the Federation and the Colony was required to possess a registration card. The scheme was reported to be working smoothly at the end of the year.

This account of the Communist terrorist campaign brings the story roughly down to the end of 1948.[1] Written as it was during the progress of the campaign it tends to give the impression of a summary of successive official communiqués—from which, indeed, much of it is directly or indirectly drawn. It is difficult at a short distance from the events to reconcile the hopefulness which is natural and (within limits) right in an official communiqué with the gloom and apprehension (equally natural and right) expressed in letters from those in the front line. It was clear, however, that though the Communists had been thwarted in their main purpose a long campaign lay ahead.

The great danger for the Government was that it might allow itself to be led into repressive action against sections of the population which, willingly or unwillingly, were assisting the Communists, and this would arouse enmity against itself. It was obvious that the British, a small minority, could not 'hold down' a population numbering nearly six millions, and that government must be at least with the acquiescence of the governed. Indeed, so long as the British were able to continue their administration this was proof positive that the Communists had failed to secure popular support. But ruthless or unwise action against large sections of the community might easily reverse the situation and make it impossible

[1] The account of the terrorist campaign is resumed in the Postscript to this Survey.

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to hold Malaya. The greatest menace, therefore, lay in that school of thought which regarded all Chinese as Communists and therefore as enemies. Luckily in 1949 the Malays as a people were not trapped into such an attitude, and they made a distinction between bandits and ordinary Chinese.

When the Communist outbreak began the Chinese in Malaya were in a condition of political apathy. They were dissatisfied with their position under the constitution of the Federation of Malaya, even though the Associated Chambers of Commerce under the guidance of Mr K. C. Lee and Colonel H. S. Lee had withdrawn their official opposition to the constitution and had agreed to give it a trial. In Singapore the new elections, as we have seen, had been boycotted by a majority of Chinese, under MDU leadership, though the Progressive Party (Chinese) put up candidates for all districts. It was not altogether surprising, therefore, that they were first of all inclined to regard the outbreak of terrorism as a matter between the Government and the Communists. This attitude, however, afforded an opening for those who wished to regard the insurrection as a purely Chinese affair, supported openly or tacitly by the Chinese community as a whole. The reluctance of the Chinese to join the auxiliary police even though their countrymen were the major victims of the guerrilla attacks lent colour to the suggestion.

Typical of the criticism of the Chinese and their leaders was a leading article in the Kuala Lumpur *Malay Mail* of 29 October headed 'The Towkay and the Terrorist'. The writer quoted a correspondent of the London *Daily Mail* as saying that the terrorist campaign could hardly last another month unless it had the solid, if somewhat reluctant, backing the Chinese terrorists still got from their Chinese kinsmen. The paper commented that the fight against the terrorists was being carried on 'with little or no help from the Chinese', and that in addition the Chinese Communists relied on their own countrymen for the support without which they could not be kept going. That most of the support was gained by terrorization and was more or less unwillingly given did not alter the fact. One source of assistance on which the terrorists relied was, of course, the squatter community.

A study of the Chinese-language press of the period throws some light on the evolution of the Chinese attitude towards the troubles. On 21 July the Officer Administering the Government, Sir Alec

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669 Newboult, made a broadcast in which he appealed to the Chinese
656 community for active co-operation. Prominence in the Chinese
204 press was extended to statements from the Chinese consul-general, Penang, and of Dr Ong Chong-keng (the Chinese Member of Council afterwards murdered), who supported Sir Alec's plea, and also to a similar plea made by the veteran Mr Tan Kah-kee of Singapore. The Kuala Lumpur *China Press* published a long editorial denying the charges of non-co-operation. It drew attention to the unenviable position in which the Chinese found themselves—heading the list of arrests for terrorism on the one hand, and topping the list of arrests under the Emergency Regula-
[625] tions on the other. The paper explained that the slowness of response in joining the special police was due to their lack of experience in this branch of the service as well as to the language difficulty. The Chinese press, however, gave publicity to a subsequent move on the part of the Selangor Chinese Chamber of Commerce to enrol Chinese members for the auxiliary police.

During August the Chinese papers increased their support for the movement for Chinese to join auxiliary police units, and in September the appeal received even greater stress. But the number of Chinese enrolled remained small.

669 The reference to the squatter community calls attention to what
423 was undoubtedly the main source of Communist strength. Chinese
656 squatters had existed for many years; during the trade depression of 1931–3 their numbers were greatly augmented by unemployed labourers, and again they received accretions during the Japanese occupation. It is estimated that they numbered between 350,000 and 500,000 in 1948.[1] They occupied their land either on temporary occupation licences, which could be terminated by the Govern-
[657] ment at will, or (mostly) on no licences at all. In the Malay States there had always been a policy of land reservation in force for the Malays and this meant that nearly all the land suitable for rice-growing had been reserved for Malays. During the Japanese occupation Chinese squatters were allowed to encroach on these Malay Land Reservations and to open up new land for cultivation, and after the liberation, when the country was desperately short of food, the British Military Administration allowed them, for the

[1] This was the official reply to a question by the Hon. Mr Tan Siew-sin in the Legislative Council of the Federation, but it is thought by some authorities to be too high an estimate.

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669 423 time being, to remain in the reserved areas. The civil Government, however, resolved to move these squatters as soon as it was feasible.[1]

656 It happened that the areas in which the squatters were principally located are on the fringe of the jungle and they therefore afford a convenient shelter and source of supply for the guerrillas. Also the guerrillas have made levies of men for their forces, compelling them under threat of reprisals against themselves or their families to join them in raids. After the raids the recruits are usually re-
[722] turned to the villages. The British troops on several occasions burnt down the huts of squatters who had collaborated with the terrorists and destroyed their crops, thus sealing the enmity between them and constituted authority.

[208] The *Straits Times* said that public opinion was undeniably worried about the burning of squatters' huts and the destruction of their crops, 'unavoidable though this might be'. It thought that there was a very real danger of turning purely passive or forced co-operation with the terrorists into bitter resentment against the Government. The Chinese press of this period showed great concern at the drastic action being taken, and gave the fullest publicity to the burning by the police of Kachau village near Kuala Lumpur. The paper *Kin Kwok* of Ipoh published a leader headed, 'Don't drive them to the hills'.

[687] However, in this twelfth hour of the emergency, the Malayan authorities had to deal with the situation as it then existed with more regard to immediate expediency than to long-term policy. New measures were introduced in November for the repatriation of any alien who assisted the Communist terrorists in any way. Such repatriation was to apply to any person who paid 'protection money' to them. A number of Chinese miners and shareholders were arrested under the new regulations. By the beginning of January 1949, 500 squatters from the Kajang district had already been moved to a detention camp to await a passage to China. Compensation was being paid them for loss of stock and produce.

Another matter, equally disturbing to public opinion as the squatter question, was that of 'regrettable incidents' in which British troops were involved and in which innocent Chinese lost their lives. One of these became known as the Batang Kali shooting. Another disagreeable happening was the burning of huts at

[1] See Appendix IV, 'The Squatter Problem'.

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669 423 656 Kachau without proof that they belonged to persons guilty of collaboration with the terrorists.[1]

669 656 578 To revert now to the leading article of the *Malay Mail* of 29 October. This, after having mentioned the squatter question, concentrated on the alleged complicity of the wealthy Chinese *Towkays* in the current disturbances. The *Towkays*, it said, were not only refraining from joining the auxiliary police; many of them were submitting to intimidation and contributing, admittedly under duress, both money and supplies to the support of the terrorists.

[181] That there is some substance in these charges is very likely. Traditionally the Chinese have always followed the line of the least resistance when subjected to intimidation. 'Protection money' to secret societies and to political societies after them had for long been a heavy item in the budget of a trader and it was paid in dollars and cents by even the smallest farmer. The reply of the Chinese *Towkay* was that in default of protection from the authorities he was taking the only course open to him to ensure the safety of himself and of his family. At the same time it was increasingly apparent that, while the Communists were nearly all Chinese, it was the Chinese also who were the principal victims of the attacks, and the Chinese as a community began to be stirred from apathy and to rally increasingly to the support of law and order. In September a Chinese plan had been adopted for the recruitment of volunteers for the auxiliary police from Chinese firms, estates, and mines.

669 727 In describing the background of the Communist insurrection it is easy to overlook a number of causes which, while small in themselves, were basic. Among these was the psychological state of the ex-members of the MPAJA. After the liberation of Malaya in 1945 the state of mind of the guerrillas passed through various phases. Most of them were mere youths who had been isolated in the jungle during the formative period of their lives. Their education was rudimentary and their sources of information were most

[127] [1] As an outcome of the unfortunate affair at Batang Kali, near Rawang, early in December, when twenty-four Chinese were shot dead by the military forces as they attempted to escape from custody, considerable hostile criticism was aroused in the press, and the Army instituted an inquiry. The investigations were supervised by the Attorney-General's Department which declared itself completely satisfied that the forces had conducted themselves in a correct fashion. See Appendix IV, 'The Squatter Problem'.

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669 727 limited. Then when the Japanese surrendered and concentrated according to the terms of the surrender in certain centres, the MPAJA had come out of their hiding-places and had filled the vacuum as the overlords of the country until the British forces had made a belated appearance. During this interregnum the Communists had tasted power, and it irked them to have to surrender it to the BMA. It is also a fact that a small minority of the personnel of the large force of re-occupying troops regarded the country as if it were an occupied enemy country and treated the MPAJA with scant courtesy. Once they were disbanded many of them were unemployed and had leisure to brood on their grievances. The gratuity of $350 a man did not satisfy them, and they expected to be paid for their services throughout the Japanese occupation. Many of them (and MCP headquarters too) had amassed large quantities of Japanese notes which the British had refused to honour.

[656] These were among the specific grievances of the ex-MPAJA, but the Chinese community as a whole nursed additional resentments. For one thing the European Government and municipal servants who were interned, and also a few who were not interned but were allowed to remain out of the camps to operate public utilities or to engage in scientific work, had received full pay for the period, while Asiatic Government and municipal servants who had not been interned had to fight for years to obtain even a proportion of the pay they would have received if the British had not been forced out of the country. The fact was, however, that the Europeans who had been employed by the Japanese had to refund the amount received by them as payment for this employment.

Another reason for discontent was that many Chinese thought that collaborators with the Japanese had been too lightly dealt with after the liberation. The prosecution of collaborators had not been in the hands of the BMA, but of a special legal branch of the Army which had conducted investigations and prosecutions on their own account without any reference to the administrative authority. A number of suspected collaborators had been arrested after the liberation, but nearly all of these were eventually released since the evidence against them was not thought to be strong enough. The military legal authorities apparently took the view that it was better to let a guilty person escape punishment than to convict an innocent one. And, indeed, during the occupation almost any individual

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669 who carried on his ordinary occupation was liable to be suspected
727 of collaboration. The ex-MPAJA and the Communists, in particular, agitated for the wholesale arrest of persons they claimed to be collaborators, but by 'collaborator' they usually meant anyone who was opposed to their political views.

467 It was the policy of the post-war Governments in Malaya to
656 encourage the growth of trade unionism; the necessary legislation had been passed before the Japanese invasion, and in 1946 English
185 trade unionists of experience had been sent to Malaya to assist the labourers to form their unions. At least one of these English officials confessed himself as very disillusioned by what he found. In February and March 1948 two other British trade unionists, Messrs S. S. Awbery, M.P., and F. W. Dalley, visited Malaya to report on developments. Their report was issued in November 1948. It emphasized that the trade-union movement in Malaya had a very different history and tradition from the British movement. It derived from associations which had social rather than industrial functions, from anti-Japanese resistance groups, and from new
[669] trade unions established after the war. The report described the clever and ruthless attempts made by Communist leaders to gain control of the movement and use it as a weapon for seizing political power. The mission approved the Government decision to encourage responsible trade unionism by collective bargaining. It said, however, that the Federation of Trade Unions, established at different levels, though disclaiming Communism, worked according to Communist directives and maintained contact with Communist associations in other countries. On the other hand, the report considered the trade-union position 'as good as we had hoped and much better than we had feared'. The mission recommended improvement of the negotiating and arbitration machinery, measures to suppress intimidation, compulsory national education, and improved housing.[1]

669 With the outstations of the mainland in the grip of Communist
369 terror (though the towns remained tranquil and Singapore's crime statistics were smaller than before the war), and with emergency regulations in force, the setting was not congenial in 1948 for the

[1] S. S. Awbery and F. W. Dalley, *Labour and Trade Union Organization in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore* (Kuala Lumpur, Government Printing Office, 1948). *Three Reports on Malayan Problems* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1949), International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1949, (in mimeograph) contains a summary of this report at p. 22 ff.

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growth of healthy democratic politics. But there was, nevertheless, some notable development.

We have noted in a previous chapter the birth of the MDU in December 1945 and how the Communists sought to dominate a party formed with the declared object of securing representative government within the British Commonwealth. The following year the party assumed a much more genuine appearance under the leadership of Philip Hoalim and of an English-educated Eurasian, John Eber. However, in December 1946 the MDU leaders, in a move to offset the influence of UMNO, formed a federation of all parties which opposed the UMNO programme. This included, in addition to the MDU, the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP),[1] the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions, the Malayan Indian Congress, the MPAJA Old Comrades Association, the Malayan New Democratic Youth, the Angatan Wanita Sedara (Women's Party), and the Angatan Pemuda Insaf (Youth Party). The federation called itself the All Malaya Council of Joint Action (AMCJA). Its six objectives were—the unity of Malaya including Singapore, a fully representative elected legislature, equal political rights for all who regarded Malaya as their real home and the object of their loyalty, the assumption by the Malay Sultans of the position of fully sovereign and constitutional rulers, the control of Mohammedan affairs and matters affecting Malay custom to be in the hands of the Malays, and lastly the encouragement of the advancement of the Malay community.

This collection of strange bedfellows did not last long. The MNP with the Angatan Pemuda Insaf seceded from AMCJA to form a Malay Council of Joint Action, and this was followed by the creation of yet another front, namely, the Pusat Tenaga Ra'ayat (People's United Front) or PUTERA, comprising the main body of MNP, a youth organization, a woman's organization, and many smaller bodies. The leading spirit in this new creation was Dr Burhanuddin, the founder of the MNP. PUTERA added four more points to the six-point programme of AMCJA—that Malay should be the official language of the country, that foreign affairs should be jointly controlled by the Malayan and British Govern-

[1] On p. 380, the MNP was said to be under Communist auspices. So it seemed at the time, and certainly it has Communist blessing; but although accused of being Communist by its opponent UMNO it was permitted by the Government to continue when the MCP was banned in the summer of 1948.

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668 ments, the term *Melayu* to be applied to all citizens of Malaya, and
186 the national flag of the country to incorporate the Malay national colours.

AMCJA was thought to be a Chinese-dominated and Chinese-financed front, while PUTERA ostensibly represented anti-UMNO Malay feeling and was guided, no doubt, by its founder. A certain amount of bargaining ensued between the two federations, the Chinese element making concessions in the shape of proposing Melayu as the name of Malayan citizenship and the retention of the Malay Sultans as constitutional sovereigns; PUTERA, for its part, dropped its Communist associates and omitted all reference to the question of immigration.[1]

668 The outbreak of the Communist terror temporarily at least effected a cleavage of Malaya into two sides—Communist and anti-Communist. The grave turn of events in China itself had naturally a strong influence on the Chinese politics of Malaya. The victories of the Communist armies and the break-down of the National Government leading to the resignation of President Chiang Kai-shek gave great encouragement to the Malayan Communists to continue their campaign.

On 24 June the MDU decided to dissolve 'in the present political situation and curtailment of civil rights.' The MCP and the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) ceased to function at the same time. Soon afterwards the MCP, the MPAJA Old Comrades Association, the New Democratic Youth League, and PETA were declared unlawful by the Malayan Governments. The Malayan

[1] The above represents the author's information regarding the political developments in Malaya at this period, but the situation was so complex and confused that it is desirable to include here another version of what was happening. Mr Peet in *Political Questions of Malaya* (Cambridge University Press, 1949) p. 13, says:

> All these opposition bodies [i.e. the MCP, MDU, MNP, Malayan Indian Congress, and Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions] except the Communist Party, banded together after it was announced that the Malayan Union had been scrapped and that a new constitution was to be drafted. This coalition became known as PUTERA-AMCJA, those being the initials of the principal member bodies. PUTERA was the Malay wing, AMCJA the non-Malay wing. The following of PUTERA among the Malay population appeared to be small. AMCJA was mainly, though not entirely, based upon the trade unions which were under strong Communist influence and were mainly composed of Chinese and Indian immigrant workers.

See also the same pamphlet for an account of the 'Peoples' Constitutional Proposals' produced by this coalition.

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Indian Congress, the sole survivor of the AMCJA, called a truce with the Governments during the emergency.[1] 668

In an attempt to fill this large void Mr Tan Cheng-lock, in September 1948, contemplated the formation of a Malayan Chinese League with the basic idea of the combination of the Chinese, not only in the interests of racial unity, but to bring about Sino-Malay friendship. At the same time Mr Tan stated that there was much to be done before the League would become an accomplished fact.

The most hopeful development of the early months of 1949 was the formation of the Communities Liaison Committee and the Malayan Chinese Association with Mr Tan Cheng-lock as president. The first was intended to bring together the leaders of Malay, Chinese, Indian, Ceylonese, and European communities. In welcoming the new Malayan Chinese Association, Sir Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner of the Federation, said: 'The Chinese community is undoubtedly placing great hopes on the successful formation of this new body which will represent the Chinese point of view and promote and assist the maintenance of peace and good order.'

Malayan politics are indeed a tangled skein. Yet before the Second World War it was often said, and with a great degree of truth, that Malaya had no politics—that is, of course, in the domestic sense. There is no near analogy to the Malayan situation in any other part of the world. Though the Communists claimed that the terrorists were a Malayan Army of Liberation, this was quite obviously not the case. There was in 1949 nothing resembling a national movement in Malaya, and there could not, for this reason, be any valid comparison between the situation in this country and that in Indonesia or Indochina. Malaya's case was *sui generis*, the product of a very rapid opening-up of virgin territory, accompanied by immigration which had resulted in the Malays being out- 668 578 185

[1] The Societies in Singapore excluded from the provisions of the Societies Ordinance as political Associations (i.e. allowed legally to function) at the beginning of 1949 were the China Democratic League, Kuomintang, Malayan Indian Congress, Malayan Nationalist Party, Malay Union, Pusat Tenaga Ra'ayat, Progressive Party, and the Labour Party of Singapore. In May 1949 the China Democratic League and the Kuomintang were deleted from this list as foreign political organizations. The position thereafter was that these Societies now came under the provisions of the Societies Ordinance and if they wished to maintain branches in the Colony they would have to apply for exemption from registration. The move was a reflection of the developments in China and the wish of the Singapore Government to eliminate foreign political activity. [642]

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numbered. Even when the terrorists have been suppressed, the basic problems of Malaya will still be very much to the fore. The problem is not merely one of a *form* of government: it is of reconciling the interests of large, and fairly equally balanced, racial elements.[1]

[1] The dilemma of those who would like to adopt a position pro or con regarding Malaya is underlined by the case of Australia. After the war Australia manifested a very strong sympathy with national movements in Southeast Asia. Yet when Mr MacMahon Ball led an Australian goodwill mission to Malaya early in June 1948 he met with a hostile reception. The reason was the White Australia policy and the refusal to receive Asiatic displaced persons back in the Commonwealth. Mr MacMahon Ball made a statement in which he implied that there would be a change in the White Australia policy within the next ten years, but this statement was immediately disowned by the Australian Prime Minister, Mr Chifley, who asserted that the Australian Government did not intend to surrender the right exercised by every country in the world to determine who should become its citizens (*Malayan Bulletin*, 25 July 1948).

In September 1949 the Progressive Party authorized its representative, Mr C. C. Tan, to introduce a Bill into the Legislative Council of Singapore 'intended to keep out of the Colony immigrants whose country does not accord reciprocal immigration privileges to citizens of Singapore'. The Bill was aimed at Australia (*The Times*, 10 September 1949).

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PART VI
THE CHINESE IN BRITISH BORNEO

CHAPTER XXXV

DEMOGRAPHY

101 131 THE term British Borneo (which is purely one of convenience and has no constitutional sanction) comprises the Crown Colonies of Sarawak (area 50,000 square miles) and North Borneo (area 29,387 including the island of Labuan (35 square miles) which was previously one of the Straits Settlements but which has been part of North Borneo since 1946), and the protected State of Brunei (area 2,226 square miles) making a total area of about 82,000 square miles.

161 162 A census was taken in Sarawak in 1947 (total Chinese 145,000), but for North Borneo and Brunei the last census was in 1931 and since then only estimates of total population are available. Therefore to arrive at a probable figure for the total number of Chinese in British Borneo is not easy. However, on the assumption that the Chinese population of North Borneo has increased since 1940, when the estimated number was 59,610[1] in a total of 309,618, at about the same rate that it has in Sarawak (which is probably not far from the truth) then the figure for 1947 would be 70,000.[2] Adding an estimate for Brunei (1931, 2,683) and Labuan (1931, 2,257) on a similar basis, this would give a total of about 220,000 Chinese in British Borneo in 1947.

722 162 Sarawak was under Japanese occupation from 16 December 1941 to 10 June 1945. North Borneo was similarly occupied from 20 January 1942 to September 1945; the country suffered heavily and the principal towns and villages were destroyed.[3]

[1] Office of the Special Commissioner for South-East Asia, Social Welfare Conference 18–23 August 1947, *Condition of North Borneo in reference to Social Welfare*, Paper no. 1b.

[2] For food control purposes in 1946 the figure for the total population was taken to be 335,379. See (in mimeograph) E. W. Ellison, Development Secretary, *North Borneo: Reconstruction and Development Plan, 1948–55*. *The Times* of 11 August 1949 in a dispatch from its special correspondent in North Borneo estimates the Chinese at about a fifth of a total population of 335,000 (i.e. 67,000).

[3] *The Statesman's Year-Book 1948*, pp. 188 ff. Labuan was occupied on 31 December 1941, the West Coast Residency of North Borneo on 1 January 1942,

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722 It appears that during the Japanese occupation the Chinese as a whole remained in British Borneo. There were, according to 162 UNRRA report, only 1,669 Chinese displaced from the whole of Borneo, British and Dutch, awaiting repatriation on 18 April 1946. About a thousand Chinese artisans from the China coast and Java were said to have been brought in by the Japanese to man the slipways they had set up in the Kuching River.

Let us now consider the territories separately, in order of the size of the population.[1]

Sarawak

162 The total population of Sarawak increased by 11 per cent. be- 167 tween the enumeration of 1939 and the census of 1947 from 490,585 to 546,385 persons. Of this figure 295,429 were classed as indigenous people (Malays, Melanaus, Sea Dyaks, and Land Dyaks, together with 'other indigenous' groups including Kayans, Kenyahs, Penans, Kelabits, &c.) and 150,932 were classified as 'non-indigenous'. The Chinese in the same period increased by 21,493 to 145,119, which made them 27 per cent. of the population.[2]

The distribution of Chinese is stated as follows:

	Chinese in Sarawak 1947	
	Males	*Females*
First Division	34,442	27,616
Second Division	4,851	3,186
Third Division	32,701	26,264
Fourth Division	8,336	5,884
Fifth Division	1,064	775
	81,394	63,725

Total persons

1939	123,626
1947	145,119
	+21,493 or 17·4 per cent.

Chinese for the purposes of the 1947 census means 'all those people claiming to be Chinese by birth, wherever born'.

Part of the increase of the Chinese (says Mr Noakes) must be

and the East Coast Residency on 19 January 1942. All contact with the outer world had, however, ceased abruptly on 8 December when the last steamer to arrive in the territory left for Singapore.

[1] In Chapter XXXVI the territories are dealt with in order of their creation as States.

[2] The authority followed is J. L. Noakes, 'Some Notes on the Census', *Sarawak Gazette* (1 May 1948).

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attributed to immigration during the years 1940–1, but in the absence of statistics it is not possible to make a firm estimate. Observers generally agree that the natural increase has been great, particularly in the years of the Japanese occupation when the marriage of young adults partially secured them from Japanese interference. Usually a Chinese arrived in Sarawak as an adult, and often was of marriageable age, thus reinforcing the adult population and in a very short time reproducing and thereby accentuating the natural increase of births over deaths. This is more clearly understood if one takes, for example, a case of five young male and five young female adult immigrants. If within five years these ten persons between them have increased 50 per cent., it might take ten people born in Sarawak twenty years to achieve the same result.

Chinese males were in excess of females by 17,669, due, of course, to the excess of male over female immigration, and from this the extent may be gauged of the Chinese immigration. However, the problems arising from an excess of males are not particularly outstanding in Sarawak because numbers of Chinese in the rural areas marry Land and Sea Dyak women. The progeny of these unions are usually regarded as Chinese, and thus we have a further contributory cause of the very great increase.

In 1948 6,342 Chinese arrived in Sarawak and 4,189 departed.

North Borneo

The total population of North Borneo in 1931 was given by the census as 270,223, of which number the Chinese accounted for 47,972 (including transients).[1] According to the food ration cards in 1946, the total population was then 312,374, and the estimated total population in 1947 was 331,361. The Chinese population in 1921 was, according to the census, 37,642, so that there had been an increase of 26·98 per cent. in the *inter-censal* decade 1921–31. As stated in the summary above, the Chinese on the mainland were estimated in 1940 to number 59,610, and in 1947 the number of Chinese in North Borneo (including Labuan) in 1947 was probably in the neighbourhood of 69,000.

[1] The total population on North Borneo was (in thousands): 1891, 67,000; 1901, 105,000; 1911, 208,000; 1921, 258,000; 1931, 270,000. A. N. M. Garry, *Report of the Census of the State of North Borneo* (1931) p. 28.

Note. The alleged relation of the Dusuns to the Chinese is discussed on p. 25 of this Survey.

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162 The principal Chinese tribes (1931) were as follows (excluding a sea-going population of 600-odd):

	Adults		Children		Total	Percentage of total
	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Cantonese	7,748	2,238	1,245	1,228	12,459	26·07
Hailam	1,010	119	141	175	1,445	3·02
Hakka	11,203	6,956	4,668	4,198	27,025	56·54
Hokkien	1,623	640	608	584	3,455	7·23
Shantung	156	14	12	14	196	0·41
Teochiu	1,436	394	293	277	2,400	5·02
Unspecified	402	161	133	123	819	1·72

Chinese in British North Borneo, 1931

Residences and districts	All races		Chinese	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
Tawau Residency				
Tawau	10,536	6,177	4,022	2,155
Lahad Datu	16,249	3,952	2,976	976
Sandakan and Kudat Residency				
Sandakan Town	13,723	10,962	6,324	4,638
,, Suburbs	9,555	3,882	2,550	1,332
Kinabatangan	10,513	704	662	42
Labuk and Sugut	14,184	332	241	91
Kudat	29,555	3,992	2,387	1,605
West Coast Residency				
Kotabelud	23,049	418	286	132
Tuaran	18,894	1,050	695	355
Jesselton Town	4,594	2,696	1,703	993
,, Suburbs and District	17,624	4,080	2,467	1,613
Papar	17,731	3,562	2,246	1,316
Beaufort	12,702	2,945	1,993	952
Mempakul	9,464	495	336	159
Sipitang	5,508	405	274	131
Interior District				
Tenom	8,970	1,491	1,006	485
Keningau	9,230	481	385	96
Tambunan	28,636	156	110	46
Pensiangan	9,252	19	15	4
	269,969	47,799	30,678	17,121
Add sea-going population	254	173	166	7
	270,223	47,972	30,844	17,128

162 241 463 Hakkas, who formed the majority of the small-holders, claimed over half of the total Chinese population. The Cantonese formed 21·04 per cent. of the Chinese estates population as compared with

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10·66 per cent. as shown by the Hakkas, and were the 'backbone of the Chinese commercial population'. Chinese agricultural workers amounted to 3,191. 162 241 463

The small Shantung settlement at Jesselton is worthy of note: it must be unique as a compact settlement of northern Chinese in Southeast Asia.

Labuan (since 1946 reunited to North Borneo)

In 1945 the total population according to the ration cards was 9,253. In 1931 the population according to the census was 7,507, of whom 2,257 were Chinese. 162

Labuan: Chinese by Tribe, 1931

	Male	*Female*	*Total*
Hokkien	668	511	1,179
Teochiu	72	39	111
Hakka	223	176	399
Hokchia	1	1	2
Cantonese	217	155	372
Hailam	105	39	144
Hokchiu	3	6	9
Kwongsai	4	..	4
Others and undetermined	19	18	37
Total Chinese	1,312	945	2,257

Brunei

The estimated population of Brunei at the end of 1946 was

Brunei: Chinese by Tribe, 1931[1]

	Male	*Female*	*Total*
Hokkien	487	218	705
Teochiu	155	57	212
Hakka	668	166	834
Hokchia	..	..	..
Cantonese	333	77	410
Hailam	159	23	182
Hokchiu	37	17	54
Kwongsai	26	4	30
Others and undetermined	195	61	256
Total Chinese	2,060	623	2,683

[1] G.B., Colonial Office, *Report: Brunei 1946*. Brunei and Labuan were included in the Malayan Census Report, 1931.

Figures of the 1947 Census (received when this Survey was in the press) gave: Malays, 16,748; Chinese, 8,313; Dusuns, 2,759—besides other races. Total, 40,670.

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16248,634. In 1931 the total population was given by the census as 30,135, of whom 2,683 (2,060 males and 623 females) were Chinese.

The increase in the population was largely due to the development of the enormous oil field after 1931.

Of the alien races the Chinese were by far the most numerous. They were mostly from the southern provinces of China and were chiefly employed as traders, shopkeepers, small farmers, and labourers.

In 1948 3,441 Chinese arrived in Brunei and 2,829 departed.

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CHAPTER XXXVI

HISTORY

SOME account of early Chinese contacts with Borneo has already been given in Chapter II of this Survey, and the story is now resumed with the arrival of the Europeans. 175

Brunei

Early in the sixteenth century the Sultan of Brunei was overlord of the territories which are now occupied by Brunei, Sarawak, and North Borneo (including Labuan), as well as of Sulu and some parts of the Philippine Islands. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 'European intrusion of an unenlightened character' reduced the power of Brunei. Lawlessness ensued, and by the middle of the nineteenth century piracy had become such a scourge that the official charts warned merchants against trading in these waters. In 1841 James Brooke obtained the cession of a large area of the Sultan of Brunei's territories, and subsequent areas were ceded to Sarawak at various dates up to 1905. Labuan was ceded to Britain in 1846. In North Borneo British and American traders endeavoured at an early period to get a footing, but it was not until 1877 that Alfred Dent and his associates obtained a large area in return for annual payments. Brunei now became the smallest of the four territories over whose total area it had once held at least nominal sway. 643 175 177 674 642 101

In 1888 an agreement was concluded with the Sultan under which the control of foreign relations was placed in the hands of the British Government, and in 1905, by a further agreement, Brunei received a British Resident.[1] [648]

We have seen that Pigafetta did not find any Chinese in Brunei (or 'Borneo Proper', as it was afterwards called) when he visited it in 1521, but it is nevertheless certain that both before and after his visit a large trade was carried on direct with China in pepper, gambier, birds' nests, tripang, dried fish, rubber, wax, sago, and jungle produce.[2] The hills around Brunei town are terraced with 175 439 241

[1] See G.B., *Colonial Office List* (1948) p. 196–7.
[2] Peter Blundell, *The City of Many Waters* (London, Arrowsmith, 1923) p. 126.

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175 The hills around Brunei town are tthxxd with
the gardens of former cultivators. Treacher puts the total popula-
439 tion of Brunei in 1889 at about 12,000–15,000, with about 80
162 Chinese and a few Tamil shopkeepers. He also tells us that in the
241 old days, when 'it enjoyed a numerous Chinese population', the
178 surrounding hills were covered with pepper plantations, and there was a large junk trade with China.[1] 'But Brunei' (says Peter Blundell) 'gave up pepper and grew pirates and naturally the trade languished.' There is no pepper grown in Brunei now; there are few Chinese plantations, indeed, of any sort. 'Wise through experience, the Chinese let others sow and tried themselves to reap.'[2]
463 (This observation holds good for all Southeastern Asia: the Chinese
forsook agriculture for trade because the latter was more profitable.)
438 The Malay cuts down the sago palms in the swamps, brings the trunks up to Brunei, rasps them into powder, and treads and washes out the raw sago for shipment to Singapore. The Chinese advances the money while he is doing his work, takes over the sago in exchange, and reaps the profits on the sale. This is also the case with jelutong. The Chinese is thus the 'hated capitalist'!

There were few places in Brunei where the Chinese was not to be found:

> . . . He goes out singly or in pairs in his clumsy row-boat far up to rivers where savage chiefs reign undisturbed over tribes of naked brown men . . . and seemingly regardless of the fact that he might pay forfeit for his temerity with his head, proceeds to swindle every man jack of the blood-thirsty tribesmen of their stores of gum, wax, rubber, rattans and other articles of value. He weighs the articles in his own scales, which all present are aware are doctored in his favour, and pays them with tobacco, knives, cotton cloth, looking-glasses, and beads of hardly any value at all.[3]

(The writer of this unsentimental account of the Chinese trader in Brunei concludes by wondering that the latter isn't murdered!)

The main history of the Chinese in British Borneo belongs, however, to the vastly greater territories on Brunei's borders and not to this small rump of a once considerable empire.

Sarawak

175 Within the last century or so political accident has drawn a line
177 through the Chinese of Borneo, placing some of them on the Dutch

[1] W. H. Treacher, 'British Borneo; Sketches of Brunei, Sarawak, Labuan, and North Borneo', *JRASSB* (1889) p. 27.

[2] Blundell, ibid.

[3] Blundell, ibid.

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side of it and some on the British, but the history of each section must be considered as complementary to the other. That of the Dutch section begins much earlier than that of the British—even before the Dutch had established their effective rule the Chinese Kongsis were flourishing—and will be told in Part VII of this survey. Both are continuations of the story of the Chinese in pre-European Borneo which began hundreds of years ago.

Both the Dutch and the British colonies have so far (and despite a three and a half year interruption by the Japanese) defied the gloomy prophecy of John Crawfurd that

> all attempts on the part of European nations to establish a permanent territorial dominion over Borneo, we may rest assured, will, in the long run, be baffled by the insuperable obstacles of an uncongenial climate, a stubborn soil, a rude and intractable population, and the absence of all adequate financial resources.[1]

It is not too much to say, however, that these European nations might not have been as successful as they were without the help of the Chinese.

In 1839–40 Sarawak (which comprised the districts now constituting the first and second divisions) was in rebellion against the tyranny of the Malay officials, insufficiently controlled by the Raja Muda Hassim, and the insurgents held out at Blidah fort in Siniawan district. The insurrection was suppressed through the instrumentality of James (afterwards Sir James) Brooke, who in September 1841 became Raja of Sarawak.[2]

It seems that before Sir James Brooke arrived in Borneo the scattered population of the extensive district which afterwards came under his control as Raja of Sarawak may have amounted to about 20,000.[3] Brooke himself relates that when he visited the River Lanou in 1839 he found about two and a half miles from the south of the river mouth a settlement which had been recently

[1] John Crawfurd, F.R.S., *A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands and the Adjacent Countries* (London, Bradbury & Evans, 1856) p. 66. Commenting on the passage 'uncongenial climate, a stubborn soil, a rude and intractable population', an ex-North Borneo official of many years' experience says: 'Did ten words ever contrive to convey so many gross libels as these amount to? . . .' He points out that North Borneo is particularly healthy, the soil of prolific fertility, the Chinese of North Borneo was, generally speaking, the salt of the earth, the natives, also generally speaking, most tractable.

[2] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed. (1910–11) xxiv. 208.

[3] Anonymous article in *China Review* (1878–9) pp. 1–11. (The writer adds that this was thought to be an exaggerated estimate.)

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Chinese

175 established by Chinese. It was on the same side of the river as Tumgong, and consisted of thirty men ('real Chinese') with five
162 women of the mixed breed of Sambas. 'Nothing [said the future
241 Raja] could be more flourishing than this infant settlement, and I could hardly credit their statement that this had been formed for only four or five months. The soil they represented as the most excellent, and none are better judges.' Many acres were cleared and under cultivation. Rice, sireh, sweet potatoes, Indian corn, &c., were growing abundantly and they were able to supply Brooke's party with seven piculs of sweet potatoes without noticeably
[438] diminishing their crop. They also showed their visitors some birds' nests, bees-wax, lignum aloes, and ebony collected in the vicinity.[1]

Brooke considered the mixed breed of Chinese and Malays to be
162 a good-looking and industrious race, partaking much more of the
144 Chinese character than that of the natives of the country. This mainly arose from education and early formed habits which were both altogether Chinese, and in religion and customs they likewise followed in great measure the paternal stock. '*They are a race worthy of attention* [he said] *as the future possessors of Borneo.*'

[161] The numbers of this people could not be estimated, but they must have run to thousands—3,000 of them were said to be on their way to 'The Bornean territory'. The head of the settlement, which was near the town of Tumgong, was a Cantonese who had long resided in the vicinity of Sambas.

175 It was clear that James Brooke already had his eyes on the Chinese as future settlers in his territory, for he says, 'I shall be
168 strengthened by incomers, especially Chinese.'[2] He also adumbrated his policy—'divide and rule is a good motto in my case'.[3] He thought that in attracting them to Sarawak their dissatisfaction with the territory where the Kongsis still held sway, especially at Montrado, would stand him in good stead. He mentions a report received the day before which stated that a man sent by the Sultan to demand gold from the Chinese Kongsis had been killed and that the letter from the Sultan, after being defiled, had been publicly burnt. The Chinese of Sarawak, Brooke added, were undoubtedly intriguing with those of Sambas.

[1] Captain the Hon. Henry Keppel, R.N., *The Expedition of H.M.S. Dido for the suppression of piracy, with extracts from the Journal of James Brooke, Esq., of Sarawak* (New York, Harper, 1846) i. 67.

[2] ibid. p. 172.

[3] ibid. p. 179.

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Although the future Raja of Sarawak had formed a favourable impression of the Chinese as colonists for his territory, he was undoubtedly put on his guard against them by the reputation of the Kongsis, even though he sympathized with their resistance to the tyranny of the Bornean native chiefs. In another place in his journal the Raja concedes that the Chinese have many good points —'they are active, industrious, and commercial', and he adds that considering the badness of the Government under which they have lived, deprived of trade and subject to all the evils of extortion and monopoly, one should give them much credit for the qualities they display.[1] 175

An early description of Kuching (1843) says that the *Julia*, a ship belonging to Mr Brooke, sailed every month for Singapore laden with antimony ore, and, at the same time, she acted as a mail-packet between Singapore and Kuching. At the point near the bend of the river was the fort. It was a strong building of large timbers and mounted 24-pounder iron guns in excellent condition. This was a very necessary defence, as the European Raja had many enemies. Another building, of which the top just appeared over the trees, was the Chinese 'joss-house' or temple, for there were many Chinese settlers in Kuching who were most useful as carpenters, blacksmiths, and agriculturists.[2] 175 439 361 463

On his return to Sarawak after an absence in October 1850, Brooke was pleased to hear that some thousands of Chinese had passed over from Sambas into Sarawak and thus had begun the long-wished-for migration. [67]

In the Dutch-protected State, Sambas, southwest of Sarawak, there were two distinct parties among the Chinese—those who sided with the gold-workers of Montrado, and those who, on account of their position, were under the influence of the Dutch. The latter were the agriculturists of Pamangkat and a few small companies of gold-workers. At the beginning of 1850 there had been trouble between the factions. The Chinese of Montrado had gained the upper hand and had driven the few Dutch soldiers into the town of Sambas, and then set upon their allies. The Pamangkats had fled for their lives into Sarawak, where they had settled 175 463 669 167

[1] Captain Rodney Mundy, R.N., *Narrative of Events in Borneo and the Celebes down to the occupation of Labuan, from the Journals of James Brooke Esq., together with the operations of H.M.S. Iris* (1848) i. 286.

[2] Frank S. Marryat, *Borneo and the Indian Archipelago* (London, Longmans, 1848) p. 98.

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175 down as agriculturists or among the established gold-workers.
463 This movement was encouraged by the British officers, who did
669 their utmost to aid them, and more than a thousand of them were
167 supported by the Government at one time. They well repaid this attention (says St John) as in a few months they had tripled the revenue.[1] The Chinese immigrants attempted for years to form secret societies in Sarawak, but the Raja's vigorous hand had
575 crushed every attempt. On the surface this policy appeared to have been successful—indeed, it was so far as the Chinese of the capital
621 were concerned, but in the interior, among the gold-workers, the Kongsi stood in the place of the secret society, and its chiefs carried on an exclusive intercourse with their fellow-countrymen in Sambas and Pontianak and with the T'ien-tei Wui (Heaven and Earth Society) of Singapore.

669 Smuggling was one of their main activities, and some Chinese
575 who were convicted of being connected with it were fined, and others were punished for gross assault on other Chinese. But these
439 trivial cases were not the cause of the Chinese insurrection which
175 took place in 1857. One of the real causes was that the second war between China and Britain was now in progress, and all the Chinese in Southeast Asia had been greatly excited by the rumour that the British had retired from Canton and that the Viceroy had offered £25 a head for every Englishman slain. Everywhere in Southeast Asia the secret societies were extremely active, seeing in this news an opportunity to stir up a rebellion against the British and to seize power for themselves. The Heaven and Earth Society sent an emissary from Malacca and Singapore to incite the gold-workers to rebel. The arguments used were not only that the British were crushed at Canton but also that the British Government was discontented with the Raja, Sir James Brooke, and that it would therefore not interfere if the Kongsi destroyed only him and his officers, and did not meddle with other Europeans or obstruct the trade.[2]

648 This alleged discontent with Brooke on the part of the British
643 Government referred to the long campaign against him by his enemies in England and elsewhere. These for the most part be-
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[1] Sir Spenser St John, *The Life of Sir James Brooke, Rajah of Sarawak, from his personal papers and correspondence* (Edinburgh and London, Blackwood, 1879) p. 225 ff.

[2] St John, op. cit. p. 293.

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longed to that stay-at-home school of British humanitarianism which systematically attributed the basest motives to the proconsuls of the empire, and it was alleged that the Raja had been guilty of brutality towards the Dyak pirates and head-hunters, who in reality were not pirates or head-hunters at all. Eventually a commission of inquiry was appointed to sit in Singapore and this exonerated Brooke, though it caused him great annoyance 'and introduced some embarrassment into his relations with the natives under his rule who not unnaturally conceived that he had forfeited the favour of his own government'.[1] This misguided opinion was shared by the Chinese secret societies.

Already in 1856, before the Raja's return, the Chinese Kongsi, or 'Gold Company', had been behaving with so much violence that Mr Crookshank, who was in charge of the Government, thought it advisable to man the stockades in Kuching and to bring up a force from Sekrang. This action temporarily overawed the Chinese, but in the following year, after the Raja's return, they attacked the Government House and other British residences and murdered several of the British. Brooke escaped in the darkness by jumping into the river, diving under the bow of a Chinese barge, and swimming to the other side. After having occupied the capital for a few days and destroying a good deal of property, including the Raja's house and his valuable library, the Chinese retired, followed by a large body of Malays and Dyaks who had stood by the Raja all through, and who, intercepting the Chinese in their retreat, destroyed a considerable number of them.

> Thus terminated [says Sir Spenser St John] the most absurd and causeless rebellion that ever occurred, which, during its continuance, displayed every phase of the Chinese character—arrogance, secrecy, combination, an utter incapacity of looking to the consequences of events or actions, and a belief in their own power and courage which every event belied. The Chinese have never fought even decently, and yet, till the very moment of trial, they act as if they were invincible.[2]

One thing the rebellion proved without a shadow of doubt was how firmly the Brooke regime was based on the support of the Malays and Dyaks, for at no moment was there any sign of wavering. Though more than 3,500 Chinese were killed or driven out of

[1] *Dictionary of National Biography* (London, Smith Elder, 1886) vi. 429.
[2] St John, op. cit. p. 312.

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the country, the revenues from the Chinese soon rose, instead of falling, which was proof that smuggling had been carried on. The breaking of the 'Gold Company' was felt by the Chinese community as a whole as a great relief.[1]

The Chinese of Sarawak with whom the Raja had to deal were of an especially stubborn and lawless kind. Speaking at the end of the century F. Wells Williams says:

> In North Borneo the protectorate may be passing through certain phases that marked the early years of Penang and Singapore. Here, and in Raja Brooke's dominion of Sarawak, the Chinese are for the most part either pirates or the descendants of pirates and the old hostility between them and the truculent Malays is apt to break out at any time in bloody frays.[2]

In the light of these happenings it is important to note the development of the point of view *vis-à-vis* the Chinese of the second white Raja of Sarawak, Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, the nephew of the first Raja. He is writing in 1866, nine years after the insurrection, and his memories of the treachery of the Kongsis had had time to soften. He says:

> John Chinaman as a race are an excellent set of fellows, and a poor show the Eastern countries make without their energetic presence. They combine many good, many dangerous, and it must be admitted, many bad, qualities. They are given to being overbearing and insolent (unless severely kept down) nearly to as great a degree as Europeans of the rougher classes. They will cheat their neighbours and resort to all manner of deception *on principle*. But their redeeming qualities are

[1] St John, op. cit. p. 314. The above account follows St John and other observers. However, an anonymous writer in the *China Review*, vol. vii (1877–9), criticizes Brooke's policy towards the Chinese in Sarawak, contrasting it unfavourably with that of the Dutch in their part of Borneo. The latter (says the writer) in modern times had adopted a policy of treating the Chinese with confidence, inviting them to take part in the administration of justice and regulating their taxation according to their own traditional arrangements and customs of the natives, whereas the writer quotes from Brooke's journal to show that he had early in his career acquired a distrust of the Chinese which did not allow him to treat them with understanding. This isolated article, though it is written with skill and restraint, conceding to Brooke many fine qualities, is not sufficient, of itself, to prove a case; but it nevertheless merits the attention of the historian making a close study of the period. It must be borne in mind, however, that at the time when the article appeared feeling was still high, and the party in England which had persecuted Brooke may have had some influence on this anonymous writer's views.

[2] 'The Chinese Immigration in Far Eastern Asia', *American Historical Review* (April 1900).

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charitableness and liberality; a fondness for improvements; and, except in small mercantile affairs or minor trading transactions, they are honest. . . . The Chinaman would be equal to the master, or white man, if both worked fairly by the sweat of his brow. . . . Upon my first arrival I was strongly possessed by the opinion that the Chinamen were all rascals and thieves—the character so generally attached to the whole race at home. But to be candid, and looking at both sides, I would as soon deal with a Chinese merchant in the East as with one who is a European, and I believe the respectable class of Chinese to be equal in honesty and integrity to the white man.[1]

In spite of the tolerance of Sarawak's rulers towards them the number of Chinese in that State did not grow with any great celerity. There were about 5,000 of them at the time of the census in 1871,[2] and in the later seventies the anonymous article above quoted does not place them above 7,000. After their display of turbulence in 1857 they seem to have sought a quiet life. A visitor to Sarawak in 1890 notes that 'the Chinese are not a communicative race', and states that he was naturally, therefore, unable to obtain any information as to the average yield per ton of gold ore. The women workers, he found, earned 40 to 50 cents a day (a good rate for that period). At Lundu he saw a Government tobacco and coffee estate which had been abandoned by the Chinese in order to

[1] Sabine Baring-Gould and C. A. Bampfylde, *A History of Sarawak under its Two White Rajahs 1839–1908* (London, Sotheran, 1909) p. 31.

[2] The census of 1871 was, according to Baring-Gould and Bampfylde (op. cit. p. 32) 'made in a very imperfect manner', and from the allowance made by the report for its error we can well believe it. These are the figures:

Malays	52,519
Dyaks	70,849
Chinese	4,947
Indians	364
	128,679
Allowance for evasion and omission 10%	12,867
	141,546

The estimates from the Consular Reports,* 1877 (presented to both Houses of Parliament by royal command in February 1878) are much more probable, viz:

Malays	60,000
Chinese	7,000
Milanuas	30,000
Sea Dyaks of the Batang, Lupar, and other reserves	90,000
Land Dyaks	35,000
	222,000

* Cited by Sir Spenser St John, *Life of Sir James Brooke* (London, Blackwood, 1879) p. 379.

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175 grow pepper elsewhere. At Sibu there was a large population,
162 mostly of traders, who exchanged European goods for jungle pro-
463 duce. It was noticeable that the Chinese alone traded direct with
Singapore; the remainder, both here and at the other outstations,
[439 being merely agents for the business houses at Kuching. At Kapit
there was a good Chinese bazaar. In 1890 the revenue farms pro-
651] duced: opium $144,240; gambling $34,096; arrack $20,780; pawn-
shops $3,196—the Chinese, as usual, being the farmers.[1]

The year 1899 saw the establishment of the Foochow Chinese colony at Sibu.

175 The second Raja Brooke (the first had died in 1868) had had the
great idea of bringing to Sarawak some experienced farmers who
168 would settle on the jungle land and show the Dyaks what might
241 be done with energy and perseverance. He said that the idea came to him during the years when he was developing his garden at the *astana* (palace) at Kuching. He and his Ranee had almost to stand over the Malay and Dyak workers in order to get the lawns, flowers, and vegetables into shape. 'These brown men simply could not—probably would not work properly.' As he tried to direct the gardeners in the difficult job of making the jungle take on order he wondered if he could not find farmers in some overcrowded land whose misery would make them listen to the appeal of a new home.[2]

[195] The Chinese pioneer who was persuaded to come from China to form the colony at Sibu or 'New Foochow' (as it was to be known) was a Christian named Hwang Nai-siang from Mintsing in Foochow province. He and his fellow converts belonged to the American Methodist Episcopal Church. The party started off in a junk and at Hong Kong they were joined by an American bishop named Warne.

[423] On arrival at Sibu the immigrants were assigned plots of jungle land which, however, belonged to a private owner. 'By some erratic reasoning (says Mr Cartwright) the proprietor had prophesied that the people would be self-supporting in six months, but the strain of clearing and planting the land quickly disproved the prophecy.'

Dyaks were hired to fell the trees and to slash away the jungle vines and undergrowth. Slowly and painfully, with sickness and

[1] G.B., Foreign Office, N. P. Trevenen, *Notes of a visit to Sarawak and its Trade* (Misc. Series no. 210, 1891).

[2] This account of the Chinese Foochow colony at Sibu is taken from Frank T. Cartwright, *Tuan Hoover of Borneo; an Odyssey of Chinese Pilgrim Fathers* (New York, Abingdon Press, 1938) p. 54 ff. and passim.

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accident claiming their toll, small clearings were made. Rice was planted, but the crop utterly failed. Whereas in China the rice lands had been cultivated for many generations and all the stones had been removed, here, on the contrary, the earth was full not only of stones but also of widespreading jungle roots: the soil was porous and irrigation was therefore next to impossible. Crude heavy axes, made by local blacksmiths, and saws, equally simple, were all the tools at command. Torrential rains came on in their season and washed out the rice that was approaching maturity.

The second year there was a slightly better success, but heavier rains than usual back in the mountains drove out the wood rats, which swarmed down towards the plain and played havoc with the swelling heads of rice.

That the settlement eventually made headway was largely due to the American missionary, Mr Hoover, who, when the private ownership of the land was abolished, became an unpaid Government official and nursed the settlement into vigour. In 1912 the aged Raja wrote in the *Sarawak Gazette*: 'We have much to thank the Americans for, for their missionary work is quite promising, and they have introduced Chinese for cultivation of different kinds.' Another settlement of the same kind was made at Baram.

A Chinese, writing in 1940 of the Chinese settlement at Sibu, says that 99 per cent. of the inhabitants were from Fukien province with a small percentage from Kwangtung.

This same Chinese writer tells us a number of other things of interest.[1] He says that the education of the Chinese in Sarawak had made progress entirely under their own efforts. The majority of all classes could read and write their own language. Of late years (pre-1940), fifty primary schools and ten middle schools with complete courses were established in Kuching and Sibu. The best known of them were the Fukien school, the Ming Teck public school, and in Sibu the Kwang Hua middle school and the Tung Hua middle school. All these followed the Chinese system of education.

After the 'Double Seventh' (7 July 1937) when the Japanese attacked China, the people of Sarawak (says Mr Hwang) were inspired with a spirit of patriotism; some returned to China to fight, others raised money or collected clothes for relief in the

[1] James P. Hwang: 'The Chinese in Sarawak', *The China Critic*, vol. xxix, no. 6 (9 May 1940).

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175 ancestral country. The funds collected from voluntary contribu-
722 tions amounted to some $5,000 a week. Mr Hwang regrets that a Chinese consulate had not been established in Sarawak up to that time, and complains of the restrictions on trade imposed by the British after the outbreak of the war with Germany in 1939.

871 After the liberation of Sarawak from the Japanese, the Chinese resumed their active interest in the education of their children. Wherever they are concentrated in any numbers, their own schools, organized and financed almost entirely by the local Chinese communities, are to be found. At Kuching the Chinese Chamber of Commerce was found in 1949 to be levying a tax of its own on all incoming and outgoing Chinese cargo in order to obtain funds for the Chinese schools (a common practice with Chinese Chambers of Commerce in southeast Asia). When arrangements were being made for the establishment of a local authority at Limbang in the fifth Division (whose population includes 6,802 Malays and 742 Chinese), it was discovered that, whereas the Malays would be contributing only Malayan $220 in school fees towards the maintenance of the Malay school and its teachers (the rest of the money coming from Government grants), the Chinese would be contributing M $7,080 to the Chinese school, which, with four teachers, was completely independent of Government assistance.[1]

'Not only is much of the wealth of the Colony in their hands (says Mr Ian Morrison, writing in 1949), but they [the Chinese] are at a far higher stage of political consciousness and educational advancement than their neighbours.'

871 In Sarawak the British policy of preparing colonial peoples to
647 govern themselves is being advanced mainly by the development of local government institutions. The 'plural' nature of Sarawak
178 society is proving an obstacle to the establishment of local authorities. In only one Authority, at Limbang, has it been possible so far (1949) to bring in the Chinese. There the school fees paid by the Chinese, far higher *per capita* than those of the non-Chinese, are paid into the Treasury and paid out again to the Chinese school. The non-Chinese in Limbang have accepted the fact that the Chinese are accustomed to a far more expensive type of education than the non-Chinese have had hitherto and that they are entitled to enjoy it if they are prepared to pay for it.

[1] Ian Morrison, 'Local Self-Government in Sarawak', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. xxii, no. 2 (June 1949).

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It is hoped that Limbang will provide a precedent for all other authorities where there are Chinese.[1]

Much more remains to be discovered regarding the Chinese in Sarawak, but there is enough in the available records to provide a complement to the histories of the race in other countries of Southeast Asia.[2]

North Borneo

On 29 December 1877 a treaty with the Sultan of Brunei gave the title of three adjoining territories to Alfred Dent and his associates in return for a payment of $12,000 per annum. The Sultan appointed Dent and his associates and successors as Maharaja of Sabah and Raja of Gaya and Sandakan, with power of life and death over the inhabitants, and with all the absolute rights of property vested in the Sultan over the soil of the country, with the rights of making laws, coining money, creating an Army and Navy, levying customs, &c. The same day another treaty with the Pangeran Temenggong (Chief Minister of Brunei) was executed for the transfer of two additional provinces which were his private property. The Sultan of Sulu received $5,000 for his claims over North Borneo.[3]

In November 1881 the British Government granted a charter to the company which had taken over the concessions from Dent and his associates, and it assumed charge of the territory under the title of the British North Borneo Company.

When the company took over from the provisional association on 1 July 1882 the stations of Sandakan, Penangan (eighteen days' journey up the Kinabatangan River), Silam, Papar, Kudat, and Gaya had already been established, and every effort was being made to attract Chinese to the country. William Medhurst, who was appointed immigration commissioner, organized a system of obtaining immigrants from southern China which at first met with success. Streams of Chinese began to pour into North Borneo—whole families, often including grandparents—mostly of the labourer or farmer class, with a sprinkling of traders and shopkeepers; all

[1] ibid.

[2] The investigations of Dr Tien Ju-Kang, who in 1949 was in Sarawak studying Chinese associations in Kuching, should add much to our knowledge of the subject besides throwing light on Chinese social organization in general.

[3] George McT. Kahin, 'The State of North Borneo 1881–1946', *Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. vii, no. 1 (November 1947) passim.

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175 were under advances from the company, and these advances were sometimes supplemented by grants of land with the produce of 168 which the settlers were to repay their loans. This experiment was 463 only too successful, for the inflow of immigrants was not properly controlled. The result was an overwhelming inrush which the young country could not stand. The labour market became overstocked; the Government had to retrench, finding it impossible to give out unlimited loans; the traders who had come down direct from China found themselves at a disadvantage with the Straits-born Chinese, who were versed in trading with the natives and could speak their language; and many of the farmers, dismayed at the sight of the Borneo jungle, absolutely declined to squat upon the land allotted to them and took to picking up a living as best they could.[1] A reaction set in and a return current began which by 1883 had carried hundreds back to their native shores.

175 Nevertheless numbers of Straits-born Chinese continued to flock to the country, and the two leading Chinese firms in Singapore put 167 on the North Borneo run steamers of their own which competed successfully with the European lines even though the latter were 439 subsidized by the Government. When Mr Pryer took over Sandakan in 1878 there were only two Chinese there, and in 1883, notwithstanding the fact that many had returned to China, the number had risen to 3,000. A large number of Hakka Christians had settled happily at Kudat, where their descendants were living and thriving when the Second World War interrupted their prosperity.

The country soon attracted notice among capitalists in China too, and the first two companies to start operations were both Chinese—the Chinese Sabah Land Farming Company and the Yaen Yew North Borneo Cultivation Trading Company, with concessions of 40,000 acres and 10,000 acres respectively. A large sum was laid out also in a new Chinese immigration scheme which, however, failed, as did others in 1883 and 1902.

175 The failure of these schemes did not deter the authorities in North Borneo from initiating others. Mr W. H. Treacher, the first 168 British Governor of British North Borneo, had declared in 1891:

> Experience in the Straits Settlements, the Malay Peninsular and Sarawak has shown that the people to cause rapid financial progress in Malayan countries are the hard-working, money-loving Chinese and

[1] Owen Rutter, *British North Borneo* (London, Constable, 1922) p. 131 and passim. See also W. H. Treacher, 'British Borneo', *JRASSB* (1889 and 1890).

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these are the peoples whom the Company should lay themselves out to attract to Borneo. . . . Once get them to voluntarily migrate and the financial success of the Company would, in my opinion, be secured. 175 168

Treacher's views have dominated the country's labour and immigration policy ever since.[1]

From 1924 to 1930 inclusive an average of 6,928 Chinese, 6,810 Javanese, and 3,866 natives were employed annually in North Borneo out of an average of 17,606 labourers in enterprises employing 20 or more persons. The Superintendent of the 1931 census was able to declare with jubilation: 'The one bright spot in spite of all these adverse conditions [i.e. those arising from the trade depression] is the increase that is still shown in the number of Chinese, who can fairly be regarded as the mainstay of the commercial and agricultural population.'[2] 464 162

The increase shown by the census report was just over 27 per cent. in the inter-censal decade, while the increase in Chinese females was over 72 per cent., 'thus justifying to the full the policy of state-aided immigration that had been barely started when the 1921 census was taken and which has been still further encouraged and developed in the last ten years'.

But the satisfaction felt by the authorities with the success that had attended their policy of attracting Chinese to North Borneo was followed later in the thirties by a mounting apprehension. In 1937 a total of 7,912 Chinese arrived, mostly labourers, which was a number much more than labour requirements necessitated. Therefore in 1938 a regulation was introduced raising the minimum sum required to be in the possession of Asiatic immigrants from SS $10 to $70 for each adult and from $3 to $10 for each dependent minor. Even so the number of immigrants for that year was 3,342. Already in 1936 powers had been granted to the Protector of Labour and other Government labour officers to deport Chinese on grounds of health, unsuitability for the work for which they had been engaged, unjust treatment by an employer, unemployment, &c.[3] 167 168 464

[1] Similar views had earlier been expressed by Joseph Hatton in *The New Ceylon, being a sketch of British North Borneo* (London, Chapman & Hall, 1881) p. 124, who said: 'It would seem, then, that the principal hope of civilizing and making prosperous the islands in the Indian Archipelago lies in the power to attract the very class of labourer which America has obtained from China, with power to control and economise it.'

[2] Census, p. 1.

[3] To escape the charge of being destitute, each adult European or American

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463 The general economic structure of North Borneo was not different from that of other Southeast Asian countries. Enterprises requiring relatively large outlays of capital (estates and timber undertakings in particular) were chiefly in the hands of Europeans, with a few wealthy Chinese participating. Some of the labour was indigenous, but the greater part of it was Chinese, Javanese, &c., imported for the work. The Chinese constituted by far the majority of the commercial and artisan sections of the community, while most of the natives pursued a subsistence agriculture.

24N 463 168 To encourage the immigration of Chinese agriculturists, especially with the object of increasing rice production, the Government granted a free passage from Hong Kong to the relatives or friends of any Chinese freeholder within the State. The result of the policy for the encouragement of rice production was that by 1938 the area planted with paddy was 90,195 acres, second only to rubber, which occupied 126,640 acres.

463 426 In North Borneo the Chinese money-lender was adversely criticized. Laws were introduced by the Government to control his activities, but their effectiveness was not likely to have been greater than in other Southeast Asian countries; even so the maximum legal interest was 10 per cent. per mensem on loans of $1 or less, 7 per cent. on loans of $10 or less, and was not reduced until 1939, when the maximum legal rate was made 4 per cent. per mensem.[1]

463 651 276 525 As in Sarawak, a considerable proportion of the Government revenues in North Borneo was obtained from gambling and opium farms which were leased to Chinese. The policy followed, however, was much on the lines of that in Malaya. The chandu monopoly was taken over by the Government about 1911, and the farms were finally abolished in 1930.

167 168 was required to possess $300 and $200 for each dependant; for Eurasians the sums were $150 and $50; for Asiatics $70 and $10. Since naturalization was open only to persons who had lived for five years or more in North Borneo, a large portion of the Chinese population was subject to this law.

[464] Indentured labour was abolished in North Borneo in 1933; probably, as in the Netherlands Indies, it was no longer necessary to maintain an adequate labour supply by this means. (George McT. Kahin, op. cit.)

[426] [1] Kahin, op. cit. My experience as a magistrate in Malaya was that it was extremely difficult to ascertain what sum had actually been advanced as the money-lender (in Malaya usually a chetty and not a Chinese) made the borrower sign a promissory note for a sum much greater than he actually received. The remedy for usurious practices lay, it seemed, not in the reform of the law to any extent but in the extension of Government and co-operative society credit facilities,—V.P.

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As in the other countries of Southeast Asia, the Chinese in North Borneo concerned themselves with organizing and supporting their own schools, in which the Chinese language was the medium of instruction and the text-books were, generally speaking, those approved by the Chinese Ministry of Education. Certainly in North Borneo there was little counter-attraction offered to Chinese parents for their children, for in 1938 only $33,000, a mere 2 per cent. of all Government expenditure, was spent in education. This went to maintain or to assist 18 Malay vernacular schools and 1 Chinese school (96 pupils out of a total of 1,347 pupils for all the registered schools). To mission schools was allotted $7,800. There were also 72 unaided schools with 3,776 pupils, most of which were Chinese, supported by the Chinese community. The total enrolment for all schools was 8,912. No secondary education existed outside Chinese schools.[1]

The Government did its best to control the instruction in Chinese schools, and in 1935 100 Chinese text-books were blacklisted.

When the Japanese occupied British Borneo in 1941–2 the

[1] Since the liberation of North Borneo there has been considerable progress, as is reflected in the following statistics (from Paper 1b of the Social Welfare Conference convened by the Special Commissioner in Southeast Asia at Singapore, 1947, already cited):

Education Statistics—June 1947

	No. of schools	Enrolment		Total
		Boys	Girls	
Government . . .	49	2,938	366	3,304
Mission . . .	43	3,300	1,361	4,661
Chinese . . .	52	4,161	1,707	5,868
Others . . .	7	154	30	184
	151	10,553	3,464	14,017

In 1947 it was estimated that there were about 65,000 of school age (6–14).

Expansion in the School Population

Expansion in the school population is reflected in the fact that the total number of Government schools prior to the war was 32, and that in 1949 there were 49 in existence and 11 being built, whilst the total school population had increased from 10,268 in September 1946 to 14,017 in 1949. It is possible that this figure would have been higher, but the marked decline in the price of rubber was considered to have affected adversely the attendance in non-Government schools in which fees were charged. As the result of planned expansion, it was estimated that the school population would increase to about 22,000 in the year 1951.

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When the Japanese occupied British Borneo in 1941-2 the
722 Chinese from the first adopted a policy of passive resistance.[1] There
463 was a tendency for them to move from their usual centres of commerce on the coast or the main rivers and to establish themselves
241 as peasant farmers in less accessible and conspicuous places. This meant a considerable curtailment of trading activity which in turn had a detrimental effect on the Japanese war economy as the occupation continued.

722 Many Chinese helped unfortunate Europeans, sometimes at grave personal risk. The doyen of the Sarawak Chinese community, Mr Ong Tiang-swee, himself took part in organizing the smuggling of news and material into the prison camps.[2] Very few Chinese can be said to have done anything voluntarily or readily to help the Japanese, whereas a number of Dyaks, Indians, and others were tried after the war, and in some cases executed, for treachery. One occasion when the Chinese distinguished themselves by the assistance they gave to prisoners was when the Japanese moved the occupants (mostly Australians) of the great camp at Sandakan southwards in the terrible 'Death March' which only a handful of them survived. The Japanese became increasingly concerned about the attitude of the local Chinese and it was as a result of their counter-measures that Mr F. Selous, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, met his death in internment.

In 1943–4 Lt.-Col. Gort Chester, D.S.O., O.B.E., established an intelligence system in North Borneo, though on a small scale. He and his party were hunted day and night by the Japanese, several of them losing their lives in the process; but they inspired new hope among the Chinese and others in North Borneo. Eventually a considerable number of Chinese, led by those who had been in contact with Colonel Chester, organized a force, staged a rising, and actually took over control in a number of places. But this uprising was entirely premature and correspondingly short-lived. Retaliation was immediate and brutal. All who had taken an active part were executed, the leaders first being tortured to disclose information. In North Borneo the effect of the gallant but ill-conceived insurrection was to handicap the development of the Chinese guerrilla force.

[1] These facts concerning the Chinese during the Japanese occupation are taken from Tom Harrisson, 'The Chinese in Borneo, 1942–46', *International Affairs*, vol. xxvi, no. 3 (July 1950).

[2] He was awarded the O.B.E. for his services and other Chinese were also honoured after the liberation.

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Br. Borneo OC4
Chinese

In early 1945 a number of paratroopers were dropped in British Borneo in preparation for the intended attack by the South East Asia Command (among them being Major Tom Harrisson, D.S.O.). The Chinese welcomed them with enthusiasm, and were ready to help the Allied troops in any way open to them. One Chinese, Miaw Siang, the headman of Sipitang, a small town on the west coast of Borneo, organized a mixed force of Chinese and natives, and successfully harried the Japanese in that area. On the great Rejang River in Sarawak Major W. L. Sochon, D.S.O., relied for his assistance largely on Chinese mixed with more numerous Sea Dyaks. 722

Over in Dutch territory the Chinese trading groups in the interior put up an astonishing performance as nuclei for intelligence and other stations.

After the liberation there was a great shortage of all necessaries, including food. The population, especially the Chinese, depended largely on rice obtained from outside the territory. In July 1946 the daily rice ration was only two ounces per head.[1]

[1] Labuan, a small island of 35 square miles, does not lend itself to separate historical treatment so far as the Chinese are concerned. It was ceded in 1846 to Great Britain by the Sultan of Brunei as a place where Her Majesty's ships might careen and refit. After a chequered administrative history it was reunited with British North Borneo in 1946. In 1881 the total population of Labuan was placed at 5,995 with 300–400 Chinese who were traders, shopkeepers, coolies, and sago-washers. 101 642 175

[p. 440 is blank]

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Indonesia OB1
Chinese

PART VII
THE CHINESE IN INDONESIA[1]

CHAPTER XXXVII

DEMOGRAPHY

659 As is the case with the other countries in the area, it is essential to ascertain what the census officials of Indonesia had in mind when they enumerated the Chinese. The law recognized a category known as 'Foreign Orientals' and, generally speaking, did not make a distinction between Chinese and other foreign Orientals[2] except for census purposes when 'all persons hailing from China and their descendants' were counted as 'Chinese'.[3] Under 'Other Foreign Orientals' were included all non-indigenous population groups not belonging to the European or Chinese por-
[562] tion of the population. All women not by birth Chinese or other foreign Oriental but who were married to a foreign Oriental were enumerated in the population group of their husbands. Vice versa, women born of those population groups, but married to a man of some other population group, were enumerated in the group to which their husbands belonged. (The group of other foreign Orientals was made up principally of Arabs, natives of India, and Malays from the Malay Peninsula, and their descendants.)

The census to which reference here is principally made is that of 1930. No general enumeration of the population of these islands

[1] 'Indonesia' is an expression which has now been adopted both by the Indonesian Nationalists and the Dutch, and is here used in preference to the terms Netherlands East Indies, Netherlands-India, the Dutch East Indies, &c., though 'Indies' is sometimes used for variety's sake or as being more appropriate to a period (see p. xv).

'Indonesia may be a name not yet familiar to Americans. It is very likely that it will come into general use after the war for the simple reason that the term is preferred by the people of the Indies as a whole.' Raden Loekman Djajadiningrat, Director of Education and Public Worship in the Netherlands Indies, *From Illiteracy to University* (New York, Netherlands and N. I. Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942) Bulletin no. 3, p. 7.

[2] Many statutes did, in fact, make the distinction (e.g. the ordinances of 1917–25 which apply the family law of the civil code to the Chinese and in civil ordinances regarding regulations for labour). But the law does not give a definition of Chinese.

[3] *Chinese and Other Non-Indigenous Orientals in the Netherlands Indies*, reprinted from the Census of 1930 in the Netherlands Indies.

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Indonesia OB1
Chinese

659 has been taken since then, and until a lasting peace has been established in Indonesia it is unlikely that any thorough census will again be attempted. This means that the figures concerning the I Chinese in Indonesia were in 1949 already eighteen years out of [162] date. However, since there had been no essential alteration in the distribution in this period[1] we may, by taking into consideration the increase of other Chinese communities in the region as well as sex ratios, immigration, and other factors, hazard a guess that the ethnic Chinese population of Indonesia was by 1947 in the neighbourhood of 1·9 million.

The 1930 census of the Netherlands Indies, then, deals with 'ethnic' Chinese, as do those of Burma, Malaya, and the Philip- SEA pines, whereas the censuses of Siam nd Indochina deal in terms of nationality and not of race.

162 Mr Unger's map of the distribution of ethnic Chinese in South- I east Asia which is reproduced as a separate folder[2] is a very useful 162 companion for a survey of the Chinese in Indonesia, but certain facts regarding it must be borne in mind when it is used.[1] It shows the areas in which the Chinese are most concentrated, but it must by no means be presumed from this that the Chinese are not resident in other parts of the region, for indeed they do exist there and in considerable numbers. For example, the areas shown white in Mr Unger's map prove on reference to the map accompanying the 1930 census to be dotted with a considerable number of isolated groups of Chinese, some numbering between 250 and 500 persons and a few of between 1,250 and 3,000. But these two maps have different purposes—the first conveys a general impression and the second the minute detail in which only the specialist is interested I (it indicates every group from one person upwards).

162 In considering the settlements in which the Chinese have attained considerable numerical strength there are only four which call for attention—one in a great circle round Singapore, another in the western part of Borneo, in the tin islands of Bangka and Billiton, and the Rhio (Riouw) Archipelago, a third in the Division of the East Coast of Sumatra, and the fourth in Batavia and its environs. In the first three areas live about 450,000 Chinese, or 17 per cent. of the total population of these parts: in Batavia and its environs their percentage of the total is 5. In the remainder of the

1 [i.e. 1930-49 -- Analyst]

[1] *See* Leonard Unger, 'The Chinese in Southeast Asia', *Geographical Review*, vol. xxxiv, no. 2 (1944) pp. 196–217.

2 [See end papers, cat. 116 - Analyst]

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Indonesia OB1
Chinese

Indies they account for only about 1 per cent. of the population. Though they are largely urban, relatively more of them live in the country than is the case with the other foreign Orientals. 162

The Chinese community of Indonesia is made up of a number of heterogeneous components differing from one another by reason of the period of time they have resided in Indonesia—which may range from over three centuries to a single day—by reason of the different tribes in China from which they have been drawn, and by reason of the difference in their occupations, not to mention their politics.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century there were estimated to be about 100,000 Chinese in Java and Madura. In the year 1815 they were enumerated at 94,441.[1] The figures for the Outer

Indonesia: The Population in Various Years[2]

(*in thousands*)

Year	*Indonesians*	*Europeans*	*Chinese*	*Arabs*	*Other Asiatics*	*Total*
			Java and Madura			
1860	12,514	..	149	6	..	..
1870	16,233	37	175	8	..	..
1880	19,541	44	207	11	..	..
1890	23,609	55	242	14	..	..
1900	28,386	72	277	18	..	..
1905	29,979	73	295	19	..	..
1920	34,429	134	384	28	3	34,978
1930	40,981	193	582	42	11	41,719
			Total Indonesia			
1860	..	44	221	9	..	..
1870	..	49	260	13	..	..
1880	..	60	344	16	..	..
1890	..	74	461	22	..	..
1900	..	91	537	27	..	..
1905	37,348	95	563	30	..	..
1920	48,300	168	809	45	22	49,344
1930	59,138	240	1,233	71	45	60,727

[1] Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, *History of Java* (London, 1817) table facing p. 70 (51,332 males: 43,109 females in a total population of 4,615,270).

Dr Vlekke remarks: 'I am inclined to be rather doubtful about Raffles' statistics. He had little means of *exact* information regarding the number of Chinese or of any other population group.'

[2] *Statistical Pocket Book of Indonesia* (Batavia, Department of Economic Affairs, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1941) p. 5.

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Indonesia OB1
Chinese

162 Islands are conjectural, but will be given as is appropriate in the historical synopsis to come. The rate of increase of the community as compared with the other races is set out in the table on p. 443.

It will be seen from these figures that the number of Chinese in Indonesia has more than doubled since the beginning of the century. The increase was greatest during the decade 1920–30 and amounted in that period to an average of 4·3 per cent. per annum. This figure, compared with the normal increase of a people under settled conditions which is from 1 to 2 per cent., is indeed high.

162 Although no exact figures were adduced by the census, it is safe to say that in 1930 the Chinese community was divided roughly 167 into 750,000 born in Indonesia and about 450,000 immigrants. (The Indonesian-born were known as *Peranakans*, and the China-born as *Sinkhehs*.) Of the group of Indonesian-born 500,000 had fathers who were also born in the country, and belonged therefore to families who had been in the Indies for more than one generation. The immigrant group divides itself into those who are only temporarily resident in the country and who pass frequently to and fro, and those who definitely settle, marry, and beget children. The growth in size of the Chinese community was thought to be due mainly to the increase in the number of the class who settle permanently and to the natural increase among those who have been in the country for more than one generation. Other factors such as the fecundity of marriages and the death-rate (though improved hygiene has undoubtedly affected both infant mortality and the expectation of life) are considered to have been of much smaller importance than the increase in the number of new-comers who become permanently domiciled and the rise in the birth-rate due [595] to this cause. Nor is concubinage thought to have contributed significantly to the increase in the Chinese population.

In Java and Madura the majority of the Chinese adults were born in Indonesia and only about 30 per cent. were born elsewhere; the Western Division of Borneo also has a large proportion of native-born Chinese. But in the other parts of Indonesia, especially in Sumatra, the foreign-born Chinese are in the majority. In Sumatra, of 100 adults of 20 years of age and over 80 were born outside Indonesia.[1]

[1] The proportion of Indonesian-born to foreign-born Chinese varied very much indeed with the tribe. Only 22 per cent. of Hokkiens, for example, were born outside Indonesia as compared with 66 per cent. for Cantonese and 62 per

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Chinese

It was only within the decade or so before 1930 that the immigration of Chinese women attained dimensions worth mentioning. There were fewer women than men amongst the Chinese inhabitants because few women were included among the immigrants, but amongst those born in Indonesia women were in the majority. The distribution of women is very unequal, but the overall ratio was 642 women to every thousand men: in Sumatra there were only 450 women to every thousand men. Many of the Chinese coolies in Sumatra's East Coast were unmarried.[1]

Now as to the tribes from which these Indonesian Chinese are drawn. Those who came first of all to the country in large numbers were Hokkiens, that is to say natives from Fukien Province in the neighbourhood of Amoy and not the Hokchius from the same province of China. The numbers of other tribes of Chinese do not appear to have been considerable until the nineteenth century. The Hakkas (Khehs), however, first settled in West Borneo about 1740 to 1745. They and the Teochius, greatly in demand as estate coolies, began to be numerous in east Sumatra, Bangka, and Billiton in the second half of the nineteenth century, when Western agriculture and mining began to develop. By 1930 there were about 550,000 Hokkiens in Indonesia. In Java and Madura they formed the great majority, and in the east of the Archipelago accounted for more than half of the Chinese inhabitants. In Sumatra, with the exception of the Division of Sumatra's West Coast and Bengkalis (in the latter of these divisions many of them are occupied in fisheries) and also in the Western Division of Borneo, they were less numerous than the Hakkas and the Teochius.

Since in some parts of Indonesia (e.g. a few remote parts of the Outer Islands, the interior of Borneo, and some parts of the Moluccas) it was possible only to carry out a simple enumeration, no distinction was here made between the various tribes of Chinese, but it is probable that the great majority of the race residing in West Borneo were Hakkas; 200,000 of this tribe were enumerated in the area of the complete census—some 45,000 in Bangka and Billiton, nearly 14,000 in the estate area of Sumatra's East Coast,

cent. for Teochius. *Census of the Netherlands Indies* (1930) p. 294. For many other interesting demographical details, especially regarding the sex ratios, the reader is referred to the reprint of *Chinese and Other Non-Indigenous Orientals in the Netherlands Indies* here cited. It is mentioned, for instance, that among the young women born in the Indies there were many who were later divorced.

[1] ibid. p. 6.

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Indonesia OB1
Chinese

162 and some 65,000 in East Java. There were also small communities of them elsewhere.

167 In numerical position next after the Hakkas, the Cantonese (Kwong Fus) aggregated about 135,000 in the Indies, fairly distributed over the entire Archipelago, but were slightly more numerous in the estate area of the East Coast of Sumatra, in South Sumatra, East Borneo, and Celebes.

Less numerous than the Cantonese (Kwong Fus) were the Teochius. The great majority of their total of 90,000 were to be found in the large circle round Singapore; about 32,000 in the estate area of Sumatra's East Coast, also in Rhio (Riouw), Inderagiri, and Djambi, and almost 22,000 of them in the northwest part of Borneo.

From the large percentage of them born in Indonesia, the more normal sex ratio, and their fairly regular age-groups, it was to be assumed that the majority of the Hokkien community were domiciled in the country. This was also true of the Hakkas in western Borneo. The other groups of Chinese consisted of migrants. 'If these other Chinese races [i.e. tribes] are becoming domiciled, the movement must still be young', says the census report.

463 *Occupation.* Of all the Chinese working in Indonesia the merchants in 1930 formed the largest group (172,000, or nearly 37 per
162 cent. of the total). More than half of the working Hokkiens were merchants, but in West Java in the neighbourhood of Batavia and in the West Coast of Sumatra the larger number had taken to agriculture and market-gardening, while in Bagan Si Api Api in Sumatra the Hokkiens were generally fishermen. The Hakkas of Java and Madura also included many merchants, but the tribe was also interested in industry. In Sumatra they were engaged in mining and in West Borneo in agriculture. The Teochius were also mostly engaged in agriculture and market-gardening, but in the estate area of the East Coast of Sumatra the majority of them were coolies on tobacco estates, for which work they appeared to be especially adapted. In West Borneo business claimed this tribe as well as agriculture. In the other parts of the Indies the majority of them were merchants, while a few engaged in industrial enterprises.

The Cantonese were rather sharply differentiated from the other Chinese tribes by the fact that two-fifths of them were employed in industry in contradistinction to trade or the production of raw

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Chinese

materials. In Sumatra, however, many Cantonese were also agri- 463
culturists, market-gardeners, or miners. In Bangka they formed an 162
important group among the mine workers, while in Palembang
numbers of Cantonese artisans were employed in the petroleum
industry.

The Chinese immigrants were usually limited to the craft or [167]
occupation which brought them to the country, but among the
descendants of this race there was a broader choice of occupation.

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Chinese
Land Dyak OC8

CHAPTER XXXVIII

CHINESE, DUTCH, AND ENGLISH IN THE EARLIER DAYS

I 167 THE principle here adopted is the same as that followed for the other countries of Southeast Asia, namely, that interest in the Chinese is reserved for them from the time when they formed more or less settled communities in the region, and little account is taken of trading voyages or the visits of isolated travellers.

Generally speaking, the Chinese came later to the seas of the Archipelago than the Arabs, Hindus, and Persians; they did not venture on visits abroad until after they had received regular visits from foreign traders, and they did not settle abroad in large numbers until after the establishment of European power had created stable conditions. Nor is this general proposition discounted by such facts as the finding in 1345 or 1356 by Ibn Bathoutha, the Arabian traveller, of Chinese junks at Calicut in one of which he embarked for Sumatra. As far back as the ninth century Chinese traders are known to have visited Java, and Chinese contact with Borneo is believed to have anticipated the founding of the Malay kingdom. However, Pigafetta (who had been with Magellan) does not mention their being in the port of Brunei, or 'Borneo Proper,' when he visited it in 1521, though (as Crawfurd suggests)[1] this may be accounted for by the time of year —the month of July—which would be after the sailing of the junks on their return voyage with the southwest monsoon. He mentions, however, the silks and porcelains of China which he saw in Borneo and he notes the adoption by the natives of the weights and money LD of China, facts sufficient to prove the existence of a trade which was afterwards known to have yearly employed four or five junks of large burden. Another curious fact attests the existence of the trade [778] and proves it to have been of some antiquity. That is the finding among the aboriginal inhabitants of Borneo of Chinese vases 'of an ancient pattern which cannot now be imitated'. These vases were preserved by the Dyaks as sacred heirlooms.[2]

[1] John Crawfurd, F.R.S., *A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands and Adjacent Territories* (London, Bradbury & Evans, 1856) p. 62.

[2] The present writer has examined a number of these vases or jars preserved

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Horace St John[1] states that when the Dutch first landed in Java they found a scattered population of Chinese working in every province of the island; Amry Vandenbosch remarks that the Chinese were in Indonesia before the Dutch and have always outnumbered them;[2] and Cator says, 'Although the Chinese had had contact with the Indonesian islands for centuries and had formed a number of permanent settlements, they did not here as elsewhere, take up their abode in any large numbers until after the Dutch began to establish themselves.'[3]

Before the arrival of the Dutch in Java there is practically no material for an account of the Chinese settlements: their denizens were anonymous, their years unmarked except by the alternation of the monsoons, and their record to us is little but an inventory of merchandise such as Linschoten and his contemporaries retail.[4] But with the coming of the Dutch fleet to the Archipelago in 1596 and the establishment of their power in Java in the second decade of the seventeenth century begins an association that has continued for well over 300 years, and of the contacts and conflicts of these two very diverse peoples is born a fascinating history from which all sorts of political and economic lessons can be drawn.

[114]

The English writer, however, who takes it upon himself to retell the story, seeing as he must through the glass of his own reading and experience, is under obligation to examine his authorities with care. Many of the standard works in English date from the period when there was strong Anglo-Dutch rivalry, and often enmity, and the histories of Raffles, J. H. Moor, and Horace St John (to mention but three), though valuable for reference, have often an anti-Dutch bias, apparent or concealed. Clive Day, an authority of half

in the Sarawak museum at Kuching. Those he saw were of provincial design and coarse workmanship.

[1] *The Indian Archipelago* (London, Longmans, 1853) ii. 1.

[2] *The Dutch East Indies* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1941) p. 100.

[3] *The Economic Position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies* (Oxford, Blackwell, for the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936) p. 193.

[4] Jan Huygen Van Linschoten, *Voyage to the East Indies*. English translation 1598. (London, Hakluyt Society, 1885) lxx, lxxi, 124: 'Those of China trafficke with these islands (Philippines and Indies) and bring thither all sortes of commodities out of their country, as al silkes, cottons, porselynes, powder for shot, sulphur, brimstone, iron, steele, quicke silver, and other metals, coper, meal nuttes, chesnuttes, bisquit, dates, al sorts of lynnen cloth, diskes, and such like, and of al curious things that may be found. . . .' To China they took in return pepper, tin, spices, &c.

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167 [14] a century ago, remarks in the preface to his book on Indonesia,[1] 'When I was first drawn into a study of some of the features of Dutch policy in Java, I was surprised by the wide divergence between the descriptions of the policy current in English and the facts as they appear in the writings of Dutch historians and in the original documents'. This is a warning which should be borne in mind.

At this point an impressionistic history of the Dutch in Indonesia is called for as a back-drop. The following may serve.[2]

The Dutch first reached the Indies in 1596; the Dutch East India Company was founded in 1602, the first Governor-General was appointed in 1609, and the city of Batavia was founded in 1619. Operations were begun against the Dutch by the British in February 1810, but Java remained in Dutch hands until 1811, when the Netherlands were incorporated in the empire of Napoleon I.[3] The Dutch East Indies were consequently seized by the British but were restored by them to the Netherlands in 1816 after the final defeat of Napoleon. The rule of the Dutch in Java and the Moluccas was established at an early date, but it was not for a great many years that the whole of the Archipelago was placed under effective Dutch control. By the middle of the seventeenth century the Portuguese influence was at an end in Indonesia except in Timor. After the interval of British rule in 1811–16 when Java was administered by Sir Stamford Raffles, England retained some posts in Sumatra. By 1876 the greater part of Sumatra was under Dutch administration, though the Achinese in the north were conquered only after long wars which ended in 1904. The new Governor-General appointed in that year, Van Heutsz, undertook military patrols of nearly all the islands, and when he resigned in 1909 conquest was complete and Dutch administration largely consolidated.

439 Long before Jacatra was conquered by the Dutch under Jan Pieterson Coen in 1619 and Batavia founded, the Chinese were

[1] Clive Day, *The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java* (New York, Macmillan, 1904) preface.

[2] Derived from *Netherlands Overseas Territories*, Information Department Papers (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1941) p. 24.

[3] It may be noted that the East India Company of Great Britain had held posts on the west coast of Sumatra without a break since the later seventeenth century, and these were not ceded to the Dutch till 1824.

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installed at Bantam and other places in Java. In the Moluccas, Chinese, Arabs, and Bugis came to Dobo to buy tripang (bêche-de-mer), mother-of-pearl, turtles, birds-of-paradise, and edible birds' nests. In the beginning of the seventeenth century the Dutch made an attempt to take part in the pepper trade of Banjermasin which was mainly carried on by Chinese. Their ships met with a hostile reception; some of the Dutch traders were captured and members of their crews were killed.[1]

Spices, especially pepper, nutmegs, and cloves, were in great demand in Europe where, before the introduction of winter feeding-stuffs in the eighteenth century, cattle had to be killed off in the autumn and the meat was likely to become tainted before the following spring. There was a deadly rivalry between the Portuguese, the English, and the Dutch for the trade. The feeling among the English and the Dutch was that the Chinese were reaping greater profits from the trade than they were. Says John Jourdain in his Journal of 1617: 'Notwithstandinge soe much money as is brought to Bantam yearlie by us and the Dutch, which wee paye for pepper, there is a great scarcitie of money, by reason that the Chinese junkes carrie itt yearlie to China.'[2]

During this period the Dutch often treated the Chinese as enemies and were not above carrying out piratical raids upon their shipping. There is news of such a raid in 1607 when the Dutch Admiral Matelief was reported to have seized a Chinese junk trading at Ternate with the Spanish, bartering linen and wearing apparel for cloves and *reals*. The admiral is said to have removed her cargo and to have given the junk to the people of Gilolo.[3] Another letter (this time from Captain Christopher Harris to the East India Company, dated on board the *Peppercorn*, 25 August 1617)[4] relates that the Dutch had again seized the junks of the Chinese 'for while they rode in the road they took their junks and sent their men ashore'. There was talk, too, of the English themselves engaging in this piracy, though the report that Sir Edward

[1] E. S. De Klerck, *History of the Netherlands Indies* (Amsterdam, Brusse, 1938) i. 112, 245.

[2] Cited by Cator at p. 6 from *So Bing Kong*, by B. Hoetink. In a letter to the East India Company of 5 October 1614 Jourdain says that there was a shortage of money among both the Dutch and English. *Letters Received by the East India Company from its Servants* (London, Sampson Low, 1897–1902) ii. 315.

[3] Letter from Gabrial Towerson from Bantam to the English East India Company dated 16 December 1607. *Letters*, &c. (ibid.) (1896) i. 6.

[4] ibid. vi. 89.

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439 Michelborne had in 1606 taken a Chinese junk was not brought home to him.[1]

577 Most English and Dutch agreed, it seems, in having a low opinion of Chinese honesty (though Captain So Bing Kong became a personal friend of J. P. Coen). Speaking of Andrea Dittis, the Captain of the Chinese in Firando (Japan), George Bell, the English East India Company's agent at Bantam, writing to Richard Cocks at Bantam on 9 June 1617 says,

> his endeavours are had in suspicion and accounted as bent to none other than to deceive you, and it disagrees not with my opinion, for never yet, having dealt with many, could I find an honest and faithful Chinesa [*sic*]; and it is not to be marvelled at, their serving so faithless and fraudulent a master, father of deceit, cannot but have inspired his disciples with his rules of perdition.[2]

George Cockayne, another of the company's servants, speaks of 'Chinese and other rogues,'[3] and in 1615 there is a reference in these same letters to the 'dishonest dealing of the China merchants of Bantam, who are indebted to the Worshipful Company to the quantity of 16,000 sacks of pepper'.[4] The 'Flemings' (Dutch), we are told, have had the same experience in dealing with the Chinese.

But what is admitted elsewhere by these downright English merchants of the ruthless, pioneering days is evidence that the Chinese had at least some virtues. Richard Cocks (writing home to the company) gives his opinion that Captain Jourdain need not be afraid of the company's lending money to the Chinese, and he mentions that when the Chinese themselves lend money they do so at 20 per cent. per annum, whereas no Japanese would lend at less than 33 per cent., and would demand double the security into the bargain![5] On another occasion we find the company's servants

[1] *The First Letter Book of the East India Company* (London, Quaritch, 1893) p. 135, n. Michelborne said he paid for all he took.

'Thereafter they fought a little with a Chinish [*sic*] ship, from which they took some silks, giving twice as much in exchange; but learning soon after from some Hollanders that the King of Java would assault the English merchants of Bantam because of the taking of the Chinish ship, whereby the King of Bantam had lost his custom, Sir Edward thought it would be very dangerous for the English merchants if he remained in those parts so determined to return home.' Purchas, ii. 347, cited by G. B. Harrison in *A Jacobean Journal 1603–1606* (London, Routledge, 1941) p. 320.

[2] *Letters Received by the East India Company* . . . (1617) vi. 13.

[3] ibid. (1617) v. 168.

[4] ibid. (1615) iii. 262.

[5] ibid. (1617) v. 14.

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Indonesia OB1
Chinese

doing their best to persuade the Chinese to accept their goods on credit to be paid for in pepper 'at the vintage'.

The English realized that whatever their shortcomings the Chinese were great merchants and that they bought very much more of their merchandise than the Japanese did. Therefore it was obviously good policy to treat them well. Thus Richard Cocks, writing to Captain Jourdain at Bantam, on 25 February 1615, repeating the letter to the agents at Patani and in Siam (Ayuthia), gives instructions that the Chinese 'may be kindly used, and not beaten and misused as heretofore.'[1]

The Dutch treatment of the Chinese, according to their rivals, the English company, was not good. They robbed their junks, seized their crews, and at Patani their ill-usage of the race had driven all the junks away to Singora.[2] The Malays also treated the Chinese in a violent manner, which, combined with a storm, kept their junks from reaching Musulpatam for a whole year.[3] Altogether the large profits gained by the Chinese merchant venturers were well earned, for in addition to the ill-usage they often received from the Europeans, especially the Portuguese and the Dutch, they were in danger of being captured and made into slaves.[4] But they were not deterred from their trade: in July 1615 George Cockayne reports the arrival of a Chinese junk at Macassar ('it being the first that ever came to this place') with a great cargo of raw silk, woven silks, porcelain, and all other Chinese commodities, and for sale at cheaper prices than at Bantam.[5]

When the Dutch came to Bantam they found the Chinese quarter surrounded by a strong palisade and a moat, containing the finest, *and the most insanitary*, houses in the town, and the only stone building. Most of the inhabitants of the quarter were traders, but in the suburbs there were also cultivators of pepper and rice. There were Chinese likewise at Jacatra where they imported rice and made arrack. In Nieuhoff's work[6] there is a pictorial map of the

[1] ibid. iv. 52.
[2] ibid. v. 168.
[3] ibid. iv. 28.
[4] John Browne writing to John Jourdain on 19 August 1616 mentions the arrival of a Borneo junk in Patani roads with 140 men on board her, 'whereof most being slaves taken at sea, both Chaynnemen [*sic*] and Javaes: amongst whom, as they say, were two Chaynemen [*sic*] were employed by the English in Bantam'.
[5] ibid. iii. 136.
[6] Johan Nieuhoff, *The Embassy of the Netherlands East India Company to the Great Tartar Cham* (1655–67).

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seventeenth century showing the Chinese quarter outside the main palisade of the town at the western corner by the water's edge. In the same volume there is an engraving of three Chinese of a superior class. Many of them owned slaves.[1]

Bantam is described in a contemporary English account quoted by Purchas (and he incidentally provides an early estimate of the Chinese and Javanese character):

> '. . . This town of Bantam is about three English miles in length and is very populous. The houses of the Javans are altogether built of great canes, but at one end of the town is the China town, for the most part built of brick, every house square and flat overhead. . . . The Javans are exceeding proud but extremely poor, for not one in a hundred will work, for that the Chineses being frugal, suck away all their wealth from them. . . . They are a dull, blockish people, whereby all strangers overreach them, and especially the Chinese, who are a very crafty people in trading, using all sorts of cozening and deceit.[2]

That the Chinese quarter of Bantam was insanitary need not be doubted when we remember the general condition of such enclaves for the next three centuries, but in any case we have explicit contemporary evidence on the subject for Nicholas Downton, at sea homeward bound, on 20 June 1613 records:

> . . . three days after I passed the Straits half my people were disabled for labour, some with flux, some with fever, and many with sore legs, for I hold that he that escapes without disease from that stinking stew of the Chinesa's part of Bantam must be of a strong constitution of body, or else of a temperate and well governed life.[3]

The belief was common that the old natives of Java were sprung from the Chinese who had escaped to the Indies in the path of the Mongol conquest of the thirteenth century, and we also find this contemporary belief regarding the natives of Macassar.[4]

A striking account of Bantam is given by Sir Thomas Herbert[5] whose travels to the Indies began in 1621. Herbert says:

> The town [Bantam] of its own growth affords little save rice, pepper,

[1] K. Verboeket, 'Geschiedenis van de Chineezen in Nederland Indië, . . .' *Koloniale Studiën*, nos. 5 and 6 (1936).

[2] Purchas, ii, 496–502. Cited by G. B. Harrison, *A Jacobean Journal 1603–1606* p. 302.

[3] *Letters received by the East India Company* . . . (1613), i. 260.

[4] Johan Nieuhoff, *The Embassy of the Netherlands East India Company to the Great Tartar Cham* (1655–67), quoted by Verboeket, op. cit. p. 9.

[5] The text here is taken from John Crawfurd, F.R.S., *History of the Indian*

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and cotton-wool; albeit pepper for the greatest part brought thither by the infinitely industrious Chyneses, who each January come to anchor in multitudes at this port, and unload their junks or praws from Jamby in Sumatra, Borneo, Malacca, and other places, making Bantam their magazine; out of which, for *rials*, or by exchange for other commodities, they supply the English, Dutch, and other nations. 439

The Chyneses are no quarellers, albeit voluptuous, venereous, costly in their sports, great gamesters, and in trading too subtle for young merchants, oftimes so wedded to dicing, that, after they have lost their whole estate and wife and children are staked; yet in littel time, Jew-like, by gleaning here and there, are able to redeem their loss; if not at the day, they are sold in the market for most advantage. 525

Internal evidence suggests that Herbert is prone to exaggerate for effect (e.g. the staking of wife and children), but another passage in his *Travels* regarding the Siamese and their alleged homosexual habits gives the impression that at times he can be a gaudy if entertaining liar. None the less there is enough of truth in his description of the Bantam Chinese to give it verisimilitude.

During the siege of Jacatra in 1619 Chinese were employed, using the Chinese language as a medium, to act as intermediaries in arranging the capitulation to the Dutch by the Pangeran or native ruler, as nobody in the fort knew how to read or write the Javanese language.[1] Very soon after the foundation of Batavia the Chinese established themselves outside the walls, and in spite of wild beasts and molestation applied themselves to agriculture, planting rice and sugar-cane and making market-gardens.[2] The citizens of Batavia who were not in the service of the company and who were known as *vrijburghers*[3] were unable to compete with the Chinese. From the beginning the Governor-General, Coen, declared that there was no people he desired to have more than the Chinese and that there could not be too many of them in Batavia. Following the practice of the Portuguese in other parts of the Indies, and indeed that of all the great marts of the East where each people had its own ruler, a native Captain was appointed for the Chinese

Archipelago (Edinburgh, Constable, 1820) i. 136 (from *An Itinerie of Some Years Travaile through divers parts of Asia and Africke, with the description of the Orientall Indies etc.* (London, Stansby & Bloome, 1634).

[1] Verboeket, op. cit. p. 9, quoting L. H. W. Van Sandick, *Chineezen buiten China* (The Hague, van der Beek, 1909) p. 165.

[2] De Klerck, op. cit. pp. 260, 268.

[3] Europeans who were *compagnies-dienaren* were not *vrijburghers*.

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of the new city.[1, 2, 3] There were no more than 350 of them at the time.

Governor-General Coen set out in a letter to the company what he considered to be the wise policy for the settlement. The Company, he said, should limit its trade to that of 'a mighty wholesale dealer'; the burghers should be active as middlemen, whereas retail trade should be left to the Chinese ('retailers who in this connexion, and even as merchants, far exceed ours in ability').[4] As far as the Chinese were concerned, the scheme succeeded to an extent that called forth laments from some of Coen's successors.[5]

The Dutch East India Company under Coen's prompting proposed to secure to itself the monopoly in buying and trading in native products (pepper, tin, spices) and it was vindictively indignant when the Chinese attempted to compete with it in these preserves. At the same time the intention was to give the Chinese as much encouragement as possible without allowing any interference with the company's monopoly. In particular, the Chinese were to be encouraged to maintain shipping between Java and

[1] Simsuan and Lak Moei are mentioned as early *Towkays*, or leaders, in Bantam, and So Beng Kong (known to the Dutch as Bencon) was the first Kapitan China in Batavia. Verboeket, op. cit. p. 11.

[2] So Beng Kong was unanimously selected by the Chinese community as their Captain. Shortly afterwards he was given a seat on the magistrate's bench and in the closing years of his life was elected one of the official executors. He had the monopolies of gambling and coining, and he was the overseer of the weigh-house so that all Chinese goods passed through his hands. He was in addition a merchant, ship-owner, and public contractor. He was also an intermediary with Bantam. He retired in 1636 to Formosa (*not* China for obvious reasons), but returned in 1639 to Batavia. He died in 1644. His successor was a Muslim Chinese named Lam Luk Ko (died 1645).

A Lieutenant China was first created in 1678 and a second Lieutenant in 1685; also Ensigns and Sergeants in 1678 (but these lasted only a short time). C. R. Boxer, *T'ien Hsia Monthly* (1937) pp. 447–68.

[3] There is a photograph of Bencon's grave at Batavia in *Netherlands Indies*, vol. iii (1930) pp. 283–91, and in the same issue another of seventeenth-century Chinese houses in the same town.

[4] Herman Theodor Colenbrander, *Koloniale Geschiedenis* (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1871) ii. 181. Quoted by Cator at p. 7. Also *Jan Pietersz Coen* (same author and publisher, 1919) ii. 181.

[5] M. Charles Robequain in *Le Monde Malais* (Paris, Payot, 1946) p. 91 gives 1632 as the date at which the company began officially to encourage the Chinese. 'Does this (asks Dr. Vlekke) refer to the slight improvement of the status of the Chinese in judicial affairs (viz. their testimony admitted in the courts in certain cases)? Governor-General J. P. Coen always showed his respect for the Chinese by accepting invitations to dinner from the Chinese Captain So Bencon and the Company's officials "encouraged" the Chinese long before 1632.'

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China. To protect the company's monopoly, as early as 1620 an *ad valorem* duty was levied on all imports and exports, but a good deal of latitude was allowed to Chinese trading to Batavia with their junks, and the duties in their case were not strictly levied. In 1643 a regulation was made freeing them of 'all vexations' on payment of an overall sum of 550 *reals* a junk.[1]

Before the Dutch came the demand for sugar had been greater than the supply, and the Dutch had set themselves to encourage cultivation in their own territories, especially by Chinese immigrants. It was the latter who had introduced the real cane-sugar industry to Java, although the natives had prepared sugar in a somewhat primitive way. Shortly after the foundation of Batavia sugar-mills had been established there under Chinese who knew their business. They pressed the cane between millstones turned by oxen or by water-power.[2] In 1637 the excise duty was remitted and it was decided to make advances to sugar manufacturers. The result was that the output which previously had been only 196 piculs rose by 1653 to 12,000 sold by the Chinese Captain, Jancon, to the company. As usual, the company lowered prices when supplies increased, but it would not fix the quantity it would pay for, although growers had to supply the company with all they grew. But the company's control over sugar was not so great as its control over coffee, which in this century was grown only by the natives, since there was a large local demand for the former, and, moreover, it was required in the manufacture of arrack which was an important article of commerce in the interior. As Furnivall remarks: 'Thus the Chinese cultivators were in a stronger position than the natives who grew coffee and, being Chinese, had a keener economic sense and greater powers of resistance.'[3]

Gradually the number of sugar refineries in the vicinity of Batavia increased, so that in 1710 there were 130. Then followed a slump caused by exhaustion of the soil, scarcity of labour, the pillaging raids of the Bantamese, and finally, by the events following on the revolt of the Chinese in 1740. In Daendel's time only thirty mills remained. All sugar had to be delivered to the company.

Tea came originally not from China direct but from Japan. As

[1] Cator, p. 9.

[2] Compare the method of sugar refining followed by the Chinese in Province Wellesley in the nineteenth century. Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 47 n.

[3] J. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India, a Study in Plural Economy* (New York, Macmillan, 1944) p. 41.

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159 demand for it increased the Dutch East India Company tried to obtain it from China, but on the whole it was found more convenient to buy it from the Chinese junks which came to Batavia. The usual price paid was $60 a picul, but when in 1717 an attempt was made to reduce the price to $40 a picul, the Chinese junks stayed away, much to the chagrin of the company's directors of Amsterdam, who never forgot this unfortunate attempt to 'buy cheap'. Later a factory was established at Canton. There was no question of a monopoly, for other European nations also had factories at Canton through which tea was procured.[1]

167 Though Coen had wished to make Batavia as soon as possible the 'largest commercial town of the entire Indies', particularly by encouraging the settlement of Chinese engaged in commerce, industry, and agriculture, the intention did not make much headway in the early years of the Dutch regime.[2] This was mainly due to the continued war with native States. In spite of the steady arrival of Chinese immigrants (2,000 in 1629 and Valentijn records another 2,000 new-comers in 1706), the Chinese population of Batavia which in 1619 had amounted to 400 had increased to 2,000 in 1629, but did not reach 10,000 until after 1725. In 1706 the number of immigrants per junk was limited to 100.

Coen used both fair means and foul to achieve his end of peopling his newly created metropolis with Chinese, for on the one hand he held out inducements to those in the neighbouring Bantam to remove themselves to Batavia (as did Francis Light later to the Chinese of Malacca to remove themselves to the neighbouring settlement of Penang), whilst on the other, he carried out a series of piratical raids on the coasts of Fukien and Kwangtung in an endeavour to seize large numbers of able-bodied Chinese for transportation to Batavia, Amboyna, and Banda.[3]

[1] *Mission Interrupted*, ed. Dr. W. H. van Helsdingen and others (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1945) p. 35.

[2] Cator, p. 11.

Compare the situation in Malacca under the Dutch where the population was 852 in 1678, did not rise to 2,161 until 1750, and had dropped to 1,390 by 1760. Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya* (London, Oxford University Press, 1948) pp. 30, 36.

[3] C. R. Boxer, 'Notes on the Chinese Abroad in the late Ming and Early Manchu Periods Compiled from Contemporary European Sources (1500–1750).' *T'ien Hsia Monthly* (1937) pp. 447–68.

Compare the kidnapping tactics of Chinese slave dealers in Sumatra in the 1840s as described by G. F. Davidson in his *Trade and Travel in the Far East*

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Meanwhile, Valentijn records under the year 1625 the arrival of the first Chinese in Amboyna.[1] They were charged a head-tax of eleven rix-dollars a year. In 1631 the Captain of the Chinese, Herman, so named after a previous Dutch Governor, who was a Christian, was murdered by a Chinese whom he had refused to help in a just cause, and was succeeded by another Christian Chinese who took the name of Artus Gysels after the then Dutch Governor. Valentijn mentions the Chinese in Ternate in 1665.[2] 167

Seventeenth-century Impressions of the Chinese in Indonesia

From the beginning the company's policy (like that of the British in Malaya) was to interfere with the life of the Chinese only in matters in which it had a direct material interest, and beyond that to leave them to their own devices and the management of their own affairs. The intermediaries between the Dutch and the Chinese were headmen of the latter community (appointed by the Dutch) whose title was later 'Captain or Chief of the Chinese'. [622]

The community was to adhere to its own usages and customs under which heading were generally included religious observances. But in 1651 (ordinances of 7 March and 28 November) the intolerant Governor-General Reyniersz issued an order that natives and Chinese were not to be allowed to follow their religion even outside the town limits, which so far had been allowed on sufferance, though, needless to say, he had little success in enforcing the order.[3] 798

But it should not be inferred that this was typical of Dutch policy. During the whole of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries *all* non-protestant religions (Mohammedanism, the Jewish religion, and also Roman Catholicism) were forbidden *on paper* (by ordinances) both in Holland and in the Indies, but *in practice* they were all tolerated. When a short-sighted man like Reyniersz tried at a particular moment to put these ordinances into practice, he succeeded only for a very short time or not at all. The last attempt in Batavia of the Calvinist clergy to enforce the paper prohibition against 'false and fallacious religions' was made under Governor-General Camphuijs (1684–91), but they received a

(1846) p. 87. (See p. 495 of this Survey.) According to Davidson the traffic was with Dutch connivance, but confirmatory evidence is lacking.

[1] Francois Valentijn, *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien* (*Ambonsche Zaken*), vol. i, p. 55 (Dordrecht, van Braam, 1726).

[2] ibid. i. 140.

[3] De Klerck, op. cit. i. 255.

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798 relaxe from the Governor-General who answered that they, the *kerkeraad*, should redouble their efforts to get the heathens and Mohammedans baptized and thereby render any measures by Government of the sort asked for unnecessary.[1]

527 The Surgeon-traveller Gautier (Wouter) Schouten (1638–1704) (to be distinguished from Joost (Justus) Schouten who was a company's official in Siam and Malaya) takes note of the 'idolatrous Chinese merchants', natives of Bantam, who had been permitted to reside in Batavia.[2] On 23 January 1659 they celebrated their New Year with many superstitions, monkey-tricks (*singeries* in the French translation), and idolatries.

> Among other things [he says] this degenerate race, degenerated from the Chinese who are their ancestors, held great festival. They erected scaffolds and theatres like those of our own countries, and gave representations of their most famous heroes with gestures most appropriate to their humour, which went on all night for nights on end. They also had buffoons disguised, as at Mardi Gras at home, as wild animals and fabulous beasts, with much beating of drums. Those who were more religious lit candles while others celebrated the New Year by gambling.

302 The worst disgrace that could happen to any Chinese, remarks
567 Schouten, was, when he had lost everything else, to lose the hair of his head, which was very long. When at length it was cut off their
558 whole countenance was changed and they were covered with infamy to such a point the other Chinese refused to speak to them or even to help them in their direst need, so that at last in an attempt to recover some money they even came to staking their own persons and freedom, and when they lost they became slaves. The Regency at Batavia had not failed to make the most rigorous regulations to stop this abuse.

18/ Schouten has a good deal to say about the nature and customs of these strange beings whom he compares, on account of their acquisitiveness, to the Jews (a comparison frequently to be made during the centuries to come—even in a series of newspaper articles written by King Vajiravudh (Rama VI) of Siam, see p. 153). He repeats that not all of them were born in China. They married

[1] Dr. F. de Haan, *Priangan* (Batavia, 1910) i. 431 ff.

[2] *Voyage de Gautier Schouten aux Indes Orientales. Commencé l'an 1658 et fini l'an 1665* (translated from the Dutch) (Rouen, le Boucher, 1725) i. 35 (from Dutch original *Aanermerklijcke Voyagie, Gedaan door Wouter Schouten naar Oost-Indiën* (1676)).

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natives and have transmitted to their posterity the greater part of 181
their manners, customs, and religious culture. With a penetrating and subtle spirit and full of the wiles of commerce they were able to deceive the Christians. They were good seamen, loved aromatics, spices, and flowers—above all flowers with a powerful scent. They had (as he has already made clear) an extreme passion for gambling, and for women, of whom they had a considerable number. What was deplorable about them was the cursed cult of theirs which had rendered devotion to the Devil.

Chinese children (continues our informant) ran about naked [291]
until seven or eight years of age, then they put a piece of cloth 857
round their middles. When they suffered some injury or from some 871
defect they were rubbed from head to foot with Borreborri, which was a kind of Indonesian saffron which they mixed with coco-nut oil, sandal wood, and other things. When they became older they received a very good education. They learnt to read, to do arithmetic, and to keep books of account, using all their written characters for this purpose. They learnt trades and they became expert in making things. The girls were taught to sew, to embroider, and to knit, to ply the distaff, and even to engage in trade, 'as are girls of our country'.

There follows a description of the Chinese dress. Although the 291
Ming dynasty had fallen in China, the Ming costume was still *de* 302
rigueur in the Nanyang—especially the way of doing the hair before the pigtail had been adopted. To help us visualize the detail and the effect there is extant an engraving (previously mentioned) in Nieuhoff's book which shows three Chinese of the headman class at Batavia. The Chinese of Batavia, says Schouten, and those of the greater part of the other places in the Indies, dress in shirts of white or blue cotton with wide and hanging sleeves which they call *Cabaiës*, and they put them on over naked shoulders, but they pass them over their drawers or pants. Some wear them long and reaching down to their feet: others wear them shorter. Their footwear consists of sandals which have no leather band passing over the foot; they have only a piece of wood in the form of a button or of a peg which passes between the big toe and the others.

The hair (says Schouten) is plaited and fixed behind the head 302
like that of our women. They pull out their beards, leaving only a 301
few hairs on the lower lip. Some of the more important persons among them wear a woven cap or a silk *ress* on the head. This cap 291

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[291] covers the head from the forehead to the back and keeps the hair,
which appears sideways, in position. It is their hair which is their
302 principal ornament: its tresses are rubbed with coco-nut oil, or
301 some other oil, to make it more lustrous and smooth. They also wear on their heads a needle of gold or silver, ivory, brass, &c. 'In fine, those who have never seen Chinese before do not fail at first to take them for women, and it has often happened that lascivious sailors have seized them in error.'

291 The women, on the other hand, do not plait their hair: they do it
302 up at the back of the neck with a button or with a cord. Some of them have red gorgets of cotton cloth, or of very light coloured cambric, which hang down and half cover their naked breasts. Others have their bodies naked from the middle upwards except for the piece of cloth or taffeta which they twist round their waists. This they wear higher than the other women of the Indies, and sometimes the swathes pass over the ends of the breasts. The lower part of this sort of dress reaches to the feet.

142 Most of the Chinese are white enough: their wives, however,
567 are browner, and some are quite black. The greater number of the women are from the Island of Bali, where the Chinese men go to
583 buy them as slaves, and afterwards often make them their wives.

The Chinese houses at Batavia are substantial but not very clean,
342 for the simple reason that the women are not clean in their habits, however rich they may be.

264 Wouter Schouten then proceeds to describe the domestic arrangements and eating habits of the Chinese, and notes the fact that rice is eaten at the end of the meal.

291 The dress of the Chinese as described here did not, except for
the manner of doing the hair, alter substantially for centuries.
302 During the third quarter of the seventeenth century the pigtail was adopted, and it had a political significance. We read in the instructions of Governor Bort of Malacca to his sea-captains of the Koxinga Chinese who wore their hair in the old Ming fashion, and of the Chinese who had yielded themselves to Manchu rule and who had their hair shaved or cut short to the crown of the head leaving a long plait or unplaited tress.[1]

[1] *JRASMB*, vol. v, pt. I (1927) pp. 187–8. See also Purcell, op. cit. p. 32. Stavorinus, 'Account of Java and Batavia', in *Pinkerton's Voyages*, ii. 179, describes the Chinese men's dress about 1790: 'They shave their heads all round, leaving a bunch of hair in the middle of the crown, which is twisted with a ribbon, and hangs down the back. Their dress consists of a long robe of nankeen, or thin

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In Tavernier's *Voyages*[1] is an amusing account of the way in which the Batavia Chinese of this period got even with the Dutch soldiers who helped themselves to refreshment intended for the ghosts of the Chinese departed. After a Chinese funeral the kindred and friends of the deceased gathered round the coffin. 764

. . . Besides that they put money in a little Box, and bury it by the deceas'd; and leave good store of victuals upon the Grave, out of an opinion that they rise and eat. Which the souldiers of Batavia observing, us'd to fill their Bellies at these Graves every time they walk'd their rounds. But when the Chinese perceiv'd it, they poysoned the victuals to spoil the Dutchmen's feasting. . . .

The townsmen took the soldiers' part in the ensuing unpleasantness and accused the Chinese of poisoning several of the Dutch, but the Chinese pleaded that if the soldiers surfeited themselves with what was left for the dead to eat,

'Twas none of their fault; for that they did not leave their victuals for the souldiers; and besides that, among all the multitudes which they had buried, they had never had the least complaint before of any one that ever came at any harm by eating their food . . .

The matter was hushed up and the pilfering stopped.

In the year 1685 Father Guy Tachard (*c.* 1650–1712) of the Jesuits came to Batavia on his way to Siam, where he was to take part in the embassy sent by Louis XIV to the Siamese court.[2] The number of Chinese in the city and environs he puts at from 4,000 to 5,000, of which the greater part, he says, had retired to Batavia in order to avoid submitting themselves to the Tartars when the latter made themselves masters of China. Of this community he remarks: 162

Since the Chinese are industrious and clever, they are of the greatest value at Batavia and without their help it would be difficult to live at all comfortably. They cultivate the land; there are scarcely any artisans excepting Chinese; in a word they are nearly everything. There are many rich men among them and we were informed that one of them who died a short time ago left a million in silver money. 181

silk, with wide sleeves, and under it they wear drawers of the same which cover their legs.' [291 302]

[1] *The Six Voyages of Jean Baptista Tavernier, a noble man of France now living, through Turky into Persia and the East Indies, finished in the year 1670* (London, 1678) iii. 173.

[2] *Voyage de Siam des Pères Jésuites, envoyés par le Roy, aux Indes et à la Chine* (Amsterdam, Mortier, 1687).

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764 Hearing from a Catholic soldier that the Chinese had their temple and their cemetery at about half a league from Batavia, Father Tachard and his companions requested him to take them to witness something of their ceremonies. They came first of all to a burial-ground in an ornamental wood not far from the little fort of Jacatra which was used for the burial of Chinese 'of low birth', but later they were taken to a second cemetery where the bonzes interred the 'people of quality' of the nation. They saw several small and grotesque idols hanging from the branches composing the roof of the rustic lodge to which the priests invited them. Here, it was said, the priests prepared the feasts for the dead. Most of the tombs were small mausoleums, very pretty and well kept. The graves were very much alike, except that some had dragons and others lions, and with steps that varied in number and in height in proportion to the magnificence of the tombs. The party, hearing the sound of kettledrums and hand-bells, repaired to the temple, where the Chinese and their priests were assembled to make a sacrifice.

000 Since the Chinese appeared astonished to see Father Tachard and his friends, the Jesuits explained that they were priests of the God of heaven and that they were going to China to preach the one and true religion, and in reply the Chinese bonzes said that they knew that in their country there were many Fathers who were very clever servants and who were held in great esteem by the Emperor and the great men of the empire. Father Tachard would have waited to the end, but hearing that the service, which was intended to drive the devil away from the body of a sick person, would last until evening, he stayed nearly an hour and then he and his companions withdrew 'with a feeling of much compassion for the blindness of this people, and a great desire to work for the conversion of their compatriots'.

167 About three years after Father Tachard's visit to Batavia we can take another peep at the Chinese as they were in these parts through the eyes of the celebrated William Dampier,[1] the ex-buccaneer and discoverer. It was at Achin (Atjeh) that he saw them, and though this part of Sumatra was not to come under the effective control of the Dutch for many years, it is nevertheless within the region we now call Indonesia, and the Chinese at Achin were the kith and kin of the Chinese of Batavia.

[1] William Dampier, *Voyages and Discoveries* (London, Argonaut Press, 1931) p. 195. (Quoted by Crawfurd in his *History*, ii. 136–7, from the original edition.)

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But of all the merchants that trade to that city [says Dampier] the Chinese are the most remarkable. There are some of them live here all the year long, but others only make annual voyages hither from China. The latter come hither sometimes in June, about ten or twelve sail, and bring abundance of rice and several other commodities. They take up houses all by one another, at the end of the town by the sea: and that end of the city is called the Chinese Camp . . . they brought with them several mechanics, viz., carpenters, joiners, painters, &c. These set themselves immediately to work, making of chests, drawers, cabinets, and all sorts of Chinese toys; which are no sooner finished at their working houses, but they are presently set up in shop, and at the door for sale. So for two months or ten weeks this place is like a fair. . . . As their goods sell off they contract themselves to less compass . . . if not at work they had as lieve be without victuals as without gaming. If before their goods are all sold, they can light on chapmen to buy their ships, they will gladly sell them also, or at least some of them, if any merchant will buy, for a Chinese is for selling everything. (Having sold their ships) they return as passengers with their neighbours. . . . They commonly go away about the end of September.

Dampier also tells us of the Chinese trick of making Europeans drunk while they keep sober themselves (no doubt with mercantile motives).

We see, then, that in spite of the Dutch policy of encouraging their immigration, and of the fact that wherever the company set up military establishments the Chinese followed close behind and set up trading posts, the Chinese community in Java at the end of the seventeenth century was still small.

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CHAPTER XXXIX

BEFORE AND AFTER THE TROUBLES OF 1740

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THE sentiment of the Dutch from early days was always hovering between two opposite opinions as to the advantages or disadvantages of the presence of the Chinese who followed the Dutch settlements wherever they were established. On the one hand, they were useful as intermediaries in the sale of the company's own imported goods; on the other hand, they were deeply involved in smuggling the native products over which the company claimed a monopoly. Moreover, they had imported with them criminal element that was always a menace to law and order.[1] I was nearly two centuries before Schlegel's revelations of the nature and activities of the Heaven and Earth Society, but it is possible that the secret societies were responsible for some of the earlier outbreaks of disorder. The Dutch also realized in time that their policy of utilizing the Chinese as middlemen meant that the latter were by their money-lending and their manipulation of mortgages and land leases extending their control over the native villages, with a consequent dislocation of the native economy.

Dr Cator says that during the two centuries of the company's existence the Chinese enjoyed many advantages from the latter's 'well-nigh permanent friendliness'. Certainly the tragedy of 1740 was an interruption of the ordinary relations between the two. Before that, on the whole, they prospered, some making great fortunes in sugar, and preserving the even tenor of their ways. [167] Though not more than 100 were allowed in each ship coming to Java their numbers by 1733 had risen to 80,000 in the Batavia district alone. This sudden rise was due to the great increase in clandestine immigration which the Dutch failed to check.[2]

But the friendliness of the company's policy was one thing and the relation between Dutch officials on the spot and the Chinese

[1] Cator, p. 11 ff. The Dutch, however, made full use of the Chinese. Beeckman (see p. 486) in June 1714 at Arabaya in Madura saw two Chinese who called themselves *Shabanders*, 'which signifies Governors of a port, who were serviceable in keeping the natives in subjection, and managing the whole trade of the place', i, p. 107.

[2] De Klerck, op. cit. i. 362. According to Horace St John, *The Indian Archipelago*, ii. 1, 2, the expulsion of the Chinese in the Philippines at the beginning of the eighteenth century had driven crowds of them to Java.

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was another. The Dutch police for their part oppressed the Chinese through extortion, and there was a general feeling that the rise of the community in wealth and importance, as well as the turbulence of its hooligans, was a threat to Dutch rule. In 1740 the Dutch decided to send as slaves to Ceylon any Chinese who could not prove that they were making an honest livelihood. This action brought to a head the rising discontent among the Chinese and resulted in rebellion, followed by a massacre. 'The Chinese bandits from the outer districts', says Dr Cator, 'raised the standard of revolt and began to attack the forts around Batavia, while many Chinese from the town now also joined the armed groups wandering about in the vicinity.'[1]

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The Government seems to have lost its head, and, being unable to bring the situation under control, initiated a promiscuous slaughter in which thousands of Chinese were killed.

A tragedy of this scale has naturally been the subject of conflicting accounts and varying judgements, in which national prejudices have at times played a great part. Horace St John, a British writer of the mid-nineteenth century, for example, censures the Dutch administration and its treatment of the Chinese in these words:[2]

> The Dutch discouraged the Chinese in every possible way. They imposed crippling taxes on them and their trade, inflicted arbitrary punishment upon them, executing them in hundreds, and subjected their residence in Batavia to a series of harsh rules. To settle there the Chinese were supposed to have written permission from the Resident, and to pay a fee of ten shillings. They were forbidden to ride out beyond the jurisdiction of the city under a penalty, unless given express permission to do so by the Dutch commissary appointed to supervise the interests of the natives. All who, when called upon, could not explain the origin of their subsistence, were arrested and sent to China. Bare suspicion was sufficient grounds for imprisoning a Chinese.[3]

The modern Dutch historian, E. S. de Klerck, states, on the other hand, that up to about 1727 the Chinese had always enjoyed much

[1] Cator, op. cit. p. 18.

[2] Horace St John, *The Malayan Archipelago* (London, 1853) ii. 1 ff.

[3] Before this period the conditions to which the Chinese were subjected seem to have been less rigorous, though de Klerck mentions that in 1717 the Governor-General compelled the Chinese tea traders to reduce their prices by one-third (*History of the Netherlands Indies*, i. 416), and Beeckman in 1714 says, 'A certain annual toll is imposed on the Chinese here (in Batavia) for the liberty of wearing their hair, which brings in no small income to the Government.' 'A Voyage to and from the Island of Borneo, 1718', in *Pinkerton's Voyages*, xiv. 105.

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439 'leniency' at the hands of the company.[1] They were appreciated as
609 quiet and industrious inhabitants and were therefore favoured to
463 some extent above the natives. The latter was protected by the Government, and so, incidentally, were the Chinese, so that little by little they spread over all the north coast of Java, and from Japara to Sidayu there was scarcely a factory that was not managed by
[167] Chinese. Eventually the Government took measures to restrict the number of immigrants, stipulating that each ship coming from China to Java should bring in no more than 100 men at a time. However, this regulation was often evaded or was not enforced, and the result was that there was great and growing unemployment among the Chinese. The Government became concerned and stiffened its policy towards this immigrant race. Chinese were forbidden to go wandering in search of work, the keeping by them of *waroengs* (i.e. little shops) in the interior was no longer allowed (though it was still possible by bribing the company's officials), and many were deported to Banda, Ceylon, or the Cape of Good Hope. 'For the flattering treatment of former days [says de Klerck] cruel persecution was substituted, and it therefore hardly could cause surprise that the Chinese rebelled'.[2]

609 In July 1740 Van Imhoff, the leader of the political faction
579 opposed to Governor-General Valckenier, proposed in the Council that all Chinese suspected of plotting against the Government should be arrested. This proposal caused much difference of opinion and led only to a resolution which was not carried out. In November of that year a revolt of the Chinese started. A rumour had been circulated that a number of Chinese who were sentenced to banishment had instead been flung overboard from the vessels transporting them. The rumour was without foundation, but many Chinese who believed it left Batavia for fear of meeting a similar fate. They joined the groups of their unemployed countrymen roaming the countryside and with them formed gangs, which used the sugar plantations as rallying-places. Fearing a general Chinese attack, the Governor-General recommended in Council that the town of Batavia be cleared of Chinese. This decision was finally taken, and the attempt to carry it out led to the 'deplorable and horrible massacre' which is known in Dutch colonial history as the 'Batavian Fury'.

[1] E. S. de Klerck, *History of the Netherlands Indies* (Rotterdam, Brusse, 1938) i. 363.
[2] De Klerck, op. cit. i. 364.

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Ni Hoe-kong, the Captain China, attempted to escape disguised as a woman, but was captured, tortured, and banished to Amboyna. The Captaincy lapsed, but was revived in 1743.[1]

De Klerck (p. 364) says that over 10,000 Chinese were killed by the enraged mob. But Cator states[2] that after the excitement 3,431 Chinese still remained, including 1,442 merchants, 935 cultivators and gardeners, 728 workers in sugar and timber, and 326 craftsmen. So the massacre did not amount to a complete extermination of the race in those parts.

Without going more deeply into the rights and wrongs of the matter, or the degree of provocation given by the Chinese, we may with safety accept the judgement of the Dutch historian Temminck.[3] He sums up:

> The impartial historian must agree, with M. van Hoevell,[4] that this catastrophe must be imputed only to the ineptitude, to the negligence and the arbitrariness of the Governors-General who were invested with power from 1725 to 1740, and without whose administration the elements of this revolt would never have been formed. . . .

But Temminck adds, 'the Chinese were nevertheless the aggressors . . . and if they had succeeded in their design all the Europeans would have been massacred'. Of this there can be no doubt either. The crime lay in the wanton slaughter after all effective resistance had ceased.[5]

The above was written before the author had had access to J. Th. Vermeulen's elaborate and authoritative work on the troubles of 1740,[6] but although this study brightly illuminates the background and provides detailed information not available to the earlier authorities the above facts remain substantially correct. Dr Vermeulen confirms the judgement of Temminck and says that for the

[1] Boxer, op. cit. p. 465, quoted from B. Hoetink, 'Ni Hoe Kong, Kapitan der Chineezen te Batavia in 1740', *Taal, Land en Volkenkund v. Nederl. Oost Indië*, lxxiv. 74, 447–518.

[2] Cator, op. cit. p. 18.

[3] *Possessions Néerlandaises dans l'Inde Archipélagique* (Leyden, Arnz, 1847) i. 4.

[4] Quoting *Batavia in 1740* (Batavia, 1840).

[5] J. Chailley-Bert, not remarkable for his sympathy for Oriental peoples, and a strong critic of the Chinese, refers, however, to the '*cruauté inutile*' of the Dutch authorities (*Java et ses habitants* (Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1901) p. 127).

[6] Johannes Theodorus Vermeulen, *De Chineezen te Batavia en de Troebelen van 1740*, dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Letters, Leyden 1938 (Leyden, Ijdo, n.d.).

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609 579 massacre of innocent Chinese in Batavia the blame must certainly be laid at the door of the weak Dutch Government. This, divided into two parties, was headed by an irresolute and tactless person, who in the crisis was unable to take command of the situation and who deliberately neglected to resist an outburst of unrighteous fury on the part of the Dutch and others in Batavia.[1]

Their first rage having subsided, the Dutch began to think of their trade and of what the Emperor of China would say when he heard of the affair. Valckenier, behaving as the Spaniards had done in like instance after their massacre of the Chinese at Manila in 1603,[2] dispatched warships to meet the trading fleets expected from China, and sent a letter to the Emperor couched in humble and submissive terms. But when the Emperor showed but little interest in the matter, Valckenier changed his tone and began to bluster. He accused Imhoff of opposing his will and had him arrested and sent to Holland. The story raised a storm in Europe. Valckenier followed Imhoff at a short interval but was arrested at the Cape, and, investigation into his conduct being protracted for several years, he died a prisoner.

Meanwhile the Chinese troubles continued in Java. Survivors from Batavia retreated into the east of Java. Here they opened negotiations with the Susuhunan (Susu) of Mataram, who longed to break the Dutch yoke. Some Chinese became Mohammedans to secure the goodwill of the Javanese. The insurrection continued until 1742, but in the end it was crushed by the Dutch.

After the rebellion (if it can fairly be so called) had been suppressed and things had settled down again the Chinese resumed their function as middlemen and extended their operations. Their numbers were soon made up by further clandestine immigration. The sugar industry, however, had been practically ruined in the troubles.

[551] 427 One of the principal causes of the Chinese penetration of Java was the farming-out by the Dutch to the Chinese of the right to levy taxes. This had been done even under the native rulers before the Dutch arrived, and the first Captain China, Bencon, was a large holder of these monopolies.[3] The principal method, however, by which the Chinese increased their hold over the people and the land was to obtain the lease of large territories (entire villages or

[1] Vermeulen, op. cit. p. 106.
[2] See p. 592.
[3] See footnote, p. 456. Also Cator, p. 18 and passim.

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even districts) from the native rulers. The native princes and chiefs, on behalf of the entire population of the leased districts, contracted to deliver stated quantities of produce, to provide labour (regulated by statute) as agreed, and to pay land rent to the lessee, either in money or in kind. The lessee usually maintained control as a kind of feudal lord. This system was responsible to a great extent for the disrepute in which the Chinese were held by the natives. By 1768 discontent had grown so strong that the people begged the Government of Batavia to depose the Sultans and to establish direct Dutch rule over the whole territory. They believed that this would protect them from the extortion of the Chinese. However, their request was refused.[1]

During the second half of the eighteenth century the Chinese gained in strength. They had in fact become necessary to both Dutch and natives as middlemen, and it was no longer possible, even if it had been desirable, to root them out.[2] Towards the end of the century the company took to farming out to them large areas, and in 1796 out of 8,536 villages (*negorijen*) belonging to the company 1,134 were leased out to Chinese.[3] This example was followed by the regents. On the Chinese estates near Batavia the people were better treated than elsewhere, but in the villages leased to them for only a short period the people were most miserable; for the Chinese were not landowners, but overlords: it was not the *land* that was leased or mortgaged to them but the *jurisdiction*, and the land went with the people and not, as in Europe, the people with the land; so (in Furnivall's analysis) they were able to exercise quasi-sovereign powers and the people were wholly at their mercy. Moreover, when the regent leased land to the Chinese, *his tribute to the company had to be made good from the remaining villages*, and the company was liable to suffer loss. This may explain why the company was so sensitive to the sufferings of the natives on these Chinese farms, and why in official reports the Chinese are consistently referred to with disfavour. One of such reports calls them 'a pest to the country' (a phrase borrowed by Raffles in the extract given below).[4]

Stamford Raffles, who was Lieutenant-Governor of Java during the British occupation of that country (1811–16), has recorded his

[1] B. H. M. Vlekke, *Nusantara: a History of the East Indian Archipelago* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1943) p. 206.

[2] Furnivall, op. cit. p. 47.

[3] Bergsma, ii. 297, quoted by Furnivall at p. 46.

[4] Van Hogendorp, *Schets of Proeve*, ii. 152, cited by Furnivall at p. 46.

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18 impressions of the Sino-native and Sino-Dutch relations as he saw them in his time when the system had reached full development.[1]

The Chinese, in all ages equally supple, venal, and crafty, failed not to recommend themselves to the equally crafty, venal, and speculating Hollanders. They have, almost from the first, been the agents of the Dutch, and in the island of Java in particular, they have almost acquired the entire monopoly of revenue farms and government contracts. At present many of the most respectable Dutch families are intimately connected with the Chinese in their contracts and speculation, and it is only very lately that Marshal Daendels sold the whole province of Pasuki [Besoeki] to the Capitan China, or head Chinaman of Surabaya. It is even rumoured that this is not the only instance in which the Marshal has assigned whole provinces over to the unfeeling oppression of the Chinese, for the purpose of raising temporary resources in money. The Chinese have, in Java, been generally left to their own laws, and the regulation of their own chiefs: and being merely temporary residents in the country, they devote themselves entirely to the accumulation of wealth, without being very scrupulous concerning the means. When therefore, they acquire grants of land they always contrive to reduce the peasants speedily to the condition of slaves.

. . . A late report from the Counsellors of Batavia on this subject, accordingly states that 'although the Chinese, as being the most diligent and industrious settlers, should be very useful, they are, on the contrary, a very dangerous people, and are to be remarked as a pest to the country; and there appears to be no radical cure for this evil but their extermination from the interior, a measure which cannot now be effected.'

This opinion of Raffles, it should be noticed, dates from *before* his experience as Lieutenant-Governor of Java, and is therefore obtained second-hand, though he had had an opportunity of observing the Chinese in Penang, and to a less extent in Malacca, but under entirely different conditions and where the abuses referred to regarding land tenure did not exist. In the same letter he adds, 'The Chinese must, at all events, be admitted to be industrious: but the Arabs are mere drones, useless and idle consumers of the produce of the ground.'[2]

[1] *Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles*, by Sophia (Hull) Lady Raffles. Letter to Lord Minto dated from Malacca, 10 June 1811 (London, Murray, 1830) p. 72.

[2] D. van Hogendorp's other strictures on the Chinese include: 'The lessees, like bloodsuckers, took as much as they could get.' (*Berigt*, 1800, p. 18, cited by Cator at p. 21.) 'The Chinese have been made the owners of Java', *Coup d'œil sur l'île de Java et les autres possessions néerlandaises*, 2nd ed. (Brussels, Mat, 1830).

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When he undertook the administration of Java, Raffles resumed a number of tracts that his predecessor had leased to Chinese. But Daendels himself, to do him justice, had early set his face against the alienation of villages to Chinese, and during his first year he redeemed 56 which had been mortgaged for a sum averaging only 13 rix dollars. But he was the victim of circumstances. He was compelled against his principles to sell land to Chinese because Javanese produce could not find a market abroad as all ships, other than American, had been driven off the seas by the British.[1]

But the Dutch generally, in their projects for reform from late in the eighteenth century onwards, had the Chinese in mind as the chief fomenters of abuses. Measures were introduced forbidding the alienation of villages, and it has since remained a fixed rule of Dutch policy that land should not be alienated to non-Indonesians, including the Dutch themselves. This rule, Furnivall points out, has given protection to the natives, but it has emphasized the plural aspect of society. This has cut both ways. The Chinese were, on the one hand, prevented from obtaining a monopoly of the land and dispossessing the Javanese: on the other hand, any progress towards the assimilation of the Chinese into the Javanese community and making it a single homogeneous society was arrested.[2]

In addition to land, the company farmed out to the Chinese tolls and taxes, including the customs duty. By Raffles's time their control of these farms had been reduced, though, as he remarks, 'in the native provinces they are still farmers of the revenue, having formerly been so throughout the island'.

After the Treaty of London had restored Java to the Dutch (he was actually relieved of his post some months before the handing-over) Raffles set himself to compose a *History of Java*, in which he set down his considered opinions of Dutch policy.

[1] 'The Chinese were forbidden (by Daendels) to lease any *dessas* (villages) even to reside in the interior; and what was probably not less necessary, the sultans were also forbidden to let out *dessas* to Chinamen', M. L. Van Deventer, *Daendels–Raffles, Governors of Java*, translated from *Indische Gids* by George G. Batten (London, Marlborough, 1894) p. 26.

Daendels, however, initiated a project in 1810 for the encouragement of Chinese colonization in the Preanger Regencies in order to obtain more regularity in the supply of coffee, but it was a failure. Cator, op. cit., p. 21.

See also *Staat der Nederlandsche Oost-Indische besittingen, onder het bestuur van den gouverneur-generaal Herman Daendels . . . in de jaren 1801–11* (The Hague, 1814). Daendels, like Raffles, appreciated the essential part played by the Chinese in the economy of the Indies.

[2] op. cit. p. 47.

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609 In all their eastern settlements the favourite policy of the Dutch seems to be to depress the native inhabitants and give encouragement to the Chinese, who, generally speaking, are only itinerants and not children of the soil and they follow the almost universal practice of remitting the fruits of their industry instead of spending them where they are acquired. The Chinese, in all ages, equally subtle, venal, and crafty, failed not, at a very early period . . . [and here Raffles repeats the passage he had included in his letter of June 1811 to Lord Minto, before cited].

Raffles's recipe for checking the Chinese was 'by bringing forward the native population of Malaya and Javanese and encouraging them in useful and industrious habits'.[1]

Raffles is quoted here at some length because his opinions are of weight and he went out of his way to express them, but we must exercise care in accepting his criticisms of Dutch policy in the Indies. For one thing, he was interested to discredit the greatest rivals of the British in these seas, but he still spoke of the Chinese as the 'life and soul of the commerce' of Java, and to his own settlement of Singapore (founded by him in 1819) he was anxious to attract them above all other races. Moreover, it is something of an irony that the reforms he introduced in Java, whereby a money payment of taxes was substituted for payment in kind, had the effect of creating a need for money where none had existed before, and putting the natives more than ever into the hands of the Chinese, this time as money-lenders. Cultivators unused to handling money, but faced with a demand for the payment of revenue in money, mortgaged their crops, so that more land passed to the Chinese than under the former practice, reprehended by Nederburgh and Van Hogendorp alike, of obtaining estates on mortgage from regents.

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439 At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Chinese had an almost uncontrolled command of the Javanese market for foreign commodities. Almost all the inland commerce was in their hands, for, possessing considerable capital and frequently speculating on a large scale, they bought up the principal articles of export from the native growers, conveyed them to the maritime capitals, and in return supplied the interior with salt and the principal articles imported from foreign countries.[2]

In the earlier days the Javanese merchants held their own with

[1] *Memoir*, by Lady Raffles, p. 72 (see p. 472).
[2] Cator, op. cit. pp. 8, 9.

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the Chinese, as some enterprising merchants still do in Minangkabau.[1] Fortune had favoured the Chinese rise to prosperity as well as their industry and acumen. Jacatra was of very small importance as a trading centre before the Dutch came, and they were quick to see the advantages of using the Chinese as their agents. For one thing, the Chinese already had trade relations with the rice-producing East Java and they could obtain rice where the Dutch could not. When the Dutch suppressed the trade of the native merchants of East Java the Chinese were at hand to take their place. 'The Chinese', says Furnivall, 'were mostly immigrants, naturally men of enterprise and character, with a long tradition of commercial affairs and craftsmanship, and it was not strange that they got the better of a mass of an oppressed peasantry in every economic transaction in which the two parties engaged. From the beginning they were playing against the natives with loaded dice.'[2]

The Dutch East India Company had been long in decay, and owing partly to its policy of monopoly, partly to its parsimony in dealing with its servants, which encouraged corruption, and partly to other causes, it had been declared bankrupt in 1798 and its assets had been taken over by the newly created Batavian Republic from 1 January 1800. Some reforms had been initiated by the Dutch when the British occupation of Java put the policy of the country once again into the melting-pot. After its restoration to the Dutch in 1816, domestic policy had to be reconsidered all over again, and this resulted in far-reaching developments in which the Chinese community were naturally involved. But before dealing with these developments it will be profitable to turn back for a few decades to see how the Chinese community was progressing, considered rather as a social organism than an intermediary or entrepreneur.

[1] Furnivall, op. cit. p. 47.

[2] ibid. pp. 47–8.

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CHAPTER XL

CHINESE SOCIETY IN THE LATER DAYS OF THE DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY

167 WE are dealing, it is well to remember, almost entirely with the Hokkiens in the first two centuries of the Dutch connexion with the Indies. An impetus was given to emigration from the province from which the Hokkiens came in the second half of the seventeenth century when the Manchu conquest of China was completed and the civil war bore particularly hard upon it. In the second half of the nineteenth century the impetus was to come from the T'aip'ing rebellion and the resulting disorder, but this time other provinces besides Fukien suffered the depredations of the warring sides. The early Hokkien stock from the region of Amoy was very hardy and active, and their descendants still form the aristocracy among the Chinese in the Southern Ocean.

Crawfurd (whose experience dates from the early years of the nineteenth century) states that the Chinese who came to Java, &c., were from Canton and Fukien province, and adds: 'Those from the latter have a much better character than those from the former. They are rarely from the lower orders of society, and they are less gross and abject in their manners.'[1]

181 577 The Chinese have, as a whole [according to Duyvendak][2] never been a seafaring people with the love of enterprise and adventure which has characterized some of the Western nations and which has made them conquerors in so many parts of the world. The spirit of adventure was really not at all in keeping with the Chinese attitude to life. The ideal life was rather the one of filial piety and it was difficult to reconcile personal love of adventure with the fulfilment of duty towards one's parents.[3]

167 Although in disregarding the Confucian precept the sea-going Hokkiens showed themselves unfilial, they were nevertheless more

181 [1] *History*, i. 137.

[2] J. J. L. Duyvendak, 'Chinese in the Dutch East Indies', *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. xi (1927) pp. 1–13.

[3] Duyvendak mentions a recorded saying of Confucius that a son should not travel while his parents are alive, that he should not climb to high and dangerous places, and that he should be careful not to incur any harm or so much as scratch his skin. For if he were to die or sustain an injury it would cause grief to his parents and prevent him from caring for them in their old age.

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imbued with the culture of China than the immigrants of other 167
provinces of a later period. They came, generally speaking, from
a better class of society. They knew something about, and therefore 181
valued, the ancient civilization of their homeland, and, once in the Indies, they learned the value of the Indonesian civilization as well. In preserving the cultural treasures of Java many Chinese, descendants of seventeen- and eighteenth-century immigrants, had a part. The immigrants of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century came mostly from Kwangtung and belonged to quite another class of people.[1] This judgement is borne out by other recent testimony.[2] The author of an article on Java pays tribute to the taste and culture of the settled Hokkien families of the country in these words:

As many of the Chinese came from China centuries ago and have not 532
ceased to hold intercourse with their native country, the houses of the wealthier men among them are often rich in ancient specimens of Chinese art. The special exhibition organized by Henri Borel and other enthusiasts showed how much of value in this matter might be brought together in spite of the reluctance of the owners to commit the sacrilege of exposing to public gaze the images of their ancestral gods and heroes. Borel has given exquisite examples of images of Kwan-yin, of Buddha, of the ghoulish god of literature, of Lie-Tai-Peh (the Chinese poet who has gone to live in the planet Venus) &c. in illustration of his papers in *L'Art flamand et hollandais* (1900), a translation of his monograph published in Batavia.

This aspect of the overseas Chinese in Indonesia is in rather sharp contrast with the indifference of some of the other communities in Southeast Asia to the refinements of their traditional civilization. In Malaya, for instance, there are very few houses where objects of vertu, images, hangings, &c., are to be found in any number, except in Malacca which also is an ancient Hokkien settlement.

We have already had a glimpse through the eyes of Wouter 872
Schouten at the education that was carried on among the seventeenth-century Chinese of Batavia. It was, it seems, mostly of a domestic nature and not carried on in formal schools. Indeed, it was not until 1900 that the first school was established on modern lines by the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan in Batavia and it was the first in

[1] Vlekke, *Nusantara*, p. 330.
[2] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 13th ed. (1926) xv. 294.

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the whole of the Indies. However, education was given for centuries before that, mostly through home instruction. De Haan says,[1] 'The Chinese have always had schools, to the annoyance of the Council of Church Elders (*Kerkeraad*) because it meant that the Chinese boys received instruction in them at home.' A separate school building for Chinese and other non-Christian children was added to the Chinese Hospital in 1729 by the Government when the hospital was rebuilt—a remarkable proof (says De Haan) of the progress in the spirit of tolerance among the Dutch. The school, of which the Chinese Captains and other officers bore the cost of upkeep, was on the side of the hospital opposite the Company's school for the poor.

In 1753 the Dutch authorities decided to place some Dutch boys in this Chinese school in order that they might learn the Chinese language, which it appears the authorities regarded as an easy task.

Later in the century the school, which from thirty to forty pupils had formerly attended at one time, ceased to function owing to mismanagement, and in 1787 the Chinese Lieutenants wanted to open a new school at Klenting.[2]

Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism remained the religion or social code of the majority of the Chinese immigrants, but a number of them became Mohammedans. There is a mosque in Batavia which was built by the Mohammedan Chinese in 1786. Near this mosque is the grave of the wife of its Chinese architect: it is ornamented with Chinese designs and inscribed with Chinese characters which would be regarded as sacrilege by an orthodox Muslim. The number of Mohammedans was small, but at Macassar it became considerably larger than anywhere else in the Indies and this town later became the seat of a Chinese Muslim Party, the *Partij Tionhoa Islam Indonesia*.[3, 4]

[1] Dr F. De Haan, *Oud Batavia*, 2nd ed. p. 392, cited by Nio Joe Lan in 'De Eigen Onderwijsvoorziening der Chineezen', *Koloniale Studiën*, no. 1 (February 1939) p. 67.

[2] *Oud Batavia*, 2nd ed. (1935) p. 392, cited by Nio Joe Lan in 'De Eigen Onderwijsvoorziening der Chineezen', *Koloniale Studiën*, nos. 5 and 6 (1936) p. 68.

[3] Kwee Kek Beng, 'Het Cultureele Leven der Chineezen in Nederlandsch-Indiën', *Koloniale Studiën*, nos. 5 and 6 (1936) citing De Haan, op. cit. i. 396, and ii. n. 16.

[4] Dampier tells of 'a Chinese Renegado (Renegade) who was Captain of the China Camp (at Acheen) who got himself so entangled with the law that he would have been ruined had he not disentangled himself by turning Mohammedan,

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Since the immigrant males married native wives they generated a mixed race 'inferior in energy and spirit to the original settler, but speaking the language, wearing the garb, professing the religion, and affecting the manners of the parent country'. 'The Chinese settlers', continues Crawfurd[1] (adding yet one more European judgement of the Chinese to the scores that sprinkle the pages of South-east Asian history), 'may be described at once as enterprising, keen, laborious, luxurious, sensual, debauched, and pusillanimous.' 181

(The statement that the descendants of the Chinese settlers spoke the language of their forebears requires modification, for many lost their ancestral language altogether. They became, indeed, like the Babas of Malacca, speaking Malay which was often a Malay of their own.[2] This fact resulted in the coming into being of Malay-speaking theatrical companies which gave Chinese plays in Chinese costume with Chinese music and according to Chinese stage technique—but the actors and actresses spoke Malay instead of Chinese!) [536 197]

Opinions of the Europeans held by the Chinese are, on the other hand, very few and far between—not, we may be sure, because the latter refrained from forming opinions, but because they rarely recorded them. One important exception is the book by Ong Tae-hae in Chinese published in the 56th year of Ch'ien Lung (1791) and referring to the author's experiences some years before in Java.[3] He lived ten years in the Indies, first at Batavia, then at Semarang, after that at Pekalongan, and then returned to Batavia. Medhurst says: 114

> The author appears to have been a man of education and observation, equal to the generality of his own countrymen. His distorted views and occasional mistakes are to be ascribed to his early habits and partial information: considering the circumstances under which he wrote, however, his remarks display not a little good sense and good feeling.

He was a Hokkien by birth. His book has three prefaces by Chinese scholars other than his own, and is accompanied by a map of the Nanyang which has to be seen to be believed. A European child of six would have made a far better attempt at cartography.

whereupon he was carried in great state through the city of Acheen on an elephant, with one crying before him that he had turned Believer', Dampier (ed. Wilkinson) op. cit. p. 96.

[1] *History*, i. 135.

[2] Purcell, op. cit. p. 293.

[3] Ong Tae-hae, *The Chinaman Abroad: An Account of the Malayan Archipelago* (Shanghai, Mission Press, 1844).

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[114] Ong Tae-hae gives a long and factual account of the Indies and the Dutch and their administration, and his statements appear to 186 be substantially accurate. The territory of Batavia, he tells us, originally belonged to the Javanese, but the Dutch, having by stratagem and artifice got possession of the revenues, proceeded to give orders and enact laws, until, squatting down all along the sea coast, they have exacted duties, issued passports, guarded ingress and egress, put down robberies, and brought the natives under their entire control. The Hollanders have long noses and red hair. The Chinese rich merchants and great traders amass in- [664] exhaustible wealth, whereupon they give bribes to the Hollanders [554] and are elevated to the ranks of great Captain, Lieutenant, Commissioners of Insolvent and Intestate Estates, or *Boedelmeester*, Secretary, Choo-kat-tat, and suchlike appelations, but all of them take the title of Captain (or Cap-pit-tan). When the Chinese [692] quarrel or fight they represent their cause to the Captain, before whom they make a low bow without kneeling, and refer to themselves as 'juniors'. The rights and wrongs, with the crooked and straight of the matter are all immediately settled either by imprisonment or flogging without giving the matter a second thought. With respect to flagrant breaches of the law and grave crimes, however, together with marriages and deaths, reference must invariably be made to the Hollanders. Those Chinese who journey by water [486] or by land must all be provided with passports to prevent them going or coming in an improper way. From this may be inferred how strict the Hollanders are in the execution of the laws, and how minute in the levying of duties.

186 The Chinese is perplexed, however, by the Dutch method of investigating crimes of violence and by their criminal procedure. 695 For example, in China when a dead body upon which violence has been committed is found, the nearest inhabitants are apprehended and are required to deliver up the culprit. (This was strictly in accordance with the Chinese theory of corporate responsibility.) Ong Tae-hae laments that this is not also the practice in Java. The Dutch instead lay great stress on evidence, requiring the witnesses to submit to examination and to take an oath by cutting off a cock's head (in the Chinese manner) before they will give judgement in any matter. But when a man meets with a violent death, his body is either thrown out into the streets or suffered to float down the 000 streams, and nobody dares to come forward as a witness. Alas!

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Alas! exclaims our author, that human life should be treated so lightly!

The Dutch are very much like the man who stopped his ears up when he was stealing a bell.[1] Regarding them by the rules of reason, they possess scarcely one of the cardinal virtues[2]—husbands and wives separate, with permission to marry again, and before a man has been dead a month his widow is allowed to go and live with another man. Thus they have no rectitude. They make no distinction between superior and inferior, and men and women are mingled together. Thus they are without propriety. They are extravagant and self-indulgent in the extreme, and thus they bring themselves to the grave without leaving any inheritance to tranquillize and aid their posterity. They have no wisdom, but of the single quality of sincerity, however, they possess a little.

Every seven days, says Ong Tae-hae, there is a day of ceremony, or a sabbath, when from nine to eleven in the morning they go to their place of worship and mumble charms, the congregation hanging down their heads and weeping as if there were something very affecting about it all. But after half an hour's jabber they are allowed to disperse, and away they go to their garden-houses and spend the remainder of the day in amusement without attending to any business. Then you may see the dust of their carriages and the pacing of their horses all along the road, presenting a very lively scene.

The book further tells us that in their habits the Europeans aim at being polite and affect an elegant air. They seem delighted at meeting their friends and are lavish in their compliments to one another. If a man should become poor and call upon them for help they will not turn him away; whether he be of the same clan or only distantly connected they will not look upon him slightingly.

In stating this, Ong Tae-hae is admitting that the Dutch possess one further virtue in adding to a tincture of sincerity and that is *I*,

[1] Insinuating that they try to hide their vices from themselves and imagine that they are equally concealed from others. They have a story in China that while a man was stealing a bell he stopped up his own ears to prevent himself from hearing the noise and imagined that others would be deaf to the sound (Medhurst's note).

[2] The Chinese cardinal virtues are benevolence (or humanity), *Jen*; the duty of man towards his neighbours, *I*; politeness, *Li*; sagacity, *Chih*; and sincerity, *Hsin*. See Purcell, *Problems of Chinese Education* (London, Kegan Paul, 1936), p. 37.

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[181] or the duty of a man towards his neighbours. But the Chinese interpretation of the virtue is somewhat different and does not in-
186 volve responsibility to anyone outside his own clan.[1]

This small book of only eighty pages in the English translation is
114 taking up a good deal of our space, but this is justified by the fact that it is undoubtedly genuine (as is proved by internal evidence), that it belongs to the period contemplated by our sub-title, and that it represents a unique attempt of a Chinese to regard foreigners objectively and not to apply to them the cast-iron judgements of a 'three-legs essay'. And in addition to revealing a great deal of the frame of mind of an immigrant Chinese, it gives valuable information about their affairs.

554 When any Chinese is appointed a Captain by the Dutch, a dis-
574 patch asking for permission to do so (says Ong Tae-hae) is sent to Holland. Having received notification of his appointment, the new Captain selects a lucky period and assembles his relatives and friends, the guests of the family, and visitors from the villages, amounting to a score or so of persons. Then on the appointed day the Hollander appears bringing with him the order for the appointment. An elaborate ceremony ensues, there is an interchange of compliments, 'and this', says our author, 'is the way the Dutch get our people into their net'.

554 We are further told that the power of the Captains in Batavia was divided and that the profits of the appointment were uncertain; whereas in Samarang the Captain's authority was fixed and his profits were more regular. The boiling of sea water to make salt and the cultivation of the fields to produce revenue were both perquisites of the Captain, and he was thus enabled to amass a great deal of wealth.

581 The habit of the Chinese of the Nanyang was to prefer for sons-
583 in-law those who were born in China, and not to regard those born in the country with great esteem. In the case of a China-born bridegroom a pair of wax candles would suffice as a marriage portion 'which was most delightfully cheap'.

361 The visitor from Fukien includes a striking picture of the luxurious lives of the richer Chinese in these parts. They lived in
342 fine houses with gardens planted with splendid shade-trees, they

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[1] It must be borne in mind that all this criticism is uttered at a time when the
556 Chinese code had fallen into a state of great ritualism and ossification from which it has not subsequently emerged.

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were waited on by scores of female slaves, and the food they ate was of the finest quality. In Pekalongan the Chinatown faced the hills and bordered the sea. It consisted of a row of houses—perhaps fifty or sixty of them, with high stories, joined to one another. Towards the west was the Captain's residence, to the right of which was a garden of perhaps an acre in extent beautifully shaded with trees. In the garden was a pavilion called the 'pavilion of floating clouds' in which the Captain relaxed. (Ong Tae-hae describes how he himself was entertained to dinner by the Captain.)

The book includes several short biographies of eminent Chinese sojourners in the Nanyang, starting off with the famous Ong Sam-po.[1] One of the celebrities was the wife (presumably a Javanese) of a Chinese. The Chinese returned to China, and his wife, hearing of his death, braved the seas to come to China in order to look after his impoverished relatives. Another was Tan P'ak-kung, first cousin of Yang, Captain China of Samarang. When Yang died he was succeeded by one Kh'eng. The author describes a visit to Kh'eng by a native chief, the Temenggong, who came in a great procession accompanied by several hundred horsemen. The Chinese Captain sat exalted and apart and received the Javanese chief with only a slight inclination of the head. That he should have attained such a lofty position in a far land, says Ong Tae-hae, 'shows what our Flowery Chinese are capable of'.

We see, then, these two races, the Dutch and the Chinese, of widely separated homelands combining together to administer and exploit a great territory but with no great degree of sympathy with, or understanding of, one another. Their common interests were exclusively material. There was indeed a mutual respect based on an appreciation of the other's administrative or commercial qualities as the case might be, but nothing more. Dutch opinions of the moral nature of the Chinese were almost invariably unflattering: we have seen from Ong Tae-hae above that the Chinese, for their part, were not willing to concede much in the way of virtue to the 'red-haired'[2] conquerors.

As an example of the extent to which prejudice and ignorance could reach, we could not improve on the libels of the Dutch

[1] R. J. Wilkinson says that Cheng Ho's name is often wrongly given by the Chinese of the Straits as Ong-Sam-po, the Ong really being the clan name of his second-in-command. See 'The Malacca Sultanate', *JRASSB*, vol. xiii, pt. ii (1935) p. 25.

[2] To the Chinese the Dutch were always the 'red-haired race'.

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114 Admiral Stavorinus (even though some of them are of the kind that
186 Gibbon usually relegates to Greek footnotes).[1]

Stavorinus is by no means, however, a stupid or an unobservant man, and to him we owe fresh sidelights on the social life of the Chinese in the later eighteenth century. He tells us, for instance, that the few Chinese who in the 1790s lived within the city of Batavia had very wretched houses. Most of them dwelt in the southern or western suburbs which were together called the Chinese Campong. Before the revolt of 1740 they had the best quarters in the city allotted to them, to the west of the great river, but when, in that commotion, all the houses were burnt to the [651] ground, the whole quarter was made into a *pasar*, or market. The Chinese were taxed, he says, at the monthly rate of half a ducatoon (one ducatoon equals 36 stivers or 6 shillings sterling). Women and children and those who had no trade were exempted from the tax which brought in a total revenue of 40,000 rix dollars a year. A flag was hoisted at the door of the Chinese Captain in the 1st or 2nd of every month and the Chinese who were liable to the tax had to come and pay it. Most of the sugar-mills, he records, were run by Chinese.

It is when he comes to the Chinese in commerce, their religious observances, and their alleged immoralities that Admiral Stavorinus reveals his prejudice and his credulity. In business, he says, [778] they are 'like the Jews in Europe'. He describes the images (or *Joostyes*) in every house, painted on Chinese paper and hung up in a niche, in front of which one or more lamps were kept always burning, and the incense made into thin tapers. Their idol is depicted as an old man with a square cap upon his head and with a female, designed for his wife, next to him. He also notes the practice of throwing lots with sticks in the temples. He says 'It is worthy of observation, that whilst the practice of the most abominable idolatry is allowed, the Roman Catholic Religion is obstinately prohibited.' (From which the presumption is that Stavorinus is a Catholic.) He ends up with the passage to which reference has already been made: 'The Chinese are of a very lustful temper. They are accused of the most detestable violation of the laws of nature and it is even said that they keep swine in their houses, for purposes the most shameful and repugnant.'

[1] Account of Java and Batavia from the voyages of Stavorinus in *Pinkerton's Voyages*, vol. xi, pp. 159 ff. Johan Splinter Stavorinus (1739–88) was writing of the period 1768–71 (see *Biografisch Woordenboek* (Leyden, Sijhoff, 1912) vol. ii).

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There is nothing to encourage the belief that either Europeans or Chinese in the Indies took any real trouble to understand one another. This is true of the Straits Settlements in the first century of their existence as it is of the Dutch East Indies. The Chinese were regarded as materially useful and left to their own devices as much as possible. It was not until 1877 in the case of the former and 1900 in the case of the latter that there came into being a department of experts whose business it was to acquaint themselves as closely as possible with the Chinese outlook, and to advise as to the best methods of dealing with that important community. 186

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CHAPTER XLI

THE CHINESE IN THE OUTER ISLANDS[1]

167 DISREGARDING earlier contacts and several smaller and often intermittent settlements,[2] the serious Chinese penetration of west Borneo began in 1760 (or in 1770 according to Veth[3]). About this time the Chinese gold-miners employed by the Sultan of Sambas rebelled against him and took over the management and the working of the gold mines for themselves. It is said that the extortionate and tyrannous behaviour of the Sultans of Sambas precipitated this revolution.[4] After this the Chinese miners took little further notice of the Sultans but the tribute agreed upon was still paid more or less regularly. Nor did their action deter the rulers from ceding tracts of territory to them. But when disputes arose between the Chinese and the Dyak population the rulers declined to intervene. There were many conflicts with a great deal of bloodshed.

437 The Chinese in Borneo did not confine their activities to mining. To begin with they came at long intervals and in small numbers. They carried out their usual systematic procedure, clearing large tracts of land, cultivating pepper, and laying out vegetable gardens. From clearings near the mouths of rivers they wandered into the interior and began felling the timber trees and floating them down stream to primitive docks they had erected. They built large and

[128] [1] For the sake of convenience the various Chinese settlements in Southeast Asia are here dealt with according to the political divisions of the territories. The Chinese in Sarawak, Brunei, Labuan, and British North Borneo are therefore discussed separately since they come within the British area, but the account should be read in conjunction with the present one of the Chinese in Dutch Borneo since the history of the two communities is connected though the former, generally speaking, belong to a later period.

[2] Daniel Beeckman, who visited Borneo in 1714, says: 'The Chinese who live among them [the Borneans] are the only persons that have ships tolerably well furnished: they set them off with coarse chintz, calicoes, bastees, tea, drugs, china-ware, and many things—the current money is dollars, half, and quarter dollars: leaden cash as small change, in strings.' Captain Daniel Beeckman, *A Voyage to and from the Island of Borneo* (London 1718), reprinted in *Pinkerton's Voyages* (1812) xi. 125.

[3] Prof. P. J. Veth, *Borneo's Western-Afdeeling, 1854–6* (Zaltbommel, J. Noman, 1854–6).

[4] Cator, p. 139 ff.

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solid junks from this timber which they steered for China loaded 439
with their merchandise. When they had disposed of the merchandise for considerable sums they sold their junks, secured inferior craft for their return journey, and then started the process all over again.[1] A Mr Jesse who visited Borneo about 1774–5 reported to the (English) East India Company that he had himself seen a junk of 580 tons laid down in a Chinese building-shed at Brunei at the beginning of March that was launched at the end of May. He mentions that the Chinese artificers built her and completed her at an outlay of $4,250 or, to use his own words, 'about 30 shillings a ton, an example of cheap shipbuilding without a parallel in any other country'.[2]

Thomas Forrest (whose work is quoted in the first footnote below) gives a vivid impression of the animated commerce of Borneo town (Brunei, or Borneo proper) in the year 1776. He tells that the town stood about three or four miles up the river Patatan, consisting of about a hundred houses on the water-front. Above the town were many pepper gardens belonging to the Chinese in a delightful country-side. Regarding Borneo's market, 'Imagine', says Forrest, 'a fleet of London wherries, loaded with fish, fowls, grain, &c., floating up with the tide from London Bridge towards Westminster: then down again, with many buyers floating up and down with them; this will give some idea of the Borneo market.' Great quantities of blackwood for furniture were bought at about $2 a picul and sold for $5 or $6. Also rattans, dammer (*damar*), cloves, swallo (bêche-de-mer), tortoiseshell, edible birds' nests, &c. The best camphor sold for $10–$12 a Chinese catty. Seven junks were in port when Forrest arrived.

Forrest has a note, too, on Chinese pepper-growing which 244
it would be interesting for the agriculturist to compare with

[1] 'At Borneo town the Chinese sometimes build junks which they load with the rough produce of the Island of Borneo, and send thence to China. I have seen a dock close to the town in which a Chinese junk of 500 tons has been lately built, worth 2,500 taels, and 8,000 in China. Could these junks come readily at our (British) woolens, they would distribute immense quantities through the northern parts of China.' Thomas Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas etc. performed in the Tartar Galley belonging to the Honourable East India Company, during the years 1774, 1775, and 1776* (London, Scott, 1780) p. 382.

Though the title reads thus, it appears that it was a galley named the 'Tartar' (10 tons burden!) and not a 'Tartar Galley' which Forrest navigated.

[2] 'The Chinese in Borneo' (anon.), *China (Quarterly) Review*, vol. vii (July 1878 to June 1879) p. 4.

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other notes of Chinese pepper-growing at various times and places:[1]

> They do not let the vine, which bears the pepper, twist round a chinkapin tree, as is the custom in Sumatra; but drive a pole, or rather short stout post, into the ground, so that the vine is not robbed of its nourishment. The Chinese keep the ground very clean between the rows of vines; and I have seen them pull off the vine leaves; saying they did it that the pepper corn might have more sun. I have counted 70, sometimes 75, corns of pepper on one stalk—more than Sumatra.[2]

Our English traveller tells us that the Chinese here in Borneo were very active and industrious. They brought with them all sorts of Chinese manufactures and kept shop on board their junks as well as on shore. But the Borneans did their best to prevent them dealing with the Muruts, wishing to reserve the trade to themselves. The Muruts did not plant pepper: this was the monopoly of the Chinese and all their produce went to China.

> As for the Chinese junks, it gave a European pleasure to see the regularity and cleanliness on board them. The fact that they did not use tar contributed not a little to the latter condition. They had instead an art of putting a mixture of lime and oil into the seams of their decks which hardened them and kept them tight. This was much cleaner than pitch, but if the deck 'worked' at sea, Forrest apprehended that the caulking would break open and the junk prove leaky. The tanks for water were sweet and clean: the cooking galleys remarkably neat; the crew all ate off china. In harbour everyone was employed without noise on his own business.[3]

But the Europeans were well aware of the existence of this trade and had for centuries regarded it with jealousy. The Portuguese first, and after them the Dutch, made treaties with the Malay princes which allowed them to undersell the junk masters. And, says Hunt, 'these powers went further; by setting at ports in Borneo their *guardas de costas*, they compelled the traders of Borneo to send their produce calculated for the China market to Malacca or Batavia, which at length completely cut up the direct trade with China by means of the Chinese junks'.[4]

[1] See Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 45, re Penang; p. 218, of present Survey, re Indochina.

[2] op. cit. p. 382.

[3] Compare, however, the experiences of Dr Ruschenberger in Siam, *c.* 1833, when he found the Chinese junks kept in a filthy condition. See p. 125.

[4] 'The Chinese in Borneo' (anon.), *China (Quarterly) Review*, vol. vii (July 1878–June 1879) p. 5.

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The Kongsis

De Groot and Schlegel date the Chinese arrival in Borneo from the arrival of a Chinese junk during the reign of Sultan Oumar Alamoudin (*c.* 1772). 'The Chinese deputation, pale and exhausted by the misery suffered during the long and difficult crossing of the sea, directed its steps humbly towards the Sultan's palace and threw themselves on his magnanimity, praying for the grant of a small portion of his territory where they might settle.'[1] Their prayer was answered and they were assigned the district of Larah. For long they were regular in the payment of their taxes, industrious, and peaceable. They intermarried largely with the Dyaks. But the tyranny and the inexhaustible thirst for riches of the Sultan brought about a change in their attitude. As their numbers increased the Chinese formed themselves into so-called Kongsis, and thus, gradually feeling their power, they backed out of their obligations.

Schlegel traces their origin to rural and village associations of China which make the base of the political constitution of China. Absolutely republican in government, they made a real counterpoise to the autocracy of the sovereign.[2] The Kongsis formed, as it were, petty republican communities, which, though occasionally in strained relations with one another, had one thing in common which was that they cared little for the authority of the native princes or, later, when it was established, that of the Dutch Government.

The founder of the original Kongsi, *Lanfong*, whose name was Lo Fong-phak, went to Borneo in 1772 with 100 members of his family. (The *Lanfong*, like the *Thian Thi* Kongsi, was exclusively agricultural and had nothing to do with mining.)

At the time of the arrival of the Chinese, native affairs seem to have been in a very fluid state, but soon afterwards the first Sultan Abdul Rahman succeeded in attracting round him several groups

[1] Dr J. J. M. de Groot, *Het Kongsiwezen van Borneo: eene Verhandeling over den Grondslag en den Aard der Chineesche Politieke Vereeningingen in de Kolonien mit eene Chineesche Geschiedenis van de Kongsi Lanfong*. (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1885.)

Reviewed in Professor G. Schlegel, 'L'Organisation des Kongsis à Borneo', *Revue Coloniale Internationale* (Amsterdam, de Bussy, 1885) i. 448–65.

See also Raymond Kennedy, *The Ageless Indies* (New York, John Day, 1942) p. 48.

[2] Schlegel, op. cit. p. 456. Cator, p. 148 ff.

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361 of Chinese, Bugis, and Malay settlers, and built a town. Soon after, in 1786 (says Hunt[1]), the Dutch appeared with two brigs and fifty troops to establish their factory.

The early Chinese establishments in Borneo were all on the fringe: there was no settlement of the huge interior. In the map accompanying Raffles's 'History of Java' (1817) Borneo is described as a 'blank'.

316 About 1812 the principal gold-mines were at Sambas and thirty-odd of them were worked by the Chinese. There were about 300 coolies on each mine. The pay of each coolie was on an average $4 a month. The mines were rented from the Raja at the rate of 50 bunkals of gold per mine per annum, besides a capitation tax of $3 per head for each Chinese. There were 30,000 Chinese in the Sambas district: in addition about 12,000 Malays and Dyaks.[2] At Salako, up a river 15 miles south of the Sambas river, and lying nearly 40 miles up it, was a settlement where 20,000 Chinese were engaged in mining. At Montrado there were (says Hunt) about 50,000 Malays, Dyaks, and Chinese. At Mandor, where many Chinese were settled, their numbers were annually increasing. There were Chinese in the Songo district and also in Matan. The mine at Tampasuk was a very valuable one. The Chinese settlement, 'Campo China', at Pontianak contained 2,000 souls. The town of Borneo proper (Brunei), 'situated 15 miles up one of the finest rivers in the world', had a population of 15,000 including Chinese, Malays, Muruts, &c.

Hunt's comment on the situation in Borneo is:

> Living as the Chinese do, under the rapacity of despotic and ferocious freebooters, who are actuated by no principle of honour, justice, or good faith, it is their interest to conceal the riches they amass, not only to preserve themselves from the clutches of these tyrants, but as the most compact substance to transport to their native shores.

439 The effect of the Dutch policy in diverting all trade via Batavia
167 was that the transport of *gruff* (coarse) goods—rattans, sago, cassia, pepper, ebony, wax, &c.—was too expensive. But the loss of direct intercourse with China had even more fatal effects:

[1] J. Hunt, *Sketch of Borneo or Pulo Kalamantan.* Communicated in 1812 to the Hon. Thomas Stamford Raffles Esq., Lt.-Governor of Java. Printed as Appendix IV to *The Expedition to Borneo of H.M.S. Dido for the suppression of piracy*, by Capt. Hon. Henry Keppel, R.N. (New York, Harper, 1846).

Hunt's sketch supplies most information about this period, but Crawfurd questions its reliability.

[2] Hunt, op. cit. p. 390.

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. . . it prevented the arrival of large bodies of annual immigrants arriving 439
from China and keeping up the prosperity of the country by commerce,
handicrafts, and tillage. The old Chinese settlers by degrees deserted 167
these shores, and to fill up the chasms in their revenues . . . the Rajahs
have been tempted to turn their views to predatory habits, and have permitted their lands to run to jungle, by dragging wretched labourers from agricultural to maritime and piratical enterprises.[1]

After the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars had restored to 316
them their Indonesian dominions, the Dutch were resolved to
establish direct control over Borneo. They were attracted in particular by the Chinese mines, and were assisted in their designs by the appeal of the Sultan Abou-Bakar-Tadjoudin to them in 1818 for assistance against the Kongsis.[2] The Dutch obtained authority from the Sultan of Sambas to purchase mines, and sent several expeditions to Borneo beginning in the year 1816. But the invasion of the Chinese sphere was at first defeated by such weapons as poisoned water. Though between two enemies, the natives and the Dutch, the Chinese held out for years. In 1826 intervention was interrupted for a long period by the Great Java War. Finally, Chinese obstinacy was defeated by Dutch phlegm. The year 1854 476
saw the 'complete extinction' of the Kongsis. However, the
Captain Liou A Sin of the Kongsi, *Lanfong*, was granted independ- 575
ence until his death by the Dutch in return for services rendered, 621
but when he died in 1884 and the Dutch Government took posses- 316
sion of his territory there was a serious revolt.

There are extant at least two contemporary accounts of the Kongsis during the height of their power, one Dutch and one English. Temminck tells us that the Kongsis were democratic communities formed with the object of exploiting for their profit the gold and diamond mines. They were divided into public associations of which three accounted for the greatest number of members and these three Kongsis occupied the leading position and exercised control over the smaller ones distributed through the interior. All Chinese belonging to the Kongsis shared in the gains and the losses of the mining enterprises. The *Lanfong* Kongsi in the Sambas Residency had an armed force of 6,000 fighting men: the Taykong and the Lara Sin-ta-kiou Kongsis in the Sambas Residency had 10,000 and 5,000 fighting men respectively.[3]

[1] Hunt, op. cit. p. 385.
[2] Schlegel, op. cit. p. 450.
[3] op. cit. ii. 399.

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476 In February 1834, a report having been brought to Singapore
575 that the people of a Chinese colony on the west coast of Borneo
were anxious to establish a permanent commercial intercourse with
621 the British Settlement, some merchants of Singapore dispatched
Mr G. W. Earl in the schooner *Stamford* to that part with a cargo
316 of opium, tea, and other commodities to exchange for the product
439 of the gold-mines of Borneo.[1] He found the Chinese colony between two small Dutch settlements on the banks of the principal rivers, one at Pontianak and one at Sambas. Sinkawan, the chief seaport of the Chinese, was not down in the charts. It was defended by a barricade of stakes. He found the Chinese boiling sea water to make salt. He was given an audience by the Kongsi, and found the court-house filled with half-naked Chinese 'each of which considered himself authorized to join in the discussion which ensued, and endeavoured to make himself heard above his neighbour'. The noise at last became perfectly deafening and Earl was glad to escape under the plea of wishing to inspect the town. The Chinese
[361] were vexed and some bad feeling ensued. The town he found to consist of a single street of low wooden houses, the front rooms of each being shops for the sale of grain, meat, groceries, &c., or
[342] rooms appropriated to opium-smoking. The court-house, which was detached from the town, contained a large room for the trans-
[344] action of public business, and several apartments which were occupied by the Kongsi and their families. It was surrounded by a low turf wall with a gate opposite to the town near which several long *jingals*, or swivel guns, carrying balls of about one pound weight, were placed muzzle up, leaning against the wall. Many of the women were Chinese, though the majority were Dyaks.[2]

The Kongsi at Sinkawan hesitated to open the port for trade for fear of a breach with the Dutch and wished Earl to wait until they could communicate with the Chinese Governor who dwelt at Montradok, the capital, about thirty-five miles in the interior. Earl, however, decided to make arrangements with the Dutch at Sambas and thereupon proceeded to that place. The Dutch representative, Mr Rumswinkle, informed him that he must make use of Sambas which had lately been a free port to vessels of all flags.

[1] George Windsor Earl, *The Eastern Seas, or Voyages and Discoveries in the Indian Archipelago in 1832–33* (London, W. H. Allen, 1837) p. 28.

[2] The Dyak women were shapely: the Chinese women were all 'large-footed' (i.e. their feet were not bound). Earl, pp. 272, 292.

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Before the arrival of the Dutch, says Earl, Sambas was a nest of pirates. In 1812 it was destroyed by the British, but in 1823 the Dutch again settled in Pontianak. They purchased the monopoly of the diamond mining from the Sultan for $50,000 and dispatched troops to take possession of the Chinese mines. The Chinese poisoned the wells and harassed the invaders by cutting off their supplies, and finally forced them to evacuate the territory. But the Dutch still held the trump card, and this was the control of the sea. It was clear the Chinese would eventually have to come to terms. The Dutch derived their revenues from salt, opium, customs duties, and a capitation tax on all Chinese who arrived in or left the country. Before the Dutch took possession of the west coast[1] in 1823, 3,000 Chinese used to arrive annually, but immigration had now almost entirely ceased. 316 167

Earl estimates the total number of Chinese in west Borneo to have been 150,000—about 90,000 in the Chinese districts and the remainder in districts under the control of the Dutch. The Malays he puts at 50,000, the Bugis at 10,000, the Arabs at 400, the Javanese and Amboynese at 150, the Dutch at 80, and the Dyaks in the neighbourhood of 250,000. The Chinese were 'chiefly of the tribe which forms the lowest class at Canton, being, I believe, of Tartar origin' (namely, Hakkas (Khehs)). 162

The belated Dutch victory was an empty one. For years they had had control of the main ports such as Pontianak and had refused to trade with the Chinese except through these ports. The Chinese, though virtually shut off in the interior, had refused to yield to coercion and had learnt to exist without commerce. Immigration from China practically dried up. 439 167

Nor did the extinction of the Kongsis bring about a cure of the political and economic ills of Borneo. De Groot and Schlegel (and they make a powerful combination) are agreed as to the nature of the trouble. This is how Schlegel expresses it: 476 575 621

> De Groot says: after the end of the wars against the *Kongsis* they [Sambas, &c.] were reduced to poor agricultural districts, mines nearly abandoned. We entirely share his opinion that the abolition of the *Kongsis* and the diminution of the Chinese population resulting from this abolition, have dealt to the development of Borneo a blow from which perhaps she will never recover.[1] 316

De Groot asks why the Government leave the Javanese their

[1] De Groot, p. 163; Schlegel, p. 458.

1 [i.e. of Borneo -- Analyst]
2 [see footnote (1), p. 492, cat. 116 -- Analyst]

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476 communal institutions and take away those of the Chinese. Why,
575 he repeats, this sinophobia, this fear of a population which has
never given any reason for fear to the Netherlands Government?
621 The fact was that without their kongsi organization the Chinese
316 became much as a nest of white ants becomes when its central ganglion, or brain, the 'queen', is removed. (Or with such a useful community as the Chinese it would perhaps be more fitting to resort to the bees for an analogy!) But the Chinese, as ever, had strong powers of recuperation.

At this point it will be convenient to leave Borneo for a time while we resume the story of the Chinese in other parts of Indonesia.

Sumatra and the Rhio (Riouw) Archipelago

167 Chinese immigration to Sumatra is comparatively recent. Trading contacts were, of course, of ancient date, and the account of the annual visits to Achin (Acheh) by Dampier in 1689 has already been given. Captain Forrest, who visited Achin in 1762, 1775, and 1784, found no Chinese there, though he adds 'Chinese were there in Commodore Beaulieu's time'.[1] There was also a very early settlement of Chinese at Palembang.[2] Marsden, too, speaks of the Chinese at Bencoolen in his *History of Sumatra*. He mentions in particular Kee Soon, 'one of the most able cultivators among the people who worked the ground with indefatigable pains and dunged high', and who nearly had his heart broken by struggling against nature, the soil being so ungrateful, and he would have become bankrupt had it not been for the help of the (English) East India Company.[3]

It is said that the Dutch East India Company bought tin from the Sultan of Palembang as early as 1710, and the directors of the

[1] *A Voyage to the Mergui Archipelago*, p. 59.

[2] On 21 May 1687 Dampier's vessel overtook at Pulo Condore a great junk [501] from Palembang, laden with pepper. It was full of little rooms or partitions 'like our well-boats'. *Dampier's Account of the Philippines*, in *Pinkerton's Voyages* (1808–14) xi. 2.

Beeckman (op. cit. p. 147) in 1714 found at Palembang 'some Mohammedans and a few Chinese'.

[3] William Marsden, F.R.S., *The History of Sumatra, Containing an Account of the Government, Laws, Customs, and Manners of the Native Inhabitants, etc.* (London, 1784).

James Lancaster visited Achin in June 1602, but did not find any Chinese there. He mentions Gujarats, Bangalis, Malabaris, Peguans, and Patani Malays. See Hakluyt Society, Series II, vol. lxxxv (1940) p. 90.

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company signed a contract with this Malay potentate in 1722. By 167
doing so the Dutch obtained a trade monopoly.[1]

The native rulers of Palembang soon discovered that the skill 167
of the Chinese miners was superior to the primitive methods of
their own subjects. They therefore sent their recruiting agents to 316
the southern provinces of China to enlist workers for their mines at
Bangka. In 1812 the Sultan of Palembang ceded his mineral rights 464
in Bangka and Billiton to the King of England. From this time onwards a representative, first of the British and then of the Dutch, resided in Bangka and contracted with the Chinese miners. When the Dutch took over from the British in 1816 the mines became the property of the Netherlands Indies Government.[2]

The Chinese miners continued with their own primitive methods
until after the middle of the century, after which Western experts 316
began to modernize the mining operations. In Billiton the native population managed very cleverly for a long time to conceal the richest mining deposits, but these were eventually worked by the Billiton Maatschappij and after 1923 by the Netherlands Indies Government.[3]

In extension of this account by Mr Ter Braake, we may quote
from Dr Cator who says that when a representative of the Nether- 316
lands Indies Government in 1825 restarted mining the tin deposits 167
in Billiton, there was no other mining enterprise in the whole island. Nor were any mining operations going on in 1851 when extensive surveys were made. It may be assumed, therefore, that before 1851 there had been no real exploitation of these fields, though the existence of deposits was widely known. To begin with, free Chinese coolies were employed, but owing to the rivalry of the Bangka mines it was decided in 1853 to solve the problem by sending recruiting agents to China: in consequence, 253 men were brought from Hong Kong and Whampoa.[4]

Bangka's history is somewhat similar to that of Billiton. The 167
Chinese settlements in Sumatra were relatively inconsiderable

[1] Alex. L. Ter Braake, *Mining in the Netherlands East Indies* (New York, Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944) Bulletin 4, p. 36.

[2] 'The Dutch employ Chinese miners to whom they pay 6 dollars for every pecul [picul] of tin delivered on the coast in a pure state, which they sell in Java for 16 dollars a pecul.' G. F. Davidson, *Trade and Travel in the Far East* (London, Madden & Malcolm, 1846) p. 87.

[3] Ter Braake, op. cit. p. 36.

[4] Cator, p. 184 ff.

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167 until the third or fourth decade of the nineteenth century. Collet says that the epoch of the foundation of Singapore fixes the period of this new immigration, but it was not until the development of the tobacco cultivation at Deli, Langkat, and Serdang (1864–70) that there was an inflow sufficiently considerable, taking the good years with the bad, to compensate for the losses due to death and, above all, to repatriation.[1]

The above are the main facts concerning the Chinese in this area during the period under review: the rest are miscellanea explaining or high-lighting them. Temminck tells us that by order of the [362] Sultans the Chinese in the town of Palembang were not allowed to live on land; they were compelled to live on the river in boats and [567] on rafts.[2] We learn from Davidson of the disgraceful traffic carried on in the 1830s and 1840s by Chinese between Padang and Nias. They visited the island of Nias and purchased hundreds of its inhabitants for whom they found markets all along the coast. Those brought to Padang were not, indeed, sold as slaves, but they were registered in the Resident's office and held as 'bond-debtors' for terms ranging from 7 to 15 or even 20 years. During this period of servitude they were treated as slaves but were free at its expiration. They also had the option of buying their liberty in the meantime if they could raise the money.[3]

567 But as an offset to this example of callous Chinese rapacity (remembering, however, that slavery still existed in other parts of the globe, including America, and was not abolished in the Dutch East Indies until 1860) Earl in 1834 (or early 1835) gives us a picture of Ban Ok, the Captain China of Rhio, 'whose hospitality and benevolence were exercised indiscriminately to all who approached him, without distinction of country or colour'.[4]

46 Chinese labour in Sumatra in the second half of the nineteenth century is referred to in the following chapter.[1]

167 As regards the Chinese in Eastern Indonesia, as long as the Dutch monopoly of the spice trade was maintained (until 1854) the

1 [i.e. Ch. XLII -- Analyst]

[1] J. A. Collet, *Terres et Peuples de Sumatra* (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1925) p. 193.
[2] op. cit. ii. 46. [3] op. cit. p. 87.
[4] Ban Ok, a plump, good-humoured looking man, advanced towards Earl and his companions, and, 'after giving each a hearty shake of the hand, called for chairs and bottles of Hodgson's pale ale'. George Windsor Earl, *The Eastern Seas, or Voyages and Discoveries in the Indian Archipelago in 1832–33–34* (London, W. H. Allen, 183[illegible]) p. 140.

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Chinese were not wanted in that area. After that time there was no inducement for the Chinese to go there for the Moluccas were now poor. There were no plantations; therefore coolies were not needed. The same was true of the Celebes and the Lesser Sunda Islands from Bali to Timor. There was some trading with the natives of the smaller islands and of the New Guinea coast, but this was not considerable, for the whole area remained infested with pirates until the last quarter of the century.[1]

[1] It has been suggested with some show of reason that the Chinese need a developing community as an economic environment and that a decaying area does not attract them.

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CHAPTER XLII

NINETEENTH-CENTURY DUTCH ECONOMY AND THE CHINESE

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AFTER the resumption of Dutch rule in 1816 many changes were made and strong pressure was put on the natives to produce for export. During the brief English occupation of 1811–16 Raffles sought to introduce the system of peasant proprietorship prevailing in British India, using the village headman as his agent.[1] In doing so he was following a policy already advocated by Dirk van Hogendorp, the protagonist of a colonial administration on liberal lines. The machinery at the disposal of Raffles was insufficient, and the peasants he established fell in many cases into the hands of Chinese money-lenders. The system, with many other of Raffles's reforms, did not long survive the British administration, but the tradition of a liberal policy on the lines of van Hogendorp's proposals and the Raffles experiments survived and bore fruit in the last decades of the century.[2]

The famous 'culture system' was formally inaugurated in 1830 by Governor-General van den Bosch. Under this scheme native cultivators were exempted from the ground-tax, but they were compelled to devote one-fifth of their land to crops indicated by the administration, and to hand over the yield in lieu of taxes. Under van den Bosch himself the scheme seems to have worked fairly well, but, involving as it did a combination of the *métayer* and the forced labour system, it was liable to great abuses, which increased until the home Government took action in 1854, when the whole colonial system was overhauled. The Regulations for the Government of Netherlands India promulgated in that year miti-

[1] In this section *Netherlands Overseas Territories*, Information Department Papers, no. 28 (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1941) is followed.

[2] On this passage Dr Vlekke comments: 'The problem of peasant proprietorship retained the attention of the Dutch administration. The number of proprietors grew gradually. I do not think that Raffles "established" any. He indicated a line of policy (which was easier to indicate than to carry out) and, as always, tried to suggest that his ideas had been realised. Therefore there was no relapse after his departure. Most of Raffles' reforms were retained after 1816. Even under the Culture System they were not abolished.'

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gated the despotic character of the administration and paved the way for the progressive reduction of servitude of all kinds, including the culture system. Extensive agrarian reforms were delayed until 1870. By that time the compulsory cultivation of pepper, cochineal, and indigo for the Government had already ceased, and from 1878 onwards the sugar plantations, at that time cultivated by forced labour, by the reforms of De Waal, the then Minister of the Colonies, were restricted and compulsory cultivation ceased altogether in 1890.[1]

The De Waal agrarian reforms prepared the way for the steady development of native agriculture which went on until the Japanese invasion in the next century. Not only was the peasant protected against economically stronger groups by the prohibition of the expropriation of his land, but also assistance was provided for the sale of the product. Native ownership of land was in many cases hereditary and individual, but part of the land was the common property of the village.

Simultaneously a sound foundation was laid for estate agriculture which did not encroach on native-tilled land but was mainly established on hitherto unused Crown lands, obtained on long lease from the Government. The estates, however, could in the case of some export crops, notably sugar and tobacco, rent native land, and later on the greater part of these two crops was grown on rented land. Government policy was in the direction of preventing the rise of non-native agrarian groups and the prevention of the formation of a rural native landless proletariat.[2] Exceptions to this occurred in special areas, particularly in west Bangka where large Chinese holdings came into being.

In 1848 the *Grondwet*, or fundamental law of the Netherlands, recognized, for the first time, the responsibility of the Dutch nation for its colonial dependencies. The *Grondwet* involved certain important changes which were embodied in an Act passed in 1854 and commonly known as the Regulations for the Government of Netherlands India. They reformed the judicature, introduced

[1] 'A delusive appearance of prosperity under the "culture system" was given by the immense increase in exports, and the great profits made by European and Chinese manufacturers, contractors, and officials. . . . The native population increased by some 50 per cent. (1870–1900) but decreased in average wealth.' Sir Alan Pim, *Colonial Agricultural Production* (London, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946) p. 21.

[2] *Netherlands Overseas Territories*, p. 47.

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43 elementary education for the natives, and abolished slavery in Java
24 as from January 1860.

The remainder of the nineteenth century from the beginning of the disappearance of the 'culture system' is known as the 'Liberal period', and is characterized by the development of private Western enterprise, mainly Dutch. The Chinese in this period made even greater progress than the Europeans, though they did not increase so rapidly in numbers.[1] There were already nearly 150,000 of them in Java and Madura alone by the middle of the century, and by 1900 there were 277,000 in Java and Madura and some 250,000 in the Outer Provinces.

651 Reference has already been made to Raffles's reforms: they de-
427 mand further mention at this point since they have an important bearing on the economic position of the Chinese in the succeeding decades. The plan of requiring, not a fixed amount, but a proportion of the average crop, while it seemed to promise the Government the maximum that it could fairly demand, led to difficulties and frauds.[2] When Raffles wrote his minute of 1814 in which he had adopted the system of individual settlement as the normal, he had had actual experience of this form of settlement only in its application in districts formerly subject to Chinese farmers. It was said that the new system, when introduced into a district in Pekalongan formerly under Chinese, gave a net revenue nearly fourfold that formerly received, which was collected with perfect ease. On the other hand, De Salis, in his report on Pekalongan and Kedoe, 1816, said that one district that was formerly leased to Chinese and was now under individual settlement, was always in arrears.[3] Raffles also proclaimed the abolition of internal duties and ordered that the market tolls should be administered directly by the Government instead of being farmed out to Chinese, but his regulations had little practical effect. Even in his own time, it is said, new toll gates were established where none had existed before, and the existing revenue-farmers persisted in their abuses.[4] After the restoration of the Indies to Holland in 1816 the predominant posi-

[1] Furnivall, op. cit. p. 273.

[2] Furnivall points out that Raffles required the payment of taxes in money with the result that 'cultivators unused to handle money but faced with a demand for the payment of revenue in money, mortgaged their crops, their cattle and their land, so that more land passed to the Chinese than under the former practice'.

[3] Clive Day, op. cit. p. 183.

[4] ibid. p. 201.

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tion of the Chinese in the economy of the islands was maintained for many years, for, although imports of most kinds were no longer in the hands of the Government, the sale of salt and opium and buying up of sugar, tobacco, coffee, indigo, &c., at first remained almost exclusively in its hands, but the Chinese were often used as intermediaries. Moreover, the system of farming out taxation (poll-taxes, slaughter-house taxes, bazaar taxes, opium monopoly, &c.) continued until after the middle of the nineteenth century, so that the Chinese, as farmers, retained their influence.[1]

The Chinese were the obvious contractors, for, as van den Bosch remarked, the Dutch themselves 'could not be beaten out of their home (in Holland) with sticks "Gentle pressure" had to be exerted to induce even the Chinese in some cases to accept the onus of being middlemen, and in the 1830s a leading Chinese was warned that he could not expect to succeed his father as the Chinese Captain unless he accepted a contract. After vainly offering $5,000 for a substitute he had to comply, and within a few years he was the wealthiest man in Java.'[2]

The position had been consolidated by the middle of the century and, as Mr Jan O. M. Broek says, 'generally speaking, the natives form the agrarian base, the Chinese and Arabs the commercial middle class, and the Westerners the small but ruling apex of the socio-economic pyramid'.[3] Standing between Europeans and natives, and necessary to both classes, the Chinese were able to levy toll on both. So much of the newly created wealth as went to the Javanese passed immediately to the Chinese as holders of all the opium shops, pawnshops, and gambling houses. Furnivall points out that while in 1900 the natives were buying much less cloth per head than in 1880, the revenue from opium had risen from fl. 10·5 million in 1867 to fl. 1·817 million in 1897 and, during the same period the pawnshop revenue rose from fl. 365 thousand to fl. 1·23 million, the gaming revenue from fl. 365 thousand to fl. 844 thousand, and the excise revenue (also largely collected through the Chinese) from fl. 112 thousand to fl. 7·37 million.[4] At the same time the Chinese profited on a similar scale from the growth of trade, both wholesale and retail. All that the natives sold to

[1] Cator, op. cit. p. 97.
[2] Furnivall, op. cit. p. 107.
[3] Jan O. M. Broek, *The Economic Development of the Netherlands Indies* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942) p. 5.
[4] op. cit. p. 213.

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441 Europeans they sold through Chinese, and all that the natives bought from Europeans they bought through Chinese. Chinese, [463] too, were at hand to supply the demand for clerks, accountants, salesmen, or artisans and at rates which commerce and industry [288] could pay. This race took part in the organization of native production so much so that an inquiry into the *batik* (cloth) industry in 1892 revealed that the replacement of native cloth by imported cloth, which the *batik* workers bought through Chinese, had resulted in the transfer of the whole industry to the Chinese, 'with native workmen in a position not unlike slavery'.[1]

441 With their undoubted energy and acumen it may be wondered why it was that the Chinese did not threaten to oust the Europeans 181 from their supremacy as capitalists. They did indeed compete with the latter in production, many of the large estates (*particuliere landerijen*) having passed before 1900 into their hands and they were conspicuous in the timber business.[2] But the bulk of the larger undertakings continued to be European. There seems, indeed, to be a limit to the ability of the Chinese to organize on the big scale, a limit arising perhaps from the family system and making them less capable of running large joint-stock enterprises with the anonymous character of their shareholders. They seem to lack, says Clive Day, the breadth and boldness of conception that would enable them to enter upon large enterprises as rivals of the Europeans, but between the Dutch and the natives they have an assured [443] position. Even in retail trade they did not everywhere have things their own way, and in the Outer Provinces the Chinese played a minor role. Here the native retained the initiative and reaped the profit, whereas in Java he was all too often simply a cog in the complicated machinery of Western trade.[3]

181 No two authors (in Clive Day's opinion) can agree in describing the moral characteristics of the Chinese, and certainly there is a great deal of contradiction in the accounts that have been preserved for us. Schlegel said that the Chinese were easy to govern; Temminck tells us that in west Borneo 'the Chinese miners formed the most boorish, the most turbulent, and the least tractable part of the population'.[4] He admitted, however, that they were regular

[1] Furnivall, op. cit. p. 213.

[2] In Sumatra the timber *Panglongs* in the forests were a Chinese monopoly and their trade was with Singapore.

[3] Broek, op. cit. p. 35.

[4] op. cit. p. 301.

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enough in their family morals and in their marriages with women of the country, and their establishments were always tranquil and well regulated. But, like the Jews, they were always greedy of gain. G. W. Earl, writing in the 1830s, is critical of their function and their value to the community as a whole: 181

> By some persons [he says] the Chinese are supposed to confer great benefit on Java, but on closer examination it will be found that their settlement on the island has been productive of very injurious effects. That they have enriched themselves and contributed to the aggrandisement of the Europeans cannot be doubted, but the interests of the natives have suffered proportionately . . . the accumulation of wealth forms their sole object, and being more energetic, and also more crafty than the Javanese, they have also managed in their commercial transactions to trammel the latter with debts from which they can rarely afterwards extricate themselves. . . .

Earl (and he seems a reliable witness in spite of the comparative shortness of his stay in the Indies) tells us that the Chinese adopted an artful and ungenerous system in their dealings with the native cultivators. They prevailed upon the cultivators to take goods in advance to be paid for by the produce of the ensuing harvest at a stipulated price, always much below its real value.[1] The following year the price of goods supplied by the Chinese would be augmented and that to be paid for the produce reduced, and the cultivator was nearly certain ever afterwards to be in debt and a slave to his creditor. The minor Government imports were farmed exclusively by the Chinese, and since these included all the smaller articles consumed by the natives the impositions pressed hardly upon those who were least able to support them. A hawker of sweetmeats or of fruit could not follow his calling without a daily *chop* or licence which had to be purchased from the farmer, and numbers of Chinese were always prowling about ready to pounce and carry off to prison any unfortunate beings who tried to avoid the imposition. It was not surprising, said Earl, that the natives detested the Chinese, for they saw in them the active agents of a system of oppression by which they were frequently reduced to beggary.[2] 406

[1] Dr Vlekke notes, 'Was not the advance sale of the harvest customary in Indonesia—and probably in other parts of the world? It certainly existed in the Spice Islands before the arrival of the Europeans.'

[2] Earl, op. cit. pp. 30, 31.

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556 Immigrant Chinese arriving in Indonesia usually brought nothing but a bundle of clothes, a mat, and a pillow. When they made money, as so many did, they were careful not to flaunt the fact in the faces of those from whom they made it. 'The main streets', says Earl of Javanese towns, 'were appropriated by the Chinese merchants, who, however, make not outward display, since, from the mean appearance of their shops, a stranger could never for a moment suppose that the occupants were rolling in riches.'[1]

181 No one, however, speaks with greater asperity of the Chinese and their role than the ardent French colonialist and defender of European pretensions, J. Chailley-Bert, writing of the situation as it was at the end of the nineteenth century. 'Who other than the Chinese', he asks, 'would mix with the natives, speak their language, take part in their life, capture their confidence, condescend to the most disgusting details, harshly exact their due and sometimes more than their due, and take advantage of the least infraction of the letter of a contract to impose harsher conditions?' (He cites as an example the case of the farming out to the Chinese of cattle slaughtering, by which three florins went to the farmer for every animal slaughtered.) The Chinese admitted no moral obligation whatsoever, and there was everywhere evidence of their 'harshness, their immorality, and their work of demoralisation'.[2]

486 Yet the privileged position that they held in the economy of the
167 Indies did not entail any great improvement in their civil liberties. They were still confined to certain towns and to certain areas of
554 these towns; they could not land without a permit, and they could not travel in the interior without a pass.[3] The restrictions on immigration, however, were slackly enforced. But in one respect their position improved, for in 1855 they were brought under the European Civil Code in most of their commercial transactions, and this gave them a higher social standing than the natives. But nevertheless they continued in all other ways to be a race apart from both natives and Europeans.

Chinese Labour in Sumatra

167 New currents of Chinese immigration were flowing into the

[1] ibid. p. 28. But as against this we have the evidence of Raffles, and Ong Tae-hae and others, of the ostentation shown by the Chinese of Indonesia in their luxurious houses and fine equipages.

[2] *Java et ses habitants*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1901) p. 113.

[3] Temminck, p. 301; Furnivall, p. 213.

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Indies before the end of the century and from different tribes of Chinese. This was notably the case in Sumatra's East Coast. In 1870 there were only about 150 Javanese in the East Coast region of Sumatra, the majority of the 4,000 labourers being Chinese.[1] From 1864 onwards thousands of Chinese coolies were recruited for the tobacco plantations. After the question of the protection of labour had attracted attention, recruiting was done either through the (British) Protector of Chinese, Singapore, or through the official bureau in Swatow.[2] Later on this Chinese labour on rubber and tobacco plantations was largely replaced by Javanese labour.[3]

Between 1888 and 1931 some 305,000 Chinese landed at Belawan. The great majority came from Swatow or Hong Kong where the Association of Deli Planters (D.P.V.) had recruiting offices. Between 1864 and 1888 the labourers were obtained through coolie-brokers in Singapore. From 1890 to 1914 German shipping companies transported Chinese labourers backwards and forwards between Belawan and south China, but from 1914 to 1931 ships of the K.P.M. brought the labourers to Sumatra.

For some sixty years the tobacco planters of Sumatra relied on Chinese labourers, but in the 1920s the number of Chinese declined while that of Javanese increased. The recruiting and importation of labourers from China stopped on 31 December 1931 on account of the high immigration fee, which was raised to 150 guilders when the penal sanctions against labourers were dropped.

Number of 'Field' Labourers employed by Sumatra Tobacco Estates[4]

1930:	21,000	Chinese	'field' labourers;	5,000	Javanese
1931:	19,000	,,	,, ,,	6,000	,,
1939:	8,000	,,	,, ,,	10,000	,,

[1] De Kat Angelino, *Colonial Policy* (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1931) p. 504.

[2] Pickering, the Singapore Protector of Chinese, made himself unpopular with the Deli (Sumatra) Planters' Committee over charges he made against them of repudiating contracts made by their agents in the Colony, and he spoke of the substitution of inferior men for those brought to engage at the Protectorate. This charge was denied in a pamphlet, *The Deli Chinese Question* (1882).

[3] Measures for the control and protection of Chinese contract labour in Sumatra are contained in *Eerste Verslag van den Dienst der Arbeidinspectie in Nederlands-Indië* (Batavia, G. Kolff, 1913) and *Derde Verslag van den Dienst der Arbeidinspectie on Kolieworving in Nederlands-Indië* (Weltevreden, Filial Albrecht, 1914).

[4] See Karl Pelzer, *Arbeiterwanderungen in Südostasien* (Hamburg, 1935) pp. 90–6, from which these details are taken.

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CHAPTER XLIII

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIVIL STATUS OF THE CHINESE

622 THROUGH the Chinese headmen the company transmitted its orders to the Chinese notables for execution, and these officials for their part kept the Government informed as to what was going on in their communities. They served as petitioners, confidants, and representatives of their group, while at the same time they filled a semi-official position. It was the policy of *laissez-faire* so long as peace and order prevailed, but it was also one of indifference, and with the evolution of ideas as to governmental responsibility was regarded as being one of neglect.[1]

692 Up to 1824 in Java the civil affairs of the Chinese were dealt with by the European courts of justice (*Raden van Justitie*); their criminal affairs by the *Landraden* (courts of justice for the natives) in the inner territories (*binnenlanden*), and in the districts of Batavia, Samarang, and Sourabaya by the Raden van Justitie. The private law applied was in the case of the Raden van Justitie the European law (with a few exceptions as to Chinese law of inheritance), and in the case of the Landraden customary (i.e. Indonesian, [586] Chinese, or Arab) law. But the Chinese did not bring their marriage and divorce disputes before the courts.

By a 'publication' of 1824 (that is to say by an Order of the Governor-General van der Capellen in Council published in the *Staatsblad*, or Government Gazette) it was ordered that the Chinese all over Java in their civil and criminal affairs should be judged by the native courts. Those who complained of this were not the Chinese but the Dutch merchants who were of the opinion that their disputes with the Chinese were better dealt with by the Raden van Justitie than by the Landraden.

671 The East Indian Government Act of 1848,[2] whereby foreign Orientals were placed on the same footing as natives, did not alter

[1] Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1941) pp. 356 ff., and compare the situation in Malaya in Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 142 ff. and Chapter XXIX of the present work.

[2] This apparently is a translation of 'Indisch Reglement' of 1848 ('The Indisch Reglement is a Code of Police and Criminal Procedure for natives', J. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, p. 214).

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the position of the Chinese in Indonesia, which position was confirmed by the Koninklijk Besluit Bepalingen van Wetgeving (Royal Decree on the Principles of the Law). In the same decree permission was given to individual non-Europeans to submit themselves to European law for some definite transaction (e.g. for a contract of sale or hire, &c.) and this was extended later—in 1917—to allow a person to submit himself to the whole of European civil law. 671

By an ordinance of the Governor-General of 1855, made at the request of the Dutch merchants of Batavia, the Dutch law of property, contract, commerce, torts, and of testamentary succession, as laid down in the Netherlands Indies Civil Code, was declared applicable to foreign Orientals, which meant that when questions in these fields of law arose they had to be judged in the European Courts. Whereas most of the legal disputes which were brought before the courts were matters of contract, torts, or property, it may be said that from 1855 onwards the ordinary jurisdiction in Chinese civil matters was by the Raad van Justitie.

The Chinese never complained of this ordinance of 1855 which in the long run proved to be a great benefit to them, although it was intended by its originators to benefit the Batavian merchant.

The great grievance of the Chinese was that in *criminal* matters they had to be judged by the Landraad and not by the Raad van Justitie. After 1918 the criminal law for Europeans, Chinese, and natives was substantially the same though, as we shall see, the law of procedure differed. 692 671

Simultaneously with the growth of the belief in the minds of the Dutch Government that they should take a closer interest in Chinese affairs, the Chinese themselves were becoming conscious of their own nationality. Hitherto those who went abroad and deserted the graves of their ancestors were looked upon as unfilial rascals, but towards the end of the century there was a complete reversal of the official attitude. In 1894, in China, the ban on emigration (so long a dead letter) was officially removed, and this was followed up by a series of acts designed to bind the Chinese more closely to their mother country. The Chinese in the Indies became increasingly resentful of the fact that they were classed with 'other foreign Orientals' and were tried in the same courts, and that to them was applied the same law of procedure, whilst Europeans and others assimilated to them were tried by the European 186 671 692

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186 courts with much greater procedural protection. That by being so classified they retained the application of Chinese custom, 671 appeared to them as of less and less consequence as time went on. 692 The recognition in 1899 of the Japanese as Europeans in their legal relations, while the Chinese in most of their activities were left under the native courts, the Chinese received as a slight upon themselves.

186 The special object of Chinese dislike was the *politie rol*, a court having jurisdiction over minor offences and conducting prelimi- 692 nary examinations.[1] Here an officer of the local civil service often sat as a judge.[2] According to Fromberg it was a court, 'deeply pene- 695 trating into the life of the people, in which the administrative power in the person of the chief of police, without obligation to hear witnesses, and, if he hears them, without obligation to place them under oath, sentences in accordance with his finding of the facts, with an immediate execution of sentence, which originally was not suspended even when an appeal was made for pardon'. Often (said Fromberg) acts were punished that were punishable under no existing law, and cases were brought before the *politie rol* which no one dare bring before the *landraad*.[3]

692 The *landraad*, the intermediate court for natives and foreign Asiatics, was also the object of criticism both from Orientals and 693 Europeans, because it was composed of a legally qualified chairman, usually a European, two native active or pensioned officials, a native officer of justice, a Chinese adviser, and a clerk. 'The non-jurist character of the layman and the recruitment of his service from the official class subjected the court to much the same criticism as was brought against the *politie rol*.'[4]

186 Another grievance of the Chinese was that, like the natives, they were often subjected to a long confinement before trial, and in 694 house-search and criminal pleading the Europeans had far greater protection against arbitrary action.

[1] Vandenbosch, op. cit. 410.

[2] This was true also of Malaya until the 1930s when a newly created Colonial legal service began to take over the magistracies. This was, however, because of the development of government on the lines of specialization—not through the influence of the principle of the 'separation of powers'.

[3] J. H. Fromberg, *Verspreide Geschriften Verzameld door Chung Hua Hui* (Leyden, Leidsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1926). This collection of the writings of the champion of the Chinese with a *prae-avis* written on his death-bed fills over 800 pages.

[4] Vandenbosch, op. cit. p. 356.

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Chinese agitation, assisted by the unification policy of Van Deventer and other Dutch Liberals, led in 1914 to the abolition of the *politie rol* and in 1917 to a measure which permitted individual non-Europeans to submit themselves to European law, thus participating in its benefits. 671 692

Commenting on this, De Kat Angelino in his monumental work says:

> The abolition of the police roll [*politie rol*] in Java was also caused to no small extent by a desire to end some disagreeable dualism in matters of justice and to purify it from the appearance of putting Indonesian and other groups as Asiatic populations behind Europeans. In the Residency Court there was a procedure which gave better guarantees than under the police roll. The more fully conscious Chinese group has especially, since about 1905, protested continually against this system. The reform of 1914 was, therefore, important in principle for more than one reason.[1]

Subsequent legislation from 1917 to 1925 had the effect of removing the Chinese completely from the civil jurisdiction of the *landraad*, but by the time of the Japanese invasion their demand to be placed on the same legal footing as Europeans in criminal procedure as well had not been granted.[2]

In 1928 a new regulation passed by the *Volksraad* abolished the jurisdiction of the Chinese headmen.[3] 622

The legal position of the Chinese in Indonesia is thus summarized by Professor R. D. Kollewijn:[4] 671

> . . . The Civil Code for Europeans was declared applicable to the Chinese in 1855 in Java (and later in the Residencies of the Outer Islands) as far as the law of contracts, torts and property and of testamentary succession were concerned, and it may be said that this has never given any great difficulty either in or out of the Courts. However, in 1919 for Java and certain of the Residencies in the Outer Islands, and in 1924–25 for the whole of the Netherlands Indies, the European family law (with the exception only of the Chinese law of adoption) and the law

[1] De Kat Angelino, *Colonial Policy* (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1931) (abridged translation from the Dutch original by G. J. Renier) ii. 154.

[2] The explanation given to the present writer when he visited The Hague in September 1946 was that the creation of the additional courts necessary to deal with the Chinese on an equality with Europeans was still at the moment a practical impossibility.

[3] De Kat Angelino, op. cit. ii. 154.

[4] R. D. Kollewijn (Professor of International Law, Batavia, later at Leyden), *A Suggestion for the Undertaking of Research Work in the Field of Private Law by the Institute of Pacific Relations (in Particular the Application of Western Private Law to Chinese)*, in mimeograph, no date [*c.* 1938].

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671 in intestate succession were also declared applicable to the Chinese who were Netherlands subjects (i.e. Chinese born in the Netherlands Indies of domiciled parents) and we cannot be easy in our minds about the social effect of these legal measures. It is already certain, for instance, that in one of the important centres of Chinese population in the Netherlands Indies, West Borneo, this statute law has not been able to drive out the law of custom, while there is also justified doubt about the following of the provisions of the European family and inheritance laws in other places.

With respect to the foreign Chinese (*foreign* according to the definition of the nationality law in the Netherlands Indies) the Netherlands Indian judges, according to Netherlands Indian private law, in questions of status and competency, dowry and property law must apply their national laws. Since these Chinese almost without exception come from Chinese provinces where the new Chinese Civil Code is being effectively applied by the judges, this implies therefore the modern codified Chinese law.

The comment of another jurist of note is that the European Dutch law was applied to the Chinese by the Dutch in the fixed belief that it was in their best interests, as, for example, when they were brought under the European commercial law in 1855.

Where the European law was inadequate to secure justice, the legislature included a special provision for the Chinese (e.g. *Adoptie*).[1]

It has been suggested that the adoption of the European law was not consistently beneficial. For instance (according to one writer in *Mission Interrupted*) the application to the Chinese of the Dutch Commercial Code had, by the end of the nineteenth century, 'severely shaken the old Chinese business morals'.[2] Professor Kollewijn considers, however, that there is no reason for believing that this was so. Again it is said that although the Company, and [428] after it the Netherlands Government, wished to leave the Chinese in undisturbed enjoyment of their own institutions and customs, they had sometimes erred through inadvertence in their interpretation of Chinese law. In support of this contention it is stated that under the Company there had already been an effort to codify the Indonesian and Chinese law of inheritance; nevertheless it had been held that Chinese husbands and wives were not married 'in community of goods' so that the Chinese law of inheritance had been

[1] M. H. van der Valk, 'De Rechtspositie der Chineezen in Nederlandsch-Indië', *Koloniale Studiën*, nos. 5 and 6 (1936) p. 30.
[2] *Mission Interrupted*, p. 63.

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ignored, for according to the old Chinese patriarchal law, far from having no property, the wife herself was the husband's property. If this is stated (says Professor Kollewijn), it must also be added that this ordinance supposed that *all* the property was owned by the husband and that if the wife contended that she was the owner of any particular piece of property she had to prove her claim by way of a deed drawn up by a notary. So that in practice the ordinance conformed very well with the Chinese customary law. (The divergences of the new law of 1917–25 from the old law were much greater, but so also are those between the new Civil Code in China and the old law.) Nor is it correct to say that as a result of the interference with the old Chinese customary law a 'so-called Indo-Chinese customary law developed which varied from place to place, or rather was interpreted differently by different courts according to the lights of the various "experts" consulted.'[1] There were some differences in the opinions of the courts, and even the highest Court of Justice (*het Hooggerechtshof*) did not always adhere to its own precedents, but these differences must not be over-estimated.

Emancipation of the Chinese from Restriction of Movement

In 1900 the Chinese could in principle live only where there were Chinese quarters (or *ghettoes* as they have been termed). For every trip he wished to make into the interior a Chinese merchant had to obtain a pass. The system was relaxed in 1904 by the grant of passes valid for a year instead of for a single journey, and in 1910 the right was conceded of free passage along the main highways without a permit, and Chinese notables were exempted from the obligation to obtain a pass. Thus for the first time since their arrival in Indonesia some hundreds of years before (and it must be remembered that restrictions were even more severe under native rule) the otherwise privileged Chinese were allowed to move about at will like free men.

National Status and the Growth of National Feeling

It is often said that the Chinese became national minded only after the impact of Western nationalism upon their country. Before then they had merely a sense of family, clan, district, or province. It is indeed true that strong localism prevented them for long from thinking or acting as a nation, and that the natives of one

[1] De Kat Angelino, *Colonial Policy*, i. p. 162.

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186 province were quite willing to assist a foreign enemy operating in another province;[1] but at the same time they were conscious at all periods in their history that they were the Black-haired Race of the Middle Flowery Kingdom and that all others were 'Outside Barbarians'. It was probably due more to a sense of race consciousness than to rising nationalism that the Chinese regarded it as a slight upon themselves that they still had the status of foreign Orientals. At the same time it is unlikely that the feeling would have had any great strength or direction had it not been for the ferment already in process in their ancestral country and for the impetus given to it by Mr Fromberg. Hitherto they had asked for nothing except the opportunity to improve their own economic position, and had accepted their unequal legal position with equanimity or with resignation.

When with the help of guns and rifles China was opened up to Western trade, the Chinese could not help but remark the importance the Europeans attached to the protection of their own nationals. How very different from their own traditional indifference to the Chinese beyond the seas! And these barbarians had shown themselves superior at least in material strength. There must be some virtue and use in exiled nationals. Her statesmen, too, were able now to see that a great source of strength resided in the Western colonies whose obvious counterpart for China was the Chinese Overseas. But before this great arsenal in the battle with the West could be mobilized it was necessary to defeat the die-hard conservatives on the home front. In 1894 the prohibition of emigration was removed, and those who had gone overseas during the centuries were pardoned. In 1898, when the young Emperor tried to engineer a *coup d'état* to oust the entrenched forces of reaction and to modernize the educational system, he was defeated by the Empress Dowager and interned on an island in the Imperial Palace. Nevertheless, the reform movement gathered strength and when in 1903 the old examination system was finally abolished the way towards educational reform and the modernizing of China was open; but it was not until after the Revolution of 1911 that the new movement gained momentum.

[1] Classic examples of this are the coolies recruited by the British in Canton to help them in their advance against Peking in the Second China War (1857–60), and the welcome given to Lord Elgin during the same war by the Chinese notables of Singapore. See Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 85.

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China's new-found interest in her overseas children manifested itself in many ways—some of which were to be obnoxious to the Dutch Government. As early as 1887 the Chinese Government had sent a committee to the Indies to study the commercial relations of China with that country. Permission to send the committee was obtained through diplomatic channels by way of The Hague, and the Netherlands Indies Government received the members as visitors from a friendly State. Then in 1891 the Peking Government requested permission to collect funds among the Chinese in the Indies for flood relief in China. Again in 1906 a Chinese official made a protracted visit to Java for the purpose of bringing about greater uniformity among Chinese commercial societies.[1] In 1907 the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Yang Shih-tshi,[2] visited the Indies to study commercial problems, and as a result of his visit many addresses and petitions were sent to Peking from the Chinese in Indonesia. These were some of the earlier Chinese missions with an allegedly commercial purpose, but already there had been Chinese emissaries with an avowed interest in education, a subject that was to be the source of much controversy and feeling between the two Governments, an important matter which is dealt with in a separate chapter.

As the Chinese Revolution grew nearer the increasing sense of unity and nationalism among the Chinese began to bring matters to a head. In 1908 Wang Kang-ky, secretary to the Chinese legation at The Hague, travelled in the Indies for several months. At Sourabaya he held a semi-official census and recommended that Chinese residents in the Netherlands Indies should choose between Chinese and Dutch nationality. In 1909 two Chinese cruisers appeared in the harbour at Batavia carrying Wa Ta-cheng, Secretary of the Department of Education, who spent some time in Java for the alleged purpose of studying commercial conditions. In 1910 Chao Ts'ung-fan, Adviser to the Department of Agriculture, Industry, and Trade, came for the same purpose.[3]

Against a background of growing nationalism and increasing diplomatic activity the question of national status assumed a new importance. The Dutch law on the subject was not at all clear, and

[1] Vandenbosch, op. cit. p. 359.

[2] This is the name as given by Vandenbosch, but *Tshi* is not an accepted rendering of any sound in the English romanizations (Wade, &c.). This is perhaps the Dutch rendering?

[3] Vandenbosch, op. cit. p. 360.

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641 in view of the controversies which were developing with several States it was necessary that it should be clarified.

The East Indian Government Act of 1854 referred to all persons living in the Indies as 'inhabitants', but as a qualification for Government service it demanded Dutch citizenship, and referred to the laws of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the definition of such citizenship. Of these laws there were two, one of which regulated public law citizenship and the second, civil law citizenship. Under the first citizenship were included all persons born in the Netherlands and their descendants. The latter could not lose their citizenship by residence in Dutch territory outside Holland. Thus the descendants of Dutch citizens born in the Indies remained Dutch citizens. Under the civil law, citizenship included all persons [692] born in the kingdom and the colonies of persons domiciled there. *Natives and Chinese born of parents there were specifically included.* Natives and Chinese could therefore sue in the courts of Holland as Dutch citizens, a right they did not enjoy in European courts in the Indies. A law of 1892 put an end to this duality of citizenship, but did nothing to clarify the status of natives and of the children of foreign Asiatics domiciled in the East Indies. Article 12 of the Act even designated them as foreigners, and at best they were regarded only as inhabitants of or residents in Dutch territory, and this had the effect of making their status abroad uncertain. It affected, for example, those Chinese from the Indies living in Siam who wished to claim Dutch citizenship in order to avoid the special tax system applying to the Chinese.[1]

Whatever were the grounds for claiming a Chinese as a Dutch citizen, they were bound to conflict with the Chinese law of nationality (until 1909 unwritten) which was based on the *jus sanguinis* and claimed all persons of Chinese descent through the male line as Chinese. This fact delayed a consular convention between the two countries and it was not signed until 8 May 1910.[2] Although the Chinese strenuously objected to the Dutch nationality law they had to accept it as the price of the right to consular

[1] See pp. 177–8.

[2] The first permanent Chinese legation was appointed to London in 1877. The minister was accredited to London and Paris. A Chinese legation was opened at Washington in 1878, in Tokyo the same year, in 1879 at St. Petersburg. Consuls were appointed in various ports abroad in the next decade or so. See Dr Tung Ling, *An Historical Study of the Establishment of Chinese Diplomatic Organs* (Leyden, 1946).

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jurisdiction in the East Indies. By a subsequent exchange of notes it was agreed that the East Indian legislation would be conclusive in determining Dutch or Chinese nationality. 641

But it was not to be assumed from this agreement that the Chinese Government, especially after the Revolution on the eve of which the consular convention had been signed, had abandoned its claim to the moral support, if not the technical allegiance, of all of Chinese race in Southeast Asia.

To continue this technical but essential description in Vandenbosch's words:

> The law of 1910 dropped the classification of Dutch citizens and foreigners, and substituted for it that of citizens and subjects. The law adopted the *jus soli* and declared all children born of parents vested [domiciled] in the Dutch East Indies were Dutch subjects even if not Dutch citizens. The status of Dutch citizens would be lost through nationalization in a foreign State, marriage with a foreign man, government or military service under a foreign State without the consent of the Governor-General, and by sojourn in a foreign State without registration with a Dutch consular official within three months of arrival, and, in the case of continuing sojourn, failure to register within the first three months of each calendar year.[1]

Fromberg criticized the law on two grounds—first, that it sought to put under Dutch jurisdiction as many as possible of the inhabitants of the country, and secondly, it allowed the status of subjects to lapse as quickly as possible when outside Dutch territory. The law (says Vandenbosch) does indeed have the aspect of forced naturalization and must frequently create a dual nationality, for no provision is made for repudiation on attainment of majority. The requirement of repeated registration was very unfair to the natives abroad, especially when they were employed at some distance from a consulate, and, as might be expected, many failed to register. The defect was remedied in 1929 when the law was revised to exclude the indigenous peoples of the East Indies from this provision.[2]

To the Chinese of the Indies this law was a great disappointment, for it conferred no rights, benefited them but little, and yet removed them from the protection of the Chinese consuls.

[1] op. cit. p. 363.

[2] 'Chinese and Indians in Malaya who are Dutch subjects but have not reported to the Netherlands Consul-General since the liberation must do so before 30 April, otherwise they will cease to be Dutch subjects', *Straits Times* (Singapore, 2 February 1948).

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CHAPTER XLIV

DUTCH-CHINESE RELATIONS 1900–42

128 IN the preceding chapter the questions of status under the law and the nationality of the Chinese of Indonesia have been discussed: in this chapter it is intended to cover a wider field, bringing in Dutch-Chinese and Indonesian-Chinese social and economic relations, though legal questions of a similar or related character will again arise.

186 In the nineteenth century Raffles, van der Capellen, and Van den
609 Bosch had all tried to attack the position of the Chinese, but these had always responded by finding new means of livelihood and growing richer and more powerful. We have seen, too, that during the Liberal period it was the Chinese who made the greatest material advance proportionately with the new-found freedom of enterprise. When in 1900, however, there was a decline in profits, the jealousy of the Europeans was directed to the Chinese who were enabled to trade successfully by reason of their lower standard of living, which meant a lower wages bill. Their strong economic position in the Indies (much stronger than in 1850) was held to be due to their exploitation of the improvidence and vices of the natives.

Indeed, with both Europeans and natives the Chinese of this period had an unsavoury reputation. They were accused of exploiting the natives and of dishonesty in trade with the Europeans. They were also known to be prominent in the bribing of officials with handsome gifts at New Year and on other festivals. But it should have been clear that, whatever their guilt in these several respects, it was not the Chinese who invented the system, nor had they a monopoly of the abuses. Theirs was the uneviable position of middlemen, exposed to the animosity of two opposed forces, the natives and the Europeans, though useful as a buffer between them. In any case, high officials of the period gave support to the theory of the detrimental role of the Chinese in Indonesian Society, and many regarded them as the 'main cause of the diminishing welfare of the Javanese'.

The Indies were now on the eve of the inauguration of the 'ethical policy', when, as a result of what is sometimes called a 'change of

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heart', the Dutch suddenly became acutely aware of their responsibilities towards the native peoples of their empire.[1] Since the Chinese were thought to be inimical to the welfare of the natives, many officials interpreted their duty of protecting the natives as necessarily meaning baiting the Chinese. The Dutch Colonial Minister, Fock (who, incidentally, made a fortune as an advocate of the Chinese in Batavia), shared the common view as to the baneful nature of the Chinese, and in his Report on measures for the relief of the Indies placed in the foreground the pressing need for stricter control over Chinese problems. 'It is unnecessary', he said, 'to argue that they exercise a pernicious influence in the interior.'[2]

The year of the Boxer Rebellion was a significant one for the Chinese of the Indies since it was marked by several governmental acts of great importance to them. In that year the farming of opium was abolished and a Government monopoly to restrict the use of opium substituted; the decision was made to extend the Government monopoly of pawning throughout Indonesia; and in the same year the Government began its system of agricultural credit banks with the object of furnishing cheaper credit to the farmers and rescuing them from the clutches of the usurers.[3] These measures all were detrimental to the interests of the Chinese, for in one case they took away a business that had been theirs for centuries, and in the other they created competitors to them backed by all the capital and resources of the Government.

From this year, too, dates the establishment of the Bureau for Chinese Affairs to meet the need keenly felt by the Netherlands Indies Government for expert advice. The personnel of the Bureau

[1] The 'ethical policy' is usually dated from 1901. In a speech from the throne that year by Queen Wilhelmina occurred the following significant passage: 'As a Christian Power the Netherlands is obligated in the East Indian archipelago to regulate better the legal position of native Christians, to lend support on a firm basis to Christian missions, and to imbue the whole conduct of Government with the consciousness that the Netherlands had a moral duty to fulfil with respect to the people and these regions. In connection with this the diminished welfare of the population of Java merits special attention. I desire to institute an investigation into this.'

[2] Fock, *Beschouwingen*, p. 4, cited by Furnivall, p. 240.

[3] De Wolff van Westerrode was the pioneer both in the initiation of the 'paddy banks' and of Government pawnshops. In the Government pawnshops the people could raise money on more advantageous terms than when they resorted to Chinese pawnshops, there was a fairer valuation, the rates of interest were lower, the clients were assured of the protection of their interests, and better care was taken of pledges. Furnivall, p. 359.

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underwent a long period of preparation in Holland, China, and the Indies and had a thorough acquaintance with the Chinese languages and customs. The Bureau, which kept in close touch with movements in China and among the Chinese community in the Indies, furnished information and advice to all branches of the Government, prepared a bi-monthly report on the Chinese and the Chinese-Malay press in the Indies, and gave special attention to Chinese schools. 'Appointed originally as a watch-dog against Chinese aggression', says Furnivall, 'the Adviser on Chinese affairs has come to function rather as a Protector of Chinese.'[1] To assist in these matters the Governor-General had also the advice of an expert in international law.

Fock's proposals for dealing with the Chinese problem proved impracticable, but in any case the Indies Government was becoming increasingly aware of the rapid changes taking place in the international situation, and towards the Chinese it adopted a policy of conciliation by which most of their civil disabilities were removed. In 1911 it made an important concession to Chinese sentiment by recognizing Chinese consuls; in a succession of orders between 1914 and 1916 it allowed them a greater freedom of residence and movement; in 1919 it abolished all restrictions on their place of residence within Java, and in 1926 it extended the order to the Outer Provinces. Thus, since 1900, the whole policy of segregation had been abandoned. In legal status, too, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, the Chinese advanced more and more towards complete equality with the Europeans. But Chinese Nationalism was now getting into its stride and creating a state of mind which allowed of no compromise with its slogan of 'Once a Chinese always a Chinese'. Dutch policy had conserved a plural society: an external force claimed one of the members of the society as an extension of itself, however mingled in blood it might be.

The Volksraad

In 1911 the foundation of the Chinese Republic aroused intense enthusiasm among the Chinese of Indonesia, not only among the large number of recent immigrants, but also among Indonesian Chinese, who, thanks in part to Dutch separatist policy, were more

[1] This statement is, however, strongly contested by some Indonesian Chinese to whom I have spoken. V. P.

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Chinese than Indonesian. Regarding the introduction of the symbols of a foreign country as a threatened invasion of their sovereignty, the Dutch discouraged the display of the new Republican flag (the 'five-barred' flag) which the Chinese were everywhere flaunting, and this led to boycotts and riots which had to be suppressed by force. Yet, in spite of these demonstrations, the Indian Government pursued a policy of courting the goodwill of the local Chinese. 186

It is indicative of the real situation that the *Sarekat Islam* (Javanese Muslim Society) was founded, before 1914, mainly as a defence against the economic encroachment of the Chinese. At the same time the nascent native movement had been stimulated by the example of the Chinese. The Javanese saw that Chinese agitation had been followed by concessions, and they also saw themselves being pushed farther and farther into the background as the Chinese grew stronger. And in its current form of an active protest against the exploitation of the natives by the Chinese, the new movement gained much sympathy from the Europeans. However, as events developed, it was the Europeans and the Chinese who were to be drawn into an unrecognized, but none the less real, alliance against the developing pretensions of native Nationalism. [476] 668 186

From at least the beginning of the century the Dutch had had in mind the gradual introduction of some measures of self-government in their huge Indonesian territories. It was not an easy matter with such a diversity of administrative units. There were in the period immediately preceding the Japanese invasion eight main units in Netherlands India—three Provinces and five Governments. Of these, three Provinces and two Governments were in Java and Madura. Finally, there were important Native States, covering large areas, within the Province or the Government, which had a certain autonomy of their own. The three Governments outside Java and Madura—Sumatra, Borneo, and the Great East—were constituted only in 1938. These large units were divided into Residencies, each under a Dutch Resident, and in Java these again were divided into Regencies, varying much in size and importance, each under the charge of a native Regent. Usually the office of Regent descended from father to son. The governmental system was one in which the administration was nominally in the hands of the native hereditary Regents, assisted by a Dutch Resident and his assistant. Under the rule of the Company the main function of 631

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631 the Resident was to ensure the collection of the produce. In more recent times he was 'charged with securing the welfare of the inhabitants and in exercising "gentle pressure" to secure efficiency in administration'.[1] The Regent had under him a native civil service. The Resident's supervisory influence was great, though the development of the specialist technical departments such as agriculture, public health, labour, &c., had meant a lessening in his responsibilities.

The ultimate unit in Javanese life was the *dessa* or village community in which local affairs were conducted under a council of leaders and a village chief; but here again there had been increasing interference with the *dessa* due to the growth of centralized technical administration.

642 In Java a beginning was made towards responsible government in 1903 with the creation of local municipalities, and this system
623 was afterwards extended. The pre-war policy of the Dutch was to provide the provinces of Java and important group communities in the Outer Islands, such as Minangkabau in Sumatra, the Bandjar in Borneo, and others, with Municipal and Regency Councils, mainly elected by a limited franchise, but with some nominated members. The powers and functions of Councils were being steadily increased.

642 The government of Netherlands India was in the hands of the Governor-General assisted by the Council of the Netherlands Indies
646 (*Raad van Indië*). In 1941 it had four members, of whom three were Dutch and one was Javanese. Finally, as a measure towards eventual self-government, a parliament, the Volksraad, came into being in 1918. It was an advisory body, but on certain subjects, including the key question of finance, the Governor-General had to act in agreement with it. It had power to amend Government Bills and to initiate legislation.

646 Representation in the municipal and legislative bodies was on a communal basis. Of the 61 members of the Volksraad no fewer
623 than 3 and no more than 5 might be Chinese, and they held about the same number of seats proportionately in the provincial, regency, and municipal councils. Since the other seats were about equally divided between Europeans and natives, the Chinese should have held the balance of power in all these bodies, but most
000 of the Chinese were Dutch-nominated. For a few years after 1918,

[1] *Netherlands Overseas Territories*, p. 26.

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For a few years after 1918 646

when the Volksraad was established, there was a group of Chinese who opposed the acceptance of Dutch citizenship in any form and 668 who opposed accepting representation in the Volksraad. Though many of these were Indonesian-Chinese of the third and fourth generations, they talked of being in the Indies only temporarily. This group of irreconcilables wished to be Chinese subjects and to enjoy a kind of extraterritoriality. Affecting to regard the Dutch as a passing phenomenon, some of them affiliated themselves with the more extreme movement of the Indonesian Nationalists; others held aloof and interested themselves only in the politics of China. A large number, however, demonstrated a willingness to co-operate with the Government. For the most part the Chinese and native movements followed along different though parallel lines. 'Only in 1925 did the Chinese and native movements intersect, when, for a short time, Chinese and Javanese Communists were associated, but the association broke down owing to the difference in their aims.'[1] The association whilst it lasted led to a series of strikes. In the 1930s new parties were formed, and those parties [665] which were based on the association of all races for the common welfare collapsed. Political parties were organized more and more on racial and religious lines.[2]

The question of military service should here be mentioned. 702 Even those Chinese who wanted complete assimilation to the Dutch wanted it without the concomitant obligation of military service. Most of the Chinese who had accepted voluntary assimilation did not answer the call-up, but the Indies Government never pressed the matter. It felt, no doubt, that, as the Chinese outnumbered the Europeans by four to one, it would be dangerous to take into the Army such an uncertain quantity. Greater certainty and reliability would be required in the event of a crisis.

In 1940 there was still a very strong Chinese nationalist senti- 668 ment, although among the Indonesian-Chinese[3] there was a 186 tendency to align themselves on the side of the Indonesian Nationalists. Many Chinese, however, were unable to make up their minds whether their interests lay on the side of the Dutch or of the natives. Those whose resentment of the Dutch led them to

[1] Furnivall, pp. 241, 242.
[2] Vandenbosch, p. 366 and passim.
[3] I have avoided the commonly used term 'Indo-Chinese' because of its suggestion of natives of Indochina.

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668 sympathize with the Indonesians reflected at the same time that as
186 a race they were not liked by the Indonesians, partly for economic reasons and partly because of the 'superiority complex' common among the young Chinese Nationalists, and felt that their interests therefore might not receive as favourable consideration under a native-controlled Government as they did under the Dutch. As regards allegiance to the Netherlands a few Indonesian-Chinese could be found who were *plus royalistes que le roi*. Moreover, these Indonesian-Chinese were more and more being orientated towards Dutch culture. Large numbers received their higher education in the Netherlands. While in Holland they were ardent Chinese Nationalists, but on their return to the Indies they increasingly attached themselves to the Europeans, both because they now felt more at home with them, and also for the protection of their interests against the natives and the Indonesian Nationalists.[1] Very few had a speaking or reading knowledge of Chinese.

871 These considerations pave the way towards a discussion of the key question of education, but before proceeding to this it would be well if we could find a Chinese spokesman to express the Chinese frame of mind in this period. This fortunately can be done in the person of Mr Oey Kang-liu, though it must be borne in mind that his feeling is probably stronger and his expression more articulate than was the case with most of his fellows in Indonesia.[2]

651 'As a community', says Mr Oey, 'the Chinese pay most of the taxes without any representation in the Government Councils. There is on every side discrimination against the Chinese. Every Chinese on arrival in the Indies has to pay fl. 150: if he fails to produce the sum he is promptly arrested and deported. Everyone in the Netherlands Indies pays an income-tax of 8 per cent. On paper the Chinese are treated on an equal basis, but in practice there is a big difference from theory—namely he is required to pay 15 per cent. extra. For example, a Government officer comes to a Chinese merchant to ascertain his annual income. He is told that it is $5,000. On principle the revenue officer refuses to accept the statement of a Chinese, and proceeds to settle the question in quite a simple manner: he arbitrarily fixes the amount of taxable income

[1] Vandenbosch, p. 366 ff.

[2] Oey Kang-Liu, 'The Chinese in the Dutch East Indies', *China Weekly Review* (7 January 1933).

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by doubling or trebling the amount stated, and his decision is final, for there does not appear to be any way of appealing against this haphazard, even when not unjust, decision. But Chinese merchants who understand the psychology of these officers and their little weaknesses will tell you that more often than not a little "greasing of the palm" will reduce the amount of income to the figure originally proposed by the payer. But here comes the rub. The following year the same officer will as a matter of routine raise the amount of the income of the harassed merchant who must again repeat the process of "palm-greasing". And so the farce goes on from year to year.'[1]

Another grievance is that for the privilege of trading in the Indies the Dutch charge a business licence fee which is determined by the officials in such a manner that the Chinese pay more for their licence fees than the Dutch engaged in similar business. Even a firm registered as a Dutch company and managed by a foreigner has to pay twice the amount charged for an ordinary business licence if the principal shareholders happen to be Chinese.

'The Chinese', Mr Oey concludes, 'are in fact treated as a subject race. The Dutch, in fact, regard all Chinese in the Colony on the same footing as the Javanese, a fact that is clearly indicated in the policy of discrimination against the Chinese and also in subjecting them to the jurisdiction of the courts specially reserved for the Javanese.'[2]

As a footnote to a chapter on Dutch-Chinese relationships it would be fitting to give an extract from the opinions of another Chinese, this time an Indonesian-Chinese educated in Holland and resident there during the German occupation of 1940–4, possessed of an affection for the Dutch and for Dutch civilization, yet at the

[1] Dr Vlekke comments: 'The assertions of Mr Oey Kang-liu ought to be checked. I cannot do this but I am sure that the tax settlements he complains about were not so arbitrary as he contends. It all sounds (except for the charge of bribery) curiously similar to the complaints I have heard many times of small business men in Holland a few decades ago when strict bookkeeping was not so regularly attended to, who would maintain to their last breath that they really did not earn a worthwhile profit. Once a proper account was made it usually proved that they had enjoyed a considerable income and were most indignant at being taxed on the full amount.'

Chinese human nature is, in fact, not very different from other kinds of human nature.

[2] An eloquent summary of Chinese disabilities in Java is given by Dr Liem Twan Djie, *De Distribueerende Tusschenhandel der Chineezen op Java* (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1947) p. 40.

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186 same time fully conscious that he is a Chinese. This is Mr Tjan Tjoe-som, the president of the Chung Hwa Hui, addressing the Association in Leyden in April 1946.[1]

186 The Chinese, says Mr Tjan, had from the beginning of their settlement in the Indies been middlemen. As such they had in the 181 course of time developed qualities of peacefulness, 'a kind of consummation of their inborn instincts', which had gradually made them the perfect type of quiet citizen. In Indonesia the middle-class man, who was *par excellence* the Chinese, enjoyed appreciation for his industry, frugality, and reliability: on the other hand he had been reproached for lacking interest in the country in which he lived, and at the same time, for having an undue interest in the country he had come from. The reproach, however, that the Chinese were indifferent to the fate of their foreign home must be seen and judged against the background of the social and political conditions under which they lived. It was common knowledge that the Chinese, having the status of, and being treated as, 'foreign Orientals', did feel themselves to be foreigners, and did feel that their interests were not sufficiently taken to heart and that their rightful wishes were not regarded. The opinion that as middle-class men the Chinese would acquiesce in any condition provided that it still left them room to earn money gave a highly distorted picture of their character. It is improbable that any human being could be found willing to suffer any sort of humiliating discrimination with gladness if only his mercenary activities were allowed, and with the Chinese it was certainly not the case. Mr Tjan continues:

> As the sons of the culture the age of which is unparalleled by any extant one, of a country the past of which contains long and numerous periods of glory and beauty, of wisdom and richness, and the future of which holds the most immense possibilities, the Chinese may be excused for a pride that does not rest on hollow imagination alone. In their heart of hearts any act of injustice, wrong or inhumanity is resented as an injury to the Heaven-ordained norms of right, justice, and humanity. From across the oceans, China's age-long traditions of morality and ethics still had their hold on its wandering sons . . . .
>
> There would have been no Chinese movement in Java if the Chinese had been content with the opportunity granted them to earn their

[1] *Chung Hwa Hui Nederland*, Brochure no. 2, Lustrum Speech, 15 April 1946, 'Luctor et Embargo', Leyden.

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bread, and in many cases to earn their bread handsomely. It was the failing on the part of the authorities to recognize that the Chinese is not the *homo economicus* all over, which gave rise to much misapprehension, much bitterness, and much resentment. The Chinese came to the conclusion, from their view naturally, from the others' view incomprehensibly, that the Government did not practise the *wang tao*, the kingly way, but the *pa tao*, the way of the oppressors. That they did not in this case feel inclined to abolish their attitude of being foreigners is a thing probably to be deplored but is not altogether unintelligible.

We shall not venture any judgement until we have considered the experiences of the Chinese of Indonesia in the field of education and have ascertained as nearly as possible their economic position at the time of the outbreak of the war with Japan in 1942, both of which are essential factors to a proper understanding of our subject.

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CHAPTER XLV

EDUCATION AND THE CHINESE IN INDONESIA

871 IN this chapter we shall be dealing with three main streams of education—the Western, the Chinese traditional, and the Chinese post-revolutionary. In Indonesia the first two streams flowed side by side for nearly three hundred years, albeit in tiny volume: the second stream, already freshened somewhat by the advance waters of the third stream, overflowed in some quantity in the first years of the present century to fertilize the mind of the Indonesian Chinese. The third of the waterways was a branch of the original river, but changed from it in character, and so reinforced by the freshets of the West that its advent was like the Yellow River once more changing its course.

For many centuries the Chinese traditional system of education had been in a state of stagnation. The written language, which had diverged so long from the spoken word that the two were entirely distinct, had become the preserve of scholars who had turned it into a means more of obfuscation than of information. At the same time an examination system had grown up by which the bookworms with prodigious memories and a morbid reverence for authority were seeded out to administer the vast Flowery Kingdom. Under the impact of the West, Japan had modernized herself whereas China resisted modernization with all her stored up resources of inertia. Reluctantly, however, she consented to adopt Western sources of strength if this could be done without disturbing her own inviolable values. Thus there was a school for teaching telegraphy long before there was any modern school system. But, warned by the threat of China's dissolution if she did not adapt herself to a changing world, the reformers were active before the end of the century, and educational reform marched hand in hand with the Revolution. But in spite of great changes in the curriculum the old written language, *Wenli*, remained an unwieldy obstruction to progress till in 1917 Dr Hu Shih made a startling proposal. He suggested that *Wenli* should be dropped as the medium of primary and secondary instruction, and reserved for advanced study, and that the written form of the mandarin ver-

[p.5 ~ 6]

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nacular should be used in its place. This written vernacular, or *pai hua*, had been used for centuries as a vehicle for romances, was distended and verbose as compared with *Wenli* and had none of its refinements, but was nevertheless easily understandable and far easier to learn. Hu Shih won his way, and in 1920 mandarin, now known in its modified form as *Kuo Yü*, or the National Language, became the official medium of instruction in all Chinese schools.[1]

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Everywhere they went the Chinese carried with them their reverence for learning. The pioneers were many of them illiterate, but of the Hokkien merchant class who predominated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it is likely that a high proportion had received some schooling. We have glimpses of the high standard of practical instruction in their more prosperous centres from the pen of Wouter Schouten,[2] and there was in addition to home instruction at least one school in eighteenth-century Batavia with thirty to forty pupils. But all they learnt in such schools was the use of the abacus, to get by rote the Four Books—The Analects, the Doctrine of the Mean, the Great Learning, and Mencius—and to write a conventional letter. The curriculum in a Batavia Chinese household or school was probably not a whit different in the time of the first Captain Bencon in 1620 from what it was in 1890. Even of this kind of schooling it is certain that not more than a very small proportion reaped the benefits—even less so in the Outer Islands than in Java. Nor did they receive instruction in any medium other than Chinese.

Only after the restoration of Netherlands rule in 1816 was education given any consideration. In 1818 it was decreed that Indonesians should be permitted to attend Dutch schools. This regulation, however, was applied in such a manner that only a few natives could take advantage of it because of the very rigid entrance requirements of family background, environment, and tuition. The most difficult requirement was that the applicant must understand sufficient Dutch to be able to follow the instruction intelligently.[3]

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[1] See the present writer's *Problems of Chinese Education* (London, Kegan Paul, 1936), passim.

Wenli is a foreign-invented term formed from *Wen* = literature and *li* = principles.

[2] See p. 461.

[3] Raden Loekman Djajadiningrat, Director of Education and Public Worship in the Netherlands Indies, *From Illiteracy to University, Educational Development in the Netherlands Indies*, Bulletin 3 (New York, Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942) p. 10 and passim.

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872 The Regulations for the Government of the Netherlands Indies of 1854 laid down that the Governor-General should encourage the 647 establishment of schools for the native population. The primary purpose in establishing these schools, however, was to train native 658 officials. The schools when established were divided into native schools of the second class for the children of officials of low rank and for the middle class generally, and native schools of the first class for children of officials of high rank and of well-to-do persons. This system continued until towards the end of the century when, under the influence of the 'ethical' movement in Holland, a policy was laid down for nation-wide education not merely in the interests of the Government.

872 Nothing, however, had been done for the education of Chinese children, for the above-mentioned article in the Regulations of 658 1854 was interpreted not to apply to children of peoples assimilated to natives. No subsidies were given to Chinese schools, and Chinese children were permitted to enter the lower native schools only if there was room for them and if they knew sufficient Dutch to follow the instruction, and upon payment of higher school fees.[1] Education in these schools led normally to employment in the Government service, but from even the lowest ranks of this the Chinese were excluded.

872 About 1900, under the stimulus of the reawakening spirit of China, and stirred to greater self-preservation by the Government 186 measures regarding opium farms and the credit system, the Chinese 204 of Indonesia began to assert themselves to improve their position. Education and the press were the chief means employed. School [875] societies were organized and schools opened. With the knowledge, and even with the support and encouragement, of the Chinese Government, Chinese teachers were sent to Indonesia where Tiong Hwa Hwee Koan schools (schools established by Chinese Associations and by the trading society *Siang Hwee*) were organized with a strong Chinese nationalistic character. Preference was expressed for Dutch as the language medium, but since school societies could not afford the high-salaried Dutch teachers, English was chosen, for the reason that English-speaking Chinese instructors could be cheaply obtained from Singapore, and, in addition, English had the advantage of being the commercial language of the East. The Chinese press in the Indies meanwhile strengthened the unity and

[1] Vandenbosch, op. cit. p. 358.

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the national consciousness of the community and pressed the Chinese grievances with the Indies Government. 'The Chinese in the Indies', so wrote the press, 'are step-children neglected by the Indies Government, but are once again recognized by their own father, China, who after being asleep all these years, is now re-awakened.'[1]

Contemporaneously, several elementary and secondary schools were established in China supported by Government and private funds to which the Chinese colonists were invited to send their children.

So far, though, the stream was but a trickle. But the Dutch Government, realizing that if it did not take things into its own hands the Chinese almost certainly would, began to make education easier for the Chinese to procure. Chinese were admitted to native schools on the same basis as natives, and the erection of Government schools for Chinese, the so-called Dutch-Chinese schools, was begun in 1908, and in 1909 private Chinese schools were granted Government subsidies.

The curriculum of the Dutch-Chinese schools was the same as that of the European elementary schools, with Dutch as the language medium, but they were intended exclusively for children of Chinese origin. In special cases children of other groups of the population might be admitted, but only with the permission of the Director of Education. However, applications for entry by non-Chinese were rarely made.

In order to meet the demand for a knowledge of English in business, courses in English were included in the curriculum of these schools when so desired by the parents.

As these schools were conducted exclusively for Chinese children, it was not demanded of the pupils that they should have some knowledge of the Dutch language before entry. The only prerequisite was some degree of social standing. Nevertheless, since the courses were given in Dutch, a knowledge of the Dutch language was necessary in order to follow the instruction. Therefore a preparatory Dutch class was included. It was calculated that as the number of Dutch-speaking families increased among the Chinese population, the preparatory classes would gradually disappear, as the children would learn Dutch at home.

It was soon evident that these schools had the support of the

[1] Vandenbosch, op. cit. p. 359.

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872 It was soon evident that these schools had the support of the Chinese community and every year more schools were established.
658 The greatest difficulty was to obtain sufficient teachers, and normal
876 schools were opened to train them. Students of both sexes were admitted to these, and to begin with the number of students applying for enrolment was satisfactory, but then it fell off because the product of the Dutch-Chinese schools were finding it more profitable to enter business. The situation could not be met by increasing the salaries of the teachers because, in the first place, Indonesian teachers trained in equivalent normal schools would demand comparable salaries, thus making the Dutch-Chinese schools too expensive to support, and secondly, because it was impossible to compete with business as an employer, especially in times of prosperity. This placed the authorities in a dilemma. Many Chinese urged that the Dutch-Chinese schools be transformed into national schools open to every Chinese child. This demand could not be granted since the number of teachers necessary was not available. Besides, the environment, development, and culture of different parts of the Chinese community varied greatly. If children of all these different groups were admitted to the same school the student body would be too heterogeneous to maintain education at the desired level. So argued the Dutch education authorities. For this reason Malay-Chinese schools were organized along the same lines as the six grades of the Indonesian schools, with Dutch as a subject. General business courses were included in the curriculum.

872 The establishment of the Dutch-Chinese schools was in the
658 nature of preferential treatment for the Chinese, and the Indonesians were not slow to recognize it. Their schools had nothing like the same facilities for obtaining a Western education.

873 The elementary education in the Dutch-Chinese schools con-
658 nected up with secondary, higher, and vocational training. The graduates of the Malay-Chinese school could, it appears, obtain admission to the secondary system through the continuation schools (for learning the Dutch language), and the connecting schools.[1]

1 [i.e. the Dutch-Chinese Schools--Analyst]

[872] [1] Dr Vlekke comments: 'The Dutch-Chinese schools never reached a large section of the Chinese population. The efforts to spread a knowledge of Dutch among Chinese or Indonesians were only half-hearted and often opposed by lower officials on the spot. In 1930 there were only 8,772 Chinese in the Indies who could write Dutch (*Visman Report*, vol. i, p. 66). Only a very few Malay-Chinese schools were ever in operation. Part of the complicated East Indian school system existed only on paper, that is to say of several 'school-types' there

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One effect of this great and novel expansion of opportunities for a Dutch education was naturally that, as has been mentioned,[1] a much larger proportion of Chinese received higher education in Holland, with the result, very often, that they conceived a warm regard for Dutch thought and European culture generally, but did not necessarily feel more reconciled to the status of the Chinese in Indonesia. A similar fact was noticeable among Indian students who attended the universities of Great Britain. Furnivall remarks that some graduates of the Chinese schools (presumably the Dutch-Chinese schools?) contributed learned articles to European periodicals, and some wrote treatises in Dutch that would stand comparison with the works of their European fellow subjects—for example the standard treatise on the land revenue system was by a Chinese. Many Chinese were trained as doctors in Dutch centres.[2]

What has been gleaned from publications such as Mr Djajadiningrat's *From Illiteracy to University* is illuminating enough, but we should be going far wrong if we assumed that it accounted for the whole of the education of the Chinese in Indonesia. According to Dr R. van Diffelin,[3] of 200,000 Chinese children between the ages of six and fourteen, in the year 1936, about 98,000 received education of some sort. Of these some 45,000 were educated in schools conducted by the Tjong Hwa Hak Tong; 23,000 in public and subsidized Dutch-Chinese schools; 13,000 in native primary schools and Malay-Chinese schools; 2,500 in the European schools (six grades); and 13,500 in the 'special' Dutch-Chinese and other 'wildcat'[4] schools under private management. That is to say, that about 50 per cent. of Chinese youth received education.[5] He further mentions that according to income-tax figures 32,000 Chinese have an income of at least $50 a month—that is to say, the minimum

existed so few establishments as to make the whole type of no importance. Moreover the statistics are incomplete as schools not coming under Government supervision (e.g. all Mohammedan schools!) were not included in the survey. In 1930, 71·1 per cent. of the Chinese in Indonesia were illiterate.'

[1] See p. 529; also Furnivall, op. cit. pp. 418, 419.

[2] The Yang Seng Hospital in Batavia was the only hospital outside China founded, financed, and administered by Chinese (though there were a number of Chinese hospital foundations (e.g. the Tan Tock Seng Hospital, Singapore)).

[3] Dr R. van Diffelin, 'Het Onderwijs voor Chineezen', *Koloniale Studiën*, nos. 5 and 6 (1936) p. 42, quoting Loe Ping Kian, article reproduced from *Sin Po* (25 April–13 June 1936).

[4] In the Straits Settlements and F.M.S. alone there were 91,534 pupils in Chinese schools in 1938. Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, App. VI.

[5] But compare this statement of Van Diffelin with that of Vlekke, p. 530, fn.

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[651 434] subsistence limit which entitles them to have their children admitted to the Dutch-Chinese schools.

872 658 No information appears to be publicly available regarding the schools conducted by the Tjong Hwa Hak Tong, but from experience elsewhere in Southeast Asia it is safe to say that, subject to Dutch official inspection and control, the curriculum had a purely [186] Chinese nationalist character. That is to say, that through the medium of *Kuo Yü*, from text-books produced by the Commercial Press or the Chung Hua Press in Shanghai, the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen (that China is the only country where 'race' and 'nation' are the same, that 'we are the wronged races', 'to save China we must certainly promote Nationalism', &c., &c.) were being inculcated day after day, either in so many words or indirectly, and that, whatever the results for the 52,000, the 45,000 were irretrievably lost to Indonesia and the Dutch as citizens or subjects. And that is in addition to anything the Communists may have been teaching during the same period and of which so little is known.

872 186 It is not difficult to see that the Chinese in Indonesia were split by reason of their varying educational background. Divided first of all into *Peranakans* and *Sinkhehs*, according to whether they were born in Indonesia or in China, they were further divided into Dutch-, Malay-, or Chinese-educated. There do not appear to be any statistics as to how *Peranakans* and *Sinkhehs* were distributed among these school groups, but while it is safe to assume that children of the former attended the Dutch and Malay schools rather than the Chinese ones, and that the China-born showed a preference for the Chinese type of education, it is probable that, as in Malaya, the Chinese schools had captured many of the children of the *Peranakans*. The reasons for this were partly that the Chinese schools provided nearly half the primary education available to the Chinese of Indonesia,[1] partly the appeal of Chinese

[1] The statement in *Island India Goes to School*, by Edwin R. Embree and others (University of Chicago Press, 1934) p. 53, in the section on Dutch-Chinese schools, that 'there are also a few schools, outside the Government system, organized and supported by the Chinese themselves with their language as the medium of instruction', does not at all agree with Dr R. van Diffelin's figure of 45,000 Chinese pupils in a total of 98,000 attending such schools. But then in Mr Djajadiningrat's book (which can be taken as official, as he was Director of Education) I can trace no mention at all of these Chinese schools. Such are the pitfalls that beset the path of the investigator.

The Statistical Pocket Book of Indonesia, 1941, gives (table 32, p. 22) the total number of 'Other Asiatic' pupils in all schools in Indonesia as 43,817 for 1933–4

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Nationalism, and partly that the European type of education had produced a surplus of clerks, &c., and the Dutch-Chinese schools did not offer the same economic advantages as before. 872 186

Christianity made surprisingly little advance in the Netherlands Indies. *The Netherlands Indies*, by John Rauws and others,[1] gives a total of only 5,841 Chinese Christians for the whole of the islands. 797

and 49,695 for 1939–40, and thus appears to ignore altogether the pupils in Chinese schools in which Chinese was the medium of instruction. [872]

[1] (New York, World Dominion Press, 1935) p. 162 and App. X.

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CHAPTER XLVI

PRE-WAR ECONOMIC POSITION OF THE CHINESE

471 RAFFLES writing in 1817 estimated the wealth of the Chinese at ten times that of all the Europeans put together.[1] This, however, must have been very much in the nature of a guess. But the modern investigator is only comparatively in a stronger position than Raffles was, for the extent of the wealth of the Chinese cannot even now be ascertained very closely. Mr Callis estimated the total entrepreneur investments in Indonesia in 1937 at 1,411 million United States dollars (at 40 cents to the guilder), of which the Dutch held 1,040 million, the British 200 million, and the Americans 95 million. He goes on to say:

> It should be expressly said that available information in the case of the Netherlands Indies is such that island-Chinese investments cannot be separated from Dutch holdings. But on the basis of what is known of the Chinese population in the islands, their general economic position, their holdings in neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia, and their family remittances from the archipelago to China, the guess can be made that Chinese business capital is worth about 150 million United States dollars at the present time.[2]

434 In conjunction with this overall figure of investment we may consider the following table of national income according to race for the year 1936:[3]

	Number assessed	*Total income in millions of guilders*
Europeans	65,000	266
Indonesians	27,000	50
Chinese	37,000	82
Other Foreign Asiatics	3,000	9

[257] When the sugar industry was dominating the economic life of Java until the world depression of 1929, when the market almost

[1] Cited by Furnivall, op. cit. p. 47.
[2] Helmut G. Callis, *Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia* (New York, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942) (in mimeograph). Above 900 guilders per annum is, generally speaking, non-agricultural income.
[3] *Mission Interrupted*, p. 246.

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disappeared, the annual income of the island amounted to about 2,500 million guilders. About 450 million guilders of this left the country in the shape of profits and interest and to pay for capital goods, 300 million going to Europeans and 250 million to Chinese.[1] The collapse of the sugar industry greatly altered the picture.

But though the Chinese are consistently charged with a lust for gold, *auri sacra fames* (on the assumption, perhaps, that this is a vice from which other races are exempt), and although many of their number certainly have a talent for acquiring it, it is nevertheless not proven that the gold is equally distributed. Many poor Chinese in Indonesia believe that it is not. Here is what the Federation of Chinese Associations in Batavia has to say about it:

> Chinese living in Indonesia are generally considered as a wealthy group. This is a myth which is easily refuted by tax statistics. A few hundred families have indeed succeeded in amassing wealth, among whom may be counted a few millionaires; on the other hand there exist hundreds of thousands whose income is barely sufficient to make ends meet. Further, the number of Chinese working class and paupers is increasing daily.[2]

The Chinese were to be found in every economic stratum of Indonesian society, as large capitalists, bankers, and agricultural concessionnaires as well as the humblest labourers, but their function in the economic life was *par excellence* that of middlemen. Of the total Chinese population of 1·233 million, 470,000 were in 1930 engaged in a trade or profession: roughly 145,000 in raw material production, 94,000 in industry, 185,000 in trade and commerce, 3,000 in Government service (note the small figure), and 43,000 in other occupations. The Chinese in Java were most numerous in trade; those of the Outer Islands as mining or plantation coolies. Apart from their peculiarly Chinese function of middlemen, the manufacture of rattan and other furniture, carpentry, and, with the Arabs, the extension of small loans, usually at an usurious rate, were some of the occupations which were almost exclusively theirs. In the Outer Islands they were to be found in large numbers as contract labourers in the mines of Bangka and Billiton and the

[1] Vandenbosch, op. cit. p. 28.

[2] *Memorandum outlining acts of violence etc.*, compiled by Chung Hua Tsung Hui (Federation of Chinese Associations) (Batavia, 1947) p. 2.

Only 32,000 Chinese had an income of 50 guilders a month or over.

Official income-tax figures are given on p. 567.

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463 European plantations of the northeast coast of Sumatra, and in northwest Borneo as independent farmers. It was here centuries ago that numbers of Chinese came in search of gold, and when gold-mining became unprofitable they settled down to agriculture, which, after all, was the traditional occupation of the Chinese in their homeland.

(It is unfortunate that the figures available are so out of date, for the picture was considerably changed by the trade depression of 1929–32 and again by the Japanese invasion of 1942–5. A similar great change had taken place between 1900 and 1930, a change to which reference is made below.)

With the great development of European trade and banking in the decades preceding 1930 the Chinese had found employment in European firms and as assistants in European shops, and later had become more prominent in professional work as teachers, dentists, and doctors, and in the technical grades of the mining industry. More than most Oriental races, the Chinese have taken kindly to learning modern technical methods, though not so far on a large scale. In journalism they had gained a large share, and this included a share in the control of the native press.

[313] Timber has been exported from Java for centuries, the trade having been mainly in Chinese hands. In 1938 the total value of timber and timber wood products exported amounted to over four million guilders.

Modification in the function of the Chinese in Indonesia 1900–30

556 In 1900 the bulk of the Chinese wealth came from opium shops,
655 pawnshops, and usury. The Government measures abolishing the
471 opium shops and establishing State pawnshops and facilities for
426 credit had a revolutionary effect on the Chinese economy. The Chinese had obviously to look for new outlets for their capital and energy. These they found in a number of less dubious activities with a resulting change in their position within the Indonesian community. This process is characterized by Furnivall as 'From Parasitism to Construction'.[1]

548 Having a monopoly of opium, the Chinese vendors were in a position to push the sale of this harmful drug—an opportunity of
426 which they took full advantage. As pawnbrokers they fixed their terms for loans 'with reference to the need of the borrower rather

[1] See Furnivall, op. cit. pp. 412 ff.

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than to the value of the pledge he offered'. The pawnshops were often illicit opium dens. In other forms of money-lending their operation was equally 'unconscionable':[1] they aimed to get the native officials in their power and used this power to oppress cultivators. Even when ostensibly engaged in commerce, they were equally engaged in money-lending, and they had such a stranglehold on the *batik* industry in particular that the native craftsman was little better than their bond-slave. Regulations made by the Government to protect the native from these forms of extortion and oppression were rendered largely inoperative by the combination of the Chinese among themselves through their secret trade organizations to defeat their ends. It was for this reason that the Government abolished the monopolies and developed State money-lending.

The first form of popular credit was the Government pawnshop service, which in the more advanced areas maintained some 500 shops having a legal monopoly of the right to lend sums up to 100 guilders against the security of movable goods. This was found to be a useful institution for a population who traditionally kept much of their wealth in the form of jewellery, gold coins, ornaments, &c.[2] The rate of interest was high, and the proceeds of the service formed a considerable item in the Government revenue.

The second measure was the establishment of rural credit banks which were divided into *dessa lumbungs*, or village granaries, lending paddy to be repaid in rice at harvest time, and into *dessa* banks making small money advances, usually repayable in ten weekly instalments. Efforts were made to incorporate the co-operative principle into these institutions, but, up to the time of the Japanese invasion, with no great success.

The third medium of credit, for the lending of larger sums, was originally organized in the form of Divisional and Regency credit institutions, mainly in Java, under the direction of Dutch and native Government officials, but these were merged in 1934 into

[1] 'unconscionable' is placed in inverted commas to indicate that the writer does not necessarily endorse the judgement it contains—he merely quotes it from contemporary foreign usage.

A spirited defence of the Chinese trader-lender is in Sim Ki Ay, *De Chineesche Nederzetting in Nederlandsch-Indië*, extra number of *Chung Hwa Hui Tsa Chih* (n.d.).

[2] Mr Phoa Liong Gie, 'De Economische Positie der Chineezen in Nederlandsch-Indië', *Koloniale Studiën*, nos. 3 and 6 (1936) p. 97 and *passim*.

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652 the *Algemeene Volkscredietbank*, and after that they acted only as
426 branch offices. The average loan was stated to be 53 guilders in Java and 134 guilders in the Outer Islands.

[474] A certain amount of rural credit was also provided by co-operative societies.[1]

To what extent all these efforts delivered the native out of the hands of the Chinese and other money-lenders is not certain. Speaking of the *Volkscredietbank* in 1938 Dr Th. Fruin said: 'Such large-scale efforts to relieve debt are by no means without attendant difficulties. What the results thereof will be—particularly the lasting results—time alone can show.'[2]

471 Outside opium and pawnbroking, Chinese investment had
454 hitherto been mainly in sugar and timber and then only on a moderate scale. The first outlet they sought for their idle capital
455 was in land speculation, in the purchase of large private estates (*particuliere landerijen*). These estates had for the most part been granted by Raffles in the first place, and more and more of them passed during the nineteenth century to Chinese. When in 1900 their channels for investment were more circumscribed than before, they sought to increase their holdings. The Fock report of 1904 suggested the repurchase of the estates as one means of enhancing native welfare and diminishing Chinese influence. There were, however, difficulties in the way, and it was not until 1910 that the Dutch Parliament sanctioned the purchase of one estate, and the following year provision was made for the resumption of others at an estimated cost of fl. 400 million of the whole area under this form of tenure. By 1930 648,000 hectares had been resumed at a cost of fl. 81·3 million, leaving 503,000 hectares still in private ownership.[3]

Land speculation, therefore, offered a rapidly diminishing outlet for Chinese capital, but up to 1915 it was still possible to describe the Chinese as investing mainly in sugar, timber, and land speculation. It was only after the First World War that they began to build up a strong banking connexion and to lead the way in the development of local industry. Thus by force of events have they been redirected from often parasitical activities towards constructive ones.

471 Before about 1870 the Chinese were almost the only holders of

454 [1] Details of credit facilities derived from *Netherlands Overseas Territories*, pp. 35, 36.

[2] Cited ibid. p. 36.

[3] Furnivall, op. cit. p. 314.

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private capital (as distinct from Government undertakings) in the Indies, but after that date they were displaced from their position by the entry of European capital and the establishment of large agricultural and industrial enterprises. For 1921 an estimate shows that of a total investment of fl. 3,200 million (fl. 1,820 million invested in large-scale plantations and fl. 1,380 million in wholesale trade, industry, transport, and banking), the Dutch holding was fl. 2,350 million (73·4 per cent.), the Chinese fl. 340 million (10·6 per cent.), and the British fl. 300 million (9·4 per cent.).[1] Part of the capital belonged to Chinese living in Singapore and Hong Kong.

One of the items of the wholesale trade in which the Chinese predominated was rice, imported from Siam and Indochina, in which countries the Chinese had a practical monopoly of both the wholesale and intermediate trade. Of sugar they bought in 1924 4 million piculs as compared with 8·6 million piculs bought by Japanese and 5·5 million piculs bought by Europeans. After the failure of sugar in the crisis of 1930 the whole picture changed. Other products in which the Chinese traded were cassava, pepper, ground-nuts, kapok, &c., and, in the Outer Provinces particularly, rubber and copra.

Dependent mainly upon the internal trade and consequently affected by even the slightest fluctuation in the purchasing power of the native population, the Chinese of Java suffered a severe set-back during the trade depression that set in after 1929. In every branch of Chinese activity—sugar factories, wholesale, intermediate, and retail trade, credit business, the *batik* industry, &c.—the full weight of the depression made itself felt. Moreover the resumption by the natives of old-time methods of production and distribution (barter) in consequence of the crisis also had a bad effect on the Chinese trading interests.[2]

But in spite of their increasing competition with Europeans, accentuated during the years of recovery, the Chinese really did not constitute the political danger that was often made out. For the most part they were content to acquiesce in the powers of government being held by others so long as they had an opportunity to make money. In the words of the metaphor that has become a

[1] Cited from E. Helfferich, 'Vreemde Kapitaalsbelegging', in *Economisch Statistische Berichten* (1924) p. 859, by Cator, op. cit. p. 64.
[2] ibid. p. 121 ff.

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cliché, they did not mind who held the cow so long as they milked it. And the milking, after all, was not organized as it might be by a great American dairy corporation with mechanical milkers and a chain-belt collection. For the most part the Chinese in Indonesia were in charge only of second-rate businesses. A few families had large interests, but the old Chinese family morality was still strong, and this made the successful operation of a limited liability company difficult. They had not the organizing power of the Europeans, who, moreover, were far better equipped in commercial, scientific, and industrial technique. The Europeans were able to build up firms which grew stronger with the passing years, whereas a Chinese business usually collapsed when its founder died.[1] The result of this limitation was that they did not make the headway that might have been expected in the accelerating tempo of local economic life, a fact which was lamented by the Chinese press of the Indies. Also it meant that in the realms of big business they were losing ground to a new competitor—the Japanese.

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A generation ago practically the only Japanese in Indonesia were a few prostitutes, photographers, and barbers; and in the preceding centuries, when the Chinese were circulating and settling in the Nanyang in their thousands and tens of thousands, only an occasional Japanese navigator drifted into these tropical waters. Then when the Meiji Revolution had restored the Emperor to his power and Japan began to gaze outwards with the hard eyes of an imperial ambition, her emissaries came south to see what outposts could be seized by peaceful means. But they came not, like the Chinese, in random multitudes, but in groups of expert trade executives directed from home. Very soon they gained a position analogous to that of the Europeans, but differing from it in the fact that while the latter used the Chinese middleman as their natural complement, the Japanese dealt with the native consumer and producer direct. But before the outbreak of the war in the East this process had not gone very far comparatively speaking, and the small number of Japanese immigrants—farmers, fishermen, and shopkeepers—had to meet competition, especially from the Chinese who were much their superiors as retailers and middlemen.

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The 'Manchurian Incident' took place in 1931, and the fourteen years of struggle between China and Japan had begun; but in spite

[1] The story of 'three generations, clogs to clogs', is very common indeed among the Chinese of Southeast Asia.

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of attempts on the part of patriots to organize a boycott of the aggressors, the time for such to be effective was not yet. To the Chinese traders in the Indies business was business: politics were outside their sphere. Thus when about 1931 the Dutch introduced quotas to stem the spate of Japanese textiles which was threatening to swamp the market and to drive the European mills out of business, the Dutch merchants found that the Chinese merchants were still importing Japanese cottons, and they themselves had to import Japanese cottons or nothing.

Chinese Labour and Immigration

The demand for labour in the Outer Islands was met for a long time by indentured labour, i.e. by the engagement of coolies, mainly from Java and China, under contracts enforceable by penal sanctions: that is to say, labourers were liable to arrest and punishment if they broke their contract or left their work. This system of contract and recruitment gave rise to severe criticism not only in the world at large, but in Holland also. Some free labour ordinances date from 1911. The tobacco planters gave up the penal sanction in 1931 on account of the new American Tariff Act which prevented the importation of agricultural commodities grown by indentured labour which could be produced in the United States. This excluded tobacco produced by indentured labour in Sumatra but not rubber or other tropical commodities that could not be grown in the United States. (Tobacco growers in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and the South were responsible for this provision, but they failed to gain their objective since the Sumatra planters gave up the penal sanction clause in labour contracts. Even as late as 1941 there were coolies still under penal sanction on non-tobacco estates.)

On the East Coast of Sumatra the recruitment of Chinese coolies for estates was considerable from 1888 onwards, but it ceased entirely in 1934. In east Sumatra the Labour Inspectorate was created in 1904 to prevent abuses on the estates, and much legislation for the protection of labour was enacted in the ten years preceding the war in Asia. Penal sanctions were abolished completely in 1941 before the Japanese invasion of the Indies began.

The regulations divided the coolies into several classes—*Singkhehs* (*Sinkhehs*), or new-comers, who were put on contract for three crop-years, never longer than three calendar years: *Laukhehs*

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167 or old hands who had at least one contract behind them, were
464 given special terms; *Kongsikangs*, or labourers on daily pay, and
466 *Noempangs*, or piece-work labourers who signed contracts for periods not greater than six months, after which they were free to go to other plantations.[1]

[313] One of the activities supervised by the new Labour Inspectorate was the *Panglongs*. These were concerns for the exploitation of timber run by Chinese along the East Coast of Sumatra and in the Rhio Residency—including beam-cutting mills, saw-mills, fire-wood mills, and charcoal-burning plants. In spite of enactments passed since 1882, Government interference with these undertakings was almost non-existent. They were often in uninhabited regions and extremely difficult of access.[2] Very bad conditions were said to prevail in the Panglongs of Bengkalis in the 1920's.[3] About 3,000 men were employed in this type of work.

In the table below is set out the labour position in the Outer Islands at the end of 1938.

Number of Coolies employed in the Outer Islands on 31 December 1938[4]

	Chinese	Javanese		Total*
		Men	Women	
SUMATRA				
Contract labour	7,752	7,733	3,219	18,704
Free coolies	17,400	177,857	96,826	299,753
BORNEO				
Contract labour	..	58	..	58
Free coolies	915	7,638	1,248	13,924
Total				
Contract labour	7,752	7,791	3,219	18,762
Free coolies	18,315	185,495	98,074	313,677

* Including other nationalities than Chinese and Javanese.

167 The influx of Chinese into Indonesia, which at one time, when
464 China was very unsettled by civil war, had threatened to become a real invasion that it would be impossible to absorb, was checked
651 by two forces.[5] The excessive flow of labour into the Outer Islands

[1] *Verslag van den Dienst der Arbeidsinspectie en Koeliewerving*, East Coast of Sumatra (Batavia, 1913 and 1914).

[2] Cator, op. cit. p. 217 ff. [3] De Kat Angelino, *Colonial Policy*, i, 583.

[4] *Netherlands Overseas Territories*, p. 39.

[5] Ordinances of 1 October 1911 and 20 June 1915, although they did not specify any nationality, were intended in effect to protect Chinese coolies and

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was reduced by diminution of the demand, and the invasion of shopkeepers and other middlemen generally was checked by the imposition of a head-tax which was payable by every Chinese entering the Indies. From 1924 to 1931 the tax was between 50 and 100 florins, and after 1931 it was 150 florins a head.

In Bangka and Billiton where the tin-mining had for so long been done by manual labour, employing respectively 40,000 and 20,000 Chinese coolies, the mining administration mechanized the industry by the introduction of dredges. Consequently, a few thousand labourers were now all that was required.[1] In Deli on the east coast of Sumatra the decrease in the number of labourers employed by the tobacco plantations was due to a decline in markets which necessitated a reduction in production. Other plantations, such as rubber, oil-palm, tea, and sisal, used Javanese labourers even before the tobacco plantations began to employ Javanese in place of Chinese. In the oil industry Chinese labourers and artisans continued to be used in large numbers, but other undertakings became more and more mechanized. In the Outer Islands the large number of contract coolies was becoming a thing of the past.

That the large immigration of Chinese in the years following the First World War was regarded with apprehension by the Indonesians is shown by a resolution, introduced by an Indonesian member in the Volksraad in 1932, to raise the immigration fee to 250 florins. In countering the proposal the leading Chinese member pointed out that the export of Java sugar might suffer through a retaliatory boycott on the part of China. Upon the urgent request of the majority of the members the proposed resolution was withdrawn, and a resolution requesting the Government to undertake a general study of the whole problem of immigration was passed in its stead.[2]

The flow of *new* immigration into Indonesia from 1932 to 1938 (i.e. excepting residents returning to Indonesia who are not included) may be gauged from the following figures (to the nearest thousand).

	1932	*1933*	*1934*	*1935*	*1936*	*1937*	*1938*
Chinese	12,000	9,000	12,000	15,000	19,000	31,000	20,000[3]

encourage their immigration. *Legislative Aspects of Asiatic Migration*, I.L.O. Geneva. I.P.R. Honolulu (July 1927) p. 19.

[1] An American expert who read this, questions its accuracy.

[2] Vandenbosch, op. cit. p. 368.

[3] Including those whose sex was not specified.

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167 Of the 1938 figures, 3,000 were males below 12 years of age and 8,000 over 12; and 2,000 females under 12 and 6,000 over 12.

From 1920 to 1930 the immigration of Chinese into Indonesia had been at the rate of over 40,000 a year. In 1921 it was about 43,000, and in 1928 about 41,000. The average from 1900 to 1930 was rather over 28,000.[1]

Chinese Politics in Indonesia before the Japanese Invasion

668 There were three happenings which had strong repercussions among the Chinese of Indonesia. The first was the Revolution of 1911, the second was the rise of the Kuomintang and the purging of its left-wing elements in 1927, and the third was trouble between China and Japan which began anew in 1931.

668 As we have seen, the Chinese and Javanese Communists came
167 together for a time in an uneasy alliance in 1925. After the purge in 1927 there was a permanent split between Chinese Communists
186 and Nationalists. At this period the Chinese were coming to the Indies at the rate of about 50,000 a year, and the strongly national-
648 istic quality of the immigrants who were from the provinces round Canton gave some anxiety to the Government of the Netherlands Indies. The Kuomintang exercised great influence through its well-disciplined branches, such as the *Shü Pō Shé* (Cantonese rendering) or reading clubs, the Ten Men League, the Boycott Pickets, and the Iron and Blood Brigades. Fortunately for the Indies
186 Government, the Chinese mentality is little inclined to translate
668 abstractions into deeds, but, nevertheless, overt acts were not lack-
648 ing.[2] During the time that Sun Yat-sen was in intermittent control of Canton and under the influence of Borodin, there were disturbances in the Indies which reflected the attitude of the militant
[439] Kwangtung Nationalists. Feeling against Japan had been bitter amongst the Chinese since the Twenty-one Demands which were made when the European Allies were fully occupied in fighting the Germans in Europe, and the Sino-Japanese conflict of 1931–2 arising from the Manchurian Incident caused a new wave of anti-Japanese feeling to run through the Chinese community. A boycott was instituted and in some places was enforced by terrorist tactics, but on the whole it was singularly ineffective at this time because the Chinese merchants and shopkeepers found it very profitable to deal in Japanese textiles, and their zeal for business confounded

[1] Cator, op. cit. p. 38. [2] Vandenbosch, op. cit. p. 366.

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both their own patriots and the Europeans who desired the exclusion of Japanese goods for rather different reasons from those of the Chinese patriots. The Government warned several Chinese newspapers against articles inciting to violence and took precautions against outbreaks against the Japanese. Luckily the number of Japanese in the Indies was small, so that the opportunity for demonstrations was limited.

The Imperial Government of China had awakened, towards the end of its existence, to the advantages of cultivating China's settlements overseas, and the Nationalist Government intensified these efforts to obtain sympathy, support, and, not least, money from China's exiled children. It sent numerous missions to the Nanyang with variously described objectives but with one unvarying motive. In the 1930s it was demanding a new consular treaty with the Netherlands which should ensure the assimilation of Chinese to Europeans in the Indies. A point of friction between the Governments was the registration of overseas Chinese. Every new consul arriving in the Indies received instructions from his Government to register all Chinese in the Indies—*Peranakans* as well as *Sinkhehs*, the residents of three hundred years as well as the China-born. The Government of the Netherlands Indies sent circulars to the residents prohibiting the practice, and repeatedly informed the consuls that this was not permissible under the consular treaty. Such protests regularly brought forth the apologetic explanation that a mistake had been made and that they had intended to register only the *Sinkhehs*. As Mr Vandenbosch remarks, a partial explanation for the practice can probably be found in the fact that the Chinese consuls received their salary irregularly and the registration fee was a welcome source of financial support.[1] Another source of conflict between the Government and the Chinese consuls was over the display of flags at half-mast on the anniversary of the Twenty-One Demands. The Netherlands India Government had prohibited the display of flags at half-mast on these and similar days on the ground that it could not within its territory permit an act that would constitute giving offence to Japan, a Power with which it was in friendly relations.

With the renewal of the war with Japan in 1937 the politically inclined Chinese of Indonesia intensified their efforts to enforce an effective anti-Japanese boycott. This time they were assisted by a

[1] op. cit. p. 369.

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648 more widely spread patriotism among Chinese retailers and by the fact that Japan having shifted over to a war economy, was no 186 longer able to supply the market. The result was that the supply of 668 Japanese goods fell considerably. At the same time the Chinese Government now called for financial aid from the Chinese abroad. 439 The Government of the Indies permitted the sale of Chinese bonds, but it did not permit public auction or propaganda for the sale of war loan. The Chinese in the Indies bought war bonds to the amount of 1¼ million florins during the first year alone, and 4½ million florins were contributed to Chinese relief in the same period.

128 The above is an outline sketch of the course of Chinese politics in Indonesia up to about 1941. A more comprehensive account of Chinese politics as they affected Southeast Asia as a whole is given in Chapter XXXI in relation, in particular, to Malaya.

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CHAPTER XLVII

VALUE OF THE CHINESE TO INDONESIA

In our survey of the Chinese in Indonesia we are constantly coming back to the question as to whether or not their presence in any particular country is beneficial or detrimental to that country. The trouble is that the person giving the opinion, usually a European, is almost inevitably an interested party. Consciously or unconsciously he is telling us whether the presence of the Chinese in the country is in accordance with his own interest or otherwise, or of that of his group. Thus when he expresses indignation at the exploitation of the native by the immigrant (and this applies to Malaya equally with Indonesia) he is almost certainly to some extent deceiving himself as to his sentiment and his motive: equally likely it is that praise of the Chinese springs from their usefulness to the speaker or his group in business or politics. 121

It is not the intention of the writer to attempt to sum up the case for or against the Chinese in Southeast Asia until the evidence available from all the countries in the area has been assembled. When this has been done he will venture to give his views in a concluding chapter. In the meantime, however, it might help the reader to form his own opinion if we were to state some of the pros and cons as they have been exhibited in this one large country of the area. A convenient way of doing this would be to summarize the balance-sheet of Chinese activities in Indonesia as drawn up by Mr J. S. Furnivall, using his terms as far as practicable, and interpolating comment only when it seems necessary.

After a career as a member of the Indian Civil Service in Burma, Mr Furnivall went to Netherlands India to make a protracted study of the Dutch system of administration. He would agree, I think, that his sympathies are with the Indonesian native, but he is at the same time anxious to give the Chinese their due, and such shortcomings as they display in the Indonesian system he is inclined to ascribe to the shortcomings of Dutch policy rather than to any essential vice in the Chinese race. Let us see, then, what Mr Furnivall has to say. 114

Although in 1925 the Chinese and the Javanese Communist 181

[p. 547]

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181 were associated for a while in an uneasy alliance, it broke down owing to the difference in their aims. Chinese interests are capitalist and European rather than Nationalist, and the introduction of representative institutions has strengthened their position by drawing them into an alliance with Europeans against the numerical superiority and separate interests of the natives. In spite of the measures taken to assimilate the Chinese to Europeans in legal status, they continue a race apart and their contact with other sections of the community remains strictly economic. In 1900 the Chinese were rich and powerful but were inferior in status, confined to their ghettoes, ignorant of European languages and often illiterate in their own, and the activities from which they gained their wealth were parasitic rather than constructive. It was thought unquestionable that they exercised a pernicious influence over the natives, and only the cynical suggested that the righteous indignation of Europeans against the exploitation of the natives might be explained by the diversion of profits from the European to the Chinese middleman.

181 The present[1] position of the Chinese is, however, very different (says Mr Furnivall). The liberation of the Chinese from their
186 ghettoes, the abolition of the pass system, the recognition of the Dutch-Chinese schools, and the improvement in their legal status
471 have given the Chinese new opportunities. These they have turned to good account. The Chinese have always been wealthy in comparison with the natives, and even in comparison with most Europeans. But a new feature of the present century is the use to which they put their riches. Now they are intimately associated with capitalist production, and this has brought them into close alliance with the European community. The new combination of Chinese and European interests, together with the improvements in the schools and the changes in the legal status of the Chinese, have given the Chinese community an increase in power greater than in proportion to its growth in numbers. And the Chinese community is now more Chinese, just as the European community is more European. National aspirations and the improvement in means of communication have strengthened the Chinese and their home country. The Chinese of 1900, if he received any kind of education, had usually been to a Dutch or native school: now he had been to a Chinese school under Chinese masters with a strong tradition of

[1] *c.* 1936.

.2: Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia
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Chinese culture, and read periodicals which kept him in touch with his fellows in Singapore and China.[1]

The diversion of the Chinese to banking and to the development of local industry in late years has, however, meant that their economic life is no longer parasitic but constructive. Nevertheless, continues Mr Furnivall, they still form a sectional, isolated community competing on rigidly economic lines with the European and native sections. Despite their diversity of race and occupation, taken all together, they form one section of a plural community with interests common to some extent among themselves and in many ways opposed to the interests of other sections. It is true that as middlemen they serve both the Europeans and the natives, but they also compete with them, and on advantageous terms.[2] In some cases they are strong enough to tax European firms for the benefit of Chinese schools.[3] They can handle goods which allow too small a margin of profit for Europeans, and can undertake more risky ventures (because the penalties of bankruptcy are lighter for the Chinese than the European), thus sharpening the edge of economic corruption and tending to lower the standard of commercial morality; again, it was the Chinese who broke the European ring against Japanese exports. Natives cannot find employment in a Chinese shop or other business,[4] and the attempts of natives to develop industrial activities are strangled by Chinese competition; it was the natives who first started kapok factories, but within a few years they were ousted by the Chinese; again, when the natives built up a new industry in the manufacture of native cigarettes, there was a long struggle before they could secure their ground against Chinese rivals who imitated their methods. In the economic

[1] This, I feel, is too sweeping considering that only half the Chinese children attending school received an education through the medium of the Chinese language. It would have been truer of Malaya.

[2] The Europeans reproached the Chinese for ruining their market by offering articles similar to theirs at a much lower price (which they were enabled to do by a far less expensive way of living). G. Angoulvant, 'Les Indes Néerlandaises, leur rôle dans l'économie internationale', *Le Monde Nouveau* (Paris, 1926) i. 192.

[3] i.e. by putting a 'cess' on some commodity they control, e.g. rice. This was true of Malaya also.

[4] 'It is only very recently that non-Indonesian enterprise, including Chinese capital, has accepted Indonesians into higher administrative posts.' *Recent Developments in the Netherlands East Indies*, speech delivered 16 September 1942 by Dr Charles O. van de Plas, formerly Governor of East Java, Netherlands, and N.I. Council, I.P.R. But still on a very small scale, I fear. V. P.

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181 sphere the Chinese are encroaching on the European world and 471 they are building up an even more formidable barrier against native 477 aspirations. Yet the cultural contact between the Chinese and the Europeans is no closer than before and nationalist sentiment is 186 widening the gap, while the conflict of economic interest places an increasing strain on the plural society to which they belong.

471 Finally Mr Furnivall quotes Dr Boeke[1] on the subject of the Western and the Westernized element of the economy of the Netherlands Indies:

> There is a materialism, rationalism, individualism and a concentration of economic ends far more complete and absolute than in homogeneous Western lands; a total absorption in the Exchange and Market; a capitalistic structure with the business concern as subject, far more typical of capitalism than one can imagine in the so-called 'capitalistic' countries which have grown up slowly out of the past and are still bound to it by a hundred roots.

114 The above analysis seems on the face of things to be a fair one, 181 except that the writer would quarrel with the word 'parasitic' as describing the activities of the Chinese in Indonesia prior to 1900. They were merely acting as revenue agents of the Dutch Government. The function, then, of the Chinese in Indonesia is mainly the creation of Dutch policy. This fact will be of the first importance when we come to consider the developments during the Japanese occupation and after the war when the Indonesian Republic came into being.

[1] 'Dualische Samenleving', in *De Economist* (1935) p. 773, quoted by Furnivall at p. 452.

1 [See category 116, pp. 548-549 -- Analyst]

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CHAPTER XLVIII

AFTERMATH OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

UP to 1949 there seemed remarkably little material available to write the history of the Chinese in Indonesia during the Japanese invasion and during the occupation. As regards the occupation, when Indonesia was cut off from the observation of the world, the Europeans, who are usually much more interested to record what they see than are the Oriental races, were isolated in concentration camps. No doubt a fairly connected story could be constructed from the narratives of individual Chinese and Indonesians, but the state of the country in 1949 did not facilitate efforts in this direction. The people were too engrossed in their attempts to repair war damage and to reconstruct their economy to dwell on the years of the occupation. 727

The following main facts, however, emerge.[1]

All the efforts of the Japanese up till August 1943 were aimed at the organization of the indigenous population of Indonesia in aid of their own war effort. The non-indigenous Orientals, first and foremost the Chinese, were left unregimented. As the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies depended on the fully developed Western capitalism in the islands, it can be readily seen that this section of Indonesian society, which was predominantly middle-class, was heavily hit when the Japanese occupation of the Indies was completed. Resentment of the Japanese which had been acute for many years was not reduced on this account.

The Japanese established an office for Chinese affairs called the Kakkio Han (in Chinese Hua Ch'iao Pan) in Batavia. This was directed by a single Japanese, one Toyoshima: the remainder of the staff were Chinese. In Batavia and every other Chinese settlement there was a Hua Ch'iao Tsung Hui, a Chinese association, which was responsible to the local Japanese commander and which through its headquarters in Batavia was a channel for the communication of orders by the Kakkio Han. The Japanese used this organization to convey their new regulations which included (1) 727 656 651 486

[1] Here is followed the doctoral dissertation, *Political Development in the Netherlands East-Indies during and immediately after the Japanese Occupation*, by Dr Janus Poppe (Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.) p. 95.

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727 the reintroduction of the internal passport system which had been
abolished by the Dutch, (2) the payment of a registration fee of
656 $100 for Chinese males and $80 for Chinese females, (3) the
651 establishment of the Chinese guards (police) for protection of their
community against possible violence on the part of the Indonesians,
486 and (4) collection of money from the Chinese for war purposes.

Before the occupation there were practically no Chinese who
727 supported the Nanking puppet Government of Wang Ching-wei:
669 most Chinese support was for the Kuomintang and its leader
Chiang Kai-shek whose regime was recognized by the Netherlands Government. The Japanese had interned a large number of prominent Chinese, both *Peranakans* and *Sinkhehs*, under the impression that the backbone of resistance would thus be broken. This assumption proved to be mistaken; dissatisfaction among the Chinese residents became so great that another attitude had to be adopted. After observing signs of a resistance movement, the Japanese in August 1943 induced a few pro-Nanking Chinese to form an organization with the intention of bringing all Chinese activities under its surveillance. Its directors were without exception appointed by the Japanese authorities. A similar course was adopted with the Eurasian community in the following month. These measures at least may have had the effect of preventing the resistance movement coming to a head and resulting in an uprising.

Allied intelligence concerning Indonesia during the occupation
727 was more meagre than in the case of any other area in Southeast
Asia. No Office of Strategic Services (OSS) or Allied intelligence
618 teams were operating in the larger islands. After the surrender,
Dutch internees and prisoners-of-war were either too biased or too out of touch to offer a fair index of the real state of affairs; unbiased Indonesians were as difficult to find, and the Chinese and Eurasian minorities were too afraid of either the returning Dutch or of the Indonesians to speak freely.[1]

727 There is, however, a document extant which, when due allow-
ance is made for the circumstances under which it was written,
579 affords some evidence of the experiences of the Chinese during the
occupation.[2] This document (to which further reference is made

[1] Charles Wolf, Jr., *The Indonesian Story* (New York, John Day for the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948) p. 10.

[2] *Memorandum outlining acts of violence and inhumanity perpetrated by Indonesian bands on innocent Chinese before and after the Dutch police action was en-*

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later in this chapter) states that when the Japanese landed in Java Chinese residents were the main victims of robbery by the natives. In the majority of cases the trouble started with the robbing of one or two houses by a few bandits. When no police appeared and no resistance was encountered, the whole of the inhabitants of the town or village, who in the past had never committed robbery or any other criminal act, participated in the looting. Moreover, now that civilized controls were removed, a number of excesses occurred and there was murder and rape. 727 579

During the Japanese occupation Chinese-Indonesian relations were adversely affected by the memory of the looting in the early stages, by the economic offensive undertaken by the Indonesians, with Japanese support, to supplant the Chinese, by political differences due to the fact that the Chinese were pro-Ally while the Indonesians were 'completely pro-Japanese', and by the haughty attitude of certain Indonesian officials who gained favour with the invaders.[1] When the Japanese capitulated and the Indonesian Republic was proclaimed, the Indonesians suddenly assumed a conciliatory attitude towards the Chinese. In the *bersiap* (preparatory) period following the proclamation of independence, when Dutch nationals were being hunted down and killed, a Chinese flag, displayed in front of a house or worn on the chest, proved a sufficient protection in even the most isolated spots. 727 579 648 609

After the Japanese surrender, the British Commander-in-Chief, who was sent by the Supreme Allied Commander to disarm the Japanese in Java, did not side with either the Dutch or the Indonesians, but confined his occupation to a few enclaves—Batavia, Bandoeng, Samarang, Sourabaya—and from there tried to contact the rest of Java which was in the hands of the Republicans. The situation was similar in Sumatra where only Medan, Palembang, and Padang were occupied by the British, the remaining territory being left under Republican authority.[2] 727 648

The Chinese in Southeast Asia generally had anticipated that

forced on July 21, 1947, compiled by the Chung Hua Tsung Hui (Federation of Chinese Associations in Batavia) (September 1947).

More than one person who read this section in manuscript (including Dr Tsoa Sik-ien), described the Chung Hua Tsung Hui as 'pro-Dutch', and an American authority remarked that it was 'an extremely non-objective and partisan source'.

[1] ibid. p. 3.

[2] *The Political Events in the Republic of Indonesia* (New York, Netherlands Information Bureau, 1947) p. 8.

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727 the liberation of these countries would be carried out by Chinese
648 troops. It was widely rumoured that Chiang Kai-shek had made a radio speech in which he had promised to give armed support to those countries which had not yet won their independence. The fact that it was British and Indian troops who entered Indonesia was a disappointment to many Chinese Nationalists, and the Mohammedan troops were later accused by the Dutch of siding with their fellow Muslims against the re-established Dutch regime.

727 The Indonesian attitude towards the Chinese began again to
186 undergo a change. The 'neutrality' adopted by the Chinese did not
609 satisfy the Indonesians who wanted the Chinese to carry out an economic boycott of the Dutch. When the Chinese began supplying
438 goods to the Dutch, and some others received monetary and other aid from the Dutch Government and began working in Dutch offices, the community as a whole began to be regarded as definitely siding with the Dutch.[1] Resentment at this supposed partiality soon produced a number of 'incidents'.

726 At first a few Chinese were kidnapped or their dwellings were
609 looted. The Chinese flag no longer afforded protection but instead incited animosity, and was often torn to shreds. Then the members
579 of Chinese families who had thus been victimized 'took an under-
702 standable, but regrettable, course: they enlisted in the Dutch forces in order to wreak vengeance'.[2] Thus Chinese-Indonesian relations became exacerbated. Yet Indonesians who were alienated from the Republican cause through ill-treatment on suspicion of helping the Dutch, and who had in some case also joined the Dutch forces, were many times greater in number than the Chinese who enlisted
[136 under the Dutch flag. There was ill feeling, too, over the Chinese use of the new currency issued by the Dutch in March 1946—but then, as the *Chung Hua Tsung Hui Memorandum* points out, Indonesians living in Allied-occupied territory also used it.

726 During the hostilities that were destined to continue intermit-
609 tently for some years to come, the Chinese were in a particularly unfortunate position. Suspected by the Indonesians of pro-Dutch sympathies and by the Dutch of pro-Indonesian inclinations, they
662 received harsh treatment on both sides, especially from irresponsible Indonesian groups. The Indonesians seem to have overlooked the fact (says the Memorandum) that as business men it was im-

[1] *Memorandum outlining acts of violence etc.*
[2] ibid. pp. 3 and 4.

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possible for Chinese living in Allied territory to boycott the Dutch, as this would have amounted to economic suicide. In the same manner, Chinese living in the Republic have closely co-operated in economic matters with the Republic, for they had no other course to follow if they were to maintain their position. 726 609 662

To prevent unpleasant repercussions for the Chinese living in the islands, China sought a middle-of-the-road position which would antagonize neither the Dutch nor the Republic.[1]

In December 1945 a punitive expedition against the village of Bekasi was undertaken by the British in consequence of atrocities committed against R.A.F. personnel and Indian troops. The greatest sufferers by the expedition were the Chinese. Some of their houses were inadvertently burnt with the rest of the village, and when the Indonesians returned the Chinese were subjected to intimidation and violence.[2] But the first really serious incident occurred in June 1946 in a Chinese settlement west of the Tangerang River.[3] The *New York Times* of 6 June reported that 600 Chinese, suspected by the Indonesians of co-operation with the Dutch, had been slain and their villages set on fire. The massacre did not end until 8 June. On 10 June the Chinese Foreign Office was reported as having protested to both the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic.[4] 726 579 609

The *Chung Hua Tsung Hui Memorandum* says that according to the minutes of a meeting held in Tangerang on 28 May, prepared by Djoenadi, executive member of the Indonesia Republic Cabinet, the People's Band had conceived a plan of carrying out a holy war (*Perang Sabil*) in disregard of the instructions given by the T.R.I. (Republican Army) Commander to establish a no-man's-land, in line with the agreement reached with the Dutch.

As might be expected in the emotional stress, the Chinese accounts are elaborated with details of horrible atrocities, including the burning alive of women and children. The mere fact of the massacre, however, is terrible enough. 'In short', says the Memorandum, 'the suburbs of Tangerang have been turned into a hell for the Chinese who for many years had lived so amicably with the Indonesians and adjusted themselves to their environment so well that foreigners could hardly distinguish them from real Indonesians.

[1] Charles Wolf, op. cit. p. 160, 161.
[2] David Wehl, *The Birth of Indonesia* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1948) p. 80.
[3] About 20 miles from Batavia.
[4] *New York Times* (6 June) p. 8, col. 5; (8 June) p. 9, col. 1; (10 June) p. 14, col. 6. Refugees reported more slain (17 June) p. 9, col. 5.

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Chinese

726 As the Chinese of this area have practically become assimilated,
579 it is incredible that they were so treated.'

609 According to the report received by the Jang Seng (Red Cross) in Batavia, 653 Chinese were murdered in Tangerang and neighbourhood, including 136 females and 36 children. There were approximately 25,000 refugees in Batavia from the area. 1,268 Chinese dwellings were burned down, and 236 otherwise destroyed.

A further massacre was reported on 18 September at Bagan Si Api Api when 200 Chinese are said to have been killed,[1] 20 more were killed at Bangko, 34 at Telok Poelau, and 75 at Djembra. Another outbreak at Palembang in Sumatra in January 1947 resulted in the death of another 250.[1]

The correspondent in Indonesia of the *Christian Science Monitor*, Mr Nathan Broch, in a report to his newspaper of the Tangerang massacre and its aftermath,[2] remarks that the fact that the Chinese decided to put themselves under Dutch protection seemed to confirm Indonesian suspicions that the Chinese had co-operated with the Dutch in the affected areas.

727 Mr Broch says that during the Japanese occupation many Chinese
609 were arrested for black-market activities. He himself was actually in the Indies at the time of the liberation, and his first-hand impressions of the cause of the feeling between the two races is therefore of special value. He relates that

> during the Allied landings at Tarakan on May 1st, 1945 and at Balikpapan on July 1st, 1945 I gained the impression that the natives of these liberated areas deeply resented the attitude of many Chinese during the Japanese occupation.
>
> In Tarakan, where the 26th Brigade of the Australian 9th Division landed right in the biggest Chinese settlement on the island at the small beach city of Lingkas, liberated natives told me that the Chinese had collaborated on a large scale with the Japanese occupation forces. In Balikpapan, the once famous oil port of eastern Borneo, I found a similar attitude among the non-Chinese part of the population.
>
> In these two liberated areas, however, the anti-Chinese sentiment among the natives was mitigated by the strong feeling of having endured together some of the heaviest naval and air bombardments of the Pacific war, and the fact that the Chinese, along with other population groups, had suffered severe losses.

To follow the same account, in Java, which was occupied after

[1] *Memorandum*, p. 6. [2] *Christian Science Monitor* (12 June 1948).

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Chinese

the Japanese surrender, the situation was different. The establishment of a strong Nationalist Government with its own armed forces and the subsequent and still-continuing fight against the return of Dutch rule over the Indies had resulted in the practical annihilation of all organized trade. For the Chinese, the cessation of trade was a heavy blow. They held the Indonesian Nationalists responsible for this, and were now obviously backing the Dutch whom they saw reconquering one big city after another, and they felt that the restoration of some Dutch rule over Java, even in a form that would give substantial rights to the Indonesians, could restore in some measure the pre-war prosperity of the Chinese communities on the island. Indonesian Nationalists, however, in common with the Annamites of Indochina, apparently refused to appreciate the versatile political character of the Chinese, whom they accused of having acquired real power to influence politics through extensive trade.

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There were moments, Mr Broch considered, when, after the end of the Pacific war in 1945, powerful Chinese interests in both Indochina and Indonesia backed the natives in their revolt against the return of the white man. This support, however, did not outlast the substantial reinforcements in men and material with which the French and the Dutch proved able to combat the native revolts in their possessions.

It does not seem that there was any large-scale massacre of Chinese before the Tangerang outbreak. Indeed no murder of individuals either appears to have been reported. A broadcast from the Government station in Republican territory, from Solo (Soerakarta), Central Java, in February 1946 stated that the Chinese consul-general, Tung (Chiang Chia-tung), had declared at a conference that the Chinese in Indonesia had no reason to complain.[1] The Chungking radio, on the other hand, a few days later said that it was learned from Batavia that the Chinese found themselves in a most unpleasant predicament. This was particularly true in Bandoeng where the attitude of irresponsible Indonesians towards the Chinese was very hostile. Allied troops had intervened to stop the eviction of Chinese and Eurasians north of the railway line. Investigations were also being made regarding alleged ill-treatment of Chinese in Samarang.[2]

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[1] Radio Free Indonesia, in English (13 February 1946).
[2] Chungking Radio, in English (18 February 1946).

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726 From the evidence available the conclusion to be drawn is that
609 after the Japanese surrender and before the Tangerang incident hostility towards the Chinese was confined to treating them with suspicion and making repeated demands upon them for financial help. Those who were not responsive were branded 'Dutch spies'. Donations were solicited for Republican funds—the contribution might take the form of money, furniture, or commodities. At Paalmerah all Chinese house-owners had to pay a 'special tax'. After all, the Chinese were traditionally considered, both by Indonesians and Europeans, as the wealthy people of the country and it was inevitable thay they should have been expected to contribute liberally to 'The Cause'. Professional extortionists naturally were not slow to add their private demands to the official ones, and the victimized Chinese naturally made no very clear distinctions between the two kinds of demands.

Chinese sympathy for the Republic had begun to be replaced by a feeling of anxiety and misgiving. This resulted in an exodus of the more well-to-do from the interior to Dutch-held territory. Those who could afford to bribe their way to Batavia did so. But the number who could be received was, of course, limited by the food and housing available.

727 A graphic account of the turn of events as they affected the
609 Chinese is given by Mr David Wehl:[1]

The Chinese suffering began with the collapse of Dutch rule in the
5719 East Indies.

The poorer Indonesians turned with the anger of jealousy upon the more prosperous Chinese, and the full storm of sudden freedom and revenge fell upon the helpless minority. To robbery, murder and rape, was added the additional horror of forcible circumcision and the Mohammedan faith, and it was not until the Japanese discovered that they could not do without Chinese help in trade and commerce that the Chinese people found some respite for their trials.

In China, the Japanese were supporting the puppet Government of Wang Ching Wei at Nanking, and in an endeavour to please Nanking they considerably alleviated the lot of the Chinese in Java, and when Chinese experience, industry and ability, were also found to be of profit to the Nippon, they were officially proclaimed the friends of the Indonesians as well as of the Japanese, worthy to share in the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and to be regarded as members of the 'Three A's'—'Nippon the

[1] David Wehl, *The Birth of Indonesia* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1948) pp. 18, 19.

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Leader of Asia, Nippon the Light of Asia, and Nippon the Protector of Asia'. 727

After the Japanese surrender, however, the position of the Chinese became slowly worse again. They were completely unprotected. In the free and easy time that followed the collapse of all controlling power the Chinese were an easy prey. Their shops were looted, their houses were fired, their people were kidnapped and murdered. In the fighting at Soerabaya, or Bandoeng, or Semarang, they lost lives and property. At Bekasi some of their houses were accidentally burnt, and when the Indonesians returned, much revenge was meted out to the innocent Chinese. 609 579

Incidents such as these were multiplied throughout Java and Sumatra, individually tragic, and historically important in that they added to the general unrest and influenced to a certain extent military moves and political feelings. British and Indian soldiers, endeavouring to keep the peace, became involved in attacks on Chinese, sometimes there were casualties, and then a local riot became an international incident.

Meanwhile, in November 1946, the Linggadjati Agreement, which was to have settled the differences between the Netherlands and the Republic, was negotiated and was signed by both parties on 25 March 1947. This agreement never became effective, and each side accused the other of violating its terms. Finally, 'in order to put an end to the intolerable chaos and to create conditions for the building of a State that would bring renewed hope and fulfilment to the Indonesian people', the Dutch from the night of 20–21 July 1947 until 4 August undertook military action.[1] 728 726

The Dutch Army and Marines advanced in the following directions—in West Java from Krawang to Tjikampek, from Tjiandjoer to Soekaboemi, and from Bandoeng to Cheribon; in mid-Java from Samarang to Oengaran, Toentang, Ambarawa, and Salatiga; in east Java from Sourabaya to Bangil. The Marines landed at Banjoewangi and Pasir Poeti. 726

Long before this 'police action' was started it was common knowledge that the Republic would adopt a scorched-earth policy to hamper the Dutch operations. Knowing that the Chinese community would be endangered if fighting occurred, the Chinese consul-general had, as early as December 1946, endeavoured to establish safety zones where the Chinese could gather in times of danger. The Republic wanted to know what guarantee could be 726 618

[1] *The Political Events in the Republic of Indonesia*, p. 30.

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726 given that these zones would not be used to the disadvantage of the Indonesians, and when the reply was given that such guarantee 648 would only be given if the Chinese were armed adequately to uphold the neutrality of the zones, the Republic objected to such a course. Another proposal to establish safety zones to be guarded by a mixed force of Indonesian-Chinese-Dutch police was disapproved by both the Dutch and the Indonesians.[1]

When the situation deteriorated and the outlook became critical, the Chinese consul-general, Mr Chiang Chia-tung, issued instructions to Chinese residing in Republican territory that they should decline to be evacuated outside the city limits, and when they were in immediate danger they should gather together in the buildings of schools or associations hoisting both the Chinese and the Red Cross flags.

726 According to the *Chung Hua Tsung Hui Memorandum*, between 21 July and 21 August 1947, 293 Chinese were killed and over 6,000 579 were missing. Reports received up to mid-September showed that 912 houses and factories had been burned. As a rule, prior to the 609 arrival of the Dutch troops, Chinese living in Republican territory were unharmed, although they were exposed from time to time to arrest on spy charges. In the face of the Dutch advance, looting and arson were carried out by the Indonesian troops. In the process of effecting the scorched-earth policy industrial plants, official and private offices, and big buildings in general were the 'preferred objectives'. Most privately-owned big buildings belonged to [471] Chinese. In addition to the destruction carried out under orders from the Indonesian High Command by special squads, native freebooters joined in the burning and looting. The *Memorandum* recites in considerable detail the separate acts of murder, rape, kidnapping, and destruction of property, usually with the names of the victims. The places named are Krawing and Tjikampek, Tjibadak, and Soekaboemi, Cheribon District, Tegal, Pekalongan District, Banjoemas and environs, Salatiga, Loemadjang, Djember, Singosari, Lawang, Malang, and Kaban Djahe.[2]

[1] *The Voice of China* (Chinese (official) News Service, short-wave radio) (Nanking, 6 February 1947) reported that the Netherlands authorities had agreed in principle to establish zones for the Chinese in Indonesia and to give emergency relief to Chinese who suffered losses in the armed conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesian troops from 1 to 5 January in Palembang.

[2] Mr E. N. Van Kleffens on 26 August 1947 in addressing the Security Council of the United Nations said: 'Ten days ago, intelligence reached our

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On 25 July a memorandum expressing the Chinese Government's regret at the outbreak of hostilities in Indonesia and its grave concern as to the welfare and safety of the Chinese nationals in the Dutch East Indies was handed to the chargé d'affaires of the Netherlands embassy by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this memorandum the Chinese Government asked what effective measures had been taken to safeguard Chinese lives and property.[1] On 31 July Dr George Yeh, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, made a statement in which he said that the Chinese Government viewed with grave concern the repeated acts of arson and violence inflicted on innocent Chinese nationals by the Indonesian Army which constituted a serious offence against international law and humanity. It might be recalled, he continued, that, during the hostilities that took place prior to the conclusion of the Linggadjati Agreement, the Chinese communities in the Netherlands East Indies had already sustained irreparable losses in lives and property. This had occurred in spite of the fact that throughout the period of fighting the Chinese communities, in accordance with instructions from the Chinese Government, had observed strict neutrality, and that the Chinese population there had been intimately associated with the development and prosperity of those islands for over three hundred years.[2]

The Indonesian Republic, of course, took a different view of the Chinese question from that of the Dutch. The Chinese, for their part, living as they did partly in Dutch and partly in Republican territory, tended naturally to adapt themselves to the situation as far as was expedient and to be conciliatory towards those exercising authority.

lines in northern Sumatra that Republican elements had herded together in a cemetery near a place called Pankalan Brandan approximately four thousand Chinese, without food, without water, without shelter of any kind, who were thus exposed to certain death.' *The Other Side of the Medal* (New York, Netherlands Information Bureau, 1947).

Most of the information relied upon above, it must be emphasized, is from Dutch or pro-Dutch sources. As against this, Dr Tjoa Sik-ien, a Chinese of standing from Java who supports the Indonesian point of view, expressed to the author his disagreement with the *Chung Hua Tsung Hui Memorandum* and stated that in his view it distorted or misinterpreted the facts. The Indonesians harboured no ill will against the Chinese. In normal times the latter lived peacefully in the Republican area without molestation. It was only during military operations that they suffered. The Dutch had magnified the differences between Indonesians and Chinese for their own purposes. He did not think that the Dutch affection for the Chinese was sincere.

[1] *Voice of China* (25 July 1947). [2] ibid. (31 July 1947).

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authority. *Indonesian Information* of 25 October 1947[1] stated the Republican position in the matter:

> Chinese nationals are the largest minority in the Indonesian Republic. Out of a population of about seventy millions, Chinese make up approximately one and a half millions. Naturally, therefore, they have to a certain extent shared in the general misery of the country, and in spite of all the efforts of the Republican Government, have suffered a certain amount of privation as a result of the two years' blockade. However, official Chinese sources have recognized the fact that the Republic is doing all in its power to help the Chinese communities.

The same publication at different times gave examples of the good feeling existing between the Chinese and the Republic, e.g. the Chinese deputy consul-general had stated at Kediri in east Java that the living conditions of the Chinese nationals in Republican territory were quite satisfactory 'except when Dutch provocations succeeded in provoking strife'; on the occasion of the Chinese National Day (10 October) Chinese planes had been given permission to fly over Republican territory to drop leaflets and pamphlets bearing goodwill messages to the Chinese inhabitants of the country; the Chinese inhabitants of Moentilar, near Djocjakarta, had contributed 18.000 rupees (Republican currency) for the defence of the Indonesian Republic, &c.

During a press interview in Singapore on 28 October 1947 Hadji Agoes Salim, Foreign Minister of the Republic, explained the position of the Chinese in the existing situation in Indonesia.

> To all appearances [said Hadji Salim] it seems that it is the Chinese who are suffering most from the scorched-earth policy which is being forced on the Republic by the Dutch military action. However, if we know our Indonesia, we realize that in places such as Malang and Sourabaya, for instance, it is the Chinese who own most of the property, and so, when there is an assessment of damage in these places obviously the Chinese seem to be the ones most affected. We tend to forget, as we contemplate the figures of damage done to Chinese properties, that the few Indonesian properties have suffered just as much, and the Indonesian owners feel the loss just as keenly as the Chinese owners.[2]

Chinese property, the Foreign Minister insisted, was not singled out for any special attention, and so long as the conditions of war

[1] Vol. i, no. 4, published by the representative in Britain of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia.

[2] *Indonesian Information*, vol. i, no. 12 (12 November 1947).

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demanded the application of the scorched-earth policy, economic scruples must be sacrificed to military advantage. The only way to end the damage to Chinese property was to end the war.

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This, of course, was cold comfort to the Chinese to whom the continuance of the civil war meant only loss of life and property.

In west Borneo there had been no conflict between the interests of the Chinese inhabitants and those of the other groups of the population for several years—not even in the agrarian sphere which was in many respects common ground. Nor was there any outbreak during the time of the serious incidents elsewhere in Indonesia.[1]

After the 'police action' was completed and the troubles of the Chinese community had died down, both the Chinese and the Indonesian Government made practical demonstrations of their sympathy with the victims. The Executive Yuan appropriated one million florins for the relief of the sufferers,[2] and the Republican Government five million rupees for the same purpose.[3] Republican leaders such as Sjahrir and Sjarifoeddin made broadcast speeches regretting the massacre of the Chinese and expressing sympathy for the sufferers from the scorched-earth policy. Though the Republic of Indonesia Information Service made no attempt to hide the extent of the Chinese casualties (it quoted the Chinese consul-general, Chiang Chia-tung, as stating in Singapore that 1,000 Chinese had been killed and 100,000 rendered homeless since the Dutch opened hostilities in Indonesia[4]), it stressed that the incidents had occurred only in the areas of military operations. Sumatra and other islands were quiet and the Chinese consul-general had visited Djombang in east Java and had stated that he was now satisfied with the living conditions of the Chinese in all the Republican areas.[5] The Republicans made much of the fact that the Chinese within the Republican area had demonstrated their sympathy with the Republic and their General Association had even made a collection of comforts for dispatch to the Republican troops at the front.[6]

[1] *Economic Review of Indonesia* (Batavia, Department of Economic Affairs, October 1947) p. 171.
[2] *Thien Sung Yit Po* (Batavia, 12 August 1947).
[3] *Sin Po* (Batavia, 15 August 1947).
[4] Indonesian News Service (New York, 25 September 1947).
[5] ibid. (3 October 1947).
[6] ibid. (5 October 1947).

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727 Controversy now turned on the subject of the establishment of
708 *Pao An Tui*, or Chinese protection corps. These bands of armed
204 Chinese were intended to protect the Chinese community during
648 times of trouble. The Dutch sanctioned their formation. Some
609 Chinese newspapers actually recommended that China should send troops for the protection of the Chinese in Indonesia, but would the Dutch (one paper asked rather naïvely) permit them to land?[1] The supporters of the Kuomintang were in favour of the *Pao An Tui*, but the Leftist papers were not. The Djocjakarta authorities compared them with the military forces maintained by the Western powers in the old treaty ports in China, and characterized them as an attempt to create a Chinese extraterritoriality in Indonesia. In this attitude they received Leftist support, and Mr Gromyko attacked the *Pao An Tui* in the Security Council. The controversy was taken up in the Convention of Chinese Associations held in August.

204 The *Sin Po* of 6 September quoted two views on the situation—
727 one that the scorched-earth policy of the Indonesian troops had
609 been carried out with the intention of destroying the economic foundations of the overseas Chinese, and the other that the Dutch wished the two peoples, the Chinese and the Indonesians, to hate one another.

The misfortunes of the Chinese during the Dutch-Indonesian hostilities were not sufficient to create a solid pro-Dutch anti-Indonesian attitude on the part of the community, though it is likely that a majority favoured the Dutch. Nevertheless, there were then and still in 1949 several Chinese holding important positions in the Republican Government itself, such as Mr Tan Ling Djie, the secretary of the Socialist Party, and a leading Komitie Nasional figure, and Mr Ong Eng Djie, former Vice-Minister of Finance and director of the Republic's Banking and Trading Corporation.[2]

[702 The *Sin Po*, in an editorial of 13 September, reported that among
648] the international volunteers who had come to Sumatra to fight for the Republic of Indonesia there were some overseas Chinese. 'This action is not welcome to us', commented the newspaper. 'When the Indonesian rioters choose to murder the Overseas Chinese and burn their property what will the volunteers do then? Will they look on or take part in the atrocities?'

[1] *Sing Hwe Pao* (8 August 1947).
[2] Charles Wolf, Jr., *The Indonesian Story*, p. 161.

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Many Indonesian Chinese, too, felt that their community was isolated from other Chinese communities in the Nanyang. Although there had been all these murders of Chinese in the Indies, there had not been a single voice of sympathy from the Chinese newspapers in Malaya.[1] 727 204

When the Security Council's cease-fire instructions had failed to end hostilities in Indonesia the Council on 25 August appointed a Committee of Good Offices to do its best to mediate between the parties. The Committee and its staff arrived in Batavia on 27 October. They chose as a neutral meeting ground U.S.S. *Renville*, a Navy transport, which sailed into Batavia bay on 8 December. The truce was accepted by both parties on 17 January with acceptance of six additional principles two days later.[2] 728

The *Sin Po* reported on 13 March that since the signing of the *Renville* agreement the Chinese in the interior of Java had been living at peace. [204]

A well-known authority on Far Eastern politics states the position as follows: 728

> The Indonesian Republicans have shown almost as much antagonism to the Chinese as to the Dutch. . . . Local Chinese organizations have appealed to the Chinese Government for protection, but though China is at the moment too weak to take any drastic action, the attitude of China in the United Nations is by no means so favourable as that of India towards the claims of the Indonesian Republic. China, indeed, is the most directly affected third party in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute and, if the Chinese civil war were to be brought to an end, Chinese concern with events in Southeast Asia would be manifested much more strongly than it is now.[3] 648 609

Chinese living within the Republican territory had to be exceedingly adaptable in order to maintain their position. When the Republican currency was put into circulation in October 1946 Chinese trade was temporarily paralysed. Many Indonesians thought that the Chinese advantage in trade had at last been destroyed and that the Indonesians could now meet them on equal terms, but they reckoned here without Chinese resilience. The Japanese had transferred to the Republic many economic assets, but quite a large number of rice-mills still remained in Chinese hands. 727 436 438 [256]

[1] Editorial in *Thien Sung Yit Po* (Batavia, 25 August 1947).
[2] *United Nations Bulletin*, vol. iv, no. 5 (March 1948) p. 163.
[3] G. F. Hudson, 'Chinese in Southeast Asia', *Eastern World* (October 1947).

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080 hands. The Indonesian politicians then introduced new laws of
727 citizenship with disabilities for aliens, whose object was to absorb
641 a great quantity of Chinese man-power and to obtain control of
609 Chinese property and other wealth.[1] The Chinese, too, were forced
471 (so said the *Seng Hwo Pao*[2]) to buy Republican national loan.
439 Trade restrictions of every sort were introduced into the Republic, one after the other, but still the Chinese traders managed to make money by reason of their knowledge of the Indies. Later a number of them became rich by running the Dutch blockade to Singapore. This blockade would have been more effective had it not been for these Chinese blockade-runners whose activities aided the Republicans.

648 The split in China between the National Government and the
575 Communists tended to cause a similar, though naturally not quite so obvious a split in the ranks of the overseas Chinese of Indonesia. It was noticeable over the *Pao An Tuis* and it was noticeable again over Chiang Kai-shek's announcement of his anti-Communist drive. In Macassar, in November, there was an uproar in the local Kuomintang branch over a birthday cable to the Generalissimo. Mr Ong of the Chang Wang Hwee Kwan refused to sign the cable endorsing the drive on the ground that he must consult his association members first: the chairman of the Chinese Youth Association signed without consulting his members, which aroused great public indignation. Only 31 out of 60 associations signed; there was a banging of tables, breaking of glasses, and resort to blows!
[204] There was a similar disturbance in Cheribon. The *Seng Hwo Pao* published an attack on Dr Kan Yun, the director of the Overseas Affairs Commission of the Chinese Government, for saying: 'The Overseas Chinese were dispersed and murdered by the Indonesians and their property was burned because they did not support the Chinese Government and make sacrifices for it in their struggle against the Communist bandits.'

727 The entirely new situation in the Indies following on the Japanese surrender had profoundly shaken the position of the Chinese, but it had not in many essential respects altered their relative position in society, especially in the Dutch-controlled areas. In these areas, which were still much greater than the ones over which the Republic held sway, the old institutions remained intact.

[1] *The Sing Ming* (monthly) described the law as a 'mortal blow to the Overseas Chinese'.

[2] 1 January 1948.

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At this point we must take leave of the Chinese of Indonesia and pass to an examination of the fate of their brethren in other countries of Southeast Asia. We have followed their career—rather patchily and spasmodically at times be it admitted—for over three hundred years, and we have seen them suffer many vicissitudes.

*Income-tax Assessments and the Assessable Net Annual Income for Indonesia**

Groups of income (annual income in) guilders)	Assessments			Net annual income in 1,000 guilders		
	Europeans	Indonesians†	Chinese and other Asiatics	Europeans	Indonesians†	Chinese and other Asiatics
900‡–1,200	5,931	11,621	10,241	6,112	11,937	10,532
1,200–3,000	25,732	19,990	26,897	51,921	35,377	48,544
3,000–6,000	22,208	3,667	7,320	93,930	14,341	29,567
6,000–12,000	13,135	577	2,298	106,979	4,387	18,369
12,000–30,000	3,124	140	699	52,214	2,087	11,985
30,000–60,000	400	8	97	16,119	307	3,789
60,000–120,000	76	2	22	6,110	206	1,690
Above 120,000	19	1	..	3,370	137	..
Total 1938	70,625	36,006	47,574	336,755	68,779	124,476
900–1,200	6,018	11,953	10,889	6,224	12,359	11,191
1,200–3,000	26,080	19,324	27,202	52,549	34,327	49,145
3,000–6,000	23,679	4,053	7,251	100,338	15,871	28,997
6,000–12,000	13,947	648	2,044	113,629	5,028	16,258
12,000–30,000	3,110	127	572	51,709	1,920	9,797
30,000–60,000	323	4	82	12,832	151	3,324
60,000–120,000	76	2	16	5,687	192	1,189
Above 120,000	14	1	..	2,013	125	..
Total 1939	73,247	36,112	48,056	344,981	69,973	119,901

* Reproduced from *Statistical Pocket Book of Indonesia* (1941) p. 134.
† In this group the income from agriculture is exempt from income-tax.
‡ The number of persons assessed at an income under fl. 900 per annum is not stated in the table because the wages tax that became effective as from 1 January 1935 covered the taxes payable by those whose income did not exceed fl. 900 per annum.

They have been admired for their qualities, but more often tolerated for their usefulness and frequently blamed for the role they have played. But it cannot be too much insisted that the Chinese had no part in establishing the system as it was. They took things as they found them, and when the pernicious tax farming was abolished and the credit system reformed they took readily to the healthier conditions of private enterprise. As society is reformed the Chinese, so it seems, will reform with it: by reason of their comparatively small numbers and their middle position they cannot

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take the lead. Their misfortune is that they have too often been made the scapegoats for the mistakes and the whipping-boy for the crimes of others.[1]

[1] Mr George McT. Kahin points out certain omissions from this chapter (due to the fact that the necessary information was not available to the author). There is no mention, for example, of the relationships between the Chinese dispenser of agrarian credit (the 'Tjina-mindering') and the Indonesian peasant and of the important political currents generated thereby. An understanding of this (Mr Kahin believes) is really basic to a realistic insight into post-war Chinese-Indonesian relations. Nor is there mention of the important relationship between the pre-war Partai Tiongwha Indonesia and the Chinese (*Peranakan*) backers of the Republic. Mr Kahin also points out that a discussion of the Republican citizenship law as it relates to the Chinese and the problems raised by it would have been very desirable. Here again the author is limited by the information accessible. There is undoubtedly room for a great deal of further research. This survey aims merely at providing a framework.

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PART VIII
THE CHINESE IN THE PHILIPPINES

CHAPTER XLIX
DEMOGRAPHY

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IN the 380-odd years that have elapsed since the Europeans first settled in the Philippines a great many enumerations of the Chinese community have been made, and within the last century and a half there have been periodic censuses of the entire population. Since the Chinese were at all times the object of suspicion on the part of the authorities, were subject to a poll-tax for centuries, and had often entered the country illicitly, they had every reason to conceal their numbers, and doubt has therefore been thrown on the accuracy of the counting of their heads. Moreover, since they suffered periodic purgings on a grand scale during the Spanish regime their numbers fluctuated violently, and during the present century they have been subjected to varying economic stresses and to war. Nevertheless, the estimates of so many independent observers do reveal a general truth, and if rectification is made for some obvious errors, figures not too far removed from the actual ones can be arrived at.

The above remarks apply in particular to the first century or so of the Spanish period, when the Chinese were to be found in a limited number of centres, especially Manila, and had not spread to every corner of the islands; but, in spite of the doubt cast on the more recent census figures by many authorities, it does not seem that an upward correction of more than 10 per cent. at the very most is necessary in the case of the more recent censuses. In support of this view the intercensal figures of the Philippines Bureau of Health, which are included in Table IV below, are from an unpublished report based on house-to-house investigations reported on by the district health officers of the provinces and the chief of police at Manila. Whatever the reliability of the method used at the censuses, it seems unlikely that an enumeration conducted on such principles should be grossly wrong.[1]

204 [1] One rough pointer to the size of the Chinese community is the circulation of newspapers. In 1937 among the daily newspapers of the Philippines 8 were in

[p. 569]

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659 None the less, it would be well to indicate that misgivings as to the reliability of the censuses were widespread, even among experts, 162 and were encouraged by the fear, ever present in the Philippines, of a Chinese inundation. Mr H. L. May, the authority on opium, says:

> So little is known of the extent of the Chinese problem that the following estimates were given me by various official and semi-official sources: 40,000; 60,000; 70,000; 96,000; 130,000. From one source I learned that there were about 10,000 Chinese a year coming into Manila by means more or less legal, and almost 6,000 to 8,000 a year by that port. . . . The figure of 96,000 came from a Chinese source, but I am inclined to believe that the actual figure is somewhat larger.[1]

[167] There can be little doubt that illicit immigration was in 1949 higher than it has ever been, partly owing to the application of the quota of 1940, the refusal of the Philippine Government to 162 receive back Chinese displaced by the war, and (very probably) to the drive after the Second World War to get Chinese Leftists into the country in order to exercise political pressure and to prepare for overt acts of revolution. But the numbers were undoubtedly reduced by the war, and it does not seem likely that there were in 1949 many more Chinese in the Philippines than there were towards the end of the Spanish period. In any case, the proportion of Chinese to Filipinos is only about 1 to 150. In Malaya the Chinese are the most numerous community; in Siam there may be one Chinese to every four or five Siamese and other races; in Indonesia the ratio is about 1 to 50 or more. Therefore, the 'Chinese problem' in the Philippines is not one of threatened swamping by pure numbers of the indigenous peoples (even if the three-quarters of a million mestizos were included with the Chinese proper—which is not politically or otherwise justified), but arises from other factors.

In 1590 there were 3,000–4,000 Chinese in the Chinese quarter of Manila, not counting the 2,000 visitors during the trading season,

[204] English (total circulation 85,000); 9 were in Spanish (total circulation 62,000); 2 were in Tagálog (total circulation 47,000); 5 *were in Chinese* (*total circulation 32,000*); 2 were in Japanese (total circulation 2,290); and 2 were in English and Spanish (combined circulation 1,800). J. R. Hayden, Ph.D., LL.D., *The Philippines: a Study in National Development* (New York, Macmillan, 1942) p. 611.

[64] In the Philippines the *jus sanguinis* was applied—even mestizos were regarded as foreigners until the third generation.

[1] H. L. May, *Survey of Opium Smoking Conditions in the Far East* (Opium Research Committee of Foreign Policy Association, 1927) p. 22. Walter Robb, 'The Chino in the Philippines', *Asia* (December 1921), says that the Chinese population was 70,000 to 80,000 *c.* 1920.

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with a total of 6,000–7,000 for the islands and by 1602 the number had increased to 30,000; the revolt and massacre of 1603 reduced the number to very few, and it did not revive to 8,000 until 1609; just before the second revolt and massacre of 1639 the total had increased again to 20,000–30,000 but the community was once more reduced to an extremely small figure when blood had ceased to flow. In 1662 there was once more a settlement of 15,000 in the Chinese quarter of Manila, the Parián, and although the ultimatum delivered to the Spaniards by the Chinese pirate, Koxinga, resulted in a drive against the Chinese, a large-scale massacre was averted, and some thousands were left in the Parián when the trouble had died down. In 1740, 20,000 were reported in Manila. A royal order for the expulsion of all Chinese was received in 1741 and again in 1747, but the orders were suspended in both cases. When in 1755 the order was renewed attempts were made to put it into effect, and after the British had occupied Manila many of the Chinese remaining in Luzon were massacred in 1763 for having sided with the enemy. In 1778 the expulsion order of 1769 was revoked and in 1804 it was decreed that only Chinese who were agriculturists or artisans should remain. Massacres, albeit on a much smaller scale than the wholesale killings of 1603 and 1639, continued as late as 1819 and 1820, and by 1828 Spanish policy had reduced the number of Chinese in the Philippines to 5,708, exclusive of mestizos, of whom 5,279 were in Tondo. By 1850, however, they had surpassed their former numbers, and there were said to be over 50,000 in the whole of the Philippines, including nearly 30,000 in the capital. The next great increase was between 1876 and 1886 when the figures rose from about 31,000 to 94,000.

It is at this point, however, that controversy intervenes. The Spanish census of 1886, as we see from Table IX, p. 580, showed 93,567 Chinese in the Philippines. Reyes Lala, *The Philippine Islands* (New York, 1899) pp. 104–6, says that there were at that time about 100,000 Chinese in the Philippines of whom 40,000 were in Manila. As against this, *The Census of the Philippines, 1903* (Washington, 1905) states as follows (pp. 38–9):

> Carlos Palanca, a Christian Chinaman, the most prominent Chinese merchant in the islands, and for forty-three years a resident, stated that he had twice been appointed Chinese captain, or headman of the Chinese, and prior to American occupation was acting Chinese consul; and that he had 40,000 Chinese under him, which included all in the

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162 Philippines, of whom 23,000 were in Manila at that time, June, 1899. As every Chinaman who arrived in or left the Islands was registered by the Chinese captain, these figures were probably correct.

Only four years after this the Americans conducted the census of 1903 which gave the number of Chinese in the Philippines as 41,035, and the census report remarked (p. 38), 'it is probable that the margin of error in the number of civilized Filipinos, Chinese, and other foreigners does not exceed a fraction of one per cent.'

When the United States Army took over control of the islands, the exclusion laws applying to Chinese in the United States were almost immediately extended to the Philippines and were continued after the end of the military period when the civil government took over in 1902. The effect of these laws was to prohibit Chinese immigration except for such groups as merchants and students, who were allowed temporary stay; but Chinese residents could bring in their families, and 'family' was liberally interpreted. Thus, when in 1940 a new immigration law was passed limiting to 500 a year the number of aliens of any one nationality to be admitted, the new law was regarded as much more restrictive than the old.[1]

The census of 1903, the first under the American regime, gave the number of Chinese in the Philippines as 41,035; that of 1918 placed their total at 43,802. If these censuses were anything like correct, then the estimate of 100,000 at the end of the Spanish period must have been very much out. It is scarcely conceivable that the Chinese population dropped by nearly 60 per cent. in the space of five years. The census of 1939 put the Chinese at 117,487 and, for reasons already given, it can be accepted as being not very far short of the truth. At the end of 1947 an official estimate of the Bureau of Immigration put the number at 100,971, a reduction of nearly 17,000 since before the Japanese war.[2]

In 1939 the Chinese consulate-general in the Philippines carried out a general registration of all Chinese resident in the islands. The registration fees were to have been used in the construction of

[1] The exclusion laws were repealed in the United States in 1943. See K. S. Latourette, *The Chinese: Their History and Culture* (New York, Macmillan, 1906) p. 508.

[2] Mr Paul McNutt, former United States ambassador to the Philippines, said that in August 1947 there were 200,000 Chinese in the Philippines, but he gave no evidence in support of his estimate. *North China Daily News* (14 August 1947).

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a new consulate and therefore the registration was considered to have been more or less complete. The total Chinese counted are said to have been about 130,000, including 50,000 in Manila.[1] 162

Miss Catherine Porter says that at least a million Filipinos have Chinese ancestors.[2]

There has at all times been a large amount of illicit immigration into the Philippines, some of it via Borneo, and some via the northern tip of Luzon, as well as by other routes. After the Japanese surrender, UNRRA assembled and examined Chinese displaced by the war from Southeast Asian countries, and of these 7,600 were certified by them and by CNRRA as bona-fide pre-war residents of the Philippines. However, it was contrary to the policy of the Philippines Government (which was completely independent from 4 July 1946) to allow the mass entry of displaced Chinese who had, therefore, to take their turn on the small annual quota of 500. A good many of these persons have made their way back to the Philippines by devious and illicit means, and there is reason to suspect that Chinese Communists in considerable numbers were smuggled into the islands between 1946 and 1949 to soften up the political ground as a prelude, if possible, to revolution. 167

In addition to the illegal entry, there is a considerable amount of passing to and fro via the recognized ports. The following abstract gives a good idea of the outward flow of migration in the years 1930–46.

Data were presented in the 1939 census report for the brown, yellow, and white races. Separate data were also given for American negroes, negritos (aborigines), and mixed (mestizos). The census enumerators were instructed to classify as mixed or mestizos only persons whose fathers and mothers belonged to different races. The Chinese of mestizo parents were to be reported not as mestizos but according to their predominant race.[3] 162

For centuries the Chinese intermarried freely with the native community (following the general practice in the early days in

[1] This information I received from Mr Chu-pei Chen who tells me that he himself checked the figures at the consulate in 1939. V. P.

[2] *Crisis in the Philippines* (New York, Knopf, 1942) p. 97.

[3] J. R. Hayden, Ph.D., LL.D., *The Philippines: A Study in National Development* (New York, Macmillan, 1942) p. 695. Through the centuries many Chinese mestizos have Hispanicized their names, e.g. Limjap, Cojuangco, and Golayco. The name of the President of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1948 was Alfonzo Z. Sycip.

The great patriot and martyr, José Rizal, was of Chinese mestizo origin.

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TABLE VII

167 *The Philippines. Aliens coming from Foreign Countries by Nationality, 1930–46*[1]

	Total	*Immigrant*	*Non-immigrant*	*Total*	*Immigrant*	*Non-immigrant*
		1930			*1931*	
Total	26,622	12,323	14,299	20,348	7,036	13,312
Chinese	20,878	8,143	12,735	16,878	5,525	11,353
		1932			*1933*	
Total	21,389	7,427	13,962	20,293	7,155	13,138
Chinese	18,271	6,079	12,192	16,727	5,641	11,086
		1934			*1935*	
Total	19,596	7,381	12,215	19,727	6,046	13,681
Chinese	15,458	5,533	9,925	15,017	4,127	10,890
		1936			*1937*	
Total	25,649	8,445	17,204	30,036	10,620	19,416
Chinese	18,717	5,485	13,232	20,242	5,170	15,072
		1938			*1939*	
Total	22,998	9,551	13,447	13,002	2,670	10,332
Chinese	16,316	6,064	10,252	7,830	750	7,080
		1940			*1941 (1 Jan to 30 June)*	
Total	13,124	2,169	10,955	7,848	634	7,214
Chinese	9,138	1,382	7,756	5,669	422	5,247
		1945			*1946*	
Total	3	2	1	400	8	392
Chinese	2	2	..	216	4	212

162 Siam, Indonesia, and Indochina) and produced large groups of citizens of Filipino-Chinese blood which have been absorbed into the general population of the country. The number of Filipinos with a notable mixture of Chinese blood amounted in 1949 to at least three-quarters of a million.[2]

The residents of the islands were in the 1939 census report classified according to the country of which they were citizens. That is to say that, since the Philippines did not claim a Chinese as a citizen, there were none of the complications of dual nationality such as we encounter in Siam and Indochina, for the description deriving from the *jus sanguinis* is ethnic as opposed to national. But it must be

[1] Abstracted from *Yearbook of Philippine Statistics, 1946* (Manila, Bureau of Printing, 1946) p. 231.

[2] The distribution of Chinese in the Philippines in 1918, 1933, and 1939 is set out in Table X, pp. 580–1.

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added that Philippine law recognizes the husband or wife of a Filipino as a Philippine citizen except when the spouse's native State has a law to the contrary. A Chinese remains a Chinese even after marriage until the Ministry of the Interior approves his or her application to renounce citizenship. (Such approval, if it has ever been given at all, must be very rare.) 162

In 1939 over 39 per cent. of the total Chinese population in the Philippines was resident in Manila, and 45·4 per cent. in Manila and the surrounding area. The only other communities over 3,000 strong were in Cebu, Davao, Iloilo, Leyte, Quezon (Tayabas), Rizal, and Zamboanga; in twenty of the other provinces the figure was from 1,000 to 2,000, but smaller communities were dotted all over the islands, and only one of the fifty-two provinces, Batanes, is shown to be without Chinese in the censuses and estimates from 1918 to 1947.

In 1939 citizens of China constituted the largest group of non-Philippine citizens, and they accounted for 70·9 per cent. of all foreigners in the Philippines. A large proportion of the group being males, most reported as married were married to Filipinos.[1]

The Chinese in the Philippines were about 75 per cent. Hokkiens (Fukienese) and about 25 per cent. Cantonese. The former predominated in all lines of business except grocery stores, hotels, and restaurants, in which undertakings the Cantonese were in the forefront.

In the Philippines the proportion of Chinese females to males was smaller than in any other country of Southeast Asia. In Siam in 1939 it was roughly 1 : 3, and in Malaya about the same; in Indonesia in 1930 it was 1 : 1·6 but in the Philippines it was only one female to every 3·3 males. Table VIII sets out the position.

Though the sexes of the Chinese were unbalanced, the ratio had greatly improved in the preceding two decades. In 1918 it had been about 1 : 13; in 1933, 1 : 5, and in 1939, 1 : 4. But while this could be described as a definite 'improvement' in the sex ratio in the case of,

[1] Mr Chu-pei Chen remarks: 'Actually most Chinese in the Islands, though reported single, are married and have a family in China. With them early marriage is a common practice. In pre-war days, many Chinese bachelors in the islands went back to China to be married and then returned to the Philippines bringing their wives. It was generally believed that this practice was due to the fear of their parents, or close relatives, that if they married Filipino women their ties with the family would be loosened.'

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162 say, Malaya, where there was practically no intermarriage between the races, and the preponderance of males had produced unstable social conditions, the increase of Chinese females was a very doubtful improvement in the case of Siam, Indonesia, and the Philippines, where there had been considerable intermarriage for centuries and assimilation was now being diminished by the importation of Chinese brides, and by the rise of nationalism which tended to discourage marriage with other races. This, as we now know, is very much a repetition of the story for the remainder of Southeast Asia.

TABLE VIII

Citizens of China classified by age-groups and sex for the Philippines, 1939

Age-group	*Both sexes*		*Males*		*Females*	
	No.	*Per cent.*	*No.*	*Per cent.*	*No.*	*Per cent.*
Total	117,487	100·0	90,007	100·0	27,480	100·0
Under 5 years	11,224	9·6	5,872	6·5	5,352	19·5
5–9 ,,	10,083	8·6	5,756	6·4	4,327	15·7
10–14 ,,	9,360	8·0	6,050	6·8	3·310	12·0
15–19 ,,	12,495	10·6	10,001	11·1	2,494	9·1
20–24 ,,	13,774	11·7	11,516	12·8	2,258	8·2
25–34 ,,	31,022	26·4	26,009	28·9	5,013	18·2
35–44 ,,	19,205	16·3	16,463	18·3	2,742	10·0
45–54 ,,	5,004	4·1	3,826	4·3	1,178	4·3
55–64 ,,	3,588	3·1	2,957	3·2	631	2·3
64 plus ,,	1,708	1·5	1,536	1·7	172	0·6
Age unknown	24		21		3	

TABLE IX

Chinese in the Philippines. Their Numbers at Different Periods[1]

(B & R = Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*)

Year		*Authority*
1570	'In the town lived 40 married Chinese and 20 Japanese', (i.e. in the native town of Manila).	Anonymous contemporary account, B & R. iii. 101.
c. 1572	'In Luzon the Chinese, all of them, number about 150.'	B & R. iii. 167.
1588	'Over thirty vessels have come here from that land China, bringing so many people that together with those living here, there are over 10,000 Sangleys now in this city.'	Letter from Manila Audiencia to Philip II, 25 June 1588, B & R. vi. 316.

[1] Compiled by the present writer.

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1589	'About 4,000 men of that land [China] are here as a general rule, including merchants and workmen.'	Santiago de Vera to Philip II, 13 July 1589, B & R. vii. 89.
1590	'The Sangleys who live in this Parián number ordinarily between 3 and 4,000, not counting the 2,000 and more who come and go in ships. These, together with those residing in Tondo, and the fishermen and gardeners who live in this neighbourhood, number, according to the Dominican fathers who have them in their charge, from 6 to 7,000 souls.'	Bishop Salazar to Philip II, 24 June 1590, B & R. vii. 230.
1591	'The Chinese quarter of Parián contained some two hundred shops and a population of about 2,000.'	Report of the Encomiendas in the islands in 1591, B & R. viii. 97–8.
1597	'. . . the large number of Sangleys here (somewhat over 10,000)' (i.e. in Luzon).	Letter from Francisco Tello to Philip II, B & R. x. 259.
1599	(re the Parián) 'Its growth has increased to such an extent that more than three hundred houses of wood and cane have been built, and in them are more than 3,000 Sangleys.'	id., B & R. x. 42.
1600	'more than 15,000 Chinese live outside its [Manila's] walls.'	Oliver van Noordt (information obtained from a Chinese pilot) 24 October 1600, B & R. xv. 305.
1603	'There are always 8 to 10,000 of them.'	Benavides to Philip II, B & R. xii. 108.
	'The Chinese were more than 16,000; and these, added to those in the fleet, when it came from China, amounted to 20,000.'	Two letters from ecclesiastics, 15 December 1603, B & R. xii. 253.
	'Although it was agreed that there should not be more than four thousand Sangleys, yet there were found in the rising more than 18,000.'	Don Pedro de Acuña, 23 December 1603, B & R. xii. 168.
	Deaths in the insurrection '22–24,000' according to anonymous contemporary Spanish account. (Acuña, attempting to explain away the massacre in a letter to the Viceroy of Fukien, says the number killed was less than half the 30,000 alleged. B & R. xiv. 45.) Argensola, *Conquista de las Malucas* (B & R. xvi. 295) says 'more than 23,000 Chinese died and only five hundred are left for the galleys'.	B & R. xxix. 249.
1602 and 1622	Laws of these years limit the number of Chinese in the Philippines to 6,000 and that of Japanese to 3,000.	

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1605	1,500 'infidel Chinese' allowed to remain for rebuilding the burnt part of Manila. 'This number not to be exceeded.'	The licentiate Manuel de Madrid y Luna, 5 July 1605, B & R. xiv.
1606	'Not over 6,000 Chinese in the Parián.'	Ramon Jordana y Morera, *La Inmigración China in Filipinas*, 1888.
1609	'in the Alcayceria "more than four hundred shops and generally 8,000 men who trade therein".'	Argensola's *Conquistas*, published 1609, B & R. xvi. 296.
1621	'there are now more Chinese in the country than there were sixteen and a half years ago, when they revolted.'	Serrano to Philip, 30 July 1621, B & R. xx. 96–7.
1627	'Fire caught at one o'clock at night on March 13, in the Parián or Alcayceria of the Chinese, where more than 12,000 Chinese live.'	Relation of 1628–9 (unsigned), B & R. xxii. 211.
1634	'. . . between one of the churches (which is called Minondo [Binondo]) and the church of the Parián is generally a settlement of 20,000 or more Sangleys during the year.'	Salamanca to Philip IV, 10 August 1634, B & R. xxiv. 328.
1635	'in one village alone, which they call Parián, an arquebus-shot from the said city, more than 20,000 Chinese Indians called Sangleys have all come out from Great China and Japan.'	Juan Grau y Monfalcon to the King, 1635, B & R. xxv. 49.
1637	'so many Chinese are now in Manila that there are two villages: one that of Vinondoc [i.e. Binondo], which is near the city, and composed of married Christians, and the other the Parián in which live those who bring merchandise.'	id., memorial of 1637, B & R. xxvii. 114.
1638	'4–5,000 Chinese now paying the general licence fee of nine pesos less one real now living in the islands.'	Corcuera to Philip IV, 10 June 1638, B & R. xxvi. 140.
	In Parián 'usually 10,000 Chinese and at times as many as 20,000'.	Aduarte's *Historia*, B & R. xxxii. 76.
	25,000 to 30,000 in the Philippines (see under 1644).	Fiscal Don Sebastian Cavallero.
1639	Second great Chinese insurrection. 'Those who make the most careful estimate of the deaths of both sides state that the number of Spaniards who died in the war were about 40 or 45, and of Indians 300 . . . on the side of the enemy, they make the deaths approximately 22,000 to 24,000—including those who died in the provinces.'	Anon. Nov. 1639, B & R. xxix. 249.
1644	The privilege of remaining on the islands 'brings his Majesty according to the number of the Sangleys now, 120,000 pesos annually; in the years 1638 and 1639, when there were 25 or 30,000 Sangleys . . . these licences amounted to 230,000 pesos'.	Fiscal's Report on Sangley licences, 1644, B & R. xxxv. 190.

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c. 1649–61	'Usually 15,000 Chinese live there in the Parián.'	Bartolomé de Letona, *Description of the Philippine Islands*, La Puebla, Mexico, 1662, B & R. xxxvi. 200.	
c. 1678–90	'the number of Sangleys is less than ever . . . for it is supposed that their numbers do not reach the 6,000 which the royal decrees allow.'	*The Augustinians in the Philippines, 1670–1694* (Manila, 1718), B & R. xlii. 252.	
1662	Koxinga's ultimatum. Third insurrection, large-scale massacre averted by Governor; 2,000 Chinese pursued and killed in six months by Spanish and Tagálogs.		
1686	Insurrection. Wealthy Chinese remain loyal.		
1693	3,000 in Parián; formerly 4,000(?).[1]	Giovanni Gemelli-Careri.	*Total population*
1740	'in the city of Manila it is said that there are at least 20,000 Chinese who constantly reside there.'	Anson's *Voyages* (Walter).	1,000,000 (1735) (Fray Juan de San Antonio est.)
1745	'Insurrection' falsely reported.		
1747	Royal order for expulsion of Chinese received, but suspended.		
1755	Order for expulsion reissued (515 Chinese Christians plus 1,000 who 'pretended to be studying the Chinese doctrine' exempted).		1,350,000 (Arguëlles, est.)
1762–4	British occupy Manila.		
1763	Massacre of Chinese for supporting the British.		
1766	Chinese survivors rounded up for expulsion.		
1769	Many Chinese expelled under order of this year.		
1785 (25 Feb.)	New order for expulsion of the Chinese.		
1785 (1 April)	Order approving Chinese colonization in certain islands.		
1790 (14 May)	Capitation tax of six pesos ordered for Chinese.		
1788	Order of 1769 revoked.		
1804	Order that only Chinese who are agriculturists or artisans may remain in the Philippines.		
1807	4,700 Chinese on the registers, but with those 'wandering about' the total was estimated at 7,000.	Thomas de Comyn (1820).	
1828	5,708 Chinese in the Philippines: 5,279 in Tondo, the rest in Cavite and other parts of Luzon.	Manuel Buzeta, cited by 1903 Census Report, 135.	1,741,000 (Census 1805) 2,593,000 (Acafo 1818, est.)

[1] Very likely an under-estimate, but is included as by a contemporary observer. But see footnote 1 on p. 604 regarding Gemelli-Careri's credibility.

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1842	10,000 Chinese in the Philippines and 240,000 Mestizos de Sangley.	Sinibaldo de Mas, *Informe sobre el Estado de las Islas Filipinas, en 1842*, p. 138.	3,815,878 (Census 1850) 4,500,000 (est. 1860)
1876	30,797 Chinese in the Philippines.	Ramon Jordana y Morera.	4,712,000 (Census 1870)
1886	93,567 Chinese in the Philippines.	Census.	5,985,000 (Census 1886)
1899	40,000 Chinese in the Philippines; 23,000 in Manila. Census Report 1903, p. 39, says these figures were probably correct', but Reyes Lala, *The Philippine Islands* (New York, 1899) pp. 104–6, says 40,000 in Manila and 100,000 in the Philippines.	Carlos Palanca (Chinese captain) cited in 1903 Census Report (pub. 1905) i. 38–9.	
1903	41,035 Chinese in the Philippines.	Census.	6,988,000 (Census)
1918	43,802 (40,704 males: 3,098 females).	Census.	10,314,000 (Census)
1933	71,638 (59,054 males; 12,584 females)	Bureau of Health.	
1939	117,487 (90,007 males; 27,480 females).	Census.	16,000,000 (Census)
1947	100,971.	Immigration Bureau.	19,511,000

Total population is given in round figures.

TABLE X

Chinese in the Philippines. Distribution 1918, 1933, 1939, and estimated total for 1947

Provinces	1918		1933		1939
	Males	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Both sexes*
Abra	18	1	29	3	66
Agusan	59	5	154	25	351
Albay	1,153	82	1,063	210	1,895
Antique	124	2	291	146	215
Bataan	21	..	30	3	55
Batanes	..	..	..	..	..
Batangas	318	15	420	64	741
Bohol	255	29	360	109	840
Bukidnon	5	..	34	2	106
Bulacan	207	13	329	64	464
Cagayan	692	53	1,082	441	1,404
Camarines Norte	1,037	38	301	109	1,220
Camarines Sur			990	207	2,087
Capiz	284	41	408	100	715
Cataduanes	227	4	210	28	..
Cavite	456	17	509	36	1,204
Cebu	1,509	153	2,215	482	6,117
City of Baguio	*	*	343	101	*
Cotabato	146	5	567	75	1,591
	6,511	458	9,335	2,205	19,071

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Provinces	1918 Males	1918 Females	1933 Males	1933 Females	1939 Both sexes
Brought forward	6,511	458	9,335	2,205	19,071
Culion I. Colony	†	†	36	2	†
Davao	743	19	1,706	213	3,595
Ilocos Norte	105	4	284	31	424
Ilocos Sur	245	6	472	66	717
Iloilo	1,560	133	3,578	321	3,511
Isabela	472	29	635	72	1,778
La Union	160	18	297	84	458
Laguna	946	21	1,171	269	1,939
Lanao	117	27	169	51	[illegible]
Leyte	2,147	99	1,986	571	[illegible]
MANILA, City of	16,136	1,624	23,357	5,502	46,233
Marinduque	189	20	263	114	557
Masbate	184	19	299	68	731
Mindoro	108	1	248	49	513
Misamis Occ.	621	71	483	74	1,049
Misamis Ortl.			686	142	1,512
Mountain Province	188	10	54	14	1,212
Negros Occ.	824	34	1,481	129	2,679
Negros Ortl.	385	7	637	127	1,125
Nueva Ecija	442	34	761	134	1,361
Nueva Vizcaya	10	..	69	14	273
Palawan	128	1	142	36	368
Pampanga	473	28	588	70	1,301
Pangasinan	643	50	823	180	1,800
Quezon (Tayabas)	1,208	66	2,117	627	4,069
Rizal	623	22	1,529	226	5,431
Romblon	113	6	158	48	214
Samar	1,451	57	1,052	135	1,956
Sorsogon	892	26	854	178	1,451
Sulu	687	67	666	391	1,294
Surigao	395	17	522	108	1,115
Tarlac	326	34	677	112	1,359
Zambales	395	30	143	74	581
Zamboanga	1,280	60	1,776	147	4,167
Total	40,699	3,098	59,054	12,584	90,007 males 27,480 females
	43,797		71,638		117,487

1947 Total Chinese in the Philippines 100,971.

* Included in the Mountain Province. † Included in Palawan.

1918, 1939 figures from census of these years.

1933 figures from an unpublished report of the Philippines Bureau of Health, based on house-to-house investigations reported upon by district health officers in the provinces, and the chief of police, Manila.

1947 total from an official estimate of the Philippines Bureau of Information.

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CHAPTER L

THE CHINESE UNDER THE SPANISH REGIME, 1570–1603

648 CHINESE intercourse with the Philippines goes back at least 700 years.[1] The *Ming Shih* (chap. 323, p. 11a) relates that in 1405 the Emperor Yung Lo sent to Luzon a high officer who was to govern the country. Berthold Laufer remarks, 'How long Yung Lo's delegate remained in the island and what character his jurisdiction was are not narrated, but it is not at all incredible that the ambitious Yung Lo exercised a kind of supremacy, or at least claimed a prerogative of protection, over the Philippine Islands; for since its establishment the rule of the Ming dynasty had been characterized by a tendency towards expansion, from a desire to extend its fame over land and sea to the furthest extremities of the world.'[2] Laufer also says that there can be no doubt that there was a colony of Chinese on Luzon before the arrival of the Spaniards, as is clearly stated in the *Ming Shih* (chap. 323, p.11b)[3] and indeed (see Table IX, p. 576) a small colony of forty Chinese is noted in Manila by a Spanish eye-witness of 1570. However, the nature and extent of Chinese pre-Spanish connexion with the Philippines are a matter of dispute among the experts, and it is convenient for us to start our narrative with the arrival of the Spaniards.[4] Our

[1] Hayden, op. cit. p. 692.

[2] Berthold Laufer, 'The Relations of the Chinese to the Philippines', *Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections* (quarterly issue) (Washington, 13 September 1907) l. 257.

[3] ibid. p. 258.

174 [4] The following extracts from the booklet, *Early History of Philippine Relations with Foreign Countries, especially China*, by H. Otley Beyer, Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, University of the Philippines (Manila, National Printing Co., 1948), will be of interest to the student of this question, for Mr Beyer has been able to rely, *inter alia*, on archaeological work done in the Philippines in the twenty years preceding 1948.

'It is improbable that many Chinese ships were engaged in this trade during the early period (at least before the late 11–12th century part of it), and it is unlikely that there were any Chinese resident in the islands at that time . . .' (p. 4). [re 12th–14th centuries] 'Chinese merchant colonies began to establish themselves in a few places where a fairly strong or well-organized native government gave prospect of protection' (p. 5). 'With the death of Cheng Ho, however, and the passing of the Yung Lo regime, this Chinese attempt at dominion overseas also passed away . . .' (p. 6). [re A.D. 1430–50]

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sources are to be almost exclusively European, mainly Spanish, from the establishment of Manila in 1571, for, in the words of Professor C. R. Boxer: 648

> Confucian scholars would have scorned to chronicle the adventures of stray coolies or fisher-folk amongst the hairy barbarians of the West so we cannot expect to find anything of importance in the Chinese annals. It is to European sources that we must turn exclusively for information about the doings of the Celestial waifs and strays in the Outer World during the late Ming and early Manchu periods.[1]

Which is no doubt an exaggeration (as we see from the writings of Laufer, Duyvendak, and others), but it correctly reflects the indifference of the Chinese mandarinate to the unfilial and (to them) impersonal emigrants.

Miguel Lopez de Legaspi landed at Cebu on 27 April 1565 and established the city of Manila in June 1571. The first conflict between the Spanish and the Chinese was at Mindoro in May 1570. The Chinese junks came out side by side with their foresails up, beating on drums, playing on fifes, firing rockets and culverins, and making a great warlike display. But they were defeated in the affray and about twenty of the Chinese were killed.[2] In November 1574 the Chinese outlaw, Lim Ah Hong, usually known as Limahon,[3] in command of sixty-two war junks, captured a Chinese merchant vessel off the coast of Luzon. From the crew he gained information about the wealth of Manila and its military weakness due to the temporary absence of the Spanish forces on a distant expedition. The Chinese landed at Parañaque, eight miles south of Manila,

'As Mohammedan influence spread eastward through the southern Philippines, and northward from Borneo into Luzon, the Siam and Indo-China trade was at first cut off, while the Chinese merchant vessels were forced to seek new trading routes leading around the eastern side of Luzon, and into the eastern Visayan Islands etc., where Islamic beliefs had not yet penetrated'. . . (p. 7). 'While the Chinese settlers intermarried freely in the country, built good houses, and taught their families better ways of living, they were not otherwise interested in converting or spreading new ideas among the native folk. Their influence was chiefly economic, and aside from the brief period of Yung Lo's empire, they made no attempt to meddle or interfere with native political institutions, social customs, or beliefs . . .' (p. 8). 174

[1] C. R. Boxer, 'Notes on Chinese Abroad in the late Ming and Early Manchu Periods, compiled from Contemporary European Sources', *T'ien Hsia Monthly* (1939) p. 447–8.

[2] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. iii. 75.

[3] His name was (in the mandarin dialect) Lin Tao-K'ien or Linfung; Lim Ah Hong was the form of the latter in the Amoy dialect. Laufer, op. cit. p. 259.

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648 surprised and killed the Spanish captain Goiti, and were prevented from taking Manila only by the arrival of the Captain Juan de Salcedo who relieved the Spanish garrison besieged in the citadel. Limahon established himself in a fortified camp in the delta of the Agno river in the province of Pangasinan but he was driven out by Salcedo. Through mismanagement, the Spanish failed to follow up their success and the Chinese eventually departed from Luzon.[1]

The following year (1575) two ships arrived from the Viceroy of Fukien with an envoy named Omocon. The mission was received by the Spanish Governor, Labezares, who considered it his principal task to entertain peaceful and amicable relations with an empire whose very pirates were able to rock the Spanish power in Asia. Laufer says that the commander (Omocon), charmed with the chivalrous character and generosity of the Spaniards, offered to take Spanish envoys over to China in his ship. The embassy sent in consequence of this invitation consisted of two military officers and two Augustinian friars, Martín de Rada and Jerónimo Marín. They were, however, unsuccessful in their mission although they humiliated themselves so far as to perform the kowtow before the Viceroy, and they returned to Manila in October 1575 accompanied by the Chinese envoy, Omocon, and three Chinese captains who had come to take Limahon back to China in chains. These officers brought rich presents for Labezares, but as he had now been succeeded as Governor by Francisco de Sande the Chinese refused, without due authority from their Viceroy in China, to hand their gifts over to de Sande. Offended at this, he from that day showed such an antipathy towards everything Chinese that he endangered the interests of the Spanish crown by his narrow-minded policy.[2]

Labezares said that the Chinese were 'mean, impudent, importunate, and deceitful'. Omocon wanted de Sande to write to China saying that Limahon was dead, but the Governor replied that the Castilians did not know how to lie, and that he could not discuss such trivial matters.[3]

[1] W. Cameron Forbes, *The Philippine Islands* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1945) p. 24. Francisco de Sande himself, in his Relation of 7 June 1576 (Blair and Robertson, op. cit. iv. 38 ff.) gives an account of the Limahon affair from which the last statement above is extracted.

[2] op. cit. p. 260–1, apparently following Gaspar de San Augustan, *Conquistas de las Islas Filipinas* (Madrid, 1698) via F. Blumentritt, *Die Chinesen auf den Philippinen* (Leitmeritz, 1879).

[3] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. iv. 49.

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The Chinese were known to the Spanish at a very early period as Sangleys, which (according to Laufer) is from the Amoy word *Seng-li*, meaning 'trade'.[1] They had been carrying on trading voyages with the Philippines for many years before the Spanish occupation, but the number of these greatly increased as a result of the arrival of the Spaniards. Bishop Salazar, writing to Philip II of Spain in 1590, stated that the Parián, or Chinese quarter, contained a population of between 3,000 and 4,000 in the ordinary way, not counting the 2,000 and more who came and went in the annual shipping season. The total in city and suburbs was from 6,000 to 7,000 souls.[2]

The Chinese were the principal artisans and labourers and built many of the old churches, convents, and forts which were still standing up to the closing phases of the Second World War, while Chinese carpenters, tailors, cobblers, and craftsmen were mainly responsible for supplying the daily household wants of the Spanish community. It is probable, too, that a Chinese was the first printer in the Philippines.[3]

Bishop Salazar's *Relación*, or Report to his royal master, of the

[1] But the author has seen a fine Spanish manuscript volume of 1590, the property of Professor C. R. Boxer, in which, obviously by a Chinese hand, there is a coloured picture of Chinese with the title 'Sangleys' and in Chinese 常來, which means 'frequently coming'. See C. R. Boxer, 'A Late Sixteenth Century Manila MS.', in *JRAS*, Pts. 1 & 2, 1950.

This alternative explanation, however, though based on this undoubtedly contemporary evidence, does not appear a reasonable one to the author, while the one given in the text above is certainly so.

[2] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. vii. 32.

But from Table IX it will be seen that writing in 1588 the bishop had estimated the total Chinese, during the trading season, at over 10,000.

The Chinese were transferred to the Parián by Diego de Ronquillo, Governor *ad interim* 1583–4.

[3] Boxer, op. cit. p. 458–9, says: 'Books printed included works in Spanish, Chinese, and local dialects such as Tagal.' See also under *Doctrina Christiana* in the List of Authorities at end of this survey.

Salazar (letter of 24 June 1590, Blair and Robertson, op. cit. vii. 226) says: 'What has pleased us all has been the arrival of a bookbinder from Mexico. He brought books with him, set up a bindery, and hired a Sangley who offered his services to him. The Sangley secretly, and without his master noticing it, watched the latter bind the books, and lo, in less than [blank space in original] he left the house, saying that he wished to serve him no longer, and set up a similar shop. I assure Your Majesty that he had become so excellent a workman that his master has been forced to give up the business, because the Sangley has drawn all the trade. His work is so good that there is no need of the Spanish tradesman. At the time of writing, I have in my hand a Latin version of Nabarro, bound by him, and it could not be better bound, even in Seville.'

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439 year 1583, illustrates the narrow policy of the civil authorities in a
609 striking manner, as may be seen from the following extract:[1]

Commerce with the Sangleys has always been considered of the first importance, on account not only of its value in supplying provisions to this town and for maintaining its foreign connexions, but also because of the expectations for the future to which it gives rise, namely, that through it we may even obtain a foothold in that great realm [China] which is the end desired by us beyond all other things. This commerce has, however, failed so dismally that we fear that next year the Sangleys may not return, or if they do, it will not be in such great numbers as heretofore, or that even if they do come they will not want to sell their merchandise at the same prices as before because of the ill-treatment they have suffered here—and because of the disorder there has been.

During the last two years they have become more and more irritated, the reason being that whereas they had paid nothing in taxes before, an anchorage tax was afterwards imposed on them. This tax was imposed more as a recognition of their presence than with any hope of gain. Last year and this they were required to pay three per cent, from which demand has proceeded many of their grievances. The long and the short of it was that they were ordered to repair a palisaded house which was turned into a tax-collecting office. They went there very much against their will, and were made by the shops to pay higher prices than they would have had to have done outside. A warder was placed over them with power of punishment, and in this place, according to what they say, they suffered many wrongs, and were much molested; indeed, for very little cause they were put in the stocks and fined, and they were fined furthermore for going out to buy provisions by night, or for not keeping their quarters and equipment clean. Under the pretext of exacting dues for Your Majesty, they were forbidden to sell anything without first registering it, and since the best of what they had was taken away from them when they went to register it, and they were compensated for this at prices fixed by the inspector or his registrar, they hid some pieces of silk in order to sell them at a better price or to persons to whom they had been promised. As a result they were heavily penalised as if they had been under this obligation for many years instead of being only the first or second time they had heard of it.

609 The bishop goes on to refer to a case when Don Antonio Yofre, the Treasurer, ordered a Chinese who had hidden certain pieces of

[1] Based on a translation of *Relación de las cosas de Las Filipinas hecha por Fr. Domingo de Salazar, Primer obispo de dichas islas, publicada ahora por primera vez* (Madrid, 1847), by H. D. Purcell, compared with that in Blair and Robertson, op. cit. v. 236 ff.

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silk to be arrested and then sentenced him to a hundred lashes and 609
a fine of 75 tostons. The brother of the Chinese had gone to the bishop, and upon the latter's plea the lashes had been remitted, but the Chinese had had to pay the fine before he could leave the prison. 'So many suffer from personal wrongs', says the bishop, 'that I am sorry for them.' Other impositions suffered by the Chinese included the forcible confiscation of their merchandise by officers who kept it for themselves; other Chinese were given in exchange for their goods official *vales*, or promissory notes, which were later dishonoured. The result of all this was that although twenty Chinese junks had arrived that year, a larger number than had been seen in Manila for some time, China goods were available only at excessive prices. A piece of satin which used to cost 10 to 12 tostons had fetched up to 40 or 45, and even at that price had not been easy to come by, even for the church, which was in dire need, for it had not been possible to get enough silk to make ornamental hangings. And it was the same with all the other things that used to come from China and were sold freely in the streets.

The evil (said Bishop Salazar) did not stop here, for the Chinese traders were compelled to perform sentry duty, just as the soldiers did, and in order not to leave their goods to be stolen they paid a soldier 1 toston (the equivalent of 4 reals) for his services as sentry. The latest imposition, which was really the last straw, occurred when a galley was being sent to Japan and the Spaniards seized twenty or thirty of the Chinese who had come to Manila that year and put them forcibly to the oars. Many went to the bishop to complain, saying that they had come to Manila in order to earn something wherewith to feed their children, and, since they were not allowed to do so, could they please go back to their own country. 'But this talk', says the bishop, 'profited neither myself nor them, for though they went back to China they soon returned.' With all this the prosperous settlement of Chinese which used to be on the other side of the river had practically ceased to exist.

As Jan Pietersen Coen, the founder of Batavia, did half a century later, the Spaniards impressed Chinese into their service just as it suited their convenience. The Governor, Santiago de Vera, in a letter to Philip II, dated 26 June 1588,[1] reporting that he had had a galley built, stated that he had tried to keep up its crew by hiring men, but the natives were such a despicable lot of people that they

[1] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. vii. 52.

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609 were of little use for the purpose, nor had they sufficient strength for rowing. On hearing the report of an arquebus they threw themselves on the ground, and did not even rise at the sting of the lash! De Vera then selected 300 Chinese, who were stronger, and who, if allowed liberty to quit this work at their pleasure, would nevertheless bind themselves to work in the galleys. 'But', he adds, 'though earnest endeavours have been made to teach them, they row very badly and have as little energy as have the natives of these Islands.' (A case, it seems, of sixteenth-century Chinese ca'canny.)

De Vera's enlistment of Chinese was, according to him, not forcible, but his successor, Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas, a year or two later, having a large army ready for the conquest of the Moluccas but not enough rowers for his galleys, seized by force any Chinese he could lay hands on in the Parián, and had them chained to the oars of the galleys.[1] Later on, however, these Chinese working under the lash rose to a man, and the Governor and his companions were all killed.[2]

The Chinese, resorting to Manila in such numbers and expanding their trade among the natives of the Philippines, soon aroused the anxiety of the Spanish authorities. Governor Dasmariñas (who later came to so sad an end), writing to King Philip in June 1592, said: 'With Your Majesty's permission, I must state that I regret the trade of the Chinese, for it seems to me injurious. It might be forbidden them on the ground of the great sums of money taken from the islands to foreign countries.'[3]

439 Most of the trade was in cotton stuffs, the raw cotton being taken from the Philippines to China and brought back woven. The Governor had already confirmed an ordinance issued by the city of Manila forbidding the 'Indians' (Filipinos) to wear Chinese stuffs.[4] In justification it was pointed out that when the Spanish discovered the islands the natives wore no other garments than those made there, planting cotton for their own use, and continued to do so for many years. But they now used Chinese stuffs and silks. Formerly, where the Chinese carried away in payment for their clothing 30,000

[1] Antonio de Morga, *The Philippine Islands* (London, Hakluyt Society, 1868) p. 35.

[2] The *Ming Shih* (History of the Ming Dynasty) under the 8th month of the 21st year of the period Wan-li (1593) records that a Chinese, P'an Ho-wu, stabbed the Philippines Governor, Dasmariñas. Laufer, op. cit. pp. 261, 262.

[3] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. viii. 269.

[4] ibid. p. 78.

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pesos annually, they now took annually 200,000 pesos. 'This money leaves the realm of His Majesty, and is carried to a foreign country, in violation of the royal edicts.' This could all be prevented if the natives were forbidden to clothe themselves in these Chinese textiles. Native stuffs, it was argued, were in any case better woven and more economical than the Chinese. Moreover, if the natives were to apply themselves to other things instead of producing raw cotton for the Chinese, there would be something for the Spanish to export. This was the purport of the evidence of Filipino witnesses examined in relation to the new ordinance. 439

The difficulty (said Dasmariñas) in dealing with the problem of the Chinese trade was the interference and obstruction of the bishop and the clergy.[1] No sooner was it decreed that the 'Indians', in order that they might cultivate and weave their own cotton, since it was so abundant in the country, should not wear Chinese silks and other stuffs, than the bishop declared that 'nothing could be worse'. No sooner was the excise, or the 'merchant's peso', or the 2 per cent. duty imposed, than the bishop would declare the order to be against the Papal bull *De Cena Domini* ('Of the Lord's Supper'). It was a hard life for a Governor in a State where the clerical arm was so powerful.

When Bishop Salazar arrived in Manila he found that in Tondo, then a village across the river from the Spanish town of Manila, many Chinese were living, some of whom were Christian but most infidels. In Manila itself there were some shops kept by the Chinese, but these people had no special quarter assigned to them and were scattered among the Spaniards until Don Gonçalo Ronquillo allotted them a place to live in, built under the guns of the fort. It contained four 'great quarters' to be used as a silk market (the Alcayceria), and it was called the Parián.[2] All Chinese, except such as were married to Filipino women, were required to live and conduct their business there. Here many shops were opened, commerce increased, and more Chinese came to the city. 'Anxious for the conversion of the people', says the bishop, 'I soon cast my eyes upon them, and took precautions to see that they were well treated.'[3] 441

[1] Dasmariñas says, of the Bishop, 'I have never seen a man more peculiar or inconsiderate and obstinate in his opinions, who even does not hesitate to oppose the right of patronage, the jurisdiction, and the exchequer of Your Majesty.' Blair and Robertson, op. cit. viii. 276.

[2] Alcayceria (silk market) was often used by metonymy for the whole of the Parián.

[3] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. vii. 220.

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439 The early writers are fond of repeating that from China came not only finished silks and costly wares which in part were destined for the trade to New Spain and Europe, but also cattle, horses and mares, foodstuffs, metals, fruits, and even ink and paper. 'And what is more', says Chirino, 'from China come all who supply every sort of service, all dextrous, prompt, and cheap.' The Chinese were everything from physicians to bakers and porters; they were the tailors and shoemakers, the metal workers, the silversmiths and sculptors, the locksmiths, the painters, the masons, and the weavers, and they performed 'every kind of service in the commonwealth'. They made chairs, bridles, and stirrups of so good a quality and so cheaply that some merchants wished to load a cargo of these articles for Mexico.[1] They baked bread at low cost, and also sold fowls, eggs, and fish, and wood split for fuel.

609 The story as it unfolds in the Philippines is one that will be repeated in essence throughout Southeast Asia: that is to say, of an initial welcome to the Chinese, on the part of the metropolitan Power because of their undeniable qualities of energy and skill, followed by fear and suspicion; the two attitudes afterwards alternating or being adopted simultaneously. Bishop Salazar, as we have seen, favoured the Chinese, and, before him, Salcedo, on his first punitive expedition to Mindoro, when he found a Chinese junk which had gone ashore on the west coast, was careful to rescue the voyagers and return them to their own land with a friendly message inviting trade relations. Governor Labezares invited Chinese friendship and intercourse, but the hostility of de Sande, his successor, was engendered against them for reasons above related.

In 1597 we find the Governor, Francisco Tello, writing to the King:

> When I came to the government I found the Sangleys had been given a free hand and jurisdiction on the administration of the *cabildo* [municipal council]. Considering the troubles that might result and the large numbers of Sangleys here (somewhat over 10,000) I took away and withdrew their power in the administration, leaving, however, a governor among them as was formerly the custom. I have expelled from the country a large number of Sangleys who were here, and I shall soon order others to go, leaving only 3–4,000 men who are necessary for the service of the country.[2]

[1] Bishop Salazar, letter of 24 June 1590. Blair and Robertson, op. cit. vii. 212–38.

[2] In the same letter (29 April 1597, Blair and Robertson, op. cit. x. 42) the

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In May 1603, not long after one of the numerous great fires in the Parián, three Chinese mandarins arrived at Manila. (Usually thirty ships or more came during the season, but this year there were only fourteen.) The mandarins sent a letter to the Governor stating that a Chinese named Tio Heng had told their Emperor that in the port of Cavite there was a hill of gold which had no owner, and the Emperor had sent them to ascertain the truth. They landed on 23 May, wearing all their badges and other signs of office as they were accustomed to do in China, and were attended by alguacils, executioners, and other officers with wands and cords, and when they landed they received much reverence from the Chinese population. They also had a box in which they carried their seals and patents of their appointments.[1] The three mandarins behaved exactly as if they were on Chinese territory and administered a flogging to any one of their race they considered deserving of it. However, the Governor was angry with Jerónimo Salazar y Salcedo, the Fiscal, for petitioning the Audiencia to stop the mandarins flogging Chinese.

This absurd mission inflamed the already active suspicions of the Spaniards, who expected that the arrival of the mandarins foreshadowed a Chinese attempt to oust them from the Philippines, while the Chinese in their turn felt that the Spaniards were on the point of attacking them.[2] On the eve of St Francis's Day, at about 11 p.m., the Chinese of the Parián revolted. Banners were raised and war gongs were beaten. The rebels chose for a leader a Christian Chinese named Juan Untae, or Juan Bautista de Vera. That night the pueblos of Quiapo and Tondo were burned and many Spaniards were murdered. Chinese gathered on the other side of the river to the number of 10,000 to 12,000. They burned several houses and the orchard of a citizen, Estevan de Marquiña, killing him and his wife and four children, and several servants. Two Spaniards, Luis Péres Dasmariñas and Tomás Bravo, who had been across the river to quell the revolt, and about one hundred other Spaniards were slain. Drawing lots to ascertain whether their attack would succeed, the Chinese insurgents decided to advance

Governor mentions that about two months before the Parián had been burned with a large amount of property in it. Fires were frequent in the Parián during the Spanish period.

[1] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xii. 83.

[2] See Charles Burke Elliott, *The Philippines to the End of the Military Regime* (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill Co.,

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609 against the city. But their assault was thrown back (the priests said it was owing to the apparition of St Francis on the walls), they were dislodged from their earthworks, and a general slaughter ensued. About 23,000 Chinese are said to have been killed.[1]

Immediately their blood lust had subsided, the Spanish dispatched letters to the Chinese Emperor explaining away the massacre, stating that the Chinese revolted without provocation. These letters were apparently sent through the Portuguese at Macao, but it seems that they were not delivered. Later the Emperor demanded redress, but he did not seem to attach too much importance to the loss of a few thousand disloyal exiles. By February 1605 we find that the Spaniards had recovered their self-confidence (if they had ever lost it), for a formal complaint was made against the Chinese by Archbishop Benavides, supported by the depositions of several witnesses. The Parián, it appears, had now been rebuilt, and was again peopled by 'infidel Sangleys'. The Chinese (said the complaint) were idolatrous and exceedingly licentious and vicious, and in both these respects were demoralizing the natives and drawing them away from the Catholic faith. The Chinese, moreover, were inclined to avenge themselves on the Spaniards for the slaughter of 1603, and this was a constant source of danger. The Archbishop recommended that they be driven out of the city except that they be allowed a space where they could live during the months while the ships for the Mexican trade were being unloaded and reloaded, but that they should not be allowed to hold intercourse with the natives. The Japanese (the complaint adds), who lived not far away from the Chinese, were equally vicious and dangerous.[2]

[1] See Table IX, p. 577. The authorities for the rebellion are notably Antonio de Morga's *Sucesos* (Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xv. 273) and Argensola's *Conquistas* (ibid. p. 295). See also *Relación verdadera del levantamiento de los Sangleyes en las Filipinas, y el milagroso castigo de su rebelión*, &c., by a soldier who found himself in these islands at the time, retold by Miguel Rodríguez Maldonado (Seville, 1606).

[2] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xiii. 271.

Colonel Fernandez de los Rios, who in 1603 was in China as the ambassador of the Governor of the Philippines, wrote the following to Manila, '. . . it seems that every Sangley is a fiend in human form, for there is no fraud or evil deed to which he will not stoop. This is brought out in my daily experience.' Ramon Jordana y Morera, *Inmigración China en Filipinas* (Madrid, G. Hirandez, 1888) p. 26. De Morga, on the other hand, is sensible of the value of the Chinese and says that 'after the end of the war the need of the city began, because of not having Chinese who worked at the trades, they had no food, no shoes to wear, not even at excessive prices'.

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Backing up the extreme view of the flagitious nature of the Chinese and their deleterious influence, a contemporary Spanish writer says that the Sangleys are the people who, 'the less they are admitted, the better will it be for us in every respect'.[1] 609

Archbishop Benavides, however, later relented, and in June 1605 appealed to the Audiencia to accede to the demands of the Chinese Emperor (which apparently had now been made) by making restoration to Chinese merchants of their property which, left in Manila at the time of the insurrection, had been sold to the Spanish, and by sending back to their own country those Chinese survivors of the rebellion who had been sentenced to the galleys. At the same time a letter sent to Acuña in March 1605 'by a Chinese official' was now answered by the Governor in a letter in which he blamed the Portuguese for not having delivered the letter containing excuses after the insurrection and massacre. The Governor renewed the excuses, emphasized the kindness of the Spanish Government to the Chinese, and asserted that they revolted without provocation.[2]

After the massacre of 1603 the Spaniards felt the loss of the Chinese, not only because they relied on them for all trades and services, but also because the Filipinos (as de Morga lamented) were unable to replace them even in agriculture, and had forgotten much of their husbandry, the rearing of fowls, flocks, and cotton, and the weaving of clothes, which they used to do in the time of their paganism.[3]

Soon the Chinese in the Parián were nearly as numerous as before.

A word or two may be said here regarding the Chinese in the Philippines and the Christian religion. 797

To the Spanish, as to the Portuguese, the conversion of the heathen in their eastern possessions was second not even to their hope of worldly gain. Thus (as Bishop Salazar states in his letter to Philip II, quoted above) the Philippines were important, not only for the opportunity that their possession afforded for saving the souls of the natives, but also as a stepping-stone to the 'great kingdom' of China.

[1] *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas* (Mexico, 1609). Translated in Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xvi. 173.
[2] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xiv. 45.
[3] Laufer, op. cit. p. 278.

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797 In 1588 the Governor, Santiago de Vera, complained that the friars had neglected his commands to learn the Chinese language and to instruct the Chinese who lived in these islands in Christianity. The Dominicans alone had entered this field and had achieved great results; there was already among the Chinese 'a village of Christians', and many more would be converted (said de Vera) if it were not for the bishop's order that the long hair of the converts should be cut off.[1] Only a few years after the foundation of Manila the Augustinians had made a bold attempt to gain entry into China to preach the gospel. They had, indeed, as proof of their zeal, offered to become slaves to the Chinese merchants visiting Manila in return for being given a chance of entry into China. Not one of their attempts, however, being successful, they prayed God to reveal to them a better way of achieving their purpose.[2]

[1] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. vii, 304, 308.

[2] *Histoire du Grand Royaume de la Chine situé aux Indes Orientales*, translated from the Spanish of Juan Gonzales de Mendoza of the Order of St Augustine (Paris, Veuve Gabriel Buon, 1600) p. 111. (Reference is to the voyage of Jerónimo Marín and Martín de Rada, 1575.)

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CHAPTER LI

THE CHINESE UNDER THE SPANISH REGIME, 1605–1700

THE Chinese trading with, or emigrating to, the Philippines caused anxiety not only to the Spanish but also to the authorities at home. The *Tung Hsi Yang K'ao*, published in 1618, states: 167

> Our people at home were anxious lest the emigrating class might be too numerous there, and after their return home breed rebellion. It was ordered that each junk should carry only 200 men, and that the number of junks sailing should not exceed a fixed number. Returning home and sailing out again, the number of men increased to 400, the number of ships remaining the same. When our people put out to sea many gave a false name, and figured only as a number. While their investigation was going on they suddenly escaped in the midst of it and went back to that country.[1]

These measures, like many others, proved ineffective as regards the Philippines, as did similar measures to restrain Chinese from resorting to the other countries of Southeast Asia.

In the Philippines the Chinese were subjected to many restrictions. They were, for example, not allowed to travel in the islands, nor to go two leagues from the city without a written licence, nor could they remain overnight in the city after the gates were closed, on penalty of their lives. They had their own alcalde, judge, tribunal, and gaol. Infidel Chinese were separated from the converts as much as possible. On the north side of the river Dominican friars who had learned the Chinese language had erected a mission and a hospital. There was a separate Barrio (district) for the baptized Chinese and their families to the number of about five hundred.[2] 609

At different times laws for the regulation of the Chinese were enacted or decreed, and the following is a summary of the more important of them:[3]

(In chronological order)

[1] *Tung Hsi Yang K'ao*, 'Investigations regarding the Eastern and Western Oceans' (1618), cited by Laufer, op. cit. p. 279.

[2] Barrows, op. cit. (London, Harrap and the World Book Co., 1924) p. 158.

[3] Based on Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xxii. 151 ff. and a translation by

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Law III

(Philip II, Madrid, 11 June 1594)

609 Since the bishops do not permit Chinese who have been converted in the Philippine Islands to our Holy Catholic faith to return to their own country, so that intercourse with and living among the gentiles [infidels] may not cause them to suffer the danger of apostasy, and recognizing that these same Christian Chinese have no means of livelihood other than their dealings in the local market, buying provisions in order to supply the community, and that the Governor does not allow them to leave Manila without a pass, which is a great stumbling-block to the conversion of others; we now order that the said permits shall be issued to them free of charge, and moreover that the Governor should show great consideration and care in preventing inconvenience or obstruction to them in their free passage through the Islands.

Law IX

(Philip II, Madrid, 1594)

Whereas Sangleys who come to trade in the Islands are subject to having their goods valued and a wholesale price fixed for them by officers deputed for the purpose (which is called *pancada*) and these goods are then left with them under guarantee that they will not dispose of them without the Governor's order, no price being attached to the goods that are classified as 'various' (except in the case of some of the more important and costly kinds); we order that those Chinese who return to these Islands shall be subject to all the laws and regulations that may be in force with respect to these and other matters, but that the *pancada* shall be applied to them only in the gentlest fashion so that they may have no grievance and no reason for ceasing to come here to trade.

Law X

(1596)

That no wrong or injury be done to any Sangley in the Philippines, and that they be well treated in every way, especially by Spaniards and officials.

Law XIII

(1598)

That the Governor and Captain-General shall not allow any inhabitant of Manila to have Sangleys in their houses, that he should forbid them to sleep inside the city, and that the judge of foreigners should severely punish all who disobey this law.

H. D. Purcell from *Bibloteca de Legislación Ultramarina en forma de diccionario alfabético* (Madrid, published for Don José Maria Zamora y Coronado, 1844) v. 398–401.

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Law VI

(1603 and 1614)

That the alcaldes-mayor of Manila shall try the suits and causes of the Sangleys jointly with the Governor.

Law VI

(1614)

Insomuch as the alcaldes-mayor of Manila have claimed the right to try suits and causes of the Chinese who live in the Parián, jointly with the Governor, we consider it fitting to order the ruling of ley XXIV, titulo iii, libro v, which concedes the first instance exclusively to the governor of the Parián with appeal to the Audiencia. Now it is our will, and we order the President, Governor, and Captain-General, and the Audiencia, not to allow any ordinary judge or one who has received a commission, to try civil or criminal suits or causes of the Sangleys in the first instance, even if they be auditors of that Audiencia, who shall be performing the duties of criminal alcaldes; neither shall they try cases regarding the locations or inspections of shops or their trade (for it pertains exclusively to the governor of the Parián to try such), except it be a case so extraordinary, necessary, and requisite that it becomes advisable to limit this rule.

Law XI

(1619)

That the practice of forcing the Chinese to give so many fowls a year to the judges and members of the Audiencia at a price lower than the market price be discontinued.

Law IV

(1620)

That no personal services be demanded of the Sangleys.

Law VIII

(1620)

That Chinese converted to Christianity who are married to Filipino women be given grants of certain uncultivated lands in the suburbs.

Law I

(1606 and 1622)

That the number of Chinese in the whole of the Philippines be limited to 6,000, and that of the Japanese to 3,000.

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Law II

(1625)

604 That licences issued by the Government of the Philippines to Chinese shall be issued under the authority of the royal officials, that the money obtained therefrom shall be paid into the royal treasury, and a separate account of the payments shall be kept.

Law VII

(1627)

That Sangleys converted to the Catholic faith shall not be liable for the payment of tribute for the first ten years after their conversion, and that after that time they shall be required to pay at the same rate as natives.

Law XII

(1627)

The Sangley Chinese of the Philippines have a treasure-box with three keys in which each Sangley deposits 12 reals a year in order to create a fund from which dues to the royal service shall be paid. The King commands that any balance there may be at the end of the year shall not be withdrawn but carried forward to the credit of the Sangley for the following year.

By this last decree of 10 September 1627 the King ordered that a Protector of the Chinese be appointed who should not be the Royal Fiscal.

The royal decrees and the report to the King by which the decrees were inspired were vigorous or tolerant according to whether the policy of the mailed fist or the velvet glove was in the ascendant. A further decree of 1627 (19 November) referred to the oppression that the Chinese in the Parián suffered by the compulsory cutting off of their hair when they became Christians and by the levying on them of an extortionate tax, and ordered that 'both these vexations be abolished'. The Governor Tavora advised that the Chinese should be tried and punished by the methods in vogue in their own country, and that they should not be allowed to appeal to the Audiencia. This was followed by a decree of the following year (1628) ordering the Governor of the Philippines to protect the Chinese from extortion and forced contributions, and directing that permission be granted them to travel in the islands.

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At the same time the King referred back for the Governor's consideration a demand made by the Manila Spaniards that all Chinese except the married Christians should be strictly confined within the Parián. In 1629 the King ordered the Governor to ascertain whether the Chinese needed a protector, and, if so, to send him a list of persons from whom an official might be chosen by the Council of the Indies.[1]

The Chinese paid annually at that time 64 reals in silver to the King for the privilege of living in the islands, plus 5 reals as the ordinary tribute, plus 12 reals for the King's Treasury, 'spent in assessments for affairs of my service'.[1]

In 1639 occurred the second Chinese revolt. It lasted nearly four months and caused a great loss of property to the Spaniards and of lives among the insurgents. Most of the Chinese population of Luzon were exterminated, thanks to their lack of firearms and to the 'special protection of Our Lord over the army'. Twenty-two to twenty-four thousand Chinese were killed as against 45 Spaniards and 300 Filipinos. The Chinese were armed with spears or with bamboos hardened by fire, and on these were fastened the knives with which they were wont to harvest the rice. After the suppression of the rebellion the *Te Deum* was sung in the churches of Manila; there was a great pageant of victory headed by the Governor Don Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera, with drums, trumpets, and halberdiers of the guard, and with a standard bearing an image of the blessed Christ from Antipolo mounted on a staff. There had been a sickening record of slaughter, caused by a blind panic, fear of the house servants and other Chinese of Manila, and there were also several thousands of Chinese killed in Cavite.[2]

After another period of depopulation the Parián again miraculously renewed itself as from a Fortunatus's purse of Chinese. In 1644, less than five years after the second rebellion, we find the Royal Fiscal reporting on the licences granted to the Chinese allowing them to reside in Manila. The amounts payable for the licences had apparently been increased by the Governor,

[1] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xxiii. 287. The King, we observe, already in 1627 had given orders for the appointment of such an official.

A colonial administrator is bound to remark on the wide range of matters that had to be referred back to the King of Spain for decision, which, especially considering the very long time required for an answer to a dispatch or a memorial, must have been a great handicap to the Philippines administration.

[2] See Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xxxv, Preface, 17, 208.

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609 Corcuera, as a punishment for the rising of 1639. The increase, the Fiscal reported, was not justified. He said that the new taxes had damaged the entire colony, since they had prevented the Chinese from leaving the Parián to cultivate the rice fields and to engage in similar productive occupations. In support of his charge he cited the great increases in price of both commodities and labour due to the new tax on the Chinese.[1]

Corcuera again came in for censure from His Majesty's Fiscal in the Royal Audiencia of Manila, Don Sebastian Cavallero, when he recommended that the issue of licences called 'fortification licences' (an increase of 11 reals to be added to general licences) be suspended as the Governor had no authority to impose the increase.[2]

Mistrust in the Spanish mind continued regarding the irrepressible Sangleys who insisted, in spite of everything, on filtering into the pool of the Parián as it was periodically drained. There were insurrections among the Filipinos, too, and the Chinese were blamed for supporting them. 'It cannot be denied', says the historian of the Discalced Augustinian Fathers, 'that the nation fomented and maintained with aid and cunning the rebellions of the Indians which we have just related.'[3] One had occurred in Pampanga and the other in Pangasinan. When the alcalde-mayor, Don Francisco, was killed in Pangasinan, there were found among the rebels some Sangleys who contrived that under cover of the small boats they might capture the large vessel in which the alcalde-mayor was defending his life very gallantly, and on the arrival of the Spanish fleet to explore the beach at Lingayen there were many armed men consisting of Sangleys and Indians.[4] The complicity of the Chinese was further proved by many bodies of Sangleys which were found in the field whenever there was an engagement with the rebels, for on all occasions (says Fray Pedro) they served the Indians as auxiliaries.[5]

China itself by this time had been for many years in a state of great and increasing disorder, the empire having passed into the throes which portended the end of the Ming dynasty and the

[1] ibid., Preface. [2] ibid. p. 185.

[3] Fray Pedro de San Francisco, *General History of the Discalced Augustinian Fathers* (refers to 1661–90) (Zaragoza, 1756), Blair and Robertson, xli. 85.

[4] Father Santa Cruz, *The Dominican History of the Philippines*, Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xli. 85.

[5] This refers to the rebellions of 1661–2.

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Manchu conquest. Piracy and buccaneering expeditions, by which thousands in the maritime provinces flourished exceedingly, gave the Spanish colonists an idea that the Chinese were dangerous fellows to be watched and repressed wherever they settled. Added to this fear on the part of the Europeans was the jealousy of the native Tagals who found themselves ousted from every lucrative pursuit the moment they were subjected to competition by the Chinese.[1]

We are now past the middle of the century and the next notable event, the ultimatum of Koxinga to the Spanish, is imminent. It would be well if we paused here for a moment to take one of our periodic glimpses at the Chinese in the Parián of Manila, since from such successive glimpses we can convince ourselves how little the tragic upheavals we have described affected the ordinary life of the capital, or that of the Chinese community within it. Here is what the Franciscan, Bartolomé de Letona, saw about the year 1661.[2]

On the Eastern side of the city, but outside of it and in front of its walls, at the distance of a musket-shot, is a silk market which they call Parián. Usually 15,000 Chinese live there; they are Sangleys, natives of China, and all are merchants and artisans. They possess, allotted among themselves by streets and squares, shops containing all kinds of merchandise and all the trades that are necessary in a community. The place is very orderly and well arranged, and a great convenience to the citizens. It is an indication of their [the Towkays'?] greatness that although they are so few, they have so many workmen and servants assigned to their service. The Sangleys live in wooden houses; they have a governor of their own nation, and a Spanish alcalde-mayor and other officers of justice, with a notary, and also a gaol. They have a parish church where the sacraments, the divine word, and the burial rites are administered to the 4,000 Christians among the Sangleys; the rest of them are heathen.

Koxinga (his real name was Cheng Cheng-kung, 1624–62), the famous corsair and supporter of the Ming dynasty, now in process of being driven out of China by the victorious Manchus, had expelled the Dutch from Formosa. In 1662 he sent a letter to the Spanish Governor of the Philippines, de Lara, in which he

[1] Frederick Wells Williams, 'The Chinese Immigration in Further Asia', *American Historical Review*, vol. v, no. 3 (April 1900) p. 503.

[2] Description bound in with author's *Perfecta Religiosa* (Mexico, La Puebla, 1662), Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xxxvi. 189.

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609 accused the Spanish of oppressing the Chinese, and demanded that they should submit to his rule immediately or be wiped out. The demand, as was to be expected, was rejected by the Spaniards, and the Chinese in Manila, fearing evil to themselves, and hearing of their intended expulsion from the islands, began to flee from the Parián and other neighbouring settlements in a blind endeavour to save their lives. The Jesuit missionaries at Santa Cruz hastened to the Government to secure pardon for the Chinese, and other priests seconded their efforts. Meanwhile, the other Sangleys in the Parián were so terrified that many were drowned in trying to swim across the river, others committed suicide, and most of those who remained fled to the hills. The Spanish in Manila, in fear of attack from the Chinese, were ready to slay them all, and a repetition of the horrors of the Chinese insurrections of 1603 and 1639 was averted only by the good sense of the Governor, Manrique de Lara, who, with mingled firmness and humanity, calmed the fears of the Chinese and the anger of the Spaniards. Granting protection to all who returned to Manila by a certain day, he ordered a specified number to remain there for the aid and service of the Spanish residents, and obliged the rest to return to China. Fugitives who did not take advantage of the amnesty and return to Manila were hunted down and slain by Spanish troops aided by the natives. The Chinese leaders of the Sangleys in their flight were captured and executed in public. Forced labour was being used in the feverish fortification of Manila and Cavite when news was received of the death of Koxinga.[1]

After the seventeenth century the Philippines were declining in prosperity and the Chinese preferred the Dutch colonies for the investment of their capital and for trade and residence. Nevertheless, they remained numerous in the Philippines, especially in Manila, where they continued to monopolize the trade and commerce of the place. This was quite contrary to the original intention of the Spaniards, who had allowed them to enter the islands only to cultivate the soil or to work in the handicrafts.[2]

Most of this history is derived from Spanish documents and very little from Chinese, so the *tu quoque* which is such a healthy

[1] *Academia Real de la Historia, Madrid*, Blair and Robertson, op. cit. vol. xxxvi.

[2] ibid. li. 228.

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corrective to the opinions of one race as expressed by another is altogether absent. Nevertheless, the Spanish themselves in their voluminous documents and histories provide some of the qualifications to their own charges. An excellent illustration of this is to be obtained from the exhaustive and meticulous index to the fifty-five volumes of Blair and Robertson's monumental collection of books and documents on the Philippines, where the opinions of the Chinese are classified and references given to the pages of the text. The 'mental (negative)' qualities (as the index puts it) take up about double the space of the 'mental (positive)' qualities. Here are some of the former:

barbarous, mean, impudent, importunate, deceitful, unwarlike, cowardly, avaricious and greedy, addicted to sodomy and secret sins, tyrannical, ignorant, superstitious, vicious, intemperate, lustful and sensuous, polygamous, disloyal and faithless, evil-minded and wicked, mercenary, covetous, timorous, suspicious, cautious, cunning, unchaste, treacherous, shameless, vile, addicted to gambling, addicted to bribery, unscrupulous, rascally, cruel (in tortures, penalties, etc.), conscienceless, nomadic, fond of litigation, commit perjury, have tendency to revolt, inconstant, proud, talkative, extortionate, not spiritually-minded, inclined to sorcery. . . .

With this must be contrasted the 'mental (positive)' qualities of which the following is the complete list:

civilized, humble, polite, ingenious, intelligent, imitative, careful of women, industrious, valiant and spirited, shrewd (generally in trade), generous, able and discreet, kind, honourable, tractable and docile, simple and unsophisticated, clever, possess good memories, not hostile to foreigners, grateful, religious, respect old age, legally minded, sensible and prudent, energetic, enterprising, fond of learning, cultured, respectful, sober, patient, peaceable.

It will be seen that the two lists are to a large extent contradictory and cancel one another out. Some epithets are favourable or derogatory descriptions of the same thing, e.g. fond of litigation, legally minded. In any case they convey the opinions of the Spanish regarding the Chinese over a period of 335 years, and are a warning to those who tend towards downright judgements of races other than their own.

As the seventeenth century draws to a close we will round off our impressions of it by a final glimpse at the Chinese in the

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Parián—this time more in paraphrase than in quotation. Our authority is a wealthy Neapolitan dilettante, who made a voyage round the world in 1693–9 (his figures of the numbers of the Chinese in the Parián are, however, not to be trusted).[1]

> . . . within a musket-shot of the gate of Parián is the habitation of Chinese merchants called Sangley, who in several streets have rich shops of silk, purcellane and other commodities. Here are found all the arts and trades, so that all the citizens are worth runs through their hands, through the fault of the Spanish and Indians who apply themselves to nothing. There are about 3,000 in this suburb, and in many more about the Islands; which is permitted them, if not as Christians, at least in the hopes that they may become such, though many are converted for fear of being banished. There were formerly 4,000, but abundance of them were put to death in tumults they raised at several times, and particularly that on St Francis' Eve in 1603, and they were afterwards prohibited staying in the Islands by his catholic Majesty. The order is very little observed, for there always remain behind hid many of those who come every year in forty to fifty *Chiampans*, loaded with commodities; the profit being very great at Manila, which they could not find in China, by reason of the small prices the manufactures bear. The merchants or Sangleys of Parián are governed by an *alcalde*, to whom they allow a good salary, as they do to the solicitor their protector, to his steward, and other officers. Besides all the duties and taxes to the King, they pay His Majesty 100,000 pieces of eight a year for the privilege of playing at *metua*. . . . The Spanish keep these Chinese very much under, not suffering them to be in Christian houses at night, and obliging them to be without their houses or shops, to break them of the abominable vice that nation is inclined to.[2]

We see, then, the Chinese in Manila submitting to conditions of life which would have been intolerable even to a people used to a capricious despotism in their own country had it not been that

[1] Giovanni Gemelli-Careri, *A Voyage Round the World*, published in *Churchill's Voyages* (1744), C. R. Boxer, op. cit. p. 405.

Gemelli-Careri was a very credulous person. He believed the estimates of the Jesuit missionaries in China which placed the population of Nanking at 32 million, and in the Philippines he saw leaves 'which when they come to a certain pitch of ripeness, become living creatures with wings, feet, and tail' (see Michael Macmillan, *The Globe Trotter in India two hundred years ago* (London, Swan Sonnenschein, 1895)).

[2] C. R. Boxer, op. cit. p. 459.

The ascription of unnatural vice to Orientals by Europeans is very common, e.g. Sir Thomas Herbert so accused the Siamese and Admiral Stavorinus the Chinese in Java.

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the rewards were very high. The question of national or personal dignity did not, however, come into the reckoning. The Chinese, like all other Orientals, understood and accepted the rule of power, and had as yet but faint glimmerings of the idea of the rule of law. It was still a far cry to the Three Principles of Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood.

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CHAPTER LII

THE CHINESE UNDER THE SPANISH REGIME, 1700–1898

609 THE question as to whether the Chinese were a blessing or a menace to the Philippines had agitated the Spaniards throughout the seventeenth century and the consensus of opinion was that they were the latter. What the critics of the Chinese particularly disliked was the silk trade. As far back as 1628 it had been argued that it was pernicious to allow the importation of the silk of China, both to the Indies and to Mexico, for although not more than 250,000 pesos 'of Tipuzque' were allowed to be taken from Mexico to the Philippines annually, an incalculable sum in pieces of eight was exported in addition. The Chinese would accept no other currency, nor would they exchange their silk for other merchandise. Consequently, they managed to carry away annually the greater part of the eight-real pieces that were coined in New Spain in exchange for 'grass, which is the substance of that coarse and hard silk which is so plentiful among the Chinese. . . . Thus they weaken our strength and increase their own; and consequently, they can make war on us whenever they wish, without any cost to them as far as we are concerned.'[1]

The controversy continued into the eighteenth century. The people of Seville urged severe restrictions on the Manila–Acapulco trade on the ground that the wealth of Mexico was being drained off by the Chinese. In consequence of this agitation the King, in 1718, decreed that the trade in Chinese silk goods be thenceforth prohibited. But the following year the Viceroy of Mexico, de Valero, remonstrated against the prohibition on behalf not only of the Filipinos but also of his own subjects, most of whom were too poor to purchase Spanish piece-goods from which to manufacture the clothes they wore, and who therefore depended on Chinese

[1] Juan Velasquez Madrco, *Economic Reasons for Suppressing the Silk Trade of China in Spain and its Colonies* (7 October 1628). Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xxii. 279.

The reference (say Blair and Robertson) is probably to a plant called 'China grass' (*Boeheria Nivea*), a shrub indigenous to India. China grass is considered a textile substance of the first rank. (Swatow-grass cloth is a famous product of China, outwearing linen by years. V. P.)

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materials. Memorials ensued from Manila and Cadíz respectively, each endeavouring to justify its own side in the controversy. At one stage Cadiz offered Manila the spice trade of Mexico as the equivalent of the latter's traffic in Chinese textiles. A decree of 27 October 1720 addressed to the Marquis de Valero, Viceroy of Mexico, laid down that two ships only should go annually from the Philippine Islands to Nueva España (Mexico), each of 500 toneladas. The value of the lading which the said ships were to carry to the port of Acapulco might be up to the amount of 300,000 pesos which must come invested strictly and solely in the following kinds of merchandise: gold, cinnamon, elephants, wax, porcelain, cloves, pepper, cambayas and linens woven with colours (*lienzos pintados*), chitas, chintzes, gauzes, lampotes, Hilicos blankets, silk floss and raw spun silk, cordage, and like commodities. These ships were prohibited from carrying silken fabrics. Manila protested against the injury done to the islands by this decree, and eventually on 8 April 1734 a decree was promulgated increasing the amount of trade permitted to Manila to 500,000 pesos of investment and 1 million of return.

In the long run Manila interests had triumphed over those of Cadiz and Seville.[1]

Spain was involved with England in the 'War of Jenkins' Ear' (1739–42), and again in the Seven Years War (1756–63). In the former the celebrated Admiral Lord Anson appeared in these waters on his circumnavigation of the globe and captured the Mexico–Manila treasure ship. His chaplain, Richard Walter, who was to become the historian of the voyage, has left on record his information regarding Manila, which can be regarded as substantially accurate:

The trade carried on from this place to China and different parts of India is principally for such commodities as are intended to supply the kingdoms of Mexico and Peru. These are spices, all sorts of Chinese silks and manufactures, particularly silk stockings, of which I have

[1] Blair and Robertson, xliv. 227 ff., 266, 286, xlv. 57–8.

The arguments recorded in Blair and Robertson to the effect that the China trade ruined the Philippines are almost equalled in number by others to the effect that the trade benefited the islands.

Meanwhile in 1709 many Chinese had been banished from Manila on the charge of carrying off the public wealth, and prosecutions of this kind led to their settling in smaller places on Luzon during the eighteenth century. In 1747 a royal order was received for the final expulsion of the Chinese but the execution was suspended.

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609 heard that no less than fifty thousand pairs were the usual number shipped in each cargoe; vast quantities of Indian stuffs, such as calicoe and chints, which are much worn in America, together with other minuter articles, as goldsmith's work etc., which is principally wrought in the city of Manila itself by the Chinese, for it is said that at least 20,000 Chinese constantly reside there, either as servants, manufacturers, or bakers. All these different commodities are collected at Manila, there to be transported to the port of Acapulco in the kingdom of Mexico.[1]

Walter remarks that Chinese silks coming directly to Acapulco could be sold there considerably cheaper than any European commodities of equal goodness, and, he adds, 'the cotton from the Coromandel coast makes the European linens useless'.

Governor Don Gasper de la Torre, whose governorship generally was an unfortunate one, became affected with melancholy and chronic dysentery (perhaps the order should be reversed) which were aggravated by the news that the village of Balayan had revolted, and finally a supposed revolt of the Sangleys caused him to depart this life. There was a rumour that the Chinese were about to enter the city of Manila and, despite his illness, he prepared to go [illegible] to meet the insurgents. The rumour turned out to be a fabrica- [illegible] put abroad to vex him, but the Governor became so feverish [illegible] m the shock that he died a few days afterwards on 21 September 1745.[2]

When a new Archbishop of Manila, Don Fray de la Santísima Trinidad (Pedro Martínez de Arizala), arrived in the Philippines on 27 August 1747 he brought with him a decree by which His Majesty the King committed the Government to the expulsion of the Chinese from the islands. The expulsion already ordered had not yet been effected on account of the personal interests of the Governors, but Pedro de Arizala thought it well not to make the decree known until a better opportunity offered because he found that Señor Arrechedera, the Commissary of Inquisition, who had been acting Governor *ad interim*, was himself greatly devoted to the Chinese.[3]

Then once more, on 30 June 1755, Governor Arandía, in obedience to instructions received from the King, ordered that all

[1] Richard A. Walter, *A Voyage Round the World in the Years 1740–44 by Lord Anson*, 3rd ed. (London, Dent (Everyman's Library), 1930) p. 220.

[2] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xlviii. 142–3.

[3] ibid. 146. 'Events in the Philippines 1739–62, compiled from Martínez de Zúñiga, Concepción, and Montero y Vidal.'

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Chinese should be expelled from the Philippines, excepting 515 Christian Chinese, and a thousand more 'who pretended to be studying the Christian doctrine'.[1] The Christian Chinese could remain so long as they confined themselves to agriculture—actually most of them engaged in trade notwithstanding. After Arandía's death in 1759 Chinese immigration and residence were again allowed.

A few years after this new order for expulsion, when Spain was involved in war in Europe, the English captured Manila in 1762 and held it until 1764. At the time of the capture the Chinese who still remained in the Philippines took sides with the English, whereupon Simón de Anda, the Lieutenant-Governor, ordered that all Chinese in the islands should be hanged. This order was to some extent carried into effect by the Spaniards in 1763.[2]

In that same year 6,000 Chinese are said to have been massacred by the Spaniards in Pangasinan alone for siding with the Filipinos in a conspiracy to oust the Spanish regime.[3]

In 1766 the survivors were rounded up and in 1769 the order of expulsion was put into effect.[4] Yet soon after Le Gentil is saying: 'I do not know any Spaniards who did not sincerely regret the departure of the Chinese, and who did not frankly admit that the Philippines would suffer for it, because the Indians were not capable of replacing the Chinese.' (This an echo of de Morga's lament after the insurrection of 1603.) In 1778 the order for expulsion was revoked, but only Chinese workmen were encouraged to immigrate.

A decree of 17 April 1766 ordered that all Catholic Sangleys who had committed excesses during the time when the British had occupied Manila should be expelled from the Philippines, only true Christians being allowed to remain. The latter were not to be allowed to carry weapons of any sort and were to be employed only

[1] *Census of the Philippines, 1903* (1905, Washington, United States Bureau of the Census) i. 319.

[2] Laufer, op. cit. p. 273.

[3] See Li Mei-ping, 'A Historical Survey of the Development of Sino-Philippine Relations', *The New Age in Asia*, vol. i, nos. 7–8 (December 1947) pp. 16–22 (in Chinese). (This journal is considered authoritative in this field of study.)

[4] 'By a Royal Warrant of 17 April 1766, all the Sangleys in the Islands, including Christians, were to be expelled. For, during the occupation of the town by the English they committed infidelity, apostasy, and other ugly abominable excesses. Only the true Christians were to remain.' D. Roman Jordana y Morera, *La Inmigración China en Filipinas* (Madrid, G. Hernandez, 1888) p. 16.

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609 in agriculture and the trades. They were not allowed to leave their respective villages without permission of the police, governor, or alcalde-mayor, under penalty of perpetual exile from His Majesty's dominions.[1]

The order of expulsion of the Chinese was revoked in 1788.[2]

Most of the interest in the Chinese during the Spanish period centres on the residents of Manila, but their compatriots were also present in considerable numbers in other parts of the Philippines.[3]

In 1775 (says Captain Forrest) many Chinese resided in the town of Selangan, near the mouth of the Mindanao or Cotabato river; many also resided on the tongue of land between the Matampay and the main stream. They were mostly carpenters, arrack distillers, and millers. They ground the husk off the rough rice (paddy) between two stones much more expeditiously than the Maguindanao (Mindanao) people were able to do in a wooden mortar. In that part of the town of Coto Intang which borders on the Melampy lived a few Chinese, but there were many Mindanao mechanics, vessel builders, and merchants. The Chinese in Mindanao were not allowed to settle higher up the river than Boyan, the Mindanoese being jealous of their superior abilities in trade.[4]

Captain Forrest explains that the coarse Chinese cloth ('kangans') used in the Pulangi delta generally came via Sulu to Cotabato, for the Spanish had long hindered Chinese junks bound from Amoy to Mindanao from passing Zamboanga. This was the cause of there being so little trade at Mindanao, no vessels sailing from India thither, and the little trade that there was being confined to a few 'country' Chinese, called 'Orang Sangley', and a few natives of Sulu who came here to buy rice and paddy, bringing with them Chinese articles, for the rice crop at Sulu could never be depended upon. (Rice was the usual currency in the market at Mindanao,

[1] Blair and Robertson, l. 253.

[2] ibid. l. 65.

[3] Joaquin Martínez de Zúñiga, O.S.A., in his *Historia* (Sampaloc, 1803) p. 19, says that in some districts Indians (Filipinos) are found who are whiter than others '. . . doubtless descendants of some Chinese or Japanese who were shipwrecked on these coasts, the Ygorrotes (Igorotes) in particular. Their eyes, similar to those of the Chinese, prove that they were mingled with the companions of Limahon who fled to the mountains when Juan de Salcedo had besieged him in Pangasinan', Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xliii. 113.

[4] Captain Thomas Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas Performed on the Tartar Galley Belonging to the Honourable the East India Company, During the Years 1774 and 1776* (London, Scott, 1780) p. 179 ff.

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and it used to be reckoned that a prow, a house, &c., was 'worth so many slaves'. But Chinese cash was also used at Mindanao, though Forrest found it scarce.) Many Chinese articles, especially 'kangans',[1] beads, gongs, Chinese basins with red edges, deep brass plates—five in a set, deep saucers—three and four inches in diameter, brass wire, and iron were carried from Sulu to Mindanao.

The Sulus told Forrest (and their claim has been repeated often since) that their island was formerly part of the ancient Borneo empire founded by Chinese. It was the Chinese, many of whom were settled among them, who had taught the Sulus the art of grafting and improving their fruits, but the fruits of Mindanao, on the contrary, had remained of indifferent quality.[2] The industrious Chinese used teak leaves and leaves of a fruit called *madang* to line the baskets of cane and bamboo in which they packed the 'swallo' (bêche-de-mer) which they exported in great quantities from Sulu. 'The Chinese must gain handsomely from their trade thither', Forrest remarks, 'else they would not put up with the rough usage they sometimes received from the sturdy barons, the Datoos' (i.e. *Datoks*).[3]

List of articles that generally compose the cargo of a Chinese junk, of which two come annually from Amoy to Sulu (January 1776)

	Cost in China in dollars	*Sell for (sic) in Sulu*
2,000 galangs (salvers of brass) seven to a picul	40	70
100 piculs iron, in small pieces, like Bengal iron	4	8
Sugar candy, a quantity, per picul	7	10
50 raw silk, ditto	400	600
3,000 pieces black kowsongs, a kind of nankeen, per piece	0¾	1
5,000 pieces of kampow, white strong linen	0¾	1
500 Kangans, 25 in a bundle, called gadangs per gadang	7	10
200 quallis, an iron pan, 3 foot diameter each	1	2
500 nests of quallis, 3 in a nest	1	2
One million pieces of chinaware, consisting of small 'terrenes' and basins in nests, big and small, plates and basins with red edges for Mindanao, etc., etc., per hundred	1	2
800 pieces of flowered silks, per piece	6	10

[1] One kangan was equal to 160–180 cash.
[2] op. cit. p. 323.
[3] The student of Eastern economic history may find interest in the above. Forrest, op. cit. p. 325.

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609 The merchandise taken from Sulu was in the shape of the following articles:

	Cost at Sulu	*Sell for in China*
Black swallo per picul	15	30
White swallo „ „	10	20
Wax	15	25
Teepye, or pearl oyster shells	1½	5
Birds' nests per catty	6	9
Tortoiseshell, price uncertain	..	..

Also agar-agar, carooang oil, clove bark, black wood rotans, sago, various barks for dyeing, cassia, pepper, native camphire (camphor), sandal wood, curious shells for grottos, pearls, etc., and spices.

There was a law both at Mindanao and at Sulu, that no Chinese could be made a slave, but at either place for a sum advanced by a *Dato* (chief) to a Chinese (and such advances were often forced on them) they were obliged to pay every twelve months a high rate of interest, perhaps 25 or 30 per cent., the lender often refusing to receive back the principal at the end of the year, unless indeed the Chinese made it appear that he was going to return to his own country, in which case repayment was never refused.[1] 'The industrious Chinese [says Forrest] seems to be excluded from the benefit of law.'[2]

Another of our peeps at the Parián of Manila is afforded by de Guignes, Resident of France in China in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The year of this visit was 1797. There were then, he says, about 3,000 Sangleys there. A very strict watch was kept over them, and an alcalde and a number of Spanish officers had the superintendence of police and exacted from the Chinese, it was reported, considerable sums of money, chiefly at Chinese New Year, the licence for playing *metora* (or *metua* ? = fan-tan?) alone being purchased by them at the rate of $10,000 a year. San Sebastián likewise, says de Guignes, had some good houses. In this suburb there was a large causeway, raised by the Government as a promenade for the inhabitants, whither Spanish ladies, in particular, resorted in their carriages. The Chinese were said to have defrayed the expenses of making this causeway or wall with money extorted for exemption from certain disabilities imposed upon them by the Spaniards; the wall was a pleasant one, shaded

[1] Forrest, op. cit. p. 327. He accuses the Chinese *per contra* of defrauding pearl fishers.

[2] ibid. p. 277, fn.

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by a number of areca trees, and commanded a fine prospect over the country. 609

'The Chinese who inhabited Manila [our French informant continues] profess Christianity, but this is only for form's sake, for when they leave Manila they throw their images and chaplets into the sea and cease to be Christians as soon as they lose sight of Mirabel Point.'[1]

Spanish policy in the early nineteenth century was to confine the Chinese as far as possible to agricultural pursuits. In 1804 it was ordered that only Chinese in the provinces who were agriculturists or artisans should be allowed to remain in the islands.[2] Later on, in 1828, various royal decrees were obtained for the promotion of agriculture, manufactures, and other industries, and for obliging the Chinese to be grouped under headmen (as were the Filipinos) whose function was to collect the taxes. (This 'headman' system was, however, not acceptable to the Chinese, as will shortly be seen.) As regards clothes, the Filipinos could manufacture cotton goods themselves, providing they knew how to dye them properly and had the machinery necessary for manufacturing cotton thread, and Chinese imports could then be dispensed with.

Meanwhile, the influence of the Chinese immigrant had already been felt in Filipino cultivation, for their plough was of Chinese origin, having one handle, no coulter or mould-board—the upper part of the share, which was flat, being turned to one side to perform this function.[3]

The Chinese in the second decade of the nineteenth century paid a poll-tax of 6 dollars (48 reals) each; the mestizos paid 3 dollars (12 reals). The tax was generally farmed out. In 1817 the Chinese paid $30,000 in a total revenue of $1,449,760 of which $639,000 came from poll-taxes, and $811,000 came from rentals (monopolies, opium farms, &c.).[4]

By this time the Philippines were in none too happy a state. Robbery and piracy were rampant in the neighbourhood of Manila; justice was neglected or corrupted. The Church insisted on so many holidays that the farmers neglected their fields. 'Until very recently [says the Englishman—a naval officer—cited above,

[1] M. de Guignes, *Voyages à Pékin, Manille [etc.], faits dans l'intervalle des années 1784 et 1801* (Paris, Imprimerie Impériale, 1806) iii. 401.

[2] *Census of the Philippines, 1903* (1905) i. 320.

[3] *Remarks on the Philippine Islands by an Englishman* (Calcutta, 1828). Blair and Robertson, op. cit. li. 128.

[4] ibid. pp. 120, 121.

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609 writing of the period 1819–22] these rich islands have been a constant burden to the crown of Spain, money having been annually sent from Mexico to supply their expenses.' As in the case of the Moors in Spain, blame was laid mainly at the door of the Chinese for drawing off the wealth of the country. How much they had in reality 'drawn off' is, however, uncertain. De Comyn estimates that between 1565 and 1820 Spanish America exported to Manila 400 million silver dollars. 'The Sangley mestizos [de Comyn goes on] have amassed immense sums in specie; but it would be impossible to point out the amount, distribution, or the secret places in which they are hoarded.'[1] The Chinese merchants were, moreover, accused of fraudulent practices.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Chinese in the Philippines paid each a capitation tax of 6 pesos a year.[2] In addition each had to pay to the public treasury a surtax to cover the expenses of maintaining the hospital, the church, the police, and other administrative expenses connected with the Parián.

A new agitation against the Chinese got under way in 1828. There were (says Crawfurd) only 5,708 Chinese in the whole of the Philippines, of whom 5,279 were in Tondo. By a new decree of 6 April the Chinese merchants, shopkeepers, and artisans were divided into three classes—I, merchants of the first class who paid an annual tax of 120 pesos; II, merchants, &c., who paid 48 pesos annually; III, smaller merchants, &c., who paid 24 pesos annually. A fourth class, paying 12 pesos annually, was introduced in 1830. When the taxation was applied it was found that there were only 7 Chinese merchants of the first class, while 166 belonged to the second class, 830 to the third class, and 4,509 to the fourth class. On account of age, 191 were exempted from taxation altogether. The Chinese were to be gathered into villages, as were the 'Indians'

[1] Tomás de Comyn, *Estado de las islas Filipinas* (Madrid, 1820) translated from the Spanish by William Walton (London, 1821) p. 76.

Charles Robequain, *Le Monde Malais* (Paris, Payot, 1946) p. 97, says: 'De Comyn estime que, de 1571 à 1821, l'Amerique Espagnole a exporté à Manille 400 million de dollars d'argent, *dont la moitié peut-être est passé en Chine*.' Which does not appear to represent de Comyn correctly. M. Robequain seems to have copied Laufer's version of de Comyn (op. cit. p. 277) which is from the *Chinese Repository*, viii. 173.

[2] The royal decree ordering this was dated 14 May 1790 (Blair and Robertson, l. 65), 'Events of 1764–1800' compiled from Montero y Vidal, *Historia de Filipinas*. But *The Census of the Philippines, 1903* (1905) says (p. 359) that the tax, which had hitherto been 8 pesos, was reduced to 6 pesos in 1799.

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(Filipinos). Their 'heads of barangay' were to collect the tribute due from them.

These taxes, it appears, were payable in addition to the capitation tax of 6 pesos.[1]

According to Crawfurd, when these new rates were approved the Chinese refused to accept them or to be concentrated in villages. Eight hundred returned to China; 1,083 fled to the mountains, where they were hospitably received by the native population; 453, not having the means of defraying the cost of their passages back to China, were seized and condemned to penal labour as defaulters. 'The effect of this action', says Crawfurd, 'is observable a decade or so later when the Chinese enrolled did not exceed 6,000, while their capitation taxes amounted to over $100,000 per annum, and those of the native inhabitants, exceeding 3,000,000, did not equal eight times that amount.'[2] The intendant, in view of the difficulty of collecting the taxes, explained to the government the expediency of modifying the enactment and this was done in 1834.[3]

Chinese engaged in agriculture were taxed on a different scale. In 1834 Chinese were allowed to engage in any occupation under permit. In 1849 the regulations were elaborated and amended by Governor Corcuera. Transient Chinese could now remain only three months: residents could stay as long as they liked.

Already in 1843 a Spanish official of standing had recommended that, since capitalists and workers were needed in the Philippine Islands, there must be governmental and administrative reforms in order to attract them, and that the heavy tribute exacted from the Chinese must be reduced to not more than 12 reals per annum for those engaging in agriculture. Europeans, Chinese, and mestizos should be encouraged to go and live in the islands in greater numbers.[4] In 1850 Chinese agriculturists were granted the same

[1] I am not certain about this. V. P.

[2] John Crawfurd, F.R.S., *Dictionary of the Indian Archipelago*, p. 97.

Commenting on this, Mr Ifor B. Powell (to whom I am indebted for a most careful scrutiny of this Part and for the correction of a number of mistakes, both my own and those of my authorities) remarks: 'Buzeta says regarding the 800 odd that they were "prepared" to go to China, and another Spanish writer says that they "opted" to go. But did they ever go?' Though I have consulted Sinibaldo de Mas (from whom Crawfurd draws much of his information) I have not yet found the answer.

[3] See Blair and Robertson, li. 53–4 and ibid. 53 fn.

[4] *Communication from the Intendant of the Army and the Treasury* (*Intendente*

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609 privileges as Filipinos of the same class and paid only a tax of 12 reals a year.[1] After 1852 every Chinese, except tillers of the soil, paid a head-tax of $6, and, in addition, an industrial tax of $100, $60, $30, or $12.[2]

After 1852 Chinese mestizos paid a poll-tax of $3 a year. The Filipino woman married to a mestizo of this class paid the same tax as he did during marriage, but if she became a widow she paid only at the same rate as a Filipino widow. But mestizos who cultivated the soil with their own hands paid only the same amount as the natives. (The mestizos formed their own 'Barangays' where 25 or 30 of them lived together.)

It was recommended in some quarters that dowries or marriage bonuses be paid by the Government at the following rates—to a Chinese mestiza marrying a Filipino, a sum of 100 pesos; to a Filipino woman marrying a Chinese mestizo, 100 pesos; to a Chinese mestizo marrying a Spaniard, 1,000 pesos; to a Spaniard marrying a Chinese mestiza, 2,000 pesos; to a Spanish woman marrying a Filipino chief, 3,000 to 4,000 pesos. This was regarded by reformers as an impulse towards the amalgamation of the races! But it does not seem that these recommendations were adopted.

The Spanish Government maintained almost to the end the theory (it was hardly more than an empty theory) that Chinese immigration to the Philippines was being regulated to constitute a stimulus to agriculture.[3]

To prevent illegal entrance via the Sulu Archipelago and Borneo, and to remove the lucrative Moro trade from the hands of the Chinese who fairly monopolized it even in the first half of the twentieth century, a decree of the Governor-General of January 1886 forbade the Chinese to live permanently in the provinces, and absolutely prohibited them from engaging in trade with the Moros; a further decree of July 1886 forbade all Chinese to live in Mindanao.[4]

Notwithstanding the liberal counsels of officials and publicists, the opposition to the Chinese continued to be strong. In 1859, when Señor Norzagaray gave up his command in the Philippines,

de Ejercito y Hacienda) of the Philippine Islands, Don Juan Manuel de la Matta, Blair and Robertson, liii. 91.

[1] ibid. lii. 53. [2] ibid. p. 58.

[3] James A. Leroy, 'The Philippines 1860–1896', Blair and Robertson, op. cit. lii. 144.

[4] *Census of the Philippines, 1903* (1905) p. 491.

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he wrote an extensive paper on the Chinese question in which he 609
argued that it would be better for Spain to be impoverished by taking energetic measures against the Chinese than that the Philippines should be ruined by foreign absorption.[1] In 1866 a new campaign for Chinese exclusion was started by Spanish merchants and business men, together with a programme for fostering immigration of Spaniards into the Philippines, especially into Mindanao and Palawan. The campaign continued with varying intensity, but with no practical effect so far as reducing the numbers of the Chinese went, right to the end of the Spanish period. It was backed by strongly-worded articles in the local press, and in the controversy that ensued the sole champion of the Chinese was the newspaper *El Commercio*, while against them were *El Boletin de Avisos*, *El Diario de Manila*, and *La Oceania Española*. A writer of the 1880s says[2] that the extraordinary increase in Chinese immigration into the Philippines during the previous few years had with great force attracted the attention of people of thoughtful habit and patriotic sentiment who saw in this a grave peril to Spanish interests in the region. He quoted a pamphlet of two years previous to this,[3] to the effect that after deduction of the mortality applicable to each case the Chinese population of the archipelago had grown during the period 31 December 1876 to 23 May 1886 from 30,797 to 93,567, this being a multiplication by three in one decade. Another Spanish writer says of the Chinese:

> The Chinese, whose peculiar racial characteristics allow them to resist successfully climatic rigours without number, are notwithstanding a terrible threat to peninsular immigration. . . . They multiply at a startling rate and not content, as they were once, with the trade in certain specified articles, they now want to embrace the whole scope of the traffic. If this goes on it will not be surprising if they also want to handle the plough and the hoe, monopolizing agriculture to the detriment of the natives who get their living in this way.[4]

At the present moment (the writer continues) the Chinese con-

[1] *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President* (1899–1900), i. 151.

[2] D. Ramon y Morera, *Inmigración China en Filipinas* (Madrid, G. Hirandez, 1888) p. 10.

[3] Series of articles in *La Oceania Español*, published in pamphlet form as *Los Chinos en Filipinas* (Manila, 1886).

[4] Eduardo Casal y Ocha, *Questiones filipinas: Estudio Politico-Social* (Madrid, 1888) p. 24.

I think that 'peninsular immigration' must refer to the Iberian Peninsula. Or am I wrong? V. P.

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609 sidered his position insecure and he was not therefore an element to inspire fear, but later on, if his immigration were guaranteed, he would become almost the only immigrant, especially as he was willing to work at a wage so low that no European could compete with him.

Such remained the suspicion and fear of the Chinese among the Spanish up to the day when Commodore Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay in 1898 and the regime which had lasted for well over 300 years was about to come to an end. There were at that time estimated to be 40,000 Chinese in the Philippines, though one Spanish writer at least places it at 100,000. For reasons stated in Chapter XLIX, the writer is inclined to accept the former figure as being nearer the truth.

As a tail-piece and a rounding off of this review of the Chinese in the Philippines under the Spanish regime, it might be well to insert a description of a cock-fight in Manila in the eighteen-nineties which demonstrates in a striking manner how the Spanish civilization had communicated something of its colour and its aplomb to the stubborn institutions of the Chinese.[1]

The great cockpit of Manila at the 'Fiesta del Pueblo' is one of the most remarkable spectacles in the world. Imagine a huge circus with an arena raised to the height of the faces of those standing; behind them tier upon tier gradually rising; above the arena, which is enclosed in fine wire netting, is the red draped box of the farmer—the leading Chinaman of Manila, named Señor Palanca; and a packed audience of four thousand people. Squatting on the earthen floor of the ring, inside the wire netting, are the habitués, half Chinese and half *mestizos*, while the officials walk about—the *juez de justicia* or referee, the *sentenciador* or umpire, the *casador*, 'go-between' or betting master, and several others. The two men enter the ring, each carrying a bird whose spur is shielded for the moment in a leather scabbard. One wears his hat—he is the owner of the challenging bird—called *llamado*; the other, hatless, is the outsider or *dejado*, who takes up the challenge. . . . An official calls out the sum for which the challenger's owner backs it, and how much is still lacking to make up the sum. Then comes the most extraordinary scene of all. The moment the words are out of his mouth, it rains dollars in the ring, apparently from everywhere dollars pour in, without method, without ownership, without a bargain, so far as one can

[1] Henry Newman, *Peoples and Politics of the Far East*, p. 177 (1904) New York, Scribners.

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judge in the deafening clamour. . . . When the sums on the birds are equal the betting master shouts *Casada* 'matched', literally, 'married', the farmer from his box on high yells '*larga!*', 'loose them,' and the fight begins. Sometimes it lasts ten minutes, sometimes only a second, the first shock leaving one bird a mangled corpse. . . .

Asked how betting could possibly be carried on, Señor Palanca said that none would put out his hand for another's money when pay time came. It was never done. If anyone were detected doing it, a dozen knives would be in his body at once.

These habitués, remember, are not hot-blooded Spaniards but Chinese and mestizos engaged in their age-old pastime of gambling with an Hispanic twist and flourish. The farmer, the while, we can be sure does not allow excitement to dull his eye for business.[1]

[1] An authority on the Philippines who read this passage in manuscript objected that it was not at all in keeping with the nature of the Manila Chinese whose interest in cock-fighting was purely commercial. The writer, therefore, obediently deleted it. Subsequently, however, while this study was in proof, he came across confirmation of Sir Henry Newman's impressions in H. N. Moseley, *Notes by a Naturalist Made During the Voyage of H.M.S. 'Challenger'* (re 1872–76), (London, Laurie, 1944, p. 356). '. . . The great business of life in the Philippines, of the men of the various tame Malay races, the half-castes, or the Chinese, is certainly the sport of cock-fighting. . . . It would be hard to say whether the Chinese coolies . . . are the more eager spectators, or the darker skinned Malays . . . . (p. 357) The Chinese shopkeepers usually keep a pet cock tied up by a string to a peg outside the door, and slip out and have a friendly set-to with a neighbour's cock, in the intervals between the arrival of customers.' The writer is thus encouraged to restore the passage, leaving its appropriateness or otherwise to be fought over by the experts.

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CHAPTER LIII

THE CHINESE UNDER THE AMERICAN REGIME, 1898–1946

642 WAR was declared upon Spain by the United States on 25 April 1898. On 1 May Commodore Dewey steamed into Manila Bay; by noon he had put the weak Spanish squadron out of action, and by August hostilities were over. At the peace conference a few months later Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States, and $20 million were paid by the United States to Spain for public works built in the islands during the three centuries of her occupation. Until 1902 the Philippines remained under a Military Government and by that year most of the Filipinos who had declared their own republic had yielded to American arms, but the Moros continued under military government until 1913. In 1934 the islands became a Commonwealth, and, after the Japanese occupation of them from 1942 to 1945, the Philippines were declared absolutely independent, as the Republic of the Philippines, on 4 July 1946.

609 As is always the case in Southeast Asia, the Chinese in 1898–9 suffered from native animosity while disorder continued. The Tagálog leaders Braganza, Vicente Ursua, and others ordered the killing of all Spanish and Chinese at Minalabag, Pasacao, Libmanan, and Calabanga.[1]

167 To the Americans who took over the reins of government in 1898 the Spanish laws in force for the control of the Chinese seemed inadequate, for they were thinking in terms of Pacific Coast sentiment, and within a month after the occupation of Manila the laws relating to the admission of the Chinese into the United States were by an order of the Military Government under Brigadier-General Otis made applicable to the Philippines.[2] In 1902 Congress extended the Chinese exclusion laws to the island territory under jurisdiction of Congress, and directed the Philippines Commission

[1] Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present* (New York, Macmillan, 1930) p. 181.

[2] Charles Burke Elliott, Ph.D., LL.D., *The Philippines to the End of the Military Regime* (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1917) p. 438, 439.

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to make necessary regulations under the law effective.[1] These laws amounted to the exclusion of the Chinese from the Philippines.[2] 167

Before the American occupation the records of arrivals and departures of Chinese showed an increase in the number of residents of 36,250 in the years 1889–93. In the first five years of the United States occupation, 1899–1903, the excess of arrivals over departures was 8,624. The census of 1903 (published in 1905) gave the total number of Chinese as 41,035 (though private estimates put it at over 100,000 in 1898 and at a similar figure in 1903). Between the Spanish and the American figures there is an obvious discrepancy.

Under Spanish rule, as we have seen, an effort had been made to admit Chinese only for unskilled labour, the lower kinds of service, and agriculture. Immigrants were forbidden to engage in any trade. Chinese brought in for tobacco-growing were not taxed. But the fact was that the Chinese did not like agriculture (though so many of the immigrants had been peasants at home) for the simple reason that it did not pay as well as trade. 462 464 167

Opinion was divided as to the wisdom of the exclusionist policy, though anti-Chinese feeling was far more vocal and influential than advocacy for the encouragement of the race. Señor Gabriel Garcia Ageo, in his memorandum to the Schurmann Commission of 1899,[3] said that he believed that the leniency of the Spanish Government towards the Chinese in the past had been to the detriment of both the Spanish and the Filipinos.[4] He suggested that heavy duties be imposed on Chinese goods, and that the Chinese should be prohibited from engaging in agriculture. The Philippine Commission of 1900–3 thought it would be unwise to admit Chinese skilled labourers to the islands in unlimited numbers. It admitted, how- 464 167

[1] Elliott, op. cit. p. 72.

Wu Ting-fang immediately protested against this action on behalf of the Chinese Government.

For the pros and cons of the Chinese immigration question as argued in 1899 see *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President* (Schurmann Commission), (1899–1900) i. pt. 10. 150 ff., *The Chinese in the Philippines*.

[2] The laws were based on the limited treaties of 1880 and 1894 between the United States and China, both of which modified the general treaty of 1868. The 1868 treaty was for the reciprocal immigration of Chinese and Americans into America and China respectively. But the agitation of the 1870s led to a limited suspension of the treaty of 1880.

[3] Report of the Schurmann Philippine Commission (Washington, 1899) ii. 432.

[4] The Spanish policy towards the Chinese may have been weak and vacillating, but it can scarcely be said to have been lenient.

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464 167 ever, that there was not sufficient skilled labour among the Filipinos to meet the construction immediately necessary for the development of the islands. The introduction of a limited number of Chinese for a period of five years, during which a Filipino apprentice should be employed for every Chinese admitted, would secure a sufficient number of skilled labourers among the Filipinos at the end of that period.[1] When the United States Senate was debating the future of the Philippines the question came up again for discussion. The following extract from the record will give an idea of how these arguments tended, and will throw some light on the economics of the Philippines.[2]

Senator Rawlins. If the Chinese are admitted that will be a phase of the question.

Governor Taft. The commission has expressed the opinion as to what ought to be done in the matter of the admission of the Chinese. It is a very definite political question in the Islands, not due to competition in labor, but to competition in trade.

Senator Hale. Do you think it a possibility or probability that in expending this large amount of money on public works you will be driven to the necessity of bringing in the Chinese?

Governor Taft. That is what the contractors say.

Senator Hale. You think it may come to that?

Governor Taft. I hope not. Some of the quartermasters of the army think it is possible by care to secure labor and teach it constancy. But if you will talk with the business man in Manila, who is usually not very friendly towards the Filipino, he scouts the idea; and I think possibly you have already had a petition from the American Chamber of Commerce of Manila to allow the entrance of Chinese, because the labor of the Filipinos is so unsatisfactory. . . .

Governor Taft. The Chinaman comes into this country and labors, say, at 12 silver dollars a month. Out of that, the local saying is, he saves $16 or $18. At any rate, he is not there for more than three to four months before he has capital to set up a store, and when he sets up a store the Filipino who has a store next to him is driven out of business.

Senator Carmack. Is it not true that one of the greatest obstacles to the pacification of these Islands has been and is, the fear of bringing Chinese labor to the country, and the fear of sudden and excessive

[1] U.S., Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, *Reports of the Philippine Commission, the Civil Governor, and the Heads of the Executive Departments of the Civil Government of the Philippine Islands (1900–1903)* (1904) p. 291.

[2] U.S., *Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate in Relation to the Affairs of the Philippines* (1902) p. 96 ff.

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exploitation, and the belief that the United States want the Islands purely for the purpose of such exploitation? 1/64

Governor Taft. Certainly there has been, if one can judge by the proclamation of the insurgents and by the statements of the insurgent leaders, a very considerable attempt to make the public believe that it is the purpose of the Americans. Now, with respect to the effect of Chinese importation, possibly that goes with it. 167

Pressed by Senator Carmack as to whether it would be necessary to throw open the doors to Chinese immigration in order to secure a supply of efficient and helpful labour for the development of the country, Governor Taft replied that he was 'profoundly hopeful' that this might not be the case. In certain parts of the archipelago, he said, the admission of Chinese labour without permission to trade, keeping the immigrant a labourer and requiring those who brought him in to take him out again, would doubtless aid the development of islands like Mindanao where the population was sparse, but in Luzon, Panay, and Negros, the thickly populated islands, he was hopeful that they could gradually give the people a motive for labour and that, so encouraged, the labour might become more efficient than it was. Asked whether all Filipinos were opposed to Chinese immigration, Governor Taft replied that generally they were, but that the Tabacalera, the largest company in the Philippines and controlled by Spaniards, had been pressing the Government to allow them to bring in Chinese *skilled* labour for the construction of warehouses and other buildings on the tobacco installation.

'The burning question of the hour', Dr Doherty proclaimed in his pamphlet printed by order of the United States Senate, 'is this: shall Chinese labour be brought into the Islands or not? The Manila papers which are printed in English howl for it, and the foreign commercial interests of Manila and Iloilo beg for it, but the civil government is averse to it, and the Filipino people are opposed to it, and look on in dumb despair as they see the net slowly drawn around them.' It was, thought the Doctor, a wrong to the Filipino people, and they should make the question their Thermopylæ.[1]

In public life the importation of Chinese labour had few advocates, but some individuals outside the Philippines urged that favourable consideration be given to the idea. Thus at the very

[1] U.S., 50th Congress, 2nd session, David M. Doherty, M.D., *Conditions in the Philippines*, Senate Document no. 170 (27 February 1904).

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164 beginning of the American regime an article was written 'in the sincere hope that the preceding lines may help in influencing 167 legislation to encourage Chinese immigration', and quoted Sir John Bowring as saying, 'There is no colonizer who, under intelligent control, may be more useful than the Chinese.' His advocacy, however, was for the importation of Chinese *agriculturists* (though they had hitherto shown little inclination towards this type of employment) and he pointed out that the Philippines had a very similar temperature to that of the fields they generally immigrated from round Amoy, Swatow, &c. 'The Archipelago', he declared, 'would soon turn from an uncultivated field to an El Dorado.'[1]

Another British writer quoted Jenks's report of 1902 to the Secretary of War in favour of the admission of Chinese labour on the ground that the measure would result, with here and there an individual exception, not at all to the disadvantage of the Filipino, but indeed to his benefit through the improved conditions in the islands which would furnish him not only with a better market for his produce but also a better opportunity of engaging in the kind of work for which he was best suited and which most closely accorded with his tastes.[2]

These arguments are here set out at length because they give the pros and cons of the whole Chinese question in Southeast Asia, and they are not likely for long to get out of date. But the anti-Chinese labour advocates won the day in the Philippines, and the exclusion laws remained. In 1909 Mr Russell M'Culloch Story sums up the situation by saying that to admit the Chinese at this stage 'would be to invite a disturbing social, political, and economic factor into the life of the Islands'. The existing number of Chinese, however (he continued), was not a menace to the peace and industry of the archipelago and would soon be absorbed into the population of the islands. The danger lay in the coolie class, who in their struggle to advance themselves would hinder the upward course of the Filipino.[3] (Mr Story, like most others, did not foresee the rise of Chinese nationalism!)

[1] Juan Mencarini, 'The Philippine Chinese Labour Question', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, China Branch, vol. xxxiii (1899–1900) p. 157.

[2] Alleyne Ireland, *The Eastern Tropics* (New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1905) p. 232.

[3] Russell M'Culloch Story, 'Problem of the Chinese in the Philippines', *The American Social and Political Science Review*, vol. iii, no. 1 (February 1909) p. 30.

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We have no means of knowing how far the Spanish censuses or the American census of 1903 were out in their enumerations, but, assuming the latter to have been nearly correct, the number of Chinese in the Philippines tripled between 1903 and 1909. This is certainly a striking commentary on the effectiveness of the 'exclusion' laws, for the second figure cannot have been mainly due to natural increase. There can be little doubt that the unquestioned multiplication of the race has been due to illicit entry. One common route was by way of the Borneo coast;[1] another, more direct, via the northern tip of Luzon. 162 167

The history of Chinese admixture with the native community follows much the same general pattern as for other parts of South-east Asia. For centuries the Chinese intermarried freely with women of the country and produced mestizos of Chinese-Filipino blood whose descendants were absorbed into the general population of the country. The number of Filipinos with a noticeable admixture of Chinese blood probably amounted in the 1940's to more than three-quarters of a million. These Chinese mestizos formed 'one of the most capable, prosperous and powerful elements of the Filipino people'.[2] Yet, as we have remarked in the case of Siam, a high proportion of Chinese blood in an individual is no guarantee of his sympathy with the Chinese community, and, as Filipino nationalism developed, the leaders who declaimed against the Chinese most violently had almost invariably Chinese blood in their veins.[3] 162

It is probable that the Chinese benefited from the change-over from Spanish to American control more than any other element of the population of the Philippines. The exclusion laws may have prevented the mass immigration of the race, but it managed, nevertheless, to multiply its numbers by about three. In the time of the Spanish control the legal disabilities imposed on the Chinese were arbitrary and unpredictable; under the Americans these disabilities were removed, and the reform of the administration meant that the Chinese were not subjected to exactions, except in some localities 609

[1] The Moros of Zamboanga are said before the war to have charged 150 pesos, or $75, for each Chinese they took in their *vintas*. Florence Horn, *Orphans of the Pacific* (New York, Reynall & Hitchcock, 1941) p. 147.

[2] Hayden, op. cit. p. 695.

[3] 'There may well be over 1 million Chinese mestizos, including the very politician who wants to legislate the Chinese out of business.' Florence Horn, op. cit. p. 143.

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609 where they still had to pay a certain amount of tribute to minor political authorities.[1]

441 In 1904 a Chinese Commercial Council was established, which later developed into the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce.[2] This was to become the centre of Chinese business and social organization. Members were divided into two types—the score of rice merchants, grocers, second-hand dealers, &c., into which the Chinese Manila business community is divided, and Chinese business firms and individuals. The activities of this powerful organization were divided again into two categories, business and civic. On the business side the chamber collected and disseminated information about trade conditions, investigated and guaranteed the credentials of Chinese business men, arranged for the display of Chinese products, conducted research into the problems and methods of business, and in any crisis or critical period provided a forum for discussion and machinery for action. On its civic side the chamber organized the collection of funds for charitable purposes, with an emphasis, no doubt, on causes favouring the Chinese, and after the outbreak of war with Japan relief for 'China distress' was the major object of the collections. But at the same time it raised funds on a considerable scale for Philippine undertakings such as the Red Cross, hospitals, &c. For the Chinese community itself the chamber maintained a school system,[3] a social club, a modern hospital, and a cemetery.

208 With the Chinese consul-general and the Philippine branch of the Kuomintang the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce formed a trinity of organs for voicing views upon questions affecting the Chinese community to the Chinese Government as well as to the Philippine authorities and the public.

441 It is estimated that, before the systematic invasion of this field by the Japanese after 1932, the Chinese in the Philippines con-
452 ducted between 70 and 80 per cent. of the retail trade and a large
471 percentage of the internal commerce of the islands. Approximately the same proportion of the commercial credit facilities was like-

[1] Hayden, op. cit. p. 695 ff.

[2] ibid. (Hayden is relied on in this chapter except where indicated.)

[87] [3] Many Chinese children in the Philippines suffered under the double system whereby they learnt history, geography, arithmetic, &c., through the medium of Chinese in the morning, and the same, or similar, subjects through the medium of English in the afternoon. The strain was great and the minds of the children were confused and dulled in the process.

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wise in their hands. Regarding the situation immediately preceding the war with Japan, Mr Helmut G. Callis provides information which may be summarized as follows:

Chinese predominate in the retail trade with U.S. $25 million investment; they own 75 per cent. of the 2,500 rice-mills which are scattered throughout the islands. They control ten per cent. of the capital invested in the lumber industry. Their influence in banking is not negligible. The total resources of the China Banking Corporation in Manila was $27 million in 1937, representing mainly capital of Chinese residents. About fifty new Chinese companies came into existence in 1937–9, with a capital of 1·5 million pesos—surpassed only by new registrations of American and Philippine companies. A great sum of money is said to have been invested by the Chinese in immovable property during this period, probably representing investments of Chinese profits which were not sent to China because of the war. Though statistical data are not available, it has been estimated that the total Chinese investments in the Philippines reach U.S. $100 million, which would give them the second place among nations doing business in the islands, Americans holding first place.[1]

The Chinese commercial and credit system covered virtually every business, and reached from Manila to the remotest corners of the archipelago. The trade organizations (which were members of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce) were the old Chinese guilds adapted to Philippine laws and conditions. As has happened in other Southeast Asian countries, the control of these guilds over wages and conditions of labour has been replaced by State legislation, and trade secrets have also largely disappeared, but the associations have a wide scope for their activities in enforcing agreements regarding competition, credit, and wages, and for the promotion and protection of the interests of their members.[2]

Chinese wholesale business, with its salesmen and buyers covering every corner of the Philippines, supplied the Chinese provincial merchants and the smallest Chinese retailers.

[1] Helmut G. Callis, *Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia* (mimeograph) (New York International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942) p. 21.

Mr Callis estimates the total foreign investments in the Philippines, other than Chinese, at about U.S. $315 million (p. 21). In 1932 the Bureau of Insular Affairs estimated Chinese investments in the Philippines at 162,932,000 pesos, exclusive of real estate. This figure, says Hayden, was probably a great deal too low. At about the same time the Chinese consul-general put the figure at 201 million pesos (U.S. $100,500,000).

A good deal of Chinese money was lost in the Stock Exchange collapse of 1937, most of it invested in worthless mines. Florence Horn, op. cit. p. 210.

[2] Hayden, op. cit. p. 698.

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merchants and the smallest Chinese retailer. Behind the business houses, which were conducted either by an individual or by a family, were two Chinese banks, one of them, opened in 1939, being a branch of the Bank of Communications owned by the Chinese National Government. There were also two other Manila banks in which a large amount of Chinese capital had been invested. In normal times there were approximately 15,000 Chinese mercantile and industrial firms in the Philippines, though in the years preceding the war with Japan, Japanese and Government-subsidized Filipino competition had reduced the number of Chinese firms. As in Siam and Indochina the Chinese largely financed the growing of rice, and to a great extent controlled its milling and distribution. This was a hold that the Philippines Government was trying to break. Chinese, too, practically controlled the retail trade in lumber and cut 40 per cent. of the timber put on the market annually.[1]

As the undeveloped country in the Philippines was opened up the Chinese were in the van of those seeking for new commercial opportunities. In Cotabato, at the mouth of the Rio Grande de Cotabato, which drains an enormous territory in fast-developing Mindanao, most of the firms were Chinese. Chinese had traded throughout the Sulu Archipelago centuries before the Filipinos voluntarily entered that area. 'From these and other centres [says

[1] Hayden, op. cit. p. 699.
The following figures of Sino-Philippine trade will have meaning in the present context only to those who can say roughly what the share of the Philippine Chinese in this trade was!

	Imports from Philippines		*Exports from China to Philippines*		*Total trade*	
	Haikwan taels	*Index no.*	*Haikwan taels*	*Index no.*	*Haikwan taels*	*Index no.*
1868	280,700	100·0	163,197	100·0	443,897	100·0
1878	112,842	40·2	242,499	148·6	355,341	80·1
1888	68,402	24·4	314,249	192·6	382,651	86·4
1897	75,887	27·0	132,095	80·9	207,982	46·9
1898	14,133	5·0	85,718	52·5	99,851	22·5
1908	1,806,726	643·6	175,078	107·3	1,981,804	446·5
1918	3,193,324	1,137·7	2,153,227	1,319·4	5,346,751	1,204·3
1928	5,775,932	2,057·7	5,848,357	3,583·6	11,624,289	2,618·7
1933	2,730,000* (*U.S. $4,254,000)	972·6	3,497,000* (* $5,449,000)	2,141·6	6,228,000* (* $9,903,000)	1,403·0

From Ho Ping-Yin, *The Foreign Trade of China* (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1935) p. 569.

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Hayden, p. 699] Chinese traders penetrate to the uppermost reaches of jungle rivers, travel the remotest forest trails, and reach the most isolated coastal villages. Carrying in cotton and assorted trade goods, they bring out copra, hemp, gutta percha, and other native products.' They did not take up land partly because public land is not alienated to foreigners and partly because Chinese agricultural immigration was now forbidden.[1] 166 443 438

The Americans continued the land policy of the Spanish, so that in 1940 the Filipino still owned 90 per cent. of the land of the islands. At the same time it was observed that the Chinese were increasingly anxious to obtain possession of soil which had yet to be tilled. As evidence of this an article in the *China Economic Journal* of January 1941 called attention to the opportunities that would be offered to Chinese investors and settlers by an independent Philippines, and also to the ease and cheapness with which Chinese born in the islands could obtain land there even now. In Mindanao the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian tribes warned that the Chinese were already adopting a device which the Japanese had successfully used in Davao, namely, marrying pagan or Moro women and acquiring public land in the names of their wives.[2] 423 425

Accentuation of the Chinese Question

It was not to be expected that the substitution of the go-ahead, democratic control of the Americans for the languid, semi-feudal, and semi-clerical regime of the Spanish would dispose of age-old problems in a night. Indeed, when the United States had terminated its rule of forty-eight years at least two notable problems 178

[1] Hayden, op. cit. pp. 699, 700 says: 'Only very courageous men would live the lives of many of these Chinese traders. In 1931, the author travelled by river boat, horseback, and on foot across Mindanao from Cotabato to Davao over a route now traversed by a modern road. Through the centre of the Island the trail, which in places had to be hacked open by Bolos, wound through virgin forests inhabited by primitive peoples. Philippine officials insisted upon providing a constabulary escort for the expedition. In the heart of this wild country was found a small *tienda*—just a counter, a dozen shelves and a place to sleep. The proprietor, a Chinese, was absent, but we met him on the trail, returning from Davao with two Manobo *cargadores* who carried on their backs his slender stock-in-trade. Few Americans, Japanese, or Filipinos would have been willing to face the isolation and danger to which he was cheerfully returning. This pioneer merchant was typical of the enterprise and determination which have brought such a large proportion of the trade of the frontier areas of the Far East into their hands.'

[2] ibid. p. 703.

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178 of the Philippines, the agrarian question and that of the Chinese, were still far from solution.

579 Outbreaks against the Chinese occurred under the American Government, but there was, of course, nothing to compare with the holocausts of 1603 and 1639. The ruling power took no part in instigating or carrying out attacks on the Chinese, but, on the contrary, was stern in their repression. Minor outbreaks of this sort were a feature of Philippine life, but the most serious disorder between 1898 and 1950 occurred in 1924. It is said to have originated in a rumour, entirely without foundation, to the effect that a number of Filipino students had been killed by Chinese in Canton or Hong Kong, and the feeling excited in the Philippines brought forth one more story, that a Filipino baby had been killed by local Chinese and parts of its body used as charms or medicine—a counterpart, in reverse, of the Tientsin rumours of 1870, when similar allegations were made by Chinese against Europeans. The first riot was at Cabanatuan in Luzon, where the Chinese control of the business and agriculture of a great rice region had made the area ripe for demonstrations of resentment. Further outbreaks took place in Manila and in other Chinese centres, and the Philippine constabulary had to be used to restore order. Another attack upon the Chinese of more than average seriousness took place at San Pablo in February 1931.

186 But quite apart from their immediate causes or excuses these disturbances were indicative of the widespread feeling of hostility
661 towards the Chinese, based on the conviction that they were an
579 alien people endangering the livelihood of the Filipinos by their competition and against whom an occasional display of spleen was both legitimate and a temperamental necessity. The ordinary people required the moral support of indignation derived from a fable or alleged sharp practice before they would attack the Chinese, but Filipinos of the better-educated classes were constantly aware of the Chinese as a sort of nagging pain in the Philippine economy. Many officials considered that redress through exactions from the Chinese shopkeepers and merchants in the shape of special licence fees by municipal councils or by demanding 'open-date credit' from them was not at all unreasonable, and when the Chinese acquiesced in the exactions as the price of their being left alone they were publicly accused of corrupting Filipino officialdom!

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Much more serious than the sporadic outbursts of popular feeling were the Book-keeping Act of 1921 and other legislation directed specifically against the Chinese business community. The Book-keeping Act required that every merchant in the Philippines should keep accounts of his business in English, Spanish, or a local dialect.[1] The aim of this legislation was officially declared to be to put an end to the defrauding of the public treasury of millions of pesos annually by the 15,000 small Chinese shopkeepers, which had been made possible because of the inability of Filipino officials to check their books. The Chinese, quite naturally, were immediately 'up in arms'. The effect of the legislation, they declared, would be to compel every little Chinese barrio to employ a Filipino clerk and to reveal to their competitors all their trade secrets. Its motive, they said, was to feather the nest of certain politicians by forcing the Chinese to bribe them to prevent the law being carried into effect. The last allegation, ironically enough, was responsible for dissuading Filipino politicians who regarded the law as unjust from voting for its repeal since, if they did so, their opponents would say that they had been bribed by the Chinese!

The Chinese business community of the Philippines, regarding the Book-keeping Law as the test case *par excellence* of their right to carry on trade under conditions of justice, marshalled their forces to fight the matter and to their aid rallied their compatriots in China, the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, and in the business centres of Southeast Asia. European counsel were employed to state the case against the Act with all their resources of legal argument. At the request of Governor-General Leonard Wood, the Philippine Legislature postponed the execution of the statute, but refused to modify it in any substantial degree. Failing to secure the repeal of the law, or its annulment by Congress, the Chinese took the case to the Supreme Court of the United States, which declared the Act unconstitutional.

In their official memorandum for the information of the Supreme Court, the Philippine Chinese declared that the matter was vastly more than local, more than a domestic regulation. It had, they said, an international character of profound importance. If the law were allowed to go into effect (the memorandum continued) it was not unreasonable to suppose that retaliation would result. China might pass a law requiring American merchants to

[1] Hayden, op. cit. p. 705 ff.

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keep their books of account in Chinese, which would be an end of American business in China.[1]

The Philippine Legislature was, however, not prepared to accept the Supreme Court's decision as a final defeat. In 1926 it enacted a new Book-keeping Law, drafted so as to meet constitutional requirements; but Chinese opposition again made it inadvisable to enforce it, nor did amendments passed in 1934 make the measure workable. In 1935 the Philippines became a Commonwealth, and the following year the Government, resuming the battle, introduced a new amendment to the law which permitted commercial books to be kept in a language other than a native language or English or Spanish, but required that all entries therein should be translated into one or other of the three recognized languages, and certified under oath by the book-keeper or manager of the company concerned. Again, the Chinese through their Chamber of Commerce intervened to delay the bringing into force of the law, with the result that President Quezon prevailed upon the Legislature to grant a year before it should become effective.

Legislative acts to keep the Chinese under control were one set of weapons against the Chinese; the Government-stimulated or subsidized organizations to compete with them were another set, and, on the face of it, much more promising of results. For years previously, privately sponsored organizations had sought to stimulate Filipino production for Filipino consumption. The Ang Bagong Katipunan in 1930–1 and later the National Economic Protective Association conducted campaigns to this end. Early in 1940 the National Trading Corporation was established and provided with capital from Government funds. This activity was an extension of the provisions of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines (article xii, section 1) which limited the exploitation of the islands to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations of which at least 60 per cent. of the capital was owned by such citizens, and (article xiii) which made similar provision with regard

[1] 'What [asks Hayden] would the suggested retaliation have been if the outraged Chinese had been dealing with an independent Philippine Republic instead of the United States of America?' (Chinese accounts, I can state from experience when I was official assignee and liquidator of companies, Penang (1926–9), kept by shopkeepers and small traders are not complicated. There are a day-book and a ledger and (usually but not invariably) a stock-book. The Chinese are very jealous of their trade secrets, and in Malaya were opposed to registration of partnerships. V. P.)

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to public utilities.[1] The object of the National Trading Corporation was, as its president declared, to 'break the stranglehold of foreign retailers' upon the Philippine trade.

Action closely parallel to that taken in Siam in 1947 was taken in the Philippines in 1941 when the Manila Municipal Board passed an ordinance prohibiting all persons from engaging in any form of business in the public markets except citizens of the Philippines or United States, three years' grace being granted to alien holders of market stalls. Chinese were the holders of practically all these stalls, and the ordinance was therefore immediately followed by a protest from the Chinese consul-general to the United States high commissioner, declaring that the ordinance violated treaties between China and the United States and would throw thousands of Chinese out of work. Although supported by a suggestion from the high commissioner that apart from its legality the ordinance 'might have an unfavourable effect in the field of international relations', the protest was disregarded and the law remained.

It must not be concluded, however, that the attitude of the Commonwealth was altogether uncompromising. So far as establishing the Filipino trade went, it was resolute in its principles, but it strove to avoid provocation of the Chinese. President Quezon explained in a speech that 'foreigners, aside from their rights recognized in international law and our own laws . . . have the further right to be treated with equity and justice, because they have helped in the development of our country when our own people were not engaging in business enterprises'.[2] What, however, the Filipino business men had the right to expect from their Government, and what it was creating for them (President Quezon went on) were banking institutions, facilities for trade and communication, and new opportunities to engage in trade and industry. But the Filipino must stand on his own merits. He must make his way through earnest, intelligent, and determined effort; he must be prepared to meet fair competition. At the same time the Government could not adopt a policy that in any way might be interpreted as antagonistic to foreigners.[3]

[1] Hayden, op. cit. pp. 838, 840, appendix ii.

[2] Address at the inauguration of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce (29 July 1938). Hayden, op. cit. p. 708 and p. 945, fn. 20.

[3] In 1933, when Tomas Confesor, Director of the Bureau of Commerce, had stated that if Filipinos were to supplant the Chinese by 'legitimate' (i.e. non-political) means they would have to develop the economic efficiency of the

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443 In his annual message to the National Assembly in 1941 President Quezon found himself able to state that Filipino participation in the retail trade of the country had increased from between 15 and 20 per cent. at the time of the inauguration of the Commonwealth to approximately 37 per cent. in 1939. Filipinos, he declared, now outnumbered the merchants of all other nationalities in the retail trade and controlled a greater number of retail stores.[1]

186 As has been remarked, and should be repeated, the Filipino
661 politician who finds himself impelled to declare that 'something
461 must be done about the Chinese' is very likely to proclaim by his
511 eyes and by the bone structure of his face that one or more of his
512 ancestors was Chinese. The same anomaly is found in Siam. But
471 what may be an historical or philosophical irony may also be a
441 practical irrelevance, since racial antecedents are of small importance beside national sentiment and political expedience. Pressed as to his case against the Chinese, the Filipino politician would say that the Chinese were too numerous, that they had more than half of the retail business in their hands, that they charged too high prices, cheated in weights and measures, and made high profits. Should it be objected that if this were so all the Filipino had to do was to open up a *tienda* on his own and put the Chinese out of business in the village, the politician would probably shift his ground. He would now say that the Chinese standard of living is deplorably low; the owner of a Chinese *tienda* is willing to live in a small corner of his store, he eats almost nothing and works day and night; so does his family and his assistant as well if he has one. The Chinese in Manila, he says, persistently disregard the eight-hour law. In fine, the charge now is that the Chinese runs his business with too little, not with too great, overhead expenses and profits. If this is true, then the Chinese give excellent service to the community as distributors. The Filipino can buy cheaply because the Chinese live so meagrely.[2]

[441] [435]

000 This argument is followed up by an appeal to the fear in the

[186] Chinese and perform for the community the services now performed by the Chinese, he had brought upon his head a storm of Filipino indignation. See Hayden, op. cit. p. 700.

[442] [1] On the other hand, the provincial commercial supervisor of Pangasinan, a rich province of central Luzon, reported that in December 1938, only 2 per cent. of the retail trade and of the wholesale dealing in the staple crops was in the hands of Filipinos. Hayden, op. cit. p. 711.

[2] The above is summarized from Florence Horn, op. cit. p. 142–3.

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This argument is followed up by an appeal to the fear in the listener of the Chinese power. If they used their control of the retail trade as a weapon they could paralyse the economy of the country in a single night. (This does not seem actually to have happened in the Philippines, but it did happen in Bangkok in 1910.)

Then there is the charge of usury. The Chinese who keeps the local *tienda* lends money to the Filipino at extortionate rates of interest. The result is that the Filipino is everlastingly in debt to the Chinese. That the Filipino is always in debt to the Chinese is undoubtedly true, but the evidence is all to the effect that the Filipino *cacique* is even more oppressive and usurious.

Finally the politician's charge is that the Chinese own the country's rice-mills. It is probable that before the Japanese war 75 per cent. of the Philippine rice-mills were owned by Chinese. The *tao* (peasant) sells rice to the mill which often acts also as a banker and money-lender. Frequently the Chinese mill is the only buyer of rice in a given locality and the price given is what the mill will pay.[1] The cure for this, in any case, would not be Filipino-owned rice-mills but something in the nature of marketing co-operative organizations set up with Government aid and encouragement.[2]

In this vexed question of the Chinese domination of the rice trade, there is some expert evidence forthcoming which tends to refute the assertion that the excessive profits of the middleman explain the low returns to the grower and the high cost of rice to the consumer. In a study of the marketing of rice in Nueva Ecija conducted by the college of agriculture at Los Baños not long before the war with Japan it was found that comparing prices paid to farmers by Cabanatuan mills with the wholesale price of rice in Manila the difference, on margin, was relatively small. In terms of the wholesale price of rice in Manila, the farmer in Nueva Ecija received on the average 87 per cent., while the Chinese rice merchants received a margin of 13 per cent. Of this margin 4 per cent. represented milling costs, and 3·9 per cent. railway freight, 2·1 per cent. marketing costs, and 3 per cent. profit to the miller or wholesaler.[3] The same authority continues:

The results of the survey show that the Chinese merchants are per-

[1] The same complaint would apply to tobacco areas where the Tabacalera is the sole buyer.

[2] Florence Horn, op. cit. p. 145.

[3] H. H. Miller, *Principles of Economics Applied to the Philippines* (Boston, 1932) p. 198–9, cited in *The Rice Economy of Monsoon Asia* (California, Food Research Institute, Stamford University, 1941) p. 182.

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435 forming essential marketing services at a fairly low cost. It is therefore
441 evident that for the Filipinos to displace the Chinese in the rice trade they must be able to render marketing services at margins equal to, or
256 still lower than, those now received by them. For co-operative marketing by farmers to be successful the same condition obtains.

181 The Chinese engaged in the business even before the Spanish regime in the Philippines. They have the experience and trade ties with other Chinese in neighbouring countries. It seems that the Filipino is not by nature so good a business man as the Chinese. though Government officials, from President Quezon down, have been optimistic regarding the ability of the Filipino to learn the rice business within ten years from *c.* 1941 after which complete nationalization was foreseen.[1]

444 Considering how popular fury had so often been worked up against the Chinese retailer 'drawing off the riches' of the country
511 and squeezing out the native Filipino by his relentless competition, it is curious to note how unimpressive the ordinary Chinese *tienda* is. This is also true of the country shops and booths of the Chinese in other parts of Southeast Asia. The average Chinese shop in the Philippines is a miserable little *nipa* shack[2] with small stocks of food and cheap household articles. (There is an aroma, too, about it
[595] of shrimp paste, kerosene oil, and dried fish.) The Chinese shop-keeper does not look at all prosperous and he cares less for his clothes and his cleanliness than does the average Filipino. Yet it is certain that he is not as poor as he looks, and it is probable that a large percentage of the villagers owe him money.

441 The balance-sheet of the value or detriment of the Chinese to the Philippine Islands, so far as we can ascertain it, consists of
471 debit or credit items presented by detractors or apologists. Each item calls for careful scrutiny in the light of the facts and the motive of the person stating it, and at the end the reader should be able to decide whether the balance should be written in black ink or red.

The Chinese memorandum to Congress on the occasion of the appeal against the Book-keeping Act does not neglect the appeals of rhetoric, of which the basis was derived from the Chinese themselves and which was given by expert American advocates the form

[1] In 1936 the National Rice Corporation (NARIC) was created.

[2] So Florence Horn observes, but a critic, commenting on this, remarks, 'This is going much too far!'

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and finish that would appeal to American elder statesmen. Here is an example:

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> The Chinese merchants are not newcomers. They are as much a part of the Philippine Islands as the hills and valleys and streams of that beautiful archipelago. No one knows when they came, as they came at a time when the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. . . . When the Spaniards came to the Islands first, in 1520, they found Chinese merchants doing all the commercial business of the Islands. It is hardly possible to call them foreigners—they are a part and parcel of Philippine life. They have never failed to answer any call for public service. They constitute the commercial class of the Islands just as the Filipinos are the official and the farming class. The existence of one is just as essential as that of the other for a proper functioning of the life of the Philippine Islands. Each has his task to perform. The officials govern; the farmers produce; but it is the merchants who pay the bills, because the greater part of the taxes for the maintenance of the Government comes from them. . . . The Chinese merchant is more than a merchant; he carries on the commercial end of the Philippine industrial life. These merchants, thus scattered throughout the provinces, loan money to the Filipinos to aid them in growing and marketing their crops. The Chinese merchant buys their crops. He exports them and brings to them in return the commodities they need. Chinese merchants constitute the very essence of the commercial life of the Islands. No complaints are heard of their dealings. They are universally recognized as fair, honest, and square. Their reputation is higher than the reputation of any similar body of merchants to be found elsewhere in the world. . .

The memorandum pointed out that the Chinese merchant is not peculiar to the Philippines. He is to be found throughout Oceania, in the Netherlands Indies, in Malaya, in French Indochina, and in other quarters of the globe. In no other instance than this 'had sovereignty presumed to enact such an unconscionable and unendurable law'.[1]

So much for the very understandable Chinese point of view. Sympathy, however, must not altogether be denied to the Filipino statesmen in their avowed political goal of the creation of a representative democracy. 'The domination of the business of the country [says Dr Hayden] by a powerful and unassimilable foreign element in the population does not make this admittedly difficult task any easier.' This outstanding authority on the politics of the

[1] Hayden, op. cit. p. 709–10.

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441 Philippines before the Second World War continues in these
471 words:[1]

> What would be the effect upon American local, state and national government, were three-quarters of the 'business men', including the bankers and the 'produce merchants' engaged in the distribution of the basic foodstuffs of virtually every city, county, town, and village in the land, aliens who had no votes, no interest in government save to protect themselves from it or to use it, and no devotion to the political institutions of the nation? What would American politics be were 75 per cent. of all taxes on business to be paid by this same group of aliens who possessed no legitimate control over government agencies for levying and collection of taxes and the regulation of business? Few, indeed, would say that the prospects of good government or democratic government would be bright under such conditions. Yet in the Philippines, which until three decades ago, was an autocratically governed Spanish colony, precisely such conditions exist.

661 In the Philippines the Chinese were, and are, the easiest political
186 target. The Americans and the Spaniards had a far larger share of the profits from the islands, but concerning them the Filipino politicians were generally silent; it was the Chinese who were the scapegoats for oratory and the objects for discrimination. In November 1939 Manuel Quezon devoted an entire speech to threats against the Chinese and to promises to set up the Filipinos in business. At just about the same time Quezon was offering haven to 10,000 Jewish exiles from Europe! They were to be settled in an agricultural colony in Mindanao. The Chinese wondered at this generous hospitality. They knew, no doubt, that, like themselves, the Jews ended up in trade no matter how they started life in any country.[2]

661 Finally, the Chinese (as elsewhere) were accused of drawing off
186 capital from the country. After the outbreak of war between China and Japan they contributed to Chiang Kai-shek's war chest as well

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[1] Hayden, op. cit. p. 711–12.

[2] See Florence Horn, op. cit. p. 146.

This was speedily exemplified. The following is an extract from the *North China Daily News* of 29 January 1947: Jews who came to the Philippines before the war as refugees from Nazi rule were recently found to have violated the conditions upon which they were admitted. A Department of Justice official said that these Jews were admitted into the country by the late Commonwealth President Manuel L. Quezon on condition that they settle down only in sparsely populated areas and engage in agricultural pursuits. Contrary to this condition, the official said, most of them settled in Manila and other commercial centres and are at present engaged in business other than agriculture.

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as to the support of their families at home. It was estimated that 661
sums exceeding U.S. $6 million had gone out of the Philippines to
China between 1937 and 1941. One close observer of Philippine 186
affairs remarks that these remittances appear to have been the only
real drain which the Chinese have made on the economy of the 471
Philippines and a control of them not only would prevent the Chinese sending wealth from the country '*out of proportion to the economic benefits which their presence brings*,' but also would provide a simple, indirect, and (at least on the surface) non-discriminatory means of controlling immigration. The difficulty would be to make the estimation required by the phrase italicized.

On 2 May 1940 the Philippine National Assembly passed an Act providing that not more than 500 'quota immigrants of any one nationality' might be admitted into the islands in any one calendar year. This law established a national 'non-discriminatory' immigration policy designed to protect the Philippines from mass immigration. The Filipino action was taken in face of 'grave warnings' from the Government of Japan issued directly to the Commonwealth (and, it was reported, repeated to Washington) and a milder protest from the Chinese consul-general in Manila. President Roosevelt, ignoring Japanese objections, granted approval to the law.[1]

In reading books and other publications on the Philippines the 114
student is struck by how little is known of the domestic life of a
Chinese community. This is scarcely less true of Indonesia and Siam, of Burma and Indochina. In Malaya the veil has been lifted much more, though even there there is a great deal left to be known. In Southeast Asia generally there is a mass of material regarding the relations between the Chinese and other communities but very little about the relations between Chinese and Chinese. Thus the complex social and political life of the Chinese is often dismissed with reference to 'secret societies' or 'Tong wars'.[2] In the Philippines this observation applies equally to the Spanish and the American periods. No one (so far as the present writer is aware) 668
has written on the history of the Kuomintang or of the Chinese
Communist Party in the Philippines, though the first at least has 648

[1] Hayden, op. cit. p. 691.

[2] For example, in 1910 deportation orders were served on twelve undesirable Chinese who belonged to the *Tongs*. These *Tongs* were usually beneficial and formed for co-operative assistance. W. Cameron Forbes, *The Philippine Islands* (New Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1928) i. 309. [575]

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648 been active since its formation.[1] Before the war with Japan the Philippines were not such fertile soil for Chinese Communism as
668 the other countries of the area because the Chinese community was comparatively small and in its make-up merchants and retailers preponderated. There is thus practically no information available about Chinese Communist activity in the islands prior to the Japanese war. After the liberation, we shall see, the Communists made up for lost time in organizing themselves and in attempting to seize power in the community.

[131] The Philippines are nearer to the China ports than other South-
[167] east Asian countries. In the old days migration between the Philippines and China was not so frequent as it has since become. Many of the richer Chinese used to maintain one household in Canton or Amoy and another in Manila or Cebu, but in the immediate pre-war years this was ceasing to be the case, and China was becoming the sole family centre with increased ties with the ancestral country, and more and more Chinese merchants retired
[871] to China. It was estimated, too, that before the Japanese war more than two hundred children of Chinese business men were sent annually to the mainland for education. Chinese nationalism was
648 thus increasingly claiming the Philippine Chinese as its own,
144 though the majority of them were still born of Filipino mothers and most of their descendants continued to be absorbed eventually into the Filipino people.[2]

609 No view of the Chinese which tries to take in both sides of the medal will find favour either with the Chinese or their critics. The former regard themselves as persecuted or unreasonably differentiated against, and will accept no other solution than that they should be subjected to no restrictions or regulations of any sort which do not equally apply to Filipinos. The Filipinos, for their part, have no difficulty in finding a moral as well as a legal justification for their legislative or administrative action. These rigid

[1] Mr Chu-pei Chen is now supplying this omission.

[2] Hayden, op. cit. pp. 697, 712.

554 Mr Claude A. Buss in his article on the Philippines in Lennox A. Mills and associates, *The New World of Southeast Asia* (Minneapolis, University of
848 Minnesota Press, 1949), p. 21 says: 'For some unaccountable reason, the children of mixed marriages between Spanish and Filipinos (like Quezon) or between Chinese and Filipinos (like Sergio Osmena) have come to be regarded as distinct social assets, while children of mixed marriages between Americans and Filipinos or illegitimate children of the liberation are often faced with unpleasant social barriers.'

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partisan attitudes (as is always the case in politics) cut across the human instinct for compromise. In the villages, the peasant who regards the Chinese traders as his oppressors and the authors of his misfortunes is yet, consciously or subconsciously, aware that they provide a distribution service which he himself could not reproduce either in this generation or the next, and, while he resents the Chinese proprietor of the *tienda*, he would think himself very lucky to obtain him as the husband for his prettiest daughter, for with him as *pariente* the whole family would never be in want. He knows him to be frugal and economical where he himself is shiftless. In the words of Hayden (p. 712), 'A permanent settlement of the issues involved can be reached only by applying the principle of equity, as well as of law; by exercise of patience and caution; and by a mutual recognition of conflicting points of view.' Unfortunately such a solution is likely to be found only when a completely impartial authority is holding the scales of justice. But even when under the Commonwealth the Americans still had a large measure of final control, they were able only to soften the impact of the Filipino offensive; after July 1946, when the complete independence of the Philippines was promised, the tribunal of power was likely to be influenced by political considerati and the Chinese were likely to be in a worse plight. Politicians are never their own masters, at liberty to obey the dictates of their own consciences or to adopt the abstract standards of justice and humanity; to remain in power they must play up to the prejudices of their electorates. It did not seem then that the Chinese had very much to hope for from the advance of democracy.

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CHAPTER LIV

DURING THE WAR WITH JAPAN AND UNDER THE REPUBLIC, 1941–1948[1]

178 THE war with Japan created an entirely new pattern in Southeast Asian politics—so much so that the observer who was fairly closely in touch with the situation in 1940 would, if he did not return to Southeast Asia until 1948 and had not kept himself up to date with a close study of reports, find himself almost unable to recognize what he saw. The basic elements, perhaps, had not changed, but some of them had developed so disproportionately, and the arrangement was so different, that the change amounted in effect to one of kind.

In the Philippines the situation of the Chinese may conveniently be described under three heads, (*a*) political, (*b*) economic, and (*c*) the immigration and repatriation questions.

668 Before the war the activity of the Chinese Communists in the islands was slight. The Chinese 'left-wingers' had their centre in Manila known as the Tion Hwa Tian (China Hall) located in Alvarado Street. It was believed that their membership did not exceed 1,000. They denied that they were Communists. Their mouthpiece was the *Kim Kuo Press* (bi-monthly) with a minute circulation. During the first year of the Japanese occupation the Chinese Communists began to get to work and created anti-Japanese organizations without at first revealing their political
668 affiliations. They had at least one underground newspaper, and organized students and young shop assistants, especially the latter
669 who were disgruntled because the shops in which they worked were closed. Later on they filtered into the neighbouring provinces

[1] Mr. Chu-pei Chen was in 1949 preparing a study of *The Chinese and the War in the Philippines* for the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. This study, of which the writer has seen some of the first chapters, will provide valuable material to supplement this chapter.

One very remarkable assertion concerning the Chinese in the Philippines in Mr Chu-pei Chen's study is that while the *majority* of the Chinese living in the Islands are adherents of the Roman Catholic faith, ancestor-worship is also carried on in the average Chinese family. On All Souls' Day Chinese Christians, Catholic or Protestant, join their relatives in ancestor-worship at the Chinese incemetery, and are distinguished from the non-Christian Chinese only by not burning incense and not kneeling before the tomb or shrine.

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and started a military training base. Classes on guerrilla warfare were held. A considerable group of officers who later organized the Hwa Chi combat units and joined the Hukbalahaps and the United States armed forces during the liberation were products of these military training classes. During the occupation a Communist guerrilla unit travelled Luzon playing hide-and-seek with the Japanese.[1] 668 669

Meanwhile the Kuomintang also organized three guerrilla units, namely the Philippine Chinese Volunteer Corps under the command of Sy Yat-sien, the head of the Kuomintang, the COHEM (*Hsüeh Kan Tuan*) headed by Li Hai-jo, and the Philippines Chinese Youth Corps under Lin Cho-mei. Li and Lin had been sent to the Philippines to organize the San Min Chu I Youth Corps shortly before the war. However, these three Kuomintang units did not co-operate very well and were not engaged in active combat. They were mostly occupied in underground anti-Japanese propaganda activities. Only after the liberation were some of Sy Yat-sien's and Li Hai-jo's men incorporated into the U.S. armed forces in mopping up Japanese remnants near Baguio and other regions. 669

During the battle for Manila in the last phase of the war both the Communist and Kuomintang guerrillas aided the Americans, acting as guides and providing guards for bridges against Japanese dynamiters. The two units each set up a headquarters, but that of the Communists had much the more militant appearance. Both units obtained recognition from the United States Army by sending new forces to the front, but both soon incurred the displeasure of the high command by engaging in rival political action within the local community.

With the Japanese removed from the scene, the Communists came into the open, taking over the campus of the Philippine Chinese high school as headquarters of the League of the Philippine Anti-Japanese and Puppets, and they placed all Communist-affiliated organizations under their control. This was now the centre of left-wing activity in Manila. At the same time a 'people's court' was set up to try persons accused of collaboration. The first persons summoned before it were Yu Khe-thai, pre-war supreme 668

[1] The commanders of the left-wing guerrilla forces were Uy Kiat, Chua Kien-hua, Tan Chon-sien, chief of staff, and Ong Seh-hsiün, commander of the Hwa Chi 48th Unit, later incorporated into the Hukbalahaps.

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668 leader of the Chinese community and President of the Resist-the-Enemy Association, and Justo Cabo Chan, the last puppet president of the Chinese Association, who had survived the assassination drive of the Communist guerrillas. Yu, however, did not answer the summons, and Chan, being under the custody of the Americans, could not come.

In the post-war Chinese community of the Philippines, the most vexed issue was that of war-time 'collaboration' with the Japanese. It was precisely similar to the situation in other Chinese communities in the Nanyang, notably Malaya. In the long period of three years under the Japanese many prominent, law-abiding Chinese had been forced to join the puppet Chinese Association. It is true that most of them were inactive and reluctant to participate in any activity under the association, such as Yu Khe-thai, the Sycip brothers, and others; but in the eyes of the left-wingers they were all collaborators and should be punished accordingly. Between the *Great China Daily News*, the post-war Kuomintang paper, and the *Chinese Guide*, the Communist official organ, a desperate press war now ensued. The Communist organ also attacked Roxas and a number of other Filipino officials.

Meanwhile the Communists were intent on taking the law into their own hands. In the early days of the liberation a ring known as the Hing Han Chu Chien Tuan, whose aim was the liquidation of Chinese collaborators, swung into action. It was believed that Tan Tien-hon, secretary of the Chinese Association, Go Co-lai, first president of the association, and Ty Han-kee, Go's successor, were victims of this ring. The leader was an unidentified bloodthirsty Communist military leader who was known as the 'Flying Tiger'. Other victims of the ring were Chan Chin, a student consul of the Chinese consulate in Manila, who was believed to have been a collaborator in the Japanese 'buy-and-sell' scheme, and Uy Ken-sien, connected with Nishimura's Kempei Thai (military police), who were assassinated immediately after the liberation.

During the occupation the Chinese Communists had established contacts with the Filipino Communists. After the liberation, the Hwa Chi 48th Combat Unit, commanded by Captain Ong Seh-hsiün (who was believed to have been connected with the 8th Route Army in China, and who was a very able man) was incorporated into the Hukbalahaps, the Filipino agrarian insurgents who were now in a state of open rebellion against the Govern-

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ment.[1] In Batangas, in Luzon province, the constabulary seized a number of Chinese Communists in one raid. It is believed that they had 'cells' in other parts of Luzon, especially in the northern tip, which is the landing point of junks smuggling Chinese immigrants into the islands as well as into other islands of Southeast Asia.

Young men and girls were organized and indoctrinated through a 'research society', a 'debating society', a 'library society', and other branches. These novices were required to live in the premises of the organization so as to be completely under its influence and without any outside contamination.

Besides these activities, the Chinese Communists were suspected of assassination and terrorism. A clerk of the Chinese consulate, who worked for the Japanese during the occupation and was one of the only two survivors of the Japanese massacre of the Chinese consular staff, was shot within two weeks of the liberation—by Communist agents, it was alleged. The same body assassinated two wealthy Chinese who had served as chairmen of the Chinese Association during the occupation.[2]

These internal dissensions in the Chinese community continued with increasing bitterness. When the Philippines became an independent republic there would be a reorientation of policy, and, though the Philippines would remain within the American diplomatic and economic orbit, it was likely that the Government would be more vigorous than before in dealing with disturbances among the Chinese in the Philippines. In September of that year, sixty-one Chinese were detained some hours for questioning, and raids

[1] 'Philippine economy is rooted in the feudal economy of sixteenth-century Spain, which the conquistadores implanted on Philippine soil. The half-century of American occupation brought about a substantial advancement in education, public health, self-government, and an increasing national income, but it did not create a middle class of any size, and the bulk of the newly created income went to the Government, the landlords, and the urban areas. In spite of large schemes for nationalizing land, little was done in effect to ameliorate conditions among the feudal peasantry or to replace the backward agricultural economy.' So says Hernando J. Abaya, *Betrayal in the Philippines* (New York, A. A. Wyn, 1946) p. 206 ff. During the Japanese occupation there came into being the Hukbalahaps or militant peasant army of the resistance movement. The name is from the Tagalog *Hukbo Ng Bayan Laban Sa Hapon*, or People's Anti-Japanese Army.

[2] The report of Mr Arthur M. Goul, United Press correspondent in the Philippines, published in the *North China Daily News* of 7 April 1948, has been closely followed in the above account.

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668 were conducted on the *Chinese Guide* and the *Chinese Commercial Bulletin* (newspapers that termed themselves independent), the Chinese Labour Federation office, a Chinese Y.M.C.A. school, the Hung Kwong Institute, and the Chinese Union high school. This action the police called 'crime investigation'.[1]

These raids threw the Chinese community into an 'apprehensive furore', since they were the climax of a long period of acute political tension among the Chinese of the Philippines which reflected divisions in the Chinese homeland. It seemed that each of the two, or several, factions had been 'informing' the police against the other or others. Certain Chinese generals living in the Philippines were declared by ultra-conservative Chinese groups to be subversive, and these groups requested Zulueta, the Secretary of the Interior, to deport them. Other elements in the Chinese community decried such a move. Right-wingers also charged the Chinese left-wingers with aiding the Hukbalahaps, but at that time no responsible authority in the Philippine Government could confirm the charge. On 7 September it was reported that indiscriminate raids by the military police on the Chinese were halted by President Roxas because of the possibility that they might be misinterpreted by the Chinese or by their sympathizers abroad. A Government spokesman explained that the raids resulted from complaints that some individuals frequenting the offices of Chinese newspapers were connected with lawless elements, and with a kidnapping ring which had been preying on prominent members of the Chinese community.

Although for the first two years, or thereabouts, after the liberation no positive evidence came to light of any association between the Chinese Communists and the agrarian revolt, it was clear that the Communists in general intended as a policy to support and make use of every dissident movement in countries which were not under a Communist Government. But until such evidence was forthcoming, the foreign observer of liberal mind was inclined to regard the charge as part of an attempt in Southeast Asia to identify all nationalist or liberation movements of whatever sort with Communism. In the Philippines it was well known that the agrarian unrest was to some extent the natural and justifiable result of the grievances arising from an obsolete system of land tenure inherited from the Spanish regime, and one which the Americans had not

[1] *New York Times* (6 September 1946).

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succeeded in replacing. But in the latter months of 1947 reports that the Chinese Communists were in league with the Hukbalahaps were not easily dismissed.

Early in September Major Napoleon Valeriano, commander of the military police commandos widely known as the 'skull unit', and acting military commander of Pampanga, declared that he had positive proof of the existence of an all-Chinese Hukbalahap squadron acting in and around Manila.[1] It was believed that most of the arms possessed by the Communists and the rebels were obtained from the Japanese, though some were served out by the U.S. forces.

The taking of justice into their own hands by the Communists and their 'people's court' after the liberation had, as in Malaya, prejudiced the action that the properly constituted authorities were in the meantime undertaking or contemplating. In Communist eyes any person who accepted employment or public appointment under the Japanese was a 'collaborator'. The effect of this attitude was that almost every Chinese who had been at all prominent or had held any property before the war was put in this class, for the simple reason that only those who had no stake in the country and had no family to protect or support could take to the hills and join the guerrillas. The Communists were ready besides with accusations and 'evidence' against anyone they happened to dislike, and of their charges authorities were naturally suspicious. The net result was that many who had been guilty of collaboration escaped punishment. But action against suspected collaborators did continue in a desultory way, and in November 1947 fifty Chinese-born persons, naturalized Filipinos, were 'screened' to decide whether or not they should be prosecuted for treason during the Japanese occupation. In the following January the screening by the Philippine constabulary was extended so as to cover, it seemed, the whole of the Chinese population; but how far this action had anything to do with suspected collaboration with the Japanese, and how far it was a round-up of Communists and others is a matter of opinion. In the meantime, in November, a clash between Chinese Communists and Kuomintang supporters was expected at any moment.[2]

[1] *Manila Bulletin* (2 September 1947).

The present writer passed through Hukbalahap country in November 1947 when attending the United Nations Conference at Baguio. The Government provided a heavy military escort, for ambushes were fairly frequent.

[2] *North China Daily News* (2 November 1947).

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668 About this time Alfonso Z. Sycip, president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, was ordered to conduct a census of Chinese [659] residents, and to submit a report. Five Chinese, black-listed by the provincial (? Pampanga) command, were already under investigation. Faction fights among the Chinese Nationalists, who had indiscriminately accused their opponents of being Communists, had stirred the constabulary to action. There were, however, enough genuine Communists in Manila and elsewhere to keep the police busy. In March 1948 Senator Salipada Pendatun, speaking in the Philippines Senate, and quoting a secret report of Government intelligence agents, asserted that there were now 10,000 Chinese Communists in Manila and the provinces. He accused them of the murder of 200 Chinese since the liberation. He mentioned incidentally that 45 Russians were registered with the Bureau of Immigration, and that 150 other Russians were classified as 'Stateless'. He claimed that the purely Russian group was under the control of 'an invisible hand' in Manila, and he asserted that during the meeting of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, held at Baguio in November and December, the Russian Communists in Manila had made contact with the Russian delegates to the Conference.[1]

It seemed inevitable, with the transition from underground to open action by the Communists in Malaya, Burma, and in Indonesia in the middle months of 1948 that, if these operations were successful, or even if they were not, the Philippines would not in the long run be omitted from the campaign.

This Communist activity belongs to what might be called the horizontal splitting-up of society according to affiliations of its layers with either the bourgeoisie or the proletariat, as distinguished from the vertical splitting which arose from differences of race, tribe, and clan. The Philippines authorities were conscious of this grid interaction, and, while they could depend on some support from the Chinese trading class in their offensive against the Communist elements, they were hostile to the Kuomintang which was still angling for power. Thus it was that when the old question of holding elections among the Chinese residing in the Philippines in connexion with the elections in China, which had been a source of friction for years between the Governments of Southeast Asia and the National Government of China, came again to the fore, the

[1] *North China Daily News* (18 March 1948).

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Philippines Government was prepared to take a strong line. In October 1947 Quirino, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, advised a Chinese delegation that the Philippine Government would not allow local Chinese to hold elections.[1] The Chinese minister to the Philippines, Mr Chen Chih-ping, advised the Nanking Government to this effect, and on 22 October Dr George Yeh, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, told a press conference at Nanking that new regulations covering the participation of overseas Chinese in the coming national elections would shortly be published, as a result of protests from the Philippines, Siam, the United States, and other countries. It had been represented in the diplomatic exchanges (Dr Yeh said) that China's attempt to hold its elections on foreign soil constituted an infringement of the sovereignty of these countries. China, he said, had a particular problem because of the overwhelming number of Chinese nationals who would be represented in the National Government. The question of dual nationality had already been raised, and no Chinese would be allowed to vote unless he had already been registered at the Chinese consulate and had formally renounced his citizenship of he country he was living in.

Simultaneously 'a well-informed Foreign Office source' confirmed that a notification had been sent to the local Chinese legation to the effect that the holding of an election by Chinese nationals in the Philippines would be regarded as an infringement of the sovereignty of the Philippine Republic. However, the same spokesman said, the Philippine Foreign Office would have no objection if local Chinese nationals were to conduct their elections in the same manner as the United States armed forces in the Philippines cast their votes at the Presidential elections. The course that would be acceptable to the Philippines Foreign Office would be for the Chinese Government to send their nationals the ballots and forms to be filled in, and that these should be sent back to China for counting. The Philippines Government, it was understood, would not countenance the local holding of election meetings, rallies, and campaigns by Chinese nationals for their forthcoming national elections.[2]

It is doubtful, however, whether Filipino public opinion took these political questions half as seriously as it did the economic pressure of the Chinese. It was always possible to arouse the intens-

[1] *Manila Bulletin* (23 October 1947).

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est resentment by any mention of the latter subject. As early as October 1945 a trade nationalization bill aimed at the Chinese was stopped only by the Presidential veto. The Press Secretary, Mauro Mendez, explained that President Osmena had favoured the measure, but had been forced to reject it because he 'couldn't afford to antagonize the Chinese Government so long as that Government remains friendly to the United States, which controls our foreign policies'.[1]

Though Brigadier-General Manuel Roxas, when candidate for the Presidency of the Philippines Republic, disavowed any anti-Chinese animus in his statement to the representative newspapers, one of his own organs, the *Daily Star*, was an outspoken baiter of the Chinese, indicating the likelihood of this sentiment becoming a campaign issue.[2] One newspaper correspondent stated at this time that 'a miasma of Axis ideology still hovers over ground ostensibly liberated nearly a year ago' and was responsible for a rising tide of animosity against resident Chinese and other national minorities, and suggested that the traditional Filipino aptitude for study had not been dormant during the three years of the Axis indoctrination.[3] Scarcely a day passed in Manila without some expression of resentment against alien participation in the social and economic affairs of the nation. Though the Chinese were the primary target, the aim was spreading in the use of such expressions as 'foreigners' and 'aliens'. The next most openly attacked group after the Chinese were the Jewish refugees.[4]

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In March 1947 a proposed Sino-Philippines treaty of amity was halted on the verge of signature. The question of sovereign rights came into the dispute, but the rights of Chinese nationals to engage in trade within the Philippines was the real sticking-point between the two countries. Vice-President Quirino had sought to eliminate a reference to this type of trade, reserving it for inclusion in a separate treaty of commerce, but in reply to this, the Chinese Minister, Mr Chen Chih-ping, said that the right of Chinese to

[1] *Christian Science Monitor* (12 January 1946).

[2] Assemblyman Sato, whose grandfather was pure Chinese, started an anti-Chinese league. During the post-war Presidential elections he was a strong supporter of Manuel Roxas. When the latter became President he entered the National Assembly and introduced several anti-Chinese Bills including one to reduce the immigration quota for Chinese from 500 to 50. His league, supported by Filipino lawyers, had a membership of over 1,000.

[3] ibid.

[4] Cf. p. 153.

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engage in trade in the Philippines could not be classified as international commerce, and properly belonged to a treaty of friendship rather than a commercial pact. 648 441

The treaty was finally agreed upon and signed on 18 April 1947. It did not meet the Chinese demands for the raising of the immigration quota nor for protection against discrimination, but provided in rather vague terms for peace and friendship, exchange of diplomatic and consular personnel, and for the right of the nationals of either party to travel and reside in the territory of the other, but only in conformity with the existing laws. The treaty was ratified by the Executive Yuan in China, but only with difficulty by the Philippines legislature. A proposed treaty of commerce and navigation was postponed. 471 [467] [186] [439]

In spite of all the agitation and the measures taken against them, the Chinese continued to retain their hold on the trade of the islands. The figures for trade in the Philippines for 1947, showing a percentage of trade done by traders of different nationalities, indicate the share of the Chinese in the total commerce.[1] [439]

	Imports	*Exports*	*All trade*
Americans	28·00	42·97	33·59
Chinese	39·14	24·08	33·51
Filipinos	23·48	21·38	22·70
Others	9·38	11·57	10·20

Tied up with the resentment of Chinese possession of the lion's share of the Philippines internal trade was the long-standing charge that the Chinese corrupted Filipino officials. This charge was frequently renewed, and in March 1947 the executive secretary of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce gave an interview in reply to it. It took two, he said, to accomplish bribery. If the Filipino was susceptible to Chinese bribes it was hardly the responsibility of the Chinese. He quoted the New Testament in pointing his argument—'As Peter said, with the exception of Jesus Christ all men are sinners.'[2] 662

The highest feeling ensued from the action of Manila municipal authorities in ejecting Chinese from the stalls in the Manila markets. The ban was to become effective on Monday, 12 January 1948. The Chinese Market Vendors' Association, on hearing of the 443 656

[1] *Manila Post* (11 March 1947).
[2] 'A.S.B.O.', 'The Philippine Islands', *The World Today* (November 1948).

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443 proposed move, had immediately petitioned the Supreme Court
656 for a writ of prohibition against the city treasurer. A move to evade the measure by the construction of private markets was frustrated by the refusal of the mayor, Manuel de la Fuente, to approve applications for permits to establish such businesses. While the application of the Republican Act No. 37 (giving the Government power to take action against the stallholders) was suspended during the hearing of the petition by the Supreme Court, the Chinese minister complained that the city of Manila had put its own ordinance into effect. The Chinese stallholders in Manila were compelled to leave their places of business. Even if the Supreme Court should decide in their favour, said the minister, the damage done to them would hardly be reparable. His own solution was, that Chinese who were already holding stalls (some had been doing so for twenty years) should be allowed to continue to do so, but that no new applications should be entertained.[1]

While the Manila city authorities were resolutely persevering in their measures against the Chinese stallholders, an obstacle to the complete fulfilment of their programme was the lack of Filipino applicants qualified to take over the stalls. Contrary to general opinion, the running of small retail businesses of this sort was an expert job. The city treasurer, Mr Sarmiento, said that the (City?) Department of Finance had ordered 1,400 stalls to be vacated, but only 1,000 would be available for raffling to Filipino applicants by 12 January, the date set.[2]

167 The third burning Chinese question was that of immigration. The Chinese population of the Philippines had dropped from 117,000 in 1939 to 101,000 in 1947; 7,600 Chinese certified by UNRRA and by CNRRA to be bona-fide pre-war residents of the Philippines were at China ports waiting for permission to return to the Philippines. The President of the Philippines now refused to accept the repatriation of these Chinese as a group because of the 'acute housing, food, and unemployment problems confronting the country'. Permission for re-entry would be considered on the merits of each individual case by the Philippine consul at Amoy, where the majority of displaced Chinese were assembled.[3] Chinese who were refused reconsideration of their cases by the consul could return to the Philippines only as a part of the 500 annual

[1] *Manila Bulletin* (7 February 1948).
[2] ibid. (8 January 1948).
[3] *Voice of China* (23 May 1947).

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quota. In April the Immigration Commissary, Mr Engracio Fabre, had reported to the President that it would not be advisable to allow these 7,600 Chinese to 'acquire *en masse* residence in the Philippines . . . considering the present housing and food problems, the high cost of living, and the number of unemployed'. The return of the Chinese, he said, would mean competition in the Philippines, especially among the labouring classes who were now struggling for a livelihood.[1]

This attitude was based on economic grounds (reinforced, no doubt, by political considerations) but the Government of the Philippines supported it by the legal argument that since the Chinese, driven out of the country by the enemy, had failed to return to Manila within the time prescribed by law, they had automatically forfeited their right to come back.[2] Nor could the Chinese who were born in the Philippines rely on the *jus soli*, for the Supreme Court decision of 17 September held that this did not apply to the Philippines.

In spite of the *non possumus* attitude of the Philippine Government it was fairly certain that the Chinese community in the Philippines was recouping itself for its losses in numbers by illicit immigration. The official reports gave the number of them now (1947) in the islands as 101,000, but Mr Paul McNutt, former United States ambassador to the Philippines (as we have seen, p. 572) said that their number was 200,000, adding 'thousands have entered during the Japanese occupation'.[3] This estimate, however, was probably in excess of the facts, and Mr McNutt was not giving his opinion as a diplomat but as a private person, he having resumed, or being on the point of resuming, his legal practice in the United States. Nevertheless, it would not have taken very long, if the existing rate of illegal entry were sustained, for the numbers of the Chinese to come up to this figure. The Communists were undoubtedly playing a big part in the smuggling of their supporters into the islands.[4] A grave view was taken by the Philippine authori-

[1] *North China Daily News* (20 April 1947).
[2] ibid. (3 May 1947).
[3] ibid. (14 August 1947).
[4] Five Chinese were arrested for subversive activities in connexion with the smuggling into the country of 67 Chinese at Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, in August, *Manila Bulletin* (9 September 1947). Another batch of 68 deportees arrested earlier were to be deported to Amoy, and the Immigration Bureau was asking the Chinese authorities to shoulder the expenses of their deportation. *North China Daily News* (4, 10 April 1947). These are but two examples among many.

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167 ties of the increase in smuggling, and in April 1947 President Roxas had told a special Cabinet meeting at Baguio that the Philippines must be firm in their attitude towards illegal entry of foreigners.[1]

642 This brings the story of the Chinese in the Philippines from the first Spanish settlement in 1565 down to the autumn of 1948 and, in some cases, to early 1949. There have been three distinct periods—the first, 300 years of Spanish rule; the second, the American colonial democratic experiment of nearly half a century (except for the three years of Japanese occupation); the third, the rule of the independent Republic of the Philippines which came into existence on 4 July 1946. During the first of these three periods the pattern of the Chinese community, and indeed of the whole of the population of the islands, was one characterized by vertical lines between the races, and one big horizontal line between the Spanish rulers and the people they ruled. During the American period, the vertical lines persisted, but the American administration, to the extent that its action was not restricted by United States political and commercial policy, was in a far more detached position than that of the Spanish had been, and held the balance between the races as impartially as it could. Though the third period, that of the independent Republic, dates only from 1946, it was already abundantly clear by 1949 that the position of the Chinese, at least, was much less secure than it was even under the fickle Spanish regime. The Philippine Republic was a young democracy fighting to establish its position in a distracted world. Its government was entirely elective and there was no veto of a [661] metropolitan Power and no appeal to an outside arbiter. To obtain election and to retain the support which they needed when they were in office, the Filipino politicians were bound to pay attention to [186] the prejudices and resentments of their electorate. And foremost among these prejudices and resentments was that against the Chinese.

668 Nor does the above fully state the situation. Forces outside the Philippines were striving to close inter-racial fissures, and to substitute a horizontal split between the owners of the means of production and the international proletariat. The Philippines had so far been fairly well removed from the great centres where the campaign was in full progress, but it was not to be supposed that this immunity would long continue.

[1] *North China Daily News* (4 April 1947).

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immunity would long continue. Indeed, the reflections of the situation in China, in Indonesia, in Malaya, in Burma, and in Indochina were already very observable in these islands of Tropical Asia.

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TABLE XI

Distribution of Real Property declared for Taxation in the Philippines, 31 December 1938, by Filipino, American, Spanish, Chinese, and Japanese Owners[1]

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Type of ownership	*Tax Declaration (Number)*	*Parcels (Number)*	*Area (Hectares)*	*Assessed Value (Pesos)*
Corporations and Associations				
Total	28,248	22,487	388,824	369,050,270
Business Corporations				
Total	18,187	13,699	346,017	267,467,280
Filipino	8,390	7,409	121,096	94,358,540
American	5,257	3,424	106,473	85,836,410
Spanish	1,560	1,076	70,981	46,334,080
Chinese	1,876	1,217	7,496	16,232,980
Japanese	441	165	33,052	13,559,970
Individuals				
Total	5,356,090	4,722,538	7,969,259	1,792,877,300
Filipino	5,322,620	4,697,386	7,769,668	1,693,4[illegible]460
Chinese	20,915	16,592	57,630	40,803,710
Spaniards	2,855	2,318	29,093	24,425,710
Americans	6,711	4,626	64,865	19,425,530
Japanese	2,016	868	30,472	7,696,880

[1] From *American Chamber of Commerce Journal*, vol. xx (October 1940). Cited by Hayden, op. cit. p. 702.

CONCLUSION

162 IT will have been observed that the Chinese of Southeast Asia
198 are, in essence, the same people over the entire area, in spite of a considerable diversity in occupation and dialect, and variation in purity of blood, There is a concentration of Yunnanese in the Shan States, but this tribe does not occur in any numbers elsewhere, and the other tribes are unequally distributed. For example, the Hokkiens and persons of mixed race of Hokkien origin form the majority community in Malaya and Indonesia, being outnumbered by the Cantonese, however, in the Malay States. In Siam the Teochius and the Hakkas are more numerous than the Hokkiens, and Hailams are also a large community. In the Philippines three-quarters of the Chinese are Hokkiens, and most of the remainder Cantonese. In Indochina the Hokkiens, though numerically seeming to yield first place to the Cantonese, are the principal Chinese merchants: indeed they were the pioneering tribe in the Nanyang and they are still, on the whole, the wealthiest.

So much may be said to illustrate the diversity of the tribal distribution of these Chinese who, but for a few exceptions (such as a tiny freak pocket of Shantung people in North Borneo) originate from the southeast corner of China—a small bit of Marco Polo's
162 'Mangi'. Diversity of occupation again is very pronounced among
463 these emigrants. Hailams, for instance, tend to be pig and poultry rearers, small cultivators, and domestic servants; in Borneo the Hakkas are the most numerous community and here they are largely agriculturists. Cantonese and Hakkas supply most of the
181 Chinese labour for tin-mines and rubber estates. Nor should we accept the naïve statement that 'all Chinese are alike' (which is but an extension of the unobservant conclusion of the European tenderfoot that 'all Chinese *look* alike'). There is a notable psychological difference between, say, the volatile, nimble-witted Cantonese and the more phlegmatic Hokkien or Teochiu; the Hailams have usually quite distinct physical characteristics from other Chinese, being more delicately made and exhibiting marked cranial differences from their brethren from the mainland. As for the Hakkas, they are in some ways a people apart, of northern origin and later immigrants than the other tribes and deriving from islands of population surrounded by Cantonese or Hokkiens in

[p. 656]

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their native country; moreover they have a stubbornness of disposition which distinguishes them from their fellow Chinese. (It is worthy of note that the most numerous among the early Communists in the Nanyang were the Hailams and Hakkas.)[1]

Sun Yat-sen said: 'The Chinese people are of the Han or Chinese race with common blood, common language, common religion, and common customs—a single race.' As regards 'blood' in any scientific sense this is manifestly untrue; on the contrary,

> The modern Chinese people is an amalgamation of many elements originally different from one another. . . . In colour; in stature, above all in cephalic indices, about 42 per cent are mesocephalic and about 43 per cent are brachycephalic, and about 15 per cent dolichocephalic. Even these classes are distinctly subdivided into dolicho-leptorrhinic and dolicho-platyrrhinic. There is also a low-headed type, and, in the South, a trace of a dwarf element. . . . Prehistory points to a race already mixed in the basin of the Yellow River. . . .[2]

In spite, however, of a number of modifications and reservations, the remainder of the statement of the Father of the Revolution, especially regarding religion and customs, could be convincingly maintained. Allowing for the numerous variations which have been suggested above, the Chinese of Southeast Asia, drawn mostly from Fukien and Kwangtung, are quite remarkably homogeneous. Not only have they marked physical characteristics in common; their customs, their religion, their attitude of mind have an almost uncanny similarity. What Clement Williams remarked of their shops in Bhamo on the Yunnan-Burma frontier nearly ninety years ago—'the likeness of one Burmese to another is striking, but the absolute sameness of one Chinese shop to another is truly wonderful'—is equally true of the 'sameness' of Chinese temples, houses, ornaments, customs, methods of mining and agriculture, and handicrafts all over the Southeast Asian area, from the city of Cholon to a remote *tienda* in Mindanao, or from the tin-fields of Larut to the pepper plantations of Cambodia. Nor is this merely a superficial impression (such as 'all Chinese look alike'); it derives from their common steeping in Chinese culture, even though the latter's springs of inspiration have ceased to well up from the depths and it has been for long (as Professor Toynbee says) in a state of petrification.

[1] See p. 370 regarding the Japanese identification of Hailams with Communism.

[2] *China Year Book* 1932.

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641 The essential nature of the overseas Chinese is, however, one thing: the traits of their character brought out by subjection to differing pressures and influences are another. In particular, the larger part of the area has for a long period been under the domination of European colonial Powers which, in spite of recent developments, to a considerable degree still maintain their hold. In the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, British Borneo, and Indochina the Chinese have been subordinated to the colonial policies of Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain, France, and the United States. In Siam, the solitary country to retain independence throughout (though she, too, was moulded by pressures from the West), the Chinese immigrants contributed to the well-being of the Siamese by their services and the admixture of their blood, but it was always the native aristocracy that held the power and, since 1932, the middle-class native revolutionaries. In post-liberation Burma the Chinese are a small minority who must leave the issues to be decided amongst the Burmese parties and communities; in Indonesia they are often uncomfortably at the point of impact of the opposing forces; in Indochina their plight is much the same. In Malaya the upshot of constitutional experiment and the campaign of Communist terrorists of their own race has placed them in a dilemma.

641 Throughout most of the period of our survey it has been a tenet of the Chinese that they should leave political policy and administration to the local Government, and this remains so in principle in spite of the increasing influence of nationalism and, latterly, of Communism in their midst. The cutworn, but still, until recently, serviceable dictum that 'the Chinese don't mind who holds the cow so long as they milk it' has been true of all purely mercantile communities since the dawn of history, and virtually the same remark is indeed made by Communists of capitalism—that it does not mind who governs so long as it draws the profits. But with the growth of the Chinese communities in the Nanyang and the development within them of political awareness the saying has been becoming less and less true.

641 From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century the Chinese in Southeast Asia found themselves, first in the Philippines, next in Indonesia, then in Malaya, and finally in Indochina, called upon to adapt themselves to a superstructure of government devised by completely strange and alien nations. These nations

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were almost entirely uninterested in them except as traders, labourers, or agents for dealing with the native peoples. In the last capacity the Chinese were very useful, for they had a knowledge of native ways which the Europeans lacked and in any case had no leisure to gain, being occupied so much of their time in warfare among themselves. The Chinese, in their turn, were interested in these white barbarians only to the extent that it was expedient to know their peculiarities. They showed themselves, however, much more adaptable to learning about the white race than the Europeans did to learning about them, for, generally speaking, the Spanish, the Dutch, the British, and the French were almost completely ignorant of the Chinese language and *mores*, and the Chinese were happy that it should be so. Another reason for the failure of Europeans to acquire any real knowledge of the people among whom they lived was that for the European life in the tropics—at any rate from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth century—was short, and he either returned home with a competence within a few years or else perished. Thus it was found convenient by the Company and early colonial Governments to leave the conduct of their community affairs to the Chinese headmen, except in the more serious cases, and this gave the Chinese much liberty of action. Unfortunately the fears of the tiny minority such as were the Europeans, especially in face of the increasing numbers of the Chinese, put them in a very anxious and suspicious frame of mind. The Chinese ethos, usually so serene, was subject to occasional social squalls or typhoons when the community was seized with mass hysteria. This was really only a means of dispersal of an accumulation of real or imaginary grievances and the trouble subsided, if handled with reason and tolerant firmness, almost as quickly as it had arisen. But in the minds of the Europeans with their tiny garrisons the outbreaks were often interpreted as signs of rebellion. Indeed in some cases they were rightly so interpreted, and there can be no doubt that when fear and distrust had dried up relationship into a tinder a spark would fire it into a rebellion, as was the case in Manila on St Francis's Eve 1603, when things had gone so far that it was either the Chinese or the Spanish who had to be destroyed. It is equally certain that a greater degree of understanding on either side would have averted this and later disasters.

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Whilst thus simplifying the situation, it must be conceded that

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Whilst thus simplifying the situation, it must be conceded that the Chinese social organization overseas early revealed serious deficiencies. It was not a complete unit of China transplanted, but fragments from various settings placed together in one spot. Different tribes and classes were put into unwonted juxtaposition, and the criminal and unruly element was disproportionately strong (this last fact needs emphasis). Embryo communal or municipal systems were often taken charge of by the deadly Triad society which used them for its own purposes. At the same time, too rigid a distinction has been drawn between the 'benevolent' *kongsis* and the 'malevolent' *huis*, or secret societies: it seems that the two were not separated in this categorical fashion and in fact were sometimes distinct associations with benevolent functions and Triad societies at one and the same time.[1] The shortcomings of the system became very manifest at certain times, as in Java when Chinese secret societies plotted to seize power from the Dutch, and in the Straits Settlements when these societies under the Triad societies got much out of hand and caused riots and practised intimidation for many years, later extending their activities to Perak where they added to the existing disorder until it approached anarchy.

This, however, is a special aspect of Chinese society in the Nanyang and is by no means typical. By and large, the Chinese were very law-abiding and gave the ruling Powers little trouble. Schlegel was right when he said that the Chinese were 'easy to govern'. Indeed this quality has brought them, at times, into the contempt of rough European individualists who have dismissed this tractableness as the characteristic of 'sheep'.

Students of the Chinese language who have ploughed through the *Tsŭ Erh Chih*, Sir Francis Wade's Documentary Series, will remember a number of memorials in which prefects or intendants

[1] The writer, after extensive experience of secret societies and district and clan organization, is sceptical of many of the theories advanced by observers. Schlegel (as we have seen in the chapters on the Kongsis of Borneo) has definitely regarded the Kongsis as a transplanting of municipal organization necessary to the functioning of Chinese society. Yet they were certainly 'secret societies' under Triad or Heaven and Earth League control. Only when countries, such as Malaya, began to legislate to control these societies was a distinction made between 'good' and 'bad' societies: the former were granted registration; the latter, if they functioned without registration, were illegal and, of course, definitely 'secret societies'. The writer is of opinion that a great deal more research into the matter is called for. (W. L. Blythe, 'The Interplay of Chinese Secret and Political Societies in Malaya', in *Eastern World*, March and April 1950, adds considerably to our knowledge.)

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of circuit of the Manchu dynasty related the details of criminal cases. There was a common offence which did not seem to come under the specific provisions of the penal code but was nevertheless heavily penalized, and it was known as 'being involved'. It appeared that to 'be involved', even quite innocently, in the felonies and misdemeanours of others, was itself in the nature of a crime. Indeed this feeling of the blameworthiness of being mixed up in any offence, tragedy, or lawlessness went right through Chinese society. It was not altogether unusual to hear of a Chinese man or woman hanging him- or herself on the doorpost of someone against whom they had a grievance in order to 'involve' him (there would be a judicial inquiry which would, at least, cause the owner of the door great embarrassment), for 'responsibility' is a far-reaching principle in China. This convention was hostile to the growth of public spirit, for a Chinese who saw a crime being committed, or a person in danger or needing assistance, would very likely do nothing for fear of 'being involved'.

This characteristic has persevered down to the present day, and, coupled with a willingness to pay for a quiet life, has been responsible for many Chinese difficulties. Chinese secret societies were able to parcel out the towns and villages in the Nanyang and to exact 'protection money' from shopkeepers and others without effective protest; in a similar way the Chinese community as a whole was willing to conform to all the laws and regulations made by alien Western Governments (whether to them they made sense or not) in return for being left alone. It was the social wisdom of 'Brer Rabbit, he say nuffin''. It was only when regulations proved to be unbearably vexatious that there was an outburst of hysteria followed by calm. This arrangement, convenient to both sides, was responsible for the saying of Gustaaf Schlegel cited above. It is an irony that this very quality, so convenient to European administrators in the past, as we have seen has brought down so much criticism on the heads of the Chinese *Towkays* in Malaya who, unprotected from reprisals, have paid 'protection' money to the Communist terrorists of their own race.

It seems true to say, then, that at the beginning of the twentieth century the Governments of Southeast Asia were conscious of the Chinese as a 'useful' element in their economic systems, and though they had some unpleasant social peculiarities they in no way constituted a danger or a threat. Chinese labour was introduced

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in quantity into the colonial possessions and received the praise that is reserved for an efficient and well-oiled machine. But a movement was already incubating which was to change the whole attitude towards the Chinese of Europeans and indigenous peoples alike. The birth of Chinese nationalism coincided with the numbers of the Chinese emigrants reaching a new high level.

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Sun Yat-sen in his *Three Principles of the People* said (as Mazzini had said long before him) that 'nationalism must precede internationalism'. Continuing the passage on race already quoted in part earlier in this chapter he went on:

> But the Chinese have no national spirit; they only know the family and clan groups. Thus China is only a loose sheet of sand. Our position is extremely perilous—if we do not promote nationalism and weld together our four hundred million into a nation, we face a tragedy—the loss of our country and the destruction of our race.[1]

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This warning was taken very much to heart by Young China, though the process towards national consciousness had already gone a long way before Sun Yat-sen crystallized the sentiment in these words. The effect of the intense nationalist campaign coupled with an education drive was to make the Chinese everywhere conscious of their separateness as a race and nation, and, in Southeast Asia, to render the peoples among whom they lived aware that they regarded themselves as a race and nation apart. Almost simultaneously the seed of nationalism had been sown in the hearts of the other races and they were beginning to feel that they, in their turn, faced a tragedy—unless they, too, promoted nationalism and welded themselves into a nation, they might suffer the loss of their country and the destruction of their race.

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The simultaneous growth of two such sentiments within one country meant that the communities grew nationalistic spines which when they were erected pricked their neighbours painfully. It was like Schopenhauer's definition of human beings as 'hedgehogs nestling together for warmth'. And the 'warmth' they sought in common (if such a metaphor can properly be used of countries sweltering in intense tropical heat) was the livelihood that Southeast Asia had, so far, abundantly afforded. But with large-scale immigration came competition, and the growth of economic rivalry between the races was coincident with the growth of nationalism.

[1] Lecture 1.

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In the course of this survey have been quoted numerous opinions on the merits or demerits of the Chinese as colonists in Southeast Asia. Many of these views have been highly critical and unfavourable. Yet they are more than offset in the minds of those of us who feel this bias by the recollection of tributes paid to the community by persons well qualified to make them—as, for example, the European ex-internee whom the writer met in Syme Road internment camp, Singapore, at the time of the Japanese surrender and who exclaimed to him, 'After this I shall *swear* by the Chinese.' (He referred to the many acts of kindness rendered by the Chinese to internees, to persons escaping from the Japanese, and others at the risk of their lives.) Again the writer, at the very moment that this paragraph was written, received a letter from an administrator of long standing in North Borneo in which he declared that 'the Chinese of North Borneo are, generally speaking, the salt of the earth'. Apart from enthusiastic tributes of this kind there are many just appreciations of the value of this people in the writings and reports of past administrators. Francis Light, the founder of Penang, said, 'The Chinese constitute the most valuable part of our inhabitants'; John Crawfurd regarded them as 'an intelligent, active, and commercial people'; Raja James Brooke of Sarawak said, 'Without the Chinese we can do nothing'; the Superintendent of the 1931 Census of North Borneo exclaims jubilantly in his report, 'the one bright spot . . . is the increase that is still shown in the numbers of the Chinese who can fairly be regarded as the mainstay of the commercial and industrial population'. And these examples could be greatly multiplied.

But the fact remains that a great deal of criticism has been levelled against the Chinese by persons, mostly Europeans, which can be boiled down to a few specific charges. The Chinese, it is alleged, are 'greedy', 'materialistic', 'parasitic', 'unconscionably usurious and profiteering', 'have a stranglehold on retail trade', 'have built up a wall against the admission of natives to their trade monopolies', 'form combinations obstructive to government', and 'create enclaves of Chinese nationalism within the countries they inhabit'.

Let us consider whether these charges have any weight.

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The Chinese in the Nanyang have never been in political control; they have therefore never had any political responsibility. The laws have been made by others. They have merely performed the functions the Governments have allowed them to perform.

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S C 578 463 651 Sometimes they have been given a choice of activities. The Spanish, for example, wanted them as peasant agriculturists but tolerated them as traders. Similarly, in Indochina the French wanted them for opening up uncultivated lands, but, since the 'Red Lands' suitable for the cultivation of rubber and other profitable raw materials were barred to all aliens, the Chinese (although he might have been a peasant at home) refused the hard toil of the fields if he could obtain a position with a Chinese firm. In Java the Dutch found the Chinese useful as middlemen, and middlemen they became, accepting the penalty of the resentment of the Javanese that such a function entailed. The farming of the revenue was allotted to them as the highest bidders by the Spanish, the Dutch, and the British alike. Such occupations are labelled 'parasitic', but it must be remembered that they were the best methods of obtaining revenue available before the Governments felt themselves able to collect it for themselves. When they could do so, the farms were abolished. Also, it should be remembered, it was from the Chinese themselves that most of the revenue of the farms was collected. If we accept Mr Furnivall's epithet of 'parasitic' we must extend it to cover the British, Dutch, and French Governments also.

S 578 463 452 426 Given a large and improvident peasantry, as existed in Siam, Indonesia, Indochina, and the Philippines, there was a demand for credit with uncertain security or none at all. This credit was most naturally extended by the traders to whom they sold their produce, and it was most conveniently given in the form of goods and paid for in produce at the time of the harvest. Certainly this gave great power to the Chinese trader; the question is whether he abused it. A survey in Siam by Mr James M. Andrews (see p. 164) does not bear out the widespread belief that the Chinese are unconscionable usurers. 'The Thai farmer [says Mr Andrews], and especially his wife, is much more given to money-lending with the hope of high profits than the Chinese.' As regards alleged profiteering in the rice trade, the College of Agriculture at Los Baños in the Philippines (see p. 635) conducted a survey and found that 'the Chinese merchants are performing essential marketing services at a fairly low cost'. In Indonesia it is notorious that many Indonesian Hajis and Arabs are far greedier money-lenders than are the Chinese. In Malaya it is the chetty and the Sikh who are the money-lenders; not the Chinese. Cases in which Chinese

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figured as lenders were practically unknown.[1] The charge of 'unconscionable usury and profiteering' is, in the writer's opinion, not proved.

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Professor Raymond Firth has gone into the question of Chinese middlemen in the Malayan fishing industry with considerable care. He says that in this role the Chinese performs important functions. He shoulders a great part of the market risks; he supplies considerable capital, in a liquid form, in consumer's goods, or in producer's goods; and he saves the fishermen much trouble in seeking buyers. On the other hand the same observer adds:

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> The system obviously has great dangers. It gives him a monopoly, with little prospect of the fishermen reaping the advantages of the rising market, or of even getting much more than bare subsistence earnings, and it tends very often to place them firmly in his debt, with little chance of extricating themselves and building up their own capital.

Among the Malay fishermen this relationship with the Chinese is variously viewed. One group told Professor Firth that they liked it 'because they can get hold of cash easily'. In several other places, however, the fishermen complained of the low prices they received from the Chinese to whom they were bound to sell. Up to 1939 the attempt of the administration to meet the situation by encouraging co-operative Malay associations for fish-marketing had had only a moderate success.[2]

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It should be added that the provision of credit on reasonable terms for productive enterprise is finally the responsibility of the Governments. Much progress has been made in some Southeast Asian countries in the establishment of landbanks, co-operative societies, &c., in the last half-century, but these advanced money only for 'productive' purposes, and in Indonesia the people have still to go to money-lenders to obtain money for wedding, funeral,

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[1] A London solicitor who was for many years in Malaya, where he had a large practice, remarked to the writer on 10 February 1949, 'I have never known a money-lending Chinese.' Nor can the writer himself, who had considerable experience as a magistrate and as official assignee and liquidator of companies, recollect any such case.

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The writer, on the other hand, has known Britons (of presumed respectability) lending money to Indian chetties at a minimum of 12–15 per cent., who in turn lent it to Malays, Chinese, and others at a rate of interest that can only be guessed!

[2] *Malay Fishermen: Their Peasant Economy*, pp. 14, 61.

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and other expenditure demanded by custom. Moreover, the money-lenders are willing to advance money without the security demanded by landbanks and co-operative societies.

In the matter of trade monopoly it is true that in Siam, Indochina, Indonesia, and the Philippines the Chinese have a virtual monopoly of the rice distribution and milling trades. The Governments of these countries have, to meet the popular agitation, passed legislation to restrict the Chinese share in this trade. The fact that the Chinese maintains his position in face of all this legislation and in face of competition, fair or unfair, is simply because he is so much more competent in the business. Florence Horn (see p. 634) points out that the Filipino politician who charged the Chinese with having half the retail business in their hands changed his ground completely when the reply was made that all the Filipino had to do was to open up a *tienda* on his own and put the Chinese out of business. He then said that the Chinese standard of living was deplorably low, he eats almost nothing and works day and night; therefore he subjects the Filipino to unfair competition! At the same time it must be admitted that the Chinese, having obtained virtual control of some trades, do their best to keep them in their hands and usually employ only their own countrymen. This is naturally galling to the native looking for an opening, but there is a sound business reason for it. They employ their own people because they are, on the whole, better at the job. No European merchant would maintain that a firm should be compelled to employ persons of inferior business capacity, thus exposing the firm to the danger of bankruptcy.

If the Governments of Southeast Asia wish to secure a greater share of the trade of their country for their nationals, they are entitled to legislate accordingly—provided, of course, that the law does not operate harshly or unjustly by depriving an alien of one source of livelihood before he has had a chance of acquiring another. (The economic effect on a country of discriminating against aliens who discharge some useful function is another matter.)

In *Fanny's First Play* Bernard Shaw pokes fun at the critics who will not give an opinion as to the merits of the play until they know 'Who wrote it?' The inference is that such a question is an irrelevance, and that the play should be judged on its own merits. But while we have, so far, attempted to consider the charges

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made against the Chinese 'on their own merits', we do not regard it as at all an irrelevant question to ask 'Who made them?' Apart from a late King of Siam, the persons who have taken it on themselves to indict the Chinese for their alleged shortcomings are nearly all Europeans. Some are administrators, or ex-administrators with even more settled prejudices, some are merchants (though these tend, through greater contact with and therefore greater knowledge of the Chinese, to be fairer to them than the first-named), and some (including the most vitriolic) are mere tourists. The author would say that he has never encountered a European qualified by an adequate knowledge of the language and customs of the Chinese and by long experience of them who delivered himself of downright judgements or sweeping condemnation of that race. Indeed knowledge of the Chinese almost invariably induces a sympathy for them and their difficulties, however much it may be tempered by momentary exasperation or by realization of some personal or collective shortcoming. A reason for the anti-Chinese bias is often that the speaker has identified himself completely with some native race afraid of the Chinese and thus he shares and intensifies the natives' fears and resentments. Another common reason, no doubt, for the charges is that the vices ascribed to the Chinese—shrewdness, foresight, business acumen, keeping one's own counsel—are counted as virtues in the City of London, in Amsterdam, Paris, or New York, and that the indictment of the Chinese race is unconsciously inspired by fear of successful competition.

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But when all these counts are disposed of there remain two which, on the face of them, are much more plausible and which deserve careful scrutiny. One is the charge of 'forming combinations obstructive to government' and of 'creating enclaves of Chinese nationalism in the countries they inhabit'.

There is no doubt that the Chinese have a strong protective clannishness which has kept them intact as a community. This in the past, however, did no particular harm to the communities around them and indeed insulated the latter from Chinese internal conflicts. Moreover their intermarriage with the native population meant that the absorption of their descendants into the native community was only a matter of time. But with the advent of Nationalism the position began to change rapidly. An almost physical wall began to raise itself between the Chinese and the native community.

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S native community. The Chinese National Government manifested
578 an increasing solicitude for the *Hua Ch'iao*, the overseas Chinese,
668 whom it regards almost as its children; it instructed its consular
officials to register all the Chinese within their jurisdiction, and
they sent missions to inspect every activity of overseas Chinese
[871] life. What is more, the Chinese Government took upon itself to
direct the education of Chinese in the Nanyang, laying down the
C curriculum to be followed, and even introducing a system of
578 grants-in-aid in competition with that of the local Government. It
648 often happened that remote officials in Nanking or Chungking,
668 very likely originating from one of the northern provinces and
completely out of touch and sympathy with the Chinese of the
Nanyang, claimed the right to direct their affairs. Even ethnically
speaking the overseas Chinese might be nearer to the Siamese or
Burmese, or (by intermarriage) to the Indonesians, than to a
Chinese from Honam or Kansu. It was no wonder that Siam,
Malaya, and the other countries of Southeast Asia saw an *imperium in imperio* growing up in their midst and began to fear for their
S own eventual safety.

578 This development, then, we are constrained to regard as in
668 many ways a misfortune for the overseas Chinese and for the
177 countries in which they had made their home or wherein they
C were sojourners. It arrested assimilation and erected a racial wall.
578 At the same time the simultaneous growth of local nationalism
encouraged the Chinese to look to their own country for pro-
668 tection—a protection, it turned out, it was, because of its own
648 internal division and weakness as a Power, in no position to give.
Nor did the authorities in the one country of Southeast Asia
177 where the Chinese now were the majority community offer any
real encouragement to the local-born Chinese to regard Malaya
as their own country and to resist the claims to control their
destinies by a remote Government in a country they had never
seen. The chance to extend the teaching of English to the community was lost and for thousands the only means of receiving an education of any sort was in the Chinese Nationalist schools; the doors of the Malayan civil service were opened to Malays but not to Chinese; the whole policy of Federated and Unfederated Malay States was, and is still, pro-Malay. It was surely no wonder that the Malayan-born Chinese who, while proud of their Chinese ancestry and culture, wished to identify themselves and their

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children's future with Malaya alone, were attracted to, or forced into, the Nationalist camp.

Malaya has for long been the 'test case' of Chinese affairs and a focus of interest in Southeast Asia. The situation as it was tending was very clearly described by a distinguished traveller many years ago; Professor Arnold Toynbee records the impression of his visit to the Straits Settlements in these words:

> And China is not only enormous already; it is rapidly getting more enormous (if logically that adjective can be put in the comparative degree). When I touched at the Straits Settlements on my way out east I realized that British Malaya is destined, by 'peaceful penetration', to become a Chinese province, and I fancy, from what I have heard, that the same destiny may be in store for Burma, Siam, French Indo-China, Dutch Indonesia, and the Philippines. In the end the current of Chinese expansion in the Tropics will meet the current of Hindu expansion over the submerged heads of the smaller and weaker and less efficient peoples in between, who are already fast going under. And, after what has happened, I surmise that the new frontier between China and India will tend, slowly but surely, to travel westward at India's expense and in China's favour.

What happened in Malaya, we cannot too frequently remind ourselves, was not the result of military conquest, not the territorial spoils of a Kublai Khan, but because the British had welcomed the immigration of a couple of million Chinese. For long after the intervention in the Malay States it had been found difficult to attract the British capital needed for the opening up of the country: it was not until a plentiful supply first of Indian and then of Chinese labour was assured that such capital was forthcoming, and it was not until the end of the 1920s that there was any control at all of Chinese immigration.

The British Colonial Office and the Malayan Governments must have seen that the admission of Chinese in such numbers that they would eventually be the majority community was bound to create a problem of tremendous magnitude. Even the degree of assimilation taking place in Siam and Indochina was out of the question because of the barrier of the Mohammedan religion. The only hope now for the future of Malaya in the interest of its diverse peoples was to promote a feeling of common Malayan citizenship to counter the claim, tacit or express, of Chinese Nationalism to consider Malaya as a new province of China. In the pre-war years

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this was a policy which the British neglected to pursue with any conviction, and the post-war experiment in this direction, the Malayan Union, was abandoned at the first sign of opposition. Unless a true 'Malayan citizenship' can be made effective, the ideal of a Malayan nation forming, as it were, a buffer State between China, Indonesia, and India, with bonds with all three but belonging to none, will remain a phantom.

In the present crisis the great and deplorable weakness of the Chinese in Southeast Asia is the absence of effective leadership (and the few notable exceptions to this generalization do not affect its truth). This is due in large part to the fact that there has grown up no Chinese middle class of sufficient proportions to provide disinterested, well-educated, and competent individuals in the numbers needed to guide their community through the reefs of politics towards a safe anchorage. The business leaders are so busy making money (or endeavouring not to lose it) that few of them have time to devote to public affairs even if they had the will and the knowledge. In Malaya, at least, the Indian stands in sharp contrast to the Chinese, and in Singapore Indian representation on the various bodies is vastly greater in proportion to their numbers than is the case with the much more numerous Chinese. This is not explicable solely by Chinese political pique but must be due largely to the training in politics and administration the Indians received in their own country during the British Raj. In Malaya, Indonesia, and Indochina the British, Dutch, and French have neglected to afford opportunities for the Chinese residents to acquire a knowledge of affairs. The penalty of this neglect is that now, when European control is loosening, the mass of the Chinese have few leaders to take control and to consolidate their community in face of the Communist advance. The lack of experience and education determines also the quality of the Communist leadership in these regions. Among the Malayan Communists are no Mao Tse-tungs or Chou En-lais and scarcely any individuals with more than the rudimentary mis-education obtainable in Chinese vernacular schools. The result is that the old professional bandit (always a feature of Malaya's jungle-fringe) is more prominent than he would otherwise be, and terrorism is unmitigated by constructive politics. Is it, therefore, strange that in 1949 the majority of Nanyang Chinese were 'sitting on the fence' awaiting the final upshot in China and its repercussions overseas? In such

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circumstances a handful of Chinese Communists, many of them uneducated youths with a strong professional bandit element as just mentioned, had almost complete freedom of action through the time-honoured weapons of intimidation and extortion. With this insidious pressure, and with little support or sympathy from the European Powers or the native peoples, the Chinese of Southeast Asia were indeed in a dilemma.

With the advent of militant Communism came a final complication to the lives of the overseas Chinese. The appeal of the Communists is to the idea of a society horizontally but not vertically divided—that is, divided into classes, but with a proletariat which cuts across racial and community divisions. So far this appeal had been listened to by only a small minority of the Chinese, and with the Malays and other races it had been an almost complete failure. But let no one underestimate the attraction it might have for the masses of Southeast Asia if they were simultaneously convinced of the sincerity of the Communist professions and of the bankruptcy of 'bourgeois' promises.

The only way to stem the advance of Communism in Southeast Asia is to raise the standard of living. The irony of such a course for the colonial Powers is that in promoting a rise in the standard of living they are hastening their own departure. Improved material welfare stimulates political awareness. Whereas in the grand old days of their trading companies they could lord it over a province with a garrison of a score of soldiers, to-day with armies of a hundred thousand they remain only on sufferance. It is of no use, however, their elder statesmen and administrators of a bygone age urging the Governments to 'go slow'. The idea of representative government came from the West, but the rate of approach to it is largely fixed by the peoples themselves. All that the colonial Powers can aim at is to leave their ex-dependencies able to decide their own future and not at the mercy of new imperialisms.

We take leave of the Chinese in Southeast Asia at a time when they are undergoing one of the greatest trials in their history. The whole of the Far East is disintegrating as it moves towards a new and mysterious synthesis. These emigrants belong to a race which for at least one hundred and twenty generations, through the rise, flowering, decline, and petrifaction of the Chinese culture, has preserved a unified attitude of mind towards life and reality, and they look towards their parent civilization and see it once more in

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a state of flux. This is no new phenomenon: it has happened a score of times in Chinese history and each time China has found a new level of stability. It was (it has been said) like a cube; overthrown by civil convulsion it falls flat on another side and is once more the same solid mass. Will it be so again? This is the moot question. The forces causing the upheaval are more powerful and destructive than ever before. They are the same forces which have shaped and are shaping the materialistic, sceptic, technological method of life that we in the West know as civilization. Can China receive the full impact of these forces and remain essentially the China of all time? The event alone will answer this, though it may be nearer than we imagine in the ever-accelerating tempo of change.

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These are long-term, philosophical questions. The more immediate practical question for the Chinese of Southeast Asia, for the peoples among whom they live, and for the rest of the world that has contact or dealings with this area (which is, in effect, everyone), is how this vital and active people will fit into the dispensation of to-morrow. It is a question that every diplomat, administrator, merchant, or student of international affairs should tax his mind to answer in advance of the event, and for this task a necessary preliminary is some knowledge of the nature, the development, and the aspirations of the overseas Chinese. This is what this work, in small compass, attempts to supply.

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APPENDIX I

THE SOUTHERN DIALECTS OF CHINESE

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WHAT are commonly known as the dialects of Chinese are confined practically to the coastal provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, Chêkiang, and Kiangsu; but there are not inconsiderable extensions into the adjoining areas of Kwangsi, Kiangsi, and Anhwei. Within the Northern Chinese ('Mandarin') area there are indeed districts in which important differences from the standard speech still exist, but these districts are largely under the influence of the speech of the capital of the later dynasties, Peiping, from which the southern coastal regions have been protected by their distance and by natural obstacles. The same forces have had the effect that within this relatively small part of China the differences from dialect to dialect are in many cases as great as those which divide the dialects as a whole from the standard language; and not less than those which separate distinct national languages in other parts of the world. 197

It is in fact the case that, apart from the phonetic archaisms by which these dialects are placed closer to Ancient Chinese (the standard dialect of the capital, then at Sian in Shensi, as interpreted by Bernhard Karlgren in 1915), they have little in common which they do not also share with the northern forms of Chinese. The outline of the history of the main groups which follows will make this plain, as well as the causes by which it has been brought about. The archaisms consist in the retention of the old final consonants *-k*, *-t*, and *-p* (throughout a major part of this area); of a fuller form of certain initial combinations in a number of words; of the distinction between final *-n* and *-m*; and of a more complete tonal system. All these features existed in the Ancient Chinese of the sixth century, but have been universally lost in the great Northern Chinese region. [194]

If we exclude from this survey the Wu dialects (spoken in the ancient kingdom of Wu, around the mouth of the Yangtsze), the speakers of which do not contribute largely to the numbers of Chinese emigrants, the remaining forms of speech in this area may be divided into three main groups of dialects: Cantonese, Hakka, and the Fukien dialects.

I. Cantonese, itself with several well-marked sub-dialects, chief among which is the Se-Yap group of the western delta of the Canton River, is commercially the most important of the southern forms of Chinese. It is spoken by the majority of the population of Kwangtung, at least as a second language, though its actual area of usage is not very 197 162

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great; the numerousness of its speakers is due to its being the speech of the great commercial centres of Hong Kong, Canton, Fatshan, Macau, Wuchow (in Kwangsi), as well as a number of smaller towns; and its speakers have tended to form colonies in the areas of other dialects in the trading ports all over the south, as in Kweilin, Fuchow, and Chiungchow. It is probably the oldest-established form of Chinese in the southern provinces, and has developed independently of the Northern language at least since the tenth century of our era, and in all probability since much earlier. Cantonese has kept the full range of eight tones of Ancient Chinese, and has even added a ninth by subdivision of one of the others, whereas the tendency in the north has been consistently towards their reduction. With a much fuller consonantal system than the Northern dialects, it has had less need to resort to compound words to distinguish homophones, and so expresses meanings with greater economy of syllables. Its divergence from Northern Chinese is mainly due to its preservation of an older phase of the language, its independent innovations being few and chiefly in the matter of tones and vocalism. In vocabulary—differences in vocabulary between Chinese dialects affect mainly the pronouns and particles—it has more affinity with the forms of Northern Chinese in use along the lower Yangtsze than with other southern dialects, except Hakka.

II. The Hakkas, speakers of the second most widespread dialect of Kwangtung, entered the province from the northeast about the thirteenth century, leaving on their way a number of now-isolated colonies in Kiangsi and northern Fukien. There is no clear boundary between Cantonese and Hakka, as the two peoples tend to occupy separate villages in the same areas; in urban districts Hakka is losing ground to Cantonese, bilinguals being mostly Hakkas. They occupy a broad belt of country beginning a short distance north of Canton city and running east and west, and many have penetrated into Hainan, adding to the linguistic complexity of that island. Hakka, like Cantonese, differs from standard Chinese particularly in being more archaic, but its archaism is less pronounced, and it distinguishes itself by peculiar tonal developments resulting in a much greater proportion of aspirated consonants than in other dialects, and moreover prefers aspirates to fricative consonants; a number of Hakka words, for example, begin with *kh* (i.e. aspirated *k*) where Cantonese has *h* or *f*. It keeps the final stop consonants, but tends to substitute final *t* for *k* in certain cases. The tonal system is very vigorous, overshadowing even syllable stress.

III. Sharply defined against the two great dialects of Kwangtung are those which, however they differ between themselves, have in common an origin in a very old stratum of Chinese spoken, probably since the Han dynasty, in Fukien province. This older stratum is marked by great

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aversion to fricatives, and so retains the initial *p-* in a large class of words in which all other dialects show a development to *f-*. It is less conservative of final consonants than are the dialects dealt with above, and tends to show a nasalized vowel in place of the final nasal consonants. The local patois of the northern half of Fukien have gone much farther in reduction of final consonants than have the remainder of this group. Common to the whole group is also a peculiar vocabulary; in place of the words for 'son', 'die', 'love', 'house', and many other basic ideas, where the remaining dialects have words which, however different their phonetic evolution, are derived from the same ancient Chinese forms, Fukien dialects have a series of words peculiar to themselves.

The Fukien group is conveniently divided into four sub-groups:

1. The most distinctive in many ways are those spoken in the southern parts of the province and, as a result of modern emigration, on the island of Taiwan, as well as in the immediately adjacent parts of Kwangtung. The chief varieties recognized are those of Amoy, Swatow, and Chaochow. The most remarkable feature of this group is a double pronunciation of its vocabulary. An illustration is the case of the English words 'cattle' and 'chattel' on the one hand, 'capital' on the other; these are in origin the same word, but the last may be regarded as a learned pronunciation of the two former (specialized, of course, in meaning). The duplication in the southern Fukien dialects is of this kind, but it extends to the full range of the large Chinese vocabulary to the degree that the words are used in the colloquial language at all. What are called the literary forms are the only forms used in reading, but in the course of time considerable numbers of literary forms have, in certain phrases, spread into the colloquial language, generally with slightly different meanings from those of their popular counterparts. The origin of this wholesale duplication is itself interesting. During the T'ang dynasty (A.D. 618–906) a new standard dialect was introduced into China, having its roots in an area in the province of Shansi, where certain of its peculiarities still survive in the local speech. On the downfall of that dynasty, north China reverted to the old tradition, and it is on this that modern Northern Chinese is based. But it appears that in a resinicization of Fukien towards the end of T'ang its court dialect was imposed as a literary language on the population of the province; and there its peculiar features, chief of which is the substitution of initial *g-*, *d-*, *b-* (in some dialects *k-*, *t-*, *p-*) for earlier *ng-*, *n-*, *m-*, still make the literary pronunciation, and in some few cases (as in the word *be* for 'horse', where every other dialect has something like *ma*) have penetrated into everyday speech.

2. The northern dialects of the province agree in their loss of final consonants, and in little else except their derivation from the early pre-

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197 T'ang stratum of Chinese. Excluding Fuchowese, to be separately
162 treated, the chief among them are those of Kienyang and Kienning.

3. The Hainanese dialect was obviously carried to Hainan by immigrants from the south of Fukien, as its basis is the old dialect of that province; but in its new home it has evolved peculiarities of its own
197 which place it apart from the rest of the group. Whereas other Fukien dialects avoid fricative sounds, Hainanese develops an *f-* sound from
194 aspirated *p-*; but its strangest characteristic is the radical transformation of initial dentals. Here all initial sibilants have become *t-*, while a new *s-* sound has evolved from the aspirated affricate, *ts-* or *tsh-* (i.e. English *ch-*). On the other hand, the initial aspirated *t-* is represented by *h-*. These changes, which give a very peculiar aspect to the language, are curiously reminiscent of similar changes in the Se-Yap subdialect of Cantonese on the mainland opposite.

[162] 4. The dialect of Fuchow city, said not to be understood farther than some forty miles from Fuchow itself, is isolated among the dialects of the province. Here again a foreign dialect has been superimposed on the original Fukien stratum, but in this case it is the standard Northern Chinese, in a rather antique form, and not the T'ang standard speech with its *d-* for *n-*, &c. This Northern Chinese dialect has been accommodated to the phonetic habits of the northern half of Fukien, with the result that final consonants are seriously reduced, all distinction between the final nasals on the one hand, between final stops on the other, being lost.

[162 The complicated linguistic pattern of Fukien province, itself due to the difficulty of communications in a country so cut up by natural
191] accidents, probably accounts for the fact that the modern standard Chinese, the 'National Language' (*kuo yü*), has made more progress there than in Kwangtung, where the commercial value of Cantonese as a lingua franca has so far protected it from displacement.

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APPENDIX II

A NOTE ON CHINESE JUNKS

THE writers who treat the Chinese junk with scorn (says Mr Donnelly)[1] are invariably landlubbers. They have not studied the junk at sea, in harbour, and at work, nor the sailorman himself and his prowess as seafarer and navigator. 501 502

This is an opinion echoed by other modern European authorities. Here is an example:[2]

'As an engine for carrying man and his commerce upon the high and stormy seas' (writes Mr H. Warington Smyth) 'it is doubtful if any class of vessel is more suited or better adapted to its purpose; and it is certain that for flatness of sail and for handiness the Chinese rig is unsurpassed.' He goes on to point out that in scientific fore-and-aft sailing and in the use of centre-boards, windlasses, and labour-saving devices, the Chinese remained ahead of Europe until the middle of the nineteenth century. The large five-masted junks of well over a thousand tons, such as used to trade with Africa, seem to have disappeared for the same reason that the larger Indian vessels disappeared. It was found safer to entrust a large and valuable cargo to a ship that looked like an English ship. [505]

Mr Parkinson, however, gives a somewhat qualified approval of the 'Chinese sailorman'. Neither lascars nor Chinese (he says) made bad seamen, both being useful *in fine weather* and the Chinese especially so.[3] The same writer remarks that 'as far as mere physical possibility goes, it must be remembered that a Chinese junk was once sailed to Europe, although it took a European to do it'.[4] 502

Until less than a century before the Portuguese reached the East, Chinese junks regularly visited the shores of southern Asia.[5] Calicut was in the fifteenth century a principal centre where they assembled to trade: 439 487

Hither came, once a year—for only during the summer months were the Chinese Seas navigable—a large trading fleet from the ports of China. The huge Chinese junks, with their fixed sails of matted reeds, never lowered, even in harbour, and mainly propelled by oars of immense length, and having on board gardens of growing vegetables, and large chambers for the ships' officers and their families, so that each was as it were a floating town, were objects of curious interest to the Arabian sailors. The largest was reputed to carry a thousand persons, and each 501

[1] I. A. Donnelly, *Chinese Junks and other Native Craft* (Shanghai, Kelly & Walsh, 1924) p. 5.

[2] C. Northcote Parkinson, *Trade in the Eastern Seas, 1793–1813* (Cambridge University Press, 1937) p. 328.

[3] ibid., p. 215. [4] ibid., p. 6.

[5] Edgar Prestage, *The Portuguese Pioneers* (London, Black, 1933) p. 315.

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501 was attended by three smaller craft for the purpose of loading and unloading.[1]

[716] But as war-ships they would not have been of much use against the Portuguese even if they had still been in these waters when the latter arrived. The hard woods used in the construction of Eastern vessels forbade the use of nails, and their heavy planks were rudely made with coco-nut cordage and wooden pins. Steering-gear and ground-tackle were of a rudimentary sort. Even a moderate gale rendered the ship scarcely manageable.

There were several types of Chinese junk of which, in this present survey, we are concerned only with the southern type of sea-going craft. This type had some outstanding peculiarities. The bow is open with two wings or cheeks on either side with a transverse beam fitted between to which the anchor windlass is attached. The junk has great single-fluke anchors twelve or nine feet in length, and weighted very often with stones. Four-fluke iron anchors are also used. Every junk is divided into watertight compartments. No ribs are used at all. The wetted surface of the junk is reduced almost to the theoretical minimum in comparison with its displacement. The stern is always higher than the bow, as it was in all European ships in former times. In this (Mr Donnelly thinks) the Chinese practice is correct, especially for work round the coast, since the vessel will easily head to wind in a gale, and, moreover, stands a better chance against being 'pooped' by an overtaking wave in a heavy sea. Also, from his point of vantage on the high poop, where he works his unwieldy tiller, the steersman commands a good view over the bow of the boat.[2]

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The junks used in the coolie trade with Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century were of about 300–400 tons burden, though they occasionally reached 1,200 tons. The usual junk had a crew of ninety-odd, a number sufficient to man five European vessels of the same size. From the construction of these vessels they could only sail before the wind—the small sail at the stern which allows a modern junk to tack being a recent innovation. At least, this is what is commonly stated, but Sir Roland Braddell says that this probably goes too far. 'At all events (he says) we know that Chinese junks of the 12th century A.D. could use not only a stern wind, but wind off or towards the shore could also be used.'[3]

502 The Chinese had some books on navigation but no charts. Finlayson (quoted by Braddell) writes of the junks which visited Singapore from China in 1821 that

they had neither chart nor book of any description on board, nor any

[1] E. J. Payne in *Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge University Press, 1902) i. 27.

[2] Donnelly, op. cit.

[3] *JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (1941) p. 49.

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written document to point out their route. They had no means even of ascertaining the ship's way, neither did it appear that they kept an account of transactions on board. They had a rude compass, set in a wooden frame, and divided into twenty-four points, which they did not appear to put great dependence on, and this was probably the only nautical instrument on board.[1] 502

Junks bound for Singapore from Canton or Amoy crept along the coast until they came to about 112° east longitude, then they steered for a cluster of islands off the coast of Hainan, kept with the coast of that island until they reached the southern extremity, and thence they steered due south for the coast of Cochinchina. They kept in with the land until they made Cape St James, then made for Pulau Condore and after that for Pulau Tioman. Sometimes they kept in with the land until they reached Cape Padaran, from whence they took their departure from land and shaped a course for Singapore.[2] Their track on their return journey was much the same. The voyage took 20–30, sometimes 40, days. The coolies, as we have seen,[3] had a very uncomfortable time, especially during a storm, when they were nailed down under hatches. (Sir Hugh Clifford has a terrifying story of a junk on which cholera broke out.) 487 502

When this study was about to go to press the author obtained from Sir Frederick Maze, lately Inspector-General of the Maritime Customs in China, the loan of the draft of his unpublished article, 'Chinese Junks and Notes on Coast and Rivers', with permission to quote it in this work. Time and space do not permit a full utilization of this valuable material, but the following short extract will greatly strengthen this Appendix. 501 114

Chinese vessels are generally divided into two principal classes—Northern and Southern. The Northern Craft have bluff bows and flat bottoms. This form of construction was adopted because the ports to which they trade are situated on rivers where grounding on shoals is not infrequent. In South China, where deeper harbours exist, hulls have sharper bows and greater draught. The Chinese have displayed unusual originality in respect of ship construction and mechanical contrivances where sailing vessels and small craft are concerned. One hundred and fifty years ago their appliances for hoisting sails, etc., were superior to corresponding equipment in foreign ships. But they have not progressed with the times and of late years have lagged behind in the field of modern ship-building and navigation. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that their ancient-looking junks (which continue to be constructed in the form followed by shipbuilders of medieval times) are 'box-like' structures unsuitable for sailing in the Seven Seas. The opposite is the case. Their 501

[1] ibid. p. 69.

[2] Mr J. V. Mills, who has made a study of these matters, thinks that the former course is the more likely one.

[3] See p. 345.

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501 under-water lines are skilfully designed, and they are unusually dry vessels at sea.

Some characteristic features appear in them all, including the division of hulls into water-tight compartments; the provision of either lee-boards or centre-boards (drop-keels); lug-sails and the ingenious 'multiple-sheet'; a uniform system of manual propulsion; and the balanced rudder. In some districts (e.g. the Fukien Province) the heavy pole masts of sea-going vessels are not stayed, but in other localities stays are fitted as in Occidental countries. The masts of some of the larger junks are 'built-up' or encased with bamboo slats, held in position with iron collars. The idea of a balanced rudder was conceived in China before it was adopted in Europe, and is found chiefly in river boats; in coastal regions the rudder is lowered in deep water and thus forms a sort of drop-keel. They are frequently perforated. This practice permits the leverage to operate further aft, without unduly impeding the movement of the rudder. The sails of junks are made in the form of balanced-lugs, stiffened by battens to each of which a section of the multiple-sheet is bent, thus keeping them flat and enabling vessels to lay as close to the wind as a yacht canvassed by Lapthorne himself, although making more leeway. The multiple-sheet keeps all the battens, including the upper one or 'gaff', at nearly the same angle in relation to the keel as the boom, which is not the case in foreign-rigged vessels, with single sheets attached to the boom only. With this form of sail, reefing as understood in Europe and America becomes unnecessary—in order to shorten sail, the halliards are eased off and the weight of the sail and battens reduces it to the required dimensions between the topping lifts. In some districts sprit-sails are used after the fashion of the Thames barge, and Northern sea-going junks occasionally carry top-sails and other extra sails for light weather, which have the appearance of stay-sails. . . .

Sir Frederick goes on to describe the Chinese system of manual propulsion of craft by means of the so-called 'yuloh' Yuloh or yaolu means 'to scull' and is the expression used by foreigners to describe the Chinese oar, or *lu*. Yulohing is a scientific development of sculling. The mechanics of the yuloh are ingenious. It operates on an iron pivot fixed over the stern which fits into a socket on the oar, thus reducing friction. The line which secures it to the deck or thwart—according to the size of the vessel concerned—balances the weight of the blade, keeps it at the correct angle, and serves to support the oarsman, assisting him, more-over, to feather the oar. An important feature is the elbow or 'kink' on the inboard or loom section of the oar.

501 114 In conclusion it may be said that there could be no better introduction to the study of the Chinese junk than the examination of the splendid collection of large-scale models of Chinese sea-going junks presented to the nation by Sir Frederick Maze and displayed on the second floor of the Science Museum at South Kensington. It includes various examples of Chinese maritime architecture carefully built to scale by skilled Chinese

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craftsmen. The captions affixed to the glass cases have meaning for the layman as well as for the shipbuilder and the seaman.

The Compass. A short note on the thorny question of the mariner's compass may not be out of place here. 502

Gibbon in *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, under the page-heading A.D. 532, says:[1]

> . . . if the Chinese, with the knowledge of the compass, had possessed the genius of the Greeks or Phoenicians, they might have spread their discoveries over the southern hemisphere. I am not qualified to examine, and I am not disposed to believe, their distant voyages to the Persian Gulf, or the Cape of Good Hope.

But *did* the ancient Chinese have a 'knowledge of the compass'? There has been heated controversy among European scholars on this point for over a century.[2] But there is now little doubt that the claim to have invented the compass formerly advanced in favour of the Chinese is ill-founded.[3] What the early Chinese histories speak about is the 'south-pointing chariot'; not the compass used on a ship. The properties of the lodestone were known to the ancient Chinese, but the earliest mention in any literature of the use of the mariner's compass is in the twelfth century. The earliest unquestionable description of a pivoted compass is contained in the remarkable *Epistola de Magnete* of Petrus Peregrinus de Maricourt, Lucera, 1269.[4] The Chinese, previous to this time, seem to have used the lodestone for geomantic purposes, as indeed they still do. But in the era referred to by Gibbon they do not appear to have been in possession of the mariner's compass.[5] [787]

[1] Chap. xl (London, Murray, 1846) iii. 506.

[2] For an account of the controversy to date see H. A. Giles, *Adversaria Sinica* (Shanghai, Kelly & Walsh, 1905–9) p. 107 ff.

[3] *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (University of Chicago Press, 1945) vi. 175.

[4] In a treatise entitled *De Utensilibus*, by Alexander Neckam (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, loc. cit.).

[5] See also A. C. Moule, 'The South-pointing Carriage', *T'oung Pao*, vol. xxiii (1924) pp. 83–8, which calls attention to a very important article by M. Hashimoto which is also cited in 'L'origine de la rose des vents et l'invention de la boussole', by Léopold de Saussure in Gabriel Ferrand's *Introduction à l'Astronomie Nautique Arabe* (Paris, Paul Geuthner, 1928) i. 59 ff.; G. Ferrand, *Instructions Nautiques et Routiers Arabes et Portuguais des XVe et XVIe siècles* (Paris, Paul Geuthner, 1923, 1925); Chau Ju-kua, op. cit. p. 28 fn. 3; Mulder in *T'oung Pao* (1942) p. 5 fn. and 9 fn.; G. R. G. Worcester, *The Junks and Sampans of the Yangtze* (1947) pp. 91–4. See also Chu Chieh-chin, 'Notes on Ancient Chinese Junks' (in Chinese), in *Journal of the South Seas Society*, Singapore, Dec. 1948.

I am indebted to Mr J. V. Mills for most of my references in this note on the mariner's compass. V. P.

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APPENDIX III

DISPLACED OVERSEAS CHINESE[1]

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THE largest group of externally displaced persons in China after the war with Japan consisted of overseas Chinese. These people, mostly small traders or labourers from the countries of Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, and islands of the southwest Pacific, were born abroad of Chinese parents or had worked abroad for years and had established domiciles in their adopted countries. Some were visiting their families in China and found return to their domiciles blocked after the extension of the Second World War to the Pacific in December 1941. About 3,000 skilled mechanics had gone to China earlier to help in the war effort against the Japanese, and these, too, were cut off from their homes abroad. Some had fled into China before the advancing Japanese and were cut off mainly in Hong Kong, Indochina, and Burma.

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Distribution of Displaced Overseas Chinese in China on 18 April 1946

Domicile	*Szechwan*	*Yunnan*	*Fukien*	*Kwangtung*	*Total*
Burma	873	5,794	20,626	2,098	29,391
Borneo	12	1	1,656	..	1,669
Hong Kong	619	..	879	101,185	102,683
Indochina	274	336	3,736	1,453	5,799
Malaya	737	665	23,426	2,486	27,314
Indonesia	194	181	14,640	167	15,182
Philippines	109	4	19,115	115	19,343
Siam	200	565	913	1,508	3,186
Other countries	344	..	..	..	344
	3,362	7,546	84,991	109,012	204,911

Thus stranded, the displaced overseas Chinese were scattered in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Fukien, Kweichau, Yunnan, and Szechwan provinces, and in Taiwan. The principal concentrations were in or near the southern ports of Canton, Swatow, Amoy, and Foochow, the native districts and traditional embarkation points of most of the overseas Chinese, and in or near Kunming at the eastern end of the Burma Road. According to the Chinese Overseas Affairs Commission, there were, on 1 April 1946, approximately 200,000 displaced overseas Chinese in

[1] Authorities: Katrine R. C. Greene, 'Repatriating China's Expatriates', *Far Eastern Survey*, vol. xvii, no. 4 (25 February 1948). *New York Times* (6 April 1948). *Rehabilitation of Overseas Chinese* (in Chinese) (Nanking, Government Information Office, July 1947). *Negotiation of Immigration Problems* (in Chinese) (Nanking, Government Information Office, October 1947). *Preparatory Commission for International Refugee Organization*, Prep/32 (25 April 1947). Also information supplied to the writer by UNRRA officials.

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the four southern provinces. About 100,000 were from Hong Kong and most of these would be expected to return by their own resources.

Since the above figures were found to include old registrations of persons who had returned home before the war reached the Pacific, or who had settled permanently in China, the Displaced Persons Division of UNRRA in co-operation with CNRRA undertook downward revision resulting in an estimate of 42,000[1] as the number needing assistance in returning from China to their domiciles abroad. The number actually aided slightly exceeded this estimate, and the work involved in doing so was long and complex.

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For displaced persons going to some countries, especially Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines, there ensued long periods of waiting in refugee camps while permission to land was being sought, and this led frequently to severe hardships. Some persons thus delayed found employment locally or, in desperation, tried to get back to their homes by any means they could, legal or otherwise; others endured privations until the necessary negotiations and arrangements could be concluded.

With some Governments there was no question regarding the granting of permission to return (e.g. Hong Kong), but the Philippines Government refused to receive any displaced persons except as part of the five hundred quota. With other countries there was a variation between these two extremes. In Indonesia and Indochina civil disturbances upset arrangements. Rising nationalism and the desire to establish greater internal control of economic and commercial life produced in some countries resistance to the readmission of overseas Chinese.

The UNRRA visa, recognized by five out of seven of the countries, was devised as a substitute for the consular visa in the absence of consular authorities at the port of embarkation in China. The cost of transport was U.S. $1 million.

Let us now consider the position in reverse—namely, the number of Chinese in Southeast Asian countries displaced from China and awaiting repatriation. The table on p. 684 shows the position on 30 June 1947.

In view of the refusal of the Philippines Government to permit Chinese displaced persons to return legally to the islands (except as immigrants on a strictly quota basis), the considerable number of Chinese returned to China from the Philippines appears outstanding; UNRRA used this figure as a bargaining point in Manila, but without success.

In Malaya, of the 78,502 persons (of all races, but the majority Chinese) *known* to have been sent to Siam by the Japanese to work on the Siam–Burma railway, 23,351 are recorded as having died, 15,987

[1] The analysis is not available.

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were repatriated, and 39,164 are shown as having absconded or are otherwise not accounted for.

Deaths from this tragic happening could not, therefore, have been fewer than 25,000 and may well have reached 50,000. The death-roll from air-raids and associated causes is variously estimated as being between 5,000 and 10,000; while the number executed is placed at between 10,000 and 20,000.[1]

Repatriation of Displaced Persons to China

From:	*Returned during UNRRA programme (Sept. 1945–30 June 1947)*	*Awaiting repatriation (approx. number on 30 June 1947)*
British North Borneo	15	1,200
Burma	46	50
India	0	562
Indochina	1	280
Italy	171	0
Malayan Union	22	100
Indonesia	692	1,217
New Britain	750	0
Philippines	6,587	0
Siam	65	0
Singapore	300	100
Solomon Islands	0	9
Still 'unscreened' (i.e. examined to decide whether or not they are genuinely 'displaced persons')	..	3,000
	8,640	6,518

[1] M. V. del Tufo, *Malaya: a Report of the 1947 Census of Population*, p. 29.

1 [See 26: del Tufo, AN1 Malaya -- Analyst]

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APPENDIX IV

THE SQUATTER PROBLEM IN MALAYA

To a study of the Report of the Squatter Committee (from which extensive extracts are given below) the remarks of Professor Raymond Firth in his *Report of Social Science Research in Malaya*[1] provide a very suitable background. The remarks should be read in their entirety, but the following extract will indicate their scope. 114

Study of a Newly formed Chinese Agricultural Community

Chinese rural communities of fairly recent formation are common in many parts of Malaya, especially on the West Coast. . . . These communities have several main features in common. The first is that they are essentially of spontaneous establishment on lands not set aside for the purpose, but even already appropriated to other use, as forest reserves or Malay reservations. In this respect as squatters they are apt to be an embarrassment to the Government. The second feature is that it is primarily economic inducements which keep them there now that the fear of the Japanese has gone. They are also in most cases making a successful living through rice as their subsistence crop and tobacco or bananas as their cash crop. All inducements to move, therefore, they counter with the proposition that it must be made worth their while. In some cases, but not necessarily all, they appear to be exhausting the soil fertility by their methods of cultivation. This is in strong contrast to the treatment of the land by Chinese who own it or intend to settle there permanently. It is clearly a reflection of two things—their sense of insecurity in their holdings, and their policy of drawing whatever return they can from the present price inflation without consideration of future land needs. Thirdly they have not been adequately caught up into the system of local government, and proper representation of their views and proper control of their activities from the administrative point of view is usually a matter of *ad hoc* assignment and experiment. This is due in part to their recent establishment. But it is also to some extent due to the inadequate provision as yet made by the government administration of Chinese communities in what has ordinarily been considered as primarily Malay rural areas. . . . 361 423 241 [311] [631]

In the Malay States all land not held under title is State land and vests in the Malay ruler. Before the war the disposal of the land and the collection of revenue was in the hands of the British Residents. Under the Federation constitution of 1948 land is not one of the subjects on which the Federal Legislative Council can legislate and it appears that the disposal of the land is entirely in the hands of the rulers. 421

[1] (Singapore, Government Printing Office, 1948) pp. 31, 32.

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421 To protect the Malays in the possession of their lands, large Malay reservations were created from 1913 onwards in which the land can be
657 alienated only to Malays and must thereafter remain in Malay hands. The Malay Reservations Enactment of 1913 defines 'Malay' as follows: 'Malay means a person belonging to any Malayan race who speaks the Malay language or any Malayan language and professes the Mohammedan religion.' The term therefore included Indonesians even if they had only just arrived in Malaya.

'These reservations [says Professor Rupert Emerson] appear clearly to have been erected less as a bulwark against European capitalist pressures than against the swarming Chinese, who in filling up the vacant spaces and driving the Malays off the land into virtual serfdom might form an even more serious threat to British political and economic dominance in a not too distant future.'[1] However, the creation of the reservations did not mean that other races were excluded from holding land, and during the decades before Japan entered the Second World War many thousands of acres of excellent State land—just as good as that in the reservations—was alienated to Europeans, Chinese, Indians, &c. In 1933, after a long period of leniency, the administration took firm action to prevent the ingenious devices through which some Chinese were evading the intention of the law. Nevertheless, Chinese in large numbers 'squatted' on State land outside the Malay reservations, and during the trade depres-
[656] sion of 1930–2 their numbers greatly increased. It was not considered expedient to interfere with them, though most of them had no title to the land they occupied. During the Japanese occupation many Chinese encroached on the Malay reservations with the connivance of the Japanese. On the return of the British in 1945 there was a great food shortage, and since these trespassing squatters were contributing to the food supply they were not immediately ejected. Chinese squatters had also taken possession of the vacant land created by the cutting down of rubber trees by the Japanese to make more room for growing food crops. But (as indicated in the report of the Squatter Committee) there was a far greater number of squatters on State land, forest reserve, and on land under private ownership than in Malay reservations.

669 The outbreak of the terrorist campaign in June 1948 brought the Chinese squatter community unto unenviable prominence. Much of the
656 land occupied by them was on the fringes of the jungle and the squatter settlements were made use of for shelter and supplies by the terrorists,
361 who also conscripted man-power from them. Since the squatters were intimidated into silence, the police and the military could not obtain information regarding a terrorist outbreak. The result was that reprisals

[1] *Malaysia: a Study in Direct and Indirect Rule* (New York, Macmillan, 1937) p. 478.

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were taken against the settlements: huts were burnt down and crops destroyed. Later on a policy was followed of either moving the squatters from the strategic areas and re-settling them elsewhere, or else repatriating considerable numbers of them to China. The natural result of these circumstances was that the squatters as a community became disaffected from the Government (even if they had been well-disposed towards it or merely neutral before) and some were willing co-operators with the terrorists. Later the squatters were treated with more consideration.

At length, in December 1948, the High Commissioner appointed, to investigate the squatter problem, a committee consisting of eight persons—three Europeans, three Malays, and one Chinese—under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary, Sir Alec Newboult. The report of this committee was dated 10 January 1949,[1] and the following are extracts from the main findings and recommendations:

> There has always been a certain number of Chinese squatters in this country and they have in the past served a useful purpose. They have been one of the principal sources of supply of fresh vegetables and they have served as a reservoir for casual labour. Their present numbers however far exceed anything they were before the war and from sample estimates of areas in different States may well amount to several hundred thousand. The reasons for this increase are various but the main causes are thought to be as follows:
>
> (i) The natural increase of population coupled with the influx of Chinese women into Malaya during the last fifteen years.
>
> (ii) The dislocation of labour during the Japanese occupation which resulted from the closing down of estates and mines. Some of this unemployed labour gravitated to the rice-producing areas of the country where rice could be obtained comparatively cheaply. Originally it entered the country for work on estates and mines, but having now left its former employment it has had to find its own livelihood.
>
> (iii) Illegal immigration during and after the Japanese occupation, partly by sea but chiefly over the Siamese frontier.
>
> (iv) The general exodus from the towns during the occupation which resulted from the Japanese pressure for greater food production without any control being exercised over the land opened up for the purpose.

The areas opened up by these squatters fall into several categories. There is firstly State land which may be occupied legally or illegally. Many of the market gardeners occupy State land on Temporary Occupation Licence. . . . The major part, however, of the State land opened by squatters is land which has been occupied without permission and which has not been made subject to Land Office control.

[1] *Report of Committee appointed by His Excellency the High Commissioner to investigate the Squatter Problem*, no. 3 (Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1949).

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162 Secondly, there is land which has already been reserved for some other
178 purpose and which the State in many cases would not allow to be occupied
423 even for temporary cultivation by squatters. Such areas are, for instance, Forest Reserves and Malay Reservations.

Thirdly, there is land already alienated and held under title by some other party. Such land includes reserves on large rubber estates and areas where rubber was felled during the Japanese occupation for the purpose of introducing squatters to cultivate foodstuffs. The total area occupied under this head is estimated at 70,000 acres. Estates have now included these areas in their replanting programme and require them to be cleared. . . .

[241] The products of cultivation in squatter areas are also varied. Some of
[231] them are vegetable gardeners and this is especially the case with those whose occupation of their land is legal. Others grow tobacco as their main crop. Some grow tapioca. . . . Coupled with all these types of cultivation is the keeping of livestock both for home consumption and for sale. Many of the pigs marketed come from this source.

[647] One salient difference between the squatter problem as it existed before the war and as it exists to-day, which the Committee views with grave concern and to which it draws special attention, is the lack of administrative control in present conditions. Before the war it would be true to say that with very few exceptions the Land Offices had control of squatter areas. . . . The position to-day is very different. The attitude of the people themselves is one of denial of authority which they flout with impunity. This impotence of the Land authorities is partly due to the aggravated size of the problem, partly to the legacy of the lack of effective land control during the occupation but chiefly to the general insecurity which has resulted from the conditions left by the Japanese surrender and the present Communist campaign against the forces of law and order. Owing to a number of incidents, extending on occasion to murder, the subordinate officers whose duty it is to enforce land policy and law in the field can no longer be expected to go out, save with large armed escorts which are not available, and in many places Land Offices have perforce had to relax their efforts to bring these areas under control.

The Committee considers that the squatter problem is one that should
162 be regarded from two aspects; firstly the long term aspect of land policy and secondly the short term aspect of security. The factors which consti-
423 tute the security side of this problem are well known. Firstly the squatter
669 areas serve as ideal cover for the bandits and it is probable that a number of the bandits are in fact squatters at such time as they are not engaged in
[361] terrorist operations. Secondly, owing to the lack of administrative control and their isolated location the squatters are necessarily susceptible to pressure from the bandits for the provision of food and shelter. This is not to imply that the sympathies of the squatters lie on the side of the bandits. In most cases in fact they probably have no sympathies either way but necessarily succumb to the more immediate and threatening influence—the terrorist on their doorstep as against the vague and distant authority of the Government of which they are hardly aware

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and which is only represented by a small police station some miles distant. . . .

The squatter community can and in some areas does fulfil a function which is of value to the country; that is in the production of foodstuffs over and above their own needs. This is generally recognised. In Johore, for example, it is estimated that there are 40,000 acres of land occupied by squatters for vegetable growing. These vegetables supply both Johore and Singapore. It is clear however that this cultivation of foodstuffs should be by proper methods of good husbandry. The soil must be properly conserved. There must be no shifting cultivation such as occurs with tapioca and bananas resulting in the land reverting to *lalang*[1] and *belukar*.[2] The land itself must be such as is suitable to the purpose. Occupation of steep hillsides or river banks where clearing will cause soil erosion cannot be permitted. In so far therefore as they contribute to the economic welfare of the community the Committee considers that there is a place in this country which this type of squatter can usefully fill. Without going into numbers, the problem then becomes one of ensuring firstly that they are settled on suitable land and secondly that they pursue a useful livelihood.

It is clear that many of the squatters are not at present on suitable land and the Committee has given some thought to the question of resettlement. The Committee had before it details of the resettlement which had been arranged in connection with the Sungei Siput security operations. These showed that only a minority of the displaced squatters had accepted the offer of resettlement and a larger number had already drifted back to the neighbourhood of the area from which they had been removed. It was apparent however that in that instance the area selected for resettlement had not been adequately prepared and, although good agricultural land, would not in fact be drained and ready for two or three months. The accelerated time of the operation had been dictated by security reasons and the Committee feels that this operation is not a fair criterion for judging the success of a similar operation conducted after proper preparation. Nevertheless, there were certain considerations which the Sungei Siput operations had served to emphasise. Any displacement of this kind, however carefully conducted, could not be accomplished without causing hardship to the people concerned. Furthermore, it could only be accomplished at considerable expense to the Government—an expense which the country could ill afford if it were multiplied by a large number of such operations on an extensive scale. A subsidiary consideration which militates against resettlement in a different area is that a number of the squatters, once they have opened up and planted the land, obtain employment in neighbouring towns and estates and mines and leave their wives and families to look after the land. This is one of the reasons why a raid on a squatter area may find an absence of the able-bodied men. Some may be with the bandits but others are at work in the neighbourhood. In such cases the squatters would clearly be reluctant to move away from their employment.

[1] Long, coarse grass. [2] Secondary jungle.

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166 For these reasons the Committee is convinced that the most satisfactory solution is to settle the squatters, wherever possible, in the areas which
185 they already occupy. . . .

Where such settlement of existing areas is for one reason or another impossible, the Committee recommends that an alternative suitable area should be made available for resettlement.

Finally the Committee recommends that a squatter who refuses settlement or resettlement on the terms offered shall be liable to compulsory repatriation.

[647] Whether the solution is one of settlement or of resettlement the Committee wishes to emphasise that the provision of effective administration is a *sine qua non*. No Scheme can succeed unless the authority of the Land Office is firmly re-established and a proper respect for law and order inculcated. This will entail the provision of adequate communications, police stations, schools and health facilities and the like and will necessarily have to be borne in mind in selecting areas for settlement and resettlement. On these lines the Committee feels that these areas could become part of the settled areas of the country.

[423] One aspect of the problem of approved and recognised squatter areas is that of land tenure. The land in these cases is held on Temporary Occupation Licence either because a permanent title cannot be given or because the occupier is unwilling to pay the prescribed fees. The Committee considers that an alternative form of title would remove some of the difficulties in such cases, and surmount the unsatisfactory nature of a temporary annual tenure. . . .

It is strongly of opinion that necessary emergency measures must be supported by administrative measures such as have been discussed above, and considers that the early adoption of its recommendations will make a start in re-establishing Government's authority and in this way materially assist in bringing an end to the present state of lawlessness.

The Committee's recommendations are designed to meet the situation as it exists at present and after a long period of enemy occupation and the consequent dislocation of the administrative machine. The Committee does not intend its recommendations to apply to cases of unlawful occupation of land in the future.

[685] The Committee is of the opinion that the present remedies at law of the registered proprietors of land are inadequate for the eviction of unlawful occupants and that legislation providing for a simple process of eviction should be enacted but that this should incorporate a period of notice to the unlawful occupants of six months or such other time as may be reasonable in the circumstances. . . .

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APPENDIX V

INDIANS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE following note is appended to facilitate comparison between the Chinese and Indians in the area.[1] 162

Ethnic Indians in Southeast Asia

			1947
Burma	1,017,825 (1931)	887,000 (1941)	700,000
Siam	..	..	100,000
Indochina	..	..	5,000
Malaya	624,000 (1931)	744,000 (1941)	600,000
British Borneo	..	..	Few
Indonesia	...	..	30,000
Philippines		..	Very few
			1,435,000

Possibly because of the historic relations of ancient Hindu India with Southeast Asia, the prohibition of travel overseas imposed by the Hindu Shastras has not been taken to apply to Java, Sumatra, and Ceylon. 162 167 There were early Hindu settlements, too, in Malaya, but these disappeared long ago and Indian immigration into the region dates virtually from the nineteenth century.

The only country in Southeast Asia in which the Indians are more numerous than the Chinese is Burma. After India and Burma were separated in 1936 uncertainty as to their future status caused thousands of immigrants to return home to India. Indian landlords and money-lenders liquidated their Burma holdings wherever possible. In 1931 there were 1,018,000 Indians in Burma; in 1947, in spite of natural increases, their number was probably not over 900,000. They retained, however, much of their economic importance. In 1931, 200,000 of the Indians in Burma lived in the Arakan Division nearest India. Of the total 618,000 were born in India—566,000 were Hindus; 397,000 were Muslims; the remainder were Sikhs, Christians, and others. Parsees were prominent in the professions; chetties (chettiars) from South India were the leading bankers with a big hold on the peasantry; Muslims from the Madras Presidency ran restaurants; the Gujeratis and Muslim Chooliahs from Madras had a large share in the hardware trade; Hindus from Upper India were the principal jewellers. Most of the common labour was performed by Hindu Telegus or Tamils. [463]

[1] I am indebted to Mr Edwin Haward for most of the material utilized in this note. V. P.

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After Burma, the Indians in Southeast Asia are most numerous in Malaya, though here their numbers have dropped from 744,000 in 1941 to 600,000 in 1947. The great majority of them are Tamil labourers on the rubber estates, but there is also a considerable community of merchants and chetties who are the money-lenders of Malaya, lawyers, &c. The Sikhs number a few thousands and are agriculturists as well as watchmen and the like. Before the war Sikhs were more numerous in the Malayan Police than they had become by 1949. They made themselves exceedingly unpopular with the Chinese during the Japanese occupation.

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In recent times Indian public opinion has been exceedingly critical of Indian emigration to Southeast Asia in the form of unskilled labour, alleging unfair conditions. The Indian Emigration Act of 1922 was amended in 1938 to give the Government of India power to prohibit even unassisted emigration (assisted emigration was that which took the place of indentured labour) for the purpose of unskilled work. The result has been the virtual drying-up of India as a source of supply for labour, and many Indians have also returned to their homes. During the Japanese occupation casualties among Tamils were especially heavy. But now that India is independent her policy may develop on different lines—the economic pressure of population on her soil may tend to make her less critical of emigration, and as the most powerful State in the Southeast Asia area she may find it expedient to resort to something like the pre-war 'imperialism' which the party now in power in India was, during its period in the wilderness, so concerned to condemn. But the whole turn of events in Southeast Asia is bound to be profoundly affected by the success of the Communists in China, and in the attempts to oppose or to compromise with them India is bound to be a factor of the greatest importance.

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POSTSCRIPT

An article in *Ta Kung Pao*, the Shanghai newspaper, of 28 January 1950 was taken as adumbrating the future policy of the People's Government towards Chinese overseas and the governments of Southeast Asia. It began by saying:

> Now that the People's Republic of China has been established and diplomatic relations have been opened between the Central People's Government and a number of other countries, the more than 10,000,000 overseas Chinese shall and must not be subjected to further abuse.

The article pointed out that it was clearly stipulated in Article 58 of the Common Programme that 'the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China shall do its utmost to protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad'. In pursuance of this principle, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had lodged strong protests with the French and Thai authorities against the abuse of Chinese nationals. The article was particularly concerned to attack the Thai and French governments. 'The Fascist elements in Thailand [it said] have a long record of outrageous action in the persecution of Chinese nationals, and for years Thailand has been a veritable hell to the overseas Chinese there.' Malaya received only incidental mention. 'But [the article continued] going back a little, we find that countless numbers of Chinese have been murdered in the Dutch East Indies during the past few years. All in all, the annals of the struggles of the overseas Chinese may be considered to be written in blood. It must be evident that it is impossible for overseas Chinese to live in peace under imperialistic rule. . . . We know full well that the indiscriminate bombing of Shanghai together with the persecution of Chinese nationals in Thailand, Indochina, and Malaya, are all part of an imperialist plot for both direct and indirect attack against the Chinese people.'

Peking radio thereafter systematically attacked the Southeast Asian governments for their alleged ill treatment of the overseas Chinese. In the case of Malaya it was noticeable that direct mention of the terrorist campaign was avoided in the ensuing months.

The diplomatic position in August 1950 was that Burma and Indonesia had recognized the People's Government of China and representatives were being exchanged, Britain had also recognized the People's Government but negotiations for the terms on which representatives would be exchanged were still in dilatory progress, while France, Thailand, and the Philippines still recognized the Nationalist Government which was then taking refuge in Formosa.

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Burma AP1

A visit to Southeast Asia during the third quarter of 1950 after an absence of nearly three years brought home to the writer the accelerated tempo of the change that the countries were undergoing, and, in particular, the dominant role which the politics of China were playing therein. As a tailpiece to this survey he has recorded the impressions of his visit, bringing the account as nearly up to date as the exigencies of publishing would allow. The observations are set down in the order in which the countries were visited.

In his many discussions with statesmen, diplomats, officials, business men, and others in these Southeast Asian countries, the writer became aware of a considerable disagreement among them regarding the number of Chinese in the area. There was, in the case of Siam and Indochina in particular, no figure that was generally accepted. The definition of 'Chinese' was an initial difficulty (as it has so often been in the course of this survey) for many Chinese appeared to possess a dual racial character, discarding one aspect and assuming the other as circumstances suggested.[1] It seemed also that that clandestine immigration into Siam, Indochina, and the Philippines and (perhaps) Indonesia within the last two or three years, had been very considerable, for during this period the immigration laws had been greatly tightened. The writer was compelled, therefore, to revise the estimates he had made in the demographic chapters of the survey to suit the probable facts of 1950 and to adopt a total not very far short of 10 million ethnic Chinese for the whole of Southeast Asia. This estimate, however, does not materially alter the ratio of Chinese to other races in the area and has no very important bearing on the general political and economic considerations which have been described in the text.

Burma. In July 1950 the Chinese Nationalist ambassador had left Burma, and one other official of the embassy had also gone away, but the remainder of both the embassy and consular staff had agreed to serve under the People's Government of China which was now recognized by the Burmese Government. Two of the staff had already been summoned to Peking for indoctrination. The new ambassador, Dr Yu, was expected to arrive in Rangoon in August. In the meantime the staffs were not being paid and the only income available was that derived from the sale of (Nationalist) passports.

At this time an incident in the Burmese Shan State of Keng-tung near Siam was the subject of a number of rumours. A force of Chinese

[1] Thus in Siam, the President of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, of very obvious Chinese race or extraction but with a Thai name, denounced vehemently the tactics of business men of acknowledged Chinese nationality in their dealings with the Thais.

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Nationalist soldiers, estimated to number between 1,500 and 3,000, had, in retreating from the Communists, crossed the frontier from Yunnan into Burma. Refusing to lay down their arms, they had dug themselves in against the Burmese Government troops sent to disarm them. Rumour said that the Chinese troops were being furnished with supplies by the Kuomintang supporters in Siam with the approval of the Siamese Government (Siam still recognized the Nationalist Government), and it was further rumoured that the Nationalists intended to use this area as a springboard for a counter-attack on the Communists of China. Marshal Pibul Songkram, in conversation with the writer about this time, agreed that the Chinese Nationalists had been supporting the Chinese troops to the extent of 60,000 ticals a month, but he had forbidden the continuance of this subsidy, and furthermore had refused to allow the sending of supplies to enable the troops to return to Yunnan. Another report in the Burmese press said that Mao Tse-tung had threatened that if the Burmese were unable to disarm the fugitive troops he himself would send a force to do so. This was immediately denied by the Burmese Government.

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Characteristic of this period was the metamorphosis that had been undergone since July 1949 by the Chinese press in Burma. There were in the third quarter of 1950 four Chinese daily newspapers in Rangoon. They were as follows (the approximate circulation being given in parentheses): the *Chinese Commercial Times* (1,000), the *New Rangoon Evening Post* (1,500), the *Zin Min Pao* (People's Gazette) (800), and the *New China Pao* (2,000). Small as their circulations were, the transformation of these papers was very indicative of the mental adjustments then being made by the local Chinese community.

In normal times the *Chinese Commercial Times* had been fairly independent, and since the Communist victories in China it had showed no marked swing towards Communism. Indeed it appeared to maintain as conservative an attitude as was compatible with the sentiment of its readers, featuring the American news of the Korean campaign quite prominently. It took, however, a critical line towards neighbouring Southeast Asian governments when Chinese interests were reported to be adversely affected by local policies. On Martyr's Day 1950 (19 July, the third anniversary of the assassination of the Ministers in 1947), it carried a full-page tribute to the memory of the 'beloved Bogyoke [General Aung San] and other martyrs, who died that we might live'. It was clear from this alone that the paper wished to identify the Chinese in Burma with Burmese national sentiment.

The *Zin Min Pao* and the *New China Pao* were avowedly Communist organs, though the former was of little influence. Both papers took the orthodox Party Line, marching in step with the four Burmese-

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language Communist dailies, condemning Western imperialist aggression and using the approved expressions of abuse ('the robber Truman' &c.). On 11 July the *Zin Min Pao* said 'accompanying imperialist aggression in Korea, the British imperialist-sponsored ICFTU has organized a labour delegation to visit the Far Eastern areas. . . . Its object is to work for the destruction of the workers' movement and the drive for national liberation in Asia.' This illustrates the prevailing tone of the Communist papers in both Burma and Siam.

The *New China Pao* had, prior to the recent Communist successes, been on the whole independent but swaying between the Kuomintang and the Communists, but after July 1949 it had begun to develop a pro-Communist tendency. This was still the case in July 1950, but the paper took a noticeably moderate line concerning the question of Hong Kong. 'Some hysterical persons', it said (5 July), 'think that the new Chinese Government will recover the territory from the British. We see that there is practically no sign of this, and indeed we do not feel that it is necessary for China to take this step at the moment. Unless another world war breaks out, Hong Kong, as far as we know, will remain a free port and a free centre for the transit trade—at least for some time to come.' On the other hand, both the *China Commercial Times* and the *New China Pao* attacked the Songkram Government of Thailand for 'illtreatment of the Chinese', while the *New China Pao* reported that the Japanese people as a whole were delighted at the outbreak of war and were hoping to profit from it, being 'great war profiteers'.

Domestic relations between Burmese and Chinese continued to be good, the small number of Chinese in the country preventing the growth of a 'Chinese Problem'. Chinese children attended their own schools and were taught through the medium of Mandarin (*Kuo Yü*), but they learnt Burmese for half an hour a day and English for a similar period. There were three Chinese middle schools in Rangoon, but the medium of the high schools was Burmese so that it was necessary for Chinese who aspired to this standard to know the Burmese language.

Siam. Estimates of the number of ethnic Chinese in Siam varied very greatly. The Prime Minister, Marshal Pibul Songkram, told the writer that the number of Chinese in the country was 4 million; a diplomatic authority of many years experience of Siam was unable, on due consideration, to reduce this estimate to under 3 million. It seemed that illicit immigration had been going on on a considerable scale from junks and steamers in the last few years. A recent visitor to Chantaburi encountered by the writer said that he had seen Chinese planting sugar there where there had been none before. As against this, a tin-miner from Prapet in South Siam gave his opinion that the number of Chinese

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on the west coast had not increased in recent years. It was commonly stated by Siamese that there was one Chinese in every four persons in the country.

The Chinese community in Siam remained the supreme example in the world of a minority without representation. While on the one hand it still controlled the lion's share of all commerce, it had no share in the government of the country. It was considered by the Thais to be more than ever a potential threat to the security of the Thai nation in view of the Communist victories in China.

Within the Chinese community itself these victories had produced a curious change. The community remained predominantly mercantile, but the Chinese daily press had turned over to the support of the People's Government of China and its slant was decidedly pro-Communist. The *Chinese Daily News* (circulation 12,000) and its evening issue the *Chung Yuan Wan Pao* (10,000) were owned by a group of Chinese business men; formerly it was a KMT paper, but turned Communist in 1949. The same was true of the *Chuan Min Pao* (10,000) and its evening edition of the same name (10,000), and of the *Chinese Overseas Daily News* (3,000) and its evening counterpart (3,000). The *Chuan Min Pao* (10,000) was the organ of the Communist Party. The *Sing Sien Jit Pao* (Singapore-Siam Daily) and the *Sing Thai Wan Pao* (the evening edition) were owned by the Straits millionaire, Aw Boon Haw, and were pro-Communist in tone. (It is interesting to note that English dailies owned by the same person in Singapore and Hong Kong were decidedly non-Communist in policy. The truth is that an anti-Communist Chinese paper in Siam at this period would have failed—if it had not been closed down beforehand by threats of violence.)

The committee of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Thailand, when questioned by the writer regarding politics and education, refused to be drawn, insisting that their interests were purely commercial and that they knew nothing at all of these other matters, whereas the representatives of the Chinese press who immediately afterwards interviewed the writer in the same committee room of the Chamber of Commerce, were avowedly Communists with a keen interest in all contemporary questions. As physical and mental types the Chinese merchants and reporters differed strikingly—the former being middle-aged and prosperous, urbane, and infinitely non-committal; the latter being young, lean, unhealthy-looking, bright-eyed fanatics who might have come straight from the Malayan jungle (which some of them conceivably did).

It appeared that the long-standing struggle between the Thais and the Chinese was at that time at a stage of uneasy equilibrium. On 16 February 1949 a Royal Decree had come into force whereby aliens were

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excluded from certain occupations—forestry, production and distribution of charcoal, the running of ice, soft-drinks, syrup and flavouring factories, and printing plants (Thai language) and, in the second category, trades—casting images of the Lord Buddha, lacquer, niello, trishaws, taxis, motor-bus driving, rice cultivation, salt making, barbering, and Thai type-setting. A year's grace in which to find other employment had been given by the decree. In the then prosperous state of Thailand, this new order had not evoked more than the usual protest, and the displaced Chinese seemed to have found other employment fairly easily.

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Siam in the third quarter of 1950 was the most prosperous and peaceful of the Southeast Asian countries. The peasants were content with the high prices for rice they received and business was good. (The fact that the common people were not communistically inclined is suggested by the fact that the 'gutter' press, dealing in sex and crime, was not Communist—which it would have been if Communism had been popular with its readers.) The Government, though careful to observe democratic forms and constrained to allow a great deal of press criticism of itself (the only pro-Government papers were three heavily subsidized organs with small circulations) was in fact a military dictatorship depending on the support of the army. Another internal coup was always possible, but there did not seem to be any individual or faction strong enough to threaten the rule of Marshal Pibul. His rival, Pridi Panomyong, then in exile, could, it seemed, have a chance of returning only 'on a Communist ticket', and this could not be unless there was a revolution supported by the Chinese minority in Siam or an invasion from Communist China. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the future seemed so largely to hinge on the fortunes of the campaign in Korea.

Indochina. At this period (August 1950) Indochina was in a very unhappy state. Negotiations between the French and the states of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were in progress at Pau regarding the future control of the treasury and the customs and other matters, and in the meantime the French were maintaining an uneasy control of, perhaps, two-thirds of the country including the larger towns, while the Vietminh was operating unhindered in the remainder. But within the French-controlled area the Vietminh was able to cause disturbances and it exacted tribute even inside Saigon-Cholon. For every piastre paid to the French-protected Vietnam treasury, half as much again was collected by the Vietminh agents. Rice suffered a three-fold exaction—at the source, in transit, and at the point of arrival. The terrorist activity of the 'underground', bringing pressure to bear on reluctant victims of its demands, was manifested in an occasional bomb explosion some-

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where in the great over-crowded cities. Yet in spite of all this Saigon-Cholon managed to wear an aspect of normality with a busy street and café life, and (ironically enough) with a unique display of flowers in the flower-shops! Saigon during the troubles remained emphatically French in character, with its religious and cultural activities in full swing. What was particularly striking was the conscientious way in which the French officials (who were quite aware of the gravity of the situation) were applying themselves to long-term economic, statistical, and economic programmes. Their inspiration was undoubtedly derived from a faith in the persistance of French methods independent of the regimes that might hold power in the future.

Those entitled to form an opinion on the subject whom the writer consulted (notably Professor Robequain of the Sorbonne) refused to accept a figure of less than a million as representing the number of ethnic Chinese then in Indochina. In reply to objections it was pointed out that the events in China had within the last year or two greatly increased the illicit immigration. In 1948 alone the *official* excess of arrivals over departures was 41,500 persons. In Cholon alone there were now over 400,000 Chinese in addition to 300,000 Vietnamese. There were said to be approaching 2 million people in Saigon-Cholon, so many having fled from the country-side for the comparative safety of the towns. The Chinese of Cholon who were included within the *Groupements Administratifs Chinois Régionaux* (the successors to the *Congrégations*) consisted of Cantonese 41·3 per cent., Teochius 36·9 per cent., Fukienese 7·8 per cent., Hakkas 10·6 per cent., and Hainanese 3·4 per cent., of which total 55·2 per cent. were men, 34·1 per cent. women, and 10·7 per cent. children under 15 years of age.[1] This concentration of Chinese was also great in the large towns of Soctrang, Bentre, and Cantho in South Vietnam. The problem of housing, food, &c., caused by this influx into the towns was enormous.[2]

Because of their industry, their frugal life, and their carefulness, the Teochius were considered by the French as the 'Auvergnats de Cholon'. Another important group because of their economic power were the Fukienese. Numerically they were only 8 per cent. of the Chinese population, but this minority played a considerable role, particularly in the rice trade.

[i.e. as of 1950--Analyst]

[1] *Bulletin Économique de l'Indochine*, Haut Commissaire de France en Indochine, Nouvelle série, fasc. no 44, May–June 1950, article 'Aperçu sur la vie économique de Cholon'. This article is largely drawn on here and was a valuable source of up-to-date information.

[2] The Cantonese were the most balanced community with the sexes practically equal (19·4 per cent. males, 18·5 per cent. females). The Teochius took the second place numerically, constituting 40 per cent. of the men and 29 per cent. of the women of the Chinese colony.

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669 The civil war had modified the rice trade in several respects. The
441 lack of security in the provinces had led to the closing of many rice-
256 mills. Also it had accentuated the tendency to the concentration of factories in Cholon (perhaps a fact of great importance for the future). But the principal change was that paddy arrived only irregularly and in very small quantities. Only one-tenth of the pre-war tonnage was exported, that is to say about 150,000–200,000 tons.

The regions in which rice was produced in South Vietnam were divided, generally speaking, into the part where cultivation had been in progress from ancient times, split up into very small fields and coinciding with the Cisbassac, and another part of recent cultivation, in large fields, more rationally exploited, namely, the Transbassac. For military reasons the export of paddy from Transbassac was forbidden; from the other provinces it came only with difficulty. This explained the small activity of the Cholon rice-mills. In five days a month's milling was over. The little rice-mills, with a trifling capacity of about 20 tons, working with out-of-date equipment, but with small overhead expenses, accommodated themselves fairly well to this chaotic regime.

501 In 1945 there had been approximately 5,000 Chinese rice junks in
505 this area with a tonnage of 300,000. The destruction of the five years following this had diminished this fleet by about two-thirds and the remainder were not always in a good state of repair. The 5,000 junks of 1945 were distributed among 3,000 owners. In addition to the junks in South Vietnam there were 200 barges and tugs, about half of which were motor-driven and some of which were steam-propelled.

000 The writer visited a rice-mill working at about a quarter capacity (whose proprietor had recently been kidnapped by the Vietminh and released on payment of ransom), a soap-works, a satin cloth-factory (a partnership between a Frenchman and a Chinese), and a housing estate replacing a village destroyed in a recent fire. The mayor of Cholon informed him that three-fifths of the total municipal expenditure was on the police force! The writer also visited the Great World where Chinese were engaged in gambling for large sums (the following evening a bomb was exploded at the entrance to the Great World, wounding four persons, to remind the farmers of the gambling to be more regular in their payments to the 'underground').

000 *Singapore.* In August 1950 the city of Singapore presented to the eyes of the writer, who had not seen it since September 1947, a very striking and even surprising spectacle. For one thing, it had been enormously improved in outward appearance—the mournfulness and delapidation consequent on Japanese neglect during the occupation had completely

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disappeared, the buildings had nearly all been repainted or refaced, 000
many new buildings had been erected, trim, park-like gardens, beautifully kept, had come into being in several parts of the city where there had been only waste ground before. Singapore was prosperous (though the enhanced price of rubber had brought dislocation to some firms as well as riches to others). Yet, as the world knew, the Colony was at the southern extremity of a country which had for over two years been scourged by a Communist terror and in which ambushes and murders were still of frequent occurrence. It was common knowledge, too, that Singapore itself had not entirely escaped involvement in the Communist campaign. Only in April the Governor had narrowly escaped death when a grenade had been thrown at him, and there had been five other grenade throwings during the year. Several attempts at arson had culminated recently in the burning down of a large Chinese rubber store, and about the same time the Chinese Chief Inspector of Schools had been shot in a bus by a young Communist gunman (though happily he was recovering). Communist activity also had been discovered in two of the principal Chinese schools (the Chinese High School and the Nanyang Girls' School) in which there were many pupils over twenty years of age. Yet the impression given to the visitor was one of security and well-being.

Nor was this initial impression illusory. Since the declaration of the Emergency in 1948, the considerable extension of the police force and the creation of a radio police network had resulted in a decrease in crime. Though in social welfare Singapore was still far behind England, there had been some awakening of social conscience and there were many welfare schemes in being, including social centres for poor children of all races run by voluntary workers, free meals for children, T.B. clinics, and provisions for child welfare, and family planning. Housing was still far behind requirements, but blocks of flats for artisans were springing up on selected sites.

The greatest advance, however, was in the field of education. In 1941 87
there had been 72,000 pupils in the schools of Singapore (27,000 in English schools, 38,000 in Chinese schools, 5,800 in Malay schools, and 1,000 in Tamil schools); in 1950 the total was 125,000 (41,500 in English schools, 73,000 in Chinese schools, 8,000 in Malay schools, and 1,600 in Tamil schools). There had since the war been a thirst for education—especially for education in English—which the authorities were extending themselves to satisfy. Schools were being built, teachers trained, and, by 1957, there would be a system of compulsory free education in English for a child population which was expected to have risen from 163,000 to 222,000. It was not a question of mere planning 000
—the scheme was being put into operation with feverish urgency as

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000 part of the measures intended to deprive Communism of its main appeal to the masses.

666 Meanwhile Singapore had progressed a considerable way on the road towards self-government. The elective system had been introduced into the Legislature and further extensions of the principle were announced during the writer's visit. There were now two parties in lively existence—the Progressive Party and the Labour Party—and a third party (the Socialist Party) was about to be formed. When the elections were first introduced, the Chinese had very largely boycotted them with the result that other races obtained representation out of proportion to their numbers, but the number of Chinese enrolling themselves on the electoral registers had now considerably increased. But it was in the Municipal elections (the elective principle had now been extended to the Municipality) that the greatest popular interest was manifested, for 18 of the 27 members were chosen by popular vote on a regional, non-racial basis (as was the case with the elections to the Legislature). Municipal questions were widely canvassed, and the public gallery of the Municipal chamber was full when debates took place.

467 In spite of these encouraging portents, there was no spirit of complacency among those in authority—nor was there room for it. There had been no strikes in 1950 (the Labour Department acting as mediator in disputes), but it was known that the Communist underground 'All Races General Labour Union' had been formed to attempt to infiltrate into the legal unions. During the writer's visit the delegates of ICFTU arrived in Singapore and after discussions with the local labour leaders, announced that they considered Singapore as an especially favourable field for the growth of trade-unionism on the democratic model.

000 *Johore.* Separated from Singapore by a strait a quarter of a mile wide, crossed by a causeway, Johore had since the beginning of the terrorist campaign been one of the most disturbed areas of Malaya. Even in days of peace, north Johore had had more than its fair share of gang robbers.
361 The writer, in mid-August, visited two places in south Johore, where
727 the resettlement of Chinese squatters was in progress.
The first was a squatter-tapper settlement. The inhabitants of the
731 settlement had been brought in from isolated holdings up to five miles
away. This was accomplished almost always with their willing co-
746 operation. They were first of all accommodated in a transit camp while
they were building their new huts, the timbers and thatch for which
166 were supplied at cost price, transport free, and a sum of $30 was paid
656 to each family as a displacement allowance. (This allowance was about to be increased.) In addition $3 a week for two weeks was paid to each individual while he was settling down in his new home. Round the

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settlement a barbed-wire fence was to be built and outside it a road. A village with shops and a Chinese school were adjacent to the settlement. An administrative headquarters and a police station had also been built. The squatters were tapping rubber in a nearby estate and because of the high price of rubber their wages were good. The principal attraction of the settlement was that the squatters would receive permanent titles to their land. This innovation ensured settled cultivation whereas the old temporary occupation licences (or no licences at all) had led to shifting cultivation involving erosion and other consequences of wasteful methods.

The second settlement was of a different kind. It was for smallholders who were engaged in market-gardening for the Singapore market. In addition to vegetables, a number of the squatters grew pepper. Pepper is a crop requiring considerable capital outlay and minute care and the vines do not bear until two years after planting. It was clear from this that the pepper-planters regarded themselves as permanently settled. The officers in charge of the resettlement were concerned not only to ensure security without dislocation of the squatters economy but also to assist them to improve their methods of cultivation and animal husbandry. For example, pedigree boars had been bought at Government expense to improve the breed of pigs of the settlements. The second camp had no fence around it, the object being, when feasible, to ensure the protection of the squatters from the exactions of the bandits by good administration alone.

Although there had been an 'incident' in which a police station had been attacked (without casualty) in a neighbouring village two nights before, and a bandit collecting subscriptions had been killed in another area, the writer saw no sign of perturbation among the squatters or in the villages through which he passed. The attitude of the squatters towards European visitors was one of friendliness. It was quite clear to a person of long experience of Malaya that whatever the propaganda of the Communist terrorists, there was no feeling of hostility towards Europeans (still less towards the officials who were helping them) among these hard-working agriculturalists, taking them as a whole. All they wanted was security. The bandits, knowing this, had on more than one occasion attacked and burnt down a squatter settlement purely to demonstrate to the inmates that the authorities were unable to ensure their immunity from violence. This utter disregard of the interests of their fellow Chinese was typical of the ruthless and impersonal nature of the Communist campaign.

The writer after his visit was convinced that any final solution of the 'Squatter Problem' must be on the lines of these well considered and humane experiments in resettlement.

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16 *Federation of Malaya.* By 30 June 1949, the total population of the Federation was calculated to have increased to 5,081,848—Malaysians 2,511,520, Chinese 1,952,682, Indians and Pakistanis 550,684, Others 66,962. The growth of the population by excess of births over deaths and by immigrational surplus (the immigration of Chinese was virtually stopped) continued to be high and was calculated to have been 1·89 per cent. between 30 June 1948 and 30 June 1949. The Malays were now increasing even faster than the Chinese.

000 From his viewpoint in the United Kingdom, the writer, in common with other observers, found his attention preoccupied with the Emergency, with the increase or decrease in 'incidents', and the dismal list of casualties. Now that he was visiting the Federation and had been to areas from which murder, extortion, and sabotage were reported every few days—or sometimes daily—it was brought home to him with painful acuteness that for Malayans this senseless violence, untinctured with justice, was as much a feature of everyday life as were (say) armed robbery, road casualties, or death from cancer or tuberculosis in England. People here were more grimly aware of the sore of the terrorist campaign and of the appalling financial burden it entailed than were people in Britain of the drain of disease or of the road, but they tended to accept them in very much the same spirit as they did their own inflictions from these sources. This was true of the large towns and of aggregates of people, though it did not, of course, apply to isolated groups in country districts or to planters and miners in their floodlit fortress bungalows surrounded by sentries and barbed wire. Yet recognition of the Emergency seemed largely relegated to the sub-conscious, while the wakeful mind occupied itself with more positive matters in which the individual felt he still could exercise some measure of free will. It was in this spirit that the Annual Report of the Federation of Malaya for 1949 dealt with Public Finance, Currency and Banking, Social Services, Legislation, Public Utilities, Communications, &c., in the text proper and reserved the Emergency for an appendix of a few pages. No doubt this attitude was prompted by the will to carry on in spite of everything, but it was none the less true that the atmosphere was one of workaday serenity in the larger towns, and there was nothing of that undercurrent of tension which the writer had discerned during his short visit to Saigon.

The impression of recovery and normality was as instantaneous to the writer in Kuala Lumpur as it had been in Singapore, and the subsequent revelations of inflation, political uncertainty, and the selfish behaviour of some individuals could not greatly impair it. It was, of course, not the Federal capital of 1939, but it was none the less a thriving town, which had in some respects if not in others, progressed beyond its pre-war self. The Federation had now adopted a Draft Development Plan for the

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Social Services, National Resources and Utilities, and Trade and Industry. During 1949 the total School Enrolment had increased by 10 per cent. to 547,000; the birth-rate had increased from 40·7 per mille to 43·8, while the death-rate had dropped from 16·4 to 14·2—figures which were eloquent testimony to the health and standard of living of the community at large. The Annual Report, in recording these figures, added: 'Indeed, the implications, no less than the size, of the net annual increase (births less deaths) which amounts to 150,370, or nearly three per cent. per annum on the mean estimated mid-1949 population, are almost breathtaking.' In the field of Social Welfare, quite apart from steady progress, 1949 witnessed the coming into force of special legislation for the treatment of juvenile delinquents; and, in spite of financial stringency, $7,000,000 was set aside during the year for housing.

In the text proper of this study the Emergency in Malaya has been dealt with up to about the middle of 1949: it will be appropriate in this Postscript to add some details which will bring the account up to the end of the same year. From the middle of February until the end of 1949 the number of weekly incidents averaged 26. The lowest number on record during the year was in the first week in August when only 12 incidents occurred.[1] The nature of bandit attacks also changed and it was noticeable that they were reluctant to attack targets which were guarded or where they had not the element of surprise. As a result they failed completely in their expressed objectives of disrupting the administration and the economy of the country, and of establishing 'liberated areas' over which they had full control. A new feature of the bandits' campaign was the creation of a 'Min Yuen Organization' whose duty it was to arrange for the collection of food-supplies and money from the local population, and for the dissemination of communist propaganda. The bandits announced during the year that on 1 February their forces had been formed into the 'Malayan Races Liberation Army'. This was an attempt to disguise the movement as nationalist and to imply that it incorporated all races. To give further weight to this argument they also formed a so-called 10th Regiment of Malays in Pahang. During the latter part of the year this Regiment was particularly harried by the Security Forces, and, by the end of the year, had almost completely disintegrated. The movement continued, as it had begun, to be based almost entirely on the Chinese.

[1] The number of 'incidents' is, of itself, no guide to the situation. 'Incident' might include anything from the dropping of a leaflet to a bomb outrage. Moreover, an increase in incidents might well betoken the success of the Security Forces since increased pressure would bring the bandits to battle, while the withdrawal of the Security Forces from an area would result in a cessation of 'incidents'. As the Security Forces progressed in their plan it was certain that the number of 'incidents' would increase.

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000 During 1949, 618 bandits were killed and 337 captured, and 1,392 jungle camps were discovered and destroyed. In September it was announced that bandits who surrendered would not be prosecuted on a charge carrying a mandatory death penalty provided that they had not been guilty themselves of a violent crime. The total of surrenders for 1949 was 216, of whom 116 surrendered after the announcement was made. Casualties during the year numbered:

	Killed	*Wounded*	*Missing*
Civilians . .	334	200	162
Police . . .	164	170	..
Military . .	65	77	..

[433] It is significant that in spite of the Emergency the value of the gross external trade of the Federation advanced by 6·7 per cent. to no less than M$2,113 million. The production of tin increased by over twenty per cent., the acreage under paddy reached an all-time record, and 670,000 tons of rubber (a 3·8 per cent. drop on the 1948 figure, but almost all of it accounted for by small-holding production where declining yields were also a factor) were produced. These figures were matched in other branches of trade. As the Introduction to the Report remarks, 'In 1949 the economic heart beat more vigorously than ever.'

668 208 186 609 In August 1950, the state of mind of the Chinese in the Federation was not easy to gauge. It seems that with the Communist victories of 1949 and the establishment of the People's Republic of China, apprehension as to their possible effect upon Malaya was tempered among the Malayan Chinese generally by a feeling of satisfaction that China was established once again as a Power. Subsequently, however, reports received by those who had relatives in China of the consistent ill-treatment of these relatives, whether or not they belonged to the better class, and of large capital levies, had greatly modified this sentiment and there was a growing hostility towards the Mao Tse-tung regime. There was, however, a considerable range of opinion even among the Chinese merchants, miners, and planters and the community was by no means a united one. One group of Malayan-born Chinese tended towards making common ground with the Malays, another group of China-born were in favour of Chiang Kai-shek and an intransigent attitude towards Mao. A few even openly speculated on the effect of a possible Communist over-running of Malaya and on whether it would not be possible to maintain business as usual under such a regime. But, on the whole, the writer found an increase in 'Malayan-mindedness' among the Chinese since 1947. The greatest force for unity among the Chinese remained the Malayan Chinese Association under the Straits-born Dato Tan Cheng-lock of Malacca (his recent (Johore) title of 'Dato' was in itself a symbol of Chinese *rapprochement* with the Malays) while the

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Communities' Liaison Committee (Mr Malcolm Macdonald's child) continued its efforts to reconcile the differences between Chinese and Malays.[1]

Whereas in Burma and Siam the entire Chinese press had swung towards Communism, in Malaya there were only two papers with Communist leanings. The remaining Chinese papers were either decidedly anti-Communist or merely non-Communist. Daily newspapers in the anti- or non-Communist categories included the *Sin Chew Jit Pao* and the *Nanyang Siang Pau* of Singapore, the *Kwong Wah Jit Poh* and the *Sing Pau Jih Pao* of Penang, the *China Press* of Kuala Lumpur, and the *Kin Kwok Daily News* of Ipoh. The two papers sympathizing with Communism were the *Nan Chiau Jit Pao* of Singapore and the *Modern Daily News* of Penang. Both the latter sailed as close as they dared to the wind, condemning the United States action in Korea, presenting the news of the campaign in such a way that the reader would always draw a conclusion favourable to the North Koreans, and, in internal affairs, encouraging the defiance of the authorities by Chinese pupils of the Chinese High School and Nanyang Girls' School. By inference, if not in actual words, the terrorist campaign in Malaya was endorsed by these papers. The tolerance which these Communist papers received no doubt reflected Whitehall policy, for in London the *Daily Worker* and the (monthly) *Malayan Monitor* openly supported the Malayan terrorists and condoned their murders. This spirit of democratic toleration completely mystified Malayans—Chinese, Malays, and Indians alike—who could not, of course, in view of the nature of Asian history, be expected to understand the philosophic niceties of democracy. It is even to be feared that they regarded the tolerance as evidence of weakness.

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The income tax reports of the Federation and of Singapore for 1948 and 1949, published in August, provide some evidence as to the wealth of the Chinese as compared with other races. It should be borne in mind, however, that the great majority of Chinese escape taxation since the allowance is much higher than in Britain or America. The assessed incomes for 1948 were as follows:

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Federation of Malaya

	No. of individuals	*Assessed income*
Chinese	3,238	M$41,414,100
Indians	710	7,370,928
Malays	345	3,288,593
Other Asians	356	3,071,770
Non-Asians	4,304	54,121,592
Non-Residents	768	3,591,309

[1] This is a convenient place to record that further investigation of the murder of Dr Ong Chong-keng (see p. 402) confirms that the motive was entirely political.

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Singapore

	No. of individuals	*Assessed income*
Chinese	4,159	51,904,293
Indians	751	9,387,794
Malays	44	366,471
Other Asians	531	5,927,929
Non-Asians	3,694	49,423,327
Non-Residents	1,180	6,175,598

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Indonesia. The Minister of Information for Indonesia placed the number of Chinese in that country in mid-1950 at about 2,000,000. Informed Indonesians generally spoke of the local Chinese as constituting one of the most difficult and frustrating of contemporary questions. Since the Republic was established, the law of Indonesia regarded all persons born in the country as citizens of the Republic. Thus the Chinese born there (*Peranakans*), had dual nationality. While the great majority of Chinese in Indonesia were now Indonesian-born, often did not speak Chinese but only their own particular brand of Indonesian, and most preferred an Indonesian way of living and Indonesian amusements (such as the theatre), the Chinese community nevertheless remained apart and unassimilated. Among Indonesian politicians there were two schools of thought—that which chose to regard the Chinese as a minority, and that which preferred to consider Chinese born in the country as part of the Indonesian people. Notwithstanding the desirability of the latter policy as an objective, the psychological tendency both among the Indonesians generally and the Chinese community as a whole favoured the former view. The Chinese still controlled 95 per cent. of the industry and internal trade of the country (it was said that in Sumatra they had actually extended their influence at the expense of the Europeans), and all efforts to extend the participation of Indonesians in these fields had so far had little success.

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One Indonesian spokesman expressed to the writer the view that within living memory the Chinese in Indonesia had successively appealed to the protection of six foreign flags—the Dutch, the Chinese Imperial, the Chinese Republican (KMT), the Japanese, the Australian (the Australians were among the first to liberate Indonesia), the Dutch again, and now that of the People's Republic of China! In August 1950 the Ambassador of the People's Republic had arrived together with his own and the new consular staff. Indonesian officials were, in September 1950, awaiting with interested curiosity the first indications of the policy of the People's Government of China both towards their own Government and towards the Chinese community in Indonesia. It was felt that it would be difficult to adopt a line in keeping both with Chinese nationalist sentiment and with Communist propaganda towards Indo-

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Chinese
Indonesia OB1

nesians. When in due course the Soviet Embassy arrived, new cross-currents would still further agitate the already highly charged political atmosphere.[1] 641

The Chinese press in Indonesia had undergone a change of front following on the Communist successes in China, but there had not been the same landslide in favour of the People's Republic as had taken place in Siam. The *Sin Pao* of Jacarta had the largest circulation and published one edition in Chinese and another in Indonesian which differed from one another somewhat in content and attitude. The paper had first of all 'sat on the fence', but had subsequently come out in full support of Mao Tse-tung. The *Keng Po* (Jacarta, in Indonesian), on the other hand, pursued a policy of real liberalism and independence of judgement. The *Seng Hwo Pao* (Jacarta) was avowedly Communist, while one paper, the *Thien Seng Yit Pao*, still supported the KMT, but had a very small circulation. Chinese newspapers were also published in other parts of Indonesia, notably in Surabaya and Medan. 204 668

While the Indonesians proceeded with forming their unitary government and creating their institutions on a basis of nationalism, the Chinese *Peranakans* were uncertain as to their future. They had, in common with other minorities, been given two years in which to decide whether they would become Indonesian citizens or remain aliens in Indonesia. Those who did not within the stipulated time register themselves as aliens would be considered to have chosen Indonesian citizenship. Like the other minorities (in particular the Dutch) they were awaiting an assurance from the Government that they would receive equal treatment with other Indonesian citizens before making their choice. Under the Dutch, aliens were not permitted to own land—the question now was whether the Chinese would be allowed to do so if they became Indonesian citizens. The opinion among high Indonesian officials was that there would be no discrimination between the various races of Indonesian citizens. 641

The extent of the control of Indonesian industry was brought home to the writer in the course of his visit to villages where domestic weaving was being carried on in the neighbourhood of Bandung. Since the weavers had insufficient working capital, they were compelled to obtain their cotton thread from the Chinese who purchased from them the woven article at a price very considerably below that at which it would be sold. 288 441

Members of the Djocjakarta Gadja Mada University, founded during 874

[1] It may be noted here that in Indonesian opinion the conflict in Indochina between the French and the Vietminh was regarded as on all fours with the Dutch–Indonesian conflict in Indonesia. This was of importance in assessing the potential strength of Communist and democratic support in Indonesia.

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874 the Revolution in 1946, expressed the view that their university had much more right to be considered the national university than the Dutch-founded University of Indonesia. It was pointed out that a majority of students in the latter institution were aliens. (The writer was informed in Jacarta that some eighty per cent. of the students in the splendidly equipped Faculty of Medicine were Chinese.) The proportion of Chinese students was no doubt due to the superior economic position of the Chinese fathers who could thus afford better than Indonesian fathers to give their children a university education.

578 609 Whatever hardships the Chinese had suffered during the Revolution, it seemed that in September 1950 they were living at peace. The writer, in the course of an extensive journey through Java and Bali as a guest of the Indonesian Government, during which he had the opportunity of meeting the representatives of the local minorities, was satisfied that the special circumstances which during the Dutch–Indonesian hostilities had brought the Chinese often into collision with the Indonesians had ceased to exist.[1] There were, indeed, still glowing embers of resentment against the Chinese for the part which they were asserted to have played during the Dutch–Indonesian conflict, but educated Indonesians affirmed that they bore the Chinese no abiding ill will since it was Dutch policy which had forced the latter into the position of middlemen between the Dutch and Indonesian communities. At the same time (as has been stated above) the Indonesians regarded the Chinese as, perhaps, their major 'problem'.

000 Java and Bali, in the third quarter of 1950, presented to the visitor a general appearance of calm and normality not to be expected in view of the reports of disorder circulating in the European and American press. It was indeed true that in some areas there were lawless bands in operation and that murders and violence were from time to time reported, but these were quite insufficient to interrupt the normal functioning of Indonesian society. The dispute between labour and foreign-owned estates, though it was causing heavy loss to Indonesia, was not considered by the Indonesian ministers and officials to be more than a dispute over wages, and they dismissed any suggestion of 'Communism'. At this period it was undoubtedly the case that Indonesia was short of trained administrators, technicians, and professional men (especially doctors), but it was none the less true that the people were getting down to work with resolution and confidence. Their newly found freedom was still having a tonic effect on their outlook. In Djocjakarta alone was there any sign of the tiredness and reaction from the recent struggle.[2]

[1] The Chinese had, however, suffered casualties in the recent conflict in Macassar.

[2] In Chapter XLVIII the writer was compelled to rely almost exclusively

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Philippines OA1

The Philippines. The figure for Chinese in the Philippines in mid-1950 commonly accepted among those qualified to form an opinion was about 250,000, though the Chinese Embassy was said to place it rather higher. Illicit immigration was undoubtedly in progress on a fairly considerable scale. The annual legal quota for alien immigrants had now been reduced to 50 per nationality. (This was, in effect, a discrimination against nationalities other than Chinese, for the illegal immigration of the latter was, of course, unaffected by the order.) Previously the quota had been 500 per nationality, and the quota for Chinese had been allotted to congressmen for disposal. This had given rise to a scandal, for it was alleged in the press that up to 3,000 pesos had been paid to congressmen by or on behalf of each Chinese immigrant who wished to immigrate into the Philippines with legal sanction. An official inquiry into these allegations had been held but the report (the Natividad Report) had not by September 1950 been released for publication.[1]

The majority of Chinese in the Philippines were still ostensibly supporters of the Nationalist regime in China and the Chinese Ambassador represented the Kuomintang Government based on Formosa. The Chinese press of Manila (with a small total circulation of about 30,000) was careful to observe the official requirements. Of the five Manila Chinese daily newspapers the *Fookien Times* was by far the most important and produced a summary in English. Its policy appeared to be to try to steer a middle course between the Nationalists and Communists. The *Kong Li Po*, the *Great China Press*, and the *Chinese Nationalist Daily* were all Nationalist, but the *Chinese Commercial News* presented the Chinese Communist point of view.

Altogether the Chinese community in the Philippines was extremely cautious in its behaviour. Any act which might be considered by the authorities to be politically undesirable might be followed by the expulsion of the offender.

In September 1950 the greatest problem of the Philippines was one of finance. It seemed inevitable that the Government would have to obtain urgently a sum of at least 250,000,000 pesos from the United

upon Dutch or Chinese sources. Some Indonesian authorities are now becoming available and should be consulted in conjunction with this chapter—e.g. *Minorities in the Republic of Indonesia* (Jacarta, Ministry of Information of the Republic of Indonesia, 1949).

[1] Since the official test for 'Chinese' in the Philippines seems to be ethnic in a restricted sense, the writer in reviewing his statistical chapters feels that he has been influenced by this to exclude many persons whom he would in the other countries of Southeast Asia have included among ethnic Chinese. On his return to Manila in September 1950 he was impressed anew by the number of prominent Filipinos of Chinese blood, and often with Chinese names, barely disguised by Filipinization.

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Chinese

000 States to offset the adverse trade balance, but the opinion commonly held was that this amount would be forthcoming only if the Philippine Government was prepared to appoint a person of the United States Government's choice with authority over economic affairs.

The Hukbalahap insurgency was said to have got stronger within the last year and there was evidence of participation by the Chinese. The movement, however, remained an indigenous agrarian one with a considerable element of pure banditry.[1]

[1] Figures of interest to the student of the Chinese in the Philippines are contained in *Facts and Figures about the Economic and Social Conditions of the Philippines 1948–1949* (Manila, Bureau of the Census and Statistics, 1950). Some of these are as follows:

Retail stores owned by Filipinos 53,260, Americans 140, Chinese 11,321, Hindus 188, Spanish 43, others 71.

Foreign trade by traders January–June 1949 (in pesos), American 308,312,471, Chinese 258,951,724, Filipino 211,738,543, British 51,219,588.

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Despite its length, this list is selective only, for a complete compilation would occupy volumes. The majority of the authorities listed here are cited in the text, but some have been added for the sake of greater comprehensiveness.

From a superficial examination of the Chinese provincial and district histories (copies of which are in the British Museum and the Library of Congress), the author is of the opinion that a great deal of material useful for the study of the overseas Chinese is available therein.

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

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

[end map B]

/For a discussion of the Chinese in British Borneo see 2: Purcell, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 415-439./

/For a discussion of the Chinese in Malaya (including the postwar period) see 2: Purcell, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 269-414./

/For a discussion of the Chinese in Indochina see 2: Purcell, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 209-268./

/For comprehensive information pertaining to the history of the Chinese minority in Indonesia from the pre-Dutch era to 1942, see 2: Purcell, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 448-525./

/For a discussion of the Chinese in Indonesia, see 2: Purcell, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 441-568./

/For a discussion of the Chinese in Burma see 2; Purcell, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 55-101./

/For a discussion of the Chinese in the Philippines see 2: Purcell, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 569-655./

/For comprehensive information pertaining to the history of the Chinese minority in the Philippines from 1570 to 1946, see 2: Purcell, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 576-620./

/For a discussion of the Chinese in Thailand see 2: Purcell, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 103-208./

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-RULE AND INDEPENDENCE IN BURMA, MALAYA AND THE PHILIPPINES

PART I. BURMA by John F. Cady
PART II. MALAYA by Patricia G. Barnett
PART III. THE PHILIPPINES by Shirley Jenkins

An interim report in a study of progress toward self-government and independence in Southeast Asia.

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

January 1948

$1.25

4: Cady, Barnett and Jenkins H,S-4 (no date) 1948 All Southeast Asia All

PREFACE.

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The three studies which comprise this report constitute part of a larger study of the development of self-government and independence in dependent and formerly dependent countries of the Pacific area. The original intention of the American Institute of Pacific Relations was to publish a single volume covering all of those areas, and including chapters on American policy with respect to dependencies and trusteeship. Because of the rapid development of nationalist movements and steps towards self-government or independence in many parts of the Far East, it has now been decided to issue the report of the project in several volumes. Those dealing with such important areas as Indonesia and Indochina will be published as books during 1948. Plans for completion of the volume on Indochina by Professor Lauriston Sharp and Miss Ellen Hammer are already well advanced. Arrangements are also being made for a volume on Indonesia by Professor Raymond Kennedy, Mr. Paul Kattenburg and Miss Jeanne Mintz.

The present volume dealing with Burma, Malaya and the Philippines provides a useful comparative sketch of the policies followed by the British and American Governments in fostering the development of self-government and independence under markedly differing conditions. The three essays do not claim to be comprehensive inquiries into the political development of the three areas, but it is hoped that they will serve a useful purpose in providing a concise comparative survey of the main lines of policy followed in three areas where the development of self-rule has proceeded in a more peaceful and orderly fashion than in such areas as Indochina and Indonesia.

Two of the authors, Mr. Cady and Mrs. Barnett, are members of the research division of the State Department and because of this they have not always been in a position to write as freely about certain controversial points as might otherwise have been the case. The American I.P.R. is grateful to them for their cooperation in revising and expanding earlier drafts of their reports. Thanks are also due to Mrs. Jenkins and to several other persons who kindly aided her in the preparation of the chapter on the Philippines. For a much more detailed analysis of recent American relations with the Philippines the reader may be referred to Mrs. Jenkins's mimeographed report, "United States Economic Policy towards the Philippine Republic" prepared for the Stratford Conference of the I.P.R. in September, 1947. A revised and enlarged version of this report is now being prepared for publication in book form by the American I.P.R., about March, 1948. Those readers who desire a full account of the development of Burma may be referred to the forthcoming volume, "An Economic Handbook of Burma", by J. Russell Andrus, to be published shortly for the American I.P.R by the Stanford University Press.

The American I.P.R. is deeply indebted to Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore for her excellent work as general editor of this project in its earlier stages. Thanks are also due to several members of the International Secretariat of the I.P.R., particularly to Mr. William L. Holland, Mr. Philip E. Lilienthal and Miss Mary F. Healy for assistance in editing and production of this report. Though it appears under the auspices of the American I.P.R., it should be emphasized that the authors alone are responsible for statements of fact, or opinion in their respective chapters.

New York.
January 5, 1948.

EDWARD C. CARTER
Executive Vice-Chairman
American Institute of Pacific Relations.

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PART I. B U R M A

by

John F. Cady.

PART I. BURMA

ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL ASPECTS

Introduction

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This section of the study of Burma deals with the basic political problem facing the emerging Burman state, namely to establish a responsible government capable of making its will effective, commanding the respect and cooperation of the population, while preserving essential political and social liberties. The pre-war British administrative system, herein described, provides the inevitable pattern which Burmans will either follow or depart from in fashioning their own government. An analysis of the strength and weaknesses of that system is therefore pertinent to any consideration of the political future of an independent Burman state. Attention is also given to the development of Burman nationalism since the 1920's, particularly as it related to successive changes in British colonial rule, to the Japanese occupation, and to post-war political events. The second section traces the emergence and growth within Burma of the remarkable phenomenon of lawlessness, which stemmed from the decay of indigenous political and social institutions, the natural proclivities of the Burman male to react violently under emotional stress, and the tendency aggravated by rising nationalist feeling to regard Government as something alien to and apart from the people themselves. This established tradition of disrespect for governmental authority promises to persist to plague any successor Burman regime.

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I. GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE OF PRE-WAR BURMA

A. Executive Authority

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Executive authority in pre-war Burma emanated from the office of the Governor, who exercised plenary supervision over the entire field of the Civil Service. The office existed under Letters Patent issued by the British Crown in Council. The Secretary of State for India and Burma signed the Governor's Commission and Sign Manual, and also prepared his draft instructions. The Governor was personally responsible, therefore, to the Secretary of State, and the latter to the British Cabinet. Sovereignty resided in the Crown, all Burma officials being required to take the oath of allegiance to "the King, his Heirs, and Successors."

Under the Burma Constitution established by Act of Parliament in 1935, the Governor was accorded reserved, mandatory, and discretionary powers. Reserved to his control were the administration of the Shan States and other hill tracts, Anglican ecclesiastical affairs, military defense, foreign relations, and monetary policy. His mandatory responsibilities included the maintenance of peace and order, the safeguarding of Burma's financial stability and international credit, the prevention of oppression and discrimination against racial and religious minorities, protection of the legal rights and legitimate interests of members of the public service and their dependents, and the safeguarding of the

643 [645] commerce of the United Kingdom and India from penal or discriminatory action by Burma's tariff laws. To assist the Governor in performing duties reserved to his personal control and included under his special responsibilities, an Advocate General acted as legal adviser along with a financial adviser and staff (selected in consultation with the Finance Minister), and three counsellors. The Governor was himself the judge of the extent of his legal jurisdiction.(1) In the face of circumstances which, in the Governor's opinion, imperilled governmental authority, he was authorized (Article 139) to assume "all or any of the powers vested in or exercised by any body or authority in Burma."(2)

645 Cabinet Ministers under the 1935 Constitution were responsible to the House of Representatives. The Governor was directed, in choosing his Cabinet, to consult with the "person who in his judgment is most likely to command a stable majority in the Legislature." He was directed furthermore to foster a sense of joint responsibility among his Ministers, and not to relieve them arbitrarily of responsibilities properly their own. The Governor followed the advice of his Ministers in ordinary matters, but he was not obliged to do so if in his judgment their counsel appeared likely to jeopardize any of his delegated responsibilities. In such instances, he could not be required to cite any specific provision of the Act of 1935 to justify his decision.(3)

668 652 646 The essential conditions were lacking to make the Burmans regard the government as their own. They had not fashioned the Constitution and they lacked the powers by which they could change features of which they disapproved. The Legislature's control of the normal budget did not include the opportunity to force any limitation on the Governor's prerogatives by withholding funds, as had happened in American colonial history. Most of the important items of expenditure, connected with the servicing of the Meston settlement of Burma's foreign debt, the payment of civil service salaries and pensions, and defense expenditures, were entirely under the Governor's control, and his plenary prerogatives could compass any emergency situation.

B. The General Administrative System

631 Under the Governor were seven divisional Commissioners (for Mandalay, Sagaing, Magwe, Arakan, Pegu, Irrawaddy, and Tenasserim Divisions) with additional Commissioners in charge of the frontier areas and performing specialized governmental functions. Except in the Hill Tracts, where Commissioners exercised immediate executive and judicial authority, their functions were mainly supervisory in character. Burma Civil Servants as a rule could not aspire to such eminence, and the population was inclined to regard the Commissionerships as nonessential luxuries.

634 Basically more important than the Commissioners and second only to the Governor as a focal point of governmental authority were the Deputy Commissioners. They possessed considerable discretionary authority as the heads of Burma's thirty-five districts, embodying the sovereign authority of the Crown on the local level. Approximately half of the D.C. posts before the war were filled by [503] Burman members of the civil service.

(1) Parliamentary Papers, 1936-37, XX, "Draft Instrument of Instructions to the Governor of Burma", pp. 2-3.
(2) John Christian, Modern Burma, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1943, Chapter VI, and pp. 79-80, 102.
(3) Parliamentary Papers, op. cit., pp. 3, 5, 7.

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Burman members of the Civil Service. The Deputy Commissioners were the top criminal magistrates of their respective jurisdictions and handled all important cases in that category. They supervised financial and police administration, the local health and forestry services; they supported educational standards and maintained communications along the trunk-line highways. The Deputy Commissioner also presided over the periodic meetings of the elected District Councils. His arbitrament was usually final in differences arising over either policy or jurisdiction.

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A score or more of officials of Deputy Commissioner rank were assigned specialized tasks not connected with general administrative supervision. Some were magistrates of district criminal courts; others supervised the collection of income taxes and land revenue. Approximately four-score Assistant Commissioners and Extra Assistant Commissioners aided in similar capacities and provided a pool from which future Deputy Commissioners could be drawn. The most promising of the younger indigenous recruits to the Civil Service could be found among the Assistant Commissioners.

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Burman members of the Civil Service class II served as township Myooks (administrative officers). Their responsibilities were largely routine. The group included Deputy Myooks who constituted a trained reserve for replacement, leave, and emergency vacancies of the regular Myooks. The township officers were ordinarily the lowest salaried officials whose authority bore directly on the native population.(4)

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The functional breakdown of bureaucratic responsibility was supervised by a central Secretariat at Rangoon, consisting of twenty-six departments.(5) Many of these departments such as Justice, Police, Health, Forests, Education, and Public Works, maintained within the several administrative districts officials assigned to specific functions, who worked under the general supervision of the Deputy Commissioners.

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British Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners, contributed to the integrity of Burma's police, court system and the subordinate branches of the civil service. In a completely Burmanized regime, British assistance will be sorely missed in technical fields of engineering, health, finances, and frontier affairs. Any serious lowering of standards of administration on the higher levels will, of course, be reflected throughout the entire structure of government.

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(4) Indian Statutory Commissioner Report (hereafter cited as ISCR), 1930, II, pp. 6, 224-5, 232-3. About five-eighths of the expenditures for general administration was made in the districts.

(5) The Departments were: General Administration, Police, Prisons, Justice, Public Health, Civil Medical Services, Land Revenue, Registration, Forests, Public Works I (Roads and Buildings), Public Works II (Irrigation), Fisheries, Agriculture, Cooperatives, Veterinary Services, Excise, Local Fund Audit, Labor, Education, Industries, Factories, Provincial Marine, Archaeology, Stamps, Boilers, and Governmental Press.

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C. The Village Headman

Burma's eleven thousand headmen (Thugyis) might be considered the capillaries which carried the blood stream of governmental authority into the most remote areas of Burma's body politic. In densely populated areas, village tracts varied from three to six square miles in area, frequently including more than one settled community. Headmen were appointed by the Deputy Commissioners, who took into consideration hereditary claims, economic status, and the preferences of the villagers themselves. As government officials, the headmen were charged with the collection of land revenue, the maintenance of law and order, and the adjudication of petty criminal offenses within the village tracts. They also performed numerous routine tasks such as the entertainment of visitors and travelling officials, the keeping of vital statistics, local road maintenance, and the prevention of cattle disease. Villagers within their respective tracts could legally be compelled to assist headmen in carrying out governmental functions. The headman's compensation was ten per cent of the land revenue he collected. Village Committees assisted the headmen in their judicial functions, but the Thugyi himself bore full responsibility for local administration.

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In the maintenance of order, headmen could not, as a rule, enlist the willing cooperation of the villagers. A village tract was too small a unit in any case to cope with organised criminal gangs. A criminal-dominated village could easily intimidate its neighbors, so that dereliction of duty on the part of a minority of headmen could have a cumulatively demoralizing effect. Police records after 1900 afford ample evidence of unsatisfactory performance of the functions of the Thugyis, although in the more stable, long-settled communities the system worked fairly well.

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D. The Court System of Burma

The High Court of Judicature at Rangoon functioned under the direct authority of the British Crown. The Justices were appointed by the Crown and could be removed only by the Home Government. Temporary vacancies on the Court could be filled by the Governor, who could also appoint additional judges on temporary tenure as needed.

The High Court supervised the regular judicial services throughout Burma, including matters of procedure as well as the services of sheriffs, clerks, attorneys, and other officers.(6) It was the highest court of appeal for both civil and criminal cases, and also reviewed cases arising in the Small Cause Court of Rangoon. The Governor consulted with the High Court in making all important judicial appointments.

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Below the level of the High Court were the Sessions Courts, the District Courts, and the Stipendiary Magistrates, all of whom dispensed both civil and criminal justice, handling an enormous amount of legal business. Judges of minor courts were appointed and removed by the Public Service Commission. Many Burmans held lower-rank judgeships. Honorary magistrates, recruited from retired officials and influential businessmen, supplemented the regular court system. They handled some 25,000 minor civil suits per year.(7) Routine administration of the entire

(6) ISCR, XI, pp. 6-7. The High Court was established by Letters Patent in 1922.
(7) Christian, op. cit., pp. 95-97, 163-164; ISCR, XI, pp. 234-35.

692 court system was entrusted to the Judicial branch of the Burma Commission. Criminal jurisdiction in the districts was shared extensively by the executive officers, as has already been explained. Executive officers in the backward tracts exercised plenary criminal jurisdiction.(8)

695 198 671 The official language of the High Court was English, and the law applied was an adaptation of British and Indian practices.(9) A codified version of Burmese Buddhist Law was operative in Burma proper "in cases where the parties are Burmese Buddhists and the question to be decided is one regarding succession, inheritance, marriage or caste, or any religious usage or institution."(10)

E. The Central Legislature and the Ministers

646 [563] The House of Representatives Under the Constitution of 1935, the nine Cabinet Ministers must resign office as a group whenever they ceased to command a majority vote in the House of Representatives. Of the 132 members of the House, 91 were elected from general single-member constituencies. Twenty-five seats were assigned to racial minority groups as follows: twelve Karen and eight Indian single-member constituencies, three European and two AngloBurman seats filled by using all Burma as the voting unit. Eleven seats were reserved for Commerce and Industry, six of the number being European, three Indian, one Chinese, one Burman. Two labor constituencies were designated, one at Rangoon and environs and the other in the Yenangyuang oil fields, each of them electing one Indian and one non-Indian labor representative. A representative of the University completed the list. Eligible Indians and Karens living outside the limits of their designated constituencies could vote in the general constituencies, as could qualified Chinese.

The Senate Eighteen of the thirty-six Burman Senators were elected by the House and half were appointed by the Governor. Approximately the same proportional racial representation was maintained in the Senate as prevailed in the House. Property qualifications for Senators were high. They must have been assessed during the previous year on income of 12,000 rupees or more ($4500), or have paid land revenue of 1000 rupees in Lower Burma (800 rupees in Upper Burma), or have served previously on the Governor's Council, as Minister, as Judge of an important court, or as a permanent Deputy Commissioner of a District. The Senate was chosen therefore from well-to-do businessmen, professional people, high Government officials, and landlords. As a consultative body with power of veto over legislative enactments, it acted as a check on the elected House of Representatives.

643 646 The Legislative Powers of the Governor The legislative powers of the Governor were extensive. He could call, prorogue, or dissolve either or both Chambers of the Legislature, subject only to the provision that the body must meet at least once a year. He appointed half of the Senate. The Governor's Counselors and the Advocate General, enjoyed the right to appear and speak before either Chamber. The Governor could influence legislative procedure directly (a) by withholding confidential information, (b) by prohibiting discussion of reserved subjects, (c) by restricting consideration of matters adversely affecting his responsibilities, and (d) by withholding consent from the introduction of any bill touching

(8) IGCR, XI, pp. 234. Included in the criminal justice system were the Government Advocate, three Deputy Advocates, and thirty Public Prosecutors.
(9) The Burma Code, 6th Edition, Rangoon, 1934, 3 vols.
(10) C. H. Moorman, Burmese Buddhist Law, Oxford, 1939, p. 1.

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constitutional matters, the Governor's powers, alteration of criminal trial procedure, or taxation liability of persons domiciled in the United Kingdom. An Order in Council of 1937 forbade the Burma Legislature from regulating Indian immigration or altering the tariff policy until 1940.(11)

Executive veto over enactments of the Burma Legislature extended through the office of the Governor to the London authorities also. The Governor himself could veto any act of the legislature or he could withhold his consent pending consultation with the Home Government. The latter procedure was mandatory for any action which would derogate from the power of the High Court, or which might embarrass the Governor in the discharge of his responsibilities.(12) Even if the Governor approved an Act, the Home Government (Secretary of State for Burma), as an added safeguard, could veto it within a year after its enactment.

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The Governor's powers to initiate legislation were fourfold. If the legislature refused to appropriate funds covering any phase of his special responsibilities, he could authenticate over his signature a schedule of expenditures covering the particular item. In the second place, he enjoyed unlimited authority to issue ordinances for the excluded areas. During a recess of the Legislature, he could promulgate emergency ordinances which had to be submitted to the Legislature for approval when it reconvened. Finally, the Governor could enact laws on the constitutional level that were superior to any subsequent legislative act (i.e., not subject to repeal) if such were needed for the proper discharge of his duties.

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The elimination of the personality of the British Governor in the future Burmese constitution will place heavy responsibilities on both the executive and legislative branches of the government. The difficulty of maintaining a stable government based on majority control of the House of Representatives may require the eventual establishment of an independent executive. Much will depend on whether experienced and trustworthy leadership will be able to counter the inevitable demagogic appeals based on religious and racial considerations. The probable absence of a property-holding Senate indicates that a radical trend in both property legislation and taxation is in prospect. A uniform system of general constituencies is in prospect coupled with representation of minority racial groups in a Chamber of Nationalities.

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The Ministers of State The operation of responsible government in Burma was impaired by the prevailing multiple-party system under which every important political figure had his coterie of personal followers. A major attraction to those aspiring to Cabinet rank was the 4,000-rupee monthly salary connected with the job. As the maintenance of a working majority in the House was the primary concern of every Cabinet group, a Minister's value to the Government was measured not in terms of administrative capacity or experience but rather in terms of the number of votes he could control in the House. Under the circumstances, Ministers were primarily politicians who cultivated their friends and kept their political fences in repair; they could give only limited attention to overseeing the management of the assortment of unfamiliar departments and bureaus assigned to each of them.

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Elective and bureaucratic features of the government had scarcely begun to be integrated by 1941, and the Cabinet system was for the most part an addendum superimposed upon an administrative structure whose procedures and policies were

(11) Christian, op. cit. pp. 81, 84-86, 91.
(12) Parliamentary Papers, pp. 7-8.

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subject to little modification. Only in the area of agricultural reform and immigration control did the new Government exert a positive influence on governmental policies. Not until the Japanese occupation did Burma's Ministers become de facto heads of administrative agencies. The departure of British Civil Servants in 1942 left a void which Burmans had to fill.

F. Local Representative Institutions

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The Municipal Councils Appointive Municipal Councils in Burma date from the Municipal Act of 1874. They developed not from an indigenous demand for local self-rule but from European concern for improving urban living conditions. At the outset, Councils supervised the maintenance of streets, lighting, markets, police protection, and water supply. Eventually their authority included vernacular education, conservancy, building regulations, road and bridge construction, vaccination and slaughterhouse inspection.(13) During the 1920's the Municipal Councils became elective, and residents were enfranchised on a property-holding or tax-paying basis. Local Government approved municipal charters and the by-laws drawn up by each community for the conduct of municipal affairs, and supervised Rangoon's administration directly. The seven regional Commissioners were responsible for keeping municipal expenditures within budgetary limits. Local Government might dissolve any Town Committee for cause.(14) At the end of the 1920's there were fifty-eight municipalities.

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Community vitality was generally lacking in the municipalities. The urban Burmans generally preferred to do without the novel and expensive schemes of municipal improvement which seemed intended to meet European rather than Burmese desires.(15) Even though Local Government offered to pay two-thirds of the cost of waterworks installations, there are few responses. Sewage disposal facilities did not improve; inspection of public works contracts was grossly inadequate; embezzlement and defalcations flourished.(16) Committees were careless in hiring employees and rarely inflicted punishment for maladministration even when fraud or loss of revenue was reported. The citizens frequently complained, but failed to use their elective power to place more responsible men on the Councils.(17) The destruction of practically all of the important cities of Burma during the war necessitates an exceedingly difficult and expensive task of urban reconstruction. How much will be accomplished in this field without the presence of Europeans to take the initiative remains to be seen. The outlook is discouraging.

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Rural Self-Government: District Councils Burma's Rural Self-Government Act was passed in 1922. Twenty-eight District Councils were set up, the members being chosen by indirect election for a three-year term. Groups of village tracts selected a representative to serve on Circle Boards, each of which elected from its own membership one or more Council members, up to a total of twenty to twenty-five for the district. Council members served without pay. The district Executive Engineer, the Civil Surgeon, and a Veterinary Officer served ex-officio on the Councils.(18)

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(13) ISCR, XI, pp.457-60.
(14) Ibid.
(15) F. D. Leach, The Future of Burma, London, 1925, p. 96.
(16) ISCR, XI, pp. 465-66.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Burma Gazetteer, Maubin District, Vol. A (Rangoon, 1931), pp.95-98; ibid, Mandalay District, Vol. A (Rangoon, 1928), pp.212-14; Thaton District, Vol.A (Rangoon, 1931), pp.93-95.

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The Councils appropriated funds for maintaining local health services, keeping up the secondary roads, promoting vernacular education, and the operation of the ferry services and waterways. Supervision by district officials or by Local Government was ineffective. As a rule Councillors begrudged the cost of hiring unpopular vaccinators and veterinary assistants; they were indifferent to the sanitary inspection of markets, cattle pounds, and slaughterhouses. Vernacular school funds were expended wastefully and money for public works was frequently squandered on unneeded roads and buildings.(19) The Public Works Department actually kept up the most important local roads and waterways, receiving compensation from the Council's funds, while the Deputy Commissioner usually collected the fees from the ferries.(20)

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District Council administration in Burma was universally conceded to be a failure. Circle Board elections were systematically boycotted. Village headmen were disqualified for elected membership on the Councils on the ground that they were officials. Council membership carried no prestige, nor was it legitimately remunerative. Personal interest rather than concern for the general welfare usually motivated the councillors, especially as they felt no responsibility to the public for their actions. Councils refused to delegate any functions to the Circle and village representatives, keeping within the Council the expenditure of all district funds. Circle boards were inactive except as an electoral agency, and village committees existed in name only.(21)

II. LEGAL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS OF THE POPULATION

A. Personal Liberties

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The inhabitants of Burma enjoyed under British law a considerable degree of freedom of the press and of speech, and complete freedom of religion. The line between what was legal and what illegal was drawn in practice on the question of whether or not the action in question constituted in fact an incitement to violence. Possession of firearms was permitted only under special license. The Governor was empowered to undertake all measures deemed necessary to maintain law and order, and the Criminal Investigation Department kept close tabs on all potential offenders. Under war emergency conditions which prevailed after 1939, the Governor was accorded by the Defense of Burma Rules extraordinary powers of arrest and imprisonment. Extensive use was made of this power before the Japanese invasion, but the reoccupation authorities were lenient toward political offenders and Japanese collaborationists. The Burma Interim Government recently repealed the Defense Rules.

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No racial or class discrimination was imposed by law relating to vocation or profession, the buying or selling of real estate, or educational opportunity. In the allocation of the limited funds available for education and other governmental services, however, the Burman population was favored over non-indigenous elements. Nationalist pressure became increasingly strong during the 'thirties against the employ of Indians especially in the public services, whenever qualified Burmans were available.

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(19) Royal Institute of International Affairs, United Kingdom Paper No. 14E, p. 7, Mont Tremblant Conference, IPR, 1942.
(20) ISCR, XI, op. cit., pp. 431-437; Mandalay District Gazetteer, Vol A, pp. 212-14.
(21) ISCR, XI, pp. 422-36.

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B. Suffrage privileges

Residence in a given constituency and the payment of specified taxes per year (usually four or five rupees) were the principal requirements for entering names of 18-year-old men and 21-year-old women on the various electoral rolls. Sex alone was no disqualification, although the franchise for women was confined almost entirely (86 per cent) to Upper Burma, where women as well as men were obliged to pay the thathameda tax on non-agricultural income. Women voters also had to qualify under a literacy test and were not permitted to stand as candidates for election. As the five-rupee capitation tax required of all heads of households in Lower Burma was sufficient to qualify for the suffrage, more than 30 per cent of the males living in the elective areas were registered voters. The revocation of both the thathameda and capitation taxes after 1937 destroyed the principal basis of suffrage. Franchise qualifications in urban areas could be met either by possession of a designated amount of immovable property (worth 200 rupees) or by occupation of a house worth 60 rupees rent per year. The 33 new general constituencies provided for by the 1935 Constitution were all assigned to rural areas, a change which went far to redress the heavy over-representation of the urban population under the previous Legislative Council system.(22)

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The electoral rolls for the two labor constituencies (one around Rangoon, one at Yenangyaung) included only the names of permanent employees working in registered factories located within the designated areas plus members of organized labor unions of two years' standing showing a membership of at least 250. No maistry (contractor)-controlled laborers were eligible, nor were Rangoon's rickshaw pullers, sampan-wallahs, and freight movers. As of 1936, around 20,000 Indians were eligible to vote under this arrangement in the Rangoon, Insein, Syriam constituency, and some 5,000 in the oil fields, out of a total local Indian labor population of several hundred thousand; non-Indian labor enrolled around 5,000 eligible voters in the first mentioned area, and a slightly larger group in the second.(23)

The greatly increased communal representation of the Karens under the 1935 Constitution (from 5 seats to 12) was in part an emphasis on rural as opposed to urban representation and in part an acknowledgment of the paramount rights of the indigenous population as compared with immigrant Indian and Chinese. Indian and Chinese representation was not increased over previous levels, as were Burman and Karen seats. Most of Burma's quarter-million Chinese inhabitants took little interest in Burmese politics. The one representative of the Chinese business community in the Legislature was required to be a British subject.(24)

C. The Minority Racial Groups

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The major social cleavages in Burma are racial. No caste system exists among the indigenous population, and under Burmese Buddhist law women are fully equal to men in legal and social status. About two-thirds of the nearly 17 million inhabitants are Burmans, but this fraction includes an important Mon element (Talaings to the Burmese), living mainly in Tenasserim division and in the lower reaches of the Irrawaddy delta, which is being rapidly assimilated to the majority group. The most important minority races are the Karens, the Indians,

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(22) Government of Burma Act, 1935, British Government, 26 Geo. 5, Chapter 3.
(23) Sir Laurie Hammond, On the Delimitation of Constituencies in Burma, London, 1936, pp. 4-12, 23-26.
(24) Ibid.

563 the Shans, the Chinese, and the Anglo-Burmans. Numerous tribes of hill peoples inhabit the mountainous periphery along the borders of China and India, the most important being the Kachins and the Chins.

The Karens. The two major Karen groups, the Sgaw and the Pwo, are about equal numerically and include the vast majority of the million and a half members of that race. They are scattered in separate villages throughout the delta of the Irrawaddy and Sittang rivers and along the mountainous ridges bordering a large proportion of Burma's border with Siam. They were originally animist in religion, and many of them are still primitive. Their traditional relations with the majority race were those of slave to master. Karen-Burman relations, always bad, have deteriorated as a result of the war experience; Burman apologies have not erased
563 the effects of armed strife, which broke out between the two groups in 1942-43.

[797] The leadership of the Karen race is drawn largely from the Sgaws, who have been in continuous contact with American Baptist missionaries for a century and a quarter. As a result of the extensive educational operations sponsored by
771 the mission, the Christian Sgaw Karens are relatively well educated from a Western point of view. The Karens themselves have contributed generously to the support of
178 their own churches and schools, many of which operate without any outside assistance whatever. The Pwo Karens have been relatively less influenced by missionary
[701] activities and they tend to accept a veneer of Buddhism and to become Burmanized. Both Karen groups have been traditionally loyal to British rule, which has protected them against possible mistreatment by the Burmese. Karens made up an important element in the Burma Rifles and in the frontier police force in prewar days.

000 Ideally, the solution for Burman-Karen relations is the assimilation of the minority groups under guarantees of social equality and religious freedom. Such a solution could develop only in an atmosphere of moderated Burman dominance and a more general acceptance by Karens of the nationalist aspirations of the majority group. The creation of an autonomous Karen state, except in a limited sparsely populated area, is out of the question because of the intermingling of leading elements of the Karens with the Burmans throughout Lower Burma. The role of the Karens in an independent Burma is not likely to be a happy one.

[162] The Indian Minority. The Indian population of Burma before the war numbered roughly 1,100,000. Approximately one quarter of them lived along Burma's Arakan
563 coast neighboring Chittagong Division of Bengal Province, India. The vast majority of the remainder lived near the port of Rangoon, the largest racial fraction (45%)
463 of that city's pre-war population being Indian. Moulmein and Bassein had a similar proportion of Indian population. Two-thirds of Burma's industrial labor was Indian, and Indians also provided nearly all of the common labor on docks, railways, river steamers, and highways. The Indian workers in the Rangoon area were largely Telugu, Tamil, and Oriya immigrants, who came to Burma for three- or four-year periods of residence before returning to their families in India. The steady rise in Burma's Indian population up to the 1930's was due, not to natural increase, but to immigration.

[164] Labor contractors, called Maistries, usually took a percentage out of the wages of members of their respective gangs in return for supplying employment. Burmans were unwilling to acquiesce in the exactions of the maistries even when economic distress forced them to seek work alongside the Indians; under normal circumstances, Burmans would not work for wages acceptable to Indians. Annual
[167] Indian immigration declined somewhat following the peak year of 1928 (424,000
609 entries) due to depressed conditions of employment and to mounting opposition from the Burman population. The latter vented their feelings in two savage race riots
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The Saw-Bagpai Immigration Agreement of 1941, which put the entry of Indians into Burma on an annual quota basis, was never approved formally by the Secretary of State for India and Burma. No new agreement acceptable to the Burmans has been completed, and it appears that independent Burma intends to regulate the matter, temporarily at least, by statute. The right of 400,000 or more Indians to return after having evacuated Burma in 1942 has not been challenged. The Government of India apparently intends to insist that adequate wages, living conditions, and police protection be guaranteed before any new Indian labor immigration to Burma is permitted. The repatriation of the Chettyar moneylender community from Madras Province will present serious difficulties. The Chettyars acquired in Burma, over a period of two generations, equities in paddy lands valued before the war at 750 million rupees, an amount greater than all British investments in Burma // combined. As the re-installation of the Chettyars is not politically or economically feasible, compensation for liquidation of Chettyar land titles and mortgages will have to be considered by the Burma authorities as soon as the country is financially able to undertake the task. Equitable adjudication of Indian rights of residence and property in Burma and the development of friendly relations between the two countries aremong the most important international problems which postwar Burma will have to face.

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Burma's Muslim Zerbadi population (Indian-Burman admixture) is pretty thoroughly domiciled and will give rise to no international problem unless trouble should develop with Eastern Pakistan which abuts the Arakanese border. Minor local difficulty may be encountered as before the war in connection with the impaired legal status of Burmese wives under Muslim family law.

The Chinese Minority. The 220,000 Chinese residents of prewar Burma were mainly Fukienese and Cantonese in origin, having come to Burma by sea via Malaya. Yunnanese Chinese inhabited certain agricultural areas included within the bounds of Burma's Shan States; others entered Upper Burma as caravan traders or as transient laborers inthe Great Bawdwin zinc and lead mine. Burma's Chinese were usually shopkeepers, proprietors of restaurants and rooming establishments, carpenters, operators of ferries, and holders of liquor and opium licenses. They ran general merchandise stores and engaged in potty lending operations in all important towns; they also controlled much of the export of Burma rice to Malaya.

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The Chinese comprised the only large non-Burman group who were not considered British subjects. The Burma Overseas Chinese organization was allowed to elect representatives to sit in the Central Legislature of Kuomintang China. The Chinese community as a whole kept its language and racial identity, but intermarriages with Burmese women at the higher social levels were not unusual. Chinese husbands were good providers, and children of Chinese fathers and Burman mothers were regarded in many quarters as being more dependable than either the pure Burmese or the Chinese residents.

If Chinese participated in Burman politics -- a rare occurrence -- they usually supported nationalist candidates. The lone Chinese member in the Legislature, representing only the business community, had to be a British subject. Resident Chinese taxpayers could vote in the general constituencies.

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Following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, Burma's Chinese supported their country's cause vigorously. Politically active Chinese fled to China when the Japanese invaded Burma in 1942. The resident Chinese community was squeezed repeatedly by the Japanese for contributions to war funds and for forced labor service. Some found relief by claiming that they were supporters of Nanking rather than of the Kuomintang. The Chinese business community in Burma took full advantage of the absence of British and Indian competitors during and immediately following the occupation to strengthen their economic position within the country.

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Some Burmans are fearful of the dangers that their country might face as an independent nation from territorial aggression on the part of China, especially in the event that a collapse of international controls should precipitate a general

609 movement for territorial expansion. The threat of heavy overland immigration of Chinese into Burma via sparsely settled Yunnan, however, is not in any sense comparable to the threat to Burma inherent in uncontrolled Indian immigration.

563 636 The Shans, Kachins, and Chins. The Commissioner for the Shan States was assisted by officers of the Frontier Service who acted as legal advisors to local semi-feudal Shan princelings (Sawbwas). The rule was paternalistic and sometimes enlightened, for a number of the Sawbwas were well educated and progressive. The Shan people, although Buddhist like their Burman neighbors in the valley, were not politically restive before the war under lightly imposed British rule. The two indigenous peoples have been brought much closer together during the war as the result of having experienced common suffering under the Japanese yoke, and the Sawbwas now apparently prefer autonomous status within a free Burma to perpetuation of British rule. With the possible exception of Kengtung State, the only feasible commercial outlet for the minerals, cattle, potatoes, and fresh vegetables, and the only source for needed rice imports were through Burma proper.

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The Kachin peoples, who live in mountainous areas of northern Burma, number possibly 400,000 all told. They are relative newcomers, having migrated southward from the Sino-Tibetan border region only a few centuries ago. Kachin territory, like the Shan, was administered by the Governor's agents, but in a somewhat more direct fashion. Except in areas where the Kachins have been influenced by missionary activity, mainly American Baptist, they remain a primitive warlike people, having developed only a rudimentary political organization. The economic status of the Kachins was always precarious; disease ravaged the population; opium eating was widely practiced among them. Burman-Kachin relations have never been good. The former regard the hillsmen as savages (the literal meaning of Kachin in Burmese), and the Kachins reciprocate by despising the allegedly effete Burmans. Union with an independent Burma will prove difficult.

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Before the war British military establishments in Burma recruited and trained considerable numbers of Kachins, who made excellent soldiers.

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American OSS agents in north Burma were able during the recent war to recruit an effective fighting force of 10,000 Kachin rangers, who made life miserable for Japanese patrols and afforded General Stilwell's forces an indispensable source of military intelligence.

The most important people inhabiting the mountainous frontier between Burma proper and border Indian Provinces are the Chins, of whom there are two major groups, northern and southern. A considerable number of the southern Chins have drifted down in recent years into newly developed rice lands of the Irrawaddy lowlands, even to the eastern side of the river. American Baptist missionaries operating for a generation in the Chin Hills have reduced the native language to writing and introduced the rudiments of education and of the Christian religion into the area.

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The Chins, like the Kachins, make good soldiers and were not unhappy under British rule. Some of the Chins have accepted Buddhism, however, and their gradual assimilation into Burma's population would appear to be much less difficult than would be that of the Kachins. The Chinese will find an acceptable place in the new Burman state.

563 The Anglo-Burman Community. Burma's European half-caste community, the result of unions between British fathers and native mothers, occupied before the war the unhappy situation of being unwilling to identify themselves with the indigenous population and of being at the same time not accepted as social equals by the European residents. In religion they are Christian for the most part, but, with notable exceptions, the group was not well adjusted socially. Capable members of the Anglo-Burman community found employment in the Civil Service or in business; the operating personnel of the Burma Railways were largely Anglo-Indian and

563 Anglo-Burman. If in the event of British withdrawal the group should identify itself with nationalist objectives, it could make an important contribution to the future development of the country.

III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES

A. Social Policies: Health, Labor, Education

744 Health. Prominent among the social services of the Government of Burma was the Public Health Department, whose primary function was the prevention of epidemic disease. Despite popular opposition to compulsory vaccination and inoculation and a correspondingly small budget, epidemic diseases such as smallpox, cholera, and plague were kept under control. The health of the people was far from satisfactory, however, for many suffered from malaria, from venereal disease, from skin and eye infections. A Public Health Board supervised major expenditures for health purposes, and attempted to coordinate private and public health services. Six General Hospitals were maintained before the war, together with some 300 smaller hospitals and dispensaries scattered over the country.(25)

273 The Burma Government supervised closely the sale of liquor and drugs, the
276 declared objective being to reduce native consumption through controlled distribu-
656 tion. Liquor was taxed heavily but consumption nevertheless increased. Only Burmans who had been registered as opium addicts in or before 1903 could purchase the drug legally from licensed vendors, whereas non-Burman addicts were rationed through a system of consumers' tickets issued by Excise officers. Licit sales of opium declined, but the high prices obtainable for illicit distribution encouraged large-scale smuggling from relatively unadministered sections of the Shan States bordering Yunnan.(26)

466 Labor. The Labor Department of the Government languished for lack of funds and
656 public interest, and carried on no program worthy of the name. No statistics were kept and little was done to improve the living standards of the laborers. A Factories Department enforced minimum standards of conditions of work in some 600 rice mills, 168 saw mills, and a score or more of ginning factories and oil mills.(27) There were no generally accepted standards for wages or hours. Trade unionism as an economic factor was practically non-existent. As of 1936, Burma's eight trade unions totalled 2,821 members. To operate legally, a union had to be recognized and registered by the Government and submit its accounts for proper auditing.(28) Whenever strikes occurred, therefore, they usually took the form of unauthorized assembly and riotous conduct. Since the close of the war, trade unions have appeared in virtually all areas of Burman employ, including government services.

871 Education. Burma's relatively high male literacy rate of 56% before the war was
212 attributable in large measure to the work of the monastic schools. Every Buddhist
792 youth was expected to attend the monastic school of his community for a period in order to learn the rudiments of the ethical and religious teachings of the Buddhist faith and the Burmese equivalent of the three R's. The work was usually very elementary and often obscurantist. If monastic schools would submit to inspection and could qualify under certain standards, they were eligible to obtain registry by the Education Department. In actual fact this was never done, and monastic schools received no support from public funds. The Buddhist order made no provision for training teachers and did little to keep up minimum standards of discipline and efficiency.

871 The rural vernacular school system sponsored by the Government was placed after 1923 under the control of District School Boards functioning under the

(25) ISCR, XI, pp. 103-13, 84-92, 281-82.
(26) Ibid., pp. 64-70
(27) Ibid., pp. 167-189, 219-20.
(28) Ibid., pp. 4-13, 20-26.

871 authority of the elected District Councils. The schools were poorly administered and many failed to meet minimum requirements. Students left the vernacular schools at the end of two to three years, so that perhaps one-half of the children from five to eleven years at any given time were not in school. Paucity of funds, inadequate training facilities for teachers, and the low economic premium placed on vernacular school training were major difficulties.

The Education Department of the Government exercised direct control over the English and Anglo-vernacular schools, which alone qualified students for University entrance and for the Civil Service examinations. Approved Anglo-vernacular schools received Governmental grants-in-aid calculated to meet half of the budgeted deficit of each school. Attendance invariably exceeded facilities. Mission-supported schools played a prominent role in the Anglo-vernacular program. A limited number of so-called National schools, operating outside the supervision of the Education Department, were theoretically eligible for grants-in-aid, but usually did not qualify. Pre-war instruction in the University was entirely in the English language.(29)

871 Educational activities in Burma were completely disrupted by the war and they will have to be revived from the ground up. Educational plans are entirely in the hands of the Burmese. They propose to abolish all grants-in-aid and to
727 establish a uniform system on the basis of universal compulsory elementary school training as soon as funds are available. English language training will be relegated to a secondary position, although it probably will continue to be used as a medium of instruction in the University when the subject content requires it. Burman leaders are intensely interested in providing educational facilities in professional, scientific, and industrial fields. The re-establishment of satisfactory academic standards disrupted by political factors prior to the war will be difficult.

B. Economic Policies in General

433 The basic objective of British economic policies in Burma was to stimu-
656 late production of rice, timber, oil, and minerals for export purposes. The function of government was primarily to maintain orderly conditions necessary for commercial operations rather than to see that social needs were cared for. The
439 rapid and unregulated expansion of commercialized paddy production produced absentee landlordism, usury, and general social demoralization throughout much of Lower Burma. It is significant that the value of Burma's annual exports was considerably more than twice that of her imported goods, and that monetary reserves were not increased within the country.

563 Quasi-monopolistic control of all large-scale industrial production by a
471 few large British firms was the rule. Opportunity was given on occasion for Burman investors to purchase stock in British enterprises, especially in oil companies, and the policy of recruiting capable Burmans for responsible commercial positions prevailed in a number of firms. Indians and Chinese tended nevertheless to take over all small-scale business activities, and Burmans on the whole were left without an important stake in the economy of their own country.

464 Employer groups, mostly non-Burman, favored the recruitment of an ample
467 supply of coolie labor from India and opposed strongly any limitation on immigration. Government and employer groups were equally opposed to attempts at labor organization.

652 The financial policy of the Burma Government was very conservative. Public expenditures even during the depression of the thirties were kept within current income, so that appropriations for such public services as health, education, and transportation were usually inadequate. The excessive sums spent for policing the

(29) Ibid., pp. 135-54.

652 disorderly countryside curtailed expenditures for constructive social purposes. Burma's foreign debt was owed to India for the most part on account of the railways taken over in 1937 and the Meston settlement to cover amortization of the cost to the British of the three Burmese wars. In view of the large annual volume of exports, the country was in a sound condition financially, but social services left much to be desired.

C. Governmental Services

241 655 The Government Estates. Governmental authorities encouraged cultivator ownership of land on a limited scale through the so-called Government Estates. Within certain areas, colonizers of newly-opened agricultural lands could become tenants of the Estates and, therefore, eligible for public credits secured by the land. Revenues realized by Government from these Estates were expended on improving roads, bunds, and other facilities, while rent levels kept pace with progressive improvements.(30) Only a small fraction of the annual increment of 100,000 acres of new rice land could be consolidated under the Government Estates.

313 656 Forest Control. The Forest Department controlled the exploitation of Burma's vast timber resources. Title to all teak trees lay with the Government, and teakwood extraction accounted for almost all of the Department's annual profits of Rs. 100,000. The Department itself extracted and sold about 20% of the annual teak output, and the five leading European firms engaged in the timber business contributed about 46 per cent of the gross revenues of the Department.(31)

653 Public Works. The Public Works Department of the Government approved projects for public roads and buildings. The Irrigation Branch maintained irrigation works and collected water rates for the use of canal water, operated three ship canals, and maintained embankments and drainage facilities. Operational expenditures of this branch exceeded by one million rupees the tolls and rates collected. Dredging costs were particularly high, and reflected the lack of attention given to the serious problem of soil erosion.(32) The Fisheries Department fulfilled an important regulatory function in preventing the undue clogging of drainage channels for fishing purposes and the consequent flooding of cultivated areas.(33)

241 654 426 231 Agriculture. The Agriculture Department of Burma operated fourteen experimental farms, which were concerned for the most part with the improvement of seed rice. Some attention was given to selective cattle breeding, cotton raising, and sericulture. Agricultural officers did very little to publicize their operations or to gain the confidence of the cultivators. A program of Government-sponsored agricultural cooperatives, started in 1917, included 156,000 participants at one time, but most of the local societies eventually defaulted on their obligations and were forced to liquidate their assets. A considerable number of the defunct societies were [illegible]ed during the late thirties. A Veterinary Department kept cattle disease under control.

IV. RELATIONS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

A. The Rise of Nationalist Sentiment

668 641 Older Burmans never forgave the British for blotting out their existence as a separate national entity in 1886, but it was not until after World War I that nationalist opposition to British rule became articulate among younger and more vigorous Burman elements. Postwar political developments within India proper produced direct repercussions on the eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal. Nationalism in Burma at the outset took the form of a fiercely asserted demand that

(30) Ibid., pp. 178-80.
(31) Ibid., pp. 18, 84-92.
(32) Ibid., pp. 196-97.
(33) Ibid., pp. 100-103.

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Burma not be omitted from the operation of the Montagu-Chelmsford reform program of 1921 as had been contemplated originally. But Burmans were highly dissatisfied with their dyarchy constitution of 1922 (half of the Ministers responsible to the Governor and half to the Legislative Council).

The General Council of Burmese Associations boycotted all elections and even those Burmans who were elected to the Legislative Council by non-boycotting groups were usually pledged to sabotage the Constitution. Governments could be maintained under the circumstances only by enlisting the cooperation of non-Burmese British, Indian, Karen, and business representatives in cooperation with a few office-hungry Burmese politicians.

When it became apparent in the late twenties that the dyarchic system would have to be abandoned in India, the Indian Statutory (Simon) Commission recommended in 1930 that Burma be separated from India and be governed under a new constitution granting a larger degree of self-government. Because of lack of confidence in London's intentions, the Burman electorate in 1932 rejected the separation proposal along with any London-made constitution. As no suitable place for Burma could be found in the projected Federation at the Center in the India Act of 1935, Parliament drafted the Burma Act of 1935 along similar lines and put it into operation in 1937 without the benefit of Burmese ratification.

Under the new constitution a Burman Ministry fully responsible to the House of Representatives did finally come to grips with basic problems of tenancy rights, noncultivator land-holding, and Indian immigration. A persistent attack was maintained on the allegedly excessive powers of the Governor. The more moderate Burman nationalist elements led by U Saw, Premier in 1940-41, demanded as the price of Burman cooperation with Britain during the war an unequivocal promise of Dominion status for Burma following the war. His demand was refused. A more radical group led by ex-Premier Ba Maw's so-called Freedom Bloc and by youthful members of the Dobama (Thakin) Party demanded complete independence. Many of the radical leaders were jailed in 1940-41 for seditious activities under the Defense of Burma Rules. This radical nationalist group provided collaborationists for the Japanese-sponsored regime.

B. Burma's Relations with Britain and India

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On the non-official level, contacts between Burma and Britain were limited to the connections which the British business community maintained with directors and stockholders in London and with governmental representatives. The Burmese people had opportunity for no comparable relations with the public of the United Kingdom, nor did the representatives of the Burma House of Representatives have access to members of Parliament. Burman delegations were invited periodically to go to London for conferences and Round Table discussions, but the constitutional initiative rested with the metropolitan power and Parliamentary enactments were not subject to ratification by the Burma Government.

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Burma's separation from India in 1937 did not abruptly sever financial and trade ties between the two countries. Burma's foreign debt was owing to India, and the Reserve Bank of India continued to stand guarantor for Burma's currency notes. When the Saw-Bajpai Immigration Agreement was concluded in 1941, it was accompanied by an arrangement giving goods manufactured in India a preferential position with respect to entry into Burma. The intervention of the war period voided both agreements, and future relations as to finance, trade and immigration will presumably be negotiated as between independent states.

C. Burma Under the Japanese

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The Burmese people in 1942 were apathetic with respect to offering resistance to the Japanese invaders. Burmans lacked both arms and training, and they were not conscious of having any important stake in the preservation of Britain's

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economic and political control. The Japanese were fellow-Orientals and Buddhists and were pledged to liberate Burma from Western control. The people very quickly became disillusioned with their "liberators", however, and it was only after it had become apparent that the country must make the best of Japanese occupation that responsible Burmese cooperated with Ba Maw's puppet regime. Nationalist youth groups led by the Thakins (some of them Communists) ultimately broke with the Japanese and formed the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), which afforded effective assistance to the British-Indian forces during the closing months of the Burma campaign.

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Burma's war experiences, although harrowing, were in one respect salutary. Burmese Ministers were obliged for the first time to shoulder full administrative responsibilities without having the British Civil Service to lean upon. They emerged from the ordeal more mature in their point of view and fully aware of the difficulties of self-government. The experience at the same time intensified the Burman desire for political and economic independence and generated a spirit of self-assurance among them that few outsiders had anticipated.

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On the negative side the war destroyed Burma's cities and her transportation facilities; it reduced the basic industry of rice production to temporary prostration; it left the population almost completely destitute of clothing and other consumer goods. Equally unfortunate was the demoralizing effect of two periods of anarchy (1942 and 1945), with a three-year orgy of looting and scrounging of goods and property in between. Police agencies became badly demoralized. Lawlessness on an alarming scale survived as a major governmental problem aggravated in some areas by economic and political unrest. A bankrupt and devastated Burma faces a grimoutlook for the next several years.

D. Rise to Power of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League

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Confusion and Deadlock. The war period was a dividing-line in Burma's political history. Prewar parties, which had centered for the most part around coteries of followers of rival political leaders, emerged discredited and disrupted in organization. Dr. Ba Maw's group of political lieutenants will carry for many years the stigma of having stayed too long with the Japanese. The Thakin (Dobama) nationalist party has split into numerous factions; many of its leaders and potential recruits found their way into the ranks of the AFPFL. From 1942 to 1946 ex-Premier U Saw was a British prisoner in Uganda. During this interval he got badly out of touch with Burmese affairs, and his Myochit (Patriotic) party disintegrated. Other older leaders either joined the AFPFL or retired from the political field. By way of contrast, the youthful ex-Thakin leaders who organized the AFPFL as an underground anti-Japanese movement enjoyed high prestige among all nationalists. They emerged in 1945 in control of the only strong and well organized political party in Burma.

The AFPFL was a hybrid organization which included Communists, Socialists, ex-Thakin nationalists, leaders of the All-Burma Students Union, veterans of the Burma National Army and its Patriotic Volunteer Organization (PVO), plus several old-time politicians such as U Ba Pe and members of the Myochit party. Except for its generally youthful character and its agreement on nationalist issues, the party lacked both cohesion and homogeneity. General Aung San and the Communist Party President, Than Tun, were its outstanding figures. Communist Party leaders were prominent in the inception of the League and for a year or so following the liberation of Rangoon (May 1945) managed to use the AFPFL organization as a front for organizing Trade Unions and Peasants' Unions working for the accomplishment of Communist objectives. Other elements of the League, particularly the Socialists, were also active. In an effort to establish its claim to speak for all Burmese nationalists, the League extended membership to many non-Communist elements, who managed by July 1946 to exclude Than Tun from the Secretaryship of the AFPFL, and eventually succeeded (October 1946) in ousting the Communists entirely from the organization. Party discipline was generally lax and political unrest tended to merge with outright lawlessness, so that the League was at various times seemingly in danger of falling apart of its own weight.

727 When Governor Dorman-Smith took over governmental affairs in October 1945
668 and attempted to organize a Burmese Executive Council to assist him, he refused to concede the claim advanced by the AFPFL to represent all of the Burmese people and insisted on including in the Council several conservative Burmans who were
665 unacceptable to the nationalists. Negotiations broke down and no AFPFL representatives were included in the Council. Subsequently the Governor brought back to Burma U Saw and two exiled Thakin leaders and persuaded some of U Saw's followers and a Thakin to enter the Council. So great was the resentment in the AFPFL that for a time it looked as if revolution might break out.

Governor Dorman-Smith returned to England in June 1946. The situation remained quiet during the summer rains while attention was focused on the pattern of settlement being fashioned in nearby India. General Hubert Rance, formerly head of the Civil Affairs Department of the Army in Burma, took over the Governorship in late August, apparently with authority to establish an Interim Burmese Government such as was being inaugurated in India.

2. The AFPFL Succeeds to Power.

[468] A series of strikes in September, 1946, beginning with a police strike to obtain better wages and culminating in a general strike backed by the AFPFL, led
668 Governor Rance to force the resignation of the existing Executive Council. Aung San agreed to head a new and representative Council which included both AFPFL and
665 non-AFPFL members and which enjoyed somewhat greater authority than the first. Under Aung San's leadership the strikes were curbed and a measure of governmental
646 authority was restored.

The continuing complaints of dissatisfied nationalist elements and the open opposition of the ousted Communists obliged Aung San to press vigorously for additional concessions from London. In November he presented an ultimatum demanding by January 31, 1947 a more satisfactory agreement including a guarantee of independence for Burma within a year thereafter. The AFPFL supported the demands by making preparations for a popular rising to take place if the concessions were not forthcoming.

The British-Burmese agreement negotiated at London in late January 1947 conceded the more essential of Aung San's previous demands, including the election of an all-Burmese Constituent Assembly. Enough was withheld, however, to give an excuse to two non-AFPFL delegates, U Saw and Ba Sein, who hoped to capitalize on the expected popular rejection of the pact, to refuse to sign the agreement. But they underestimated Aung San's personal prestige. Upon his return to Rangoon, he was able to obtain both party and popular acquiescence in the new arrangement, leaving his opponents discomfited and with no alternative to propose in place of the London settlement. In the Constituent Assembly elections held in early April 1947, nearly half the seats were uncontested and the AFPFL obtained an overwhelming majority of the remainder.

Thus after two years of political maneuvering the AFPFL under Aung San's leadership finally established its claim to enjoy the backing of virtually the entire Burmese nation. Burma's immediate future rested in the hands of the patriotic youthful following of a man himself only thirty-two, a group short on experience but determined to strike out on the path toward independence.

641 Following the April elections, Aung San undertook to quiet the unrest which had reached fever pitch during the course of the London negotiations. Meanwhile
668 committees of the Constituent Assembly proceeded with the task of drafting the new constitution, which entailed prolonged negotiations with representatives of
178 the Shan, Kachin, and Chin peoples inhabiting peripheral mountainous areas of Burma.

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Preliminary negotiations with London were also initiated covering conditions of Burma's separation from the British Commonwealth.

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The orderly course of these transitional activities was temporarily interrupted on July 19, 1947, by the cold blooded assassination of Aung San and six other members of the Executive Council at the hands of hired gunmen who forced their way into the Council Chamber. The objective was apparently to spread confusion preparatory to the overthrow of the Government. Among the victims were some of the ablest and most experienced members of the AFPFL, whom it will be impossible to replace. The party weathered the immediate crisis thanks in part to the prompt action of Governor Rance in establishing a new AFPFL Government. But Burma will miss in days to come the firm hand of Aung San and the prestige which his enormous popularity gave to the Government. His elimination makes inevitable a struggle for political leadership within the party as soon as independence has been achieved. The July 19 incident underscores the crucial character of the problems of political indiscipline and lawlessness to which the preceding discussion alludes and the antecedents of which will be discussed below in Part II.

Burma's new Government under Thakin Nu negotiated a defense agreement with the British authorities in late August. The new constitution was formally approved by the Assembly in September (see Appendix I). On October 17 Thakin Nu signed at London a definitive treaty with the British (see Appendix II). The trial of those accused of complicity with the July 19 assassination, including ex-Premier U Saw, began in October. The present Ministry is drawn exclusively from AFPFL ranks although signs of party fission are clearly in evidence.

The British House of Commons on November 5, 1947, approved by a vote of 288 to 114 the crucial second reading of the Burma Independence Bill after an extended debate featured by strenuous objections on the part of Mr. Churchill. At Rangoon, on January 4, 1948, the Burmese flag replaced the Union Jack at Government House and the popular British Governor, Sir Hubert Rance, boarded his waiting cruiser. Burma's Parliament thereupon ratified the October 17 British Treaty, thus completing the legal steps by which independence became a reality.

V. CURRENT PROBLEMS.

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The measure of success achieved during the coming months by the interim regime in effecting an orderly transition from the legal basis of authority derived from the plenary powers of the Governor under the 1935 Act to the new legal basis of popular sovereignty will have considerable bearing on future developments. The complicated machinery of the new constitution will obviously be difficult to put into operation. Problems connected with economic rehabilitation and land reform are extremely urgent. The settlement of land titles and immigration policy will entail delicate negotiations with India. Steady progress in agricultural recovery can be expected, but industrial rehabilitation and urban reconstruction will take much longer. Outside capital is urgently required as well as the services of technical experts in numerous fields if planned developments are to be realized. Popular resistance to Western standards in such fields as medicine, education and administrative practice will have to be overcome. The immediate problem of establishing effective governmental authority can be expected to raise enormous difficulties in view of Burma's tradition of lawlessness and disrespect for police authority aggravated as it is by the collapse during the course of the Japanese occupation of the very foundations of social control.

APPENDIX I.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF BURMA.

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The government of independent Burma as projected in the constitution approved by the Constituent Assembly will be the legal successor of both the pre-war British regime and the interim post-war variant of it. Existing laws will continue in force until repealed and the pattern of administrative organisation will presumably continue unchanged. The only major administrative departure is the creation of a semi-autonomous Kachin State from the old Bhamo and Myitkyina districts of north Burma. Other innovations include the assertion that governmental powers derive not from the King but from the sovereign will of the people, the substitution of a Chamber of Nationalities for the pre-war Senate, the abolition of all property qualifications for both electors and Parliamentary candidates, and the elimination of communal representation for the Chamber of Deputies.

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The titular head of the new Burma Government will be a President elected for a five year term by secret vote of the combined Chambers of Parliament. The President is accorded limited emergency prerogatives as well as the power of pardon, and he is removable only by impeachment proceedings. The real executive power is to be exercised by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, who are collectively responsible to a majority of the Chamber of Deputies. The Constitution also provides for a Supreme Court, the members of which are appointed by the President in consultation with the Prime Minister and are removable only on grounds of misconduct or incapacity. The Court is protected against interference by the Chamber of Deputies and is charged with the final interpretation of the Constitution and law.

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The powers assigned to Parliament far exceed those enjoyed by Executive branches of the Government. In specific instances such as the definition of citizenship and the regulation of private property the Parliament is explicitly empowered to legislate contrary to general provisions of the Constitution. Amendment of the Constitution can be accomplished by majority vote of both Chambers of Parliament plus a two-thirds vote by members of the two Chambers sitting in joint session, except that provisions relating to the rights of minority races cannot be so repealed. The Chamber of Deputies is accorded complete authority over money bills. The Parliament must meet at least once a year, and the maximum life-time of a given Parliament is four years barring earlier dissolution. Indigenous minorities control 72 of the 125 seats of the Chamber of Nationalities, which is approximately half the size of the Chamber of Deputies. If the Chamber of Nationalities fails to approve a legislative measure passed by the Deputies, the deadlock will be resolved by a majority vote of the Chambers sitting jointly. All members of Parliament will enjoy freedom of speech and exemption from legal liability for all actions taken in their legislative capacity.

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All citizens of Burma (acquisition of citizenship by non-Burmans is possible but not easy) are guaranteed equality before the law, inviolability of person, dwelling, and property, together with freedom of religion, of speech, of peaceful assembly, of occupation, and of membership in non-seditious associations. Wide protection is afforded the rights of minority groups, especially the Karens. Thus numerous liberal features adapted from British, French, and American practice are embodied in this portion of the Burma Constitution.

653 Equally significant in the new Constitution is the wide authority and responsibility ascribed to the State in the economic and social sphere. For example, the State is authorized on appropriate occasions to impose compulsory
421 labor service for public purposes on a non-discriminatory basis. If it is deemed that the public interest so requires, Parliament may by law limit or expropriate private property and may prescribe in which instances and to what extent the owners shall be compensated. As the ultimate owner of all lands, the State is empowered to regulate, alter, or abolish land tenures on a non-discriminatory basis, and to redistribute agricultural lands to collective or cooperative farming organizations or to assign them to agricultural tenants severally. Individual ownership of agricultural land is arbitrarily limited to three hundred acres per landlord. The State is held responsible for protecting workers from exploitation, for providing opportunities for work, leisure and education, for safeguarding public health, and for shielding the aged and incapacitated.

433 Prominent among the "Directive Principles of State Policy", which are listed in the Constitution but are explicitly declared to be not enforceable
641 in any court of law, is the promotion of a planned economy calculated to improve the material and cultural conditions and health of the population. State policy shall assist economic organizations not working for private profit and shall endeavor to secure the operation of all public utilities and the exploitation of natural resources by the Union Government, by local governmental agencies, or by peoples' cooperative organizations.

185 In a substantive portion of the Constitution it is provided that the exploitation of Burma's agricultural lands forest and mineral resources,
563 fisheries, and all potential sources of electrical energy must be carried out by citizens of the Union, or by companies in which citizens hold sixty percent of the capital stock. If the public interest so requires, exceptions to this rule may be made by special act of Parliament, but any licenses granted to a non-citizen for economic purposes would be limited to a maximum duration of twenty-five years. The authors of the Constitution clearly intended to curb large scale economic development under private auspices and particularly by non-citizens of the Union.

Although one may question whether the elaborate façade of Burma's new constitutional structure will ever become reality in view of the anterior problem of establishing an effective administration of any sort, the document clearly reflects the hopes and intentions of Burma's new leadership.

APPENDIX II.

TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF BURMA, OCTOBER 17, 1947.

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Political Provisions.

In the treaty signed by Prime Ministers Atlee and Thakin Nu at London on October 17, 1947, and scheduled to come into force on January 4, 1948, the United Kingdom recognised the Republic of the Union of Burma as a fully independent sovereign state to be the heir of all obligations and benefits deriving from international instruments heretofore applicable to Burma. The treaty also provided that citizens of the new state who are also British citizens by virtue of connections outside of Burma or who may subsequently elect British citizenship may declare alienage from Burma in a manner to be prescribed by a law scheduled to be passed by the Burma Union.

Economic Provisions.

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The UK cancelled not only the cost of the Civil Affairs operations in Burma prior to the restoration of civil government (October 15, 1945) but also £15 million (approximately three-fourths) of the sums advanced in recent years by the UK Treasury to meet deficits in Burma's ordinary budget. The UK agreed also to waive payment of interest on the balance of Burma's debt to the British Treasury, which was made payable in twenty annual instalments beginning in 1952. The UK agreed finally to reimburse Burma for claims arising from the 1942 military campaign and to meet claims for services on the part of demobilised Burmese personnel.

The Burma Union on its part accepted the obligation to pay from public funds all salaries, pensions, and provident annuity funds due British subjects domiciled elsewhere than in India and Pakistan. Burma renounced claims in respect of supplies and services furnished the Civil Affairs administration, and agreed to repay all sums advanced by the UK since reoccupation in support of the various rehabilitation projects. The Burma Government also recognized the continuing validity of its existing contracts conferring rights or benefits upon British subjects currently domiciled in the UK or upon companies mainly owned or managed by subjects so domiciled, and acknowledged that compensation would be due United Kingdom owners of any such contracts or properties taken over by the Union Government. Without prejudice to the principles of state socialism to which the Burma Government is committed by the terms of the Constitution, the Burmese negotiator agreed in an exchange of notes appended to the treaty that the Burma Government would take no action prejudicial to UK interests in Burma without advance consultation with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory settlement, save only in possible emergency situations when advance notification would be given. Pending the early negotiation of conventions regulating postal services, civil aviation, and trade, it was agreed that existing arrangements covering such matters would continue in force.

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Defense Provisions.

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Incorporated as an Annex to the treaty was the three-year Defense Agreement signed at Rangoon on August 29, 1947. Under this agreement, the UK undertook to evacuate all troops from Burma as soon as possible following the transfer of power, and to provide a Naval, Military and Air Force Mission, including an

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instructional staff, for the training of Burma's armed forces. The nature of the Mission and the training facilities to be provided, including the terms and condition of service of UK personnel attached thereto, would be negotiated subsequently between the two governments. The UK agreed also to hand over gratis to Burma a naval contingent of some 37 small vessels, together with initial equipment and supplies for the Burma army. The UK will also facilitate the future purchase of war material by the Government of Burma. With respect to air services, the UK agreed to provide technical personnel for one year, and an agreed portion of the annual cost of maintaining Mingaladon Air Field (near Rangoon) plus a maximum annual contribution of £40,000 for the maintenance of Akyab and Margui landing grounds.

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Burma's counter commitments in connection with the Defense Agreement included the pledge to receive no Naval, Military, and Air Force Mission from any government outside the British Commonwealth, to accord to British naval vessels the right of entry into Burman ports and to British military aircraft the right to fly over Burma territory and to enjoy staging facilities at prescribed air fields within Burma. All reasonable assistance including facilities of entry by air, land, or sea would in the future be afforded such British forces as were bringing help and support to Burma. The terms of the Military Agreement would after three years be subject to cancellation on twelve months' notice by either party.

THE PROBLEM OF LAW AND ORDER IN BRITISH BURMA

FOREWORD

128 The following historical and sociological study of community disintegration and decline of governmental authority in pre-war Burma does not purport to be a total evaluation or balanced appraisal of the effects of British colonial rule, many of which were positive. Although the material on which the study is based is taken exclusively from published British and British-Burman sources, as the footnotes will attest, it has been selected to illuminate one aspect only of the situation, namely the inordinate growth of lawlessness within the country. From the Burman point of view, an understanding of the underlying causes for developing the tradition of indiscipline may counsel a large measure of patience on the part of outside observers as the new nation endeavors to establish effective social and governmental controls.

175 I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE, 1826-1914

631 A. Feudal Aspects of Governmental and Legal Institutions under the Burmese Kings

641 [625] The King's court in pre-British Burma did not concern itself with actual problems of maintaining order, nor did the Provincial officials appointed by the Courts.(1) The Court served a constructive purpose in cultural matters, encouraging the production of literature, music, and art, and lending support to the Buddhist religion. The head abbot of the monastic order, called the Thanthanbaing, who authenticated all monastic credentials and disciplined the Sangha (order of Buddhist monks), was a court official.(2) But the immediate personal allegiance which the Burman villager acknowledged was to his own feudal chief. Feudal status was determined by birth or marriage. The middle and upper-class Burman population included a number of feudal retainer categories (ahmudan) subdivided into regimental orders (asu). The order to which each individual belonged determined the particular type of personal service due his chief. Members usually were obliged to render military service for a few months of each year in rotation with others who remained at home to support those called up for service. The "official lands" assigned to the heads of the various orders were parcelled out to the members through a kind of sub-infeudation for purposes of residence, subsistence, and cultivation.

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565 Socially inferior to these ahmudan retainers were the ordinary taxpayers, or athi. This group was fairly homogeneous in character and acknowledged the authority of the myothugyi (township headman) as a kind of hereditary squire. The social gap between ahmudan and athi was not great. They lived in the same villages and frequently cooperated in agricultural matters. A change in residence did not cancel any person's rights or obligations, and any alteration of political affiliation required the consent of one's feudal chief.

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(1) G. E. Harvey, History of Burma (London, 1925), pp. 358-60; H.F. Hall, The Soul of a People (London, 1903), p. 49, 80-83; F.B. Leach, The Future of Burma (London, 1936), pp. 28-30; J.G. Scott, The Burman, His Life and Notions (London, 1910), p. 406.

(2) J.S. Furnivall, The Political Economy of Burma (Rangoon, 1938), p. 227; Hall, op. cit., pp. 84-85; Cambridge History of India, 6 vols. (Cambridge, 1929), VI, pp. 40-41.

622 423 The myothugyi, as a locally resident squire, customarily enjoyed jurisdiction over minor criminal offenses.(3) He also exercised lordship over all non-private lands of athi-necessibility or occupancy. He supported the traditional legal right of the local community to banish undesirable or recalcitrant residents, to declare their lands forfeited, and to guarantee that all unoccupied land was open to settlement by socially acceptable persons. Through continuous occupancy and cultivation, individuals could acquire land as private property.(4)

621 [625 792 312] The Burmese village as a residential and agricultural community functioned with a considerable degree of vitality. Petty crime was effectively curbed, as were breaches of morality and unmannerly conduct.(5) Each community supported its own monastery where the boys attended school under the tuition of the local pongyi, or Buddhist monk. Community requirements with respect to roads, bridges, and wells were met. In Upper Burma villagers themselves managed the equitable distribution of the water rights from irrigation projects without any supervision from central government authorities.(6)

671 691 692 [626] Burman Buddhist law was largely procedural rather than substantive in character. The object was to reach a compromise satisfactory to both parties of a dispute through the services of a disinterested arbiter. A court decision was, in fact, legally enforceable only when the participants and the arbiter sealed it by taking oaths together. The successful judge-arbiter required neither legal code nor advisors, and he properly received a fee for his services.(7) If any individual proved incorrigible, the community could banish him. Completely foreign to the Burman tradition was the application by the state of an impersonalized law on the British model, operating on a punitive basis without securing the consent of the parties to the decision.(8)

B. The Developing Pattern of British Administration in Lower Burma

177 631 621 [692] 1. Arakan. When the East India Company took over the Arakan and Tennasserim coastal district of Burma after 1826, it ignored the fact that Indian political institutions were alien to anything known in Burma, and set up in 1831 an administrative system based on an extension of regulations used in Bengal. Policy was directed from Calcutta and, under a uniform system, administrative boundaries became a matter of convenience only. The myothugyi usually became the salaried clerk on the staff of a European District assistant, with basic administrative operations centering in the taikthugyi, or circle headman. The latter collected the revenues on a fifteen per cent commission, assisted in the apprehension of criminals, and tried petty civil suits. Criminal jurisdiction was almost exclusively under British control. European personnel occupied the upper brackets of the administration.(9)

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(3) Furnivall, op. cit., pp. 38-41; O.H. Mootham, Burmese Buddhist Law (Oxford, 1939), p. 123
(4) Furnivall, op. cit., pp. 101-103; Hall, op. cit., p. 88
(5) Hall, op. cit., pp. 88-89; Mootham, op. cit., pp. 120-22. This principle survives in Buddhist civil law in the denial of rights of inheritance to a child guilty of incorrigible disobedience.
(6) The British Burma Gazetteer, 2 vols. (Rangoon, 1880), I, pp. 389-95; Hall, op. cit., p. 91; Furnivall, op. cit., pp. 41-45
(7) J.S. Furnivall, Reconstruction in Burma, MS., pp. 20-21
(8) An adaptation of Burmese Buddhist law was developed under British rule to cover questions of "succession, inheritance, marriage and caste, or any religious usage." See Mootham, op. cit., p. 1.
(9) Cambridge History of India, V, pp. 563-65

177 621 [423 651 433 554] Many of the Arakanese were not unhappy at first to be delivered from Burmese rule, but despite the tangible benefits realized, the people all disliked the alien British governmental and legal system. The efficiency of the new regime was attested by the eventual reduction of assessed land dues to one-fourth of their pre-1831 level. The rice acreage of the Arakan multiplied four and one-half times from 1830 to 1852, making Akyab at the latter date the foremost rice-exporting city in the world. Expanding cultivation gradually absorbed the disorderly unemployed.(10) Material prosperity however could not restore the lost vitality of the indigenous Burman community. Men of property and social standing under the old order found themselves denied real political power and reduced to virtual peasant status.(11)

177 621 692 2. Tenasserim. In the Tenasserim area (east and south of the mouth of the Salween river), the Company enjoyed at first the cooperation of the Mon (or Talaing) population, traditional enemies of the Burmese. The first resident commissioners wisely adapted their administrative set-up to local tradition with the result that popular participation was enlisted in the enforcement of law. Indigenous revenue clerks, judges, and township officers enjoyed for a decade or two considerable authority, and the police system operated on a traditionally Burmese pattern.(12) Court litigation was discouraged, and until 1838 lawyers were dispensed with. Magistrates acting as arbiters simply made briefs of the evidence and eliminated the calling of unnecessary witnesses by charging a small fee for each one used. Court costs were fixed on a moderate percentage basis, and if the parties effected a private compromise, even at the court's suggestion, the fees were remitted. Jury trial operated with eminent success. Slavery was reduced; divorce was lessened; and the Burman-Talaing village under efficient British rule became an orderly community remarkably free from crime.(13) [674]

178 [653] 467 674 Difficulties developed during the 1840's when the Company's commissioners, faced with strong native opposition to forced labor service on the roads, asked for the despatch of convict labor from Calcutta. Some of the most undesirable types of criminal Indians were unloaded at Moulmein to the dismay of the local authorities. The desired roads were never built but substantial jails had to be erected.

[433] When the Burmese kings forbade the migration of additional Burmese cultivators into Tenasserim, the Company's commissioners imported Malay and Chinese agriculturalists with unsatisfactory results.(14) Early attempts to promote shipbuilding, the mining of tin and coal, and the raising of cotton yielded discouraging returns.(15)

The teakwood industry began to thrive during the middle thirties, and Moulmein, the port of delivery and export, quickly changed from a sleepy Talaing village to a bustling heterogeneous trading center of forty thousand people. To fill the demand for common labor, Madrasi coolies were introduced in large numbers, some under contract, others by wage inducements.(16) In this new situation, [692] European entrepreneurs refused to accept the jurisdiction of the Burmese courts,(17) and demanded lawyers and a regular justice of the peace. Labor prices were fixed [465 686] and imprisonment for debt revived.

(10) Ibid.
(11) British Burma Gazetteer, I, pp. 480-82
(12) Cambridge History of India, V. pp. 566-69
(13) J.S. Furnivall, "The Fashioning of Leviathan," Journal of the Burma Research Society, XXIX (1939), pp. 18-45
(14) Furnivall, The Political Economy of Burma, pp. 53-58
(15) Cambridge History of India, V, p. 566
(16) Furnivall, "Leviathan", pp. 44-51, 58-75
(17) British Burma Gazetteer, I, pp. 497-98

178 and imprisonment for debt was revived. After 1842, when the Tenasserim administration was placed directly under Calcutta's control, business interests virtually
631 dictated policy. Court actions in Tenasserim were subject to the review of the
692 judges of the High Court at Calcutta.(18)

Teak extraction declined rapidly after Karen jungle folk, who had been
313 forced to cut logs for meager compensation, retaliated by burning the timber. By
563 1850, the forests of Amherst district were practically ruined and the timber interests began to look elsewhere.(19)

Rapid expansion of rice acreage after 1845 established agriculture as
243 the leading industry in Tenasserim. By 1855, migrant cultivators from free Burma,
166 attracted by economic inducements, helped boost the total population of the area to three times that of 1826.(20) But indigenous social institutions decayed among
161 the newcomers who tended, under an alien administration of impersonalized law, to become increasingly disorderly. In Tenasserim, the entire structure of government
631 was affected. Nevertheless, centralized British rule was so much more efficient than was the Burman system in promoting material prosperity that the deleterious effects of the decay of social institutions were not immediately appreciated. The
[178 same general pattern of social disintegration was reproduced in Lower Burma (extending northward as far as Toungoo), which the East India Company conquered in 1852.(21)

313 3. Lower Burma. Company authorities in Calcutta introduced two important changes of policy in Lower Burma. Despite the bitter opposition of the Euro-
656 pean timber firms, a Forestry Department was established in 1856 to supervise the exploitation of the timber reserves, which were now placed under state control.(22)

They also recognized the jurisdiction of the hereditary township headmen
631 (myothugyi) over petty civil and criminal affairs in their respective areas. The name "Myo-ook" (later spelled Myook), given to this official, meant literally
651 "chief of a city." The position of circle headman (taikthugyi) was retained mainly for revenue-collecting purposes, under strict European supervision. The taikthugyi was paid on a percentage basis, and resignations and dismissals were quite frequent in contrast to the permanent tenure of the Myo-ook. Appointive gaungs (under the taikthugyi) acted in the villages as revenue assistants and rural police, but were paid only by being exempt from capitation taxes. With the exception of the Myo-ook, who constituted a strong and vital link between British rule and indigenous political practice, the Burman officers lacked local support and prestige.(23)

167 The economic and political outlook for British Lower Burma was discouraging for many years. The area had been largely depopulated by protracted warfare so that entire townships had reverted to jungle. Fisheries and salt production
433 were more important throughout much of the Irawaddy delta than was agriculture. Disaffected Burmese feudal retainers withdrew north of the border, where they led organized raids for many years. Lord Dalhousie refused in 1853 to undertake mili-
579 tary operations into Upper Burma on the ground that the hostile population, once conquered, could not be administered without undue expense.(24)

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(18) Furnivall, "Leviathan", pp. 40-43, 58-75
(19) Cambridge History of India, V, p. 567
(20) Leach, op. cit., p. 28. The figures were 170,000 in 1826 and 555,000 in 1855
(21) Ibid., pp. 30-37
(22) Cambridge History of India, VI, p. 444
(23) British Burma Gazetteer, I, pp. 485, 498-501; Cambridge History of India, VI, p. 442; J.S. Furnivall, Reconstruction in Burma, MS., pp. 3-4
(24) Cambridge History of India, V, p. 562; VI, p. 445

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The Lower Burma administration induced many emigrants from Upper Burma to help extend the area of rice cultivation in the delta. Rice acreage increased threefold from 1852 to 1872. It nevertheless proved difficult to distinguish between the bona-fide immigrants and the disaffected dacoits. Although active rebellion had ended by 1857, armed gangs from the delta jungle and the mountainous periphery of the country continued operations for a long time.(25)

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4. The Effect of Commercialized Agriculture With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, trade developed rapidly on a triangular basis between Burma, India, and Europe. For the first time all of the surplus rice of Burma could find a profitable market, and as a result commercial production began on a large scale. For many years after 1872, the paddy acreage expanded at the phenomenal average rate of 1.6 million acres per decade.(26)

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The moneyless cultivators who came in from Upper Burma were usually restless. They found that squatter's rights on the land were very insecure because of the slowness of the land survey and the speculative claims which possessors of capital had staked out in large undeveloped areas. Commercial interests were inclined therefore to ask for Indian labor. On the initiative of the Government of Lower Burma laborers were imported from Bengal and Madras, beginning in 1874 and 1876 respectively. The rice millers set up their separate labor-contracting agencies in Madras. Eventually the Burma Government adopted the plan of subsidizing the steamship lines at so much per head for each immigrant brought over, a practice continued for a number of years. By 1883 the annual immigration of Indian laborers reached 83,000 persons, less than half of whom returned home at the end of the paddy season. Indian businessmen, traders, capitalists, and professional men followed in time.(27)

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The immediate effect of the influx of Indian contract laborers, many of them recruited from criminal elements, was to aggravate disorder. From 1875 to 1877, for example, the jail population of Indians was proportionately four and one-half times greater than that of the Burman Buddhists. The latter group, in fact, had the smallest percentage of any at this time.(28) The second result was to reduce the wages of ordinary labor so that Burmans could not compete in the general labor market. By 1885, all labor on docks, public works, freight handling, and railways, and much of the labor on the rivers was passing into Indian hands. The unfortunate implications of these changes in terms of rising social tension and unrest were fairly clear but the practice continued nevertheless.

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The feeling of growing insecurity among the Burmans was reflected by a statement appearing in the Burma Gazeteer, published in 1880, that it was "impossible to be sure that there would not be /a Burman/ outburst at any time." The reckless, passionate character of the Burman, the persistence of old disorderly habits, the fascination which riotous excitement had for him, and "the indisposition of the people to help themselves and to resist criminals" were cited by the Gazeteer as important factors contributing to unrest.(29)

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(25) Ibid., VI, p. 446; British Burma Gazeteer, I, pp. 498-502; Furnivall, Political Economy, pp. 47-49. In 1872 criminal offenses numbered more than 44,000 annually; in 1878, they numbered only 40,000, but crimes of violence against persons had increased slightly.
(26) Furnivall, Political Economy, p. 50
(27) Ibid., pp. 66, 85-87; Interim Report of the Rent Inquiry Committee, pp. 14-17
(28) British Burma Gazeteer, I, pp. 513-14
(29) Ibid., p. 509

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C. Changes Arising from the British Conquest of Upper Burma

1. Rising Tension and War. The half-decade directly preceding the extinction of the Burmese Kingdom in 1885 was characterized by growing disorder in Lower Burma.(30) Township officers and taikthugyi were having increasing difficulty in controlling the footloose Indian and Burmese immigrants. British authorities unwilling to deal with the economic causes, tried with little success to enlist the aid of the village elders in policing measures.(31)

The problem of law and order was immensely aggravated in 1885-86, when British forces precipitated widespread rebellion by deposing King Thibaw and adding Upper Burma to the British domain. The threat to British interests implicit in King Thibaw's intrigues with French agents, coupled with an allegedly extortionate fine imposed by the King on a British teak firm for non-payment of export duties, were the occasions for the action. Official Britishers, who realized the effect of the conquest in aggravating popular unrest, apparently wanted only to replace Thibaw by a more acceptable rival. Military advisers supported them, declaring that it would take ten times the number of troops to hold Upper Burma as it would to take Mandalay. But non-official British commercial firms who were unanimously in favor of annexation won out.(32)

The Pacification. Mandalay fell easily to the British in 1885, but when the Burmans realized that British intentions were to take over their country, they took up arms and began spirited guerrilla resistance. Rebellion spread to Lower Burma, where the situation became almost anarchic. Burman guerrilla groups lacked coordination and were unable to inflict serious losses on the British, but it required no less than five years and the use of 32,000 troops, led by the commander-in-chief of the Indian forces, to pacify the country.(33)

The stubborn character of the futile, uncoordinated Burman resistance proved that national spirit was behind the effort although for many participants loot and love of adventure were supporting motives.

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The pacification of Burma by Charles Crosthwaite was accomplished mainly by the use of Indian troops and military police, who functioned under the direction of the district magistrates. Enlistment of Burmans in the army was discontinued in 1887. Burman constables, serving under British officers, were used to detect, investigate, and report intelligence but were kept distinct from the Indian military police.(34) The possession of arms, even for headmen, was rigidly forbidden except for license-holders.(35)

The Burmans finally submitted to superior force. But they resented thereafter the presence of an alien army in which they could not enlist. British distrust did not increase the Burman's reliability or his desire to cooperate. The intelligence role assigned to the Burman constabulary caused the rapid deterioration of its morals and destroyed public confidence in it. In January 1887,

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(30) Cambridge History of India, VI, p. 446; Report on Police Administration in Burma, 1880-84 (hereafter cited as RPA). As compared with the previous five-year span, the incidents of murder rose 34 per cent and that of dacoity 77 per cent. Cognizable crime in 1884 was 50 per cent higher than in 1879.
(31) Ibid., 1881, p. 29-33; 1883, p. 19
(32) Cambridge History of India, VI, pp. 436-39
(33) Ibid., p. 439
(34) RPA, 1889, p. 2-3
(35) Sir Charles Crosthwaite, The Pacification of Burma (London, 1912), pp. 48-50, 53-55, 96-99

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In January 1887,[30]

Crosthwaite offended the Buddhist monks by refusing their profferred assistance in the restoration of order in return for official recognition of their religious status and authority.(36) Instead he removed the monks from their traditionally detached position, and gave them the same status as lay citizens.(37) The Buddhist hierarchy suffered loss of power, and refused thereafter to back governmental authority.

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The Institution of Village Headmen. As a final act of renovation, Crosthwaite abolished the last remnants of the feudal structure of Burman society by eliminating all the higher categories of headmen: the asu chieftains and myothugyi in Upper Burma, the myo-ook and taikthugyi in Lower Burma. This decision was made primarily because fully half of the feudal chiefs during the rebellion had led their followers in armed opposition to British authority. The destruction of the old order was carried out against the advice of experienced officials who opposed the sweeping elimination of customary feudal authority.(38) To take the place of the traditional system, Crosthwaite established by law the new post of village headman, to be appointed by and responsible to the Deputy Commissioners of the several districts.(39)

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The arrangement was as logical in appearance as it was impracticable in operation. Headmen were accorded the status of petty magistrates and were assisted by so-called "ten-house gaunge," unpaid householders (one to every ten houses), who acted as village police and defenders against dacoity raids.(40) Village agencies were also assisted after 1891 by itinerant Burman "Beat Patrol" constables,(41) whose morale was impaired by arduous travel requirements, poor pay, general unpopularity, and exposure to bribery. Eventually, the patrol concentrated on the surveillance of registered criminals and the regular visitation of communities where they lived.(42)

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The village headman, or thugyi, were obliged to perform a variety of thankless governmental tasks. They had to maintain order, assess and collect taxes (on a ten-per cent commission), keep a record of vital statistics, maintain inter-village roads, prevent cattle disease, and take care of the needs of travelling officials. In the execution of their responsibilities headmen could legally require the assistance of every resident of their respective villages on pain of direct punishment.(43) Every headman was held liable to reprimand, fine, or outright dismissal by the Government for any dereliction of duty. Most headmen found their assimilation to the bureaucracy a handicap to their social leadership.

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The Weakness of the Headman System. On a higher level, magistrates and regular police were virtually powerless to control crime without effective cooperation from the headmen. In many newly formed or loosely organized villages the headmen often exercised little of no influence. Conscientious thugyis were sometimes

(36) Cambridge History of India, VI, p. 411
(37) Meotham, op. cit., pp. 123-27
(38) R. Grant Brown, Burma as I Saw It, 1909-1917 (New York, 1925). pp. 201-3
(39) Crosthwaite, op. cit., pp. 51-2
(40) RPA, 1889, p. 3
(41) Ibid., 1892, p. 2; India Statutory Commission Report (1930) (hereafter cited ISCR), XI, p. 423
(42) RPA, 1893, p. 4; 1896, p. 3; 1906, p. 30; 1908, p. 29; 1913, p. 34-5; 1915, p. 26; 1917, p. 20; 1919, p. 36
(43) ISCR, XI, pp. 423, 433

622 victimized and intimidated by criminal-dominated neighbor villages whom they were unable to control.(44) Cooperation was enlisted by punishing and dismissing dereliict thugyis and by granting rewards to those who performed their duties well.(45) The wise headman simulated the appearance of loyal cooperation and occasionally attracted attention to himself for gallantry when good opportunity was afforded. But he was also careful not to invite bullying from criminal elements by being over-conscientious.(46) Public opinion continued to function in behalf of law and order only in older settled areas of Upper Burma, where social cohesion had not yet been destroyed by disruptive forces.

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101 The ineffectiveness of the village headman system was concealed for a time by statistics which failed to reflect the extent of undetected crime.(47)
178 After 1906, however, the annual police reports for Lower Burma comment monotonously on the inferior quality of the police recruits, the apathy among headman,
674 and their malfeasance in faking evidence, perjury, failure to act against gambling and excise violation, actual concealment, and the hindrance of convictions.(48) The situation deteriorated alarmingly after 1914.(49)

101 Upper Burma was not at first seriously affected. Once the furor of the rebellion of the 1880's had subsided, the village elders in this area re-
626 established effective social controls.(50) Down to 1915, periodic lapses into lawlessness occurred only under famine conditions.(51) Long familiarity with
423 one's neighbors, resident ownership of land, the absence of commercialized agriculture and the attendant Indian moneylender, together with the continued influence of natural social leaders eliminated crime as a serious problem in most areas.(52) Resident cultivators were usually the legal owners and family land was ordinarily not for sale.(53) Some, however, sought their fortunes in Lower Burma, usually contributing their share to the lawlessness which characterized the region. The people of Upper Burma opposed British interference with their traditional water and forestry rights and disliked the levelling of social distinctions under alien rule. But these grievances did not make them lawless.(54)

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(44) In 1897, 341 derelict villages were inquired into, of which 171 were fined collectively. 695 headmen were also fined. RPA, 1897, p. 44; J.S. Furnivall, Progress and Welfare in Southeast Asia, (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941)
(45) RPA 1897, pp. 6, 43; 1905, pp. 5, 29.
(46) Ibid. 1905, p.5.
(47) Ibid. p. 2.
(48) Ibid., 1905, 1906, 1909, 1911, 1913.
(49) Cognizable criminal cases reported annually varied from a low of 36,265 in 1901 to 42,767 in 1912. There was slight improvement from 1899 to 1901, from 1905 to 19 08, from 1912 to 1914. RPA, 1899 - 1915.
(50) Ibid., 1889 - 94. Violent crime in Upper Burma fell from 3,409 cases in 1889 to 296 in 1894.
(51) Thus, in 1897, Lower Burma had 14 of the 16 bad districts while the two unruly areas in Upper Burma were affected by Kachin depredations and depression conditions. Ibid.,1897, p. 8.
(52) Leach, op. cit., p. 121.
(53) Furnivall, Political Economy,pp. 105, 128-29. As late as 1936 cultivator ownership was 67 percent in Upper Burma, as compared with 42 percent in Lower Burma.
(54) Cambridge History of India, VI, p. 440

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D. Factors Responsible for Social Disintegration.

Evidence of Disintegration. A leading British authority has attributed the disintegration of social life in Burma to anti-social forces inherent in a system of economic freedom which tended to eliminate values that were not immediately material and to encourage the pursuit of individual interest without regard to social interests. (55) Commented one political observer in 1896:

> "This government of the king, which was so bad in all that it did, and only good in what it left alone...will never rise again...The local government is passing away, too. It cannot exist with a strong government such as ours. For good or for evil, in a few years, it, too, will be gone." (56)

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Cultural vitality also ebbed away. Proficiency in the use of the Burmese language became a cultural luxury, for it was no longer used in courts, higher schools or hospitals. The requirements for securing government jobs put a premium on English training. Native craftsmanship was less developed. The piety and learning of the Buddhist sangha order declined, (57) and the pongyi schools of the villages, which Sir Arthur Phayre had tried (1866-71) to make the center of an indigenous educational system, fell into decay. Another unfortunate development was the rapid expansion of court litigation. The government courts became the only recourse for settling civil disputes. British-Indian law and procedure were unfamiliar to the Burman, and those who went to court found themselves the prey of lawyers. Judicial administration became very complex, while frivolous appeals and long drawn-out trials became the rule. (59) Generally speaking, crime increased as litigation became more expensive and complicated. (60) Much of the civil litigation concerned disputes connected with the rapid turn-over in the ownership of land in Lower Burma. Under Burmese customary rule, improvidence had not been dangerous. Children were sufficient security for parents against old age, and the small borrower had been protected by custom against excessive interest charges and the loss of family land. Under the commercial expansion of agriculture which encouraged contraction of debt, the Burman was afforded no legal protection against his overborrowing of funds.

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The Influence of Moneylenders. The practices of the moneylenders and the landlords effectively hindered the Burman paddy farmers in the Irrawaddy delta area from becoming established in permanent communities where social controls could be revived.

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The Chettyar moneylender community of South India, which started large-scale credit operations in Burma around 1880, was a highly efficient organization. Its operations extended from banking institutions in India through various intermediate levels in Burma down to local agencies administering loans to individual rice cultivators. No rival agency could compete with the Chettyars, and the government was little interested in providing alternative credit facilities. Lending money on crop and land security, the Chettyars provided abundant credit for expanding rice cultivation throughout the Irawaddy delta. Once cultivators became involved in debt, they seldom succeeded in extricating themselves, for crop returns varied with the rains, and loans carried fifteen to forty-five percent annual interest, sometimes collectible in advance. (61) Burman occupant-owners usually discovered after a few years that they were only digging deeper their grave of debt; they accordingly walked out on their obligations, and moved on to repeat the process elsewhere.

The Chettyars, as mortgagers, controlled from the outset most of the newly-developed land in Lower Burma, installing on their holdings a succession of Burman

55) Furnivall, Reconstruction in Burma, MS., p.1
56) Hall, op. cit., p. 91.
57) Furnivall, Political Economy, pp. 228-34.
58) Cambridge History of India, VI, pp. 444-45.
59) Cambridge History of India, VI, p. 443.
(60) Furnivall, Reconstruction in Burma, p. 22.
(61) BPA, 1897, p. 33.

426 pseudo-owners at two or three-year intervals.(62) The process was finally inter-
423 rupted during the slump of 1931, when Chettyars were obliged to call in their loans and take title to some two and one-half million acres of rice land for whom new cultivator-owners could not be found.

426 Rack-renting. Agrarian indebtedness was further aggravated by the rack-renting practices of landlords. Persons with capital, both Burmans or foreigners, purchased estates which they auctioned off on annual leases to the highest bidder. Many conservative owners preferred Indian tenants, who usually stayed longer and took better care of the land.(63) The footloose Burman cultivator, desperate to rent land for the coming crop season, usually outbid more responsible tenants, and was often unable to pay out. Paddy prices did not keep pace with rising rents, partly because renting was competitive and collusive buying on the part of European rice millers held prices down.(64)

Seasonal unemployment as well as conditions of chronic debt aggravated disorderly conditions throughout the Irrawaddy delta. During the two long breaks in the agricultural year, one near the end of the rains after the rice was planted and the other during the latter half in the dry season following the harvest, many of the paddy farmers found sport in lawless escapades. Passionate disputes growing out of petty bickering were frequently settled with knives. Anonymous criminals had no difficulty hiding in a countryside where entire villages were semi-migrant. Criminal bands sometimes got control of entire village tracts.(65)

182 Rising Incidence of Disorder. The incidence of dacoity and murder in Lower Burma,
178 which had declined somewhat following the pacification, rose rapidly after 1904. Violent crime in 1912 was reported at approximately twice the level of 1904. By 1915 murder reached an annual incidence of almost forty per million of population.(66) From 1904 to 1912, cognizable crime increased seventeen per cent and
674 non-cognizable crime forty per cent. But the number of cases reported was directly proportionate to the number and vigilance of the police. A vast amount of petty crime went undetected.(67)

Authorities found it increasingly difficult to gather dependable evidence against criminals. During the pacification period, young participants in disorderly conduct frequently confessed quite readily, and voluntary surrender of criminals to the authorities was common as late as 1896. By 1902, the situation was different; an increase in perjury and false witness was universally reported.(68) In the face of growing popular contempt for law, the addition of magistrates, jails, and police proved unavailing. Whipping, collective fines on villages, the passage of the Habitual Offenders' Restriction Act and the Criminal Tribes Act were equally ineffective. The author of the Cambridge History of India, in 1918, reported that conservative social forces in Burma which might have held in check anti-social forces had been destroyed, and that the lawless propensities of Burma's homeless cultivator classes were getting beyond control.(69)

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(62) Furnivall, Reconstruction in Burma, pp. 13-15
(63) Furnivall, Political Economy, pp. 66-69, 75-82, 97-93
(64) Furnivall, Reconstruction in Burma, p. 15
(65) Furnivall, Political Economy, pp. 26-27; Furnivall, Reconstruction in Burma, pp. 16-24; RPA, 1905, p. 13
(66) Cambridge History of India, VI, p. 446; RPA, 1889-1914. Temporary improvement was realized in 1913 and 1914
(67) RPA, 1904-1912
(68) Hall, op. cit., p. 101
(69) Cambridge History of India, VI, p. 146

II. POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS

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A.. The Impact of World War I

1. Economic Aspects.

During World War I depressed agricultural conditions prevailed in Lower Burma, and migrant Burman laborers were drawn to Upper Burma, where increased demands for cotton, sesamum, chillies, onions, tobacco, and sugar had arisen. Money became much more plentiful where such products were grown, in contrast to hard times in the rice-growing regions. Primarily as a result of population shifts the incidence of crime in Upper Burma increased during the war years, while it decreased in Lower Burma.(70) In Mandalay and its vicinity where money was plentiful, gambling became a mania and housebreaking became common. An enormous amount of city real estate changed hands.. Similar conditions obtained at Meiktila, Pakokku, and Sagaing. Governmental administrative standards relaxed under war conditions and social controls throughout Upper Burma began to give way. Burma's increase in violent crime from 1914 to 1921 was due entirely to the demoralized conditions in Upper Burma.(71)

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British civil servants, who were asked to review the causes of increasing social demoralization reported that the villagers were giving less and less information about the movement of criminals, that evidence was suppressed, and that offenders were screened.(72) The Commissioner of Akyab reported as follows:

> "The instincts that lead to social conduct are most imperfectly developed. . . This is evidenced by the friction that exists in very many villages, the frequent murders usually committed on the very smallest provocation and the general lack of community feeling and a sense of mutual responsibility. That Burmans can develop and in the past have developed a comparatively high standard of social conduct is clear to anyone who has visited the remote parts of the province. It is equally clear that under modern conditions, this standard of conduct has largely disappeared . . .
>
> "The . . . reenforcements of the social instincts which every human society has devised . . . are. . . custom, religion, and criminal law. The Government of Burma has relied almost entirely on the last named, and it is to the decay of the first two that I would largely attribute the present tendencies to crime. . . The real solution is to be found elsewhere than in the progressive improvements of the methods of police administration."(73)

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(70) RPA, 1915, p. 6. Cognizable crime for all of Burma was 41,000 in 1914, 45,000 in 1915, and almost 48,000 in 1917.

(71) Ibid., 1914-1921, pp. 8-12. In 1917 violent crimes increased by 87 instances in Upper Burma, declined by 53 in Lower Burma; in 1921, the increase in Upper Burma was 69, the decrease in Lower Burma, 64

(72) In 1919, 216 headmen were fined or dismissed and 117 villages were punished for harboring criminals.

73) Ibid., 1919, p. 11, by Mr. Clayton

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The World War period also witnessed the beginnings of rapid expansion of foreign investment in Burma's mineral industries such as oil, wolfram, zinc, tin, lead, antimony, silver, and nickel. Rubber production also increased. These industries continued to expand after the war, so that from 1914 to 1942 the value of foreign industrial investments in Burma tripled.(74)

The Burman people did not profit from this industrial development of the resources of their country except for tax revenue and a slight increase in opportunities for employment. Most of the labor used was Indian while both executive and technical jobs went to 30,000 European operators and managers. Owners of these new industries knew little about Burma or its people and regarded the country only as a source of dividends. Communication and transport facilities, long needed, were improved out of increased taxation, but vested interests opposed making needed innovations in the political and economic field.(75)

European employees of commercial firms resident in Burma far outnumbered British Civil Servants and the former were better paid. Business interests, which wanted a strong government and an abundant supply of docile Indian labor(76), rather than Governmental ends, therefore, tended to fix the tone of the resident British community. Foreign commercial interests enjoyed legal representation in municipal councils and in the Legislative Assembly. Their conservative influence accounts in some measure for the failure of the government after the war to attack basic economic and political ills.

2. Intensification of the Spirit of Nationalism

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World War I intensified national consciousness in Burma. Europe's fratricidal strife and Allied propaganda on democracy and self-determination stimulated the hopes of colonial peoples everywhere.(77) The significance of Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 became clearer. Nationalism in Burma became a factor capable of bridging racial, economic, and cultural differences, and operated as a medium of social cohesion in the interest of political independence. Anti-European expressions among the populace provoked a strong defensive reaction and a hardening of anti-native opinion especially within non-official British groups. Growing Burman suspicion made it difficult for Governmental agencies to direct even the most justifiable complaints into constructive channels. The outcome of the fortunate combination of Burman political majorities lacking economic power, and European and Indian capital favoring strong government and the imperial connection(78) will emerge in a later context.

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(74) Helmut G.Callis, Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia (New York, 1942), pp.88-89. Oil production eventually reached 280,000 imperial gallons annually. Commercial profits outgoing averaged £10 to £12 million per year and were included in Burma's £23 million average export surplus. The Burma Oil Company paid 22 per cent annually on its ordinary shares from 1928 to 1938; Steel Brothers dominated the milling industry and much of the export and import trade; the Burma Corporation controlled the production of minerals except wolfram. See Ibid., pp. 89-93.
(75) Furnivall, Political Economy, pp. 165-170.
(76) Maurice Collis, Trials in Burma (London, 1937). Collis tells how he was dismissed as High Court judge because he dared try three Englishmen, two employees of Steel Brothers and one soldier, for offenses against Burmans, and refused to pass summary judgment on an Indian seditionist arraigned on a petty charge.
(77) Leach, op. cit., p. 18.
(78) Furnivall, Progress and Welfare in Southeast Asia, pp. 48-52.

B. Governmental Adjustments to New Demands.

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1. Standards of Administrative Efficiency.

British policy down to World War I encouraged rapid economic expansion and was largely insensitive to the negative social and political effects of such a program. Economic processes were left at full throttle on the assumption that social interests would automatically be benefitted. In reality, society disintegrated. J. S. Furnivall has described the situation as "anarchy boxed in."(79)

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British attempts to improve governmental efficiency along European lines of departmentalization ignored the traditional Burman pattern of personalized control, with the result that social services became fragmented and out of touch with the popular points of view. The officials of the central Secretariat did not learn to know the natives at all. Well-intentioned district officials often did not stay at one post long enough to cultivate local confidence and to develop popular support for their proposals. Without careful guidance, the Burman population tended to regard over-zealous British reformers as nuisances and busy-bodies. Discouragement inevitably took its toll, and Government agencies tended to revert to the same laissez-faire policy that foreign industrial groups advocated, refusing to tackle such problems as high rents and land alienation.(80) Such political reforms as were finally undertaken under pressure of nationalistic agitation in the 1920's were not valued by the Burmans. The dismal results of Municipal and District Council administration have been described in Chapter I.(81)

2. The First Legislative Council.

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The Legislative Council introduced in Burma in 1897 was not intended as a move toward democratic government. Like the Municipal Councils it was primarily a means by which British businessmen "on the spot" were afforded a voice in governmental affairs. The original Council consisted of nine nominated members, five of whom were chosen from the non-official British group. After 1909, one of the seventeen members was chosen by vote of the Burma Chamber of Commerce and another by the Rangoon Trades Association, both European organizations. The number was raised to thirty in 1915, but without increasing the elective element.(82)

Burman rejection of the first elective Legislative Council under diarchy has already been described in Chapter I, as has the failure of the Rural Self-Government Act of 1921, which established the District Councils and Circle Boards. The pattern of Burman non-cooperation was set by the General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA) which assembled in Mandalay in 1921 and voted to boycott any governmental proposals which did not "affect the speedy attainment of Home Rule."(83) Only the very moderate component elements of the GCBA were included in the eighteen percent of the qualified voters who participated in the first election. Even so, the majority of the elected councillors refused to cooperate with the government. A few ultra-conservative Burmans together with British representatives and the non-Burman Independents, constituted the pro-government side of the House.(84)

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(79) Furnivall, Progress and Welfare in Southeast Asia, pp. 48-52.
(80) Ibid., pp. 28-34, 41-43. The original Councils were entirely appointive and included forty percent non-official representation. Election of Councillors became general after 18[illegible].
(81) See Part I, pp. 10-13.
(82) Leach, op. cit., pp. 32 -35; Furnivall, Progress and Welfare in Southeast Asia pp. 39-41.
(83) Pfaff, op. cit., pp. 267-69.
(84) Leach, op. cit., pp. 34-35; ISCR, IX, pp.30-197.

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The opposition was solidly Burman in race and sympathies. Political factions developing within the Council had no foundation in the constituencies and reflected personal ambitions rather than gradations of popular sentiment. The Simon Commission reported that:

> "In the constituencies, political activities....are governed by the crude question of foreign rule; and they are inspired... by organizations outside the Council." (85)

The Legislative Council's operations under dyarchy served only to focus discontent and to accentuate the conception that "Government" was something apart from the Burman people. The official group managed to keep control of the situation by pursuing a very cautious policy and avoiding all contentious legislation, however important. There was no widespread popular interest in the proceedings of the Legislative Council, and it came to grips with no important problems. (86)

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3. Attacks on the Police in the Council.

The Burman opposition in the Legislative Council was particularly fond of attacking the police. In connection with the budget debates in 1923, some speakers objected to the heavy expense involved, others to the ineffectiveness of the system, and others to the preoccupation of the police with curbing political activities. Participants in the debate obviously enjoyed, as did the dacoits, "the exciting and exhilarating game of Police baiting." The governor was eventually obliged to certify the unvoted deficit of one million rupees later in the year. The vernacular press eventually developed a habit of villifying the police. (87)

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The government made a bold but futile attempt to reorganize the police system. They tested the efficiency of a better-paid, though smaller, staff; they separated administrative functions from criminal policing. (88) They abolished the useless forty-year-old Village Beat Patrols. The net result was an immediate and universal increase of violent crime. In several places dacoity got out of hand. Criminal elements apparently concluded that the authorities were yielding to political pressure and were therefore relaxing their hold. (89) The suffering population became so frightened that people often refused to give evidence against criminals or even to identify their own stolen property when recovered. (90) The increasing barrier of distrust between Government and people was progressively aggravated by factious opposition on the Burman side and counter-accusation on the part of British spokesmen.

4. Government's Defense of the Thugyi System.

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The office of village headman was also criticized in the Council. The government refused to allow officials including headmen to participate in popular discussion of public questions, thus isolating them politically from their villagers. In 1922, when headmen were made ineligible for election to the newly-formed district councils, (91) they encountered increasing difficulty ..

(85) ISCR, IX, pp. 270-71.
(86) Ibid., pp. 578-81.
(87) Ibid., pp. 213-15.
(88) Ibid., pp. 211-12.
(89) Ibid., p. 211.
(90) RPA, 1925, pp. 13-14.
(91) RPA, 1921, p. 40. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Paper 1/B Burma, p. 7. Commissioners could nominate headmen to District Council vacancies.

622 in obtaining assistance from villagers to carry out their governmental responsibilities. (92)

An official Crime Inquiry Committee, in 1924, recommended that the appointment and removal of headmen should be made subject to the approval of the villagers and that important powers should be delegated to elected village committees. (93) British authorities opposed the move, for they regarded the power of the thugyi as the crux of village administration and feared that further weakening of his authority might cause complete collapse. The Burma Village Amending Act of 1924 provided only for the election of advisory village committees to aid the headman, but the latter retained full police responsibility. Committee members received no compensation and did no work. (94) British defense of the headman's prerogatives only increased his unpopularity.

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The attacks against the headmen slackened somewhat after 1924, but the police report of 1927 still complained that political elements were making it very difficult for any headman to "flout the public opinion of his village." (95) From the Maubin police report of 1929 came the following revealing observations:

> "The duties of a headman are difficult and often dangerous. He may have to arrest a relative or friend causing lifelong enmity, or he may have to arrest an armed criminal at the risk of losing his life. Too much credit cannot be given to headmen for acting without hesitation in such circumstances." (96).

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Government increased somewhat the compensation due the headman by amalgamating village tracts, (97) and multiplied the number of rewards. (98)

5. Increased Use of Native Personnel.

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The policy of enlisting Burman personnel in all brackets of the civil service (99) required an expanded educational program. The University of Rangoon was accordingly established in 1921 as an autonomous degree-granting institution. An educational program with English as the instructional medium and designed primarily to sift the multitude of candidates for higher civil service posts had obvious limitations from a cultural point of view and created political problems. The University eventually became a center of political unrest. But undoubted gains were realized from increased native participation in administrative tasks.

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Burman sensibilities were greatly offended in 1923, when, in the face of an objection by the Burma Governor, the military services of the Government of

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(92) ISCR, XI, p. 447. The Simon Commission reported: "The spread of political ideas during and after the war led to a feeling....that such joint (villager) responsibility should no longer be enforced."
(93) Ibid., p. 274.
(94) Ibid., pp. 447-48.
(95) Ibid., 1927, p. 57.
(96) Ibid., 1929, p. 77.
(97) Village Administration in Burma, (Government of Burma) 1934-39. The number of headman fell from 12,302 to 11,363 from 1930 to 1939; the average income rose from Rs. 175 to Rs. 223 per year.
(98) Ibid. 2,503 rewards were given out in 1934 and 3,394 in 1939.
(99) Cambridge History of India, VI, p. 447. The first Burman Deputy Commissioner had been appointed in 1908, and the first High Court judge in 1917.

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India adopted a fixed policy of enlisting only Karen, Chin, and Kachin recruits.(100) Not until 1939 was a vigorous attempt made to bring Burmans into the army.(101) It was then too late to attempt to Burmanize the army.

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6. Correlation Between Political Discontent and Lawlessness.

A direct correlation existed between rising political discontent and the increasing incidence of lawlessness. Public opinion tended not to condemn the criminal when all Burman political groups were attacking the authority of Government.(102) Violent crimes were 1,456 in 1918; 2,600 in 1924; and 3,250 in 1925. Reported "cognizable crime" averaged almost 54,000 cases per year during the twenties. Crime regularly outran the capacity of the police and the courts to deal with it.(103) The total number of persons tried in Burman courts on all counts averaged 193,000 per year from 1935 to 1940, the figure for the final year being almost 204,000 cases.(104)

The contradictory position in which British rule found itself in Burma by 1930 was apparent. The problem of law and order was beyond its solution and growing steadily worse.(105) The British obviously did not trust the Burmese majority, and yet they faced the political necessity for granting it greater governmental responsibility. The Simon Commission Report of 1930 expressed no optimism, but concluded as follows:

> "It is neither possible nor desirable to go back upon the announcement of August, 1917, that it is the object of His Majesty's Government ultimately to establish completely responsible government in British India, nor is it possible or desirable to move back toward autocracy. And if the Commission hold that further advance in Indian provinces is a matter of political necessity, the same advance should be made in Burma."(106)

Turning power over to Burman hands imperilled not only the posts and pensions of civil servants but also the salaries, dividends, and invested capital of the large British industrial stake in Burma. Political necessity and economic interests were in direct conflict.

C. Economic Distress and Racial Friction.

1. Inadequate Relief for the Cultivator.

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The chronic state of debt under which cultivators normally had less than enough paddy to last until the next harvest after they finished settling obligations with the landlord, the moneylenders, and the store keeper(107) gave rise during the twenties to direct intimidation by clandestine debtor associations.

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(100) ISCR, Survey I, pp 80-81.
(101) Sir Henry Craw, "Burma", The Asiatic Review, July 1942, Vol. XXXVII, pp.260-62.
(102) RPA, 1923, p. 13.
(103) ISCR, XI, p. 210; RPA, 1919-29.
(104) Ibid., 1935-40.
(105) ISCR, XI, pp. 583-86. Said the Simon Commission Report: "Whether or not political agitation has fostered the increase of violent crime by engendering a spirit of lawlessness and defiance of authority amongst the people, political crime and sedition have appreciably increased the work of the Police Department
(106) Ibid., p. 586.
(107) J. R. Andrus, Preliminary Survey of Relief and Rehabilitation Needs in Burma, p. 7.

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"Their object was to terrorize the Chettyars into allowing redemption of debts on ridiculous terms. Villagers .....who declined to join were assaulted or had their houses burnt or their cattle maimed. One man was murdered because he had hired fields belonging to a Chettyar." (108)

426 Even in prosperous times land was falling increasingly under ownership of non-agriculturalists. (109)

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Relief measures were inadequate. Governmental lending facilities were cumbersome and the funds available were woefully insufficient to meet the demand. The government agent usually spent only a short time in a given place and had nothing to gain by adding loan administration to his already numerous responsibilities. (110) During the twenties the government sponsored cooperative societies made up of groups of cultivators who could borrow funds from banks on the basis of a pledge of collective security. Such a joint pledge could be effective only under efficient administration in a settled locality where participating individuals knew one another. These conditions were not present in most debt-ridden areas. Delta cultivators already in the clutches of the moneylender usually needed larger advances than were available through the societies. Even in Upper Burma, where conditions were much more favorable, only a small proportion of the societies survived. Generally speaking, carelessness and laxity in repayment of obligations were so long tolerated by local committees that the debts became irretrievable. (111)

2. Increased Hostility Toward Indian Labor.

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The annual immigration of Indians reached an all-time peak in 1928 with 428,343 entries at Rangoon alone. Excess of entries over departure from 1922 to 1928 averaged 64,000 a year. Burman harvest labor was being displaced even in central Burma. (112)

Depression and racial rioting brought this trend to an abrupt end in 1930. For the next two years, Indian departures exceeded arrivals by 30,000 and 57,000 respectively.

In May 1930 a number of Indian laborers were killed during a succession of riots in Rangoon. One of the ugliest phases of the riots was occasioned by the discharge of Burman dock workers who had been temporarily hired as strike-breakers. The riots were followed by a prison mutiny in which the Burman prisoners tried to kill the Indian superintendent. An understanding British magistrate characterized in the following words the spirit of the naive populace following the riotous outbreak:

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(108) ISCR, II, p. 216.
(109) Interim Report of the Rent Inquiry Committee (hereafter cited as IRRIC) pp. 14-17; Appendix III, pp 62-63.
(110) Furnivall, Political Economy, pp. 148-52.
(111) Ibid., pp. 152-61. During the later thirties a fairly successful effort was made to reorganize bankrupt cooperatives with the result that some 1,520 of them were actively functioning by the end of June 1939.
(112) Burma Round Table Conference Proceedings (London, 1932), p. 84.

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"The Burmese proletariat walked with a lighter step. They had shown the Indians their place. This was Burma, a land which had been independent for hundreds of years before it fell to the English. Too many Indians had crowded into it from their starving villages across the bay. They could live on nothing and undersell the Burmese, and there was a swarm of them too in the public services.... Well, they had been taught a lesson." (113)

III. THE PERIOD OF THE NINETEEN THIRTIES.

A. The Depression in Burma -- Economic Effects.

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Then came the depression. The price of paddy fell from over 200 rupees per 100 baskets in 1928 to 120 rupees in 1929, to 80 rupees in 1930, and finally to the ruinously low price of 60 rupees in 1931, far below the cost of production. What little equity the Burman "owner" had acquired in his land was liquidated. (114) The Chettyars also lost heavily, but when they could not secure buyers or tenants to take over the obligations on the debt lands, they could still foreclose their mortgages. More than one-quarter of the nine million acres of delta rice lands passed into Chettyar hands as actual owners, and much of the remainder was under their control. (115) European-owned mills, mines, and other industries also curtailed operations. (116)

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In the resulting straitened economic circumstances, Burmans were forced for the first time to leave the land and enter into direct competition with the surplus of Indian labor for undesirable jobs. They were angry as well as hungry, and they blamed the authorities for their woes. The Government was not capable of the heroic relief measures called for. Current plans to restore equities in land to Burman cultivators officially "broke down on the difficulty or the impossibility of defining 'agriculturalist' in Burma," [illegible] the necessity of keeping in mind the "susceptibilities of the Indian" (117) The mass of the population of Lower Burma became footloose and landless. Anti-Indian feeling was increasingly intense and British authorities shared the popular resentment. (118)

B. Political Repercussions.

1. Concentration on Political Objectives.

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Prior to 1924, Burma's excessive lawlessness was attributable mainly to demoralized social and economic conditions, and to popular non-cooperation

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(113) Collis, op. cit., pp. 209-220.
(114) Sir Arthur Page, "Burma in Transition", Asiatic Review, XXXIV (1938), pp. 238-39.
(115) Non-agricultural ownership for all land in Lower Burma increased by two and one-quarter million acres between 1929 and 1937. See ERRIC, Appendix III, pp. 62-63.
(116) Furnivall, Southeast Asia, pp. 52-54.
(117) Page, op.cit., p. 239. Statement by Governor Sir Charles Innes.
(118) The Land and Agricultural Committee found, in 193[illegible], that fifty percent of the tenants in Pegu district remained in place only one year, and that an additional seventeen percent stayed only two years. The Committee commented:

"We think that conditions in Lower Burma are nearing the danger point, and that the continued transfer of land....to the non-agriculturalist is likely to result in violent agitation for the ousting of the foreign owner." (Quoted in ERRIC, p.11).

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with the police. Thereafter, nationalist agitation reflected both social discontent and rebelliousness. The confluence of these several streams of disaffection produced cumulative psychological results. All goals, social, economic, political, were presumably to be achieved by ending foreign rule. Independence became the objective of all striving and concurrently the assumed solution of all problems. From the Burman point of view it was no longer pertinent for anyone to suggest that self-government must await the development within Burma of a larger measure of social responsibility. They believed that the colonial government had forfeited their confidence, and they resented official homilies concerning respect for "law and order". They came to regard British "face", always self-assured, authoritative, aloof, and never-bothering to get acquainted, as an affront to the dignity of the Burman nation. (119)

2. Rise of the Thakin Party.

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For a number of reasons political disaffection developed among the student population of Burma. The entire Anglo-vernacular educational system extending through the University, which was the only road to civil service preferment, came to be regarded by many as a means of humiliating and denationalizing the Burman people. Those who gained entry into the Civil Service, although secretly envied, were accused of having abandoned the nationalist cause in the interest of their personal advancement. (120)

Student opposition to British rule found expression in the organization of the radical Dobama ("We Burmans") Society in 1930. Members greeted each other with the title Thakin, a word meaning Lord, which the British had in the nineteenth century designated as the proper salutation for themselves. Society members became popularly known as the "Thakins." In 1935 the Dobama Society absorbed the Burma Youth League to form the so-called Dobama Asi Ayon. (We Burmans Association). Their declared purposes were to obstruct governmental activities and to wreck the existing constitution. After 1938 several Thakin leaders developed personal and ideological connections with the Communist Party of India. They organized strikes at industrial plants and popular protests against exorbitant bazaar rentals. They even supported a strike of the Indian rickshaw coolies of Rangoon. But mainly they fomented indiscipline in the schools throughout the Province. (121) Many of the Thakins were imprisoned for seditious utterances. The Thakins advocated complete freedom for Burma and radical economic changes; they condemned the corrupt practices of Burman politicians; they asked no favors of Government. In this group British "face" found its counterpart in an out-and-out revolutionary organization which, however inexperienced, could not easily be controlled.

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3. The Rebellion of 1931.

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The Burmese rebellion of 1931 had roots not in the Legislative Council but in the politically inarticulate substrata of Burmese society. Saya San, leader of the rebellion and an executive member of one faction of the General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA), had been assigned by the organization to inquire into the causes of increasing agricultural distress and particularly complaints concerning the forced collection of the capitation (thathameda) tax and Chettyar collections. Another grievance concerned the denial to villagers of free access to forest areas for needed bamboo and firewood.

After completing his investigation, Saya San allegedly withdrew from

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(119) Collis, op. cit., p. 58, 67-73, 101-02.
(120) Furnivall, Reconstruction, p. 75.
(121) IRRIC, pp. 43-48.

669 the GCBA and began to make secret preparations for an armed rebellion with the objective of overthrowing British rule. The temporary incumbency of a Burman as Acting-Governor may have emboldened the rebels. The first move to collect the capitation tax in the Tharrawaddy area in December 1930 was the signal for the rising. (122)

668 669 [411] The rebellion was as obscurantist and foolhardy as it was determined. Tattooing was generally used as a means of rendering the participants invulnerable to bullets. The rebels killed headmen and attacked both Indian Chettyars and laborers. But their fanatical resistance to the better-armed Government troops, the first serious effort of the kind since 1837, was a marvel of improvisation and courage. Crude cannon were made from lengths of gas piping, and telegraph wire was chopped up for canister. The rebellion was widespread and Government efforts were extended to put it down. After organized military operations ceased the embers of rebellion continued to smolder and the movement degenerated into gang violence and looting. (123) A young lawyer named Ba Maw gained notoriety by defending the captive Saya San in court.

The principal significance of the rebellion from the standpoint of the problem of law and order was that it revealed the radically seditious temper of the lower strata of Burmese Society, which had thus far refused to participate in any of the elections. The same elements made up the rank and file of the so-called anti-separationist movement which will be considered shortly.

668 687 646 The rift between people and authorities was carried over into the Legislative Council by Government's proposal of a Criminal Law Amendment Act authorizing arbitrary arrests on suspicion of seditious intentions and the trial of apprehended persons in summary fashion by special judicial commissioners. The declared reason for the measure was the activity of Bengali revolutionaries within Burma. (124) The debate on this measure multiplied the recriminations. Said an Indian Councillor:

> "It is this incongruous and insensible type of legislation which, more than any other, has been the cause of constant friction between the Government and the country.....Instead of preventing terror, it inspires it." (125)

A Burmese member from the Government side of the Council suggested that:

> "If Government is so bankrupt of ideas, why not call for a conference of the leaders of the various communities in Burma and get their views on the question?" (126)

Mr. Frederick Leach, speaking for the bill, argued that it was a slur on Burma's good name to allow its territory to be used by Bengal revolutionary agitators and anarchists. Sir Oscar de Glanville warned that "the extent of Parliament's

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(122) Burma Round Table Conferences Proceedings (London, 1932) (Hereafter cited as BRTCP) pp. 67-80
(123) "Report of the Rebellion in Burma up to 3rd May 1931, and Communique of 19th of May 1931." Parl. Cmd. Paper 3900 (1931), Vol XII, pp. 18-20.
(124) The Burma Criminal Law Amendment Act (London, 1931), pp. 5-14. The Act was to run for five years.
(125) Ibid., p. 25, By E.P. Pilley.
(126) Ibid., pp. 52-55. By Ba Pe, Burma leader at the Round Table Conference.

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grant of responsibility [for Home Rule] depends upon the people of Burma and to a very large extent upon the opposition of the House." The measure was defeated but not before it had alienated conservative elements in the Council which had entertained no sympathy whatever for the foolhardy Saya San.(127)

4. Anti-Separationism and the Burma Round Table Conference.

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The British proposal that Burma be separated from India, which the Simon Commission had recommended in 1930 with apparent Burman consent, ran into unexpected opposition at the Burma Round Table Conference at London in November 1931. The argument for the proposal seemed conclusive. Burma could play no useful role in the contemplated program for a federation of the Indian provinces and states, and it was perfectly obvious that Burmans would never allow themselves to be ruled by a self-governing India.(128)

Anti-separationist sentiment drew its inspiration primarily from Burman distrust of British intentions. Some feared that Britain was deliberately setting Burma adrift from India in order to reduce her to the status of a Crown Colony. If Britain wanted separation, they argued, it must be for some sinister reason.(129) No balanced calculation of possible advantages and disadvantages deriving from separation was attempted. Opponents of separation simply decided that if Parliament offered Burma anything less than complete self-government, they would reject the offer out of hand, regardless of the opinion of the Legislative Council.(130)

Burman suspicions were not quieted by London's assurance in January 1931 that "the prospect of constitutional advance held out to Burma apart from British India will not be prejudiced" by separation. When the British representative on the Burmese Round Table delegation, Sir Oscar de Glanville, tried to claim for Burma all of the promises previously given to India, he was promptly corrected. London's spokesman, Mr. Wardlaw-Milne, explained that the British Government had made no commitment whatever with regard to the character of the new Constitution for Burma. The document would be suited to Burma's needs, he said. It might be superior, it might be inferior, to that of India.(131) A more generous interpretation of British intentions would have been justified in view of the final character of Burma's Constitution of 1935. As it was Burman anti-separationist fears seemed fully confirmed.(132)

The Round Table Conference also demonstrated the complete unanimity of all strata of Burman political opinion on the need to establish self-government for Burma if law and order were ever to be restored. Burman spokesmen(133) affirmed the complete lack of popular confidence in the existing Government of Burma and insisted that only the agencies of a government trusted by the people could get at the roots of the difficulty. A new, fully responsible Burman government must be installed without delay, they insisted, if further disorder and suffering were to be avoided.(134) Some spokesmen, in effect, challenged the right of Parliament to determine Burma's Constitution. Dr. Thein Maung,

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(127) Ibid., pp. 26-30.
(128) ISCR, II, Recommendation, pp. 181-84.
(129) See account of Sen Gupta's Rangoon trial in Collis, op. cit., pp. 34-35, 68-73, 166.
(130) TRRTC, pp. 23-24; BRTCP, p. 65.
(131) BRTCP, pp. 48-53.
(132) Ibid., p. 35. Statement by U Ni.
(133) Particularly U Chit Hlaing, U Ni, and U Ba Po.
(134) BRTCP, pp. 31-34, 37, 39, 64-65, 67-68, 81.

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later to be Dr. Ba Maw's wartime ambassador to Japan, advanced one of the few effective arguments premised on the legal realities of the situation. Said he:

> "We would like to remind the members of the British Delegation that they should bear in mind the decisive fact of the logic of events, that it is safer to go forward than to stand still, and to confer institutions perhaps somewhat prematurely than to arouse discontent by withholding them. The success of the working of representative institutions depends, not so much on their logical excellence, as on their being able to attract and make use of the forces of public opinion." (135)

The final report adopted by the Round Table Conference simply registered the views of the delegates, often quite divergent in character, on all important matters relating to Burma's future constitution. (136) In the subsequent election of 1932, the non-cooperating elements of the GCBA and the potent pongyi Sangha Association participated for the first time to swell the overwhelming majority of the anti-separationists. Despite the vote, there was nothing for the British to do but decide for separation and to proceed to implement the newly-drafted Constitution, which proved to be quite as liberal as that given to India. (137) British-Burman relations nevertheless suffered because the new arrangement was imposed. An Order in Council issued concurrently with the constitution, and after consultation with the governments of India and Burma, froze existing commercial and immigration regulations until three years after separation took place, or until 1940. (138)

5. The Functioning of the new Parliament.

The functioning of the new Burman Parliament was hindered by the intense rivalry of Burman political leaders, which made it impossible to secure a working majority drawn from native-born elements. Dr. Ba Maw finally succeeded in establishing himself as premier in 1937, but he was obliged to depend upon non-Burman support, just as had the ministries under dyarchy. Parties and coalitions were fluid, with two new groups, the Thakhin (Patriotic) party of U Saw and the Dohama Asi Awun gradually gaining strength and prestige. The vernacular press, led by U Saw's paper, the Sun, kept up an intemperate attack against British and Indian elements. (139) Dr. Ba Maw's political rivals spared no means of embarrassing him.

A disquieting feature of the new regime was the increase of corruption and bribery in all branches of the administration. The civil service began to feel that they could no longer count on the firm support of the Burman Ministers in maintaining service standards. (140)

C. The Anti-Indian Riots of 1938.

Popular furor aroused by several intolerant passages in a republished book by a Muslim author attacking the Buddhist faith became the occasion in July 1938 for a very serious riot in Rangoon. A mob from Rangoon's Shwe Dagon

(135) Ibid., p. 84.
(136) Ibid., pp. 106-134.
(137) Leach, op. cit., pp. 48-50.
(138) Parl. Cmd. Paper 4985 (London, 1935) pp. 11-13.
(139) FRRIC, pp. 34-36.
(140) Final Report of the Riot Inquiry Committee (cited as FRRIC hereafter) (1939) pp. 263-64.

579 Pagoda surged into the downtown section and started attacking Indians. Disorder
563 extended in concentric circles from Rangoon as soon as the news spread. The verified casualties of the rioting were 1,084, of which over 200 instances were fatal. Crown forces killed 86 Burmans and wounded 99 others in putting down the disaffection. (141) The amount of looting in Indian homes and shops was prodigious.

A Riot Inquiry Committee, consisting of a British chairman and secretary, two responsible Burmans, and two Muslim Indians, produced the first official full length statement of Burma's problem of law and order. So critical was the situation which the committee uncovered, that they paused at Mandalay in the course of their investigation to prepare an Interim Report dealing with factors on which prompt remedial action was needed. (142)

[423 The unsatisfactory status of land tenure was named the basic underlying
426 cause. The Committee declared that for more than forty-five years the problem of land alienation had been recognized but not attended to, while the evil grew progressively more intractable. Some remedy had to be found if discontent
464] was to be allayed. (143) Opposition to Indian labor was a second cause. (144) The report declared:

> "There does exist especially in Lower Burma a feeling whether right or wrong, that the continued immigration of Indians into Burma constitutes a danger to the prospects of the Burman himself.....Indian immigration into Burma has become a burning question in the eyes of the Burmese people.....Until something is done either to remove the uneasiness....or to satisfy it, it will remain a standing source of danger."

The report urged that a preliminary exploration be made of the extent to which Indian labor had displaced that of the Burman. (145) In the meantime some sort of preliminary contact between Burma and India on the immigration question might profitably be made "for the purposes of satisfying the anxiety of the vast majority of the Burmans." (146) The Order in Council which had accompanied the Government of Burma Act prevented any definitive action until 1940.

462 A third cause concerned the status of Burmese women married to Muslim
563 Indian husbands, where the wife sacrificed that equality of status with her husband which existed under Burman Buddhist law. Property inheritance rights of the Burmese wife were impaired and she was required under the marriage
579 contract to renounce her Buddhist faith and to raise her Zerbadi children as Muslims. The process, it was argued, would eventually split the social structure and create an additional minority problem. (147) No specific solution was advanced for the Zerbadi question.

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(141) Ibid., p. 201.
(142) IRRIC, pp. 1-5, 8-11. The sixteen localities most seriously affected were visited. Most attention was given to Rangoon, Henzayoung, Sagaing, Shwebo, and Mandalay.
(143) Ibid., pp. 11-14.
(144) Ibid., pp. 14-17. As of the 1931 census. Indians hold forty-six percent of all transport jobs, seventeen percent of all trade employ, and sixty percent of industrial places in a country where they represented only seven and a half percent of the population.
(145) Ibid., pp. 21-22.
(146) Ibid., pp. 26-27.
(147) Ibid., pp. 28-33.

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As a fourth and final underlying cause of the riots the report charged the vernacular press since 1933 was charged with having done everything in its power to poison Burman-Indian relations. The press was indicted for applauding contempt of law, fomenting industrial unrest, and trying to thwart civil and police authorities in the performance of their duties. The false rumours issued by the press were said to have played a large role in extending the rioting. (148)

1. Public Attitude Toward the Police and the Rioters.

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The Final Report presented by the Riot Inquiry Committee contained pertinent references to three important matters relating to law and order, namely, the status of the police, the attitude taken by the public toward the rioters, and the role of the pongyis (Buddhist monks).

The following statement with respect to the first of these items requires no comment:

> "No one .....who studies...the position of the police in Burma ....can fail to be struck by ....the impenetrable barrier of prejudice, suspicion and distrust which separates them from all classes of people.....If there is anything more than another which is responsible for the stubborn resistance of crime to all attempts to decrease its volume in Burma, it is, we think, the universal distrust of the police..... A complete and thorough over-haul of the police system of the country is ....most to be desired.....If confidence in the police could be established, then, we think, the people would be more ready to accept the rule of law. And once that happened, a public opinion might arise which would insist upon tranquility." (149)

The report also criticized the over-meticulous regulations which prevented prompt police intervention during the initial stages of rioting. (150) Subordinate police were not sure, for example, exactly what their duties were, or for that matter, whether they would be supported if they should unintentionally violate the regulations. Police morale was reported to be declining under the double barrage of public opposition and the intemperate criticism coming from Burma's elected representatives. (151)

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Arrested rioters were treated leniently by the lower courts because of public sympathy for them and the intimidation of prosecution witnesses. Many known rioters were not arrested. (152) Particularly ominous to the British was the fact that many village headmen had either abetted the rioters or actually led them in their attacks. The report commented as follows:

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(148) Ibid., pp. 34-36, FRRIC, pp. 273-76.
(149) FRRIC, pp. 225-27.
(150) Only an officer in charge of a police station could disperse an unlawful assembly, and a magistrate's consent frequently had to be got before any order to fire could be given.
(151) FRRIC, pp. 227-36, 247-49.
(152) Of the 4,306 charges actually laid, only 1,798 cases were tried and 800 persons convicted. In one instance, the secretary of a Cabinet Minister brought pressure on a Deputy Commissioner to secure the release of prisoners in his home district.

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"Not the least of the depressing aspects of our inquiry has been the evidence of the readiness, indeed the anxiety of Burmans on every hand to do whatever lay in their power to exculpate those who have transgressed in these riots.... There has been displayed before us so complete an absence of public spirit and good citizenship in this respect that we might have been excused had we abandoned hope -- which we have not -- of the creation of a sound and healthy public opinion in Burma. This has nothing to do with nationalist ambitions, with which we sympathize. For, in our view, the quickest way these ambitions can be realized is by the establishment among the Burmans of the nation of a spirit of orderly conduct, tolerance, and honest dealing, while the greatest handicap to their realization is the spirit of hostility to discipline and social order which has been displayed before us.....There is no doubt that the sympathies of the vast majority of respectable men and women lay, and still lie, with the rioters and not with their victims or the police." (153)

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The Riot Committee charged, finally, that designing political groups had exploited the prestige and immunities of the Buddhist monks for unworthy ends. Meetings of a subversive character had been held in kyaungs (monasteries), and criminals purporting to be monks had participated in all types of rioting, including assault, looting, and even murder. More than 130 specifically recorded cases were cited in an appendix to substantiate the charge. (154)

The Riot Committee, in short, presented a picture in which the government had delayed too long in taking cognizance of economic and political grievances, popular hatred and distrust of the police was rampant, and police efficiency and morale were giving way. (155)

D. Incidental Factors Baring on Lawlessness.

1. Educational Policy as a Factor in Unrest.

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The Burman Buddhist community generally disliked the Anglo-vernacular educational system because it discredited traditional Buddhist learning and undermined the prestige of the monks. In their pre-British medieval world it could be argued that the monks had taught Burman youth the religious and moral principles by which they were to live, whereas popular secular schools, however badly, concentrated on preparation for making a living. Religious sanctions to right conduct had therefore become ineffective.

The pongyis, who were characterized by J. S. Furnivall as the "symbol of hostility to western ways and values...hopelessly obscurantist and ignorant in terms of modern learning," were losing the respect of the student nationalists. And yet in many villages the monks controlled the votes of the uninformed peasantry and no candidate for elective office dared offend the local pongyi political bosses.

(153) Ibid., pp. 265-273.
(154) Out of deference to popular feeling, only one kyaung had been searched by the police, although it was known that many of them harbored hooligans and had been used as depositories for loot.
(155) Ibid., pp. 287-91.
(156) Furnivall, Reconstruction in Burma, pp. 26-27; Christian, op. cit., pp. 199-200.

000 powerful political bosses. (157)

871 Student discontent centered on the arduous examination system which took
668 heavy toll of high school and University candidates. (158) Only the honors
students could normally qualify for Class I of the civil service, and no more
than twenty-five percent of the bacheler of arts graduates normally qualified
for Class II. For B.A. holders who were rejected, only subordinate service
647 jobs and clerkships remained, and such individuals were compensated meagerly
for their educational investment. The declining utility of education was a
measure of increasing student discontent. What Burmese students learned in
school was largely irrevelant to anything but the passing of the examinations
themselves, while the system of progressive elimination guaranteed that the
discontented group would far outnumber the successful. Anger and frustration
abounded. Student strikes at the university were easy to foment around
examination time, and certain politicians exploited the opportunity to the full.
Election to the headship of the University Student Union was a promising step
toward a political career.

The Prison System.

697 The number of Burmans committed to jail annually numbered in 1932 almost
three times the total prison capacity. (159) All but two or three percent were
male adults. (160) Administrative efficiency of prisons as measured by health
considerations was high, but stress was placed on making them self-supporting.
Expenses were rigidly curtailed and production emphasized. At certain quarry-
camp jails, the annual per-capita income was from 87 to 97 rupees, two to three
times the per-capita food cost. The only woollen mill of any importance in
[288] Burma was in the Insein jail, where production in 1932 was 62 rupees per capita.
Besides rock quarries and woollen mills, there were furniture and rug factories,
boot factories, dairies, and gardens. (161) Imprisonment at virtually forced
labor was not a deterrent for crime, while simple incarceration for short terms
was particularly ineffective. (162) Jail sentences carried no social stigma
whatever.

681 The percentage of convictions in court cases averaged seventy percent
and was highest in the areas most seriously affected. Criminal incidence was
not, therefore, attributable to court laxity. (163) The courts, police, and
674 prison system added up to a very considerable drain on the public revenues, but
succeeded at best in holding back the flood of lawlessness.

(157) Ibid., p. 199.
(158) Year after year sixty-five to seventy percent of the tenth-standard (high school) candidates failed to pass their examinations; about fifty-two percent of the Intermediate (sophomore) University students regularly failed of promotion; approximately thirty-five percent of the baccalaureate candidates failed.
(159) Prison entries increased from 37,400 in 1918 to 51,000 in 1928 and 62,600 in 1932 while the jail capacity was 22,000.
(160) ISCR, XI, p. 160; Report on the Prison Administration of Burma, 1932 (1933), pp. 1-2, 6-7. In 1932, 2,400 prisoners were released by "jail delivery" to relieve overcrowding. Very few women were convicted and juvenile delinquency constituted a very small fraction of the total crime.
(161) The total receipts from prison industry sales, even during the depression years, averaged over eight lakhs (800,000) of rupees.
(162) Ibid., pp. 6-7.
(163) Ibid., 1939, pp. 16-19.

E. Outlook on Eve of World War II.

646 665 185 A remarkable factor amid the personal vendettas, feuding with the Governor, student strikes, and the increase of political corruption in the pre-war years, was the growing prestige of the Thakin party, which took a bold stand against official dishonesty; another was the fact that the Legislature at long last came to grips with the basic social problem of land ownership. On this question, all Burman parties in the legislature were in essential agreement on the fundamentals of what they wanted. (164)

426 423 241 [167] A Land and Agricultural Committee was appointed in 1937. In 1939 a Tenancy Act was passed to fix fair rents and give greater continuity of tenure, and an accompanying Land Alienation Act to prohibit the surrender of land by "agriculturalists" to "non-agriculturists." An attempt to apply the Tenancy Act encountered serious administrative difficulties. The Land Purchase Act of 1941 gave the government power to acquire land for distribution to agriculturalists. Another proposal to provide government land mortgage facilities was under consideration at the outbreak of the war. The war cut short efforts to adminster these laws. On the basis of the report of a special Study Commission on the Indian Immigration question, issued in 1939, an agreement was arrived at with the Indian Government in 1941 granting the Burman Government control over its own immigration policies. (165)

178 Although no fundamental economic and social problem had been solved by 1941, Burmans were at last free to undertake remedial measures. The difficulty of finding solutions was greatly aggravated by the appalling destruction and demoralization of the war. With respect to the capacity of the Burmans to deal with their unfortunate tradition of lawlessness, the following comment of an experienced and sympathetic British civil servant is significant:

> "To the British it might seem that the Burmans with their deplorable leniency toward offenders and disbelief in the moral value of punishment, would not easily cope with this disease. But it should at least be remembered that the British had utterly and completely failed to do so. With all their multiplication of police, magistrates' courts, and prisons, they had not progressed an inch toward the cure, and did not even know that they were on the right road. Burmans are not naturally criminal; even today there are thousands of villages with little or no crime. A Burmese Government might in time succeed where the British have failed." (166)

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(164) B.W. Swithinbank, "Responsible Government in Burma", The Asiatic Review, XXXIX, No. 138, (April 1943), pp. 153-58.
(165) Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., No. 1/B p. 10.
(166) Swithinbank, op. cit., pp. 157-58.

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PART II. M A L A Y A.

by

Patricia G. Barnett.

PART II. M A L A Y A.

INTRODUCTION.

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British areas in Southeast Asia have been governed through one of the most intricate administrative patterns of any dependent area in the world. Secured by Britain during the nineteenth century, they composed at the outbreak of World War II nine individual protected states on the Malayan peninsula and a colony covering the islands of Singapore, Penang and Labuan, and the areas of Malacca and Province Wellesley on the mainland. In addition, British control in nearby North Borneo encompassed one more protected state, a rajahdom and the property of a chartered company, but was unrelated to Malaya in governmental terms except through the contacts of individual civil servants who were occasionally transferred from area to area.

Since the end of the war, the strategic importance of these areas to Britain has increased as Britain prepared to withdraw from India. British postwar policy toward Southeast Asia has focussed on the creation of a centralized and uniform administration which could provide an orderly framework within which native participation in government could be developed without threatening firm British control.

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In the following pages, the nature of the relations between Britain and the British dependencies on the Malayan peninsula is traced as it existed both legally and actually at the outbreak of the Pacific War and as it has developed since the end of the war.

I. PREWAR RELATIONSHIP OF MALAYA TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

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Britain concluded a treaty with the Sultan of Johore in 1914 extending British control, though technically not British sovereignty, over the last nominally independent state on the Malay peninsula south of Siam. In fact, however, for at least six decades prior to 1914, complete political and economic dominance of Malaya had centered in London. Thereafter, although the fiction of five independent Unfederated States and four Federated States was maintained with appropriate ceremony, the whole area was subservient to Britain on all matters except Malay religion and religious customs which were left to the control of the Malay Sultans.

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Malaya's economy was as dependent as its political life upon Britain. Despite the fact that, even in the late thirties, a third of the tin and rubber production, the backbone of Malaya's prewar economy, came from properties owned by Asiatics, even those industries were regulated by British firms whose finan-

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sial power emanated from London. Although export taxes on tin and rubber provided an important share of the revenue of the Malay States, making possible the development of transport and welfare services, the bulk of profits flowed to Britain and the foreign exchange accruing from sales abroad was used to cover imports into Britain rather than into Malaya.

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Britain's 100 years' rule of Malaya prior to the Japanese occupation was generally peaceful, unmarred by civil wars or revolution. Nationalistic impulses were few and loosely organized. Only a handful of Malay intellectuals thought in terms of "independence for Malaya" or "Malaya for the Malays". Potential conflict between the Chinese residents, some 43 per cent of the population in July 1941, and the native Malays, only 42 per cent, for control of Malaya's economic and political life was still largely dormant in spite of the unchallenged superiority of the Chinese in commercial affairs. The trend towards cooperation between British, wealthy Chinese, Indians and Eurasians, who considered themselves permanent residents of Malaya, in striving for participation in the government of Malaya and in seeking to weaken the grasp of London firms on Malaya's business life, had barely started. Dual citizenship had not seriously undermined the loyalty of Chinese and Indian residents to Malaya.

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Close relations were maintained between Malaya, particularly the Straits Settlements, and Britain as much by personal contact as by administrative structure. The largest firms exploiting Malaya's rubber and tin resources or engaged in trading had their head offices in England but retained their principal Malayan offices in the Straits Settlements. There was constant travel and correspondence back and forth between London and Malayan offices. Smaller firms limiting their business activities to Malaya and operating entirely on the peninsula, had their main office in the Straits Settlements. Even though Britishers in the Malayan Civil Service spent the greater part of their careers in Malaya rising rank by rank to positions of some administrative power, the majority of them sent their children "home" to England to school and college, spent their leaves at "home", and planned to return to England upon their retirement to live on a pension from the Malayan Government. Thus, personal contacts between Britishers in the Straits Settlements and Britain were an important means of maintaining close relations between Malaya and the United Kingdom. Travel back and forth between Malaya and England was of course much less common for Chinese and Malays. However, the Sultans paid official visits to England from time to time, several of the brighter students from each class at Raffles College were sent to England to complete their education, and members of the wealthier Chinese firms paid occasional visits to England.

a. <u>British Policy toward Malaya</u>

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Very little was said before the war by British officials, either in England or in Malaya, about the British Government's plan for Malaya's political future although it was assumed that Malaya, like all other sections of the Empire, was to be prepared for eventual self-government within the Empire. The Colonial Office, which was charged with responsibility for governing Malaya, appeared to assume, whether correctly or not, that the Malays were satisfied with the pattern of indirect rule worked out for them, and that the heterogeneous character of the population made any immediate program of self-government undesirable. It was further assumed that non-European foreigners in Malaya were fully occupied in pursuing their economic aims and did not care about a political role. To more liberal Britishers and articulate Asiatics it appeared that developments in India, Burma and Ceylon might be considered to offer a pattern for Malaya.

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During the nineteenth century, the British Government had taken the attitude that colonial areas should be financially self-sufficient. Funds for educational, health and transport developments were raised locally. By 1940, with the passage of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, this policy was reversed and it was clear that thereafter the British Government would take some responsibility for developing colonial areas. The Act declared that "His Majesty's Government are trustees for the well-being of the peoples of the Colonial Empire . . . The primary aim of Colonial policy is to protect and advance the interests of the inhabitants of the Colonies in which term are included for the purpose of this statement Protectorates and Mandated Territories."

In July 1943 the Colonial Secretary stated in the House of Commons, "We are pledged to guide Colonial people along the road to self-government within the framework of the British Empire. We are pledged to build up their social and economic institutions, and we are pledged to develop their natural resources."

These two statements expressed the heart of Britain's official prewar policy towards colonial areas: eventual self-government, preceded by the improvement of educational and welfare standards. No specific statements were made about Malaya -- except to point out that in developing the country special attention would be given to safeguarding the interests of the indigenous peoples, the Malays.

The first official statement relating to postwar Malaya was made in December 1943 — "the main object of His Majesty's Government as regards the political future of Malaya will be the development of its capacity for self-government within the Empire." This objective was reiterated in October 1945 in the announcement of the British Government's plan for the postwar government of Malaya through a Malayan Union. But no date was set for the attainment of self-government nor were a series of steps towards that goal laid down.

b. Malaya's Role in the British Empire

1. Relation of Component Parts of Malaya to the United Kingdom.

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Before the Japanese occupation, Malaya was divided into ten administrative units-- the Straits Settlements and nine Malay States. The Straits Settlements, consisting of Singapore, Penang, Province Wellesley, Malacca, Christmas and Cocos Islands, and Labuan, was a Crown Colony under the direct control of the Colonial Office. The Malay States were protectorates. Four of them had been joined together in 1895 to form a federation and were governed by a High Commissioner, a Federal Council and federal government at Kuala Lumpur. The five independent states retained their predominantly Malay structure of government although their rulers were required to take the advice of British Advisers on all matters except Malay religion and religious custom.

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(a) The Straits Settlements. The Straits Settlements have been longest under British rule of any part of the Malay peninsula (Penang having come under British control in 1791, Singapore in 1819 and Malacca in 1824) and have been closest in their relations with Britain. Like most Crown Colonies, the Straits Settlements were administered by a Governor, acting through advisory Executive and Legislative Councils. The Governor was appointed by the Colonial Office from among the ranks of British civil servants and generally had not had previous service in Malaya. His executive assistant, the Colonial Secretary, and other principal officials rose from the ranks of the Malayan Civil Service. While they had come fresh from Britain to start their careers in the lower ranks and would return to England upon their retirement, it was the Governor who retained generally the

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more recent and close relations with the home country. Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils were chosen from the select higher strata of resident Europeans and Asiatics. The lower and clerical jobs in government were held by Asiatic appointees to the local Straits Civil Service.

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(b) Federated Malay States. Relations between the Federated Malay States and Britain were looser than those of the Straits Settlements. Whereas, in the latter, the Governor was required to consult his Executive Council on all important questions and had to report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he did not take the Council's advice, there was no such requirement in the Federated States. The Governor of the Straits Settlements was concurrently High Commissioner of the Federated States (as well as for the Unfederated States) and presided over the Federal Council, a dominantly official European body which had legislative authority on all questions except a few (e.g. education, forests, some aspects of public health, agriculture and Islamic law) which were reserved to the State Councils. Although the High Commissioner was theoretically the principal executive officer of the Federated States, he was, in fact, too busy to exercise his function regularly and delegated many executive functions for direction of federal departments and communications with the states to a Federal Secretary. The latter was, however, junior to the four British Residents in the States and his department heads were in most cases only Advisers to the separate State departments. The Residents had direct access to the High Commissioner and through his office to the Colonial Office in London.

(c) Unfederated Malay States. The Unfederated Malay States had a considerably higher proportion of Malays in their state governments than did the Federated States. In addition, several of the key posts were held by Malays. This was particularly true in Kelantan and Trengganu where all the leading positions, except one or two technical ones, were held by Malays. Since there was no federal structure superimposed on state governments in the Unfederated States, considerably greater authority rested with state governments than in the Federated States. Finally, the principal official performed as an Adviser, despite the fact that his decisions had to be accepted in all matters except religion. It follows that there were far fewer Britishers in the Unfederated States than in any of the other parts of Malaya. Hence, contacts with Britain were fewer, and, in atmosphere, the Unfederated States were definitely detached from United Kingdom influence. The High Commissioner had a special Secretary for the Unfederated States as a liaison between himself and the Advisers in the states.

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2. Malaya's Relations with the Empire.

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Malaya's role in the Empire, as in the world at large, rested ultimately on the United Kingdom. While individual British members of the Malayan Government had Empire-wide contacts, Malaya, as a unit in the British Empire, was unrepresented in the formation of Empire policies or in the government of the United Kingdom. Relations between Malaya and the United Kingdom were remote and rested technically on the authority of the Colonial Office, and actually on the presence of varying numbers of Britishers and the personal contacts resulting from their presence. Through them British-inspired legislation, British-dominated economic policies, etc. prevailed in Malaya. From time to time, as it became necessary to formulate uniform programs of, for example, medical services, sanitation or education for all crown colonies in the Empire, conferences were held at which the Straits Settlements were represented by one of their British officials.

3. Defense.

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Malaya was a strategic British base in the Far East. The huge expenditures which went into construction of the Singapore naval base were made through the United Kingdom. Malaya itself bore virtually no responsibility for its own defense. Financial contributions of the States to imperial defense were voluntary and voluntary gifts far exceeded the small fixed annual grant from the Straits Settlements for this purpose. On a local basis, small volunteer Malay and Malayan regiments were maintained but their training was more along police lines than as a genuine combat group.

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4. Foreign Relations.

The component parts of Malaya did not conduct any foreign relations. Political relations with other countries were handled entirely through the British Foreign Office. Economic and commercial policies were likewise laid down by the appropriate British ministries and only minor lattitude in their implementation was given to the governments of Malaya in their relations to foreign consulates located in Malaya.

Malaya has been an important factor in Britain's foreign relations in the Far East. It contained Britain's principal Far Eastern naval base and was, therefore, a key point in Empire defense. Because of its large Chinese population, it affected Britain's relations with China. The close racial, cultural and linguistic ties between the Malays of Malaya, of the Indies and of southern Siam and their frequent contacts influenced Britain's relations with Holland and with Siam. Britain's relations with Holland were further affected by the similarity of the problems of the rubber and tin industries in Malaya and the Indies, and the transshipment and processing of rubber, tin and oil in the Straits Settlements.

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c. Structure of Government in Malaya

The general framework of Malaya's Government has been sketched. In no sense could the government of Malaya, either that of the British or of the Malay Sultans, be considered a democratic one. The Governor had almost absolute authority in the Straits Settlements and the advice of the Residents and Advisers in the States had to be accepted on all matters except religion. Unofficial members of councils were appointed by the Governor in the Straits Settlements,(1) by the High Commissioner for the Federal Council and by the Sultans in the States. Official members of the Federal and Colony councils had to agree with the Governor. In the state councils few Malays would presume to disagree with their hereditary Sultans. Although legislative bodies existed, actual authority in government lay with the executive in view of the authority of the Governor-High Commissioner and the Resident-Advisers. Nevertheless, in practice, the principal British officials followed a policy of persuasion, sounding out public opinion through the press and private conversations, before forcing through important regulations.

1. Executive Authority.

Both in the British structure and in the Malay structure, government was from the top down, and did not afford expression of the people's will through

(1) With the exception of two British members who were chosen by the Singapore and Penang Chambers of Commerce.

642 their own chosen representatives. At the village level government was through
[622] a village headman appointed by his Malay chief with the approval of the District Officer (generally a Britisher). The headman, called a Pengkulu, had authority for maintaining order, presiding over local courts and carrying out government regulations for his region. His relationship to his people was a paternal one.

631 The Pengkulus were under the control of District Officers who in most States
634 (except certain parts of Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu) were British. The District Officer had complete authority to pass along to the Pengkulu instructions
642 for carrying out programs directed by the State councils, the Resident (or Adviser) or the Governor (High Commissioner). It was in the relationship between the District Officer and the Pengkulu that the British civil servant came into closest contact with the Malay. In many Districts, particularly in the early days, the District Officer was the only British official. He had to spend a great deal of time travelling from village to village consulting with the Pengkulu and other local personalities. He had to perform all the executive and judicial functions for his District, and, in addition, in many instances, he was a teacher in explaining the purpose of health, education, tax and other regulations. More recently, and particularly in the more densely populated areas, the District Officer has been assisted by members of the various government departments (Education, Health, Labor, etc.) whose activities he has directed.

631 In the Straits Settlements there was one government structure but in the
642 Malay States, there were actually two structures, a Malay and a British one. In the Unfederated States, the principal British official, the Adviser, directed the affairs of the State through advice to the Sultan and his ministers. For the sake of peace and to discourage sabotage against government the Adviser, in most cases, despite his power, tried to gain his ends by offering advice instead of issuing commands. A head-on disagreement was usually avoided and difficult issues dropped until more favorable circumstances provided probability of agreement. Likewise, the Advisers' assistants in the various departments of government sought to run the departments through advising rather than ordering. And even the District Officers called themselves Assistant Advisers and used an indirect means of governing. This system of dual structure with British advisers in key positions was not always as efficient as the system in the Federated States and the Straits Settlements where British officials actually exercised executive direction of their offices, but it served as a training ground for Malays in the practice of administration. Shortly before the war it was conceded that a group of trained Malay officials was being developed in several of the Unfederated States who were competent to run their government.

There was far less opportunity for such a development in the Federated States. A federal structure superimposed on the states meant that the exercise of all the important functions of government and many of the technical services were conducted at the federal level in which Asiatics participated only as clerks in the lowest ranks of government. In the States, the Residents actually directed the affairs of state, with the approval of the Sultans-in-council, and administered British officers heading departments and British District Officers. On the whole, Malays received little practice in responsible administration in the Federated States.

Similarly the Straits Settlements government was a hierarchy of British officials except for Asiatics in the clerical positions.

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2. Legislative power.

In practice, legislation in both the States and the Colony was formulated, introduced and made law by British officials. A Legal Adviser in the Federated States set the pattern for legislation in most cases, in line with that in the Colony. Laws drafted for the Unfederated States were generally modeled on Federated States statutes and modified only sufficiently to be adaptable to local conditions. By 1940, legislation in all of Malaya was virtually uniform.

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Nevertheless, the procedure for enacting legislation differed slightly in the several parts of Malaya. In the Straits Settlements prospective laws were introduced into the Legislative Council by the Governor for discussion and approval. The Council did not have actual authority to legislate. Since the Council had a majority of official members who were required to vote with the Governor, the laws were certain to be approved. Discussions in Council did give an opportunity for securing various opinions on the legislation and, in fact, the unofficial members usually played the role of Opposition. Important legislation was also argued widely in the press before being passed. For ease in enforcing legislation, the Governor generally felt it expedient to sample public opinion through the press and Council before insisting on new legislation.

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Legislative procedure in the Federated States was actually similar but technically different. The Federal Council passed legislation. Since only the High Commissioner could introduce bills, and since the Council had an official majority which had to vote for the legislation, bills presented were always passed, albeit with long drawn out discussion. Bills did not, however, become law until they were signed by the four Sultans. This was a mere formality in view of the Sultans' treaty agreement to accept British advice.

From time to time, in an effort to decentralize government authority from the federal to state governments, suggestions were made that legislation on certain subjects should be left to the States with only a few topics retained by the Federal Council. Despite all the discussion and the agreement on decentralization in principle for a number of years, by the outbreak of the Pacific War the Federal Council still retained control of legislation on all important topics (with the exception of religion) while State Councils had authority for passing legislation for spending a part of their finances and for certain educational and public health programs.

The Federal Council was a predominantly British body chaired by the High Commissioner.(2) The State Councils in the Federated States were divided about half and half and were under the chairmanship of the Sultan. The British Resident and British heads of important departments were ex-officio members and their votes equalled those of the Malays. Since the Sultan had to vote as the Resident advised, there was an official majority. In addition, the other Malay members of the councils hesitated to vote in opposition to their Sultans. Hence, unanimity in passing legislation was frequent.

In the Unfederated States, the State Councils legislated on all aspects of government, and legislation was introduced by the Sultans. Because so many of the key positions in government were occupied by Malays, the State Councils were predominantly Malay bodies. In theory the British Adviser who sat on the

(2) In 1940, of the 28 members, only four were Malays, two Chinese and one Indian.

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Council might be voted down or forced to use a veto. In practice, use of a veto was avoided. If it appeared that legislation which had been drafted in consultation with a British Legal Adviser (in conformity with legislation passed, pending or anticipated for the Federated States or the Colony) would be voted down in the State Council, the British Adviser often suggested that a vote on it be postponed until a subsequent meeting. In the time intervening, he and his British assistants tried to persuade the Malays of the usefulness of the law so that at the following meeting it would be passed.

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The important cities had local governments run by Municipal Commissions, whose members were appointed from among British officials and important British and Asiatic leaders in the community. The Commissions had authority to pass ordinances on purely local matters such as upkeep of roads, disposal of garbage, standards of housing and sanitation, and to set fees and license rates which would bring in revenue for city governments.

3. Financial Authority.

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Malaya, as a section of the British Empire, was generally self-supporting. The United Kingdom did not make grants for government or welfare in Malaya. Salaries and pensions of British civil servants employed in Malaya were paid from Malayan revenues. The only important expenditures by the United Kingdom in Malaya were for the Singapore Naval Base and this was considered an Empire, rather than a peculiarly Malayan, investment.

There was no attempt made in Malaya's finances to spread taxation over a large proportion of the population. This would have been impractical and unrewarding in view of the poverty of many natives, the problem of collection in distant jungle areas, and the lack of popular comprehension of a modern tax system.

Revenue in the Straits Settlements was derived largely from a Government Opium Monopoly(3) and from import taxes on liquor, tobacco and petroleum. Other sources were receipts from the Post and Telegraph Departments and various licenses and fees.

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The Federated States were considerably wealthier than the Colony or the other states. Export duties on rubber and tin, land rents and sales, and import duties (particularly on tobacco, liquors, petroleum and textiles) provided the bulk of revenues, the remainder coming from miscellaneous fees and rents. The export duty on tin, alone, brought in a fourth of the revenue in 1937.(4) The amount of revenue taken in by the government varied greatly from year to year and fluctuated in relation to prosperity or depression in the rubber and tin industries. Rubber and tin exports were regulated by international bodies on the basis of world demand, principally American demand, for those two products. Since government rents were largely from rubber and tin properties, their receipt also depended upon conditions in those industries. Finally, the bulk of purchasing power for imports came from staffs of rubber or tin enterprises. Hence, revenues from import duties also fluctuated with conditions of prosperity in two industries.

Except for Johore, the Unfederated States were poor states and several of

(3) This became proportionately less important in the years before the war as the government tired to suppress opium smoking.
(4) In 1900, it had brought in 46%.

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them had to depend upon loans from the Federated States or the Colony to make up their deficits. Johore, like the Federated States, got a substantial part of its revenue from rubber (export duties and land rents), from export duties on copra, tin and iron, from import duties, opium and miscellaneous licenses and fees. The other States were not important areas for rubber and tin production and their populations were less interested in and could less afford imported goods. Nevertheless, the bulk of revenue came from customs duties followed by opium monopolies.

4. Judicial System.

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The administration of law and justice in Malaya was complicated by the presence of several races with different concepts of law. In order to avoid racial conflicts and offense to traditional concepts, the enforcement of law in Malaya was handled with caution. In the Malay village, the local Pengkulu presided over an informal court dealing in Moslem law in most cases. The District Officer included the role of magistrate among his many functions. In areas of exclusive Chinese residence, the Protector of Chinese or a member of his staff tried to settle disputes between Chinese. Among Indians, the Department of Labor performed similar functions.

In the Straits Settlements, the British judges of the Supreme Court, appointed by the King, handled all serious criminal and civil cases. Less serious cases came before District courts and minor offenses before Police courts.

The system in the States was similar. In the Federated States, a supreme court with a chief justice and three judges, all appointed by the High Commissioner, magistrates courts which encompassed a District, and Pengkulu courts made up the framework. Judges of the Federated States were ex-officio judges in the Straits Settlements and judges and certain of the magistrates were recruited from the Colonial Service. In general, Britishers held judicial positions in the Supreme Courts and District courts. In the dominant Malay States of Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu, Malays occupied the principal judicial positions but in the other States and the Colony, British judges sat in the higher courts.

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The tradition of English trial justice prevailed and in most instances every effort was made to handle cases fairly with the forms of British custom. This was not at all times comprehensible to the Asiatics appearing before the courts. Over the long period of British rule there was little complaint of one-sided, e.g. pro-British, justice. In cases between an Asiatic and a Britisher, the Asiatic had British legal advice and the adviser generally fought his case sincerely.

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Likewise in the handing down and execution of sentences in modern times, there were few charges of torture or excessive cruelty, or the use of prison sentences to suppress political opposition.

5. The Civil Service.

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The principal positions in the governments of Malaya were filled from the Malayan Civil Service, originally an entirely British service, which young career civil servants joined and through which they rose in rank to the highest positions. Theoretically, members of the Malayan Civil Service could be transferred from one British dependency to another but, in general, only the Governor-High Commissioner had seen service outside Malaya. His principal assistants, including the Residents, Advisers, and the Federal Secretary, on the other hand, had been career men in the Malayan service. Members of the Malayan Civil Service were eligible

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642 for appointment in any part of Malaya. This was one means by which uniformity of government was maintained in the separate sections. Certain positions in the Colony, the Federated States and the Unfederated States, though differing slightly in title, were held by one individual, e.g. the Legal Adviser.

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635] Chinese, Indians, Eurasians and other non-Malay Asiatics were not eligible for appointment to the Malayan Civil Service. Since members were appointed to the States, it was felt that the Malay States would resent subordination of any part of their state government to a foreign Asiatic. In the Straits Settlements, therefore, a Straits Civil Service was in existence to which Asiatics of all races and Eurasians were eligible and from which clerical and minor positions in the Colony were filled.(5)

In the States, a system of Malay preference was in practice. There was an exclusively Malay Administration Service in the Federated States from which candidates for the less important positions were chosen. Each of the Federated States had a special clerical service open to all races but with preference for Malays, from which clerical positions were filled. An increasing number of Malays were promoted from the Malay Administration Service to the regular Malayan Service. By 1939 there were twenty Malays in the Malayan Civil Service. In most cases, Malays native to a State served within that State. There was almost no transfer of Malay civil servants between States. The traditional loyalty of the Malay to his own Sultan was considered to make such transfers impracticable. In several of the Unfederated States Malays from the Malayan Civil Service were gradually replacing British officials.

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Since there was no semblance of democratic government in Malaya, with election by the people of their own representatives, and since there were few bodies on which Asiatics sat and on those generally a small proportion of aristocratic Malays, it was in the ranks of the civil services that the greatest number of Malays in the States, and Chinese and Indians in the Colony participated in government and received training in public administration methods.

d. Rights of Inhabitants.

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563 Except in the political sphere, there was wide freedom of action for the individual resident of Malaya whether he was native born or immigrant. Freedom of religion was complete and freedom of speech, press and assembly was interfered with on few occasions and only when an act was considered treasonable to the government. Because of the variety of races in Malaya and the separate political entities, rights of individuals varied from section to section.
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British citizens, of pure white extraction, could live, travel and work in any part of the peninsula. All persons born in the Straits Settlements of whatever race were considered British subjects and could move into the States only with the permission of the Sultans. Persons born in the States were subjects of the Sultans and while in the States had no special claim on British protection. However, both British subjects from the Colony and subjects of the Sultans when going abroad, travelled on similar passports indicating they were British-protected persons. There was no general Malayan citizenship nor any system of naturalization for new immigrants. First-generation immigrants, of which there

(5) Candidates must be British subjects domiciled in the Colony or sons of British subjects by birth or naturalization, and must have a diploma from Raffles College or a British university.

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were thousands each year from India and China, retained their foreign status. If their children were born in Malaya, they were regarded as subjects of Malaya but at the same time by China and India as citizens of those countries. Thus there developed a large group of permanent Chinese and Indian residents of Malaya who possessed dual citizenship.

In the Straits Settlements there was no official racial discrimination on ownership of land or place of residence although socially it was understood that certain areas and certain buildings were reserved for white use only, and other districts became predominantly Chinese or Indian. In the Federated States large tracts of land, totalling 4,358 square miles and known as Malay Reservations, were set aside for Malay use. Chinese and other Asiatics were not able to buy land in those areas. The Government attempted to limit the growing of rice to these areas and thus to keep it in Malay hands. Otherwise, throughout Malaya, the granting of land for sale or rent from the Crown in the Colony and the Sultans in the states, whether to be used for mining or agricultural purposes, was not restricted on a racial basis.

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Malaya had a race problem but not a minority problem in the usual sense. Its racial problem stemmed from the fact that the population was made up of four races -- British, Malays, Chinese and Indians -- so nearly equal in power terms that a severe tug of war for control of the country could develop. In the past dominant control lay with the British. Proportionately only a very small part of the population, they nevertheless held the key government positions, the wealth and the military power. The Chinese were numerically the largest group and in some parts of the country far outnumbered other races.(6) Next to the Europeans, Chinese were the most successful businessmen and controlled the most wealth. They were bankers, merchants, tin mine owners, rubber estate owners, pineapple factory managers, and they were the middlemen of the country, the collectors of Malay produce, the lenders of credit, and the laboring force for industry and mining. Thus, in many instances, they held economic control over the commercially less acquisitive Malays. The Malays, adhering to their Islamic customs and loyal to their Sultans and their Chiefs, did not participate prominently in Malaya's economic life. Outside the Straits Settlements and the busy mining districts, and especially in rural areas, Malays were in the majority. Indians, far smaller in number than the Chinese or the Malays, were not so conspicuously successful commercially as the Chinese although they played a significant role in Malaya's economy as shopkeepers, railway workers, rubber tappers. They had evidently developed no strong sense, before the war, of belonging to a political minority. Their political loyalties, insofar as they had any, were focussed on politics within India.

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(6) For example, 75 per cent of the population of Singapore and 79 per cent of Penang was Chinese. Large districts in the Kinta valley of Perak, heart of the tin mining area, were dominantly Chinese.

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Estimated Population of Malaya, June 1941

Group	Total Number	Total Per Cent	Malayan Union Number	Malayan Union Per Cent	Singapore Number	Singapore Per Cent
Malays	2,277,352	41.9	2,200,121	46.6	77,231	10.2
Chinese	2,377,989	43.7	1,778,330	38.0	599,659	78.1
Indians	742,202	13.4	632,364	14.4	59,838	7.0
Europeans	31,366	.6	16,781	-	14,585	2.1
Eurasians	19,330	.2	11,009	-	8,321	1.2
Others	58,491	1.0	48,909	1.0	9,582	1.4
Total	5,506,730	100.0	4,737,514	100.0	769,216	100.0

642 e. Economic Policies.

421 656 427 471 The several governments of Malaya through their British officials retained control over land ownership and utilization. Although details of the system varied from one section of the country to another, in essence there was a uniform system for controlling land. In the Settlements, land was generally leased from the Crown for a period not exceeding 99 years although some agricultural lands outside the cities have been granted in perpetuity and the earliest Singapore leases run for 999 years. In the States, all land not held under title belonged to the Sultan of the State. Actually its disposition and its collection of revenue was managed by the Resident (Advisor). Land was granted in perpetuity to private citizens but the Resident had power to set the annual rent and to insist on the nature of cultivation. Land, half of which was not properly cared for for three years, defaulted to the State. Possession of land did not carry the right to mine. Special prospecting and mining licenses had to be obtained from the State.

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This system of land tenure was used by the Governments of Malaya to set aside certain areas for Malay Reservations,(7) to restrict cultivation of rice to Malays only,(8) to delimit areas of rubber cultivation and to control mining in relation to agriculture. Aside from its deliberate pro-Malay policy in maintaining the Malay monopoly of rice production and in assuring Malays of exclusive rights in certain areas, land grants and mining licenses were open to all who could afford to pay the fees regardless of citizenship. However, foreign companies had to be incorporated in the Colony or the States or to comply with the provisions of the British and Foreign Companies Enactment of 1912, which meant incorporation in the Empire if not in Malaya. The lack of discrimination against foreign companies in granting of land and mining leases is indicated by the fact that Japanese firms owned and operated all five of Malaya's iron mines and the largest bauxite mine before the war. Three affiliated American tin mining companies operated near Kuala Lumpur with some of the most modern machinery in the country and the Malayan subsidiary of United States Rubber had one of the larger plantations in Malaya.

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(7) Control over mortgaging of land has been weak and actually a considerable part of lands in the Malay Reservations came under the control of Chinese and Indian moneylenders.

(8) Until the war emergency in 1939.

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Economic policies for Malaya did and did not completely tie the development of Malaya's economy to the United Kingdom. The free trade practices of the Straits Settlements meant that ships from all over the world visited Malaya's ports (although 33% were British) and her stores were stocked with goods from many lands. On the other hand, by indirect means it was arranged that the bulk of Malaya's important imports — machinery, iron and steel products, automobiles and bicycles — were purchased primarily in the United Kingdom. It was very difficult for American or other foreign businessmen to sell machinery in the Malayan market. Their efforts were discouraged by the loyalty of local British merchants to their mother country. In addition, the governments of Malaya tended to buy British goods for development of railroad, power and public utilities and other facilities.

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Through the relationships of the British world business community a large proportion of Malaya's dollar exchange was transferred to the United Kingdom's account in exchange for sterling credits. This offset, in terms of Malaya's imports from the United States, the advantage the United States had from being Malaya's leading export market — taking 49% of the total value of exports in 1925 and over 30% in all other years while the United Kingdom took 10-15%.(9) By contrast, the United Kingdom supplied 15-18% of imports, the Empire another 18% (principally India and Burma — rice, gunny bags and sarongs) while the United States supplied only 1-3%. While imports from the Indies equalled the combined imports of the United Kingdom and the Empire, those from the Indies represented tropical produce for processing and/or re-export. The dominant supplier of imports for use in Malaya was the United Kingdom. If manufactured goods only are considered, the United Kingdom supplied 25-29% of the total. Nevertheless, the percentage of imports from Britain had been declining steadily before the war partly because the British product tended to be of high quality and hence high priced, and partly because British firms did not study the desires of their customers. Manufactures from other European countries were assuming greater importance.

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Until 1932, tariff policies did not particularly favor British firms. The Straits Settlements, with the exception of low revenue duties on liquor, tobacco and petroleum, followed its traditional policy of free trade, and low ad valorem tariffs in the Malay States applied equally to imports from all sources. The Malayan market was therefore highly competitive. Beginning early in 1932, the Malay States adopted Imperial preference. The Straits Settlements did not alter its free trade status except to impose a higher registration fee on non-British motor cars and to give preference in its duties on liquor and tobacco. The former arrangement merely made certain, once again, that British cars should predominate in Malaya.(10)

In the States ad valorem duties on such items as alcoholic beverages, tobacco, petroleum, textiles, wearing apparel, rubber shoes, cement, cycles and motor cars varied from 10-15% while duties for Empire products were about half. Machinery was generally free of duty.

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Of the local Malayan industries which produced for export, only the canned

(9) In 1938, 40% of the value of Malaya's rubber and 55% of its tin exports went to the United States.

(10) The Ford Motor Company of Canada had the one automobile assembly plant in Malaya. Hence, American type cars, only technically British, were common in Malaya.

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of the local Malayan industries which produced for export only the canned pineapple exports benefitted substantially from Empire preference since they could enter United Kingdom markets more cheaply than their biggest competitor, Hawaiian pineapples. The major Dominions (India, South Africa and Australia) refused to grant Imperial preference to colonial manufactures due to their low production costs.

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Between 1930 and 1934, imports of Japanese goods had increased sharply in proportion to imports from other countries, despite Imperial preference and at a time when total imports were falling. British businessmen, particularly Lancashire textile interests, alarmed at the loss of their share in Malaya's trade, pressed for some control of trade. In mid-1934, at the request of London, a system of quotas for imports of cotton and rayon piece-goods was imposed, based on each country's imports to Malaya during the five years 1927-31. Although the quotas made possible a revival of British textile imports to Malaya (from 17% of the total cotton piecegoods imports in 1933 to 37.5% in 1937), Japanese-made textiles exceeded them -- at a controlled level -- until 1937-8 when the Chinese boycott and Japan's concentration on war industries reduced imports of Japanese goods.(11) In 1935, when Japanese electric light bulbs were swamping the Singapore market, the Straits Settlements passed an ordinance (directly aimed at Japanese imports) prohibiting imports which did not comply with standard British specifications.

These regulations had been aimed directly at Japan. The prohibitive export tax on tin ore from the Straits Settlements (35% ad valorem applied against ores shipped to any destination except Britain and Australia) was intended to forestall the development of a tin smelting industry in the United States and to maintain the monopoly in smelting of Malayan ores in the hands of two powerful British firms, the Straits Trading Company and the Eastern Smelting Company.

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The Malayan currency, the Straits dollar, was tied to the pound sterling at 2s. 4d. in 1906 and has been maintained at this rate since then. In terms of US currency it was generally in the neighborhood of 50 cents. Banking in Malaya was dominated by a handful of large British banks including the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, and the Mercantile Bank of India. Foreign banks, such as the National City Bank of New York and the Yokohama Specie Bank, as well as dozens of small Asiatic banks, also operated.

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Despite the liberal policy of the Malayan Governments in granting mining rights and land to non-British firms, Malaya's major industries upon which her prewar economy depended were undeniably dominated from London. It has already been pointed out that the largest British mining and plantation companies had their head offices in London and their shares were bought and sold on the London Stock Exchange. The bulk of rubber sales were handled in the London Rubber Market and of tin sales by the two smelting companies. London interests for both rubber and tin developed London organizations: the Malayan Chamber of Mines for tin and the Malayan Rubber Growers Association for rubber. These became powerful organizations which largely determined policy and programming for the rubber and tin industries, and which advised the British Government (and the Malayan Governments). Members of these London organizations were also able to dominate the international organizations(12) which, in the thirties, regulated production and

(11) Actually India benefitted as much as the United Kingdom from the quotas on textiles. Its share rose from 1% in 1934 to 18% in 1938.
(12) The International Rubber Regulation Committee and the International Tin Committee.

439 prices of rubber and tin in an effort to maintain stable markets.

473 British influence in other segments of Malaya's economy was the natural result of the establishment of British firms in various lines of business and their inclination to deal with each other, a habit which once the country became advanced in its development, appeared to exclude firms of other nationalities. A few large British Straits merchants wielded considerable power in the import-export business and developed their own distribution networks throughout the peninsula which were encouraged to "Buy British." Most of the individuals employed in the British networks were Chinese. Many Chinese merchants were also successful in competing in the import-export trade. [563]

f. Social Policies.

744 1. Public Health and Sanitation.

The Governments of Malaya have long been proud of their record in the field of public health and sanitation. For whatever reason (whether to improve native welfare or to provide safe and sanitary living and working conditions for British businessmen), it is undeniable that great progress was made in improving health and sanitation in Malaya between 1900 and 1942. In a country where malaria was rampant, drainage systems were provided and prophylactic quinine tablets distributed so successfully that the fear of malaria was eradicated except in the less developed jungle regions. Sewage disposal in the major cities was so regulated that cholera and typhus cases were rare and infrequent outbreaks were quickly brought under control. Dysentry was an uncommon ailment. [364]

743 Each State and the cities of Penang, Singapore and Malacca had large government general hospitals to which patients from surrounding areas were brought by ambulance. Dispensaries serviced rural districts. Agricultural estates and large mining enterprises were encouraged to maintain their own doctor, clinic and hospital services. The larger European enterprises were fairly good in doing so. Smaller concerns, and Asiatic-owned outfits, were more lax in their medical services. In 1937 there were 232 estate hospitals, 83 of them group hospitals serving several estates. District and State Health Officers made periodic inspection visits to estates and mines to observe health conditions but their work loads were so heavy that the visits were less productive than might have been hoped. [744]

874 Malaya had one medical school, the King Edward VII College of Medicine, founded at Singapore in 1905 to train local doctors. Standards of instruction were high and degrees were recognized by the British General Medical Council which meant that graduates could practice anywhere in the British Empire. In 1939, the College had 158 students and was giving training in dentistry and pharmacy as well as general medicine and surgery. The Institute of Medical Research, founded in 1900 at Kuala Lumpur, concentrated on tropical medicine for which it had a worldwide reputation. [742]

744 The Governments of Malaya bore the costs of the public health programs.
652 The program was administered through a central medical and health department for the Colony and the Federated States. Services in the Unfederated States were less extensive, because the States were poorer, but were modeled on the Federated
642 system and since officers were interchangeable a fairly uniform system was maintained.

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2. Education.

Educational systems in Malaya, like the medical and health services, were centralized through a single Department of Education functioning for both the Colony and the Federated States and providing a pattern and personnel for the departments of the Unfederated States. But unlike the medical service, education in Malaya was less amply provided with funds by the government. The Education Department had to struggle along paying inadequate salaries and unable to develop higher education facilities.

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The Malayan Governments had a twofold primary school system: education in English which was available to children of all races who could pay the small fees; and free compulsory vernacular education in Malay for Malay students only and for all Malay boys between the ages of seven and fourteen.(13) Exceptional Malay students who passed the final examination at the vernacular schools could transfer to the English schools and receive a free education, a privilege reserved to Malays. Government education at the elementary level was supplemented by private Chinese schools in which the Chinese language dominated, mission schools and a few Tamil estate schools, to all of which the governments made small grants-in-aid. Chinese schools were staffed largely by teachers from China and served as a means of teaching the children about China and spreading pro-Chinese and sometimes anti-British propaganda.

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Education was neither required nor encouraged above the elementary grades. A high school education in English was provided by the government for those who passed the lower grades and could afford it. It was sought by ambitious Chinese businessmen and Malay aristocrats who desired their sons to secure positions as clerks. Final high school examinations were similar to the Cambridge examination in Great Britain for students of the same level. There was no university in Malaya, though one had been publicly clamored for for years. The few schools of college level included the medical school, Raffles College (founded at Singapore in 1928) and Kuala Kangsar Malay College. The medical school had very high standards of instruction but Raffles College gave higher arts and science courses which were barely above high school level. A diploma from Raffles College was inacceptable for graduate work in English universities, although Raffles trained teachers for the Malayan schools.

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The educational system of Malaya and that of the United Kingdom were in no way coordinated. Four students a year had an opportunity to win scholarships (awarded by the governments of the Colony and the Federated States) which would take them to an English university — one was reserved for a Malay, the others were generally won by Chinese. A few private scholarships were available and it was customary for the Malay Sultans and a few wealthy Chinese to finance an English university education for their sons. Children of English residents in Malaya were sent back to English schools to complete their education. Within Malaya, except in private schools attended by children of Malay aristocrats or prominent Chinese merchants, English children did not mix with Asiatics. The school system was not, therefore, a means of drawing English and Asiatics together. The influence of the few Malays and Chinese who did attend private schools, however, and who later studied in England was in later years very great.

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Technical education (for example, in mechanical or handicraft skills) like

(13) Late in 1946, it was announced that the government would provide free elementary education for children of all races.

874 university education was underdeveloped in Malaya, largely because there was little demand for it. The Sultan Idris College in Perak had been opened in 1922 to train Malay vernacular teachers. Emphasis was also placed on handicrafts and agriculture. The Technical School at Kuala Lumpur trained subordinate staff for work on transport, public works and communications. The departments of Agriculture and Forestry also had schools to train their staffs. The Federated States established a trade school at Kuala Lumpur in 1926 to teach fitters and motor mechanics with Malay as the medium of instruction. By 1937, trade schools had been established in half a dozen other centers including Singapore and Penang. Graduates were snapped up by governments and European firms but Chinese companies preferred immigrant artisans.

g. Nationalist Aspirations.

186 563 Nationalist sentiment was not a force in prewar Malaya. The Chinese population as a whole was more interested in business than in politics and what political sentiments they had were, except on the part of a handful of Chinese Communists, directed towards China. The Indians, likewise, had developed little political interest in Malaya. At least half of the Chinese and Indians in Malaya were transients who tended to keep close ties with their mother countries.

The Malays, who felt strong loyalties to their Moslem Sultans and aristocratic leaders had not developed, on the whole, a strong Pan-Malay sentiment. It was rare indeed, for example, for all nine Malay Sultans to consult together on any common problem, and their subjects, by and large, had even less sense of kinship with Malays in other parts of the peninsula. This division of political feeling was fostered by the system of government in Malaya which maintained nine presumably independent Malay states whose principal connections lay in the persons of British members of the Malayan Civil Service.

Despite the apparent lack of national feeling in Malaya prior to the war, there were, in the years just before Pearl Harbor, a few stirrings of the calm surface of political Malaya which suggested to the alert observer that the prewar political calm would not go on forever.

668 467 Singapore had been, since 1926, the center of the Communist party for the Southeast Asian area. The Malayan Communist Party, directed from China and predominantly Chinese in membership though including a number of Indian workers and Malay seamen, was an illegal organization which had to operate underground but nevertheless managed to maintain continuous contact with Communist cells in Indonesia, Indochina and other nearby areas. Its program for Malaya was ultimate independence but the preliminary step towards this goal was to be the organization of laborers into unions and use of the strike weapon to gain political as well as economic objectives. During the 1930's and particularly after 1937, there had been active organization of unions and a number of strikes in major industries which the local Malayan press generally ascribed to communist agitation.

[575] Although there were, with the exception of the underground Malayan Communist Party, no purely political parties in Malaya before the war, there were a great number of social organizations which could have been diverted to political purposes. The Chinese were particularly active in such organizations which had been an outgrowth of their earlier secret societies.

186 578 642 The Malays also were developing a national consciousness. A small Malay middle class was beginning to resent the authority of the Malay aristocracy and to desire more participation of Malays in responsible government positions. Educated Malay

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youths were finding competition with Chinese in earning a living very difficult and were beginning to think about keeping or restoring "Malaya to the Malays". The more radical wanted real government by Malays, and Malay as the official language.

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According to a postwar Malay nationalist publication, "the need of unity of the Peninsula Malays as a whole was first seen in 1934 when the 'Persandaraan Sahabat Pena' (Pen Friends Brotherhood) was established in almost every Malay State to raise standards of Malay language and to improvise and increase Malay literature and indirectly to protest against the proposal . . . to do away with the Malay language. Later Malay Associations and Unions with much broader aims and objects were formed in the various states and settlements and meetings of the delegates of the various groups were held twice in Kuala Lumpur. A third conference was held in Singapore in 1940. The need for a Pan-Malayan Association was not felt then but it became urgent and necessary during the Japanese occupation."

II. POSTWAR RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND MALAYA

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Postwar Malaya is strikingly different from prewar Malaya. Japanese occupation left the country dilapidated and economically stagnant, but politically more mature. British efforts since October 1945 to create a uniform, centralized administration have encountered opposition and stimulated political organization on a wide scale. Developments in neighboring Indochina and Indonesia have fanned nationalistic impulses in Malaya. Malays have organized themselves into political groups on a Pan-Malay basis for the first time in their history. Chinese political organizations have been active in looking out for Chinese interests. Remnants of wartime Chinese guerrilla groups, organized into social clubs, have been a potential political force. Organization of labor has been developing rapidly. A vigorous and enlarged press has been spreading new ideas.

a. Effects of Japanese Occupation.

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Three and a half years of Japanese occupation left the country with the major industries stagnant, transport and public utilities services run down, widespread shortages and accumulated demand for food, clothing, and essential goods, and almost inevitably with prices rapidly rising. A well-organized underground army, with a large civilian organization in the towns and villages to supply it, had harassed the Japanese, and upon their defeat took over control of many towns and regions of Malaya until the British troops arrived. There was widespread disillusionment over the British defeat in 1942, the cruelties of Japanese rule, and consciousness of native struggles for independence in neighboring Indochina and Indonesia.

The British reentered Malaya early in September 1945 with the military force they had intended to use to oust the Japanese had the Japanese surrender not already occurred. Contact was made with the underground army and civil government was transferred to British Military Administration (BMA) authority. The BMA declared Japanese currency and all Japanese regulations illegal, and reimposed 1941 legislation including price and wage controls. Specially prepared teams of British experts came in to examine conditions in the rubber and tin industries, to purchase stocks of rubber and tin, and to see that these commodities were shipped out according to international allocations. The BMA concentrated on restoring law and order, providing food through imports and through encouraging increased local production, and repairing transport and power services so that the

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country's economy could function again. Initially, the guerrilla army assisted the BMA in various police functions and by rounding up Japanese prisoners. On December 1, 1945, after appropriate ceremonies with wide publicity, the guerrilla army was disbanded, its members paid a bonus and asked to hand in their arms.

b. Malayan Union.

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On October 10, 1945, the Colonial Secretary announced in the House of Commons Britain's postwar plan for the government of Malaya. Only the broad outlines of the plan (which had been in the process of formulation for several years and was actually the product of Churchill's Coalition Government rather than of the new Labor Government) were given: a Malayan Union was to be created comprising the nine Malay States, Penang, Province Wellesley and Malaya; Singapore was to remain a separate colony; and a Malayan Union citizenship was to be created which would give equal rights to all permanent residents of Malaya.

Since the nine Malay States were nominally independent states having treaties defining their relationship to Great Britain, implementation of the Malayan Union plan required the negotiation of new treaties with the Malay States which would transfer authority for direct jurisdiction in the States from the Sultans to the British Government. Shortly after the Parliamentary announcement, a British emissary arrived in Malaya with power to negotiate new treaties and with power to replace the existing Malay Sultans if he found they had collaborated with the Japanese or were otherwise unfit to rule. Sir Harold MacMichael, the British emissary, worked quickly and without publicity, visiting each of the Sultans at his capital.

On January 22, 1946, a second Parliamentary announcement reported that new treaties had been concluded with each of the Malay Sultans and that the British Government could proceed with Orders-in-Council which would bring the Malayan Union into being. A White Paper was issued giving details of the proposed administration of Malaya.

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In brief, the British proposed to govern Malaya legally as they had actually governed it prior to the war through Advisers and Residents. The administration of the whole peninsula was to be uniform. Singapore would still be a traditional crown colony headed by a governor with veto power over his advisory executive and legislative councils (which would however no longer contain official majorities). The rest of Malaya would have a government similar to the prewar federal government at Kuala Lumpur except that there would be two Councils, Executive and Legislative, in place of the one Federal Council in prewar Malaya. The Governor of Singapore and the Governor of the Union were to be separate individuals and their work was to be coordinated by a Governor General of Malaysia.

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The Governors of the Union and Singapore were to have wide powers and authority, including appointment of all important members of the government. Each Governor was to be assisted by an Executive and Legislative Council composed of official and unofficial members, all appointed by himself, except for certain members of the Singapore Legislative Council.

Under obligation to consult their Executive Councils, the Governors would, if a disagreement occurred, have to report to the Secretary of State, giving the reasons for the action followed. The Governors would make the laws "with the advice and consent" of the Legislative Councils. "Reserve powers" to make laws in the interests of "public order, public faith, or good government" would be

642 vested in the Governor, particularly concerning foreign relations, Empire rela-
643 tions, defense, uniformity of legislation between the Union and Singapore, the creation of public offices, and the appointment of public officers — even if the Council had shown no desire to pass such legislation. The Governor would have to report each case where his "reserve power" was used to the Secretary of State.

[646] The Malayan Union envisaged other official bodies: a Council of Sultans to pass on legislation concerning Moslem religious matters recommended by Malay Advisory Councils and to advise the Governor on other matters; Malay Advisory Councils appointed and chaired by the Sultan in each Malay State to advise the Sultan on matters of Moslem religion; and State and Settlement Councils in each of the States and in the former settlements of Penang and Malacca to legislate on questions for which they had been given legislative power by the Governor or the Legislative Council.

642 This plan differed from the prewar government of Malaya in that (1) the Legis-
178 lative Councils would not be dominated by a majority of official members; (2) several members of the Singapore Legislative Council and the State Councils would be elected representatives, and (3) a Council of Sultans would be created thus permitting expanded influence of the Sultans on a pan-Malay basis. The plan called for no explicit change in the form or composition of local governments in the Union below the State level. In the absence of any statement and in view of the fact that the prewar form and prewar Malay and other officials had been reinstated after British reoccupation, it must be assumed that for the time being no changes are contemplated in local government. While preparation for self-government within the British Empire was to be the goal of the new form of Malaya's government, no date was set for its attainment and whether it would mean dominion status was not clarified.

c. Opposition to the Malayan Union and Development of Malay Nationalism.

668 The Malayan Union plan proved to be the catalyst for Malay nationalism. Bet-
642 ween September and December 1945, Chinese political groups, many of them backed by the Malayan Communist Party, had been the most active organizations in the country and it appeared that Chinese would take the lead in the politics of postwar Malaya.
563 With the October announcement of the Malayan Union, there had been little reaction from Malay circles (partly because Sir Harold MacMichael operated with so little publicity, partly because no details of the plan had been announced, and partly because of the general postwar chaos). A few Malay newspaper articles urged the Sultans to think carefully before signing away their peoples' rights. With the January announcement of the conclusion of new treaties, the Malays became suddenly very vocal in their opposition to the plan. It appeared that political groups had been organized in various parts of Malaya. The Perak Malay League was the first to be organized on a statewide basis in January and it was followed by the Movement of Peninsular Malays of Johore in February. Widespread and, in fact, apparently universal Malay opposition to the Malayan Union plan provided the stimulus to Malay political organization on a Pan-Malay basis. This was a startling development to all those who had thought the Malay was politically lethargic.

[186] Early in March, representatives of forty-one Malay organizations from all over the peninsula held a four day meeting at Kuala Lumpur. They decided to form a United Malays National Organization to oppose the Malayan Union plan. A resolution was adopted challenging the validity of the recent treaties signed by the Malay Sultans as being inconsistent with Malay tradition and custom and condemning both the plan for a Malayan Union and the projected Malayan Union citizenship on the ground that it would undermine the integrity and independence of the Malay race.

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Shortly thereafter, the Sultans, on their part, submitted to the British Government their own list of suggestions for amendments to the British plan. They requested greater authority for state governments, complete Malay control of Moslem religious affairs, and establishment of rigid qualifications for Malayan Union citizenship.

Meanwhile, debates in the British Parliament over the Orders-in-Council for the Union and Singapore found the Conservative Opposition sharply insisting that injustices were being done to the Malays.

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The British plan was modified late in March with (1) the Council of Sultans being permitted to discuss any topic without prior consent of the Governor; (2) the Governor required to withdraw whenever Moslem religious affairs were discussed; (3) one member of each state council being an appointee of the Sultan; and (4) qualifying standards for Malayan Union citizenship being applied equally to those born or fulfilling residence requirements in the Union and Singapore. The actual Orders-in-Council establishing citizenship, however, was postponed until further study of the problem was completed. For the first time in the history of Malaya, public opinion expressed by organized political groups of Malays themselves had produced a practical effect on British plans for governing Malaya.(14)

The Malays were not satisfied with these minor modifications, the question of the treaties not having been dealt with and citizenship for other Asiatics being still permitted. Nevertheless, the Orders-in-Council were passed, although only those parts of the order providing for the new geographical framework, the offices of the two Governors, and a transitional stage of government were to become effective immediately. For six months, or as long as was necessary, the Governor was to rule with the assistance of an Advisory Council which he would choose, while he consulted public opinion on the best means of implementing details of the order dealing with the Executive and Legislative Councils, the Council of Sultans, State and Settlement Councils and the Malay Advisory Councils. On April 1, 1946 military administration in Malaya ceased and civil administration passed to the governments of the Malayan Union and of Singapore. Sir Edward Gent was installed as Governor of the Union with headquarters at Kuala Lumpur; F. C. Gimson became Governor of the Colony of Singapore, and Malcolm MacDonald became the first Governor General of British Malaysia.

The influence of the United Malays National Organization continued to grow under the dynamic leadership of Dato Onn bin Jaafar and in cooperation with the Sultans. No Malay Sultan participated in the ceremony installing Sir Edward Gent as Governor of the Malayan Union and Malays went into mourning for a seven day period. No Malay joined the Union Governor's interim Advisory Council although six seats were held vacant for Malays.

The United Malays National Organization wanted to send a delegation to England in June to present its views on the Union to the British Government. The trip was forestalled by the opening of discussions between the Sultans, leaders of the United Malays National Organization and the Governor General and Union Governor. In July a Working Committee, made up of five British and seven Malays, was appointed to agree on modifications in the plan.

(14) The amendment giving Malayan Union citizenship to residents of Singapore as well as the peninsula was a concession to Chinese in Singapore who did not wish to be deprived of the benefits of Malayan citizenship.

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d. Federation of Malaya instead of Union.

The Malay-British Working Committee negotiated in secret from August to November 1946. The secrecy of the discussions, their prolongation and exclusiveness created uneasiness in Chinese circles and among left-wing Malays in the Malay Nationalist Party which had seceded from the United Malays National Organization in June and was thus not represented on the Working Committee.

The Malay-British Working Committee drafted detailed constitutional proposals for (1) the negotiation of new treaties with the Sultans on the prewar basis which would supersede the MacMichael treaties(15); (2) the establishment of a Federation instead of the union, with a High Commissioner in place of the Governor; and (3) more rigid qualifications for citizenship. The Constitutional Proposals envisaged the creation of constitutional monarchies in the states. They did not change the organs of government proposed for the Malayan Union (See b above) but gave greater authority to the Council of Sultans, the federal legislative council and State executive and legislative bodies, and increased the proportion of Malays on the federal legislative council. The Constitutional Proposals would in effect eliminate equality of citizenship and would not preclude dual citizenship.

The Constitutional Proposals were approved without substantial alteration by the Sultans and the United Malays National Organization and were presented to the Colonial Office in December 1946. After approval in London, a Consultative Committee consisting of British, Chinese Indian and Eurasian members was set up in Kuala Lumpur to receive comments from non-Malay groups. The Committee held public meetings in Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Malacca and Ipoh from January to March 1947 and received dozens of written comments from individuals and organizations.

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Leading the opposition to the Constitutional Proposals was the Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action. The Council was an amalgamation of existing political organizations, social clubs and labor unions — Chinese, Indian and Eurasian — which had been formed late in 1946 before the Constitutional Proposals had been made public but with the specific purpose of opposing them. The Council intended originally to be an inter-racial group coordinating all opposition to the Proposals but the Malay Nationalist Party dropped out after its first meeting and subsequently was instrumental in forming a Malay Council of Joint Action which pursued a parallel program. Although neither group was recognized officially by the Consultative Committee, their views, as expressed in the newspapers, were weighed by the Committee. They demanded a united Malaya, including Singapore, responsible self-government through a fully elected central legislature for the whole of Malaya, and equal citizenship rights for all permanent residents of Malaya.

The Consultative Committee drew up a report on the basis of its hearings and the comments received. The report recommended no basic change in the Constitutional Proposals; it suggested minor modifications, such as an increase in the membership of the Federal Legislative Council, and the relaxation of language requirements for citizens over 45 years of age. The Committee's report was discussed and approved, with small changes, by the Malayan Union Advisory Council, the former Malay-British Working Committee, the Sultans and the United Malays National Organization. In May 1947, the report was forwarded to London.

(15) I.e., the new treaties would restore internal sovereignty to the Malay Sultans within the States but give the British authority to advise the Sultans on all questions except religion.

642 On July 21, 1947, the British Government issued a new White Paper accepting the Federation substantially as delineated in the Constitutional Proposals. It would appear, therefore, that the form of government for Malaya has been finally determined and that there remains merely the technical procedure of passing a new Order-in-Council through Parliament and concluding new treaties with the Malay Sultans.

668 e. Political Parties in Postwar Malaya.

642 The long drawn out period of consultation on the structure of the government in Malaya presented an opportunity for the formation and development of political parties in Malaya as they had not existed prior to the war. By mid-1947, seven leading parties had emerged: the United Malays National Organization, the Malay Nationalist Party, the Malayan Democratic Union, the Malayan Indian Congress, the Malayan Communist Party, the Kuomintang Party and the China Democratic League.

The United Malays National Organization had been formed in March, 1946, through the federation of some forty political organizations which had been developed during the preceding months in the several states and the major cities. The UMNO was organized to oppose the Malayan Union Plan. It has become, in British eyes, the spokesman for the Malays, and has been represented in discussionswith the British concerning changes in the Malayan Union. The UMNO apparently supports the Sultans and is accused by more liberal groups of being an aristocratic right wing party. Its leader, Dato Onn bin Jafaar, currently Prime Minister of Johore, is undoubtedly one of the most intelligent and energetic Malays. He is an aristocrat from Johore and has been educated in Malaya and England and has travelled in the United States. He and his party desire eventual self-government for Malaya but do not advocate its separation from Britain.

The other Malay political party is the Malay Nationalist Party which was founded at Ipoh in October 1945. The party program has been gradually altered since its formation. Early in 1946 and until June 1946, the Malay Nationalist Party belonged to the United Malays National Organization. On June 30, 1946, it broke away and has since pursued an independent and oppostion policy. The Malay Nationalist Party is dominated by liberal Malays from the professional, student and labor groups who have a strong Indonesian orientation. Its leader, Dr. Burhanudin, is in his early thirties, has travelled in India and Indonesia but has not been widely known in Malaya. Its program aims at an independent Malaya, composed of both the Malayan Union and Singapore, which would cooperate with Indonesia. The Party is anti-British and anti-Sultan. It desires to raise Malay living standards and increase Malay participation in Malayan industry and agriculture. The Malay Nationalist Party was the prime force in the Malay Council of Joint Action which opposed the Constitutional Proposals (see above). It advocated that three-fourths of the legislative and state councils consist of elected members, half of whom should be Malays; that the executive council be responsible to the legislative council; that the Governor not be empowered to over-ride the legislature; that the state councils be presided over by the sultans concerned or their representatives; and that the Malay language be the official language of the country.(16)

Membership claims of both the UMNO and the Malay Nationalist Party are probably

(16) From official statement of the Malay Nationalist Party referred to in "Political Thought in Malaya" by Max Seitelman, Far Eastern Survey, Vol. XVI, No. 11, June 1947, p. 129.

668 642 exaggerated. It is probable that active members of each number only a few thousand although sympathizers who will appear at public meetings clearly reach into the tens of thousands. Leadership is limited to a dozen individuals in each party. Dato Onn and Dr. Burhanudin represent the greatest talent and the driving force in their respective parties. These parties are not, therefore, in any respect similar to political parties in the Western world.

668 563 The Malayan Democratic Union was founded in Singapore in December 1945 as a venture in inter-racial cooperation. It remains the only important inter-racial party in Malaya. Nevertheless, Malay participation is slight. The leadership is Chinese, Eurasian and Ceylonese. At its inauguration, the Malayan Democratic Union was supported by the Malayan Communist Party, the Kuomintang and various of the trade unions. Its program was designed to achieve self-government for Malaya within the British Commonwealth, an elected legislative assembly for all Malaya, free education and medical services, social security and equality in employment.

The Malayan Democratic Union was slow in receiving popular support. It was overshadowed during the first nine months of 1946 by the UMNO and the Malay Nationalist Party. However, it followed a policy of publishing its detailed views on local questions such as the Malayan Union citizenship qualifications, educational needs, and the structure of municipal government at Singapore which won it respect as an intelligent, thoughtful, public-spirited body. Late in 1946 the Malayan Democratic Union took the lead in forming the Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action to oppose the Constitutional Proposals.

The Malayan Indian Congress was formed in August 1946. Its aims were to provide a channel for the expression of Indian opinion in Malaya, to look after the interests of the Indian community, and to cooperate with other races in Malaya. Until mid-1947, the Malayan Indian Congress, a dominantly Hindu organization, had not taken a stand on any Malayan question except the Constitutional Proposals -- which it opposed largely because they were pro-Malay and had been formulated without Indian participation -- but it had expressed interest in Indian politics and had sent a large delegation to the Inter-Asian Relations Conference at New Delhi in March, 1947. Although a Moslem Indian organization also existed, its outlook focussed on India and the Malayan Indian Congress seemed, in mid-1947, likely to remain the outstanding Indian political organization in Malaya. Nevertheless, the Indian community, which had been lying low politically due to its wartime participation in the Indian Independence League, is now more than ever, oriented toward India. The near prospect of a free and sovereign India is more exhilarating to them than the benefits to be derived from a Malayan citizenship which does not carry with it the connotation of a nationality. If the Indians of Malaya follow Nehru's behest to choose definitely between India and Malaya as the object of their primary loyalty, there is little doubt but that they will select the former.(17)

The Malayan Communist Party has been a legal organization in postwar Malaya. Still largely Chinese in its membership and leadership, it has been active in labor unions and strikes, in organizing public celebrations, in its press and in its many affiliated organizations. Its basic aim, i.e. the creation of an independent Malayan Republic, has not been altered but has been subordinated to a program of organizing labor and political groups. In the months immediately following British reoccupation of Malaya, the Malayan Communist Party was the leading political party in Malaya. As law and order were restored and economic conditions improved, other parties were formed and the influence of the Malayan Communist

(17) Based on "Opposition in Malaya" by Virginia Thompson Adloff, Far Eastern Survey, Vol. XVI, No. 11, June, 1947, p. 131.

668 563 Party declined. The Malayan Communist Party may have had some influence in the leadership and program of the Malay Nationalist Party and the Malayan Democratic Union at their inauguration; however, changes in leadership of those parties and their growing support have dissipated early communist influence. By mid-1947, the Malayan Communist Party was smaller in its membership and less effective on the local political scene than the other parties described.

The Kuomintang Party and the China Democratic League have been Malayan Chinese counterparts of the Chinese parties of the same name. They have large memberships, are tightly organized and have had active programs in 1946 and 1947. However, their activities focus on politics in China. They have not as parties been active on Malayan questions although individual members have been outspoken in their criticism of the Malayan Union and the Constitutional Proposals, and have been active in the Pan Malayan Council of Joint Action. Right-wing Chinese political organizations wanted dual citizenship, while the left-wing organizations were strong critics of the Malayan Union. Both wings opposed the separation of Malaya and Singapore and urged a democratic constitution based on suffrage. At first the Chinese were vehement in their remarks about the Malayan Union, but when it became apparent that some compromise would be made between the government and the sultans, the right-wing Chinese realized that any newly acquired rights would be in jeopardy. Consequently the right-wing Chinese have approved the union scheme and throughout the negotiations between the government and the Malay representatives urged the protection of their prospective status.(18)

f. Inter-racial Tension.

186 578 [579] 642 The development of Malay nationalism following so closely on the widespread organization of Chinese into wartime guerrilla organizations which have persisted in the form of social and veterans clubs has aggravated the ever present danger of racial conflict in Malaya. Shortly after the British reoccupation of Malaya there were several bloody incidents in one of which an entire Chinese village was wiped out. Physical violence between Chinese and Malays ceased, except for isolated instances, soon after British authorities had reestablished order. However, the long drawn out controversy over the Malayan Union plan, the formation of exclusively Malay political organizations, the secrecy and exclusiveness of Malay-British negotiations to amend the Malayan Union plan, and Malay insistence on special rights for Malays have been divisive influences on Malay-Chinese relations.

g. Labor.

467 The organization of political parties in postwar Malaya has been paralleled by the rapid growth of an organized labor movement. Labor activities started in October 1945 with the formation of unions by trades in the various states and the main cities. By February 1946, unions had been federated into General Labor Unions in Singapore, Perak, Penang, Selangor, Johore and Negri Sembilan. The General Labor Unions cooperated in forming a Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Unions which became affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions. Chinese dominate the membership and leadership of most Malayan unions. Indians play a role in certain unions, e.g. the railroad workers, but only a handful of Malays belong to unions. [563]

467 656 642 The British Labor Government is committed to promoting the organization of labor in colonial areas. It has sent trade union advisers to both Singapore and the

(18) Based on "Political Thought in Malaya", op. cit., p. 129.

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Malayan Union to assist in the formation of unions and to build up conciliation services to settle labor disputes. Prewar legislation (never put into effect) concerning trade unions and industrial disputes has been revived. It limits use of union funds to purely economic self-improvement purposes, it requires strict accounting of funds, and registration of unions and their officials.

The governments of Malaya have been anxious to register existing unions. October 1, 1946 was set as the last date on which unions could apply for registration but so few unions had applied by that date that the time was extended to May 1947. By late spring of 1947, most local unions which could legitimately apply for registration had done so. Problems arose over the General Labor Unions and the Pan-Malayan Federation. Some British officials believe that these federated unions may be communist dominated and have political aims. They have insisted that, before these federated unions could be accepted for registration, application must be voted upon by a definite proportion of their member unions and agreement must be reached that not more than 10% of local union dues should be passed on to the federation. Late in June, the Singapore General Labor Union was accepted for registration. The Pan-Malayan Federation had complied with all the requirements for registration and it was only a matter of time before it would be accepted. Thus, by mid-1947, registration of trade unions was in effect complete. Organized labor, legally recognized, had become part of the Malayan scene.

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Meanwhile, strikes have been frequent and prolonged. Between September, 1945 and May 1946, some 200,000 workers engaged in thirty odd strikes which affected all major industries and utilities. Strikers sought both economic and political objectives: e.g. higher wages, larger rice rations, standards of work commensurate with those in Western countries, support for the United Nations, for nationalists in Indonesia and Indochina, and for democracy in Malaya. Strikes have continued on an equal scale since mid-1946 and have adversely affected coal and power production, rubber estate operation and the Singapore docks. With increasing government insistence upon registration of unions, however, there has been a trend towards limiting strikers' demands to non-political points and towards settlement of disputes through voluntary arbitration.

h. The Press.

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Further evidence of the new Malaya which has emerged from Japanese occupation is clearly evident in the quantity and vigor of newspapers and magazines which are being published. This is a natural corollary of the development of nationalism, political parties and labor unions. Now publications are instruments of these groups.

i. Malaya's Postwar Economy.

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It is too soon to predict how far Malaya's postwar economy will resemble the prewar economy. During 1946, rigid trade and exchange controls limited imports to Malaya to sterling areas, primarily to Britain. Export of rubber and tin was in accordance with international allocations of these scarce commodities and there was a demand for as much as Malaya could produce.

By mid-1947, Malaya's transport system had been put into fair shape. Under Government orders food production was being increased, but food supplies remained scarce; promised imports did not materialize in as large quantities as expected and food rations were reduced several times. A widespread black market in food and all essential goods prevailed. Standards of food, clothing and shelter were far below prewar.

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-727 While large orders for machinery to re-equip the tin industry had been
433 placed in Great Britain, deliveries had been slow and it was expected that it
439 would be 1949 or 1950 before the industry was back in normal condition. Rubber
[249] production, on the other hand, was increasing rapidly particularly from native
[316] holdings, and was expected to surpass any prewar year in 1947. Since the rubber price had slumped during mid-1947, since international allocation of rubber ceased at the end of 1946, and since synthetic rubber production was continuing in the United States at a high rate, Malayan producers were naturally worried over the long term prospects for their industry.

[255] The Malayan pineapple export industry which was nurtured under the wing of Imperial Preference and whose processing plant was largely destroyed during Japanese occupation also faces an uncertain future in the face of competition with the Hawaiin industry should a free world market develop.

[185] Despite the uneasiness which grips Malayan business, both European and Asiatic, especially among those interested in the export trade, no plan for the postwar economy of Malaya has yet been announced by the Malayan government. Merchants in Malaya are uncertain what their future ties to Great Britain and the Empire will be.

J. Malaya's New Role in the Empire.

648 Meanwhile, the plan for Malaya's postwar role in the Empire is becoming
642 clearer. It is now apparent that the transfer of direct jurisdiction from the Malay Sultans to the British Crown and the establishment of a unified Malaya was to be part of a plan to integrate Malaya with other British-controlled areas in Southeast Asia and to strengthen Britain's military and political position in Southeast Asia. The creation of a Federation of Malaya in place of the Union will not alter the basic British plan.

The five main British areas in Southeast Asia — Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei — have been formed into an informal unit in the British Empire known as Malaysia, under the Colonial Office and headed by a Governor General. Policy in the areas as a whole is coordinated through a common defense council, a common political committee, and periodic conferences of the Governors of the several areas under the chairmanship of the Governor General. Malaysia's importance within the British Empire increases as India approaches independence. As India's ties with Britain are weakened, Malaysia, now under the direct control of the Colonial Office, will become Britain's principal military and political base in the East.

648 Malaya's integration into the larger Malaysia, whose importance within
178 the Empire is being augmented, is occurring at a time when within Malaya there is a development of national consciousness among the Malays, a desire among Chinese for equal rights, a drive for labor organization, and widespread uncertainty about the future of the country's economy. If the country suffers from loss of world markets for rubber and tin and is unable to readjust its economy to the loss, it may find itself dependent upon financial assistance from Britain to support necessary educational and welfare services. On the other hand, the striving for

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self-government and the effort for a self-realization along racial lines within Malaya (fanned by aroused nationalism in China, India and Indonesia) may conflict with Britain's efforts to direct Malaysia into its new Empire role. The postwar decade will be a period of internal political growth within Malaya which, unless handled with utmost wisdom, will create a constant potential threat of racial conflict and Malay-British antagonism.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.

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Opposition to the plan for creating the Federation of Malaya (as outlined in the July White Paper) continued during the autumn of 1947, culminating on October 20 in a one day Malaya-wide general strike organized by the Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action, the Malay Council of Joint Action, the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions and the Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce. The most startling aspect of the strike was the participation in it of Chinese business interests, on the one hand, and Chinese liberal and labor interests, on the other hand, groups which are ordinarily diametrically opposed to each other on political issues. The strike, carried out with a noticeable lack of intimidation, succeeded in paralyzing business and transport throughout Malaya for one day. Thus far, however, it has brought no political results.

The strike was called to demand abandonment of the plan for a Federation of Malaya as enunciated in the July White Paper and to request instead a Federation which would include Singapore, which would have a genuinely representative form of government and which would have a citizenship open to all races and connoting real nationality. All the groups backing the strike (except the Chinese Chambers of Commerce which disagreed with a few minor points) had accepted as an alternative to the White Paper the People's Constitutional Proposals, a document which had been worked out during the summer months by the Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action and the Malay Council of Joint Action. The People's Constitutional Proposals would establish under British sovereignty a Federation of Malaya including Singapore. The Malay States having joint sovereignty with the United Kingdom would be constitutional monarchies. Britain would retain authority for defense and foreign relations but on all other questions the Federation would have autonomy. The Federation would have a central elected Legislature with one representative for each 45,000 of the population. For the first nine years of its operation, 55% of the seats in the Legislature would be reserved for Malays. The Legislature would elect a Prime Minister and an Executive Council. The only functions of the British High Commissioner in relation to these central bodies would be to formally open the Legislature and to approve bills. The Federation would have a genuine citizenship which required allegiance to the Federation and renunciation of other allegiances, and enumerated rights and duties for citizens. The official language would be Malay. A Council of Races would pass on all bills to insure that they contained no racial discrimination.

Despite the success of the general strike on October 29, despite the apparently wide and coordinated opposition to the White Paper Federation Proposals, and despite the existence of an alternative constitution in the People's Constitutional Proposals, there has been no indication that the Federated Proposals will be altered or their implementation delayed. On the contrary, there is every reason to suppose that the Federation as described in the July White Paper will be created very early in 1948.

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PART III. P H I L I P P I N E S.

by

Shirley Jenkins.

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PART III

THE EVOLUTION OF PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE

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On July 4, 1946, the United States formally inaugurated the Republic of the Philippines. The United States presidential proclamation declaring the independence of the country affirmed that "the people of the Philippines have clearly demonstrated their capacity for self-government" and officially announced that "the United States of America hereby withdraws and surrenders all rights of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control or sovereignty now existing and exercised by the United States of America in and over the territory and people of the Philippines."

This shift in sovereignty took place according to the schedule laid down in the Philippine Independence Act adopted by the United States Congress on March 24, 1934. That Act provided for the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines as a ten-year transitional form of government, preparatory to the withdrawal of American control, to culminate with the proclamation of independence and the inauguration of the Republic.

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Over-simplified interpretations of the motives for this novel innovation in colonial policy by a major power saw in it the undisputed triumph of moral principle, presaging the voluntary abdication of colonialism from the historical arena. More serious students of colonial relations, however, discerned other equally compelling and perhaps more realistic factors in the situation. The adoption of the Philippine Independence Act reflected a curious combination of diverse motives which together accounted for the legislative majority supporting the ultimate withdrawal of American sovereignty from America's largest, richest and most populous colonial possession. Some supporters were acting on a gehuine anti-colonial principle; others responded to the strong pressure of Filipino nationalism for Philippine independence, which had been envisaged by the United States as far back as 1916 in the Jones Act. Doubtless a considerable degree of support to the measure came from the isolationists in Congress, who were hopeful thus of sparing United States' involvement in Asiatic problems which were being highlighted by Japan's incursions in Manchuria and North China.

An additional factor, and one which contributed strongly to the support of the independence movement, was the growing concern in some American circles during the depression years of the early thirties about economic competition between certain American and Philippine products. American interests with capital investments in the Philippines and those engaged in import-export business with the islands, would have preferred retention of American control. Their importance was more than offset at this particular period by the influence of Americans with interests in domestic, Cuban and Puerto Rican sugar, and in the American dairy and oil business, all of whom envisaged growing competition from Philippine sugar and coconut oil. American labor while in general anti-imperialist, was also anxious to shut out competition from cheap foreign labor.

This conflict of economic interests had been reflected in Congress for some time. In October 1929 an amendment to the tariff bill providing for immediate independence to the Philippines, and thus terminating all duty exemptions for Philippine products, came within nine votes of being adopted in the Senate. In January. 1933, the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, almost identical with the later

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Tydings-McDuffie Act, was adopted by Congress. It was vetoed by President Hoover, but the veto was promptly overridden. Before the law was presented to the Philippine Legislature for approval, however, Franklin D. Roosevelt had succeeded Herbert Hoover as president and the political complexion of the United States Congress had likewise changed.

The Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act was rejected by the 10th Philippine Legislature-largely, it is generally believed, because it was secured by the Osmeña-Roxas Mission. Quezon, then President of the Philippine Senate and undisputed leader of the Nationalist Party, was believed to be unwilling to see the victory of independence go to his two greatest rivals. Basing his objection to the Act on its provision for United States' retention of military and naval establishments in the Philippines,(1) Quezon immediately headed another mission to the United States and returned home with the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which differed very little from the previous Act. The latter did provide, however, that the United States, upon withdrawing its sovereignty, would withdraw "all military and other reservations of the Government of the United States in the Philippines (except such naval reservations and other fueling stations as are reserved under Section 5)" (sec. 10, (a)). The economic provisions of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, dictated by American interests fearing the competition of Philippine products, were preserved in the new Act virtually intact.

There was one important alleviating circumstance in connection with the Tydings-McDuffie Act which made it somewhat more palatable to the Philippines. When he had presented it to Congress, President Roosevelt had stated:

"Where imperfections or inequalities exist, I am confident that they can be corrected after proper hearing and in fairness to both peoples".

The Philippine Legislature accepted the Act which Mr. Quezon brought back to them, and their confidence in President Roosevelt was justified when a Joint Committee was created in 1937 to "study trade relations between the United States and the Philippines and to recommend a program for the adjustment of Philippine national economy." As a result of this committee's studies and recommendations, the Tydings-McDuffie Act was amended in 1939, easing to some extent some of the economic provisions of the original Act.

While it is clear that particular American interests did bring pressure to bear in the matter of Philippine independence, it is also amply clear in the record that the United States had intended to grant independence to the country, and that it was a combination of domestic and world developments that gave impetus to the movement at the time of the passage of the Independence Act. No one is more insistent upon this point than Filipino spokesmen such as former President Sergio Osmeña and General Carlos P. Romulo, who declare that American economic interests alone could not have forced the issue had it not been the overwhelming desire and purpose of the United States to assist the Filipinos to attain their independence.

I. GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE.

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The independence proclamation of July 4, 1946, further recognized "the independence of the Philippines as a separate and self-governing nation" and acknowledged "the authority and control of the Government instituted by the people thereof, under the Constitution now in force."

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(1) The Good Fight, by Manuel Luis Quezon. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1946, p. 149.

642 That Constitution was drafted in 1934 - 35 by a Constitutional Convention consisting of delegates elected by the Philippine electorate as provided for in the Tydings-McDuffie Act. The Convention was thereby instructed to formulate and draft a Constitution republican in form and embodying a bill of rights and including specific provisions to protect American interests pending "the final and complete withdrawal" of American sovereignty. The draft was approved by President Roosevelt and then ratified by the Philippine electorate later in 1935.

In its original form, the Constitution provided for a unicameral legislature and six-year terms for the president and vice-president. In 1940 the Constitution was amended to provide for the establishment of a bicameral legislature and the presidential and vice-presidential terms of office were reduced to four years, with eight years set as the limit of consecutive service for the two latter offices. These amendments were approved by the President of the United States on December 20, 1940.

Executive power is vested in the president. Legislative power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of a Senate with 24 members chosen at large, to serve six -year terms, and a House of Representatives composed of "not more than 120 members who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one member." The representatives serve four-year terms.

The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court composed of a Chief Justice and ten Associate Justices appointed by the president with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Congress, and "such inferior courts as may be established by law". Congress has the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction as defined in the Constitution.

641 Of particular significance is the Bill of Rights, comprising 21 points, which constitutes Article III of the Constitution. Although the instructions to the Constitutional Convention included provision for such a bill, it might be noted that such a concept was not entirely foreign to the Filipinos, who had included in their Malolos Constitution (Jan. 20, 1899) a Fourth Title, "The Filipinos and Their National and Individual Rights."

At the time of the Constitution's adoption, suffrage was exercised by male citizens of the Philippines 21 years of age or over, able to read and write. Later, after a plebiscite held in accordance with Article V of the Constitution, the right of suffrage was extended to women with the enactment of Philippine Commonwealth Act No. 233.

641 The literacy requirements actually serve as a limitation on suffrage, since less than half of the adult population is literate. This is not to
212 belittle America's educational activities in the Philippines, which have frequently been cited as one of the singular achievements of American rule.
871 In comparison with the Dutch and British policy on education in the colonies, America's educational policy in the Philippines appears nothing less than revolutionary. As much as one third of government revenue in the islands was expended on education. It must be remembered, also, that the broad program of public education had to begin almost from scratch.

212 Lack of comparable figures for the literacy of the population in Spanish
871 days and in the early years of American rule makes it somewhat difficult

212 871 [illegible] progress on this basis. The census of 1918 did reveal, at any [illegible], that 49.2 per cent of persons ten years of age or over could read [illegible] language, and this marked an increase of 5 per cent over the1903 census figures. (2)

871 The immensity of the task of public education, the handicaps of travel, communication and language which beset the early American teacher and his Filipino successor, and the comparatively brief period since the public school 212 system was inaugurated, all are reflected in the literacy figures presented in the last pre-war census (1939). At that time, after forty years of American 191 rule, only 48.8 per cent of the total population could read and write some language or dialect. Only 26.6 per cent were able to speak English, the only language of instruction used in the public schools of the islands during the period. Less than one per cent of the Filipinos were graduates of college, normal school or university; only 18. 2 per cent were graduates of primary school.

641 These conditions were of course reflected in the electorate. In 1939, only 44 per cent of all Filipinos of voting age were literate - 51.7 per cent 212 of the men and 36.3 per cent of the women. Therefore, more than half of the population of voting age was denied the right to vote because of inability to comply with literacy requirements.

369 Further, as is to be expected, the highest literacy rate is found in urban areas and among the wealthier classes. This means that the majority 565 of tenants, peasants and laborers, and especially those in the rural areas - the groups which make up by far the larger proportion of the Philippine 212 population - are virtually without representation in government. This 641 situation contributed to the emergence of one-party dominance in the government even while the country was under the jurisdiction of the United States.

Essentially, the Constitution of the Philippine Republic and the country's governmental structure are modelled after the Constitution of the United 642 States and the American form of government. As Manuel Quezon, the first President of the Commonwealth, described it: "Although in its main features, the Philippine Constitution was practically a copy of the Constitution of the United States, it contained new provisions to meet the social problems of our day which did not exist when the fathers of the American Republic drew up their own constitution. It also contained the clause in the famous Kellogg Pact that the Philippines renounced war."

While the Constitution did grant far greater power to the President than is granted by the United States Constitution, this was considered by no less an authority than the late Dr. Hayden to be "in harmony .....with the native Filipino conception of the role which the President should play." (3) "The critical situation of the Philippines and the world during the Commonwealth period gave a further impetus to the developing strength of the presidential office, at the expense of the Legislature and the Judiciary. Thus it has been noted that "the Constitution laid the legal foundations for the quasi-dictatorship which seems to be emerging." (4)

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(2) Census of the Philippine Islands, 1918, II, p. 57.
(3) The Philippines, by J. R. Hayden. Macmillan, New York, 1942, p. 75.
(4) Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia. IPR Inquiry Series, New York, 1942, p. 62.

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II. FILIPINIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION.

From the American acquisition of the Philippines in 1898 to the proclamation of the Republic in 1946, a complex progression from outright American military government to complete Filipinization of the administration unfolded. The development was not straight and sequential, but proceeded unevenly with recurrent retrogressions and progressions reflecting the conflict on Philippine policy in the United States and shifting legislative majorities. It was not that America lacked a Philippine policy, as had been frequently asserted. Historically speaking, two conflicting lines of policy contended for dominance in America's relations with the Philippines from the very beginning.

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One stressed the dependence of the Islands on the United States within the framework of an American colonial empire. The other, articulated by the Democratic Party, the anti-Imperialist League and the independent anti-Expansionists, insisted upon the independence of the Philippines from the very inception of American relations with the Islands. The apparent contradictions in the Philippine policy of the United States reflected the shifting balance of power between these two diametrically opposed trends of American thought. Sometimes one and then the other assumed the upper hand, and frequently both were rather evenly balanced in a single legislative act.

In essence, the conflict reflected America's growing pains as a world power. The Jeffersonian and Lincolnian concepts of democracy and national freedom, that epitomized America's emergence from colonial status to independent nationhood and the development of America's own potentialities and resources were challenged by new political doctrines reflecting America's economic expansion and entrance into world markets. In the graphic words of A. Whitney Griswold:

"Amid the clash of arms the Philippine Archipelago became an American colony. These Islands, lying some six hundred miles off the Chinese coast, bore no conceivable relation to American supremacy in the Carribean, much less to the continental security of the United States. With their annexation the United States emerged from its habitual, self-sufficient abode in the Western Hemisphere and entered the limitless realm of world politics, naval rivalry and imperial dominion. A step so unprecedented could not have failed to influence the character of American diplomacy in every quarter of the globe, and nowhere more profoundly than in that which included the Philippines". (5)

In President McKinley's early pronouncements on the Philippines we hear the uninhibited voice of expansionism, intermingled with perorations on the nobility of America's mission in the Islands. The President's statement of December 21, 1898, frequently alluded to as the "Benevolent Assimilation" proclamation, is a classic expression of this strange mixture. On the one hand the Filipinos were told: "In the fulfilment of the rights of sovereignty thus acquired and the responsible obligation of government thus assumed, the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible dispatch to the whole of the ceded territory.... Within the absolute domain of military authority, which necessarily is and must remain supreme in the ceded territory .. the operations of civil and

(5) The Far Eastern Policy of the United States, by A. Whitney Griswold. Harcourt Brace and Co; New York, 1938, pp 3- 4

175 municipal government are to be performed by such officers as may accept the supremacy of the United States by taking the oath of allegiance....."

The proclamation went on to say: "Finally, it should be the earnest wish and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule." The very next sentence, however, was: "In the fulfilment of this high mission, supporting the temporate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority, to repress disturbances and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States."

To the Filipinos who had revolted against Spain, played an important role in her defeat, and proclaimed their own Republic with the expectation of American recognition, McKinley's proclamation was tantamount to a declaration of war. In the opinion of some contemporary observers it precipitated the Filipino - American war which lasted for three and a half years until American might subdued the resisting Filipinos and American sovereignty over the Islands was established.

175 642 647 The Filipino resistance and anti-expansionist criticism at home forced a modification of the policy embodied in the "Benevolent Assimilation" proclamation. After the occupation and pacification of the Islands, American civil government was inaugurated. President McKinley's instruction to the Second Philippine Commission, dated April 7, 1900, formulated what amounted to the basic principles of American administrative policy during the first period of American rule under Republican control (1899 - 1913). In essence, it established the pattern for the development of local self-government under American control; or Filipinization of the lowest levels of government administration, with the executive and the higher echelons of government vested in American hands. Both the executive and judicial power were vested in the Philippine Commission. At first this body was composed exclusively of Americans, but later a few Filipinos were added with limited legislative rights. In 1902 election of Filipino provincial and municipal officials commenced.

644 The first steps toward some democratization of the Insular Government were undertaken in 1907. The franchise was granted to approximately four per cent of the population of the Philippines. An elected legislative assembly was established, with a voice and some measure of control over domestic legislation and finances, but the executive remained entirely under American control. Throughout this period Filipino nationalism continued to grow, Filipino aspirations for independence intensified, and American avowals of the ultimate right of the Filipinos to self-government, after a period of preparation, began to make their appearance as the characteristic political framework in which American sovereignty was enforced. As far back as 1908 Secretary of War William Howard Taft (formerly Chief Executive of the Philippine Commission and the first American Civil Governor of the Islands) asserted in his report to President Theodore Roosevelt:

> "When the Filipino people as a whole show themselves reasonably fit to conduct a popular self-government, maintaining law and order and offering equal protection of the laws and civil rights to rich and poor, and desire complete independence of the United States, they shall be given it."

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The Democratic victory in the elections of 1912 and the assumption of office by President Wilson ushered in a new period of Filipinization which has been termed by Joseph Ralston Hayden the period of "the development of Philippine Autonomy (1913 - 1921)". In 1913 the key positions in the Philippine administration were held by Americans and Filipinos were confined to the subordinate and a few intermediary posts. Between 1913 and 1921, under Governor General Harrison's application of the Jones Act, the government services were Filipinized extensively and all but a small number of Americans had been replaced by Filipinos.

In 1916 the right of franchise was extended to all literate males who were over 21 years of age or who paid $15 annually in taxes. A bicameral legislature was created, with increased power over domestic legislation, taxation and expenditure, but American control was firmly retained in the form of the American Governor General's sweeping power of veto.

The significant fact that emerges is that Filipinization was not at all synonymous with the relaxation of American control. As a matter of fact Congress balanced every increase in local autonomy and Filipinization of the Philippine administration with more specific and rigid definitions of America's sovereign and controlling power. This was reflected most clearly in the Jones Act of 1916. The preamble to the Act committed America to the independence of the Philippines in the following much quoted words:

> "It is, as it always has been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein."

But as Hayden has so carefully noted:

> "In its preamble this law gave lip service to Democratic principles, but its body conformed with traditional Republical policy by providing for the Philippines a typically American system of government over which the United States retained final control. In effect, the Jones Act turned the Philippine Legislature almost completely over to the Filipinos, but greatly strengthened American control over the executive department and retained in American hands ultimate authority in certain vital subjects of legislation and over the government as a whole. Particularly, the Governor-General created by the Act was the typical head of the executive branch of the government under the theory of the separation of powers, together with additional prerogatives not enjoyed by any of his continental prototypes." (6)

Governor-General Harrison proceeded with rapid Filipinization and enabled the Philippine Legislature to assume a greater degree of authority than it had ever enjoyed previously. The Republican victory in the 1920 elections and President Harding's assumption of office brought about a reversal of the Philippine policy of the previous Democratic administration. President Harding sent a special mission to investigate the Philippines. Its report (Wood-Forbes Commission of Inquiry Report, 1921) condemned the Harrison policies and established the basis for limiting the authority that the

(6) The Philippine Policy of the United States, by Joseph Ralston Hayden. International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1939 (mimeographed) p. 10.

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Philippine Legislature had won in the Harrison regime. Wood was appointed Governor-General and with the full support of PresidentsHarding and Coolidge endeavored to limit Philippine autonomy. To cite Hayden once again:

> "He (Wood) refused to be bound by the doctrine that the Governor-General had no power or responsibility except in matters involving the continuation of American sovereignty or the international obligations of the United States. The Council of States was eliminated in August 1923, by the resignation of the legislative members as a part of the campaign of the Filipino political leaders against the Governor-General. The Board of Control was put out of existence in 1926 by an executive order of the Governor-General which was upheld by the Supreme Courts of the Philippine Islands and of the United States. By 1927 the syten of government which had been created by subordinating the body of the Jones Law to its preamble had been profoundly altered. It is of interest to note that this constitutional volte face was accomplished wholly by the executive (supported by the courts) and without any congressional action whatever." (7)

The ensuing years were marked by the further momentum of the Philippine independence movement in the Islands, and the growing conflict between the contending economic interest groups and the pressure for Philippine independence in the United States, that culminated in the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act.

The establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as the transitional government preparatory to independence, marked the complete Filipinization of the Philippine government. In setting a specific date for Philippine independence and providing for the establishment of the Commonwealth Government, manned and administered by Filipinos, was a great advance for Philippine autonomy and local self-government and constituted a unique development in colonial relations, but the sovereignty and authority of the United States was zealously guarded. Thus the President of the United States was vested with the authority "to suspend the taking effect of or the operation of any law, contract, or executive order of the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands" on virtually unlimited grounds. (Tydings-McDuffie Act, (Sec 7 (2)). Further the Act accorded the United States "the right to intervene" for the purpose of preserving governmental stability in general, order, and property. In addition the Act made mandatory the inclusion in the Philippine Constitution of a series of provisions asserting the sovereignty and supreme authority of the United States and assuring equal civil rights to its citizens, and reserving to the U.S. Government final control over the public debt, currency, trade relations, immigration, foreign affairs, the armed forces of the Commonwealth, review of court decisions, the rights to expropriate property for Federal Government use, and to maintain military and other reservations, as well as provisions binding the future independent government to adjust and respect American property rights.

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The pressure of the economic interests fearing the competition of Philippine products was instrumental in the adoption of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, but American investments in the Islands were carefully safeguarded, not only for the interim Commonwealth period but for the indefinite future. A special Constitutional provision (Article XVII, Sec. 1) provided that upon

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(7) Ibid, p. 17.

175 642 421 the proclamation of the independence of the Philippines:

> "The property rights of the United States and the Philippines shall be promptly adjusted and settled, and all existing property rights of citizens or corporations of the United States shall be acknowledged, respected and safeguarded to the same extent as property rights of citizens of the Philippines."

175 642 647 That the Commonwealth period was one of comparatively little friction, and that the supreme authority of the United States was seldom invoked, and then in minor matters, bespeak the political maturity of the Filipino leaders and America's interpretation of her role during that time as providing safeguards rather than brakes to the full development of the Philippine government. Imperfect as American rule doubtless was in many respects, and unattractive as may have been some of the provisions accompanying the promise of independence, the Filipinos on their part realized that this was an entirely new development in relations between two countries and accepted the pattern, frankly hoping that some of the provisions for future adjustments would redound to their benefit.

175 669 Their faith in that concept was amply demonstrated during the years of war and enemy occupation. The largest and most effective anti-Japanese resistance movement arose throughout the archipelago — truly a people's army. The Filipinos offered the resistance of a nation standing on the threshold of independent national existence, cognisant that the Japanese invader represented the defeat or prolonged setback of the independence already promised for July 4, 1946. The fact that Filipino aspiration for independence had already been acknowledged by the United States laid the basis for the depth and completeness of the alliance between the Filipino people and the United States during the war.

175 642 Moreover, there was sufficient knowledge among the Filipinos of Japan's own governmental structure and colonial administration for them to realize that Japan had nothing to offer them comparable to what the United States had promised. Not to be outdone by the United States, however, Japan went through the motions of granting "independence" to the Philippines and set up a puppet Republic on October 14, 1943, under the presidency of Jose P. Laurel. This followed an initial period during which the Japanese had administered the country through a Philippine Executive Commission. A large part of the prewar Nacionalista Party served in both the Executive Commission and the puppet Republic.

The attitude of the United States towards the puppet Republic and collaborators was defined unmistakably by President Roosevelt in a statement released to the press by the White House on October 22, 1943. The statement said in part:

> "I wish to make it clear that neither the former collaborationist 'Philippine Executive Commission' nor the present 'Philippine Republic' has the recognition or sympathy of the Government of the United States. No act of either body is now or ever will be considered lawful or binding by this government. The only Philippine government is that established by the people of the Philippines under the authorization of the Congress of the United States— the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands. At my request the principal executive officers of the Commonwealth were transferred in

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1942 from Corregidor to Washington.....Our sympathy goes out to those who remain loyal to the United States and the Commonwealth—to that great majority of the Filipino people who have not been deceived by the promises of the enemy and who look forward to the day when the scheming, perfidious Japanese shall have been driven from the Philippines. That day will come."

Indeed the Philippines was accorded legal international recognition during the war. A Philippine government-in-exile was established in Washington and was officially recognized as representing an allied nation. Upon the initiative of President Roosevelt, the Philippines was included as a member of the United Nations, President Quezon signing the United Nations agreement. Also, it was officially represented in the Pacific War Council, which embraced the United States, Great Britain, China, the Netherlands, and the Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

When President Quezon died, at Saranac Lake on August 1, 1944, he was accorded in death the full honors of the head of a sovereign state, with interment at Arlington Cemetery until July 1946, when a U.S. carrier with escort bore the body of the first President of the Commonwealth back to Manila for a state funeral and burial in his native land. At a simple ceremony in Washington, Vice President Sergio Osmeña was sworn in as President of the Philippine Commonwealth a few hours after word was received of the death of Quezon.

III. POST-LIBERATION PERIOD

It was of some significance that one of General MacArthur's first announcements after he landed at Leyte in October 1944, was that the United States would not establish military government in the Philippines. The General was accompanied on his return to the Philippines by Sergio Osmeña. Civil government was carried on by Osmeña and other Commonwealth officials from October 23, 1944, and full civil authority over the entire country was turned over to the President in Manila in February 1945.

Frequently, however, the line of demarcation between the Commonwealth's authority and that of the United States Army was vague or indistinguishable. In many respects the authority of the United States Army was the dominant factor in the initial post-war period. Much of his people's dissatisfaction with President Osmeña's performance during this trying period may well be traced to this confusing situation, unavoidable as it may have been.

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The United States Congress in December 1945, and the Philippine Congress in January 1946, made provisions for the holding of the first general elections in the Philippines since November 1941. The elections engendered widespread controversy throughout the entire closing period of the Commonwealth. President Osmeña was a candidate, though by no means an active one. His war record was clear, since he had been brought to the United States along with President Quezon and members of the Cabinet. His administration in the pre-election period was undistinguished, though many of his supporters recognized the difficulties of the situation which he inherited.

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The other candidate, Manuel Acuña Roxas, had been identified with the puppet Republic during its later period. He had been a member of the

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Preparatory Committee on Philippine Independence created by the Japanese, had helped draft the constitution for the puppet Republic, and had been Chairman of the Economic Planning Board with the rank of Minister without Portfolio. There were persons in both the Philippines and the United States who felt that such activities during the puppet regime should have made Roxas ineligible for office in either the Commonwealth or the emerging Republic. President Roosevelt, in signing two resolutions dealing with Philippine matters, on June 29, 1944, had specifically outlined the most important tasks of preparing the Commonwealth for independence, once civil government had been restored. One of these was: "Those who have collaborated with the enemy must be removed from authority and influence over the political and economic life of the country."

General MacArthur, however, had set Roxas free shortly upon the return of the liberating forces to Luzon, while Roxas's colleagues in the highest echelon of the puppet government were placed in confinement for the duration of the war, "as a matter of military security" according to General MacArthur, and were then to be turned over for trial to the Philippine Government. Before the elections, therefore, Roxas was at complete liberty to assume the presidency of the Senate, a post to which he had been elected before the war, and to return to a commanding position in the Commonwealth Government and Philippine politics.

The controversy about Roxas has by no means entirely abated. The charge has been made that vital evidence pertaining to his wartime role has not been made public. Following a directive of President Truman of late 1945, the Attorney General of the United States sent Walter Hutchinson to investigate the entire collaborationist question in the Philippines. Upon his return, Hutchinson filed a detailed report with the Department of Justice, but the report has never been made public.

General MacArthur publicly absolved Manuel Roxas of the collaborationist stigma some two weeks after the Philippine elections, in which Roxas was victorious. The General stated that Roxas had acted as his contact man in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation. He further stated: "Not only was (Roxas) instrumental in providing me with vital intelligence of the enemy. He was one of the prime factors in the guerrilla movement." However, there are some guerrillas who sharply disagree with this.

The part played by the United States and its officials and representatives during this period is not, and may never become, entirely clear. (It is important to note that press censorship was not lifted until September 1945). A whole year elapsed between the liberation of the Philippines and the inauguration of the Republic. The United States then had full authority and ample opportunity to take appropriate action against the key war criminals and collaborators. Not only did it fail to act, but its attitude may have influenced the tide of events since then. Few prominent collaborators have been tried. As 1947 wore on, the People's Court trying the cases was finding it more and more difficult to secure the necessary witnesses, and many of those appearing seemed no longer anxious to testify. Laurel and his puppet associates were still at liberty, appearing at public functions, making addresses, and enjoying a surprising amount of public support. Their trials have been repeatedly postponed, and they appear confident of their eventual acquittal. Laurel was being mentioned as a possible senatorial candidate, in the November 1947 elections, and although he finally refused to allow the minority party — the party which in the 1946 election was bitterly anti-Roxas and anti-collaborationist — to propose him as a candidate, it was still

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662 believed that he might be free to and willing to consider a higher office at a later date.

IV. NEW COMPLICATIONS IN THE POLITICAL PICTURE.

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669 At this point, a new factor in the situation must be measured, for it may help to explain the failure of the United States to follow President Roosevelt's mandate with regard to collaborationists.

427 During the war, a new militant popular movement had emerged in the Philippines, the core of which was the Hukbalahap (People's Army against the Japanese). The basis of this movement, which was strongest in central Luzon, was complete resistance to the Japanese— and the puppets — accompanied by an effort to improve the agrarian situation. Among its leaders were such well-known persons as Pedro Abad Santos, leader of the pre-war Socialist Party who had devoted his life to the improvement of the situation of the tenants and laborers of central Luzon; Dr. Vicente Lava, scientist, who with his brothers had been part of the nucleus of intellectuals interested in social reform; and labor leaders of both industrial and peasant groups, among the latter being Luis Taruc.

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427 The problems which this group faced during the war were not new, except for the presence of the Japanese in their land. All during Spanish days and during the years of American rule, semi-feudal conditions of land tenure and agricultural production persisted, especially in the great rice region of central Luzon, where tenant farming was the predominant form of rice culture. The lot of those kasamas or tenant farmers is little removed from
566 serfdom. It is briefly described in a study of Agricultural Geography in the Philippines, by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, published in December 1945:

> "Kasamas usually have to borrow money to live on and are in debt continually, often with little knowledge of their indebtedness. Being under heavy obligation to the landowner, they are worked to extremes, frequently with little hope of getting out of debt during their lifetime. In 1933 the Rice Share Tenancy Act was passed in order to promote the well-being of tenants (kasamas) on agricultural lands devoted to the production of rice and to regulate the relations between them and the landlords. Much of the benefit of this law was lost through amendments which the landlords were able to have passed, and which greatly limited the power of the original law."

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668 Before the war, the United Front of Socialists and Communists, labor unions, the Civil Liberties Union, the Young Philippines and similar bodies, had endeavored to find a political foothold in order to introduce economic reforms in their country. A few gains had been made in the 1940 elections, when Socialist mayors and councils were victorious in eight of the largest towns in Pampanga. In 1941, three opposition candidates won seats in the lower house. These gains constituted but little threat to the powerful Nacionalista Party, supported by the landed interests, the wealthy industrialists and businessmen, and the most experienced politicos.

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669 Those opposition groups seized the opportunity, after the Japanese

175 occupation, to combine resistance to the enemy with actual reforms in their
669 territory. The Hukbalahap was organized in March 1942 and attracted wide support throughout the five central Luzon provinces where agrarian unrest was most severe - support from the tenants and laborers, and from an occasional enlightened landlord. Many of the landlords, however, fled to Manila and many of them collaborated with the Japanese. The Huks, arming themselves with weapons left behind or discarded by both Americans and Japanese, carried on constant guerrilla warfare against the enemy. They were commended by American officers who knew at first hand of their successful campaign against the Japanese.

175 Within the area of their control, the Huks instituted reforms, dividing
[666] the land among the tenants, or insisting upon a more equable division of the crop than the former 50-50 division which had kept the tenants penniless, landless and hopeless. They conducted elections, so that for the first time this section of the electorate began to taste real self-government. Schools were kept open, and the health of the communities was safeguarded.

669 With the end of the war, the peasants had therefore developed a new
427 consciousness, organization and strength. They demanded agrarian reforms amounting to a democratization and modernization of agriculture and a greater reward for their labor demands that had been repeatedly ignored or defeated by the landlords in pre-war days. They also urged that collaborationists not be allowed to occupy positions of leadership.

President Osmena met their demands in part by liberalizing the division of crops, 60 to 40, in the tenants' favor. He was not so successful, however, in keeping collaborationists from positions of influence — the legislature elected in late 1941 and convened again by President Osmena after the return of civil administration, was made up in large part of persons who had served in one capacity or another under the Japanese. Osmena's attempts to place well-known resistance leaders in his cabinet were thwarted by the Commission on Appointments, now under the chairmanship of Senate President Roxas.

175 The Roxas supporters likewise turned their attention to the Huks.
669 They were branded as Communists, bandits, outlaws. American military authorities in many instances supported the claims of the landlords and thus weakened the Hukbalahap. Two of the most prominent Huk leaders, Taruc
667 and Alejandrino, were held by the United States Army as "security risks" for seven months. Because of the personalities of some of the Americans involved, and because of the pre-war interests they were known to represent, there is reason to suspect that the Hukbalahap represented an unwelcome challenge not only to the old ruling party in the Philippines but also to American interests that had flourished in the old days. There were many evidences that American post-war policy was directed towards the restoration of the pre-war status quo and continued reliance on the landlords and the upper layer of Philippine society.

175 For the first elections, therefore, the cards were already stacked
666 against the opposition. The Huks, together with several liberal groups forming the new Democratic Alliance, somewhat reluctantly supported that part of the old Nacionalista party headed by Osmena and including several persons prominent in the resistance movement. As noted above, however, the
667 Osmena administration had been able to accomplish little in the confused period following upon the end of the fighting. The Roxas wing of the party, backed by the wealthier elements of the population and with American support

175 only thinly disguised, campaigned on the failures of the Osmena administration
666 and its own promises of improvement of the situation. Roxas was elected President with 54% of the total popular vote. His running mate, Elpidio Quirino, was elected Vice President.

667 The Roxas party, now calling itself the Liberal Party, as a result of the elections held 13 seats in the Senate to the opposition's 11. In the House, the Liberal Party had 58 seats to the opposition's 40. Thus the Roxas party won the majority of both the Senate and the House, but lacked the three-fourths majority in each body necessary for undisputed control.

V. THE REPUBLIC'S FIRST ADMINISTRATION

175 One of the first blots upon the new administration's record was its
646 challenge to several of the successful opposition candidates. Basing their case on allegations of terrorism and falsification at the polls, the Senate and the House respectively prevented three minority members of the Senate
642 and eight Congressmen, elected from provinces in Central Luzon and certified by a majority of the Electoral Commission, from taking their seats. Exclusive power on matters of elections, returns and qualifications of the members of each House, is vested in the Electoral Tribunal, according to the Philippine Constitution (Article VII, Section 11). Those men representing the opposition were barred from their seats in spite of this constitutional procedure. Not until May 1947 were the three Senators and four of the eight Congressmen finally seated. It should be noted, also, that although the Philippine Constitution explicitly provides that "no person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines" (Article VI, Section 7), Spanish-born Congressman Tomas B. Morato of the Liberal Party was sworn in.

175 There are other danger signals on the precarious path of constitutional
642 democracy in the Philippines today, many evidences that provisions in the Constitution are not being strictly adhered to. The Constitution provides for a Supreme Court of eleven members (Article VIII, Section 4), but President Roxas has reduced it to seven members under authorization to reorganize and revamp its membership. A Reorganization Act has vested unlimited powers in the hands of the President. Some conservative Manila newspapers have described this unprecedented delegation of power to the president as a virtual abdication on the part of Congress. The separation of powers on which the Philippine Constitution is based is giving way to a vast centralization of authority in the executive.

175 A grave deviation from the Constitution was expressed in the
642 administration's approval of an amendment to the Philippine Constitution to grant American capital equal rights with Filipino capital in the exploitation of the Islands' natural resources, as required by the U.S. Congress in the Philippine Trade Act of 1946, which is discussed at some length in the following section. The Philippine Congress voted to approve this Constitutional
667 amendment, popularly known in the Philippines as the "parity" amendment, by a vote of 68 to 18 in the House and 16 to 5 in the Senate. (8) The Constitution, however, explicitly provides that constitutional amendments shall first be approved "by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the

(8) New York Times, Sept. 19, 1946.

175 Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately." (Article
642 IV, Section 1). Three-fourths of elected members (including those not
667 seated) of the Senate is 18, three-fourths of the House is 73. The amendment did not have the support of this number of members in the respective bodies, and the minority in the Philippines thus challenges the constitutionality of the plebiscite to ratify this amendment.

175 The parity amendment was ratified in a popular plebiscite held on
667 March 11, 1947, by an overwhelming majority of the voters -nearly eight
666 to one in favor of the amendment. The presentation of the issue had much to do with the result. The Government leaders conducted a barnstorming campaign all over the islands, while the opposition, anti-parity speakers faced many difficulties in presenting their position. In the pleas for a favorable vote, it was commonly implied that failure to ratify the amendment meant the loss of the benefits of preferential trade, of war damage settlements, of all manner of American aid. The point was also made over and over that a vote for the amendment was a vote of confidence in America. As the President of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce stated, parity was supported on the grounds of "economic expediency", and hope was expressed for later adjustments. (9)

In view of the importance of the issue, the total vote - 1,920,000 out of a potential vote of well over 3,000,000 - was considered very light. It is common knowledge in the Philippines that there was an uncommon amount of intimidation, irregular voting and outright fraud. And within the time since ratification, lack of evidence of a great influx of private American capital in the new republic has led to some misgivings among the people. It is already reported that a "small but influential" group of Manila businessmen are seeking to set aside some of the restrictive provisions, and that the Board of Directors of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce is sponsoring an amendment of the Bell Act providing for limited free trade. (10)

175 In its handling of the Huk problem, the administration has laid itself
669 upon to serious question. The peasant guerrillas retained the arms which
427 they had captured during the war, claiming the necessity of self-protection as it became evident that they were being not only discredited but hunted
185 down. The landlords had organized private armies of their own, known as Civilian Guards; and the military police, made up of many former collaborators, engaged in a small-scale campaign against the armed peasants as "Communists" and outlaws who were seeking the overthrow of the government. Strife increased with Roxas's assumption of the presidency.

Shortly after being sworn into office, on July 28, 1946, President Roxas met with peasant leaders from Central Luzon, to map out a solution of agrarian problems and restore peace in that part of the country. He agreed to check Military Police atrocities, and to sign a new crop sharing agreement on a 70-30 basis - a measure which was later passed but which has not been complied with in many instances. However, M.P. raids continued, and the first year of the Roxas administration was marked by constant fighting and by much more bloodshed than is generally realized, even within the Philippines.

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(9) American Chamber of Commerce Journal, July 1946, "A Filipino Looks at the Rehabilitation and Trade Acts", by J. Puyat.
(10) Christian Science Monitor, August 11, 1947.

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Certainly the Huks have not been blameless, and there is reason to believe that their morale has deteriorated seriously. There has not been, however, sufficient recognition of the basic causes for the origin of the movement, nor has there been much hard evidence that the administration is endeavoring to institute any thorough-going social reform. The current Communist scare in many parts of the world has strengthened the hand of the administration against the so-called "Communists" of Luzon. A recent official survey of the situation purports to have found much Soviet and Communist literature in the area. On the other hand, the Huks declare that "the military police, the Civilian Guards and some...provincial and municipal officials have trampled to the dust our constitution and suppressed every democratic right of the peasants — to crush, not lawlessness and banditry, but the vanguard of the Nation's peasant movement, the Hukbalahap Veterans and the National Peasants Union." (11)

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The suppression of the Huks appears to be related to the collaboration issue. As a group whose resistance to the Japanese has not been questioned, the Huks were the most dangerous witnesses to the collaborationist activities of the old party leaders. While the trials of the most prominent puppet figures were under way, the most valuable witnesses of the prosecution were unable to testify, not daring to come out of hiding and run the gauntlet of the M.P.'s and the civilian guards, many of whom were themselves among those who aided the enemy.

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The Philippine Civil Liberties Union and the Philippine Lawyers Guild have protested against large-scale arrests of persons and searches of homes without warrants or charges, and mass arrests of members or suspected members of organizations such as the Peasants Union, the Huks, the Democratic Alliance and the Congress of Labor Organizations. The legality of these acts has never been placed before the bodies with the constituted authority to rule on the question. Thus under the present administration the rights of the minority party have been infringed, civil liberties have been suspended on numerous occasions, and the government has resorted to force as its immediate solution for the agrarian problem.

One of the most surprising and contradictory factors in the current Philippine scene is the fact that freedom of speech and of the press have not yet been greatly jeopardized. There have, however, been attempts of the administration to woo Manila's popular "Town Hall" to the adoption of non-controversial subjects for its popular discussions, and to restrain some of the most vocal oppositionist newsmen by offering them government posts. Traditional liberty of the press has thus far, however, been zealously guarded by the members of the fifth estate, and Philippine delegates to the United Nations have been most ardent advocates of measures to ensure freedom of the press to all the world.

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A recital of the positive accomplishments of the Roxas administration is largely one of agreements with the United States, interpreted by most Americans as a testimonial to our good faith in assisting the Philippines to attain and maintain its independence; by some Filipinos, and by many other countries, as a measure of the extent to which the Philippines has failed to attain complete freedom. That the United States was under a serious obligation to help the islands recover from the mortal blows of the war, one can hardly question. The question is the extent to which the present program will aid not only reconstruction but long-range economic development.

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(11) Far Eastern Survey, Oct. 9, 1946.

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By the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946, the United States provided for the establishment of a War Damage Commission, with two Americans and one Filipino member, empowered to pay $400 million in war-damage claims; stipulated the granting to the Philippine Government surplus property to the value of $100 million; and authorized various United States agencies to spend over $120 million in actual rehabilitation and in a five-year program of training Filipinos. Substantial progress may be reported in these activities, but the handling of surplus property has created one of the most unpleasant scandals in the Philippines. According to one newspaper report, the Philippine Surplus Property Commission has estimated that losses from looting and pilfering might run as high as 70 per cent of money values of goods it had expected to sell.(12) Goaded by congressional disclosures and press criticism, President Roxas has ordered an investigation of the entire matter.

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Facing immediate financial difficulties the Philippine Government appealed to the United States and was able to secure, through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a loan of $70 million of an authorized total of $75 million. A Joint Philippine-American Financial Commission studied the financial situation of the new Republic in the early months of 1947, with particular attention to President Roxas's request for a loan of $400 million from the United States to meet budgetary needs over the next five years. The Commission after a thorough study, found that the Philippines had sufficient financial reserves and foreign exchange to meet its own fiscal problems. It recommended a tightening of tax administration, increases in tax rates, a program of domestic borrowing, the establishment of a central bank and managed currency, and concluded that the Philippines could finance itself by 1948 without additional loans from the United States. President Roxas has already announced that improvements in domestic and foreign trade and in tax collections will enable him to balance the budget of some $150 millions in 1948.

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The matter of security has caused much controversy since the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill was first drafted. Public Law 380 authorized the President of the United States to make such arrangements for bases in the Philippines "as he may deem necessary for the mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and of the United States." When the President signed this Law on June 29, 1944, he said:

> ".....the present organic act (Tydings-McDuffie Act) permitted acquisition only of naval bases and fueling stations, a situation wholly inadequate to meet the conditions of modern warfare. The measure approved today will permit the acquisition of air and land bases in addition to naval bases and fueling stations. I have been informed that this action is most welcome to Commonwealth authorities and that they will gladly cooperate in the establishment and maintenance of bases both as a restored Commonwealth and as an independent nation. By this we shall have an outstanding example of cooperation designed to prevent a recurrence of armed aggression and to assure the peaceful use of a great ocean by those in pursuit of peaceful ends." (13)

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(12) New York Times, August 6, 1947.
(13) New York Times, June 30, 1944: Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. XI, July 2, 1944.

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President Quezon, who was still alive at that time, his successor, President Osmena, and later President Roxas, all officially welcomed the proposal for military bases in their country to assure mutual protection to the United States and to the Philippines. The Commonwealth Congress, on June 22, 1945, authorized the Philippine President to conduct negotiations with regard to such bases. The long drawn-out negotiations, carried on in the greatest secrecy, resulted in frank and often unfavorable comment in the Philippine press. There was much public criticism of the large number of American bases reportedly being requested — over seventy, according to many press stories.

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In his defense of the arrangement, President Roxas declared that if the Philippines withdrew from such an agreement, it would be sacrificing its "national security on the altar of a mistaken sense of dignity. We would then be faced by the problem of assuming alone our national security." Pointing out that the Philippine Republic was training an army of only 12,000 men, he expressed thankfulness that the young country was not called upon to maintain a large and costly defense force." (14)

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Although the majority of Filipinos, official and private, raised little objection to the principle of the base agreement, there was much vocal and printed criticism of the magnitude of United States' demands, and of the location of some of the suggested sites, principally in the Manila area. A few more thoughtful commentators raised the question of the relation of such bilateral arrangements to the system of security envisaged under the United Nations; and there was an occasional voice that raised the possibility that such bases in the Philippines might eventually prove to be an invitation to attack rather than security against aggression. However, one offer on the part of the United States to withdraw altogether met with such instant disfavor on the part of officials and citizens alike that it was apparent some mutually satisfactory arrangement was desired by the Philippines no less than by the United States. The base agreement was approved by a vote of 18 to none by the Philippine Congress on March 26, 1947, three senators abstaining from voting.

The one provision in the agreement which may cause future complications, and which has already produced the cry of "extraterritorial rights" in the Philippines, is the one which grants United States authorities jurisdiction over offenses committed within the bases, and Philippine authorities jurisdiction over those committed outside, with certain exceptions.

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Authorization was also given by the United States Congress (Public Law 454, June 26, 1946) to the President of the United States to provide military assistance to the Philippine Republic "in establishing and maintaining national security, and to form a basis for participation by that government in such defensive military operations as the future may require." The consequent military assistance agreement was signed on March 21, 1947, by the United States Ambassador and President Roxas. For the Philippine Army, over $38 millions has been set aside for 1948, well over half of this sum to be spent on the Military Police.

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(14) Address to University of Philippines Alumni Association, Sept. 28, 1946, and address before Philippine Bar Association, October 12, 1946.

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VI. UNITED STATES ECONOMIC POLICY.

In no other field has there been so much controversy about United States-Philippine relations as in the field of economic relations. The history of that relationship, and its current evolution, are of vital importance in any consideration of the development of the new Republic.

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America's economic relations with the Phillipines have gone through many stages of development and have been governed, successively, by numerous tariff bills and acts of Congress. Notwithstanding the complexity and variety of legislative expressions, the economic relationship that has emerged is a relatively simple one. After the acquisition of the Philippines, American capital went to the Islands and played a large part in the exploitation of the rich hemp, sugar, coconut, tobacco and mineral resources of the archipelago, as well as in its trade and commerce. Pre-war American investments in the Philippines were estimated at $258,564,000.

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Light on the overall United States economic policy in the Philippines was shed by a memorandum to the House Ways and Means Committee on the Philippine Trade Act of 1946 by Congressman C. Jasper Bell, chairman of the Insular Affairs Committee of the House:

> "Since 1909, the economy of the Philippine Islands has been effectively tied to that of the United States. This was accomplished by the establishment of free trade between the two countries. This was done over the protest of the Filipino people through their representatives in the Philippine Assembly which, on March 27, 1909, adopted a joint resolution petitioning Congress not to establish free trade on the ground that: 'Free trade between the United States and the Islands would in the future become highly prejudicial to the economic interests of the Philippine people and would bring about a situation which might hinder the attainment of the independence of the said people.'
> "The fears expressed in that resolution have been justified, because as a result of the establishment of free trade between the two countries the Philippines became almost entirely dependent upon United States markets for the disposition of their products. This made more difficult the assumption of an independent status by the Philippines."

Paul V. McNutt, then High Commissioner and later the first United States Ambassador to the Philippine Republic, was remarkably frank in explaining the essence of American economic policy in the Philippines in a statement he made at the hearings of the House Ways and Means Committee. He declared in his testimony on February 15, 1946:

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> "In the Philippines the national economy was geared before the war entirely and completely to export trade. And 95 per cent of that export trade was with the United States. Except for rice and fish, which are locally consumed, 98 per cent of all other production in the Philippines, amounting to $266,000,000 in 1941, is produced for export.....and I might and should say here and now that we, the United States, managed it that way. We are responsible for the sole dependency

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of the Philippines on the American market. Our businessmen and our statesmen in past years allowed the Philippines to become a complete economic dependency of the United States to a greater degree than any single State of the Union is economically dependent on the rest of the United States."

Perpetuation of the so-called Free Trade system that had transformed the Philippines into an economic as well as a political dependency of the United States in the past, would be inconsistent with the realization of the full and true independence of the Philippines. This central point had been stressed by a spokesman of the Filipino independence movement and by American authorities. Francis B. Sayre, for six years Assistant Secretary of State charged with the negotiation of American trade agreements and American High Commissioner to the Philippines from 1939 until the Japanese occupation of the country, raised this question sharply in an article in The Atlantic Monthly of March 1945.

"If the Filipino people are ever to have the independence which they crave, clearly their fundamental economy and means of livelihood must be free from dependence upon changeable legislative majorities in the United States Congress. Political independence without economic independence would be a mockery. Furthermore, if stable foundations are to be built for a lasting world peace, the post-war trade arrangements must be built upon the equality of commercial treatment to all and not upon special trade preferences and discriminations. If the United States grants and receives exclusive preferential treatment in areas with which it has close political ties, it would be difficult for us successfully to oppose Imperial and Dominion preferences in the British Empire and elsewhere .....
"Because the present economic dependence of the Filipinos upon the United States is largely of our own making and because it is to our own interest to build for future stability in the Pacific, the Filipino people must be given their independence under such conditions as will assure them sound economic foundations for their future."

In spite of this recognition of the shortsightedness of past economic policy, the legislation adopted by the United States Congress in 1946 to regulate trade with the Philippine Republic simply sought to perpetuate the previous relationship. This represented a real victory for the economic interests with holdings in the Philippines — a reversal of the situation at the time of the passage of the Independence Act, when those American groups fearing competition from Philippine products were wielding more influence.

The Philippine Trade Act of 1946 is based on the principle of a prolonged period of free and preferential trade, and perpetuates the economic dependence of the Philippine Republic on the United States. The Act established exclusive preferential treatment for the United States in such extreme terms that the amendment of the Constitution of the Philippines was required, despite the protection of American property rights afforded by the Constitution. Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution provided:

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"All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this constitution."

Article XIV, Section 8, further provided that:

"No franchise, certification or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines..."

Section 341 of the Philippine Trade Act of 1946, however, provides:

"The disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly by United States citizens."

The Act establishes gradually declining Free Trade relations until July 3, 1974. During this period absolute quotas are imposed on Philippine sugar, cordage, rice, cigars, tobacco, coconut oil and buttons. These quotas are to be allocated annually to the manufacturers in the Philippines in the calendar year 1940 or their successors in interest. This provides a protected position to the American interests already established as of this date, and penalizes newcomers, American as well as Filipinos. Furthermore it is provided (Sect. 504, Title V) that additional quotas may be imposed on any article "coming or likely to come" into substantial competition with a United States product, an implied threat to industrialization for export. The Act (Sec. 342) ties Philippine currency to the U.S. dollar as a further preferential American condition.

The insistence upon adoption of the Trade Act by the Philippine government is quite harshly reflected in the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946 (Title VI, Sec. 601) which provides that no payments in excess of $500 shall be made until an executive agreement, in accordance with the terms of the Trade Act, shall have been entered into between the President of the United States and the President of the Philippines. Thus the Philippine Trade Act of 1946 tends not only to perpetuate the pre-war agricultural economy, it ties Philippine political sovereignty with economic strings.

President Roosevelt, before he died, had given his approval to a policy that envisaged a break away from prolonged free trade, as outlined in a report prepared by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, and as reported to the House Ways and Means Committee by the Deputy Director of the Office of

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International Trade Policy. The Act approved by Congress and signed by President Truman on April 30, 1946, was a compromise between the position adopted by President Roosevelt and the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, and the original Bell Bill, later adjusted, which had provided for 20 years of duty-free trade.

The exclusive preferential privileges for the United States incorporated in the Act have proved embarrassing to the State Department. Assistant Secretary of State Clayton called the attention of the Congressional Committee to the fact that the Act would force the Filipinos "to give American citizens special rights which we cannot give to Philippine citizens. Moreover, the bill ties the hands of the Philippine Government in allocating quotas for certain products .....Not only does this deprive the Philippine Government of a sovereign prerogative, but it has the effect of giving pre-war producers a virtual monopoly for 28 years of most important Philippine exports. It would enable them to prevent the investment of capital by new American enterprises in these important export industries, and new Philippine producers would not be able to compete freely in their own country. These provisions should be eliminated."

Secretary of State Byrnes and Secretary of Commerce Wallace at the time likewise expressed opposition to these provisions, which were nevertheless embodied in the final Act.

The Commonwealth Government of the Philippines, whose Resident Commissioner, Carlos P. Romulo, was present at the U.S. Congressional hearings on the bill in its various forms, approved it and urged its passage. But there were some aspiring Filipino industrialists, important sections of the middle class, and the organized peasant and labor movements in the Philippines that opposed the Act strenuously.

When Roxas, newly elected President, reported on the Act to the Philippine Congress on June 21, 1946, and proposed its approval of the Executive Agreement required by the Trade Act, he said in part:

> "The Trade Act and some of its provisions have been under violent attack in some parts of the press and in some public circles during the past two months.....There are perhaps some plausible arguments against some portions of the Philippine Trade Act. If I had been permitted to promulgate it by personal edict, it would have been different in many respects from the Act we are considering today....."

Referring to Section 341, the so-called "parity" provision, he further stated:

> "Had I been in Washington at the time, I would have vigorously protested against its unilateral quality and, had it been insisted upon, I would have suggested other means of accomplishing the same objective.....Today we are faced by the fact that section 341 is a part of the Trade Act. If I could, I would remove it, not because of the alleged dangers it holds for us.....I believe these to be non-existent....

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but rather because of the manner and form in which it is included.....I have no fear whatsoever that the granting to American citizens of rights equal to those of Filipinos in the development of our natural resources will bring about an imperialistic exploitation of our country. This was not the intention of Congress. I am certain it will not happen.

"It is perhaps too distant in the past for most of us to remember, but it is most interesting to note, that the provision in our Constitution protecting our natural resources from exploitation is not of Filipino but of American origin. The prevention of this exploitation has been the constant concern of the American Government from the very beginning of the occupation in 1898.....

"The equal rights provision was not designed as a protection for American interests already here — it is intended to reassure potential investors that the Philippines is a safe area for enterprise, safe against discrimination for the next 28 years. Every responsible Filipino leader I know desires American capital enterprise, and know how, to participate actively in our reconstruction. Our rehabilitation would be impossible without such assistance.....

After a thorough description and defense of the Trade Act, the President concluded:

"I sincerely believe that we have only one choice, and that is to accept it. Let me point out to the Congress, that were we to be actuated by partisan considerations, the majority party might oppose this legislation. We are not responsible for it. We had nothing to do with its formulation or passage. But we do not intend to take a partisan attitude toward a question which involves our national existence....."

The Executive Agreement to carry out the terms of the Philippine Trade Act was subsequently signed in Manila on July 4, 1946, with the approval of the Philippine Congress, was proclaimed by President Truman on December 17, 1946, by President Roxas on January 1, 1947, and the trade agreement went into force on January 2, 1947. The acceptance of the parity provision has already been described.

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Having molded its program to fit American interests, the Roxas administration faces a dilemma; how to reconcile the demands of foreign capital with those of local business, how to keep the economy unfettered by economic controls and yet provide the stability required by prospective investors. As a result of the long-standing program of "Filipinization" and the steady steps towards political sovereignty, the transition from United States to Philippine administration was smooth. Less simple is the process of self-government in economic affairs. The legislation outlined provides limits to economic action, but within that framework nonetheless there lie several alternative paths.

The Philippines is today in a unique position in the world economy. A small, undeveloped agricultural country, it enjoys a most advantageous

433 financial position, as the result of large postwar American dollar expenditures
471 and commitments. It has been estimated by the Joint Philippine-American Finance Commission that these will exceed three billion pesos in the years from 1945 -50. They arise from two major sources. (1) compensation to
175 the Philippine Government and people for war services and war losses, in payment of obligations undertaken by the United States, and (2) American expenditures in fulfilment of her own current military objectives in the Pacific, including maintenance of bases and armed forces. As a result the Philippines, during the next few years, will have available to it sufficient foreign exchange to buy approximately double the amount of goods and services it could earn from exports alone. This opportunity challenges the Philippine Government to use the coming period to set its house in order and to lay the basis for industrialization and diversification, before the beginning of declining preferences in United States trade, scheduled for 1954, adversely affects her world position.

433 The report of the Finance Commission faces this question and makes
185 several recommendations. These include the need to channel a higher proportion of income into investment, rather than consumption, to avoid
175 inflated prices, to finance current budgetary expenditures from taxation and domestic borrowing, to conserve foreign exchange for economic development and limit luxury imports, and to institute a central bank which could issue a managed currency. While all of these recommendations are theoretically possible within the framework of existing legislation, they assume a political stability which does not in fact exist. Similarly in proposing a program of industrialization and agricultural development, the administration reflects conflicting motives. Emphasis on reconstructing the pre-war economy and uncertainty on the role of government in industry all inhibit action. And while there are many reasons for this indecision, including the aftermath of the wartime destruction and the undeveloped state of resources, it is due in large measure to attempts on the part of the Philippines to achieve the impossible end of having its foreign cake, and eating its domestic one as well.

666 The recent elections in the Philippines was a strenuous test for the democratic process in the Young Republic. The results of the voting have
667 less significance, perhaps, than the interest and concern including widespread protests at alleged fraud and corruption, which were aroused. The
175 ferment of political activity must reflect strong popular feeling, and is a hopeful sign for the eventual working out of democratic procedures.

The election, scheduled for November 11, 1947, was held for the purpose of selecting of a formidable number of officials, including 8 Senators, 50 Provincial Governors, 1,130 Mayors, 250 members of Provincial Boards, and 7,000 members of Municipal Councils. Press reports anticipated an easy 6-1 victory for the Liberal Party, of President Roxas, but nonetheless widespread violence was expected. By October 4, nine persons had been killed and one abducted in the course of local campaigning; on November 6 it was reported that one Congressman was ordered arrested for sedition, another shot, and a third sued for libel. On November 10, President Roxas put the entire province of Cavite under Army control after the mayor of one of the town was wounded by the chief of police. The toll of political shootings had accounted for 30 lives by that time, and the Interior Department had placed 23,000 national police in strategic locations.

But in spite of pressure and police vigilance, popular reactions were

175 vigorous and universal. Early returns gave a surprising and totally
666 unexpected lead to the opposition Nacionalista candidates, particularly
in the Manila area, but as returns from outlying provinces began to come in,
567 President Roxas' party gained strength. With about 60 per cent of the
votes counted, however, the Nacionalista Party led the Liberals by a
total of 1,103,296 to 1,059,393 and seemed to feel sure of victory.

Delays in releasing results were sharply criticized in Manila by
the Nacionalista Party President Eulogio Rodriguez, who told the
667 Manila Bulletin on November 14, "The tactics of withholding and delaying
release of the final returns, especially in the Liberal-controlled
175 provinces, until a close estimate of the Nacionalista votes can be made,
are highly suspicious." A Nacionalista congressman from Cebu stated
that the names of thousands of Nacionalista voters had been stricken from
the registration census, and replaced by names of dead Liberals, and
assemblyman Mindalano from the Lake Lano region charged that the Liberal
party inspectors there turned opposition voters away from the polls,
These were typical of numerous charges.

On November 15, indignation was again expressed by the refusal of
Manila's mayor, Valeriano Fugoso, to issue a police permit to Nacionalista
leaders for a mass protest meeting against alleged nation-wide frauds,
on the grounds that such a gathering might incite "violence and bloodshed".
On November 17 the opposition party conceded defeat, despite the fact that
one of their candidates, Camilo Osias, led the field in the Senatorial
race, that they had carried provincial and municipal leadership in many
regions and that the election count was still continuing. Two days later
President Roxas rejected the proposal of minority leaders to create a
body to investigate charges of fraud, on the grounds that this would be
a transgression of the authority of the election commission.

The opposition rally was finally held in Manila on November 22, and attended by 75,000
persons. The meeting, according to the New York Times press correspondent
in Manila, amounted to a "mass revolution" against graft, corruption,
and fraud. At the same time, military police were alerted in various
parts of the country.

In part this election protest and opposition vote may be characterized
as the usual blaming of the "ins" by the "outs", common to politics
everywhere. In actual fact, political issues were somewhat obscured by
the uneven character of the candidates, and the uneasy sort of coalition
that supported them. For example, the Osias leading Nacionalista in the
senatorial race, was a former collaborator and Minister of Education in the
puppet cabinet. The lack of clearly defined policy issues and the grab
for personal political power are evident, but the significance of the
elections should not be underestimated. The gathering together of 75,000
Filipinos in Manila in a mass indignation meeting surely reflects strong
dissatisfaction with the conduct of the present regime, and this uneasiness
is by no means confined to the cities. It is probable that unsettled
economic conditions and delays in reconstruction have contributed to unrest
in the Philippines. The Filipinos, in their evolution toward real
sovereignty, are confronted with the difficulties of mechanical applying
Western style voting procedures in a country with a large percentage
of illiteracy, a semi-feudal economy, and a strong internal army and
militia. On the other hand they are becoming increasingly aware of the
democratic forms of political protest as a means for effecting change.

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A balance sheet of America's record in the granting of independence to the Philippines is not easily arrived at and cannot hope to be definitive. On the positive side, it may be said that a form of independence has been granted on schedule, and that the United States is dispatching some of its obligations in assisting the new nation to recover from the effects of the war through the Rehabilitation Act and through special trade arrangements. It is carrying out President Roosevelt's promise of December 28, 1941, that the independence of the Philippines would be "protected", through the military base and military assistance agreements.

On the negative side, it is apparent in the terms of United States economic legislation that these aids are conditioned on provisions that infringe seriously upon the national sovereignty of the Philippines in the interest of a very limited group of American investors and businessmen. Whether or not the new Republic profits by these arrangements, a better informed generation in coming years is not likely to overlook the unilateral manner in which the United States imposed these benefits.

Today, at perhaps the very apex of its power, the United States may feel that it can afford to ignore the implications of the Philippine situation. In coming years, as the peoples of Asia move further along the path of freedom from the political and economic ties with the West, the American people may learn at what great price to themselves and the prestige of their country they allowed the Philippine pattern of freedom to be distorted.

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000 SOUTHEAST ASIA

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

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SECOND EDITION

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JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.,
NEW YORK

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PREFACE

121 THE aim of this book is to present a picture of environmental conditions and human adaptations in Southeast Asia which shall provide the student with a basic text and at the same time stimulate the sociologist, the administrator, the politician and the businessman to see the relation of their work to the general field. It is assumed that readers will already know modern writings on the physical, environmental and social aspects of geography, and the text dwells at length only on those circumstances peculiar to Southeast Asia and its people.

This book is not a dictionary, a gazetteer or an encyclopaedia. It is one of the first studies of locational perspectives in Southeast Asia, the critical importance of which became apparent during the last war when the scarcity of information demonstrated how little study had been given to the region as a whole.

128 The book is divided into three parts. The first pictures the natural setting, the second goes from this basis into the human details of each political unit, and the third ties together the social geography of Southeast Asia, to pose some of its present problems.

All money references have been converted into Straits dollars (2s. 4d. or U.S. 47 cents) partly because this currency had wide pre-war usage in the region, partly because it is the one with a simple and fixed relation between its post- and pre-war values. The object has been not to overload the text with statistics which are best obtained fresh from the latest year-books. At every stage in reading this book, reference should be made to the topographic maps of Southeast Asia, which now exist in fair quantity.

000 The author thanks Professor E. G. R. Taylor for her advice on this work and her encouragement at many stages of his career, and Professor L. D. Stamp for his kindness in reading and advising on the manuscript. Those pioneer scholars of the area, whose papers are listed in the bibliography, and upon whose work the author has of necessity drawn liberally for facts, are also thanked. In addition he is heavily indebted to his wife for her continued patience and co-operation at every stage in the production of this book.

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DDD

If the result of this work is to stimulate a flood of critical studies of Southeast Asia, however much later workers may question its statements, the author will be satisfied, especially if it encourages and helps students living in Southeast Asia to write about their own countries.

E. H. G. DOBBY

SINGAPORE, 1950

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PART I

THE NATURAL LANDSCAPE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

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Chapter One

THE NATURAL LANDSCAPE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

101 SOUTHEAST ASIA is a term which became popular during the Far
131 Eastern War 1941-45, to describe those territories of Eastern Asia
103 which lie south of the Tropic of Cancer (Burma, Siam, Indochina and Malaya) and the nearby islands spreading eastwards from the Asiatic continent towards New Guinea. The archipelago section merges eastwards into island groups of the West-Central Pacific, for which reason New Guinea itself may best be considered outside the definition "Southeast Asia," an exclusion justified (*a*) by its closer physical association with the Australian Continent, (*b*) by its sparse population of distinctive anthropological type now found principally in Australia, and (*c*) by the close affinities of its flora and fauna with those of Australia. The northern limit of Southeast Asia extends beyond the Tropic of Cancer to include Upper Burma on the western side, and withdraws south of the tropic to the political boundaries of Siam and Indochina farther east. By this definition, "Southeast Asia" and its off-lying islands sprawl asymmetrically across the Equator and cover a zone not far short of 1,500 miles in radius from a point off the mouth of the Mekong, an area comparable to all Europe and its seas north of the African coast. Thus isolation by great distances, as well as by physical obstructions, is a constant factor in the geographical relation between the various parts of Southeast Asia.

133 In Southeast Asia, that which forms its core and constitutes the geological link between its chief parts is the Sunda Platform, the southernmost continental block of Asia, whose integrity as a land mass has continued, with only minor tectonic disturbances on its fringes, through such long geological periods that it may be compared with those other "permanent" massifs, the Deccan, the Arabian Block and the Laurentian Shield. It is this physical feature which underlies Borneo, Eastern Sumatra, Northern Java and Malaya.

A somewhat similar platform is the common physiographic basis of Australia and New Guinea, forming what is known as the Sahul Shelf, to the east of the East Indian Archipelago.

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

FIG. 1.—Landforms of Southeast Asia

The three basic physical units (Fig. 1) of this region are, then:

1. The Sunda Platform
2. The Sahul Shelf
3. A "ground swell" of young mountain arcs fringing and lying between the two other units.

1. THE SUNDA PLATFORM

The line of the Himalayan mountain formations extends eastwards to the China Sea to appear in South China as the Nanling and as that line of W-E. mountains forming the watershed between the Red River of Tonkin and the Sikiang of Canton. This chain of fold mountains of Alpine type delimits Southeast Asia geologically from the rest of Asia and is accepted as evidence of mountain building processes related to forces operating from the north.

South of this marginal zone of latitudinal alignments, the structural trends, although varying from place to place, are mainly meridional and modulate the surface of the Sunda Platform itself

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on similar lines. These roughly N-S. ranges are described by Suess as the roots of ancient mountains. They are to be thought of as the denuded vestiges of mountain systems, the inner crystalline cores of which stand revealed by prolonged erosion of the sedimentaries within whose folds they were primarily intruded. These stumps of mountains are typically free from precipices and crags, have gentle slopes but are still fairly high because the parent mountains were huge, probably of Himalayan proportions. Today these "Altaid" relief features, apparent in that mountainous



FIG. 2.—A Section of the Kra Isthmus

country between Burma and Siam, in Indochina, in Malaya and in Borneo, by no means approximate to the towering heights of Himalayan and Alpine mountains, having been denuded to little higher than some 10,000 ft.

Towards the centre of the Platform, in Malaya and Borneo, the characteristically senile, denuded relief (Fig. 2) is most emphatic, extending into the islands of the Lingga and Rhio Archipelagoes, which may be considered as monadnocks. The Altaid trend lines, while mainly meridional, are least so in Borneo, where NE-SW. alignments are apparent. In Indochina, Siam and the Kra Isthmus, the N-S. line is well developed and very pronounced in that closely packed series of ranges among which the Irrawaddy, Salween, Menam, Mekong and Red Rivers have parallel courses. While the Sunda Platform has had a prolonged history of stability, at the present moment it is extensively inundated, so that only its higher parts stand above sea level. The advanced peneplainisation of the Platform as a whole is evidenced by the uniformity in depth of the shallow seas, the South China Sea, Malacca Strait and Java Sea, now spread across the continental shelf.

The Sunda Platform is characteristically free from volcanic

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133 phenomena of any except very remote geological periods and it is not subject to earthquakes.

2. The Sahul Shelf

Similar to the Sunda Platform in its morphology, the Sahul Shelf is best considered as a northern extension of the Australian continental mass, partially inundated by the shallow Arafura Sea, and terminating south of the main E-W. range of middle New Guinea. This stable land mass is, like the Sunda Platform, free of recent volcanic forms. Evidence of active mountain building on its fringe, in the north of New Guinea, suggests stresses from the Sahul Shelf towards the north.

3. Young Mountains and Insular Arcs

The festoons of mountains which enfold the Sunda Platform and the Sahul Shelf provide much scope for theories about mountain building processes, a matter outside the immediate field of geography. These mountains in many cases rise steeply from the floor of the Indian and Pacific Oceans to heights over 15,000 feet above sea level; in other localities, the greater part of the mountain system is below sea level and only its topmost points emerge as strings of islands. Fault and fold systems on several lines curve and recurve over one another to make an exceptionally involved pattern, in which certain well marked alignments may be distinguished.

(*a*) The Burma-Java loop starts from the India-Burma border and runs through the Arakan Yoma, disappears for some distance as a topographic feature and then continues as the complicated fold-fault systems of Western Sumatra, South Java and eastwards as a string of islands curving back from the Sahul Shelf through the Kei Islands to Ceram. This series on the Indian Ocean fringe of Southeast Asia is paralleled seaward first by a deep oceanic trough and then by an oceanic ridge showing as the Nias-Mentawei Islands off West Sumatra and as the islandless submarine ridge south of Java.

(*b*) The arcs on the Pacific margins run through the Philippines and Northern New Guinea, creating lines of islands enclosing small, deep, square-shaped, oceanic basins. Troughs or trenches much deeper than the Pacific average are situated on the Pacific side of these arcs (the Philippine Trench is over

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7 miles deep), and these resemble in form and location the oceanic trenches off Sumatra and Java. 133

(*c*) The complex of short arcs and knots showing in the Celebes-Moluccas groups have alignments which repeat the patterns of the Pacific and Indian Ocean fringes, and of the inner edges of the Sunda Platform and the Sahul Shelf. Here, too, the arcs



FIG. 3.—East Indies Volcanic Zones

enclose deep geosynclinal oceanic basins, such as the Molucca Sea which is over 16,500 ft. deep. The intersection of these alignments produces the curious shapes of Celebes and Halmahera. This zone may be likened to the "mediterranean seas" between Europe and Africa and between North and South America; in this case it is a mediterranean sea between Asiatic and Australian continental blocks.

Throughout these zones of contemporary crustal deformation, the longitudinal and transverse fractures are dotted with volcanoes, many of which are still active (Fig. 3). Their ejecta further complicate the land forms already made complex by the ravages of violent erosion (Fig. 4). Lava and igneous materials of widely varying ages have flowed over large areas and even on to parts of the Sunda Platform, as in Sumatra. Within the oceanic deeps marginal to these zones of crustal stress are the epicentres of most of those major earthquakes whose frequency is yet another symptom of the instability surrounding the shelves.

Thus the geomorphology of this third zone is transitional,

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

FIG. 4.—Detail of a Volcanic Island in the East Indies

reflecting at once the influence and forms of continental Asia and continental Australia, and of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

ROCK TYPES

135 133 Profound chemical action caused by tropical and equatorial weathering has two effects on most of Southeast Asia; the destruction of readily accessible fossils by weathering and the concealing of native rocks by great thicknesses of weathered material. Thus the historical geology of Southeast Asia, the dating of the rocks, is not yet fully studied, and the geological interpretations of local rocks are by no means unanimous.

So far as their general character is concerned, however, no appreciable difference can be noted between the rocks of Southeast Asia and those of more intensively studied areas in Europe and North America. The effects of each rock type in conditioning landscape forms appear to be much the same throughout the world, differing in degree, not in character.

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The pattern of rock types may be summed up thus: 135 133

1. Within the Sunda Platform quartzites and shales are prominent over large areas, generally producing subdued relief, not closely allied to the fold lines of the strata. These metamorphics often appear at the surface close to a group of limestone rocks of which a calcareous shale, much of it in areas of low elevation, is most extensive. Massive limestone is most common as a landscape feature where least subject to solution weathering,



FIG. 5.—Schematic West-East Section of the Mountain Structures in Malang

towards the drier margins of the Platform (as in East Java and Tonkin) where it stands out as gaunt hills whose features recall those of the Karst, though partly disguised by a wilder profusion of vegetation. Small, slightly metamorphosed limestone formations retain this karstic character even under equatorial rains, as in North Malaya where they still rear prominently above the horizon. A large part of Borneo, the biggest single exposure of the Platform, is built of old sandstone, establishing a flat-topped landscape through which ravine-like valleys have been cut. The higher mountains of the Sunda Platform, the Altaids of Suess, are invariably elongated intrusions of igneous rock, mainly granitic, and this material forms the chief heights of a relief otherwise gently modulated.

2. Upon the young mountain systems marginal to the Platform, the landform owes more to recent tectonic activity than to the nature of the constituent rocks, most of which are also represented on the Sunda Platform. Complex fracturing and folding produce on the young mountains a wild steep landscape which here and there encloses fragments of older continental blocks. The vents and caldera of volcanoes (Fig. 5) add their special forms built from looser, easily eroded rock materials of lava

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133 type which have been severely scarred by denudation. Mag-
135 matic rocks have flowed extensively from these volcanoes, spreading over a large area and serving to mask relief forms developed upon underlying earlier structures. As a result of these igneous formations throughout the region, contact metamorphosis has taken place on a large scale, which has a major bearing on the frequency of metallic minerals and helps to account for the scarcity of coal formations.

133 3. The detail of much of the Southeast Asia landscape is condi-
134 tioned by contemporary river alluviation and coastal sedimentation (as in Eastern Sumatra and South Borneo, whose thickness and profusion relate to the rapidity of tropical erosion on the one hand and to the stability of the continental platform on the other. Relief upon the great alluviated landscapes is slight. In this zone where there is so much coastline in proportion to the land area, marine accumulations of spits, bars and off-shore beaches are both prominent and important in conditioning coastal topography and the location of settlements. Marine loads tend to be heavy in this zone of violent terrestrial erosion and under certain conditions sediment accumulates quickly owing to the speed with which mangrove establishes itself upon any bank or spit which is built up, thereafter further hastening deposition by hindering the free scouring of normal wave action. Marine sedimentation is greater upon the inner coasts of the Sunda Platform and less upon those coasts facing the Indian and Pacific Oceans where the shore profiles are steep and the waves have maximum fetch.

Character of Seas

133 Three types of seas may be distinguished by the criterion of depth:

1. Shallow seas of the Sunda Platform
2. Shallow seas of the Sahul Shelf
3. The Austro-Asiatic "mediterranean" basins between the Sunda Platform and the Sahul Shelf, and subdivided by island festoons. In this group may be provisionally placed the Sulu Basin, though the South China Basin between the Philippines and the Asiatic mainland may only be included by considerably stretching the "mediterranean" conception.

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1. *Sunda Platform Seas*

These seas, the Malacca Strait, the southern portion of the South China Sea, the Sunda Sea and the Java Sea, are remarkable less for their shallowness than for the uniformity of their shallowness, which is mostly about 120 ft. and only in a few places reaches depths exceeding 150 ft. This derives from the long history of peneplainisation of the whole platform prior to its present partial inundation, which has fairly conclusively been shown to be due to eustatic rather than tectonic changes. The small islands (the Rhio, Lingga, Banka and Billiton islands) within these seas are generally of monadnock type and they have granitic cores. Low profiles characterise the adjoining shore lines where broad estuaries carry low topography far inland and where flat coasts of sedimentation, backed by marshes, are more common than those of marine erosion. Such shallow seas are affected strongly by currents arising from winds and less by the circulatory systems of the surrounding oceans, so that monsoonal wind reversals are the major influences on water movement. The drift of surface water thus relates closely to the wind systems described in Chapter 2. Out of contact with oceanic circulations by reason of the disposition of islands athwart the lines of Indian and Pacific Ocean water movements, and located between equatorial land-masses with a very heavy rainfall draining into them, these shallow seas are abnormally fresh and remain abnormally warm: from salinities of 31 per mille and sea temperatures of 70° F., few parts of the surface waters show any significant deviation from place to place or from season to season.

Enclosed between the Andamans, Burma, Kra and Sumatra is a sea steadily being encroached upon by the Irrawaddy Delta, yet its depth and connection with oceanic circulations external to the Platform relate it chiefly to the Bay of Bengal, except that the huge outpouring from Burmese rivers lowers its surface salinity to figures even below those of the Platform seas.

Further evidence that the existence of these seas derives from eustatic rather than tectonic changes is found in the loose gravels, sands and muds which form most of the beds of Sunda Platform waters and in the absence of raised wave-cut terraces along the coasts. Attached plants may be found almost everywhere on the sea floor, which is entirely eulittoral in character.

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2. *The Sahul Shelf*

123 The Arafura Sea and its extension to the Gulf of Carpentaria have been only sketchily studied and are properly outside Southeast Asia. They broadly repeat the features of the Sunda Platform seas except that the salinities are not so abnormally low because the freshwater inflow is less abundant, since the Australian margin has a lower rainfall.

3. *The "mediterranean seas" of the Indies*

The Snellius Expedition catalogued twenty-six distinct basins and trenches in the 'mediterranean seas' of the Indies, excluding the deep between the Philippines and China which scarcely belongs to the region. Of these, eight are deeper than 15,000 feet while the sills between them are not less than 4,000 feet deep. Within each basin there tend to be two circulatory systems:

(*a*) the surface circulation, relatively fast-moving, connected freely with circulations in adjoining basins and thence with currents in the open ocean. It is confined to an upper layer reaching from the surface to approximately the depth of the sill surrounding the basin, that is, to an average depth of about 5,500 feet. The location of the main island barriers is such that the upper waters are strongly influenced by water from the North Equatorial Current of the Pacific, which presses into the 'mediterranean seas', through those many gaps between Mindanao and New Guinea. Scarcely any similar currents derive from the Indian Ocean, in the direction of which the basins are almost isolated by the continuous Sumatra-Java obstruction. In temperature, these basins have a surface warmth similar to that of all equatorial waters, the great difference between their surfaces and those of the Platform seas being a higher salinity—generally 34.5 per mille—and a diminished influence of monsoon winds.

(*b*) the circulation at depth, a movement so slow that the expression "creep" might be substituted. This movement takes place within each basin or trough, isolated from circulation in neighbouring deeps by the sill, and from the surface movements by a discontinuity plane which develops owing to the greater density of the deep water. For the most part, however, the water moving in these isolated deeps originates from the

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Pacific by creeping into the Northern Banda Basin, then passing through the Southern Banda Basin and the Weber Deep, the Sawoi Basin and the Weker Basin out into the Indian Ocean deeps. All these lower waters have characteristically high salinity and low temperatures, which prevent any continued outward movement from the basins, though there is a steady removal of water drawn in from deep-level Pacific Equatorial water, whose feature is low temperature by comparison with adjoining water at the same depths within the sills. Inside the basins, minimum temperatures are found just below the level of the lowest sill. Farther down this temperature increases adiabatically but the potential temperature (i.e. reduced to sea level) remains low, so that no convectional circulation is induced. Under these conditions of dense water stably stratified, the profound deeps tend to accumulate hydrogen sulphide.

The margins of these 'mediterranean seas' commonly show raised beaches and wave-cut terraces uncorrelating in altitude from point to point owing to the wide variation of amplitude in the tectonic changes over short distances. Shore profiles are normally steep with the result that estuarial sedimentation is negligible.

Tides

Within these partially enclosed seas, the greatest tidal impulse comes from the Pacific, towards which broad openings are presented on either side of the Philippines. Only in the Gulf of Rangoon and in the funnel-shaped Malacca Strait do tidal forces from the Indian Ocean operate, though they do slightly filter through the gaps in the Lesser Sundas, the line of small islands between Java and New Guinea.

Tides in the deep basins and troughs of the mediterranean sector have not been studied in detail. They probably function as standing oscillations, whose periodicity depends on the form and size of the deeps.

Conditions on the Sunda Platform are better known because of their greater importance to international navigation. The tidal impulse comes to the shallow seas mainly from the east and whatever the character of tides in the open ocean or in the mediterranean basins, the impulse is converted into progressive waves by the shallowness of the seas upon the Platform (Fig. 6).

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

FIG. 6.—Co-tidal Lines in Southeast Asia seas for 15th March 1947

From the west, tides from the Gulf of Rangoon Deep move down the funnel-shaped Malacca Strait, travelling somewhat faster on the Malayan side than on the Sumatran, and steadily increasing in range. From the east, there is firstly the tide from the Hongkong Basin, which is of Pacific origin, and secondly the tide in the Java Sea deriving from the southernmost ' mediterranean seas ', which take their main impulse from Indian Ocean tidal movements, operating in the Timor Sea and through the Lesser Sundas. The South China Sea tide moves south through the Sunda Sea and travels through the Java Sea along the southern coast of Borneo, whereas the Northern Java coast is for some distance subject to a tidal movement from the east.

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Just west of Singapore Island, the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea tides converge, locally retarding the scouring capacity and apparently favouring heavy marine sedimentation derived from the adjoining land masses. Among the Lingga and Rhio Islands, the actual tidal movements are extremely complicated due to convergent tidal waves from neighbouring seas. Tidal values in all these seas are modified seasonally by winds which practically reverse through the year, working to augment or reduce the tides as the case may be. The South China Seas, whose length parallels the direction of the seasonal wind streams, is particularly subject to this modification in the Northeast Monsoon which very much affects the ease of tidal progression from that sea into the Java Sea. 130

Corals

The polyps and other organisms whose skeletons accumulate to form coral reefs, live in colonies which within four years may grow to two inches in diameter from a single individual. They are exacting in their environmental requirements, needing sea temperatures of at least 58° F. throughout the year, shallow clear water to permit their food processes, which are largely photosynthetic, and fairly high salinity. A live coral colony has a slimy surface which is in fact the living matter; the live cells die if exposed to the air, or if covered with mud. Corals establish themselves for the most part on rocky foundations. Off Southeast Asia distinct differences can be seen in their regional distribution. 136

On the Sunda Platform as a whole corals are only developed well beyond easy access from the shore. The relatively fresh seas with swampy margins heavily charged with fine silts and humic acids are unfavourable to the polyps and the recent history of slow inundation of the Platform operates against them as well, though corals are found at depth along its margins and in broad belts round the rocky islands off South Malaya. Platform corals are exclusively submarine and generally stand below sea level well offshore, so that they are never prominent on a coastal landscape. The great development of coral is on the eastern edge of the Platform, running parallel to the east coast of Borneo and well out into the Macassar Strait (Fig. 7), where broad reefs occur whose proportions resemble those of the Great Barrier Reef on the eastern edge of the Sahul Shelf. These locations are favourable because they are washed by the warm onshore equatorial currents;

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FIG. 7.—The Borneo Bank and the Great Sunda Barrier Reef on the East of the Sunda Platform

similar extensive developments on the western side of the continental shelf are prevented by slight upwellings of water produced behind offshore currents.

Within the 'mediterranean seas', the occurrences of coral are less extensive at any one point but they show much greater variety of form. Atolls, barriers and reefcaps at varying levels above, below and inclined to present sea levels and in varying degrees of symmetry to existing islands, may be found in this zone where there has been steady and repeated displacement of the geanticlines which form the chains of islands.

Several theories have been devised to account for the formation of coral. All of them start from the environmental requirements of the live polyp, which is eulittoral, and go on to account for the shape and extent of the accumulations of skeletons by some change of water level. In the Southeast Asia seas may be found examples to support those coral formation theories stressing sea level or eustatic change, a dominant process on the Sunda Platform, and also examples of corals associated with secular changes of the earth's crust, the chief physical factor operating among islands of the 'mediterranean seas' and the basis of theories attributing coral formations to submarine tectonic changes.

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Chapter Two

CLIMATIC FACTORS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

FEW regions comparable in size to Southeast Asia have so uniform a temperature régime over the whole area and throughout the year. Apart from those local variations due to altitude, and in Northern Burma and Siam to continental influences from Tibet, Southeast Asia from Lower Burma to Cochinchina and New Guinea has average monthly temperatures which remain within ten degrees or so of 80° F. at all seasons. Symmetry about the Equator and a set of land units thoroughly broken up by water bodies of greater area than themselves account for this uniformity of warmth in time and from place to place, and in turn mean that the broad human and vegetation variations do not correlate closely with variations of warmth from place to place, nor is the rhythm of vegetation and cultivation in the region as a whole set by an annual procession of temperature changes. 132

The basic rhythm of plants and agriculture through most of Southeast Asia is dominated by rainfall—by its incidence rather than by its volume, though considerable differences in volume make distinct climatic sub-divisions away from the axis of the Equator. Köppen's classification emphasises these climatic differences. In this broken terrain, the pattern of the rainfall and the pattern of its variations within short distances, are set by the wind systems. To understand these is to see the operative factor behind the local differences in rainfall periodicity which very much depend on the aspect of the land masses in relation to the seasonal air currents and to local water areas. [22]

THE WIND RÉGIME

Two similar air masses move across Southeast Asia:

(*a*) The Northern Tropical Air Mass which normally moves from the Tropic of Cancer towards the Equator as the Northeast Trades;

(*b*) The Southern Tropical Air Mass, originating over the Tropic of Capricorn and normally moving towards the Equator as the

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

FIG. 8.—Daily Weather Chart of Southeast Asia with isobars in millibars at 12.00 on 28th September 1946

Southeast Trades.

The physical character of the air is much the same in these two masses, which each have long courses across extensive warm seas, so that each is uniformly warm and uniformly damp. Furthermore, the air masses are both losing impetus as they move into lower latitudes. Where the Northern and Southern Tropical Air Masses converge is thus a front, by analogy with conceptions regarding air convergences worked out in other parts of the world, e.g. the Polar Front. The surface of convergence of the two tropical air-streams may be called "The Intertropical Front" and it shows on the weather map as a line.

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The similarity of physical conditions in these airstreams means that the Intertropical Front is less sharply defined at any one time by comparison with the Polar Front which separates air masses in different physical states. The warmth, the humidity and the loss of horizontal impulse in each of the Tropical Air Masses mean that vertical impetuses are increasing so that the Intertropical Front is marked by upward movements on both sides, tending to a vigorous convectional action. This explains the frequent calms along the Intertropical Front when strongly developed in what may be called its "ideal position," i.e. roughly along the Equator. In the older terminology, the zone of convergence of the Trade Winds was called the Doldrums. Just as the Polar Front has been found extremely useful in forecasting depressions in more northern latitudes, so also the Intertropical Front is a valuable line for forecasting weather, since along it move mild depressions and squalls which may assume great violence. Daily weather charts (synoptic charts) in this zone have so far only been prepared for official use and are not sold publicly (Fig. 8).

This relatively simple pattern is complicated by two other influences. Firstly, the two air masses are displaced across the Equator by the annual migration of the sun. The Intertropical Front is thus pulled south during the Southern Hemisphere summer and north of the Equator during northern summer. When the airstreams cross the Equator, Ferrell's Law operates upon them differentially so that Southeast Trades moving into the Northern Hemisphere become southwesterly winds and Northeast Trades become northwesterly winds when moving into the Southern Hemisphere.

Secondly, the low pressure areas developed over the continents to which Southeast Asia is marginal, induce certain seasonal deviations in the air streams. Summer low pressures over Australia are just strong enough for the Intertropical Front to be pressed abnormally far south over Northern Australia in December. But the summer low pressures over India and the margins of continental Asia, particularly over Central Burma and Central Siam, have more dramatic effect: the Northern India low pressure system draws parts of the South Tropical Air Mass over the Equator in late northern spring, to maintain a parabolic path over the North Indian Ocean until November. The low pressure system which becomes established over the eastern parts of Asia two or three

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

FIG. 9.—The Intertropical Front in Southeast Asia. The front is shown by a heavy line, drawn as continuous where it is sharply defined and persistently located; as an interrupted line where the front is weakly defined and subject to considerable variation in position. The open lines show diagrammatically the manner in which the air masses move

months later than that over India, has a somewhat similar effect, drawing Southern Tropical Air far northwards through the South China Sea during June-July-August.

These influences produce the air streaming analysed in the accompanying four maps (Fig. 9), each representing conditions over three-month periods, which may be summarised thus:

1. December to February. The Southern and Northern Tropical Air Masses at this period move almost on ideal lines. The northern air streams cross the Equator as northwest winds reaching to about 7° S. where the Intertropical Front runs almost latitudinally except for a sag farther south towards the Australian low pressure zone.
2. March to May. Three air streams interact at this time. The Southern Tropical Air presses northward but does not substantially cross the Equator near Southeast Asia. The Northern Tropical Air Masses withdraw towards the northeast and in

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places more towards East Asia as east winds. Over mid-Indian Ocean, a first part of the Southern Tropical Air Mass (under the influence of Indian low pressures) crosses the Equator to blow across the Bay of Bengal as southwest winds, reaching farther eastwards as the season advances. The Intertropical Front at this time has branched form; its trace becomes roughly a cuspate curve pointing northward and prolonged in that direction by one or two arms which mark the convergences of air streams from the Bay of Bengal and from the West Pacific. The crux of this front is over the Central Indian Ocean in March, moving to positions eastward and slightly northward to one off Labuan in May.

3. June to August. Southern Tropical Air increases its migration north and a second major transfer of it into the Northern Hemisphere takes place, driving through the Java Sea and the South China Sea, drawn far northwards by East-Central Asia low pressures. At this time Northern Tropical Air does not reach Southeast Asia. The Intertropical Front opens into two almost symmetrical fronts of hyperbolic shape as a result of the second streaming of South Tropical Air. The double arms of the Fronts are close together at first but the distance between them increases until during August only the western portion lies over Southeast Asia as a roughly N-S. curving front off the coast of Indochina. The Intertropical Front persists over the Malaya-Indochina area throughout this quarter, delimiting two air streams both of which are Southern Tropical in origin yet which have acquired different physical characteristics and directions by taking different courses.
4. September-November. At this season the Northern Tropical Air rapidly increases its pressure from the north, extending its coverage westward and southward. Southern Tropical Air continues to cross the Equator over the Indian Ocean but diminishes in drive, to cease as an air transfer by November. The streaming of Southern Tropical Air through the South China Sea becomes completely occluded and is finally confined below the Equator as the Southeast Trades. Moving southward, the Intertropical Front reverts to the cuspate form of March-May, flattening to a latitudinal alignment. At this transitional period the cuspate curve is much sharper at its beak and less symmetrical than in the spring.

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132 In considering this analysis of tropical air masses, it must be remembered that the Intertropical Front varies in its preciseness and the positions given here are tendencies often disguised in practice by broad zones of calms. Thus the Doldrums should be considered as the zone within which is located the Intertropical Front, characterised by highly unstable air conditions and traversed by weak depressions moving sometimes westwards, sometimes eastwards, or at certain seasons polewards under the influence of the adjoining continents.

Rainfall

In Fig. 10 the generalised effect of aspect, relief and these air streams may be seen to produce a rainfall above 80 in. per annum upon most territories of Southeast Asia. The zones of low rainfall are the dry belt of Upper Burma and South-Central Siam which are shielded by relief barriers athwart the air streams. Moreover the total precipitation lessens eastward in the East Indian areas, particularly in the territories and islands east of Central Java.

North of a line from Achin through North Malaya to Mindanao, and east and south of Central Java, very distinct dry seasons appear, the criterion being that of Köppen: at least one month of these areas has less than 2.4 in. of rain. The disposition of these dry zone areas is related to latitudes beyond the equatorial belt and towards the tropical limits. Towards the Equator, precipitation varies seasonally, generally with double wet seasons, though no season is sufficiently rainless to be called dry.

The tropical air masses operating over Southeast Asia are characterised by high temperatures and humidity, coupled with a physical instability which is greatest towards the Equator and decreases towards the continent of Asia. As a result of this instability, relatively weak depressions, small relief features and local overheating by insolation in, say, a town or in bare fields, can act as triggers to stimulate violent vertical air movements. Altitude thus has greater effects proportionally than is normal in other latitudes. Under these conditions cumulo-nimbus clouds of as much as 10,000 ft. depth may develop within half an hour and vertical air currents of 100 m.p.h. inside such clouds are quite common. With the parent air so humid, the precipitation consequent on such updraughts is very heavy (often as much as 2 inches

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

FIG. 10.—Climatic Factors of Southeast Asia

within an hour) even though localised over a small area, and the latent heat deriving from precipitation serves to perpetuate the uprush of air. While all types of initial cause of precipitation occur over Southeast Asia, they tend always to be accompanied by

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

FIG. 11.—Correlation of Rainfall and Wind Direction in Southeast Asia. The bearing of each arm represents the mean monthly direction of the wind (blowing towards the centre) and the length of each is proportional to the mean monthly rainfall. Months of no rainfall are thus no more than points at the compass centre. The numbers on each arm indicate the month (1 Jan., 2 Feb., etc.)

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

FIG. 12.—Structure of a Tropical Thunderstorm

thunderstorms, which towards the Equator are of daily occurrence and great violence (over 320 storms occur at Buitenzorg each year). Thunderstorm frequency decreases in those sub-regions where winter dry seasons are pronounced, yet even there the rainy months have high thunderstorm frequency. These Southeast Asia thunderstorms resemble those of middle latitudes (Fig. 12) and are accompanied by a "chimney" of rapidly rising air at the core, often with downflows of cooler air just in front of the storm. While the up-current of these thunderstorms is strong enough at times to tear an aeroplane apart, the freezing level is so high (above 25,000 feet) that hail, a common feature of similar storms in other latitudes, is here rare. The degree of correlation between rainfall and wind is evident from the combination of wind-roses and rainfall data in Fig. 11 which also demonstrates how emphatic is the dry season at places away from the Equator.

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

FIG. 13.—Theoretical Structure of a Typhoon

TYPHOONS

"Typhoon" is the name given to tropical cyclones which occur off East Asia. Only the northernmost parts of Southeast Asia come under the influence of typhoons which are most frequent over the Philippines and Indochina. A few have been known to cross the Kra Isthmus and pass over Bengal. The Bay of Bengal typhoons, frequenting a restricted area well north in the Bay, do not normally affect Burma, so that only the South China Sea typhoons strongly influence the weather conditions of Southeast Asia territories.

While theories about the origin of typhoons do not reach general agreement in detail, partly due to the difficulty of obtaining full meteorological data about these phenomena whose violence so often destroys instruments and whose variable paths defy advance preparation for tests, they seem to result from a widespread convection of hot, moist, unstable air and may represent extreme variants of the forces arising from convergent air currents. Much has been done to accumulate data about sea level features of

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

FIG. 14.—Typhoon Tracks in the South China Sea

typhoons, but little information is available about their vertical structure apart from navigators' notes on cloud formation. Clines, writing on the basis of U.S. data, seems to have established that typhoons are in fact largely self-perpetuating from the release of much latent heat due to violent precipitation in the front right quadrant, where he suggests a point above the ground at the precipitation level is in effect a constant generator of heat, and a constant low pressure focus towards which the sea-level barometric centre is always moving (Fig. 13). A close relation between the path of typhoons and a front between air masses has also been suggested.

Typhoons of the South China Sea normally originate somewhere east of the Philippines and travel towards those islands and Indochina, along paths which gradually assume that parabolic line peculiar to all tropical cyclones, so that somewhere between the Philippines and Tonkin they begin to recurve on a line towards the northeast (Fig. 14). The seasonal incidence varies. In the period 1918-29, ninety-eight South China Sea typhoons were distributed thus through the year:

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	Jan.	*Feb.*	*Mar.*	*Apr.*	*May*	*June*	*July*	*Aug.*	*Sept.*	*Oct.*	*Nov.*	*Dec.*	*Total*
Number of Typhoons	2	0	0	0	4	6	22	17	11	15	15	6	98

The peak periods, July to November, relate to the abnormal positions of the broken Intertropical Front as shown in Fig. 9. Regarding the mean tracks of these East Asia typhoons, it will be noted that they normally move on paths shifting progressively northward from February to August and shifting southwards thereafter until January, but they never reach much farther south than the Cape of Cambodia. From July to September the maximum danger zone for typhoons is north of latitude 15° (Luzon and the Gulf of Tonkin) while in October and November maximum typhoon risk is on the coasts of Cochinchina and the extreme south of Annam.

South China Sea typhoons have characteristics like those of similar disturbances elsewhere. In advance of them whispy cirrus clouds at high altitude and broken cumulus clouds at lower levels drift across the horizon, the latter becoming dark rugged clouds, more numerous and coalescent in the centre as the typhoon approaches. About 100 miles from the centre, dark nimbus clouds develop and produce torrential rains moving forward with the whole typhoon at rates from 10-20 knots, while the constituent winds often increase to speeds reaching and exceeding 80 knots. Each typhoon has an "eye" of comparatively small area, perhaps 5 miles in diameter where the sky is relatively clear, calmer or only lightly squally and no rain falls, resembling an intensified form of the quiet conditions between the warm and cold fronts of a middle latitude cyclone. Behind the "eye" of the typhoon winds again blow with devastating violence, in a reverse direction to winds in advance of the "eye," with nimbo-stratus clouds producing torrential rains which reduce visibility to nil. These gradually lose intensity and the typhoon passes over, leaving a trail of high cirrus.

In these deep tropical depressions, the great force of the winds involved causes widespread damage in built-up and cultivated areas. Their violence and frequency is particularly great in Luzon and they appear to lose violence over Indochina. They form one of the major hazards of shipping in the South China Sea, particularly

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for native sailing vessels. Most of the first study of these typhoons was contained in European seamen's handbooks which were chiefly concerned with rule of thumb methods by which ships unlucky enough to be caught in a typhoon could avoid the most dangerous parts of them. The coastal zones of Tonkin and Annam experience severe floods in low-lying areas when the typhoon winds set in certain directions which augment the tides. Typhoon winds can, at their worst, lift trains from their rails and cast steamers several hundred yards inland from the shore.

The French observers, Bruzon and Carton, describe thus a typhoon over Nha Trang and Hon Ba in 1926: "The typhoon appeared first on 2nd November, WNW. of Yap and on the 3rd was 700 km. east of Manila. During the night of 5th-6th November it crossed south of Manila. Over the China Sea, its course changed from west to west-southwest and the typhoon struck the coast of Annam on the 7th. At Nha Trang about 16.00 hours on that day, the wind blew violently from WSW. During the night its violence increased and its course changed through NW. and N. to NNE. Minimum pressure was experienced that night (980 m.b.) but at Hon Ba in the mountains (1,480 m.) pressure went down two hours later to 818 m.b. During that one night pressures dropped about 30 m.b. in the path of the typhoon but after a few hours reverted to normal again. Considerable damage was done to Hon Ba forests, many trees were uprooted and in some places entire groves were destroyed. The typhoon brought torrential rain to the whole Annam coast from Faifoo to Cap Padaran."

Certain line squalls moving eastwards to Malaya at very low latitudes in the Malacca Strait have a violence at times approaching that of typhoons and the squalls are in fact related to disturbances on the Intertropical Front: they are not circular in character, have no "eye," are not extensive or persistent features and they have no connection with true typhoons.

Sunshine

Over most Southeast Asia territories for much of the year, the cloud cover is very heavy and the sunshine period is low. This is most emphatic towards the Equator away from which a season of clear skies and continuous sunny weather occurs. The effective sunshine

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132 is rendered even less by the high humidity which cuts off many actinic wavelengths. In Singapore over half the sunshine day is obscured by clouds; in Jakarta less than 70 per cent of the possible sunshine hours are sunny. A distinct diurnal rhythm of sunshine incidence is characteristic of the Equator; during the mornings, which frequently begin clear and sunny, cumulus clouds steadily increase to a maximum in the afternoon, when convectional influences are at their peak, often producing thunder-showers followed by a clearing of the sky towards sunset. The amount of sunshine received is normally greater at sea level and decreases with altitude. On the other hand, those districts with distinct dry seasons have high sunshine values in the dry periods, often offset on the average by prolonged obliteration of the sun during the rainy season. These factors have considerable agricultural significance.

Humidity

High average humidity values are normal everywhere in Southeast Asia, but they are subject to frequent variations. Coasts are damper than interiors and highlands are damper than plains. Localities with marked dry seasons have periods of low humidity accompanied by high temperatures. In any one place a few hours sunshine rapidly lowers the relative humidity and it is a fact that even in the wettest places, the ground and wet clothes dry out under direct sunshine. Comparatively minor humidity variations have considerable effects on plants, and from the point of view of human beings it is the humidity rather than the temperature which produces feelings of body heat or body cold. When the relative humidity drops a few points, the skin sensation is one of coolness, due to easy evaporation of perspiration. By the same cause, a site exposed to regular breezes feels drier and cooler than the actual humidity or thermometer figures justify. The generalised rainfall and seasons map (Fig. 10) is a convenient guide to the distribution of humidity.

Altitude Effects

133 Throughout the region altitude is an important factor varying
132 the local weather conditions. While the land masses are relatively small, they are orographically very broken so that (apart from

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East Sumatra) no very extensive plains have developed and mountains are visible from most points. Even the highest peak known (Kinabalu, Br. Borneo, 13,681 ft.) lies well below the snow line but those highlands adjoining Yunnan do receive a brush of snow in winter. The average highland is, however, more

FIG. 15.—Köppen's Climatic Regions in Southeast Asia

of the order 8,000 feet and continuous areas at a high altitude are quite small. These altitudes induce local temperature reduction, more evident at night than during the day, and local high humidities. They cause local rain shadows which, owing to the differing winds through the year, are seasonal rather than permanent, except where double ranges give the intervening lowland a fairly constant rain shadow, as in Central Burma. A major function of the higher altitudes is to cause orographic rains and to lower the temperatures, which latter has less geographical significance than the overall raininess.

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Climatic Regions

132 Raininess is the basic criterion between major parts of this climatic area where temperatures are for most regions never less than warm. Two broad rain types may be distinguished:

(*a*) heavy rains at all times of the year (over 80 inches per annum). In detail there are peaks of raininess, generally double peaks, but between these peaks is a season less rainy, though still without any month which may be called dry. This region is mainly equatorial.

(*b*) rains through most of the year, with at least one month with less than 2.4 inches during these cooler months, the length of dry seasons increasing with latitude and the limits being roughly latitudinal as in Fig. 10. The dry seasons are normally related to wind streams at various times of the year. This zone subdivides into:

1. A subdivision where total rainfall is exceptionally low (below 60 inches per annum) and the drought season long, as in Central Burma and East Siam.
2. A subdivision where the dry season is long and altitude reduces the temperature to less than about 60° for the cool season, but not reaching freezing on the average.

Köppen's classifications for this zone are a convenient but by no means fully checked scheme (Fig. 15).

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Chapter Three

THE DRAINAGE PATTERNS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE Irrawaddy, Salween, Menam Chao Praya and Mekong are remarkable for their length compared with most Southeast Asia rivers, which rarely exceed a few hundred miles long. Those four major rivers are associated with tectonic basins; relief elsewhere only permits short streams. All districts marginal to the Sunda Platform have experienced relatively recent tectonic changes and the rivers developed upon them are youthful as well as short. Upon the Platform itself much more advanced landscape maturity is evident but because this older surface has only limited areas exposed, rivers even there are short. 133

CHARACTERISTICS OF TROPICAL RIVERS

In the régime of tropical rivers several factors have distinctive emphasis compared with conditions in temperate latitude rivers. Firstly the volume of water precipitated into and to be carried from any drainage basin is several times that of equivalent temperate latitude rivers as a result of the much higher rainfall. Moreover the precipitation is more intense. Even the dry interior of Burma experiences falls of rain averaging ·6 inches per rainy day. The water content of those Tropical Air Masses over Southeast Asia is so high and the rising air currents so strong and sustained that several Javanese stations have recorded falls of over 16 inches per day. These violent torrential downpours are often very localised at any one time, yet on an average they affect large areas. Thus the volume of rainwater in any drainage basin is enormous and fluctuates widely within short periods of a few hours. 132 133

A further consequence of these great rainstorms is their powerful erosive effects. Upon cultivated land the force and volume of these downpours cause surface downwash to be large, the soil rapidly washes away and whole hillsides may slip, so that the run-off has a high mud content. Because the rivers are mostly immature, this heavy load may be sustained by turbulence for considerable 134 132 133

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distances. In areas of alternating wet and dry seasons, drought cracks the ground, loosens the top surface and thereby increases the available load when the rains begin. The Dry Zones of Burma and Siam are for this reason areas of most violent surface removal. The very heavy load of Southeast Asia rivers gives them a great capacity for rapidly building up deltas, sedimenting the estuaries and at times causing heavy deposition of silt well inland. Furthermore the rainfall is not only violent and intense, it is also variable in seasonal incidence; thus many streams of Upper Burma, Central Siam and Eastern Java are for months practically dry and then come into spate within a few hours, not unlike the wadis of North Africa. Landform combined with the seasonal rains causes the Salween, for instance, to vary its level 50 feet within a few hours. Such variability of volume induces deposition well inland. Huge silt banks lie across many watercourses, vast alluvial fans develop at the debouchment to plains, and even at the junction of tributaries.

The Irrawaddy presents an example of how the drainage conditions differ at different points in the course of a tropical river. Near and above Bhamo changes of Irrawaddy level directly parallel changes of rainfall. As the stream passes through the Dry Zone of Burma it receives no significant additional water from the tributaries after it passes the confluence of the Chindwin and it is effectively losing water by evaporation. Stamp estimates 45 per cent of Irrawaddy water has been lost by evaporation when the stream finally reaches the head of the Delta. Evaporation rates in the Burmese Dry Zone are little, if at all, less than the precipitation. Farther downstream, in the Delta, heavy precipitation occurs again, so that the Irrawaddy floods arrive at the Delta roughly a month after peak rains in the reaches above Bhamo, to find it already suffering from floods due to local rains and small local streams. These floods of local origin effectively oblige the Irrawaddy water to remain within the main distributaries. Even more interesting is Stamp's evidence that the average annual silt load at the Delta head is 261 million tons, whereas at Mandalay it is only 32 million tons, showing that 229 million tons of silt is added in the Dry Zone. Since the Chindwin provides 109 million tons of silt, the balance of 120 million tons derives from the wadi-like, highly variable streams (chaungs) joining the Irrawaddy in its driest section.

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Load and the Erosion of Basins

Acting as a brake on the destructiveness of the rivers and on the changes of river levels, the dense forest cover of most of the landscape breaks the force of the downpours and provides roots and undergrowth to act as a spongelike retainer of water and as a partial filter of sediment. Under natural conditions, where the forest is undisturbed by man, this influence is so strong that even minor brooks are relatively clear, but where the natural cover is removed by burning to permit cultivation or mining, the brooks are thick and opaque with sediment, a condition rapidly extending as more and more surface is exposed for farming or for alluvial mining. Wherever there are active volcanoes, great quantities of loose ash are thrown out regularly; Southeast Asia volcanoes typically eject ash rather than lava. Unconsolidated ash without vegetation cover is rapidly washed into the streams and by these agents spread out over the estuaries. A new volcanic outburst is at once followed by heavier loads in the local rivers and increased estuarial deposition (Fig. 19) and greater danger of silting up irrigation and drainage canals which may have been built downstream for cultivating rice. That so much of Java's volcanic ash cones are terraced may only partly be ascribed to agricultural pressure; the terracing is equally necessary to control slip of the ash and to prevent sedimentation by waterborne ash from completely overwhelming the lowlands. Largely as a result of heavy ash loads, the Solo River, for example, carries some sixty times as much sediment as the Rhine, though it has only 40 per cent of its length.

The heavy load being carried away by the rivers lowers the surface of the drainage basin over most of its area, even though part of the lower basin is being built up a little by sediment. The rate of destruction of the drainage basin in the tropics is far higher than anywhere else. The Chindwin is removing the surface of its basin by .78 mm. per annum, the Irrawaddy above Prome by .52 mm. per annum, the Loesi in Java by .87 mm. In some small Javanese streams the destruction of the drainage basin has reached as much as 3 mm. per annum. As standards of comparison, the annual lowering of the Danube basin is at the rate of .006 mm., and of the Marne, .005 mm.

As a region, Southeast Asia is thus one of the least stable in the world, as far as orographic form and drainage patterns are

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concerned. Erosion here works faster and the associated deposition occurs at a greater rate than temperate latitude geographers allow for. This adds only a further variant to the general tectonic instability of all the zone fringing the Sunda Platform, but in the case of the Platform itself, its great age and relative stability plus the intensity of river erosion, provide an excellent case of a landscape exposed continuously to subaerial erosion for a period long enough to indicate an approach to the peneplainised state. The Malayan landscape, central to this continental Platform and exposed fully to continuous, powerful and prolonged river action, has special interest in this connection. In Malaya, large alluviated plains dominate the landscape and the hills rise sharply from these plains, yet the features of normal river types still persist. Rapids exist in a number of Malayan rivers, profiles are slightly broken at a number of levels, trellis drainage patterns have persisted on tilted strata (Fig. 32) and river capture goes on even at this advanced stage, as in the capture of the Bera headwaters by the Muar (Fig. 16). Lakes, however, are unusual on the main Sunda Platform; this negative point is at once a symptom of erosional senility and of the ability of tropical vegetation to build out into the lakes, hastening their sedimentation until the standing water disappears. Thus the Bera Lake of Malaya is really a large swamp periodically inundated; the Tonle Sap of Indochina is rapidly filling to become a similar swamp-lake varying with the seasons. Infilled swamp-lakes appear also in Borneo and the Shan Plateau.

The Glacial Period and Southeast Asia Drainage

While tectonic and erosional changes have produced most variations in river forms of those parts of Southeast Asia fringing the Sunda Platform, *upon* the Platform itself, rivers have been more recently affected by a process of marine inundation. There is general agreement that the history of the Platform is one of stability or possibly of slight sinking; the uniform depth and terrigenous bottom material of the Sunda Platform seas, and also the fully-developed river valleys upon their floors, combine to support the view that a rise of sea level has taken place, associated with continental icemelt which took place in northern latitudes when the last Glacial Period closed. De Geer estimates that the last Scandinavian glaciation reached its peak some 25,000 years

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

FIG. 16.—River Capture in Central Malaya. The Palong, tributary of the Muar, is drawing off headwaters of the Bera system

ago, at which time maximum water would be withdrawn from oceanic circulation and locked up as ice, thereby lowering the average sea level. Daly calculates that this withdrawal of water would mean a lowering of sea level (relative to present level) at the Equator by between 250 ft. and 300 ft. The average depth of

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133 water in the Sunda Platform seas today is 180 ft., so that on Daly's figures the whole Platform would be exposed and drainage lines developed upon it. Molengraaf's work (Fig. 18) suggests the drainage lines of the exposed Sunda continental surface formed two river systems flowing roughly north-eastwards from the Singapore area and roughly due east through what is now the [136] Java Sea. To support this conception he instances the striking likeness between fish of the Moesi in Sumatra and those of the Kapuas in Borneo and suggests the similarity derives from association through the main stream developed during the Glacial period. Because there have been in fact several glacial advances in northern latitudes (the Gunz, Mindel, Riss and Wurm Glaciation) his theory implies at least four periods of water withdrawal from the Sunda Platform (and of course from all equatorial areas): that is, four periods when the Sunda sea-floors were exposed to subaerial erosion.

Thus the broad history of recent river development has been one of periodical lowering of sea level, in effect a lowering of erosion base levels for all Sunda Platform rivers, which means four intervening periods of rejuvenation of Southeast Asia rivers and corresponding periods of rising sea level when rivers diminished their cutting power and became senescent, owing to rising erosional base level (Fig. 17). While the world glacial periods varied in duration, they appear not to have differed very widely in extent of greatest development, so that present sea level at the Equator probably represents roughly the level towards which the erosional base rose at each interglacial phase. Those early periods of rising sea could not, on present facts, have reached higher than 100 ft. above present sea level and it is almost certain the variation was much less. It is therefore difficult to accept any theorising which postulates during the last million years over the Sunda Platform sea level positions 100 ft. higher than the present one.

The landscapes carved by river systems over the older parts of Southeast Asia are conditioned in their recent forms by circumstances of a rising sea level, quite different from Europe and North America where a relatively rising land surface has had the latest influence on landscape form. A recent history of rising sea level implies:

(*a*) rising base levels to river erosion;

(*b*) diminution of downcutting power by existing streams;

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

FIG. 17.—Diagram explaining the Development of Inselberge and Concave Profiles typical of the Sunda Platform

(*c*) diminution of load-carrying power and an increase of upstream sedimentation, due to loss of grade in the theoretical profiles;

(*d*) shallow offshore coastal profiles and consequent increase of coastal sedimentation;

(*e*) detrunking of streams as the inundation formed new marine gulfs (see Molengraaf);

(*f*) the rapid sedimentation of the estuaries produces in river profiles an abnormal flattening at lower levels while the upper profile retains the acute forms developed at lower sea level positions. This produces "sagging profiles," concave or flattened outlines (Fig. 17), as contrasted with kinked, faceted and convex profiles of contemporary streams in Europe;

(*g*) mountains in the form of "inselberge," that is, standing like islands surrounded by low-level alluvial plains.

During the glacial periods, when downcutting to a lower base level was the major influence, considerable upstream terraces could develop at all altitudes, but this aspect of Sunda Platform geography is difficult to study owing to the intensive weathering since that time and the heavy vegetation now masking any benches built or carved during the period. Such upstream terraces have been noted by Richardson and Scrivenor in Malaya.

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

FIG. 18.—Drainage and Shallow Seas of Southeast Asia. Seas now shallower than 200 ft. were probably land areas in the Glacial Periods

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

FIG. 19.—Coast Changes at the Mouth of R. Tjimanoek (Hoek van Indramajoe). This shows the rapid changes of the Java coast as a result of sedimentation

The history of inundation at first glance makes it surprising that ria forms have not appeared on the Sunda Platform; the explanation lies in the heavy sedimentation by the rivers and in the relatively soft laterised surface which would be presented to the rising sea and quickly moulded by it.

The glacial periods had little other effect in Southeast Asia; Weissman estimates the snow line in Northern Burma to have descended to about 9,000 ft. during the Glacial Periods. If this lowering of the snow line by about 3,500 ft. compared with today roughly indicates the condition for all Southeast Asia at the time of maximum glaciation, then in the equatorial zone where the present snowline is about 16,000 ft., no mountain tops of Borneo, Java, Sumatra and Malaya could have been seriously affected by snows, let alone by mountain glaciation. Interpretation of land forms in these units on the assumption of glaciation must therefore produce overwhelming evidence to counter such arguments.

SEDIMENTATION

Very heavy river loads, the decreasing carrying power of rivers, and the shallow seas of the Platform zone, combine to make rapid sedimentation of estuarial and coastal regions the characteristic

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of contemporary relief forms and drainage patterns. The rate of coastal advance seaward upon the Platform is in places phenomenally rapid; the Tjimanoek (Fig. 19) and Solo deltas in Java are extending at the rate of 100 metres annually, the Mekong at 60–80 metres annually. An outburst of volcanic ash increases the deposition by neighbouring rivers at the coast, though the behaviour of sea currents moulds the riberine deposit in detail on reaching the sea. Mangroves and associated vegetation quickly establish themselves on sandbanks and cays so that at the mouth of the Perak, for example, an exposure of a bank for only a few days at a low water season is enough to permit vegetation to start there, hastening the rate of deposition by offering an obstruction to river outflow and thereby perpetuating the bank which in other settings might disappear by erosion during the next high water spell.

Where streams debouch into deep seas the rate of coastal extension is inevitably less, due to the greater thicknesses which must be laid for every outward extension, yet the Irrawaddy Delta is building outward at the rate of about 60 metres per annum; that the Irrawaddy can maintain this rate of building into a deep basin reflects its tremendous load and a physical condition which concentrates the deposition of this load at the outer edge of the Delta rather than over its surface. (See Chapter 9.)

Because the rivers are steadily sedimenting the bed of their lower reaches, these are in fact generally being raised in level. Such a process cannot continue very far; when its bed is raised slightly above the surrounding land, the river easily changes course, and every large delta of Southeast Asia shows signs of frequent migration of distributaries. Old channels and distributaries in various phases of abandonment may be seen at nearly every river mouth. Most deltas suffer regular inundation at various times of the year facilitating farming for rice, which depends on either natural or artificially induced floods, in most cases derived from rivers. The process of spreading sediment over the whole delta zone goes on both by migration of distributaries and by seasonal inundations, so that the deltaic surface over a wide area is being slowly raised by sedimentation, making it progressively more difficult to irrigate the inner and higher sections of the deltas and in the long run causing the centre of gravity of irrigation steadily to move

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FIG. 20.—Flood Zones at the Junction of the Lipis-Pahang Rivers

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133 downstream, where also the newer unexhausted soils are to be
134 found.

Marshes and Swamps

133 All land masses whose rivers empty on to the Sunda Platform are thus characteristically fringed with flat landscapes of marshes on a large scale. East Sumatra is an outstanding example of prolonged sedimentation by tropical rivers moving into shallow seas; this coastal marsh, at least 60,000 square miles in area, about a third of Sumatra, indicates what may result from equatorial sedimentation, here probably aided by a volcanic outburst in inner Sumatra during historic time (possibly during the century or so prior to A.D. 1000) and facilitated by the shallow Malacca Strait where the main tidal scour is to the east rather than to the Sumatra side. Huge flat islands have been formed off East Sumatra and they are regularly inundated by tides even now, so that they are in effect amphibious areas. The speed with which these coasts of sedimentation can advance and change should be taken into account when attempting to correlate historic place-names with sites and settlements of today. It may be that the decline of large principalities in Eastern Sumatra, reported in the first millennium by Oriental travellers, should be attributed to changes of coastline and to rapid deterioration of old site values.

Floods

A further feature of old drainage forms in Southeast Asia is the large size of inland swamps, as apparent in Malaya and Borneo. These arise from a combination of several factors:

(*a*) the torrential downpours are often so intense that for a few hours the surface water is greater than streams can carry off, or subsoil can absorb;

(*b*) the density of the vegetation cover impedes run-off;

(*c*) differences of downpours in nearby rivers frequently cause a swift rise of level in one stream and not in another which it joins, so that at the confluence (Fig. 20) the stream in spate dams back the other and the flood may even flow into it, or build bars of silt across it. The Tonle Sap marshes suffer from Mekong floods in this way;

(*d*) where a drainage system has cluse (as in Malayan streams) or similar constrictions (as in the Irrawaddy gorges) these features

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may induce flooding of the valley above the narrows. The Tasek Bera of Malaya in this way reflects constrictions in the Pahang Valley;

(*e*) the presence of levees means that the zone between them and the foothills has difficulty in draining to the river after a flood or during a downpour, so the levees are generally lined landwards by broad freshwater marshes, as by the rivers across the Korat Plateau in Siam (Fig. 90);

(*f*) where local rain seasons coincide with the arrival of spates, originating elsewhere in the local rivers, the landscape cannot shed the direct rainfall rapidly and it induces marshes.

Most of the freshwater marshes are seasonally flooded, drying out quickly in spells of drought, draining when local streams are low, but then flooding to depths up to 10 ft. during wet seasons.

Some types of swamp are man-induced. When alluvial mining is being carried on, dredges and gravel pumps effectively stir up large quantities of river sediment which is carried downstream as the mining effluent (Fig. 21).



FIG. 21.—Alluvial Fans being thrust across Bentong Valley

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311 This artificially stirred sediment is agriculturally negative and
133 it penetrates the ditches and drains of rice growing areas,
gradually silting them up, often spectacularly raising the
241 local river bed (at Serendah in Malaya, the river bed was
134 raised 21 ft. by sedimentation over the decade 1923-33), as well as sterilising fields on which the silt spreads so that cultivation becomes more difficult as the river can no longer be kept out. The yields decrease and the fields are abandoned, swamp vegetation gradually obliterating signs of cultivation. Round the lower Malacca River may be found signs of the old field bundings within the tangle of swamp vegetation now growing there, a sign of the effects of mining higher in the river whose effluent is obliterating cultivation in lower areas. This type of swamp comes slowly and has all the appearance of nature overcoming men's efforts to farm, but it is fundamentally a result of man-induced erosions or abrasions elsewhere. Thus interference, by mining and forest clearing, with landforms stabilised over long periods, not only goes on by removal of silt and gravels carried from mining areas and topsoils removed by torrential rains on clean-weeded agricultural areas as a mark of transfer of surface materials from one area, but it also causes the obliteration of cultivation and an extension of useless marsh in the areas where this material is deposited.

133 Because these tropical marshes occur in zones of human signifi-
361 cance, that is, in the flatter areas with agricultural possibilities, and along the coasts where settlement from overseas might take place, they have played a major part in conditioning the distribution of human beings in Southeast Asia. Both the coastal and inland marshes are tree-covered, making it even more difficult to penetrate, control, or cultivate them. Varying degrees of swampiness often account for the ease of development of farming in one place rather than another in Southeast Asia and a broad belt of marsh has generally proved a greater human impediment than any other topographic feature.

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Chapter Four

SOUTHEAST ASIA'S NATURAL VEGETATION

Tropical Forest Factors

The heavy, evenly distributed rainfall and constant high temperatures of most of Southeast Asia encourage continuous plant growth and a profuse, very varied flora. Because the whole year is here a growing season, plant life becomes almost overpowering in its rate of growth. This region contains more species than any other; the flora is not yet completely known, but some 35,000 species of flowering plants alone are thought to exist there (van Steenis). On Borneo at least 11,000 species have been listed, according to Merrill. This contrasts with the parallel figure of 13,600 species for the whole of Tropical West Africa (Good). Woody plants predominate and 15 per cent of the species are trees whose mature trunks are over 16 in. in diameter. The profusion of species is due to (*a*) the predominantly warm, moist climate, (*b*) the constancy of this climate over long geological periods, (*c*) the variety of relief and islands producing minor adaptations, (*d*) the rapidity with which selective and adaptive evolutionary processes can establish new characteristics in a tropical climate which has no resting season, and (*e*) the migrations of plant types from both Asia and Australia. 132 137

Southeast Asia was originally clothed by nature almost entirely by a tree cover. Only in modern times has there been any extensive clearing because apart from firing, primitive people were technically incapable of removing the forest. Some clearings became permanent for cultivation, in recent centuries, but the majority have been temporary and partial clearings, later left to natural replacement by a selective vegetation such as grass, savannah or scrub. Temporary clearings resulted largely from systems of shifting cultivation which finally abandon an area, partially cleared by fire, to a series of quick-growing plants, becoming after a few years a secondary forest which may, over prolonged periods, evolve to be scarcely distinguishable from primary forest. 137 311 241

The system of migrant agriculture or shifting cultivation, in Malaya called *ladang* and in Burma *taungya*, is widespread through-

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[31 24] 137 out Southeast Asia and it may be this form of nomadism has in fact operated so long that it affects nearly every acre of the region, thereby exercising a distinct selective action on the whole forest (Sauer). Much forest which we call "primary" may be senile secondary. This is evident in more densely populated areas such as Java and Tonkin, and over the centuries may have no less influenced the forest types of even thinly populated zones, as Borneo still is. In this sense "primary forest" is a relative term, to be retained for convenience rather than as presupposing an absolutely virgin tropical forest.

Two main types of primary lowland forest may be distinguished, the critical factor being drought:

1. In those zones astride the Equator where no season may be called dry, the natural forest is a tall, leafy, congested and evergreen type known as Tropical Rain Forest, sometimes called Equatorial Rain Forest. It may even occur well away from the Equator, towards the northern limit of Southeast Asia, where certain local conditions create a more continuously wet climate than is normal for the latitude.
2. In localities where there are several consecutive months practically without rain, a shorter and more open forest type develops: it has deciduous foliage on the whole, and considerably fewer species. Deciduous Tropical Forest is more generally known as 'Monsoon Forest' and occurs over huge areas in eastern Java, Burma, Siam and Indochina.

Between these Tropical Rain Forests and Monsoon Forests, there are intermediate types and transitional areas where no single meteorological criterion can be used to define the boundary sharply. Within both types, local peculiarities of soil porosity, number of rain-days, relief, exposure and aspect all induce minor variations. In any given unit of this mountainous region, three zones of vegetation may be distinguished within both main forest types, these zones being more distinctive in their differences than the variations of vegetation from one part to another of this huge region. These zones are: (1) coastal vegetation, (2) lowland vegetation, (3) mountain vegetation.

(1) Coastal Vegetation

On shores predominantly sandy, short herbs, grasses and shrubs with creeping stems and fleshy leaves are found; these plant

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groups resemble those of salt-tolerant vegetation on European beaches of which spinifex is a sample. Behind this shore grows a distinctive strip of what may be called *beach woodland*, sometimes referred to as beach forest. On reefs, on muddy shores and estuaries, where there is diurnal flooding at high tide, the *mangrove* forest develops. When the shore is rocky, lowland forest may reach high tide mark. In this vegetation seeds and fruit are waterborne so that currents are an important means of dispersion.

Well-developed beach woodland forms as a ribbon rarely more than 200 ft. inland from the shore and contains tree types not usually seen elsewhere and often reaching 90 ft. in height. The typical tree, the casuarina (Equisetifolia, rhu, ru, tjemara) is rather like a conifer to look at and is related to Australian she-oaks. Sometimes the casuarina is in pure stands; at places the strip includes screw pines (Pandanus), the leathery-leaved Calophyllum, Inophyllum and Barringtonia. Coconut palms, which can take root after nuts have been dispersed by sea-currents, are now prominent in beach woodland areas as a planted crop, but they occur self-sown everywhere through the islands.

Mangrove forests are widely distributed on sedimenting shores throughout Southeast Asia. The fringe of mangroves is interrupted where rocks or cliffs come to the sea and when drainage control has diminished the silt from terrestrial sources. Where mangroves develop, silt is being deposited at a fast rate (sometimes to a thickness of 1½ in. annually); the mangrove thus both raises the surface level and progressively presses farther seaward. Whether mangroves grow only where silt is being deposited or whether they cause silt deposition by their root system, obstructing tidal currents and flood run-off, is still disputed. Possibly both processes operate together. The net effect is one of raising the land level and reclaiming land from the sea. In addition, the wood of mangroves is valued for firewood and charcoal; the bark is sold extensively for tanning. The mangrove trees are of some thirty species, all with structural adaptations enabling them to root in unstable muds and to tolerate daily inundation of their root system by saline tidal water. In addition to the tree, there are shrubs, herbaceous plants and ferns (particularly Aerostichum aureum). The trees are evergreen, sometimes 100 ft. tall, mostly with shining, leather-like leaves, small flowers, and unusual root systems. Some (as Rhizophora) have many roots supporting the trunk which begins well

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

FIG. 22.—Mangrove Root Types. (*a*) The stilted roots of Rhizophora. (*b*) The knee-roots of Bruguiera. (*c*) The up-growing roots of Avicennia

above mud level, as though supported by flying buttresses (Fig. 22). In others (Avicennia and Sonneratia), the main roots are horizontal with many small branches exposing themselves through the mud to stand up above its surface in great numbers covering a wide area round the tree. Another mangrove, Bruguiera, has lateral roots which bend in loops showing above the mud; these loops are called knees and make a great obstacle to movement between the trees. These special root adaptations protrude through the mud to reach free air and they have breathing pores (lenticels); their function may be to oxygenate the roots but they also enable fresh rootlets to be put out at higher and higher levels as the mud and silt increases and stifles the older roots. Many mangrove plants have seeds which germinate before leaving the parent tree. Being heavy and fleshy, they can stick firmly in the mud at low tide or may float away in the tidal currents for considerable distances; other germinated seedlings are shaped like darts to pierce deeply into the mud when they fall.

The main differences between mangrove species are the result of selection according to the amount of tidal inundation they can tolerate; the tide is the chief selective factor in the vegetation pattern from place to place in any one mangrove forest and results in a belt zonation of types roughly paralleling the shoreline. The seaward plants, the pioneers, are most tolerant of salt water; the inland fringe is of the least salt-tolerant types and, as the silt is progressively built up, tidal effects diminish and the vegetation gradually turns into a freshwater swamp with different associations.

The nipa palm (Nipa fruticans), with short stem and feathery leaves often 18 ft. long, lines many estuaries where tidal influence is weakening. It is a palm of brackish but not saline preferences and is extensively used for thatching huts.

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(2) Lowland Vegetation

Tropical Rain Forest.—This primary forest is evergreen, tall and profusely-leaved, but by no means gloomy; the forest floor is usually dappled with sunlight at midday and the undergrowth is fairly thin, except at the edges of roads, paths or rivers, where extra 137



Fig. 23.—Tropical Rain Forest in Profile. The diagram represents a strip of forest 180 ft. in width. Note: (i) the height of the trees; (ii) the crowns are represented in a conventional manner

light induces dense ground vegetation. Within the forest, air is still and constant at temperatures as much as 10° F. below those at the top of the forest. Plants with showy flowers are unusual; variegated and multicoloured foliage is common, while not modifying the general impression of a dark green landscape.

It is the Tropical Rain Forest which most often gets called "jungle." This word, however, has been applied so loosely from district to district, to vegetation types ranging from forest to dry scrub, that it has lost precise meaning and should be avoided.

A distinct structure shows in Tropical Rain Forest, based on height and light. Trees some 190 ft. high are scattered throughout the forest, jutting their isolated heads through a layer of foliage some 60 ft. high, where the crowns of trees touch one another to form a canopy or storey (Fig. 23). Below this are shrubs, saplings and herbaceous plants, all shade-loving types and thinly scattered. On the whole the trees are evergreen, though there are distinct

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137 leaf changes in individual trees. This change of leaves is not regional and some trees retain old leaves until new ones are well formed. The general impression of evergreen persists as a result of a non-synchronous leaf rhythm. The degree of correlation between flowering, leafing and climate varies considerably; certain of the forest plants flower after a few days of drought or a slight local drop of temperature, as in thunderstorms, others persist in annual rhythms whatever the local weather may be, some correlate with the local peaks of rainfall, and some assume a fifteen months' periodicity. Each storey of trees has special features; the topmost storey has thin straight boles despite the great height of the trees, and is inclined to flattened crowns of undivided, tough, oval leaves. Many of the tall trees have plank buttresses, thin outgrowths extending up to 15 ft. from the ground, stabilising the relatively thin boles in soils not well suited for root anchoring, and presenting a major difficulty when the trees are to be felled. Second storey trees are in general smaller in every respect; their leaves are proportionately larger, extending to long fine points.

Two groups of plants fit into this tree ecology: (*a*) the lianes, (*b*) the epiphytes.

Lianes are woody creepers, often several hundred feet long, which climb from the ground using hooks and tendrils on the tree-trunks in order to reach the sunlit crowns. They use trees as supports only and spread in great festoons from tree to tree; their flowers are in the upper storeys and their stems may be from finger thickness to as much as 10 in. in diameter. Rattans are typical lianes, their strong thorny stems being much used as native ropes and wires.

Epiphytes include orchids, ferns and wild figs. Their seeds become established in high branches and are adapted either to live self-contained above ground, or as in the case of the strangling fig (Ficus), to send down very long roots which ultimately fasten in the ground. Only certain of these epiphytes are truly parasitic, feeding on the sap of a host; most of them are merely supported by the host-tree. The fig sends down tough quick-growing roots round the trunk of another tree, finally strangling the host until it rots away, leaving the fig tree sustained by a hollow network of roots. This particular plant, the seeds of which are both bird-carried and wind-borne, may prove highly destructive to stone structures, as in the case of the Angkor temples.

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Tropical Rain Forest is remarkable for the number of tree-types which go to make it and for its heterogeneous composition. Continuous stands of any single tree species very rarely occur, and often thirty may be found in a forest patch 100 yds. square. While the trees differ widely, the family group Dipterocarpaceae, gigantic in dimensions and bearing winged seeds like shuttlecocks, is the most prominent. Within the forest individual trees are restricted by the congestion so that the shape of high trees in tropical gardens or along roads is no guide to their shape when in their natural setting. 137

From the thousands of tree types in this forest some commercially valuable timbers, gums, resins and camphor can be obtained. Most of the trees, however, are commercially useless; the heterogeneous composition and density of the forest operates against exploitation of even those species which could prove useful. 314

Within the Tropical Rain Forest, several subsidiary types may be recognised. 137

(*a*) Parts of Borneo, Sumatra and Malaya have a white, porous, sandy subsoil thought to be a tropical podsol (see Chapter 5). Upon this, pitcher plants, conifers and a treeless, heathlike ecology of grasses and shrubs may develop.

(*b*) Upon porous limestone landscapes, the trees are short and epiphytic plants are most common, since these can tolerate the absence of groundwater.

(*c*) Behind the mangroves and transitional between them and the true lowland Tropical Rain Forest, are Freshwater Swamp Forests, extensively developed in Sumatra, Malaya and Borneo. The plants peculiar to this swamp setting vary with the duration of freshwater flooding. Trees here are shorter, fewer in species, well-buttressed and often stilt-rooted. Over considerable areas stands of a single type of palm may occur and palms of short varieties cover the ground to impede movement. Sometimes on the east coast of Sumatra the Freshwater Swamp Forest produces a tropical bog on peat soil formed by rotting vegetal remains several yards deep.

Secondary Forest.—The sequence of vegetation which replaces Tropical Rain Forest after removal is called Secondary Forest, made up of ferns, tropical grasses and scrub. It may be subdivided into distinct vegetation types which are various stages in the transition from naked ground to tropical forest. The process of replace-

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137 ment depends for its character in detail on the length of time the forest clearing has continued in cultivation, the extent of soil erosion, the clearing suffered, the original soil type and the proximity of natural forest from which seeds may be derived. To go through these replacement phases, natural vegetation is thought to need at least two centuries of most favourable conditions before it will become anything like Primary Tropical Rain Forest again. During the transitional stages spontaneous fires often occur, to prolong the replacement period; grazing animals have similar selective effects.

The normal replacement succession is first herbaceous grassland, then shrubs and finally trees. Tropical grasses, coarse, tough and in tussocks, quickly appear on any newly exposed ground and reach a height of 5 ft. These grass landscapes, on which Imperata Cylindrica is typical, often resemble savannah. The grass burns rapidly and regrows quickly because it spreads by subsurface root runners shielded from the effects of burning. Quick-growing tropical grass stifles most other vegetation, so that it is both a sign of inferior soils and may even be the cause of them. While grass is the most prominent type, sometimes wild sugar canes establish themselves.

The scrub consists of wild ginger and a tropical rhododendron (Melastoma malabathricum). Giant ferns spread rapidly and compactly in some districts as pure stands in which bracken (Pteridium) appears prominently.

Young Secondary Forest develops trees some 30 ft. high in a few years but the earlier successions leave behind a dense undergrowth and many giant creepers. Stands of the same species persist for some time and the trees are at first of fast growing, soft wooded varieties. Pines are fairly common in some local secondary vegetation, the older types of which are scarcely distinguishable from Primary Forest except for the thick undergrowth.

Monsoon Forest.—Because Monsoon Forest has a distinct dry season, it is subject to widespread and frequent fires which exercise a selection in favour of deep-rooted or thick-seeded types which can regrow after a forest fire. Shifting cultivation is thought to have had a greater effect in Monsoon Forest areas than on the Tropical Rain Forest, so that Monsoon Forest may be largely a secondary rather than a primary forest type. The type stretches across Southeast Asia in two broad zones, roughly symmetrical to the Equator. The

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argest zone covers Burma, Siam and Indochina, while the counterpart in Eastern Java, the Sunda Islands and New Guinea covers a much smaller area, with local variants due to insularity. These zones are identical with the dry areas of Fig. 10. 137

In the rainy season, Monsoon Forest resembles Tropical Rain Forest. Its tree heights are less, the foliage not so profuse, and the spacing more open. Only the undergrowth remains fairly green for the whole year; the rest of the vegetation sheds leaves in the dry season, when the forest has a bare, stark appearance. Herbaceous plants, lianes and bamboo are common but epiphytes are unusual and the herbs almost disappear in the very hot dry season. Among the trees, Acacias and Albizzias are especially common and Leguminosae are prominent.

Some observers distinguish between wetter and drier types of Monsoon Forest, both transitional from Tropical Rain Forest to Tropical Desert, the latter being outside Southeast Asia.

Monsoon Forest is mostly of mixed species but sometimes a single species dominates, possibly as a result of selection through repeated burning. Of these, teak forests (Tectona grandis) are characteristic and important commercially, occurring in Northern Burma, Northern Siam, Eastern Java and the Moluccas. So valuable has teak proved itself that some existing forest areas are actually re-plantations of it. Teak has thick hard-cased seeds which are fire resistant. Its saplings come through fire successfully and the pure stands are thought to have been the result of natural selection on these lines, since it is fairly certain that forests of teak alone do not occur under natural conditions. Teak reaches to heights of over 120 ft., the lower half of the tree being straight and unbranched under forest conditions. Undergrowth is negligible and the ground is covered with brittle teak leaves which often cup, forming mosquito-breeding places in the wet season. [313]

Resembling the teak forests in origin, eucalyptus forests have developed in the eastern islands as migrants from Australia, occurring naturally only in New Guinea, Timor, the Lesser Sundas, Celebes and the Philippines.

Another single stand deriving from the Monsoon Forest by selection, is bamboo forest. Considerable areas almost exclusively occupied by bamboos are found in the northern parts of Southeast Asia, with small patches in East Java. Bamboos in great variety grow everywhere in Southeast Asia and they have been planted 313 137

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137 extensively because of their usefulness structurally and domestically, but continuous stands become established only where the 313 dry season is very marked and where shifting cultivation is known to have been practised extensively. Bamboos are giant perennial grasses of about a hundred species, with woody stems and woody 137 roots. They grow in clumps and may be evergreen or deciduous. Some bamboos flower at long intervals (25-70 years) and their seeds are fire-resisting. Constant friction between the dry woody stems may cause forest fires and help to produce that selective process which leads to stands of bamboo.

[134] Monsoon Dry Forest, an open wooded landscape containing very few species, may be found over large areas of Burma, Siam and Indochina in association with poor soils. Known as *indaing* in Burma and *padeng* in Siam, this forest develops where rainfalls are not much above 40 in. per annum, and it may merge on the equatorial side into Tropical Rain Forest and on the other into dry or thorny savannah vegetation. Within Monsoon Dry Forest trees are widely spaced, tending to be stunted forms of Dipterocarpaceae and distinctly deciduous.

Secondary Monsoon Forests.—Considerable areas of savannah found in Burma, Siam, Indochina and the Eastern Indies are secondary growths after a removal of the natural Monsoon Forest. Savannah is open country of tall, coarse grasses, occasionally having a few scattered bamboos or low trees and very much associated with long dry seasons whose effects are aggravated by poor or porous soils. Savannah merges into Monsoon Dry Forest and is often covered with low palms (Borassus flabellifer), and contains prickly pears, spiny cactus-like plants, and similar thorny scrub.

(3) Mountain Vegetation

Vegetation steadily and often imperceptibly changes with altitude and the resulting types are much the same, level for level, throughout Southeast Asia. All but the very highest mountains are forested, though the trees on exposed summits are dwarfed; only in New Guinea and Yunnan are the heights great enough entirely to prevent tree growth and produce an alpine vegetation. Young volcanoes may be treeless for pedological, rather than for climatic reasons.

Above about 2,000 ft., at most points of Southeast Asia, large

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trees of Dipterocarp type gradually disappear and temperate trees of the oak and chestnut type become commoner, though the landscape continues full of giant bracken and tree ferns. Higher still the vegetation dwarfs considerably, shadiness diminishes, and woody plants become twisted and gnarled. This often turns into a moss or "elfin" forest above 5,000 ft., in localities where the air is constantly cool and saturated, to produce thick blankets of wet mosses and liverworts upon all other vegetation. Mosses hang in fantastic festoons everywhere and sometimes (as in Borneo) form walls or platforms under which other vegetation, such as dwarf oaks and rhododendrons, are buried (Harrison). Moss forest will not occur in localities with a noticeable dry season: in monsoon areas it is replaced in succession by pine forest, in which, however, some broadleaved trees persist. Above both these mountain forest types (above 6,500 ft.), mountain grasses and shrubs form landscapes of rolling downlike appearance. 137

Fauna

Between the western and eastern fringes of Southeast Asia there are greater differences zoologically than between Asia and South America, even though these are separated by the Atlantic (Merrill). The differences derive from the long separation of Australia from Asia. Migration has gone on from Asia and Australia into the islands and peninsulas of Southeast Asia which is thus a transitional zoogeographical region (Fig. 24). 136

The Tropical Rain Forest has complicated ecologies of living creatures associated with the various storeys and the variety of these creatures parallels the variety of vegetation. Large animals such as elephants, tigers, rhinoceros, etc., are relatively few and confined to the coastal sections. Specially numerous are arboreal and flying creatures, butterflies, birds, moths and insects. These are able to migrate from place to place with considerable ease so that the convergence of Asiatic and Australian species has gone on fairly freely. The contrasting zoological types are summed up in the difference between mammals; in Australia, except for a few bats and rodents, mammals are marsupial (pouched) or monotreme (single vented); in Asia these groups are entirely lacking and are replaced by placental mammals, monkeys, shrews, squirrels and ungulates.

By far the richest zoological group is that spreading from Asia.

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

FIG. 24.—Biological Regions of Southeast Asia

136 For a long time Wallace's Line was held to demarcate these zoological types; Wallace himself drew the boundary just west of Lombok and Celebes but Huxley later extended it to include the Philippines in the "Australian" zone. Geographically the boundary clearly correlates with the limits of the Sunda Platform and the interglacial connection between Malaya, Borneo, Sumatra and Java appears to have permitted zoological migration fairly uniformly among them, whereas there has been no continued land connection between the "mediterranean islands" east of the Platform. Later more detailed study of the fauna has produced criticisms of the Wallace Line. The steady pressure of zoological types eastward has been demonstrated and Weber laid down another limit which he showed more closely to accord with the balance between Asiatic and Australian fauna. East of it Australian types dominate. Wallace's Line thus is now best thought of as the eastward limit of the typically Asiatic zoological types; it is matched by a line just west of the Sahul Shelf which is the westward limit of exclusively Australian and New Guinea faunal types.

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Between this and the Wallace Line is the zone of tectonic instability, the "mediterranean" zone, where faunal destruction followed by re-population from nearby continents has gone on fairly frequently, but irregularly and without uniformity from place to place; Weber's Line is roughly marginal to this "mediterranean" faunal zone. 136

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Chapter Five

SOUTHEAST ASIA SOILS

Factors in Tropical Soil Development

134 While most soils of Southeast Asia have in common the fact that they have been evolved under conditions of plentiful moisture, they vary very considerably and the term "laterites," frequently used to describe them, is so broad that it misleads. In the tropics, as elsewhere, soils represent a synthesis of the inter-related factors of climate, parent rock, plants and animals, relief and drainage; a change in any one of these factors will cause a change of soil character. Time, too, plays a considerable part. If the factors operate for a period indefinitely long, the soil type conditioned by them will evolve until the soil represents a perfect balance or end product of them. When the forest cover is removed or a volcanic eruption throws out new rock material, certain of the factors are changed, the soil reverts to a more juvenile stage and its evolution begins again on different materials and may take a different form. Thus soil differences from place to place are often due to differences in stage of evolution, in the time factor.

Southeast Asia weathering is fairly uniform from place to place. It occurs without exposure to frosts or to wide alternations of heat and cold, but under conditions of warmth and heavy rainfall. Hence the weathering process is chemical rather than mechanical.

Those regions of Southeast Asia away from the Equator and having a markedly seasonal rainfall (as in the dry belts of Burma and Siam) may be described as subject for part of the year to equatorial soil processes where surface evaporation is nearly nil and for part to desertic soil processes in which surface evaporation is at a maximum.

The warm rainwater of tropical conditions, well carbonated and charged with the biochemicals of vegetal disintegration, breaks down the silicates, which form most rocks, into salts which are leached away, leaving the complex sesquioxides to accumulate in the soil. These may in turn undergo selective changes, all leading to the accumulation of clays. In the tropical heat of Southeast Asia

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lowlands these changes, known as the hydrolysis of the silicates, most involved phases of soil chemistry, take place very fast compared with those of European latitudes or of high mountains, and reach the "end-product" or mature stage quickly. On the Sunda Platform and the Sahul Shelf, prolonged geological stability has in any case brought the mature stage in local soils, but even the more juvenile types of soil on the younger volcanic structures are rapidly evolving towards maturity. Adding further to the complexity of Southeast Asia soils is the variety of rock types and the varied lengths of dry season towards the margins of the region. Thus the diversity is great, although differences in the soil end-products is lessened to some extent by rapid maturity under a single broad weathering type—the warm, damp tropical.

Tropical Groundwater

With certain local exceptions, Southeast Asia experiences an annual excess of rainfall over evaporation. This means that there is a steady movement of rainwater downwards, percolating through the soil as a dilute solution of chemicals from the air and from plants, capable in turn of dissolving some solids in the soil. While some of the soil compounds are produced by the decay of vegetation, the plants depend on the groundwater to dissolve those which become plant nutrients and are absorbed through the root systems. Not all solubles enter plants; most of them are just carried away. The continued downward movement of the soil water effects a steady removal (leaching) of the solubles in Southeast Asia soils. While a thick vegetation cover continues to be in place upon the surface, replacement of some solubles by humus renewal goes on all the time, but once that vegetation is removed, the surface soil rapidly loses its existing soluble elements, receives no renewals, and becomes infertile, a factor making continuous agriculture a drain upon the soil which not only loses its qualities by greater leaching but in addition loses by that which is absorbed into the cultivated plant. Where, however, there are breaks in the cycle of leaching, as in areas having a dry season, the soil water is for a time subject to a condition where evaporation exceeds rainfall, the leaching ceases and there begins the accumulation of soluble plant nutrients or even the drawing up of solubles from depth by capillary processes. These zones, where soil impoverishment is seasonally checked, are those with dry seasons, i.e. from Central Java eastwards, in the

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134 monsoon zones of the Kra Isthmus and northward into Burma, Siam, Indochina, a factor in the greater fertility, agriculture and population of those zones compared with the equatorial areas.

Solution by groundwater, however, is not peculiar to tropical latitudes—it goes on elsewhere. The distinctive point is that high tropical temperatures and heavy rainfalls give groundwater great power both to dissolve and to carry away special selections of the solubles. Easily soluble components of the soil disappear wherever rainfall and groundwater are ample, but the order in which sandy elements, clay elements and iron oxides (the main colouring element) are leached depends on the organic content and temperature of the groundwater. Water containing large quantities of organic material is a rapid solvent of clay and iron compounds; when groundwater is of this type, the silica occurring in the soil in the form of quartz remains scarcely touched for a long period, according to Glinka, causing the mature topsoil to consist largely of sandy elements bleached white by the removal of iron oxide colouring and the mature subsoil to show signs of re-precipitation of the iron oxide at lower levels. This is the process of *podsolisation*. On the other hand, where its organic content is low, groundwater breaks down any silica in the form of complex aluminium silicates faster than the other compounds and removes certain elements of it, so that there remains an upper soil consisting at maturity largely of stable clays and iron compounds, strongly coloured red, yellow or brown. This process is *laterisation*, the dominant soil process in Southeast Asia. The end-product of laterisation may be called laterite, a porous, crumbly-textured, bright red soil often hardening on exposure to the air and composed almost exclusively of clays and iron compounds, and much the same whatever the parent rock. Only in limited areas is this laterite fully developed; elsewhere the process has not reached its final or mature stages so that most Southeast Asia soils may more aptly be called laterised, that is, at an intermediate stage of laterisation. This stage may be assessed by measuring the proportion of silica to the alumina; the higher the silica content, the less laterisation has taken place (Polynov).

The whole process of laterisation involves very special aspects of complex chemical and physical changes which await the researcher for clarification.

The organic content of soils depends in turn on temperature

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which conditions the rate at which soil bacteria and fungi can break down dead leaves and other plant remains, first to the dark-coloured humus and then to chemical compounds. Thus there is a steady addition of decaying vegetable matter to the soil as trees and plants drop their leaves or die, and a continuous depletion of it as bacteria complete its breakdown. The balance between them is established by temperature and in the tropics where soil temperatures remain so steadily above 75° F. the breakdown by micro-organisms is considerably faster than the vegetation, profuse as it may appear, can replace. Thus the organic content of laterised soils is relatively small, and confined to a few inches of topsoil, beneath which practically no humic solids or liquids will be found. In vegetation-covered localities, shielded by the canopy of trees, where average soil temperatures may be well below 75° F., accretion of organic matter exceeds depletion, enabling humus to accumulate and form black-coloured soils.

Where the soil is waterlogged, a widespread condition in western Southeast Asia, bacterial action is hindered by the exclusion of oxygen so that, whatever the soil temperature, dead vegetation accumulates, often in the form of thick layers of peat. Altitude, by lowering the soil temperature for periods below the critical 75° F. (Glinka), is also responsible for variations in the humus content of soils. In Preanger (Java) for example, the top soil gradually changes from one with a slow humus content and red colour on the foothills, through brownish, with an increasing humus content at altitudes of 5,000 ft., to become dark brown or black at higher levels on mountains. The relative subsoils are red in the foothills, where laterisation predominates, and gradually change to dirty white at higher levels where podsolisation and bleaching are aided by the lower temperatures.

Examples of local podsolisation in the tropics have been observed upon parent rocks of exceptionally porous character, as in the coarse sands and sandstones of Banka, Borneo and Malaya over which distinct bleached earths occur. Why laterisation should be replaced by podsolisation under these conditions is not clear, but the sandy, white or bleached soils are unmistakable. Thin Secondary Forest is normally the vegetation cover of such districts, whether as cause or effect of the podsolisation has not been determined. Glinka quotes examples where excessive moisture and humus have bleached certain soils among laterites and notes that

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134 podsols developed under these conditions in the tropics differ chemically from analogous types in temperate climates. He reports the possibility that white laterised soils may derive from rocks containing magnetite forms of iron, which will not break down into ordinary brownish oxides under weathering.

Laterised Soils

While the characteristic colour of laterised soils is red, some of them have bright yellow colours which, however, do not indicate major chemical differences, except that the various types of iron oxide are more intensely hydrated. The colour distinction is now held to be of minor importance. Sometimes a red mottling breaks the uniformity of the yellow colouring; this is thought (Pendleton) to be connected with aeration along dead roots of plants, which have now disintegrated. Occasionally the fine channel of a root can be seen at the core of such mottlings, cross-sections of which often have ringed or oyster-shell patterns.

Laterisation produces end-products not materially differing however different the parent rocks may be, so that tropical red soils develop to much the same appearance over granite and over limestone, although the rate of maturing varies. On the other hand, the chemical character of parent rock may show for a considerable time in the laterised soils. Thus, the igneous rocks of Sumatra and Java are in some regions basic and in others acid. The more acid type of igneous rock contains very little calcium and phosphorus, weathering slowly into poor soils, whereas the basic rocks initially contain more of these elements and release them readily, to weather in the tropics into soils whose composition makes them more fertile. The leaching continues rapidly, and at a more advanced stage of weathering the soils from basic rocks are no richer in these solubles than those from acid extrusions. This accounts for great differences in the agricultural potential of the flanks of different volcanoes in Java, where any thinly populated zone may safely be interpreted as a zone of soils lying over acid igneous parent rocks, or of overmature soils upon basic parent rocks. Pedologists disagree as to whether mature laterites can be derived from every type of rock but the majority incline to accept this point of view. Pure quartz sandstone, however, resists laterisation and quartz veins persist unweathered long after the original rocks containing them have broken down.

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The term "laterite" (from L. later, brick), now limited to mature laterised soils, has had a history confused by varying definitions. It was used in India by Buchanan in 1807 to describe a tropical soil containing large quantities of iron, soft enough to be cut with a spade or mattock, yet rapidly hardening on exposure to sun and air into an excellent constructional material much used for tropical buildings. Afterwards the term became loosely used for any reddish



FIG. 25.—Section of Laterised Sandstone, Korat. Surface burnt for shifting cultivation. (*a*) Reddish-yellow sandy layer with tubular ironpan along old root-lines. (*b*) Lateritic ironpan and granular concretions, 6-12 inches thick. (*c*) Weathered sandstone, some bedding still showing, tubular passages (old roots), brownish-red. (*d*) Red sandstone of Korat, lightly consolidated, hardly deformed

tropical soils. Discrimination in the use of the word is modern and the standards are by no means uniform.

At best, only certain layers or horizons of laterite will harden on exposure. When this type of laterite is used structurally, being an end-product of weathering, it resists further weathering and buildings made of it stand up to the tropical climate better and longer than any other local material, evidenced by the old fort at Malacca and the temples of Angkor whose laterite slabs are firm and square after centuries of exposure.

Mature laterites may be up to 100 ft. thick, all weathered *in situ* and justifying the word "soil" to describe it. Several distinct horizons occur within this thickness. On top is a few inches of forest soil, dark with humus and partially decayed matter (Fig. 25). Under this is red earth, crumbly and sticky to the hand, permeable to water yet easily "baking" if ever exposed to the direct sun. Much of the water is held colloidally so that percolation wells can rarely be used in laterised ground. Four or five feet below the surface a

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134 distinct cellular structure develops, consisting of a coarse network of iron compounds round softer cores of clay. This is the horizon which may be of that hardening type suitable for a structural material. Sometimes the iron compounds at this level change *in situ* into hard concretions like a pan roughly paralleling the surface and looking like a lustrous slag. These crusts or concretions ring like hollow iron and might be mistaken for volcanic material. Containing up to 30 per cent of iron, they have at times been smelted, but extensive use for this purpose awaits development of a suitable



FIG. 26.—Section in West Singapore: Hill with Partially Removed Rubber. 1. Lateritic ironpan running across bedding planes. 2. Red subsoil, 3 feet thick. 3. Partially removed shale. 4. Conglomerate

process. Oxide of manganese occurs in these concretions as well. The pan may be continuous beneath a large area and prevent percolation, and in deforested areas the softer topsoil may be washed away, or slide down the surface of the iron pan which then shows as a compact platform inhibiting secondary vegetation.

The concretion of iron compounds is thought to be connected both with seasonal variations of the subsoil water level and with electrolytic changes in descending water heavily charged with solvents. Fracture planes, by creating internal drainage lines, encourage panning to follow lines unrelated to the surface contours. Skew-panning may also develop strongly along lines of quartz which persists undecomposed through thick laterites. While the iron concretion layer has special interest because of its resemblance to pan layers in other latitudes, it is by no means ubiquitous and some writers relate the pan to igneous parent rock. The stratifications of laterised soils are more related to the relief of the surface than to stratifications of the parent material (Fig. 26).

Beneath the concretion layer is another horizon of almost continuous saturation where the coloration tends to be less red and more yellow or whitish right down to the horizon of decomposing rock. These deeper horizons represent less advanced stages of

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weathering, repeating at depth some of the variations noted at the surface in less maturely laterised soils elsewhere.

Cuttings through laterised soil, as for roads and railways, frequently develop a dark crust after exposure, giving the sides of the cuttings an appearance of hardness belying the soft soil beneath it. Occasionally these exposures are honeycombed where softer parts have been washed away by rains, leaving the cellular structure of iron compounds fully evident. Because laterised soils are so wet and thick, the destructive processes of slumping and slipping assert themselves strongly. Soil creep on slopes operates relatively fast, particularly if an iron pan exists not far below the surface. Whole sections of a hillside may thus slump down into a valley leaving a scar which wild vegetation needs a long time to conceal. Road cuttings frequently slump at the sides as though huge spoons had been used upon them. Almost any ditch will show soil creep in the form of root-matted topsoil hanging well out over the side of the ditch.

Polynov and Laterisation

Polynov in his "Cycle of Weathering" has discussed a new interpretation of lateritic soils. Previous pedologists have considered laterisation to be a process peculiar to the high temperature and heavy rainfalls of the tropics. Polynov produces an argument to show that laterised soils may result as the end-product of weathering in any latitude, given a sufficiently long time for the process to operate. In his view the frequency with which laterites occur in the tropics now is due less to the special character of weathering there, and more to its rapidity, which brings soil maturity very much faster than in cooler latitudes. The age and stability of the Sunda Platform and the Sahul Shelf fit into both schemes since soils upon them may be considered to be brought to maturity by uninterrupted weathering during prolonged geologic time, and by the intense and continuous nature of tropical weathering. Whatever the value of Polynov's theory from the soil chemist's point of view, it helps to account for red soils of lateritic aspect outside tropical areas without needing to postulate major climatic changes.

Soils in the Drier Zones of Southeast Asia

Northward from the Equator, Southeast Asia is subject to a longer and longer dry season during which soil leaching diminishes. On exposed soils, the high surface evaporation of dry periods even

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134 induces an upflow of groundwater which evaporates and thereby precipitates solubles in the topsoil. These have sometimes been called the Savannah Soils, found extensively in Siam and Indochina. The type occurs not only where the climate permits but also where destruction of marginal Tropical Rain Forest has gone on at a rate faster than natural replacement. Because tropical forest soil works with a very small quantity of plant nutrients circulating rapidly in a cycle from soil to leaves and back again to soil, the balance is delicate. Where the forest is almost virgin, natural fires do little damage, but persistent burning by men may break the cycle of nutrients and release altogether the small initial capital of solubles. The iron concretions under such conditions become firmly cemented into subsurface platforms inimical to anything except coarse tropical grass and the topsoil is exposed to rapid removal by torrential storms. The more accessible laterites which received early examination were often under vegetation of the savannah type and they were thought at one time to be signs of a change of local climate, from Equatorial to Savannah, whereas in fact they reflect over-destruction of the original tropical forest, followed by such a change of soil type that the forest cannot re-establish itself. Because laterite is very porous, rain falling upon it may be heavy yet quickly passes beyond the reach of plants, carrying all plant nutrients away, thereby preventing regrowth of the original vegetation cover.

Natural savannahs in Southeast Asia are noteworthy for their extensive iron concretion layers which provide support for the view that vertical fluctuation of subsoil water is a factor in the formation of lateritic iron-pan.

Soils and Agriculture

134 241 The different types of tropical forest induce minor differences in the soils beneath them, which assume major significance when the forest is cleared for cultivation. The limited supply of plant nutrients explains that paradox between the apparent fertility of an elaborate and profuse forest vegetation and the poverty of the soil when the forest is removed, the cycle of nutrients broken and most solubles washed away. Eventually clearances in the forest mean an increase in the outflow of nutrients in solution or suspension which are finally distributed into the swamps, the estuaries and the sea. To some extent the practice of burning, which reduces the forest to

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ash, lying for a while upon the surface, returns to the soil part of the chemicals of plant structure, yet unless steps are taken to retain this "capital" by terracing or cover crops, the ash quickly dissolves and disappears into the streams. Good crops may be obtained by utilising this soil capital immediately, but it can last only for a season or two, after which the natural infertility of laterised soils becomes apparent. It is not so serious with isolated native clearings, done under the shifting cultivation system, because each clearing is so small, and surrounded by forest, that lost soil nutrients are not carried far before they are recaptured into the forest ecology by the tangle of adjoining vegetation. When shifting cultivation is done too frequently over the one patch, that is, more frequently than, say, once in twenty years or so, then progressive impoverishment of the soil takes place. Maintenance of fertility in clearings is easier in less maturely laterised areas and where there is at least a short, dry season to interrupt the depletion processes. 134 241

The basic volcanic rocks of Java as well as the recent ash and mud flows contain chemicals which weather to plant nutrients and, being in addition very young in the laterising cycle, they produce fertile soils. On the older lavas and on the acid outpourings, a maturer stage of laterisation has been reached to produce soils no better for agriculture than other parts of the Sunda Platform. A new volcanic outburst, while creating temporary havoc, may ultimately produce local agricultural prosperity because it brings a new supply of plant nutrients. The elaborate terracing of new volcanic ash landscapes is only partly due to population pressure: it equally reflects the need to restrain the run-off and to hold back the solubles as long as possible. 134

Apart from the loss of soil fertility due to rapid solution, all bare or clean-weeded soils in the tropics suffer from mechanical erosion by the violent torrential rainstorms. Rainfall of tropical intensity rapidly gullies all bare landscapes and is particularly evident on the less cohesive ashes of volcanic cones, so that another reason for terracing is to offset gullying. Tangled vegetation prevents mechanical soil erosion having any great significances in forested areas, but in Java, where recent ash and intensive cultivation combine to facilitate this type of erosion, rivers contain from 300 to 2,000 gms. of silt per cubic metre; the Irrawaddy has about 750 gms. suspended in each cubic metre. (The Seine and Rhine only contain about 50 gms. of silt per cubic metre.) From tropical forest in a

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134 natural state the soil loss is mainly by solution, and streams running from the jungles are either clear or black with humus content. From clearings, whether natural or artificial, subsoil solution is supplemented by violent mechanical erosion, and streams from these zones are thick and muddy, often tinted red.

Since both the subsoil processes and the surface erosion have water as their principal vector, the solubles and the silt are carried to the deltas and to the freshwater swamps which are the depositories of plant nutrients from all the forested soils. The coastal and freshwater swamps are not subject to rapid decomposition and they progressively accumulate plant foods, hence they function as the chief agricultural areas, continuing to produce without serious soil exhaustion through years of productiveness, as in the Irrawaddy and Menam Chao Praya valleys. These sticky wet soils are black or dark brown, often containing lenses of peat, and completely unlike the laterised soils around them. They are all transported soils, both fluvial and marine sedimentation playing some part in building and shaping them.

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PART II

000 THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

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Chapter Six

THE NATURAL LANDSCAPE OF MALAYA

133 SITED roughly at the middle of the Sunda Platform, Malaya has special interest as a sample of a very ancient landscape scarcely disturbed by tectonic changes which have gone on close to the margins of the Platform. In addition, Malaya is almost entirely equatorial in climatic character, accentuating the maturity of the landscape forms. It also exemplifies the surface effects of that process of marine inundation which followed the glacial epochs of northern latitudes.

RELIEF

Broadly, the country is mountainous. Wide plains, scarcely above sea level, surround the ranges and caused early explorers approaching Malaya from the sea to think the Peninsula was a string of islands. Yet the mountains have no great altitude: Gunong Tahan is only 7,186 ft. and just breaks the continuity of the forest cover, so that Tahan is sparsely covered with thin shrubs through which quartz crystals gleam, an unusual phenomenon in this otherwise tree-covered country, giving rise to the Malay legend that the mountain is made of diamonds guarded by demons.

The mountain ranges stand up most strongly in the northern half of the country but their altitudes diminish southwards where their line disappears beneath the sea to the south, to continue in the hills of the Lingga, Rhio and Banka islands. In Central Malaya meet two sets of ranges; the northern ranges, which lie staggered *en echelon* and skew-wise across the peninsula on NNE-SSW. lines, and the southern ranges of lower altitudes which are less skew to the peninsula and have a NNW-SSE. pattern, apparent also in the Trengganu Highlands. Of the ranges, one called the Central Range, though it lies well to the west, running from Patani in Siam to Malacca, is the most continuous. While differing slightly in detailed structure, all these ranges dominating the Malayan topography have igneous cores which were intruded into very ancient (late Mesozoic) fold mountain systems, possibly

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133 fan-folded with the Central Range as the middle fold, so extensively eroded over long periods that the intrusive granitic rocks within them are now exposed and stand out as the greatest heights.

The ranges are, from west to east:

1. *The Nakawn Range*, reaching the seas as a limestone ridge on the Perlis-Siam border.
2. *The Western Range*, from Singgora through west-central Kedah to the western border of Province Wellesley, with minor outliers in Penang, at Kedah Peak and extending to hills round the Dindings.
3. *The Bintang Range*, from Siam nearly to Bruas.
4. *The Kledang Range*, east of the Perak River and west of Kinta, breached by the Sungei Plus.
5. *The Central or Main Range*, sometimes called the Kerbau or Korbu Range after the highest peak (Gunong Kerbau, 7,160 ft.), stretching in an arc from Siam to Malacca.
6. *The Benom-Mt. Ophir Range*, whose continuity is much broken by east-flowing streams from the Central Range.
7. *The Tahan Range*, running from the Trengganu Highland through Johore and continued through Singapore to the archipelago southward. It is interrupted by the Pahang and Rompin rivers.
8. *The Eastern Range*, the least known, evident from Kelantan to the Pengerang Peninsula in SE. Johore, and considerably interrupted by transverse drainage lines.

On either side of the ranges are hills taking their form and pattern from scarps developed upon the folded sedimentaries flanking the lines of granite.

Malayan Rocks

135 Much of the Malayan rock structure (Fig. 27) is concealed by a thick cover of weathered material and this in turn by the Tropical Rain Forest; only in streambeds, in hills and in mining areas does it show clearly. The main rock formations are:

1. Limestone and calcareous shale: marked on the geology map as a single formation, it may be subdivided into:
   (*a*) massive, resistant, jointed limestone, greyish when newly cut, with minor intercalations of shale. Those parts in contact with the intrusive granite of the ranges have been metamorphosed into marble; partially metamorphosed examples

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

FIG. 27.—Location and Distribution of Malayan Rocks

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have resisted weathering and stand up as cliff-like hill masses repeating the solution features of karst landscapes, as in Langkawi, Kinta, Perlis and Kelantan.

(*b*) calcareous shales, containing only thin beds of limestone. They have in places been metamorphosed by contact and pressure into schists, phyllites and slates. Most of this formation has suffered from equatorial weathering and now has low altitudes often blanketed by alluvium; frequently the subsurface limestone continues to dissolve, causing slips of the overlying rocks.

2. Quartzites, conglomerates and shales normally lie upon (1). They form highlands to the north where they often constitute the ranges (as in Tahan) but elsewhere have been partially removed, to remain on the flanks as foothills, standing up because of the resistance of quartzites to equatorial weathering. Jointed and severely folded, the beds often dip steeply, frequently forming steep relief with precipices. The formation contains some purple-green shales, often almost black and with a high carbon content, which quickly weather except where metamorphosed to a glossy schist. Some chert beds, fine textured and flinty, occur among the shales in South Kedah and Selangor.

   A few outcrops of hard quartzite (sandstones whose silica grains have been cemented together by additional silica or by recrystallisation into a resistant mass of interlocking quartz crystals), formed before (1) and (2) and with a few beds of shale, have been proved in small areas of the Langkawis, in North Perlis and near Baling in Kedah. These are the oldest rocks of Malaya but they cause no significant relief differences.

3. The Pahang Volcanic Series is a mixed group of igneous rocks, mainly of volcanic ash, cemented pumice beds and coarse fragments from explosive volcanoes, together with lavas varying from cream or purple rhyolites to dark greenish basaltic rocks. Some of these have metamorphosed into very resistant rocks. This group, whose age is greater than that of Malayan granites, and whose origin has not been fully studied (Scrivenor), is found within the bedding of (1) and (2) and is therefore younger than those formations. It occurs scattered through those parts of Malaya east of the Central Range, except for a few small outcrops west of the Central Range. No volcanoes, active or extinct, have been found in Malaya; the Pahang Volcanic Series is

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unrelated to the existing volcanoes of Sumatra and it is difficult to connect them with the long-extinct ones of Borneo which are so far away.

4. Granites, mostly coarsely crystalline intrusive types marked on the geology map variously as syenite, hornblend-granite, granite and granite-porphyry, are generally grey, with large crystals of felspar set among finer crystals of quartz, mica and various dark minerals. Strongly jointed, the granite contains veins of quartz and metallic ores from which derive many of the exploited minerals of Malaya. These granites form the structural framework of Malaya, outcropping as low hills articularly in the south, but also as the major heights of Bint g and Benom (over 6,000 ft.); younger than any of the formations so far described, they assume smooth outlines and gentle curves, emphasised by the thick layer of weathered material which invariably lies upon them.
5. Deposits of soft shale, sandstone and coal occur at Batu Arang in Selangor, on the Siamese border of Perlis, near Kepong and Niyor in Johore and at Enggor in Perak. The coal is a high-grade brown lignite, tending to crumble and with a high moisture content. Its principal working is at Batu Arang where there are easily accessible seams 45 ft. and 25 ft. in thickness (output 1950, 375,000 tons).
6. Great deposits of alluvium, brought by rivers flowing from the other formations, have been spread along the valleys in belts of varying thickness through the foothills, and along the coasts.

The coastal deposits, of dark blue clays containing lenticulate sands and peats, stretch inland for up to 40 miles, as flat swampy ground, at the coast thickening to as much as 400 ft. (as indicated by borings in Selangor). Formed by both river and marine action, these coastal alluvials represent the effects of progressive post-glacial inundation together with the effects of rapid sedimentation among mangrove and swamp vegetation, which seems often to have maintained the coastline despite eustatic change, so that today the general trend is an advance of the coastline seaward.

Inland alluvial belts at the foot of the ranges and along the valleys vary according to rock of origin and the degree of sorting done by rivers and torrents. Clays, sands, gravels, thin peats (old

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135 marsh or lake remains) and thin ironstone bands are common, but adjoining the granite outcrops occur "granite-wash," of white kaolin-like clays containing coarse quartz grains, the first sorting of disintegrating granite. Among the alluvials from metalliferous parent rocks, metallic ores have been segregated by flowing water and from these most Malayan tin derives. The alluvials vary in thickness, probably reflecting differences in erosion rate: in Kinta thicknesses from 60 ft. to 200 ft. have been verified. Partial dissection of older alluvial deposits has left scattered patches of high-level alluvials, remnants of river terraces (Richardson).

Climate

132 Two factors dominate the Malayan climate:

(*a*) Low latitude, which gives uniformity of high temperatures throughout the year and from place to place. Even at places of high altitude such as the Cameron Highlands in the Central Range, the uniformity is still characteristic though at somewhat lower temperatures. The absence of continuous high altitudes and of large settlements there makes this lowering of temperature of little human significance.

(*b*) The movement of tropical air masses to and fro across the Equator, which causes seasons to depend on wind reversal rather than on temperature changes. In the northern winter, winds from northwesterly points cover the whole peninsula; in the summer, the incidence of wind varies, being southerly towards Singapore and westerly over North Malaya, which makes for minor differences in local climates.

The movement of air masses affects the incidence and distribution of rainfall, variations in which are the chief characteristics of the seasons. Rainfall, however, is not at its peak during any one of these seasons. Maximum rains occur in the Doldrums at the periods between the wind seasons. The belt of equatorial calms is well established over Malaya during April-May and during October-November, bringing rainfall peaks separated from one another by drier (though not dry) seasons when the wind systems are well established (Fig. 31). Thus the rains are largely of instability type, depending on local influences acting upon unstable warm, damp air masses. Hence the importance of aspect, local relief, local convection over bare paddy fields and over bare tin mines, and land and sea breezes in establishing the detailed pattern of rainfall.

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

FIG. 28.—Malaya: Total Annual Rainfall



FIG. 29.—Southwest Monsoon: July Rainfall



FIG. 30.—Northeast Monsoon: November Rainfall



FIG. 31.—February Rainfall

Frequent storms, generally accompanied by lightning, bring very localised rains, typically though by no means always occurring in afternoons, so that the diurnal rhythm (cool clear nights and mornings, hot thundery afternoons) in the weather is often more emphatic than the seasonal rhythm of change.

The seasons are: (1) Northeast Monsoon, from late October to the end of March, when strong winds blow from the South China Sea, bringing heavy rain and low cloud to the east coast and to the

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132 eastern side of mountains, while elsewhere winds are lighter and the rainfall less (Fig. 30). (2) Southwest Monsoon, from the beginning of June to September, bringing generally light winds and a drier period (Fig. 29). (3) The Doldrums or transitional seasons of April-May and October-November, with light variable winds, very heavy rain, much cloud and violent electric storms.

During the Southwest Monsoon small intense storms called "Sumatras" occasionally move towards the Malacca-Singapore coast from the Malacca Strait. They are line-squalls in character, bringing violent winds and heavy rains for a few hours. These storms rapidly lose force after crossing the coast.

Rainfall

Malaya's rain falls mainly in torrential showers (often an inch in an hour) and during the late afternoon, though the incidence tends to be after midnight on the east during the Northeast Monsoon and on the west during the Southwest Monsoon. The total rainfall (Fig. 28) varies widely from year to year, a reflection of its origin in instability storms, and at any part of the year heavy rains and dry spells are equally possible. To the west, rainfall averages are high from October to January and least in July or February. To the north August to October brings intense rains and December to February is distinctly dry. To the east October to December brings heaviest rain, with minimum in February (Fig. 31). Severe flooding often results from the very heavy showers which may bring 15 inches in one day; 17 inches in 8 hours have been recorded in Penang.

The east coast is a belt where high annual rainfalls occur (mostly over 125 in. per annum) but the localities of highest rainfall are the Larut Hills of the Bintang Range (over 200 in. per annum) and that part of the Central Range between Kampar and Tanjong Malim (over 150 in. per annum). The driest district is the sheltered one just southeast of the Central Range, centring on Kuala Pilah (below 75 in. per annum).

Humidity for most of the year remains high and, while the relative figure for daytime may fall to 65 per cent, the wet bulb is usually above 75° F. for most days, nights and seasons, which produces enervating conditions. In these circumstances, human comfort depends on the cooling effect of evaporating perspiration and this, in turn, on movement of air, so that on shores and windy

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places the enervating effect is not strong, though it may become overpowering in closed or sheltered places. 132

AVERAGE MONTHLY RAINFALLS (in inches)

	Aver. heavy rain days	*Jan.*	*Feb.*	*Mar.*	*Apr.*	*May*	*June*	*July*	*Aug.*	*Sept.*	*Oct.*	*Nov.*	*Dec.*	*Total*
Alor Star ..	58	1.7	1.2	5.3	10.5	8.6	7.5	6.6	10.6	10.2	13.7	8.3	6.2	90.4
Trengganu ..	59	9.2	3.4	7.3	4.6	4.7	5.1	6.2	7.0	5.8	14.7	27.2	24.7	119.9
Cameron Highlands ..	68	6.0	5.1	6.8	12.4	10.7	5.1	3.7	7.8	8.9	13.1	12.3	9.8	101.7
Kuala Lipis ..	61	10.1	3.5	6.9	8.0	8.4	5.8	5.1	6.6	7.7	11.5	11.8	9.8	95.2
Kuala Lumpur	62	6.6	6.1	8.8	10.5	8.5	4.9	4.3	6.3	7.3	11.1	9.9	9.7	94.0
Kluang ..	55	8.6	4.1	8.7	9.9	10.0	6.5	3.9	6.3	6.5	9.3	10.1	8.4	92.3
Singapore ..	58	9.9	6.9	7.6	7.4	6.8	6.8	6.7	7.7	7.0	8.2	10.0	10.2	95.2

(By "heavy rain days" is meant "days receiving 0.5 inch and over")

More significant from the agricultural point of view is the cloud cover, upon the absence of which largely depends the ripening of fruits and paddy. Clouds, mostly cumulus, vary very much during the course of any one day, though October and November are decidedly the cloudiest months and February the clearest. Over the interior and the west, January to March is a period of moderately clear skies. At all times Singapore and the mountains have denser and more prolonged cloud cover. In part the rainfall map reflects the cloud cover which is significantly small over the rice areas of Kelantan and Kuala Pilah.

Drainage System

High rainfall and low evaporation cause Malayan rivers to have great volume relative to their length or catchment areas; they contain more organic solubles and colloidals than solids, they change rapidly in volume within hours or days and so encourage levees. While the drainage system is of great antiquity and far advanced in development, there are discordances in Malayan river profiles which relate to a remoter history, the more recent physical history (Fig. 17) being one of progressive inundation which has overflattened the lower profiles in relation to the upper profiles. Changes of landscape due to solution of limestone massifs have also caused drainage readjustments. The rising sea level has not caused ria estuaries owing to rapid sedimentation, but rivers have not developed normal delta form because strong seasonal onshore winds spread the sediment as spits and lines of offshore drift, flattening the plan of deltas on their seaward side. 133

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

FIG. 32.—Drainage Lines of Malaya

The plan of Malayan rivers (Fig. 32) is a product of several influences, each of which varies in proportion from place to place:

(*a*) The tectonic pattern of the ranges tends to produce longitudinal streams running on broad meridional lines through the strike-vales. This is apparent in the Kelantan, Perak and Johore rivers and in the middle course of the Pahang.

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(*b*) The orographic influence produces streams on latitudinal lines consequent to the slopes of the ranges and sometimes breaking through the adjoining ranges in cluse. Under this influence the Upper Pahang tributaries, for example, flow east.

(*c*) The continental submergence has induced premature precipitation upstream and created meanders and vague drainage far inland.



FIG. 33.—River Capture in the Upper Muar Area

Where (*a*) and (*b*) predominate, as in most of Central and North Malaya, the river pattern becomes trellis-like with broad marshes in the meridional sections and sharper relief at the transverse courses in the cluse. Senile versions of the pattern familiar in uniclinal structures show fairly symmetrically on each side of the ranges. Towards the south, the factor (*c*) is dominant with some erosional competition between the Malacca Strait and South China Sea drainage systems; the upper Muar shows signs of capture of the latter by the former (Fig. 33). Capturing of upper courses and shifts of lower courses are widespread, as in the Kinta and Pahang rivers.

In the limestone zones a fourth influence comes into play: the drainage originally developed on the limestone rapidly changes as solution removes the formation, which factor, for example, has

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133 re-aligned the Kinta streams from being tributaries of the River Pari to being Perak tributaries, as at present (Fig. 37).

Soils

134 Rocks differ in their reaction to equatorial weathering, which tends to be one of laterisation, though there are considerable areas of podsolisation which produces bleached grey or white subsoils that have complicated the interpretation of high level soils found in many places.

(*a*) On granite, weathering first breaks down the felspar crystals to kaolin, leading to a mixture of fine clay and coarse sand which may be 50 ft. thick. Squared blocks of fissured granite disintegrate into rounded boulders within the clay-sand mass. High precipitation aids slipping and slumping of this weathered surface so that bare slopes of granite appear in parts of Malaya.

(*b*) Quartzites and conglomerates weather chiefly into loose sands and pebbly gravels, generally not weathered so deeply as in granite. Chert rapidly bleaches into dull angular fragments. Ease of drainage through such loose materials appears to encourage podsolisation rather than laterisation (Glinka).

(*c*) On shales, slates, schists and phyllites the laminated structure breaks down easily into a soft tenacious clay, often containing mica flakes. The carbon compounds in these rocks bleach white. The clay may take on a wide range of colours, yellow, brown, green or blue. Core boulders of fresh rock are found within this weathered material and laterised ironstone concretions commonly occur close to the surface, often forming a surface athwart the structural lines.

(*d*) Limestone weathers by solution and little residuum is left except from the calcareous shales. Pinnacles and knife-edge ridges, the normal superficial effects of limestone undergoing solution, have been preserved beneath the alluvials of the Kinta Valley which also conceal old drainage channels, incised into the limestone. Solution still goes on under the alluvial blanket which is constantly subsiding. Cave systems occur in all stages of development from fissures to enclosed basins (*wangs*) formed from collapsed areas, and stalactites are found everywhere in association with the caves.

(*e*) Most rocks of the Pahang Volcanic Series resist weathering and stand up as bare outcrops with only an inch or two of bleached

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surface like a rind above the original rock. Rhyolites, however, weather down into silts and volcanic explosive agglomerates into loose boulders. Certain local zones of weathered basic igneous rocks produce fertile soils though these are not particularly significant in Malaya owing to their inland location and the absence of adequate incentive to exploit fully the soil resources (Scrivenor).

(*f*) Quartz veins, which run through and beyond the granites, resist weathering and may persist as lines of broken crystals within masses of weathered material. Where the quartz is continuous and thick, as near the Klang Gates. . stands out as a topographic feature.

Within the valleys and marshes and along the coasts, soils are transported, consisting of fine sticky clays with a high vegetal content; these are depositories of river-borne topsoil from the uplands. Outside these areas soils have mostly developed *in situ* to produce only a few inches of humus-bearing topsoil overlying a thick laterised subsoil. The agricultural value of the *in situ* soils is invariably very low; that of the transported soils varies enormously, a fertile loam often deriving from the calcareous shales. The major fertility factor is less the soil itself and more the location of the watertable. Cleared, drained and cultivated, the transported soils of the estuarial zones represent the accumulation of fertile elements from the whole interior and maintain production for long periods without noticeable deterioration, largely because at this stage and at such low levels weathering does not leach them. Elsewhere solefluction, slipping and slumping combine to hasten the removal of both top and subsoils, aided by the high proportion of water within the ground and by the characteristic panned structure of laterised soils which are very fully developed in Malaya where both climate and tectonic history have together induced advanced laterisation.

The flow of subsoil water varies considerably, though under most areas such water is held colloidally rather than interstitially, so that wells are only rarely of the percolation type. Large areas of the Malayan surface are so waterlogged that the watertable lies only an inch or so from the surface. Local artesian conditions have been met within the lenticular alluvials along the coast. Most water supply, however, is from surface sources and wells accumulate surface run-off rather than fill by percolation from below. Hot springs near Malacca and Kuala Lumpur and in Perak

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134 have low pressure issues of water at about 100° F.; these are probably from great depth, deriving their heat from pressures rather than from vulcanism and for this reason are known technically as "juvenile" waters.

Forest Landscape

137 While certain types of Malayan natural vegetation occupy too small an area to be easily mapped, they merit special consideration because they stand in just those marginal zones where population concentrates and because the Malayan natural landscape is more sharply differentiated by the forest types than it is by any other single factor. To some extent the forest types relate to the relief and location so that a dual tag aptly describes them.

The Casuarina Beach Woodlands.—An almost continuous casuarina fringe some 60 ft. broad stretches just above high water level and above the level of fresh-water swamp, along the coast from Trengganu to Johore and in patches along the west coast. These trees, often 80 ft. tall, have needle leaves which fall to make a bed, obliterating other vegetation, though other gnarled trees, like *penaga laut* (Calophyllum) and *ketapeng* (Terminalia Catappa) may accompany it. The tree establishes itself quickly upon exposures of marine sands and dunes, often acting as pioneer for mangrove. Behind it, inland, usually stretches a few hundred yards of scrub, tropical grass (*lalang*, Imperator cylindrica) and Straits rhododendron (Melastoma). This beach forest provides some timber for building fishing boats.

Mangrove Sea-Swamp Forest.—Forming a seaward belt from Kedah to Singapore, the mangrove forest ranges from 50 yds. to 12 miles in width and extends farther inland along rivers. Within it, river estuaries provide waterways and sometimes the forest subdivides into islands with deep channels between them, as round Port Swettenham. These mangrove swamps develop from river muds, often infilling lagoon-like spaces between offshore bars of marine sands thrown up persistently by Malacca Straits currents. They shelve gently on the seaward side so that even small seagoing boats must keep hundreds of yards from shore at low tide. Mangrove banks become convex, the slightly higher part being less frequently and less deeply inundated, which exercises a selection of species. Deposition quickly raises the surface level, a process aided by burrowing prawns (Thalassina).

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

FIG. 34.—Forest Types of Malaya

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137 The trees are uniform dense growths averaging 40 ft. high, with dark shining foliage. The *Api-api* (Avicennia), with typical greyish leaves, is an early coloniser, capable of establishing itself upon banks exposed by the sea only for a few days; it binds and builds up the surface, making possible the setting of other species. Fireflies frequent this tree, which is traditionally a guide to sailors. Behind the *Api-api* in situation, and succeeding it in progression, come *Bakau* (Rhizophora), and *Lenggadai* (Bruguiera). Away from the estuaries in Selangor, Perak and Province Wellesley there are areas of swampy scrub enclosed by small bunds built to exclude tides from farmlands and often the sign of land which has gone out of cultivation.

Mangrove forests of the east coast are confined to estuaries and colonise somewhat differently upon sandspits driven southward from the river mouth. These banks are colonised by casuarinas and then the creek or lagoon behind is converted into mangrove swamp and gradually filled by tides through some breach in the sandspit. Remnants of successive spits and mangrove swamps may be traced inland for several miles in some places and the swamps at a later stage frequently become lines of paddy fields. Similar successions may be met in Kedah.

Mangrove covers over 460 square miles and is well worked over for firewood, charcoal and poles for which the trees are particularly suited. Some parts of the mangrove zone are well peopled. Villages in them may have several thousand people in settlements built on piles and lapped by the tides, or in lines on old beach sands. Fishing, fish drying, pig keeping and crocodile hunting (for the skins) are the human activities in mangrove settlements, which usually avoid sandy stretches of the west coast owing to the high incidence of malaria and sandfly fever. That pigs are so frequently kept is sign that these villages are often non-Muslim and the people more primitive than Malays.

Lines of nipa, nibong (Oncosperma) and pandanus develop along estuaries where water is fresher; the nipa is highly valued for thatching and the pandanus leaves are woven into sleeping mats and bags.

Inland Freshwater Swamp Forest.—The recent history of rising sea level, together with the torrential rains of today, cause the extensive alluvial lowlands to be frequently under water, to form Inland Freshwater Swamp Forest. In these places the soil is a viscous mud

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covered with peat which may, as in Kuala Selangor, be as thick as 30 ft., the greater thicknesses normally being well inland. While the trees of this Freshwater Swamp Forest are below the Malayan average for height, the sodden ground has a thick undergrowth mainly of palms, pandanus and thorny plants, making the forest almost impenetrable. *Lopak* is the local name for those marginal areas which are occasionally rather than regularly flooded. *Permatang* are low ridges of slightly drier land running through the swamp, probably old levees or beach lines. In Kedah and Perlis the swamps contain considerable pure stands of *gelam* (Melaleuca) which can grow in water up to 3 ft. deep. The types of tree are relatively few though they include commercial trees which remain untouched because of inaccessibility over the swamp ground.

Lowland Tropical Rain Forest.—This forest type in Malaya differs little from the one usual to similar areas of Southeast Asia (see Chapter 4). It persists from the coastal plains to heights of 2,000 ft. and occupies 60 per cent of the peninsula. While there are thorny types of undergrowth, such as *bertam* (Eugeissona), rattans (climbing palms) and *kelubi* (Zalacca), access is not generally difficult, which makes the extraction of *chengal*, *balau*, *kapur*, *keruing* and *meranti*, the chief Malayan timber trees, commercially practicable, though difficulties of haulage, extraction and labour shortage prevent extensive exploitation. These timbers are used domestically, yet Malaya is a net importer of timbers. The collection of gums and similar products from wild trees has always gone on, but has rarely exceeded a third of a million dollars annually; of this *jelutong* for chewing gum was always the greatest single item.

Malayan timbers are:

1. *Chengal* (Balanocarpus), a very strong, hard, heavy structural timber.
2. *Balau* (Shorea) similar to, but less durable than *chengal*.
3. *Merbau* (Afzelia) strong, hard and heavy, for internal construction because it resists white ants although liable to quick decay.
4. *Kapur* (Dryobalanops), strong, moderately hard, durable, for buildings; especially abundant in Trengganu and East Johore.
5. *Keruing* (thirty species of Dipterocarpus), strong, moderately durable, shrinks greatly, very abundant but needs treating unless used for covered constructions; mainly extracted from Johore.
6. *Meranti* (several types of Shorea), generally reddish, moderately

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hard, not very durable; for light or temporary constructions or cheap furniture.

Secondary Forest.—This has no natural location since it originates from clearings man-made, from forest fires, and from abandoned farms. Known in Malaya and the Indies as *belukar*, it is a forest type whose stages of growth vary enormously from initial long tropical grasses (*lalang*) to a forest not clearly distinguishable from lowland forest. Patches of it may be exclusively *resam* (impenetrable climbing bracken), but it is generally mixed with heavy undergrowth.

It is commonest near *kampongs* and in northeast Kedah where jungle tribes have almost over-worked the forest with their temporary clearings. *Belukar* has no commercial use, apart from the extraction of a little bamboo; it is, however, a heritage of other uses.

Hill Forest.—This is a type of Tropical Rain Forest which is adapted to the slightly different weather of the hills. It develops on uplands and ridges from 2,000 to 4,000 ft. high. Most *keruing* (Dipterocarpus) disappear at this altitude. The *serava*, a grey-leaved tree, is prominent, together with the thorny *bertam* palm. Nothing of value comes from these forests though they are threaded by tracks of many wandering tribes.

Mountain Forest.—Above 4,000 ft. the mountain forest of Malaya is that normal to similar heights in Southeast Asia (see Chapter 4), being a transition varying from mountain oak forest (Pasania) at lower altitudes to xerophytic scrub at greater altitudes. The only tree of commercial use is "mountain oak" for local firewood and hill station structures.

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Chapter Seven

THE CULTURAL LANDSCAPE OF MALAYA

THE Malayan cultural landscape as a whole has been only lightly modified (on about 33 per cent of the total area) by human activities and both the intensities and the age of the modifications are dominated by two distinct objectives; to obtain food, and to obtain money. 311

Activities associated with obtaining food are still the chief concern of indigenous peoples, whose ways, traditions and patterns of settlement and distribution have been much the same for centuries and are closely integrated in detail with the subtle variations of local environment. On the other hand, those parts of the landscape devoted to obtaining money, by the sale and export of produce, are recent innovations by foreigners whose ways and patterns of settlement relate more to conditions overseas than to the Malayan landscape. These latter areas show the influence of recent diffusions of modern technique and modern economic organisation, immaturely modified to the setting though varying in impact upon and interrelation with the older cultural landscape forms. Thus the cultural landscape may be divided into two, the food producing and the money producing; to a certain extent there are marginal overlaps between these landscape types.

THE LANDSCAPE OF FOOD PRODUCTION

The large-scale food-producing activities in Malaya are rice farming and fishing. All are overwhelmingly Malay activities, so that traditional Malay houses (stilted, thatched wooden huts), costume (loose skirtlike *sarong* and black fezlike *songkok*) and cultural centres (mosques) characterise the associated landscapes in degrees varying with the prosperity of the region and with its isolation. 243 226

Fishing.—While fishing is most developed and specialised on the basis of sea fishing, all rivers, streams and even canals are fished for local use, and fish form the second staple in the Malay diet. Along the East Coast, villages are often nearly entirely devoted to fishing 226

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226 and to drying the fish into forms suitable for transport in this hot climate; round Pangkor Island and the Dindings there are similar specialisations. In those places the fishing village occupies a part of the coast fairly sheltered from the violence of the sea during the worst monsoon storms, and its houses are often partly hidden under coconut palms, grown as adjunct to fishing and as source of cooking oil. Malayan fishing is inshore work using drift, seine and lift nets and lines in waters less than 20 miles from the coast. In the shallow fringes of the calmer West Coast thousands of long screens of bamboo stakes are built in the water to lead the fish into traps; these are mainly used by Chinese fishermen. Fishing tends to be an exclusive occupation, other food needs of fishing [321] families being obtained by sales of fish; on the East Coast, where November to March is a closed season due to the violent weather, fishermen may also be paddy farmers or coconut smallholders. The frequence of coastal swamps tends to isolate fishing villages from the interior and their communications are normally by water, except in Malacca and on the Perak coast where there are major interior markets for fresh fish chilled with ice and transported by road.

The chief fish edible in Malaya are, in order of weight caught, *Kembong* or mackerel (Scomber) especially from the Dindings; *Bilis* or whitebait (Stolephorus), chiefly from Trengganu; *Udang* or prawns (Peneus), from the West Coast; *Tamban* or sprats (Clupea) from northern coasts; *Selar* (*Selayang*) or horse mackerel (Caranx) mainly from the East Coast; *Parang* or Dorab (Chirocentrus) from the southern coasts; *Delah* or seabream (Caesio), coming to Singapore from deep sea fishing among islands farther south than Malaya.

In 1950 the total catch amounted to 100,000 tons, of which nearly two-thirds was from the West Coast where fishing is more commercialised; on the East Coast much is consumed fresh on the spot and goes unrecorded. About 65,000 persons reported themselves employed in fishing in the 1947 census.

243 *Rice Farming.*—Whether or not the theory that Malays were originally seafarers, fishermen and sailors can be maintained, they have in fact become the paddy-farmers of the Peninsula. Of some six million acres of agricultural land, about three-quarters of a million acres normally carry rice, the chief states concerned being Kedah, Kelantan and Perak in that order; these three states contain

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over two-thirds of the Malayan paddyfields. At least 90 per cent of Malayan paddy is wet, so that hill or dry paddy contributes negligibly to the landscape and the production. Dry paddy is sown to a small extent in the small clearings of shifting cultivation and also as a catch crop on land being newly cleared and prepared for other agricultural uses. On the land utilisation map only wet paddy is sufficiently large to mark, occupying only a small surface of Malaya as a whole and best examined on the regional maps of land use (Figs. 35–43).



FIG. 35.—Land Use in Perlis, Kedah and Province Wellesley

Wet paddy depends on water control which in Malaya varies from primitive arrangements for holding or restraining local rainwater run-off to ingenious Malay devices for directing river water, and to modern engineering schemes. Kedah, Province Wellesley, Krian in Perak, and Kelantan have extensive and continuous areas under rice, all of them in the lower deltaic zones of large streams. Elsewhere units of paddy-land tend to be small, stretched along the flood plains of the larger rivers, the Perak and Pahang (Fig. 42), and in thin ribbons among hill valleys (Fig. 38). Scarcely any wet paddy grows above the 50 ft. level anywhere in Malaya. In the coastal belts of Kelantan, Trengganu and in parts of Province Wellesley, the rice is in innumerable small areas mostly of the order 10 acres, lying between the sandy ridges of old spits which once enclosed mangrove creeks and lagoons. These are areas of coastal advance under continual river deposition, moulded by marine currents. During dry periods, the fields in such areas

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243 receive brackish water from seawater percolating inland through old beach sands as the water-table lowers; bunds of 2 ft. are built on the tidal side of these fields to reduce this risk. Occasional flooding by dilute seawater in some of these areas seems not to affect agriculture since the heavy torrents of fresh rainwater later remove the brackish water from the surface.

243 [361] These paddylands provide on the Malayan landscape the only open plains without trees. There is rarely any settlement within them, houses and villages being characteristically marginal, seeking levels just high enough to be free from normal flood risk. The houses are, in addition, stilted to stand some 3 ft. from the ground. This stilting of houses has become a tradition, based no doubt on present flood risk, security from wild animals, coolness, and possibly the old Malay association with coastal and estuarial 312 sites subject to tides. Across all paddyland run shallow control 243 ditches and canals lined by bunds which become tracks of movement and sites for settlement. Malay-built canals have been dug to 4 ft. depth and 18 ft. width, the bunds being perhaps 3 ft. high, 10 ft. broad and unsurfaced. Heads of water in the canals are often formed by dams of faggots and boulders. They are filter-dams in the sense that they are to some extent permeable, allowing a gentle trickle of water through and over the dam. These are easily built, quickly removed during unexpected floods and they do not significantly diminish the silt load. Modern canals constructed by western engineers are similar in size but the bund on one side is usually broader and carefully surfaced as a track. In these canals the dams are generally permanent cement structures, often with sluices at the bottom. By stopping water completely they tend to retain the silt content and the violent outflow from the sluices has in some cases bitten deeply into the valley below the dam, causing progressive lowering of the water-table in the adjoining fields, which thereafter become more critically dependent on irrigation rather than on natural water.

Fields are subdivided with small bunds 9 in. high, to mark property limits and to facilitate water control. They give a shallow-stepped or terraced appearance though it is rare to have more than a few inches difference of level between adjoining fields. At most stages of paddy growth these fields are flooded; in the off season they bake hard and the bare ground under the sunlight works up to very much higher temperatures than is customary

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elsewhere, a factor which may act as a "trigger" in local convectional storms.

In Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu and most of Malacca, paddy stands growing in the fields during the wet phases of the year from September to January. Where seasonal water is ample, as in Kedah, even in June planting may take place. Reaping, by hand methods, generally cutting head by head, goes on variously from January to March, after which the ground lies fallow. Where there is little noticeable rainfall rhythm, planting depends on irrigation from rivers whose flood peaks harmonise with heavy rains in a remoter part of the country; planting is then timed by official announcements based on information about heavy rains round the headwaters. Few areas cultivate more than one crop of rice a year, the local explanation being that the ground and the shortage of water will not permit a second crop. Over the paddy areas, roads invariably stand upon embankments above normal flood levels.



FIG. 36.—Land Use in Perak

Considerable variation in the rhythm of cultivation may be noted from district to district, depending upon the incidence of floods either from torrential rains or from the river. While these rhythms of activity relate to solar rhythm affecting the rainfall, the local calendar is lunar, and the festivals associated with it are not closely connected with the rhythm of agricultural life of the seasons, a discordance matched also by the Muslim religious

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[221] 243 festivals which relate more to Middle East events than to those of Southeast Asia. Geographically, the persistence of seasonal rhythms in food agriculture is an interesting contrast with the ill-defined character of local seasons. Despite the absence of strongly marked seasons, leaving an equable condition which better matches a yam agricultural system, the average yields of Malayan paddy (some 1,033 lbs. of cleaned rice per acre for 1946–50) are higher than those of most Southeast Asia territories.

CYCLE OF MALAYAN PADDY FARMING (1946–47)

	Kedah	*Kelantan and most E. coast*	*Inner Pahang (Temerloh)*	*Malacca*	*Negri Sembilan*
Preparing fields ..	Early Aug.	Early Aug.	End Feb.	Early July	Early March
Setting seedbeds ..	Mid Aug.	Mid Aug.	Mid March	Mid July	Late March
Transplanting ..	Early Oct.	Early Oct. possibly Dec.	Early May	Mid Aug.	Mid May
Harvesting	Early Feb.	End Mar.	Oct.	End Jan.	Late Oct.
Expectation of heaviest rain	Oct.	Dec.	Dec.	July	Mar.
Length of time in ground	7–8 months	8–9 months	8–9 months	7–8 months	6–8 months

The total Malayan rice production is normally about one-third of a million tons, which is roughly one-third of the population's requirements. Much of Malayan rice is locally consumed by the Malay farmers and scarcely enters the trading system. Often the milling and processing of paddy is done on the farms by hand methods. Because these methods suit only small quantities at one time, paddy is often stored in the husk (it keeps better that way) in large thatched bins of woven palm leaves standing upon rat-proof legs in front of the farmhouse. A few official power mills have been set up to encourage large-scale rice production in the more extensive areas such as Kedah, Perlis and Perak but there are very few huge mills such as those of the Burma-Siam-Indo-china rice producing landscapes.

231 Because buffaloes are used to pull the ploughs, they are common in all paddy areas, where Siamese-type oxen may also be used. Over two-thirds of Malaya's oxen and buffaloes are distributed in the paddy areas. Inadequate local fodder restricts these animals in number and size and they play little part in the economy of farming apart from haulage; they graze on paddyland after harvesting and upon young shoots of tropical grasses.

361 Settlement in the paddy areas is in villages (*kampongs*) of Malay houses standing a little apart from each other and surrounded by a few coconut or fruit trees which both conceal and shade the

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houses. There is little nucleation in the European sense; not even the mosque acts as focus to the house groups and the typical long string of houses may have different place names in different parts of the same line. Settlements of this open type have clearly no defensive outlook and the lines of houses run (*a*) along the edges of paddylands, so that the kampong has the form of the contour, (*b*) along bunds or canals, in straight lines, (*c*) along roads, mostly linear but occasionally cruciform, where roads cross. To some extent the dispersed settlement form offsets and makes innocuous the absence of any sanitation and the dependence for potable water on local streams or canals. 361

Few supplementary food crops are grown by the Malay farmer: he plants small patches of coconut for his cooking oil and illuminant, a few areca palms and some fruits, but vegetables are neither extensively grown nor prominent in his diet. 241

The Landscape of Production for Cash

Whereas food production is an indigenous activity, production for money is an innovation by foreigners upon parts of the Malayan surface which previously had had no production value. Thus the two forms of production have been able to go on side by side with relatively little mutual interaction in techniques, in peoples or in tradition. 177 24

Two distinct types of landscape have evolved with the object of production for cash sales—one an agriculture for commerce, the other mining. The former is mainly concerned with rubber and the latter with tin, though there are variants. 311

(*a*) *Cash Agriculture*

Rubber.—Over the last fifty years, the rubber tree has become the most important crop in Malaya both by area (about 3½ million acres out of a total agricultural area of 6 million acres), in value, and in numbers of people directly employed (.5 million out of a total 1.2 million agricultural workers in 1947 census). In post-war years all figures except those for area have changed without changing the outstanding position of rubber farming. 249

Until the introduction of *Hevea Braziliensis* as a British experiment over several years from 1879, Malaya had never been concerned even with collecting wild rubber and no local latex-producing plant had attracted major interest.

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

FIG. 37.—Land Use in the Kinta Valley

The *Hevea* was particularly suited to the poor lateritic soils and the climate of Malaya, both of which resemble those in the Amazon Valley, and its introduction met several needs—the need for an agriculture to open up Malaya's virgin forests, the growing needs of the electrical industries in Britain, and the new needs for rubber tyres as the car industry developed in the United States and Europe. It was, however, a tree requiring at least seven years to reach maturity which, together with the heavy initial labour costs of jungle clearing and of recurrent maintenance costs during growth, implied substantial financial backing. Hence the rubber plantation became a highly capitalised, company-promoted operation of long-term planning, something as foreign to Malaya as the new tree and the people who worked to cultivate it. As a result, the cultivation of rubber represents an outstanding example of large-scale human intervention in plant geography so that Malaya and Southeast Asia are now more linked with the *Hevea* than is the Amazon Forest which was its home, and large portions of Malayan land have been converted from its natural heterogeneous forest to a homogeneous forest of rubber trees with an artificially limited undergrowth retained as erosion control.

At various times other crops were tried in Malaya to establish commercial agriculture—gambier, coffee, tea, sugar—to be virtually abandoned for different reasons of soil poverty, labour scarcity and competitive production elsewhere. Only tea continues as a commercial crop.

Originally all rubber was "clean-weeded," kept free from undergrowth in the manner of orchards in temperate latitudes.

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This caused rapid erosion of topsoil by torrential rains and led to experiments to control and improve the soil. It culminated in the technique of letting undergrowth develop as a soil protector, a device hastened by neglect during the Japanese Occupation, so that most plantations now have considerable scrub undergrowth through which run paths for the labourers to reach each tree.

When the rubber-growing became well established as a highly capitalised agriculture run by plantations normally covering about 2,000 acres each, Asiatic smallholders took up the crop in units mostly of less than 100 acres. These smallholdings are of two types: larger ones organised as miniatures of the estates, and smaller ones run by paddy-farmers or fishermen as an adjunct to their food producing activities and drawing them, to a degree varying with the price of rubber, into the system of production for cash. More than 39 per cent of rubber is now in this smallholding category, which produced 46 per cent of Malayan rubber in 1950.

While rubber fits the Malayan ecology by being almost constantly productive through the year and continuously growing and producing over many years, it needs an equally continuous labour supply for the tapping and collection routines. In this sense the rubber plantation by its regularity of rhythm throughout the year resembles the dairy farm. On an average one worker is needed for each six acres though this proportion is less where workers contract to tap by area rather than by time and varies considerably from estate to estate. These workers are at wages, and purchase their food from distant producers, a factor which operates to keep rubber costs relatively inflexible except in the case of smallholders who can grow food to feed themselves and thereby lessen their immediate dependence on rubber prices.

But the total labour force needed for rubber growing is clearly heavy. There was no labour force in Malaya, so that the whole of the rubber system came to depend upon imported labour, partly Indian, partly Chinese. By 1948, 2.0 million acres of rubber estate employed 290,000 workers of whom 52 per cent were Indian and 29 per cent Chinese. These live in small squalid hamlets scattered within the plantation which has one central nucleus round the factory where the latex is coagulated, formed into sheets and smoke-dried for sale off the plantation. Only in a few large scientific estates such as those pioneered by Dunlops, has it

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become the practice to move liquid latex from the plantation to the ports for shipment in that form to processors overseas. Except at the factory, the workers' settlements have every sign of their unattached, floating lives; their quarters are almost makeshift, they have tolerated monotony and crudity to accumulate money to set them up elsewhere. When foreign labourers immigrate, they often go to the estates as their first experience of work in Malaya and they generally graduate to other less austere types of employment.

The factory is the managerial centre, but is no more integrated to the population and the setting than the tappers' hamlets, because the managerial group is mostly transitory as well. Everything on the landscape tends to be impermanent, crude, unshapely and artificial, without any mature cultural or communal living at all. Thus the cultural landscape of a rubber estate bears little resemblance in its structure to that of Europe where the technicians came from, or to that of South India or China whence the labour comes, though an occasional Tamil shrine or Chinese temple stands among the trees. The atmosphere of makeshift and impermanence is in contrast to the actual outlook of a rubber plantation which is above all long-term. Other crops, like rice, leave the ground cleared and ready, at the end of each year's harvest, for replacement by new sowings; the rubber tree and its work goes on regularly and the costs of making a change would be almost as great as the original cost of clearing the primary forest—for which reason the Japanese Occupation and the war leading up to it, failed to cause the destruction or change of more than a few per cent of the rubber acreage. Just as the dairy farm centring on the cow has produced a distinct cultural landscape and tradition elsewhere, so rubber is ripe for creating around it traditions and associations more intimately and permanently linked to the setting than is the case now in Malaya. That type of smallholding exclusively concerned with rubber differs from the large estate only in proportion, not in style, but the small-holding of two or three unevenly planted acres adjoining paddy or vegetables and cultivated on a family basis is more closely integrated to the environment, giving rise to family or co-operative tapping groups sometimes selling the latex to a larger factory. In total this last type of holding covers large areas though individual units are very small.

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

FIG. 38.—Land Use in Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Malacca

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249 The aspect of planted rubber is one of a uniform crop from trees which, when fully matured, represent only a variant of the otherwise ubiquitous landscape of forest. Rubber trees to the south are not markedly seasonal in their leafing, though to the north where the dry season becomes more emphatic, rubber foliage turns red and then drops for some four weeks, about February; elsewhere the fall takes place sporadically and the estates as a whole appear evergreen. Controlled undergrowth has become widespread now that rubber can be called fully mature. The regular alignment of trees allows visibility within a plantation for as much as a quarter mile. Properly cultivated, rubber roots are not far below the surface, yet if soil erosion takes place roots appear to lie upon the surface itself. Silt pits along contours are customary erosion precautions, made necessary by the rolling or lightly hilly country which best suits rubber, whose vitality lowers if the roots are in soggy ground. Some rubber trees acquire a gnarled appearance as a result of careless cutting of the bark during tapping. Where rubber has been planted in badly drained lowlands, drainage ditches have been dug to lower the water-table. Roads through plantations, essential because of the coagulant acid, finished rubber and food supplies going to and from the plantation, are invariably of red pounded lateritic ironstone which makes a fair surface from easily accessible local materials. Isolation obliges most plantations to provide their own power either from diesel engines or from wood-burning steam engines.

Because external contact is necessary both for the sale of rubber and for bringing in the food of the labour force, rubber plantations need main road or railway communications. Hence the distribution of rubber relates to the pattern of highways and railways, as well as to the better drained lowlands or foothills. Association with immigrants who come in for other activities accounts in part for the concentration of rubber in the western belt of Malaya where at the same time the lowland forest zone is better accessible to port facilities, the last and essential stage in the export of rubber, which has practically no use locally.

Coconut and Oil Palm Plantations.—Besides being grown in small units for direct local consumption, coconut has developed as a plantation crop on large estates close to the coast where the necessary deep drainage is maintained by ditching with sluices to keep out the tide. Beneath the palms only short Victoria grass

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grows without other undergrowth, so that the plantations seem light and open, although the ground is not worked. The labour used is much less than that in rubber growing and it is regular throughout the year because the tree fruits continuously. About 37,000 people were employed on coconut production at the 1947 census, which was less than the number of market gardeners. Many



FIG. 39.—Northeast Malaya : Land Use

of those employed are Malays who usually build villages and houses within the plantation on traditional Malay lines so that the whole integrates well with the Malayan landscape. To convert the coconut meat into copra, either sun drying, smoke drying, or kiln drying is used, depending on the size of the plantation, but for this also the labour required is small in volume and unskilled in character. Smoke kilns predominate and they are fuelled by burnt husks; early drying is essential and must take place on the estate, which always ships its crop in the form of copra. Coconut oil is expressed from copra generally at portside, particularly at Singapore and Penang, or even overseas.

Coconut production for trade is an unstable activity. The price and demand fluctuates considerably and freight charges can easily squeeze away the profit from this low-grade, bulky commodity. Moreover it is highly competitive because part-time growers,

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249 already assured of their food supply by other work, can sell their copra individually in small units which make a large total, at rates below those of wage-paying plantations. Altogether about two-thirds of a million acres of coconut stand in Malaya, mostly in units too small to appear on the land utilisation map except on the Perak coast (Fig. 36). Malayan trade figures for copra and coconut are difficult to assess owing to the high local consumption and the entrepôt trade in those commodities at Singapore. For 1950 Malayan production was 90,000 tons of coconut oil.

The Oil Palm (*Elaeis guineensis*), imported from West Africa, and not indigenous, is grown only in large plantations on riverine and coastal flats. These palms branch fairly close to the ground and the dead fronds persist for a long time, so that the plant has a more solid, compact appearance than the coconut, and although to each acre there are only about the same number of palms as in a coconut plantation, the estates appear denser and more continuous. Though there is negligible undergrowth, it is not possible to see far. As in the case of coconuts, practically no cultivation of the ground is done. The palm fruits continuously giving a regular daily labour rhythm. These plantations are large units, exclusively foreign, mainly British, generally employing South Indian labour in the same proportion per acre as the coconut plantation and there is no competitive smallholder production. A good transport system on the estate is essential and may be either road, light railway or canoe on the drainage canals; the nuts, which are fairly small and very numerous, must be treated immediately at a large, expensively equipped factory on the estate; the process is mostly expressive but several minor processes have to be used to prevent chemical changes. The oil moves from the estates as liquid, some going to Singapore by sea; special storage tanks are necessary for handling the commodity which has the same broad industrial uses as coconut oil.

Oil palm estates are distributed through Johore (half of all in Malaya), Perak and Selangor in that order of acreage (Figs. 36, 38, 43). They made a spectacular post-war recovery to export 57,000 tons of palm oil in 1950 (cf. 51,100 tons in 1938).

245 *Other Cash Crops.*—Pineapples, which fruit in December and June, eighteen months after planting, were at one time extensively planted by canning-factory owners in Singapore and Johore, where they were sometimes used as a catch crop in young

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

FIG. 40.—Correlation of Rocks and Land Use in the Cameron Highlands

rubber. It was essentially an industrialised activity, closely integrated with Chinese canners and exclusively using Chinese labour in a fluctuating and seasonal activity, which made very little impact on the landscape as a whole. The output went very largely to the British market. 245

Following its virtual disappearance during wartime, pineapple-growing abandoned the older hillside locations favoured by the *Singapore* variety and was re-established in a new terrain, the peaty soils of SW. Johore, where about 6,000 acres of a new strain, the *Mauritius*, were growing in 1948, mostly as smallholdings involving some 5,000 Chinese families.

Market gardening occupies fairly extensive areas round every 244

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town though it ranks very low in total area. Almost entirely Chinese in character, it is the most intensive form of cultivation in Malaya, worked mainly on a family basis and essentially a cash occupation needing at least two persons per acre. In the Cameron Highlands, many smallholders produce temperate climate vegetables for consumption in the towns of the lowlands which are served daily by road transport (Fig. 39).

A number of minor crops for sale show in the list of normal Malayan production, though many continue only as catch crops. Of them, tapioca ranks exceptionally large in acreage, partly because it is a rice substitute and partly because it has a sale value for commercial starch. Sugar, maize, gambier, tea, coffee, spices, tobacco, derris and groundnuts are also grown on a small scale for cash sales. Almost all these minor crops are Chinese or Indian activities and their total significance on the Malayan landscape is negligible; they inject little into the Malayan stream of internal trade and even less into the external stream.

(*b*) *Mining*

Tin.—With the exception of lode tin mines in Sungei Lembing (inland from Kuantan) and gold mines at Raub, Malayan mining is characteristically operated as various types of open-cast and is mostly alluvial, especially in tin mining. Thus mining makes an impression on the landscape which is out of proportion to the tonnage produced (57,500 tons of tin from 703 mines in 1950).

The tin ore (cassiterite, containing about 75 per cent tin) occurs mostly in weathered grains scattered through gravels and sands; it may be elluvial (weathered *in situ*) but the majority is alluvial, that is, originally water-borne and partly sorted by flowing water. The principle of mining remains the same—removing a "dead" surface, breaking up the tin-bearing alluvials and washing away the sands, clays and gravels by a water method which leaves behind the heavy cassiterite grains. Techniques vary, however, and make different impressions on the landscape.

1. *Dredging:* This method has been the most productive and labour-saving since 1929. The dredge floats in a pond (technically called a paddock) covering about 4 acres and its steam or electrically-driven buckets on an endless chain draw up from underwater the alluvium. As this is removed the dredge

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

FIG. 41.—Locations of Malayan Minerals

moves on, progressively excavating the bottom and sides of the pond. Within the dredge, the alluvium is screened to remove the tin and any other minor minerals, and the rest passes out as tailings which are spread by sluices behind the dredge. Thus the dredge ultimately transfers its pond slowly from place to

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316 place. The tailings lie only a little above the surface of the water to form loose swamps for hundreds of yards behind the dredge, and, being soilless, these tailings can only be slowly colonised by vegetation.

To build a dredge is expensive (£25,000 to £50,000 each), so that this technique is confined to large-scale, heavily capitalised mines, chiefly European. By dredges a high extraction rate can be assured and alluvials once dredged are not worth going over again. Because only a few labourers, of the skilled artisan type, are employed, such mines have few buildings round them and these are often temporary, so that labour can move closer to the dredge as it moves on. Dredge mines are located in or close to river beds, but they do not make great demands on water supply—the same water is being used over and over again and fill-in by the tailings goes on automatically. Cheap tin may always be expected from dredges, which need very little labour. Most dredges were destroyed during the war and they were not quickly replaceable owing to the demands for heavy equipment in other parts of the world; 78 were operating in 1950, employing about 16,000 people.

2. *Gravel pump mines:* These tin mines open great pits in the alluvials to form scars on the landscape for long periods at a time. They can conserve the topsoil separately from the rest and spread it again over the alluvials once the mine is filled in, so that they need not permanently affect the landscape, though in point of fact careless infilling has mutilated large areas of landscape by preventing regrowth.

The pumping, by steam, diesel or electric power, is part of the process of raising a mixture of water and tin-bearing gravels by wide pipeline to the top of a high-level sloping sluice, built on tall timber trestles which stand everywhere on a Malayan mining landscape. The sluice upon these trestles is stepped and the tin ore gathers in the steps while the gravels are washed away by the continuously pumped water. Gathered from the sluice, the cassiterite is rewashed before drying and sacking for shipment. The tin-bearing alluvials are mixed with water by jets (monitors) playing on the sides of the pit, and the water carries the alluvials in a muddy stream to a "gravel pump" at the bottom of the pit. Tailings on these mines are derived from chutes here and there along the sluice and from

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its lower end; they are spread out loosely round the mine to form a landscape of dead land covering greater areas than those left by dredges. Considerably more labour, chiefly unskilled, is needed, and round gravel pump mines lie haphazard groups of thatched, wooden, earth-floored miners' huts. Nearby there must be a pond or impounded stream to provide water for the monitors and when mines are abandoned the pits often fill with water and remain as deep lakes.

The proportion of extraction by this method varies and often the tailings merit being worked over several times by successively better methods. Some Malayan areas have already been worked over four times. Work often goes on continuously day and night. This type of mine can be rehabilitated fairly quickly, it needs less machinery than a dredge and is not confined to heavily capitalised undertakings. Ownership is very mixed: European, Chinese and Indian firms own gravel pump mines, and by 1950 about 500 Chinese gravel pump mines were operating with 22,000 labourers.

3. *Other forms of Tin Mining:* Hydraulic mining resembles the gravel pump mine in most respects as far as technique, layout and form are concerned. It differs chiefly in using a pipeline from the hills to supply the head of water for the monitors and to motivate the gravel pumps.

Several true open-cast mines are operated, the Hong Fatt at Sungei Besi, being the outstanding example; in these, the alluvials are mechanically excavated from spiral terraces round the sides on which run rails for trucks and mechanical grabs. After being hauled to the surface the alluvials are treated with water as in gravel pumping.

The primitive method of panning by hand, to separate the cassiterite grains from the other gravels, better known in connection with gold prospecting and mining, has also been extensively used by small free-lance miners employing Chinese women coolies. In Malaya, panning is known as *dulang* mining, a form much used by miners during slumps when larger concerns closed down.

At the Sungei Lembing lode mines, not far from Kelantan, the usual system of vertical shafts (to 1,200 ft. depths) is used, and the ore comes to the surface for crushing and roasting, an unusual technique in Malaya. This particular installation of the Pahang

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

FIG. 42.—Pahang: Land Use. Areas left blank are forested

316 Consolidated Mining Company is large, heavily capitalised and elaborately equipped.

Most of the labour on tin mines has always been Chinese, supported in immediately pre-war years by Indians in the proportion roughly nine to one. Only a few Malays worked in this industry. The number of people employed varied with the prosperity of the industry which has changed considerably; in the six years 1933-38, annual production varied from about 25,000 tons to over three times that figure, and labour was recruited or discharged accordingly. There were about 46,000 workers on the mines in 1950 when Malayan tin production was 57,000 tons, as compared with 83,000 in 1940 when the production was 85,000 tons. Even for labourers, the industry was thus a gamble; some workers were employed on daily wages, though housing and food were provided; others worked on contract and were paid according to the volume of ground cut away. A few groups of miners worked as a form of co-operative, sharing profits after the tribute (royalty) of the actual lessor had been paid.

From the human geography standpoint, the cultural landscape of mining was transient in most respects, except that the industry in boom years attracted mining rushes and it left relatively per-

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manent scars of tailings and ponds on the worked-over landscape. This last was not in general serious from the agriculturists' point of view, since only occasionally had suitable alluvials been found under land already intensively cultivated. As a remoter effect, by altering the rate and incidence of natural sedimentation, tin mining has changed water-courses, increased deposition and clogged estuaries, particularly on the west coast, in Lower Perak and Selangor.

The pattern of Malayan tin mining is thus set by alluvial deposits which have brought cassiterite from its veins at contact zones and fissures in the rocks adjoining the igneous intrusions. These deposits lie predominantly among the foothills to the ranges, where break of slope has lowered the capacity of streams to continue carrying heavy cassiterite. Thus, the mining zones flank the Central Range throughout its length, more especially on its west side, in the Kinta Valley and round Kuala Lumpur, where about three-quarters of Malayan tin is produced, but there are workings at Bentong and a few other points east of the Range to the south (Fig. 41). Other workings flank the Nakawn Range in Perlis, the Western Range and the Bintang Range (chiefly round Taiping). On the extreme East, workings are few, largely due to inaccessibility, and are scattered on the coastal side of the Eastern Range all the way from Besut River to Johore; of these, the Sungei Lembing lode mines are the most important.

It has been estimated that Malayan tin mines have an average expectation of about 24 years of life from 1946 (see also Fermor). Although tin has played a major part in Malayan external trade, it has only a subdued rôle on the landscape and in human activities within the country, which are more extensively affected by the rubber and paddy industries. So far the great asset of Malayan mining has been its low average cost of production which remained far below that of any other major tin-producing zone of the world.

Cassiterite leaves all mines in granular form to be transported in sacks by rail to Penang and Singapore where two furnaces up to 1942 handled about half the world's tin, importing ore from surrounding countries in addition to handling Malayan ore. Thus tin smelting was a more stable industry than mining itself. To smelt tin the ore is mixed with limestone and anthracite, the former gathering the non-tin minerals and the latter reducing the tin which is further refined to over 99 per cent pure in cast-iron

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

FIG. 43.—Land Use in South Malaya

316 kettles before flowing into moulds. These smelting works were not materially damaged by the war and have in fact acquired greater significance due to the destruction of rival smelters at Arnheim, offset in part by the growing tendency of United States consumers to import tin ore and do their own smelting.

Iron.—By 1940 Malaya was annually producing nearly 2 million tons of iron ore derived from haematite deposits in Johore, Kelantan, Pahang and Trengganu, which have an iron content of 50–65 per cent, thereby ranking as high quality ores (Fig. 41). The Johore deposits (at Batu Pahat and Endau) (Fig. 43) and the Trengganu deposits (at Dungun and Kemaman) (Fig. 39) produced over 80 per cent of the whole. The mines were worked on the open-cast system, using Chinese labour, and causing considerable local landscape changes in what had been virgin territories. The great bulk of the production made a substantial labour demand, out of proportion to the low value of iron ore production compared with tin. Since the majority of mines were on East Coast sites, they had to devise their own transport system which was chiefly by river barges down to the coast. They faced difficulties of harbourage (no major steamers can come inshore for loading

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on the East Coast and they must anchor offshore to load from barges), difficulties of transhipment during the heavy Northeast Monsoon seas, and remoteness from suitable coal deposits. Before the war, iron mining was exclusively a Japanese-financed industry and the whole production was shipped to Japan for smelting. During the occupation, a little smelting was done in charcoal furnaces, a most wasteful method, not likely to be continued. The problem of exploiting this iron must arise again, though the previous difficulties of access and coal supply are unchanged. The problem is specially acute for Trengganu, where the deposits are of good grades and easily worked and form the only major cash-producing asset of the state. The mines restarted in 1949.

Gold.—Small quantities of alluvial gold occur at many places in Kelantan and northwest Pahang, and in association with tin alluvials of the Bidor-Tapah area of Perak, of Malacca, and parts of Selangor. These alluvials are sporadically washed for gold by small groups of prospectors. No major undertaking is concerned with gold except at Raub, where lode mines with shafts as much as 1,000 ft. deep can produce about 28,000 ozs. troy annually (14,000 ozs. in 1950), the whole process of crushing and amalgamation being done at Bukit Koman, near Raub.

Other minerals.—Low-grade manganese ores have been mined in conjunction with the iron ores of Northeast Malaya and sent to Japan. In Kedah and Trengganu, small tungsten ore (wolfram) deposits were regularly worked for sale to the United Kingdom and the United States. Superficial and shallow deposits of bauxite were quarried immediately pre-war by Japanese firms at Batu Pahat and just east of Johore Bahru; no facilities for extracting the aluminium existed locally and the total export of ore did not exceed 60,000 tons per annum. Aluminium works in Australia have called for tenders to supply them with Malayan bauxite. As a by-product of tin mining, ilmenite (titanium ore), together with monazite (a source of thorium) are recovered magnetically from the refuse, but the production varies widely (19,000 tons ilmenite in 1949, cf. 2,600 tons in 1940), and comes largely from the Perak and Selangor mines.

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Chapter Eight

THE SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY OF MALAYA

361 621 BECAUSE the development of Malaya into the forms of today has taken place within the last 150 years, it exemplifies geographical factors involved in changing the ecology and associations of life in tropical areas.

THE EVOLUTION OF MALAYAN LIFE

Before the end of the 18th century, the pattern of Malaya was simple and Malays lived as self-supporting rice farmers and fishermen with only a little interchange between these groups in a few districts of specialised activity. Probably a population of no more than a quarter million was involved, and people lived in settlements strung along the coasts and rivers where transport by small boat, drinking water and irrigation water, were available. The dense forest seems to have repelled the Malay no less than it repelled the foreigners who occasionally passed by on the high seas, and it was left as a negative no-man's land between the settlement lines of rivers and coasts. Thus Malay political units, sultanates, chieftaincies and so on, were shaped round estuaries where rice growing was easy and where the coastal and riberine strings of villages met. The interfluve was a forested frontier zone to political units undefined by boundaries and among its forests wandered a few poorly-organised debilitated aborigines.

621 177 241 Malay society was communally self-sufficient, a nice balance between the amount of food needed and growable and the number of hands available to produce it. All the Malayan agricultural products grown for sale today and at various times tried commercially, are foreign innovations. Apart from spices, nothing cultivated by the local people then had exportable value; even rice, which had become their staple food, was introduced by first millenium Indian colonists to this setting which is more naturally fitted for yam cultivation. The trade in spices which developed round medieval Malacca was of small volume, and depended on a few trees in native gardens rather than on large-scale plantations.

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Equally repelled by the Malayan surface, the first modern settlements concentrated on the coast, where position relative to the whole region attracted Arabs, Indians, Chinese and Europeans in succession. The Portuguese and Dutch trading post was Malacca; the first British posts were on the Islands of Penang and Singapore, isolated from the peninsula, and following until 1874 a general directive of avoiding political ties or mainland responsibility. 361 563 162 177

When interest turned to the Malayan mainland, its physical difficulties and their variations from place to place had to be taken into account. There are four main types of surface: unpopulated forest-covered ranges of which the Central Range is the most prominent; foothills flanking these ranges, forest-covered but well-drained and partly broken up by lines of pioneer Malay settlements; a badly-drained zone of freshwater swamp forest, forbidding to settlement and to cultivation and penetrable only along the rivers; and a healthier coastal strip of mixed farming and fishing, with here and there an intensively cultivated plain or a rocky outlier which sedimentation had converted from an island to part of the mainland. This fourfold pattern is arranged roughly symmetrically to the Ranges but the Central Range is nearest the west coast at certain points, serving to narrow that repellant unit, the marsh zone. 133

In the foothills lay Malaya's great attraction to external interests, alluvial tin, and accessibility to the foothills was the most important consideration to the western tin belt, which is richest and nearest to the coast. To these foothills, only the rivers provided access and along them the first outsiders were able to move through the marshes, concerned with rivers not only as a means to travel inland, but also as a means for sending out the heavy, bulky tin and for bringing in the food for miners who were working in areas generally far from local agriculture. Local agriculture was in any case closely involved in a tight subsistence ecology without appreciable surplus for sale. 316 133

At two places, on the Larut coast and at the mouth of the Klang River, ranges came so close to the coast that the tin belt in their foothills could be easily and quickly reached by poling shallow-draught canoes and boats along streams too shallow for large ships and never very significant even for Malay settlement. Hence the first two mining settlements inside Malaya were round what are

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now Taiping and Kuala Lumpur where the first mining was exclusively Chinese in management, labour and financing. Kuala Lumpur as described by Sir Frank Swettenham in 1874 was merely a dozen squalid thatched huts. Later it became the focus of a Chinese tin rush with all its attendant disorder and riotousness and today it is a wealthy modern city and capital of the mainland, though containing only 176,200 people (1947).

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This opening up of mines did not produce an economic struggle between miners and farmers, nor a struggle between Malays and Chinese, because in those first zones Malay settlement and Malay farms were negligible, so that there was no significant displacement of the old by the new or of the indigenous by the foreign. The state of Selangor, where Kuala Lumpur is, had an extremely small Malay population in the third quarter of last century when mining was beginning to assume importance and the sultanate capital of the time, Bandar Termasa, was a poor, neglected, unhealthy village on a swampy flat at the junction of the rivers Langat and Jugra, resembling the primitive settlements to be seen today on the lonelier parts of the Borneo coast. The Chinese miners worked on concessions from the sultans at a royalty of 10 per cent on production. The disorders of the mining areas arose from disputes among rival groups of Chinese prospectors, not infrequently due to Malay chiefs granting new concessions which, being ill-defined and unsurveyed, overlapped, infringed or ignored previous concessions. Malays declined to do mining labour themselves and all work was done by Chinese, often imported under dubious conditions direct from China by the concessionaires. Friction between rival groups was aggravated by the traditional banditry and clan fighting which the Chinese brought with them. They came from separate clans of South China and were often as unintelligible and foreign to one another in speech and customs as they were to the Malays. What the number of immigrant miners was at that early time, prior to British intervention on the Malayan mainland, is not clear. In 1891, by when a fairly reliable enumeration became possible, nearly 90,000 Chinese arrived to work in the peninsula, though there were probably well above 100,000 already in the mining districts.

Miners do not farm, in whatever part of the world they prospect, and these Chinese immigrant miners depended on imported food. To cater for them, other Chinese set up shops and brought in commodities from outside. Even Malay villages then had no shops.

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The advent of miners, and later, planters, working a money-based economy, introduced money into rural Malaya, accompanied by the development of rural shops and trading centres. Into this new Malayan setting of middlemen and shopkeepers, the Chinese quickly fitted, helped by earlier experience elsewhere in the East where certain types of them had already a long tradition as traders and middlemen. As a result, throughout Malaya today shops and mercantile businesses are almost exclusively Chinese interests, although there are a few rival Indian traders who came in with an eye on the parallel needs of Tamil labourers brought into the rubber estates this century. 316 178 177 464 563

The tin rush had little effect on Malayan agriculture, though it might have been expected that the presence in the country of so many extra rice-eating consumers would stimulate Malayan cultivators. The Malay remained tied to his original ecology, justified to some extent by the limited areas of land in Malaya with just those conditions of fertility, level and drainage which suited paddy. The steady natural increase of Malays which has in fact gone on since 1874 (the Malay population today is probably some six times what it was then and rose 35 per cent over the period 1931-47) means that their resources were already sufficiently strained by needing to expand their food growing areas to keep pace with their own natural increase. 316 178 161

At Kuala Lumpur and Taiping, the inward movement of people, food and essentials, and the outward movement of tin ore, led to the building of short railways to the nearest coastal points (Port Swettenham and Port Weld), replacing poling along the rivers which was unsatisfactory, unsafe and very soon inadequate as the rivers rapidly silted up when mining got fully going. Later a railway was built longitudinally to link these early mining centres, through the western foothill belt and in turn this longitudinal railway made it possible for mining rapidly to extend along it. Thus railways, paid for by tin, preceded roads in Malaya. 496

Despite increasing British interest in the mainland from 1874 onwards, Malayan tin mining continued to be very much a Chinese activity. European finance, management and techniques were introduced when mining became a matter of heavy equipment, competitive costs and high capitalisation. Now that much heavy mining machinery has been destroyed by the 1942-45 war, there has been an emphasis on Chinese mining forms. 316 563

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496 178 Gradually the Taiping-Kuala Lumpur railway line was extended during the nineties to link Malacca and Prai (for the ferry to Penang) and ran completely to Singapore by 1909. The line initially and in extension kept well inland to the foothills and away from the marshy forests behind the west coast. It was characteristically a national railway, capitalised and run without resort to publicly raised external capital. Inspired by and located for the tin areas, the railway both encouraged speedier development of that activity and fixed the pattern for future opening up of the mainland. It assured export of commodities from the interior and import of food for immigrants. When the time came for new agricultural plantations and associated industries, they gravitated towards the railway, which moulded them into a longitudinal pattern round the railway as axis. Bridle paths through the forest were the early feeders to the first railway. The present road system developed later than the railways, to feed them; roads came later than the railways because in the forest where indigenous draught animals were negligible and horses unsuitable, roads could have little value until motor transport evolved. When they became practicable roads followed patterns roughly complementary to the railways.

491 496 Roads were first designed in Malaya to serve the railway rather than to compete with it or duplicate it. Only when oil-driven vehicles came into general use were longitudinal roads constructed through the west coast zone. Even by 1942, no through road paralleled the east coast but an eastern railway through the mountains and valleys from Gemas to Kota Bahru followed principles worked out on the other side of the Central Range. It was linked to the east coast by a long road to Kuantan and by the old river route down the Pahang, whose middle course was not far from the railway (Fig. 36). This line had only a limited service before 1942 when the Japanese removed its rails for use in Siam, and it was not restored until 1948.

491 Two zones of comparatively dense road network now spread out, bounded in each case by the Malayan ranges:

(*a*) From Butterworth south to the Kinta Valley;

(*b*) From Kuala Selangor to Muar.

These are both zones of old-established and elaborate development in mining and planting. Elsewhere, except on Singapore Island, the road network is very open and has frequent dead-ends.

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The absence of coastwise roads reflects the difficulty of crossing the wide, swampy estuaries which mostly still have to be ferried. Where N-S. roads do exist, they are generally confined to foothill zones and do not in any case link with road systems through the Kra Isthmus where the railway has a monopoly beyond Singgora. Only two highways cross the Central Range, linking the mining and planting settlements on either side and encouraging the development of hill stations, one of which, Cameron Highlands, has become a producer of vegetables (Fig. 40), using a daily road service to the lowlands. 491

In 1890, after the major tin rush, there began the move towards cultivating rubber and the locations sought by British planters for this purpose were close to those originally sought by the Chinese tin miners. There were two reasons. The foothills where the tin occurred had the advantage of good natural drainage and therefore suited rubber trees, which had to be out of the swampy lowlands. Moreover, the railway built for the tin mines provided the communications which were needed for rubber plantations, whose supplies, particularly rice for their Indian labourers, had to be brought in from outside, and whose rubber needed to be sent abroad. The rubber plantations gravitated to the western foothills as ribbon developments along the railway lines and although plantations gradually fanned out from the railway, even today the land utilisation map shows how closely the distribution of rubber correlates with the railway and the road system. 249 496 311

The Malay tradition of self-sufficiency presented a wall of opposition to the introduction of exportable crops, whether of the outstandingly successful rubber or of the less successful sugar, coffee, gambier, coconuts and oil palms, which Europeans introduced, with the result that, failing to get the innovations taken up by local farmers, Europeans took to farming themselves in contrast to the turn of events in Burma and resembling those of the Indies. Even this was no easy solution because the plantations had to be in virgin country to get suitable soils, and at the same time needed labour which local communities were ill-adapted to supply because every hand was needed for food production. In Malaya, planters remedied the situation by bringing in agricultural labourers from abroad. Thus the South American Hevea was grown in Malaya by European methods with predominantly Indian labour, and the Malay was not involved until the First World War, when he tried a little 177 249 464 178

177 rubber planting, more in the spirit of gambling than of farming. So
249 far as most Malays were concerned the innovation caused little
464 disturbance in their way of life, since it occurred on land which had
178 been forest and not on lands involved in their rice ecology. They steadily drifted into wage-earning occupations, so that Malays formed 12 per cent of the estate labourers by 1947, or 18 per cent if with them be included Indonesians.

361 All these influences have worked to establish the greatest con-
162 centrations of people and the exploitative industries (rubber and tin) in the belt of West-Central Malaya, running from Malacca, through Kuala Lumpur to Ipoh and Taiping (Fig. 44). To this belt of immigrant peoples and foreign innovations, Kuala Lumpur is as focal as midpoints of a belt can be, thereby justifying its selection as the capital of the newly-established Federation of Malaya (1948). It has assumed this rank because (*a*) it is the old-established focus of a wealthy, commercially active tin and rubber zone, (*b*) it is exclusively Malayan in interest, by contrast with coastal towns, (*c*) its choice as a federal capital was aided by not being a sultanate seat and thereby not the traditional focus of any one state. Kuala Lumpur is not particularly central to the peninsula yet no other point rivals it for centrality in view of the configuration which disperses rather than focuses natural routes. The centrality of Kuala Lumpur to the "Tin and Rubber Belt" has been deliberately emphasised by transport systems which link it to all the well populated zones.

The other dense population centre, Singapore Island, has been less a centre for Malaya and more an entrepôt for Southeast Asia; it is foreign to Malaya both in population (729,000 Chinese out of 941,000 in 1947) and in economic interests, which are trade rather than production.

177 In the far northwest and northeast corners of Malaya, the Malay
162 continues his life much as before, fishing, farming for his rice and
523 nearly self-sufficient; very little change has come to him through the great and speedy immigrations of Chinese and Indians in West-Central Malaya, and though the Second World War has stirred his nationalism, it has not given him means or numbers to balance, rival or subdue the newcomers in a combination of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, though in the Federation the Malays in conjunction with Malaysian or Indonesian immigrants roughly equal in numbers the combined Chinese and Indian population.

[See p. 133, category 116 -- Analyst]

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

FIG. 44.—Distribution of Population in Malaya. (Based on 1945 estimates)

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162 184 563 571 Broadly speaking, Malayans do not form a plural society in the sense of several groups struggling to occupy the same land or the same occupations; it is a cellular society of different cultural, linguistic, ethnic and economic communities living their separate ways in different parts of the Peninsula and stratified socially within themselves.

COMPOSITION OF MALAYAN POPULATION
(in thousands, 1947 Census)

	Malays	*Other Malaysians*	*Chinese*	*Indians*	*Europeans and Eurasians*	*Total*
Federation of Malaya	2,130	265	1,880	534	19	4,867
Percentage ..	44	5	39	11	—	100
Singapore Island ..	72	43	728	71	18	938
Percentage ..	8	5	78	4	2	100
Total	2,202	308	2,608	605	37	5,805
Percentage ..	38	5	45	10	1	100

Distribution of Ethnic Groups

563 162 369 361 Thus the ethnic groups of Malaya have taken on a distinctive pattern, which, although modified to some extent by the war which emphasised population in the west and the south and accentuated urbanisation, continues to have much the same form. In detail the intensities may have altered a little, more so in the case of Indians than in the others. The following brief analysis assumes that only settlements of over 10,000 people may be called towns and derives from the 1947 census.

Malays.—Only three towns, Butterworth, Kota Bahru and Trengganu have Malay majorities, indicating that Malays are not normally urban, though groups of them live on the fringe of most towns. The greatest densities of Malays in rural areas are:

1. In the northeast, on the rice-growing plains of Kelantan and Trengganu.
2. Along the northwest coast from Taiping to the Siamese border, where rice farming and fishing draw Malays into relatively dense groups over fairly large continuous areas.
3. A narrower fringe of more dispersed and less homogeneous Malay settlements from Malacca southwards along the Johore coast to Singapore.

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Nowhere else are there concentrations of Malays, although all the coasts and rivers have scattered Malay hamlets, too dispersed to appear on any but inch to the mile maps. Malays totalled at the last enumeration (1947) just over two millions, 44 per cent of the total mainland population.

Immigrant Peoples.—Malayan non-indigenous people, principally the Chinese and Indians, have settled densely in a belt about 40 miles wide down the west coast, where concentrate 90 per cent of the Chinese and 95 per cent of the Indians living on the mainland. In this belt are nine out of ten of the peninsula's large towns, a symptom of the urban preferences of immigrant peoples. The immigrant communities are far from evenly distributed; south of Muar and north of Butterworth their density thins markedly.

The Chinese, apart from a few shopkeepers and small dealers, have avoided the east coast (even though it faces their homeland) and also the sultanate of Kedah. East of the Central Range the only large Chinese settlements are Raub and Bentong. Along the west coast belt large urban concentrations of Chinese are in Johore Bahru, Muar, Malacca, Seremban, Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh and Taiping. In districts round Taiping (41,396) and Ipoh (90,635), which have in turn been the focus of Chinese activity in the northern part of the "Tin and Rubber Belt," dispersed groups of miners form the chief extensive settlements of Chinese in the peninsula. Between the Kinta Valley (Fig. 38) and Kuala Lumpur the Chinese population thins out, but from Kuala Lumpur southward, along the coast and the railway, there are fairly regular and extensive rural Chinese settlements.

By comparison with that of the Chinese, the map of Malayan Indians is very open; the group has experienced a post-war decline of 7 per cent. There is no sharp differentiation between the distribution of Indians and the distribution of Chinese, which roughly parallel one another. In the Kuala Lumpur-Klang-Malacca zone is the most even and dense distribution of Indians, that being the zone of old and extensive rubber plantations which have chiefly attracted Indian labourers. Another concentration of Indians is from the Kinta Valley to Butterworth, also a rubber zone. Outside these two areas, Indians are not prominent and east of a line from the Central Range south to Muar, Indians are comparatively scarce.

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Regional Geography

184 In subdividing Malaya into regions, the following factors have
132 to be considered:

133 1. Because dense forest covers highlands and lowlands alike, it makes them equally difficult to human activity, so that orographic delimitation is not a primary consideration.
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489 2. Marsh and swamp forest have obstructed human activities more than any other landscape type.
3. Climatic distinctions are subdued and condition only the incidence, not the character of local rhythms.
4. The cultural landscape is more differentiated than the physical.
5. Indigenous groups used interfluves as boundary zones and rivers have had major significance as lines of entry and development at all stages.
6. Lines of transport not only establish coherence but also set the pattern of actual and potential development.
7. External considerations have been at least as strong as internal factors in Malayan development.

Population distribution and economic development justify a primary division into Western and Eastern Malaya, using the Central Range as main boundary, extended south along the watershed between rivers leading to the Malacca Strait and South China Sea and terminating at the Johore Strait between Johore Bahru and the Johore River. To Western Malaya the railway and road system forms the main artery; to Eastern Malaya the line of movement is mainly eastwards along the rivers to the coast and coastwise. Singapore Island is best treated as a region separate from these two primary peninsular regions, which subdivide thus (see end-paper):

Western Malaya

133 (*a*) Northern Coastal Plain, west of the Western Range from the
162 Siamese border to just south of Province Wellesley, a zone
438 where Malays predominate and subsistence farming on a rice basis is the development type in a climate with a slight dry season. The Langkawi Islands, best thought of as outlier of Malaya, resemble the Nakawn Range, and they are more interesting geologically than geographically, since they support only a few hundred people in small bays on a karstic limestone landscape.

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(*b*) The Mountain and Valley zone of broken, isolated, little-developed country between the Western Range and the Central Range, terminating north of the Taiping-Kuala Kangsar railway. 133 162 438

(*c*) The Tin and Rubber Belt, in the foothill zone from Larut and the Kinta Valley southwards to include the coast south of Port Dickson and stretching to Singapore. A zone of intense tin and rubber activities, linked throughout by railway and a dense road network, it has developed on the basis of production for export and is populated by Chinese in large pioneer nuclei and by Indians dispersed in the rural areas. Only in Malacca and in Negri Sembilan are there small enclaves of the Malay subsistence-farming landscape.

(*d*) The West Central Marshy Coast, including the Perak, Bernam, Selangor and Langat River estuaries; an undeveloped, repellant zone typically fringed by mixed fishing and coconut-growing colonies on the coast itself where there are distinct rocky island zones (the Dindings) now silted up to link with the mainland. On this coast are outports, Telok Anson for Ipoh and the Kinta Valley, Port Swettenham for Kuala Lumpur.

(*e*) Penang; entrepôt for (*a*) and the Kinta Valley portions of (*c*).

Originally established as a centre for buying spices and selling textiles and opium to Northeast Malaya, Penang Island, a granite cored outlier of northwest Malayan ranges (area 110 square miles, maximum height, 2,722 ft.), was taken over uninhabited (1796) as a potential mercantile and naval base, a pawn in the competition between the rival British and Dutch East India trading companies. It provided one of the few available deep water anchorages for sailing ships coming before the wind across the Indian Ocean, but did not protect them from the violence of storms from east and west. As long distance shipping displaced trade routes across the Kra Isthmus into Siam, Penang lost its earlier significance as fulcrum of Malayan, Burmese and Siamese interests and became an entrepôt, yet its location finally proved inconveniently far from direct routes between East and West. Development of the Malay Peninsula gradually shifted well south so that, while the port continued to increase its population and trade, it did so less rapidly than Singapore, which outpaced it. From being deserted in 1790, the island of Penang carried 20,000 people, mostly Chinese, by 175 504 438 162

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175 1801 and by 1947 had 446,422 people, of whom about half were
504 Chinese and one-third Indian; the town itself has an even higher
438 Chinese proportion. From these Chinese came those who made the first tin rush to Taiping so that Penang was from the beginning the
162 "outport" of the northern mining interests, maintained to some extent today by the presence of a smelter. Rubber plantations centred much farther south, so that as the rubber trade came to the fore, Penang's trade decreased, to become half Singapore's by 1825, and one-third by 1864, shrinking steadily in proportion into this century, yet grossing $1,400 million in 1950.

496 The railway into Siam brought a considerable tin and rubber
438 trade from Kra to Penang, yet even in this trade Penang suffered from the increasing hold of Singapore as the greatest entrepôt for
504 the South China Sea. Although the town occupies only a small fraction of northeastern Penang, very little farming is done now in rural areas where sugar, tapioca and spices for export were cultivated at the end of last century. The town has functioned as a stepping stone for much of the Indian coolie labour which has gone into Malay's pioneer industries from Madras.

Eastern Malaya

133 (*a*) The Kelantan-Besut delta zone north and east of Kuala Krai
162 is a densely populated rural zone concerned almost exclusively
438 with Malay self-contained farming for paddy with subsidiary fishing.

489 (*b*) The East Coast Fringe, isolated from the mainland by a difficult terrain of broad marshes, occupied by discontinuous Malay fishing communities with subsidiary subsistence farming and linked by coastwise shipping in small boats.

(*c*) The mountains and valleys of West Pahang, running from the Middle Kelantan Valley along the east of the Central Range as far as inner Negri Sembilan. A complicated terrain of mountains with two sets of emphatic valleys on N-S. and E-W. lines, sporadically developed for mining by Chinese in the Raub-Bentong district, with a few Malay subsistence paddy farming valleys towards the south (Kuala Pilah). The developed areas are linked by roads across the Central Range to Western Malaya. The N-S. link of the railway from Gemas to Kuala Lipis has been restored and lies well east of the mining areas, though it has attracted rubber plantations along its track.

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

FIG. 45.—Penang: Land Use and Relief

(*d*) The Trengganu Highlands, an isolated, almost uninhabited, forest-covered area has only been developed by foreigners on the easternmost fringe where the Dungun-Kemaman iron mines until the war exported to the coast, as does the big tin mine of Sungei Lembing behind Kuantan, all employing Chinese or Indian labourers. 133 162 438 489

(*e*) The Pahang-Rompin Valleys, including the Pahang from Jerantut southwards and the Sungei Bera. This is an isolated,

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undeveloped, thinly populated area. Along the middle and lower Pahang, Malay villages have evolved a little subsistence paddy farming between the riverside levees and the marshes adjoining them. The Pahang itself is a transport link, though its traffic has no great commercial significance.

(*f*) East Johore, a zone of hills isolated by marshes and very thinly populated, had in the inter-war period developed tin mines (behind Mersing), iron mines (near Endau), and rubber plantations towards the south. The original outlet from these production points was the east coast, but roads to Singapore increasingly carry tin and rubber in that direction. Chinese labour preponderates.

The roughly E-W lines of the Muar-Simpang Kanan-Endau river marshes virtually isolate south Johore from both Western and Eastern Malaya. This isolation was significant historically and in our own times and might justify delimiting Johore as a region transitional between Western and Eastern Malaya and forming the immediate hinterland of Singapore, towards which Johore's roads and railways converge.

Singapore

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While the physiography and development of Malaya have been centrifugal in their effects on the peninsula, Singapore may be described as representing the climax of routes and relations centripetal to Southern Malaya, though it is only since 1811 that these influences finally focused in Singapore itself, being centred in Palembang, Malacca, Batavia and Penang at previous periods in history. For over sixty years from the year Raffles took it over as just one other of those almost unpopulated, undeveloped and unproductive little islands scattered thinly south of Malaya, Singapore in fact was concerned with nothing else except trade upon the basis of these centripetal influences, which made it the port of call and of interchange for Indian, Chinese, European and East Indian commodities; during that time Singapore was solely an entrepôt. Later, Malayan tin came into its commercial sphere, yet this was for a long time just one extra aspect of the entrepôt trade. As Malayan tin and rubber came into world-wide prominence in the present century, trade in these products originating in Malaya began to pass almost entirely through Singapore, establishing the port as the tin and rubber market for the world, gradually drawing

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to itself more of these commodities as the East Indies and other parts of Southeast Asia imitated Malaya's successful innovations and added them to their stream of trade with Singapore. On this basis, Singapore was started as a free port and has remained so, the fiscal dues on Malayan trade being paid at the Johore Strait and not in Singapore itself, which was not in fact linked to the

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

FIG. 46.—Physical Features of Singapore Island

peninsula by causeway until 1918 and is even now administratively distinct from it. There was no sustained success in cultivating pepper, spices or rubber on Singapore Island which has increasingly concentrated on its commercial life.

Within four months after establishing his port at Singapore, as another development in the rivalry of British and Dutch East India companies, Raffles reported the arrival of 5,000 Chinese, whom he deliberately encouraged because he thought their business-like astuteness and hard-working character fitted well with British mercantile interests, and because he had an eye on the China trade and the part Chinese merchants were already playing in the trade of the archipelago. It was, in fact, something of a paradox since the main interest of the British East India Company was India, from which base Singapore was controlled until 1867.

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

FIG. 47.—Drainage Pattern of Singapore Island

The accompanying maps (Figs. 46, 47, 48) summarise the geographic facts about the island (area 220 square miles) and show how it subdivides into three parts on the basis of physical and land utilisation differences; these are largely delimited by deep mangrove indentations. The central and eastern portions of the island have been tending for years to become largely urbanised as a result of rapid expansion of the town towards the south and towards extensive buildings at the naval base on the northern side and at Changi, an air base in the extreme east. Even the western side is coming more and more into the urban sphere, which has increased steadily through the last twenty years. Before 1941 the civil population of the island was about two-thirds of a million; in 1947 it became nearly a million.

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The town itself is built on the rectangular street pattern common to most pioneer towns of the peninsula, with house forms and layout very westernised in character though the population is nearly 80 per cent Chinese. To these, the focus of activity is the waterfront where dozens of ocean-going vessels and hundreds of small inter-island ships are always assembled, some transhipping offshore, others by the quayside—for Singapore has the deepest harbour and dock facilities within a thousand miles radius, as well as elaborate warehouses and a complicated network of predomin-

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

FIG. 48.—Land Utilisation on Singapore Island

ately Chinese shipping lines, both steam and sail, connecting it to all Southeast Asia and the archipelagos. Its street life is Chinese but dressed European; its commerce is largely Chinese, but the communal language is English, supplemented by bazaar Malay, though newly-immigrant Chinese still use their own vernacular. 504

Singapore's trade follows well-defined lines. On the normal figures of the immediate pre-war years, it was to be noted that the railway freight from Singapore to the mainland was nearly eighteen times that from the mainland to Singapore so that it was characteristically a one-way flow. Tin came in by road more than by railway. Nearly half of Singapore's imports came from the East Indies, consisting largely of oil, tin and rubber for re-export. Commodities such as manufactured goods from Europe and the United States, the most prominent single item being cloth, are imported in bulk by European firms, but their distribution retail in Malaya and the adjoining territories is by Chinese and Indian dealers. While tin smelting for most nearby territories is done by Singapore smelters, it is little evident in Singapore itself because the smelter is on a small island outside the harbour (Pulau Brani). Singapore has always played a considerable part in the financing of rubber without processing it. In few cases does Singapore add anything like a stage of manufacturing to goods passing through; its 439 438

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function is that of handling, forwarding, shipping, reshipping, breaking bulk, sorting, grading, distributing and collecting. Its commerce is one of go-betweens, middlemen and carriers, with profit more from commission than from processing. In addition Singapore handles the distribution of food, and other daily needs of the mining and plantation workers; it handles huge quantities of rice from Burma and Siam, minor Chinese foods from China, dried fish from the islands and cotton textiles from Britain, India and the Far East. During postwar years, Singapore's gross trade overseas has averaged about $2,000 million annually, rubber, rice, cotton textiles and tin being the chief items, in that order; about a quarter of this trade has been with other Southeast Asia territories and about half with Indonesia, U.S.A. and U.K. together. In 1950, its trade reached a total of nearly $7,000 million.

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Chapter Nine

THE NATURAL LANDSCAPE OF BURMA

133 MALAYA represents an example of Sunda Platform environment; Burma exemplifies conditions marginal to that Platform and to the Himalayan systems, a region transitional in type between geographical environments of Southeast Asia archipelagoes, of mountainous Western China, and of India.

PHYSIOGRAPHY

The physiography of Burma, less simple than it appears at first sight, and particularly complex in the human reaction to its various parts, is laid out with a relief-pattern shaped like an asymmetrical inverted V.

(*a*) The relief stems from a nameless mountainous core north of Putao, rising to heights of more than 20,000 ft. as a complex structural knot where the typical W-E. Himalayan trend lines branch into a great loop of fold systems which run southwards on a great arc, forming the mountain system of West Burma (mainly the Arakan Yoma), and thence as the southern and western margins of the Sunda Platform in Sumatra and Java.

(*b*) On the extreme east are the Shan Highlands; from the Putao Knot mountainous relief continues southward into the Shan Highlands, though the orographic continuity has no basis in structural uniformity.

(*c*) Between the Western Mountains and the Shan Highlands lies the Irrawaddy Basin, broadening and sloping southward to become the Gulf of Rangoon.

(*d*) Modern Burma as a political unit tapers towards the Kra Isthmus, where the ranges *en echelon* of the Malay Peninsula are repeated northward to merge into the Shan Highlands; this isthmus section of Burma is Tenasserim.

Thus there is a triple physiographic division, the Western Mountains, the Shan Highlands and their continuation into Tenasserim, and the Irrawaddy Basin (Fig. 49). Of these the best studied, the most elaborately developed and highly organised is the Irrawaddy Basin.

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FIG. 49.—The Regions of Burma

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1. *The Western Mountains*

The knot north of Putao is complex but its form lines in Burma run predominantly N-S. The thinness of peopling and poor development cause it to be more interesting geologically than geographically, though it has functioned as a bridge for peoples moving from Asia southwards.

More significant for Burma is the main Western Mountain group (highest peak, Mt. Sarametti, 12,557 ft.) through which runs the India-Burma border. This arcuate set of ranges which includes the Arakan Yoma and is mostly above 6,000 ft., is broad to the north, tapering in width southward to become Negrais Point and later a submarine section, showing above the sea as the Andaman Islands. It is largely a series of parallel ranges through which rivers have in places cut transverse valleys to produce a trough and cluse drainage-pattern resembling a trellis in plan. To the north the ranges are called the Patkoi, Lushai, Naga, Manipur and Chin Hills, becoming more compacted at the centre as the Arakan Yoma. Between the Patkoi Hills and the Arakan Yoma is the intermontane basin of Manipur, lower than the surrounding country yet called "The Highland of Manipur," an important channel of entry of ethnic groups moving into Burma. Some of the mountain masses are possibly fragments of older structures caught up in the western mountain building processes. In its northern section, this unit on the east breaks sharply to the Hukawng alluvial valley, but the Arakan Yoma proper abutts an area of hilly dissected upland shaped from pitching synclines to produce in places a series of boat-shaped scarps as in the Lower Chindwin. The Arakan coast, a group of narrow alluvial flats laid down by short, violent streams, and dominated by forest-clad hills often reaching to the sea as cliffs, is of the type called "Pacific Coast," where the fold-structure lines parallel the coast. Though the northern end has considerable heights, glaciated relief is found only north of latitude 27° and has not been proved to exist in the Arakan Yoma itself.

2. *The Shan Highlands*

A deeply dissected plateau, the Shan country, averaging 3,000 ft. high, rises abruptly, often in single steps of 2,000 ft., from the Sittang-Irrawaddy Basin. It is, however, intensely folded on N-S. lines and consists of rocks and structures much older than most in

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133 Burma and more closely related to those of the Sunda Platform; great stretches of massive limestone, sandstones and metamorphic rocks and granite repeat on a larger scale at sustained higher altitudes the rock types and relief forms already described in Malaya. Granites are not prominent at the surface of the structures here in Burma, except to the south and on the western fringe where the Highlands narrow and break down into the Tenasserim Ranges lying skew-wise to the Isthmus. The Shan Highlands merge northwards into the mountainous uplands dissected on N-S. lines by deep river gorges, a landscape which increases in altitude to the Putao Knot and extends eastwards through Siam and beyond the Mekong into Laos. Over large areas the compact limestone provides excellent examples of landscape, developed on this relatively soluble rock, whose usual valleys are broad, shallow and with gently sloping sides, now undergoing solution; through them streams meander sluggishly, often edged by marshes. Where several streams combine to give a powerful flow of water, down-cutting exceeds the rate of solution of the sides and leads to narrow gorges choked with masses of limestone fallen from the precipitous sides. Sometimes the dissolved limestone is redeposited from the groundwater to form travertine or calcareous tufa which looks rather like pumice; should this form rapidly, a natural dam may be built up. Later the stream will break this dam and take another course, resulting after a time in a network of small watercourses, not all of them full, surrounded by marshy ground—as at Hsum Hsai on the Mandalay-Lashio railway. Enclosed drainage basins (polje) are also very common, together with the other evidence of subterranean river systems. Extensive limestone caves are found at Moulmein, Kalaw, Gokteik, Singgu (above Mandalay) and Myitkyina.

3. *The Irrawaddy Basin*

Located between the two higher landscape types to the east and west, the Irrawaddy Basin, while also primarily a folded structure, though of less amplitude, has in addition the remnants of local volcanic land forms. It is by no means merely a large river valley or an old gulf of the sea: its rocks and structures are distinctive and in places of great thickness, considerable age and of successions peculiar to this area, so that there are special rock groupings called the Irrawaddy Series and the Pegu Series. Though partly concealed by terraces of Chindwin, Irrawaddy and Sittang river alluvials, the

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folded substructure of this Basin appears dissected at the surface in the Pegu Yoma which runs lengthwise through the middle, from the Myingyan District to the low ridges overlooking Rangoon, continuing far northward as a double line of dissected hills across the Irrawaddy and Chindwin rivers as the Sagaing-Mingin-Zibyun hills. Originating in connection with the folding of the Pegu Yoma and their extensions in the northern hill ranges is the line of extinct volcanoes now showing as the eroded cones and lavas of Mount Popa on the northwest flank of the Pegu Yoma, of Wuntho's jade mining district, and of Taungthonlon in the Mingin Hills. Once thought to be a tectonic rift flanked by faults, the Basin is accepted as mostly a fold structure, developed on alternating beds of clays, shales and sandstones, the varying characters of which produce great variations in the surface according to their exposures. 133

The Irrawaddy Series of rocks consists essentially of sands with subordinate conglomerates and clays which have been folded and eroded into a landscape of strike ridges and valleys. In the Dry Zone round the Chindwin-Irrawaddy junction, the series is capped by looser gravels and lateritised soils over a wide area (Fig. 56).

The Pegu Series includes thick, massive but easily eroded sandstones forming long continuous escarpments on N-S. lines, the lowest sandstone forming the impressive scarp overlying the Ponnyadaung Range, clays and shales with thin interbedded sandstones forming low ridges above clay lowlands (as at Pyawbwe). The Pegu and Irrawaddy Series of folded, younger rocks have produced under erosion some of the best Southeast Asia examples of scarped landforms.

Farther south over the Basin are spread alluvial deposits of many types and thicknesses, varying in character from coarse gravels near the hills to fine clays and silts towards the centre and south. While these deposits, interpreted by de Terra as a succession of river terraces, vary too much for generalisation, their different qualities and texture condition the pattern and intensity of cultivation.

Climate

Several factors modify in Burma those climatic influences common to most of the rest of Southeast Asia. 132

1. Higher latitudes and altitudes and more continental location produce in parts of Burma lower temperatures than those normal for Southeast Asia, so that freezing in January may be met

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

FIG. 50.—The Rainfall of Burma

on altitudes over 3,500 ft.; the Shan Highlands experience light frosts at that time and higher still, above 10,000 ft., farther north, snow falls for about two months a year. A cool season is noticeable throughout Burma.

2. A distinct dry season occurs in most districts except where on the coastal fringe or on uplands local influences may cause sufficient precipitation to minimise the drought. The dry season tends to be more emphatic in areas where annual precipitation is lower than the average for Burma. Rain comes on with the abrupt violence characteristic of an Indian monsoon, starting fairly generally towards the end of May and ending in the third week of October. During the dry season sunshine periods and temperatures are high, until the coming of the rains brings a sharp drop in daily maxima which are highest in April and May.
3. The N-S. arrangement of the relief runs athwart the airstreams sweeping over Burma, so that the central Irrawaddy Basin is in a rain shadow for most of the year and has a Dry Zone of elongated, lobate shape roughly centred on Pagan. The dryness of this zone is emphasised by föhn winds produced as the airstreams move into it from the Arakan Yoma and the Shan Highlands. When rain does fall in the Dry Zone it comes chiefly from southerly sectors of the summer airstream.

Relief dominates the pattern of rainfall (Fig. 50). During the period of southwesterly winds, the warm damp air masses impinge

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on the Western Mountains and the isthmus coast to produce heaviest rainfalls in Arakan and Tenasserim where over 200 in. per annum may be recorded. On the eastern flanks of the Arakan Yoma at that time considerably less rain falls, but precipitation increases again in the eastern highlands. Northern Tropical Air, in this latitude flowing over Burma in winter, is not particularly rainy except where altitude induces precipitation in the eastern highlands and on the western side of the Irrawaddy Basin.

MONTHLY RAINFALLS (in inches) AND PREDOMINANT WINDS OF MONTH

	Aver. No. of rainy days	*Jan.*	*Feb.*	*Mar.*	*Apr.*	*May*	*June*	*July*	*Aug.*	*Sept.*	*Oct.*	*Nov.*	*Dec.*	*Total*
Rangoon ..	122	.2 NNE	.2 NNE	.3 SW	1.4 WSW	12.0 SW	18.0 S	21.4 SSW	19.4 SSW	15.3 SW	6.9 NE	2.8 NNE	.4 NNE	98.3
Thayetmyo ..	73	.1	.1	.2	.8	4.5	6.7	6.8	6.5	6.1	4.1	1.7	.2	37.8
Moulmein ..	139	.2	.1	.5	2.8	20.3	37.2	46.2	43.6	27.7	8.7	2.2	.3	189.6
Mandalay ..	51	.1 N	.1 SSE	.2 SSE	1.1 SSE	5.8 SSE	5.5 SSE	3.3 SSE	4.6 SSE	5.7 SSE	4.7 SE	1.6 NE	.4 N	33.1
Minbu ..	57	0 NW	0 NW	.3 SE	.8 SE	5.6 SE	5.7 SE	4.5 SE	5.3 SE	6.2 SE	4.5 SE	1.8 NW	.5 NW	35.3

The Dry Zone, focal area of Burmese life and development, has much of its scanty rain (in places less than 25 in. per annum) concentrated in a few torrential storms (Fig. 52). Moreover the fall is less reliable here than elsewhere in the country, a critical factor since the most elaborate and complicated agricultural development has taken place in the Dry Zone. The unreliability of rains has been countered to some extent from the human angle by a diversified agriculture so that whatever the particular rainfall of one year, at least one crop may be expected to be satisfactory. Fine clear weather, with many calms, continues from November to March though in river valleys morning mists may lie; during the rains (June to September) which reach the Dry Zone rather later than elsewhere, winds are weak and daily cloud densities are high. Violent thunderstorm-rains arrive in May and October. While the Dry Zone is strictly confined to Inner Burma, the tendency to drought is apparent even in the Irrawaddy Delta (Fig. 59) which has a longer dry season than either Arakan or Tenasserim. On the Delta, rainfall diminishes rapidly inland from 200 to 100 in. per annum at the coast, to about 40 in. inland; at Thayetmyo rainfall is 38 in. per annum, and at Prome 47 in.; July is the rainiest month and December-March the driest season.

During the period November-May cyclonic disturbances streaming across northern India eastwards cause minor deteriorations of

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132 the otherwise fine weather over northern Burma. Minor depressions from the South China Seas sometimes cross north Burma from July to September, producing local rains. Tropical cyclones also move over the Bay of Bengal between April and December, moving westwards away from Burma but occasionally striking the Arakan coast. In the last sixty years, the totals of tropical cyclones of various intensities striking the Arakan and Martaban coasts were:

Season	*Arakan*	*Martaban*
December-March	—	—
April-May	21	15
June-September	2	1
October-November	24	—

In Burma, close correlations between climate and tropical diseases have been demonstrated. Inland, malaria increases in the wet season but on the coast it is more frequent in the dry season. Cholera is a feature of the early rains, while smallpox reaches its peak at the end of the dry season. Dysentery peaks are associated with disrupted sanitation during floods early in the wet season.

Drainage Patterns

133 While two-thirds of Burma's surface drains into the Irrawaddy, which therefore ranks as by far the most important Burmese river system, there are several subsidiary river systems.

Arakan Rivers

The Kaladan, Lemyo, Mayu and Naaf rivers flow on N-S. lines separated by abrupt, high and forbidding watersheds related directly to the fold structure. Their courses become trellis patterns and they have all built broad deltaic forms at the coast where the streams debouch after taking sharp bends out of the structural alignment. Apart from the lower zones of sedimentation, tending to delta form, though much flattened against the coast by onshore winds, the streams are immature and unusable for navigation, except the Kaladan which can be used almost to Paletwa. These streams rank as important because only on their estuaries can settlement reach any great density. Their headwaters lead to the passes through the Arakan Yoma which have had negligible modern significance.

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Tenasserim Rivers

On the Burmese part of the isthmus, relatively short streams follow lines resembling those of Malaya, between ranges slightly skew to the coast and continuing out to sea as a string of offshore islands which has facilitated coastal sedimentation (Fig. 55). Often the rivers, while otherwise mature in form, pass through narrow rocky gorges at gaps in the ranges. Tenasserim streams frequently make right-angled bends to reach the sea. As in the case of the Arakan streams, these are short tropical streams bringing heavy silt loads in their fairly constant flows and the rate of coastal sedimentation is rapid. Some were used by earlier merchants for harbourage and a trans-isthmus route, but most are no longer usable even for sailing craft. A fluvial sorting of the sediments, varying from gravels to fine silts, may be observed from the ranges to the coast and in Tavoy the gravels are tin-bearing under much the same physical circumstances as in Malaya. 133

The Salween River

Paralleling the Irrawaddy for much of its course, the Salween crosses the Shan Highland in a series of deep gorges whose lengths are unequalled even by the Yangtze gorges. Coming from Tibet, the Salween draws close to the Mekong and Yangtze, all three lying within 42 miles of one another at some points.

Until it reaches the Shan country, the Salween has no tributaries apart from torrents, but there it receives many streams as much as 300 miles long. Its deep, rocky trough-like valley reaches within 50 miles of the sea, so that the Salween's erosive power remains strong almost to the coast. The greater incision of the Salween compared with the nearby upper Mekong is due to its greater rainfall; the narrowness of its long, ribbon-like drainage basin is thought to be due to encroachment and capture of its tributaries by neighbouring rivers, of which the Irrawaddy and Mekong have been particularly active as captors. Many Salween tributaries, of which the largest are the Yungzalin, Gyaing and Attaran, enter the parent stream with a cataract or cascade, caused partly by more intense erosion by the main stream, partly by the enormous variations of water level in it. The average seasonal change of the Salween level is 65 ft. which dams tributaries and induces them to drop gravels and boulders not far from

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

FIG. 51.—The Sittang and Salween Deltas

the confluence. Despite its size, the Salween has so broken a course, is so deeply incised and suffers such enormous changes in level that it is probably the least useful major river in Burma. Its only value has been for floating teak logs, yet it might with major engineering works be made a source of hydro-electric power. A quick and constant building of shoals and bars with a resulting frequent change of distributaries goes on at its mouth (Fig. 51) which is becoming silted up beyond possibility of use as an entry for steamers, though its outlets near Moulmein were extensively used for harbourage earlier this century. The great volume of the Salween in spate is the cause of inundations in rivers like the Attaran, an otherwise stable stream in a mature valley. During the rainy season, when the Salween runs faster than its choked outlet can discharge, widespread floods develop behind the coast.

At Inle, between the Salween and Irrawaddy watersheds, is a small area of inland drainage into a lake 14 by 4 miles at 3,000 ft., varying greatly in depth according to the season. It drains southward but the outflowing streams quickly disappear into a limestone substructure, probably to discharge ultimately into the Salween.

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The Irrawaddy River System.

In the Irrawaddy Basin we see the effects upon drainage pattern of subdued tectonic foldings which took place on a landscape where a complete river system had already been established. Following the upfolding of the Pegu Yoma, two streams drained into the basin:

(*a*) A western stream, formed of what is now the Chindwin, together with that part of the Irrawaddy below Pakokku; this river has been named the Proto-Irrawaddy.

(*b*) An eastern stream, formed of the present Irrawaddy above Mandalay continued south into the present Sittang, to constitute the Proto-Sittang.

The capture of the headwaters of the Proto-Sittang by the Proto-Irrawaddy near the great bend at Mandalay seems to have resulted from structural warpings within the basin and from an outburst of volcanism, which has now become extinct (Stamp). The Sittang (Fig. 56) neatly demonstrates the normal symptoms of capture, i.e. conformity between its profile with the Upper Irrawaddy, irregular and reversed drainage near the elbow of capture, disproportion between the Sittang stream and the alluviated valley it now occupies, and a much reduced vertical erosive power of the river. Rapid silting up of the Sittang still goes on as a result of cultivation and forest clearing, so that while forty years or so ago the river at Toungoo averaged 18 ft. deep, it now averages scarcely 3 ft. and the water has been forced to fan out to at least double its previous width (Fig. 51).

The Irrawaddy itself varies so much in different parts of its course that its features will be best described in subdivisions:

(*a*) The Irrawaddy above "the confluence" (north of Myitkyina) does not carry that name. Two mountain streams partly draining the southern snows, the Mali Hka and the Nmai Hka, combine at this confluence. Of these the Mali seems the maturest and is probably an antecedent stream.

(*b*) From the confluence to Bhamo, the name "Upper Irrawaddy" is used. Over this 150 miles the current is usually strong yet permits navigation, except at a dangerous point below Sinbo where the river enters a gorge only 50 yds. across and becomes violent and dangerous (known to rise as much as 80 ft. in one night). Through it passes water which even at low levels back

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at the confluence is already a quarter mile broad and 30 ft. deep. The gorge (Third Defile) has over its 40 miles of length immediate cliffs of 60 ft. height between mountains over 2,500 ft. high. East of the defile and paralleling it, is a broad, low valley, once the Irrawaddy watercourse. Why the river was diverted from it to the present defile has not been convincingly explained.

(*c*) At Bhamo the Irrawaddy spreads across an alluvial basin about 12 miles broad, and this plain continues as a bend to the west.

The Irrawaddy takes a different bend to the west, avoiding the plain and passing into its Second Defile through a massive limestone. Here the gorge is sometimes 250 ft. deep and 100 yds. wide. Again this entry into a gorge and evidence of an easier alternative course cannot readily be explained; Stamp suggests it evolved not as a drainage line antecedent to the present relief but as a capture by rivers originally underground in solution channels within the limestone. After this defile, the Irrawaddy re-enters the alluvial plain westwards to reach Katha, whereafter it resumes its southerly course. From its source to Katha, the Irrawaddy is broadly antecedent to existing structural forms.

(*d*) From Katha to Mandalay the Irrawaddy follows a strike valley. East of it are the crystalline hills of the Shan Highlands which thereafter continue southwards in almost a straight scarp as much as 2,500 ft. high for about 500 miles to the sea, probably representing a faulted limit of the Sunda Platform and conditioning the pattern of the Proto-Sittang. Near Thabeikkyin the river enters a sandstone gorge (First Defile) whose sides are forested and less precipitous than the other defiles. At Kabwet a lava sheet, probably poured out in historic times, has diverted the river to the west, which after it rapidly widens southward to the Mandalay Basin, where a few crystalline hills (outliers of the Shan Highlands) occasionally show through the alluvials as inselbergen. The one bridge across the Irrawaddy at Ava was built to benefit from a local inselberge.

The great swing westwards of the Irrawaddy near Mandalay in preference to what appears an easier route southward to the Sittang is one of those puzzles so often associated with capture processes. The swing may have been connected with that period of vulcanism producing Mt. Popa which, rising now to some

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

FIG. 52.—Régimes of the Upper Irrawaddy

5,000 ft., overlooking the Irrawaddy from the south, was still active a few centuries ago. At its turn the Irrawaddy has a huge discharge of water (about 900,000 cusecs—cubic feet per second—for ordinary wet seasons).

Chief focus of the Burmese people and their tradition, Mandalay is clearly located as a convergence centre and dominating point for human movements in the Chindwin-Irrawaddy-Sittang valleys, and from the valleys through the Shan country.

(*e*) From Mandalay to Thayetmyo, the Irrawaddy passes through the Dry Zone, a landscape where low terraces and degraded scarps flank the flat Irrawaddy alluvials and generally stand up sharply without much vegetation (Fig. 56). The long dry season and the violence of a few rainstorms each year make this zone one of powerful erosion, producing "bad lands" terrain whose deeply scored hillsides witness the heavy load of silt which each storm adds to the Irrawaddy. Many side streams here are dry for most of the year, to become seething torrents of dirty brown muddy water within a few minutes during the brief wet season. Throughout this Dry Zone, the evaporation rate is high, so that the river volume is not usually very great, emphasised by the fact that the river is here losing grade because it is less than 200 ft. above sea level and has over 450 miles more to go to reach the sea.

(*f*) From Thayetmyo to the Akauktaung Ridge below Prome, the Arakan Yoma and Pegu Yoma approach one another fairly closely and spurs from both lie across the Irrawaddy Valley,

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which narrows and becomes more variegated because pockets of alluvial terrain, reminiscent of the Mandalay area, alternate with steep rocky sections recalling the Upper Irrawaddy; in one of the narrower sections stands Prome, a key river port. Some 90 miles below it, the Irrawaddy begins to subdivide into its first distributary, the Bassein River. Even below this, however, sandstone cliffs still occur to constrict the river, and the valley section continues to Myanaung, the apex of the delta.

(*g*) The delta, 180 miles from north to south and fanning to a width of 150 miles at the coast, is covered by a complicated braiding of distributaries which merge, subdivide and recombine until nine mouths empty into the sea. Most water passes out through the Eya mouth. While the Bassein and Rangoon rivers connect with the Irrawaddy distributaries, they are really separate streams, the Bassein draining the southern Arakan Yoma, the Rangoon River the Pegu Yoma, whose respective deltaic fans have merged into the main delta. The delta is less noteworthy for its flatness and more for its low altitude; about 2,000 square miles (of its total 12,000 square miles) are below high spring tide level and another 2,000 square miles are only one foot above that level. The heavy rainfall in violent showers and the fineness of the silts which form this landscape combine to produce rapid erosion of the deltaic surface despite its being so little above sea level. Hence the surface is not being built up vertically, especially where cleared for cultivation, but it is extending horizontally seawards at about 3 miles per century (about 50 metres per annum) as lines of spits built by onshore drift from deltaic sediments are fixed by vegetation growing upon them, so that the lagoon or creek behind each spit becomes gradually filled by mangrove to rise above sea level by the process explained in Chapter 4. Thus the landscape has a very low relief, slightly modelled by levee banks arranged radially across the delta and parallel to the distributaries, and by lines of casuarina-covered low ridges paralleling the lobate coast, the vestiges of old spits now continuous with the mainland.

Tributaries of considerable complexity resulting from an interaction between antecedent drainage lines and the tectonic drainage lines of the present Basin, join the Irrawaddy above Mandalay. These, of which the Shweli and Myitnge are the longest, have

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highly irregular courses with frequent captures, diversions and gorge features. 133

The Chindwin (drainage basin 44,000 square miles) is, however, the main tributary of the Irrawaddy. Its headstream in the Hukawng Valley rises close to the Upper Irrawaddy, and then moves westwards in a great arc with frequent rapids and waterfalls until it takes on the southerly course which it maintains until it joins the Irrawaddy in a group of distributaries and a landscape like an inland delta. Such a form at the junction indicates the loss of grading experienced by the Chindwin on reaching the Irrawaddy Valley. The Upper Chindwin runs through a wide syncline flanked by bold scarps, mostly fan fold structures, though there is a great fault line east of the Shwebo Hills; north of Kalewa the river has scarp falls to the east and dip slopes on the west. Near Mingin the Chindwin breaks out of the tectonic basin it has flowed through and penetrates scarps to reach a depression between the anticlinal domes of Medin and Palusawa after which its southward course as a calm wide stream is interrupted only near Shwezaye where barriers of volcanic ash from extinct volcanic craters, on either side of the river, for some miles constrict the Chindwin into a narrow cliffed channel.

Forests and Vegetation

Tropical Rain Forest covers the whole length of western Arakan Yoma, the southern part of the Pegu Yoma, the western edge of the Shan Highlands overlooking the southern half of the Sittang Valley, a narrow belt astride the Salween as far north as 25° N., and the whole of Tenasserim (Fig. 53). 137

The 80 in. isohyet chiefly delimits forms of deciduous (monsoon) forest containing ironwood (Pyinkado, Xylia dolabriformis) and teak. These have sparse bush and ground vegetation giving an open aspect, and they are mixed with some evergreen trees and bamboo, almost ubiquitous in Burma. Two types of teak forest have been distinguished, the drier one with thickets of bamboo and a wetter type, source of most commercial teak, in north Tenasserim, Pegu Yoma, and near Bhamo and Katha in Upper Burma. Where heights increase, this type of forest merges above 3,000 ft. into one dominated by oaks. Conifers appear on the higher Arakan Yoma and over the Patkoi Ranges.

Savannah mixed with forest, the effect of porous subsoils and

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FIG. 53.—The Vegetation of Burma

overcutting by shifting cultivators, is very extensive over all the Shan Highlands.

The Dry Zone of the Irrawaddy Basin has dry scrub forest within the 35 in. isohyet. A form of ebony (Diospyros) in stands pure enough to be attractive commercially, extends through the Yaw Valley west of Pakokku. South of Mandalay, particularly on the Pegu Yoma, low-branching short types of trees, the teak species and acacias grow, with some cycads towards the wetter limits. At the middle of the zone short thorny acacias and euphorbias are most common, with toddy palms (palmyra) along water lines.

In the far north, altitude and a more continental climate induce a "rhododendron forest," where rhododendrons, magnolias and maples are common, together with firs and tall Formosan pines. Even here, above 8,000 ft., scattered short bamboos persist. Higher still this forest merges into an alpine vegetation of mossy heaths, dwarf junipers and rhododendrons, and a wealth of small evergreens and perennials.

On the coasts and over the deltas, the mangroves and swamp vegetations repeat features common to similar parts of Southeast Asia.

Commercial Work of Forests

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Teak and ironwood constitute the bulk of commercial timber extracted in Burma, where, however, there is in addition

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considerable local use of many other timbers. Bamboo and various palm leaves are prominent in Burmese domestic life.

Teak, known to Burmese as *Kyun*, occurs over large areas and has proved to be one of Burma's valuable commercial assets, capable of sustained annual yields of over 400,000 tons of timber. The main areas exploited are the Tharawaddy-Prome forests, Pyinmana, Toungoo, Katha, Shwebo, Chindwin Valley, Myitkyina, Minbu, the Shan Highlands, and the lower Salween. Careful planning of the extraction is made necessary by the scarcity of labour and the timing of spates for transport. Teak in most of these forested areas is hauled to water-edge by elephants and floated downstream. Waterways like the Irrawaddy, Sittang and Salween take down great rafts of teak during the rainy season from July to October, and deliveries of the timber at the chief commercial centre for it, Rangoon, normally go on through the period November-February. The assembling of teak rafts is done at Mandalay, Pakokku, Prome and Toungoo, and the milling into commercial boards mostly at Rangoon and Moulmein, though there were scattered local mills elsewhere along the rivers. Burma's production of round teak logs averaged 446,000 tons per annum over 1925-40. Some three-quarters of the teak exported normally goes to India and much of the rest to the United Kingdom. The total output of teak from all other Southeast Asia areas amounted to only one-third that of Burma in pre-war years.

Over the last twenty years the cut of other timber has exceeded that of teak but the other timber was mostly consumed within Burma. The output of timber seems less than proportionate to so forested a territory, but the difficulties of extraction are high and some of the best "other timbers" are heavier than water (e.g. *pyinkyado* or ironwood, invaluable for sleepers on tropical railways and heavy structures) and can only be floated if buoyed with other wood, which means it can only be floated down the deeper streams which give the suspended logs clearance. About 110,000 tons per annum of ironwood were cut over 1935-40 and Mandalay was chief milling centre for it.

Forests provide 20 per cent of the state revenue, which indicates that their significance for Burma is second only to rice cultivation. This front-rank importance of forest resources in Burma contrasts with the negative interest in the forests closer to the Equator, in Malaya and the East Indies.

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

FIG 54.—The Oilfields of Middle Irrawaddy

MINERALS

The absence of suitable coal has operated against attempts to industrialise Burma; low grade lignitic coals occur in the Northern Shan States, near Lashio and Namma and in the Arakan Yoma foothills near Minbu and Henzada. Burma's chief mineral is petroleum, found in the anticlinal and dome structures northwest of the Pegu Yoma where a line of oilfields from Indaw (Upper Chindwin) through Sabe (west of Pakokku) and Singu to Yenangyaung was being operated up to 1942 (Fig. 54.) The output of over 275 million gallons (1939-40) was piped to the Syriam refineries across the river from Rangoon. The output was small in relation to world production (less than 1 per cent) though located conveniently to supply India with petroleum and the Far East with paraffin and candles. Destroyed in the campaign of 1942, the wells are being slowly re-equipped for nationalised production which was barely 27 million gallons in 1947. A small output by crude methods dating back two or three centuries is still going on.

Precious stones, particularly rubies from the Mogok mines northeast of Mandalay, have a reputation in Burmese tradition, but no great commercial significance today. Following the older

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Chinese workings, a modernised mining and refining system at Bawdwin in the Northern Shan States produced some 70,000 tons of lead-silver (one-sixth world total) almost entirely for export. Tin gravels in the western foothills of the granite formations in Tenasserim and Karenni (Fig. 55) repeat conditions found farther down the peninsula in Malaya; while east of Tavoy tin and tungsten occur together; between Mergui and Victoria Point the mines are exclusively for tin. Most tin concentrates (about 1,500 tons in 1950) went from Tenasserim to Rangoon and thence to smelters at Penang or Singapore. Alluvial gold in the Irrawaddy gravels near Myitkyina has ceased to be worth working.

In total, Burma's primary mineral production is relatively small, not particularly important for the national welfare, and inadequate for industrialisation, more especially since the means of production were destroyed during the war. While there are great reserves of lead-silver at Bawdwin, it may be that the cream of Burma's other minerals has already been skimmed and that the likelihood of reviving these productions will remain low until methods of solving the labour difficulties are devised. These



FIG. 55.—The Mines of Lower Burma

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316 are by no means new difficulties: Burmese agriculture faced labour shortages for most of the past century.

Soils

134 Burmese soils mostly repeat features common to Southeast Asia *pari passu*, except for those of the Dry Zone where climatic conditions are abnormal for this region. In the Dry Zone, while laterisation processes are apparent peripherally, high evaporation rates cause accumulation of solubles to be dominant in the topsoils. Two distinctive soil types have evolved in this Dry Zone:

(*a*) *Black Cotton Soil.*—Known as *tane*, it forms to depths of about 2 ft. upon some older Irrawaddy alluvials and is remarkable for its black colour (though when dry it may be straw yellow) which intensifies when moist. Its texture is claylike, though clay is not predominant in its composition (about 45 per cent) and its stickiness and tenacity derive from a high calcium and magnesium content which accumulates as the result of prolonged evaporation. Associated with cotton cultivation, and difficult to work, Black Cotton Soil occurs on either side of the Chindwin at Monywa and round Shwebo, and small patches are widely distributed through the central parts of the Dry Zone. Its retention of moisture makes it a reliable producer even during abnormally dry seasons and suitable for winter cropping.

(*b*) *Saline and alkaline soils* develop under high evaporation where the clay content is low; capillarity causes the accumulation of carbonates and sulphates of sodium, calcium and magnesium which colour these soils yellow or brown. Generally inimical to vegetation, saline soils develop southeast of Shwebo and in northern Sagaing where even salt lakes occur (Halin, Yemyet In). Saline efflorescences also appear round the Selingyi Volcanic Uplands.

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Chapter Ten

THE CULTURAL LANDSCAPE OF BURMA

THERE are three distinct types of agriculture in Burma. They are: (1) Hill agriculture, (2) Dry Zone agriculture, (3) Delta agriculture. Of these, the Dry Zone agriculture has had special significance for Burmese people, establishing their traditional way of living and conditioning their integration as a nation. The delta agriculture has most interest for the outside world since it produces that surplus of rice which goes into the export trade. The hill agriculture is restricted both in the number of people concerned with its direction and its external interest. 241 184

DRY ZONE AGRICULTURE

At first glance it appears anomalous that the nursery of Burmese people since about the ninth century should be the Dry Zone where the landscape has the features of aridity for most of the year and where, as soon as population density approached optimum for the environment, at the beginning of last century, the Burmese suffered from the agricultural risks attendant on unreliable rainfalls (Fig. 61). The explanation for development in the Dry Zone rather than in what have become the more productive ricelands of the southern deltas, is a complex of environmental and traditional influences, and not one of conscious choice of the Dry Zone in preference to the deltas. Burmese people came to this region from the north, from the landward rather than from the seaward side, and they brought agricultural conceptions from dry rather than from wet environments. In these circumstances, the Dry Zone was within their technological range; they could cope with the conditions of cultivation there and probably find them considerably easier than farther north. This Zone of undulating plains and irregular rivers, low hills and very varied light soils has proved capable of a very mixed agriculture and is still essentially a mixed farming area. Quite clearly too, the Dry Zone, sited midway along the Irrawaddy Basin and at an area of convergence of people moving along the Chindwin, Upper Irrawaddy, Lower Irrawaddy and 241

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241 Sittang valleys, was one of centripetal influence which at once conserved and strengthened Burmese traditions, enabling them to retain a firm hold against later intruders who followed them from the inhospitable north.

Agriculture in this dry area is at once diversified and broken into relatively small units of property. Paddy grows only in scattered areas, to take advantage of water in narrow valleys, and where some [312] local catchment basin may be used to supplement the rainfall. Small-scale irrigation systems of distributary type (as opposed to storage type) have been developed since the eleventh century, particularly in Kyaukse, and as a whole the Zone became practically self-sufficient in paddy. Irrigation from tanks (natural run-off water impounded inside shallow bunds) is quite common, the small streams of the Zone being too incised, violent and erratic in flood to be controllable or stored by smallholder techniques. The degree of self-sufficiency grew less as the pressure of population increased, but the principle of self-sufficiency continues to be strong in the farming tradition. About two million acres (2.2 million in 1948) are normally under paddy and a portion of this is planted in April-May for harvesting in June-July, a rhythm different from that of most of Burma.

248 Upon the Black Cotton Soils of this region[1] cotton has been placed on about half a million acres, mostly in very small units. It remains a crop of peasant farmers and the possibility of extension or elaboration of cotton growing is impeded by the difficulty of obtaining harvesting labour. Cotton is sown in May for harvesting usually in late September, which is generally the end of the local paddy harvest. Often it is intersown with lines of pigeon peas (*pesinngon*) which ripen after the cotton and form a dietetic staple in this country of vegetarian people. The foci of cotton cultivation are Myinyan, Thayetmyo, Meiktila and Pakokku, but the fibre everywhere has low grade. At one time exclusively despatched overland to Yunnan by way of Bhamo, more recently it went to Japan, only 5 per cent being retained for local weaving before 1941.

245 Since the Zone[1] has low rainfall and light alluvial soils, dry, deep-rooted crops like groundnuts and sessamum are an important part of the Burmese farming system, occupying two-thirds and one and a half million acres respectively, though again broken into very small lots. These oil seeds supply the staple cooking oil of nearly all Burma in normal times. Sessamum, the most important

[1] [i.e. the Dry Zone, see p. 167, cat. 116 -- Analyst]

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

FIG. 56.—The Dry Zone of Burma

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[345] of the oil seeds, goes into the ground in June for reaping in early
243 September. In addition, there are ranges of beans, grams, pulses and chillies, all with an important place in local foodstuffs. No less than three and sometimes as much as five million acres of the Dry Zone are planted with millet, which at once reflects the aridity and the lightness of some of its soils. Reliable as a crop even in specially dry years when unirrigated paddy fails, millet goes into local diet to varying extents and has the advantage of being sown later than paddy for harvesting in November, which means farmers who find their paddy failing can cover their loss quickly by planting millet; this accounts for the great fluctuation of millet acreages from year to year, since for most farmers millet is an insurance rather than a staple.

231 Dry Zone diversified farming would be impossible without bul-
241 locks and buffaloes as draught animals. They are bred and reared there on a scale large enough to permit sale to other parts of Burma where climatic conditions are less suited to cattle, which must therefore be constantly replaced from the Dry Zone. This activity (see also the relation between Korat cattle and Lower Siam) is not highly organised yet it is essential in the agricultural ecology of all Central and Southern Burma. It has little significant influence on local diet either in the Dry Zone or in the delta owing to Buddhist and Hindu prejudices. Loss of cattle consumed by armies for food and transport has proved a most difficult problem in rehabilitating Burmese agriculture after 1945.

433 Thus the diversified agriculture of the Dry Zone is in the first
241 place largely subsistence farming, providing most of what is needed for domestic use locally, and the farmers, small landholders, de-
427 pending on their families and neighbours for help, have an assured
311 livelihood, buffered against most vagaries of external prices. They invariably own their land-holding, which averages between 5 and 15 acres per family; a holding of 80 acres ranks as a large one. Roughly one-third of each holding in any one year is left fallow and a method of tilth ploughing (*t'ayee t'unde*) is used, which resembles the water-conserving device of dry farming in such settings as
[349] Spain. Rotation of crops is regularly practised.

433 Farming for money is, however, also carried on as a subsidiary
241 activity. Oilseeds, cotton, cattle and pulses are the money producers, mostly going into commerce within Burma, though not exclusively within the Dry Zone. Despite the erratic rainfall, there-

[See p. 167, cit. 116 -- Analyst]

fore, Burmese farmers of the Dry Zone have an agriculture more 433
constant in its effects than at first appears because, being diversi- 241
fied, it is rare that all crops fail in any one year. In any case, double cropping is sufficiently common to act as a further crop assurance. Because so strong an influence of subsistence farming may be traced in the Dry Zone, it follows that, though buffered from the effects of crop failures or abnormally low prices in the external world markets, the Dry Zone Burmese are also buffered from the occasional boom. There is never much money about in Dry 436
Burma[1] and, to that extent, its standard of living is normally lower 511
and the way of living less elaborate than that elsewhere in Burma. Life there in the arid tropics is simple yet exacting, with a pace entirely set by natural conditions and therefore seemingly slow. The peasants live in nucleated, fenced villages and not upon their 361
farmland.

Most settlements[2] have domestic industries based on handweav- 472
ing of cotton and silk from fibres that are generally imported; over 438
200,000 handlooms, generally one loom per family, were reported, even in post-war years, to be scattered through Central Burma.

Some exclusively commercial activities go on: the milling of rice 464
and oilseeds, the transport of teak through the zone on the main 256
rivers, the working of the Chauk-Yenangyaung oil wells. These work more on the basis of immigrant labour than of local farmers, and, whatever their rank in export trade, they are little significant in local life, except that in the post-war period they absorb more Burmese workers.

Thus Dry Burma forms an admirable example of a mature and 241
highly developed indigenous agriculture producing enough margin 171
of food and allowing enough personal time to encourage a ripe and imaginative culture expressed in wood and stone carvings and 105
paintings, centring on Buddhist ceremonials, a complex tradition of music, dancing and drama, and a highly decorative dress of the skirt and jacket type which relates to similar modes through South-east Asia. All of this fits into a balanced ecology which continues to be almost on a subsistence basis, showing considerable caution towards farming for money and interchange with the rest of Burma.

Delta Agriculture

This broad type includes the form of agriculture carried on along 241
the Arakan and Tenasserim coasts and upon the deltas of the 184

[1] [See p.167, cat.116--Analyst] [2] [... in the Dry Zone--Analyst]

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241 Irrawaddy, Sittang and Salween. The whole character is set by
184 the Irrawaddy Delta where the bulk of agricultural land outside the Dry Zone is located.

The Irrawaddy Delta Agriculture is based on the cultivation of
243 a single crop—rice—on a large and extensive scale with the object
311 of selling the bulk of it. It is monocultivation of the staple Asiatic cereal. Farmers depend on sales of rice to purchase their other basic
433 food needs and only a few fruit trees and vegetables are grown on
311 delta farms to supplement the rice. This monoculture of rice has
178 evolved under circumstances of special geographical interest because, as a result, the Irrawaddy Delta (followed historically by agricultural developments on the Menam Chao Praya and Mekong deltas) has had the same significance for the world's rice-eating peoples as the Argentine, North American and Australian wheat-lands have for bread-eaters. Over half the total rice in international trade for the decade 1930-40 originated on the deltas of Burma where some ten million acres of quondam swamp were planted with rice, which occupied the whole agricultural landscape.

This specialised agriculture on a money basis is so new that Lower Burma must be thought of in the same terms as the pioneer agricultural areas of other continents. At the beginning of last century, although rice was the staple food of Burma, it was farmed entirely on a subsistence basis, almost exclusively in the Dry Zone, and the export of rice from there was in fact forbidden by Burmese kings, so that the scanty surplus of Lower Burma at that time went inland to supplement the already inadequate production of the Dry Zone. A little rice trickled from Arakan into Assam, then a province of Burma, but to all intents and purposes, Burma was merely self-supporting in rice and the great deltas were negative areas, undeveloped and covered with forms of swamp forest. Such terrain throughout Southeast Asia continues to be repellent, but the only large-scale examples of still untouched deltaic swamp may be found along the east coast of Sumatra where may be seen something of the conditions prevailing on the Irrawaddy and other Burmese deltas only 150 years ago.

Penetration of the deltaic zone began just before the middle of the 19th century, but reliable statistics are available only since 1870. The following figures sum up the development of Burmese ricelands :

[See p.167, Cat. 116 - -Analyst]

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Year	*Acres of Burma under rice (millions)*	*Lower Burma only*
1866	1.75	1.44 (1865)
1886	4.00	3.70 (1885)
1896	5.75	5.00 (1895)
1910	9.95	7.81
1920	10.30	8.59
1930	12.37	9.91
1940	12.80	9.95
1950	9.30	6.70

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These figures of expanding acreage under rice are the more astonishing because the expansion implied the clearing, flattening, draining and organising of freshwater swamp terrain, processes carried out exclusively by manual methods without any mechanical devices or elaborate equipment. The vast acreage of riceland in the Deltaic Zone now is a monument to the sustained effort of millions of peasants working only with bullocks or buffaloes and the simple, locally-made ploughs and implements they had evolved in their own way over the centuries. Too little attention has been given to this aspect of large-scale pioneering squatters in the virgin swamps of Lower Burma, an amazing development at roughly the same time as the pioneering on the world's wheatlands and well in advance of similar developments in the deltas of the Menam Chao Praya and Mekong which were imitative of the success achieved in Burma. The rates of annual increase of rice acreage rose to a peak during the last twenty years of the 19th century.

RATE OF EXPANSION OF RICE ACREAGE IN LOWER BURMA

Period	*Acreage: Average annual increase in acres*
1852–72	63,577
1873–82	117,490
1883–92	164,041
1893–1902	162,595
1903–12	136,888
1913–22	78,867
1923–32	84,105
1933–37	14,385

Paralleling this agricultural expansion on the deltas, people migrated southwards because the development in the first instance was essentially by the hands of Burmese peasants who took up

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

FIG. 57.—Land Use in the Irrawaddy Delta

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paddyland on the delta. The high rate of increase of Burmese paddy- 166
lands at certain phases of the '80's might justify calling it a scramble for pioneer lands—a "rice rush" to use an expression more common for gold and tin rushes. The main rush to the Delta had taken place before census figures became available and after 1880 an evening up throughout Burma was already apparent. The first rice rush seems not to have drained population significantly from other parts of Burma so much as to have formed an outlet for the population which here, as over all parts of Southeast Asia, was rapidly expanding.

POPULATION CHANGES IN BURMA

Year	*Lower Burma*			*All Burma*	
	Millions of persons	*Percentage of 1881*	*Percentage of all Burma*	*Millions of persons*	*Percentage of 1881*
1872	2.59	—	—	—	—
1881	3.57	100	61	5.9	100
1891	4.41	122	57	7.72	131
1901	5.41	150	51	10.49	178
1911	6.21	173	51	12.1	205
1921	6.86	191	52	13.2	224
1931	7.77	215	53	14.7	249
1941	8.92	249	53	16.8	284

Gradually, however, the labour question arose, as it has done [464]
in every pioneer territory; the land under rice increased beyond 243
the capacity of the traditional Burmese family and communal 426
systems to deal with. It was difficult enough to get the new lands 563
cleared for rice-farming and as crops came along, the situation 427
was worse because every rice seedling is plucked separately by 167
hand and every ripened head is cut by sickle. That the crop was for cash sales led inevitably to hired labour, mainly from India, and it was not long in the Burmese community, traditionally not organised on a cash basis, before the rate of spending, whether on non-essentials, on labour or on mere subsistence during poor years, as in the depressions of the 19th century, exceeded the average income, leading in turn to loans of money from outsiders, to mortgages and very soon, instead of a pioneering community owning and working its land, it became a money agriculture on farms in the hands of mortgagees. Thence it became an estate agriculture renting to tenants or employing labour at wages, and

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243 426 563 427 167 the wage earners included the original peasant farmer, now landless and no longer assured of getting his staple rice for his family consumption, and also the landless group which originally farmed as labour hired by the peasant farmer. By 1936 over 9 million acres of Lower Burma agricultural land had transferred from

[439] [161]



FIG. 58.—Burma : Changes of Population and Agriculture

peasant owners to mortgagors and landowners who thereafter rented it back to the peasants.

[178 184] This delta agriculture has ultimately led to the disintegration of the original Burmese system of cultivation based on personal landholding and family or communal co-operation, which is now 243 427 confined to Dry Zone farmers who continue on their smallholdings as subsistence farmers, only lightly touched by the system of farming for cash. But the paddylands of the Delta are still the chief source of Burma's commercial rice, and the rental system developed there at any rate assures a steady flow of rice into trade, because the farmer must immediately after his harvest get cash to provide the rent, which is a fixed money payment on a short lease of two or three years. Thus agricultural land became a social problem in Lower Burma, as within a century it changed from the system of pioneer landowning peasant to one of short-term tenants who found themselves in a more prejudiced and unfavourable position than has arisen in the very oldest land systems of Europe, where at any rate *latifundia* are broken down into farms rented on a percentage of crop basis (as opposed to a fixed

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cash rental) which buffers the tenant from some of the worst evils of external price changes for the commodity he produces. 243 427

The Second World War had a great impact on the weak agricultural structure of Lower Burma where the abandoning of three million acres of paddy over the period 1941-48 almost entirely accounted for the national decline of paddy acreage.

As a result both of the opening up of the new paddylands of the delta and of the progressive squeeze to sell rice brought about by the changing social systems, Burma's outflow of rice into commerce has expanded enormously, at a rate considerably faster, until the present decade, than the population increase (Fig. 58). The following figures make a picture of rapid expansion of Burmese agricultural production which has grown faster than that of the pioneer wheat producing areas (the U.S. and Australia), accompanied though these were by greater proportional population increases and rapid mechanisation of field work: 243 178 433 439

Year	*Burma's Rice Exports (million tons cleaned)*
1881	.52
1891	.82
1901	1.42
1911	1.78
1921	2.45
1931	3.00
1941	3.50
1946	.43
1950	1.20

These exports represent surpluses over internal consumption which in 1941 roughly equalled the amount exported.

The bulk of the deltaic paddy crop comes from "rainfall" swamps, which receive the necessary floodwater direct from the heavy rains of Lower Burma rather than from systems of irrigation drawing water from the Irrawaddy itself (Fig. 59). There are bunds (*kazims*) round every paddyfield and systems of channels to drain away the surplus in due course, and relatively little is fed to the fields from the Irrawaddy in spate. This is a peculiar interaction of physical conditions in the Delta, where local rains produce floods well in advance of the peak heights of the rivers, which behind their levee-like banks often run at higher levels than the rain-flooded fields on either side of them. Farmers of the Irrawaddy Delta thus have the problem of protecting their paddyfields from flood by the river, not the more usual one of using the river 312 243 133

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312 floods to irrigate the paddyfields. Because the Irrawaddy comes to
243 the sea in a rainy area and not a dry area, the control problem
133 resembles that of the Lower Rhine rather than that of the Nile. Only on the right bank of the Irrawaddy have major embankments been built to protect fields that side. The technique of using local



FIG. 59.—Régimes of the Irrawaddy Delta

rainstorm floodwater (and to some extent the spates in small streams originating within the delta area) implies that the Irrawaddy load goes almost exclusively into the sea and does not contribute much to building up the delta surface.

[171] The process of rice cultivation in Burma is the one common
[101] to most of Southeast Asia. To work the ground, the local plough
243 is simple, consisting of little more than a light wooden tooth or sole tipped with iron and intended to break the ground, not to turn it in the European manner. In addition, farmers make very extensive use of a form of harrow upon which they depend for levelling the fields, puddling the wet surface at planting time and clearing the weeds. All delta rice is transplanted, usually with many female helpers, from a nursery or seedbed, usually one-tenth the area to be farmed. Transplanting has only so far been possible by hand, so that it makes a high demand on labour over the short planting period. Upon the seedbed, animal manure from the farm cattle is usually spread, but the other fields are not manured. Very little land is left fallow and no rotation has been

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devised, so that symptoms of over-cultivation have quickly appeared, hastened by the dependence on rain floods rather than on silt-laden river floods. Only in Akyab has broadcast sowing become the tradition, where it yields somewhat less than the transplanting system. This is less a mere convention and more the result of the character of local rains, because there must be careful correlation between the rising flood in the fields and the height of the growing rice plant which needs just to show above the water surface without either being submerged or drying out.

Between planting and harvesting, little attention needs to be given to the growing rice. High winds in the late-growing period or cyclonic storms during the ripening period may cause crop damage and call for palliative field work. It seems incredible that all Burmese paddy is cut by hand, using only the sickle; it is traditionally a male activity, which explains the great need for male labour at harvest time, the labour peak of the Burmese farming year. Threshing is still done upon sunbaked mud floors where the paddy sheaves are stacked and then trampled by the buffaloes or oxen until the grain is loosened. Afterwards hand and wind winnowing separate the grain from the chaff with the help of a rough bamboo tripod from which the threshed mixture is slowly poured so that the grain falls below and the chaff is blown to the side. After this stage, the grain is sacked and goes into the circuit of transport and brokers to the rice mills. For seed and local use, about 17 per cent of the Lower Burma crop remains on the farm.

At least 95 per cent of Burmese lowland rice may be called a winter crop. The rhythm of planting activity reaches its peak in July and that of harvesting in November and December, a period of much more concentrated activity than at planting time. From mid-December to mid-January the bulk of the crop is moving towards the mills, firstly by cart towards local collection points, then by water to the milling centres. Burma's elaborate river system is an essential part of its rice commerce because upon these rivers, in small country boats and barges or—on main streams—in river steamers, most of the rice moves. Little cutters travelling coastwise bring the rice to the major centres from patches of riceland up and down the coast. Without this water transport, we may doubt whether commercial rice production would have been possible at all, because trade in rice has for a century been possible only by maintaining very low prices.

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256 Rice milling ranks as a separate industry. It has steadily changed
243 character, having been for most of last century a Europeanised industry near the ports, but in the present century dozens of small capacity mills owned by local people have been set up along the main rivers at the foci of paddy-growing areas, where the gaunt structures of corrugated iron mills make an unusual note on a landscape otherwise still dominated by traditional Burmese forms. By 1941 about 700 mills were in operation; of these 650 were small, dealing with less than 100 tons of rice a day, and the larger ones were in Rangoon, Akyab, Bassein and among the distributaries south of Henzada.

Until the milling operation removes the outer skin, the cereal is frequently called by terms differing from those used for the grain after milling. The actual words vary from country to country. In the rice trade, which is no less complex in its nomenclature than the wheat trade, there is the grading of broken or unbroken rice, the broken being grain fractured by milling. Technical terms distinguish grain containing various proportions of broken rice, the more broken being *pari passu*, the cheaper. Another process is that of polishing, a milling process giving
262 a shine to the grain. Increasingly popular among Asiatic people, particularly in India, is parboiled rice—grain which undergoes steaming, boiling and drying processes, said to give it a better vitamin content and keeping quality, the latter being specially attractive to labourers wishing to make one cooking of rice which will last through the whole day.

252 Those Burmese farmers who retain some rice for their consumption during the year use hand-milling methods involving both pounding and milling, but they have increasingly sold all unhusked paddy except that needed for seed, and purchase milled rice for their domestic use.

256 Although the harvesting is almost completed in the two months, November-December, milling is fairly evenly distributed through the year, at the rate of about a quarter million tons monthly, the spread arising from varying distances and brokerage considerations in a territory where transport is simple and slow.

243 Rice was ranking just before the war as 40 per cent of Burma's
439 export values, but its significance was much greater than this, because the bulk induced a high shipping tonnage between Burma and its rice markets. About 70 per cent of the rice moved out

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through Rangoon. The ports of other rice-growing areas, Bassein (12 per cent), Akyab (9 per cent), Moulmein (6 per cent), handled a relatively small volume of the rice exports which derived overwhelmingly from the Irrawaddy Delta, and less from the hinterland of these subsidiary ports. At Rangoon, Akyab and Moulmein shipping of rice was exclusively in sacks and by way of lighters, which loaded steamers at Rangoon with the output of mills situated in minor inlets and creeks, away from Rangoon proper and not accessible to deep draught shipping. 243 439

The rhythm of export was distinctive. Each of the months October, November and December exported about 5 per cent of the year's total, and the monthly outgoing thereafter increased to a peak in March when nearly 15 per cent of the year's export left Burma. Then the rate of export diminished again. The hurried post-harvest export was explicable by the absence of large storage space at the ports and the rapid deterioration of any rice stored through the wet season. 439

While the direction taken by Burmese rice exports changed in detail according to the state of the rice harvest in surrounding countries, about half usually went to India, 12 per cent to Ceylon, and 6 per cent to Malayan ports. Long distance rice trade was never large, yet it had special significance because it absorbed the highest grades; Burma has always been the chief long-distance exporter, serving Holland, the United Kingdom, Germany and China.

Hill Agriculture

In the Burmese hill districts may be seen examples of cultivation types at various stages of evolution from "shifting cultivation" called *taungya* (literally "hill-field") in Burma, to sedentary cultivation. 241 184 162

The whole hill zone outside teak reservations is peopled by groups whose basic and traditional form of farming is *taungya*. Their experience with the more amenable valleys leading into the Irrawaddy Basin has encouraged the fixation of agriculture, particularly in the Shan Highlands, yet shifting agriculture still goes on and probably at least 7 million acres at any one time are temporarily occupied by people who set up their villages near a clearing and move their villages every four or five years as they shift their interest to a new clearing. Formerly shifting cultivation

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241 184 162 went on even in the Irrawaddy Delta and it continues to be customary in the contrasting types of level open country round Myitkyina and Mergui. As late as 1930 cotton was an important *taungya* crop at Thayetmyo. Migrant farming partly accounts for the mobility of the clans and tribes who have been constantly moving over the Burmese hills for centuries (Fig. 62). The forms of farming evolved in this tropical jungle, from the hunting-collecting type to the shifting agriculture and so to the fixed agriculture in the valleys, make an interesting contrast with parallel conditions in tropical Africa where the evolution largely turns upon variants of animal farming; apart from pigs and chickens, animals have no great place in Burmese hill agriculture, which centres upon subsistence crops of dry rice, millet, yams and sugar.

241 Though simple in its scheme, hill farming is not easy. With the limited labour and simple tools at its disposal, a family finds the clearing of new fields from virgin forest represents most of a whole year's work. These hill farmers are far more mutually dependent than fixed farmers of the plains and their clan or tribal structures are the tighter, making their style of farming, their general culture and tradition remarkably uniform over wide areas, irrespective of language or origin.

311 241 The physical problem of erosion caused by extensive shifting cultivation has not been fully studied in Burma. Probably 14 million acres lie bare to the torrential rains at any one time, allowing for existing cultivated areas and those recently abandoned. In addition, the hill peoples have been steadily increasing in numbers over the last 150 years at least, and the rapid silting of the Lower Sittang in recent years may quite well reflect greater erosion arising from more intensified cutting of the hill cover by the increasing hill population. At present about 2½ million people in Burma are estimated to be engaged in *taungya*, an activity more elaborate and widespread in this continental sector than elsewhere

241 184 in Southeast Asia. The Shan Highlands have in part a fixed agriculture, often including plants of temperate latitude, concerned with market gardening and fruit farming for Rangoon. *Tung* trees have proved a successful cash crop introduced from the Chinese side of the border; the oil extracted makes a high quality varnish. Tea is grown by Shans for the Burmese market only. Farther south, in Tenasserim, the rubber and coconut

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plantation techniques of Malaya have been introduced this century on a small scale. 241 184

The overall picture of agricultural activity in Burma provides interesting correlations with Malaya. In both countries there has been a rapid change-over from subsistence farming to cash farming. In Burma the key item of cash farming is the local staple food, rice, while in Malaya it is the non-indigenous, locally-unusable rubber. Both zones have been pioneering areas, the one on the basis of immigrants, the other originally on the basis of indigenous Burmese peasants. The whole structure of trade and commerce for both countries has been built up on a large-scale production of single commodities, rice and rubber, whose value depends on external assessments. 241 433

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Chapter Eleven

THE SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY OF BURMA

361 184 THROUGHOUT Upper Burma, the history of tribal clashes has left a tradition of tightly nucleated settlements enclosed by a stockade situated in valleys near enough to the fields yet well out of the *chaungs* or torrential water courses. Bamboo, timber and palms are the universal structural materials and they provide domestic utensils produced by a wide range of cottage industries.

Upon the Irrawaddy Delta, the pioneer tradition, foreign influences and the long period of social security, have led to loose settlements designed to take advantage of slight embankments across the swamps, and houses are strung along levees beside the distributaries and along old spits paralleling the seaward edge of the deltas. For urban settlements, brick and imported corrugated iron are the structural materials. In the Delta landscape, the greater security and the linear village form combine to eliminate the conventional stockades, and the cash economy is made apparent in the frequent show of foreign textiles and domestic utensils among the peasants.

POPULATION PATTERN

161 162 174 Essentially an agricultural people, the Burmese concentrate on the best agricultural lands (Fig. 60). Even so, Burma has the lowest nutritional density (population per cultivated acre) (Fig. 61) of any Southeast Asia territory, rivalled in this only by Malaya. Greatest population density lies roughly within the triangle Henzada, Bassein, Rangoon, in the upper and older part of the Delta where average densities are 250-500 per square mile. The rest of the Delta and most of the Irrawaddy Basin up to Thabeikyin have densities averaging 125-250 per square mile, which occur also in the narrow sedimented zone round Akyab. Outside these areas, in the far north and in the Shan Highlands, population thins out until in the Western Ranges there are less than 25 persons per square mile.

The pools of peoples to the north and in Central Asia have

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combined with the basin topography of the terrain to produce a steady compression of many peoples at differing stages of development into the relatively dead-end location of Burma (Fig. 62). Of these people, the Burmese have established greatest coherence and set the ethnic character of the whole Irrawaddy Basin, which is almost exclusively occupied by them as far as the latitude of Bhamo; they constitute two-thirds of the whole population (16.8 millions in 1941). Towards the south they have inter-bred with Mon Khmer groups (known as Talaings in Burma) who, part of those highly developed Indo-Malayan peoples found also in Siam, Indochina and Malaya, preceded the Burmese in the Irrawaddy Basin. 161 162 174

The national nucleus of modern Burmese is the Dry Zone whence they have in more recent historic times pressed out southwards. Their physique, culture and character is Mongoloid with cultural assimilations from the Mons. Their speech is tonal and monosyllabic, related to Tibetan but with script and grammar derived from Pali through the Buddhist priesthood, the literary tradition of which has made 50 per cent of Burmese males literate—a higher vernacular literacy rate than anywhere else in Southeast Asia. Burma has sometimes Burmanised other and later waves of peoples from the north, sometimes diverted them, as in the case of the Shans who migrated southward later and were forced into the eastern highlands and Siam, while another Mongoloid group, the Karens, was pressed in turn to the southern highlands and to the Pegu Yoma. Today the distinction between these rival groups persists and 9 per cent of the people of Burma describe themselves as Shans and 7 per cent as Karens. Isolation, differences in language, and transport difficulties have perpetuated differences which appear sharper than the similarity of social and cultural habits justifies. 162 101 105 174

In the more thinly populated areas of the western and northern hills, ethnic fragmentation has proceeded farther. Thesehills have been called an ethnological maze of tribes stratified by altitude and by inter-digitations along valleys. Burmese call all tribes of the Western Mountains Chins, though among the tribes at least 60 different languages are in use and the tribal names are equally varied. While they have played little part in the modern evolution of Burma, a number of not too difficult ways cross these hills from Assam; of them, the Myittha route through Manipur, the 161 162 174

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

FIG. 60.—Density of Population in Burma

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

FIG. 61.—The Relation between Cultivation and Population in Burma

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

FIG. 62.—Burma : Overland Migrations and Communal Patterns

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An route from Arakan to the Dry Zone and the Taungup route to Prome were used in historic times, though travel through these tropical valleys is by no means easy and overland movement is better facilitated on the drier uplands. From the north, the Hukawng Valley and the Tuzu Gap have been lines along which known groups have entered. From Assam and the north by these routes came peoples of a Mongoloid or Tibetan type resembling those

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already in Burma. A contemporary parallel to the historic migrations from the north has become evident by the repeated pressure of Chinese people from Yunnan into northeast Burma and the Shan States, where at times the Chinese have ranked as a political problem. 161 162 174

Though Buddhism has become the characteristic expression of Burmese cultural life, its entry into Burma was neither caused by, nor cause of, subjugation to India. Into the Arakan deltaic zone have steadily filtered peoples from India over the past two millennia, followed by interbreeding with indigenes so that the Arakanese people differ slightly from the main Burmese stock with which, however, it was constantly in contact through the Arakan Yoma. 174

Large-scale Indian contacts are relatively modern features of Burma and came in two distinct stages. Firstly in mediaeval times the trade and interchange between India and China skirted Burma to the north by way of Tibet over the mountain routes, and, more significantly, southward round the coast, where points of call for shipping grew up from Akyab to Pegu, Moulmein and Mergui as successive laps on that trade route partly seaborne, partly overland, which crossed the Kra Isthmus. Buddhism came to the Burmese along this sea-route, followed in its time by Islam which has established little more than a minor cultural influence in the Akyab area only. This formed part of a trade movement skirting the nucleus of Burmese people, whose agriculture and state organisation was inland, in the Dry Zone. At that stage the skirting trade influenced the Burmese very slightly and their traditions developed in their own way and at their own pace within the protective isolation of the interior.

Yet it was along the coast that the momentum of activity gradually increased, to create influences centrifugal to Burma and out of harmony with the centripetal influences of the Dry Zone. Following the coastwise trade route came the East India Company, through which the British became associated with Lower Burma. As a result of the administration of the East India Company from Calcutta, the centrifugal influences round Burma drew that fringing zone within the commercial and organisational orbit of India, and, although the control from India ceased by formal governmental separation in 1935, commercial ties with Calcutta continued and governmental forms and traditions in Burma had

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174 already received the indelible impression of the Indian pattern whether or not it suited the Burmese environment.

Then came the migration of Burmese as pioneers to the new
166 delta paddylands which were brought under control in Akyab, the
464 Irrawaddy Delta, the Lower Sittang and, to a less extent, Tenas-
167 serim. The new cash agricultural system developed in these pioneer areas led to a heavy demand for labour, far more labour than Burma could supply—and it was met by seasonal migration from the congested areas of Bengal and Madras. Over recent decades the flow has decreased so that the movement of Indians to Burma in 1937 was half that of 1927 and stopped in 1942 when over half a million Indians are thought to have returned to India.

The movement both ways was governed by general economic conditions in Burma relative to those of India; in 1928, for example, there was a net immigration of 85,000 Indians, declining to a net emigration from Burma of 57,000 in the 1931 depression. It is to be stressed that the peak period of developing new paddylands, 1880-1900, was not the peak period of Indian immigration, showing that the rice pioneering was largely by indigenous Burmese peasants in the first place.

178 Thus the commercialisation of Lower Burma has led to the
563 introduction of foreign populations, just as has been the case in
167 Malaya. These Madrasis and Bengalis came originally as seasonal
464 migrants, making for the Irrawaddy Delta in the harvesting season and returning to India immediately afterwards, or in the next dry
241 season, having done a series of jobs from harvesting, reaping, and milling to repairing the field bundings. To this extent the duration
656 of one man's stay was on the average shorter than was the case with
433 non-seasonal migration into Malaya. Gradually they came in also for the non-seasonal work of running the railways, the harbours, the river shipping, milling, lumbering and the other industrialised occupations established by the commercialisation of Burma over the last hundred years. Early labour difficulties in these specialised occupations were in part met by official subsidies from the Burma Government to encourage Indian immigration.

162 Thus a steady settlement of Indians and their families took place and by 1941 over a million Indians were living in Burma, principally in the urban and commercial centres of the coastal and deltaic zones. Hindustani became the second language of the country, and the professions and the administration for a time

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were almost exclusively Indian in personnel. In this way the multiplicity of peoples already in Burma was complicated by commercialisation and urbanisation based on Indians. 162

How the early Burmese pioneers of the newly opened rice areas of the deltas gradually lost their independent smallholdings and became tenant farmers has already been described. To complicate the issue, the hands into which the mortgaged lands fell were Indian, mostly of the Chettyar Indians, who became owners of half the Delta's agricultural lands by 1931. They were foreign, absentee non-agricultural landowners, which added to the Burmese farmers' economic difficulties the passion of racial animosity which had scarcely arisen while the immigration of foreigners was confined to the temporary agricultural labourer type. Thus, the Irrawaddy Delta was not only foreign to Burma in its agricultural system of cash crops; it was more concerned with overseas interests and overseas trade. The port of Rangoon was almost the sole entry and exit of the country; land on the Delta was largely in the hands of foreign Indian owners who encouraged still further cultivation by compatriot Indian labourers. This split Burma into the centripetal zone, the Dry Zone, essentially Burmese and poor, and the centrifugal zone, the wealthy Irrawaddy Delta and Rangoon, essentially foreign and mainly Indian, an exit rather than a nucleus of Burma. While, then, Burma's earlier history was one of a dead-end to Mongoloid migrations, the relative emptiness of the new most fertile part of the country made it a magnet for the impoverished, loose-footed peoples of congested eastern India. 426 427 583 184

Urban Centres

Only two places, Rangoon and Mandalay, can be called big towns; of the others, only Moulmein, Bassein and Akyab contain over 40,000 people. Towns may be classified as minor ports and estuarial rice centres, such as Akyab, Bassein, Moulmein and Tavoy. In addition there are river ports in a string from Henzada to Bhamo, lining the great Irrawaddy waterway, which is commercially navigable to 900 miles inland. Many small towns like Myingyan have the rural industries of oil pressing and cotton ginning. Yenangyaung and Namtu are garish and makeshift oil and mining towns. The railway and administration centres often have a long history, as is the case with Pegu, Shwebo and Toungoo. All these places have been described by Spate as little more 162 369 361

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162 than overgrown villages, sprawling vaguely round a few buildings
369 often of the "corrugated iron" period; they were pioneering
361 settlements in character, whatever their history.

Rangoon (half a million inhabitants in 1941) stands at a point where converge the Irrawaddy waterways, an overland route to the foothills of the Pegu Yoma and overseas steamship routes. Itself accessible by ocean-going steamers, Rangoon thus commands the approaches to Burma by both the Sittang and Irrawaddy waterways and valleys, as well as along the Pegu Yoma, which is a well-drained land route followed today by the railway. The town has the rectangular pattern common in pioneer towns and it had no local significance until external trade developed over the last century or so. Its prewar aspect was distinctly Indian though Burmanisation of the administration has gone on rapidly
[504] since Burmese governments were established there. In its function as chief port, Rangoon has handled over 4-5th of the country's external trade and been the gathering point of great numbers of Indian migrants with a seasonal volume of passenger traffic to and from India, which totalled over half a million annually for the period 1921–31. Overseas shipping and interests gave Rangoon a cosmopolitan air, the most modern and westernised town in the country. Though the port suffered to some extent by being off the general run of major ocean-going steamers, its international significance was increased when it became a halt on transcontinental airlines linking it to India and Europe, Bangkok and the Far East, and to Singapore and Australia. About one-third of a million Chinese had settled in the different ports of Lower Burma as traders, more resident than migrant. For a time the Rangoon-Lashio-Kunming route to wartime China produced a feverish activity among Chinese in Rangoon, but there is little postwar evidence that this route into inner China is likely to assume permanent value. There has arisen no serious movement to change the function of Rangoon as the administrative capital of Burma in its independence (1948). The city suffered more from war in the Far East than any other capital of Southeast Asia except Manila: its transport facilities were destroyed and this, together with the breakdown of internal organisation, paralysed trade which, despite greatly increased prices, was in 1946 valued at only 54 per cent of that in 1940.

Mandalay, historically associated with Burmese kings, is a much

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smaller and now war-scarred town which never ceased to be entirely Burmese in its tradition. It had less than 200,000 inhabitants, yet these had created a cultured and matured social atmosphere in the Oriental manner, with an elaborate and indigenous art, music and drama which was paralleled in few other parts of continental Southeast Asia, where pioneering has so far evolved little that is mature.

While the detailed geography of urban Burma will have suffered most from the two military campaigns fought through it in 1942 and 1944, the pattern of the countryside remains the same, with minimum effects on the subsistence farming areas of Central Burma and maximum effects in the commercialised deltaic fringes where not only has trading organisation been destroyed but also much of the migrant labour has ceased. The Indian population has changed considerably because over 600,000 Indians trekked through the Arakan Hills into Assam in 1942, a fact of special significance in the social and commercial structure of post-war Burma.

Regional Geography

Four relatively densely populated regions are the core of Burma's geography (Fig. 49):

1. *The Dry Zone*, whose dry climate, subsistence agriculture and exclusively Burmese tradition make it the most distinctive region, centring on Pagan and Mandalay. Its boundaries are partly the 40″ isohyet, emphasised by sharp marginal relief changes.
2. *The Lower Burma deltas*—where, centring on the Irrawaddy Delta, and spreading through the Sittang Delta, a commercialised agriculture based on rice, foreign trade and foreign labour has created a composite non-Burmese region whose evolution has given Burma a second and powerful focal point, Rangoon.
3. *The Arakan deltaic coast*, a minor paddy-growing area and historic line of Indian approach to Inner Burma, with less population than (1) and (2). Sharply confined to seaboard by "Pacific type" mountain ranges inland, it has tended in the last half century to be related commercially to Bengal rather than to Burma.
4. *The Tenasserim Coast* is a highly varied region of ranges, fringed by small cultivated lowlands hedged in by mangrove swamps

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132 where the setting and the pattern of local life resemble those of
133 Eastern Malaya. Rubber, tin and coconut production give it
162 a commerce distinct from that in the rest of Burma and relate
184 it more to the Kra Isthmus.

All the remaining regions of Burma have hill or mountain landscapes, thinly populated, with agriculture still evolving from migrant cultivation to fixed cultivation and at different stages of Burmanisation going on among the many tribes and clans living there. These regions are :

5. *The Western Forest Belt*, a completely forested region, stratified into types altitudinally and having rain forest on the western flanks and deciduous forest on the seasonally dry eastern flanks, the whole drained by longitudinal and trellis patterned rivers, the chief ones flowing to the Irrawaddy.
6. *The Northern Irrawaddy Basin*, north of the latitude of Bhamo, where the basin merges into the Himalayan mountains, and becomes a series of high N-S. ranges, trenched by headwaters of the Irrawaddy River and leading up by high mountain wastes into Tibet and Inner Yunnan. Through this very thinly populated territory came many of the present Mongoloid tribal groups now in Burma.
7. *A transitional region* of rising altitudes, increasing rainfall and teak forests between the Dry Zone, the Northern Irrawaddy Basin and the Shan Highlands.
8. *The Pegu Yoma*, a thinly peopled inlier region of young warped rocks between the Lower Irrawaddy and the Sittang, with vestigial volcanic cones to the north, oil on its NW. flank and commercial teak nearly everywhere.
9. *The Shan Highlands*, a zone of cool seasons (due to altitude) and more rainfall than the Dry Zone, producing deciduous forest and a subtropical mixed forest, reflected in subtropical agriculture with rice cultivated only in the warmer lowlands. Occupied by Shan peoples who are related to the Siamese, it connects as readily to Siam as to Burma. Commerce has intruded towards Lashio and Kalaw which are rail terminals for the routes into Yunnan, and at Bawdwin where there are lead mines and a growing *tung* plantation industry. This terrain is thought to have considerable prospects for agricultural and population developments. The Salween runs through it without providing a negotiable line of approach.

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The nine regional units are linked together simply:

(*a*) By the Irrawaddy waterway, which suits the needs of the middle and lower Irrawaddy basins for cheap and bulk transport; and focuses on Rangoon as terminal and entrepôt.

(*b*) By the Rangoon-Myitkyina railway running first along the Pegu Yoma foothills to join the Irrawaddy at Mandalay, and by the Mandalay-Lashio branch leading to the Yunnan road. Over the period 1926-36 railway traffic (passenger and freight) showed great falling off. There is a fanning of railways from both Mandalay and Rangoon; from Mandalay, lines reach Yeu, from Thazi they reach Myingan and some miles beyond Kalaw, to Heho, from Pyinmina a line crosses the Pegu Range to Kyaukpadaung; in the south there are links from Rangoon to Prome, to Henzada and Bassein, and from Pegu to Moulmein and Ye; the Japanese Moulmein-Bangkok line has not proved worth continuing.

(*c*) By an elaborate coastwise traffic of small sailing and steam vessels, centring on Rangoon.

(*d*) A road from Rangoon to Mandalay and Lashio crisscrosses over the railway and duplicates its function. Roads have later been pressed into the Shan States on the east and to Prome and the oilfields on the west. In general, the road system in Burma has remained undeveloped, sketchy and frequently dead-end.

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Chapter Twelve

THE EAST INDIES

THE WESTERN ARCHIPELAGO—SUMATRA

The East Indies

101 131 The East Indies will be treated as that group of islands lying off Southeast Asia from the Sulu Sea southwards and terminating at Weber's Line, west of New Guinea. Broken down into some minute units of land, the whole group has been subject over the last few centuries to political administration by the Dutch (with the exception of North Borneo), a fact upon which is largely based the conception that the archipelago is a geographical unit, though the Indonesian region is one of broadly similar ethnic groups dispersed through a sprawling island world, of similar physical environments and of similar human adjustments to it.

131 101 184 133 The East Indies is the one example of large portions of equatorial environment sufficiently penetrated by stretches of sea to make them accessible, so that human beings have been able to enter the region easily and to experience the environmental factors at work. The human response has varied widely; the teeming millions of Java contrast with the forest-covered emptiness of Borneo, and the barbaric tribes still wandering in the mountains of Sumatra scarcely relate to the elegance and refinement of Balinese cultural life.

That the archipelago stretches through 2,000 miles has effectively kept apart the people of individual islands whose forested terrain operated also to isolate coastal people from those of interiors. Against these impediments have been working the ease and fluidity of movement by water, on seas smiling and benevolent for weeks at a time, on rivers, the only natural paths through forests and swamp, and on sheltered lagoons behind the coast. The waterways that provided the easiest lines of movement for indigenous people made this zone equally accessible to foreigners, obliged to travel among the islands by reason of the long Malay Peninsula thrusting far south of the Asiatic mainland, so that people of India,

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China and Europe have moved freely for millennia among the islands, adding to the mixture and diffusion of diverse ethnic and cultural types and stages of technological development. None of the islands has height sufficient to create large areas of other climates or vegetation which might breed special human types, but the volcanic highland zones of young fertile soils have drawn to themselves very dense populations of intensive agriculturalists who have pressed farming almost to the lips of active craters, a single outburst of which may therefore bring calamity to hundreds of thousands of people. Political power has, in Java particularly, centred round the productive volcanic zones; other political units have centred on the coastal fringes, to form amphibious political units rather than units of land. 131 101 184 133

With the justification of geomorphological, faunal and floral differences, the Indonesian islands may be subdivided into: (*a*) The Western Archipelago, to include Sumatra, Java, Borneo and other islands related to the Sunda Platform, a group where routes between major parts of the Asiatic continent have converged to make a strong impression on local ways of living, especially by introducing modern commerce; and (*b*) the Eastern Archipelago from Bali and the Macassar Straits eastwards to Weber's Line, a group of youthful structures off the track of international routes, much less influenced by Asia and little touched by modern commerce. 138

In the following discussion of Indonesian regions, Dutch phonetic renderings of local place names will be used. These differ from English renderings of similar words in Malaya but are best retained for easier reference to maps and sources. 103

The Western Archipelago

Although Borneo is by far the largest of this group, most interest attaches to the much smaller island of Java where the greatest population and the intensest cultivation have evolved. Sumatra is in these respects intermediate in type between Borneo and Java. Small islands like Banka and Billiton have significance only for their tin mining. 184 162

Sumatra

(*a*) *Physiography*

About 1,600 miles long and fairly equally divided by the Equator, Sumatra is itself surrounded by islands. Paralleling it 133 131

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

FIG. 63.—Landforms of Sumatra

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in the Indian Ocean are the Nassau - Mentawei islands, mountainous, neglected, thinly peopled and off the track of world interests. On the Malacca Strait side are flat, marshy islands slowly building up seaward, and progressively linking by sedimentation to the Sumatran mainland. Farther east still are the islands of the Sunda Sea, submerged extensions of Sunda Platform ranges in Malaya. The ranges of Sumatra extend northward as the islands round We and southward into the Sunda Strait where the great Krakatau volcano marks the meeting place of lines of tectonic weakness running lengthwise through both Sumatra and Java. None of these marginal islands supports many people. The Sunda Platform, mostly concealed by sediment, lies roughly east of a line between Tandjoengbalai to Oosthaven.

Sumatra is remarkable for the huge flat alluvial lowland extending along two-thirds of the East Coast, from Tandjoengbalai southwards. This region, a forest-covered swamp masking the edge of the Sunda Platform and merging into the shallow

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Malacca Strait, is an obstacle to settlement and approach from the east, sparsely inhabited and undeveloped, the longest and most continuous example of Southeast Asia equatorial swamp still beyond the control of human technology. More than any other single factor, this repellent East Coast has operated against the development and peopling of Sumatra. These alluvial swamps in places extend inland for as much as 150 miles, and are chiefly responsible for the bulging shape of southern Sumatra today.

The Sumatran mainland (Fig. 63) is formed by a complex series of mountains well to the west, establishing a watershed rarely over 35 miles from the Indian Ocean. It has no generally accepted name except in the southern two-thirds where it is called the Barisan Range (Barisan means "line of hills"); to the north the terms Atjeh and Batak Highlands apply.

These mountains and the plateaux they enclose are partly tilted from west to east so that a mountain wall, edged by raised coral beaches and trenched by short, violent streams, forms the western landscape, hindering approach and human development on that side. Throughout its length the mountain system has been accompanied by faulting to produce longitudinal rift valleys arranged as a discontinuous trough through most of the mountain region, from the Basin of Goja and Alas in the north to Semangka Bay in the south. The Angkola-Gadis (Padangsidipoean), Upper Soempoer, and Fort de Kock (Bukit Tinggi) depressions are other basins along the medial trough.

To this triple division vulcanism has added the complication of lava outpourings of several ages and types, from andesite to ash. Erosion by the torrential rains has carved and removed much of the older lava yet large deposits of it remain in the south and at points on the west. Most of the outflow seems to have spread east as great sheets of pumice, tufa and ash, partly in the original state, partly redistributed as water-borne alluvials. The East Coast swamps are largely built of redistributed debris from more recent volcanic eruptions of South Sumatra. In the Batak Highlands tufa from recent vulcanism has obliterated all earlier relief over an area of some 5,500 square miles; south of Sorikmerapi occurred another large outflow of lavas. One effect of these outpourings of volcanic material has been to block parts of the medial trough, interrupting and diverting its drainage for a time, often creating temporary lakes which have left fertile alluvial basins attractive

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133 to farming and accessible only through gorges at what was the debouchment of the lake, as at Lake Tawar. The whole drainage pattern is one of interaction between the alignment of the medial trough, the general tilt eastwards, and the tongues of volcanic debris.

Between the mountain system and the East Coast is a strip of piedmont varying in continuity through the length of Sumatra. It has a distinct character set by only lightly folded sedimentaries crossed from the west by entrenched streams, and containing oil-bearing substructures exploited at various points from Atjeh to Palembang. This piedmont comes almost to the coast north of Medan, to narrow the line of coastal swamp, but it stands well inland elsewhere.

In the Batak Highlands, the volcanic outpouring of acidic rocks 2,000 ft. thick has concealed the medial troughs and the adjoining eastern piedmont down to the East Coast. Huge dormant cones still stand on the inner Batak landscape round Lake Toba. Steeply graded rivers have cut gorges to break up the plateau-like landscape, and carried the easily eroded volcanic debris towards the east coast; upon these transported soils has grown up the plantation agriculture (Fig. 66) west and south of Medan. In contrast to the acidic rocks elsewhere on the Highlands, from the dormant Batak volcanoes in the north came basic ejecta, weathering into fertile soils which alone make possible the tobacco plantations behind Medan. Elsewhere the acid volcanic cinders have spread a porous mantle on the plateau, upon which the normal Tropical Rain Forest will not grow, so that a semi-arid savannah vegetation scattered with giant ferns covers the landscape. Probably, too, this zone has been overcut by shifting agriculturists and regrowth of the secondary forest hindered by soil porosity and by the dry föhn winds coming across the mountains from the south and east. Lake Toba, 50 miles long, 3,000 ft. above the sea and covering over 500 square miles, is surrounded by cliffs often 2,000 ft. high, at the foot of which are narrow alluvial belts intensively farmed for rice; its outlet to the southeast (Soengai Asahan) plunges through tremendous gorges.

Farther south from the Batak district, the dormant Boealboeali volcano is the first of the Barisan Mountains where the typical form of two ranges separated by a series of fault depressions becomes emphatic. These depressions are swampy or occupied

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by lakes. The Western Range, built of recently dormant cones and less resistant volcanic materials, presents a torrentially scored face to the Indian Ocean where only scanty and small alluvial fans, separated by cliffed headlands, attract settlement. In the Eastern Range appear more resistant metamorphic rocks, schists, slates and limestones, descending less steeply to the east and enclosing a few depressions, such as the Batang Oembilin Basin, site of the chief Sumatran coalfield, linked by railway to Padang.

At about 1° 30″ N. the whole mountain structure narrows to a low waist not more than 20 miles wide through which it is possible to cross without rising above 2,000 ft., at Padang Sidimpoean. A highland road threads the medial trough from this small town through the Angkola and Soempoer Valleys to the Fort de Kock Basin, thence splitting to traverse the West Coast southward from Padang and the eastern piedmont to Djambi, Palembang and Lampoeng Bay. Lake basins are present in this section of the medial trough (Manindjau and Singkarak) each fringed by minor agricultural areas.

South from the Batang Hari rises first the active Kerintji volcano (Piek van Indrapoera), highest and most naked peak in Sumatra (12,470 ft.), and thereafter volcanic cones, mostly active, dominate the landscape as far as the Sunda Strait. Granite, crystalline lavas and tufas spread everywhere. Where the medial trough appears, its alluvial fillings attract cultivators and settlements, but transmontane routes are few. In this zone begins the great Air Moesi which, very mature in contrast to most Sumatran streams, is at this stage broad and shallow, with gently sloping sides. Many of the volcanoes of South Sumatra discharge tongues of mud (lahars) which drain into the lowlands.

Half the area of Sumatra lies on the plains east of the Barisan Ranges and does not exceed 100 ft. in altitude. Apart from the piedmont, where oil and coal frequently occur, the recent alluvium from the volcanic highlands plasters all other formations. Since mangrove and tropical swamp are progressive growths, there are by now some slightly higher and drier sections, well away from the rivers which, heavily laden with mud and decaying vegetation, have lost the power of vertical aggrading so that they abrade sideways to form constantly changing courses and to leave numerous abandoned channels quickly choked with thick-matted vegetation. Much of the swamp is inundated each rainy season, and twice

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FIG. 64.—Land Use in Sumatra

daily the large deltas and a zone up to 12 miles broad along the coast may be flooded by tides. While the rivers across the swamps are navigable to some extent, depending on shifting sandbanks, villages along their banks are separated by great distances. Some of the channels near the coast are surprisingly deep, probably due to tidal scour; the Kampar, for example, has a powerful bore. The navigable streams establish an E-W. line of communication, met inland on the piedmont by roads and a railway with a NW–SE. alignment. The natural vegetation is of two types: (*a*) Tropical Swamp Forest, predominating in the eastern half of the island, and (*b*) Tropical Rain Forest, occupying most of the rest of the island, with a few variations due to changing altitudes and porosity of soil (Fig. 64). Along the East Coast, corals do not appear, inhibited by the muddy shores and extensive mangroves. On the West Coast there are both live corals and coral terraces on raised beaches.

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(*b*) *Climate*

Sumatra's climate broadly resembles that of Malaya. The high mountain barrier induces very heavy rains (over 150 in. p.a.) at all seasons with maximum during October-November north of the Equator and during December-January south of it. Seasons of less rain (not amounting to drought) are more pronounced to the

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

FIG. 65.—Rainfall in Sumatra

north (as in North Malaya) and some of the mountain basins have low rainfalls because they are shielded from rain (Fig. 65).

Considerable differences of weather from district to district occur in the Barisan Ranges where föhn winds are very pronounced on the eastern flanks during southwest winds. Cool drier climates upon some of the plateaux create minor variations in the equatorial

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132 régime of violent convectional rains and uniform warmth. Strong, east-moving squalls, the "Sumatras" of the Malacca Strait, blow most frequently across the north in January; to the far south they reach a peak in August on the West Coast, in July on the East Coast. No tropical cyclones have been recorded.

SUMATRA: AVERAGE RAINFALL (inches)

	Rain-days (over .02in.)	*Jan.*	*Feb.*	*Mar.*	*Apr.*	*May*	*June*	*July*	*Aug.*	*Sept.*	*Oct.*	*Nov.*	*Dec.*	*Total*
Bukit Tinggi (3,018 ft.) ..	195	9	7.2	8.4	9.9	7.0	5.4	3.7	6.0	6.7	8.7	8.7	9.6	90.3
Padang (230 ft.)	190	13.4	10.9	11.4	14.3	12.0	12.8	10.9	13.4	16.4	19.4	19.9	18.7	173.5

161 (*c*) *Population Patterns*

Medan, the most populated district of Sumatra (Fig. 66), has a density equal to that of the least densely peopled part of Java —that is, between 150 and 300 persons per square mile. This contrast, while reflecting physical differences, relates also to accidents of recent historical developments. In the Hindu colonisation period travellers visited Sumatra frequently, recorded the relative grandeur of principalities centred there and did not suggest that the contrasts between Sumatra and Java were so great as they are now. During the last few centuries, Sumatra has been off the track of the international trading interests threading these seas, and the East Coast swamp and the West Coast cliffs made it far more difficult to approach the populated interior than was the case in Java. Operating to its disadvantage also was the late arrival of modern organisation and transport systems; Sumatra only came under Dutch control early this century. The island escaped that impulse to population expansion, the Culture System, which had much influence in Java last century, and it has never in modern times attracted large-scale immigration. These are negative factors. Probably the present population (8.3 million in 1938), an average density of 44 persons per square mile, indicates a condition likely to have been repeated in Java had positive factors not operated there.

The pattern of people in Sumatra may be summed up thus. The densest population spreads behind Medan; somewhat lesser densities cover the Fort de Kock basin, the adjoining depressions of the medial trough, and the Batak Highlands. Fringing the

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northernmost and southernmost tips, in the fertile little estuarial bays of Atjeh and Lampoeng, are minor concentrations of people. Least populated is the East Coast swamp where over large areas there are densities well below 25 per square mile, indicating that the same swamp has acted as a major barrier between the people

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

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FIG. 66.—Correlation of Lavas and Agriculture behind Medan

of Malaya and Sumatra, more so than the Malacca Strait itself, which is a means of contact for sea-going people. Fertile soils of basic lava origin are found only in Lampoeng, in the foothill country west of Palembang, in the Padang Basins, and on the Batak Highlands, all attracting agricultural populations. Only 16 towns, mostly peripheral, as in the case of Palembang, Medan and Padang, have over 10,000 people each.

Menggala is the centre of a fairly prosperous farming region whose population barely reaches 60 per square mile. In the middle and upper valleys of the Air Moesi, the alluvial soils and the controllable water supply permit rice farming, flanked by rubber and coffee plantations; this zone attracted interest because

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

FIG. 67.—Petroleum Deposits near Palembang

161 it is near productive oil wells (Fig. 67). Palembang (population 110,000), where a line of low hills approaches the Moesi, has been the chief centre of this region for long historical periods; although the settlement was mentioned by early Indian and

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Chinese travellers, its modern revival as almost monopolist commercial centre of Sumatra is connected with the oil refineries of Pladjoe nearby and its accessibility from overseas by ocean steamers and from Central Sumatra overland through the piedmont. Djambi has a rather similar location and historic value with respect to the Batang Hari river. The Bukit Assam coalfield, linked by rail to Palembang, has special postwar significance for this region deficient in coal supplies because it resumed production quickly (360,000 tons for 1948).

Where the eastern piedmont comes to the coast, on either side of Medan, relatively dense populations have settled recently in connection with tobacco, rubber, coffee, tea and oil palm plantations. Medan itself (76,000) originally developed into the regional capital because, located on the Soengai Deli, riverine and coastwise routes centred there. Shipping difficulties in so shallow a river made necessary in course of time the creation of an outport at Belawan, which handled mainly an export trade of bulky primary commodities (1950 exports 250,000 tons, imports 105,000 tons). Belawan once dealt with more shipping tonnage than any other Sumatra port, multiplying its tonnage five times over the inter-war period, but was used by less than a million tons of shipping during 1947; it suffered from much silting during the Japanese Occupation.

Few mountain districts in Sumatra have more than 50 people per square mile, and though the youthful soils round the Kerintji volcano rank as well peopled, the density of that region is only 70 per square mile. A longitudinal highway links the various medial troughs, encouraging their agricultural development. Among the Padang Highlands there is more intensive settlement than elsewhere in Sumatra, based on the fertile volcanic soils round Merapi. Thus densities of over 850 people per square mile occur in the Fort de Kock (Bukit Tinggi) country where tobacco, coffee and coconuts are grown. Nearby at Sawahloento, coal is mined. This dense population extends to the west coast where Padang (52,000) is chief town of West Sumatra and third in the whole island. Even here, however, a sheltered outport, Emmahaven, has had to be built farther south because Padang's shallow and unprotected harbourage does not suit modern shipping. To Emmahaven, often broadly included in the name Padang, was routed for export the agricultural produce of the Highlands and the

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161 prewar output of the Oembilin coal mine, one of the few sources of coal regularly available for archipelago railways and shipping. Transport proved a costly overhead to these remotely located coals which, after railing to seaboard, still have considerable distances to cover before reaching convenient selling points at Sabang or in Java. The Batak Highland is the only other mountain zone with fairly dense settlement (over 200 persons per square mile). It has good links to Medan and to Sibolga. The Batak setting has not only stimulated a vigorous agriculture among local people, but also encouraged "hill station" development round Lake Toba.

(*d*) *Human Types*

162 174 144 563 While numerous clan groupings developed here where evolution in isolation was facilitated by the terrain, two ethnic types settled in Sumatra. Long-headed Caucasoid types (Nesiots) are represented by the Bataks, the Gajo and the people of the Nias-Mentawei islands. Broad-headed Mongoloid types seem to have migrated hither from Continental Asia, by way of Malaya, and may be recognised today among people of the Sumatran East Coast, the Menangkabau and the Atjeher who fringe all the northern tips of Sumatra. Among Sumatrans no less than fifteen languages and a wide range of dialects are in use today; though their customs vary, they are variations on a similar pattern closely associated with the uniformity of environmental conditions.

105 Three groups of peoples may be distinguished:

162 174 563 (*a*) *The Menangkabau*, distributed from the middle of the island to the West Coast. This is a people more broad-headed (Mongoloid) than neighbouring groups; Menangkabau are Muslim now but retain their older matrilineal social system and its strong family ties which have led to the housing of many branches of the one family under one roof, and to customs resembling those of the Hindu family system, calculated to keep family property intact. The elaborately-decorated quarter-moon-shaped houses evidence a fairly high cultural standard, producing skilled wood and metal work. Menangkabau agriculture has considerable complexity, based on wet paddy and buffalo breeding. The Menangkabau have a commercial reputation as the only Sumatran community astute enough to be able to hold its own in trade against the Chinese middlemen established everywhere else in the island.

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To the east of the Menangkabau, other types of Malays live on the East Coast and its adjoining islands. They are Muslims with a patrilineal system and they gravitate towards village sites close to tidal water. Some Malays near Palembang have a tradition of originating from Malacca. They are not located well enough to be more than indifferent agriculturalists but they are active fishermen, among whom much overseas influence is apparent.

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(*b*) North and south of (*a*) are ***Batak and Lampoenger***. The word Batak, originally a derogatory Malay term, covers a number of tribes of the uplands round Toba and reaching to the west coast at Natal. These people are chiefly influenced by Hindu and animistic traditions, though conversion to Islam and Christianity has taken place among southern tribes. Patrilineal inheritance and class distinctions, related to the caste system, govern Batak customs, which are associated with multi-family houses and a subsistence agriculture now emerging from the shifting cultivation type. The Gajo people of inner Atjeh resemble the Bataks yet they have been subject to Atjeh influence long enough to adopt many Atjeh ways.

Lampoeng people have had long associations with the Bataks, weakened now by influence of Sunda people from across the strait and by the belt of Malay peoples stretching east-west through Middle Sumatra. Though Muslim, they are not far from the head-hunting stage. Their several-storeyed houses are distinctive, each standing in its own stockaded compound on high piles. They are almost vegetarian and have an elaborate literary culture.

(*c*) *Atjeher*.—The Atjeh people comprise many tribes among which there are marked differences between more agricultural coastal types, much influenced by foreign contacts, and the more mobile interior types. Atjeh was invariably touched by the peoples crossing the Indian Ocean over many centuries and it has had longer associations with Arabia and travellers from that direction than with any other single foreign interest. It was historically the first part of the Indies to become Muslim. All peoples of the group have an aristocratic society whose fanatic Muslim tradition has welded them into a community which fiercely resisted subjugation by outsiders in modern times. Atjeher land is tribally owned but individually

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105 cultivated on a subsistence basis. The influence of Arab
162 traders has been very strongly superimposed upon much older
174 cultural traditions.
563 In addition to more settled communities, there are in Central Atjeh very primitive peoples resembling the wandering tribes of inner Malaya. Incompletely Muslimised, they are hunters, gatherers and fishermen. Odd migrant tribes of shifting agriculturists have been found farther inland but the nomadic hunter-gatherer types predominate. Among the non-Muslim Mentawei-Nias islanders, Polynesian affinities are very marked and cultivation is based on yams.

Upon this pattern of indigenous people has been imposed the more recent immigration induced by modern agricultural mining activity, bringing Chinese labourers into the Medan district and into Palembang. In 1938 Sumatra contained 450,000 Chinese who were prominent as plantation and mining workers, as fishermen at Bagansiapiapi, and as retailers and middlemen in nearly all the towns.

(*e*) *Land Utilisation*

137 Most of Sumatra remains under its natural vegetation cover (Fig. 64), the Tropical Rain Forest being interrupted only by patches of secondary forest and savannah where local soil conditions are inferior. The largest patches of secondary forest are upon the eastern side of the southern mountain system (west of Palembang Residency) and marginally round all agricultural zones.

241 Indigenous agriculture continues to be more dependent on
161 shifting cultivation than on sedentary farming. Hence the zones
311 of densest indigenous population are being extensively cut over
361 by the predatory shifting system, accounting for the fringe of savannah round all settlement areas. So far the population has not reached a density sufficient to weaken the tradition of shifting cultivation which now supports about 6 million Sumatrans. Many of the people still depend on roots, the typical indigenous interest of local cultivation. Rice and maize, which the more developed groups cultivate, are definitely the result of external contacts and practised close to lines of external communication.

243 Wet paddy farming is confined to a few deltaic embayments on
311 the Atjeh coast, and to the upper valleys of the Moesi and Hari rivers on the flanks of Kerintji, as vestiges of the prosperous

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principalities of the first millennium when Indian colonisation reached its peak. Elsewhere dry paddy on temporary forest clearing is more usual. There are a few permanent rice-producing zones scattered round the Lampoenger coast. These agricultural activities are on a subsistence basis, yet Sumatra as a whole is not self-supporting even in rice, so that maize has become well established as secondary food crop. Only in the Padang Highlands has a more intensive indigenous agriculture produced rice for local commerce. In Atjeh and Lampoeng rice acreages have rapidly expanded over recent years, made possible in Lampoeng by soil rejuvenation from last century's Krakatau volcanic explosion which spread fertile ash in south Sumatra. Much of the difficulty of agricultural expansion has been the scarcity of people. In modern times, officially encouraged immigration to Sumatra has been slow and reluctant even from nearby Java which faces the problem of too many people and inadequate land. The zones of immigrant settlement were chiefly near Lampoeng; by 1929, 45,000 Javanese had settled in Oostkust Residency and 30,000 in Lampoeng and Bencoelen; by 1941 there were 117,000 in Lampoeng, 14,500 round Palembang and 7,500 in Bencoelen. These Javanese immigrants needed to be farmers to be suitable as permanent settlers, yet they were wanted as labourers upon European plantations as well. Under this double demand for labour, the expansion of Sumatran food agriculture scarcely kept up with the rate of immigration. Once caught in the system of cash farming, immigrants became smallholders of rubber, in imitation of the chief European plantation interest.

Rubber ranks as an important crop of the indigenous farmers of Sumatra, a development fitting in both with the shifting cultivation when undergoing transition to sedentary farming, and with cash crop farming. The smallholdings are worked partly for food and partly for rubber. Other crops grown by smallholders for cash are tobacco, coffee, tea, kapok, coconuts and pepper. The actual acreage under rubber, the chief smallholder cash crop, cannot be listed accurately because the units are small, widely dispersed and irregularly worked. The most convenient index comes from Sumatran statistics of smallholder rubber exports which from nothing prior to 1915 grew to 61,000 tons in 1929; this included 22,000 tons from Djambi, 16,000 from Palembang and 14,000 tons from the northeast coast. A rough estimate of

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249 the smallholding acreages may be made on the basis of 15 acres
241 producing a ton of rubber.

311 Sumatran agriculture has not closely followed the Malayan
433 pattern. European-capitalised plantations under foreign management began late last century. The oldest (1863) were for tobacco in the sultanate of Deli behind Medan, where high-quality tobaccos are still grown in plantations totalling 32,000 acres upon basic lava soils. Large rubber plantations gradually occupied lands adjoining these old tobacco plantations and now exceed them in importance. Similar large rubber plantations were established inland from Palembang and Djambi. Even during the confusions of 1950, .40 million metric tons of rubber were purchased from Sumatran smallholders as compared with the estate production of .14 million tons. The Medan area (Fig. 66) has a diversified plantation agriculture rather than the monoculture typical of Malayan plantations and oil palm, tea (particularly near Pematangsiantar), coffee and sisal estates alternate in strips roughly at right angles to the coast to take advantage of transported volcanic soils. Attracted by these plantations, considerable numbers of Chinese labourers have immigrated into the countryside round Medan.

316 Most mines were also largely worked and managed by foreigners.
471 The Atjeh and Northeast Coast oil wells were handled by refineries
315 at Sabang and Medan, those farther south at Palembang and Djambi. Much of this oil went to islands near Singapore for final distribution. In 1940 over half the Sumatran crude oil production (5 million tons) came from the Pladjoe fields and another quarter from Djambi. During 1950 a total of six million tons of crude oil was again being exported from Sumatra. Chinese miners have regularly washed for gold in the alluvials of West Sumatra, the output being more important as a legend than it is in fact.

Singkep, Banka and Billiton

133 Offshore from Sumatra and connected with it administratively are the islands of Singkep, Banka and Billiton whose over-mature relief repeats that of Malaya. They are the largest of that maze of small coral-girt, granite-cored, thinly peopled and almost uncultivated islands known as the Rhio and Lingga archipelagos, scattered south of Malaya, restricting movement of shipping now,

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

FIG. 68.—Banka. This island is almost entirely forested except where mining is carried on

though they facilitated the inter-continental movement of people for millennia in the past. The form of the Sumatran coast curiously parallels those of Banka and Billiton (Figs. 68 and 69). These two islands have rich alluvial tin deposits under conditions recalling those of the Kinta Valley though here partially deposited in the sea—hence locally known as "sea tin." These alluvials have been worked by dredges and some lode tin was mined in Billiton up to 1942. Large colonies of Chinese labourers have settled on these mines as temporary immigrants; of 115,000 persons on Banka in 1940, 43,000 were Chinese and there were 20,000 Chinese among the 58,000 people on Billiton. Up to 1932 some smelting was done on Banka though the bulk of ore went to the big smelters at Singapore, until Dutch political considerations caused the building of a smelter at Arnheim (Holland) to short-circuit the processing in British territory. Activity on these mines has fluctuated with world prices. Of about 44,000 tons produced by them in 1940, over half came from Banka, and a third from Billiton. Their combined production was back at some 32,000 tons for 1950.

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316 From Poelau Bintan in Rhio bauxite was extracted prewar (275,000 tons 1938), but only restarted in late 1947 for delivery to U.S.A.

133 Farther south, the volcano Krakatau has little significance in



FIG. 69.—Billiton. Apart from mining areas the island is forested

human geography, although it is notorious for a tremendous outburst in 1883 which, by spreading ash over huge areas of South Sumatra and as far as Singapore and Batavia, exemplified what devastation and changes by inundation and by covers of ash can be produced within a short while in the unstable sectors of the archipelago.

TRANSPORT

504 While much of the East Coast is repellent to settlement, transport now gravitates in that direction on account of the navigable rivers leading to the international artery of the Malacca

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Strait. Thus, Singapore, not far from the middle of the East Coast, has tended to be the focus of Sumatra's external trade, especially as link to Europe, and as port of call for shipping moving from all East Coast ports to Batavia, the administrative capital of the archipelago. The configuration of the Strait led local and international shipping through the narrows close to Singapore whose long-standing significance in relation to Sumatra was reflected by the Japanese device of making Singapore the administrative capital of both Malaya and Sumatra.

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Java

Chapter Thirteen

THE EAST INDIES

THE WESTERN ARCHIPELAGO: THE NATURAL LANDSCAPE OF JAVA AND MADOERA

131 JUST over 600 miles long, the prolific island of Java is set slightly
132 askew to latitudes and located farther away from the Equator
133 than the most northern parts of Malaya. It tends to have an emphatic dry season and a rainfall diminishing east of a meridional line through Goenong Merapi, though these tendencies are overridden in detail by relief. Middle Java (Cheribon to Semarang) scarcely exceeds 60 miles in width, but east and west of this "waist" the island broadens to about 100 miles, so that its form is distinctly elongated, emphasised by a lengthwise arrangement of the structure and the landscape types, whose continuity is more pronounced to the south than to the north. The island of Madoera, always bracketed with Java administratively, is a structural extension of North Java.

133 Beginning from the south, the landscape types may be summarised thus (Fig. 70):

1. The south coast limestone platforms.
2. The medial "ridge and valley" belt of disturbed sedimentary rocks.
3. The line of volcanoes forming the axis of Java.
4. A belt of alluvials from Bantam eastwards through the Loesi-Solo valley to the Madoera Strait and enwrapping the volcanoes.
5. The North Coast limestone platforms of Rembang and Madoera.

THE SOUTH COAST LIMESTONE PLATFORMS

Five platforms, a small one in S. Buitenzorg, a large one in S. Priangan, the extensive Goenong Sewoe between Kali Opak and Patjitan Bay, the plateau between the bays of Popoh and Sipelot, and an eastern outlier forming the Blambangan Peninsula, are built of little disturbed massive limestone rising precipitously

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from the coast and forming a landscape of tropical karst type. The formation is thick and porous and its subterranean drainage leaves the surface generally waterless and barren, negative to agriculture and to population. Goenong Sewoe sets the type, as a platform rising to about 1,000 ft. in a series of steep bare hills and hollows, uncrossed by modern routes. Those platforms to the west receive regular rains and have a more profuse vegetation, while those to the east serve to emphasise the arid note on a landscape naturally subject to a long dry season.

The Medial Range and Valley Belt

The Medial Range and Valley Belt is a maturely dissected landscape on marls which give rounded relief forms. These sedimentaries which, with the limestone, cover 33 per cent of the surface, were derived on the south from eroded volcanoes of previous geological eras and have been much folded and fractured. There tends to be a medial trough among the ranges, after the Sumatran pattern, showing as various basins (e.g. Bandoeng and Garoet) to



Fig. 70.—Landforms of Java

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the west and as a broadening trough to the east where it opens and loses altitude until partially inundated by the Madoera Strait. The sedimentaries reach altitudes over 4,000 ft. and form the substructure of Java's highlands. They involve on the north lignite and oil deposits. To the south the highlands come to the coast as cliffs, frequently marked by raised beaches and only in a few places, as near the Banjoemas Plain does the highland stand ack from the coast behind alluvial belts. It is among these sedimentaries that fossils of "Java man" (*Homo soloensis*) have been found as evidence of the contact of this region with Asia over long geological periods. Upon these marls and associated rocks there is abundant surface water, exemplified in the rolling, maturely-eroded landscapes of Preanger, but the formations are not extensive in dry East Java and their detail is much influenced by volcanoes and the superficial material derived from them. On the north, these sedimentaries do not reach the coast.

The Volcanoes

Volcanoes dominate the Javanese landscape everywhere, disrupting the sedimentary structures (Fig. 72) and masking the older landscape forms with lava and ash outpourings. Scarcely any long distance view can be found which does not include a volcanic cone. Java's volcanoes rise in steep slopes, scarred by torrential rains, to greater heights than any other of the relief forms: 44 cones are between 6,000 and 10,000 ft., and 14 are even higher. In few parts of the earth are structural weaknesses and lava flows crowded together in such profusion. The degree of explosiveness among the volcanoes varies so that the ash sometimes builds up round the vent a steep, narrow cone with a funnel-shaped centre, and sometimes spreads farther afield. The pattern of volcanic materials depends on whether the ejecta comes as molten lava or as the ash of exploded lava; the former flows like a viscous tongue down the sides of the volcanoes, usually from a point where the crater rim is lowest, while the ash is carried as a cloud whose direction depends on the wind. Because the rainfall is generally so heavy, the effect of tropical storms and of altitude, the craters tend to become lakes. Extinct cones invariably have rounded lakes within them for a time until erosion breaks down their rim. Other craters may become explosive by reason of the steam pressure set up in them by the percolating water, or become

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FIG. 71.—Physiographic Sketch of Goenong Oengaran

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

FIG. 72.—Block Diagram of the Volcanic Structure of the Old Oengaran

hot mud lakes which periodically spill over as lahars, devastating the countryside round the volcano, or emit ladoes, which are scorching clouds of hot dust of equally devastating effect. Gas vents (fumaroles) and hot springs of sulphuretted water or mud (solfataras) occur round some Javanese volcanoes. Poisonous heavy gases may lie in valleys for long periods, converting them to "death valleys" where fauna cannot live.

134 Javanese volcanoes erupt more frequently with ash than with
133 lava and when lava flows it is generally basic, so that soils on the lava and on alluvial ash derived from the lava, contain high proportions of calcium, nitrogen, magnesium and phosphorus in soluble form, to the great benefit of agriculture. Erosion, especially as great landslips, is, however, severe, because the ash is unconsolidated, the slopes steep and the rainfall heavy. All these features mean that the landscape form close to the volcanoes is abrupt and severely scored, unrelieved round the active vents by vegetation cover.

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Goenong Merapi (fire-mountain, a common local term for volcanoes) may be cited as example of one of Java's most destructive volcanoes (Fig. 73). Nearly 10,000 ft. high now, it was continuously active for long periods over the last hundred years. To the north, within a few miles, there towers another cone, Merbaboe. On its other side, Merapi slopes into the teeming, fertile and congested plains of Magelang, Jogjakarta and Soerakarta where intensive agriculture has been possible on the volcanic ash spread out by the torrents. Farmers push their settlements and their terraces of rice to within a few miles of the vent, so that the regular lahars, ladoes, avalanches and eruptions may cause heavy destruction of life and property. Nevertheless farmers press back again on the devastated hillsides whatever the risk, so great is the value of the volcanic soils. Close observation is kept on this volcano and siren warnings are given to the population at critical times.

FIG. 73.—The Irregular Nutritional Densities on the Flanks of G. Merapi. These probably relate to the prevailing wind direction (from northwest) at time of ejection

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The volcanic axis is inland, with the exception of Karang in Bantam and Moeria in Rembang which are volcanic outliers within a few miles of the coast. Lavas, however, reach the coast at points south of the Madoera Strait and at Wijnkoops Bay (South Bantam). In West Java the volcanoes are arranged in a loop enclosing the Bandoeng and Garoet Basins, which were lake-filled at one time owing to the obstruction of volcanic outpourings. In East Java too, the vents form a continuous group, but in Middle Java the volcanoes are in twos or threes, separated by sedimentary uplands. Most volcanoes are distributed along the medial trough which their ejecta have obliterated at many points. Only the

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volcanoes of South Bantam erupt acidic lavas, largely explaining the low fertility and thin agriculture on the flanks of Bantam volcanoes (Fig. 75).

The Bandoeng and Garoet Basins merit special attention because an intensive agriculture has developed within them.

(*a*) Formerly a lake, the Bandoeng Basin, now about 800 ft. above sea level, is drained westwards by the Tjitaroem which has a gorge marking its break through the ring of volcanoes surrounding Bandoeng. Small lakes still stand in the basin which has a high fertility.

(*b*) The Garoet Basin is a similar feature separated from the Bandoeng Basin by G. Goentoer lavas. The two basins may have been continuous at one stage. Floored by fertile volcanic alluvial soils, the Garoet Basin still has vestigial lakes. Its main stream, the Tjimanoek, leaves it by a deep gorge through the encircling volcanoes. Round the Garoet are numerous tea and cinchona plantations.

The Northern Alluvial Belt

Here the water-transported debris of the volcanic interior has been spread out, concealing the Sunda Platform and forming the floor of the shallow Java Sea which is steadily being reclaimed by natural sedimentation and by cultivators pressing seawards with their skilful reclamation methods. These alluvials form a fertile coastal belt west of Semarang and continue eastwards as the depression occupied by the middle Loesi-Solo rivers. Eastwards from Merapi, too, the isolated groups of volcanic cones are surrounded by alluvium. The portion of the alluvial belt to the north may be divided into two parts. The inner portion, closer to the uplands, is lined by low terraces roughly parallel to the coast, marking pausing levels in the progressive uplift associated with Java's recent tectonic history. The outer and later alluvials are flat and less than 50 feet above the sea. Between these two alluvials is a distinct terrace or break of slope though the transition is gentle in some places. Settlement, as at Bekasi for example, tends to concentrate at this break of slope, which is healthier and safer from flood than the lower alluvials. It attracts railways (the Jakarta-Cheribon Railway) and roads for the same reason. The lower alluvium is given over very largely to rice, with elaborate drainage, irrigation and water control channels threading the land-

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scape and acting also as lines of settlement and transport. Rapid delta formation is still taking place at a rate increasing temporarily whenever there is an outburst of volcanic activity in the interior to provide heavy loads of ash for the rivers (Fig. 19). 361 243 312

The inner belt of alluvial terraces is not continuous, varying from gulfs reaching inland almost to Buitenzorg to complete disappearance, as in the Tjitaroem Valley. The upper alluvials rise in places to altitudes of 300 ft., providing a diversified landscape due to the incision of watercourses below the terrace level. Rice occupies much less of this upper surface, which must be irrigated artificially to control the run-off. Many plantations have been set in this area which has a more scattered, evenly distributed population than the lower and younger alluvials nearer the coast. 133 361

The Loesi-Solo Depression, drained both eastwards and westwards by the two rivers after which it takes its name, has an almost imperceptible watershed and a confused meandering drainage system through a number of swamps and lakes (often used as fishponds (Fig. 77). Large areas of it are under paddy, but the several limestone islands jutting through it have a teak forest cover. A fair density of people runs right through the Depression, especially along the Solo, whose banks carry almost continuous villages. 133 311

Among the volcanoes east of Merapi, the transported alluvial filling between the vents has formed zones of major human interest because they have been nurseries of Javanese culture and tradition. Large principalities grew up there on the basis of intensive agriculture :

(*a*) *The Soerakarta Basin*, part of the Solo Valley, lies between the volcanoes Merapi and Lawoe and is scored by streams so that its intensive agriculture depends upon elaborate artificial terracing to produce rice and sugar. This is one of the highly productive areas, whose soil has been frequently renewed by Merapi ash (Fig. 73).

(*b*) *The Madioen Basin* between Lawoe and Wilis-gebergte is narrow and flatter, enabling it to be well covered with permanently irrigated paddyfields. Terraces have in addition been pressed up the sides of the Basin to heights of 3,000 ft. on Lawoe. This Basin ends sharply to the south against a wall-like range of sedimentaries. To the north is the Solo River

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133 311 which the Madioen River joins just before it enters its narrow course through the northern range of sedimentaries.

(*c*) Discontinuous with the Soerakarta and Madioen troughs, *the Kediri Basin* is twofold. An upper part, the narrow plain of Toeloengagoeng, lies at the foot of the Popoh-Sipelot limestone platform. The lower section, below a bottleneck at the town of Kediri, broadens northwards and eastwards into one of the most fertile rice and sugar districts of Java, with terraces carved along its sides far up the adjoining mountains. The eastern loop of the Basin, often known as the Brantas Plain, continues to the Madoera Strait, the lower, younger alluvials round the Strait being lined with fishponds.

133 (*d*) *The Malang Basin*, communicating by the middle Brantas Valley with the Kediri Basin, is unlike the other intra-volcanic basins in broadening to the south. It is probably an old lake basin (cf. Bandoeng) whose floor is more concave than flat, at about 1,200 ft. above sea level. There is no easy way through from this basin to the south coast and the direct road and rail route north to the Madoera Strait has been difficult owing to the steep slopes.

The Limestone Platform of Rembang and Madoera

The north coast limestones of Rembang and Madoera give East Java a coast unlike that farther west. These massive limestones repeat the karst character of their counterparts on the south coast:

(*a*) A very narrow fringe of alluvial plain lines the Rembang-Bodjonegoro coast and the cliff-like limestone hills press well to the north. Much of the Rembang limestone, of which considerable areas exceed 900 ft., is covered with teak forests and there are oilfields south of Rembang itself. The width of the limestone is greatest towards the middle, tapering to a mere two miles near Brondang, where it approaches closest to the coast. Several roads and light railways cross this limestone which is in general an area of negative human interest.

(*b*) In the extensions of this limestone into Madoera, the alluvial fringe is discontinuous. Only small embayments of alluvium separate the steep limestone cliffs. Flat-topped limestone at heights of 800 ft. is nearly continuous over Madoera. Undulating relief develops upon the marly sedimentaries which

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form a low central longitudinal belt through the middle of the island, yet rivers frequently run right across the island from north to south, little influenced by the marly depression. Most of Madoera has a barren aspect and its vegetation is distinctly deciduous owing to the East Monsoon drought. Farming concentrates in three alluvial pockets on the southern coast but most activity centres on coastal saltpans and fish-ponds. 133

River Systems

About two-thirds of Java drains north to the Java Sea as a consequence of the watershed lying well to the south. From Jogjakarta to G. Mohomeroe the watershed is actually only a few miles from the Indian Ocean. The relatively simple pattern of the rivers is complicated in detail by (*a*) radial drainage from the volcanoes, (*b*) old lake basins and the medial trough, which break the symmetry of streams flowing meridionally, (*c*) the E-W. fault and fold systems, which impose their lines on the rivers to make dislocated trellis patterns. The longest rivers are in the middle-east where Java is broadest. The Solo drains over 600 square miles. The Brantas is curious for turning at some place in its 340 mile course towards every point of the compass. Javanese streams vary tremendously in volume at different seasons, accounting in part for their heavy deposits at the coast. They have greatest volume from October to May when rains are heaviest, bringing floods from the torrential downpours and from the overflowing streams, despite elaborate engineering precautions. From May to September is a dry season, most pronounced in East Java, when rivers are low and desiccation prepares the soil for rapid erosion after rains begin again. Some Javanese streams have been proved to denude their basins in a day of torrential rain by as much as the Marne denudes its basin in two centuries. Part of the heavy load forms a network of levees across the northern plains. [132]

Climate

Well into the southern hemisphere, Java receives its wind-seasons from directions differing from those of the rest of South-east Asia. The northern tropical air arrives as northwest or westerly winds bringing equatorial downpours from October to May, which is a wet season throughout Java, rainshadow effects 132

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

FIG. 74.—Rainfall in Java

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being negligible because the high relief is conical rather than in ranges. Southern tropical air remains as southeast or easterly winds which bring to East Java a pronounced drought from these warm latitudes (Fig. 74). 132

JAVA: AVERAGE RAINFALL (inches)

	Rain days (over .02in.)	*Jan.*	*Feb.*	*Mar.*	*Apr.*	*May*	*June*	*July*	*Aug.*	*Sept.*	*Oct.*	*Nov.*	*Dec.*	*Total*
Jakarta (26 ft.)	138	11.9	13.4	8.0	5.6	4.1	3.7	2.6	1.6	2.8	4.5	5.7	7.6	71.5
Pasoeroean (16 ft.) ..	94	9.6	11.8	8.0	5.2	3.5	2.3	1.1	0.2	0.3	0.8	2.5	6.3	51.6
Tosari (5,692 ft.) ..	142	12.4	14.6	10.8	6.9	4.6	3.3	1.5	1.1	1.0	3.4	7.8	11.8	79.2
Bandoeng (2,395 ft.) ..	146	7.6	7.7	9.2	9.2	5.2	3.7	2.5	2.2	3.5	6.6	9.2	8.7	75.3

Among the western mountains, particularly on the southern side, this drought is less pronounced. Rains come in violent thunderstorms which reach a peak to the north in December and to the south in May. The dry season has long sunshine periods, a factor encouraging intensive farming. Yearly rains vary considerably; in Bantam, averages above 160 in. per annum are common, while the north Cheribon Plain receives less than 40 in. per annum and all the northeast plains from 40 in. to 80 in. per annum.

Forests

Although about a quarter of Java is still forested (Fig. 75), the high population density implies that forest gives way to agriculture where at all practicable. Commercially the Javanese forests are of interest for the teak-growing on the porous and infertile limestone soils of Rembang, Semarang, Madioen and Kediri. This timber is extracted chiefly for local use, so that Java's teak export has been barely 6 per cent of that from Burma. 137

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Chapter Fourteen

THE EAST INDIES

THE WESTERN ARCHIPELAGO: THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL LANDSCAPE OF JAVA AND MADOERA

177 241 JAVA and Madoera have for over three centuries been associated with agricultural conceptions brought by the Dutch who imposed cash farming upon the agricultural systems traditional to the country. For most of the colonial period, this western influence aimed to obtain from Java exportable agricultural products rather than minerals, and to procure them through local farmers rather than from European plantations, although these gradually appeared. Dutch techniques have largely been responsible for the great intensity and variety of Javanese cultivation, unequalled in any other unit of Southeast Asia and representing a tropical variant upon the intensive gardening methods evolved by the Dutch in Europe. The possibilities could not have been realised 134 had it not been for the soil conditions of Java which are largely 241 derived, both inland among the mountains and along the coast 361 on the river-transported alluvials, from volcanic ash of basic character which weathers to a soil of high fertility and is constantly renewed by further ejecta from the volcanoes. The importance of this renewal is evident on the flanks of Merapi, for example, which show the most intensive agriculture and densest populations where the winds prevailing at the time of ejection have deposited the ash, the windward sides being distinctly less cultivated and less populated (Fig. 73). Zones of sustained fertility are zones of constant soil renewal—hence the pressure of farming to areas as close as possible to the cones where ash deposition is most frequent, and also to those alluvial areas where streams are bringing silt from the new ash on the volcanic uplands.

241 These circumstances, the physical and the traditional, combine to make Java the most outstanding example of a mixed agriculture, aiming both at subsistence and at cash sales (Fig. 76) Indigenous agriculture has gradually adopted some of the crops

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for export which were first introduced and cultivated on highly capitalised plantations, creating rival systems of production.

By now, shifting cultivation has nearly disappeared from Java and farming has become sedentary, though the "*desa*" system, under which communal land is periodically redistributed and re-assigned to individual village cultivators, may be looked upon as a continuation of principles once evolved among shifting cultivators. Except in the wetter, cloudier west, much land is cropped biennially so that in Semarang and Malang the area cropped is recorded as 50 per cent more than the area farmed, so great is the double cropping.

Much of the variety of crops (Fig. 76) arises from the variety of environments; tea is apt for the wet uplands of the west and sugar for the sunnier irrigated lands of the east; the flat lowlands of the north suit paddy growing, which is practised in a continuous belt from one end of north Java to the other, broken only by the teak-covered limestone plateaux, as at Rembang. To supplement the inadequate rice production for so teeming a population, tapioca and maize



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FIG. 75.—Land Use in Java

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

FIG. 76.—Distribution of Plantation Crops in Java

are widely grown as second crops, even exceeding the area under rice, along the northeast coast and in the eastern intra-volcanic basins. Pulses are extensively but unevenly distributed. Of the cash crops, sugar has for many years been the mainstay, grown at times on almost all village paddy-lands from Cheribon eastwards, wherever permanent irrigation is possible. Sugar has become an integral part of village farming rather than of permanent European plantations (Fig. 76). Because religion, social custom, tradition and family life are all intimately tied into the ecology of indigenous farming, to make agricultural innovations is extremely difficult and extremely slow. To have established such an innovation as commercial sugar growing by smallholders and to have obtained exportable produce from them has been accepted as a mark of Dutch administrative success in Java. European plantations and indigenous farming systems go on simultaneously, but the latter were supplying an increasing share of the exports, reaching 40 per cent by 1938, and they are likely to form an even greater proportion in the future. Sugar for a time entirely displaced spices, the chief trading interest of the first Westerns in this region, as the key agricultural export. Here, as in other tropical areas, the huge and rapid production of the tropics quickly tends to saturate the market, so that sugar later

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slumped heavily and lost much of its importance inside Java, where 241
its acreage in 1940 was only 45 per cent that of 1930.

Though the island has had a significance in agricultural exports 439
out of proportion to its size, subsistence agriculture is still 241
dominant. In 1940, about 20 million acres were farmed for local foods and only 2.4 million acres for export crops, which, however, were valued at nearly three-quarters of all exports from the East Indies. Few commercial crops could be called exclusively European or exclusively Javanese, but rice, by far the largest single crop, is almost entirely produced by Javanese. Sugar, tea, cinchona and oil palm are mostly plantation grown, pepper comes generally from local farmers, while tapioca and coconuts are grown roughly equally by plantations and by smallholders. The Javanese have not taken up many rubber smallholdings and by 1937 practically all rubber from Java was plantation grown—a great contrast with conditions on the other islands and due to the preoccupation of farmers in Java with more immediately necessary food crops, whereas the other islands still had much virgin land awaiting development.

The staple food crops of Java are invariably irrigated and the 241
cultivated landscape is extensively bunded, serving to prevent 312
soil erosion and to conserve soil qualities. The torrential rains, loose topsoil and steep relief would otherwise cause quick erosion. The elaborate terracing of the loose ash on the sides of volcanic uplands is thus a soil conservation necessity as well as a device for water control and an expression of population density. Much ingenuity with limited means has been shown by Javanese farmers whose irrigation methods are of great antiquity but still very effective. Large modern irrigation systems have been built by the Dutch to cope with violent, erratic or entrenched streams beyond control by indigenous methods. Over 2¾ million acres were cultivated by these modern canal systems, the largest being on the Tjimanoek, Tjitaroem and Brantas rivers.

Patterns and Methods of Food Cultivation

Of about 20 million acres cultivated by local farmers in annual 241
crops, 40 per cent is in wet paddy, 25 per cent in maize and 13 per cent in tropical root crops (yams and tapioca), the latter an association with the root agricultures common on Central Pacific islands.

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243 So closely has wet paddy-growing become integrated with local farming that *sawah*, the Javanese word for it, is used to mean farming in general. A fluctuating total of about 4 million tons of rice is produced each normal year and eaten within the island. The amount of rice produced often reflects the general economic condition, so that greater profits in export crops cause less cultivation of rice. When sugar for export slumped over the period 1930-37, sugar land reverted to rice cultivation, whose total annual acreage over that period increased by 1.2 million to 9 million in Java alone. To this extent the agriculture of Java is more fluid, versatile and responsive than is the case with most countries of Southeast Asia, certainly more so than in other tropical sugar-growing regions. The average yield of rice (880 lbs. per acre) is higher than any other state in Southeast Asia, except Malaya, varying considerably within Java and being highest in the east.

While the greatest production of rice comes from wet lands, which are most abundant in the Cheribon and Pekalongan Residencies, one-sixth of the total paddy acreage is dry, a technique concentrated in the Jogjakarta, Bantam and South Buitenzorg areas. This older method yields less than two-thirds of the wet method and the increase of dry paddy over the last decade indicates considerable pressure on food crops and the full use already being made of irrigable land. Dry paddy farming exhausts soil far quicker than the wet method and it cannot be continued indefinitely on the same patch of land.

The methods of ploughing, planting and harvesting paddy in Java differ little from the hand methods of the rest of Southeast Asia. Most processing of the grain is also by hand, only a small proportion leaving any one locality to go to middlemen for mechanical milling by Chinese firms. For the heavy work of reaping, local labour is sufficient, the whole community participating if necessary and sometimes taking for the service a percentage of the harvest (varying from 10 per cent to 20 per cent). Essentially a cooperative communal activity in each village, Javanese rice farming still uses systems of common seedbeds and communal seedstores. Often the payment in kind for reaping services goes into a community pool.

221 243 Because of the double cropping and of the great variety of local conditions, the rhythm of activity is more spread than usual elsewhere. Rice seed begins to be sown in October for the West

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Monsoon rains. Transplanting may be deferred until January or February. The harvest takes place 3½ to 6 months after transplanting. January is the peak sowing month for Java as a whole but some sowing goes on in parts of Java every month. Similarly the harvesting peak occurs in May and June, although harvesting takes place in one district or another throughout the year. 221 243

Tapioca has been occupying about one-tenth of Java's cultivated area and, besides being an important local supplementary food, it is exported (supplying three-quarters of the world's pre-war needs) for industrial starch, gums and textile sizes. The woody refuse after the starch has been extracted is used as cattle fodder. 249

About a quarter of the cultivated area is under maize, which is eaten in large quantities by the Javanese, and exported to nearby islands, in at least one of which (Timor) it is a staple food. 243

In 1949 Java and Madoera produced 6.1 million tons of paddy in the ear from wet lands and .5 million tons from dry lands, a total of 4.2 million tons of clean rice. While in total this production (80 kgms. per person) is barely adequate for direct consumption by the Javanese, who ate 86 kgms. per person each year over 1936-40, there is an export of finer grades to Sumatra, Celebes and Borneo and an import of poorer qualities from Siam.

The post-war position has been confused by dual controls and disrupted transport, yet in 1947 the Dutch controlled *sawah* were only 9 per cent below prewar acreages and the price of rice was the lowest in Southeast Asia. By 1950 paddy was being sown on 9·5 million acres.

Cultivation for Export

Sugar occupied about 650,000 acres of Java-Madoera in 1931, dropped to 65,000 acres by 1935 and was back to nearly a quarter of a million by 1940. This great fluctuation in acreage and of labour demand resulted from external prices and the varying impact of international control. It missed causing a rural catastrophe in Java only because of the method of farming. Sugar is essentially a crop of the wet lowlands, of land suitable for rice. A three-year rotation system is normally used by which the planters, generally European, rent acreage for sugar from local farmers, who do the cultivating and harvesting for the planter at wages and between-times cultivate the rest of their land in the usual subsistence food crops. Thus in years of bad external sugar 249 439 [242 427]

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249 439 prices it is not a matter of sugar lands going out of cultivation, but of the land being put to the other uses by the local farmer. Radically different from conditions in the West Indies, this is a relic of last century's "Culture System" of forced cultivation for the government, a system which, whatever its social effects, successfully produced large quantities of sugar, then the mainstay of exports. Sugar is a long-term crop compared with most of those in Java: it is planted between April and October under the planter's supervision for harvesting after twelve months. [464] The heavy demand for labour at cutting time is readily met because the plantation is invariably in densely populated lowlands; altogether about 60,000 temporary wage earners were used for [496] sugar plantations in 1940. Across the sugar-growing lowlands, light railways have been built to bring the cane to the mills, whose number varies with the acreage cultivated. Before 1929, Java had 179 sugar factories, three-quarters of which had closed down by 1940.

While sugar was typically produced by Dutch planters in Java, the export was primarily to Britain and India, owing to the expansion of a protected beet-sugar industry in Holland. Javanese farmers also cultivated some sugar on their own account, obtaining lower grade sugars for local consumption and not using the mills owned by the large planters. Local cultivation of sugar was a steadily expanding business and Javanese consumption was rising. The smallholder may ultimately set the character of this industry, much as rubber smallholders tend to do elsewhere.

Over the inter-war years, Javanese sugar production has undergone changes no less than the acreage involved. It dropped from 2.9 million tons in 1930 to less than half a million tons in 1936, and rose to 1.4 million tons by 1939 when India alone was taking about half a million tons from Java. It was evident in the pre-war years that, from being a producer of food products for Europe, Java was becoming a producer for the countries of Asia, a tendency which may become more apparent in the post-war period. For 1949 the exports of sugar from Java were negligible compared with those of 1938, evidence of stagnation and destruction which may take so long to rectify that rival tropical producers may eliminate any need for Java's sugar (295,000 tons in 1949).

245 439 Coffee and tea have at different times been the incentive to planters for export from Java. Coffee became highly speculative and proved very susceptible to devastating disease, besides quickly

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

FIG. 77.—Land Utilisation at the Mouth of the Solo River

exhausting the soil, so that, although it was forcibly cultivated under the Culture System last century, it is now only a minor crop produced in conjunction with others. Tea, begun as a British plantation interest in Java, particularly in the cool, rainy Preanger Highlands, because the tea bush is limited to areas whose driest month has not less than 20 rainy days, has to a great extent displaced the older Dutch coffee trade. Some 85,000 lbs. of tea were being produced annually before the war, local smallholders supplying about 15 per cent which they sold green to the planters for processing. The 1950 tea crop in Java was estimated at 30,000 tons, but only 23 tea factories were operating as against 243 before the war. Individual tea factories may not be re-established and cooperative processing may become the normal. A change of direction in exports has appeared; instead of two-thirds of the Java tea going to U.K. and U.S.A., over half the 1949 output went to other Southeast Asia territories. A fairly substantial smallholder production of tobacco goes on in the *sawah* lands of the eastern valleys.

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Cinchona, whose bark is the basis of quinine, has had a varied

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success. Nearly stifled commercially by a monopolistic buying ring late last century, cinchona has since been an expanding, specialised industry based on trees which grow at elevations between 3,000 and 6,500 ft. on the Pengalengan Plateau near Bandoeng. Over 32,000 acres, largely estates, were still cultivating cinchona in 1948, estimated to produce about 500 tons of quinine.

Commercial cultivation of spices in Java is largely dead. The local demand for cloves, for example, is more cheaply met by importing from Zanzibar, a great change from the early Dutch period when spices were the basis of Javanese exports. Indigo cultivation, at one time an objective of Dutch agricultural policy, no longer goes on and synthetic indigo is imported for Javanese textiles. The coconut has, on the other hand, assumed major significance as a cash crop. Coconuts are grown very largely by Javanese smallholders whose total planted area in 1939 was about a quarter million acres.

Rubber continues to be much more exclusively a plantation industry in Java than in Sumatra; the plantations are invariably located round the 1,500 ft. level. Being heavily capitalised, in time of low prices Javanese rubber has difficulty in competing with the smallholder production in other parts of the Indies and with crops in other parts of Java. Plantations were occupying 1.4 million acres of Java and Madoera, of which area 41 per cent was in rubber, 19 per cent in tea and 17 per cent in coffee. Java's production of rubber declined from over 90,000 tons in 1937 to 72,500 tons in 1950, of which over 80 per cent was from estates.

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Because cattle are necessary as draught animals for fields and local transport, they are reared for this purpose and serve as peasant investments as well. Over 5½ million cattle (40 per cent buffaloes) were distributed rather unevenly over Java and Madoera. This represented a cattle density of over 100 per square mile in Java and over 300 per square mile in Madoera where some districts had a density equalling that of European cattle-breeding regions. Buffaloes are preferred in the damper, cloudier west where rough haulage has to be done, while oxen are more numerous in the rice areas of the east. Cattle breeding is a widespread minor occupation and in Bantam and Preanger large herds are kept. Madoera is a major centre of the cattle trade, exporting over 90,000 annually for meat as well as large numbers for draught in the nearby islands.

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Industrialisation

As a development of this century, a considerable amount of industrialisation has proved possible by extending the domestic industries already existing and by village industries of a type developed in Japan. While the production of these industries was small relative to the numbers of part-time workers employed, it added up to a considerable total, which went into local consumption, though only *batik* cloth, cigarettes and hats had a wide circulation. European-style factories employed farm labourers at off-seasons to process sugar, rice and tapioca or to weave imported cotton. Rubber manufacturing and chemical industries had been established as part of Dutch policy. In Madoera large-scale salt extraction developed to take advantage of the high evaporation rate and the large domestic market in Java. 47

Extractive industries of Western pattern were based on the manganese ores of Jogjakarta and Preanger, on sulphur from various craters (as at Kawah Poetih), on iodine springs at Soerabaya and on the china clay of Preanger. Monthly about 5,500 tons of petroleum were produced in 1948 in Rembang and Soerabaya and the oil refining went on at Tjepoe Wonokromo and Kapoean (Blora) for the Java market. Mineral production was, however, a very minor part of Java's activities. 316

The Culture System

The Culture System which strongly influenced the form of agriculture in Java was operated by the Dutch after the Dutch East India Company failed by other means to obtain a substantial export of agricultural products. Introduced in 1830 and withdrawn in 1870, this system, an unusual one for colonial territories, compelled Javanese farmers to give a part of their land and their labour for cultivating, under Dutch supervision, prescribed export crops (sugar, coffee, indigo) to be sold in Europe for the benefit of the Dutch Government. By thus treating Java for a period as a money-making concern, the Dutch Government soon obtained a huge revenue surplus, for the first time in Java's colonial history. More important in the long run, the system incidentally taught the Javanese new types of intensive cultivation and an understanding of the principles, new to Java, of large-scale agriculture for export. It proved a very heavy tax on the 177 241

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177 241 fertility of soils and on the families which had to provide labour, to the extent of impeding subsistence farming, so that the Culture System offended the spirit of the times and was soon resented in Europe no less than in Java. Although at maximum it only affected five per cent of Java's cultivated area, it led to new cash crops, and planters (for sugar especially) continued to cultivate on lines established by the Culture System long after it had been abolished. Coffee, sugar and indigo, the objectives of Dutch policy, soon faced depressions due to rival producers in Europe (beet sugar) and elsewhere in the tropics, so that an increasingly diversified and highly scientific type of planting had to be adopted.

421 621 177 241 471 One of the reasons for imposing the Culture System had been the Javanese tradition that the village or tribe has land rights as a community, a tradition admirably suiting the interests of self-contained communities but not of exporters. Hereditary personal possession of land is gradually displacing the periodical redistribution of communal land, an old tradition persisting over large areas. While in 1882 only 18 per cent of villages followed the personal property land system, 39 per cent did so in 1927 and the rest redistributed land at various intervals. One effect of the Culture System was to establish among Javanese the idea that personal land owning is a heavy burden. The regular subdivision of agricultural land by sharing among the huge rural population has produced very small farms and the average farm rapidly diminished in size as the population increased. In 1930 the average holding of wet and dry land together was 2.45 acres, decreasing to 2.2 acres in 1937. So closely is farming and subsistence integrated with social and religious life that only in very recent years, as a long term effect of the introduction of money crops, has there been much sign of Javanese farmland falling into the hands of absentee mortgagors.

Population Patterns

161 One of the most densely populated countries of the world, Java averages over 800 people per square mile and by 1947 totalled 53 million inhabitants (Fig. 78). Within the island many localities have even greater congestions. In the states of Soerakarta and Jogjakarta, over 3,000 people live on each square mile; these very dense regions are directly associated with wet paddy which occupies more than 40 per cent of their surface. Southern

[See p. 237, Cat. 116 --Analyst]

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Bantam and the southeast corner of Besoeki, which are dry or infertile areas, show on the population map a density averaging less than 350 persons per square mile.

The reasons for this concentration of people are complicated and manifold. No one reason is significant on its own. Propitious climate, constantly rejuvenated basic volcanic soils and extensive irrigable lowlands suiting rice, provide the physical basis. Long association with western methods and interests has led to a remarkable interlocking of subsistence and cash crops, combining oriental and western techniques which have here achieved some sort of balance. Java has had an exceptionally prolonged period of social security coupled with the increasing communal assurances of major irrigation and drainage systems. The Culture System, short-lived though it was, proved to be an incentive to population increase, because it placed on the community a pressure to obtain extra hands, so that towards the end of the Culture System period population was increasing at the fantastic rate of 33 per cent per decade.



FIG. 78.—The Distribution of People in Java

The population concentrates in three zones:

1. Throughout the northern alluvial plain, from the Jakarta

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5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia
Indonesia OB1
Java

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Plain through to the plains of Probolinggo and Pasoeroean, dense populations have grown up in association with the wet paddylands and sugar cultivation. In this belt are Adiwerno (near Tegal), a district with 6,200 persons to the square mile, the highest rural density anywhere in Java; and also the chief exits of the export trade, Jakarta (over 900,000 people), Cheribon, Semarang and Sourabaya. Jakarta, the original base for Dutch influence in the archipelago, now lies too far inland for modern shipping which is handled at its outport, Tandjong Priok. Together, these four ports handle about three-quarters of all shipping tonnage connected with Java, which has a heavy coastwise traffic as well as overseas movements.

2. Within the intra-volcanic basins of Central Java (the Solo, Madioen, and Brantas basins) lives about a third of the Javanese people, occupied almost entirely in agriculture, the urban centres of Jogjakarta and Soerakarta (each over 120,000 people) containing only a negligible proportion of the people. Despite the frequency of eruptions causing heavy losses of life and property, the volcanoes are ringed by crowded villages and farms pressing up the slopes to the newer ash deposits.
3. Subsidiary concentrations of people are in the Bandoeng-Garoet Basins, connected with plantation agriculture on western lines. On the south coast the only densely populated zone is between Kali Serajoe and Kali Progo, where a narrow belt of deltaic alluvials from the Central Java volcanoes permits a rural life resembling that of the northern alluvial plains and extending southwards the high densities common to the intra-volcanic basins. Tjilitjap, the only fairly deep-watered harbour on the South Coast and sheltered from the violence of Indian Ocean storms by the Noesa Kambangan, is an outlet for the southern portion of densely-populated Central Java. Its trade is overwhelmingly export, mainly sugar and tapioca.
4. Although the relief of Madoera consists predominantly of dry limestone, its few coastal plains are highly productive, and it sustains an average density of 1,300 per square mile, which is higher than the average for all Java. The medial trough is barren and thinly peopled, but elsewhere rice, maize and tobacco-growing, cattle-rearing and salt production are important activities. From Madoera there is steady migration into Java to relieve the pressure of population.

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia
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Java

These zones of concentrated population and agricultural activity are linked by a close net of roads and railways threading the northern plain from end to end, with offshoots southwards into the fertile intra-volcanic basins and to the Tjilitjap and Jogjakarta zones. Only a few patches of Java on the South Coast and on the more broken mountains are over ten miles from a road or railway, which combines with the ample coastwise shipping to give Java an excellent transport system.

In Java settlement forms resemble those elsewhere in Southeast Asia. River and canal bank settlements in lines occur upon all the rice-growing plains. Along both north and south coasts are linear sand-dune and sandspit settlements, with further linear settlement on the old marine terraces. Girdles of villages surround the cones of basic volcanoes. Defensive stockades to settlements are practically non-existent owing to the centuries of policing; cattle pens are unusual on the village landscape except in the breeding areas of Madoera. Javanese houses are bamboo and thatch structures without stilts, differing in this respect from the typical Malay-Burmese house forms.

Javanese Peoples

The people of Java are more homogeneous than those of neighbouring territories. Only three main languages are used, permitting the diffusion of literary, musical and plastic arts which over centuries have reached and maintained very high standards and continue to play an intimate part in Indonesian social and cultural life. Justifiable pride in this culture, modified to some extent by Islamic influence, is the basis of Javanese nationalism, to which the communal system adds the preference for the communal solution of difficulties, and which expresses at the same time the urgencies arising from a teeming population in a territory now reaching the limits of its capacity to support people.

There are distinctions between the Javanese, the most numerous group, whose homeland is the eastern two-thirds of the island, the Sundanese of the west, and the Madoerese, who spread into Java from their own congested island. Among Javanese, the Hindu and Buddhist influence of the first millennium Indian colonisation period, whose stone monuments are at Borobodur, Blitar and Kedoes, expresses itself in many ways, not least as the aristocratic tradition and as the self-contained community of the *desa* or

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia
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Java

village. Upon these smouldering traditions is imposed the different communalism of Islam. Sundanese people speak another language and show their cheerier outlook by using brighter coloured clothes. Their villages are characteristically broken into small hamlets and their cultural development is not considered to have reached Javanese standards. The Madoerese are dour, dogged and more individualist than the Javanese, befitting their function as the chief cattlemen of Southeast Asia and their origins on an island where it is a struggle to survive.

Though the population is extremely dense, it has led to only a trickle of migration from Java to the other islands, despite the increasing difficulties of living in Java. Pressure of population has been met so far by increasing the intensity of agricultural production, by pushing cultivation to the maximum within Java, and by industrialisation.

Immigrants

While Java has itself a great indigenous population, more than 500,000 Chinese have settled there, their presence dating from the very early days of Dutch colonial activity, when local labour could not be detached from its own ecology and Chinese were brought in for sugar plantation work. Since then Chinese have become the key community of urban middlemen and shopkeepers and they play a large part in inter-island commodity trade. One-third of Java's Chinese live in Jakarta, Semarang and Soerabaya, indicating their association with external trade. Most of the Chinese retain associations with China, to which they expect eventually to return. In addition, about 50,000 Arabs, mainly Hadramautis, live in Java, engaged also as middlemen, but tending to merge with the Javanese by marriage. They are highly respected for religious reasons as evidence the religious traffic and pilgrimages between Java and Arabia.

Unique in Southeast Asia colonial developments was the settlement on Java of nearly 200,000 Dutch people. Until 1870, only Dutch officials lived there, but from then onwards permanent migration of Dutch people steadily increased until 1940. The Dutch chiefly settled in Jakarta, Buitenzorg and Bandoeng, working as officials, traders, professional men and primary producers. This group was the one chiefly affected by post-war events, which almost eliminated it.

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia
Indonesia OB1
Java

Java escaped most of the effects of large-scale immigration of temporary foreign labourers and its cultural landscape has retained the character of a mature indigenous life well adjusted to and traditionally corporate with its environment. Having multiplied ten times since 1815, the people of Java were obliged to pioneer in quite a different manner from those of Malaya and Burma—by developing an extended, intensified and diversified farming combining both subsistence and cash farming practices.

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Borneo

Chapter Fifteen

THE EAST INDIES

THE WESTERN ARCHIPELAGO: BORNEO

131 LARGEST of the Sunda Platform land units, Borneo takes its name
132 from Brunei, the now diminutive west coast sultanate which once
133 controlled most of the island. It bestrides the Equator and is predominantly covered with Tropical Rain Forest, merging at altitudes to great stretches of Mountain Moss Forest and in the coastal lowlands to Freshwater Swamp Forest and Mangrove (Fig. 79). Flanked to west and south by shallow seas scarcely 200 ft. deep, Borneo has only a narrow continental platform to north and east where the sea floor slopes steeply to great depths of the order 12,000 ft.

BORNEO: AVER/ GE RAINFALLS (in inches)

	Rain days (over .02in.)	*Jan.*	*Feb.*	*Mar.*	*Apr.*	*May*	*June*	*July*	*Aug.*	*Sept.*	*Oct.*	*Nov.*	*Dec.*	*Total*
Sandakan (105 ft.)	—	18.2	10.4	7.9	4.1	5.8	7.4	6.4	7.9	9.5	9.8	14.8	17.4	119.6
Pontianak (10 ft.)	182	10.6	8.5	9.6	11.1	10.7	8.9	6.5	8.6	8.6	14.7	16.1	13.1	127.0
Balikpapan (16 ft.)	137	7.7	7.5	9.0	7.6	8.7	8.3	7.8	6.9	4.8	5.7	6.4	7.5	87.9

631 Divided for most of a century into a smaller north-western portion under British influence (North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak) and a larger Indonesian portion to south and east, the island has shared little in the innovations and advancements of adjoining territories. This backwardness is no recent thing, though there is evidence of very old Chinese interest in NW. Borneo (for pearls and bird's nests) and of some first millennium Hindu penetration along South Borneo rivers. Borneo exemplifies today conditions which four or five centuries ago were probably widespread in the
134 archipelago and nearby territories. That they persist in Borneo is
135 due (*a*) to being off the track of Southeast Asia routes; (*b*) to low fertility of its surface and the low sunshine of its climate; (*c*) to the
131 non-discovery of any valuable mineral to attract a "rush" deep

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Borneo

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

FIG. 79.—Land Use in Borneo

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into Borneo; (*d*) to the compactness of the island; (*e*) to the difficulty of approach by Borneo rivers which invariably have shifting bars across their mouths so that even shallow boats can only cross at highwater or, on the east, dangerous barriers of coral reef, and (*f*) to the absence of any strong agricultural tradition among the people.

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Over the interior of Borneo moves a scattering of aboriginal peoples, many of whom have not advanced beyond the collecting-hunting stage, and where they practise agriculture it is by the shifting system. Activity and settlement are peripheral (Fig. 80) and the interests centrifugal; even on the coasts the cultural

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Borneo

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

FIG. 80.—The Distribution of People in Borneo

landscape is that of crude tropical pioneering settlements poor-looking and squalid, mostly peopled by immigrant Chinese and Malays from nearby territories. To the people of the interior applies the collective name "Dyaks" although they are subdivided into many groups at widely different cultural levels (Fig. 81). On the coast, settlements are often like lake dwellings built out over shallow tidal waters. There is practically no transport except on the rivers or by jungle paths. Of 2¾ million people now in Borneo, only about a quarter are in the British sector.

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The landform, hilly rather than mountainous, and generally below 6,000 ft., is one of advanced maturity, varying from the

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5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia
Indonesia OB1
Borneo

rounded slopes of igneous rocks to the flat-topped interfluves of sandstone country, as in the Madi Plateau, and the striking fretted landscape of limestones, as in the Boelit Valleys, which are covered with vegetation because their porosity is offset by the even and heavy rains. The mountain systems reflect structural lines deriving from old E-W. fold-fault systems with some NNE-SSW. trend lines evident in the long watershed boundary of Inner Sarawak. Round the river mouths spread great swamps upon which the distributaries are constantly dividing and reforming. 133

British Borneo

Under this term can be included Sarawak, Brunei and British North Borneo, an area of about 80,000 sq. miles, of which 60 per cent is in *Sarawak*, draining mostly by streams to the west and north. The Rejang is the longest river but its great deltaic swamps form an impediment to penetration along it, though Sibu, 60 miles from its mouth, ranks as a port for the 125,000 local people of the Rejang Valley. About three-quarters of a million people inhabit British Borneo altogether : of these half a million are in Sarawak, mostly close to the southern and northern coastal sections, dominated by Chinese immigrants who act as middlemen and exporters for local produce and as artisans on the oil fields. Kuching, the capital, is a minor port in Datoek Bay, well away from deltaic obstructions which indicate the rapid sedimentation going on at the coast. Miri, close to Brunei, developed over recent years as oil producer, with refineries at Lutong, which turned out 3½ million tons in 1949; these wells were destroyed in 1941 but are now coming back into production. At Lutong ends a pipeline from Seria in Brunei, where over 3·5 million tons of crude oil were being obtained to swell Lutong's refining output (1950). [36] 133 162 315

British North Borneo contains about 380,000 people, mostly Muslim seafarers scattered round the coasts. Its chief towns, Jesselton and Sandakan, include many Chinese immigrants. 162

Brunei, while only a small unit, has continued to be predominantly Malay.

This large territory of British Borneo was never agriculturally self-sufficient. Brunei produces only a third of its rice needs and North Borneo about half. Chief interest has centred on rubber and coconuts to take advantage of the cheap land, although labour has been a major difficulty. British Borneo last century attempted 433 439 249 311

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Borneo

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

FIG. 81.—Ethnic Distributions in Borneo

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commercial tobacco growing and failed; rubber is now its mainstay, accounting for 70 per cent of the exports and totalling 60,000 tons in 1949. While large company plantations had been started, smallholdings represented an expanding interest, worked in conjunction with rice cultivation. For these pioneer areas, statistics are not detailed. Some 160,000 acres altogether were in rubber, mostly in North Borneo, which was also the leading copra producer. Rice occupies a total of 797,000 acres (1950) in small poorly-kept patches, but official postwar development schemes plan to create new rice-growing areas in these territories on the basis of imported Chinese labourers, with the object of relieving

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia
Indonesia OB1
Borneo

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rice shortages in Malaya and British Borneo. Sarawak was always a key sago producer, containing about 80 per cent of British Borneo's 96,000 acres under sago.

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Much pioneer settlement in British Borneo was destroyed by military action during the war. The flimsy structures burned quickly and the already precarious economy collapsed. Only the oil wells show signs of speedy rehabilitation, reaching an output of 3.5 million tons in 1950, which was 3½ times the prewar output.

Indonesian Borneo

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The greater area and coast of Indonesian Borneo are responsible for its higher population (over two millions) which does not indicate any development more intensive than that in British Borneo. The population has a slightly different composition on the coast, where there are Bugis from Celebes in the southeast, Javanese in the south, and Chinese in their very old settlements at Sambas (where their colony is about 1,000 years old) and Pontianak in the west. Local people who are Muslim are all described as Malays, a term which covers many different types; the others, generally called Dyaks, are tribes of Kajan, Kenja and Bahau in Central Borneo, Ulu, Ngaju in the south and east, together with many nomadic tribes such as the Punan. Among Dyaks strong family ties have replaced the more usual village systems and often the whole of a large family lives in a single "long house," located on ridges and containing what is almost a village of related people.

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Only the valleys of the west and southeast are well peopled, and all five towns, Bandjermasin, Pontianak, Balikpapan, Tarakan and Tandjoengseilor are coastal, containing about 10,000 people each. Round Sambas and Pontianak much land is under coconut, rubber and pepper; the middle Kapoeas Valley is fairly well cultivated with similar crops round Sintang whence the products go by river to Pontianak. In the southern lowlands between Soengei Barito and the Meratoes-gebergte is a well-populated farming area less rainy than elsewhere and less severely leached, so that rice, pepper, rubber and coconuts are grown for export by way of the local town Kandangan which several good roads link to Bandjermasin (16,000 people), the chief town of Indonesian Borneo.

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The East Coast is everywhere thinly peopled. Coal was mined prewar at Poelau Laoet, but the greatest postwar exploitation has

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia
Indonesia OB1
Borneo

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been at Loa Koeloe and Parapattan which yielded 135,000 tons in 1948. Balikpapan was focus of the lower Mahakan Basin where Samarinda, one of the largest oilfields in the archipelago, and an outlying oil zone at Tarakan, were producing 12½ million barrels of oil in 1940 for refining mostly at Balikpapan: production for 1950 was running at about 70,000 tons monthly. Food cultivation is negligible except where Javanese have settled. Pepper for export is grown on Poelau Laoet. Smallholdings of rubber were becoming popular and produced at the rate of 10,000 tons per month by 1950.

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia
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Chapter Sixteen

THE EAST INDIES

THE EASTERN ARCHIPELAGO

EAST of Borneo and Java, the population of the islands thins out and development is both recent and not far advanced, so that geographical references diminish almost to those of a gazetteer. These islands are mostly volcanic, set in very deep seas. Coral reefs invariably surround them, often as double palisades preventing access from the sea. The maze of small islands, often ill-surveyed and scarcely above water, presents a worrying obstacle to navigation. Today the strait between Bali and Lombok is the most frequented international shipping highway through the region yet the Portuguese in their decline as Far Eastern traders for a time used the Macassar Strait as route to and from China, and Macassar as a watering place on their way to the Moluccas. Halmahera, which so curiously resembles Celebes in form, and its offshore islands, the Moluccas, were the magnet for spice traders through the Roman and medieval periods, because they produced unrivalled cloves. That interest has disappeared and there is no commercial activity drawn towards these smaller eastern islands, apart from minor copra production which has varied much in prosperity, tending now to be formally and reliably cultivated on plantations farther west rather than in small patches among these islands, where the collection costs are high and the copra standards uncertain. Celebes, Bali and Lombok today merit interest since upon them live 7 million of the approximate 8 million people settled in this eastern island region, which has become the separate political unit called East Indonesia since 1946; thus the new political pattern emphasises the "mediterranean" section of the Indies.

The southern part of the Macassar Strait was a most difficult sea passage for sailing ships and is still considered dangerous to shipping in stormy seasons. Innumerable coral-girt islands and reefs lie across it, forming in one place the Great Sunda Barrier

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Indonesia OB1
Celebes

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

FIG. 82.—Celebes

Reef, only slightly smaller and more dangerously located than the comparable Great Barrier Reef at Queensland; it thrusts nearly 250 miles out from the Borneo coast, leaving a narrow gap of deep water between it and Celebes. The Reef extends southward irregularly, to the Lima and Kangean Islands, making a shallow coral-edged bank over 50,000 square miles in area (Fig. 7). Other coral masses are scattered between this bank and South Celebes, of which the Spermonde Archipelago off Macassar is the largest.

CELEBES

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Though larger than Java, the tentacled island of Celebes (Fig. 82) is remarkably attenuated and digitated, its 3,000 miles of coast enclosing 73,000 square miles, so that no part of Celebes is

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia
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Celebes

more than 70 miles from the sea. This does not make for greater accessibility because rocks and corals line the coast almost without break, probably explaining why the island escaped the flood of early Indian colonisation, was largely bypassed by early European traders and became Islamised at a later date than most parts of the East Indies. 131 133

An extension of that arcuate series of folds and faults already observed in Sumatra and Java, Celebes has been subject to tectonic stresses from many directions; its shape relates to the Java-Sumatra mountain system on latitudinal lines and the Philippines system on meridional lines. Its precipitous shores and the uplifted blocks and rift valleys which form its surface evidence the strong influence of faulting processes which at a later stage involved vulcanism, still apparent in the extreme northeast tip behind Minahasa and in the extinct Lompobatang of the south. All except its northern limb lies below the Equator but the whole island has the typical humid, warm unvarying climate which permits Tropical Rain Forest over its whole surface. 132

THE EASTERN ARCHIPELAGO: AVERAGE RAINFALL (inches)

	Rain days (over .02 in.)	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
Manado (30 ft.)	164	17.7	15.1	11.6	7.9	6.3	6.5	4.6	3.7	3.4	4.6	8.7	14.4	104.5
Macassar (13 ft.)	134	26.6	23.2	16.4	6.0	3.4	2.9	1.4	0.4	0.6	1.7	7.2	23.5	113.3
Koepang (148 ft.)	80	15.2	15.8	8.5	2.6	1.1	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.7	3.6	9.5	57.8

The rivers deriving from this setting are large in volume, but at a very youthful erosional stage; their short courses are frequently broken, in places with great waterfalls, elsewhere by deep incisions and gorges. Very little of its surface is below 1,500 ft. and Celebes ranks as a most mountainous terrain, the only significant lowlands being the Sidenreng-Tempe lake belt which almost isolates the southwest limb, and the valley of Sampara at the southeast tip. Lakes are numerous, particularly towards the middle of the island, and in some cases are graben lakes of great depth; Lake Poso, one of a group of lakes on NNW-SSE. lines, has a depth of nearly 5,000 ft. Other lakes have filled up to form inland marshy flats. 133

While gold, nickel, iron and petroleum have been traced in Celebes, they have not been worked to any extent. [135]

On Celebes there are nearly 5 million people, of whom over a 162

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia
Indonesia OB1
Celebes

[162] million are in Minahasa. Large tracts of the country are still un-
361 populated except by a few wild tribes. The Minahasa district has a density of 75 persons per square mile whereas Macassar on the southwestern limb has as many as 325 per square mile. Dense settlement is confined to the coast, and the interior has only
101 a wandering population in the isolated valleys and basins. Most
162 numerous of the indigenous people are the Bugis and Macassaris, 2 million of whom live in the southwest. They were historically one of the most active Muslim seafaring peoples of the Indies, acquiring a notoriety as pirates and slavers; they now rank as an inter-island trading people whose little sailing ships may be found anywhere between Singapore and Port Moresby. The Portuguese recruited Bugis to work in Malaya, a very early sign of colonial labour shortages there, and a colony of them settled inland from Malacca. Tribes of the interior are collectively known as Toradjas whose animism has distinct Polynesian associations; they practise the shifting cultivation of yams. In the northern Celebes limb are Muslim Gorontales and Christian Minahasis which latter are thought to resemble Filipinos and to be the most progressive and advanced people in Celebes—probably because they are well educated on western lines and European mannered.

161 The concentration of people in the northeastern tip, Minahasa,
361 results largely from the more intensive agriculture made possible
241 by young volcanic soils. Only a valley agriculture is practised there and none of the volcanoes of this corner are terraced to the maximum as in Java. The narrow fertile lowlands are vigorously farmed, centring on subsistence rice with coconuts and maize for export from Manado (population 27,000). In the southwestern peninsula too, large populations are supported on volcanic ash soils from Lompobatang, which are cultivated for rice, maize, coffee and coconuts. On the west coast of this limb, Macassar (population 85,000) acts as outlet to the belt of dense population which extends along the coast to the low-lying area round the Sidenreng-Tempe lakes, through which zone, and radiating from Macassar, has been built the only noteworthy road system of Celebes. Westernised farming styles and plantations are negligible in Celebes and the exports derive from smallholders. Rubber has not been taken up to any appreciable extent.

631 That Macassar is so central to seaways among the easternmost islands causes it to be named capital to East Indonesia in the

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia
Indonesia OB1
Bali
Lombok

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projected new federal structure of the Indies, to revive a pattern evident in the later Portuguese period among the lands.

Bali and Lombok

The islands stringing from Bali to Timor are known as the Lesser Sunda Islands, of which only Bali and Lombok are densely populated and well studied. They are thus interesting geographically while by no means representative of conditions in the islands east of them. Separated by the Lombok Strait, the safest and deepest channel through the western Lesser Sundas, the physiography and patterns of Bali and Lombok have close similarities. They are to be considered as extensions of the relief forms already met in Java. Thus the southern parts of both Bali and Lombok are low limestone plateaux, as in South Java; the outcrop in Bali is small, forming the bare, unpeopled Tafelhoek, which is linked to the island by a tombola or sandspit, but Lombok has a large out-crop forming a waterless karst upland (about 1,000 ft. high) thicketed with bamboos, barren and unpeopled, with a similar limestone outlier in the sterile zone between Djembrana and Tabanan (Fig. 83).



Fig. 83.—Landforms in Bali and Lombok

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Bali
Lombok

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

FIG. 84.—Drainage Patterns in Bali and Lombok

While the substructure of Bali and Lombok to the north is undoubtedly an extension of the fold-faulted sedimentary ranges of the Java axis, it is completely obliterated by volcanoes whose ejecta dominate both landscapes.

361, 241 311

In Bali there is a line of active volcanoes well to the north (Piek van Tabanan, Tjatoer, Batoer and Agoeng) scored on their northern sides by short streams too torrential for irrigation and dry for half the year. Large streams fan southward (Fig. 84) to build up a most fertile inclined alluvial plain, constantly rejuvenated by water-borne volcanic ash upon which dense settlement and paddyfields on ingeniously irrigated pre-Dutch terraces extend inland and upward to about 2,000 ft., slightly thinning thereafter, although settlement and cultivation extend up to the western rim of the Batoer caldera at about 5,000 ft. Rivers on this side are incised in the loose, high-level ash; they vary greatly in volume because the watertable in the scoria quickly lowers during dry seasons. These streams are in torrential spate during the rains and almost dry up during the east monsoon (May to November). Upon this sunny tilted plain the fertility of the transported ash soils exceeds even that of Java and the population density is accordingly very high (Figs. 5).

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Indonesia OB1
Bali
Lombok

is accordingly very high (Fig. 85).

The volcanic zone of Lombok is more like an elliptical cone and there are few caldera—Rindjani (12,200 ft.) and Nangi. Here the steep dry northern slopes are notably unpeopled and the gentler southern slopes lead down to an inclined rectangle of intensely cultivated and irrigated land. Towards the east, the climate becomes distinctly drier, taking on an almost Australian aspect, with prickly pears and cockatoos indicating the migration of Australian flora and fauna.

FIG. 85.—Rice Growing in Bali and Lombok

The people of Bali are still Hindus. They have descended from high caste Hindu Javanese pressed eastward during the Islamisation of Java, yet retaining an aristocratic society and strongly communal life which finds expression in an elaborate artistic culture reaching higher forms here than anywhere else among the island peoples. Their temple architecture is unusually striking and complex. In Lombok the Balinese are outnumbered by "lax Muslim" Sasak people. Population in each island concentrates upon the fertile southern volcanic slopes. In the Gianjar district of Bali there are 2,300 people per square mile and the whole island averages 1,000 per square mile, to total 1.5 million. Lombok has little

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161 less than a million people and a lower average density—750 per square mile. Each island contains about 250,000 acres of
311 wet paddy (Fig. 85) and Bali has a further 120,000 acres under
243 maize, together with a wide range of other food crops cultivated on a subsistence basis. The Balinese have an old tradition of craftsmanship in wood, stone, gold, silver and weaving, which
439 has an export value. Their principal money industry is the rearing and export of pigs for the Chinese consumers of Southeast Asia. Neither of the islands has good harbourage and international shipping normally passes between them without stopping.

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Chapter Seventeen

THE NATURAL LANDSCAPE OF SIAM

133 In many respects, Siam resembles Burma. Both countries have a south-facing trough form, similar climates of alternating wet and dry seasons, similar interest in a single major river system, considerable cultural likenesses between their people, and similar economic structures based on the export of rice and teak. Their differences derive from Siam's more southerly latitude, and from aspect, which influences the Siamese climate adversely from the rice-growing point of view, and leads Siamese external relations towards China (particularly in the past) and towards the trade streams of Southeast Asia. Siam is, however, the least documented territory of Southeast Asia and even its place names have not yet been uniformly phoneticised.

Siam is laid out very simply (Fig. 86). To the west are strung out old mountain systems which extend into Burma in the one direction and into Malaya in the other. To the north, an eroded plateau forms a broken upland terrain, resembling the Shan Highlands, of which it is an extension. To the east of Siam is a low platform, the Korat Plateau, with two scarps facing west and south as ramparts separating it from Central Siam and combining as a high bastion to the southwest where Kao Lem (Khao Khiaw) reaches 4,100 ft. Between these three units is Central Siam, a trough comparable to the Irrawaddy Basin, forming the heart of the country though less dominated by a single stream. Into Southeast Siam juts a small extension of the Cardamom Mountains between which and the Korat Plateau is a broad low corridor drained by the Prachin River and leading from the plains of Tonle Sap to the Gulf of Siam.

Siam's eastern boundary, mostly one of natural repulsion, runs for miles along the Middle Mekong, then follows the south Korat scarp to become a watershed boundary in the Cardamom Mountains. With Burma, Siam shares a complex watershed boundary zigzagging down the skew coulisses of Tenasserim and Tavoy in such a way that near Sam Roi Yot the boundary approaches so

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

1 RANGES & VALLEYS OF WEST SIAM
2 PENINSULAR SIAM
3 NORTHERN MOUNTAINS
A ME PING & ME WANG HIGHLANDS
B ME YOM - ME NAN UPLAND
4 MIDDLE SIAM
A CHAO PRAYA
B PASAK LOWLANDS
5 LOWER SIAM - CHAO PRAYA DELTA
6 KORAT PLATEAU
A THE PLATEAU
B KORAT MARGINAL HIGHLANDS
7 THE CARDAMOM MOUNTAINS

80.—A Regional Division of Siam

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near to the Gulf of Siam that Peninsular Siam, the Kra Isthmus, is almost separated from Continental Siam. To the north in the Shan country, the boundary is also a watershed boundary, though it runs for some miles along the Salween gorge and even returns to the Mekong at its incised mountainous section near Chieng Sen. 133

Landscape Types

1. *The Western Mountains* (Fig. 86) follow patterns already fully described in the comparable parts of Malaya and Burma. In detail these alternations of low corridors separated by lines of high granite mountains flanked occasionally by patches of limestone producing a landscape resembling the karst, show varieties of disposition though not of landscape type—and these dispositions moulded historic overland routes. North of Sam Roi Yot, the mountain lines run NNW. to SSE. and the parallel wet valleys drain two ways, to Burma and to Siam, converging upon Moulmein and Radburi respectively, and used as mediaeval trade routes particularly along the Meklong Valley. South of Sam Roi Yot, the granite ridges first assume a line NNE-SSW., becoming meridional farther south when crossing into Malaya. Here the Kra Isthmus is at its narrowest (about 35 miles in lat. 10° N.) and the short torrents have laid down tin-bearing alluvials on the flanks of nearly every granite outcrop. This was also the location of overland routes between east and west, of which the Takuapa-Bandon route was typical. It was largely a route for small river boats, only a short section needing portage which, in so forested a setting where draught animals are scarce, was always critical and difficult for traders. None of these trans-isthmus routes have modern significance; on the Radburi-Sisawat-Moulmein route the Japanese began a wartime railway which is now out of use and offers little prospect of commercial operation. 133 487
2. *The Northern Mountains*, an intensely folded old-mountain system of shales, schists and limestones, are in an advanced erosional stage and their intrusive granite cores are exposed on distinctive N-S. lines. Many streams flow south from this extension of the Shan Highlands and through the Central Siam depression. Between Lampang and Pre is one of the few volcanic outcrops in Siam, which today has no active volcanoes. The 133

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region contains the highest relief of Siam and in its valleys are fertile pockets of alluvials which have attracted peoples from the harsher north. Its southern limit is a latitudinal line about 17½° N.

3. *The Korat Plateau* has characteristics unique in Siam and all Southeast Asia. It is a practically horizontal bed of red sandstone lying unconformably and almost undisturbed upon that general mass of eroded faulted rocks apparent at the surface in most adjoining regions (Fig. 87). This sandstone plateau,

FIG. 87.—Section of Korat Plateau Sandstones. 1. Lowland forest. 2. Bamboo with isolated trees. 3. Tropical rain forest. 4. Dwarf trees capping bare scarp. 5. Savannah with scattered pines

while averaging about 500 ft. above sea level, tilts slightly from scarps of above 1,500 ft. at the east and south, towards the Mekong, shedding eastwards its streams, the Nam Chi and Nam Mun, and giving the whole region an outlook towards the Mekong and away from Central Siam. The landscape is square-cut with broad, flat, incised valleys and flat-topped interfluves like mesas in which the watertable stands well below the surface for most of the year. The sandstone plateau terminates in linear scarps (possibly of fault origin) to the west and south as the Dong Paya and Dong Rek, in the neighbourhood of which small outcrops of ancient volcanic tufa have been found. Equally sharp is the termination of sandstone north and east overlooking the Mekong Valley. Along the Nam Mun and Nam Chi wide marshy flats extend latitudinally almost right across the Plateau, as the only well-watered areas in an otherwise dry area, and they are subject to inundation by Mekong spates as is the case with Tonle Sap. Below the Nam Mun junction, the Mekong enters a gorge-like bottleneck where sandstone barriers in places extend almost from side to side. During heavy rains this rocky impediment causes the Nam Mun to be inundated far upstream by a rush of water from the Mekong, aggravated by rain-floods on Korat itself. A similar condition occurs in most of the lesser streams flowing

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from the sandstone into the Mekong, though most Korat drainage goes to the Nam Mun before reaching the Mekong. The Nam Mun valley is thus a flat belt of seasonal marsh (Fig. 90) which remains the longer because the main stream has built levees which prevent quick drainage of flood-water back to the river. Upon the Plateau capillarity causes salt frequently to flower at the surface during the summer, when it is collected for domestic use and traded by caravan routes into Yunnan as well as into Central Siam. An outlier of Korat is found at the Mieng Hills northwest of Petchabun. In the southwest corner of the Plateau appears a line of granite hills in continuation of the Cardamom Mountains.

4. That portion of *the Cardamom Mountains* in Southwest Siam repeats features found in Cambodia (see Chapter 19) with a difference of aspect : the Siamese section has a number of fertile alluvial valleys opening south to the Gulf of Siam. These valleys are moderately peopled and cultivated. The low hills of these peneplained folded rocks extend to the straight eastern side of the Bight of Bangkok where a fault structure extends the line of the Dong Paya scarp.
5. *Central Siam* may be described as a depression floored by highly eroded complex-structured sedimentaries mostly reduced to levels below 300 ft. and is generally masked by river alluvials. It extends to lat. 17½° N. north of which mountains appear, to the scarp of the Korat Plateau where it terminates as a meridional line, and to the west where it ends in a fairly straight line against the Tanon Tong Chai and Tenasserim Ranges. It remains to be verified geologically whether this is a fault depression or an erosional basin.

While Central Siam is often called the Menam Valley, there is in fact no River Menam; Menam means river in Siamese. Four main streams enter the depression on practically N-S. lines from the Northern Mountains of Siam. Three of them, the Metun, Ping and Wang combine near Ban Sop Woung and are joined near Nakawn Sawan by the Nan and the Yom to form one single stream for about 25 miles, but from Chainat southward these combined waters braid into distributaries of which the chief are the Tachin on the west and the Chao Praya to the east. It is this main distributary, the Menam Chao Praya, which is meant conventionally by describing the "Menam" as the chief river of Siam.

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133 The easternmost distributary receives near Ayuthia the waters of the Pasak, a river which distinctly parallels the Dong Paya scarp.

The Prachin, draining the depression between the Korat Plateau and the Cardamom Mountains, makes a sharp bend southward so that it does not join the main drainage system of Central Siam but separately enters the Bight of Bangkok. The Meklong flows from the Western Mountains southeastward to make a similar separate entry to the Bight, though artificially connected to the Menam Chao Praya by parallel canals (for irrigation and transport) across the deltaic plain along one of the old trans-isthmus routes between east and west. These rivers periodically have great volume and heavy silt load; they have built up large alluvial fans and deltas and are steadily filling the Bight of Bangkok.

As with the Irrawaddy Valley, we may distinguish two distinct parts of Central Siam:

(*a*) *Lower Siam*, the flat deltaic alluvials forming a trapezoid from the Bight to the points Prachinburi on the Prachin, Saraburi on the Pasak, Peiyuakiri on the Chao Praya and Raiburi on the Meklong. Within this area the relief of levees and alluvial banks alone rises above the surface, which is only a few feet above sea level (Fig. 92).

(*b*) *Middle Siam*, the northern part of the trough of Siam, characterised by rolling hill and valley relief crossed by lines of much-folded shales and schists. The narrows below Nakawn Sawan indicate that the substructure runs athwart the drainage lines to form an almost enclosed basin to the north. Beside the main rivers are alluvial flats containing braided streams, thus extending far inland long fingers of landscape resembling that of Lower Siam. The Pasak Valley is large and disproportionate to the present river within it; it follows a linear form apparent on the Mekong between Luang Prabang and Paklay and is in turn extended south by a tributary of the Prachin, suggesting that the Pasak once flowed separately to the Bight as an old course of the Mekong.

316 Exploitation of minerals in the rocks of Siam is negligible, apart from the Kra tin mines. A few people wash river gravels for gold in the Nam Nigau valley (tributary of the Mekong) and some of the Kra valleys, though these last can be relics of old trade routes

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rather than signs of local veins. In the Nam Wa of North Siam, at Chon Luk in Dong Paya and at Muang Kut in the east, the copper mines no longer operate. Galena has been worked commercially at Kanchanburi and tungsten ores in the Kra Isthmus. A few gems continue to be found in the Cardamoms. Iron ore is widely distributed but unworked owing to transport and fuel difficulties. The only known Siamese coal is an unworked lignite near Nakawn Sawan. All tin from Kra was shipped coastwise to Penang or Singapore for smelting. Exclusively a foreign investment of European or Chinese capital, the tin mines worked with Chinese labour on systems (particularly dredging) already developed in Malaya. About 17,000 tons annually was Siam's normal tin production capacity in the years immediately before the war and its 1950 tin export was about 8,800 tons.

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Climate

The climate of Siam relates to climates of the adjoining territories of Burma, Indochina and Malaya. The Kra Isthmus experiences the North Malayan type of climate with rains at all seasons and two distinct maxima. The Central Depression is distinctly dry (Fig. 88), receiving rains only when the summer airstream comes directly from the south, otherwise the Western Mountains shield the Menam Chao Praya Valley, producing a dry zone resembling that of Central Burma. The high surroundings of Central Siam deny the region any significant amelioration of drought by occasional cyclones. Typhoons from Indochina and the South China Sea rarely reach even the Korat Plateau.

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Thus, excepting the Kra Isthmus, all Siam has less than 1 in. of rain for each month from December to April. Rains then set in with an abruptness like those of India and Burma, at the end of April, to continue until mid-November. The volume of rain varies from district to district according to aspect and altitude so that in July, for example, southeastern Siam and all the mountain areas receive over 10 in. of rain, while Central Siam and Korat receive less than 10 in. By October the rains diminish throughout Central Siam.

Relief largely determines the pattern of annual rainfall totals, according to the few long-period records which have been kept. The higher edges of Korat receive as much as 120 in. p.a. whereas

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

FIG. 88.—Rainfall in Siam

the lower plateau areas receive less than 60 in. and even less than 40 in. in the rainshadow east of the Dong Paya scarp.

SIAM: AVERAGE RAINFALL (in inches)

	Jan.	*Feb.*	*Mar.*	*Apr.*	*May*	*June*	*July*	*Aug.*	*Sept.*	*Oct.*	*Nov.*	*Dec.*	*Total*
Bangkok	.9	1.0	1.3	1.9	6.8	6.4	6.9	7.3	11.6	7.8	2.1	.7	54.6
Kanburi	.9	1.0	1.3	2.3	6.4	5.2	5.3	3.8	7.8	6.9	.7	.4	51.3
Nakon Nayok	1.0	1.1	1.9	2.3	7.9	11.6	14.5	16.3	16.7	7.3	2.6	.5	83.9
Chiengmai	.4	.1	1.0	1.6	6.0	5.1	5.7	9.1	9.5	6.7	2.3	.5	48.0
Udorn	nil	0.7	3.0	3.7	9.1	10.4	8.6	8.4	9.9	2.2	1.2	nil	57.2
Takuapa	1.1	1.3	6.1	7.5	17.1	20.5	23.8	23.9	33.3	21.2	9.2	3.1	168.7

Central Siam everywhere receives less than 60 in. while on the eastern foothills of the Western Mountains a narrow belt of rainshadow from Prau Kao on the Bight to Raheng on the Ping River

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has less than 40 in. p.a. Thus Central Siam has a rainfall resembling the Dry Zone of Burma but there is no increase of rain towards the southern plains, which continue dry all the way to the Bight. Upon the Korat Plateau a similarly low rainfall is emphasised by the porosity of the red sandstone and comes in a season of about 200 days, during which high temperatures prevail to lessen the effectiveness of the low rainfall. 132

A climatic drawback is the wide variability in the Siamese rainfall from year to year, always a critical factor in drier climates. Over the period 1914–25 the wettest years differed from the driest years by as much as the average rainfall at Bangkok, and the length of the wet season varied from 174 to 236 days per year.

Low rainfalls in Central Siam have several effects. Because the streams are relatively short and originate within the Siamese climatic régime, their volume fluctuates widely during the year and their load at the onset of the wet season is abnormally heavy, due to the ease with which rain scours the dry dusty surface. Such an alternation in the rivers produces bars across their mouths. The Chao Praya at Paknampoh has a flow of scarcely 4,000 cub. ft. per second during the dry season, becoming 54,000 cub. ft. per second in the wet season. At Bangkok the flood discharge is of the order 95,000 cub. ft. per second. The rise begins rapidly in May and continues until the end of October, after which it falls gradually to a minimum in April. For fifty miles inland the distributaries of the Chao Praya are subject to tidal influence, particularly during the dry season, making the lower reaches of the river brackish and creating a problem from the farming and potable water point of view, while helping to scour the channels slightly. The Chao Praya mouth can be entered only at high tide owing to the sandbars which are very little modified by marine currents because the Bight is so sheltered. Other streams are unsuited for navigation even at their mouths; the smaller rivers, like the *chaungs* of Burma, dry out to a trickle among banks of gravel during several months, when water shortage dominates Siamese life everywhere outside the main river valleys.

Vegetation

The Korat Plateau and Central Siam are covered by the dry deciduous type of Monsoon Forest (Fig. 89) in which bamboos predominate, much subject to fires in the dry season and becoming 137

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

FIG. 89.—Siam—Vegetation

121 savannah or scrub in type after frequent burnings, whether caused naturally or by shifting cultivators. Higher altitudes everywhere induce an approach to Tropical Rain Forest because they receive heavier and more regular rains and the Kra Isthmus is practically entirely of this type of forest. North of about 17° N., apart from the occasionally cultivated alluvial valleys, the landscape is deciduous Teak Forest, Northern Siam repeating in this respect
313 the pattern of the Irrawaddy Basin. Some six foreign firms had leases to extract teak from this area up to 1942 and over a million logs a year were cut from Siamese forests, dragged to the

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water-side by elephants and floated down to the coast during the wet season beginning in May and June. A little Siamese teak moved out by way of the Salween and the Mekong but at least three-quarters went by the Chao Praya to Bangkok. About half the commercial teak was from the Yom valley, and a quarter each from the Wang and Ping Valleys. Recently legislation stipulated re-forestation after cutting the teak because it was becoming

FIG. 90.—Rivers and Swamps in Korat. 1. Evergreen shrubs and small trees. 2. Thorny bamboo lining levees. 3. Grasses. 4. Marsh. 5. Park-like savannah above wet season water level

apparent that the extraction rate was faster than the natural replacement and was causing hill erosion to increase. Near Bangkok were many teak mills though logs also went to Singapore for milling, in company with much Siamese rattan, for which Singapore was also an entrepôt. The timber trade has been a declining one since 1907 and the demand for Siamese teak fluctuated widely, its pace being set by Asiatic rather than by European or American consumers. After its wartime stagnation, teak extraction showed no sign of recovery by early 1948.

Peculiar to the valleys of Korat is the great development of seasonal Freshwater Swamp Forest. The flat lands away from the rivers (Fig. 90) are inundated during the wet season, which encourages a profuse vegetation and this in turn becomes an impassable forest in the dry season. Thus the landscape when dry resembles the worst savannah-scrub, lined with bamboo on the slightly higher ridges, and when wet resembles young swamp forest found in latitudes much farther south.

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Chapter Eighteen

THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL LANDSCAPE OF SIAM

243 311 THE agriculture and the social structure of Siam hinge upon rice farming, yet by comparison with conditions elsewhere in Southeast Asia this territory by no means has optimum rice conditions. In particular, the low and unreliable average rainfalls of the whole riverine plains and the brevity of the rainy season operate against rice farming. Zimmerman considered at least three-quarters of Siam was unsuited to rice cultivation.

OLDER FARMING SYSTEMS

Probably almost a million Siamese people in the northern and western mountain districts and on the Korat Plateau still regularly depend for their food on shifting cultivation. The amount of land used in this way is probably half a million acres in any one year.

Outside Lower Siam where special conditions operate, farming is of the subsistence type and agricultural produce does not move in an appreciable quantity from one district to another. To the north the subsistence farming is based upon glutinous rice, less because the glutinous type is preferred dietetically and more because that type matures in the short period of about 4 months, making it a safe crop for a district whose rainy season is unreliable and never longer than 4½ months. The same consideration causes Korat to devote 70 per cent of its farmland to glutinous rice.

241 311 Supplementary to this staple peasant food are many other crops for local use, all of them tolerating the low rainfall, short wet season and long dry season, but the riceland is never re-cropped in any one year. Tobacco, a little cotton, fruits, tea (on the uplands) and vegetables are produced in this subsistence system. For the whole of Siam outside Kra, the non-rice crops occupy in total less than 3 per cent of the cultivated land. Of these, only the tobacco and tea (a pickled variety for chewing rather than for brewing) 312 provide a small cash income. For rice growing, areas away from the main rivers depend fundamentally on direct rainfall supplemented by direct flooding from the smaller rivers where this takes

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place naturally. Controlled irrigation with dams and distributary canals is negligible. 312

In the Korat valleys rice grows on the fringes of the seasonal swamps and the timing of planting and harvesting is related to their natural floods. Any cultivation behind the levee banks of these swamps must wait for the river itself to subside, because no method has been evolved to drain to the river which is then standing at least as high as the water in the fields. Frequently there arise communal clashes of interest in the Korat swamps: peasants who live by catching the freshwater fish brought to the swamp by the river in spate, work for the quickest possible draining of the swamp as the river subsides, paddy-farmers on the other hand need the water to be retained behind the levees as long as possible. It is remarkable in this Southeast Asia region, where water control has generally reached a high standard by methods devised under and for local conditions, that paddy farmers of north and east Korat, where conditions are unreliable, should have evolved no irrigation of their own, not even the simple water-gate to use the swamps behind the levees as water storage tanks. Water scarcity sets the key of all Korat activity; the combination of low and unreliable rainfall, high evaporation, porous sandstone and low watertable leaves the people critically dependent on the brief natural floods of the river valleys. Less than 7 per cent of the Plateau is cultivated, much of this being on the shifting system and less than 2 per cent being in crops other than rice. All processing and cultivation is haphazard here. Of land reported to be under rice in the 1946–47 season, 10 per cent was in Central Siam north of Nakawn Sawan and about 30 per cent in the Korat Valleys where there is always quick response to rice prices, a rise of which encourages catch-cropping in marginal areas. Only a very small portion of the rice thus produced moved out of these localities. 243 312 221 [578]

In the Kra Isthmus is another minor subsistence agriculture, similar to that of Northern Malaya.

The Commercial Agricultural Regime

The deltaic plain of Lower Siam (Fig. 92) is the zone of specialised rice agriculture, resembling in its position within the state and in the economic machine the commercial rice-producing zone of Lower Burma but with differences in method. For 1946–47, 438 243

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

FIG. 91.—Rainfall and River Régimes at Ayuthia

438 nearly 6 million acres of paddy were being cultivated in this
243 restricted region, representing over 54 per cent of the paddy area
of Siam. Precipitation everywhere in Lower Siam is less than
[132] 60 in. p.a. and is only just over 50 in. at Ayuthia in the heart of
the rice country, as against the minimum wet paddy requirement
of 70 in. p.a. The effective rainfall is considerably less—about
40 in. only for the critical months when paddy is in the ground
(Fig. 91). Thus we have the unusual circumstance of a large-
scale commercialised rice production—almost all Siam's rice
export derives from Lower Siam—in an area without adequate
rainfall for rice.

243 All rice grown in Lower Siam for trade is non-glutinous and
312 wet-cultivated. Rainfall deficiency is made up by direct floods
221

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from the rivers whose spate in the deltaic sector of the Chao Praya is about a month after rains begin in the mountains of the north. The whole plain is canalled for simple distribution of the spate. Because most of the fields are fed by gravity without an artificial head of water, the duration and depth of flooding are uncontrollable and the crop risks are very great. There are the risks of inadequate depth of flood, too much depth, inadequate duration and too prolonged duration, so that the harvest has a wide variability. At Ayuthia over a century of observation, only 32 per cent of the years had adequate floods, 22 per cent of the years they were barely adequate, 30 per cent of floods were far too shallow and 15 per cent too deep. These are the consequences of having neither dams to store, dykes to protect nor adequate canals to distribute and balance the supply of field water.

To provide adequate floods for the rice areas, the Chao Praya waters at Ayuthia must rise to at least 10.5 ft. above the average level of the Bight of Bangkok and the success of any one crop depends on maintaining this level for a sufficient period to mature the rice. Maintenance of level depends in turn on the continuation of rains at the headstreams of the Chao Praya; should August and September be unusually dry in North Siam, a sharp drop of the Lower Siam floods occurs and the rice plants cannot mature—with serious results for the commercial economy of Siam. Thus in 1919 when the minimum 10.5 ft. of flood at Ayuthia was not reached at any time, over 2½ million acres of rice were destroyed, representing 43 per cent of Siam's total paddy acreage for the year.

The precariousness of agriculture in these circumstances has been recognised and a modern canalisation is now complete in the Khlong Rangsit area northeast of Bangkok where Pasak and Pakong water is led to half a million acres of paddyland east of the Chao Praya. The area is being extended but west of the Chao Praya no control works of this type have been carried out.

Since the Chao Praya has a heavy load in spate and varies in volume rapidly, silting is a constant problem in the channels and in the fields. Distributaries build up levees, which in time they penetrate, leading to a change of course (Fig. 92). There are signs of steady migration of distributaries to the east, leaving what were once good rice areas with every expectation of floodwater to become relatively unimportant and unreliable producers, as in the Suphanburi district where a heavy rice production was obtained

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

FIG. 92.—Landscape and Land Use in Lower Siam

243 in the 14th century when the Chao Praya reached the sea by way
312 of what is now the silted up Thachin River.

During floods, Lower Siam is in effect under water to depths varying from a few inches to as much as 10 ft. The canals (*klongs*)

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243 312 are aids to water distribution and do not significantly drain the landscape. They are, however, the only practicable routes and the rural areas are linked by shallow-draught boats along these *klongs* which are at once agricultural aids, the high street, the sewer and the water supply to local people. The nature of the floods is a factor maintaining fertility but the migration of the waters and the frequent silting up of channels cause a shift in the location of the most favoured and reliable rice-growing areas. Without controlled irrigation, any area built up above the general level by sedimentation will no longer be flooded and must fall out of cultivation.

Rice

438 243 241 The Lower Siam fluvial plain is a one-crop area. Rice for sale dominates all else, but there is a little vegetable growing near Bangkok and fruit and peppers at Chandburi. A few districts grow legumes and maize for local domestic use and transitional forms of self-sufficiency farming appear towards the margins of the normal flood zone. In the technique of rice cultivation, great differences may be found close together. The areas with most dependable floods follow the transplanting system, timing the field work so that preparation of the ground by ploughing is done as soon as the beginning of local rains softens the baked fields, and transplanting into flooded fields takes place later when the spate reaches the plain. If the local rains and the spate happen to come almost simultaneously, then broadcast sowing is adopted, as it is also where the farmer has inadequate assistance for transplanting. Broadcast sowing yields poorer crops and permits less accurate adjustment to local floodwater vagaries. The minor vegetable and legume-maize-pepper-tobacco cultivations are in areas working from direct rainwater rather than from floods. In every case cultivation and processing is by manual methods until the rice leaves the farm.

221 243 The rhythm of activity in Lower Siam is rather short and more sharply defined than in most paddy areas. July is the peak planting month and December the peak harvesting month. A spread of activity arises from differences in the date when spates appear in different parts of the lower Chao Praya and in the middle Mekong (which controls Korat planting seasons).

Although paddy cultivation in Lower Siam is non-intensive and

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221 precariously related to the natural conditions in any one year, the
243 acreage under paddy has steadily increased.

PADDY FARMING IN SIAM

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Quinquennium	*Area under paddy p.a. Million acres*	*Production clean rice p.a. Million tons*	*Average exports clean rice Million tons*
1910–1915	4.54	1.92	.8
1916–1920	5.50	1.92	.7
1921–1925	6.45	2.76	1.1
1926–1930	7.14	2.71	1.2
1931–1935	7.93	2.94	1.5
1936–1940	8.45	2.71	2.0
1946–1950	10.40	3.40	.87

Between 1910 and 1940 an additional 5 million acres came into cultivation, mostly in this delta sector, an expansion which was not so much as in Burma for the same period but was an impressive additional acreage to have been put under rice by Siamese farmers alone. Foreigners have played no part in the increasing farming labour, all of which has been done by Siamese and their families who have in that time considerably increased in number, though not quite so fast as their rice acreages.

The Land Question

423 Until early this century, land had little value in itself. It was
471 often communal and held on what were in effect squatters' rights.
427 There were still in existence large individual land holdings dating
249 from the period when Siamese officials were granted land accord-
435 ing to their rank, in lieu of salaries. At that time so much land was unclaimed that it could be had for the asking, subject to the claimant being able to farm it. Confusion began to arise in land questions as population increased and the best lands were fully taken up. The farms were often unsurveyed and without deeds, as much of Siam is even today. In the delta, floods regularly obliterated landmarks, making identification of property difficult. After 1912 when rice and ricelands began to have a significant money value in Siam, new lands were authorised publicly in the hope of encouraging smallholders to settle on them, but in effect, big landowners obtained even bigger holdings and went in for land speculation which intensified at each stage in the expansion of rice exports. Delta farming property has become

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concentrated into large units and the bulk of commercial rice today comes from great estates cultivated by a changing stream of tenant farmers supervised by a rent collector for the absentee landlord.

Round Bangkok and in Rangsit the farms exemplify this property concentration. They are larger than anywhere else in Siam and at Dhanyaburi nearly 85 per cent of peasants are tenants. Tenancies average 40 acres each, usually on a yearly basis, so that there is no need and no encouragement to form a settled village life. Thus the commercial rice is produced by migrating farmers who pay rent, who cultivate very little food for themselves and have no reason to improve the land. Naturally these short-term tenants extract as much as possible from any field they rent, irrespective of the effects of overtaxing the soil, which passes to other hands the following year. It is not surprising that after the progressively heavy rice exports of the 15 years to 1935, the next quinquennium showed an alarming decline of yield per acre, by about 25 per cent compared with 1921-25.

The system of renting ricelands led to borrowing from money-lenders, because the tenant suffered the losses arising from Nature's variations, which are very considerable, as has been demonstrated. Where tenant farmers started off by possessing a little family land and rented a field or so in addition, their personal property was steadily lost to cover the risks. The landless population has thus swollen, to total 36 per cent of the families in Lower Siam by 1930, making available that supply of landless labour which is needed seasonally on the great rice farms. Outside Lower Siam, harvesting and planting are communally organised among the smallholders. Within Lower Siam it must be done with hired labour—an additional burden on tenant farmers, whose outgoings are thus all in cash, for rent, land, taxes and wages.

Milling.—Rice mills are located near Bangkok and they extend along the major water channels by which rice moves through Lower Siam. The movement of rice to mills is loosely organised. Rice leaves the farm in small units and the tenant is without means or knowledge to negotiate directly with the mills. Hence there has grown up a complex middleman system mostly run by Chinese, which handles all movement and storage from the farms to the mill. It is this phase in which holding for a market rise may take

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

FIG. 93.—Density of Cattle in Siam

256 place. The impecunious tenant farmer must turn his rice into
441 cash as quickly as possible to meet his obligations, a condition by
563 which the middlemen profit, as they do also at the stage of bar-
432 gaining with the mill which wishes to purchase for export. Thus the benefits of improved rice prices are denied the farmer and taken by the middleman. It is doubtful, however, whether the increasing rate of extraction of rice from the countryside and the commercialisation of Siamese rice would have been possible without the initiative of the Chinese middleman.

243 Of the .87 million tons of rice exported annually on an average
439 over 1946–50, 25 per cent went to Singapore for Malayan consumption, 9 per cent to Hongkong, 15 per cent to India and

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9 per cent to China. In this movement, carried out by foreign shipping from the one port, Bangkok, the proportion to Hongkong tended to decrease in postwar years, while that to Singapore, India and Japan was increasing. 243 439

Cattle

A variant on Siamese monocultivation of rice is the cattle breeding which goes on in Korat. Rice farmers throughout Siam use buffaloes and oxen as their draught animals. Usually each family has a pair of animals, buffaloes being preferred in Lower Siam and bullocks elsewhere. In Korat, however, the average smallholder owns just over four of these animals and the savannah setting plus fodders from the local subsidiary maize growing, suit this small breeding activity, which supplies draught animals to the cultivators of Lower Siam. But Korat has no specialist cattle farming. The animals come from smallholders, not from herds of cattle on a grazing terrain. Caravans of these small cattle make their way from Korat to Lower Siam throughout the year. In the Plateau area some 5½ million cattle are usually living (1942), an average of 3.2 per acre of riceland as against an average of .7 per acre in the Siamese plains (Fig. 93). From Korat, too, comes a steady supply of pigs, in demand by the Chinese of Bangkok and exported to Chinese elsewhere in Southeast Asia. 231

The Population Pattern

Siam is as thinly populated (Fig. 94) as the greater part of Burma and North Malaya. A general average of 87 persons per square mile is distributed so that Lower Siam has a density of over 250, the Korat Plateau and the teak country of the north have between 50 and 100 people per square mile, while the Western Mountain zone has less than 50 per square mile. Densities round Bangkok resemble those of congested parts of the Tonkin deltas but Tonkin is an over-populated emigrating area, while the Bangkok zone ranks neither as over-populated nor a source of migrants. The difference is largely one of "nutritional density," population per acre of paddy (Fig. 95). Lower Siam has only .86 persons per cultivated acre as against 2.6 per cultivated acre of Tonkin. In the same sense, the nutritional density of Lower Siam is far below that of most other regions of the country, which helps to account for the paradox of a large population 161 [362]

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

FIG. 94.—Density of People in Siam

and a large agricultural production for export (compare also Fig. 61).

[361] Of Siam's total population, 14.5 million in 1937 and estimated to be 17.6 million by 1950, about 850,000 are in Bangkok itself, the only significant town in Siam, 88 per cent of Siamese live in rural villages, and the rest in small market towns. While census reports in Siam are difficult to correlate, Broek estimates the crude annual increase in most rural districts of Siam as between 4 and 6 per cent. Over the period 1929–37, 3 million locally born people were added to the population and by 1947 there was a further increase of 2.6 million. An increase of this size and proportion has been unusual elsewhere in Southeast Asia (apart from Java)

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

FIG. 95.—Nutritional Densities in Siam

over a similar period. During the 30 years 1907–37, Siam's population practically doubled, without immigration significantly influencing the totals or the high rates of increase in rural areas. 161 162

The rise of population has made it possible for the Siamese paddy acreage to become more than double in this century and for the rice exports nearly to double. This fast rate of increase may not, however, be a modern feature because an estimate of the total Siamese population for 1854 was only 6 million. Such a sustained natural increase of population justifies questioning Zimmerman's assertion that malaria, arising from the uncontrolled floods, has undermined the Siamese people. Indiscriminate drinking of canal-water has repeatedly produced epidemics of cholera and the panicky abandoning of whole centres of population, particularly on Korat, yet the rate of increase in Siam scarcely indicates progressive and cumulative debility, notorious though Siam may be for its swarms of mosquitoes and other disease-carrying pests. Historically the focus of population and of agriculture has steadily 161 243 164 162

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162 shifted south from Chiengmai to what would appear to be the more unhealthy yet more productive settings of Ayuthia and Bangkok.

464 Siam has for two or three centuries suffered from labour shortage rather than over-population. This was the background 567 of the slow approach on to the more fertile ricelands of the south and to the frequent slave raids upon surrounding territories. 166 Slaves continued to be part of the Siamese solution of the labour question until the beginning of the 20th century and there is still a tradition of forced labour. Today the heavy seasonal requirements of workers in Lower Siam are met by temporary migrants from the northeast (the Korat Plateau), who stay in the plains for only about 6 months, leaving their families behind to look after their smallholdings. They return with a little cash which suffices for two or three years. Individuals do not apparently repeat this migration frequently.

563 *The Chinese in Siam.*—It follows from the shortage of people and the preoccupation of most Siamese with subsistence farming 167 that the Chinese have been able to move into Siam in considerable numbers, as they have into most other Southeast Asia countries. Chinese coolie migration into Siam has taken the usual form. It was at first encouraged by the Siamese nobility and the Siamese peasants were indifferent. It fluctuated with the prosperity of the country and became an emigration during depressions. The movement has left a group of locally-born Chinese and Sino-Siamese who rank as Chinese by Chinese law and as Siamese by Siamese law. The Chinese became a target of Siamese nationalist indignation and were subject to discrimination. The net movement of Chinese for the period 1925-30 was into Siam at an average of 37,000 per annum, while for the period 1930-35 it was an average loss of just under 1,000 per annum. By 1939 there were just over three-quarters of a million foreign Chinese in Siam, though China claimed its nationals there numbered nearly 3 million. The Chinese community controlled the middleman and milling aspects of the rice trade, they were the artisans and skilled workers, the miners and the rubber planters of Kra, and the principal importers. They took little direct part in agriculture except as market gardeners near Bangkok, though they dealt in all agricultural produce, kept village shops, and commanded a key position in public affairs, more so than in any neighbouring country.

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Indigenous Groups.—Among the indigenous people a wide ethnic range may be recognised. In Lower Siam, the Tai group (hence Thailand, sometimes an official name of Siam) dominates. North of Sukotai and in the Korat Plateau live Laos, part of that group widespread in inner Indochina and closely related to the Tai. In all the virgin forest areas are scattered nomadic peoples, of which the most numerous are the Karens who overlap the border with Burma, normally living at altitudes of 1,500–3,000 ft. Among the Northern Mountains at still higher levels are the "hill people" of whom the Miao, Lissu and Yao are representative. Round Chantaburi in the southwest are remnants of Khmer-Cambodian types and a few Annamites have moved round the coast as far as Bangkok. In Kra are the Semang aboriginal types, found also in Malaya. Along the Kra coasts are the Chao Nam, a group of "gipsy fishermen." Malays totalling about 600,000 occupy the border area south of a line from Singgora to Puket which is an ethnic-religious boundary well north of the political boundary. About 85 per cent of people in Siam are Tai-Lao, between whom there are only minor differences, so that Siam is fairly homogeneous, apart from the Chinese traders of Lower Siam and the Malays of the far south.

Customs.—The preponderance of Tais means that a single language runs throughout Siam except for the hill and jungle people (Fig. 118). Laos speech is a dialect variation of standard Siamese rather than a distinct language. While the Chinese and Malays keep to their own languages in private, they are educated to use Siamese publicly. Siamese is a tonal language of the Tibeto-Burman type strongly influenced by Pali as a result of long Buddhist missionary activities, and written in a script of Indian origin.

Because the Buddhist tradition is strong, pagoda-type temples have been built in the well-populated zones. Villages have pagodas located outside the house group and not as the nucleus of the settlement, though the religion is integrally associated with social and agricultural life.

It is through the Buddhist priesthood that intellectual life in Siam relates so much to the tradition of the early Indian colonies, an influence which appears also in the traditional Siamese dress, the *panung*, a cloth wrapped round the lower body and through the legs after the manner of the Indian *dhoti*. This dress, common

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to Siamese men and women, differs from the *sarong*-like dress of the rest of Southeast Asia and of the hill and jungle people surrounding the Siamese.

Settlement Types.—Village forms resemble those of all Southeast Asia. There are linear villages along levees and similar locations naturally above flood-level, and along the drier edges of the flood plains. Proximity to water is everywhere the chief site consideration. The only landscape of flimsy pioneer type is in the newer commercial rice-farming areas of Lower Siam where tenants are too mobile to concern themselves with formal village construction. House forms are generally raised, built upon bamboo legs, beneath which the simple farm tools and draught cattle are kept. In Korat and in the Western Mountains defensive village forms are more usual, the houses standing in a rough ring surrounded by earthworks and a bamboo stockade; these in part reflect the need for coralling the cattle and also the social insecurity of these remoter areas. Among Laos the word for a town, "*wieng*," meaning a fortified place, emphasises this defensive interest. During the flood season, Siamese cultivators of the lowlands may become water-borne, putting their whole family on small boats until the waters subside. Many houses are in fact built on bamboo rafts, rather like Noahs' arks, and nucleated as villages on the *klongs*, even in Bangkok, where the network of waterways lined by these house-boats has caused it to be described as the Venice of the Far East.

Transport

That North Siam had two-way trading associations with the Shan States and with Burma until 1921 caused Burmese currency to be used there. The anomaly resulted from the difficulty of reaching North Siam from Bangkok on the Chao Praya whose waters and sandbanks vary so much and so quickly. It was a centrifugal tendency increased by the Siamese teak trade being in the hands of those who also held teak concessions in Burma. Burmese, Indian and Chinese traders were at that time dominant in the North. When the Bangkok-Chiengmai railway was built (by 1921) it created a tie, bringing North Siam into the hinterland of Bangkok rather than of Burmese ports. The teak trade continued to use the Chao Praya system seasonally, while the new railway operated for passengers and minor trading goods.

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A similar centrifugal tendency existed in the Korat Plateau which has easier routes towards the Mekong (by shallow boats) than towards Central Siam with which the connection was by cattle-caravan. Very little trade went into Korat; the outward movement involved agricultural produce and the cattle carrying it to Bangkok were sold for farmers of Lower Siam. The Ayuthia-Korat Railway, the first major line in Siam, was intended to establish centripetal forces and the line was extended to Ubon more from political motives than because any trade stream was expected. Today this railway brings Korat rice to Bangkok (120,000 tons per annum of poor grade rice which releases better grades for export from Lower Siam), together with cattle and pigs. The inflowing traffic to Korat is very much smaller in volume and value, consisting of a miscellany of fish, sugar and manufactured goods. 505 492 497

The Bangkok-Singapore railway assisted the development of Kra tin and rubber and was also intended to tie this remote southern province closer to the Siamese capital. Its actual flow of freight was small and the movement of rubber and tin by railway from South Kra to Penang has in practice added to the centrifugal tendencies in the isthmus. 497

Siam is more roadless even than the Philippines. In part this results from the technical difficulties of building roads safe from the Lower Siam floods, in part from a policy of doing nothing to detract from the railway freight. Local freight and passenger movement is largely by the rivers and canals. In 1940 the railways carried well below a million passengers and this was thought to justify not building roads. Southern Siam is without trunk roads and Bangkok road traffic is isolated from the few short roads elsewhere in the country, where they have been built at right angles to the railways as feeders, rather than as routes. Through much of the country bullock caravans are still the only means of land transport. 491 505 497 492

The Chao Praya system is navigable during high water seasons by steam launches as far as 120 miles above Paknampoh. Thus it carries major traffic inland only for about 260 miles, even in the most favourable season. In the dry season launches can scarcely reach 100 miles from the sea. This is a great contrast with navigation on the Irrawaddy and helps to account for the slower opening up of the Siamese interior. Ships of 1,500 tons can reach 487 505

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487 Bangkok but the bulk of rice exports goes out beyond the bar in
505 lighters for loading to the ocean-going steamers offshore.

Towns

361 The Siamese are not an urban people. They have one large
369 town, *Bangkok*, which is the political, social, economic and commercial capital. Siam may almost be thought of as a city state, because what Bangkok says is acted upon, the isolation of the rest of the country cutting it off from the current of affairs. Bangkok became the capital only in 1782, before which Ayuthia was the principal city with Bangkok merely an outport. The only modernised city in the country, Bangkok is rather isolated from the interior. It is a delta port with the disadvantage of a shallow, winding and variable river across which lie great sandbanks impeding access. The suburb south of the town is industrialised by rice and teak mills. Many Chinese are to be seen on its streets, sign of their prominence in Siam's commercial life. The town has the quality of an advanced artistic tradition, expressed in ornate temples and palaces of distinctive style, often juxtaposed with other buildings of ultra-modern design. Its population in 1947 was 827,000, an increase of 32 per cent since 1937.

Ayuthia, the earlier capital, repeatedly described by 18th century travellers and twice destroyed in Burmo-Siamese wars, has a function in Siam comparable to that of Mandalay. Its transport is principally by river. Though the main railways pass through it, only farmers and shopkeepers live there in a light and flimsy settlement containing less than 20,000 people, many of whom live upon houseboats threading the confusion of creeks surrounding the town.

Chiengmai on the Ping River is the second town of Siam, once important as the capital of a Laos kingdom for which Burmese and Siamese fought frequently. This is evidenced by the elaborate fortifications of what is now a very small country town, focus of the teak industry and entirely dependent upon it now that the cattle caravans into the Shan States and Yunnan no longer operate. Organisation of the teak rafts which go down to Bangkok was done from here.

Political Unity

Siam is unique in Southeast Asia for having remained apart from the pressure of European colonisation going on all round it.

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Its independence of an influence so strong throughout this region is more apparent than real since it was originally based on the function of Siam as buffer state between French colonial interests in Indochina and British colonial interests in Burma and Malaya. Thus its independence was tolerated by others rather than maintained by the Siamese and the country was steadily drawn into the process of commercialisation going on round it. Its finances were until 1941 closely linked to British currencies and its trade focused on Singapore. To some extent the strong Chinese influence in its commerce and trade may be considered as having made Siam a Chinese colony in all except the political sense. It has been at home and abroad a very strong influence in Siamese politics this century.

Chapter Nineteen

THE NATURAL LANDSCAPE AND REGIONS OF INDOCHINA

Physiography

DDD INDOCHINA is built round a resistant crystalline Central Massif of great geological age now forming that part of the Chaine Annamitique roughly south of the river Song Buong (Fig. 97). The rocky coast of Annam, a fractured margin of this massif, is part of the northeast edge of the Sunda Platform which may be traced through the South China Sea to North Borneo. Differential movements between this massif and another in South China led to compressional structures between them and the extrusion of igneous rocks. West of the Central Massif, sandstones conceal much of the substructure, signs of which show on roughly north-south arcuate lines from Northern Laos through the Korat Plateau of Siam. Ancient basaltic outpourings mask much of the Central Massif and recent tectonic changes in Tonkin have produced a gorge and plateau landscape.

Between the Central Massif and the Cardamom Mountains and also between the Chaine Annamitique and the South China Massif level expanses of alluvials are still being laid down by the rivers, forming fertile and cultivated lowlands contrasting with the scarcely untouched forests of the crystalline highlands. Limestone occurs extensively to the north, intricately carved by solution processes to produce that bizarre karst landscape of the northern Chaine Annamitique and of the Baie d'Along.

Climate

The climate of Indochina (Fig. 96) is transitional between the influence of continental extremes centring on Asia to the north; and the equability of the archipelagoes to the south, complicated by the changing streams of air described in Chapter 2.

Over the period mid-September to March, continental Asia dominates the meteorology and airstreams from the north and northeast bring low temperatures to Tonkin, rains to the eastern

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

FIG. 96.—Precipitation in Indochina

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flanks of the Chaine Annamitique and to the Cardamom Mountains, and dry, sunny weather to the rest of the country.

From June to September, windstreams from the south and southwest bring tropical conditions of warmth and high humidity. Shallow depressions travel from west to east across Tonkin, and a low pressure system often remains over South Indochina for long periods. The whole country at this time experiences its heavy rains, though these do not come with the sudden violence of the Burmese monsoon. Except in the enclosed coastal valleys of the extreme east, Indochina's maximum rains fall in July-August.

Very damaging tropical typhoons sweep across Indochina from the east from July to November, bringing particularly heavy rains to the Middle Annam coast. The average track of these typhoons moves northward from February to mid-August and then southward until January, so that the whole of the east coast from the Mekong to the Chinese border is seasonally exposed to typhoons. During July-September they frequent the coast north of lat. 15°, but during October-November, the danger shifts to South Annam and Cochinchina (Fig. 14).

RAINFALL IN INDOCHINA (inches)

	Jan.	*Feb.*	*Mar.*	*Apr.*	*May*	*June*	*July*	*Aug.*	*Sept.*	*Oct.*	*Nov.*	*Dec.*	*Total*
Hanoi	.9	1.4	1.8	3.7	8.7	10.7	12.8	14.3	10.7	4.1	1.8	1.1	72
Luang Prabang ..	.8	.5	1.3	4.5	6.2	6.7	8.9	12.6	6.8	3.2	1.2	.3	53
Hue	7.0	3.1	4.1	2.1	4.4	3.2	3.3	4.6	14.4	25.5	29.1	15.2	116
Cap Padaran	.5	.2	.7	.9	3.1	2.5	2.3	1.2	4.1	5.7	6.1	2.7	30
Dalat	.3	1.1	2.2	7.1	8.1	6.4	10.2	8.6	12.7	8.9	3.5	.9	70
Saigon	.7	Nil	.6	1.6	8.4	13.7	12.3	11.3	14.1	11.4	4.4	2.5	81
Val d'Emeraude ..	1.5	1.7	7.2	8.8	22.4	30.6	41.6	41.5	33.7	19.5	9.9	2.6	221

The average rainfall for all districts is high, with relief causing an accentuated precipitation. The Cardamom Mountains and Ch. Annamitique are zones of highest annual rainfall (over 160 in. p.a.) while the Mekong and Red River plains are comparatively dry (below 60 in. p.a.) and a coastal strip from Phan Thiet to Cap Padaran is the driest zone (30 in. p.a.). Wide variations of rainfall and the uncertainty of its incidence in any one year, complicate the agriculture. These irregularities are greatest to the north, worsened by long sunny seasons of high evaporation which accentuate the drought. Uncertainty of rainfall incidence, a factor fluctuating more here than in other Southeast Asia territories, is

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most critical for Indochina rice farming and the crop may fail entirely when the timing of rain or of sunshine is widely irregular. Thus in Indochina a year with a normal rainfall total may prove agriculturally calamitous if one or two critical times of the year are abnormally dry or wet. Rains in Tonkin customarily fall as drizzles (called *crachin*); farther south, they come with more tropical intensity.

Natural Vegetation

Indochina is naturally a forested area of which some 14 per cent has been cleared for agriculture and another 50 per cent modified by cutover to stand now as savannah.

The forest types discussed in Chapter 4 are all represented in Indochina (Fig. 104). Tropical Rain Forest occupies most plains and foothills to 2,500 ft., though lowlands of particularly porous subsoil may have only Monsoon Forest. While rain forest which has scarcely been cut at all remains in the Cardamom Mountains and near Savannakhet, elsewhere shifting cultivation has modified it to secondary forest. The Ch. Annamitique and the Mountains of Tonkin carry Tropical Rain Forest broken by great patches of Monsoon Forest, particularly in the drier uplands adjoining the Middle Mekong Valley. Stands of teak do not develop extensively in the Monsoon Forests except in association with crystalline rocks round Pak Lay in Laos. In Cochinchina and behind Cap Padaran extensive savannah is a response to the low rainfall. Tropical grass (Imperator cylindrica), called "*tranh*" in Indochina and used for thatch, is widespread. Round the Tonle Sap where seasonal inundations occur, the Freshwater Swamp Forest contains many Hydrocarpus or *chaulmoogra* trees whose oil is used for leprosy. The higher altitudes and cooler winters of Western Tonkin Mountains have produced fairly large areas of pine forest, with P. Merkusii and P. Khasya as common types.

Mangrove Forests are restricted to three zones of the coast, the rest being too rocky or too steadily attacked by currents: (*a*) a discontinuous fringe to the Tonkin Delta, (*b*) a continuous fringe to the Mekong Delta, extending northwards into the Gulf of Siam from Pointe de Ca Mau, and (*c*) a fringe round the southern end of the Cardamom Mountains.

On the dunes of bays between the rocky promontories of the Annam coast, are stretches of Casuarina Forest.

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

FIG. 97.—Regions of Indochina

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Regional Landscapes

Indochina divides into distinctive regions (Fig. 97) which are :— 000

1. *The Deltas of Tonkin*, including the Red River delta and adjoining deltas of north Annam rivers.
2. *The Lower Mekong and the Tonle Sap plains.*—These regions differ from their surroundings in possessing great population densities (Fig. 102) and large-scale agriculture (Fig. 104), both having served as nurseries for distinctive cultural and communal developments (Fig. 103), though the rhythms of development have differed.
3. *The Highlands of Northern Tonkin*, north of the Red River.
4. *The Mountains and Plateaux between the Mekong and the Red River.*—These are zones of sharp internal contrasts arising from very broken relief in which population is low and scattered and human development has been slight. The Highlands are transitional to South China and through them has been a constant, poorly channelised, coming and going of peoples between Tonkin and Canton. The negative region of mountains and plateaux relates mostly to Northern Siam and Yunnan, and has functioned as a refuge for human groups pressed from the north and from the east.
5. *The Annamite Highlands* or *Chaine Annamitique*, between the Mekong and the South China Sea, is a composite region politically subdivided into Laos, the wild country draining westward to the Mekong, and Annam, centring on small coastal and fertile pockets of intensive agriculture and dense population backed inland by negative uplands.
6. *The Mountains of West Cambodia*, including the Cardamom Mountains and the Elephant Range, an undeveloped and repellent region throughout its known history.

The Tonkin Delta

In Lower Tonkin, the terrain is flat, almost entirely built up of river alluvium (Fig. 98). Minor differences of level on this flat landscape have major significance for agriculture and settlement.

The Red River delta, thickly peopled and intensively cultivated, is edged landward by highlands of rugged limestone. Dunes have been built up on the seaward fringe, and are most developed towards the south. The delta, a large part of it less than 10 ft.

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

FIG. 98.—The Red River Delta

above sea level, is a network of distributaries carrying off water of the Red River and of many shorter streams, such as the Song Cau, from the Northern Tonkin Highlands. A distinct drift of the main distributaries towards the south has been going on under the influence of heavy sedimentation from these northern tributaries. The deltaic surface merges northwards into deltaic fans built by tributary streams. Numerous embankments, some old terraces and old levees, provide drier and safer zones for settlement and also model the delta surface into shallow basins

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which suit the needs of rice cultivators. Towards the north, little of the delta is embanked and tides spread far inland, especially in the dry season when the outflow of fresh river water is least.

Adjoining deltas, the Song Ma, Song Chu and Song Ca, extend the landscape of the Red River delta southward, but the highlands approach closer to the sea and in places isolate parts of this southern alluvial extension, whose agricultural development differs from that of the Red River delta because there is a broken inland



FIG. 99.—Régime of Red River at Hanoi

belt of coarse, sandy soils (probably marine) without natural or artificial embankments to control spates.

The Tonkin and Annam deltas are difficult to approach from the sea and the water channels across them are subject to frequent changes (Fig. 99). These features have impeded overseas trade and make Hanoi and Haiphong not easily accessible by modern shipping. Towards the south, the delta extends seaward at the rate of about 300 ft. a year under the influence of heavy river alluviation and longshore drift.

Upon the delta daily temperatures fluctuate sharply, especially in winter, when temperatures are lower than in any other Indochinese lowlands. Rainfall, while showing some seasonal contrasts, is more evenly distributed than farther south, benefiting from South China cyclones in winter and from rain showers brought across the Gulf of Tonkin by the northeast winds. Winter rains come as drizzles (the *crachin*) which have high effectiveness

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and make second cropping possible. Annual rain totals are very variable, which, added to wide variations of river flooding, make for unreliability in the rice farming.

Tonkin rice cultivation depends on flood regulation, which has become more difficult following continued deforestation of the surrounding hills, irregular sedimentation and slow migration of the distributaries. Major embankments have been built at various times to control the floods, but have often led to more disastrous floods, as when in 1926 about one-third of the delta was under water following a break in the embankments. As the height of embankments is being progressively increased, the whole river profile tends to rise above the delta level. This admittedly aids the distribution of water to the fields, yet makes more difficult the draining of the inter-embankment basins when once these are flooded.

Modernised irrigation goes on side by side with primitive irrigation. About 2.6 million acres of the delta are under rice; of these 1.2 million acres (in the centre and east) are cultivated during both winter and summer, .6 million acres are harvested only in summer, and .8 million acres only in winter. In response to the great variety of soil, weather and flood conditions from place to place in the delta, over 300 different types of rice are grown, to produce almost 2.2 million tons per annum, with an average yield of 17½ bushels per acre, though it may vary from 37 to 5 bushels per acre in different localities. Of this production less than a tenth goes into trade at Hanoi and Haiphong; the rest is locally consumed by the farmers who are working largely on a subsistence basis. Farms are small; 36 per cent of the cultivated land is in properties of less than 5 acres each, and 27 per cent average between 5 and 10 acres each. One-fifth of farming land is communal and redistributed among individuals of the community every few years, a system in operation particularly on the difficult newer alluvial soils close to the coast.

Through the war years, Tonkin acreages under paddy remained fairly close to prewar figures, indicating the predominant interest in subsistence farming.

The delta carries 9 million people with a rural density averaging 1,400 per square mile which is equivalent to figures in the crowded lowlands of China and Japan (Fig. 102). The urban population is small and only Hanoi, the capital, has over 100,000 people, most

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of the other towns containing less than 10,000. Highest rural densities (over 1,500 per square mile) are in districts lining the Red River and in a belt towards the sea, round Hanoi and round Ninh Binh. These concentrations are in the more fertile zones, particularly on newer alluvial soils. To the east and north, delta populations do not reach such great densities, except near Haiphong (70,000), a minor manufacturing town and terminus of a railway into Yunnan. The dense rural population is nucleated for communal help in agricultural work and located where there is some physical security against flood risks. Villages take the form of levee settlements, embankment settlements, sand-dune settlements and groupings round the foot of hills rising above the plains.

The Highlands of Northern Tonkin

A terrain of igneous mountains and plateaux of sandstone or limestone, the Highlands have a pattern aligned from NW. to SE. Through them flow rivers on similar lines, but of varying maturity, most of them having sections of deep narrow gorge. A small portion of the Yangtze drainage system (Song Tso Kiang) carries water northward from the Highlands. Much deforestation has gone on, leaving naked hill landscapes recalling those of South China. Only a thin farming population is scattered through this region, which is chiefly settled by groups of hill people.

Between the Mekong and the Red River

An extensive mountainous area between the Red River and the Mekong reaches greater average heights than the Northern Tonkin Highlands. To the east, this unit has a NW-SE. trend in its relief which is of massive limestone or crystalline rocks forming inaccessible blocks of country. Towards the Mekong the structural trend becomes NE-SW., and involves old sandstone which forms plateaux, such as the Plateau de Tran Ninh, southeast of Luang Prabang. The rivers are here deeply incised in narrow valleys which are infertile, uncultivated and sparsely peopled. The chief stream is the Black River, paralleling the Red River before joining it, and navigable to Cho Bo; despite its rapids this is the artery of local transport.

Both these mountainous regions west and north of the Delta of Tonkin are deeply ravined, generally forested and left to

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ODD primitive groups of Laos (or Laotians), Man, Miao and Lolo hill people who have moved in from Yunnan over the centuries. They are stratified in distribution, Laos occupying valley floors and growing wet paddy, and Man groups living at slightly higher altitudes and practising shifting cultivation. Higher still, above 3,000 ft., live the Miao who maintain an energetic mixed hill farming of dry paddy, maize and cattle, and are the militant latecomers to Tonkin. The Lolos are less localised but frequently appear settled beside the Laos.

The population of these highlands totals barely 1¼ million, with a density of 30 per square mile which, while very low compared with the delta populations, exceeds that of other Indochinese uplands. North of the Red River is somewhat more densely populated than to the west, where there are large virtually uninhabited areas.

The Annamite Highlands

An extensive region, including the country between the Mekong and the Col de Dong Trai Mit and Cap St. Jacques, and known as the Chaine Annamitique, it is less a chain and more a sequence of weathered plateaux sloping more gently to the west than to the east, where high spurs reach the sea to enclose between them small coastal plains which have been attractive to settlement. From the Song Buong valley northward, the chainlike character is more pronounced as a consequence of the fold-fracture structure involving extensive sandstones and limestones. South of the Song Buong are ancient crystalline masses partially covered by lava flows and flanked to the west by old tabular sandstones leading down to the Middle Mekong and the province of Laos. Upon the basalt lava flows, a laterised soil, called "terres rouges," has proved more fertile than most other upland soils surrounding it.

On the east, the small coastal plains vary considerably in size, fertility and population. They are isolated landwards by broad stretches of negative country edged by abrupt scarps and cliffs and they relate more to the sea than to the mainland. They lack modern harbours and suffer from violent seas which build bars and lagoons across the mouths of the short torrential rivers.

Across the Highlands during midsummer blow the "Winds of Laos," which are föhn winds bringing hot, dry, violent winds to the coastal plains and imperilling agriculture by causing rapid

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desiccation. At other seasons the coast induces local variations of climate by shielding certain areas and varying the incidence of land and sea breezes. To these factors attaches special importance because the rainfall in Annam is highly irregular and torrential. The coastal plains are subject to the dangers of typhoons and the risks of local floods because it is difficult to regulate the torrential rivers which frequently have a régime resembling that of the *chaungs* of Burma.

Within the coastal lowlands live 4½ million people in patches of great density associated with the deltas of Song Ma, Song Chu, Song Ca, Huong Giang, Quang Ngai and Quang Nam, separated by virtually unpeopled, barren uplands where only a few nomadic tribes wander. The chief towns are Hue, Tourane and Phan Thiet. Towards Cap Padaran the coastal lowlands contain less people, a result of droughts and greater agricultural risks. These lowlands are almost entirely peopled by Annamites who have steadily migrated southward from the Tonkin deltas.

Over towards the Mekong, population thins out, consisting in the uplands of a group of primitive people derogatively called Moi (savages) by the Annamites. The many tribes of Moi operate interesting transitions between, and combinations of collecting-hunting, shifting cultivation in the forest, and sedentary agriculture. Laos, the state of the Middle Mekong, is peopled by Laotians who are ethnically related to Tais. They live in small agricultural hamlets and have strong Buddhist associations and semi-feudal customs, with a disinterest in mime and dancing, therein differing from Cambodians farther south.

The settlements of Laos are generally along the Mekong itself, with Vientiane, Luang, Prabang, Pakse, Savannakhet and Tha Khek as the largest. The river is the chief line of transport, especially between Savannakhet and Vientiane, but contact with the exterior by way of the Mekong is impeded by rapids, narrows and shifting sandbanks, the signs of an immature river.

Rice occupies 2 million acres of land scattered through the Annamite coastal plains, the larger units being towards the north. Irrigation methods in these plains are primitive. To the north double harvests (June and November) are normal, while farther south, three harvests a year may be gathered, as at Quang Ngai, where harvests occur in April, September and January. About 1 million tons of rice are produced annually, the low yield

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

FIG. 100.—Tonle Sap and the Mekong Confluence

arising from soil poverty and irregular rainfall. Salt water fishing is fairly intensive in Annam, a large portion of the catch being salted and converted into the sauce *nuoc mam*, one of the few exportable forms of fish.

THE LOWER MEKONG AND TONLE SAP PLAINS

The plains south of the Phnom Dangrek Hills, Pakse, on the Mekong, and the Plateaux du Muong and Djiring (which end the

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000 Chaine Annamitique), and east of the Cardamom Mountains, have three subdivisions :

(*a*) *The Tonle Sap Alluvial Plain* is one of the most interesting features in Southeast Asia. The area has been converted from an arm of the sea into a plain containing a lake, the Tonle Sap, as the result of Mekong sedimentation which has taken place within probably historic times. The transition was slow enough to retain in the lake fish which are adaptations of marine species. The Tonle Sap (Fig. 100) is shallow (not deeper than 6 ft. anywhere in the dry season) and in process of further subdivision by lacustrine deltas built out by the Stung Sen and Stung Chikreng, and it is blocked at the eastern end by sedimentation which forms the Veal Phoc (Plain of Mud).

The amount of water in the lake varies widely. At low water (November to June) its area is about 1,000 square miles and its breadth 22 miles. Its water then drains to the Lower Mekong across the Veal Phoc through great floating islands of tangled vegetation. At high water (June to October) its area may be 4,000 square miles, its width 65 miles and water flows into it from the Mekong. This reversal of flow at the flood season reflects the fact that the Mekong is so sedimenting its distributaries that it has seasonal difficulty in discharging to the sea. The Tonle Sap thus acts as safety valve for the Mekong, probably explaining the low flood risk in the Mekong Delta, which needs no embanking such as is essential in Tonkin.

(*b*) Through the lowland east of Tonle Sap, the Mekong continues a southward course as an elaborately braided stream over flat clay lowlands above which small sandstone outliers rise as low hills, as near Khone. Rapids in the Mekong below Khone are caused by an east-west belt of basalt and there are minor obstacles of similar type near Kratie.

(*c*) *The Mekong Delta* may be considered to begin from Phnom Penh (Fig. 101) where the Tonle Sap outflow joins the Mekong and the whole river divides into two major distributaries, the Fleuve Anterieur and the Fleuve Posterieur, which in turn subdivide before reaching the sea. The delta merges and is continuous with the Vaico-Saigon deltas on the north which are less fertile and less populated. The whole is built of sticky

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FIG. 101.—The Mekong Delta

mud with occasional belts of fluvial sands. Except at the mouth of the Saigon River, the delta's coast is not approachable by major shipping and the distributaries are unnavigable except for very small boats. The Ca Mau Peninsula (Presqu'ile de Ca Mau) is a gigantic spit, built from Mekong materials carried southeast by marine currents. It is extensively forested and advancing seaward at 200 ft. a year, so that charts of it are unreliable.

Cambodia roughly consists of (*a*) and (*b*), whereas most of Cochinchina is (*c*).

On the Mekong Delta, a midsummer drop of the otherwise high temperature is caused by rains which here derive from southerly winds in a monsoon régime; at Saigon 76 in. of rain fall from April to December (with peaks in June and September) and only 4 in. during the rest of the year.

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000 The delta floods resemble those of Lower Siam. Cultivation depends entirely on the natural flood rhythm and there is practically no controlled irrigation. At Bathé, for example, on the border of Rachgia and Long Xuyen, from October to January the Mekong is flooding its delta to depths from 18 in. to 6 ft.; during July and August the delta is flooded by local rains. For these conditions, "floating rice" was devised and introduced at the end of the eighteenth century, an innovation which alone made possible the great increase of paddyland on the delta this century. "Floating paddy" is sown (without using a seed-bed) in the dry period of March and left to grow through the river-floods for harvesting in January when they subside. Strains of this paddy may have stalks as long as 18 ft., which permit the plant to continue growing through floods which would drown normal types of paddy.

Of the population of this whole lowland, about 4.6 million are in the Cochinchina portion and only 3 million in the much larger Cambodian portion (Fig. 102). In the former, the average rural density is about 150 and in the latter 40 per square mile. In the Mekong Delta itself densities reach 250 per square mile, far below those for the Tonkin Delta, an interesting contrast between two deltaic regions of similar climate and agriculture. The explanation lies in the physiography of the Mekong Delta which has been the scene of faster deposition and more dangerous inundations (comparable with the Chao Praya floods) than the technology of earlier Cambodians could deal with. The Indian colonial period here is fairly well documented: at that time interest centred round what is now the Tonle Sap, more particularly at Angkor on the line of overland routes into Siam, an area where there appears to have been prolonged social disruption by disease and flood. The parts of the delta most densely populated and intensively cultivated today are those where Annamites have immigrated from seaward, more recently, causing population to increase very rapidly this century.

Though elsewhere generally rural, the population of the lowlands is urbanised at Saigon and Cholon, twin towns on the northeast margin, whose combined population totals about a quarter of a million people. These twin towns are not upon any Mekong distributary, but on the Vaico and Saigon Rivers, though these are linked by old channels to the Mekong and their deltas are

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000 continuous with those of the Mekong. Thus Saigon has a site value relative to the Mekong similar to that of Rangoon and the Irrawaddy.

Where the deltaic soils are specially fertile and water control has been developed for paddy cultivation, new populations have settled ; towards the coast the population thins, where tides make the subsurface water brackish and prejudice farming. Away from the distributaries, on the interfluves or mesopotamia, the population also thins out. Distinct linear patterns of settlement along the river banks and along the lobate lines of old dunes, now well inland from the sea, are apparent throughout the delta.

In the Cambodian plains, densest population spreads across the lowlands from the Cochinchina border towards Kompong Chhnang and Kompong Cham. Phnom Penh, the state capital, is fairly central to this lowland though eccentric to the state as a whole. Population round Tonle Sap is confined to a narrow band between the marshes bordering the lake and the forested hills. Most villages are above the limit of summer floods and therefore well away from the lake itself, though some pile villages have grown up close to it, Angkor, the ancient capital near the country town of Siem Reap, lies well north from the lake today, though its old importance probably hinged upon waterside location during the Indian colonial period. Battambang, second town of Cambodia, lies far south of the lake on a well cultivated lowland now connected by rail to Phnom Penh.

In Cochinchina 5.5 million acres were under rice prewar, as were a further 2 million acres round Tonle Sap and its adjoining Cambodian lowlands. This cultivated area had increased four times since about 1875 and rice monopolised it more than anywhere else in Indochina, though the farming was much less intensive than in Tonkin. On the delta zone, where the rice pioneers have been most active and effective, the yield averages about 10½ cwts. per acre; characteristic of the landscape are special granaries for storing that rice which is paid as rent-in-kind by the tenant farmers. A variety of floating paddy is grown in the fields liable to specially deep floods round Tonle Sap. About 3 million tons of rice are normally produced on the delta with another .9 million tons from Cambodia. The former is derived from compact holdings averaging 22 acres each held on a system by which the tenant halves the harvest with the landlord. In Cambodia 80 per cent of the

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holdings are less than 13 acres and for the most part owner cultivated. 00D

The agricultural situation arising from the Second World War differed from most parts of the region in being more affected by postwar disturbances than by wartime expediencies. While acreages under rice remained well up to prewar average in Cambodia, in Cochinchina they declined by nearly half in 1946-47, reflecting the delta's greater concern with rice as an article of trade.

The second activity is fishing in the Tonle Sap which produces tremendous quantities of fish, equalling the total sea fisheries of Indochina. The fish are dried, smoked or fermented for export from the region by junks which move out of the lake to the Mekong by way of the Snoc Trou or mud flats. In many places the junks must be pushed through mud and vegetation rather than floated in the ordinary sense, taking 15 days to reach Phnom Penh from Kompong Luong. There is a sea-fishing industry round the Mekong Delta where the river discharge contains much food for fish.

Saigon, chief port of South Indochina, is on a river accessible by seagoing vessels of 27 ft. draught despite the shifting bars and curves which make it an awkward entry. These defects are aggravated by the port being located off the main lines of Southeast Asia shipping routes. Very much a French town in atmosphere and layout, Saigon's trade and industry centres on rice; practically the whole of Indochina's export of rice passes through this port and its mills. Its general trade, apart from the rice export which moved characteristically to ports elsewhere in Asia, was closely linked to France until 1940.

The isolated *Mountains of West Cambodia*, the Cardamom and Elephant Mountains, resemble an island surrounded on the one side by the Gulf of Siam, and on the other by the fertile Mekong lowlands and their extensions westward to Lower Siam. Densely forested and very rainy, the Cardamom Mountains are the highest points of a plateau over 3,000 ft. high, a little known area of crystalline and calcareous rocks with short, violent and deeply entrenched rivers. Its coast is lined with miles of inaccessible cliff, broken by low-lying estuaries supporting isolated farmers. The zone is negative, isolated and very thinly peopled.

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Chapter Twenty

THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL LANDSCAPE OF INDOCHINA

The Population Pattern

000 Indochina has an average population density of over 200 per square mile, greater than that of Siam and Burma, yet scarcely 8 per cent of the country is cultivated and settled. Large areas are virtually unpopulated, leaving the agricultural areas with densities of over 1,000 per square mile, thus repeating the Southeast Asia pattern of congestions and empty spaces standing side by side (Fig. 102).

The empty spaces of Indochina are repugnant to people of the crowded coasts and deltas because the forests and mountains are considered to have endemic malaria from which the lowlands are relatively free. The malaria of these forests has not only prevented permanent internal colonisation in modern times, but also undermined the stamina of people already settled there and is thought to have diminished their natural reproduction. The barrier of malarial forests largely accounts for the greater success of coastwise migrations into Southeast Asia from the north, as compared with overland movements which have petered out in the last century or so. The rise and fall of historic kingdoms in Southern Indochina may also be related to this disease factor, which has discouraged population in the uplands. No doubt there has been a slow expansion of highland people, suggested by the rapid silting up of the lowlands in modern times, but the net effect has been unfavourable to the uplands.

Of 24 million (1947) people, over 72 per cent are Annamites, most of whom live outside the state of Annam, and 13 per cent are Cambodians. The other large groups are : 1.3 million Laotians (in Laos and Cambodia) and about 1 million Mois in the mountains. The chief non-indigenous peoples are the Chinese of Southern Indochina towns. Three-quarters of the total population is rural and the total urban population in 1936 was only

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about a million, shared between the towns of Hanoi, Saigon, Cholon and Phnom Penh.

Because the population is rural and dependent both for income and for subsistence on the one crop, rice, the people are largely concentrated in the rice-growing areas. The ratio of population to rice areas, the "nutrition density," is thus more relevant than the ratio of population to state areas. There are fairly wide variations of nutrition density state by state. Many districts have far greater nutritional densities than those of the state as a whole. Cua Bang, for example, is a Tonkin province with a nutrition density of eight per acre!



FIG. 102.—Density of Population in Indochina

Population pressure is clearly most acute in Tonkin and the Annamite lowlands and least in the Mekong Valley.

INDOCHINA: NUTRITION DENSITIES BY STATES

	Persons per acre of paddy (1941–46)
Annam	2.5
Cambodia	1.2
Cochinchina	1.0
Laos	.9
Tonkin	2.6

Reliable censuses began only in 1906, since when the Indochinese population as a whole has increased by about 1.2 per cent per annum, a rate fairly constant throughout the country at the present time. Thus Indochina has added another 75 per cent to its population during the course of this century.

The contrast in population density between the crowded alluvial lowlands and the thinly peopled uplands reflects differences

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DOD in agricultural potentiality, differences in outlook, and different forms of land utilisation. The Annamites in the deltaic lowlands round the Red River have grappled with the difficult conditions there and acquired a reputation as hardworking farmers; the Mekong lowlands, originally developed without continued success by Cambodians and Laotians, later received large numbers of Annamites who settled and coped satisfactorily with the Mekong paddylands, which thus were some of the last in Southeast Asia to be brought into production. Why Cambodians should thus have lagged behind other communities in agricultural initiative is not easily determined, especially in view of their historic importance, of which we have evidence at Angkor. It is probably less an inherent defect of Cambodians and more a combination of progressive debility, high disease rates and a long series of Mekong inundations which for a period were beyond control by the techniques available.

Migration

Migration in Indochina has assumed several forms. When the agricultural potentialities of the Mekong Delta began to be realised early this century, large numbers of Chinese from South China and Hainan immigrated to take up land, and later to specialise in trade along the inland waterways. Few of these farm immigrants are still agriculturists. The Chinese community has fluctuated with the state of trade, although local nationalism in modern times has put a brake upon it, but Chinese are important as rice dealers (recalling the situation in Siam), rural moneylenders, fish dealers and middlemen. Until 1941, Chinese were continuing to immigrate into Southern Indochina. The total in Indochina as a whole was 293,000 in 1912, 400,000 in 1926 and 326,000 in 1936.

More significant, though less easy to analyse in detail from statistics available, has been the migration of Annamites from overcrowded Tonkin and Annam to the Lower Mekong. Transport difficulties hindered the movement of Annamite peasants, who in addition have an aversion to leaving their traditions and their home fields, however congested. They moved on short contracts to plantations in the hill zones, but they avoided the mosquito-infested forested areas when they sought permanent settlement. Despite these factors, about 4 million Annamites now

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live in the paddylands of Cochinchina, the result less of recent events and more of that steady southward drift of Annamites which has been going on since the 14th century, and has gone on irrespective of the French conquest and the development of local politics. Only figures for contract-labourers are available, and of these 10,000 Annamites moved into South Indochina each year so that the population balance of the country as a whole has been steadily changing, however small the movement in proportion to the congested population of the north.

Ethnic Groups

In Indochina is found again the contact between earlier people of Indian and Far Eastern origin who have left influences in culture, religion and language (Fig. 103). The old Hindu tradition centres in Cambodia and the Chinese tradition in Tonkin, so that the two major population foci, the Mekong and the Red River lowlands, differ ethnically; the areas between are zones of interaction between these peoples and the migrant hill people at different stages of development, who are partly wanderers overland from the north and partly refugees from the lowlands. Thus Indochina's physiographic differences are paralleled by different population densities and differing ethnic groups, and the impediment of the Chaine Annamitique has served at once to separate the major groups and to conserve a few hill peoples.

Among the peoples we may distinguish two distinct types:

1. The South Mongoloid people, fairly short, bracycephalic, with short flattened nose, straight black hair, the epicanthic eye and a yellowish-brown skin. Annamites often show these features clearly, retaining their slight build even after considerable intermingling with other types. The Laos of the Middle Mekong Valley are of this Mongoloid group which has spread south and east from Tibet and Siam (see also Fig. 62).
2. A short, long-headed, moderately broad-nosed people with wavy black hair and straight eyes is a type widespread in the East Indies and represented here by the Cambodians who, while mostly a cross between South Indian colonists and Mongoloids, are smaller, darker and better built people than Annamites. The physical types among the Mois, in Laos particularly, are generally Nesiot, though many hill groups relate to woolly-haired Negritos.

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

FIG. 103.—Ethnic Distributions in Indochina

These physical distinctions between North and South Indochina are emphasised by language (Fig. 118). The Tonkinese and Annamites have monosyllabic tonal languages, related to Cantonese, once ideographic and now rendered into a romanised form. Southern and western parts of Indochina use Cambodian or Khmer languages, which have no tones, are polysyllabic and written in a derivative of a South Indian script. Tai, used close to the Siamese border, while tonal, has many Cambodian roots. The hill peoples speak languages allied with Malay, Burmese and

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Tibetan, and many almost extinct languages are preserved among them. 000

Indochinese Agricultural Types

Agriculture in Indochina is generally of the subsistence type, direct consumption of home-grown produce limits the circulation of commodities and of money among the peasants. Plantation agriculture, under European direction, has developed only this century and the area involved is less than 1 million acres as compared with 14 million acres of indigenous cultivation, and Indochina's total area of 185 million acres. The indigenous agriculture concentrates in the lowlands, the plantations in the uplands, more especially in the more fertile "terres rouges" over laterised basic lavas in the southern Chaine Annamitique.

The Tonkin and Mekong Deltas are the key farming areas, with small but well-cultivated patches in the innumerable small coastal basins of Annam. The Tonkin Delta has been built up of alluvial loams, sands and clays in proportions varying from place to place. North of the Red River and west of Hai Duong the alluvium is sandy, elsewhere a loam of red, yellow or grey colour predominates. These soils are laterised, accounting for the tendency to bake hard when left bare for a time. Cultivation and repeated flooding by the heavily silted Red River seems to be stemming the worst effects of laterisation, enabling soil fertility to be maintained despite very heavy cropping. In Cochinchina the most fertile areas are of recent Mekong alluvium which has a high nitrogen and potassium content but is deficient in lime and phosphorus. Certain alluvials round Saigon appear to have suffered podsolisation, to become infertile sandy grey earths not suited for agriculture.

Three types of indigenous land utilisation (Fig. 104) have grown up in different regions:

(*a*) Coastal plains to the east as far south as Binh Dinh are intensely cultivated with two or three crops each year, on a subsistence basis with negligible trade in agricultural products.

(*b*) On the plains of the Lower Mekong and Tonle Sap, land is farmed more extensively. Only one crop is usually obtained each year and much potential farmland remains unused. From this zone of relatively low population, a considerable surplus

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

FIG. 104.—Land Use in Indochina

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of rice is produced for trade, forming the chief source of Indochinese rice exports. OOD

(*c*) In the jungles, the hill tribes follow the self-sufficing system of shifting cultivation.

The human ecology of rice shows clearest in the older, more intensive agricultural districts of Tonkin and Annam, where personal or family farming (as opposed to tenant farming) and seasonal communal co-operation is customary. There the peasant has a small thatched wooden house, stilted for security and nucleated into small hamlets (an isolated farmhouse is unusual) but at the same time close to his small fields. A few fowls and pigs are his only livestock and produce little cash income. On an average, individual peasants do not own buffaloes or oxen, but a group of them shares one animal for ploughing. The simple farming tools are everywhere home-made, almost entirely of wood, for rural Indochina is still largely in "the Wood Age."

To illustrate how self-sufficing the system is, Gourou took samples in 1934 which showed that the net cash receipts of the Tonkin farmer averaged only $32 per annum. It is to be understood that such farms produced enough rice for home consumption and this cash represented all that was available for sale off the farm after subsistence needs had been met.

In Cochinchina, the most recently developed rice-growing region, large personal holdings of land were staked out before development began, so that cultivation through tenant farmers is the usual practice. Peasants find it difficult to obtain suitable virgin land and a floating labouring population exists, often made up of those who need wages to send back money to families in northern Indochina. The usual tenant family rents 12 to 25 acres of paddyland on which all members must help. The tenant pays 50 per cent of the crop as rent in kind, consumes most of the balance in his own family, and goes as wage earner for short periods to obtain a margin of cash which the sale of the excess rice is insufficient to produce for him. Cochinchinese tenant farmers have annual cash receipts averaging $75-100.

In all parts of Indochina the farmers become involved with moneylenders, who are often the Chinese merchants upon whom the peasant depends for selling rice and purchasing his other needs, as has been the case with Burmese peasants.

Of the 15 million acres cultivated (1940), 12½ million acres

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000 were under paddy, which provided about 6 million tons of cleaned rice, supplying 90 per cent of the Indochinese diet and 70 per cent of the exports. The whole rhythm of rural life centred on rice, which set the pace also for general commercial activity. The margin of rice exported, 1.3 million tons per annum for 1936–40, was only about 20 per cent of the annual production, so that given normal wide fluctuations of climate, yield and price, Indochinese commerce depended on a narrow margin.

As a result of postwar dislocations rather than of the war itself, the rice export declined to a nominal 90,000 tons for 1950. There is no reason to suppose that paddy acreages throughout Indochina have decreased as spectacularly. Over the period 1941–48 about 4.5 million acres went out of cultivation in South Indochina (cf. 3 million in South Burma, Chapter 10).

Maize has been introduced as a supplementary crop on paddy-lands for years when the rice crop is below normal. Although supported by preferential tariffs on the French market, maize made little headway as a crop though very widely grown and fairly prominent in the export trade with France.

Tropical root crops (sweet potatoes and yams) and tropical fruits are grown as dry season crops in small patches, generally for home use. The limit of coconut cultivation is in middle Annam, northwards of which winter temperatures are too low. Extensive coconut plantations have been located near Bong Son, Binh Dinh, Faifoo, Quang Ngai, My Tho, Ben Tre and Vinh Long. Groundnuts were grown in the Tonkin Delta but vegetable oils entered little into trade, because of competition with vegetable oils in other French territories and of the French home preference for olive oil in domestic use.

A quick-growing dwarf mulberry pecular to Indochina is often grown in combination with rice round Hai Duong in Tonkin, and Thanh Hoa, Quang Nam and Binh Dinh in Annam, for feeding silkworms as a cottage industry. The quality of silk has not been good or cheap enough for the European market, but some went to Siam's cottage weavers. Cotton cultivation was tried in Thanh Hoa and in Cambodia, but never produced enough for local needs; the crop does not attract peasants because of its poor return, although climate, soil and rural conditions otherwise suit the plant.

Sugar is grown as a peasant crop, occupying just over 100,000

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acres, of which the majority is in Annam (the Quang Ngai-Phu Yen lowland) and east Cochinchina (particularly in the Vaico Oriental, Saigon and Dong Nai Valleys). The crop is carelessly processed and therefore gives a poor yield so that the total production of sugar is less than the peasant consumption.

The well-populated districts of Nam Dinh in Tonkin, Tourane-Faifoo in Annam, and Gia Dinh, Hoc Mon and Kompong Cham in the Mekong lowlands cultivate poor quality tobacco, which needs considerable labour and forms a dry-season cash crop for peasants, although it is unsuitable for export.

Indochina has been the world's second largest pepper producer. Characteristically a product of Chinese cultivators, on the Kampot plains of Cambodia, the crop hitherto went almost entirely to France.

Plantation agriculture was started in Indochina as part of the colonial system and concentrated mainly along the Saigon River and the Dong Nai in Cochinchina, in the "terres rouges" districts, near Kompong Cham in Cambodia, and scattered through Laos and north Annam. Of the large plantation holdings by Frenchmen, nearly two-thirds were under paddy and sublet to tenant farmers, a condition unparalleled in any other Southeast Asia colonial territory; the rest was in rubber, coffee and tea.

Indochinese rubber plantations appeared later than those elsewhere in Southeast Asia, totalling in 1940 less than 150,000 acres spread over 350 plantations, mostly in eastern Cochinchina and Cambodia. Producing about 52,000 tons in 1950, the industry had to be repeatedly state-supported and was primarily related to the tariff-protected market of France, rather than to the world market.

Coffee, one of the earliest plantation enterprises, has ceased to be important in Indochina. Begun originally in the hills near Phu Ly, cultivation rapidly shifted south as soil became exhausted, to small estates on the "terres rouges" of Central and South Annam, near Vinh, Quang Tri and on the Plateaux of Darlac and Lang Bian. Only a small proportion of the 1,500 tons of coffee produced went into export.

Political Units

Indochina as a unit was a creation of French administrators who exercised a single political control over the different physical, economic and human regions which were divided into the following

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ODD administrative units, whose modern names show that they are evolved from historic political units :

1. *Cochinchina*, which became a French colony in 1862, was previously an outlier of the Empire of Annam, and never before a unit on its own. There is little correlation between Cochinchina and its physical setting—the seaward fringe of the Mekong Delta—and it is populated by Annamites.
2. *Cambodia*, a kingdom which began as a Hindu colony, is centred in the Tonle Sap-Lower Mekong agricultural area and was much used in earlier times as an overland route between west and east.
3. *Annam* was a historic unit, under its own emperor, and has been militantly expanding southward since the 14th century.
4. *Tonkin* was also an "Empire" which had for long been under Chinese suzerainty. Its conquest by the French in 1884 was in effect a Sino-French conflict and later the "empire" became the focus of Indochinese nationalism and "Viet Nam."
5. *Laos* was originally a group of small principalities pulled politically between Annam and Siam.

The units constituted "The Union of Indochina," in which Cochinchina was a French colony and the other units French protectorates under a Governor-General in Saigon. The political centre of gravity had previously been well to the north in Hanoi as opposed to the first millenium centre on Tonle Sap. The French established a new focus, serving to emphasise the divergent outlook between the north (the Annamite area, base of the Viet Nam movement) and the south (the Cambodian area). The political units relate to the geographical pattern : Tonkin is roughly the Red River Delta, Annam is shut in between the negative Chaine Annamitique and the South China Sea, Cochinchina is a conventionally-bounded fringe to the broad Mekong lowlands which as a whole form Cambodia. The unity instituted by the French is planned to continue as a federation of four states.

Industries

Mining industries have been developed on western lines and peasant industries are limited to small-scale production by village or cottage workers of pottery, cotton textiles, basket-work and woodwork for domestic use.

Of the worked minerals, coal, and tin with its tungsten associate,

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have been by far the most important, valued at 63 per cent and 29 per cent respectively of the total Indochina mining production of $9.5 million (1937).

Coal was mined almost entirely from the Quang Yen field which stretches in a fairly large arc close to the coast north of the Red River. Close to the surface and fairly horizontally bedded, the coal, of anthracitic, smokeless and high calorific type, was first mined opencast. As mining moved east into descending strata, shaft systems became necessary. Capable of about 2½ million tons per annum, the fields have the advantages of accessibility, proximity to shipping and the best type of coal in all Southeast Asia, where coal deposits of any kind are few. There are small inland extensions of coal at Tuyen Quang and Phan Me, where production has never been significant, which was also the case at the small field of Nong Son in Central Annam. Total production in 1950 was .48 million tons (cf. 2.3 million tons in 1938).

Tin came into production very recently in Indochina, to achieve an annual output of 1,500 tons by 1940. It was produced at two centres—which together produced only 60 tons in 1950:

(*a*) Near Cao Bang in the Pia Ouac Massif of Tonkin, close to the Chinese border, as an outlier of the Yunnan tin-fields. Here the lode tin, which is associated with wolfram, produced about 40 per cent of the Indochina output and went by way of Haiphong to Singapore for smelting.

(*b*) Near Nam Patene in Laos, close to the Mekong, a basin of alluvial tin has been mined, to produce 60 per cent of Indochina's tin. Sulphurous and ferruginous minerals associated with Nam Patene cassiterite make it less simple to smelt. The ore travelled down the Mekong for export to Singapore smelters.

Zinc had been produced in widely fluctuating volume at Cho Dien in Tonkin, but difficulties of production, transport and varying demand operated against it. Small quantities of silver, lead, antimony, iron ore (from Kompong Thom in Cambodia and Thai Nguyen in Tonkin), gold, phosphates and precious stones have also been produced but have little significance as a whole.

Communications and Trade

The road pattern consists of a fan of roads round Hanoi, another opening through the Mekong lowlands from Saigon, and the two

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000 linked by a coast road through Annam. The road from Saigon along the Mekong is only seasonally usable throughout its length to Vientiane.

The railway system is more sketchy, though designed to establish cohesion between the northern and southern zones of population and production. The main line runs between Saigon and Hanoi, keeping close to the east coast. A separate line from Phnom Penh to Mongkol Borey provides an isolated system intended to link Cambodia to the lower Mekong river shipping and avoid the mud flats below Tonle Sap. From Haiphong and Hanoi a railway has overcome considerable relief difficulties to run northwest into Yunnan as far as Kunming, the only railway to inner China. It was always a restricted service, carrying scarcely 300,000 tons of freight per annum in prewar times.

The external routes are shipping lines to Saigon, a few local shipping services to Haiphong and an airline linking Saigon to Bangkok, Singapore and Hongkong. A considerable coastwise shipping goes on, linking the population centres of Annam and taking part in trade with Siam and South China.

Indochina is primarily an exporter of agricultural produce of low value in proportion to weight. Of the total exports in 1950, valued at $210 million, rice formed 20 per cent, rubber 50 per cent and maize 4 per cent. The last two items went primarily to France, the rice to China, Japan, the East Indies and France in that order of value.

Its imports are mainly processed goods, generally few and costly. Of the 1950 imports, valued at nearly $700 million, 28 per cent were textiles and fibres, 25 per cent were metals and machinery, of French origin.

Indochina's total trade after the war was 10 per cent with the Far East, largely with China, 10 per cent with U.S., and 60 per cent with France. Rice, rubber and tin went into trade at Singapore, entrepôt for the rice consuming and tin and rubber producing territories of Southeast Asia.

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Chapter Twenty-one

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

PHYSIOGRAPHY

133 ELEVEN islands, Luzon, Mindanao, Samar, Negros, Palawan, Panay, Mindoro, Leyte, Cebu, Bohol and Masbate, in that order of size, account for 95 per cent of land area in the Philippines. The other 7,000 islands of the group are mostly a few rocks or corals showing above the sea, with areas of less than one square mile each. Themselves separated from the Asiatic mainland by deep seas, the Philippines are flanked to the east by one of the world's profound oceanic trenches (over 7 miles deep) and they form part of the "fiery girdle" of volcanoes, earthquakes and tectonic instability, which rim the Pacific on meridional lines. A knot of different structural lines sets the pattern of these islands. Through Luzon, Samar, Leyte and Mindanao distinct N-S. fold-fault systems are apparent in continuation of that line of structures paralleling the eastern edge of the Sunda Platform. To complicate the physiography, volcanoes and their ejecta dominate the landscape from the south as far as the southern peninsula of Luzon, an extension of the volcanic line evident in Minahasa. Athwart these meridional trends lies another continuing the ancient SW-NE. form lines of British North Borneo and marked by horst and graben landforms such as the deep collapsed block now containing the Sulu Sea which is edged with linear fracture remnants forming the Palawan and Sulu Islands. It may also be traced in the alignment of the Zamboanga Peninsula of Mindanao and in the islands of Negros and Panay.

The Philippines can be conveniently grouped as (1) Luzon, the large, well-populated island of the north; (2) the Visayan Islands, arranged roughly radially round the Visayan Sea, and including Samar, Negros, Panay, Leyte, Cebu, Bohol and Masbate; (3) Mindanao, the second largest island, well to the south; (4) Palawan and the Sulu Islands, stepping stones between the Philippines and Borneo. High relief is general throughout the islands which are surrounded by reefs and marine terraces of coral, accounting

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133 for the difficulty of approach in modern times. Luzon and Mindanao are the only units of sufficient area to have distinctive regional differences within them.

Upon the islands limestone, shales and sandstones occur in small outcrops and cause local variations of soil.

To the north in Luzon the Cagayan Valley flows meridionally in a tectonic trough between the eastern high Sierra Madre Mountains and the Central Cordillera on the west, to form one of the key agricultural regions of the Philippines. Roughly paralleling it farther east beyond the Central Cordillera, the Middle Luzon or Manila Plain opens to the sea at both ends, at the Lingayen Gulf and Manila Bay, and forms a densely populated farming zone. The Central Cordillera extends south to the latitude of Manila, whence it is interrupted by a graben-like lake plain, the province of Laguna. South and east of Laguna, Luzon loses its meridional form lines to become a fretted, varied country of volcanoes, spreading from Taal Mountain behind Batangas to Mayon Mountain near Albay. On the east of Mindanao the Diuata Mountains repeat the meridional structural lines and are separated by the Agusan Valley from the Lanao-Bukidnon upland where groups of extinct volcanoes cause the Cotabato River to have a complicated course in part meridional, in part related to the SW-NE. structure of the Zamboanga Mountains, and provide soils whose qualities make the valley the largest potential agricultural area of the territory. Mindanao otherwise has a landscape of high rugged mountains and rolling uplands; Mt. Apo at 9,450 ft. is the highest Filipino mountain.

Throughout the Philippines drainage is by short, violent streams of immature development.

Climate

132 Insularity and latitude combine to make the climate of the Philippines distinctively even and mild in its temperatures which range between 75° F. and 85° F. everywhere and throughout the year. More variety from place to place and seasonally is evident in the rainfall régime yet even in this respect there are neither the extremes of total rainfall nor the seasonal contrasts to be found in comparable latitudes of Burma, Siam and Indochina. Streams of the southern and northern tropical air masses play over these islands in a rhythm differing from the rest of South-

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east Asia as a result of the northeastern oceanic location. The northern air masses exercise by far the most continuous influence, flowing over the islands from October to April without modification as northerly and later easterly winds. May is the month of equatorial calms, particularly to the west. From July to August southern tropical air comes as winds from slightly east of south bringing very heavy rains everywhere, especially to the western islands.

RAINFALL IN THE PHILIPPINES (inches)

	Jan.	*Feb.*	*Mar.*	*Apr.*	*May*	*June*	*July*	*Aug.*	*Sept.*	*Oct.*	*Nov.*	*Dec.*	*Total*
Baguio	1.2	.7	1.9	4.9	15.8	15.7	42.3	45.5	28.3	17.0	3.4	2.2	178.6
Paracale ..	18.1	10.9	8.1	4.1	7.0	8.5	11.4	6.8	9.6	20.6	19.5	20.0	144.6
Manila	1.0	.5	.7	1.2	5.1	9.9	17.0	16.6	14.4	7.7	5.6	2.5	82.2
Tacloban	14.0	8.7	6.2	5.3	6.2	7.9	6.9	5.5	6.0	8.0	10.9	14.0	99.6
Zamboanga	2.1	2.2	1.5	2.0	3.5	4.2	4.9	4.0	4.7	5.7	4.2	3.4	42.4
Cebu	4.2	2.9	2.0	1.7	4.5	6.4	7.2	5.7	6.9	7.7	6.4	5.0	60.6
Davao	4.8	4.4	5.2	5.8	9.3	9.1	6.5	6.5	6.7	7.9	5.3	6.1	77.6

These conditions interact with the variations of altitude and differences of aspect to produce four types of rainfall (Fig. 105):

1. An alternation of wet and dry seasons: a dry winter and spring followed by a wet summer and autumn bring to western parts of Luzon, Mindoro, Negros, Panay and Palawan a régime resembling that of Burma, though the cool season is more humid.
2. A wet season throughout the year with a distinct maximum in winter is characteristic of the Bicol district of South Luzon, eastern Samar, Leyte and eastern Mindanao.
3. An important variant of (2) has no pronounced heavy rainy season, yet considerable rains fall most of the year with a minimum but by no means a drought for about two months in spring. The Cagayan Valley, the plains round the Visayan Sea, and north-central Mindanao, significantly the important agricultural areas, experience this rainfall régime.
4. An insular uniformity of rains at all seasons, without pronounced wetter or drier seasons, occurs as a coastal régime along northeast Luzon, southwest Bicol and east Mindoro, western Leyte and most of central and western Mindanao.

Total rainfalls vary between 40 in. and 180 in. with highest falls on southwest aspects.

The Philippines form probably the world's most typhoon-infested area because just east of the islands is the zone where

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

FIG. 105.—Régimes of Rainfall in the Philippines

begin the typhoons moving towards East Asia (Fig. 14), so that the Philippines feel the effects, if not always the full force, of most of those typhoons which finally cross Indochina, South China and Japan. In the period July-September the typhoon tracks invariably pass across Luzon. During November-December, which are also months of intense cyclonic activity, the tracks more frequently cross the Visayan Sea. At the onset of the typhoon

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seasons, cyclones take a more south-to-north route across the Philippines. Very few typhoons ever cross Mindanao in which respect that island resembles the East Indies. 132

Soils

Recent and frequent tectonic changes have produced highly diversified soils upon which laterisation is the process operative almost everywhere in the Philippines, although mature laterites are infrequent. Large areas have immature transported or volcanic ash soils and many coastal plains have a fertile soil derived from weathering of extensive uplifted corals, as in Cebu. Regular soil renewal is here a prerequisite for the maintenance of fertility, and zones with regular local flooding by heavily silted streams (as in the Cagayan Valley) or with frequent addition of volcanic ash (as in Negros) support the intensest and longest established agriculture. A contributory factor in the general low quality of soil in the Philippines is the persistence of shifting cultivation (called *caiñgin*) coupled with a steadily increasing population, and few areas of the main islands are not suffering from overcutting or overburning. 134

Land Utilisation

About 15 per cent of the Filipino surface is cultivated, though cultivation is most unevenly distributed (Fig. 106). On Luzon, the Cagayan Valley and the west coastal fringe of the Ilocos and La Union are narrow cultivated belts. The Manila Plain and its extensions through the volcanic peninsula south of Laguna de Bay is now the largest and most continuous agricultural area in the Philippines. Coastal plains of the Visayan Islands, Panay, Negros and Cebu, are prosperous agricultural areas whose continued fertility relates to basic volcanic soils and weathered coral soils. Elsewhere agricultural units are small and isolated, often related to local alluvial fans and transported volcanic ash. 311

Forests and Mining

Large patches of Tropical Rain Forest persist in northeast Luzon, on Samar, southern Negros, Palawan and, largest forest of all, on Mindanao, where the continuous forest cover resembles that of North Borneo. Tropical Swamp Forests having little 137

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

FIG. 106.—Agriculture in the Philippines

137 opportunity to develop in so youthful terrain, are only found round the lakes of the Agusan and Cotabato Valleys in Mindanao. Upon the Central Cordillera of Luzon relief has induced much pine forest. Large areas of Secondary Forest (called *cozon* in the Philippines) cover districts marginal to sedentary agriculture, where shifting cultivation is still widespread, i.e. on the flanks of the Central Cordillera, on Panay and Masbate and behind Cagayan and Cotabato on Mindanao.

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Mining has had little effect on Filipino land utilisation and has played a subdued and infrequent note on the landscape. That the region has igneous formations in its structure implies some mineralisation, against which have operated the difficulties of exploitation and the relatively unattractive yield of any one deposit, except for the gold of Luzon. While Luzon gold and rumours about it drew external interest from as far afield as China and Spain at various times, large-scale exploitation of the gold is very recent, most mines dating from about 1913, since when mining rose to a peak of value and volume in 1940. There were about 200 goldmining companies in 1940, yielding 1.1 million ounces, valued at $76 million, chiefly in Mountain Province of Luzon and centring on the lodes of Baguio and Bontok. Production was down to 31,000 oz. in 1947. The absence of any considerable coal deposits, apart from the low-grades on Cebu and Albany, retarded development of other minerals, but the domestic output of coal has been strikingly increased as a result of postwar necessity; in 1946 about 440,000 tons of coal were extracted as against 41,000 tons in 1938. Iron ore, once mined at Camariñes Norte for export to Japan had not resumed output by early 1948. Chrome ore produced in Zambales already approaches its customary output of 190,000 stones annually, while the manganese of Sequijor Island south of Cebu and of Basuanga (between Palawan and Mindoro) is only slowly being extracted again. Copper, the traditional metal of the volcanic east, is coming from Mountain Province now at a rate faster than prewar; this was a trading article sought in Luzon by early Chinese merchants.

Agriculture

Because it occupies a large area compared with other activities and employs over 70 per cent of all Filipino workers, agriculture has been the primary activity of the Philippines (Fig. 106). The types of crop are much the same as those of Southeast Asia, though differing in emphasis and equally unconcerned with animal farming. About 38 per cent of the cropped acreage is normally in paddy, one quarter of it on the dry system; 17 per cent of the farmland grows maize; tropical root crops (yams and tapioca) occupy 3 per cent of the cultivated area. These are all food crops grown for local consumption. In addition, 35 per cent of the cropped area is for commercial production and the emphasis in

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

FIG. 107.—The Northern Philippines

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241 the Philippines is on coconuts (on 25 per cent of the cropped area) with lesser acreages of hemp and sugar. The Philippines, by specialising in coconuts, clearly differs from the commercial cropping of most of Southeast Asia and relates more closely in agricultural pattern to the easternmost East Indies.

For social reasons, agriculture aiming at both food and trade has become more commercialised in the Philippines than elsewhere and maximum return, rather than sustained return, has been the farming objective, facilitated by the reliable, evenly distributed rains and the continuous growing season. Hence double cropping is very common. Rice often follows rice on the same piece of ground and corn follows corn, and rotational schemes are not much practised except in non-irrigated farming among the hills. Thus in 1938, 9.8 million acres were cultivated and 11.8 million acres were cropped, which means that about 20 per cent of the fields were double-cropped.

438 241 Regional agricultural specialisation appears very distinctly, encouraged by spatial isolation and by great differences in soil. Rice will grow to some extent on every island, but the heavier soils, level landscape and alternating wet and dry seasons of Central Luzon cause that area to be specially suited to lowland rice. Coconuts, which need a climate without prolonged dry season, are extensively grown in South Luzon. Abaca (Manila hemp) has been found peculiarly successful under the even rains and high humidity of Davao where volcanic soils retain their fertility even with this exacting crop.

Luzon may be divided into five agricultural regions (Fig. 107):

(*a*) The Central Luzon rice area, where sugar cane is the chief subsidiary.

(*b*) The Cagayan Valley with large rice areas pressed well up the hillsides on the elaborate terraces of the Igorotes (whose skill pre-dates commercial farming), and supplemented by tobacco and maize.

(*c*) In the Ilocos-Mountain region of northwest Luzon rice, maize and potatoes are grown on the narrow coastal plain.

(*d*) In that part of South Luzon east and south of Laguna and including Tayabas, is a zone growing rice as subsidiary to coconuts on large plantations.

(*e*) In the extreme southern tip of Luzon, the volcanic region, rice fades out to give place to an agriculture specialising in

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

FIG. 108.—Land Use in the Visayan Islands

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coconuts and abaca, the latter invariably associated with volcanic soils in the Philippines.

Among the *Visayan Islands* (Fig. 108), a zone of vigorous agricultural activity, Panay specialises in rice, and western Negros in sugar cane. Cebu is a maize island with subsidiary rice. The other Visayan Islands have a poorer agriculture based on rice, coconuts and a little subsidiary hemp and maize.

Mindanao, an undeveloped island (Fig. 109), is fringed with subsistence farms cultivating a little rice, maize and coconut, except in Davao where half the cultivated land carries hemp and a large acreage is in coconuts. In recent attempts to colonise this island, the uplands were leased as pastures but the success of animal husbandry there has yet to be demonstrated.

Farming methods resemble those of all Southeast Asia. The hoe, the mattock and small sickles (*karit*) are used on rice farms, and the wooden ploughs are of the older soil-opening rather than the soil-turning type. While much discussion of mechanical methods went on during the American colonial period, in total the modern tractor and harvester have had no significant place in

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

FIG. 109.—Land Use in Mindanao

438 the Filipino agricultural system, which is essentially small-scale
241 family farming. Over half the farms (as distinct from the properties) contain less than 5 acres each and about a quarter have only 2½ acres each. Farms are, however, much bigger in the commercial crop and pioneer areas of Mindoro, Mindanao, Negros and Masbate.

312 Irrigation is chiefly for rice, aiming to control and distribute water rather than to counter drought, so that most systems have no storage or reservoir arrangements. Only upon the irrigated land is double cropping possible. Sugar has been farmed on irrigated land to a minor extent—differing in this respect from the technique in Java. The Igorote water systems of Mountain Province are at least twelve centuries old and repeat in the Philippines that skilled and intensive farming evident on the Javanese hills. While 1¼ million acres of the Philippines were reported as irrigated in 1940, it was mostly mere bunding to retain direct rainfall. Over three-quarters of the irrigated land is in the Manila Plain.

241 Over the period 1946–50, agricultural yields in the Philippines

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241 were consistently low, lower than the Southeast Asia average. Only 630 lbs. of rice were obtained from each acre, less than that of any other Southeast Asia territory where yields in any case are low. In Luzon the yields are better than the Filipino average, usually by nearly 50 per cent.

243 *Rice.*—Self-contained subsistence farming is less prominent in the Philippines, for historic reasons, than in other Southeast Asia territories, but local foods, of which the most important are rice, maize and yams, occupy nearly 60 per cent of the cultivated area and meet the major food needs of the Filipino population as a whole. Prewar rice production was about 1.4 million tons annually as against 1.7 million for 1950. The islands are complementary in their food production and mutually self-supporting—normally the group neither imports nor exports rice internationally on any appreciable scale.

Rice stands upon 40 per cent of the cultivated land, to provide the most important single item of Filipino diet as well as a cash crop. While grown by small farmers for domestic consumption, large commercial estates (*haciendas*) of rice exist in Central Luzon and Panay, districts containing 30 per cent and 12 per cent respectively of all Filipino paddyland. Mindanao carries 10 per cent of Filipino paddy, reflecting the size of Mindanao rather than a special interest in rice production. Two-thirds of the total crop comes from Luzon alone, the chief rice surplus area, whence rice is shipped to the other islands, particularly to the Visayan islands which, though intensively farmed themselves, are also densely populated and form a zone of net rice deficiency. Nearly a quarter of the total rice production was of upland varieties largely from shifting cultivators who are prominent in the hilly, less developed areas of Batangas, Cavite, Mindoro, Palawan and Zamboanga. Altogether a thousand distinct varieties of rice are recognised, indicating the subtle variations in local conditions. Transplanting is the usual method for lowland rice which has two seasons, as against one for upland rice, sown on the broadcast system.

The first lowland wet paddy is transplanted as early as May in Mindanao, but is deferred until July to the north in the Cagayan Valley. This will be harvested from September in the south to January or February in the north. Second cropping is not customary far south: on the Visayan Islands second transplanting

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starts about November for harvesting in April and in the Cagayan Valley starts in February for harvesting at the end of June. This latitudinal variation in the timing of heavy work periods has major significance in encouraging inter-island migration of harvesting and planting labourers. 243

Dry paddy activities are a month or two earlier than those of the first wet paddy cropping.

In keeping with the practice of other Southeast Asia territories, rice harvesting makes heavy demands on labour because the cutting is by hand with a small sickle or a knife (the Filipino *yatab* is like the Malay *tuai*) and even farmers with a few acres are obliged to use outside labour, customarily on the basis of giving the harvesters a portion of the crop. Communal farming help is less common in the Philippines than elsewhere, probably the result of long association with Spanish land usages. Only in the intensive paddy-growing districts such as Central Luzon are modern rice mills to be found and milling is generally done by hand, after foot-threshing and wind-winnowing the rice. [412]

From Central Luzon milled rice went to Manila by rail, road and coastal vessels, the largest surpluses originating in Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, and Pargasinan. Thence it was traded exclusively by sea to Cebu, Davao, Albay and Negros, at two peak seasons of rice movement, January-February and August. This internal rice trade was largely done by Chinese dealers, paralleling the condition in most parts of Southeast Asia, with the result that Filipino nationalism was often directed to eliminating these "foreign" intermediaries even though they were frequently long-standing residents in the Philippines. 438 243

Maize.—Maize became one of the staples of Filipino diet as an effect of early and prolonged colonial association with Central America where maize was indigenous. It is grown a little on the upland belt with distinct wet and dry seasons, but is more general in areas without a dry season and it is very popular with shifting cultivators. For food, the maize is sun-dried, ground and eaten in various dishes resembling those of rice. It occupies a little less than half the acreage devoted to rice, the greatest single producing area being Cebu where half the cultivated land is under maize, producing a quarter of the Filipino total. Negros, Leyte and Mindanao between them account for nearly half the total maize acreage and the people of these four islands have become principally 243

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243 maize-eaters. Maize was also prominent in Bohol, Masbate, Isabela and Cagayan. Only a low yield was obtained, to produce 475,000 tons altogether (1947). In Cebu signs of soil exhaustion were becoming apparent in the maize yield which was there much lower than the Filipino average. Several maize crops can be raised each year and three seasons of planting-harvesting can be recognised though the first produces 60 per cent of the total, and the third crops are quite small. The chief seasons are (*a*) late winter or spring sowing (January to May), and (*b*) autumn sowing (October). Harvesting is in each case about three months after planting.

241 *Other Foods.*—While they occupy only a small acreage in any holding, yams, sweet potatoes and tapioca are prominent in local diet and very widely grown. During the war years these roots, which are easy to grow, attracted cultivators and increased their total acreage in 1947 by .35 million compared with 1938, to that extent offsetting rice shortages. Large quantities of legumes and savoury or peppery vegetables are cultivated to form a rounded diet which for most Filipinos is vegetarian, here by obligation rather than by religious conviction. The chief source of protein is inshore fishing which produces exclusively for local trade. Animal farming is negligible though buffaloes and oxen are the usual rural draught animals, the former being customary in the rice and sugar areas. Loss of half these animals during the war was the most serious obstacle to rural rehabilitation. No island specialised in animal breeding which is a widely distributed small-scale interest producing no animal exports.

Commercial Crops.—Of crops grown fundamentally for commerce, the most important have been sugar cane, coconuts, hemp and tobacco, together with small areas of crops which have been tried in nearby territories. Rubber has significantly not been taken up, although Mindanao has suitable climatic conditions; apart from about 800 tons produced annually from Zamboanga, interest in rubber was negligible.

177 *United States Influence.*—The reasons for the subdued development of Filipino commercial crops are :
241

1. The early Spanish colonial system did not encourage pioneer agricultural activities.
2. The change of colonial power in the Philippines towards the end of last century, followed by a Filipino-American War

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meant a state of insecurity and uncertainty at the very time when most other Southeast Asia territories were going ahead with commercial agriculture. By the time pacification had taken place, other tropical areas were too competitive to encourage new rivals in rubber or rice production. 177 241

3. Association with the United States tariff systems and the virtual autarchy of North America operated against the production of Filipino sugar, which had to compete with Cuban and Louisiana cane, of Filipino fruits, which rivalled Californian and Hawaiian products, and of Filipino tobacco, rivalling that of Georgia.
4. There was a sufficient field for investment and pioneering in the United States to dissuade from similar initiative so far away in the Philippines.
5. The working of Filipino gold mines conveniently paid for United States manufactured imports without stimulating Filipino agriculture to long-term improvement.
6. Isolated by distances and by politics from the rest of Southeast Asia, the Philippines were little influenced by experiments, incentives, and developments taking place there.

Sugar.—Although coconuts occupy the greatest cash crop acreage, sugar cane had first place in value. It was estimated for 1940 that 2 million Filipinos depended on sugar for their livelihood, $500 million were invested in it, and over the quinquennium 1935–39 sugar formed 45 per cent of export values. Among the world's major sugar producers, the Philippines ranked after India, Cuba, Java and Formosa. Sugar growing practically disappeared in 1942 with violent repercussions in Filipino country life; by 1947 only 9 per cent of the sugar acreage had been replanted and the production of sugar fell from its prewar annual average of 900,000 tons to 71,000 tons, which is less than half the domestic consumption. 249

Commercial sugar-growing centred on Luzon and Negros which combined about equally to produce 85 per cent of the total output. The Luzon sugar zones are Tarlac, Pampanga, Batangas, Laguna, Pargasinan and Bataan. Negros sugar plantations concentrated to the west of the island. In Luzon, sugar grows in conjunction with rice as a smallholding crop, half the farms averaging less than four acres each of sugar. The estate or *hacienda* system is more typical of Negros where there are over 400 estates cultivating

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249 between 250 and 650 acres each. Upon each of these as many as 250 men will be needed during the milling season, tapering to about a quarter of this number for the rest of the year. Hence for the brief harvest period thousands of labourers must be brought from Panay and Bantayan. Because the cane grows best on a sandy loam which is not flooded even during the rainy season, upland locations are favoured. Haciendas use mechanical equipment for ploughing, smallholders the buffalo and wooden plough. Planting is begun in October to the south, continuing until January farther north. On Negros second cropping of new canes rising from the old root stock (ratooning) is common, as in the West Indies. Harvesting starts in November and may go on through April, labourers using the *bolo*, a form of chopping knife common throughout these wooded zones (*vide* the Malayan *parang*). Haulage to the mills, known as "centrals," is by narrow-gauge railway in the commercial areas, or by cart to small mills producing coarse sugar for local use.

The system of milling is the one common even in Europe in sugar beet areas; the mill is a private concern entering into agreement with growers who undertake to plant a certain acreage regularly over a pre-arranged period which may be as much as three years. In return, the mill extracts the sugar on a percentage basis, retaining 40–50 per cent for their service. The balance of sugar is sold by the grower directly, through a cooperative, or through the mill as broker. Mills do not purchase sugar outright nor engage in planting. Of the centrals in 1941, 16 were on Luzon, 18 on Negros and 6 on Panay.

The average production over 1930–39 was nearly 1 million tons of refined sugar. This was double the amount produced in 1921 but represented a diminution of peak production (in 1933 it was 1.7 million tons) under a quota system arranged with United States producers. In one centre the fibre from the cane was used for paper-making and to brew large quantities of potable alcohol produced everywhere as a local liquor called *basi*. Production of sugar was distributed thus: Luzon, 33 per cent, Negros 59 per cent, Panay 5 per cent and, though the acreage of 1921 was about the same as in 1939, yield per acre had in fact doubled.

Coconuts.—In acreage planted and number of people engaged, coconuts have been an outstanding feature of Filipino cash farming. Over 2½ million acres under coconuts gave employment

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to 4 million Filipino people, to produce, for the 1935–39 period 29 per cent of export values. No other single state exported so much coconut and the Philippines supplied one-third of all vegetable oil exported from Southeast Asia. Coconut cultivation proved remarkably elastic over the war period largely because the trees are perennial and production can be increased or decreased within wide limits solely by varying the intensity of collecting the nuts. Most smallholders have coconuts growing on their land; whether they harvest or not depends on the inducement. Thus the yield in 1947 was nearly double that of the prewar average, enabling Filipinos to offset the collapse of their sugar industry. 249

Some 30 per cent of acreage under coconuts is in southern Luzon, on the wetter east side out of the track of the more damaging type of typhoon. On Mindanao was 22 per cent of the coconut acreage. Large plantations do exist, yet most of the crop comes from scattered smallholdings. The tree is a continuous producer after six years and smallholders harvest the dropped nuts rather than organise gathering from the tree. Ninety per cent of the nuts go to make copra, one-third by sun-drying, the balance smoke-dried. Over 1934–39, nearly .6 million tons of copra were exported annually, and the estimate for 1950 was .8 million tons. Copra is sacked among the islands and shipped in small boats to Manila, centre of the oil extraction and export trade, and to Cebu which reshipped overseas without processing.

Abaca.—This perennial plant, yielding a fine hemp-like fibre (Manila hemp), resembles a related species, the banana, and reaches heights of 10–20 ft. The fibre comes from the leaf sheath on stalks or shoots, of which 12-20 may grow from a single root. It is native to the Philippines, whence a large portion of the world supply still comes and averages 14 per cent of Philippine exports. 248

Abaca grows on rolling hills of well-drained fertile soil where there is an even heavy rainfall; a dry season is unfavourable. It grows commercially in South Luzon and Davao, the former carrying 43 per cent of total acreage, on a mixed farming basis, the latter having been a Japanese-managed speciality grown alone, and not in association with other crops. From a total area of three-quarters of a million acres, about 165,000 tons of fibre were produced, of which nearly half was from Davao; in 1947 production was half the normal. The fibres are extracted by a serrated or

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

FIG. 110.—Density of Population per square mile in the Philippines

248 smooth knife drawn up and down the sheath. One plant may go on producing for 25 years.

249 *Tobacco.*—First introduced from Mexico by Spanish missionaries, tobacco found the Philippine climate suitable and became commercially important after Filipinos learnt the smoking habit. During most of the 19th century tobacco was strictly a government monopoly and thereby restricted until the United States became accessible this century as market for Filipino cigars.

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249 Tobacco averaged 5 per cent of Filipino exports, for marketing in Spain, France, China and Japan from the tobacco areas of Cagayan, Cebu, Panay and Negros. Tobacco plants brought in from near Medan (Sumatra) have become favoured commercially in the Philippines. Production in 1947 was a third of prewar and was continuing to decrease.

The minor cash crops are: agave, grown for its fibre which resembles abaca; cotton, which has never been a leading crop despite Spanish hopes; kapok; coffee, which has lost the importance it had late last century, and derris, for insecticides.

The Population Patterns

162 An uneven distribution of people has developed in the Philippines (Fig. 110). Of 19.5 million Filipinos (1950 estimate), 24 per
161 cent live in the intensively farmed zones from the Lingayen Gulf southward through Manila and Laguna to Batangas. About 35 per cent of Filipinos live in the narrow congested plains encircling the Visayan Islands, forming a separate nucleation of people on the volcanic and weathered coral soils. Cebu and Pargasinan are by far the most densely populated areas, each exceeding 400 people per square mile. On the other hand, Palawan, Mindoro and Mindanao each have less than 25 per square mile, though north Mindanao has fairly well peopled pockets along the coast.

The picture is one of congested pockets and plains separated by nearly empty forested interiors where wander aboriginal tribes or
[262] an occasional pioneer practises shifting cultivation. The average nutritional density for the Philippines is over 1,000 per square mile of cultivated land, a very different picture from the overall 135 per square mile. Not counting urban groups, rural areas of Ilocos and Cebu have over 1,750 persons per cultivated square mile, so that the nutritional density is as high as anywhere in Southeast Asia.

Only to a very small extent did this local congestion produce migration to the emptier islands. Official encouragement to this end produced as little permanent result as in the East Indies.
166 There have been two distinct types of migration:

1. An inter-island seasonal migration, at the end of which mi-
464 grants returned to their home districts. The latitudinal extent of the Philippines and the consequent varying times of harvesting made possible this migration for wages which took the following lines:

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166 (*a*) From Ilocos on the west Luzon coast, to the tobacco farms of the Cagayan Valley.

464 (*b*) From Ilocos and La Union to the paddylands of Central Luzon and the sugar haciendas of Pampanga and Laguna.

(*c*) From Iloilo, Antique and Cebu to Western Negros sugar haciendas.

(*d*) From Cebu and Bohol to the coconut and abaca plantations of Mindanao.

(*e*) From Capiz, Batangas and Pampangas to the sugar plantations of Mindoro.

In this migration the labourers went to the same sort of work they did in their home districts. Some three-quarters of a million workers were usually involved in these movements, which varied in volume and direction with the yearly success and market value of each crop.

167 2. Long distance migration: while Filipinos were still United States citizens they moved in considerable numbers into the
464 ~~western~~ United States for a long period, hoping to return with enough money to settle comfortably in their home districts. Much of the oriental labour force in the western United States was Filipino. Over the quinquennium 1934–38, the net movement was a return to the Philippines because conditions in the United States were decreasingly favourable; for that period, emigration from the Philippines averaged 6,000 and immigration 23,600 per annum. This was characteristically a male migration, the families remaining in the islands. For a time organised migration of sugar workers under contract to the Hawaiian plantations also went on until recruiting ceased in 1932, after which it was disorganised and was merely part of the drift of Filipino emigrants eastwards across the Pacific. In all cases there was some permanent settlement by Filipinos overseas, particularly in Hawaii, that half-way house between East Asia and North America, whose conditions resembled those of the Philippines.

While there had been a steady gravitation towards the towns for many years, the Filipino was distinctly agricultural and rural. There were only six towns of more than 50,000 people in 1939.

Composition of the Population.—Like its neighbours, the Philip-
162 pines has a complex people derived from stock of contrasting
174 types (Fig. 118). Originally the Philippines was populated by

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Malayan types and for the period 1292–1478 it was under the influence of the Majapahits from Java whose impact was greatest and most prolonged to the south. The Malay stock penetrated the islands from the sea, driving inland those aboriginal tribes of Negrito type still to be found in northeast Luzon, in the Sierra Madre, inner Panay and Negros, and in the Surigao Peninsula of Mindanao. The Philippines escaped direct colonisation by Indians, and Islam spread along that old trade route (Fig. 114) from Makassar and the Moluccas northwards, converting the Malay stock of southwest Mindanao and southern Palawan. The bulk of these southern peoples remained animists of the Borneo type, as they still are in inner Mindanao, Palawan, Mindoro and the Central Cordillera.

From 1565, Spanish influence was strong and emphatic, operating colonial methods and policies already worked out in Central America. The Spanish focus was Manila and the cultural influences of Christianisation and hispanisation spread from there radially southwards to have much effect in the Visayan Islands, but leaving Mindanao an Islamic area which Spaniards never completely controlled. They discreetly left the "Moros" alone. The Spanish cultural influence continued so long that 80 per cent of Filipinos are Christianised as against 4 per cent Muslim. This reflects the deep hispanisation, both by intermarriage and by education, of the Philippines today, though the Spanish colonial aristocratic group is rapidly diminishing. The place and personal names are strongly Malay to the south, and increasingly Spanish to the north.

Spanish infiltration into the stock was not the only process of mestization which has gone on in the Philippines. Chinese were well established in the northern islands when the Spaniards first came and they staged at least two risings against the Spaniards in the 17th century. Chinese have continued to trade and to act as middlemen during the two successive colonisation periods undergone by Filipinos, who were themselves not attracted by trading activities. For that reason in Luzon and the urban centres there has been a considerable cross-marrying of Chinese with Filipinos, evident in the more active personalities of Filipino public life. The cross currents of Malay, Spanish and Chinese stock have become confused and the distribution blurred so that the Philippines may be described as a mestizo territory, yet

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162 174 another point of resemblance to conditions of Central America rather than of Southeast Asia. The Philippines is unique in Asia for the mestization which has been achieved.

197 Equally complex is the language situation. Sixty-five languages and dialects have been officially recognised. The Visayan (sometimes spelt Bisayan owing to the character of the Spanish initial V's) language is that of the densely populated central islands and is spoken by the biggest single group of Filipinos (44 per cent) who distinguish between Cebu and Panay variants of it; it extends also to the agricultural fringe of Mindanao which has been settled by Cebu migrants. Tagalog, the speech of Manila and the more thickly populated provinces round it, is returned as the speech of 25 per cent of Filipinos and is slightly exceeded in importance by English, returned as the speech of 27 per cent Filipinos. Iloco is spoken by 15 per cent and Bicol by 8 per cent of the people, after which comes Spanish, now spoken by only 2.5 per cent of Filipinos and likely to disappear. Chinese is used by less than 1 per cent of the population, that is, by the more recent immigrants living in Manila, but it is in use in most trading centres of the islands.

English as a language dates from this century, a result of United States colonisation which ended in 1946. Following the Spanish example, Americans stressed an education in their own language, which has been most effective in the urban centres, leaving the countryside to use local dialects. Filipino indigenous languages are non-tonal and romanised, except in the south where people use a flowing script of Arabic style. Ordinary Malay or Javanese is not spoken, the southern dialects being more related to North Borneo speech than to modern Malayan or Javanese forms.

Overseas Influence

000 Off the beaten track to and from Southeast Asia, the Philippines differs from all neighbouring territories in its long trans-Pacific association. Adjoining territories have been involved to various extents in the interchanges and interactions between India, China and Europe; the Philippines was for the last three centuries connected with Central America whence the Spanish colonists first came and to which they looked for economic, political, religious and social example in dealing with the Philippines. The last and

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final stage has been trans-Pacific association with the United States, as a poor relation rather than as an objective of major economic or social developments. 000

A heritage of Spanish colonial influence is the unusually high proportion of landless farmers in the Philippines, unequalled anywhere else in Southeast Asia. At the last detailed census (1948) less than half the farmers owned the land they worked, about 16 per cent owned some of the land they worked and 35 per cent were tenants on a sharing basis. This was at the end of strenuous United States efforts to undo the social evils and economic paralysis left by the Spanish aristocrats in rural areas. 427 177

Spanish Influence.—It is interesting to trace this Spanish influence on land holdings because they left behind problems resembling those in their American colonies and in Spain. They found in these islands the system of communal land holdings and communal help common to equatorial Asia and they observed that there was a head of this local communal activity with rights to direct it, but they did not realise or acknowledge that he was a communal centre-piece rather than the proprietor of village farmlands. Spaniards treated him, however, as the local landlord and gave him additional rights in return for his aid in taxation. They grafted into this their own colonial system of land grants to individuals who had feudal rights over property and persons living on the land. At that early time the population was much less than now (less than 90,000 people lived on Panay in 1586 and they had increased to over a million by 1928), and huge grants of land (*encomiendas*) were given to encourage settlers from Spain as well as to reward people who had been useful. This was easily possible in newly developed territories.

The local leader thus became a *cacique*, as the Spaniards call one of these feudal landlords, or a foreigner came to act as one. The land became the property of one person and everyone on it lost his land rights, thereby forming a group of landless labourers. It was a system evolved in Spain when communal cattle-grazing lands became enclosed for cultivation. By this system the Spaniards created for the first time in the Philippines a landless population in a territory which had been one of subsistence farmers. Latifundia (large estates of absentee landlords) followed as a matter of course. The rural people were reduced to tenants or workers for wages, whereas they had been traditionally partners in their

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427 community, with equal rights and obligations in the food production. The degree of thoroughness with which this foreign system
177 became established depended on the firmness of the Spanish hold, hence even now the highest proportion of landless farmers is round Manila and in Panay. Least tenancies appear where the Spanish system never became well established—in Mindanao, Palawan and North Luzon. Operating to increase the concentration of property was the gradual acquisition of huge properties by the religious houses and the tendency, noted elsewhere, of people newly introduced to money systems to mortgage their property.

427 The *caciques* continued through the United States colonial period and reaped most of the advantages therefrom. Land was a major social problem in the Philippines, a circumstance not fully paralleled in adjoining territories. There was a highly educated class of landed proprietors, who were prominent in all agitations for political power, and an illiterate, defenceless landless group of rural workers, tending to migrate to places where wages were high, but often unable to move from their districts because they have become deeply indebted to the landlord.

The usual form of tenancy on rice land is the share tenancy (*kasama*) by which a proportion of the crop is retained by the tenant. The proportion varies according to whether he merely works the land and has seeds and animals provided for him (which gives him half the crop after half costs for these items has been deducted) or whether the tenant supplies his own animals, seed, harvesting labour, etc. (which obtains for him two-thirds of the crop). While at first glance reasonable, these terms in kind operate against the tenant, who in poor years may receive for his labour less rice than his family needs to feed it, so that he must borrow to get through the year and meet his taxes, whereas, whatever the state of the crop, the landlord gets a clear return which is probably worth more in cash to him in a scarcity year than in a normal year. It is a case of partial cooperation, seemingly fair, but inevitably getting tenants progressively into debt because they bear all the risks of cultivation. A modern evil has been subleasing; landlords lease *haciendas* on a cash rent basis to a few tenants, who in turn sublease on sharing terms to many smaller tenants, whose position and risk becomes increasingly desperate as pressure of population on the paddylands increases. Landed corporations were tending to

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maintain this system, which gave them returns at minimum bother to themselves. Expropriation of large estates became part of the Filipino constitution after 1936 and the laws prohibiting new large estates operated to divert United States plantation interest away from the Philippines to other parts of Southeast Asia. Tenant indebtedness in the Philippines has been as bad as in Burma and Siam. These land questions have constantly moulded the political life among Filipinos.

The Philippines thus clearly differs from Southeast Asia in being far from the pioneering stage and also entangled with Spanish land systems. The coastal Filipinos have a traditional culture based on the wood and woven palm ecology of Southeast Asia which they have developed with artistry and enthusiasm. Their music, however, is of the Spanish guitar type rather than the pipe and finger-drum type of Indian and forest origins.

In Mindanao there are still empty spaces, but it is doubtful whether these can absorb the excess of specialised farmers from Luzon and the Visayan Islands, without tremendous preliminary developments of roads and clearing schemes. It is as difficult in the Philippines as in Java to cause relief of rural populations by migration to virgin territories. An adequate incentive has not yet been found and it is clearly not enough to have a population pressure in the home districts.

So far there has been little evidence that modern industrialisation is practicable for the Philippines. Before the war a few cement plants, coconut oil mills, sweet and shirt factories had grown up, but there was neither local coal nor hydro-electric power. Only in cottage industry, particularly for hats and clogs, was there any considerable development, and this was rivalled by similar products imported very cheaply from China and Japan. Cigar making was shifting from the home to the factory. Embroidery too was changing from a cottage industry to small village factories. Some home weaving persisted on the basis of local fibres and on a little cotton grown for domestic use in Luzon.

The whole geography and ecology of the Philippines is a special extension of conditions similar to those of Southeast Asia, particularly of the eastern East Indies, but modified by several centuries of control and influence from America rather than from India, Europe and China. As in the case of Burma, the current problem of the Philippines is physical rehabilitation after two

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000 military campaigns, which have each caused extensive damage and disruption. The campaigns of the Philippines were firstly in Luzon and secondly in the Visayan Islands fanning out from Leyte. Manila suffered physically from the war more than most parts of Southeast Asia.

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PART III

000 THE HUMAN GEOGRAPHY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

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Chapter Twenty-two

SOUTHEAST ASIA AGRICULTURE

241 SOUTHEAST Asia has several agricultural types which are, however, less related to major climatic or environmental differences between one place and another and more to differing rates of agricultural development. To these rates of development the greatest impulses have derived very largely from conditions outside the region and most of the crops concerned have been introduced from outside. The system of shifting cultivation, often described as indigenous to Southeast Asia, is associated with all tribes and groups entering Southeast Asia overland from continental Asia, and the key crops of today, rice, sugar, tea, coffee cotton, rubber and maize have all been brought from overseas and cultivated largely with the object of sales overseas. Prior to the introduction of these plants, agriculture centred on root crops, on sweet potatoes or yams, which are still staples for the more isolated and hence more primitive groups.

SHIFTING CULTIVATION

Of the agricultural types particular interest attaches to shifting cultivation because it represents a special stage in the evolution from hunting and food gathering to sedentary farming. Within this style considerable variations exist, from the clearing used for cultivating yams and bananas, probably the earliest form of land utilisation by peoples wandering through the jungles, to shifting cultivation of coffee and pepper by farmers intending to sell these crops, which are so exacting in their soil requirements. Some shifting cultivators are true wanderers: the whole group, family or tribe, moves on to a new location when it abandons one clearing for the next. Others are sedentary farmers, staying in one village all their lives, but varying the piece of ground they cultivate from time to time, abandoning the old piece to secondary forest growths, which can be thought of as a form of fallow. This last type has a long tradition in Java, the Philippines and Indochina, and has blended with the custom by which a tract of land belongs

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241 to a group, the individuals of which choose or are given, every now and again, different portions to cultivate for themselves.

231 Within Southeast Asia the shifting cultivation system has no relation to the needs of domesticated animals. There is no evidence here that the simpler tribes have been primarily cattle grazers, except in so far as all Mongoloid types coming south overland

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

FIG. 111.—The Accessibility of Southeast Asia by Land

231 from the grazing grounds of Tibet and farther north may, at remote times outside this territory, have been associated with animals. Inside Southeast Asia, cattle do not fit well into the ecology of climate, vegetation and pests, and the disinterest in animals has become part of the religious tradition; Buddhists and Hindus do not eat beef, Muslims will not eat pork and even the primitive animists have similar inhibitions. Wherever today there has grown up a cattle system, it relates to the ploughing needs and is concerned with buffaloes or small oxen and does not derive from an earlier tradition of cattle farming or nomadism.

241 Shifting cultivation is a system well adapted to large empty areas where soils are poor and the rate of soil erosion high. As soon as population increases, shifting cultivation, which needs each cutover area to stand unused for 7 to 10 years before being

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recultivated, rapidly overtaxes the capacity of the forest vegetation to reassert itself. Hence much of Southeast Asia has been progressively overburnt by the increasing forest population and the natural cover has selectively changed towards the savannah vegetation type, a progress speedier in the drier zones where the regrowth rate is slower. Overburning caused by overpopulation in turn induces rapid soil erosion, affecting the load and silting of river systems, possibly disturbing settled agriculturists far down the valley and remote from the overburnt area. For these reasons shifting cultivation has generally become illegal, yet it still persists in areas not easily accessible or amenable to control and probably even today as much as 5 million acres of temporary clearing each year is being cultivated over Southeast Asia, and between 40 and 50 million acres of clearings in the forests is being cultivated or is recovering from recent temporary cultivation—an area not far short of the total area of Siam. From the shifting agricultural system, very little that is of trading or commercial significance derives; the proportion in coffee and pepper is negligible. As a whole, shifting cultivation is for subsistence only, yet it is an integral part of the regional farming tradition.

Subsistence Farming

Farming of the ordinary sedentary type has in this region evolved from shifting cultivation as pressure of population on the land increased. Fixed cultivation can only be sustained where local conditions prevent soil exhaustion and soil erosion, or natural conditions counteract these inevitable effects of cultivation. Thus farming gravitates to the localities dry for a part of the year, where leaching is a periodical rather than a permanent process, to localities where erosion and leaching are negatived by altitudes nearly at base level, to zones where the soil is the accumulation of fertile elements from other areas, or to zones of young soils rich in nutrient chemicals. The dry zones are away from the Equator and towards the "monsoonal fringes" of the tropics; flat flood plains beside mature streams are subject to little erosion and leaching; deltaic and basic volcanic soils remain fertile for long periods. These facts underlie the pattern of sedentary farming in Southeast Asia which occupies a total area of almost 97 million acres.

The greater part of this farmland, about two-thirds, is given

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over to subsistence farming, a system where practically nothing leaves the farm, which only grows what the family needs for food, the family needing all that it grows. Subsistence farming is at once deeply rooted in the tradition of the people and at the same time isolation, difficulty of access and absence of communications largely force it upon much of the region, which remains for the greater part as isolated now as it was several centuries ago, and must even grow its own fibres for textiles. On subsistence farms the interest centres on rice, an almost universal staple in Southeast Asia, and only in the most congested areas, such as the Vizayas and Java, is there any well-established practice of growing some other food as substitute for rice. Rice dominates the diet even where local conditions do not seem favourable, as in the dry zones of Burma and Siam or in the relatively gloomy, rain-soaked areas immediately round the Equator. At least 90 per cent of subsistence farmland is under rice, the balance of supplementary food needs (coconuts, spices, fruits and pulses) occupying a very small fraction of any one farm and often being gathered wild rather than cultivated. The dominance of rice, even among the hill peoples, is the more remarkable because the plant was apparently introduced by Indian colonists some time about the middle of the first millennium, since when thousands of varieties have been evolved to suit the subtle differences of local climate, seasons and soil.

In total, Southeast Asia subsistence farming has continued with methods evolved locally centuries back. The hoe or mattock and the dibble are still the only soil-working implements in many areas, even on paddyfields, but ploughs of the soil-opening rather than the soil-turning type have become widespread, generally home-made and entirely of wood, that raw material ubiquitous in this terrain. With the plough came the need for draught animals and most subsistence farms now have one buffalo or ox per family, the former being favoured towards the Equator, the latter in the drier or more seasonal areas.

Commercial Farming

Farming for crops intended to be sold, that is, commercial or cash farming, came late to Southeast Asia. Except in one or two districts of the Philippines and Java, cash basis farming is scarcely a century old and many types of crude adjustment to this innovation

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may be found. The oldest cash farming of Southeast Asia was the spice trade of the Moluccas, but even at its peak that trade involved very few areas given over exclusively to spices, which for the greater part were collected from farmers each with a tree or two, rather than a number of acres devoted to a crop of spices. The crux of the matter at that period was that nothing cultivated in Southeast Asia apart from spice was transportable to or of use to the world's population centres overseas. To a large extent over the present millennium Southeast Asia has been an absorber rather than a supplier of goods or commodities; only in the last hundred years or so has the condition changed, not so much by new demands for Southeast Asia products as for crops transferred to Southeast Asia for production. 241

Rice.—Commercial agriculture in the whole region occupies about 35 million acres and has taken two forms, both strongly influenced by European interests: farming food crops for sale, and farming non-food crops for sale. Of the food crops, sugar was the earliest successful innovation established in Java and the Philippines soon after European colonisation began, and intended for export to Europe. Today at least half the area devoted to crops grown for export is in rice and, taking into account the amount of rice grown for cash sales in deficit regions inside each territory, the proportion may reach as much as three-quarters. Upon commercial rice production depends the possibility of workers leaving their own farms and devoting their full time to non-food cash crops, so that the workers on rubber, cotton, hemp, coffee and sugar plantations have provided a great demand for Asia's staple cereal, supplies of which have been vital to the development of plantation and mining industries of Southeast Asia and, incidentally to the industrialisation of other parts of Asia. The bulk of the rice produced in Southeast Asia for export has gone to India and China, where a condition approaching the limit of rice-growing has been reached, and to Malaya and the Outer Islands of the East Indies. Japan too was becoming a major rice importer until 1941. All this rice export came from Burma, Siam and Indochina in that order of importance, territories which have pioneered in rapidly expanding commercial rice production to form the pool, the only rice-pool in the world, from which other areas have made up their deficits. Moreover the commercial production of rice in Southeast Asia has been steadily increasing over the last 20 years—the average 243

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

FIG. 112.—Distribution of Rice Cultivation in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia acreage under rice each year of 1916–20 was 38.28 million, and each year of 1936–40 was 51.40 million. These figures of course include both subsistence and commercial production of rice, but they make it clear that by far the most important farming interest was rice, which covered nearly 95 per cent of cultivated land in Siam, 85 per cent in Indochina and 65 per cent in both Burma and the Philippines.

SOUTHEAST ASIA AREAS UNDER RICE (million acres)

	1914–15	1919–20	1924–25	1929–30	1934–35	1939–40	1944–45	1949–50
Burma	10.0	10.5	12.1	12.8	12.7	12.8	8.5	9.0
Indochina	10.4	11.9	11.7	14.0	13.1	14.7	14.1	12.0
Siam	5.0	6.1	6.8	7.5	8.1	8.8	5.5	12.4
Malaya	—	—	.6	.6	.7	.8	.7	.9
Java and Madoera ..	6.9	8.8	8.7	8.8	9.9	10.1	7.7	9.7
Philippines	2.7	3.6	4.2	4.4	4.9	4.9.6	3.6	5.7

SOUTHEAST ASIA RICE PRODUCTION (million metric tons clean rice)

	1914–15	1919–20	1924–25	1929–30	1934–35	1939–40	1944–45	1949–50
Burma	3.73	3.74	5.15	5.07	4.6	4.73	2.4	2.9
Indochina	4.32	2.96	3.54	3.67	3.4	4.00	3.6	3.6
Siam	1.93	1.41	3.08	2.41	2.86	2.86	—	3.7
Malaya	—	—	.24	.16	.33	.34	—	.4
Java and Madoera ..	2.88	3.64	3.43	3.38	3.54	4.09	3.5	4.2
Philippines	.05	1.02	1.28	1.44	1.28	1.5	1.1	1.6

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Cash farming for rice is the only extension of a Southeast Asia subsistence farming crop into commercial farming on a large scale; only a negligible proportion of coconut-growing is for export, though this too, is an extension of Southeast Asia subsistence farming. It has been inevitable that subsistence farmers and the techniques they developed for rice have set the character of commercial rice farming which has been pioneered by local people and continues to be essentially a non-mechanised produce whose volume comes more from area and less from intensive farming. 243

RICE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
ANNUAL AVERAGES PER QUINQUENNIUM [439]

Period	*Million Acres Under Rice*	*Production Million Tons Clean Rice*	*Net Exports from SE.A. (Million Tons Clean)*	*Per Cap. Utilisation (kgms.)*	*Yield in Tons per Acre*
1916–20	38.3	13.5	3.9	119	.352
1921–25	43.6	15.3	4.6	137	.352
1926–30	47.5	16.5	4.7	131	.348
1931–35	49.6	16.7	5.2	117	.337
1936–40	51.4	17.5	5.0	118	.339
1946–50	48.1	15.6	1.9	98	.325

For 1951 *it is estimated that Southeast Asia sowed about* 50 *million acres of paddy, probably producing* 16 *million tons cleaned rice. The exports may total* 3 *million tons. These figures suggest the consumption had declined to below* 100 *kgms. per person, but this is not reliable since unreported dealings were going on and reported facts were not necessarily the true ones.*

Other Food Crops.—The other commercial food crops, sugar, coffee, tea, cinchona and oil palm total much smaller areas than rice farming. Broadly, these innovations were developed by European colonial planters opening up what were very largely virgin territories, normally in the form of large estates calling for a labour force which derived only in part from local people, the rest being obtained by introducing labour from outside. In the Philippines and in Java the first European essays in agriculture caused serious interactions on local land customs; in Siam an aristocratic feudal system enabled commercialisation to be introduced without external intervention. These crops tended to be perennial cultivations, taking advantage of the continuous growing season of the region. In due course this has led to a large production, causing the external price to drop, especially as there has 249

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249 been similar commercialisation of the same crops in other tropical areas, all quickly reaching large-scale production of commodities which began as expensive luxuries and gradually cheapened to become low-priced semi-staple foods not offering any prospect of large returns for nominal outlays. Rivalries with other producing areas and speedy saturation of the world market has so far given these types of commercial agriculture a confused history of boom and depression, of rapid extension and then dereliction or scientific experiments to cheapen production. In these crops, techniques and methods more western than eastern have been used though mechanisation in the field has not been possible owing to the nature of the crops. The processing involved has often been modern and highly mechanised.

Rubber.—Commercial production of non-food or industrial crops in Southeast Asia has centred on rubber. Rubber has been an innovation peculiar to Southeast Asia (Central Africa and Ceylon took it up later) and its cultivation proved a remarkably successful transfer of a tree from another part of the tropics, developed here on plantation mass production lines, whereas in its original habitat the tree was wild and tapped on the "gatherer" system now only used for gums and damars collected from forest trees. Upon Southeast Asia rubber has depended the popularisation of the petrol driven vehicle, the incentive to petroleum production and the development of world road systems. Its cultivation was on the European orchard pattern and at first it was only possible by companies sufficiently capitalised to wait 7 to 10 years for maturity and to recruit labour from other regions to make the plantations in virgin areas, at a distance from subsistence farmers or cash farmers of foods to suit the plantation workers. Smallholders gradually took up rubber planting as an adjunct to other crops and as part of a mixed farming system. Reversing the history of rice agriculture, rubber started as a large-scale plantation cultivation worked by non-indigenous people and gradually moved towards a smallholder, mixed-farming type. Altogether, some 6 million acres of Southeast Asia are in rubber, the greatest single block being in Malaya. Rubber, too, is a perennial and a long-term crop and its history has been an alternation of high prices and low prices, and of rapidly saturating the market which has throughout been external to Asia. Malaya, by almost exclusively specialising in rubber, proved very highly geared to

external events and their effects on rubber price, to a degree not paralleled by other types of Southeast Asia farming which were, during a crisis, more closely related to subsistence farming and thereby buffered from external valuations. 249

Trends in Agriculture

Several long-term tendencies in these various farming types have become apparent. For all the commercial crops except rice, external events have obliged experiment and development towards higher and higher production per unit area; yields for commercial crops have progressively increased. In rice farming, however, methods have continued to be extensive, yields have steadily decreased and there has been little advance in either maintaining fertility standards or increasing the yield. Experimental farms exist throughout the territory to promote these improvements, but they have made little impression on the rice-farming community as a whole. 243

RICE YIELDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (hundred lbs. milled per acre)

	1934–35	1939–40	1944–45	1949–50
Burma	8.2	8.4	6.5	7.0
Indochina	5.7	5.5	5.6	6.6
Siam	9.1	8.6	7.5	6.6
Malaya	9.7	9.1	—	10.7
Java and Madoera	9.3	10.0	—	9.5
Philippines	5.8	5.8	6.8	6.6

By the quinquennium 1936–40 annual yields had declined nearly 4 per cent from those of 1916–20 and production had increased solely by increasing the acreages, whose annual average for the same quinquennial periods increased by 34 per cent.

The general movements of rice in Southeast Asia are evident from the table on page 356 which summarises surpluses and deficits over a period.

Commercial rice production was associated almost exclusively with the expansion of agriculture to the deltas of the Irrawaddy, Chao Praya and Mekong and in varying degrees to increased control over flood waters. It is in this large-scale water control that the greatest long-term changes have been set going by western engineering techniques coping with the wide range of circumstances under which Southeast Asia floods occur. Effective

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243 small-scale water-control methods had in fact existed in this region before; the earlier technological interest was to expand rice production by increased water-control on specially fertile, generally volcanic, upland soils. The objective then and now was the same—to cultivate the most fertile areas; the difference was that the volcanic soils attracted local attention and were within the capacity of local people, considerably earlier than the deltaic soils.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA RICE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
(million metric tons clean)

	Exporters			*Importers*		
	Burma	*Indochina*	*Siam*	*East Indies*	*Malaya*	*Philippines*
1915	2.12	1.09	1.0	.55	—	.22
1920	2.0	1.09	.25	.22	—	.07
1925	3.32	1.33	1.18	.50	.41	.10
1930	2.95	1.02	.93	.62	.60	.01
1935	2.93	1.52	1.38	.36	.48	nil
1940	2.50	1.40	2.00	.06	.70	.1
1950	1.17	.09	1.48	.28	.50	.16

A further process at work has been a decline in Southeast Asia consumption of rice per person over the last 30 years, which made possible the expanding exports of rice at a time when population was rapidly increasing. The declining consumption seems to be due to slight changes in diet habit; maize, potatoes and tapioca have steadily entered into local meals and the proportion of vegetables has increased, more especially as it has come to be realised that the dietetic value of meals exclusively based on rice, the custom in Southeast Asia for a long time, is low, as indicated by the small stature and delicate bones of Southeast Asia peoples.

245 Commercial agriculture has largely revolved round tree cultivation (arboriculture rather than agriculture) in which the continuous growing period produces maximum effects. In this tendency may be seen a return to the tree vegetation which is indigenous to equatorial Southeast Asia, and away from the annual and deciduous plants more suited to ecologies associated with the seasonal margins of the tropics. Labour difficulties too are eased to some extent by tree crops whose periodicity is better spread than in the case of annual crops. To the labour difficulty also is due the trend towards devolving arboriculture from plantation systems

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to smallholder systems, leading to the smallholder becoming an exponent of diversified rather than single crop cultivation. 245

While the region has sought to escape the consequence of overmuch dependence on one or two cash crops, Southeast Asia subsistence farming is really already highly diversified. Moreover, the region as a whole must be considered reasonably well diversified in the range of commercial crops it produces, even though individual districts within Southeast Asia are monocultivated rather than polycultivated. 241

Effects of the Second World War

During the 1941–42 campaign, battles were fought through Burma, Malaya and the Philippines. More military action took place in Burma and the Philippines over the year 1944–45. The direct long-term effects of these campaigns were not emphatic because agriculture and arboriculture cannot be "scorched" and denied to the enemy on a large scale. The war in these territories devastated internal communications, broke down the systems of internal trade, removed the means of communication between different parts of Southeast Asia and destroyed the channels to those overseas markets which had been the principal destination of commercial agricultural produce. Breakdown of external trade channels occurred in all Southeast Asia territories whether campaigns took place in them or not. 241 177

The first consequences of this disruption, as distinct from destruction, were to place a premium on subsistence farming, to cause all commercial cultivation to fall into desuetude, to undermine confidence in agriculture for cash, to cause the loss or destruction of draught cattle which were taken away for military use, to disperse labour forces, and to stimulate self-sufficiency policies. Very little of the perennial tree acreage, such as of rubber, was cut down—only 6 per cent in the case of Malayan rubber—yet it was the commercial production which suffered most from disruption, which created in the postwar period considerable difficulties for those territories needing imported rice for the labour to rehabilitate commercial farming and industries. Agriculture itself, where labour was available, rehabilitated quickly; all but 2 per cent of Malayan rice acreages were back in cultivation during 1945–46 and rubber made an equally quick comeback, so

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that about one-third of its prewar estate area was being tapped in 1947, representing two-thirds of the area tappable.

In the food crops, surplus margins were more slowly restored. Exports of Southeast Asia rice totalled about a million tons during 1946, as against a combined export of 5.7 million tons annually for 1936–40. The drop in production of this staple was greatest in the case of Burma because there the dislocation by war had been greatest, but by the 1946–47 season, about two-thirds of Lower Burma rice acreages were back in cultivation, as against half in 1945–46. In Cochinchina over 70 per cent of the rice area was being cultivated in 1946–47. Siam which was untouched by military campaigns reported 10.6 million acres under cultivation in rice for 1946–47 (22 per cent more than 1939–40)—the only territory to show a substantial increase of rice acreage in the immediate postwar years.

A postwar feature has been the general decline in rice yields, mostly an effect of loss of draught cattle, though to report low yields was a convenient cover for black market sales. The consequence of lost production in local food was felt more in places like Malaya which has specialised in non-food commercial agriculture, than in any other territories of Asia, which customarily needed to import only a small margin and not the majority of their rice. For the Philippines in 1947, the United Nations reported that *per capita* consumption of rice was actually higher than in 1939 by about 5 per cent.

Since labour shortage has been prominent as a factor operating against postwar commercial agriculture, the subsistence farmer and the diversified smallholder have assumed far greater significance than before. Over 55 per cent of Malaya's rubber production for 1946 was from smallholders, a proportion which had been as much as 85 per cent in the early months of that year, yet fell to 45 per cent in 1950 (cf. 39 per cent in 1940).

The vegetable oils soon came back into production and by early 1947 monthly production in Southeast Asia was not far short of 1941 production and now exceeds it.

The general lowering of food acreages and of yields, combined with the enforced reversion to subsistence agricultural forms, has a special significance for Southeast Asia food supplies over the next few years, because the restricted food supply comes at a time when population is rapidly increasing, at the rate of about 20

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million people per decade, and when social policy is for raising the standard of nutrition. These two factors mean that the prewar rice exporters are on every score likely to continue to have less margin for export. How the communities will meet this basic difficulty of supply in their staple food is not clear ; mechanisation is scarcely a solution, yields are very difficult to raise on a large scale, and there are few unused areas of high potential for rice farming, yet unless improvement is reached the labour force is unlikely to remain in non-food producing territories, rice may be for such areas a luxury and not a cheap staple, and the costs of any production must remain high. Influences of this sort in a region where average productive skill is low and slow, may cause it to become one of the world's most costly producer zones and hasten in Europe and the United States the exploitation of substitute commodities which lend themselves to mechanisation more than is the case with typical Southeast Asia agricultural products. It may happen that rapid peopling of Sumatra, Borneo and New Guinea deltas may take place, much as the continental deltas of Southeast Asia were quickly filled with people over the last 50 years; the fact that there has been previous reluctance to go to these places is no guarantee that there will be continued reluctance. Southeast Asia may even become a consumer for rice cultivated in the new areas of South America and Northern Australia. Perhaps some startling innovation of crop or technique will change the otherwise rather gloomy picture, much as the opening up of Canadian, Australian and Argentine wheatlands speedily altered the similarly gloomy outlook for European wheat-eating peoples at the end of last century.

Directions in these trends of Southeast Asia agriculture are difficult to determine because there are major stratifications of local society both vertically and horizontally which are in process of readjustment, aggravated by currency confusion and widespread ignorance. These will take time to reach an equilibrium and during that period subsistence farming and its nationalist corollary, territorial self-sufficiency, are likely to be strong influences working against a great revival of commercial activity of any sort, with the result that Southeast Asia may not continue indefinitely in its prewar role of one of the world's major sources of supply. Against this must be weighed the proved ability of tropical agriculture to respond quickly to new impetuses.

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Chapter Twenty-three

THE FISHERIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Fish Population

136 Because equatorial waters have low salinity and low oxygen content, it has frequently been assumed that they have a low fish population. That view is difficult to maintain for the shallow waters of Southeast Asia where, according to Herre, the number of kinds of fish and their diversification is unrivalled by that of any other marine region. Whether this paradox disproves the theoretical view about equatorial seas or shows that the fish population depends more on the local supply of nutrients which so broken and well-watered a region as Southeast Asia discharges to the sea in extraordinarily large quantities, has yet to be demonstrated. There is no co-ordinated study of the fishing industry as a whole in this region.

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Until recently, only the generic character of these Southeast Asia fish had been studied, from which it appears that, while by no means all of them have been named and identified, over 1,500 varieties are normally fished round Java, over 500 have been named as economically valuable round Malaya, and similar large varieties are reported from all territories. Most of the fish known are inshore fish, closely dependent on food particles carried from shore to sea and on the great growth of plankton, seaweeds and corals which supply fish food. Because the shores of the landmasses in most of this region are frequently backed by swamps, there is a very considerable fish population on the land surface itself, in a gradual transition between shallow water marine fish and swamp or riverine fish. Thus the fishing industry is not merely an inshore activity: it continues very vigorously inland, in the swamps, in the flooded paddyfields and their canals, in the lakes and lagoons, and in the rivers.

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[228] Though the deep-water fish of Southeast Asia have only in recent years been exploited commercially, by Japanese trawlers, they exist in these waters in surprising numbers. Schools of sardines some 10 miles long have been seen, together with frequent

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great shoals of mackerel and bonito. Porpoises (mammals which live on fish and are a guide to the fish density) have been seen in a school which packed an area 15 miles long and 2 miles broad. Plankton occurs at times in astounding quantities, practically smothering all other fish life in the neighbourhood. The movements and migrations of these fish of deeper waters have been little studied and the inshore fishing has been enough to meet local food needs, as well as not demanding too complex a technique or too great a capital outlay by the local fishermen who are generally very few, and too poor to equip themselves for long distance deepwater trips. A major impediment to introducing the elaborate systems of trawling and seining which have been developed in temperate seas is the frequency of coral reefs and knolls which, although attracting fish, catch the nets and ruin them.

Fish as a Staple Food

Fish is a staple in the Southeast Asia diet as complement to rice. It supplies calcium, iodine and salt as well as animal protein, items otherwise not easily come by in these areas, or too expensive for the peasants. By habit Southeast Asia people are rice-fish-curry eaters and vegetables in the European sense enter very little into their meals. They are largely vegetarian but not interested in vegetables. Fishing has an importance in local ecologies second only to rice. In Malaya, for example, well over 80 lbs. of fish is normally consumed by every man, woman and child every year. When looking through the records of any one territory, however, the great significance of fish is not apparent because fishing is a mobile and widely dispersed activity not easily checked, the more illusive statistically because it plays little or no part in revenues.

Several stages of commercialisation are met with but subsistence fishing predominates. In every paddyfield and swamp, villagers go fishing for their personal needs; on the coast many fishermen are part-time, sharing their labour between a paddyfield and a fishing boat. Some villages have specialised fishermen whose produce goes into exchange among the landsmen to make the village self-supporting. Gradually fishing for sale has become possible, yet there are major difficulties of transport to consuming centres, of organisation between fishermen and consumer, and of preserving the fish in good condition during transport.

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Trade in Fish

228 Apart from that fish eaten fresh on the coasts, the bulk is preserved for commerce and for storing during seasons when the sea is too violent, by sun-drying, salting or by conversion into one of the highly-spiced, partly-fermented fish sauces widely admired by Southeast Asia people (i.e. *blachan* in Malaya, *trassie* in Java, *nuoc mam* in Indochina, *kapi* in Siam, *ngapi* in Burma). Huge quantities of fish in these forms move inland within each country and there has developed a considerable movement of preserved fish between the different Southeast Asia territories, to supply the plantation and industrial workers. From Siam and Indochina alone preserved fish to the value of about $12 million was exported each year before the war. That fish preserving is widely practised even for local use means that the activity is very largely buffered from the alternations of glut and scarcity which are common in fishing industries. The transport of the preserved fish both internally and externally tends to be by sea for cheapness, a paramount consideration in a food for peasants, and because there are few alternatives. Only in a few areas is there a speedy land service able to deliver fresh fish to inland urban centres.

563 228 Commercialisation of fishing has brought in foreign personnel. Whenever fishing is carried on for export as cash sales, Chinese are frequently the principal fishermen, as at Bagansiapiapi (Sumatra) and Pangkor (Malaya), in the deep-sea fishing centred on Singapore (once associated with the Japanese) and even in the cultivation of fish in Javanese ponds. Moreover, Chinese are strongly represented as the middlemen who handle the trade from the actual fisherman to the ultimate consumer, and they are generally responsible for processing the wet fish into transportable forms.

Freshwater Fishing

226 While the absence of deep-sea and mechanical mass fishing methods is one peculiarity of Southeast Asia, equally remarkable is the emphasis on freshwater fishing. Very largely the methods of freshwater fishing—traps and small nets—have established the styles used for inshore sea fishing. For the most part the value of this freshwater production cannot be gauged though it has major importance in local diet. Two variations of freshwater fishing

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have exceptional interest. In Indochina the Tonle Sap fisheries represent the most productive of the natural fresh fisheries, and in Java has been developed a large cultivation of fish in ponds. 226

From Tonle Sap over 25 tons of fish are produced annually from each square mile of its surface, a productivity ten times greater than that of the well-fished North Sea of Europe, and unique in its intensity. This exceptional production is possible because the large area covered from early June by shallow floods enables fish to spawn profusely in about 3,000 square miles of inundated forest, where abundance of vegetable matter makes the fish grow larger than those in any of the neighbouring rivers. Over 30,000 persons are normally fishing this lake and the full-time fishermen live in villages of pile dwellings scattered round it; of these lake-side fishing villages Snoc Trou is the most important. A considerable number of migrant fishermen, Annamese, Chinese and Malay, move into this area temporarily for the peak fishing season from October to January. Over 135,000 tons of fish are obtained annually and half of this is dried before leaving the region; some fish are sent alive towards the estuary of the Mekong in floating cages of bamboo enclosing what is virtually an artificial shoal moving through the water to the market, an ingenious device for transporting live fish. The commercial side of this fishing is almost entirely Chinese. Over-fishing has been going on in recent years and controls are becoming necessary. 228 563

In Java two types of pond fishing have been evolved. Near Batavia, Sourabaya and Semarang where the demand for fish is great, mangrove swamps are partially enclosed to control the tidal water and into the enclosures are placed, between April and July, the spawn and young sea fish gathered among bundles of leaves which fishermen have previously placed in the open sea for the purpose. The spawn and young fish are carried to the fishponds in jars and there left to fatten on algae and water weeds cultivated for them. The milkfish (Chanos chanos) is popular for this purpose and reaches marketable size within a year. Elsewhere inland artificial freshwater ponds have been built, covering a total area estimated at over 100,000 acres, in which fish of the carp type are bred and fattened all the year round; 65,000 tons of fish are obtained every year by this means. Freshwater fisheries are now encouraged in every little tank or pond as a form of mosquito control. 228

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Inshore Fishing

226 Inshore sea fishing is by far the most usual in Southeast Asia. The boats used are generally very small, often needing only a man and a boy to work them, indicating the small units of the industry. Land and sea breezes play a key part in the rhythm of activity, being the source of power to and from the shore. It is unusual for the boats to move more than a mile from shore and rarely do they lose sight of land. Much inshore fishing is done without boats at all. The beaches are netted by fishermen moving waist deep through water and, wherever fish are known to migrate along the coast, barriers of bamboo are built out, leading the fish into a square enclosure or trap from which they are periodically drawn up in a net by a fisherman who lives with his family on a platform above the trap. Probably three-quarters of Southeast Asia sea fishing is done where the sea is less than 10 ft. deep. The fish thus obtained tend to be of the small type and a large proportion are crustacea, much favoured in local diet. Huge quantities of crabs, shrimps and mussels are obtained, and squids are regularly netted in large numbers for local use. The shells of crustacea are ground to powder and used in conjunction with the areca nut as a favourite old-fashioned chew common to the whole region. Because coastal fishing takes place so close to the shore where breakers are violent, it is markedly seasonal in character, depending on aspect relative to the seasonal winds. This seasonality is a great incentive to preserve the fish to last through that season when the little fishing boats cannot cope with the heavy seas. Inshore fishing closely relates to the shallow waters of the Sunda Platform; where the coast drops away to great depths, the intensity of fishing diminishes.

Distribution of Fisheries

438 226 While fishing commands a wide interest, it is by no means uniformly developed through the region. Broadly, the coasts near densely populated areas are the most intensively fished and estuaries and deltas have major fishing developments, though neither at the Red River mouth nor the Irrawaddy mouth has fishing reached a high pitch of development. The Mekong, particularly at the seasons when the Tonle Sap water is discharging, has great attraction for fish and the whole coastal zone from the Mekong

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round the Gulf of Siam to Singapore is well fished and is one of the few known tracks of fish migration in these seas, possibly relating to the southwesterly drift of the Mekong discharge. The Malacca Strait also has vigorous fishing industries, associated with the fishing at Bagansiapiapi and Pangkor which have been commercialised by Chinese. Along both sides of the Malacca Strait fish traps stand out from the coast almost continuously for mile after mile. Bagansiapiapi fish comes almost entirely from traps set across the creeks of the Rokan River. In the Philippines, themselves spread athwart the equatorial currents of the Pacific like a great trap, the annual catch of fish exceeds that of any other territory, yet the Philippines import much canned fish in addition.

For most Southeast Asia countries information about the significance of fishing activities is sketchy, although in every case fish ranks high in the basic foodstuffs. The total activity in fishing is enormous; probably 3 million people are engaged in Southeast Asia fishing and the amount of internal trade in fish must total far higher than so widely dispersed and so little commercialised an industry might at first suggest. There is always a substantial movement of fish in various forms from the coasts to the interiors and from one territory to another, as the following points indicate:

Burma.—That Burmese developed their tradition well in the interior may explain why it is only in Arakan and Tenasserim there has been intensive sea fishing. Within the Irrawaddy distributaries South Indians have taken to fishing and they deliver fish on ice to the rice farmers of Lower Burma, whose diet is more monotonously rice-and-fish than is the case towards the interior. The Buddhist tradition causes Burmese to disrespect fishermen on the grounds that they are responsible for the destruction of many living creatures. From Tenasserim and Arakan, surplus fish is exported to Malaya and India respectively, the total value (over 1935–40) being of the order $115,000 annually, of which Malaya takes over three-quarters. In net trade Burma is a fish-deficit area, importing over $3½ million of fish (about 12,000 tons), 60 per cent from India.

Malaya.—About 100,000 tons of fish were regularly landed on Malayan coasts by some 20,000 fishing boats (1950) chiefly on the coasts of Selangor, Perak, Trengganu, Pahang and Penang. At Singapore heavy prewar landings were accounted for by the deep-sea trawl-fishing done by Japanese crews working at long range

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among the remoter islands and off Borneo. In addition to this home production, over $9 million of fish (1947) was imported dry from the East Indies, Siam and Indochina, mainly as part of Singapore's entrepôt trade; only a small portion of this import was consumed in Malaya.

In Malaya and Burma pond cultivation has been negligible.

East Indies.—In Java intensive fishing is carried on, though its coast is small in proportion to its population and production has rapidly become inadequate, in contrast with the thinly-peopled coastlines of Sumatra, Celebes and Borneo. Java's fishing concentrates upon the northwest coast where 21,000 tons were caught in 1940; farther east along the north coast fishing diminishes. A large part of the catch moves to West Java and the Outer Islands for the plantation workers. Since 1900 the interest in fishing declined until Java became no longer self-supporting in fish and imported from Siam and Indochina which together supplied about 45,000 tons annually in the seasons 1938–40.

To establish commercialised fishing in the Outer Islands was no easy matter, but in Sumatra and Borneo a start had been made. At Bagansiapiapi about 12,000 Chinese had established a large fishery producing annually about 35,000 tons of fish which went to Java (60 per cent), Singapore, Penang and Malacca. To salt the fish nearly 20,000 tons of salt moved into Bagansiapiapi. In Borneo, Soekadana on the west and Pegaban and Kotabaru on the east were fishing centres, supplying the interior and exporting yearly about 4,000 tons of dried fish to Java; Macassar functions as a market for pearl and shell fishing and for the *abalone* (Holothuria) catch of the eastern seas besides exporting annually about 1,300 tons of *agar agar* (a seaweed for jellies).

To Java and Madoera just before the war 49,000 tons of cheap fish were imported from Siam and Indochina by way of Singapore, 46,000 tons from East Sumatra, and 8,000 tons from other Outer Islands. The home catch of sea fisheries totalled about 94,000 tons per annum, and fish weighing nearly 30,000 tons (1947) was obtained from ponds and rivers. Lake Tempe (South Celebes) has been intensively developed for inland fishing and 3,000 tons of dried and salted fish were exported from that district in 1946.

Indochina.—Although the physiography of the Indochina coast appears to favour sea fishing, yet coastal fishing interests local people less than the inland fisheries. A luminant oil for peasants

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is extracted from Indochinese fish. Salt water fishing produced 150,000 tons annually before the war. Only along the Annam coast, particularly near deeper waters round Tanh Hoa, is inshore fishing very active on the basis of trawling and seining, which are unusual styles for Southeast Asia. The Cambodian coast, meeting place of migrant fish from the Mekong mouth and the Siamese and Kra coasts, produces fish of exceptional size. The Mekong distributaries are also considerably fished to supply the Saigon and Cochinchina markets. Of the freshwater fishing that in Tonle Sap is the best known and most productive, but there are others well developed in the streams of Tonkin and along the Mekong, where oxbow lakes and artificial ponds are used for seasonal fish cultivation.

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Fish products rank high in Indochina's exports, though valued only at one per cent of the total exports. Shipments usually go to Malaya and averaged 37,000 tons per annum for the period 1939–41, but they were valued at $2 million in 1950.

Siam.—Every Siamese is said to eat some fish with every meal of rice. At any rate the Siamese consumption of fish is estimated to be larger than for any single Southeast Asia unit. Much of the fish comes from inland fisheries and the floods of the Chao Praya and the Nam Mun create natural ponds which last long enough to fatten many fish. These inland fisheries are not well documented. Fishing is taxed according to the implement used rather than in relation to the amount caught, yielding a revenue of $.9 million (1944). Siamese sea fishing provides that dried fish which is exported. Mackerel, sardine and pilchard types migrate along Siam's attenuated coast and they are exhaustively fished as a whole though individual fishing units are small and poorly organised. At certain seasons the sea offshore is almost solid with squid which are caught in large numbers for eating. Probably 43,000 tons of fish are annually salted on the coast for transport and trade, but poor organisation and careless salting with low-grade brine taken direct from the sea has given Siamese fish a low reputation; it ranks as the lowest grade of salt fish in Southeast Asia markets. The export usually ranks at about $2.5 million annually (100,000 tons 1941), going to Singapore, Penang and Hongkong, largely for re-export from those places. Because the local fish is inferior, higher grade fish are annually imported from surrounding areas to a value of some $1.5 million (1950). The fish

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trade was largely Chinese, but Japanese fishermen had pirated the coast for years, using large trawlers serving markets in Singapore and in Japan.

Philippines.—Fish is as important in Filipino diet as in that of peoples on the mainland, and it is likewise an inadequately documented phase of their activities. Only in 1939 was a census of fishing taken. The amount that went into inter-island trade was small compared with the catch and only 100 out of the 1,600 types of local edible fish were marketed. Filipino fishing resembles that elsewhere in Southeast Asia and both inshore and inland methods are used. In the last decade also, some deep fishing had developed and steam trawlers landed quantities of *bonito*. Deep-sea fishing centres on Batangas, Manila and Sulu, whereas the inshore types are most developed round Mindoro, Batangas and Bulacan. More than 90 per cent of inland fishing (from rivers, ponds and lakes) comes from Batangas, Bulacan, Laguna and Rizal. The Pampanga and Iloilo districts have many fish ponds. Pearl oysters are gathered sporadically round the Palawan and the Sulu Islands.

In 1939 about 180,000 Filipinos were fully engaged in fishing and another 200,000 fished part-time. The total catch was then valued at $150 million. Fish had no significance as an export and about 400,000 tons were imported in 1940.

Postwar Fishing

Casually organised and producing a poorly graded commodity Southeast Asia fishing has everywhere an important place in the diet of local people. The international trade in fish within the region has certain resemblances to the rice trade in direction, in variability from year to year, and in foreign monopolisation of the middleman function and trade organisation. On the other hand, the dispersed and loose organisation of Southeast Asia fishing proved an advantage in the war period. Its simplicity of operation, use of locally-made boats for fishing and bulk transport, and ease of replacement of locally-made equipment, meant it suffered lightly from the war.

The fish trade between Southeast Asia countries was, however, paralysed, owing to difficulties of procuring bulk salt supplies and of transport, but the rice-eating people in rural areas were not seriously deprived of their supplementary fish, so much of which was caught nearby. The large towns which once consumed fresh

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fish trawled at a distance or brought on ice from the coast could not receive adequate supplies and suffered accordingly until transport became easier. Java suffered most from the breakdown of international fish trade because no other Southeast Asia territory normally imported such large quantities of dried fish.

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Chapter Twenty-four

INDUSTRY AND TRADE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

39 438 25 If "industry" be taken to include all activities connected with processing, then there is more industry in Southeast Asia than appears at first glance, though not much manufacturing in mechanised factories may be found. The territory is, however, overwhelmingly agricultural and in almost every part of the region it is subsistence agriculture which employs and sustains the largest number of people. Much manual processing is done by these subsistence agriculturists on their own little farms to prepare their production for their family consumption.

Cottage Industries

286 438 472 The tradition of being self-supporting in each territory, the national counterpart of individual subsistence farming, is very strong even today, finding expression in the widespread cottage industry of weaving and in that Southeast Asia custom of making a single length of span-broad, hand-made cloth the basis of a skirt-like dress—the *sarong*, *lungyi*, *panung* and so on. Today this domestic weaving, where it has managed to persist in spite of competition from cheap imported cloths, uses imported cotton yarn, although parts of Burma still weave homegrown silk, and Siam and Indochina continue home-weaving on the basis of Indochinese silk. Only in Java has the "cottage industry" become elaborated into a village factory industry for a more intensified and commercialised production of sarongs. Ninety-two per cent of Java's *batik sarongs* (printed cotton skirts worn by men and women alike) come from factories of less than 80 workers each; this specialised process of dyeing in patterns defined by wax is now done by the small factory working upon imported cotton cloth.

385 415 The other considerable domestic industry deriving from the subsistence tradition is that of making innumerable varieties of articles from plaited palm leaves. Containers of many sorts, hats, domestic utensils, house walls, mats, fish traps and agricultural

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tools are all made by villagers using the palms and bamboos of 285
their setting. Boats, shoes and tools are made of wood by peasants, 415
mostly for their own use. While this type of industry usually secures no place in national statistics and has low monetary value, it plays a most important part in Southeast Asia life which may be described as still in the "Wood Age" so far as most peasant and rural life is concerned. Domestically-made cigars and 438
cigarettes supply local needs and rapidly displace the *areca* or 277
betel chewing habit. In Burma, the Philippines and Java cigar-making has become commercialised for trade and export; in Java some $9 million of hand-made cigarettes entered trade during 1937.

Throughout the region, too, are scattered remnants of a metal- 326
working industry, as in the beaten silver of Malaya and Java, the niello work of Siam, and the gold settings for precious stones in Burma.

But these domestic industries rank as small by external standards 438
and they play a negligible part in international trade. They must not be forgotten, however, because in the evolution of Southeast Asia we may see grow up forms of industrialisation originating in these domestic industries, as has been the case in the industrial evolution both of Europe and of the Far East. In these domestic industries little or no money is involved. At their simplest they are "subsistence industries" providing the family needs and scarcely anything more.

Thus most Southeast Asia people produce what food their 433
families need and what articles they need. Their requirements from outside are very small and in any case their way of life involves so little money that they have small means to buy anything outside their local subsistence ecology. That was the earlier condition everywhere in Southeast Asia before the industrial revolution in Europe, and it continues both in the simple form and in many variations even today, when there have evolved groups of people in Southeast Asia who are entirely dependent on wages to buy food and what other articles they need. The subsistence 434
principle is still strong in that very little money interchange goes on among the great majority of the population; some of them by doing part-time work earn wages, yet the money they earn has a very low average, indicated by the very low per capita revenues of the various states. Just before the war, Indochina revenue

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434 averaged below $2 per person per annum and revenues were of that low order for all Southeast Asia countries except Malaya, where it was about $70 per person, a sign that Malaya, of all these countries, was the one where work and activities centred on money and had moved farthest from the subsistence principle.

It has to be noted that the small amount of money involved in such ecologies does not mean poverty in the European sense: it represents only that margin of necessities which is outside the subsistence ecology. In addition to the little money it obtains, each family in general has both its food and its domestic equipment produced by itself, or in conjunction with helpers from the village community. This is a state of society long since outgrown in Europe though we have to allow for it in every phase of Southeast Asia industry and trade and to assume it will continue to play a part in future changes.

Agricultural Processing

256 249 Because Southeast Asia is so overwhelmingly agricultural its mechanical industries relate largely to agricultural processes. Rice mills, sugar mills, starch factories (from sago and tapioca) and sack factories, have all grown up in connection with agricultural processing in every one of these territories. In addition, rubber factories, oil presses and sugar mills have been established on western lines in association with European-style agricultural developments. The fabrication of rubber has not gone far within this region; tyres have been made in Java where also mass-produced rubber shoes were made for Southeast Asia markets. For the most part, mechanical processing industries are located peripherally to the countries concerned and they operate primarily for immediate export, though small rice, brick and sugar factories have spread inland away from coastal sites.

Textiles

439 288 Apart from food, the chief personal need of Southeast Asia people is cloth and the demand for textiles ranks as by far the greatest single item of fabricated goods. Most of the textiles recorded are imported; the domestic industry has tended to disappear except in the remoter districts, and textile factories have not been set up to any extent within Southeast Asia. Cotton spinning at Semarang, Tegal and Damak and some 200 small

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weaving factories in Java, were the leading developments in local 439
textile industries, but the bulk of cloth and even of raw cotton has 288
been brought in from abroad. Just before the war Southeast Asia was absorbing textiles to the value of well over $300 million per annum; much of it was cheap cloth from Europe, India and Japan, but there was a substantial need for the very finest cotton cloth produced anywhere and quite an exacting local standard of qualities. Should this huge demand for textiles stimulate local industry within the new nationalist units, Burma, Siam and Indochina may improve the quality and output of their present scanty and very inferior raw cotton.

Road and rail management, engineering maintenance and port 39
industries form a leading group of mechanical industries directly 40
affecting local techniques and introducing forms of industrialisation on western lines. The capital equipment for these activities is imported as are nearly all metal manufactures for other purposes. Manufactured goods form the largest single category of goods moving into Southeast Asia, to a total of nearly $500 million annually before the war. These manufactured imports chiefly went to urban consumers, yet simple farming tools and articles like needles and scissors went in large quantities far into every country. Although this category was broad, the components were very varied so that the value of each ranked comparatively low. Manufactured articles of western type showed little sign of being made locally, except in Java where successful attempts at making electric equipment had gone on for some years to supply the Southeast Asia markets with very cheap electrical goods like lamps and filaments, suggesting the possibility that Java may become industrialised on the Japanese pattern for mass production methods, and using part-time or women workers. In neighbouring territories, however, there are no such immediate prospects because labour has proved costly in proportion to its skill.

Mining Industries and Prospects

Mining industries of great value have developed in Malaya, 316
Burma, Sumatra, Borneo, the Philippines and the small islands 439
east of Sumatra. Tin and petroleum have been the region's specialities so far and these have assumed great importance, combining to be chiefly responsible for the prewar annual exports of about $650 million of mineral products from Southeast Asia

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316 to the rest of the world. Iron ore and bauxite occur in large
439 quantities, but without location convenient to the power needed to develop them. Gold has had special significance in Philippines mining, yet though found at many points, it ranks low for the region as a whole. Both tin and petroleum give rise to processing industries of smelting and refining which take place close to the streams of international traffic, particularly associated with Singapore and Penang. They play little part in local life, employ few people and go on at isolated points.

These mineral industries (which employed less than 250,000 persons before 1941) suffered from the war both by destruction in denial action and by neglect, so that they practically started anew from 1945. Whether they will all return to their prewar status remains to be seen. Southeast Asia provides the most prolific source of petroleum accessible to the Indian and Far Eastern markets and the wells are rapidly re-opening under the international oil groups which own them (output 1949, 9.0 million tons). Tin is coming back into production again more slowly because it needs more capital equipment such as pumps and dredges, which cannot be readily obtained, and there are some doubts whether world need for tin is likely to continue as great as before. The length of life of Malayan tin mines, the main prewar source, has been questioned, yet the little-known islands just south of Malaya are thought to contain extensive deposits of untouched tin likely to come into production in due course, though carefully screened for the time being from prospectors by local authorities. By 1950 the total tin output of Southeast Asia was about 99,000 tons.

Labour and Power for Industrialisation

464 Whether intensified industrialisation of Southeast Asia on the basis of these minerals is possible, turns upon two factors. Labour continues to be scarce; many prewar mining labourers dispersed during the war years when mining stagnated, and any immediate diversion of labour from agriculture to mining, even if possible under the tight ecology of the prevailing subsistence farming, is likely to prejudice local food supplies which depend basically on hand-grown rice.

316 Furthermore, Southeast Asia has limited sources of mechanical power, a factor not only of consideration regarding expansion of

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industries derived from mining, but also regarding the general prospect of local industrialisation. While good qualities are mined in Tonkin, coals of most Southeast Asia territories are of inferior grade and ill-suited to major industrial uses. This is an obstruction to developing the extensive iron ore deposits because only Tonkin coal can be used for smelting. Mineral oil does not suit heavy industrial processes though diesel type heavy oil engines are widely used in existing local industries, and will probably be the source of power for any new dispersed industries. 316

Water power resources are huge and widely distributed. So far only minor harnessing of water has been done and it is remarkable that, although Southeast Asia people have evolved skilled techniques of using their water supplies for agriculture, they have shown little traditional interest in its use as power, even for textiles and rice-milling which might seem obvious needs. The high and fairly even rainfalls of the upland areas are assets for water power; only in the loose materials of volcanic flanks, as in Java, is there any great difficulty about the necessary damming. On the other hand, where the rivers have water enough and suitable relief, they are remote from the centres of greatest population concentration, where a labour corps is available. Hence of the 6½ million horse power estimated to be available from the waterways of the East Indies islands, hydro-electric stations with only a capacity of .2 million kilowatts had been installed and three-quarters of them were in Java. Outside the equatorial zone, the irregular régime of rivers renders them less suited for water power, and scarcely any hydraulic power is developed in Burma, Siam and Indochina. A single installation derived from a dam at Chenderoh across a major stream, the Perak River, motivates many tin mines of West Malaya. On the other hand, electrification (from imported coals) has become widespread throughout the urban centres of the whole region. It is possible that a dispersed industrialisation based on water power might rapidly develop on lines apparent in parts of Central Europe, and Southeast Asia might, by industrialising on water power and heavy oils, skip the phase of steam industrialisation through which both Europe and Eastern United States passed. On this basis the bauxites of Southeast Asia could come into full exploitation. 31a

Apart from teak extraction, Southeast Asia forests have provided little international trade, which is more remarkable now that 31B

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313 the resources of temperate forests show signs of exhaustion. The defects of tropical forest for a timber industry have been explained; it is not clear why no interest has been shown in a pulping industry based on tropical trees most of which have the advantage of relatively quick natural replacement. Pulping of tropical woods may yet solve the world paper shortage, especially as woody or fibrous tropical plants might be cropped for pulping instead of depending on predatory deforestation as is the case in the pulping industries of temperate areas today.

372 374 The forests, however, supply the basic domestic fuel of the region. Apart from westernised suburbs of the town, charcoal and wood are the normal means of cooking, in which respect the domestic life continues today much as it did two or three centuries ago. Wealthier residences may use electricity which is mostly steam-generated from imported coals, but domestic coal-gas is uncommon. Domestic heating, of course, is a question which does not arise in these climates. For their illuminants the bulk of the people turn to their trees, to coconut oil, second to which is paraffin oil from within the region. Urban areas are electrically lit.

From Commodity Production to Local Processing

38 268 32 Because the production of primary agricultural commodities like rubber, copra, medicinal plants, and tapioca, all the basis of industrial processes elsewhere, has been the function of Southeast Asia territories over the first third of this century, culminating in an immediate prewar export valued at nearly $1,000 million per annum, processing and manufacturing of these commodities may cease to be done overseas and become the basis of industrialisation within Southeast Asia to make use of local power resources and of the margin of time available among rural populations. A tendency in this direction was very evident in Java where skill and incentive were present; rubber goods, textile printing, preparation of medicines, confectionary and refining essential oils had grown to significant proportions by 1941 and the enforced isolation of the war years should have intensified them, though a resumption of normal trading relations will oblige these industries to so organise that they meet the rival processed goods of zones as varied as India, Europe and the Far East. The influence of India as a source of manufactured goods was evident, particularly in textiles, before the war and could become even more prominent after India's

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additional expansion under the almost autarchic conditions of the war period. Political instability within India can, however, offset this advantage. 288 32

It is to be noted that the great markets for goods manufactured from Southeast Asia commodities so far have been in Europe and the United States. The little nations of Southeast Asia seem ill-prepared to absorb much of them for some years. Because food is produced in such large quantities in this typically agricultural zone, we may not overlook the possibilities of manufacturing foods in forms such as biscuits, jam and canned varieties. Hitherto the tight association with industrialised colonial powers has to some extent dissuaded intense application to the miscellany of industrial productions possible in Southeast Asia, yet the local nationalisms and the incentive to establish more balanced social and communal systems tend to encourage local industries. Burma, Siam and Indochina before the war were only lightly touched by these tendencies to manufacture. 433 439

From the point of view of the rest of the world, a re-orientation of the tremendous quantity of Southeast Asia's primary agricultural materials now handled by processing industries already established in Europe and the United States, would have major effects, not least on the ability of those industries to maintain their manufactured exports at levels which have been increasing over the last century. Thus, a nationalistic Southeast Asia driving towards self-sufficiency industrially is likely to diminish the international trade streams to and from this region, though it may progressively increase the occupational activities and living standards of Southeast Asia people.

Intra-Regional Trade

A total value of about $400 million was involved in the prewar interchange of goods and commodities between one part and another of the Southeast Asia region. This intra-regional trade was relatively small because the component units of the region produced much the same commodities and goods, by reason of which the countries tended to be rivals rather than customers of one another. An additional factor was the pull of several metropolitan areas, Britain, France, Holland and the United States, which acted to lessen intra-regional trade and to lessen the regularisation and rationalisation of production in Southeast Asia as a whole. Food 438 439

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438 deficiencies of local people were largely met by intra-regional
439 trade, particularly the rice and fish movements from Burma, Siam and Indochina to the other territories. The layout of the whole region relative to transocean shipping routes drew much of the intra-regional trade to major foci like Singapore, from which point manufactured imports from other parts of the world were also distributed within the region. Singapore has functioned for a long time as entrepôt centre for the region and some two-thirds of its import values derived from Southeast Asia. Siam had a very balanced trade relation with its surroundings, over 40 per cent of both its imports and its exports being related to Southeast Asia territories.

Extra-Regional Trade

439 The overall trade movements from the region to the rest of the world were huge; annually over the quinquennium 1936-40 commodities valued at well over $2,000 million went overseas from Southeast Asia and some $1,200 million of goods moved into the region, quite apart from the intra-regional trade. The disparity of values moving in and out of Southeast Asia has for years been paralleled in the trade of each country, the disproportion being least in the case of the Philippines and greatest for Burma. The disparity went deeper; since the Southeast Asia output was of bulky, raw or partially-processed commodities, the outgoing tonnage far exceeded the incoming tonnage and the carriage involved made Southeast Asia one of the busiest oceanic shipping areas of the world, an activity swollen further by the great amount of coastwise shipping made necessary by the insular character of the region. It was largely the absence of this shipping which paralysed the region during the war years.

By 1947, re-establishment of trade flows was becoming apparent, though Indochina and the East Indies were still largely isolated. Southeast Asia commercial activity then showed a new pattern: about $3,500 million of goods went into the region as against $2,500 million passing out. While these figures included both intra- and extra-regional trade, they were mostly the latter; they involved an entirely new valuation of goods and a substantial addition could be added for "black" or unreported trade.

Nevertheless, the overall figures showed that Southeast Asia was absorbing far more in value than it was exporting. Part of the

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disparity could be attributed to replacement of capital equipment, yet it may indicate the beginnings of a great change in the function of Southeast Asia in world trade. Postwar revival by 1950 had become most spectacular in Malaya which, though the smallest political unit of the region, had re-established its trade and was responsible for nearly half the total trade of the region. The Philippines also recovered quickly, to be involved in a quarter of the trade. 439

Convergence of Routes

This region stands at zones of convergence for transoceanic routes between the very densely populated areas of India and China, and also between those areas and Europe, Australia and North America, so that international shipping is likely to converge upon Southeast Asia independently of purely colonial considerations which have hitherto specially drawn the Philippines into the U.S. shipping circuits, the East Indies into the Dutch, and the rest of Southeast Asia into the British shipping streams. French shipping has been relatively little involved, certainly not more than Danish, Italian and German and far less than the Japanese. 131 439

The convergence of shipping routes has left a heritage of convergent air routes which are tending to follow closely the shipping lanes, making Southeast Asia the terminus of the air lanes from North America down through the belt of narrow seas along the West Pacific (linking the United States with Japan, China and Java population centres) and from Europe across the "Eurasian Mediterranean" of Southwest Asia and India, as well as a junction for lines to Australia, although the population and production of the latter scarcely justifies considering it in the long term as a major objective of airways in the way that India and China must continue to be.

Convergence of Interests

There is thus much to be coveted in Southeast Asia, the raw materials and the food it produces, the manufactured goods it needs, the commission on the coming and going involved, are all desirable and those who share or have shared in its $15,000 million 1950 trade turnover are inevitably defensive of their portion. Colonial powers have jealously divided up these assets in the past and it is to be expected that there will always be from India and 433

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China no less than from Europe and America, rivalry to share the trade of Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asia has been for a long time divided up by divergent colonialisms. Its prospect is to be divided within itself by divergent nationalisms which leave it only too open to the covetous from East and West, more particularly as Southeast Asia is the only zone providing a surplus of rice and the only zone likely to absorb even the shoddiest of cheap mass produced articles. From now on it is not only the western manufacturers who seek the great markets of Southeast Asia. The factories of India, China and Japan will be equally interested to enter this market—all of which suggests that the trading interests convergent upon Southeast Asia may increase rather than decrease.

Asia and Southeast Asia

In its relation to the rest of Asia, Southeast Asia has functioned chiefly as a source of food (rice from Burma, Siam and Indochina, and sugar from Java) and of money derived from Indian and Chinese remittances sent back to their homes by traders and labourers in the pioneer mining and planting zones. So far the region has been the only population and food "safety valve" for Asia, and the only "New World" for the teeming populations of India and China. Possibly it can continue to function in the same way for some time to come, but the food margin in Southeast Asia is decreasing. Other Eldorados of migration and food have in the past rapidly become overpopulated areas, needing imported foods—the rhythm of such a change-over may prove specially fast in a tropical region. Developments of the last century in Burma, Siam, Malaya and Java have certainly shown how rapidly changes can be brought about and how when certain types of pioneering and initiative are concerned, the people of these territories are capable of large-scale action. Directed into forms of cooperative rural and industrial activities aptly fitting their traditional subsistence farming and communal mutual assistance systems, their rate of industrialisation may prove as remarkable as their rate of commercialisation of agriculture over the last fifty years. Just as commercialised agriculture on its own has produced disruptions and breakdowns of many aspects of local life and reduced it to a degraded form, so also industrialisation without planning to fit in with the ecology of Southeast Asia may reproduce for long periods only the more

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sordid phases of industrialisation from which the West is just starting to emerge. Commercialised agriculture in Southeast Asia has led to rural slums; industry uncoordinated with this special environment may merely bring squalor and bad living conditions which it has taken years to eliminate from the older industrial centres, but which can easily go on for much longer in a more ruthless oriental setting.

Chapter Twenty-five

PEOPLES, POLITICS AND PROSPECTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

101 THE setting of Southeast Asia may be summed up as one of extremes of relief (deltaic plains and mountains) and a climate 184 mostly approaching the wet limit for plant life but merging into 361 monsoonal types. To this setting the people have made varying 105 responses, ranging from migrant food gatherers and hunters in the jungles, to subsistence farmers in the plains, but all turning upon woody materials for weapons, implements, house-structures and domestic utensils, upon rice, the cereal of the wet extreme, and upon social systems of communal help. The whole social and economic life has been galvanised over the past century or two by being more and more drawn into commercial and industrial activities developed in response to and on the basis of external needs for the minerals and agricultural products of Southeast Asia, whereas prior to that time the region was touched only by a trickle of traders moving between India and China.

FACTORS IN THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY

174 Several factors account for the difficulty of obtaining firm data 177 to fill in our general picture of the historical geography of South- 311 east Asia. In the first place, there grew up no strong literary tradi- 175 tion to last through the centuries and record the past in a form other than mythical. Here tradition is largely oral and literature essentially Indian rather than indigenous. And whatever there was of local record and history has rotted away quickly, the climate, the ants, insects and moulds soon destroying anything on wood, paper, leather or cloth. Moreover, in this setting of swamps and forest, the most easily available material is wood, and artistic tradition expressed in wood, whether in carvings, buildings or tools, rapidly disintegrates, leaving little of that sort of evidence which is the basis of our facts about early periods in other regions. Buildings and carvings on stone were not normal expressions of Southeast Asia people where over large areas stone is not easily come by and where

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

FIG. 113.—Historic Pattern of Southeast Asia during Indian Colonial Period

implements had not in any case developed far enough to deal with stone. Hence monumental evidence in Southeast Asia is so largely Indian, an introduction by foreigners using styles and techniques developed in their home settings, and most developed in the drier parts of this region, where stone is more accessible. On the clay lands, historic brick structures, also an Indian innovation, weather to nothing very quickly. At Angkor may be seen the power of quick-growing tropical trees to shatter and break down temples and palaces built of stone and lateritic blocks. 174 177 211 175

This, too, is a region of natural calamities, difficult though it is to pin-point them. Little kingdoms have been wiped out in a few hours by Javanese volcanoes, as in A.D. 1006 when the flourishing city of Dharmavamsa (a great king of Central Java) was reduced to ashes by "a great calamity," probably an explosion and lava outflow of the Merapi volcano. Settlements along rivers have been obliterated when huge mud-flows swept down from loose ashes on the flanks of new eruptions, possibly accounting for our ignorance of east Sumatran kingdoms. Coasts have altered through the years [731] 133 175

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133 and deltas have changed; areas which once were shallow sea have
175 become sedimented to swamps, a process by which Cambodia has been cut off as the Lower Mekong built up mud-flats isolating Tonle Sap from contact with the sea. The evolution of new routes has caused some old centres of power to fade into mere fishing villages, evidenced in the decline of Takhola and Bandon after the sea route through the Straits of Malacca became more generally

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

FIG. 114.—Historic Pattern of Southeast Asia at the Islamisation Period

175 used than that across Kra. Plagues have laid waste whole cities, as
164 when Uthong in about 1350 was devastated by cholera and its population fled. The region is still one where malaria, dysentery, cholera and plague are endemic, more especially in the older, more congested territories like Java. These diseases have frequently flared up into appalling epidemics killing thousands of people, epidemics reflecting a relation between bacteria and the climate (which encourages bacterial reproduction), the population density, the difficulties of sewage disposal and social habits of indifference to hygiene (which has no ill effects among lonely settlements in the forest but becomes a social menace in towns). Fevers and virulent diseases have frequently ravaged the local people, debilitated them, and wiped out their settlements. The region is strewn with ruins of towns now abandoned, and with ruined groups of people who have degenerated physically by disease and under-nourishment. South-east Asia proved capable of engulfing rather than enshrining those moving into it to live.

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Further to complicate the historic geography was the fact that the literary people, the monks and religious men, were Indian or Indian-minded for long periods, disinterested in mundane records, and following the custom, still evident among many Southeast Asia people today, of avoiding personal names, so that anonymity, obscurity and confused nomenclature veil the past even in such records as do exist. Many experiments in writing styles were developed among these isolated and complex peoples and often inscriptions made in them cannot be translated today. Because of the dispersal tendencies within the territories themselves and the lack of focus to the region as a whole, no great depositories of learning were established in Southeast Asia to gather and conserve the record of its past.

Population Changes

Broadly speaking, the region has been until recently one of very thin population and large patches of it still contain populations of remarkably low density. Direct evidence of densities are scanty for periods farther back than this century, yet it seems probable that the whole of Southeast Asia in 1800 contained only about ten million people, when the region was probably as thinly peopled in its most attractive areas as Upper Burma and Upper Siam, the least attractive and developed areas, are today; Malaya then contained about a quarter million people, Java about four million, Burma probably less than two million. It was, even at the end of the 18th century, a zone of labour shortage and the objective of the local princelings of the times was to get hands, the basic power resource of their time, the one way of securing a small surplus from their fundamentally subsistent territories. Outsiders were not greatly attracted to Southeast Asia itself, as apart from the routes through it. To Spain its old colony, the Philippines, was no great asset and more related to Mexico than to Spain, remote and ready to drop from the Spanish orbit during the 19th century. To Holland, its colony in Java was a company venture that yielded little direct profit for many years and was at times on the verge of bankruptcy.

But the last 150 years brought tremendous changes in population. First, on the heels of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, came a revival and an expanded volume of trade between the Indian Ocean and the Far East, a stream which threaded the seaways of

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

FIG. 115.—Population Expansions of Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia, diffusing new conceptions as it passed, re-establishing trading centres, drawing out the produce of Southeast Asia people and stimulating development of Southeast Asia as a source of trade rather than a passage for traders. It has been a century and a half of tremendous population increases, causing people to swarm upon the more fertile areas, upon deltas and volcanic cones where people had not clustered before. In these choice areas, the new deltas and the newer ejecta, the bulk of the great population increase has concentrated, so that upon them live teeming multitudes in limited zones separated by stretches of forest-covered space scarcely more populated now than they were several centuries ago. By the quinquennium 1916-20, the total population of Southeast Asia had become 84 million, by 1936-40, 120 million, and in this present quinquennium (1946-50) it is nearly 145 million. The increases, while general, have not been even (Fig. 115). Over the present century, of the political units, Java has been increasing very much faster than any other, and Siam has since 1911 so increased that its population exceeded that of the Philippines by 1933 and by now exceeds also that of Burma.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA NUTRITION DENSITIES
(Average number of persons per rice-acre per annum)

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Quinquennium	*Burma*	*Indo-china*	*Siam*	*Java and Madoera*	*Philip-pines*	*Malaya*
1916–20	1.23	1.75	1.66	4.12	3.13	—
1921–25	1.19	1.67	1.57	4.27	2.67	5.61
1926–30	1.14	1.61	1.57	4.50	2.69	6.13
1931–35	1.19	1.64	1.63	4.60	2.76	6.42
1936–40	1.25	1.63	1.74	4.96	2.79	7.02
1946–50	2.0	2.1	1.6	5.9	3.9	7.2

Because population and the net production of food have increased *pari passu*, it is important to examine the "nutrition density" (persons per acre under rice) since the surplus for export depends on low internal consumption of the Southeast Asia staple and high internal production. The countries of Southeast Asia pre-war showed considerable differences in nutrition density, from Malaya (the plantation-mining specialist) with 7.2 persons per rice-acre, to Siam (the rice-surplus specialist) with 1.6. Malaya, Java and the Philippines had nutrition densities much higher than the rest of neighbouring countries and in the case of Malaya and Java the nutrition density had been steadily rising, whereas in Burma, Indochina and Siam it was fairly static. Over the same period, the domestic consumption of rice per person sharply dropped (by 20-25 per cent) in Burma, Siam and Java and rose about 10 per cent in Indochina, Philippines and Malaya. The postwar figures available show considerable increases of nutrition density everywhere except in Siam, yet these were changes of degree, not of pattern.

Changing Internal Emphasis

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Today the very crowded places are firstly, Middle and North Java, Lower Siam and the Red River Delta, where densities of over 1,500 people per square mile occur, with secondary crowdings in Lower Burma, the Lower Mekong, Central Luzon and the Visayas. These concentrations of people are pre-eminently in agricultural areas (Fig. 116), and they are in fact largely made possible by exceptional soil qualities within an area whose general soil fertility is low. These crowded areas have taken part in a commercialisation of local agriculture and their subsequent history has been firstly a

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

FIG. 116.—Distribution of People in Southeast Asia

rapid increase in people to a point where the new agricultural development ceased to be enough for the large population, leading to the second stage of slow migration and emphasis on commercial agriculture upon newer zones of similar type. Hence the change of emphasis from Tonkin to the Annam coastal plains and then to the Lower Mekong; from the Central Luzon area to Visayan Islands;

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from the plains of Java to the dangerous upper limits of the volcanic country; and from Dry Burma to the Irrawaddy Delta. Sometimes there has been a little agricultural migration—very largely this change has been brought about by different rates of growth rather than movement of people to new places. Everywhere commercialisation of agriculture has led to population increase, because the agricultural technique has not changed from the Southeast Asia tradition of manual work at every stage. The bringing of new areas into cultivation has been followed by an increase in the number of hands to do the cultivating, partly a response to the need and partly made possible by additional nourishment and an added vitality arising from lower disease rates natural to the less populated area, because human diseases are diffused more slowly where people are isolated from one another, as in new areas. Thus Southeast Asia has been the scene of intense pioneering by people seeking, developing and filling new agricultural areas, to create for a time the eldorado of rice-eating peoples and the one safeguard of Indians and Chinese against the vagaries of their own harvests and against the congestions of their home districts.

Minerals in turn have attracted external interest. There has been the pull of gold in the Philippines, of tin in Malaya and nearby islands, of petroleum in Sumatra and Borneo. These great gambles drew capital and pulled in crowds of labourers, wage-earners who were unavailable from local people so tightly held in their manual agricultural systems. Minerals drew millions of Chinese through the South China Sea in the tin rushes and oil rushes of the last hundred years.

Yet another form of commercialised agriculture developed, to provide the industrial raw materials of distant factories in Europe and America and based on crops entirely foreign to Southeast Asia. Sugar, coffee, hemp, rubber, oil palm proved highly successful in this terrain where they had never existed before. Large plantations of them were laid out, still more wage-earning labour was absorbed, a still greater production was obtained, drawing more and more people into virgin areas. Migrations from India and China were further stimulated to work upon the plantations whose uneven development, in successions of booms and depressions, alternately attracted migrants in the boom years and sent them home again in the depressions.

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Political Convergence

438 These local products for commerce not only stimulated export
174 trade; they stimulated import trades to feed the migrant peoples,
162 to dress them, and to dress the agriculturists so preoccupied that
they could no longer spare time to weave for themselves. And
166 trade itself drew external interests; Chinese and Indian traders
came in to monopolise middleman functions and Europeans came
in and worked out here the complex balancing of their own industrial systems far away. Britain stimulated the commercialisation of Burmese rice production as an assurance of cheap food for an industrialising, overpopulated India. The Dutch fanned out from Java into the adjoining islands. Not to be outdone, the French moved into Indochina as a base for their China trade. Germans for a time controlled the copra trade of the farther eastern islands. Thus all the major Western European powers had colonial interests in the expanding peoples, the expanding production and the expanding needs of Southeast Asia. And the major oriental powers, India, China and Japan, had equally direct interest in Southeast Asia (Fig. 117) as an outlet for their people, a source of rice, a source of raw materials for their industries, and finally as outlet for their own industrial products, India and Japan being mostly involved in this, the latest phase.

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Internal Divergences

The resulting pattern of people is one of unparalleled diversity in stages of evolution from subsistence to commerce, in densities of people, in ethnic types, in languages (Fig. 118). The similarity of setting, circumstance and products have disrupted Southeast Asia within itself by economic rivalry in producing similar commodities, and the divergencies of overseas connections with different colonial powers established divergent trade streams, currency differences, educational differences and political differences. Political and economic forces released in Europe and America had their repercussion within Southeast Asia, by means of which French protectionist policies virtually isolated Indochina from its neighbours and Filipinos turned their backs upon Asia. Siam has been wooed, ignored or bullied, depending on the fluctuation of Anglo-French relations in Europe and the opportunism of the U.S. in building up its bloc in East Asia. All sorts of colonial systems have been

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FIG. 117.—Pattern of Modern Migrations

experimented with, so that Southeast Asia has a great range of constitutional forms, from fossilised oriental aristocracies to democracies of a few intelligentsia and to would-be republics trying to combine the gestures of democracies with the powers of autocracies, the whole being permeated by complex trading systems of both Western and Oriental types. All this may be summed up by saying that the cross-currents and backlashes of the world's political and economic systems of the present and past still move

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through Southeast Asia, irrespective of what the parts of Southeast Asia may have in common and overriding their traditional differences.

Every human type is represented in Southeast Asia. Successive peoples from East-Central Asia have filtered overland from the north, ranging from primitive Australoid types who left a few



FIG. 118.—The Pattern of Languages in Southeast Asia

Negrito and Australoid people in the forests as mark of the greater stream which went island hopping to Australia, to the later Tibetan-Mongoloid peoples, forefathers of the Burmese, Siamese and Laos of today. Then there were centuries of Indian migration early in this era, pressing overseas from South India across Kra, along the coasts of Sumatra and Java, into Lower Siam and the Lower Mekong, leaving an indelible mark in the speech, culture and religions of people there today; this was a spread of Indian merchant adventurers and traders, and large-scale colonies exclusively of Indian settlers seem not to have been established, but in time there took place a great blood mixture between Indians and the older indigenous stocks. Later came a similar seaborne migration into Southeast Asia by predominantly Chinese people who first trickled south in the manner of sea gipsies, developed agricultural colonies

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as in Tonkin and merged with local people, followed later in our times by a stream of traders who started by being dealers in the India-China trade and became in time traders between one Southeast Asia people and another. Thus the migration to and settlement in Southeast Asia of millions of Indian and Chinese labourers over the last fifty years or so (Fig. 117) is the modern expression of a process of convergence which has been going on for some two thousand years, differing only in that these latest migrants aimed to be temporary even though a portion of them never returned to their home countries, staying to marry and help change the character of Southeast Asia people. The predominantly Indian stream moved east and south to a northern limit roughly running through Cambodia—Lower Siam—Lower Burma; the Chinese stream moved into Luzon, into Borneo, Siam, Cochinchina, into the coastal fringes of Malaya, Java and Sumatra, into Lower and Northern Burma. Never has any one people or any one power controlled the whole of Southeast Asia until the Japanese period 1942-45 which, repeating in form though not in character the Chinese migration, demonstrated a unity only of paralysis not of invigoration.

Plural Societies

Thus, though the ethnic types converging upon Southeast Asia have been of separate groups, they have extended over different lengths of time, with the result that the region's ethnic map shows different degrees of their absorption into the Southeast Asia setting. In some places the absorption is complete, in others it has scarcely started, and there are all variations between. Hence the units of Southeast Asia are peopled by a range of types from indigenes to raw immigrants, each with specialised functions in society, so that no unit is homogeneous horizontally: there are great variations of custom, speech and stock from one part to another of the same layer of society; or homogeneous vertically, because there are generally communal differences between wage labourers, peasants, traders, administrators and aristocrats. Sometimes a religion is the only link. In certain cases, education by the colonial power is the chief link—as among the people of Indochina and the East Indies. These conditions, added to the wide range of economic interests, mean that each political unit repeats in miniature the variety of peoples and interest which is typical of Southeast Asia as a whole.

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000 The dualisms and pluralities of Southeast Asia society are relatively modern, becoming emphatic only over the past three hundred years, but plural societies and changing values within the units have been apparent in their changing political patterns. First there were the inland political nuclei; the kingdoms of Middle Burma, Upper Siam, Inner Cambodia were matched among the islands by principalities set in the mountains of Sumatra and Java. Then came the little powers related more to the sea than to the land; the Sailendra kingdoms using the Malacca Strait as their bond and artery, the Majapahit sea kingdom whose territories in Borneo, Celebes, Java and South Sumatra may be thought of as footholds for a sailing people, fringing rather than entrenched in the islands (Fig. 113). At a later phase the move of power centres was to the lower rivers of the continental edge, to Lower Burma and Lower Siam. In these historic patterns of political units may be seen operating the influences and traditions of widely differing human types, one rooted in the land, coming overland, depending on agriculture for its welfare and power; the other of seafaring people, many kinds and grades of them, coming to the lands of Southeast Asia by water, relatively mobile on their seaways, fishing and trading through the seas, and always peripheral to the land.

Dual National Foci

369 In most of the constituent political units of Southeast Asia there
184 is thus a split of interest (Fig. 117). Burma has a focus at Mandalay
177 and a commercial-administrative focus at Rangoon; the Philippines
631 has a dual nodality round Manila and round the Visayan Islands; Malaya, which has only recently acquired clear internal focus, has two centres of different interest, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, the former exclusively peninsular, the latter as much involved with all Southeast Asia as with Malaya; Indochina has the double pull of the Tonkin (Hanoi) area and the Mekong Delta (Saigon); Java, its old internal focus at Jogjakarta, with Batavia acting as external point of attraction. Sumatra is in the strange position of having several inland nuclei plus the tendency to use Singapore as its outport and route to Batavia. Only Siam can claim to have no second focus, yet even there the channelling toward Bangkok is only natural for the Chao Praya Basin; the Korat Plateau topography leads human and commercial interests towards the Mekong and the border country towards the northwest was once focused on

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the historic kingdoms at Chiengmai. Borneo is laid out so far entirely under centrifugal influences, complicated by the split into British and Dutch zonations. 369 184

If this "balkanisation" be true of the individual political units, it is equally strong in the region as a whole, except that the intersection of major seaways and airways tends to make an internal regional focus on Singapore, a tendency diminished by India's economic pull on Burma and South China's pull on the people, trade and foods of Siam and Indochina. 177 631

To some extent these dual foci to each territory have been stimulated by the arrival of Western trading systems which pulled in one direction while the traditional interests pull in another, yet in a sense all these political units have been created by colonial powers administering as a unit territories not previously politically unified or previously using the present boundaries. Spain and the United States enforced unity upon what is now the Philippines and in practice had continued difficulty in keeping Mindanao, for example, within the unit. France has imposed a uniformity and a certain coherence upon Indochina which was novel to the constituent units. Malaya as it exists today is a British political creation. Before the Dutch colonial period of the present century, all the islands of the East Indies had never been controlled as one whole.

Environment and States

The continental political units, Burma, Siam and Indochina in some ways may be likened to little Egypts—nucleations of people within attractive, fertile valleys protected in these cases by the nearly empty space of forests and mountains. The combination of natural encouragement and natural protection conditioned major civilisations in Egypt and in Mesopotamia at one phase in history and appears to be equally encouraging in this tropical setting except for one difference, that although this environment on the southeastern fringe of Asia certainly suited the growth of states, its protective isolation was incomplete. In the north the growing riverine states were exposed to intruders. Thus in these riverside nurseries, states were environmentally encouraged to grow in a setting attractive as breeding grounds for nations, though the environment was not sufficiently isolating nor sufficiently protective to enable the nascent states to persist. So far as the main islands were concerned, on our maps they appear as more emphatic units 369 631 184

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369 631 184 than their elongated forms, difficult interiors and cliffed, marsh or forest edges in fact justify. Rarely has any one of the major islands been the locale of a single people singly governed, homogeneous and integrated into an island-state. These large islands have been dispersive and fragmentive to the peoples in them.

Postwar Nationalism

186 The postwar effusion of nationalism in Southeast Asia is thus a paradox. It is a nationalism of plural societies and substantial minorities, without homogeneity inside the states, and without a nation, as understood in Europe, and very much a culmination of the insecurity and uncertainty produced by the divergent influences which have long been at work, breaking down old social integrations and their warm, human associations, substituting for them nothing but commerce and the new myth "economic man," cold, inexorable and not adequately or fully integrated with Southeast Asia people and their setting.

The devolution of Southeast Asia from colonial into nationalist units takes place at no propitious time. The cultivation of rice has been predatory, the accumulated effects of which are now showing in diminishing yields; new paddylands before the war were ceasing to be so easily available and the war threw a large proportion of the old lands out of cultivation. Rubber has found a competitor in synthetic rubber, and its production may repeat the history of sugar. Tin recovers from the war slowly because equipment has been lost. Plantation crops have lost labour, markets and opportunities. Yet Southeast Asia is still increasing its people faster than 161 the world average. Its increase, however, has gone on at a slower rate in the already congested areas and at a faster rate in what had been the emptier areas of South Sumatra (with Javanese migrants), in Mindanao (with Filipinos), in Johore (by Chinese immigrants), as well as in Laos, Dutch Borneo and Inner Siam, by local increases. Thus Southeast Asia has been filling up, though there is little prospect yet of an even distribution.

Devolution

000 The Southeast Asia population is expanding now as the trade systems which provided its first impetus to expansion shrink and lose coherence. The atmosphere is one of relinquishing colonies, but under circumstances when they are involved in an international

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bankruptcy rather than profitable, going concerns falling ripe for redistribution among new hands. Briefed in the theories and profits of a prewar economy, possibly even persuading themselves that something of the splendour of a 19th-century empire is theirs for the picking, these little nationalities are very largely liabilities, not assets. The policy of national autarchy may, under these conditions, reduce Southeast Asia to a condition approaching its low-pitched subsistence system, a reversion to the confusion and stagnation found there by the first European colonists. An era of political and material expansion has ended for a time and another of explosive instabilities has taken its place, a process of relinquishing and flinging off, possibly of disintegration. From a phase when Southeast Asia people were overwhelmed by the technological superiority of Europeans and Americans, the region is passing to one where this disparity becomes less and less. Whether or not this will prove pleasant for the people there, their leaders think it desirable, and a congenial poverty may ultimately prove the normal and agreeable thing for them, as it was in the 16th century.

How devolution will shape the political units of this region is not yet clear. Accentuating the pattern of dual foci already established, the divergencies produced by colonialisms and nationalisms, whose violent tenacity in the years 1945 to 1948 have been as disruptive as war itself, may yet produce in Southeast Asia a set of political units from which the colonial powers have withdrawn to a few key trading posts by the sea, reproducing once again that pattern once familiar as the foreign concessions (like Shanghai) on the coast of China.

The diminishing political hold of European and American colonising powers cannot decrease the interest of China and India in this area where they have had traditional influence, whence they have derived great profits in the past, where many of their nationals are, where raw materials for their own industries can be obtained, and where the one rice granary of Asia is. It is difficult to avoid supposing that, whatever the sentiment they profess, India and China in varying degrees may become involved with the control of Southeast Asia no less intimately than the colonial powers have been. Possibly this marginal, internally disrupted zone can only exist as an appanage and countries there may become the colonies or satellites of Asiatic powers rather than independencies.

In the readjustment of political, economic and social forces now

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000 going on between the relinquishing of colonial power by one set of foreigners and its replacement by another or by indigenous party groups, it is to be expected that processes of merging and re-shaping the states may occur, because the metropolitan powers had, in effect, frozen Southeast Asia into a set of political units which bore little relation to readjustments they caused to take place in Southeast Asia and more to considerations of policy and industry in Europe and the United States. Nationalism and its social policies may first result in a pulverisation of Southeast Asia into very small political units until complementary components to a state are realised to be no less important to a government than nationalistic units, which consideration may then lead on to a re-grouping of the small units into large ones differentiated internally but integrated as complementary parts of a nearly self-sufficient whole. Whether such fissions and re-groupings will be by arrangement, by force from within or by compulsions from without, depends as much on the persons thrown to the political forefront as on qualities inherent in the many-dimensioned pattern of Southeast Asia's political geography.

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EASTERN WORLD

S.E.ASIA · FAR EAST · PACIFIC

LONDON JANUARY 1953
Volume VII Number 1

[Title page]

6: Fisher U-3 (no date) 1953 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

000 THE CONCEPT OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA

By Charles A. Fisher

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101 DURING the past decade the term "South-East Asia" has figured increasingly in the literature of international affairs but there is still a surprising lack of agreement over its exact meaning. Many writers apparently continue to use it as a synonym for the whole vast area stretching from Pakistan in the West to Manchuria and Japan in the north-east, which S. K. Datta once called 'Asiatic Asia' and geographers have more usually referred to as Monsoon Asia. The very existence of these alternatives is, however, an argument against using the term South-East Asia in this way and, in the writer's opinion, there are very strong grounds for restricting its meaning to cover simply the area lying to the east of India/Pakistan and to the south of China, i.e., Burma, Thailand, Indo-China, Malaya, British Borneo, Indonesia and the Philippines. For, clearly, this area, and this alone, seems entitled on purely geographical grounds to be regarded as South-East in relation to the rest of the continent and, more important, there is an obvious need for a collective term to embrace these seven lands which have so much in common with each other.

Lying as it does between the Indian sub-continent (South Asia) and the Sino-Japanese realm (East Asia) which together constitute the two great cultural and demographic foci of the continent as a whole, South-East Asia has always been in some degree overshadowed by these neighbours. In a sense, indeed, that very fact lends it a measure of unity, for its civilizations are essentially derivative and, indeed, colonial in origin, and the region as a whole may not unfairly be regarded as transitional, both in its physical and human characteristics, between India and China. If, ethnically, its peoples are in general more closely related to the Chinese, Indian strains are nevertheless present, while, conversely, except in Annam, the Chinese element in South-East Asian culture is far less evident than the Indian, though both are usually recognizable.

[p. 12(B)]

101 Perhaps the outstanding feature of the human geography of South-East Asia throughout historic times has been the much lower density of population which it has supported, in comparison with the two neighbouring subcontinents already noted. In the main this must be attributed to the great difficulty of entry overland, through the mass of lofty jungle-covered plateau in the north, to the predominantly mountainous character of South-East Asia itself, and to the prevalence of tropical diseases which are endemic in such conditions. So far as available records can be trusted, the population of South-East Asia has never exceeded a third of that of either the Indian subcontinent or China proper, and today its average density of about 90 to the square mile compares with 275 for India, 285 for the former eighteen provinces of China, and over 500 for Japan.

This state of affairs, both past and present, taken in conjunction with the political fragmentation of South-East Asia which has been fostered by its physical division into a maze of islands and peninsulas, goes far to explain the extent to which it has fallen under the shadow of both India, China and, in more recent times, Japan. Thus, during the early centuries of the Christian era, nearly the whole of South-East Asia, apart from Annam which formed part of Imperial China, came under the influence of southern Indian colonization. This has left as its memorials not only the glories of Angkor and other monuments, but also the Buddhist religion of the mainland and the surviving Hinduism of Bali and Lombok. Likewise from India, through the intermediary of Gujarati spice traders, came Islam which, after the 13th century, established itself in the greater part of Malaysia but achieved no lasting foothold in the Buddhist lands farther north.

In the meantime, however, commercial ties had been slowly developing between many parts of South-East Asia and the Chinese empire. At least from the 8th century A.D. onwards there are records of missions arriving in

[p. 12(C)]

101 China from Java and elsewhere in the Nan Yang ('southern seas'), bringing with them specimens of their countries' produce. Although these were apparently intended to promote trading relationships between the lesser lands of South-East Asia and the great empire to the north—a design in which they were usually successful—the Chinese frequently chose to interpret such missions as evidence of submission and to regard the goods brought by the foreigners as tribute. Thus there grew up an established tributary relationship between many countries of South-East Asia and Imperial China. By an extension of the Confucian family code into foreign affairs the former lands came to be styled the younger brothers and China the elder brother and, notwithstanding the severance of these links by the European powers in modern times, this attitude is by no means forgotten even today.

Despite these very ancient links of both its great neighbours with South-East Asia, however, it was not until the area had begun to pass under European control that really extensive Chinese or Indian settlement took place within its borders. To be more precise, although the Dutch found many Chinese, as also a handful of Japanese, in Indonesia even in the early 17th century, it was not until the latter half of the 19th century, when the completion of the Suez Canal led to rapid economic development in South-East Asia, that Chinese began to pour into almost every part of the region. Meanwhile, and more especially in the present century, Indians, though on a smaller scale, have emigrated to those areas, notably Burma and Malaya, which were under British influence or control. Taken as a whole, this migration, which has provided South-East Asia with a population of over eight million Chinese and nearly two million Indians at the present day, must be regarded as second only to the great European exodus to the Americas during the same period. And, like it, the incentive was primarily economic. The relatively unoccupied pioneer lands in both cases provided far greater opportunities than the congested home-lands of the peoples in question. Just as the youth of Europe was advised to "go west," so to the Southern Chinese and Indians opportunity beckoned towards the south and east respectively.

The resultant plural societies, which are a feature of every country in South-East Asia, form yet another distinctive characteristic which marks out the latter as something different from either of its great neighbours. Yet the parcelling out of the region, with the solitary exception of Thailand, into a series of western-controlled dependencies, each subjected to different methods of administration in accordance with the particular colonial philosophy of the respective metropolitan power, served steadily to obscure the overall unity of South-East Asia as a whole. Indeed, it was not until the Japanese overran the entire region after 1941, thereby depriving the West of invaluable supplies of rubber, tin, and both vegetable and mineral oils, and creating a vast series of problems, many of which still defy solution, that the West first began to think in terms of South-East Asia as an entity.

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101 The primary problem at this juncture was, of course, to expel the Japanese from the area, and it was with this in mind that SEAC, which first publicised the new regional name, was established. Of necessity SEAC had initially to be based outside the region, since the latter lay entirely in enemy hands. Unfortunately, the habit has consequently grown up of regarding Ceylon and often, by association, both India and Pakistan as well, as integral parts of South-East Asia, and this has undoubtedly led to much confusion and muddled thinking. More recently, several writers have attempted to perpetuate this use of the term on the grounds that, under the aegis of the Colombo Plan, a new economic alignment is developing between South and South-East Asia. Thus, for example, Mr. Woodrow Wyatt* has stated that the formerly accepted definition of South-East Asia in its narrow sense is out of date since it is impossible to dissociate the countries to which it refers from India, Pakistan and Ceylon. While one may in large measure agree with many of his conclusions, this particular argument would appear to lead logically to such absurdities as including the United States in a definition of Western Europe or the Soviet Union as part of Eastern Germany.

The usage should, however, be criticised for more fundamental reasons than this. In the first place the problems of South Asia are by no means the same as those of South-East Asia. Thus, whereas in South Asia the outstanding problem is posed by over-population, only a few parts of South-East Asia are so affected and the region as a whole could undoubtedly support many more people without fundamental changes in techniques. Indeed, although its immediate preoccupation is with economic and political rehabilitation after the disruption and devastation of Japanese rule, which South Asia did not experience, South-East Asia may well in the near future come to regard the existence of so much relatively sparsely peopled land as its greatest source of weakness. Already since 1945 the Japanese have again several times raised the matter of emigration to such under-developed lands as eastern Indonesia and, with mounting population pressure in India, Pakistan and China also, it is by no means impossible that Japan's lead may later be followed by others of South-East Asia's neighbours.

This, in turn, leads to a further criticism of the extended use of the terms South-East Asia to embrace South Asia as well. Granted that the ties between India, Pakistan and Ceylon on the one hand and South-East Asia on the other are both strong and of deep historical significance, it still remains an open question whether they will prove tougher and more permanent than those which bind the latter to East Asia.

In the days before the war, when the modern concept of South-East Asia had not won general acceptance, two alternative names for the area were sometimes used, *viz.* Further India and the Far Eastern Tropics. Both of these terms enshrine important elements of truth, and both implicitly suggest that South-East Asia, on account of its

* *Southwards from China*, Hodder and Stoughton, 1952.

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inherent weakness, must be thought of in relation to one or other of its Asian neighbours.

Such is clearly the case today. The ties binding South-East Asia to India (and to a lesser extent to Pakistan) are based largely on personal respect for India's leaders and a common experience of breaking free from political dependence on the West. In this respect India is, in effect, the elder brother to the newly-independent States of South-East Asia and has effectively championed their cause both at the United Nations and elsewhere. Thus India has taken over the rôle which was formerly, though hardly disinterestedly, played by Japan as champion of "Asia for the Asiatics"* until the experiences of 1942-5 revealed her true intentions.

Certainly today there is far less affection in South East Asia for Japan than for India, but, thanks to the rapacity of many Chinese middlemen, local feeling towards China is even more hostile throughout the region. Thus, on grounds of sentiment alone, the alignment of South-East with South Asia appears to be eminently secure.

Unfortunately, however, this is by no means the whole story and two other factors weigh heavily on the opposite side of the balance. Economically speaking, the interdependence of temperate and tropical lands, at least in the present stage of Asian development, affords a firmer basis for trade between South-East and East Asia than anything existing in the relationship between the former

* The term "Asians" had not then come into general use.

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101 and India. This interdependence, which has in some degree underlain the economic geography of the Far East from the days of the early tribute-bearing missions to the time of Japan's short-lived Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, is likely to be exploited still further in future. Certainly, so long as Japan is cut off from trade with China she has no option but to pursue such a course, and it is by no means unlikely that China herself, once industrialized, will follow a similar policy. And, if such should indeed prove to be the case, the presence of a vast Chinese commercial community scattered throughout South-East Asia would be a formidable asset, quite apart from its even greater potential significance should an attempt ever be made to create by force a new Co-prosperity Sphere under Chinese auspices.

In short, the conclusion seems inescapable that the alignment between South and South-East Asia, desirable though it undoubtedly is from the standpoint of all free men, is by no means assured for the years that lie ahead. On the contrary, the possibility of new association with East Asia, with all the formidable consequences which that implies, cannot be ruled out. Indeed the dominant theme in the oriental history of the second half of the 20th century may well be the struggle of both South and East Asia for paramount influence in the area which lies between them. Greater East Asia we have known in our lifetime; it remains to be seen whether Greater South Asia can capture the minds and energies of men sufficiently to prevent a further relapse into barbarism and exploitation.

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BY THE SAME AUTHOR

An Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma
(Burma Book Club, Ltd., Rangoon)

The Fashioning of Leviathan
(Burma Research Society, Rangoon)

Progress and Welfare in South-east Asia
(Institute of Pacific Relations, New York)

Educational Progress in South-east Asia
(Institute of Pacific Relations, New York)

Netherlands India
(Cambridge University Press)

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COLONIAL POLICY AND PRACTICE

A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India

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by

J. S. FURNIVALL

Issued in co-operation with
The International Secretariat,
Institute of Pacific Relations

CAMBRIDGE
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
1948

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PREFACE

121 642 THIS book originated in a request from the Government of Burma at the end of 1942 for my views on reconstruction, with particular reference to features of colonial rule in Netherlands India that might suitably be adopted in Burma. One cannot transplant administrative machinery without reference to the environment; in a new environment it may work better or worse, but it certainly will not work in the same way. It was necessary therefore to emphasize the fact that British and Dutch colonial policy are founded on different traditions. Two basic principles of British colonial policy are the rule of law and economic freedom, whereas Dutch colonial policy has aimed at imposing restraints on economic forces by strengthening personal authority and by conserving the influence of custom.

121 642 182 In modern Burma under British rule there were five notorious evils: the failure of western self-governing institutions; the growth of debt and agrarian distress; the multiplication of litigation and crime; the rise of disaffection and unrest among the Buddhist clergy; and widespread corruption in the judicial and administrative services. I suggested that these can all be traced to a common cause: the disintegration of social life through the inadequacy of law to control the working of anti-social economic forces. Although in other respects Dutch rule is open to criticism which does not apply to Burma, yet in all these matters Netherlands India presents a notable contrast. We would not, even if we could, abandon what is valuable in the traditions of British rule, and in any case we cannot break suddenly with old traditions, or escape the consequences of the past. But the contrast indicates that we ought to incorporate in our policy the principle of controlling economic forces in the interest of social welfare. I tried accordingly to show how, by adapting certain devices of Dutch administrative machinery, this principle might be applied to cure the ills of modern Burma, and to lay the basis of a new and constructive policy.

121 While formulating these proposals it occurred to me that the comparison between Burma and Netherlands India might be of somewhat more general interest. In presenting it to a wider public there was,

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121 however, one obvious difficulty. The officials for whom the original note was written shared with the writer a common knowledge of Burma and its administration. For readers without such special knowledge it was necessary to trace the course of development more closely and to illustrate the results more clearly, even at the risk of multiplying tedious detail. Another difficulty, still more formidable, may be less obvious. For undesirable features of British rule in Burma, British officials, conscious of their good intentions, naturally tend to blame the Burman; Burmans, no less naturally, blame the British. Similarly in Netherlands India we find mutual recriminations between Dutch and Indonesians. Only by eliminating so far as possible all personal and local factors can one arrive at a just estimate of any particular experiment in colonial rule. It seemed necessary therefore to frame the comparison between Burma and Netherlands India in a general survey of colonial policy and practice. For such a survey, however, they provide a convenient introduction by presenting respectively extreme types of the alternative systems of direct and indirect rule.

114 In venturing further afield one was inevitably treading on uncertain ground. I was at home in Burma. After more than twenty years in the Civil Service, I was occupied for some time in business and in the direction of an agricultural bank, and also had the privilege of being associated with the University of Rangoon and the Education Department in various educational experiments. With the ready assistance of Dutch and Indonesian authorities I have made some study of Netherlands India, and I have visited Malaya, Siam and Cochin China. I also have some personal acquaintance with administration in British India. But of Africa, the other great field of colonial rule, I knew nothing at first hand. Fortunately it was possible to turn for information to Lord Hailey's great *African Survey*, and the extent of my debt to it will be readily apparent. It would be hard to say how much I owe to the voluminous writings of Dutch colonial experts, but among them I must mention in particular Dr J. H. Boeke, Professor of Tropical Economy in Leiden University, and Mr Meijer Ranneft, formerly Vice-President of the Raad van Indië. It is impossible for me to express adequately my gratitude to my friend Mr G. E. Harvey, for the care with which he read the first proofs of this book and for his

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generous comments and criticisms, and also for allowing me to use his unpublished extracts from the records of early British rule in Arakan. 114

The book was written during the late war, and completed early in 1945. The delay in publication has been due partly to the difficulties of the present time, partly to imperfections in the original script; and in this connection I must gratefully acknowledge the help and patience of the University Press. During the interval there have been great changes but, as the Japanese invasion of the Tropical Far East must certainly mark a turning-point in colonial rule, and subsequent events are still too close to be reviewed in due perspective, it seemed expedient merely to revise the tense in references to the war. 000

One change however calls for comment. Britain has granted Burma independence. On both parts this may seem bold even to the point of rashness. Some contend that we have been too ready to throw off the responsibilities of Government and Burmans over-ready to assume them. It is a tumbled house that they inherit, and there is urgent need to repair the damage, moral and material, inflicted on Burma in a war during which it was twice invaded. Exports have fallen by two-thirds of the pre-war figure of £37 million. The annual revenue covers only one-third of the current expenditure, and the national debt of over £110 million, about seven times the revenue, is rapidly increasing. Despite the general inexperience of Burmans in modern industry and commerce, their new leaders must enable Burma, so far as national interest allows, to make a due contribution to world welfare by the development of its resources. Moreover, in a country where the tradition of military service has long been suffered to decay, they must train the people to defend their freedom. Now also it will fall on them to deal with problems long-standing and hitherto insoluble: to adapt western institutions to an eastern people, provide remedies for agricultural debt and land alienation, reduce litigation and crime to healthy proportions, restore order among the Buddhist clergy, and purify the administration of corruption. In a troubled world, though less acquainted with affairs than their old rulers, they face a situation far more difficult. In these circumstances it is impossible to contemplate the future without misgivings, and we may well regret that in the past more was not done to equip the people and their leaders for the responsibilities of independence. 727 642

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Some advocate Dominion status as an alternative.[1] But, for countries such as Burma, Dominion status is an unmeaning formula. The British Dominions are countries potentially able to stand alone but preferring to be associated on equal terms with the other major partners in the Commonwealth. Burma is not in that position. The racial divisions and sharp conflict of interest and sentiment, which weakened the former Government, would still continue and are incompatible with Dominion status. On the other hand, if the Burman leaders had accepted it, they would have split their party, strengthened their rivals, especially the so-called Communists, and conferred on the prevalent dacoity the halo of patriotism and the semblance of civil war. It is lamentable that we failed to capture the imagination of the people so as to inspire an instinctive loyalty to the British connection, but we cannot escape the consequences of the past. In purporting to grant Dominion status, we would have been promising something that we could not give in return for support that the leaders of the people were unable to command. Once again we would have been committed to the ungrateful task of pacification; more difficult now, and far more costly, than after the wars of 1852 and 1885 when we could employ Indian troops.

I hold then that on both parts the decision in favour of independence was as wise as it was bold, not only in their interest but in ours. Nothing less than independence could transform nationalism from a destructive fever into a creative force. Yet national independence is not a cause or guarantee of welfare. Burmans still need help, and by our long connection we can do most to give the help they need. But we can help them only on terms acceptable to both parties. If we can help Burmans to stand alone securely, we may perhaps look forward to a time when they will welcome a more intimate association. However that may be, we can at least feel that we have done our best to meet whatever difficulties lie ahead by responding boldly to the challenge of a new age.

J. S. FURNIVALL

24 October 1947

1 [i.e. to unqualified independence — Analyst.]

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CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND OF COLONIAL POLICY AND PRACTICE

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1. Colonies and Dominions

One outstanding feature of world history during the last few centuries is the expansion of Europe. In some regions, chiefly in North and South America, settlements of European origin have become independent powers. Other settlements, in what are now the British dominions, are independent in all but name and sentiment, though owing a voluntary allegiance to the Crown. But wide areas, mostly in the tropics, still remain under the rule of a few western powers, reckoning as western powers the countries and dominions of western origin. Some, at the outset of the late war, were ruled by Japan, which had recently established itself in the position of a western power. In law these subordinate regions exhibit a wide variety of status, but they may all conveniently be termed colonies, and the powers that have assumed responsibility for their welfare may be termed colonial powers. Colonization originally implied settlement, but the tropics have been colonized with capital rather than with men, and most tropical countries under foreign rule are dependencies rather than colonies, though in practice both terms are used indifferently. Some tropical countries, such as Siam, though in law politically independent, resemble colonies because, in their economic relations, they are largely dependent on the West.

Up to the end of the last century, or even later, tropical peoples seemed, after the initial troubles of pacification, to accept, and even to welcome, foreign rule. Of British dependencies it has been said that 'a sentiment of alienation or estrangement has seldom shown itself in the earlier days of British administration....Where the sentiment occurs, it has tended to manifest itself most clearly as the people of the dependencies advance in education and standards of living.'[1] That is generally true of tropical dependencies in their relations with colonial powers. Towards the end of the nineteenth century impatience of foreign control appeared both in India and the

[1] Hailey, Lord, *Britain and Her Dependencies* (1943), p. 36.

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000 Philippines, and during the present century a reaction against western rule, and even against western civilization, has spread rapidly and widely. This raised new problems for those concerned directly in the administration or development of tropical countries, but it hardly touched the ordinary man except to suggest that his investments might be safer elsewhere. Recent events, however, and especially the rapid collapse of western rule throughout the Tropical Far East, have thrown down a rude challenge to western dominion in the tropics, and even those who know little of the outer world, beyond what they gather from the newspaper, have come to feel that colonial policy and practice need reconsideration.

The general growth of discontent and unrest, and the general sudden collapse in the Pacific, suggest a common cause in some defect inherent in colonial relations. The situation is all the more remarkable by the striking contrast between the dependencies and the dominions. Formerly it was held that colonies resembled fruit which falls from the parent tree when it is ripe. Yet the links of interest and affection between Britain and the dominions seem to grow stronger, while dependencies clamour for independence even when to outside view they seem unripe for it, and we have come to regard it as natural and right that they should claim independence. It would seem possible for Burma to gain much more than Canada from an association with Britain. But, as a former Chief Secretary to the Government of Burma said recently, 'it may be candidly admitted that our rule was not beloved by the Burmans'.[1] Why should the ties with Canada grow closer while Burma finds them irksome? What common factor is there making for estrangement with the dependencies? All human relations have a particular character arising out of the personality of those concerned, and this is no less true of colonial relations. The relations between Englishmen and Hindus cannot be identical with the relations between French and Annamese, or between Dutch and Javanese. Yet Europeans have much in common that contrasts with features common to tropical peoples in general, and colonial relations in themselves present many common problems that are little if at all affected by the particular nationality or race of those concerned. Let us then glance briefly at some of the common factors in colonial policy and practice.

[1] Leach, *Quarterly Review*, Jan. 1944, p. 50.

2. The Background of Colonial Policy

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It would appear superfluous to argue that the western powers which have come to exercise dominion in the tropics have a fundamental unity. No one would suggest that Portuguese and Spaniard, Dutch, English, French and American are all alike; all have their distinctive national character which is an invisible export on every ship from Europe. The towns which they have built in the tropics are as different as those who built them. Similarly, each colonial power has stamped its own imprint on its system of administration. But the West has a common civilization derived from Greece and Rome under the vitalizing impulse of Christianity. When this civilization first made contact with the tropics the rebirth of reason had already begun to liberate fresh sources of material power by the rationalization of economic life; from that time onwards there has been a growing tendency in the West to base economic and social relations on reason, impersonal law and individual rights.

Similarly, throughout the tropics one finds everywhere a basic resemblance in the social structure. There is a wide range of variation, from primitive tribal communities to settled agricultural societies with a complex social and political organization, yet in all the variations, from the most primitive to the most advanced, one can trace a common pattern. Under native rule everywhere, even in settled agricultural communities, social and political relations were customary, not legal; authority was personal, based on Will and not on Law; and both custom and authority were closely bound up with religion. The social order rested not on impersonal law and individual rights, but on personal authority and customary obligations, and authority and custom derived their sanction not from reason but from religion.

Wherever a western power has gained dominion in the tropics, or even, as in Siam, a large measure of economic control without actual political sovereignty, an intimate contact has been established between these two contrary principles of social life: between the eastern system, resting on religion, personal authority and customary obligations, and the western system, resting on reason, impersonal law and individual rights. That is a common feature of all colonial relations. And it is common to them also that the contact has been established for the advantage of the colonial power, and that the first condition of establishing dominion is the maintenance of order.

Ordinarily, the motive of colonial expansion has been economic

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000 advantage. Considerations of prestige and military strategy have played their part, but in the main economic considerations have prevailed. It is, indeed, generally true that colonization has arisen out of commerce, and not commerce out of colonization: the doctrine that trade follows the flag is quite modern, and in history the flag has followed trade. During the earlier stages of its expansion Europe produced little that tropical peoples required, and the main object of colonial policy was to get tropical produce at the lowest cost. That was the economic end of empire in the days of Portugal and Spain. The same end was attained more effectively by the great chartered companies, concentrating on economic activities, enjoying, as regards their nationals, a monopoly over eastern produce, and exercising sovereign powers which enabled them to obtain part of their supplies free of cost as tribute. But, with the growing rationalization of life in the western world, man has achieved a greater mastery over material resources, and there has been a continual readjustment of colonial policy to meet new conditions arising through economic progress. The first great change was the Industrial Revolution, which enabled Europe to sell its products in the tropics. This required a new colonial policy, no longer directed towards obtaining tropical produce cheaply through chartered companies, but towards opening up markets for the sale of European manufactures by the encouragement of native enterprise. Further economic development in Europe built up large-scale enterprise, needing a secure command over vast quantities of raw materials which natives working by their own methods were unable to supply; at the same time it created a surplus of capital available for overseas investment. Thus, from about 1870, with the opening of the Suez Canal, the tropical market ceased to be the main object of colonial policy, which now aimed at obtaining the necessary raw materials of industry by the rapid development of the tropics through western enterprise. Meanwhile, in some of the more closely populated regions, the abundant supply of cheap unorganized labour was attracting capital to oriental industry and manufacture, with the result that during recent years imports from India and Japan have reduced the value of the tropics as a market for cheap European manufactures, though increasing rather than diminishing their demand for capital goods. This has encouraged in the colonial powers a more sympathetic attitude towards local manufactures in their dependencies, and towards economic nationalism; but the full effect on colonial policy of

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this new trend, which was interrupted by the recent war, is not yet clearly visible. In this gradual transformation of world economy during the building of the modern world, all colonial powers and all dependencies have been involved, and it has been necessary, as a condition of survival, that colonial powers should revise their policy to meet the challenge of new circumstances.

The course of economic progress has had a further reaction on colonial policy by its effect on domestic politics within the colonial powers. In Britain the transition from a policy of endowing a chartered company with a monopoly over tropical products to a policy of opening a free market for British goods signalized, and was partly the result of, the transfer of power from the aristocracy and London merchants to the manufacturers of Manchester. When, in due course, policy turned in the direction of developing the natural resources of the tropics by western enterprise, Manchester had to meet the growing rivalry of heavy industry in Birmingham, and of financial interests in the City. But at this stage a new factor intervened. In order to secure its interests against the increasing power of capital, labour entered politics. For some time this had no obvious reaction on colonial policy. Manchester and Birmingham alike furnished employment, and imports of tropical produce encouraged production and reduced prices; colonial rule was profitable, more or less, to all classes. But the clash between labour and capital in Parliament encouraged a tendency towards colonial autonomy under capitalist control, answered by labour with demands for colonial autonomy on a democratic basis. Then, with the growth of tropical industry and manufacture, the conditions of labour in the tropics became a matter of economic interest to various classes in Britain, and welfare measures began to assume a new importance in colonial policy. In other lands, also, colonial policy has been moulded by the interplay of conflicting domestic interests, and in general on much the same pattern, though in some countries the rivalry of industry and agriculture has had a greater influence on colonial policy than in Britain.

Naturally, colonial policy is framed with reference to the interests, real or imagined, of the colonial power. But modern colonization is an affair of capital and not of men, and capital knows no country. The capitalist, the owner of capital, may be swayed by national or ethical considerations, but reason impels him to disregard them and lay out his capital where, on a long view, it will obtain the best return, and within recent times capitalist activities, reaching out rapidly beyond

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national boundaries, have acquired an extra-national character. Labour interests have had to counter this by uniting in an international association with a common policy. Out of the adjustment of the relations between capital and labour on an international plane has arisen a common recognition that the economic development of the tropics is a matter of world welfare.

Not infrequently, however, there is a conflict between world welfare and particular national interests, and colonial powers, pursuing their own interests, tend to disregard world welfare and the interests of other powers. The danger of rivalry in the colonial sphere first found public recognition in the Berlin Conference of 1884–5, which marked a new stage in the evolution of a common colonial policy. Before that one can trace a common resemblance in the colonial policy of different powers because they all had *similar* interests; from the closing years of the nineteenth century the common features of colonial policy are accentuated because colonial powers recognize, at least in name, a *common* interest in the development of backward areas. Colonial policy, though still directed with primary reference to the interests, real or imagined, of the colonial power, must now be justified to world opinion with reference to world welfare.

But colonial policy is only one aspect of national policy; each generation evolves its own social philosophy with no direct reference to colonial affairs, and inevitably colonial policy is framed in terms of the broad general conceptions which dominate the national outlook, and reflects the emergence of new general ideas. Moreover, although colonial relations arise out of the search for material advantage, men like to justify their activities on moral grounds and colour them with the warm glow of humanitarianism. 'I do not pretend', says the historian of the Portuguese Empire, 'that our sole aim was to preach, if others will allow that it was not only to trade.' When men came to accept the principle of freedom of person, property and trade, consistency required that it should be extended to colonial relations. Similarly, the idea of social justice that took shape in Europe during the nineteenth century permeated colonial policy, and so likewise did the ideas of democracy and self-determination or nationalism. It was self-determination in Europe for which Asquith drew the sword in 1914, but before the war was ended the right of colonies to self-determination had been recognized in principle. Again, popular Darwinism of the last century held that progress was achieved through the survival of the fittest, of the more efficient; accordingly, in the name

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of progress and efficiency, men set themselves to run the colonies on more business-like, efficient, lines. Thus colonial policy tends to follow, even if at a distance, domestic policy. Liberty, Social Justice, Democracy, if approved as sauce for the domestic goose, are served up a little later with the colonial gander; Free Trade is good for Britain, and good, therefore, for India; social legislation protects British labour and should, therefore, promote welfare in the tropics; democracy strengthens the political fibre of Europe and should, therefore, help dependencies towards autonomy. As one aspect of national policy, colonial policy reflects ideas transcending economic aims. It is true that, in retrospect, ideals claiming a moral basis have often worked in practice to the advantage of the colonial power rather than of the dependency, and men are apt to dismiss the humanitarianism of a former age as humbug and its zealous advocates as hypocrites. That is partly because on the whole morality is a paying proposition; yet, though it pays to be honest, men are not honest merely because it pays. For ideas have an independent vitality; men accept them even to their apparent prejudice. And the ideas may outlast the empire which they help to build, just as Roman law survived the fall of Rome and provides a steel framework to the fabric of the modern world, and as in the Spanish colonies the Faith survived the fall of Spain. So in Asia and Africa the ideas of Law and Liberty and Social Justice may have a longer life than western rule. But the point immediately relevant is that the succession of these general ideas is common to western civilization and therefore to all western colonial powers, and forms a common feature in the evolution of colonial policy.

If, then, colonial relations have so much in common, and colonial policy reflects the application to colonial relations of ideas which are common to all colonial powers, it might seem that a comparative survey of pronouncements on colonial policy should lead to the enunciation of certain principles of colonial rule. But the matter is not so simple. One obstacle to the progress of the social sciences is the difficulty that students find in maintaining an objective attitude. The rules for statesmen which the economist prescribes in his academic cloister reflect his political opinions; educationists vehemently debate what education should and might be, and what it could or must do with little heed to what education actually is and does; 'political philosophy has chiefly concerned itself with how men *ought* to live, and what form of government they *ought* to

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have, rather than with what *are* their political habits and institutions'.[1] Similarly, projects of colonial policy lay down the goal at which it ought to aim, but the measures advocated to attain the goal, even if free from unconscious bias and likely to succeed in Europe, often lead in tropical dependencies in a different or even a contrary direction. In policy, as in law, men must be held to intend the natural consequences of their acts, and it is from the results of colonial policy rather than from statements of its objects that its true character may be ascertained. In the study of colonial affairs statements of policy need scrutiny in the light of practice. That is far more difficult. For if a survey of colonial policy reveals a fundamental identity in colonial relations, the study of colonial practice gives a first impression of diversity.

3. The Background of Colonial Practice

In respect of colonial practice, however, one can distinguish two factors characteristic of colonial relations in general. Since colonial relations are predominantly economic, colonial practice is conditioned by economic laws, and we shall see that in the tropics the working of these laws has certain features common to all dependencies. The second factor common to all colonial practice is that the responsibility for maintaining order is assumed by the colonial power; an organic autonomous society maintains order with more or less success in virtue of its inherent vitality, but a dependency is kept alive, as it were, by artificial respiration, by pressure exercised mechanically from outside and above. These two factors are common to all colonial relations, though it is in connection with them that divergences in colonial practice first arise.

The prime care of any colonial power must be to maintain order, for order is essential to such advantages as it anticipates from imposing its rule on the dependency. In maintaining order the colonial power must choose between the western principle of law and the tropical system of relying on personal authority, between direct and indirect rule. Secondly, to attain the prospective advantages the colonial power must choose between the western principle of freedom and the tropical system of compulsion. These are the two main lines along which colonial practice divides, and the line actually followed is a resultant of complex factors. General ideas carry some weight:

[1] Fortes, M. and Evans-Pritchard, E. E., *African Political Systems* (1940), p. 4.

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compulsion will be less uncongenial in an age which values welfare more than freedom. So also do national traditions; reliance on authority will be less uncongenial to a western power with a strongly centralized administration. Of greater importance is the relative strength of the ruler and the ruled: a chartered company reinforced once a year by a small fleet of sailing vessels must show more regard to native sentiment than a Governor who at need can summon by radio the assistance of modern naval and military forces. These things affect colonial practice, but the dominating factor is the nature of the advantage envisaged by the colonial power from its relations with the dependency; whether it is chiefly concerned to sell its own goods or to obtain tropical produce. All these conditions vary from one colonial power to another, from one dependency to another, in different dependencies of the same colonial power, and in the same dependency at different times; and colonial practice varies accordingly. Naturally then in any comparison of colonial relations it is the diversity of practice which first impresses the observer, and only by tracing their evolution can the first impression be corrected.

Yet even a historical study may be misleading. For colonial relations arise out of the impact of western civilization on the tropics, and the violence of this impact varies with the width of the gap between the particular western and tropical cultures, and the rate at which the process of bringing them together is effected. In their mastery over the material world, India and Europe in the sixteenth century were far closer together than modern Europe and the modern tropics; the connection dates from before the Industrial Revolution, and both have grown up in the modern world together. Again, Indian society stands alone in resting on the institution of caste, which has fortified it to some extent against the impact of the West. For both these reasons care is needed in drawing parallels between conditions in India and in the tropics generally. Where tropical conditions elsewhere resemble those of India, one may presume that they are inherent in colonial relations. For example, one feature of the modern tropics that is not confined to India is the growth of agricultural indebtedness; another feature is the increasing impatience of foreign rule. On the other hand, if India is in some measure exempt from the 'atomization' of society that is found elsewhere in the tropics, the explanation may lie in the fact that the impact of the West has been less violent, and that caste has afforded a considerable measure of protection.

Still it remains true that, if one would understand colonial practice,

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one must study it both comparatively and historically. Such a survey could hardly be compressed within the limits of a single volume, even of the dimensions of Lord Hailey's *African Survey*, and would need abilities to which the present writer can make no pretence. It is, however, as a contribution to such a study that the following comparison of British rule in Burma with Dutch rule in Netherlands India is intended. It is a comparison with many points of interest. Both countries came under the effective rule of the home Government shortly after the Industrial Revolution had transformed the economic, and therefore the social and political, relations between Europe and the tropics, and when the social philosophy of Europe was dominated by liberal ideas; in both, therefore, it is possible to trace the reaction on colonial practice of subsequent economic progress and of the procession of general ideas. Both countries, like the tropics in general, lacked the consolidating bond of caste to protect them against the solvent influence of western thought and economic forces. In these things both countries are alike. But in respect of colonial practice they show a striking contrast. In Burma the British have from the first relied on western principles of rule, on the principles of law and economic freedom; in Netherlands India the Dutch have tried to conserve and adapt to modern use the tropical principles of custom and authority. In each case the choice was dictated in the first instance by the interests of the colonial power. When Britain first established contact with Burma it could already sell its produce in the East and looked to Burma as a market. The Dutch at that time had neither manufactures nor capital; they wanted tropical produce at the lowest cost and could best obtain it through the native chieftains. For an understanding of subsequent developments it is necessary to have some knowledge of physical conditions and past history in the two regions.

4. Burma

The dominant factor in the social life of Burma is immediately apparent on a first glance at the map. It is cut off from the world by mountains and the sea. Though marching with India, China and Siam, land traffic with these countries on any considerable scale is almost impossible. From the mountains on the north two rivers run throughout the length of Burma, the Irrawaddy and the Salween, and between them is a third river, the Sittang, rising in the middle of Burma and also running south. The mountains and hills, separating

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these rivers and on either side of them, are covered with forest, and are sparsely inhabited by backward hill tribes. Apart from the hill country there are five natural divisions: Burma Proper, the central tract of rolling uplands; the Shan Tableland, open country in the eastern hills; Pegu, comprising the deltaic plains; Arakan, a broken strip of land along the Bay of Bengal, cut off from Burma by the Arakan Hills; and Tenasserim, the southern projection towards the Malay Peninsula. Burma Proper, the Shan Tableland and the surrounding hills are known as Upper Burma; the rest of the country, comprising Pegu, Arakan and Tenasserim, is known as Lower Burma. The Salween, forcing its way through narrow mountain gorges, is of little use to commerce, but the Irrawaddy is navigable by steamboats for nearly a thousand miles, and its main tributary, the Chindwin, is also open to steam navigation. The Sittang, owing to a bore, is difficult of navigation, but is open to large country boats for some two hundred miles. Thus within Burma, even under primitive conditions, it has always been easy to travel north and south, and the facility of communications has favoured the growth of a common social life, while at the same time the difficulty of communications between one valley and the next has been an obstacle to the permanent establishment of a common political authority. The only part of Burma where a man may pass easily in all directions is the centre, commanding the valleys of the Chindwin, the Irrawaddy and the Sittang. Farther south the level plains formed in the deltas of the rivers are cut up by innumerable creeks, and the heavy rainfall promotes dense forest growth, but in the centre of the country there are few streams, and the arid climate allows only of scrub jungle that forms no barrier to traffic. Natural conditions, therefore, mark out Central Burma as the seat of political authority. This has had an unfortunate reaction on the course of social evolution, for, in a country naturally isolated, social life has centred in the region most remote from the quickening impulse of contact with the outer world. On the other hand, isolation has allowed Burma to build up its own distinctive culture.

Burmans in general[1] have a basis of indonesian or nēsiot blood, mixed with more primitive elements and strongly overlaid with mongoloid

[1] Here, and so far as possible subsequently, the term 'Burman' connotes all the indigenous inhabitants of Burma together with permanent residents of alien origin who have come to regard themselves as natives of the country; this leaves 'Burmese' for use as a distinctively racial term.

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144 characters, derived from successive waves of migration from the north. Until recently the inhabitants of the deltaic plains along the southern coast were Mons or Talaings, a people with an austronesian language but a mongoloid physique. Formerly, their northern neighbours were the Pyus, but these were conquered and assimilated by the Burmese who came down into the plains about A.D. 600–800. By 1100 the Burmese had conquered the whole of Burma. Two hundred years later the Shans, cousins of the Siamese, broke across the eastern border, and the subsequent course of Burmese history is largely a tale of conflict between Burmese, Shans and Mons, punctuated by wars with Siam and Arakan. In the event the Burmese gained the mastery, drove the Shans back to the eastern hills to rule petty states as vassals of their Burmese overlord, and subjugated, and in great part assimilated, the Mons. They also conquered the Arakanese. Of the other peoples of Burma it will suffice to mention here the Chins and Kachins, backward hill tribes but in racial stock and language akin to the Burmese, and the Karens, a mixture of mongoloid peoples with doubtful affinities, who have gained in importance under British rule
184 by the conversion of large numbers to Christianity. The Burmese, Shans, and Mons, though of somewhat diverse racial origin and widely different in language, all partake the common Buddhist culture that they have absorbed from India.

During the first millennium of the Christian era, though at long
177,77 intervals, merchants from India established trading posts and settlements all along the coasts and up some of the larger rivers of the Tropical Far East. They brought with them their religion and a higher civilization than had hitherto been known. Some were Hindus, and some Mahayanist or Hinayanist Buddhists. In Burma, Hinayanism seems always to have predominated and was the religion which finally prevailed. Early Chinese sources portray among the Pyus a social life that in its leading features was still characteristic of Burma during the nineteenth century. There was little intercourse with India after the tenth century, but contact with Hinayanism was maintained by the occasional interchange of missions with Ceylon.
771 It is Buddhism that has moulded social Burman life and thought, and
182 to the present day the ordinary Burman regards the terms Burman and Buddhist as practically equivalent and inseparable. The whole political and social life of Burma, from the palace to the village, centred round the Buddhist religion and the monastic order. The King had his domestic chaplain and every village its monastery.

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The Crown regulated clerical affairs through a patriarch who, with the assistance of a council of ecclesiastics, presided over the whole organization and had jurisdiction over the monks and over matters of religion.[1] Within the Order there were sectarian divisions, represented on the central council, and a dignitary of one sect had no authority over monks of a different sect. Although a monk could be unfrocked and excommunicated for heresy or gross sin, obedience to a superior was voluntary and the monasteries were largely autonomous. Each village appointed, or rather 'invited', its own monk, just as the King selected his own chaplain, but a monk once inducted to a monastery was almost independent of control. Another feature of the organization was its democratic character. Anyone of approved life could obtain ordination by taking the prescribed vows, and the great majority of the monks were ordinary villagers. If the monastic discipline and vows of chastity and temperance should prove too rigorous, a monk could at any time return to secular life. But so long as anyone wore the yellow robe, he was the object of superstitious veneration. The King, as head of a Buddhist State, was head also of the Church and had large patronage, but, as an individual, he recognized yesterday's new monk as his superior. This loosely knit religious organization helped greatly to preserve social continuity when civil government collapsed.

One tradition of Buddhism, which has been observed in Burma with great faithfulness, is that every boy should learn at least his letters. Under Burmese rule there was a monastery in every village, with a monastic school, in which all boys, regardless of rank or wealth, learned from the presiding monk the creed and moral precepts of their religion, and gradually absorbed the national traditions of their people. There was a tradition also of female education, though, in fact, not many girls learned to read and write. The freedom and high social status of the women, a feature common to all the peoples of the Tropical Far East, even among those which adopted Hinduism or, later, Islam, has always been especially conspicuous in Burma. Along with their religion the Indians brought the arts of architecture, sculpture, wood-carving, and painting, and these also the Burman peoples made their own in a form distinct from that of India but common to the whole of Burma, so that all the leading peoples, and even those hill tribes which accepted Buddhism, had a common social culture, shared also by Siam. Neither in learning nor the arts

[1] *UBG*, II, 1 ff.

[The Buddhist religious organization — Analy.

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17753 did their civilization attain a level comparable with that of India,
184 China, or Japan, but it had its own distinctive character and was very generally diffused among the people.

631 The social and political structure[2] was in the main indigenous. The unit of social life was naturally the agricultural village or settlement, but the higher organization was partly tribal and partly territorial. Groups of ten or twenty villages up to fifty or more were governed by a hereditary local chieftain. But his authority was personal, not strictly local; the political organization was quasi-regimental, and if, within the territory of a local chieftain, there were people of another regiment or group, they were subject to the jurisdiction of their own leader and not to that of the local chieftain. Above the local organization there was a central administrative system; how far this derived from China or India is uncertain. At times the Supreme King ruled the country through subordinate kings or vassals governing large provinces, but from a very early period there was a tradition of a more centralized form of government, and this acquired sharper definition under the dynasty that ruled from the middle of the seventeenth century.

631 The Crown, with an Advisory Council, serving also as a High Court,
642 was the centre from which there radiated an official administrative organization linking up through the hereditary petty chieftains with local affairs. The functioning of the system has not yet been adequately studied, but certain features are clear. One is that there was a dual system, with a purely official central element and an hereditary local element. The next is that it was a product of gradual evolution with the complexity inherent in such a process. Thirdly, it had no firm basis either in law or on military force and was accordingly unstable. There was no regular army beyond the quasi-feudal levies, no regular police, and there were practically no prisons. Thus, although in theory absolute, and in practice often arbitrary, the King had no means to enforce orders that were not regarded as within his customary powers.

[671] There were law books regarded as expositions or adaptations of a
[692] Buddhist version of the Laws of Manu, and, in addition to the High Court, already mentioned, the provincial governors and their subordinates exercised judicial functions, in addition to their other duties. But they acted as arbitrators rather than as judges, referring to the law books for guidance, but not for rules, and aiming to effect a

631 settlement between the parties rather than to decide on points of law
652 and fact. The officials drew no fixed salary. Some were paid by allotment of the revenue of a particular district, but for the most part their

2 [of Burma — Analyst]

emoluments were derived from a commission on revenue collected, or 631
from fees paid by the parties to a case. One great source of revenue 652
was from local tolls on the transport or sale of goods.

In theory life was minutely regulated. The whole kingdom, accord- 656
ing to an eighteenth-century traveller, was governed by the pen. No one could move without permission from one village to another. No one could transfer to another regiment or group, nor could anyone marry outside the regiment or group without paying a fine. No one could build a house, or dress, or even be buried except in a style appropriate to his rank. But the periodical census rolls which illustrate some of these precepts show also that many of them were often disregarded. And anyone of the humblest birth, with few ex- [555]
ceptions, could aspire to the highest position, one broad avenue to promotion being the monastery.

This complex social organization, medieval in its character, was 433
based almost entirely on agriculture. External trade was unimportant 439
and subject to severe restrictions, exports being regarded with dis-
favour. There was little in Burma to tempt the outside world until the eighteenth century, when the teak forests acquired a new value for shipbuilding during the wars in Indian waters between the French and English. At long intervals when, as during the late war, the sea route and main land route to China from the West were blocked, Burma figures in history as a backdoor to China, and it is probable that the early Indian settlements up the Irrawaddy at Prome and Pagan may have been in connection with this trade. But the silks of China, and spices from the Moluccas, ordinarily went straight across Asia or round by sea, and Burma was left in a backwater cut off from the outer world. It had little to attract the outer world, and, on the other hand, it pro- 433
duced at home all the requirements of a simple medieval agricultural 241
civilization; its own food, rice, millet, vegetable oils, fish and salt; 311
its own silk and cotton; its own pottery and tools and weapons. In its agricultural resources it was exceptionally fortunate. Central Burma with its dry climate grew cotton and oil-seeds, while the deltaic plains of Lower Burma, with their regular and heavy rainfall, could yield vast quantities of rice, and an ample supply of fish and salt. At one time the rice plains seem to have been closely peopled, but they were the chief scene of the wars between the Burmese and the Mons and, during the last war leading to the final victory of the Burmese in 1752, they were laid waste so thoroughly that a generation or more later the census rolls report some tracts as almost uninhabited.

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A comparatively small area yielded a surplus adequate to meet the requirements of Upper Burma, and fresh land came under cultivation only as the population gradually increased and required more food. In such conditions it is a slow and difficult process to reclaim land that has once been abandoned to the jungle, and it was not until some time after the British occupation that, with the opening up of a foreign market, cultivation spread rapidly. Thus at the time of the first war with Britain in 1824–6, Upper and Lower Burma presented a striking contrast. In the central dry tract of Upper Burma there was an established peasantry practising mixed agriculture on dry land, whereas in the deltaic plains the chief occupations of a scanty people were the cultivation of rice, fishing, and salt-boiling, and (except in the parts bordering on Upper Burma and supplying it with rice, fish and salt) a few small market towns and some villages and hamlets were sparsely scattered among wide areas of swamp and waste. Those conditions have very largely determined the whole course of the subsequent economic and social development of Burma.

175

One other feature must be noted. Although the history of Burma is so largely made up of war between Burmese, Shans and Mons, yet during long periods they have been united. From the end of the eleventh century to the end of the thirteenth, Burmese kings ruled in Pagan over a region corresponding to the Burma of the present day. During this period the Burmans absorbed the Mon civilization, and research indicates that the kings were partly of Mon blood. In the middle of the sixteenth century a Burmese prince made himself master of the Mon country and adopted Mon ways, while his successor on the throne of Pegu, the capital of the Mons, extended his rule over the Burmese homeland, and reunited under one rule the whole of the former Burmese Empire of Pagan. After a sudden collapse in 1600 the whole country was once again brought under a single rule for a hundred and fifty years. This dynasty fell when the last king was taken captive by a Mon rebel, but the Burmese immediately rose again under a new leader who reconquered the whole country, and established a new line which held the throne up to the time of the British conquest. Thus for the greater part of the time since 1100 the whole country recognized a common rule. When the Burmese finally defeated the Mons in 1752 they laid waste the country, but for the most part re-established the hereditary local chieftains, and although most of the provincial governors were Burmese and the official language was Burmese, Mons were eligible for the highest

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offices under the Burmese Crown, and their separate national feeling was fast disappearing.[1] The whole country, marked out by nature as a distinct political unit, and with a common religion and a uniform social culture, had a far more national character than one could find anywhere in India. 'The Burmans, in fact, correspond far more closely to the ordinary conception of a nation than the Indians.' They had 'developed what may fairly be called a nation State, and possess a national consciousness';[2] the Mons and even many Karens preferred to be considered Burmans.

In this national society, however, authority was personal. Burmese, Shan, Mon and Karen were all ruled by chieftains of their own people. The Court and the central administrative organization were largely Burmese, but the local administration was racial, not because of the difference of race, but because rule was based on personal relations. The Karens had their own head, but so also had the brokers, and the manufacturers of palm-sugar.[3] Racial differences were not reflected in economic functions and, so far as the people were Buddhist, they had a common civilization and all met and mixed together. This civilization which the people of Burma, despite frequent and prolonged civil and foreign wars, built up through the centuries, had many pleasant features. In every village the monks, in a community singularly free of scandal, imparted to all the boys the elements of letters and practical morality. The monastic order, free to all and spread over the whole country, was influential but not oppressive, and Church and State, instead of dividing the country by their rival claims, lent each other mutual support. The women enjoyed a freedom greater in some ways than in other countries of the Tropical Far East, unparalleled elsewhere in Asia and, until recently, exceptional in Europe. And if one aim of the State be the organization of happiness, then, by common consent, few people have been more light-hearted than the Burmese, a happiness that the numerous and severe political catastrophes must have interrupted but did not dispel. This national civilization was held together mainly by two strong links; the monastic order and the hereditary local chieftains. Through intervals of anarchy these survived, and it was round them that society grew up anew, but on the old lines, when order was restored.

The best picture of life in Burma under native rule is that given by

[1] Gouger, p. 266; Trant, pp. 117–18; *BBG*, II, p. 168.
[2] *ISC*, XI, 570; Harvey, *CHI*, V, 566; VI, 447; *BBG*, II, 553.
[3] Harvey, *Burma*, p. 352; *BBG*, I, 483; II, 127, 181.

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181 Gouger, who was a prisoner in Burma during the first war with Britain. He was a merchant who had found it impossible to compete against the agents of the East India Company in Bengal, and came to sell his cotton goods to Burmans. On his arrival in Rangoon he was favourably impressed by 'the absence of all unauthorized exactions',[1] and took his goods to the capital in Upper Burma 'with no annoying exactions or tolls to impede them on their passage'.[2] When he reached it 'no royal or municipal dues were demanded; no troublesome official appeared to obstruct the course of business, and he found himself comfortably established in his new quarters with less vexation and annoyance than he would have encountered in any town in Europe'.[3] British envoys had always complained of vexatious delays before they could secure a reception, but 'nothing of the kind was experienced by the foreigner who had no State dignity to uphold'. There was, he remarks, far less difficulty in gaining an audience with the King than he would have had in interviewing the Secretary of State in Downing Street; 'a few questions were asked at the *Byadike* (secretariat), and in less than an hour I was in the presence of the King'. Like the others present he squatted on the floor, half sitting and half kneeling, but the King, noticing his discomfort, desired him to be at ease, and before long he 'had the audacity to sit upright and stare His Majesty in the face'.[4]

181 His[1] next visit, when he brought samples of his goods, gave him 'a
156 pleasant impression of the freedom allowed to the inmates of the Palace. The hilarity, good humour, and cheerfulness exhibited by the ladies of the Royal household, were sufficient evidence that no excessive strictness of discipline was exerted to mar their happiness.' The girls dressed up in his wares 'and no effort was made to restrain the laughter and fun'. Even when the Queen entered, 'her presence did not serve to impress more than a salutary restraint'. The King himself saw that all the girls paid for what they took, and 'entered into the spirit of the trafficking, laughing heartily at every dispute'.[5] A like cheerfulness prevailed among the common people, and he was greatly struck by 'the free-and-easy bearing of the natives, contrasting so harshly with the obsequiousness and the polished insincerity to which he had been accustomed in Hindostan'. On the other hand, towards their own rulers there was 'certainly no lack of servility'. Every one in authority was despotic, and the people were submissive.[6]

[1] Gouger, p. 15. [2] *Ib.* p. 24. [3] *Ib.* p. 27.
[4] *Ib.* pp. 29, 33. [5] *Ib.* p. 43. [6] *Ib.* p. 10.

1 [i.e. gouger—See top of page—Analyst]

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As customers he found them very satisfactory. To some he had to grant credit, and was astonished at their very loose manner of committing engagements to writing, with merely a record of the transaction, and the witnesses, written in pencil and unsigned. He was assured that this was their custom, and that the debt could be established by the witnesses, and 'it spoke well for the people that none of them failed in their payments'.[1] 181 156

In view of his freedom from unauthorized exactions when landing his goods and taking them up-country, it is rather strange to read that 'bribery is the mainspring by which all manner of business is moved throughout the country'. But this was brought home to him when he wished to go back to India with his profits, as the law allowed him to take neither money nor goods. Restrictions were so numerous, and regulated life so closely, that it was inconvenient and almost impossible to live within them; but it was always possible to get round them. When he wanted to get round the regulations, he 'became as expert a briber as the rest'.[2] In other respects, however, his account of the conduct of official business is favourable. He gives a very interesting description of the disposal of affairs in the Privy Council, which was also the High Court. This was presided over by the King, and met every day at sunrise. 'Nothing could exceed the order and solemnity with which business was transacted, for although I very imperfectly understood what was going forward, and although bribery and corruption might be at the root of every subject discussed, yet it was evident that there *was* a discussion, that rival interests were represented, and that the semblance at least of a certain amount of freedom of opinion was preserved. The usual form of introducing a topic was by a written document, which was read, or rather sung, or intoned, by an officer of the Court...and before the Royal order was given on it, those present were permitted to express themselves....The sight was altogether an imposing one, calculated to inspire confidence in a stranger by the strict order and apparent deliberation that prevailed in the assembly.'[3] 661 645

Thus, although social life in Burma had a very limited horizon, and its political institutions, lacking any secure foundation in law, were unstable, yet the country when first brought into contact with the West provided a good example, both in its virtues and defects, of a medieval eastern society embodying a system resting on personal authority, custom and religion. 181

[1] Gouger, p. 63. [2] *Ib.* p. 50. [3] *Ib.* p. 56; cf. Trant, pp. 241 ff.

1 [gouger, a merchant — Analyst]

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5. Netherlands India

131 If we turn over the pages of the atlas from Burma to Netherlands India, we find a map suggesting conditions very different from those of Burma. In place of a comparatively small country shut in by sea and mountain there is an open archipelago, comprising numerous islands, large and small. Yet, as is apparent in the British Empire, to a seafaring people the sea is a bond and not a barrier. Man learned the art of sailing earlier than the art of making roads, and in early times, indeed until quite recently, the waterways were the main highways. The peoples of Netherlands India have in general a 144 common racial stock, similar to that of Burma, though less strongly mongoloid and more profoundly nēsiot, and they speak indonesian languages, distantly akin to that spoken by the Mons. Now they are commonly termed Indonesians and their common home is often called 175 Indonesia. Three times the whole region, or the greater part of it, has been united under a common rule: during the ninth century under 177 Shri-Vijaya in Sumatra; in the fourteenth century under Majapahit 171 in Java, and then under the Dutch. Shri-Vijaya and Majapahit were respectively Mahayanist and Hindu, and had their origin in the Indian settlements of the first millennium. Civilization in the archipelago, as in Burma, has an Indian basis and, although from about 1300 Islam has spread gradually and has become the dominant creed, it was India that moulded social life.

175 The attraction of Indonesia for these Indian merchants, as for later merchants from the West, was presumably the trade of China and, [177] more especially, the spices of the Moluccas. It was only along the coasts on the main routes to China and the Moluccas that they founded settlements and spread civilization. Their chief settlements were on the mainland in the Malay Peninsula and Indo-China, and in the archipelago on Sumatra and Java. The other islands, even Borneo and Celebes, show little trace of direct Indian influence. In Java there [171] evolved an agricultural civilization similar in many ways to that of Burma. The diet of the people consisted of rice, vegetable oils, and fish, and they grew and wove their own cotton. As in Burma the women enjoyed great freedom, and the conditions of land tenure were very similar in Burma and Java. The social and political organization also was very much the same. In Java there were three distinct peoples, the Sundanese, Javanese and Madurese, sometimes independent and sometimes under a common overlord, but all had a dual

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administrative system in which provincial officers of the central Government ruled the people through hereditary chieftains. 175

Within the archipelago Sumatra and Java have always been rivals for supremacy. Sumatra commands the gateway and the trade, but Java is the main granary. When the Dutch came East, they found the Portuguese, strongly entrenched in Malacca, guarding the northern sea-coast of Sumatra, and they established themselves in Java, where they gradually extended their rule over the whole island. They also held the Spice Islands, but elsewhere they had only garrisons and trading posts. Up to about the beginning of the present century regular administration hardly extended beyond Java (including the adjacent small island of Madura) and the Spice Islands; the whole region outside Java and Madura was known collectively as the Outer Possessions or, later, Provinces. It was in Java that the Dutch system of administration took shape, and subsequent references to Dutch rule disregard the Outer Provinces unless otherwise indicated by the context. 175 642

Dutch rule in Java dates from the occupation of Batavia and the surrounding territory in 1619. Their chief concern was to obtain rice and other requirements, including products for export, among which coffee and sugar came to be the most important. They recognized those native chieftains who would undertake to supply them with what they wanted, and for long they abstained so far as possible from further interference with native life. These native chieftains came in general to be known as Regents. A European official was posted at suitable headquarters to see that the Regent fulfilled his obligations; this officer became known as a Resident. In order to obtain produce, and especially coffee, subordinates were charged with the duty of supervising cultivation, and eventually special officers for that purpose were appointed as *Controleurs* (inspectors) who had no authority but served merely as the eyes and ears of the Resident. That, in brief, was the origin of the Dutch system of indirect rule. There was a dual system comprising a European responsible for the business of the Company, and a native responsible to the Resident for the supply of produce, and with the Controleur as a link between the two. On this plan the Resident was regarded as the overlord, or 'elder brother', of the Regent who held the position of a largely autonomous vassal chieftain. On no other plan could the Dutch obtain the coffee and other things they wanted, as they had nothing to exchange for them.

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This system, which arose by a process of gradual evolution, survived until the fall of the Company, largely as a result of the wars arising out of the French Revolution. In 1800 its possessions were taken over by the State. An acute controversy then arose as to the manner in which the country should be administered. Reformers wished to introduce a system somewhat resembling that of direct rule, then recently adopted in British India. Finally, it was decided to retain the system of indirect rule, but the Resident, as 'elder brother', was expected to prevent the abuses that the people had formerly suffered from the Regents. Before the new system could be introduced, Java passed by the fortune of war into the hands first of the French and then of the English. From 1811 to 1816 it was governed by Raffles on behalf of the East India Company. Raffles was conspicuous among the many leading servants of the Company at that time who believed fervently in the new Liberal faith. He set aside the Regents and introduced direct rule through officials, with the village under an elected headman as the unit of administration; in place of compulsory cultivation and services, he substituted taxes in money, thereby encouraging the people to sell their produce and buy imported British manufactures. At the end of the Napoleonic wars, however, the Dutch regained their territories. By this time Liberal doctrines were held by all enlightened men, and the Dutch came back to Java with the intention of ruling it on new Liberal principles, only to find that Raffles had applied these principles far more thoroughly than the Dutch had ever contemplated. That was the general position at the beginning of the modern period of Dutch rule in Netherlands India.

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CHAPTER II

BURMA, 1826–1870: LAISSEZ-FAIRE

1. The Wars of 1824–6 and 1852

(*a*) *1824–6.* Up to the beginning of the nineteenth century Burmans were still living in the Middle Ages, and in their medieval world they had good reason for complacency. In 1759 they conquered Pegu, and shortly afterwards their troops overran Siam and repelled an invasion from China, the traditional great power of the Tropical Far East. In 1785 they conquered Arakan and, with the new century, carried their arms still further, defeating Manipur in 1813 and Assam in 1816. This brought them into political contact along a common frontier with the expanding British power in India. At the same time they were making contact with the British on a common economic frontier. The long struggle between England and France during the eighteenth century created a demand for Burma teak, and, when the Continental System of Napoleon made British manufacturers look outside Europe to dispose of the cheap cotton goods produced by the recent Industrial Revolution, Burma offered a potential market. Thus quite suddenly, within a few years, the rulers and peoples of Burma were faced with a new challenge. Burma was brought into political and economic relations with the modern world; its whole political, economic and social organization needed readjustment to these new conditions and, failing reformation from within, forces that would not be denied were working for foreign intervention.

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The rulers of Burma, secluded in the centre of their kingdom, were incapable alike of recognizing their danger and of imagining reforms, and they refused intercourse with the outer world except on their own terms. But, in standing out against the current of world progress, they were challenged by moral and material forces that they were wholly unable to resist; subjugation by some outside power was inevitable, and that Burma became involved with British India was merely the accident of propinquity. The two countries faced one another on the frontier of two different civilizations, and naturally there was a succession of difficult incidents culminating in the war of 1824–6, which showed that the power to determine the frontier between Burma and the modern world lay with Britain.

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When hostilities began the British expected help from the Arakanese and the Talaings. These expectations were largely disappointed.[1] In 1785 Arakanese chieftains, in rebellion against their own King, had called on the King of Burma for assistance, but turned against him on finding that he treated their country as a conquered province. When their repeated insurrections failed, the rebels found refuge across the border in British territory which they used as a base for new attacks. This kept the spirit of resistance alive among the Arakanese and gave them a juster estimate of British power, so that, on the outbreak of war, the British were able to recruit an Arakanese levy. In Pegu the situation was different. Many, if not most, of the local chieftains were Talaings, whose ancestors had held the same position under their own kings; even the Governor of the important charge of Syriam, commanding the entrance to Rangoon, was a Talaing, with a sister married to the Burmese King.[2] They had accepted Burmese rule and, believing the Burmese to be invincible, made no attempt to rise until after the Burman power had been broken. The Burman forces, though no match for modern troops in armaments or military skill and discipline, made a brave but ineffectual resistance and, after operations in which the invaders suffered heavy losses from disease but few in battle, the Burmese Government was compelled in 1826 to accept the Treaty of Yandabo, including among its terms the cession of the two maritime provinces, Arakan and Tenasserim. These gave the British a bridgehead on each side of Burma in the event of further strife; Arakan marched with Chittagong and had formerly been the centre of a flourishing trade in rice; Tenasserim had valuable teak and was expected to open up a channel of trade with China and Siam.

For several years conditions were unsettled. Arakan gave most trouble. The chieftains, who had welcomed British aid against Burmese rule, were equally impatient of British rule. After a succession of petty risings, a widespread rebellion which had long been smouldering came to a head in 1836.[3] This was promptly suppressed, and there was no further serious disturbance. Tenasserim was quieter, but here also the men who had sided with the British turned against them. Under Burmese rule Tavoy and Mergui had been the seats of provincial governments. In 1830, insurgents captured Tavoy and in Mergui the British garrison, either panic-struck or misled by false rumours, withdrew, leaving the town in the hands of the rebels.[4]

[1] *BBG*, II, 553; Gouger, p. 266; Hall, *Europe and Burma* (1945), p. 114.
[2] *BBG*, II, 675. [3] *BBG*, I, 480; II, 290, 623. [4] *BBG*, I, 483; II, 382, 691.

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Order was restored and subsequently British power remained unchallenged.

(*b*) *1852.* Relations with the Burmese Government, however, grew no better. Burma was unfortunate in its kings; two in succession became insane and the third was at best unstable. King and people alike bitterly resented their defeat and the loss of territory, and failed to profit by the sharp lesson of the first war. The Treaty of Yandabo provided that each Government should be represented at the other's capital, but the Burmese had no wish to be represented at Calcutta and regarded the British representative in Ava as a spy. Successive Residents found the position so difficult that in 1840 the Residency was withdrawn. This was the more unfortunate because one result of the extension of British power over the maritime provinces was a growth of trade with the Burmese. But more trade meant greater friction. British merchants in Tenasserim complained of the restrictions on trade, and were supported by local officials in pressing for a forward policy and for the extension of British rule over the interior. The grievances of traders in Rangoon were partly their own fault, as 'the unruly conduct of some of them tended to invite oppression rather than inspire respect'.[1] Many complaints against the Burmese Government had no better foundation than similar complaints in Tenasserim, where the merchants grumbled that after fourteen years of British rule no one had yet been able to engage in their trade without loss.[2] The Indian Government, mindful of the great cost of the first war and apprehensive lest a further contest should be 'ruinously embarrassing', was reluctant to support even legitimate grievances. Moreover, the possession of Tenasserim proved unprofitable, and for some years there were suggestions that it should be restored to the Burmese or even sold to Siam.[3] The Indian Government was more inclined to cut its losses than to extend its liabilities.

The appointment of Dalhousie as Governor-General brought a change of policy. He regarded the expansion of the British Empire as a law of nature, and was acutely sensitive on matters of prestige. Complaints from two ship's captains of unfair treatment in Burmese courts gave him an occasion to intervene. His demand for redress soon took the form of an ultimatum backed by an expeditionary force, and in 1852 the Burmese Court found itself at war almost before it was aware that negotiations had begun.

[1] Gouger, p. 76.
[2] *SL*, p. 268.
[3] Desai, pp. 57, 132–7.

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175 Dalhousie anticipated that the Talaings of Pegu would be actively friendly[1] but, apart from furnishing supplies in regions occupied by the British troops, they gave little help. In the earlier stages of the operations, according to the despatches of the general commanding the expedition, the Burmans showed themselves better armed and bolder than in the first war; they displayed skill in defending Rangoon, put up an obstinate resistance in Bassein, made a formidable attack on Martaban, and stood their ground with great resolution in Pegu; their fortifications were carefully and substantially built in a manner that would have done no discredit to a European engineer; and they were no less brave than in the former war and would fight until the enemy reached the muzzle of their guns. Other witnesses and the British casualties suggest that this account of the resistance was exaggerated. The Burmans were 'morally beaten'; most of their troops had little training in the use of their weapons; their fire was ineffective, and they were no better able than in the first war to make any prolonged stand against western military science and discipline. The British expedition was much better organized than in 1824, and could rest on advanced bases in Arakan and Tenasserim instead of depending on the long communications with Calcutta and Madras. By the end of June the British were masters of Lower Burma. The Burmese however were holding out in Upper Burma, and Dalhousie feared that, even after further victories, the King would still 'oppose to our advance the passive resistance of a retreat beyond our reach'. He decided, therefore, merely to stand fast, and on 20 December 1852 issued a proclamation annexing the Burmese provinces of Pegu and Martaban, thereby linking up Arakan with Tenasserim and giving the British effective control over the trade of the whole country by cutting off Upper Burma from the sea. Thus the second war decided that Burma could no longer hold aloof from the modern world. The British provinces came to be known collectively as British Burma, and the independent Burmese kingdom was usually distinguished as Ava, after its capital.

The annexation of Pegu synchronized with a palace revolution. This strengthened the British hold on Lower Burma, as the troops were called back to the capital to suppress it;[2] it also proved helpful to the British by placing on the throne the King's brother, Mindon, who was pacifically inclined and more enlightened than most members of his family. But Dalhousie was soon compelled to realize that he had

[1] 1852–53, Cmd. 1608, pp. 48–9. [2] *BBG*, II, 665.

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been optimistic in expecting a general welcome.[1] The Talaings were 'cowards, if not worse', and the Karens, apart from the Christians, were unhelpful; for three years the British had to conduct minor operations against guerilla bands. Those who still held out were treated for the most part as dacoits, liable to summary execution on capture. Some, however, earned respect for their prowess, as, for example, one of the most famous, Myat Htoon. 'A man', wrote Dalhousie, 'who has 4000 men under him, who repulses three British attacks and after a very stout defence is routed only by a Brigadier-General after a month's operations and with severe loss to us, must be regarded as a Chief and a Soldier—and a good one too.'[2] After about three years, serious military operations ceased, but disorder still required firm handling. In 1857 a rising under a Karen pretender in Martaban spread to the Delta of the Irrawaddy and Bassein,[3] and eight years elapsed from the first annexation before Pegu could be regarded as finally pacified.

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2. Administrative Policy

(*a*) *1826*. When Arakan and Tenasserim were first added to the Indian Empire British policy in India was in a stage of transition. The transformation of the East India Company from a body of merchants into a sovereign state was still quite recent, and, indeed, not yet complete. In early days the Company had been content with trading privileges but, with the dissolution of the Mogul Empire, it began to trade in kingdoms, seeking a profit in tribute rather than in commerce. Most of the profit, however, went to its servants in bribes and booty, and their corruption and misrule were disastrous both to the Company and to its subjects. Within a few years it was threatened with bankruptcy and had to seek aid from Parliament. Meanwhile its servants were using their huge gains to corrupt home politics, and party jealousy impelled the British Government to use the financial difficulties of the Company as a lever for insisting on its responsibility for good administration. At the same time the Company, in the interest of the shareholders, was aiming at reforms.

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The authority of the native princes was almost unlimited, but they would not and could not govern along western lines. A solution was sought in direct administration through the Company's officials.

[1] *BBG*, 1, 487; Hall, p. 48.
[2] Hall, p. 57; 1887, Cmd. 4962, pp. 104, 247.
[3] *BBG*, 1, 488.

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Hastings was sent out as Governor-General (1772–85) to organize the collection of the revenue, and Cornwallis (1786–93) carried the process a stage further by converting the writers and merchants of the Company into civil servants exercising criminal jurisdiction. In pursuance of these reforms the territories of the Company were divided into districts, each under a European officer, who was both magistrate and collector, and drew a fixed salary from funds derived mainly from land revenue, a charge on land collected either through the holders of large estates (*zemindars*) or from peasants (*ryots*) through their village headman.

This novel experiment of direct rule not only helped to prevent corruption and extortion, but also furthered the commercial interests of Britain, and it was in line with the current political philosophy. Through the Industrial Revolution Manchester was able to send its earliest samples of cotton goods to India in 1786,[1] and the closure of the European market during the Napoleonic wars encouraged merchants to extend their trade in Asia. Manufacturers and merchants had a strong interest in promoting Indian welfare, and in encouraging the use of money, the extension of free trade, and the observance of the western law of contract. Thus colonial policy reflected the Liberal doctrines of economic freedom: freedom of trade, enterprise and property, and equality before the law. But Liberalism was not merely a sordid philosophy of self-interest. Although claiming that everyone should be allowed to pursue private interest in any way that was not forbidden by the law, it held that such restrictions on the activities of Government would best serve economic progress, and that economic progress was a sufficient guarantee of general welfare, both material and moral. It assumed, what many then denied, that the oriental would respond to economic motives and that, in this respect at least, he was 'a man and a brother'. Liberalism was not merely a policy but a faith.

It was a faith that was not held by the elder servants of the Company, who inherited the former policy of ruling indirectly along native lines through native chieftains and the tradition of 'shaking the pagoda tree'. But the new doctrines were eagerly discussed in correspondence between Raffles in Malaya, Munro in Madras, Elphinstone in Bombay and others of the remarkable group of scholar-statesmen who then gave lustre to the service of the Company. They prevailed also in the India House, where from 1819 James Mill was a leading figure, and

[1] Parshad, I. D., *Some Aspects of Indian Foreign Trade*, 1757–1893 (1932), p. 93.

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they were being taught by Sir James Mackenzie at Haileybury to the probationers for the Indian service. In India the new policy found its staunchest protagonist in Bentinck, whose rule as Governor-General (1828–35) coincided with the establishment of British rule in Burma: 'I am going to India', he said to Bentham on his departure for the East, 'but it is you who will be Governor-General.'[1] Commercial interest and Liberal philosophy, no less than the conquest of oppression and corruption, required a system of direct rule on western lines under the immediate supervision of British officials. Regard for native custom still survived as a tradition, but in practice, from the earliest days of British rule in Burma, Liberal doctrines prevailed.

(*b*) *1852*. These principles were held even more firmly at the time of the second war in 1852. Although at home conditions in the factories were already throwing doubts on *laissez-faire* as a complete panacea for all social ills, the Great Exhibition of 1851 was an effective illustration of the prosperity that it had brought to England. In India the rapid growth of the population, cultivation, revenue and trade seemed to justify a belief in Liberal principles, and encouraged a belief in the inherent superiority of British rule and a confidence in British power that found expression in Dalhousie's policy of annexation. Naturally in these circumstances the machinery of Liberal administration was set up, without hesitation and with practised skill, in the new province of Pegu.

3. The Foundations of Administrative Practice[2]

When the maritime provinces were first taken over, they were separately administered under the direct supervision of the Governor-General of India. Arakan was soon transferred to the Government of Bengal, and in 1828 the Superintendent of Arakan was subordinated to the Commissioner of Chittagong. 'By 1831 the administrative system was complete. It was imposed ready-made from above, not built up from below',[3] and naturally it was modelled on the pattern recently introduced by Hastings and Cornwallis. Tenasserim, however, remained under the Governor-General until 1834, when the judicial and revenue branches of the administration were made over to Bengal. Thus for nearly ten years it could develop along its own lines, and up to 1843 the officers in charge of it were men from Penang with no personal experience of administration in India.

[1] Bell and Morell, p. xxx.
[2] Furnivall, *Leviathan*, passim.
[3] Harvey, *CHI*, v, 563.

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x 175 Mr Maingy, the first civil officer appointed to Tenasserim, took over charge from the military in September 1825, before the conclusion of hostilities. His instructions illustrate the transitional character of contemporary policy; for they required him to govern according to local laws and customs, but at the same time to introduce a system in accordance with Liberal ideas. The double aim appears in the Proclamation that he issued on his first arrival. In this he undertook to provide 'a Civil and Political administration on the most liberal and equitable principles'; to defend the people 'against all foreign and domestic enemies', and to administer justice 'according to their own established laws'; in regard to revenue and all other matters, 'their own customs and local usages would be taken into consideration, but the most free and unrestricted internal and external commerce would be established and promoted'.[1] He promised in effect to reconcile Liberal policy with Burmese practice. But it was no easy matter to ascertain Burmese practice. Every vestige of the Burmese records, together with every paper in any way connected with the late Government, had disappeared; those officials who had not fled or been taken prisoner were hostile, and either would not or could not explain the Burmese system, which, as the product of a long and gradual evolution, was illogical and complex and, when described through interpreters by men who did not understand it very well to a foreigner who did not understand it at all, appeared still more complicated. Moreover, the Burmese system and Liberal principles were fundamentally opposed. Maingy had to choose between them, and naturally chose the Liberal system that he understood. It is, indeed, striking to observe the close parallel between the system adopted in Burma and that which Raffles had introduced on avowedly Liberal principles some ten years earlier in Java.

x 175 692 695 *Judicial System.* The instructions to Mr Maingy directed him to re-establish the Court of Justice as formerly constituted. Enquiries showed that judicial administration had been one function of the general government, comprising the Governor, three high revenue officials, and six officials of lower rank, including two officers of police, two scribes and two reporters. In a full court all these took their seats on three tiers of benches, 'the Governor on the most elevated, the three next on the second and the last six on the lowest seat'.[2] All these might hear suits in court jointly or separately, but attendance in court

[1] *SL*, pp. 15, 16. [2] *SL*, pp. 9, 10, 27.

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was optional, and each might try cases in his own house, either in person or through a privately appointed deputy. From every decision, whether of a bench or a single judge, there was an appeal to the Governor, but the Governor might refer the appeal to his own deputy, and the decision, whether given by Governor or deputy, was final. 175x 692 695

All this was very puzzling, and it was a further puzzle to find out what the people regarded as 'their own established laws'.[1] At first Mr Maingy[2] inclined to the view that there had been 'no fixed Code of Laws', and that all the decisions were arbitrary. Subsequent inquiries showed that this view was mistaken; there were two kinds of law books, 'a Pali version of the Laws of Manu, and a collection of precedents and rules and regulations established by different kings of Ava'. These, however, seemed 'too vague and indefinite to prove of any service', and Mr Maingy thought (conveniently perhaps) that the people had 'little veneration for them'. 175x 671

Mr Maingy was quite unable to fathom the Burmese judicial system. In his view legal proceedings were meant to ascertain disputed facts and arrive at a logical decision on them according to fixed legal principles; he failed to understand that Burmans went to court to find a man of wisdom and authority who could help them in arriving at an amicable settlement of their disputes; that the various officials who tried cases, jointly or separately, in person or by deputy, in court or in their private house, were (according to English notions) arbitrators, and that the so-called codes were compilations by jurists,[2] used for guidance but not for literal application. He found the whole 'so complicated' that he drew up a new code, providing in its first clause that in every court 'the Commissioner, his Deputy or Assistant shall preside as the sole judge'. In order to safeguard Burmese custom he directed that there should 'always be in attendance a person skilled in the Burman laws and usages, and well acquainted with the decisions that would have been given by the late judges'.[3] But the whole idea of giving judgment in accordance with fixed legal principles was contrary to Burmese custom, and the decisions on this plan were as foreign as the court. For Burmese custom Mr Maingy substituted the rule of law. 175x 671 692

Another innovation was the jury system, which Raffles had formerly introduced in Java. This gave a human touch to legal procedure, and 175x 695

[1] *SL*, pp. 10, 53, 105.
[2] Furnivall, *JBRS*, Aug. 1940, p. 351.
[3] *SL*, pp. 10, 11.

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for some years the law courts in Tenasserim were perhaps all-too-human. When they were placed under Bengal, the Honourable Judges were scandalized and perplexed by some of their proceedings. In one case both complainant and accused were sentenced to be tom-tomed round the town; the Commissioner explained that they were husband and wife who had repeatedly troubled the court with frivolous complaints until neither he nor the jury wanted to see any more of them. In another case the complainant had been punished instead of the accused: a woman who had brought a charge of rape was convicted of seducing the accused to commit adultery with her. An absconding husband was sentenced to be forcibly employed on Government work and part of his wages made over to his wife. Similarly, a thief was set to work until he should have made good money that he had stolen. Another man was sentenced to 'exposure': he had been made to stand up in the public bazaar with a placard showing his offence. The Commissioner was given to understand that these sentences were irregular; a sense of humour was banished from the courts, and the majesty and machinery of law replaced the native jury.[1]

One Burmese custom that Mr Maingy retained was the levying of court fees. Under Burmese rule the unsuccessful party to a law-suit had to pay 10 % of the amount in issue, and fees were charged for the issue of summons to a defendant or a witness. Such charges contravened the Liberal principle of cheap law. The Board of Directors 'disapproved in principle of all such taxes, and were only prepared to countenance them if sanctioned by long custom or essentially important as a source of revenue'.[2] The judges in Calcutta also regarded such charges as objectionable. In general, however, the judges stood for the formality of law, and the Commissioner, apprehensive lest they might 'have it in contemplation to introduce a closer analogy to the system of the Courts in Bengal', urged that this would cause 'delay and the introduction of peculiar forms adapted to a higher and more refined state of society', and would prove unwelcome.[3] He would have preferred to make the procedure even less formal by restricting the administration of an oath, which seemed unnecessary owing to 'the happy infrequency of Perjury in this Country'.[4] In other ways also there was increasing friction with the judges in Calcutta. One trouble was the employment of advocates. It was a source

[1] *Corr.TD*, p. 44.
[2] *SL*, p. 139.
[3] *SL*, pp. 11, 106, 249.
[4] *Corr.TD*, p. 55.

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of pride to the Commissioners that no *vakeels* or advocates were recognized; time and again they refer to this as a most valuable feature in their judicial administration, but with an ominous absence of any expression of approval from Calcutta. When at length the growing mercantile community petitioned the Government of Bengal that they might be permitted to engage advocates, the Commissioner objected that this would 'raise up a set of low adventurers seeking a livelihood by conducting cases on speculative terms'.[1] But he was overruled. The matter had, in effect, already been decided when Mr Maingy introduced the rule of law.

Revenue System. It was no easier to reconcile Liberal principles with the Burmese revenue system. The export of rice and other products had been prohibited; there were oppressive and, it seemed, arbitrary duties on exports and imports; fees had been levied on traders large and small, and even on pedlars; almost every form of productive activity was taxed: the cultivation of rice land and gardens, sugar-boiling, fishing, the manufacture of torches and the collection of forest produce.[2] The Karens in the hills of the interior paid a household tax consisting of beeswax, cardamoms, sesamum oil and cloth; and the Sea-gypsies, or Salons, a village tax in beeswax and mats. Ordinarily the taxes were collected in kind; so much as was required for the local officials was retained, and the balance remitted to Ava only once in three years. Judicial and other officers had derived the major part of their emoluments from fees and commission. In addition to the regular revenue the people had been liable to compulsory services, as, for example, on the construction of war-boats, paid for at half the market rate.

The whole system conflicted both with Liberal canons of taxation and with practical convenience. Burmese officials lived on the produce of the country, rice and sesamum oil and fish; but British and Indian troops wanted beef and flour and butter. These things had to be purchased, and, for other reasons also, the collection of revenue in kind, though useful in the barter economy of Burma, was unsuited to a commercial economy using money as the medium of exchange. Under the Burmese system of spreading the burden of taxation as widely as possible, some taxes had brought in very little, and some were injurious to trade, while the practice of remunerating officials by fees and commission facilitated extortion and embezzlement. The use of compulsory services, under-paid or unpaid, reduced the supply

[1] *SL*, p. 106; *Corr.TD*, p. 100. [2] *SL*, p. 12.

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of labour available for private employers, and restricted the market for imported goods. Mr Maingy[1] preferred orthodox fiscal methods; the collection of revenue in cash, the abolition of taxes which were unproductive or a burden on trade, and the payment of fixed salaries to officials in lieu of fees or commission. For the bulk of his revenue, like Raffles in Java, and in accordance with the general fiscal system of India, he looked to a tax on the produce of land, supplemented by the farming-out of gaming houses and of opium and liquor shops, for which, as for a tax on land, the authority of Adam Smith could be invoked.

The land tax which, under Burmese rule, had recently purported to represent 6 % of the produce, was at first fixed at 10 %.[1] For each village the produce was estimated on such information as was available, including crop measurement on selected fields, and from 1827–8 onwards it was valued at a price taken to represent the market rate; the total amount due was distributed by the villagers among themselves, and a list posted in the village showed the contribution of each cultivator.[2] The tax collectors were paid a fixed salary, but this was found too costly; the Burmese custom of paying them a commission was revived, and subsequently the largest taxpayer (*kyedangyi*) in each village was charged with the collection. The yield, however, was inadequate to meet the cost of administration, and the share taken by Government was raised gradually to 25 % of the gross produce, while, in order to avoid inconvenient fluctuations, it became the practice to settle for a period of years the amount due annually. This system formed the basis of the procedure for the 'settlement' of land revenue now in force. But, even at the enhanced rate, the revenue was inadequate, and most of the other Burmese methods of raising money for the State were retained or gradually reintroduced. For some years it was still found necessary to employ 'compulsive labour', until a substitute was found in the importation of convict labour, and subsequently of free coolies, from India.

Thus, in 1834, when the revenue administration of Tenasserim was placed under the Government of Bengal, the fiscal system was very similar to that previously obtaining under Burmese rule, and was open to much the same objections from the standpoint of orthodox finance. The Board of Revenue not unnaturally regarded it as in various ways 'inimical to the general welfare of the Province'.[3] It recommended the abolition of the tax on salt as 'peculiarly liable to

[1] *SL*, pp. 12, 28, 43–4. [2] *SL*, pp. 74, 100, 170. [3] *SL*, pp. 82, 192–4.

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the objection of harassing the people, salt being a necessary of life and a condiment essentially conducive to health'; the bazaar tax was 'objectionable in principle' as a restraint on trade and, if continued, should be limited to the amount necessary for the upkeep of the buildings; the duty on teak might prejudice exports; and the charges on mineral and forest produce, on the manufacture of pots, of chewing lime and of torches were unremunerative and oppressive; the poll taxes on Karens and Salons were excessive and should be reduced, or, better, abolished. But Tenasserim was still unprofitable. The Government had to raise money as best it could; like Mr Maingy the Board pocketed its scruples, and things went on much as before. Liberal principles are admirable in theory, but when they cost money, one must be prudent in applying them.

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In 1839, of a total revenue of Rs. 4 lakhs, land revenue produced over one-third, and together with the excise on liquor and opium, over one-half. These taxes were consistent with Liberal doctrine, but the Government had to scrape together money where it could. The bazaar tax, and the poll tax on Karens and Salons, although condemned by India, came next in importance, closely followed by the proceeds of hiring out convicts to private individuals. On teak, the chief item of export, the duty, which fell on European merchants, amounted to Rs. 21,814, rather less than was derived from the hire of convicts.[1]

4. Administrative Machinery

(*a*) *1826–52*. On the introduction of civil rule Arakan, as already mentioned, was placed under Bengal, but the earliest civil officers in Tenasserim, Maingy (1825–33) and Blundell (1833–43) were appointed from Penang. Penang at that time belonged to the East India Company, and naturally the system of direct rule that Cornwallis had recently established in Bengal, provided a model for the machinery of administration in Tenasserim. One of the first problems was the re-employment of the former Burmese officials. As usual under Burmese rule, these were in two grades: superior officials belonging to the central administrative system and appointed by the Crown; and subordinate local officials, of whom the most important was the *Thugyi*, the hereditary chieftain of a small district. Under British rule these two grades were treated differently.

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[1] *Corr.TD*, p. 98.

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The superior officials had enjoyed 'unbounded influence' and were 'viewed as troublesome and disaffected characters'; from all he saw and heard Mr Maingy was 'well convinced that the natives would put much more confidence in an English judge'; their retention would destroy the Burmese expectation of obtaining under British rule 'a just and impartial administration without the fear of oppressive exactions', and, moreover, it would nullify the introduction of Liberal principles, as 'no vigilance could prevent their following the old system'.[1] Government on western lines required direct rule on the model recently adopted in Bengal, and Tenasserim was accordingly divided into three Districts, with a European Deputy or Assistant Commissioner in each District as judge, magistrate and collector of revenue. For some years, under the easy rule of the Governor-General, officials in Tenasserim were left to dispense justice and collect revenue according to their own ideas of equity and common sense with very little interference from above. All this was changed in 1834, when they were placed under the Government of Bengal. They were called on to furnish explanations, submit periodical returns and fill up forms, which were so foreign that they could not even understand the headings. Gradually the administrative machinery became standardized on Indian lines, and, after the departure of Mr Blundell, the process was expedited under four officers from India who held the appointment of Commissioner in rapid succession during the next ten years. These were at home in the routine of Indian machinery and knew nothing of the province, the people or the language, and the administrative system was worn into the routine grooves of the Indian mechanism. All this, however, was implicit in the first decision to replace the superior officials by Europeans, and the subsequent development was one of gradual centralization, bringing Tenasserim under the impersonal rule of law, and allowing little scope for initiative on the part of local officers. The result has been described as 'an undeveloped copy of the non-regulation model' of Indian administration; in fact, however, it was the germ of the non-regulation system, subsequently adopted in the Punjab.[2]

Meanwhile, and partly for the same reason, local administration was developing in a contrary direction towards a restoration of the Burmese system. Mr Maingy decided to retain the services of the hereditary local headmen, the *thugyis*, and to hold them responsible for the maintenance of law and order, the collection of revenue, and

[1] *SL*, pp. 10, 27. [2] Harvey, *CHI*, v, 569; Durand, I, 104.

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general administration within their charges. But he tried to convert them from hereditary chieftains into government officials. The local organization in Tenasserim was much the same as in the rest of Burma.[1] The normal and stable unit of administration was a tract known almost indifferently as the *myo* or *taik*, which may conveniently be rendered in English as the Circle. The circle, under its *thugyi*, or headman, often comprised smaller units, villages and hamlets, under a *gaung*, or head, appointed by the *thugyi*. But the circle headman was not necessarily the overlord of all the people in his circle; authority was based on personal relations, and some of the inhabitants might belong to a separate overlord. Mr Maingy preferred a more uniform, rational, arrangement.[2] He graded the headmen in three classes according as they had charge over several districts, over one district containing several villages, or over one or more villages. On this system of 'gradationary control' every headman was to receive a fixed salary, and to be responsible for all the people within the circle instead of merely for those of his own group or class. The headman was given the general charge of his circle, and made responsible both for police duties and for the collection of revenue. But it was soon found expedient to form a village police; each police officer or *gaung* had charge of a group of villages in which he had to investigate cases reported by the circle headman. Similarly the actual collection of revenue for payment to the circle headman was allotted to a villager, who was nominally the largest taxpayer (*kyedangyi*), but, in practice, a village servant of the headman. This system, so far as it was put in force, changed the whole character of local administration. It encroached on the autonomy of the circle by interfering with its internal administration; it converted the hereditary chieftain into a salaried official; and, for the rule of authority, based on personal relations, it substituted a territorial system based on law, placing all the people regardless of race or class under the legal authority of the circle headman.

But the plan worked out very differently in practice. One district alone was 'nearly as large as the whole province of Oudh, and unlike Oudh, mountainous and covered with dense forests'.[3] There were no means of communication with the interior except by country boats on tidal rivers, and the circle headmen had to be left practically unsupervised, to run their charges in their own way. The payment

[1] Mya Sein, *Administration of Burma* (Rangoon, 1938), pp. 34, 44, 47, 83.
[2] *SL*, pp. 36, 51, 54, 59; *Corr.TD*, p. 11. [3] *RAB*, 1868–9, p. 61.

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of salaries soon proved too costly, and the Burmese system of payment by a commission on revenue collections was revived.[1] The circle headman, though nominally liable to transfer, ordinarily remained in one charge for life and, as in Burmese times, was succeeded by a member of his family, while the *gaung* or village policeman and *kyedangyi* or village head were merely retainers of the headman. A more striking instance of reversion to the Burmese system is that twenty years after the introduction of British rule it was discovered that, within the same tract, two or three different circle headmen might still be exercising a personal criminal and revenue jurisdiction over their own people, regardless of the territorial system nominally in force since the beginning of British rule.[2] Thus, while the European branch of the administration was becoming more centralized and mechanical, the local or Burmese branch was reverting to type, and the people were still managing their own affairs much as under their own rulers.

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For some years the European and native branches of the administration continued to function separately, the chief link between them being a Head Native (*gaung-gyok* or *sitke*) in each district.[3] No native of the country could legally exercise judicial or magisterial powers, as these were reserved to Europeans. But Bentinck believed on utilitarian grounds in the employment of 'native agency', and in 1835 the Commissioner was asked to report how far it could be adopted in Tenasserim. Mr Blundell, like his predecessor, held that 'the feelings of the people generally were adverse to seeing judges in the courts selected from themselves', because 'their thoughts would immediately revert to the days when bribery and corruption held unlimited sway'; he doubted if the men to be entrusted with judicial powers would exercise them to the best advantage, but thought that, nevertheless, they might in fact be granted rather extensive powers, as they would be working immediately under his own eyes.[4] The numerous misappropriations and irregularities discovered among the European officials shortly after Mr Blundell's departure suggest that his eyes may sometimes have been closed,[5] but it was the accepted policy in India to employ natives so far as possible, and the Head Natives were accordingly promoted to be magistrates and judges. Henceforward, alongside the circle headmen exercising personal authority through

[1] *Corr.TD*, p. 26.
[2] *BBG*, I, 483; II, 127, 215, 220.
[3] *SL*, pp. 107, 126.
[4] *SL*, pp. 125, 148–50, 248.
[5] Harvey, *CHI*, V, 569; Durand, I, 90.

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hereditary influence, Burman judicial officers were appointed to dispense western law according to western ideas. But so late as 1870 practically none of them knew English or had been to a western school, and even ten years later some courts had no copy of the laws which they were supposed to administer.[1] It may be presumed then that in the subordinate courts eastern ideas carried more weight than western laws. Moreover, the people continued to settle their disputes by private arbitration rather than in the courts.

(*b*) *1852–70*. When Pegu and Martaban came under British rule after the second war, the former was placed under a separate Commissioner, directly responsible to the Governor-General, and the latter was allotted as a separate province to the Commissioner of Tenasserim. In 1858 the British possessions in Burma passed, with the rest of India, from the East India Company to the Crown. Within a small and largely homogeneous area there were four distinct provinces, governed separately, but on much the same system. This was costly and inconvenient, and in 1862 they were amalgamated as the Province of British Burma, under a Chief Commissioner with headquarters in Rangoon. Then, in 1868, there was a modest step in the direction of provincial autonomy. Until then the 'Local Government' for Burma was technically the Governor-General in Council, but by Act I of 1868 the term was so defined as to include the Chief Commissioner. This gave him the legal power to extend Indian Acts to Burma of his own mere motion, but in fact there was little change, 'because the Indian system was one of strict subordination and the Chief Commissioner would not extend an Act without the prior approval of the Supreme Government'.[2]

The officer appointed as Commissioner of Pegu, and subsequently as Chief Commissioner, was Major (later, Sir Arthur) Phayre, who had been in Burma for close on twenty years and was outstanding in his knowledge of the people, their language and their history. Naturally he adopted in Pegu the system which had grown up in Tenasserim under the direction of the Bengal Government, and 'Indian ideas of administration prevailed in the British reorganization of the conquered Province'.[3] Pegu was divided into five Districts, each under a Deputy Commissioner, who was at once magistrate, civil judge and collector. The Districts were divided into Townships, in which the Township Officer (*myo-ok*) discharged the same varied functions as the

[1] *RAB*, 1868–9, p. 61; 1881–2, p. 23.
[2] *BBG*, I, 496. [3] Hall, p. lxii; *BBG*, I, 485.

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Deputy Commissioner, but with smaller powers. The township comprised a number of circles, each under a Circle Headman (*taik-thugyi*) with police and revenue powers, and responsible for the general order and welfare of his charge. Subordinate to the circle headmen were rural police officers (*gaungs*), responsible to the circle headman for matters of police within a small group of villages but also assisting him in the collection of revenue; and in each village (which might comprise several hamlets) a village officer (*kyedangyi*) charged with revenue collection and with some police duties. Thus at the outset the administrative system of Pegu and British Burma closely resembled that of Tenasserim, both in the superior or central, and subordinate or local grades. There was a further parallel with Tenasserim in the chief direction of affairs. The two earliest Chief Commissioners, Phayre (1862–7) and Fytche (1867–71), were both, like the two earliest Commissioners of Tenasserim, officers who served almost their whole life in Burma, and their successors, the seven heads of the province between 1871 and 1897, were all men from India and looking to go back to India on promotion. As in Tenasserim between 1843 and 1852, the administrative convenience of a mechanical conformity with Indian routine carried greater weight than a regard for the organic growth of local institutions. In other respects, however, administrative development contrasted with that of Tenasserim in earlier days; in Tenasserim the machinery grew less efficient, and in Pegu more efficient.

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The constitution of the province of British Burma in 1862, while allowing a reduction in the administrative staff, required greater uniformity in administrative methods, and this was met by a gradual reorganization of the machinery along departmental lines. The weary and uncongenial task of pacification compelled attention to the inadequacy of the police. Phayre believed firmly in village autonomy in the maintenance of order.[1] But the village police, though sufficient for the needs of Tenasserim in quiet times, could not cope with the disorder that troubled Pegu for many years after the second war; an Inspector-General was appointed in 1861 to organize a police force in Pegu, and his charge was extended to the whole of British Burma on its formation in 1862. Formerly the Deputy Commissioner had himself been head of the police; under the new system he still remained generally responsible for the maintenance of law and order, but was given the assistance of a Superintendent of Police who in

[1] Hall, pp. 101, 107.

departmental affairs was directly under the Inspector-General.

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departmental affairs was directly under the Inspector-General. The Deputy Commissioner had also been in charge of the local jail, with the assistance of an army surgeon, or in outlying districts an assistant apothecary. In 1864 the jails were placed under an Inspector-General, who was also Inspector-General of Civil Hospitals, Sanitary Commissioner and Superintendent of Vaccination. Public works likewise had been directly under the Deputy Commissioner, though in military stations he could obtain technical advice from the garrison engineer. On the constitution of British Burma a chief engineer was appointed, though extensive public works still received little attention until 1869. In Tenasserim the destruction of the teak forests had necessitated the appointment of a special conservator, and a second was appointed for Pegu. Although this new departmental organization may appear considerable, actually it reflected the contemporary opinion that, beyond the maintenance of law and order, Government should do no more than seemed unavoidable; but the creation in 1866, at the instance of the Indian Government, of a Department of Public Instruction foreshadowed a change that will come under examination in the next chapter. Thus, during the sixties, within the narrow limits of contemporary views, there were laid down the functions of the modern departmental organization. The central administration was becoming more efficient, or at least more elaborate, than before the second war.

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This tendency was still more strongly marked in the subordinate or local administration within the district. We have seen that the scheme of local administration devised by Mr Maingy declined into a system more on Burman lines; after the second war this tendency was reversed. The general character of the Burmese system in Pegu resembled that in Tenasserim. There were hereditary circle headmen, exercising a personal authority 'more tribal than territorial'; some threw in their lot with the Burmans, or were killed during the war, but most of the others were retained, and Deputy Commissioners had some difficulty in making them understand that they were responsible for all the residents within their charge. But the organization in Pegu was vastly more complex than in Tenasserim. There was a great diversity in the status of the circle headmen: some were subordinate to the local Governor, others were in direct relations with the Crown. There was a similar diversity in the area of circles: some were large and fairly populous and others comprised only one or two villages. In the early days of British rule this diversity became more intricate,

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as many who had been no more than village officers managed to gain recognition as hereditary circle headmen. But when 'these hereditary officials began to find that their position was no longer what it had been...[and that]...they were nothing but underpaid and hard-worked underlings, many of them came to the conclusion that their appointments were not worth holding'.[1] As time went on, circles were amalgamated or divided for the sake of administrative convenience, and an artificial and mechanical uniformity replaced the rich diversity natural to the gradual evolution of a living organism. In Tenasserim the project of uniformity in village rule had failed; in Pegu, and later in British Burma, it was enforced, but the appearance of greater efficiency concealed a loss of vitality.

For many years, however, this new trend had no great effect on social life. District officers still attempted little beyond the maintenance of law and order and the collection of the revenue. Although districts and circles were subdivided or remodelled as population grew and cultivation expanded, they remained unwieldy, and communications were so defective that the people in general continued to live their own life in their own way, hardly conscious of any authority higher than the circle headman. The circle headman, though appointed by the Deputy Commissioner and liable to transfer like any other official, still usually remained in one charge for life and was succeeded by a son; the village taxes were collected by a fellow-villager, the *kyedangyi*, who was a servant of the circle headman rather than a Government official; civil and petty criminal disputes were ordinarily settled by private arbitration, and villagers, unless required to attend court in connection with criminal proceedings, saw nothing of the Government. The system, though in theory one of direct rule, was in effect a system of indirect rule through the circle headman.

5. Economic Progress, 1826–52

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When Mr Maingy first arrived in Tenasserim he conjured up a glowing vision of its economic prospects, needing for their realization nothing but the sound political economy that he thought to introduce. 'Its central position, both with regard to the Burman and Siamese territories, point it out in every respect as a depot for Commercial Emporium, and with an increased population, combined with the

[1] *BBG*, II, 766.

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industry and enterprise of British and Chinese merchants, it may reasonably be expected that the ancient commerce formerly carried on with Siam will again be revived, and that by this means the manufactures of England and British India will be widely dispersed.'[1] He proposed accordingly to establish and promote the most free and unrestricted internal and external commerce. It soon appeared, however, that free trade had its disadvantages. The people 'received such a spur from the large and unknown profits of a free foreign export that the love of gain was in danger of running away with a due regard for their own wants'; they exported not only their surplus but their seed grain and their food. 'In the balance of good and evil he preferred a deviation from Political Maxim to the misery of a starving population',[2] and imposed a temporary embargo on the export of grain. But this 'deviation from Political Maxim' was merely an exception to his general policy of encouraging freedom of enterprise.

Communications. Good communications are the first condition of economic progress and, both in Arakan and Tenasserim, the new Government set to work with enthusiasm on making roads. But road-making needs labour, and this was scarce. Mr Maingy was compelled therefore to revive the Burmese system of 'compulsive labour', and on a more extensive scale. Under a Government less zealous for progress the use of forced labour had been exceptional, but under British rule the villagers were called out to work for about two months in the year. These forced services were not only contrary to Liberal doctrine and 'most irksome to the people', but they interfered with cultivation; it was unprofitable to make roads to carry rice if road-making left no rice to carry. Arrangements were made therefore to import convicts from India. By these means the old Burmese trunk road from Mergui to Amherst was reopened and extended to Moulmein. Before Mr Maingy left the country he could report that this had been effected by the inhabitants themselves, who had been 'taught the value of good roads, and had cheerfully constructed them or borne the expense of having them constructed'.[3]

But private individuals also wanted cheap labour, and it was found simpler and more lucrative to hire out the convicts than to provide them with work. Thus after fifteen years of British rule the whole Public Works establishment in Tenasserim consisted of 'one Native Superintendent on Rs. 20 a month', and this meagre establishment was regarded as sufficient because there were 'no roads, canals, tanks,

[1] *SL*, p. 4. [2] *SL*, p. 48. [3] *SL*, pp. 44, 63, 65, 105.

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or other public works in the interior'.[1] In Arakan the course of events was much the same. At first a road was built down to the mouth of the river at Negrais, and the old roads across the passes into Burma were patched up; but there was little traffic and they all relapsed into jungle.[2]

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Population. The chief obstacle to progress was the scanty population. At first hopes were entertained of a great influx from Pegu, especially of Talaings. These seemed likely to be justified when the former Talaing Governor of Syriam, after the failure of an attempt to rebel against the Burmese, fled across the border with followers estimated at 10,000. But some of these returned, and few came afterwards.[3] It was thought also that the 40,000 Talaings, said to have emigrated formerly from Burma to Siam, would return to their ancestral home to enjoy the benefits of British rule, but the few who visited Tenasserim annually seemed to come as spies.[4] Attempts were made therefore to recruit foreigners. Malays were encouraged because 'the dread which all Burmans and Talaings entertained of them' should make it possible 'to dispense with a portion of the Military force'.[5] Suggestions were made that the Company's supercargoes should 'quietly inform' the Chinese of 'the salubrious air and fertile soil in Tenasserim', and money was advanced to a Chinese contractor to import miners from Penang, but, although he was 'very respectable', the advance had to be written off as irrecoverable.[6] Only from India did settlers arrive in any numbers. The troops at Moulmein were chiefly from Madras, and these were accompanied by a numerous crowd of moneylenders, shopkeepers, washermen, tailors and barbers. Nothing seems to have come of a proposal to offer a free passage and a grant of land to 'the destitute and half-starving population on the coast of Coromandel', but from 1838 labour was imported from India for the commissariat, and more came after 1843 when convicts were withdrawn from private employ and debtor-slavery was abolished. Almost all the Indians, however, settled in Moulmein. In 1826 this was a mere fishing village, but it grew rapidly owing to its selection as the civil and military headquarters, and within a few years one finds frequent references to its 'motley population'. By 1852 the inhabitants numbered about 40,000, of whom perhaps one-third were natives of India.

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[1] *SL*, p. 195. [2] *BBG*, I, 514; II, 299, 607, 623.
[3] *SL*, pp. 60, 74; Desai, p. 57; *BBG*, II, 15, 50.
[4] *SL*, pp. 102, 104. [5] *SL*, pp. 95, 101. [6] *SL*, pp. 38, 102; *Corr.TD*, p. 26.

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Despite the failure of attempts to attract immigrants, the favourable conditions of life under British rule stimulated a rapid growth of the home population. This cannot be exactly measured, as the estimates based on the revenue returns were far from accurate and, during the early years of the British occupation, can have had little relation with the facts. According to these estimates the population of Tenasserim was originally 70,000 and that of Arakan 100,000 but the correct figure for the two was probably not less than 300,000. In 1852 it was estimated at 543,824.[1]

Production and Trade. British merchants were less enterprising than Mr Maingy had anticipated. Grants of land were offered on easy terms; but few responded, and those who did so failed. The timber trade was more attractive. Teak was the chief product of Tenasserim, and at first the Government proposed to reserve this for the Navy. From 1828, however, licences were issued to private traders. These were mostly adventurers of little substance, who did not visit the forests but obtained timber through indiscriminate felling by Burmese agents, and the licensees did no more than pay duty, when they could not dodge it, at the rate of 15 % *ad valorem* on logs arriving in Moulmein. For many years their operations were practically unsupervised and, through fraud and neglect, three-quarters of the timber escaped duty, while competition among the licensees bred confusion in the forests. In 1841 the Executive Engineer was appointed as Conservator, apparently in addition to his other duties, and was given an establishment of one headman and three peons to supervise extraction over thousands of square miles of virgin jungle.[2] Teak accounted for about half the total value of the local products exported, but up to 1841 yielded only some Rs. 20,000 in revenue;[3] under the system then introduced the revenue rose to Rs. 71,630 by 1852, but by this time the forests, it is said, were ruined.[4]

In connection with the timber trade sawmills were erected, and there was a considerable development of shipbuilding. Between 1830 and the second war more than a hundred ships, with a gross burden of over 30,000 tons, were built in Moulmein.[5] In all branches of the timber industry Burmans found employment, and in 1852 Burmese carpenters from Moulmein helped to construct the barracks in Rangoon.[6] But Indian convict labour, hired from the Government, was

[1] See note (p. 59) on Growth of Population. [2] *SL*, pp. 208, 279.
[3] *Corr.TD*, p. 98. [4] Harvey, *CHI*, v, 567.
[5] *BBG*, II, 368. [6] 1852–53, Cmd. 1608, p. 113.

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But Indian convict labour hired from the Govt. was
x 175 cheaper and more docile than free Burmese labour. From one report
464 it appears that 88 convicts were hired as private servants, 64 as day
[697] labourers, 60 as sawyers, 220 as brick and tile makers, and others as weavers, potters, blacksmiths and brass founders.[1] In 1839 more revenue was obtained from the hire of convicts than from the forests. Convict labour was not always cheap, as when a man 'in whom his master placed every confidence' bolted across the frontier with cash and valuables worth Rs. 4000. If convicts had not been available, Europeans and Burmans would have learned to work together in these various employments, and the people of the country would have been developed at the same time as its material resources. The importation of convicts failed even as regards its professed object, the construction of roads, and it erected a barrier between Burmans and the modern
x 175 world that has never been broken down. When the hiring out of convict labour ceased, the importation of Indian coolies raised an
464 even more formidable barrier against the economic education of the Burman. The officers of the medical and engineering departments
563 were accustomed to working with Indians; the subordinates in those departments were Indian and, when more were needed, it was cheaper or less trouble to import Indians than to train Burmans. The camp-followers of the garrison, the moneylenders, shopkeepers, tailors, barbers and washermen were all Indian. Modern India had grown up with modern Europe; western banks and merchants were accustomed to dealing with Indians and knew their language, while Indian moneylenders and traders had long experience of western ways of business; naturally in Burma Indians came to function as middlemen between the British and Burmese. Thus from the very earliest days of British rule there evolved a mixed community with a racial differentiation of functions.

x 175 In this community the function of the ordinary Burman was agriculture, and especially the cultivation of rice. In this the Indian
243 immigrant, an unskilled labourer accustomed to a different soil and
439 climate, was no match for him. The same process that drove the Burman from the town drew him to the country, and under British rule he found new opportunities for disposing of his produce. The proximity of Arakan to India provided a market for the local rice crop, and, with the removal of the restrictions formerly imposed by the Burmese Government on the export of rice, British merchants entered the rice trade. By 1846 the export rose to 74,203 tons, though

[1] *Corr.TD*, p. 48.

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little over 6000 went direct to Europe.[1] Tenasserim produced little more rice than it required for home consumption, and the larger output under British rule was absorbed by the growing population of Moulmein; only during the forties did a small export trade develop, mostly with the Straits.[2] At that time, however, there were wide annual fluctuations in the demand for rice in India and China, and cultivators were under no temptation to cultivate primarily for the market; they worked small holdings for domestic consumption and merely sold the surplus if the market were favourable.

Trade with Ava. Apart from timber Tenasserim found its best market in Ava.[3] In 1833, out of European piece goods to the value of Rs. 6 lakhs imported, about two-thirds were re-exported, mainly to Ava, and this item alone constituted half the total value of the exports, including timber. Subsequently the import of European piece goods declined; in 1839 not merely had re-exports almost disappeared, but less were imported for local use. The import of woollens also declined. It would seem that, despite the complaints of merchants in Rangoon, more trade was passing direct by that port instead of through Moulmein. For, during the same period, Moulmein was importing more goods from Ava; the value of Burmese piece goods rose from Rs. 11,000 to Rs. 85,000, and Burmese 'sundries' from Rs. 15,000 to over Rs. 200,000.[4] Tenasserim was an unprofitable possession to the British, and it might almost be claimed that the chief benefit of the British occupation of Tenasserim went to Ava.

6. Economic Progress, 1852–70

Communications. Although Tenasserim had failed to pay its way, Dalhousie anticipated that the acquisition of Pegu would establish British interests in Burma on a more profitable footing. 'It could be held easily and cheaply. Its ports, tidal rivers, fertile soil, products and forests held out a fair promise of commerce and wealth.'[5] Both on military and commercial grounds he stressed the importance of road-making and, as in the early days after the first war, ambitious schemes were projected. One road was to be built from Rangoon to Prome and another from Rangoon to Pegu, whence the frontier at Toungoo could be reached by water. Toungoo was to be linked up with Prome, and Prome with India by a great highway through

[1] *BBG*, 1, 460.
[2] *SL*, p. 103.
[3] *BBG*, 1, 461.
[4] *Corr.TD*, pp. 49, 99.
[5] Hall, pp. xxiv, xxviii, 114.

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Chittagong to Calcutta.[1] Pegu was likewise to be the starting point of another main road by way of Moulmein, Amherst and Mergui to Malaya. Most of these were old Burmese routes, and the stretches within the former British territory had been repaired and afterwards abandoned during earlier years. The road from Chittagong to Akyab was reported as almost finished within six months of its commencement, and by 1854 the section from Arakan to Prome was 'traversible by a horseman at full gallop'.[1] A start was made on other roads. But road-making needs money and labour, and neither was available. For eight years the enforcement of order was the primary concern of Government. The roads were neglected and most of them abandoned, and in 1869 the Chief Commissioner reported that in the whole of British Burma there was not a single completed road. 'Arakan', he said, 'has been under British rule for more than forty years, Tenasserim for the same period, Pegu fifteen years, and in these periods but five incomplete roads gave evidence of our possession of a country covering an area of 90,000 square miles.'[2]

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Roads, in fact, were a luxury; for most purposes the waterways were good enough. The only important place really difficult of access was Toungoo, which was a journey of six weeks from Rangoon. This was reduced to a fortnight or three weeks by the construction of a canal to join the Pegu and Sittang rivers. All over the Delta and as far as Thayetmyo the mails were carried in Government steamers, but these very rarely went beyond the frontier. Steamboats of the King of Burma sometimes visited Rangoon, but the only other form of transport was in country boats. In pursuance of the policy of encouraging private enterprise all the Government steamers and plant were sold to a private company about 1863, but in 1867 only four British steamers had ever taken merchandise to Mandalay and none went farther.[3]

The maritime provinces were even more isolated. Apart from irregular visits by a Government steamer they long depended on small sailing craft that could not face the monsoon. A pathetic report of 1856 reveals the condition of Mergui. 'I beg', writes the Deputy Commissioner, 'with all the earnestness that may become me, to report the miserable state of this station from the irregularity with which it has been visited. We have run short of all the common necessaries of life. Bread, meat, flour, candles, potatoes, wine, beer,

[1] *BBG*, II, 607.
[2] *RAB*, 1868–9, p. vi.
[3] *BBG*, I, 515; II, 829; Fytche, II, 323.

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brandy all are done.'[1] Ten years later, the annual shipping entering Kyaukpyu, the second port in Arakan, was some half a dozen small sailing vessels with a total burden of 651 tons.[2] Not until the late sixties, when private enterprise at last woke up to the possibilities of steam transport in eastern waters, did these conditions change.

Thus, to keep in touch with the interior, the frontier and the outside world, the Government was dependent on the telegraph service. Lines were opened to the frontier at Thayetmyo and Toungoo in 1858, to Akyab and Calcutta in 1862, and to Moulmein in 1863. The cable between Akyab and Calcutta broke down, and in 1865 they were linked up by a land line. Only in 1870 did it become possible to communicate with England by a direct and independent cable from India.

The Chief Commissioner, then, had good grounds for complaining in the annual report for 1869, cited above, that 'beyond the mere fact of our military possession of the country, beyond the existence of a police, most inadequately paid, there is hardly anything in the length and breadth of the Province to testify the presence of any rule superior to the one from which it has been wrested.... Of barracks, of gaols, of court-houses we have not a few, but as for Public Works in the true sense of the word, they are only now being called into existence.' Cobden opposed the annexation of Pegu, but it would be difficult to find a better application of the principles for which he stood than in the conduct of its administration. By the canons of Liberal orthodoxy the Government deserved credit for its fiscal policy; although part of the revenue from Burma went to India, and there were complaints that India took more than its fair share, the general aim of policy was to keep down expenses and to raise no more revenue than was necessary for the maintenance of law and order, leaving economic development to free private enterprise. But the real reason why no more was done was that the system of Indian government was 'one of strict subordination', and nothing beyond the maintenance of law and order could be attempted without sanction from the Government of India.

Population. During the 1852 war large numbers of the people fled to Upper Burma, or were evacuated in accordance with the 'scorched earth' policy adopted by the Burmese Government, and after the annexation of Pegu there was a further exodus. According to the revenue returns the remaining population was only about 700,000,

[1] Butler, p. 9. [2] *RTC*, 1867–8, p. 90.

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but this estimate was far too low.[1] In 1857–9 the Indian Mutiny created a demand for Burmese rice, and there began a steady flow of immigration from Burmese territory, partly of people returning to their homes and partly of newcomers.[2] In 1861 Indians and Chinese in Pegu were still few in comparison with Tenasserim and Arakan, and, although they increased in number during the following decade, they did not venture beyond the towns.[3] From 1867 the Government renewed attempts to import labour from India, but these met with so little success that in 1876 they were finally abandoned.[4] Probably the original population of Pegu and Martaban was rather less than 900,000 and the subsequent increase was mainly due to natural fertility under favourable conditions.

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Production. For many years after the occupation of Pegu European enterprise was as slow to take advantage of its new opportunities as in the maritime provinces in former days. Attempts to attract planters by the grant or lease of lands on easy terms had a discouraging reception, and those Europeans who settled in Rangoon mostly had their eye on the new teak forests now made accessible. But one result of the occupation of Pegu was to establish rice instead of teak as the staple export of Burma. Even before the war the price of paddy had been rising, and between 1852 and 1856 it rose from Rs. 35 to Rs. 53 per hundred baskets. As yet, however, the Europeans were only merchants and not millers. The first steam mill was erected in 1861; apparently it was unprofitable, as no more were built for many years. Rice was in fact a risky business, as the precarious harvests in India and China were the chief factor in the demand. The quantity exported, after reaching a maximum of 470,000 tons in 1864–5, fell to 248,000 two years later, and the average export for the three years 1863–6 was 420,000 as against only 340,000 for the years 1867–70. The price of paddy was the same in 1872 as in 1855,[5] and the area under cultivation between 1861 and 1870 rose only from 1·61 to 1·96 million acres. This was considerably below the increase in the population, and it is evident that the people still cultivated primarily for home consumption rather than for export. Before the opening of the Suez Canal the results of leaving economic progress to private enterprise were disappointing.

[1] See note (p. 59) on Growth of Population.
[2] *RAB*, 1861–2, p. 32.
[3] *RAB*, 1861–2, pp. 7, 32, App. A. [4] *RAB*, 1877–8, p. 13. [5] *BBG*, II, 588.

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7. Welfare

(*a*) *Individual.* Yet there is good reason to believe that the cultivators, as individuals, were vastly better off from a material standpoint under British than under Burmese rule. Formerly they had been liable to compulsory service, debarred from the free disposal of their produce, and subject to restrictions on freedom of movement and of marriage, and on their clothing, housing, and other items of personal expenditure. Under British rule they were relieved of all these disabilities. However little they may have resented such restraints so long as they could imagine nothing different, their readiness to take advantage of the boon of economic freedom showed that it was welcome. Quite apart from positive and customary restrictions, the Burmese economic system had discouraged the production and accumulation of wealth. The frequent references to the comfort and prosperity of the older villages are sufficient to discount as exaggerated, if not wholly without substance, the common allegation that under Burmese rule the people dared not gather riches for fear of being victimized by unscrupulous officials, but with a barter economy there was little incentive to increase production or accumulate wealth. Under British rule money became the medium of exchange, and its use was encouraged by the collection of revenue in money and, still more effectively though indirectly, by the importation of goods that the people liked to buy. Formerly there had been little incentive to make money because there was little to spend it on; now they had to make money to pay their taxes, and wanted to make it in order to provide themselves with various exciting and attractive novelties. Also, with the rapid rise of prices during the first years of British rule, it was much easier to make money; when the cultivator obtained two or three times as much money as before for the same quantity of produce, he had more to spend and was readier to spend it.

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As mentioned above, cultivation expanded less rapidly than the population, and the people had not yet taken to cultivation for export. Although they gained higher prices for their paddy, they did not make much more per head. But, on the other hand, there was little to tempt them into debt, and we shall see below that, even ten years after the opening of the Suez Canal, when cultivation for export had already made some progress, few were in debt and practically none in difficulties. It was not only cultivators who were more prosperous.

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Salt-boiling, fishing, pottery and boating were almost as important as rice cultivation, and in some parts more important. All these industries prospered. Until 1867, when foreign salt was first imported, the manufacture of salt and of dried fish continued to expand. So little foreign pottery was used that in 1869 the value of pottery imported from abroad was still less than the value of lacquer ware (used for plates and cups) from Upper Burma. There were practically no steamboats on the river, and the increase of traffic under British rule brought new wealth to boatmen, and stimulated boat-building. Foreign cloth was beginning to compete with local cloth, but the import of yarn was still high in relation to the import of cloth; most of the clothing was still home-woven, and the imported yarn furnished the weavers with new and cheaper materials. Up to the opening of the Suez Canal, and for some years later, everyone enjoyed under British rule freedom and a degree of material prosperity formerly unimagined.

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Taxation was heavy; its incidence was about double that of any British possession in the East, and, so far as any comparison is possible, heavier than under Burmese rule. The marginal table gives the figures for Pegu. Formerly dues to Government had been rendered mostly in personal service or in produce, and the officials had lived on what they could make out of the people. The customary payments to the central Government in produce or in money were on record in official documents, and were ordinarily light or even nominal. The demands of local officials were limited by custom though not by law, and could easily be evaded by migration if excessive; various estimates by British officers suggest that they averaged about two-thirds of the amount taken by the Crown.[1] So long as the demands were not excessive, this suited the people better than taxation in money. The British Government, with a more elaborate administration, and paying salaries in money, needed a much larger revenue, imposed heavier taxes and could enforce its demands more stringently. But higher prices enabled the people to bear a heavier burden, and the taxes did not prevent the growth of population or the spread of cultivation.

*Taxation in Pegu**

	Rs.
Burmese	1,469,160
1852–3	2,077,538
1861–2	3,700,216

* *BBG*, I, 450–1

Moreover, there was this difference between the two systems of taxation. Under Burmese rule arbitrary demands had been recog-

[1] *BBG*, I, 450; II, 434, 560, 622.

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nized as part of the ordinary machinery of government. It cannot be claimed that British rule put an end to oppression, and extortion by subordinate officials did not cease under British rule, but they became illegal. That was one benefit conferred on the people by the rule of law. Again, under Burmese rule, bandits could try their strength against the Government on almost equal terms, and if a capable and energetic official tried to suppress them, they could take refuge elsewhere; under British rule, with its formidable apparatus of magistrates and police and prisons, and its immense reserve of military strength, there was much greater security for life and property.

(*b*) *Social Welfare*. But, despite the great increase in individual prosperity, there were already signs of the activity of forces adverse to social welfare. We have noticed that from the earliest days of British rule the towns became largely Indian. After the second war this process continued more rapidly. The increase in the native population was accompanied by a wholly disproportionate increase in the foreign population. The earliest figures that can be accepted as approximately correct are those in the Administration Report for 1861–2.

Population of British Burma, 1861

Class	Pegu	Tenasserim	Arakan	British Burma
Indigenous	1,111,809	330,096	344,809	1,786,714
Indian	17,907	28,731	26,841	73,479
Chinese	2,001	8,118	135	10,254
European	1,252	1,146	164	2,562
Unclassified	17,220	3,311	4,357	24,888
Total	1,150,189	371,402	376,306	1,897,897

Already in 1861 the town police were chiefly Indians, 'as being more likely to understand those with whom they are brought into contact'.[1] Between 1861 and 1872 the number of Indians was nearly doubled, rising to 131,000. The labour on the wharves was still Burmese,[2] but unskilled labour in the towns was Indian, and so was most of the skilled or semi-skilled labour. With the exhaustion of the forests of Tenasserim and the substitution of steam for sail, the shipbuilding industry declined, and with it the employment of Burmese as carpenters. In 1852 Burmese carpenters from Moulmein were

[1] *RAB*, 1861–2, p. 7. [2] *RCLI*, x; Pt II, 163.

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mentioned among those employed on building barracks in Rangoon, but soon they ceased to find employment on Government buildings. The change was noted with regret. In former times Burmese and Karen carpenters had 'executed excellent work in pagodas and monasteries; in outlying towns and villages capital wooden houses, belonging to well-to-do cultivators, were to be seen with close-fitting joists and ornamental well-designed staircases. The American Baptist Mission had built, through the agency of Karen and Burman carpenters, fine school houses and churches in many parts of the country.'[1] But regrets were ineffectual to hinder the economic forces ousting them from employment on Government work.

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Under Burmese rule there were native schools of medicine, and the King accorded special recognition to skilled practitioners. Europeans who knew the country recognized that Burmese treatment might effect cures where western medicine failed,[2] but there was no place for Burmans in the Government medical service. 'The entire staff of the several dispensaries was composed of natives of India and with a difference of caste, creed and language it was impossible to expect that the benefits of scientific medicine would be brought home to the people in the way that they would be if administered by native agency.'[3] 'Even the menial establishments of the dispensaries were almost entirely composed of foreigners.' The European doctors were ignorant of Burmese, and the Government found it necessary to protest against the appointment from India of subordinates who were ignorant not only of Burmese but also of English; such men 'could be of little use in Burma'.[4] But it was easier and less expensive to employ Indians than to train Burmans. Under a system dominated by the idea that Government activity should extend no further than necessary beyond the maintenance of law and order, expenditure on medical attention was jealously scrutinized. 'The buildings were of the simplest and cheapest kinds and everything was done to diminish expense; thus for instance the hospital at Prome was a mat building inside the gaol walls and served for a prison hospital as well—an arrangement conducive neither to the encouragement of applications for medical relief nor to the discipline of the prison.'[5]

x175 871

The fact that the engineering and medical departments could be staffed at little expense from India reacted prejudicially on education. About 1800 the Burmans compiled histories of China and Portugal;

[1] *RAB*, 1880–1, Intr. p. 33. [2] *CISM*, pp. 9, 13; Forbes, pp. 156, 234.
[3] *RAB*, 1868–9, p. 117. [4] *RAB*, 1880–1, p. 123. [5] *BBG*, I, 527.

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Burney notes an attempt to translate an English encyclopaedia into Burmese; Mindon sent Burmans for education in Calcutta, and at the time of the Annexation of Upper Burma in 1886 some Burmese officials knew English and a few were proficient in French. But under British rule until close on 1870 education languished. Thanks to the monastic schools practically all elderly Burmans and Talaings could read and write, but before very long the monks lost much of their prestige, and the Commissioner, Mr Maingy, was apprehensive lest the rising generation should grow up almost wholly uneducated. Missionaries were already at work in Burma, but were making 'far more progress among the simple-minded Karen than amongst the more astute Burmese'.[1] Mr Maingy therefore sanctioned a grant to a missionary school which would take Burmese pupils. This experiment failed, because the missionaries wanted to teach Christianity and the boys merely wanted to learn English. The Government wanted English-speaking clerks and Burmans wanted clerkships, and between 1834 and 1844 a Government school was opened in each of the three chief towns. A return for 1852 shows that just before the second war there were 316 pupils in Government schools, of whom about two-thirds were natives of the country.[2]

On the occupation of Pegu another Government school was opened in Rangoon, and missionaries began to extend their activities to the new province. But the Government could get along without Burman engineers or doctors, and even in general administration it needed few English-speaking subordinates. For clerical and administrative appointments, the education given in monastic schools sufficed; Burmans could get jobs without attending western schools, and even the judges still had 'little other education than that which they had received as boys in some Buddhist monastery'.[3] When the Province of British Burma was constituted in 1862, out of some 5000 children in western schools only about 1000 were Burmese; the others were mostly Christian Karens. Of the four Government schools, that in Moulmein, the oldest, was recommended for abolition, and the school in Rangoon had only twenty-nine scholars and shortly afterwards was closed.[4] Education in Burma was left almost entirely to private agency; western education to the missionaries, and Burmese education to the monks. Formerly the mental horizon of the Burman

[1] *RAB*, 1868–9, p. 123.
[2] 1852, Cmd. 361.
[3] *RAB*, 1868–9, p. 61.
[4] *RAB*, 1861–2, pp. 19–21.

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had been restricted to the narrow world of medieval Burma, but was commensurate with its boundaries; now in a wider world his outlook was still narrower. But as yet few Burmans were conscious of their social impoverishment; most of them had always been cultivators with little interest in the world beyond their village, the Europeans and Indians and other foreigners resided in the towns, and the cultivator in the village was conscious of little change under British rule except that in many ways he was better off.

Every picture of Burma under native rule and in the early days of British rule brings out the charm and cheerfulness of Burmese social life. Captain Forbes[1] gives a good description of the country in the early seventies, dwelling on the Burman's 'love of sport and social amusement as well as his intense appreciation of the ridiculous.... The Burmans are a lively people, fond of amusement. Horse and boat racing and dramatic performances are the greatest attractions. The young men and boys may often be seen of an evening playing football in the street, and the elders engaged at chess in the verandahs....The great national sport of the Peguans is boat-racing.... The boats belong to certain towns or villages, and are rowed, or rather paddled, by the men belonging to them; and sometimes, when a match occurs between two localities that have long been rivals, the enthusiasms, the wild excitement, is almost incredible, and certainly indescribable....One of the characteristics of the Burman race is their intense love of dramatic performances....No festival, public ceremony or private rejoicing is complete without a performance of this kind...which with him is always a gratuitous exhibition by the hirer of the troupe....In some large villages the youths and maidens form an amateur company. In the ordinary performances the dancing or, as we should say, the incidental ballet form a principal attraction. (But) the legitimate drama or high Art is the puppet show....No festive gathering is complete without a band. Almost every important event in a Burman's life is made an occasion for a festival or a feast.' The chief were those at the beginning and end of the Buddhist Lent, and he describes a typical carnival where pasteboard hobby-horses, turtles and gigantic figures revelled in all the fun and freedom of a carnival in southern Europe. These festivals were all part of the common village life, and almost all of them centred round religion.

Yet, even in the village, life was not quite the same as under Burmese rule. The monastery was, as it still is, the centre of village

[1] Forbes, pp. 135ff, 186.

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life in Burma, and one natural and almost inevitable result of British rule was to undermine monastic influence. Under Burmese rule the monks, in addition to conducting the whole education of the country, from the Court down to the village, had played a considerable part in political affairs, holding a balance between the Government and the people. At first they sought to play a like part under British rule.[1] It was at the instance of the monks that a monastic building used by the troops for an armoury was restored to religious purposes; and at their instance also the Commissioner of Tenasserim obtained permission from the Government of India to abolish gaming houses. But so early as 1833 we find a report that the monks were no longer regarded with the former veneration. Although this report was probably exaggerated, the monastic order naturally lost cohesion when cut off from the regular establishment with its headquarters at the Burmese capital. The second war struck it a further blow. When the people fled from Pegu to Upper Burma they were accompanied by the monks, and the substantial wooden monasteries fell quickly into disrepair. From 1857 onwards the refugees returned, but often they could not afford to build a monastery or maintain a monk, and many of the monks remained behind in the more congenial environment of Buddhist rule in Upper Burma; instead of a monastery to every village, in Pegu there was only one to every three or four villages.[2] Moreover the monks in British territory were exempt from all ecclesiastical supervision, and before long there were complaints of indiscipline and insubordination.

Such conditions hindered the revival of common social life within the villages, which the troubles incidental on the Annexation had disturbed. This was most evident in Thayetmyo, where the comparatively scanty rainfall necessitated common action among the villagers for the irrigation of their rice lands. As the result of the British occupation harmonious co-operation was no longer possible and the village irrigation systems decayed.[3] In general, however, village life went on much the same as before. Anyone who went to law might find the law and procedure unfamiliar and uncongenial, but very few people went to law until the conditions of life were changed by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. In a report for this year, we are told that 'in a large number of disputes, the people prefer to have their differences settled in their own village by their own village elders....(They) have been accustomed for

[1] *SL*, pp. 62, 77. [2] Census, 1891, p. 66. [3] *BBG*, II, 755.

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ages to have their differences settled by arbitrators—who receive a fee—and consequently they are content with such an award and hardly ever dream of disputing it; for them it is as binding as any Civil Court could make it.'[1] If they wanted an arbitrator with greater authority they could resort to the circle headman, and very few ever encountered any official higher than the circle headman. If finally they obstinately took the matter into court, they would find that it tended to support the decision of the circle headman, and that the law administered was still based on Burmese custom as expounded in the first Civil Code of 1860.

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In practice it was only in some criminal matter that people ever had to come into contact with the law. And there was very little crime, and among all sections of the community the Burmese section was the most law-abiding. In this matter there was an astonishing contrast between Burma then and now. In 1826 the British occupation was followed by a period of unrest both in Arakan and Tenasserim. But after the country had been effectively pacified, the annual reports testify repeatedly to 'the generally peaceable and orderly habits of the people...' and to 'their highly flourishing circumstances with consequent diminished temptation of crime'. Moulmein with its 'motley mixture of people of all countries and castes' was a partial exception, but this was attributed to bad characters from Martaban across the border, and to 'the constant influx of strangers from all parts of India'. 'The country districts and villages continued to be very generally free from offences of all descriptions, although none of them have any Police Establishment.'[2]

The course of events was very similar later on in Pegu. At first the country was disturbed and there were numerous local risings, some on a considerable scale, until about 1860, but then, for nearly twenty years, there was little crime, and those chiefly responsible were Karens or Toungthus from the hills or Shans and Upper Burmans from beyond the frontier.[3] The Burmese and Talaings were conspicuously law-abiding; in 1879, 0·74 % of the Hindu population was in jail, 0·28 % of the Moslem population, 0·20 % of the Christian population, and only 0·12 % of the Buddhist population.[4] In the light of future development these figures are of great significance. The British Government relieved the people from the abuses to which they were subject under Burmese rule, and beyond that left them free to prosper

[1] *RAB*, 1868–9, p. 60.
[2] *SL*, pp. 159, 161, 176–7.
[3] *BBG*, II, 57.
[4] *BBG*, I, 5-4.

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according to their own devices and in their own way. Despite the slow rate of economic progress, or because of it, there was a general diffusion of greater material welfare, and it is probably correct that, as reported in 1879, although there was no enthusiasm for British rule, the majority of the respectable classes were content with it and would be unwilling to see it disturbed.[1]

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Note on Growth of Population, 1826–72.

The first regular census in British Burma was held in 1872; previously there had been annual estimates based on revenue returns. In the census of 1872 the population was given as 2·75 million. From subsequent enumerations it appears that the record in rural areas was very defective, and that the correct figure should have been about 3·11 million.[2] In the revenue returns for 1872 the population was given as 2·63 million. In earlier years, when conditions were still unsettled, they must have been much less accurate.

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In 1852 the population of Arakan was estimated at 352,348, of Tenasserim at 191,476 and of Pegu and Martaban at 718,464. For Pegu and Martaban the estimate was certainly far too low.[3] From about 1858 there began a steady flow of immigration from Burmese territory, partly of people returning to their homes and partly of newcomers. The earliest figures for British Burma as a whole are those of 1861, which gave a population of 1·90 million. Until that year, pacification was not complete, and between 1861 and 1870 the country was quieter and cultivation more profitable, so it would seem likely that the increase, whether from natural causes or immigration, would be slower between 1852 and 1860. The returns show an increase from 1·90 million in 1861 to 2·50 million in 1870; even if it increased at the same rate in the earlier decade the population in 1852 would have been 1·44 million and of Pegu and Martaban about 890,000 instead of only 718,000.

Similar difficulties hinder attempts to gauge the increase of population in Tenasserim and Arakan between 1826 and 1852. According to the official returns the population in Tenasserim grew from 70,000 to 191,000 and in Arakan from 100,000 to over 350,000. On the basis of these figures Fytche calculated the immigration from Pegu and other native Burman states up to 1855 as 257,000

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[1] *RAB*, 1880–1, Intr. p. 4.
[2] *BBG*, I, 443; II, 553.
[3] Census, 1891, p. 21.

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and this figure, which was followed in the official Gazetteer has frequently been quoted.[1] But it is demonstrably absurd. Harvey puts the immigrants into Tenasserim in 1827 at 30,000, and the Gazetteer says that 20,000 arrived in the first four years. Both these estimates seem to be based on the Annual Administration Report for 1868–9. Desai, apparently following reports from Burney, the Resident in Ava, mentions 12,000.[2] But the original records are practically silent as to immigration from Burma except for 10,000 who came with the Governor of Syriam on the failure of his rebellion in 1827, and some of these returned.[3] Attempts to encourage immigration from Siam, Malaya and China were unsuccessful. The only immigrants were Indians, and these remained in Moulmein, where in 1852 there were about 25,000. Thus the increase in population in Tenasserim must have been almost entirely due to natural causes.

Arakan was annexed to Burma in 1784, and there followed numerous reports of emigration into Bengal, where it seems that two Arakanese settlements, each of some 10,000, were established at Harbang and Cox's Bazar about 1798, though within a few years many returned to Arakan.[4] The Burmese Census figures, however, though in most cases rather low, give the population in 1802 as 248,604. The apparent decline to 100,000 in 1826 is usually ascribed to further emigration consequent on Burmese oppression, and the subsequent increase to the return of the emigrants after Arakan had come under British rule. But, according to the official *Gazette*, a great trade was carried on between Arakan and Ava before the war of 1826, employing annually, it was said, forty thousand people; and a road laid down in 1816 to carry the traffic was maintained in excellent order.[5] This is hardly consistent with the references to widespread devastation. The alleged influx after 1826 is also contradicted by the evidence. In 1840 Phayre reported that emigrants were 'gradually returning'.[6] At that time it was believed that many had returned before 1833, although no figures were available. Yet, according to a report of 1835, unfavourable rumours as to conditions in Arakan had deterred emigrants from returning for some years after 1826, and it was not until recently that a better opinion

[1] Fytche, II, 291; *BBG*, II, 56.
[2] Harvey, *CHI*, V, 567; *BBG*, II, 50; *RAB*, 1868–9, p. 1; Desai, p. 57.
[3] *SL*, pp. 60, 74.
[4] Banerjee, *Eastern Frontier*, p. 192 n.
[5] Banerjee, *Eastern Frontier*, p. 46 and n.
[6] *BBG*, II, 15.

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had been 'gradually spreading and bringing with it a return of the original inhabitants and their descendants to the country of their forefathers'.[1] It seems, moreover, that this flow was checked again in 1838.[2] Doubtless some returned, but if British rule in Tenasserim did not induce emigrants to return from Siam, one would not expect many to return from Bengal, where they already enjoyed its benefits. The early records refer also to the immigration of Indians, but even in 1861 there were less than 27,000 Indians in Arakan out of a population of 376,000. There were also reports of immigration from Ava and Pegu, but in fact this was negligible; so late as 1872 there were less than 5000 Burmese and not a single Talaing in Arakan.[3] It would seem, therefore, that the revenue returns were no more accurate in Arakan than in Tenasserim, and that the increase of population was mainly due to natural causes. Thus with a population of over 500,000 for the two provinces in 1852, the population in 1826 cannot well have been less than 300,000.

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[1] *Letters Issued, Arakan* (unpublished) 1835, p. 100; 1841, p. 142.
[2] *BBG*, II, 15.
[3] *BBG*, II, 15.

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CHAPTER III

BURMA, 1870–1923: EFFICIENCY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

(a) *PROGRESS*

1. Administrative Policy

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In reviewing the background of colonial policy, we have noticed that 1870 may be regarded as a turning point in the transition from a policy of *laissez-faire* to one of active participation in the economic development of the tropics. During the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century industrial progress in Europe was building up a supply of capital available for investment overseas, and the demands of industry for raw materials from the tropics were rapidly increasing. Among the earlier manifestations of western enterprise were the construction of railways and, from about 1860, the growth of steam traffic in eastern waters. In this process, gradual but steadily accelerating, the opening of the Suez Canal at the end of 1869 may be taken to mark the dawn of a new era in the economic, social and political relations of Europe with the East and with the tropics in general.

The new age required a new social philosophy. In Liberalism there was a double strand combining the practical common sense of Adam Smith and Bentham with the humanitarian ideals of Rousseau and the French Revolution. The new philosophy also had a dual origin; from Darwin's principle of the survival of the fittest it derived a justification of efficiency, and, from St-Simon, Robert Owen and other Socialists of various schools, the doctrine of social justice. These ideas, applied to colonial policy in the new environment, gave birth to modern imperialism. Liberals could view with detachment the prospect of an independent India that would still provide a market for European goods; but capitalists, engaged in western enterprise in the tropics and concerned for their supplies of raw materials, demanded a more active and intensive colonial policy. Accordingly, during the closing decades of the century, we see the European powers engaged in 'the struggle for Africa', and jockeying for position with a view to the prospective 'break-up of China'. At the same time the growing sense of social justice encouraged a more

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sympathetic attitude towards native welfare, fostered by the Labour movement, and also by the natural tendency of rival powers to justify their colonial pretensions on moral grounds as promoting the general welfare of the world and of their tropical subjects. By the end of the century both these aspects of colonial rule found expression in British policy as the doctrine of 'the White Man's Burden'.

In Burma the outstanding illustration of the new turn in colonial policy was the annexation of Upper Burma in 1886. Until then, the only form of economic activity to attract Europeans, apart from the exploitation of the teak forests, was the export of rice, grown by the natives. The opening of the Suez Canal gave a tremendous impulse to the cultivation and export of rice, but this still remained wholly a product of native enterprise, though the rapid multiplication of steam rice-mills gave Europeans a larger share in preparing it for the market. From 1886 onwards, however, European capitalists began to engage in productive enterprise, first in the ruby mines, then in the winning of oil and other minerals, and a little later in developing rubber plantations. The earlier reactions of this course of events on administrative policy may be found in the elaboration of departmental machinery with a view to greater efficiency; this led in 1897 to the recognition of Burma as a Provincial Government, with a Legislative Council mainly representing capitalist interests. The further development of the Council is described below.

For some time, however, the elaboration of administrative machinery was not accompanied by any noteworthy change in the general colour of administrative policy. On the annexation of Upper Burma in 1886 it was conceived in much the same terms as at the annexation of the maritime provinces sixty years earlier, and was directed to the provision of a suitable code of laws, the enforcement of a moderate system of taxation, the recognition of religious and personal freedom as a fundamental principle of rule, the freedom of trade and abolition of oppressive duties, and the improvement of roads and other means of communication.[1] Except for the final item this policy was merely negative, a policy of *laissez-faire*. Only with the new century did it assume a more constructive aspect, with a corresponding elaboration of administrative machinery for the more efficient development of material resources and the promotion of social services in respect of agricultural indebtedness, sanitation, primary instruction, and other matters bearing on the material welfare of the people. Administrative

[1] 1887, Cmd. 4692, p. 113.

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policy was no longer content to leave economic forces uncontrolled, but aimed to protect the people against their deleterious effects. This involved a new attitude towards western enterprise; it required that Government should maintain an impartial balance between the interests of western enterprise and of the people. 'The standard that the Services have tried to follow', said one of their most distinguished representatives, 'has been the standard of "Justice, Equity and Good Conscience", involving a just balance of the claims and interests of all classes of men.'[1] Under the new conditions, the due adjustment of conflicting claims and interests raised difficult problems of justice, equity and conscience. In disputes between Hindus and Moslems a British Government could, in the words of Burke, observe 'the cold neutrality of an impartial judge'. But the chill is taken off neutrality when a western Government holds the balance between western enterprise and native subjects; both interest and sympathy falsify the scales, and the problem of holding a balance becomes difficult if not impossible, while it is impossible to convince outside observers that sympathy has provided an adequate equipoise to interest. It was, however, the conception of Government as a benevolent but impartial umpire that dominated policy during the period inaugurated by the opening of the Suez Canal. The earlier policy of *laissez-faire* was gradually transformed into a policy of actively promoting economic progress, and this was slowly permeated by ideas of social justice and concern for the welfare of the people. Only with the political reforms of 1923 did policy take a new turn in the direction of autonomy.

2. Upper Burma and the Third War

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King Mindon, who came to the throne by a palace revolution arising out of the war of 1852, was probably the best sovereign of his line, and under his fostering care his people grew in numbers and prosperity. He introduced a coinage, remodelled the system of taxation, aimed at abolishing taxation by State enterprise and commerce, and built up a fleet of river steamers.[2] He despatched missions to Europe, sent lads abroad to study English and French, and had others trained in telegraphy in Rangoon, subsequently introducing a telegraph system based on the Morse Code adapted to the Burmese alphabet.[3] He encouraged

[1] Craddock, p. vii; Garratt, G. T., *Europe's Dance of Death* (1940), p. 39.
[2] *RTC*, 1867–8, p. 155. [3] *RAB*, 1868–9, p. 121.

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industry by erecting factories, with European machinery and in some cases under European management, for the manufacture of lac, cutch, sugar, and of cotton and silk piece goods;[1] with a view to making Upper Burma less dependent on British Burma he stimulated the cultivation of rice, apparently with no little success.[2] These experiments were costly, and he was 'induced under the stress of financial difficulties to obtain all the cotton he could to meet the requirements of certain European houses to whom he was in debt, and to pay the cost of machinery and steamers he was persuaded to order from Europe'.[3] This, however, was in line with his general fiscal policy of reducing taxation by deriving revenue from trade. He entered the market both for home and foreign produce, purchasing for export cotton, wheat and palm-sugar produced in Upper Burma, and employing agents to buy rice and British cotton goods in Lower Burma. He 'did everything possible to foster trade with Yunnan', sent embassies to India and Persia, and tried to open up commercial and political relations with Spain, Italy and France. During his reign there was a great increase in the value of the trade between British territory and independent Burma.

After some years of steady progress a commercial treaty was arranged in 1867, with the result that during the next two years the exports averaged rather more than Rs. 135 lakhs and the imports close on Rs. 100 lakhs. Ten years later, on the death of King Mindon in 1878, the value of exports had risen by a third, and the value of imports had doubled. The imports of cotton and silk piece goods, the item of chief interest to the common man, rose not only in volume but in value, suggesting that 'the people of Upper Burma, like those within British territory, were in a position to buy more expensive articles of apparel than formerly'.[4] His successor, King Thibaw, continued and in some ways extended the same policy, and the figures for 1884–5, the last complete year before

Trade with British Burma

(Rs. lakhs)*

Year	Exports to Ava	Imports from Ava
1858–59	39·8	31·9
1865–66	83·4	72·5
1877–78	177·6	200·1
1884–85	200·1	196·0

* Lakh = 100,000, usually of rupees.

[1] Lac, *RTC*, 1874–5, p. 24; Cutch, *RAB*, 1877–8, p. 54; Sugar, *RAB*, 1879–80, p. 68; Cotton, *RTC*, 1871–2, p. 44; *RAB*, 1877–8, p. 51; 1879–80, p. 66; Silk, *RAB*, 1877–8, p. 51.

[2] *RTC*, 1874–5, p. 40.

[3] *RTC*, 1871–2, p. 47.

[4] *RTC*, 1875–6, p. 49.

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175 439 the annexation, show that trade continued to prosper. Cheap English crockery was rapidly replacing lacquer ware, and tinned provisions, glass lamps, safety matches and fuzees, were prominent among the articles of petty luxury that found their way across the border.[1] It would seem that, as formerly after the occupation of the maritime provinces, the extension of British dominion over Pegu was profitable to Burmans still living under native rule.

× 175 439 477 The growth of trade with Upper Burma was certainly profitable to the European mercantile community in Rangoon. But they expected more trade and greater profit if Upper Burma could be brought under the British flag. The King exercised a strict control over the export of the more important products by restricting the right of export to his own agents or to licensees; this system was applied to cotton, wheat, palm-sugar, pickled tea, cutch and ivory. The merchants could obtain earth-oil at Rs. 2·5 in the open market, but the King held out for Rs. 5. In a good cotton year the price might have fallen to Rs. 25, but the King demanded Rs. 35. Purchasers could get palm-sugar at Rs. 100 a ton, but next year the King bought up the whole output and, for a rather larger crop, charged Rs. 125 a ton; he is said to have made a 100 % on the transaction. He paid Rs. 7 for lead and sold it to British merchants at Rs. 15.[2] Even if the people received no more, the profits remained in the country instead of going abroad. This 'vicious system of monopolies'[3] was a sore point with the European merchants of Rangoon. Strictly speaking, however, the system was not one of monopoly. 'The trade was free, but under the pressure placed upon him by European firms, the King was obliged to obtain all the produce he could to meet his liabilities.'[4] The people could grow what crops they liked and were free to dispose of the produce in the home market; the only restriction was that certain goods, if sent across the frontier, had to be sent through a Crown agent, or a licencee, to whom the concession had been granted. 'The monopolist', it was admitted, 'cannot interfere with the trade in Upper Burma itself; but all the goods of which he holds the monopoly must, before being exported to other countries, pass through his hands.'[5] Still, whether monopoly or not, it was a grievance, except to European firms fortunate or astute enough to obtain such a concession—then,

[1] Crockery, *RTC*, 1874–5, p. 31; 1875–6, p. 16; 1876–7, p. 31; 1882–3, p. 28; Tinned provisions, *RTC*, 1882–3, p. 98; 1884–5, p. 24; Glass lamps, *RTC*, 1883–4, p. 29; Matches, *RTC*, 1876–7, p. 28.

[2] Hall, pp. 163, 173, 399.

[3] *RAB*, 1877–8, p. 49.

[4] *RTC*, 1871–2, p. 47; 1883, Cmd. 3501, pp. 4, 11.

[5] *RAB*, 1881–2, p. 80.

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as happened with cutch, they could use it to drive the Chinese off the market.[1]

Importers of piece goods also had their grievances. They could fix their own price when dealing with individual traders in British Burma, but all such goods for Upper Burma were bought through agents of the King who could insist on lower prices and extended credit,[2] and, if Rangoon prices were too high, could deal directly with Calcutta. Similarly, 'legitimate private traders'[3] could not sell rice to Upper Burma because the King's agents dealt directly with the Delta cultivators. This was especially annoying when there was a famine in Madras, and merchants could have found a profitable market in India for all the rice in Burma, if the royal agents had not purchased a quantity sufficient to meet the requirements of Upper Burma. In respect of the rice trade especially Government was sympathetic, for rice to Ava paid no duty and 'withdrew from the revenue of British Burma a large sum annually which would otherwise be secured to Government were the rice sent seaward,'[4] and both Government and shippers felt aggrieved when 'a large amount of rice which would otherwise have been conveyed to Rangoon for shipment, went inland instead'.[5]

The King's speculations were not always profitable, nor even governed solely by ideas of profit.[6] His purchases of paddy were for the army, and also to relieve distress in tracts liable to scarcity. But it was just in these tracts that a year of good rainfall might yield abundant crops, as in 1872 when paddy was selling in Upper Burma at Rs. 15 to Rs. 25, half the price in Rangoon, while the royal granaries were overflowing with grain bought in the previous year at Rs. 60 to Rs. 70.[7] Such miscalculations exposed his policy to criticism as conflicting with a sound political economy. Not only did his policy touch the pockets of the merchants, but it stirred them to sympathy with his downtrodden subjects. The King, they said, 'forced advances' on the cultivator to secure a lien on the produce[8]—a practice not unknown in the rice trade of Lower Burma. They complained also that the concessionnaire oppressed the cultivator by 'fixing the price sufficiently low to enable him to realise a profit by sale at the rates which he can obtain in the country to which

[1] *RAB*, 1880–1, Intr. p. 43; 1881–2, p. 73.
[2] *RTC*, 1876–7, p. 7; 1877–8, p. 6.
[3] *RAB*, 1877–8, p. 51.
[4] *RAB*, 1877–8, p. 51; *RTC*, 1877–8, p. 2.
[5] *RAB*, 1879–80, p. 67.
[6] *RTC*, 1875–6, p. 50.
[7] *RTC*, 1871–2, p. 45; *RAB*, 1880–1, p. 84.
[8] *RAB*, 1877–8, p. 53.

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he exports'; so that the cultivator 'had to sell as much of his product as possible in the home market and leave as little as possible for export'.[1] It is unlikely, however, that foreign merchants would have bought produce at rates which they did not expect to leave a profit.

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The advantages anticipated from annexation were not limited, however, to the prospect of freer trade in Upper Burma; the merchants looked across the border to China.[2] 'The teeming cities of China', it was said, 'remain to be reached, and the vast inland trade of that province directed down the Irrawaddy rather than through the tempestuous seas which wash the southern coasts of Asia.' Like the merchants of Tenasserim in earlier days they found allies among the local officials in urging a forward policy. Everyone 'confidently believed' that after annexation Burma would become one of the best fields for British energy and capital; communications would rapidly be opened up and the great resources of the interior and the neighbouring territory of China 'developed'. It was urged that 'if we do not annex Burma America will', and one of the main objects of solicitude was the 'hot haste' of America to secure if possible the command of the Chinese market; it was thought therefore 'highly prudent on Imperial grounds that we should be in a position to substitute a western ingress to China for the present seaboard approach, destined to be disproportionately shared, if not entirely absorbed by America'.[3]

But the Government of India refused to be scared by the bogey of American imperialism. Apprehensions of French imperialism had more substance. From 1867 political relations between Burma and the Indian Government deteriorated. The rift had its origin in the treaty of that year which allowed the King to import arms and ammunition subject to the sanction of the Chief Commissioner, who undertook, in a note appended to the treaty, that this would ordinarily be granted. Repeatedly, however, applications to import rifles were refused, and this never ceased to rankle.[4] Another continual source of friction was the claim of Burma to suzerainty over Karenni, a cluster of hill tribes on the eastern hills, where there were valuable teak forests. Then in 1876, Lord Lytton, newly appointed Viceroy,

[1] *RAB*, 1881–2, p. 80. [2] *RTC*, 1867–8, p. 30.

[3] Fytche, II, 120, 127; Gordon, C. A., *Our Trip to Burma* (n.d. [1874]), p. 159; Durand, II, 185; Laurie, W. F. B., *Our Burmese Wars* (1880), p. 355; Thomas, E., *Gladstone of Hawarden* (1936), p. 66.

[4] Banerjee, *Annexation of Burma*, p. 243; Macaulay, p. 143; 1868–9, Cmd. 251; 1883, Cmd. 3501, p. 25.

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insisted that the British Agent in Mandalay should abandon the practice of removing his shoes in the presence of the King, with the result that he was no longer received in audience and British influence declined. On the accession of Thibaw in 1878, Lytton urged the home Government to press matters to an issue even at the risk of hostilities, and sent troops to Burma. He followed the same course in 1879, when Thibaw, fearing an insurrection, sanctioned the massacre of a large number, variously estimated at 32 to 80, of members of the royal family. A few months later the British Agent was withdrawn on the ground that his life was in danger, though British merchants, visiting Mandalay just afterwards, received a friendly welcome from the King.[1]

The Burmese feared that the Indian Government was stirring up trouble with a view to annexation, and their fears were not wholly unjustifiable. In 1867, the Myingun Prince, who had taken refuge in British territory after an unsuccessful rebellion, escaped from internment and made another attempt upon the throne. There were similar incidents in 1881 and 1882.[2] Mercantile interests had long pressed for intervention and in 1884, when renewed fears of danger from the Myingun Prince occasioned the 'liquidation' of his prominent adherents on the excuse of suppressing a jail outbreak, merchants and missionaries alike clamoured for annexation.

Meanwhile the Burmese Government was cultivating relations with other European powers, and chiefly with France. This was the direct consequence of the refusal to abide by the agreement regarding the import of arms. But the situation did not become serious until January 1885, when the French Government, in pursuance of Ferry's forward policy in south-east Asia, signed a treaty with Burma. At first the danger of French influence was regarded as potential rather than imminent, and the Indian Government, reporting on the mercantile demand for intervention, remarked that the treaties with Burma had been on the whole respected, British commerce protected, and friendly relations maintained between officials on the frontier. The Home Government agreed that, despite the French treaty, annexation would not be justified. In July, however, it transpired that the arrangements with France seriously threatened British interests, and the Chief Commissioner suggested that, unless the

[1] 1886, Cmd. 4614, pp. 2, 11, 18, 54; Macaulay, p. 141.
[2] 1886, Cmd. 4614, p. 40; *UBG*, I, i, 104; *RAB*, 1868–9, pp. 15, 21; Macaulay, p. 141.

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proposed concessions were abandoned, there would be no alternative to annexation.[1] The occasion was propitious because of a new turn of events in France, where reverses in Tonkin had caused the fall of Ferry and inspired a revulsion against colonial adventures. This gave Britain a free hand in Burma, and there was soon a chance to use it. A British company was working the teak forests and the French wanted to take over their concession. In August the Burmese Government imposed a heavy penalty on the company, which it accused, not entirely it would seem without some grounds,[2] of defrauding the revenue. This furnished a pretext for intervention with a view to clarifying the general situation. The Burmese, still hoping for French support, stood firm, and, shortly before the French Senate was due to ratify the treaty signed in January, the Indian Government addressed an ultimatum to the King, allowing him a week for submission to its terms, and backed the ultimatum with the despatch of troops. It was known that the Burmese did not expect immediate invasion and were not ready for it,[3] but their reply was interpreted as a final rejection of the terms, and the army was ordered to advance. After a short and almost bloodless campaign, the King was induced by one of his ministers to surrender, and on the first day of 1886 Ava was annexed to the Indian Empire. Although it is true that Burma forfeited its independence because the Government was unable and unwilling to accept the conditions of independence in the modern world, the annexation may be regarded from a wider standpoint as an episode in the rivalry of Britain and France for supremacy in South-east Asia, and can best be justified as removing at an opportune moment a potential cause of a European war.

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The Burmese army, however, was still undefeated. 'They refused to obey the order to surrender which had come from Mandalay...[and]...waged a guerilla warfare against the invaders.' As in 1826 and 1852 the British expected a welcome. The Viceroy reported that the people would generally regard with pleasure 'the prospects of the substitution of a strong and orderly Government for the incompetent and cruel tyranny of their former rulers'. But, as on former occasions, this optimistic view was an illusion. In Upper Burma 'the resistance was more widespread and obstinate than anyone had foreseen', and the people of Lower Burma,

[1] 1886, Cmd. 4614, pp. 125, 160, 173.
[2] *UBG*, I, i, 108.
[3] 1886, Cmd. 4614, p. 256.

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after thirty-five years of British rule, seized the opportunity to rebel. When the larger units of the regular army were broken up, scattered bands under local chieftains all over the country carried on guerilla warfare, 'euphemistically termed dacoity', into which it gradually degenerated. But, even when suffering from the depredations of the dacoits, the people refused to help the British troops, and were zealous in giving aid and information to their countrymen. 'The only course open to us was to make them fear us more than the dacoits.'[1] Pacification required an army, numbering at one time 32,000 under the Commander-in-Chief in India, and in the course of five years, by rigorous administration, supported where necessary by armed force, the country was effectively subjugated.

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3. Administrative Practice

The administrative machinery of the central Government remained almost unchanged from 1870 until the end of the century. In 1872 a Judicial Commissioner was appointed to relieve the Chief Commissioner of judicial work and, in 1881, arrangements were made for the Judicial Commissioner and the Recorders of Moulmein and Rangoon to sit together on occasion as a single Chief Court; in 1890 a Judicial Commissioner was appointed for Upper Burma. Immediate control over the revenue was delegated to a Financial Commissioner in 1888. Otherwise the Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners, Subdivisional Officers and Township Officers continued to discharge civil and criminal judicial functions, and to be responsible for all aspects of revenue and general administration within their charges.[2] But the growth of trade and the trend of opinion towards a more active administration demanded a more elaborate mechanism, and from about the end of the century the whole system was gradually reorganized. Changes were made both in the constitution of the central Government and in the machinery through which it worked.

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The transformation of the system of *laissez-faire* into one inspired by the doctrine of efficiency may be dated from 1897 when the Chief Commissioner was promoted to be a Lieutenant-Governor and was given a Legislative Council of nine nominated members including five non-officials. This measure 'was one of decentralization for administrative convenience rather than of constitutional progress'.[3] In

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[1] Crosthwaite, pp. 2, 13, 14, 104; Smeaton, pp. 2, 3; Churchill, Rt Hon. Winston, *Life of Lord Randolph Churchill* (1906), I, 524.
[2] *RAB*, 1882–3, p. 7; 1901–2, p. 11. [3] Leach, p. 15.

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1909 the membership was enlarged to fifteen, and of the nine non-official members one was elected by the Rangoon Chamber of Commerce, representing European business interests. A further revision in 1920 increased the membership to thirty, with two elected representatives of the European mercantile community and twenty-eight nominated members, of whom twelve might be officials, and two experts. The nominated members always included native non-officials. In 1920 these numbered thirteen (ten Burmans, two Indians, one Chinese); nearly half were lawyers and the rest belonged to the land-owning, trading and money-lending classes.[1] Thus the reforms tended to increase the preponderance of capitalist interests in the direction of affairs, and reflected their growing importance in the economic life of Burma. The changes symbolized a greater efficiency in economic development; only with the subsequent constitutional reforms of 1923 did the main interest shift to political development.

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Up to the end of the nineteenth century district officers were struggling ineffectually with the new tasks imposed on them as the local government, under pressure from the Government of India, gradually and almost reluctantly accepted new responsibilities. From about 1900, however, and largely under the impulse to efficiency given by Lord Curzon, the Government of Burma began to provide for the discharge of these new functions through special officers and departments. Notable changes were the appointment of two separate officers to the charge of jails and hospitals (1899), of a Commissioner to deal with the settlement of land revenue and the machinery of land records (1900), of an Excise Commissioner (1906) and, more important, the constitution of an enlarged Chief Court (1900), followed by the creation (1905–6) of a Judicial Service, to relieve district officers of civil, and of some criminal, work. These innovations aimed chiefly at increasing administrative efficiency. Others were directed towards making the Government more efficient as an instrument of economic progress. Among these were the appointment of a Chief Conservator of Forests (1905), of a Director of Agriculture (1906) and the constitution of distinct Agricultural, Veterinary and Fishery Departments; another innovation under the same head was the constitution of an Advisory Board for Communications in 1916, due mainly to the growth of motor traffic. A third series of reforms aimed to promote welfare. A growing concern for education appeared in the assumption of closer control in

[1] *RAB*, 1911–12, p. 11; *ISC*, XI, 7.

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1900 over public instruction, and the subsequent extension of state provision for instruction, leading in 1920 to the creation of Rangoon University. Other developments of welfare administration were the constitution of a Co-operative Credit Department (1904), and the appointment of a Sanitary Commissioner (1908) followed by the creation of a Public Health Department distinct from the medical service. All these departments dealt separately with isolated aspects of social life and had to be linked up with one another and with the Government and district officers. The link was provided when, in place of the single secretary who had sufficed for the Chief Commissioner up to 1886, there came into existence an elaborate and many-sided secretariat; but it was only a mechanical link, for the secretariat dealt with cases according to rule and precedent, devoid of human interest, and, though the administration might appear more efficient, it became more rigid and less human. One result of the process was that the simple machinery which, up to the end of the nineteenth century, sufficed for the maintenance of law and order, almost disappeared from outside view beneath an imposing western superstructure, designed for the furtherance of economic progress and the enhancement of human welfare.

But the machinery of law was far more obvious than ever before to those beneath the harrow with whom the administration had to deal, for the new departments touched their life on all sides, imposing on them new regulations which they had to obey under the sanction of a legal penalty. It was, indeed, in local affairs, both urban and rural, that the doctrine of efficiency was first manifested, long before the end of the nineteenth century. From the earliest days of British rule funds were raised to meet local requirements, and in 1874, at the instance of the Government of India, municipal institutions were introduced in certain towns in order to provide more efficiently for public requirements under the conditions of the modern world. The working of these institutions will be examined in connection with self-government; here it may suffice to mention that by 1923 there were about fifty municipal committees charged with certain responsibilities in connection with roads, lighting, water, public health and schools. The motive force on these committees was the local officer of the central Government. In rural areas there were no corresponding bodies, and the care for all such matters rested solely with the local officer in person.

But it was in rural areas that the transformation of the administra-

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tive system in the interest of efficiency was carried furthest. As we have noticed, the Burmese system of local administration was based on the circle under a hereditary circle headman, exercising a personal authority over his own people but not necessarily the overlord of all the inhabitants of the circle. Although the British authorities changed the character of this system by the partial transformation of the circle headman into an official, and by the frequent subdivision, amalgamation or abolition of circles for administrative convenience and without regard for local sentiment, there was no intentional departure from the Burmese model. In practice local administration still centred round the circle headman, who retained much of his former authority as an instrument of local autonomy within his charge. In 1883 Mr (later Sir Charles) Crosthwaite, an official from India acting temporarily as Chief Commissioner, commented on the absence of village communities with recognized heads, and on the importance of the circle headman. These features, distinguishing the administrative system of Burma from that of other Indian provinces, appeared to him defects, and, on returning to India, he drew up a project of village administration more in accordance with Indian ideas.[1] Shortly after the annexation of Upper Burma he was appointed Chief Commissioner, and brought with him a draft of his new plan.

Conditions in Burma provided an occasion to introduce it. In Upper Burma many circle headmen led the resistance to British rule, and in Lower Burma they failed to suppress, if they did not sympathize with, the rebellion. Sir Charles Crosthwaite accordingly introduced his new system of breaking up the circles into villages, and a Village Act, passed as an instrument of martial law, imposed on both headmen and villagers duties under penal sanction without conferring on them any rights. This abolished self-government over any unit larger than the village and, by converting the village from a social and residential unit into an administrative unit, cut at the roots of organic social life within the village. Just as formerly the circles had been cut up and reshaped in the interest of administrative uniformity, so now were the villages. They were regarded merely as units of administration and 'consequently many considerations irrelevant to the life of the community enter into the formation of a village. It may contain one or more hamlets within its borders, or its boundaries may cut with seeming irrelevance through the heart of some large residential unit. The general principles determining its formation are that its

[1] Crosthwaite, p. 23.

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area must not be too great for the control of a headman, and the revenues must be sufficient to afford by the commission on their collection an adequate remuneration for his various responsibilities.'[1] At first the tendency was towards greater subdivision. Later it was thought that better-paid headmen would be more efficient, and the amalgamation of charges gained favour. With a view 'to achieve the happy mean, the combination of adequate emoluments and efficient administration', a systematic scheme for amalgamation was drawn up in each district. Between 1909 and 1919 the number of headmen declined by over 2000, mostly in the later years, when 'the vigorous continuance of the policy of amalgamation' led to the abolition of 593 charges in a single year. Yet at the same time the remaining circles of Burmese rule were being abolished. Thus, while organic ties were broken down, new artificial units were constituted. 'The policy was naturally unpopular with the villagers who almost invariably resented the extinction of their villages as a separate entity.' A year after the policy of amalgamation had reached the stage of 'a systematic scheme' it was suddenly reversed;[2] rather perhaps because a new Governor had different ideas than because of its unpopularity with the people. From the first introduction of the village system the village was in fact little more than a cog-wheel in the machinery for maintaining order and collecting revenue, and it was under the head of 'police administration' that a paragraph on village affairs was published annually. The results are perhaps best summarized in the Administration Report for 1931–2, which states that the village headmen had performed their difficult tasks satisfactorily 'in face of the apathy or opposition of the villagers'.[3] As will appear below, the greater efficiency of the machinery for dealing with crime was ineffective to prevent the growth of crime.

With the substitution of the Village System for the Circle System, local administration, like the central administration, became more mechanical and, by undermining common social life, it allowed, and indeed encouraged, individual villagers to encroach on customary common rights. The process of abolishing the circle headman was gradual, but, even where he still survived, the new policy reacted to the prejudice of his authority. Formerly, the more serious disputes between adjacent villages were settled by the circle headman, and in 1883 the Courts still tended to confirm his orders. But by 1891 a

[1] Census, 1911, p. 24.
[2] *RAB*, 1919–20, p. 51; 1920–1, p. 51.
[3] *RAB*, 1931–2, p. 77.

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decision by a circle headman, based on Burmese custom and ratified by a Burmese judge, was set aside by the Judicial Commissioner as contrary to 'Burmese' law.[1] That signified the passing of the habit of referring disputes to a local arbitrator with a view to arriving at a compromise according to known custom; the search for greater efficiency substituted the mechanical logic of the law courts, applying laws which the people, and not infrequently the judges, did not understand.

In course of time, however, the multiplication of petty units under the village system was found to occasion administrative inconvenience and a project of grouping village headmen was contemplated.[2] The original object of grouping them was to obtain joint security for the revenue which they collected. Then in 'the very criminal district of Tharrawaddy' the groups were given new functions 'in the interests of law and order'. 'The primary functions of the group were to secure co-operation in the maintenance of order, any inefficient member being reported with a view to replacement.' The work of the group included 'surveillance of bad characters and suspicious strangers, the maintenance of fences, and of village guards at night, drills in defensive tactics against dacoits, and the prevention of offences'. They were allowed, however, to submit recommendations with regard to sanitation and other village interests, and were expected to submit monthly reports for the information of the Deputy Commissioner. But this system of grouping headmen had no organic basis and, so far as it was adopted, served merely to make them more efficient instruments of Government. As was remarked in connection with the political reforms of 1917–23, the headman in Burma was 'far more an executive officer of Government than under any similar system in any other province'.[3] The village system was no organic growth but a mechanical contrivance, and, in the pursuit of administrative efficiency, the native political and social organization was broken down; there remained no organic unit higher than the village, and even the village became very largely an artificial administrative unit. The general effect was that the popular self-government of Burmese times was replaced by a foreign legal system unable to control the anti-social forces which it liberated, and favouring the decay rather than the growth of local autonomy.

In 1870 the system of administration, so far as it impinged upon

[1] *Ru.SJ*, 1883, p. 233; 1891, p. 607.
[2] *RAB*, 1920–1, p. 53.
[3] 1920, Cmd. 746, p. 13.

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In 1870 the system of administration, so far as it impinged upon the people, was still one of indirect rule through the local circle headman, normally hereditary and remaining in one charge throughout his life. Even up to 1900 the people saw little of any Government officials, and very few ever caught more than a passing glimpse of a European official. By 1923 the Government was no longer remote from the people but, through various departmental subordinates, touched on almost every aspect of private life. The people were no longer unconscious of foreign rule, but were continually reminded that they were subject to a foreign government actuated by alien ideas. Moreover, the contact between Government and the people had taken on a new character. In 1870, if ever they met an official, he was a human being able to take a comprehensive view of their affairs. In 1923 they had to deal with departmental subordinates, each concerned solely with his special functions: the school inspector looked at the children, the agriculturalist at the crops, the veterinary inspector at the cattle and the sanitary inspector at the latrines. None of these officials saw life whole and, by reason of frequent transfers, none of them saw it steadily. But life cannot be cut up into departments, nor can any problem be treated without reference to the past and future. Most of the subordinate officials, even, and perhaps specially, those charged with welfare activities, were regarded as agents of oppression, to be propitiated by petty bribes.[1] Again, the multiplication of departmental specialists deprived administrative officials of their more congenial functions, and presented them to the people merely as magistrates and tax collectors, so that their relations with the people became both more distant and less kindly.

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4. Economic Progress

Communications. The opening of the Suez Canal gave a new stimulus to trade and to the improvement of communications. There was a spasm of interest in road-making and many old projects were revived, only to be forgotten before the roads were built. By 1918, in a country covering twice the area of the British Isles, there were 'still barely 2000 miles of metalled road, less than in a London suburb'.[2] Roads were not really needed. When the crops were off the ground, the villager could drive to market across the open fields; for longer journeys the rivers, which hindered the building of roads, rendered them unnecessary. Until the advent of the motor-car the country could manage without roads.

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[1] *CBC*, p. 8. [2] Harvey, *CHI*, VI, 444

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But the relations with Ava were such as to render war almost inevitable, and the Indian Mutiny had demonstrated the need of railways for military operations. Private enterprise was not forthcoming, and the project of a State railway to the frontier at Prome was adopted in 1868, though nothing was done until 1874 when construction was put in hand to provide relief for the famine-stricken peasants of Bengal.[1] The line to Prome was completed in 1877, and in 1885, just in time for the third war, a line to the frontier at Toungoo reduced the journey from twenty-five days to less than half as many hours. In 1889 it was carried on to Mandalay, and then to the Chinese frontier at Myitkyina in 1898 and at Lashio in 1902. These last extensions were laid down by the Burma Railway Company, to which the line was leased in 1896. It also opened lines to Bassein in 1902 and to Moulmein in 1907, when, for the first time in history, one could travel across Lower Burma from east to west by land without having to force a way by footpaths and ford innumerable creeks.

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During the same period there was a corresponding improvement in communications by water.[2] The small company which took over the Government steamers in 1863 was reorganized in 1868 as the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company. At that time the King of Burma was adding to his fleet, and another private firm in Rangoon was running occasional steamers up the Irrawaddy. But it was rarely that any boat went beyond the frontier. After the treaty of 1867, trade with Upper Burma increased so rapidly that, two years later, the Government was able by the grant of a subsidy to induce the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company to run a weekly service to Mandalay and a monthly service to the Chinese frontier at Bhamo. For a few years the company made cautious headway, but in 1875 it embarked on a bolder policy by importing five large steamers and six flats or houseboats to be attached to the steamers as travelling bazaars. The activities of France in Burma in 1885 aroused some apprehension lest a French company should take over the King's vessels and enter into competition for the river traffic, but, fortunately for the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company, these fears were dispelled by the Annexation, and by 1900 it had secured a practical monopoly of steam transport over all the inland waters of Burma.

External communications also made rapid progress. The minor

[1] *BBG*, I, 516; *RAB*, 1884–5, p. 46.
[2] Fytche, II, 323; *RAB*, 1868–9, p. 14; 1880–1, Intr. p. 34; *RTC*, 1867–8, p. 155; 1871–2, p. 13; 1875–6, p. 12.

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ports, formerly almost cut off from the outer world, were linked up with Rangoon in 1871 by a fortnightly service of the British India Steam Navigation Company, and from 1873 there were regular services to Penang and Singapore. A local European firm had three small steamers on the same run; the Chinese began to replace their junks by steamers, and the King of Siam sent an occasional vessel to Rangoon. Direct steam communication with Europe began in 1871–2, when three steamers from Glasgow arrived in Rangoon by way of the Suez Canal. This experiment was so successful that in the following year a regular line of cargo steamers began to run between these ports. Not until 1883, however, did they carry passengers. In that year, although 70 % of the imports came through the canal, only a quarter of the export trade took that route. By the end of the century, however, practically the whole trade, both export and import, used the canal, and 95 % of the tonnage entering Rangoon from foreign ports was steam. Meanwhile, in 1889, another line had opened a regular service between Liverpool and Rangoon.

At the end of the century there was a new development. Up to then practically the whole trade of Burma was in the hands of British shipowners, with headquarters either in Britain or India. But the British policy of the 'open door' gave free access to all. Between 1899 and 1902 three German lines began to call at Rangoon. Direct trade between Burma and Japan also began in 1899, and direct communications were opened with the Philippines in 1902, and with Netherlands India, chiefly for the exchange of rice and sugar, in 1905. Japan, however, proved the most formidable competitor. In 1911 a Japanese line opened a direct service to Tokyo, and also cut into the trade between Rangoon and Calcutta. Just before the war of 1914 Japan headed the list of foreign ships entering Rangoon.

Population. The economic progress after 1870, indicated by the improved communications, was reflected also in the growth of the population.[1] In the first regular census, held in 1872, the population of British Burma was returned as 2·75 million, though actually, it would seem, about 3·11 million. By 1901 the population of the same area was 5·58 million, and by 1921 7·05 million. The population of Ava in 1872, apart from its dependencies, may be put at 3 million. By

[1] Census, 1931, p. 8; 1886, Cmd. 4614, p. 72. As part of Ava was transferred to Lower Burma the census figures of 1901 for Lower and Upper Burma are 5·65 million and 3·61 million.

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1901 the population of the same area, according to the census figures, was 3·68 million, but actually about 3·70 million. Thus between 1870 and 1900 the population of Burma, excluding the Shan States, rose from about 6·11 million to about 9·28. The total population, including some hill tracts, rose from 10·5 million in 1901 to 13·2 at the census of 1921. In regard to the population two matters deserve special notice. One is the growth of the large foreign element, concentrated chiefly in the towns, especially the larger towns. The other is that, in the lowlands, the wealthiest districts are the most thinly populated in proportion to the cultivated areas. It is a remarkable fact that the richest districts of the delta, the centre of rice production, come lowest in the scale with less than 500 per thousand cultivated acres. One would expect to find a scantier population in the far less productive districts of the Dry Zone, but here the lowest figure is 621. Among purely agricultural districts the most closely populated, in relation to cultivated areas, are those where, as in the delta, rice is the sole crop, but agriculture is least commercialized, and has spread slowly from the earliest days of British rule.

*Population per 1000 acres cultivated**

Delta	
Pegu	442
Pyapon	448
Hanthawaddy	456
Myaungmya	473
Dry Zone	
Sagaing	621
Myingyan	656
L. Chindwin	706
Meiktila	715
Kyaukse	760
Maritime	
Kyaukpyu	1076
Sandoway	1179

* Census, 1931, p. 36; Subsidiary Table Ib.

These matters will be further examined in connection with the welfare of the people.

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Trade. The best measure, however, of the economic progress between the opening of the Suez Canal and the introduction of political reforms is given by the figures for the growth of trade. In this one may discern three stages. The first ended with the nineteenth century. Until near the close of the century even direct trade between Burma and the continent of Europe was carried in British vessels, and exports were registered as destined for the port at which the vessel called for orders instead of according to their final destination. With a view to elucidating the actual British share in trade, the returns for 1903–4 aimed for the first time at showing the countries to which goods were actually sent. It is convenient, therefore, to take this year as the end of the first period. The second stage ends with 1913–14, the last complete year before the war. When the period of executive rule came to an end in 1923, the violent oscillations set up by the war had

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not yet subsided, and it is preferable to take the end of the third stage as 1926–7, when trade relations had become relatively stable. The selection of this year allows, moreover, of comparison over a complete decade with the conditions at the time of Burma's separation from India.[1]

The period as a whole was one of astounding economic progress. Between the opening of the Suez Canal and the end of the century the value of imports rose fourfold; by the outbreak of war it was ten times and by 1926–7 more than fifteen times as great as in 1870. The value of exports rose even more steeply; it showed a five-fold rise by the end of the century and by 1926–7 was well over twenty times as great as in 1870. The crude figures need correction to allow for changes in the value of money, but the bare comparison just given sufficiently indicates their general dimensions. The actual figures, with the necessary corrections, are given in the table on p. 187. If British rule be tested by its effect in enhancing the contribution made by Burma to economic progress, to the welfare of the world, one may fairly claim that it has been abundantly justified by the results.

Yet to ascertain their bearing on local welfare the figures need somewhat closer analysis. The exports of Burma may be classed under two main heads: *Rural Produce* due to native enterprise, mainly in rice cultivation; and *Capitalist Produce*, due to western enterprise in the forests, oilfields, mines and plantations. Up to 1900 rural produce, and especially rice, formed an increasing proportion of the exports, rising from rather less than three-quarters in 1870 to as much as 85 % in 1900; after that date, the products of native enterprise, while continuing generally to increase in volume and value, did not keep pace with capitalist produce. In 1870 capitalist produce was confined to timber, and furnished about one-fifth of the total exports. By 1900 the oilfields were beginning to come under production, but timber was still the chief item in capitalist produce. But by 1923 capitalist enterprise was furnishing a third of the total exports, with oil as the chief item and minerals almost on a level with timber. Thus one outstanding feature of this half century was the increasing part played by foreign capital in the production of wealth in Burma.

The greater importance of foreign capital appears likewise in the figures for import trade. Here one may distinguish *consumption goods*, mainly for the native market, and *capital goods*, mainly for production by western enterprise. The import of capital goods rose from 19·6 %

[1] For details of trade during this period see the tables, pp. 187, 191 and Appendices I and II.

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in 1872–3 to 23·1 % in 1903–4, and to 24·3 % by the outbreak of war; then it grew more rapidly and by 1926–7, in little more than ten years, it rose by as much as during the previous forty years, to 30·3 %. It is only natural that with increasing wealth a larger proportion should be devoted to capital goods, but in Burma, as in other tropical dependencies, the capitalists are Europeans or, to some extent, foreign orientals working on capitalist lines, and the growth of capitalist imports indicates the increasing hold of foreign capital on economic activities. In this connection it is instructive to notice the parallel and contemporaneous change in the character of the imports for consumption. Burma can produce its own food, but depends on the outer world for certain luxuries. At the opening of the Suez Canal the imports of food constituted one-fifth of the total imports, but they comprised mainly luxuries (15·6 %) and only a small proportion of necessities (4·9 %). By the end of the century food imports constituted 32·6 % including 13·5 % of necessities. In 1926–7 necessities accounted for 11·2 %. A larger proportion of the imports went to provide the necessities of life. Imports of clothing show the same trend even more clearly. Cotton goods may be taken to represent necessities and silk goods and European apparel luxuries. In 1872–3 clothing accounted for 51·3 % of the total value of imports, and included 19·7 % of luxuries. At each of the turning-points selected for examination we find a declining proportion of luxuries and by 1926–7 it had fallen to 6·6 %.

Changes in the geographical distribution of trade also show features of interest. It is rather strange that, before the opening of the Suez Canal, two-thirds of the exports of Burma went to Europe, and that when Europe was brought nearer by the canal, its share of the exports dropped by the end of the century to one-third. The new century, however, coincided with a growing demand in Europe for tropical produce, and until the war of 1914 the proportion of exports to Europe showed a rising tendency. Imports from Europe, on the other hand, rose with the opening of the canal, because previously European merchandise had been imported through India. There was a still more marked rise during the early years of the present century; due presumably to the increasing share of foreign shipping. The European share of the trade reached a peak in 1913–14; this was followed by a decline both in exports and imports. The distribution of the trade by countries has some interesting features which we shall examine later.

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Production. The figures for trade indicate both the general course of production, and the need to distinguish the parts played in production by native and western enterprise. In general, rice, cotton and other agricultural commodities are produced by native enterprise, and purchased by non-natives, European or Oriental, for treatment, if necessary, and export. Timber is extracted by natives employed by, or under the direction of, large European firms; plantation crops are grown by capitalists, mostly European, using imported labour. Oil and other minerals are worked by capitalists, who for long employed, chiefly or solely, imported labour, though of recent years there has been an increasing tendency to use native labour on the oilfields. Transport and industry are also in European hands, employing immigrant labour, though here also native labour has of late years made some headway.

Western Enterprise. Up to 1900 western enterprise was confined mainly to transport, the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company and the railway; and to the old-established rice and timber industries. Under native rule the extensive deposits of 'excellent iron ore' were worked by Burmans until iron could be imported more cheaply from abroad.[1] Salt was an important item in native production until the seventies. Ships carried it at low rates to avoid sailing in ballast, and this reduced the homeward freight on rice; thus foreign salt gradually replaced the native article, at first in domestic use, and then in curing fish. Burmans worked the oilfields, and in Tenasserim Chinese miners washed for tin. But the tin mines were worked by primitive and wasteful methods, and by 1880 American kerosene was competing successfully with the native product even in the neighbourhood of the oilfields. Among other native industries, weaving, pottery, and lacquer ware were gradually displaced by imported goods.

During the present century Europeans have taken a wider interest in agricultural produce, especially cotton, groundnut and beans. The first factory for ginning cotton was erected in 1898 and the first cotton-seed mill in 1900; a few years later groundnut mills were established. Apart from isolated and usually unsuccessful experiments, capitalist methods were not applied to agricultural production until the early years of this century, when a demand arose for plantation rubber. But the chief advance of western enterprise has been in mineral production.

[1] Iron, *BBG*, 1, 44, 62; Salt, *RTC*, 1868–9, pp. 3, 25; 1871–2, p. 36; 1875–6, pp. 19, 50; 1876–7, p. 36; *RAB*, 1877–8, p. 52.

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The mineral resources of Upper Burma, and especially the ruby mines, were its chief attraction to European capitalists.[1] At a notorious public meeting in 1884, urging the annexation of Upper Burma, the chairman was the local representative of a firm which had its eye on the ruby mines. But the concession (granted to a rival firm) proved of no great value. Rice and oil were more precious than rubies. Before the annexation the wells were worked on very crude lines by their owners. Some wells belonging to the Crown were taken over by the British Government. A Rangoon firm, which had formerly been dealing in the native produce, formed the Burma Oil Company to lease the Government wells and also some of the wells in private ownership. With modern machinery, American drillers and Indian labour it soon drove American kerosene off the Burma market. In 1890 it began to export oil to India and in 1895 to Penang. By 1898 the production exceeded 20 million gallons, and by 1923 270 million. The capitalist development of oil was followed by an extension of western enterprise to other minerals. In 1891 Europeans began exploring the mineral resources of the Shan States and various concessions to work lead, silver and other minerals were granted, though progress was slow until they were taken over by the Burma Corporation in 1920. About 1909 the Tenasserim tin mines began to attract interest through the discovery that they yielded wolfram, but it was only during the war of 1914–18 that scientific methods under European management were introduced on any considerable scale.[2] Thus western enterprise, almost negligible in 1870, had come by 1923 to play an important part in the economy of Burma.

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Native Enterprise. At the same time, native production also grew rapidly. 'The greatest achievement in the history of the Province, the colonization of Lower Burma, has been almost entirely the work of the Burmese.'[3] Despite the growing value of cotton and the introduction of groundnut and other new crops, rice contributed more largely to the total value of native exports in 1923 than fifty years earlier. But rice cultivation took on a new character; it was no longer cultivated mainly for subsistence but for export. Up to 1870 the population increased faster than the area under cultivation; from 1861 to 1870, while the population of Lower Burma, the main rice centre, grew by 595,000, the area under cultivation rose by only 354,000 acres. But between 1890 and 1900, the population grew by

[1] 1886, Cmd. 4614, pp. 126, 130.
[2] Chhibber, pp. 140, 202.
[3] *RAB*, 1916–17, p. 1.

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987,000, and the acreage by 2,295,000. Thereafter the rate of expansion declined, but remained higher than the increase of population. During this period the agricultural economy definitely assumed a new character that is discussed below; here it is enough to notice that large-scale production for export yielded a larger surplus, as fewer hands were needed to cultivate the same area and fewer mouths had to be fed. This partly explains the fact, already noticed, that the wealthier districts are the less populous. During the first few years after the opening of the canal the export of rice and paddy remained fairly steady, averaging 425,000 tons, but in 1872–3 there was a sudden rise to 720,000 tons. By the end of the century the export, expressed in terms of paddy, had risen to 2½ million tons, and twenty years later to 3½ million.

Some aspects of native enterprise deserve closer examination, and especially rice cultivation, not only because of its importance in the economy of Burma, but because the course of development is probably without any close parallel, and yet presents in an extreme degree the working of unrestricted competition in a tropical society. Lower Burma when first occupied, and still even at the opening of the Suez Canal, was a vast deltaic plain of swamp and jungle, with a secure rainfall; when the opening of the canal created a market for rice, this wide expanse of land was rapidly reclaimed by small cultivators, with easy access to capital and an abundant supply of seasonal labour, producing a single crop for the export market. Some of these conditions obtained in Siam and Indo-China, but it is the combination of all these factors in the delta of Lower Burma that has produced a type of agricultural organization which would seem to be unique. Formerly, the villager in Lower Burma, like peasants in general, cultivated primarily for home consumption, and it has always been the express policy of the Government to encourage peasant proprietorship. Land in the delta was abundant, and the people would ordinarily cultivate rather more than was sufficient for their needs. If scarcity in Upper Burma, India or China created a market for rice, they would sell the surplus, but in years when there was little demand for paddy, much of the crop might often be left unreaped. The opening of the canal provided a certain and profitable market for as much rice as people could grow. Everyone took up as much land as he could, and men from Upper Burma crowded down to join in the scramble for land. In two or three years a labourer could save out of his wages enough money to buy cattle and make a start on a modest

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scale as landowner. But a man who did not stake out a claim over as much land as he thought that he could work was liable to find himself forestalled. The land had to be cleared rapidly and hired labour was needed to fell the heavy jungle. In these circumstances newly reclaimed land did not pay the cost of cultivation, and there was a general demand for capital. Burmans, however, lacked the necessary funds, and had no access to capital. They did not know English or English banking methods, and English bankers knew nothing of Burmans or cultivation. Even up to 1880 there were few Burmans outside the large ports who could raise £500 (Rs. 5,000) at a fortnight's notice.[1] But in the ports there were Indian moneylenders of the *chettyar* caste, amply provided with capital and long accustomed to dealing with European banks in India. About 1880 they began to send out agents into the villages, and supplied the people with all the necessary capital, usually at reasonable rates and, with some qualifications, on sound business principles. At that time very few cultivators were in debt, and none seriously in debt, even near Rangoon, though the position was not quite so satisfactory in Arakan, where the rice trade was of longer standing. But now the *chettyars* readily supplied the cultivators with all the money that they needed, and with more than all they needed. On business principles the moneylender preferred large transactions, and would advance not merely what the cultivator might require but as much as the security would stand. Naturally, the cultivator took all that he could get, and spent the surplus on imported goods. The working of economic forces pressed money on the cultivator; to his own discomfiture, but to the profit of the moneylenders, of European exporters who could ensure supplies by giving out advances, of European importers whose cotton goods and other wares the cultivator could purchase with the surplus of his borrowings, and of the banks which financed the whole economic structure. But at the first reverse, with any failure of the crop, the death of cattle, the illness of the cultivator, or a fall of prices, due either to fluctuations in world prices or to manipulation of the market by the merchants, the cultivator was sold up, and the land passed to the moneylender, who found some other thrifty labourer to take it, leaving part of the purchase price on mortgage, and within two or three years the process was repeated. Thus the land was continually changing hands, and already in 1895 a Financial Commissioner remarked that land in Lower Burma was

[1] *RAB*, 1880–1, Intr. p. 3.

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transferred as readily as shares on the London Stock Exchange.[1] The moneylenders in general, and notably the *chettyars*, a purely moneylending and non-agricultural caste, did not want the land. But they could always find a purchaser to take it off their hands; in early days the buyer was usually a cultivator, but, as time went on, the purchasers came more and more to be men who looked to making a livelihood from rent, or who wished to make certain of supplies of paddy for their business. In the rice districts 'the ownership of land was to a large extent a branch of the rice-export industry, traders and brokers buying it in order to control supplies of paddy'.[2] Others also, merchants and shopkeepers, bought land, because they had no other investment for their profits. These trading classes were mainly townsfolk, and for the most part Indians or Chinese. Thus there was a steady growth of absentee ownership, with the land passing into the hands of foreigners. Usually, however, as soon as one cultivator went bankrupt, his land was taken over by another cultivator, who in turn lost within two or three years his land and cattle and all that he had saved. Thus on the revenue records a considerable, though steadily decreasing, proportion of the land was still registered as held by cultivators, and in 1930 only 27 % of the occupied land in Lower Burma was recorded as in the ownership of non-agriculturalists. Then the depression of the thirties prevented moneylenders from finding purchasers at prices approximating to the value of their loans, and the land registers began to reveal the true proportions of the problem. It appeared that practically half the land in Lower Burma was owned by absentees, and in the chief rice-producing districts from two-thirds to nearly three-quarters. But for the past sixty years the land had continually been passing to and fro between the moneylenders and a succession of transitory occupants and, if one looks at the facts beneath the forms, it may be said that most land in the rice tract has been held by absentee moneylenders since its first reclamation. The policy of conserving a peasant proprietary was of no avail against the hard reality of economic forces, and the picture given by official records was misleading.

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The process had other interesting reactions upon land tenure. In a country with an old-established peasantry, one finds the land fairly evenly distributed between the villagers in holdings that are sufficient to provide a subsistence for the family. That was formerly, and is still very largely, the position in Upper Burma. When such a tract comes

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[1] Smeaton, quoted in *Agriculture in Burma* (1927), p. 21. [2] *RAB*, 1914–15, p. 17.

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into contact with the market, there is a tendency to the parcelment or minute subdivision of holdings. One can see this state of affairs very clearly along the Arakan coast of Burma, where the rice trade developed gradually in the first days of British rule, and the holdings nowadays average an acre or so. But in the delta, as holdings have continually changed hands, they have tended, by the natural working of economic forces, towards the size that gives the maximum net produce and not, as with peasant cultivation, the maximum gross produce. According to local circumstances the separate units of occupancy may require two to four or more yokes of oxen, but the area has been determined by close reference to the rent obtainable. In some parts 30 acres may yield the maximum surplus of yield over cost, in others 60 or 80 acres; but only in the districts that were under cultivation before the opening of the Suez Canal does one, generally speaking, find any traces of a peasantry. The units of occupancy, however, are by no means identical with the units of ownership. The gradual transfer of land to absentee landlords has built up large estates of some hundreds, or even thousands of acres, not continuous but scattered over a wide area. These landowners have little knowledge of agriculture or interest in cultivation, and there evolved a kind of annual auction with the land 'let out to the highest bidder, the tenant of the previous year being replaced by any one willing to offer a slightly higher rental'.[1] On this system good cultivation was impossible, as a man holding land for no longer than a year, especially rice land where so much depends on a skilful use of water, cannot make the best of it. Indeed, the system encouraged bad cultivation, because an inferior cultivator would bid higher than a man who could earn good wages as a labourer, and many tenants were worse off than their labourers. It likewise expedited the substitution of Indian for Burman tenants, for Indians, though they got less out of the land than Burmans, could offer a higher rent on account of their lower standard of living. It also fostered improvidence and dishonesty, for prudent and honest cultivators would not bid so much as those who were reckless or dishonest. The landlord usually financed his tenants, and, as these grew poorer, they had to borrow more. It mattered little to the landlord whether he took his profits under the name of rent or interest, and the problems of rack-renting and debt became inextricably entangled. The labourers lived on advances from

[1] *Hanthawaddy Settlement Report*, 1911, p. 19; *Myaungmya Settlement Report*, 1920, p. 29; *RAB*, 1909–10, p. 11.

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the tenants, the tenants on advances from the landowners; the smaller landowners were continually losing their land through debt to money-lenders, and even the larger landowners mortgaged their land as security for funds required in their main occupation as brokers and paddy merchants. By 1930 the agricultural indebtedness of Burma (excluding seasonal advances, short-period loans to be repaid at harvest), was estimated at £40 million.[1]

Possibly, however, the feature of chief interest in the rice economy of Burma is the evolution of what has been described as 'industrial agriculture'. While economic forces were working to the prejudice of landowners and tenants, they were also reacting adversely on the labourers. So long as people cultivated for the home they hired little outside labour, and those without land found their chief employment in other occupations; in boating, salt-boiling, the manufacture of salt fish and fish-paste, in pottery, or in the towns in milling rice by hand, in shipbuilding and as coolies on the wharves. With the multiplication of steam rice-mills during the seventies there arose a strong demand for cheap coolie labour during the milling season, from about January to May. The volume of immigrant labour from India, though considerable, was no longer adequate to the demand. The Government attempts to import Indian labour failed,[2] and in 1876 recruitment was left to private enterprise. The system of private recruitment had been criticized so far back as 1840, but, when objections were revived in 1880, the Government held that private enterprise 'got over more labourers, provided for them better, met the demands of the labour market more regularly, and generally managed the business more cheaply than Government could do'.[3]

At that time some 16,000 coolies arrived annually from Madras, but a new shipping company cut passage rates, and the number of immigrants rose sharply to 40,000. The Government decided therefore to subsidize immigration. Within three years the number of immigrants had nearly doubled, and a subsidy was no longer required.[4] The conditions under which these coolies lived were so insanitary that the death-rate was enormous. Burmans would not live in conditions under which the Indian coolies died, and were driven from the towns out into the jungle. By the end of the century it was remarked that in four out of the chief six towns, despite a much larger total population, there were actually fewer Burmans than at the previous census, while

[1] *CLA*, III, 77.
[2] *RAB*, 1877–8, Intr. p. 13; p. 77.
[3] *RAB*, 1880–1, Intr. p. 52.
[4] *RAB*, 1880–1, Intr. p. 52; 1882–3, p. 140.

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in the other two the increase of Burmans, in comparison with that of Indians, was negligible.[1] At the same time Burmans were losing other forms of employment. The hand rice-mills worked by Burmans gave place to steam-mills employing Indian coolies. The substitution of steam for sail on sea and river compelled the boating population to look for work on land, and cheap Indian labour drove the Burmans from the wharves. The introduction of foreign salt and the tax on local manufacture ruined the salt-boilers and the salt-fish industry, to the prejudice also of the potters who specialized in making the large pans for boiling salt. From 1900 onwards Upper Burma became involved in the same process, and between 1900 and 1910 the number of people employed on spinning and weaving fell by a half.[2] All these people, driven out of the towns and out of other occupations, had to look for employment on the land, and especially in rice cultivation, the only form of agriculture requiring much hired labour.

Thanks to the rapid spread of cultivation, this large influx of labour had little direct effect on wages; the results were chiefly apparent in the consequent reorganization of production on rice lands, and this reacted on wages indirectly. Up to 1870 those few cultivators who employed outside labour hired it by the agricultural year of ten months. This system continued during the earlier years of cultivation for export. In 1880 a labourer usually earned 150 baskets of paddy, together with his board and lodging for the year; he lived with his employer and became a member of the family.[3] But men from Upper Burma were already beginning to come down, not for the year, but merely for the harvest 'to reap, thresh, store and cart the paddy'. At about the same time the Indian coolies in the rice-mills found that, by coming to Burma rather earlier, they could obtain employment on reaping.[4] These immigrants from Upper Burma and India introduced an agricultural revolution in the delta. 'Cultivation to meet local requirements gradually changed into the system of industrialized agriculture organized for the export market which prevails to-day.... In the more developed areas the earthwork, ploughing, planting, reaping, threshing, etc., are all separate operations performed by different people, and the division of function has been pushed almost as far as is possible in agriculture.'[5] The deltaic plain became in effect a factory without chimneys. This was possible only because of the large area in which a single crop was cultivated under almost uniform

[1] Census, 1901, p. 27.
[2] *BBG*, II, 551.
[3] *RAB*, 1911–12, p. 72.
[4] *RAB*, 1884–5, p. 63.
[5] *ISC*, XI, 18.

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conditions, and because an abundant supply of seasonal labour was available to undertake such operations as did not require special skill. One result was to reduce the cost of agricultural production, because the cultivator no longer had to maintain and pay his men throughout the year. But it impoverished the agricultural labourer and left him without work, wages or maintenance for a great part of the year, and compelled him to be continually on the move in search of work. 'An important feature in agriculture in Burma is the large proportion of labour which is migratory.'[1]

These conditions were developing gradually from the eighties onwards. A settlement officer then remarked that 'the immense wealth of the Burmese cultivator is as much a myth as the unbounded fertility of the soil. In some parts the cultivator is in easy circumstances but in others he is in a state of chronic indebtedness and as miserable as a Burman can be.'[2] Not, however, until the end of the century did Government come to recognize that these conditions were general, and that for some years the land had been passing to moneylenders whose tenants enjoyed no fixity of occupancy and had no protection, legal or customary against excessive rents.[3] From that time onwards there are frequent references to the subject in the annual reports. By 1911 we read that land was being transferred to absentee owners and 'a large proportion of the non-resident owners were of non-Burman nationality and had thus no interest in their land or tenants save the extortion of as large an income as possible from them'; most of the lessees were 'tenants one year and labourers the next, working their lands as tenants only for a single year and generally dependent on their landlords for advances to meet the cost of cultivation and living'; and 'a very considerable proportion of the agricultural population, particularly among the tenants and labourers were dependent for their subsistence during the working season on loans at high rates of interest, which were barely covered by the produce obtained by them at harvest'.[4]

A graphic picture of conditions in a tract newly brought under cultivation is given in a report of 1926.[5]

'Immigration has been, in fact, a scramble for land...the immigrants came from various localities and various races. Rich men, poor men, Burmans, Karens, Chittagonians, Indians were all animated by the sole

[1] *ISC*, XI, 19. [2] *Bassein Settlement Report*, 1880–1, p. 35.
[3] *RAB*, 1901–2, pp. 13, 28; *RRA*, 1895–6, Resolution, p. 5; 1901–2, p. 29.
[4] *RAB*, 1911–12, pp. 15, 34. [5] *Myaungmya Settlement Report*, 1926, ch. IV.

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idea of each man doing the best for himself regardless of every other consideration.... Government indeed appointed headmen and ten house gangs, but in practice these commanded practically no respect or obedience. There was thus no local authority or public opinion making for reasonable compromise and equitable settlement on the spot between disputing parties, but a dispute became forthwith a lawsuit or a fight.'

Anyone who could obtain possession of land long enough to start clearing the jungle could obtain a loan of about Rs. 100 an acre even before he had sown paddy, and the prospects of material gain held out an attractive bait to immigrants. But 'the inducements presented to what we may call the capitalist were greater still'. Much of the land was uncultivable except by the construction of large dykes to prevent floods and promote drainage. That was a costly business.

'It was an inevitable economic process that the land should pass into the hand of the capitalist. The capitalist could clear more extensively and more rapidly than his poorer competitor. Where his occupation was forestalled he could often buy out the smaller squatter. Moreover, whether from illness, misfortune, or pure reckless management, the squatter is always tempted by the offer of ready money, and plunges into mortgages and other commitments which usually culminate in a transference of possession.'

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'Not a little sharp practice attended the transference of land to the capitalist.' Usually the borrower was required to execute a registered deed of sale and was given a written or oral undertaking that, in accordance with Burmese custom, the transaction would be treated as a mortgage. This was an old practice, already general in 1900.[1] But only the registered deed was legally valid, and the creditor thus secured the outright possession of the land at its mortgage value. 'The rapid absorption of waste land by the capitalist, together with the legal and barely legal transference of possession to the capitalist naturally embittered the relations between the capitalist and the squatter.' The professional moneylender, the *chettyar*, was not yet prominent in this tract, but there were numerous Indian and Chinese capitalists who had accumulated large estates. Some lived on their lands, but most were absentees.

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'Many wealthy men, it is true, were content to amass land as quietly as possible, but others more aggressive were constantly intent on forcing the pace. The practice of maintaining a body of retainers became prevalent. These retainers were usually men of bad character, and their function was to overawe, and override, by violence if necessary, those who in any way opposed the interests of their employers.... There can be no doubt that

[1] *RRA*, 1901–2, p. 28.

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the squatter has in many cases been bullied off his land by brute force. If he had been so unfortunate as to settle on a section of jungle required to round off an estate, he would probably be visited at planting or at harvest by these retainers. At planting his work would be harrowed over, and he would be compelled to stand aside while the area was planted on the capitalist's behalf. Or the visit might be postponed until the harvest; then a man might see the fruit of his year's work disappearing in sampans and his field hut burnt into the bargain.' 175x 243 578

But the most violent conflicts were between rival capitalists:

'There were at least three organized bands of retainers. Two were led by Burmese ex-headmen, who found it more profitable to exercise their activities in this area and acquire land by fair means or foul. They possessed motor boats and operated like veritable flying columns, directing and organizing their nefarious schemes in different parts of the area.... Their exploits...are too numerous to mention, but one worthy of notice was a pitched battle between Chittagonians and Burmans in 1921....About fifty to eighty persons on each side took part in the fight, the Burmans being armed with crossbows while the Indians defended themselves with sticks and dahs. In the end the Burmans took to flight, leaving several of their members on the field, badly disabled.'

But the capitalist did not always have matters his own way. Although in fact the process of evolution has created a capitalist class of landlords, it has always been the policy of Government to encourage smallholders. The land regulations accordingly direct that extensions made by a tenant shall be registered as his own property and not that of his landlord; but this assumes a high standard of diligence and integrity in the surveyors. In this tract large bodies of tenants not infrequently combined to induce the revenue subordinate to register as their own property not merely the extensions but all the land that they had taken on lease, and 'the large landlords were brought to a standstill by the mass of litigation in which they were involved to sue recalcitrant tenants all over the country'. By way of protection 'it became customary for a landlord to insist on a tenant's signing a blank stamped document. Tenants are thus compelled to deliver themselves over to the mercies of the Landlord, since the latter can at any time adjust the terms of the document to a pitch of severity calculated to daunt the slightest symptoms of insubordination.' Moreover, the whole situation was aggravated by the defects of the original survey. 'Untouched jungle has frequently been shown as cultivated, presumably for the benefit of some client of the revenue surveyor wishing to establish title in advance of occupation; similarly 175x 243 423 427

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x 175 cultivation has been wiped off the map'.... 'Reports were also forthcoming of a trade union of land dacoits...this association apparently 243 mobilized its forces at planting and harvest to establish spurious 423 evidence of occupation.'

427 A former Governor of Burma has suggested that one needs experience and skill to read between the lines of published official documents.[1] But it would need penetrating vision to detect any approximation to the facts in the statement, in almost the last administration report published under his rule, that 'cordial relations are said to have prevailed between landlord and tenant'.[2] This has been a stock remark, often expressed less cautiously, in such reports throughout the present century, apparently because 'the tenant is so completely in the hands of his landlord that he is unable to assert himself in any effective way'.[3] Unfortunately it sometimes deceives the writers, who picture complacently a golden age when 'at the hush of the Pax Britannica... the people gradually settled down to a life of peace, leisure and amusement, tempered now and then by a little toil'.[4] The committee dealing with the report from which the above passages are taken suggested that it 'would furnish an ideal example for any philosopher desirous of expounding the *homo homini lupus* theory of mankind'. Such conditions were not distinctively characteristic of that particular time or that locality; they have accompanied the spread of cultivation over the whole of Lower Burma. The technique of land-grabbing has gradually been perfected, but conditions essentially similar have prevailed in newly opened areas from the beginning of the century and earlier. As appears from an earlier report from the same district, land-grabbing was not confined to agricultural land. New residential settlements were usually formed on a narrow strip of high land beside a stream. The area occupied as house sites paid no revenue, and was ordinarily shown as vacant on the maps. 'Quite frequently', either by carelessness or for a consideration, the revenue surveyor included the house sites in an adjacent holding. After paying revenue on the land for a few years, the man shown as owner evicted the people from the residential area, and, if they ventured on appealing to the courts, the map was taken as conclusive evidence against their claim. Few however dare to go to court 'because the hope of successful resistance is so weak'.[5]

[1] Craddock, p. 211. [2] *RAB*, 1920–1, p. 31. [3] *CLA*, I, 12. [4] Craddock, p. 111.
[5] *Myaungmya Settlement Report*, 1920, pp. 21, 222. It should perhaps be mentioned that if any single individual was responsible for these conditions, it was the present writer, who was in charge of the district from 1915–19, and had observed similar conditions elsewhere, almost from the beginning of his service.

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The Rice Trade. The evolution of the paddy market also presents many features of interest as illustrating the course of events where economic freedom is subject to no restriction but the rule of law. Up to 1870 rice was still grown on small holdings by peasant cultivators for their families, and the surplus was sold to merchants for shipment, either to India, mostly as paddy (unhusked rice), or to the East or Europe, as 'cargo rice' (one-fifth paddy and four-fifths roughly cleaned in hand-mills), because white rice would not stand the long passage in sailing vessels round the Cape. From about 1870, with the opening of the Suez Canal, the substitution of steam for sail and the erection of steam rice-mills, conditions gradually changed.[1] During the course of development six distinct parties were competing for the profits of the rice trade: the Burman cultivators, the Indian money-lenders who financed them, the middlemen who bought the rice, the millers in the ports of Burma, the shipowners, and the fine-millers in London who cleaned the cargo rice. The substitution of steam for sail gave the local millers a stronger position in the outside market. The quicker journey, by allowing the shipment of cleaned rice, eliminated the London fine-miller. At the same time shipment became possible throughout the year instead of depending on the monsoons, and shipowners had to compete for cargo instead of millers for cargo-space. The greater security of the millers in the outside market enabled them to combine and obtain control over the local market.

Until about 1880 the advantage rested with the cultivators. They grew rice mainly for food and kept a reserve until the next harvest; they could sell their surplus if the price was good enough, but were under no compulsion to dispose of it. The millers, on the other hand, were forced to buy under the penalty of paying demurrage, or even of missing the ships, which had to sail before the monsoon, and thus breaking their European contracts. So far back as 1867 there was a preliminary skirmish. The merchants, hard pressed by the shipowners, 'tried to force a reduction of price on sellers'. A few years later a strong demand from Europe coincided with famine in Bengal In Akyab the millers had some success in keeping down prices because they could call in their advances, but in the delta the people were still free of debt and, 'as demurrage days drew near' they got their price. Next year a shortage of shipping enabled the millers to suspend buying. In Akyab they seemed likely to repeat their former victory, but one firm broke the ring and swept the market; in the delta, as

[1] *RTC*, 1868–9, pp. 3, 25; 1871–2, pp. 9, 13; 1875–6, p. 27.

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'tonnage had to be filled...necessity compelled the demands of the sellers'. The cultivators got their price, but the 'one redeeming feature' (according to the official report) was that, owing to the fall of the rupee, merchants could well afford to pay it.[1] Thus, during the seventies, millers and cultivators competed on almost equal terms.

The change dates from about 1880. Indian moneylenders began to penetrate the interior and furnished the capital required for the speedy reclamation of the waste, and cultivators, who had to pay their debts, could not hold back their stocks. Moreover, cultivation for export discouraged the practice of reserving a supply for the coming year. Already in 1877 high prices, consequent on a famine in Madras, 'drained Burma of its stocks of rice'.[2] The millers were not slow to press their advantage, and their first great victory was in 1882. This year they were once more 'obliged to combine', and kept down prices 'to an extent which brought distress in some instances to the native agriculturalists'. But officials looked for a remedy to political economy. Values would 'sooner or later adjust themselves in accordance with the laws of supply and demand', and, if people were 'taught by their present experience to erect mills of their own, they would defeat the European combination and a further step would be taken towards an equitable adjustment of prices in their favour'.[3] Next year the fall of the rupee, and the conjunction of a short crop with Indian competition and the ties of forward contracts, hindered combination among the millers. In Akyab a combine was attempted but 'unfortunately for the shippers' a new firm broke the ring; in Bassein, remarks the official report regretfully, the European firms 'might have saved some £80,000 to £90,000 if they had entered into a combination as last year'.[4]

One weak point of the millers was in their forward contracts. In 1884, with another short crop, they tried to cancel their charters and buy back their contracts. But 'the shipowners, perceiving the straits to which they were reduced, exacted the utmost penalty for cancelment'.[5] Moreover the Indian and Chinese moneylenders and traders were not only middlemen, but were also potential rivals of the millers, as they bought rice for India and the Straits. This aroused a new sympathy for the cultivator. The *chettyars*, it was said, 'had done much to destroy the independence of large numbers of Burmese

[1] *RTC*, 1867–8, p. 144; 1874–5. pp. 17ff.; 1875–6, pp. 27ff.
[2] *RTC*, 1876–7, p. 39.
[3] *RTC*, 1881–2, p. 38.
[4] *RTC*, 1882–3, p. 34
[5] *RTC*, 1884–5, p. 14

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cultivators, to whom they make advances on ruinous terms. When harvest time comes round, it usually turns out that to satisfy the moneylender's claims, the debtor's whole crop of paddy has to be made over to him', and the *chettyar*, instead of selling it at a low rate to the European miller, shipped it to Madras.[1] Sometimes the Chinese were pictured as the villains. In 1886 some wealthy Chinese combined 'to purchase all the paddy coming in and hold it up against the millers'. But the disorder consequent on the third Anglo-Burmese War broke out anew; 'the dacoit scare came in very handy about this time to bring down prices, for alarm was taken by these would-be controllers of the local market and they gave up purchasing'. The European millers, however, were not to be intimidated by attacks upon their brokers. Although Lower Burma was aflame with rebellion, a combination of millers was fairly successful in 'keeping down prices and receiving good weight and quality'. Not unnaturally 'a great deal of discontent prevailed among the cultivators at the persistence of merchants in keeping down prices',[2] and their action must have enhanced the difficulty of restoring order. But, with the replacement of sail by steam, there was no longer the same need for millers to make forward contracts and to charter vessels in advance, and this weak spot in the armour of the millers ceased to be vulnerable.

Meanwhile the annexation of Upper Burma had stopped competition from the King. But European merchants still had little contact with the Upper Burma market; their interest lay in export by sea. In 1889 there were rumours of a famine in Upper Burma and, 'had not steps been taken officially to suppress these rumours, and thus bring down prices a great deal of mischief would have been most probably caused';[3] millers would have lost their profits and Government the revenue accruing from rice sent to Europe. Another weakness of the merchants was the lack of common action between those in different ports. In 1893, however, the Rangoon millers managed to gain control over all the rice-mills in the country, and were thereby able to obtain paddy at an average rate of Rs. 77 as against Rs. 127 in 1892. There was a stubborn fight, and demurrage had to be paid on nearly all the vessels in port. It was to be hoped, said the official report on trade, that 'the cultivators will give in'. Eventually they did give in, and the ring held until halfway through 1894.[4] The conflict set back economic progress for two years, damaged the revenue

[1] *RTC*, 1884–5, p. 55. [2] *RTC*, 1886–7, pp. 17, 21. [3] *RTC*, 1888–9, p. 22.
[4] *RTC*, 1892–3, pp. 21, 22; 1893–4, pp. 1, 22; 1894–5, p. 1.

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and the importers and bankers, and ruined thousands of cultivators, stimulating the rapid transfer of land that, as mentioned above, shortly afterwards engaged the attention of the Financial Commissioner.

In other ways also the combination on this scale had reactions on the organization of the rice trade. It encouraged Indians and Chinese, and later Burmans, to erect godowns and small rice-mills in the interior. Partly because of the improved facilities for storing paddy up-country, and partly it may be because of the injury sustained by European import houses and banks, subsequent combinations were for many years less comprehensive and less successful. But in 1912–13 matters came once more to a head. On this occasion millers resorted to the device of importing paddy from Bengal. Shippers complained that the millers could not legally sell Bengal paddy as Burma rice, but 'their complaints were overruled as the millers were completely masters of the situation in Rangoon'.[1] Of the six parties who had competed in 1870 for the profits of the Burma rice trade, it was the millers who had gained the victory. But the detached observer may perhaps offer the comment that for an illustration of the *homo homini lupus* theory of mankind, it was unnecessary to travel to the backwoods. The further development of the rice trade must be reserved for a later chapter.

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The process of economic development that we have just been examining was chiefly active in Pegu, the territory occupied after the second war. It was less active in the maritime provinces, where by 1870 conditions were more or less stabilised. In Upper Burma it came into operation later and more gradually. Here the open country was closely peopled, the social system was stronger, there was no mass immigration, Indians and Chinese were less numerous, there was less to attract the moneylender, land was of lower value and less tempting to the speculator, and the change from a subsistence to a commercial economy was less rapid and less complete. The chief items of rural produce exported from Upper Burma just before the Annexation were palm-sugar, cutch, cotton, wheat and hides. Under British rule the restrictions on export were abolished; from about 1905 groundnut was introduced and spread rapidly, a new market was opened for the innumerable variety of pulses, and improved irrigation raised the output of rice to such an extent that in good years there was a surplus available for export. At the same time, in the mines of Upper Burma and especially in the oilfields, western enterprise tapped resources previously almost neglected.

[1] *RTC*, 1912–13, p. 13.

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CHAPTER IV

BURMA, 1870–1923: EFFICIENCY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

(b) *WELFARE*

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1. Individual Welfare

On the liberal theory that economic progress guarantees the general diffusion of welfare, the rapid development of Burma after the opening of the Suez Canal should have multiplied prosperity. One might expect to find the people far better off in 1900 than in 1870, and again during the present century achieving a still higher standard of comfort through the greater activity in welfare measures. That, on the whole, was the official view, as expressed in successive annual reports, though not always without qualification. We read of 'the advance of the people towards a higher standard of living', and that 'the increasing wealth and prosperity of the country are undeniable, and are reflected in the material condition of the people'.[1] If in one year 'doubts were expressed whether after all successive years of good crops and high prices had effected any permanent improvement in the position of the ordinary agriculturist', the report for the following year notes 'a further rise in the prosperity, intelligence and comfort of the community'.[2] Consecutive reports often pronounce conflicting verdicts, the one suggesting optimistically that the condition of the people 'attains a high level of prosperity throughout the country generally', the other stating that high prices are prejudicial to a considerable proportion of the agricultural population.[3] Again, on the eve of political reforms, after fifty years of rapid economic progress under executive rule, we are told that 'the general rise of prices benefits only a comparatively small proportion, mostly of the wealthier classes'.[4] But these sudden fluctuations of opinion may possibly reflect little more than the passing mood of the official writing the report.

The more optimistic view derived support from the growth of the population, revenue, exports and imports. The rapid increase of the

[1] *RAB*, 1904–5, p. 5; 1906–7, p. 6.
[2] *RAB*, 1908–9, p. 11; 1909–10, p. 11.
[3] *RAB*, 1911–12, p. 34; 1912–13, p. 7.
[4] *RAB*, 1919–20, p. 18.

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revenue naturally coloured the vision of the officials who collected it, and the ample profits which accrued to merchants who exported rice or imported cotton goods, encouraged them to believe that all was for the best in the best of all possible worlds. Yet the burden of agricultural debt was growing, cultivators were losing their land to money-lenders, and in general making no more than a bare subsistence.[1] Although the statistics of imports suggested that the people were spending more money, the conditions of agriculture showed that they had less money to spend. A closer examination of the trade statistics helps to explain the apparent anomaly.

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Imports. At a first glance the trade statistics support the view that the cultivator was generally better off. For, while he was getting better value when he sold his rice, the cotton goods that he bought were getting cheaper. At the end of the century Burma was exporting more than twice as much rice as when the Suez Canal was opened and at about double the price; and it was importing nearly four times the volume of piece goods at a rather lower price. The higher value of rice was partly due to the fall of the rupee, and one would expect a corresponding increase in the price of imports; but the actual rupee price of cotton goods declined. It would seem then that the cultivator was buying much more cloth, and for the same quantity of paddy was obtaining about twice as much cloth; and this was of a more expensive quality, as the imports comprised a larger proportion of coloured cloth. In 1876, however, the cultivator had worn cloth woven in Burma, and by 1900 this, 'notwithstanding its better and richer quality'[2] had been driven out by the novelty and cheapness of imported cloth. It was not so much that the people were better clad, as that they were differently clad, with foreign instead of local cloth. Moreover, although the total value of imported piece goods was impressive, it represented an annual expenditure of less than Rs. 2 per head of the population.

Imports of Cotton Goods

(*a*) Million yards; (*b*) Value (Rs. lakhs); (*c*) Price index (1872–3 = 100)

Year	(*a*)	(*b*)	(*c*)
1872–3	29·85	61·19	100
1903–4	103·60	190·67	90
1913–14	182·75	445·96	118

From 1900 imports continued to increase in volume, value and variety. The war of 1914 and the subsequent boom and slump enhance

[1] *RAB*, 1920–1, p. 38; *CLA*, I, 10.
[2] *BBG*, I, 402.

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the difficulty of arriving at a statistical basis for a comparison of welfare between 1900 and 1923. But the general trend is clear enough from the figures for 1913–14 when, apart from a general rise of prices, conditions were still fairly stable. Between 1900 and the outbreak of war, while the population was increasing by about 15–20 % the value of the imports, even allowing for the rise in prices, was nearly doubled. There was again a great rise in the import of cotton goods, but these were more and more replacing goods woven in Upper Burma, as formerly they had replaced the home-woven goods of Lower Burma. As already mentioned, the census of 1911 revealed that the number of people employed on spinning and weaving had fallen during the decade by one-half. Imports of food included wheat and pulse for the rapidly growing Indian population, and there were now imported large quantities of salt and fish, formerly produced in Burma. Similarly local pottery and lacquer ware were being ousted by imported crockery. Thus the growth of imports was not wholly a net gain, but replaced a drop in home production. There was also a notable increase in the value of capital goods imported for use in western enterprise.

One feature supporting the more optimistic point of view was that many of the goods were petty luxuries: boots and shoes, cigarettes, and European provisions, such as biscuits, sardines and condensed milk. It was remarked in 1912 that the import of such goods into Rangoon to supply a population of 12 million was practically equal to the import of corresponding goods into Calcutta for a population of 87 million.[1] At the beginning of the century the people smoked native cheroots; by 1913–14 the import of cigarettes exceeded 600,000 lb., a remarkable development, but only equivalent to about half a pound annually per head. The import of boots and shoes rose from less than 200,000 pairs in 1900 to nearly a million in 1913–14; but this was less than one pair for every ten people. The use of cigarettes and European footwear did not extend beyond the towns and larger villages, and this was generally the case with European provisions. Thus Europeans in the towns, who saw their clerks and servants gay in imported silks and cottons, and wearing boots and smoking cigarettes, gathered an impression of prosperity and of a rising standard of living that conditions in rural areas, outside the places where rich men congregated, did not justify. In comparison with most parts of India the people were still well fed, well clothed and well housed, but how far the great mass of the people were better or worse off than formerly it is very difficult to say.

[1] *RTC*, 1911–12, p. 5.

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mass of the people were better or worse off than formerly it is very difficult to say.

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One reason why it is difficult to say whether the people were more or less prosperous is that there was no longer a people, but a mixture of peoples. Even in 1872 it was remarked that 'there is possibly no country in the world where the inhabitants are more varied in race, custom and language than those of Burma'.[1] To this question we must return later; here we are dealing solely with Burmans, the indigenous peoples. Among these also there was a wide range of variation in respect of welfare from one race to another, and from one place to another, between Burmese, Karens and the more backward peoples, between Lower and Upper Burma, and between urban and rural areas.

In the maritime provinces the people had come slowly into contact with the West for about half a century before the opening of the Suez Canal and the change in their economic environment had been gradual. In Tenasserim, the capital, Moulmein, was largely an Indian town, and in the immediate vicinity there were wholly Indian villages, but the people as a whole retained the character of a typical agricultural community of peasants. Not until 1907 was it linked up with Rangoon by rail, and internal communications were still primitive; in the narrow valleys between the hills the people were settled on the soil, living much as they had always done but enjoying the greater security of British rule, and problems of debt and land alienation were comparatively insignificant. Arakan was similarly cut off from the rest of the country, but even more effectively. Here, however, cultivation for export had been prominent from the earliest days of British rule, and a flood of immigration from Bengal drove the natives into the more distant villages, where, as in Tenasserim, they lived their customary life. Until well into the present century the people pounded their own rice, and one could hear in the villages the clatter of the loom. Most of the people were peasants cultivating small holdings, and the distinctive feature of the agricultural economy of Arakan was that here, as in no other part of Burma, except in small patches, the growth of population led to a minute subdivision of the land into tiny parcels.

Conditions were very different in Pegu, and those parts of Tenasserim which, as the Province of Martaban, came under British rule in 1852. This large expanse of almost uniformly level plain was by far the greater part of Lower Burma. In 1852 it had been for the most

[1] Census, 1872, p. 27.

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part a waste of swamp and jungle,[1] and 'the conversion of such land into fertile paddy land was an epic of bravery and endurance on the part of the Burmese cultivator, who was then generally a settler from Upper Burma'.[2] In the older villages and towns, which dated from Burmese times or which had grown up along the river-side during the earlier years of British rule, the Burman could enjoy all his customary amenities of life, together with such imported goods as he could afford to buy. In the newer towns, and especially those along the railway, there was more wealth, but less comfort; and the richest people were largely foreigners, Indians and Chinese, while many of the Burmans were little better off than the crowd of Indian labourers who dragged out a brief and miserable existence in coolie barracks. The inhabitants of the towns and larger villages, however, formed a very small proportion of the total population; the bulk of the people lived in small hamlets, often little better than rural slums. The centre of village life in Burma is the monastery, but, as already mentioned, it was remarked in 1891 that, whereas in Upper Burma there was a monastery for almost every village, in Lower Burma about three-quarters of the villages had no monastery. The villagers were tenants and agricultural labourers, continually shifting from one village to another in search of land or work. Rents were continually rising and, with the development of industrial agriculture, labourers were unemployed for half the year or more, while there was no clear line of distinction between tenant and labourer, with people moving from one class to the other in successive years. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that over Lower Burma as a whole the great mass of the people were steadily growing poorer, and there is further evidence of this in the increasing difficulty in the collection of the capitation tax. Despite the rising price of paddy, the people were earning less money. And they were also worse off in other ways:

'In the old days of farming for subsistence, the cultivators could get free grass for thatching free bamboos and free firewood from the public waste lands. They could get fish free in the neighbouring pools or streams, and they could weave their own clothes in their own homes. As the public waste lands became converted into cultivation, as fisheries were declared the property of Government and as home weaving became unprofitable, the small proprietors, like the tenants, were increasingly obliged to find money for needs which they could formerly supply themselves.'[3]

[1] Furnivall, *Economic Journal*, 1909, p. 554. [2] *CLA*, II, 37.
[3] *CLA*, II, 51.

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Moreover the labourer in early days had been supported by the hope of saving enough money to become a landowner. As his wages fell and more land came under cultivation this hope disappeared. The myth of the immense wealth of the Burman cultivator and of the unbounded fertility of the soil survived, but over Lower Burma as a whole, as had been noticed locally in the earliest stages of development, the cultivator was 'in a state of chronic indebtedness and as miserable as a Burman can be'. To this general statement a partial exception may be made in respect of the Karens. Under the guidance of American Baptist missionaries the Karens made great progress, and the Karen village, with its church and school, was more prosperous than most Burmese settlements; but even the Karens were not exempt from the influence of the environment. Thus, in Lower Burma generally, the conditions of living in 1920 contrasted very unfavourably with the general diffusion of a modest standard of welfare that had characterized the country fifty years earlier.

In Upper Burma, however, for some years after the Annexation, economic freedom, as formerly in Lower Burma, brought new prosperity, especially in those tracts which had previously been least flourishing. The introduction and rapid spread of groundnut brought unimagined wealth to villages which formerly had barely had sufficient food in good years, and about once in every ten years had been liable to scarcity, amounting at long intervals, after a succession of bad years, to famine. With a wider market for their crops the people could buy more rice from Lower Burma, and, with the improvement of irrigation, even the poorest were enabled to substitute rice for the less palatable, though possibly more nutritious, food grains of former years. Up to about 1910, as in Lower Burma up to about 1870 or 1880, the people were better off than under their own rulers. But in successive annual reports and elsewhere one can trace economic forces acting in the same direction as in Lower Burma. From the beginning of the present century there are references to the growing pitch of rents in some localities, and to the activities of Indian moneylenders. The market for the chief export crops, cotton and groundnut, was dominated by the European millers, and these, being comparatively few in number, were better able to manipulate prices than the more numerous and more widely spread rice-millers of Lower Burma. Owing to defects in the methods of compiling agricultural statistics, which ignored the forms of mortgage and tenancy customary in Upper Burma, the course of economic development cannot be traced so

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clearly as in Lower Burma; but export crops were comparatively insignificant and the people clung jealously to their ancestral holdings, so that economic forces were less powerful and were more strongly resisted, and it would seem probable that in Upper Burma as a whole the people enjoyed greater individual welfare in 1910 than under Burmese rule. But from about 1910 there were increasing signs of the decay of social life.

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2. Social Welfare

We have seen that in the maritime provinces, and also in Lower Burma generally for some twenty years after the occupation of Pegu, there was little change in village life. In the towns the population was more mixed, and the monastic order was losing its hold on education and, in this and other ways, much of its influence; but, in the villages, life went on very much as before. There was in effect a system of indirect rule through the circle headman, and the village was a residential and agricultural unit, managing its own affairs in its own way, but not an administrative unit. Then in 1886 the Village Act broke up the circle into villages, which became administrative units to the detriment of their former organic unity. Economic forces, reinforced by administrative regulations, carried disintegration a stage further by breaking up the village into individuals.

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Over the greater part of Lower Burma, newly occupied by immigrants, there never had been any social life, and, in the economic conditions that prevailed, with the land passing backwards and forwards every two or three years between moneylenders and a succession of transitory occupants, or held on annual lease from absentee landowners who knew nothing either of the land or of their tenants, and with people, whether cultivators, tenants or labourers continually on the move, it was impossible that any communal feeling should develop; often there was not even a monastery to serve as a nucleus of social life.

In Upper Burma things were different. Before the Annexation and for some years afterwards, there was a strong communal feeling in the villages. Under British rule this faded. The people were much freer under British rule; freer to make money and to spend it, but freer also to disregard customary social obligations. In most villages custom had set aside certain lands for grazing or fuel, or for sanitary convenience. Under Burmese rule no one thought of encroaching on them, and would have gained little by doing so; while any trespass

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X 175 would have been prevented by public opinion and the authority of the headman. But under British rule there was money to be made by 621 encroaching on common land and no law to prevent it, while the head- 178 man no longer wielded the authority given by popular support. Before long someone would brave public opinion; there was no effective remedy and others followed his example, with the result that common land tended to disappear, to the detriment of social life. Most of the rice land in large parts of Upper Burma depends on local irrigation systems. We have noticed that in Thayetmyo in Lower Burma such systems were already breaking down by 1880.[1] The same thing happened in Upper Burma. Under Burmese rule every one wanted to grow rice. Under British rule someone might think, say, onions more profitable, and, by cultivating onions, which make different demands on the supply of water, throw the whole system out of gear. He would make a profit, but the gross production of the village would decline, and the village as a whole would suffer by the collapse of the irrigation system, while communal feeling would decay.

X 175 Rules for the protection of common village rights and interests were included in the instructions for assessing land. But in practice 621 communal interests were disregarded. When the modern system of assessment was first introduced in 1879, the officers charged with this 178 function were recruited from India and brought over their own estab- 423 lishments. Much inconvenience and delay was occasioned by the inability of the subordinates to talk Burmese and, despite protests from 651 officers 'with a distrust of Burmans as workmen',[2] it was found expedient to train Burmans in this work. The experiment was soon justified by its success, but for the preliminary survey, however, it was possible, and still seemed cheaper and less trouble, to employ Indians. One result of their inability to speak Burmese was that the demarcation of common lands was neglected; there was a tendency 'to make the record of customs stereotyped and, after a few facts had been ascertained, to assume a community of usages all over the tract'.[3] In the newly reclaimed and recently settled parts of Lower Burma this disregard of common rights was of small importance, for there were few to place on record; though, as already noticed, the omission to demarcate and map residential areas often led to illegal evictions and oppression. But in Upper Burma there was an infinite variety of local

[1] See p. 57 above.
[2] *RAB*, 1879–80, pp. 6, 8.
[3] *RAB*, 1879–80, p. 10.

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custom, and social welfare was closely dependent on the preservation of common rights. Not merely on irrigated land but also on dry land, cultivation depended on water from the adjacent catchment area; so likewise did the supply of water for drinking and bathing and for the cattle. Village welfare was closely bound up with rights of pasturage, and fuel, and with the maintenance of rights of way across the fields. But when officers from Lower Burma came to assess land in Upper Burma, they brought with them the tradition of disregarding all such rights.

By this time, moreover, waste land in the delta was becoming valuable and people were 'land-grabbing', putting forward unfounded claims to waste land. In Upper Burma the British Government found that land in private ownership had been exempt from revenue. By Indian tradition land revenue was the main source of income to the State, and the Government hurried through a Land Regulation to make all future extensions liable to revenue. One result was to exclude from the maps land not actually under cultivation. But in Upper Burma the poorer soils require long periods of fallow; much of the land omitted from the maps had long been private property, and much of the land shown on the maps soon passed out of cultivation. That, however, was not the most serious defect of the revenue survey. In Lower Burma the land was newly occupied and belonged solely to the occupants, man and wife; in Upper Burma the land was a family affair in which all members of the family had complicated interests but, in accordance with the Lower Burma practice, it was usually registered as the property of the actual occupants at the time of survey. Much confusion also was caused by definitions of tenures in terms that had little relation to the facts. All this multiplied disputes and litigation to the further prejudice of common village life.

In still another way the British revenue system was a potent factor in the disintegration of the village. The Burmese Government derived most of its revenue from a tax on *property* under the name of *thathameda*. This was assessed on villages at a fixed rate per household and distributed among the people according to their means by village assessors. Under British rule agricultural income was assessed to land revenue, and a separate tax imposed on non-agricultural *income*.[1] For the tax on non-agricultural income the name of *thathameda* was retained; it was calculated at a fixed rate per household and its total amount due was distributed by village assessors. But a tax on property

[1] *Burma Settlement Instructions* (1911), p. 91.

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differs fundamentally from a tax on income. Everyone in the village knows whether a man lives in a large or small house, has much or little land or none, and has many or few cattle, and whether his wife wears gold and jewellery or cheap cotton cloth. But enquiries into income are invidious; it is unpleasant to disclose one's income to an official, but far worse to have to discuss it with one's neighbour. No more effective method of destroying village harmony could well have been devised. In practice, however, this was mitigated, because the assessors disregarded the rules and often levied the tax at a uniform rate on rich and poor alike. Sometimes district officers made a further encroachment on village autonomy by intervening to obtain what they regarded as a more equitable distribution. In one district an attempt by a Deputy Commissioner to distribute the tax, as he thought, more equitably, led to something like mass civil disobedience.[1]

One system of social disorganization was the increasing dreariness and drabness of ordinary village life. At the beginning of the present century it was still possible to attend cattle races between prize bullocks, gay in ornamental head-gear and many-coloured harness, drawing small racing chariots. But the cattle races and the traditional village rivalry in boat races were condemned by the iron hand of efficiency as promoting gambling and a cause of crime; and so also were the pony races—except on European courses. In Upper Burma one could still watch village theatrical performances, and troops of village dancers; but these disappeared with the decay of village life. The dances have been forgotten, and one of the most charming and entertaining, an elaborate ballet called a sword dance, is hardly, if at all, known to modern Burmans. The theatre has been commercialized, and the old puppet show, which in 1900 as in 1870, Burmans preferred to live-shows, seems quite to have died out, even before the introduction of the cinema. The water festival and festival of lights are less spontaneous and general, and the carnival processions are no longer a feature of ordinary village life, if they have not wholly disappeared. Burmese football still flourishes, and the introduction of English football must be placed to the credit of British rule, possibly the chief item on the credit side. But this has hardly reached the village and, as we have noticed, by 1920 the 'decay or suppression of the old-fashioned amusements' was suggested as a partial explanation of the growth of crime, and (for a short time) an officer was placed on special duty to revive them. But the decline of village amusements

[1] *RAB*, 1920–1, p. 22.

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was part of the same process as the growth of crime, and both were symptomatic of the decay of village communal life and the disintegration of society.

Thus, chiefly through attrition by economic forces, active everywhere and always, and partly through regulations devised with greater regard for administrative convenience than for the protection of social welfare, the village community, even in Upper Burma, broke down into individuals. Now it has become a catchword that 'individualism', a disregard of common welfare and a reluctance or inability to combine for common ends, is a Burmese characteristic, often attributed to the influence of Buddhism.[1] Of the modern Burman this is probably not untrue, especially in Lower Burma, where the wild beasts that roamed the forests have passed with the felling of the jungle, but man has preyed on man as a condition of survival in the new jungle growth of unrestricted competition. Individualism, so far as it finds expression in free enterprise, is beneficial, but it can be turned to good account only in a suitable environment; and the rule of law alone is powerless to hinder it from sapping the foundations of society. The Government seems never to have realised this; it tried, not perhaps very vigorously or continuously, to provide remedies for land alienation, rack-renting and indebtedness, but it approached these as separate problems, without recognizing that they were related, and with little or no appreciation of the fact that they were merely different economic symptoms of a common social problem.

3. Agrarian Conditions

In its essence the native system of land tenure was simple and closely resembled the Indonesian system of land tenure, from which it may possibly derive. The village, or other social unit, was regarded as having the disposal of the land in the neighbourhood. Anyone who was recognized as a member of the community could clear a patch of waste and, as the first to clear it, *dama-u-kya*, was allowed to continue in occupation. Shifting cultivation was usual, but it was only with the consent of the former occupant, express or implicit, that another could enter on land by the right of *thu-win, nga-htwet* ('he comes in, I go out'); customarily, if a man left land unoccupied for twelve years, another might take it up. Where the same man continued in occupation, it passed on to his descendants and became *bo-ba-baing*

[1] *ISC*, XI, 22.

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175 (ancestral property). Possession, however, was never absolute against the community; cultivated land could be taken up for house sites, and
423 house sites for a monastery (*yua-lok*, *ya-hsok*; *kyaung-la*, *yua-sha*—village-make, field-goes; monastery-comes, village-withdraws). In
425 practice *bobabaing* land could be alienated, but alienation was never
241 final; any member of the family could at any time redeem it, but seven generations were usually regarded as the limit of kinship.

175 Under British rule anyone was allowed to take up land as a squatter on condition of paying the revenue; after paying revenue for twelve
425 years it became his private property in the western sense of property. When land grew in value many began to stake out claims to land and
241 pay revenue on it for twelve years without cultivating it. With a view to encouraging cultivation the Government also introduced a system of making small grants of land, up to 50 acres, known as *pattas*, free of revenue for a period of years, supposed to represent the time required for clearing the jungle. Now and then attempts were made to induce capitalists to take up large tracts of waste land on grant or lease, but these attempts met with little success and were soon abandoned. With very few exceptions the land in Burma has been brought under cultivation by squatters, or by men holding a *patta*. The *patta* system proved unworkable. Ordinarily there were several applicants for the same plot of land, and by the time that their claims had been surveyed and adjudicated, someone else was found to be in occupation as a squatter; the *patta* system facilitated the transfer of land to wealthy landowners and moneylenders, and between 1905 and 1910 it was abandoned.

In practice, under either the squatter system or the *patta* system, anyone who could get his name on the revenue records could raise money on the land, even while yet uncleared. Only in very favourable circumstances will new land provide a living for the first year or two, and most of those who cleared it had to borrow money. A man had to stake out a claim over a considerable area, more than he could immediately bring under cultivation, in order to prevent others from settling on land that he would need to employ his cattle profitably. Much of the land was under heavy jungle, or required strong embankments to keep out salt water. The settlers had to borrow money, and usually lost their land to the moneylender by the time they had cleared it. 'The official policy of Government had always been to discourage the growth of a landlord class and to make Burma a country of small landowners. It would appear however that Govern-

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ment has not in the past regarded its declared policy as imposing on it any obligation to action, since very little has been done to make the policy effective.' In practice there was 'free trade in land'.[1] The dangers of land alienation were pressed on the Government of Burma by the Indian Government from the nineties of the last century, but, after desultory consideration at infrequent intervals, a draft Bill to deal with the matter was finally abandoned in 1912, in circumstances leading the Government of India to remark that the opposition to the Bill was 'not based on the interests of the peasant proprietor but of those from whom it is desired to protect him'.[2] Nothing more was attempted until it appeared that the serious rebellion in 1931 was partly due to agrarian distress. The subsequent agricultural depression revealed something of the gravity of the situation. The revenue records for the thirteen chief rice districts of Lower Burma showed that half the land was held by non-agriculturists, and that the chief moneylending caste, the Indian *chettyars*, alone held a quarter of it. In fact, however, there was nothing new in this. The only difference was that the moneylenders, *chettyars* and others, could no longer find anyone to take the land off their hands; for over fifty years most of the land, as it gradually came under cultivation, had been passing backwards and forwards between the moneylenders and a succession of transitory cultivators.

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*Occupancy in Lower Burma**

(acres 000)

(*a*) Total area occupied; (*b*) Area held by (i) Non-agriculturists, (ii) *Chettyars*

	(*a*)	(*b*) (i)	(*b*) (ii)
1930	9249	2943	570
1937	9650	4929	2446

* *CLA*, II, 39.

The history of the tenancy problem is very similar.[3] 'In the early eighties of the last century the Government of India put the Government of Burma on its guard against the growth of a tenant class and advised it to be prepared to impede this growth.' The matter received more attention than land alienation, and a succession of abortive drafts from 1892 led up in 1908 to 'the first Bill of its kind in Burma to be placed before the public. It encountered opposition in the Legislative Council [then representing capitalist interests] and among the public from the landlord class, the *chettyar* community and the European merchants in Rangoon engaged in the rice and piece-goods trade.' The Bill was based on Indian precedents, and

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[1] *RRA*, 1901–2, p. 29; *CLA*, I, 2. [2] *CLA*, II, 44 ff., 50, 52.
[3] *RRA*, 1895–6, p. 5; *CLA*, I, 3, 5, 6.

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displayed a singular ignorance of local conditions in confining protection to tenants with a record of continuous cultivation, whereas in Lower Burma few tenants held the same land for longer than a year, and in the rice plains of the delta even men registered as owners held their land for only two or three years before having to abandon it to the moneylender. But that was not the ground of the violent opposition which it encountered. Free trade in land was profitable to commercial and capitalist interests, and 'the discussions went on intermittently and half-heartedly until 1914' when the project was abandoned. Another draft Bill in 1927 'raised such a storm of protest from landowners that Government decided not to proceed with it'. So the problem of tenancy, like the problem of land alienation, was left as a heritage to the Government established under the new constitution of 1937, when a committee, appointed to examine the matter, found, as had long been apparent in settlement reports, that the rents throughout Lower Burma and in some parts of Upper Burma were too high and that, after subtracting rent, debt charges and costs of cultivation, 'the balance remaining was in many, perhaps even in the majority of cases, insufficient to provide the tenant and his family until the next harvest with a bare subsistence'.[1]

The committee suggested that the unsatisfactory economic condition of the tenant might possibly be attributed to his indebtedness rather than to the level of rents. Yet the problem of debt had long received attention, though only in isolation, apart from other agrarian problems with which it is closely entangled. The opening of the Suez Canal, which revealed the potential value of the Burma rice trade, coincided with the transition from a policy of *laissez-faire* to one of efficiency, and it appeared to Government that the rapid spread of cultivation was hindered by the lack of labour and the lack of capital. As already mentioned, during the early eighties it took action to increase the labour supply by subsidizing immigration. At the same time it began to assist the cultivator with loans under the Land Improvements Loans Act of 1883 and the Agricultural Loans Act of 1884. Originally both these Acts were designed to promote efficiency rather than welfare. For various reasons the former Act has always remained practically inoperative. But the latter proved useful in helping cultivators who could not readily obtain loans from other sources. Although the interest charged by Government was below the market rate, the cultivators

[1] *CLA*, I, 10.

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could not obtain loans without considerable trouble and expense. The village headman was required to stand security and naturally expected a commission, a practice that was regarded as both general and legitimate.[1] The clerks expected a small percentage, and in some districts it was common for the officer disbursing the loans to take from 5 % to as much as 25–30 % of the capital advanced.[2] For these and other reasons the loans, which from 1919 to 1929 averaged about £125,000 annually, did little to relieve indebtedness, though they were often useful to alleviate exceptional distress and were in practice generally confined to such occasions.

175 452 241

The co-operative credit movement, started at the beginning of the present century, was more directly inspired by solicitude for the welfare of the cultivator. As with the discussions regarding land alienation and tenancy, the original suggestion came from India, having been put forward in the report of the Indian Famine Commission of 1901. For some years official returns showed rapid progress, and hopes were entertained that co-operative credit would solve the problem of agricultural debt in Burma. But conditions in Burma were unfavourable to the provision of credit on co-operative principles. Debt was heaviest in the districts with a migratory population, where transitory occupants, living in small scattered hamlets, with no social cohesion, were cultivating large holdings. In such conditions co-operation was impossible, and the movement never made much progress. In Upper Burma, on the other hand, where the villages still enjoyed a common social life, the formation of societies among certain of the villagers for economic ends tended to weaken rather than to strengthen social life among the village community as a whole. The system of co-operative credit requires that the members of a society shall understand, accept and apply the principles on which the system rests. Their education in such principles is necessarily a slow process, and, while the people are slowly learning the principles of sound co-operative credit, they must obtain from other sources such capital as they require. These considerations were disregarded. The education of members in co-operative principles was neglected, and an elaborate and costly departmental superstructure served chiefly to make borrowing easier than before, with little regard to any necessity for borrowing. By 1925 there were some 4000 agricultural societies, lending £1½ million to their members. But in 1929 the Provincial Bank, the apex of the whole movement, was found to be insolvent, and the

[1] *RAB*, 1906–7, p. 34. [2] *CBC*, p. 19.

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position of many societies was unsound. Most of them succumbed to the subsequent depression, and by 1935 only 1387 societies survived; the loans due by cultivators to these societies totalled about £450,000, of which some £400,000 was overdue.[1] As against a total volume of permanent indebtedness amounting to some £40 million, with another £5 to £10 million of seasonal indebtedness,[2] the advances from Government and from co-operative societies were inconsiderable.

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It was necessary that the cultivator should have capital to live on while bringing the jungle under cultivation. If the land was to be reclaimed rapidly, it was necessary that he should borrow large sums. In the interest of the rice trade and of the outside world it was desirable that the plains of Lower Burma should be brought under rice as rapidly as possible. But it was only in the interest of alien money-lenders and business men that he should be encouraged to borrow as much as possible. That, however, is what happened.

Under Burmese rule there was no foreign market for most produce, and, if a cultivator grew more than was sufficient for his household, the surplus might not be worth gathering. He had little money, because a barter economy prevailed; he did not need much money, because he could himself provide for most of his requirements, and there were not many things on which he could spend money. No one need save for his old age, because of the tradition, deeply rooted in Burman social life, that children should support their aged parents. Men did not borrow to gain wealth, and it might even be dangerous to appear too rich. Those who borrowed through poverty were protected by custom against excessive interest and the loss of land; interest could not accrue beyond an amount equal to that borrowed, and land was a family possession that individual members of the family could not alienate. Under British rule the cultivator was encouraged to borrow and to spend money, and deprived of the customary protection against borrowing and spending it unwisely. The principle of economic freedom stimulated cultivation for export. Formerly the cultivator had been content with as much land as he could live upon; now he wanted all that he could work. The money-lender could supply the cultivator with as much money as he needed, but made greater profit by supplying him with all that the security would stand. The substitution of money for barter provided cultivators with cash to spend, and attractive foreign novelties tempted them to spend it. By the end of the century they had less money to

[1] *CLA*, III, 85, 86, 102. [2] *CBE*, p. 53.

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spend, but there were many things on which they had to spend money. Formerly, during the two months' interval between harvest and ploughing, the people obtained from the adjacent jungle the material for repairing their houses and agricultural implements; now, with the spread of cultivation, they had to buy these things. They could no longer earn money in the dry weather by making salt and fishing, but had to buy their salt and fish. Instead of earning money as boatmen they had to pay steamer fares for their necessary journeys. In place of home-made clothes they had to buy foreign cloth. By their own standards the people were still well fed and well clad, and in some ways better fed and better clad. Imported salt was better than local salt; imported cloth, if less durable than local cloth, had a much greater variety of patterns. But those who could not afford to buy these things felt poorer than before; their wants expanded as their income declined. Naturally men borrowed recklessly, and took full advantage of the new facilities for borrowing. Western law fixed no limit to the accumulation of interest, and gradually defined and restricted family property in land, making it freely and finally transferable by the occupant, while the courts supported creditors in treating as sales transactions that in the intention of the borrower were mortgages.

When the extent of agricultural indebtedness came to be realized it was regarded, not without some justification, as a sign of wealth rather than of poverty, or was attributed to 'the characteristic thriftlessness of the Burman', his 'want of foresight and tendency to extravagance and speculation'; he 'squandered his money on unproductive luxuries'.[1] Investigation showed that these charges were largely untrue, 'that thrift and saving were not alien to his character',[2] and that indebtedness was due in great measure to his new environment. In 1880 it was reported that 'as a rule Burmans of all classes invest their savings in gold and silver ornaments'.[3] Now many find it difficult to make both ends meet, but the bolts and bars on the doors and windows of the richer people show that their houses are their banks. Many, all but the really poor, store in their house posts, or bury in the ground, a few rupees to meet emergencies. In a year when much damage had been caused by floods a woman dug up the savings of many years to pay the family poll tax of Rs. 30, and was greatly distressed because the Treasury refused the money as no longer

[1] *RAB*, 1901–2, p. 28; 1908–9, p. 11.
[2] *RAB*, 1909–10, p. 11.
[3] *RAB*, 1880–1, Intr. p. 46.

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current; it consisted wholly of William IV rupees. The savings in these little hoards must be considerable. Until quite recently cultivators used to set aside enough rice to provide for all their needs until the next crop should ripen. In Upper Burma the usual form of tenancy is a system by which the poor man saves up enough money to take land on mortgage from the rich. But the outstanding example of thrift among the cultivators appears in Lower Burma, where the burden of debt is most severe and the people are often regarded as conspicuously thriftless. Practically the whole of the ten million acres now under rice has been reclaimed by men who started life as field labourers, and saved enough money to buy cattle and to clear or buy some land. Out of his wages the cultivator saved up money to obtain land, and then, within two or three years, he lost the land, his cattle and his savings. These facts refute the easy explanation that the burden of debt is due to thriftlessness or any excessive tendency to extravagance and speculation; it has come about through the working of economic forces restrained solely by the rule of law, and was the outcome of a process over which the people could exercise no control. Thus 'the epic of bravery and endurance' relating 'the greatest achievement in the history of Burma', the reclamation by Burmese enterprise of ten million acres of swamp and jungle, ends with a picture of imposing Government offices and business houses in Rangoon, and gilded *chettyar* temples in Tanjore, while in the rice districts, the source of almost all this wealth, nearly half the land is owned by foreigners, and a landless people can show little for their labour but their debts, and, for about half the year, most of them are unable to find work or wages.

4. Social Evolution

X 175 162 563

The large foreign element has long been the most obvious aspect of social life in modern Burma. This has special features due to the incorporation of Burma in the Indian Empire.

'In India the British administration had to employ Indian agency for all posts, major and minor, which were not filled by Europeans. Indian commerce and Indian professions were gradually built up by the people themselves. All that was not European was Indian. . . . But in Burma the people were in no position to compete with the influx of Indians who flooded in to exploit the resources of the country and to take up posts for which no trained Burmans were available.'[1]

[1] 1920, Cmd. 746, p. 60.

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In the administration, commerce and industry, it was less trouble and usually cheaper to recruit Indians than to train Burmans; and Indians, once they had gained a footing, naturally tended to build up an almost insurmountable barrier against the admission of Burmans. In 1872 aliens were 5·50 % of the total population; by the end of the century, although the annexation of Upper Burma had meanwhile brought in a large and almost entirely indigenous accession, the foreign element rose to 6·97 %, and by 1931 to 9·74 %. The table below shows the details at decennial intervals.

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Racial Constitution, 1901–31 *

Year	Total population (000 omitted)	Percentage (a) Foreign (b) Indian		Percentage of Non-Buddhists (a) Large towns (b) Other towns	
		(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
1901	10,491	6·97	5·84	—	—
1911	12,115	8·02	6·15	62·8	22·3
1921	13,212	8·98	6·69	63·5	25·3
1931	14,667	9·74	6·95	62·7	28·1

* Census, 1931, p. 224.

So large a proportion of foreigners differing in creed, custom and language is sufficiently indigestible; but the gravity of the situation lay in the fact that the foreign element was concentrated mainly in the towns, and controlled almost the entire commercial and industrial sides of economic life. Unfortunately figures for the urban population by race are not available until 1931, but the foreign element may be roughly equated with the non-Buddhist element, although it is really larger, because many Chinese return themselves as Buddhists. Accepting this assumption, however, it appears that from the beginning of the century about two-thirds of the population of the six large industrial towns have been foreigners. Taking the urban population as a whole, the foreign element has been steadily increasing and, as shown on p. 118, at the latest census in 1931 it exceeded 40 %.

In 1872, although in the ports, and especially the older ports, Moulmein and Akyab, the population was largely Indian, numerous urban occupations were still open to Burmans, and they were employed even in the heaviest labour. In Rangoon the ships were still

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Racial Constitution, Urban and Rural, 1931*

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Race	Racial population (a) Large towns (b) Other towns		Racial percentage in			
			Large towns	Other towns	All towns	Rural areas
	(a)	(b)				
Indigenous	210,796	679,170	36·0	72·7	58·5	93·9
Indian	290,124	173,090	49·6	18·5	30·5	4·2
Chinese	39,262	32,871	6·7	3·5	4·7	0·9
Indo-Burmese	24,497	39,708	4·2	4·2	4·2	0·9
Others	20,555	9,964	3·5	1·1	2·0	—

* Census, 1931, p. 50.

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handled by Burmese labour, and 'there was no port in the world where timber was stored as well as it was in Moulmein, and they were all Burmese workers'.[1] All this was changed by the rapid influx of cheap Indian labour, encouraged by a Government subsidy, and the Administration Report for 1884–5 shows that by then the social economy of Burma was beginning to acquire its modern features:

> 'A large number of natives of India are permanently settled in the seaports and large villages, and they have driven the more apathetic Burman out of the more profitable fields of employment. The moneylending business of the country is in the hands of the Madrassi banking caste of Chetties; the retail piece-goods trade is chiefly in the hands of Suratis, natives of India, and Chinamen; the retail liquor trade is almost exclusively in the hands of Chinamen. The natives of India have also driven the Burman out of the field where hard manual labour is required; the coolies employed by the Public Works Department are almost exclusively Indian, the gharry drivers everywhere are chiefly Madrassis, the coolies on the wharves and at the railway stations are also natives of India, and natives of India are here and there settling down to permanent rice cultivation.'[2]

The whole trend of development illustrated the economic process of natural selection by the survival of the cheapest, justified in contemporary thought, and especially in the eyes of those who paid for labour, as the survival of the fittest.

The working of this process in rural areas has already been depicted. In the towns it can perhaps best be illustrated from the history of coolie labour in the rice trade. Old reports tell of the clatter of thousands of Burman rice-mills all along the river-side at Rangoon. In 1861 the first steam-mill was erected, but machinery was not yet cheaper than men, and no more were put up until 1867. In that year

[1] *RCLI*, x, 163.

[2] *RAB*, 1884–5, p. 64.

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there were three mills, but by 1872 the number had risen to twenty-six. The mills employed Indian coolies, and overcrowding among them was already attracting notice. The danger to the health of the whole country arising out of such conditions was frequently admitted, but they continued to deteriorate as the supply of cheap labour grew with the demand. The influx rose by 1918 to 300,000 coolies a year and made Rangoon second only to New York as a port for immigration;[1] but they spread disease, raised the death-rate, and, by driving Burmans out of the towns, deprived them of contact with the stimulating influence of modern industry.

If Burmans could no longer get a footing on even the lowest rung of the industrial ladder, still less could they aspire to enter the higher ranks of industry and commerce. In finance Indians had long done business with European banks; and naturally came to function as middlemen between them and the people. In commerce Indians had learned to deal with European merchants before ever the British came to Burma. Importers did not speak Burmese; Burmans did not understand European methods of business; they could obtain credit or capital only on ruinous terms; and they had at the same time to compete against the lower standard of living of the Indian. When local cloth was driven off the market by the flood of imported cloth, the retail trade in clothing passed largely into Indian hands. With the growth of an import trade in dried and salted fish from Singapore and Indo-China as a result of the tax on local salt, this trade, for similar reasons, became largely a Chinese monopoly. The same thing happened throughout the whole sphere of economic life. All the large European firms had previous connections with India or China, and naturally found it cheaper and less trouble to import Indian or Chinese employees than to learn Burmese and train Burmans in western methods of business. The most comfortable explanation was Burman apathy and incompetence; yet in goods which were both produced and consumed in Burma, the trade, wholesale and retail, still remained in Burman hands. The exclusion of the Burman from modern economic life was not deliberate, was indeed frequently deplored; it just happened.

It happened likewise in the professions which, outside the European or westernized community, were branches of the administration. In the early hospitals, as already remarked, 'everything was done to diminish expense', and they were staffed from India, even down to the menial staff. Larger funds allowed more liberal expenditure on buildings,

[1] Harvey, *CHI*, VI, 446.

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and a new hospital in Rangoon in 1910 was proudly claimed as 'one of the most imposing buildings in the East'.[1] But the new buildings were still staffed with Indian hospital assistants, Eurasian nurses and Indian menials, and were little patronized by Burmans, except those brought in as police cases or involuntarily detained as suspected of infectious disease. Burmans and Europeans had different ideas of welfare in respect of medical assistance. Up to the end of the century and later there were still no facilities in Burma for training the people in western medicine. A few scholarships to medical schools in India, though nominally open to all in Burma, mostly went to Anglo-Indians and Indians, who would find themselves at home in India.[2] Some of the Indian doctors were excellent men, whose wards were always overcrowded, but many were content to draw their pay, and such fees as they could pocket from false evidence in cases of assault.[3] There were not even sufficient Indian doctors, as these did not wish to serve in Burma, and the establishment was always below strength. Among the Burman population less than ½% attended hospital, and in 1908, as in 1868, their reluctance was attributed 'to the fact that so large a proportion of the subordinate medical staff are not natives of the Province'.[4] The provision of a Medical School in 1907 was intended to promote the recruitment of Burmans. But it was easier to open a school than to change the conditions of service. The hospitals still remained Indian institutions. It was almost impossible for a Burman to get a training even as a compounder; and still more difficult for a Burman compounder or ward-servant to find employment in a hospital where, by long tradition, the whole staff and atmosphere were Indian. Naturally in such conditions the recruitment of Burmans to the medical profession was a slow process, and the spread of western medical science among the people even slower. Meanwhile the native tradition of medicine was declining, and the traditional drugs formerly gathered and compounded by the practitioner were being ousted by the free competition of adulterated or imported substitutes such as cheap quinine tabloids with coatings that defied the strongest gastric juices, and 'white oil' kerosene to adulterate the vegetable or animal oil of the local dietary.[5]

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The outbreak of plague in 1905 raised a new problem. But it was solved on the old lines. Gangs of Indian coolies were employed to

[1] *RAB*, 1910–11, p. xii.
[2] *CBC*, p. 31.
[3] *RTC*, 1910–11, p. 10; 1911–12, p. 9.
[4] *RAB*, 1901–2, p. 95.
[5] *RAB*, 1868–9, p. 117; 1907–8, p. xiii.

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clean out the houses of the Burmese, causing no little discontent and, incidentally, tending to spread rather than suppress the disease. These worked under a staff of Indian sanitary inspectors and, when a Sanitary Commissioner was appointed in 1908, his usefulness was limited by his ignorance of the country and the people. Experience suggested that 'properly trained Burmese Inspectors would be a valuable asset to the Province' but 'shortage of funds' made this impossible.[1] In matters of public health as of medicine, policy was conditioned by economic factors, though the experience of nearly a hundred years had demonstrated that this was false economy.

Burmans had to face the same obstacle in the other professions. King Mindon had trained telegraphists and adapted the Morse code to Burmese.[2] But the postal and telegraph departments in British Burma were managed from India, and it was cheaper and less trouble to employ Indians than to teach Burmans, so that the telegraph department became, and even after the annexation of Upper Burma remained, an Indian preserve. So likewise did the telephone system, and up to 1930 or later one could not use the telephone in Burma without a knowledge of Hindustani. The postal department also was staffed by Indians, though sometimes the Indian postmen had to get Burmese villagers to read the addresses on the letters. All branches of engineering remained Indian for the same reason. Burmans and Karens could build schools and churches for missionaries and fine houses for wealthy cultivators. Engineers admired the skill and resource with which in 1871 Burmans raised to the top of the Shwe Dagon pagoda, a height of over 300 feet, a massive finial weighing 1¼ tons, 47 feet high with a diameter at the base of 13½ feet.[3] This was achieved successfully and at little cost; all were only too anxious to lend a hand or supply the workmen with provisions. But that was not the way of conducting public works under a foreign government, believing in individual profit and apprehensive of religious zeal, and it was cheaper and less trouble to employ Indians. With the rapid growth of cultivation after the opening of the Suez Canal, some interest began to be displayed in the introduction of labour-saving machinery, until Indian immigration relieved the shortage and there was no more need to save labour.[4] On the construction of the first railway, arrangements were made to train apprentices in the railway workshops, and for a time

[1] *RAB*, 1905–6, p. 26; 1909–10, pp. 104, 107; 1910–11, p. xvi.
[2] *RAB*, 1868–9, p. 121. [3] *BBG*, II, 637.
[4] *RAB*, 1880–1, Intr. p. 51; 1885–6, p. 26.

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lads were sent with scholarships to India but, as with the medical scholarships and for similar reasons, few Burmans took advantage of them.[1] In 1895 an engineering school was opened to train men for subordinate positions in the Public Works Department, but here again most of the students were Anglo-Indians or Indians.[2] In all branches of the public works, on the railway and on the river steamers, Indians had a monopoly of employment; the Burman could not get a job unless he took to wearing trousers and passed himself off as a Eurasian. In all these various activities there was no demand for Burmans, but Indian lads came over from India to study in the technical schools of Burma. Only when the School of Engineering was closed to non-domiciled Indians, coming from India to attend it, did the number of Burman students rise from six to twenty-two;[3] this enabled about 2 per million of the Burman population to obtain sufficient technical instruction for subordinate appointments in the Government services. Outside Government service, even fifty years after the opening of the Suez Canal had brought Burma into economic contact with the West, there was still no opening for Burmans as technicians, though European and Anglo-Indian apprentices, for whom stipends were provided by Government, were taken in the workshops of the Burma Railways, the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company, the Dockyards, Tramways and other important corporations and private firms connected with technical work.[4] It was not the policy of Government to exclude Burmans from these various careers; on the contrary it wished to help them, but this remained no more than a pious aspiration, because the Government, like the Burman, was the victim of circumstances.

There is one striking exception to this monopoly of urban occupations by non-Burmans. Thanks to the monastic schools almost every Burman learned to read and write. When the British introduced printing, it was less trouble to teach Burmans how to set up type than to teach Indians the Burmese alphabet; hence Burmans secured, and managed to retain, a position in the printing trade though in the Government press they were ousted subsequently by cheaper Indians. Thus, apart from employment under Government in general administration, Burmans had to look to agriculture for a living. Europeans directed or controlled all large-scale enterprise; Indians or Chinese manned the urban occupations and acted as middlemen

[1] *RAB*, 1880–1, Intr. p. 33; p. 130; 1892–3, p. 124.
[2] *RAB*, 1901–2, p. 94.
[3] *RAB*, 1913–14, p. 86.
[4] *RAB*, 1915–16, p. 106.

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between the Europeans and the Burman cultivator. There was a racial division of labour. All the various peoples met in the economic sphere, the market place; but they lived apart and continually tended to fall apart unless held together by the British Government.

5. Education

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For the backwardness of Burmans in non-agricultural activities education was commonly regarded as the remedy. In this as in other matters, policy in Burma was directed from India, and to understand the course of educational progress in Burma one must have some acquaintance with the Indian background. The encouragement of education by the State dated from long before the emergence of the idea that the State should actively promote welfare; it had the sanction of Adam Smith and derived its inspiration from sentiments, liberal, humanitarian and Christian, transcending the material plane. In 1793, when Wilberforce opened his campaign for modernizing education in India, it was the conversion of the people that he had in mind. Again, in 1836 Macaulay firmly believed that if his plan of education were adopted there would not be a single idolater among the respectable classes in the next generation. One argument for the annexation of Pegu was that it would have 'a blessed effect by spreading civilization and the Gospel'.[1] The education of the general public was expected to remove superstitious prejudices and to attach them more closely to British rule. Accordingly from the first conception of a policy of systematic education in 1854, the leading item was the spread of primary instruction among the masses of the people.

But education had a more practical side. It furnished Government with cheap subordinates and the people with well-paid jobs. Government wanted schools to train clerks, and the people wanted schools to obtain clerkships. There was an economic demand for schools. The demand became more urgent when the Suez Canal gave a new stimulus to commerce, and consequently to administrative expansion. Educational progress was dominated by the economic laws of demand and supply. This tendency was accentuated when, in accordance with liberal doctrine, the Indian Education Commission of 1882 recommended that education should be left so far as possible to private

[1] Durand, II, 185.

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enterprise. The principle of spreading primary vernacular instruction among the masses was still put forward as the chief aim of policy, but in practice the system provided secondary anglo-vernacular instruction for the middle classes. When there was a surplus of lads from the fourth standard, they would try to secure a job by working up to the seventh standard; when that was no longer sufficient qualification they went on to matriculation, and then a few years later to a university degree, either locally or, if they could afford it, in England. Thus in India, by the end of the century, merely under the pressure of economic forces, at every stage there was a growing surplus of university and school graduates, who were a focus of discontent and disaffection. The educational system did not foster attachment to British rule or conversion to Christianity, but a reaction against western civilization and the British Government. It was generally said that the system of instruction was 'too literary in character' and had 'stimulated tendencies unfavourable to discipline', while the ignorant superstition of the masses was 'a source of administrative difficulty and political danger'. Lord Curzon accordingly formulated a new policy.[1] Government was to be more active in providing educational facilities; the encouragement of elementary vernacular instruction was to be a primary obligation and a leading charge on provincial revenues; technical instruction was to be promoted, especially in agriculture; female education was to receive special attention, and discipline was to be strengthened by 'moral text-books and primers of personal ethics' and by a stricter departmental supervision over schools and pupils.

As already explained, up to close on 1870 little progress had been made in Burma in education along western lines. The demand for educated men was very limited, and was met chiefly by the monastic schools. Under early British rule, as formerly under Burmese rule, these gave the brighter lads a chance to rise in the world. But their primary object was to teach the boys how to live and not merely how to make a living, so that there was no possibility of the over-production of school graduates, and the more who went to school the better. Then, during the sixties, when the Government of India was concerned to promote education, Sir Arthur Phayre was directed to submit a plan of public instruction for Burma. In 1866 he introduced a system based on the monastic school. The moral discipline of the monastic training had always been highly esteemed and he hoped

[1] *RPI* (India), 1897–1902, App., pp. 457ff.

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that by the exercise of 'very great tact, judgment and discretion' the technique of monastic teaching might be improved and the curriculum extended. As Director of Public Instruction he selected a man with thirty years' experience as a schoolmaster in Burma. Unfortunately ill health compelled the Director to retire within a few months, and his place was taken by an educational expert from Bengal, who knew nothing of Burma. Phayre's plan languished, and in 1868 there was a proposal to abandon it and substitute the establishment of village lay schools. By 1871 only 46 monastic schools had adopted the plan. A new Chief Commissioner, just appointed from India, considered this unsatisfactory and started lay schools. Had he known more of Burma he might have had more patience, and even a little more patience might have justified Phayre's hopes, for by 1873 the number of recognized monastic schools had risen to 801 as against 112 lay schools.[1]

By this time the effect of the Suez Canal was beginning to be felt. Trade was growing rapidly; the policy of Government was turning in the direction of efficiency; and there was an increasing demand for English-speaking clerks, and for opportunities to learn English. 'As an agency for moral training', it was said, 'the value of the monastic schools is incalculable, viewed as an agency for secular education their value seems to have been over-rated...much more is to be expected from lay schools.'[2] It was believed also that the monastic schools, instead of improving, had been deteriorating. A proposal to encourage the teaching of English in the monastic schools was vetoed on the ground that the boys would not acquire a correct accent,[3] and the attention of the Education Department came to be concentrated on anglo-vernacular schools. For the most part these were conducted by missionaries of various denominations, chiefly American Baptists and French Roman Catholics; officials of the Education Department inspected the schools, conducted public examinations, and awarded grants. When the standard of instruction was sufficiently advanced, the schools were affiliated to Calcutta University, but by 1880 only nine Burmans had been able to matriculate.[4] One reason for the slow progress was that few Burmans or Karens could teach English, mathematics or history, 'The masters of the middle and higher schools', it was said, 'are chiefly Englishmen or Natives of India, who can not make Burmese the vehicle of

[1] *BBG*, I, 529; *CVV*, pp. 130, 132, 136.
[2] *RAB*, 1877–8, p. 80.
[3] *RPI*, 1928–9, p. 11.
[4] *RAB*, 1880–1, Intr. p. 36.

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instruction; and so the boys do not really grasp what they are taught'. Up to 1918 Burma had produced only 400 graduates, including many non-Burmans.[1] But until 1900 or later the seventh standard was a sufficient qualification for well-paid employment.

Thus, when Lord Curzon formulated a new educational policy, conditions in Burma were very different from those in India. The proportion of literate males was three times and of literate females five times the corresponding proportion in the most advanced province in India; there was as yet no local university; the output from western schools was still inadequate to the demand; industrial development had not yet begun; and Burma was considered to 'stand high in respect of discipline and moral training'. In Burma the new educational programme could be drawn up on a blank sheet. Yet in Burma, under the new policy, educational progress followed much the same course as formerly in India under the old policy. Under economic pressure contrary policies gave identical results. Let us then trace briefly the course of development in respect of secondary and vocational instruction, of female education and of cultural and moral values.

One principle of the new policy was that the Government 'should devote proportionally more money to primary instruction and less to secondary instruction'. But economic progress during the present century multiplied the demand for clerks, and, with the supply outpacing the demand, secondary schools were multiplied and standards rose until, in 1920, it was deemed expedient to constitute a university in Rangoon. All this entailed a much greater proportional expenditure on the higher standards. Meanwhile two-thirds to three-quarters of the villages still had no provision for learning except in the monastic school, if any; and the monastic schools were no more closely in touch with the modern world, and were losing their hold on the people, because the wealthier and brighter lads were forsaking them for schools which paved a quicker way to better jobs.

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Economic factors also dominated professional and vocational instruction. The medical school, opened in 1907, provided for the training of medical subordinates, and the closure of the engineering school to non-domiciled students in 1913 encouraged Burmans to train for subordinate appointments in the Public Works Department, but up to the end of executive rule in 1923 men still had to go to India to become a doctor or an engineer,[2] and for neither was there an effective

[1] *RAB*, 1880–1, Intr. p. 36; Harvey, *CHI*, VI, 445–7. [2] *RAB*, 1921–2, p. 154.

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demand. Long experience of western medicine as practised by Indian medical subordinates failed to wean Burmans from their own medical system and practitioners, and few could afford the fees that a modern doctor with a long and costly training had to charge. Europeans preferred European doctors, and there was no opening for a Burman doctor except in government service, where the conditions and standards of pay had been adapted to Indian requirements. There was no demand for Burman doctors trained on western lines. Similarly there was little demand for Burman engineers. European firms preferred European engineers for the higher posts, and were accustomed to Indian subordinates, who were also cheaper than Burmans. In village life there was no scope for men trained in western engineering science. The steam engine came to Burma with Indians trained to use it; only later, with the advent of the petrol engine, was there any demand for Burman mechanics. The promotion of technical instruction in agriculture was a matter on which Curzon laid great emphasis, and he commented on the absence of an agricultural school in Burma. But, although the influx of Indian labour revolutionized agricultural organization in the delta, agricultural technique remained unchanged, and there was no demand for technical skill beyond that common to all cultivators in their inherited tradition. Thus in 1923, as when Curzon formulated the new policy, there was still no school of agriculture.

The legal profession furnished a striking contrast. In the law there was no need, as in medicine and engineering, to encourage students. There was a demand for lawyers. Doctors and engineers could not find employment except in Government service or in the western sphere of social life. Burmans, Indians, Chinese and Europeans all wanted their own doctors; but all had to employ lawyers trained in western law; the Government had only to regulate by examination the right to appear before the courts. With the spread of Indian moneylenders and of modern business methods, the practice of settling disputes by arbitration declined. Even in 1875 an experimental law class failed to attract students, and a decade later litigation among Burmans was still infrequent. But the abolition of the circle headmen, and the encroachment of the courts on custom, gave a further blow to arbitration. Burmans increasingly resorted to the courts; there was a demand for lawyers and the demand created a supply. At first, as in other lines, the lawyers were Indians. But men who struggled through the schools and failed to find employment, had no resource except the law. Burman lawyers multiplied rapidly in competition with

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the ever-growing number of Indian lawyers, and the excess of the supply over the demand encouraged litigation and a decline of ethical standards.[1] The gloomy prognostication of the Commissioner of Tenasserim in 1840 was fulfilled, and 'the system has helped to create a class of denationalized native lawyer who shows little skill save in raising obstructions and procuring perjury'.[2]

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There was, however, a notable advance in the number of girls attending school. Under Burmese rule there was an old tradition of female education. In Ava in 1826 Trant reports that women 'for the most part know how to read and write' and 'entered with the greatest warmth into the news and politics of the day'. The first census report of 1872 states, with very considerable exaggeration, that female education 'was a fact in Burma before Oxford was founded'. In practice however, literacy among women was exceptional, though, according to the same report, 10 % of the female convicts could read and write.[3] It was a defect of the Burmese system of education that it made no provision for the girls; parents welcomed the opportunities given by the lay schools, and the new facilities were valued as helping the women in their business as petty traders in the bazaars. The advocates of female education stressed its cultural value in domestic life, but an acquaintance with the rudiments of arithmetic made little difference in the home, and the progress of female education in contrast with the stagnation of vocational instruction is significant chiefly of the difference in their market value.

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In his review of education Curzon remarked that in India it had a commercial rather than a cultural value. With no openings for doctors and engineers there was no incentive to study the elements of natural science, or to acquire the mental discipline on which the modern world is based. Natural science was not taught in any of the schools and, though the few who struggled on to the university standard could take chemistry and, from 1915, physics, there was no provision for the teaching of biology. The chief attraction of the science course was that it was reputed less difficult than the arts course. What the students wanted was a job, and for this science and art degrees were of equal value. Similarly there were no openings in which they could turn to account a knowledge of economics, and no provision was made for them to study the economic aspect of

[1] *RAB*, 1877–8, p. 83; 1880–1, p. 130; 1887, Cmd. 4962, p. 119.
[2] Harvey, *CHI*, VI, 443.
[3] Census, 1872, p. 25; Trant, pp. 209, 259.

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the modern world. Arts graduates from the university colleges had a competent knowledge of English, but on leaving the university they had nothing to read; even in Rangoon there were no bookshops. There was no museum, no art gallery, no theatre or concert hall, nothing to represent the cultural aspect of the modern West.

Meanwhile Burman culture was decaying. It is true that successive census reports indicate an advance in literacy. Formerly almost all the boys learned to read and write, but few had occasion to practise what they learned and many forgot what they had been taught in school. Under British rule the introduction of printing and other developments, that will call for notice later, helped them to remember their alphabet, but although they did not so readily forget how to read and write their language, foreign rule narrowed the range of intellectual interest which it provided. Under their own kings they knew little of the outer world but within their native medieval world the language was co-extensive with their national life. After the conquest English became the medium of discussion for all the higher social activities, and Burmese degenerated into a language for the cultivator and the home. In a wider world the people led a narrower life. This process was aggravated by the decline of the monastic school and was reflected not only, as already noticed, in the deterioration of native medicine but in all the native arts. In these matters no British governor could replace a Burmese king. No one could expect him to patronize Burmese medical practitioners or to be a connoisseur of Burmese art. The Government did what it could to stay the decline of native arts and crafts. From the eighties onwards art was 'sedulously fostered'. One artist was 'said to be the best. He finishes work fairly to time, keeps regular accounts, completes his orders in rotation, and has apprenticed pupils.'[1] Yet art continued to languish. One reason was the wide difference between Burmese and European standards of artistic values. Still more potent was 'the severe competition of cheap jewellery and fancy articles of European or cognate make', and attempts 'to stem the competition by combining art and utility in the articles produced'[2] only too often produced articles that were neither beautiful nor useful. In fostering cultural values the new educational policy was no more successful than the old, and economic values still remained supreme.

Yet the most conspicuous failure of the new policy was probably in its attempt to improve moral standards. Curzon had thought to

[1] *RAB*, 1885–6, p. 32. [2] *RAB*, 1911–12, p. 91.

[Under British rule, 1870-1923—Analyst]

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effect this by closer supervision over the schools and by extending Government enterprise in education. In Burma, 'under private enterprise, education had not spread to the extent necessary for the needs of the Province'.[1] There was a reaction against '*laissez-faire* principles which preferred to leave the guidance and practical management of education to private bodies and persons, more or less irresponsible and with very varying views on the needs of the educated and the ends of education',[2] and Government schools were expected to educate more children more efficiently. But the Government could not provide enough schools without the contributions of the faithful in America and elsewhere. More than twenty years later, among 6000 institutions providing general instruction there were only 79 Government schools, and of these 47 were anglo-vernacular schools.[3]

Official and non-official schools alike were expected to inculcate morality and discipline by moral text-books and primers of personal ethics, but all had in common one feature which vitiated moral teaching. Many lads passed from one school to another. As small boys in the monastery they would be taught the vanity of desire; then in a Roman school they would be exhorted to abhor the heresies of Wycliff and Huss; if they went on to a Protestant school they would start the day with a prayer for success in the next examination; and they would probably seek a final polish in a Government school where success in the examination was the only thing that mattered. That was the one thing that all schools, other than the monastery, had in common. Few parents cared for anything except success in the examinations. 'Moral text-books and primers of personal ethics' had no examination value, and stricter discipline and closer supervision over the schools were of no avail in an environment where the sole end of education was to get a job. Discipline, praised as satisfactory in 1900, deteriorated so rapidly that in 1915 there was a strike in the chief Government school, and in 1920 the foundation of Rangoon University was the occasion for a general school strike. It was followed by many similar incidents and for some years the morals of the schoolboys were continually under discussion.[4] And the Director of Education noted regretfully that districts with the best record for education had the worst record for crime.[5]

[1] *RAB*, 1901–2, p. 93; *RPI*, 1897–1902, Intr. p. 4.
[2] *CVV*, p. 133.
[3] *RPI*, 1928–9, App. I, p. v.
[4] *RAB*, 1915–16, p. 103; *RPI*, 1927–32, p. 37.
[5] *RPI*, 1927–32, p. 36.

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6. Litigation and Crime

Litigation. The growth of crime was one aspect of a general growth of litigation. The significance of this cannot be appreciated without an understanding of the difference between British and Burmese ideas on legal procedure and law.

We have noticed that Mr Maingy was quite unable to make sense of Burmese legal procedure. Even an observer so sympathetic and competent as Burney commented on the absurdity of going to law to reach a compromise.[1] The ten judges in the Court of Mergui, whether hearing cases individually or as a bench, did not try to arrive at strict legal decisions on proved facts but to settle disputes. They were arbitrators rather than judges. That continued to be the Burmese system. In 1878 the British representative on the Mixed Court at Mandalay noted that 'in deciding civil suits the principal aim of the judges was, if possible, to satisfy both parties, the usual result being in almost all cases a compromise'. It was still the practice for judges to hear causes through a deputy, and no decision was regarded as final unless both parties signified their acceptance of it by the ceremony of 'eating tea together'.[2] This difference of principle between Burmese and western legal procedure seems to have been overlooked in British Burma until, about 1880, Jardine, as Judicial Commissioner, made a close study of Burmese law. He then suggested that 'the Native system of settling disputes was not by a decree of original jurisdiction, which a Court could enforce irrespective of the will of the parties, but by conciliators, whose duty, expressly stated in cases of matrimony, was to soothe and advise the parties to make a compromise agreeable to both'.[3] In early days of British rule matrimonial disputes, in which the parties obtained a divorce and then shortly afterwards came together again, were a nuisance to British judges until they drove them from the judgment seat by punishing both man and wife. Jardine stated his view more explicitly in a judgment. 'I am convinced that in the Burmese family system the reasonable is to precede the legal, not under the system of the English courts by undeviating arithmetical rules and compulsory decrees, but by contracts and compromises obtained by argument, expostulation among themselves, all parties appealing more or less to what is right (i.e. the *dhammathats*) and more or less allowing

[1] Dessai, p. 103 n.
[2] Jardine, Note iv, p. 4.
[3] Jardine, Note ii, Circular, p. 15.

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themselves to be governed by these considerations.'[1] But this procedure was quite inconsistent with a system based on the rule of law, and upholding the sanctity of contract in the interest of economic freedom. In British courts the judges, whether British or Burman, applied western principles of law, and preferred what was legal, or what the judge regarded as legal, over what Burmans regarded as reasonable.

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British and Burmans differed not only in their systems of legal procedure but also in their conception of law. Burmese law was founded on 'the *Dhammathat*, a Pali version of the Hindoo laws of Menu, and the *Yazathat*, a collection of precedents and of rules and regulations established by different Kings of Ava'.[2] Burmans drew their idea of law from the *dhamma*, the Moral Law. To the Buddhist this is not a divine law, a law of God, a commandment; it lacks the element of 'command' which Austin took to be an essential element of law, and Burmans regard law rather as a statement of cause and effect, like the laws of nature. Every act or omission entails certain consequences in this world or the next. Some consequences are beyond the jurisdiction of the courts, but they fall within the subject-matter of their law books; thus anyone guilty of striking a monk is liable to a fine of Rs. 100 and to innumerable existences in various stages of hell. The function of the judge was subordinate to that of the jurist whose aim was to discover the law, much as a scientist aims at discovering natural law. The men who wrote the *dhammathats* were mostly clerics wishing to advance religion, jurists looking for promotion, scholars demonstrating their erudition or ingenuity, or men of letters showing their skill in prose or verse; of the better-known *dhammathats* about one-third are in verse.[3] The extant *yazathats* purport mainly to record the decision of wise men on knotty points, and in fact are largely folklore of Indian Buddhist origin.

[1] *Ru.SJ*, p. 197. The Burmese idea of law still apparently persists in Japan. 'There is not in the Japanese mind that clear-cut distinction between, say, justice and injustice, pure and impure, legal and illegal, that there is in the Anglo-Saxon.... For example, take a law case. There is a law suit about a sum of 10,000 yen. This has been borrowed on terms, and has not been returned to the lender according to the agreement. There is no dispute about the terms. All that is clear and agreed. The leader seeks the authority of the court to compel the borrower to keep the letter of the agreement. There is no need to ask what a British court would decide; the agreement, the whole of the agreement and all its implications would be implemented. Not so in Japan. Judgment would probably (I have known such cases) take the form—9000 yen to the lender, 1000 to the borrower.' Rt Rev. Bishop Heaslett, *Spectator*, 13 April 1945.

[2] *SL*, p. 105.

[3] Furnivall, *JBRS*, Aug. 1940, p. 351.

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British judges were puzzled by the apparent disregard of Burmans for their own law, and thought at first that they treated the *dhammathats* with little veneration. This idea was quite mistaken. Both in Lower and Upper Burma, elders called in to arbitrate professed to be following the *dhammathats*, while giving decisions that ran counter to them.[1] The British judge on the Mixed Court remarked that the Burmese judges 'used the Laws of Menu to some extent as a Civil Code'. In the official digest of Burmese-Buddhist law, published for the British Government in 1893–6, the compiler, a judge of the former Burmese High Court, defines a *dhammathat* as 'a collection of rules, which are in accordance with custom and usage and which are referred to in the settlement of disputes';[2] they had no claim to authority except as representing the views of learned men. They were venerated, as the Bible was venerated by the British, but they were applied only so far as the judges thought expedient. As was remarked by a judge of the Chief Court, who had long previous experience as an administrative official, 'The law to which Burmans were subject was not the law of the *dhammathats*, but the customary law to which the *dhammathats* were a very important but not the only guide.'[3] To the Burman a code of law furnished 'rules of conduct'; to the British judge the law was a command.[4] Under British rule the *dhammathats* came to be treated like western codes of law and, so far as possible, were literally interpreted and strictly enforced.

Of necessity the new idea of law changed the law. But the change was gradual, as for many years the *dhammathats* were neglected in the British courts; until 1847 none had been translated. By that time the tradition of disregarding them had been established, and the first Civil Code, compiled by Major Sparks in 1860, was based on current practice, including only a few phrases from the *dhammathats* that had become proverbial as expressing general custom. With the appointment of a Judicial Commissioner in 1872 legal administration began to pass into the hands of professional lawyers, who tended to give the *dhammathats* an authority and rigidity which they had never possessed under Burmese rule, and tried to interpret and apply them strictly like statutory law. For example, the general Burmese custom on the inheritance of an estate is for all the children to obtain an equal share; but the *dhammathats* can be held to support the view that the first-born child should be regarded as an *orasa* child entitled to a larger

[1] *Ru.* 2 *UB*, p. 102; *Ru.* 5 *LB*, p. 8.
[2] *Digest*, p. 2.
[3] *Ru.* 3 *LB*, p. 187.
[4] *Ru.SJ*, p. 197.

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x175 share. In Sparks' Code all the children shared alike, and the right of the eldest to special treatment was wholly ignored. Not until 1882 671 does the term *orasa* appear in a judgment. Jardine then remarked that, according to the *dhammathats*, the eldest son or *orasa* held a 428 superior position,[1] but in his Note on the subject in the following year he states that, although Burmans who know the *dhammathats* say that under their codes the eldest son has special rights, these are seldom exacted.[2] No claim to such special rights was put forward until 1899, when it was asserted by a man who knew something of the British interpretation of Burmese law.[3] Now, anyone who can make good his position as *orasa* can obtain a special share through the courts, but among the people in general the old custom of equal division still survives.

x175 Thus, even where professing to apply Burmese law, the courts have substituted the *dhammathats* for Burmese custom; they apply them 671 as rules of law instead of as principles of conduct; and they try to lay down the law instead of aiming at a reasonable compromise. But they have gone beyond this, by disregarding both Burmese law and custom, and substituting western law. Burmans regarded land as a family [423] possession over which all members of the family had rights; no one could alienate it without the consent, express or tacit, of all parties interested. The British courts defined and restricted family rights, and made land subject to the western law of property. Under Burmese rule the outright sale of land was unknown; if a man 'sold' his land, it was always understood that he or any member of the family might at any time redeem it. The British courts came to treat such conditional sales as final. According to Burmese custom the interest on a [426] debt could not accumulate beyond the sum originally borrowed, but the British courts recognized no limit. The Burmese held that all who had taken part in cultivation were entitled to a first claim upon the produce, but this was disregarded in the British courts. In all these matters Burmese custom, in the interest of social welfare, formed a barrier to economic progress. Moneylenders would not grant loans on land if the title was uncertain, or if they could not sell it to realize their claims, or if they could not recover more than the original loan as interest, or if labourers had a prior claim upon the produce. Economic progress took precedence of social welfare; western ideas of individual property in land were substituted for the Burmese custom of family possession; transactions which the Burman regarded

[1] *Ru.SJ*, p. 115. [2] Jardine, Note iv, p. 22. [3] *Ru.PJ*, p. 585.

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as a mortgage were construed as sales; debts were allowed to accumulate; and labourers lost their security of payment for their labour. But all these changes were implicit in the introduction of the rule of law, and this was necessary for the conduct of business on modern lines.

Although the courts were supposed to apply western law on western lines, most courts of original jurisdiction, from almost the beginning of British rule, have been presided over by Burman officers. Up to 1870 and later few were acquainted either with English or the law. For the more efficient administration of justice they were then required to pass examinations in law. This gave an advantage to candidates who 'had received some smattering of education in a government or mission school to the exclusion of the old class of hereditary and highly influential men'; but even ten years later some courts still had no copies of the Acts which the judges were expected to administer. As they 'did not understand what they learned and had little or no power of applying it',[1] these changes tended to produce uncertainty rather than efficiency; though in practice they probably had little effect in either direction and, in the courts, as in native custom, the reasonable continued to have preference over the legal.

That was well enough so long as the courts were dealing merely with Burmans. But from about 1880 Indian moneylenders, attracted into the interior by the profits of paddy cultivation, looked to the courts for the enforcement of their contracts, and judges had to pay more attention to law, and to the view that would be taken on appeal. At the same time the constitution of a provisional Chief Court of three judges in 1881, 'to the great satisfaction of the mercantile community',[2] marked a step in the direction of efficiency, carried still further by the constitution of a formal Chief Court in 1900 and the creation of a separate judicial service in 1905–6. But the judicial system became more and more the apparatus of a foreign government. In the great majority of courts in Burma the law was administered by Burmese judges and magistrates, but on the bench they were living in a different world from that in which they lived at home. It was no longer true that the judges could not apply the law, but, as the law had no roots in the community, they applied it literally, mechanically. The British lawyers on the Chief Court also applied the law mechanically because they did not know the people. It has been alleged that

[1] *RAB*, 1868–9, p. 61; 1881–2, p. 23.
[2] *RAB*, 1881–2, Intr. p. 9.

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'there were no High Courts in the British Empire where the atmosphere was so unreal'.[1]

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The cleavage between law and life has had many unfortunate results. One result, further noticed below, was to encourage corruption. Another result was the growth of litigation. Up to about 1870, as already noted, the people preferred to settle their disputes by arbitration, and in difficult matters would accept the decision of the circle headman. The demand for lawyers was confined to the mercantile community, European, Indian and, to a less extent, Chinese. These classes wanted lawyers who could speak English and appear in western courts. In India law was the only profession outside Government service for the unemployable surplus of the schools, and large numbers of Indian lawyers, naturally not the ablest, flocked over to Burma, giving the courts a still more alien aspect. Even in 1880 there were no facilities in Burma for the study of law and, though every little court throughout the country had a few licensed pleaders, none of them, except possibly one or two Indians, had any legal training.[2]

But conditions were already changing. The Indian moneylenders employed lawyers to conduct their cases, and Burmans had to employ lawyers in self-defence. The growth of litigation was beginning to attract attention. In 1862 the total number of cases before the courts was less than 20,000. During the next ten years it rose by only 2000; but in the following six years by more than 6000. By 1886 even in the remote hill tracts of Arakan 'the large increase of litigation' was attributed to 'the disuse of the custom of referring disputes for arbitration to the local chiefs'.[3] For many years the law remained the prerogative of Indians; as there were few Burmans with a general education sufficiently advanced to study western law, there were still no law classes and naturally few Burman lawyers. Moreover, in cases before European judges, Burman litigants preferred Indian lawyers who could speak the same language as the judge. Gradually, however, Burman lawyers swelled the crowded ranks of the profession, and the instigation of lawsuits and the employment of touts grew until legal practice became synonymous with sharp practice, while the courts and judges, though increasing in numbers almost every year, were still unable to cope with the accumulating mass of litigation. The growth of commerce stimulated the demand for lawyers, the supply

[1] Harvey, *CHI*, VI, 443.
[2] *RAB*, 1880–1, Intr. p. 12; p. 130.
[3] *RAB*, 1881–2, Intr. p. 9; 1886–7, p. 16; *BBG*, I, 500.

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of lawyers stimulated the demand for lawsuits, and the supply of lawsuits stimulated the demand for courts. Litigation hastened the decay of custom, the decay of custom encouraged litigation, and the courts, intended to promote efficiency and welfare, served chiefly to break down the social order that was the best guarantee of welfare and the strongest bulwark against crime.

Crime. The growth of crime during the past sixty years is one of the outstanding characters of modern Burma. We have seen that in Tenasserim the Commissioner was impressed by 'the generally peaceable and orderly habits of the people'. Again in Pegu, after the suppression of disorder consequent on the British occupation, crime diminished and the people settled down to a quiet life; dacoity became less frequent, and its former accompaniments of torture and cold-blooded murder almost entirely disappeared.[1] Gang-robbery, though not entirely unknown, was rarely committed by British subjects, and the proportion of Burmans in jail was far lower than that of any other people. In some years, as in 1872, there were waves of crime, but such years were exceptional. Then, from about 1880, there was a change for the worse.

The change may best be illustrated from Tharrawaddy which, during the present century, has been proverbially the most criminal district in Burma. Yet in 1860 it had less crime in proportion to population than any other district, and was so peaceful that a separate district magistrate was thought unnecessary. From 1861 to 1876 dacoity was regarded as practically impossible, because a gang would find no sympathy among the people.[2] For some twenty years the district, now regarded as conspicuously criminal, was just as conspicuously peaceful. Then, in Tharrawaddy as in the rest of British Burma, something went wrong. The problem of crime in Burma seems first to have attracted attention in 1878 when, 'during the past few years there had been a large and continuous increase of crime'.[3] By 1884 this had assumed such dimensions as to call for comment by the Government of India, and the criminals were no longer from outside British territory but were local men. Dacoity was rife even in the vicinity of Rangoon. The rebellion that broke out at the time

[1] *BBG*, I, 509, 514; II, 57, 564. [2] *Tharrawaddy Gazetteer*, pp. 33, 74.

[3] *RAB*, 1877–8, Intr. p. 4; *BBG*, II, 564–5. It should, however, be noted that the annual reports are inconsistent. In 1880–1, there is reported a gradual *reduction* since 1870 when violent crimes were twice as numerous (pp. 12, 22), whereas in 1881–2 there was '*again* an increase in violent crime in Rangoon and the districts around' (Summary, p. 8), and there was also 'a serious increase' in 1882–3.

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of the third war gave a new impulse to disorder,[1] and from 1900 onwards the growth of crime is noticed in almost every annual report.

Crime in Upper Burma followed a like course. For some five years after the Annexation conditions were disturbed, but from 1890 Upper Burma 'enjoyed greater freedom from crime than the Province formerly known as British Burma'.[2] In 1906 there were only 16 dacoities in Upper Burma as against 84 in Lower Burma, and, including all violent crime, there were 201 cases in Upper Burma as against 729 in Lower Burma. The annual report for 1910 re-echoes that of 1890. But in 1911 Upper Burma went the same way as Lower Burma,[3] and the number of cases under the more serious heads rose by 1080 in Upper Burma as against 280 in Lower Burma. The sudden rise was probably due to a failure of the crops, but within a few years there was little to choose between them, and sometimes an increase in Upper Burma coincided with a decrease in Lower Burma. The marginal table illustrates the incidence of the most serious crime per million people.

Murder and dacoity per million people *

(*a*) Lower Burma only; (*b*) Whole Province

Period	Murder	Dacoity
1876–80	26·5	11·6 (*a*)
1886–90	War and Rebellion	
1896–1900	24·8	9·5 (*b*)
1906–10	32·0	9·4 (*b*)
1916–20	42·9	17·9 (*b*)
1926–30	59·7	31·9 (*b*)

* Harvey, *British Rule in Burma* (1946), p. 40.

The prevalence of crime in Burma is the more impressive if contrasted with conditions elsewhere.[4] By 1913 it was remarked that, in proportion to the population, the number of people sentenced to rigorous imprisonment in Burma was three or four times as great as in any other province of India; the jails were continually being enlarged and continually over-crowded. New jails were built, but the jail population outgrew the new accommodation. In 1910, with accommodation for rather less than 15,000 convicts, there was a jail

[1] Crosthwaite, pp. 23, 50, 54. [2] *RAB*, 1901–2, p. 8; 1906–7, p. 16; 1911–12, p. 9.
[3] *RAB*, 1911–12, p. 43; 1918–19, p. 27.
[4] In England and Scotland, with a population of over 40 million, there are on an average about 150 murders a year; in two districts of Burma, with a combined population of less than 1 million, the murders in 1927 numbered 139. In the United States, where social ties are looser than in England, the number of cases of murder and deliberate manslaughter even in the largest cities, taken as a group, is no more than 33 per million, whereas over the whole of Burma, including the most remote and peaceful areas, there are close on 40 per million. One district alone, about the size of Devonshire and with a population of only half a million, had 87 murders in 1927, as many as there are in Chicago with 3½ million and world-wide notoriety for gangsters. *ISC*, XI, 24; *The Times*, 28 Dec., 1935.

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population of over 16,000. Whipping was substituted so far as possible for imprisonment; convicts were employed on extra-mural labour on the roads and other public works and in the mines; every opportunity was taken to release well-behaved convicts on occasions of ceremonial importance and, during the war of 1914–18, many were drafted into a Labour Corps. But in 1920 'the old trouble of overcrowding, for which during the war several palliatives presented themselves, had now once more to be faced'.[1]

The growth of crime was not due to lack of efforts to suppress it. When it was first noticed in 1878 the immediate reaction of Government was to strengthen and improve the police; the police force was frequently reorganized and repeatedly enlarged. But all in vain. The population was growing rapidly, but crime grew more rapidly. Between 1900 and the outbreak of war in 1914 the population increased by about 15 %, the number of police rose from 1 for every 789 people to 1 for every 744, but crime increased by 26 %.[2] Police training schools were opened and a special detective branch was formed, but crime still increased. In 1921 it was noted that during the preceding decade the population had risen by about 9 %, but the percentage of increase in the more important forms of crime 'ranged from 31 % in the case of murder to 109 % in the case of robbery and dacoity'.[3] In the more criminal tracts the ordinary police was reinforced from time to time by 'punitive police', an addition to the local establishment of which the local residents had to bear the charges. Heavy sentences were imposed, and for certain offences rigorous imprisonment for two to seven years became almost a matter of obligation. Magistrates were multiplied and magisterial powers steadily enhanced. Ordinarily only the district magistrate had been vested with special powers to impose sentences of seven years' rigorous imprisonment, and when in 1903 these special powers were given to selected European officers, it was with some hesitation and only 'to relieve over-burdened Deputy Commissioners in the most hardworked districts';[4] thirty years later the same abnormal powers had been conferred on some 200 officers, including even some Burmese township officers, the lowest grade in general administration. Again, the ordinary law has always allowed preventive action by the taking of security or

[1] *RAB*, 1910–11, p. vi; 1911–12, p. 50; 1912–13, p. 26; 1920–1, p. xi.
[2] *RAB*, 1877–8, Intr. p. 4; 1910–11, p. vi; 1914–15, p. 23.
[3] *RAB*, 1920–1, pp. xi, 38.
[4] *RAB*, 1903–4, p. iii.

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x 175 674 681 693 imprisonment in respect of reputed criminals who cannot be convicted of a specific offence. Magistrates were continually exhorted to make full use of these preventive sections, but eventually they had to be supplemented by an Habitual Offenders' Restriction Act and a Criminal Tribes Act, which rendered any portion of the general public liable to be treated as a criminal tribe.[1]

x 175 681 672 674 These measures under the penal law were supported by forceful executive action under the Village Act. This Act, as we have noticed, was introduced on the annexation of Upper Burma as an instrument of martial law, and reports on village administration were made annually under the head of 'police'; the village was regarded as an instrument of law and order rather than as a social unit. Under the Village Act collective penalties may be imposed on villages which fail to resist or to report on criminals; relatives and friends of suspected criminals may be deported, and villages are expected to maintain fences and to report on the movements of strangers. These powers were vigorously employed. In some years upwards of 300 villages were fined up to a total amount exceeding a lakh of rupees. Deportation was not infrequent, and in exceptional cases a whole village was removed. Headmen were required to fine villagers for omitting to maintain the village fence or to report strangers, and they were themselves fined for derelictions of duty. It may fairly be claimed that Government did everything possible to suppress crime. But it did not succeed in preventing the growth of crime.

x 175 674 From time to time various explanations were suggested.[2] It was often attributed to 'the passionate nature of the Burman', which might explain the prevalence of crime, but not its growth. Another suggestion was 'improved detection', though one might have thought that this would check it. A more plausible explanation was found in the greater indulgence in alcohol. The use of alcoholic liquor had [733] been prohibited under Burmese rule, but this was impossible under British rule, as provision had to be made for the requirements of Europeans, Chinese, and Indian coolies. Another theory, which certainly cannot be accepted, was that suggested to the Simon Commission in 1931, that it was due to 'unrest following the war'. Clearly the cause lies much deeper. The abnormal criminality is a feature of British rule, which did not appear until some years after the British occupation. Up to 1880, as we have seen, the people in Lower Burma

[1] *RAB*, 1918–19, pp. ii, 24.
[2] *RAB*, 1910–11, pp. 17, 22; 1920–1, p. 38; 1887, Cmd. 4962, p. 122; *JSC*, xi, 24.

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were law-abiding, and the jail population contained a remarkably small proportion of Burmans. Again, in Upper Burma there was very little crime for twenty-five years after the Annexation. In Lower Burma the growth of crime first attracted notice a few years after the opening of the Suez Canal, and it spread to Upper Burma when similar conditions began to prevail there after 1910. In Lower Burma it synchronized with a steadily increasing difficulty in the collection of the poll tax, despite measures that in some districts amounted to 'undue harshness'.[1] A review of the problem in 1921 suggested that

> 'in certain portions of Lower Burma, the root of the trouble is probably agrarian...the slow but steady passing of the land into the hands of non-agriculturists, especially non-resident members of this class. Agricultural instability induces a want of ballast which reacts disastrously upon the communal life. With no incentive to improve another's land and no guarantee of fixity of tenure a man is apt to find a life of crime more profitable and exciting than a bare subsistence on the balance of the profits of his labour after the non-cultivating landlord or moneylender has been satisfied.'[2]

Other factors noticed were the 'loosening of civil and religious authority and the decay or suppression of the old-fashioned amusements'. Here we would seem to be nearer to a true explanation of the growth of crime during the last thirty years in Upper Burma and sixty years in Lower Burma. In view of the fact that social disintegration, unemployment and impoverishment were all features of the same period, and all alike due to the abnormal predominance of economic forces, it seems unnecessary to look further for a cause, or to expect a cure except by the reintegration of society on a new basis.

[1] *RAB*, 1885–6, p. 54; 1911–12, p. 85.

[2] *RAB*, 1920–1, p. 38.

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CHAPTER V

BURMA, 1923–1940: POLITICAL DEMOCRACY

(a) *POLICY AND PRACTICE*

1. Administrative Policy

OCO During the early years of the present century few Europeans questioned either the benevolence or beneficence of British rule in India. Although European peoples 'rightly struggling to be free', whether in Ireland, the Balkan States or South Africa attracted Liberal sympathies, for Asia good government was thought better than self-government, and that Indians should govern themselves was only less absurd than that they should govern Europeans. But the suppression of nationalism in India gradually became more formidable, and, when Indian troops rendered good service in 1914–18, the moral fervour for the liberation of subject peoples, which from the first had been proclaimed as a major purpose of the democratic powers, found new scope in Asia. In 1917 the Government announced that the goal of British policy in India was the gradual realization of responsible government within the British Empire. At the same time forces, brought into action by the war, began to change the economic relations between East and West, leading up to the economic crisis of 1929, which signalized the end of the period dating from the Suez Canal, and the dawn of a new age in world affairs, more favourable to the autonomy of dependent peoples in the tropics.

2. Burmese Nationalism

668 Nationalism of the modern type was a late development in Burma, not for lack of national sentiment but from ignorance of the modern world. As elsewhere in the Tropical Far East its source of inspiration was the victory of Japan over Russia, which taught the East that it might use western science to defeat the West. The stir of a new spirit was first evident in the enthusiasm aroused by the sermons and publications of a Buddhist monk who conducted a revivalist movement throughout the country from 1906 onwards, and in the foundation of numerous Young Men's Buddhist Associations (Y.M.B.A.).[1] One outcome of

[1] *RAB*, 1907–8, p. 88; 1909–10, p. xviii.

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the movement was a revival of interest in the past of Burma, and a society then founded to study art, science and literature in relation to Burma and the neighbouring countries attracted a considerable Burman membership. That some Burmans were beginning to look towards Japan was manifested by the visit to Japan in 1910 of a young monk, U Ottama, who subsequently played a leading part in Burmese politics, and by the publication of an account of the Russo-Japanese War, and of an illustrated description of Japan.[1] But it was to India rather than Japan that Burmans looked for their ideas, and their current political literature came largely from India. The Y.M.B.A. movement soon developed political activities, and Government servants were warned against taking part in them. One feature of this new development was a protest against the use of footwear in the precincts of pagodas and monasteries; this protest gained such general support that Europeans had to comply with it.

Yet in 1919 the Government still regarded the political ferment as an alien importation due to 'consistent efforts by Indian agitators to capture Burman opinion'.[2] But national sentiment had never lain far below the surface, and when Burmans studied the Indian press, or sometimes listened to Indian agitators, it was only because they hoped by copying their methods to convert national sentiment into an effective political force. In 1920, when the proposals for a reformed constitution in Burma seemed less advanced than those proposed for India, the Y.M.B.A., 'which had become the principal political organization in the country' began to advocate the Indian device of non-co-operation with the Government. When the Y.M.B.A. was succeeded in 1921 by the General Council of Buddhist Associations (G.C.B.A.), the aim of Nationalist policy was formulated as Home Rule, some favouring complete independence, and non-co-operation was adopted as the most effective line of action. On the publication of the Reform scheme the more moderate members of the Association decided to co-operate with Government, so far as this did not prejudice the speedy attainment of Home Rule, and formed a separate party, known from the number of those who signed its programme as the Twenty-one Party. This marked a definite stage in the progress of nationalism: the severance, if only formal, of politics from religion. Hitherto Nationalists had been linked together, nominally at least, on the basis of their common Buddhism, but the manifesto of the Twenty-one Party was Nationalist, not Buddhist; political, not

[1] *RAB*, 1914–15, p. 101.

[2] *RAB*, 1918–19, p. 39.

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668 religious. In the more extreme nationalist party some Buddhist monks were prominent; there remained a close tie between Nationalism and Religion, and Nationalism still drew much of its strength from Buddhist sentiment; but the new policy made a wider appeal, potentially embracing all peoples in the country instead of only Buddhists. Since then there has been no division of principle between the various groups of Nationalists; all have been agreed on Home Rule, which has ordinarily been identified with independence from foreign control, and, apart from personal rivalries, they have differed only as to the method by which it may soonest be attained.[1]

3. Local Self-Government

364 632 We have seen that although under Burmese rule the circle was practically autonomous, under British rule it first lost its autonomy and was then broken up into villages, which were converted into instruments of rule without regard to organic social ties. Under British rule the popular self-government of Burmese times decayed, and was replaced by the machinery of a foreign legal system, unable to control the anti-social forces which it liberated, and favouring the decline rather than the growth of local self-government. But the development of commerce gradually raised new problems of urban administration. For many years the towns, left to the care of local officers, were left to look after themselves. At length sanitation began to compel attention. Even in Rangoon the people still resorted for their necessary occasions to the surrounding waste. With the felling of scrub for fuel this practice became so unpleasant that public latrines were contemplated;[2] those using them were to be taxed; and those not using them were to be taxed more heavily, while the sweepers were to make strangers use them at a fee of one pie a head. But this plan was too costly, and it was thought sufficient to forbid the people to clear jungle round the town. In Moulmein, after fifty years of British rule, 'attempts to introduce efficient conservancy and other measures for the health of the town had only recently been made'. In Akyab, ten years later, there was still 'no system of removing the night soil'.[3] In Pegu, thirty years after it had been conquered, only in two towns, Rangoon and Bassein, had there been any attempt at scavenging and water supply, and only two, Rangoon

[1] *ISC*, xi, 25, 267, 273.
[2] *Syriam Gazetteer*, p. 171.
[3] *RAB*, 1877–8, p. 77; 1884–5, p. 66.

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and Toungoo, were lit at night. Meanwhile, with the clearing of the scrub jungle round Rangoon, the streets became the only public convenience, and 'the back drainage spaces had long been a disgrace to the town'.[1] 364 632

Under purely official rule these matters were neglected and, apparently, unrecognized. Not until municipal institutions were introduced in 1874, at the instance of the Government of India, did the state of affairs attract notice. The formation of municipal committees, including members nominated to represent the people, stimulated interest in local administration, enabled Government officials to avail themselves of local knowledge, and provided them with local funds to do what they thought necessary. But it did not help the people to get what they might want. In 1882, again at the instance of the Government of India, arrangements were made to increase the number of municipalities, and to introduce the principle of election. Hopes were expressed that in Rangoon sanitary needs would 'receive constant and careful attention at the hands of the elected committee'. The prospect of managing their own affairs seems to have been generally welcome in the towns where this privilege was conceded, and 'for the most part the townspeople, especially the Burmese, took a hearty interest in the elections'.[2]

Yet it is now the general opinion that local self-government in Burma has proved a failure. In 1915, 'in view of the lack of success of the elective system...committees were ordinarily nominated, and only 13 of the 46 included elected members'. The elections 'evoked no interest' and 'such work as was accomplished was almost wholly due to the efforts of the official Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Members'. In Moulmein, the headquarters of Tenasserim, after eighty years of British rule, the elective committee was suspended for incompetence. In 1921, by way of preparing for constitutional reforms, officials were withdrawn from municipal committees, and subsequent reports show a progressive increase in expenditure and decline in efficiency; by 1927 expenditure had risen from Rs. 58 lakhs to Rs. 70 lakhs, and the number of committees classed as unsatisfactory or worse had risen from 43 to 95 %. Rural self-government on modern lines dates only from 1921 and has given as little satisfaction. How is it that, with so promising a start, municipal government fifty years later could be pronounced a failure? The official view 632

[1] *RAB*, 1880–1, Intr. p. 27; 1881–2, p. 127.
[2] *RAB*, 1881–2, p. 127; 1884–5, p. 17.

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632 was that 'the principle of self-government is an exotic plant, and the character and temperament of the people are not favourable to its speedy growth'.[1]

But if we look into the matter more closely, this explanation seems inadequate. We have seen that under British rule the organic structure of Burmese local administration was broken down; for many years, under a system that attempted little beyond the maintenance of law and order, local affairs were neglected, and municipal institutions and the elective principle were adopted as devices for repairing this neglect. The committees were expected to do and pay for things they did not want, and they represented sectional communities which had little in common except a dislike of taxation; naturally they preferred to do nothing. The only people who wanted most of the things that municipal committees were expected to provide were the official members, and these rarely stayed long enough in any one place to undertake and carry through reforms. But economic forces were active all the time in all aspects of social life. These conditions were not confined to municipalities; they obtained also in small towns and rural areas under executive rule, and with similar results. On the other hand, popular self-government in the villages, so far as it was possible, was reasonably successful in giving the people what they wanted. Let us examine these points severally.

Municipal Self-government. The failure of municipal administration might have been prophesied when the elective principle was first introduced. Projects of forming new municipal institutions with nominated members had already met with opposition. One town, Shwaydoung, protested that 'if we had a municipality we should be obliged to pay grievous taxes like people in Rangoon and Prome, and we would be prevented from tying up goats under our houses'. (The reference to goats suggests that the protest was raised by Indians rather than Burmans.) The case of Yandoon is even more instructive.[2] Yandoon was the chief purely Burmese market town in British Burma, and organic social life survived. Here, without municipal institutions and at a time when, under government officials, sanitation was neglected, the people 'combined among themselves to carry out a regular system of night conservancy'. But they objected to a municipal committee and, significantly, Government yielded to their protest.

Rights along the river front were disputed between Government

[1] *ISC*, XI, 422, 442, 454, 466, 487.
[2] *RAB*, 1880–1, p. 32; 1881–2, p. 127.

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and the people; local opinion was so strong that even a nominated committee might have outvoted the official President, and Government thought better not to run the risk. 'Subsequent experience showed that...local interests would have benefited if the action of the local magistrate had been controlled by an intelligent committee of the townsfolk.' Here the people of Yandoon were managing their own affairs in their own way better than local affairs in other towns were being managed by officials; they objected to municipal institutions lest these should put an end to self-government, and Government acquiesced for fear that such institutions, even with a nominated committee, might allow too much self-government, and 'perhaps end in the committee's outvoting the resident magistrate'. And on the matters in dispute the people were right and the local official wrong. It is not strange that people welcomed the promise of electing representatives to manage their affairs, and that they became apathetic on finding that election gave them no greater power of self-government than nomination.

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The Government displayed its zeal for self-government by calling on the Government Advocate, who knew nothing of the country, to draw up 'a complete set of by-laws, applicable so far as possible to all municipalities'.[1] These machine-made rules were translated into Burmese, largely unintelligible, and at that time few except European officials knew enough English to understand them. They provided mainly for things that the people did not want, and often in a manner least likely to commend them. One or two illustrations must suffice. Vaccination was introduced into Burma within a year or two of the occupation of Tenasserim. The practice of inoculation against smallpox had already been introduced about 1800 and had spread rapidly.[2] Presumably the people would have taken just as kindly to vaccination if it had proved more effective. But, after fifty years, one explanation for its slow progress was 'the frequent failure of the lymph supplied'. Another reason was that the inoculators were Burmese and the vaccinators Indians—it was cheaper and less trouble to employ Indians than to train Burmans. 'Few medical officers understood Burmese well enough to explain the superior advantages of vaccination.' Naturally the people 'preferred to adhere to the practice to which they were accustomed and in which they had most faith'.[3] Even in Rangoon the honorary magistrates petitioned that vaccination

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[1] *RAB*, 1880–1, p. 37.
[2] *BBG*, 1, 526.
[3] *RAB*, 1877–8, Intr. p. 13; 1881–2, p. 128; 1886–7, p. 59.

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632 should not be made compulsory. Until well into the present century the lymph still gave unsatisfactory results and the people had greater 744 faith in inoculation;[1] but the committees had to pay the cost of the Indian vaccinators.

Again, as already noticed, the Government needed hospitals for prisoners and police cases, but did not try to make them attractive to the public. A report of 1869 explains that 'at present the entire staff of the several Dispensaries is composed of Natives of India and, with a difference of caste, creed and language, it is impossible to expect that the benefits of scientific medicine will be brought home to the people'. They continued to believe in their own medical system, as they do to the present day;[2] but the committees had to pay for the upkeep of the hospitals.

Not infrequently, as in Yandoon, the local officials made mistakes, wasting money, for example, on laying out markets in unsuitable localities, or on buildings of an unsuitable type.[3] By-laws require that meat stalls in bazaars shall have fly-proof doors and windows. These are costly and, on the approved pattern, dark, damp and hot. The butcher wants to attract custom, the purchasers want to see what they are buying, and the fly-proof doors and windows are kept permanently open. The shop with open doors and windows attracts more custom, and, against economic forces, official regulations unsupported by public opinion are of no avail. Quite possibly the meat keeps better with more light and air. Certainly the people do not want these things; but the committees must spend money on them. 'Self-government' after this fashion does not give the people what they want.

632 Again, though more people now know English, and the Burmese version of the by-laws may possibly be less incomprehensible, the whole western machinery of self-government, with formal agenda and resolutions and legal regulations, does not work in a way that the public understands; even if some of the members appreciate what they are doing, they do not carry the people with them. The East has its own democratic machinery which one can see at work in Karen Christian conventions. In the Burma volume of evidence before the Royal Commission on Labour of 1931 there is an instructive account of the manner in which a public meeting of Telugu coolies achieved an

[1] *RAB*, 1904–5, p. 65; 1907–8, pp. xiv, 76; 1912–13, p. 85.
[2] *RAB*, 1868–9, p. 117; *CISM*, Resolution, and p. 22.
[3] See e.g. *Ru.SJ*, 1880, p. 94.

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unanimous decision.[1] Official municipalities do not work on the lines of oriental democracy. If 'such work as was accomplished was almost wholly due to the efforts of the official members', it is because only the officials wanted such work done, and because they alone understood how to manipulate the machinery. To the people in general the municipal committee was a western device for doing what Government wanted. 632

Moreover, taking the whole community in any town, there was very little that it did want. By the time that municipal institutions were adopted, the urban population was already divided into separate Burmese, Indian, Chinese and European communities, with very different and often conflicting interests, different ideas of welfare, and few wants in common. There was indeed little that all wanted, except to avoid taxation, and on this point all the non-officials would usually (and vainly) oppose the official members. Self-government was impossible because there was no self to govern itself. Inevitably in such circumstances, the non-official members were for the most part men who on various grounds wanted to stand well with the officials, or saw a chance of making money.

The pressure of economic forces may perhaps be demonstrated most easily in Rangoon, where municipal institutions worked under the most favourable conditions and with most success. Here there was a considerable European community, well represented on the committee together with the most enlightened and westernized Burmese, Indians and Chinese, under the chairmanship of a high Government official, who held the post as a whole-time job and usually for some years. One of the most urgent problems was to safeguard the health of the town, and the whole country, from the dangers consequent on a large floating coolie population. This was an old problem. In 1872 there were barracks capable of accommodating 500 coolies. In 1881 the density of the population over the bulk of the business portion of the city was double that of Liverpool, the most crowded town in the United Kingdom. In 1891 the Census Report notices the fearfuly high mortality among the Indian immigrants; 'crowded together in insanitary lodging houses, they swell the death rate of our chief town'. Thousands lived 'in the veriest hovels in the suburban swamps, with the most disgusting filth piled up in heaps or fermerting in pools at their very doors'. Rangoon, it was said, owes most of its high death rate to the imported coolies. Yet in 1931 632 362

[1] Smeaton, p. 205; *RCLI*, x, Pt 1, p. 25.

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632 the Royal Commission on Labour found things even worse. In a
362 room without windows, ventilation passages, or sanitary arrangements, licensed for nine coolies, there would be forty to fifty men with one or two women. Many others slept in the streets, so tightly packed that there was barely room for a wheelbarrow to pass.[1] These were the conditions under the eyes, or one might say, under the nose of the officials busy in the Secretariat, drafting model by-laws and designing plans for sanitary meat stalls. The methods of importing coolies had been criticised in 1841; in 1880 the Government had declined to intervene, remarking that it could not import coolies 'more cheaply', though taking steps to make the cost of importation cheaper still. In the absence of any common social will, economic progress took precedence of social welfare, and in 1931 the firms chiefly concerned could not imagine any better system, representing that any change would not only 'increase the miller's difficulties but also the cost of his labour bill, and he cannot afford to do anything that will make it more difficult than it is at present to meet the competition of other rice-producing countries'.[2]

Outside Rangoon municipal administration was still less efficient, but its defects remained for the most part unnoticed. Even as regards overcrowding, the abuses, as suggested in the Census Report for 1911,[3] were not so bad in Rangoon as in some towns and even in some villages in the surrounding districts. People will not of
632 their own volition do or pay for what they do not want, and the local officials who managed municipal affairs rarely stayed long enough in any one place to know what it needed, or how to do what it needed, and never stayed long enough to carry through constructive measures that would bring economic forces under control. Despite efforts to limit transfers and changes of officers[4] it was impossible to achieve continuity of tenure, and transient officials were unable to keep pace with economic changes; they could not know what was happening. The law was always at the service of private interest, but there was no one to set it in motion in the public interest, and it helped to promote and not to prevent the working of economic forces. Popular representation on local bodies increased the efficiency of local government, but 'self-government', despite the liberal ideas by which it was inspired, served merely to induce a mixed community

[1] *RCLI*, Report, p. 434; Census, 1872, p. 13; Census, 1891, p. 177.
[2] *RCLI*, x, Pt 1, p. 173. [3] Census, 1911, p. 21.
[4] *RAB*, 1880–1, p. 8.

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which had no common wants, to acquiesce in raising money for things that the Government wanted and the people did not want, and it was imposed on them often, if not usually, against their will. Self-government did not fail because it was an 'exotic plant'; it came to be regarded as a failure, but it never failed because it was never tried. 632

Rural Self-government. But matters were no better under the direct rule of Government officials in small towns and rural areas outside the jurisdiction of municipal committees. Rural District Councils were set up in 1884 at the instance of the Government of India, but executive rule was regarded by the Burma Government as more efficient, and this experiment in rural self-government on western lines ended with an epidemic of infantile mortality among the new-born councils. The district officer remained solely responsible for rural welfare. From early days district officers had at their disposal various local funds, and in 1865, at the instance of the Government of India, a cess of 5 % (raised subsequently to 10 %) on the land revenue in Lower Burma was levied to provide amenities in rural areas. But, as in the municipalities, the money was spent on what the Government or the local official thought the people ought to want and not on what they wanted. With the development of trade there sprang up numerous small towns which could not afford municipal institutions. Most of the local officer's work lay in these towns, which naturally got most of the money; though raised in the villages it was spent in the towns. As in municipal areas, and for the same reasons, much of the money was spent in ways that the people disapproved, and much of it was wasted.

Control over lands and buildings is a first condition of urban sanitation, and a few remarks on this matter will serve to indicate the degree of efficiency attained under purely official rule. In 1883 rights over town lands and the mode of their acquisition had for several years engaged the attention of the local Government.[1] The matter continued to engage attention, and this prolonged gestation eventually gave birth to the Town and Village Lands Act of 1898. The present writer spent the first two years of his service as subdivisional officer in Toungoo District, where thirteen places were notified as 'railway towns' under this Act, and no one could build in them without previous approval of the site and building. In 1903 there were piles of applications from each town; some of the stacks, containing hundreds of applications, stood higher than the office table. It had 632 361

[1] *RRA*, 1882–3, Resolution, para. 6; *RAB*, 1892–3, p. 5; 1897–8, p. 30.

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632 361 been impossible to dispose of them for lack of instructions. Some towns had been notified without any boundary on the north and south and, to judge by the notifications in the official *Gazette*, ran parallel to the railway line the whole way from Rangoon to Mandalay. During two years five different Deputy Commissioners held charge of the district. Although they got the notifications rectified, their attempts to obtain orders as to procedure were in vain. Meanwhile the wiser and bolder people were building houses without sanction, presumably paying the local surveyor a small fee to keep silent. The last Deputy Commissioner decided to deal with the matter by the light of common sense, without waiting further for instructions; but apparently the proceedings were set aside as irregular, as the cases were said to be still pending two years later.

The matter of town lands came to my attention again as Deputy Commissioner of Myaungmya, one of the busy districts in the delta, from 1915 to 1919. Meanwhile in 1908 a Sanitary Commissioner had been appointed and, possibly at his instance, town plans had been prepared. Some of these plans showed nothing but the main roads, leaving large blocks that would inevitably become congested. Subsequently all plans had to be passed by the Sanitary Commissioner; one could not hope to obtain his sanction within two years and if, as usual, he wanted changes, the matter would take four or five years—if it was not forgotten. The Sanitary Commissioner knew nothing of the people or, as a rule, of local circumstances, and often wished to impose conditions that were quite impracticable and would have led to worse congestion; he would require large vacant spaces on land round the market worth hundreds or perhaps thousands of rupees for a few square feet. His ideal, the Divisional Commissioner suggested, was 'a wilderness of latrines'. A little later in another district, Pegu, there was a set of town plans that the Sanitary Commissioner had approved. But they had been drawn up in the local record office according to a model plan in the *Manual*, and without relation to conditions on the ground, so that they were of no use except as a source of income to revenue subordinates, who could threaten proceedings where the house sites were not in accordance with the plans.

632 661 At the same time the Government was losing revenue through defects in the system of assessment. In 1927 a special officer was appointed to deal with the revision of town land taxation, 'long overdue because district officers had neither the necessary time nor expert

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knowledge'.[1] But that was merely one of the simpler problems of urban administration; it is much simpler to raise revenue than to provide for welfare. Control over land and buildings is a first condition of urban sanitation; the towns were the centre of interest in local administration, and sanitation one of the most urgent problems. But while plans were being drawn and redrawn, and regulations elaborated and multiplied, the land was daily growing more valuable, buildings were being erected, new vested interests were accumulating, sanitary conditions were deteriorating, and improvements were becoming more difficult and costly. Necessarily the whole process created new opportunities for subordinates to make money, and allowed the haphazard oppression of those who did not pay enough. Only in one matter was there any notable difference between administration by local officials and municipal committees; under official rule the accounts complied better with the Accounts Rules. An official had practical experience in complying with regulations as part of his everyday routine and, unlike the non-official Commissioners, was liable to make good defalcations. In one district the Commissioners were called on to show cause against recouping certain losses. 'We would resign', they said, 'and you would get no one else to take our place.' But book-keeping is no cure for corruption. In Myaungmya one of the most respectable inhabitants was a retired district cess fund overseer, whose pay had never exceeded £60 a year, but who had managed to maintain a son at Cambridge.

Thus municipal committees were not exceptional in respect of maladministration. Both under municipal and official rule, welfare measures on western lines, applied by western methods with no other sanction than the penalties imposed by law, and with no one to apply them but a rapid succession of district officials, were in general ineffective and unwelcome; they were regarded, not without reason, as oppressive, and tended to excite discontent and disaffection. An official was no better able as Deputy Commissioner than as president of a local municipal committee, to give effect to western ideas of welfare, or to hinder the unceasing activity of anti-social forces.

Village Self-government. The ill-success of municipal administration along western lines is the more striking in contrast with the comparative success of self-government in village life. All the time the people were in fact managing their own affairs, so far as circumstances allowed, with reasonable honesty, efficiency and economy.

[1] *ISC*, XI, 177.

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621 Their opportunities were limited. In some things a village cannot act alone, but any combined action between villages became impossible with the break up of the circle. The village contributions to the district cess fund were intended to provide material amenities, such as in riverine villages a landing stage, sheltered from rain and sun. But the villages had no say in the spending of the money; much of it went to build and maintain rest houses for inspecting officers on tour and, if the people wanted landing stages, they had to build their own or go without. Many villages, as already noticed, were unable to provide a site for a monastery as a centre of their social life, or even adequate living space for the inhabitants. Where, as over large parts of Lower Burma, the population was migratory, a crowd of strangers could not act together; and in villages with Indian or Chinese moneylenders as shopkeepers or landowners, the division of interests on racial lines prevented common action. Yet villages more happily circumstanced provided for their own requirements in their own way with little or no help from district officers.

The anti-social effect of economic forces in mixed communities was very strikingly illustrated in Toungoo District. Under Burmese rule, and also under British rule until the opening of the railway in 1885, the river had been the main high road, and along the banks there was a succession of small towns and large villages which had long enjoyed organic social life. They had their monasteries and schools, rest houses, open spaces, wells, tanks, paths, bridges and so on; there was a community with a life of its own governing itself in its own way, like the community in Yandoon which attracted notice as a pioneer in modernizing its conservancy arrangements. But trade shifted from the river to the railway, and the new railway towns, with a mixture of Indians, Chinese and Burmans were far richer. Yet in the two richest towns, although the roads were reported as newly completed by the Public Works Department in 1901,[1] it was impossible a year later to get from the district bungalow to the bazaar during the rains except along the railway line; in the more important of the two, shortly afterwards constituted a subdivisional headquarters, the mud along the road was almost knee-deep within twenty yards of the bungalow. One finds everywhere a similar contrast between the provision of local amenities by official and by local agency. Officials try to provide western amenities that Government approves, and often fail; the people try to provide the amenities that they appreciate, and often with success.

[1] *RAB*, 1900–1, p. 48.

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Some villages run their own bazaar. In the delta a few small towns have been lighted by electricity without official help or supervision; the people wanted to light up the pagoda and incidentally provided electric light for private houses—that is not the way district officers or municipal committees go to work. Where there is an organic community capable of common wants, it will try to meet those wants. That is self-government, and it is no exotic plant in Burma. But to try and make people do of their own accord what they do not want to do, is neither self-government nor common sense. 621

Popular Control. It is not strange then that, even after fifty years, municipal institutions failed to take root in Burma. But the *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms* recommended that as part of the project of introducing responsible government 'there should be as far as possible complete popular control in local bodies and the largest possible independence for them of outside control'. By way of complying with this direction the official presidents and members were withdrawn. Of thirty-seven presidents in 1921 only one remained in 1923, and the number of *ex officio* members was reduced from 172 to 6. Thus the committees were left to do what the Government expected of them with no one on the committee who wanted to do it. At the same time arrangements were made 'for more frequent and comprehensive inspections of the accounts' and 'for greater scrutiny and more efficient audit'. There was also 'an important change in the efficiency and standard of audit', which was no longer to be confined 'to the formal examination of authorities and of rules', but to be conducted with a view to ascertaining whether rate-payers were 'getting the best value for their money'. The officials who had formerly been members of the committees were now required to supervise their work, and were perhaps rather more critical of defects than when they had been responsible for the work themselves.[1] Doubtless municipal administration was less efficient than before, but the recommendation by the Royal Commission on Labour that Government should exercise greater control over it[2] would have been justified at any time since municipal institutions were first introduced. 632

In accordance with the policy of extending popular control in local bodies, the Rural Self-Government Act of 1921 created district councils.[3] But these were as artificial as the municipal committees and at least as ineffective, and for the same reasons. Despite all

[1] *ISC*, XI, 245, 454, 459, 470.
[2] *RCLI*, Report, p. 436.
[3] *ISC*, XI, 424, 431, 441.

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experience the village was neglected. Provision was made for circle boards and village committees; but the circle boards remained inoperative, and the village committee had no powers or functions. The chief matters delegated to the district councils comprised vernacular education, public health, sanitation and vaccination, and the maintenance of dispensaries for men and cattle. 'It was not unjustly claimed', we are told, 'that these local bodies either have had, or may have, transferred to them almost every aspect of administration affecting the people in their daily lives.' But the councils had no organic unity; the members could not understand the elaborate western regulations by which their activities were controlled; even in matters that interested them, such as education, their freedom of action was restricted; in some matters, such as public works, the necessary machinery was lacking; and in matters of sanitation and public health 'their apathy was a reflection of the attitude of the general public'. 'The only chance of improvement', it is suggested, 'is to have an efficient executive'. But an 'efficient executive' doing what the people do not want to do, is hardly 'self-government'.

How far was there in fact any real transfer of local administration to the people? How far will people, who mistrust western medicine and other foreign welfare measures, do or pay for what they do not want? How far can any system on that basis be termed self-government? And how far will self-government on such lines counteract the ceaseless pressure of economic forces? The answer to all these questions may be found in the history of the coolie barracks in Rangoon. In Rangoon the Royal Commission on Labour was 'struck by the contrast presented between the thought and foresight devoted to technical and commercial aspects of industry, and the comparative neglect of the labour aspects'.[1] But that is merely one instance of the contrast between economic progress and social welfare in modern Burma. The village, so far as circumstances allow, still manages its own affairs in its own way. But, in general, economic forces have prevailed over social interests, and it is only by bringing them under control in the interest of social welfare that self-government can be adapted to the requirements of the modern world. And this implies nothing less than the reintegration of society.

[1] *RCLI*, Report, p. 442.

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4. National Self-government

The problems of national self-government were essentially the same as those of local self-government, but more difficult and complex. The four main sections Europeans, Indians, Chinese and Burmans had nothing in common but the economic motive, the desire for material advantage. In some economic matters the foreign sections had conflicting interests, but they all had a common interest in economic progress and in the promotion of commerce and industry, and they were content that the Government should maintain law and order and leave everything else to the play of economic forces. The leaders of this group were the heads of the large business concerns, whose shareholders knew nothing of Burma except as the place where they had invested capital, and cared nothing so long as their investments were secure and profitable. Some few among the mercantile community might have a wider vision and a more sympathetic view, but very few knew anything of Burma outside the mainly Indian city of Rangoon, and in any case they were the agents of shareholders whose attitude to Burma was purely economic. That was the attitude also of the Indian and Chinese sojourners, down to the humblest coolie who came to Burma for a few months to earn higher wages than he could get at home. All these interests may be summed up as capitalist. For Burmans, on the other hand, the country was the home of their national traditions and aspirations. There were cross-currents, racial, political and economic, but the main issue in political affairs was the conflict between Capitalism and Nationalism, with European business men and Burmans as the protagonists on either side, and with the Indian and Chinese sections generally in loose alliance with the Europeans.

Thus in 1917, when Parliament accepted the principle that in India government should be made responsible to the people, there was in Burma no homogeneous people to which it could be made responsible. Among the various groups the Europeans alone possessed a working knowledge of western institutions, and not only were these few in number but their common organs, the Chamber of Commerce and the Trades' Association, representing western capitalist production, 'regarded themselves as charged with special commercial interests only'.[1] As such they were necessarily anti-social, because not related to the welfare of society as a whole but merely to the economic

[1] 1920, Cmd. 746, p. 17; Craddock, p. 123.

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641 interests of a single section. On the other hand the Burmans with their large numerical majority lacked both experience and education.
563 The then Governor has vividly depicted the Burman share in modern Burma. 'Her military forces, her military police, are not Burmans, her prison warders, her clerks, her post office, her labour force are largely manned by the Indian races. In her capital, Rangoon, there are 190,000 Indians, or nearly 60 %. Her captains of industry and her richest men are almost entirely non-Burmese.'[1] Their education stopped short at the threshold of the modern world. Although a hundred years had elapsed since the death of Ricardo and the birth of Darwin, it did not include economics or biology. Practically no one had read any history; in the leading Government school it was not taught.[2] Hitherto the political energy latent in the common religious and national sentiment had found its chief outlet in waste and destruction, extravagant festivities and futile insurrections; now, at a word, it was expected to take a major part in constructing the political machinery of a new social order. With good reason the Government of Burma expressed doubts whether the country was fit for responsible government.

642 Two alternatives were possible. One was to make a bold stand on the principle of Nationalism as the only means available for dominating economic forces; to provide Burma with a national system of
668 defence, to build up Burmese enterprise in industry and commerce, as had formerly been attempted by King Mindon, and to bring the people into cultural relations with the modern world, as was the policy in the neighbouring kingdom of Siam under its own rulers. Along those lines the Government of Burma might have looked to achieve more than native rulers because of its better understanding of the modern world. It would have seemed possible to capture the imagination of the people and to create a new environment, a common society to which a modern government might be responsible. The other alternative was to introduce the forms and machinery of western government, with such precautions as would leave economic forces supreme. The latter alternative was chosen.

In the *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms*, 'the problem of Burma's evolution was set aside for separate and future consideration'.[3] The Burma Government believed that the people had always been 'content to pursue their private callings and leave affairs of State alone, secure in the sincerity and impartiality of their British officers'

[1] Craddock, p. 128. [2] *CII*, p. 61. [3] *ISC*, XI, 7.

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Political strife was deprecated as 'so foreign to the nature of the people, and so inimical to their true interests'.[1] 'Never', the Governor wrote subsequently, 'was a country and its people more untimely ripped from the womb of political future progress than Burma and the Burmese, when Mr Montague with his magic midwifery from across the Bay of Bengal started to disturb them from their placid contentment.'[2] The Government accordingly submitted proposals in line with its views on political advance. The discussion on the proposals caused delay and, under the guidance of a few leaders, Burmans advanced from the extreme of acquiescence to the extreme of self-assertion. Their national sentiment, long perverted and suppressed, broke out in a violent attack of Nationalism, and there was 'a rapid development of political activity among the people which few, if any, of those most conversant with the psychology of the people ever predicted, or could have predicted'. 'Great dissatisfaction was caused in Burma by the delay, and by the belief that a smaller measure of advance was to be granted than was already in force in India in the shape of Dyarchy. Two deputations were sent to England, political agitation was intensified, organized boycott was freely used, and the demands of the extremists rose from Dyarchy to Dominion Home Rule.'[3] These demonstrations were accepted as proof that Burma was no less fit for responsible government than India, and an 'analogous constitution' was promised. The Burma Government thereupon took the line that 'there was nothing further to do than to make the best of a bad business, and go through all the processes for a new constitution'.[4] Burma was fitted up with the machinery of responsible government on the fashionable model of western democracy as applied' under the system of Dyarchy in India; this however was restricted to Burma proper, excluding the Shan States, Karenni and the Tribal Hills, long politically associated with Burma though ethnologically distinct, and, incidentally, containing valuable mineral resources.

On this plan the Governor was given an Executive Council comprising two Members nominated by the Governor, and two Ministers selected from among the members of the Legislative Council, which was enlarged and transformed. The functions of government were divided into two categories: Reserved and Transferred. The reserved subjects, comprising defence, law and order, finance and revenue were administered by the two Members; the other functions, sometimes

[1] *RAB*, 1918–19, p. vii; 1920, Cmd. 746, p. 30.
[2] *RAB*, 1920–1, p. xxv; *ISC*, XI, 7.
[3] Craddock, p. 109.
[4] Craddock, p. 118.

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comprehensively described as 'nation-building' were administered by the two Ministers. The Legislative Council in its new form consisted of 103 members (79 elected, 2 *ex officio* and 22 nominated, including 13 officials and 8 non-officials).[1] A system of communal and special constituencies was adopted, so as to provide for the representation of interests that might otherwise have been excluded. Rural areas were given a substantial majority among the elected members lest the interests of the country at large should be 'subordinated to the interests of a vocal minority which though representing the views of an advanced section, mostly young politicians, would not voice the sentiments of the conservative element among the people'. The adoption of the village as the primary electoral unit was rejected on the ground that the headman must remain an executive officer of Government.[2] The franchise was based on household suffrage at the age of eighteen; sex was no disqualification.

Thus, in a country where few had ever voted even for a local council, where the urban councils were regarded as 'an experiment not justified by success' and self-government as an exotic plant unsuited to the character and temperament of the people, the first tentative measure in the direction of responsible government bestowed the franchise on boys who in England, or anywhere in Europe, were regarded as still too immature to vote, and on a considerable proportion of the women. Various reasons were assigned for this astounding venture. The official explanation was that no qualifications by age, property or education could be devised; simplicity welcomed it as evidence of faith in liberal ideals; cynics ascribed it to petulance, 'making the best of a bad job' or to astuteness—if the people do not like bureaucracy, let them have democracy in full measure to disillusion them. The kindest explanation is that the Government trusted, as it believed, the well-merited affection of the 'conservative element' against the disaffection of a few pernicious agitators. It is a comfortable and flattering belief that the people like foreign rule, and apparently invincible. In Tenasserim in 1826 'every one hailed with delight the certainty of being considered and protected as British subjects' and 'received with horror the possibility of being again made subject to the authority of their old masters'. In Arakan we were greeted as allies until the people gathered that we meant to stay. But in both provinces we soon had to suppress

[1] *ISC*, xi, 249 ff.
[2] 1920, Cmd. 746, pp. 13, 35, 36.

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formidable insurrections.[1] In 1852 Dalhousie believed that Lower Burma would 'hail the substitution of any dominion for the savage oppression of the Burmese Government', but pacification was not completed until 1860.[2] Again in 1886 the Viceroy reported that the British force was welcomed as a deliverance from past and existing evils, and as a prelude to the establishment of British rule for which the people evinced a genuine desire. This view was based on reports from civil officers accompanying the expedition who had no doubt that the people would 'soon be as peaceful and loyal subjects as those in Lower Burma'.[3] But within a few months 'it had become evident that a considerable minority of the people, to say the least, did not want us', and this was emphasized by a rebellion in Lower Burma.[4]

'The Mandalay campaign', said a prominent civilian, 'was undertaken with a light heart in the belief that the people of Upper Burma would welcome us with open arms. Events have proved how ill-founded the belief was. While our army was far away north, on the Irrawaddy, a real campaign was being prepared for us in the low country. The people do not want us any more than they did thirty years ago. They rose to throw off the yoke, now they are still carrying on a guerilla warfare against us.'[5]

Finally, however, the people came to acquiesce in British rule, and for some years their natural dislike of foreign ways was tempered by increasing material prosperity. But it remained latent, and during the present century there have been petty local risings every few years. Their sympathies were clearly apparent to anyone whose official position allowed him to move inconspicuously among the people and overhear their remarks. In Upper Burma, for some twenty years, the people were about as well content as is possible under foreign rule. Men of middle age still bore the tattoo mark indicating the regiment or group in which they had been liable to compulsory service, and the irksome customs and various abuses swept away by British rule were a living memory; the new market for cotton and other produce and the introduction of groundnut put money in the pockets of the people, and their social system had not yet been seriously corroded by economic forces. As formerly in the older province, men welcomed their new freedom and the protection against arbitrary authority given by the rule of law. Yet so far back as 1907, long before they had come into contact with modern nationalism, one could hear complaints that they had to work so much harder than

[1] *SL*, p. 4; *BBG*, i, 481, 483; ii, 14, 382, 691.
[2] 1852–3, Cmd. 1608, pp. 48, 49.
[3] 1886, Cmd. 4614, p. 265; 4887, p. 15.
[4] Crosthwaite, pp. 13, 14, 103, 104.
[5] Smeaton, p. 3.

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before; they pitied 'the little king whom the foreigners had carried off into captivity'; and a boy, tending cattle in the jungle, would chant, 'It is not fit, it is not fit, that foreigners should rule the royal Golden Land'. In Lower Burma also, even before the dawn of Nationalism, an old man at the pagoda would regret that the people were 'stifled with *kalas* (foreigners)'; younger men would tell how they had to dress as half-castes in European trousers in order to secure a job; a knot of villagers discussing the comparative merits of British and Burmese rule would admit that 'it is cooler now, but, like the soil under that water-stand, rotten'. The people valued their national customs, traditions and religion, and, when things went wrong, felt they would have gone better under Burmese rule. In their eyes things were going wrong. There was increasing resentment of Indian moneylenders and landlords, and of Indian competition as tenants and agricultural labourers; vaccination, plague precautions, veterinary regulations and other welfare measures stimulated discontent, and the townsfolk at least saw only too clearly that the 'richest men were almost entirely non-Burmese'. That was the 'placid contentment' among the major element of the public, when a Government, committed to the maintenance of British rule, was nominally made to share its responsibilities with the numerical majority including lads of eighteen. People did not even have the trouble of getting registered, for all were entered automatically on the roll, and the vote was no more highly valued for being made so cheap.

The new constitution undermined village administration,[1] the basis of executive authority, without providing any substitute, and those few (including the present writer) who protested that it would be necessary to restore order with machine-guns were amply justified when, within less than ten years, the most serious rebellion since 1886 broke out, involving military operations over a great part of the country, together with internment camps for thousands of prisoners. But Government had the guns, the Europeans had the money, and it was thought safe to let the people have the vote. The plan, like the municipal institutions, tried to get the people of their own accord to do what they did not want to do, while leaving undone what they wanted. Naturally the results were very much the same as in local self-government. From the outset the Government was faced 'with an opposition almost altogether Burmese in race and completely Burmese in sympathy'.[2] The desire of the opposition was 'that ample facilities

[1] *RAB*, 1930–1, p. 26.

[2] *ISC*, XI, 268.

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should be afforded for the education of Burmans so as to fit them for advance in all spheres; that the public services and public bodies should be manned by Burmans; that indigenous economic and industrial development should be fostered, and the economic condition of the masses improved; that foreign exploitation should be curtailed, and posts in the services for which Burmans were not yet fitted should be reduced; that funds should be diverted from "law and order" departments to "nation-building" departments, and that money should be spent in providing credit facilities for agriculturalists, rather than on buildings and roads'. The contrary policy of the ministerial parties may be summarized as a colourless and comprehensive negative; 'they were not actuated in common by any definite forward policy. Their general attitude was one of support for law and order, the maintenance of administrative, educational and economic principles and standards, and opposition to extravagance.'[1] 642 668

In mere numbers, the Government was in 'a perpetual and hopeless minority'. But political inexperience and personal rivalries hindered the opposition from using its numerical strength to the best advantage, and the Government could always recruit ministers, even from among the nationalists. The ministers were highly paid, even by European standards; very few Burmans could earn a tenth, and few even a hundredth part of the salary of a minister, and on these terms there was no lack of candidates and it was possible to witness 'the somewhat unusual spectacle of opposition by a party to a Government on which its own leaders were ministers'. Apart from groups or individuals detached from the opposition, the Government could rely on the official block, the nominated members, the representatives of capitalist and foreign interests, and occasionally the indigenous minorities. The non-official supporters were liable to vote against the Government on matters affecting their particular interests, but the members of the official block were allowed to speak and vote only in support of official policy, and 'it is not too much to say that only the existence of the official block enabled the Government to carry on without serious difficulty.' Thus, except on very contentious matters, it was possible to outvote the opposition.[2] 662

The public in general took little interest in the proceedings in the Council.[2] The tie between the members and the constituencies, especially in rural areas, was very weak. The old hereditary aristocracy had been reduced to the dead level of the people by the abolition of 646 668

[1] *ISC*, XI, 273–4.

[2] *ISC*, XI, 273, 577–9.

[2] [The Legislative Council, cf. cat. 116, p. 160 — Analyst]

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646 668 the circles. Its place had been taken, though not filled, by the money-lenders, predominantly Indian, and lawyers, now mostly Burmese though little if at all acquainted with village life. In the Council there was a high proportion of lawyers, not always of the best standing in the courts, and many of these became professional politicians. The electorate in general was apathetic. In 1925 only 17 % of the voters went to the poll in contested constituencies, and 20 % in 1928.[1] The total circulation of Burmese newspapers was only a few thousand copies and their circulation was roughly proportional to their Nationalist zeal.[2] Thus the electorate could always be 'swayed by suggestions that religion was in danger, that foreign rule is burdensome, that taxation is heavy, and that therefore the proper course is to vote for the candidate whose programme is to oppose the Government'.[3] In the country as in the Council, there was an opposition almost altogether Burmese in race and completely Burmese in sympathy. The well-disposed 'conservative element' was an illusion.

647 In general and departmental administration, however, the political reforms made little difference. The executive framework of Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and so on stood firm. Nationalist ministers, dependent on the support of officials for their salary, 'were cautious in their application to the administration of the policy of their party' and 'adopted the current policy of the Department as substantially suitable'. The transfer of certain services to the nominal control of the ministers led to increased expenditure under those heads, but 'for the most part they were carried on as in pre-Reform days'.[4] It was frequently alleged that the services were dispirited, and that there was a general lowering of the tone of the administration. Officials were harassed by the demands which the new constitution made upon their time, overburdened with the growing complexity of administration, and felt that their responsibility had in some measure been transferred to the Council. But much was done to improve the material condition of the services, and the protection of their interests was entrusted to the immediate care of the Governor. In the newer services designed for 'nation-building', liberal terms were sanctioned, due provision was made for the recruitment of Englishmen, and precautions were taken against the introduction of the 'Spoils System'.[5]

661 563 The chief failure of the reforms was in the direction of affairs. The tangible rewards of office naturally stimulated intrigue and cor-

[1] *ISC*, XI, 580–1.
[2] *ISC*, XI, 272, 338, 581.
[3] *ISC*, XI, 581.
[4] *ISC*, XI, 274, 577.
[5] *ISC*, XI, 577–8.

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ruption in the Council? and encouraged divisions among Nationalists. Unfortunately for the prestige of Government and for the cause of purity in public life, the Chinese leader of its few Burman supporters, who was understood to furnish his party with the funds necessary to secure votes, ended his political career in the law courts on the charge of fraudulently obtaining many lakhs of rupees from European banks.[1] Moreover, the representatives of special interests and communities were always looking to their special interests and defending them when they appeared to be attacked, so that racial and communal feeling tended to become exacerbated; there were violent explosions of anti-Indian feeling in 1924 and again in 1931; the rebellion of 1931 was regarded as partly due to anti-Indian sentiment. In 1931 there was a serious affray between Burmans and Chinese. As the European business men were the ablest and most active exponents of official policy, Burman feeling, which in 1920 had been directed largely against Indians, came to be directed against Europeans. In this atmosphere of mutual suspicion, 'for obvious practical reasons it was necessary to refrain from difficult and contentious legislation'.[2]

The intention of Parliament had been that the Government should gradually be made accountable to the people of the country, as represented on an elected Council? But the Council had no root among the people, and it could not exercise effective control over the Government even within the limits contemplated in the project of Dyarchy; in reality it represented only the western superstructure divorced from national life. Thus, during the first stage of responsible government, the most urgent problems of the country were neglected, and the sores that had broken out during the past fifty years were left to fester; the condition of the cultivators deteriorated, racial tension became more acute, crime increased and disaffection spread. The old fallacy of expecting functions to develop out of forms had vitiated local self-government, and it had a like result in national self-government.

5. Separation from India

It must be recognized then that, despite the adoption of responsible government as the goal of policy, there was little indication of any advance beyond a mechanical conception of the problem. The new forms of responsibility were patched on to the old garment of

[1] *ISC*, xi, 270–1; Craddock, p. 121. [2] *ISC*, xi, 579.

? [The Legislative Council – Analyst]

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642 executive rule, and in practice the direction of affairs was still left to the guidance of economic forces. Administration was necessarily less efficient, because the new forms had no meaning in a purely economic system; it was as if a Board of Directors had suddenly been charged with caring for the employees instead of the shareholders, and yet still tried to carry on as before. When, by the inherent logic of events, the time came for a further advance towards responsible government in India, the question whether Burma should be separated from India became the dominant issue in local politics.[1]

Separation had been advocated intermittently for fifty years or more by British business interests, chiefly because they expected to have greater influence under the Colonial Office than under the Indian Government. Many British officials also, largely through local patriotism, had recently come to favour separation. Others, though content with Burma's position in the old constitution under a British Viceroy, held that 'the Burmese could not, would not and should not consent to become a vassal state of a Nehru's commonwealth'.[2] Burmans had never felt that their country was part of India, and thought that to treat it merely as an Indian province was derogatory to their national status. The Indian with his caste system was in some ways more foreign than the European, and Indian competition and the employment of Indians in the administration and in private enterprise were resented. It was believed accordingly that Burmans would welcome separation.

642 668 But when the question came up for decision in 1932, Burmans were growing suspicious of the proposal and its effects. These suspicions were stimulated by the unanimity with which the Government of Burma, Big Business and the European Press declared in favour of it. Yet at the same time the Government was frowning on patriotic groups, such as the *Do Bama* (We Burman) Association, which had 'started a movement against foreign cigarettes, the English style of hair-cut and the wearing of foreign clothes'.[3] It is true that such activities tended to encourage boycotts, picketing and agitation, but the use of home-spun clothing and of home-made cigarettes would have reduced the unemployment, then prevalent in Burma as elsewhere, and would have opened up new avenues to the modern economic world. Burman enterprise was discouraged even when it had no political significance, as when the manufacture of cheap lighters was made illegal lest it should prejudice the revenue

[1] *ISC*, XI, 565. [2] Craddock, p. 128. [3] *RAB*, 1930–1, p. x.

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from a tax newly imposed on matches. A national government would have encouraged such activities, and it was difficult to believe that the Government had suddenly been converted to nationalism.

Moreover the relations between Burmans and Indians had taken a new turn. Although on the one hand, with the increasing pressure of Indian competition, the former attitude of half contemptuous tolerance had been transformed into a growing antipathy, on the other hand the politically active Burmans were turning to Indians for guidance and support in their common opposition to the British Government, and Burmans and Indians had sometimes joined forces in the Legislative Council. Thus, as Government and the capitalist interests became more insistent on separation, Burmese opinion, partly under the influence of Indian politicians, hardened against it. As an experienced Rangoon journalist has said, the fact that the Government and especially the Governor were believed to be strongly in favour of separation was a good enough reason for voting against it.[1] That is perhaps the most significant aspect of the opposition to separation. One outcome of the political reforms had been to replace dislike of Indians by distrust of Europeans, and the opposition to separation marks a further stage in this process, for the view rapidly gained ground that the real object was to rescue Burma from 'the Lost Dominion' and to make it 'Safe for Capital'.

There were indeed more solid grounds against any sudden and final breach with India. Although the Indian connection had been in many ways unfortunate, it was not without some advantages. The fact that British firms had wished for the transfer of Burma to the Colonial Office suggests that the Indian Government had to some extent acted as a brake on capitalist activities. And we have frequently had occasion to note that measures to promote the welfare of the people usually, if not invariably, emanated from India. This was largely because the Burma Government was merely part of the machinery for maintaining law and order, whereas the Viceroy, to some extent, stood outside the machine, and was not only the source of all initiative, but from time to time inspired the Indian administration with new ideas from England. Also it is not improbable that the link with India helped to protect Burma from being overrun by the Chinese, like Malaya.

These considerations however carried little weight with the opponents of separation, who were mainly actuated by the fear that it

[1] Collis, pp. 56, 59; J. J. Nolan, *Asiatic Review*, 1934, p. 207.

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would be an obstacle to further political progress.[1] Although opposed to immediate separation they wished 'that Burma should be allowed to enter the Federation on a strictly temporary basis, with the right reserved to her to secede at will'. It would have seemed possible to devise some form of association with India which would have promoted the autonomous development of Burma, while easing the stresses of transition. But this was rejected and Burma had 'to choose between two alternatives; either she could separate and pursue her own political destiny apart from India, or she could enter the Federation unconditionally on the same terms as any other province'.[2] It was a case of all or nothing, now or never. In view of the hesitation to accept unconditional admission the issue was decided in favour of separation, but, as a concession to agitation, separation was accompanied by the promise of a 'more advanced' constitution.

6. The Constitution of 1937

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Under the constitution framed on the separation of Burma from India, which took effect from 1 April 1937, the Burma Government became directly responsible to Parliament, and the Secretary of State for India became the Secretary of State for India and Burma, with a separate Under-Secretary for Burma at the head of the Burma Office. The Government of Burma consisted of a Governor, appointed by the Crown; a Council of Ministers, restricted to ten members, responsible to the Legislature for all matters within the scope of its authority; and a Legislature with two Houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Governor was allowed to appoint three personal Councillors, who could attend and speak, but not vote, in the Legislature. The authority of the Legislature did not extend to the Shan States, Karenni, or the Tribal Hills. Within Burma proper the Governor remained solely responsible for defence, external and internal; monetary policy, currency and coinage; and external affairs, other than those connected with the relations between Burma and other British territories. In other matters the Governor was bound by the advice of his ministers, save in a certain range of matters defined in the statute as those in which he exercised a special responsibility. These included the prevention of grave menace to internal peace, the safeguarding of financial stability, the protection of the legitimate interests of minorities, the position of officers in the

[1] *ISC*, XI, 567. [2] Sir Charles Innes, *Asiatic Review*, 1934, p. 203.

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services, and the prevention of discrimination against British subjects domiciled in the United Kingdom or British India or against goods of United Kingdom or Indian origin. In such matters he could refuse to accept the advice of his ministers. In practice, however, his reserve powers proved inadequate. As will appear below, there were frequent complaints that officials were exposed to political pressure, and, despite his special responsibility for minorities, there were prolonged anti-Indian outbreaks in 1938–9. 642

The Senate consisted of 36 members, half elected by the House of Representatives and half nominated by the Governor. Of the 132 seats in the House of Representatives 92 were given to territorial units and were non-communal; the remainder represented communal or other special interests. The franchise was enlarged to about one-third of the total adult male population, and one-tenth of the female. [646] [641]

In the new Legislature there was no official block. But it suffered, even in an exaggerated degree, from the other defects of the former Legislative Assembly. There was no organic connection between the people and their representatives; villagers did not look beyond their village or care twopence who represented them, so that votes went for less than two a penny, paid in promissory notes. The system of special and communal representation still aggravated racial tension. 'The minorities—Karens, Indians, Chinese, Anglo-Indians and Europeans—had between them 37 seats out of the 132, so that any Burmese leader who wanted to depend entirely on a Burmese majority had to command at least 67 out of the 95 Burmese seats. It never appeared likely that this would be the case.' After prolonged negotiations a coalition was formed under Dr Ba Maw 'who had been the most prominent anti-separationist, had expressed his determination to wreck the constitution, and had preached doctrines of advanced socialism'. His coalition included the Indians and Karens, about 12 each, but even so it commanded the barest majority and 'depended largely on the support of the Europeans, who maintained an independent position'.[1] This aggravated discontent with British rule, because the leading representative of British commercial interests was commonly regarded as the effective head of the government, even with a Nationalist premier. It was also a defect of the new system, as compared with the former, that there were now ten ministers and these could appoint members as salaried assistants. The salaries were still extravagantly high as compared with normal 646 642

[1] F. B. Leach, *Asiatic Review*, 1939, p. 631.

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646 Burmese incomes. To hold office it was in practice necessary to command the anti-Nationalist vote, and this tended to split the
642 Nationalist camp and multiplied intrigues to obtain the lucrative appointment of minister.

663 Yet the new Government made an impressive start, and showed a readiness to deal with long-neglected problems. Committees were appointed to examine agrarian distress, and their enquiries were followed by legislation. It formulated proposals to abolish 'the obnoxious capitation tax', regarded since the seventies as 'a very important reform in the fiscal system'.[1] Village administration was examined. And for the first time there was a public enquiry into the prevalence of corruption.

7. Corruption

661 It has long been frequently asserted among all sections of the community that corruption prevailed in every branch of Government service. According to the official view it was a survival from Burmese rule that would gradually be remedied with the spread of education. Prevention was left to the ordinary processes of law. Those who gained their ends by bribery naturally made no complaint, and complaints from those who suffered were suspect as malicious. Such evidence as was available mostly came from people who had given bribes and, as accomplices, their evidence, even if admissible, was doubtful. It was difficult and dangerous for any private individual to set the law in motion, and in practice this was hardly possible except by some local or departmental superior of the man suspected of corruption. But officials rarely stayed long enough in any one place to collect the necessary evidence, make all the necessary preliminary enquiries and carry through a prosecution; or long enough even to find out what was going on, and who should be prosecuted. In 1941 the current lists of officials dismissed between 1896 and 1939, which presumably showed all those still believed to be alive, contained only sixty-five persons found guilty of corruption.[2] Under executive rule the Government sometimes deplored the prevalence of corruption, sometimes minimized it, but did nothing to stop it, and did not even hold any formal enquiry to ascertain its extent and propound remedies.

The association of Burmans with the Government under the reforms of 1923, however, changed the situation. Members of the

[1] 1886, Cmd. 4614, p. 72. [2] *CBC*, p. 44.

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Legislature knew the facts better than officials; some had a personal interest in preventing corruption, and many welcomed the chance to attack Government in one of the weaker places in its armour. They repeatedly drew attention to the subject and 'the leader of the Home Rule party introduced a motion in regard to the prevalence of bribery and corruption'.[1] But this was one of the many contentious subjects which Government thought it prudent to avoid, and nothing was done.

A further change came, however, with the separation of Burma from India. Burman ministers had greater patronage, and charges of graft and nepotism were freely vented, and taken up with zest by those Europeans who disliked the political reforms.[2] Once again there was a motion for an enquiry into corruption; this time it came from a member of the Karen group. Although the Government persuaded him to withdraw his motion, it was pressed and carried by the Nationalist opposition, and a Committee of Enquiry was constituted. The interest of Nationalist politicians would seem to have been largely factitious as, although members of the Legislature were invited to give evidence, 'with a few distinguished exceptions they not only did not attend, but did not even reply'. Among those who responded, however, were some members of the legal profession and adherents of the *thakin* (extremist) party, and it is interesting to note that it was the extremist party, most keenly opposed to foreign government, which was most solicitous for pure administration. Moreover, an appeal to the general public evoked many replies, 'clearly inspired by the conviction that corruption in the public services is a great evil and by a desire to help the Government to eradicate it'; evidently there was a fund of constructive good will on which a government secure in the affections of the people could rely.[3]

The report of the committee touched on the tradition of corruption under Burmese rule. As already noticed there was then no salaried civil service. Judges were entitled to take fees from the parties according to the value of the matter in dispute; revenue officials drew a commission on collections; everyone in authority could make such demands for fees or personal services as custom allowed or as he could manage to exact. Shortly after the occupation of Pegu, the demands of local authorities were estimated at about two-thirds of the amount due to the Crown, but there is nothing to show how far these estimates

[1] *ISC*, XI, 325, 329
[2] Craddock, pp. 122–3; Leach, *Asiatic Review*, 1939, p. 634.
[3] *CBC*, p. 5.

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were reliable. It may be well to recall the experience of Mr Gouger. He landed in Burma with valuable merchandise from Calcutta, ignorant of the language or customs. He comments on 'the absence of all unauthorized exactions', and it seems that neither he nor others had to pay anything beyond the prescribed duties. On his way up the river there were 'no annoying exactions or tolls to impede them on their passage', and on arrival at the capital he took up his residence 'with less vexatious annoyance' than he would have encountered in any town in Europe. All that was necessary in importing goods was to comply with the easy regulations. But, when he wished to export produce, he was contravening regulations imposed by a mistaken economic policy, and he had to get round the regulations by bribery.[1] His experience suggests that the view generally accepted as to the corruptness of Burmese administration is exaggerated. That was the view taken by the committee.

> 'There can be no doubt', says the *Report*, 'that the fees and presents paid to Burmese Judges were to a great extent prescribed by custom, and that honest Judges took no more than the customary amount.... The testimony of European traders and diplomatic agents that they had to bribe Ministers and local officials is largely irrelevant. They were imperfectly acquainted with the scale of customary fees, and in any case...foreigners are fair game.'[2]

But the Burmese system of remunerating officials was radically unsound. The officials had no fixed salaries, there was no fixed rule of law to which aggrieved parties could appeal, and, although under British rule officials might still exact more than their legal due, they could no longer depend on the support of Government in doing so. But 'even to this day the rural public frequently draws no distinction between payments to government officers which go into the Treasury, and those which do not'; and this confusion is by no means restricted to the villager or the uneducated. 'The British annexation placed at the head of things a group of officials who by tradition were inaccessible to bribes; this was an inestimable advantage in that it gave Burma for the first time the idea that an incorruptible Civil Service was a possibility.' But 'the actual advantage to the individual citizen may easily be exaggerated'. The European officers were strange and far away, and the villager was 'exposed to contact with an ever-increasing variety of functionaries—Township Officers,

[1] Above, p. 18. [2] *CBC*, p. 7.

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administering three separate legal systems—all of which were equally strange to him; Police, Vaccinators, Veterinary Assistants, Cadastral Surveyors, Road Overseers, Irrigation Overseers, Epidemic Sub-Assistant Surgeons, Sub-Inspectors of Excise, Forest Rangers, and superior officers who controlled all these; persons of whose duties he had only a vague idea, who had to administer regulations with which he was almost unacquainted, and many of whom administered them mainly with a view to extortion'.[1]

The *Report* of the committee is melancholy reading. In most services there are three grades of officers: 'Higher', 'Burma', and 'Subordinate'. In the two lower grades of the general and judicial services the majority of the committee doubted whether more than 30 % were honest; estimates of the number corrupt varied from 20 to 99·9 %. Among the Police it was suggested that 'not less than two-thirds of the Inspectors were corrupt, and the proportion among Deputy Superintendents was perhaps less'. The Excise Department was 'by general consent the most universally corrupt'; honest officers, if any, were very rare. In the jails 'a prisoner could have anything he wanted except women; some said he could even have women'.

In the Medical Department there was no point on which the witnesses were more unanimous than that subordinate medical officers could be bribed to make false reports or give false evidence in hurt cases; hospital assistants had to be bribed to give better attendance, and almost everywhere it was reported that the ward servants and dressers, if not paid, would purposely treat wounds roughly so as to cause pain; 'that the story should be so widely believed is a measure of the fear and mistrust which the public feel towards the hospitals'. Vaccinators had formerly taken bribes to disregard breaches of the regulations, but 'malpractices had declined with the increasing popularity of vaccination' (coinciding with improvement in the lymph and the substitution of Burman for Indian vaccinators). Formerly extortion by veterinary assistants was extremely common, and 'the visits of these officers were dreaded in the villages', but this was no longer generally true and the public was learning to appreciate the benefit of their services. In the schools there were many deputy inspectors who did not take bribes, and there were no complaints against inspectors, but for years the Ministry of Education had acquiesced in 'an elaborate and long-continued system of corruption', by which school managers furnished false certificates

[1] *CBC*, p. 8.

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about the salaries paid so as to obtain larger grants than they had earned. (That was a common practice long before the Reforms of 1923.) In the Public Works Department the public generally thinks that corruption is extensive and serious, but the committee believed that a majority of the executive engineers (officials of the 'higher' class) were honest, and that 'by no means all Subdivisional Officers were corrupt'; in the Irrigation Branch corruption was less frequent and extensive. The Postal Department had a good reputation among the public, but internal corruption seemed to stop short only at the Director-General, and postmen and clerks paid to get their appointments. In the Agricultural Department, officials were often bribed by would-be tenants of Government farms. In the Land Records Department, corrupt superintendents were believed now to be rare, though inspectors often demanded a share of the illicit gains of their subordinates. Viewing conditions as a whole the committee believed that many officers were led into corruption by the evil influence of corrupt seniors and that 'to put it plainly, if justice were done, a very large proportion of all the public servants of the country would be in jail'. Not infrequently the prevalence of corruption is suggested as a reason for not entrusting Burmans with self-government. Yet it should be remembered that in some of these departments few Burmans were employed, and that the tradition of corruptness dates from a time when practically no Burmans were employed in Government service except as magistrates and clerks; on the other hand there is least corruption in the departments where Burmans are chiefly employed, and the people understand and value their activities.

The published report does not deal with the allegations of ministerial corruption, but there can be little doubt that, even if exaggerated by scandal and by racial discord, they were only too well founded. The official who presided over the enquiry subsequently published his impressions on this aspect of the problem. He was careful to explain that he had known some ministers who were incorrupt and several others whose activities were at least not directed by the motive of putting money in their pockets. But many of their proceedings 'went far beyond the normal bounds of graft', and some ministers 'chose to scrabble in the mud for petty bribes, and to squeeze money out of aspirants to appointments, promotions or transfer in the public service—money which the public servant would usually recoup by extortion from the public, preferably from

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the poor, for the rich are not such easy subjects for intimidation'. 661
But extortion of the same kind, recouped in the same manner, was
an old story. Formerly most of the patronage was reserved to high 647
officials who were above all reasonable suspicion of corruption, and the opportunities of office superintendents and clerks for taking bribes were limited, yet it was commonly reported that there was a recognized tariff for transfer to the more lucrative or otherwise desirable stations. The difference was that those responsible for suppressing the evil would now sometimes share the loot. Also the ministers were more exposed to temptation, and were less fortified to resist it. Officials stood outside party politics, were trained as public servants, and inherited the modern western tradition of integrity in public life. The ministers who took their place were party men, with no special training and the heirs of a very different tradition. It is a tradition in Burma that every one should provide for his dependents, and should use his influence for that purpose (like Sir Thomas Bertram in *Mansfield Park*) 'from a general wish of doing right'. And the conditions were much the same as in Lincoln's Cabinet, where the Secretary of State 'would steal anything but a red-hot stove'. The professional politician incurred heavy expenses, legitimate and illegitimate, and expected to reimburse himself from the prizes of a profession in which his chances of office were uncertain and his tenure insecure. In the general atmosphere of intrigue, it is not strange that some grabbed with both hands all that they could get, and their example and influence must certainly have encouraged corruption in the services. But the main cause of corruption in the services was the cleavage between law and custom and the contradiction between administrative policy and public sentiment.

Corruption may conveniently be classified as either *judicial* or 661
administrative; judicial corruption relates to the conduct of the courts,
and administrative corruption on the other hand covers all those 647
matters not directly concerned with the administration of justice. 671
Our government is based on the western principle of the rule of law, and in that respect may justly be claimed as superior to the Burmese system. But in England, though not in Burma, law is based on public opinion and on what the people want; in Burma the law and procedure of the British courts conflict with Burmese sentiment, and the rule of law often seems to differ little from caprice. Every one knew more or less what was customary, but even the judges themselves, below the Privy Council, cannot be certain of the law. If a

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661 legal decision purports to be based on custom, every one knows more
647 or less whether it is correct, because every one knows local custom.
671 But when, following some obscure *dhammathat*, a court decides that in law an eldest child has certain privileges, the people do not know whether it is good law, but only that it is contrary to custom. If a court decides that a transaction is a sale, or that labourers have no lien on the crop, people do not know whether the decision is technically correct, they know only that it contradicts what they have always believed. Judges no longer have to justify their decisions to public opinion but to the court of appeal, and parties cannot tell whether an adverse decision is due to corruption or to the vagaries of western law. It is much easier, therefore, for judges to take bribes. Moreover, aggrieved litigants will usually attribute an adverse decision to corruption, and this view is encouraged by the fact that the decision usually goes in favour of the longer purse, which can better afford to fight the case and can engage the more skilful advocate. As the general belief in judicial corruption grows, the people are more ready to offer bribes, and judges are less fortified to resist them.

661 Administrative corruption is largely due to the multiplication of
647 unwelcome 'welfare' measures. These require a host of subordinates on low pay, among whom many, according to the committee, use them 'mainly with a view to extortion'. Ordinarily, however, welfare measures promote corruption in a more insidious manner. The surveyor who omits to notice encroachment on Government land, or infractions of the building rules, the sanitary inspector who is not too active in nosing out nuisances, the vaccinator who overlooks unvaccinated children, the veterinary assistant who does not insist on the slaughter or burial of diseased cattle, all earn the public gratitude, which naturally finds expression in a trifling present; they are regarded as kindly rather than corrupt. Corruption grows together with the elaboration of western administrative machinery, and is at least a by-product if not the main product of 'efficiency'. It is probable that judicial officers are, on the whole, less corrupt than fifty years ago, but, as western rule has reached out further into every department of social life, it has brought new occasions for corruption and, only too often, very little else.

Naturally, corruption grows most rapidly where it is most secure. Local bodies, composed of members who share the general opinion about western welfare, are more likely to give and take bribes than to prosecute offenders. Probably their own houses contravene the build-

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ing and sanitary by-laws, their own children may be unvaccinated; their own cattle may under the rules be liable to segregation or slaughter; almost certainly some of them are more or less distantly related to the departmental subordinates who take bribes. Self-interest and apathy make them reluctant to suppress corruption and, under their rule, those who take bribes are safe. Again, the notorious corruption in the Public Works Department is largely due to its divorce from Burman life. Through economic forces it has come about that work is given to Indian or Chinese contractors employing Indian labour and working on western lines under the inspection of officials, largely alien, and under European direction. In 1931, of 170 contractors for the Railway, only 12 were Burmans, 140 were Indians and the rest Chinese or European.[1] Such control as is exercised by the law and the Accounts Department is no substitute for public interest, and the corruption and waste of public money are naturally far greater in Government or municipal works than in village works undertaken by the people for themselves; we have already noted the alleged completion of town roads in Toungoo. It is significant that in the Irrigation Department, where the people understand and sympathize with the work done, and where the staff is largely Burman, corruption seems to be less prevalent. Most vaccinators and veterinary assistants are now Burmans and are said to be growing less corrupt as western methods become more effective and, accordingly, better appreciated by the people.

For both judicial and administrative corruption the remedy is essentially the same. We cannot depart from the rule of law, and although, as suggested recently in a ruling of the Chief Justice, much might be done to reconcile law and custom, no one would revive old customs that sufficed for the medieval society of Burmese rule. It should be possible to reduce litigation and to encourage arbitration, but the only effective remedy for judicial corruption is to build up a new society in effective contact with the western world, and able by its inherent vitality to restrain anti-social economic forces instead of leaving control over them to a legal system that encourages rather than prevents corruption. Similarly, we cannot neglect western welfare measures merely because the people have not yet learned to appreciate them; the suppression of disease and epidemics in Burma among men and crops and cattle is not merely of local interest but a matter of world welfare. The remedy lies not in multiplying

[1] Census, 1931, p. 153.

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regulations and establishments, and measuring efficiency by expenditure, but in devising some means to enlist public support for western welfare and the law.

8. Defence

Before the separation of Burma from India the military forces stationed in Burma consisted of two battalions of British Infantry, three battalions of Indian infantry, the Burma Rifles (a regiment of four battalions recruited in Burma, but containing no Burmese), a company of Sappers and Miners, and ten battalions of Military Police, acting as an armed reserve for the Indian Army and for dealing with frontier raids and internal disturbances. 'They are, in fact, soldiers as well as police.'[1] There were no Burmese in the regular army and, until shortly before the separation of Burma, none in the Military Police. For this there were two main reasons.

In early days in India the East India Company enrolled guards for the protection of its factories, but for show rather than for military service. Gradually they assumed a more military character, and from about 1750 the Company began also to entertain irregular troops armed with swords and targets, lances and matchlocks, bows and arrows. Clive shaped this material into a battalion of sepoys, drilled, disciplined and clothed on western lines. By the time of the first war with Burma in 1826, there was an Indian army accustomed to European discipline, under European officers accustomed to Indian ways.[2] The Burmese, however, in military as in civil matters, were still living in the Middle Ages; their forces resembled those which Clive had used as the raw material for his levies. The East India Company did not need their services, and had no officers acquainted with their ways to train them; moreover, they needed higher pay than Indians because they were not so poor. It would have been difficult, troublesome and costly to recruit Burmese for the army, and, from the standpoint of economy and common sense, it was unnecessary to recruit them.

It was not only unnecessary but imprudent to recruit Burmese. There could be little reliance on troops raised from among a people with no divisions of caste but united in religion, race and national sentiment with the king and their kinsfolk just across the border, still waiting an opportunity to wipe out defeat in another trial of strength. Obviously security required that the Burmese should be disarmed and debarred from military service. The Karens and other

[1] *IG*, IV, 375; *ISC*, XI, 206. [2] *IG*, IV, 326.

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minor tribes, however, might be expected to side with the British, and these have been recruited, even when an initial reluctance had to be dispelled, but it has always been easy to find reasons for withholding military training, even as volunteer cadets, from the great mass of the people.

In this matter there was a difference between the situation in Tenasserim and Arakan. The Arakanese had called in the Burmese for help in ousting an oppressive ruler, but the Burmese who came to help them stayed to rule them. The Arakanese never acquiesced in Burmese rule, and, from across the British frontier, continued to resist. On the outbreak of the war in 1824, it was thought expedient to raise an Arakanese levy to assist in driving the Burmese out of Arakan, and this levy was retained after the end of the war. In Tenasserim, however, the Talaings had in great measure been assimilated by the Burmese, and could hardly be distinguished from them. For many years no attempt was made to recruit Talaings. In 1833, however, the Commissioner urged that the Burmese and Talaings were 'superior in physical strength and in all points calculated to make good soldiers to most of the sepoys of western India', and suggested that, if the experiment of a Talaing Corps should prove as successful as he anticipated, 'the whole of the external defence of these Provinces might be undertaken a few years hence by the Talaings'. But he insisted that care should be taken to select suitable officers. His proposals were approved and the preliminary steps were taken. But the officers, instead of being men with local knowledge, were sent over from India, and the Government of India hoped to save money on the pay. Madras troops in Burma drew pay at Indian rates together with an allowance for foreign service, and the Talaings were expected to serve at Indian rates with no allowance. The Commissioner protested that one could not attract respectable men on inferior pay, and the project was abandoned.

Shortly afterwards war with Ava seemed imminent, and the Commissioner again urged that, to give confidence to the people by putting arms in their hands and by entrusting their defence in some measure to themselves, would be eminently useful 'in Political and Military points of view'; he thought, moreover, that in the long run the measure would 'decidedly prove economical' by making it possible to dispense with Indian troops.[1] The Indian Government again yielded to these arguments, and a Talaing Levy was formed in

[1] *SL*, pp. 140, 165.

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701 1839. But the crisis passed and, under a succession of Commissioners appointed from India and less infected with local patriotism, imponderable sentiment was outweighed by common sense, convenience and economy, and the Talaing Levy languished and was disbanded in 1849.

When the second war broke out in 1852, the question of recruiting local forces was reopened.[1] The Arakanese Levy rendered useful service, and Phayre wished to raise a force in Pegu, partly of Burmans and partly of Malays. A nucleus already existed in Bassein, where Fytche had hit on the idea of using dacoits against dacoits. He 'enlisted no man into the corps unless it was shown that he had been a bad and dangerous character'. 'They were brave enough in all conscience, and required no European officer to lead them into action.' But, inevitably, severe discipline was needed to maintain order among a band of criminals, and neither the character of the men nor the stringent discipline encouraged respectable men to accept military service so long as cultivation was more profitable. However, a regiment was raised as the Pegu Light Infantry. But in 1861 there seemed no longer any near danger of war with Ava, and both the Arakan Levy and the Pegu Light Infantry were converted into civil police.

Besides these two regiments there was also a Karen Levy of some two hundred men.[2] The Karen tribes were small and divided, and could never endanger British rule; formerly a wild jungle folk oppressed by the Burmese, large numbers had accepted Christianity, with a rise in status and prosperity that attached them to the British. Some, however, were Buddhist and regarded themselves as Burmans, and in 1857 considerable trouble was caused by a Karen rising. Regular troops could not operate in their wild country and a special force of two companies, each of a hundred men, was raised. 'It was intended that this should be composed of Karens, but it was found impossible to make soldiers of them, and Shan and Toungthoo were to a great extent enlisted instead.' But the Government persisted in the effort to recruit Karens, and by 1880 these formed about three-quarters of the total. However, they would not serve for long and, as soon as they had made enough money to take a wife, they resigned; or deserted if the resignation was not promptly accepted.

The recruitment of Karens received a new stimulus in 1886.[3] The

[1] Fytche, I, 145; *BBG*, ii, 108.
[2] *BBG*, II, 553, 605.
[3] Smeaton, pp. 7 ff.

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Burmese were in rebellion throughout British Burma, and American missionaries were active in rallying Karens to the British cause. Under this stimulus the Karens proved useful auxiliaries and in 1891 a Karen battalion of Military Police was formed; this is said to have proved a failure, and in 1896 the Karens were distributed among Indian battalions. There were still difficulties in filling the ranks, but these were partly overcome by the appointment of a European from the police as a special Karen recruiting officer. Even during the present century, one of these remarked, not wholly in jest, that he reckoned it a good season if three recruits joined up and only one recruiting sergeant deserted. But, as a result of this continual encouragement, the Karens became accustomed to military discipline, securing a place in the Military Police, and later in the army.

The case was different with the Burmese. During the early days of the occupation of Upper Burma, when the people were believed to welcome British rule, some were recruited for the Military Police. But the Chief Commissioner, newly arrived from India and out of touch with Burmese sentiment, found himself opposed by a generally hostile population and a Burmese army still conducting guerilla operations. He was easily persuaded that the recruitment of Burmese involved a 'gross waste of money', and the men were forthwith disbanded. At the same time he determined to disarm all Burmese as rigorously as possible while leaving arms with the Karens; he therefore imposed conditions for bearing arms which, though ostensibly impartial, could be accepted by the Karens but not by the Burmese.[1]

Thus, when war broke out in 1914, Burmese for two generations or more had been given no opportunity of a military career, except in one Company of Sappers and Miners, and the Government congratulated them on the privilege of exemption from military service. But there was 'evinced throughout the Province an unmistakable desire that the Burmese should be allowed to enlist as soldiers' and later, when the problem of manpower became serious 'a vigorous recruiting campaign'[2] was set in hand, mainly through the local magistrates, and the people were congratulated on being granted the privilege to serve. The Sappers and Miners were expanded to three companies and a depot, a regiment of Burma Rifles was formed, and several Mechanical Transport Companies and two Labour Corps.

[1] Crosthwaite, pp. 64, 80, 131.
[2] *RAB*, 1916–17, p. 10; 1917–18, p. i; *ISC*, xi, 23.

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These units served in Mesopotamia, Palestine and France. The Sappers and Miners 'did excellent work in Mesopotamia and on the North-west Frontier of India', and the Burma Rifles, 'though a very new formation, with no old soldiers to give it a stiffening, received excellent reports' and 'showed no lack of actual fighting qualities'.[1]

But at the end of the war the forces had to be reduced to a peace establishment, and most of the new units were disembodied. In 1925 it was decided to recruit only Karens, Kachins and Chins for the Burma Rifles, and shortly afterwards the Sappers and Miners were disbanded for reasons of economy. 'The discharge of all the Burmese members of the Burma Rifles and the disbandment of the Burma Sappers and Miners was a great blow to the national pride of the Burmese', but defence was one of the reserved subjects over which the people had no control, and the Government, although expressing sympathy with Burmese sentiment, made no effective protest against the decision.

During the war the Burmese were admitted also to the Military Police. After the war recruitment was suspended and there were numerous desertions, over half of them among Karens and Kachins. Two years later, when recruitment was reopened, Karens, Kachins and Chins were admitted, but not Burmese.[2]

In addition to the regular forces there was also a volunteer force in Burma. This comprised various units dating originally from 1877 at a time of tension with Upper Burma. For this volunteer force only men of European descent on the father's side were eligible, though in fact Indians and Karens were admitted, and some Burmese found admission by adopting European names and costumes. Burmans had long urged their claims to admission, and in 1917, when patriotism was in the air, a committee appointed to promote 'the Imperial Idea' recommended that Burmans from approved schools should be admitted to cadet corps as boys (though not to volunteer corps as men).[3] This recommendation was disregarded, and Burmans remained ineligible for any form of military training either as boys or men.

Thus, between the introduction of the earlier reforms in 1923 and the separation of Burma from India in 1937, Burma became less and not more capable of self-defence. It has been commonly held that

[1] *RAB*, 1919–20, p. 46; Leach, *Asiatic Review*, 1940, p. 747.
[2] *RAB*, 1919–20, p. 48; 1921–2, pp. 72–3; *ISC*, XI, pp. 23, 206.
[3] *CII*, p. 29.

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the Burmese are not a martial people,[1] and not unnaturally a view so congenial to our interest has found ready acceptance. It is true of course that a people deprived of weapons and excluded from military experience for fifty to a hundred years loses the tradition of defending itself in arms, but the Burmese do not forget so readily as we are apt to do their former record of frequent, and on the whole, successful war, when they were masters of the minor races which we have recruited for the army. It is true also that, with the growing distrust and dislike of British rule during the present century, there was little desire for service in an army which might be called on to support the British Government against their fellow countrymen, and that the pay and conditions of service were less attractive to the Burmese than to the tribal peoples of the infertile hills. But those who served with them in the war of 1914 knew that 'the recruits included some first-rate material and, with care in recruitment and the avoidance of undue haste, there was no reason why the Burmese should not make excellent soldiers and be able in time to undertake the defence of their own country'.[2]

If the problem of responsible government had been conceived in terms of creating a united people to which the Government might be made responsible, the question of building up an army would have been recognized as a matter of primary importance, but it was conceived in terms of constitutional mechanics, of constructing machinery that, if it could not do much good, could do no serious damage; the military aspect of the problem was disregarded, and indeed, with an executive government in 'a perpetual and hopeless minority' in the Legislative Council, the existence of a Burmese army might have multiplied embarrassments. When, however, it was decided in 1934 that Burma should be separated from India, something had to be done about defence. The problem was solved by converting the units of the Indian army serving in Burma, together with the Military Police, into a Burma Defence Force, and placing it under the Governor as Commander-in-Chief. Thus the army still remained non-Burmese, entirely distinct from the people, and an instrument for the maintenance of internal security rather than for defence against aggression. It was recognized that the demand for the admission of Burmese to the Burma Defence Force could no longer be resisted, but there was little activity in meeting it. At the outbreak of war in 1939 a question in

[1] Sir C. Innes, *Asiatic Review*, 1937, p. 185.
[2] Leach, *Asiatic Review*, 1940, p. 747.

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the Council elicited the figures in the marginal table showing the number of men locally recruited according to race, together with the percentage of the total population which each race constituted at the census of 1931. The figures for Burmese include Talaings and Shans. Only on the eve of war, on 31 August 1939, did the Government announce that indigenous peoples would no longer be excluded from the Burma Auxiliary Force which had replaced the former volunteers. Thus, when the Japanese invaded Burma, the people had no means of taking part in its defence. Within four months of the invasion 4000 Burmese were under arms on the Japanese side, and before long the Burma Independence Army reached a strength of 30,000.[1]

Racial constitution of the Burma Army

(*a*) Race
(*b*) Per cent of population
(*c*) No. in the army

(*a*)	(*b*)	(*c*)
Burmese	75·11	472
Karen	9·34	1448
Chin	2·38	868
Kachin	1·05	881
Others		
Native	2·38	168
Foreign	9·74	

[1] T. L. Hughes, *JRCAS*, 1943, p. 91.

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CHAPTER VI

BURMA, 1923–40: POLITICAL DEMOCRACY

(b) *PROGRESS AND WELFARE*

1. Economic Progress

Communications. The main lines of communication by rail had already been laid down under executive rule, and since 1923 the extensions have consisted merely of feeder lines. Projects of linking up the system with India encountered opposition, as this would have encouraged immigration to the detriment of the Burman labourer, and also of the steamship companies which handled the coolie traffic. By 1936 the total mileage worked was 2060. In 1929, however, there was a change in the management of the railway; the lease granted to a private company in 1896 expired, and the system was taken over by the Indian Government. It passed to the Government of Burma in 1937. 496

The Irrawaddy Flotilla Company maintained its monopoly over the waterways; the new lines of railway did not tap the river, and it could disregard or suppress local competition from a few small private steamers, mostly owned by Indians. The rapid development of motor traffic, however, led to a considerable extension of the road system, and by 1940 there were 17,000 miles open to wheeled traffic, of which some 12,500 miles were available for motors, though only 5000 were metalled. One feature of this new development was the multiplication of bus services and taxis owned by Burmans. But Burma was still cut off from the outer world by land, chiefly because the traffic across the frontiers with India, China and Siam was too small to justify expenditure on roads. The Burma Road lies in China (except for about 120 miles from the frontier to the railhead), and was built by the Chinese in 1938 when the Japanese invasion cut off China from the sea. As throughout the course of its past history, Burma became a channel of world trade only when the normal routes were blocked. 505 494

In respect of communications by sea the most noteworthy feature was the development of trade with Asia, and especially with India and Japan, at the expence of Europe. 505

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000 Japan, at the expense of Europe. Wholly new was the emergence of
509 Burma as an important centre on the air routes linking Europe and India with Australia and the Far East. A project of building up an internal air service in Burma, however, proved a failure and was abandoned.

161 *Population.* Between 1921 and 1941 the population rose from 13·2 million to 16·9 million, an increase of 24·6 % as against an increase of 25·8 % between 1901 and 1921. As at each census enumeration has extended over a wider area in the tribal hills, the figures are not exactly comparable, but they show that the rate of increase was much about the same. For the census of 1941, figures by race are
162 not available, but the returns for 1931 show that Indians constituted rather more than 6·9 % of the total as against less than 5·9 % in 1901, and Chinese 1·32 % as against 0·59 %. Europeans also were more numerous. Urban occupations, commerce and industry still remained almost entirely in foreign hands.

439 *Trade.* We have seen that under executive rule the half century from the opening of the Suez Canal was a period of rapid economic progress, but that the productive apparatus passed increasingly under the control of foreign capital, while as regards imports a smaller proportion went to the natives, and of the imports for native consumption the proportion of luxuries declined. As the constitutional reforms of 1923 were to give the people greater control over their national life, one might expect the trend of the previous fifty years to be reversed, with foreign capital diminishing in importance in the national economy. Again, the reforms led eventually to the separation of Burma from India, and one might expect to find the economic ties with India growing looser, as during the earlier years of the present century. In both these matters the actual course of development followed other lines.

From 1922–3 onwards trade flourished, the exports reaching a maximum of Rs. 777·3 million in 1925–6 and the imports a maximum of Rs. 429·1 million in 1927–8. During the following decade the world depression dominated both exports and imports, the former touching a low point at Rs. 362·8 million in 1932–3, and the latter falling to Rs. 178·7 million in 1933–4. To understand the significance of these figures it is necessary to eliminate changes in the value of money. The marginal table (p. 187) accordingly gives the nominal values of imports and exports at turning-points in economic development, together with corrected figures showing the equivalent values at the prices of 1898–1901. The corrected figures indicate that in 1933–4,

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on the basis of the prices of 1898–1901, Burma was exporting goods to the value of Rs. 466·1 million and receiving in exchange goods to the value of only Rs. 162·9 million; since the beginning of the century the volume of imports had risen by over 60% and the volume of exports by close on 200%. Thus Burma was receiving very much less for its exports than before.

*Trade values (Rs. mill.)**

(*a*) Imports; (*b*) Exports

Year	Nominal		Corrected	
	(*a*)	(*b*)	(*a*)	(*b*)
1868–72	25·4	30·7	19·5	51·0
1898–1901	100·8	159·6	100·8	159·6
1913–14	254·0	389·0	190·6	305·1
1926–27	386·9	659·5	208·3	346·6
1933–34	178·7	389·2	162·9	466·1

* For Index numbers, see *RTC*, 1910–11, p. 2; 1911–12, p. 2. No index numbers were published after 1933–4.

The increasing discrepancy between imports and exports has indeed been a constant feature of the trade returns since the opening of the Suez Canal. It is often attributed to invisible imports representing payments for services rendered, but to some extent the imports are invisible because they do not exist, and the surplus includes profits for which no services are rendered. At the same time there has been a change in the character of the exports, as is illustrated below.

Average Export Surplus (Rs. mill.)

1868–70	3·95	1901–10	90·73
1871–80	13·11	1911–20	War
1881–90	War	1921–30	279·48
1891–1900	39·59	1931–40	268·70

Classified Exports, 1869–1937*

Class of exports	1868–9	1872–3	1903–4	1913–14	1926–7	1936–7
Native produce						
Rice products	63·7	65·2	72·8	68·5	59·8	39·3
Other agricultural products	2·8	7·8	3·4	6·2	5·1	6·5
Other rural products	9·3	10·0	3·5	2·8	1·8	0·8
Total	75·8	83·0	79·7	77·5	66·7	46·6
Capitalist produce						
Forest products	21·3	15·5	8·2	5·8	7·6	7·1
Plantation products	—	—	0·1	0·4	1·8	1·3
Oil-well products	—	—	10·6	14·1	16·8	34·9
Mineral products	—	—	0·5	1·5	6·4	9·3
Total	21·3	15·5	19·4	21·8	32·6	52·6
Unclassed	2·9	1·5	0·9	0·7	0·7	0·8
Total	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0

* For details, see Appendix, p. 551.

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439 From this table it is clear that, despite the political reforms purporting to endow the people with self-government in respect of 'nation-building' activities, foreign capital continued to strengthen its hold over the economic resources of the country and, by the time that Burma was separated from India, the exports of capitalist produce had come to exceed in value the exports of native produce. We shall see below that, during the same period, capitalist enterprise took a growing share of the imports, and that among the imports for consumption the proportion of luxuries continued to decline. Thus the political reforms were of no avail to promote native enterprise or welfare.

Another feature of the trade from 1923 onwards was the development of closer ties with India. We have noticed that during the present century up to 1914, the European share of the trade was increasing in respect both of imports and exports. After that it fell rapidly under both heads. In 1913–14 the West supplied over half the imports, 51 %; by 1926–7 its share had dropped to 44·9 %, and by 1936–7 to 30·7 %. Thus by 1936–7 Asia was supplying over two-thirds of the imports, and India alone just over half, 50·1 %. It is a coincidence that the Indian share of the imports was almost the same as in 1868–9; but at the earlier date they were largely British goods imported through India, and in 1936–7 these had been replaced by Indian manufactures. As regards exports, Europe took two-fifths, 40·3 % in 1913–14; by 1926–7 its share had dropped to 30·1 % and by 1936–7 still further to 24·5 %. Asia was taking three-quarters of the exports, and India alone nearly three-fifths. Thus, just at the time when Burma was separated from India, the economic ties between the two countries were closer than ever before.

Percentage Distribution of Trade

(*a*) Europe, Africa, America; (*b*) Asia, Australasia

Year	Exports		Imports	
	(*a*)	(*b*)	(*a*)	(*b*)
1868–9	69·0	31·0	38·7	61·3
1903–4	37·2	62·8	44·9	55·1
1913–14	40·3	59·7	51·0	49·0
1926–7	30·1	69·9	44·9	55·1
1936–7	24·5	75·5	30·7	69·3

433 *Production.* The growth of capitalist production was, as shown above, mainly under the heads of plantation, oil and mineral products.

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The value of plantation products rose from Rs. 1·24 lakhs in 1903–4 433
to Rs. 74·32 lakhs in 1936–7. During the same period oil products rose from Rs. 216·16 lakhs to Rs. 1936·46 lakhs, and minerals from Rs. 3·27 lakhs to Rs. 512·88 lakhs. In the oil industry Burman labour was to some extent substituted for Indian labour, but otherwise industry and commerce were still characterized by foreign labour and management. Another notable feature of industrial development was 256
the increase in the number of small rice-mills in the interior. In 1900, apart from a few mills in the immediate vicinity of Rangoon, all the mills were concentrated in the ports. But the victory of the millers in the great combine of 1892–4 stimulated the Indians and Chinese to erect godowns and mills in the interior, and subsequently Burmans began to follow their example. The number of small mills in the interior rose from 27 in 1900, all but one close to Rangoon, to 151 in 1914, 260 in 1920, and 528 in 1930. During the same period the mills in the ports increased from 72 to 94. The mills in the interior had a milling capacity of only 10 to 75 tons a day, while the mills in the ports could deal with 200 to 500 tons a day.[1] To a large extent, however, the small mills worked for local consumption, replacing the rice hand-milled in the villages. When steam-mills became locally available, people began to take their rice to them instead of pounding it themselves or with local labour, with a consequent increase in seasonal unemployment. Of the rice from these mills only a small proportion was normally available for export. So far as the small mills competed in the export market with the large mills, they were handicapped by the rates charged by the railway company for transport, which favoured the carriage of paddy rather than rice. Thus the bulk of the rice for export continued to pass through the hands of the millers in the ports, and these exercised a further control over the industry by financing small mills and purchasing their produce. Many of the small mills were erected with capital borrowed at high rates of interest, and, with the onset of the depression, a large number had to close down. This, however, did not prevent the erection of new mills wherever the prospects seemed favourable, and between 1930 and 1939 the total number of mills rose from 622 to 692, of which Europeans owned 27, Chinese 164, Indians 190 and Burmans 311. Over 80 % of the mills employed less than 100 workers. The extent of Burman labour was correlated with the size and ownership of the mills; in the smaller mills, taken as a whole, 34 % of the

[1] Grant, J. W., *The Rice Crop in Burma* (1933), p. 29.

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256 employees were Burman, but in the larger mills at the ports the proportion of Burmans employed was negligible. Thus, from about 1920 onwards, Burmans were making some little headway in the rice industry, in addition to cultivation of the crop; but they were still excluded from the export trade, and their share was confined to the local business, which was very speculative, many mills changing hands frequently or closing down from time to time. The rice industry therefore constituted no exception to the general division of labour along racial lines.

471 As we have frequently had occasion to notice, the economic progress of Burma, though based in the main on Burman enterprise in cultivation, has been stimulated by foreign capital. Agriculture and small-scale enterprise is financed mainly by the Indian *chettyars*, whose capital in 1929 was estimated at rather more than £50 million (Rs. 750 million).[1] But direction and control of the capital invested in large-scale enterprise, estimated at another £50 million,[2] rests with the European population of less than 10,000, representing only about 0·07 % of the total population. About nine-tenths of the European population is British, and of the foreign investments about the same proportion is in British ownership or control, though there are some Dutch, Danish, American and Japanese holdings, especially in banking and trade. Concessions for oilfields are held only by British concerns, and some of the large corporations restrict voting powers to British subjects, including of course Asiatics. In general however the policy of the 'open door' characterizes both investment and trade, and the large British interest is a natural consequence of the long British connection. Many of the larger corporations have an intricate ramification of interests.[3] The Irrawaddy Flotilla and Airways Co. for example not only controls steam navigation on the inland waters, but owns dockyards, warehouses, rice- and saw-mills, steelworks and a foundry. It is also linked up with one of the two chief shipping companies operating between Burma and the United Kingdom. All the more important mercantile firms act as importers, exporters, millers, estate and shipowners, and some of them also have considerable interests outside Burma. These firms all remit most of their profits abroad. Exact
471 figures are not available. It has been estimated that, with a capital of £50 million, the European firms make an annual profit of
457 £10–12 million, more than half of it from oil and minerals. The estimate may be excessive, and the capital is certainly much larger as the share capital is augmented by the periodical appropriation of

[1] *CBE*, p. 211. [2] Callis, p. 106. [3] *Ib.* pp. 101, 104.

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some of the profits to capital expenditure. Nevertheless the profits are undoubtedly high, some of the firms paying up to 20 % and still retaining a large balance of undistributed profits for new investments in Burma. But these reinvestments remain in European hands and, since the distributed profits are sent abroad, the export surplus tends continually to increase, and of recent years has averaged about £21 million, which is about four times as large as that of Siam.[1]

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2. Individual Welfare

If we turn to examine what Burma was receiving in exchange for its produce we find that the value of imports rose from an average of 100·8 million rupees in 1898–1901 to 386·9 in 1926–7, and then declined to 178·7 in 1933–4. Thus for some years the value of imports grew much faster than the population, and, even at the lowest point of the depression, the value of imports per head was greater than at the beginning of the century. These figures, like those for exports, need readjustment owing to the fluctuations of prices, but if we correct them by valuing the imports for the later years at the average prices of 1898–1901, they still amounted to 208·3 million rupees in 1926–7 and to 162·9 in 1933–4, and show therefore a rise in the actual volume of imports per head from about Rs. 10 to Rs. 12·3. But there has been a remarkable change in the character of the imports, as can be seen in the following table:

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Classified Imports, 1869–1937*

Class of imports	1868–9	1872–3	1903–4	1913–14	1926–7	1936–7
Consumption goods						
Food: Staples	5·1	4·9	13·5	9·7	11·2	10·8
Luxuries	18·9	15·6	19·1	18·9	18·2	17·0
Total	*24·0*	*20·5*	*32·6*	*28·6*	*29·4*	*27·8*
Clothing: Staples	35·7	31·6	21·2	24·5	21·8	20·9
Luxuries	17·2	19·7	10·4	8·6	6·6	4·9
Total	*52·9*	*51·3*	*31·6*	*33·1*	*28·4*	*25·8*
Household goods	2·7	3·4	7·0	6·7	5·7	4·2
Total for consumption	79·6	75·2	71·2	68·4	63·5	57·8
Capital goods						
For transport	1·6	3·6	4·9	5·2	6·9	8·3
For industry	12·1	16·0	18·2	19·1	23·4	25·2
Total for production	13·7	19·6	23·1	24·3	30·3	33·5
Unclassed	6·7	5·2	5·7	7·3	6·2	8·7
Total	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0

* For details, see Appendix, p. 552.

[1] Callis, pp. 76, 104.

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439 511 At the opening of the present century the value of capital imports was less than a third of the value of imports for consumption: by 1936–7 the proportion had risen to three-fifths. With an increase of production one would expect more imports for production. But for their own use the people were importing less per head than thirty years earlier. In 1903–4 the value of imports for consumption was Rs. 103·5 million; in 1936–7, with a population that had grown by close on one-half, the value of imports for consumption had risen by less than a quarter, to Rs. 125·9 million. Moreover, the imports included a larger proportion of necessities, and a smaller proportion of luxuries. Thus in 1903–4 the import of cotton goods was Rs. 30·7 million, rather less than 30 % of the imports for consumption, and in 1936–7 it was Rs. 45·5 million or just over 35 %; although the imports nearly kept pace with the growth of population, the people cannot have been so well supplied with cotton goods because, as we have already noticed, local production had declined. On the other hand, during the same period the import of silks and other luxuries continued to drop, not only in proportion but absolutely; it fell from Rs. 15·1 million, about 15 % of the imports for consumption, to Rs. 10·7 million, or just over 8 %. For silk goods alone, the fall is even more striking, as the value dropped from Rs. 7 million to less than half a million. And for the cotton goods imported they had to give more rice than before. In 1933–4 the index number for rice, based on the prices for 1898–1901, was 73·8, whereas the index numbers for cotton goods were 122·8 for greys, 153·4 for whites and 109·8 for coloured goods. If, at the beginning of the century, a man sold a hundred measures of paddy for Rs. 100 and purchased with the proceeds 100 measures of cloth, in 1935–6 he would receive only Rs. 73·8 for his paddy, and have to pay about Rs. 140 for the same quantity of cloth. He had to give about twice as much as before for what he got. Thus in 1936–7 the cultivators were importing less per head than before, and paying more for what they imported.

511 433 243 This tallies with such information as is available regarding the production and domestic consumption of rice. It has been estimated[1] that during the thirties the consumption of rice in Burma fell by nearly 25 % a head; this estimate rests partly on estimates of production which are very unreliable, and it is difficult to believe that in 1940 the people consumed only about three-quarters as much rice as twenty years earlier. Nevertheless there is good reason to hold that

[1] Wickizer and Bennett, p. 216.

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the quantity of rice exported has grown at the expense of that retained for food. With the great fall in the value of rice consequent on the depression of the thirties, there was a corresponding fall in land values. Men who received half the price that they expected for their produce were unable to pay their debts, and had to make over their land to the moneylenders. As already explained, that was no new thing. From 1870 onwards landholders in the chief rice districts had been losing their land for debt. But what happened now was that the moneylenders could no longer find cultivators to take the land off their hands at a price that they would accept. Thus over half the land in these districts was now admittedly owned by non-agriculturists. This naturally tended to reduce *gross* production while increasing *net* production, the surplus available for export. The tenant, on a system of annual leases, could not get so much out of the land as a man who held the land for a longer period. Landlords preferred poor cultivators who would give a high rent, over better cultivators who would not pay so much rent. Moreover, production on a large scale allowed of economies in working. A holding of a hundred acres worked with seasonal labour will produce less than the same area cultivated by half a dozen smallholders, but will yield a larger surplus for the market. We have already noticed that, taking the lowlands as a whole, the richest districts are the least populous. It is quite likely then that the increase of exports per head synchronized with a decrease in production per head, and likely also that the people were consuming less rice per head than before, but it is perhaps improbable that the decline in consumption per head fell by more than 10 %. Even that, however, suggests a considerable decline in material individual welfare, and it is of particular interest as accompanying the introduction of political machinery supposed to give the people a larger say in the management of their own affairs.

Under the Constitution of 1923 nothing could be done, because the Government was unable to take action on controversial issues. The Constitution of 1937 seemed to give more power to the people, and the premier, Dr Ba Maw, must be credited with valiant endeavours to repair past neglect. Besides investigating corruption he appointed a committee to study agrarian distress. He was in a difficult position because he depended on the support of capitalist interests which had opposed agrarian legislation in the past, and his expert advisers had learned their art under the system of executive rule, when these problems were evaded. The agrarian legislation was not very

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wisely conceived. Instead of harnessing to the task of economic reconstruction the forces of individual interest and nationalist sentiment, it attempted to control economic forces by regulations that disregarded them; by multiplying work and jobs, it increased the cost and burden of administration, creating much confusion and some hardship, and achieving little for the public welfare. Thus, up to the time of the Japanese invasion, the forms and machinery of self-government had been no more effective than executive rule in staying the decline of individual welfare consequent on the abnormal predominance of economic forces.

3. Social Welfare

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Village Communities. Another matter into which Dr Ba Maw directed enquiry was village administration. The village system in Burma, as already explained, was invented by the British Government in 1886 to facilitate the pacification of Upper Burma and the suppression of rebellion and disorder in Lower Burma. 'This system was based on the village headman on whom numerous administrative duties were imposed, who exercised petty powers of civil and criminal justice, was authorized to punish his villagers for failure to assist him in the execution of his public duties, and was remunerated by commission on the revenue he collected.' From time to time suggestions were put forward that village councils should be formed, but 'had not been accepted by the Local Government on the grounds that they would be an innovation foreign to the customs and spirit of the people, would diminish the authority of the village headman and so weaken the system of village administration'.[1]

One of the earliest symptoms of unrest in rural areas was the constitution by the people themselves of village associations. These were discouraged or suppressed as political in character and centres of disaffection. Partly to counter these unofficial associations and partly to cope better with the growth of crime, the Village Act was amended in 1924. The new law provided for the constitution of village committees to administer civil and criminal justice and to advise the headman, while maintaining the individual responsibility and powers of the headman, who was to be the chairman of the committee. Among the various defects of the former system were the fact that the headman 'was looked upon by the villagers more as an official than as

[1] *ISC*, XI, 447.

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their representative and that unsuitable applicants were at times appointed'.[1] The formation of village committees did nothing to remedy these defects, and was merely another device for getting the people of their own accord to do what they did not want to do. So far then as village committees were appointed, they existed 'not for the exercise of the functions of local self-government, but solely for the trial of petty civil and criminal cases, and to act as an advisory body to the village headman in the performance of his duties concerning the general welfare of the tract'. In practice they made little difference and, as before, village administration centred round the headmen, though it became increasingly inefficient as his authority declined.

The Village Amendment Act of 1924 was in fact a political move on the part of Government. It 'anticipated the introduction of proposals to amend the Village Act by the Nationalist Party at the instigation of the G.C.B.A., which had found village administration, and especially the authority of the headman, an obstacle to the political activity of village associations'.[2] Naturally the creation of officially sponsored committees to counteract non-official associations failed to restore harmony within the village or to revitalize village social life. The committee appointed in 1937 to enquire into village administration did not rise to any conception of the village as an organic social unit, but was content to regard it from the administrative standpoint. Although Nationalists, and some officials, had long urged the substitution of popular for executive control, it reported, rather surprisingly, that there was 'no public demand for any radical reconstruction of the village system'.[3] Despite the known unpopularity of amalgamating villages, it thought this 'a necessary step in the process of gradually providing adequate remuneration' for the headman. It noted that villagers did not generally take a keen interest in the election of the official village committees, but made no proposals to use for constructive ends the numerous non-official village associations. It recommended the enforcement of the numerous regulations, universally unpopular, often unwise, and generally disregarded, for village sanitation, the construction of houses, and the prevention of infectious and contagious diseases among men, cattle and crops. It also urged the stricter observance of the rules for reporting the arrival and departure of visitors, and the retention of powers to impose collective penalties and to deport undesirable characters. Thus

[1] *ISC*, XI, 447. [2] *ISC*, XI, 314. [3] *ISC*, XI, 274; *CVS*, p. 2.

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632 it suggested no departure from the policy of treating the village as a unit of administration for the maintenance of law and order, and the village headman as an executive official instead of as a leader of the people, and it quite disregarded the possibility of rebuilding society on the basis of common social life within the village.

578 *Communal Discord.* Meanwhile the political reforms were aggravating communal discord, while hindering the provision of remedies.
563 At the beginning of the century it was a commonplace to describe the Burman as tolerant of foreigners, though indifference was a more accurate description of his attitude. At that time such racial or class feeling as may have existed was limited to Europeans, who found Indians less attractive than Burmans, had little sympathy with Indian Nationalism, and to some extent were already apprehensive of Indian competition. But twenty years later Burmans were held to feel a 'natural antipathy' to Indians, and one could trace the main lines of cleavage between capitalist interests, primarily concerned with economic progress, and national interests aiming to promote social welfare.[1] The reforms ranged the groups in opposing camps, and in each camp there were divided counsels.

The various capitalist groups, despite their common interest in economic progress, were competitors in the economic sphere; the Europeans looked to the interests of the big rice-mills, while Chinese and Indians were interested in the smaller mills; Chinese were chiefly concerned with the Eastern trade and Indians in the trade with India. Europeans in general favoured the separation of Burma from India, which would tend to diminish competition, whereas Indians wished to retain the connection. So far as measures touched on Indian nationalist policy and interests, Indians were apt to diverge from the purely capitalist standpoint, and might line up with Burman Nationalists. In the opposite camp were the Burmans. In this camp the chief division was due to the imperfect sympathy between Burmese and Karens, especially the Christian Karens, where religious differences accentuated racial particularity.

669 During the ten years after the introduction of the reforms there were serious communal riots between Burmans and Indians, and Burmans and Chinese, and the most formidable rebellion since 1886. This broke out at the end of 1930 in Tharrawaddy, from about 1860 to 1880 the most peaceful district in Burma but, during the present century, conspicuous for crime. It spread rapidly over

[1] *ISC*, XI, 21, 268; 1920, Cmd. 746, p. 31; *RAB*, 1930–1, p. ix.

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the greater part of the delta so far north as Thayetmyo, and up the railway line to Yamethin. The rebels, styling themselves *Galons*, assumed a distinctive uniform and attempted a military organization. In addition to the local forces, one British and five Indian battalions were called in from India. In August 1931 the rebel leader was captured, but an amnesty offered to his followers met for some time with little response. By March 1932, however, some 9000 had surrendered, and the rebellion was over. The casualties included 102 Government servants killed and 114 wounded; the known casualties among the rebels amounted to about 2000.[1] The Burman who appeared for Government in the subsequent prosecution was promoted to the High Court; Dr Ba Maw, who conducted the defence, and U Saw, who subsequently identified himself with the rebel cause by assuming the style Galon U Saw, were rewarded in due course by election successively as Premier. The rebellion was explained as due in part to anti-Indian feeling, but there were Indians in the rebel army and one, at least, among the leaders. So far as it was directed against Indians, this was due to their association with agrarian grievances as landowners and moneylenders. The movement spread rapidly and widely because executive authority had been undermined by the political reforms, but it had only a very remote connection with modern nationalism. Educated Burmans did not conceal their natural sympathy with the rebels, but were too wise or prudent to take part in the rebellion. It showed indeed how little progress modern Nationalism had made among the people, and was chiefly significant perhaps as demonstrating that time had done little to reconcile them to foreign rule. The rebellion was anti-Government and anti-European, rather than anti-Indian.

We have noticed the growing distrust of Europeans in connection with Separation. Another notable illustration appeared in the case of 'the Bullinger Pool'. Between Burmans as producers of rice and European millers as the chief buyers there is a natural conflict of interest. As already noticed, up to the nineties there was little attempt to conceal the sympathy of the Government with the millers. After the disastrous results of the great combine of 1893–4, the millers were less aggressive and the attitude of Government towards similar combines less sympathetic. With the growth of rice-mills in the interior the position of the large European millers in the ports grew weaker, and in 1920–1 an attempt by the big millers to keep

[1] *MMR*, 1930–1, p. 130; 1931–2, p. 36.

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down prices failed because they had to obtain supplies to meet their forward sales.[1] An immediate sequel in 1921 was the formation by the four chief European firms of the Bullinger Pool to observe a common policy in buying and selling rice. This combination was generally believed to exercise a powerful influence in lowering the prices received by cultivators for their paddy, and to use its influence in inducing the railway company to fix rates on rice and paddy prejudicial to the rice-mills in the interior. In February 1929, at the instance of the Nationalist members, the Legislature recommended an enquiry 'into the rice and paddy trade generally, and, in particular, [into railway] freights and combinations to control prices'. The committee charged with the enquiry took the view that the Pool was 'an organization devised in the need for self-preservation in the fight with the too numerous small mills'; 'it does not seem right', says the report, 'to scrutinize too closely the tactics in a fight for existence. The Pool enjoys no legal advantage. It has no monopoly. It rests on its commercial reputation, its business skill and its financial backing. It is our opinion that in all the circumstances no case has been made out for government interference.'[2] This account of the matter is not quite correct, as the Pool was created in 1921 with a view to controlling prices, and at that time the small mills were still comparatively few. When the report of the committee reached the Government in May 1931, Burma had recently become involved in the general collapse of world prices, consequent on the Wall Street crisis of September 1929. The Government, in reviewing the report, disregarded both the terms of reference and the recommendations of the committee. It stated that the main reason why the committee was appointed was in order to enquire into the causes of the fall in prices. Overlooking the fact that the enquiry originated in a recommendation by the Legislative Council in February 1929, it held that the collapse of prices in 1931, being a world-wide phenomenon, could not be due to any purely local cause in Burma, and that accordingly there was no need to take action on the report. Not unnaturally the report, and the Government resolution on the report, failed to remove Nationalist suspicions that, even without any legal advantage and depending merely on business skill, financial backing and tactics which should not be too closely scrutinized, the Pool was detrimental to Burman interests. But the chief importance of the agitation against the activities of the Pool was to demonstrate that the Nationalist attack was no longer directed

[1] *RTC*, 1912–13, p. 13; *RAB*, 1920–1, p. 104. [2] *CRT*, p. 27.

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mainly against Indian moneylenders and landowners but against European capitalists, and against the Government as supporting them.

This change of direction is the more significant because at the same time capitalist activities were tending to promote communal discord between Burmans and Indians. The use of cheap Indian labour has long been justified on the ground that 'Burmans dislike hard work'. But in 1924 a strike among the Indian dockyard coolies was broken by calling in Burman labour.[1] As soon as the Indians had been brought to terms, the Burman labour was dismissed. The same expedient was adopted on the occasion of another dockyard strike in March 1930. On this occasion, when the Indians submitted, the Burmans refused to acquiesce in their dismissal; for a few days there were serious riots, causing much damage to life and property, but securing for Burmans 'a foothold ... in the Rangoon labour market'.[2] Again, in May 1931, Burmans were called in to break a strike of the Rangoon Conservancy staff.[3] These incidents not merely aggravated communal tension between Burmans and Indians, but aroused ill-feeling against the European employers of the Indians. Further evidence of increasing communal tension was apparent in 'a serious riot, between the Burmese and Chinese communities which resulted in considerable loss of life'. Thus, by the time that Burma was separated from India sectional discord and racial antipathy prevailed, and there was urgent need for a strong Government capable of restoring harmony. This the new constitution of 1937 failed to provide.

4. Clerical Disorder

A further symptom of social disintegration was the growing turbulence of the monastic Order. Clerical intervention in political activities is often regarded as wholly new. But monks were among the leaders of resistance to British rule in 1886 and 1852, and have been prominent in numerous petty insurrections back to 1831.[4] The rebellion of 1886 was everywhere headed by the monks; some actually took part in the fighting, and Karens brought in numerous decapitated shaven heads to claim rewards.[5] The Order inherits a political tradition; under Burmese rule clerics played an important part in local and national affairs, and the monastery was an avenue to promotion

[1] *RCLI*, x, Pt II, p. 163. [2] *RAB*, 1930–1, p. x. [3] *RAB*, 1930–1, pp. x, 37.
[4] *BBG*, I, 481, 487; II, 290; *Tharrawaddy Gazetteer*, p. 34; *UBG*, ii, 7.
[5] Smeaton, p. 14.

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in the State. The Order, which 'theoretically had nothing to do with politics or things of this world, was really a political power, the only permanent power'.[1] Under British rule all that was changed.

But that was not the only ground for disaffection. In Burmese times the whole Order was knit together in a complex system under a central committee with a single head, and it was very largely autonomous. The piecemeal occupation of Burma by the British cut off the monasteries within British territory from the central committee and thus left each monastery an isolated unit. Just as the native political organization was broken up into villages, so also was the ecclesiastical organization. This allowed the machinery of discipline to decay, and the growth of 'laxity and insubordination'[2] already attracted notice in 1870. Despite this, on the occupation of Upper Burma in 1886, the central authority in Mandalay, still recognized throughout the newly conquered territory, was set aside as of no concern to the British Government. For some years ecclesiastical causes were left for decision by the Order, but judicial decisions gradually brought them within the jurisdiction of the civil courts. In ecclesiastical as in lay affairs, British law supplanted Burmese custom, the last vestiges of monastic autonomy disappeared, and with them the only effective machinery for regulating admission to the Order and expelling disreputable members.

In other ways also the monks lost much of their influence and prestige. We have noticed that there were reports to this effect so far back as 1833, that at least since 1852 many villages in Lower Burma have been unable to build a monastery or maintain a monk, and that from 1870, if not earlier, there have been complaints as to the deterioration of monastic schools. Nowadays the monk can no longer be so helpful to the village, and in particular the Order has lost its hold on education. Formerly the monastic school provided a training in democracy, as boys of all classes worked and played together, sharing alike in the menial duties of the monastery. To-day the children of the wealthier and urban classes are sent to lay schools to pass examinations. Pali, the classical language of the monastic curriculum, now has no market value, and the suggestion made in 1870 to encourage the demand, then finding expression, for the teaching of English in monastic schools was rejected,[3] so that the monks in general are now among the most unenlightened of the people instead of, as formerly,

[1] *UBG*, II, 1. [2] Fytche, II, 334.
[3] *RPI*, 1871–2, cited *RPI*, 1928–9, p. 10.

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their leaders in cultural development. Moreover, Buddhism, as ordinarily understood by the Burmese monk, is wholly incompatible with western individualism, and even the strictest monk, though he may hold aloof from anti-British agitation, tends to sympathize with it and condone it. 793 578

But the monks are still regarded, at least among the lower orders and generally in rural districts, with a superstitious veneration that gives them power without responsibility. Anyone may become a monk at any time, but as soon as he assumes the yellow robe, he becomes sacred. The small boy in the monastic school, who yesterday hardly dared venture into the presence of a European official, will address him on terms of equality immediately on becoming a novice. In any attempt by Government to take action against a monk, popular sympathy and support are always, whatever the merits of the case, in favour of the monk and against the Government. Hesitating to act firmly, even in notorious cases, lest this should further alienate the people and multiply unrest, the Government takes refuge in pious platitudes or vague aspersions, thereby advertising its weakness, and furnishing new cause for disaffection among both clerics and laymen.

There is nothing new either in the power exercised by the monastic Order, or in its disintegration or its antipathy to western rule. What is new is that recently men have taken the yellow robe as a cloak for political activities, because they can rely on general sympathy among the monkhood for their political aspirations, and because the monastery affords the best shelter for attacking a foreign government. From a very early stage in the modern nationalist movement monks have been active, forming an association which 'threw in its lot with the extremists and ere long dominated their activities'. This militant section plays a conspicuous part in annual conferences and in meetings to discuss political or other grievances, and their speeches, though decried by Government as 'not of a high order as regards accuracy or reason',[1] are effective in inflaming sentiments of disaffection. Thus the vacuum caused by the decay of the force which held society together has been filled by an instrument of disruption, and the only organized body among the clergy now serves for disseminating malice instead of fostering goodwill. 792 668

[1] *ISC*, XI, 24–5.

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5. Education

871 The introduction in 1923 of a constitution based on the principle of responsible government implied the need for a more active encouragement of education, so as to bring the people into closer touch with the modern world, and to provide both an instructed electorate and leaders. Until then, as we have seen, the schools produced clerks and lawyers, but practically no doctors, engineers or men of business; there were no facilities for the study of economics and practically none for the study of natural science. Burma had been thrown open to the world, but the world had not been opened up to Burma. In 1923, as in 1869, it might have been said without much exaggeration that of barracks, of jails and court-houses there were not a few, but hardly anything in the province to testify the presence of any rule higher than that from which it had been wrested. There were many more barracks, jails and courts, and the public offices and business houses in Rangoon were now built of brick or concrete instead of native timber; there were also many more schools, but these, like the courts, were instruments of British rule. Just as the village had been adapted from social to administrative ends, so had the schools been adapted from cultural to economic ends.

All were agreed that Burma needed better education to equip it for the modern world. But opinions differed as to how this should be done. The Government favoured the spread of primary instruction; Burmans set more store on higher instruction that would enable them the sooner to take over the government. Both parties, however, tended to identify education with instruction, and both looked to attain their ends by multiplying schools. And both parties alike ignored the fact that education is conditioned by environment. The Government tried to extend primary instruction by providing more schools and teachers, but without taking measures to stimulate the demand for learning; Burmans wanted men trained for industry and commerce without regard to the demand for their employment. Thus efforts to promote education had very little effect, and in 1940 Burma was still almost as remote from the modern world as in 1923. We have discussed the state of education in 1923 under the heads of primary instruction, secondary and higher instruction, technical and vocational instruction, and the education of women. Let us examine now the further progress under these several heads.

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Primary Instruction. Looking merely at the numbers attending school, a comparison of the figures of 1900 with those of 1940 suggests a considerable advance. The total number at school rose from 307,000, or 3·34 % of the population, in 1900 to 827,000, or 4·90 % in 1940. But the increase was largely due to the remarkable progress in female education, as the number of girls at school rose during the same period from 36,000 to about 220,000, so that, in proportion to the population, there was a very small increase in the number of boys at school.[1]

Some would even question whether the progress in instruction represented progress in education, for at the same time the percentage of the population in unregistered schools, almost all monastic, is shown as having declined from 1·61 to 1·26, though the figures for these schools must be accepted with caution. Up to about 1900 it was the custom to recite the praises of the monastic schools, but, when Government adopted a policy of closer supervision over instruction, advocates of the official system became more critical of the monks, describing them as 'very ignorant, or very bigoted or both',[2] and condemning monastic schools as inefficient. Yet, even thirty years later, of the pupils in the registered schools 75 % did not go beyond Standard I, and 88 % failed to complete Standard IV, which is regarded as the minimum for permanent literacy.[3] Lay schools were claimed as more efficient than the ordinary monastic schools because they taught the children their alphabet in shorter time. But time was a consideration only for children who were meant to press on to higher standards, so as to qualify for a job at an early age; as regards children who would never go beyond the alphabet it mattered little whether they took a year more or a year less to learn their letters. In fact not many got beyond 'the unwieldy infant class in which the majority of the pupils had barely passed the crawling stage'. An onlooker, it has been said, 'would no longer wonder why children left school so soon, but why they were ever sent at all'.[4] There was a simple explanation. 'People for the most part send their children to school to get them out of the way.' The lay school, which took girls as well as boys, was more useful as a crèche. It would seem, then, that only a small proportion of the lay schools teach more than the unregistered monastic schools while, on the other hand, some monastic schools are still capable of educating lads who, with no other schooling, could, at least until quite recently,

[1] *RPI*, 1899–1900, p. 57; 1897–1902, p. 4; 1932–7, p. xx.
[2] *RPI*, 1897–1902, p. 41. [3] *CVV*, pp. 147, 151, 153. [4] *ISC*, XI, 497.

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872 rise to become magistrates. After the official policy of concentrating on primary instruction had been in operation for nearly forty years, a committee, appointed to report progress, found that it presented a picture of 'almost unrelieved gloom'.[1] Under Burmese rule all the boys were sent to monastic schools because there was a social demand for education; but primary vernacular instruction provided little opportunity for material advancement, and when, under British rule, education came to be valued solely as an economic asset, 'the difficulty was to create a demand for the school',[2] and primary instruction languished.

873 *Secondary Instruction.* For the same reason that primary instruction languished, secondary and higher instruction flourished. While the number of boys in the primary standards did little more than keep pace with the growth of the population, the number of pupils in the middle standards (V–VII) was eight times as many in 1937 as in 1900; in the higher standards (VIII–X) twenty-five times as many; and in the colleges fifteen times as many. These figures provide an instructive comment on the official policy of regarding the extension of elementary instruction as 'a primary obligation'. The secondary schools led to jobs, and the higher standards to better jobs; soon, as formerly in India, lads from the middle schools could no longer find employment, and a little later, when the market for higher standard qualifications was glutted, they went on to college.

They went on to college because there was no opening for them in industry or commerce, and the only avenue to a well-paid job was through 'academic' studies. Lads from Burma had to take a Calcutta degree, and their choice of subjects was limited by the curriculum which was adjusted to the conditions of employment. Scientific studies especially were backward and in 1922, when Burma was officially recognized as fit for an instalment of responsible government, only eight men took a degree in science; despite the mineral wealth of Burma, there were no facilities for the study of geology. But, just as the period of executive rule was drawing to a close, the output of the schools was thought sufficient to require a local university. The University of Rangoon, established in 1920, comprised two colleges, one a Government institution, the other managed by the American Baptist Mission; a Training College for Teachers, and a Medical College were added in 1930–1. With the growth of the university the course of studies was widened both in

[1] *CVV*, p. 156. [2] *RPI*, 1928–9, p. 13.

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arts and science. In 1923 provision was made for taking economics in the arts course, but, as the teachers from India knew nothing of Burma, their lectures were very remote from the life and surroundings of the students. At about the same time the curriculum was expanded to include all the usual scientific studies. But there are still comparatively few science students. As there is little demand for Burmans in the scientific professions, little science is taught in the schools. In 1937 ten anglo-vernacular high schools provided courses in chemistry and physics, but only one—a girls' school—taught botany and zoology; eleven vernacular high schools professed to teach 'general science', but the course included no practical work. In these circumstances not many take science in the university and, in 1937, of 108 male graduates only 25 took a science degree.

The latest report notes 'the universal desire of parents to provide opportunities for their children to enter the superior services and the "professions" to which the road lies through the University'.[1] But, for various reasons, the proportion of Anglo-Indians and Indians at the university is high in relation to their numerical strength in the population; the former are 0·2 % of the population, but 8·3 % of university students, and for the latter the corresponding figures are 6·9 and 33·8 %. One reason for this is that the universities represent the urban population, in which most of the Anglo-Indians and Indians are concentrated, and Burmans are comparatively few. In 1937 out of 1744 students receiving university or intermediate education, only 155 were classed as coming from rural areas. But secondary instruction as a whole is very largely urban, and one-third of the pupils are concentrated in Rangoon.[2] Thus there is a cleavage in society not only along racial lines but between the educated and uneducated classes, and the educated who have spent all their life in towns are astonishingly ignorant of rural Burma, and the life of the people. They cannot even write the language well, and it has been said, with much truth, that those who know English do not know Burmese, while those who know Burmese know nothing else. Nowhere are the relations between Europeans and Burmans so human and friendly as in the University where an able and enthusiastic staff, English and American, tries to persuade the students that, despite their experience and environment, life in the modern world is not solely concerned with making money. But most of them on graduating are caught up into the machinery of general administration, where cultural

[1] *RPI*, 1932–7, p. 7. [2] *RPI*, 1932–7, Tables IVa, b; *CVV*, p. 181.

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873 values are at a discount, and, in an atmosphere devoid of books or other instruments of humane life, such impression as the university may have made upon them fades. Moreover, even within the university politics are rife; to the Government it is a hot-bed of dangerous thoughts, to the Burman an instrument for inculcating 'slave-mentality', and both sides are suspicious of the staff.

874 *Vocational Instruction.* One feature of Curzon's policy was the encouragement of technical and vocational rather than academic instruction. In Burma this problem was less urgent, because the rapid growth of the administration provided adequately for the output of the schools. But gradually a surplus of school graduates led, as earlier in India, to a greater interest in technical and vocational courses, and the problems arising in this connection were examined by special committees in 1927 and again in 1936.[1] During a discussion of the subject in the Legislature it was suggested that 'only criminals and detectives could obtain technical education in Burma'. The Director accepted the criticism as not without foundation for the schools, but thought the provision outside the schools not inconsiderable 'for an agricultural country'.[2]

There is in fact provision for instruction in medicine, law, forestry, veterinary science, teaching, engineering, industry, commerce and art. But the total under all these heads in 1937 was only 2488, and of these 1269 were training as teachers and 613 were studying commerce, leaving only 616 under all the other heads to meet the requirements of a population of 16 millions in the modern world. Of the students in the highest or university grade, Burmese numbered 32 out of the 79 law students, 55 out of 141 in education, and in engineering only 16 out of 54, in medicine 23 out of 147. The usual explanation is that the Burman dislikes a professional career because the work is too arduous and poorly paid; yet in the courses for subordinate professional appointments, certainly no less arduous and much worse paid, the proportion of Burmans was much higher. In education there were 880 out of 1128; in engineering 52 (mostly training as

Technical Students, 1937*
(*a*) University; (*b*) Collegiate

	(*a*)	(*b*)
Law	79	—
Medicine	147	103
Education	141	1128
Engineering	54	75
Industrial	—	39
Veterinary	—	17
Forestry	—	47
Commerce	—	613
Art	—	45

* *RPI*, 1932–7, Tables va, b.

[1] *RPI*, 1927–32, p. 2; *CVV*, pp. 389ff.

[2] *RPI*, 1927–32, p. 28.

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revenue surveyors) out of 75, in medicine 42 out of 103, in forestry 28 out of 47, and in commerce 344 out of 613. As Burmans form over 80% of the population, these figures are not very satisfactory to Nationalists. It is remarkable that one subject is conspicuously absent from this list, and that the most important—agriculture. But there was no demand for such agricultural instruction as western institutions could impart. An Agricultural College on ambitious lines, opened for teaching in 1924, was not very successful, because of 'the reluctance of educated Burmans to adopt an agricultural career'. An Agricultural School of a more elementary character, founded by American missionaries, is said to have demonstrated the value of its methods. But teaching in such schools demanded 'Burmans with high technical qualifications, and a flame of zeal and energy'[1]—a pious aspiration rather than a practical suggestion. It seems that both college and school succumbed to the depression of the thirties, as there is no reference to either in the latest quinquennial review of education. The only schools under the head of Vocational and Special Education in which Burmans preponderated were the reformatories, where they numbered 308 out of 342—still less satisfactory, and pointing the gibe in the Legislature that technical instruction was reserved for the criminals and police. Under executive rule the lack of a demand for Burmans with technical qualifications prevented the growth of technical instruction, and the machinery of western democracy, when introduced in 1923, was of no avail to change the social and economic environment, and failed consequently to attract lads to technical institutions.

Morals and Discipline. Under the new system of government, school morals and discipline received even more attention than under executive rule. In addition to primers of personal ethics, recommended in 1904 by Lord Curzon, Burmans advocated, partly on political grounds, the provision of systematic instruction in the Buddhist religion, though educational officials had greater faith in football.[2] But during the last five years before the separation of Burma from India, there were more than thirty school strikes, and, though freedom and preparation for free citizenship received fuller recognition in the theory and practice of education, the boys in the upper standards reacted by showing less temperance and less tolerance of the ordinary rules of school life. For over a hundred years the monastic schools had been criticized as unpractical; the schools that had replaced them were severely practical:

[1] *ISC*, xi, 115, 137; *CVV*, p. 399.
[2] *RPI*, 1927–32, p. 37.

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871 'How to spiritualize education', writes the Director, 'is the real problem.'[1]

Female Instruction. On the other hand, as already noticed, female education continued to make great headway. The provision for teaching girls has been the great contribution of British rule to the system of instruction. Except in the number at school, however, the progress of female education was disappointing. Curzon looked to the women to improve 'the educational and moral tone of the people'. But even fewer girls than boys get beyond 'the unwieldy infant class'. The lay schools in towns, however, gave them better opportunities to learn enough reading, writing and arithmetic for retail trade in the bazaar; they had an economic value. The few girls who went further looked on instruction, like the boys, merely as a means of livelihood. 'What beacon of light', asked an inspectress, 'can we hold up to induce girls to seek education in the higher departments',[2] if it gives them no opening to a profession? There was a demand for schools as crèches, a demand for elementary instruction for use in retail trade, and a very small demand for higher instruction so far as this was an economic asset. But there were few signs that girls regarded western education as having a cultural value. To Christians, whether Burman or Karen, the education of the girls was a matter of religious obligation, like the education of boys among Buddhists, and many girls went back from the high school to the home; but the Burmese girl in the university looked for a job, or, possibly (if not preferably), a wealthy husband. Even among the women education served economic and not social ends.

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212 *Literacy.* We have already noticed that under British rule the proportion returned as literate has risen, not merely, as one might expect, among females but also among males. The first census after the annexation of Upper Burma showed that the newly conquered province had a greater proportion of male literates than British Burma, with 46·2 % learning and literate as against 44·3, though Lower Burma was ahead in female literacy with 3·8 against 1·5. The lower proportion of literate males in Lower Burma was largely due to the influx of illiterate Indians, and was in fact lower than ten years earlier. Between 1900 and 1940 the percentage of literate males rose from 37·6 to 56·0 and of females from 6·1 to 16·5. It would seem difficult to reconcile the rise in male literacy and its high proportion with the small increase in the number at school, and with the fact that so small a proportion remain at school

[1] *RPI*, 1932–7, p. 45. [2] *RPI*, 1927–32, p. 25.

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long enough to acquire permanent literacy. Figures for literacy must needs be somewhat arbitrary; they are obtained by enumerations at the census by subordinate officials who have no time for detailed enquiries and, moreover, the standard of literacy varies from one census to another. Even in the earliest census probably a much larger number, if pressed, could at least have signed their names. Here we may find an explanation of the apparent anomaly. Under Burmese rule practically every Buddhist boy learned his letters, but subsequently lapsed into illiteracy for lack of practice. Printing was unknown and manuscripts were costly, and letters were of little use except to monks, traders and officials. But under British rule there arose a social demand for literacy; every railway station and every railway ticket gives a reading lesson; the public notices, the courts, still more the moneylender, and most of all the post office prevent people from forgetting what they learned. It is the environment and not the school that has promoted literacy. In 1860 few but Europeans and Indians used the post office, and up to 1880 there were few postal facilities for towns and villages in the interior.[1] About that time, however, the rural police began to be useful as postmen. The people soon took advantage of this privilege, and gradually the regular service was extended. It is perhaps not too much to say that the postal system, introduced originally for the benefit of the foreign community, did more to promote literacy than all the lay schools; it fostered a latent demand for *adult* literacy, and the ability to read and write ceased to be merely an ornament that one discarded on leaving school.

This consideration applies much more widely. If the number of children at school has not increased more rapidly in Burma, it is because there was little demand for primary instruction; formerly the people *wanted* to send their children to the monastic school, and for this and other purposes maintained at their own charge the monastery and its inmates; there was a social demand for education. If there is to be any great increase in primary instruction, it is not sufficient to supply schools and teachers; it is essential to cultivate a demand for them. Similarly, if Burmans are to be held responsible for the conduct of their national affairs, it is necessary to cultivate a demand for the type of education that will help them to discharge their responsibilities. The machinery of democratic government is a dangerous implement to place in the hands of uneducated people but, when introducing a modern constitution with household suffrage, the Government did

[1] *RAB*, 1861–2, p. 25; 1880–1, Intr. p. 38; pp. 17, 90; 1882–3, p. 117.

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little to train leaders in a knowledge of the modern world, or to fit the people for the franchise. A private association for the encouragement of reading, though regarded with suspicion by some administrative officials, enjoyed the patronage of the Governor and the support of the Education Department. Successive Directors also devised plans for supplying the public with books, though none was carried very far, as each new Director had a new plan. By these means subscription libraries were established by some municipal committees, but in 1940 as in 1923 there was still only one public library, which in some years, as a Director of Public Instruction noted, with an income of nearly £1000 managed to spend about £10 on the actual purchase of books.[1] There was still no museum, art gallery or theatre. For a long time nothing was attempted in broadcasting and then only in a very small way, while the cheapest wireless set cost over £30. The cinema was left to private enterprise and the only glimpse of Burmans on the outer world was from the angle of Hollywood.

But the great need of the country was a modern vernacular literature. According to the official returns less than 200 books were published annually, only about half of them in Burmese and almost all of them still medieval in their outlook. There were one or two monthly magazines of some merit, but the total circulation of Burmese newspapers was still negligible. The first vernacular newspaper was started in the seventies. There were two in 1877, and by 1879, when they had grown to five, we are told that 'the tone was gentlemanly and on the whole loyal to the British Government, though traces of a decided national feeling were occasionally visible'.[2] Their circulation was only 150–300 copies. By 1930, among the newspapers in Burmese, four, with a circulation of 3500, were subsidized by the Sino-Burmese supporters of Government; four, mainly non-political, had a circulation of 4600 (chiefly due to the 'Burmese Cinema' with 2500); six nationalist, with a circulation of 11,350 and six extremist, with a circulation of 12,500.[3] Thus the circulation varied with the violence of opposition to the Government. But there were no modern books in Burmese, and no attempt had been made to solve the difficult problem of translating western literature, apart from some half-dozen adaptations of popular novels. From the earliest days of the reforms the encouragement of a modern literature and the translation and adaptation of western books was a main item in the nationalist pro-

[1] *RPI*, 1928–9, p. 23. [2] *RAB*, 1879–80, p. 104. [3] *ISC*, XI, 272.

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gramme, but a motion to this effect was opposed by Government on the ground that 'there was no demand for translated books as there was no reading public for such literature',[1] though at the same time a private organization was demonstrating that it was quite possible to organize such a demand on a paying basis.

Educational Progress. The progress of education under all its forms in Burma during the period between 1923 and 1940 shows a notable contrast with that achieved in neighbouring countries. The figures for Burma in the marginal table omit the Shan States. Sixty years ago Upper Burma, under native rule, had far more children at school than any country outside Burma in the tropical Far East; in 1900 Burma as a whole still held the lead, but by 1940 it had sunk to the fifth place, and, in respect of institutions managed or helped by Government, was little ahead of Netherlands India, where general public instruction dates only from 1907. Moreover, many children never attended any school. The number of children of school-going age (6–11) in 1936 was estimated at 1·6 million of whom 0·4 million attended recognized schools and 0·2 million other schools, leaving a million with no schooling.[2]

*Percentage of population at recognized schools,** 1936–9

Formosa	11·16
Philippines	10·75
Thailand	9·69
Malaya	6·02
Burma	3·92
Netherlands India	3·35
Indo-China	2·06

* Furnivall, *Educational Progress in S.E. Asia* (1943), p. 111.

But the picture is darker than these figures indicate. It might be claimed sixty years ago that Burma was the best educated country in the tropical Far East, with the possible exception of the Philippines. It would be difficult to repel the charge that at the time of its separation from India it was the worst educated. In the Philippines there were hundreds, and in Siam scores of people, who had seen something of the modern world; in Burma only about eight students were sent abroad annually, and for three successive years during the depression none were sent. Both in the Philippines and Siam many men have a long experience of practical administration along modern lines in responsible positions; in Burma the corresponding posts were held by Europeans. In Malaya many Chinese are citizens of the modern world, and even the Malays, though still backward in higher education, almost all receive primary instruction. In Java, comparatively few have been to Europe, though some members of the upper classes

[1] *ISC*, XI, 296, 366.

[2] *CVV*, p. 148.

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871 have been brought up in Dutch families and Dutch schools for three or more generations; all Dutch-vernacular students above the primary grade learn three European languages; and some have made original contributions to knowledge. In Indo-China, though little has been done for primary vernacular instruction, not a few natives have had brilliant academic careers in France. In Burma it would be difficult to name more than half a dozen works in English by Burmans that are worth reading, and only one or two of these look outside Burma. In the Philippines, Siam and Malaya there are many-sided adult education movements, and much has been done for adult education in Netherlands India. In technical instruction Burma seems to stand at the bottom of the list, except for Indo-China.

Burmans demanded, justly, a greater part in industry and commerce, and urged accordingly that technical and vocational instruction should be provided to train them for such careers. Government replied, truly, that one cannot create an industry by training men to practise it. But the whole situation arose out of the fact, which neither party recognized, that education is governed by demand, and when social demand is ineffective, it is governed by economic demand. The solution lay in creating a demand for Burmans in industry and commerce. A policy of social reintegration would have aimed at fostering such a demand, but the forms of political democracy served only to expose and irritate this sore in the social body, without contributing towards a remedy.

6. Review of Progress and Welfare

439 178 In the early nineteenth century Burma was cut off from the world, as it had been from the beginning of time. It was almost inaccessible except by sea, and lay along no high road, either by sea or land, except as a difficult back entrance to China, when at infrequent intervals both the main routes between West and East by land and sea were closed. It contributed almost nothing to the world except a little teak, and, though Burmans were quite willing to take from the outer world what they could get, they could get nothing because they had little to offer, and what they had they would not sell. Under British rule all this was changed. Restrictions on trade were abolished; the people were encouraged, and provided with the money, to purchase foreign goods; the opening of the Suez Canal created a steady market for rice, and by the end of the century British capital was beginning

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to develop the mineral resources of the country. Just before the great depression Burma was exporting a wide variety of native and capitalist produce, and, as shown in the marginal table, ten years later, when the depression was first lifting, the value of oil and mineral exports had risen. The total value of local merchandise exported in 1926–7 was Rs. 654·7 million, and in 1936–7 it was Rs. 555·27 million. That is an index to the contribution to the world which Burma has made under British rule. Regarded as a business concern, it was good business.

Chief Products of Burma (Rs. million)

Class	1926–7	1936–7
Native produce		
Rice products	391·49	218·42
Other field crops	33·48	35·87
Other rural produce	11·85	4·63
Capitalist produce		
Oil products	110·00	193·64
Other minerals	41·86	51·41
Timber	49·87	39·73
Plantations	12·04	7·43

For details, see App. I.

Naturally it was especially good business for the British. About 90 % of the foreign capital invested in Burma was British,[1] and practically the whole direction of industry and commerce within the country was in British hands. But, until the Ottawa agreement of 1932, all peoples could trade on equal terms with Burma. In 1903–4, the first year for which approximately correct figures as to the distribution of trade are available, Europe took about one-third of the total exports, with Britain taking 12·3 % and Germany 8·4 %. Ten years later, just before the war, the British share had dropped to 9·3 %, and Germany with 8·9 % was almost on a par with Britain. By 1926–7 the British share had declined still further to 8·4 % and Germany with 7·9 % had almost recovered its pre-war level. Subsequent developments, economic and political, raised the British share in 1936–7 to 12·4 % and reduced the German share to 2·3 %. The course of trade with India has already been noticed; as regards other Asiatic countries, Japan, since developing its own sources of rice, has been a very moderate customer of Burma. Britain has always had a larger share of imports. In 1903–4 it supplied 33·3 %, the nearest competitor in Europe being Germany with 3·3 %. Ten years later their shares had risen to 35·1 % and 4·5 % respectively. By 1926–7 the British share had fallen to 27 %, though Germany, with 3·8 %, was still supplying a larger proportion than at the beginning of the century. Even the Ottawa agreement could not stay the

[1] Callis, p. 105.

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439 decline of the British share, which dropped to 18·9 % in 1936–7. The benefit of the Ottawa agreement went mainly to India, yet the
178 Japanese share of the trade, only 3·4 % in 1993–4, rose from 6·9 % in 1926–7 to 10·9 % ten years later. Whatever the destination of exports or the source of imports, the handling of the business in Rangoon is very largely in the hands of British subjects, European or Indian with some Chinese, nevertheless it is true that under British rule Burma was thrown open freely to the world, and made great and rapid economic progress.

178 Regarded from the standpoint of welfare, however, Burma presents a very different picture. The effect of British rule was to remove the abuses of the Burmese political and social system, and endow the people with the privileges of economic freedom and the rule of equal law. But, as we have seen, this undermined all the stable elements in social life; it reduced the hereditary leaders of the people to the common rank, broke up the political organization into villages, transformed the village from a social unit into a unit of administration, and the village community into a crowd of individuals; it cut at the roots of the national religion and converted education from a social force into an instrument of individual ambition. These changes, however, were gradual, and the people, while quick to profit by their new freedom, were slow to recognize what they had lost.

For economic freedom and equality before the law may be doubtful privileges. As Blake said in one of his Memorable Fancies, 'One law for the lion and the ox is oppression.' The people were freed from servitude to their hereditary chieftains only to find themselves bound to foreign moneylenders in chains firmly riveted by western law. Economic forces, subject to no restraint but law, upset the balance of native economy, sapped the foundations of religious life and institutions, ousted native arts, crafts and industries, and killed the social pastimes and recreations. Welfare is a social good, and the dissolution of society led to a decline in individual welfare. The growth of debt, the loss of land, the seasonal unemployment, the smaller proportion of luxuries among the imports, the reduced consumption of rice all indicate growing impoverishment among the great mass of the people, the Burmans in general, while the growth of foreign elements in numbers and wealth was creating a mixture of peoples with nothing in common but the desire of gain.

British rule only opened up Burma to the world and not the world to Burma. It could neither stay the decline of Burman culture nor

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replace it by a new western culture. Despite increasing cause for discontent the people remained acquiescent; they did not venture or even think to question British rule. Those who saw it most closely were the least inclined to question it, for they saw its power and it was the only power they saw. The victory of Japan over Russia came as a revelation. Burmans saw an eastern nation able to challenge the West by using western science. Hitherto the natural but latent dislike of foreign rule had been manifested only in sporadic futile risings among the most ignorant and superstitious; now some of those from western schools began to look on education as a path, not merely to higher pay, but to a national revival. But they hoped to pluck the fruit of western learning without planting the tree of moral discipline on which it grew, and this hope was, inevitably, frustrated.

Meanwhile the machinery of government rolled on, regardless of new hopes and new ideas. Nationalism was politics, and in the government of dependencies, as Count Smorltork said, 'The word polteek surprises by himself.' Moreover Nationalism was bound up with religion, which was even more dangerous. Even if the Burma Government had been gifted with the imagination to lead the new movement, it could do nothing because it was only part of the machinery of Indian rule, and the power to direct the machinery lay not in Burma, nor even in India, but in London, where Parliament knew little of India and still less of Burma. Thus the direction of affairs was still left to the unceasing activity of economic forces, uncontrolled by human will.

But in 1917 the decision of Parliament to grant responsible government in India opened a new prospect of rebuilding Burma on the basis of a common nationalism. Here was a chance for leadership. 'It is not enough to give good laws, or even good courts', said Elphinstone in the early days of British rule in India, 'you must take the people along with you, and give them a share in your feelings which can only be done by sharing theirs.' But the Government of Burma, grown old in the grooves of mechanical routine, had lost the art of leading. The Government made no attempt to capture the imagination of the people, and was content to 'go through all the processes for a new constitution'. Burmans now hoped to get from political reforms what they had failed to get from education; they had a large numerical majority and looked to win freedom through the franchise. Again, inevitably, this hope was frustrated.

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178 The reformed system aggravated the tension between the several communities, and the conflict, active everywhere in all human affairs, between social will and economic forces took shape as a conflict between Burmese nationalism and western capitalism supported by the British Government. Despite the quasi-democratic constitution, the hold of capitalism grew stronger, as is demonstrated in the greater share of capitalist enterprise in both the export and import trade. Among Burmans the national religious sentiment gave place to a religion of nationalism, as yet blind and leaderless. The growth of crime, corruption and clerical unrest are, like the growth of debt and loss of land and the widespread agrarian distress, merely symptoms of a social order, or rather disorder, in which economic forces have been held down only by law and not by social will.

All this happened despite the best intentions of the British Government. Good intentions paved the way to evil and one may almost say that the ill results were the direct consequence of its good intentions. For the greater part of the nineteenth century everyone believed in *laissez-faire* and economic freedom as the key to progress and welfare, and British rule conferred on Burma the boon of economic freedom. Everyone likewise believed in equal law, and in Burma all were made equal before the law. Everyone believed in education and the Government tried to foster monastic schools, and supplemented them with lay schools on a western model. When the doctrine of *laissez-faire* gave place in England to ideas of efficiency and social justice, the British Government in Burma multiplied its administrative activities in order to enhance production and welfare. During the present century, with the general acceptance of the principles of democracy and self-determination, the Government constructed democratic machinery on an up-to-date model, and distributed the franchise with a liberality that would have been thought rash in England. Yet economic freedom merely allowed the people to pile up debt and lose their land; law multiplied litigation, even at the expense of justice; education lost its spiritual content and became a means of livelihood; the departments charged with enhancing production and welfare became vehicles of oppression and corruption; democratic machinery fostered civil strife and political discontent. All these things that worked so well in Britain went awry in Burma.

It should be instructive, therefore, to study the course of events in Netherlands India, where the administration was conducted with a different objective and on a different plan.

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CHAPTER VII

NETHERLANDS INDIA

1. Administrative Divisions

121 Netherlands India, often termed the Dutch East Indies, has been examined in some detail by the present writer in another work, which follows the same general plan as that adopted here for Burma. It may suffice here, then, to attempt merely a general survey with a view to illustrating the more notable points of similarity and contrast in respect of colonial policy and practice in Netherlands India and Burma.

[131] Netherlands India is a great empire comprising many diverse regions. In popular usage two major divisions are recognized: Java, together with the adjacent small island of Madura, which will not subsequently be distinguished from Java unless this is indicated by the context; and the remaining territories, known collectively as the Outer Provinces but, since 1934, grouped in three Governments, Sumatra, Borneo and the Great East. Until the present century the Outer Provinces received little attention, and the following account of Dutch policy and practice relates especially to Java, which has been under Dutch control for nearly three hundred years; it does not deal with administration in the comparatively small part of Java where native states survive.

181 Between Java and Burma there is much in common. Under native rule their social and political institutions were fundamentally similar, despite the fact that Burma professes Buddhism and Java Islam. Now, in both countries there is a tropical people, mainly agricultural, under the rule of a western power; and in both there is a mixed community of natives, Chinese, Indians and Europeans, who have little in common outside the economic sphere. At a first glance there 131 would seem also to be a close resemblance between their respective systems of administration. Java is divided into provinces, rather like 142 the divisions of Burma; these comprise residencies, corresponding roughly to the Burma district; in a residency there are *afdeelingen* (subdivisions) that seem to resemble the Burma subdivision, and in the *afdeeling* there are usually two regencies, which may roughly be equated with the Burma township. The general administration is

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conducted by civil servants, European and native, and these are assisted in matters requiring expert knowledge by specialist officers of various departments. The smallest unit is the village under an elective headman. As in Burma, representative government on western lines has been introduced. The people are represented in Regency, Urban and Provincial Councils, and in a National or Peoples' Council, the *Volksraad*, which includes delegates from the whole of Netherlands India. At the head of the administration is the Governor-General, responsible to the home Government, but sharing the task of government in Indian affairs with the Volksraad; he also has a small official council, the 'Raad van Indië' to advise him. But the general similarity between the administrative machinery of Java and Burma is superficial, and covers a profound contrast; the form and functions of the machinery in the two countries, and the principles on which it works, are quite different. It is hardly possible, however, to appreciate the nature and extent of this difference without some knowlege of the past history of Java under Dutch rule.

2. Netherlands India up to 1830

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We have already touched on the earlier history of Netherlands India, but it may be convenient to recall the main facts before tracing its later course. The Dutch East India Company was founded in 1602 to trade in eastern produce, and especially the spices of the Moluccas. In order to carry on trade it had to assume sovereign powers, and it was thereby enabled to obtain produce not only by trade but as tribute. In 1619 it conquered the small kingdom of Jacatra, and founded Batavia, from which it gradually extended its rule over the whole island. In Java there were hereditary local officials, corresponding to the circle headmen of Burma. Many of these officials were confirmed in their charges with the title of Regent on condition of providing the produce and services that the Company might require; otherwise they were left a free hand in governing their people. A European was appointed at suitable stations to see that the Regent fulfilled his obligations, and this officer came to be known as a Resident. Thus, solely on economic grounds, and with a view to administrative convenience and commercial profit, the Dutch from the earliest days adopted a system of *Indirect Rule*, with a native chieftain in charge of native affairs, and a European agent to look after the business of the Company. The Company introduced coffee, and, to see that the people cultivated it

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properly and in accordance with the requirements of the Company, some of the subordinate European officials were charged with supervising its cultivation. These officials, later styled Controleurs (inspectors), formed a link between the European and native branches of the administration.

For many years the Company, obtaining produce for little or nothing as tribute, flourished exceedingly; but in the course of time it suffered losses through the corruption of its servants. The Dutch Company, like the English, and at about the same time, tried to reform the administration but, largely because the States-General had less power than the British Parliament, these attempts failed. At the end of the eighteenth century, by reason of the war with England and the French Revolution, the Company went bankrupt, and in 1800 its possessions were taken over by the State.

A sharp controversy followed as to the policy to be adopted. One party, led by an official who had been in touch with the reforms recently adopted in British India, advocated the introduction of a similar system of direct rule based on liberal principles. The conservative majority, however, prevailed, and the principle of indirect rule through native chieftains under European supervision was reasserted; the relations between the European officials and native chieftains were to be those of an elder and younger brother, the term used in Java, as formerly in Burma, to describe the relations of suzerain and vassal. It was recognized, however, that under the Company the people had been subject to oppression by their chieftains, and European officials were enjoined 'to protect the common man against all arbitrary treatment' and to act towards him 'more like a father studying to promote the welfare of his family than a ruler governing his subjects'. One conspicuous abuse under the Company had been the tendency of Regents to alienate large tracts to wealthy Chinese; the occupants went with the land, or rather the land went with the people, whose services were lost to the Regent and consequently to the Company, while they were more oppressed than by their native rulers. It was decided, therefore, to prohibit the alienation of native land to foreigners. From that time on Dutch colonial policy has always recognized three basic principles: indirect rule; the protection of the people against oppression; and the retention of native land in native hands.

Apart from the formulation of principles, however, the controversy had little practical result, as, during the Napoleonic Wars, Java

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was taken over by foreign powers, first by the French and then, 1811–16, by the British. Raffles, who was appointed Lieutenant-Governor, was a fervent disciple of the new political economy with its doctrines of economic freedom and equal law. The English, like the Dutch, wanted tropical produce, but, whereas the Dutch had to obtain it as tribute because they had no goods to sell, the English wanted to sell western goods, the cheap cottons of Manchester, which, by the recent industrial revolution, could now be sold in Asia at lower rates than native cloth. For the English, trade was more profitable than tribute. As a humanitarian Raffles aimed at liberating the people from the oppression of their native rulers, and as a practical man he wanted to put money in their pockets so that they might buy English cottons. The measures that he adopted were almost identical with those adopted a few years later in Tenasserim. For the Regents he substituted European magistrates and judges, trying cases with the assistance of a jury; for the regency as the unit of administration he substituted the village; and, for compulsory contributions and services, he substituted land revenue collected in money through the village headman. His great contribution to Dutch colonial practice was the village system, which he claimed to be in line with native custom, though it more nearly resembled the British system of administration in South India.

3. The Culture System, 1830–70

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When the Dutch recovered their possessions in 1816–18, they found that Raffles had gone further in the Liberal direction than their own most advanced reformers had ever thought possible. By this time Liberalism was in the air, and the new Dutch Government attempted a compromise between their old traditions and the new policy of Raffles. Among the features of his rule that they retained were the village system and land revenue. But the Dutch, after twenty years of French domination, had no merchants, no manufactures, no shipping, no capital—and no enterprise. Under a system of economic freedom the English monopolized the trade of Java, while the Dutch had to bear the cost of government. The King induced them to found a large commercial firm, the Netherlands Trading Company, providing out of his own purse a great part of the capital and guaranteeing a profit, in the hope that it would be able to compete with English merchants. This plan was ineffectual; the Dutch preferred an easy-going, unadventurous life of petty retail trade at home. Then he took up a

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scheme for colonizing Java 'with capital rather than with men', and created the Java Bank, of which practically the whole capital was furnished by the Government and the Netherlands Trading Company in equal shares. These measures established another tradition of Dutch rule, the active participation of the Government in economic development. But they failed to restore financial equilibrium or to ensure peace and quiet (*rust en orde*). The colonial debt accumulated and disorder grew more serious. The Governor-General was forced to mortgage all the Dutch possessions in the East to a British firm in Calcutta, and the disorder culminated in a dangerous rebellion, the Java War, 1825–30.

A saviour was found in Van den Bosch, who had served under the Company and, in 1830, returned to Java as Governor-General. He attributed the financial breakdown and the general unrest to the system introduced by Raffles, based on the principles of economic freedom and the rule of law. Raffles, he said, had made Java profitable to England by remodelling its institutions on the Indian pattern, with the result that Chinese and Arab moneylenders and middlemen had replaced the hereditary leaders; and the collapse of authority and social order, and growing impoverishment had then brought into existence 'a numerous class of proletarians who go about and steal', against whom judicial forms were useless. His description of Java in 1830 reads in fact very like an account of modern Burma. His remedy was to revive the methods of the Company on a new plan, known as the Culture System.

The essence of the Culture system was that the people, instead of paying land revenue in cash, should furnish an equivalent amount of such produce, ordinarily export crops, as the Government might want; they were also encouraged to sell the Government additional produce at a low rate. On this plan it was necessary to restore authority to the Regents, who could use their influence to make the people grow these crops and perform such services as might be required for public works. Van den Bosch recognized that the village would be useful as a unit of communal production, and therefore retained the village system introduced by Raffles. So long as the requisite produce and labour were forthcoming, he abstained as far as possible from interfering in native affairs, which he left to the Regents and the villages, 'the little republics'. The chief duty of the Resident was to look after the interest of Government in connection with the Culture system, while the controleur, as under the Company,

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175 formed a link between the European and native branches of the
651 administration. The Culture system, however, was only one aspect of
471 a comprehensive plan to encourage Dutch manufactures, banking,
642 shipping and enterprise. Dutch firms, financed by Dutch banks, exported Dutch cotton goods in Dutch ships in exchange for tropical produce to be sold to the rest of Europe at auctions held in Amsterdam. The Government assisted manufacturers of cotton goods; the Netherlands Trading Company had a monopoly of the trade and shipping, and provided funds for the Government at home; while the Java Bank, on behalf of Government, financed the scheme in Java. Under the Culture system the whole of Java became 'one huge State enterprise'. For twenty years this system was consistently and vigorously applied by two men, Van den Bosch and his successor Baud, either as Governor-General or Colonial Minister.

175 The main object of Van den Bosch was to stimulate Dutch enter-
471 prise which, in 1815, had been killed by twenty years of foreign rule.
661 In this he was successful, beyond his hopes, and even perhaps beyond his wishes. The profits of the Culture system enriched the Dutch Treasury, but it also enriched manufacturers and others, who began to look with a jealous eye on the profit that Government was making out of the plantations, and to sympathize with the Liberal doctrine that Government should leave business to private individuals. The revolutionary movement of 1848 brought the Liberal party into power, and led in 1854 to the enactment of a new Indian Constitution bringing India under parliamentary control. For the next twenty years colonial policy was a central issue in home politics, with considerations of economic progress and the welfare of the people vehemently debated in a tangle of argument based on practical and moral grounds. Meanwhile the course of events in Java strengthened the Liberal contentions. Van den Bosch had claimed that his plan would diffuse prosperity by enabling the people to produce more, and therefore to earn more. For some years his claim was justified by the results, and all classes became more prosperous. But, with money pouring into the Dutch Treasury so easily, the Government always found some new occasion for expense, and wanted still more money. The system encouraged this, for it was radically vicious in combining political and economic control in the same hands. All the officials, European and native, from the Resident down to the village headman, shared in the profits of the Dutch Treasury by drawing a commission on produce. Naturally they used their authority to enhance pro-

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duction, and were stimulated to do so by the Home Government. On the plan, as originally conceived by Van den Bosch, officials were expected to supervise and encourage the production of subsistence crops alongside export crops. But attention was concentrated on export crops, and a succession of famines during the forties strengthened the liberal appeal to humanitarian sentiment. Baron van Hoëvell, formerly a pastor in Java, impressed on the States-General that the Culture system handed over the people of Java to oppression by their own chieftains; Dekker, an ex-official, under the pseudonym of *Multatuli* spread the news abroad in a novel, *Max Havelaar*, which 'sent a thrill throughout the land'; and Van de Putte, a planter, convinced Holland that the Culture system was unprofitable business. In 1870 it was decided to replace this system 'rooted in unrighteousness', by one 'which preferred freedom and justice above profit-seeking'; or, in other words, based on the principle that profits should go to private individuals rather than to the public.

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4. The Liberal System, 1870–1900

Liberalism gave a new impulse to economic progress and, for a time, to welfare. But within a few years welfare declined, and progress gradually slackened to stagnation. On the new system, private planters took over the plantations formerly managed by Government, and used the influence of the village headmen to secure labour and produce, as the Government agents had done formerly. Business, it has been said, went on much as before, 'but with many shareholders instead of only one'. Private enterprise tended to be more oppressive than State enterprise. But three things protected the people.

175 x 471

Foremost among these perhaps was the tradition of Dutch rule that Government should protect the people against oppression by their chieftains. Liberalism had a double aspect, practical and humanitarian, and practical men and humanitarians had joined forces to defeat the Culture system. The planters represented in the main the practical aspect of Liberalism; they were interested in economic progress. But the new generation of officials, inspired by Liberal humanitarian ideas, showed a more lively interest than their predecessors in the welfare of the people. They no longer drew a commission on the produce, and their transformation from quasi-mercantile agents into a regular civil service was a step towards the separation of political from economic control. Similarly in the central Government political and

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x,175 642 economic control were divorced. Formerly the Government had been blinded to the abuses of the Culture system by the profits; now, with the Indies under the control of the States-General, there was a division between the planting interest, profiting by low wages, and the manufacturing interest, which could find a better market with high wages; and both parties, in appealing to neutrals in Parliament and elsewhere, urged their case so far as possible on moral grounds. Thus under the new system officials regarded it as one of their main functions to protect the people from oppression by their native chieftains acting as agents of the planters, and in this they had the support of Government; the demi-official manual for controleurs directed them to encourage, though without actively instigating, complaints.

x175 423 The second form of protection[z/1] was the long-established principle of Dutch rule that native land should not be alienated to foreigners. Under French rule, and even more under Raffles, financial stringency had been relieved by the sale of large estates, often comprising many villages, to be held with almost full sovereign rights over the occupants. On these estates the Government lost its revenue and the services of the people, and oppression by the owners frequently caused unrest. The Government feared that, if the people were allowed to dispose of their land to foreigners, large areas would be transferred to planters and Chinese moneylenders. It accordingly resisted all attempts by Liberals to apply western ideas of property to native land. Planters could obtain waste land on long lease from the Government, or they could rent land on an annual lease from villagers; but they were not allowed to buy village land, and the village retained full control over the disposal of its land in accordance with village custom.

175 444 The third protection[z/1] of the people was the village system. This was not wholly to their advantage, for the planters obtained labour through the village headman, and sometimes enrolled him on the list of their establishment. To this extent they were interested in the maintenance of the village system, and they upheld the tradition of abstaining from interference in the 'holy hamlet'. On the other hand, the village system kept up the rate of wages by reducing the supply of labour available. The Government still required the people to give [651] their services instead of paying taxes in money. Compulsory service was burdensome and wasteful, but men called out to work for Government or the village reduced the labour available for private enterprise. The planters, and liberal interests in general, were zealous for the principle of free labour, which would give them command over

z/1 [Protection against abuses of private enterprise
see cat. 116, p. 223 — Analyst]

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a much larger supply, but they did not gain their point until the Liberal period was passing.

Like the Culture system, the Liberal system did not fulfil its early promise; in both cases progress was followed by stagnation and collapse, and 'to many who expected great things from the noble sentiments and shrewd forecasts of Liberal prophets the results were a bitter disappointment'.[1] The practical Dutch idealists who instituted the reforms of 1870, though certainly mindful of potentialities for Holland itself, were quite sincere in their conviction that in giving its chance to private initiative in the Indies, they would be acting in the best interests both of that country and of its inhabitants: free labour in a frame of world free trade would bring to the Indies prosperity and development and to an eager and avid world a great increase of resources. The new system actually had some of these results and they could hardly foresee its other consequences whereby 'free enterprise eventually became from a social and economic ideal to be almost a byword for capitalistic exploitation'.[2]

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The Liberal period gave a new turn to the policy of indirect rule. The European officials had always been expected to protect the cultivator from oppression by his native rulers; under the Liberal system it became necessary also to protect him from oppression by Europeans engaged in western enterprise. That was not the only change. European officials had always been required to look after European affairs; this was in accordance with the basic principle of Dutch rule that the rule of 'like over like is welcome'. There were native Regents to administer native affairs; Chinese and Indian 'captains' to look after the affairs respectively of Chinese and Indians, and similarly European officials for European affairs. But until 1850, and even until 1870, there was little in Java that was European except the Government. With the growth of private enterprise, European officials had more work in connection with European business, and this emphasized the dual aspect of the administrative system, with Europeans for the rapidly increasing European business, and Regents for the native business, and with the Controleur still acting as a link between these two distinct elements in the administration.

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During the Liberal period also, the simple administrative machinery which had sufficed for Van den Bosch grew far more elaborate. The development of trade and private enterprise made it necessary to cut up the residency into *afdeelingen* (subdivisions). But there was a

[1] Rengers, cited *Netherlands India*, p. 223. [2] Hart, p. 40.

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characteristic difference of principle between the manner of constituting subdivisions of the residency in Java and of the district in Burma. In Burma, the principle of Government is one of 'strict subordination'; the subdivisional officer is a subordinate of the Deputy Commissioner, and naturally there is one in charge of the headquarters subdivision as well as at out-stations. In Java the officer in charge of an *afdeeling*, known as the Assistant Resident, is an agent rather than a subordinate of the Resident, and accordingly there is no Assistant Resident at residency headquarters. The Controleurs grew in number and their functions were multiplied, but they were still regarded as merely the eyes and ears of the Resident or his assistant, and they remained without administrative powers. In the native branch of the administration the changes were so great as to give it a new character. Partly for greater efficiency, and partly to serve as a check upon misuse by the Regents of their authority, each regency was divided into three or four districts, and each district into three or four sub-districts, comprising about twenty villages, and a native civil service was created to administer these charges. The Regent and his assistants constitute the Native Administration (*Inlandsch Bestuur*), alongside but not directly subordinate to the European Administration (*Binnenlandsch Bestuur*). The native officials of lower rank are not hereditary, like the Regent, but ordinary civil servants and, although nominally at the service of the Regent, they are more amenable than the hereditary Regent to suggestions by the European Controleur. A comparison of this organization with that of Burma suggests the far greater intensity of Dutch rule. In Burma the lowest grade in general administration is the Township of about a hundred villages; in Java the smallest unit of general administration is the sub-district of about twenty villages.

5. The Ethical System and Political Democracy

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The earlier hopes of Liberalism were dispelled by a severe economic crisis, 1883–5, and individual enterprise began to yield place to combination; the economic structure was no longer individualist, but definitely capitalist. Again, from about 1895, the Indies encountered another depression. Meanwhile new interests were exerting an influence on Dutch colonial policy. Low wages were profitable to the planters and to those concerned in the export of tropical produce; but they were bad for the Dutch cotton trade, and chambers of com-

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merce began to press the view that native welfare was declining. In 1902 the Queen promised an enquiry into 'the Diminishing Welfare of the People of Java'. This may be taken to mark the transition from the Liberal policy to what the Dutch call the Ethical policy, based on ideas similar to those which at about the same time in England inspired the doctrine of the White Man's Burden.

The Ethical policy had a two-fold aspect, economic and social. On the economic side it aimed at promoting development by western enterprise with a view to providing funds for the enhancement of welfare. On the social side it aimed at promoting social welfare through the village. Van den Bosch, believing that the Liberal experiment inaugurated by Raffles had multiplied unrest and impoverished the people, used the village as an instrument for maintaining peace and order, and as a lever for increasing material production. Similarly the Ethical reformers, holding that under Liberal rule economic freedom had weakened village solidarity, aimed to strengthen the village and use it as a lever, not for increasing material production, but for enhancing social welfare, and for promoting democratic self-government, an idea which they inherited from the Liberal tradition. These views found expression in the Village Act of 1906, intended to convert the village into a petty municipality on western lines, endowed with power to administer village affairs, property and land in the interest of the people, and functioning under the control of the general body of villagers. It was thought that this would train the people in political democracy, and at the same time would furnish European officials with a 'practical apparatus' for enhancing village welfare, and thereby individual welfare. Thus the Dutch welfare movement and the welfare movement that took shape at about the same time in Burma were based on different principles. In Burma the Government aimed at promoting individual welfare through the elaboration of administrative machinery; the Dutch aimed at promoting it through the growth of social welfare. It was common to both policies, however, that they required a great expansion of official machinery, the western superstructure over native life.

In practice the new machinery was used in the interest of efficiency rather than of political education; village meetings were held, and the records showed that they were attended by the prescribed quorum and that resolutions were adopted by the prescribed majority. But this procedure, so far as it was observed, was largely formal; the resolutions usually originated in suggestions from the Controleur.

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At the same time[1] councils on western lines were constituted for larger rural areas,[1] for urban areas and ultimately for the whole territory in the Volksraad, or People's Council. Representative institutions are examined separately below. Here it is sufficient to notice that the original local councils proved lacking in inherent vitality, and subsequent reforms were directed to linking up the whole system of self-government, from village to Volksraad, in one organic system. As a part of this development the residencies were grouped between 1926 and 1928 into three Provinces under civil servants as Governors.

In respect of administration the chief outcome of the new policy was to change the character of indirect rule. During the Liberal period the Regent was regarded with some suspicion as a survival from the days of arbitrary oppression, and lost some of his authority. Under the Ethical system this tendency was carried further. Many Regents were impatient of new-fangled notions, and the Controleurs, zealous for promoting welfare, came to work more and more through the subordinate ranks of the Native Civil Service, who were readier to interpret suggestions as commands; thus the Regent tended to sink into the background. With the extension of Government activities, specialist officers were recruited to promote education, agriculture, medical and veterinary care and so on, and, alongside the general administrative services, there came into being large departments charged with these special functions. At first the specialist officers worked through the Assistant Residents and Controleurs, but gradually they became more independent, working in direct relation with the native subordinates, and turning to the European civil servants only for assistance in enforcing measures that the people were reluctant to adopt. This was directly contrary to the traditional Dutch policy of ruling through the Regents, with the European civil servants emerging from the background only in the light of benevolent protectors.

Another aspect of the Ethical policy was, in fact, a heritage from the Liberal doctrine of equal law for all. The Dutch rule of 'like over like' recognized a dual system of administration, with Europeans and natives under their respective laws and customs. Many Ethical leaders advocated a unified system of administration, with Europeans and natives all in one combined service administering uniform law. One application of this policy was an experiment in liberating the Regents from the tutelage of the Controleur (*ontvoogdij*). But the chief

[1] [At the time of the inauguration of the Ethical Policy circa. 1901 — Analyst]

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function of the Controleur had been to look after the Regent, and the new plan left the Regent to look after himself and the Controleur with nothing to do. The experiment was never popular either with Dutch or natives, and the first Regent to be emancipated declared afterwards that he never noticed any difference. In 1931 it was abandoned.

From the financial standpoint, the Ethical policy looked to the development of the country by western enterprise with a view to providing funds for social services. Like the doctrine of the White Man's Burden, it originated at a time of imperialist expansion, when a rapidly growing demand for tropical produce was attracting western capital and large-scale enterprise. Capitalist enterprise provided much of the revenue expended on social services, but experience suggested that these welfare services were of little benefit to the people. The head of the Credit Service, afterwards Professor of Tropical Economy in Leiden gave a depressing picture of the results. 'I really cannot assure you that the people are any better off for the millions which they have borrowed from the State Banks.' Similarly, he continues, irrigation, emigration, colonization, are catchwords that have lost their lustre; other catchwords—the promotion of export crops, the improvement of hygiene, the relief of taxation—have their ups and downs in the current of policy, as, for example, the cry for industrialization rising and falling with the economic conjuncture. 'But the only popular response to all these nostrums is an increase in numbers, while foreign capitalists and foreign energy take out of native hands a rapidly increasing share of native activities.'[1] Another high official said, 'The welfare of the native population has not been noticeably raised, for higher production is counterbalanced by increase of population.'[2] The policy was attacked from another side also as purely artificial. One of the foremost advocates of the Ethical system, disillusioned by long experience, exclaimed, 'As soon as we withdraw our hands, everything sinks back into the marsh.' And after a consistent endeavour for over twenty years to strengthen the village community, and use it for promoting welfare, a survey of the results led to the conclusion that 'deplorably little village autonomy remains'.[3]

Meanwhile a Nationalist movement had been gaining strength. Growing unrest culminated at the end of 1926 in a serious rising in Java and Sumatra. An enquiry into unrest in Bantam supported the

[1] Boeke cited *Netherlands India*, p. 403.
[2] de Wilde, Dr A. Nietzel, *Asiatic Review*, 1934, p. 232.
[3] Adam, cited *Netherlands India*, p. 404.

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x 175 668 view that one source of trouble was the tendency under the Ethical policy to displace the Regent. Thus the Ethical policy was subjected to an increasing volume of criticism on all sides, as a departure from the traditional principle of ruling the people through their own leaders, and as an attempt to westernize the East too rapidly. Opinion turned towards restoring the Regent to the centre of the picture, and thereby bringing the people into contact with the modern world by methods less artificial and more congenial to their ideas. That was the position when suddenly the whole situation was changed by the depression of the thirties.

6. Economic Democracy and Nation-Building

x 175 656 From 1800 it has been the express principle of Dutch policy that its officials should protect the common man against oppression. This principle has become a tradition among the European officials. They protested against some aspects of the Culture system so forcibly as to call from Baud the remark that 'the tender feelings of a few young gentlemen Controleurs' could not be allowed to affect the profits drawn by Government. From 1870, inspired with the new Liberal humanitarianism, they sought to protect the people not only against the native chieftains but against the planters. After 1900 they were zealous in pursuing the new Ethical policy of not merely protecting the people but of actively promoting their welfare. Their training and their duties fostered a sympathetic attitude towards the people. During a long course at Leiden University an enthusiastic staff aimed at enabling them to understand the East. For their first ten or twelve years they moved intimately among the people, with no executive or magisterial functions to produce estrangement. Accordingly, when the welfare movement seemed to favour western capitalists rather than the people, they were among the earliest to react against it. At the onset of the depression 'the younger civil servants...had long been dissatisfied with the shape and tempo of the Indies community socially and economically: with its crippling dualism; with the outflow of profits to shareholders outside the country; with the limited chances for Indonesians of establishing enterprise of their own or of obtaining higher positions in western concerns; with inadequate Government control of wages and land rents'. 'It happened that, in the early thirties when the depression broke, these men were just stepping into key positions in the central and local government.' Even those who had not been so keenly sensible of Indonesian disabilities

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began 'to realize clearly that this crisis was not a passing phase in a trade cycle, but the initial stage of fundamental social and economic changes which would develop into a major disaster to humanity if they were not met by new conceptions and new methods'.[1]

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At the same time the depression changed the relative position of western enterprise and the Government. Many held that, among other defects of the former system, was the fact that western enterprise 'had grown too powerful in the country and that it wielded that power in order to retard progress in the political, economic and social fields, lining up for that purpose with other political groups...there was at one time certainly more activity lobbying and browbeating by private interests on political issues, both in Batavia and the Hague, than is consistent with the proper place of business'.[2] Formerly Government had been largely dependent on the goodwill of western enterprise; the depression made western enterprise dependent on the goodwill of Government. Also Japan, flooding the country with cheap cottons, threatened not only Dutch manufacturers but the young local weaving industry. Western enterprise called on Government for help, and 'Government intervention never seemed to stop just where the business interests would like it to stop'.

Thus, just when the Government was adopting a new outlook, it acquired greater power, and adopted a policy of directed economy, aiming at the development of economic democracy as the basis of political democracy which if 'not based on or closely related to economic democracy...could never really flourish among the Indonesians...(but)...would remain a bewildering and dubious blessing'. The apparently easy way of promoting native welfare by encouraging development through western enterprise had proved fallacious. Now, says Dr Hart,

> 'we had to learn directed economy, the hard way, because we could not afford the easy way; very little public money went into any of the schemes, because there was very little money available in those depression years. There were no large-scale credits, no so-called "money injections", no expensive organizations, paid out of public revenues. Persuasion and legislation were the principal instruments and the inevitable costs of running the new machinery were met by levies from the interest involved.'[3]

The result, it is claimed, was 'the birth of a nation'.

> 'An Indonesian nation was being born, not made, born by the will and the efforts of the best of the Indonesians themselves....The European and

[1] Hart, p. 53. [2] *Ib.* p. 48. [3] *Ib.* pp. 60, 62.

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X175 656 Chinese elements were becoming conscious of their integration into this new community while the Administration felt that for the first time in history, it was becoming, slowly, but quite perceptibly, from a benevolent and progressive western superstructure, the natural and true Government of the Indies.'[1]

7. NATIONALISM

668 The Ethical system,[2] as we have seen, took shape at the beginning of the present century. No sooner, however, had Government set the helm along an Ethical course than it ran into a new and unsuspected current of Nationalism. As Dr Colijn, the colonial statesman and Prime Minister, remarked, national consciousness in Java, probably always latent, suddenly emerged above the surface. The victory of Japan over Russia inspired the educated classes with new hope of a national revival, and this spread rapidly to the other classes and the other islands. The changed attitude of the Javanese towards those who for three centuries had been their masters was suspect, yet it was not wholly unwelcome, as it seemed to promise favourable results for the Ethical movement; and, even when further developments brought disillusionment to many well-wishers, and the current of opposition to native claims grew stronger, the principle of autonomous political democracy gradually replaced welfare as the main end of policy.

668 563 The nationalist movement in the Indies has tended to follow the same lines as the somewhat earlier movement in British India, but certain features of society have given it a special character, though with some resemblance to the course of events in Burma. Among the native population in general there is greater social unity than in India for, as in Burma, they are free of caste, accord a high status to women, are largely of one religion and, at least in Java, culturally homogeneous. There is a resemblance to Burma also in the relations of the foreign elements, European and oriental, with the natives. The Chinese, like the Indian in Burma, acts as a middleman between European and native, tending to be a focus for the animosity of both, and yet at the same time a buffer, averting the direct collision of their conflicting interests. In political developments the Chinese have played a part very similar to that of the Indians in Burma. Signs of new life first appeared among the Chinese, and the success of Chinese agitation encouraged the Javanese to adopt like methods. But Chinese interests are capitalist rather than nationalist, and the introduction of representative institutions tended to draw them into alliance with

[1] Hart, p. 21; Vlekke, pp. 369, 371.

[2] [Cf. cat. 116, pp. 226–230 — Analyst]

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Europeans against the numerical superiority and separate interests of the natives. Peculiar to Netherlands India is the large Indo-European (Eurasian) community. An even more outstanding character is the presence of a large European population of very diverse composition, not merely as a ruling class but all down the social scale, and actively engaged in various economic activities. It is chiefly this European element that has given a distinctive course to the nationalist movement in Java. 668 563

As in Burma one can trace national sentiments in the earliest publications of the native press. Modern Nationalism was clearly foreshadowed in the work of a remarkable woman, Miss Kartini. Under the sympathetic encouragement of Dutch officials she developed, about 1900, a project of female education as an instrument of national welfare. Thus Nationalism was already present as in a saturated solution, ready to crystallize out at the first shock. Although the shock came from outside with the victory of Japan over Russia, the vital force of Nationalism came from the people themselves; the Japanese victory merely transformed national sentiment into modern Nationalism, inspired by the idea of using western science and western education to counter the supremacy of the West. As in Burma, it first became manifest among the educated classes. In 1906 a retired medical subordinate began to tour the country with the advancement of Java as his text. In 1908 he founded the first nationalist society, *Boedi Oetomo*, the Glorious Endeavour. This organization did useful work, but chiefly among those from western schools; it never became a popular movement and on the whole exercised a moderating influence in politics. The next development had a very different character; it was popular and primarily economic. In 1911 some Javanese traders in cloth, resenting the sharp practices of the Chinese, took their religion as a symbol of social unity, and formed a society under a title subsequently abbreviated to *Sarikat Islam*. This grew rapidly and became the spear-point of the nationalist movement. 668

The movement took on a new and more aggressive character when it was joined by recruits from among the Indo-Europeans, popularly known as Indos. Although Dutch policy has always been to assimilate Indo-Europeans with Europeans of pure blood, there is in fact a cleavage of interest between permanent and temporary residents. With the influx of Europeans consequent on the growth of western enterprise during the present century, the cleft grew wider, and in 1912 an Indo journalist, Douwes Dekker, nephew of the author of *Max* 668 563

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668 *Havelaar*, created a great stir by an article claiming 'India for the Indians', including under one head domiciled Europeans, Indos and
563 Indonesians. Together with some native leaders he formed an 'Indian Party', aiming avowedly at independence.

The intervention of the Indos in nationalist policy was soon followed by European intervention, but in circumstances that were wholly new. The outbreak of war in 1914 cut off Java from its usual markets and supplies, and there was a move to develop local markets and local manufactures. Before long the war stopped the supply of new assistants, and western enterprise had to recruit and train a local staff. At the same time the problem of defence assumed a new importance and, under the influence of a struggle, represented on all sides as being waged for human freedom, other colonial problems were transformed. 'In 1915 autonomy was in the air.' The European population began to take a new interest in local politics, and the creation of the Volksraad gave them a new opportunity to participate in the direction of colonial affairs. Many Europeans were of humble social origin and were employed in the lower grades of economic life. In Europe they had belonged to democratic political associations and to trade unions, and they brought their politics and trade unionism with them to the East. In 1914 they formed the Indian Social Democratic Union (I.S.D.V.), corresponding to the Social Democratic Labour Party in the Netherlands. This was soon countered by the Liberal Bond (N.I.V.B.), which aimed to unite moderate Progressives of all races. In opposition to these secularist parties there were formed the Christian Ethical Party and the Indian Roman Catholic Party, representing the two main branches of the Dutch Clerical Party. At about the same time the I.S.D.V. developed revolutionary tendencies, and the moderate element split off to form the Indian Social Democratic Party (I.S.D.P.) leaving the original I.S.D.V. an extremist party with Communist views. In all these parties, from Right to Left, the different races were associated.

At the opening of the Volksraad in 1918 every 'non-clerical' European was Liberal and progressive, aiming at the development of Java as a province of Europe in the East. Then a nationalist colour visible in the policy of the Governor-General led to a reaction. Big Business scented danger and said so, forcibly. Others followed with more discretion and the more conservative elements of the N.I.V.B. founded the Political Economy Bond (P.E.B.), corresponding to the *Vrijheidsbond* at home. Like the other political groups this was an 'association-

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party' comprising members of all races. Under European influence the nationalist movement developed in the direction of Socialism and then of Communism. Although the Indonesian labourer cared little for Karl Marx, and the great bulk of the party cared only for Nationalism, with Islam as its symbol, the leaders succumbed to the prestige of their European allies, and to their greater organizing capacity and better understanding of political tactics. In this new line, however, they were heading for a split. The fourth Nationalist Congress in 1919 purported to represent two and a half million members, but two years later the revolutionary section broke away from the main body. The post-war depression bred industrial disputes, and the vigorous suppression of strikes under a new Governor-General encouraged the spread of revolutionary views, fostered by Chinese Communists under Russian influence. Despite the appointment in 1926 of a new and more sympathetic Governor-General, the movement ran its course leading up to 'carefully planned and widely extended revolutionary operations, which indicated that the conspirators were able to reckon on at least the connivance of a large part of the native population'.[1]

The rising was suppressed, and the failure of the revolutionary movement allowed the older organization, Sarikat Islam, to resume the lead. But once again extremism made headway, and by 1930 there were three main parties, all however aiming to break loose from the Netherlands and differing only as to the best line of action. On the other hand among Europeans also an extremist, or diehard, movement was gathering strength. Irritated by the succession of strikes and alarmed by the rising of 1926, they formed in 1929 the Vaderlandsche Club as a reaction against Indian Nationalism. In the elections of 1931 strictly racial parties came to the front, while those based on the association of all races for the common welfare collapsed; even the Christian religious parties were organized on racial lines, and Muhammadan parties appeared racial rather than religious. In 1934 the *Stuw* group of Europeans, mainly officials, who had most sympathy with native aspirations, was no longer able to publish its journal, and the organ of the civil service remarked that it had suffered the natural fate of idealists; whereas many Europeans, more realist in temperament, who found the Vaderlandsche Club too moderate, formed a Fascist organization. On the opposite side the Women's Movement, and still more the Youth's Movement, tended to become aggressively nationalist. Thus the course of political development,

[1] *Indisch Verslag*, cited *Netherlands India*, pp. 253, 254.

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among Europeans and natives alike, appeared to show a steady trend in the direction of extremes.

But common distress inspired a community of sentiment. As in 1900 and 1870 and 1850, realists found that idealism had roots in common sense, and practical men and humanitarians joined hands. The *Stuw* group, as already noticed, acquired more influence in the direction of affairs. The membership of Fascist organizations was declared illegal. Strong action by the Government, in controlling western capitalism and vigorously promoting Indonesian economic activities, did much to attract native support, so that, when the test came, all sections of the community seem to have presented a common front against Japanese aggression. Since 1916 Nationalists have been demanding a larger part in military defence, and in July 1941, when it was clear that war with Japan was inevitable, the Volksraad passed a bill for a native militia, by a majority of 43 to 4, the only dissentients being the representatives of the extremist *Parindra* party, who asked that political reforms should have priority over military service; these abandoned their opposition when in December the bombing of Pearl Harbour was immediately followed by a declaration of war on Japan.[1] Although the number of the native militia was limited to 18,000, upwards of 100,000 volunteers presented themselves for enrolment. On the Japanese invasion 'the Government ordered everyone, Indonesian and Dutch, civil servant and private individual to remain at his post: there should be no quitting in the hour of direst need'. 'Dutch men and women', it was said, 'belong in the Indies and to the Indies; they are part of the Indies; it is their country as much as it is that of the Indonesians themselves, for better or for worse.'[2] In Netherlands India, as elsewhere, the Japanese found men of some standing to co-operate with them, and it seems that those who joined the Japanese have not forfeited the respect and sympathy of other Indonesians;[3] it is therefore still uncertain how far the war will tend to weld together as one people with a common Nationalism the various sections in the social structure of the recent past.

8. Administrative Practice

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(*a*) *District Administration.* The foregoing account of the evolution of the administrative system of Java has shown that, despite a superficial resemblance to the system of Burma, it is in fact quite different.

[1] Vlekke, pp. 390, 394. [2] Hart, p. 13; Vlekke, p. 404.
[3] *Vrij Nederland*, 27 Nov. and 11 Dec., 1943.

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There is indeed hardly anything in common between the character and functions of the civil servants of the two countries. In Burma there is one service divided into three grades, there are no Europeans in the lowest grade but even the highest grade is open to natives, and all, from top to bottom, so far as they are engaged in general administration, do the same kind of work. In Burma the Deputy Commissioner, the head of the district, is primarily magistrate and collector; he is a servant of the law, and is directly responsible for the collection of revenue, but in every capacity he must observe legal procedure and act strictly according to law. His subordinates, the subdivisional and township officer have the same functions, and must work under the same limitations. The European civil servant, within a year or so of his arrival in the country, becomes a magistrate of the first class, empowered to impose a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for two years; some four or five years later he becomes a district magistrate, empowered to impose a sentence of transportation for seven years. Subdivisional and township officers are likewise magistrates, with judicial powers varying according to their experience and capacity. The Deputy Commissioner and township officer are personally responsible for the collection and safe custody of the revenue, and are liable to make good defalcations; the Deputy Commissioner must himself count the money in the treasury once a month.

In Java, instead of a single service, there are two separate services, one European and one native, each with its own functions, and in neither service does any officer perform either of the two main functions of the civil servant in Burma. There is a separate judicial service and a separate treasury service, and the administration of justice and collection of revenue form no part of the duties of the ordinary administrative civil service. The European civil servant starts as a Cadet (*adspirant-controleur*) and, even when confirmed as a Controleur, has no magisterial or judicial powers, and no administrative responsibilities of any kind: his function is to keep Government in touch with the people, and to watch over and help the native civil servants. After ten or twelve years he rises to be an Assistant Resident. In the less important charges the Assistant Resident has magisterial powers, corresponding roughly to those of a third-class magistrate in Burma, and tries petty cases on one or two days a week; but he is being relieved even of this work. The Resident does no judicial work. In the native civil service the lowest grade is that of the Subdistrict officer in charge of general administration over a small

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647 tract of some twenty villages. Above him comes the District officer,[1] and at the head of the native civil service is the Regent. The sub-
634 district and district officers are purely official in character, but the Regent holds his appointment by an hereditary tenure, though he qualifies for it by service in the lower grades or in the police. The Regent has petty judicial powers such as might be specially conferred on a village headman in Burma, and the district officer has much the same judicial powers as an ordinary village headman; but such few cases as they try are disposed of in a very informal manner. No European or native civil servant is a magistrate as the term is understood in Burma. No civil servant, European or native, ever has charge of a treasury or any direct responsibility for the collection or safe custody of revenue.

625 In Java the administrative officials are not servants of the law but officers of police or policy and, in rural areas, until quite recently there was no organized police force apart from the civil servants and their orderlies. As agents of policy they are expected to maintain, not law and order, but peace and quiet (*rust en orde*), and to see that revenue collections are proceeding smoothly; but these are only incidental to their main function which is, as it has always been, to see that effect is given to the policy of Government: under the Culture system they saw to the encouragement of export crops: under the Liberal system to helping the planters and protecting the peasants: under the Ethical system to promoting village uplift. In the machinery for giving effect to the policy of Government three features deserve special notice: the *Vergadering*; the Subdistrict officer and the Regent.

634 The *Vergadering* (Gathering or Assembly) is an application to modern administrative practice of the oriental institution which in India has survived as the formal durbar, or has languished as the *panchayat*; in Dutch practice it is a meeting in which an official discusses affairs with representatives of the people, and, as in oriental usage, it has both an educative and a democratic character. From the restoration of Dutch rule in 1816 the Resident was expected to hold once a month a *vergadering* of his subordinates for the discussion of current affairs; the Regent held a similar meeting of his subordinates. The practice seems to have been developed by Van den Bosch, and

[1] It is important not to confuse the district officer of Java with the high official, often known as the District Officer, in British tropical administration. In Java the district is merely a subdivision of the Regency, and the Regency itself is a subdivision of the Residency, which corresponds more closely with a British District.

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was useful under the Culture system as a means by which the Resident could explain what produce and how much was required, and could ascertain how much was likely to be forthcoming and discuss measures for obtaining more.

During the present century the mechanism has become more or less standardized. The sub-district officer holds a gathering of his ten or twenty village headmen once a week; the district officer holds a gathering of subdistrict officers and others so many times a month; the Regent holds a gathering of district officers and others once a month, and the Resident, or at out-stations the Assistant Resident, likewise holds a gathering once a month. The Controleur holds no gathering, but attends that of the Resident or Assistant Resident, and is at liberty to attend the gatherings of the Regent or his subordinates. Attendance is not restricted to administrative officers and village headmen. At every meeting, from that of the subdistrict officer upwards, departmental officers of the appropriate rank may ask or be invited to attend for the discussion of affairs concerning their department. Forest officers, public health officers, education officers, and officers of the agricultural, veterinary or credit services may attend as necessary to explain policy or smooth out difficulties. Similarly, at the gathering of the subdistrict or district officers, the village officials, the village policeman, schoolmaster, or the man in charge of irrigation may accompany the village headman. Ordinarily only one or two services will be represented in any one meeting, and there is no need for specialist officers to attend unless there is some matter within their sphere of interest to discuss. The Controleur may be present at any of these meetings to represent the views of Government, and to help in clearing up misunderstandings and removing difficulties. Thus, on the one hand, the procedure goes far to cure the evils of departmentalism, as specialist officers are compelled to recognize that their work is not an end in itself, but only one aspect of social life; and on the other hand it seems admirably designed to secure the willing and intelligent acceptance of official policy by presenting it as fully, forcibly and reasonably as possible to those who carry weight among the people, and will have to obtain the co-operation of the people in making it effective. The whole system is indeed one of practical adult education; it is a form of government through social education.

At the same time the *vergadering* has a democratic character. It does not work on western lines with agenda, motions, amendments,

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634 numerical majorities and resolutions, but allows an informal discussion in which the presiding officer can gather from representatives of the people, the general sense of the meeting, and can take such steps as may best give effect to it or, if some measure proposed by Government does not sufficiently command approval, can make provision accordingly. Both as an institution in line with oriental democracy and as a means of adult education it is a powerful instrument of official policy, and helps to build up a strong Government based on popular support.

Another valuable feature of Dutch administrative machinery is the Subdistrict officer. In Burma the smallest unit of general administration is the township comprising about a hundred villages. The township officer is a busy man, chiefly concerned with trying cases and collecting revenue. More often than not he is transferred to another appointment within a few months. Education, sanitation, irrigation and so on, so far as they receive attention, are the concern of departmental subordinates who look at them from a departmental standpoint, knowing and caring little for their reactions on other aspects of life. The Government is impersonal; it never comes into human contact with the people as living individuals with a hundred and one different interests. But in Java the Subdistrict officer within his tiny charge can get to know the leading people as human beings, and in his own person coordinates all aspects of administrative activity.

Still more valuable is the Regent. He is a permanent institution; through all the divagations of official policy he remains a link between the past, the present and the future. He can see what is going wrong, because he knows what went before; he can use his personal inherited influence to set it right; and he remains permanently to see that his advice is followed. For example, a Regent showed the present writer a clump of trees on a hillside. Shortage of fuel had led the people to cut down a small copse. He noticed that erosion was damaging the cultivation on the slope, explained matters to the people, and encouraged them, used 'gentle pressure' as the Dutch say, to plant the trees. In Burma no one would stay long enough in one place to notice the erosion until simple remedies were no longer possible; the matter would go from one department to another while the erosion was getting worse, and in the end probably nothing would be done, because a remedy would need the co-operation of several different departments, and no one in any department would stay long enough to see the matter through and, for lack of a few trees, land would go

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out of cultivation and village harmony would be endangered. Welfare measures do not take root without prolonged encouragement and supervision, and unless recommended by someone with personal influence. The Regent satisfies all these requirements. He is permanent and enjoys general respect. Most of the younger Regents are well educated, and some have been to Europe; they can recommend western welfare measures in a way congenial to the people. In the Ethical period, when enthusiastic Controleurs tried to push reforms through subordinate native officials, they did not understand so well as the Regent the way to make reforms acceptable, and when they were transferred 'everything sank back into the marsh'. Frequent transfers of officials are unavoidable, but, in working through the Regent, transfers may even be a source of strength by bringing the Regent into touch with a succession of new ideas. Many suggestions may fall on barren ground; but some, one here, another there, take root and yield a rich harvest. Thus the Regent has once again become, as in the days of Van den Bosch, the hub on which the administration turns. It is a Regent of a new type, using, as will appear below, the new machinery of representative institutions, but he still embodies the Dutch tradition of ruling the people through their own leaders, and the welcome principle of 'like over like'.

(*b*) *Village Administration.* The Regent, however, still works through the village. Perhaps the most interesting and instructive aspect of Dutch rule in Java is the consistent effort to conserve village solidarity. There have, it is true, been frequent encroachments on village autonomy. Under the Culture system the village was used to promote cultivation for the State; under the Liberal system it was adapted to the requirements of the planters; under the Ethical system it was used to promote welfare along western lines. But the Dutch have never abandoned the principle that, so far as the interests of Government allowed, the village should be left to manage its own affairs. The Village Act of 1906 was expressly designed both to strengthen the village community and to adapt it to the modern world, 'to stimulate social growth, and enable local officials to cope with their main function, the care of public welfare'. In the manner of its application three points are of especial interest.

In Java, as in Burma, it seemed common sense that to get better headmen one must give them better pay, and the Government adopted the policy of amalgamating villages so that headmen should collect more revenue and draw a larger commission. But it was soon

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632 found that the headman remained a stranger within the new village added to his charge; in some cases, it is said, he hardly dared to show his face there. The readjustment of village charges tended to convert the village from a natural social unit into an administrative unit and, although the headman earned a larger income, he had less and not more authority than before. Thus experience brought a reaction towards leaving traditional village boundaries intact.

When the Village Act was first introduced, the villages were given powers similar to those of a western municipality, and were expected to use them similarly: to prepare a budget, pass it in a legally constituted Village Meeting attended by a quorum of villagers duly qualified to vote, to spend their funds accordingly, and to prepare annual accounts. Other matters of general interest, the leasing of village land to sugar planters, and so on, were dealt with in such village meetings. Before long almost every village had its village treasury to provide funds for everything that the Controleur thought the village ought to want: school, village bank, paddy bank, bazaar, stud bull, pedigree goat, and so on. The people were educated in business principles, and numerous registers were prescribed for the headman, clerk and village priest; but, with anxious care lest democracy should be sacrificed to efficiency, everything had to be put before and passed by the village meeting. That at least was the ideal of policy, but in practice very few villages came up to this high standard. Even the 'village clerk' was often illiterate, and for some villages the records and registers had to be maintained in the subdistrict office. The whole machinery was too complicated and western. Some few villages could manage it competently, others not at all. The mistake lay not merely in introducing western machinery, but in treating all the villages alike. Warned by this experience, when measures along somewhat similar lines were adopted for the Outer Provinces, they were applied gradually to selected villages.

A third defect was the experiment of working through the Controleur instead of through the Regent. The Controleur pressed some welfare measure on the people, but his successor would have a different enthusiasm, and strike out along new lines. Some of the reforms, sound enough perhaps in Europe, were so unpopular that the people would not accept them. For example, the veterinary department wished to improve the breed of cattle by castrating unsuitable bulls; but in Madura, the chief cattle breeding centre, the people sold their animals for slaughter rather than allow them to be castrated. The

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people could be made to build latrines, but were so careful to keep them sanitary that they never used them. Only with a reversion to the principle of working through the Regents did reforms take root. 632

(*c*) *Departmental Administration.* For the Culture system a very simple type of organization sufficed, and it was not until 1866–70 that departmental administration was adopted. With the rapid growth of Government activities during the present century numerous special services were constituted, but they were grouped in large departments, and at the latest reorganization in 1934 the functions of general civil administration were distributed between six departments dealing respectively with justice; finance; internal affairs; education and religion; economic affairs; and public works. At the head of each department is a director. The comprehensive character of these departments is a notable feature of Dutch administration, as it minimizes the evils of departmentalism by enabling the director to take a wide view of several related services and thus co-ordinate their activities. Another device to the same end is the appointment of liaison officers between the departments and services. The Director of Education, for example, has two advisers from the European administrative service to help him in respect of native education. There is also a special liaison officer between the agricultural, credit and civil services. 647

Much use is made of specialist Advisers, charged with studying important problems, but without any responsibility for policy. There have been Advisers on native affairs, on Chinese affairs, on Japanese affairs, on credit institutions, on native education and on decentralization. These Advisers make a continual study of large issues from a broader aspect than is possible for officials immediately concerned with the daily routine of administration. It was largely through the advice of the Adviser on Moslem affairs that the Dutch finally succeeded in pacifying Achin. This device helps in some measure to minimize a difficulty common to all colonial administration, the lack of institutions and periodicals in which large issues can be studied and discussed by an intelligent and instructed public.

(*d*) *Judicial Administration.* In accordance with the principle of 'like over like', law and procedure are adapted to the several requirements of the various sections of the public. Since 1915, however, there has been one Penal Code applicable to all sections. If civil disputes between natives come into court, they are decided according to native customary law, including thereunder any statutory laws that 692

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692 have been made applicable to natives. Religious matters between Muhammadans come before Moslem clerical tribunals.

Petty offences by natives mostly come before the Regent or district
692 officer, who may hear them in the large open verandah that forms part of his official residence; he has no court and his only office is a small
695 out-house that might easily be mistaken for a garage. Local dignitaries sit on a bench with the presiding officer, but the latter alone gives the decision. The whole procedure is very informal, and the penalties imposed are little more than nominal. Other petty offences and misdemeanours by natives or others are tried in the local police court (*landgerecht*) by a magistrate, who until recently was usually the Assistant Resident; a native official (*fiscaal-griffier*, registrar or bailiff) sits beside him, but the proceedings are conducted by the magistrate. Most of the cases before him would be tried in Burma by honorary magistrates, or be dismissed as insignificant. He rarely seems to impose a fine of more than a quarter or half a guilder (sixpence or a shilling), or imprisonment for longer than three days. The procedure is far more informal than could be imagined in any court in Burma. There is no police officer in court. The accused is shown in and sits upon a bench. There is a short and apparently friendly conversation, and the witnesses, if any, join in the conversation without taking an oath. The magistrate announces his decision, scribbles it in blue pencil on the charge sheet together with his initials and that, together with an abstract by the registrar of the offence charged and the decision, constitutes the whole record. The cases on an average last rather less than two minutes. No appeal lies against the order, but the High Court is entitled to intervene on revision, though apparently it never does.

People, other than Europeans, charged with more serious offences come before the *Landraad*. This consists of a judicial officer as chairman and a bench of local dignitaries. The decision is collective, by a majority of votes, the laymen are not merely assessors. The court is attended by a *djaksa* (judge-advocate) and *griffier* (registrar). The president, *djaksa* and *griffier* are all professional lawyers, holding a university degree in law, and the president achieves his position as a judge, only after some years of experience as *djaksa* and *griffier*. Europeans charged with serious offences are tried by a Court of Justice, consisting of a bench of judges, all of whom are professional lawyers; in Java there are three such courts.

Petty civil disputes between natives may be settled in the regency

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or district court, which indeed do not always distinguish very carefully between criminal and civil matters. The regular court for the decision of more serious questions is the Landraad, constituted as for criminal cases. But a visitor from Burma is impressed by the fact that even civil disputes of considerable value or importance may be brought for arbitration to the Assistant Resident, although in law he has no judicial powers or functions. He seems to take it as a matter of course that he should give up much of his time to the amicable settlement of such affairs. 'Why', he asks, 'should the poor people waste their money on litigation?' Cases of minor importance between Europeans come before the Residency Court, consisting of the chairman of the Landraad, sitting alone with a *griffier*; more serious matters come before the Court of Justice. 692 695

Religious questions between Muhammadan natives are dealt with by a clerical tribunal (*priesterraad*) comprising a high cleric and three to eight Moslem religious officials. It has jurisdiction over all religious disputes, so far as not otherwise prescribed, and it applies Moslem Law. 692

The ultimate authority in all cases, criminal or civil, is the High Court of Justice in Batavia.

Some features of the judicial system are of outstanding interest. One feature is the type of law applied in civil matters between natives; it is not the written law but the customary law. In Burma the courts have recognized certain legal treatises as codes of law, and try to give the codes a strict legal interpretation. In Java strenuous endeavours have been made to ascertain and enforce those customs which have the force of law. Closely allied to this is the procedure adopted. In Burma, under the rule of law, the tradition of settling disputes by an amicable compromise has died; all differences must be referred for decision to the regular courts, and even matters that are not within the cognizance of courts of law must be dealt with so far as possible according to the processes of law. The informal settlement of disputes by civil servants, native or European, is practically unknown. Again, in Java even the official magistrate disposes of matters as speedily and informally as possible, whereas in Burma even the village headmen are expected and encouraged to observe legal forms. On the other hand the courts in Java are manned by professional lawyers, and cases ordinarily come before a bench; in Burma few magistrates or judges have any legal training, and except in the High Court (and in the courts of honorary magistrates) there is no bench of judges, but the presiding officer sits alone. [671] [695]

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9. Representative Institutions

616 One aspect of the Ethical movement was a new stimulus to the Liberal tradition of representative government on western lines. In 1900 the Government was constituted in much the same manner as under the Company. The Governor-General, from the first appointment in 1610, had been given the assistance of Councillors with, nominally at least, a share in the responsibility for government. In 1836 these councillors were for the first time recognized as a formal Council of India, which functioned merely in an advisory capacity, and consisted of a few senior officials. With the growth of private enterprise after 1870, non-officials chafed at the restrictions imposed on them by the States-General. On Liberal principles they urged that the Indies should be 'free'; in other words they wanted to abolish the restrictions on economic progress which the Hague imposed on the Government in Batavia, and to cut the red tape of bureaucratic rule in the interior. One favourite project was the enlargement of the Council of India by the addition of non-official Europeans, thereby converting it into an instrument of western enterprise, like the Legislative Council established in 1897 in Burma. This was steadily opposed as prejudicial to the welfare of the people, and the principle of representation was first applied in local affairs. Under the Decentralization Act of 1903 certain of the larger towns were constituted municipalities, and, subsequently, Residents were given a Residency Council, and smaller councils were formed for special rural areas.

These measures were intended to serve a double purpose; to promote efficient administration and to develop local autonomy. But the title of the Act emphasized efficiency rather than autonomy and 'those who held the baby to the font, guided its earliest footsteps'. The large towns had a considerable European element, and the urban councils, though, or rather because of, representing European interests, functioned efficiently. But the other councils languished, doing little to promote efficiency and nothing to introduce autonomy. With the growth of Nationalism after 1906, and especially after 1911, policy inclined in the direction of native representation, and the outbreak of war in 1914 brought a change in the climate of opinion; by 1915 autonomy was in the air. In this new atmosphere criticism of the local representative institutions became more audible, and the principle of representation was extended also to the central government by an Act of 1916 constituting a People's Council, or Volksraad,

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to advise the Governor-General in matters solely concerning the Indies. 646

Criticism of the local representative institutions was based mainly on two grounds. The residency council was condemned as a mechanical device giving the semblance of autonomy to an artificial unit; and the various councils lacked the organic relationship of local government in the Netherlands, where rural and urban councils form part of the same system as the provincial councils, which link them up in a single chain of popular self-government to the States-General. Attempts were made accordingly to organize local self-government on lines more congenial to Dutch ideas. The Residency Council was abolished and, in place of it, Regency Councils were constituted and given certain powers of supervision over village administration. This system linked together the two traditional units of native society, the regency and the village, under the guidance of the Regent, whom the common man still regarded as his natural leader. The process was carried a stage further with the creation of Provinces. 631

Just as the regency was the hub of the native branch of the administration so was the residency the hub on which the wheels of European administration turned. In 1921 there were seventeen residencies in Java and twenty corresponding units, mostly termed residencies, in the Outer Provinces. There was no one between the Residents and the Governor-General. The Residents could not, it was held, be entrusted with extensive powers, and the Governor-General was therefore overwhelmed with detail. With the growth of administrative activity during the present century decentralization became urgent, and this led to grouping the residencies into larger Governments. In Java the residencies outside the native states were grouped between 1926 and 1928 into three Governments, roughly coinciding with the three major racial divisions; Sundanese, Javanese and Madurese; with two others, much smaller, for the Native States. Subsequently, in 1934, the charges in the Outer Provinces were grouped into three Governments: Sumatra, Borneo and the Great East. The constitution of these Governments was purely a measure of administrative decentralization; but in Java the opportunity was taken to combine administrative and political reforms. For the administration of local affairs the three Governments in Java were constituted Provinces, in which the Governor conducted local administration with the assistance of a Provincial Council, exercising certain powers of supervision over the Regency Councils, and forming a link

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631 between the Regency Council and the Volksraad. Thus the Volksraad, the Provincial Council, the Regency Council and the villages were all brought within one system of self-government on the principle obtaining in the Netherlands.

646 The first Volksraad, opened in 1918, merely had in law the right of being consulted on the budget and on certain legislative measures. But in 1925 a new constitution for the Indies (*Staatsinrichting*) made its assent necessary for the budget and, normally, for other legislation on internal affairs; it was also given power to amend Government measures and to initiate legislation, and was granted the rights of petition and interpellation (i.e. to ask for information),[1] but not the right of 'enquiry' (i.e. to appoint commissions of enquiry with legal powers to obtain evidence). It cannot change the Government; there are no ministers and neither the Governor-General nor departmental heads are responsible to it, but it can influence policy by a vote of non-confidence, indicating its disapproval of men or measures. Its chief function in full assembly is the criticism of the budget; legislation and other functions in respect of administrative routine are mostly assigned to the College of Delegates, a permanent committee of twenty (later sixteen) members elected in the first session for the whole period of four years that forms the life of the Volksraad, and presided over by the chairman of the Volksraad. Any conflict of opinion between the Governor-General and the Volksraad is decided by the Home Legislature; a conflict as to legislation is decided by the Crown, but the Governor-General may take action in matters of urgency.

The Chairman of the Volksraad is appointed by the Crown; of the other members some are elected and the rest nominated by the Governor-General. Representation is based on the communal [641] principle. Only Dutch subjects are eligible for the franchise or for membership. Three communities are recognized: natives, Dutch and 'others' (preponderantly Chinese); until 1927 the two last categories formed one constituency. The constitution of the Volksraad since 1918 is shown on p. 249.

666 The electorate consists of the members of the rural and urban local councils, and was therefore greatly enlarged when the Residency Councils gave place to Regency Councils. Formerly each community formed a single constituency, but in 1927 the native community was divided into twelve constituencies, with a single constituency or each

[1] The right of interpellation did not carry the right to a written answer, leading up to a debate, and a vote of confidence. Visman, I, 98, 106.

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*Membership of the Volksraad**

(*a*) Elected; (*b*) Nominated

	1918–21		1921–7		1927–31		1931–42	
	(*a*)	(*b*)	(*a*)	(*b*)	(*a*)	(*b*)	(*a*)	(*b*)
Native	10	5	12	8	20	5	20	10
Dutch	} 9	} 14	} 12	} 16	15	15	15	10
Others					3	2	3	2

* Visman, I, 82 ff.

of the other two groups, then first separated. The total electorate in 1939 numbered 2228, comprising 1817 in Java and 411 in the Outer Provinces. The electorate in Java consisted of 312 members of urban councils, and 1505 members of Regency Councils. The urban members, comprising 98 natives, 177 Dutch and 37 'others', all obtained their seats by election. On the other councils some members are nominated by the local Governor. The membership of the Regency Councils consisted of 774 natives elected, and 334 nominated, together with 231 Dutch and 166 'others', all nominated. In the local councils, constituting the electorate in the Outer Provinces, there were 139 elected members (65 natives, 59 Dutch and 15 'others') and 272 nominated or *ex officio* members (181 natives, 76 Dutch and 15 'others'). Thus out of the total number of 2228 electors, 1003 have obtained the privilege by nomination (515 natives, 307 Dutch and 181 'others'), and only 1225 (937 natives, 236 Dutch and 52 'others') have obtained their seats on local councils by election. In the towns the franchise is restricted to resident males, literate and assessed to not less than f. 300 for income tax. Not many natives have so high an income, and of these some may be barred for illiteracy. As shown above, the Dutch members have a majority over the other two communities together, and in some towns there is even a Dutch majority among the electors. The regency franchise in Java is based on the village, and is granted to all those who by the custom of the village take part in the election of the village headman. Each village chooses one 'elector' for every 500 inhabitants, and these 'electors' constitute the electorate for the native members of the regency council.

666 [641]

One feature of Dutch political life is the multiplicity of parties and, as already indicated, this has spread to India. In the latest Volksraad the twenty-five European members represented eight parties,

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665 and one belonged to no party; of the thirty native members, twenty-three represented ten parties and seven had no party affiliation, and even in the small group of 'other' members there were two and at one time three parties. To a certain extent this is due to the system of nomination, as it is an accepted principle that the Governor-General, or other official charged with the duty of nomination, shall aim at providing for the representation of parties which have not obtained adequate representation in the elections; in practice the Government has nominated some of its bitterest opponents, European or native. There is no official block, but a large proportion even of the elected members are classed as officials. Officials, however, are quite free to speak and vote against Government measures, and are often the keenest and, naturally, the best-informed critics; the only limitation on their freedom is an understanding that they shall not disclose matters which are officially 'confidential'.

635 The Provincial Councils comprise elected and nominated members of all three sections of the community, with the Provincial Governor as chairman. The electorate, as for the Volksraad, consists of the members of the regency and urban councils, and is predominantly official and largely nominated. The full council does little more than consider the budget, and routine work is conducted by a College of Deputies. One function of this college is to pass the budgets for the regency and urban councils, which is a step in the direction of organic local government such as obtains in the Netherlands. The revenues are largely derived from public services, and the functions are such as might be allotted to a local board in British India assisting a Divisional Commissioner in the administration of a divisional fund. Thus the Provincial Council has little resemblance to the Provincial Legislatures of British India.

632 The Regency Council comprises all three sections of the community, with elected and nominated native members, and nominated members of the other two communities; the figures are given above. In 1932 out of 1583 members, 813 elected and 770 nominated, no less than 651 elected and 186 nominated native members were officials. Only 54 of the members were classed as cultivators, but the 'officials' apparently included village headmen, who are agriculturalists and sometimes large landholders. The system of election has already been explained. The Regency Council meets once a year for the budget, and at other times when necessary, usually three or four times in all. The routine work may be allotted to a College of Commissioners. The

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council and the college have a say on the village budgets. The activities of the Regency Council seem to depend largely on the attitude of the Regent; a prominent Regent has stated that he found it of great assistance in the administration of his regency. 632

The Urban Council, as noticed above, is predominantly Dutch in its constitution and character. The revenue comes mainly from a cess on Government taxes, mostly paid by Europeans, and from municipal services, such as housing, the supply of electricity, water, trams and buses. The varied range of municipal activities is very striking; even in a small town one may find a theatre and a swimming bath. It is hardly too much to say that the towns are run by Europeans for Europeans, though of course the other communities benefit by the amenities.

10. Economic Progress

In respect of economic development the progress achieved during the past century is no less remarkable in Netherlands India than in Burma, and in some ways even more impressive. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Java contributed practically nothing to the world but a little coffee, indigo and tin, and bought nothing but ship's stores, and a few luxuries for Europeans; the Outer Provinces still yielded only spices, and of these the value was declining. It was under Raffles that the foundations of foreign trade were laid. The table below shows the growth since then for Java and the Outer Provinces, and brings out the striking progress during the present century, especially in the Outer Provinces. 439

*Trade of Netherlands India (f. million)**

(*a*) Java; (*b*) Outer Provinces; (*c*) Total

Year	Exports			Imports		
	(*a*)	(*b*)	(*c*)	(*a*)	(*b*)	(*c*)
1825	16	—	16	12	—	12
1873	149	35	184	83	36	119
1894	137	45	182	112	46	158
1904	171	96	267	119	65	184
1914	385	351	736	319	154	473
1924	1002	747	1749	588	316	904
1937	290	661	951	317	173	490

* Visman, 1, 2; *Indisch Verslag*, 1938.

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439 In 1890 the mineral exports, consisting solely of tin, were valued at f. 24 million, and by 1925 the value had risen to f. 94 million, and oil products to the value of f. 173 million also were exported. These come mainly from the Outer Provinces, and are won by western enterprise. Meanwhile the value of agricultural exports had risen from f. 153 million in 1898 to f. 1455 million in 1925, and the native share in these exports from f. 16 million, or 10 %, to f. 530 million, or 36 %. In 1937 the agricultural exports were valued at f. 660 million, to which natives contributed f. 302 million or 45 %.

655 In the promotion of economic development the Dutch Government has always been far more active than the British Government in Burma. Under the Culture system it had almost a monopoly of production for the western market; during the Liberal period the State was still associated with the cultivation of coffee and managed the chief tin mines; and the present century has seen a renewal and extension of State enterprise. Even in the Liberal period private capitalists were reluctant to risk their money in railways and coal mines, and these were developed by the State. From about 1900 the Government has taken a prominent part in experimental cultivation, and has developed numerous estates under a variety of crops. These are managed on commercial lines and are expected to be self-supporting; the managers and employees are not officials, but derive part of their remuneration from the profits of the business. The Government has also assumed a monopoly of pawnbroking, and has built up an extensive credit service. The forests, formerly leased to private firms, have now mostly been taken over by the State. Raffles introduced a monopoly of salt, and almost all the salt is now manufactured in government factories with a very up-to-date plant.

615 One interesting development of State enterprise may be found in the mining industry. The first Mines Law of 1899 was framed on the 316 assumption that the exploitation of minerals would normally remain 315 in private hands. The oil fields were then beginning to attract private capital to mining enterprise. A trend in the direction of State control found expression in an amendment of the law in 1910, providing for the exploitation of mineral resources by the State under direct State management or through contractors. For large undertakings direct management was thought expedient, but exploitation through contractors left the control and a large share of the profits to foreign capital. In 1921 therefore the Mines Law was further amended to allow the formation of 'mixed enterprises' conducted by a private

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company working under State control. Since then there have been four forms of working minerals: (*a*) by the State; (*b*) by a mixed company under State control; (*c*) by a private company on an exploitation contract; and (*d*) by a private company, holding a concession and paying royalties. Experience shows that a mixed company is preferred where prospects are good, and an exploitation contract, where exploration costs are high and the risk great.

The Mixed Company was originally devised for the exploitation of the Djambi Oil Fields. The Colonial Minister was empowered to form a company to work the fields and select a firm to conduct its business. He selected the Batavian Petroleum Company, a branch of the Royal Dutch and Shell group, which was already working oil in the vicinity. Together with this company he formed the 'mixed enterprise' known as the N.-I. Petroleum Company. The success of this plan in the oil business led to its extension to tin. From the time of Raffles the Government had been working the Bangka tin mines. A private firm, the Billiton Tin Company, founded on the initiative of the Crown in 1851, had yielded high profits. On the expiry of its lease in 1924 it was taken over as the Joint Mining Company, Billiton (G.M.B.), with a capital of f. 16 million, of which five-eighths was subscribed by Government. The executive management was entrusted to the former company under a council of five members, including three nominated by Government. In 1933 the G.M.B. bought up the Singkep tin mines, administering them separately but with the council of the G.M.B. as the board of directors. The device of a mixed enterprise has also been applied to the provision of electricity and water power. The Government is also interested in the organization of finance, as it still holds shares in the Java Bank and is represented on the board.

One interesting feature of economic development in Netherlands India is the activity displayed by private enterprise in scientific research. The sugar firms led the way, combining to form the General Syndicate of Sugar Producers. Firms in other lines also formed unions, subsequently amalgamated as the General Agricultural Syndicate; in Sumatra there is a Union of Tobacco Planters. These associations maintained experimental stations, which have been largely responsible for the conspicuous progress of scientific agriculture. All these representative bodies are themselves represented, together with other European interests, on the General Federation of Indian Industry and Commerce (*Indische Ondernemersbond*), with

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816 which the Government maintains a close contact. The Government has also created, chiefly during the present century, numerous 242 institutions for the promotion of pure and applied science, and in 1928 the Council of Natural Science was founded as the coping-stone 654 of a comprehensive organization for scientific research. Until 1906, though European and native civil servants had always been expected to encourage and direct native agriculture, their efforts were unorganized and amateurish. In that year the Department of Agriculture was established. With the growth of a wider conception of state functions, this was merged in 1911 into one of greater scope dealing also with industry and commerce, which came to function as the mainspring of economic life, and in 1934 was converted into the Department of Economic Affairs. The private associations are accepted as the official representatives of their interests; the committees directing them are advisory in respect of Government but have power to regulate their respective organizations. Thus, through all these various institutions, the whole structure of economic life is linked together in an elaborate economic constitution and, during the present century, the State has come to have, as it were, a dual framework, political and economic.

654 The depression of the thirties brought greater power and a new place to the State in economic affairs. One of the earliest signs was the inability of private enterprise to maintain its experimental stations. In this and many other ways the State had to intervene in support of western enterprise. 'The business men in the Indies, at least a sufficient number of them, gradually understood and accepted that Government intervention in economic affairs was indispensable under the circumstances, and that it could not in reason be limited or modelled to suit the purposes of big business',[1] and it has been suggested that the post-war world will see the 'overall governance of business in the hands of public spirited business men, co-operating with business-minded public servants'.

*Capital Investments in N.-I. (f. million)**

Dutch	2500
Indonesian	900
Indo-Chinese	320
British	450
U.S.A.	380
Franco-Belgian	160
German	30
Japanese	30
Italian	30

* Sitsen, p. 12; Hart, p. 44.

454 In the development of Netherlands India, as of Burma, the policy of the 'open door' has been observed. A recent estimate of capital investments is given in the margin. These figures do not include reinvestments out of undivided

[1] Hart, p. 61.

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profits. Indonesian investments are of especial interest as quite a new development, mainly due to native rubber, although there are also native plantations of coconut, coffee and tea. Agricultural production, disregarding annual crops, accounts for f. 700 million out of the Indonesian total of f. 900. 454

II. Welfare

Equally remarkable with the economic development of Netherlands India has been the growth of the population, especially in Java. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the density of the population in Java and Burma seems to have been very much the same. Estimates suggest that the population of Java doubled between 1815 and 1845 and again during the next thirty years. Returns were made annually from 1860 onwards, but until 1895 they remained very incomplete for all except Europeans, and not until the first regular census of 1905 were any useful statistics compiled for the Outer Provinces. The following table shows the growth in numbers by classes. Figures for the Outer Provinces in 1905 were still very defective. 161

Growth of Population, 1880–1940 (*thousands*)

Year	Java				Outer Provinces				N.-I. Total
	Eur.	F. Or.	Nat.	Total	Eur.	F. Or.	Nat.	Total	
1880	33·7	219	19,540	19,794	—	—	—	—	—
1890	45·9	259	23,609	23,914	11·9	—	—	—	—
1900	62·4	298	28,384	28,746	13·3	—	—	—	—
1905	64·9	317	29,715	30,098	16·1	298	7,304	7,619	37,717
1920	135·2	415	34,433	34,984	34·4	461	13,871	14,366	49,350
1930	193·2	634	40,889	41,717	48·7	709	18,253	19,011	60,728
1940	(a)		47,456	48,416	—	—	21,176	22,060	70,476

(a) Estimate, Statistical Abstract, 1940; Census of 1940 postponed.

Two things stand out from this table: the rapid growth of the population of Java; and the still more rapid growth of the foreign element in the population. Java is the most densely inhabited major area in the world. In 1930 there were already 800 inhabitants to the square mile; far more than in the most densely peopled industrial countries of Europe and nearly twice as many as in Japan. In one district there are 4100 to the square mile. 'It is no exaggeration to

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161 say that the problem of overpopulation is the central problem of Java...the vital problem primarily of finding food for more mouths and secondarily—most desirable, but definitely secondarily—more food for each mouth.'[1]

Density (1930) *per sq. mile**

Java	800
Belgium	670
Netherlands	578
U.K.	485
Japan	425

* Hart, p. 34.

433 The rapid economic development during the Liberal period created a demand for labour, and
511 the population responded to the new demand. With the growth of population there was an increase in the area under rice, but it seems that the production of rice did not keep pace with the rise in population and 'the growth of the people gobbled up the larger yield'.[2] By 1900 the people were producing less food per head, were drawing lower wages from the planter, and had fewer opportunities to earn
[651] money by odd jobs. The people were liable to various compulsory services and it was thought that, if relieved of this obligation, they would be able to earn more in wages by free labour; a capitation tax was accordingly imposed in lieu of compulsory service. The express object of the Ethical policy was to help the common man.

'Never, perhaps, has any Government set itself so wholeheartedly and with such zeal and comprehensive thoroughness to building up the welfare of its subjects as the Government of Netherlands India at the beginning of the present century. Most of the officials at that time had fallen under the spell of Multatuli during their studies at Leiden, and came to India as enthusiastic idealists, filled with ardour to take part in the great civilizing mission of the Netherlands. On their arrival they found a welfare programme as the official policy of Government; zeal for the well-being of the people was a condition of promotion, as any who were reluctant to interfere with native life were regarded with disfavour as "weak and recalcitrant administrators".'[3]

The new opportunities afforded by the Village Act were seized with enthusiasm. Yet successive welfare surveys, confirmed by the figures for the import of goods consumed by natives, suggest that the people were rather worse off in 1930 than in 1913. In 1926 it was found that the substitution of capitation tax for compulsory service had done so little to improve the condition of the people that they could not even afford to pay the tax.[4] About 1935 the Director of Economic Affairs remarked that, although for sixty years it had been possible to stave off the disasters consequent on over-population, new and radical

[1] Hart, p. 36.
[2] Gonggrijp, cited *Netherlands India*, p. 214.
[3] *Netherlands India*, p. 382.
[4] *Ib.* p. 401.

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measures were still urgently needed or the position would soon become critical.[1] 433

Native rubber planting has done little to relieve it, as this is mostly on small holdings, except for a comparatively few plantations, almost all in Sumatra and Borneo. The villager, especially in Java, still cultivates rice, and a recent survey suggests that during the past ten years the consumption of rice per head has fallen by about 8 %.[2] It is true that to a casual visitor the standard of comfort appears much the same as in Burma, and is certainly far higher than in Bengal or Madras, yet it would seem that the rapid economic development of the present century, despite the multiplication of welfare services which it has made possible, has had little effect on welfare. 511

One notable feature of welfare activities in Java has been the attention paid to public health. So far back as 1851 a school was opened for training medical subordinates; by 1900 there were 103 Europeans and 90 native medical practitioners in Java, and by 1930 the combined number had risen to 667, while the expenditure on public health rose from f. 2·2 million in 1900 to 20·7 million in 1930. The chief items of expenditure have been the provision of hospitals and dispensaries, inoculation, the improvement of housing and, later, propaganda. The most obvious result of this activity is the large proportion of houses with tiled roofs, which were regarded as conferring security against plague. From the first it was recognized that hygiene was very largely a matter of education, and it is a notable instance of the sympathetic imagination which so often characterizes the administration that the Public Health Service forms a branch of the Education Department. 'Gentle pressure' was freely exercised to improve rural sanitation. Naturally zeal for sanitary welfare was not always tempered with discretion. The people often understood the wishes of the civil officers better than the intentions of the medical service, and there are numerous stories, some doubtless *ben trovato*, of villages where the headman proudly led the Resident to his new model latrine, bearing the banner 'Welcome', and of others where the people observed so strictly the injunction to keep the latrines clean that they refrained from using them. 744

Public instruction, however, until the present century, was comparatively backward. Schools for Europeans, including of course Indo-Europeans, were maintained from 1816, and, with the influx 871

[1] Hart, p. 35.
[2] Wickizer and Bennett, pp. 223, 328.

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871 of Europeans from 1870 onwards, educational standards improved. These schools have usually been open to a limited number of natives of good birth. One condition for admission was an adequate knowledge of Dutch, and many natives were accepted in European homes where they could learn the Dutch language and Dutch ways of life. Thus, for over a hundred years, there have been a few among the upper classes who have absorbed western culture from intimate contact with Europeans instead of merely learning about the West from books. Even a hundred years ago some Regents could speak more than one European language.[1]

Under the Culture system western schools were little needed, and the people were left to attend Koran schools. The Liberals of 1848 struck out a new line. They regarded it as 'their task, their duty, to spread light among the Javanese'. Humanitarian ideals were gradually reinforced by practical considerations, because the growth of commerce and the extension of Government activities created a demand for clerks. Indo-Europeans did not suffice to meet the demand, and from about 1870 schools were provided for natives, though on a very modest scale until after 1900, and it was not until 1914 that the Government provided Dutch-vernacular schools leading up to a higher education. Since then the progress of education among the natives has been rapid. In 1930 there were nearly 12,000 children in Mulo standards, corresponding to the High School in Burma, and close on 5000 in the middle standards, corresponding to the Intermediate course in an Indian university. In the Middle School there is a special section for Oriental Letters. Children in the Mulo standards take not only the usual school subjects (including natural science) but also three European languages—Dutch, English and German—as well as two oriental languages. The standard of attainment seems extraordinarily high. There is, as in Burma and for the same reasons, a competition for diplomas, with the natural result that students press on in growing numbers towards diplomas of higher market value. But one factor tends to prevent the devaluation of diplomas. Dutch parents expect their children in the European schools to enter the corresponding classes in Holland; the diploma is of no use to them unless it carries its face value. Similarly pupils in Dutch-vernacular schools must be able at any time to enter the corresponding standard in the local European school. Thus the standards of instruction are protected against deterioration, despite the demand in Java for

[1] *De Zieke Reisiger*, by a Bengal Civilian (1853), p. 75.

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diplomas, by the demand in Holland for the qualifications that the diplomas are supposed to represent. 871

Technical and vocational instruction has also made great progress during recent years, owing to the demand for technical subordinates on western enterprise, and in Government service. Also, as in Burma and in the tropics generally, the petrol engine has stimulated a new demand in the native world for mechanics to drive and repair taxis, buses and lorries. One aspect of vocational education of great interest is the training of civil servants, both European and native. The course for Europeans is designed to give them a wide understanding of native society and covers five years' study of 'Indology' at a Dutch university, where the probationers specialize either in letters or economics, with the alternative branch as a subsidiary. The course for native civil servants is designed to give them a western background for their work; they live in hostels, furnished on European lines with books, pictures, a piano, radio and billiard table, etc., and the course includes tropical economy and hygiene among the subjects. Thus the training of Europeans and Indonesians is complementary; it aims at making Europeans understand the East and Indonesians understand the West, and to equip both as social engineers in a modern tropical environment. 874

Colleges of university standing date from 1920 to 1926. The leaders of the ethical school held that higher western education could not flourish healthily except in a western background, and advocated that students should finish their course in Europe. The results of experiments along these lines were regarded as unsatisfactory, and not many students were sent. The war of 1914–18, however, created a demand for locally trained engineers, and in 1920 a School of Engineering was founded by some private capitalists. It was taken over by the Government in 1924, and Schools of Law and Medicine were created during the next two years. These gave a university course in their respective faculties. In 1940 Schools of Agriculture and of Humane Letters were constituted, and a bill to merge all the faculties in one University was adopted by the Volksraad.

One matter of great educational and political importance is the encouragement given to what may be termed the adult education of officials and others of like status. In Dutch practice the university course does not confer a degree on the successful student but entitles him to qualify for a degree by writing a thesis. The titles of Doctor and Master are highly valued, and many colonials, officials and others,

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874 aspire to them. The thesis usually relates to some aspect of colonial life or administrative policy which has attracted the attention of the student in his daily work, and an able thesis may lead to preferment. By this means colonial problems of importance are studied from an academic standpoint by men with practical experience, and not infrequently the resulting thesis is a useful contribution to colonial policy or administrative practice. Moreover, officials are encouraged to discuss both policy and practice freely in departmental periodicals and also in periodicals for the general public, and, as already mentioned, they are free to criticize Government measures in the Volksraad. This considerable volume of well-informed criticism necessarily has a salutary effect in stimulating an intelligent interest in colonial affairs among officials and non-officials, and presents a notable contrast to the traditional reserve of British administration, which allows the public discussion of affairs only by the ignorant or malicious.

871 464 Nevertheless, many serious educational problems still await solution. One of the most difficult arises out of the close connection between western education and economics. In the past there has been no demand outside Government service for highly educated Indonesians, and of necessity there are limits to the number whom the Government can employ. But the supply is limited only by the ability of students to pass the examinations, and the ability of parents to pay the fees and other incidental charges. An enquiry in 1928 showed that a large percentage of school graduates failed to find employment. On an average, since 1900, about half of those passing the clerkship examination had entered Government service; but in 1928 the number obtaining this qualification was 6559 and the annual demand was 447. It was then estimated that, taking public service and private enterprise as a whole, if every post requiring a knowledge of Dutch were filled by men who had passed the clerkship, or some higher examination, the supply would still be about three times the demand.[1] During the subsequent depression fewer pupils could afford to stay the course, and the numbers in the various western institutions declined; but those who remained seem to have studied more diligently, for the number of graduates from all classes of school and college rose, as appears from the table on p. 261.

Another difficulty is the emergence of 'wild schools', private schools which refuse State aid. These arose out of dissatisfaction on

[1] *HIOC*, Eindrapport, pp. 45, 46.

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*Graduates from Western Schools and Colleges**

(*a*) 1914–15; (*b*) 1938–9

Class	Europeans (*a*)	Europeans (*b*)	Natives (*a*)	Natives (*b*)	F. Or. (*a*)	F. Or. (*b*)	Total (*a*)	Total (*b*)
Lower	1598	3743	951	7349	209	2274	2758	13,366
Mulo	107	740	8	1012	5	487	120	2,239
Middle	49	457	4	204	3	116	56	777
Higher†	8	20	—	40	—	21	8	81

* Visman, I, 60ff.

† For 1914–15 read 1924–5, the first year when higher students graduated.

political or economic grounds with the aided schools, which found expression in the *Tamansiswo* movement, aiming to reconcile western education with oriental traditions. Some of these accept State inspection, but few of those inspected are regarded as on the same level of efficiency as the corresponding public schools. When the depression of the thirties restricted government expenditure on education, the wild schools multiplied rapidly, and by 1940 there were 120,000 pupils in the Dutch-vernacular schools of this type as against 66,000 in the corresponding aided schools.[1]

It is in the sphere of vernacular instruction that educational progress during the present century has been greatest. Not until 1907 was there any serious attempt to provide instruction for the masses, but the village schools first established in that year have been remarkably successful. By 1937 the proportion of children at recognized schools was nearly as high as in Burma, and a recent estimate places it at 40 %. A very large proportion fail to remain even for the three years which constitutes the complete course in the village school; but those who persevere may cross the narrow bridge leading to the western schools with their attractive prospect of well-paid employment. The possibility of promotion through the village school into the western world has probably been one factor in making it popular. Another factor has been the adaptation of the school to village life, which has been rendered possible by appointing civil servants to advise the Director with regard to native education. But the chief factor undoubtedly has been the constant exercise of 'gentle pressure' by the subdistrict officer. 'Mild coercion had to be employed to inveigle parents into sending their youngsters to school. And it often

[1] de la Court, p. 39.

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871 happened in primitive regions that a school would be set afire in the hope that this would offer an escape from the painful necessity of education.'[1] One important function of the subdistrict officer is to inspect the school registers, and enquire into the reasons for irregular attendance. The success attained in Java appears to be due in great part to insistence on the value of education as a social asset enabling the Javanese to compete more adequately with the Chinese. In this, as in other matters, the minute attention paid to welfare, is possible only because the charge of the subdistrict officer is so small, and the successful working of gentle pressure through the headman is largely due to the survival of common life within the village.

658 The Dutch have not been content merely to teach the people how
217 to read, but have provided them with reading matter in the People's Library. There are nearly 3000 recognized libraries; school managers act as local librarians, lending books free to children and at 2½ cents (½*d.*) a volume to adults. Motor book vans are also sent out, and some of these sell 2500 books a month. Thus there is readily available to the schools and general public an extensive modern literature comprising popular handbooks on a wide range of subjects, from carpentry and agriculture to hygiene, and translations and adaptations of European literature from Dickens and Dumas to Molière and Kipling. In this manner the Government has succeeded within a single generation in organizing a demand for books that will serve to bring the people into touch with the modern world. As we have noticed above, the Burma Government preferred to leave the supply of modern literature to private enterprise.

12. Social Welfare

156 We have already remarked that the conservation of village life is an
621 old tradition of Dutch rule, and they pride themselves on its success.
476 Wongso, the typical villager, says a recent account, is a farmer. But he is primarily a member of the closely knit *desa*-community and his landownership comes in the second place because it is altogether tied up in the clan, which is his village. That membership gives him rights and duties, but the duties come first, and they come naturally, self-evidently. He has duties towards the *desa* (village), a whole system of duties which he fulfils as a matter of course, as his ancestors have

[1] Vlekke, p. 323.

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done through the ages, without payment or recognition. There is another set of duties to which Wongso adheres no less rigorously; they are the services which he gives, not to the village but to his fellow villagers individually—duties which are summed up as mutual help. The *desa* is primarily a social unit, and 'economic man of individualistic liberalism has never been either loved or understood in the Indonesian village. That is why Government schemes, both large scale and small, to further Indonesian enterprise and initiative, risk failure if they try to appeal to the individual economic instincts, and have a fair chance of being comprehended and accepted, if they are based on a foundation of organic co-operation, which has the *sambatan* touch'.[1] This social sense, it is claimed, has been transferred to village industries organized in 'industrial centrals', 'the co-operating craftsmen have developed the same sense of obligation to make good towards that central as they have always had towards their *desa*'.[2]

It is difficult for anyone of a critical temperament wholly to repress a suspicion that this picture is just a little too good to be true. It is certain that for the past sixty years there has been a trend towards the relaxation of communal ties, and this has been furthered by the policy of encouraging agricultural production for profit instead of for subsistence.[3] On the other hand, the scrupulous care for the preservation of customary law, the restrictions on the alienation of village land to foreigners, and the tradition of abstaining from intervening in village affairs seem on the whole to have been effectual in protecting the village community against the solvent influence of economic forces, and the foregoing picture of the typical Indonesian village which the Dutch have consistently endeavoured to conserve would seem to depict accurately, at least in broad outline, the Javanese village of the present day. Dutch rule has, in great measure, been successful in softening the impact of the modern west on native social life.

Outside and above the village, however, the social structure presents the normal character of modern tropical society. 'The most obvious feature of the community in Netherlands India is the heterogeneous composition of the population.'[4] This complex social structure is dominated by economic values. In the western or westernized element, as Dr Boeke remarks, 'there is materialism, rationalism, individualism and a concentration on economic ends far more complete and absolute than in homogenous western lands; a total absorption in the

[1] Hart, pp. 64, 65.
[2] *Ib.* p. 89.
[3] *Netherlands India*, p. 319; Visman, 1, 27.
[4] Visman, 1, 53.

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Exchange and Market; a capitalist structure, with the business concern as subject, far more typical of Capitalism than one can imagine in the so-called "capitalist lands" which have grown slowly out of the past and are still bound to it by a hundred roots'. He was writing with special reference to the European element, but his remarks apply with equal force to the Chinese element, and to the growing number of natives 'who have adopted a western mentality as their own, and who possess and use those qualities which modern capitalism requires of its representatives'.[1] Dr Boeke and other Dutch economists tend to contrast this rationalist material attitude of western enterprise with the disregard of economic values that they regard as characteristic of the native element. That will need further consideration; here it will suffice to note that during the present century, up to the depression of the thirties, the foreign elements were growing more numerous and more powerful, and that political reforms did nothing to check this process. On these points Netherlands India resembles Burma; what is distinctive of the social order in Netherlands India is that, for good or ill, the native community has largely been cut off from and protected against the working of economic forces, which in other tropical regions, as in Burma, have been allowed free play.

13. Netherlands India and Burma

SA 178

In the foregoing pages I we have tried to bring out some of the more important points of similarity and contrast between Java and Burma. In both there has been rapid progress; both countries have been thrown freely open to the modern world under the policy of the 'open door', and both now make a valuable contribution to the material resources of the world. In both alike the process of development under foreign rule has resulted in a racially mixed community in which economic forces are abnormally active, and in both a nationalist movement voices a reaction against foreign rule.

SA 642

We have seen, however, that in the principles and machinery of administration a superficial resemblance conceals a profound difference. British rule in Burma rests on the principles of economic freedom and equality before the law, and there is a single uniform system of direct rule in which the administrative officers are essentially servants of the law. Dutch rule in Java rests on the principle of 'like over like', and there is a dual administration

[1] Boeke, cited *Netherlands India*, pp. 452, 457.

I [See category 116, pp. 23–264 for description of colonial policy and administration in Java and Burma — Analyst]

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642 in which European and native officials have different functions but are both alike agents of a policy directed towards 'the spontaneous and autonomous promotion of the interests of land and people'.[1] In pursuance of this policy the Dutch have aimed at the conservation of the village and of village customary law, and at the retention of native land in native hands; in Burma, on the contrary, under the rule of law, the policy of Government has been to allow the people to pursue their individual interests within the limits of the law. We have seen that the system adopted in Burma has allowed the emergence of certain notorious abuses; self-government is generally regarded as a failure; agricultural debt has assumed vast proportions and is only one symptom of agrarian distress; there has been a formidable growth in litigation and, what is worse, in serious crime, and this has been accompanied by increasing clerical unrest, while the whole administration is riddled with corruption. It may be useful to examine rather more closely how these matters stand in Java.

Self-government. For many reasons it is difficult to make any fair comparison between Java and Burma in respect of self-government on western lines. In Java the problem of westernized self-government is simplified to some extent by the presence of a much larger and more stable European element, especially in the towns and even in small towns in the interior; in Burma, outside the main ports, and, one may say, outside Rangoon, the European element in the population, if any, is negligible. One would naturally expect self-government on western lines to run more smoothly where Europeans take part in running it. Europeans form a stabilizing element both in the Volksraad and provincial councils, and, moreover, these have not been granted such extensive powers as the corresponding organs in Burma. It is significant that, as soon as the Volksraad was entrusted with a share in the Government under the constitution of 1925, the association parties broke up into their racial elements. 'This is the last Association-Volksraad', said the Chairman in his final speech to the first Volksraad under the new constitution. 'Henceforth each group will pursue its own interests, keenly and without reserve.'[2] The Dutch recognize that 'at least in that still comparatively thin upper stratum of the Indonesian community which is conscious of political and other problems' there is 'a desire for further extension of political rights and suffrage, for formal embodiment in the constitution of

[1] Van Vollenhoven, cited *Netherlands India*, p. 91.
[2] Visman, I, 88.

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642 [liberal] conventional practice, an ambition to obtain greater influence within the Realm on affairs of the Realm as a whole'.[1] In Burma the constitution formally embodies those rights that the Javanese demand, but, because the form has no substance in political realities, it is a source of discontent rather than of satisfaction, and the people make still further demands.

631 As regards self-government in local affairs, urban administration in Java is in many ways a model of efficiency, contrasting very favourably with municipal administration in Burma. But it is largely run by Europeans for Europeans and, in the provision of amenities such as houses for the people, it aims at European standards. The Regency Councils, corresponding roughly to District Councils in Burma, seem to reflect in great measure the personality of the Regent, but one does not hear the charges of gross inefficiency and corruption, ordinarily levied against western institutions of local self-government in Burma.

Western self-government however hardly touches the mass of the people, either in Burma or Java. These live in villages. In Burma western self-government has been constructed, in accordance with western ideas, on the basis of individual rights. The Dutch system was built up on the basis of the village, and aimed to bring the village into organic relation with higher units of popular self-government. But the preponderance of local officials among those elected suggests general indifference, due perhaps to the device of indirect election. Yet in Burma we find a similar indifference, and the lack of any local ties between members and their constituencies has often been deplored; politicians can easily secure votes by appealing to the natural dislike of foreign rule, but they know and care little for their constituencies, and the villagers know and care little about what happens in the legislature.

In Burma as in Java local interest does not extend beyond local affairs, but there is a striking difference between them in village administration. In Java the Dutch have tried to conserve both the form and content of traditional self-government while adapting it to the requirements of the modern world; in Burma a contrary policy has been pursued. In Java the intricate complexity of the native political organization has been simplified, but the regency and village have been retained. In Burma the organic unit, the circle, has been replaced by the purely official township, and the country has been broken up into villages, while there is no organ of oriental

[1] Hart, p. 29.

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democracy corresponding to the *vergadering* of Java. In Burma the village has become merely an administrative unit, whereas in Java the village still appears to be mainly a social unit. And it would hardly be possible to find a more striking contrast than between the Village Act of Java, designed as an instrument of social uplift, and the Village Act of Burma, designed as an instrument of law and order and 'vigorously enforced' by fines on villages, villagers and headmen. Government schemes in Java, we are told, 'risk failure if they appeal to the individual economic instincts and have a fair chance of being comprehended and accepted, if they are based on a foundation of organic co-operation'.[1]

Indebtedness. Both in Burma and Java agricultural indebtedness has accompanied, and has indeed been a condition of, economic progress. It was through giving out advances that the planter in Java secured his land and labour, and that the miller in Burma made certain of getting an adequate supply of paddy at the lowest possible rate. The Dutch, with their State pawnshops and People's Banks, have done more than has been attempted in Burma to provide credit on sound lines, but they have by no means solved the problem of indebtedness; alongside the state institutions the private moneylender still flourishes. But the application of native customary law to land, and the prohibition against the alienation of land to foreigners have obviated the most pernicious social and political consequences of agricultural indebtedness, and it is not in the same measure as in Burma a cause of agricultural distress and political ill-will.

Litigation and Crime. Until quite recently litigation was as unusual in Burma as it still is in Java. But in Burma the people have been encouraged to settle their disputes by the processes of western law; whereas in Java, customary law and the practice of arbitration and the settlement of disputes by reasonable compromise have survived.

An even greater contrast is presented in respect of crime. In Java the death sentence is almost unknown; for the five years from 1935 to 1939, with a population for the whole of Netherlands India of nearly 70 million, only three persons were sentenced to death; in Burma, with a fifth of the population, the death sentence is passed on some two hundred a year and upwards of a hundred a year are hanged. It is difficult to compare sentences of imprisonment, but the position in Java is very different from that in Burma where, for some thirty years, the accommodation for convicts has failed to keep pace with

[1] Hart, p. 65.

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674 the number sent to prison, and one reads year after year of over-
681 crowded jails. In Burma whipping is freely used in addition to, or as a substitute for, imprisonment, and is a regular feature of jail discipline, whereas in Netherlands India whipping has been abolished as a judicial penalty and, though still permissible for unruly convicts, is in practice never used. In Burma, in addition to those convicted of offences, upwards of two thousand people a year may be placed on security, imprisoned or restricted under the ordinary Criminal Procedure Code, and another five hundred under the more rigorous provision of the Habitual Offenders Restriction Act.[1] In Netherlands India action along these lines seems to form no part of the ordinary processes of law. After the revolutionary outbreak of 1926–7 in Netherlands India, upwards of a thousand people were interned and deported by executive authority; but this was an exceptional measure to counter an emergency. In Burma, however, the Village Act provides for deportation as part of the recognized machinery of administration, and under this Act over twelve hundred were deported in connection with the rebellion of 1931.[2] In Burma collective penalties are imposed over large areas under the Police Act by quartering on them punitive police, of which the inhabitants must defray the cost; collective penalties may also be imposed on villages under two distinct sections of the Village Act. In the police courts of Burma a fine of less than Rs. 5 is unusual; in Java the penalty rarely seems to exceed half a guilder.

674 Yet in Burma, despite this vigorous enforcement of the law, crime continues to increase, whereas in Java the registers of the police stations seem mostly to be filled with charges as to the use of an unduly severe bit, riding a horse without a saddle, or something of that order.[3] In Netherlands India the whole system of administration is directed to preventing crime by removing its causes; in Burma the Government has been content to aim at maintaining law and order through legal penalties. In Lower Burma up to 1880 the proportion of Burman convicts was far lower than among other sections of the population, and up to 1910 Upper Burma was comparatively free of crime. These facts sufficiently dispose of a general indictment against the people as normally and naturally criminal, and the only possible conclusion would seem to be that the principles on which the administration of Burma has been conducted

[1] *RAB*, 1930–1, p. 23. [2] *RAB*, 1931–2, p. 77.
[3] *Netherlands India*, p. 299; Colijn, cited Bousquet, p. 90.

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were such as to develop their worse rather than their better qualities. Our methods might have done very well for Europe; they may have been suitable in India, where the people are protected against economic forces by the ties of caste, but they did not suit the Burman. 'It was the best butter', said the Hatter; but it spoiled the watch. 674

Clerical Unrest. In Burma the turbulence prevalent among the monks is one of the more recent features of social disorder and unrest, but it is merely one aspect of the dissolution of society indicated by the growth of crime. In Java there is nothing of the kind. As already noticed, causes relating to religion are tried in special Moslem courts, instead of, as in Burma, coming before the ordinary lay court; and the law applied is Moslem ecclesiastical law as interpreted by native Moslem judges, whereas in Burma the rule of decision is looked for in the *dhammathats* as interpreted on the principles of western law. The procedure in Java does not weaken but fosters corporate authority in the religious establishment. Moreover, the village clerics are appointed by or with the approval of the Regent, whereas in Burma the Government has held aloof from all concern with promoting the establishment, while actively breaking it down by the transfer of religious causes to the civil courts. The Dutch have with good reason tried to conciliate Moslem sentiment and, even if they have not been wholly successful, there is nothing in Java corresponding to the clerical unrest in Burma.[1] 692

Corruption. We have had to notice the prevalence of corruption in Burma. By all accounts it is practically unknown in Java. The absence of judicial corruption can easily be understood. Petty cases are settled by arbitration either out of court, or before a bench of notables with a senior and well-paid official as chairman; or they go before a civil servant or judicial officer with long service and on high pay. Moreover, the penalties imposed are so trivial that it is cheaper to be punished than to bribe a policeman or magistrate to escape punishment. Serious matters go before a bench containing at least three high judicial officers as well as laymen of good standing. It would be difficult and dangerous to bribe the whole bench. In civil cases the decision purports to follow customary law, and the people can know whether it is right; the court must justify itself to popular opinion and not to higher judicial authority. In these circumstances there is little scope for bribery. 696

But that corruption should be unknown in general administration, 661

[1] Bousquet, pp. 51 ff.; *Vrij Nederland*, 27 Nov. 1943.

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661 with a Government intervening so actively in every branch of social life, seems almost incredible. That, however, is certainly the general opinion. For example, the People's Banks, in dealing with applications for loans, depend largely on reports from the village headman as to the character and circumstances of the applicants. This would seem to provide a ready means by which the headman might supplement his income. In Burma it was regarded as natural and not improper that the headman should charge applicants for loans from Government a fee for making his report. In Java a suggestion to this effect met with the response, 'But there would be a complaint!', and that was taken as a sufficient and final answer. So far as the general opinion as to the absence of corruption is well-founded, there would seem to be two explanations: one is the tradition of 'complaints'; the other, the permanence of the Regent.

694 As already explained, it has been a tradition from the early days of Liberal rule that the Controleur, without actually instigating com-
661 plaints, should encourage the people to complain of any oppressive act. The Liberals prided themselves on relieving the people from the oppression by their native chieftains that had been one feature of the Culture system, and one chief duty of the Controleur, as he moved among the people, was to detect and bring to light oppression by encouraging them to complain, so that the 'complaint' has become a word of magic. In Burma anyone may petition the local magistrate; but the petition must bear a court fee stamp; in practice it is written by a legal practitioner or by a licensed petition writer; it must be presented in open court, and must disclose some matter in respect of which the law entitles the petitioner to relief. It is an application to an officer of the law for some action according to the law. In Java anyone may complain, orally or in writing, at any time, on any matter; no stamp or court fee is required; there are no licensed petition writers, and anyone may write the complaint. Even diehards recognized one good feature in the nationalist movement: that the nationalist leaders encouraged the people to formulate complaints. The tradition goes back far beyond the Liberal period; it dates from the principle adopted in 1803 that Government should act 'more like a father studying to promote the welfare of his family than a ruler governing his subjects'; the Liberals merely devised machinery for making the tradition more effective. Thus the 'complaint' has come to take a place alongside 'gentle pressure' as a distinctive feature of Dutch colonial practice.

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Another safeguard against corruption is the Regent. In Burma no one stays long enough in one place to ascertain in what quarters and to what extent corruption may prevail; still less is it possible to work up and carry through proceedings against those who are corrupt. In Java the Regent is permanent. His position and his high pay protect him against the temptation to accept petty bribes, and concern for his own authority and prestige makes him jealous of the influence of corrupt subordinates. These cannot practise corruption long or effectively without attracting the attention of the Regent, who can see that the offender is brought to account. If, then, the administration is so free from corruption as one is told, the credit is probably due in great part to the Regent.

661 632

Authority and Law. It must be admitted then that, in all those matters which stand out conspicuously as abuses under British rule in Burma, Dutch rule in Java presents a favourable contrast. Yet there is another side to the picture. The Government has employed 'gentle pressure' to protect the village community against dissolution, and to promote welfare; yet 'gentle pressure' may be debilitating rather than a stimulant, making the patient less able and not more able to stand alone. And it is difficult to reconcile gentle pressure, however well-intentioned, with the principles of liberty and law. In an address to a Dutch audience interested in colonial problems, the present writer endeavoured to illustrate this point.[1]

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'One of your subordinate native officers described his work. "I improved sanitation. I got the people to found schools, and build bazaars, and provide a polyclinic. And I would not allow bamboo bazaars; if they could not afford wooden walls, I took care that the posts were of substantial timber and that the roof was sound. I even planted flower gardens, a thing that practically no one else has done; and it was all my own idea, without pressure from above." I have heard your European officers described as social engineers and your native civil servants as welfare officers, and the terms are justified. As I went round your villages and saw the infinite pains you take to conserve village society and build up social welfare, I found myself humming a tune. It was a hymn tune. Gradually the words came back to me: "Can a mother's tender care, Cease towards the child she bare? Yes, she may forgetful be, Yet will I remember thee!" I thought of the hours and days we spend on the Bench, listening to advocates (trying to mislead us), laboriously taking down evidence (much of it false evidence), and sending poor unfortunates to jail, and I was filled with envy and admiration of your officers who have the privilege of giving

[1] Furnivall, *Asiatic Review*, 1935, pp. 655 ff.

642 their life to constructive social work as missionaries of western civilization. ...Your Regent can look round his Regency and say, "*si monumentum requiris, circumspice.*" Our energetic township officer reviewing his work would take you to his record room and point to Alps and Himalayas of completed cases; here, he would say, "*si monumentum requiris, circumspice*".

'In your offices of equal standing I found no such mountains of proceedings. There would not have been room for them. I remember visiting a native subordinate. A broad drive through a walled park of several acres took us to a roomy house with a spacious audience hall. In one corner of the park were two outhouses. One was a garage; the smaller one I took to be a bicycle shed. But it was not a bicycle shed; it was his office. I do not wish to guarantee the details of this picture, but it represents correctly the general impression that I gathered everywhere....Things are changing, but until within the last few years, you had large houses and little offices; in Burma we have large offices and little houses. Your system is, or has been, personal: ours, mechanical....

'(Yet), by a quasi-natural process, by the play of supply and demand, we arrive at very much the same results as you—with very much less work and worry. But the principle is not the same, the method is not the same, and the results are not quite the same. Your policy is, professedly, ethical; ours, practical. These are not mere catchwords. You try to give the people what they ought to want; we are content to give them what they will pay for. Your method is one of personal influence, *zachte dwang, parentah aloes*; we rely on the economic motive, the desire for gain, working within the limits of the law. The results, I admit, are not quite the same. Our villages compare very badly with yours in respect of hygiene and roads; it is hardly an exaggeration to say that, outside the larger towns, until the coming of the motor-car, we had no roads. People do not want disease, and they would rather go dry-foot than through mud. But no one can make money out of hygiene and roads, and not much can be done by a private individual in respect of either. The want for these, and for many other things, is a social want. On the ethical system you aim at organizing social demand; on the practical system we neglect such wants until they threaten to create a public nuisance. Your system works very differently from ours....

'Let me recapitulate the main points of difference. Our officers are magistrates; yours are policemen and welfare officers. Our methods are repressive; yours are preventive. Our procedure is formal and legal; yours, informal and personal. Our civil service is an administrative machine; yours is an instrument of Government. Our aim is negative—to suppress disorder; yours is positive—to maintain order. Order—it is a word we both use frequently, but with a significant difference of context. We talk of "law and order" and you of "*rust en orde*"; but in the absence of a social conscience it is difficult to distinguish between law and the letter of the law, and between *rust* and the placidity of a good baby in its perambulator. The caricature which depicts your system as a *baboe*, a nursemaid,

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and ours as a *babu*, a clerk, does emphasize a difference in vital principle. You try to keep a man from going wrong; we make it unpleasant for him if he does go wrong. You believe in protection and welfare; we believe in law—and liberty.' 642

Burmans, after so many years of British rule, would probably feel stifled in the hot-house atmosphere of Java, and Javanese would shiver in the bleaker, if not bracing, climate of Burma. But it must be admitted that the version of Dutch policy given above did not pass without protest. Everyone readily admits that the people are too fondly coddled. There have long been general complaints that they are treated as children who will never grow up; that 'a villager cannot scratch his head unless a district officer gives him permission and an expert shows him how to do it'. In a powerful article that met with wide approval, the late Professor Van Vollenhoven pressed home the point that, in exercising 'gentle pressure', officials are not hampered by an obsequious deference to law. But not many would accept the suggestion that their colonial practice encroaches on liberty. Possibly their attitude may be due in part to their heritage of Roman law. 'Its influence', remarks Sir Henry Slesser, 'in stimulating a disciplinary outlook in politics and study on the Continent has been incalculable.' Yet even continental students present a rather similar picture of Dutch practice.[1] Whatever criticisms may be levelled at British colonial policy, and whatever defects may be manifest in practice, both policy and practice are based on the principles of equal law and individual freedom. That is why, in the earlier stages, it is both successful and in many ways congenial to the people; it liberates them from arbitrary oppression by native chieftains or Government officials. And it is probably one reason why, in its later stages, it is found irksome and unpopular; it brings them under bondage to economic law.

Another point which our comparison has brought out is that neither Dutch nor English have solved the problem of enhancing native welfare. The Dutch, by strenuous endeavours, have succeeded in maintaining an astonishingly high level of material welfare, far above the level in those parts of India which are comparable in respect of population, and about the same level as in Burma with much fewer mouths to feed. Yet if the Dutch have protected the people against 511

[1] Slesser, Sir H., *The Judicial Office* (1943), p. 83; Bousquet, pp. 90ff.; *Netherlands India*, pp. 382, 390.

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511 those factors which have caused agrarian distress and fostered crime, corruption and clerical unrest in Burma, the price has had to be paid in other ways. For the problem of enhancing welfare, says Dr Boeke,

> 'a real solution can be found only by instilling into the masses of the people a rational view of sex relations and a dynamic view of production. This is the only conclusion that can be reached by those who desire to make actual a general, a mass-welfare policy. And it is striking to note how often writers on welfare policy for Oriental peoples finally come to the conclusion somewhat in the nature of a cry of despair, that the only hope of saving the situation lies in neo-Malthusianism. Unfortunately this has never proved to be a remedy for the very poorest: and Java is a country of the very poor. What is worse, it can never be counted upon as a means of enhancing prosperity in the Indies, because it is in itself a symptom, the sign of the dynamic spirit, of a new frame of mind not yet acquired by the people. This dynamic spirit is the crux of the matter—but how to arouse it?''[1]

Only with diffidence can one venture to question the views of a Dutch economist on the affairs of Java. Yet one cannot suppress the feeling that Dutch writers who do not know Burma and India tend to be over gloomy as to the poverty of the Javanese. And there is evidence that the people do not wholly lack the 'dynamic' spirit, the desire to improve their lot. Throughout the last half of the nineteenth century there was a steady flow of immigration to districts where new public works offered prospects of higher pay; practically all the crops now cultivated by natives are of foreign origin, and one finds now that the areas under cash crops, such as potatoes, rise and fall with prices. So far as it is true that the Javanese are lacking in initiative and that the outstanding problem is to provide food for more mouths, the cause would seem to lie in their past history and present environment. In any case it is difficult to accept the lack of a dynamic spirit as the crux of the matter. In Burma the colonization of the Delta is only one instance of the dynamic spirit of the Burmese, and the people have long taken with avidity to new and more profitable crops. And in the delta there is no pressure of population. On the contrary, although containing the richest agricultural land, it is more lightly populated than other settled tracts of Burma. Yet the great mass of the inhabitants are rack-rented tenants or landless labourers, unable

[1] Boeke, p. 164.

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to find work for a great part of the year—except when, as happens too frequently, they are in jail. If the population were denser one might be tempted to regard the numerous murders in modern Burma as nature's way of reducing a surplus population. But neither a dynamic spirit nor a thin population have assured welfare to the Burmese. We would seem then to be faced with the melancholy alternative of economic apathy or crime. Before we acquiesce in accepting one of these alternatives as the inevitable outcome of colonial practice, we would do well to enquire further why the benevolent aspirations of colonial policy are frustrated. 511

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CHAPTER VIII

COLONIAL POLICY

1. The Study of Colonial Relations

642 From this brief outline of the course of events in Burma and Netherlands India some facts stand out clearly. Under native rule they both presented typical and not unfavourable examples of tropical society, held together by religion and personal authority in a complex of customary social obligations. Both achieved an elaborate civilization, with many valuable and pleasant features, but their political organization was unstable, and, when challenged by the superior moral and material forces of the modern West, neither was able to preserve its independence. The British in Burma and the Dutch in Java represented the western principle of social order, resting on reason, impersonal law and individual rights, which Europe inherits from Greece, Rome and Palestine. From the beginning of the nineteenth century their policy has been directed towards furthering economic progress and promoting native welfare, but they have employed different methods. The British in Burma adopted the system of direct rule, and the Dutch in Java the system of indirect rule.

In colonial literature the distinction between direct and indirect rule is familiar, and the choice between these systems is sometimes regarded as determined by the national philosophy of rule accepted in the colonial power; it is suggested that indirect rule will be preferred where the goal of policy is to allow the native to attain independence along his own lines, and direct rule where the objective is to find a place for the native in a society of which the principal institutions are European in character. It is true that, so far as colonial administration is directed towards inducing native opinion to accept innovations which it does not actively demand, indirect rule will be favoured by those who prefer genuine acceptance and slow development, and direct rule by those who prefer mere compliance and rapid development. But the theory that the preference for direct or indirect rule depends on colonial policy in respect of native evolution does not cover all the facts. It cannot, for instance, easily be reconciled with the adoption of direct rule in India and the Philippines. Moreover, there is no sharp line between direct and indirect rule, and we find the same

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power adopting different systems in the same place at different times, and in different places at the same time. But the chief defect of the theory is that it does not sufficiently recognize the connection between colonial policy and economic circumstances. Colonial policy is only one aspect of national policy, and national policy is not directed solely by economic considerations. Similarly a man's business is only one aspect of his life, and his life is larger than his business; yet his business will suffer if he does not run it on business lines. Colonial relations are primarily economic and, although pronouncements on colonial policy will be framed in terms congenial to national traditions, colonial practice is conditioned by the economic environment, and it is this, rather than any national philosophy of empire, which determines the choice between direct and indirect rule.[1]

When Europeans started trading in the tropics they had to gain the favour of the local rulers. In order to acquire influence at court the usual plan has been to support the weaker among rival claimants to the throne. If the object of policy be merely to prevent border troubles, he may be allowed a nominal independence, but ordinarily such a subordinate alliance leads gradually and naturally to indirect rule. Indirect rule through a local chieftain is the simplest and cheapest way by which a western power can obtain economic control. So long as its main economic objective is to obtain tropical produce at low rates, the local ruler can do most to help it. Similarly, with development by western enterprise, though large-scale transactions must be regulated on western lines, land and labour can be provided most readily and cheaply by the local ruler, governing his people on traditional lines, and there tends to evolve a dual system of administration, half western, half tropical, with the natives governed on the principle of indirect rule. But where the dependency is chiefly valued as a market for the sale of western goods to natives, and is opened up through native enterprise, with natives growing crops for sale, even native transactions must be regulated in the ordinary way of business according to western law and procedure, and a system of direct rule is indicated. Where, however, any considerable area of the dependency is taken up for European settlement, direct rule must be applied within that area, and may also be extended to the natives.

Few regions are developed solely as markets or solely as sources of tropical produce. A dependency which is originally opened up as

[1] Hailey, *African Survey*, pp. 130ff., 528ff.

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642 a market may acquire importance as a scene of western enterprise, as has happened recently in Burma with the development of oil, tin and other minerals, and rubber. Similarly a dependency, originally valued as a source of tropical produce, will almost certainly, like Java, become important as a market. The economic character of a dependency gradually changes, and so also, and more or less contemporaneously, does the system of rule. Indirect rule is slowly adapted to western requirements, and the western element in the administration becomes more pronounced; or else direct rule on western lines comes to include a popular element. In either case the distinction between direct and indirect rule tends to lose its sharpness.

It is not suggested that the choice between direct and indirect rule is governed solely by economic conditions. Where there is a strong local chieftain, direct rule may be impossible. Where, on the contrary, there is no outstanding local chieftain with authority over a wide area and able to comply with the requirements of the colonial power, direct rule may be unavoidable and is likely to encounter less opposition. In such cases the traditions of rule in the colonial power will carry weight. At the beginning of the present century the Dutch in Java had a long tradition of succcessful indirect rule. On extending active administration to the Outer Provinces they found some tracts where a multiplicity of petty chieftains was an obstacle to indirect rule, but they tried so far as possible to follow their traditional system by creating artificial units. On the other hand, the British had a long tradition of direct rule in India, and there was a tendency at first to adopt this system also in Africa.[1] But in some parts of Africa conditions necessitated indirect rule, and the success of this system encouraged its adoption even where it might at first appear less suitable. (As explained below, in British administration indirect rule is strongly coloured by the older tradition of direct rule.) Apart from such exceptions, economic considerations prevail and, unless the conditions require or justify the more costly and troublesome system of direct rule, one finds indirect rule, with a dual system where western interests require the application of direct rule to certain regions or races.

The connection between economic circumstances and principles of rule gives a special interest to the comparison between Burma and Java. British rule was extended to Burma when the Industrial Revolution was first impelling British manufacturers to seek new markets

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 133, 536.

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in the tropics, and just when Indian administration had been reorganized on a system of direct rule. Naturally this system was extended to the parts of Burma then acquired. At that time, and until the end of the century, western enterprise took no part in exploiting the natural resources of Burma, except, on a comparatively small scale, its teak; Burma was developed as a market, and its progress depended solely on the response of Burman enterprise to the stimulus of economic freedom. This method of development necessitated the introduction of direct rule on western lines, as in India. But the conditions were different in Burma and India. India was protected against the disruptive forces of economic freedom by the institution of caste, and it had long been under, or in touch with, British rule; modern India grew up with modern Europe. Burmans were quite different from Indians in their ideas and ways of life; caste was unknown and their social and economic organization exposed them in an exceptional degree to the impact of economic forces.[1] They knew nothing of the modern world. Yet they were governed from India; no one in India knew anything of Burma, and the local governors were mostly transient officials from India with neither the opportunity, the knowledge or the stimulus to adapt Indian administration and the rule of western law to the requirements of the people. Thus Burma represents in its purest form the process of economic development by native enterprise under a system of direct rule. In Java, on the contrary, the Dutch had nothing to sell, and they valued Java only as a source of tropical produce to be obtained as cheaply as possible. This required indirect rule through native chieftains who could furnish the necessary produce and labour. Java accordingly came to represent the purest type of indirect rule. Up to the end of the nineteenth century native enterprise for export was negligible; but western enterprise developed and with it the need, within the western sphere of the social economy, for direct rule on western lines. This led to a dual system of administration, with the natives under indirect rule, and the Europeans under direct rule. Burma and Java, then, are typical examples respectively of direct and indirect rule.

In both countries the policy of Government has had a two-fold objective: economic progress and native welfare. In both countries economic development has made remarkable, astounding, progress; in both there has evolved a social structure comprising distinct racial

[1] Census, 1911, p. 304.

642 sections with an elaborate western superstructure over native life; in both native welfare has lagged behind economic progress, and, in both, during the present century, a growing impatience of western rule has found expression in a nationalist movement. These features are characteristic of tropical dependencies in general. Since Burma and Java furnish extreme types of direct and indirect rule, and of development by native and by western enterprise, the comparison between them would seem to furnish a useful starting point for a more general enquiry into colonial policy and practice. Such an enquiry is indeed necessary if we are to understand the problems of either Burma or Java or of any tropical dependency, for it is only against a background of general principles that the phenomena of western rule in any region of the tropics assume their due proportions, and that we can reasonably anticipate finding a satisfactory solution for the many weighty problems of colonial policy and practice. The enquiry may well seem, and is indeed, beyond the competence of any single student, whose intimate acquaintance with practical administration must of necessity be limited. But one conclusion to which the following enquiry points is the need for better knowledge of the facts and better understanding of their implications, and to the urgency of international co-operation in the comparative study of colonial affairs.

2. Survey of Colonial Policy

175 Of late years there has been a growing interest in colonial policy and colonial relations. To this many factors have contributed. Prominent among them are unrest in the tropics, consequent on the rise of modern nationalism, and the jealousy of non-colonial powers. Thus colonial policy has a double aspect, domestic and international. These are interrelated, for, while the advantages accruing to colonial powers from their dependencies arouse envy, and stimulate other powers to assert their claims by force of arms, tropical unrest serves as a pretext and a tool for intervention. The international aspect of colonial relations will require attention in due place, but it is convenient first to discuss the relations between colonial powers and their dependencies.

Discussions of this matter often contrast the high aspirations of modern colonial policy with the selfish exploitation of the past. Thus, according to Lord Hailey, 'the imperialist sentiment which animated much of our public policy in the latter part of the last century led us along paths some of which we should not be inclined to follow

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to-day'.[1] And a well-known Dutch colonial statesman says, 'He who would maintain that in the best colonial empires this predatory but profitable policy belongs to history will have to admit that it is in several respects not too remote history.'[2] This view hardly does justice to our fathers and grandfathers, who indeed themselves put forward similar pretensions. Dutch writers admit as not without validity the charges levelled against western enterprise in Java at the onset of the great depression of the thirties. But that was the generation of the Ethical leaders who aspired to build a brave new world in 1900. They in turn succeeded the Liberals who had thought to introduce a golden age in 1870 on the principle of freedom. The Liberals condemned, as rooted in unrighteousness, the system by which Van den Bosch had expected to restore prosperity to a country ruined by the reforms that Raffles, a generation earlier, had claimed would bestow liberty and welfare on millions of his fellow human beings. We may, and should be, wiser than our fathers, and should have learned from their mistakes; but it would be wise to bear in mind the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican. Although chartered companies may have disregarded the moral obligations of sovereignty, European powers which have accepted responsibility for dominion in the tropics have always claimed a moral basis for their activities.

Spain and Portugal. The earliest system of colonial rule may indeed be distinguished as the religious system. It has been well said that the colonial adventure of the Portuguese was also the last of the crusades. When Alexander VI in 1493 adjudicated on the rival claims of Spain and Portugal to undiscovered heathen continents and islands, he made it a condition that they should exert all diligence to convert their subjects to Christianity and 'instruct them in the Catholic Faith and good manners'.[3] They both took this injunction seriously. Paraguay under the Jesuits has often been cited as a model of colonial rule; in Manila the Spaniards founded the oldest western university in Asia, and by the end of the nineteenth century western culture was more widely spread in the Philippines than in any part of Asia. In the Moluccas the Portuguese established a Christian seminary within a few years of their arrival, and their claim that, if they did not aim solely at conversion, neither did they aim solely at commerce, is justified by the fact that, long after they have lost their colonies, many of their former subjects still retain their Christian faith.

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 46. [2] Hart, *Asiatic Review*, 1941, p. 629.
[3] Danvers, F. C., *The Portuguese in India* (1894), II, 483.

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175 *Chartered Companies.* The chartered companies, which mark the next stage of western tropical enterprise, were professedly mercantile associations, and, so long as they prospered, were practically independent of the state. Their object was to pay good dividends to their shareholders, and they subordinated political considerations to economic ends. Yet the Dutch in early days were zealous for the conversion of their subjects, and it was only later, when religious enthusiasm had declined, that they came to disregard everything but profit. Even so, during the eighteenth century, there were aspirations after a more generous conception of colonial rule, and the high official who bequeathed his estate as a permanent heritage for his Christian slaves was not alone in caring for the welfare of the people.[1] Still one must accept the verdict on the Dutch East India Company that 'its polestar was profit and the lodestone greed'; and in the eighteenth century this was notoriously true also of the English Company. It is not without significance that in both cases this concentration on economic ends led to bankruptcy, and at about the same time; the English Company was brought under State control, and the Dutch Company was taken over by the State.

Liberalism. In both countries the assumption of effective state control over tropical administration synchronized with the dawn of modern Liberalism. We have already remarked that Liberalism had a double aspect, material and moral, economic and social. Liberals believed in economic freedom—freedom of person, property and trade—and trusted to economic freedom as a guarantee of progress. When the English Government assumed control over India by Pitt's Act of 1784, the Industrial Revolution was already presaging a revolution in colonial relations. Manchester cotton goods were beginning to compete successfully with Indian calicoes and muslins in England; the first consignment reached India in 1786, and from 1814 onwards they rapidly displaced native products. During the same period the ideas that subsequently came to be termed Liberal were making headway, and the East India Company, after a vain effort to retain its monopoly, adopted them. The doctrine of economic freedom implied the introduction of a money economy, and the encouragement of native enterprise which would enable the people to buy imported goods. In assuming that, equally with western peoples, the oriental was alive to the desire of improving his condition, and in introducing the principle of equality before the

[1] Vlekke, p. 187.

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law. Liberalism, even in its economic aspect, was strongly coloured by humanitarian ideals.

These ideals were carried further in its social doctrine that all men were equal and had a natural right to freedom of speech and religion. Liberals believed that men had a right to political freedom, to live their own life in their own way under their own national institutions. They hoped to see India free, and tied to England only by ties of interest and affection. If the maintenance of law and order were the sole functions of the state, it seemed that the replacement of British magistrates by Indians should make India capable of self-government. Moreover, with the introduction of direct rule on western principles, economy demanded the employment of natives as officials. This made rapid progress and was adopted as a principle in 1833 when, on the renewal of the Company's charter, it was laid down that 'no native of the said Indian territories shall, by reason only of his place of birth, descent, colour or any of them be disabled from holding any place, office or employment under the Company'. By the end of the century the subordinate establishment was almost wholly Indian, and many Indians held high judicial and executive appointments. The Liberal faith included also a belief in the virtue of self-governing institutions on the English model. The largely European Presidency towns already enjoyed self-government; from 1842 attempts were made to apply the principle of local self-government in the interior, and it was widely extended from 1881–2. Meanwhile Indians had already been admitted to the Central Legislature from 1861 and at the same time Provincial Legislative Councils were established. This project of self-government reached its logical conclusion in 1917, when the Secretary of State for India announced responsible government as the goal of British policy.

While Liberals believed in economic freedom as good business, and in political freedom as a natural right, they looked on education as the main instrument of freedom. They held that the wide diffusion of western education would inspire the masses with the desire of improving their condition, dispel superstition, substitute Christianity for idolatry, and promote affection towards British rule. So early as 1793 Wilberforce tried to interest Parliament in the education of Indians. In 1815 the Governor-General declared his anxiety to see some system of public instruction established.[1] In 1854 the East India Company, in a despatch which laid the foundations of the

[1] *IG*, IV, 409, 413, 417.

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175 modern system of public instruction, proclaimed the advancement of the people through primary education as its main objective, and in all subsequent pronouncements on the subject this leading principle has been reaffirmed. Thus for about a hundred years from 1813 the lofty sentiments of Liberalism inspired British rule in India.

Meanwhile Britain had been carving out a vast new colonial empire in Africa under conditions very different from those of India. Instead of a populous country with an ancient agricultural civilization, there were empty lands and backward peoples. But the empty lands contained resources needed on a large scale for industry in Europe, and capital was available in Europe for the development of these resources by western enterprise. The Ashanti War of 1874 marked the beginning of British penetration into the interior of Africa. It was closely followed by the flotation of numerous large companies to develop the new territories under a charter from the State, as this 'offered a means of asserting British sovereignty without the expense and responsibility that sovereignty usually entails'.[1] The companies appealed to Parliament and the public for support not merely as commercial projects, but as instruments for spreading light in 'the dark continent' and as a response to Livingstone's appeal for commerce and Christianity. But they lacked the resources of a sovereign power and, in the interest of the shareholders, had to keep down the cost of administration. 'Every Government in Africa has been faced with the initial difficulty of administering an extensive area with a small European staff, frequently ignorant of local native custom and language; in every case it has found itself obliged, in the early days of its rule, to make use of chiefs or other native authorities, and the extent to which it has done so has depended on circumstances rather than on any difference of principle.'[2] It was the economic environment and not national political philosophy that dictated the adoption of the system of indirect rule.

In Nigeria, however, Sir George Goldie found a virtue in necessity.

> 'Even an imperfect and tyrannical native African administration, if its extreme excesses were controlled by European supervision, would be, in the early stages, productive of far less discomfort to its subjects than well-intentioned but ill-directed efforts of European magistrates, often young and headstrong, and not invariably gifted with sympathy and introspective powers. If the welfare of the native is to be considered, if dangerous revolts

[1] Burns, p. 163.
[2] *African Survey*, p. 527.

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are to be obviated, the general principles of ruling on African principles through native rulers must be followed for the present.'[1]

As a corollary it followed that, alongside the native administration, there should be 'colonial' courts to deal according to western law and procedure with 'cases involving non-natives, to exercise jurisdiction over natives in areas where native courts do not exist, and, where native courts exist, to deal with cases involving natives which are held to be unsuitable for these courts'.[2] As in Netherlands India there arose a system of indirect rule and dual administration. But the system is notably different in Dutch and British practice. In Britain there is a stronger tradition of the rule of law than on the continent of Europe, and British colonial administration owes much to preconceptions based on direct rule in India. Thus British colonial administration on the system of indirect rule emphasizes the judicial aspect of native authority, encourages greater formality in native courts, and insists on close supervision over native judicial procedure by British officials. On the Dutch system even the European officials are policemen, agents of policy; on the British system even native officials tend to become magistrates and judges, servants of the law.

The adoption of indirect rule in Africa did not, however, involve a departure from the principle of *laissez-faire*; rather it carried this principle still further by abstaining from intervention in native ways of life. But whether under direct or indirect rule, the lofty aspirations of Liberals were disappointing in practice, and, beyond narrow limits, conduced neither to economic progress nor to native welfare. For a time the prospect of easy money that had attracted capital in the first instance was realized, but 'the earliest attempts to develop trade sometimes involved the destructive spoliation of the resources of the colony. Rubber or forest timber was exhausted without proper replacement; accumulations of ivory were for a period obtained by exchange for cheap imports. Such a policy of exploitation could not continue indefinitely. Once the realities of the situation were understood, capital was less easily attracted.'[3] Moreover, the concentration of political and economic power in the same hands had shown 'the difficulties of reconciling the responsibilities of the administration with the interests of shareholders, and of demarcating justifiable administrative compulsion from forced labour for the purpose of profit making'.[4] Thus, during the last quarter of the nineteenth

[1] *African Survey*, p. 417.
[2] *Ib.* pp. 286ff.
[3] *Ib.* p. 1314.
[4] *Ib.* p. 1314.

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175 century, initial progress was followed by stagnation, and the aspirations of improving native welfare proved illusive. In India likewise under direct rule, Liberal hopes and forecasts proved illusive. The cultivators, burdened with debt, were losing their land to money-lenders, and public instruction, so far from dispelling the superstition of the masses, did not even reach them, while among the middle classes, who went to school to earn a living, the spread of education, instead of fostering goodwill to Britain and diffusing Christianity, bred growing disaffection and a reaction to an aggressive Hinduism. After the roseate dawn of early Liberalism the sky turned dark and stormy, and the century closed in 'gloom and depression'.[1] Liberals, regarding economic freedom as the key to progress and welfare, released economic forces which for a time furthered economic progress, but, at the same time, preyed on social welfare, setting bounds to progress, leading to stagnation and foreshadowing decline.

Under Dutch rule Liberal principles were differently applied, and colonial practice evolved in a contrary direction, but with similar results. On the restoration of the Dutch possessions in 1816–18, the leading statesmen from the King downwards admired all that was 'brave and liberal' and professed warm sympathy for 'the little man'. The King drafted a constitution along these lines for the Indies, and the commissioners sent to introduce it 'decided at once that the time had come when the Indies should be governed for the sake of its own people and not for that of the Netherlands'.[2] They found that Raffles had introduced, at least on paper, a system of direct rule, applying Liberal individual principles, far more thoroughly than any Dutch statesman had ever contemplated. Brief experience showed that 'measures that if seen at three thousand miles apparently are liberal, here prove to be highly illiberal in their effects' and implied 'the protection of European landowners at the expense of the native population'. Affairs drifted in confusion until the arrival of Van den Bosch in 1830. He also claimed Liberal views, but denounced the 'perverted Liberalism' of Raffles as unsuited to the Javanese, and propounded 'a Liberal policy adapted to their character and institutions'. He reverted to the Dutch system of indirect rule through native chieftains, which the commissioners, though recognizing in policy, had departed from in practice. While repudiating the Liberal principle of individual freedom under western law, he appealed, more

[1] *IG*, II, 526.
[2] Vlekke, pp. 254, 256.

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logically, to the principle of *laissez-faire* as justifying non-interference with native institutions. It is, however, no fortuitous coincidence that indirect rule in Java was profitable to the Dutch and direct rule in India profitable to the British.

The Culture system introduced by Van den Bosch gave a temporary stimulus to economic progress, but in the long run proved detrimental to native welfare and led to economic stagnation. Also it was unprofitable to a later generation of more orthodox Liberals, who came into power in the Netherlands in 1848 and during the next twenty years gradually obtained control over colonial policy. They substituted private enterprise for state enterprise, and thereby gave a new impulse to economic progress. Like Liberals in Britain they believed in education 'to spread light in India'. But under indirect rule there was little demand for natives educated on western lines, and, with little to gain from schooling, there was little demand among the natives for schools. Western education made slow progress in Java as compared with India. On the other hand, western enterprise in Java required a large and healthy population and, in respect of medical assistance and a care for hygiene in rural areas, Java was ahead of India. The system of rule through native chieftains, introduced by Van den Bosch, made inadequate provision for the Europeans who crowded in when Java was thrown open to western private enterprise, and the dual character of the administration, with different laws for Europeans and natives, became more prominent. Liberals of all hues wanted an administration along western lines for the European community, and urged the need for decentralization—the delegation of power from the home to the colonial Government, from the colonial Government to departments and local officials, and from the bureaucracy to local bodies. From 1848 onwards various aspects of decentralization were discussed, and every year, with the growth of western enterprise, it became more urgent. Finally, in 1903, western political institutions were introduced in local government, and in 1918 the creation of the Volksraad as an advisory body marked a long stride towards the adoption of Liberal principles in the central government. Thus, whereas in British dependencies the system of administration developed during the nineteenth century from direct towards indirect rule, in Netherlands India the tendency was in the contrary direction.

The Liberalism of Van den Bosch was profitable to the Dutch of 1830 and the later individualist Liberalism profited the Dutch of 1870,

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175 but in neither case need one question that the appeal to humanitarian ideals was genuine. The Liberals, like those in England, looked forward, in two senses, to a golden age. But in Java, as in India, the century ended in stagnation and depression, with chambers of commerce in the Netherlands demanding an enquiry into the 'decline of welfare'. Under Dutch rule, as under British rule, the Liberal policy of *laissez-faire* gave place to a constructive policy of efficiency and social justice.

Construction. In 1900 the British Government was less reluctant than in 1870 to accept imperial responsibilities, and Joseph Chamberlain, as an apostle of efficiency and social justice, was trying to put the British Empire on a business footing, with Kipling as the popular exponent of the 'White Man's Burden'. This 'involved a new philosophy of [colonial] politics and an ethical standard, serious and not ignoble'.[1] The failure, economic and political, of the chartered companies in Africa, implied that the State, on taking over charge of the colonies, should intervene actively to promote economic development and to enhance native welfare. This new constructive policy with its double aspect came to be known as 'the dual mandate'. In India, under direct rule, the administration, chiefly at the instance of Lord Curzon, proliferated new economic and welfare services, while in Africa and elsewhere the conception of indirect rule acquired a new character. Formerly indirect rule had been justified as a means of protecting the natives from the impact of the west, now it was conceived as a means 'to graft our higher civilization upon the soundly rooted native stock...moulding it and establishing it into lines consonant with modern ideas and higher standards'.[2] It was no longer a negative system of *laissez-faire*, but an active policy of economic and social construction. Liberals looked to freedom as a key to economic progress, and regarded economic progress as a *cause* of native welfare, leading *automatically* to political independence. Modern colonial theory regards economic progress as a *condition* of native welfare, and native welfare as a *condition* of political advancement, but recognizes the need for state intervention to further economic progress. Liberals thought to promote welfare through freedom; the modern tendency is to promote welfare, even at the expense of freedom.

Simultaneously, with this new trend in British colonial policy, Dutch colonial policy turned from Liberalism to a new constructive

[1] Buchan, J., *Memory-Hold-the-Door* (1943), p. 125.
[2] *African Survey*, p. 432.

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policy avowedly based on 'ethical' principles. This found its first practical expression in the Village Act of 1906, intended to strengthen corporate village life and thereby 'stimulate the process of social growth and enable local officials to cope with their prime function, the care of public welfare'. Thus both Dutch and English may fairly claim that, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, their colonial policy has always been inspired by high ideals, and has kept in sight the dual aim of increasing the contribution of the tropics to the welfare of the world, while promoting the welfare of the people. Yet even the 'ethical' system and the theory of the 'White Man's Burden' are now disavowed, as illustrating the predatory past when we followed paths that we should now be reluctant to pursue. How far this criticism may be justified we shall have to examine more closely when dealing with modern colonial policy and practice. All we are now trying to show is that the inspiration of colonial policy by humanitarian ideals is no modern invention, but as old as western rule.

'But policy is a matter not only of purpose but performance, and it must be judged by its operation in practice.' In politics, as in law, men must be held to intend the natural consequences of their acts, and the natural consequences of colonial practice have differed widely from the humanitarian aims set forth in colonial policy. This has often been attributed to hypocrisy. On the suppression of the slave trade in 1807, humanitarians advocated the encouragement of commerce as a means of creating an interest which would have a strong motive for co-operating with the abolition of slavery. 'Thus at an early date that intimate connection between idealism and commerce was established which has exposed African administration to the easy cynicism of those who see in every declaration of interest in the African's welfare the veiled intention to secure benefits for the mother country.' In French colonial policy there is often a note of warm cordiality, 'qui *parfois* part vraiment du cœur'.[1] Raffles had a sincere liking for Malays, and claimed 'the happiness to release several millions of his fellow creatures from a state of bondage and oppression' under the Dutch; but Van den Bosch regarded him as solely concerned to build up British trade. Van den Bosch was unquestionably a philanthropist who, long before he ruled Java, had shown practical sympathy with the Socialist experiments of Robert Owen, yet, according to his Liberal successors, he 'wrapped a gilt

[1] *African Survey*, p. 133; Bousquet, p. 156 (italics *sic*).

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175 coating of philanthropic theory round a bitter pill of practice'. The Liberal leader, Van de Putte, was genuinely convinced that economic individualism would create welfare in Java, but Ethical critics remarked that Liberals 'balanced their love for the natives against regard for their own pockets'. The Ethical reformers in their turn were charged by a later generation with 'hoisting the Cross in place of the Jolly Roger, but without changing the sailing orders'.

Yet charges of conscious hypocrisy cannot be sustained. In almost every generation there have been reformers sincerely zealous for native welfare but, while picturing a golden future in the warm glow of their imagination, they have judged their predecessors in the cold light of actual achievement. In colonial relations a wide gap between policy and practice seems perennial, as if there were some factor in the nature of such relations by which the lofty aims of policy are continually frustrated in their practical application. Let us try to elucidate the cause of this divergence by studying the evolution of tropical economy under the rule of *laissez-faire*, when economic forces were left uncontrolled.

3. Tropical Economy

000 In the study of tropical economy it seems necessary, even at the risk of emphasizing platitudes, to go back to elementary principles of economic activity. The endeavours of all colonial powers to enhance progress and welfare in their tropical dependencies are of necessity conditioned by certain economic laws. One fundamental principle is the economic process of natural selection by the survival of the cheapest, known technically as the Law of Substitution. This does not imply deliberate substitution, but is a natural law operating independently of human volition; it is the economic aspect of the evolutionary principle of natural selection by the survival of the fittest. In times of famine, the man or beast that needs less for subsistence is, other things being equal, most likely to survive. Stronger men may take the food out of his mouth, but the ability to sustain life on a minimum of nourishment has in itself survival value. In Burma some poor flooded areas gave a yield below the margin of subsistence for Burmans, and they are cultivated by Indians who can make a living on them. This process of natural selection is reinforced by reason. Everyone would pay twopence rather than threepence for the same thing; that is rational, a matter of universal common sense. There is an economic process, active everywhere and always, tending in all

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economic operations to increase the margin between yield and cost. This may conduce to economic progress by favouring more efficient methods of production, but at the same time, unless kept under control, it reduces costs by eliminating all human qualities that are not directly required to maintain life on the lowest level of subsistence, the bare need for daily bread.

A second principle of economic progress is the desire of gain, the economic motive of profit. That also is natural; but only in the sense that it is human nature, *phronema sarkos* 'the fault and corruption of the Nature of every man'. Everyone ordinarily wants threepence rather than twopence for the same thing. That is a principle which all accept as rational, irrespective of their race and creed. It is a condition of economic progress, because it checks the tendency towards the degradation of human life inherent in the principle of the survival of the cheapest. It was indeed a postulate of *laissez-faire* economists that, since everyone aims to get as much as possible while giving as little as possible, free competition will conduce to the greatest benefit of the greatest number. But the easiest way to make large gains is to limit competition, and this ends in economic stagnation through monopoly. Moreover, the desire for gain tends to subordinate all social relations to individual economic interest, and, unless kept under control, leads no less certainly than the process of survival of the cheapest, to general impoverishment.

For man does not live by bread alone, and the life of man solitary is brutish, short and poor. The two basic principles of economic progress are supplemented by a third: that progress is conditional on the observance of certain social obligations. These obligations are not natural, and cannot be justified by universal common sense. They can indeed be justified rationally, but only to members of the same society, or to those who accept in common similar moral standards. Where slavery is reprobated, people may be willing to pay threepence for a thing produced by free labour rather than twopence for the same thing produced by slaves. Or they may consent to pay more for home products than for foreign products, and will forgo the attraction of 'a free breakfast table' with a view to strengthening imperial relations. The Englishman regards it as common sense to breed cattle for the stockyard, but the Burman, at least until recently, would lose money rather than sell his beast for slaughter. The Burman will have no compunction in selling the flesh of cattle that have died of foot-and-mouth disease, but the Englishman voluntarily complies with

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000 legislation that forbids it. Men with common standards of social welfare can agree on reasons for reacting against the survival of the cheapest and for disregarding profit, but these reasons, based on moral grounds, differ according to race and creed from one people to another. Among all peoples and in every generation the observance of customary standards is a part of the social heritage and, unless a society accepts certain social standards as of superior validity to individual economic interest, it must collapse.

Thus one may distinguish three principles of economic progress: natural, rational and moral; but the two former, which are strictly economic forces, are anti-social. So far as these economic forces were active in primitive society, it was a condition of survival that they should be held in check by social custom, and it was only through the evolution of social custom that primitive societies were protected against disintegration. But custom implies that man adapts his wants and activities to his environment. In accepting the rule of custom, man surrenders his unique prerogative, the ability to use reason in adapting his environment to his requirements. This ability of man to master his environment is the key to human progress as distinct from social evolution; and in the tropics, although the rule of custom protected the social order, it was at the cost of progress. Western Christendom, however, with the rebirth of reason at the Renaissance, achieved a new synthesis of Greek intellectual freedom and Roman law under the energizing and binding force of Christian ideals of duty to God and man. This laid the foundations of a social order based on law, informed by will, that could allow far greater scope to economic forces without incurring the penalty of collapse; it raised economic potential to a higher level. Their goodly heritage emboldened Europeans to seek their fortunes in the tropics, and enabled them to impose western rule on the inhabitants. The resulting impact of western civilization on the tropics liberated economic forces from the control of custom, feebly at first by gradual permeation from outside, and then, so far as the people were brought under direct rule and western law, actively and from within tropical society itself.

Now it is a matter of general experience that western rule in the tropics, after the initial troubles of pacification, is in its earlier stages not unwelcome. It is true that sometimes western rule has merely substituted new tyrants for old, but in general the West comes to the tropics as a liberator; it liberates the people both from the oppression of arbitrary personal authority, and from the burden of social abuses

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that the people have tolerated in the name of custom. Soon, however, there succeeds a second stage. So far as the people are released from customary inhibitions, economic forces are subject to no restraint but that of western law. In the West the law is an expression of social will, proceeding from the society itself and reinforcing custom, while adapting old customs to new circumstances. But in the tropics western law is imposed on society from outside, and, because it is not an expression of social will, it is powerless to restrain anti-social economic forces. These forces, liberated from the control of custom by the impact of the West, pursue their natural course, breaking down the social order, disintegrating native organic society into individual atoms, and, by thus depriving man of social protection against natural selfishness, operate more intensively, eliminating social values, and diffusing poverty. Let us then examine more closely the nature of their working; first, where the main object of colonial policy is development by native enterprise under direct rule, and then where it aims primarily at development by western enterprise under indirect rule.

Development by Native Enterprise. The development of native enterprise must be a chief object of policy in any dependency which is valued as a market for the products of the colonial power. If a subsistence economy prevails, it must be converted into a money economy by substituting money taxes for taxation in produce and labour. This compels the cultivator to sell his produce in order to pay his taxes, and he finds the best, and usually the only, market in crops suitable for export. The sale of his produce enables him to buy imported goods, and stimulates the desire for individual gain. Once this has been liberated from the control of custom, he needs little further inducement to concentrate on export crops, and wants more money so as to clear or buy land and hire labour; 'where crops are marketable, the ambition of owners is to plough as much land as possible'.[1] Exporters can best make certain of supplies by encouraging cultivators to borrow on the security of their crops; importers of western goods can sell more if the cultivators enjoy easy credit; and the more that cultivators borrow the greater is the profit of western banks which supply the fluid capital essential to the working of modern economic machinery. Thus exporters, importers and bankers all gain by the entanglement of the cultivator in debt, and, however much they may deplore the consequences, they must as men of business work on

[1] *African Survey*, p. 885.

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433 business lines. Men lose their land for debt and work as tenants, and the tenant who can live most cheaply can pay the highest rent, so that a larger portion of the surplus is available for the purchase of foreign goods. Caste in India has been of no avail to protect the cultivator against this process. Irrigation works, undertaken in the name of welfare, serve merely to expedite insolvency. In the Canal colonies of the Punjab, we are told, there is 'a high standard of rural prosperity', but this has tended to 'increase the mass of debt...moreover the debt is largely unproductive; little of it is incurred for land improvement. The moneylender is not in the least concerned with the purpose of a loan; his policy is to entangle the debtor to an extent that will leave him with just enough of the produce of his labour for the bare subsistence of himself and his family.'[1] But it is nonsense to blame the moneylender. A moneylender who did not work on business lines would soon be in the miserable position of the cultivator. The whole process illustrates the unrestricted working of economic forces, largely impersonal; and exporters, importers and bankers alike are all involved in it. In Lower Burma, as we have seen, the whole agricultural system has been 'industrialized', so as to produce the maximum net yield from land supporting only the minimum population requisite to produce that yield. But Lower Burma is exceptional only as an extreme instance of agricultural development under free competition in a tropical region, newly opened up among a people where custom does not exert the binding force of caste. Agricultural debt and the alienation of land are common to tropical dependencies in general. Even in some of the newer dependencies in Africa, debt has already assumed formidable proportions,[2] and, as conditions there have some resemblance to those of Lower Burma, one may expect future development to follow a like course. Ordinarily, economic development links up the cultivator with exporter, importer and banker through middlemen who absorb a portion of the profits, and the next stage in its working, after the cultivator has been reduced to penury, is the elimination of the middleman. This usually involves some measure of Government control over development, and appears as one of the early stages in the transition from a policy of *laissez-faire* to one of construction.

464 Economic forces react on individual welfare in yet another way. By stimulating the concentration of production on a few export crops, they enable the people to buy more imported goods. These compete

[1] *ISC*, I, 275. [2] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 25.

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more or less directly with local manufactures, and create unemployment among artisans and craftsmen. Some of these find employment in agriculture, and the enlarged supply of labour tends to reduce agricultural wages and to lower the cost of trade crops to the exporter, but to the prejudice of the agricultural labourer. For various reasons many will be unable to turn to agriculture and will be left without employment. Where, as in Lower Burma, agriculture develops along industrial lines, there grows up a mass of part-time labour, unable to find employment for about half of the year and with no other source of livelihood but crime. Thus the free action of economic forces tends to create unemployment and under-employment. 464

One feature of the encouragement of native enterprise in cultivation for export is the introduction of the rule of law. The rule of law is a foundation stone of western freedom, and should provide a far more secure basis for society than the rule of personal authority. But this is true only where the law is an expression of social will; in a tropical dependency it expresses the will of the colonial power, and is an instrument of economic development. The rule of law becomes in effect the rule of economic law. The ideas embodied in the western law of property and contract are foreign to the tropics. Even attempts to apply local law, or to embody local custom in legal codes, must fail if made in western courts according to western procedure by lawyers who, as was said formerly in Java, 'look on native law as a doctor looks on native medicine'.[1] Unwritten custom changes its character when formalized in law and legal decisions, and we have noticed how 'Buddhist law' has been applied in Burma. In India, Elphinstone remarked that Hindu law was 'as a whole beyond the knowledge of perhaps the most learned pundit, and every part beyond the knowledge of the people who live under it.... The uncertainty of decisions obtained from such sources must be obvious, especially when required for the guidance of a foreign judge both to the written law and to the usage which supplies its place.'[2] Indigenous law or custom administered in a foreign court is no less foreign than law proceeding directly from a foreign ruler. In either case one result is the encouragement of disputes and litigation, because people can appeal against the custom that all know to the law which no one knows. Law encroaches on custom, and the decay of custom encourages the resort to litigation. Moreover, as is notorious, for reasons already 671 691

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 218. [2] Cotton, p. 182.

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691 indicated, education tends to flood the land with lawyers, who foster litigation for their living. The growth of litigation in India has long been deplored. In Burma there was little litigation until rapid economic development began in 18[illegible], and so late as 1886 it could still be said that Burmans were not litigious. That is no longer true. We find the same plague of lawyers in Indo-China and the Philippines, and in Africa litigation has been described as the curse of the country.
674 The law breeds litigation and this, married to poverty by agrarian distress, breeds crime. Here again Burma is exceptional, but it appears that of the four countries in the world with the highest proportionate jail population, three are British dependencies.[1] All this is nothing new. In Burma, as far back as 1883, dacoit bands flourished just outside the capital. So they did in Java in 1830, when the introduction of western law by Raffles created a 'proletariat who go about and steal'. Still earlier in Madras, on the introduction of the rule of law from Bengal at the end of the eighteenth century, 'the same results', says Munro, 'followed here which had occurred elsewhere; justice ceased in great measure to be administered and the increase of crime was appalling'.[2] These words might have been taken from any report on the administration of Burma from the eighties onwards.

696 Under native rule disputes are usually settled by arbitration. Under European rule it is at first only in cases with foreigners that natives come to court. Naturally Europeans best understand their own laws, and the middlemen and moneylenders learn it in the course of business, but the cultivator neither understands the law nor how it works and, as a rule, is least able to afford a skilful advocate. The decision usually goes in favour of the longer purse. Men who lose their case against a wealthier opponent and without understanding that a decision, apparently arbitrary and in their view unjust, may none the less be good law, naturally attribute the result to bribery, and this is the readiest excuse given by their advocate for his failure. Nothing is so favourable to judicial corruption as a belief that it is general. That is a principle which works in Africa as in Asia.[3] It seems, indeed, to be generally true in tropical dependencies that western law encourages litigation, crime and corruption.

182 The substitution of the rule of law for the rule of custom naturally expedites the disintegration of the customary social structure. But it also reacts more directly on the social structure. The former native

[1] Barnes, L., *Skeleton of the Empire* (1937), p. 60.
[2] Gleig, pp. 221–2. [3] *Colonial Review*, 1944, June, p. 170.

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authorities, who could maintain order in their own way, are unable to apply western principles of rule and must be replaced by Europeans, or by native officials trained on western lines. We have noticed this in Burma, and also as one outcome of the reforms introduced by Raffles in Java. It had already happened still earlier in India. Formerly, under native rule, there were 'large tracts of country, embracing, according to circumstances, ten, twenty, forty or a hundred villages. At the head of each of these was a Zemindar, Poligar, Tehsildar or Amildar who...was to his district in almost every respect what the potail (headman) was to his village.'[1] He was the natural, organic, representative and leader of his people. By the reforms of Cornwallis all power was withdrawn from these local chieftains and made over to the officials of the central government. Under direct rule the whole organic edifice of native polity collapses, and there remains no unit more comprehensive than the village. The introduction of the rule of law is necessary as an instrument in the liberation of economic forces, but it breaks up the country into villages. On this plan the people are easier to govern, as they have no bond of union, but the same process, as we shall notice later, makes them less capable of self-government. The point immediately relevant, however, is that it constitutes the first, or political, stage in the disintegration of society.

The dissolution of the political structure is only the first stage in social dissolution, and it is completed by the second, or economic, stage, breaking up the village into individuals. In this process two factors are operative: economic forces are released; and the checks controlling their action are relaxed. Where, under native rule, an agricultural economy obtains, and the village has replaced the tribe, the village still retains tribal features and resembles a large family in which, by gradual evolution through long ages, economic relations are adjusted by the growth of custom to the common social welfare. The village conducts its affairs in its own way, and the headman derives his authority from the people. But under the rule of law he becomes a servant of the law, an instrument of government, occupying the same position as before, but hanging from above instead of standing on his own feet. The village survives, but from an organic social unit it is transformed into an administrative unit. In Burma the richest man, as the largest taxpayer, was appointed village headman, but the so-called 'largest taxpayer' soon became 'the village drudge'.

[1] Gleig, p. 217.

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182 Similarly in Africa, leadership passes from the hereditary authorities to men with more money or better education.[1] In such circumstances there remains no embodiment of social will or representative of public welfare to control the economic forces which the impact of the West releases.

So long as communal feeling survives, no one thinks of encroaching on land set apart for village amenities, and villagers cultivating for subsistence have little motive to extend their holdings; if, however, anyone should encroach on public land, he will be turned out by the headman with the support of public opinion. But men who cultivate for the market want more land in order to make more money; the headman and public opinion are no longer able to prevent them; the law, without the support of custom, is ineffective to prevent encroachments, and may even sanction or encourage them because they produce more crops for sale. If anyone encroaches it is easier and more profitable for others to follow his example, and before long the village common land is taken up for private cultivation. The village may produce more than before, but at the expense of social welfare. Not infrequently the total produce of the village is reduced. If a man encroaches on the catchment area left waste for the irrigation of crops depending on it, his gain is at the cost of those who lose their water. Or again, one or two members of a common irrigation system may take to cultivating some new crop that gives them larger profit but disturbs the equitable distribution of the water. In these, and many other ways, the economic motive, the desire of individual gain, reduces the total output of the village, and social will, public opinion embodied in the headman, is no longer able to control it in the public interest. The produce available for export rises, and this is taken as an index of prosperity, but social welfare deteriorates.

Even when there is no decline in material welfare, the village is deprived of these social amenities that money cannot buy. The village community is transformed into a crowd, and social recreations and pastimes disappear with social life. That is the natural sequence of the liberation of economic forces from the control of village custom. In the rice lands of Lower Burma, where the process has been carried to a logical conclusion, the village is no longer a family but a factory. In Indo-China we are told that nothing remains between the Government and twenty-three million individuals. In Africa 'atomization' is a well-known symptom of social disease. So far as economic forces

[1] Read, M., p. 21; Wilson, p. 7.

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are allowed free play, the disintegration of society is an inevitable sequel. They work, subject to economic friction, towards giving the maximum net produce of commodities for the market, but most of the profit goes to those engaged in commerce and, even if a few cultivators make more money, they are poorer for the loss of things that are bought without money and without price.

It is not merely village life but the whole of native social life that is deprived of its amenities. In every society successive generations make their contributions to the art of living, and the most congenial survive to enrich the social heritage that builds up its distinctive civilization. The process of civilization may be regarded from the economic standpoint as the gradual evolution of the social demand for better living, and it is through the leaders of the people that this demand acts most effectively. Foreign rule inevitably undermines native social values, for common standards disappear and a foreign Governor can never wield the power behind a throne. In Burma, the King, merely as a Buddhist sovereign, was the Defender of the Faith and the lynchpin of the Buddhist hierarchy; he was the natural patron of religion, learning and the arts. The most learned monks, the most successful doctors, and the most skilful artists and craftsmen looked to the Crown for recognition. Now the monastic order has collapsed, the native practitioners of medicine have degenerated, and the artistic genius of the craftsmen is confused by the flood of cheap foreign manufactures.[1] In all such matters Europeans have their own standards, and so also have other immigrants such as foreign orientals, Indian or Chinese. Contact with the outer world should furnish new sources of inspiration and enrich native social life, art and religion. But the people are not brought into contact with the outer world except in the sphere of economics; they remain imprisoned in a dying civilization and their social life is impoverished and not enriched.

In another way also foreign rule is detrimental to native social life, for by the normal working of the process of the survival of the cheapest, economic forces act, directly, rapidly and effectively to eliminate all non-economic values. In Burma, for example, during the past half-century, the native cargo boat, modelled on the graceful lines of the medieval galleon, with decorative figure-head and an elaborately carved and ornamental castle in the stern, a joy to build, to sail and to behold, has disappeared. It has been

[1] See also *African Survey*, p. 1290.

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182 replaced by squat hulks that have no advantage except as cheaper means of transport. Merely for carrying paddy the modern barges are the more commodious, but they add nothing to the beauty of the river scene or to the delight of the builders and the boatmen in their work, and on any reckoning that includes such items they are worse than useless. Everywhere throughout the tropics, apart from the buildings that advertise imperial power or mercantile prosperity, the process of natural selection by the survival of the cheapest operates to strip life of its amenities and reduce it to a struggle for bare subsistence.

Not only does this process impoverish the social life of the people, it imposes restrictions on their economic activities. For another aspect of the same process is the specialization of function by the division of labour. This was favoured by Adam Smith and his disciples as a corner-stone of the wealth of nations. Liberal economists in England could rightly insist on this principle because they could take the stability of social life for granted, but in a tropical dependency this basic assumption is invalid. The development of a tropical dependency as a market for imported goods leads to the elimination of local manufactures and a corresponding contraction in the range of economic activities and of social interest in the native community. We shall return to this point later; here it requires notice as illustrating how the horizon of the native world is narrowed not only by the elimination of non-economic values, but by restrictions on the content of their economic life.

Development by Western Enterprise. If we turn now to examine the alternative method of development through western enterprise, we find that along different lines it arrives at similar results. The great distinction between development by native and by western enterprise is that, as already noticed, with the former, economic forces dissolve native society by direct action from within, whereas with the latter, though gradually permeating native society, they attack it in the first instance from without.

112 The primary requirement of western enterprise in the tropics is cheap labour. This can be obtained most easily through native 4.6 chieftains and accordingly, except where large tracts are set aside for European settlement, indirect rule tends to prevail. Netherlands India provides the classic illustration of tropical development by western enterprise. In Java at the beginning of the nineteenth century the people were unaccustomed to work for wages and, even if they

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could have been induced to do so, the Netherlands produced nothing that they would buy. 'All wise men' were agreed that the native would not respond to the desire of gain, and that he would work only under compulsion.[1] People were none the less sincere in this belief, because it suited them to believe it. Under the Culture system the Dutch used the authority of the native chieftains to obtain labour both for public works and for export crops for the Government. Subsequently under Liberal rule compulsory labour was still used for public works (despite the protests of Liberals who wanted more labour for private enterprise), and the planters employed the native chieftains as agents for recruiting labour. But paid labour was found more efficient than compulsory labour whether on public works or private enterprise, and the people became accustomed to working for wages. In Africa development by private capitalist enterprise has followed similar lines. 'The introduction of capitalist undertakings in Africa found a population that had little incentive to improve its subsistence by wage-earning, and, since it was inexperienced in the use of money it was slow to react to the stimulus of cash inducements.'[2] Moreover, there was 'a popular belief that the "collectivist" organization of African society implied the absence of those individual ambitions in the material sphere which are the mainspring of European development'. Custom supported the use of unpaid labour for the common purposes of the tribe, and this furnished a precedent for using compulsory labour on public works 'such as the construction of railways or major roads for long distance transport which were outside the range of even an extended definition of communal labour, more especially since they at times involved the absence of labour from their homes for considerable periods'. Here there is a significant contrast with Burma, where the object of policy was trade, and therefore of development by native enterprise; compulsory labour interfered with native enterprise and was soon abolished. But in Africa, although 'the wide use of impressed labour for railway construction...led to many incidents which reflected grave discredit on the administration',[3] it did not wholly cease until railway construction came to an end with the depression of the thirties. Again, in Africa as in Java, the people were accustomed under native rule to render tribute in kind or service to the local chieftains. This interferes with the supply of labour to private enterprise, and in Java measures to restrict it were among the

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 59.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 604, 694.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 613, 615.

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earliest fruits of Liberal reforms. In Tanganyika such tribute was commuted for a tax in money in 1926.[1]

Employers, while sympathizing with humanitarian protests against compulsion to obtain labour for Government or native chieftains, are not averse from measures which provide labour for private enterprise. In Africa, as in Java, 'if there is now little use of direct pressure by government in order to secure labour for private employment, this was a marked feature of policy in the past....A complete history of this aspect of labour development would comprise the use of means so various as slavery, direct statutory compulsion, the curtailment of native lands, assistance given by administrative officials to the efforts of private recruiters, and the use of chiefs to recruit their people as labourers.' Now in Africa, as long ago in Java, it is 'generally recognized that, apart from any grounds of equity or humanity, labour done under compulsion is uneconomic';[2] yet the use of compulsory labour appears to save trouble and money, and employers are reluctant to abandon it. With compulsory labour wages tend towards the minimum of bare subsistence for a man without a family. The conditions are worst where no single employer stands to gain by healthy labour, and the death roll in the coolie barracks of Rangoon is typical of the impoverishment which naturally results from the exposure of unskilled labour to the unmitigated action of economic forces.

Even where action is taken to protect the individual labourer, the mass recruitment of unskilled labour, especially if recruited through local chieftains, naturally disintegrates native social life. 'The most characteristic results which have followed from the introduction of capitalist enterprise (are) the depopulation of certain areas or the deterioration of local subsistence conditions owing to the migration of labour, the social evils due to the removal from their families of large numbers of adult males, and the difficult situations created by the aggregation of industrial population divorced from the traditional controls of tribal life.'[3] At the same time the use of native chieftains to provide land for concessions and labour to work the concessions conflicts with native custom, and weakens the authority of the chieftains as it makes them look for support to Government instead of standing on their own feet. Then, in a later stage, when an ample supply of labour is assured and the awakening of the desire of gain

[1] *African Survey*, p. 437.
[2] *Ib.* pp. 628, 635, 636.
[3] *Ib.* p. 699.

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allows the replacement of compulsion by wages, the effect on native 182
society and welfare is much the same as when development proceeds 466
by private enterprise.

General Course of Development. Thus, whether the method of development be through native enterprise working for the market, or 182
through western enterprise employing native labour, 'the disintegration of social life is an almost inevitable result of the contact of primitive peoples with European civilization'. In either case the liberation of economic forces from the moral restraint imposed by social obligations is detrimental to social and individual welfare. During the first stage there may be, and usually is, a rise in the standard of individual welfare through the removal of the abuses normally inherent in native social life. For a still longer period there is an increase in production, by the exploitation of social welfare for material ends. But, as such forces gain in strength, they tend to restrict and even to reduce production, and thus defeat the hopes of gain which set them working. Forests are laid waste and valuable lodes of ore are buried beneath surface workings. Cultivation, as in the delta of Lower Burma, aims at the maximum net outturn by the smallest number necessary to produce it, instead of at the maximum gross outturn by the largest number that the land will maintain at the customary level of social life. Human resources are wasted by under-employment or by unemployment and, as in the Congo under Leopold, so many people may be killed off that capitalist enterprise is no longer profitable or even possible.[1] Both the two great East India companies were bankrupt, and the modern chartered companies had to surrender their concessions because they could no longer pay their way. Profit, progress and welfare, are all linked together on a single chain, and economic forces, unless controlled by social will, corrode the chain that links them. Man is a social animal, but economic forces tend to convert human society into a business concern. In tropical dependencies the outward and visible sign of this is the evolution of a plural society.

4. The Plural Society[2]

All tropical dependencies, and indeed all tropical countries, so far as 184
they have been brought within the modern world, have in common certain distinctive characters in their social structure. In Dutch

[1] Frankel, pp. 36, 37.
[2] Furnivall, *Economic Journal*, 1910, pp. 23 ff; *JRCAS*, 1942, p. 195.

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184 colonial literature they are often said to present a dual economy, comprising two distinct economic systems, capitalist and pre-capitalist, with a western superstructure of business and administration rising above the native world in which the people, so far as they are left alone, lead their own life in their own way according to a traditional scale of values in which economic values rank so low as to be negligible. It is unquestionably true that there is a wide difference between the social standards of tropical peoples and those of the modern West, that the natives are slow to assimilate western values, and that over native life there is a western superstructure representing an outpost of Europe and not rooted in the soil. Yet the Dutch picture of a native world, in which economic values are disregarded, seems, so far as it is based on facts, to be drawn from Java, where for some two hundred years employers secured labour through compulsion rather than by appealing to the desire of gain. In Africa likewise, as we have just noticed, a popular belief in the native disregard of economic values has been held to justify compulsion as a means of securing labour. But everywhere experience has shown that the desire of gain can easily be stimulated or, rather, liberated from the control of custom. In British colonies under indirect rule, interpreted according to the British tradition of the rule of law, economic forces soon permeate the native world and, in colonies under direct rule, it is just in the economic world that all men meet, if not on equal, yet on the same terms. Even in respect of Dutch dependencies some of their own writers vehemently dispute the theory of a dual economy.[1] Yet in all tropical dependencies the western superstructure over native life is a prominent feature in the economic landscape.

But the western superstructure is only one aspect of a distinctive character, common to all tropical dependencies, that cannot fail to impress even the most casual observer; the many-coloured pattern of the population. In Burma, as in Java, probably the first thing that strikes the visitor is the medley of peoples—European, Chinese, Indian and native. It is in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market-place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit. Even in the economic sphere there is a division of labour along racial lines.

[1] Meijer Ranneft, J. W., *Koloniale Studiën*, 1928, p. 151.

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Natives, Chinese, Indians and Europeans all have different functions, and within each major group subsections have particular occupations. There is, as it were, a caste system, but without the religious basis that incorporates caste in social life in India. One finds similar conditions all over the Tropical Far East—under Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, British, French or American rule; among Filipinos, Javanese, Malays, Burmans and Annamese; whether the objective of the colonial power has been tribute, trade or material resources; under direct rule and under indirect. The obvious and outstanding result of contact between East and West has been the evolution of a plural society; in the Federated Malay States the indigenous inhabitants number barely a quarter of the total population. The same thing has happened in the South Pacific. The Fiji chieftains invited British protection, and one result has been that half the inhabitants are immigrants from India. In African dependencies there are Indian immigrants in East Africa and Syrians in West Africa, and in some regions the 'coloured', or Eurafrican, population forms a separate caste. Sometimes a section of the native population is westernized: 'there are some territories, of which those in West Africa are perhaps most typical, in which sections of the population most closely in contact with European influences have attained a development out of all relation to the rest of the population. . . which is often still living in primitive conditions and has interests different from those of an urban or industrial society'.[1] One finds much the same thing in Java, and in all tropical dependencies 'westernized' natives are more or less cut off from the people, and form a separate group or caste. The plural society has a great variety of forms, but in some form or other it is the distinctive character of modern tropical economy.

Outside the tropics society may have plural features, notably in South Africa, Canada and the United States, and also in lands where the Jew has not been fully assimilated into social life; in other countries also there are mixed populations with particularist tendencies. But in general these mixed populations have at least a common tradition of western culture, and, despite a different racial origin, they meet on equal terms and their relations are not confined solely to the economic sphere. There is a society with plural features, but not a plural society. It is significant that, in Canada and the United States, and also in Australia, when the influx of alien elements threatened national life and common social standards, barriers were raised against free

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, pp. 34, 44; Teeling, L. W. B., p. 126.

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184 immigration. In tropical dependencies there was no common social will to set a bar to immigration, which has been left to the play of economic forces. The plural society arises where economic forces are exempt from control by social will. It is general in the modern tropics because everywhere and always the social order seems to have had plural features. In Burma under native rule the people were not organized territorially but on quasi-feudal lines by race and occupation, and that is the normal character of tropical society based on personal authority. But in such lands, apart from minor backward groups, there is a common cultural tradition; there is a society with plural features but not a plural society. Again, in the great fairs held annually in medieval times in ports and market towns, each company of merchants was governed by its own heads according to its own customs. But the concourse did not form a plural society, because it lasted no longer than the fair. All that happened was that, during the fair, the town was transformed into a bazaar. In the modern tropics the bazaar lasts throughout the year, and the whole country is converted into a shop or factory; from a social organism into a business concern. Despite certain plural features, tropical society was distinct from the plural society which has been created by economic forces. This is a modern invention because, only in modern times, have economic forces been set free to remould the social order. The result is a social structure quite distinct in its political and economic properties from the homogeneous unitary society of western lands and, for a solution of colonial problems, it is essential that its properties should be clearly understood. Let us examine it first in its political aspect and then in its economic aspect.

Political Features. On looking at a plural society in its political aspect one can distinguish three characteristic features: the society as a whole comprises separate racial sections; each section is an aggregate of individuals rather than a corporate or organic whole; and as individuals their social life is incomplete.

To Europeans the incompleteness of individual social life is most readily apparent in the European section. The European works in the tropics, but does not live there. His life in the tropics centres round his business, and he looks at social problems, political or economic, not as a citizen but as a capitalist or an employer of labour. Many Europeans spend twenty years or more in the tropics, and, on retiring from work to live at home, they know no more of the country than on the day they landed; nothing of the people or even of the

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language. Foreign orientals, likewise, are transient; they come merely to make money and their interest in the country is purely economic. The life of the ordinary native is similarly incomplete. He is a cultivator and nothing more. Under native rule the people lived within a little world, but their cultural horizon was co-extensive with its boundaries; under western rule their horizon is contracted to their life as cultivators and their social life is less comprehensive than before.

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If we look above the individual to the group in which he forms a unit, we find a similar contrast between the plural society of tropical dependencies and the unitary society that western peoples take for granted. In all accounts of the modern tropics we read of the collapse of corporate tribal or village life and the atomization of society. In the foreign sections the individual stands even more alone; even among Indians caste loses its validity, and in every census in Burma it has been found impossible to compile useful returns of Indian castes. Among the Indian immigrants in South Sea Islands one may even find mixed marriages between Muslims and Hindus. Europeans often deplore the isolation of the individual in their own section. Men are continually on the move; they form business acquaintances but not friends; there are no children in the home; the club and not the home is the centre of social life, and all look more or less eagerly to going 'home' on retirement. Each section in the plural society is a crowd and not a community.

On a wider survey of the plural society as a whole comprising separate groups, we may find the nearest analogy in a confederation of allied states, united by treaty or within the limits of formal constitution merely for certain common ends, but otherwise, in matters outside the terms of union, each living its own life as a separate province. Yet this analogy fails to bring out the full complexity of a plural society. In a confederation each unit is segregated within its own territorial limits; there is contact between the states but not between their members as individuals; the union is voluntary; the terms of union are definite and limited; and any party can at will withdraw from the confederacy. In a plural society the sections are not segregated; the members of the several units are intermingled and meet as individuals; the union is not voluntary but is imposed by the colonial power and by the force of economic circumstances; and the union cannot be dissolved without the whole society relapsing into anarchy.

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184 Like a confederation, a plural society is a business partnership rather than a family concern, and the social will linking the sections does not extend beyond their common business interests. It might seem that common interest should tie them closely, for a dissolution would involve the bankruptcy of all the partners. But the tie is strong only so far as this common interest is recognized. Perhaps the only plural society inherently stable is the Hindu society in India. Here there are separate groups or classes, partly racial, with distinct economic functions. But in India caste has a religious sanction, and in a plural society the only common deity is Mammon. In general, the plural society is built on caste without the cement of a religious sanction. In each section the sectional common social will is feeble, and in the society as a whole there is no common social will. There may be apathy even on such a vital point as defence against aggression. Few recognize that, in fact, all the members of all sections have material interests in common, but most see that on many points their material interests are opposed. The typical plural society is a business partnership in which, to many partners, bankruptcy signifies release rather than disaster.

Economic Features. The political aspect of the plural society is reflected in its economic aspect. A plural society is no ordinary business partnership. In form it is also a political society and is, or should be, organized for 'the good life', the welfare of the people, enabling them to live as well as possible. As a business partnership its function is solely economic, to produce goods as profitably as possible. But as a social institution also it has an economic aspect, and is concerned with both production and consumption, supply and demand. It is in the interest of a society that its members shall get what is best and not merely what is cheapest; by custom or law it must regulate demand. It is also in the interest of society that in the supply of goods, production for profit shall be regulated by custom or law on behalf of social welfare. In a plural society both supply and demand take on a special character.

Let us first consider the matter of demand. In buying goods it is only common sense to pay no more than necessary. But purchasers are not always guided solely by common sense. Some will pay a higher price for home products than for foreign products, or for goods untainted by sweated labour. In such cases there is a social demand for home manufactures, or for a higher standard of wages. In this matter there is a difference between the plural society and the homo-

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geneous society. When the recent depression flooded Java with cheap cottons from Japan, European merchants tried to boycott Japanese goods; but the boycott collapsed because Chinese merchants bought them and seemed likely to capture all the trade. When Britain annexed Upper Burma the British Government contemplated retaining the Burmese prohibition of trade in opium and alcohol, but this was impossible because the demand of the Chinese and Indians had to be met. In a plural society the feebleness of social will is reflected in the weakness of social demand, which is the economic aspect of social will. Economists deal in great detail with problems of aggregate demand but, partly it may be because they take a homogeneous society for granted, they have not given social demand so much attention as it deserves. If any town or village in the western world wants better sanitation, it can spend more on conservancy. There is a collective demand which may conflict with individual demand, and at periodical elections people can choose between better conservancy and having more money in their pockets. Economists can measure this collective demand with their supply and demand curves and schedules, but collective demand is only one form of a social demand that, in general, defies measurement. The monastic schools in Burma were a response to social demand, but no one could estimate their cost, or balance it against their value. In tropical countries social demand usually takes effect through custom. Sometimes a patch of scrub jungle round a village is reserved as a public convenience and is closed to fuel cutting. People could get their fuel with less trouble, more cheaply, by cutting timber there, but social demand, taking effect through village custom, prevails over individual demand. So long as custom retains its force, no one would think of cutting down the scrub. But we have noticed that in Rangoon Indian immigrants saw a way to make easy money, and cleared the scrub to sell fuel in the market. Individual demand for private gain prevailed over the social demand for common welfare, and prevailed the more readily because society was no longer homogeneous. Even in the West social demand is most effective when it requires no stronger support than custom, because no one thinks of encroaching on it. In London rickshaws might be cheaper than taxis, but we would walk rather than use them. The individual demand for cheaper transport is overborne by the social demand for human dignity. And because we resist the temptation of cheapness we finally attain better, and probably cheaper, transport in tubes and motor-buses. During

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184 the present century Rangoon, in common with most eastern towns, has been flooded with rickshaws. In Batavia the Dutch refused to sanction them; they disliked seeing Javanese between the shafts and already had too many Chinese. Now motor transport in the towns of Java is probably better and cheaper than in any country in the tropics. Social demand can take effect only through organic social will as embodied in the social structure, and, in default of social will, individual demand prevails over social demand. A villager in Burma may wish to spend money on schooling for his children, but the maintenance of a school is conditional on the existence of social demand and, if there is no village school, he may spend his money on giving them new clothes, or on furniture that he does not use, or even on English books that he cannot read.[1] If he cannot satisfy those wants which he has as a member of society, he will satisfy his individual wants; he must take what he can get.

Here is one of the distinctions between a homogeneous society and a plural society. A plural society is broken up into groups of isolated individuals, and the disintegration of social will is reflected in a corresponding disorganization of social demand. Even in a matter so vital to the whole community as defence against aggression, the people are reluctant to pay the necessary price. In religion and the arts, in the graces and ornaments of social life, there are no standards common to all sections of the community, and standards deteriorate to such a level as all have in common. And because each section is merely an aggregate of individuals, those social wants that men can satisfy only as members of a community remain unsatisfied. Just as the life of an individual in a plural society is incomplete, so his demand tends to be frustrated. Civilization is the process of learning to live a common social life; but in a plural society men are decivilized. All wants that all men want in common are those which they share in common with the animal creation; on a comprehensive survey of mankind from China to Peru these material wants, essential to the sustenance of life, represent the highest common factor of demand. In the plural society the highest common factor is the economic factor, and the only test that all apply in common is the test of cheapness. In such a society the disorganization of social demand allows the economic process of natural selection by the survival of the cheapest to prevail.

If, again, we examine plural economy from the standpoint of production or supply, we find a similar predominance of economic forces.

[1] Furnivall, *Economic Review*, 1912, pp. 380 ff.

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In selling goods it is common sense to charge as much as one can. All those engaged in production have in common, in greater or less degree, the desire for gain, to get as much as possible while giving as little as possible. But, in a plural society, that is almost all they have in common. Everywhere, in all forms of society, the working of economic forces makes for tension between groups with competing or conflicting interests; between town and country, industry and agriculture, capital and labour. In a homogeneous society the tension is alleviated by their common citizenship, but in a plural society there is a corresponding cleavage along racial lines. The foreign elements live in the towns, the natives in rural areas; commerce and industry are in foreign hands and the natives are mainly occupied in agriculture; foreign capital employs native labour or imported coolies. The various peoples meet only in the market, as competitors or as opponents, as buyers and sellers. In Burma the Indian and Chinese middlemen form combines against both the cultivator and the European miller, and Europeans form combines against both middleman and native. In Java the nationalist movement first assumed a popular character in action against the Chinese, whom Europeans at the same time were describing as worse than ten epidemics. In Indo-China Annamese and Europeans regard the Indian moneylender as a pest. It might seem that, on a long view, all sections have a common interest in the common welfare, but the foreign elements, European or oriental, mostly need not look beyond the day when they will leave the country. In any case, the end is so remote that it is out of sight; so far as the horizon of the business man extends sectional interests are opposed. It is true that big business with large capital investments in the country must take long views, and sees further than the cultivator who does not look beyond the harvest and the coolie who looks only for to-morrow's rice, but it looks on the country as a business enterprise.

Moreover, within the economic sphere there are no common standards of conduct beyond those prescribed by law. The European has his own standard of decency as to what, even in business, 'is not done'; so also have the Chinese, the Indian and the native. All have their own ideas as to what is right and proper, but on this matter they have different ideas, and the only idea common to all members of all sections is the idea of gain. In a homogeneous society the desire of profit is controlled to some extent by social will, and if anyone makes profits by sharp practice he will offend the social conscience and incur

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184 moral, and perhaps legal, penalties. If, for example, he employs sweated labour, the social conscience, if sufficiently alert and powerful, may penalize him because aware, either instinctively or by rational conviction, that such conduct cuts at the root of common social life. But in the tropics the European who, from humanitarian motives or through enlightened self-interest, treats his employees well, risks being forced out of business by Indians or Chinese with different standards. The only deterrent to unsocial conduct in production is the legal penalty to which those are liable who can be brought to trial and convicted according to the rules of evidence of infringing some positive law. In supply as in demand, in production as in consumption, the abnormal activity of economic forces, free of social restrictions, is an essential character of a plural society.

In colonial relations then, economic forces both create a plural society and, because unrestrained by social will, continue to prevail. The dictum of Dr Boeke, that we have already noted with reference to Java, applies to tropical economy in general: 'there is materialism, rationalism, individualism, and a concentration on economic ends far more complete and absolute than in homogeneous western lands; a total absorption in the exchange and market; a capitalist structure, with the business concern as subject, far more typical of capitalism than one can imagine in the so-called "capitalist" countries, which have grown up slowly out of the past and are still bound to it by a hundred roots'.[1] In the first half of the nineteenth century economists eulogized economic man; in the last half they said he was a myth. Unfortunately they were mistaken. When cast out of Europe he found refuge in the tropics, and now we see him returning with seven devils worse than himself. These are the devils which devastated the tropics under the rule of *laissez-faire* and which it is the object of modern colonial policy to exorcise.

5. Modern Colonial Policy

000 The foregoing analysis of the course of social evolution in tropical dependencies under a regime of *laissez-faire* may perhaps appear superfluous, for *laissez-faire* is dead, and modern colonial policy aspires to be constructive. The constructive policy, as originally conceived, reflected popular Darwinism, the survival of the fittest, and looked mainly to efficiency. Gradually however it was permeated by the idea of social justice which gathered force in Europe with the re-

[1] Boeke, cited *Netherlands India*, p. 452.

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action against the impoverishment due to unbridled competition. These two ideas, when extended to colonial policy, found expression in the theory of the dual mandate, professing to reconcile economic progress with native welfare and to regard native interests as paramount. The new policy, like the Liberal policy, placed economic development in the foreground, but took a different view of the relations between economic development and welfare. The older Liberal colonial policy, as we have seen, assumed that economic freedom was the key to progress, and economic progress an automatic and sufficient guarantee of welfare, which would in due course lead to political independence; it aimed accordingly at restricting State activities to an unavoidable minimum. The modern constructive policy advocates State intervention in promoting development, so as to provide funds for economic and social services intended to enhance native welfare and thereby lay the foundations of autonomy. Liberals regarded economic development as a cause of welfare and, therefore, a means of political advancement; modern colonial policy regards it as a condition of welfare and a condition, therefore, of political advancement. The decline of faith in the doctrine of *laissez-faire* reacted also on the international aspect of colonial relations, but at present we are concerned solely with the domestic aspect.

Another matter calls for passing notice. *Laissez-faire* is dead, but economic forces still remain active, everywhere, unceasingly. When a colonial power adopts a constructive policy with a view to enhancing welfare, it must first repair the ill-effects of economic forces in the past, and then bring them under control so as to prevent further damage; only when it has succeeded to that extent can it raise the general standard of welfare to a higher level. These matters will need attention when enquiring into colonial practice, but first we must look at statements of policy.

Modern British policy has been restated with all the authority of Acts of Parliament in connection with recent projects of colonial development. Formerly the assistance given to the dependencies went little beyond defraying the initial military expenditure on pacification, and providing or guaranteeing such loans as were required for internal development. Of the £110 millions of interest-bearing loans now standing in the names of dependent Governments, about three-fourths have been expended on railway and port development.[1] It was assumed that in other respects local development would

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 14.

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ordinarily be financed by the dependent Governments out of their own resources. The home Government, however, would meet deficits in local budgets, and in the ten years from 1919 to 1929 a total of some £12 million was allotted for this purpose. In 1929 there was a new departure. A Colonial Development Fund was created to allow an expenditure of £1 million annually on colonial development in order to promote commerce with, or industry in, the United Kingdom. Up to 1940 a total of £8·87 million was granted, 30 % going to communications and another 5 % to harbours. The plant and machinery had so far as possible to be of United Kingdom manufacture, and all materials of Empire origin, while all orders for imported materials had to be placed in the United Kingdom. One feature of this project was that it aimed directly at promoting British economic interests, and during the subsequent depression the grants did in fact give a considerable contribution to employment in the United Kingdom.[1] Another feature of this plan was that 'the emphasis was throughout on material development'. It aimed at promoting agriculture and industry, and specified the heads on which expenditure might be incurred, while objects of no less importance from the standpoint of welfare were excluded. For example, education, other than technical instruction, was outside its scope. Moreover, the grants were strictly limited to capital expenditure, and were based on the old principle that a dependency should not be equipped with services unless it could afford to maintain them out of its own resources.

A new plan, embodied in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, went much further. It recognized the indirect benefit that might accrue to the United Kingdom from colonial development and made provision up to £5 million annually for *capital* expenditure, not merely under specified heads, but on development in the widest sense, and it also permitted grants for *recurrent* expenditure on certain services, such as agriculture, education, health and housing; beyond this it provided an additional £500,000 for colonial research.[2] The emphasis was no longer, as in the plan of 1929, on material development as an end in itself, but as 'the primary requirement upon which advance in other directions is largely consequential'. It was by economic development that colonies would be placed in a position to devote their resources, to the maximum extent possible, to the provision of those Government and other services which the interests of the people demand. Such assistance was held to be justified as, other-

[1] 1941, Cmd. 6298. [2] 1940, Cmd. 6175.

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wise, 'many colonies would not finance the research work, the schemes of major capital development and the expansion of administrative or technical staffs which are necessary for their full and vigorous development. Nor could they always afford in the absence of such development, an adequate standard of health and education services'.

Here we have in brief the modern constructive policy of encouraging economic development with a view to promoting welfare as a condition of political advancement. It is a policy that has been welcomed with remarkable unanimity by all parties, Conservative, Liberal and Socialist, and among that section of the general public which takes an interest in colonial affairs.

The attitude of Conservatives has been formulated in a recent speech by Col. Oliver Stanley as Colonial Secretary.[1] 'We are pledged', he said, 'to guide colonial peoples along the path to self-government within the British Empire. We are pledged to build up their social and economic institutions, and we are pledged to develop their natural resources.' He looked on 'educational advancement and economic development as the twin pillars upon which any sound scheme of political responsibility must be based', and regarded the measures taken under these heads as the most important test of the sincerity and success of our colonial policy.

In education he stressed the importance of primary instruction. 'The spread of elementary education through the colonies is a necessity for everything we are trying to do. Every social improvement, every economic development in some measure demands an increase of knowledge among the people. Every health measure, every improvement of agricultural methods, new co-operative machinery for production and distribution, the establishment of secondary institutions —all these are going to make increasing demands upon the people, and they will be able to respond only if they have had some educational opportunities.' Higher education also would be needed 'to provide the doctors, the teachers, the veterinary surgeons, the specialists and technicians which the approach to higher standards of life will entail'. Education was, in fact, a fundamental condition of all Government activities in the promotion of material welfare. These various activities would entail heavy expenditure. Something might be done by subventions, but the main cost would have to be met by economic development. For promoting economic development he urged the encouragement of air transport, the fostering of secondary industries

[1] House of Commons, 13 July 1943, quoted *Colonial Review*, Sept. 1943, p. 69.

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000 and the constitution of a Central Advisory Committee on economic affairs. In this development he anticipated that private capital would play a useful part, as the people of Britain were coming to understand that the development of the colonies was a profitable undertaking. As a basis for political development he looked chiefly to education 'by life for life', through trade unions, co-operative societies and similar forms of community effort. In this also, however, as he remarked at greater length on a subsequent occasion, education would play an important part. The goal of British policy is self-government but, 'we have got to be certain that when, in any colony, we hand over the responsibility for government, administration, justice and security, it shall be handed over to the whole of the people, and that they are ready and prepared to receive it'.[1]

The latest pronouncement on Liberal colonial policy may be found in the report of a committee appointed by the Liberal National Council to examine the future of the colonies.[2] The report deals largely with machinery. It insists on the maintenance of British sovereignty in the interest of efficient administration, but recognizes the value of international collaboration. The proposals with regard to machinery comprise the creation of an Advisory Council, an International Colonial Institute and Regional Consultative Councils; constitutional problems are expressly excluded from the competence of the two latter bodies. Colonial policy, it holds, should aim at promoting 'the welfare of native populations in the widest sense'. This welfare must have a sound economic foundation, but the construction of such a foundation 'must be regarded not as a sufficient end in itself, but rather as a condition precedent to native advancement in a wider sense', including political advancement. Economic development should therefore be accompanied by safeguards for native populations.

For an ampler statement of Liberal policy we may perhaps look to Lord Hailey,[3] whose Liberal sympathies are enriched by long experience as an administrator and by a wide study of colonial practice. He recognizes the importance of political development, which earlier Liberals valued so highly, but he comments on their failure sufficiently to recognize that 'we cannot hope to build up political institutions on a foundation of poor material resources, of insufficient health or of undeveloped minds'. He holds accordingly that the first problem of colonial policy is to improve the standard of living in respect both

[1] *Colonial Review*, June, 1944, p. 165. [2] *The Colonies and their Future* (1944).
[3] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, pp. 7, 8, 10, 29, 30, 33.

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of the material conditions necessary to physical well-being, and of the extension of educational and other agencies that make for better social organization. To achieve these ends he looks mainly to the institution of economic and social services by the State, especially with a view to grading up subsistence production by natives, by extending their production for export, and by encouraging every means to give them a larger part in the industrial and commercial activities which have hitherto been mainly in foreign hands. Here he breaks away from the older Liberal tradition by accepting the need for some measure of compulsion. For the great mass of the people in tropical dependencies, the fundamental need is 'the mass extension of a form of popular education which will increase their ability to make use for their own benefit of more scientific processes of cultivation, or will break down anti-social or unhygienic customs impeding the improvement of their physical well-being, or will accelerate the progress made by members of the native communities in undertaking the innumerable services—whether in trade, transport or domestic crafts—which are necessary for their economic and social life'. This he regards as the only sound means of social advance, which 'must be a corollary of economic development, since the possibilities open both to the administration and to the individual depend on the achievement of a progressive measure of economic well-being'. Like the older Liberals, he welcomes the prospect of political advancement, but he gives priority to economic progress as a condition of political advancement; like them also, he believes in economic development through capitalist enterprise, but would supplement private capital by State subventions; and like them he aims at promoting individual welfare, but he is not averse from compulsion, where necessary, to reinforce the desire of gain.

Socialist colonial policy is very similar.[1] According to a well-known writer of this school, 'the intense poverty of colonial areas...is directly due to lack of capital. Through lack of capital the colonial areas have been deprived of the fundamental public services on which all economic progress is based.' As the colonies cannot afford to borrow capital, it must be given freely by the State or supplied at nominal rates of interest; 'they must be given their railways and roads and harbours and water and power supplies; they must be equipped, with schools and hospitals; they must, in short, be endowed, altruistically, with a complete foundation of public services on which to build their economic life'. Moreover, as free enterprise tends to concentrate

[1] Hinden, pp. 187, 194.

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on external trade, policy should be directed towards fostering internal trade, and those exports that require development on capitalist lines should be nationalized.

One striking fact about these various programmes of constructive welfare is their unanimity. Formerly Conservatives and Liberals held directly contrary opinions on colonial policy, and Socialists differed from both. Now on the main points all are agreed.[1] Even in the Socialist programme social life is disregarded; it is a project of mass individualism stimulated through the State by foreign capital, and differs little from the Liberal programme except as to the source of capital, while both programmes closely resemble that of the Conservatives as expounded by Col. Stanley. The points of difference are superficial and lie mainly in a diversity of emphasis on matters that all accept. All agree that the maintenance of the imperial connection is to the common advantage of the British people; this solidarity of interest in the Empire is something new. All agree likewise on the need for foreign capital to promote the development of material resources, and thereby provide funds for economic and social services; and all agree that these enhance welfare and make the dependencies capable of responsible government within the Empire. This common agreement is very significant and, as we shall see, has consequences of great interest and importance.

Another striking fact is that this new constructive policy is almost point for point identical with that formulated by the Ethical leaders of Dutch colonial policy forty years ago.[2] The States-General gave practical expression to the Ethical policy by making a free grant of f. 40 million to be expended on colonial development. Western enterprise, public and private, flourished, yielding revenue that was expended on economic and social services. Yet, while economic progress made rapid forward strides, native welfare lagged behind. On the other hand, when the depression of the thirties and trouble with Japan cut off supplies of capital, native prosperity increased. If, then, we wish to promote native welfare, it would seem necessary to scrutinize closely the working of the modern constructive policy in practice.

[1] See e.g. Mr Churchill, House of Commons, 21 April 1943; Dr Hinder, *Fabian Quarterly*, April 1943, p. 5.

[2] One difference between the Ethical policy and modern British colonial policy should be noted. The Ethical leaders still held the older Liberal belief in the intrinsic value of western political institutions; but experience has compelled the Dutch to recognize, like all schools of political thought in Britain, that political democracy requires an economic basis.

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CHAPTER IX

WELFARE: LAND AND LABOUR

1. The Instruments of Welfare

From the foregoing survey of colonial policy it should be evident that the promotion of welfare in tropical dependencies is not a new idea; what is new is the recognition that this requires a constructive policy with appropriate instruments of welfare. The instruments devised to promote welfare fall under two heads: economic and social. Measures under the former head aim directly at increasing production, which should enhance welfare indirectly; measures under the latter head aim directly at enhancing welfare, which should increase production indirectly. The machinery for increasing production comprises public works for the development of material resources, *la richesse naturelle*, and economic services for the development of human resources, *la richesse humaine*. The machinery of social welfare comprises services intended to protect the land and labour of tropical peoples against the adverse influence of economic forces, and services to promote health and education. It is often taken for granted that activities under all these various heads are effective in raising the standard of welfare above its native level; the next stage in our enquiry is to examine the validity of this assumption. We must try to ascertain how far public works and economic services do, in fact, increase native production; how far any such increase in production enhances native welfare; to what extent social services are effective in protecting land and labour; and how far the health and education services endow the people with new powers in body and mind. These are the questions that will engage our attention in this chapter and the next.

2. Public Works

Colonial rule is often judged by its achievements in respect of public works, such as ports, railways and irrigation, and colonial powers, in justifying their claim to exercise dominion, point to such things as proof of their beneficent activities. But it is necessary to distinguish between public works as instruments of progress and as instruments of welfare. Railways are the chief item under the head of public works, and in Africa they account for about three-quarters of the total

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loans raised by governments of British territories.[1] Some were constructed for strategic ends and some mainly to facilitate administration, but the usual object was to open up the interior to trade. In dependencies chiefly valued as markets for European goods, the populous districts usually lie along great rivers, and development requires little expenditure, because the waterways suffice without railways or even, as we have seen in Burma, without roads. The case is different, however, where local products are developed by western enterprise, as this prefers more sparsely peopled regions; plantations require large tracts of vacant land, and mineral deposits are mostly found in barren hilly regions. In such circumstances the cost of transport by carts or porters to remove the produce of enterprise or to supply its needs may be so formidable as to preclude development; in West Africa it was estimated in 1926 that porterage cost 2*s.* 6*d.* a ton-mile as compared with 2*d.* by rail.[2] In such circumstances, if the resources of backward regions are to be made available to the outside world, communications must be improved, and western enterprise demands the construction of railways. This opens up new and wider prospects of gain, and provides employment for western capital and labour in the colonial power. Inevitably there is a tendency to overestimate the advantages that improved communications confer upon dependent peoples, and to overlook the disadvantages. It is usually assumed that roads and railways act as an instrument of civilization and promote welfare by bringing the people into contact with the modern world, but negro slavery was formerly defended on the same grounds. Whether closer contact is beneficial depends upon its nature and the results, and where as has happened sometimes on railway construction large numbers die, or where as also has happened, a whole people fades away, it can be regarded as beneficial to them only on the ground that they are better dead.

The construction of railways was part of the campaign against slavery, and against porterage with which slavery was closely linked. The Uganda Railway, for instance, was approved by Parliament on the ground that activities against the slave trade must be extended to the interior.[3] Porterage is not only costly, but it is wasteful of labour, deadly; it is costly both in money and human life, and modern forms of transport have been acclaimed as an immense benefit to the peoples whom they free from the scourge of porterage.[4] But the matter is not quite so simple. Under native conditions, un

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1657. [2] *Ib.* p. 1540. [3] *Ib.* pp. 1538, 1582. [4] *Ib.* p. 1539.

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touched by modern commerce, there was little need for porters, and slavery was in general merely a form of domestic or agricultural service that, under the conditions then obtaining, best provided for the welfare of the labourer.[1] It was the impact of the West, and the consequent liberation of economic forces from the restraining influence of custom, that changed the character of slavery and multiplied the evils of porterage. In Africa 'during the early days of European occupation large demands were made on the population for the supply of porters, with the inevitable result of much suffering and a large loss of life; and it is further clear that the extensive use of human porterage was responsible for the spread of forms of disease which had hitherto been local in their incidence'.[2] So far as economic progress renders slavery and porterage unnecessary, it is removing evils for which in great part it has been responsible. Moreover, it is notorious that road building and railway construction have, at least for the time being, aggravated the abuse of compulsory labour. 'The wide use of impressed labour for railway construction in Africa has, in the past, led to many incidents which have reflected great discredit on the administration', and quite recently the death rate on such work has been 'exceedingly high'. A French writer, commenting on the heavy burden of compulsory labour imposed on the current generation in improving communications, offers the consolation that future generations will be freed from compulsion.[3] But the benefits to future generations are remote and doubtful. As Mr Frankel notes, railway construction 'will be justified on economic grounds only if, after the line has been built, the efforts of the population as a whole, including that of the porters, can be so redirected as to yield sufficient quantities of additional or more valuable goods, of a kind which can enter trade and bear the cost of railway transport'.[4] The completion of a line sets free a large volume of labour for employment on adjacent capitalist enterprises, but there remains a still larger surplus which can no longer find work, even as porters, and this opens up new problems.

Where railways are not needed to replace porters, their advantage to the native population is still more questionable. Liberals had no doubt on this point because they regarded progress as a guarantee of welfare. Now we have come to recognize that railways tend to meet the demand for export products at the expense of subsistence products.

[1] Burns, p. 209.
[2] *Ib.* pp. 615, 628.
[3] *African Survey*, p. 1538.
[4] Frankel, p. 6.

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653 Of recent years the construction of railways, like other projects of economic development, has usually been advocated on the ground that they would provide funds for welfare services. How far they have promoted welfare indirectly through opening up new fields for commerce and industry we must examine later, but here it is relevant to note that, except where they have served mining enterprise, they have usually been unremunerative and have 'made a serious reduction in the resources available for general expenditure'.[1] Some forms of expenditure on public works are not, like railways, open to the criticism that they deprive people of employment; irrigation, for instance, creates a new and permanent demand for native labour. But general experience shows that, as we have noticed in the Punjab, it tends to increase the mass of debt, leaving the peasant with a bare subsistence and, at best, no wealthier than before.

There is, indeed, no necessary connection for good or ill between public works and native welfare. We have seen that economic development, unless kept under control, is on the balance prejudicial to the welfare of the people; that is one reason for the modern departure from the Liberal doctrine of *laissez-faire*. Public works in general, whether roads, railways, airways, ports or irrigation, serve to expedite development, and thereby enhance the difficulty of protecting natives against its evil consequences. It would, for instance, be difficult to argue that railway construction in the Belgian Congo under Leopold improved the well-being of the natives. In Malaya we are told of a 'once flourishing Sakai village [which] has, since the road touched it, plainly deteriorated, physically and morally.'[2] Even irrigation works must be regarded as a failure from the standpoint of welfare if they merely enable more people to live more miserably. Thus the general belief in the intrinsic value of roads, railways and other forms of public works as instruments of native welfare must be dismissed as an illusion; only too often they do more harm than good to those whom they are supposed to benefit. Public works are instruments of economic progress, of world welfare, not of native welfare; sometimes in some ways they may improve the common lot, but they extend and intensify the action of economic forces and, without protection against these, they do not promote native welfare but enhance the need of measures to protect welfare.

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 23; *African Survey*, pp. 1316, 1006.
[2] Malaya Census, 1931.

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3. Economic Services and Production

Economic services, intended to improve the human factor in production, have somewhat the same character as public works intended to improve material resources. Like public works, they are primarily instruments of economic progress, world welfare, with native welfare as, potentially, a by-product. Like public works also, they often originate in the need for preventing the spoliation and exploitation characteristic of unregulated economic activities. Humanitarian sentiment condemned porterage, but it was the waste of human life and high cost of labour that stimulated railway construction. Similarly, in Burma as in the tropics generally, it was the devastation of the forests by free capitalist enterprise that created the need for a forestry service. Rich mineral deposits are often buried beneath the refuse of surface workings. In South Africa ostrich farming nearly committed suicide by killing off the ostriches.[1] One natural consequence of the improvement of communications in the process of economic development is the spread of diseases among crops and cattle. In all these and in other ways economic development creates a need for economic services. There is, however, one notable difference between economic service and public works. Whereas public works are mostly intended to promote general economic progress, economic services may be particularly directed towards promoting the economic progress of the natives.

Not infrequently it is assumed that all expenditure on economic services goes to native enterprise. Much of it, however, is incurred solely on behalf of western enterprise, and does not contribute towards increasing native production. Mineral deposits are worked almost exclusively by Europeans, and it is they who profit by the geological survey and mines service. Ordinarily, as in Africa, Europeans hold most of the commercial forests, to which the activities of the forestry service are mainly directed; it may, by reafforestation or in other ways, assist native cultivation, but protective forestry receives less attention, partly because it is less directly remunerative and partly because it lacks the support of native public opinion.[2] The economic services which touch native life most closely are those concerned with agriculture, veterinary care and irrigation, and even in these western enterprise commands a share, and sometimes the chief share, of

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 985, 993, 1313, 1492, 1499, 1528; Frankel, p. 65n.
[2] *African Survey*, p. 987.

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654 their attention. When, therefore, economic development is advocated on the ground that it provides funds for economic services, it is well to enquire how far these services are concerned with native rather than with western enterprise, and how far they do in fact make native enterprise more efficient. Information on such matters is not readily obtainable, but some light is thrown on them by a recent study of Malaya.

243 654 Formerly the natives of British Malaya cultivated little but rice. Conditions did not favour the growth of a large export market such as stimulated cultivators in other parts of Indo-China to extend their holdings, and the Government tried to encourage the cultivation of rice by regulations making it compulsory. In the early years of the present century, when the doctrine of efficiency was beginning to replace the principle of *laissez-faire* as the motto of colonial rule, an agricultural service was created. This included a paddy experimental station, but no one was appointed to specialize in rice, and experiments in the improvement of rice cultivation were discontinuous. About the same time plantation rubber was coming into favour, and the agricultural experts 'gave most of their time to the European and Chinese rubber planters'. Malays also found rubber profitable, and tended to substitute rubber for rice. Thus, with the influx of many hundred thousand coolies to the mines and plantations, the country became increasingly dependent on imported rice. When the war of 1914 and post-war developments stopped these imports, the Government had to import rice and lost £42 million on the transaction, while the estates and mines also lost heavily on importing rice for their coolies. 'The result of this experience was the decision that rice cultivation must be increased and more attention paid to native agriculture.'[1]

Accordingly the regulations for compulsory rice cultivation were enforced more stringently, and experiments were undertaken with a view to make it more profitable by improving the yield. Under the latter head progress was slow, as frequent changes in the agricultural staff hindered continuity of policy. By about 1925, however, the agricultural department claimed to have discovered new varieties that would enhance the yield by 30%. This had little effect on extending cultivation, and in 1930 a committee was appointed to examine the situation. It estimated that the area under rice could be more than doubled by the addition of some 600,000 to 1,000,000 acres of potential rice land, but 'there was no one way of making paddy growing

[1] Mills, pp. 250ff.

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profitable and bringing about its extension. The problem must be attacked simultaneously through drainage and irrigation, agricultural betterment and the co-operative department.' One outcome of its recommendations was the reconstitution of the irrigation department in 1932, and the investigations of the new department confirmed the previous impression that 'all over the country padi lands were steadily going out of cultivation.... Even in the fine padi plain of Province Wellesley, ...conditions were steadily deteriorating, the cultivators in debt, and their *kampongs* (villages) often indicating a state verging on poverty.' During the next few years upwards of 40,000 acres were added to the existing irrigation schemes.[1] At the same time, under the influence of the depression there was a fall in the price of rubber, and by 1934 the area under rice had grown by over 100,000 acres. In the following year, however, with a rise in the price of rubber, the area under rice fell by 35,000 acres. Thus although there was a wide area available for extending the cultivation of rice, and the fall in the price of rubber consequent on the depression encouraged cultivators to prefer rice cultivation, which at the same time was stimulated by compulsion, by extensive new irrigation and by the discovery of more productive strains, yet, with a population that increased between 1926 and 1936 by 29 %, the area under rice expanded by only 11 %.[2]

Area under rice[3]

	(acres, 000)
1924–5	654
1929–30	657
1933–4	767
1937–8	726

This brief survey of the attempts to foster and improve rice cultivation in Malaya suggests that neither compulsion nor the efforts of the agricultural service to enhance production met with much success, and it contains many lessons of general application regarding the relation between economic services and the increase of production. The failure of agricultural experts to increase native production is often explained on the ground that it is difficult 'to persuade a conservative and easy-going peasantry to improve their methods',[4] and that the economic motive, the desire of gain, does not appeal to 'natives'. This is the easiest and most comfortable explanation of all failures to enhance native welfare; it is their fault and not ours. But it is inconsistent with the facts. While the Malayan was reluctant to grow more rice, he was taking readily to growing rubber. All over the Tropical Far East, native rubber has expanded rapidly, sometimes in the face of opposition. Similarly in Java the opposition of planters and

[1] Mills, pp. 262, 272, 274.
[2] *Ib.* p. 195.
[3] Wickizer and Bennett, p. 314.
[4] Mills, pp. 251, 259.

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of some officials could not stop the people from cultivating sugar instead of the less profitable rice.[1] In Africa as in Asia the people are only too ready to substitute commercial crops for food crops, and in parts of the Gold Coast and Tanganyika the farmers are coming to depend on the market for their food.[2] Everywhere the acreage of new crops under native cultivation rises and falls with the demand. The adoption of new crops is nothing new. In Netherlands India, of all the produce now cultivated by natives, only the coconut, soya and the spices are indigenous, and even rice is an immigrant. All the staple crops have come in from abroad over a period of many centuries, and that is true also of Burma. In Africa bananas, rice, wheat, and sugar were introduced by the Arabs in the seventh century, and the sweet potato, cassava and maize are attributed to the Portuguese. In the most notable modern developments of native production, agricultural services have played a very minor role. In Burma the two outstanding innovations in agricultural practice, the introduction of hard rice for the European market and, later, of groundnut, both preceded the creation of an agricultural department. So also did the substitution of transplanting for broadcasting in rice cultivation, which became general when the price of paddy rose sufficiently to justify the extra cost. In Africa 'the production of cacao in the Gold Coast and of groundnuts in Northern Nigeria are examples of the development of new industries almost without aid, when the African has been satisfied that production is possible and within his capacity...(and)...this wide adoption of maize and other crops, which are comparatively recent introductions is further evidence of capacity of adaptation'.[3] Where new crops or methods of cultivation are profitable, compulsion and expert assistance are unnecessary; where they are unprofitable, compulsion and expert assistance are of no avail.

General experience shows that even if tropical peoples fail to evince a desire of gain before contact with the West, this is one of the earliest lessons which they learn. For the introduction of new and more profitable crops it is not even necessary that the cultivators themselves should make the profit. Where economic development leads to land alienation and rack-renting, or wherever rents are fixed by competition, the land goes to tenants who can pay the highest rent, and cultivators are compelled therefore to adopt new and more productive crops, or cheaper methods of cultiva-

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 321.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 864–7, 961.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 883, 886.

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tion, even though the profit goes to the moneylender or the landlord. If an agricultural service can make the cultivation of any crop more profitable either to cultivators or landowners it will increase production; if it does not increase production, the presumption is that it has not enabled cultivators, working under local conditions and with the means at their disposal, to get a better return.

Even in Europe the application of modern science to agriculture is comparatively recent, and practical agriculturists are apt to view the suggestions of experts with suspicion not always unjustified. But the scientific study of tropical agriculture is still in its infancy, and experts must be cautious in their recommendations, for, if they base suggestions on experience in Europe, they are liable to make mistakes. For example, in Europe cultivators prize a warm soil and in the tropics a cool soil, and in other ways conditions are reversed, but specialists are not always capable of adapting to a tropical environment what they have been taught in Europe. In Burma deep ploughing was recommended to rice cultivators, until experience showed that this breaks up the hard pan which holds the water. The early rubber leases in Burma required planters to grow at least 400 trees to the acre, whereas the optimum number was about 80. Western planters condemned the neglect of natives to weed their rubber holdings until the recent depression, by precluding expenditure on the weeding of plantations, taught them that it reduced the yield of sap. Mistakes are accepted as inevitable by western planters, but shake the confidence of native cultivators in western science. There is no doubt that modern science can do much to improve agriculture in the tropics. It has already done much in Netherlands India, where the 'great cultures' have been built up on a scientific basis. But it is European agriculture that chiefly benefits from the modern science of the agricultural service. Naturally agricultural experts can do more for planters who believe in them, seek their help and employ methods of cultivation with which they are familiar, than for peasants who have no faith in modern science and believe, often not unjustly, that they know most about their own job; and just as naturally, where, as formerly in Malaya, there is a choice between helping the planter or the peasant, agricultural officials tend to do the work that is more obviously useful, and prefer to help the planter rather than the peasant.

But the immaturity of scientific agriculture in the tropics, the lack of continuity in policy and experiment, and the prior claims of planters

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to assistance are matters of comparatively small importance. A far more serious obstacle to the success of agricultural experts is their ignorance of tropical economy. Everywhere production is a social function. In Europe we are apt to overlook this fact because our methods of production grow out of our established social life, and, because we do not notice it in Europe, we tend to disregard it in the tropics. The agricultural official is usually an expert in scientific agriculture, but one cannot expect him to have an expert knowledge of native social life. That is not his business; he is an agriculturist and not an economist. Consequently he tries to adapt native life to scientific principles instead of adapting scientific principles to native life, and, if the people do not accept his suggestions, he regards them as unreasonable. Under experimental conditions some new crop or new method of cultivation may seem profitable, but under the conditions of village life it must fit in with the established rotation of crops and with the available supplies of water and labour. In Malaya, for instance, if the new strain of paddy, said by the agricultural service to increase the yield by 30 %, had given corresponding results in practical experience, it is difficult to believe that during the next five years the area under rice would have remained practically constant. In Burma at one time there was a suggestion that sugar palms should be cut down or taxed out of existence, the demand on fuel for sugar boiling was considered uneconomic; fortunately before much harm had been done, it was discovered that palm trees were a stand-by of the cultivator against famine, because drought does not affect the yield until the following year. Similarly, in Africa, 'agricultural experts are becoming more chary of introducing sudden changes in African agricultural technique, for, they say, Europeans lack knowledge of local conditions, and the indiscriminate application of European technique, such as the use of the plough, has in some places had disastrous results'.[1] 'An examination of the present methods used by natives to produce food or cash crops will reveal a planned effort, the balance of which may easily be upset by ill-considered innovations.... Such a system is of proved value in native eyes, and is peculiarly adapted to native conditions of life; it needs careful study before improvements can be recommended which are not only sound in themselves but will appeal to the cultivators.'[2] These things lie outside the province of agricultural science, and are not within the competence of experts.

[1] Wilson, p. 118. [2] *African Survey*, p. 960.

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In other matters not only the agricultural expert but the individual cultivator is helpless, and even the whole village, working as a common unit, can do nothing. Production is a social function that extends beyond the village. In Malaya, as we have noticed, it has been recognized that the problem of making rice cultivation profitable requires the co-operation of numerous departments. (This raises the question of departmentalism, which we shall have to examine more generally.) Another illustration of the wide range of what may appear simple agricultural problems may be found in the marketing of crops. In Burma groundnut, and new varieties of beans and onions spread rapidly, without instigation from the agricultural service, because they found a market and were profitable. But attempts by the agricultural service to introduce chickpea, chillies and tomatoes where there was no market, met with failure, and the cultivators lost their time and labour. Tomatoes are widely grown and in one district cultivators were induced to grow a more productive variety. They obtained larger crops but could not sell them, because the flavour did not appeal to the Burman palate, and there was no local European market. Again, millers wanted a special variety of paddy. The agricultural experts produced a variety to meet their wants, and found cultivators to grow it. But it needed a special adaptation of the milling machinery, and this was impracticable unless the new variety was available in quantities requiring the co-operation of many cultivators over a wide area, so that those who grew it had to accept a lower rate and not, as they had been led to expect, a higher rate for their produce. Every such misadventure shakes confidence.

For these and other reasons the possibility of increasing native agricultural production through the assistance of an agricultural service are very limited. Similar obstacles beset the veterinary and other services. In general, economic services can increase production only where they appeal to the desire of gain by enabling the people *as individuals* to make more money; even this, as will appear below, does not always imply greater welfare. Many improvements, however, as we have seen, are profitable to individuals only through co-operative or collective action, and many, though possibly tending to increase the total volume of production, are prejudicial to the peoples as individuals. In such cases it is necessary either to appeal to some motive other than the desire of gain, or to employ compulsion. An appeal to social welfare requires conditions that are not easily fulfilled, and becomes more difficult with the increasing 'atomization'

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654 of native social life; ordinarily therefore a remedy is sought in compulsion.

The resort to compulsion for improving output raises new difficulties. Where the expert aims at helping the cultivator to earn more, both have a common object, and the results are readily apparent and can be measured by the standard of profit, which both recognize. If the expert tells the cultivator that some new variety will give a larger yield or fetch a better price, the results soon test the value of his counsel. It is a different matter when experts recommend measures that may possibly improve production in general over a long period, but require time to test their value and, in the first instance, entail trouble or loss to individuals.[1] If they advocate the eradication of dangerous weeds, the use of chemicals for spraying, the destruction of diseased crops, the cutting down of oil palms to protect the market the inoculation of cattle at the risk of death, the castration of undesirable sires, or the slaughter of cattle to prevent infection, the benefits are distant and uncertain, and the disadvantages immediate and obvious. In such matters they cannot expect the co-operation of the people, but must rely on inspection by a costly staff of numerous subordinates on low pay, ignorant and probably corrupt. Under indirect rule they may enlist the help of native chieftains, but this, like all attempts to employ the chieftains as agents of western policy, tends to undermine traditional authority. Finally, the success of measures of this kind depends not on blind obedience but on genuine acceptance through a recognition of their value. If the regulations intended to promote efficiency are sound, one would expect Europeans to comply with them more readily than natives, yet it seems that in some matters there is least progress on European estates, 'where control is much more difficult to exercise'.[2]

654 241 Measures to make production more profitable may gain acceptance if in the long run they show a profit to individuals, even though entailing a temporary loss; it is true also that, so long as a communal sentiment survives, individuals may acquiesce in personal loss for the benefit of the community. In time, if possibly a long time, the value of such measures can be demonstrated, and assessed in terms of money. But it is a different matter to increase the production of unprofitable crops. In such cases the agricultural service and the cultivators have no common standard. If it is difficult and dangerous to interfere in native economy where output and profit, debt and land

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 912, 934, 937. [2] *Ib.* p. 970.

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alienation provide comparatively simple tests of the results, the objections are much stronger where experts run counter to the profit motive, and where their recommendations are based, not on agricultural or veterinary science, but on western views as to the nature and purpose of tropical economy. The attempt has often been made and often, perhaps invariably, failed. In Java in the reaction against the Culture system 'officials were so zealous in promoting the cultivation of rice rather than export crops as to insist on the cultivation of long-lived paddy, even where the soil or water supply was unsuitable'.[1] In Malaya, rice land was found to be going out of cultivation although regulations enforcing the cultivation of rice had been imposed for over thirty years. To-day history is repeating itself in Africa. 'The expansion in the growth of marketable crops has seemed to be leading to a dangerous reduction in subsistence crops', and 'there is to-day a much clearer recognition of the need for organizing subsistence production.' Accordingly provisions for the encouragement of subsistence crops have been framed in Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika and Uganda.[2] Whether they will have greater success in Africa than in Java or Malaya time will show. They are unlikely to strengthen the authority of the native dignitaries enforcing them, or to foster affection towards the western Government responsible for preventing cultivators from turning their labours to the most profitable account; nor are they likely to make the agricultural service popular or to facilitate its work in other matters.

Moreover, in directing economic activities along these lines, it is hard to escape bias, and still harder to escape the suspicion of bias. When Europeans try to 'prevent the unwise extension of the growth of economic crops',[3] they are inevitably exposed to the unpleasant suggestion that they are chiefly considering western interests. We have seen that, in Malaya, it was the loss sustained by Government and the planters through the neglect of subsistence crops, that stimulated activity in promoting rice cultivation. In Africa interest in food crops grew with the need for healthy labour. Measures to encourage subsistence crops may easily be interpreted as meant to discourage unwelcome competition, and the more so because at various times the planting interest has, in fact, opposed the native cultivation of sugar, rubber and coffee. Even with the best intentions

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 167.
[2] *African Survey*, p. 631; *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 23.
[3] *African Survey*, pp. 635, 887, 978.

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it is obviously no easy matter to decide whether the extension of cultivation for the market is wise or unwise, and, in view of the generally inadequate acquaintance with native social and economic life and the deficiency and inaccuracy of tropical statistics, the material for a sound decision is unlikely to be available.

The foregoing remarks deal mainly with native agriculture, but this is the chief occupation in the tropics and has received most attention from colonial administrations. Similar considerations apply to other economic services intended to promote native enterprise. Undoubtedly native production grows, and often very rapidly, under western rule. But this is the natural result of greater security of life and property, and of the opening up of new markets, and in the past it has grown rapidly without the help of economic services, as the stimulus given by western rule to the desire of gain has been sufficient. The application of modern scientific methods to native enterprise should make it more efficient. That is the function of economic services. In practice, however, their contribution to the increase of production is confined within narrow limits. They can increase production only by making it more profitable to individuals and for various reasons, some of which we have noticed, this is rarely possible except in such matters as the introduction of new crops, which does not call for expert knowledge. Economic services can and do render much help to western enterprise, and they are useful instruments of progress; but they can do comparatively little to improve native enterprise. Thus the argument that development is necessary to provide funds for economic services in the interest of native enterprise is of doubtful validity and requires closer scrutiny than it usually receives.

4. Economic Services and Welfare

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Unless economic services make native production more efficient, they obviously must be ineffective in enhancing welfare. But they may promote efficiency by increasing production or in other ways without contributing to native welfare, and may even have contrary results. In Malaya, so far as the agricultural service enabled cultivators to obtain a larger yield, it did not enable them to make a greater profit. One obstacle was a ring of Chinese mill owners.[1] 'The Malay had no option save to sell at the price offered by the middleman

[1] Mills, pp. 255. 261.

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who bought for delivery to the mills.' The Government accordingly built a rice mill in order to break the combine. (One cannot help noticing the contrast between the forceful action taken against a Chinese combine in Malaya and the tolerance of European combines in Burma.) But this touched only the fringe of the problem. From 40 to 90 % of the cultivators were not free to sell their crop in the open market because they were in debt either to Indian moneylenders or to Chinese shopkeepers. Similar conditions obtain generally throughout the tropics wherever the promotion of trade and native enterprise is a main object of policy.

We have seen how, in Africa, throughout the ages tropical peoples have been ready to accept new crops. But 'these early introductions were incorporated with the system of shifting cultivation and the staple diet became a form of rough porridge made from one or other of the grains or from cassava root, ground between stones or pounded into a mortar, and supplemented by a relish of vegetables, meat or milk'. Similarly 'the introduction of cassava and sweet potatoes by the Portuguese conferred an inestimable boon on many tribes by providing them with a famine crop which will flourish under conditions unfavourable to grain crops'.[1] The introduction of these new crops enriched native social life. But where native society has been brought into economic contact with the modern world, the introduction of new crops has a contrary result. In Burma the introduction of groundnut led to the substitution of groundnut oil for sesamum oil because, although less palatable, it is cheaper; cultivators sold their more valuable sesamum and used groundnut oil instead for cooking. Similarly in Java cassava tends to replace rice.[2] Native society has been unable to resist the economic process of natural selection by the survival of the cheapest, and the introduction of new crops has not enriched but has impoverished native life. One finds, of course, the same thing in the West, where potatoes have often displaced more nutritious edibles.

The purpose of economic services is to make production more efficient, and they tend accordingly to concentrate on export crops.[3] On the principle of the local division of function, the production of crops for export contributes to efficiency. Also it encourages trade and provides Government with revenue. But the profits from increased production go mostly to foreign middlemen and merchants; so far

[1] *African Survey*, p. 883. [2] *Netherlands India*, p. 321.
[3] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 23.

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654 511 as they remain with the natives, economic development may enrich a few but, unless kept under control, impoverishes the people in general and detracts from welfare by the disintegration of native social life. To seek a remedy by multiplying economic services is like casting out devils in the name of Satan, for they expedite the process, and, like public works, merely enhance the need for social services.

5. Social Services: Protection

000 Wherever economic forces have been released by the application of reason to the conduct of social life, it has been found necessary in the general interest to protect those who are adversely affected by the consequences. This is the key note of the long conflict between Capital and Labour. In the West Greece liberated reason from the restraint of custom; Rome substituted the stronger rule of law for the rule of custom; Christianity furnished a moral principle stronger than the rule of law for keeping rational activities within the bounds of social welfare. The happy fusion of these principles in the Renascence allowed a high degree of freedom without disorganizing society. It allowed the freer use of capital in the production of wealth, and there evolved the type of social organization often described as capitalist, or capitalism. But these terms are often loosely used, and it is important to be clear as to their meaning. Human labour applied to natural resources produces a surplus beyond what is needed for sustenance. This surplus, if stored, is wealth. Wealth applied to the production of more wealth is capital. Thus capital may be regarded as disembodied economic energy. Capitalism may be defined as the form of social organization in which economic forces are predominant or, at least, conspicuously prominent. Such a society may be defined as capitalist. But the term capitalist is used also to signify the owner or employer of capital, and is usually confined to those who own or employ capital on a large scale. Thus there may be a capitalist society in which economic forces are predominant without capitalists who are owners or employers of large capital; and there may be capitalists, owners or employers of capital, in a society which is not capitalist in its general character. The neglect of these distinctions often leads to confusion.

In Europe the principle of economic freedom grew out of social life, and a homogeneous society has been able by its inherent vitality, though not without much tribulation, to gain an ever-doubtful victory over the forces of disruption. In the tropics, however, economic free-

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dom was no natural growth but the exotic seed of a plural society, unable to protect itself. Usually the first stage in the transition from a policy of *laissez-faire* to one of constructive effort on behalf of native welfare can be recognized by attempts to protect the people against the economic forces liberated under western rule. As we have noticed, development by native enterprise and by western enterprise react differently on native social life. Each requires its appropriate method of protection. In the former case, with natives cultivating for the market, economic forces attack the native social structure from within, and the problem is to protect them in the produce market and to assure them of the fruits of their labour and suitable conditions of occupancy. In the latter case, with natives employed in capitalist enterprise, economic forces act in the first instance from without, and the problem is to protect them in the labour market and to secure for them sufficient wages and suitable conditions of employment.

6. Native Enterprise and the Land

In the course of development by native enterprise, one conspicuous feature is the growth of agricultural indebtedness; this is indeed a natural and almost inevitable consequence of native cultivation for the market. Rapid development demands that cultivators shall borrow money to take up land and hire labour, but circumstances encourage them to borrow more than they require and more than they can repay.[1] This is often ascribed to the shiftlessness of cultivators, or the wickedness of moneylenders, who deliberately entangle the cultivator in debt so as to leave him with no more than a bare subsistence.[2] It is true that the grant of easy credit to the limit of the security available is profitable to the moneylender, who has least trouble with large loans, but it is profitable also to the exporter, who can obtain steadier supplies at lower prices, to the importer, who can sell more goods to cultivators with more cash than they know how to use, and to the banks which finance the whole series of transactions. Easy credit greases all the wheels of the economic mechanism. We have seen the result in Burma. The indebtedness of cultivators in India is notorious. In the Philippines, Malaya, Fiji, Ceylon, Cyprus, Egypt, Zanzibar and other parts of Africa,[3] everywhere indeed where the people cultivate for sale rather than for the family, the burden

[1] *African Survey*, p. 885. [2] *ISC*, 1, 275.
[3] *African Survey*, p. 872; *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 25; Mills, p. 276.

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426 of debt lies heavy on them. Indebtedness leads naturally to the transfer of land from peasants to large owners, and then to rack-renting. Protection accordingly takes two forms: one is to protect the people against the loss of land and excessive rents; the other is to protect them against debt.

423 In the tropics generally the western idea of property in land is a modern innovation. Landlords, so far as they existed, were also quasi-feudal lords over the people, and they were more concerned to multiply the number of their followers than the area of their estates. In western feudalism the people went with the land, but in the tropics the land went with the people, who did not pay rent to their overlord but a customary tribute and services. Where there were no landlords, the peasant might enjoy an hereditary title to individual occupation, subject usually to the interests of his whole family group and to the needs of the village or tribal unit. These conditions are inconsistent with economic development by native enterprise, and cultivation for the market gives land and its produce a new value. Cultivators, inspired by economic motives, borrow money in the hope of earning more, and lose their land to moneylenders and large landowners, often absentees. Landowners, old and new, inspired by economic motives, screw up the pitch of rents. Land alienation and rack-renting attract attention, partly because they are the most obvious symptoms of distress, partly because they foster discontent and political unrest, and, of course, to some extent from humanitarian sentiment. The matter first came prominently to notice in India, where there have been various attempts to restrict mortgage and transfer, 'but these measures are easy neither to frame nor to execute', and they seem to have had little success. Similar attempts have failed in Malaya.[1] Ordinarily they are based on the idea of protecting the cultivator against himself, whereas the real trouble is that he needs protection against the economic forces dominating the whole social life of a plural society. In Netherlands India the cultivator has been saved from the disaster that has overwhelmed his fellow in British India by regulations prohibiting the alienation of native land to foreigners and confirming the rule of native customary law in land transactions. This, however, is possible only where development by western enterprise allows or requires the preservation of native authority and native customs.

Where development by western enterprise is the prime object

[1] *African Survey*, p. 873; Mills, p. 251.

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Where development by western enterprise is the prime object of colonial policy, land alienation need present no problem, except as regards the lands actually taken up for western enterprise, and even debt may not be serious. Thus, in large parts of Africa, 'so far conditions have not favoured the growth of moneylending; the general restrictions imposed on the sale of native land to non-natives, as well as the limitations which some territories have placed on the giving of credit to natives by non-natives have militated against it'.[1] It is sometimes suggested in British publications that there is little indebtedness in Netherlands India. But that is a mistake. The Dutch have protected the native against the worst result of debt, the loss of land, but not against incurring debt. In the development of British India and Burma by native enterprise the merchant gave out advances to secure produce; in Java the planter gave advances to secure labour. The actual moneylender is usually a middleman, in the Tropical Far East mostly Indian or Chinese, who reaps some of the profit that would otherwise be divided between natives and Europeans, with a lion's share to the latter. In such circumstances exporters of produce have a common interest with cultivators. Moreover, as is conspicuously illustrated in Burma, the transfer of land to people whose sole interest is to exact the highest rent, tends to reduce the outturn. Thus everywhere in the Tropical Far East we find sympathy for the cultivators in the clutches of middlemen: in Indo-China 'the chetty is a plague', in the Dutch Indies 'the foreign asiatic is worse than ten epidemics', in Burma the wiles of both *chettyars* and Chinese were denounced so far back as the early eighties. Both practical and humanitarian considerations demand a solution for the problem of indebtedness.

The favourite remedy for debt is the encouragement of co-operative credit societies. But this is no cure for debt, and it may quite possibly aggravate the disease which is the chief cause of debt, the disintegration of society by economic forces. It is no cure for debt, because the success of co-operative credit requires a genuine acceptance of co-operative principles, and this is a slow process, while debt increases daily. It tends to aggravate disintegration, because the principles on which it rests are contrary to those which form the basis of native social life and, indeed, of social life in general. The suggestion that co-operative credit accords with native ideas as being communal in character is mistaken.[2] The village community embraces all the inhabitants of the village in a common bond for all the purposes

[1] *African Survey*, p. 872. [2] *Ib.* p. 1482.

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452 474 of social life; the co-operative credit society includes only selected individuals who unite for specific economic ends. If a whole village were transformed into a co-operative credit society, it would at the same time be transformed from a village into a business concern. The spread of co-operative principles is much to be desired; it would encourage thrift and train the people in modern business methods, and mark a forward step towards the reintegration of native economy, the economic aspect of their social life. But, unless the limitations of the co-operative movement are appreciated, it is apt to be perverted from an instrument of native welfare into an instrument of economic progress. Ordinarily cultivators can borrow at a lower rate from a co-operative credit society than from a middleman. This should reduce the cost of production of native crops, and increase the margin between cost and yield. But competition in the market transfers the profit from the cultivators to the firms engaged in the export of tropical produce. Co-operative societies provide an attractive investment for banks and private individuals. The elimination of the middleman removes a possible competitor to western firms, and has political reactions by hindering the growth of a politically conscious middle class. In practice the multiplication of co-operative credit machinery usually outruns the spread of co-operative principles, and the co-operative credit service, established in the cause of native welfare, serves chiefly to promote the interests of western enterprise. This is the natural outcome of confounding two distinct problems: the social problem of training the people in modern business methods, and the economic problem of providing a remedy for agricultural debt.

452 474 452 In Netherlands India this distinction has been recognized, though by accident rather than design. One aspect of the Ethical movement was an attempt to foster co-operative credit. This made slow progress. The remedy for debt is to provide the cultivator with as much credit as he requires, and no more than he requires, at the lowest rate that economic conditions allow. The co-operative movement failed to solve this economic problem because the people, though quick to borrow money, were slow to accept new ideas. The Government held the view that the chief need of the cultivators was sound credit, and the co-operative societies were accordingly transformed into State banks of various types. This has been justified on the ground that if the economic problem can be solved, it will then be possible to foster co-operative credit as a social institution. Of recent years, therefore, co-operative societies have been established

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in addition to the State banks. How far the State banks have been successful in solving the economic problem is a matter of debate. The successful working of such banks demands a restriction on private credit. In Netherlands India this is provided in some measure by the application of native customary law to native lands, which prevents their alienation for debt to foreign moneylenders. But apparently the banks, nominally for agriculturists, find most of their clients among townsfolk; and some critics allege that the people borrow as much from private moneylenders as before, in addition to what is borrowed from the banks. It would appear then that the restrictions on private moneylending in Netherlands India are inadequate, but the banks do at least provide facilities for individuals to obtain credit on sound lines.

The State pawnshops in Netherlands India provide similar facilities for individuals, mainly townsfolk, to obtain temporary accommodation on a small scale. These also were an outcome of the Ethical movement, originating with the same man who started the early co-operative credit movement. Formerly the pawnshops were in the hands of the Chinese, who managed them merely with a view to profit. The pawnbrokers were cunning in sharp practice; the terms for loans were exorbitant, and the arrangements for the safe custody of pledges were unsatisfactory, while the shops were widely believed to be used as opium dens. All this has been changed, and the shops are not only a public benefit but yield a handsome revenue.

Both State banks and pawnshops illustrate the fact that the promotion of welfare does not necessitate the introduction of foreign capital. In fact they require practically no capital as, by beginning on a small scale, they can provide the capital for further development. All they require is a knowledge of the people and their economic situation, the will to promote their welfare and, above all, patience. They differ from co-operative credit societies mainly in three points. They appeal merely to economic motives, common to all men, whereas the co-operative movement urges social ideals easier to preach than to practise. They meet the requirements of individuals as such, whereas co-operative societies only meet the individual requirements of those who are willing to combine for common action. And in meeting individual requirements they fulfil their purpose, whereas the co-operative movement requires common *social* action for common *economic* ends which are prejudicial to common social life and thereby hinder common social action. Credit institutions, like public works,

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may give the people new opportunities of improving their condition, and, if well managed, may give some protection against economic forces, which public works, even irrigation works for the benefit of native enterprise, do not attempt. For the relation between the co-operative movement and State credit, we may find a parallel in the relation between economic services aiming to increase collective production and those aiming to increase individual production. We have noticed that ordinarily the former fail because it is impracticable to obtain collective action by a sufficient number over a sufficient area, whereas the latter may meet with some success. Yet even individuals who take advantage of the new opportunities to produce more, ordinarily receive no lasting benefit, because they are unable to withstand the economic pressure of the environment. Co-operative credit and State credit are alike intended to strengthen them against this pressure. Experience in Netherlands India suggests that State credit has better chances of success. But it is important to appreciate the conditions of success. The State banks in Netherlands India have achieved useful results because the land policy protects cultivators against the impact of the West, and not because the banks protect them against the natural consequences of this impact. Similarly the pawnshops have been useful because the State monopoly of pawnbroking protects the people against the action of economic forces, and not merely against their natural consequences. State credit has no virtue in itself. It may, as has been charged against State banks in Netherlands India, merely increase the volume of indebtedness, and it is liable to become just an instrument of economic progress instead of helping to promote welfare. As an instrument of welfare it is of value only so far as it is accompanied by other measures in a comprehensive welfare policy.

7. Western Enterprise and Labour

The problems arising out of tropical development by western enterprise have a different character, and are more readily apparent and more urgent. In some cases it may lead to agrarian distress, but this is found chiefly where lands available for native occupation have been curtailed by the grant of large estates for European settlement. Such conditions present special difficulties. Formerly in Burma waste lands were granted or leased for European enterprise, but this resulted in the oppression of the natives, both on the estates and in their neighbourhood, and the concessions remained uncultivated

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long after the surrounding land had been brought under the plough by natives. That seems to be the general result. In Netherlands India the large estates, created at the beginning of the nineteenth century, were an endless source of trouble and unrest; much of the land long remained unworked, the owners were often absentees, aiming solely at profit and with no personal interest in the welfare of the occupants who were more grievously oppressed than elsewhere. Moreover, the grants tended to pass into the hands of foreign Europeans and orientals, and during the present century this stimulated the Government to adopt a policy of gradually resuming them. In Africa the difficulties arising out of western agricultural settlements are notorious, and European settlers, when faced by even a remote prospect of their eventual displacement by foreign orientals, have carried opposition to the point of threatening armed resistance.[1] The possibility of European settlement in the tropics, however, is confined to particular localities, and it presents, though with special characters, features common to development by western enterprise in general. The outstanding problem in regions developed by western enterprise is not directly concerned with land-holding and debt, but with the relations between western enterprise and native labour.

The first condition of the economic development of backward areas is an adequate supply of labour. Even native enterprise creates a new demand for labour, and we have seen in Burma how this demand has led to a seasonal supply and to the industrialization of agricultural production. But the expansion of native enterprise is gradual, and it can obtain much of its labour from customary sources and dispose of its produce along established routes. Western enterprise, whether in mines or plantations, being usually situated in thinly peopled tracts, requires a large volume of labour quickly, and also requires new and more rapid means of transport; there is a sudden and large demand for labour both on private enterprise and public works. The Government must provide this labour. The provision of labour is no longer necessary when free labour becomes available, but free labour needs protection. Then, as employers gradually realize that healthy and intelligent labour is less costly, attention is directed to improving the conditions of work. Thus in general, labour policy in tropical dependencies passes through three stages: the provision of labour; the protection of labour against abuse; and the promotion of labour welfare.

[1] *African Survey*, p. 165.

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The Provision of Labour. The provision of labour by Government might seem to come under the head of economic rather than of social service. But, so long as it is necessary, it is usually regarded, not wholly without justification, as an instrument of welfare. 'To pierce the darkness shrouding entire populations in Africa', said Leopold II in 1876, 'would be a crusade worthy of this century of progress.'[1] At the beginning of the present century Chamberlain was a leading champion of this crusade. The native would not advance in civilization until he had been 'convinced of the necessity and dignity of labour'... 'I think it is a good thing' he said, 'for the native to be industrious, and by every means in our power we have to teach them to work.'[2] For a quarter of a century this remained the keynote of British labour policy in the tropics. Even sympathetic officials acquiesced in compulsion, 'in the genuine belief that no advancement was possible unless the native accustomed himself to regular labour', and officers charged with a special care for native welfare have urged the educational value of compulsory labour on European enterprises.[3] It is true that, if tropical peoples are to live in the modern world, they must adapt themselves to the modern world. But it is true also that the use of compulsion to provide labour engenders abuse, and that the labour it provides is inefficient. It is pressed furthest and is most harmful where the Government has an economic interest in production, and in the Belgian Congo, as in the later days of the Culture system in Java, the use of compulsion to obtain labour defeated its own ends by killing off the supply of labourers.[4] General experience has shown that compulsion tends to reduce the labour supply and to furnish incompetent and unwilling labourers, yet employers, accustomed to obtaining labour through the State, prefer this easy though inefficient way of meeting their requirements and, long after the provision of labour has become unnecessary, continue to urge the educational value of labour as an argument for Government assistance in recruiting it. Now, however, that compulsion is no longer needed, it is condemned as generally as it was formerly supported. But the fact that, so long as compulsion was thought expedient, it was justified, like slavery, as an instrument of welfare suggests the need for cautious examination of measures now recommended on the same ground.

[1] MacDonell, J. de C., *King Leopold II* (1905), p. 184.
[2] Boulger, D. C., *The Reign of Leopold II* (1925), II, 121.
[3] *African Survey*, pp. 640ff. [4] Frankel, p. 37.

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Official activity in the provision of labour assumes various forms; it embraces compulsion, direct and indirect, the recruitment of labour by the Government or with official support, and the inclusion of a penal sanction in labour contracts. Under all these heads much may be learned from Netherlands India, where the provision of labour for development by western enterprise dates from the beginning of the nineteenth century.

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Direct compulsion has been little used except to provide labour for the State. At various times compulsion has been employed to recruit men for State economic enterprise, for the army and, chiefly, for public works. Where, as in Java under the Culture system and in Africa under the chartered companies, the Government is at once sovereign and merchant, it is naturally tempted to use political control for the advancement of its economic interests, and is not too rigid in restricting compulsory labour to purely administrative purposes.[1] The Culture system in Java is the classic example of compulsion on State enterprise. Van den Bosch justified compulsion on the ground that it would instil habits of industry among the people and, by increasing production, would enable them to earn more. For a time they did in fact make more money, but within a few years a series of famines devastated the tracts that were richest in natural resources, and the people, instead of being inured to industry, acquired the habit of working only under compulsion. Moreover, the system was inefficient because the officials charged with supervising production had not sufficient knowledge either of agriculture or of the people. What killed it, however, was neither its harshness nor its inefficiency, but the growth of private enterprise, and, when private enterprise was ready to take over production, public opinion was quick to appreciate the defects of State enterprise. The system was advocated as an instrument of welfare, it was applied as an instrument of progress, and finally condemned as both pernicious to native welfare and a barrier to progress. The compulsory recruitment of tropical peoples for military service has also been found uneconomic. Only a small proportion can stand the rigour of modern army life, and the withdrawal of large numbers from the labour market conflicts with the demands of private enterprise; 'in view of the shortage of men for internal development such a utilization of man-power would have the effect of economic self-annihilation'.[2]

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1314.

[2] *Ib.* pp. 627, 1121.

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466 464 Ordinarily then, the main use of compulsory labour has been on public works. Throughout the tropics it was formerly the practice under native rule to obtain such labour as might be required for the common purposes of the tribe or village, or for the chieftains or the State, by calling on the people to supply it. 'It was perhaps natural that the early administrations should see in the use of this "communal" labour an easy method by which to provide for the making of roads or for the transport necessary for official purposes. It became, indeed, the usual method of securing labour for official or public needs.'[1] In Burma and other lands developed by native enterprise, compulsory labour was soon abandoned as interfering too greatly with cultivation. But in Java, as in other countries developed by western enterprise, it has been freely employed. One limitation on its use is the difficulty of securing by compulsion the volume of labour required for large capital works. In Java paid labour was first used on the harbour and defence works in Sourabaya in 1849, when modern Liberal ideas were in the air. It was found so much more efficient and economical that, in 1851, the use of paid labour on all public buildings was enjoined, and in 1857 this order was extended to all public works. In practice, however, it was still used to some extent, especially on irrigation works. Meanwhile Liberal sentiment in favour of free labour was gathering momentum, and was reinforced by the practical consideration that the use of compulsory labour on public works reduced the supply available for the rapidly growing demands of private enterprise. Attempts to restrict labour for the State to seasons when it was not required by private employers proved unsatisfactory, and at the end of the century the system of compulsion was abolished.

Experience during the nineteenth century in Java has been repeated during the present century in Africa. The various administrations used 'communal' labour for local road construction and also needed labour for other purposes, 'such as the construction of railways, or major roads for long distance transport, which were outside the range of even an extended definition of communal labour, more especially since they at times involved the absence of labourers from their homes for considerable periods'.[2] Imported labour was expensive, and the more costly because so many died. Ordinarily, for the improvement of communications, the use of impressed African labour was imperative, and was justified as a moral discipline and a source

[1] *African Survey*, p. 611. [2] *Ib.* p. 613.

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of future welfare. During the present century, under Dutch rule also, compulsory labour, though no longer necessary in Java, was freely used in the Outer Provinces as part of the Ethical policy of promoting native welfare; 'without strong rule, without order and security, no ethical policy'.[1] Compulsion was indeed used so freely as to provoke disorder and unrest. Of recent years, however, throughout tropical regions in general, there has been less need for direct compulsion to procure labour for public works, and now it is generally regarded with disfavour as both prejudicial to social welfare and also uneconomic.[2]

Although direct compulsion has been used chiefly for the State, indirect compulsion has frequently been adopted as a means of providing labour for private employment. The usual methods have been by the restriction of natives to reserves and by taxation. Both these expedients tend to reduce the supply of labour. The curtailment of native land discourages the growth of population, and taxation encourages migration. There are technical difficulties in imposing differential rates of taxation and 'the effect of a rigid flat rate is to drive the taxpaying male population to industrial and urban centres, and consequently to disorganize native society to such an extent that, on several occasions, governments have felt obliged to reduce the amount to be paid by men who are without resources other than their labour'. Moreover, men who are compelled to work merely in order to pay the tax, stop work as soon as they have earned enough to pay it, and they fail therefore to acquire efficiency as labourers. Experience shows that 'the shopkeeper probably provides a far greater incentive than the tax-gatherer'.[3] Indirect compulsion tends accordingly to follow direct compulsion into desuetude.

Compulsion, direct or indirect, is however less effective in providing a supply of labour than the employment of a special recruiting agency. In this, as in other problems, Netherlands India has led the way. Labour for private enterprise may be recruited by the State, either directly or through native chieftains, or by unofficial agents, with or without State assistance. Recruitment is often distinguished from compulsion, but 'a State agency for recruitment inevitably involves some degree of pressure', and is open to many of the objections brought against other forms of compulsion.[4] From the standpoint of employers, moreover, State intervention is undesirable as

[1] Gonggrijp, cited *Netherlands India*, p. 237.
[2] *African Survey*, p. 628.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 596, 648.
[4] *Ib.* p. 651.

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464 it is usually accompanied by unwelcome restrictions on the terms and conditions of employment. It was on these grounds that the Government of Burma formerly rejected proposals that it should revive the former practice of official recruitment, and fifty years later mill-owners protested against suggestions that the recruitment of labour should be supervised.[1] Even where recruitment is nominally free, private employers may utilize the assistance of native chieftains, and, during the Liberal regime in Java, when officials were no longer allowed to take part in the provision of labour, the planters commonly entered village headmen on the pay roll as servants of the estate in order to secure their influence in recruiting villagers. Usually, however, labour for western enterprise must be imported from some distant region where it is more plentiful, and in such circumstances special arrangements for recruiting are required. Naturally a private agent, dependent for his livelihood on the number of recruits, is less scrupulous than an official in his relations with both employers and labourers; he will supply employers with anyone whom they will take, and entice recruits with advances and specious promises. Although the substitution of private for official recruitment may supply more and cheaper labour, it is in some respects a change for the worse; the supply of labour is doubtful, the men engaged are often immature or weaklings, and the cost per head is high. Moreover, recruitment causes a local shortage in the area of supply; recruitment for South Africa causes a shortage in Rhodesia which has to be made good by recruitment for Rhodesia further inland, and so on.[2] This stimulates opposition among employers to the system of recruitment. Firms with large capital resources can make their own arrangements for obtaining labour, and thereby ensure a more regular supply of better labourers at less expense. Accordingly the strongest firms, best able to influence the policy of Government, add their weight to humanitarian protests against the evil of recruitment, and advocate stringent regulation.

464 686 The question of recruitment is closely linked up with the penal sanction, imposing a legal penalty for the breach of labour contracts. This protects the employer against strikes and desertion, and thereby reacts on the demand for labour. In Java such provisions originated in local police regulations dating from 1829, which were designed to ease the transition from servile to free labour in domestic service.

[1] *RAB*, 1880–1, p. 52; *RCLI*, x, Pt 1, p. 173.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 648ff.

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When similar provisions were embodied in the General Police Regulation of 1872, they attracted the attention of Liberals in the States-General, who obtained their cancellation in 1879. In Java the penal sanction was no longer required as there was by this time an abundant supply of wage labour, but the new tobacco plantations in Sumatra were dependent on labour imported under contract, and their needs were recognized by an Ordinance of 1880, providing for the imposition of penalties. The facilities thus granted were abused, and about 1900 an enquiry, held as the result of Socialist agitation exposed 'a general collapse of morality'.[1] An attempt to mend conditions by stricter enforcement of the law proved unavailing, as the legal effect of the penal sanction favoured employers. Accordingly labour policy, hitherto directed towards providing labour, turned gradually in the direction of protecting it. The means chiefly favoured were a closer supervision over recruitment, the gradual abolition of the penal sanction, and a more precise regulation of the duties of employers and employees, together with machinery for enforcing the regulations. The change may be dated from 1909 when official agents were appointed to recruit Chinese coolies from abroad, and rules were framed to control professional recruiting in Java. As the Government considered a penal sanction necessary to efficient management even on its own tin mines, its abolition was a slow process. But the closer supervision over private recruiting encouraged employers to take the matter into their own hands, and from 1915 various planters' associations established recruiting agencies. Employers came also to recognize the value of trained and voluntary labour; they tried to induce time-expired coolies to return for a further period of service after recruiting friends and followers in their villages. In this way plantation labour assumed a new character. By 1930 it was no longer mostly alien, temporary and recruited by irresponsible recruiting agents, but much of the labour was Javanese and exempt from penal liabilities, and the relations between employer and employed had become more permanent and human. A new Ordinance of 1931 aimed at encouraging these tendencies, and provided among other matters for a gradually increasing minimum of free labour, engaged on contracts without a penal sanction. Almost at the same time the Blaine amendment to the United States Tariff Law of 1930 prohibited the importation of the products of labour employed under a penal sanction, unless otherwise unobtainable in sufficient quantities. This threatened the

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 354; Vandenbosch, p. 282.

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464 686 Sumatra tobacco planters with the loss of a valuable market, and they announced their intention of recruiting all labour on a voluntary basis. As a moral gesture this was not very convincing since, owing to the depression, there was a surplus of labour on the estates, but it served the purpose of satisfying the customs regulations of the United States. At the same time, penal provisions were also renounced by Government in respect of the coolies, mostly Chinese, on its tin mines. Thanks to the Blaine amendment and the depression, the results attained under the Ordinance of 1931 were greater than had been contemplated and, when it came up for revision in 1936, a further advance was possible. By 1941, the penal sanction had practically disappeared, and on the revision of the Ordinance in that year it was finally abolished.[1]

In British India, where western enterprise has never been of such predominant importance as in Netherlands India, the Workman's Breach of Contract Act was repealed in 1926. But in most British territories in Africa, western enterprise is influential, and penal sanctions are attached to labour offences; though legislation of this type is less conspicuous in West Africa. The accepted view is that 'the complete disappearance of criminal penalties must await the evolution of social and economic conditions which will replace the sanctions which penalties supply'.[2] Conditions are less favourable for its abolition than in Netherlands India, but possibly a stimulus, such as that applied by the United States tariff to tobacco planters in Sumatra, might expedite the process.

466 But the abolition of the penal sanction need not, and ordinarily does not, improve the position of the labourer. Just as free recruitment needs regulation if it is not to lead to worse abuses than official recruitment, so free labour, unless protected, may be worse off than contract labour. The social and economic conditions which obviate the need for any legal sanction replace it by a more stringent economic sanction, for the legal sanction becomes unnecessary when the supply of labour is in excess of the demand. Javanese coolies working in Sumatra felt safer under a contract, even when it exposed them to penalties, than when working as free labourers. In Netherlands India it was the Blaine amendment that stimulated the tobacco planters to employ free labour, but their example was followed generally because, owing to the labour surplus resulting from the depression, employers 'were able, easily, and with a certain profit to themselves, to make

[1] *Vrij Nederland*, 22 Nov. 1941. [2] *African Survey*, pp. 659, 664.

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good any deficiency in the coolie force by hiring free labourers, in regard to whom they were much less bound with respect to wages and working conditions than they had been in the case of the indentured coolies'.[1] Women are cheaper than men, and the relation between free labour and the rate of wages is illustrated by the fact that between 1930 and 1938 the proportion of female labour among Javanese coolies rose from one-third to one-half. Thus the conditions that allow the abolition of the penal sanction create a greater need for measures to protect labour.

Protection. Compulsory labour and the penal sanction were opposed to Liberal principles, and were especially repugnant to the humanitarian idealism which gave Liberal principles a moral basis. But *laissez-faire* could not provide the necessary labour or cure the evils that Liberal principles condemned, and humanitarian protests remained ineffective until reinforced by the growing power of Labour in European politics. This gave humanitarians the support of an organized party with a practical material interest in improving the conditions of labour in the tropics, especially in occupations competing with industry in Europe. Still more convincing was the logic of facts. Changes in the social structure made the natives more dependent upon wages, and they grew better accustomed to working for western enterprise.[2] Gradually the more far-sighted employers in the tropics came to recognise 'that an improvement in the efficiency of labour offers a possibility of effecting a reduction in the numbers required, and has an important bearing on the costs of production', and they even went ahead of official activities in the care for welfare.[3] But the original impulse came from Europe. It was the Labour Party in the Netherlands that, at the beginning of the century, demanded an enquiry into conditions in Sumatra, and since 1919 the International Labour Office has taken tropical labour under its wing.

The protection of labour demands suitable regulations and adequate machinery for enforcing them. Paper costs nothing, and in this as in other matters tropical administrations tend to proliferate reforms on paper, but as we have already had occasion to observe, one must scrutinize the extent to which reforms on paper are applied in practice.[4] In Netherlands India the scandals in Sumatra led to the appointment of an Inspector of Labour for that region, and in 1908 he was charged with the supervision of recruiting and the operation of the Coolie

[1] Boeke, p. 151.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 651, 655.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 696, 1194.
[4] *Ib.* p. 649.

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466 Ordinances. Meanwhile the increase of factories in Java had led in 1905 to the introduction of a Factories Act. Out of these developments there has grown up an elaborate Labour Service. It is only natural that the need for such a service should first be felt in Netherlands India, where western enterprise has been so long established. In British colonies numerous regulations bear witness to the benevolent aspirations of Government; many of them 'have a common characteristic: they avoid laying down definite standards in regard to diet, housing, or medical attendance, and leave in these matters a considerable discretion to inspecting officers', so that their effect depends on the machinery for supervision. As Lord Hailey remarks, 'the efficacy of social legislation as a whole is dependent on the technical inspectorates which are the most significant creation of modern administrative activity.' Yet 'with the exception of Kenya, inspection for the most part has been left to administrative officers' and 'experience shows that their other duties do not always permit them to exercise that close supervision which is essential when large bodies of labour are employed'; they are liable to frequent transfer and know very little of what happens on the estates and mines; and they have an inadequate acquaintance with labour problems.[1] The regulations may be suitable, but there is no machinery to enforce them. It is instructive that in this, as in other aspects of care for labour, the larger enterprises would welcome closer supervision.

467 But suitable regulations and adequate machinery are not sufficient in themselves for the protection of labour. They have been useful in the West, but chiefly through the efforts of the labourers, organized in trade unions, either by their influence on legislation or by direct action. It has been generally held that tropical labour has little capacity for organization, and employers have reckoned this a merit. In Netherlands India, however, conditions favoured the growth of trade unions. The policy of segregating the people under their own chieftains and protecting them against the impact of the West, required the importation of Europeans of humble social status and on low pay to perform tasks for which under a different policy natives might have been trained. These men brought with them their labour politics and unionism. That was probably one reason why colonial problems attracted the attention of Socialists earlier in the Netherlands than elsewhere. It was certainly the reason why trade unionism reached the native world in Java. Europeans were linked

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 678–9.

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up with the natives through the large body of Indo-Europeans and in 1908 the railway staff, comprising all three groups, formed the first trade union. Before long purely native unions were formed, at first in Government service and from 1915 in private employment. By 1918 there were over twenty unions with upwards of 70,000 members, and by 1931 106 unions with 111,344 members, including 46 nation unions with over 85,000 members. In Africa 'natives are to a great extent debarred from forming unions to protect their interests, and legislation makes it an offence for contract natives to strike or withhold their services without giving notice of the termination of their contracts'.[1] Experience has shown that some collective means for the ventilation of grievances is desirable, as otherwise they may remain unknown to the authorities until disorders break out, but it has been questioned whether trade unions can serve any useful purpose in territories where the State has assumed a full responsibility for working conditions. The answer to this question depends on the extent to which the State discharges the responsibilities that it has assumed, and, in view of the lack of special machinery to enforce protective regulations, and the general ignorance of administrative officers regarding labour questions and conditions, there would seem to be a wide field in which the organization of labour could be useful.

In the West labour disputes turn chiefly on the point of wages. It may be assumed that better wages will enhance both efficiency and welfare, and that a standard minimum wage will ensure a reasonable level of subsistence. In the tropics the rewards of labour are governed by different considerations. Low wages seem to reduce the cost of production and, until recently, have been regarded as contributing to economic progress. In Burma the Government subsidized the importation of Indian coolies with a view to bringing down the rate of wages.[2] In Java, up to the end of the nineteenth century, low wages were considered one of the chief assets of the country, and a source of its prosperity. In Africa it is only of recent years that employers have tended to question 'the traditional view of the African labourer as crude man-power, which could be suitably remunerated by a low and undifferentiated scale of pay', and the conditions of development and the free use of pressure to provide labour have resulted in artificially low rates, approximating to the amount required for the support of an unmarried man.[3] Low wages attract capital and encourage

[1] *African Survey*, p. 698. [2] *RAB*, 1882–3, p. 141.
[3] *African Survey*, pp. 696, 710; Frankel, pp. 11, 12.

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465 economic development. But experience has shown that they hinder economic progress and destroy welfare. They destroy welfare because they leave the labourer no margin for maintaining his family at home, and thereby contribute in no small measure to the disorganization of social life; they hinder economic progress because they are too low for physical efficiency and discourage the introduction of machinery. Standard minimum rates have been suggested as a remedy. In Netherlands India minimum wages were fixed for the sugar estates of Java so far back as 1898, and for the plantations in Sumatra a few years later. In Malaya standard wages were fixed in certain districts in 1927, as an indirect outcome of the rise of nationalism in India.[1] Britain and other colonial powers have accepted the Geneva Convention of 1928 for the creation of wage-fixing machinery, and in Africa some Governments have been given the necessary powers, though they have been slow to act on them.[2] Regulations can make the best of existing economic conditions, but they cannot in themselves change the conditions. In Netherlands India wage rates have usually been above the standard rates, but in Africa it would probably be difficult to sanction any minimum wage that did not involve a general rise of wages. Moreover, opinion is divided as to the probable result of higher wages. Even in Europe higher wages do not always increase production or enhance welfare. In the tropics many hold that higher wages encourage labourers to do less work, as generally happens where employment is sought merely to pay taxes. There are also complaints that men who make good money tend to waste it on whatever takes their fancy instead of spending it on their food and families. Employers are naturally reluctant to raise wages if the result is that they lose their men, and, when paying good wages, they want the men to spend the money in ways that will make them more productive workers. There is much force in the argument that high wages do little to promote either development or welfare, but are chiefly beneficial to western manufacturers importing goods, often prejudicial to native economy and social life.

Moreover, there are great practical difficulties in raising wages. Far-sighted employers, actuated by enlightened self-interest may wish to pay good wages, but they cannot risk being undercut by employers who are less scrupulous or less intelligent. Also much of the labour is seasonal or casual. No single employer has any interest in raising the wages of the coolies huddled in the coolie barracks of

[1] Mills, pp. 227–9. [2] *African Survey*, p. 695.

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Rangoon on pay that is far below the level of subsistence. The agricultural labourer is in the worst case of all, for except so far as he may be protected by custom, which soon proves ineffective, he is exposed to the full blast of economic forces, and does not even enjoy the support of European labour. These conditions are inherent in the plural character of tropical economy. As Lord Hailey notes, 'the situation presents features essentially different from those of Europe', where economic development implies that 'new centres grow into organized wholes', and imposes responsibilities on the whole community where the labourers reside.[1] In the plural society of the tropics, however, employers and employees, even though living in the same locality, inhabit different worlds with no common social life. The 'iron law' still holds, and wage levels are determined by conditions in the reservoirs from which the labour supply is drawn. In Malaya any very great increase in wages must wait upon a similar rise in the reservoirs of over-abundant and, therefore, cheap labour in India and China.[2] Conditions in Bangkok and Saigon react on the wages of rice-mill coolies in Rangoon. Similar considerations apply to unskilled labour in Africa. Local action is almost impotent to raise the scale of pay, and any attempt in that direction encounters stiff opposition.

It is much easier to improve the conditions of working than to raise wages. Not even the most acute inspector can fathom the implications of a wages bill, but anyone can see housing, hospitals and schools. Good employers may lose their men by raising wages, but they can retain them by providing food and quarters. These things attract labour and make it more docile and contented. Firms which voluntarily provide amenities with a view to increased efficiency naturally support legislation to impose similar conditions on their competitors, and, as the provision of amenities is costly, such legislation favours big business at the expense of less substantial rivals and tends to limit competition. Also capital has often been invested on the assumption that labour would continue to be available at artificially low rates, thus creating vested interests 'likely to demand measures which would, in fact, ensure a supply of labour on these terms'.[3] Such conditions are especially prevalent in urban areas, where industries depend on the existence of a supply of relatively low-priced labour. This allows employers to claim plausibly that 'the contribution which the workers make to industry and through it to the financial prosperity of the

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 709, 1199.
[2] Mills, p. 249.
[3] Frankel, p. 12.

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466 country, carries with it an equivalent obligation for a recognition by the community of its social obligations towards them', or, in other words, that wages should be subsidized out of public revenue.[1] Although enterprises on a large scale with great capital resources can afford to provide amenities, other firms also want healthy, intelligent and efficient labour on low pay, and welcome State assistance in supplying it. Thus there is a general demand that private enterprise shall be subsidized at the public expense, and although, according to the generally accepted theory of colonial policy, economic development must be encouraged to provide funds for welfare, yet, in practice, funds must be provided for welfare in order to encourage economic development. Thus, with a growing demand for more efficient labour, the State has passed on from providing and protecting labour to promoting the welfare of labour, especially in regard to health and education.

[1] *African Survey*, p. 711.

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CHAPTER X

WELFARE: HEALTH AND EDUCATION

1. Health and Progress

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Good health is a condition of both human welfare and economic progress. Most people would agree that, if there is one sphere of human life in which the West can promote greater material welfare in the tropics, it is in the conquest of disease. For whereas western medicine rests on modern science and, by applying reason to the cure and prevention of disease, daily performs new miracles, the native medicine of the tropics is pre-scientific. Its practitioners inherit a traditional knowledge of herbs and rules of healing, and probably acquire some skill from clinical experience; even in Africa not all those who practise native medicine can be dismissed as witch-doctors,[1] but native medical practice is empirical, and its sovereign remedy is faith. Not infrequently it cures where western science fails because western medicine still calls, as it has always done, for faith, and the people trust their own doctors rather than Europeans. But if medical treatment in the tropics is to reach a higher standard, the empirical methods of native practitioners must be corrected, supplemented or replaced by methods based on scientific principles. This is the more urgent because economic development, unless kept under control, fosters unhealthy conditions, spreads disease and makes for the deterioration of native medical practice.

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Doubtless under native rule the standard of health varied greatly from one place to another according to the climate, soil and native social customs, and the good physique and healthiness of tropical peoples have often attracted favourable comment. In Burma Europeans have been puzzled to reconcile the sparse population with the robust constitution of the Burmese. In Malaya 'the general good health and freedom from tuberculosis'[2] have been attributed to the fact that the villagers usually choose a site where air, light and water are abundant and build their houses in a manner that ensures good ventilation. In Africa 'early European travellers speak of the magnificent physique of the Ngoni warriors and their amazing feats of endurance'.[3] Economic development changes the environment.

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1198. [2] Mills, p. 320. [3] Read, p. 21.

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147 [362] Pestiferous slums compel attention in the larger towns, but conditions may be worse in the smaller towns up-country where they escape notice; even the villages often suffer from congestion. Food is less abundant, because cultivation for export reduces the area under subsistence crops, and the greater pressure on this smaller area diminishes the outturn; the demands of western enterprise for labour [146] have a similar effect. Often the people take to cheaper or to more palatable but less nutritious food; thus groundnut oil replaces sesamum oil, cassava replaces rice, polished rice spreads beri-beri; sometimes the food is adulterated with imported products as when for some years large quantities of mineral oil were imported into Burma to mix with native vegetable oils. The natural effect of the economic forces released in the course of development is to lower the standard of health.[1]

000 Again, with man, as with crops and cattle, there is an intimate link between material development and infection. The improvement of communications and the mass migration of labourers spread old diseases and bring in new diseases. In Africa 'diseases have been introduced to which the African was formerly a stranger, and fresh strains of parasites cause attacks to which he was formerly immune; further, Africans now contract diseases common to temperate zones, and it is possible that the intensity of these is increased owing to the lack of acquired immunity'. The spread of sleeping sickness 'must in many cases be associated with the opening of new communications and the development of trading facilities'. The conditions under which labour is employed foster venereal disease, which in modern Africa seems to have an incidence ranging from 50 to 90 %.[2]

759 For various reasons also native medical skill deteriorates. The patronage of native rulers encourages the most successful physicians, and helps to maintain traditions, in Burma reminiscent of the Hippocratic oath, that make for professional self-respect. Under western rule the native doctors lose their best and most remunerative clients. 278 Moreover the herbs, formerly gathered in the fields, come to be purchased in the market, and are liable to adulteration, so that the practitioner no longer knows what he prescribes. This applies also to modern substitutes for native drugs, such as cheap brands of quinine tabloids which, if they contain any quinine, are of little use except as marbles owing to the thickness of the coating; prac-

[1] *ISC*, 1, 21; Mills, p. 321; *RAB*, 1915–16, p. 30; 1918–19, p. 41.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1129, 1144–6, 1199.

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titioners and patients do not know the difference and buy the cheapest.[1]

These probably are among the chief reasons why 'the systems of oriental medicine have fallen into decay'. The task of improving the standard of health in the tropics is aggravated by the fact that western medical science usually reaches the people as one aspect of economic penetration, and must first be applied towards repairing and preventing the mischief naturally consequent on the process of development. A solution of the problem has been attempted along two lines: the provision of medical assistance; and the introduction of modern hygiene. It is important to notice the essential difference between these alternatives. Medical assistance aims to promote *individual* welfare, and ordinarily requires the voluntary co-operation of the patient; hygiene aims to promote *social* welfare, and necessarily involves a certain measure of compulsion.

2. Medicine

Ordinarily the introduction of western medicine in the tropics originates in the needs of Europeans. From very early days the East India Company arranged with the Apothecaries Company for the supply of barber-surgeons to their ships and settlements. In Africa likewise the various administrations at first confined the provision of medical services to the needs of their own establishments. But administrative establishments are partly native, and non-officials in commerce and industry require medical attention. In Burma the earliest members of the general public to receive the benefits of western medical skill were the convicts in jail, and the expansion of medical services in the interior has been closely bound up with the growth of crime. It is only natural that generally throughout the tropics the provision of medical assistance has developed with the economic demand for doctors, and has been organized so as to cost no more than necessary.

But the spread of western medicine in the tropics has not been due solely to the growing demand for doctors; it has been due in part to the demand for patients. Medical missionaries look for patients. It is true that missionary organizations need doctors to preserve the lives of missionaries. But they have also recognized in western medicine an instrument for extending their influence among the people. To deliver their message they must find some method of

[1] *RPI* (India), 1897–1902, p. 245; *CISM*, pp. 13, 15, 23.

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758 attracting listeners. Where, as under direct rule, the people want education in order to get jobs, missionaries have provided schools.
797 Where, as under indirect rule, education has had less market value, they have provided hospitals. Missionaries have sought patients in the cause of welfare, hoping that by saving life they might rescue souls. Moreover the demand for patients has not been wholly altruistic. On western enterprise employers have come to recognize the economic value of providing medical attention for their labourers, in the hope that by improving health they might save labour. In Java under the Culture system the Government produce depended on the well-being of the plantation coolies and, in the forties, when the pressure on the labour supply led to famine and depopulation, it could no longer be disregarded. Thus, so early as 1851, a start was made in the training of natives in western medicine. In the same year Protestant missionaries were admitted. In Burma, developed by native enterprise under direct rule, missionaries have specialized in education, but in Java, developed by western enterprise under indirect rule, medical work presented a more favourable opening.

It is true, of course, that medical missions have looked on the provision of medical care as a good thing in itself, apart from ulterior motives, and that administrations and employers have been actuated by human sentiment in providing and extending medical facilities. Ordinarily the chief factor in stimulating humanitarian impulse has been the shock occasioned by a sensational outbreak of disease. In Siam the modern medical service dates from an epidemic of cholera in the early eighties; the ravages of sleeping sickness in 1901–2 focussed British attention on Uganda; shortly afterwards the outbreak of plague advertized the need for medical care in India and the Tropical Far East. But humanitarian considerations have been reinforced by the practical requirements of western enterprise, and it is
758 in regions developed by western enterprise that medical work has made most progress. Of the hospitals in Java, other than dispen-
743 saries, about two-thirds are private institutions, and in the Outer Provinces nine-tenths.[1] In Malaya, before the late war, the tin and rubber companies were maintaining 232 hospitals. In Ceylon about three times as many were provided by companies managing estates, and there were about an equal number of Government dispensaries together with 93 State hospitals.[2] But Asiatic owners and

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 380.
[2] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, pp. 29, 30.

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managers often have little faith in western medicine and are reluctant to incur expenditure that they think of doubtful value, and Europeans, to protect their own interests, demand legislation to bring such estates up to their own levels.[1] On the other hand, some regions, where western enterprise is backward or unprofitable, are very scantily supplied with hospitals.

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In these circumstances, though policy may be inspired by humanitarian zeal for human welfare, the spread of western medicine is dominated in practice by economic factors. The Government must provide first for its European staff and for natives in its own service, civil or military, for convicts in jail and for the requirements of criminal administration, and for Europeans engaged in economic development. Efficiency and the numerous other demands on public revenue require that such services should be rendered at as little cost as possible. Often, as in Burma and in parts of Africa, the easiest and cheapest way is to import foreign medical subordinates and menials.[2] These conditions tend to stress the importance of hospital discipline rather than to encourage human sympathy; as Lord Hailey remarks, 'It must need a great deal of skill and personal sympathy on the part of the European staff to overcome the impression left on the African by the discipline and isolation from friends which is the rule in many of the British hospitals.' We have noticed that in Burma the people regard the hospitals 'with fear and mistrust'. In Malaya the cult of efficiency and economy has led to the building of large central hospitals to which patients can easily be brought by ambulance, but where they are cut off from their friends. Similarly in Africa much money has been spent on imposing buildings that alarm rather than attract the people.[3] Even in England hospital discipline is often irksome, but the patient accepts it as necessary; to tropical peoples the need for discipline is less apparent, and it is exercised more rigorously. A tradition of human sympathy is characteristic of the healing art in Europe and also in great measure among native medical practitioners,[4] and a good bedside manner is a valuable asset to the private practitioner, whether of modern western or traditional native medicine. But kindliness is less important to native medical subordinates who regard medicine as one branch, and not the most highly esteemed or best-paid branch, of Government service, and it is easier to teach them

[1] Mills, p. 309. [2] *African Survey*, p. 1183.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 1195–6; Mills, p. 308; *CBC*, p. 33.
[4] Landon, p. 115.

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758 743 things required for their examinations than to inspire them with professional traditions.

758 Medical science, then, serves to further economic progress rather than to promote native welfare. Economy forbids that Government shall spend more on medical assistance than will meet the demand at the least expense, and the demand is limited even more closely by economic factors. Employers who recognize that sickness involves a costly waste of labour can provide medical assistance,[1] and can insist as a condition of employment that their employees shall accept it. Personal interest in the well-being of their staff often induces them to press this doctrine to its farthest limits, but they must submit to the test of annual accounts to shareholders, and they cannot sacrifice efficiency to welfare without risking the loss of business to their competitors. Although missionaries can take more altruistic views, they find most scope for their activities in providing Government and western enterprise with medical facilities for their employees, and Christianity is enlisted in the cause of commerce.

It is not the case, therefore, that economic development is necessary as a condition of providing funds for medical services to the people, but medical services are necessary as a condition of economic development. The progress of medical science *as an instrument of welfare* depends on the organization of a demand for it among the people. 757 How far tropical peoples voluntarily avail themselves of western medical assistance is uncertain; in Burma, as in Africa, they are readier to believe in western surgery which shows results than in western medicine of which the results are slower and less obvious. In general, western medical science has found little favour.[2] Burmans, we are told, 'don't care for English medicine'. In Siam western medicine has been encouraged since 1880, by their own King and not by foreign rulers, but 'in 1939 the old style doctor was still the one to whom the people ordinarily turn in times of sickness'. In Java, where natives have been trained to practise western medicine for nearly a hundred years, the people still have greater confidence in their own system, and in the general hospitals 40 % of the beds are empty because the people do not realize the benefits of western medicine.

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1194.

[2] *CISM*, pp. 1, 22; Leeuw, H. de, *Cross Roads of the Java Sea* (1931), p. 109. Fischer, Dr I. A., *Bulletin*, Colonial Institute, Amsterdam, 1939, p. 243; Landon, p. 114; *Rural Hygiene in Indo-China* (1937), pp. 11, 50.

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The usual explanation of the general reluctance to accept medical science is ignorance and conservatism. Yet the people readily accept new remedies that they find helpful. They are easily convinced, for example, of the value of quinine, and, as just noticed, will buy cheap imitations that are ineffective. Still more striking is the rapid spread of the new treatment of yaws and venereal diseases by injections.[1] These give speedy and obvious results, and quacks find ready patronage for cheap courses, long enough to cure the symptoms, if not to restore health. We have noticed that Burmans were quick to adopt inoculation as a prophylactic against smallpox, but slow to accept vaccination because inoculation gave results, and vaccination, administered by Indian subordinates with defective lymph, was not infrequently a failure. Natives will not admit the superiority of western medicine unless it effects cures where their own doctors fail, and they often find greater benefit from native treatment.[2] Modern science is no substitute for sympathy and understanding. A French doctor in Indo-China, who accompanied his treatment by tattooing his patients with charms in iodine, is said to have had great success.[3] But ordinarily western medicine is presented to the people as part of the apparatus of foreign rule and western enterprise. In Burma until recently the subordinate medical staff was almost wholly Indian, and the patients in small up-country hospitals were mostly sent there by the police. Yet it was possible to find Indian doctors with a gift of sympathy, whose hospitals, despite the barrier of race and language, were continually overcrowded with voluntary patients. But that was exceptional. The people generally do not want western medicine because they have no faith in it. Economic development multiplies the number of hospitals and doctors, but so far as their only patients are those required by administrative or estate rules to submit to western treatment, they have no bearing on welfare; they merely serve efficiency. If western medicine is to be an instrument of welfare, the people must be induced to want it. It is not enough for them to want it; there must be an economic demand for it. Very few can afford to pay the fees necessary to recompense a western practitioner for his long and costly training. So long as the people do not want and cannot afford western medical attention, the supply of hospitals and doctors is conditioned and limited by the demand arising out of the need for greater efficiency in business and administration.

[1] Mills, p. 315; *African Survey*, p. 1145; Landon, pp. 123, 125, 127.
[2] Teeling, pp. 19–21. [3] Thompson, V., *French Indo-China* (1937), p. 283.

757 This hinders the progress of medical science and therefore hinders economic progress. To popularize western medicine 'it is not enough to multiply facilities (however good in themselves) for the treatment of such as apply for relief'.[1] In homogeneous western societies the improvement of medical facilities is a problem of supply; the demand for better medical care is almost unlimited, and the extension of medical relief depends upon the provision of larger funds and a better organization for meeting the demand. But in the plural society of the tropics the problem is one of demand; it is a waste of money to provide medical assistance for which there is no demand. Apart from compulsion, it is first necessary to organize the demand. That is a difficult matter. The appreciation of western medicine, as of co-operative principles, must ordinarily spread slowly, but disease, like debt, spreads daily. The machinery of co-operative credit without the spirit has proved useless or worse than useless, but the machinery of medical attention may seem to offer more scope for compulsion. Tropical diseases are a mass affliction, and their rapid elimination is necessary both to native welfare and to economic progress. Hence it is argued that the treatment 'to be effective must partake to some extent the character of an operation, scientifically planned and humanly conducted, but military in its spirit and in the thoroughness with which it establishes itself in the area which it has occupied'. Thus the provision of medical assistance tends to be transformed from the promotion of *individual* welfare, requiring voluntary co-operation, into the promotion of *social* welfare by compulsion, the method which is characteristic of hygiene.

3. Hygiene

744 Even in Europe it was only during the last half of the nineteenth century that men came to regard the state as responsible for public health and for the prevention of disease, and a growing volume of welfare legislation marked the earlier stages of the transition from a policy of *laissez-faire* to one of efficiency and social justice. The new trend of opinion naturally reacted on colonial policy. In India, although the growth of towns consequent on the development of trade had long compelled attention to conservancy, sanitation was not treated seriously until 1863, when a Royal Commission showed that the insanitary condition of urban areas was intimately connected with ill-

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 1115, 1196; *Social Policy in Dependent Territories* (1944), p. 6.

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health in the army.[1] Even then the action taken was not every effective, and in rural areas practically nothing was attempted. In Netherlands India the Dutch, with their tradition of civic cleanliness, had been more active from very early days, and the first police regulations, framed for Sourabaya in 1829, required every one to tidy up his compound daily, and twice a day if along a public road. Van den Bosch extended these rules over the whole of Java, and it has been stated that a regular health service existed from the middle of the century.[2] The cleanliness of the villages in Java, as compared with the tropics generally, has often attracted favourable comment from visitors. But under Dutch rule, as elsewhere in the tropics, it is only during the present century that the care for public health has been placed on a scientific basis. Naturally it was in the larger towns with a considerable European population that the new concern for hygiene first took effect. The outbreak of plague in India and the Tropical Far East stimulated greater activity, though for the most part this did not extend beyond the towns. Gradually with the growth of western enterprise a new factor intervened, for the mines and plantations were situated in the interior, and attracted attention to the need for improving rural hygiene.

In Burma the epidemic of plague was the immediate occasion for the appointment of a Sanitary Commissioner and the creation of a Public Health Department, but, as in Java and Africa, the earlier measures to prevent plague tended on the contrary to spread infection. In Burma western enterprise is comparatively insignificant, and the activities of the Department have not been extended to the villages. In Malaya, however, where western enterprise dominates economic life, the public health service made greater progress, and, for various reasons, the course of affairs in Malaya is especially instructive. The Straits Settlements have been business centres for over a hundred years and suffered from the former disregard of public health, so that in Singapore 'immense sums have had to be spent to undo the damage caused by the *laissez-faire* policy of the nineteenth century'.[3] But the Malay States remained almost untouched by western enterprise during the nineteenth century:

'Their economic development and rapid increase of population roughly coincided with the growing realization of the necessity for public health measures. About the same time came the series of discoveries of the cause

[1] *IG*, IV, 286, 467.
[2] Hydrick, p. 7
[3] Mills, p. 298.

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744 and prevention of tropical disease which revolutionized or rather created the science of tropical medicine. The Malay States were able to take advantage of this situation without having first to spend large sums in remedying the effects of previous indifference. Tin, and later, rubber provided revenue on a scale which many older colonies lacked; and the administration was generous and far-sighted in its expenditure.'[1]

Moreover, in comparison with many tropical dependencies, the area of the Malay States is small, and the population, though not dense, is mainly concentrated in certain areas, and therefore the people as a whole are readily accessible. The local Sultans are men educated on modern lines, who can appreciate western medicine and can 744 use their influence to recommend it to their people. Probably there is no region in the tropics where conditions are so favourable to the 164 improvement of public health as in the Malay States.

As we have noticed, the rural population is said formerly to have enjoyed general good health. Tuberculosis was almost unknown until fostered by the congestion in the towns consequent on economic development. Similarly venereal diseases have multiplied with the mass importation of male coolies. The rice plains, in which most of the people lived and worked, 'were practically free from malaria'.[2] But when mines and rubber land were opened up to western enterprise, malaria was a formidable obstacle. Klang, the station at the coastal end of the railway to the mines, was very malarious, and the adjacent shipping centre, Port Swettenham, was so deadly that the Government directed its abandonment. But campaigns against malaria proved successful at both these places, and were extended to other towns.[3] At that time rubber plantations were being laid out, and malaria took a heavy toll among both Europeans and coolies, 'as high as one-fifth of the labour force'. Measures for the prevention of malaria were accordingly extended from the towns to rural areas. In 1910 a separate Health Branch of the Medical Departments was established to supervise anti-malarial and other health work in the interior, but its operations were hindered by the lack of adequate control over labour conditions. In 1912 accordingly the numerous separate ordinances for different classes of immigrants were consolidated in a Labour Code, which has since then regulated the conditions of labour on the plantations and mines. 'In earlier years some managers opposed the "interference" of the Health Branch, and failed to realize the

[1] Mills, p. 298.
[2] *Ib.* p. 301.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 299ff., 328.

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economic value of maintaining their labourers in good health.' The opposition, however, had some justification, as the measures that had proved efficacious in preventing malaria in the towns, had a contrary effect on the plantations, and 'resulted merely in heavy expenditure and increased mortality'. Patient research discovered and removed the defects, and by 1935 the protection against malaria was as complete on the larger estates as in the towns.[1] Another disease that has received special attention is hookworm. This is generally prevalent, and a special element of contagion exists in the Indian estate labourers, among whom a high percentage are infected, despite the treatment given to immigrants at the quarantine stations. It is not serious in itself, but it causes physical and mental fatigue, and consequently reduces the efficiency of labour. Strict provisions in the Labour Code regulated sanitary conditions on the plantations, but they were sometimes disregarded, especially on Indian properties. A campaign against the disease from 1926 to 1929, partly financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, effected a temporary improvement, but probably its chief permanent value was to direct renewed attention to the importance of rural sanitation. The Government decided accordingly to enlarge the health service, to enforce the Labour Code more strictly on estates, to provide sanitary latrines in rural schools and other Government buildings, and to persuade the villagers to build latrines and wear shoes.[2]

The beneficent activities of the public health service have gained the confidence of European employers, who now recognize its value in improving the health and enhancing the efficiency of their employees, and many provide hospitals and other amenities in excess of official requirements. But 'many Asiatic-owned plantations frequently evade the regulations, and have to be closely supervised by the Health Branch. They are a menace to their neighbours who have obeyed the regulations'. Yet the chief difficulty has been among the villagers, who 'are the worst offenders against the anti-malarial and other health measures and require constant supervision'.[3] They can be compelled or encouraged to build latrines, but, as has been found also in Java and Ceylon, they cannot be compelled to use them. In the towns shoes are a sign of higher social status, and every one wears them who can afford the money, but Government pressure has met with little success in inducing the villagers to wear shoes, which

[1] Mills, pp. 225, 234, 299, 300. [2] *Ib.* 234, 316, 17.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 234, 316–17; *Netherlands India*, p. 363.

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744 indeed are hardly suited to the cultivation of rice in mud and water. Much of the expenditure incurred in improving conditions on western enterprise is wasted if the adjacent villages continue to be sources of infection. But 'the Health Branch has to contend against the dead weight of a naturally indifferent and insanitary population' that, perversely, enjoyed 'general good health' without their attentions. Constant inspection is costly, and penalties are apt to raise the pitch of corruption rather than the standard of health. Even in a wealthy dependency with conditions so generally favourable as in Malaya, it has not been possible to do much towards improving the health of the ordinary villager.[1]

744 165 Yet one finds Malaya cited as 'one instance where the whole population benefited from medical and health organization assisted by economic development',[2] and it may be well to examine the evidence more closely. According to the Census Report on Malaya for 1931 the death-rate for Malaysians was 22·4 per 1000, for Chinese 24·3 and for Indians 29·8.[3] Since Malaysians receive least attention from the health service, it would seem that its activities play a minor part in reducing the bills of mortality. In Burma for the same year the provincial death-rate was returned as 17·36 and for rural areas, where western medicine and hygiene are practically inoperative, the death-rate, according to the official returns, was only 15·87.[4] But in Burma the apparently low death-rate was explained as due in part to 'slackness in registration', and this probably holds true also of Malaysians. It has been claimed that, in Malaya, 'the fall in infantile mortality is one of the best indications of what has been accomplished'.[5] Of recent years there has indeed been a marked downward trend in the figures, and this has coincided with greater activity in welfare work. In the Federated Malay States, the recorded death-rate for infants under twelve months fell from 218 per 1000 births in 1917 to 147 in 1937, and in the Straits Settlements during the same period it fell from 267 per 1000 to 156. But the first result of greater attention to vital statistics is an improvement in registration, and 'there is unfortunately no doubt that, even in such an area as Singapore Municipality, registration of births has up to quite recent years been very far from complete, and that even to-day it leaves a good deal to be desired'. The failure in registration in Singapore was estimated

[1] Mills, pp. 314–16, 320. [2] *Social Policy in Dependent Territories* (1944), p. 6.
[3] Malaya Census, 1931, p. 10.
[4] *RAB*, 1931–2, p. 130. [5] Mills, p. 328.

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at 10 % in 1931, over 20 % in 1921 and over 35 % in 1911; yet 'the relevant statistics for Singapore are probably the best available'.[1] Death registration, however, is far more complete than birth registration, and it is certain that no inconsiderable part of the apparent decline of infantile mortality must be ascribed to the more accurate registration of births rather than to the attention to child welfare. Here, again, the figures for Burma are suggestive. In 1931 child welfare work did not extend beyond the towns, but the infantile mortality rate in rural areas was returned as 178 per 1000, whereas the corresponding figure for urban areas was 277. These figures may not prove that most children die where they receive most attention, but they do at least suggest a need for caution in accepting the figures for infantile mortality in Malaya as proof of the benefits accruing from the health service. If those figures are 'the best indication of what has been accomplished', it is unsound, in the face of evidence to the contrary, to conclude that the whole population has benefited.

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In Malaya attention was directed to public health by the needs of private enterprise, and by the spread of disease as a result of economic development. European employers often go beyond the official minimum, and expenditure on the enforcement of regulations, as distinct from the provision of amenities, is chiefly incurred on western enterprises managed by non-Europeans, who cannot afford to comply with them or do not believe in them. Experience shows that the problem of improving the standard of health and the efficiency of labour on mines and plantations is ultimately linked up with the improvement of health among the people in general. But an improvement in the general standard of health among the people would seem to require that they shall comply with regulations in which they have no faith, and voluntarily accept rules which they are unable to obey and which the government is equally unable to enforce. In Singapore, as in Rangoon, conditions preclude the enforcement of the housing by-laws.[2] Where ill-health is the direct result of economic circumstances, the remedy lies not in legislation but in changing the environment. To most reforms, however, the chief obstacle is apathy. Without a change of attitude, expenditure on a health service as an instrument of welfare, or even as an instrument of economic progress, is largely wasted; given a change of attitude, most of the urgent reforms could be effected without spending large sums on a public health service, because common sense is sufficient to recommend

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[1] Malaya Census, 1931, pp. 106, 108.

[2] Mills, p. 321 n.

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them. Where improvements call for more than common sense, experts insufficiently acquainted with tropical hygiene as applied to local conditions are apt to make mistakes, as in the first attempts to prevent malaria in rural areas and to combat plague, and such failures tend to confirm people in their apathy.

Although Malaya has features of special interest, experience in Asia generally points to similar conclusions, and so it does likewise in Africa. The growth of modern views in Europe on the relation between environment and disease, and on the responsibility of the State for public health, 'coincided with the very general recognition that measures which lead to an improvement in health and an increase in population are likely to have a direct influence on African economics'.[1] The larger industrial concerns have in some areas anticipated recognition by the administrations of the need for extending public health measures. 'They have realized that, low paid as the African may be, an ailing and inefficient employee is expensive and wasteful.' 'Experience has shown that efficiency is closely linked with health conditions, and the more important organizations have now adopted, with satisfactory results, the practice of giving a period of "acclimatization" by medical treatment and dieting before the recruit begins active work.' This expenditure could be avoided if the people in general enjoyed better health. Moreover, owing to the generally low standard of health, labour was not only inefficient but deficient. Attention has frequently been drawn to 'the wastage of labour due to ill-health', and a recent committee in Tanganyika suggested that 'with the elimination of waste there is ample man-power for the needs of the territory, both for wage-earning and in the growing of economic crops'.[2] But in most regions much of the labour comes from a long distance, and a solution for the problem of making it more efficient 'lies not merely in attention to the health conditions of employed labour, but in intensive medical work and the promotion of improved standards of subsistence cultivation in the areas from which labour is drawn'. 'In some areas concentration on economic exploitation has resulted in enormous labour migrations which have not only drained the native reserves of the menfolk, needed for subsistence agriculture and a balanced life, but at the other end have brought into existence a dingy, discontented, "atomized" black proletariat which, on any standard of ultimate human values, represents a regression from traditional tribal standards.'[3] In Africa as in Asia, unregulated

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 697, 1194. [2] *Ib.* pp. 693, 697. [3] Huxley, p. 121.

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economic development tends to spread disease and foster ill-health; the more enlightened employers recognize the need for measures to improve the health of their labourers, and support the Government in taking steps to enforce similar measures on other employers; and attempts to raise the standard of health on western enterprise bring to light the need to raise the standard of health among the great mass of the people. 744

One aspect of this problem is nutrition. It is now recognized that in lands developed by native enterprise, cultivation for export tends to grow at the expense of cultivation for food, and it seems that during recent years, even where food grains constitute the staple export, less has been available for local consumption.[1] Moreover, the expansion of cultivation deprives the people of spontaneous products of the waste, formerly used to supplement their diet. Naturally problems of nutrition engage most attention where the profits of western enterprise are closely linked with the supply of food. We have noticed that in Malaya the loss to the Government and employers occasioned by the shortage of rice after the war of 1914 led to renewed insistence on the compulsory cultivation of rice. Especially in Africa the inefficiency of native labour is regarded as largely due to inadequate or unsuitable diet, and so 'nutritional problems are now much in the minds of administrations: whether the African eats enough food and, if he does, whether it is the right kind, and whether the attack on nutrition may not be the most important factor in reducing disease'. In the past Africans have adopted new kinds of food, but whether they will be so willing to accept the advice of dieticians would seem doubtful. In Malaya where the polished rice that has recently gained favour is regarded as a cause of beri-beri, attempts to induce the people to revert to roughly husked rice appear to have had little more success than the propaganda for standard bread in England, and it is unlikely that the African will be more responsive. It is unlikely also that the African will be able to afford more nutritious food, if it is more costly; normally, as we have noticed, in the process of economic development, cheap food drives out good food. Moreover, dietetics is a new science, and 'some African tribes seem to maintain physical fitness on food which is, according to nutritionists, wanting in certain constituents essential to health'.[2] Caution would seem necessary, therefore, in introducing innovations, and in any case no one can force the people to eat proper food. 146

[1] Wickizer and Bennett, p. 188. [2] *African Survey*, pp. 1122, 1194.

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744 Yet in this matter,[2] as in others, one may notice a growing tendency to use compulsion as a means of promoting welfare. Welfare is an attribute of social life and, for the common welfare, men living in society must accept restrictions on individual freedom. In tropical society they accept such restrictions in the name of custom, but welcome their removal under a policy of *laissez-faire*, allowing them at least the illusion of freedom. Welfare measures limit freedom. Men who value the common good voluntarily accept measures which they think likely to promote it. But in tropical dependencies, economic forces disintegrate society and foster a disregard for social welfare, while the people do not understand the measures that, rightly or wrongly, are expected to promote it. In such circumstances compulsion is attractive because it is easy to issue orders; but it is important to recognize the limits within which they can be enforced.

Compulsion may be *negative*, by penalizing breaches of regulations; that is the method typical of *laissez-faire* and the rule of law. Or compulsion may be *positive*, through pressure exercised to induce the people to adopt new habits, grow certain crops, eat special food and so on; that is the method typical of indirect rule through personal authority. The law, for example, may require that every house shall be provided with a latrine and, with an adequate and honest inspecting staff, and with a sufficient magistracy imposing deterrent penalties, such a law can be enforced. But it is impossible by legal methods to make the people use the latrines. The promotion of welfare through the law multiplies offences and administrative corruption. To make the people use the latrines is possible only by persuasion. And in this comparatively simple matter even the Dutch have failed. With a national tradition of public hygiene, and with the use of 'gentle pressure', on a scale almost beyond belief, through administrative machinery built up on customary authority and far more powerful than may be found in any British dependency, the death-rate in Java has remained almost constant during the last twenty years, 'having fluctuated around 1·9 % annually—about 1 % higher than in the Netherlands'.[1] In a recent brochure Dr Hydrick, of the Netherlands India Health Service, comparing the efficacy of curative medicine with the use of pressure and compulsion for improving hygiene, remarks that the provision of latrines is no more effective as propaganda for hygiene than the hospital as propaganda for western medicine. In a city compulsory hygiene may be possible and necessary, but he insists,

[1] Boeke, p. 163.

[2] [i.e. Nutrition — Analyst]

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with all the emphasis of italics, in rural areas '*the jails are not large enough to make the use of force possible*'. Moreover, coercion cannot give permanent results, and, after a failure due to the use of coercion, it is more difficult to secure the co-operation of the people. It should, he suggests, be used 'only to carry out measures which have already secured the support and the co-operation of at least 90 % of the people of that area'.[1] The use of gentle pressure to improve hygiene was a characteristic of the former Ethical policy in Netherlands India. But experience brought disillusionment. Modern British colonial policy follows the Dutch Ethical policy, in aiming to encourage hygiene by lavish expenditure on social services, and by recourse to legal compulsion or pressure. But compulsion in the interest of public health creates more problems, and more difficult problems, than it solves; the essential factor is human, not mechanical. Hygienic customs in the tropics have grown up slowly as a condition of survival in a tropical environment. Even so far as they suited the environment they reflected the general backwardness of tropical peoples, inviting European intervention which entailed the disintegration of tropical society and the collapse of social customs, good and bad alike. Many customs, indeed, that formerly were useful, now became harmful. Modern conditions require the observance of new restrictions on individual liberty. It is possible to enforce these so far as they are requisite to economic development, and the expenditure of funds on social services has done much to promote economic efficiency, though not to the full extent needed by economic progress. But that is very different from enhancing welfare, in which little can be done until the people themselves or their leaders are conscious of a need for betterment.[2] This change of attitude is usually expected to result from education.

4. Education: Types of Schools

In modern colonial policy few subjects have been so voluminously discussed as education. Apologists for colonial rule cite the expenditure on education as proof of its beneficence; critics complain that the expenditure is inadequate and that the methods of education are unsound. There is nothing new in this emphasis on education in tropical dependencies; it is an old tradition dating back to the Papal Bull of 1493. Education has always been regarded as a main instrument

[1] Hydrick, pp. 18ff.

[2] *African Survey*, p. 1206.

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of welfare; what is distinctively modern is a new conception of welfare. Formerly attention was concentrated on welfare in the next world, but now few look beyond this world. Education is expected to help the people to produce more, and to teach them thrift and business principles; to improve their health and inculcate modern ways of life, and, finally, to guide them to self-government. On these objectives, despite controversy as to methods, colonial powers in general agree. It seems also that in tropical dependencies in general educational policy has developed along similar lines, has produced similar types of schools, has encountered similar difficulties, and has had similar results. And repeatedly these results have been directly contrary to the ends proposed. At each setback educational enthusiasts elaborate new projects, but with no better success. For the repeated failures there would seem to be one sufficient explanation: they disregard the environment. Educationists frame their projects with reference to conditions in the homogeneous society of the West and attempt to show what education might be and ought to do, but they do not pause to consider what education actually is and does and can do, and accordingly in the plural society of tropical dependencies, their plans miscarry.[1]

The common tradition of western civilization is that education should teach the children how to live as members of the community. This tradition is not merely western but worldwide. It is the tradition of Hindus and Moslems, and was formerly well illustrated in the monastic schools of Burma, which aimed at teaching the boys how to live as Burman Buddhists. The African likewise has 'his own methods of education in the form of character training and instruction in crafts or, in the case of girls, in the duties of domestic life. . . . Social obligation forms the core of all teaching given by tribal elders, and the system is directed to fitting the youth to take his place in the traditional life of his group.'[2] But the old systems of education, whether elaborate as in Burma or primitive as in Africa, do not equip the child for life in the modern world, and modern education aims at teaching a new way of life. In the tropics 'education is, and is intended to be, an instrument of change'.

Naturally then the educational activities of colonial powers have depended on their desire to change the outlook of their subjects and to diffuse new ways of life among them. Educational policy accord-

[1] Furnivall, *Economic Review*, 1912; *Proc. Anglo-Netherlands Society*, 1944–5, p. 7.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1207, 1279.

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ingly reflects both the evolution of political ideas in Europe, and the course of changes in the relations between Europe and the tropics, so that, in broad outline, it has followed much the same course everywhere. Not infrequently missionaries have preceded, and indeed paved the way for foreign intervention, and have included education in their sphere of work. Ordinarily, however, in the earliest stage the Government has made such provision as might seem necessary for educating Europeans and has laid the foundation of modern European schools, but has left native education to the people. Then humanitarians, and especially missionaries, with the support of Liberal opinion, have obtained permission to provide schools for natives. This leads to a third stage in which practical considerations induce colonial powers to encourage native education. All these three stages, though distinct, have a common feature, that the prevailing attitude to education is one of *laissez-faire*: although in the third stage they provide funds and supervise expenditure, they abstain so far as possible from intervention and leave native education to private enterprise. Then, with the transition from a policy of *laissez-faire* to one of active construction, there succeeds a fourth stage in which the colonial administration assumes responsibility for the promotion, direction and control of education.

The process thus briefly summarized may be traced most clearly in the older British and Dutch dependencies; elsewhere the various stages have been telescoped, but we may recognize its operation in the evolution of four different types of schools. For children recognized as Europeans, there are *European schools* which aim at giving an education similar to, if not identical with, the corresponding course in Europe. The schools provided by missionaries have developed along two lines. In some the instruction is based on the appropriate European language, and in others on the vernacular. Both kinds of school are western in type, because directed by Europeans in accordance with western ideas, but it is convenient to distinguish those based on a European language as *Western schools*, and those of the other class as *Vernacular schools*. This classification applies equally to schools maintained wholly or in part from private sources and those managed by the Government. The western schools are intended for the westernized native; sometimes policy has inclined towards making them different from European schools, but the general tendency now is to make the course and conditions in western schools as much like those in European schools as

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871 circumstances allow, but with an adaptation to local culture. The vernacular schools are intended for children who will ordinarily remain within the native sphere of life, but in some degree of contact with the western world. The *Native schools*, mostly religious and often confining formal instruction to little more than the elements of religion, are a survival from an older world, and provide for that section of the people which still looks backward to the past. Thus almost everywhere we find these four types of school: European, Western, Vernacular, and Native.

The evolution of the same types of school under different colonial powers in widely distant regions of the tropics suggests that the course of progress has been directed by the force of circumstances rather than by deliberate policy, and it is significant that in respect of each type educational policy has been frustrated by the force of circumstances. Until quite recently policy has aimed at marking off the European schools by refusing the admission of natives or restricting it within such narrow limits as not to imperil their predominantly western character. But it has rarely been possible for long wholly to exclude natives, or even to maintain western standards of instruction. Now, at least under British rule, the tendency is to draw the line between European and western schools less sharply. Of still greater interest is the contrast between policy and practice in respect of western and vernacular schools. The policy has been to exercise restraint over the growth of western education and to encourage vernacular education. Yet everywhere western schools are vigorous and have multiplied even to excess, especially under the system of direct rule; one great problem of educational administration has indeed been to keep these schools within limits that the revenue can afford. On the other hand, it has often been easier to provide vernacular schools than to get children to fill them. So far as in some countries vernacular education has made progress, it is for the same reason that has made western education generally popular, namely, that it provides the means to make a living. Similarly, attempts to foster native schools have failed; their curriculum has grown more narrow, and the attendance has declined.

5. Education and Laissez-faire

Any examination of educational policy and practice in tropical dependencies must start from India, for this has led the way. We have glanced at education in India when reviewing educational progress

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in Burma, but it requires closer study. Formerly in India, as in Burma, the native schools aimed at teaching the children how to live, and, where this is the end of education, the more who go to school the better. At the end of the eighteenth century missionaries, aspiring to teach a better way of life, arrived. Despite the sympathy of some liberally-minded men, including the Governor-General, Lord Hastings, who in 1815 expressed a wish for some system of public instruction,[1] they had a long struggle against official discouragement and popular apathy. Their prime object was to elevate the masses, dispel ignorance and superstition, and spread Christianity, and with this object in view they gave instruction both in the vernacular and English. The latter soon proved its utility. So early as 1833 we find an Indian parent instructing his son that, although Sanskrit literature contained all that was really valuable, yet 'for secular purposes, for gaining a livelihood, a knowledge of the English language was absolutely necessary'.[2] These early missionary efforts had a most important influence in fostering the demand for English education. They taught the natives that English was a profitable acquisition, and the Government that English-speaking natives were profitable servants. The four stages of tolerance, approval, and encouragement of private enterprise, and finally of State control over education are marked by four outstanding official pronouncements.

In 1835 a Resolution decided unequivocally on preferring western education over the native system. The foundations of the modern educational system were laid in a dispatch from the Court of Directors in 1854, which recognized it as 'a sacred duty to confer upon the natives of India those vast moral and material blessings which flow from the general diffusion of useful knowledge'. This dispatch stressed the importance of primary instruction for the masses. 'If any portion of the orders can be pronounced characteristic and distinctive, it was education for the great mass of the people.' When a commission was appointed in 1882 to report progress, the instructions required that it 'should specially bear in mind the great importance which the Government attaches to the subject of primary education'. Its report, which guided educational policy for the remainder of the century, was based on the principle of encouraging private enterprise and abstaining so far as possible from official competition. The review by Lord Curzon in his Resolution of 1904 was the fourth of these

[1] *IG*, IV, 409ff. [2] McCully, p. 44.

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landmarks in educational policy, 'the special obligation of the Government towards the vernacular education of the masses, which was declared by the Court of Directors in 1854, was endorsed by the Education Commission of 1882, and has been reaffirmed by the Government of India whenever it has reviewed the progress of education'.[1]

But the masses did not want primary instruction, whereas the middle classes wanted jobs and the Government wanted 'to create a supply of public servants'. There was an economic demand among the public for western schooling, and an economic demand in the administration and in western enterprise for the product of western schools. In these schools missionaries preached the Christian virtues, and educational authorities stressed cultural values, but with the people nothing counted but examination results. Boys crowded the schools, and parents demanded more schools. Missionaries and schoolmasters, zealous in their calling, but not insensible to the lure of larger grants, made room for more and more boys, and educational authorities, also from mixed motives, provided more and more schools. Where schools teach children how to live, the more who go to school the better; but when they teach them merely how to make a living, the more who go to school the less they earn. There was a demand for clerks; and the more clerks, the cheaper. Competition raised the standard of qualification for the various appointments. When the market for school graduates at any standard of attainment became saturated, the boys pressed on to higher standards, and higher education was little more than an euphemism for more valuable qualifications. The results were surveyed by Lord Curzon in his Resolution of 1904. Contrary to the hopes of early enthusiasts, education had become an economic rather than a cultural asset; the desire of Indians 'to realise the manifold advantages as soon and as cheaply as possible, tended to prevent both schools and colleges from filling their proper function as places of liberal education'. There was a keen demand for schools and schooling, but practically none for school graduates except in clerical employment and the law. Thus the schools produced a surplus of unemployable and discontented men, whose intellectual attainments were bounded by the 'literary' syllabus prescribed for their examinations, and whose character had not been strengthened by moral discipline. On the other hand, the primary

[1] Indian Education Commission, 1882, Report, pp. 24, 112, 625; *RPI* (India), 1897–1902, pp. 457 ff; *IG*, iv, p. 417.

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instruction of the masses had made practically no progress. The early pioneers of education looked forward to raising the masses, dispelling superstition, spreading Christianity and fostering an attachment to British rule. But a hundred years of educational endeavour left the masses ignorant, stimulated aggressive Hinduism, and provided a focus for seditious agitation. The Resolution of 1904 accordingly marks the turning-point from a policy of *laissez-faire* to one of constructive effort and control.

In Burma and Malaya similar conditions, complicated by the supply of Indian and Chinese candidates for employment, had similar results, though rather later. In Netherlands India educational progress was slower, chiefly because under indirect rule and the Culture system there was a smaller demand for clerks. But the course of development was essentially the same. On the restoration of Dutch rule in 1816 the Government provided schools for Europeans, but in Java it expected the Regents to encourage native education. Missionaries were admitted to the Outer Provinces, though excluded from Java through fear of Moslem sensibilities. With the Liberal reaction against the Culture system, the Government recognized its responsibility 'for spreading light in India'. The adoption of this policy dates, as in British India, from 1854. Missionaries were admitted to Java at about the same time, but, as there was still some fear of Moslem reaction to Christian schools and there was as yet little demand for educated natives, they paid more attention to medical work. The European schools provided the subordinates required for clerical employment, and, except for a very few members of the upper classes who were admitted to the European schools, the natives had no facilities for learning Dutch, though in the towns some attended vernacular schools. From about 1900, however, the rapid economic development created a demand for more subordinates than the European schools supplied; the Ethical leaders emphasized the moral and material value of education and, before long, they found support in the growth of a Nationalist movement. In 1907 Dutch was introduced in some vernacular schools; in 1911 these were converted into western schools, preparing boys for the Clerkship Examination; and in 1914 facilities were given for further study. (The village schools established from 1907 will call for notice in connection with vernacular instruction.) Western education rapidly developed along the same lines as in British India. A junior clerk could earn fifteen to thirty times as much as an ordinary labourer, and the western school became 'the

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871 principal gateway to higher social rank and better opportunities of earning money'. Within a little over ten years from 1914, there was a surplus of unemployable school graduates, and diehards were criticizing western education as breeding unemployment, discontent and political agitation.[1] Similarly, under French rule in Indo-China, an educational policy claiming to diffuse the high ideals of French civilization had similar results, and was subjected to the same criticism.

If we turn to Africa we find educational progress following much the same lines. Here, as elsewhere, the pioneers of modern education, western and vernacular, were missionaries, with little support or supervision from the Government. In regions under indirect rule, so long as native chieftains were left to govern on their own lines, there was little demand for men from modern schools and, as in Java, western education made little progress. In Nigeria there was no Government school until 1899 and, when the country was taken over from the Niger Company in 1900, 'the first problem that presented itself to the newly formed administration was the lack of a clerical staff.... In these circumstances the various governments, and to a less degree the trading firms, were only too anxious to employ anyone who could read and write, and, as the country developed, the demand increased far more rapidly than the supply.' Education was a profitable economic asset and naturally 'the demand for any form of education was tremendous'.[2] 'At the mines, the trading stores and on European estates, the English speaking native can often command a better position and a higher wage.' The people wanted education 'not only for its use as a medium of approach to the administration and in commerce and industrial relations, but as the symbol of a higher status'. In Africa as in India the competition for well-paid appointments pushed up the standard of qualifications required to secure employment and, for lack of local facilities, natives with sufficient means went on to European or American universities, though 'the resultant efflux was socially and intellectually undesirable'. Thus, within a generation, we find in Africa the same complaints as in India and the Tropical Far East. The curriculum was criticized for 'bookishness', as being 'academic', 'literary'; there was the same 'cult of the certificate' and, although under indirect rule lawyers were not

[1] Creutzberg, Dr K. F., *Asiatic Review*, 1934, p. 119; Freytag, p. 69; Schrieke (*see* Bradley, p. 275).

[2] Burns, pp. 263–4.

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so numerous as in India, the superfluity of 'preachers and editors' was criticized from very early days. By about 1925 the conditions which had inspired Curzon to formulate a new educational policy for India in 1904 had arisen also in Africa, and here also education policy took a turn in the direction of control.[1]

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6. Constructive Education

When Curzon reviewed education in India the high hopes of early enthusiasts had faded, and the system of public instruction was generally regarded, not only in India but in other British dependencies and under French and Dutch rule, as a horrible example of what not to do. Criticism was chiefly directed against two points. The curriculum was condemned as academic, useless; and the study of English history and of the British constitution was held to be largely responsible for political agitation. Both criticisms were mistaken. The curriculum was, in fact, narrowly utilitarian, adapted to meeting the economic demand for clerks and subordinate officials; and political agitation was far more advanced and effective in the Philippines under Spanish rule than in India where the pupils studied Burke and Mill. Both ideas, however, were shared by Curzon, and he set about providing remedies. He directed that vocational and technical instruction should have a preference over 'academic' subjects; he wished to encourage higher moral standards by ethical teaching, stricter discipline and closer supervision and, especially, by stressing female education; and he reaffirmed the urgent importance of primary vernacular instruction. Through these reforms he expected to further economic progress by enabling cultivators to produce more, and also by providing capitalist enterprise with a larger supply of skilled labour and of more intelligent unskilled labour; he thought also to enhance individual welfare by teaching the people how to earn more, and social welfare by instructing them in modern hygiene; and he hoped to quiet political agitation by providing new openings for the unemployable intelligentsia. 'We have done our part,' he said, 'it rests with the people themselves to make a wise use of the opportunities that are now offered to them, and to realize that education in the true sense means something more than the mere passing of examinations, that it aims at the progressive and orderly development of all the faculties of the mind, that it should form character and teach right conduct—that it is, in fact, a preparation for the business of life.'

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 1219, 1232, 1244, 1258, 1279, 1285.

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871 During the present century the course of economic, social and political evolution has given a similar trend to educational policy throughout the tropics and especially in the direction of giving the system of instruction a more 'practical' character. In Burma, Malaya, Netherlands India, Indo-China and the Philippines, there have been repeated attempts to foster more assiduously vocational and technical instruction; from 1925 a series of pronouncements on policy in Africa almost re-echo the words of Curzon. Advanced education should be 'of a definitely utilitarian type' and mainly directed to 'the improvement of agriculture, animal husbandry and health'. The money spent on it 'would return to primary education in the form of teachers, to health in the form of doctors and to economic production in the form of agricultural, veterinary and forest officers'. It was thought that 'there is little danger of creating a class of educated unemployed as there is a growing need for the services of educated Africans'. There was 'general agreement that education cannot be confined to the few, but must progressively extend to the mass of the people', and there must be 'a drastic improvement in primary education'. At the same time 'the greatest importance was to be attached to religious teaching and moral instruction', and female education was to be encouraged—with such caution as might be necessary in view of Moslem prejudices. Also 'the need for closer inspection and control by government' has been accepted.[1]

That everywhere the current of educational policy should have turned in the same direction at about the same time is remarkable; what is still more striking is that it has been reinforced by the rising tide of nationalism. Between foreign Governments and Nationalist politicians there are many points of acute difference, but all agree on the importance of education and, in general, on the lines that it should take. Official and Nationalist views are not wholly identical. Official policy tends to regard education as an instrument of individual welfare and Nationalists regard it as a means of national advancement.[2] Although Nationalists admit the desirability of general primary instruction, they tend in practice to lay more stress on higher education with a view to political and economic emancipation. Nationalists whole-heartedly endorse the official view as to the importance of technical instruction. There is still another feature common to the educational policy of Nationalists and officials. All alike

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 1229, 1233, 1281, 1290.
[2] *Ib.* pp. 1281, 1286.

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throughout the tropics recognize the *need* for well-educated natives in all lines of life; but they tend to overlook the fact that there is a very small *demand* for them. 871

7. Education and Progress

It is in the sphere of vocational and technical instruction, bearing directly on economic progress, that one would expect to find the need for education most intimately connected with demand. Throughout the tropics agriculture is the chief, and almost the sole, occupation of the people, and it is conducted on traditional lines without the help of modern science. There should, then, be great scope for improving agricultural methods by instruction. That appeared obvious to Curzon and, in his project of giving a practical bias to education, he assigned the first place to agriculture. In other dependencies the same plausible argument has seemed convincing. Yet in India, Burma, Java and the Philippines attempts to teach the people better cultivation have proved unsuccessful. General experience shows that the courses fail to attract farmers and that the students look for posts under Government or on western enterprise, or else seek non-agricultural employment in the towns. In Malaya, when an agricultural school was opened in 1931, 'there had long been a serious need for it'. There was a serious need but a very small demand. 'A disappointingly high percentage do not intend to manage their own land, but want positions under Government or on estates. Here the experience tallies with that of agricultural schools in Java and the Philippines. The agricultural department is now pretty well staffed, so that the number of vacancies is declining.' The school helped the plantations by turning out cheap overseers, but even these were mostly Chinese, whom the employers preferred to Malays. Although the intention was to promote Malay welfare, the result was chiefly to profit western enterprise.[1] Much the same thing has happened in Africa. In the Transkei agricultural training has been provided since 1904, and there have been special schools since 1914. The men found employment as demonstrators and not as farmers, and in the former capacity their services were in demand so far off as the Belgian Congo. 'There is some fear however that it may not be possible to keep up these schools; the demand for agricultural demonstrators is, for various reasons, already slackening, and shows signs of decreasing still further.'[2] 874

[1] Mills, pp. 355–6.

[2] *African Survey*, p. 1222.

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It is significant that the provision of technical instruction has not been quite so disappointing in forms of production organized on western lines and mainly under western management. Even in this branch of economic life, however, the progress has been unsatisfactory. In most tropical dependencies western enterprise does not extend far beyond primary production and offers little scope for men with technical qualifications. In the Tropical Far East it has been built up on a basis of Eurasian, Chinese or Indian subordinates, thereby obstructing the employment of natives by a barrier which they cannot easily surmount. Even the trade-crafts are largely in foreign hands; the natives encounter similar difficulties in gaining an entrance, and sometimes meet with organized opposition, as when the Chinese master carpenters in Malaya declined to employ trained Malays.[1] In European concerns the higher posts have hitherto been reserved for Europeans, so that natives had no prospect of advancement. Moreover, where technical instruction has been provided, it has often, as for some years in Java, been debarred to natives because their 'academic' curriculum was not sufficiently advanced for them to profit by it. There is a popular belief that 'natives' prefer clerical employment as an easier, softer life, but this has frequently been disproved.[2] In most dependencies the failure of earlier attempts to encourage technical instruction has led to the appointment of committees of enquiry, and their reports have shown that there was little demand for men with technical qualifications. Even in Malaya, where the vast scale of western enterprise would seem especially propitious to the growth of technical instruction, a committee, largely composed of business men, reported in 1926 that 'the number of openings for technically trained men was limited, since the principal need of the country was unskilled manual labour, which was supplied by Chinese and Indian immigrants'.[3] So recently as 1938 a Commission on Higher Education in Malaya reported that the prospects of employment did not justify the establishment of an engineering school at Raffles College, and that training for the limited number of civil engineering posts could be given elsewhere.[4]

The slow progress of technical training in subjects bearing directly on material production is the more striking by its contrast with the

[1] Mills, p. 355.
[2] See e.g. Dr Van Mook, *J. Roy. African Society*, Oct. 1943, p. 180. Mills, p. 353.
[4] *Overseas Education*, 1939–40, April, p. 146.

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progress achieved in pedagogy. Ordinarily one finds that most of those receiving vocational instruction are being trained as teachers. Often, as at least formerly in Malaya, the pay and prospects of teachers are inferior to those of a clerk,[1] and the teaching profession is the last refuge of the semi-educated unemployed. Why, then, do so many seek to be trained as teachers? One reason is obvious. The demand for men in western enterprise and in the various specialist departments of Government service is soon met. But there is a general demand for lucrative employment, and consequently for schools to qualify men for employment, and therefore an almost unlimited demand for teachers. The Government can encourage the demand for trained teachers by imposing appropriate conditions on the grant of funds to schools. In agriculture and other special lines it is obviously waste of money to train men in excess of the demand, but there is little danger of an unemployable surplus of trained teachers, because in the teaching profession the Government fixes the demand that it supplies. Not until every school receiving grants from Government is fully staffed with trained teachers can the supply be in excess of the demand.

Whether the money spent on training-schools is well spent is another question. It seems plausible to argue that men will teach more efficiently if instructed in modern principles of teaching. But, in this matter as in others, the concept of efficiency is valid only in relation to the end proposed. Modern teaching methods have evolved out of educational experience in the homogeneous society of the West, where the school and the environment co-operate and teach the children at the same time how to live and how to make a living. But in the plural society of the tropics the children have a choice between attending schools, western or vernacular, where they may learn how to make a living, and native schools that still adhere to the tradition of teaching children how to live. Where children seek education in order 'to realize its manifold advantages as soon and as cheaply as possible',[2] a trained teacher should be better able to help them to qualify for 'a decent job' in the shortest time at the least possible expense. Within these narrow limits the certificated teacher should be more 'efficient'. But, in inculcating a higher, or at least different, point of view, he is no more likely to succeed than the many generations of devoted missionaries and educational enthusiasts in the past;

[1] Mills, p. 335.
[2] *RPI* (India), 1897–1902, p. 459.

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816 and the man who acquires a teaching certificate merely as a condition of employment, or as a qualification for higher pay, is unlikely to
874 recommend a different attitude to those he teaches. Moreover, in vernacular schools the great mass of the children do not remain long enough to acquire permanent literacy or even to get far beyond the alphabet. Often they attend irregularly when they are not wanted at home or in the fields. In such circumstances there is little advantage in scientific teaching, and it seems that teachers, after acquiring their certificates, tend to lapse into traditional methods of instruction; not without excuse, as their chief function is to keep the children out of mischief. In lay schools with certificated teachers, the great majority of the pupils get little if at all farther than in native religious schools such as the monastic schools of Burma, the Koran schools in Moslem lands or the bush schools under missionary auspices in Africa, while they do not enjoy the same moral background, and it may well be questioned whether, from a cultural standpoint, the lay schools are the more efficient. Thus, although the easiest way of spending money on vocational instruction is to multiply training schools for teachers, and such expenditure is less obviously wasteful than on other special types of school, it is not so easy to be certain whether the money is wisely spent, with a proportional return in social welfare or economic progress.

874 A further instance of the relation between economic demand and vocational education may be found in the contrast between the
463 numbers studying medicine and law. In the dispatch of 1854 one matter thought to demand attention was the provision of special facilities for training lawyers in India. Now, not only in India but in all parts of the tropics where lawyers can find employment, they are even too numerous. Governments no longer need provide facilities for those who want to practise law, but, as with teachers, can insist on adequate qualifications. Yet it is still necessary to encourage the study of medicine. The tropics need more doctors, and generally could do with fewer lawyers. Yet there are many lawyers and few doctors. That is a characteristic feature of plural economy. Every one, European, oriental immigrant or native, who has a case, whether criminal or civil in a western court wants a lawyer trained on western lines. They all want the same kind of lawyer. Demand creates supply and the supply multiplies in excess of the demand, with the result that the lawyers employ touts to seek for clients by fostering disputes, litigation increases, and legal practice

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forsakes the honourable traditions that mitigate litigation in the West. On the other hand, each group in each community believes in its own system of medicine, and wants its own medical practitioners. There is no demand for western doctors except among Europeans or in Government service, so that natives trained in western medicine can find only a few openings with little prospect of high fees or good appointments. Naturally they prefer the Bar. Even with such unattractive prospects the supply of doctors is sometimes in excess of the demand and, as in the law, professional standards tend to deteriorate or, as in the Philippines, a considerable number of doctors and dentists are compelled to seek appointments as clerks.[1] Ordinarily, however, the training of medical students rests with the Government, which can adjust the supply to the probable demand. The tropics need doctors, but there is a demand for lawyers, and consequently there are many lawyers and few doctors.

Here then we have the key to the slow growth of vocational and technical instruction in the tropics; it is hampered by the economic environment. But that is not a complete explanation. Other factors have contributed, and among them the tendency to regard economic progress as identical with native welfare. Educational policy looks to technical instruction as an instrument of native welfare, but educational practice encourages it as an instrument of progress. In many dependencies there have been repeated enquiries into the promotion of technical instruction, but these have been conducted largely from the standpoint of employers. The committee of 1926 in Malaya, for example, said, 'We fear that it is only too true that many of the youth of this country have a genuine distaste for hard and continuous manual labour'.[2] Clearly they regarded the youth of the country as merely so much labour, and this note, less crudely expressed perhaps, dominates most of such reports in most dependencies. Yet the report just cited has exceptional significance. The committee reported that there was little scope for technical instruction. But, just at that time, men were crowding into the motor industry and picking up the requisite technical skill where they could and how they could. That was happening throughout the tropics. One of the most striking developments of recent times is the rapid spread of the petrol engine and the introduction of motor transport in the native world. Men have learned to drive cars and lorries and taxis, and to do running repairs and even more difficult work, without special schools but through some form

[1] Mills, p. 368. [2] *Ib.* p. 353.

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874 of apprenticeship or through learning from one another. As with legal training, the demand common to all communities of the plural society has created a supply even without expenditure or encouragement by Government. It is noteworthy also that, so far as the student demands qualifications for employment in the western sphere rather than the ability to exercise his calling in the native sphere, there is the same tendency to the deterioration of standards as in other professions, and the boy claiming to be qualified as an 'engineer' may be employable only as a mechanic's mate or a road ganger.[1] The encouragement of technical instruction without regard to the demand for men with technical qualifications implied that it is possible to create industries by training men to practise them. This idea still survives in nationalist circles, though it has been abandoned by educational authorities. For the encouragement of technical instruction it is not sufficient to found training-schools and institutions or to train men for employment in the western sphere; it is necessary to create and organize a demand for it in the native sphere of tropical economy, by extending the native sphere to comprehend the whole content of modern economic life.

Naturally the cult of the certificate has extended to the domain of commerce. Formerly in Malaya there were great complaints at the salary required by anyone who could read and write a European language, even very imperfectly; 'youths who were neither good clerks *in esse* or *in posse*' could command high pay.[2] With the multiplication of schools employers get better value for their money, and employees find their certificates less valuable. When a child enters the education stakes in the infant class, his parents may look to matriculation as a standard that will insure them a competence in their old age but, by the time that he matriculates, nothing less than a university degree will command an adequate salary. The commercial school provides a less costly alternative, and of late years the number of commercial schools has multiplied rapidly. These are mostly private enterprises run solely for profit, with no encouragement from the State. But of the students receiving vocational or technical instruction, the number in commercial schools usually ranks second only to the number in teachers' training institutes. Yet normal and commercial schools do not give the kind of technical instruction that was contemplated at the beginning of the century, when the authorities were seeking an alternative to an 'academic' and 'literary' curriculum.

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1234. [2] 1905, Cmd. 2379, p. 21.

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The expectation that technical instruction would provide a substitute for academic instruction has clearly proved fallacious. On the contrary, academic instruction has developed more rapidly than before. For this the insistence on technical instruction is in part responsible. Technical instruction is based on modern science, and requires a higher standard of general education than most pupils in the ordinary western schools attain. In Netherlands India technical instruction dates from 1901, when the growth of western enterprise was creating a demand for locally trained assistants. The technical institutes were open to natives, but were inaccessible because at that time only European schools equipped their pupils to receive technical training. That is still the position in many tropical dependencies. Few pupils study natural science, and only a small proportion reach a stage which equips them to receive technical instruction. Technical instruction does not take the place of general education, but stimulates the further development of general education. But the chief reason for the continued and more rapid growth of ordinary secondary and higher education is the modern expansion of western enterprise and commerce. This has created a greater demand for clerks and for a better knowledge of the appropriate European language. In Burma the growth of private enterprise in teaching English compelled the Government to accede to the teaching of English in vernacular schools. In Java the people insist on learning Dutch, and in Indo-China French. In some parts of Africa 'native life is so closely bound up with a dominant white civilization, that the native is not adequately equipped to meet the conditions with which he has to contend unless he knows a European language'.[1] For nearly half a century colonial education policy everywhere has been directed to giving a technical, utilitarian bent to the system of instruction, but has been unable to prevail against the economic forces creating a demand for (more strictly utilitarian) 'academic' courses. Curzon looked to his new policy to train the people in the business of life, but in practice the new policy, like the old, does no more than train them for a life of business. Under the new constructive policy as under the former policy of *laissez-faire*, education in the plural society of a tropical dependency is an instrument of economic progress, dominated by economic forces, and a powerful factor in converting the social order into a business concern.

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1286.

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8. Education and Welfare

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Everywhere and always education has an economic aspect, for material welfare is one main concern of human life. The monastic schools in Burma aimed primarily at teaching the boys how to live as Burman Buddhists, but under their own kings they were also the chief means of advancement in Church and State. That was true also of education in medieval Europe. But in the modern world, when the application of rational criteria to social life reached the classroom, the economic aspect of education came into the foreground. In Europe this tendency has hitherto been kept within safe limits by the force of common social tradition but, in the plural society of tropical dependencies, there is no such tradition. It was because experience during the period of *laissez-faire* showed the need for some corrective that Curzon inaugurated the modern policy of providing a substitute for social tradition by teaching hygiene, thrift and morals.

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Hygiene, accordingly, is now often taught in schools. The teaching of hygiene can be enforced by attaching suitable conditions to the grant of funds, and teachers can be encouraged to obtain certificates as teachers of hygiene by the lure of better pay. But hygienic principles, as actually taught, are valid only for the examination hall. In Burma, one may find lessons on hygiene being given in a classroom thick with cobwebs. In western schools the teaching of hygiene survives only through compulsion, and in the vernacular schools it 'is a farce'.[1] Similarly in Malaya, as elsewhere, the teachers of hygiene sleep in unventilated rooms and neglect the most elementary precautions as to food and drink that they impress daily on their pupils.[2] In the teaching of hygiene 'success lies not in having the child learn facts about hygiene, but in having him learn hygienic habits'.[3] In this matter the Dutch, as usual, are very thorough. Each child is provided with a form in two parts. Every day on reaching school he must inspect the teeth, hands and nails of the child next him, and enter their condition on that child's form. The other part of the form, concerning his habits during the previous day in washing his hands, using the latrine, cleaning himself after defecation and so on he must fill in for himself. At the end of the month the forms are made over to a sanitary inspector, who visits sample

[1] *RPI*, 1927–32, p. 40; 1932–3, p. 17; 1932–7, p. 26.
[2] *RPI* (Malaya), 1938, p. 89.
[3] Hydrick, p. 59.

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homes to check the correctness of the entries. The system would seem unlikely to foster harmony in the classroom or the home, and one would hesitate to recommend it generally; and, except possibly in Java, the entries in the forms, whether made at home or in school, might be inaccurate and incomplete. But, even so, the Dutch recognize that it is useless to teach hygiene in school without raising the standard of hygiene among the parents.[1] In Burma, and probably elsewhere, men who have qualified as sanitary inspectors make a large part of their income by conniving at breaches of the health rules. Children may learn to pass examinations from text-books, but they learn to live from example and experience, and where the text-book teaches one thing and the environment another, it is the latter that prevails.

Again, the modern school is expected to inculcate thrift. In this matter also, in Malaya as elsewhere, teachers exhort the children to be thrifty while themselves notoriously in debt. Another agency for teaching thrift is the co-operative credit movement, but co-operative subordinates are no more solvent than subordinates in other services. The whole economic system of tropical dependencies favours and, one may even say, is based on, indebtedness among the cultivators and labourers; it is through advances to cultivators that exporters get cheap produce, and through advances to coolies that employers get cheap labour. One cannot cure this by teaching thrift in schools. Parents incur debt to provide a western education for their children, and men who have been taught thrift in school from the infant standard to the university do not learn to shun the moneylender. If the schools cannot teach cultivators to make more money, which they do want, they are unlikely to be more successful in teaching them western ideas of welfare which they do not want, and in great measure are precluded by the environment from adopting. Without fundamental changes in the economic environment, and in the climate of popular opinion, the idea that western ideas of material welfare can be taught in school is an illusion.

Very similar conditions apply to education as an instrument of moral welfare. Curzon deplored the lax discipline and low moral standards in the schools, and thought to provide a remedy by introducing moral primers and text-books of personal ethics, and by enforcing stricter supervision and control. We have noticed the sequel in Burma. When the new policy was first adopted, the moral standards

[1] Hydrick, pp. 13, 81.

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811 of the western schools in Burma were considered satisfactory; but religious training, ethical instruction and closer supervision were of
577 no avail to check the decline of school discipline and morals until, within a quarter of a century, they had deteriorated to much the same level as in India. In India itself a tacit admission of the failure of the new policy to attain its end is apparent in the latest report on educational progress, which contains no reference to religion or religious education, and only 'one depressing and colourless paragraph is devoted to moral instruction'.[1] In Africa again, when the need for a constructive educational policy was realized, 'the greatest importance was to be attached to religious teaching and moral instruction'. It seems, however, that the adoption of this formula was partly due to the need for conciliating missionary bodies that provided nine-tenths of the instruction, and in practice moral training fights a losing battle against efficiency. Many of the missionary schools are regarded as unsatisfactory in respect of secular instruction, and Governments, hard-pressed for funds, demand efficiency, with visible and measurable results. Thus 'it may well be felt that the time has come when the state should show greater discrimination in the support it gives to the smaller mission school'. The larger mission schools also feel the strain of reconciling religion and efficiency. As standards of instruction rise with the demand for higher and more valuable certificates, the maintenance of schools becomes more costly, and the missions feel the pinch already, while their prospects of financial expansion are remote.[2] Educational policy pays homage to morals and religion, but economic forces govern practice and oust morals and religion from the schools. As the people want cheap qualifications quickly the Government has their support in cultivating efficiency. 'It is the desire for school-teaching rather than any doubts about his own faith which is often the chief inducement for the native to bring his children to the missionary', and native opinion is beginning to show itself impatient of missionary control.[3] The missionaries themselves recognize the utility of secular instruction and, although there are some 'with whom the impulse to effect conversions has seemed to outweigh all other considerations, it would be far from true to say that this spirit has been characteristic of missionary endeavour as a whole'; many 'would wish to combine a more effective

[1] *Overseas Education*, 1940–1, Oct. p. 75.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1229, 1235, 1237, 1242, 1284.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 1216, 1235, 1242.

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type of education with their religious teaching did their resources permit'. Some, however, are suspicious of efficiency. '*Education*', wrote Bishop Weston, 'is in danger of killing Africans, soul and body. I view with great alarm the movement for educating Africans as quickly as possible....Education is the right of Africa—but education as practised at present will be Africa's curse.'[1]

The restriction of official support to the more 'efficient' type of missionary school reacts on female education. In Africa since 1925, as in India since the time of Curzon, the importance of female education as a means of promoting social welfare has been emphasized. There was the same apprehension that was felt in Java as to Moslem reactions, but in 1936 experience was held to justify the reaffirmation of this principle with greater confidence, and female instruction went ahead—to the prejudice of female education. In the domestic education of women the missionaries were doing useful work. 'There are few stations where some girls or women are not receiving a valuable if limited training in the domestic sciences or in the care of children, in nursing or midwifery, or as teachers.'[2] This was education—learning a new way of life not from text-books but by example and experience in an appropriate environment; but it could not be tested by examinations, or easily be recognized by grants conditional on any mass criterion of efficiency, and financial limitations and the doctrine of efficiency are causing the withdrawal of official grants from most of such schools. In Burma the American Baptists have done similar work among the Karens, with the indirect result that, among all the native peoples, the Karen Christians show far the highest percentage of female literacy. But that is not all. Many Karen girls after passing through the high schools, or even the university, willingly return to domestic duties in the village and the home. It is different with the Burmese. Despite the tradition of female literacy, there was no systematic provision of instruction for the girls. The women do most of the petty trade and, when the British Government opened schools to them, the girls in towns hastened to take advantage of their new opportunities. But it is only of late years that many have sought more advanced education in western schools, and these seem to be actuated by the same motive as their brothers, the desire to get 'a decent job'.[3] Whether female 'education' among westernized Burmese

[1] Maynard Smith, H., *Frank, Bishop of Zanzibar* (1926), p. 257.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1229, 1231, 1255.
[3] *RPI*, 1927–32, p. 25.

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871 562 will produce better mothers, or birth control and cheaper typists, is a question for the future.

9. Vernacular Education

872 So far we have been dealing in the main with western education, and have seen that the prospect of gain is sufficient to crowd the schools beyond capacity, but only so far, and in such directions, as they lead to a remunerative certificate; and that all values, other than examination values, are at a discount. Primary vernacular education provides the obverse of this picture because, in general, it does not pay; it is merely an instrument of human welfare. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century the diffusion of general enlightenment in India through primary instruction has been a main objective of humanitarian sympathy; this principle was adopted and placed in the forefront of official policy from the middle of the century, and it was reaffirmed by Curzon at its close. Yet the progress achieved 'is shown by statistics admitted by the highest educational authorities to be thoroughly unsatisfactory',[1] and in Burma, which started the nineteenth century under native rule with a literate male population, the picture of primary instruction after a hundred years of British rule is 'one of almost unrelieved gloom'.[2] For over a hundred years there has been general agreement in India that primary instruction is the most effective instrument of material and moral welfare, yet, so far as there has been any progress under either head since the time of Wilberforce and Carey, it certainly cannot be attributed to the spread of primary instruction. This has not spread because there has been no demand for it. Now that it is again proclaimed with new insistence as the chief aim of modern educational policy in the tropics generally, some examination of the grounds on which it has been advocated seems expedient. Apart from humanitarian considerations they fall under two heads, political and economic.

872 21 Many have urged the spread of vernacular instruction on grounds of political convenience. Curzon cited with approval the dictum that 'among all sources of administrative difficulty and political danger, few are so serious as the ignorance of the people'.[3] This view is still widely held. Mass education is recommended as a safeguard against explosive temper liable to produce a social upheaval. One is told that 'an increase of literacy makes the people easier to control and govern',

[1] Mayhew, *India*, p. 226. [2] *CVV*, p. 156.
[3] *RPI* (India), 1897–1902, p. 462; *Mass Education*, p. 7; Mayhew, *India*, p. 226.

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and that 'it is pleasanter and cheaper to mould a literate population by appropriate and intelligent methods of education than to suppress an illiterate mob by machine guns'. There is very little evidence for such assertions, and certainly experience in Netherlands India and Burma contradicts them. The Dutch, when ruling an illiterate people through their native chieftains, had less difficulty in preserving *rust en orde*, and in moulding the people to their will, than in recent years when literacy has been making rapid progress. In the serious outbreak of 1926, though few of the rebels were highly educated, many had gone far beyond the common man in schooling. In Burma, with a high proportion of literates, there has been greater difficulty than in Java in maintaining law and order, and in obtaining a ready compliance with Government policy; on the contrary, districts conspicuous for literacy are also conspicuous for crime, and of the rebels in 1931 most would have passed for highly educated men in Africa. The early Liberals believed that education would automatically strengthen the ties between India and Britain; Curzon, finding this belief mistaken, tried to stimulate loyalty by hanging up portraits of the King in schools. In Burma there were attempts during the war of 1914–18 to use the schools for spreading 'the imperial idea', and 'to foster a sense of personal attachment to the King-Emperor'.[1] In French dependencies the schools try to evoke an admiration of France, and in Belgian dependencies an affection for Belgium.[2] But those who learn to read find little reading matter except newspapers, described in Netherlands India as 'cheap and nasty—like other things intended for tropical consumption', and often disaffected towards Government. Both in Burma and Java, long before the rise of modern Nationalism, the earliest native newspapers were critical of foreign rule, and the figures already given show that in Burma the circulation of periodicals varies directly with the violence of their attacks on Government. Under indirect rule the people learn from the newspapers to criticize not only the foreign Government but their own chieftains. There would seem little reason, therefore, to expect that the spread of primary instruction will increase docility, and even if it were true that primary instruction makes a people easier to control and govern, this would not induce illiterate parents who do not value education to send their children to the schools.

Others hold out a more tempting bait. They argue that undeveloped minds are incapable of political activities, and that 'in order to pro-

[1] *CII*, p. 5. [2] Mayhew, *Colonial Empire*, p. 143.

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gress towards self-government in the modern world colonial peoples must learn to read, and to understand, not only their own local affairs but those of wider import'.[1] Primary instruction is advocated as a first step towards 'responsible government', and therefore a condition of autonomy. But in the early nineteenth century, literacy was far more widely diffused in Burma than in Britain, yet this did not secure its independence. Even now the comparatively greater literacy of Burma does not seem to make it apter for western political institutions than Java, whereas Siam, with a smaller proportion of literates, has managed to remain independent. In Netherlands India, despite the spread of primary instruction during the past generation, it has been estimated that 167 years must elapse before the last illiterate is dragged to school, and in the Gold Coast, the most forward dependency in Africa in respect of education, the period has been put at 600 years.[2] Prospects of self-government at so remote a date are unlikely to kindle much enthusiasm for primary instruction, and critics have not unnaturally enquired whether its advocates wish to diffuse enlightenment or to delay self-government.

The recent project of mass education looks to the elimination of illiteracy in Africa within some thirty years.[3] That project, though optimistic, is not impossible if the people can be induced to want primary instruction. The prospect of self-government is an inducement; but it is also an illusion. 'Self-government' suggests that they will be free to do what they may want to do. But unless they want to do what, in the conditions of the modern world they must do, they will not be free, or even able to do it. To change their wants is much harder than to teach them letters and, without that, literacy may help them to express their dissatisfaction at not getting what they want, but it will make government more difficult and will raise a new obstacle to self-government. Literacy in itself is nothing. If it were possible to make the whole of Africa as literate to-morrow as Burma is to-day, it would be no more capable than Burma of managing western democratic institutions. Literacy may be an instrument of good or evil and, if tropical peoples are induced to acquire letters on the ground that this implies self-government, they will use the power of letters to vent their disappointment on those who have deceived them. Their profit will be that they know how to curse. Primary instruction, if recommended as

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 7; *Mass Education*, p. 14.
[2] *African Survey*, p. 1235; *HIOC*, Résumé, p. 76.
[3] *Mass Education*, pp. 10, 11.

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a step towards self-government, is more likely to cause than to cure an explosive temper and a social upheaval. It may not be impossible to teach tropical peoples their alphabet within a generation, but 'if means must be found and found quickly whereby the people as a *community* can understand and appreciate the forces which have changed and are changing their lives so radically' and 'to call out the ability and will to share in the direction and control of the social, economic and political forces', this end is more likely to be attained by educating the leaders of the community rather than through the mass education of individuals who, taken in the mass, are chiefly concerned, in Africa as elsewhere, with getting their daily bread, and do not hope or wish to meddle in matters that are too high for them. In this matter nationalist opinion, which insists on the education of leaders, is guided by a sound instinct, and the emphasis of colonial powers on primary instruction, however well intended, makes nationalists suspect that leaders are not wanted.

Among the advocates of primary instruction on economic grounds one can also hear two voices. Those who are chiefly concerned with economic progress urge that it will make the native more profitable as a coolie. 'If he is to work harder, longer and more continuously, education must inculcate the ideas of sanctity of contract and of ordinary honesty to his employers.'[1] This appeal to the sanctity of contract—the only saint in the Calendar of Mammon—suggests that the coincidence between the modern emphasis on primary instruction and the discovery that unintelligent labour is uneconomic is not wholly fortuitous. In Malaya the project of opening special schools for immigrants was formerly regarded as a 'fatal error' creating a plural society by 'tending to keep them aliens and encouraging them in the idea that China or India is their home'. But shortly afterwards, the Government decided to open Tamil schools 'with the object of making the F.M.S. from the point of view of the Indian immigrant, an outlying province of India, like Ceylon'.[2] These schools, though recognized as detrimental to social welfare, were created in the interest of economic progress. Experience has shown that Tamil education 'is of value not only as an incentive to recruiting labour for the rubber estates, but as a means of keeping the Tamil labourer happy and contented',[3] and many plantations now have schools for

[1] Mayhew, *Colonial Empire*, p. 141.
[2] 1905, Cmd. 2379, p. 11, and 11 n.
[3] Sir George Maxwell, quoted Sidney, p. 203; Mills, pp. 340, 34[illegible]

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872 coolies. In Africa some western enterprises support schools under the right kind of missionary and although, so far, employers in general have displayed little interest in the matter, it is thought that 'shortage of labour in some African areas may dispose them to offer facilities for education, in addition to provisions for general welfare, as an inducement to workers to stay in one place and become more efficient'.[1] Doubtless human sympathy plays a large part in the establishment of schools on western enterprise, but economic interest stimulates this sympathy, and the substantial contributions from Government and from missionary bodies towards the cost of education help to reduce the cost of wages. Education in the name of welfare becomes an instrument of economic progress even to the detriment of social welfare, as with the fostering of communal separation in Malaya. In any case the diffusion of primary instruction among the general public depends not on the demand of employers for more intelligent labour, but on the demand of parents for more schools, and they will not send their children to school in order that they may 'work harder, longer and more continuously' on western enterprise.

Most advocates of primary instruction, however, state the case, more persuasively, on grounds of native welfare. Curzon held that it would help the cultivator in his transactions with moneylenders, merchants and officials. Many claim that it will not only help the cultivators in their business but will enable officials to teach them better agricultural methods, the principles of co-operative credit and modern hygiene.[2] 'Every health measure, every improvement of agricultural methods, the co-operative machinery for production and distribution, the establishment of secondary industries—all these will make increasing demands upon the people and they will be able to respond only if they have had some educational opportunities.'[3] This sounds plausible, and some hold that it is proved. 'So far in the British Colonies we have acted on the assumption that people would eventually adopt improved methods of agriculture, hygienic surroundings and western medical ideas without learning to read and write....It has been proved that the attainment of literacy makes people aware of the need for social and economic improvements, and therefore they will co-operate more readily with welfare and other agencies working on these lines.'[4] It would be difficult to find another

[1] *Mass Education*, p. 27. [2] Mayhew, *India*, p. 226.
[3] Colonial Secretary, House of Commons, 13 July 1943.
[4] *Mass Education*, p. 14.

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example of so many fallacies in so few words. It is not true that we have acted on this assumption, and it is not true that literacy entails better living. On the other hand people take to better living without literacy, for they will take over from the West anything that they find profitable, even education. But education when sought as a means of individual profit is not an instrument of welfare, not even of individual welfare, because it injures social welfare. The assumption is against all probability, and, as will appear below, is contradicted by the facts.

It is certainly not the case that we have tried to improve the condition of the people before teaching them to read and write. In India the diffusion of primary instruction had been a main object of policy for half a century before the promotion of hygiene and other objects of social welfare received serious attention. Since about 1900 it has been advocated as a means of improving hygiene. But the people, in general, have been no more responsive to the efforts to encourage primary instruction than to the efforts to promote hygiene. They did not want to learn to read and write because it would not pay.

Again, the suggestion that literacy leads to better living will not stand the most cursory examination. Doubtless in Singapore the proportion of literacy is higher among the Chinese who live in palaces than among the Chinese of the slums: but the former do not live in palaces because they are literate; they are literate because they can live in palaces. Literacy is often expected to encourage thrift. But if a man wants to borrow money he will sign his name as readily as he will make his mark, though, as a signature is less easy to repudiate, the transaction is really more imprudent. When he sells his crops, literacy will not raise the price fixed by a ring of buyers. In Burma debt is most burdensome in tracts with the highest proportion of literates, and in these tracts co-operative credit was the greatest failure. All over the Tropical Far East literacy under native rule was far more widely diffused than in India or Africa, but it has not kept the people out of debt. Also if so much is expected from vernacular literacy, one would expect more from the higher standard of literacy attained by those acquainted with a European language. Yet in Burma, and probably elsewhere, we find clerks in Government service and commercial firms heavily indebted to illiterate menials. Similarly indebtedness prevails among subordinate officials, including judges and magistrates. In Java one hears of Regents in the clutches of Chinese moneylenders. In the Philippines, for all the efforts of the

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American Government to promote literacy, agricultural debt seems worse than in Malaya, and even candidates for the local representative assembly, who are presumably among the more highly educated, readily incur insolvency in their electoral campaigns.[1] For the promotion of thrift and better business methods, the attainment of literacy in itself is nothing, nor has literacy enabled administrations to promote thriftiness. Create an environment that puts a premium on thrift, imbue the people with a spirit of thriftiness, and literacy, though unessential, will be helpful.

But if literacy can do so little in helping the people to improve their economic position and get the things they value, no one can expect it to be more effective in changing their standard of values, in leading them voluntarily to accept the restrictions on personal liberty, involved in modern western hygiene. We have noticed that even the teachers of hygiene do not practise what they preach, and those who give and receive these lessons are all literate. Where a comparatively high degree of literacy has such poor results, universal primary instruction is unlikely to be more effective. If, as is commonly believed, people will not 'adopt improved methods of agriculture, a more nutritious diet, hygienic surroundings and western medical ideas without learning to read and write', they will not adopt them the more readily merely for being taught their alphabet.

In point of fact, however, this common belief is wrong. It is untrue that people must learn to read and write in order to attain greater welfare. We have noticed that throughout the tropics in both Africa and Asia, cultivators, literate or illiterate, have taken to new crops and new kinds of food. In Java, despite illiteracy, the standard of rural hygiene, unsatisfactory as it may seem to the Dutch, has long presented a striking contrast with conditions in most parts of the tropics. If people can be induced to want social and economic improvements they will value literacy, both in itself and as an instrument of other aspects of social advance, but in itself literacy will not inspire them with new wants.

Literacy is one sign of civilization. The Burmese are literate, and stand on a higher plane of civilization than the surrounding hill tribes; but they are more literate because they are more civilized, and not more civilized because they are more literate. Some of these hill tribes are Karens. Missionary work has made great progress among the Karens, and among Christian Karens there is a higher standard

[1] Mills, p. 276; Malcolm, pp. 171, 212, 220.

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of literacy, and a far higher standard of female literacy than among the Burmese. But the Karens did not learn to read and write in order to become Christians; they learned to read and write because they had become Christians. Social progress led to economic progress, and both social and economic progress are reflected in their literacy. Similarly the Burmese are not Buddhists because they learn to read and write, but they learn to read and write because they are Buddhists Literacy is a sign and not a cause of social progress. Inspire tropical peoples with a desire for western standards of social life and they will want, among other things, to read and write; but the ability to read and write will not inspire them with a desire for social or economic progress. It is true that in Russia and China there has recently been great progress both in literacy and in the general standard of living, but that is because a new spirit has descended on them. In Malaya the people remained apathetic in respect of schooling until 'the Malay rulers turned to education to equip their subjects to hold their own against the educated Indian and the intellectual and energetic Chinese'.[1] Similarly in Java the modern growth of literacy has been stimulated by the appeal to patriotism. But, without a complete transformation of the social and economic environment, literacy alone will help the people no better than it has helped the Burmese. 'Even if popular education were made universal and compulsory throughout the dependencies, it would not in itself produce a revolution in social outlook such as seems, for instance to have been effected in Soviet Russia and to some extent in China.'[2]

The easiest way to diffuse primary instruction is to make it pay. That is the way in which western instruction spread. Where, as frequently in urban areas, literacy has an economic value, or where it confers a higher social standing, many lads will pick up reading and writing without special facilities and without encouragement. We can see this in Africa, where 'in some areas a number of them have had a smattering of education, often quite unrelated to their environment and to the possibilities of employment. But this smattering, which includes the three R's, represents the intention of their parents that their children shall have *some* education, and expresses an almost pathetic belief in the inherent value of learning to read and write'.[3] Yet mere literacy has no intrinsic value; it has a scarcity value, and enables those who can read and write to earn more. Parents who

[1] *RPI* (Malaya), 1938, p. 8.
[2] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 33.
[3] *Mass Education*, p. 18.

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872 believe this will send their children to vernacular schools so that they can earn more, just as in the past they have sent their children, often at great sacrifice, to western schools, and with the same result, but on a vastly wider scale, of producing discontent when the supply of those who can read and write is in excess of the demand. If vernacular education be recommended to the people as a means of individual advancement, it may provide more intelligent and more economic labour, but it will be perverted, like western education, from an instrument of welfare into an instrument of progress and its expansion will be governed by the demand for labour. The problem is to find some non-economic motive sufficient to induce parents to send their children to school. If such a motive can be found, then the more who go to school the better.

10. Native Education

871 While vernacular instruction has languished, native education has declined. It was formerly the strength of native education that it was based on ideas transcending the economic sphere. It taught them how to live. Now that the world in which it taught them how to live has vanished, the native schools decay. In Burma the monastic schools have lost much of their social value through the drainage of their wealthier and brighter pupils into western schools. In towns they have suffered also from the competition of lay schools, feeding the western schools, providing candidates for subordinate vernacular appointments, and attracting others who for various reasons are content with secular instruction. It has been the policy of the Government to adapt them to the modern world. 'The method of translating the policy into practice varied from time to time, but the variations played on a single theme—the secularization of the curriculum and methods of the monastic school.'[1] The monastic schools sufficed to provide magistrates and judges, so long as no other schools were available, but they did not fit into a scheme based on the assumption that efficiency in education could be tested by the acquisition of certificates qualifying for appointments, and they could not compete with the better lay schools in getting boys quickly through their examinations. Thus they were driven into the backwoods. There was no need to secularize western education, though it was largely in the hands of missionaries, for missionary schools, no less than lay schools, are dominated by the cult of the certificate, and now, as we have noted, the problem is 'how to spiritual-

[1] *CVV*, p. 131.

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ize education'. Similarly, in Java, the progress of modern education has led to the decay of native schools. Formerly 'the children were entrusted to some village elder or religious leader for moral and social training, and also to learn simple arithmetic and reading and writing in a local script or in Arabic. These forms of teaching shrank to a simple religious teaching, and this process was quicker at first than the development of the new government education. Paradoxically therefore the creation of modern education increased the number of illiterates'.[1] The introduction of French education in Indo-China seems to have had a similar result. The decay of native education in the Tropical Far East is obvious because these schools, especially in Burma, had attained a comparatively high standard of instruction, but it has happened throughout the tropics from the Pacific Islands to Africa.

In Africa the native system of education was directed to character training and instruction in crafts. But the crafts are dead or dying. 'The African artistic genius has produced objects of singular beauty inspired by religious beliefs and social customs and the necessities of social and domestic life. These sources of inspiration are profoundly modified, if not destroyed by modern conditions, and there is evidence of a decline in artistic taste accelerated by the replacement of indigenous articles by those of European manufacture, the commercial exploitation of so-called native crafts, and lack of encouragement.' Everywhere 'native manufacture is undoubtedly on the decline: the smelting of iron is moribund; the ubiquitous petrol tin has made pottery almost a forgotten art; the handloom has nearly disappeared. It is a regrettable effect of European contacts in Africa that an increase of wealth should thus destroy rather than stimulate local craftsmanship.'[2] In Africa also, as in Burma and the tropics generally, the same process is visible in non-productive arts, in music, dancing and the drama, and also in native pastimes. 'The danger of the present time', it has been said, 'is that undue emphasis will be placed on economic welfare and mechanical progress, and that even leisure will be commercialized so that the true springs of artistic creation and enjoyment may have very little outlet.'[3] But that is nothing new, or peculiar to the present time. Despite benevolent aspirations in colonial policy, it has always been inherent in colonial practice. The decline of native arts and crafts and

[1] C. O. van der Plas, see Djajadiningrat, p. 65.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1207, 1290, 1420.
[3] *Mass Education*, p. 49.

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871 517 pastimes is merely one aspect of the elimination of non-economic values in the plural society of a tropical dependency, and native schools and native education decay because the ideas on which they rested lose their meaning.

II. Education and Instruction

871 Even in England it is often suggested that the ideas on which education has rested in the past are fading and must be recovered. Enthusiasts for education propound large claims as to what education might or ought to be, and what it might, should or must do. But they tend to overlook what education actually is and does, and confound education with instruction. Education is much wider than instruction, and much older. During the long ages of pre-history man survived because he was capable of learning, by example and experience, to adapt his way of life to his environment; succeeding generations learned new lessons in the school of life. Education dates from the emergence of mankind. Instruction, however, was of minor importance before the invention of the art of letters, which gave man a new and more efficient means of transmitting his social heritage and of communicating new ideas. But it was chiefly significant in giving a foremost place in education to mental discipline, the training of the mind. This helped man to understand his environment and made him better able, not merely to adapt his way of life to his environment, but to adapt his environment to his way of life. It gave him a key to progress. In the course of modern progress instruction has come to play a growing part in education. But it is not the whole of education; it is that part of education which consists in the formal training of the mind. Education is much wider; it is the sum of all the processes that equip the child for life in adult society.

The distinction between education and instruction is so obvious that it might seem a platitude if it were not so often overlooked. When advocates of education in the tropics say that 'education is, and is intended to be an instrument of change', or that 'the whole mass of the people must have a real share in education and some understanding of its meaning and purpose',[1] they show that they mistake its meaning, and are regarding it as something grafted on to life. The teacher of a training college in the Philippines tells us to 'think of tropical peoples as organisms having to adjust themselves to a physical and social environment which under modern conditions may embrace

[1] *Mass Education*, p. 4.

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more or less of indigenous and alien elements'. That is true. But he goes on to argue that 'education is the process by which they gain the best adaptation',[1] and obviously is thinking merely of instruction. In Burma, 'the major task of education is to help towards the establishment of economic security and the improvement of living conditions in the village'.... 'The task', says an optimistic expert in educational technique, 'can be undertaken *by reconstructing the curricula of the schools*.'[2] Educationalists, in claiming that education should or must promote the good life, or change the social order, or soften the impact of western civilization, overlook the fact that education is not something given in the school or by way of formal instruction, but is the operation of the whole environment. They will readily admit that the school can play only a minor part in education, but underlying the high ideals that find expression in educational policy is the tacit assumption that these lofty aspirations can be realized in practice by instruction for a few years, during a few hours a day in certain subjects as set forth in text-books through teachers who often do not believe in what they teach.

In the West the tendency to identify education with instruction is not unnatural, for the school is the product of and is conditioned by the environment, and the instruction given there is reinforced by and reinforces the social environment outside the school. The education of the child proceeds on the same lines inside and outside the school, and it is convenient to distinguish by the name of education that which is given in the school. But in the tropics 'the school itself is largely exotic in character, and so is often unable really to reflect and interpret the society which it is intended to serve'.[3] The schools are expected to promote welfare, but much of the teaching in school runs counter to and is countered by the social environment outside the school. Europeans are quick to impress on nationalist politicians the folly of trying to create industries by training men to practise them, but the project of creating welfare by training men to teach it is no wiser. Instruction *seems* important, far more important than it is, for whereas we are conscious of instruction, other educational processes are largely unconscious. We know when we are being taught, but often fail to recognize until long afterwards, if ever, that we are learning and, in comparison with the pressure exerted by the environment, school teaching is negligible.

[1] Keesing, p. 43.
[2] *CVV*, p. 195 (my italics).
[3] *Mass Education*, p. 6.

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811 The tropics have learned much from Europe; but very little from schools or school-books. Their first lesson is that spears and bows and arrows are no match for bayonets and machine-guns. More is taught by the wrath of the tiger than by the horses of instruction. It is significant that they do not grasp the meaning even of this lesson. They learn from experience the greater efficiency of western arms, but experience does not teach them the secret of moral discipline that has gone to the perfection of western military power. Even the Japanese, whose social tradition was strong enough to provide the necessary moral discipline, overrated the importance of military power and did not fathom the secret of its limitations. Schools, teachers and text-books may try to sow the seed of western civilization, but the pupils are content to pluck the fruit. They see the fruit; they see that export crops are more profitable than food crops; that the motor-car is speedier and more comfortable than the bullock cart; and, among other things, both good and bad, they learn that 'education' is a way to make a living—not from pronouncements on educational policy, but from practical experience both inside and outside the school. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, missionaries and humanitarians have expected education in the tropics to change the character of the environment, but in the event the environment has changed the character of education. The schools meet the demand for officials and subordinates in administration and western enterprise and produce a supply in excess of the demand. In Burma there is 'waste of effort and money on instruction that is making but little, if any, impression on the illiteracy of the masses at one extreme, and adding to the gravity of the already grave problem of the unemployed graduate and product of the secondary schools at the other'.[1] This picture of the results attained in Burma after a hundred years of British rule applies to tropical dependencies in general, but it is a poor return for the labours of so many generations of zealous and devoted teachers, missionaries and laymen.

Western schools produce a surplus of clerical skill, and mass education may produce a surplus of educated unskilled labour. So far as it goes, the instruction given in the schools is good, useful. It enables those, or some of those, who receive it, to earn more money than they would otherwise, and helps western administration and enterprise to function more efficiently and cheaply. Both these things are desirable. But they are not the things that humanitarians have in view

[1] *CVV*, p. 183.

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when pleading the cause of education. The advocates of education look on instruction as a key to western civilization and the modern world, and so it is. So long, however, as the people have no books to read, the door is not only locked, but barred and bolted. 871

Primary instruction teaches the people to read. But if they have no occasion for reading, they tend to forget what they have learned in school and to lapse into illiteracy. A modern environment, with moneylenders, law courts and a postal service, creates a demand for reading as a useful accomplishment; in a literate environment people do not forget their alphabet so readily. But it does not supply them with books or create a habit of reading. If their religion has its scriptures, there will be a demand for religious books, as in Burma, where there has been a demand for such books from the first introduction of printing, though for show rather than for use. Both in Burma and Netherlands India, when the reading public was still very small, it was thought necessary to take action against pornographic literature.[1] That was what the public wanted. Under the stimulus of nationalism, newspapers may achieve a modest circulation, if sufficiently critical of Government. But it is more difficult than it may seem to provide books in the vernacular that open a door into the modern world, and still more difficult to get the people to want to read such books. We have seen that the Dutch have gone some way to solve the problem, and something has been done by private associations in Africa. The crux of the problem is to organize a demand for books, and, if this can be accomplished, it is comparatively easy to supply reading matter.

Western instruction might seem more effective as an instrument of civilization than vernacular instruction, because a European language in itself provides a gateway to the modern world. But the progress of western instruction is conditioned by the economic environment. This places limits on the numbers who receive it, and restricts its scope to attainments with a market value. One distinctive feature of the modern world is the importance of natural science in the affairs of daily life. But in the tropics, so long as the demand for men with a western education is confined to administrative and clerical employment, scientific studies are at a discount. Only when, and so far as, the growth of western enterprise creates a demand for men with technical qualifications, is there a demand for the teaching of natural science. If tropical peoples are to be brought into closer contact with the modern

[1] Freytag, p. 71; *RAB*, 1914–15, p. 101.

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871 world and to contribute as fully as possible to world welfare, it is desirable that colonial administrations should do what they can to foster a demand for western education (including vernacular education on western lines) and for the enlargement of its scope. That is not a problem for educational authorities, though often left to them. How best to meet an actual demand for western studies is an educational problem, but to organize a demand for more men with a western education and for education with a wider scope are matters that lie outside the province of the educational authorities and the schoolmaster.

The people seek western education for its economic value and they wish 'to realize its manifold advantages as soon and as cheaply as possible'. If they are to appreciate its cultural value, and use it as an introduction to the modern world, there must be some inducement sufficient to encourage them to understand the modern world, its material achievements and the spiritual foundations on which its material achievements rest. But just as the western man of business only earns his living in the tropics while his real life is in the West, so likewise the people live in the native world and only earn their living in the western sphere. That is the environment which conditions education, and it is impossible to change the environment through the schools, because the schools supply what the environment demands; if, however, we can change the environment, the schools will reflect the new environment, and it is only thus that we can transform mere instruction into education.

Western education, then, is necessary if the people are to become citizens of the modern world, but the present system of instruction is precluded from performing this function by the environment in which it functions and which it reflects. Among Europeans concerned with education, though some reconcile themselves to a purely utilitarian view of their activities and some lapse into cynical indifference, many and probably most do their best to instil cultural values. But Europeans come into close and direct contact with only a comparatively small number of students, usually in the higher standards. Most of the teachers are natives, often men who have failed to find more lucrative employment, and ordinarily, like the students, they care for little but examination results. Some teachers may inspire some pupils with ideals, but 'idealism is easy in the class-room' and rarely survives contact with the outer world. It is true that western education under British, Dutch and French rule,

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has produced a few men who are at home in the modern world and some who have achieved an international reputation. But most of these have drunk the waters of modern civilization at the fountain head in Europe, and it is noteworthy that among them the men who believe most fervently in education found schools like the *asrams* of Gandhi and Tagore, or the *Tamansiswo* schools in Java, which repudiate the whole material basis on which public instruction rests. This is in striking contrast with the early native educationists such as Ram Mohur Roy and Miss Kartini, who looked to western education as a means of spreading light in Asia. It is in contrast also with the general attitude among modern nationalists. These have founded Nationalist schools partly with a view to attaining the same results as Government and mission schools, but more rapidly and cheaply, and partly with a view to national advancement by using western learning as a means to rid themselves of western rule. Often such schools are tempted by the lure of grants to succumb to the environment, and become merely inferior imitations of the Government schools, so that nationalists succeed no better than missionaries in transforming instruction into education. Thus humanitarians, missionaries, nationalists and statements of official policy present education as an instrument of culture, according to the common tradition of Europe and the tropics; but in practice, it becomes an instrument of economic development, and even as such is less effective than it would be in a more congenial environment.

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CHAPTER XI

PROGRESS, WELFARE AND AUTONOMY

1. Colonial Policy and Autonomy

000 In the last two chapters we have been examining colonial p[illegible] in relation to material and moral welfare. Almost everywhere i[illegible]e tropics western rule has stimulated rapid economic progress, and [illegible]at, in itself, is a good thing. It is well that backward regions should [illegible] tribute as freely as possible to the general welfare of the world; in [illegible] case they will be made to do so because, if the inhabitants are unable or unwilling to develop their local resources, they will be too feeble to resist others whom the hope of profit m[illegible] tempt to undertake this task. But modern colonial policy does not accept economic progress as an end in itself; it regards progress as the means to the material welfare of dependent peoples. That is a heritage from the Liberal tradition. From this tradition also, and from the far older Christian tradition, it inherits the belief that material welfare is not an end in itself. It regards material welfare as a condition of welfare in a wider sense, embracing political welfare and autonomy. In the present chapter we are concerned with the relation between progress and welfare, and with the bearing of colonial practice on political autonomy.

A preliminary survey may help to clear the way. Briefly, then, where economic development fails to promote welfare, the explanation usually propounded is the insufficiency of revenue, and a remedy is sought in more vigorous development so as to produce more revenue. But an enquiry into the relations between revenue and welfare indicates the need to find some other explanation. In seeking it we are hampered by the lack of adequate data for the measurement of welfare. This, although a serious defect in the machinery of welfare, is not the chief defect. The machinery of welfare under direct rule does not comply with the essential conditions of success. Under indirect rule the machinery might prove effective if it were allowed time to work; but it acts slowly, and the modern tendency is to expedite its working by compulsion. Compulsion, however, is worse than useless as an instrument of welfare, and in practice is only one aspect of the constant pressure to expedite development. This leads to the conclusion that the view of progress as a condition of welfare is mistaken, and that,

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on the contrary, welfare is a condition of progress. If, therefore, colonial powers would enhance welfare in their dependencies, they must aim directly at promoting welfare instead of expecting it as a sequel of economic development.

Here we encounter a preliminary difficulty in defining the concept of welfare. If we define welfare as consisting in harmony between the individual and his environment, colonial policy must aim at reconciling them. They can be reconciled in two ways: by submission to the environment, or by mastering it. The former might be consistent with material welfare if men were no more than cattle, but it fails because men are not merely cattle. It is true that men must accept the facts of their environment if they are to master it, and that tropical peoples, when brought into contact with the modern world, must come to terms with western civilization in order to achieve harmony with their environment, but they alone can promote their own welfare, and whereas modern colonial policy regards welfare as a condition of autonomy, we are led to the conclusion that, on the contrary, autonomy is a condition of welfare.

Colonial autonomy is a heritage from the Liberal tradition. But in the past it has been attempted through mechanical reconstruction by the introduction of a native personnel into the administration, and the imitation of western political institutions in local and central government. Such attempts to adapt tropical society to western forms of self-government are based on the fallacy that form gives birth to function, and they serve merely to facilitate the working of economic forces, destructive both of welfare and autonomy. If we would promote autonomy, and thereby welfare, we must aim at adapting western institutions to tropical society, on the principle that function will devise appropriate forms of government.

These in brief are the considerations that will engage our attention in the present chapter. They lead on to the conclusion that what is needed is not mechanical reconstruction, but a creative impulse, strong enough to solve the problem of restoring unity to a disintegrated social order, and strong enough also to surmount the obstacles arising from considerations of profit and prestige.

2. Welfare and Revenue

Under western rule, tropical dependencies produce more. Because people must grow more in order to eat more, it is natural to assume that they eat more because they grow more. But this assumption

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is invalid. Public works and economic services increase the productivity of western enterprise. They may also, within limits, increase native production, but without any corresponding enhancement of welfare. Such devices indeed, by allowing freer play to anti-social economic forces, tend to prejudice rather than promote native welfare, and create a need for social services to mitigate their deleterious effects. Yet the services intended to furnish the necessary protection function mainly to make production more efficient, and the services intended to promote welfare directly by improving health and education have a similar result; though designed as instruments of human welfare they are perverted into instruments of economic progress.

When the machinery for enhancing welfare proves ineffective, a remedy is sought in more and more elaborate and costly machinery. For the promotion of welfare, it is argued, economic and social services are needed; these cost money and require larger revenue; larger revenue can come only through economic development, and economic development depends on western enterprise and capital. Therefore western enterprise and capital are needed to provide the revenue for economic and social services that will enhance welfare. This is the proposition that we must now examine.

It is true that western enterprise and capital are effective agents of development; but so also is native enterprise. Both under direct rule and, though less conspicuously, under indirect rule, the maintenance of order and the opening up of new markets have sufficed to call forth native enterprise without the importation of western capital. It is true also that economic development provides more revenue. But at the same time it raises the cost of administration. This rises even with development by native enterprise, because expenditure must be incurred on law and order and on communications. But it rises far more rapidly and further with development by western enterprise. 'The most superficial observer must be struck by the difference which the existence of a resident European community makes in the standards of government expenditure.'[1] The European community demands better provision for its own amenities in respect of health, education and so on, and also demands better provision for natives so that they may furnish more efficient labour or more abundant produce. Some of the services incidental on development become indispensable. But usually the revenue from tropical dependencies barely suffices for urgent expenditure on the maintenance of order and the improvement

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1463.

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of communications. Not infrequently debts incurred to the Home Government have had to be remitted, and in most dependencies the financial position is one of constant stringency, while the inadequacy of the surplus available for economic and social services forms a recurrent burden of complaint both among officials and the representatives of western enterprise.

The argument that western enterprise is needed to provide the funds for social services assumes that the revenue derived from it more than covers the extra cost of administration consequent on economic development. But 'whether the local administrations have yet taken a sufficient share of the profits of foreign enterprise is a matter of some debate....It must be admitted that a number of administrations have shown reluctance to utilise fully their powers to impose taxation on the profits of companies or firms working in their territory, or have done so only in response to pressure from the Home Government'.[1] In practice, there is a deficit, which is met partly by imposing new obligations in services or taxation on the natives, and partly from private contributions, native and foreign.

It is indeed generally recognized that, in the course of economic development, excessive burdens have often been imposed upon the natives, either in taxation or compulsory labour, to meet the charges of general administration and the additional expenditure consequent on economic development, and even for the direct benefit of western enterprise.[2] Especially in the improvement of communications by road and rail, there have been serious abuses. In Africa, moreover, railway construction has mostly been unprofitable, constituting a charge on general revenue and cramping economic and social services so narrowly as to keep them below the standard required even for economic progress.

Another very considerable contribution to the cost of essential services comes from private sources. Among these one may reckon contributions from western enterprise otherwise than through taxation. As already mentioned, the great experimental stations in Netherlands India, which have done so much for the science of tropical agriculture, were until recently maintained by the planters' associations without Government assistance; they were intended to make production more profitable for those who supplied the funds, but their benefit radiated throughout the tropics and beyond, sometimes to the

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 22.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 613, 635, 1549, 1565.

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657 detriment of local interests as in teaching India and Japan how to grow
652 sugar. In all parts of the tropics, in Asia as well as in Africa, the more enlightened employers provide good quarters, medical attention and schools, and make their employees comply with modern sanitary requirements; such amenities make production more efficient and profitable. Employers will provide such services as they deem profitable, and on humanitarian grounds may carry this principle to the farthest limit or possibly beyond, but they are not disinclined to be relieved of the expense by the Government or private charity.

741 Private charity, indeed, together with the voluntary contributions and exertions of the inhabitants, seems to bear most of the cost of social service in the tropics. The assistance rendered by missionary organizations to educational and medical services is a matter of common knowledge. We have already noticed their large part in the provision of hospitals and schools. From the accounts of one mission in Uganda it appears that the public revenue furnished only £22,420—less than one-third of its charges—while the natives contributed £13,333 in gifts and £17,667 in school fees, and a grant from Europe provided £17,987.[1] This suggests that educational progress should be ascribed to Christianity rather than to western capital. If the encouragement of western enterprise is necessary to provide funds for economic and social services, one would expect the greatest progress in education where western enterprise penetrates most deeply. This is notoriously contradicted by the facts. As we have seen, during the nineteenth century education made far more rapid progress in Burma with development by native enterprise than in Java with development by western enterprise. Experience in Africa corroborates this view. The total expenditure of Government may be taken as an index to economic progress, and the expenditure on the education of non-natives is an index to the degree of western penetration. Such figures as are available under these heads suggest that the percentage of expenditure on native education is lowest where western enterprise is most conspicuous.[2]

Other facts point in the same direction. The first comprehensive enquiry into African education was financed by the Phelps-Stokes Fund in America, and American funds contributed largely to the foundation of the Jeanes schools that were established as one result of the enquiry. The monumental *African Survey*, conducted by Lord

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1306.
[2] *Ib.* p. 1309, and Table XI.

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Hailey, was rendered possible by the munificence of the Carnegie Trust. A substantial contribution towards the cost of a new Burmese dictionary has been made by the Leverhulme Trust. Even so wealthy a dependency as Malaya looked to the Rockefeller Foundation to provide funds for a campaign against hookworm, and to the same generosity it owes two chairs in its Medical School. The Leverhulme Trust makes grants to study economic conditions in Africa, and the Burma Oil Company provided the buildings for an Engineering School in Burma.[1] The two last instances should perhaps be classed with the expenditure incurred by intelligent employers with a view to conducting their affairs more efficiently and profitably.

It appears, then, that doles out of general revenue or by private charity relieve western enterprise of charges that it would otherwise have to incur on amenities in the interest of efficiency and profits, and go to promote economic progress rather than native welfare. In the preceding chapters we have seen that economic and social services, though an important factor in economic progress, do little to enhance welfare, except so far as it is necessary to economic progress. Now it appears that the contribution to public revenue by western enterprise is barely sufficient, and often insufficient, even to cover the additional administrative charges that it involves, and that the public revenue provides only a part, apparently a minor part, of the cost of social services. It is difficult to reconcile these facts with the theory that the provision of funds for greater welfare necessitates the encouragement of western enterprise.

It is equally difficult to reconcile this theory with the state of affairs in dependencies so prosperous as Java, Burma and Malaya. Java, under indirect rule, has been developed by western enterprise employing local labour. During thirty years of Liberal rule, with a rapid expansion of western enterprise, not only did the growing population 'gobble up the greater yield', but there was an actual fall in wages, nominal and real. Again, after another thirty years, with a constructive welfare policy based on ethical principles, and purporting to encourage economic development with a view to enhancing native welfare, economists are unable to assure us that the people are better off. Dr Boeke, whom we have already quoted, returns to the subject in his latest publication. With reference to irrigation, colonization, the clearing of fresh land, the increase of secondary crops and home-grown

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 1228, 1252; Mills, pp. 310, 316; Mayhew, *Colonial Empire*, pp. 120ff.; *Colonial Review*, Sept. 1944, p. 194.

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511 vegetables, he suggests that the race between welfare measures and population cannot be continued indefinitely; he 'cannot escape the conclusion that the standard of living of the masses becomes more and more reduced'.[1] If there is one thing on which all Dutch colonial authorities agree, it is that the cause of poverty in Java is over-population.

In Malaya under indirect rule—though somewhat differently interpreted—western enterprise has developed the country with foreign labour. There is no problem of over-population. But the immigrant coolies draw low wages, because 'any very great increase in the Malayan standard must wait upon a similar rise in the reservoirs of overabundant and therefore cheap labour' in India and China. The Malay, on the other hand, left aside by the main current of economic development, remains stagnating in a backwater, and the progress of the last sixty years has merely changed him 'from a poor man in a poor country to a poor man in a rich country'; relatively at least he is poorer than before.[2]

Burma provides another type of economic development—by native enterprise under direct rule. The population, in comparison with Java is scanty and, in the delta, the chief centre of modern economic activity, the density per acre cultivated is less than in other lowland districts; yet the cultivators have been transformed into a landless rural proletariat and the country as a whole is conspicuous for the growth of crime.

In all these countries, and throughout the Tropical Far East, recent enquiries suggest that the people are less well fed now than twenty years ago, despite the rapid economic progress during the same period.[3] The people grow more but they do not eat more. Java was developed by western enterprise; there was a demand for local labour, and the population has grown up to the limit that the soil will bear. Malaya also was developed by western enterprise; but foreign labour was available and the population adjusted itself to these conditions. Burma was developed by native enterprise. The demand was for cheap produce and not for cheap labour. Holdings, instead of growing smaller grew larger, until they reached the size that would give the maximum net outturn and not, as in Java, the maximum gross outturn; and, under a system of industrial agriculture, the growth of

[1] Gonggrijp, quoted *Netherlands India*, p. 214; N. de Wilde, *Asiatic Review*, 1934, p. 232; Boeke, pp. 163, 165.

[2] Mills, pp. 249, 329.

[3] Wickizer and Bennett, pp. 188ff.

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population was checked at the point of diminishing returns. In all these lands the growth of population has reflected the conditions of employment, but whether numerous or scanty, under different systems of rule and with different methods of development, the people remain poor. Economic development has failed to enhance material welfare. 511

The argument for economic development as an instrument of welfare further assumes that economic and social services are necessary for the provision of welfare. We have already seen that this is not the case. Cultivators adopt new crops and new methods of cultivation without the aid of economic services, and the people take to new foods without encouragement from dieticians. One of the outstanding victories over the tsetse fly in Africa was achieved by ordinary natives, under sympathetic leading, but with no expenditure on welfare services.[1] Most of the reforms most urgently needed in social life in most parts of the tropics need no expert knowledge, and could be introduced without any special staff (though a special staff *should*, of course, facilitate and expedite their introduction). Where the people can be induced to want new amenities they will pay for them, as they do for schooling in Uganda and elsewhere. Thus the inability to promote welfare in tropical dependencies cannot be ascribed to the limitation of economic and social services through lack of revenue or of funds from other sources, and we must seek another explanation. 657

3. The Measurement of Welfare

If we cannot accept the rapid economic progress of tropical dependencies as sufficient evidence of increasing welfare, we must look elsewhere for a yard-stick by which it may be measured. In social science as in physical science, only beginners and amateurs will conduct experiments without trying so far as possible to measure the results. Some of the older dependencies produce masses of statistics purporting to show the population revenue, and trade, and also matters of social interest, such as litigation, crime and the numbers at school or in jail. The statistics, however, are mostly compiled for administrative purposes and have little meaning or interest for outsiders; many figures are of doubtful accuracy and are frequently misleading, full of traps for the unwary (and even for those who compile them and use them in administration). One might expect at least the trade returns to be intelligible to the public, but anyone who has tried to work on them will endorse the comment of Lord Hailey that 'eccentricity, so in- 803

[1] Hinden, p. 202.

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803 teresting in social life, loses its charm when applied to trade statistics'.[1] The revenue statistics often seem designed to furnish the least information at the greatest length. The trade and revenue statistics and the figures for population, so far as they are available, accurate and comprehensible, may throw some light on economic progress, but as an index to welfare they are of little or no value.

In India many attempts have been made to arrive at estimates of welfare by calculating the national income, but in the plural society of the tropics the conception of a national income is invalid because there is no homogeneous nation. For the same reason estimates of welfare based on trade returns are meaningless. It has been suggested that in Africa the value of imports retained for consumption provides a basis for measuring economic conditions.[2] But, as a criterion of welfare in a plural society, this has no significance. The import of machinery for constructing mills or factories may increase the profits of western enterprise, but it will not raise the prices paid for raw materials to cultivators. Similarly the export figures tell us nothing about the economic progress of the natives unless they show the native contribution to the exports. Trade statistics do throw some light on the relation between economic progress and native welfare because they usually reveal a large export surplus, often attributed to 'invisible imports' but due in part to quasi-monopolist profits of western enterprise for which no services are rendered. In general, however, statistics afford no criterion of welfare in a plural society unless they furnish information separately for each important section of the community.

That is a matter which has received great attention from the Dutch. The inadequacy of the trade and other statistics came to notice in the 'Enquiry into Diminishing Welfare' held at the beginning of the century; subsequent enquiries of the same kind, official and non-official, have stimulated attempts to give a more precise content to the figures. In some matters the statistics for Netherlands India are less complete and less accurate than those for Burma, but they are notable for the endeavour to differentiate racial sections. There are separate figures according to racial status for production by western and native enterprise, for income-tax assessments, for housing, for the ownership of motor cars and even for the use made of the post office. Moreover, in special enquiries, such as that of Meyer-Ranneft and Huender into the pressure of taxation, and in the 'Little Welfare

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1353. [2] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 27.

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Enquiry' by Wellenstein, a technique has been developed for turning to the best account such statistics as have any bearing on native welfare.[1] 803

Lord Hailey has remarked that in Africa the existing statistics might be considerably improved without additional expense, and that a comparatively small expenditure would make them much more useful. That remark applies also to Burma and probably to most other tropical dependencies. Unsatisfactory as the statistics for Netherlands India are in some respects, they do at least serve to illuminate many corners that are left dark elsewhere, and the general neglect to provide means for judging how far the benevolent aspirations expressed in statements of colonial policy bear fruit in practice, naturally affords a handle for critics of colonial administration to suggest that it is more keenly interested in economic progress than in native welfare. It is not enough that material should be available for measuring individual welfare. The analysis of welfare demands a suitable technique for measuring social welfare by presenting accurate and intelligible information regarding debt, civil litigation, crime, health, education and other matters that find no place in individual budgets of income and expenditure. There would still remain imponderable elements, those cultural and religious aspects of social life in the tropics which are the first to suffer from the economic struggle for survival of the cheapest consequent on the impact of the West. But this is no reason for neglecting to carry so far as possible the objective scientific measurement of welfare.

4. The Machinery of Welfare

The deficiency of statistical material is a notable defect in the machinery of welfare. But it is not the only, and not the chief, defect. It may seem that no special machinery is necessary, that the care for welfare may be left to the local official charged with the maintenance of order. That is very largely true. Any European official can tell the people that dirt breeds disease, or explain the benefit of vaccination, or advise them to destroy mosquitoes and rats, or bring to their knowledge new and more profitable crops, or suggest new breeds of cattle, or inculcate the advantages of thrift and the danger of getting entangled with money-lenders. None of the most urgent reforms in the daily life of tropical peoples calls for special scientific equipment beyond the stock of knowledge common to educated Europeans. Natives have frequently 657 654 177 647

[1] Furnivall, *Economic Journal of India*, 1934, p. 295.

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657 adopted of their own accord innovations which appeal to them, and it
654 would seem possible for European officials to recommend European standards of hygiene and other reforms with little or no expenditure on welfare services. It is true that modern science has done much and can
177 do more for the welfare of tropical peoples. The connection between
647 rats and plague and between mosquitoes and malaria are recent scientific discoveries, and scientists have traced the origin of hookworm and beri-beri. There is unbounded scope for research, and useful expenditure on it is limited only by the funds available. But it is well to remember that research does not bear fruit until it is applied to daily life; its practical application depends on the efficiency of the machinery of welfare.

It is true also that administrative officials should be better able to promote welfare if they have the assistance of departmental specialists. But departmental specialists will usually need the help of administrative officials if they are to get into touch with the people in their daily life. The departmental specialist is probably an expert in his own line, but one can hardly expect him also to be expert in native economy and customs or to be proficient in native languages. It is useless for the medical officer to advocate shoes for hookworm if the people cannot afford to buy shoes, or for the sanitary department to devise modern latrines which the people will not use, or for the agriculturist to recommend crops which local conditions of labour or water supply do not allow the people to grow. Although the specialist may try to adapt native life to scientific principles, the administrative official should be capable of adapting scientific principles to native life. Thus the welfare specialist must ordinarily work in double harness with the administrative official by his side. But the administrative official can do little to promote welfare unless he knows the locality, and what needs doing; has influence that will lead the people to attend to his advice; and remains among them long enough to make certain that they act on it. All these conditions must be fulfilled if welfare work is to succeed.

The machinery ordinarily employed differs according as the system of rule is direct or indirect. In the adoption of direct rule one object was to promote greater welfare through liberating the people from arbitrary oppression by their own chieftains. On this plan all the administrative officials, European and native, became servants of the law, charged with administering equal law to all. When it became apparent that the law, while liberating the people from arbitrary will,

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subjected them to mechanical economic forces, attempts were made to protect them against the action of these forces. That is the distinctive character of welfare machinery under direct rule; it allows free play within the law to economic forces, but attempts to mitigate their consequences. This is directly contrary to the method of indirect rule, systematized by Van den Bosch in Java, which tries to soften the impact of economic forces by leaving the people under their own chieftains and their own customs, while aiming to protect them against arbitrary oppression. Direct rule attempts to mitigate the action of economic forces; indirect rule aims at providing a buffer against their action. There is a corresponding difference in the machinery of welfare.

(*a*) *Direct Rule.* It is often suggested or implied that the promotion of welfare in the tropics requires nothing more than the provision of funds for the services of experts. But this view disregards the conditions limiting their activities. The application of science to the affairs of daily life is quite a novel idea even in Europe; each generation of doctors regards its predecessors as unscientific, and in agriculture, hygiene, dietetics and other studies, what is held for true to-day may be out of date to-morrow. But the tropics are still almost virgin lands in science; experience in Europe may be misleading and conclusions based on it invalid. Conditions are different or even contrary. Cultivation requires a cool soil instead of a warm soil; natives apparently maintain good health on a diet that, according to western science, is defective; plague and malaria were spread by measures intended to prevent them. The application of modern science to tropical problems requires long and patient research, and continuity of experiment. But tropical life is adverse to continuity; men go on leave or are transferred for administrative convenience. Lack of continuity nullified experiments on rice cultivation in Malaya, and official transfers hampered the researches of Ross on malaria. Moreover, any single problem may, and often does, require a whole staff of experts for its solution. In agriculture the investigation of a single crop disease may need the collaboration of agricultural experts, botanists, entomologists and so on. The same principle applies in almost all departments of economic and social life. If the agricultural expert, by patient research breeds a more productive variety of some generally grown crop, the people may be unable to take advantage of it because of difficulties in the supply of labour, water or credit; his work raises new problems for a wide circle of other departmental specialists and it will be wasted without their co-operation.

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657 It is easy, given the funds, to multiply economic and social services. But the multiplication of service tends to defeat its own ends, and
654 greater expenditure gives worse results through excessive depart-
177 mentalism. Each specialist looks at life through departmental blinkers. The agriculturist sees nothing but the crops, the veterinary
647 expert only the cattle; to the sanitary inspector the latrine is more important than the home, and the policeman would guarantee security more confidently if the whole population were in jail. Often the experts are at issue. The agriculturist advocates grazing reserves to provide fodder, while the veterinary officer wants to close them to prevent infection; the fishery officer advises the people to breed fish, and the medical officer drains the ponds to kill mosquitoes. Everywhere the specialist inclines to a narrow view of life, but in the tropics departmentalism has peculiar dangers; in Europe the expert looks at a familiar world, but in the tropics, owing to his ignorance of native life, the field is out of focus. In Europe the expert understands the public and the public understands the expert, because they have a common background, but in the tropics it is only the European community in the towns and western enterprise that has a mutual understanding with the expert and values his assistance. Thus the natives in towns prefer to live in the native quarter, where they can escape the unwelcome attentions of the sanitary inspector, 'whose unreasonable prejudice against picturesque filth is never understood';[1] and plantation coolies, on returning home, lapse into their old comfortable ways. Moreover in Europe there is an organic community, living its own life, which can decide for itself what it wants most; but in the tropics, where innovations are pressed on the people from outside, there naturally ensues a lack of co-ordination between the competing and often contrary activities of the departmental specialists; too many cooks, as usual, spoil the broth. The confusion may be mitigated on the Dutch plan by grouping allied services in large departments under a single head. But this device alone is insufficient. What an organic community does by the dynamic force of its inherent vitality must in the tropics be entrusted to some official personifying, as it were, the common social will. There must be someone to co-ordinate the activities of departmental specialists and to foster a demand among the people for their services.

647 Under direct rule the District officer, the local civil servant in charge

[1] Burns, p. 306.

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of general administration, is expected to discharge these functions, and to act as a link between the experts and the people. One condition of success is that he should have an intimate acquaintance with tropical economy. So far as he is assisted by native subordinates, they should so far as possible understand these principles of western social life which they are expected to spread among the people. In both these matters Dutch standards are far higher than the British.[1] It seems that training for the British Colonial Service has lagged behind that given by Holland, France and Belgium. Yet the Colonial Service can claim to be ahead of the Sudan and India, as well as of the Home Civil Service in this respect. The British system of training administrative officials is a survival from the days of *laissez-faire* when an officer was expected to do little more than try cases and collect the revenue. Tropical administration has never been regarded, like law and medicine, as a profession requiring vocational instruction. European officials while on probation undergo a short course which does not give them any background for their work, and in Burma and probably elsewhere, native subordinates receive no training whatever—a university degree or proficiency as a clerk is regarded as sufficient qualification for administrative work. In Netherlands India, on the contrary, European civil servants are given a five years' course designed to help them to understand the East, and native civil servants a three years' course designed to give them an understanding of the West. Moreover, Dutch officials in Java, for some twelve years after their arrival in the country, have no judicial or executive authority, whereas British officials from their earliest days are primarily magistrates and collectors of revenue; they have neither the training, nor the practical experience, nor the time to acquire the general understanding of native life that is necessary if they are to help departmental specialists to turn their activities to the best account.

But the most thorough preliminary education in tropical economy will avail little without local knowledge, local influence and opportunity to exercise effective supervision. For all these continuity of tenure is essential. Under direct rule, however, there is no permanent element in the administration. In Africa an officer in Kenya was posted to as many as eleven different districts within six years, and the problem of frequent transfers exists possibly in a more acute form in West Africa. This is characteristic of tropical administration in

[1] *African Survey*, p. 224; O'Malley, p. 255. Furnivall, *JRCAS*, July 1939 *Koloniaal Tijdschrift*, May 1938, p. 273; 1946, Cmd. Col. 198, p. 22.

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647 general, and is found also in Dutch, French and Belgian dependencies.[1] A contrast is often suggested between modern conditions and the 'good old days'. Yet in Burma, though the numerous transfers were deplored sixty years ago, no remedy has yet been found. In India, in the placid days before the Mutiny, the normal period of service in any one post seems to have been eight or nine months, and that was the case also in Burma under the East India Company, right back to the first years of British rule.[2] Lack of continuity is universal and inveterate.

'Universal experience shows that lack of continuity in the administrative services produces one inevitable result—the decay of the factor of personality and the substitution of a mechanical routine of administration.'[3] One symptom of routine is that everything must be reduced to writing, and as far back as we can go we find this symptom of the disease; and always, so great is the lack of continuity in tropical administration, we find it, as at present, deplored as something new. Eighty years ago in Burma officers were complaining that, if reports continued to multiply, officials might be found to write them, but no one would have time to read them. In 1830 the East India Company framed rules to reduce correspondence. Still earlier Munro complained that 'unless we contrive to reduce the quantity of reading the members of Government will have no time for giving consideration to matters of general importance'.[4] We have no time to think, says the harassed official of the present day, but his predecessors have always made the same complaint, since the time of Sir John Shore (Lord Teignmouth) in 1790: 'The members comprising it (the British Government in India) are in a constant state of fluctuation and the period of their residence often expires before experience can be acquired or reduced to practice. Official forms necessarily occupy a large portion of time, and the constant pressure of business leaves little leisure for study and reflection.'[5] What is new in modern administration is that more is attempted, and the machinery is therefore more elaborate and more obvious. Specialization multiplies departments and concentrates co-ordination in the secretariat, which functions as a clearing house for departmental activities. That is a mark of Dutch administration as much as of British administration, perhaps even more deeply imprinted because the Dutch system is more intensive. Dutch officials, like

[1] Bousquet, p. 109; *African Survey*, pp. 231, 237, 243.
[2] *RAB*, 1880–1, p. 8; *RRA*, 1899–1900, p. 53; Bright, I, 101.
[3] *African Survey*, p. 231.
[4] Gleig, p. 321; *Corr. TD*, pp. 2, 85.
[5] *5th Report Select Committee*, 1812, p. 11; O'Malley, p. 193.

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their British fellows, deplore the concentration of authority in the secretariat, and complain that they spend the first fortnight of each year reporting what during the past year they have seen, done—and reported. Nowadays there is more machinery, but the administration has always functioned mechanically because there has always been a lack of continuity and it must needs function mechanically unless informed by human will.

Transient officials cannot possibly acquire the local knowledge that is necessary for promoting welfare. The District officer must know the district of which he is in charge. Natural forces, such as erosion, operate continually but gradually. So also do economic forces, leading to indebtedness and land alienation, to the disappearance of communal land in villages and to overcrowding and disease in towns. Sometimes remedial action might be possible in the early stages, but officials come and go, and they notice these things, if at all, only when they can do nothing to cure them.

A knowledge of the district is of little avail without a knowledge of the people. The British tradition of colonial rule may undervalue the study of tropical economy as academic, unpractical, but it recognizes, at least in theory, the importance of an acquaintance with the local inhabitants; it portrays the District officer as 'the father and mother' of his people. Yet where officials follow one another at intervals of a few weeks or months, it takes a wise child to know its father; and the father cannot have any close acquaintance with his family or families, the bewildering succession of adopted foundlings.

Unless the District officer knows the people he cannot exercise personal influence. The need for personal influence was recognized in the recent proposals for mass education:

> 'Guidance and leadership are clearly of the first importance. The effective guidance given by governments will depend on the vigour and sincerity with which those responsible for government face their task and recognise their responsibility, not only towards the people as a whole, but as inspiring leaders of the agencies which the Governments themselves directly or indirectly control. Of these agencies the district officers have a crucial part to perform. Their close and varied contact with the lives of the people affords unique opportunities for fruitful guidance. In effect they can largely make or mar the efforts of welfare workers and other departmental officers.'[1]

But, as we have seen, although the contact of district officers with the people may be varied, it can hardly be described as close. Under the

[1] *Mass Education*, p. 9.

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647 system of direct rule the only people with whom the ordinary district officer becomes acquainted, outside his court and office, are those who push themselves forward in the hope of a decoration or a job; he may meet people in the villages, but he has no time or leisure to make friends among them, and appears to them as an official rather than as a man.

In order to acquire the personal influence needed for the promotion of welfare among a backward people, sympathy is essential; one must share their feelings. Yet one cannot share the feelings of people whom one does not know, or knows merely in the mass and not as individuals; sympathy requires more than mere acquaintance through official intercourse during a few months. Moreover, under direct rule the official is primarily a magistrate and tax collector, and that has long been recognized as a barrier to sympathy. As Munro observed, a man posted to judicial duties 'learns forms before he learns things. He becomes full of the respect due to the Court but knows nothing of the people. He has little opportunity of seeing them except in court. He sees only the worst of them and under the worst shapes; he sees them only as plaintiffs or defendants or as criminals, and the unfavourable opinion with which he too often enters among them, in place of being removed by experience, is every day strengthened and increased.'[1] It is a common complaint that under indirect rule, in Java or Malaya, officials coddle the people, treat them as children; but under direct rule they are apt to treat them as naughty children.

Without sympathy for the people among officials, there can be no confidence in officials among the people; they will not confide in one unless they know him as a man. In Burma the mistrust of officials is accepted as a fact, and is often ascribed to the native tradition that Government is one of the five enemies of the common man. It is more comfortable to attribute this mistrust to the character of the people rather than to defects in the administrative machinery; but one finds the same mistrust in India, where the people have known British rule for longer even than in the maritime provinces of Lower Burma. While writing these pages an instance comes to hand. 'It is pathetic', remarks an observer of the recent famine in Bengal, 'to see the crowds of destitute lying on the Calcutta pavements rise and scatter when they are approached by anyone who looks like an official'[2]—not neces-

[1] Gleig, p. 27.
[2] *Daily Telegraph*, 2 Nov. 1943.

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sarily, of course, a European official. The same report tells of an official who was lynched by the peasants whom he was trying to provide with food. That is not the atmosphere in which a constructive welfare policy can flourish. 'It is significant', says Lord Hailey, 'that a sentiment of alienation or estrangement has rarely shown itself in the earlier days of British administration.'[1] But there must be something wrong with the machinery of welfare if people like it worse as they get to know it better, and one defect certainly is the lack of continuity in the administrative services.

Even if an official can gain sufficient influence to induce the people to accept reforms, his work is incomplete. He must remain long enough to see that they adopt the reforms, not merely because they trust him but because they recognize their value or come to accept them as a habit. Take, for instance, the matter of erosion. An official who knows his district may detect it in an early stage; if he has influence among the people he may induce them to abstain from the cultivation or wood-cutting that is causing the erosion. The cultivators may promise to allow the scrub to grow, but some years must elapse before there is any noticeable difference, and all the time they will be subject to the lure of making a small addition to their income. One or two will succumb, and others will follow their example. If an official who is keen on sanitation tries to enforce housing rules that will improve living conditions but reduce rents, the owners of house property know that they need only bide their time, because he will soon be replaced by some new official with other interests. Successive officials may be zealous for education, for co-operative credit or for sanitation; but, as each one leaves the district, nothing remains of his enthusiasm but a new layer on the dust-heap of abortive projects. Not unnaturally, many lose their early enthusiasm and lapse into cynical indifference, content just to carry on. But, while successive welfare projects fade and are forgotten, anti-social forces, natural and economic, hold the field.

It is comparatively easy for officials to promote economic progress. If an official begins to build a road, although it may and often does relapse into jungle after his departure, a successor, if so minded, can easily go on with it. But in the promotion of welfare, as for example by founding schools or promoting co-operative credit, continued personal influence is indispensable and, as the Dutch remark, when this is withdrawn, everything sinks back into the mire.

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 36.

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647 It is easy likewise to promote reforms that are immediately and demonstrably profitable to individuals; these indeed require little recommendation. Good wine needs no bush. But the reforms most urgently needed for promoting welfare impose unwelcome restrictions on the people and offer distant and doubtful benefits; such reforms require close and constant supervision if they are to be adopted into native custom. The District officer, like the departmental specialist, can do something to further economic progress, but the conditions under which he works make it almost impossible for him to promote native welfare.

Under direct rule, which implies the rule of law, the District officer is further hindered in promoting welfare by the fact that all his actions must be kept within the law. In the promotion of welfare as in the collection of revenue, he is as closely bound by legal procedure as in the trial of cases in court when sitting as a magistrate or judge, and he must be prepared to defend his acts against trained advocates who will insist on the letter of the law.[1] The same rule applies to all departmental subordinates. They are liable to legal penalties if they exceed their functions, but are exposed to little risk, and, as we have seen in Burma, may add appreciably to their income, if they fall short of them. It is improbable that in this matter Burma is exceptional. Under inadequate supervision the multiplication of welfare services means the multiplication of corruption, and the subordinate who takes a small gratuity to condone the breach of welfare regulations acquires merit with the public at the same time that he fills his pocket. Hence the expenditure of revenue on social services may even promote corruption rather than welfare, and impose new burdens instead of conferring new benefits. Every elaboration of the machinery of welfare calls for closer supervision by the District officer and, at the same time, increases the difficulty of supervision. Unless the District officer knows the district and the people, he can rarely penetrate the conspiracy of silence which conceals such irregularities, and if he hears of them he does not hold charge long enough to punish them. Under the rule of law, suspected offences must be proved according to forms of law, which operate to protect offenders. Moreover, the difficulty of action by the District officer is enhanced because he has little or no authority over departmental subordinates, as these are directly responsible to their departmental superiors. Thus, although it may seem that specialist services should assist the District officer to promote welfare, they are often, in

[1] O'Malley, p. 96.

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fact, of very little use. The most urgent welfare measures require no more than common sense. If the District officer has sufficient local knowledge and influence he can induce the people to accept them and, without this knowledge and influence, the multiplication of subordinates is a hindrance rather than a help. Thus the machinery of direct rule, which served originally to mitigate oppression in the native world, does not fulfil the conditions essential to the promotion of welfare in the modern world.

(*b*) *Indirect Rule.* Under the system of indirect rule the promotion of welfare is approached from a different angle. This system accepts the position that western rule in the tropics liberates anti-social economic forces from the control of custom, and thereby produces changes that are detrimental to native social life. 'So far as deliberate policy can affect the issue', writes Lord Hailey with reference to Africa, 'it is clear that in the interests of the African himself, it should seek to moderate the pace of change, and allow full scope for the innate characteristics of the people to assert themselves in the conflict of forces that must ensue.'[1] That may be claimed as the principle underlying the policy of indirect rule. The functions and limitations of the departmental specialist are the same under indirect rule as under direct rule, and on both systems the officer in charge of general administration serves to link up departmental specialists with the people. But on the system of indirect rule some native authority, assumed to represent the people, can exercise personal influence among them and is more or less permanent. Indirect rule would seem, therefore, to comply better than direct rule with the conditions for promoting welfare.

As already noticed, there is a wide difference between the Dutch and British interpretations of indirect rule. On the original Dutch model, which still dominates their conception, the 'recognized or appointed heads' were regarded as native chieftains, and, so long as they maintained order and complied with Government requirements for produce and services, they were left to govern the people according to native law and custom with no interference from European officials. Since then western law has been adopted for all classes in criminal proceedings, and taxation along western lines has replaced the customary dues and services, but the officials of the administrative service in Java, whether European or native, try no cases (with insignificant exceptions), and have no formal connection with either magisterial or revenue work. British colonial

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1280.

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647 administration, however, even under indirect rule, derives its inspiration from the tradition of equality before the law that took shape under direct rule in British India. European administrative officials do not, like those in Dutch territories, approximate to the character of the Resident in a Native State, but take an active part in judicial and revenue work, while even the native chieftains tend to be converted into western magistrates and tax-collectors. The system of indirect rule as thus interpreted differs little from direct rule, because the native officials are, in effect, subordinate to Europeans, who supervise the revenue collections and hear cases on appeal from native courts or transfer cases from native courts to their own courts.

Although indirect rule is advocated as an instrument of welfare, the choice between direct or indirect rule has, in practice, been governed by convenience rather than by principle. In general, as we have seen, direct rule has tended to prevail where the colony was regarded primarily as a market to be developed by native enterprise, and indirect rule where it was chiefly valued as a source of raw materials to be developed by western enterprise. This coincidence between the economic interest of the colonial power and the system of rule adopted, suggests a need for caution in accepting the claims advanced for indirect rule as an instrument of welfare. Although now advocated as a means of moderating the pace of change, it won favour originally as a means of expediting change, by facilitating the supply of land and labour through native chieftains. Moreover, few would desire to protect the people wholly from the impact of the West, to segregate them and preserve them as museum pieces in native innocence and ignorance. In order to reconcile progress and welfare, tropical peoples should be brought as rapidly as possible into fertilizing contact with the principles that western civilization derives from Greece, Rome and Christianity, while given protection against the anti-social forces that its impact on the tropics liberates. Indirect rule, however, strictly applied and as originally conceived, has a contrary effect; it cuts the people off from western civilization and keeps them backward without giving them adequate protection against economic forces. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that this is largely responsible for the helplessness of the Javanese which strikes foreign observers[1] so forcibly and is deplored also by the Dutch, and which contrasts so notably with the vigorous enterprise that has impelled Burmans to colonize the delta, even if it also helps to fill the jails.

[1] Bousquet, p. 86.

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The older negative conception of indirect rule, however, has given place generally to a positive conception of its value as a means of inducing people to accept innovations intended to raise their standard of living. Here again, one cannot disregard the fact that the acceptance of this new interpretation coincided with the recognition by western enterprise that it required more efficient labour, healthier and more intelligent, and by western labour that its interests were endangered by the competition of cheap tropical labour. These practical considerations added weight to human sympathy, and European officials began to force the pace of welfare, using the native authorities merely as agents to obtain compliance with measures regarded, for the time being, as desirable. Thus the system of indirect rule becomes infected with the disease characteristic of direct rule: the infirmity of will and vacillation of policy consequent on frequent transfers. Moreover, every new use of native authorities to introduce unwelcome reforms strains their authority, on which the system of indirect rule is founded. And unless the native authorities themselves wholeheartedly accept new measures, they will not enforce them when the Government changes its policy, or the officer who recommends them leaves the district, so that compliance is superficial and impermanent. Usually, too, indirect rule is born a weakling. For the native chieftain recognized by the colonial power is the weaker among rival claimants, who seeks or accepts outside support because unable to stand alone. With the help of the colonial power he may be strong enough to place land and labour at its disposal, but this does not strengthen his position among his subjects. More and more, as time goes on, he derives authority from the Government rather than from the people, and it is the form rather than the reality of native institutions that indirect rule preserves.

Even under Dutch rule European officials have in fact interfered in native administration whenever convenient. During the period of the Culture system 'they did not debate whether action would prejudice village autonomy; they acted'. Under the Liberal system they bypassed the Regents in order to protect the people against oppression. Under the Ethical system, intended to strengthen the corporate village, Europeans, zealous for uplift, used the village administration as 'welfare apparatus' until 'precious little autonomy remained'. The conservation of village life and custom has always been a fundamental principle of Dutch administration; departures from this principle have been regarded as unorthodox and have been followed by a reaction to

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647 the old tradition, but the temptation to intervene has repeatedly proved irresistible. Under the tradition of direct rule in British India, and with a greater veneration for the rule of law, British officials are less disposed to resist the temptation, so that, in British practice, indirect rule loses its virtue and vitality, and tends to become little better than a sham, differing from direct rule chiefly in the name. The Dutch who tried intervention for some twenty years during the Ethical period were finally disillusioned, and came to recognize that it was mistaken. There seems little reason to anticipate better success under British rule.

Yet the principle underlying indirect rule is valuable. A native authority whom the people accept as representing them personifies their common social will. He has great influence to recommend reforms in which he himself believes, and he remains permanently among the people to supervise their application until they have been adopted into customary social life. But he can do this only so long and so far as he is the prime mover and has the chief direction in affairs. A leading Dutch civilian has suggested that whereas, during the Ethical period and earlier, the European official was the 'elder brother' or overlord of the native official by his side, it has become necessary for the European to accept the position of 'younger brother', as adviser and assistant rather than a chief executive. On this plan the chief defect of colonial administration, lack of continuity, becomes a virtue. The native authority is permanent, but of necessity cannot be in immediate and continual close contact with the modern world, and a succession of European officials can put before him various new points of view and make suggestions among which he can choose those that are congenial and seem feasible. This process, however, works slowly, and requires that the native authority shall be at home in the western world. Some form of pressure or compulsion seems easier and quicker.

5. Compulsory Welfare

656 It does not require an extensive acquaintance with contemporary colonial literature to note a growing tenderness towards compulsion as an instrument of welfare. There are demands for compulsory education, for the compulsory destruction of diseased crops and cattle, for campaigns against disease by operations, scientifically planned and humanely conducted, but military in spirit and thoroughness. For the common welfare men living in society must accept restrictions on individual freedom. In tropical society the people under their own rulers

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accepted such restrictions in the name of custom, but they welcome their removal. That was the strong point of British rule in former days; it brought, or seemed to bring, freedom. Now one finds suggestions of regret that compulsion is 'repugnant to the spirit of British administration', and that 'our traditions have not allowed us to contemplate the general use of regulation for the medical "cleaning-up" of disease-ridden areas'.[1] This tendency is often justified on the ground that we ourselves increasingly accept regulations that our more individualist fathers would have flouted, and that we must 'ask ourselves whether in dealing with the Dependencies, we are performing the function of a modern State'.[2] But the regulations in which we acquiesce, not without grumbling, proceed from ideas in which we share; although we recognize the need for penal sanctions to enforce them on a recalcitrant minority, public opinion is the most effective sanction. In tropical dependencies welfare measures proceed from the foreign Government and find no response among the great body of the people; on the contrary, they run counter to public opinion. We have already noted that in such circumstances the efficacy of compulsion is limited, but the relation between compulsion and welfare is so important that it deserves further examination.

In a city with a large European population it is possible to insist on modern hygienic precautions, at least within the European quarter. On western enterprises under European control the management can require their staff to accept western medical attention, and to comply with sanitary regulations; they can insist on these things as a condition of employment, and their hands are strengthened if they have the backing of the law. But in rural areas one may accept the estimate of Dr Hydrick, already cited, that compulsory measures are effective only where they have the support and the co-operation of at least nine-tenths of the people. No compulsion is required to encourage the people to attend secondary schools or to seek instruction of any type that improves their prospects or their status. People readily, too readily, submit to injections for the cure of venereal disease. But they do not, in general, believe in primary instruction or in western sanitation or western medicine. Their apathy is a subject of general complaint, but compulsion is no cure for apathy; rather it induces a reaction and transforms apathy into hostility. If the people do not accept innovations, the remedy is not compulsion but the demonstration

[1] Mills, p. 317; *Britain and her Dependencies*, p. 31.
[2] Hailey, Lord, quoted *Colonial Review*, 1942, p. 155.

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656 of their value by example and experience. Apathy betokens the failure of welfare measures, and the resort to compulsion is not only a sign but a confession of their failure. When measures that would really promote welfare fail, the explanation must be sought in some defect in the machinery of welfare, and as we have seen, this is defective because it works mechanically in response to the will of Government and not as an expression of organic social will. Compulsion can, within limits, be exercised effectively in the interest of economic progress, but to raise the standard of living among people in general it is necessary to organize a demand for welfare. Where an effective majority demands welfare measures, compulsion by penal regulations will give strength to their demand; beyond that, except so far as such measures are needed for the health of Europeans or the efficiency of western enterprise, attempts to promote welfare by compulsion almost certainly do more harm than good.

6. The Relation between Progress and Welfare

178 Indirect rule as we have noticed, although originally adopted for convenience, has been justified as a means of softening the impact of Europe on the tropics by leaving the people under their own rulers, laws and customs, and thereby moderating the pace of change so that they can adapt themselves to their new environment. Indirect rule does, in fact, provide machinery which should enhance welfare, and we may find cases where it has been effective. But the machinery often fails because the motive principle is unsound; it is applied to further progress rather than welfare. The growing tenderness towards legal compulsion under a penal correction is a tacit confession that, even under the stimulus of gentle pressure, adjustment fails to keep pace with the ever-increasing rate of change. Despite aspirations to moderate the rate of change in the interest of human welfare, there is constant pressure to hasten it for the sake of economic progress. 'A striking feature of most European economic enterprise in Africa has been the constant effort of Governments, companies and individuals to achieve specific developments in particular directions as rapidly as possible.'[1] That is true of modern colonial expansion in general. Governments are expected to bring new territories to a state of financial independence as soon as may be; the numerous departmental heads call for reports on this, that and the other sub-

[1] Frankel, p. 10.

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ject, and officials in charge of a district for only a few months must act quickly if they are to do anything and show results; shareholders in private enterprise look for quick returns. 'Means, speedy means', is the motto of tropical development in all its aspects. 178

The rapid development of tropical resources is not only profitable to the colonial power but helps to justify its position under the 'dual mandate' to the outer world. At the first international conference on colonial affairs held at Berlin in 1884–5, the development of dependencies was laid down as a condition on which their tenure should receive international recognition. The modern world demands access to backward regions, and the pace at which their resources, human and material, are made available for world welfare steadily grows faster. Before the days of steam, the funds derived from the taxation of native enterprise were sufficient to meet the charges of development. With the construction of railways and the growth of western enterprise, the demand for speedier development compelled dependencies to raise loans from or through the colonial power. Now this also is regarded as too slow, and there is general agreement that colonial powers should expedite development by loans free of interest or by outright gifts. The Dutch contribution of f. 40 million to Netherlands India in 1904, for promoting irrigation, emigration and agricultural credit services, was regarded as exceptional and as justified by special circumstances.[1] So likewise was a recent contribution of f. 25 million. But in British colonial policy the grant of financial assistance to dependencies found acceptance as a matter of principle. This is the basis of the Colonial Development Act of 1929, supplemented and extended by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940.

It is not without significance that, in the title of this Act, development precedes welfare, and that aviation has been recognized as one of the objects having a prior claim on the funds which it provides. Air services have proved useful for the conveyance to Europe of gold and diamonds. They may in future contribute to economy in administration by allowing the concentration of the forces maintained for preserving order, and by reducing the time required for the journeys of officers on furlough, but hitherto the demand for air transport for civil purposes has come from a comparatively small group among the European community.[2] The issue is primarily between transport by air and by sea, but ranged on either side are all those who stand to profit by these

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 236.

[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1602–3.

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178 respective forms of transport. Even before the present war, a situation was arising which called for measures to prevent wasteful competition between air and rail. It is not improbable that the powerful and vocal interests pressing for air services will obtain for them an undue share of the funds available for economic development, but doubtless all the rival interests will finally reach some form of agreement. Yet whatever agreement may be reached, one thing is certain: that the provision of air services will not 'moderate the pace of change'; on the contrary it will hasten economic development and increase the urgency of social services to mitigate its consequences. Already the subsidy to air transport constitutes a relatively heavy charge on the revenue in some territories, thereby diminishing the funds available for welfare services, and one may assume that, in the conflict of rival interests, the grant of funds for aviation (so far as it is not affected by lobbying) will be determined on purely economic grounds, and that the natives, who are least powerful and least vocal, will not have much influence on the decision.

Although the Act provides for expenditure on welfare services, it is based on the assumption that economic development is a condition of welfare. 'It can hardly be anticipated', says Sir Alan Pim, 'that the taxpayers of the Colonial Powers will, after the war, consent to such an annual levy on them as would meet the colonial needs either free of interest or at a nominal rate.'[1] Although additional expenditure on the development of dependencies does, or should, make them more profitable, it is doubtful how far grants or cheap loans for the purpose of development would benefit the British taxpayer. On the other hand, they would expedite the pace of change, and thereby enhance the difficulty of natives in adjusting themselves to their new environment. Grants made in the name of welfare will have a similar effect. However much may be available from public revenue or private charity for expenditure on social services, its effect on promoting welfare is conditioned by the demand for welfare, which in tropical dependencies, as we have seen, is effective only so far as welfare is necessary to development. Development creates a demand for social services, for the protection of land and labour, for the improvement of health and the multiplication of schools; but these services are transformed from instruments of welfare into instruments of progress. It is not true, as liberals held, that development is a cause of welfare or, as modern colonial policy holds, a condition of

[1] *Colonial Review*, Sept. 1944, p. 203.

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welfare. On the contrary, welfare is a condition of economic progress, and has economic progress as a by-product. We have noticed a striking instance of this principle in Burma, where the people wanted to decorate the local pagoda with electric light. Their interest was primarily in religion and, without any help or subsidy from Government, they illuminated the pagoda! But, incidentally, they also provided electric lighting for the town. It is a matter of general experience that many, probably most, utilitarian reforms have originally been conceived as humanitarian ideals and, indeed, so far as our western civilization has a Christian origin, we may claim that it is based securely on the rock of vision.

Everywhere in the tropics there is abundant scope and need for the enhancement of welfare. But, as Lord Hailey has remarked, little can be done to promote welfare until the people themselves, or at least their leaders, are conscious of their needs.[1] Economic progress under western rule should provide the means for enhancing welfare, but we cannot enhance welfare merely through economic progress. The problem of enhancing welfare has some analogies with the problem of encouraging scientific research. Sir Joseph Thomson made some wise remarks on this matter in connection with the use of Röntgen rays in war. Administrations and employers want research in applied science that will give practical results, and the scientists whom they employ are expected to show results and, indirectly at least, are paid according to results. Research in applied science, starting to find an improved method of locating bullet wounds might, he suggested, have led to the invention of better probes; but the improvement of war surgery was mainly due to the apparently quite useless, unpractical research that led to the discovery of Röntgen rays. He drew the moral that 'research in applied science leads to reform, research in pure science leads to revolutions'.[2] For the enhancement of welfare in the tropics nothing less than such a revolutionary change in our attack upon the problem will suffice. One cannot achieve it by attempting to mitigate the consequences of economic progress. It is necessary both to organize a positive demand for welfare and to control economic development in the interest of welfare. We must go outside the domain of economics to find some dynamic principle, stronger than economic forces, which all accept as of superior validity to the desire of gain. But if we are looking for some principle of welfare, we should have a clear understanding of what we mean by welfare.

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1206. [2] Rayleigh, Lord, *Life of Sir J. J. Thomson* (1942), p. 199.

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7. The Concept of Welfare

177 Between progress and welfare there is a fundamental difference. Economic progress is a matter of universal common sense. It consists essentially in making two blades of grass grow where one grew previously; in widening the margin between yield and cost. Progress is measurable and, if accurately measured, there is little question as to the degree of progress. But welfare is largely a subjective concept; everyone wants different things. Everyone has a different idea of welfare, and it is differently interpreted by successive generations. All colonial powers have claimed in their contemporary idiom a two-fold objective of colonial policy: progress and welfare. On progress there has been general agreement, but in different ages welfare has been identified with salvation, liberty and comfort. The Portuguese and early Dutch both claimed to open the kingdom of heaven to their subjects, but they opened respectively a Roman heaven and a Protestant heaven. The later Dutch and the English both thought to confer freedom on their subjects; but the Dutch allowed them the freedom of their own custom, and the English gave them the freedom of western law. Modern colonial powers aim at promoting comfort, but different ideas of comfort are reflected in Rangoon, Batavia and Saigon. Welfare has been defined as the possibility to satisfy those needs of which one is aware.[1] This definition is not wholly satisfactory, for welfare depends still more closely on those needs of which one is not conscious until they are frustrated, and it is frustration of this type that is largely responsible for unrest among tropical peoples. The definition does, however, suggest that welfare is not wholly subjective; it contains an objective element because it implies a relation between man and his environment. A bullock cart is good enough for those who do not see others ride in motor-cars, but a poor man in a rich country enjoys less welfare than a poor man in a poor country.

Certain things men generally recognize as good. Peace is a good thing. But the nightly drone of planes and the news of battle in the daily papers reminded us that it can be priced too highly. Order and security are good things, but under foreign rule their value as elements of welfare is debatable. In India it was questioned so far back as 1817 by Munro, who was no idealist but a highly competent administrator, able from his own experience to compare the welfare of Indian peoples

[1] Visman, I, 69.

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under their own rulers and under the greater security and order enforced by a paternal British Government. The advantages, he wrote, 'are dearly bought. They are purchased by the sacrifice of independence, of national character and of whatever renders a people respectable....The effect of this state of things is observable in all the British provinces, where the inhabitants are certainly the most abject race in India.'[1] (It should be noted that he was not contrasting the peoples of southern India with what we now regard as the more virile races of the north, at that time not yet under British rule, but with one another.) Gouger about the same time was struck by the difference between the free and easy bearing of the Burmans under their own king and the cringing humility of the peoples of Bengal. A recent traveller contrasts the Annamese with the Chinese and Siamese.[2] 'I must confess', he says, 'that I like my Orientals free.' There was greater security and order on slave plantations than in Africa, but this was not regarded by the conscience of mankind as sufficiently justifying slavery. Peace, security and order usually promote welfare, but, as may be seen from the *pax Japonica* in Korea, they are not identical with or even a guarantee of welfare.

Economic progress is still often confused with welfare, and it is assumed that because a country produces more the people will be better fed, better clothed and better housed. But, as we have seen already, this belief is contradicted by the facts. More commonly it is suggested that the standard of living can be measured by the demand for European goods, and a rise in imports is taken as an index of welfare, although they may consist largely of production goods for western enterprise. The import of foreign cloth is claimed as an increase of welfare, even when it deprives people of employment, and is perhaps of inferior quality to native cloth. Rather surprisingly, the import of tinned foods is said to be a means of 'strengthening tribal life'.[3] Imports of sewing machines, bicycles, gramophones, motor cars and other western products for natives show that some can afford to buy things of which formerly they were unaware, but at the same time make the general public aware of things that they cannot afford to buy. The sewing machine, the bicycle and the petrol engine are probably the greatest boons which modern invention has placed at the disposal of tropical peoples, and an enquiry

[1] Gleig, p. 249.
[2] Gouger, p. 10; Brodrick, A. H., *Little China* (1942), pp. 157, 172.
[3] *African Survey*, p. 690; Mayhew, *Colonial Empire*, p. 82.

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177 into their spread and its effects would be of great interest and also of practical importance. But not infrequently such imports merely show that some people have more money than they know how to use; they indicate superfluity rather than welfare among those who buy them, and at best they do not compensate for the decay of social goods that money cannot buy. Even careful attempts to measure welfare in terms of income and expenditure may be misleading, for they omit all those goods that have no price. Probably in Africa, as in Burma, few people are so well fed or so well-housed as the prisoners in jail, but the only people who appreciate the comforts of prison life are the warders. If welfare signifies harmony between man and his environment he may be better fed, better clothed and better housed under foreign rule, and still enjoy less welfare than under native rule.

Perhaps we shall obtain a clearer notion of welfare as an object of colonial policy if we try to look at it from the standpoint of the dependent people. Although between individuals in any land there may be a wide range of preference for one thing rather than another, their general idea of welfare conforms to a common pattern which can be seen by looking at what they themselves make of their own social life under favourable circumstances. The ordinary Burman villager, for example, wants to be well fed and well clad according to Burmese ideas, and to live in a dwelling that is comfortable by Burmese standards. These requirements he can satisfy as an individual, but he has other wants, social wants, that he can realize only as a member of the community. He wants his village, also according to his own standards, to have sufficient house room, good roads and paths, a good water supply for men and cattle, adequate sanitary convenience, shady open spaces for social intercourse, and common land for general village amenities in respect of grazing, fuel and so on. High up on his list of social wants is a monastery, with a monastic school and with pagodas and rest houses in pleasant surroundings. He also values opportunities for recreation and for religious and social festivities and entertainments. This may be taken as an outline sketch of the Burmese idea of welfare, which found material expression in the more prosperous villages under Burmese rule, and was probably diffused more widely in the early days of British rule. The Burman wants these things, and he wants, chiefly, to get them to his own liking and in his own way and, beyond that, to have no more to do with Government than necessary. Production is a social function and welfare is a social attribute; in both his work and leisure he is a member of the village and does not live alone.

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Such a conception of welfare is quite different from that which ordinarily finds expression in modern welfare legislation. Much of this is based on western models designed to protect labour against capital and, though less effective in the tropics, does something to prevent a reduction in the standard of living in industrial employment below the minimum essential to efficiency. So far as it aims at more than this, it is for the most part unwelcome. The Burman does not want to eat food that Europeans may regard as more nutritious, to observe sanitary precautions that accord with European ideas, or to cultivate his land in ways that Europeans may think more desirable or profitable. His ideas differ in many ways from ours, and where they differ, he is not always mistaken. Native rule in the tropics gives the people more or less what they want, and allows them in great measure to realize their ideas of welfare. But native authority is liable to abuse, and native custom may unconsciously be irksome. So far as foreign rule, by removing abuses and abolishing irksome customs, confers on the people greater freedom to realize their idea of welfare, they accept it more readily. That was what formerly gave strength to British and Dutch colonial rule. As in Lower Burma until about 1880 and in Upper Burma up to about 1910 the people acquiesce in foreign rule because they are hardly conscious of it. It has always been the set policy of Dutch rule to conserve the native social order, however far they may have departed from this principle in practice. The same principle has found expression in some interpretations of indirect rule in British territories,[1] and apparently is still favoured in parts of Africa. If, then, the earlier days of British administration are the happiest, and it is most successful in dealing with primitive and backward peoples, this is probably because the people have been unaware of a change in their environment, except in some ways for the better.

Yet all the time, and even though they do not notice it, the environment is changing. Gradually these changes impinge on native consciousness; the people no longer feel at home, even in their own homes, and increasingly resent foreign rule and foreign ways. For various reasons, humanitarian and practical, colonial powers endeavour to counteract the ill effect of the forces which they have liberated, and to promote native welfare. But this involves closer and more frequent interference with native life and provides fuel for disaffection. In the homogeneous society of the West reforms which raise the individual standard of living tend also to promote social

[1] *African Survey*, p. 134.

177 welfare, and it seems not unreasonable to assume that similar results will follow in the tropics. Schools, sanitary regulations, the improvement of agriculture, and so on, appeal to humanitarians as likely to improve individual welfare, and by making for economy in administration and business, they appeal to reason as well as to sentiment. Naturally colonial governments conceive of welfare on western lines, and administrative practice is concentrated on enhancing the welfare of the people as individuals.

These attempts to promote welfare are effective only so far as the people will respond to them. The West may scatter pearls, or what it takes for pearls, about the tropics, but the people will not pick them up unless they appreciate their value. Scientific agriculture, modern schools, western medicine and sanitary regulations may not conduce to, and frequently conflict with, what the people regard as welfare, but if they cannot get what they want they must take what they can get. Agricultural and other economic services may enable them to earn more as individuals; modern schools may provide their youngsters with 'a decent job'; they may adopt some western foods or remedies for illness, and they may, perhaps, go to hospitals to be cured of their complaints. But these are all individual benefits, and have no relation to welfare as a social good. Welfare consists essentially in harmony between the individual and the environment; the environment must allow him to obtain both what he knows he wants and also what he wants without being [illegible]re of it. Economic progress enlarges the possibility of welfare by increasing the command of man over material resources, but it profits the native as an individual only so far as he participates in the larger surplus, and it enhances his welfare only so far as it contributes, directly or indirectly, to the enrichment of his social life.

8. Welfare and Autonomy

647 There is, as we have noticed, a growing recognition of the complexity of welfare problems. 'The problems of development touch upon the
657 work of officers in various departments, such as administrative officers, both at headquarters and in the districts, and the technical officers in the
654 agricultural, veterinary, medical and other services. There is need for machinery to provide complete co-ordination between these separate
177 departmental staffs.'[1] The health officer finds that he must seek assistance from the chemist and entomologist, and the veterinary officer

[1] 1940, Cmd. 6175, p. 7; *African Survey*, p. 1612.

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looks to the forest officer to provide grazing for the stock. As experts come more and more to recognize the need for special knowledge outside their own branch of study, there is an increasing demand for the creation of new services, and welfare work is distributed among departmental officials who are unable to see life as a whole. At the same time there is a growing recognition that all aspects of life are closely interrelated. In Malaya the improvement of paddy is found to require co-ordinated action by the agricultural irrigation, co-operative credit, education and other services.[1] In Nyasaland the Welfare Committee comprises representatives of the Medical, Agricultural and Public Works Department together with non-officials. In Southern Rhodesia there is a Director of Native Development in charge of all native affairs.[2] The Dutch in Netherlands India minimize sectionalism by grouping the various services in large departments and, further, link up some of the departments by liaison officers. All these expedients may improve the co-ordination of the welfare machinery. But it still remains machinery, and acts mechanically on the people taken in the mass as an aggregate of individuals. Each group of specialists takes snapshots of the people from its own angle, but the composite photograph obtained by fitting the results together bears as little relation to the native world as a Hollywood film to life. It shows native life from an alien western standpoint and, however lifelike, it never comes to life. The more elaborate the machinery, the more mechanically it functions, driven by economic forces and not by human will. Improvements in the administrative machinery merely effect reforms which adapt the people better to the economic forces that dominate life in tropical dependencies. Evolution along this line leads to a dead end. It is the type of evolution characteristic of the lower forms of life which have survived by adapting their way of life to their environment; to adapt his environment to his way of life is the prerogative of man, and reforms adapting him to an uncongenial environment produce not harmony but discontent. The impact of the West has liberated forces which were formerly kept under control by custom; for the enhancement of welfare it is necessary that the people shall be enabled to regain control over these forces, that they shall regain their former autonomy. That a higher standard of welfare is a condition of autonomy is alleged as one ground for the elaboration of welfare machinery. But improvements in welfare machinery resemble improvements in applied science. Research in applied science may increase the efficiency of

[1] Mills, pp. 255, 262.

[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1197, 1227, 1230.

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647 current practice, but the great scientific achievements come from
research in pure science, which revolutionizes practice by attacking
old problems along new lines. Similarly the elaboration of welfare
657 machinery can have no appreciable effect on welfare, and still less
654 can it promote autonomy. It will not give them what they want
unless they want what it can give, and the promotion of welfare must
177 be approached from a new angle by a revolution in method. The
machinery is not only defective, but is applied on a wrong principle.

But, in the modern world, how is it possible for tropical peoples to get what they want? For the environment has changed, and not the people; they still, if left to themselves, would try to reproduce their old environment. But they have been brought into contact with the modern world and cannot get away from it. All the king's horses and all the king's men cannot set the clock back. They can get what they want only if they want what in the conditions of the modern world they *must* want. A fundamental problem of autonomy is to change the people so that they shall come to want, or at least voluntarily to accept, those conditions which the welfare of the modern world requires. Some light should be thrown upon this problem from an examination of attempts already made to introduce self-government among dependent peoples in various projects of colonial autonomy.

9. Autonomy

642 Colonial autonomy is closely linked with the Liberal tradition, which had two aspects. On the economic side it stood for economic freedom, freedom of person, property and trade; on the political side it stood for freedom of thought, speech and religion. Political freedom was regarded as the natural fruit of economic freedom. In the nineteenth century Liberalism was in the air. British and Dutch colonial statesmen alike claimed Liberal ideals though interpreting them differently; French Liberals recognized their colonial subjects as citizens of France, and Liberalism in Spain, suppressed at home, took refuge in the Spanish territories overseas.

During a great part of the century Liberals in Britain thought colonies a burden, and often cited Turgot's dictum comparing them to fruit that would fall from the parent tree when ripe. Men looked forward to the day when India should be able to stand alone as the proudest day in the story of British rule. Practical administrators like Sir Thomas Munro argued that when Indians were sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for themselves, it would

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'probably be best for both countries that the British control over India should be gradually withdrawn'.[1] From that time onwards the vision of self-government in India, though often veiled behind the clouds of more immediate problems, has never wholly been obscured. The attainment of virtual independence by the great dominions furnished a succession of encouraging precedents, and the rise of Nationalism in the East transformed the question of self-government from a vague and remote prospect into a live political issue. Indians came to demand variously self-government, dominion status and independence, and their example has been followed in other dependencies. Britain responded by formally accepting self-government within the empire as the professed goal of its colonial policy.

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But, as the prospect of self-government grew less remote, its meaning required clearer definition. Mr Curtis, in his book on *Dyarchy*, remarks that on his visit to India in 1916 'self-government was discussed in official as well as in Indian society, as the one conceivable goal of British policy'.[2] But he found no less than four different interpretations, none of them agreeing with his own. To some British officials it meant no more than the emancipation of the Government of India from the control of Parliament and the Secretary of State, coupled with the devolution of specified powers and revenues to the provincial Governments. To others it meant the repartition of India into native states. To some Indians it implied merely the progressive substitution of Indian for British officials. Others thought that executives in India could be left responsible to the Secretary of State, and yet be rendered dependent for the exercise of their powers on Indian electorates and elected legislatures. His own interpretation was that executives should be 'responsible' to elective legislatures. Still another interpretation of self-government is possible; for there is no necessary connection between self-government and the elective principle, and a dependency, recognizing allegiance to the Crown but otherwise independent, would be self-governing, even if the ruler were an autocrat. Shortly after his visit self-government was identified with responsible government in the pronouncement in Parliament in August 1917, and was more exactly defined in the preamble to the Government of India Act, 1919: 'It is the declared policy of Parliament to provide for the increasing association of Indians in every branch of Indian administration, and for the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in

[1] Gleig, p. 316. [2] Curtis, p. 357.

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642 British India as an integral part of the Empire.' The same doctrine has since been extended to other dependencies; formerly they were regarded as held on trust, but now they are to be admitted to 'partnership'.

In this formula one may distinguish three separate elements: men, machinery and will; a self-governing personnel, self-governing institutions, and self-determination. These are often regarded as necessary and logical successive stages on the road leading to self-government, and they have in fact marked the political advance of Burma, as of the rest of India. This line of advance, however, would seem to be associated particularly with the system of direct rule. Direct rule signifies the acceptance of western principles of rule, and self-government implies therefore the training of men to apply them, the construction of institutions to work them, and the education of the people to adopt them. The approach to self-government along this line assumes that in tropical society western forms of self-government will, at least in time, come to function in the same manner as in the West. It attempts to adapt tropical society to western principles of government, much as the scientific expert in agriculture or hygiene too often tries to adapt native life to scientific principles.

We have noticed that when the Dutch regained their eastern territories in 1816, they were full of enthusiasm for 'all that is brave and liberal'. Van den Bosch claimed to be applying Liberal principles when he left the Regents and villages, 'the little republics', in Java free to govern their people on their own lines. Indirect rule purports to conserve the self-governing personnel and self-governing institutions that are already in existence and, so far as it is used as an instrument of political advancement, implies the adaptation of western principles of government to tropical society. But most Dutch Liberals of 1816 would have ranked with the more backward British 'Tories'; even the more orthodox Liberals of a later generation, when introducing Liberal reforms on a mid-Victorian pattern, expressly disavowed the idea of governing Java on British principles with a view to political emancipation. Yet circumstances compelled the Netherlands to follow the same path as Britain. The expansion of private enterprise under Liberal rule led to the multiplication of administrative activities, and economy dictated the recruitment of a native personnel. With the growth of the western element in the plural society, administrative efficiency required the introduction of western self-governing institutions in local government. Then,

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during the present century, the convergence of Liberal, Ethical and Nationalist ideas, together with considerations of practical convenience, led in 1918 to the creation of the Volksraad, introducing western institutions in the central government. The new Dutch constitution of 1922 recognized the autonomy of Netherlands India in principle, and, as subsequently formulated in 1942, Dutch policy looked forward to the reconstruction of the kingdom 'on a solid foundation of complete partnership' among all the members.[1] Thus circumstances have dragged the Dutch, for long almost reluctantly, along the track blazed by the British. In Dutch as in British dependencies, colonial policy has sought to make the people capable of self-government by substituting natives for Europeans in the administration and by the construction of western self-governing institutions, and in both alike partnership has come to be recognized as the goal of policy.

10. Personnel

The application of Liberal principles to tropical administration may be dated from the revision of the charter of the East India Company in 1813. Liberal orthodoxy expected Government to confine its activities so far as possible to the maintenance of law and order. On that view it was not illogical to hold that the substitution of Indians for Europeans in the law courts would take India a long way towards self-government. Merely of necessity this process was already making great strides forward. The system of direct rule, inaugurated by Warren Hastings, was completed when Cornwallis took over civil and criminal jurisdiction from native authorities. It soon appeared that the Company could not afford to entertain a sufficient European staff, and Lord Hastings considered various expedients, including the revival of *panchayats*, for dealing with the pressure of business. The easiest and cheapest solution was to train natives as magistrates and judges. They were employed in courts of first instance and, under Lord Amherst, in appellate courts. By 1827 over 90% of the original suits in civil cases were tried by native judicial officers. Thus the employment of Indians was 'rendered imperative by the cost of a purely English administration'. But it was also regarded as 'a great moral duty'.[2] 'With what grace', asked Munro, 'can we talk of our paternal government, if we exclude them from

[1] *Netherlands India*, pp. 82, 84, 109, 160; Broek, J. D. M., *Pacific Affairs*, 1943, p. 338.

[2] Ross, p. 202; Boulger, pp. 60, 64, 67; *IG*, IV, 45.

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647 every important office?'[1] The great Liberal reformer, Bentinck, was heartily in favour of the employment of Indians, and, on the renewal of the Company's charter in 1833, this view found expression in the memorable pronouncement that no one should be excluded from any appointment in India by reason only of his colour, creed or race. This principle has always since then been 'adopted by the Government and people of England as a cardinal point in their Indian policy'. It may be claimed that it has been steadily applied. By the end of the century there were Indian judges on various provincial High Courts, while 'the European element in the government was confined within the limits essential for efficiency and guidance', and was employed chiefly where special knowledge or requirements were needed, or where 'as in the case of the Police, a large measure of European control was essential'.[2] But although the administrative personnel was so largely manned by Indians, India was no nearer to self-government. In this matter there was still, says Mr Curtis, 'almost everything to be done. You will not have done it, or begun to do it, merely by substituting Indian for English officials from the Viceroy downwards.' Such a Government might even be further from self-government, because an English Viceroy, merely by the circumstances of his birth and upbringing, is better able to treat with members of the Home Government as one of themselves on equal terms.

Indians were indeed less capable of self-government at the end of the century than at the beginning. In the early years of the nineteenth century India was merely a geographical expression; politically it was a congeries of native states and British territories; the former were self-governing and in the latter the machinery of government was little more complex than in native states. But, with economic progress, the administrative system was unified and centralized at Calcutta, while the machinery of government grew more complex and the art of government more intricate and difficult. As soon as a Government wants to do anything beyond maintaining law and order, it needs experts who can do these things: engineers for the roads and railways, irrigation and drainage; geologists and mining engineers; agricultural and veterinary officials; doctors and schoolmasters. It needs a larger staff, and especially a much larger staff of native subordinates. The multiplication of special services leads to departmentalism. Even in Europe, where the public services have grown up in response to social demand, the delays and obstructions of bureaucracy are a common

[1] Gleig, p. 307. [2] *IG*, IV, 45.

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theme of complaint. But in India and other tropical dependencies, they form the framework of a huge western superstructure over native life, wholly foreign to the people. Not only is there less self-government, but less government than before, because the machinery is too vast and complex to be informed by human will.

The multiplication of native officials is, therefore, no measure of the progress of self-government, but rather the reverse. In Europe the public services provide what the people want, and a comparatively small staff suffices to give them what they want; but in the tropics the much larger staff necessary to obtain the compliance of the people with innovations that they do not want constitutes a hindrance to self-government.

The inverse relation between self-government and the multiplication of native officials is illustrated by the system of indirect rule. Under this system there is a much greater measure of self-government than under direct rule, and one of its advantages is that it does not require so large a staff. During the nineteenth century in Java, when the Regents and villages managed their own affairs, few officials were employed. But, with economic progress, and the influx of foreign elements, there is a demand for the introduction of western law and western amenities, and accordingly far more judges and magistrates and the multiplication of special services. Thus, as native officials become more numerous, native self-government decays. On the other hand, as happened in Siam, an independent country can employ a large number of European officials without ceasing to be self-governing. So long as the Government remains an instrument of foreign rule, the increasing association of natives in every branch of tropical administration is no index to the progress of self-government.

II. Machinery: Local Government

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Together with the increasing association of natives in the administration, Liberals placed their faith in the 'gradual development of self-governing institutions'. Local self-government is, of course, no new thing in the tropics. From very early times tropical rulers have allowed foreign traders in the ports to settle their own affairs in their own way according to their own laws. It was in accordance with this principle of 'like over like' that Europeans in India and other parts of the tropics were allowed, and required, to maintain order among their own community. But modern self-government on a western pattern is the child of sanitation. It was owing to trouble over town conservancy

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631 that, in 1687, the East India Company obtained from James II a charter constituting a new civil government for Madras on an English model with a mayor, aldermen and burgesses empowered to levy taxes for such matters as seemed 'convenient for the honour, interest, ornaments, security and defence' of the corporation and inhabitants; their powers included the constitution of a court for the trial of both civil and criminal issues.[1] Similar corporations were subsequently established in the other Presidency towns, but the extension of municipal administration to the interior is comparatively recent.

Local self-government in the interior had its origin, as in the city of Madras, in the urgent need to find some more efficient way of dealing with the problem of sanitation. But the situation was very different. In Madras an effective majority of the chief inhabitants wanted better conservancy, and of their own motion they obtained a charter so that they might better be able to do what they wanted to have done. In the interior it was the local officials and not the people who wanted better sanitation. So long as nothing could be done without the sanction of the central Government in India or Europe, local officials could not help themselves; some measure of deconcentration of authority was needed to invest them with the requisite powers and to enable them to raise the necessary funds.[2] Municipal administration provided the machinery. In Madras, as in Europe, western self-governing institutions enabled the townsfolk, or the dominant class among them, to do what they wanted; in the interior Government could provide the machinery of local self-government, but the people did not want to use it.

The outcome of the first essay in municipal legislation was ominous. In 1842 an Act for Bengal enabled 'the inhabitants of any place of public resort or residence to make better provision for purposes connected with health or convenience'. But so far were the people from wanting better provision that in the first town to which it was applied they prosecuted the collector for trespass. This killed the Act, and little more was attempted until the Report of the Royal Army Sanitary Commission in 1863 attributed the bad health of the troops largely to the insanitary condition of the towns. This report may be taken to mark the beginning of both modern sanitation and modern local self-government in India. During the next five years the various Provinces were equipped with municipal legislation. But even so far as the people wanted better sanitation, they did not want, and could not

[1] *IG*, IV, 284. [2] *ISC*, I, 301.

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use, western municipal machinery. We have noticed that in Burma the townsfolk were beginning to adapt their social life to the new environment, and could make their own arrangements for conservancy without western machinery or help from Government. In Madras, also, there were voluntary associations in some towns for sanitation and other social ends. Modern sanitation was *needed*, and in some degree was *wanted*; a social demand for sanitation was emerging. This might have served as the basis for a gradual organic development, but it seemed easier and quicker to turn out western municipal machinery by mass production. Yet the western machinery did not meet the emerging social demand; and, because it answered no demand, it was inefficient in providing for the need. The Acts of 1864 to 1868 did something to improve urban sanitation, but they marked little progress towards self-government. In 1870 the Provinces were for the first time given some control over their own revenues and were allowed to raise taxes if the fixed grant from central revenues did not suffice. The Resolution of 1870, introducing this new system, emphasized the importance of engaging local interest in the management of funds allotted to education, sanitation, medical charity and local works, and between 1871 and 1874 a new set of Municipal Acts provided for popular representation on local bodies. Only in the Central Provinces, one of the most backward territories, was popular representation regarded as successful; possibly because the people were too backward to question the wisdom and authority of the executive officers who presided over the committees.

So far, despite Liberal aspirations, efficiency had been the main theme and object of local self-government, and local organs had been provided in the towns, where better sanitation was urgently needed in the new environment consequent on economic progress. But in 1881 the Liberal Viceroy, Lord Ripon, struck a new note by emphasizing the value of local self-government as a means of political and popular education. Accordingly, in 1883–4, for the third time within twenty years, all the provinces were fitted out with new Municipal Acts.[1] These purported to introduce a more democratic principle. Former legislation had enabled the Government to get the people to do what it thought necessary; now the people were given powers to do, of their own accord, what Government thought necessary.

That was not the only reason for the inefficiency of local self-government. There was very little that, taken as a whole, the people did

[1] *IG*, IV, 164, 286, 287.

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631 want. Even in India, with a comparatively homogeneous population, 'the violent sectional antagonism between Hindus and Mohammedans, or Brahmins and non-Brahmins has certainly impaired the efficiency of local bodies'. In other tropical dependencies, with a more strongly plural character, self-government on western lines is impossible because, as we have noticed in Burma with its mixed population of Burmans, Indians and Chinese, and in the larger towns Europeans, the people lack 'the sense of common citizenship which the necessary basis for healthy civic life'. It is not only in Burma that the various communities have little common interest except in resisting proposals for enhanced taxation, or that the membership of local bodies largely consists of men who seek official favour or hope to line their pockets. In India the Statutory Commission noticed 'a number of cases of corruption and certain instances where very large sums had been expended in order to obtain seats on local government authorities, suggesting that those who expended such large amounts expected to be able to recoup themselves from illicit gains'.[1]

Most of the functions imposed on local bodies were things that needed doing, and the local bodies helped to get them done. If the inhabitants will not or cannot make the necessary adjustments for themselves, others must perform the task. Ordinarily it has devolved on the local official in charge of general administration. The forms of local self-government help him to discharge his functions more effectively by providing him with funds and by bringing him closer to the people. But form does not give rise to function. He was merely 'carrying out the will of his official superiors. He was just as much the eyes, ears and arms of the provincial Government as when functioning as revenue officer or district magistrate. Local self-government was just one of his many activities.' In India, forty years after the introduction of the forms of self-government through the Liberal enthusiasm of Lord Ripon, it was reported that 'the custom of the country, force of habit, apathy, and lack of desire to assume responsibility among those elected—together with the natural reluctance of an overworked official, desirous of efficiency, to consume much time in getting things done badly which he felt he could himself do well—combined to prevent real and substantial progress being made in political and popular education in the art of self-government'.[2] The view current among officials was that 'certainly Indians of the political class have not shone greatly in the

[1] *ISC*, 1, 314. [2] *ISC*, 1, 301.

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sphere of local self-government during the last thirty years, although of course they blame everything but themselves'. With wider powers 'many will weary and again blame anything rather than their own lack of perseverance'.[1] These remarks suggest that Indians were not alone in looking beyond themselves to find a scapegoat for the failure of self-government, and they are illuminating as to its effect on causing friction between officials and the people. But such recriminations serve merely to divert attention from the real cause of its failure.

Under indirect rule local self-government follows a like course. With the growth of a western element in social life, it becomes necessary to replace native self-government by western self-governing machinery. In Netherlands India urban self-government on western lines was first introduced under the Decentralization Law of 1903. This was intended to promote efficiency by deconcentrating administrative activity, and also to provide an element of popular co-operation in the task of government. In the large towns self-government proved efficient, partly because it was based on the Dutch rather than the English model with an official *burgomaster* instead of a non-official as Chairman, but chiefly because the large towns contain a stronger European community than in British India, and in effect self-government was government by the European section. Elsewhere, however, it had a different result, and promoted executive efficiency rather than self-government.

Economic progress requires a readjustment of social life to new conditions; most rapidly and urgently in the towns, less obviously but no less inevitably in the villages. Under Lord Ripon the forms of western self-governing machinery were applied to rural areas. Here they were even more unreal than in the towns. For some towns did at least possess economic unity, whereas the districts and their subdivisions were merely artificial units devised for administrative convenience and with no organic cohesion. The natural effect was to expedite the decay of organic self-government in the villages. Under indirect rule, also, the readjustment of social conditions in rural areas comes, if less rapidly than under direct rule, to demand attention. In Netherlands India the Village Act of 1906 was intended to provide western machinery for consolidating village life, and for lifting the community to a higher level. But 'autonomy and progress do not go together', and after twenty years 'precious little autonomy remained', and the western machinery, having no organic relation to

[1] Curtis, p. 33.

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native life, ceased to function as soon as the hand of Government was withdrawn. Similarly, in British territories under indirect rule,

'the varied responsibilities now placed on native authorities demand the exercise of close and continuous supervision by the administration.... Many observers have questioned whether the traditional native authorities, or at all events a large number of the weaker units, will not be strained beyond their powers by the tasks now laid on them. Everywhere the supervision now exercised over them must bring home to the people that the sanction for their authority is no longer the good will of their own people, but the recognition accorded to them by the administration.'[1]

And under indirect rule, as under direct rule, native social units are continually readjusted and are often amalgamated for the sake of convenience or economy into large artificial administrative units with no traditional sanction, in which administrative methods can be applied according to a standard plan. Under Dutch rule as under British rule, and under direct rule as under indirect rule, local self-government fights a losing battle against efficiency.

12. Machinery: Central Government

In the machinery of the central government in tropical dependencies, one can trace a similar conflict between the contrary ideals of efficiency and autonomy. From very early days both the British and Dutch East India Companies furnished their representatives in the East with the assistance of a council. In British India, under the rule of law during the nineteenth century, this council took on a new character. From 1833 the Council of the Governor-General was gradually enlarged for the purpose of legislation, and in 1861 the Indian Councils Act provided for the addition to the Central Legislative Councils of non-officials, including Indians, and also for the constitution of Provincial Councils on similar lines. But these councils were merely 'committees by means of which the executive Government obtained advice and assistance in their legislation, and the public derived the advantage of publicity at every stage of the law-making process'.[2] Gradually the councils came to exercise an increasing influence over the conduct of affairs, and there was a growing deference to the opinions of important classes. This became more marked when the Indian Councils Act of 1892 enlarged the Provincial Councils and gave partial recognition to

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 538–9; Field, M. J., *Man*, 1943, p. 90.
[2] *ISC*, I, 114–16.

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the elective system. Yet there was no change in the constitutional position of the councils; the object of the Act was that 'each important class shall have the opportunity of making its wishes known in Council through the mouth of some member specially acquainted with them'.[1] The Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 were a further advance in the same direction; they created larger councils with numerous non-officials elected either by local authorities, large landowners, trade associations, or universities. But the authors of these reforms expressly repudiated the suggestion that they would lead 'directly or indirectly to the establishment of a parliamentary system in India'.[2] Thus all these successive changes in the form of government were intended to increase its efficiency and not to transfer the responsibility for government from the British Parliament to the Indian people.

On the other hand, however, they went a long way towards local autonomy by strengthening the Provincial Governments against the Central Government, and the Central Government against Whitehall. In all the various councils the predominant influence was that of western industry and commerce. We have noticed that, in Burma, agrarian reforms were pressed on the Provincial Government by the Government of India, and at first not without response. Later, with the enlargement of the Legislative Council, capitalist influence was strong enough to defeat them. In some matters there may be a cleavage of opinion between officials and non-official Europeans, but usually these two classes, from their common origin and upbringing, if for no other reason, tend to adopt the same point of view, and in India from about 1870 onwards, with the growth of western enterprise after the opening of the Suez Canal, there was an increasing tendency towards capitalist autonomy, which became more Indian in colour during the present century; as Indian capital grew more powerful and Nationalism more clamorous and better organized.

Yet, up to the outbreak of the war of 1914–18, the Liberal doctrine of training India for political emancipation had made no impression on the machinery of the Central Government. The Government aimed to promote the welfare of the people, and was amenable to the influence of the Indian public so far as this was vocal. But Nationalists wanted more than influence; they wanted power. The first stirrings of modern Nationalism were directly inherited from the Liberal tradition, but by the end of the nineteenth century it derived most of its strength from a blind reaction, seditious and destructive, against both foreign rule and

[1] *ISC*, 1, 183. [2] *ISC*, 1, 119.

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western civilization. The Japanese victory over Russia inspired new hopes of freedom and a more constructive attitude. Nationalists came to look on western education, western science and western political institutions as instruments by which India might achieve a place among the nations of the modern world. The Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 aimed to appease rather than to satisfy these new demands, and only when Britain, having drawn the sword to defend the liberty of the small nations of Europe, invited help from India, was the doctrine of self-determination extended to the tropics. Indians demanded self-government and, in reply to their demand, the pronouncement of 1917 held up responsible government within the Empire as the goal of British policy. The substitution of responsible government for self-government is significant. Responsible government was intended to imply a Government accountable to the people, and in England therefore had the whole weight of Liberal tradition to back it. In India it appealed both to those Europeans who held that the strength of British rule lay in the well-merited affection of the masses, who would outweigh the disaffected Nationalists, and also to Indians who looked to the Liberal principle of counting heads as ensuring a majority for Indians in the conduct of Indian affairs.

The reforms that followed this pronouncement 'struck at the essentials of the previous system. Authority, instead of being concentrated at the Centre, was to be in large measure devolved on the provinces; the opportunities of the Central Legislature for influencing the Government of India were to be increased; the control of Parliament over the whole of Indian government was to be modified by marking out a portion of the provincial field in which it would be no longer exercised'.[1] This system came to be known as Dyarchy because the British Parliament remained supreme in certain matters, while transferring control over others to Indian ministers, chosen by the people and responsible to a popular electorate. Forms of parliamentary government were devised in the expectation, or the hope, that they would function in the same manner as in England. But conditions in England and India were very different. In England there was a strongly homogeneous society; in all parts of India (and especially in Burma) there was a much divided plural society. In England the franchise has been extended to new classes as they have gained economic power, and voting power, the numerical majority, is a rough measure of economic and military power; in India generally

[1] *ISC*, I, 122.

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(and especially in Burma) the numerical majority lies with that section of the community which has least economic and military power. In England the whole people accept the standards of the modern world; in India only a very small minority lives in the modern world. These conditions, which are general throughout tropical dependencies, are incompatible with parliamentary government in the form which has gradually been worked out in England, and, if attempts be made to introduce western democratic forms, they necessitate the adoption of safeguards to prevent the collapse of government.

In India various safeguards were devised. The executive was empowered to override the legislature, if necessary. Apart from matters expressly transferred to popular control, the executive still remained responsible to the British Parliament. The special representation of particular interests and classes made for a balance of power in the legislatures. The legislatures included an official block, speaking and voting in accordance with the views of the executive. And, possibly the most effective safeguard against unwelcome legislation, the pay and patronage enjoyed by ministers weakened party solidarity among the Nationalist opposition. Responsible government, so far as it makes for better representation, helps Government to know what needs doing, but so far as it involves a system of balance, blocks and bribery, it prevents the Government from doing anything. In India dyarchy failed to gain the approval of the Nationalists, who attributed its shortcomings to the safeguards. But, in fact, it merely brought to light and aggravated the conditions which made India unsuitable to self-government on British lines. The reforms gave new point to Hindu-Moslem competition, and communal tension grew more acute.[1] Similarly in Burma western democratic forms have fostered ill-will and strife between Burmans, Indians, Chinese and Europeans. In Netherlands India likewise the first Volksraad to have an actual share in government was the last 'association-Volksraad', and each racial group began to look to its own interests. Self-government on a popular basis requires the existence of a common social will, but the reforms engendered communal ill-will. In the tropics people in general do not want what the conditions of the modern world necessitate, and self-government consequently does not give them what they want. It does not even give them what they need, for a legislature representing a photographic portrait of a plural society in all its detail of conflicting social and economic interests cannot pass difficult and contentious legislation,

[1] *ISC*, 1, 29.

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and its composition effectually hinders it from doing what is necessary to counterbalance the play of economic forces; social will is paralysed and anti-social forces become more active than before. Thus in a plural society the forms of responsible government not only prevent self-government but make constructive government impossible, and allow greater freedom to economic forces.

It is not only by intensifying sectional and communal differences that the machinery of responsible government tends to hinder progress towards self-government. In India 'while the experienced member of the Services will admit the benefit of British Raj and realize the difficulties in the way of complete self-government; while the member of a minority community, putting the safety of his community first, will stipulate for safeguards; and while the moderate will look askance at extremist methods which he will denounce; all alike are in sympathy with the demand for equal status with the European and proclaim their belief in self-determination for India'.[1] When nationalist aspirations conflict with capitalist activities, Europeans are usually associated with the latter. In India, where Indians own much of the capital, this is not so marked as in Burma and most other dependencies. In Burma, the Indians and Chinese share with Burmans an inferiority complex; they all want equality of status with Europeans. Yet, at every point of divergence between national interest and economic development, the Indians and Chinese tend to line up behind the Europeans, who stand out in the legislature as the protagonists of capital. But the Government is a European government, and the ill-feeling centring on Europeans is focussed on the Government and accordingly on Britain. A dependency cannot obtain self-government peacefully except by co-operation based on mutual good-will between the people aspiring to autonomy and the colonial power attempting to confer it on them, but this is weakened and not strengthened by the introduction of democratic institutions along western lines.

Thus, although Europeans inheriting the Liberal tradition of democratic government will sympathize with democratic aspirations, both general considerations and practical experience suggest that premature experiments in introducing western institutions hinder rather than help towards the attainment of independence, and prejudice rather than promote the growth of popular government and the ultimate achievement of democracy.

[1] *ISC*, 1, 408.

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13. Progress, Welfare and Autonomy

It would seem then that the machinery of western democracy, like the machinery of western welfare, operates merely to further economic progress. Idealists pleaded the cause of education, but the effective stimulus was the need for educated officials. Humanitarians denounced the conditions of labour, but with little effect until employers came to recognize that more efficient labour was cheaper. Arguments for the employment of natives in the higher ranks of private enterprise found a hearing only when the recent depression necessitated the substitution of natives for Europeans in order to cut down expenses. In India Liberals urged the employment of Indians in Government service, but this came about through the impossibility of entertaining a sufficient staff of Europeans. Liberals advocated also the principle of self-government, but the machinery of self-government was not introduced until there was a need for better sanitation. Reforms have been conceived in a spirit of idealism, but they have had to wait on occasion for the midwife. It is true that humanitarian ideals have done much to accelerate the adoption of reforms by creating a favourable climate of opinion. And they have done more than that; they have encouraged Liberal experiments. It was hope rather than any confidence in their ability that led to the first employment of Burmans as magistrates.[1] Shortage of labour may have encouraged employers to examine the possibility of improving the efficiency of labour, but human sympathy and faith in native potentialities were needed to justify expenditure on providing costly amenities. It was faith in the Javanese that inspired the reforms of Raffles in Java. He believed that they would respond to the desire of gain, and work harder in order to make more money; the Dutch at that time were firmly convinced that they would not work except under compulsion. But Raffles wanted the Javanese to make more money so that they could buy British goods; the Dutch had no manufactures to sell and wanted the Javanese to provide them with tropical produce as cheaply as possible. Projects of enhancing welfare may be inspired by high ideals, but they are conditioned, and therefore frustrated, by economic circumstances. It is of little avail to attempt social reforms without first creating a suitable environment in which they may achieve their purpose.

This principle applies throughout the whole range of colonial policy.

[1] *SL*, p. 127.

177 So long as Britain looked on India mainly as a market and enjoyed a natural monopoly of tropical markets, British manufacturers and merchants cared little who should govern India, provided that it was governed well and cheaply and set up no barriers to trade; they looked forward to withdrawing from India and could envisage its independence with equanimity. But, with the growth of overseas investments and of capitalist enterprise in the tropics, there were stronger grounds for retaining political control; at the same time Britain lost its natural monopoly of commerce in the tropics, and had to safeguard the political connection in order to fend off foreign powers with a protective policy. Synchronizing with this change in the economic environment there was a corresponding transformation of opinion, a new pride in imperial responsibilities and a new reluctance to sever colonial relations. The goal of policy was no longer independence but responsible government 'within the empire', or 'partnership'. Dutch colonial policy also reflects changes in the economic environment, but in a contrary direction. Under the Culture system and for some years later the Dutch treasury looked to the produce of Java to maintain financial solvency; the Home Government maintained a strict control over colonial administration, and the British policy of training the people for independence was expressly repudiated. But with the development of Java by private enterprise and the growth of its importance as a market, opinion shifted in the direction of autonomy; Batavia wished to shake off the fetters of The Hague. French colonial policy has fluctuated with each change in the balance of power between industry and agriculture. In the United States the strong tradition against imperialism could achieve nothing for Filipino independence until a combination of dairy farmers, Cuban sugar planters and Labour leaders turned it to account for the furtherance of their economic interests. Whatever lofty sentiments may inspire pronouncements on colonial policy, its practical application is coloured and conditioned by interest. But this interest is not often avowed, and is very largely subconscious. It is important therefore, when examining statements on colonial policy, to scrutinize the means designed to give effect to it.

In Britain all parties, with unanimity if with diversity of emphasis, look forward to making the dependencies capable of independence as 'partners' in the Empire. They agree also that economic development is the means by which this end may be attained; the modern constructive policy regards economic development as leading in-

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directly through welfare to self-government. Yet we have seen that economic development is, at best, no guarantee of welfare; also that it makes the people less capable of self-government, increases the difficulty of self-government, and makes the colonial power more reluctant to grant self-government. There is no reason to doubt that the policy is stated with all good faith, and there are plausible arguments for regarding it as sound. Yet general considerations suggest that the means usually advocated would defeat the end proposed. Experience confirms this doubt. Let us examine these matters rather more closely.

Economic development, it is said, is a condition of welfare, and welfare a condition of autonomy, because self-governing institutions cannot be built on a foundation of ignorance and ill-health. We have found, however, that there may be great and rapid economic progress with little or no enhancement of welfare; that economic progress is not a condition of greater welfare but, on the contrary, welfare is a condition of economic progress; and that whereas economic progress is ordinarily a by-product of welfare, it may be, and, unless kept under control, is usually if not invariably prejudicial to welfare. So far then as economic progress fails to enhance welfare, the view that it leads through welfare to self-government cannot be sustained.

But, quite apart from its effect on welfare, economic development hinders the attainment of self-government. Everyone now recognizes that it disintegrates and atomizes native society and, obviously, a crowd of individuals is less capable of self-government than an organic social structure. In regions developed by native enterprise, economic development produces a middle class of landlords and moneylenders, possibly native, often or usually foreign orientals. These, in virtue of their economic strength, tend to acquire political importance. But considerations of welfare, and also of political stability, call for measures to protect the peasantry against debt and the loss of land. Such measures hinder the emergence of a middle class, or tend to eliminate it, leaving nothing between the peasant and the western merchants, a situation that is incompatible with popular self-government. On the other hand, in regions developed by western enterprise, there comes into existence a middle class of petty capitalists, possibly native, often or usually foreign orientals. Considerations of welfare call for measures to protect labour against exploitation. But only western men of business apprehend the advantage of welfare measures and have command over sufficient capital to adopt them, and here again the

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effect of welfare measures is to hinder the emergence of, or to eliminate, the middle class, leaving nothing between the coolie and the representatives of western capital, interested in the dependency solely as a business proposition. Thus economic progress necessitates welfare measures that hinder political advancement. Indeed economic progress makes self-government by the people as a whole impossible, for in place of a whole people it creates a plural society devoid of any common social will and incapable, therefore, of governing itself; in this plural society, moreover, all those sections which are mainly interested in economic progress are in general content that the dependency should be managed as a business proposition, and included among them are some natives, officials and others, who fear to lose the crumbs that fall from the capitalist tables. Economic development creates a plural society not only incapable of self-government, but divided against itself and in part undesirous of self-government.

Again, economic development not only makes a dependency less capable of self-government, but even makes government more difficult. For it builds up above the native world an elaborate superstructure of western economic enterprise in which the people have little or no part; corresponding to this economic superstructure, and as a necessary corollary of its existence, there arises an administrative superstructure wholly foreign to the people, directed and in great part staffed by Europeans. As we have already noticed the administrative machinery finally becomes so elaborate as to be unmanageable, but long before this stage is reached it is beyond popular control. Every new administrative development which does not proceed from the people themselves in response to social will, raises another barrier against self-government. Moreover, the agents of administrative machinery are not merely passive; a steam engine is indifferent whether it enters or leaves its yard, but a horse goes more willingly towards its stable. Similarly officials apply rules in accordance with their inclinations. Under both British and Dutch rule, when officials were converted from mercantile agents into civil servants, it was recognized that, in order to ensure impartial administration, they must be debarred from mercantile transactions. In British dependencies regulations, inherited from the eighteenth century, forbid officials to own land or to engage in trade. This restriction was found essential to uncorrupt administration. But with the growth of joint stock companies it is no longer effective. European officials belong to the same class as men engaged in western enterprise and

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naturally tend to have similar preconceptions. This natural tendency for them to identify themselves with the cause of economic development is strengthened by material interest where they invest in local companies or can look forward to employment by such companies on retirement from official life. Both environment and interest encourage them to look favourably on economic development, and to be suspicious of entrusting the people with powers that may seem prejudicial to economic progress. While co-operating wholeheartedly with measures to increase production or trade by developing material and human resources, they will tend, even unconsciously, to hamper the transfer of control over development to the natives. Friction of this type is not reduced but rather enhanced by the substitution of native officials for Europeans. Europeans, by their tradition and education, are more likely than natives to oppose measures that they regard as unsound, and by their status can do so with less risk to their careers; for similar reasons there would seem to be especial need for the control over investments by native officials. Thus the personnel of the administrative machinery, whether European or native, hinders smooth progress towards self-government. And in any case, the administrative machinery grows so cumbrous in the course of economic progress that all, together with the leviathan that they seem to guide, are carried along by the current of economic forces. With every forward step in economic progress self-government becomes more difficult.

Again, the ordinary course of economic progress extends the circle of people in the colonial power whose interests would seem to be prejudiced if the dependencies had full control over their own affairs. In Britain comparatively few people used to have any great interest in India. Before the Industrial Revolution the profit derived from the Indian connection went mainly to the directors and shareholders in the East India Company, and to the small class that supplied recruits for mercantile, civil and military appointments. After the Industrial Revolution this small class expanded to include the manufacturers of cotton goods, and to those providing capital and labour to the cotton trade or otherwise benefiting directly or indirectly by its prosperity. With the growth of overseas investment and of capitalist enterprise in the tropics, the development of trade stimulated the growth of shipping, and the multiplication of public and private enterprise was profitable to banks and financiers, so that the circle of those interested in maintaining control over dependencies expanded further to include almost

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177 everyone in Britain who was engaged in any form of production or commerce. Tropical education opened up lucrative prospects to the great publishing firms, and a variety of welfare measures provided openings for the professional middle class, and encouraged a sympathetic attitude towards colonial relations in universities and other institutions training men for scientific or social activities in the tropics. If England had lost its tropical possessions at the beginning of the nineteenth century, few people would have felt the loss, but now it would threaten the material interest of almost everyone throughout the British Isles.

Colonies, regarded as a business proposition, need capital for their economic development, and can raise funds in the home money market on more favourable terms than some independent powers. But the financial houses which provide the money allow favourable terms on the strength of the imperial connection, and must naturally view with apprehension any change which weakens their security. Manufacturing interests in the colonial power may seem to be threatened if dependencies are enabled to restrict the import of their manufactures, or to foster industries likely to compete with them. During the recent depression, grants under the Colonial Development Act of 1929 made a considerable contribution to employment in this country. Similar conditions will probably recur, and 'if at any time the existence of an unemployment problem requires the examination of providing work in Great Britain, the possibility of further grants to assist African Governments to purchase railway, bridging or other capital equipment might perhaps be considered'.[1] All parties, Conservative, Liberal, and Socialist, are agreed that such assistance should be provided, and all agree that measures are needed to ensure full employment in Great Britain. If dependencies attain independence, it will not be so easy to control them in the interests of Britain or to fit them into comprehensive projects for ensuring employment in this country. Thus we are in much the same position as the Dutch in Java a hundred years ago when the Dutch people as a whole profited by the Culture system. So far as economic development diffuses in the colonial power a material interest in maintaining colonial relations, it must of necessity increase the reluctance of the colonial power to make its colonies capable of independence. Modern colonial policy advocates economic development as a road to the independence of colonies. But if every step along the road to self-government strengthens and

[1] 1940, Cmd. 6928; *African Survey*, p. 1321.

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diffuses those interests in the colonial power which self-government imperils, makes self-government more difficult and dependencies less capable of self-government, there would seem good reason to ask whether it is the right road.

Experience supplies the answer to this question. In few British dependencies, if any, has there been such vast and rapid economic progress as in Malaya during the first quarter of the present century. If economic development leads to self-government, no dependency should be more capable of independence. In the Federated Malay States, however, it has created a plural society in which the natives contribute only 26 % to the general population, and there is no dependency where self-government presents more difficult problems. In Netherlands India economic progress up to 1930 was even more conspicuous. The Government had not disregarded native welfare and, especially from 1900 under Ethical inspiration, it had been zealous in benevolent activities. But the country was run on business principles as a business concern, and it was the huge scale of the western superstructure that made the depression of the thirties so disastrous. For the collapse of the whole edifice seemed imminent, and capital had to seek the aid of Government; it was no longer a master but a mendicant. The Government took this opportunity to impose restrictions on capitalist activities in accordance with a policy of directing economic development in the interest of Netherlands India as a nation. Dutch writers claim that the ten years before the Japanese attack witnessed the 'birth of a nation' in Netherlands India, not merely an alliance of local peoples, creeds and castes agreeing only in a sectional opposition to foreign ways and foreign rule, but the amalgamation of all the distinct constituent elements of a plural society into one society with a common social will. History will test this claim, but the point immediately relevant is that the transformation was effected not by 'injections of western capital', but by restricting capitalist activities in the interest of a common nation.

In other dependencies various new developments during the recent war point in a similar direction:

'In all colonies the restrictions on imports have stimulated the growth of local industries both for making household and other articles of common use and for the processing of local produce. In West and East Africa, for example, among the articles now being made in addition to food products are the following: rope and twine, starch, shingles and tiles for roofing, shoe-leather and shoes, boot polish. These industries have been part of a

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temporary war time plan to supply local needs as far as possible from local resources.'[1]

In many or most of these new ventures western enterprise has taken a leading part. For the time being, and under the pressure of economic circumstances, capitalists have been transfigured as nationalists. But so far as these enterprises are run by western capitalists, it is doubtful how long they will survive the circumstances to which they owe their birth. During the war of 1914–18 there was a similar expansion of local industry in Netherlands India, but when communications with Europe were restored, western enterprise found other activities more profitable and local industries collapsed.

There is a greater chance for the survival of local industries when they are in native hands. In the Tropical Far East the recent depression which stimulated western enterprise to develop local industries also provided new opportunities for native enterprise. In Burma, for instance, as in Netherlands India, high taxation on matches impelled the natives to manufacture cheap cigarette lighters.[2] The encouragement of native manufactures was an outstanding feature of economic policy in Netherlands India during this period.[3] Between 1930 and 1940 the number of modern handlooms rose from 500 to 49,000, and of mechanical looms from 40 to 9800; the import of cotton thread for weaving rose from 3000 to 28,000 tons and created a spinning industry. By 1936 the local production of *sarongs* had risen to 5·6 million kgs. and imports had fallen to 2·35 million and by 1940 to 0·33 million. The import of caustic soda for soap manufacture rose from 4000 tons in 1930 to 18,000 tons in 1940. The manufacture of native cigarettes and of native straw hats showed similar progress. And a native bank came into existence to finance the various native enterprises. After the war such purely native industries have a much better prospect of survival than local industries in the hands of European capitalists who will find other forms of enterprise more profitable. Moreover, any tendency to restore the conditions that existed before

[1] *Mass Education*, p. 48.

[2] The sequel is of some general interest. In both countries the finance department urged that the manufacture of lighters should be prohibited in order to safeguard the revenue from matches. In Netherlands India the Government, though not responsible to the people, resisted the proposal on the ground that in the current depression anything which gave employment was beneficial. In Burma, with nominally a much greater measure of self-government, the proposal was accepted, and the enterprising and ingenious Burman manufacturers of lighters were subjected to heavy penalties by Burman magistrates.

[3] Sitsen, pp. 19, 20n., 47; Mitchell, pp. 197ff.

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1930 will encounter formidable resistance because economic power implies political power. 177

In Netherlands India, then, recent economic circumstances, by imposing restrictions on economic progress, have favoured national solidarity, the enhancement of welfare and economic development on a broader basis, and therefore, in the long run, greater progress. In the first throes of the depression the vision of impatient idealists seemed to be eclipsed. But reality lay below the surface, and even men of shorter vision 'learned that ideals should find their place in practical policy'.[1] As so often in colonial history, humanitarian ideals proved plain common sense. The lesson taught by Netherlands India is reinforced by the course of affairs in China and Russia. Forty years ago European powers were greedily expecting the 'break-up of China' to provide new opportunities for western capital. Twenty years ago Russia seemed to have collapsed. But China and Russia have been restored to greater vigour, not by the medicaments of capital, but by the vivifying tonic of a new idea. The plural society of tropical dependencies is dominated by economic forces, and, as recognized by the Statutory Commission, foreign rule is impotent to counter social and economic evils. Only some force transcending the economic sphere can bring them under control. Christians, Buddhists, Moslems and Hindus accept the principles of their religion as of greater validity than economic forces, but, in religious allegiance as in other matters, the plural society is divided, and there is no principle of social life, transcending merely economic considerations, that all will accept as valid except the principle of nationalism. In Europe at the present time the principle of nationalism is suspect. Men see in it a force stronger than self-interest, but for the same reason they fear it, and seek an alternative in a vague and ineffectual humanitarianism based on Christian tradition but disclaiming Christian doctrine. We may readily grant that 'patriotism is not enough', but one need not reject patriotism in order to rise above it. Economic forces operate everywhere alike, but social and political conditions in the tropics are directly contrary to those prevailing in homogeneous western lands, and in almost all matters it is necessary to apply contrary remedies to get the same results. That is especially true of nationalism as a principle of action. In the West we assume without question that 'defence is more than opulence', and that the individual should subordinate his personal interests to the common weal. In tropical

[1] Hart, p. 54.

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177 dependencies the conception of a commonwealth has been destroyed, and only an explicit acceptance of the principle of nationalism can restore it; only by aiming directly to make them capable of independence can we enhance welfare and lay secure foundations for economic progress.

14. The Problem of Autonomy

If, then, we are to aim at making dependencies capable of independence, how should we set about it? Experience shows that it is futile to proclaim ideals without creating the conditions which make them practicable. If we would make dependencies capable of independence, we must first achieve those conditions which make it possible. The problem of conferring autonomy on a tropical dependency is not merely a problem of mechanical contrivance, of ingeniously constructing political machinery that can be worked by natives, or despite native opposition; it is a problem of creative will. In the colonial power there must be an impulse to create a tropical society capable of political autonomy, and in the dependency a society capable of responding to this impulse, a society with a common social will that accepts the conditions of the modern world. This is so obvious that it would not be worth saying if its implications were not so generally disregarded.

Self-government implies the existence of a common social will, and a colonial power which aims at making its dependencies self-governing must aim directly at promoting a common social will, and must foster the social, economic and political reintegration of the whole community which economic development disintegrates. Further, self-government in the modern world requires the acceptance of the conditions of the modern world, and implies therefore a process of social education so that the common social will shall be informed with those principles on which modern western civilization is founded. The transformation of the environment through the reintegration of the plural society and through social education represents one aspect of the problem.

But the problem has another aspect. In the colonial power the creative impulse is weakened by considerations of national prestige, and by the economic motive which tempts all to pursue their immediate and obvious economic advantage, and by the rational appeal which economic efficiency makes to universal common sense. We find a law that when we would do good, evil is present with us, and may exclaim,

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with the apostle, the good that we would we do not: but the evil which we would not, that we do. It is very easy to deceive ourselves, and we have observed that each generation of colonial reformers is apt to accuse its predecessors of hypocrisy. Clearly then, if we aim at making dependencies capable of independence, we must take such measures as are possible to strengthen our good intentions by creating such an environment as is most likely to fortify our will. 177

Thus the problem of autonomy has two distinct aspects which we consider separately in the following chapters.

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CHAPTER XII

REINTEGRATION

1. Conditions of Reintegration

000 No one who seriously faces the problem of making tropical dependencies capable of independence is likely to under-estimate the obstacles. It is no difficult matter for one people, greatly superior in numbers, wealth, strength and knowledge, to keep another in subjection, just as it is not difficult to keep a criminal in jail. It is easier in proportion as the subject people is divided and ignorant. But those things which make it easier to keep them in subjection, make it difficult to set them free. The problem of endowing a tropical dependency with an instructed social will, so that it can find a place among the comity of nations, has much in common with the problem, simpler though not yet completely solved, of enabling the convict to live as a free citizen. Like the time-expired convict, a people that has known subjection is in need of after care. And a subject people resembles not only a convict but an invalid; it suffers from debility as the result of its confinement. Under foreign rule political and military traditions degenerate, cultural life decays and economic activities, losing their national significance, are distorted to meet the requirements of the colonial power. The social fibre is relaxed, and many will be impatient of restrictions which formerly they accepted without question in the name of custom. If the penal discipline of foreign rule is to give place to the social discipline of freedom, they will need a tonic. Should social welfare require the substitution of food crops for more profitable trade crops, or of local manufactures for imported goods, some will hanker after the fleshpots of foreign rule. They will need leaders to confirm their faith that such unpalatable remedies are necessary to their welfare; but foreign rule deprives them of their natural leaders or deprives their natural leaders of authority. If a foreign ruler is to induce them to accept the necessary restrictions, he must first of all, and above all, capture their imagination.

He must not only capture their imagination but gain their confidence. The wisest doctor cannot cure a patient who doubts whether the doctor wants to cure him, and even regards him as responsible for the disease. It is not strange if the people of a dependency hesitate to trust

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the colonial power and regard its policy with suspicion. For the doctor is, in fact, not quite certain whether he wants to cure the patient. In Burma, for example, the cutting off of supplies during the war has provided an opportunity to revive the spinning and weaving industry. Yet it has been suggested that the early import of the consumer goods formerly enjoyed would exercise a tranquillizing influence on nationalist aspirations stimulated under Japanese rule,[1] much as a doctor might prescribe an opiate for a sufferer from chronic opium poisoning. That may be the correct prescription, but one's confidence in it would not be strengthened if the doctor himself were in the dope trade.

It may well seem that the difficulties of equipping tropical dependencies for autonomy are insuperable. But if, as there is good reason to believe, this is essential for the survival of western civilization, we must assume that it is possible. How, then, are we to set about it? Are there any general principles to guide us? Some may question the validity of general principles in colonial administration. The English notoriously like to 'muddle through', to deal with situations as they arise. But that in itself is a general principle of action. In the last century the maintenance of peace and quiet could be ensured by the occasional scattering of crumbs beneath the table; this sufficed as a general principle of colonial rule and accorded with the wider general principle of *laissez-faire*. It may be sound to leave well alone so long as things are going well, but few would claim that nowadays colonial relations are improving, and to leave them alone is to go from bad to worse. Some would merely scatter larger crumbs more frequently. But if, as it would seem, this must end in an explosion, only the more violent the longer it is delayed, we must devise some other plan. No plan can apply in detail to all dependencies in all circumstances, but any plan implies the recognition of some general principles, and our analysis of colonial relations would seem to suggest certain general principles bearing on the social, economic and political reintegration of dependencies.

2. Social Reintegration

So long as the tropics were cut off from the modern world, their rules of behaviour and standards of living were their own concern but, as soon as they come into contact with the modern world, these things are matters of general concern. We cannot pursue our lawful occasions among head-hunters, and we cannot lead healthy lives while dark

[1] *Blue Print for Burma* (1944), p. 8.

000 corners breed pestilence. In our own interest we must eradicate barbarous customs and raise the standards of living to the minimum that the conditions of the modern world require. The need for higher standards of welfare is obvious, and colonial powers have tried to raise the standard through administrative machinery. From our survey it appears that this solution is impracticable; that the new machinery, though useful as an instrument of progress, is an obstacle to social welfare, and that the enhancement of welfare requires common action by the people, while at the same time contact with the modern world makes them incapable of common action. Here we seem to be faced with a dilemma. But our enquiry suggests that the key to welfare problems lies in the organization of demand, through social reintegration, so that the people can themselves, of their own accord, do what is necessary. It is along this line that we must look to escape from our dilemma.

The problem of enabling the people of a tropical dependency to want what they need, and do what they want, or in other words the problem of self-government, is essentially the same in the village as in the State, but is less complex and on a smaller scale. Let us first, therefore, consider the question of conserving and reintegrating village social life and of adapting the village, as a community, to the modern world. It would seem possible to arrive at certain principles generally applicable to village (or tribal) communities which are predominantly native and homogeneous. Clearly the first object must be to enable them, and help them, to do what they want to do and can do. Colonial powers should be better able to help the people than their own rulers. Under native rule the village community did whatever it wanted to do and could do. But there was much that it could not do; for example, it might be unable, through lack of scientific knowledge, to protect itself against an epidemic of cholera. But, through common life for many generations, sanitary precautions had been adopted into village custom, and public opinion often protected the water supply against encroachment or defilement, thus minimizing the risk of epidemics. Under foreign rule, with the decay of custom, individual interest tends to prevail over social welfare, and common village amenities are sacrificed to the desire of gain, or merely through the growth of population which the colonial environment encourages. The people still want house sites, water for man and beast, grazing facilities and so on, the various amenities formerly supplied by village custom. But they can no longer get what they want, and one condition

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of local autonomy is that there shall be someone closely and continually in touch with the people who can study and make known their wants.

So far as village social life survives it should be a comparatively simple matter to help the people to get what they want. Where the communal tradition has decayed, reintegration is necessary, and this becomes more difficult at every stage in the process of dissolution. The people still have common needs, but there is no longer a common will. In these circumstances it is no longer sufficient that someone shall be available to study and make known their wants; he must stimulate and foster social wants. This, however, is only a particular aspect of the general problem of *social* education, adapting the village *as a community* to the modern world. It may be comparatively easy to arouse village sentiment against breaches of traditional common amenities as, for example, by encroachment on the catchment area of the village water supply, because this requires no more than, as it were, an appeal to the dormant village conscience. But the problem is essentially the same as that of organizing a demand for modern welfare standards: getting the people to keep the village clean, or to accept vaccination, or to send the children to school. If the traditional local authorities are allowed, encouraged and helped to do what the people want, they will probably accept obligations to do what the people do not, but can be induced to want. In such matters supervision by some external authority is necessary. Moreover some things will strain traditional authority, weakening its virtue, and some are beyond its competence; for such things other provision must be made.

Here, then, we would seem to have certain principles that must be observed if social reintegration within the village is to be successful:

(*a*) The people themselves will do all that they want to do and can do; all such matters should be left to them, but with such help in expert assistance or money as can be given without encroaching on local autonomy;

(*b*) As a condition of being helped to do what they want to do, they may be willing to undertake things that they do not want to do. Such matters also should be left to them, but under the supervision of someone who will see that they are done; this applies not merely to dependencies, but to tropical lands in general, whether dependent or independent.

(*c*) As regards those things which the village or other local authority will not or cannot do, attempts should be made to enlarge their wants

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000 and improve their capacity, but, until that has been achieved, such things must be done by some authority outside the village, representing the central government and not the people.

These principles suggest a general design for the machinery of welfare. *There will be a need for specialist services, but equally a need for the co-ordination of these services; the supervision of the welfare machinery requires an element of continuity in the administrative personnel; the administrative units must be adapted as welfare charges to the primary administrative function of promoting welfare through social education; and the whole machinery must be driven by some creative impulse that will ensure the co-operation of the people.* Our comparison of Dutch and British colonial administration would seem to provide material for filling in the details of this general design.

Specialist Services. Although the first condition for the enhancement of welfare in tropical dependencies is to create an environment in which the people can provide for their own welfare, they must be induced to regard as essential to their welfare those conditions in respect of hygiene and education which western experience shows to be essential to the welfare of the modern world. Much may be done with little or no expenditure, yet in any project of enhancing welfare, economic and social services must find a place. If a Government wishes to encourage vaccination, there must be officials to vaccinate the people, and if it wishes to diffuse primary instruction there must be teachers for the children. For the enhancement of welfare, however, specialists in every line must have a double function: executive, to do what the Government requires; and propaganda, to get the people of their own accord to do what the Government requires. From the standpoint of welfare the latter is by far the more important, but the former *seems* more urgent and attention tends to be concentrated (and money to be wasted) on elaborating the machinery of welfare rather than on promoting welfare. Departmental heads can always make out a plausible case for more costly buildings or a larger staff and, because greater expenditure ought to yield better results, there is a tendency to assume that better results will follow greater expenditure. It is easy to spend money, especially other people's money, and welfare is often measured by the money spent. Economic and social services are necessary, but the expenditure under these heads, and especially expenditure on buildings and equipment, needs careful scrutiny if it is to enhance welfare rather than to expedite development. Also, however much or little may be spent on economic and social services, specialist

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activities can do little or nothing to promote welfare unless they are co-ordinated, and linked up with native life.

Co-ordination. In the co-ordination of specialist activities and in adapting them to tropical conditions, the Dutch system of administration has some advantages over the British system. The difference between the two systems is largely due to history. In England we had no need of an official corresponding to the French prefect and the Dutch burgomaster, 'sent down to a particular locality to carry out part of the work of the Central Government'; this was unnecessary in England because 'local bodies with wills of their own exist'.[1] In India, however, and in other parts of the tropics, circumstances dictated the appointment of such an official, known generally in British colonial literature as the District Officer. But, under British rule, on the principle of *laissez-faire*, he was for long solely and is still primarily a magistrate and collector of revenue, trained as such and functioning as such. Under Dutch rule, on the contrary, with a different national tradition, a different conception of administration and a different objective of colonial policy, the local representative of Government was charged with more comprehensive functions and, when the enhancement of welfare came to be accepted as a main object of policy, he developed, as it were naturally, into a social engineer, trained as such and functioning as such. If we wish to promote native welfare it would seem essential to recognize tropical administration as a profession requiring no less special skill than medicine and law, and to incorporate in the administrative machinery a class of social engineers. In British dependencies, however, the constitution of a special service alongside the present administrative service would multiply expense, and its members would lack the prestige attaching by tradition to the District officer. On the other hand the District officer, even if trained in social engineering, cannot do the work of a social engineer, partly for lack of time, and partly because he appears to the people in the unsympathetic capacity of magistrate and 'tax-hunter'. The solution would appear to lie then in converting the District officer into a social engineer by relieving him, as far and as fast as possible, of these repellent functions.

It should be noted that the need for a service of professional social engineers rests not in colonial relations but in tropical conditions. Such a service would still be needed, perhaps with even greater urgency, if the whole administrative staff were native and tropical dependencies were wholly independent. It is needed in Siam no less than in Indo-

[1] *ISC*, I, 301.

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000 China or in Burma. One of the chief causes of the failures and defects of local self-government in India under recent reforms was that when control by the District officer was abolished, no skilled professional administrator was appointed to replace him.[1] In tropical administration a main function of the social engineer is to interpret western ideas to tropical peoples and to adapt modern principles of social life to tropical conditions. In the discharge of that function native officials may have certain advantages in their better knowledge of the people (though town-bred natives may know little more of rural life than Europeans), but in other respects the advantage lies with the European officials through their innate, as it were instinctive, grasp of western principles. An autonomous native government would still need social engineers, native or foreign, just as European lands need their prefects and burgomasters; it would have far greater need of them, in order to instil western ideas of welfare and to induce the people voluntarily to accept the minimum standards consistent with world welfare. Only through the gradual evolution of local bodies with a will of their own, and complying of their own accord with the requirements of the modern world, would it be possible to dispense with supervision; and that is most improbable, for even in Britain, the home of local self-government, its history during the nineteenth century 'might be described from one angle as the steady invasion by the Central Government of a sphere formerly left entirely to local authorities'.[2] In tropical lands generally, whether dependent or independent, some official able to link up the various economic and social services with one another and with native life is likely to remain an indispensable element in the administration.

Continuity. There must also be some machinery for ensuring that modern conditions are so far as possible accepted, and so far as necessary enforced. No one can encourage the acceptance of modern conditions of social welfare, or ensure compliance with them, except through local influence and local knowledge. Under the conditions of tropical administration, representatives of the central authority must needs be transient; they cannot possess these qualifications. In the system of direct rule nothing fills this gap; with indirect rule the local chieftain, hereditary or elective, might fill it. In this, as in other matters, British colonial administration is hampered by its traditions, and especially by the valuable tradition of the rule of law. Under British rule the tendency is to convert native traditional

[1] *ISC*, 1, 309. [2] *ISC*, 1, 310.

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authorities into magistrates and tax-collectors, administering western law and collecting western taxes, and thereby losing the influence that they derive from native custom. Again, even under Dutch rule, and still more under British rule, there is a tendency to treat native authorities as agents of Government rather than as representatives of the people. No one has the time to do anything; everyone is in a hurry to get things done; native authority seems to offer the speediest means to get things done, and the frequent and extensive drafts on it soon exhaust its credit with the people. Moreover, as the native authorities themselves do not want most of the things that they are expected to get done, their supervision is often ineffective, and perhaps less effective in some cases than the machinery of direct rule.

It is in providing the element of continuity that the Dutch combination of the permanent and hereditary Regent with an official of the central Government seems peculiarly happy. The Regent is, like the representative of the Central Government, primarily a welfare officer; he has little or practically no part in the administration of the law, and no formal responsibility for collecting revenue. So far as the promotion of welfare is the aim of Government, the Regent, with his local knowledge and influence, can lend his help, unhampered by the opprobrium attaching to magistrates and tax-collectors. But he lives up-country in the native world, and must naturally tend to vegetate. Alongside him, however, there is the Dutch equivalent of the District officer, who can help to keep him in touch with the modern world, and the liability of the European official to frequent transfer tends to be an asset rather than a defect. In welfare machinery these two distinct elements would seem indispensable: one representing the modern world, and one, permanent, representing the people. It may seem that the permanent local authority, if really at home in the modern world, might combine both functions. But this is hardly possible. Many Regents in Java are at home in the modern world because for three generations or more the boys have resided with Dutch families in their school-days, but the assistance of a European adviser is still helpful; native chieftains in other parts of the tropics without the same advantages have still greater need of assistance and advice, though it is not necessary that the assistance and advice should be given by a European.

Welfare Charges. But an official in the position of a Regent, with a somewhat extensive charge, despite his local knowledge and influence, cannot be in such close and continual touch with all the people, as is necessary both to protect them against the constant and all-pervasive

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000 action of economic forces and to adapt the village communities to the conditions of the modern world. The administrative machinery of Java provides for this requirement by the division of the regency into districts and subdistricts. In each subdistrict comprising some twenty villages there is a subordinate official in charge of general administration. This is a distinctive feature of the Dutch system, contributing greatly to its efficacy as an instrument of welfare. In Burma, also, the villages are grouped together as revenue or police charges, but the units of police and revenue jurisdiction do not always coincide, and there is nothing corresponding to the small unit of *general* administration found in Java, which might be termed a welfare charge. One obvious objection to the Dutch system is the heavy cost of maintaining a large establishment of subordinate officials, but it would not seem necessary that these group leaders should be salaried officials. The village is the natural unit of social welfare. But, as we have noticed in both Java and Burma, there has been a constant tendency to rearrange village boundaries with a view to greater efficiency in administration. Such readjustments of traditional boundaries to administrative convenience can always be supported by common-sense arguments of efficiency and economy. But, if social reintegration be an aim of policy, then it is a matter of fundamental importance to retain natural geographic, historic and economic units even at the cost of administrative convenience, and although the village is the natural unit of social welfare, many welfare projects require the co-operation of groups of villages. Under native rule in Burma, Java and India one could find such groups, but the tendency of foreign rule is to break them up into isolated villages. This tendency should be resisted, and where the traditional organic groups have been broken up, they should as far as possible be reconstituted. Where, as in Burma, each village has its headman, it should be possible to group them in welfare charges under one of the headmen, elected or appointed as their leader and representative. In any case, and by whatever means may be available, it would seem necessary, as already indicated, to collect the villages into organic groups. Economic forces are continually making for social disruption.

Social Education. The machinery of welfare, however, requires more than the conservation of social life; it requires also the adaptation of social life through social education. The construction of welfare machinery and the constitution of welfare charges will have little effect unless the people can be induced to take advantage of their

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opportunities. Except so far as economic and social services can show immediate results, mere propaganda will mostly be a waste of money. Welfare services can do little for the people in general unless there is a demand for their services, and some form of 'gentle pressure' is needed to stimulate the demand. Here again the Dutch system of social education through periodical and frequent *vergaderingen* at every stage in the administrative organization would seem to provide a useful model.

Motive. Education implies discipline, and social education in the tropics demands the provision of a motive sufficient to induce the people to accept the restrictions on individual liberty that the conditions of the modern world require. Even the most formidable machinery for exercising pressure on the people will prove unequal to constructive work, requiring their willing co-operation, unless it is inspired by some creative impulse. Backward peoples converted to Christianity try to live up to its precepts, and similarly those who adopt Islam or Buddhism accept the imperatives of their new creed. Spain and Portugal owed their success as colonial powers to their zeal for the conversion of their subjects; they found one monk worth a regiment of soldiers. In the modern world nationalism alone can provide the necessary impulse, and it is only by using to the full communal and nationalist sentiment that tropical peoples can be brought voluntarily to accept those conditions that the welfare of the outer world requires. Autonomy is a condition of welfare, and social reintegration requires political reintegration.

3. Economic Reintegration

Social reintegration necessarily has an economic aspect, because the economic, material, sphere is one part, and a very important part of social life. But measures for social reintegration in their economic aspect aim chiefly to obtain a mastery over economic forces acting on the native social order from *within*; measures for economic reintegration aim rather to master economic forces acting on it from *outside*. These forces take effect through the impact of western capitalist activities, converting the tropical dependency into a business concern. Economic reintegration implies the transformation of this business concern into a human commonwealth, and demands the reintegration not merely of the native social order but of the whole composite plural society.

In this society, as we have seen, the European community usually dominates the entire economic sphere, and has the direction and

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000 control of practically the whole industrial and commercial system. Most members of this community are only temporary residents, and its leaders are the local representatives of large enterprises financed by people who know nothing of the dependency except as the place from which they draw, or hope to draw, their dividends. In this they are at one with all foreign elements, Asiatic or African, from the wealthy middleman down to the humblest immigrant coolie. Whatever their race, apart from missionaries, they tend to look on the dependency as a business concern and not as a nation, and their interest is in material progress rather than in national welfare. The whole foreign interest may accordingly be comprehensively described as capitalist, and nationalism represents a struggle against capitalism, the predominance of purely economic values in human affairs. That is a struggle in which we are all engaged, in Europe as in the tropics, and it is our interest, no less than that of dependent peoples, to bring capitalism under control. National welfare should be enhanced by an abundant supply of capital or, in other words, of goods representing the surplus of former economic activity and available to enhance production. But national and capitalist interests are not identical, and frequently diverge, especially where the capital is owned by foreigners. This stimulates nationalist jealousy of capitalist activities and, for the welfare of a country, capitalist interests must be protected—though they can usually look after themselves; but it is through capitalist activities that external economic forces react on social life and, if national welfare is to be paramount, such activities must be controlled. Ultimately, national welfare is the soundest guarantee of economic progress, and is in the interest therefore of foreign capital; but the pressure of economic forces tends continually to sacrifice national welfare to immediate capitalist ends.

Colonial economic relations are fundamentally identical with the economic relations between individuals. It is natural that the colonial power should wish to obtain tropical produce as cheaply as possible, and to find in the dependency a profitable market for its own produce. Even where colonial policy is not deliberately framed to promote the economic interests of the colonial power, it must inevitably be coloured by an unconscious bias in that direction. This is apt to prejudice social and national welfare in the dependency and, if these social interests are not to suffer, some control must be exercised over both exports and imports.

In the tropics production for export illustrates the tendency, found

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everywhere in the modern world in almost all economic activities, towards working on a large-scale. A western enterprise in the tropics needs larger capital than a similar enterprise in Europe, and in other respects also the conditions of production in the tropics are especially favourable to large-scale enterprise. Even in western countries with a constitution on a broad democratic basis, constant vigilance is needed to check the power of anti-social monopolies, but in tropical dependencies there is no such check. Big business reaches out towards a comprehensive monopoly. In Burma we have noted that the more important business houses do not concentrate on trade only but are importers, exporters, millers, estate and ship owners at the same time, and may have considerable interests outside Burma. Similarly a few firms, closely interlinked, have dominated the economic life of Netherlands India. The United Africa Company is a signal illustration of the same tendency in Africa. Merely by its dominant position in economic life, western enterprise exercises a great influence over political and social evolution, and its economic power is ordinarily reinforced by political pressure; as in Netherlands India there is 'more activity, lobbying and browbeating by private interests on political issues...than is consistent with the proper place of business'.[1] If western enterprise, and capitalist interests in general, are to be brought under control, there would seem little prospect of achieving this from inside the dependency; the mainspring of action lies in the larger western world, and it is here that measures must be taken to enforce control.

So far as capitalist enterprise in the tropics succeeds in establishing a monopoly over any kind of produce, the consumer in the West is apt to suffer. In such cases the large wholesale buyers of such produce may combine to resist the monopoly, or it may be possible to form an association to act on behalf of the general body of consumers. Sometimes arrangements have been made for the representation of the consumer (or rather of consumer-business) on organizations to control prices, and in some cases this is said to have been effective. Monopoly is a special danger to the welfare of dependencies where capitalist production competes with native production, as in rubber in the Tropical Far East and in palm-oil in West Africa. In such circumstances western enterprise tries to obtain control over native production, and native interests suffer unless the Governments concerned are resolute to protect them. Yet free competition may be

[1] Hart, p. 48.

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000 more detrimental than monopoly, for then capitalist enterprise is free from any taint of monopoly, and serves to reduce the cost of tropical produce, while favouring anti-social conditions of production that the outer world will tend to disregard, as formerly men condemned slavery but ate slave-grown sugar and wore clothes of slave-grown cotton. In these circumstances Labour may join forces with organized humanitarianism in insisting on welfare legislation, but, as already explained, this tends to favour big business and not the native world. In America Labour supported the dairy-farmers and sugar-growers in its protest against cheap imports, and in France the agricultural interest has always been suspicious of colonial adventures. But it is only within narrow limits that external economic interests can be organized on behalf of native welfare.

On the view that only the principle of nationalism can dominate economic disintegration, there would seem much to commend the suggestion, frequently put forward, that in tropical dependencies the Government should 'nationalize' production, that it should take over and manage industries which are now in foreign hands because the natives lack the necessary capital, experience or skill. But one difficulty is that the direct ownership by Government of properties in rubber, oil, tin and other products necessary to large-scale industry may lead to international complications: the Government of Netherlands India was able to resist the Japanese demands for the supply of war material on the plea that firms dealing in such products were not under Government control. The suggestion is also urged plausibly on the grounds that the State would benefit by the profits that now go to foreign shareholders; could ensure good conditions of labour and wages; and could train natives to take over the industries. It is doubtful, however, whether these ends would be achieved, and other methods of attaining them would probably be more effective.

It is generally recognized that foreign enterprise takes money out of the country which might otherwise be devoted to the enhancement of native welfare, and that the quasi-monopolist structure of western enterprise in the tropics enables it to draw profits out of proportion with any services that it may render. Nationalization might seem to provide a remedy but, even if this should transfer the profits to the State, it might still be undesirable. One objection to private enterprise in tropical dependencies is that it exercises too much influence over Government policy, that in effect there is a combination of economic and political control. This would be aggravated under

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State control, for a Government engaged in enterprise would try to make, or at least to show, a profit on its undertakings, and the combination of economic and political control would grow still closer. In the past unremunerative State railways have been constructed to serve private interests, and the rates for transport have been adjusted to the advantage of private enterprise. Government would be no less ready to build unremunerative railways for its own enterprises, and to adjust rates so as to make them show a profit; also it would be far better able to draw up flattering accounts than a private firm which has to satisfy the demand of shareholders for dividends. Moreover, if a Government borrows capital to develop an enterprise, the drain in the form of interest may be even more onerous than the outgoing of profits; for a private company pays no dividends unless it makes a profit, but the interest charge would have to be met whether the enterprise succeeded or failed, and in bad years as in good. The Dutch policy is to restrict state enterprise to concerns which promise high profits with small risks, leaving the less attractive projects to private firms and, so far as state enterprise may be desirable, this rule would appear sound. Yet, from the standpoint of deriving revenue from economic development, there would seem to be greater advantage in a system of taxation adjusted so as to take as large a share of the profits of private enterprise as it can bear. If the Government is not strong enough to impose adequate taxation on foreign enterprise, it can hardly be trusted to manage industrial production in the native interest. The nationalization of industrial production in the tropics would seem then liable to confuse business and government to the prejudice of both.

Nor is it certain that the nationalization of industry would lead to better conditions of employment. The Culture system in Netherlands India and the Belgian Congo under Leopold certainly point in the opposite direction. It may be argued that these are old stories, and that the modern world would not tolerate similar oppression. But on a Government enterprise no one would know the conditions until attention was drawn to them by some outbreak of violence. It is well to remember that, even under the Ethical policy, the Government of Netherlands India objected to the abolition of the penal sanction on contract labour for fear of its effect on the profits of the State tin mines. Van den Bosch claimed that the Culture system would benefit the people. 'The field is large enough,' he said, 'there is no need to overwork it'.[1] But the field had boundaries, the limits

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 137.

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were reached, and the system was worked too hard. Now again we see on all sides a tendency to employ compulsion, strictly of course 'to promote native welfare'. But there is little doubt that the field would as before be overworked. A Government is likely to be far more vigilant in its control over business concerns if it is not in business on its own account. It is desirable that Government should exercise control over business, and it may be better able to exercise control if it is itself in business in a small way, as this will enlarge its practical experience of business affairs, but if it looks to enterprise for any considerable portion of its revenue, past experience in connection with alcoholic liquor, intoxicating drugs and gambling suggests that it may sacrifice native welfare to the claims of revenue.

Some degree of Government participation in enterprise would certainly be valuable as a measure of social education by opening up to the natives a wider sphere of economic activity. In the state pawnshops and banks in Netherlands India Indonesians have received a useful introduction to modern business. Probably it is in agricultural finance and in the management of agricultural land that Government enterprise might do most good, just because these are matters about which the people already know something. Government should be able to show them how to manage their own affairs more profitably. But suggestions for nationalization are usually put forward in connection with mines and other forms of enterprise about which the people in general know nothing. If the State is to employ natives in such enterprises it can employ them only so far as, on a long view, their employment is more economical. In the first instance Europeans or other foreigners would have to be employed, and it can hardly be expected that these would show much zeal in training natives to deprive themselves of jobs.

Economic autonomy requires the direction and conduct of private enterprise by natives rather than the employment of natives in state enterprise. It is desirable accordingly that, wherever possible, natives should be substituted for foreigners in the higher ranks of industry and commerce. Economic forces tend in that direction, and the process was hastened during the recent depression, when highly paid Europeans were replaced by non-Europeans on lower pay. For some years past the more far-seeing firms have already made this a feature of their policy. Probably it will be expedited under the conditions obtaining in the post-war world. But steps might well be taken towards ensuring more rapid and more general progress in this direction. One

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device might be to impose on foreign enterprise a condition that it should furnish annual reports on the progress made in substituting natives for foreigners in the direction, management and staff, and to transmit such reports for review to any international organization established for supervising colonial affairs. Such a measure would be an instrument for converting capitalists into nationalists and nationalists into capitalists. It would create a demand for the employment of natives in western enterprise and, by creating a demand, would stimulate a supply. Here, again, the key to the economic advancement of tropical peoples lies in the organization of demand. Moreover, not a few of the natives employed in western enterprise should prove capable of undertaking industrial and commercial enterprises on their own account, as has in fact happened, on a very small scale, in the past. Thus, although in the first instance the benefit of substituting natives for Europeans would accrue to western enterprise by reducing salary charges, the further result would be a gradual transformation of the colonial economic system.

The approach to economic reintegration through control over imports may seem to present a simpler problem, because tariffs have long been used for the protection of special interests and industries; but the practical difficulties may be no less formidable. Competition is likely to be more open than with exports, though there is a tendency for large export firms to be prominent also in the import trade. And, whereas exporters want to obtain produce as cheaply as possible, and would seem to derive most profit from low wages, or when operating in a primitive economy of barter and compulsory labour, importers and the manufacturers of imported goods gain most where the natives have plenty of money to spend on more, and more costly, foreign goods. We have noticed that the growth of imports is commonly regarded as evidence of welfare, even if only a small proportion of the imports goes to natives; and so far as welfare can be identified with native expenditure on foreign goods, importers have an interest in promoting native welfare. In practice, however, imported goods tend to replace local manufactures, thus limiting the scope of native activities, while the people are thrown on to the labour market to the prejudice of wages, and may be unable to find work. Under-employment is indeed a characteristic feature of the modern tropics, and this is the economic justification for Gandhi's policy of encouraging the people to turn their leisure to account in home-spinning and home-weaving. The encouragement of local manufac-

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tures is likely to meet with opposition from competing interests in the colonial power, and these may recruit support from natives who, for various reasons, prefer foreign goods; but if Gandhi's policy were adopted, it would help to restore the balance that cheap imports disturb, and be a notable step in the direction of economic reintegration.

The restoration of this balance is indeed gradually becoming more advantageous to colonial powers. Cheap imports are profitable to a colonial power only so long as it can supply the goods. With the growing industrialization of the tropics, Europe is losing its hold over the cotton trade, the chief item in native imports. If tropical dependencies can buy their cotton goods more cheaply from Japan, India or China, colonial powers stand to gain by encouraging the local manufacture of such goods, so that the dependency shall provide a better market for goods in which Europe still has an advantage. Here then we have a common-sense economic argument for encouraging nationalist sentiment in favour of home products. That a protective policy may assist dependencies has indeed been demonstrated by the success of the Government of Netherlands India in encouraging the native hat, cigarette and fishing industries, while its encouragement of local cotton manufacture was a strong factor in obtaining native support for quota restrictions on the import of Japanese piece goods. Limitations on free trade in respect of home industries are now generally approved, but they imply fiscal autonomy. The control of exports and production in general on nationalist lines also implies economic autonomy. Thus economic reintegration, like social reintegration, is bound up with political reintegration.

4. Western Institutions in Tropical Dependencies

If both social and economic reintegration depend upon political reintegration, then the problem of endowing dependencies with self-government cannot be postponed until they have achieved a higher standard of welfare but, as the older Liberals held, is of primary importance. It is as part of the Liberal tradition that self-government has been adopted as the goal of colonial policy by Britain and the Netherlands, is favoured by some colonial statesmen in France, and is strongly advocated in the United States. It is also part of the Liberal tradition that self-government implies democratic government; government by the people for the people. In British colonial theory this is ordinarily termed responsible government.

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But the term responsible government is vague and, in some respects, unsatisfactory, as is apparent in the first authoritative pronouncement on the subject in the Preamble to the Government of India Act 1919. This looks to 'the progressive realisation of responsible government', with the implication that the term signifies a government accountable to the people that it governs. Yet progress is to depend on 'the extent to which it is found that confidence may be reposed in their sense of responsibility'; at every stage the 'responsible' government is accountable, not to the Indian people, but to the British Parliament. Further, the Preamble lays down that Parliament is responsible for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples; but this is merely a moral responsibility, and in this matter Parliament is accountable only to the people of Britain. Thus the pronouncement makes no clear distinction between responsibility *to* the people and responsibility *for* the people, between accountability and responsibility, or between legal and moral responsibility.

Every Government has a complex burden of responsibilities. Ultimately it is always responsible, accountable, to its subjects, and they will call it to account, either by peaceful methods or by violence. Only too frequently tropical rulers have been called to account by rebellion or assassination. The British Government in the former American colonies, the Spanish Government in South America and the Philippines were called to account by rebellion. One great contribution of Britain to the art of modern government is the invention of constitutional machinery for calling the Government to account by peaceful methods. That is what is usually understood by responsible government, but the term is really a misnomer, for when a Government is constitutionally accountable to the people, its responsibilities are transferred to them, and it is the people who are responsible and not the Government. Every Government, again, is responsible, accountable, in some measure to the outside world, and must adjust its differences with other Governments either peacefully through diplomacy and arbitration, or by war. It was mainly because tropical rulers failed to realize their responsibilities to the modern world that their peoples lost their independence. The doctrine that colonial powers are responsible to other powers for the administration of their dependencies obtained formal acceptance at the Berlin Conference of 1884–5, was extended by the Mandates System after the war of 1914–18, and forms the basis of recent projects of international supervision over colonial relations. Further, every Government, alongside its responsibility to

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000 its subjects and to the outer world, has a moral responsibility for the welfare of its people; it may suppress rebellion and withstand aggression, but it must abide the verdict of praise or blame recorded in the judgment of history.

In statements on colonial policy, self-government is usually identified with some form of democratic government, whether known as responsible government or by some other term. That is only natural, because the colonial powers are democratic powers, whose institutions have evolved as part of the Liberal tradition and who tend accordingly to identify self-government with those forms that they have learned to value for themselves; also it seems easier to export their own machinery of government than to invent new machinery. Moreover, democratic forms of government have proved their stability in two hard-fought wars, and democracy, where and so far as it is possible, would seem the best device for securing a stable government that will permit the adaptation of social institutions to changes in the environment and thereby reconcile economic progress with human welfare. Obviously democratic forms have a very practical appeal. They appeal to Nationalist politicians, who think that the numerical majority of the native group will ensure for them control over the Government. They appeal also to men of Liberal sympathies in the colonial power, who fail to recognize that the difference in kind between homogeneous western society and the plural society of dependencies demands new and appropriate machinery. And they may encounter no more than a show of resistance from the more astute opponents of Liberal ideals, who foresee that democratic machinery will prove the most formidable obstacle to self-government.

We find accordingly that projects of conferring autonomy on dependencies have usually attempted to dress up the colonial type of government in democratic forms. Each colonial power tries to reproduce in its dependencies that type of democratic government with which it is familiar, and in Burma and elsewhere we have tried to introduce parliamentary government on the supposition that what is good for us should be good enough for Burmans. The process of introducing self-governing institutions has indeed been reduced to a set formula: first representative institutions, then a gradual development of partial responsibility, culminating in fiscal autonomy, and finally complete responsibility or dominion status.[1] On this line of approach the first step in political evolution is to give the colonial

[1] Astor, pp. 235, 246; *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 42.

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Governor a council of nominated officials; then non-officials are included and the principle of election is adopted and extended; this representative body is then transformed into a legislature by entrusting some of its functions to ministers accountable to the people, and in the final stage, not yet attained in any tropical dependency, it is contemplated that the legislature shall have full control over the Government, with the Governor as little more than its chief executive official.

Advocates of political reforms insist with growing urgency that 'we cannot hope to build up political institutions on a foundation of poor material resources, of insufficient health or of undeveloped minds'.[1] They look accordingly to develop natural resources with a view to diffusing welfare in the tropics, so that the people may become fit to exercise the responsibility for control over their Government. We have found, however, that material development does not have these results. Few of those whom it enriches are natives, and it does not diffuse general welfare or enhance social welfare. If, then, autonomy be conditional on welfare, reliance on material development implies that the attainment of autonomy will be indefinitely postponed. We have found also that, quite apart from its effect on welfare, material development hinders the attainment of responsible government, because it converts the social order into a business concern which cannot be run on democratic lines, and it creates a plural society which cannot stand alone but depends on some external force to protect it against disruption. It appears moreover that attempts to introduce the machinery of responsible government in such a society do not help to consolidate it but aggravate the disruptive tendencies by increasing sectional friction. They are detrimental also to that co-operation between the colonial power and the dependency which is essential to the attainment of autonomy. Democratic forms are attractive to nationalist politicians who think they will ensure power for the numerical majority, and fail to realise that voting power without economic power or military power does not confer political power, and the consequent disillusion tends to foster a distrust of democratic principles and, as in the Philippines and Siam, favours the emergence of a one-man, one-party system of government. Thus, in its political as in its economic aspect, modern colonial policy works in a contrary direction to that which it announces as its goal.

That western self-governing institutions in the tropics do not work

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 7.

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on western lines is now generally appreciated by those who know most about their working. 'We have encouraged the peoples of the tropics', says Lord Hailey,[1] 'in the faith that self-government can only be obtained through institutions of the parliamentary model with which we ourselves are most familiar. The experience we have gained justifies some doubt whether these institutions can operate to the best purpose in communities which have a tradition and a social organisation so unlike our own, or which are divided by racial differences.' In South America,[2] as in the Philippines and Siam, democracy no longer connotes western political institutions, but has come to signify the type of government that best conduces to national independence. If then we accept the Liberal principles underlying western institutions, 'it is incumbent on us to explore any variation within the general range of these institutions which seems best suited to the conditions of the territories. If we can somehow afford their people practical proof that they can obtain the substance of self-government, they may be willing to agree that the form in which it is embodied is relatively of less importance.'[3] The experiments in introducing western democratic forms in tropical dependencies merely illustrate the old fallacy that form gives rise to function; if we can make dependencies capable of independence the political machinery will automatically assume appropriate forms. In the homogeneous society of western states, the basic problem of applied political science is how best to ascertain and give effect to the common social will; in the plural society of the tropics the basic problem is to create a common social will. The functions of government are different, and there must needs be different machinery.

5. The Functions of Government

What then are the functions of government in a plural society which is to be made capable of independence? The primary function of any Government is to comply with the requirements of the outer world. This is a general principle which is too often overlooked. The government of village, town and guild had to comply with the requirements of the nation. National Government must respect the comity of nations, and Germany and Japan are now experiencing the con-

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 45.
[2] Gunther, J., *Inside Latin America* (1942), p. 12.
[3] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 45.

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sequences of transgressing it. If a Government does not provide adequately for economic progress, it will be unable to maintain itself against external economic forces; it will not be permitted to survive. And if it does not attain a reasonable minimum in respect of human well-being, and especially in preventing epidemics of men, cattle and crops, then in the interest of world welfare it must be subjected to some measure of control. Tropical peoples forfeited their independence because, under the guidance of their native rulers, they were unable to qualify as citizens of the modern world by complying with its requirements. The usual type of colonial Government complies with them more adequately than the native tropical rulers whom it has superseded. Doubtless colonial powers, in the management of colonial affairs, look primarily to their own interest, and one source of weakness in colonial rule is the feeling in the outer world that they do not sufficiently regard the interests of non-colonial powers. Still, it is generally true, at least in British and Dutch dependencies, that the Government, though primarily responsible to the colonial power, does on the whole act as a trustee on behalf of the modern world. Throughout the whole course of progress towards the attainment of self-government, it is essential that the new Government shall not fall appreciably below the standard set up in this respect under the colonial type of rule. So far as political progress is on sound lines, the new Government should attain a higher standard, because a Government of the colonial type, though enlightened, is not effectively enlightened; for lack of popular support it cannot spread enlightenment among the people.

Assuming then compliance with the requirements of the modern world as the primary function of government, what other conditions must be fulfilled for the attainment of self-government? No machinery, however ingeniously devised, will confer self-government on a people that is incapable of governing itself. In tropical dependencies there are three formidable obstacles to self-government on the pattern of western democracies. The Government cannot represent the people, because in a plural society there is no 'people' to be represented. It cannot stand alone because of the racial and economic cleavage between the various sections, of which some may not wish for independence. And it cannot be fully responsible to the people because the great mass of them do not accept the requirements of the modern world. It is insufficient therefore merely to construct new machinery; first it is necessary to transform society. The functions of the Government are

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000 to create a common social will as the basis for a Government that shall represent the people as a whole; to enable this representative Government to stand alone without support from the colonial power; and by a process of social education ensure that the new Government, while complying adequately with the requirements of the modern world, can be made responsible to the people, and thereby achieve the stability that is derived from popular support.

Until the process is complete, the Government must obviously have a dual character, comprising an element representing the interests of world welfare and an element representing, so far as possible, the people. The colonial type of Government is both unrepresentative, and unable to stand alone, and clearly the first step is to introduce an element of representation. In almost all dependencies of all colonial powers something of this kind has been attempted; there is a *dual government*. A further stage is reached when the element intended to represent the people is, in fact, accepted by them as their representative. The Government has something of this character in territories under indirect rule, where the natives in general recognize the hereditary chieftain as their representative; but it does not represent the people fully until all sections of the community are sufficiently united to accept a common representative. Even then, however, it may be unable to stand alone without external support and is therefore *semi-colonial* in character. The next step is to enable the dependency to stand alone, when it will be much in the position of Siam before the recent revolution. All sections of the community voluntarily recognized the Crown, and it could maintain the national independence. Its independence was *conditional*; it rested on inducing the people to comply with the requirements of the modern world. Economic progress transferred the control of economic life to foreigners, European and Chinese, while the people remained backward. Independence is unstable until the people in general have become citizens of the modern world; only then is a country capable of responsible or *popular* government.

We have noticed that, according to the accepted formula, the stages on the road to independence are representative government, partly responsible government and dominion status. But if we are to set up milestones, the stages, beginning from the purely colonial type, might be: dual government; semi-colonial; conditional independence; and popular government. But in each case the transformation of society is a prerequisite of changes in the form of Government.

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Let us then examine these various types of government with a view to ascertaining how the transformation may be most rapidly and smoothly effected.

6. Continuity

In many respects the problem of political reintegration, the equipment of a people for self-government, is fundamentally similar to equipment of a village with the power to manage its own affairs. In both there is a need for dual control, and in both there is need of a definite plan and of someone to devise and supervise the execution of the plan. It is impossible to over-emphasize the need for continuity of person. Perhaps the two most conspicuous examples of the successful conduct of colonial relations on constructive lines are the rule of Van den Bosch in Java and of Cromer in Egypt. Van den Bosch knew Java in his youth, and on coming back to it in 1830 controlled the Government for ten years as Governor-General and Colonial Minister. Cromer devoted the better part of his life to Egypt. In Papua recently Sir Hubert Murray has shown what one man can accomplish who has a lifetime for his work. The modernization of Netherlands India was largely the work of one man, Idenburg, who, when a captain in the Indian Engineers, was elected to the States-General in 1901, held office as Colonial Minister from 1902 to 1905 and in 1908–09, was Governor-General from 1909 to 1918 and again Colonial Minister in 1918–19. It is significant that the most stable democratic governments in the modern world have in general an element of permanence in the Crown, which they value not only as a symbol of national unity, above and outside the conflict of interest and opinion that characterizes democracy, but also in virtue of its permanence, enabling it to accumulate a store of experience and to link up successive administrations representing different or contrary political ideas. Even in the United States, the outstanding exception to the general rule that democracy functions best under a titular monarchy, the need for continuity finds expression in the frequent re-election of the President for a second term, and its urgency in times of stress led to the repeated re-election, against all precedent, of Mr Roosevelt. In tropical dependencies there is far greater need of continuity than in homogeneous western lands with a long tradition of common social life. Any constructive effort, and above all the project of endowing them with independence, demands personal continuity to ensure continuity of policy, but it is very difficult to combine

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000 in one person both representation and continuity. Yet, until the course of political evolution is complete, it is necessary to provide for both.

7. Dual Government

In the purest type of colonial Government both representation and continuity are disregarded; a foreign Governor, appointed for a limited period, represents the colonial power and not the people of the dependency. During recent years however there has in general been an advance in the direction of duality by the provision of a representative council to advise and assist the Governor. But it is still the usual practice to appoint a European as Governor for a short period, ordinarily no longer than five years. That is a tradition from the days of *laissez-faire* when little was expected of government. In maintaining order the Governor depends ultimately on the armed force of the colonial power, and must therefore be responsible to the colonial power. This responsibility could most safely be entrusted to a European official of the colonial power and, given normal competence, one man was as good as another, while the short period of office was no serious disadvantage, because the machinery ran of itself. A colonial Government in any form must still be responsible to the colonial power until it is able to stand alone. It might seem then that, at least during this stage, the Governor should be a European. There are other reasons also for preferring a European as Governor. By his origin, upbringing and status a European would seem best able to promote the interests of foreign capital, while restraining its anti-social tendencies. And if the people are to be educated as citizens of the modern world, some may hold that this can best be accomplished by one who, by birth and nurture, is himself at home in the modern world.

Yet it is unlikely, or even impossible, that a European, newly appointed to a colony for a short period of some five years, can adequately discharge the functions of modern colonial government. For he could hardly escape unconscious bias. In the first instance he would share the outlook of the leading representatives of foreign capital, men of the same origin and traditions as himself, and at first would naturally adopt their point of view. He would be unable to converse with the people in their own tongue freely if at all, and would require some years to understand local conditions, to learn to look at problems from the standpoint of the natives and to appreciate their objections, possibly quite valid, to his well-meant plans. As in the past he would be condemned merely to carry on.

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It might seem, however, that a European, gifted in unusual measure with imagination, sympathy, courage and, above all, patience, could, over a long period of years, do something towards building up a unified and enlightened people. But in the meantime all his projects would be exposed to Nationalist criticism as designed in the interest of foreign capital and of perpetuating foreign rule. Take, for example, three measures that, rightly or wrongly, are in great favour among western administrators: primary instruction, peasant proprietorship, and co-operative credit. The ability to read and write may produce more docile subjects and more intelligent coolies—it is often advocated on those grounds; but it does not help the people to run their country or to manage western enterprise, or even to get better prices for their crops or better terms from moneylenders. Peasant proprietors are less able than large landowners to resist combinations among European merchants and are, in general, politically backward. Co-operative credit cuts out the middleman who is potentially the rival of Europeans in political and economic life. Or take the European demand for welfare legislation. We have seen that this favours big business against tropical rivals, and western labour against coolie competition, but tends to hinder the political and economic advancement of the people. Could a foreign Governor be certain that he was wholly free of bias in advocating such measures; and, if so, could he convince Nationalist critics of their soundness? Even if measures under these various heads be sound, a foreign Governor is less well able than a native to make them acceptable. In Burma, as we have seen, one of the most urgent problems is to re-establish monastic discipline and to modernize the monastic schools. In Siam under national rule the monks support the Government, and have allowed their monasteries to be used for lay schools. No foreign Governor could accomplish that in Burma. No policy, however wise, can be above suspicion, and there must always be some opposition to any policy of any Government, for there are two sides to every question. But the critics of a foreign Governor can always rally the people to their side. To accomplish his task he must foster national sentiment, but in doing so he piles up combustible material for his critics and opponents. A foreign Governor can maintain law and order sufficiently to allow of material development, and he can hold the people down, with the support of foreign troops if necessary, but he cannot build it up by converting nationalism from a destructive fever into a creative force. Only in the very earliest stages, and in default of any practicable alternative, can the process of

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000 introducing self-government be conducted under the supervision of a foreign Governor, and, if self-government be seriously intended, the first step towards realizing it would seem to be the substitution of a native for a foreigner as Governor.

With a non-European Governor, many difficulties in the task of creating a common social will would be diminished or removed. He might not understand the West so well, and he might need help and guidance in protecting and controlling capitalist interests, but he should understand the people better, and have an instinctive sympathy with their sentiments and aspirations. His measures would be less open to suspicion as actuated by foreign interests, and he would be better able to use personal influence to commend the adoption of necessary but unwelcome welfare measures. The mere fact that the nominal head of the Government was not European would indicate that the European section was not regarded as superior in status; if he were a native of the country, the appeal to national feeling would be stronger. There are, indeed, precedents for such appointments. Non-Europeans have acted as Governor in various provinces of India, including Burma, and the late Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa was a West Indian Negro.

But in any dependency, so long as the plural society remains unresolved, the Governor, whether native or European, must protect and control foreign capitalist interests and cannot dispense with the support of foreign troops. Also he must still be responsible to the colonial power, as this cannot abandon control over the conduct of affairs which might involve it in military operations for the suppression of unrest. The Government, whatever its form, would still retain a dual character, and the best expedient would seem to be the appointment of a European to advise and help a native Governor. At present, on the normal pattern of modern colonial rule, a European Governor acts with the advice and assistance of representatives of the people. There is in fact a dual Government. The position of the Governor resembles that of the Resident in former days in Java, when the Regent, as representative of the people, was expected to treat him as his overlord or 'elder brother'; the introduction of political reforms in Java, it has been said, reversed this position and converted the Resident into the 'younger brother'. The first step in the direction of self-government would seem to be a similar change, giving a different aspect to the dual Government, by nominating a native as Governor, chosen to represent the people so far as possible, but acting with the advice and

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assistance of an official representing the colonial power and, so far as necessary, in accordance with his directions. The dual Government would then comprise a native Governor and a European official who might suitably be termed a High Commissioner. This new type of dual Government would still be strictly colonial because not effectively representative and not able to stand alone, but it would have the form, and much of the substance, of indirect rather than of direct rule. Doubtless in special cases, where native society is wholly backward or sectional divisions are excessive, such an arrangement is impracticable, but on any system where a colonial Government is expected to justify before some international tribunal the progress made towards self-government, it might well be called on to furnish sufficient reasons against taking the initial step of creating such a dual government with a native head, accepted formally as representing the people.

Under this form of Government, however, there would be no less need for continuity. Permanent representation by one individual, as by the Crown in Siam, is possible only where there is organic unity, and a distinctive character of plural society is lack of organic unity, so that permanent representation is impracticable, and the man chosen to represent the people cannot hold office for more than a limited period of years. The element of continuity must therefore be supplied by the representative of the colonial power, and the arguments against limitation on the period of his office are no less valid when he is transformed from a Governor into a High Commissioner.

8. Semi-Colonial Government

The Government in its new form would be no less competent than a Government of the pure colonial type to discharge its responsibilities to the colonial power and to the outer world, and would be better able to induce the people to accept the responsibilities of modern citizenship. But the appointment of the native Governor by nomination would weaken it. The primary constructive function of the dual government would be to convert formal representation into actual representation. Three essential elements of a representative government in a tropical dependency would seem to be a native President, a National Assembly and an Economic Council.

The President. We may perhaps assume that the native Governor would not be merely a promoted official, but would be a non-official, chosen to represent the people so far as possible. Nomination, however, is clearly an inadequate method of providing for represen-

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tation. The Government would gain strength if the Governor were chosen by the people, and the next step forward would be the substitution of election for nomination. In countries such as Burma, where the minorities, though possessing great economic power, are numerically almost insignificant, the election of a representative whom all communities would accept should not present great difficulty. Where, as in Malaya, the sections are more equally balanced, the problem, though more difficult, should not be beyond solution. The significance of the change in the character of the Government, implied by the substitution of election for nomination, might suitably be emphasized by styling the elected representative President instead of Governor. The conversion of the Governor into a President should enable the Government to discharge its former functions more adequately but would indicate a change of status rather than any change of function. Until the dependency could stand alone, the Government would still be responsible to the colonial power, and continuity of person in the office of the High Commissioner would be no less important than before.

Representation and Responsibility. How much farther would it be possible to carry the principle of representation? The President would be better able to perform his duties if he were able to consult the particular interests of all important groups in a representative assembly, and such an organ might be valuable both as an instrument of social education and as a means of welding the several groups and interests into a single people. But its usefulness would depend on its composition and functions.

The problem of devising machinery to represent the various peoples and interests is not very difficult. In backward regions where social life has not yet broken down, the people accept the village or tribal authorities as representative. Among more advanced peoples it has usually been found possible and expedient to gather elected representatives of the people in various councils, local, provincial or national. This has added to the strength of the Government, even under foreign rule, and is now a normal feature of colonial administration. But in general, and especially under British rule, the same machinery has been expected to serve both for representation and legislation, on some model based originally on parliamentary institutions. Parliament however discharges a great variety of functions. It brings together those who represent different localities, classes and interests, and allows them to contribute their knowledge to the common stock; it

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serves for the organization of knowledge. It also provides them with opportunities for discussion and deliberation; it serves for the organization of thought. But it serves also for the organization of the common social will; it enables them to choose someone who shall act on their behalf, and to control his actions. As an organ of knowledge and thought, a representative assembly should cast its net as widely as the diversity of conditions may require. As an organ of will the membership must be limited by two factors: the membership must be restricted to those who accept the convention of democracy that the national interest shall prevail by legal methods over sectional and local interests; and it must be restricted to those who accept the requirements of modern civilization.

Parliamentary government, as understood in Britain, is possible only where one assembly fulfils all these various requirements. Even in Britain it was strained almost to breaking point by the inclusion of a comparatively small body of Irish representatives who did not accept the necessary conventions, and it could not long survive the incursion of any considerable Communist or Fascist element, repudiating the principle of the rule of law. As an organ of will parliamentary government assumes the existence of a united people. But in the plural society of tropical dependencies, each separate section is another Ireland, preferring its sectional interests to common national well-being. Again, parliamentary government implies the acceptance of common welfare standards, but in the tropics the great majority of the people represented, and probably even of the representatives, do not accept the requirements of modern civilization. Yet in tropical dependencies we find the same machinery expected, as in England, to serve both for representation—the organization of knowledge and thought, and for legislation—the expression of the common social will. Under British rule all save the smallest or most primitive territories have a 'legislature'. This system confounds the functions of representation and legislation, and the result is a compromise unsatisfactory in both respects.

In tropical dependencies there is far greater need than in Europe for the organization of knowledge and thought. Europe is both the creator and the child of the modern world, while tropical countries are, at best, adopted children. In European countries there are innumerable societies, institutions and periodicals which diffuse knowledge and promote discussion, but in tropical countries these things are few or wanting. In this respect Netherlands India compares favourably with

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000 British dependencies, even with British India, in the multitude of periodicals to which officials are not merely allowed but encouraged to contribute. But even in Netherlands India the People's Council, the Volksraad, has proved its value in providing new facilities for the discussion of affairs. The benefit of a representative organ will be proportional to its comprehensiveness; it will be most useful if it represents all important communities and interests throughout the land. It should, so far as possible, be a National Assembly. Where, as in the Volksraad, officials are allowed to speak and vote freely without regard to the policy of Government, their position enables them to make conspicuously useful contributions to the debates. But the practical difficulties of allowing them so much freedom are obviously greater if the representative body be vested also with powers of control. As soon as a representative body is given control over the Government as an organ of will, it becomes necessary to limit the membership and, however narrowly limited, the conflict of sectional interests aggravates discord and hinders the attainment of national unity. If, then, the object of policy be to make dependencies capable as soon as possible of independence, it would seem necessary to separate representation and responsibility, and in the first instance to create a National Assembly without legislative powers, deferring the creation of a legislature until there is a united and enlightened people.

The National Assembly. In a National Assembly with advisory powers there is no need to restrict membership to those who are in touch with the modern world or aspire to a common national unity; on the contrary, membership should be as wide as possible. Nomination would serve where election was impracticable. It would seem well, as Lord Hailey suggests, 'to make the fullest possible use of the customary institutions of the people, based on tribal, village or other organizations'.[1] In any case, with a view to the reintegration of social life within the village, it would appear desirable to base the electoral system on the village, as in Java, rather than on the individual as in Burma. Again, since the council should represent all sections of the people, it should provide for the representation of all important sections and communities. It is desirable to foster a common nationalism and get rid of sectionalism. But one cannot suppress sectionalism by disregarding sectional views and interests; such views can find expression only through the section or community as a whole, and it is no less desir-

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 45.

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able to promote solidarity in minority communities than in the village. It may seem that the representation of minorities and special interests conflicts with the aim of imbuing all classes with the sentiment of a common nationality; but this is an illusion, for it is only through a recognition of its special claims that a minority will accept common citizenship with the people in general. In a *legislative* assembly, an organ of will, communal representation is a defect because it makes for division of will and weakness; but in a *representative* assembly it makes for strength and promotes community of feeling. In this matter it is of interest to recall the practice in Netherlands India, where the Governor nominates representatives of important minorities which would otherwise be inadequately represented.

Economic Council. In such a National Assembly, based on communal representation, domiciled aliens of whatever origin would, if sufficiently numerous, be represented either by election or nomination. But most of the European community and many foreign orientals are only temporary residents, whose interest in the dependency is in general solely economic. They would be out of place in an assembly purporting to represent national interests and, even if seats were reserved for them, they would have little concern in many aspects of national life, while among the members of the National Assembly in general few would have much interest or competence in many weighty economic problems. It would seem expedient, therefore, to constitute, alongside the National Assembly, an Economic Council, somewhat on the line suggested a few years back by Mr Churchill, and corresponding to the Grand Council of French Indo-China or the Economic Council of Netherlands India. This might be given powers of control over the business concerns that it represented, as is the case with the Federation of Indian Enterprise (*Indische Ondernemersbond*) in Netherlands India, but it would serve chiefly to advise the Government on economic affairs, much as the National Assembly would give advice on national affairs. Various devices might be adopted to co-ordinate their activities, as by establishing joint committees, or by allowing the Economic Council representation in the National Assembly.

Presidential Election. It is not necessary that the constitution of a National Assembly should be postponed until the election of a President or even until the nomination of a native as Governor; there is, indeed, already in most colonies some form of representative body to advise the foreign Governor. On the other hand there might well

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000 be a native Governor, or even an elected President, without a National Assembly. It would, for example, be possible to elect the President on some plan similar to that adopted in Presidential elections in the United States. But the National Assembly would seem to be the most convenient instrument for electing a President, and there should be no great difficulty in entrusting the Assembly with this function. Although in the first instance the Governor might tend to represent the majority in the Assembly rather than the people as a whole, one might hope and expect that he would gradually come to adopt the attitude of a representative of the whole people, and that all sections of the community would come to regard him in that light. Such a Government, representing the people though still unable to stand alone without support from the colonial power, would be semi-colonial in character.

9. Conditional Independence

Defence. The essential function of the dual Government in its semi-colonial form would be to enable the dependency to stand alone without external support. For this it would be necessary to create a military and police force on which a representative government could depend without having to call in foreign aid. It is not enough that the troops shall be non-European, as in Burma, where the maintenance of order has rested on the support of Indian troops, or even as in India where the army is recruited from a comparatively small section of the population. How long any national Government could hold India together from Kashmir to Tinnevelly and Bombay to Calcutta, without support from Britain, is a matter that attempts to find a formula for reconciling Muslim and Hindu often disregard. In Burma it would not be enough to recruit soldiers, as on a very small scale in the past, from hill tribes and minor peoples; this fosters and does not conciliate sectional divisions. A national army implies a national militia in which the duty of national defence is incumbent upon all.

Territorial Integrity. This carries two further implications. It implies that one character of the dependency shall be territorial integrity. We have noticed that a plural society resembles a confederation of independent states, and it is this which constitutes the chief barrier to self-government. But the difficulty is aggravated if it also comprises distinct regions that recognize no organic bond and do not wish to hold together, as when Burma was amalgamated with India. The incorporation of Burma in the Indian Empire was solely for administrative

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convenience, and it has greatly enhanced the difficulty of reconstituting Burma as a national unit. Some of the territorial amalgamations now contemplated in Africa seem to be dictated by administrative convenience or economic efficiency. So far as that is the case, it will be harder in future to make the several constituents capable of independence, and harder also to confer independence on the whole artificially created complex. If after the Mutiny the British Government had accepted the advice of John Bright to constitute five distinct territorial regions in India,[1] the problem of making the people capable of independence would have been greatly simplified. So far then as a dependency comprises distinct territorial units, some kind of federation would seem to be indicated. In Burma, for example, the recognition of the Shan States, the Tribal Hills and possibly Arakan, as separate entities within a comprehensive federation, might promote harmonious co-operation and a real national unity.

Economic Autonomy. The second implication of creating a national militia is that the tension due to the cleavage between numerical and economic power must be resolved. It is no difficult matter to recruit local troops, but it is hazardous to entrust local troops with the defence of foreign capitalist interests. For a country to be capable of independence it must possess economic autonomy, and for this it is essential that the economic system must be largely in native hands. The transformation of the economic system is necessary also as a part of social education. So long as the indigenous inhabitants of a country are restricted to agriculture, and are debarred from gaining experience in modern industry and commerce, they cannot as a people acquire a comprehensive outlook on the modern world.

Thus during the semi-colonial phase of the transition the Government would have a double task: to make the dependency capable of independence in respect of military force, and at the same time to transform the economic system so that the endowment of the people with military strength should not endanger internal security. On the completion of this task the dependency would, like Siam, be capable of independence. It would be able to stand alone and, as the Government would no longer be responsible to the colonial power for the maintenance of order, it would no longer require a dual form of government.

Being able to stand alone it would no longer be tied of necessity to the colonial power, although it might, and probably would, wish to

[1] Bright, I, 50.

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000 retain the connection, as the great dominions do at present, and with better reason. For its independence would still be conditional on compliance with the requirements of the modern world in respect of progress and welfare. A representative of the colonial power could do much to help it, no longer however as a High Commissioner directing the control of policy but as a Resident or, better, Agent occupying somewhat the same position as that formerly held by Cromer in Egypt. The change in status might accordingly be recognized by the conversion of the High Commissioner into an Agent; and, if the post of Agent carried a higher status than the post of High Commissioner, the transformation of the form of government would probably be expedited.

10. Popular Government

When a dependency had become capable of independence, the Government would be responsible to the people for maintaining their independence. But it is unnecessary that it should be accountable to them for the daily conduct of affairs, and impossible that it can be made accountable to them in such matters until they are, in fact, able and willing to accept the responsibilities of modern citizenship. It is conceivable that there should be a perpetual President occupying a position resembling that held formerly by the Crown in Siam, responsible to the people for maintaining their independence, but not accountable to them for his actions. The people needs a leader if it is to make good and maintain its place in the world, but experience shows that leadership only too easily becomes a military dictatorship, and shows also that dictatorship is unstable. Both for stability and as an instrument of social education, it is desirable to create an organ with some responsibility to the people for the conduct of affairs. The National Assembly suggested above would not serve this purpose, as it is expressly devised with a view to organizing knowledge and thought, and not as an instrument of will. Doubtless it would exercise an influence on government, and so also would the Economic Council; experience suggests that they would exercise a strong and increasing influence. In British dependencies the 'legislatures' have little constitutional power, but 'all observers agree that the attitude of the local executive shows a growing measure of response to the influence of their legislatures'.[1] That has been true also of the Volksraad in Netherlands India from its earliest days. Yet representation cannot be accepted as fully adequate

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 42.

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to the demands of self-government, and everywhere in the modern world the system of monarchy, though embodying the principle of virtual representation in its strongest form, has broken down unless combined with institutions serving to express not merely the general opinion but the general will. For the attainment of independence on a stable basis it would seem necessary, therefore, to devise alongside the National Assembly some organ serving as an instrument of social will. A precedent for the combination of a National Council and a Legislature exists apparently in Fiji.

In a homogeneous society in which the people in general accept the conditions of modern civilization, the same organ can serve both as a means by which they may express their views and as an instrument for doing what they want. It can serve both ends because fundamentally the people are agreed on promoting national welfare, however widely they may differ as to the means by which this may be achieved, and because they all accept the standards and ideas of modern western civilization of which democracy is one expression. In the plural society of a tropical dependency important sections of the community have little or no regard for national well-being; and to some sections, including the great majority of the indigenous inhabitants, the ideas and standards of modern civilization are not only alien but unwelcome, or even repugnant. It follows, then, that the membership of a legislature must be restricted to those who, as permanent inhabitants, have a vital interest in national welfare and at the same time accept the ideas common to the modern world. There is no place in such a body for members who, as foreigners, are primarily interested in the security and rewards of foreign capital. Nor is there any place for members, indigenous or domiciled, who are ignorant of the modern world, or who are dependent for membership on an electorate even more ignorant. This implies that, in the first instance, there shall be educational and property qualifications for the franchise, which may be gradually lowered as an appreciation of the requirements of modern civilization become more generally diffused. Again, communal representation would be precluded because this tends to impair and not to strengthen social will, and makes for sectional division and not for social unity; also it would be unnecessary because, from the conditions of membership, all the members would have a common interest in national welfare and would accept the basic postulates of modern civilization. By excluding on the one hand temporary residents, solely interested in economic progress, and on

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the other hand those permanent residents who are not at home in the modern world, it would represent the highest common factor of social will and should promote social unification instead of sectional discord.

It is important to distinguish the functions, and therefore the forms of the two separate organs embodying respectively the principles of representation and responsibility. The representative body, the National Assembly, should be as comprehensive as local or sectional diversity might require and would be based on the principle of communal representation; the responsible organ, the Legislature, would, in the first instance, be far more narrowly restricted as regards both membership and franchise and it would exclude communal representation. Such a legislature would not represent economic power, the strong foreign capitalist interest, nor numerical power, the great mass of the people ignorant of the modern world; it would not represent the whole people, and therefore could not be accountable to the people as a whole. The Government, however, must represent the people as a whole and be responsible for them to the outer world and, until the legislature can fulfil both these conditions, it cannot be entrusted with final control over the executive. The main constructive task of Government (beyond the maintenance of order and the care for security against oppression) would be to foster a common social will, but this demands greater continuity of policy than can be expected of a legislature consisting of members elected for a comparatively short period. The restriction of the franchise to the educated and wealthier classes should ensure general agreement between the legislature and the Government, but there would certainly remain occasions of difference, and the Government must retain full power to override the legislature and to carry measures on its own initiative.

The irresponsibility of responsible organs in dependencies that are not, in fact, capable of independence has always been a source of difficulty and friction wherever such organs have been constituted, and it has always been necessary to impose safeguards against the dangers of entrusting legislatures with excessive powers. But with a native President the relations between the Government and the legislature, and indeed the character of the Government would take on a new aspect. Differences arise chiefly where the requirements of the outer world demand action that the members of the legislature do not approve. The native President would presumably be one of the most enlightened and intelligent among the people; he would be

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better able to understand the necessity for such measures than most members of the legislature, and would be better able to recommend them to his people than any foreign Governor. Also a dependency, so long as it is incapable of independence, must needs depend on the support of the colonial power, but the people in general do not recognize the need; a native President would realize that he was dependent on the colonial power for retaining his position, and would listen more attentively to advice from the High Commissioner than would the people as a whole or their representatives in the legislature. In experiments in responsible government under a foreign Governor one frequent cause of friction is that Nationalists urge a wider extension of the franchise with a view to strengthening their hold upon the legislature, and also greater power for the legislature at the risk of weakening the Government, or even in order to make it weaker. If the Government is weak enough to yield to the demand it soon becomes too weak to rule; yet if it resists the demand, it becomes weaker by exciting disaffection. But with a native President or Governor conflicts between the executive and the legislature would lose much if not all their sectional character. The Government would still not infrequently have occasion to override the legislature, but it would be less exposed to the suspicion that it was acting in foreign interests. A native President, aiming to obtain complete autonomy for his country, would appreciate more keenly than the electorate the dangers of transferring control too rapidly to an elected body, and not improbably would even be too jealous of extending the powers of the legislature and of widening the franchise. It is indeed not unusual under indirect rule to find the native ruler reluctant to allow more power to his people, and he does so only under pressure from the colonial power. Similarly, with a dual Government comprising representatives both of the people and of the colonial power, the latter would often be able to take the more Liberal and progressive side congenial to western traditions. As social education brought more of the people more intimately into cultural contact with the modern world, successive extensions of the electorate for the legislature would mark the progress towards popular government. Just as the High Commissioner can be transformed into an Agent when through his help the dependency becomes able to stand alone, so, when the progress of popular government gives sufficient assurance of stability, the Agent could be transformed into a Minister, on a par with the representatives of other powers.

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II. Political Reintegration

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Here then we have a project of political reintegration. We have seen that foreign rule in a tropical dependency liberates economic forces, which acting internally produce social disintegration, and acting externally produce economic disintegration, building up a plural society precariously balanced in unstable equilibrium and held in position only by pressure from outside. Our analysis of attempts to promote economic progress and social welfare has shown that these are nullified by the working of economic forces, which can be brought under control only by recognizing the validity of some quasi-religious principle accepted by all concerned as of superior validity to economic motives, and that this can be found only in the principle of Nationalism. We have ventured on suggestions for the reintegration of social and economic life, and have been led to the conclusion that in both respects success can be attained only through political reintegration on a national basis. Political reintegration is not conditional on but a condition of social and economic reintegration. This accords with the Liberal and Christian tradition of the West, which has found expression in attempts at constructing the machinery of western self-governing institutions. The failure of earlier experiments in the construction of such machinery was attributed to the poor foundation of inadequate material resources, insufficient health and undeveloped minds, and a remedy was sought in encouraging economic development in order to raise the standard of welfare to a level at which western institutions would work on western lines. But we have found that economic development promotes efficiency rather than welfare, and enhances the difficulty of political reintegration. It has now come to be recognized that in the plural society of the tropics such institutions cannot work. The fundamental problem is not to create new machinery, but to transform society so that it shall be capable of independence, and thus capable of framing its own institutions in its own way without having the machinery of western political organization imposed upon it by a foreign power. The project here formulated therefore concentrates attention first on building up a common social will, and then on enlightening this common social will, so that the people will gradually be brought to do of its own accord those things which of necessity it must do, for therein alone lies perfect freedom.

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12. Independence and Finance

No project of political integration as a condition of self-government would be complete without considering it in relation to finance. Financial control implies political control, and loans have played no less a part than armies in securing the ascendance of the West over the tropics. Every country must pay its way, and the less it has to pay the more likely it is to live within its means. If tropical dependencies are to attain financial independence, it is important that they should economize on administration, both by reducing establishments to the indispensable minimum, and by restricting salary rates to the lowest point compatible with efficiency. It is not only on financial grounds that efforts should be made to simplify administration. We have noticed that lack of co-ordination between the various services is a common defect of tropical administration. This indicates that even under foreign rule the machinery is apt to become unwieldy, and every elaboration of the administrative machinery, by enhancing the difficulty of control over the conduct of affairs, thereby hinders the transference of control from the colonial power to the dependency. Still more effectively does it hamper the transference of responsibility from the Government to an elective body composed of members to whom many of the activities of Government are unwelcome. Both on political and financial grounds it is desirable that the administrative machinery should be as simple as possible, and should cost no more than necessary.

A rapid growth of administrative activities is the first result of opening up new regions under colonial rule. It becomes necessary to maintain order at a higher level than under native rule and by more costly methods: capital charges are incurred on communications and other public works necessary to economic development; and various services are constituted in the name of welfare but in the interest of economic progress. These things are essential to economic progress, which is in itself desirable and inevitable, but, as we have seen, prejudicial to self-government. Welfare measures that the people value and demand cost little or nothing to the colonial Government, as in Burma where a high level of literacy has been maintained through the monastic schools. But most of the measures undertaken by western Governments in the name of welfare are unwelcome, and are therefore costly and ineffective. The people, if left to govern themselves, will not of their own accord provide money for measures that they regard as waste of money, and they are therefore incapable of complete self-govern-

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000 ment until they can be induced to appreciate their value, until they have learned to want what, in the conditions of the modern world, they must want if they are to manage their own affairs. But the organization of demand is a slow process, and in the tropics both government and western enterprise are always in a hurry for speedy results. We have seen, however, that self-government is a condition of welfare and therefore of sound economic progress. If that is so, then it is desirable to restrict all activities purporting to be undertaken in the name of welfare to the minimum required for the sake of economic progress, and so far as possible to relieve the inhabitants of dependencies from charges incurred on that account. That the colonial power should contribute to the cost of development and welfare in dependencies has been recognized by both British and Dutch rule. In Britain this principle finds its latest expression in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. But that Act provides for assistance only in respect of such matters as dependent peoples cannot be made to pay for. If economic development is to proceed rapidly it would seem desirable to provide dependencies with funds to the full limit that such expenditure is likely to be profitable. It is on this principle that some Socialists advocate the equipment of dependencies with railways and other capital goods at the expense of Britain. That would doubtless benefit both capital and labour, the manufacturers and labourers employed in Britain in producing the materials, but whether it would be profitable to the general taxpayers who would have to meet the charge is a matter for debate. Also it would tend to expedite economic development in the dependencies to which the gift was made, whereas a slow progress seems more likely to promote their welfare. Whenever economic development requires so-called 'welfare' measures to mitigate its ill-effects, it is important to provide them and to see that they are effective. But the expenditure on such measures should be charged to the enterprises which they make more profitable. Western enterprise in the tropics is advantageous to the colonial power, but its benefit to the country in which it is conducted is, at best, questionable. So far as rapid development is in the interest of the colonial power, there is a sufficient reason to encourage it, as under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act; but it is hardly fair to make the welfare measures that it necessitates a charge on people who do not want them or regard them as promoting welfare; and to claim credit for generosity for such welfare grants is a draft on credulity that is unlikely to be honoured by the people of the dependency to which the grant is made.

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The multiplication of welfare services and other Government activities in tropical dependencies involves the entertainment of a large European establishment and the elaboration of the western superstructure over native life. Considerations of economy would tend gradually to replace the Europeans by natives and in the interest of social education it is desirable that they should be replaced by natives so far and so fast as is consistent with efficiency. But experience suggests that the process is likely to be slow, and that one result will be to multiply subordinate officials who will supplement their income by conniving at breaches of the regulations which they are paid to enforce. It is always an easy matter to find plausible arguments for the employment of more welfare officers, and such proposals are likely to engage the sympathy of the colonial power because they expedite development, provide more appointments for Europeans, pacify discontent among the unemployed native intelligentsia by providing more jobs, and enable the foreign Government to display its benevolent aspirations at the expense of its native subjects. There must always, therefore, be a temptation to multiply welfare activities up to the limit that colonial revenues can afford, and colonial powers will find it easier to resist this temptation if they are required to contribute towards the cost.

So far as superior appointments in the various services are transferred to natives, a colonial power will have less interest in adding to their number. But the transfer of such appointments raises an administrative problem of grave practical importance. This matter has been noticed by Lord Hailey:

'Important as it is', he says, 'to expedite the process of opening the superior official cadre to recruitment from the people of the country, there is one danger from which dependencies must be safeguarded. In Great Britain there is a generally accepted ratio between the scale of remuneration given to members of the public services and the average family income. The salaries now given to European members of the services in the dependencies are based roughly on the scale of similar salaries in Great Britain with a necessary addition for the disabilities attending overseas employment. Where natives of the dependencies have been admitted to posts hitherto held by Europeans, there has been a tendency to demand for them either the same salary, or something approaching it, as that formerly paid to Europeans. To concede this demand would involve an unreasonable burden on the finances of the territory, more especially as there will always be pressure on the part of the large body of subordinate services to approximate their pay to that of the smaller number in superior employment.'[1]

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 37.

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000 It is indeed a common defect of administration in the tropics that the scales of pay, even in the lowest grades, are far above what the people could earn in the native world, so that everyone looks to obtain if possible a post under Government or, failing that, in the employ of western enterprise where also rates of pay are based on the standard of living in the western sphere of social life. Lord Hailey suggests that natives employed in Government service 'must be content with salaries based on a scale determined by a ratio to the average income of their own countrymen'. But it is easier to preach contentment than to enforce it. When natives in appointments ordinarily held by Europeans demand equal pay for equal work, it is difficult for a foreign Government to resist the demand without arousing disaffection among just that class which it is most important to conciliate. Men in such positions set the standard of living which those in subordinate appointments try to emulate. These also demand higher pay, and again it is difficult to resist the demand. Like the multiplicity of transfers, the excessive burden of routine, the indigestible masses of reports, it is a defect common to all colonial powers and all dependencies, an inveterate complaint that cannot be charmed away by pious aspirations. Everywhere the administration of dependencies is costly in comparison with their resources, and everywhere, even in wealthy dependencies like Malaya and Netherlands India, one finds complaints that the resources are inadequate to the needs. Yet the example of Japan shows that this high scale of expenditure is unnecessary. When seam in Netherlands India mutinied for higher pay, it was observed that the men were already drawing higher pay than officers in the Japanese fleet. The modernization of Japan, however, has been effected under its own rulers, and would probably have been far more costly, and less effective, under foreign rule. In India some ministers have accepted low salaries from patriotic motives, but patriotic fervour is unlikely to reconcile the rank and file of native officials to low pay, while they see Europeans drawing greatly higher pay for much the same work.

Yet it would not seem impossible to find a solution of the problem even under foreign rule. The assistance of European officials is necessary both for economic development and for social education, but dependencies with meagre resources cannot always afford to employ as many as is desirable, while colonial powers tend to employ more Europeans than is really necessary. In either case the scale of pay for Europeans must be fixed at a much higher rate than native officials need. It has been suggested, with reference to grants under the

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Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 'that it would surely be of far more practical value to the colonies, to relieve them entirely of the cost of European salaries and pensions than to make them isolated grants for development and welfare projects which they would then be able to finance themselves'.[1] From the standpoint of the colonial power this plan, although startling, would probably be advantageous; but it would seem to encourage dependencies to beg for doles while starving them of useful services. If the cost of administration is not to be excessive, the rate of pay in all appointments must be fixed with reference to native standards; but it should be possible to frame a rule that where Europeans are employed the colonial power and the colonial Government shall each pay half the difference between the pay necessary to attract a competent European and the pay fixed for natives in similar positions. This would make it possible for the dependency to employ a larger number of Europeans, and encourage it to recruit Europeans whom it would obtain at little more than half the market rates, while it would discourage the colonial power from multiplying the number of Europeans unnecessarily; at the same time it would tend to keep native scales of pay within the limits that the dependency could afford. The proposal that colonial powers should contribute to colonial expenditures in this manner may appear Utopian. But the principle that dependencies should receive financial aid has already been accepted in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. Capital grants tend to promote development rather than welfare, and recurring grants on the above lines in aid of colonial establishments should be more economical than when given merely as windfalls or subsidies, as was abundantly demonstrated by the former practice of doles from the central to provincial governments in India, with alternating periods of extravagance and stringency.

In connection with the remuneration of officials it may be well to recall another matter already mentioned incidentally. Both in British India and Netherlands India Government servants were formerly allowed to trade or to take a commission on produce supplied to Government. This system was incompatible with the encouragement of private enterprise and, on the introduction of the rule of law and the principle of economic freedom, the officials were converted into civil servants and were debarred from trading and from holding land. As civil servants they no longer profited by the exploitation of the natives, and could take a dispassionate view of

[1] *Economist*, 30 September 1944, p. 447.

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native welfare without the natural bias due to personal interest. But the regulations prohibiting trade and landholding were framed before the modern growth of limited companies. Officials who hold shares in private enterprises operating in the country where they serve, or who may look forward on retirement to highly paid appointments in such enterprises, can hardly remain wholly impartial in questions where capitalist interests conflict with national advancement, and are at least exposed to a suspicion of bias. If, then, the function of government be to promote national advancement, there would seem good reason to place some restriction on the relations between officials and private enterprise. In Netherlands India the Governor-General must abstain from all concern with local private interests, not only during his period of office but for five years subsequently. Some corresponding restriction might well be made more general; at least it would seem expedient that officials should be made to report their holdings in private enterprises operating within the dependency. This precaution is likely to be more necessary with the increasing replacement of Europeans by natives, less fortified by an old and strong tradition of integrity in public life.

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CHAPTER XIII

INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION

1. The Need for Autonomy

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It is obvious, we have said, that in the problem of making dependencies autonomous two parties are concerned, the dependency and the colonial power. A dependency cannot achieve autonomy unless it is capable of independence, but its achievement of autonomy requires also a creative impulse in the colonial power, and almost inevitably this creative impulse is weakened by division of opinion and infirmity of purpose. On the desirability of the economic development of dependencies there will be general agreement; it is a matter of common sense that backward regions should contribute as fully as possible to the resources of the world or, at least, to the resources of the colonial power. Experience shows that their contribution can be made more effective by raising the standard of living among the people and, to this extent, it is a matter of common sense to promote their welfare. But the conferment of autonomy is regarded as a privilege, a concession justifiable only on moral grounds superior to self-interest. Why not, asks common sense, hold what we have?

The answer to this question is usually framed in terms of lofty principles, by no means obvious to common sense, not universally accepted, and of doubtful validity. For instance, in a recent interesting and suggestive essay, Mr Panikkar lays down 'essential principles of colonial administration': that the sovereignty belongs to the people; that the people should be protected against industrial fluctuations; that a progressive policy of education, public health and social consolidation should be adopted; that there should be no racial or colour discrimination; and 'finally' that colonial powers should train dependent peoples for their own defence.[1] Such principles may be admirable as moral sentiments, but who wants these things? Who is going to do them, or to pay to have them done? And in the plural society of a tropical dependency, what is 'the people'? If Mr Panikkar were given a free hand to govern a country of the Tropical Far East on these lines, he would probably find that he needed two hands—to

[1] Panikkar, K. M., *The Future of South-east Asia* (1943), p. 25; Furnivall, *Asiatic Review*, 1944, p. 265.

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000 pull in opposite directions. Humanitarian ideals may point the goal for political reforms, but human nature travels faster with self-interest for its guide. We are probably better judges of our own interest than of the interests of others. We may be, and often are mistaken as to what we want and how best to get it, but at least we think we know what we want, and we can only guess what other people want. It is possible, of course, that having decided where our interest lies, we may, on some ground of higher principle, be willing to forgo it; but we shall at least know where our will needs strengthening. Let us then examine the ideal of colonial autonomy frankly from the standpoint of our interests as citizens of a colonial power and heirs of western civilization. But let us take care also to understand our interests.

Among all tropical dependencies few attract so much attention at the present time as those in the Tropical Far East. The chief reason is that here there is a focus of stresses and tensions which endanger peace. When a recent Colonial Secretary was discussing international co-operation in colonial affairs, he urged that it was needed for security. Security is the keynote of almost every such project. But the word security in this connection savours of 'securities'—investments of foreign capital. We have seen that in the past the whole direction of economic life, and one may say of political life also, lay with foreign capital. After the war foreign capital will again be active in developing the oil, tin, rubber and so on. When we talk of security, are we thinking of security for foreign capital? Capitalist interests will be more concerned in security for capital than in the maintenance of peace. It is true that in any given region capitalist interests are particular and local; not many people in Britain are directly connected, as shareholders or otherwise, with firms operating in Burma; still fewer are those with investments in Netherlands India, Siam or Indo-China. But all capital has a common interest, well-organized and vocal—if need be, clamorous—and, for the protection of its interest, it can appeal for general support because we are all capitalists now, all interested, one way or another, directly or indirectly, in the capitalist development of the tropics. Organized capitalist interests demanding security for western enterprise in the tropics are likely to prevail over our silent unorganized general interest as citizens and human beings in the maintenance of peace. But our true interest lies in peace and, if we understand our interest and can get our way, we shall endeavour to

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promote peace rather than security. Is it indeed economic, or even possible, to ensure security for foreign capital in tropical dependencies? So far as this conflicts with social interests we cannot safely entrust its defence to indigenous native troops. Foreign troops will be more costly, and someone, eventually the consumer, the citizen, must bear the extra charge. Our tropical produce will cost more and, in the long run and not perhaps a very long run, will be cut off by rebellion. Foreign troops may ensure temporary security, but it will be the security promised to Macbeth, 'mortal's chiefest enemy'. If we would maintain peace in the tropics we must enlist the co-operation of tropical peoples and train them in arms, not, as Mr Panikkar suggests, 'finally' and on altruistic grounds, but as a matter of the first importance in our own interests, our true interests as distinct from what may seem at first sight to be our economic interest. This implies, as Lord Hailey remarked at the International Conference in Canada in 1942, that we must try to promote among them 'the status which will give them both the incentive and the means to organize for their defence'. The security of capital is least endangered where the people is divided, as in a plural society; but peace is most secure where the people is united and the tensions and stresses of a plural society have been resolved. Autonomy is needed in the interest of peace.

Again, we are all interested in economic progress; we all want to develop the material resources of the tropics and to open them up as markets for our produce. We are all concerned to promote the activity of economic forces, but experience justifies the social instinct which, in western homogeneous society, keeps their anti-social tendencies within safe bounds. In the tropics these forces, released from the control of custom, disintegrate society, and there is no effective restraint on the conflicting economic interests of capital and labour, industry and agriculture, town and country. In almost all the problems thus arising economic tension is aggravated by racial cleavage. Let us recall merely a few instances from the Tropical Far East. How can one regulate the influx of Indian or Chinese labour with due regard to the respective interests of the natives and foreign capital? Or consider the protection and welfare of labour. Asiatics differ from Europeans in their ideas and standards of welfare. Are we to push up welfare standards to the advantage of European big business in competing with Indian, Chinese or native employers, and of western labour in competition with oriental labour? Economic competition

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000 cuts at profits as well as at wages. How far shall western capitalists be allowed to defend their profits against native competition, and thereby hold up the price, say, of rubber, to the detriment of American and other consumers? Or again, what about markets? Are colonial powers, with high standards of living and high wages, to throw open their dependent markets freely to cheap oriental produce? All these, and many other problems, foreshadowed towards the end of the last century with the growth of capitalist enterprise in India, became acute when Japan entered the modern world. But they will not be eliminated even if the war may have put Japan out of business; they will become more acute and difficult with increasing competition from India and China and, if these can support economic with military strength, and can make a common stand, with moral and perhaps material support from Africa, many economic problems will become almost insoluble on peaceful lines or in economic terms because they are not purely economic. The uncontrolled reactions of economic forces will, as in the past, make for the survival of the cheapest, hindered only by the self-interest of competitors for profit. For the solution of such problems we must look outside the sphere of economics for some principle to which we can appeal. We must promote among tropical peoples 'a status which will give them both the incentive and the means to organize for their defence'—not merely military self-defence, but economic self-defence. Our immediate and apparent interest lies in giving free play to economic forces, but our true interest lies in promoting economic autonomy so that these forces may be kept under adequate control.

Moreover, we all want to promote welfare, or what we regard as welfare, not merely on humanitarian grounds but in our own economic interest. In our own interest we want to prevent disease among men, crops and cattle; we want good sanitation in commercial centres and an ample supply of healthy and intelligent labour for western enterprise. Experience shows that attempts to gain these ends by administrative machinery are costly and ineffective; the promotion of welfare requires the voluntary co-operation of the people. Also we want tropical people to be well off so that they may buy our goods, and, in order to earn more, they must produce more. But experience shows that production is a social function just as welfare is a social attribute. Our interest in capitalist development seems to lie in promoting individual welfare so as to increase the efficiency of production, but individual welfare is a by-product of social welfare. In our own in-

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terest we must promote among the people a status which will give them the incentive and the means to organize their own welfare. Colonial autonomy is not merely a humanitarian ideal, a privilege to be graciously or grudgingly conceded, but an end that we should pursue in our own interest, and press on dependent peoples who may be reluctant or too ignorant to accept responsibility for conducting their own affairs.

Yet it will seem risky to abandon control over profitable markets and fields for investment. If dependencies should become autonomous they might prefer to buy goods from other sources, to place restrictions on foreign enterprise, and to employ Europeans other than subjects of the colonial power. If Britain after the war should be faced with unemployment, one remedy would be the increase of exports to countries within the Empire; but the dominions might be unable or unwilling to take them, whereas the colonies would have to accept whatever might be thrust on them in the name of 'colonial development and welfare'. However strongly humanitarian ideals and practical, though remote, considerations of our own interest may support arguments for making dependencies capable of independence, we are apparently and more immediately interested in making certain of the profits that accrue from our established relations with tropical dependencies, and this tends to weaken the creative impulse that the task of fostering autonomy demands. It is common sense that 'every effort should be made to increase the contributions which each dependency can make to the economic or military resources of the Empire', and although in pronouncements on colonial policy this may be formally subordinated to local interests, yet in actual practice 'for many years to come the African colonial dependencies of Great Britain, France and Belgium are unlikely to give active encouragement to industries of a type which will compete with their home manufactures'.[1] It is a matter of common knowledge that men prefer higher wages rather than a reduction of the cost of living which would really be more beneficial, they prefer the glitter to the gold. Similarly we have a direct interest on business grounds in retaining our control over dependencies, and only a remote, less obvious though more substantial, interest in promoting their independence. We can, moreover, support our reluctance by the plausible argument that, if they are granted nominal independence before they are in fact capable of independence, they will be unable to maintain it. For sound

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 247, 979.

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reasons then as well as for selfish reasons we are divided and infirm of purpose in facing the problem of colonial autonomy.

This is apparent in the accepted formula that the goal of policy should be self-government 'within the Empire'. Strictly construed this formula is meaningless, for it implies that dependencies shall be free to do what they want, so long as they do what we want. Also, as we have found already in the case of India, it cannot be enforced, for effective self-government must carry with it ability to secede from the Empire. There are two guarantees against secession. One is the inability to stand alone, a defect that, if we aim at colonial autonomy, we should endeavour to remove. The other, more durable, is the tie of interest and affection. The advantages of the connection with Britain are, or should be, so great that no dependency, once capable of independence, should wish to secede. Yet we endeavour to impose as an obligation what they should welcome as a privilege, and thereby foster disaffection, and enhance the already difficult task of making them capable of independence. Until a national sentiment develops, a dependency is incapable of autonomy; but where such a sentiment exists, every delay will be regarded with suspicion as dictated by the interest of the colonial power and will promote ill-feeling. If in such circumstances the connection be violently ruptured, there will probably remain a legacy of ill-will, such as still complicates the relations between Britain and the United States. Our true interest lies in the promotion of colonial autonomy; but our natural selfish inclination is not to look beyond the short period within which (at least apparently) it is more profitable to keep dependencies in subjection. It is necessary then to strengthen colonial powers in the resolve to make dependencies capable of independence, and to minimize suspicion among dependent peoples, anxious, perhaps unduly, to expedite the process.

2. Political and Economic Control

It would appear then that the project of making dependencies capable of independence implies a revolution, if not in colonial policy yet in its practical application. It is a striking fact that, probably without exception, all the great revolutions in colonial policy have followed the same general plan. Under all forms of colonial rule there is a constant tendency towards the unification of economic and political control. 'Where the Ruler is at the same time Merchant, compulsion knows no bounds',[1] and revolutions in colonial policy have been

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 116.

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effected by separating economic and political control. In the first period of modern colonial history we find both the Dutch and British East India Companies seeking trade as merchants and then, by force of circumstances, acquiring political control and using this to make their economic control more effective. In Britain the corruption of home politics by the vast fortunes of the nabobs stimulated those whose political interests were thus endangered to deprive the East India Company of political control over India, and the financial difficulties of the Company gave an occasion to attempt this in the Regulating Act of 1784. This partial separation of political and economic control was formal rather than effective, and for a generation the Company remained almost as powerful in India as before, though exercising control through Parliament rather than of its own unquestionable motion. Then the Industrial Revolution changed the environment, and the company, when challenged by the cotton manufacturers of Manchester in the cause of free trade, had to surrender its monopoly. Political and economic control, however, were both transferred to Manchester, which for fifty years dictated colonial policy on the principle of economic freedom under the direct rule of law. The next transformation in colonial policy came through the accumulation of capital available for overseas investment and the needs of large-scale industry for raw materials which native enterprise could not furnish in sufficient quantities, if at all. Birmingham and the City favoured the active development of colonial resources by western enterprise under indirect rule through chartered companies. Later, when these proved unremunerative, Government was induced to take up 'the White Man's Burden'. About the same time colonial policy took a new turn with the rise of the Labour Party which, fearing the competition of cheap tropical labour, urged measures to promote the material welfare of native subjects, especially those engaged in western enterprise and industrial employment. At the same time also other powers challenged British supremacy in colonial affairs, and their demand for freer access to colonial resources gave birth to the doctrine of the dual mandate, according to which colonies are held in trust for world welfare and the welfare of the natives.

What, however, is most significant in these successive transformations of colonial policy, lies below the surface. For the undercurrent of western Christian tradition has flowed steadily below the surface throughout all the various phases of colonial relations. 'Where the ruler is at the same time merchant', there is no criterion of policy but

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000 profit. Under company rule, with economic and political control held firmly in the same hands we find in the direction of affairs, as was said of the Dutch East India Company, 'the pole-star profit, and the lode-stone, greed'. Parliamentary rule not only allows but necessitates the emergence of other considerations. It allows economic interest to dictate the course of policy, but it also allows newly emerging economic interests to challenge the established order, and in no case is there a clear ring for the contending rivals. Each party must appeal for support to the indifferent majority of normal men who 'would fain see the world go well, so it be not along of them'. Both sides must base their claims on an appeal to national interest and morality. When Manchester denounced the monopoly of the East India Company in the name of free trade and Liberal humanitarianism, the Company called in the aged and venerated Warren Hastings to expose the evils likely to attend the free admission of the private trader. Always since then, practical men with a material interest in colonial reform have had to enlist humanitarian support to win their cause, and their opponents have responded by a similar appeal to moral principles. Although both parties have urged moral considerations, the advocates of the established order have been able to cite facts and figures showing its material advantage, whereas reformers have had to base their arguments on the evidence of things as yet unseen. Faith has been justified by its fruits in material advantage, but after each victory the indifferent majority has lapsed into indifference, and economic factors have resumed their sway.

These conditions are not the peculiar character of British colonial policy, but obtain wherever a democratic legislature exercises supreme control over colonial affairs. When the Dutch East India Company went bankrupt the Home Government, as in Britain, assumed control. But it was the Crown and not the Parliament which took over the territories of the Company, and it administered them as a State enterprise, retaining complete and unquestionable political and economic control of their affairs. On this system the only criterion of policy was the tribute that Java yielded to the Treasury, and despite good intentions, economic development in the interest of profit followed the normal course of oppression and demoralization. When the Revolution of 1848 transferred political control over the States-General there was, as in Britain after 1784, no immediate change in colonial practice.[1] But parliamentary rule allowed the emergence of

[1] *Netherlands India*, pp. 159, 175, 227.

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a 'Colonial Opposition', and both parties appealed to moral principles. Steam transport worked in favour of the Liberals and their crowning victory in 1870 synchronized with the opening of the Suez Canal. The sequel justified Liberal claims as to the effect of the new policy on economic progress and Conservative apprehensions as to its effect on native welfare. Economic development in the interest of profit again followed the normal course, leading to 'diminishing welfare' in Java and 'moral collapse' on the plantations of Sumatra. Meanwhile Conservatives were attracting humanitarian support by their doctrine of moral responsibility for colonial welfare and, when the Chambers of Commerce protested in 1900 that, under Liberal rule, the Javan had less to spend on clothes, Conservatives found material support for their appeal to the indifferent majority, powerful in numbers and therefore powerful in a democracy, which inclines in favour of any good cause that does not touch its pocket. Colonial policy turned in an 'ethical' direction.

Similarly, in France, industrialists and agriculturists have appealed to the generous traditions of French culture in support of their conflicting interests in colonial problems, and the close balance of agricultural and industrial interests in France goes far to explain the vacillations of French colonial policy. But the most conspicuous illustration of the connection between economic and political control comes from the United States. Americans had practically no economic interest in the Philippines before taking them over from Spain, and there was a strong prejudice against imperialist adventures. From the earliest days of American rule, its policy was directed toward enabling the Filipinos to manage their own affairs more efficiently and with greater regard for economic progress than under Spanish rule. But American capital and trade found profit in the Philippines, and a current of opinion adverse to Filipino independence grew stronger, submerging the general distrust of imperialism, though, as in France, it remained suspect to agriculturists. Dairy farmers and sugar producers and refiners feared the competition of cheap Filipino products, and organized Labour demanded the restriction of Filipino immigration. For some years there were vain attempts to keep out Filipino goods by differential duties, and Filipino labour by new immigration laws. In 1929, however, it became clear that these attempts were bound to fail so long as the Philippines were legally American territory, and the groups whose interests were affected organized humanitarian sentiment so efficiently that in 1934 the Tyddings-McDuffie Act was

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000 passed to arrange for Filipino independence within ten years from 1936.[1]

Everywhere, then, experience shows that economic interests seek political control over tropical dependencies with a view to strengthening their economic control, and that this combination of economic and political control is fatal to native welfare. Political control has been surrendered only at the challenge of newly emerging economic interests and, under democratic forms of government, this raises the question of colonial relations to a moral plane. Rival interests bid for the support of the indifferent majority, and must appeal to faith in moral values transcending the economic sphere of human life. These considerations suggest that the key to success in colonial administration lies in the separation of economic and political control which parliamentary institutions facilitate, and they go far to explain why Governments on a broad democratic basis have managed colonial relations most successfully. They tend to the general conclusion that only democratic powers should be entrusted with dependencies.

But the same considerations lead still further to a conclusion of immediate importance. Parliamentary institutions favour good colonial administration because they allow the emergence of new interests, and compel the public discussion of colonial issues in terms of right and wrong. In the past colonial policy has come into the foreground only with the emergence of some new claimants to a share in the profits of colonial rule, and only at such times has the moral aspect of colonial rule attracted widespread interest and been vehemently debated. But, in the ordinary course of democratic evolution, Parliament comes to represent a people with a single solid interest in the management of colonial affairs, so that economic and political control are once again concentrated in the same hands, and Parliament can no longer function effectively to keep economic interests within due bounds. Notwithstanding the vast extent of the British Empire and the tremendous responsibilities of Parliament 'in the period between 1934 and 1939 the House of Commons debated colonial affairs on (only) nine occasions, of which four were devoted to Palestine'.[2] Burma may attract the attention of Parliament once in ten years, or not so often. It is true that, under the stress of war, as during the war of 1914, there has been a revival of interest in colonial affairs; as the

[1] Porter, C., *Pacific Affairs*, Sept. 1943, p. 270; Pelzer, K. J., *Economic Survey of the Pacific Area* (1941), p. 41.

[2] King-Hall, S., *Britain's Third Chance* (1943), p. 142; *Colonial Review*, 1944, p. 198; *Hansard*, 12 Dec. 1944, p. 1086; *Netherlands India*, p. 229.

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Colonial Secretary remarked, with no cynical intention, Colonial Governors 'are only too anxious...to "cash in" on the present good will'. It is significant that among all parties there is general agreement on the main lines of colonial policy. Not infrequently, one may notice suggestions that colonial affairs, like foreign affairs, should be outside party strife as matters of common national concern. All parties look forward to the attainment of colonial autonomy on the basis of responsible government; all regard the multiplication of welfare services as the key to responsible government; and all assume that the provision of capital is a condition of tropical welfare. Yet the provision of capital favours economic progress rather than welfare; the multiplication of welfare services hinders the growth of responsible government, and the insistence on welfare as a condition of responsible government implies the indefinite postponement of autonomy. Parliament represents a solid national interest in the management of colonial affairs and, by ceasing to be an impartial tribunal in which rival claimants to the profits of colonial rule can refer their case to an indifferent majority, it can no longer discharge the function of dissociating economic and political control. Only before some supernational tribunal can the moral aspects of colonial rule be sifted, and only by constructing international machinery to supervise colonial relations can we fortify ourselves against temptation to maintain practical control over dependent peoples even when announcing that the goal of policy is to set them free.

3. International Collaboration

It would appear then that the logic of history requires some form of international supervision over colonial relations. Under native rule, custom preserved social order in the tropics, but insecurely and at the cost of progress. Clerical rule allowed a higher standard of welfare, but finally collapsed because it identified welfare with the Church and failed to provide adequately for economic progress. Under Company rule the subordination of political control to economic interest confined both progress and welfare within narrow limits. The transfer of political control to parliamentary government encouraged a more rapid exploitation of the material resources of the tropics and also the exploitation, the *mise en valeur*, of their human resources so far as economic development required; but the enhancement of native welfare was still conditioned by economic factors, and these set limits

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to economic progress. Ultimately, under parliamentary control, the whole people of the colonial power comes to occupy a position similar to that of the shareholders in a chartered company, and this sets up a new and more formidable barrier to progress and welfare in the tropics. Just as formerly the personal interest of the shareholders in chartered companies came into conflict with national welfare, so now does the national interest of colonial powers come into conflict with world welfare. Precedent and analogy suggest that the barrier will eventually be broken down, if not by peaceful means then by revolution or war. But barriers of interest do not collapse merely by the operation of logic. Some new contending interest must be brought up to force a breach. In the United States the dairy farmers in their own interest led the assault. In Britain all the ranks of economic life, the cotton trade, shipping, heavy industry, finance, labour and the professional classes have been called up successively to man the citadel of private interest; and no one remains to lead the forces of humanitarianism. That is even truer of the Netherlands. The chartered companies of the late nineteenth century surrendered control over their possessions, because they were no longer profitable and yielded no dividends to the shareholders. It might seem that colonial powers would similarly relinquish their hold voluntarily on unprofitable dependencies. But national interests cannot be audited by methods of accountancy, and colonial powers are naturally reluctant to hazard the profit and prestige that accrue from colonial possessions, and even if these are a doubtful asset to the nation as a whole, they may still be profitable to particular interests, which will vehemently oppose any relaxation of control. Yet the defects of existing colonial relations in respect of progress, prosperity and peace, increasingly compel attention.

That national interest may hinder the material progress of dependencies was recognized at the first great international conference on colonial affairs held at Berlin in 1884–5, when the powers laid down the principle that colonial rule must be justified by economic development. This decision was one factor stimulating the Dutch to extend effective administration to the Outer Provinces of Netherlands India, then still neglected. At the same time, from about 1870 and especially after 1900, capitalist activities showed a rapidly increasing disregard of political boundaries; private individuals invested more freely in foreign enterprises, local enterprises reached out to even wider regions, and large enterprises linked up with one another in world-wide trusts and combines. One instance was the expansion of British

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tea-planting from Assam to Sumatra. Dutch prospectors in the nineties obtained British capital in London for exploiting the oilfields of Netherlands India. In the new century a rate war between British and Dutch oil interests led to an agreement delimiting their spheres. These are merely illustrations of a general trend. A more ambitious project took shape during the inter-war period in the Stevenson Rubber Restriction scheme. But these developments were economic rather than political, extranational rather than international. Though capitalists may know most about the dependencies of their own country, capital knows no country and follows the line of least resistance; trade follows the flag, but only so far as the national flag offers greater security or other advantages. Capital and commerce are impatient of political authority. The depression of the thirties changed the situation. Extranational control gave place to international control, and the production of numerous tropical products, such as tin, tea and rubber, was brought under control through the national Governments concerned. International collaboration was found necessary for the security of profits.

Western labour naturally responded to extranational capitalist activities by seeking to protect its interests against the competition of cheap tropical labour. The consolidation of the labour front, however, was more difficult than the consolidation of capitalist interests and necessitated action through the state, international collaboration, political and not merely economic. This first became effective with the foundation of the International Labour Office in 1919. It soon appeared that the regulation of tropical labour was in the interest of large-scale European enterprise as against non-European capitalist interests, and western capital joined hands with labour to secure international co-operation in support of welfare. Epidemics among men, crops and cattle have no more respect than capital for national flags and boundaries, and the regulation of such matters was also recognized as needing international co-operation. Thus the decade following the creation of the International Labour Office saw a very active multiplication of international agreements in the name of welfare and the cause of progress. But in this matter also the depression of the thirties marked a new stage. For the international combinations to regulate production and marketing were so successful from the standpoint of producers that they aroused protests from capital interests representing the standpoint of consumers. The American motor business, for example, could not disregard attempts

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000 to maintain rubber prices at an artificially high rate. This introduced a new element in international collaboration: the adoption of devices to represent large consumers on the international committees established to regulate production. Thus practical men of affairs were increasingly insistent on international collaboration not only for safeguarding profits, but also for promoting welfare as a concomitant and condition of progress; and tropical conditions in respect of employment, and the regulation of epidemics and other matters came to be recognized as of importance to the West.

This new development reacted on colonial administration in a way that is often overlooked. World welfare requires higher standards of hygiene and public instruction in the tropics than tropical peoples themselves regard as necessary. Hence one of the leading notes of modern colonial policy is a growing tenderness towards compulsion, ostensibly in the interest of native welfare: compulsion to improve native agriculture, to grow export or subsistence crops as the economic conjuncture may require, to eat such food as current expert opinion deems nutritious, to build and use latrines, to take such precautions against disease as are fashionable in the West, to send their children to the elementary school, and so on. Most of these things were originally humanitarian visions; most of them are desirable and are still supported by humanitarian sentiment; but the driving force is western interest. For these and many other things that western opinion thinks beneficial, colonial powers are increasingly held responsible. So far as the measures are effective the benefit accrues to the outside world in general; but the odium of enforcing welfare legislation and of raising taxes to provide the necessary funds, falls on the colonial power immediately responsible. Except so far as mitigated by corruption, welfare regulations foster disaffection and unrest, which on occasion has had to be repressed by force of arms. Prudence requires that the colonial power responsible for enforcing welfare measures shall be able to appeal for international support, and the common interest of the western world requires that the necessary support, moral and if necessary material, shall be accorded. Welfare, no less than progress, or rather, because it is a condition of progress, requires international collaboration in colonial affairs.

The dominant consideration however in arousing international concern for colonial affairs has been security. So long as colonial powers gain, or are believed to gain, peculiar advantages from their dependencies, other powers will envy these advantages, and the

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colonial powers must hold what they have in the manner of the strong man armed. Colonial rule endangers peace. It was the danger to peace that brought about the Berlin Conference in 1884. The development of industry in Europe during the nineteenth century caused a demand for larger supplies of tropical produce, and for tropical markets as a vent for home manufactures. Hence arose from 1870 onwards the 'scramble for Africa', and the Berlin Conference sought to prevent war over colonial issues by confining international rivalry in Africa to 'the peaceful competition of trade and industry'. But competition in trade and industry does not make for mutual good will between the competitors. Colonial rivalry grew keener with the anticipated 'break-up of China'. One source of contention was the reaction against free trade. Britain, secure in its industrial equipment and world-wide mercantile marine, and Holland, with its command over important tropical products, could for some time afford to keep an open door and admit free access to their dependencies, but other powers, less fortunately situated, wanted colonies as close markets for their protected industries. This international rivalry for the possession of dependencies was in part responsible for the outbreak of war in 1914. Among the numerous reactions of the 'war to end war' was a new stimulus to the idea of international trusteeship in respect of 'backward peoples, not yet able to stand by themselves in the conditions of the modern world'. This found expression in the Mandates System, by which the colonies of the defeated powers were distributed among the victors to be administered in accordance with mandates from the League of Nations. The arrangements then sanctioned aggravated instead of allaying colonial rivalry. Germany wanted to regain its colonies; Italy was ambitious to extend its empire; Japan aspired to political and economic control over the Far East. Here again the depression of the thirties marks a turning-point. Colonial powers and their dependencies alike lost their accustomed markets, and tried to restore prosperity by quotas and other devices. This concentrated attention on the advantages of colonial rule, and exacerbated colonial rivalry, and, as the conflict of interest between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' grew more acute, the powers lined up into the groups which made war possible in 1939. Then the collapse of western rule in the Tropical Far East in 1942 emphasized another danger to security, the resentment of colonial relations among the inhabitants of tropical dependencies. Inevitably a colonial power is linked up with one section in the plural society of the tropics; it has especially close associations with the

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000 European capitalist section, and naturally incurs the suspicion of governing the country in the interest of that section. Political and economic control rest in the same hands. Only by dissociating itself so far as possible from direct political control can the colonial power justify itself to non-European elements in a dependency as representing the general interest. By recognizing some form of international supervision over colonial relations, colonial powers can both mitigate the rivalry of other powers and allay the suspicions of their subjects, and by the same means they strengthen themselves to resist any challenge to their rule. International supervision reinforces their moral and material strength.

Thus the logic of economic circumstance confirms the logic of history. The old East India Companies served a useful purpose in their time, but times changed and they outlived their usefulness. From the wider standpoint of the nation they became an intolerable nuisance by engendering corruption in home politics; they furnished a justification for reform by going bankrupt; and they stimulated a moral impulse to reform by their oppression of their subjects. Similarly at the present time, the relations between colonial powers and their dependencies have created an intolerable nuisance from the wider standpoint of world welfare; they no longer provide adequately for economic progress, and they have failed to secure the standard of welfare among dependent peoples that the modern world requires. Many recent pronouncements show that we have once again reached a stage where idealism is justified by common sense, and visions of harmonious international co-operation in colonial affairs have come within the field of practical politics.

The public acceptance of the new policy may perhaps be dated from the Atlantic Charter of 1941, which affirmed the principle of international responsibility for the welfare of all nations, notably in points 5 and 6, laying down that the signatory powers

> 'desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security.
>
> 'After the final destruction of Nazi tyranny they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford the assurance that all men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from war and want.'

'Backward areas', the Charter implies, 'are intolerable, and prejudice the good relations between nations. Not only do the demands

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of security compel us to assume responsibility for the less fortunate colonial territories, but for economic reasons as well they must be integrated as healthy partners into a world economic system.'[1] This view has met with at least partial acceptance by the British Government. In March 1943 the Colonial Secretary, while emphasizing his belief that the administration of the British colonies must continue to be the sole responsibility of Britain, regarded close international co-operation as essential. A few days later this interpretation was reaffirmed by the Prime Minister. The principle of international responsibility obtained further recognition at the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture held at Hot Springs in May–June 1943. This was recommended in Resolution XXIV:

1. That the governments and authorities here represented, by virtue of their determination to achieve freedom from want for all peoples in all lands, affirm the principle of mutual responsibility and coordinated action:

(*a*) To promote the full and most advantageous employment of their own and all other people, and a general advance in the standards of living, thereby providing for an increase in both production and purchasing power;

(*b*) To promote the uninterrupted development and most advantageous use of agricultural and other material resources for the establishment of an equitable balance between agriculture and industry in the interest of all;

(*c*) To secure for agriculture the stimulus of additional purchasing power through the sound development of industry;

(*d*) To assist in the achievement of these ends by all appropriate means, including the supply of capital, equipment and technical skill;

(*e*) To maintain an equilibrium in balances of payments, and to achieve the orderly management of currencies and exchange;

(*f*) To improve the methods and reduce the cost of distribution in international trade;

(*g*) As an integral part of this programme, to reduce barriers of every kind to international trade, and to eliminate all forms of discriminatory restrictions thereon, including inequitable policies in international transportation, as effectively and rapidly as possible.

2. That these governments and authorities take, individually and in concert, whether by conference or otherwise, all necessary measures, both domestic and international, to secure the application of this principle and the attainment of these objectives.

[1] *International Action and the Colonies* (1943), p. 17.

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000 Official approval of the policy of common action was carried a stage further by Britain in a pronouncement of the Colonial Secretary in July 1943.

'Developments of modern transport and modern communications have brought together vast areas which before were widely separated. Many of their problems today are common problems and can only be solved in co-operation, for problems of security, of transport, of health, etc. transcend the boundaries of political units. H.M.G. would therefore welcome the establishment of machinery which would enable such problems to be discussed and to be solved by common efforts. What they have in mind is the possibility of establishing Commissions for certain regions. These Commissions would comprise not only the States with Colonial Territories in the region, but also other States which have in the region a major strategic or economic interest. While each State would remain responsible for the administration of its own territory, such a Commission would provide effective and permanent machinery for consultation and collaboration so that the States concerned might work together to promote the well being of the Colonial territories. An important consideration in designing the machinery of each Commission will be to give the people of the Colonial territories an opportunity to be associated with its work.'

Thus the principle of international collaboration has been accepted.

4. International Supervision and Autonomy

In the near future, then, we are likely to see experiments in international supervision over colonial relations. On certain matters there seems to be general agreement. It is commonly accepted that international collaboration must be organized regionally; that, for example, there should be a Regional Council for the Tropical Far East, comprising the lands from Formosa down to Netherlands India and from Burma to the Philippines. There seems also to be general agreement that any such Regional Council would, at least in the first instance, be merely a local agent charged with exercising on behalf of a World Council or other global organization some measure of supervision over the political Governments within that region, and with offering advice and assistance to those Governments if they should consult it.

At a first glance there would seem ground to welcome such an organization as tending to separate political from economic control. But there is reason to apprehend that it might enable economic forces to act more freely by liberating them from such restraint as

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still exists. The British tradition of respect for law, the Dutch tradition of care for native custom, are peculiarly national traditions; in all such matters an international organ would represent merely the highest common factor among the constituent members and fail to reach so high a standard as any single colonial power. A society of nations tends to resemble a plural society with only economic interests in common, and this tendency gains strength in proportion to its comprehensiveness. Although British, Dutch, French and Americans all have their own peculiar ethics, they also have in common those principles of Christianity from which the West has learned its way of life. But what have they in common with Moslems, Hindus and Buddhists, with Turks and Indians, Burmese, Chinese, Japanese? In the development of the tropics by western enterprise, casual labour suffers most because no single employer is responsible for protecting it (even in his own interest) from economic forces. Similarly, under an international body, colonial peoples may well be more exposed to economic forces than under the protection of a single power; at the same time they will be less able to offer resistance to the combined forces of the modern world than to a single Government, and will have no court of appeal in world opinion such as denounced the rule of Leopold in the Congo. It is the interest of colonial powers rather than of dependencies that has brought international collaboration within the range of practical politics; these powers will carry most weight in the deliberations of any international council, and it may well prove that with the growth of international collaboration, colonial policy will be dominated even more than in the past by purely economic material considerations. 'The main objective of Regional Councils', it has been said, 'should be to speed up material development.'[1] Dutch Liberals during the mid-nineteenth century drew glowing pictures of the future of Java when State enterprise should be replaced by private enterprise, but the result was merely to increase the number of shareholders in the exploitation of the colonial estate. Similarly a regional council may do no more than increase the number of shareholders in the vast enterprise of developing the tropics as a business concern.

International supervision will not in itself affect the working of economic laws. The economic process of the survival of the cheapest will still operate, perhaps even more effectively. Merchants dealing in native produce want to obtain it as cheaply as possible. Employers

[1] Lord Listowel, quoted *Colonial Review*, June, 1944, p 166

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want cheap labour. Western shareholders want dividends. If economic development arouses native disaffection, western interests lie in keeping the people weak by depriving them of arms and by fostering divisions in a plural society, in security rather than in peace. In the name of welfare employers approve reforms that will produce healthier, more intelligent, more efficient and more docile employees; such reforms appeal also to western labour as likely to diminish the threat of cheap oriental competition. Importers will support plans to increase the buying power of natives. All these factors will operate in the future as in the past, and will tend in some measure and among some classes to raise the standard of living, so far as economic efficiency requires. There may be some appearance or illusion of enhancement of individual material welfare, but this will remain an illusion unless there is an enhancement of social welfare, and, if international supervision is to promote social welfare, it must aim first at promoting colonial autonomy.

It is not improbable that in such a regional council there would be some opposition to measures purporting to endow dependencies with political autonomy. In the past such measures have often, if not usually, been resisted by the European section of the plural society, even although the political reforms have in fact strengthened its control over economic activities. This section would exercise great influence over the deliberations of the council, and would probably still oppose political reforms, until convinced that they were propitious, or at least innocuous, to its interests. But it is not sufficient that international supervision should be directed towards effecting reforms in political machinery, because this, whatever its design, works only in accordance with the will directing it, and, in the absence of a common social will, the machinery would still be directed by economic forces in the interest of economic progress. In order to bring these forces under control, international supervision must be directed towards making dependencies capable of autonomy, and this will necessitate restrictions on capitalist activities that will certainly encounter resistance. There is then a very real danger that the regional council may develop into an unholy alliance, enforcing more rigorously than at present the economic and political control of the West over the tropics.

In numerous suggestions for international collaboration in colonial affairs, this gloomy prospect is foreshadowed. They dwell on the value of such collaboration in promoting security, economic progress

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and welfare, the kind of welfare that is needed for economic efficiency. At the Colonial Conference in Canada, Lord Hailey, in advocating the constitution of a Pacific Council, touched on these points and further emphasized the need for charging it with 'the periodic review of the progress made in the promotion of self-governing institutions in the dependencies and in the improvement in their standard of living'. But all the evidence that we have studied goes to show that in the plural society of tropical dependencies, western self-governing institutions foster division and unrest, and hinder the attainment of self-government; and, further, that an improvement in the general standard of living can be attained only through self-government. That the regional council should be charged with the periodic review of the progress made towards self-government would certainly be useful, but it may well be doubted whether a council, representing in the main colonial powers, would seriously attempt to endow dependencies with the reality of independence, or to promote social welfare. If, as is only too possible, the regional council aims merely at constructing the machinery of western self-governing institutions in tropical society, instead of attempting to reintegrate and consolidate society so that it shall be capable of independence, and is content to mitigate the ill-effects of economic development on individuals instead of trying to promote general welfare by social education, it will do more harm than good.

Yet history allows of hope. We have seen that parliamentary institutions have favoured colonial welfare because they compel rival economic interests to appeal to national and moral considerations in order to attract support. The maxim of divide and rule works both ways. If it is easier to keep people in subjection by dividing them, it should be easier for subject peoples to gain their independence when there is division among their rulers. In a regional council there would be a wide diversity of interest. Some members might wish to remove all barriers to trade; others would object to flooding tropical markets with cheap imports to the prejudice of western manufactures. Some members would advocate welfare measures enabling western enterprise to pay low wages; others, more sensitive to competition from cheap labour, would favour high wages. There would be contrary views as to the importance of protecting tropical industries. Some members would wish to promote welfare by compulsion, but the colonial power immediately responsible for enforcing welfare measures, but responsible also for maintaining peace and quiet, would be more

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000 alive to the need for fostering social demand as a sounder, if a slower, way to welfare. In these and other such differences of opinion both parties would look for support to members with little economic interest in the point at issue, and the principle of national autonomy would emerge as a criterion transcending economic values that all would recognize as valid. There are then grounds for hoping that international supervision would promote colonial autonomy, and a council which adopted this as its basic principle and main objective could do more than any single colonial power towards this end.

5. Regional Councils

Functions. The mere institution of such a council would indeed go far towards removing one of the main obstacles to colonial autonomy. In the plural society of tropical dependencies the Government is to some extent, and looks even more largely, identified with the European section of the community. This naturally breeds suspicion among the native community, and hampers the Government even when aiming to promote native interests. The acceptance of international supervision would tend to separate economic and political control, and would be a gesture of goodwill. The European community might object to any effective international supervision as prejudicial to their economic interests but, if the goal of policy be the creation of a common social will, it is necessary to impose due limitations on economic activities and especially on those of foreign capital. Another objection sometimes put forward is that the acceptance of international supervision would be derogatory to national prestige. But colonial powers have always claimed to intend the welfare of their dependencies, and their critics have usually been sceptical about these claims. A system of international supervision would enable colonial powers to justify their claims by bringing their achievements to the notice of a public body, and this would enhance and not diminish their prestige.

It is probably by enabling colonial powers to demonstrate their achievements that a regional council could do most to promote the welfare of dependencies. Many or most colonial problems are common to colonial relations in general, and they have most in common within definite geographical areas such as the Tropical Far East, which are marked out by nature as appropriate units for a regional council. At present each colonial power tries to solve its problem separately for

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each dependency. Little or nothing is known of what is being attempted elsewhere for the promotion of literacy, the improvement of rural hygiene, the prevention of agricultural indebtedness, or any of the many other difficult problems arising out of the impact of the modern West on tropical society. Every Government could learn much from the achievements of the others, and no less perhaps from their mistakes. A regional council would gradually accumulate a fund of knowledge and experience from which all the countries of the region, whether colonial or semi-colonial, could benefit.

If the council were required as its primary objective to aim at making the dependencies capable of independence, it would review and report on the progress in respect of social, economic and political reintegration. It would examine the precautions against social disintegration, the methods of social education adopted to remedy the evils consequent on atomization, and the steps taken to bring under the control of social will the economic forces acting on tropical society from within. It would study also the progress towards economic reintegration. It would examine too the reports from western enterprises showing what they had done to substitute local for imported labour and to train natives of the country for technical posts and for the management and direction of their business; and reports from the Governments concerned, explaining what assistance they had rendered in this matter and what supervision they had exercised over the economic forces impinging on the country from outside through the activities of western enterprise. Again in respect of political reintegration it would examine what was being done to foster a common social will among all sections of the community and, on the programme suggested in the last chapter, the progress accomplished through dual government, semi-colonial government, and conditional independence to complete autonomy. Also it would examine the position with reference to representation of the various communities, and to the expression of the common social will in a 'responsible' legislature.

So long as any form of dual government might be needed the council could be especially helpful in resolving differences between the representative of the colonial power and the representative of the people. Such differences would inevitably be not infrequent in the future as they have been between governors and legislatures in the past. In the past such differences have, if necessary, been decided by the colonial power, but a regional council should be able to intervene with greater impartiality and with a more intimate and wider

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knowledge of the circumstances. Moreover, in the past, such differences have usually been evaded by abstaining from necessary but difficult and contentious legislation. With a regional council to enquire why necessary measures were neglected, it would be more difficult to adopt the easy course of leaving economic forces in control by doing nothing.

The most prolific source of difficulties in the administration of tropical dependencies is inherent in their character as plural societies. So long as minor communities exist which do not accept the common tie of nationality or are not regarded as full citizens, special arrangements are necessary to protect their interests without encouraging particularism. It is with reference to such questions that differences between the members of the dual Government are likely to be most frequent and acute. But it is also in such matters that a regional council, dealing with similar problems in a number of cognate plural societies, could give the greatest help. In general it may be claimed that the constitution of a regional council would provoke emulation for the enhancement of welfare throughout the region, and at the same time facilitate the imposition of sanctions on governments and peoples which failed to keep step with the general advance towards full membership in modern world society.

Constitution. In projects of a new world order one often finds elaborate provision for constitutional forms, with little reference to the functions that the machinery will discharge. But, as we have already insisted, the sound principle of social engineering is first to consider the functions and then to devise the simplest machinery that will perform them adequately. We have assumed that, in the first instance, a regional council will act as the agent of a world society to receive reports from the Governments within its region and to offer them assistance and advice. It would appear sufficient therefore to appoint a permanent representative of the world society as president and chief executive of the regional council and to hold annual or other periodical meetings of representatives of the governments concerned. Probably various private bodies would soon press for occasional or permanent representation, and the organization would grow more elaborate. Almost certainly the regional council would soon go further than the passive acceptance and consideration of reports, and would develop an inspecting staff. The various Governments also, as they came to value the advice and assistance of the council, would desire fuller and more permanent representation. But

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it is much easier to devise machinery than to make it work satisfactorily, and the less elaborate the constitution of the council is to start with, the more likely it is to develop on sound lines.

6. Burma, Netherlands India and Tropical Economy

Our attempt to see the problems of Burma in due perspective against a wider background has led us through a far-ranging enquiry into various aspects of colonial administration. This voyage of exploration through tropical jungles may well seem unduly venturesome. Pronouncements on colonial policy may be digested in the study, 'but policy is a matter not only of purpose but of performance, and it must be judged by its operation in practice'.[1] One fact impressed on us, however, by our experience is that the material for framing a judgment on colonial practice is both insufficient and inaccurate. The statistical material which a detached observer requires for an objective judgment is defective, and too often misleading. Even in official circles, owing to the general lack of continuity in tropical administration, few can know what is happening within their charges until some incident provokes an enquiry, which not infrequently is mainly concerned to gloze the facts. Moreover in British (though not in Dutch) colonial administration, the tradition of official reticence, valuable in Europe but disastrous in the tropics, seals the lips of those best acquainted with affairs, and precludes informed and constructive discussion while leaving the administration a target for ignorant and malicious criticism.

Nevertheless our enquiry does point to certain general conclusions of considerable interest and importance. For various reasons conditions in Burma and Netherlands India are especially instructive. Social studies differ from those of natural science by the greater difficulty of isolating significant factors; it is impossible to control experiments under the conditions of the laboratory. But here we have experimental conditions to our hand. Burma is an extreme example of development by native enterprise under direct rule, and Netherlands India of development by western enterprise under indirect rule. In other respects they are typical of the tropics in general. Both have come suddenly into contact with the modern world. When Europeans first arrived in British India, they had little superiority in their command over material resources, and in some respects India

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 5.

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was in advance of Europe. Modern India grew up with modern Europe. But Burma and, in effect, Netherlands India came into contact with the West only after the Industrial Revolution had transformed the relations between East and West; and it was not until after the opening of the Suez Canal that their contact with the West became so intimate as to affect the general masses of the people in their daily life. Again, British India has been protected against the solvent influence of economic forces by the shield of caste; Burma and Netherlands India have lacked this safeguard against social disintegration. Similarly the peoples of Africa and of the tropics generally have been brought suddenly and recently into contact with the modern world, and their social order, lacking the cement of caste, is readily liable to erosion.

In Burma the native Government refused to enter the modern world. This was a defiance of world society which carried its own penalty, and British intervention may fairly be claimed as an act of social justice. In the event British rule has destroyed the Burmese social order; in opening up Burma to the world it has purged the abuses of Burmese rule, but has swept away good and bad together. Possibly nothing less catastrophic would have cleared the way for reconstruction. But the destruction of an ancient civilization, slowly built up through long ages by the good will of successive generations, is an offence against humanity. Needs be that offences come, but those who, even as the instrument of social justice, destroy a civilization, thereby assume responsibilities which they can discharge only by building a new and more highly organized civilization in its place and, if they fail in this, must pay their reckoning with Nemesis. Doubtless in Africa western rule brings greater benefits and does less harm, because native civilization was on a lower plane than in eastern lands. It has frequently been claimed that British colonial administration shows to best advantage in dealing with primitive and backward peoples, and that Englishmen have been uniquely successful in dealing with 'the unspoilt native'.[1] But it is in the later stages that colonial rule is tested; the tree is known by its fruit. The same factors are operative in Africa as in Asia. African dependencies are now in much the same stage as Burma when, superficially, all seemed to be going well—up to about 1880 in Lower Burma and 1910 in Upper Burma. Of the dependencies colonized by western capital during the nineteenth century, Burma and Netherlands India are among the

[1] *Colonial Review*, Dec. 1943, p. 103; 1946, Cmd. Col. 198, p. 26.

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oldest, and would seem accordingly to point a line to future developments in African dependencies which are a generation, or even two generations, younger.

In framing a balance sheet of tropical administration we must certainly place economic development to the credit side of the account. It is well that tropical lands and peoples should furnish their full contribution to the welfare of the world. With good reason we believe in the economic development of dependencies. We believe in it not merely because we find it profitable, yet the fact that we profit by it calls for a careful scrutiny of the results, lest the dazzle of gold should blind our eyes. That the development of tropical dependencies is profitable to colonial powers is no ground for condemning it. One may claim rather that it is sound as an economic proposition just because it is right in principle. 'Philanthropy and 5 %' is no mere catchword, for philanthropy which does not pay at least 5 % (though not necessarily to the philanthropist) is probably muddle-headed sentiment. In any case western men of business will not be restrained from developing the resources of the tropics wherever the material reward seems likely to repay their labour. Not infrequently, though perhaps less frequently than a generation back, administrators, civil servants, assume credit for the benefits of western rule in the tropics while holding business men responsible for its evil consequences. But business men come to the tropics on business. It is their function to develop the material resources of the tropics, and they must needs do it on business lines or they will be put out of business. It is as idle to blame the man of business, western or oriental, for conducting his business in the manner which the environment demands, as it is to blame the moneylender for entangling cultivators in debt, or the Javanese for breeding too freely and for economic apathy, or the Burman for the growth of crime, corruption and clerical unrest. These things are naturally engendered by the environment.

In western homogeneous societies the business man accepts the social obligations of his environment; and social will, enforced and reinforced by law, compels any who would disregard them to restrict their activities within the limits of social welfare. In the plural society of the tropics, the business man must still keep on the safe side of the law, but the law has no sanction in a common social will and in great measure reflects and subserves business interests. If the activities of the business man result in the depopulation of wide areas, the

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000 deterioration of subsistence conditions owing to the migration of labour, the social evils due to the removal from their families of large numbers of adult males and the difficult situations created by the aggregation of industrial populations divorced from the traditional controls of social life; if they lead to debt, agrarian distress and crime, or to over-population and economic apathy; if they entail the narrowing of native life, the restriction of native economic activities, the decay of native religions and cultural values and the degeneration and disappearance of the arts and crafts in which these values found expression—these things are not his business. His duty, not only to his shareholders but to society, is to run his business on the most efficient and most profitable lines that the environment allows. This, however anti-social its effect in a tropical environment, is his social function. He is merely performing his functions in an environment which favours instead of restraining acquisition, exploitation and other anti-social effects of economic forces. These evils are inherent in a distinctive tropical economy where, in a plural society, the social order is transformed into 'a capitalist structure with the business concern as subject, far more typical of capitalism than one can imagine in the so-called capitalist countries which have grown slowly out of the past and are still bound to it by a hundred roots'.

In politics as in law, men must be held to intend the natural consequences of their actions. The early Liberals could not easily foresee the further consequences of their doctrine. Adam Smith taught the world that economic freedom was the key alike to progress and welfare. In the world of Adam Smith that was very largely true, since he could take for granted the stable foundations of society. But in the tropics the Liberals built their house on sand. It had no foundations and had to be buttressed from outside by the command and, if necessary, the exercise of military force, force so commanding that there was rarely need to exercise it. Experience has made us wiser than our fathers. We have learned that it is necessary, in our own interest, to impose restrictions on economic freedom. We claim also to be better than our fathers, with higher ideals in tropical administration; and we impose restrictions in the name of a moral obligation to promote native welfare. Yet we very readily come 'down from the region of moral obligation to the more familiar ground in which the issues that are debated, the standards that are applied, are those of our own domestic political life'.[1] Whereas formerly in the nineteenth

[1] Lord Hailey, quoted *Colonial Review*, March, 1942, p. 155.

century economic freedom was congenial to British interests, now what may be termed Fabianism is congenial to the interests of colonial powers in general. We are content to preach material comfort, where the Liberals promised freedom and Spain salvation.

Modern colonial policy promulgates welfare measures to counteract the ill-effects of economic development, but looks to pay for these measures by injecting capital to expedite development. Such measures can be justified to common sense on the ground that they are profitable and to the humanitarian conscience as instruments of welfare. Common sense and common humanity require that tropical regions should be efficiently developed by mitigating the natural evil consequences of development. But experience has demonstrated that economic and social services, otherwise than in response to a native demand for welfare, function chiefly if not solely to make enterprise more efficient, and also more profitable, by relieving it of charges that, in default of subventions, it would have to bear in its own interest; and the efficiency of enterprise is questionable where it must be subsidized from the public treasury or from private charity instead of bearing its own charges. One repeatedly finds measures described as generous when they compel natives of the tropics to pay for education, or sanitation, or agricultural or veterinary precautions which, however desirable in the interest of commerce or of the colonial power or of world welfare, the people themselves do not appreciate, and which serve in fact merely or mainly to enhance the efficiency and profits of western enterprise. Colonial powers feel even more virtuous when they contribute to the cost of colonial development and welfare, incidentally subsidizing home capital and labour. In the name of welfare, for example, we vote subsidies to aviation that will expedite the process of colonial development. Socialists would go so far as to equip dependencies 'altruistically' at British expense with a complete outfit of railways, irrigation works, schools, hospitals and so on. A bridge over the Zambesi, comments Lord Wedgwood, means to them work for the unemployed on Tees side.[1] These things may be good business for the British taxpayer (so far as the money is not wasted), for we all have a finger in the colonial pie. But they are not altruistic. They serve merely to speed up the development of the colonial estate and enhance its value as a business concern to the colonial power. Once again, as so often in past colonial history, we seem to hear little Jack

[1] Lord Wedgwood, *Testament to Democracy* (n.d. 1942), p. 148.

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000 Horner exclaiming, 'What a good boy am I!' as he pulls out a few more plums.

It is inevitable and desirable that backward regions shall be developed. Welfare measures are needed to oil the wheels of economic progress and to mitigate the consequences. Yet welfare measures which lubricate the machinery of production but have no root among the people multiply the complexity of social life, adding more stories to the alien superstructure, and there is a danger that the lubricant may turn out to be nitro-glycerine. If, then, statesmen responsible for colonial affairs sincerely treat the welfare of subject peoples as of paramount importance, they will make it an object of colonial policy to moderate the pace of progress, so far as circumstances permit.

Formerly the rate of progress was retarded by the difficulty of getting anything done, and it has been claimed, not unjustly, that the most important function of officials in the tropics is to put a brake on progress. This view was tenable in the nineteenth century and the days of *laissez-faire*, when progress consisted in removing obstructions that official inertia helped to conserve. But the modern solidarity of interest in colonial development among all classes in a democratic colonial power, however philosophically it may accept restrictions imposed in the name of welfare on dependent peoples, is impatient of restrictions which it does not recognize as necessary to its own welfare. Progress is more purposeful; a merely negative policy of obstruction is no longer sufficient, and there is a growing urgency to reconcile progress and welfare. It is important then to recognize, as our enquiry shows, that progress is not a condition of welfare, but welfare a condition of progress; the problem is human, not mechanical, and compulsory progress bears fruit in disaffection and unrest. If we are to reconcile progress and welfare in the tropics we must organize a demand for welfare among the people.

Now, if tropical peoples are to be enabled to promote their own welfare, it is necessary to create an environment in which they enjoy the requisite status, a sufficient motive and adequate means to do so. The promotion of welfare is possible only in an autonomous society. Liberals obeyed a healthy instinct in placing autonomy in the forefront of their programme. But they thought that economic freedom would lead automatically to political advancement, and introduced the machinery of western political institutions, trusting that by some inherent magic form would take effect in function. Experience has

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demonstrated their mistake. We know by now that economic freedom may, and in the tropics ordinarily does result in economic bondage to the moneylender or employer, and that, in social as in civil engineering, form does not give birth to function. Western political institutions have proved disappointing in the tropics, and consequently we now impose conditions on political advancement, postponing autonomy until some remote future when by welfare measures the people shall have been endowed with the qualities requisite for working western institutions. But welfare is the product of autonomy, and not autonomy of welfare. We have seen that the failure of western institutions in the tropics must be ascribed chiefly to the environment, the plural society of tropical economy in which the political institutions of western homogeneous society are unworkable. In such an environment western political institutions aggravate the internal tension in a society divided against itself, and are inconsistent with self-government; like welfare measures, they are perverted into an instrument of economic progress. In its political as in its economic aspect, modern colonial policy is based on the same fallacy as the older Liberal policy; it aims at adapting tropical society to western principles instead of adapting western principles to the intricate confederation of native and alien elements constituting tropical society.

Here then in brief are certain principles of tropical economy suggested by our enquiry into colonial policy and practice. In the western world during the past three hundred years, economic forces have been increasingly liberated from the restraint of custom and transferred to the control of reason. In fact, custom still retains great force, but we are apt to underrate its power because it is native to us and unnoticeable, like the air we breathe. Moreover, the reason by which we exercise control over economic forces is not the natural reason impelling man to seek his individual advantage regardless of other considerations, but what may be termed the social reason, which accepts as valid the obligations and restrictions commonly acknowledged by the peoples of modern Christendom. It is only in international relations, and in these only within limits (though, it would seem, expanding limits) that the natural law prevails. Through its vastly greater power over the material world consequent on the freer play of economic forces, the West has come to exercise dominion over the tropics in economic and, over the greater part, political affairs. The first effect of this is to expose the fabric of tropical society to the solvent influence of forces acting on it both from outside

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and from within. Economic forces are liberated from the customary restraints which preserved the native society from dissolution, and in the new colonial society the various elements recognize no common principle of social obligation by which the newly liberated forces may be brought under control. Thus, by a process of natural evolution, there comes into existence a plural society dominated by economic forces, and functioning as a business concern for the profit of economic enterprise instead of as a political organ for the promotion of the common welfare. Colonial policy may aim at promoting material welfare or political emancipation, but in practice these aims are conditioned and frustrated by the economic environment. These, so far as our analysis of colonial relations is valid, would seem to be the fundamental principles of tropical economy.

If tropical economy in general has these common features, then it should be possible to arrive at general principles of colonial policy. A colonial estate enhances the prestige and adds to the wealth of the colonial power. If the estate is to be managed in the interest of the colonial power, colonial policy will be directed towards making the dependency incapable of independence, inducing the people to acquiesce in foreign rule, and gaining their co-operation in developing the estate as a business concern. It will overthrow or undermine the native political organization, encourage social disintegration, and foster communal rivalry on the principle of divide and rule; it will restrict the privilege of bearing arms to particular communities, numerical or racial minorities, favour with high pay and valued distinctions those who as officials or otherwise assist in the maintenance of foreign rule, and relieve the public in general of restrictions on their economic activities. So far as may be serviceable to economic progress it will aim at protecting the people against economic forces, and at promoting health and education. A sound colonial policy on this interpretation will aim at what a French writer has criticized as the aim of Dutch colonial policy—to get 'milk from contented cows'.[1] But, as we have seen, these are the results in practice of the most enlightened modern colonial policy. Such a policy will be adopted most whole-heartedly if the colonial power can persuade itself that it is treating native interests as paramount, and the policy will be successful in proportion as the subject people can be induced to regard it as beneficent. Instinctively and inevitably political control is used to further the interests of the colonial power, and the only

[1] Bousquet, p. 155.

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safeguard against the misuse of political control is to divorce it so far as possible from economic control. That would seem to be the first principle of colonial policy if it is to be directed in the interest of subject peoples; and the expedient of international collaboration in colonial affairs should be capable of application to that end.

Naturally we like to believe that our rule over dependent peoples is beneficial. But goodwill is no substitute for knowledge, and it is easier to believe in the efficacy of good intentions if we are sheltered from the shock of facts. At present colonial powers, while stressing in official pronouncements the benevolent aspirations of their policy, seem almost deliberately averse from providing material for a just appreciation of their practice. The system of training candidates for the administrative service in British colonies, suitable enough for the system of *laissez-faire* from which it is a survival, is behind the times now that public administration is a skilled profession, and colonial administration a very specialized branch of that profession. Their training does not equip them to acquire a knowledge of the people or an understanding of tropical economy; and, even if it were better adapted to that end, it would be nullified by the conditions under which they work, with constant transfers from place to place and job to job. But the outside world is dependent for its knowledge of colonial affairs on the statistics and reports which they compile. Formerly a colonial government would conceal itself, like a cuttlefish, behind a flood of ink; now it has brought its tactics up to date and puts up a smoke screen in the local legislature, taking refuge behind a fog of words. Both expedients are useful to make darkness palpable, and if the object of colonial practice were to conceal the working of colonial policy, it would be hard to improve on them. But if the good intentions animating colonial policy are to take effect in practice, we want light to see the fruit. Here again international collaboration should help to facilitate a comparative and scientific study of colonial rule.

Goodwill can effect little without knowledge, but both together are of small avail without an understanding of the problems to be solved. The most conspicuous feature of tropical society and the natural consequence of colonial rule is atomization, social disintegration, which debars the people from procuring their own welfare while frustrating endeavours to help them. If colonial policy be directed towards promoting the welfare of tropical dependencies the basic problem is reintegration. Its primary object must be to frame

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000 together into one political society with a common social will the diverse and conflicting elements which, taken together, have their nearest analogy in a confederation, but differ from a confederation in combining instability of union with inability to stand alone. The problem of reintegration has no counterpart in normal homogeneous western states, and demands an appropriate technique outside the range of political science in the West. In the West the basic problem of applied political science is how best to ascertain and give effect to the common social will; in the tropics the basic problem is how best to organize a common social will. As with fundamental changes in physical science, it requires a revolution, a new system of ideas and new line of approach, and not merely reforms. Disintegration is the natural and inevitable effect of economic forces that are subject to no restraint but that of law, and reintegration must be based on some principle transcending the sphere of economics. The only principle that hitherto has enabled the colonies of western powers to assert and maintain their independence is Christianity, which has demonstrated its political value in South America and the Philippines.

One of the early Christian Fathers claimed that the Roman Empire was a providential dispensation for the spread of Christianity, and a similar justification is sometimes advanced for the modern expansion of Europe. At the time of the second Burmese war it was suggested that one result would be the conversion of the Burmese to Christianity,[1] but these hopes have been conspicuously disappointed. In this matter Burma and China present an instructive contrast. Both the two great leaders of modern China, Sun Yat Sen and Chiang Kai Shek, were Christians. In Burma the first Burmese Governor was brought up as a Christian and so also was Dr Ba Maw, the first Premier after the separation of Burma from India. But the former was regarded as an instrument of British rule, and the latter had to proclaim himself a Buddhist in order to gain popular support. A Burmese Christian is regarded with suspicion by his fellow-countrymen. Similarly in Java missionaries, though regarded by the Dutch as almost disloyal in their 'ethical tendencies', are looked on by the people as 'servants of the capitalist system'.[2] In Buddhist or Moslem lands the introduction of Christianity multiplies divisions in the plural society, weakening instead of strengthening the social fibre. Moreover, as an instrument of colonial policy the propagation of Christianity by the Government is too dangerous; and for reintegra-

[1] Durand, II, 185. [2] *Netherlands India*, p. 381.

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tion it is necessary to adopt some principle that Christians and those of other creeds alike accept as valid.

We have seen that the Dutch claim to have achieved remarkable progress towards reintegration during the past ten years, not by the apparently easier device of 'injections' of capital, but by taking advantage of the difficulties under which capitalist interests laboured during the recent depression. They contend that by converting capitalists into nationalists and nationalists into capitalists they have induced all the several elements of the plural society to recognize the ties of a common nationality. This is a bold claim. The community of sentiment between the Javanese and the Dyaks of Borneo or the Papuans of New Guinea must be tenuous, yet, at least as regards Java, it is not impossible that, given appropriate measures in post-war reconstruction, history may substantiate their claim. It is not impossible that, by similarly taking advantage of the difficulties under which capitalist interests now lie in Burma, we might achieve a similar result. In any case, if we are to find some principle that all may accept as of superior validity to economic interest there would seem to be no practical alternative to the principle of nationalism, which, as Sir Ernest Barker has argued,[1] is a principle that Christians must acknowledge as part of the Divine ordering of world economy.

Nationalism must indeed figure largely in any project of reintegration, for the object of reintegration is the framing of a national society capable of independence, so far as any minor (or even major) power is capable of independence in the modern world. But a people is fully secure of independence only when a Government, based on popular consent, accepts the obligations of national existence in the modern world. Under native rule the people accept the customary restraints on which the existence of native society depends. Foreign rule liberates them from the bonds of custom, but the acceptance of new obligations requires a process of social education that is possible only under their own leaders. There must be leaders who have graduated as citizens of the modern world, and these must be enabled and encouraged to exert their influence among their people. It is not sufficient that a few men and women shall be brought to finish their studies in England, France or Holland. These, in fact, are just the countries where least is to be learned. It was from the example of Japan and Siam that we took the idea of

[1] Sir Ernest Barker, *Christianity and Nationality* (Burge Memorial Lectures, 1927–33), p. 25.

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000 bringing men to Europe,[1] but we have copied them on a comparatively small scale and have been concerned rather to strengthen the ties, political and economic, with the dependencies rather than to make the dependencies capable of independence. Not infrequently the result is disaffection rather than affection, and the advantage of the dependency will best be served by sending men, as has been the practice of Japan and Siam, to the country where they will learn most; ordinarily, so far as regards administration, they will learn most in countries engaged in the solution of problems similar to their own, rather than in England, France or Holland where such problems have already been solved in by-gone ages. Dependencies not only need such men as leaders; they need also appropriate machinery for social education, probably somewhat along the lines invented by the Dutch, so as to bring the people as a whole into vital contact with the modern world.

Finally, and not of least importance, is the principle of continuity. It is not unnatural that the importance of this principle should escape notice in lands where the tradition of party rivalry, as in England between Tory and Whig, Conservative and Liberal, Capitalist and Socialist, figures so prominently in history, and has proved so stimulating to political evolution. Yet it is the social unity of western lands which allows of party rivalry because all are agreed on fundamental issues. In the divided plural society of tropical dependencies one must needs foster the social unity that is the happy heritage of western peoples. Western political societies survive by their inherent vigour, but in the tropics social will must be conserved and strengthened by artificial respiration until the patient can safely be left alone. Continually economic forces are active everywhere and by all means to disintegrate the social fabric and consume social vitality, and constant vigilance and unremitting activity are needed to defeat them. Political machinery, uninformed by living social will, is unavailing, because it is always condemned to fight a rearguard action on a changing front against new circumstances, to which, being only machinery, it cannot adapt itself. Social, economic and political reintegration demand the embodiment of social will in continuity of person, which is just what the machinery of western political institutions was intended to prevent. These institutions were invented by and for western peoples whose social heritage provided adequately for continuity of social will apart from continuity in the person of the ruler; and the English, who

[1] Curzon, *RPI* (India), 1897-1902, p. 470.

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may claim the original invention, have been careful to maintain an element of personal continuity in the Crown. Dependencies, on the other hand, are distinguished by their lack of social will and the need for fostering stability, while the characteristic defect of colonial administration, from top to bottom, has always been discontinuity. This is aggravated by the introduction of western political institutions. Colonial powers when introducing them may hold firmly the belief in their innate value, inherited from the Liberal tradition, but in effect they multiply vacillation of policy and discord among the people, to the profit of the colonial power and the further enfeeblement of the dependency. In a stable society western democratic institutions are a sign of strength; but, where they are not a sign of strength, they are a source of weakness. Nevertheless subject peoples who fail to understand that only a strong social constitution can withstand the rigours of party strife, are usually too ready to seek the means of liberation in institutions that will perpetuate subjection until there is no remedy but revolution.

If, then, we are to accept the welfare of dependent peoples as the main objective of colonial rule, the principles briefly summarized above would seem to derive from the essential character of colonial relations and to hold good for colonial policy in general, though doubtless in practice requiring diverse and even contrary methods of application according to local circumstances. Yet it may seem idle to discuss colonial relations in terms of general principles. So long as colonies are valued for considerations of power, prestige or profit, realists will be satisfied with 'the good old rule, the simple plan, that they should take who have the power, and they should keep who can'. Even those who are less realist in their outlook readily believe what it is, or seems, advantageous to believe. They believe in welfare measures that make the colonial estate more profitable, and that such measures will promote autonomy; and they believe in autonomy on condition that it is autonomy 'within the empire'. They may accordingly be reluctant to accept the principles emerging from this survey which run counter to these comfortable doctrines. Yet our survey shows also good reason to believe that it is well for tropical dependencies to remain within the empire, attached to England, France or Holland, as the case may be. When, however, we try to impose this as a condition of autonomy, instead of aiming to equip dependent peoples for autonomy and leaving them to seek admission to the larger political system as a privilege, there spreads throughout

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000 the tropics, naturally and inevitably, a growing human reaction against western rule, that must lead finally to a general revolt against western civilization. Already, instinctively, we are taking precautions against this in projects of international co-operation among western powers for safeguarding security. But if we value peace rather than security, we shall aim at making dependencies capable as soon as possible of independence, not on altruistic grounds or as a grudging concession to nationalist agitation, but on our own initiative and in our own interest as a condition of world welfare, and in order to preserve those established political connections between Europe and the tropics which have come into existence through the temporary incapacity of tropical rulers and peoples to accept the conditions of modern civilization. No one who has made a serious study of the problem is likely to underestimate its difficulties, but the chief obstacle is the reluctance, mistaken and largely subconscious, of colonial powers to seek an effective solution. Given the necessary creative impulse, goodwill can find a way and the difficulties will prove less formidable than many like to think. That we shall seek and find a solution depends on the evidence of things unseen.

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APPENDIX I

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Seaborne Trade of Burma, 1869–1937: Exports (Burma Merchandise) (Million Rupees)

Commodity	1868–9	1872–3	1903–4	1913–14	1926–7	1936–7
			Native Produce			
1. *Rice Products*						
Grain	20·55	29·40	144·74	258·21	381·71	209·17
Fodder	—	—	4·19	6·51	9·78	9·25
Total	*20·55*	*29·40*	*148·93*	*264·72*	*391·49*	*218·42*
2. *Other Agricultural Products*						
Other grain	—	·23	2·65	5·03	8·17	13·09
Cotton: Raw	·73	2·88	2·23	8·98	12·77	12·70
Manufactures	·07	·02	·03	·06	1·07	·29
Seeds	—	·23	·06	4·17	·56	·31
Oil-cake	—	—	—	2·17	5·22	4·13
Oils (vegetable)	·01	·02	·01	·06	·04	·28
Fruit and vegetables	·03	·02	·01	·45	2·08	3·01
Spices	·03	·06	·34	·40	·48	1·33
Tobacco	·02	·04	·66	2·47	3·08	·72
Total	*·91*	*3·52*	*7·04*	*23·70*	*33·48*	*35·87*
3. *Other Rural Products*						
Coir and cordage	—	—	·01	·15	·33	·26
Dye-stuffs	1·77	2·28	2·46	1·48	2·16	1·21
Fisheries: Manure	—	—	[illegible]	·36	·24	·07
Other products	—	—	·28	·32	·48	·18
Cattle: Hides and skins	·18	·80	2·73	8·57	4·01	2·11
Bone-meal	—	—	—	—	—	·10
Lac	·08	·29	1·51	·37	4·62	·69
Tea	·01	·17	·01	·01	(*a*)	(*a*)
Mineral oil	·13	·27	(*a*)	(*a*)	(*a*)	(*a*)
Ores and metals	—	·08	(*a*)	(*a*)	(*a*)	(*a*)
Precious stones, jade, etc.	·82	·63	(*a*)	(*a*)	(*a*)	(*a*)
Total	*3·00*	*4·52*	*7·21*	*11·27*	*11·85*	*4·63*
Total, Native Produce	**24·46**	**37·45**	**163·18**	**299·70**	**436·82**	**258·92**
			Capitalist Produce			
4. *Forest Products*						
Wood and timber	6·87	6·98	16·55	22·02	47·75	37·81
Railway plant, etc.	—	—	[illegible]	·25	1·51	—
Matches	—	—	—	—	·60	1·92
Total	*6·87*	*6·98*	*16·76*	*22·27*	*49·87*	*39·73*
5. *Plantation Products*						
Rubber	—	—	·12	1·05	11·88	6·99
Tea	(*b*)	(*b*)	(*b*)	(*b*)	·16	·44
Total	—	—	*·12*	*1·05*	*12·04*	*7·43*
6. *Oil-well Products*						
Mineral oil	(*b*)	(*b*)	20·0[illegible]	44·07	91·79	173·44
Candles	—	—	·8[illegible]	3·64	2·07	1·28
Paraffin wax	—	—	·6[illegible]	6·61	16·14	18·92
Total	—	—	*21·62*	*54·33*	*110·00*	*193·64*
7. *Mineral Products*						
Metals and ores	(*b*)	(*b*)	·[illegible]	5·26	41·39	51·29
Precious stones, jade, etc.	(*b*)	(*b*)	·8[illegible]	·40	·47	·12
Total	—	—	*1·16*	*5·66*	*41·86*	*51·41*
Total, Capitalist Produce	**6·87**	**6·98**	**39·66**	**83·91**	**213·78**	**292·21**
8. Other produce (unclassed)	*·94*	*·70*	*1·84*	*2·52*	*4·13*	*4·14*
Total Exports	**32·28**	**45·13**	**204·69**	**386·23**	**654·74**	**555·27**

(*a*) Included under capitalist produce; (*b*) Under native produce.

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APPENDIX I (*contd.*)

Seaborne Trade of Burma, 1869–1937: Imports (Merchandise) (Million Rupees)

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Commodity	1868–9	1872–3	1903–4	1913–14	1926–7	1936–7
	Consumption Goods					
1. (*a*) Food: Staples						
Grain, pulse, etc.	·07	·05	4·91	8·59	12·11	5·29
Oil	·28	·38	5·69	3·11	6·57	5·29
Oil-seeds	·02	·06	1·46	1·09	5·31	1·67
Fruit, vegetables	·56	·47	2·91	5·29	8·28	4·81
Fish	—	—	3·79	5·28	8·56	4·99
Salt	·48	·63	·87	1·44	2·34	1·56
Total	*1·41*	*1·59*	*19·65*	*24·80*	*43·18*	*23·62*
(*b*) Food: Luxuries						
Alcoholic liquors	1·28	1·22	3·90	5·15	6·10	2·62
Coffee and tea	·10	·14	·54	1·61	3·79	2·07
Provisions:						
Fruit (tinned)	—	—	—	—	·28	·18
Fish (tinned)	—	—	—	2·06	2·96	1·11
Others	·52	·66	7·74	15·43	19·10	12·12
Spices	1·61	1·39	5·89	7·46	12·75	4·72
Sugar	·33	·31	3·84	6·69	10·66	5·33
Tobacco	1·35	1·30	5·87	9·67	14·85	8·76
Total	*5·20*	*5·03*	*27·78*	*48·07*	*70·49*	*36·91*
Total food	*6·62*	*6·62*	*47·43*	*72·87*	*113·67*	*60·53*
2. (*a*) Clothing: Staples						
Cotton goods	*9·85*	*10·18*	*30·77*	*62·19*	*84·18*	*45·47*
(*b*) Clothing: Luxuries						
Silk goods	2·82	4·37	7·09	8·82	6·26	·49
Artificial silk	—	—	—	—	2·38	1·51
Woollen goods	1·26	1·13	3·40	5·93	8·50	2·43
Apparel, etc.*	·53	·71	3·31	4·71	5·31	4·48
Boots and shoes	·09	·11	1·15	2·07	2·49	1·37
Dyes	·03	·03	·13	·25	·56	·41
Total	*4·75*	*6·36*	*15·08*	*21·79*	*25·51*	*10·69*
Total clothing	*14·60*	*16·54*	*45·85*	*83·98*	*109·69*	*56·16*
3. Household goods:						
Earthenware	·25	·30	·85	1·97	2·27	·95
Glassware	·16	·16	·81	1·41	1·68	·84
Hardware, etc.	—	—	3·86	7·29	10·45	5·37
Soap	·05	·06	·48	1·65	3·51	·16
Lighting: Candles	·11	·23	·20	·16	·03	·01
Matches	·04	·11	1·20	1·58	1·66	·10
Kerosene	—	—	1·34	·57	·63	·76
Umbrellas	·10	·19	1·28	2·03	1·38	·50
Books	·03	·02	·20	·27	·61	·53
Total household goods	*·74*	*1·08*	*10·23*	*16·95*	*22·23*	*9·23*
Total Consumption Goods	**21·95**	**24·25**	**103·51**	**173·80**	**245·59**	**125·92**

* Includes Haberdashery.

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APPENDIX I (*contd.*)

Seaborne Trade of Burma, 1869–1937: Imports (Merchandise) (Million Rupees)

439

Commodity	1868–9	1872–3	1903–4	1913–14	1926–7	1936–7
			Production Goods			
4. Transport						
Cycles (pedal)	—	—	—	·33	·69	·58
Motor vehicles	—	—	—	1·30	5·79	2·25
Aircraft	—	—	—	—	—	·25
Carriages, etc.*	·02	·03	·69	·63	1·55	3·01
Rubber tyres	—	—	—	·06	1·71	1·25
Petrol	—	—	—	·24	2·94	5·65
Ships	—	·60	2·39	1·46	·12	·35
Railway plant	—	—	·14	2·24	3·03	·07
Coal	·41	·53	3·93	6·90	10·73	4·72
Total Transport	*·44*	*1·16*	*7·15*	*13·16*	*26·58*	*18·13*
5. Industry						
Building and Engineering	·02	·03	·48	1·94	3·90	2·36
Stone and marble	—	·03	·21	·21	·20	·04
Metals	1·50	1·51	11·81	16·90	25·04	13·99
Machinery, millwork	·36	·81	3·52	4·98	19·46	14·75
Belting	—	—	—	·63	1·18	·40
Packing	—	—	—	·10	·03	·03
Lubricants	—	—	·09	·27	1·23	·98
Paint	·09	·06	·60	1·07	1·74	1·32
Pitch, tar, etc.	·02	·02	·20	·19	·07	·05
Coir and cordage	·05	·07	1·16	1·97	2·83	1·25
Jute, gunnybags, etc.	1·27	2·58	6·85	17·42	27·63	13·36
Chemicals	—	—	·86	·94	1·79	2·22
Instruments	·03	·03	·68	1·79	5·39	4·11
Total Industry	*3·35*	*5·15*	*26·48*	*48·42*	*90·50*	*54·87*
Total Production Goods	**3·78**	**6·31**	**33·63**	**61·59**	**117·08**	**73·01**
6. Other Imports (unclassed)	*1·85*	*1·69*	*8·22*	*18·66*	*23·83*	*18·88*
Total Imports	**27·59**	**32·25**	**145·36**	**254·06**	**386·50**	**217·81**

* 'Carriages' include unspecified vehicles. The decline under Shipping and Railway Plant is due partly to local construction, partly to redistribution of items over Metals and Machinery, and partly to the replacement of foreign imports by Indian imports, including undifferentiated items.

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APPENDIX II

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DISTRIBUTION OF SEABORNE TRADE OF BURMA, 1869–1937. EXPORTS OF MERCHANDISE (MILLION RUPEES)

	1868–9	1872–3	1903–4	1913–14	1926–7	1936–7
Europe						
U.K.	21·4	29·6	25·4	36·3	55·5	61·0
Eire	—	—	—	—	—	·5
Austria-Hungary	—	—	9·0	20·9	2·2	—
Belgium	—	—	1·7	3·9	10·3	5·1
France	·4	—	1·0	4·3	·5	·5
Germany	·4	·2	17·5	34·8	52·3	11·3
Holland	—	—	8·5	29·9	15·0	9·0
Italy	—	—	·9	2·0	3·9	1·6
Elsewhere	·1	1·4	2·7	6·8	7·3	7·1
Total: Europe	*22·4*	*31·2*	*66·7*	*139·0*	*147·1*	*96·1*
Africa						
Egypt	—	—	2·9	5·3	9·1	·9
Elsewhere	—	—	3·4	6·3	16·2	11·3
Total: Africa	—	·1	*6·4*	*11·6*	*25·4*	*12·2*
America						
Canada	—	—	·3	1·4	·3	1·7
U.S.A.	—	—	·1	2·2	2·5	·7
Elsewhere	—	—	3·5	2·5	23·3	9·4
Total: America	*·1*	*·1*	*3·9*	*6·1*	*26·1*	*11·8*
TOTAL: WEST	**22·5**	**31·5**	**77·0**	**156·8**	**198·6**	**120·1**
Asia						
India	8·2	7·6	48·1	150·0	262·0	280·5
Aden	—	—	—	—	—	·6
Ceylon	·1	·2	2·8	7·1	49·9	27·6
Straits	1·7	5·3	34·4	34·1	45·9	24·7
F.M.S.	—	—	—	·6	6·4	5·6
Neth. India	—	·1	2·1	5·0	16·9	3·3
Siam	—	—	·1	·3	1·6	·1
French Indo-China	—	—	—	—	—	—
Philippines	—	—	4·1	·1	—	·7
China	—	·8	3·3	1·8	29·2	2·9
Hong-Kong	—	—	—	4·8	2·8	1·3
Japan	—	—	30·7	19·3	32·2	22·2
Japanese Empire	—	—	—	—	10·6	—
Elsewhere	—	·4	3·2	5·9	·5	1·9
Total: Asia	*10·1*	*14·4*	*128·7*	*229·0*	*458·1*	*371·4*
Australasia	—	—	*1·0*	*3·3*	*2·9*	·9
TOTAL: EAST	**10·1**	**14·4**	**129·7**	**232·4**	**461·0**	**372·3**
TOTAL EXPORTS	**32·6**	**45·9**	**206·7**	**389·1**	**659·5**	**492·5***

* Excludes duty on oil products, Rs. 65·7 mil.

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APPENDIX II (*contd.*)

Distribution of Seaborne Trade of Burma, 1869–1937. Imports of Merchandise (Million Rupees)

439

	1868–9	1872–3	1903–4	1913–14	1926–7	1936–7
Europe						
U.K.	10·2	13·5	48·5	89·1	104·6	41·3
Austria-Hungary	—	—	1·4	2·4	·3	·2
Belgium	—	—	3·1	8·6	7·6	3·8
France	—	—	1·8	1·6	3·0	·7
Germany	·1	·5	4·9	11·4	15·2	5·8
Holland	—	·2	2·7	6·3	10·0	2·7
Italy	—	—	·2	1·7	4·7	·5
Elsewhere	·1	—	—	2·3	6·2	3·6
Total: Europe	*10·5*	*14·2*	*62·7*	*123·3*	*151·6*	*58·6*
Africa						
Egypt	—	—	—	·2	·8	·2
Elsewhere	—	—	—	—	·1	·5
Total: Africa	—	—	—	*·2*	*1·0*	*·7*
America						
Canada	—	—	—	·1	2·7	·1
U.S.A.	—	—	2·5	5·8	18·3	7·1
Elsewhere	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total: America	*·2*	—	*2·5*	*5·9*	*21·0*	*7·3*
Total: West	**10·7**	**14·2**	**65·3**	**129·5**	**173·6**	**66·7**
Asia						
India	14·1	15·3	62·7	94·0	153·3	109·3
Aden, etc.	—	—	—	—	—	·7
Iran	—	—	—	—	—	5·6
Ceylon	—	—	·1	·2	·3	·5
Straits	2·6	2·6	9·7	8·1	12·6	6·3
F.M.S.	—	—	—	—	—	—
Neth. India	—	—	·7	4·9	9·5	·7
Siam	—	—	—	·1	·1	—
French Indo-China	—	—	—	—	—	—
Philippines	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	—	—	1·7	1·9	3·7	·6
Hong-Kong	—	—	—	3·7	3·3	2·8
Japan	—	—	5·0	10·5	26·9	23·9
Elsewhere	—	—	—	·4	2·7	—
Total: Asia	*16·9*	*18·0*	*79·9*	*124·0*	*212·5*	*150·5*
Australasia	—	—	·1	·6	·8	·6
Total: East	**16·9**	**18·0**	**80·0**	**124·6**	**213·3**	**151·1**
Total Imports	**27·6**	**32·2**	**145·3**	**254·1**	**386·9**	**217·8**

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

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[For a theoretical discussion of the necessity for granting political autonomy to the colonial dependencies of western states and the required changes in administrative practices and economic policy, see cat. 116, pp. 468-512; for discussion of the relationship between the colonies and the colonial powers in the modern world, and the author's proposal for international collaboration in preparing the colonies for eventual independence, see pp. 513-550.]

[For a history of Burma from 1826-1923 and an account of administrative policy and government under the British, see 7. Furnivall, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 23-141.]

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By

J. S. FURNIVALL

Author of *Netherlands India; Progress and Welfare in Southeast Asia*

With a Supplement on

TRAINING FOR NATIVE SELF-RULE

By

BRUNO LASKER

Research Associate, Institute of Pacific Relations

I. P. R. INQUIRY SERIES

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PUBLICATIONS OFFICE, 129 EAST 52ND STREET, NEW YORK

1943

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FOREWORD

This study forms part of the documentation of an Inquiry organized by the Institute of Pacific Relations into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East. 000

It has been prepared by Mr. J. S. Furnivall, formerly a member of the Colonial Service in Burma; author of *Netherlands India; Progress and Welfare in Southeast Asia* and other works. A supplementary chapter by Mr. Bruno Lasker of the International Secretariat of the Institute has been included; it has been independently written and Mr. Furnivall has no responsibility for it.

The Study has been submitted in draft to a number of authorities, many of whom made suggestions and criticisms which were of great value in the process of revision.

Though many of the comments received have been incorporated in the final text, the above authorities do not of course accept responsibility for the study. The statements of fact or of opinion appearing herein do not represent the views of the Institute of Pacific Relations or of the Pacific Council or of any of the National Councils. Such statements are made on the sole responsibility of the authors.

During 1938 the Inquiry was carried on under the general direction of Dr. J. W. Dafoe as Chairman of the Pacific Council and since 1939 under his successors Dr. Philip C. Jessup and Mr. Edgar J. Tarr. Every member of the International Secretariat has contributed to the research and editorial work in connection with the Inquiry, but special mention should be made of Mr. W. L. Holland, Miss Kate Mitchell and Miss Hilda Austern, who have carried the major share of this responsibility.

In the general conduct of this Inquiry into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East the Institute has benefited by the counsel of the following Advisers:

Professor H. F. Angus of the University of British Columbia.

Dr. J. B. Condliffe of the University of California.

M. Etienne Dennery of the Ecole des Sciences Politiques.

These Advisers have co-operated with the Chairman and the Secretary-General in an effort to insure that the publications issued in connection with the Inquiry conform to a proper standard of sound and impartial scholarship. Each manuscript has been submitted to at least two of the Advisers and although they do not necessarily subscribe to the statements or views in this or any of the studies,

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they consider this study to be a useful contribution to the subject of the Inquiry.

The purpose of this Inquiry is to relate unofficial scholarship to the problems arising from the present situation in the Far East. Its purpose is to provide members of the Institute in all countries and the members of I.P.R. Conferences with an impartial and constructive analysis of the situation in the Far East with a view to indicating the major issues, which must be considered in any future adjustment of international relations in that area. To this end, the analysis will include an account of the economic and political conditions which produced the situation existing in July 1937, with respect to China, to Japan and to the other foreign Powers concerned; an evaluation of developments during the war period which appear to indicate important trends in the policies and programs of all the Powers in relation to the Far Eastern situation; and finally, an estimate of the principal political, economic and social conditions which may be expected in a post-war period, the possible forms of adjustment which might be applied under these conditions, and the effects of such adjustments upon the countries concerned.

The Inquiry does not propose to "document" a specific plan for dealing with the Far Eastern situation. Its aim is to focus available information on the present crisis in forms which will be useful to those who lack either the time or the expert knowledge to study the vast amount of material now appearing or already published in a number of languages.

The present study, "Educational Progress in Southeast Asia," falls within the framework of the first of the four general groups of studies which it is proposed to make as follows:

I. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the present course of the policies of Western Powers in the Far East; their territorial and economic interests; the effects on their Far Eastern policies of internal economic and political developments and of developments in their foreign policies vis-à-vis other parts of the world; the probable effects of the present conflict on their positions in the Far East; their changing attitudes and policies with respect to their future relations in that area.

II. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the present course of Japanese foreign policy and possible important future developments; the extent to which Japan's policy toward China has been influenced by Japan's geographic conditions and material resources, by special features in the political and economic organization of Japan which directly or indirectly affect the formulation of her present foreign policy, by economic and political developments in China, by the external policies of other Powers

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affecting Japan; the principal political, economic and social factors which may be expected in a post-war Japan; possible and probable adjustments on the part of other nations which could aid in the solution of Japan's fundamental problems.

III. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the present course of Chinese foreign policy and possible important future developments; Chinese unification and reconstruction, 1931-37, and steps leading toward the policy of united national resistance to Japan; the present degree of political cohesion and economic strength; effects of resistance and current developments on the position of foreign interests in China and changes in China's relations with foreign Powers; the principal political, economic and social factors which may be expected in a post-war China; possible and probable adjustments on the part of other nations which could aid in the solution of China's fundamental problems.

IV. Possible methods for the adjustment of specific problems, in the light of information and suggestions presented in the three studies outlined above; analysis of previous attempts at bilateral or multilateral adjustments of political and economic relations in the Pacific and causes of their success or failure; types of administrative procedures and controls already tried out and their relative effectiveness; the major issues likely to require international adjustment in a post-war period and the most helpful methods which might be devised to meet them; necessary adjustments by the Powers concerned; the basic requirements of a practical system of international organization which could promote the security and peaceful development of the countries of the Pacific area.

EDWARD C. CARTER
Secretary-General

New York,
April 15, 1943

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EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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CHAPTER I

EAST AND WEST

The Problem of Education

Cold water, poetry, and education, it has been said, are the three things in the world guaranteed to disperse any crowd. It may be that any reference to education recalls the days we "crept unwillingly to school." For all admit that education, however distasteful, is important, and most people with an interest in the contact of civilizations agree that education is one of its most important aspects. For our own profit we of the modern West reach out over the world, buying and selling, getting and spending. Necessarily we bring even the most remote peoples into contact with our world; we change their economic environment, and therefore their social and political environment. What is the function of education in this process? This is the problem that I wish to examine in relation to the Tropical Far East, the group of countries extending from Burma to the Philippines and from Formosa to the Netherlands Indies.

To many the whole idea of education in the tropics is folly or a stumbling block. Those who hold "the still potent colonial doctrine that the so-called backward peoples are destined to remain in an inferior position"[1] may dismiss all educational endeavor as futile. Some, regarding education as necessary though dangerous, apt to provoke discontent and sedition, would dole it out grudgingly in minims. Others, though mistrusting higher education, favor primary instruction, either on political grounds—as making subject peoples easier to control and govern, or on economic grounds—as increasing the supply of intelligent though cheap and docile labor. Many, for similar reasons, would go further; they would encourage technical and vocational training for their

[1] Keesing, F. M., *Education in Pacific Countries* (1937) p. 31.

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political value in reducing the surplus of educated unemployables, or their economic value in providing assistants for public or private enterprise. All these practical, realist views exist and, so far as they exert political force, must be taken into account in framing and applying educational policy. But education and humane ideals have a natural affinity, and those who are zealous in the cause of education look on it as a means of promoting welfare.

But what do they mean by welfare? What, more precisely, do they aim at through education?[2] All will agree that education should teach people how to live, but that is almost the limit of agreement. Many "state with easy familiarity certain very general aims towards which education should move, such as 'the good life,' 'happiness,'" and so on. "We must not only educate for life but for a happy life." Or again, it should be "fitted to the needs of the community." Others hold that the educator should seek actively to reshape the individual and the society to what he may consider as "better." Others hold that education "must be a means of making life to-day richer and more adequately lived" or "want to develop to the fullest the powers of the individual mind." Sometimes the problem is stated with more immediate relevance to the modern tropics, where the social order is changing rapidly and education is expected to hasten, retard or guide the process. In Africa, says Lord Hailey, education is, and is intended to be, an instrument of change. People must adapt themselves to modern conditions, and "education is the process by which they gain the best adaptation." It should aim "to bring East and West together" and to "soften the violence of the impact" of Western civilization. "We wish," says Mr. Mayhew, "to offer the African what we believe to be fundamental and best in our modern life." Education should be directed to "changing the social order in ways that are calculated to improve the lot of the citizen as a whole," or "prepare them to cope with the problems of modern life in a self-governing nation." All

[2] *Ibid.*, Ch. 3 and pp. 17, 62, 126; Mayhew, A., *Education in the Colonial Empire*, p. 142; Hailey, Lord, *African Survey* (1938), p. 1207; Hayden, J. R., *The Philippines*, p. 513.

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mean well, but all mean something different, and those responsible for education "are almost everywhere uncertain and perplexed as to the efficacy of existing systems and the right lines for future development." Education, it has been said, "is all dressed up, and doesn't know where to go."

For this diversity of aims and general perplexity it would seem possible to suggest a common cause. Do not advocates of education, in putting forward these large claims, and emphasizing what education might or ought to be, and what it might, should or must do, tend to overlook what education actually is and does? The people perish where there is no vision, but a ladder leading up to heaven is of no use unless it starts from earth. And are they not perhaps, with the natural enthusiasm of those concerned with teaching, identifying education with instruction? Let us look into this matter more closely.

Education and Instruction

It is many years now since the distinction between education and instruction was impressed on me by a Burman villager. Much of my time in Burma was occupied with the classification of land for the assessment of revenue. The cultivators would listen to my comments on different qualities of soil with, as it seemed, flattering attention. But one day I overheard a remark, "that is all very well. Any one can be taught to read and write, but one must be born and bred a cultivator." One learns to read and write in school, but cultivation by example and experience. Education includes all that one learns by example and experience, and is much wider than instruction. Also it is much older. During the long ages of pre-history man survived because he was capable of learning by example and experience to adapt his way of life to changes in his environment; each generation learned new lessons in the school of life and passed them on in the common stock of its social heritage to succeeding generations. That process still constitutes the whole of education in primitive societies. In the South Seas, "in pre-white days indigenous societies had definite systems of education, in the broad sense that every gen-

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operation took steps to transmit the cultural heritage to growing youth." [3] In Africa, "tribal life involves a tribal system of education." [4] In the hills on the borders of Assam and Burma the children grow up fluent in five languages; each of which, it is said, would take even a Dutchman two years to learn.[5] But they do not learn them in school.

Everywhere all men still learn much from example and experience outside the school. During recent years the Burman has learned much that is new: to drink tea rather than eat it; to smoke cigarettes rather than cheroots; to play football and billiards, and to go to the cinema. He has of course learned other more important things: to cultivate for the market instead of for the home, to drive a car instead of a bullock cart, and so on. In these and many other ways he has learned to adapt his way of life to his new environment, but he did not learn them in school; and all these new factors in his environment have contributed to his education no less, and perhaps more, than the teacher and the textbook. Now, as in primitive societies, education, whatever more it should or might be, is the adaptation of man to his environment, and since man is a social animal, it is the adaptation of the individual to social life. As we are considering the case of children, we may define education more narrowly as the sum of all the processes that equip the child for life in adult society.

Education then dates from the emergence of mankind. Instruction came much later and can hardly have been of primary importance before the invention of the art of letters. This gave man a new and more efficient means of preserving and transmitting his social heritage, and of communicating new ideas. But it was chiefly significant in giving a foremost place in education to mental discipline, the training of the mind. This helped man to understand his environment and made him better able, not merely to adapt his way of life to his environment, but to adapt his environment to his way of life. It gave him a key to progress. In the course of modern progress instruction has come to play a growing part in education. But

[3] Keesing, F. M., *The South Seas in the Modern World* (1941), p. 243.
[4] Mayhew, A., *op. cit.*, p. 84.
[5] *Census of India, 1931*, Vol. I, Pt. 2, p. 355.

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it is not the whole of education; it is that part of education which consists in the formal training of the mind.

The distinction between education and instruction is so obvious that it may seem a platitude The stock argument on behalf of the English "public" school is that it places the formation of character above the acquisition of knowledge. In *Tom Brown's Schooldays* Mr. Brown sent Tom to Rugby to be educated as a Christian and a gentleman, and gave only the third place to books. Cardinal Newman went further. From the secular standpoint he preferred a resident university which taught nothing to a non-resident university which taught everything; in the former the lads would absorb education in social intercourse, but in the latter they would get nothing but instruction. "The school is not the only, nor indeed the major, agency by which native life is transformed."[6] Every one must accept this fact; but almost every one, in talking of education, forgets it. The principal of a teachers' training college tells us to "think of people as organisms having to adjust themselves to a physical and social environment which under modern conditions may include more or less of indigenous and alien elements." That is true; but when he goes on to say that "education is the process by which they gain the most adaptation,"[7] he is thinking merely of instruction. When enthusiasts for education protest that education should promote the good life, change the social order, or soften the impact of Western civilization on the tropics, they are making a tacit assumption that these various ends can be obtained by instruction during a few years, for a few hours a day, in certain subjects as set forth in textbooks that even the teacher may regard as valid only for the school room and the examination hall.

That education nowadays is so generally confounded with instruction would seem largely because of the close connection between them in the modern West. "In Western countries we have been specializing in mental disciplines,"[8] and when we find this attitude prevailing among educationalists in the

[6] Keesing, F. M., *Education in Pacific Countries*, p. 73.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 43.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 96.

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tropics we may suspect that they are looking at native society from the standpoint of the West. Seen through Western spectacles the East is out of focus, and to correct the locus one must allow for the distortion. It may be useful then to glance briefly at the Western background of education.

The Western Background

The oldest letters of the Western world are priestly symbols, hieroglyphs; and literacy long remained a secret of the priests. In some religions it never spread much further, as among the Hindus where it did not reach the common man, the *sudra*. But in the great world religions, offering salvation to all men, letters became a means of grace to all; it was a duty, or a work of merit, to confer the gift of letters, and to profit by the gift was a condition of wellbeing. The Buddhist formula *mata, pita, acariya,* mother, father, teacher, recognizes that, although parents impart life, it is the teacher who imparts the way of life, makes life worth living; and in Buddhism, as in other world religions, the way of life extends beyond the confines of the visible world. Religion taught men how to live as members of a great society, embracing the dead, the living and those yet unborn, and though reason did not venture beyond the limits demarcated by religion, learning was highly prized as a social and religious asset. In the West this view of learning prevailed throughout the Middle Ages, and schools were founded to the greater glory of God; in the East it survived until the advent of the European.

With the Renascence a new attitude to learning appeared in Europe. The polite student of humane letters esteemed the ancient classics above the early fathers, and reason began to disregard the boundary posts set up by religion. As rationalism made headway, learning was transformed from a social and religious asset into an individual and cultural asset, and its end was to promote the greater glory of Man. This deprived the teacher of religious merit, and he looked for social prestige and material reward—to the prejudice of the common man, who could not afford to pay for instruction and consequently received little more attention than the Indian *sudra*. The

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doctrine of equality proclaimed in the French Revolution implied that learning was the natural right of all; but this left the common man no better off, as he had no means to pay for it.

Only during the nineteenth century did a further development take place. Then, with the growth of nationalism, rulers came to recognize the political advantage of an instructed public; and about the same time, with the growth of industrialism, employers came to recognize the economic value of intelligent employees. Under the combined impact of these forces education took on new functions. Schools were multiplied; and, though mostly divorced from the traditional religion and secular in name, they became the shrines of a new idolatry, the worship of the State or Nation, and aimed at making the children useful and successful. Formerly the child was taught his letters for his spiritual welfare and the love of God; now he was dragged to school under the sanction of a legal penalty for his material welfare and the greater glory of the State. By tradition education studies the welfare of the child and equips him for life in a society transcending political and economic ends; in modern practice finding its logical development in Nazism, the child becomes an instrument of policy, and the end of education is the welfare of the State.[9]

The Renascence likewise brought to the front another aspect of learning, the economic aspect. Learning has always been potentially of economic value to the student. In mediaeval Europe, it might lead to promotion in Church or State, and even the bondman sent his sons to school to "advance them by clergy."[10] Though the main function of the school was to teach children how to live, it might also teach them now to make a living; by origin and tradition the school was a religious institution, but it also opened prospects of material advantage, appealing to the natural man on rational grounds apart from

[9] A good illustration is a comment by *The Times* on a proposal that "it shall be the primary duty of national education to develop a strong sense of national obligation in the individual, to encourage in him an ardent understanding of the State's needs, and to render him capable of serving these needs." This, in the opinion of *The Times*, is "unexceptionable as a general statement." (Sept. 7, 1942)

[10] Coulton, G. G., *Mediaeval Panorama* (1938), p. 389.

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any religious motive. With the emancipation of reason from religion in the Renascence, men began to look for rewards in this world rather than in the next, and the practical economic aspect of education acquired greater prominence.

In the nineteenth century, when the State introduced compulsory education, it did not rely solely on legal penalties to enforce attendance at the new secular schools, but attracted pupils by opening a career to talent; and the parents, in whose eyes the main function of the schools was to provide their children with a means of livelihood, valued education, or more properly instruction, for its material benefits. Material advantage, formerly of subordinate importance, came to be accepted as the main benefit of education; and religious training, formerly the central aim of education, was, in any form but nationalism, left to other agencies or was increasingly neglected. Formerly the child learned in school how to live; now he learns how to make a living.

Here then are three features characteristic of modern education in the West: it is commonly identified with instruction; it is dissociated from any form of religion except Nationalism; and it teaches the means of living rather than the way of life. But these characters, though distinctive, are developments, not noticeable for being new, but resulting from gradual evolution and still embedded in their traditional environment. Against the age-long tradition of the school as a religious institution, the changes began only some three hundred years ago and date mostly from within the last hundred years. Our modern system of education has grown out of the mediaeval world, and that in turn from Rome, Greece, and Palestine. During this process instruction, the training of the intelligence, has come into the foreground. But you cannot equip a child for social life merely by training his intelligence. You may teach a child in school that he should love God, and that he should love his neighbor as himself; but you cannot inspire him with charity. The social virtues are a necessary part of education, but they are learned from example and experience and not from textbooks. On the contrary, the training of the intelligence has even an anti-social tendency, for it helps a man to pursue self-interest without

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giving him any sufficient reason to subordinate his individual interests to social interests; if not corrected or counterbalanced by other factors in the educational process, it would disrupt society.

In fact, however, in the West, these new features in the educational system are corrected and counteracted by other factors in the social environment, and mainly by the force of old tradition. Just as in primitive society tribal life involved a tribal system of education, so now we are learning all the time in the great public school of social life with its heritage of the Christian religion and the Christian tradition; and, where this fails, men turn for the protection of society to Nazism or Communism. In comparison with the pressure exerted on us by our environment, the impression made by schoolbooks is negligible. It may *seem* important, far more important than it is; for we are conscious of instruction whereas other educational processes are largely unconscious; we know when we are being taught but often fail to recognize until long afterwards, or not at all, that we are learning. In the West it is not merely the instruction in school but the whole of our education that equips the child for adult life. So it is likewise in the East. But in the West the school is the product of and is conditioned by, its social environment, and the instruction given there is reinforced by and reinforces the social environment outside the school. In the East, on the other hand, the Western school is "out of touch with reality," and much of the instruction given in school runs counter to and is countered by the social environment outside the school. An educational policy that disregards the difference of environment between East and West must necessarily leave those responsible for education "uncertain and perplexed"; it is just because education in the East is "all dressed up" in European clothes that it is so uncomfortable in the tropics.

The modern school plays its part more or less successfully in equipping the European for life in the modern world; and it seems to be assumed that it should be equally successful in training the Oriental for life in the modern world, and thus, by creating a new people, create a new society. "It is, and it is

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intended to be, an instrument of change." But "idealism is comparatively easy in the classroom."[11] One can transplant the school but not the atmosphere of which it is a product, nor the environment in which it works.

Before discussing what education might or should or must do, it seems prudent to examine what it *can* do. What *is* the function of education in the modern tropics? Perhaps we shall get some light on the subject by a brief survey of what it has attempted and accomplished in the past. That is no easy matter. It is difficult to ascertain the facts and still more difficult to interpret them. Many facts cannot be objectively expressed in terms of figures, and even where figures are available they often mean little to those who do not already know from the inside what they mean. Yet a survey of what education does and has done may suggest what it can do and what more need be done and, even if inadequate to the importance of the theme, may help to contribute suggestions for policy in the post-war world.

[11] Mayhew, A., *op. cit.*, p. 35.

CHAPTER II

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BEFORE THE MODERN ERA

Education under Native Rule

When Europeans first reached the Tropical Far East they found schools already in existence, and literacy far more widely spread than in contemporary Europe—more widely spread indeed than in Europe until the last half of the nineteenth century. From Burma it was reported that almost every man could read and write; in Thailand the vast majority of boys received "an elementary education embracing the three R's"; in Cambodia, Cochin-China and Annam few were illiterate; in the Philippines "the knowledge of reading and writing was fairly general," and in the Moslem world, though only the clergy and the upper classes were literate, it seems that in some parts many had acquired the alphabet.[1]

Perhaps the native system of education could be seen at its best in Burma. In almost every village there was a monastery where the Buddhist clerics, swathed in yellow robes, taught the lads their letters, the elements of their religion, some notion of the sacred language—known to Europeans as Pali, and the traditions of their people. In these schools all the children, rich and poor alike, met on equal terms, shared in the common meals, performed the menial routine, and every morning and evening chanted together the sonorous Pali of the Buddhist creed. At the age of ten or twelve the boy put on the yellow robe and spent at least one Lent as a novice in the monastery; without this his education was incomplete, he was not yet a

[1] Furnivall, J. S., *The Fashioning of Leviathan* (Rangoon, 1941), p. 80; Graham, W. A., *Siam* (1924), Vol. II, p. 125; Gourdon, H., in Institut Colonial International: *Compte Rendu, 1931*, "L'Enseignement aux Indigenes," p. 219; Thompson, Virginia, *French Indo-China* (1937), p. 353; Blair, E. H., and Robinson, J. A., *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1893* (55 vols., 1903-09), Vol. I, p. 44; *Census of the Philippines, 1903*, Vol. III, p. 638; Wyndham, the Hon. H. A., *Native Education* (1933), p. 200.

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man. The cleric, though vowed to poverty and chastity, lived on the best that the village could afford and, if celibacy should prove too irksome, could at any time go back to the world as an ordinary villager. In the larger towns the course was more ambitious and there were special schools for the study of medicine.[2] In the capital, at least during the nineteenth century, there was the Burmese equivalent of a high school, where the course included arithmetic, geometry, astrology, history, geography, and even fencing—though the history and geography were fanciful and the fencing for exercise rather than for use.[3] Any lad of promise might graduate through these schools to the highest position in the land, but the main end of education was to teach the children how to live as Burman Buddhists. In the usual village school few boys got very far beyond the alphabet, and the chief lesson of the day was the recital of Pali verses inculcating the secret of a happy life. They learned the words by heart and, as in mediaeval Europe, with very little comprehension of the meaning. "Would it not be better, Sir," I once asked, "if the boys studied the Burmese translation which they could understand?" The monk replied by tapping a small boy on the head: "Such a thick little skull," he said, "can take in only one thing at a time, and the sacred text, that is the important matter." In Thailand and in Cambodia there were similar schools. In all these Buddhist countries one found village schools where the monks taught not for pay but as a work of merit, and the children studied not for material advantage but as a necessary process in their education for adult social life.

In Annam the educational system was more elaborate and was based on that of China, but in principle it was the same except that Confucius took the place of Gautama. In the Malayan region during the prevalence of Buddhism the universities rivaled those of India; although decaying under Hindu rule, later, when Buddhism and Hinduism succumbed to Islam, new schools took their place. These new schools were of various standards. In the village school the children learned the daily devotions

[2] *Report of the Committee on Indigenous Medicine* (Rangoon, 1931), p. 9.
[3] Information from a former student, Pagan Wundauk, U Tin.

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and ritual ablutions, and also to recite verses from the Koran though with little understanding of the words; sometimes, it appears, the children were taught at least the alphabet. In certain boarding schools the discipline was stricter, and for those aiming at proficiency in Islamic studies there were still more advanced schools. Among the upper classes these religious schools were supplemented by special provision for learning the traditions, arts and graces of the national culture.

Thus, all over the Tropical Far East, under native rule, there were schools much like those of mediaeval Europe, with similar aims and similar limitations. They formed part of an education in the older sense, teaching the way of life, and equipping the child for social life in the adult world. It was a small world with a limited horizon, but the training of the child enlarged his survey, according to his capacity up to the limits of the horizon. Perhaps it is unjust to call the horizon limited; for it was limited only in space: its extent in time was infinite. The child became a member of a social order extending indefinitely in the past and future. More than that, he learned, at least in Buddhist and Moslem lands, to look on life as a period of probation in a universal scheme. The system had primarily a social and religious value, and the training did not encourage the intellect to criticize the social and religious foundations of society. Yet the system had also an economic aspect. The monastic school was an asset to the State as providing a literate community and the requisite supply of men of learning and affairs, and an asset also to the individual by giving the more intelligent an opening for advancement. It was a response to social demand, and its maintenance constituted an economic charge on the community no less than if it had been supported on the modern plan by rates and taxes. But it had no economic end; and there was no danger that it would produce an unemployable surplus of school graduates; it was an instrument of civilization, and the more who went to school the better.

Under European Rule, 1500—1800

The earliest Europeans in the Tropical Far East, the Portuguese and Spaniards, had much the same idea of education as

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the natives. They looked on education as a religious and social function, and on instruction, the training of the intelligence, as a means of education but in itself of subordinate importance. Their adventure in the tropics had the color of a crusade to enlarge Christendom, and native education was necessarily a main head of their colonial policy. They sought wealth not by trade but by dominion, by bringing the tropics under Christian rule and, if they carried a sword in one hand, they held a missal in the other.

The Portuguese came first and spread most widely, and everywhere they founded schools to propagate the Christian faith. In 1536, within little more than ten years from their settlement in Ternate, their headquarters in the Spice Islands, they opened there the first Christian seminary in the East. Shortly afterwards St. Francis Xavier was exhorting the missionaries to set up a school in every village and "to teach and drive into the children the elements of reading and religion, and the prayers which all must know by heart." [4] Although the Spaniards reached the Tropical Far East not long after the Portuguese, not until some forty years later, with the foundation of Manila, did they attempt regular administration. "From the beginning the Spanish establishment in the Philippines was a mission and not in the proper sense of the term a colony," and "in the first stage of their civilization, education in the Philippines was based exclusively on religion." [5]

The object of the Dutch, when they came to the East about 1600, was trade and not dominion, and they extended Dutch rule no further than was necessary or profitable. Yet, within the limits of their rule, they were zealous for the conversion of their subjects. The history of the Dutch in Formosa from 1624 to 1662 is largely a story of missionary enterprise, and more attention was paid to the cultural than to the economic welfare of the people. In the Moluccas they convinced the natives that Geneva was closer to the truth than Rome. But in Java, shut in between two powerful Moslem States, they lacked the authority to impose their creed; nonetheless they opened schools

[4] Wyndham, Hon. H. A., *op. cit.*, p. 18.
[5] Blair and Robinson, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 48; Vol. XLV, p. 155.

and employed teachers to inculcate the rudiments of Christianity and Western culture.[6]

All these schools, however, Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch were essentially similar to the former Buddhist, Confucian and Moslem schools. The training "was primarily religious, and had as its object the mechanical assimilation by the pupils of an imported culture through the medium of an alien or unfamiliar tongue."[7] The Christian schools differed merely in teaching a new way of life and not in the manner of their teaching. But the natives were quite contented with their old way of life and would not send their children to the Christian schools unless compelled or bribed to do so. Both compulsion and bribery were used to fill the schools. In Formosa the Dutch made not only the children but also their parents attend school and imposed fines for irregular attendance. In Java they adopted the milder course of paying 40 *stuivers* (cents) to each convert, and at that rate soon bought over enough Christians to fill a church. The Spanish and Portuguese aimed chiefly at converting the local rulers, whose example and influence could procure the mass conversion of their subjects. They stimulated conversion also by giving Christians a preference in the grant of villages and lands, and by appointing a "Protector of the Christians" to promote their interests. In the Philippines the Spaniards formed Christian concentration camps, under missionaries who provided for both the spiritual and material welfare of their wards.

Thus the schools were filled and did much to instruct and confirm the children in the new way of life. But these did not become Christians because they went to school; they went to school because their parents became, or had to become, Christians. The European rulers gave their subjects a new Christian environment, and it was not the school that changed the environment but the environment that changed the school. The school, however, was a powerful instrument in adapting the younger generation to the new environment and thereby reacted

[6] Wyndham, Hon. H. A., *op. cit.*, p. 13; Drewes, G. W. J., in *The Effect of Western Influence in the Pacific* (Batavia, 1928), p. 142.

[7] Wyndham, Hon. H. A., *op. cit.*, p. 70.

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on the environment by enhancing its stability. More than fifty years after the Dutch left Formosa many natives could still speak, read, and write Dutch and retained traces of the Christian doctrines that their fathers had been compelled to learn by heart. Had the Dutch stayed longer, they would probably have been as successful as the Spaniards in the Philippines, where by 1800 there were over two million Christians.

During the eighteenth century learning seems to have had an increasing economic value under Spanish rule, but the chief function of the Spanish school in the Philippines was still to train the children as members of a Christian society and not merely to help them forward in the material world. As under native rule, the more went to school the better. Over most of the Tropical Far East, however, European policy developed along different lines; it aimed at extending commerce and not Christendom. The Dutch East India Company was a mercantile association. After destroying the last Portuguese stronghold by the capture of Malacca in 1641, it no longer felt any political incentive to spread Protestantism; and in Java, where it depended on native rulers for tribute, prudence constrained respect for Moslem feeling. The Dutch interest in native education accordingly declined. The English East India Company likewise was an association of merchants and for long was even more precariously situated than the Dutch company. Political and economic circumstances deterred both Dutch and English from interfering further than was necessary in native life and, while the Spaniards in the Philippines were creating a new world and equipping it with the schools that it required, the Dutch and English left their subjects in their old world and their old schools.

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CHAPTER III

THE ERA OF LIBERALISM—1800 TO 1900

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, political and economic developments in Europe gave a new turn to colonial policy in Asia. Contemporaneous, and in part associated with these developments, was a revival of missionary zeal and a new impulse to the foundation of schools for propagating Christianity. The results were first visible in India. Until quite recently India had been the center of British administration in the East; British Malaya formed part of India until 1867 and Burma until 1937. Moreover, British policy in India and its results have had great influence on colonial policy and among subject peoples in regions outside British rule. It is necessary, therefore, to sketch briefly the course of educational policy in India.

India

Up to the death of Aurungzeb in 1707, the British, like other Europeans in India, confined themselves strictly to commerce. But with the break-up of the Mogul Empire they found it more profitable to engage in politics or, rather, to trade in kingdoms. They bought and sold kingdoms instead of cotton goods and, like the Dutch in the Archipelago, ruled indirectly through native princes. On this system the English Company, like the Dutch, went bankrupt while its servants amassed huge fortunes. Attempts to reform the Dutch Company were ineffective, but in England the influence of the Nabobs on political life became a major issue in home politics, and the Regulating Act of 1773 "for the better management of the affairs of the East India Company" was a step in the direction of closer supervision that foreshadowed the Board of Control in England, created by Pitt's Act of 1784. At the same time, the Company itself was trying to prevent corruption by substituting

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direct for indirect rule. In 1772 it resolved "to stand forth as Diwan" or, in other words, to collect the revenue through its own servants. This measure was carried to a logical conclusion by the reforms of Hastings (1772-85) and Cornwallis (1786-93); Hastings laid the foundations, but the superstructure of direct rule was raised by Cornwallis who transformed the clerks and merchants of the Company into an administrative civil service entrusted with criminal jurisdiction.

Other factors, still more potent, were at the same time making for the introduction of direct rule. One was the new political philosophy based on the principles of equal law and economic freedom. This new philosophy, deriving largely from Adam Smith and Rousseau and absorbing elements from Bentham and the doctrines of the French Revolution, came to be known as Liberalism. It rested on two fundamental assumptions: one, that economic progress would best be served by leaving every one to pursue his private interest with a minimum of State interference; the other that economic progress would promote the general welfare of all classes. During the early nineteenth century, liberal ideas prevailed among all the leading Englishmen in the East, and Raffles in Malaya exchanged views with Munro in Madras and Elphinstone in Bombay. Native princes could not rule on Western principles, and Liberalism favored therefore the replacement of indirect rule by direct rule. Liberal doctrines moreover were not merely abstract speculations but had an immediate bearing on current problems of practical administration. The Industrial Revolution had enabled the English manufacturer to sell his goods at a price that the Oriental could afford, and from about 1815 the import of cotton goods grew rapidly; the interests of trade required good government on Western lines and therefore by direct rule.

The substitution of direct for indirect rule necessarily reacted on educational policy. Direct rule called for native assistants trained on Western lines, and to train them schools of a new type were needed. The first experiments in training assistants were contemporaneous with the first introduction of direct rule; as early as 1782 Hastings founded a college for Moslems at Calcutta, and in 1791 another for Hindus was

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opened at Benares. In these schools the language and curriculum were vernacular but, like all schools founded by a European government, they represented Western and not Oriental ideas and were essentially Western schools.[1] Liberal principles favored the opening of schools for the spread of enlightenment as an end in itself, and humanitarian sentiment was reinforced by missionary fervor. Thus at the beginning of the century Christianity and cotton goods came to India together, and Liberalism lent an arm to both. Indians themselves were pressing at the same time for the reform of prejudice and superstition, and Ram Mohun Roy started an influential movement to diffuse Western learning. Thus in 1815, when Lord Hastings (1814-23) expressed his desire for a system of public instruction in India,[2] he had the sympathies of humanitarians, of missionaries and of all who valued education as a cultural asset.

That was the atmosphere in which the earliest English-teaching schools were opened: the Baptist College at Serampore in 1817, and the schools in Calcutta founded respectively by the Church of England in 1820 and the Church of Scotland in 1830. It was an atmosphere of widespread humanitarian enthusiasm for Western learning. But as yet there was no economic demand for it. Even the two schools founded by the Company to train assistants had to grant stipends to attract students, and the mission schools were still less attractive; the people did not yet wish to learn the Christian way of life and did not yet realize that the mission school might help them to a livelihood. The diffusion of Western culture remained a humanitarian ideal; and on the renewal of the Company's Charter in 1813, when Wilberforce, as spokesman of the humanitarians and missionaries, obtained the insertion of a clause sanctioning grants for education, there ensued a battle of cultures between Eastern and Western learning. Advocates of Western learning argued that it would recruit allies for England among the leading classes, raise the general standard of enlightenment among the common people, and convert India to Christianity.

[1] Hollandsch-Inlandsch Onderwijs-Commissie, Publicatie II (1931), *Eind-Rapport*, p. 14.

[2] *Imperial Gazetteer of India* (1907), IV, p. 409.

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These arguments were ineffective until reinforced by more practical consideration.

It was the renewal of the Charter in 1833 that brought victory to the Western cause.[3] One clause in this provided that no British subject should "by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office or employment under the Company." Another clause opened up India to all British subjects. The former clause implied that Indians would be appointed in ever increasing numbers to responsible positions; but they would have to acquire in Western schools the language, modes of thought and ideas of British rule. The latter clause gave free admission to missionaries who could provide the necessary training. Thus in 1835, when Macaulay in his famous Minute championed the cause of Western learning, he was sounding a loud trumpet around walls that had already fallen. It was on practical grounds that Bentinck (1828-35), a disciple of Bentham, favored Western education: it would promote commercial and industrial intercourse with Europe and thereby enhance Indian revenues; this would require a larger establishment, and only by training Indians could the necessary staff be obtained cheaply, if at all. Macaulay's Minute therefore served conveniently as the occasion for a pronouncement by the Government of India deciding unequivocally in favor of Western instruction.

The substitution of English for Persian in the Law courts in 1837 and the appointment, about the same time, of native judges enhanced the demand for natives trained in Western schools, but for some time progress was slow. Gradually the Government learned that the mission school produced the most useful type of public servant, and the people learned that the mission school opened a path to well paid jobs.[4] On the one hand there was an economic demand for educated natives to perform certain necessary functions, and on the other an economic demand by natives for education as a means to make a living. Aspirations for the spread of education were no

[3] Mayhew, A., *The Education of India* (1926), p. 13 *ff*.
[4] *Imperial Gazetteer of India, loc. cit.*

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longer humanitarian ideals but practical common sense. Humanitarian and practical considerations were indeed so closely intertwined that it is impossible to disentangle them, and both found expression in the document which marks the next step forward, the Despatch of 1854, enunciating the educational policy of the East India Company, and laying the foundations of the modern system of public instruction. This proclaimed as a primary concern of Government the uplift of the people by the systematic promotion of general education, and especially by the wide diffusion of primary instruction.[5]

Such a comprehensive programme was still premature. Western influence had hardly penetrated beyond the coast, and the mass of the people was still shut off from the modern world. In the whole of India there was as yet no railway and the roads were mostly primitive cart tracks, so that there was little demand for native help in administration or commerce outside the Presidency towns. The military importance of good communications was revealed by the Mutiny of 1857; and, when the British Government took over the rule of India on the suppression of the Mutiny, it set about linking up the interior with the ports by road and railway. Thus, on the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 almost the whole of India was brought for the first time into close contact with the West. The improvement of communications led to more intensive administration and therefore gave a new stimulus to educational progress. In 1859 the Crown reaffirmed the policy laid down in the Despatch of 1854 and during the next few years created an Education Department in each of the large provinces.

The creation of educational services introduced a new and important factor into the economics of education. Education officers may perhaps tend to measure progress by the yardstick of technical or departmental efficiency, by "passes" and "returns," but by their training and profession they have much in common with humanitarians and missionaries in their attitude to education: they regard it as an instrument of culture. Professional zeal together with a human regard for pay and promotion stimulate administrative officials to open schools

[5] *Ibid.*, IV, 413; *Report of the Education Commission*, 1883, p. 24.

and teachers to multiply pupils without regard to economic circumstances or to the employment market. That is good, in so far as education is an instrument of culture; under native rule, or under the Spaniards in the Philippines, there could not be too many children at school. But in India the function of education was primarily economic—to provide Government with assistants and boys with jobs. At the time this mattered little, as the revolution in the economic relations between East and West consequent on the opening of the Suez Canal stimulated a rapid growth of trade and, despite a corresponding development of education,[6] the supply of school graduates could hardly keep pace with the demand. They continued to develop at much the same rate until the end of the century, when an unfavorable turn in the economic conjuncture compelled attention to the danger of over-production by the schools.

The surplus of unemployable school graduates was only one of many problems demanding a closer inquiry into educational policy. The progress of education had diverged widely from the course anticipated by early enthusiasts. They had expected to recruit allies for the ruling power, to free the people from ancient superstition and to promote Christianity, and they had advocated Western knowledge for its cultural and social value as teaching a new and higher view of life. To that end the more who went to school the better, and every statement of educational policy, under the Crown and under the Company, had stressed the dominant importance of primary instruction for the masses. But education had been governed by economic factors. In administration and commerce there was an economic demand for more and cheaper assistants, and the more of them the cheaper. Among the people there was an economic demand for instruction as providing a new and better means of livelihood, and the more who went to school the less they got for it. As supply overtook demand competition forced up the standards of instruction and lowered the value of degrees. In early days a primary certificate was sufficient for a job; before long candidates for employment had to produce a secondary certificate and by 1900 even lads from the universities might fail

[6] *Ibid.*, III, p. 263; IV, p. 414.

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to find remunerative work. Discontent was rife among the educated classes, led by the older and more ambitious who, relying on the promises of 1833, had qualified themselves in Europe for positions of responsibility and, on returning, found themselves disappointed of their hopes. Meanwhile public instruction had failed to reach the common people who were still buried in superstition. Christianity had made some headway among outcasts on whom it conferred a higher status, and in a Christian environment the school was a valuable instrument of culture. But many prominent Indians in their reaction against Western individualism were lighting new fires to their old gods and finding tinderwood among the masses. Missionaries and humanitarians had expected to transform the social environment through the school, and the environment had changed; but it had been changed by economic forces and not by education; and the new environment had transformed the school from a social into an economic institution. Modern principles of education, which had proved their value in the West, worked differently in India where they had no Western background. In the Tropical Far East they gave very similar results.

Burma

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the expansion of the British and Burman empires brought them into political contact along a common frontier; and at the same time the growth of British trade brought them into economic contact. Burma was a mediaeval State suddenly brought up against the modern world. Failing reformation from within, foreign intervention was inevitable. Continual friction led to a succession of wars. The first ended in 1826 with the cession of two maritime provinces: Arakan, bordering on Bengal; and Tenasserim, reaching down to Malaya. The second war in 1852 linked up the earlier possessions through the occupation of Pegu and brought the whole of Lower Burma under British rule. In 1886, after a third war, the absorption of the country within the Indian Empire was completed by the annexation of Upper Burma. Until 1937 Burma remained a province of the Indian Empire

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871 The earlier officials in Burma held the liberal views then generally prevalent. A proclamation by the first civil governor of Burma announced his intention to rule the country "on the most liberal and equitable principles." He was interested in education, but that given in the monasteries seemed to him "of little practical use," and he hoped "to offer the people the means of acquiring a knowledge of the English language, and more useful learning than could be gained under their own system of instruction."[7] Roman Catholics had been working in the country with little intermission since 1719 and about 1800 had a school in Rangoon with sixty to seventy boys, including some natives. Baptists, at first English and then American, had been in Burma since 1807 but did little or no educational work before the arrival of the English. In 1825 they opened a school in Tenasserim but about the same time turned their attention to a backward heathen tribe, the Karens.[8] An attempt to enlist their help proved unsuccessful, but the Government needed English-speaking clerks and between 1835 and 1844 opened three Anglo-vernacular schools, one in each of the three chief towns.[9] Economic progress however was slow. So late as 1870, apart from barracks, jails and law-courts, built mostly with Indian immigrant or convict labor, the public works consisted of little more than five incomplete roads.[10] There was little demand therefore for lads from Western schools. Moreover, the Buddhist monastic schools, though unaided and unrecognized and often decried as impractical, met the needs not only of the people in their home life but also of the Administration for the supply of public servants. Even the judges had "little other education than that which they received as boys in some Buddhist monastery."[11] Meanwhile the missionaries were devoting practically all their attention to the Karens, from whom they met a ready welcome. In 1864 the

[7] Furnivall, J. S., *The Fashioning of Leviathan* (Rangoon, 1941), pp. 6, 81.

[8] *Census of Burma*, 1891, p. 79; Luce, Rev. E., *The Catholic Mission in Southern Burma* (1904), p. 17.

[9] Campbell, A., *Report of the Vernacular and Vocational Reorganization Committee*, 1936, p. 129.

[10] *Report on the Administration of British Burma, 1861-62*, p. viii.

[11] *Ibid.*, 1868-69, p. 61.

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Government still maintained three schools, and various missionary societies maintained 24 middle or special schools, 170 village schools and 10 schools for girls. Of just over five thousand children in these schools only one thousand were Burmese.[12] But the officials were now being required to study the law codes and to pass examinations, though "they did not understand what they learned and had little power of applying it." The Government was therefore beginning to recruit youths who had "received some smattering of education in a government or mission school to the exclusion of the old class of hereditary and highly influential men."[13] This naturally reacted unfavorably on the monastic schools, which lost the brighter and wealthier lads. Almost from the beginning of the British occupation the decay of these schools was regretted. How far the deterioration proceeded is uncertain. According to the first Census, taken in 1872, only 32 per cent of the males were literate, and among over two million families only 12,300 were literate. Yet the corresponding figures for the jail population were 60 and 10 per cent, and, as the Census Report suggests, it is "hardly probable that the criminal classes were better instructed than the general population."[14]

That was roughly the position when the educational impulse of the sixties spread from India to Burma. In 1865 the then head of the Province, Sir Arthur Phayre, who knew the country intimately, put forward a plan based on the monastic schools. He proposed gradually to establish Anglo-vernacular schools in the chief towns and to have no other lay schools, but to encourage the monastic schools to improve their curriculum by providing them with books on arithmetic, land-measurement, and geography. But his plan never had a fair trial. In 1866 a Director of Public Instruction was appointed. "The Director spoke little Burmese, the clergy spoke no English; the Director had no staff and the clergy no central authority."[15] Phayre had recognized that to obtain the cooperation of the Buddhist monks

[12] Campbell, A., *Report of the Vernacular and Vocational Reorganization Committee, 1936*, p. 129; *Administration Report, 1861-62*, p. 19.

[13] *Administration Report, 1868-69*, p. 61.

[14] *Census Report, 1872*, p. 25.

[15] Harvey, G. E., *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. VI, p. 444.

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871 "would require very great tact, judgment and discretion," and these were lacking. By 1871 only 141 monasteries had accepted the scheme. Even in remote villages there was an almost universal cry for English, and it was suggested that Phayre's plan would be more attractive if English were taught in selected monastic schools; but the proposal was vetoed as the boys would not acquire a correct English accent.[16] Phayre's plan would have based the whole of vernacular instruction on a national traditional basis and, especially with the inclusion of English, might have breathed new life into the monastic schools. But progress was too slow, and it was decided to recognize lay schools which were expected to prove more efficient. Even a little more patience might have justified Phayre's hopes; by 1873 the number of monastic schools on the registers had risen to 801 against 112 lay schools.

By this time the opening of the Suez Canal had stimulated rapid economic progress with a corresponding growth of the demand for Anglo-vernacular instruction, and this occupied the chief attention of the Department. Vernacular education however, was gradually passing more under Government supervision, and just before the annexation of Upper Burma in 1886 the departmental registers included close on four thousand monastic schools and rather more than six hundred lay schools. The annexation was followed by a swing in the direction of "efficiency". By the end of the century the number of monastic schools on the registers in Lower Burma had fallen to 1171 against 523 lay vernacular schools; during the same period in Upper Burma the number of registered monastic schools after rising to 2998, dropped to 1804—as against 557 lay vernacular schools.[17] According to the Census Report for 1901, the registered primary schools, monastic and lay, numbered 4091, with 127,638 pupils; and there were 13,118 unregistered monastic schools with 147,682 pupils.[18] By this time Anglo-vernacular instruction had made considerable progress: there were 388 secondary schools with 31,616 students and 2 high schools with

[16] *Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1928-29*, p. 11.
[17] For annual figures see Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 136.
[18] Cited in *Census Report*, 1911, p. 166.

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140 students. Out of a total population of 10.5 million, there were some 275,000 children at school, including about 27,000 girls, mostly in "boys" schools. The proportion of male literates was 37.8 per cent and of female literates about 4.5 per cent. The figures for literacy were reduced by Indian immigration; in the central basin of Upper Burma, where they were few Indians, the percentage of literacy among males was 45.6. Thus it was largely to the unregistered monasteries that the supremacy of Burma among Indian provinces was due. Female literacy was higher in Lower Burma and notable among the Christian Karens.

In the first years after the Annexation, some Buddhist monks in Upper Burma welcomed the introduction of new studies and even encouraged the teaching of English in the monastic schools. "There is perhaps no more hopeful sign of the future of the country," says the Census Report for 1891, "than the admirable foresight which the *pongyis* (monks) in Lower Burma have shown before, and which is shown at the present day by the *pongyis* of Upper Burma. The worst service the conquerors of Burma could render the conquered is to take away their religion and give them instead nothing but a smattering of English and a Calcutta degree."[19] From the beginning of British rule in 1826 the Government repeatedly expressed sympathy with the monastic school. But this was fighting a losing battle against economic forces and against departmental regulations intended to promote efficiency. A smattering of English conferred social status and had economic value. The lay school was more useful to the petty trader, increasing in number in the towns, and to the lad who would go on to an Anglo-vernacular school. Some lay schools attempted "surreptitiously" to teach English.[20] Formerly the general diffusion of English had been viewed with favor, and English was the usual medium of instruction in Anglo-vernacular schools, where indeed many of the teachers, European and Indian, could not speak Burmese. But in 1891 it was ruled that in Anglo-vernacular schools instruction up to Standard VII should be in the vernacular, but

[19] *Census Report, 1891*, p. 139.
[20] Harvey, G. E., *op. cit.*, p. 445.

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87| the wishes were disregarded and English continued as the medium of instruction until 1900.[21]

Standards I to IV were classed as Primary, V to VII as Middle School, and VIII to X as High School; and schools were classed according to the highest standard taught, even though going down to the lowest standard. Of the two high schools one was a government institution; of the secondary schools three were managed by Government and seventeen by local bodies. All the other schools of these grades were under private management, almost entirely missionary. All the primary schools were under private management.[22] Thus the control of Government over education was for the most part exercised only through grants to recognized institutions, calculated almost exclusively on the results of examinations, and about half the children were in monastic schools wholly independent of Government control. As in India, the system of public instruction, despite the high ideals of missionaries and educational authorities, had become a factory for the production of clerks, and the Eastern Schools, struggling to maintain a different tradition, were deteriorating and falling into the background. As yet, however, there were no such problems as perturbed the Government in India. No Burman had returned from studies in Europe; even lads who failed to reach the VIIth standard could easily find employment, and the Buddhist clergy still acquiesced in their supersession by lay teachers; there was no trouble in the country and the boys were well conducted in the schools.

British Malaya

British Malaya includes the Straits Settlements, four Federated Malay States and five Unfederated Malay States. The Straits Settlements, consisting of Singapore, Penang and Malacca with their immediate environs, were acquired between 1786 and 1824; the two former had been under native rule, but Malacca had belonged successively to the Portuguese and Dutch. They were under the East India Company until 1857 and under the India Office until 1867, when they became a Crown

[21] *Administration Report, 1891-92*, p. 128.
[22] *Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1899-1900.*

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Colony under the Colonial Office. The four Federated States accepted British protection at various dates between 1874 and 1889, and in 1896 were constituted a Federation under a Resident-General. Of the Unfederated States four were taken over from Siam in 1909 and the fifth, Johore, formally accepted British protection in 1914. The headquarters of government is in Singapore, where the Governor-General is also High Commissioner for the Malay States.

The long connection between the Straits Settlements and the East India Company gave an Indian bias to the administrative system, and this in turn influenced the administrative system of the Malay States. But the great distance between Calcutta and Singapore, the difference between Indians and Malays, and the primary significance of the Straits Settlements as ports raised special problems affecting all aspects of the administration, including public instruction. The Straits Settlements were almost exclusively commercial centers with a mixed population in which Malays rapidly sank into the background, giving place to Chinese and Indians. In early days, especially under Raffles, Liberal views prevailed, schools were opened for all classes. But these soon abandoned vernacular instruction and concentrated on an English course that would furnish the necessary subordinates for government and trade. So great was the demand for English that these government schools were soon supplemented by private schools, mostly established by missionaries. Few of the pupils were Malays, and little was attempted for the vernacular instruction of Malays. As shown below, the pupils in English schools were three times as numerous in 1872 as those in vernacular schools.

In Malaya as elsewhere a new interest in education coincided with the opening of the Suez Canal, and in 1870 a Committee was appointed to examine the position. It found that boys from the lower standards could easily obtain jobs, and therefore left school with a very imperfect knowledge of English; that the vernacular schools had done "little or no good," and the education of girls was very unsatisfactory.[23] The defects of the Eng-

[23] Special Reports on Educational Subjects, 1905 (Cd. 2379); "The Systems of Education in the Straits Settlement," p. 138.

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871 lish course were ascribed to the short time spent in school and to the lack of a preliminary grounding in the vernacular. The Committee recommended the appointment of a director to supervise and coordinate education, and the encouragement of vernacular schools, apparently to provide a firmer basis for English education. In 1872 an Education Department was created and an Inspector of Schools appointed; the English schools were left mainly to private enterprise, supervised and assisted by Government, but the Government encouraged vernacular education among the Malays by providing free instruction in State village schools. In the English schools the medium of instruction continued to be English. These principles governed educational policy in the Colony up to the end of the century.

The assumption of control over the Malay States raised a new problem. It was thought impolitic to encourage missionary enterprise among a Moslem population newly brought under British rule, and for some time English as well as vernacular education was under the direct control of the Government; towards the end of the century missionaries were invited to take over some of the English schools that the Government had opened. Vernacular instruction was provided on the same lines as in the Colony. Each State had its own inspector, but in 1898 a federal officer was appointed to exercise the functions of a director. From 1891 one State introduced compulsory attendance and the others followed its example. Thus by the end of the century vernacular instruction had made notable progress, though in the Colony there were still more pupils in the English than in vernacular schools.

PROGRESS OF EDUCATION IN BRITISH MALAYA[24]

	(a) No. of Schools Straits Settlements				(b) No. of Pupils Federated Malay States			
Year	*English*		*Vernacular*		*English*		*Vernacular*	
	(*a*)	(*b*)	(*a*)	(*b*)	(*a*)	(*b*)	(*a*)	(*b*)
1872	19	2,641	28	818	..	..	..	..
1900	39	7,528	171	7,404	24	1,629	234	6,494

[24] *Ibid.*, ". . . Straits Settlements," p. 134; ". . . Federated Malay States," p. 8.

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The complete English course up to the VIIth standard corresponded in intention to that of an elementary school in England, though falling short of it in practice. To the ordinary non-European it represented a "higher" education [25] and very few went further. To encourage the brighter lads to remain at school annual scholarships, known later as "Queen's Scholarships", were instituted in 1886, enabling the successful candidates to proceed to an English University. With the same object the Cambridge Local Examinations were introduced in 1891; but in 1900 only some two hundred were receiving a secondary education and practically all these were from the Colony. Not many stayed at school up to the VIIth standard, as their one object was to acquire enough English to become a clerk and they could achieve this after the IVth standard.

The vernacular course comprised four standards covering the three R's and a little very elementary geography; from about 1894 the pupils were taught the Roman as well as the Arabic characters. To improve the teaching a training school was opened in 1878, but the teachers were still unsatisfactory as they did not practice the virtues that they learned and taught. The chief problem however was to obtain the cooperation of the parents, who were "apathetic, jealous of the loss of their children's services, and distrustful of secular teaching."[26] They voluntarily sent their children to the Moslem schools for their spiritual welfare or to English schools for their material welfare, but the official vernacular schools offered them nothing in this world or the next. The use of the schools as centers for distributing quinine and other medicines did something to dispel the prejudice. From 1888 pupils were encouraged to complete the course by the grant of a free education in an English school to those few who did so. Gentle pressure was exercised through the chieftains and headmen and, as mentioned above, compulsory attendance was gradually introduced. In these various ways vernacular instruction made headway; and in 1900 it was estimated that about two-thirds of the Malay boys of

[25] *Ibid.*, ". . . Federated Malay States," p. 7.

[26] *Annual Report on Education in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States, 1938*, p. 18.

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school age attended school, though mostly for no longer than a year or two. Female education was still unpopular; in the States only about 250 girls attended vernacular schools, and those in English schools, about the same number, were Europeans or Eurasians. In the Colony the Malay girls' schools were few and very ill-attended.[27] There were few vernacular schools except for Malays as it was felt that to provide schools for foreign Asiatics "would be committing the fatal error of encouraging them in the idea that China or India is their home."[28]

Thus by the end of the century English education was firmly established on an economic basis. There was no unemployment among school graduates and no discontent; on the contrary, there were bitter complaints both from Government and commercial firms at the high salaries that had to be paid for incompetent clerks. The Government has succeeded in getting a considerable proportion of the younger boys into the vernacular schools, but not for long enough to acquire literacy, and it had failed to organize a demand among the people in general for primary instruction.

Netherlands India

One of the indirect consequences of the French Revolution was the collapse of the Dutch East India Company, which went bankrupt and was taken over by the home government. Dutch rule was still concentrated in Java, which, between 1808 and 1815, passed successively to the French and English. Raffles (1811-15) believed fervently in the new Liberal principles of equal law and economic freedom, and replaced the Dutch system of indirect rule by the system of direct rule, then recently adopted in India. Liberal ideas prevailed among the Dutch when they regained possession, and they tried to reconstruct their rule on the foundations laid by Raffles. But free trade, though profitable to the English manufacturer, was unprofitable to the Dutch, who had no manufactures. Gradually they reverted to the older plan of obtaining tribute by indirect

[27] *Special Reports, loc. cit.*, "Federated Malay States," p. 8; ". . . Straits Settlements," p. 141.

[28] *Ibid.*, ". . . Federated Malay States," p. 11.

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rule. This developed in 1830 into the Culture System under which the whole of Java became one huge agricultural enterprise, run by the Government untrammelled by parliamentary control. In 1848 the Liberals came into power and, under a parliamentary system, gradually substituted private enterprise for State enterprise. Although the growth of manufactures in the Netherlands gave Java some importance as a market, it was chiefly valuable throughout the nineteenth century as a source of agricultural products under European management, and for this the system of indirect rule was most expedient. The possessions outside Java were neglected, except that from about 1870 European enterprise spread to the East Coast of Sumatra. In British India the encouragement of trade under direct rule gave, or seemed to give, the natives an outlet to the modern world, whereas in the Netherlands Indies dependence upon tribute under a system of indirect rule shut up the natives in their own world. On the other hand the British system gave few openings to Europeans except as high officials and employers, whereas the Dutch system required a large establishment of European subordinates. These different characteristics of the respective systems required a corresponding divergence in educational policy.

The Constitutional Regulation of 1818, in which the Dutch expounded their future policy, was colored by the prevalent Liberalism and recognized the principle of providing instruction for both European and non-European inhabitants. The considerable and growing number of Europeans and Eurasians (juridically Europeans) needed European schools; to these schools natives were cautiously admitted. Under the Culture System a primary course sufficed to equip the lads for such posts as were available. After 1870, Europeans grew rapidly in number: the work in administration and on the plantations grew more complex and required better educated men; and, as Europeans and their families passed more freely to and fro between Java and the Netherlands, they demanded that the schools in Java should be on the same level as those at home. Until 1890 home politics precluded State aid to denominational institutions, and public instruction was mainly in

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871 State schools. In 1900 all the secondary schools and almost all the primary schools were managed by the State, and of the few private schools only nine were helped from public funds. It should be noted that all these schools were meant for Europeans in contrast to the English in Malaya which were open to all classes; they corresponded to the English schools as distinct from Anglo-vernacular schools in India and Burma. This appears clearly in the table below.

EUROPEAN SCHOOLS AND PUPILS, 1900[29]

	Secondary			Primary		
Management	*Schools*	*Pupils*	*Non-Europeans*	*Schools*	*Pupils*	*Non-Europeans*
Government	7	1,139	19	130	15,642	1,870
Private	..	..	..	21	3,270	51

The course in these schools was mostly academic. Apart from two training schools for teachers there was no provision for vocational instruction. Towards the end of the century the growing use of machinery on the sugar estates called into existence engineering classes; and a demand for skilled "European" workmen was met by trade classes provided for destitute Europeans by charitable organizations.

As regards native education, an inquiry held in accordance with the Regulation of 1818 did not lead to action. Missionaries, admitted since 1814, were restricted to the eastern archipelago, where the people were heathen or already Christian, and there was no fear of inflaming Moslem sentiment. In the Netherlands, Liberal enthusiasm waned, and in the Netherlands Indies the reversion to indirect rule obviated the need for a large staff of native assistants. A few members of leading families were sent to learn Dutch in European homes or schools, and some Dutch officials, as office work increased, made private arrangements for training clerks. But under the Culture System there was no economic demand for native education, and the Malays under Dutch rule were as apathetic as were the Malays and Burmans under British rule.

The first acknowledgment that native subordinates required Western education came in 1848 when the Government sanc-

[29] *Jaarcijfers, 1900.*

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tioned an annual grant of f.25,000 for schools among the Javanese "especially with a view to the training of officials."[30] This measure was strictly utilitarian, but with the revival of Liberalism, more generous views were making headway and found an eloquent exponent in Baron van Hoevell, a Dutch pastor who left Java in 1848 to enter the States-General as an ally of the Liberal statesman Thorbecke. In 1851 the ban on missionary work in Java was withdrawn, and in 1854 a new Constitutional Law for India recommended native education to the special care of Government. "It is our task, our duty," said Thorbecke, "to spread light in India."[31]

But, as elsewhere, the humanitarians were ahead of the times. Ten years elapsed before the measure even began to take effect. Then in 1864 Eurasians and natives were made eligible for the higher administrative posts; the Dutch schools, closed to natives since 1848, were reopened to them; the limit of f.25,000 for native education was removed, and an Inspector of Native Education was appointed. In 1867 there followed the creation of a Department of Education, Religion and Industry. The Suez Canal gave a new impetus to commerce and educa-

NON-EUROPEAN SCHOOLS AND PUPILS, 1900[32]

	First Class		Others			
	State		*State*		*Private*	
	Schools	*Pupils*	*Schools*	*Pupils*	*Schools*	*Pupils*
Natives.....	4	208	539	88,235	840	58,132
Foreign.....	..	..	..	..	696	13,349
Orientals.....	..	..	..	..	..	..

tion, and the schools for natives grew in number and in the scope of the curriculum. This became too cumbrous for most pupils. A new "First Class School" was therefore created, primarily for officials; the old schools were retained under the name of Second Class Schools for natives who would remain within the eastern world. The original intention was that native education should be dominated by the State, but financial stringency rendered this impossible, and private enterprise

[30] Hollandsch-Inlandsch Onderwijs-Commissie (1931), *Resumé*, p. 1.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[32] *Jaarcijfers, 1900.*

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played an increasing part, especially after 1890 when religious bodies became eligible for grants.[33] Alongside vernacular schools for natives, there also grew up schools for other Orientals.

In addition to these schools there were five schools for the training of teachers and one for training medical subordinates. The ordinary native school served the same purpose as elsewhere in providing townsfolk with an elementary education suitable to their requirements; but in the Netherlands-Indies it did more than this, as it was practically the sole avenue for natives to employment under Government and this was its chief attraction. The training and medical schools also led to comparatively well paid official posts and the students were partly recruited from men with no interest in or intention to practice teaching or medicine, but who could not afford or obtain any other form of instruction.

Indo-China

Aspirations in the Far East brought the French into conflict with Annam in 1858. In that year they took Saigon, and between 1862 and 1867 the rest of Cochin-China. For some time Norodom, King of Cambodia, had been at issue with both Siam and Annam, and in 1863 he accepted French protection; Siamese claims over Cambodia were renounced in 1867 except for two provinces, Battambang and Angkor, which did not come under French rule until 1907. In 1884 the French made further progress by extending suzerainty over Annam; the northern province, Tonkin, came under direct rule, and Annam proper remained a Protectorate. Friction with Siam led to the constitution of a French Protectorate over Laos in 1885-86. In 1898 the French obtained from China a lease of Kwangchouwan in Kwangtung.

In Cambodia and Laos there was an Indian civilization similar to that of Burma and Siam, but the other peoples derived their civilization mainly from China. In all these countries there were native schools. In the sphere of Indian influence there were monastic schools as in other Buddhist lands. In the regions under Chinese influence there was a comprehensive

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

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system of education based on the Chinese classics. It was essentially philosophic and religious; and, though many of the people learned to read and write, few went further. But the schools differed from those in Buddhist countries in being formally linked up with the civil administration, and the members of the civil service were recruited from boys who began their education in the village schools and passed by a series of examinations through more advanced schools.

The French on their arrival in Cochin-China needed interpreters and not philosophers. Although the native system provided "a solid basis of Moral education," it seemed of little value "pour les besoins de la vie pratique." [34] In any case the French could not take over the system, as it broke down when the Emperor of Annam, on ceding Cochin-China, recalled all the officials, including educational officials. Under British and Dutch rule, long years of contact had built up a tradition that officials should be conversant with the native tongue, but few French were able to speak Annamese, and it seemed easier to teach the people French. This agreed with the prevailing colonial doctrine of assimilation. According to the instructions to the first civil Governor, "no sacrifices could be more useful and fruitful than those which the colony should make to familiarize the Annamese with French ideas on morality, science and economics." [35] But educational policy was closely entangled in home politics; the French tradition of a centralized administration tied the colonial government with red tape to Paris; anti-clericalists were jealous of missionary enterprise, and many people were critical of imperialist expansion.

Until 1879 Cochin-China was governed by a succession of admirals. When the southern provinces of Cochin-China were ceded to the French in 1862 stipends were granted to natives who would attend the missionary Ecole d'Adran in Saigon to be trained as teachers in Franco-vernacular schools. This raised the problem of writing Annamese. The current use of Chinese characters enhanced the difficulty of the language and the Government decided to adopt a system, known as *quoc ngu*, devised

[34] Gourdon, H., *op. cit.*, p. 219.
[35] Cited by Wyndham, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

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871 by missionaries in the seventeenth century for writing Annamese in Roman characters. In 1864 Franco-vernacular schools were opened in the larger centers. But the Annamese though zealous for the traditional learning, remained indifferent or hostile to the new secular schools. Even stipends failed to attract pupils, and schooling was regarded as a corvée, the whole village subscribing to indemnify those who would send their sons to school. Gradually however the people learned that the school led to promotion, and even before the introduction of civil rule the schools were crowded with the sons of notables. Meanwhile the older village schools were disappearing, and attempts to replace them with Western schools were unsuccessful. Thus the admirals "had unwittingly destroyed the traditional education . . . and the problem of mass education was totally untouched." [36]

The civil Governor appointed in 1879 had a special mission to promote assimilation. "On paper schools were established in each village and canton," [37] but for some years the scheme was not translated into practice. By the end of the century there were about ten to twenty thousand children in village schools learning *quoc ngu* and a little arithmetic, and about five thousand in the Franco-vernacular schools. There were also a few hundred children in schools reserved for European and Eurasians; these could acquire a primary diploma but it was not recognized in France. With a view to promoting assimilation a few native students had been sent to absorb French culture in Paris, but some of them had come back disaffected to French rule. The general result of educational progress in Cochin-China by 1900 was summarized by the Lieutenant Governor. "A few hundred natives could speak French adequately. A few thousand could gabble it well enough to earn a living as servants, cooks, coolies and so on, and the rest were more illiterate than their fathers had been before the French occupation. Meanwhile the curves of crime and European education rose concurrently." [38]

[36] Thompson, Virginia, *op. cit.*, p. 285.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 286.
[38] Harmand, Jules, *Domination et Colonisation* (1910), p. 264.

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Outside Cochin-China Western instruction made slower progress. In Cambodia French rule was merely nominal, and there was no attempt to change the monastic system of education. In Annam the position was very similar. But Tonkin was brought under French administration and, as in Cochin-China, the French officials depended on native intermediaries in their relations with the villagers. An attempt was made to spread French rapidly and widely, so that no Frenchman traveling anywhere should fail to find some one to whom he could convey his meaning. The people however preferred their children to be taught classical Chinese. The French therefore founded Franco-vernacular schools for training native subordinates and by the end of the century there were some 1500 pupils in these schools.[39] But here, as in Cochin-China the standard attained was far below a complete primary course. Western instruction did not penetrate beyond the provincial capitals and some prefectures, and the native system continued to function in the villages.

The Philippines

The troubles of Spain during the nineteenth century were necessarily reflected in the Philippines. In colonial history the outstanding event was the secession of Mexico in 1823. Until then the Philippines had been governed from Mexico and tied to it commercially and financially, but now they were brought into direct relations with the homeland. Spaniards with the new Liberal ideas arrived in larger numbers, and Filipinos began to send their sons to Europe. The impact of Liberalism and modern progress shook the old concept of education as the handmaid of religion and, though the friars continued to give primary instruction in the vernacular, the University of Manila began to produce graduates with Liberal views. In 1855 a Commission was appointed to consider the improvement of education and, especially, the extension of Spanish. During the 'sixties the Liberal movement made great headway; an Education Code was promulgated in 1863, and two years later the Jesuits opened a Normal School. In 1870 steamers began to

[39] Brenier, H., *Essai d'Atlas Statistique* (1914).

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87 arrive directly from Barcelona by the Suez Canal, and the immediate sequel was a rapid growth of trade, accompanied, despite a clerical reaction, by a corresponding growth of education with a multiplication of schools and pupils. The conflict between a clerical government and Liberal Filipinos came to a head with the Revolution of 1896, which lasted until the United States defeated first Spain and then the rebels.

The Education Code of 1863 directed that at the headquarters of every township (*pueblo*) there should be at least one primary school for boys and one for girls; in large towns there were to be extra schools for each five thousand of the population. Attendance was to be compulsory and, for the poor, free. (Before resorting to compulsion, however, the parish priest was to exhort the mothers on the spiritual and material benefits of education.) The course would comprise three classes with two grades in the top class. The teachers would be recruited from a normal school maintained by the Jesuits. The parish priests would be *ex officio* inspectors, and the supreme direction was vested in Provincial Boards under the local prelates and a Superior Commission with the Archbishop as President. After five years no Filipino would be eligible for a salaried post under Government without a knowledge of Spanish; after fifteen years a knowledge of Spanish would be required for local offices and for exemption from labor dues. The accompanying Regulations prescribed the primary syllabus: Christian doctrine and sacred history, reading and writing in the vernacular, arithmetic, elementary Spanish and the general history and geography of Spain, practical agriculture, deportment, and vocal music. In the girls' schools domestic training was to replace Spanish geography and history and agriculture.[40] The progress of primary instruction is indicated in the following table, though the figures are only approximately correct.

By the end of Spanish rule the number of schools had risen to 2,167. (The figure 200,000, sometimes given as the total attendance at that time, would seem to refer to boys only.)

There were a few secondary schools, some dating from the early days of Spanish rule and intended originally for Euro-

[40] *Census, 1903*, Vol. III, p. 576.

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peans but later opened to natives. The complete course lasted five years, leading up to the baccalaureate; it consisted mainly of Latin and philosophy and neglected natural science. Three of the secondary schools for boys, including the Municipal Athenaeum of Manila, were official institutions but under clerical control, and there were 41 private schools, of which 14 were in Manila. Of the schools for girls two dated from the

NUMBER OF SCHOOLS AND PUPILS[41]

	1866	*1892*
Boys' Schools		
Number	840	1,087
Pupils	136,108	..
Girls' Schools		
Number	783	1,059
Pupils	9,608	..

seventeenth century, and some half dozen were founded in the last half of the nineteenth century; all these were maintained by religious bodies. The secondary schools comprised normal schools for men and women, a college of medicine and pharmacy, a nautical school, a school of painting, an agricultural school, founded in 1887, and about six seminaries for theological training.

Higher education was given in five provincial seminaries in the University of Manila. This was founded in 1619 as the College of St. Thomas and in 1645 was recognized by the Pope as a university with the right to grant degrees in theology and philosophy; also, from 1734, in canon and civil law. In 1785 chairs of literature, Roman law, medicine and mathematics were founded, but the two last were unoccupied for lack of pupils. In 1865 the university was reorganized on modern lines and partly secularized; it produced about three hundred graduates annually. The growth of commerce created a demand for lawyers; in 1883-84 there were 232 students of jurisprudence against 68 taking theology and medicine. At about the same time the students of medicine and pharmacy rose suddenly from 60 to 200.[42] Thus, although education remained under

[41] *Ibid.*, III, p. 593. Other sources give slightly different figures.
[42] *Ibid.*, III, p. 626.

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clerical control, the students were turning increasingly to secular careers, and especially the pursuit of law.

From this brief summary it is clear that by the end of the nineteenth century the Philippines were far ahead of any country in the Tropical Far East in respect of educational facilities. They stood alone also in female education. Nor was there any dependency where so many natives had been to Europe for their studies; and among these were the two outstanding figures of the struggle against Spain, Rizal and Aguinaldo.

Thailand

The European invasion of the Tropical Far East during the nineteenth century brought Western influence in due course to Thailand, then still known as Siam. Here the system of education, as of economic, social and political organization in general, closely resembled that of Burma. In every village there was a monastic school attended by all the boys. But Thailand was fortunate in its situation and its kings. The mutual jealousy of France and Britain favored its independence as a buffer State, and though it lost outlying provinces inhabited by Cambodians and Malays, the Thai region was preserved intact under its own rulers, who enlisted the cooperation of Europeans of divers nationalities in transforming the country from a mediaeval into a modern State.

The first step in this direction was taken when King Mongkut (1851-68) engaged an English governess for his heir, and allowed American missionaries to teach the ladies of his court. His successor, Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), visited Java, India and Europe, and not only sent his sons to study abroad but encouraged his nobles to follow his example. He came to look on the monastic schools as inadequate to modern needs, and in 1891-92 tried to effect an improvement by incorporating them in a system of general public instruction under a Ministry of Education. Provision was made in the capital, Bangkok, for instructing officials, and members of the upper classes in the English language and Western learning, and youths were sent in larger numbers for higher studies abroad; but up to the end

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of the century the mass of the people depended on the monastery for their schooling. 87/

Outside the schools, however, they were already gaining a far wider education in general experience. There was an Italian as instructor of the army; the navy was commanded by a Dane, with Danish and Norwegian officers, and the police, under a Dane, included English police officers from Burma; the Director of Railways was a German, and Germans were also in charge of the Posts and Telegraphs; an Englishman superintended the Forests, and Frenchmen the Medical and Engineering Departments; the Adviser on Foreign Affairs was successively a Belgian and an American, and there was an English Adviser on Finance. But alongside these foreign officials there were Siamese of high rank, gaining experience, and the subordinates were not foreigners, European, Indian or Chinese, as in some other parts of the Tropical Far East, but very largely natives. From these men, serving under foreign officials, and from the students sent to Europe, Thailand was gradually acquiring a modern education and a modern point of view far more effectively than through the schools, and a wider experience than in dependencies where the higher officials were all of one race and servants of the ruling power rather than of the local people.

Review

In this brief survey of the trend of educational progress in the Tropical Far East during the nineteenth century one outstanding feature is the striking synchronism of its course in the component regions. At the beginning of the century in all the countries under European rule we find humanitarian aspirations for the spread of education as a cultural asset: in the Charter of the English East India Company in 1813; in the Constitutional Regulation of 1818 for Netherlands India; under Raffles in Malaya; in the early days of civil rule in Burma; and in the dawn of Liberalism under Spanish rule in the Philippines. Humanitarian sentiment created a new atmosphere and gave a new color to policy, but had little practical effect until economic circumstances were propitious. Then in 1854

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the East India Company laid the foundations of modern public instruction in India; in the same year a new Constitutional Law provided for native education under Dutch rule; in 1855 a Commission of Enquiry in the Philippines made regulations that took effect in a Code of Public Instruction in 1863; an Education Department was established in Burma in 1866, in Netherlands India in 1867, and in British Malaya as the result of a committee appointed in 1870. That year the opening of the Suez Canal led everywhere to a rapid growth of trade and a corresponding development of public instruction.

Again, we find all over the Tropical Far East a wide divergence between humanitarian ideals and practical achievements. From 1854 the Government of India gave the first place in its educational policy to raising the cultural level of the masses; Thorbecke wanted to spread light in Java; Phayre in Burma hoped to build up general instruction in the monastic school; the Malayan Government was chiefly concerned to promote the interests of the Malays; the Spaniards wanted every one to learn Spanish; and the French sought to create a new France in Asia. But everywhere the people failed to respond to these advances.

The most obvious failure was in respect of primary vernacular instruction. The natives voluntarily sent their children to the monastic schools, the Koran schools or the schools teaching the Chinese classics; but they were indifferent or hostile to the new secular State schools, except in so far as these promoted individual material advancement. Lay vernacular instruction made slow progress in the towns, where it was of value to the growing class of traders and artisans, but in a preponderantly agricultural society it failed to reach the countryside. The peoples continued in their ancient prejudices and superstitions, unenlightened by the learning of the West, and at the same time in those countries with an old educational tradition, the native schools were losing their pupils and their influence.

On the other hand, Western letters were making rapid headway among the official classes. Schools teaching the appropriate and most useful European language enabled the pupils to earn good pay, conferred a social status and prospects of advance-

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ment; and these schools were overcrowded with lads seeking instruction, or at any rate a diploma, as a means of livelihood. But almost the only opening for them was as clerks or subordinates in government or commercial service, and the training in school, though nominally literary and academic, was in fact narrowly vocational. The more ambitious and intelligent men who went to Europe for higher studies but could find no suitable employment on their return, became centers of discontent. Practically the only profession freely open to large numbers of natives was the law, and lawyers multiplied exceedingly wherever there was a demand for them. All this was very different from the roseate hues of the early dawn of Liberalism. The advocates of education had expected to promote Christianity and Western culture, and to forge new links between the Western rulers and their Eastern subjects. But they had created enemies and a reaction against Western rule.

How far was this reaction caused by the ideas implanted by Western education, and how far did it result from the limitation of economic circumstances under which education labored? In their educational policy the colonial powers had not only possessed like aims but common principles. They accepted the fundamental postulates of Liberalism that economic progress is best forwarded by leaving every one to pursue his private interest without interference by the State, and that economic progress is the key to general welfare. On these principles they assumed that economic progress would make for enlightenment; and they thought to spread enlightenment by promoting economic progress. They placed economic progress first and gave enlightenment the second place, looking on it as a by-product of progress. In their primary aim they were successful, in the enrichment of the world and their own material advantage. How far the great mass of the dependent peoples profited materially is questionable, but there is general agreement that on the spiritual plane they were impoverished; the Eastern schools decayed and with them native culture and religion. Western statesmen had looked to transform oriental society by education; they brought into existence a new society, not however by education but by economic forces; and this new

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87/ society transformed the character of education. While the leaders of the people learned in school that the whole duty of man was to get on in the world, the mass of the people remained untouched by Western culture, and beneath the surface the fires of reaction against the Western world were smouldering.

EQUIVALENCE OF LOCAL GRADES AND STANDARDS

V = Vernacular; *E-V* = European-Vernacular; *E* = European

Norm	*Burma*(a)		*Neth. Indies*(b)		*Formosa*		*Indo-China*	*Malaya*	*Philippines*	*Thailand*
							Elementary, *V*	Malay *V*		
							I	I		
							II	II		
							III	III		
								IV		
Primary	Primary		Lower		Primary		Primary	Primary *E*	Primary	Primary
	V	*E-V*	*V*	*E-V*	*V*	*E*	Lower	Lower Class	*E*	*V*
	I				I		*E-V* & *E*	Upper Class	1	1
I	II	1	I		II		1	1	2	2
II	III	2	II	1	III	1	2	Middle	3	3
III	IV	3	III	2	IV	2	3	2	4	4
		4	IV	3	V	3	Upper	3	Inter-	Secondary
	Second-		V	4	VI	4	4	4	mediate	Lower
V	ary	5	VI	5	Link	5	5	5	5	5
VI		6	VII	6	Link	6	6		6	6
VII		7	Link	7			7		7	7
Second-	High	8	Mulo-Link		Middle		Secondary	Secondary	High	Secondary
ary		9	Mulo	8		7	8	6	8	Upper
VIII		10		9		8	9	7	9	8
IX	Univ.	1		10		9	10	Junior	10	9
X		2	Middle	11		10		Senior		10
XI				12		11		College		College
XII				13				3 Yrs.		1
XIII										2
Higher	Univ.		High		Univ.		Univ.		Univ.	Univ.
	3 to		School		7 Yrs.		3 to		4 to	3 to
	6 Yrs.		4 to				5 Yrs.		6 Yrs.	6 Yrs.
			6 Yrs.							

(a) In Burma and Netherlands India the Vernacular Course continues to the Xth standard, but has no further link with the European-vernacular, though in Burma any one who has passed the Xth Vernacular may sit for the Xth Anglo-vernacular in English only. In Indo-China and Malaya the Vernacular goes on up to Standard VI.

(b) Pupils in Dutch schools go straight from Standard 7 to Standard 8; pupils from Standard 7 in other schools must spend a year in a preparatory class (Mulo-link) before going into Mulo proper in Standard 8.

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CHAPTER IV

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EFFICIENCY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, 1900-1940

By the end of the nineteenth century Europe no longer granted the two main postulates of Liberal political philosophy. Experience had shown that unrestricted freedom of private enterprise is not the best method of promoting economic progress, and that economic progress is not in itself a sufficient guarantee of general welfare. In the interests of both efficiency and social justice, progress and welfare, there was a growing tendency to look for State aid to private enterprise and for State control over private enterprise on behalf of public welfare.

This new trend of thought reacted on colonial policy. In Britain it found expression in the doctrine of "the white man's burden" which "involved a new philosophy of politics and an ethical standard, serious and not ignoble"[1]; colonial statesmen in the Netherlands preached the "ethical" policy; and in French colonial theory "association" replaced "assimilation." At about the same time two new colonial powers emerged in the Tropical Far East; in 1895 Japan acquired Formosa, and in 1898 the United States took over the Philippines from Spain; and both framed their colonial policy in accordance with the new ideas, though applying them in different ways. Both aspects of the new policy implied a change of attitude to education which was regarded as a main instrument both of economic progress and human welfare; and once again, as in the early days of Liberalism, humanitarians and men of business joined forces in giving a new impulse to educational progress.

In the various countries of the Tropical Far East education, under the direction of a long series of transitory officials, had got into a rut. In India it was still held that "important benefits would be likely to accrue to Government and education by the

[1] Buchan, J., *Memory Hold-the-Door* (1942), p. 125.

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87/ relaxation of control," and less thought and vigilance was bestowed on the difficult and delicate problems of education than on problems of administration. In Indo-China "no one worried about such speculations." In Java a project of general public instruction put forward by a regent was waved aside as Utopian. "Qu'était l'enseignement aux indigènes dans la plupart des colonies et possessions d'outre-mer?" asked M. Louwers; and he replied "Bien peu de chose."[2] The system of instruction supplied the necessary subordinates for administration and commerce, and a generation that no longer felt the glow of early Liberal enthusiasm asked nothing more of it.

Yet forces, similar to those turning minds in Europe to ideas of efficiency and social justice, were at work below the surface in the East, threatening to ruffle this sluggish complacency. In some parts unemployment or insufficient pay or narrow prospects were fomenting discontent among the educated classes; in some cheap immigrant labor was stirring up resentment among the lower classes; everywhere debt was a growing burden on the peasant. Economic forces were loosening the bonds of social order and sapping the religious foundations of oriental life. All the material of political unrest was available for leaders with the skill to use it, and these were found among men who had learned the technique of party politics in Europe. Some merely wanted better jobs. Others were more dangerous because they did not want to get anything out of Government but wanted Government to get out, and could stimulate the dormant antipathy of the masses to foreign ways of life by appealing to religion; Tilak in India, Ky-dong in Annam, Rizal and Aglipay and Aguinaldo in the Philippines all used a Western education to proclaim a challenge to the West. Thus when colonial governments were being urged from Europe to move forward, smouldering fires beneath the surface were making their seats uncomfortably warm.

Idealism and a genuine feeling for the common man played their part in the new policy. At the same time common sense

[2] Chirol, V., *Indian Unrest* (1910) pp. 212, 238; Harmand, *op. cit.*, p. 256; Bert, J. Chailley, *Java et ses Habitants* (1900), p. 300; Institut Colonial International, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

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suggested that if funds spent on training unemployables and agitators were diverted to enlighten the people by primary instruction, they would be more docile and contented, and better able to cooperate in the plans of a benevolent government for their well being and the appeal to religious sentiment would lose its sting. Other factors were turning educational policy in this direction. Economic forces were making for the industrialization of the East, and also for a new development of its agricultural and mineral resources along capitalist lines. Vast quantities of cheap labor, local or imported, were available, but modern methods of production required labor that was reasonably intelligent as well as cheap. Primary instruction, it was hoped, would sharpen the laborer's intelligence and make him able and willing to work harder and more continuously and to have greater regard for the sanctity of contract[3]—the only saint in the Calendar of Mammon. Capitalist enterprise also required cheap technical subordinates; and technical instruction was expected to supply these, and also to make for prosperity and contentment by providing employment for the surplus of school graduates and by promoting better cultivation. The cultural and social defects of the system of public instruction were also gaining recognition, and remedies were sought in the encouragement of female education and in ethical and religious teaching.

Here then are the main features of the new educational policy that took shape at the beginning of the present century. It aimed especially at developing primary and technical instruction, it regarded literary and academic studies with disfavor, but laid great stress on the education of girls and at promoting high moral standards in the schools. But before this policy was well under way, all the combustible material, long ready to take fire, burst suddenly into flame with the victory of Japan over Russia. This did much to give a new stimulus and a new aspect to the growing impatience of foreign rule; hitherto it had been for the most part critical, seditious, destructive, but now it was inspired by a new constructive patriotism. Formerly

[3] Chirol, V., *op. cit.*; *Mayhew, Education of India*, p. 226; Mayhew, *Education in the Colonial Empire* (1938), pp. 94, 141, 143.

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811 Orientals had despised Western learning except for its bread and butter value; now they sought it as an instrument of liberation. The nationalists urged the importance of the vernaculars as a vehicle of the nationalist spirit, pressed for more scientific and technical instruction with a view to mastering the magic of the West, and demanded religious instruction in the schools as a prophylactic against the solvent influence of Western individualism. Superficially the nationalist policy in education had much in common with the official program. Nationalists and officials were in general agreement about educational machinery, but they wanted to use it for different purposes. Let us examine how it worked, and with what results.

Burma

In 1900 Burma was still a province of India, where Curzon (1898-1905), a fervent apostle of the doctrine of efficiency, devoted special attention to the problems of education. He appointed a committee to consider them and in 1904 published a Resolution expounding his new policy.[4] This recognized that education had come to be of economic rather than of cultural value. "In India, far more than in England, the majority of students who frequent the higher schools and universities are there for the purpose of qualifying themselves to earn an independent livelihood" . . . and the desire "to realize the manifold advantages as soon and as cheaply as possible tends to prevent both schools and colleges from filling their proper position as places of liberal education." As regards primary instruction Lord Curzon cited with approval the dictum that "among all the sources of administrative difficulty and political danger, few were so serious as the ignorance of the people"; from the economic standpoint, moreover, ignorance placed the cultivator at a disadvantage in commercial transactions and hampered welfare projects. He directed therefore that elementary vernacular instruction should be made a leading charge on provincial revenues, and "its encouragement should be a primary obligation." In secondary schools the course was "too literary in character." Hitherto technical instruction had been "mainly

[4] Annexed to the *Report on the Progress of Education in India*, 1892-1902.

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directed to the higher forms of technical instruction required to train men for government service"; the pupils in the few industrial schools looked chiefly to qualify for clerical employment at less cost than in the ordinary schools; and, though agriculture was the chief occupation, some provinces, including Burma made no attempt to teach it, and in others the schools had failed either to produce experts or to attract agriculturists. Now there was a need of technical instruction for the development of Indian industries, especially those resting on Indian capital, and special heed should be given to agricultural instruction; further, after the example of Japan and Siam, men should be sent abroad for higher technical studies. With a view to emphasizing the cultural rather than the economic aspect of education, he encouraged the provision of extra funds for female education, as by this "a far greater proportional impulse is imparted to the educational and moral tone of the people than through the education of men." He also alluded to the general belief that "an education modelled upon European principles and, so far as concerned government institutions, purely secular in character, had stimulated tendencies unfavourable to discipline and encouraged a spirit of irreverence." For a remedy he suggested the provision of "moral textbooks and primers of personal ethics" and a stricter departmental supervision over schools and pupils.

In this Resolution Lord Curzon had in mind Indian problems rather than those of Burma. In Burma the proportion of literate males was three times and that of females five times the proportion in Madras, Bombay or Bengal; hardly any one had been to Europe for higher studies, and although a few students had obtained Calcutta degrees there was no local university; the output from Western schools was still inadequate to the demand for clerks, and there was no unemployment and no unrest; industrial development had not yet begun, and it could be claimed that Burma "stands high in respect of discipline and moral training."[5] Thus the new educational program could be drawn up on a blank sheet.

Burma had its own problems. One was the strength of the

[5] *Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1899-1900*, p. 7.

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87 indigenous system of monastic schools. These could neither be incorporated in a secular State system nor disregarded; they gave Burma its high standard of literacy and were the only means of education in more than two-thirds of the villages, but they were not amenable to departmental regulations, their curriculum was limited and their method of teaching out of date. Another problem was that of the Indian immigrant. Burma had been conquered and governed from India. Indians, through long association with the British, were accustomed to modern business methods and, with a lower standard of living, would accept lower wages. With these advantages they had secured a stranglehold on commercial and industrial life and pushed Burmans out into the jungle where they had an advantage over the Indians as cultivators. In commerce the clerks were mostly Indians, and even in government service Indians filled the posts requiring technical qualifications. Naturally, when the Japanese victory over Russia bore fruit in nationalism, one of the demands of Burman nationalists was that places filled by Indians should be given to Burmans. In other respects the nationalist education policy in Burma followed the usual lines: Burmans pressed for scientific, vocational and technical instruction; they advocated, though with less zeal, primary education and urged that it should be made compulsory; they wanted Burmese to find a larger place in the Anglo-vernacular curriculum, and English to be taught in the vernacular schools; they insisted also that facilities should be given for instruction in the Buddhist faith. For a time there was a move to cut loose from the official educational system on the ground that it fostered a "slave mentality," and National Schools were founded which in their early days refused government assistance. But all this was a later development. In the early days of the new official policy at the beginning of the century nothing of this kind was anticipated.

The doctrine of efficiency through closer State control was emphasized by the local Government in official Resolutions[6] by the Director of Public Instruction in 1906.[7]

[6] *Ibid., 1897-1902,* Resolution.
[7] Cited by Campbell, *op. cit.,* p. 133.

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"Educationally the axis of the Province has been shifting. *Laissez faire* principles, which preferred to leave the guidance and practical management of education to private bodies or persons more or less irresponsible and with very varying views of the needs of the educated and the ends of education, have been tempered by a fuller sense of the State's obligations in the matter. In effect these obligations have a two-fold relation: they concern the State itself on the one hand, and on the other those whom for the State's sake and their own it is necessary to educate. As thus conceived education is not the necessary accident of a religious propaganda nor the provision of careers in life for various sections of the community. It is rather a vital and essential element in the organic life of the State itself."

In future education was to place first the welfare of the State, and next the welfare of the child, while religion as an element in education was an unnecessary accident. This view found expression in a less sympathetic attitude towards the monastic school, where most of the children learned their letters, and thereby hampered the campaign for extending primary instruction. The Director, while still claiming to base vernacular work on the monastic school, described the monks as "very ignorant, or very bigoted, or both."[8] By 1906 the lay schools (2,899) outnumbered the monastic schools (2,369), and ten years later there were 5,066 against 3,418.[9] In the following year, 1917, vernacular education was made over to local bodies, which had not sufficient funds to maintain all the schools and struck the less efficient off the register. Again in 1921 a new Director from India opened another campaign against inefficiency. The effect of these measures was to reduce the number of recognized monastic schools to 1,434 in 1921, though the schools struck off the registers went on working as before.

The decline caused some perturbation, and in 1924 the question of vernacular education was studied by a special committee. Its report is interesting as an index to the official conception of efficiency. It suggests that "the school's existence should be that of efficiency. . . . The efficiency of the schools

[8] *Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1897-1902*, p. 41.
[9] For these and subsequent figures see Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

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871 should be tested yearly by the results of a first public examination, as well as by other tests, if necessary, and those that fail to reach the desired level should be removed from the register or suffer such other penalty as may be laid down."[10] A further inquiry into vernacular education was held in 1936; the committee held that the monastic schools were of little value as institutions for secular education, and all expedients to bend them to secular purposes had failed. In 1933 there were 4,967, lay schools with 364,669 pupils but the number of registered monastic schools had fallen to 928 with 79,135 pupils; it was estimated that there were some 17,000 to 18,000 unregistered monastic schools with 200,000 pupils. The progress since 1900 is summarized in the following table.

PROGRESS OF EDUCATION, 1900-1940[11]

Year	a. No. of pupils at all recognized institutions.	b. Per cent of population	a. No. of pupils at unrecognized institutions.*	b. Per cent of population	Literacy per cent a. Male	b. Female	c. Both
	a	*b*	*a*	*b*	*a*	*b*	*c*
1900.....	159,394	1.72	147,682	1.62	37.6	6.1	22.1
1940.....	613,938	3.64	213,294	1.26	56.0	16.5	36.8

*Figures for unrecognized institutions are only approximate.

Figures for "literacy" must needs be somewhat arbitrary; probably many more, if pressed, could write their names and spell out simple notices. Female literacy is highest among Christian Karens (in 1921) with 27.7 per cent as against 12.2 per cent for Burmese Buddhist women, and 4.9 for Buddhist Karens. Despite the progress during the present century the Committee of 1936 put the figure for children of school-going age (6-11) at 1.6 million with 0.4 million at recognized institutions, and 1.0 million not at any school.[12] Moreover, of the pupils in registered schools 75 per cent did not go beyond Standard I and 87 per cent failed to complete the IV standard,

[10] Cited by Campbell, *op. cit.*, 141

[11] *Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1900-01; Statesman's Yearbook, 1941.*

[12] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

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reckoned as the minimum for permanent literacy.[13] It would seem therefore that only a small proportion of the registered schools produce much better results from the scholastic standpoint than the unregistered schools, while these still turn out men who, with no other schooling, may rise to be magistrates.

One recommendation of the Committee of 1924 was that 250 lay schools should be opened annually for five years in the poorer districts. The actual number opened in accordance with this plan was 1231.[14] But the results were deemed incommensurate with the cost, "the difficulty was to create a demand for the school," and opinion turned towards compulsory education. This was urged by some nationalist leaders and found support among educational authorities. A bill was drafted in 1928 and after consideration laid before the Legislature in 1932, but the cost was regarded as excessive and the difficulties as insuperable. The Committee of 1936 expressed the opinion that "the child cannot be left indefinitely to the mismanagement of ignorant parents"[15] and, deprecating criticism for its "excess of caution," recommended compulsory attendance up to the end of Standard II, for all children voluntarily enrolled in a recognized school. The proposal however was deemed premature; experience in other provinces of India had shown the difficulty of enforcing compulsion except against a recalcitrant minority, and before any such measure could be effective it would be necessary to educate "ignorant parents" to send their children for instruction.

The great obstacle was the lack of demand. The vernacular schools led nowhere. There was a "bridge" from Standard IV in Vernacular schools to Standard III in Anglo-vernacular schools, but of the few students eligible for "bridge scholarships"—some 250 a year—only about one half received them, and after 1934-35 only a quarter.[16] From 1927-28 those who passed the X-th Standard Vernacular were eligible for an Anglo-vernacular certificate on passing in English only. Otherwise the

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 151, 153.

[14] *Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1928-29*, p. 13; *ibid., 1927-32*, p. 20.

[15] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 190; *Report on the Administration of Burma, 1931-32*, p. 145; *Report on Public Instruction, Burma, 1933-37*, p. 23.

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87/ vernacular pupil had no prospects except as teacher in a vernacular school.[17] The recognition of English as a second language in the early 'twenties reduced wastage in the lower standards in those few schools that could comply with the conditions, and the closing of the lower standards in government Anglo-vernacular schools forced some children into the vernacular schools.[18] But in general the lay vernacular school outside the towns taught the child neither a better way of life nor a better means of living and, without endorsing the description of primary vernacular instruction given by the Committee of 1936 as a picture of "almost unrelieved gloom,"[19] it may be said that progress had certainly come far short of the objective set up at the beginning of the century.

In respect of more advanced instruction there was a still more striking contrast between intentions and results. "The accepted principles," said a Resolution of 1900, "are that Provincial Funds should devote proportionally more money to primary and less to secondary instruction."[20] But in 1937, as compared with 1900, there were 8 times as many pupils in the middle standards (V-VII), 25 times as many in the higher standards (VIII-X), and 15 times as many in the colleges. Meanwhile most money had been spent on the most advanced instruction by the establishment, in 1920, of the University of Rangoon.

PUPILS IN VARIOUS STAGES, 1900 and 1937[21]

1900			1937		
Middle	*High*	*Collegiate*	*Middle*	*High*	*Collegiate*
4,997	556	140	41,719	14,249	2,165

These Anglo-vernacular schools were situated in the towns. Of the total secondary school population 30 per cent were concentrated in Rangoon.[22] The course trained the pupils for urban life, and there were not sufficient openings for their employment. Thus by the force of economic circumstances there came

[17] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 156.
[18] *Report on Public Instruction, Burma, 1927-32*, p. 21; *ibid., 1933-37*, p. 20.
[19] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 156.
[20] *Report on Public Instruction, Burma, 1897-1902*, p. 3.
[21] *Ibid., 1900-01* and *1933-37*.
[22] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

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into existence the surplus of educated unemployables which Government had foreseen and which the new educational policy had been intended to prevent. On that policy technical rather than academic studies were to be encouraged for pupils in the higher grades. In 1900 there were no organized institutions for technical instruction and, "strictly speaking, no technical education."[23] There was a class for lawyers attached to Rangoon College, but doctors had to go to India for training, though nurses and midwives could be trained in Burma. "It is a popular cry" wrote the Director in 1900, "that technical education should be more largely introduced, and this form of education is spoken of as the great means of reforming the country."[24] At that time only the European community was vocal, but with the growth of Nationalism Burmans added their voice to the cry for technical instruction. Experiments were discouraging. In one town a technical school was founded with public subscriptions; costly buildings were erected and classes in various subjects were arranged, but pupils could not be attracted without stipends, and the school was finally closed as useless because there were no industries.[25] So far as a demand existed students were forthcoming, as for a weaving institute and technical classes for mechanics, etc., in Rangoon. But advantage of these opportunities was chiefly taken by Indians who were cheaper than Burmans to employ, and had fewer openings on the land and in the administrative services.

The problem of technical instruction was examined by a committee in 1927. This criticized the ordinary school curriculum as "divorced from realities" and made proposals for expanding technical instruction, but these remained ineffective for lack of funds.[26] By this time the output of the schools was catching up with the demand for clerks, and the unemployment of school graduates was beginning to attract attention. The matter was re-examined, together with vernacular education, by another committee in 1936, but this did little more

[23] *Report on Public Instruction, Burma, 1897-1902*, p. 29.
[24] *Ibid., 1899-1900*, p. 4.
[25] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 392.
[26] *Report on Public Instruction, Burma, 1927-32*, p. 23.

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87/ than lay down two principles: one that vocational education should not begin until the pupil has completed a sound "liberal" education; and the other that the provision of vocational education should be related to an actual demand for specific technical qualifications.[27] During a discussion in the Legislature it was suggested that "only criminals and defectives could obtain technical education in Burma." The Director accepted the criticism as "in the main true as regards school children,"[28] but for other persons thought the provision not inconsiderable for an agricultural country. There is, in fact, provision for instruction in medicine, law, forestry, veterinary science, teaching, engineering, industry, commerce, and art. But the total number receiving instruction under all these heads in 1937 was only 2,488, which is not very adequate for a population of over 16 million; and of these 1,269 were training as teachers and 613 were in commercial schools, leaving only 559 under all other heads. The separate figures are given in the table below. It seems that among students of university standing only 32 out

NUMBER OF TECHNICAL STUDENTS, 1937

	In Colleges	*In Schools*
Law	79	..
Medicine	147	103
Education	141	1,128
Engineering	54	75
Industrial	..	39
Veterinary	..	17
Forestry	..	47
Commerce	..	613
Art	..	45

of 79 in the law school were Burmese Buddhists, in Medicine 23 out of 147, in Education 55 out of 141 and in Engineering 16 out of 54. In the schools they were better represented, but these led only to subordinate appointments. In Medicine there were 42 Burman Buddhists out of 103, in Engineering 52 out of 75, in Education 880 out of 1,128, in Forestry 28 out of 47, and in Commerce 344 out of 613. But as Burmans form some 85 per cent of the population these figures are not very

[27] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 391.
[28] *Report on Public Instruction, Burma, 1927-32*, p. 29.

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satisfactory to Nationalists. The only schools classed under Vocation and Special Education in which Burmans preponderated were the Reformatories, where they numbered 308 out of 342, still less satisfactory, and giving some point to the gibe in the Legislature.

One subject is conspicuously absent from the above list, and that the most important—agriculture. Lord Curzon, in laying down the new policy, noted the absence of agricultural instruction in Burma. In 1924 an Agricultural College was opened but did not attract cultivators and closed in 1932 when recruitment for the department ceased. A vernacular school for cultivators, maintained by the American Baptist Mission, had at one time over sixty pupils,[29] and was well spoken of, but is not mentioned in recent departmental reports. From time to time great stress has been laid on the educational value of school gardens. But they were never popular with the pupils or their parents and were only maintained by schools "for the purpose of getting grants. When the grants ceased the gardens disappeared," and between 1933 and 1937 the number of school gardens fell from 395 to 19.[30] Thus "the all pervading bookishness and the dissociation of education generally from life and occupation" are still, as in 1900, among the chief defects of the system of instruction; it is not designed for a farmer's country, its whole bias is literary."[31] But it meets the economic demand, and the unsatisfactory progress of technical instruction, as of primary instruction, is due to the difficulty of organizing a demand for it. More perhaps might have been done for the teaching of natural science in schools, as this is the basis of most technical or vocational instruction. But this found a place in the curriculum only of recent years and on a very modest scale. In 1936 ten Anglo-vernacular High Schools gave teaching in chemistry and physics, and one only, a girls' school, in botany and zoology; eleven vernacular High Schools professed to teach "General Science," but the course included no laboratory

[29] *Indian Statutory Commission, 1930*, Vol. XI, p. 509.

[30] *Report on Public Instruction, Burma, 1933-37*, p. 37.

[31] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 2; *Report on Public Instruction, Burma, 1933-37*, p. 28.

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work.[32] The suggestion of Lord Curzon that students should be sent to Europe for higher technical studies was disregarded for some years, but just before the depression of the 'thirties the number sent averaged eight a year. The scheme was then suspended for three years, and on its revival seventeen in all were sent in two years.[33] But not a few of those sent abroad failed to find employment on their return.

The progress of female education has been much more satisfactory. The figures for the number of girls in each stage of instruction are compared in the table for 1900 and 1937. In the latter year nearly one third of the children in school were girls. The university and the village schools are co-educational, and so are many of the Middle and High Schools. The proportion of girls who do not get beyond the two lowest stand-

FEMALE EDUCATION[34]

	1900	*1937*
College	4	403
High School	63	2,436
Middle School	554	9,376
Upper Primary	1,103	34,367
Lower Primary	4,089	171,429
Total	5,813	218,011

ards, however, is higher even than for boys. Those who continue their studies further look very largely to the teaching profession, and their enthusiasm was dampened when access to this was restricted.

"What beacon of light," asks an Inspectress, "can we hold up to induce girls to seek education in higher departments when the only profession open to educated women has been almost killed by abolishing the teachers' training classes?"[35] Karen and Burmese Christians, however, seem to place a higher value on education as a cultural asset. There has always been a tradition of female education in Burma. It may be a pious fiction that

[32] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

[33] *Report on Public Instruction, Burma, 1927-32*, p. 28; *ibid., 1933-37*, p. 29; see also *1928-29*, p. 18.

[34] *Ibid., 1933-37*, p. 24. Other figures suggest a rather different total.

[35] *Ibid., 1927-32.*

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during the great age of Burma, about the time of the Norman conquest of England, the girls used to study the Pali scriptures over their cooking pots, but the legend has colored social life.[36] As already noticed, a tenth of the female prisoners were returned as literate in the Census of 1872. There has always been a potential demand for female education, and the growth of trade, which is largely in the hands of the women, has enhanced the value of the schools. Under Burmese rule girls had no access to the monastic schools; only under British rule have they have been given facilities for schooling, and they have taken good advantage of them. Even in monastic schools the prejudice against co-education is breaking down, and of the 8,114 Burman Buddhist girls attending unrecognized institutions in 1937 probably the great majority were in monastic schools.

One reason for the stress laid on female education in 1900 was that it would impart an impulse to the educational and moral tone of the people. In respect of discipline and moral training the schools in Burma were regarded as satisfactory, but new directions were given for the voluntary provision of religious instruction in all the schools. Most lay vernacular schools already included "religious instruction" in their syllabus, but this might signify nothing beyond the teaching of the Burmese alphabet. In the mission school the pupils were expected to take part in the general devotional exercises and to attend the classes in religious instruction. Many lads passed from one school to another. As small boys in the monastery they would be taught the vanity of human wishes; then in a Roman school they would be exhorted to avoid the heresies of Wyclif and Huss; if they went on to a Protestant school, the class would start the day with a prayer for success in the forthcoming examination; and they would probably end their school life in a government institution, where success in the examination was the only thing that mattered. With the growth of Nationalism the practice of imparting Christian instruction to Buddhist boys gave agitators a weapon for attacking a Govern-

[36] See, for example, the Census Report for 1872, which describes Burma as "a country where female education was a reality, before Oxford was founded."

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ment which, if not Christian, was at any rate not Buddhist. In response to the agitation, Government introduced a "conscience clause," of which not many parents took advantage.[37] When the political reforms placed education under a Burmese Minister, the instruction of Buddhist pupils in their own religion, formerly encouraged, was made compulsory in all Government and lay schools.[38]

Meanwhile the schools were losing their high moral tone. "The morals of the school boys were constantly under discussion." And, what was more disconcerting, the district with the best record for education was equally conspicuous for crime, and was also the center of the most serious rebellion that has ever troubled British rule. On this matter there were two schools of thought. Burmese opinion favored a good knowledge of the Buddhist Scriptures as an antidote to all moral evils, whereas educational officials trusted more to closer supervision, football, physical training, and the boy-scout movement.[39] Cleanliness was the next best thing to Godliness, and much easier for inspecting officers to assess, but teachers who preached hygiene seldom practiced it.[40] Neither religious instruction nor football restored the earlier high standards. In five years, 1932-37, there were over thirty school strikes. It was a common practice for schools to obtain grants in ways that would have been fraudulent if not condoned by the department.[41] For seventy years Government had been trying to secularize the monastic schools; now it seemed that "how to spiritualize education was the real problem."[42]

From this brief review of progress under the various heads of the new policy laid down by Lord Curzon, it seems clear that it had not achieved the results anticipated. On the contrary, although in Burma it began with a clean sheet, yet in the next generation education in Burma followed along much the same lines as under the old policy in India and produced the

[37] *Ibid., 1928-29*, p. 24.
[38] *Ibid., 1927-32*, p. 37.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 37.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 40.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 17; *Report of the Bribery and Corruption Committee, 1941*, p. 34.
[42] *Report on Public Instruction, Burma* [illegible] 37, p. 40.

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same unsatisfactory results that the new policy was intended to prevent. We shall be in a better position to inquire into the reasons when we have examined the course of educational progress elsewhere.

Malaya[43]

At the end of the nineteenth century conditions in Malaya had much in common with conditions in Burma. The Malays had been left behind by the course of progress, and industry and commerce were dominated by Europeans and foreign Asiatics. Although there was no unrest or unemployment, and the output from the schools was still inadequate to the demand. the system of public instruction was criticized on much the same grounds as in India. It was said to be "unpractical, to make the people litigious, to inspire a distaste for manual and technical work, and to create a class of literary malcontents, useless to their communities and a source of trouble to the Empire."[44] The remedies proposed were also very similar; closer State control, and the encouragement of vernacular and technical instruction.

A more active policy in education was indicated by the appointment in 1901 of a Director of Public Instruction for the whole of the Straits Settlements. To promote "a due measure of uniformity in administration and educational aims,"[45] his charge was extended in 1906 to cover the Federated States. One feature of this appointment deserves special notice. The Director has always been a member of the Civil Service and not of the Education Service. To foster education among an illiterate people is an administrative rather than an educational problem and requires an intimate knowledge of the people rather than scholastic experience; and the fact that in Malaya education has been directed by men acquainted with the people in their homes and not only with the children in school probably goes far to account for the measure of success attained. Further evi-

[43] The statistical and other information in this paragraph does not cover the Unfederated States, which it has not been found practicable to include.

[44] Wilkinson, R. J., *The Education of Asiatics*, Special Report, 1902 (cd. 835).

[45] *Education Report*, 1938, p. 8.

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dence of the renewed interest in education at the turn of the century appeared in the appointment, in 1902, of a Commission to examine the existing system.

Vernacular instruction among the Malays had already made considerable progress, but parents were still reluctant to send their children to school even though buildings, quarters, staff, equipment and books all cost them nothing, and in 1908 the provisions for compulsory attendance, already applied in the States, were extended to the Colony. By this time Malay rulers were looking to modern education as a means whereby their people could withstand Chinese and Indian competition; and their influence, together with the growth of national feeling among the Malays, did much to reconcile the people to secular instruction. But the vernacular schools still led nowhere; even the boys who became eligible for free education in an English school by completing the vernacular course were usually too old to profit by the concession. In 1918 it was made conditional on their having completed the course before their eleventh birthday, and boys admitted under this scheme were given an intensive course in English. This effective link with the English schools made the vernacular schools more attractive. Thus by a combination of gentle pressure and good prospects vernacular education made such progress that now compulsion is almost superfluous and the difficulty now is to find accommodations for all who wish to enter. At the Census of 1931 there were returned as literate 35.5 per cent of the men and 7.6 per cent of the women, with 24.1 per cent for both sexes together, while of the rising generation 80 per cent of the boys and 20 per cent of the girls were said to be attaining literacy.[46] The details of those at school are given below.

A new feature of the present century has been the provision of vernacular schools for non-Malays. Formerly this was deprecated as tending to keep them foreigners; but such considerations lost their force in the new zeal for economic efficiency, and in 1902 it was "decided to open Government schools for Tamils . . . with the object of making the Federated Malay States, from the point of view of the Indian immigrant, an out-

[46] *Census Report, 1931*, p. 91.

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lying portion of India, like Ceylon."[47] With the development of rubber, Indian coolies were wanted in large numbers; the provision of Tamil schools was found to encourage immigration, and planters came to recognize the advantage of opening schools on their estates.

That a large alien population has political and economic disadvantages is, however, already evident in regard to Chinese immigration. The Chinese have always predominated in the English schools, and have also arranged for the instruction of boys outside the English schools. The creation of the Chinese Republic stimulated them to new zeal in founding schools to give their children a modern education in their own tongue. From 1920, *kuo yu*, the "national language," was adopted as the basis of their system, and the textbooks were found to contain much political and anti-foreign matter. These were banned both in Malaya and in Netherlands India, and the publishers arranged to avoid further loss by printing special books for European dependencies. Better control over Chinese schools was obtained by the introduction, in 1924, of a system of grants-in-aid to approved schools, though few took advantage of it before the great depression.[48] Another recent development tending to improve the relations of the Chinese schools with the Government has been the introduction of English as a second language. The basis of control over these and other schools however, rests on the Registration of Schools Ordinance of 1920, requiring the registration of all secular schools attended by ten or more pupils.[49]

As regards the English schools the position has entirely changed since the beginning of the century. Then any one with a smattering of English could get a job, and employers complained bitterly of having to pay high wages to lads who were clerks "neither in *esse* nor in *posse*."[50] The supply of clerks gradually caught up with the demand and, with the depression of the 'thirties, overtook it; now, highly qualified men cannot

[47] Special Report (Cd. 2379), *Federated Malay States*, p. 11 n.
[48] Mills, Lennox A., *British Rule in Eastern Asia* (1942), p. 358 n.
[49] *Education Report, 1938*, p. 23.
[50] Special Report (Cd. 2379), p. 21.

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find employment. This threatens "economic disorganization and social unrest," and "one of the gravest problems of today is to devise types of instruction fitting the youth of Malaya for such careers as the country offers." Attempts to reduce the output from schools under Government control merely had the effect of sending more boys to private schools run solely for profit. The table shows that, despite the rapid progress of Malay vernacular schools, the English schools went ahead still faster, and in these schools the Malays lag far behind. Above the Malay classes for students from vernacular schools the Primary Grade in English schools comprises a Lower and Upper Primary Class and Standard I; next comes the Middle Grade (Standards II to V), and then the Secondary Grade with Standards VI and VII and a Junior and Senior Certificate class; one or two schools have a Post-Certificate or High School class.

NUMBER OF PUPILS, 1900 and 1938[81]

Type of School	*1900*	*1938* *Boys*	*Girls*
Vernacular			
Malay	13,898	59,383	22,984
Chinese	..	66,645	24,889
Indian	..	17,484	8,222
English	9,157	44,323	18,541
Total	23,055	187,835	74,636

The surplus of school graduates has revived interest in technical education. One of the questions examined by the Commission of 1902 was how to give the system of instruction a more practical bent. Further inquiries were made in 1917, 1918 and 1926. The Commission of 1902 reported that there was no demand for commercial or technical training, but recommended that instruction should be provided in lieu of scholarships to Europe, and suggested the inclusion of science in the school curriculum. The scholarships were reduced in number and in 1910-11 abolished; but this discouraged students from going beyond the VIIIth standard, and they had to be restored. A science master was appointed to one school until the war

[81] *Education Report, 1938*, pp. 77, 80, 81, 82. Other figures suggest a rather different total.

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took him away and temporarily extinguished the teaching of science. In 1926 the Committee regarded the circumstances as still unpropitious for technical instruction. In industry "the principal need of the country is unskilled manual labour, which is supplied by the Chinese and Indian immigrants." "We fear," they said, "that many of the youth of this country have a genuine distaste for hard and continuous manual labour"—shared, not improbably, by most members of the Committee.

PROPORTION OF PUPILS IN ENGLISH AND VERNACULAR SCHOOLS[52]

	Per cent		
	S. S.	*F. M. S.*	*Malaya*
English	8.2	4.1	6.6
Malay	7.3	18.2	11.7
Chinese	70.9	49.0	62.0
Indian	12.5	28.0	18.8
Others	1.1	0.7	0.9

For technicians the number of openings was limited,[53] and most of the skilled workmen were Chinese, so that Indians and Malays, and even local-born Chinese, had little chance of employment. In the Committee's opinion "the most important educational need of the moment" was an agricultural school.

For some years the Agricultural Department had been recruiting Asiatics, and since 1924 had made provision for instructing them. In private enterprise also there was a limited demand for local men with some knowledge of agriculture. An Agricultural School was opened in 1931, providing a choice of elementary or advanced courses, but stipends had to be granted to attract Malays. The ensuing depression enlarged the field for employment, as Asiatics were wanted in place of Europeans whom the estates could no longer afford to entertain. But the planters preferred Chinese and, though the Agricultural Department gave a preference to Malays, its demands were limited. Very little success seems to have been attained in enabling cultivators to work their land more profitably.

As regards industry, the 1926 Committee seems to have looked at technical instruction too much from the standpoint

[52] *Education Report, 1938.*
[53] Cited, Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 368.

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811 of big business. For, as elsewhere in the East, the petrol engine has given the local people a fresh start at less disadvantage with their competitors. Not only did Malays come forward to train as fitters and mechanics in European workshops, but many started their own small establishments or set up as taxi drivers. A Trade School was started in 1926 to help them and was so successful that tailoring, carpentry and furniture making were added, though the last two gave less favorable results, as most of the employers are Chinese and refuse to entertain Malay labor.

The Queens' Scholarships were restored in 1923 in the Colony and 1931 in the States—two to each, with one in the States reserved for Malays. Many private students, especially Chinese, go abroad for study. In 1938 students from the Colony numbered 73 in Britain, 47 in Hongkong, 1 in China, 10 in India, 9 in the United States, and 5 elsewhere; figures for the Federated States are not available. The teaching of science was resumed about 1925 and is now popular in the few schools where it is provided.

Professional education began with the opening of a Medical School at the instance of the Chinese community in 1905. Originally it aimed merely at training medical subordinates and "local practitioners in racial sympathy with the peoples of Malaya,"[54] but so rapid was its progress that in 1916 its degrees were recognized by the British General Medical Council. The planters recognized the value of medical attention to their coolies and in 1939, 40 per cent of the graduates were in private practice.[55] The great obstacle, however, is the difficulty of educating the people to appreciate Western medicine, despite strenuous propaganda. For a higher education in other branches of arts and science Raffles College was founded in 1928. It aims at giving a diploma equivalent to the pass degree of a university. Up to 1939, 48 per cent of the entrants failed to obtain diplomas, and of those who succeeded 82 per cent of the men and all the women took to teaching; 11 per cent obtained posts under Government, and only 3 per cent commer-

[54] *Education Report, 1938*, p. 15.
[55] Mills *op. cit.*, p. 368.

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cial posts. Of recent years, however, the surplus of would-be clerks has made a commercial training valuable, and some schools in Singapore prepare candidates for the examinations of the London Chamber of Commerce. In this matter, as in all branches of vocational and technical instruction, demand is the condition of progress, and it is because demand is lacking that progress is so slow. Details are given in the table. There are

NUMBER OF STUDENTS RECEIVING TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION, 1938

	High School	*Technical School*
Education	160	469
Medicine	176	..
Engineering and Industry	154	640
Commerce	..	827
Agriculture	58	..

also 963 students in evening classes. Malays constitute the bulk of the students in education and make a good show in the trade schools but are less than ten per cent of the students of commerce.

In female education there has been marvellously rapid progress. In 1900 there were only some five hundred girls at schools in the States, and the Malay girls' schools in the Colony were "very few and very ill-attended." "There is," said the Director, "no more absolutely ignorant, prejudiced and super-

FEMALE EDUCATION, 1938[56]

Schools	Number of Students *S. S.*	*F. M. S.*
Vernacular		
Malay	6,324	16,660
Chinese	12,794	12,095
Indian	1,201	7,985
English	8,113	5,449
Private	4,988	

stitious class of people in the world than the Straits-born Chinese woman. Almost the same may be said of Malay women and of a majority of the Eurasians."[57] But the Chinese were converted by the Revolution and their experience during the War,

[56] Special Reports (Cd. 2379). *Straits Settlements*, pp. 141, 148.
[57] *Education Report, 1938*, p. 77.

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87 and their example kindled enthusiasm among the Malays, which developed rapidly from about 1928 and ten years later "the flood of applications for the admission of girls could not be stemmed."[58]

The policy in respect of religious and moral training is much the same as in other British dependencies. Religious instruction is given out of school hours; hostels are regarded as nurseries of virtue, and great importance is attached to school games, which are generally regarded as part of the curriculum popular with the Malays, though some Chinese who "want to learn in order to make money" are apt to grudge the time for recreation. It is doubtful how far the religious and ethical instruction is effective. Non-Christians often "take" religious knowledge in examinations under the impression that it is a soft option, and choose Paley's *Evidences of Christianity* at Cambridge for the same reason. Teachers of hygiene sleep in unventilated rooms and neglect the most elementary precautions as to food and drink that they impress daily on their pupils. Similarly they preach thrift though notoriously in debt. As the Director remarks, until they practice what they preach, their teaching is not likely to be successful.[59]

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 77. Other figures suggest a rather different total.

[59] *Education Report, 1938*, pp. 89, 96. Special Report (Cd. 2379), Federated Malay States.

CHAPTER V

EFFICIENCY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, 1900-1940 871
(*Continued*)

Netherlands India

Under Dutch rule the reaction against Liberalism in the direction of greater State activity to promote efficiency and social justice came to be known as the "ethical" policy. Moral uplift required firm government, so also did capitalist enterprise; and between 1900 and 1910 effective administration was rapidly extended over the Outer Provinces, hitherto neglected. The aim of the ethical policy was to readjust native society to the Western world; this involved the diffusion of vernacular and technical instruction and the provision of facilities for secondary instruction, such as had long been available to natives under British rule.

A prospect of the new policy in its educational and economic aspects was drafted at the request of Government by Fock, a Liberal who had long practiced as an advocate in Java. In 1907, as Colonial Minister, he included in his budget a comprehensive scheme for vernacular and technical instruction. He proposed to open a large number of Second Class Schools. These schools, known later as Standard Schools, are still the usual native schools in towns and resemble the urban vernacular school of Burma. But they were too costly for the villages, and Van Heutsz, the Governor-General, devised a simpler school, teaching the bare rudiments of the three R's, towards the cost of which the village and the parents should contribute. The chief obstacle was the reluctance of the parents to send their children to school. To bring the Department into closer touch with the people, the Director was given the help of an Adviser and Assistant-Adviser from the Civil Service[1] and, by the remission of fees, and by "gentle pressure" through the na-

[1] *Regeerings-Almanak*, 1930, I, p. 350.

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871 tive officials who, on the Dutch system of indirect rule, retain much of their inherited authority, the prejudice was in part dispelled. There still remained the difficulty that these schools led nowhere. The same objection attached to the Standard Schools, though with less force, as these were helpful to petty traders and artisans. Dutch was the only avenue to social and material advancement. (Later, in 1922, by way of making the vernacular schools more attractive, "link" schools were to be established by which the pupils could find access to a new type of school where they might learn Dutch.)

In 1903, in accordance with "ethical" principles, natives were re-admitted into European schools, where they could qualify as clerks. The consequent influx of natives threatened to destroy the European character of these schools, and, to relieve the pressure, Dutch was added to the curriculum of the First Class School. But the natives "valued Dutch only when it led to a Diploma."[2] The First Class Schools did not prepare students for the Clerkship (K. A.) Examination, and they remained unpopular, while the pressure on the European schools continued.

By this time nationalism was becoming a political force. The Chinese were the first to respond, and they began to modernize their schools and to introduce the teaching of English. This was prejudicial to Dutch political and economic interests, and it was arranged that Dutch-Chinese Schools should give much the same course as the European schools and enjoy the same privileges. A similar device was adopted for the First Class Schools, and the natives were thus enabled to obtain a complete primary education through the medium of Dutch. In 1914 the First Class Schools were re-classified as Dutch-Vernacular Schools, which involved no change in the curriculum but paved the way for fitting them into a comprehensive scheme for higher studies.

The new scheme involved the creation of schools where secondary education could be given. In the first instance the de-

[2] H.-I. Onderwijs-Commissie, *Résumé*, p. 7.

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mand was met by providing schools for More Extended Lower Instruction (M. U. L. O.), or Mulo Schools. These were open to pupils from all schools on a Western basis, Dutch, Dutch-Chinese and Dutch-vernacular, but pupils from the Dutch-Chinese and Dutch-vernacular schools were placed in a preparatory class. The Mulo diploma corresponds approximately to Matriculation in British India. Some Mulo graduates wanted to go further and in 1919 their requirements were met by the creation of General Middle Schools, taking them up to the standard required for admission to a university in the Netherlands —approximately that of the Intermediate Examination in British India. Some Mulo graduates go on to vocational instruction, and some leave school; in 1926 the Mulo course was revised to provide suitably for all three types of student. Similarly, the General Middle School has three sections: Mathematics and General Science; Western Letters; and Oriental Letters.

Two features of the system deserve special notice. One is that in the Mulo Schools the pupils learn not only Dutch but also English and German, and thus have access to a wider field of Western learning than in British India, where few study any Western language except English. The other is the high standard of education. Generally throughout the East the high goal of study is the diploma and not the attainments that it represents, and this drags standards downwards. But in Netherlands India many European children will go to a university in Europe, and their parents demand instruction well up to the necessary standard; attainments are as important as diplomas. The whole system indeed is throughout linked up with that of the home schools. At every stage children in the Dutch schools in Netherlands India must be up to the work of the corresponding standard in Europe, when their parents are at home on leave, and at every stage children in the mixed schools must be able to enter the corresponding standard in a Dutch school. Thus the demand of European parents for a high level of education is diffused through all classes. The proportion of literacy is shown in the table below.

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NUMBERS AT SCHOOL, 1900 and 1938[a]

Type and Grade of School	1900	1938			
	Total	Native	Foreign Asiatic	European	Total
Vernacular					
Rural	..	1,826,906	12,480	..	1,839,386
Urban	146,575	276,052	2,163	2	278,217
Chinese	13,349	65	2,200	..	2,265
Primary					
Dutch-Native	..	77,173	1,681	506	79,360
Dutch-Chinese	..	2,100	22,350	396	24,846
European	18,192(a)	5,236	1,436	39,015	45,687
Secondary					
Mixed	..	7,968	2,612	3,571	14,151
European	1,139(b)	724	838	4,845	6,407
Total	179,255	2,196,224	45,760	48,335	2,290,319

(a) Includes 1,921 non-Europeans; (b) Includes 19 non-Europeans.

LITERACY, 1930

Region	Per cent		
	Natives	Chinese	All Races
Java			
Male	9.7	47.5	10.7
Female	1.4	16.0	1.9
Total	5.5	33.3	6.2
Outer Provinces			
Male	13.4	33.2	14.5
Female	4.0	7.7	4.2
Total	8.7	24.7	9.5
Netherlands India			
Male	10.8	39.5	11.9
Female	2.2	12.4	2.6
Total	6.4	28.9	7.2

It will be noticed that among natives the percentage of literacy is lower in Java than in the Outer Provinces which, although more backward from the economic standpoint, include districts, such as Menado and the Molaccas, that have long been active centers of missionary effort and contain a large proportion of Christians. Among the Chinese on the other hand the proportion is lower in the Outer Provinces, where coolies are numerous; in Java nearly one-half of the male Chinese are literate.

[a] *Jaarcijfers, 1900; Statistical Abstract, 1940.*

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Despite the growth of education the population has grown even faster, and in 1930 the number of children not at any recognized school was larger than in 1900. Moreover, the figures give an unduly favorable impression, as they do not reveal the wastage. It seems that of the children in the vernacular schools only about one-third complete the course, and of those entering the Dutch-vernacular schools only 45.5 per cent obtain a Primary Diploma, and not more than 14 per cent survive to the end of the Secondary course.[4] On the other hand, some 400,000 children in Koran schools[5] do not appear in the above statement, and there are a few thousand in the "wild" schools, with a nationalist bias and independent of the official system. Some of these have been doing useful work, notably the *Taman-siswo* schools, but many are poor imitations of the State schools. The emergence of these schools has led to a change in educational policy. Formerly European schools had to be registered, but native schools, then unimportant, were exempt. The growth of native education during the present century changed the position; and, when the "wild" schools sprang up, native schools were subjected to the same restrictions as European schools. This occasioned some controversy, and under new regulations of 1932 both Europeans and natives were allowed to teach on merely giving notice of their intention, though for teaching European pupils a diploma was required.

With the growth of education there has been a steady drift of school graduates to the large towns, where they can best profit from their attainments.[6] As the numbers of those who hold diplomas have increased, the values of the diplomas have fallen. Since 1900, about half of those with the Clerkship (K. A.) diploma have found employment under Government. In 1928 the number obtaining the diploma was 6,559, and the average number of vacancies annually was 447.[7] As elsewhere, the overproduction of school graduates has revived interest in technical instruction. At the beginning of the century there were no technical schools, and the few technical classes were

[4] *Résumé, op. cit.*, p. 32. However, conclusions based on 1930 figures are probably much less valid today.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 72. [6] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

[7] H.-I. Onderwijs-Commissie, *Eind-Rapport*, p. 45.

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87/ a preserve for Europeans. The first technical school was established in 1901 and, with subsequent foundations, provided technical subordinates for the rapidly expanding European enterprise. The war of 1914-18 gave a new impetus to industrial development and caused a shortage of engineers from Europe, and in 1919 the Bandoeng Engineering College was founded by private capitalists. Natives were not excluded except by financial limitations and because their demand for technical instruction was slight; but technical instruction remained largely a preserve for Europeans.

One aim of the ethical policy was to promote industrial development among the natives. Fock attacked the problem along three lines. He hoped to train natives for technical posts under Government, for employment in private industry, and for the creation of native industry. The first objective was not difficult, as the growing extension of State activities opened a field for employment, and the gradual improvement of academic education supplied men with the necessary basis for technical instruction. In all Departments now, the lower and middle grades are mainly recruited from local men with a specialized training of a primary or secondary standard. In private enterprise there has been an increasing demand for skilled labor and technical assistants. In 1910 three trade schools were opened, and the men readily found work. The war, and the relations between Capital and Labor after the war, enhanced the demand for men of this type. New schools were opened at other centers, and also branch schools with a shorter course. But until the depression of the 'thirties enforced rigid economy, only very subordinate positions were open to local men.

Fock's third aim was more ambitious. He hoped to train artisans who would raise the standard of native industry and develop new occupations. But there was no demand for such men in the native world before the introduction of motors and bicycles. Now many men trained in government shops set up as cycle smiths or in various branches of the motor business, and some men find work in the very few native industries. From about 1929 the Government made a serious attempt to develop native weaving, not merely as an interesting craft but as a

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modern business. They turned the nationalist movement for home products to good account and had considerable success in improving not only weaving but also the ancillary crafts of dyeing, and carpentry for the manufacture of looms. This came in useful when cheap goods from Japan threatened the cotton market, as not only Dutch cottons, but also native cottons were prejudiced. Further experience has shown that the simple hand loom can compete successfully with machinery. The manufacture of hats was encouraged in a similar way. It is still more remarkable that persistent efforts and many experiments seem to have had some success in attracting cultivators to agricultural schools. The secret of this seems to be a close study of agricultural economy, which has made it possible to adapt scientific principles to native practice, instead of trying to adapt native methods to scientific principles.

In higher education, vocational and cultural progress has been much slower. The leaders of the ethical movement favored sending men to Europe, holding that higher studies could flourish only in a congenial environment.[8] That had never been the Dutch policy, and in 1900 there were only five native students in Europe. For a few years they were sent more freely, and by 1908 the number had risen to 23. Most of them looked for appointments in the higher branches of the government service; but there was some hesitation in admitting them, and the consequent discontent among the students, fanned by the growth of Nationalism, threatened dangerous political reactions. An experiment in sending some of the hereditary native officials was also thought unsuccessful, and the opinion made headway that it was better for Orientals to remain at home.

This implied the provision of facilities for higher studies in Netherlands India for those few with a sufficiently good general education. But the large European population and the high pitch of European enterprise had attracted European professional men who did not relish native competition; the lawyers resisted the opening of a Law School in 1909, and the Medical Association protested against a new Medical School

[8] Schrieke, J. B. O., in Bradley, E., *The University Outside Europe* (1939), p. 267.

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87 in 1913. On the other hand, the shortage of engineers, caused by the war, induced European men of business to take an active part in promoting technical studies and, as mentioned above, to found an Engineering College in 1919. This was taken over by the Government in 1924; a Law College was founded in the same year, and a Medical College in 1926. All these colleges give a full course of the same standard as a university in Europe. The present war gave a new impetus to local industry; and by cutting off the Indies from Holland, made it desirable to provide industrial training in the East. Other colleges have therefore been added, and the whole complex has been grouped together as the University of Batavia. The following table shows the number of students enrolled.[9]

NUMBER OF COLLEGE STUDENTS, 1935-36

Faculty	*Europeans*		*Natives*		*Chinese*		*Total*	
	M.	*F.*	*M.*	*F.*	*M.*	*F.*	*M.*	*F.*
Engineering	66	3	49	1	31	..	146	4
Law	61	6	204	7	50	9	315	22
Medicine	88	16	243	12	159	16	490	44

The above table shows that women are beginning to seek a career in the professions. The pioneer of female education was Miss Kartini, the daughter of a high Javanese official, who looked on education, and especially the education of women, as an instrument for the advancement of her people. "Educate the women," she said, "and you will find sturdy cooperators in the splendid and gigantic task of civilizing millions." She found a friend in the Director of Education, a leader of the ethical movement, and about 1900 opened a school for the daughters of officials. By 1928 nearly 20 per cent of the native children in the primary and lower schools were girls, and in the missionary centers, Menado and the Moluccas, over a third. In schools teaching Dutch the proportion of girls rose during the same period from about 15 per cent to 30 per cent. The growth of female education among the Chinese is still more remarkable. In 1928, of the total number in all schools, 37.19

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 274.

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were girls, and in schools teaching Dutch the percentage had risen from about 11 per cent to 40 per cent.[10]

A notable educational invention is the People's Library. When rural education first started in 1907 the Dutch realized that it was of little use to teach people to read if they had no books, and that the first difficulty was to create the reading habit. Children taught to find a pleasure in reading might continue to read after they left school, and might borrow books even if they would not buy them. Libraries were therefore established in connection with the schools; children may borrow books without payment, but adults pay a small fee. At first all the books were in the vernacular, but later it was found that there was a demand for Dutch books also. By 1937 there were 2,528 vernacular libraries and 158 Dutch libraries lending out some three million books. The books are mostly publications of the Bureau—either indigenous stories rewritten or Western works adapted or translated, both fiction and non-fiction. Now the people are buying the books, which are sent around in vans, and some agents can sell books to the value of fl.1,000 a month. The remuneration of the author or compiler depends partly on the sales, and a technique for translation and adaptation has thus been worked out. The example has been followed on a modest scale in Malaya and Indo-China.

Indo-China

Nowhere in the Tropical Far East was the educational system so keenly criticized at the beginning of the century as in Indo-China. It was blamed both for what it had done and for what it had left undone; in Cochin-China it had sapped authority and broken down the social order; in Annam on the other hand it had taken no hold upon the people. By this time the generous ideal of inspiring the Annamese with French culture had lost much of its attraction. "It was not for its beauty that subject peoples learned the French language, but for its utility"; the study was not so profitable as they had expected, and the bitterest enemies of the French were among those who knew the language best.[11]

[10] *Résumé*, p. 27.
[11] Harmand, *op. cit.*, pp. 265, 281.

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87/ The new doctrine of efficiency was brought to Indo-China by Doumer (1897-1902), but he was preoccupied with administrative and economic problems, and did little for public instruction beyond suggesting principles and founding a trade school in each of the three capitals. It was his successor, Paul Beau, who laid the foundations of the modern educational system. Harmand, writing in 1910, summarized the current French doctrine.[12] Purely native schools should be encouraged, but the teaching of French confined to towns where it would be of practical use, and Western learning extended cautiously. Vocational training was desirable because the Government, planters, industrialists and merchants all wanted cheap assistants, and it would be hopeless to introduce machinery if there were no one to run it or effect simple repairs. But such instruction could be better given in workshops than in schools. Secondary and higher instruction should look to utility and form technicians rather than savants.

The instrument devised by Beau for reorganizing public instruction was the *Conseil de Perfectionnement de l'Enseignement Indigène*, created in 1906, which played a great part in the educational reforms of the next few years. The central idea of the new system was that natives should begin their education in the vernacular schools, and the more intelligent should pass on through French-vernacular primary schools to the secondary stage. At the bottom of the ladder was the Elementary or Village School in which Chinese characters were used, though *quoc-ngu* might also be taught. This led on to the Primary Vernacular School at the headquarters of the canton (township), in which both Chinese characters and *quoc-ngu* were compulsory, and French was optional. A few went on to the Complementary (or secondary) Vernacular School. Western science was added to the curriculum in deference to nationalist wishes, and normal schools were founded to provide teachers and to improve the standard of teaching.[13] The system was first introduced in Tonkin and Annam, and in 1909-10 was extended to Cochin-China. By 1913 there were 49,399

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 272 ff.
[13] Brenier, *op. cit.*, p. 119; Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

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pupils in the elementary stage, and 12,103 in the primary stage. 871
But many remained outside. In Tonkin and Annam there was still a preference for private education, and in Cambodia and Laos there were only the monastic schools. In these the monks were encouraged to adopt modern textbooks, and in 1912 a public examination was introduced for pupils from monastic schools, with an Elementary Certificate for those who passed.[14] The plan was much like that proposed by Phayre in Burma. Like many other projects, not only in education, nor in Indo-China alone, it was introduced with enthusiasm, reported on favorably for a few years—and then forgotten.

The Elementary Certificate in the village schools also gave admission to the French-vernacular Primary Schools, which had been opened in Cochin-China since 1879 and in the other provinces between 1904 and 1906.[15] In these schools the medium of instruction was French, which pupils from the elementary school could not understand. A Preparatory Course was therefore introduced, laying special stress on French but using the vernacular as the medium of instruction. In 1913 there were 19,267 pupils in the Preparatory Schools and 17,628 in the Primary Schools. Pupils were expected to complete the primary course by the age of 14, when they became eligible for the secondary schools, where they worked alongside French students.

Meanwhile a course for French students had grown up to meet the needs of the European population. This comprised a Primary Course, with Lower and Upper Grades, and a Secondary Course, with only a Lower Grade—until 1912, when an Upper Grade was opened in one school, which acquired recognition as a Lycée. The total number of French students in 1913 was 1,193 of whom 172 were in the Lycée, together with 84 natives.[16]

The war gave a new stimulus to cultural assimilation and educational progress. In 1915 the competitive examinations for the mandarinate, in which the Chinese classics figure largely, were abolished in Tonkin, "and this was the death sentence for

[14] Brenier, *loc. cit.*
[15] *Ibid., loc. cit.*
[16] *Ibid., loc. cit.*

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traditional culture."[17] On the other hand, Sarraut (1917-19) compiled a Code of Public Instruction, emphasizing the importance of French, and attempted to amalgamate the elementary and primary schools by taking over the village schools and introducing into them the teaching of French. He also gave new facilities for secondary and higher education. The postwar years saw a reaction against Liberal ideas, typified by Merlin (1923-25), with his "rather negative dread of higher education";[18] and even more sympathetic rulers like Varenne could not resist the current of opinion in favor of primary instruction rather than higher studies.[19] It has however been found necessary to abandon Sarraut's project of taking over primary instruction by the State; it was too costly, and it was also impracticable to provide instruction for everyone in French. In 1924 the division into vernacular and French-vernacular schools was restored; in the former the medium of instruction is the vernacular, with French as an optional subject. Progress was still slow, and in 1926 villages that could not be provided with State schools were allowed to open village schools at their own expense, but subject to official approval and supervision. In Cambodia the monastic schools were still functioning as village schools, and in 1924 a new attempt was made to incorporate them in the official system. Suitable textbooks were prepared, and monks were encouraged to volunteer for training. The experiment promised success, and in 1930 the King "signed a Royal Ordinance . . . to revive everywhere the Pagoda schools."[20] By 1936-37 over a thousand monks had been approved as teachers, and there were 813 pagoda schools with 34,462 boys and 121 girls.[21] (In Burma 928 recognized monastic schools with 79,135 pupils.)

In order to improve the teaching in these schools there are *"Formations de pénétration scolaire,"* which send itinerant teachers around to the pagoda and other village schools. In

[17] Thompson, *loc. cit.*, p. 291.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 293.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 295
[20] Keesing, *Education in Pacific Countries*, pp. 78, 79.
[21] *Annuaire Statistique, 1936-37* (Hanoi, 1938). Other figures for that year are from the same source.

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1936-37 there were 3,740 schools under this scheme, with 155,933 boys and 8,115 girls. The Elementary schools in the same year numbered 2,496, with 135,306 boys and 31,315 girls; and there were 59,399 boys and 16,541 girls in the elementary department of schools of higher standing. The course lasts three years and includes the three R's, some notions of local history and geography, and in some schools a little French.

NUMBER OF STUDENTS, 1936-37

Grade	Native Public	Native Private	French Public	French Private
Elementary	406,669	62,423(*)		
Primary				
Lower	55,025	22,986	4,759	2,078
Upper	4,611	5,422(b)	449	587
Secondary	41		1,485(c)	
University	612	..	..	..
Technical	1,889	..	..	..

(*) Includes Chinese schools but not Malay or Burman.
(b) Includes Chinese Lycée.
(c) Includes 675 Natives and Chinese.

In the Village and Pagoda schools the same course is followed so far as practicable, but the aim is to replace them with State Elementary schools. At the end of the course there is an examination for the Elementary Certificate; in 1936-37 only 47,293 were successful and of these 11,804 passed the test in French, and 5,621 in Chinese.

Successful candidates are eligible for the Primary School with two grades, Lower and Upper, lasting three and four years respectively. The Lower Grade schools (*écoles de plein exercice*) have elementary departments. The medium of instruction in the Primary Grade is French, but the aim is to give the oriental equivalent of a modern classical education. The curriculum is based on the local vernacular, French and a classical language, Chinese, Pali or Sanskrit, and it comprises the usual school subjects, including Elementary Science in the Lower Grade and Chemistry and Physics in the Upper Grade. The Lower Grade leads up to the Certificate of Franco-vernacular Primary studies, and is a qualification for some minor appointments, including that of Assistant Teacher, and also qualifies

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871 for promotion to the Upper Primary course. This has two branches, one for general students and one for teachers, comprising agriculture, psychology and practical teaching. In 1936-37 there were eighteen Upper Primary schools. Successful candidates receive the Diplomas of Primary Franco-vernacular studies.

In the Primary Grade the education of French children is usually separate from that of natives, but follows along the same lines. In the Secondary Grade both follow the same course and largely in the same schools. In 1936-37 there were four native secondary schools, and of the three lycées two admitted natives. As the native candidates far exceed the vacancies in number, there is a stiff competitive examination for entrance. The course carries on the attempt made in the primary school to give a modern general education on the basis of oriental culture. It lasts three years, and the baccalaureate examination at the end qualifies the student for admission to a university in France as well as to that at Hanoi.

Alongside the public schools there are also private schools. Most of these follow the ordinary course; they comprise both lay and mission schools, with 36,010 pupils in lay schools, mostly Franco-vernacular, and 41,711 in mission schools, mostly vernacular. Missionary work had been hampered by anti-clericalism and was badly hit by the war of 1914-18; since then the annual arrivals have been reduced by two-thirds. The lay schools, about half Chinese and half Annamese, represent progressive Nationalism and aim at combining Western science with Eastern culture. There are also purely Chinese schools—with 13,110 pupils, including 156 in a lycée, and some small Burmese and Malay schools with about 500 pupils. The birth of Nationalism was contemporaneous with the reforms of Beau, and in its early stages found expression in associations for promoting Western learning and modernizing literature, and also, rather later, in a long succession of school strikes, beginning in 1909.[22] Before long Chinese textbooks began to spread dangerous thoughts even in public schools, and unsuitable works were banned. The Chinese and Annamese replied by opening private

[22] Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

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schools. These multiplied rapidly and, with the rise of Communism in post-war China, were regarded as centers of infection. In 1924 the Annamese schools were required to comply with "regulations for scholastic hygiene"[23]—moral, presumably, rather than physical. In 1930 the regulations were extended to Chinese, Malay and Burman schools. The curriculum in these schools is much the same as in the official schools.

The apex of the whole system is the University of Hanoi. This was founded by Beau in 1907 as a concession to the new spirit of Nationalism, and to give ambitious students a local alternative to Japan or Hongkong. But the growth of a more assertive Nationalism caused a reaction, and the university was closed in 1908 and not reopened until 1917, when Sarraut tried to kill Nationalism with kindness. It was reorganized in 1925, with schools of Law, Medicine, Fine Arts, Education, Commerce, Public Works, and Agriculture and Forestry; all but the first three, however, were closed in 1931 as a result of the depression. The course lasts from three to five years. In 1936-37 there were 359 students of Law, 202 of Medicine, and 51 of Fine Arts (painting and architecture); they include some fifty French. Some students go on to universities in France. Official policy has varied greatly, from encouragement to discouragement, according as the students have been regarded as hostages to French culture or as potential rebels, but not a few who have studied in France have achieved notable success.

Female education is backward. In 1913 there were no more than 3,230 girls at school, and in 1936-37, although the number had risen to 63,918 in public schools, 55,971 were in the elementary grade; in the pagoda schools the girls are much fewer than in the corresponding schools in Burma.

Vocational and technical education is also backward. The excessive number of lawyers has been described as "a menace to social equilibrium."[24] The Government has tried to maintain close relations with capitalist enterprise in the provision of "apprentices and qualified workers," and to preserve a strict correlation between the requirements of industry and the out-

[23] *Teaching in French Indo-China*, p. 14.
[24] Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

87 put of the schools; annually local officials report the number of openings available, and admissions into the schools are regulated accordingly.[25] According to a report of 1931 there were three technical schools giving instruction in the handling of iron, wood and electrical apparatus; these were linked up with the navy, marine, and military aviation respectively. "Electricity and mechanics applied to machines and motors (and above all repairs and driving of automobiles) have developed spontaneously and attract the largest number of students."[26] Another group comprised schools of applied art. In a third group there were two schools of apprenticeship and industrial planning. In 1936-37 there were 11 technical schools in all, a school for the blind, and 20 technical departments attached to primary schools; the total number of pupils was 1889, including 314 girls.

No account of French education would be complete without a tribute to the work done in oriental science, literature and art by the *Ecole de l'Extrême Orient*, Hanoi and the Buddhist School at Pnom Penh. As can be seen above, much has been done to promote Western art, and the present writer cannot forget the large number of Annamese in the audience at the Opera House in Saigon. The Dutch have encouraged painting and so, of recent years and on a smaller scale, have the British, but in the cultivation of artistic sensibility, the French unquestionably lead the way.

The Philippines

During the last half of the nineteenth century the conflict in the Philippines between clerical rule and Liberal ideas grew tenser. It came to a head in 1896 with the execution of Rizal, which was the signal for a general rebellion. By 1898 the insurgents were pressing on Manila, when war broke out between Spain and the United States. The war ended in December with the cession of the Philippines to America, and the Filipinos, who had welcomed the Americans as allies, found themselves

[25] *Teaching in French Indo-China*, p. 12. Keesing, *Education in Pacific Countries*, p. 135; Ennis, T. E., *French Policy and Developments in Indo-China* (1936), p. 175.

[26] *Teaching in French Indo-China*, p. 13.

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American subjects. Although organized resistance dragged on until the surrender of Aguinaldo in 1901, the forms of civil government were introduced in 1900, by a Philippine Comission with Judge W. H. Taft as its presiding officer. In the following year he was appointed Governor-General, and three Filipinos were nominated to the Commission. From the outset American rule was inspired by two ideas: the doctrine of efficiency in the interests of economic progress, and the principle of self-government by the introduction of American institutions. At the beginning of the American regime only 15 per cent of Philippine exports went to the United States, but of recent years 75 per cent of all the trade was with the United States;[27] thus there has been a radical transformation of the economic environment. With the growth of American business interests there has sometimes been a trend towards giving the first place to efficiency. But the claims to independence urged by the Filipinos found much sympathy among the large mass of Americans traditionally opposed to Imperialism, and also increasing support from sugar growers and dairy farmers in the United States, averse to the importation of Filipino products at privileged rates, and from labor leaders apprehensive of danger to American standards of living. Out of this conflict of ideas and interests was born the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, constituting the Commonwealth of the Philippines with a promise of complete independence in 1946.

The Spaniards came to the Philippines doubly armed with swords and missals; the Americans came with rifles and school primers.[28] The army leaders held that no measure would so quickly promote the pacification of the islands as the introduction of the American school system. In each new stretch of country occupied, officers were detailed as school superintendents and private soldiers as teachers; altogether the military commanders opened about a thousand schools, for which the General selected and ordered textbooks. The civil government showed no less zeal and imported civilian teachers to replace the soldiers. By 1902 there were 926 American school teachers, but

[27] Keesing, F. M., *The Philippines* (1937), p. 85.
[28] *Census, 1903*, III, p. 638.

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87 since then the number has declined, and in 1939 out of nearly 40,000 teachers only 80 were Americans. The Government regarded English as the best instrument for inculcating the principles of modern progress, and the Filipinos recognized it as the best means of getting on in the world.[29] English was therefore adopted as the medium of instruction, and, indeed with a large crowd of teachers, ignorant alike of Spanish and the native languages, no other course was practicable.

The teachers were full of missionary zeal to implant the gospel of equality, democracy and love of country, and they succeeded the friars as the general guides and guardians of the people. "Almost without exception they joined the Filipino leaders in spreading the doctrine of Filipino nationality and patriotism";[30] portraits of the national heroes adorned the school-room walls, their lives were related in the textbooks, and the Filipino national anthem was sung daily in all the schools. Through all the phases of American policy the zeal for education has been unabated, and the primary function of the system has been "to facilitate progress along the road to democratic self-government."[31] The Filipinos are no less zealous than the Americans, and even the children take their schooling seriously. The table below gives some indication of the progress achieved.

PROGRESS OF EDUCATION, 1903-1938[32]

Type of School	*Standard*	*No. of Pupils* 1903	1938
Primary			
Elementary....	1— 4	261,615	1,408,652
Intermediate...	5— 7		250,503
Secondary			
High School...	8—11	4,747	76,084
Collegiate.....	..	436	3,629
University.....	..		7,711
Private.....	..	89,567	129,591

Criticism follows much the same lines as elsewhere: the system is charged with being wasteful and unpractical, and some are

[29] *Ibid.*, III, p. 647.
[30] Hayden, J. R., *The Philippines, a Study in National Development*, pp. 515-6.
[31] *Census, 1903*, III, p. 671; *Statesman's Yearbook, 1941*.
[32] Hayden, *op. cit.*, p. 467.

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uneasy at its secular character. Of more particular application to the Philippines are the complaints that more regard has been paid to quantity than to quality, that the system is excessively directed to political education, and that the use of a foreign language was a mistake. A somewhat unfavorable picture was given by an American Commission in 1925. Their report, known usually as the Monroe Survey, gives the average period of school attendance as less than three years; 82 per cent did not go beyond the 4th grade, took five years to do it, and even then were only on the same level as pupils after the 2nd standard in the United States. From recent figures it seems that 48 per cent survive to complete the 4th standard,[33] which compares favorably with results in countries with a much smaller proportion at school. The political bent, regarded as excessive, would seem to have been a chief factor in getting so many to school and keeping them at school, judged by the standards of the Tropical Far East, so long. But it does not seem to have been very effective in pressing home the idea of democracy; for what has emerged is a one-party government—democratic possibly, but not at all like that intended.

The advantages of English as a medium of instruction were debated until the foundation of the Commonwealth. The chief reason for adopting it in the first instance was practical; in no other language could education be rapidly pushed forward. It has helped to diffuse Western ideas among the people and has given larger numbers chances of employment. But it has never struck home; the pupils, parents and even the teachers seldom use English out of school. In school "both teachers and pupils function in an atmosphere of book-learning,"[34] and in the administration the use of English tends to divorce the officials from the people. As a second language it is likely to survive, but the Commonwealth Government has adopted for official use a modified form of Tagalog, one of the chief native dialects.

The secular character of the system of public instruction has not aroused appreciable opposition. Under Spanish rule the Liberals advocated secular instruction as part of the reaction

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 472.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 118.

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against the clericalism of the Government, and some of the lay schools which they founded still survive. So far as secular instruction was distrusted, hostility was mitigated by the fact that both Americans and Filipinos professed Christianity. But there were some who still valued religion as a basis of education and preferred their old Church schools. These now provide for about 100,000 of the 130,000 pupils at private schools. The old University of St. Thomas has not only survived but has grown lustily; now it numbers 4,000 students and "combines with modern literary and professional training, classical scholarship and the cultural values inherent in that form of learning." Other institutions on the contrary reflect the values inherent in education regarded as an economic asset, and one difficulty has been to prevent them from exploiting the general eagerness for diplomas. Many were eliminated by the recognition only of diplomas awarded by approved schools, and in 1936 the regulations were tightened by prohibiting the opening of any school or college without permission.[35] Most of the reputable institutions follow much the same course as the public schools. The Elementary Grade comprises the Primary Schools with four standards and Intermediate Schools with three standards. Above these come the High Schools with four standards. Graduates from these may proceed either to Collegiate education, vocational in character, in Standards 12 to 14, or to the University with courses of four to six years according to the faculty.

We have seen that under Spanish rule female education had already made considerable progress, with practically as many schools for girls as for boys. American policy was definitely coeducational and encouraged girls to share the privileges of their brothers. One indication of their progress is the foundation of a women's university by a woman who took a prominent part in the struggle against Spain for independence.

Criticism of the system as unpractical hardly does justice to the persistent efforts to promote vocational instruction. From the first the American Government was zealous in the cause of industrial and, especially, agricultural training. A Bureau of Agriculture was established, which in 1910 was placed under

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 555.

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the Education Department. Gardening was made part of the school course. In 1902 a trade school was opened in Manila to give instruction in carpentry, plumbing and telegraphy. The Nautical School, taken over from the Spanish Government, was given a more practical charcter, and commercial instruction was provided. Other trade schools were opened at minor centers, and all pupils were required to take a vocational course involving manual training.[36] So far was this carried that at one time the school system became one of the chief industrial enterprises in the country; but few of the boys found jobs on leaving school. It is still, however, a character of the system to combine practical and academic instruction. In Standard IV gardening is introduced; in the Intermediate Grade some schools are specialized as farm schools; in the High School Grade, in addition to the academic and general schools, there are others that specialize as normal schools, rural high schools or trade schools, and some teach domestic economy. After leaving school the student has a choice of training in normal, trade or nautical colleges, or may study a profession at the university. The State University of the Philippines, founded in 1908, had in 1938, 7,711 students with two branches outside Manila. In addition to academic instruction in the humanities it offers courses in law, medicine, pharmacy, veterinary science, education, commerce, music and the fine arts.

Despite the abundant provision for vocational instruction, this remains unpopular, and the academic course is overcrowded, though the value of its diplomas continually declines. In 1905 any boy from the 4th standard could get a job; in 1912 he had to reach the 7th standard, and in 1925 he required a high school diploma. The Monroe Survey criticized the vocational training as "not suited to the immediate needs of the country,"[37] and recommended every endeavor to attract boys to rural high schools. Another inquiry, in 1930, found that some courses still gave a training for which there was no demand, and that "only a small proportion of the students in the specialized courses in agriculture and the industrial arts later

[36] *Census, 1903.*
[37] Roosevelt, Nicholas, *The Philippines* (1927), p. 194.

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87 entered the vocations for which they were trained."[38] In 1938, of 76,000 pupils in the high schools, only 9,000 were in the trade schools and 4,600 in the agricultural schools, and "it is a matter of common knowledge that a large proportion of the students attending them are there not because they wish to take the vocational work offered, but because the vocational schools are free and in some cases provide opportunities for self-support."[39] Only the prospect of starvation will drive them, discontented, back to the land.[40] The fact is that industrial education has "operated in a vacuum";[41] business is still largely in the hands of foreigners, and the only openings for Filipinos are in administration, the office and the law. The Philippines, it has been said, are overrun with lawyers.

In respect of foreign travel the Filipinos have had much greater advantages than the people in most tropical dependencies. From the early nineteenth century they were studying in Spain and other parts of Europe. When the United States first took over the islands one method of inculcating American ideas was to send a hundred boys from fifteen to twenty-one years old to school in California, with homes in "pleasant private families."[42] It is said that since then thousands have studied in America, and more than five thousand have gone elsewhere. In addition to these some ten thousand have gained a wider experience of the world in America and Hawaii.[43] The Filipinos also gained practical experience in administration not merely as subordinates but in responsible positions. Already in 1921 many were heads or acting heads of departments, and practically all the assistant chiefs were Filipinos.[44]

The recognition of the Commonwealth has given a great stimulus to education. Since then the school population has risen by over 600,000. Another recent feature of the national effort to raise the general standard of intelligence is a nation-

[38] Hayden, *op. cit.*, pp. 520-21.
[39] *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*
[40] Keesing, *The Philippines*, p. 90.
[41] Hayden, *op. cit.*, p. 523.
[42] *Census, 1903*, III, p. 669.
[43] Malcolm, G. H., *The Commonwealth of the Philippines* (1936), pp. 357, 376, 380, 381.
[44] Keesing, *The Philippines*, p. 97.

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wide organization for adult education.[45] The movement made little headway until taken in hand in 1932 by the Bureau of Education, which enlisted the support of the Y. W. C. A. and similar institutions. In 1936 an Office of Adult Education was constituted and by 1940 there were over six thousand adult schools manned by fifty thousand volunteers, with half a million students enrolled in adult classes; and two and a half million educational publications were distributed. The enthusiasm to which these impressive figures bear witness may subside, but hardly without leaving some permanent impression on the people. But until quite recently the country was ill provided with books and other reading matter. The total circulation of the daily papers was only 200,000,[46] and the only public library was in Manila; even the University had no adequate library. The Filipinos were not a reading people. Now the Manila Library has branches in all the chief towns. The new enthusiasm for adult education is closely associated with the prospect of early independence. From Spanish times education has been entangled in politics, and under American rule no educational problem could be considered without reference to its political bearing, "independence rather than education was at stake." In the University issues were clouded by personal rather than by national politics. But a friendly critic suggests that in the long run professional educationists may find greater difficulties in dealing with a popular electorate than they have found hitherto in their relations with the representatives of American authority.[47]

Formosa

From 1662 until 1895 Formosa was under Chinese rule. Chinese immigrants pushed back the aborigines and during the nineteenth century rapidly increased in numbers. But the administration was slack; and the immigrants, mostly of the lower classes, were in general illiterate. In the last half of the century missionaries opened schools, and after Formosa was constituted

[45] Hayden, *op. cit.*, p. 531.
[46] Malcolm, *op. cit.*, p. 333.
[47] Hayden, *op. cit.*, p. 510.

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871 a separate province in 1886 the Provincial Government began to take steps to educate the aborigines. But material development and education were alike backward when the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1894. When Formosa was ceded to Japan in the following year, the people, mainly of Chinese birth or origin, attempted armed resistance, proclaiming a Republic, but this was suppressed before the end of 1895. The country remained under military rule until the appointment of the first civil Governor-General in 1918.

The Japanese theory of colonial policy is that "the economic development of the country must come first. Education and the raising of the standards of the people will follow. Afterwards political development may be possible,"[48] but as an integral part of the Japanese Empire. The progress that has been achieved in both economic development and education is astonishing, but what chiefly strikes the observer is the zeal and pertinacity displayed in linking up the economic and cultural life of the country and people with those of Japan.

ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF FORMOSA, 1897-1937[49]

	Population (000)				*Imports*		*Exports*	
Year	*Formosan*	*Japanese*	*Year*	*Expenditure (£000)*	*Total (£000)*	*Japanese*	*Total (£000)*	*To Japan*
1904 . . .	2,916	53	1897	1,049	1,276	210	1,266	372
1938 . . .	5,393	310	1937	15,644	32,212	24,114	44,016	35,363

Yen at rate of ¥10 = 1£.

The picture of economic progress given by the table above finds a companion in the progress of education. In the early days schools were opened to provide interpreters but met with violent resistance; teachers were murdered and schools burned down. The Japanese reopened the schools under military protection as language schools, where volunteers gave an intensive course in Japanese. Active resistance subsided, and in 1898 systematic public instruction was started with the opening of village schools, with Japanese as the chief subject and as the

[48] Hayden, R., "Japan's New Policy in Korea and Formosa," *Foreign Affairs*, II, p. 474.

[49] Figures for 1897: Rutter, Owen, *Through Formosa* (1923), pp. 280, 282; for 1904: *Census, 1904*, cited, Wyndham, *op. cit.*, p. 150; for 1937-38: *Far Eastern Yearbook, 1941*.

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medium of instruction.[50] The Formosans "looked upon the education offered by the Japanese with suspicion; they had no desire for their children to learn to read and write Japanese, and consequently refused to send them to school." But they "gradually came to see the advantages of securing a good education for their offspring, and of course other subjects besides Japanese were taught. In many of the schools not only was education free, but the students' living expenses were paid as well . . . schools were, to begin with, only established in areas where the consent of the inhabitants had been obtained. At the same time a large number of old-fashioned Chinese schools were allowed to continue."[51] By 1904 considerable progress had been made in overcoming Formosan antipathy, and there were 153 schools, with 23,178 pupils, of whom 2,655 were girls.[52] The Japanese victory over Russia enhanced Formosan respect for Japan, and the subsequent China renascence stimulated them to seek modern education in the only form available. Numerous associations sprang up to promote Formosan interests, economic, cultural and political, and, within limits, the treatment of such aspirations seems to have been not unsympathetic, though any one transgressing those rather narrow limits soon found that the Government knew how to discourage dangerous thoughts.[53] At the same time, a strong formative influence was exercised by the predominantly Japanese administrative and economic environment, and the system of public instruction was directed to reinforcing this environment by cultural training.

In all the schools, from the lowest standard, the medium of instruction is Japanese. As the Formosans do not speak Japanese at home, they cannot attend the same primary schools as Japanese children. In the Primary Grade there are two sections, each with three standards. The Lower Primary School, such as is found in most villages, concentrates on Japanese, and goes only to Standard III. In the Upper Primary School the curriculum includes elementary science and may include agricul-

[50] Wyndham, *op. cit.*, p. 150.
[51] Rutter, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
[52] Wyndham, *op. cit.*, p. 151.
[53] Rutter, *op. cit.*, p. 150; Wyndham, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

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NUMBER OF SCHOLARS, 1939[54]

Class of School	No. of Pupils Japanese	Others
Kindergarten and Primary	49,028	569,308
Middle		
Boys	5,123	4,129
Girls	5,312	2,558
Vocational		
Two years	1,822	5,751
Full course	3,342	2,626
Normal	1,788	..
Higher		
Academic	192	91
Vocational	600	141
Private and Special	..	5,644

ture, commerce, and English; Chinese is optional. After the Primary course the native still requires two years' study before he is fit for the Middle Grade and even so is backward in comparison with the Japanese who has been using his own language. Thus Japanese children have an advantage in the examination qualifying for admission to the Middle School. The children are eligible for this school from the age of twelve. The ordinary course lasts five years for boys and four years in the corresponding school for girls, known as the Girls' High School. The curriculum includes physics, chemistry, law, economics, and English, French or German. In the girls' schools it is adapted to their special requirements. The figures given above indicate the notable progress of female education; doubtless Japanese example has had great influence in this matter. Some Middle Schools have a High School Department, with a course of three years in preparation for the University. The Imperial University was founded in 1929 and provides courses in literature, science, and politics; there are also vocational schools of university standing. The full course at the university takes seven years; but for students who have taken the preparatory course at school, four years is sufficient.

After completing the primary course students may go on to vocational or technical schools instead of going to the Middle School. One feature of the Japanese system is the high propor-

[54] *Far Eastern Yearbook, 1941.*

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tion of vocational students in comparison with those in the Middle School. Most of them take a short two years' course, with a wide choice of subjects and this is especially favored by the Formosans, who presumably find, that even with longer training, it is difficult to make headway where commerce and industry are dominated by the Japanese. The same explanation would account for the large number studying agriculture, but the figures under this head are of interest as suggesting that the Japanese have made some progress towards a solution of the difficult problem of relating agricultural instruction with practical agriculture. The comparatively small number of Formosans in the University and High Schools may be due partly to the Japanese policy of encouraging them to seek for higher education in Japan, but more probably reflects the Japanese predominance in the direction of industry and commerce.

NUMBER OF STUDENTS RECEIVING VOCATIONAL INSTRUCTION[55]

Grade and Kind	*Students* *Japanese*	*Others*
Middle School		
Short Course	1,822	5,751
Full course		
Agriculture	588	1,432
Industry	963	468
Commerce	1,791	726
Education	1,788	..
High School		
Agriculture	181	5
Industry	201	28
Commerce	238	26
Medicine	80	82

Private education plays an insignificant part in the system of instruction, and the missionaries, who were the pioneers of Western education in Formosa, suffered a grievous blow when the growth of public instruction enabled the Japanese to order the closure of the elementary department in missionary schools. In recent years practically the whole system worked towards strengthening the process of assimilation, for life in a society with a considerable Japanese element and wholly Japanese in its economic environment. The progress of education under

[55] *Ibid.*

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87 Japanese rule is certainly a remarkable achievement, and one would like to know how it has been accomplished. *Fas est et ab hoste doceri.* But we have a picture of their system among the aborigines, and it is not one that people who still enjoy a democratic heritage are likely to adopt. Education is not compulsory, but the parents are encouraged to entrust their children to the Japanese. The teacher is a policeman, and the school is sometimes in the police station. When after five years the children are allowed to return home, they have been transformed from wild aborigines into civilized Japanese.[56] That is not education but "conditioning." How far gentle pressure has been carried to the same lengths among the Formosans is not clear. And whether the Japanese, even if they escaped disaster in the present war, will attain their goal of assimilating the Formosans may well be questioned. A sympathetic critic summarizes the results of twenty-five years of Japanese rule as "law and order, economic prosperity, elevated standards of living, widespread education and rising political discontent."[57]

Thailand

Chulalongkorn, though working to remould his land on modern lines, maintained the tradition of personal rule until 1895, when he created a Legislative Council, but this rarely met, and exercised no influence. In 1925, however, King Prajadhipok on his accession appointed a Supreme Council of State as an advisory body, and in 1927 formed a Committee of the Privy Council. But these bodies merely represented the hereditary aristocracy, and the Crown retained its full traditional and legal powers, while the actual administration was controlled by the various foreign departmental heads or advisers. As Siamese who had studied abroad grew in years and numbers, they became impatient alike of an autocratic tradition that they thought out of date, and of foreign control that seemed no longer necessary. In 1932 some of their leaders formed a People's Party and induced the king to accept a constitutional form of government. A Popular Assembly was convened, and this gave a small body of

[56] Rutter, *op. cit.*, p. 218.
[57] Hayden, *loc. cit.* For another view see note, p. 112 below.

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military leaders and progressive civilians, acting in the name of the People's Party, the opportunity to seize power. A royalist insurrection failed, and early in 1934 the king left for Sumatra on the plea of ill health. The party leaders remained in full control of the government, and in 1935 the king abdicated and was succeeded by a ten-year-old son, then at school in Switzerland; in fact, however, there is a one-party government under party leaders who allow no free political discussion. Under the monarchy, though the higher aristocracy were wealthy, the control of economic life rested with Europeans and Chinese. There was a strong Chinese community and, in the south, a large body of unassimilated Malays. One feature of the new government has been an attempt to promote the economic development of the people, especially in agriculture, and to bring the economic life of the country under national control.

The progress of public instruction in Thailand has features of special interest. In subject countries attempts by the government to improve education have been suspect as inimical to national progress, and similar attempts by nationalists have been regarded as subversive. In Thailand there has been no such conflict. The educational system, as modernized by Chulalongkorn, survived with little change, though in 1921-22 all children from seven to fourteen years of age were required to attend school. (In 1935 the age limits were changed to eight to fifteen.) Of recent years, however, it has been replaced by a new system on Western lines.

The new system recognizes four classes of schools:

(a) Local, or Village, Schools, maintained by the government;
(b) Municipal Schools, in urban areas with public corporations;
(c) Government Schools, as models of progressive education;
(d) Private Schools, mostly missionary institutions.

So far as practicable the monastic schools were incorporated in the system as local schools, but in many villages they were supplemented by schools which, though housed in monastic buildings, followed the official curriculum under lay management. In 1934 out of 9,001 local schools, 6,519 were monastic precincts, though only 1,219 were monastic schools. The table

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below shows the distribution of pupils at the various schools. Although the introduction of compulsory education was not immediately effective, in the course of ten years provision had been made for 90 per cent of the districts, and in 1937 there was said to be a school available everywhere for children of the primary grade.

NUMBER OF PUPILS IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF SCHOOL, 1939[58]

Class of School	Number of Pupils	
	Boys	Girls
Local	714,521	611,379
Municipal	30,410	28,182
Government	42,180	19,117
Private	78,037	43,928

Primary instruction comprises four standards (*pratome*). In 1934-35 there were 801,571 children in the two lowest standards and 248,640 in the next two. The teachers are largely *pratome* graduates, employing the old-fashioned methods of instruction of the monastic schools. In the secondary course there are six standards (*matyome*), divided into a lower and upper section, each of three standards. In the upper section there is a choice of two courses, linguistic and scientific. The total number of secondary students in 1934-35 was 44,784. On completing the secondary course the student is eligible for admission to the Preparatory or Intermediate College at Bangkok. As appears from the above table, there are almost as many girls as boys at school. The system is not intentionally co-educational, but the country cannot afford separate schools for girls, and the parents do not want them to be separated in the primary grade. Boys and girls are usually separated in the secondary schools but meet again in the university.[59]

In theory the primary grade, and each section of the secondary grade, should end with two years' vocational instruction on an appropriate level. In 1934-35 however, only 5,058 were in the vocational grades. Some local schools offer carpentry, hat-making, agriculture and "hand-work." The Government schools comprise normal, agricultural and trade schools with a wide

[58] *Statesman's Yearbook, 1941.*

[59] Landon, K. P., *Siam in Transition* (1939), p. 101.

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range of courses: building, carpentry, tailoring, printing, domestic science, and almost every other form of activity from secretarial to silver work. Private schools offer instruction in foreign languages, pedagogy and hand-work, and the press advertises numerous courses in commerce, dress-making, and so on. In 1934 a School for National Song and Music was established by the Department of Fine Arts.

Higher education dates back to 1880-81 when a cholera epidemic induced Chulalongkorn to start a movement for a modern hospital. Funds were collected and plans drawn up. Then in 1886 one Siriraja died. Tradition required an imposing cremation with elaborate booths. The king directed that these should be made of good timber, so as to be serviceable afterwards, and they were used to build the Siriraja Hospital. At first this taught both the Siamese and Western systems of medicine, with the natural result that the better system gradually replaced the old. The course was at first for three years and aimed at producing medical assistants, but it has been extended to six years, and the first M. B. was granted in 1931. Up to 1940 it had produced 142 graduates, and the total number of Western doctors was barely 500. In course of time other institutions were founded to train men for administration, law, public works and survey, the agricultural service and the army. There

NUMBER OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, 1936-37

Arts and Science	473
Medicine	106
Nursing	166
Pharmacy	1
Engineering	94
Architecture	32

were also three schools, known as the Royal Pages' College, to train children of good birth for service at the Court and in the higher administration.[60] In 1917 the medical and administrative schools were amalgamated as the Chulalongkorn University. In 1937 the old Law School was remodeled as the University of Moral and Political Science, with a view to training "men

[60] Graham, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 253.

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87 capable of taking part in the conduct of affairs to whom the voters might grant their confidence."[61]

As already noticed, Thailand has been able to draw on all the countries of the modern world to gain administrative experience, and it has had the like good fortune in education. In 1934-35 there were 410 foreign teachers in private schools. Of these 74 came from the modern West including 30 Americans, 20 French, 11 English. The foreign Asiatics included 291 Chinese, 3 Japanese, and 31 Indians. Thailand has been fortunate also in its freedom of choice in sending students abroad. In 1937-38 there were said to be some 600, with 200 in Japan, 200 in the Philippines, 100 in England, 50 in France, 50 in America and 20 in Germany. Many of these were private students, but the State scholars numbered 12 in Japan, 11 in the Philippines, 32 in England, 10 in France, 11 in America, 2 in Germany and 1 each in India and Indo-China. The budget allotment under this head was B.482,000 (£44,000). Formerly State scholars were chosen by influence, but of late years they have been selected after a stiff competitive examination.

The modern system of public instruction is wholly secular, or rather, wholly nationalist. Inspectors, hankering after modern progress, report unfavorably on the monastic schools that still survive, and these are, it seems, gradually to be replaced by official schools. Even where the official schools are within monastic precincts, the monks take no part in the instruction and are no longer an important factor in the school. Many regret this departure from tradition, and there is a movement to found private schools on modern lines but with a religious background. In 1934 the Premier, when opening a normal school for monks, expressed the view that the Law of the Buddha is the best instrument of education, and to impart it no one is more worthy than the monk. In the private schools maintained by missionaries it seems that the Government imposes no restrictions on religious teaching.

Outside the schools various organizations promote social education. The Boy Scout movement was taken up as far back as 1911 by King Rama VI, who founded a Siamese branch

[61] *Siam Chronicle*, June 10, 1937, cited Landon, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

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under the title of the "Tiger Cubs Association," which has spread into every village. The Cub-leader is usually a school teacher, and most of the members are his pupils. The aim of the whole movement is to strengthen nationalist ideas and to foster a national spirit. There are about ninety thousand members. Another movement that has much the same impulse is the Junior Red Cross, started in 1922-23, with a view to training young people to become effective members of the adult Red Cross Society. It now has about a hundred thousand members. 871

The chief instrument of adult education is the correspondence department of the University. One feature of this is that the course ends with about fifteen days in residence, during which the students live in camp under quasi-military conditions, and combine lectures and sightseeing with physical and military exercises. One obstacle to the spread of a modern attitude to life has been the lack of books and the absence therefore of the habit of reading. Of late years there have been attempts to encourage translations into Siamese by men who have studied abroad, and "regular book stores have been opened in the larger centers with a good supply of books on law, medicine, agriculture, politics, foreign affairs and so on."[62] The only library on any considerable scale is that in Bangkok, though one or two provincial towns have made a beginning, and school libraries are not unknown. The Chinese seem to be taking a lead in this matter. "Every small village where Chinese congregate has its Chinese reading room. And every small town is visited periodically by the Chinese bookseller."[63] There are many Chinese newspapers, and novels, magazines and newspapers in Siamese are beginning to attract a considerable public.

Review

In our review of educational progress during the nineteenth century we noticed that, in general, public instruction in the various countries of the region derived from a common impulse, developed through approximately contemporaneous stages along much the same lines, encountered similar problems,

[62] Landon, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. 99.

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87 and led generally to much the same results, which were very different from those anticipated. During the present century likewise all Governments adopted much the same policy, and the lines of progress have been roughly parallel; in some matters all have failed, but in others a varying measure of success has been attained. Before venturing on an explanation of the facts it may be well to summarize them.

The main objective was to diffuse primary instruction. The figures for the number of children now at school are certainly impressive; as one half or more leave school before attaining permanent literacy and even from the lowest standards they give too favorable a picture, but they will serve for a comparison between the various countries. From the tables on pages (pp. 111-112) it seems that generally most children are at school where the largest proportion of the revenue is spent on education; but it is uncertain whether more children go to school because more money is spent, or whether more money is spent because more children go to school. The first table does show however, that the Philippines, Formosa and Thailand stand out in a separate class.

In the *Philippines* nine-tenths of the children at school are in public schools. There is only one system of public instruction, and the medium throughout is English. The percentage of the population at school is 11.54.

In *Formosa* practically all the children at school are in public schools. The medium of instruction is Japanese, but there are two separate primary courses, one for the Japanese and one for natives. Promotion to the secondary grade is by a competitive examination in Japanese in which the natives are at a disadvantage. Even in order to be eligible for this examination the natives must study for two years longer than the Japanese. Despite these obstacles the proportion at school is 11.36 per cent.

In *Thailand* nine-tenths of the children at school are in public schools. There is only one system of instruction, and the teaching is mainly in the vernacular, with no language barrier against promotion to the highest class. Education was made compulsory in 1921-22, but for some years the rules were in-

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effective. Including private schools the proportion at school is 871
10.65 per cent.

Among the second group *Malaya* leads the way. There are two systems of instruction, one with English and the other with the vernacular as the medium of instruction. The Malay vernacular schools are public schools and others are largely private. There is a formidable language barrier between the vernacular and English schools; and, though a bridge has been set up to help Malays across the gap, comparatively few can do so. Compulsory instruction was introduced locally in the last century and has been gradually extended, but it has not been rigorously enforced, and compulsion is no longer necessary. The percentage at school is 7.76, but this figure excludes the more recently incorporated and backward Unfederated States.

Burma has three distinct systems of instruction: English, Anglo-vernacular and vernacular. In the first, English is the medium of instruction; in the second Burmese is used in the lower standards, and in the vernacular schools the local language. The great majority of the schools are maintained by local authorities, by private institutions, mainly religious, or by individuals, and the Government exercises control over them by grants. Anglo-vernacular schools are freely open to all who can afford the fees, and a few boys from the vernacular schools obtain bridge scholarships enabling them to pursue their studies in Anglo-vernacular schools. In the university, where the teaching is in English, and in public examinations conducted in English, boys from English schools naturally have an advantage. The percentage of the population in recognized institutions is 3.92, but the monastic schools are, on the whole, as good as many lay village schools in Burma or elsewhere and, including these, the percentage rises to 5.45. This figure however excludes the Shan States.

In *Netherlands India* there are three systems: Dutch, Dutch-vernacular, and vernacular. In the two former, instruction is in Dutch. Private institutions, mainly religious, play a useful part in Dutch and Dutch-vernacular education, the latter chiefly managed by local authorities under the control of Government. Language operates as a barrier against both Dutch-vernacular

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871 and vernacular pupils; the former require a preparatory year before entering on the secondary grade, and vernacular pupils in the "link schools" require an extra year to reach the level of those in Dutch-vernacular schools. The unrecognized institutions are mainly Koran-schools, where mental discipline is far below that in Buddhist monastic schools; excluding these the percentage of the population at school is 3.35.

In *Indo-China* there are three systems of instruction: French, French-vernacular and vernacular; in the two former the medium of instruction is French. All natives must start in the vernacular schools and, unless they drop out on the way, end in a French school or in a French-vernacular school with an identical curriculum. The native takes seven years to reach the standard attained by French pupils in four years, and before admission to the secondary grade has to succeed in a competitive examination. French and French-vernacular instruction is partly managed, under State supervision, by private institutions, mostly religious, but vernacular schools are under the direct control of the State or local authority. Including private institutions the percentage of the population at school is 2.47.

Female education was another objective. The table below gives figures to the nearest thousand for the boys and girls at school, so far as this information is available. In the Philippines and Formosa the figures seem to be in much the same proportion as in Thailand. In Malaya the former prejudice against

NUMBER OF CHILDREN AT SCHOOL BY SEXES

	In Thousands	
	Boys	*Girls*
Burma	498	218
Malaya	193	76
Indo-China	511	56
Thailand	866	702

female education has been so largely overcome that now it is difficult to provide accommodation for the girls, but this dates only from about 1928. In 1928 a fifth of the native children in the primary and lower schools in Netherlands India were girls, but the proportion has probably risen since then. Co-education

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is a matter of policy only in the Philippines, but elsewhere it is 811 general for children below twelve and in the universities.

In respect of higher academic instruction the Philippines are far ahead. But here it has been encouraged, whereas elsewhere more regard has been had to restricting the surplus of educated unemployables. Despite this there has been a general increase in secondary and higher instruction, and universities have been founded everywhere except in Malaya. The high figure for secondary students in Formosa is largely due to the inclusion of 10,435 Japanese; elsewhere Burma, with 14,969 students, and Malaya, with 15,066, have the largest number in proportion to the population.

One great object of policy was to encourage scientific, vocational and technical instruction. This was also a leading feature of nationalist policy. Yet the results are disappointing. Two different methods have been applied. In the Philippines, and to some extent in Thailand and Malaya, there has been an attempt to combine vocational with general instruction; elsewhere vocational and technical instruction have been given in special schools or classes. Not much detailed information is available as to the progress made in teaching science; but few reach a stage where it can usefully be studied, and it has little practical value where scientific vocations are so backward. Despite numerous enquiries and experiments, technical instruction has made little progress, and only in Netherlands India has there been even moderate success in the attempts to teach agriculture to prospective cultivators.

There remains the last, but in some respects the most important item in educational policy as it took shape at the beginning of the century, the attempt to reinforce social order by giving a religious and ethical color to a secular system of instruction. As the inadequacy of moral textbooks and primers of personal ethics became more apparent, interest tended to shift from moral to physical training. The "white man's burden" became "an almost meaningless phrase"[64] except to scoffers, and in the Netherlands Indies the most ardent supporters of native progress were among the first to react against the

[64] Buchan, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

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87 "ethical" policy.[65] A review of the latest Education Report for India notes the "complete absence of any reference to religion or religious education" and the single "depressing and colourless paragraph" devoted to "moral instruction."[66] Provision for religious instruction seems to have had little effect, and the problem of reconciling secular education with religion has proved even more difficult than that of reconciling religious institutions to secular instruction. Cleanliness comes next to godliness and is easier to inspect, but the teachers themselves do not practise the lessons they teach in hygiene and thrift. One feature of the present century has been the growing popularity of team games, and especially of football, and also of the Boy Scout movement. These have struck root among the people but, though good in themselves, the frequent reports of school strikes suggest that they have not been effectual in promoting discipline and a respect for authority. The main problem is still, as at the beginning of the century, "how to spiritualize" a secular system of instruction.

Lord Curzon ends his Resolution on educational policy with a characteristic specimen of his practiced eloquence. After pointing out all that had been done "to elevate the standard of education in India and inspire it with higher ideals," he goes on to invite the cooperation of Indians. "It rests," he said, "with the people themselves to make a wise use of the opportunities that are offered to them, and to realize that education in the true sense means something more than the acquisition of so much positive knowledge, something higher than the mere passing of examinations, that it aims at the progressive and orderly development of all the faculties of the mind, that it should form character and teach right conduct—that it is, in fact, a preparation for the business of life."[67] In this eloquent appeal he is thinking, like so many others, of what education might or should be. In fact, in the Tropical Far East, education, or rather instruction, is not a preparation for the business of life, but preparation for a life of business; and it does not rest with the

[65] Boeke, J. H., *The Structure of Netherlands Indian Economy* (1942), p. 102.
[66] Mayhew, A., *Overseas Education, 1941*, p. 75.
[67] *Progress of Education in India, 1897-1902*, p. 475.

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people themselves to give it a wider content. The schools, the people and the governments are subject to the control of economic forces.

POPULATION AND SCHOOL ENROLMENT

	Burma	Neth. India	Formosa	Indo-China	Malaya	Philippines	Thailand
Year	*1936-37*	*1938*	*1938*	*1936-37*	*1938*	*1938*	*1939*
Population, millions....	13.10	68.41	5.75	23.00	3.46	16.25	14.90
Private or unrecognized..	201,307	450,000	12,088	93,649	60,265	129,591	121,965
Primary							
Elementary and Lower, 1–4..	*458,148*			*466,453*		*1,408,652*	
Upper, 5–7..	*40,700*			*5,160*		*250,503*	
Total....	498,848	2,269,761	611,559	471,613	189,631	1,659,144	1,442,780
Secondary							
Lower, 8–10.	*13,734*				*14,679*	*76,984*	
Upper.....	*1,235*				*387*	*3,629*	
Total....	14,969	20,558	17,093	1,890	15,966	79,713	(a)
Higher Academic...	509	(b)	282	612	(b)	7,711	872
Total Recognized schools only.....	514,326	2,299,319	641,022	474,145	208,279	1,746,568	1,443,652
Including Private, etc..	715,633	2,740,319	653,110	567,641	268,544	1,876,159	1,568,617
Per cent of population							
Recognized schools.....	3.92	3.35	11.16	2.06	6.02	10.75	9.69
All schools..	5.45	4.01	11.36	2.47	7.76	11.54	10.65
Vocational							
Technical...	2,067	33,085	13,311	2,630	3,093	13,311	(c)
Higher.....	421	1,101	2,629	366	759	2,629	(c)

Sources. Burma: *Report on Public Instruction, 1932-37.* (Figures exclude Shan States): Netherlands India: *Indisch Verslag*, Pt. II, 1938; Formosa: Yearbook of Far East, 1941; Indo-China: *Annuaire Statistique, 1936-37*; Malaya: *Malayan Yearbook and Education Report, 1938* (Figures exclude Unfederated States). Philippines and Thailand: Population, *Statistical Yearbook, League of Nations, 1940*: Education figures from *Statesman's Yearbook, 1941.*

(a) Included under Primary. (b) Included under Higher Vocational (c) Included under General.

Notes. In Netherlands India the private schools are mostly Koran schools; in Burma the monastic schools and elsewhere private schools in general are on much the same level as public schools. For comparison the "recognized school" figures should be taken for Netherlands India and "all school" figures elsewhere. Higher professional training is classed sometimes on Academic, sometimes on Vocational.

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COMPARATIVE SURVEY, EDUCATION AND FINANCE

	Burma	Neth. India	Formosa	Indo-China	Malaya	Philippines	Thailand
Year	*1938-39*	*1938*	*1937-38*	*1936-37*	*1937*	*1938*	*1939-40*
Population (mil.)...	15.96	68.40	5.50	23.50	5.29	16.25	14.90
Imports (£mil.)....	15.57	56.89	32.21	11.62	82.18	31.32	17.70
Exports (£mil.)....	36.39	81.60	44.02	20.48	106.47	34.59	19.66
Expenditure (£mil.)	11.54	74.15	15.64	12.10	17.98	16.40	11.28
Percentage spent on Education.....	6	6	11	12	5	20	11

Local currencies converted at rate of £1.00=Rs. 13.3; Fl. 8.75; ¥.10.00; Piastre 8.35; Singapore dollar, 8.50; Peso 8.50; Baht, 11.00.

Figures for percentage of expenditure on education from *Annuaire Statistique* for Indo-China, *Statesman's Yearbook* for Thailand, and for Netherlands India, Formosa, Malaya and Philippines from *Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia*, pp. 67, 84, 90, 105, 116.

Populations as at December 31, 1938 from *Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations, 1940.*

Other figures based on *Statesman's Yearbook, 1941.*

Supplementary Note

Up-to-date information on education in Formosa is not easily obtainable in Western languages and most Western writers have not been able to make any very critical analysis of the Japanese-language reports and statistics on education. A recent exception to this statement is Mr. Andrew J. Grajdanzev whose book *Formosa Today* (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1942) contains a section on education based on the Japanese sources. Because his information is more detailed and because his conclusions are more critical than those of the sources cited above (pp. 95-100), some of his paragraphs are here reproduced in an Appendix below (pp. 175-179). *Editor.*

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CHAPTER VI

EDUCATIONAL SUPPLY AND DEMANDS

We set forth on this inquiry into the progress of education in the Tropical Far East in the hope that it might furnish suggestions as to the function of education in tropical countries that have been brought into economic contact with the modern world. We remarked that, despite widely different views as to the aims of education, most people look on it as a most potent influence in moulding society, and have high ideals as to what education should or might do, but at the same time are perplexed and uncertain as to the efficacy of existing systems and as to the right lines for future development. Our inquiry serves to explain the perplexity, for everywhere we have found a wide divergence between intentions and results, and sometimes results quite contrary to those intended. During the Liberal period humanitarians were disappointed in their hopes, and the nineteenth century ended with a general restatement of educational policy. Yet the new policy has been little more successful than the old. One new factor, the nationalist movement, has emerged, but the nationalist educational program has had much in common with official policy, yet neither governments nor nationalists nor both together have managed to get what they wanted. They have wanted more and better schools of various types for various purposes. They have advocated or experimented in compulsory primary instruction; but, under any form of rule congenial to Western democratic traditions, compulsion is of no avail except against a recalcitrant minority. They have founded schools and classes for technical instruction, but the facilities provided have been neglected or abused. The one condition for the success of an educational policy is not what government or a nationalist party may want, and not merely what the community in general may vaguely want, but what people want, or can be made to want, so urgently that they will

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pay for it either individually or as a community to the extent at least of going to school or sending their children to school. The crucial factor in matters of education is the economic demand for schooling or instruction. Let us look at educational policy from the standpoint of demand.

Where progress in primary instruction has been slow, the general complaint is that the people do not want it. In all these countries the parents have long sent their boys to the village school, Koran, Monastic or Confucian, to learn the way of life and be equipped as members of society, but they do not want to send them to the modern public school. Why should they? Certain grounds on which primary instruction has been advocated may immediately be ruled out as irrelevant. It is suggested that an instructed population will be more docile and contented, that schools are cheaper than machine guns, or, in the words of Lord Curzon, that there is no greater danger to the State than an ignorant people. That may or may not be true. Of the political exiles from Java nearly three quarters had been to school; in Burma most of the rebels of 1931 were literate, and the district with the best record for education holds also the worst record for crime; in Cochin-China the curves of crime and Western education rise concurrently.[1] So far as it is true that education makes subjects easier to govern, there is reason for teaching them but none for them to learn. Nor will parents send children to school to make them work harder, more continuously and with a keener sense of the sanctity of contract. Again, it is argued that a literate people will be better able to cooperate in the benevolent plans of Government for its welfare, will be more ready to welcome model latrines and sanitary slaughter-houses. But that argument will not appeal to parents ignorant and careless of modern hygiene; until they have been educated in its principles, they will not send children to school to learn them.

On material grounds there is only one argument to which parents will respond. They soon learn that a child profits by learning the language of the ruling power, and stint themselves

[1] Keesing, *Education in Pacific Countries*, p. 70; *Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1927-32.*

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and borrow money to give their children this advantage; and they will be just as ready to send their children to the village school if this will give them a better start in life. It is often suggested that the school will help cultivators to make more money, or to escape the clutches of the moneylender. But is this true? Townsfolk in Burma need more arithmetic than is taught in monastic schools, and in the towns and larger villages both boys and girls are sent to school, and nearly as many girls as boys. In the recognized primary schools (Standards I-IV) there are 201 thousand girls to 257 thousand boys; but the public school hardly touches the rural area, and in three quarters of the villages the only school is in the monastery. Attempts to provide public schools for rural areas show that there is little demand for them. The cultivator takes readily to new crops and new methods as soon as he learns by example and experience that they are profitable, but the boy who is taught agriculture in school looks for a job in town. The man who knows how to write no longer makes his mark on the moneylender's promissory note; but he is just as ready to sign his name. The Burman is conspicuous for literacy but equally conspicuous for debt, and the most literate districts are the most heavily indebted. One will not easily induce parents to send their children to the public school on the grounds of material advantage, for the benefit of universal primary instruction is social rather than individual.

But the people soon learn that knowledge of a European language may be profitable, and do their utmost to send their children to a school where they may learn it. Even a smattering of the language confers social prestige. The supply of school graduates overtakes the demand, and there accrues a surplus of educated unemployables. But that is no deterrent; it is on the contrary a stimulus to further effort. When boys can no longer get jobs from the IVth standard, they work on to the VIIth standard, so as to have a better chance, and so on upwards to matriculation and university degrees. They do not want learning but diplomas, but with every raising of the standard, diplomas lose their value and larger numbers of students are thrown on to the scrap heap. The diplomas are subject to the law of diminishing returns which, translated into human

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values, is the law of increasing discontent; but so long as education, or rather instruction, is dominated by economic forces, boys will press on to higher and still higher standards in the hope of finding jobs; if the worst comes to the worst, they can become lawyers.

But why lawyers, rather than doctors or engineers? Which do the tropics need most, lawyers or doctors? Doctors. Which profession, medicine or the law, does the State most encourage? Medicine. And what do we find? Too many lawyers and too few doctors. The Philippines are overrun with lawyers; in Indo-China the annual output of lawyers is "a menace to social equilibrium"; under British rule the plague of lawyers is a general complaint; under Dutch rule, for special reasons, lawyers have been less numerous but now seem to be increasing. Everywhere on the other hand there is a shortage of doctors. In Burma for a population of thirteen million in 1921 there were little more than a thousand modern doctors, and these were in government service or in towns where Europeans congregate. In Siam, with fourteen million people, there are barely five hundred doctors, and, outside the capital, practically all are in government employ.[2] Why are there so many lawyers? One explanation is obvious and seems sufficient. All classes of the community, European, foreign, Asiatics and natives, must bring their causes before Western courts and need the help of Western lawyers. There is a demand for Western lawyers, and the supply tends to exceed the demand, lowering standards of legal practice, until it becomes synonymous with sharp practice. Matters are different with medicine. Everywhere the people prefer their native healers. "Burmans don't care for English medicine"; a few years back the foremost Burmese official expressed his content with Burmese midwifery. In Java, though native medical training goes back nearly a century, people are still doubtful of European methods. In Siam "the old style doctor was still in 1939 the one to whom the masses of the people in the country ordinarily turned in time of sickness."[3] The native

[2] *Report on the Indigenous System of Medicine, (1931)*, p. 21; Landon, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

[3] *Report on the Indigenous System of Medicine*, p. 22; Leeuw, H. De, *Crossroads of the Java Seas* (1931), p. 109; Landon, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

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does not want the Western practitioner and cannot afford the fees that the cost of Western medical training makes it necessary to charge. The European on the other hand prefers a doctor of his own race. Thus, outside government service there is practically no demand for native doctors qualified in Western medicine. The East needs doctors, but there is a demand for lawyers, and lawyers are many and doctors few.

Similarly there is a very limited demand for engineers and other technicians. In the construction of village buildings, roads, bridges, irrigation works and so on, Western methods are no more demonstrably successful or economic than they are in native agriculture. With the exceptions, already noticed, of bicycles and the petrol engine, the demand for technicians hardly extends beyond the Western element in the community. Western enterprise has preferred to recruit its superior staff from Europe, so that local men had had no prospects of high advancement. Even subordinate positions have often been difficult of access to natives. In Malaya attempts to encourage agricultural instruction among Malays have been hindered by the preference of planters for Chinese assistants. Carpenters from the technical schools have been unable to get work because Chinese master carpenters would employ only members of the hereditary guild. In Burma Indians enjoy the doubtful advantage of a lower standard of living. Everywhere technical instruction for natives comes up against barriers raised by established interests and economic forces. The native cannot expect technical or vocational instruction to be remunerative in comparsion with the prospects open to him in other lines and, naturally, does not join a technical school unless he can be tempted by free tuition or a stipend to attend the school for its incidental advantages and without meaning to exercise the special skill it teaches. There is no economic demand for technical instruction.

It seems then that all educational effort in the tropics is conditioned by the economic environment; the Western school in the tropics does not teach children how to live, but how to make a living. And the environment reacts, not on the Western school only, but on the native Eastern school. The Eastern schools lose much of their educational and social value through the drain-

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age of their wealthier and brighter pupils to the Western schools, but that is not the only nor the most serious damage they sustain. Their end has been, not to teach the children how to make a living, but to teach them how to live. Now the mediaeval world in which they taught them how to live has vanished and the schools lose their meaning and decay. It is no wonder that in Burma the yellow robe is coming to be a symbol of hostility to the Western world and Western values.

Not a few advocates of Western education, perplexed and uncertain at the frustration of their efforts and reversal of their values, will sympathize with the protest of the Buddhist monk. When undertaking this inquiry we noted a tendency to identify education with instruction, and remarked that this suggested a disregard of the difference in environment between East and West. That suggestion our inquiry seems to confirm. Modern education in the West has three features: it is commonly identified with instruction; it is dissociated from any form of religion except Nationalism; and it teaches the means of living and not the way of life. But these distinctive features are recent developments, superficial, and the school functions in an atmosphere of old tradition, inherited values and a common social life. We can transplant the school and system of instruction to the East, but not the atmosphere in which it functions. In the modern tropics economic forces have free play. They are not as a rule counteracted effectively even by Nationalism, for Nationalism in the plural society of the modern tropics is a misnomer for sectionalism, and there is no common social will by which economic forces may be restrained. Education has not produced this environment, but it has taken color from the environment, and instruction is sought merely as a means of individual material advantage. It is a preparation for the life of business; how can we convert it into a preparation for the business of life? How can we liberate the school from economic bondage, so that it may once again teach children how to live?

This has been done in the past. The early Europeans, and especially the Spaniards, got the children into schools which made no attempt to promote material welfare; but they did this by giving them a Christian environment. The Moslems

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did the same thing by surrounding the school with an atmosphere of Islam. We see the same thing happening at the present day with Christian missionaries and their converts; the children of the converts go to school not to learn how to make money but to be confirmed in their new faith, and it is among native Christians that we find the largest proportion of children at school and the largest proportion of female literates. Even the highly educated Karen Christian woman, we are told, goes back to her home, while the Burmese women with a higher education wants a job. If we look rather more closely at the progress of primary instruction we can see the same thing happening on a larger scale.

Leaving aside Formosa, the two countries which show the greatest progress in primary instruction are the Philippines and Thailand. In both there have been specially favorable circumstances, and in both the adoption of a single system of instruction has opened a career to talent. But in both countries the chief impulse to the progress of primary instruction has been the nationalist drive behind it. In the other countries foreign governments have inevitably been critical of nationalist enthusiasm, and nationalist leaders have had less zeal for primary instruction then for higher education, which, as they hope, will equip them for handling national affairs. In these countries primary instruction has made less progress, but a comparison between them is suggestive. Malaya presents features of special interest. There was no tradition of literacy or education; secular education was distrusted, and the women of all races were "absolutely ignorant, prejudiced and superstitious." Except for those few who could cross the barrier into the English school, vernacular education led nowhere and offered no material reward. Yet, within little more than a generation, we find boys and girls elbowing their way into the schools. How, under a foreign government, can we explain this miracle? Compulsion has been gradually extended, but seems to have had little effect until it was no longer necessary. One, possibly the determinant, factor has been the new Chinese enthusiasm for learning that has been a high note of Chinese Nationalism. This has given an example and a stimulus. But it has been turned to good ac-

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871 count by a happy co-operation between British and Malay authorities. The Chinese in Malaya are conspicuous not only for their zeal for learning but also for their success in industry and commerce, and the Malays have been stirred up to emulation. The British Government has always taken up the position that it has a special duty to the Malays and, with the growth of the Chinese in numbers and economic power, has become more actively solicitous for Malay interest. Educational propaganda among a backward and suspicious people is a task for the administrator with a knowledge of the people rather than for the expert in educational technique, and one reason for the progress in Malaya may be the appointment of a civil servant rather than an education official as Director of Public Instruction; moreover for some years the head of the department was outstanding in his knowledge of Malay life, language and literature. He was able to impress on Malays the need for education if they were not to be driven further into the background by Chinese and Indians. Again, on the Malay side, he was not confronted with a crowd of unorganized individuals. When Phayre tried to improve monastic education in Burma he had to deal separately with each school, as there was no centre of clerical authority. But in Malaya there were the Sultans, men able to appreciate the Director's arguments; one is a barrister, and all know English. At the same time, under a system nominally at least, of indirect rule, they could use their influence to induce people to send their children to school, not with a view to their individual advantage but for the welfare of the Malay people as a whole.

Netherlands India suggests much the same reflections as Malaya. Here also there was a language bar, and the great mass of the people could hope for little profit from the vernacular school. It was not until 1907 that, under the "ethical" impulse, the Government tried to spread primary instruction widely; and, considering that it was forty years behind the British Government in Malaya, the progress has been little less remarkable even if the present figures for attendance are less striking. And it has been achieved by similar means. The Head of the Education Department was given the assistance of an Adviser and As-

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sistant Adviser from the European Civil Service for the promotion of rural education, and native officers with hereditary influence have used "gentle pressure" to encourage the people to support the schools. One important function of officers in the lower ranks of the Native Civil Service is to act as school-attendance inspectors.

In Burma no such machinery has been available, and the care of education has rested primarily with departmental officers, largely concerned with the numerous and urgent problems connected with the rapid growth of Anglo-vernacular education. Thus, in comparison with other countries, primary instruction has made less progress and it is the unrecognized monastic school which has enabled Burma to retain a leading place in the record of literacy. In Indo-China the language barrier is more formidable than in Burma, and education is in general less attractive because the higher posts are much less freely open to natives than under British rule. The French, moreover, possibly through their tradition of assimilation, seem less sympathetic than the British to nationalist aspirations. If economic advantage and nationalist sentiment are the two main factors in the spread of primary instruction, it is not strange that Indo-China should occupy the lowest place.

Yet the progress in Formosa warns us against too readily accepting any simple formula for encouraging primary instruction. Here there is a single system of instruction, and the child entering the lowest standard has no further language barrier to cross because, as in the Philippines, he must struggle across it at the beginning. But the prospects of material advancement are remote, and the Japanese system is based on the suppression of nationalism. Yet Formosa stands among the highest in the proportion of the people at school. Presumably the example set by the large Japanese contingent in sending all their children to school provokes emulation among their subjects. The strongly Japanese character of the economic environment may be another factor in furthering the study of Japanese. It seems, too, that the Formosans were so taken with the Chinese zest for learning that they welcomed it even through the medium of Japanese. And the Japanese method of "conditioning" the

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aborigines suggests that they carry "gentle pressure" to its extreme limits. One would certainly like to know more about education in Formosa, but the progress made there does not necessarily invalidate the conclusion suggested from experience elsewhere that, where the economic motive is inadequate, the cultivation of national sentiments and aspirations is the best method of getting the children into school. In general the great obstacle to primary instruction is that illiterate parents do not want their children taught to read and write. They want them brought up in their religion, and to be taught their letters so far as this is incidental to their religious training. But secular instruction will bring the children no material advantage, and they can appreciate no other reason for sending them to school. Before we can instruct the children, we must educate the parents, and nationalist propaganda is one way, and apparently the only way of educating them.

Nationalism, like other religions, takes education out of the sphere of economics and supplies a motive that is superior to economic considerations; but although it transcends economic laws it cannot dodge them. It may induce parents to send their children to school where they can learn to read and write, but it will not automatically create a reading habit. For that it is necessary to provide books. This may seem a simple matter, but it raises difficulties, both technical and economic, that deserve examination. All these countries have their literature, but they have no books. In England, in living contact with the modern world and in the center of world affairs, upwards of 15,000 books are published every year. But in Burma, dependent almost entirely upon books for contact with the cultural aspects of the modern world, barely a hundred books a year are published, and most of these belong, not to the modern but to the mediaeval world. Of the comparatively small number of people who read English only a few have access to the one public library in Rangoon, and that is very inadequate to the requirements of a modern capital. Even in Rangoon it has not yet been found possible to establish permanently a modern bookshop. Nor are the people better off for newspapers. In 1930 the total

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circulation of Burmese daily papers was less than 10,000.[4] Elsewhere conditions are generally similar. It seems that in the Philippines quite recently the total circulation of daily papers in all languages for a mixed population of fifteen millions was only about 200,000. If people have no books they will lapse into illiteracy, and the money spent on providing them with schools will have been wasted. The older literature is largely religious, poetical, conventional and hardly intelligible to the ordinary man. If the people are to read they must be given books that they *can* read, and the written language must be modernized, as was found necessary in China. That is a difficult and, except under a national government, a delicate task. But that is not the chief difficulty. It may seem easy to put, say, into Burmese a popular handbook to modern science, such as sell by the hundred thousand in Europe. These, however, are written for a more or less sophisticated public. Huxley wrote popular works for an unscientific generation. But the science in his books is out of date and the modern handbook assumes that the general reader has assimilated Huxley's teaching. A popular handbook for Burmans at the present day must explain modern science to readers whose science is that of ancient Grece. Even a Huxley could hardly manage that. Again, it has been said that those who know Burmese know nothing else, and that those who know anything else know no Burmese. The graduate in science can write English but he is a poor hand at writing his own language intelligibly. Apart from these and other technical difficulties there are economic difficulties in selling books at a price that the people can afford and that will yet remunerate writers and publishers. In Burma it was held that there was no demand for translations as there was no reading public for such matter,[5] but in Netherlands India there has been an attempt, largely successful, to organize a demand for books both vernacular and in Dutch. Make the people want to read, and they will want to learn to read and will pay for schools where reading may be learned, as part of their education for life in an adult society which has acquired the reading habit. But to build schools and

[4] *Indian Statutory Commission, 1930,* XI, p. 272.
[5] *Ibid.,* p. 296.

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pay teachers to instruct children in reading for which they will have no use on leaving school is waste of money. Here again it is the environment that makes the school, and the instruction has no meaning apart from the environment.

Similar considerations apply to all welfare projects. Local authorities may frame rules that meat stalls shall be protected by fly-proof doors and windows and can provide suitable stalls in public markets. But butchers prefer to keep the windows open to see what they are buying, and no army of inspectors will be large enough to enforce the regulations until the people have been educated to want clean meat. Model latrines can be provided, but it is impossible to keep them clean until the people have been educated to use them properly. But you will not educate them in these matters by making the children learn "hygiene" in school from teachers who neither believe in it nor practice it. Get the people to want these things, and the new environment will change the schools, and the lessons in hygiene will be useful. But the first essential is the education of the parents.

In the light of these considerations let us look once more at the problem of technical instruction. The view now generally accepted offers no solution. The demand is limited, so runs the argument, over-production will be a waste of money and, still worse, of men; therefore we must limit the supply in accordance with the demand. We must accept the environment; it is *kismet, dhamma*. But that is the argument of the dodo and the dinosaur and of the beasts that perish. And it is unsound. Take for example the report of the Malayan Committee of 1926 that there was no opening for a training in mechanics. At that very time the petrol engine was creating a demand for mechanics in the native world. In Netherlands India the sea fisherman learned by example and experience that new methods were profitable, and began to demand instruction. Instead of limiting supply there is the alternative of organizing the demand, and that is the solution that is being attempted by the nationalist governments in the Philippines and in Siam. In order to work out a solution of the problem of technical instruction along those lines it is necessary to educate, not the people, but those responsible for policy and for directing Western enterprise.

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The principle of Nationalism would seem then a means of liberating education from its economic bondage. For all its limitations as compared with world religions, it does not, like those, appeal solely to those of the same religious faith. If the Scotsman says that he drinks whiskey rather than water because it is his national beverage we may not believe him, but we politely accept his statement as an explanation. In the expanding circle of human relationships the nation, like the family, seems to have its natural place in a world wide civilization, and among most people of the modern democratic West, Nationalism, although they may be keenly sensible of its dangers, will strike a responsive chord.

It is notorious that Nationalism has its dangers; in an acute form it may be regarded as a disease, a fever of the body politic, striving to throw off some foreign matter that endangers its constitution. It may rise superior to economic motives and drive out the money changers and the hosts of Mammon, but it will pass its children through the fire to Moloch, and thrives on hatred rather than on charity. And it is true that it has often exercised an unfortunate influence on education; in the Philippines under American rule it hindered educational reform: "independence rather than education was at stake." In a tropical dependency a Government, aiming first to preserve the imperial connection and seeming at least to be closely linked with capitalist interests, cannot easily come to terms with a movement directed to make the people capable of independence. Moreover, in the Tropical Far East the working of economic forces has brought into existence a plural society. In every country a medley of Europeans, Indians and Chinese constitute foreign enclaves, and nationalism tends to degenerate into sectionalism. This has been abundantly illustrated in clashes between Annamese and Chinese, Siamese and Chinese, Burmans and both Indians and Chinese; and in Java the popular nationalist movement arose out of a demonstration against the Chinese. Yet we have seen in Malaya that national or racial sentiment can be turned to good account by provoking the Malays to emulate the Chinese in education, and an instructed Nationalism should fit into a world-wide civilization so that the people should learn

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to be at once citizens of their own country and of the modern world.

But what has all this to do with education? Much, every way. We set out to ascertain the function of education in the Tropical Far East, and I would suggest that we have found an answer. Education we have defined as the sum of all the processes that equip the child for life in adult society. The school is merely one among many other factors. Life in the modern tropics is dominated by economic forces, and that is the environment for which their education equips the children. Here is the reason why primary and technical instruction make slow progress, why diplomas depreciate in value, why the schools flood the land with clerks and lawyers, why in sum, the modern school merely teaches pupils how to make a living; and the more who go to school the less they earn. It is one reason also why Eastern schools, intended to train pupils for a different environment, decay. Enthusiasts for "education" may proclaim lofty ideals as to the function of the school, but "idealism is comparatively easy in the class room."[6] The teacher, whether modern schoolmaster or Buddhist monk, cannot shut out the environment by shutting his eyes to it. He may instill ideas that will inspire some pupil to challenge circumstance, and do a little, a very little, towards providing him with the necessary tools, but he cannot directly through the school change the environment. That is the function, not of the schoolmaster, but of the statesman. In the West the modern school teaches the pupils how to live, as formerly did the Eastern school. So far as the school succeeds in that, the more who go to school the better. So far as the school in the modern tropics fails in that, the fault lies not in the school or system of instruction, but in the world in which they function. If we want better schools, we must create a better world.

[6] Mayhew, *Education in the Colonial Empire*, p. 35.

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CHAPTER VII

POST-WAR EDUCATION

Here perhaps we might stop. We have carried our inquiry beyond the limits of the classroom into the world outside. But we have not done with education. We have come to see it as a social rather than an individual process, and this will be more than ever important when we come to rebuild society in the post-war world. It seems that to get the children into school we must educate the parents; and we must educate the parents also before we can effectively instruct the children in hygiene and other matters of social welfare. We must make the parents want them, organize a demand for them. Similarly, if we are to extend technical instruction, we must organize a demand for it. Educational activities have been fettered by economic forces, because the society in which they function is only in economic contact with the modern world; we can not disregard economic forces, but we can control them in the interests of society and human welfare. If we would give greater freedom to the school, we must bring the people into cultural contact with the modern world. To do this does not lie within the province of the teacher, but it is a matter in which he has a vital interest. The problem of education in the tropics is then primarily a problem of adult education, including of course, all the paraphernalia of modern adult education, books, lectures and, still more, broadcasting, the cinema and so on, but with special reference to tropical society. It is a problem of social education. Obviously that is a matter of profound complexity, but our inquiries do seem to suggest certain lines on which, among others, it might be tackled.

Consider, for example, hygiene. For the prevention of epidemics it is necessary to world welfare that tropical peoples shall attain a minimum standard of modern hygienic knowledge and practice. Hygiene has no immediate and obvious cash value, and

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871 it is pre-eminently a sphere in which no man liveth to himself alone; it is of value to the community rather than to the individual, and it requires common or corporate action. To raise the standard of hygiene we must appeal to some motive other than and superior to the economic motive, the prospect of individual advantage, and must devise some machinery other than the economic machinery of unorganized supply and demand. But that is true also of primary instruction. Yet, under the impulse of nationalism, we have seen primary instruction spread throughout whole peoples, both for boys and girls, within a single generation. And we have seen much the same thing under foreign rule in Malaya and Netherlands India by a happy combination of European and native authority. Let us look at the machinery that has been employed.

If we analyze the machinery of social education in the tropics we find four distinct elements: the expert with a special knowledge of scientific principles in relation to his own subject; then, some one who by origin and upbringing is at home in Western thought, and by training and environment is sufficiently acquainted with the tropics to adapt scientific principles to native life; then, some one who by origin and upbringing is at home in native society but has sufficient knowledge of the West to carry the process of adaptation a stage further to the local circumstances of the particular people whom it is to benefit; and fourthly, some one with sufficient local influence to encourage the adoption of new methods. It is possible of course that one person may combine two or more of these qualifications. But it is rare that the scientific expert is also an expert in native life. Europeans in the tropics are transient and rarely have sufficient local knowledge or personal influence to do without a local coadjutor. Natives of the tropics who are really at home in the Western world are apt to lose touch with their own world. But the exact form of the machinery is indifferent so long as some machinery exists capable of the functions that we have just enumerated.

Hitherto such functions, so far as they have not been neglected, have devolved on members of the general administrative

service. If in future they are to be more efficiently performed it will be necessary to provide a suitable training for the civil service. In the past colonial policy in this matter has differed widely. In Britain the policy has been to select men with a high standard of general education and to give them a year's training of a practical character, closely related to their work as magistrates and collectors of revenue. In France there has been a longer course—of three years, with a break during which the probationers were sent abroad for a short experience of colonial life. The Dutch system is based on a different conception of tropical administration; it is regarded as a profession requiring vocational training of university standard.[1] The Dutch administration in Netherlands India has two branches, one European and one Native. The European, who inherits an understanding of the West, has a five years' course in language, law, including customary law, tropical economy, anthropology and so on, designed to give him a knowledge of the East. The native, who inherits an understanding of the East, has a three years' course, designed to give him a knowledge of the West. Thus the two between them are able to place the scientific knowledge of experts in hygiene, agriculture and other matters at the disposal of the people. Moreover in the native civil service there is a strong hereditary element which increases its influence among the villagers. The Dutch system is, naturally, a product of gradual evolution in response to local circumstances, and could not be transplanted. But it aims at producing "social engineers" and, if the peoples of the tropics are to be brought into cultural contact with the Western world, a service of social engineers would seem to be essential. At the head there might well be, as Professor Julian Huxley has suggested, a Commissioner for Native Development, who would be responsible for the general education of the people, with, as one of his chief assistants, the Director of Public Instruction, to help him as regards the schools.

Other suggestions also emerge from our inquiry. It seems

[1] Furnivall, J. S., "The Training for Civil Administration in Netherlands India," *Journal, Royal Central Asian Society*, 1934, p. 415.

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to have been greatly to the advantage of Thailand that it could draw on expert assistance from many different countries, and that it could choose freely among all countries in sending youths abroad for higher studies. The Philippines also have benefited in the same way, though to a less extent, by the double connection with Spain and the United States. In general however youths from a tropical dependency go to the colonial power, and the higher administrators are drawn from that power instead of from many different countries. And in sending youth abroad, it seems especially desirable that they should go to other countries of the Tropical Far East, where so many of the problems are so similar.

And here we come to what is perhaps the point of chief importance that our inquiry has made clear. We have seen that during the nineteenth century the progress of education followed much the same course in all these countries, and with much the same results. This has continued during the present century. It opened with a renewed interest in education and a new statement of policy that everywhere was very much the same. Since then the problem of educated unemployables in all these countries has grown more urgent. In each country there have been numerous inquiries into technical and agricultural instruction, and the reports in any one country might serve for any other; they reveal much the same facts, come to much the same conclusions, and make much the same recommendations. There have also been numerous experiments with much the same results. In general there have been similar vacillations of policy as to sending men abroad for higher studies, and everywhere provision for higher studies has been made in universities: the University of the Philippines since 1908; the Chulalongkorn University, founded in 1917, and the University of Hanoi, reopened in the same year; the Bandoeng College of Engineering, established in 1919 and followed a few years later by Colleges of Law and Medicine; the University of Rangoon, dating from 1929; Raffles College, with a course aiming at the standard of a pass degree, founded in 1928, and the Imperial University in Formosa in 1929. In all the dependencies of colonial powers the nationalist movement has followed much

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the same course, giving rise first to associations to cooperate with government in promoting education, then breaking away to found nationalist schools, that in due course have accepted government assistance and adopted a curriculum very similar to that of the official system. We find again, generally and at much the same time, new regulations to tighten up control over private instruction by requiring the registration of schools. With all these and many other questions arising from the polyglot character of the plural society common to all these countries, it seems essential that there should be some permanent international committee to deal, not merely with education in the narrow sense of schooling and instruction, but with superintending and promoting native development, and stirring up emulation in well-doing between the different communities in each country and between the several countries and peoples. Here we would seem to have a means of promoting harmonious relations between the different communities in each country so as to foster a common social life, and between the different countries so as to foster an instructed nationalism that might be as valuable a force in world civilization as the family in national life. If, by thus pooling our knowledge and experience, we could devise a means of social education, training the people of these countries as members of the great human family, citizens of the modern world, then the education of the child would necessarily equip him for life in such a social order, and the school, helping him to look beyond the narrow limits of his village and his people, would again have its traditional character, that in the West it has never wholly lost, of giving the children life more abundantly and teaching them how to live.

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SUPPLEMENT

TRAINING FOR NATIVE SELF-RULE

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TRAINING FOR NATIVE SELF-RULE

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It will be evident to readers of the preceding pages that they mark a turning point in colonial education. Mr. Furnivall's review of educational progress in Southeast Asia ends with the era which came to a close on August 14, 1941, when the British Prime Minister and the President of the United States issued the joint declaration which was subsequently to be signed by all the United Nations and to become known as the Atlantic Charter. Already in the last phase of the epoch covered by this study, described by the author as that of "efficiency and social justice," the welfare of natives had in principle been placed before all other considerations in the development of educational policies for the dependencies of Southeast Asia. But the third article of the Atlantic Charter by implication changes the educational objective in its very heart. The era ended on a note of conflicting aims, of "general perplexity"; a new era may well have begun with the pledge "to respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." That "respect" implies an active furtherance of self-government, in the colonial dependencies no less than elsewhere, at least to the extent of helping the subject peoples through suitable educational disciplines to acquire the mental prerequisites of self-government.

Educational Implications of the Atlantic Charter

The evaluation of educational principles and practices just at the point where they must undergo a revolutionary change is a delicate and difficult task. When the preceding study was completed, there had not yet been wide public discussion of the Atlantic Charter and the meaning of its various propositions. Its educational implications have, in fact, received almost no attention even yet (March 1943). The question raised in the minds of some whether the joint declaration applied at all to

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the colonial regions of the world has been resolved by authoritative confirmation. The major differences in the interpretation of the document hinge on the relative importance to be attached to its various articles and on the speed with which one may hope to see its various aims achieved.

One of the special values of the preceding study is its demonstration that the diverse forces which make for the progress of the subject peoples are interrelated. Education, both formal and experimental, obviously is one of these forces. It may put life and energy into other processes of advance; it may give them direction. But it is in turn inspired and directed by the new possibilities of material advance and the new hopes of cultural satisfactions that spring from changed conditions. For whole peoples to acquire control over their environment, to conquer their own limitations, involves a multiple task.

Mr. Furnivall's historical account and his analysis of the current school systems in the region under survey suggest that oriental societies have their own characteristic fetters but also their own characteristic dynamics. Fetters may be broken and currents of life be geared to conscious aims. Educational agencies and institutions (but not merely those of instruction) are the instruments through which social transformation becomes the object of conscious and purposeful management.

Mr. Furnivall suggests that "all educational effort in the tropics is conditioned by the economic environment," and "there is no common social will by which economic forces may be restrained." But the evidence shows only that there is no way of controlling these forces from without; they have already for half a century been animated and directed from within oriental society by the movement variously described as nationalism, nativism, or any of the vaguely racial or cultural combinations that are stronger in their opposition to the existing order than they are in constructive purposes. The inner unity of the native societies, destroyed by the plural economy of modern colonial regimes, can be restored only from within. What Mr. Furnivall calls "instructed nationalism," and not the manipulation of extraneous incentives, will enable the peoples of tropical Asia to become citizens of the modern world.

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All efforts to infuse oriental society with occidental ambitions unrelated to the inner springs of oriental culture have failed. The new goal of self-determination, however we may define it and however long its attainment may take, does not call for new loads of learning in the curricular sense as much as it calls for a freeing of desires already present in a large part of oriental society. To lift the incubus of alien domination is quite as much a prerequisite of the new alignment as is the provision of more adequate educational tools.

Another special value of this study is that, having examined the various systems of education and the principles that have motivated them at different times, it indicates in concise and practical terms the point of departure for the future. It is the point at which a negative nationalism, though now probably the principal motivating force, no longer suffices as a guide to the ends that must be achieved. For, despite all the diversity of conditions, differences in rates of growth, and conflicts of cultures, it is after all a single world society into which these oriental societies must train themselves to fit if they are to survive. Neither mass education nor higher education can meet what is expected of it in the new era if it does not promote, in addition to native development within the specific environment of each group, also a harmonious interaction of the various communities, countries, and peoples. In one respect, then, the educational post-war problem in Southeast Asia is no different from that in other parts of the world. It is the problem which at the 1942 conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations was described as that of a "two-way cultural traffic, a real interchange of cultures between East and West."[1] Actually it is a problem of multiple cultural exchange[2] and not least exchange between groups within the region that are in different stages of cultural maturity.

On its educational side, this problem was explored at the 1933 conference of the Institute, which arrived at two conclusions: first, that an increase in mutual knowledge between

[1] *War and Peace in the Pacific*, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1943, p. 112.

[2] For an illustration, see Stuart Lilico, "Pan-America or Pan-Malaya: Which Will the Filipino Choose?" *Asia and the Americas*, March 1943, pp. 148-150.

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two peoples or culture groups in itself does not necessarily make for greater harmony or assimilation but may actually sharpen a sense of difference and of conflict; second, that too rapid an impact of one culture upon another arouses fears, engenders resistance, and so tends to hinder rather than help the readjustment of traditional ideas.[3] These dangers are fully realized by those colonial administrators who sympathize with the aim of self-determination for dependent peoples. Sometimes they put their doubts in the form of questions, such as these: Does anyone really believe that the Dyak headhunters of Borneo can become self-governing in a generation, or even two? Do not the Burmese people for all practical purposes exercise the functions of a free people—what have they to gain from losing their slender ties with the British Commonwealth? Of what use are political self-government and economic freedom going to be to peoples whose thinking is dominated by shamanism and primitive religious fears? Will not a strengthening of the demand for self-determination increase the unhappiness, without increasing the economic strength, of the native rubber-growers in Sumatra who have grown prosperous under alien domination of their industry? Will not increased independence make all the more difficult the accomplishment of the one thing all these peoples need most for their security: the strengthening of international interdependence?

This is not, of course, the place to argue these matters. It may be pointed out, however, that on a few preliminary answers to all such questions most thoughtful students of colonial problems are agreed. First, obviously political freedom alone does not suffice. There is nothing in the Atlantic Charter or in any other authoritative declaration of United Nations war aims to warrant the assumption that any of the powers with colonial possessions will attempt simply to transfer sovereignty to the subject people regardless of their ability to rule themselves. If it were possible to apply some objective standards to the measurement of tasks and results, the time it must take to prepare different peoples for self-government would certainly be seen to vary greatly. As to trusting too much in political reforms,

[3] *Problems of the Pacific, 1933*. London and Chicago, 1934, p. 218 *et seq.*

other articles of the Charter impose upon all the governments the duty of helping in the emancipation of the people from crushing economic burdens, from the extraneous limitations imposed upon their productivity and hence also on their consuming power. Third, the diverse movements that are commonly labeled "nationalistic" also contain many germs of internationalism. They are usually directed against an oppressive imperialism but not necessarily against collaboration with others, East and West, for common ends. Indeed, so-called nationalism in Southeast Asia owes much of its incentive to a desire for cultural enlargement, for a sharing in all the benefits which the genius of a few great centers of civilization has bestowed upon the world. The nationalists of Southeast Asia are not exponents of a policy of "Balkanization." They are not even, for the most part, ardent regionalists but in addition to the common bonds between the different sections of native society also recognize the bonds which that society as a whole has with humanity at large. All they insist upon is that every people, every ethnic group, shall have the right to retain what it cherishes in its own cultural heritage, the right also to abandon whatever customs, traditions or laws of old may stand in the way of their freedom, and the right to participate freely and as equals in the making and the administration of the laws that govern larger political entities of which they are part.

The Goal of Self-Determination

It is true that some colonial administrators do not yet take freedom itself very seriously as an object of policy. They may have worked so assiduously and so long for the welfare of their "wards" as to have come to regard the accustomed apparatus of colonial government—if not themselves—as indispensable. Some of them may be unable to imagine the native society over whose slow progress they have watched as entering into the full maturity of responsible citizenship. They may even be able to point to actual instalments of a freer life produced by their own efforts and ask without undue pride why reliance should not be had in the same safe line of progress. Does any sane and well informed person believe, such an administrator may ask,

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What more substantial progress toward the "four freedoms" would have been made under native rule?

In a sense, then, it is true that, whether this was the aim of colonial rule or not, it has in many of its recent phases contributed toward its own eventual liquidation by strengthening native society at those points at which potential self-government begins. And Mr. Furnivall's study shows that the teacher, with all the limitations placed upon him, has at least here and there succeeded to "inspire some pupil to challenge circumstance."

In any case, there is need for a fuller discussion of the part which education can play in what is essentially a movement of liberation if we understand that term as including positive and constructive as well as unchaining, revolutionizing forms and phases of action. If for the present we think of "self-determination" with its broader implications and not merely of "self-government" (though that is the term used in the Atlantic Charter) we shall by-pass the controversy as to the time it must take economically and culturally backward peoples and population groups to acquire the qualifications for modern citizenship; and the interest of some may be invoked who see political autonomy as a rather remote end.

Such a substitution of the less precise for the more definite term may not please all of those who trust in learning through participation, those who believe that the art of democratic government can be learned only through its exercise. But even these political reformers may agree that the requisite habits of mind and abilities can be trained in smaller and somewhat different areas of responsibility, later to be transferred to the national political scene.[4] In any case, it is not, as Mr. Furnivall reminds us, the function of the schoolmaster to provide the setting in and through which the individual shall receive his informal learning and apply what he has learned. At best he can

[4] For example, in 1906 a full-fledged Labour Party made its first appearance in the British Parliament. Of the 53 party members elected only a very few had previously held national office, but all had been trained in the schools of labor organization and of local government. In Parliament the party was from the start equipped for effective participation by the long and practical experience of its members in the use of the requisite techniques.

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provide him with analogous situations, so as to give him opportunities for practice in the arts of life.

Some educators insist that a sound educational system must prepare the whole of society, and not just a few, for the exigencies of here and now. They correspondingly deprecate a moral or humanistic education for some far-off utopia the constant contemplation of which may actually unfit the recipient of such education for an effective functioning in his actual setting. This is a matter of concern everywhere, but it is perhaps most pronounced in the East where education has more fully continued into modern times as a professional prerogative of the religionist.[5] If we accept the challenge of these realists we are obliged to define the war aim expressed in article three in terms of steps that lead to self-government, a *gradus ad parnassum* leading safely—and painlessly—to the proclaimed ideal. Some such idea often lies behind the emphasis which colonial educators lay upon vocational training and the teaching of hygiene. They see livelihood and health as objects easy to understand and therefore suitable starting points for training the minds of simple people in receptiveness to new ideas; incidentally these subjects, taken directly from the pupils' environment, also afford rich opportunities for evoking individual initiative and for building habits both of self-reliance and of cooperation. If a large enough proportion of the people, both children and adults, take part in such learning experiences, these teachers hold, the ground will have been laid for the practice of social self-determination, and the transference of what has been learned from the narrower to the wider environment, from economic and social to political situations, will not be too difficult.

All will agree that it must depend on the circumstances and on the stage of social development in which a particular people finds itself whether an immediate large forward step in the widening of the area of responsibility is practicable or not. For example, a fairly large degree of autonomy in a region where the economy is still entirely pre-industrial may be preferable to

[5] See, for example, Zakir Husain, *Post-War Education in India*, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1942.

outside interference even from the standpoint of internal security; but it does not follow that the inhabitants of such a region, expert in the management of their native economy, would be able to protect their interests directly by holding franchises in a more inclusive political system. This is evident from the illustrations offered by Mr. Furnivall of the mental preparation of different peoples in Southeast Asia for the relatively modest advances in native participation in government that were open to them before the war. For, although there has been considerable, even surprising similarity in the evolution of educational policies throughout the region, the results have differed widely. Unforeseen responses and reactions have halted progress where it seemed most assured. Profit and prestige have operated, as they do everywhere, to elicit application to learning; but peculiar traits in the inherited culture, peculiar conflicts between old and new incentives, peculiar maladjustments between ambitions fostered by the schools and the scale of values more sincerely shown by society in the apportionment of vocational rewards—all have tended to divert talents from socially useful to socially useless and even harmful forms of their exercise.

Sources of Educational Dynamic

With all their desire to be realistic, the colonial schoolmen have often missed the essential clue to success. They have blamed the petrifaction or the degeneracy or the complexity or merely the backwardness of oriental society for lack of educational progress when they should have blamed their lack of success in finding its hidden dynamic. Even when admitting that native society is not altogether lifeless but continues to evolve, the alien official often thinks of the only thing that can animate an educational process in purely occidental terms and is liable to miss it when he encounters it in unfamiliar forms. The present writer has met many schoolmen in tropical Asia (and in other parts of the Far East) who could understand and sympathize with the ambitions of those natives who, having received some foreign schooling, showed a strong desire for profit, preferment and prestige—showed it in familiar ways;

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but the same men often supposed, without any proof whatever, that those who did not respond to typical Western incentives, or responded without alacrity, were altogether lacking in ambition.

There are, of course, other schoolmen and public officials who go below the surface of appearances and catch a glimpse of the latent ambitions in these old societies. Or sometimes a chance circumstance, such as a tenant uprising or an agitation against Chinese or Indian middlemen, discloses that under the crust of old-established social relations, of conservative practices, of regard for custom and native law, there flickers that same spirit of revolt against tyranny which is so often falsely regarded as bound up with the individualistic post-Renaissance civilization of the West. Revolt against social injustice or against the tyranny of tradition is not a new disorder of the social fabric, even in tropical Asia, though the mysterious travel of new ideas may have given it a new impetus. The opposite statement would be nearer the truth: there is a sense of human dignity in oriental societies that has never quite permeated the newer and more barbarian societies of the occident. Without it the world would, indeed, be divided into master races and slave races. Conquest and class rule have not extinguished the spark of latent revolt.

In Burma, in Indo-China, in the Indies, throughout tropical Asia, hope and defiance have broken again and again through the dams so carefully built to uphold privilege, have overflown the channels that were to provide safe outlets for native energies. Almost every native insurrection in recent times has been attributed by Western officials to the infiltration of communist influences. But no colonial author, as far as the present writer knows, has yet explained why these agitations—usually very small affairs in terms of personnel and sums expended—secured so large a response. What element is there in oriental society which thus responds?

Most colonial governments have preferred to deny the existence of an inherent dissatisfaction in native society until they were obliged to acknowledge it. If their benevolent plans for the native welfare meet with suspicion or opposition they tend

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to ascribe this to the lethargy and the ignorance of the people. Volumes have been written about the inertia of tropical societies—a thesis refuted every time such a society has the chance to rise against oppression. Exactly the same phenomenon may, of course, also be noted in non-tropical countries where one racial or national group dominates over another. As long as such a myth can be maintained, the ruling group accounts for the lack of progress in the subject group by declaring it to be lacking in native ability, in spirit, and in ambition. When discontent rises, it must be explained with yet another myth: the mysterious power of a small group of outside agitators who work upon the poor but normally happy people and make them act outside the established character.

On such evidence as we have it is safer to conclude that latent discontent is the primary source of educational ambition when suddenly it surges up in unexpected places. This does not, of course, preclude that stimuli from without may play a vital part in the release of that inner force. It is quite true that a relatively liberal educational policy, sensitive to native psychology, has in Malaya and in the Netherlands Indies turned ambition into socially productive channels. In Indo-China, on the contrary, the movement seems more often to have been in the opposite direction: only very strong expressions of native discontent have stimulated the government to introduce forward steps in the educational system. But again the educational safety engineers went to work: in the 'twenties began the systematic attempt to link the lower schools more and more to the native culture, so as to deflate whatever influence they may have had on political aspirations, and to alienate the higher schools from native culture by gearing them more securely to French culture—thus to cut the roots of an Annamite nationalism that had already grown too far to be stunted or repressed. The resulting growth of dissatisfaction only made for even greater reaction on the part of the authorities.[6] Perhaps one may add that in the difficulties of the 'thirties with their economic upheaval, and the tragedy of the 'forties with the enslavement of the whole country by Japan Annamite nationalism has

[6] Virginia Thompson, *French Indo-China*, New York, 1937, p. 293 *et seq.*

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achieved its education for self-determination—despite and not through the school system.

These contrasting examples must suffice to reinforce a central thought of Mr. Furnivall's conclusions. He enumerates many of the difficulties which nativist movements have created for an orderly pursuit of educational policies, shows that at times they have changed the character of the school systems and perhaps even exercised an unfortunate influence on it. And yet it is clear that during this last generation the educational motive power arising from the inner core of native society might have become dissipated and produced a new sense of frustration had not the educational policies and programs themselves been flexible and alive with real enthusiasm. The awakening desires of the people have been, and again can be, turned to good account.

Tradition and Progress

As has already been intimated, the Indonesian and Malay peoples have often been libeled by those who ascribe to them a traditionalism quite distinct from that in other parts of the world. Not all occidentals who have gone through school and vote in elections are free from the pull of value judgments unrelated to the world of today. The views expressed in any Western public assembly show how many influential people still take their criteria from days when the use of steam power was but a dream and electric currents unheard of outside the laboratory. And these outdated views affect not only personal tastes but also moral judgments which in the aggregate press heavily upon public opinion. The oriental peasant or small businessman who sends his children to a modern school has taken at least the first step toward a mental readjustment which is a world need. His motive may be personal and economic, but more often it is made up of several strands. He realizes at least vaguely that the material basis for the "good old days" has gone or is disappearing. Neither possessions nor the good opinion of his neighbors can give him the security he seeks for himself and his children.

The unadjusted occidental is liable to compensate for a

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troublesome present by dwelling inwardly on memories—authentic or fictional—of a golden age; the oriental still has so much of the past around him that its contemplation does not take his mind away from his troubles. It may be said that he is less in need of compensation because less is expected of him in rational adjustment to the conditions of modern civilization. The emotional pull which at times takes him "out of himself" is not, in fact, away from realism but toward it: toward the seemingly magic source of that strange new civilization which fascinates him and draws him on.

Even the Buddhist schools of Burma and the Mohammedan schools of Java are obliged to take notice of this urge. They have gone a considerable way to adapt their practices to the demands of the people; and what the people demand of schooling is that it help them to come to grips with the meaning as well as with the mechanics of the modern side of their environment. Of course, neither the public nor the private school can easily abandon the older values. On the contrary, some show of respect for the inherited culture is essential to gain the confidence of the people. They want the new arts; but they also want the security of tested wisdom. A former governor of East Java tells a graphic story of the success with which illiteracy was combated in his province by the introduction of native song and poetry into the "readers," and by the establishment of village libraries on community premises that also serve the customary rites and pastimes.[7]

The creative ability shown by those Orientals who have had the chance to combine a knowledge of Western science with respect for their own people and their historic culture is the best answer to those who see only a disruptive force in modern education, and especially in higher education. That ability overcomes many obstacles—even the deliberate attempt to confront the student or the graduate with a wholly unnecessary clear-cut choice to declare himself either for the old or for the new learning. Foreign learning itself—or, better, modern learn-

[7] Charles O. van der Plas, "The Battle against Illiteracy," appendix to *Educational Developments in the Netherlands Indies*, by Raden Loekman Djajadiningrat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1942, mim.

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ing, for, its sources are no longer limited to distant lands—when pursued far enough will turn the oriental student back from too intensive a longing for the external finish and glitter of occidental accomplishments to a fairer appraisal of his own heritage.

The charge is often made against a native intelligentsia that it is selfish, unstable in its ideals, possessed of an inferiority complex, and easily corrupted by doles. In answer to such a charge, a French university teacher from Hanoi writes:

> "Nothing is farther from the truth. On the contrary, the long years which I have spent in different parts of the Far East have convinced me that of all the upper classes that have formed in Eastern Asia since the beginning of this century the Indo-Chinese is certainly one of the best equipped and most gifted with creative energy. We have been berated for trying to inculcate our students with French learning; but that learning is not the superficial varnish which the critics suppose it to be. The elite [he cites many distinguished names] . . is proof that our hope in it has not been vain."[8]

Mass Education or Education for Leadership?

Mention of the role of an elite—comprising men and women of outstanding achievement in the arts and professions, in industry, commerce, science, and government—brings up a key problem which Mr. Furnivall's study raises without answering: that is the relative importance of mass education and of training for leadership. Both are needed, of course. Both are complex tasks in themselves; and a third category of problems arises precisely from their combination in a single school system. Thus, it is pointed out in the concluding chapter of this study that "to get the children into school we must educate the parents." Before the people can want the knowledge and the skills which schools may be able to give their children, they must have been brought into contact with that side of their pluralistic universe in which these things count; and this contact can most

[8] Pierre Laurin, *La France en Indo-Chine*, Publications de la France Combattante, London, 1942, p. 46. It may be added here that in the field of art the two great French Institutions in Inde-China have unquestionably released much native talent through a successful blending of traditional and modern techniques and art forms.

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effectively be established by leading members of their own community in whom they trust. And yet, according to many observers on the scene whom the present writer has interviewed, even that is not enough: without the elementary disciplines, especially without literacy, it is exceedingly difficult for simple peasant and laboring folk to form criteria with which to judge the *bona fides* or the ability of those who offer themselves for posts of leadership. As long as any kind of magic quality adheres to unusual accomplishment, it affords no safe reliance. In the long run it will make little difference whether the educated leaders are imbued with social enthusiasm or with secret personal ambitions: they cannot but be disturbing elements if their will alone and not also the common sense of the people dictate the direction of progress. The populace must be at least far enough advanced in modern knowledge to understand aims and to comprehend the general character of proposed means. It must be literate enough at least to ask penetrating questions.

The educational authorities would face an insoluble problem if they had to decide which comes first, schools for children or a generous provision for adult education. Most of them know that they must do both. In the Philippines they plunged at first for the common school, for that had been the great American tradition; but already, in recent pre-war years, the Commonwealth Government, seeing the greatest hindrance to progress in the ignorance of the average villager who has had only a very few years of elementary schooling, has embarked on a vigorous program of adult education, administered since 1936 by an Office of Adult Education in the Department of Public Instruction.

"Our regional surveys have revealed one fundamental weakness of Filipino life: ignorance with its concomitants—poverty and civic disintegration. Illiteracy is at the root of this weakness which forms a serious drawback to Philippine culture and progress. To remove the cause requires the formulation and adoption of an educational program which would raise the general intellectual level of the common *tao* (peasant). Until this level is attained, all efforts of the Commonwealth Government to improve the social and economic well-being of the masses will prove futile. Social justice may only shift

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the balance and allow the perpetuation of injustice by the laboring class. Ignorance and social justice cannot long go hand in hand."[9]

Significantly, Thailand, the only independent nation of Southeast Asia, also has stressed adult education to an unusual degree in its recent educational policies, although the country's school system as a whole is as yet less developed than that of most of the colonial dependencies in that region. Under the constitutional amendments of 1932, a literacy test was to have been applied to the franchise in ten years' time, and to make this practicable a vigorous adult-educational program was introduced. Incidentally, this program also had a culturally nationalist and anti-Chinese bias[10] and was combined with much needed popular instruction in hygiene, agriculture, and animal husbandry.

The thought occurs that perhaps only incipient democracies can afford to make their citizens receptive to the information and ideas which literacy supplies without first subjecting the population to the slow conditioning process of universal schooling.[11] It is true, of course, that in other countries of Southeast Asia, too, progress has been made in the combat of adult illiteracy, notably in the Netherlands Indies; but there it has taken place only because the government felt sure that it could control what people would read after they had become able to do so.[12] In French Indo-China there has at times seemed to be

[9] Director of Education, Report for 1938, as quoted by J. R. Hayden in *The Philippines, a Study in National Development*, New York, 1942, p. 532.

[10] Kenneth P. Landon, *The Chinese in Thailand*, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1941, p. 282.

[11] A well-known Chinese educator, P. C. Chang, some years ago, after a survey of rural schools in northern and central China, was so impressed with the slowness of their improvement that he led a national campaign for the diversion of funds from the maintenance of elementary schools to a rapid increase in nonliterate adult education—making use of radio, motion picture, travel exhibits, poster art, and so forth. A middle path between reliance on the public schools and adult education is provided in China by the Mass Education Movement which still continues in war time under the direction of Y. C. James Yen and from which stem several other adult-educational movements of an even more popular character. While a simplified teaching for literacy is the kernel of Yen's program, the other campaigns make use of the old Chinese arts of story telling and the popular drama.

[12] See K. A. H. Hidding, "The Bureau for Popular Literature," *Bulletin of the Colonial Institute of Amsterdam*, I, 3, May 1938, pp. 185-94; for a criticism of the policy: G. H. Bousquet, *A French View of the Netherlands Indies*, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1940, p. 98.

a surprising lack of censorship; but further inquiry revealed that periodicals openly critical of the government were permitted to circulate only when they were published in the French language and therefore did not in the least influence the masses. To protect the French-educated Annamite intelligentsia from the effect of subversive literature would have been impossible. A similar seeming liberalism in the attitude of governments toward publications in European languages is to be found in a large part of the Far East—always because effective suppression would be too costly in proportion to the relatively small harm done by a literature which only a few even among the educated can read.

Mass education for self-determination certainly has its dangers. Even when preparation for eventual independence of the subject people is a matter of policy with the authorities, there are intermediate steps toward that objective which cannot with impunity be skipped. Recognition of the need for a graded progress is something very different from a desire to suppress all ambition or to guide it into channels where it cannot come into conflict with the interests of the ruling group.

Education for Economic Security

There is, as Mr. Furnivall intimates, a long history of striving among colonial educators for a balance between progress and security—security, that is, for the existing order. There have been notable changes in emphasis; but in essence the task has remained within the orbit of a justifiable concern with law and order as prerequisites of prosperity. As the more enlightened administrations see it, this concern does not involve a static indigenous society but demands a good deal of movement up and down the social ladder, individual competition and loosening up of caste and class differentiations. What they aim at is not a dead stability but as much internal social life and ferment as is compatible with the unquestioned authority of law.

As a result, vocational education has received marked attention in most of the countries under survey. Both in the schools and out of them a kind of instruction was stressed which Mr. Furnivall describes as "preparation for a life of business" as

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distinct from "preparation for the business of life." Money was spent cheerfully to demonstrate the efficacy of an improved plow, to introduce a new commercial crop, even to unmask the villainy of the mosquito and to proclaim the virtue of fertilizer—in its proper place. The departments of health and of agriculture, sometimes also others, vied with the departments of public instruction in efforts directed primarily toward the increase of the villager's productivity. Without such increase there could be no improvement in living standards, no prolongation of life expectancy, no building up of native capital to break the monopoly of alien Orientals, no schools. For, as Mr. Furnivall reminds us, "the school is only one among many other factors. Life in the modern tropics is dominated by economic forces."

Of course, no one believes that higher productivity alone will insure a higher degree of prosperity. The producer must also be able to hold on to his fair share in his product and know how to put it to uses that benefit him and his fellows. It is at this point that vocational training in the narrow sense is reinforced, in most of the educational systems of the region, by other kinds of training about which there is a good deal more controversy. The technical educational reports tell only part of the story. They do not usually exaggerate the part played by vocational training in economic betterment, because it would be difficult to do so. But the more discerning of the educators at least realize that there will be little lasting improvement in the condition of the masses unless they also learn to organize for the protection of their economic interests. Obviously, however, that is outside the province of the schoolmen. Except where, as in Malaya, the government takes a hand in stimulating and supervising the formation of trade unions among certain limited categories of workers (more especially to prevent strikes at the waterfront, in communications, and in public works—hence in essence company unions), economic organization is more often a by-product of organization promoted for other ends.[13] However, in some instances government agencies

[13] See reports of the Netherlands Indies Public Health Service, Netherlands Indies and Philippine reports on the organization of cooperatives and credit

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have made joint cause with indigenous community leaders to organize the people for an effective promotion of thrift, of methods to curb the monopoly position of alien middlemen and moneylenders, even of methods to protect tenants against rapacious landlords. In some localities, if not as yet widely, government agents have lent a hand in experimental applications of the co-partnership principle to native enterprise under conditions that sufficiently resemble old customary forms of collaboration to find acceptance. Thus, in most of the countries of the region new forms of self-help have developed, either with the active aid of the government or at least with its tacit approval, which contain the most valuable of all germs of democratic procedure and training in self-determination. Public discussion of local problems has been invigorated, and sometimes school authorities will admit that the vitality of the school system itself, especially its combat of illiteracy, has been favorably affected.

The nativist movement in many parts of Southeast Asia, according to some writers who know it intimately, is not originally political but economic. The most successful adult-educational programs have usually been those which helped the people in their attempt to grope their way out from under one kind of monopoly or another or to regain ancient common rights. Even the native reformers who have taken part in such campaigns often admit that education alone can sometimes conquer the usurpation of power by native or foreign exploiters: it alone can overcome the inner weakness of the people's cause, the sense of frustration created by the violation of its rights through so many generations. It is the children of such native leaders as these, themselves not yet altogether emancipated from the shackles of the past, who "elbow their way into the schools." They believe in literacy. The more liberal regimes of Southeast Asia deserve credit for having permitted, and sometimes fostered, a great deal of experimental economic education which must precede a popular appreciation for the added power which systematic schooling can confer.

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unions, bureaus charged with the development of village industries, and local government generally.

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Educational Effects of Industrialization

The local rural community has not been much changed by even considerable improvements in agricultural techniques unless intensification has meant the use of more complicated tools, the growth of processing and other associated industries, and, above all, participation of the villagers in either economic or administrative (public health, sports, defense, local government) management. The social structure is, of course, more liable to be conservative in purely agricultural areas than in those with a mixed economy. From many examples, especially in the Philippines and in the Netherlands Indies, it appears that those areas which permit of a substantial growth of small or subsidiary industries, at least, have the advantage over others in a multitude of opportunities for education. The social history of the Industrial Revolution as the West first knew it here repeats itself.[14]

"The same decade," writes a Netherlands Indian official, "which was marked by the upward curve in the line of economic development showed an equally important turning point in the social organization of the country. There was an impressive expansion of education, coupled with the transfer of its management to autonomous councils, mostly with Indonesian majorities in control: transfer of public health services to the same social-political institutions; formation of producers' unions for obtaining better distribution of income for all who collaborate in production, with here and there spontaneously organized social provisions for the workmen; there were savings in the Indonesian community, which have been invested in productive ventures instead of in sterile gold. This all seems conclusive evidence that in these years forces have grown

[14] It is sometimes falsely assumed that the incipient industries, with their use of child labor, held back the development of public school systems in Europe and America. Actually, the opposite was the case; and interestingly enough, as in the Far East today, the child's path to school was cleared by the tired father's faltering steps to the night class. The radical workers' movements in the first third of the nineteenth century saw in education primarily a means of economic revolt. The simple evening schools of the Chartists and Owenites in the British Isles were followed by the establishment of hundreds of Mechanics Institutes—many years before there were any public schools. The London Workingmen's Association and similar bodies were, indeed, instrumental in the passage of the early education acts.

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in the Netherlands Indies which will carry the land more and more rapidly to greater freedom and prosperity."[15]

In the Philippines it is even more difficult to dissociate and evaluate separately the various forces that have made for greater freedom and prosperity. They have so interacted as to create the semblance of a single organized movement in which the public school takes its place among many other instruments and influences. But actually the school system introduced under American rule could hardly at first have had much influence on the economic functioning of a typical Filipino community. That community continued to exist under the domination of the landlord-politician and of the most reactionary branch of the Catholic Church. The new teachers had, for the most part, no experience of oriental social life and, of course, little knowledge of the technical means of livelihood in a tropical environment. Yet, their effect on attitudes and habits, their faith in the importance of the individual, their belief in the dignity of manual labor—sometimes by example as well as by precept—all contrived to produce a considerable change in personal and social value judgments. Despite the continuing dominance of the older institutions, the social crust was pierced by ambitions that had been latent and were now brought to full bloom. Not all the new demand for knowledge and freedom was superficial and imitative, as unsympathetic foreign observers have tried to convey. Many a fountain pen really held ink and rested over a heart that beat in sympathy with a new rhythm; many a framed photograph expressed pride in genuine achievement.[16]

The American school system in the Philippines has justly been criticized as wasteful; but at least a useful byproduct has been the enhanced ability of the people to make use of the local resources and of their own talents, to think ahead a little way, to have faith in themselves. Through improved agricultural methods, through new enterprises connected with processing and manufacture of the resources, many parts of the

[15] Peter H. W. Sitsen, *The Industrial Development of the Netherlands Indies*, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1942, min., pp. 9-10.

[16] See Joseph R. Hayden, *op. cit.*, p. 528.

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Philippines have since come to realize the importance of technical knowledge. In the course of time, those who possessed such knowledge brought into the community also knowledge of organizational methods or acquired it through the trial and error of their own efforts. Thus a trail was cut through the economic jungle of the hybrid Filipino-Spanish-American community life to basic changes also in social relations. At least it may be said for a large part of the Philippines that modern knowledge of sorts has permeated the whole of society to such an extent that only a resort to force could now resurrect the exploitative structure for which "law and order" were maintained through the centuries.

Formerly it was usually the son of a middle-class home who, after receiving a higher education, took hold of the economic opportunities of some rural enterprise which prospered not so much through his application or his ingenuity as through the monopoly market afforded by American protection. Such a person might advance his fortune in opposition to the local landed aristocracy; but quite often—as is the wont among successful businessmen everywhere—he would be drawn into it. Today the modernizing influence of that class is still considerable, not only in the technical improvement of long established forms of rural enterprise but also in the introduction of industries that require capital in larger doses than the local landlord, who is also the banker and the moneylender, is willing to supply while usury still flourishes. But the influence of that class is increasingly matched and challenged by that of yet another class: the man of the people who has received a modest education and who has risen to popular leadership through new possibilities of local organization. Whether he, too, will be absorbed or will lead his Israel out of Egypt remains to be seen.[17]

Public Service and Political Education

The emergence of a continuous professional leadership of

[17] The prospect for a united, purposeful and responsible labor movement in the Philippines looks decidedly hopeful according to a recent American study: Kenneth K. Kurihara, *Labor in the Philippine National Economy* (unpublished manuscript).

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the people's cause, such as has arisen in the Western world, is favored by the increasing opportunity, in colonial society too, for successful careers in public and private organizational and administrative services.[18] Reference has already been made to some new branches of public activity in that society that are rich in educational byproducts. Even in those countries of Southeast Asia that have continued "indirect rule" the old relationship of the central authorities to local administration has undergone great changes in recent times. It is no longer the Sultan or the Resident who determines what new services shall be introduced or how they shall be run. The direct activities of the central government may leave the core of custom and native law untouched but operate precisely in those areas of the social life where change is imminent. And it is there that the learning process goes on apace. The conservation of traditional culture values has not ceased to be an object of governmental care; but it is an object that can be pursued—and more and more is pursued—with understanding for all the implications, with skill, and with an economic sense of values. It is no longer allowed to stand, as self-purpose, in the way of necessary reforms—even of such re-education of popular attitudes and beliefs as may, at some future time, threaten the established order in so far as it rests on ancient superstitions.

Moreover, the interested reader will find in the literature of colonial administration examples of innovations in native life that could not have been brought about except through an effective use of values current in the traditional culture complex. Again, it should be pointed out that in this respect progress in the Asiatic tropics hardly differs from that in the Occident: almost no great movement of reform in recent history, East or West, has been able to dispense with an appeal to the sanction of tradition.

[18] The general case for a rapid increase in the number and proportion of natives admitted to the colonial civil services is, of course, much larger than it would be merely on grounds of training for self-rule. The subject is treated admirably in the pamphlet *Downing Street and the Colonies*, prepared by the Faban Colonial Bureau (London, 1942). Although the references of that study are largely to African experience, the authors would probably agree that the case for a rapid substitution of native for European administrative and technical public employees is even stronger and more urgent in the Asiatic dependencies.

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Once the political machinery of democratic government has begun to operate, even the rural population is drawn more and more into the discussion of issues and into the clash of parties. Superficial appearances may discredit this view. The introduction of limited franchises in Thailand, the Philippines, Burma, and the Netherlands Indies—to mention only the politically most advanced countries of Southeast Asia—did not automatically produce a vigorous discussion of public questions. The chief reason is that all these governments still are somewhat class-bound. Another is that there is not in these countries anything like the full system of communications which Western electorates possess to bring the issues home to the people. And, of course, in none of these countries has the literacy of the masses advanced to the point at which they can effectively be reached by the printed word.

Converging Lines of Approach

Mass education for self-government, then, is a multiple task in which advance along any one line may be hindered or speeded by that along some other line. But one element must be present if there is to be progress at all: those whose responsibility it is to guide the transformation of a colonial or quasi-feudal society into a self-reliant commonwealth must themselves trust the democratic process. Too often, while paying lip service to democracy, they unwittingly substitute for such trust a cautious reliance on the apparatus which they themselves administer. At best, such men may be willing gradually to admit to participation in the management of affairs those natives who have learned the ways of the West. And that is not enough.

A frequent argument in defense of the system of trusteeship —that is, continuation of the white man's rule—is that the native people will, in its absence, only the more thoroughly subject themselves to class rule. It is possible, of course, even probable, that no pure democracy results immediately from the freeing of those who have long been unfree. But as long as consciousness of subjection to an alien power unites the more rebellious members of different population groups in a com-

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mon dissatisfaction, they cannot come to grips with their own conflicts of interest. The point to be stressed in the present connection is that self-government is conditioned by the ability of different ethnic groups, religious sects, economic classes, to deal realistically with their own conflict situations. It is true that the internal economy of a country under strong imperial rule may be more prosperous than that of a self-governing commonwealth—social peace may be more assured in Malaya or Borneo than it is in Thailand or the Philippines; but the colonial dependencies afford all too few occasions for the people to compose their own differences where the clash involves more than petty conflicts of no great social significance.

To start anything new in an old society there must be upstarts. There are those in the colonial and class-bound governments who sincerely believe that they alone stand between the common people and the vested interests that are ready to exploit them. Their confidence in the power of the people to rule and protect themselves gains to the extent to which they see men of ability rise from the ranks, men equipped with enough education to challenge those who dominate the political and economic life by means of their wealth or social position. Thus, the men who composed the Thai reform movement that produced the *coup d'état* in 1932 knew well enough that the newly gained power of the commoners was not safe unless wider circles could quickly be brought into participation with the new government. The first step they took toward this end was adult mass education, to explain the constitutional change itself and to arouse the people. Another step was to make the student body of the national university more representative and to open a new, modern university.[19] A critical attitude on the part of the students was encouraged, and most of them were upon graduation absorbed in the civil service, dispersed in local offices all over the country, and charged with educational and propagandist responsibilities in addition to their

[19] This was modeled on the *École des Hautes Études politiques* in Paris and was intended as "a democratic bulwark against the rising tide of militarism." Late in 1939 a third university, with medical and engineering schools, was added. See Virginia Thompson, *Thailand: the New Siam*, New York, 1941, p. 785.

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regular duties. A third step was the establishment, in 1936, of agricultural, industrial, and trade schools so as to break through the bad tradition of using secondary education only as a means toward political office. Also it was hoped that through the application of trained native ability to the technical problems of production it might be possible to loosen the hold which foreign capital had obtained over the economic enterprise of the country. Only the accumulation of capital through native earnings and savings could make the financing of the government more independent of the revenues procured by the licensing of foreign-controlled monopolies; only through an essentially educational process, forwarded in thousands of rural communities, could the vicious circle be broken that had so long dominated the country's economy. The recent unfortunate turn in Thailand's external policy which brought a reactionary group to power has only delayed but not eliminated the planned and graded progress toward a people's self-determination through an ever wider sharing of responsibility.

In the Philippines may be seen yet another example of a modern government just rising from the shadow of the past; and there, too, the government has tried in recent pre-war years to reinforce its own existence through education for economic as well as social and political self-determination.[20] Here the campaign against illiteracy has been linked up with parallel forward movements in vocational and a more widely diffused higher education. Though it has been impossible to finance these movements adequately, they have not been without effect. To some extent they have helped to dignify labor, to elicit local initiative, and to train for responsible leadership. President Quezon and his government have on many occasions shown their desire to speed up the process; but apart from financial stringency it has suffered from the heritage of a class system that has not yet disintegrated because the economy of the country has remained essentially a colonial one. Perhaps for these reasons, there has been more reliance on mass education than on the slower influence of the school system.[21]

[20] See Joseph R. Hayden, *op. cit.*, chapter XX, pp. 512-33.

[21] See *Annual Report of the Director of Adult Education for the Year Ending June 30, 1939*, Manila, 1939, Introduction, p. 7 *et seq.*

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An American educator with long experience in India, consulted on the subject of the present essay, has suggested:

"Before there can be self-determination there must be self-confidence. And this cannot grow when people are too anxiously guarded against making mistakes. One of the first fields for the exercise of self-determination in Southeast Asia may well be that of education itself. No school system will be very effective in training for citizenship unless the teachers have a voice in the making of educational policies and are permitted—as they are not always now—to organize openly for national educational ends.

"In the education of adults it is, of course, almost equally important that the students themselves be won for a purposeful consideration of means and ends. Those educational movements which would relegate the self-expression of the adult student to the realm of the native cultural and economic segment of society—on the assumption that there alone he can function effectively—will not go far. He must have access to every part of the national life that is important to him; and this will usually include much of the modern as well as the traditional culture that surrounds him.

"Of course," he continued, "those occidental teachers and administrators who take part in preparing the people of tropical Asia for self-government also must be interested on both sides of the cleavage which has so falsely been imagined to separate the historic and the modern phases of life. It is not their job to deculturize the indigenous people. But it is not their job either to preserve their culture intact for later generations. Their main job is to transmit the knowledge which is essential for the new day."

Another American educator, active in the field of international cultural relations, recently told the writer:

"The key is modernization, how to achieve for the native peoples of the East the advantages that arise from modern knowledge. In the Occident this knowledge has been brought to bear on the condition of the people more especially through the growth of the professions—but this in the widest sense. Specialization of skills was necessary to produce a working class. And even farming has become more of a profession as farmers have learned to use tractors and other modern tools.

"In the Asiatic dependencies of the great powers a modern working class could not arise because the imperialist form of exploitation did not encourage a development of skills. If modern states are to arise in place of the colonies people must be produced who can

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manage modern manufactures and manipulate public utilities. An industrialization which merely continues what the large estates under foreign ownership have begun, throwing on the world market vast quantities of goods produced with cheap and depressed labor, would be a real danger to the world. But large industrial developments will not take place without imported capital; and so the process of industrialization can be subjected to international supervision. The emphasis should be both on modern methods of production and on a product that fits into the consuming habits of the indigenous population. In that way two conditions of a safe cultural change will be fulfilled: regard for modern knowledge and regard for established culture values."

It may not be amiss to point out that liberal colonial officials —British, French, and Dutch—agree with the one or two major demands here expressed by informed Americans. Training for greater participation of the native peoples in the management of their affairs, they admit, does not allow of a sharp separation of the native economy from the dependency's modern economy: the aim must be to obtain a larger native participation in the national economy as a whole. For the same reason, they regard it as a mistake to confine the political education of the masses to their own geographical or ethnic community and, indeed, usually frown upon any proposal to build up a national franchise on a community basis. For, as they see education for modern life, it is of its very essence that it enlarge the outlook of the people beyond their village, their religious institutions, and their tribal customs.[22]

An anthropologist with large experience in Southeast Asia, consulted by the writer on the part which the colonial governments may legitimately be expected to play in bringing the native people into modern society, asked rhetorically, "why has health education in the colonies proved so difficult?" And he answered the question himself: "because it was attempted from the top down; the people had not asked for it."

[22] It is, perhaps, significant in this connection that the term "Indonesia," the public use of which has long been prohibited in the Netherlands Indies because of its association with a nationalist movement, has now become respectable and is, indeed, used by the government itself to stress its hope that all the diverse ethnic elements of the archipelago will soon be merged in a united nation.

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"It would be absurd to maintain," he continued, "that the people do not value good health; but there is nothing in their experience to suggest that it can be procured, like a good crop, by careful attention to details.

"Education in hygiene may be the beginning of education in many other useful things. But it must really be education and not simply a transfer of the native's respect from the shaman to the foreign or foreign-trained doctor. The native's cooperation must be enlisted, step by step. He will understand a simple demonstration, performed with patience and with such explanations as come close to his experience. Even the less intelligent will respond if the confidence of the more influential personalities has first been won.

"More tangential but more generally successful as a means to gain acceptance of modern ideas has been the whole field of sport, and more especially teamplay. If self-determination is the end sought, the important thing is to provide more and more occasions on which the rank and file can take part in democratic procedures.

"Another necessary step is specialization: training for special tasks. It is quite true that professional training is liable to create new classes, perhaps even a new hierarchy of social status. But by its means native society can more easily adjust itself to new conditions; it keeps that society flexible as individuals are drawn from one class into another, until a more dynamic and modern social pattern has evolved."

The Management of Incentives

There is, in short, great need for the study of incentives in native society. Some writers—not, to be sure, the best informed—seem to assume that the desire for knowledge is motivated altogether by personal ambition; or rather, they do not recognize it unless it comes to their attention in that form. Some explain it with a growing economic class conflict; and, as we have seen, there often is such a connection. But far more colonials see in that desire a regrettable reflection of alien influences that have no great reality in personal experience and are of little use to native society. They speak forever of the Oriental's tendency to "ape" his Occidental superior—blissfully ignorant that many of the culture traits for which the West takes credit have actually originated in the East. The probability is that many factors converge to create out of a variety of motives a loosely knit nationalist or nativist or other

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reform or revolutionary movement which, once it is under way, becomes itself the largest stimulus to learning.

We are thus led to the conclusion that mass education can provide at best only a general setting of enhanced mental alertness and response; but that education for self-rule, in the meaning adopted for the present discussion, involves a more diversified approach. In as far as modernization of attitudes and skills is indispensable for the entrance of pre-industrial societies into the modern world, there is need for specialization—perhaps even for the deliberate creation of vocational and professional classes so that the interests of every group of the population may find full scope when all take part in the management of their common affairs.

Vocational education thus assumes a meaning somewhat different from that which it had when it was regarded as a means of raising the efficiency and general intelligence of manual workers without stirring too much their interest in modern knowledge. In those countries of Southeast Asia where native education has advanced beyond the primitive formal stage of moral conditioning, vocational training of sorts has always been resorted to as the most efficacious way of raising production and thus the plane of living. But not all educational administrators have welcomed the new consciousness of power to which such training almost inevitably gives rise. Only the more advanced among them have seen a valuable social force in the emergence of what may here be called the professional spirit. They recognize that a society cannot lift itself to a higher level of civilization merely by enjoying more opportunities for individual competition. When the movement up from ignorance and lethargy transcends personal economic or social success and acquires a class character, it must sooner or later come in conflict with the barriers artificially set to the advance of an ethnic or a culture group as such. What we inaccurately call race discrimination will set in and provide the most intelligent and the most ambitious of the indigenous middle class with yet further, but socially wholly undesirable, steps in their social education.

In contrast with vocational training which occasionally has

reduced very undesirable attitudes in a small indigenous minority, adult education more generally has not, as far as this writer is aware, in any of the countries of Southeast Asia been carried to the point where it has awakened ambitions really dangerous to the dominant group. But this may be only because whenever it threatened to reach that stage it has been successfully repressed. In but few instances can class conflict be traced to such education—and then, a close examination might be expected to show, only because the education was poor and missed its purpose. Neither general adult education nor vocational specialization have in themselves to any large extent produced autonomous group organization. The trade union movement is still exceedingly weak. Sometimes it is little more than a government-sponsored substitute for labor initiative. Yet it would be unfair to lay the blame for lack of modern and effective forms of organization entirely upon the tactics of the governments. Usually the people are as yet incapable to organize for long-range action. Peasants and laborers seek recourse in sporadic strikes and riots because they do not know any better. Only in the relatively few highly developed industries, with their own large incentives to learning, have modern unions taken root.

In short, it may be said that throughout Southeast Asia preparation for self-rule is as yet a process that operates for the most part in exceptional situations only and through exceptional personalities. There is not thus far enough of a foundation in the social experience of the people at large to build upon; and not too rapid a progress must be expected in postwar years.

Training for Leadership

Those who would help to accelerate the native peoples' progress toward self-determination are inevitably led back from considerations of mass methods to those of a narrower field of education: training for native leadership. In that field noteworthy successes have been obtained; indeed a whole volume might be made up of the biographies of Malays and Indonesians who in recent times have made notable contributions

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to the intellectual or social progress of their people.[23] Education for leadership in this sense differs greatly from education provided to insure the succession of an existing social elite, in that those who undergo it do not necessarily assume an envied social status and are not wrenched from their cultural background but, on the contrary, are fitted to function in it the more effectively. A native community does not normally have occasion to take pride in the achievements of a local son who has been alienated from it by a European education; it benefits only indirectly if it benefits at all from the greater ability of such a person to find his way about in the modern part of the economy. In contrast, it benefits directly, and is aware of the benefit, from a modern education of some of its sons if these retain their membership in the native society that has given them birth. The local son who has been educated away from the native culture tends to look down upon it and to despise those who adhere to its time-honored dictates. The local son who has been provided by his education with the requisite knowledge and skills to bring the community into contact with world civilization acts as an intermediary between old and new and may become a trusted liaison officer for those who are not yet able to take part in the modern economy.[24]

Native armies and police forces have often in Southeast Asia provided restricted opportunities for such training in leadership—perhaps better, in some ways, than the civil service because occasions for the exercise of power are needed to gain

[23] Since it lies ethnically and geographically outside the scope of the present study, the astonishing advance of the Maori people of New Zealand to full citizenship and considerable participation in the political and intellectual life of the Dominion, in less than two generations, can here be mentioned only in passing. It is a striking illustration of the social results that can be obtained with training for native leadership. For descriptions of that process see Felix M. Keesing, *The Changing Maori*, New Plymouth, N. Z., 1928; and I. L. G. Sutherland, ed., *The Maori People Today*, Wellington, N. Z., 1940.

[24] The Filipino sociologist Serafin E. Macaraig makes the point that "stratification is not conducive to progress. The upper strata of society will always be inclined to exploit the lower class." But he distinguishes from it a more fluid class structure: "If stratification engenders suspicion and hatred, competition destroys ill-feelings, for as people gain more social experience, people will look with growing satisfaction upon those who succeed in a fair field of competition." *Social Problems*, Manila, 1929, pp. 306, 307.

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confidence in the capacity to achieve it. The native officer commands at least that small native body which makes up his troop, and the soldiers learn to respect a native in the role of a leader who functions with apparent ease on the modern side of their pluralistic society. The native civil servant, even when admitted to a position of relative importance, does not, with his more attenuated exercise of power, produce that effect upon those around him. Even greater than in either of these cases is the educational byproduct of leaders and rank-and-file relations in organizations that owe their inception to native initiative and which rest entirely in native hands—such, for example, as cooperatives or the local improvement societies to be found in Burma. But the history of social movements in many parts of Southeast Asia has shown that such organizations tend to be short-lived unless the leaders are equipped for them with the requisite modern knowledge.

Keesing has characterized this type as distinct, on the one hand, from the native leader who functions entirely—and therefore within a very limited range—as a representative of the inherited culture and, on the other hand, from the "intellectual cream" that is separated and liable to become a privileged class.

"In contrast to this," he says, "higher education may bring a swinging back to some individuals to their own people and indigenous culture. Reaching in some instances the highest pinnacles of Western learning, they see not only the benefits but also the limitations of the West; in turn, they are in a position to evaluate critically their own ancestral heritage, seeing its good and bad points. Evidence from a number of places indicates that education conducted beyond a certain point, and infused with a constructive spirit, is likely to have such results."[25]

How is this kind of education to be achieved? The present book contains a number of suggestions. In another publication its author compares the methods used by the British Indian and the Netherlands Indian governments in training natives for

[25] Felix M. Keesing, *Education in Pacific Countries*, Honolulu 1937 (distributed by the University of Hawaii, Honolulu), p. 139; followed by several concrete examples.

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the civil service[26] and comes to the conclusion that, on the whole, the methods of the Netherlands Indies come closer to meeting the needs of the future, because they rest on the conception of "society in a tropical dependency as essentially dual in character, . . . capitalist and pre-capitalist."[27] We cannot here enter more fully into the discussion because, after all, it belongs to the pre-Atlantic-Charter realm of discourse in which the continuation of alien rule was assumed as a matter of course. But it is interesting to note that native education for leadership has apparently made greater strides under the Netherlands system than under the British because, with the recognition as "Europeans" of the sons of Dutch fathers and native mothers, the stark line of racial demarcation has not been permitted to cast its arbitrary division across Netherlands Indian society. The fact that many Europeans born in the dependency were sent to Europe to receive or complete their training in civil administration, together with the high sensitivity of the Dutch administration to the inherent values of the native culture, has made for a mutually supplementary education of Europe-born and Indies-born students. The former were given courses steeped in scholarly understanding for the native culture; the latter were, not only through the courses they attended but also through the mode of life required of them, introduced to the spirit as well as the mechanics of European culture.

The advantages of such a complementary preparation of Westerners for civil service in the East and of native Orientals for leadership in their own country with a sufficient mastery of Western resources has been recognized in other countries, too, by educators who are familiar with the problems involved. For example, in the United States the American Council of Learned Societies and the Committee on the National School of Modern Oriental Languages and Civilizations, have recently developed a program of intensive language studies which is

[26] J. S. Furnivall, "The Training for Civil Administration in Netherlands India," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, vol. XXVI, July 1939, pp. 415-39.

[27] *Loc. cit.*, p. 427.

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gradually becoming transformed into a more inclusive program of regional studies. This has for one of its major purposes the training of Americans for administrative responsibilities and business management in the Orient, especially in countries with predominantly pre-industrial civilizations. War needs have accelerated both the growth and the transformation of this enterprise which now places into the forefront of its aims the creation of a realistic understanding of the various Asiatic societies as they pass further from native to modern economies. The interest aroused by such courses among American students provides an intellectual soil into which it might be wise to transplant those native students who likewise are to be trained for administrative abilities in their respective countries. Such oriental graduate students have in the past often been unfitted by foreign study, rather than made more fit, for native leadership. Introducing them into such intensive regional courses for administration as those now being given at several American universities would have advantages for both oriental and American students. To the latter it would bring more first-hand knowledge of facts and problems as the native peoples experience them. The oriental students participating in such courses and seminars—while at the same time also pursuing their separate studies of Western lore—would receive an encouragement that has often been lacking in the past to re-examine the values of their heritage and to help it to a new flowering with the aid of modern knowledge.[28]

The suggestion has been made that, even while the war in the Pacific is still in progress, it may be worth while to pool the large combined experience of educators in Southeast Asia to advance training for native leadership by setting up, perhaps in the United States, a school for comparative studies and experiments. There will be a dearth of trained oriental as well as occidental administrators of relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction activities on the reoccupation of territories now in

[28] Some of them might, by participating as teachers in the intensive language courses, contribute toward their own expenses as students. This would have the added advantage of tending to enlarge the social base from which native personnel in such countries as the Philippines or Thailand could be chosen for foreign study.

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the hands of the enemy. In addition to personnel with past experience, many will have to be employed who will go to their tasks with only such preparation as careful training can give in a short time. As far as occidental and specifically American relief and rehabilitation workers are concerned, such training is now proceeding at an increasing rate. In some institutions the regional knowledge required by Army and Navy personnel is also given to prospective civilian relief and rehabilitation workers. In the United States alone some twenty-five institutions now participate, or have advanced programs for participating, in such training. One proposal is that these many courses, schools, and institutes—not all of them very well equipped for the tasks they propose to undertake—be combined in a single American University for Foreign Service. Another proposal is for a combined approach to the common problem on the part of all the interested United Nations, with the establishment of a joint training and research center under international auspices—perhaps the League of Nations or one of the new agencies of joint activity. Such a center would have the special advantage of facilitating a comparative study of educational methods and administrative practices.

An Educational Synthesis

Those who favor a considerable extension of university training for potential native leadership agree with others who are more skeptical in this respect that it cannot take the place of an expanded training for self-determination on a somewhat lower educational level. It cannot take the place of a diversified and systematic modern education for natives throughout the dependencies of Southeast Asia, geared in every region and in every locality to the specific conditions and needs. In other words, if preparation for self-determination of subject peoples is the accepted purpose, then there must be, first of all, a considerable increase in the appropriations made from public funds for education in general. We cannot here pursue the financial problem involved because it introduces many economic factors outside the purview of the present study—above all, the question how international collaboration may best pull

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the public finances of all of Southeast Asia out of the slough into which the war, the economic depression which preceded it and, in some instances, faulty policies in pre-war times have placed them.

Between the elementary schools and mass adult education on the one side and university or other higher education on the other, there is a large middle ground of educational need and opportunity, explored in Mr. Furnivall's study and in other recent surveys,[29] which should now be reexamined from the standpoint of the Atlantic Charter—that is, as to the contribution which diverse types of institutions and of courses may be expected to make, not only to the wellbeing of the native people and their general progress, but specifically to their preparation for social, economic, and political self-rule.

Marie Keesing, an observer of educational methods in the Philippines, Samoa and Fiji, refers to the fact[30] that there still often is a wide gap between general and higher education, and that this gap makes for the exploitation of the more ignorant by those who wield the tools of modern knowledge. She writes:

"This is a criticism of the kind and quality of higher education rather than of the amount provided. Any study of the conditions under which education and native development take place in the Pacific area leaves one amazed, not that progress is slow, but that there has been progress at all. Such achievements as have been won usually stem from devoted and inspiring individuals. . . .

"A primary need in most of the countries and dependencies is the development of the local economy as a first claim on the educational system. Public works of one kind or another may give rise to projects on which democratic organization can be learned and around which primary and vocational education can be centered at the same time that basic needs are met and basic problems solved—at the same time, this usually means that the community is brought into beneficial contact with civilization.

"A study of experience in the field of public health is particularly revealing, showing as it does the successive steps by which the retarding influence of traditional ideas and attitudes can be over-

[29] *E. g.*, Raden Loekman Djajadiningrat, *op. cit.*: chapters in J. R. Hayden, Virginia Thompson, *op. cit.*; also in Lennox A. Mills, *British Rule in Eastern Asia*, Minneapolis, 1942, *et al.*

[30] In a communication to the writer, January 1943.

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come. It has, for example, proven useless to rely on external changes in the matter of hygiene where there has been no change in inward conviction. Only as people are enlisted in bringing about changes in their own behalf can general progress become more rapid."

Trained native leadership—that is, the provision of higher education within the framework of native society—thus, instead of being antithetical to mass education, may take its place as one of the principal means of advancing the capacity of the common people to rule themselves. Mrs. Keesing makes this one of four major principles of such advance, which she states as follows: demonstration (especially in relation to the economic life, matters of health, and technical improvements of all sorts, where the value of proposed innovations can best be brought to popular appreciation, leaving no doubt as to their results); visual modes of teaching, rather than reliance on words; democratic procedure (presumably something akin to the methods practiced in our progressive schools); and the most rapid possible substitution of educated native for even the best non-native leadership.

This list of principles can no doubt be amplified and enlarged, but it may here suffice to indicate, as indeed Mr. Furnivall does indicate with reference to specific situations, that the authority charged with the formulation of educational policies does not, in a region as undeveloped educationally as most of tropical Asia, face the necessity of making absolute and mutually exclusive choices. There is a large field for fruitful experimentation and for the comparative study of the results produced with diverse programs and methods.

Indeed, it may be said that educational progress has suffered from too sharp a juxtaposition of supposedly conflicting aims: that of the religionists—both Asiatic and Occidental-Christian, that of the employing groups, and that of the nationalists. The first are primarily interested in cultural, especially moral, values, whether traditional or universal, and often have little direct concern with practical problems of material advance. The second desire improvement in skills from which they can profit and favor higher education for natives to the extent to which it contributes to that end—that is, helps them to substi-

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tute a cheaper native supply of labor for the higher as well as the lower categories of technical skill. The third group desire, above all, to acquire that knowledge which will help them to break through the alien upper stratum of the pluralistic society which holds them down; that is why they study law rather than engineering and train for the civil service rather than for the operation of native industries. But the new situation calls for a synthesis that overcomes the conflict of purposes: for, presumably, the objectives named—moral integration, higher technical qualifications, and political power—now become aspects of a single and inclusive objective—that of placing education in the service of a progressive realization of self-rule. And in this synthesis the contrasting claims of mass education and education for leadership also are resolved.

"Create an environment in which there is a demand for education; remove all hindrances to the free play for this demand; and it will no longer be necessary to discuss what instruction shall be given, because the demand will create the supply."[81]

The creation of that environment includes not only economic and social changes; it also implies a transformation of the institutional structure, and not least that of the school systems. As long as the present governments of tropical Asia continue to rule, they carry the responsibility for guiding those changes and that transformation. Most of them are pledged to prepare their subject peoples for self-government. Some of them will face conditions, when the war is over, that will make it difficult to do so. But the Atlantic Charter also implies the principle of international mutual aid. "An instructed nationalism," says Mr. Furnivall, "should fit into a world-wide civilization so that the people should learn to be at once citizens of their own country and of the modern world."

A new instrumentality, perhaps regional but certainly linked to an international organization, will be needed—not only to exercise some supervision in behalf of world opinion over recalcitrant authorities that may fall back into educational indecision and indifference, but more especially to assist all the

[81] "Colonial Southeast—Instruction or Education," *Pacific Affairs*, March 1942, pp. 77-89.

authorities, as their joint agency, to deal effectively with their similar and common problems.[32] A beginning with such educational collaboration can be made at once.

The concrete tasks of relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction upon the reoccupation of the invaded areas of Southeast Asia necessitate an immediate training of personnel, as has already been suggested. But much less thought has thus far been given to the intellectual and psychological havoc wrought by years of enemy control. In some instances, the school system seems to have continued to function almost normally in externals, but with a sullen acquiescence that does not make for educational vitality. In others, it seems to have disintegrated or even to have been corrupted to serve the propaganda purposes of the enemy; information is very incomplete. While thus there will be much loss to make up for, there will also be unusual opportunities to start in with new plans and programs, invigorated by a new determination.

Relief and rehabilitation pose their own tasks for the educator. These tasks are emergent and can be performed with an eye to their early fulfilment and liquidation. But they can also be made subservient to the needs of a larger and longer task of reconstruction. A joint organ of the powers concerned, inspired with faith in democracy, could do much to bring permanent good out of the necessity to deal with immediate ills. Following the successful example of other international agencies, such as the International Labor Organization, that have made social reconstruction an occasion for the practice of the principle of democratic representation, such an organ may in its own procedures exemplify the spirit it should seek to promote. Certainly there should be native participation in the highly educational experience of planning for a new day.

[32] Further suggestions for such regional collaboration will be found in B. Lasker, *Freedom and Welfare in Southeast Asia*, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1942.

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APPENDIX

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EDUCATION IN FORMOSA

In the sphere of education the island has passed through two periods, one before 1919 and another since that year. Before 1919 the policy of the government with respect to the Chinese of the island was vacillating. It was ready to recognize the existence of the Chinese in the Japanese Empire as a separate entity, and was ready even to help them preserve their Chinese character. A special society was created to investigate Chinese customs and habits and these were to be taken into consideration in court practice. Later, the failure of this policy was recognized and the avowed end became the japanization of the inhabitants of the islands in order to make them loyal subjects of the Empire. The elementary school was to become the chief instrument in this japanization. While before that period the education of the Chinese was completely neglected, since then school expenditures have grown and the number of pupils has increased from year to year. But this does not mean that there is any equality between the Japanese and Chinese as regards education. A literate population is necessary for the japanization of the islanders. Knowledge of the Japanese language is indispensable for workers, policemen, for the *paocheng*, for clerks, for all who work for their Japanese rulers. It does not mean that there is any intention of raising the Chinese to an equal position with the Japanese. The school is considered the best instrument for turning the islanders into docile, law-abiding, hard-working servants. As may be seen from the following table the results, before 1930, were hardly impressive:

NUMBER OF CHINESE ON TAIWAN WHO UNDERSTAND THE JAPANESE LANGUAGE (*census data*)

	1905	*1915*	*1920*	*1930*
Women	469	4,194	11,168	70,750
Men	10,801	50,143	87,897	294,677
Total	11,270	54,337	99,065	365,427

Source: *Kokumin nenkan*, 1940, p. 665.

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If we look at the rate of growth these figures may appear imposing. But actually the results can hardly be considered satisfactory since by 1930, after thirty-five years of Japanese rule over such a small area, only about ten per cent of the population understand the language of the rulers—and the degree of understanding required by the census-takers was small.

The growth in the number of pupils in elementary schools may be seen from the following table:

PRIMARY SCHOOLS IN TAIWAN

	1935	*1936*	*1937*	*1938*	*1939*
Number of schools.....	781	783	789	796	812
Number of teachers.....	6,255	6,659	7,239	7,888	8,718
Number of pupils, 1,000.....	373.9	407.6	450.0	505.5	557.1
Number of pupils as percentage of children of school age	41.5	43.8	46.7	49.8	....
Graduates, 1,000.....	42.3	45.7	50.3	59.0	....

Source: Taiwan Jijo.

From this it appears that in five years the number of pupils in primary schools increased from 373.9 thousand to 557.1 thousand. About half the Chinese children of school age (8-14) are now in primary schools. This increase is partially due to the absorption of new pupils by schools, and partially to the fact that the schools have been increasing the length of the courses they offer from four to six years. If one takes into consideration the fact that during these six years the pupils must master thousands of characters as well as a foreign language and that most of the teachers are foreigners (to them), it is clear that a six-year course is not a long one. These statistics do not include the schools for Japanese children. Theoretically there is complete equality in Taiwan and there are no special schools for the Japanese, but there are schools where instruction is carried on in the Japanese language. With the permission of the governor of the province Chinese may also be admitted to such schools, even if they do not know the Japanese language, but this permission is not given willingly. Many parents among the lower groups of Chinese officials want to send their child to a Japanese school so that he or she will have a thorough knowledge of the language of the rulers and a better chance to get a higher

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paid job. But in 1936, out of 42,576 pupils in these schools there were only 2,975 Chinese. There is another important fact with respect to the Japanese pupils; while in 1938 only fifty per cent of the Chinese of school age were in school, 99.4 per cent of the Japanese of this age were attending school in 1936.

Whether or not the Japanese and Chinese children in their respective schools receive the same kind of education may be inferred from the following fact. In 1936 the maximum monthly salary of teachers in the schools for Japanese children was ¥82 for men and ¥70 for women and the minimum, ¥40 for men and ¥30 for women. But in the public schools (i.e. for the Chinese) the maximum salary was ¥50 and minimum ¥10, and this difference was not due chiefly to nationality, for the majority of teachers in the public schools are also Japanese, but to the calibre of the teachers.[1]

A further important test of any system of education is the number of students in secondary schools and in universities. As was mentioned, literacy is a necessity under modern conditions, even in the colonies. But to give a secondary education and especially a university education to the colonial peoples *en masse* is quite a different proposition. On April 1, 1939, there were 5,125 Japanese and 4,117 Chinese in the Taiwan secondary schools for boys. It will be recalled that the number of Chinese on the island is almost twenty times as great as the number of Japanese, and the proportion between the children of the two groups is even greater. In the girls secondary schools the situation is even less favorable to the Chinese—5,312 Japanese pupils as compared with only 2,541 Chinese (1939). In the specialized schools the situation is similar—in the industrial schools there are 963 Japanese boys and 460 Chinese; in the commercial schools, 1,791 Japanese boys and 724 Chinese. The agricultural schools form the only exception, but even here there are 588 Japanese to 1,426 Chinese pupils though there are at least 300 times as many Chinese farmers as Japanese. The fact that in 1936, for example, there were 5,576 applications for entrance

[1] On the average the expenditure per pupil in 1926 was twice as high in schools for the Japanese as it was in schools for the Chinese.

to secondary schools, but only 1,622 boys were admitted (29.1 per cent of the applicants) and most of those were Japanese shows that there is an ardent desire to study on the part of Taiwanese youth. In 1936 there were 985 Japanese students and 384 Chinese in the teachers' colleges (which prepare teachers for the Chinese schools).

In discussing the public finances of Taiwan, it was noted that the expenditures on the only university in Taiwan, which is in Taihoku, cannot be considered as expenditures purely for the education of the Chinese population. In 1939 there were 192 Japanese and 90 Chinese students in this university.

SCHOOL ENROLMENT IN TAIWAN, APRIL 1, 1939

	Japanese	*Chinese*
Youth of school and college age (8-22)	88,000*	2,000,000*
Pupils in primary schools	44,000*	557,135
Pupils in secondary schools	10,437	6,658
Pupils in special secondary schools	3,343	2,610
Students in teachers' colleges (1936)	985	384
Students in the university	192	90

SCHOOL ENROLMENT PER THOUSAND CHILDREN OF SCHOOL AGE

Pupils in primary schools	500*	278*
Pupils in secondary schools	118	3.3
Pupils in special secondary schools	38	1.3
Students in teachers' colleges	11	0.2
Students in the university	2	0.05

* Approximate figures

It may be thought that the figures of students in secondary schools and colleges are not complete because they do not include those who are studying in schools and colleges in Japan proper. It is quite natural that those who have the means prefer to send their children to Japan to get their education at the center of the Empire. We know that many Japanese from Taiwan are studying in Japan; probably their number far exceeds the number of those who study in Taiwan, but unfortunately, we have no statistics. However, we have complete statistics of the Chinese from Taiwan who are students of Japanese colleges and universities. In 1936 there were in Japan 1,113 Chinese pupils from Taiwan in secondary schools of all types and 952 students in colleges and universities. These stu-

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dents studied: law 204 persons, medicine 507 persons, literature 27 persons, political science and economics 66 persons, commerce 71 persons, music 3 persons, art 7 persons, religion 6 persons, housekeeping 13 persons, physical culture 3 persons, all other subjects 45 persons, or a total of 952 persons.

These figures reflect the views of the students as to their future chances in life. The corresponding figures for the university in Taiwan are not so instructive because there the choice is very limited, while in Japan they may choose in accordance with their future plans. The great majority of the students select courses leading to liberal professions—law, medicine, etc. They do this because they know that all other roads in Taiwan are closed to them. These figures show also that the inclusion of those who study in Japan in the number of pupils and students in Taiwan does not materially change the picture.

(Andrew J. Grajdanzev, *Formosa Today*, pp. 165-99.)

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[For a general discussion of the several aspects of the history of education, and its relation to colonialism in Indonesia, from pre-European contact to 1941, see table of contents for pertinent sections in 8: Furnivall, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116.]

Malaya AN1

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THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

Vol. XXXI April, 1941 No. 2

[Title page]

9; Christian F, H-3 (no date) 1941 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

ITS HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY AND DIPLOMATIC CLIMATE

John L. Christian

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AN apposite instance of the interdependence of geography and history is provided by the tense rivalry between Great Britain and France in Southeast Asia before 1910. This rivalry, which was essentially a problem in the historical geography and diplomatic climate of the times, had its origin in the astonishingly persistent belief that somewhere between the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea would be found a short route to the wealth and trade of interior China, particularly Yunnan and Szechwan.

Contemporaries regarded it as axiomatic that a Sino-French or Siamese-French war over French aggressions in Indochina would result in an Anglo-French war. Indeed, twice (in 1893 and 1896) the two countries were on the verge of battle for control of the Menam and Mekong routes to Yunnan. But geography and malaria were against the diplomats. These routes never have come into use; and the area where Burma, French Indochina, and Thailand now march in a common frontier is today one of the least-known regions of all Asia.

Largely because of the existence of close ties between the two countries since the maturing of the Entente Cordiale of 1904, it is easy to forget that they were in acrimonious rivalry in Southeast Asia for decades, particularly from 1862 to 1904, when Britain kept careful watch over French activities from Oman and Afghanistan in the Middle East to New Caledonia and the New Hebrides in the South Seas. In this instance certain historicogeographical aspects of the problem are basically more important than the usual facets of diplomacy and politics.

Beginnings of French and British Interests

Historically, French interest in the lands east of Suez began with the organization of the French East India Company, in 1604, the dispatch of the first French ships to the Orient, in 1611, and the beginnings of the French Oriental establishments, in the middle of the century. As early as 1631 the French regarded Madagascar as of particular value because of its favorable location for extending their trade to Southeast Asia.[1] By 1663 French priests were acquainted with coastal Burma, Siam, and Cambodia and in that year made their first crossing of the Malay Peninsula, near modern Tenasserim, while

[1] The Cambridge History of India, Vol. 5, British India, 1497–1858, edited by H. H. Dodwell. London, 1929, p. 62.

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en route to Siam.[2] Shortly thereafter the French, hard pressed on the mainland of India, proposed that their headquarters be moved to the Pegu coast. The French naval expedition of six ships that reached the Bay of Bengal in 1690 had as its object the establishment of commerce with Burma and Siam. In fact, the failure of the trade of the British East India Company in Burma and Siam in the seventeenth century was traced to the superiority of French influence in those states.[3]

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In the eighteenth century Dupleix was interested in Burma and Siam because of the abundance there of teakwood for shipbuilding, and he suggested to his superiors that they acquire a portion of the Burmese coast.[4] During Burma's internal strife that resulted in the establishment of the Alaungpaya dynasty in 1755, the French made the mistake of aiding the defeated Talaings, while the British aided the conquerors. As a result, Alaungpaya acquired a supply of French arms, including 1300 muskets and forty 24-pounders, together with 200 French gunners, with which Burma became the premier state in Southeast Asia. The French, meantime, evened the score by inciting the Burmese to destroy the British colony on Negrais Island.[5]

In the nineteenth century Britain sent to the native states of Southeast Asia numerous embassies that had as their primary or secondary purpose inquiry into the extent of French influence in these states. For example, the missions to Burma of Symes in 1795 and 1802 and of Canning in 1803 and 1809; that of Crawfurd in 1822 to Siam and in 1826 to Burma; that of Finlayson in 1821 and Crawfurd in 1830 to Cochinchina; and those of Captain Burney, Sir James Brooke, and Sir John Bowring to Siam in the first half of the century were all interested in British trade and French ambition.

The Indochinese Peninsula

Ever since the early merchant adventurers were forced to pass through the Strait of Malacca or the Sunda Strait to reach the China coast the great Indochinese peninsula has been of interest to Europeans, principally as an obstacle to a direct route to the Far East, as that term is generally understood. In the past century it became common knowledge among Europeans in the Orient that at one point, far above the head of navigation, the Yangtze flows within 600 miles of the northern reaches of the Bay of Bengal, whereas it is some 4300 miles by sea from Calcutta to Shanghai. It was only natural that

[2] Adrien Launay: Histoire générale de la Société des Missions-Étrangères, 3 vols., Paris, 1894; reference in Vol. 1, p. 74.

[3] D. G. E. Hall: Early English Intercourse with Burma (Rangoon Univ. Publs., No. 1), London, 1928, pp. 138–153.

[4] V. McL. Thompson: Dupleix and His Letters, New York, 1933, p. 721; and Alfred Martineau: Dupleix et l'Inde française, 1749–1754, Paris, 1927, p. 451.

[5] D. G. E. Hall: The Tragedy of Negrais, *Journ. Burma Research Soc.*, Vol. 21, 1931, pp. 1–133.

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FIG. 1

early cartographers and pioneers of commerce should assume that the most direct route to interior China would be along one of the great meridional rivers of the Indochinese peninsula to the Yangtze.[6] At one point, somewhat north of the present Burma Road, the Yangtze, Mekong, and Salween are compressed within a distance of 48 miles (separated by ridges reaching up to 8000 feet above the floor of the adjacent valley).[7] But the Irrawaddy, contrary to early beliefs, does not rise on the Tibetan plateau as do the other great meridional rivers[8]

[6] Bruno Hassenstein: Some Contributions to the Geographical and Cartographical Literature of the Indo-Chinese Frontier Territories. n. p., n. d., gives a useful list of the principal sources on the area before 1900. Reports of early British attempts to penetrate India's northeastern frontier are summarized in "Selections of Papers regarding the Hill Tracts between Assam and Burmah." 10 vols., Calcutta, 1873.

[7] For a photographic report see J. F. Rock: Through the Great River Trenches of Asia. *Natl. Geogr. Mag.*, Vol. 50, 1926, pp. 133–180.

[8] A fact first noted in Sir Henry Yule: A Narrative of the Mission Sent by the Governor-General of India to the Court of Ava in 1855. London, 1858, p. 272.

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and thus occupies a unique place among the rivers of Southeast Asia, as Professor L. Dudley Stamp has recently pointed out.[9] 487 175

Geographical and historical knowledge of the area within 300 miles of the point where the frontiers of Thailand, French Indochina, and Burma now meet was extremely sketchy until the beginning of the present century. For example, Dupuis, in his study of Tongking in 1872, prepared a map that showed the Burmese possessions reaching to the Black River, within 200 miles of Hanoi, into territory concerning which King Mindon and his successor, Theebaw, had only the slightest knowledge and no jurisdiction.[10] Dupuis was perhaps willing to show extensive Burmese territory in the hope that France would inherit Mindon's holdings; but the map was later to plague the French, who, after the British annexation of Burma, in 1886, found it to their advantage to maintain that Burma had at no time extended even to the Mekong. 439 648

Garnier's Expedition

In 1858 France seized Saigon; in 1862 the Court of Hué signed a treaty that surrendered Cochinchina to France; and in 1867 Siam was forced to recognize the French as overlords of Cambodia. As a result of the treaty with Annam, Francis Garnier was appointed Inspector of Native Affairs in the new protectorate, with permission to travel on the Mekong. On June 5, 1866, the De Lagree–Garnier expedition left Saigon in the first organized European exploration of the hinterland of Indochina from the China side.[11] On April 29, 1867, the party reached Luang Prabang, a place seldom visited by Europeans since the Dutch trader Gerard van Wusthof arrived there in 1641.[12] By June the party had reached the point where Burma, Thailand, and French Indochina now meet. Garnier noted there the sale of British cotton goods in the bazaar of Kiang Sen; and De Lagree reported that tribes on the left bank of the Mekong were loyal to Siam. Both explorers observed the presence of Burmese agents with authority at the principal crossings of the Mekong. On August 23, 1867, De Lagree visited Keng Tung, in what was undoubtedly Burmese territory; and thereafter the British in Lower Burma were ever watchful of French designs on territory bordering the upper Mekong. The Frenchmen passed on to Kiang Hung town, which has been under Chinese sovereignty since the Sino-British boundary settlements and

[9] The Irrawaddy River, *Geogr. Journ.*, Vol. 95, 1940, pp. 329–356 (see note elsewhere in this number of the *Geographical Review*).

[10] J. Dupuis: L'ouverture du Fleuve Rouge au commerce et les événements du Tong-Kin, 1872–73. Paris, 1879.

[11] Hugh Clifford: Further India, London, 1904, pp. 129–254, gives a vivid account of the Garnier expedition. The basic source is Francis Garnier: Voyage d'exploration en Indo-Chine effectué pendant les années 1866, 1867 et 1868 . . . ; 2 vols. and atlas, Paris, 1873.

[12] Garnier seems to have been the first to make readily available a translation of Van Wusthof's diary. The translation, which was made for Garnier by M. P. Vœlkel, was printed, with Garnier's annotations, in the *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie*, Ser. 6, Vol. 2, 1871, pp. 249–289.

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treaties of 1894 and 1897, where they noted that both Burma and China had agents in the court. On March 2, 1868, the party left the Mekong, and they reached Talifu by a journey that took them directly across the route followed by British and Burmese trade to interior Yunnan. The Moslem Sultan of Tali ordered the Garnier party away from his territory. Garnier explained the action: The Sultan has mistaken us for Englishmen. After the death of De Lagree in Yunnan young Garnier took the party out by way of Hankow, whence they traveled on to Shanghai by the American steamer *Plymouth Rock*. The Garnier expedition touched the Mekong at no point above Kiang Hung, a city to which the Britisher Captain McLeod had preceded them by thirty years. McLeod made his remarkable journey from Moulmein to Kiang Hung with six elephants and was the first European to penetrate China by the Salween route for purposes of examining trade routes.

When once it had been reported[13] that Garnier intended to "strike the Irrawaddy at Bhamo" and that he was expected also at Keng Tung and Mandalay, British interest in French activities in Southeast Asia was keen. Major General Albert Fytche, Chief Commissioner of British Burma, proceeded to Mandalay and secured Mindon's signature to a treaty that compromised Burma's independence.[14] Extraterritoriality was secured (abandoned in 1879). British agents were permitted to sit in Burmese customhouses; and Burma's power to control commerce across her territory to China was further restricted. A Resident was authorized for Mandalay, and the Irrawaddy was opened for navigation by British steamers. Captain Strover was stationed as agent in Bhamo and traveled up in November, 1868, by the first British steamer to reach that river port 40 miles from the Chinese frontier.[15] He was not, however, provided with a gunboat, as had at first been suggested; nor did Britain assume control of Burma's foreign relations, as her officers in British Burma had urged.[16]

The Sladen and Browne Expeditions

After much patient work, General Fytche in 1868 obtained permission from the King of Burma and authorization from the government of India for the dispatch of an expedition from Bhamo to Tali. Colonel E. B. Sladen, Political Agent at Mandalay, set out[17] with a group of six Europeans and a guard of 50 sepoys toward the same

[13] The London *Times*, June 7, 1868.

[14] Albert Fytche: Burma, Past and Present, 2 vols. (in 1), London, 1878. See the Anglo-Burmese treaty of Oct. 25, 1867, in *British and Foreign State Papers, 1870–71*, pp. 61 and 1305–1308.

[15] J. G. Scott, assisted by J. P. Hardiman: Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States, 2 parts in 5 vols., Rangoon, 1900–1901; reference in Part I, Vol. 1, p. 64.

[16] Alexander Bowers: Bhamo Expedition: A Report on the Practicability of Re-opening the Trade Route between Burma and Western China, Rangoon, 1869, p. 100.

[17] The official account is E. B. Sladen: Narrative of the Expedition to Explore the Trade Routes to China via Bhamo, Rangoon, 1869.

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goal as the Garnier party that had left Saigon two years before. The Sladen party reached Momein (modern Tengyueh) in September, 1868, three months after Garnier's return to Saigon. Colonel Sladen could get no farther than Tengyueh, however, because of the disturbed state of the country as a result of the Panthay rebellion.[18]

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Eventually Lord Salisbury yielded to the fears of British commercial interests that the French would entirely absorb the markets of Yunnan and neighboring provinces and sent an expedition to reopen British trade routes (1875). Colonel Horace Browne, accompanied by the geographer Ney Elias, who is remembered for his journey through Mongolia and his survey of the Yellow River, succeeded in getting farther than Manwyne, to Serai, where they learned that Augustus Margary, who had gone on ahead, had been murdered (1875).[19] Browne's party thereupon returned to Bhamo as the last official British attempt to open a direct route to interior China. As a matter of fact, the reports of Grosvenor, Baber, and Davenport, who were sent from Hankow to Yunnan in connection with the British demand for reparation over the Margary affair, convinced the home government that the topographic difficulties of the route from Bhamo to Yunnan and Szechwan were too great for practical railway construction.[20]

Government of India's Lack of Interest

British officials in Burma frequently complained of the impossibility of getting the government of India to give any attention to the northeastern frontier. That government was wholly occupied with the northwestern frontier and the danger of Russian aggression through Afghanistan and the Khyber Pass. As early as the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1816–1818 Dr. Francis Buchanan, of laterite fame,[21] had advised the East India Company against "giving the Chinese any just reason for suspicion by forming pretensions to any part of the mountainous region which separates the two Empires."[22] Lord Lawrence, the Viceroy, had advised against the Sladen expedition: "His Excellency can hardly conceive any step more imprudent than for British merchants to settle in Bhamo or a British official to be stationed there for any purpose."[23] In the short viceroyalty of Lord

[18] This disturbance hindered the British and aided the French. Captain Strover reported that during his first three years in Bhamo "not a single consignment belonging to British firms had reached Bhamo."

[19] The resultant British demand for compensation gave rise to the famed Chefoo Convention, a recent study of which is S. T. Wang: The Margary Affair and the Chefoo Agreement, New York, 1940.

[20] Particularly E. Colborne Baber: Travels and Researches in the Interior of China, *Royal Geogr. Soc. Suppl. Papers*, Vol. 1, 1882–1885, pp. 1–201, especially pp. 154–192, "Notes on the Route Followed by Mr. Grosvenor's Mission through Western Yünnan," reprinted from *Parliamentary Rept., China, No. 3 (1878)*.

[21] See this number of the *Geographical Review*, p. 177.

[22] Papers respecting the Nepaul War, London, 1824, p. 45.

[23] Letter from the government of India to Fytche, dated Simla, July 18, 1867, in Sladen, *op. cit.*, appendix T.

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487 Mayo the government of India, even at the risk of losing control over
175 the trade routes to Yunnan, again stated its policy:[24] "The future annexation of Burma, or any of its adjacent states, is not an event
439 which I . . . desire; . . . I should view with extreme regret . . .
648 the necessity of occupation, or of assuming, even in a temporary manner, the government of any of the states lying adjacent to the province now in your charge." In short, the official attitude of the government of India has been summarized as follows: "The condition of the Northeastern frontier caused no Governor-General a single sleepless night."[25]

Railways Suggested

496 Meantime, British commercial interests continued to demand
487 that the Indian government provide facilities for trade to western China in order to forestall any French plans to acquire prior advan-
175 tages in Yunnan and Szechwan. The *Parliamentary Papers* alone
439 contain nearly twenty reports on expeditions and proposals with
648 respect to trans-Burma trade with western China and the upper Mekong from 1824 to 1900. The most persistent advocates of British penetration of Yunnan, Szechwan, and Kwangsi from the Bay of Bengal were Captain Richard Sprye and his son, who for half a century (1840–1890) presented numerous proposals for railways and highways into western Siam, to the Shan and Laos States, and to southern China.

Perhaps the best-publicized effort was that by Archibald R. Colquhoun, a deputy commissioner in British Burma, and Holt S. Hallett, a civil engineer. Colquhoun, who was ardently anti-French, resigned his office when the government of Burma refused him leave to survey a railway route from Moulmein to Szemao by way of Chiengmai in Siam. He became a special correspondent for the London *Times*, traveled overland from Canton to Bhamo, and wrote voluminously against French designs on Southeast Asia.[26] The Colquhoun-Hallett railway plan suffered from a general suspicion that it was merely a means for "taking the King of Siam by the hand and leading him into the great British Indian family."[27] Although Colquhoun's line is actually the shortest practicable route from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnanfu (Kunming), it passes through sparsely settled country that is everywhere malarial below 4000 feet. There is not today a railway line, caravan route, or highway, British or French or Siamese, that anywhere follows the Colquhoun-Hallett survey.

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[24] Fytche, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 124–125 (letter from Lord Mayo).

[25] D. G. E. Hall, edit.: The Dalhousie-Phayre Correspondence, 1852–1856, London, 1932, p. xv.

[26] A. R. Colquhoun: Across Chrysê, 2 vols., 2nd edit., London, 1883; A. R. Colquhoun and H. S. Hallett: Report on the Railway Connexion of Burmah and China, London, 1887. See also H. S. Hallett: A Thousand Miles on an Elephant in the Shan States, Edinburgh and London, 1890.

[27] Philippe Lehault: France et Angleterre en Asie, Paris, 1892, p. 562.

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British Annexation of Upper Burma

French intrigue in Upper Burma, with its consequent danger to British commercial interests, was the principal reason for the annexation of independent Burma, in 1886.[28] Jules Ferry had pledged repeatedly that no French arms should be supplied Burma through Tongking. But British suspicions were aroused upon the discovery that a Franco-Burmese agreement had been signed providing for the construction of a railway, the establishment of a Bank of Burma with French capital, control of the Burmese postal system, and establishment of a line of French steamers on the Irrawaddy.[29] The die was cast when the British learned of a secret agreement to supply arms from Tongking after the signing of the Franco-Burmese treaty of January 15, 1885.[30]

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The Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, sent a message to the senior official in Lower Burma: "If, however, the present proceedings should eventuate in any serious attempt [by the French] to forestall us in Upper Burma I should not hesitate to annex the country."[31] After the publication of a "remarkably indiscreet" report by M. de Lanessan on the progress of French activities in Burma,[32] the Secretary of State on November 11, 1886, wired the Viceroy: "Please instruct General Prendergast to advance on Mandalay at once."[33]

British occupation of Upper Burma was followed by expeditions into the various Shan States tributary to King Theebaw. In 1890 a British party under Sir George Scott reached Keng Tung. Meantime both the French and the Siamese had asserted claims to parts of the former Burmese possessions. During the Franco-Burmese negotiations of 1885 Burma purported to cede part of Kiang Hung across the Mekong to the French. The British, as heirs to Theebaw's dominions, claimed the area but later awarded Kiang Hung to China on condition that it should never be ceded to another power.[34] However, the Chinese almost immediately gave part of Kiang Hung to the French.

Further difficulty arose over the substate of Mong Hsing, a trans-Mekong territory ruled by a junior branch of the governing family of Keng Tung. In March, 1894, Mr. Stirling of the Burma

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[28] The British were fully aware of Burmese and French plans, which were reported in detail to the government of India. The Blue Book "Correspondence Relating to Burmah since the Accession of King Theebaw, in October, 1878," has 266 pages of dispatches, C. 4614 in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1886.

[29] Comte A. Mahé de la Bourdonnais: Un français en Birmanie, Paris, 1891. pp. 295–306.

[30] C. 4614 (*op. cit.*, footnote 28), No. 105.

[31] Sir Alfred Lyall: Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, 2 vols., London, 1905; reference in Vol. 2, p. 118.

[32] J. L. de Lanessan: Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée d'examiner le projet de loi portant approbation de la convention complémentaire de commerce, signée à Paris le 15 janvier 1885, entre la France et la Birmanie, Paris, 1885. Lanessan became an aggressive governor general of French Indochina (1891 to 1894).

[33] C. 4614 (*op. cit.*), No. 122.

[34] Sir Edward Hertslet: Hertslet's China Treaties, 3rd edit., revised by G. E. P. Hertslet, with the assistance of Edward Parkes, 2 vols., London, 1908; reference in Vol. 1, pp. 99–109.

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Commission visited Mong Hsing; and he was followed, on Christmas Day, 1894, by Sir George Scott and Mr. Wharry, Chinese Political Adviser to the government of Burma, in connection with the Anglo-French Mekong Commission. M. Pavie, the French commissioner, had sent the French flag to Mong Hsing before the arrival of the British party, and the sawbwa had hoisted the tricolor over his palace. Pavie, who reached Mong Hsing on New Year's Day, had intended to welcome Sir George Scott to French territory. However, Scott had the French flag lowered and ran up his own. For a few months the incident had all the possibilities of an Oriental Fashoda nearly five years before the famous incident on the Nile.[35] The London *Times* had columns about the Mong Hsing incident; and Pavie in private conversation with Scott doubted the validity of French claims to the bazaar town. On January 15, 1895, a telegraphic message from the Viceroy announced an agreement with France that set mid-channel of the Mekong as the boundary.[36] Thus Mong Hsing, which had flown the British flag and had had a British post office for a year, was acquired by France. Siam's claims were quieted by the Treaty of Chantabun, which transferred all Siamese rights east of the Mekong to France. The remainder of the subordinate state of Keng Cheng went first to Siam but was acquired by France in May, 1896. British interests with respect to the Mekong frontier suffered from frequent changes of policy: Lord Roseberry favored the buffer-state idea;[37] Lord Kimberley ordered the occupation of Mong Hsing; then Lord Salisbury, "without exception the worst Foreign Secretary we ever had for matters east of Suez,"[38] gave up the state to France. The French secured a strategic, natural frontier for their Indochinese holdings and had the "further gratification of having enlarged them beyond all expectation."[39]

Later Rivalries

Anglo-French rivalry continued in Yunnan along Burma's northern frontiers until well into the present century. Rival railway and mining claims were the most frequent causes of friction. Article XII of the Anglo-Chinese agreement of February 4, 1897, contemplated

[35] The Mong Hsing–Keng Cheng incident is treated definitively by Clarence Hendershot: The Conquest, Pacification, and Administration of the Shan States by the British, 1886–1897 (Diss., Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1936). The best French account is contained in "Mission [Auguste] Pavie Indo-Chine, 1879–1895: Géographie et Voyages," Vol. 5, Paris, 1902, pp. 264–284.

[36] "Livre Jaune: Affairs du Haute-Mekong et de Siam, 1893–1902." By Article IV of the declaration, the two governments agreed that all commercial and other advantages conceded in the two Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Szechwan either to France or to Great Britain by their respective conventions of March 1, 1894, and June 20, 1895, and future privileges should "be extended and rendered common to both powers."

[37] G. L. LaFuze: Great Britain, France, and the Siamese Question, 1885–1904 (Diss., Ph.D., Univ. of Illinois, 1935), discusses the various proposals for a buffer state.

[38] G. E. Mitton [Lady Scott], edit.: Scott of the Shan Hills, London, 1936, p. 166.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 215.

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railway construction in Yunnan and provided for connection with Burmese lines.[40] No development, however, took place and the British abandoned their surveys beyond Bhamo and Lashio. The agreement between France and China of April 10, 1898, authorized the French to construct a railway from the Tongking frontier to Yunnanfu.[41] This was carried out, but the plans for carrying the line farther were discarded. Activities of French explorers and missionaries in Yunnan along the Burma frontier were watched closely; the British in Burma were only mildly enthusiastic about the explorations of Prince Henry of Orleans from the Mekong to Assam across the top of Burma in 1895. The British were careful to open consulates in Szemao (Es-mok) and other inland treaty ports of Yunnan and Kwangsi that had little trans-Burma trade.

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Siam probably owed her independence to the desire of both her neighbors to have a buffer state between them, the British having decided that Burma was "too soft and pulpy" to serve in that capacity. As matters turned out, France got much the lion's share of territory shorn from Siam. There is not in Burma today any area that was for any length of time Siamese territory, a fact recognized by the present Thai minister to the United States, who issued a communiqué indicating that, in contrast with her present demands upon the French possessions, Thailand is entirely satisfied with her Burma frontier.[42]

British development of Singapore after 1819, introduction of steam navigation to the Orient, the opening of the Suez Canal and the American transcontinental railway in 1869 only heightened the rivalry for alternate short cuts to "the greatest market in the world." By 1882 French engineers had completed surveys of a proposed Kra canal; and on June 8, 1883, Ferdinand de Lesseps presented the completed plans to the King of Siam as "la route Français au Tonkin." That distinguished Frenchman spoke of Bangkok as "the beginning of the Menam route to Yunnan."[43]

By about 1910 the epic age of European imperialism had come to an end; and since that time there have been no considerable additions to the French and British empires east of the Red Sea. Yunnan and Kweichow, for which the rivalry was particularly acute, during the past decade were perhaps less subject to foreign influence than any other provinces of China proper. Lord Curzon (Viceroy of

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[40] J. V. A. MacMurray, edit.: Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China 1894–1919 (Publs. Carnegie Endowment for Internatl. Peace. Division of Internatl. Law, Washington), 2 vols., New York, 1921; reference in Vol. 1, pp. 96–97.

[41] *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 124.

[42] *The New York Times*, Oct. 6, 1940. Britain took compensation in the Malay states of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perak, which had been under loose Siamese protection before their cession to Britain in 1909.

[43] La Bourdonnais, *op. cit.*, pp. 232–241 and 265–284, discusses French interest in a Kra canal and contains a copy of De Lesseps' report.

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India from 1898 to 1905), for whom frontiers and imperialism in the grand manner had great fascination, forced the Iman of Muscat to renounce the lease of a coaling site to France,[44] saw the Hague Court decide in Britain's favor in 1905 the question of the grant of the French flag to Muscat dhows, carried on an intimate correspondence with King Chualalongkorn of Siam, and considered that country an outpost of the British Empire.[45] From the Olympian heights of Simla Lord Curzon took pride in Britannia's supremacy in Southeast Asia. The Indian Ocean was a British preserve: "At no point in the long stretches of British territory washed by its surf has the flag of any European rival ever been hoisted since the French colours were struck over Cuddalore in 1783."[46] Curzon dreamed of a grand trunk railway from Calais to Shanghai by way of British India and sent Major Davies to do the necessary survey work in Yunnan.[47] He believed mistakenly that India and China, the two most populous countries in the world, would in his time be joined by steel rails.

The great delusion that the Irrawaddy, the Salween, the Menam, or the Mekong would provide the entrepôt to interior China was the key to Anglo-French policy and rivalry in Southeast Asia for a century. The delusion died hard. Eventually, however, "loath as most Englishmen are to admit it," trade decided that none of these river valleys provided an economical entrance to China.[48] Likewise, it was at length realized that Indochina was not the path of empire. Both Britishers and Frenchmen, learning lessons from geography and history, agreed with Sir Henry Yule: At no time has a conqueror from India or Burma passed on to China, nor (with one minor exception) from China to India or Burma; nor did the conquests of any one of the great warriors of medieval Asia embrace any part of both countries.[49]

But the delusion was so persistent and complete that it amounted to a perfect case of mistaken identity. Meantime, "England annexed areas where she had interests to protect, France annexed areas where she *wished* to have interests to protect."[50]

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[44] Lovat Fraser: India under Curzon and After, New York, 1911, pp. 86–91, gives a convenient summary of French attempts to secure a base at the mouth of the Persian Gulf.

[45] Curzon wrote a brilliant defense of Britain's record in Siam (G. N. Curzon: The Siamese Boundary Question, *The Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 34, 1893, pp. 34–55).

[46] G. A. Ballard: Rulers of the Indian Ocean, London, 1927, p. 287.

[47] H. R. Davies: Yün-nan: The Link between India and the Yangtze. Cambridge, 1909. Davies urged construction, for political reasons, of a meter-gauge line from Burma to China at a cost of £20,000,000.

[48] Clifford (quoting Colborne Baber), *op. cit.*, p. 294. A governor general of French Indochina came to the same conclusion. "French Indochina cannot be considered as a country of commercial transit. Saigon can never compete with Singapore" (J. L. de Lanessan: L'Indo-Chine Française, Paris, 1889, p. 478).

[49] Yule's introduction to William Gill: The River of Golden Sand, 2 vols., London, 1880

[50] E. V. G. Kiernan: British Diplomacy in China, 1880–1885, London, 1939, p. 187.

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LABOR PROBLEMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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By

VIRGINIA THOMPSON

With a Preface by Wilfrid Benson, Director, Division of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the United Nations Secretariat

Published Under the Auspices of
The International Secretariat
Institute of Pacific Relations

New Haven
YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS
London Geoffrey Cumberlege Oxford University Press
1947

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By the Same Author

French Indo-China
Thailand, the New Siam
Postmortem in Malaya

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BY THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
1 EAST 54TH STREET
NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AMERICAN BOOK-STRATFORD PRESS, INC., NEW YORK
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NOTE

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THIS BOOK constitutes a report of a longterm project in the international research program of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The disturbed conditions in Southeast Asia have made it impossible to deal as fully as had originally been hoped with the wartime and postwar labor problems of the area. Many of these more recent developments, however, will be discussed in the author's forthcoming study of the effects of the Japanese occupation in Southeast Asia. This new study will probably be published under the auspices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations during 1948.

Thanks are due to Mr. Bruno Lasker for editorial and other assistance in the preparation of the supplement to the book, and also to Mr. Wilfrid Benson for his Preface. Although the book is issued under the auspices of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the author alone is responsible for statements of fact or opinion presented in it.

William L. Holland
Secretary-General

New York
July 1947

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PREFACE[1]

IMPERIALISM, IN THE FORM of the government of weaker peoples by the peoples of the West, was an element in the explosion which rent an explosive world economy. Western society had failed to control its own inventions. The palliative of geographical expansion had produced a struggle for trade and raw materials which at a late date led to Western rule. Through this expansion the world was ringed by a powder train leading from and back to the Western countries. 177

There is now a recession of this form of imperialism. In the strength of its industrial revolution, Western Europe had gained the economic and political control of much of the world and of its products. To some extent, it had won spiritual control. The system which seemed nearly all-powerful was nearly all-desirable; and the West, out of the abundance of its adventurers and its adventures, produced men of outstanding character and ideas and inventions of outstanding value. Now in Southeast Asia the tide has turned. As the London *Times* reported in 1942, the fall of Singapore was something "more than the evacuation of a city; it was the end of an epoch."

Long-term factors, such as the spread of industrial techniques to other civilizations, the decline of the Western birth-rate and the very success with which some of the most valid Western conceptions had been received, together with immediate circumstances, such as the failure of Europe and of America to protect their interests, the success, short-lived though it was, of an Asiatic power and the rapidity of the Japanese surrender, make impossible a return to pre-1942 conditions and assure the determined resistance of Southeast Asia to any reimposition of former colonial rule.

Account needs also to be taken of other features in the change. Western Europe resents the criticisms directed against her past record. Western Europe reached a high stage of civilization, has suffered grievously, and can claim that its contribution to world progress has been considerable and includes many achievements in its colonial policies. There is indeed something of a Greek tragedy in the decline of power due to the fulfilment of the Western destiny as the awakener of aspirations inherent in Western thought. The results are a sensitiveness which cannot stomach ill-considered condemnations of "colonial exploitation" and a determination to resist criticism by counter-criticism and force by counter-force. Secondly, if a vacuum of political anarchy comes about in any

[1] The views expressed in this preface are those of the writer alone.

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177 part of Southeast Asia for even short periods, new forces may fill it, while avoiding the responsibilities of government provided by the colonial system. The new or re-established nations cannot avoid contact with the old and the new forces. The tools, the experience and perhaps the doctrines they need are to be found abroad, for the vast increase in their peoples has added to the problem of poverty so that it can only be solved by the increasing use of perfected forms of production in agriculture and in industry.

177 The independence of the Philippine Republic, the preparations for independence in Indonesia, the recognition of Viet Nam, the constitutional
648 progress of Burma, thus not only mark a local epoch; they are of worldwide significance. In many cases, they represent a change of national policies. Internationally, in Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter, countries responsible for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories have undertaken "to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions." Events in Southeast Asia and the course of discussions at the General Assembly of the United Nations suggest that the general principles of Chapter XI cannot be relegated to the future as pious aspirations. For good or for insufficient reasons, the pattern of past colonial rule has been broken, and the trend of world policy presupposes the relaxation of the political controls established by the Western powers in Southeast Asia and the rapid emergence of new sovereign states.

Even so, the basic problem of Southeast Asia in relation to world affairs is not the passing of the colonial stage of government. It is the broader problem of the evolution towards self-reliance of communities which in the past were largely controlled by outside forces in their economic and social, as well as in their political life, and which at present must seek some adjustment with these and other world forces. The political aspects of the problem are narrowing. They mainly relate to the detailed questions of when, where and how political autonomy will be established. On the other hand, Southeast Asia may long remain under foreign domination in matters of economic and social policy, with the danger that indirect control will be established without responsibility and that the next center of world rivalries will be found in the region.

The countries of Southeast Asia will be unable to play their part in the peace and prosperity of the world without drastic improvements in the economic and social life of their peoples. Poverty, unbalanced economic development, ill health, ignorance, labor difficulties and the exploitation of the weak by the strong, which were problems during the period of European control, will not be abolished by the abolition of such control. The change is that the countries will need economic and social assistance which can aid their political evolution.

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In this general problem of Southeast Asia, it would be dangerous to neglect the contributing problems of labor standards and labor policies. It is true that the population is predominantly peasant, that the wage earner usually comes from and returns to his land and that wage standards must remain low so long as peasant standards of living are low. Yet with all this, a social revolution was taking place during the colonial period and will spread if the expanding population is to live. In Southeast Asia, as in the rest of the world, this will involve an exodus from the country to the town and to a certain extent, from agriculture to industry. In the country, it will involve the acceleration of the change from subsistence to cash farming, an increase of wage earning as a normal means of making a living, and the penetration of the effects of employment to villages which are as yet remote. And neglect is more than possible. Whereas under colonial rule indigenous leaders were being increasingly associated in the political functions of government, their participation in and training for the complexities of modern production were hopelessly inadequate. Now, not only are the trained technicians scanty, but it is possible that the feudal, static traditions of the countries will leave local opinion indifferent to the lot of the men and women laboring outside the established practices.

Miss Virginia Thompson's studies on labor problems in Southeast Asia are therefore not merely of value to the labor expert and the sociologist; they are of political importance. Despite the difficulties of research when many of the detailed reports were unobtainable and few persons could be consulted on practical conditions, so that some of her statements may be open to question, she has been able to present a valuable synthesis of labor laws and of the problems confronting the administrations, managements and workers in Western undertakings. She has also sketched with skill the postwar developments which appear to be of greatest significance. Whether or not the future will bring out other changes than those she indicates, it seems certain that throughout the period of settlement there will be a close connection between political peace and progress and labor peace and progress. Therefore, that she has political opinions which color her judgment on labor conditions is not a criticism. Without political opinions, any survey of the labor situation would be merely academic.

As Miss Thompson indicates, in many respects the labor policies of the colonial powers were progressive. For some time attention was confined to the regulation of plantation and mining labor, but from the late thirties the importance of a comprehensive labor policy was receiving increased recognition. It could no longer be thought that the administrations' chief responsibility was for conditions of employment on the estates and mines in respect of which they controlled the labor supply. Problems of modern employment were being tackled through minimum wage

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466 legislation, workmen's compensation and the regulation of industrial relations. In Indochina, the Popular Front Government had begun to apply by stages metropolitan French labor legislation to various groups of the workers. In the Indies, between 1940 and 1942 detailed workmen's compensation laws were adopted, the system of employment under penal sanctions was brought to an end, compulsory road labor in the Outer Provinces was abolished, and in Java the whole wage structure was being changed to provide for a general minimum wage for the lowest ranks of workers.

464 Nevertheless, as Miss Thompson states in her first essay, there remained two major labor problems. The labor supply was unsatisfactory and there was no effective labor movement.

Labor migration enabled the employers to meet their immediate needs and in many cases, as between India and Malaya, was well-organized. In the circumstances of much of Southeast Asia, however, it has helped to absorb some of the surplus population rather than to improve living con-
[458] ditions. In times of economic prosperity there was more money in the villages; with the great depression the villages, more dependent on money, were poorer than ever, and those workers who kept their employment saw their wages drop almost or entirely to vanishing point. The skill of the rubber-tapper, the cigarette roller, the batik worker and of other workers in manual operations demanding delicacy of touch was considerable; the industriousness of the Chinese was even excessive; above all, peasant rice production in the wet lands was marked by the fullest use of available resources. But for modern production in industry, labor efficiency was low and in particular the availability of the skilled mechanical worker was in many areas rare and uncertain.

467 Miss Thompson shows the prewar weakness of the labor movements. In Java, the maximum number of organized workers appears to have been reached in 1941 when the membership of trade unions was estimated at 123,500. In the Philippine Islands, at the end of 1940 the total membership of the registered labor organizations was 96,877, and 190,000 workers were estimated to be organized in unregistered unions. There was little unity or continuity among the unions which existed. The Western governments feared the political interests of the labor movements. The seasonal character of much of the employment, labor migration and, in some cases, the racial diversity of the labor force, were other factors making trade union organization difficult.

000 All these problems still exist. An improved standard of living is one of the essentials for stability in Southeast Asia. Such improvement cannot be effected without economic developments, and although these developments will be hindered by labor which is cheap and inefficient, in the absence of much of the equipment of modern industry it will be long before standards of employment in Southeast Asia are comparable with

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the standards possible in countries which have already reached industrialization. Nevertheless, labor will remain inefficient rather than cheap unless progress in remuneration and improved services is rapid. 000

The countries of Southeast Asia should be able to require Western undertakings, whether European or American, to provide better conditions of employment than in the past and to enforce the same standards in any state or cooperative undertakings that may be established for large-scale production. In the case of the services which formed a large part of remuneration, they should be extended to workers in the smaller employments and as far as practicable to the independent producers from which the wage-earning class is drawn. For this purpose, it should be an objective of policy to provide that the social services which have been imposed on large employers in Southeast Asia in the form of estate hospitals, schools and the like, should become the responsibility of the state or the local authority and taxation on the employers should take the place of labor costs in respect of welfare. The change would help to close the gap between the employed and the local population, and, with that pride which newly won self-government can often inspire, the assumption by national governments of the direction of social services may lead to an unexpected response in the desire of the peoples for higher standards of living.

In the second place, modern labor legislation and enforcement should be extended as far as practicable to all forms of employment. Conditions of employment under Asiatic employers have often been oppressive in the extreme. The European administrations were, in many cases, discouraged by the difficulties of control. Where they attempted to complete and to enforce the law, they frequently found worker and employer combining in a tacit understanding to expect no good of European intervention. Here again a new state in its national pride may well be able to arouse a new desire for better living among workers who in the past accepted their bondage with resignation.

A third major problem will be the development of workers' organizations. The argument that trade unions are of Western origin, and therefore unsuited to other conditions, takes little account of the fact that the workers who have been bred under these other conditions have passed into forms of employment in which trade unionism is one of their major forms of protection. A new communal life remains to be built up and the worker combining for his economic defense with his fellow workers may be able to translate into modern conditions of life the principles of mutual help which are among the most admirable characteristics of Southeast Asia. Whether it will early be possible, as Western advisers would hope, to disassociate political from trade union claims is doubtful. The struggle for national political power may well take place in the unions themselves, and the unions are likely to seek a social revolution

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000 rather than peace in industry. However that may be, unionism is a force which can no more safely be neglected or suppressed than the political movements whose neglect or suppression in the past strengthened the revolutionary character of the nationalist movements.

With all this it seems probable that large-scale labor migrations will still remain necessary. In Malaya and in particular Sumatra, the local labor supplies are inadequate to exploit the natural riches of the countries, and there are thickly populated countries such as Java where even a rapid development of local resources will still leave a surplus population for which provision cannot be made at home. Where the workers are still mainly illiterate and ignorant, migration and labor recruitment need control at a high level. There is too great a temptation for the village headman and those with local influence to send their people away to labor for their own advantage or as a form of sanction or for the moneylender to keep them in servitude at home. The European governments have had considerable experience in the development of labor migration to a point where the worker was free from the obvious forms of pressure and provision was made for minimum conditions of employment; the workers were no longer the weaklings or wastrels of the village but comprised a high percentage of good workers and citizens. There is much experience to be saved, and, whereas it seems essential that the officers responsible for general labor inspection should be indigenous, the supervision of large-scale migration movements may require a regional organization under the control of the countries of labor demand and supply but staffed internationally.

Mention has already been made of the importance of securing local leadership in production. The new states of Southeast Asia will remain largely colonial so long as there are no national engineers, businessmen and managers capable of taking the chief direction in running each country's undertakings. The basic problem is one of education and of training. For the bulk of the population this must be local. Recent experiences, however, in the training of Indian technicians in England and schemes for the training of Chinese overseers and Filipino fishermen in the United States could be usefully extended with the cooperation of Western firms and workers' organizations. At the same time, employment possibilities must be found. The countries of Southeast Asia would be entitled to require the adoption of quota rules by foreign firms employing labor, to provide for the employment of pe ntages of national employees in the higher ranks. The temptation, however, should be avoided of using such rules to impose on enterprises employees who are inefficient. An individual may have won the right to take his share in the direction of the political destinies of his country. If he takes his share in its economic life by law rather than by efficiency, the economic life and the public sense of responsibility of his country will be the main sufferers.

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There remains the possibility of labor competition within Southeast Asia. The countries will remain competitors in the world markets notably for the sale of their rubber and their tin. As early as 1935, the reduction of wages on rubber estates in Malaya was claimed to result from the lower wage levels in other countries, and it was suggested that the international labor conventions should be uniformly applied in respect of commodities subject to international control schemes.

The International Labour Organization's conference of Asiatic Countries (New Delhi, October 1947), attended by representatives of the independent countries and by delegations from the chief Non-Self-Governing Territories, may prove to offer the opportunity of establishing a regional labor organization for Southeast Asia. The tasks of such a regional organization might comprise (1) the application on a uniform basis of international labor standards as adapted to the region, (2) collaboration between the public authorities and managements and workers, (3) labor migration agreements, and (4) minimum wage levels. This organization might hold periodical conferences. Its existence would help to strengthen a regional public conscience concerned with the improvement of living conditions and the development of a regional sense of responsibility for labor policy. It should permit concrete agreements to be reached on many concrete questions of employment. It would enable the representatives to familiarize themselves with the world problems of social policy.

Yet this in itself may not be enough. Labor problems can hardly be treated in isolation from the general problems of health and education, and from the economic foundations on which social policy must be built. The regional labor organization might be expanded with a view to the consideration of other problems of social advance. An Eastern Commission of the Economic and Social Council is being established. Its responsibilities will be broad and its problems many. In addition, it is worth considering whether in the region of Southeast Asia an organization should not be established, in which, with the assistance of and indeed under the control of the local governments, specialized agencies such as the International Labour Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the World Health Organization could cooperate.

This brings back the political question. Any such wide coordinated treatment of social problems in Southeast Asia would conform to the political needs of policy. Southeast Asia may well be a test case of the possibility of a world policy of dev lopment through the assistance of poverty-stricken countries. Without such a policy, the political developments which are now inevitable in Southeast Asia may remain sterile and leave the region once more a center of world rivalry.

New York, February 1947 Wilfrid Benson

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LABOR PROBLEMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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CHAPTER I · INTRODUCTION

I

LABOR SUPPLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

464 TWO MAJOR LABOR PROBLEMS, which have confronted Southeast Asia in
467 the past and which remain unsolved, are the inadequacy and irregularity of labor supply and the dearth of organized labor movements having objectives like those of Occidental labor unions.

464 Except in such overpopulated areas as Java, the Tonkin delta, and Northern Annam, labor is generally inadequate in quantity and in quality to meet the requirements of large-scale enterprise. Where numerically adequate, the labor supply is either poorly distributed in relation to areas of employment or fails to respond to opportunities offered. The industrial development of the entire area suffers from lack of full-time services of skilled laborers. Some of the factory employees form the only stable, trained groups of workers. They comprise a small proportion of the population.

[874 Few facilities have existed for the training of skilled workers, and the
461] association in Oriental minds of manual labor with the humblest social classes has limited wage-labor largely to those driven by economic necessity. Handicrafts are carried on principally by agriculturists in their
[476] leisure time and by other "non-professionals." Farmers form the bulk of the workers. Only during the slack agricultural season or after a disastrous harvest are they willing to perform labor for others.

464 Supplementation of the inadequate labor force has been effected in various ways—some spontaneous, others planned. The starvation condi-
167 tions chronic in south China and in India have caused emigration of workers to the underpopulated but richer regions of Southeast Asia, whence they usually repatriate their savings and eventually their persons to the home country. With the exception of Burma, which by reason of its geographic and administrative relations with India formed a special category, the prosperity which prevailed at times in Southeast Asia was less a factor in stimulating this flow than were conditions in the homeland.

Accelerated by the boom in plantation industries during the early

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Chinese
Indians

464 years of the present century, the flow of immigration has been large and
167 comparatively steady except during the depression and the two world wars. Chinese and Indian immigrants usually could better their position soon after arrival because their industry and organization were superior to those of the indigenous peoples. Partly because of this, there were constantly new arrivals willing to do coolie work until they too could
[178] rise economically. Except for the large-scale repatriations to China and India caused by the depression, the flow of labor thus set into motion was adequate for the economy prevailing in the underpopulated areas until changing conditions created a growing class of landless proletariat and
[668] dissatisfaction among both the indigenous and immigrant peoples. This dissatisfaction often became associated with other motivations in nationalist movements.

Controlled migrations occurred only between regions under the same government or those held by governments of the same nationality, except for a limited migration of Javanese labor to Malaya (and to New Cale-
[166] donia). In the Netherlands Indies and in Indochina the governments endeavored to transplant groups of laborers from overpopulated to underpopulated areas, but in so doing they learned that the process required careful organization, was expensive, and raised serious economic, social, and psychological problems. Such movements could be effected successfully on a limited scale only. This fact obviated the possibility of their contributing substantially to solution of the problem of overpopulation. As labor supply, such migrations were only temporarily satisfactory, because social and religious ties inclined the workers to return to their home villages immediately upon the expiration of their contracts or even to desert. To stabilize this labor force some of the governments tried after the depression to obtain a better adjusted sex ratio in the migrant population by encouraging the immigration of workers' families and the establishment of agricultural villages—a program too recently initiated to make possible a definite appraisal of its comparative success or failure. In Malaya, with the exception of a few Javanese, planned immigration was confined to Indian laborers. It was arranged and operated jointly by the two British governments concerned. There, however, the depression, the growth in voluntary Indian immigration, and India's ban in 1938 on assisted emigration to Malaya tended to render many of the official controls unnecessary. The unplanned and uncontrolled movement of labor across the Burma-India frontier was the sole migration of its type in Southeast Asia.

563 The indigenous populations in general hold themselves socially aloof
609 from the alien Asiatics. To the Muslim Malays the Chinese were materialistic, pork-eating idolators; and the Indians, with the exception of the small Islamic minority, were similarly disdained, though regarded as less aggressive. To the sinicized Annamites, the Burmese, and the Siamese,

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Chinese

religion was no barrier between themselves and the Chinese; all were Buddhists, though of differing sects. Chinese culture had long been admired by the peoples of Farther India, and had influenced them. Moreover, the Chinese were regarded as distant and desirable relatives. With the advent, however, of Chinese women and the accelerated growth of Chinese nationalism after the first world war, intermarriage occurred less frequently (though it continued to be common in Burma and Cambodia), and the indigenous peoples had few social contacts with the Chinese in their midst. The cleavage between the ethnic groups was further widened in the British colonies by the official policy of representation of various communities on legislative and advisory bodies. 563 609

Economically, relations between the indigenous and the immigrant peoples altered from a mosaic of non-conflicting occupations to one of rapidly increasing competition. For years the native peoples had contentedly seen the arrival of thousands of immigrants annually who were able and willing to perform the hard labor for which they themselves had neither inclination nor compulsion. Through much of the region, however, during the inter-war period an indigenous proletariat was developing as a result of the transfer of farm land from the indebted native peasantry to non-agriculturists, often to alien moneylenders, and also because of the growth of a Western-inspired individualism which was weakening family ties once paramount. The trend was apparent chiefly in parts of Burma, Siam, and Indochina. 464 477 178 425 177

This development did not assume significant proportions until the world economic depression, when considerable unemployment arose out of the drop in prices and the curtailment of foreign markets for products of Southeast Asia. The result was a swift increase in the number of natives seeking to return to their villages and, on the other hand, of those forced to seek part-time or full-time employment away from their villages in competition with immigrant laborers for work previously scorned as arduous, monotonous, and underpaid. 464 458 178

Meanwhile the native middle classes for the first time faced a serious unemployment problem. Until the depression years, the opportunities for desirable though moderately paid employment in government or business had seemed to exceed the number of qualified candidates. The depression made it clear that the saturation point had been reached, and each year an increasing number of educated youths would be thwarted in their expectation of employment or, if given a job, in their rise to higher positions. Thus two groups of economically frustrated natives developed simultaneously in numbers and in consciousness in the decade prior to the second world war. 464 178 563

Nascent political factors became significant during that period. The struggles of the Chinese against the Japanese and of Indians against British rule were reflected in the attitudes of the emigrants from those coun- 464 668

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Chinese Indians

464 tries. Although this was truer of the immigrant Chinese than of the immigrant Indians, the comparative inertia of the latter was compen-
668 sated for by a more aggressive championship of their cause on the part of
563 their compatriots at home. In the case of Malaya, where the indigenous population was numerically weak and psychologically passive, the Central Indian Association of Malaya and the Congress Party leaders prodded the Government of India to exert pressure upon the officials at Singapore and Kuala Lumpur to grant greater economic and political
[167] privileges to the Indians in Malaya. The governments and planters of Malaya, however, with the curtailment in their labor needs resulting from the current cut in rubber export, felt free to resist this pressure, even at the price of the embargo placed in 1938 on emigration to Malaya of assisted Indian labor.

464 In the case of the Chinese the situation was different. Smaller num-
668 bers were employed in the rubber industry and larger ones in mining. More of them were able to graduate from contract labor into other occu-
563 pations, especially retail business, farming, and small trades. They tended to stay longer because of the insecurity of enterprise in south
167 China. Moreover, the home government was in a much weaker position than that of India to exert pressure on the governments of Malaya. These remained free to regulate at their pleasure the spontaneous flow of Chinese immigrants and to keep watch on the political activities of resident Chinese. In Burma, however, the British authorities were unable to keep the situation so well in hand. Serious anti-Indian rioting broke out in 1938, and the strength of the Burman nationalists in the government (especially after separation from India in 1937) enabled it to negotiate an agreement with India restricting the number of Indian immigrants and permitting the exercise of more control over those domiciled in the country.

In Indochina and the Netherlands Indies the governments were able to keep the immigrant problem from assuming intensity because of the smaller proportion of Chinese in relation to the native populations. In all these countries, however, Chinese laborers suffered somewhat from the bad reputation of those of their countrymen who as merchants and moneylenders had acquired an economic power which differed from that of other aliens in that it affected directly and visibly the welfare of large numbers.

464 All the governments, including that of Siam, were compelled by public
668 opinion to exert more control over the immigrant minorities. In so do-
563 ing, they faced unpleasant alternatives. The demand of Chinese and Indian laborers for better working conditions and improved political
167 status was accompanied by a threat to cut off entirely the flow of emigra-
468 tion. Encouraged by nationalist groups, they engaged in strikes and boycotts. If these succeeded, other demands would probably be made; and

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Chinese
Indians

the indigenous peoples were not sufficiently willing, numerous, or skilled 464
to replace the immigrant laborers. A higher wage scale, they feared, 668
might compel many firms either to go out of business or to install expen- 563
sive machinery. Already local nationalists, succumbing to the philosophy 167
of economic self-sufficiency, were demanding intensive programs of gov- 468
ernment-aided industrialization. If such demands were acceded to, the
industrialists and labor leaders in the home country could be expected to
protest strongly against the new competition.

In this complex situation, the colonial governments of Southeast Asia [664]
gradually yielded to the popular demands, although loath to abandon
their traditional function as instruments of capitalist planning in the
home countries. With the exception, however, of the embryonic and
ineffective industrial programs of the Siamese and Burmese governments
and the more constructive policy of the Netherlands Indies for a planned
industrialization, none of the countries did much in this direction. None
was forced as yet to consider very seriously that change in colonial rela-
tionship which would result from general economic development in the
world and specifically from the new role that China and India would
inevitably play before long in Southeast Asia. The Japanese invasion
interrupted the efforts of local governments toward a solution of these
labor problems. It also injected new elements into the situation.

2

LABOR ORGANIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

For various reasons an organized labor movement has never developed 467
in Southeast Asia to notable dimensions. In large part this was because 575
of the predominance of alien, transient, and illiterate labor forces, di- 563
vided—even when of the same nationality—by geographical and linguistic
differences. The Indians were further subdivided by caste and religious 668
sect. The Chinese had a far better family, guild, and secret-society
organization; but the antagonisms imported as an integral part of these
organizations provoked periodic violence. Later the political and gang-
ster elements which operated within their framework impelled all the
governments throughout Southeast Asia to control them severely.

National solidarity among the immigrant labor groups was further 466
broken up by the methods of recruitment and management. Agents and 167
foremen exploited their compatriots for their own personal gain, until
the governments concerned were gradually and reluctantly forced to
intervene. Asiatic agents behaved much as recruiting agents of emi-

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Chinese Indians

466 grants to the United States did in Europe until they were checked. They
167 consistently misrepresented to prospective recruits the conditions of work that awaited them, herded them aboard ships and in lodgings under conditions of filth and crowding, and tried to crimp their competitors' labor forces. Immigrant Asiatic foremen also were similar to their prototypes among immigrant foremen in the United States. They were notorious for the "cuts" they took from their crews' wages, for their unscrupulous profiteering from the sale of food and other necessities to the workers, and for their brutality toward those recalcitrant under arbitrary rule. Nor were alien Asiatic employers liberal in their relations with compatriots among their labor forces. Small Chinese-owned estates and mines were regularly cited in the reports of independent labor inspectors as the most delinquent in their observance of health and safety regulations. Singapore Indian shop-owners were the object of unpleasant publicity regarding the long working days, irregular and inadequate wages, and general tyranny meted out to their compatriot assistants. Disinterested labor leadership or even employer paternalism was conspicuously absent among the immigrant groups.

466 Working conditions were not much better in the enterprises owned by indigenous employers; but they were less conspicuous than those of the immigrant employer's shop, as most of the native workers are farmers scattered over the land and cared for, when in need, by the traditional village and family organization. Little was done by the native governments, whenever they were in power, to better the lot of the small native
[563 farmer-artisan. The Siamese and Burmese governments falteringly at-
654] tempted to introduce scientific agriculture, to improve cottage industries and to reduce the landless proletariat; but their efforts were directed more toward ousting foreigners who preyed on the people, particularly alien landowners and moneylenders, than toward improving labor conditions of those working for indigenous employers. The Siamese National Assembly, in 1938, turned down a proposal for labor legislation designed to set maximum hours and minimum wages and to restrict child labor. Its policy on labor organization was much the same as that of the colonial governments, that is, to keep the labor forces under control and to exhibit, at most, a certain indulgence toward the formation of unions in some trades or localities where this seemed advantageous.

Wherever labor legislation was introduced in Southeast Asia, the initiative came from the government and not from the workers. Originally
[686] it was the difficulties which European employers experienced in retaining their workers (at first domestic servants and later plantation laborers) that inspired legislation which imposed a penalty upon employees for their non-observance of agreements. Gradually, throughout the region, this penal sanction was abolished and more beneficial types of legislation were introduced to reduce the labor turnover. Considerations of

health and welfare induced the governments throughout the region to legislate that laborers be recruited with full knowledge of, and with a physique adequate to, the conditions of their future work; that they receive medical care and compensation for illness and injury; that certain minimum wage standards and a maximum number of working hours be maintained, either by district or by industry; that women and children be not employed in tasks beyond their strength. Everywhere labor inspectorates were created to see that the labor laws were enforced, but because of budgetary limitations they were hardly ever equal to their task. Though these were undoubtedly steps in the right direction they were far from adequate. Much of the legislation in the colonies was taken over from that of the home country or other colonies and only partially adapted to local conditions. Often it was wholly inappropriate to the area where it was applied. Even where it was at first applicable, it did not necessarily remain so, because industries and occupations changed; and invariably it covered only a fraction of the total labor force in the country. Further, inspectors usually lacked the time and the authority to see that even the few laws on the statute books were enforced. More complete, more specifically focussed, and more generally applicable labor laws were needed. 466

Having enacted measures designed to keep order and protect the laborer's physical well-being and the proceeds of his toil, the governments of the region felt that they had few additional obligations toward their wage-earning population. Conditions in Southeast Asia were sufficiently better than those prevailing in southern India and in China to attract all the labor that was needed; and this lulled the governments into believing that even if the territories under their sway had not achieved a labor millennium, there was no urgent need to do more. However, on the eve of the Pacific War, certain of the governments became more active in projecting further labor codes and reforms, long held under consideration. [185]

Although embryonic associations of workers existed in each country of Southeast Asia, they did not grow and coalesce to become important economic entities. No genuine trade-union movement had developed before the war broke out in the Pacific. Such associations as formed invariably occurred first among transport workers, since railroads, tramways and harbor operations were the first industries created in the area and since they could most easily be held up by strikes and found it most difficult to replace their workers even when there was a large surplus supply of general laborers. Moreover, the workers in them were fairly well concentrated geographically. The delayed growth of unionism in others of the larger enterprises is explained by the extremely small minority of industrial workers amid the large and unassimilable blocs of foreign laborers, and by the indifference of the governments to the formation 467

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467 of unions in industries the operation of which did not directly affect the public order.

The employers' resistance to unionization derived naturally from their 467 desire to have available an abundant supply of cheap labor. They had on their side, as an argument that must weigh heavily with the govern- 668 ments, the involvement which such organizations as existed were be- 468 lieved to have with subversive political parties and leaders. Communism was reported to be rife among the Chinese labor groups. Indian Congress emissaries were supposed to be stirring up the traditionally docile Indian coolies. The growing wave of strikes and riots which occurred during the second part of the inter-war period, particularly in the middle and late 1930's, had the effect of modifying the opposition of the employer groups. Violence or work stoppages often took place without any formulation of demands or without the workers' support of the spokesman theoretically representing their views. At least some employers therefore began to see the advantage of dealing with responsible labor leaders and of forcing any subversive elements in the workers' associations out into the open.

466 Thus in Malaya, in 1939, legislation was introduced (but not enforced until 1941) authorizing and facilitating the functioning of unions. Em- 467 ployers in Indochina, who also had long opposed unionization, moved similarly in the latter part of the decade toward a recognition of the need for it. In the Netherlands Indies, membership in unions, after a setback in the early 1930's, slowly increased, although by far the largest unions were still composed of government officials and professional men. In [563] Burma, as in Siam, unionization was impeded by the presence of a predominantly alien body of workers to whose welfare the nationals of both countries were either hostile or indifferent. Such organizations as existed survived only insofar as the governments in each country favored them as useful aids in preventing curtailment of production. Their development, however, was controlled lest they harbor elements striving to overthrow the established order.

The loss of their colonies by the Western powers and anti-colonial Japanese propaganda naturally induced a greater consciousness on their part of the existence of labor problems that must be coped with if the larger economic and social programs are to succeed. From the resolutions passed at the International Labour Organization's conference at [648] Philadelphia in 1944,[1] it appears to have been generally recognized that the colonial governments could no longer rely on paternalistic measures or the voluntary cooperation of individual employers.

[1] Bruno Lasker, "A Labor Code for Dependent Peoples," *Far Eastern Survey*, XIII, 12, June 14, 1944, pp. 103-10.

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LABOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION

JAPAN'S TREATMENT of labor throughout Southeast Asia varied according to the military situation, the political relations of Japan with the individual country, and the availability of manpower. Everywhere, however, labor suffered from dislocations, regimentation, and general deterioration in working conditions except for the limited amount of technical training dispensed by the Japanese to create a needed nucleus of skilled workers. The information required to draw a complete picture of the labor situation during the war in each of the countries of this region is not yet available, but from such data as exist—drawn chiefly from former enemy sources—the outlines are reasonably clear. 727 466

By mid-1943 their military position in the Pacific War led the Japanese to alter their policy in Southeast Asia. Labor in the area had not previously been regimented on a nation-wide basis, although attempts to register the available manpower and use it for individual projects had been made as the need arose. But the critical shipping situation, which prevented both exports from Southeast Asia to Japan and imports needed in those countries, of necessity changed the objective of Japanese policy from one of economic exploitation for the benefit of the homeland to maintaining Japanese troops in the area and achieving local self-sufficiency and defense.

In June 1943 new labor measures were widely introduced; these foreshadowed large-scale forced labor and indicated that the Japanese realized that patriotic as well as economic and prestige incentives had to be offered to secure native cooperation. Soon after, the transplanting of laborers from the most populous areas to those requiring workers for defense projects and economic development was systematically undertaken. This policy prevailed until V-J Day at a tempo which kept pace with the worsening military situation of Japan. [166]

Japan's political aims were reflected in marked differences in policy in each of the countries of eastern Asia, and also toward separate groups within each state. The comparatively good treatment meted out to the Siamese derived from Japan's need, for propaganda purposes, to maintain the fiction of Siam's voluntary alliance in the Greater East Asia war. Being unwilling, for political reasons, to coerce masses of Siamese workers, and for economic reasons to rely on their small, unskilled and re- 727 167 464

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727 167 464 luctant services, the Japanese imported prisoners of war and Javanese laborers for the construction of the Burma and Kra Isthmus railroads. Even after the pro-Japanese dictator, Pibul Songgram, had been ousted by a resistance government, the Japanese tolerated the change so long as they retained military and economic control over the country.

727 [464] 466 Malaya, on the other hand, received the least favored treatment. The only country in the area to which the Japanese did not promise "independence," it was earmarked as a Japanese colony. The Japanese were faced with a small, foreign labor supply whose special skills were adapted almost exclusively to the tin and rubber industries. Since they could utilize only a small proportion of the country's major produce, there occurred tremendous dislocation and unemployment of labor. The Chinese, as the largest, most skilled, and most hostile group, were subjected successively to brutal treatment, registration and regimentation, and transportation to farming colonies on the peninsula. The Indians were similarly organized along racial lines through the Japanese-sponsored Indian Independence Leagues and the Indian National Army. The Malays escaped the more rigorous forms of coercion because of their negligible importance as a source of labor.

[167] Despite the tight network of organization developed by the Japanese, Malaya's labor problem was never satisfactorily solved; guerilla ranks were strengthened by recalcitrants of all races and eventually the occupying forces had to import Japanese and Javanese workers in order to strengthen the defenses of that vitally strategic area.

727 466 Indochina, thanks to the survival of the French administration until the Japanese coup of March 1945, was treated only slightly less favorably than Siam. The Japanese found there a more abundant labor supply than in immediately neighboring countries but were hampered by the necessity of working indirectly through French officials, by the concentration of labor in the north, and its antipathy to furthering Japan's war aims. [167] As in Malaya, the inadequacy and indifference of the local labor supply compelled the Japanese to import a few thousand Chinese and Malay coolies as well as some Japanese technicians and supervisors. [166] A certain number of local laborers were conscripted to work on defense and industrial projects and an undetermined number of Tonkinese were transported to work on plantations in the south. [464] Unemployment seems not to have become a major factor, although as the war progressed there was a marked shift of agricultural workers to the cities, only partially offset by the evacuation of some laborers from heavily bombed urban areas. In common with the other laborers of Southeast Asia, Indochinese workers suffered from coercion and inflation but apparently not from nation-wide regimentation or transportation to work outside their own country.

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Indians

Next to the Javanese, the Burmese endured the greatest hardships during the Japanese occupation. Burma was more completely devastated by military campaigns than any other country in the area, and its proximity to India made it Japan's frontier zone. The need to win Burmese cooperation led Japan to grant Burma "independence" on August 1, 1943, and thereafter the local intelligentsia were placated by a Burmanization of the administrative services. But the country's laborers were in a far worse plight than they had been under the British administration. The Indians, whose number in Burma had been halved during the 1942 campaign, were immediately thereafter exposed to persecution by the Burmese. Virtual pogrom conditions in the delta compelled them to flee to Rangoon for Japanese protection and employment. Indian coolies supplied the casual labor needed in the nation's capital, and most of the white-collar class was absorbed into the Indian Independence Leagues and Indian National Army. Burmese laborers, who had long agitated for a restriction of Indian immigration, now found themselves bearing the brunt of Japanese requisitioning, which was represented by the puppet native government as a patriotic service. They had to perform heavy manual labor far from home, for low wages, and under alien and often harsh supervision. They suffered, in addition, from the knowledge that their own fields were neglected and their homes unprotected. Burma was frequently praised by the Japanese for having supplied more cooperative labor service than any other area in the southern regions, but nevertheless Javanese workers had to be brought in.

727 563 [464] [466]

Java, with the greatest labor reservoir of the area, was inevitably the country whose manpower was most intensively exploited by the Japanese. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Javanese served as coolie labor for the construction of defense works and means of communication and also were trained by the Japanese for more technical work in shipyards and in factories. They were shipped by the thousands to areas outside their island as local needs and the exigencies of the military situation dictated.

727 466 167

Originally the Japanese planned to perpetuate, on a far vaster scale, Dutch colonization schemes in Sumatra; in this they not only encountered the same obstacles as had their predecessors, but they found they could exploit all of the island's resources they could use with the manpower and machinery locally available. In mid-1943 they seem to have transferred the plan to Borneo, where additional labor was required to develop such local industries as timber. Many hundreds of male Javanese workers were shipped to Borneo, while smaller groups were sent to other areas.

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Unemployment during the Japanese occupation was serious only in Malaya. Elsewhere the defense and economic programs of the Japanese,

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727 together with the curtailment of alien Asiatic immigration, afforded
464 plenty of jobs for those who were willing, or were forced, to work for wages paid in inflated currency.

727 In the food-surplus countries—Burma, Siam, and Indochina—which were also those receiving the most favored political treatment at the hands of the Japanese, the areas under rice and allied crops declined.
433 The decrease in the number of draft animals through disease and Japa-
464 nese requisitioning; the lack of implements; and, above all, the loss of former export markets caused the local farmers to cultivate very little more than their families required, and there was a marked exodus from the agricultural communities to the cities or places of more remunerative employment. In the countries of food deficiency—Malaya and the Outer Islands of the East Indies—the Japanese made great efforts and probably succeeded in increasing the area under food-crop cultivation, but never to the point of self-sufficiency. The Japanese also arbitrarily prohibited certain industries as "nonessential" and shifted the workers to others accordingly.

727 Very little information is available as to the wages paid during the Japanese occupation. Where local labor was limited and native good-
465 will was sought, as in Siam, the Japanese seem to have paid high wages from the outset. In densely populated areas like Java, wages were reportedly decreased immediately after the occupation. In time, and with the ever greater need for additional labor services, the Japanese permitted successive wage rises. But nowhere did wage increases keep pace with the more rapidly rising cost of living and they had to be supplemented by allowances, medals, and words of praise. The groups that suffered most from this disparity were the Asiatic government-servant and white-collar class, whose numbers had always exceeded the demand and whose services were far less necessary to the Japanese than was manual labor.

727 Labor legislation was passed only in negative measures of regimentation and outlawing of strikes. Nevertheless, reports of strikes periodi-
466 cally filtered through the barrage of Japanese propaganda, particularly a few that took place in Indochina and Burma. Most of them registered
468 grievances against low pay, high living costs, and heavy taxation, but some were doubtless of a political character—difficult to distinguish from sabotage. Following one strike in 1943, the Cochin-China police arrested a number of "communists." In Malaya and Indonesia, control by the Japanese military and naval forces was not exercised through any native administration, and the strictness of their rule seems to have precluded any possible recourse to the strike weapon.

727 In Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia the Japanese set up a bewildering array of organizations into which the local peoples were regimented by
466 communal, occupational, religious, sex, and age groups. Not only did

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many of these organizations overlap but they were assigned multiple and often identical tasks and all were subjected to Japanese "spiritual" indoctrination. Most of their members had to undergo military training and perform labor services, ranging from accompanying the Japanese army to look after supplies to washing clothes for Nipponese officers. Most of the forced labor, however, was required for the construction of defense works and communications. Some of those performing such services—lured into "volunteering" by the promise of uniforms, additional food, and the same treatment as was accorded to Japanese soldiers—were organized into picturesquely named *Heihos* and Sweat Army battalions. While these militarized groups probably suffered more than any others, the bulk of Southeast Asia's population, wherever they were, performed hard labor for the Japanese during a large part of the occupation period. 727 466

Had Japan's gamble in far-flung imperialism not been undertaken at so rapid a tempo, and against such overwhelming forces, the occupying authorities might have evolved some means of winning over the peoples of Southeast Asia before resorting to the harsh and unlimited exploitation they did. For where the Japanese seemed sincere in their encouragement of nationalist aspirations, as for a time they appeared to be in Burma, the people were far more cooperative than they were in such areas as Malaya, which from the outset were scheduled to become colonies of Japan.

The chief victims of the Japanese were undoubtedly those who were transplanted to work in foreign lands, most of whom will never return to relate their sufferings or to keep alive hatred of the Japanese. However, the people as a whole suffered in common from the same hardships and the same demands on their services and it cannot be concluded that laborers as a class developed any special consciousness as a result of their war experience. Their hours of work were probably longer, their pay less adequate to their needs and their masters more demanding than the Occidentals whom the invasion had displaced, but their grievances and aspirations had probably come to be identified with those of their compatriots and their status as laborers was neither more nor less advanced than before the war. [467]

4

POSTWAR LABOR DEVELOPMENTS

SINCE THE JAPANESE SURRENDER, labor movements throughout Southeast Asia have made significant advances in organization, solidarity, and political self-consciousness. Their progress varies from country to coun- 467

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467 try, depending on the stage of development reached before the war, the quality of leadership during and after the Japanese occupation, and the degree of authority and stability achieved by the present governments.

While politics are the overwhelming preoccupation everywhere, Indochina and Indonesia have been the scenes of almost continuous warfare since V-J Day and have been unable—judging from the limited information available—to produce strong, cohesive labor movements. Siam, although not badly damaged by Allied bombing, has been absorbed in achieving administrative stability amid internal political rivalries and in maintaining its sovereign status internationally. The basic reasons which prevented the prewar labor movement in Siam from evolving beyond the embryonic stage remain valid. The greatest progress has been made in Burma and Malaya, where labor movements were comparatively well delineated before the war and where subsequent conditions have combined to further their growth.

467 Nowhere in the area has a labor movement developed without politi-
668 cal implications and inspiration. Nationalism, in the embrace of so-
186 cialism or communism, has been its guiding and dominating force. Political leaders have worked upon laborers as the only have-not group in an area where the majority of the inhabitants are cultivators who possess, or aspire to possess, their own land. It is not accidental that peasant unions have been organized only in Burma, the sole country of the region where absentee and non-agriculturist landlordism has flour-
[464] ished and where there is marked ethnic homogeneity. Labor shortages exist everywhere as a result of the wartime cessation of immigration and the depletion and displacement of existing labor forces, and are aggravated by the desire of business firms to resume their export trade as quickly as possible.

These factors have placed labor in a particularly favorable position. While laborers remain on the whole almost as inarticulate and as closely identified with the mass of the population as before the war, they have acquired a new political consciousness and a sense of their own indispensability, as well as a more aggressive leadership. Everywhere their economic grievances derive from the growing disparity between increasing wages and more rapidly rising living costs and from the absence of consumer goods and adequate housing in urban areas. Their political objectives are those assigned to them by nationalist or communist leaders, who are using labor as the best spearhead available locally for the achievement of their own goals.

467 At the present time Malaya and Burma have the only labor move-
ments in the area worthy of the name. Their prewar economies differed widely—Malaya's resembling that of Sumatra more than Burma—but
464 their metropolitan power is parallel and both are committed to a pro-labor policy. They are the two countries of Southeast Asia which have

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been traditionally most dependent on imported labor and their prewar labor movements were the most highly developed of any throughout the region. 467 464

Nevertheless, the labor movements in these two countries have taken different paths. Burma is made up of one predominant race, overwhelmingly agricultural and guided by strong nationalist leadership. Development of solidarity among Malaya's laboring class has been retarded by the tripartite ethnic composition of its population and by the country's traditional dependence upon two export industries. Accordingly, Malaya's labor movement has developed schismatic tendencies bordering on mutual hostility and has been influenced by alien Asiatic leadership. While in both countries the British Government has not as yet formulated any policy toward immigrant workers and has thus played into the hands of labor, already in short supply, the effects in the two countries have been quite different. Because of Malaya's lack of a self-sufficient economy, its laborers are in a more favorable position to press their demands. At the same time they suffer from serious internal weaknesses not found in Burma. The government and private firms in Malaya—if the planting-mining economy is to survive—will have to make greater concessions in order to reconstitute an adequate labor force than will the analogous authorities in Burma and Siam.

The special composition of Malaya's population and the organization of its industries are probably responsible for the development of its labor movement from many small unions, organized by subdivisions within trades, into a central association. This pyramidal set-up has been turned upside down in Burma, where labor was at first organized on a very broad basis and then divided into smaller units. In both areas the British Government has been making a marked effort to foster labor unions and at the same time to divorce them from political programs and ideologies. But since the nationalists throughout the area have chosen the labor movement as their chief medium for the achievement of the socio-political revolution they desire, it is unlikely that this attempt will prove successful. The laborers of Southeast Asia still feel themselves to be, above all, members of their own national or ethnic communities and have only secondarily developed a consciousness of a class apart. The whole area is too little industrialized to be fertile ground for a labor movement, strictly speaking. When trade unionism is discussed in referring to the labor movements now budding in Southeast Asia, it should be borne in mind that little more than its nomenclature has been borrowed from Occidental labor organization. 467 [668] [565] [563]

Throughout Southeast Asia the various governments have begged two outstanding questions affecting local labor problems—agricultural indebtedness and land tenancy, and the control of Asiatic immigration. In regard to the former, nothing has been done thus far and one can 466 426 167

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167 426 466 [563] only surmise that a development of the cooperative movements will be furthered as the one policy free from international complications. As to the immigration of Indians and Chinese, the local governments seem unable to chart a course between the Scylla of indigenous nationalist sentiment and the Charybdis of demands from the governments of India and China. The latter today are in a far stronger position than before the war to insist that improved working conditions and greater political privileges be accorded to such of their nationals as they permit to emigrate to Southeast Asia.

466 167 563 Any restoration of the prewar planting-mining economy will depend upon the resumption of Asiatic immigration. But management will be forced to grant better working and living conditions and possibly the governments will have to concede a more privileged political position to immigrant Indian and Chinese laborers. On the other hand, native nationalists throughout the area will try to curtail such immigration and will oppose granting political privileges to alien Asiatics who, they believe, will continue to feel a primary loyalty to their homelands. These opposing forces have already locked horns on the citizenship clause embodied in the Malayan Union plan—the first postwar attempt to ameliorate the political position of alien Asiatics—and the British Government has not yet resolved the equally important immigration issue.

433 No matter what constitutional changes emerge from the current political crisis in Southeast Asia, the governments set up throughout the area will have to face the same labor and minority problems as did their predecessors. The urge toward industrialization received an impetus from the Japanese occupation, though the synchronous growth in the industries of China and India (not to mention Japan's continuing need for export markets) will offer sharper competition to the nascent industries of the region. Moreover, shortages of labor and fuel in most of Southeast Asia cannot but curtail the expansion of even light industries and may prevent any immediate and effective way of satisfying the desire of nationalists for the establishment of large-scale and heavy industries.

[439] The region seems destined to remain for some time predominantly a source of raw materials and a market for the industrial output of its neighbors. Before the war certain sections of these countries had entered the phase of commercialized agriculture and mining, and of processing the output—distinct advances over the traditional economies. This trend is now being accentuated, although it is influenced by such wartime developments as that of the synthetic-rubber industry. In any case the form of international organization set up to control production and sales will be different from that of the past, in which the colonial producer interests predominated. In the immediate postwar period, world shortages of the commodities produced by Southeast Asia have created a market eager for all its major output.

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CHAPTER II · BURMA

1

GENERAL LABOR SITUATION

464 It was the British Government's original goal to create a body of peas-
166 ant proprietors as a means of developing Lower Burma. But as Burmese peasants could not be attracted from up-country at a sufficiently rapid
167 tempo to keep pace with the delta's agricultural commercialization, the government encouraged the immigration of Indians. Although the first groups imported failed to form a settled agricultural community in Lower Burma, they did reveal to the government the potentialities of nearby India as an unlimited source of labor for Burma's rapidly expanding rice, timber, and oil industries.

At the outset there was no competition between the two racial groups; the Indians' contributions in converting the delta's wastelands were chiefly industrial and commercial, and the Burmese played the greater part in actual cultivation. The Indian immigrants fitted tidily into the country's economy, arriving in time to harvest the crop and then to supply the labor demand for the equally seasonal milling industry.

464 The amount of wasteland available for rice culture in the delta was so large and so cheap that for twenty years—and especially between 1900 and
433 1906—there was a phenomenal expansion of the industry. Simultaneously there was a movement of the indigenous population from the towns to
166 these newly opened areas. This speeded up not only the growth of commercial agriculture but also that of industries closely connected with the disposal of agricultural products. The Burmese confined themselves largely to the expansion of rice production, and the labor deficiency in other fields was made good principally by Indians. Even in agriculture itself the rapid expansion created such a dearth of workers at harvest time that the delta rice farmers came to rely increasingly on Indian labor, rather than upon the irregular indigenous workers who came down from Upper Burma only when a poor harvest occurred there.

464 Indian labor soon swamped the Burmese labor market in every line of
563 enterprise. Except for a few clerkships, no Burmese could find employ-
463 ment with navigation companies or with the railroads. They had no

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[463] 464 563 better luck with the Public Works Department, which hired Indians even as postmen.[1] Although the Indians in this way soon succeeded in getting a stranglehold on the development of the delta, the British annexation of Upper Burma presented the now more awakened indigenous peoples with greater opportunities for employment on the railroads and in public works. Mandalay's streetcars were staffed with Burmese, at a time when Indians had things all their own way in the country's capital. The introduction of gasoline engines, in particular, gave Burmese new vocational opportunities which they were now more alert to seize. Soon they acquired almost a monopoly of the available jobs as stokers on steamers using oil fuel. Because of their advantages over Indians in the matter of literacy, the growing printing business became largely their province.

[186] In those fields where they were able to gain a foothold, Burmese held their own and justified the feeling that they could and should play a larger role in their country's economic development. They were no longer willing to be limited to agricultural and rural interests while the industrial and urban life of their country was dominated by aliens. They [461] resented the fact that where Burmese labor was employed it was supervised by foreigners and compensated on unequal terms. They came to feel, above all, that the watertight racial compartments set up in many vocations were a consequence of their domination by a foreign government, forgetting that until very recently their own lack of interest in such matters and their distaste for monotonous and sustained work had been the main reasons why the exploitation of the country's resources had so largely passed into the hands of others.

311 Conditions that prevailed in the period between the wars modified the situation considerably. While there was, and still is, a large amount of 433 unused arable land, it is of the type which does not lend itself to profitable cultivation without a heavy capital outlay. Burmese methods of 464 cultivation were so little improved that the crop yields remained virtually static, and competition grew between the Burmese and Indians for a 563 share in urban employment, especially for the skilled occupations that were for so long an undisputed Indian preserve. While the spirit of Indian-Burmese rivalry became more violent during the last prewar years, it was of longer standing than the comparatively recent desire shown by the Burmese to replace the British as well as the Indians in administrative posts.

464 The native demand for the Burmanization of all professions, businesses, and labor forces antedated the country's separation from India, 563 but it became more acute when the existence of a constitution permitted the free expression of this and other grievances. The economic depression brought about a greater replacement of Europeans with Asiatics but

[1] Furnivall, J. S., *The Political Economy of Burma*, Rangoon, 1931, p. 162. Revised in 1938 by J. R. Andrus.

 Indians Europeans 464

Burmese still made little headway in displacing Indians in the lower posts and even less in ousting British incumbents from the higher offices. They complained that, even after separation, the terms of their agreement with India permitted nationals of that country not only to come freely into Burma, but to continue to staff the defense services and such large employers of labor as the Post and Telegraph and Public Works Departments. Britons, even in recent years, were still recruited in the home country and in India to fill the more important posts. 563 [167]

Early in 1939, the government proposed the optional retirement of civil servants upon completion of twenty-five years of service. The purpose was to relieve the ever-more-acute problem of unemployment among the educated Burmese, who claimed that they could fill the same posts at a lesser cost to the country because of the elimination of paid leave to England and of the allowances allotted to enable Britons to adjust themselves to a tropical country. [647]

The report of the Committee on Public Services, set up in June 1939 and composed of members of the Legislature under the chairmanship of Sir Joseph Maung Gyi, recommended measures that went much further than did those of the earlier Fiscal Committee in the direction of Burmanizing the administration. This committee recommended that recruitment to all services, including the sacrosanct Secretary of State services, should in the future be confined to persons domiciled in Burma. Also it wanted to obliterate all differences in the wage-scale between Europeans and Asiatics. Since all appointments did not come within the competence of the government (Class I of the Civil Service and Class I of the Police Service being appointed in London), European recruitment could not be entirely stopped. But the same results might be achieved indirectly by rendering the conditions of work in such services unattractive to non-Burmese candidates.[2] The strongly nationalistic trend of the whole report was most clearly shown by passages recording the committee's views and recommendations on subjects for which it had no competence, especially in the recommendation that the recruitment for all Burma's services should be the province of the country's ministers. This view became an obsession with Burmese nationalists and it colored almost all of the committee's recommendations. 464 563 186 647

The war brought something of a truce. The defense services were thrown open to Burmese. Not only did the recruitment of Britons from the United Kingdom stop, but the compulsory military service required of those resident in Burma produced staff depletions which in many cases were filled by Burmese.[3] While the elimination of Britons from the higher posts was, to some extent, automatically effected by war conditions, the curtailment of Indian employment became a burning issue. 722 464 563

[2] Rangoon *Times*, January 28, 1941.
[3] *Ibid.*, March 5, 1941.

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464 The position of Indian labor in Burma was complex, both from the internal and the external aspects. It was complicated by Burma's long
563 administrative association with India, by Britain's continuing relations with both countries, by the attitude of Indian nationalists regarding the position of their compatriots in Burma, and by Burma's increasing dependence on India as a source of supply and to a lesser extent as a market. From the internal angle, this problem was perhaps even more involved. The better equipped and more experienced Indians were solidly
[471] entrenched throughout the whole of the country's economic life. Indian capital remained of paramount importance to farming, and Indian labor was still the cheapest and the most abundant.

[427] These were long-standing factors. Of more recent growth, dating mainly from the world economic depression, was the rise of a landless Burmese proletariat created by the acquisition of so much of the country's arable land by Indian creditors. Attacked thus in their agricultural
[668] stronghold, and unable to dislodge these aliens from their dominating positions in urban employment, the Burmese manifested their resentment against the Indians' status in the country by the riots of 1938. While the subsequent appointment of an Agent by the Government of India to look after the interests of Indian laborers in Burma did something to solve that group's problems, it did not protect the life and property of Indian residents in Burma other than laborers, nor solve the existing Indian-Burman competition for employment, or regulate the immigration of Indians into Burma. The Enquiry Committee had indicated the latter as one of the major causes of the riots.

563 The outbreak of 1938 was the violent release of an Indian-Burman tension that had been endemic since the turn of the century. The Indians, whose aloofness from the Burmese did not help mutual understanding, were resented as alien landowners, moneylenders, and competitors in almost every sphere of life except in agricultural production. Their outlook on life was very different from that of the Burmese. The expatriated Indians living in Burma were, generally speaking, a hard people whose materialism and caste system were distasteful to the easy-going and democratic Burmese.

While it could hardly be said that the Chinese were popular in the country, they were far more akin, spiritually and physically, to the Burmese than were the Indians. They were not so numerous, and they did not lend money on the security of land; they were chiefly artisans and merchants who did not compete with the Burmese on anything like the same scale. In contrast to the recent trend prevailing among the overseas Chinese in Malaya, Siam, and Indochina, the Chinese rarely brought their women to Burma, and the result was more extensive intermarriage and identification with Burmese life. The inter-war period changed their status somewhat, though to a lesser degree than in the case of the

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Indians, and there was a demand for restrictions upon the entry of both Asiatic groups into the country. The seething frustration of the landless and indebted Burmese, who were faced with the prospect of a lowered standard of living, gave rise to an intense nationalism directed against the foreigner, who had made the Burmese feel like strangers in their own land. Separation from India was first hailed and then denounced by them because the results failed to live up to the promises held out—namely that it heralded the extinction of the alien moneylender and of the whole regime of the "*Kalas*," the contemptuous term under which the Burmese lump all Indians.

Since, by the terms of the separation agreement, the Burmese were unable for a period of three years to alter the *status quo*, they resorted to the indirect device of reserving certain fields of employment to the indigenous people. In addition to their campaign for the Burmanization of the central administration, the nationalists exerted pressure on the Corporation of Rangoon to reserve 90 per cent of employment to natives. This entailed a long struggle, and eventually was scaled down to one-half on the ground that there were not enough qualified Burmese. Burmese members of the Legislature repeatedly queried the government, not only regarding the degree to which its own services were being Burmanized, but also as to how far it used its powers to require business firms in the country to employ Burmese. In 1940, when the government was negotiating new leases with the teak companies, it stipulated as one condition of their renewal that Burmese must be employed to fill one-half of the positions on their superior staffs.[4] In answer to pointed inquiries as to what was the government's policy in assuring the employment of Burmese in such large concerns as Steel Brothers, the Burma Oil Company, the Rangoon Electric Company, and the Indo-Burma Petroleum Company, the Ministry cautiously stated that it was encouraging their hiring of Burmese labor, but that the restriction of foreign immigration would automatically increase the percentage.[5]

The regulation of Indian immigration, in turn, had to wait upon the findings of the Baxter Commission, appointed in 1939 as a result of the riots of the preceding year, for the specific purpose of informing the apprehensive and ignorant Burmese public as to the status of Indian labor in their country. It was hoped that the public was not so thoroughly prejudiced that it could not appreciate the facts of the case, which were for the first time to be made available to them. However, even the appointment of this commission was the subject of misunderstanding. It was taken in some quarters as being designed expressly for the purpose of making out a case for immigration restriction, whereas its primary pur-

[4] *Ibid.*, August 31, 1940.
[5] *Ibid.*, April 17, 1941.

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[185] pose was to test and correct current ideas on the subject and to see if a system of control was actually necessary.

167 Baxter's report dispelled the popular impression that unrestricted In-
563 dian immigration would bring about a noticeable change in the character of Burma's religious and social customs; that Indians were driving Burmese into poverty and unemployment; and that Indians used Burma as a convenience, only coming there when conditions were bad in India and remaining just long enough to take rice out of Burmese mouths, without giving anything in return. On the contrary the report showed that the flow of immigration was automatically decreasing; that the surplus of incoming over outgoing Indians was declining; that the growth of the Indian population in Burma was slowing down, if it had not already ceased; in short that there was no danger of Burma's being flooded with Indians or of becoming Indianized. Baxter's provisional conclusion, in [464] the absence of complete statistical information regarding the current situation, was that the flow of immigrants was not dependent upon local conditions in India but followed the demand for labor created by fluctuations in Burma's prosperity.

464 Although limited to the field of industrial employment, the Baxter in-
162 quiry established several important facts. Most fundamental perhaps was that, although 67.5 per cent of the total workers in Burma's indus-
563 tries were Indians as compared with 30.7 per cent Burmese, and among unskilled workers 69.5 per cent were Indians as against 29.7 per cent Burmese, during the period of maximum employment,[6] since 1934 the Burmese had gained a larger proportion of the increased opportunities for employment.

Although by 1939 there had been an increase of 17.4 per cent in the numbers of all workers of all grades and races compared with the numbers employed on the corresponding date in 1934, the increase in the number of Indians employed was only 10.2 per cent whereas the increase in the number of Burmese employed was as high as 32 per cent. An even more striking relative improvement was shown in the employment of Burmese among the skilled workers, where it represented an increase of 42.5 per cent over the number of skilled Burmese employed in 1934. During this same period the number of skilled Indian laborers had grown by 21.4 per cent.

464 Probably the most controversial aspect of Baxter's Report lay in its
assessment of the possibility and merits of replacing Indian laborers by
461 Burmese. The issue seemed to hinge upon the changing and differing living conditions of the two groups. Until the 1930's, the typical Bur-
563 mese was a member of a moderately prosperous agricultural family, fairly carefree by temperament, not overfond of arduous labor, and content to

[6] Baxter, James, *Report on Indian Immigration*, Rangoon, 1941, p. 58.

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be supported by his family during workless periods. The Indian, on the other hand, came from a grossly overpopulated region and belonged to an undivided family system in which the young men who could not obtain employment locally were expected, under penalty of severing forever their family ties, to go elsewhere for work and from their wages to remit sums for the family's maintenance. The world economic depression and possibly the increased population of Burma produced a marked change in Burmese living conditions. Whatever its main cause, there grew among the Burmese a steadier and more persistent demand for work as unskilled laborers. This, in turn, aggravated their competition with, and animosity toward, the Indians. Baxter found employers unanimous in favoring Indians for dull, arduous, and monotonous tasks, but equally united in their conviction that Burmese more readily understood intricate work and were far more desirous of obtaining positions as skilled artisans than as unskilled laborers. Physically the Burmese were as strong if not stronger than the Indians so that the former's attitude was apparently psychological. The Burmese were not—at least not yet—prepared to work arduously and mechanically for long hours, at a low wage, far from home, and without freedom on their traditional holidays. If the two groups were working together, the Burmese apparently assumed that the heavier and dirtier tasks would be performed by the docile and submissive Indians, but if Burmese alone were employed they would perform the same labor as Indians, only more slowly.

464 461 563 [78]

The relative status of Indians and Burmese varied from industry to industry. In sawmilling the situation had crystallized. The Indians did the heavy work (Rs. 16 a month and upwards), lived in barracks, and remitted a portion of their wages to India. The Burmese, starting in some clerical position (beginning at Rs. 25 a month), worked their way up to the position of skilled supervisor or clerk, seemed to assume the right to boss the Indians, and required far better living conditions. The memo submitted by four European timber firms in Rangoon indicated that if Burmese alone were employed, their production costs would rise appreciably. In metalliferous mining the Burmese normally refused to work underground, or in any occupation requiring shift work, so that comparatively few Burmese were employed. Attempts made to mix Burmese and Indian crews in the inland navigation vessels and in government dockyards were so unsatisfactory that they provoked threats of strikes. The Indians, long entrenched in such occupations, preferred to employ their own caste, and the Burmese were averse to the long training period required, the prolonged absences from home, and duty shifts of twenty-four hours. Yet in many skilled and semi-skilled occupations, offering variety and calling for initiative, Burmese were already replacing Indians. What delayed the process was the policy followed by some firms of encouraging the sons of existing employees to enter the same field and,

563 461 [465] [461] 563 464 472

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563 464 472 more important, the scarcity of Burmese capitalist-businessmen who would naturally be prone to hire their own compatriots. The crux of the whole problem—to what extent were the Burmese available or willing to work in the same positions currently occupied by Indians—was unknown and would remain so until some system of registration for unemployed workers was set up.

563 167 From the standpoint of the Burmese officials who negotiated the immigration-restriction agreement with the Government of India, the Baxter Report supported their policy: while they would recognize a privileged class of Indians domiciled in Burma, they insisted that those coming into the country should not retain a divided loyalty—they would have to identify themselves either with Burma or with India. If Indians had contributed to the prosperity of Burma, they had also enriched themselves in the process and should not begrudge paying back a small portion of their profits in the form of fees and taxes.

Unfortunately, instead of using the Indo-Burmese immigration agreement (a consequence of the Baxter Report) as an opportunity to prevent their compatriots from enduring such humiliating and miserable conditions of life and labor in a foreign land, the Indians in India regarded the restrictions placed upon Indian immigration into Burma as an insult to them and to their country. Equally unfortunately, from the viewpoint of the effectiveness of this and other measures in Burma, racial prejudices had permeated too deeply for the Burmese public to grasp the main fact presented in the Baxter Report—that Burma did not have to face an unmanageable influx of immigrants whose movements bore no relation to the country's needs. The Burmese, as a whole, continued to regard emotionally what was essentially a practical, economic problem.

2

TYPES OF LABOR

162 241 *Agricultural*

BURMA STANDS OUT in its true perspective as an almost exclusively rural country when it is realized that in 1931, out of a total worker population of 6.66 millions, 65 per cent were engaged directly in agricultural cultivation and stock-raising. In the census of that year, 6.5 millions out of the total laboring population were grouped, in the proportion of three to one, under the two heads of producers of raw materials and preparers and suppliers of material substances.

000 *Burmese.* In the period of the depression which followed the First

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Burmese. In the period of the depression which followed the First World War, there developed a marked trend, in Lower Burma particularly, for indigenous peasant proprietors to lose their land to moneylenders and to become tenants or, in some cases, agricultural laborers. It was generally the best land which was taken from the peasants, since moneylenders were often unwilling to lend on the security of inferior land. During the decade between 1921 and 1931 cultivating owners declined from 50.6 per cent of the total of some 2.5 million engaged in farming to 30.9 per cent of the total. The percentage of tenant-farmers remained substantially unchanged (22.3 per cent in 1921 and 23.0 per cent in 1931) and agricultural laborers rose from 27.1 per cent of the total to 40.1 per cent; this trend continued until 1936 when the position appears to have been stabilized at least temporarily. 427 426

Though by tradition and inclination the Burmese is a farmer, he alternately works hard, moderately, or not at all. During the planting season the rice farmer labors long hours. Thereafter he and the women of his family are occupied no less strenuously in transplanting. No horses are used as draft animals, and most of the field and road work is done by water buffaloes and bullocks. The latter are more prevalent in the dry zone, where they can endure tropical conditions, while the former are used more extensively in the delta. Crops are harvested by hand and the only progress noted has been in the use of an improved plow. To some extent tractors have been used on government farms and by a few of the wealthier landowners, but generally speaking power farming is not adapted to paddy cultivation nor to the purses of rice farmers. Between the very active periods of planting, transplanting, and harvest, the farmer works with gentle moderation, and after the crop has been garnered he has some months of almost total agricultural inactivity. 241 221 461

Indians. For some decades after the annexation of Pegu (1852) the government's policy was the active promotion of migration on the part of farmers from India to Burma, in order to accelerate the development of Burma's great arable wastelands and to relieve congestion in the most poverty-stricken areas of India.[7] Direct encouragement of such migration, however, was so consistently unsuccessful that the Famine Commissioners, reviewing the whole question in 1858, expressed preference for leaving the problem to private agencies, although still advocating the desirability of relieving overpopulated regions in India. Subsequently the government made two grants of land, comprising about 27,000 and 15,000 acres, in Pegu and Toungoo districts respectively, on the understanding that colonists would be mainly Indians recruited from India. When it became increasingly evident that colonization of the waste areas was proceeding satisfactorily through the emigration of Burmese from Upper Burma to the delta, the government very soon changed its policy, 167 166

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[7] Ibid., p. 44.

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167 claiming that "it was neither expedient nor necessary to encourage th
166 settlement on the land of non-indigenous races."[8] Moreover, it appeared from a government-inspired inquiry made in 1908, that the objectives of the grant had not been realized. The Indians had not been recruited from the congested areas of India; they were paying comparatively high rents; and they were introducing neither new crops nor better agricultural methods. Furthermore, they lived in small enclaves, apart from neighboring Burmese farmers. There was no further government-assisted immigration, and the Indian agricultural population, which comprised 30 per cent of all Indian earners and working dependents in 1931, had found their way into Burma without any intervention on the part of the government.

162 The percentage of Indians classified as engaged in "ordinary cultiva-
464 tion" has been considerably influenced by the situation in Arakan, where there has been a large Indian population established on the land. But, if Arakan were excluded, the Indian percentage of 3.9 would fall to 2.7,
476 and the indigenous percentage would rise to 96.7. Throughout Burma, family agricultural labor was the rule. Even in the monocultural region of the delta neighbors were called in to supplement family labor and Indian gangs were seldom employed.

162 Arakan was exceptional since at the time of the 1931 census, 38 per
427 cent (43,570) of all Indian non-cultivating owners, cultivating owners, and tenant cultivators in Burma, were located in that area. Although practically all of the increase in the area occupied by non-agriculturists in the thirteen principal rice-growing districts of Lower Burma was accounted for by the increased areas occupied by the Chettyars, it did not necessarily follow that the number of Indian non-cultivating owners had increased in the same proportion. There was, indeed, some increase in their total—a comparatively small number owning large land acreages.

167 Indian immigration into Arakan has had a special character, owing
464 primarily to the existence of a land frontier with India across which movement is easy, quick, and cheap. In 1931 about 97 per cent of the Indian population of Arakan (predominantly Chittagonians) was concentrated in Akyab district; out of the 1,008,538 forming the total population of Arakan, Indians numbered 217,801.[9] The great majority of the Chittagonian population (84 per cent in Akyab) was born in Burma and the sex ratio among them was far more nearly normal than among Indians elsewhere in the country. Every year, however, from 20,000 to 40,000 coolies entered Akyab from Chittagong, the bulk of whom came to reap the paddy crop and returned after the harvest was over. The nearness of their homes and the small amount of money required for the journey

[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

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made their sojourn in Burma far shorter than that of the average Indian immigrant. Witnesses were unanimous in their testimony before the Baxter Commission that a restriction of this seasonal immigration was desirable, on the grounds that it was resented equally by the settled Chittagonians and the Arakanese. It appears that the resident population, of whatever origin, could not compete with the cheap labor supplied by the immigrant, whose standard of living was lower than theirs, and who were superior as workers. A restriction of their immigration would inevitably result in an increase in wages which, in turn, would bring forth an ample supply of local labor. Baxter, however, was not convinced that some supplementary immigrant labor would not still be required for the harvest season.

Chinese. Agricultural and forest laborers accounted for only 6.4 per cent of all the Chinese in Burma at the time of the 1931 census.

Industrial

The total industrial population of Burma before the war was small, and rice-milling, which was widely distributed throughout the country, accounted for about half of all the factory workers. The number of factory laborers barely exceeded 100,000, although a great many artisans and part-time domestic workers worked independently. The size of industrial units was generally small, as shown by the definition of a factory (under the 1934 Act) as "a premise in which power is used in aid of a manufacturing process and in which twenty or more workers are employed, or ten in the case of rice mills."[10]

At the end of the First World War there existed about five hundred factories employing some 71,000 persons. With the growth of small rice mills the number expanded, but the increase in the number of factories and of employees did not always tally. The pre-depression peak in the number of factories was not subsequently surpassed, and the maximum figure of employees—over 100,000 in 1928—has never since been equalled.

A characteristic of Burma's industries before the war was their transiency. In 1939, for example, sixty-four new factories opened but fifty-five closed down; forty-six new rice mills were started but twenty-two others ceased to function. Among the new establishments were a quinine tablet factory (a jail industry); a tile factory; and a barytes crushing mill. Even the most interesting among the newcomers, a maize-starch factory, was avowedly temporary as it had been set up in conjunction with the Pegu Yomas water-supply scheme. At the end of 1940 there were in Burma 1,088 factories falling within the scope of the 1934 Act, or two more than existed the preceding year.

[10] Spate, O. H., "Beginnings of Industrialization in Burma," *Economic Geography*, January 1941.

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464 In the last year before the Pacific War, the total number of workers employed in Burma's factories, expressed as a daily average, was 89,383, compared with 87,946 the preceding year. Perennial factories employed 84,184 and seasonal establishments, 5,199. The increase was spread fairly evenly over the main industries, except that rice-milling showed a decrease of some 800 workers. In the Federated Shan States, which were analyzed separately in the Labor Department's report, the eleven existing factories employed 3,676 men and fifty-five women in 1940. Of these, ten establishments were connected with silver and lead mining and one was a tea factory.

464 *Rice-milling.* At the season of maximum employment the milling of rice normally took one-third of all the workers engaged in industry. Also it contributed in an average year over 40 per cent of the total value of all commodities exported to other countries.[11] About 83 per cent of the total of 673 rice mills were classed in 1939 as small mills, individually employing less than 100 workers, or 32.5 per cent of the total number of workers in the industry, whereas each of the large mills employed more than 500 workers.

[439 433] 256

The increase in the number of mills between 1934 and 1939 signified the establishment of small up-country mills engaged principally in the preparation of rice for the local market. To a secondary extent, such mills worked under contract to their larger colleagues in the seaports which virtually controlled the export trade in rice. This growth represented the recovery of an industry which had suffered seriously from the depression. It was also associated with an important change in the proportion of Indians engaged in rice-milling. Although there seems to have been no significant alteration in the proportion of Indians employed as unskilled workers in this industry, in the skilled categories the percentage of Indians decreased by as much as 12.4 per cent between 1934 and 1939. This change was apparently related to the growth of up-country mills; to the comparative immobility of Burmese laborers, which has tended to restrict them to employment offered in their home districts; and to the foreign ownership of the large mills, which catered to the export trade and were naturally inclined to recruit workers from the comparatively fluid supply of Indian laborers in the south. The extent to which the Burmese participated in their country's major industry was correlated with the size and ownership of the mills, the Burmese generally being employed in equal numbers with Indians in the smaller mills but decreasing to a very small fraction in larger seaport establishments.

316 *Mining.* The majority of the permanent labor force employed in mines and quarries has been Indian—roughly 45 per cent of those engaged in skilled work and somewhat over 60 per cent of those employed as un-
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[11] Baxter Report, p. 65.

TABLE I: BURMA: PERENNIAL AND SEASONAL FACTORIES *

A. Perennial

Type of Factory Ownership	Total Perennial and Seasonal	Engineering		Sawmills		Rice Mills		Vegetable Oil Mills		Others	
		Number	Persons Employed	Number	Persons Employed	Number	Persons Employed	Number	Persons Employed	Number	Persons Employed
Government and Local Fund	29	19	4,802	2	110	..	..	..	..	7	2,028
European	114	34	5,535	6	4,358	21	8,757	5	578	40	11,228
Burmese	390	..	..	36	1,810	313	11,866	15	458	6	451
Indian	283	5	116	52	3,627	166	9,564	4	179	28	4,851
Chinese	208	..	..	20	1,274	173	11,439	5	198	8	322
Japanese	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	97

B. Seasonal

	Ginning		Others	
	Number	Persons Employed	Number	Persons Employed
Government and Local Fund.....	1	54	..	..
European	5	889	3	627
Burmese	19	819	1	106
Indian	26	1,608	2	653
Chinese	1	24	1	47
Japanese	2	372	..	..

* *Annual Report* on the working of the Factories Act in Burma, 1940, p. 30.

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316 skilled workers.[12] Almost all of these Indians were immigrants, more
464 than 97 per cent of those engaged in mining having been born outside of Burma. Chinese labor was employed principally in the Shan States (Yunnanese who worked in Burma during the dry season) and to a lesser degree in Tavoy and Mergui. In the more isolated mines it was found that only Gurkha labor would remain for any length of time. Mine owners tried to lure the local inhabitants to hire out their services to reduce the heavy labor turnover, but since most of Burma's mines were situated in sparsely settled and generally unarable areas, most of the labor had to be brought in from other regions.

464 Few indigenous laborers were employed in metallic mining; they were
much more numerous in the exploitation of non-metallic minerals. In
315 the middle and late 1930's there occurred an appreciable contraction in

TABLE II: NUMBER OF FACTORY EMPLOYEES IN BURMA *

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Industry	All Burma 1940	All Burma 1939	All Burma 1940 Perennial	All Burma 1940 Seasonal	Rangoon Only Perennial	Rangoon Only Seasonal
A.						
Government and Local Fund factories	6,994	6,265	6,940	54	2,088	..
Textiles						
Woolen mills	430	420	430	..	..	..
Engineering	4,802	4,208	4,802	..	1,192	..
Dockyards	806	730	806	..	742	..
General	187	129	187	..	174	..
Ordnance factories	516	162	516	..	..	..
Railroad workshops	3,293	3,187	3,293	..	276	..
Printing presses	1,302	1,256	1,302	..	681	..
Sawmills	110	85	110	..	110	..
Cotton ginning and baling	54	64	..	54	..	..
Leather and shoes	130	108	130	..	..	..
Sewage and pumping	42	..	42	..	42	..
Quinine tablets	63	63	63	..	63	..
Water pumping	61	61	61	..	..	..
B.						
All other factories	82,389	81,681	77,291	5,098	23,047	..
Textiles	2,423	2,495	2,423	..	..	..
Engineering	5,701	5,376	5,701	..	3,541	..
Minerals and metals	7,990	7,579	7,990	..	927	..
Food, drink, tobacco	43,902	44,579	42,516	1,386	8,283	..
Chemicals, dyes	4,356	4,312	4,356	..	2,912	..
Paper and printing	1,379	1,156	1,379	..	1,379	..
Wood, stone, glass	11,936	11,365	11,936	..	5,336	..
Cotton gins, presses	3,712	3,497	..	3,712	..	..
Miscellaneous						
Rubber, rope, etc.	990	1,076	990	..	169	..

* *Annual Report* on the working of the Factories Act in Burma, 1940, pp. 12-13.

[12] *Ibid.*

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the volume of labor required in the oil industry, both in the refineries and at the wells, apparently because of the completion of construction work. Baxter's analysis indicates that during that period there was a slight increase in the number of Indians employed in the skilled categories but a decrease in those doing unskilled work and it appeared likely that Burmese were being employed in an increasing extent in the unskilled labor associated with the normal routine of the oilfields. 464 315

Textiles. For many years the total number of persons registered as employed in the cotton-textile industry was around 6,000 to 7,000, over half of whom were employed by the gins. Yet, according to the 1931 census, there were 234,892 persons in Burma engaged in cotton spinning, sizing, and weaving—the majority of whom were part-time workers, mainly women, performing their tasks outside the factories. Probably only 1 per cent of the persons engaged in the cotton industry were urban as against 99 per cent dwelling in rural areas. 286 288 464 [438]

The growth of cotton mills in the dry zone represented one of the more important recent industrial developments in Burma. However, most of the newer mills were on a very small scale so that—as in the rice-milling industry—the growth in employment was not commensurate with the numerical increase in units. The cotton industry expanded in an area and under conditions which were very different from those of the Indianized sections of Rangoon and the south. Consequently Indian labor did not succeed in penetrating it to any appreciable extent. In 1940 only about one-eighth of the skilled and one-fifth of the unskilled workers were Indian. This industry has been seasonal in Burma, and the labor force, especially at the period of maximum employment, was recruited principally from among Burmese living in the districts adjacent to the mills.

Sawmilling. The preparation of timber, particularly teak, was such a well-established industry in Burma that there was over recent years little variation in the number of workers employed. The increase in the total number of workers employed from 1935 to 1939 was due to a revival in the export trade of teak, after the depression conditions prevailing in the early 1930's. 313 464

Statistics indicate the persistent hold which skilled Indian workers have enjoyed, without significant variation, during the five years preceding the war. In the same period, the proportion of Indians obtaining employment as unskilled workers decreased by approximately 5 per cent. Out of the total of 102 sawmills, the 10 mills each employing more than 200 workers accounted for 52 per cent of the whole industry, whereas over 92 units were much smaller establishments. In the latter the Burmese were more than holding their own, but their percentage in the large Rangoon mills shrank to a very small proportion. Nevertheless, the number of Indians engaged in forestry as a whole in Burma was small, amounting in 1931 to only 2.2 per cent out of a total of 52,728.

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Public Service

464 Laborers in public services were heterogeneous in character and engaged in the various transport services as well as in road work, water [653] supply, etc. In the second half of the last decade there occurred a steady expansion in the activities of public services, amounting to an increase of 6,000 in the number of workers employed over the years 1934–39. During that period the percentage of Indians among the skilled workers employed showed no significant variation. This was due partly to the fact that skilled workers in services such as transport and those employed by public bodies, such as the municipalities and the port of Rangoon, were normally engaged for long-term periods so that there was little opportunity for a rapid increase in the number of Burmese employed, despite the growing nationalistic demand for a 50 per cent Burmanization of such industries. In the unskilled categories the case was different; in these there was a decline of about 10 per cent in the proportionate employment of Indian workers.

Handicrafts

438 Handicrafts, more important than large-scale industry in Burma, were
464 carried on primarily in the rural districts and in most cases by part-time workers, though some towns became famous for their craft output. A large proportion of Burma's pottery, clothing and articles of daily use was made by village artisans who carried on such work in conjunction with other activities. Most of the textile producers and those engaged in the food industries were residents of the countryside, the metal and chemi-

463 TABLE III: NUMBER EMPLOYED IN COTTAGE INDUSTRIES IN BURMA, 1931 *

Industries	*Number*
Cotton spinning, sizing, and weaving	234,892
Lacquer workers, makers of bamboo and wood products	66,462
Tailors, milliners, dressmakers, etc.	51,190
Silk spinning and weaving	45,908
Carpenters, turners, and joiners	42,260
Toddy drawers	36,434
Manufacturers of tobacco	24,296
Makers of jewelry and ornaments	21,680
Blacksmiths and other iron workers	12,997
Workers in other non-precious metals	9,988
Potters and makers of earthenware	12,454
Boot, shoe, sandal, and clog makers	8,394
Condiment and candy makers	8,164
Makers of hats, caps, umbrellas, etc.	6,213

* Somewhat less than half the persons listed were full-time workers. In a few cases, such as cotton spinning, a small part of the total consisted of workers in urban factories. The proportion so employed was, however, never over 1 per cent.

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cal industries being the only ones with about half of their workers living in urban areas, and the majority of them were employed outside of factories. [438] 464

According to the census report of 1931, wage-earners and working dependents of all races engaged in industry numbered 664,376, of whom 536,995 were indigenous and 104,767 were Indians. Of the Indian component 93.1 per cent (97,589) were immigrants from India and 6.9 per cent (7,178) were local-born.[13]

The textile industry was carried on almost entirely by the indigenous races; the number of Indians enumerated under textiles—773—was insignificant. Of those engaged in the wood industry 84.8 per cent were indigenous and 9 per cent were Indians. The majority of the Indians were employed in the sawmills, and only 616 of those engaged throughout this industry were born in Burma. In the food industries 70.9 per cent belonged to the indigenous races and 26 per cent were Indians. Indian rice-pounders were numerous, accounting for 33,360 out of a total of 63,290 persons so occupied, and nearly all of them were born outside of Burma. In the dress and allied industries, 68.3 per cent of the earners and working dependents were indigenous, and 26.1 per cent Indians. The racial division was somewhat more even in the chemical and building industries. In the former, 43.4 per cent were indigenous and 53.7 per cent Indians; in the latter 50.9 per cent were indigenous and 40.9 per cent Indians. The ceramics industry was almost wholly carried on by the native peoples, the number of Indians engaged in this work forming only 6.5 per cent of the total.

Burmese craftsmen usually acquired training in their skills in the traditional fashion, either through being taught by their fathers or through an apprenticeship system. The government accomplished little, even in the fields of textiles and lacquer, in which it was the most active. The inadequately staffed Cottage Industries Department ran the Saunders Weaving Institute at Amarapura and the Lacquer School at Pagan, and supported a few traveling weaving instructors. A Fine Arts School was organized in Rangoon, in the late 1930's, as a result of the recommendations of the Campbell Commission on Vernacular and Vocational Education, and annual arts and crafts exhibitions were held. In 1937 the Burmese Senate recommended to the government that it immediately establish a central industrial institute in or near Rangoon, and intermediate ones in Meiktila, Moulmein, Bassein, Mandalay, Akyab, and Prome districts "to impart practical training in rural industries to pupils who pass the middle part of the Anglo-Vernacular or English School examinations."[14] Simultaneously the government was asked to grant one hundred [868] 874

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[14] *Senate Proceedings*, Vol. 2, August 18, 1937.

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874 traveling scholarships for the study of small industries in neighboring countries. Agitation for the development of cottage industries as a distinctive Burmese activity did not achieve concrete results before the outbreak of the Pacific War.

531 Burma's traditional arts and crafts give proof of a widely developed artistic sense, even though they were, at least before the Japanese occupa-
517 tion, generally declining. The Burmese had found other uses for their leisure; improved transportation made it easier for them to travel; export
178 markets were never organized and the Burmese Court no longer functioned as a means of disposing of craft output; and, above all, fashions
438 changed rapidly as a result of the importation of cheap machine-made goods. Chinese and Indian immigrants virtually monopolized certain trades like carpentry, furniture making, and the slipper industry.[15] However, the Burmese craftsman managed to survive as a cartmaker, goldsmith, worker of lacquer, and—in the delta—as boatbuilder. A number of crafts, like those of basketry, toy-making, etc., continued to exist, though not on a commercial scale. Cottage industry has never been so basic in Burma as in some other Asiatic countries and before the war, despite official efforts at encouragement, had not found the vitality to compete with its industrialized rivals.

3

IMMIGRANT LABOR

167 BEFORE THE WAR, there were two major groups of immigrants in Burma, Indians and Chinese, of which the former were by far the more important.

Indians

167 The immigration of Indians into Burma began on a large scale in the second half of the nineteenth century with the growth of foreign markets
464 for Burma's rice. The part played by Indian agricultural labor in bringing Lower Burma's wastelands under cultivation was small in comparison
477 with the contribution made by Burmese farmers. It was principally in operations connected with trading and industry, for which their long association with the Burmese and with the British qualified them, that Indians were active. Only in recent years have Burmese and Indian enterprise become competitive.

167 The successive but variable census reports, the statistics of steamship

[15] Christian, John L., *Modern Burma*, Berkeley, 1942, ch. ix.

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companies, the records kept by Port and Health Officers, and the rare official inquiries into the subject supply the sole (and fragmentary) data regarding Indian immigration. The time of year in which the census was taken; the Indians' suspicious uncooperativeness in the attempt made in 1931 to differentiate between those born in and those born outside of Burma; and the religious rather than racial basis used in presenting census figures until 1921—all have militated against a comprehensive knowledge of Burma's immigration problem. Although in general it may be assumed that until 1931 the Indian population grew continuously in numbers and that its rate of growth exceeded that of the population as a whole, rising in a sixty-year period from some 5 per cent to about 11 per cent of the population of Lower Burma, the rate of increase slackened in the 1920's and in the next decade the numbers actually declined.[16] (In 1921 Indians in Burma as a whole numbered 887,077 of a total population of 13,212,192, and in 1931 comprised 1,017,825 of a total population of 14,667,146.)

Indians in Upper Burma have always been few; in large part they have been concentrated in and around Rangoon and the district of Akyab. On the whole the volume of emigration from India seemed to adjust itself to the conditions of economic prosperity in Burma, but there were also factors in the local situation which suggested periodical and serious maladjustments in the labor supply.[17] The journey from India was short and cheap; the wages in Burma were sufficiently higher than in India to attract an almost inexhaustible stream of Indian labor; and Indian immigration into Burma followed a fairly regular pattern and one largely independent of seasonal movements. The great majority of Indian immigrants were unskilled laborers, who might be called "permanently temporary" in the country. They usually stayed for two and a half to three years at a stretch, returned to India for a period of about six months, and then came back to Burma. Apparently this movement was quite unregulated, most of the workers making their own arrangements for employment and returning to India only for holidays or because they were incapacitated for further work in Burma. Despite the highly transient character of Burma's Indian population, there was a steady increase in the proportion of local-born Indians. In 1940 approximately 40 per cent of the Indians in Burma were believed to have been born in the country.

In 1939, by no means a record year, the port of Rangoon recorded 222,265 immigrants and 178,292 emigrants. While the capital accounted for the bulk of Indian passengers traveling between the two neighboring countries, Akyab, a port engaged in similar traffic, was second only to

[16] Baxter Report, p. 3.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

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167 Rangoon. That same year Akyab received 21,689 incoming and saw 29,107 outgoing. The excess of outgoing passengers has been an annual feature of this port, for, during the harvest, most of the laborers from Chittagong came into the district by land and at the end of the season departed by the sea route.[18]

464 563 In 1931 the male Indian earners in Burma were divided as follows: unskilled and semi-skilled, 206,555; agriculture, fishing and hunting, 140,523; traders and shop assistants, 82,549; craftsmen, 48,305; and clerks, 20,037. A comparative classification of these earners and their working dependents showed that Indians provided 9.4 per cent of the labor force in 1931. In industrial employment there was a decrease between the years 1931 and 1939 in the percentage of Indians employed from 70.1 to 67.5 per cent, although during these same years there had been an increase of 14,557 in the absolute numbers of all earners.[19] Agricultural workers were predominantly indigenous with Indian earners in cultivation no more than 5.2 per cent of all the male earners; in other occupations the percentages of Indians were very much higher.[20] Indian semi-skilled and skilled laborers represented about half of all the male laborers, and the part played by Indians in the working life of Rangoon was overwhelming. Over 90 per cent of all male earners in the capital were in the four categories of clerical workers, craftsmen, unskilled and semi-skilled, traders and shop assistants, and for every indigenous male worker there were five Indian male earners; in unskilled and semi-skilled labor there were ten Indians for every indigenous income-earner; in crafts, more than two Indians for every native craftsman; and over five Indian traders and shop assistants for every indigenous counterpart.[21]

Chinese

167 563 In 1931 Chinese immigration into Burma totaled 193,594, of whom more than 60,000 lived in the Shan and Wa States along the China border. They constituted only 1.3 per cent of Burma's total population but the large concentration of this racial element in the same regions as the Indians made the impact of aliens appear more obvious to the indigenous peoples.

In Rangoon the Chinese formed a large and important trading group. In 1941 they were estimated to number 22,759 males and 13,797 females, representing an increase of more than 6,000 over the figure reported in the 1931 census—undoubtedly as a result of the construction of the Burma Road. This increase, coming as it did with the rising tide of Burmese

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[18] *Report on the Public Health Administration of Burma, 1939*, Rangoon, 1940.
[19] Baxter Report, p. 105.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 35.
[21] *Ibid.*

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nationalism, led to fears in the Burmese Legislature that the famous road would induce large-scale Chinese immigration. Completion of the agreement restricting Indian immigration into Burma was to have been followed by an analogous arrangement with China, but this was delayed by Premier U Saw's ill-starred trip to Great Britain. 167 563

By far the greatest proportion of Chinese were engaged in mercantile pursuits, of which perhaps the pawnshop business and the illicit opium traffic attracted the most attention. It was only in the field of mining, where they formed almost a fourth of the total workers so employed, that the Chinese were important as laborers. 464 548

TABLE IV: CHINESE EMPLOYED IN BURMA, 1931

Occupation	*Number of Chinese*	*Percentage of Total Employed in Occupations*
Mining	2,940	23.7
Metals	2,235	10.4
Banking, etc.	1,060	9.8
Hotels, cafés, etc.	7,505	10.0
Trade	38,419	6.9

Although their economic importance far outweighed their actual numbers, as everywhere throughout Southeast Asia, the Chinese in Burma, despite the recent increased tempo of their immigration, remained less of a minority problem than they did in Siam or Malaya (where they formed respectively 21 per cent and 43 per cent of the total population). Their relations with the Burmese were probably the most cordial of any Sino-native relations in the whole region, chiefly because they brought fewer of their women with them (males outnumbered females by a two-to-one ratio) and therefore many married Burmese women and reared their children to regard themselves as Burmese. 563

4

LABOR LEGISLATION AND WORKING CONDITIONS

WHILE BURMA'S LABOR legislation has been almost unaffected by direct action by the laborers themselves, the wage-earners' chief problems received occasional and inadequate legislative attention. Unemployment and intermittent employment, consequences of the seasonal character of so much of the country's production, were long recognized as the major causes of such labor unrest as existed, particularly in Rangoon, but little was done about them. Industrial employment, in the true sense, was pro- 466 [464]

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466 vided largely by British firms which made no attempt to impose hard [177] working conditions. On the whole, such legislation as existed was the result of copying or adapting the British laws most applicable to Burma.

[646] In many ways Burma had a unique labor position in the Far East. Burmese laborers were under less restraint than in many other Oriental countries; a juvenile-labor problem did not exist, and not only was labor represented in the Legislature but separate representation was provided for both Burmese and non-Burmese workers. Freedom of contract existed and wages, although very low, were much higher than those prevailing in [674] China and India. Recognition of the relationship between the seasonal character of rice-farming and the serious prevalence of crime and agricultural indebtedness in Burma stimulated the work of the Rural Reconstruction League and lay behind the State Aid to Industries Policy.

Labor Laws

Much of the labor legislation represented hangovers from the pre-separation regime; the most important were the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1923, the Factories Act of 1934, and the Payment of Wages Act of 1935. Although subsequently some of this legislation was extended to the Shan States, Burma's labor laws were by no means applied evenly [468] throughout the country. This was also true of such labor measures as the Conciliation Boards (set up *ad hoc* to deal with specific strikes and in some instances failing to effect settlements) and the various commissions appointed to study the labor conditions of certain regions and occupations. These latter included the Oilfields Labor Committee, the Rangoon Industrial Committee, and the Immigration Commission. Usually they concentrated on Rangoon's problems, were wholly official in character, and had no representative of labor in their membership.[22] There was no compulsory social insurance or pension schemes for non-government employees, although these were under consideration before the Japanese invaded Burma.

The Factories Act of 1934, superseding a similar act of 1911, widened control over matters affecting the health and safety of workers, reduced the maximum period of daily employment (in which a statutory distinction was made between seasonal and non-seasonal factories) and increased the rates of overtime pay for certain forms of labor. This act, however, applied only to premises where power was used in aid of the manufacturing process and twenty or more workers were employed (excepting rice mills). With reservation it was extended in June 1938 to the Shan States. In 1940 it applied to 1,088 factories.

The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1923 was carried over in Burma

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[22] Rangoon *Times*, July 30, 1939.

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under the terms of the separation agreement. Under this act, a workman might obtain compensation in all cases where personal injury was caused by accidents occurring in the course of employment, provided he had followed the safety rules and had not been guilty of misconduct. It was not necessary, under this act, for the injured workman to prove negligence on the part of the employer and occupational diseases were also covered. The weakness in this legislation lay in the absence of compulsion throughout the field of industrial labor. It did not apply, for example, to employment on the railroads, nor to clerical workers or to employees earning more than Rs. 300 a month. However, as the average unskilled laborer's pay ranged from Rs. 30 to Rs. 45 a month, the act, where it applied, covered the main group. 466

The act was administered by special inspectors in the few existing industrial areas and by the judiciary in other regions. In 1939 industrial units insured under this act included 49 rice mills, 3 oil mills, 12 sawmills, 22 engineering establishments, 7 petroleum refineries, 3 smelting plants, 1 tramway company, 50 mines, and 28 other establishments.[23] The insured units on the whole were larger than those not insured, so that while only 13 per cent of the total were reported as insured under the act, these employed 37 per cent of the country's non-agrarian labor. This act was regarded by the government as a measure of insurance for workmen against factory risks, but it could not fulfil that function until it was also so regarded by the employers, especially those with small labor forces. The best agencies for making the act work would have been the trade unions, but in the years between 1934 and 1940 very few of them assisted workmen in prosecuting their claims.[24] [467]

The Payment of Wages Act was introduced in India in 1935. In 1938 some of its provisions were applied in Burma. This act provided for the appointment of an officer in Burma to inquire into laborers' grievances, particularly the non-payment or irregular payment of wages, deductions of pay for sickness, and the like. Its purpose was to remedy the habit of some employers who persistently withheld wages and arbitrarily imposed fines in order to retain an undue hold over their labor forces but it applied only to employees in factories registered under the act and on the railroads. Restricted as was its application—and there was increasing agitation in the Legislature to have the act extended to cover labor of all categories—matters connected with its enforcement took up an increasing amount of time of the very limited Factories Inspectorate. In 1939, complaints about delayed wage payments were investigated in fifteen factories.[25] One of the greatest obstacles to even a limited enforce- 466 465 000

[23] *Ibid.*, August 23, 1939.
[24] *Ibid.*, September 28, 1940.
[25] *Ibid.*, September 25, 1940.

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[472] One of the greatest obstacles to even a limited enforcement was the number of small concerns which underwent frequent changes of management.

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The war prompted an amendment to the act which was considered highly unsatisfactory by those concerned with promoting progressive labor legislation for Burma. In March 1941 an amendment was proposed to the Legislature to do away with the legal restrictions imposed on wage deductions on the ground that many applications had been received by railroad and commercial employees requesting a deduction from their wages for investment in war-savings schemes, and the current act prevented acceding to this request in the case of employees receiving less than Rs. 200 a month. The ostensible object was that of "encouraging thrift among that class of employees which ordinarily had no provident fund or pension to anticipate, and also to give individuals with limited income an opportunity to aid voluntarily in the prosecution of the war."[26] One Burmese legislator asked that the public be circularized on this amendment, which he regarded as dangerous from the laborers' viewpoint in that it contained no time limit for the operation of its provisions. It was unlikely, he said, that such a poor class of employees—who could hardly support their families—would be able to make a contribution to war funds. Further, it gave the employers, "in whose interests the present war is being waged," power to coerce their employees into subscribing.

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The war inspired interest in labor legislation, but more in discussion than in actual accomplishment. An Industrial Labor Committee, appointed in October 1939, enjoyed a wider scope than had its predecessors; its competence included the maistry (contractor-overseer) system, rates of payment, hours of work, regularity of employment, and the extent to which the principles embodied in the Factory and Payment of Wages Acts could be applied to those categories of labor theretofore excluded. The committee also branched out to study the problems of labor's indebtedness, housing, medical care, holidays, and provident funds.

The appointment of this committee, the range of questions it was to study, and the fact that it solicited expressions of public opinion, were regarded as big steps toward official recognition of the importance of more complete labor legislation. Just after its appointment was announced, the president of the All-Burma Labor Federation asked the Premier for legislation assuring a minimum wage, unemployment insurance, a housing program for laborers, the appointment of a Labor Commissioner for Indian Workers, the complete enforcement of the Payment of Wages Act, and the decasualization of labor.[27] In a letter

[i.e., of the payment of wages act -- Analyst]

[26] *Ibid.*, March 19, 1941.
[27] *Ibid.*, July 16, 1939.

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addressed to the Commerce Department, the Federation went even further and asked for representation on the Railroad Board, the Corporation of Rangoon, the Rangoon Development Trust, the Commission for the Port of Rangoon, and the Burma Board of Film Censors. While the government was not prepared to accede to such a program, this request sketched the foundation of a far more complete labor code than the skeleton legislation which then existed. 466

Pending settlement of the major labor problem—the restriction of Indian immigration, under investigation by the Baxter Commission—the government announced its intention of introducing two interesting labor bills.

The first, the *Industrial Disputes Settlement Bill,* drafted by a private member of the Legislature, was considered in the Lower House during April 1941. The increasing number of strikes in Burma had made it apparent that some better machinery must soon be established to handle such disputes. The existing law stopped short at conciliation, and there was need to give the Conciliation Boards set up for the settlement of individual strikes the power of compulsory arbitration. Burma was experiencing more and more of the lightning type of strikes so prevalent in Malaya: the strikers often stopped work before formulating their demands, and then disavowed their chosen representatives if immediate satisfaction was not forthcoming. The bill now introduced was modeled after that of Bombay, with a larger maximum penalty against employers but no change in the penalties incurred by laborers. The two main objects of this measure were to prohibit strikes and lockouts during conciliation and to achieve legal recognition of trade unions. Unfortunately, discussion concentrated on the advisability of adopting the Bombay Act, which was an elaborate measure designed specifically for that city's highly concentrated mill industry and hence unsuited to Burma. It required, for its working, a large staff of officials who were not available in Burma. While the U Saw Ministry could hardly object to a bill favoring the amicable settlement of labor disputes, the Premier asked for its withdrawal pending the introduction of an analogous measure which his government intended shortly to draft. 466 468

The second bill, the *Burma Shops Bill* of 1940, was accepted by the Legislature in its underlying principle of regulating hours, but the practical difficulties facing its application in a country with such varied occupations, such regional differences, and so many types of family labor, were at once recognized. In mining, for example, Chinese coolies were said to prefer the tribute system—where earnings depend on the amount of ore extracted and on the world market price—a sort of piecework system which permitted them to regulate their own hours of work. On the other hand, the employees of the big European companies at Namtu and Bawdwin generally worked a regular eight-hour day. In the jails, where 466

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466 agriculture and trades were taught, a maximum nine-hour day was enforced, but no compensation was paid for this type of work. Under the maistry system, indirect payment was the rule, though the end of this type of intermediary was clearly in sight.

Thus, prior to the Japanese occupation, the government under stimulus of war pressure was working to fill some of the worst gaps in its rudimentary labor code. But the actual legislation achieved was so sketchy and so unevenly applied that only the limited degree to which Burma was industrialized and the existence of comparatively good working conditions in the country prevented Burma from being one of the labor sore-spots in Southeast Asia.

Working Conditions

167 464 *The Maistry System.* The official recruiting of Indian laborers in India came to an end early in the twentieth century when the government found the flow of Indian immigration sufficiently spontaneous for its needs. Even as recently as 1939 there was no evidence submitted to the Baxter Commission that pointed to any direct recruitment in India of laborers for private enterprises in Burma, although assisted passages were arranged on a small scale by gang maistries (labor contractors with varying functions) and at times shipping-company agents played up job possibilities in Rangoon to encourage Indians to emigrate. For many years the supply of labor in Rangoon, at least, seems to have been appreciably in excess of normal requirements.

In 1939 employers in industrial establishments were asked to make a specific report in regard to their laborers recruited from outside of Burma. Only forty-one establishments returned replies. These indicated that the total number of their employees of all races especially recruited amounted to only 549 skilled and 1,938 unskilled workers.[28] Even these small numbers may have been an exaggeration, as some firms interpreted the question as applying to all their employees not born in Burma. Meager as were these data, they tended to confirm the conclusions reached in the 1934 inquiry: the number of workers in Burma especially recruited formed quite an insignificant proportion of the labor force there; Indians made their own individual arrangements for work in Burma, and were replaced in most cases by other Indians having some link with a particular industrial establishment.

445 464 If the maistry had practically disappeared as a recruiting agent, he still survived as a labor contractor and foreman. His importance, however, had declined and he no longer contracted for the entire care of a certain commodity—paddy, for example—from the time it arrived at the

[28] Baxter Report, p. 75.

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mills till it was shipped on cargo boats. In most contracts no mention was made of the number of workmen required, the maistry simply agreeing to supply those needed. A sum was usually deposited by the maistry with the firm as security, to be forfeited if he failed to live up to his pledge. In most cases he made an agreement with one or more gang maistries, who did the actual rounding up of coolies. The maistry controlled his laborers through the time-honored devices of advancing money for trips, debts, illnesses, and the like. The maistry either paid wages lower than those given him for the purpose by the employer, or took a commission on the wages, or both. In 1928 the maistry's profit amounted to anywhere between 6 per cent and 12 per cent. Cuts on food distribution were usually the province of the sub-maistry. 445 464

When originally introduced, the maistry system[1] had the advantage of assuring labor supply and relieved employers of the irksome administrative work dreaded by unilingual Europeans. With time it became apparent that the system not only worked malignantly in the economic sphere but also aggravated Indo-Burmese racial antagonism. Burmese were handicapped because they had no head maistries with capital who could make contracts directly with shippers for the transport of such commodities as teak, coal, and salt—the traditional monopolies of Indian laborers. Indian head maistries were in a position to finance their own coolie gangs and were preferred by some employers in order to avoid the nuisance of day-to-day advances. Most maistries preferred Indian laborers because they were more docile about submitting to their exactions.[29] [563]

Obviously the indirect system of payment was open to very serious abuse, but employers who tried to pay their coolies themselves found they could not wholly uproot the system, for a well-established maistry seemed able to continue to receive his traditional percentage. [177]

Wages. Wages varied not only with the type of employment, but also regionally and racially. Despite the labor unrest of 1938 and 1939 and some wage rises, no upward trend in the wage scale was noted during the years preceding the Japanese occupation. 465

In mining, wages were about twice the income of an agricultural laborer. Burmese laborers in the oilfields received between Rs. 30 and Rs. 45 a month. Among the Chinese miners the tribute system prevailed, and earnings depended upon the amount of ore extracted and the prices for tin, tungsten, etc., in the world market. Although the Chinese were notoriously industrious and liked to work on their own initiative, no case was reported of their average earnings exceeding Rs. 50 per month.

More detailed information is available on wage payments in the port of Rangoon. Stevedore and foreshore coolies were organized and remunerated on a different basis. The former made their contracts directly 445 465

1 [i.e, use of labor contractors -- Analyst]

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 83.

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with head maistries who distributed work among gang maistries who, in turn, controlled and distributed wages paid to individual laborers. The greater part of this work was arranged for on the basis of a daily wage ranging from Rs. 1 to Rs. 12, which had been fixed by a Conciliation Board after the Coringhi riots of 1930. This rate was apparently maintained for work which coolie gangs received direct from other maistries to fill in the gaps between their regular periods of employment. Settlements occurred every two to three months between the stevedores and the head and gang maistries. Head maistries usually got advances for the stevedore groups once a month, normally about 50 to 60 per cent of the full amount owed them. As a result of this indirect system of payment, the wages of laborers were always in arrears, sometimes for several months, and it was generally believed that the head and gang maistries retained a margin for themselves, although little definite evidence on this subject has been available.

Arrangements made for the employment of foreshore labor followed a different system. For the handling of goods once landed upon the wharf, the foreshore head maistries made contracts directly with the shippers of goods. Most of these contracts were expressed in terms of piece rates rather than the daily wage basis. The head maistries then made their own subcontracts with gang maistries, who in turn engaged the laborers and paid them on piece rates. In this foreshore work, laborers might get more regular employment, amounting to 20 to 25 days a month during the busy season and 14 to 15 days during the slack period. The normal rate of wages worked out at an average of about 9 annas a day. Baxter believed that "nowadays dock laborers are more generally aware of their rights and of the exact sums due them, and such abuses as still exist are not on the same serious scale as they were in former years."

Payments made to agricultural laborers seem generally to have been more in kind than in cash. The Searle Inquiry of 1934 established the fact that groups of local harvesters in Lower Burma worked on the same terms as the Indian gangs. The most usual form of remuneration was a percentage—usually a tenth—of the crop reaped. It was found that payments were sometimes made by area—that is, Rs. 2 per acre were paid, plus subsistence rations—or even the daily wages of 6 annas. A more recent report indicates that an agricultural laborer would receive seven months' board and 100 to 140 baskets of paddy, and for the remaining five months of the year he would return to any handy employment in his village or work on roads for the government.[30] The standard wage for road work or forest labor was 12 annas per eight-hour day.

Baxter found that the remuneration received by Indians for heavy

[30] Andrus, J. R., *Rural Reconstruction in Burma*, Bombay, 1936.

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Baxter found that the remuneration received by Indians for heavy labor was slightly lower than for Burmese, where the two were comparable, but that it was much the same in skilled and semi-skilled occupations.[31] This was attributed to the differences in the living standards of the two racial groups. In almost all cases the Indians had left their families in India and lived very cheaply, crowded together with twenty-five or thirty of their fellow-workers, with food and lodging provided by the gang maistry at a low contractual rate, or arranged for by the coolie gang itself. It is a sad commentary upon the poverty of southern India that such low wages were sufficient to induce large numbers of Indians to leave their villages and families for two or three years at a time and engage in hard, monotonous labor with disciplined regularity in order to remit such small pittances to their homes. The equivalent wage was accepted by Burmese only as a last resort and in such a spirit of revolt that it led periodically to violent outbreaks. Employers long recognized that among the agricultural and laboring classes the living standard of the Burmese was appreciably higher than the Indian. The former insisted on living with his family at some distance from his work, even when free lodging was provided with his fellow-workers. 511 465 167 563

Restrictions upon Indian immigration had been opposed by employers in Burma. They claimed that since the Burmese had shown himself disinclined to forms of labor which require exhausting mechanical effort, he should not object to the Indians performing such tasks. However many of the types of work to which the Burmese objected were performed in other countries by animals or machines. One Rangoon employer testified before the Baxter Commission that a demand for increased wages from a completely Burmanized labor force, protected by immigration restrictions, would simply lead to mechanization. The day of the Indian coolie gang seemed, even before the war, to be nearly over. It had never been efficient, and as wages tended to rise it became increasingly profitable to introduce machinery. From the purely Burmese viewpoint the quicker the country was mechanized the better it would be for the indigenous peoples who, being handy with machinery, would in all probability replace a large number of unskilled Indian laborers. 167 464 [401]

Fines. The data amassed by the Labor Department in regard to fines are very incomplete. Out of the 1,088 factory managers to whom the Department submitted forms for the prescribed return of fines and deductions in 1940, only 36 answered in the affirmative. No reply was received from 140 and 912 blanks indicated that that number of establishments had not fined their employees during the year. 465

Hours of work. Under the Factories Act, a statutory distinction was drawn between the maximum hours to be worked in seasonal and non-seasonal industries: 60 a week in the former, and 54 in the latter. Work- 466

[31] Baxter Report, p. 53.

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466 ing hours in rice and sawmills, which together comprised nearly 80 per cent of the premises coming under the act, remained generally at the maximum allowed, according to the Labor Department's report for 1940. Rice mills usually worked continuously throughout a 12-hour milling period. The provision that machinery attendants must take rest intervals was found hard to control by the Labor Inspectors. Continuous-process factories worked on three 8-hour shifts, resulting in a 48-hour week for many workers. This was also generally true for those employed in the heavy industries. Engineering works varied between a 44- and a 54-hour week. Cotton gins continued to work the full 60-hour week allowed for seasonal factories.

[464] The existence of so many small scattered mills made enforcement of working-hour regulations very difficult, but in the late 1930's the number of inspectors under the Factory Act had been increased and consequently the effectiveness of this limited legislation had improved.[32] Another major difficulty was the prevalence of part-time employment: many more persons were employed in part-time handicrafts than in factory industries proper.

The strongest demand for maximum-hour legislation came from urban workers. When the Burma Shops Bill came again before the Lower House in 1941, it was found that one of the major demands from the Shop Assistants Aid and Welfare Society was for a weekly holiday. While many employers had already voluntarily agreed to this, it was not the general practice, especially on the part of small employers.[33] At this time the Society solicited public cooperation, asking people not to shop on Sundays.

[527] In agriculture, working hours depended upon seasons and crops but probably averaged somewhat less than in the temperate zone. Holidays were frequent, especially during the full moon, so that there were seldom more than twenty-four working days per month.

464 *Women, children, and adolescents.* In 1940 the daily average of women
462 employed in factories, as defined under the Act of 1934, was 11,770. The average was about the same for the preceding years and the type of employment remained unchanged. Perennial factories, such as those manufacturing matches, hosiery, and rubber shoes, provided regular employment for many. In the districts casual coolie work in the rice mills was frequently carried out by women and during the cotton season many women found work in sorting kappas (cotton lint) and at the gins. The younger women in farming families generally found part-time employment in such industries as cheroot-making. The wages paid to women

[465] were about three-fourths of those for men. Since 1937, the law forbids that women be employed in underground work of the mining industry.

[32] Rangoon *Times*, November 10, 1939.
[33] *Ibid.*, February 20, 1941.

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that women be employed in underground work of the mining industry.

The Factory Act of 1934 for the first time made special provisions regarding the employment of adolescents (16 to 17 years of age) and reduced the maximum period of their daily employment from 6 to 5 hours. The Labor Department did not give its official blessing to the figure of 937 adolescents (as compared with 1,038 in 1939) as being industrially employed in 1940 on the ground that the classification was inaccurate and that many were listed as adolescents who should rightly have been classed as adults.

According to the same report the employment of child workers was not extensive in 1940 and was confined mostly to light sawdust removing in mills and to kappas-sorting in cotton gins. These children were usually brought to the factories by their relatives who also worked in the same mill. No serious abuses were brought to light—at least officially—over a long period of years. In the last year before the war, a total of 120 children, compared with 94 in 1939, were industrially employed.

Health and safety conditions. Prior to enforcement of the Factories Act of 1934, little had been done to provide medical assistance to factory laborers except in three or four big factories where there was a resident doctor. In some of the more important units a visiting doctor came occasionally, but he was said to pay little attention to the coolies because of the linguistic difficulties of communication; in the small factories no doctors came at all.

After 1934 the enforcement of health and safety provisions under the Factories Act became one of the major functions of the Labor Inspectorate. According to the Department's report for 1940, the standards required by the Act appeared to have been generally complied with by the larger firms, although reasonable allowances had to be made for jungle conditions in many areas. The smaller firms, especially those engaged in mining operations, were most open to criticism; in many such cases the owners seemed to be totally unaware of any responsibility in the matter. The tribute system and the generally fatalistic outlook of Orientals were not conducive to the reduction of accidents, and admittedly the understaffed Inspectorate had to neglect the most isolated mines. In 1940 inspectors visited a total of 918 out of Burma's 1,088 factories.

In 1940 the Inspectorate attested to the conscientious attempt on the part of many factory owners to comply with the Act's safety regulations but claimed that the greatest difficulty lay in keeping the safeguards in working order, once they had been installed. This was attributed less to the ill-will and negligence of owners than to the frequent changes in factory managements and to the lack of adequate supervision in many of the mills.

The number of persons fatally injured as the result of factory acci-

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[165] dents in 1940 was six—the lowest figure for some time past; the average
466 during preceding years had been 18. However, 388 persons (compared with 331 in 1939) sustained serious accidents and 1,942 (1,753 in 1939), minor injuries. Rice-milling had the lowest accident rate, although
[686] such mills gave more trouble than others over fencing irregularities. In 1939 and again in 1940 there was an increase in the number of prosecutions. Convictions were obtained in the cases of 108 persons (compared with 82 in 1939), and fines totalled Rs. 3,996—the highest fine being Rs. 150 and the lowest Rs. 5. The Inspectorate reported that the courts were generally inclined to take a lenient view of such offenses.

Housing. Reports regarding the housing of workers differed radically from location to location. The Labor Inspectorate claimed in 1940 that the housing for industrial workers was on the whole adequate. The Inspectorate had no jurisdiction over the residential quarters connected with factories, and employers were under no legal obligation to house their laborers. In rural areas the problem was not acute. Housing depended largely upon the existence of villages adjacent to the factory site. Some of the larger firms, especially the mining companies in isolated areas, provided adequate quarters, i.e., pseudo-military barracks, and seasonal laborers were often furnished with huts.

466 In Rangoon the problem was totally different. The housing situation was undoubtedly connected with the unenviable health record of that city.
[164] In 1937 it had the highest incidence of tuberculosis of any urban area in the world. Rangoon's industrial workers, without employer-provided accommodation, usually lived in very crowded tenements, often managed
362 by a maistry who made profits by overcrowding them so that many workers slept outside in the streets except during the rains. One cause of the abnormal social conditions was the great difficulties which married laborers experienced in finding family accommodation, and, as the majority were Indians, caste prejudices further complicated the situation. The Rangoon Development Trust was engaged in various schemes for comprehensive housing, and the provision of low-cost living quarters was urged fairly consistently by various organizations, but no appreciable change occurred between the period when Bennison reported in 1928 and when Baxter gave his devastating testimony in 1939:

> In Rangoon I have been shocked and saddened to see under what grievous disabilities a large portion of the laboring population of the capital lives. Housing conditions are often squalid in the extreme. . . . As Indians constitute an overwhelmingly large part of the manual workers in Burma, it is mostly they who endure the misery and degradation inexorably resulting from the conditions above-mentioned. One can only hope that the public conscience may soon be quickened into taking steps to improve the lot of the unfortunate, which is a reproach to all concerned. Meanwhile it may be safely said that conditions in certain fields of employment, especially in Rangoon,

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are such that few Burmans would contemplate entering them. They could not live on the wages paid nor in the conditions imposed without sacrificing their self-respect and abandoning ways of decent living to which they are accustomed and which they rightly regard as necessary to the maintenance of a simple but humanly dignified life.[34] 466 362

Unemployment. Intermittent employment has been one of the major causes of unrest in Burma. Although this was more characteristic of Rangoon than of the rest of the country, the periodic underemployment of rice farmers was closely associated with the country's unenviable crime record. 464

Of the 1,027 factories which in 1940 worked throughout the year, 966 were classed as perennial and 61 as seasonal. The latter comprised principally cotton gins, sugar factories, and rubber plantation factories; rice-milling, though subject to seasonal variations, could not have been called a truly seasonal industry. The data supplied to the Baxter Commission indicated considerable variation in the number of workers registered as in full employment during the active season (February) and the slack period (November); the difference amounted to more than 30,000 workers.[35] An analysis of the figures, however, revealed that seasonal variations in the employment of all skilled workers was comparatively slight. For them the slowest season represented a decrease of only 4.2 per cent as compared with the average, whereas in the busy season the percentage rose to 2.9 per cent above the average.

The general impression conveyed by this inquiry as to the comparative stability in the volume of seasonal employment had to be modified when it came to individual industries. The large numbers of workers engaged in the services listed as public administration, as well as those in sawmilling, oil winning, and to a lesser extent in the exploitation of other minerals, were largely unaffected by serious seasonal disturbances. On the other hand, there were violent fluctuations in the number of workers employed in the rice and cotton mills, especially in the categories of skilled workers. In rice mills alone, there was a difference of approximately 25,000 workers engaged in the slack and in the busy seasons, which accounted for about five-sixths of all the truly seasonal employment in Burma. The newer and less well developed cotton mill industry was carried on with even greater proportionate fluctuations, but, as the total numbers affected were small compared with other industries, the consequences were less disturbing. However, even in this industry about 300 skilled and 1,400 unskilled workers were laid off during the slack season.

An inquiry made by the Baxter Commission in regard to the racial composition of the jobless workers during the slack season disclosed that

[34] Baxter Report, p. 108.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

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464 20,000 out of the 25,000 unemployed unskilled workers and 2,000 of the skilled laborers in the rice mills were Indians. Therefore, fully two-thirds of the workers affected by seasonal unemployment were Indians associated with the one industry of rice-milling. This appeared to be the most serious aspect of the problem; compared with it, unemployment in the cotton mills, metalliferous mines and other enterprises were subsidiary local problems. A mitigating feature, however, was the large number of alternate employments open to the Indians, such as work on the railroad, in the quarries, as rice-bag carriers, as ricksha-pullers, or as bazaar coolies. In addition, a certain number returned every year to India for a holiday. In the rural districts as a whole, there was probably no very acute unemployment problem among the Indian immigrants.

In Rangoon, however, the unemployment problem was acute, both among the immigrant Indians and among the Burmese intelligentsia. Decasualization of the labor at Rangoon port had long been recognized as a problem but no attempt was made to solve it despite its connection with race riots and strikes throughout the 1930's. The Royal Commission sent out to India to inquire into industrial labor conditions visited Burma's capital in 1929–30 and recommended a more equitable distribution of employment, a system of registering dock labor under the port of Rangoon authorities, and the direct payment of wages to laborers. Almost a decade elapsed, however, before the problem was seriously tackled.

The Baxter Commission, finding that no accurate statistics were available as to the number of workers employed at the port, took the figure of 12,000 to 15,000, arrived at by the Searle Inquiry of 1934, as still approximately exact. This Commission found remarkable unanimity expressed by witnesses: that even the regular coolie gangs at the port could not count on more than eleven to thirteen days' work per month at normal wage rates, with perhaps three or four extra days at lower rates of pay during the busy season (November to May, with the maximum reached in February and March). During the slack season, according to the testimony, there were only nine or ten days of work in the month for casual laborers. As in the rural regions, there were alternate employments. [494] The principal part-time occupation was rickshaw-pulling, but in 1939 the number of licenses granted for rickshaws was further reduced by 500, making the maximum number allowed 2,500 (from 4,137 in 1934), reducing substantially the amount of labor required for that supplementary occupation.

It was "abundantly clear" to Baxter that Rangoon dock laborers, almost entirely immigrant Indians, suffered from persistent underemployment; the general opinion expressed to his Commission was that the bulk of the port's work could be carried on satisfactorily by a body of quasi-permanent, registered laborers, augmented during the busy season by casual laborers. Baxter's recommendations, embodying in substance

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those of the Royal Commission, were finally incorporated into the Rangoon Dock Laborers Registration Bill, 1940, which was introduced into the Burmese Senate during the spring session of the following year and promptly referred to a Select Commission. There was at the time no indication whether the employment bureaus, also recommended by Baxter, were going to materialize. 464

One employment bureau was set up in Rangoon in 1939, but its function was simply to provide a liaison between the university student and a prospective employer. Probably the attempt was made to solve the unemployment problem for this class because the political implications were clearer and its victims more vocal. If the Indians in Burma had confined their competition with the Burmese to the lowest stratum of the labor market, the racial antagonism that developed between them would not have come to the fore so early or so acutely. However, the invasion by the Indians of white-collar positions, both in urban private employment and in government service, accentuated a problem which in the case of the Burmese had its roots in the educational system of the country. 563 464

After the founding of Rangoon University in 1921, the character of Burmese education changed radically, and with it the economic set-up. Formerly, Buddhist Burma emphasized universal, male, primary education, achieving widespread literacy of a sort but neglecting higher education. The British introduced a distinctly literary form of secondary education which created a plethora of degree-holders prepared only for the overcrowded legal profession and for government service. Vast sums were spent on creating a stereotyped educational system to the neglect of technical training—a crore of rupees was the annual average for the Department of Public Instruction as against about 11 lakhs for the Department of Agriculture. From the group so educated came many of Burma's obstructionist politicians. The educational system failed to develop a widespread, informed opinion in Burma. This lack largely neutralized the benefits the country might have derived from the measure of self-government meted out to it. 177 873 464 [874] [208]

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ORGANIZED LABOR

RURAL LABOR, both Burmese and Indian, was totally unorganized before the war, except for the type of activity animating the Thakin party, which, in affiliation with the All-Burma Cultivators League and the 467 665

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[665] Pongyis Association, displayed Soviet symbols and subscribed to a radical creed. The interest of these groups, as well as of the Burmese nationalists generally, in the country's rural problems lay far more in a redistribution of the land than in improving the conditions of work for agricultural laborers. The appointment of an Agent by the Government of India in 1939 theoretically safeguarded the interests of all types of Indian workmen in Burma including rural labor, but the inarticulateness of Indian workers at the time of the immigration-restriction discussions suggested that they had made no appreciable progress toward becoming an organized group. The fact that rural labor in Burma is composed of small, scattered groups militated against its effective organization; it was significant that the major non-urban strike in Burma occurred in the oilfields where existed the greatest concentration of rural labor in the country.

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[646] Before the war urban labor was organized to the extent that it had its own representatives in the Legislature, where the separate representation of Burmese and Indian labor indicated that apparently the framers of the constitution believed in the essential divergency between the interests of the two groups. Yet U Saw, when negotiating the Indian restriction agreement, piously proclaimed his government's concern to improve the conditions of labor for Indian as well as Burmese industrial workers.

What retarded the development of such embryonic labor movements as existed in Burma was their preoccupation with political and racial issues. The latter, from the outset, was a particularly complicating feature. It was perhaps significant that, in 1935, the first large-scale strike that occurred in Burma was that of Burmese women working in an Indian-owned hosiery factory. Most of the subsequent attempts to treat labor problems on their own merits foundered on the reef of local racial antagonisms. At the first big labor conference held at Rangoon on the eve of the Second World War, more Indians than Burmese attended and, in consequence, an Indian president was elected, to the dissatisfaction of the less-experienced and less-organized Burmese present. Conscious of the possibility that this dissatisfaction might provoke the usual breakdown of all such attempts to create a common labor front, and also to divert Burmese workers from their deep-rooted attitude toward Indians as alien competitors, the new Indian president threw the entire blame for labor's plight in Burma on British imperialism and capitalism.

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467 How much further Indians were advanced in labor-organization techniques was shown by the formation of many new unions among Indian workers in 1939–40. In August 1939, a union was formed among Indian shipping laborers; in March 1940, the Tamil Labor Union was organized; in April 1940 that of the Indian dock laborers; and in June 1940 both the Indian employees of the Rangoon Electric Tramways and the ricksha-pullers formed their own unions. In 1941 the various unions

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composed of Indian laborers sent a resolution to the delegates who were then negotiating the immigration agreement to the effect that the opinions emanating from the Indian Chamber of Commerce in Rangoon did not reflect the views of the Indian laboring class in Burma, which alone should be consulted on all matters affecting them.[38] In August 1941 another effort was made in Rangoon to unite the various Indian and Burmese organizations into a Rangoon Federation of Labor. 467

The racial antagonism which obstructed the chance of real solidarity among the country's labor forces was inevitably mixed with politics, and both affected the development of unions and collective bargaining. The close association between the struggle for political and economic independence was made clear by the increase in the number and violence of strikes in Burma after its separation from India. The most significant strikes of the prewar years were those of the Burmese employees of the Burma Oil Company—later the subject of a special inquiry—strikes which if not actually political in origin were made the subject of political dispute in the Legislature. The anti-Indian riots of 1938 were preceded and followed by a series of strikes. 467 563 665 468

It was a curious but understandable phenomenon that transport workers throughout Southeast Asia had generally been the first to organize strikes. In Burma the Rangoon Electric Tramway employees struck in April 1938, and again, with greater strength, in October 1940, so that transit in the capital was paralyzed for some time. A conciliation board was appointed just in time to prevent the unrest from spreading. While this board required a month to effect a settlement, prompter government action resolved a subsequent strike by the laborers at the Duneedaw plant of Steel Brothers. Numerous other strikes in Burma's sawmills and match factories were handled efficiently by the Labor Commissioner and his staff. While this series of strikes was partly a result of war conditions and the rising cost of living, and partly of the general breakdown in authority recognized for some time throughout Burma (notably in the growing lack of discipline among school children), it may be attributed principally to the failure of Burmese labor to organize itself and to keep clear of political entanglements. Most of the strikes had apparently little to do with the wage scale and had little effect on them. An exception was the sawmill strike of April 1941, which had to do more clearly with labor issues, including such demands as the release of arrested union leaders. 468 [178]

Ba Maw and Thein Maung, in two remarkably candid addresses made at a labor meeting held in Rangoon in July 1939, stressed these deficiencies in Burma's labor movement and analyzed their cause. Ba Maw claimed that labor in Burma lacked organization, interested leadership, 467 665

[38] Rangoon *Times*, June 17, 1941.

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467 and experience in hard and practical bargaining, and for these reasons it
665 had so far produced only negative results.[87] Unfortunately for the value of his argument, Ba Maw used this occasion to tilt at the Ministry in power. The recent labor agitation, particularly the strikes in the oilfields, had shown the grave dangers of unscrupulous party and personal exploitation to which labor in Burma had been exposed. He emphasized the urgency of forming genuine unions which would devote themselves exclusively to labor questions and keep clear of politics. Such unions, he said, should concentrate on obtaining the right kind of labor laws and give up their habit of shouting slogans and political abuse.

6

POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS

467 SINCE THE END of the war, the labor movement has made far greater advances economically and politically in Burma than in any other coun-
[468] try in Southeast Asia except Malaya. The reasons for this are the progress made by organized labor before the war; the greater self-confidence
668 of Burma's leaders who enjoyed nominal independence and gained greater administrative experience during the Japanese occupation; and the more liberal policy of a metropolitan government committed to supporting the advancement of organized labor. The British, however, have been influenced by the merging of labor with the independence movements under the aegis of the Communist leaders of the Anti-Fascist League (AFL). Strikes have occurred and continue to occur in spite of the presence of a British adviser sent to Burma for the purpose of fostering the growth of trade unionism, largely because the workers' demands combine legitimate labor grievances with political objectives, which, to the British, are impossible. Unionism has developed but within the framework of the AFL, which guides its growth to better effect a sociopolitical revolution similar to that desired by the Malay and Indonesian nationalists. A unique development in Burma is that of the peasants' unions; these have no parallel in other areas of the region.

467 There is no evidence that labor unions have expanded in Burma as
668 the result of any large, spontaneous demand on the part of the country's
563 workers. Divergent nationalisms have prevented the identification, to any marked extent, of the interests of Burmese laborers with those of the

[87] *Ibid.*, July 25, 1939.

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resident Indians, and, to date, nationalistic political aspirations dominate such unions as exist. Apparently it has not been necessary to resort to forced labor, except in the case of Japanese prisoners, and no serious labor shortages exist despite the curtailment of Indian immigration. The government has not yet resolved this last question, nor has it placed land tenure on a satisfactory basis, or come to grips with the indigenous labor movement. Probably it recognizes that these issues are part and parcel of the whole political problem and cannot be settled apart from it.

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Labor Organization

Shortly after the reoccupation of Rangoon by the British, Burma's leaders met to revive and expand trade unionism throughout the country, both in urban and rural areas. In May 1945, labor leaders convened with Thakin Thein Maung, president of the Dobama Asiayone, U Kyaw Myien of the AFL, and other Burmese politicians. Thankin Sein, as chairman of the group, urged all those present to work for such objectives as "the freedom of the world and of Burma."[38] On June 30 of the same year, labor representatives met in the Burmese capital to form an association of trade unionists in Burma; Thankin Ba Hein was elected president of this group.[39] Six days later the *Sun* reported that the Trade Union Congress, which had been started in 1940 under the Indian Trade Union Act of 1926, would begin to function again.

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Than Tun, secretary of the AFL, published on July 8 a statement of the League's policy on trade unions. It was stated that the AFL felt a responsibility for labor unions, that members of unions might meet unofficially, and that the League to date had made no effort to enroll workers as members nor to form labor unions. However workers were welcome to join if they wished to do so provided that the League, after investigation, was satisfied that the candidates were not Japanese spies.

On September 30 a mass meeting of the All-Burma Laborers' Union was held in Rangoon, and resolutions were passed. Most of these resolutions embodied the Union's political objectives: the Union condemned the British White Paper on Burma, stating that "only a national government formed by the votes of the people who are old enough to vote can set up a legislature which, in turn, can draw up Free Burma's Constitution"; urged the transformation of Burma into an industrial country as quickly as possible in order to raise the laborers' standard of living; advocated a reform of Burma's bureaucracy in general and of its public-works program in particular, with special reference to improving the housing of the poor; and proposed the formation of a committee com-

[38] *The Sun*, July 4, 1945.
[39] *New Light of Burma*, July 5, 1945.

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467 prising representatives of the government, the employers, and the labor unions for the purpose of settling amicably all labor disputes and grievances.[40] Officials of the All-Burma Laborers' Union were elected at a meeting held at the premises of the Socialist Party in Rangoon on November 4.

Mass meetings were frequent during the first half of 1946 and new unions were formed, large organizations of laborers generally preceding, or less frequently absorbing, those of a particular trade. In January, Burma's clerks and office workers formed an association which affiliated itself with the All-Burma Trade Union Congress. The following month the post-office workers formed a union and formulated demands for better working conditions. In March the mining laborers of Tavoy met to form a union and agreed to cooperate with the Burma Miners' Association and to present its desires and grievances to the government.[41] The most important of these trade unions was that organized on January 1, 1946, by the civilian workers on Burma's railroads. This union was a new association and not an outgrowth of the nonpolitical, prewar Burma Railroad Union. In February, the newly formed railroad union, whose membership then reportedly totalled about 2,500 members, sent a delegation to the government which demanded a more complete Burmanization of the railroad services and better working conditions. It also decided to affiliate with the All-Burma Trade Union Congress, thereby greatly strengthening that body and the hand of its president, Ba Hein.

[463] An unusual development in Burma's postwar labor movement has been the organization of peasants into unions under political leadership. Cultivators who had attended the All-Burma Trade Union Congress were asked to a special peasants' mass meeting to be convened at Shwedagon pagoda on January 25, 1946. Resolutions adopted at this meeting enjoined upon all workers in Burma the duty of uniting under a single trade-union congress and called upon cultivators throughout the country to join associations which eventually would be merged into an all-embracing Peasants' Union.

467 Organization of the farming class seems to have antedated the British
185 reoccupation of Burma. By January 1946, a central committee of the proposed Peasants' Union was involved in the current rice program, tak-
665 ing an active role under the chairmanship of the Communist leader Than Tun, who was also secretary of the AFL and the nationalists' chief spokesman on agricultural reform. His committee urged that the government remit all rents and taxes payable by the farmers throughout Lower Burma, enact a new tenancy law along the lines of the prewar act but which would take into account the programs formulated by the indi-

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[40] *The Sun*, November 9, 1945.
[41] *New Times of Burma*, March 30, 1946.

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vidual peasants' unions, purchase paddy directly from the cultivators and stop all rice exports, and finally set up an Agricultural Projects Board on which the peasants' unions would be represented to make concrete plans for the 1946–47 paddy season. This program included a host of other proposals designed in general to better the farmers' status in regard to land tenure, credit, housing, relief supplies, education, protection against robbers, and the like. In all these proposals, the peasants' unions were the agencies proposed for cooperating with the government in the execution of this program. 467 185 665

The above proposals of the Central Committee represented the most thorough, constructive, and liberal propositions thus far advanced by any group in the country regarding current agrarian problems. It also indicated the aggressive spirit and competence of the AFL, particularly of its Communist elements, on the question of Burma's agricultural rehabilitation. It is also noteworthy that the committee's proposals constituted a political platform calculated to appeal to the nationalist sentiments as well as to the self-interest of the vast majority of Burma's population and one that should arouse widespread support for the AFL in the forthcoming general election.

Strikes

In the months following the British reoccupation of Burma, the Anti-Fascist League's leaders preferred to concentrate upon the organization of labor before launching a strike program. It was not until early in 1946, some months after the military administration had been replaced by the civil government, that work stoppages were organized on an appreciable scale. 468

The most important of these strikes was the one announced in mid-January by employees of the great prewar import-export firm of Steel Brothers. The immediate cause of this strike was a new policy of the Projects Board which had recently taken over control from individual firms. The strike was precipitated by a reduction in the pay scale from Rs. 42-4-0 to Rs. 19 a month plus a living allowance amounting to Rs. 11-4-0. This adjustment downwards, it was contended, derived from an error made originally by the individual company which had been paying coolies at rates appropriate to artisans and technicians. The demands subsequently formulated by the strikers included restoration of the former pay scale, and the establishment of a conciliation board to resolve the dispute. On the basis of figures submitted respectively by members of the employers' group and of the Trade Union Congress, the board submitted recommendations generally favorable to the strikers but refused to fix over-all wage levels on the ground that a much longer and more thorough investigation was required. On the eve of a settlement,

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468 a snag developed over wage payments during the strike. Eventually the workers accepted half-pay for this period and agreed to return to work on February 18. A few days later a new strike threatened over the dismissal of the strike ringleader by the manager of Steel Brothers. He was shortly reinstated, however, without loss of pay, and the company also allowed other union leaders to enter the workers' premises.

Sympathy for the Steel Brothers strikers and the simultaneous occurrence of strikes and riots in Bombay and Karachi inspired other workers in Burma to threaten work stoppages. In February laborers at the Dalla shipyards, numbering more than 1,350 men, went on strike. Without leadership from their own ranks, they approached the AFL for support and guidance. Workers at the Hong Heng and Foucar sawmills struck almost simultaneously with their colleagues at Steel Brothers. In March employees of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company passed a resolution of sympathy with the Dalla strikers; coolies at the Myingyan wharf struck on March 11. These strikes were followed by others throughout a variety of occupations and eventually culminated in a general strike, unprecedented in Burma's history, which occurred in September 1946. Among the demands for higher pay, larger living allowances, and other improvements in working conditions, several groups of strikers demanded more courtesy and less harshness on the part of their European supervisory staffs. A significant feature of the Dalla shipyard strike was the sympathy for the strikers by the Indian laborers who had been brought in as scabs. Almost immediately they refused to work and had to be replaced by Japanese war-prisoner labor. All strikes received the outspoken sympathy (and in some cases were under the leadership) of the AFL, the All-Burma Trade Union Congress and the Burmese press. In March, Ba Hein, who had emerged during this period as the ranking Burmese labor leader, claimed that labor difficulties were just beginning in Burma: two months previously he had asserted that labor was so well organized under his aegis that he could call an effective nation-wide strike of workers within seven days.

Attitude of the British

Governor Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith was generally sympathetic to Burma's labor movement during his incumbency. A. C. Baker, a labor official from England, arrived in Rangoon on February 21 to help in particular with the Steel Brothers strike and to organize trade unions in general. The local government's chief labor officer, U Kum Zaw, had been active throughout the strike period trying to conciliate the sawmill workers and their employers. But the latter were not receptive to his efforts, probably because he was a Burmese in British employ. At the mass meeting held by the Burma Railroad Union in January 1946, he

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was hissed by the workers even when he announced that the government had sent him to wish the new-born organization success. 468

The recommendations of the government's conciliation board, which was made up of representatives of Steel Brothers, and two delegates of the strikers under the chairmanship of an Indian civil servant, Payton, had a better reception. Throughout the Steel Brothers strike, the government generally showed itself sympathetic to the workers' demands and exercised considerable pressure on the company on behalf of the strikers. In the Governor's Advisory Council, formed toward the end of 1945, a separate department of labor was set up. At this time considerable interest was shown in the Burmese press for a "new deal" for Burma's laborers. The hardships this group had suffered as a result of forced labor during the Japanese occupation were recalled and the government was asked to appoint immediately a committee "to investigate laborers' affairs and to find out the best way of dealing with them."[42] Possibly in response to such a plea, the government set up a Labor Enquiry Commission. [647]

Government's Wage Policy

Shortly after Rangoon was reoccupied by the British, the Civil Affairs Service (CAS/B) of the military administration inaugurated measures to control inflation and, incidentally, the increased wages demanded by local labor. On May 29, 1945, controlled rates of pay for all types of labor were established by Price Control Order No. 3. In general this pay scale was based on the prewar wages that had prevailed in Rangoon. Under its provisions, all laborers were divided into four classes according to the type of work performed, as follows: clerical and supervisory staff receiving pay on a monthly basis; miscellaneous types of labor also paid by the month (chiefly domestic servants); classified artisans earning daily wages; and unclassified manual workers also receiving pay on a daily basis. Each of these four classes was further broken down according to the specific service performed, and a sliding scale of pay within the class established; in practice a living allowance was usually added to the basic wage. Wages paid to women were generally 75 per cent and to children 50 per cent of those paid for male laborers. [458] 465

The hiring of all labor was handled by the CAS/B, which divided Rangoon into four labor areas and registered workers according to occupation. As various requests for labor were received, the registers were checked and appropriate workers assigned. The greatest demand during this period was for artisans and domestic servants; there was little need for clerical workers because of the delays involved in the reopening of 466

[42] *Bamakhit*, December 4, 1945.

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466 business firms and of civil-government bureaus. Enough coolies were registered with the CAS/B to supply the curre[illegible]demand, mostly for dock workers, but many did not appear for work [illegible]hen called up.

465 The daily wage fixed for coolies during the military administration was 10 annas plus a 4-anna living allowance; an additional inducement was later offered in the form of a free monthly distribution of food or clothing items. This proved necessary to attract a sufficient quantity of [674] labor. A major difficulty proved to be the fear of many laborers to leave their homes and families in outlying villages to work in Rangoon because of the danger of dacoit attack during their absence. Another obstacle [362] was the shortage of housing and transportation facilities in Rangoon, as well as the insanitary conditions prevailing in the dock area.

[647] Far more enthusiastic was the response of government servants to the openings offered by the CAS/B. Employers who had been on the permanent staff in 1942 were given three months' full pay and promised half-pay for the remaining time under the Japanese occupation as well as having the established annual increments in salary made retroactive. Also, all officials received a living allowance. These terms, as well as the prestige and permanency associated with government employment, proved sufficient to lure back to duty all permanent civil officials and to offset the inducement of higher pay offered by private concerns.

As a result of the foregoing measures, wages were fairly well stabilized during the military administration. However, the official rates were not strictly adhered to. Usually the maximum allowed within a job category became the usual and not the exceptional rate paid; special privileges, including tips, free food, and priority in commodity distribution, were added. When the Projects Board took over and introduced pay cuts, strikes broke out. The government's policy was, in general, to re-establish wages at the prewar level and then enable laborers to meet inflationary living costs by supplementary allowances.

Racial Aspects of the Labor Problem

167 Primarily because the flow of Indian immigration into Burma has not been resumed on a prewar scale and because the government has not yet 563 formulated its policy on this matter, relations between Indian and Burmese laborers in Rangoon have remained fairly harmonious. The govern- 464 ment has resisted pressure from the Indians to return freely to Burma and from the Burmese to prohibit Indian immigration entirely. The military administration claimed that the 90-per-cent-Indian and 10-per-cent-Burmese labor force employed at the Rangoon docks worked together amicably. Later, under the civil administration, Indians refused to be used as strike-breakers during the Dalla shipyard work stoppage. There have been indications, however, that this truce may last only during the present

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immigration stalemate. Among the resolutions passed at the January 1946 meeting of the Burma National Congress, the government was asked to define its policy regarding Indian immigration. It was simultaneously advocated that percentages of Burmese and foreign labor would be established; that all laborers of any nationality enjoy equal status; that foreign immigration be restricted to requirements and that such as came remain in the country for a definitely limited period; that nonessential alien laborers be refused permission to reside permanently in Burma; and that such immigration as was then taking place be completely stopped, pending issuance of a government policy statement. It is obvious that while Burmans do not want to prohibit completely the immigration of Indian laborers, they do demand that the right to restrict and control it be put into their hands.

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CHAPTER III · MALAYA

1

GENERAL LABOR CONDITIONS

241 464 423 178 PRIOR TO THE DEVELOPMENT of plantation agriculture, no labor problem in the accepted sense existed in Malaya. The growing of rice, coconuts, sago, tapioca, and spices did not create such a problem, for the proprietors themselves worked their lands and harvested the products. The Malays have remained smallholders and in large measure have been unaffected by the rapid development of their country.

[245] 249 464 167 In the early years of this century, sugar was grown on a small scale in the northern states. At one time coffee cultivation promised to compete with the sugar plantations for labor, but a serious blight permanently checked its production. The main labor force for both industries was supplied by indentured laborers from southern India, who were imported by individual planters at their own expense for three-year periods. The only aids given them by the government were the provision in 1890, by the Straits Settlements Government, of a depot at Negapatam (Madras Presidency) where recruits were housed and fed while awaiting shipment; the grant for some years of subsidies to a steamship company; and a limited amount of free transportation. Simultaneously a certain number of free laborers were imported, also at the expense of individual employers, who worked on month-to-month agreements.

With the development of hevea rubber plantations, the defects and inadequacies in the current system of labor supply became apparent. Not only was the cost of importing both free and indentured laborers high and their numbers inadequate, but the general practice of crimping greatly aggravated both aspects of the problem. Dissatisfaction was so widespread that, when a proposal was made in 1906 that all employers of Indian labor be taxed and the proceeds paid into a fund usable exclusively for the purpose of importing Indian labor, it was almost unanimously welcomed and for many years proved highly successful.

445 466 Laborers in India were recruited by *kanganies,* usually foremen on estates in Malaya who were licensed to operate only in their native Indian villages. Their licenses had to be issued, registered, and approved

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by officials of both countries, and the number of recruits they could engage was generally limited to twenty. Effective precautions were taken against commercialized recruiting: the commissions received by the *kanganies* were modest, the laborers they engaged left with the consent of their village headmen, recruits were well cared for en route to Malaya, and they understood the conditions of their future employment. Although the *kangany* system died out in 1938 owing to the increased flow of nonrecruited and unassisted Indian immigrants and to the quota placed by the Indian Government on emigration to Malaya, it had had the advantage of regulating the supply to the demand and of canalizing the recruits to the places where they were most needed. It spelled the end of the indenture system in 1910 (1914 for Chinese and 1932 for Javanese); it permitted the Indian laborer to land in Malaya free of debt and with liberty to leave his place of employment upon giving a month's notice or upon paying the equivalent time in wages. Moreover, the Labor Department hovered paternalistically over the Indian laborer throughout his sojourn in Malaya, regulating his wages, housing, medical care, and repatriation.

No such supervision was exercised over the Chinese laborer, owing to very different political and economic circumstances, as well as to the general Chinese aversion to paternalism. The Chinese emigrated to Malaya on his own initiative, motivated almost wholly by economic considerations, and neither his home government nor that of Malaya did much to ensure equitable recruiting, safe and comfortable transportation, or minimum wages once in the country. In 1914 indentured labor was abolished, for the Chinese and the Labor Code placed a limit upon the debt owed by the laborer to the recruiting agent. Later, during the depression, a quota was placed upon the immigration of Chinese into Malaya. The Chinese Protectorate and various administrative officials "looked after the interests" of Chinese laborers, chiefly by seeing that they did not get out of hand, but as regards wages, conditions of employment, and welfare, the Chinese pretty much looked after themselves.

Taken together with the few thousand Javanese laborers, imported under special arrangements with the Netherlands Indies Government, the Indian and Chinese immigrants were in general numerically equal to the task of developing Malaya economically. But their transience in the country, their remittances to the homeland, their growing consciousness as a labor force, and the resentment their presence and profits were arousing in the Malays, were creating for the government an increasingly serious problem, and one with political implications. Since, by and large, the indigenous population was neither numerically able nor psychologically willing to hire out its services, the country perforce remained dependent upon imported labor, but the government was beginning to recognize the need to stabilize it.

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563 The Indians, by virtue of their country's status as a British possession,
167 were long made subject to agreements between the two governments con-
cerned, but the growth of the nationalist movement in India increased
648 that government's use of its powers to prohibit emigration. Its motives were mainly to improve the economic status of Indians in Malaya and to increase the political privileges accorded to them there. The Chinese Government, preoccupied with internal difficulties throughout the interwar period, never played an analogous role, and it vacillated between condemnation, indifference, and, more recently, a not disinterested solicitude for its overseas nationals. Thus while Indian immigration was better regulated according to Malaya's economic requirements, the conditions successively imposed by the Government of India increased its cost, restricted its availability, and aroused a consciousness of its political and economic power and rights. Chinese immigration was handicapped by no such formal intervention—rather, it was stimulated by conditions in the home country—but nationalism grew apace among the Chinese in Malaya and political factors engendered violence among them. Despite consular representation, the Chinese in Malaya were fairly arbitrarily handled, both as regards immigration quotas and in the maintenance of order.

458 One major factor making for instability in Malaya's labor forces was
largely beyond its government's control, that is, the country's dependence
[435] upon two industries which in turn depended on world conditions. The
restriction schemes for rubber and tin, to which Malaya adhered in order
464 to be cushioned against the rapid alternation of booms with depressions,
did not prevent violent price and quota fluctuations, and these drastically
[167] affected the demand for labor and its wages. The expensive method of repatriating surplus workers during the two interwar slumps solved the problem for neither employer nor employees. Though it was argued that the laborers were returned to their native villages no worse off than when they started, this did nothing to resolve the problem of their employment in their homelands from which they had originally emigrated because of starvation conditions. Moreover, when prosperity returned to Malaya, employers were caught short of labor and the time lag involved in reconstituting their labor forces sometimes proved fatal to industries so highly competitive and so subject to swift change.

563 The need to stabilize Malaya's labor forces was vaguely recognized by
the government and the employer groups, but before war broke out they
167 had not brought themselves to face the issues its solution would have in-
464 volved. Second-generation Indians and Chinese were no longer content to be "second-class citizens," and wanted full political and economic privileges. The granting of both would have outraged the indigenous people and would have abrogated the British tradition of Malay preference. A few Malay nationalists were already calling for a much more restricted

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immigration of alien Asiatics, were violently opposed to the Governor's proposal to permit Chinese to cultivate rice even as a wartime measure, and refused to consider the possibility of opening more widely the civil service to domiciled Chinese and Indians. To meet the acute labor shortage on the eve of the Pacific war, the governments could think only in the time-honored terms of importing other and less troublesome laborers, namely, Javanese, who mixed well with the local Malays and who were docile and did not demand political and economic rights.

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TYPES OF LABOR

Immigrant Labor

Indian. Like the Chinese, the Indians had visited Malaya long before the Europeans came. After the British had established themselves in the archipelago, the Straits Settlements served until 1873 as Indian convict stations, the inmates of which were used to build the first public works, and Indian regiments garrisoned the country. With the opening up of the peninsula, Indian labor was encouraged to emigrate to work both in public and private enterprises; this recruiting in the beginning was carried on under flagrant misrepresentation, and the ratio of women to men was extraordinarily low. The Indians themselves had no voice in such arrangements; they were made between the India Office, the Colonial Office, and the Malayan governments.

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Government control was first exercised toward the end of the nineteenth century through regulations to prevent overcrowding on the ships transporting Indian coolies to Malaya. An inadvertent result of this regulation was that fares rose so far beyond the means of poor immigrants that Malayan employers had to send out their agents to recruit laborers in India, and ship-owners and merchants began professional recruiting on a speculative basis. After Malaya's separation from India in 1867, the government of the latter country exercised a measure of control over emigrants. A commission appointed by it in 1880 to inquire into the status of labor in the Straits Settlements and the Federated States found that the quantity was insufficient partly because of the ineffective methods employed by certain professional recruiters; the quality poor because of the inclusion of nonagriculturists; and the cost heavy because recruiting had become virtually monopolized by a kind of agents' trust. In 1897 all restrictions on emigration from India were removed and it re-

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167 mained uncontrolled so far as the Government of India was concerned until 1922, except for a brief period during the First World War.

464 Meanwhile the Malayan rubber planters introduced a new type of recruiting by *kanganies,* that is, by workers on rubber estates in Malaya who returned to India to recruit additional laborers for their employers. As this system developed, licenses for *kanganies* were required (1901) in order to alleviate the abuses which had grown up. Under the new system coolies were to be employed on a monthly basis and were no longer bound to a particular estate by a contract. Toward the end of 1906, when a rubber boom gave rise to new estate expansion and to a sudden increase in the demand for labor, crimping threatened to undo the good results obtained from *kangany* recruiting. To solve this problem a common recruiting organization was formed in 1907 to be comprised of all planters who used Indian immigrant labor, and an Indian Immigration Fund was established. Three years later the indenture system was abolished.

167 In 1922 the passing of an emigration act in India again brought the emigration of Indians to Malaya under the control of the Government of
466 India and enabled it to impose its terms upon the Malayan governments. A new enactment, built upon the framework evolved by the Indian Immigration Committee, introduced a standard wage for Indian laborers in Malaya; provided for the compulsory education of their children and the payment of maternity allowances to female workers; regulated *kangany* recruiting; and, most important of all, abolished the penal sanctions for breaches of labor contract.

[464] The Immigration Committee was placed in charge of a Malayan civil servant, the Controller of Labor, who represented all official and private interests with the exception of those in Trengganu and levied a cess on all employers according to the number of their Indian labor. This fund covered the expense of bringing Indian laborers to Malaya, the repatriation of those in distress, the maintenance of a home for decrepit Indian workers, and care for the orphans of Indian laborers who had died in Malaya. Collaboration between the Government of India and the governments of Malaya was assured through officials stationed both in India and in Malaya. The Agent for the Government of India in Malaya had supervisory but no executive powers in the country. *Kangany* recruiting was regulated by a license issued by the Malayan Controller of Labor for a specified district in India and for a maximum of twenty recruits. The *kangany* was paid on a commission basis by his employer in Malaya, who, in turn, was remunerated from the Immigration Fund. The Indian immigrant's passage was paid, his medical examination enforced, and his contract explained to him by his village headman. Nonrecruited workers were such emigrants as applied directly for assisted passages at one of the labor depots set up at Negapatam and Avadi in India.

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Before the depression, non-*kangany*-recruited, or voluntary, workers formed an increasing minority among the Indian emigrants to Malaya. In August 1930 assisted emigration was suspended because of the slump in the tin and rubber industries, and subsequently only a few non-recruited workers were given assisted passages to Malaya to enable them to join relatives already established there. By May 1934 the situation of the rubber industry had improved sufficiently for the Government of India to agree, under certain conditions, to resume a limited amount of assisted emigration of nonrecruited workers, thereby generally by-passing the services of *kanganies*. The conditions were aimed to prevent excessive emigration and a possible fall in Malaya's wage rates. They provided that in the first year not more than 20,000 adult males would be assisted to emigrate; that within two years from his entry into Malaya the Indian laborer would be entitled to repatriation for reasons of ill-health, unjust treatment, unsuitable work, or the impossibility of finding employment at standard wages; and, finally, that the emigration commissioner in Madras should supply monthly reports on employment conditions in Malaya.

The end of *kangany* recruiting, which this agreement heralded, had begun even before the depression and was attributable directly to the unfavorable economic conditions existing in southern India and to the policy of the Indian Immigration Committee in Malaya, as well as to the comparatively better working conditions existing there.

In order to introduce into Malaya more than the twenty workers they were legally allowed to recruit, the *kanganies* had been bringing in others who were only nominally voluntary workers. By this device—and also spontaneously—voluntary immigration into Malaya had increased. The policy of the Indian Immigration Committee encouraged voluntary immigration by payment of a $2 bonus to each adult volunteer and of $1 to each of his minor dependents. The result was a complete reversal of the situation prevailing in 1920, when only about 12 per cent of the Indian laborers entering Malaya were nonrecruited: by 1938 their proportion reached more than 91 per cent. Yet the restriction schemes for tin and rubber were cutting down Malaya's need for an unlimited labor force, and many of Malaya's plantations had by this time acquired such an attractive reputation in India that *kangany* recruiting was becoming—as had the indenture system before it—a superfluous expense. By recommending its abolition, the Sastri Report of 1936 sounded the death knell of *kangany* recruiting. Thereafter *kanganies* retained their usefulness only for newly established palm-oil plantations and those estates which had not yet built up their own recruiting grounds in India, and for such laborers as were too poor to pay their traveling expenses to the embarkation camps. Beginning in 1934–35, the Government of India imposed quotas on emigration to Malaya without consulting the governments of

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167 that country but leaving to them control of the numbers to be admitted. In 1938 only 4,580 laborers were assisted to emigrate to Malaya, as com-
464 pared with 54,849 in 1937.

In response to the criticisms of Indian nationalists and to the invitation
466 proffered by the Malayan administration, in 1936 the Government of India sent an experienced and "liberal" investigator, Srinivasa Sastri, to
563 study the situation of Indian labor in Malaya. On the whole his report confirmed the contention of Malaya's planters that the system which they had evolved was highly satisfactory and that their Indian workers were "happy children in a happy land," generally conscious that they were far better off there than they had been in southern India. In visiting various peninsular estates Sastri recorded that no complaints had been made to him of physical violence or compulsion, and that in only one instance did he find evidence of abusive language directed toward a laboring compatriot. The Labor Department, he said, was able and conscientious and he found estate managers on the whole to be a good sort, Tamil-speaking, and with a genuine concern for the welfare of their labor forces. Freedom of movement for laborers was not only laid down by law but well appreciated by the workers themselves, and it had engendered a healthy spirit of independence in them. Sastri saw no reason at the time for prohibiting Indian emigration to Malaya and he recommended minor reforms in a system which, on the whole, he warmly approved. Among his suggestions were elimination of the *kangany* system; improvement in the quarantine depot at Port Swettenham; a better use of the coolie gardens on estates; more supervision for urban Indian laborers; and finally the restoration of wages to the predepression level.

The planting community was naturally delighted with this testimonial, although a few among them thought that the investigation had been carried out in too short a time to be definitive. The Sastri Mission, it turned out, hardly proved to be the deputation to end all deputations, as its sponsors had hoped. Its soothing effect lasted only a few months, and within two years the situation demanded the return of a Malayan delegation to India. The Indian organizations in Malaya and India were hardly pleased by Sastri's report, which they termed too superficial and too favorable to the *status quo*. Sastri was accused of having gone out of his way to grant a certificate of merit to the Malayan administration and employers, and he was further attacked for not having sought an improved status for Indians politically in Malaya. Of immediate concern were the terms on which he recommended continuance of assisted emigration.

167 From the beginning of 1938 Malaya's Labor Department drastically re-
464 stricted the number of assisted immigrants from India and granted free passages only to individuals joining their families and to those returning to employment in Malaya after a holiday at home. As this measure

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proved to be inadequate, a 10 per cent cut in rubber tappers' wages was imposed in the late spring of the year and a second cut was threatened as of August 1, 1938. At the end of 1937 the number of Indian laborers in Malaya totalled 3[illegible],343, compared with 290,395 at the beginning of the year. Although the cause of this increase had been the sudden raising of the rubber quota for the country to 90 per cent, and the ensuing unemployment was attributed to its almost immediate reduction, Malayan authorities maintained that even during the brief period of almost maximum production the labor force available had been excessive. Unemployment during the spring of 1938 affected 30 per cent of the estate workers, besides reducing wages for those who retained their jobs. 167 464

On the ground that such conditions were detrimental to the interests of the vast majority of Indian laborers in Malaya, the Central Indian Association of Malaya (CIAM) sent a cable to India which was thought to have been instrumental in the ban subsequently placed on assisted emigration to Malaya. The CIAM contended that a further unchecked flow of labor into Malaya would further depress wages and worsen working conditions for those already there; they felt that its prohibition would influence Malayan planters to improve the status of laborers still in their employ. A second bill was soon passed empowering the Government of India to stop, if it deemed advisable, the flow of voluntary emigration to Malaya.

The CIAM was the self-appointed Malayan spokesman for nationalist opinion in India, which was becoming increasingly interested in its overseas compatriots. The ever-more-aggressive expression of such interest was resented by Malayan planters; they looked upon the whole issue as a purely economic problem, whereas Indian nationalists regarded it primarily as a matter of national prestige and honor. Some extremists in Malaya took the stand that it was none of India's business, despite the fact that for many years it had been admitted to be such by Malaya's own Labor Department, and it was fairly generally recognized that such reforms as had been locally effected were largely instituted at the Government of India's insistence. 563 648

Although emigration was a subject technically reserved for the Central Government of India, in practice the province of Madras had a good deal to say since its population was principally affected and its government at the time was a Congress administration with strong pro-labor sympathies. India's Congress leaders were viewing with increasing alarm the pro-Malay policy of the Malayan governments, fearing that it foreshadowed an even less liberal attitude toward the Indian immigrant. In India complaints were repeatedly voiced that Chinese laborers were replacing Indians on many Malayan estates, and that the repatriation of shiploads of Indians whenever economic conditions were bad in Malaya was a source of embarrassment to the Madras administration and added fuel to 563 648 167

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563 648 167 [466] the flame of Indian nationalists' resentment. Newspaper articles were written in India dramatically describing the repatriates as "sucked-out oranges" and those still in Malaya as a floating population of "tragic orphans" forced to accept any menial job they could get. Since even the permanently settled Indian population in Malaya was treated as semi-alien and as second-class citizens, the Government of India felt that it had every right to retaliate by refusing to let any more of its nationals go to Malaya. It was but natural, and no evidence of disloyalty, that the Indians in Malaya should look to the government of their homeland for protection and for insistence upon rights denied them in the country of their adoption. That they stood in need of such active vigilance was shown by the Malayan governments' imposition of a wage cut solely at their own discretion and by their tactless refusal to postpone enforcement until the matter could be discussed with India. With the increase in voluntary immigration, a surplus labor force had been built up in Malaya which had now rendered almost ineffective the use of the powers of the Government of India, under the act of 1922, as a bargaining weapon.

Although the ban imposed in June 1938 was ostensibly a temporary measure, designed to check the volume of unemployment in Malaya, the advantageous position in which it placed the Government of India was used in its negotiations with the delegates Malaya sent to India in the summer of that year. The latter were primed to discuss only the wage question, but the talks ranged over such contentious issues as citizenship rights for the local-born Indians, their public representation, their right to form unions, proportionate representation for them in the public services, better facilities for Indian education, the inclusion of Indians in the local defense units, and the like.

167 467 To a certain extent the Malayan delegates recognized that henceforth Indian immigration should be based on terms mutually agreed upon through bilateral treaties, with control exercised by the homeland, and that the whole machinery governing its importation required overhauling. The Malayan Labor Department had indeed succeeded in landing the Indian worker in Malaya a free man, without debts which bound him either to the *kangany* or to his employer, and it had prevented the worst abuses in the employer-employee relationship. But Malaya's labor legislation was still too meager and its enforcement generally too negative. Not even the most ardent Indian nationalist could say that his compatriots were brutally treated in Malaya, but they could justly contend that the Indian laborers there were not a self-reliant, coherent, and organized body. The day of paternalism and favors was drawing rapidly to a close, and the next step was the development among the laborers of sufficient strength to present a united stand for their rights.

648 466 The New Delhi talks ended in a stalemate. The unlikelihood of any imminent increase in the then prevailing 45 per cent rubber quota, and

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the existence in Malaya of a labor supply ample to fill the quota, 648
were largely responsible for the intransigent attitude maintained by the
Malayan delegates. The new planting permitted under the Third Re- 466
striction Agreement would not come into tapping for a number of years,
and by then the children of estate coolies—a numerical potential of from
one-half to two-thirds of the current adult force—would have grown up
into a permanent, domiciled labor supply. If by some miracle the rubber
industry should be permitted to produce to capacity there was always the
possibility of importing Javanese labor or of increasing the Chinese
quota of immigrants. If, and only if, prosperity returned to the industry,
would Malayan planters be inclined of their own accord to make some
improvements in working conditions for laborers, but they would cer-
tainly not do so if the CIAM and the Government of India held a pistol
to their heads. They claimed that those who treated Indian laborers [563]
most unfairly were Asiatic employers and that they should be the first
required to enforce reforms.

After the failure of the New Delhi talks there ensued in Malaya con- 167
siderable discussion as to the advisability and feasibility of substituting
Chinese for Indian labor. The drawbacks to such a move were that Chi- 464
nese workers were more independent and more expensive; they were
prone to organize and to strike at the instigation of political agitators;
and they balked at such tasks as weeding and tapping. Proponents of the
superiority of Chinese workers stated that one Indian was worth only
two-thirds of a Chinese in terms of energy and enterprise and that, if the
wages for Indian workers were forced up to the same level, the latter
group would lose almost every advantage. It took the all-out production
of rubber, brought on by the Second World War, for planters in Malaya
to admit that their dependence on Indian labor was greater than was the
loss of the sixty lakhs of rupees which represented the revenues from emi-
gration that the Government of India had sacrificed when imposing its
ban in 1938.

The census of 1931 gives the last available analysis of the composition 162
and occupations of the Indian community in Malaya. At that time the
Indian element amounted to 14.2 per cent of Malaya's total population,
showing an increase of 32.3 per cent over the past decade and bringing its
number to a total of 624,009. Madrassis—Tamils, Telugus, and Malaya-
lees—totalled 582,625 and of these Tamils made up five-sixths of the
whole. With the exception of a very small mercantile and clerical class,
the Tamil population was migrant and was employed on rubber estates
and, to a minor extent, in mining and general labor. Over the preceding
decade the Malayalee component had doubled, in contrast to the Telugu
element which showed a marked decrease. The sex ratio for both
Tamils and Telugus had improved, while that of the Malayalees was the
lowest of all—209 females to 1,000 males. Of the northern Indians the

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162 Punjabis were the most numerous (31,000 out of a total north Indian population of 37,989), and they were distributed all over Malaya, chiefly in or near large towns where they were employed as policemen or night watchmen with moneylending activities as a sideline. In rural areas, principally in Perak, the Punjabis went in for stock raising and tin mining.

In 1931 the Indian population as a whole ranked second numerically in Selangor and Singapore, fourth in Pahang and Johore, and in every other region was the third largest element. The dominant position of Indians in Selangor, where they constituted 29 per cent of the population, was due to the development of rubber estates there; in Singapore it was attributable to the numerical strength of the Indian trading class and to the large number of Tamils employed as government laborers. Their fourth place in Pahang and Johore was due to the then slight development of estate rubber and to the relatively large Malay component in the populations of those states.

563 On the eve of the Second World War the number of Indians in Malaya had grown to 744,000, but their ratio to the total population had undergone little change. The vast majority were still manual laborers, of whom 243,999 were employed on rubber estates—Indians representing 80 per cent of the total labor force employed on European plantations. In addition, more than 8,600 worked in mines, 9,297 labored in factories, and nearly 45,000 were employed by government departments. In general the Indians filled the same positions as the Chinese, but they were less able and less well remunerated. They were preferred to Chinese only in the rubber industry, where they were more docile, especially under the direction of planters and officials who had received their early training in India.

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[668] *Chinese.* The exploitation of newly arrived Chinese laborers by their own secret societies in Malaya led to a series of riots which culminated in 1872 and resulted in the appointment, eight years later, of the first Protectors of the Chinese in Singapore and Penang.

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167 Raffles' Ordinance of 1823 showed an early appreciation of the necessity for some legal protection of this class of immigrant. Prepaid passage money was thereby limited to Straits $20; coolies were to be landed as free persons; the period of service required to pay off their indebtedness was not to exceed two years; and the contract of their employment was to be registered before a magistrate. Unfortunately this Ordinance was ignored. The "pig business," as it was called, became the object of such abuse that anti-foreign riots broke out in the southern Chinese ports where most emigrants embarked, and the Straits Government was finally compelled to take steps to control it.

563 In the debates which were carried on throughout the 1880's, the Ordinance of 1823 was treated as non-operative, and the only law apparently

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then enforced was one by which those breaking labor contracts became liable to punishment. Two commissions of inquiry appointed during the period of riot proposed three ordinances, two of which proved abortive. The last, in 1880, called for the appointment of Protectors of the Chinese in the two main Straits ports, and subsequently a chain of such agencies was established throughout the peninsula. The standard of protection which they dispensed to the Chinese differed according to the area and to the epoch. In Singapore the Protectorate concentrated upon checking abuses connected with the importation of labor, with improving the immigrants' accommodations on junks and steamers, with restricting to certain ports the landing of coolies who had to be examined medically before disembarkation, and finally with ascertaining that the laborers fully understood the contracts of their employment. Coolie depots in Malaya were licensed and supervised, and care was taken to stop the kidnapping of laborers for work up-country. Most of this legislation was not effectively enforced, but it was important in that it made Chinese immigration a matter of official interest.

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The number of Chinese immigrants paying their own passage to Malaya steadily increased, and the presence of so many free workers naturally improved the status of their indentured compatriots. Some far-seeing employers, such as the Penang Sugar Estates and the Tanjong Pagar Dock Company, paid the passage from China not only for their laborers but for the families as well, or they reimbursed the depot concessionaries who had paid their fares. Until contract labor was abolished for the Chinese in 1914, the labor work of the Chinese Protectorate consisted largely of settling disputes about contracts and adjusting complaints in regard to wages concerning both free and indentured laborers. From 1890 on, the Protectorate officials, notably in Perak, under instructions from the government but without legal authority, inspected some estates to see that laborers in remote areas got fair treatment. Health Department officers also visited with fair regularity mines and plantations where Chinese workers were employed. The depression decade witnessed the inauguration of more effective protection for the Chinese along the lines laid down for Indian labor, but both the character and the working habits of the Chinese rendered them less tractable to official paternalism.

Abolition of indentured labor on the eve of the First World War brought about no change in recruiting methods in China. Recruiting agents, who were either the representatives of specific Malayan employers or independent individuals, still paid the passages of coolies and advanced them money, but the Labor Code of Malaya did intervene to the extent of limiting the maximum indebtedness that the recruit could so incur, and his liability for repayment was made a civil one. The increasing interest taken by the Government of China in its overseas nationals

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464 effected a slight improvement in the recruiting methods prevailing in Chinese ports, where agents operated with less violence and misrepre-
167 sentation than previously. According to the annual reports of the Straits Secretary for Chinese Affairs, no cases of assisted Chinese immigration were dealt with after 1927. Thereafter emigration from China, which had always been spontaneous, was totally unassisted.

The state of the tin and rubber industries in Malaya was not so important a factor in stimulating the influx of Chinese labor as were conditions in southern China. Although Chinese immigration grew rapidly with the extension of British control over the peninsula, the enormous demand for Chinese labor began only with the swift expansion of the rubber industry. Until the outbreak of the First World War conditions in both Malaya and China stimulated the movement, but after 1914 the number of unemployed Chinese in Malaya became so great that many were repatriated by the local government and immigration was totally prohibited between August 1914 and April 1915.

The flow of immigration, once stopped, was not easily resumed. The totals for 1916–17, although large, were far below the average for the years preceding the war. In 1918–19 the number of immigrants showed heavy decreases owing to the current rice shortage in Malaya and to the rising price of silver. Since nearly all of the Chinese in Malaya remitted money to the homeland, the wages prevailing in the peninsula lost their attraction for the Chinese when the value of the Straits dollar fell to only a third of that of Hongkong. By 1920 conditions in Malaya were not much better but those in southern China were worse, hence emigration to Malaya picked up again. In 1921 the Chinese in Malaya numbered 1,175,000, compared with 916,619 a decade before.

[468] Throughout the 1920's the increase in coolie traffic became complicated by political upheavals in southern China, where an anti-British boycott occurred in 1926. The following year a clash took place between the Singapore police and some Chinese school children who were parading in commemoration of Sun Yat-sen's death, provoking a Chinese boycott in the Straits capital. In turn this induced the local government to pass the Ordinance of October 10, 1927, which somewhat restricted the immigration of Chinese laborers into Malaya and provided for the deportation of those considered undesirable. Although criticized by the wealthy resident Chinese and by the shipping companies, both of whom preferred strengthening the local police force to restricting immigration, the ordinance was enforced, and in the same year the Thai Government took parallel action. Those two similar and significant pieces of legislation foreshadowed the adoption of a restriction policy (analogous to that adopted by the United States) in the two countries of Southeast Asia where theretofore the Chinese immigrant had been most welcome.

000 The 1931 census revealed the presence of 1,709,000 Chinese throughout

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The 1931 census revealed the presence of 1,709,000 Chinese throughout British Malaya. In the Straits Settlements, where they were most numerous, the Chinese constituted nearly 60 per cent of the population, but they fell to their lowest proportion in Kelantan, where they accounted for less than 5 per cent of all the inhabitants. Over the preceding decade the Chinese community had increased considerably more than it had during the previous inter-census period, and at the outset of the world depression it constituted 30 per cent of Malaya's total population. For every 100 arrivals there were 80 departures—a striking case of migration and a convincing proof of the constantly changing individual composition of the Chinese element in Malayan society. During the 1930's, conditions in China and the increasing proportion of women among the Chinese immigrants tended to make their community in Malaya a more stable one, yet the Chinese element in the country continued to be predominantly transient in character. 162 167 563

The depression brought about the spontaneous and the assisted repatriation of unemployed Chinese. Of the 167,903 Chinese who returned to the homeland in 1930, some 13,000 were destitute persons repatriated by the Secretariat for Chinese Affairs. Since in the same year a total of 242,149 Chinese arrived in the country, the Malayan governments felt it necessary to enforce for the first time the restrictive ordinance of 1928. Consequently a quota was placed on the number of male laborers entering Malaya from Chinese ports (not until 1938 was the immigration of Chinese women restricted), and direct immigration into the peninsula was stopped entirely. The original quota of about 6,000 monthly was apportioned among the various shipping companies. As the depression began to affect radically the demand for labor in Malaya, this quota was progressively cut until it reached the low of 1,000 immigrants monthly in July 1932. The Aliens Ordinance of that year extended government control over the immigration of all adult males other than British subjects. 167

By 1934 Malaya's adherence to the restriction schemes for tin and rubber effected an increase in the monthly quota of immigrant laborers to the extent of permitting 4,000 entrants. But the character as well as the mobility of the Chinese population in Malaya changed in the years preceding the Second World War. It was primarily the excess of production of Malaya's major industries over world consumption and secondarily the increasing mechanization of tin mining which were fundamental causes checking the flow of Chinese immigration into Malaya. The need for a smaller and more settled labor force to supplement the growing minority of Straits-born Chinese in the country was increasingly felt. Another major factor was the extension of the Japanese war to southern China. In the five years preceding the outbreak of the European phase of the recent war, only about 380,000 Chinese entered Malaya compared with the maximum of 359,262 recorded in the single year of 1927. 167 464

The Chinese Sinkehs, or newcomers to Malaya, were divided originally 000

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563 The Chinese Sinkehs, or newcomers to Malaya, were divided originally
463 on a linguistic and provincial basis into tribes or clans, having little to do with one another and frequently mutually hostile. All but a negligible fraction came from the provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Kwangsi, and according to the 1931 census were divided then into at least eight racial types. Such distinctions were still reflected in the language, mode of living, and to a large extent in their chosen occupations and distribution throughout Malaya.

The Hokkiens, albeit extensively engaged in agriculture, formed the bulk of the trading and shopkeeping classes and were more than twice as numerous as any other group of Chinese in the Straits Settlements. In the Federated States, however, they were greatly outnumbered by both the Cantonese and Hakkas, who were mainly engaged in mining and agriculture. In Johore the Hokkiens formed a third of the total Chinese population and had the distinction of having the least abnormal sex ratio—620 females to every 1,000 males—of all the Chinese elements in Malaya. This apparently was rooted in their predilection for mercantile and urban pursuits, which provided the amenities of living conducive to a greater immigration of their women, with the result that they achieved a more permanent settlement in the country. The great majority of the Baba class of old Malacca, whose descendants have gone far along the road to assimilation, were originally of Hokkien extraction.

The Cantonese were more catholic in their tastes, occupations, and manner of life than were the Hokkiens. In the Straits Settlements they were predominantly urban, but in the Federated States—although they were strongly represented in the towns—they were more numerous in rural areas, forming a large proportion of both the mining and estate populations. As regards the ratio of the sexes, they came next to the Hokkiens, with 581 females to every 1,000 males. The Hakkas or Kheks were more rural than urban, supplying the bulk of mining laborers. In the Federated States they were slightly less numerous than were the Cantonese, but they constituted less than a fifth of the Straits population. The Tiuchius were far more plentiful in the Straits than elsewhere, except in Kedah, where they were the most strongly represented Chinese group. Since 1921 the Hailams had increased proportionately less than any of the other Chinese tribes, except the Cantonese, and formed 5.7 per cent of the total Chinese population. In the towns they were principally engaged in domestic service; in rural areas they went in for rubber tapping. During the interwar period there was a marked increase in the number of Hailam and Hakka women immigrants.

On the eve of the depression the number of Chinese engaged in professional work was small: in the Straits Settlements, 0.8 per cent, compared with 12.8 per cent for Europeans; in commerce, 18.4 per cent as against 25 per cent. While still complementary rather than competitive, the Chinese were beginning to invade the traditional European pre-

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serves in the upper branches of commerce and finance. Only in the political field and in rice-growing did the British put any obstacles in the way of Chinese expansion. The vast majority among them, however, continued to form the bulk of Malaya's skilled and unskilled labor. In 1937, almost 52,000 Chinese were employed in mining, or 77.6 per cent of the total number of miners; 75,589 on rubber estates, or 21.3 per cent of the workers so employed; 44,583 in factories (78.8 per cent of the total); and 6,424 in government departments. The majority of Chinese laborers in all fields of enterprise were hired by contractors.

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Most of the Chinese miners worked for a daily wage or under contract and a small minority were employed by the tribute system. This latter method entailed, for the advancing of supplies, an initial outlay on the part of a mining speculator, but he limited his liabilities toward his labor force to their housing and feeding. If the mine worked out profitably, the workers were paid on a share basis from the profits, after a deduction or tribute was taken by the financier. Wages might be paid by the day—as yet unstandardized—or by the piece. The Chinese vastly preferred a piecework basis because it put a premium on individual industry; in 1936, 80 per cent of the Chinese employed in the Federated States mines were so employed. Although a trend toward the direct employment of Chinese labor developed in recent years, the majority of the Chinese were still hired through contractors who acted as interpreters and intermediaries for their European employers and who took a percentage of the workers' wages which were distributed by them. In most areas they also received commissions from supplying their coolies with necessities on a credit basis. In the west-coast states, where contractors did not enjoy such a monopoly in the matter of supplies, they took about one-fourth of the coolies' wages as their cut; in the east-coast states the percentage came to about one-tenth.

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In the interwar period the outstanding development in the tin industry was the progressive decline in the number of laborers employed because of the growth in mechanization and the decreasing part played by the Chinese in that industry. In 1907, when Malaya's tin output amounted to only 48,429 tons, the largest number of workers (229,778) was hired; in 1939, a year when Malaya exported more than 82,000 tons of tin, only 72,954 laborers were employed in the Federated States mines, representing an increase of about 20,000 over 1938 but substantially the same number as in 1931. In 1937, when Malaya's mines were producing to capacity, a labor shortage was felt. The president of the FMS Chamber of Mines attributed it to the high cost of passage from China, which in the case of those destined for Malaya was not sold directly by the steamship companies to passengers but was purchased from those companies by ticket brokers who resold the tickets to emigrants for as much as they could get. Nominally the fare was $(Chinese)55, yet the actual cost to

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[565] a coolie, for the journey from his home in China to Singapore, ranged up to $220, and even higher figures were mentioned. As few coolies 167 possessed this sum—otherwise they would not be coming to Malaya as 464 laborers—the Chamber took the matter up with the government, but nothing apparently materialized from this attempt to regulate fares more equitably.

[464] This effort was but another of the abortive attempts made during the interwar period to improve conditions for Chinese emigrants to Malaya. In 1920, during the brief postwar boom, the United Planters Association of Malaya appointed a committee to consider means for increas- 466 ing the number of Chinese laborers in the country. The committee's 563 report reviewed exhaustively the efforts made since 1910 to place the recruiting of Chinese workers on a more satisfactory basis, and it proposed to establish a General Labor Board to control recruitment of all types of Asiatic labor. This suggestion was not adopted by the government but, as a compromise measure, an advisory committee was appointed to consider a scheme limited to Negri Sembilan, Johore, and Malacca—the areas then principally dependent upon Chinese labor. Nothing came of it, and the government's policy remained simply that of letting the Chinese laborer fend for himself. It was obvious, however, that the day would inevitably come when the government of China would be strong enough to insist on reforms analogous to those imposed by the Government of India for its overseas nationals.

Actually, the government appeared indifferent because the system seemed to work well enough for all practical Malayan purposes. The need for Chinese depots, modeled on those of Madras and Negapatam, was not apparent; no one seriously advocated assisting Chinese immigration; and a standard wage was not wanted by the Chinese themselves because they could earn more on a piecework basis. The government was stirred into devising machinery to handle the strike problem as a whole, and not with sole reference to the Chinese; the Chinese Labor Committee, created by the United Planters Association of Malaya, aimed simply to prevent the country's employers being again caught short of Chinese labor. When, in 1939, the president of the Malayan Collieries made a plea in behalf of a better regulation of Chinese labor in the country, it was the first time in seventeen years that a prominent and large employer of Chinese workers came out boldly with the declaration that what was good for the Tamil was good for the Chinese. But neither the government nor public opinion in Malaya concurred in that view.

167 *Javanese.* The possibility of recruiting large numbers of docile and agriculturally-minded Javanese laborers exercised a perennial attraction 464 for Malayan planters as it did for those of Indochina. And the same drawbacks prevented it: the expense of importing Javanese under the conditions laid down by the ever-more-reluctant Netherlands Indies Gov-

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ernment. In the case of Malaya the immigration of Indians was easier to arrange, as between two British governments, and was less costly. The number of indentured Javanese working on two- to three-year contracts dwindled until they amounted to only seven in 1932, when the Netherlands Indies Government finally showed willingness to abrogate the contract system. However, the 1930's witnessed an influx of free Javanese laborers—more than 15,000 in 1937—who were mostly employed on rubber estates. The Javanese were unique in being the only Asiatic immigrants who mingled harmoniously with the indigenous Malays, but from the employer's viewpoint they had the great drawback of tending to become small landholders as soon as they were economically able to do so.

When the labor shortage became acute in 1941, the Colonial Office acceded to the proposal made by Malayan employers to import more Javanese workers to fill Malaya's huge tin and rubber export quotas. However, the Japanese invasion followed too swiftly upon the adoption of this policy to have permitted it to become effective.

The underdeveloped state of industry in Malaya and the lack of specialization on the part of both individuals and business firms make difficult any clear-cut classification of occupations. A Malay peasant often planted rice, grew rubber and fruit trees on his own land, worked spasmodically on nearby plantations, and did a little fishing and bullock carting on the side. Similarly, a Chinese might run a general store, own a rubber estate, breed pigs, deal in rubber, and operate a billiard parlor. Even European mercantile houses engaged in multiple pursuits, often combining a general import business with an agency for rubber companies and shipping lines. However, occupations in a general fashion followed racial lines: Europeans were at the top in official, technical, and managerial positions; Chinese were largely either merchants or miners; Indians were in great majority rubber tappers and laborers, only a few being found in commerce and the professions; and the Malays were mostly farmers or fishermen, with a handful occupying government posts in the peninsular states.

According to the latest census (1931) 46 per cent of Malaya's total population was gainfully employed. Agriculture occupied 57 per cent of the male and 77 per cent of the female working population; mining and manufacture, 13.7 per cent of the males and 6.7 per cent of the females; transport, 7.75 per cent of the males and 0.2 per cent of the females; commerce, 12.3 per cent of the males and 4 per cent of the females; public service, 1.7 per cent of the males and 0.3 per cent of the females; professions, 1.8 per cent of the males, and 1.64 per cent of the females; and personal services, 5.8 per cent of the males and 10.2 per cent of the females. The transient character of Malaya's population was shown by the fact that less than 57 per cent were born in the country.

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463 The impression conveyed by the 1931 census was of a community
433 where 65 per cent of the population was concerned with the production of foodstuffs and raw materials, while a minority served the majority's needs in the spheres of administration, marketing, transport, supplies, and personal services. The two major producing industries, rubber and tin, although of almost equal importance as contributors to the revenue, varied enormously in the number of persons they directly employed. Somewhat more than 500,000 persons were classified as engaged in rubber cultivation, but as rubber was included with other agricultural industries and was produced spasmodically and as a sideline by many, probably only about a third of the working population of both sexes could be formally regarded as rubber growers. Tin mining employed 79,438, or only 4 per cent of the working population, partly because of increasing mechanization in that industry. The number of persons registered as rice cultivators was 396,110, or 19.5 per cent of those gainfully employed, but in many parts of Malaya paddy planting was combined with other work so that probably only a fifth were engaged in rice farming as a nearly full-time occupation. Likewise the figure of 35,762 persons engaged in cultivating coconuts was misleading, since such activities were mixed with a multitude of others.

Agricultural

241 The statistics furnished by the 1931 census leave no doubt as to the
162 predominantly agricultural character of most of Malaya. The extreme case was furnished by Kelantan, where 88 per cent of the male and 81.5 per cent of the female working population were so employed. The ancillary services required by such large agricultural populations were mainly centered in the Federated States and to a lesser extent in other parts of the peninsula. The percentage of male laborers recorded in Johore and Kedah was lower than that of Kelantan, owing to the more advanced economic development achieved by those states and to their greater urbanization. Trengganu's lower percentage, however, was due to other causes: the country was less developed agriculturally, and a larger proportion of its inhabitants were engaged in arts and crafts and petty trade.

433 Rice growing was by tradition a Malay preserve, and for political and
243 economic reasons it so remained, although this meant that Malaya had to import annually about half a million tons of rice to feed its population. To begin with, Malaya's soil had not the volcanic richness of
[439] Java's and, even with the most scientific methods, probably never would have been able to achieve rice self-sufficiency. The efforts of the Agriculture Department to teach better farming were for some time academic and sporadic, and the influx of abundant and cheap agricultural labor

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placed a premium on traditional farming methods. Moreover, extensive 433
tin mining had effected a silting up of Malaya's rivers, and erosion had
ensued. But the most important cause for the shrinkage in Malaya's 243
paddy lands was the greater remuneration for rubber planting and the
Malay's indifference to raising rice beyond the satisfaction of his own
needs. Most Malays worked their smallholdings by family labor, raised
the crops they liked best to eat, and sold whatever surplus they had in
the nearest market. The new rice lands opened up by the Irrigation [177]
Department failed to attract as many Malays as anticipated because of
their conservative desire to farm individually on their own lands and
not to participate in communal efforts in unfamiliar surroundings where
they were not sufficiently ensured by the government of a proportionate
return for their effort. Although rice farming was not remunerative [563]
enough to induce large-scale efforts on the part of the Malays, they
resented the suggestion, periodically advanced, that the Chinese and
Indians be allowed to participate in it. And, although they feared the
encroachments of tin companies on their reservations, they frequently
slipped through the legal loopholes designed to keep their land heritage
from the grasp of alien moneylenders.

Except in Kedah and Kelantan, where Malays were employed by the 464
government and on estates in large numbers, they were negligible as a
labor force. No big estates elsewhere depended to any great extent upon
Malays, and the total number so employed at any one time was at most
4,000. It seems that the Malays had neither the desire nor the need to [461]
be permanently employed. They merely used estates as occasional con-
veniences, and even then to a very small extent in order to supplement
the traditional livelihood they gained from smallholdings. They could
not be relied upon to remain on the estates when their services were
most urgently required, and those plantations which were either situated
near Malay villages or which permitted regular leaves of absence to their
Malay employees were the only ones where the indigenous people were
engaged for any long period or in considerable numbers. As a rule, the
Malays did not care to earn any more money than was sufficient to sup-
port them and to provide them with the cash required to supply their
immediate needs. But in some parts of Malaya, notably in the western
states and in the Kelantan plain, some slight consciousness of money
values was growing. Such Malay labor forces as were in existence came
under the supervision of the Labor Department.

That part of the transient Indian population which was engaged in 563
rubber tapping was discussed under Immigrant Labor; here only those
Indians who settled as farmers in Malaya will be considered. During
the depression many Indians refused to accept repatriation, even where
wages were unsatisfactory, and it became evident that throughout the
western states there existed a considerable resident Indian population

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563 that was rooted in Malaya and had largely lost connection with India.
[162] The census of 1931 noted that 21 per cent of the 624,000 Indians then in Malaya were local-born. Most of the Indian population was located on rubber estates, where the sex ratio was 643 females to 1,000 males (as against 355 among other Indians) and the number of children under the age of fifteen who were resident in Malaya was 154,000.

466 The Labor Code required every employer to set aside one-sixteenth of an acre of arable or grazing land for each laborer with dependents.
311 During the First World War and the depression immediately following it, some degree of compulsion was used to enforce the ruling that laborers should cultivate food crops, but when the price of rubber subsequently boomed, these gardens were neglected. Employers were reluctant to see newly cleared land used for any purpose other than rubber growing and refused to allow laborers' livestock to feed off young rubber plants, and the laborers found it easier to buy than to raise such additional food as they wanted. Not until the outbreak of the Second World War did the authorities make a belated effort to enforce the cultivation of food crops by rubber tappers in their leisure hours.

427 Probably the domiciled adult Indian population in Malaya did not
[426] exceed a third of their total numbers. Little indication of their importance could be derived from statistics of Indian smallholdings, since much of the area was held by chettyars and acquired from their defaulting Malay debtors. On the eve of the Second World War the acreage held by Indians amounted to 35,812 in the Straits Settlements, 168,456 in the Federated States, and 108,534 in the Unfederated States exclusive of
[463] Kelantan. Most of the permanent Indian population consisted of the urban mercantile and professional classes and a small percentage of Malaya-born children, whereas the laborers who formed over two-thirds of the total Indian population were frankly transients in the country.

563 Attempts to settle Indians on the land date back many years and were generally unsuccessful. In 1928 an Indian member of the Federal Coun-
427 cil made the first public reference to the desirability of founding land settlements for Indian laborers, and he attributed past failure in this
423 regard to the lack of any guarantee of occupancy rights. An outstanding exception was the Chuah settlement in Negri Sembilan where about seventy families occupied some 250 acres on temporary grants. During the depression a tropical jungle in another region was converted into a thriving settlement by unemployed Tamils. At about the same time an area was created at Sungei Ujong, where the Indian laborers on the local estate were formed into a cooperative society; the Labor Department admitted that this settlement would have prospered better had it been possible to give greater security of tenure. A much older and outstandingly successful settlement was that of Tamils at Bagan Serai, founded about sixty-five years ago under the auspices of the Roman Catholic

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mission. One major reason for its success was the grant to the original settlers of outright ownership of plots of five acres each. The owners tilled their lands, and only when in need of ready cash did they seek work elsewhere and then for only a limited period. Smaller settlements located at Bukit Asahan, Permatang, Carey Island, and on Ayer Tekah were of too recent origin and on too small a scale to judge their value. 563 427 423

Even after the imposition of the ban on assisted Indian emigration to Malaya, the local government showed no inclination to make a policy of Indian land settlement. The furthest it went was to waive or reduce the rents payable by estates on land assigned to the use of laborers, and in 1932 it ignored a plea made by officials of the Government of India to set up a committee to study the whole question. As was the case with rice cultivation by non-Malays, the government yielded to the storm of Malay protests against forming a polyglot peasantry in their country. Although the CIAM favored the establishment of Indian land settlements, it believed any such schemes injurious unless accompanied by recognition of Indian equality of political status, since any land granted without fixity of tenure, freehold titles, and subsidies for development would be of little use to the Indians in Malaya. [167] 427 563

Only in market gardening were the Chinese important as agricultural laborers. They were the only farmers in Malaya who voluntarily produced crops for sale wherever a market was available and even when the profits therefrom were periodically negligible. Not until the grow-more-food campaign was stimulated by the war did many of the country's towns recognize their dependence upon the industrious Chinese garden-squatter communities. 244

Only during depression and war periods was the question seriously studied of permitting the Chinese to cultivate rice. As a matter of fact, it was exclusively at such times of either unemployment or food shortages that the Chinese were interested in so unremunerative an occupation. Although no official budgets of the rice farmer were ever drawn up, an official of the Cooperative Department in 1939 estimated that a cultivator and his family could farm about four acres without hiring additional labor, and that this would probably net them a gross income of $97.20 for an entire year's arduous work. This did not take into account deductions for quit-rent and water rate. As a solution to the unemployment problem, especially during the recession of 1938, the District Officer of Kinta was asked to draw up a scheme of land settlement for the jobless, including the possible conversion of mined areas into arable land. (The total number of registered unemployed was then 8,000 and probably many more were unregistered.) This inquiry heralded the government's launching of a large-scale scheme in 1939 to open up Malaya's rice lands to the Chinese. As a result, some of the peninsular states did accede to the scheme in principle, but actually they assigned very small 243 464 [434] 654 563

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654 areas for Chinese settlement. In the flurry of increased wartime employ-
563 ment offered by the major industries, the government was able to withdraw from the whole project fairly gracefully in the face of the indignation it had aroused among Malays.

167 The main inducement to permanent residence in Malaya, on the part of all Asiatic immigrants, was the higher standard of living there com-
466 pared with that in the countries of their origin. The attractions offered estate laborers in Malaya in recent years consisted of cottage-type housing; differential recruiting allowances in favor of married couples; the payment of a dollar bonus for each child brought along by nonrecruited immigrants; the presence of women traveling inspectors on immigrant steamers; the provision of nurseries, crèches, and schools on estates; the allotment of land to estate laborers for cultivation purposes; and the opportunity for the women and children of laborers to earn supplementary wages. Further, the transportation of a family absorbed the lifetime savings of those coolies not entitled to repatriation, and once back in India their children who had been brought up in Malaya were found to have developed no immunity to the diseases prevalent there.
[563] However, conditions favorable to the settlement of families in Malaya were offset by the tendency of the unrestricted flow of immigration regularly to depress wages and by the government's chariness about granting citizenship rights to immigrant Asiatics.

474 The cooperative movement enjoyed a real though limited success in Malaya; it was least effective among the strictly rural communities. On
452 the eve of the Second World War only about 2,000 peasants belonged to it. Its growth had been most marked in urban areas. The movement began in 1922 with formation of the first urban credit association. It was motivated by the government's desire to encourage thrift and to supply credit at moderate rates. A department was set up to advise on all types of cooperatives. No funds were granted by the cautious government and the cooperatives were endowed with only a few modest fiscal privileges. Some additional encouragement was given them by the Straits Settlements authorities in 1933, when it was announced that thereafter no civil servant would be allowed to sign a promissory note except to the government or to a cooperative association.

474 Credit associations became the predominant type, forming 88 per cent
452 of the total number in 1938 and comprising 92 per cent of the entire
454 membership. Other societies were composed fairly exclusively of Indians, for purposes of thrift, and the "better living" associations were formed to induce members to forego such unnecessary expenditures as were usually incurred for weddings, funerals, etc. Before the advent of cooperatives, Indian laborers were accustomed to investing their money in usurious transactions, in jewelry, or in livestock. Another common method of investment was in kutus, analogous to the tintine in Indo-

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china, but this was frowned upon by employers and by the Labor Department as savoring too much of gambling. Actually such forms of investment were decreasing in favor of membership in the officially sponsored cooperatives. In the ten-year period of 1928–38, the number of all cooperative societies rose from 144 to 579; total membership increased nearly fivefold to reach 103,102 on the eve of the Second World War, but over the same period the average capital per member had declined from $99 to $88. The movement was regarded as being successfully launched, but it was too small in scope to make much headway in a country ridden by periodical booms. Apparently no effort was made to adapt it to meet Muslim prejudices against the charging of interest rates, and it seems to have been no factor in keeping their lands in Malay hands. 454 474 452

Industrial

Tin smelting was the only large-scale industry in Malaya, although there were several small processing industries using as raw materials local or imported agricultural products. These included the manufacture of sago, tapioca, pineapples, timber, and oils. In addition, many governmental or semi-official organizations, such as the Harbor Board, Railroad Department, and Public Works Department, had large manufacturing plants. Most of the factories were concentrated in the Straits Settlements and consisted largely of small Chinese-owned and manned establishments. Although Malaya could offer fine sites, a fair labor force, good communications, and a stable government, these advantages were insufficient to overcome the handicaps of a small local market, Japanese competition, and an official policy that generally discouraged local industrialization. The recent war stimulated two existing industries—tin smelting and lumber milling—and in shipbuilding created a third promising industry. Perhaps most important of all, it revealed the impracticability of trying to industrialize the country on a much larger scale. 328 433 [654] [313] [396]

While a fair number of Indians were employed in such industries as existed, the bulk of Malaya's skilled labor force was furnished by the Chinese, who proved themselves to be admirable workmen in wood and metals. An apprenticeship system and a few technical schools existed for a small number of students in the main towns, and these facilities were somewhat expanded to meet the increased need for a larger local supply of skilled laborers on the part of the military establishment. Wages for factory work were almost twice as high as those prevailing on plantations, but the industrial worker enjoyed less legislative protection and fewer amenities than did the rubber tapper. Sastri in his report of 1936 suggested that "the interests of urban workers do not receive from the Labor Department the same care and attention as those of estate 464 [401] 874 [465] 466

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466 laborers." The much slighter importance of industry as compared with rubber growing and tin mining was undoubtedly responsible for this. Moreover, the division of inspection into Chinese and Indian departments, although justifiable on linguistic and other grounds, was apt to cause complications when Indians and Chinese were employed in the same undertaking.

Factories and workshops were regulated by a series of ordinances, beginning in 1923, which enabled a number of ILO conventions to be put into effect. Legislation concerning the following conventions was adopted: Night Work (women and young persons); Minimum Age (industry, trimmers and stokers); Unemployment Indemnity (shipwreck); Workmen's Compensation (agriculture, occupational diseases); Medical Examination of Young Persons (sea); Equality of Treatment (accident compensation); Minimum-Wage-Fixing Machinery; and Forced Labor.

433 At the beginning of 1937 there were in all Malaya only 825 factories, of which 728 were located in the Straits Settlements. In these establish-
464 ments about 7,000 Indians, 38,000 Chinese, 1,000 Javanese, and 300 Malays were employed.

Clerical and Mercantile

467 As recently as 1938 Malaya's clerks were called the most inarticulate body of workers in the world.[1] Their pathetic status was variously
463 attributed to a lack of efficient organization and leadership and to the resigned apathy of the mass of clerks, who were only too conscious of the superfluity of their numbers. No representative group among them ever rose to tackle their problems seriously or to bring them to the notice of either the public or the government. Such organizations as existed seemed to confine their activities to the sporting sphere and were apparently unwilling to venture into controversial fields. The Clerical Union, founded in 1920, had no employment bureau, no organized evening classes, no propaganda, and no social or mutual-help committees.

Singapore's 10,000 clerks wanted to keep their jobs and felt that the best way to do so was to work uncomplainingly and docilely. They were under no illusions as to their indispensability, knowing how many unemployed men were ready to snap up the lowest-paid clerical position. Malaya's schools were annually producing from 700 to 800 boys with Senior Cambridge Certificates, and though in recent years there was a wider recognition of the need to reorient the school system, such a change was not going to be effected overnight. If Malaya's clerks had felt able to fight for their rights they would have demanded a minimum living wage and a provident fund upon which to retire. But their sole organ-

[1] See quotation from the *Malaya Catholic Leader* in the *Straits Times* of September 20, 1938.

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ization, the Clerical Union, did not enjoy independent leadership, being 467
financially connected with the employer group, and its membership com- 463
prised only 1,547 clerks. If the Union had staged a strike, the employers
could easily have dispensed with the services of all its members.

Chinese. In 1931 a comparatively small proportion of the Chinese 466
(5 to 7 per cent) were employed as clerks and as shop assistants. The
investigation made into working conditions in Chinese stores by the
Straits Times in 1938 revealed that a 17-hour working day was common
practice, and that a 12- to 14-hour day was only for the more fortunate
few. Factory girls worked 10 hours daily, and there were very few
Chinese shops in Singapore operating on an 8-hour day.

The Straits Settlements Singapore Association pioneered a drive for
legislative improvement in this field of labor. It was so bold as to
advocate a weekly half-holiday and shorter daily working hours. Before [444]
it requested the government to introduce such legislation, the Association
tried to enlist the support of employer groups: among those it approached,
it found the Chinese Chamber of Commerce the most recalcitrant. Yet
the conditions that the Association was seeking to ameliorate prevailed
in the businesses conducted by many Chinese employers who were not
members of the Chamber and who ran their firms on a system which
differed greatly from that adopted by Europeans and by the larger Asiatic
firms, which generally held to an 8-hour day. Among the smaller enter-
prises, it was found that coffee shops and sundry-goods stores kept the
longest hours, from 6 A.M. to 11 P.M., for which the pay ranged from
Straits $8 to $25 a month. Both employers and employees lived on the
premises so that the shop could be kept open during their collective
waking hours.

The enthusiasm which inspired the Association's campaign died in the
course of a few months. Although in Singapore thirty-six Chinese trad-
ers voluntarily introduced such long overdue—but to them highly radi-
cal—reforms as the Association advocated, there remained others who
argued against them on the flimsiest of pretexts. By January 1939 it was
estimated that half of the Chinese shops in Singapore had closed for a
weekly half-holiday; those which remained open claimed that it was a
public benefaction since they catered to the poorer classes. Aside from
the grave injustice done to individual employees, the prevailing long
hours intensified the unemployment problem by making two men do the
work of three. Obstinate employers were warned that their recalcitrance
might bring down on them that worst of all evils to Singaporeans—official
interference.

Since the depression Singapore's Chinese clerks had been drawing as 465
salary from Straits $10 a month upwards—barely a living wage and ob-
viously the principal cause of their widespread indebtedness. Compara-
tively better off were the clerks in government service, who had special

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465 credit facilities and whose initial salary of $55 rose by annual increments of $5 to $95 maximum. If they were promoted to higher grades, government clerks might earn from $100 to $160 a month. Employers stoutly maintained that a starting salary of $20 monthly was not unfair even for boys with school and commercial certificates, the value of which they regarded as approximately zero. Few business executives realized how dependent they were upon their lowly clerks for the smooth functioning of their offices.

466 One very long-standing clerical grievance concerned the disparity in treatment accorded to European and to Asiatic employees, which focussed
563 upon the issue of bonuses and provident funds. When a bill was introduced into the Federal Council in 1936 to provide such a fund for railroad employees, it was vigorously opposed by the Chinese member on the ground that European subordinates received pensions upon retirement without having been required to contribute to any such fund. Inequality of treatment certainly prevailed in such of the commercial firms as paid bonuses. In prosperous times European employees received twice as much as did Asiatics; after the depression, whenever the Europeans received gratuities, the Asiatic staff was completely ignored.

In a courageous speech delivered before Singapore's Rotary Club in December 1938, G. H. Kiat spoke for the city's "forgotten" community of docile clerks. Deprecating the habit of many Singapore firms of dismissing aging employees to replace them by younger men at lower wages, he advocated annual paid vacations and a provident fund that would give clerks a protection analogous to that furnished by the government to manual laborers. He prophesied that if another economic blizzard struck Malaya there would be an exact repetition of the tragic scenes enacted in 1931–32, when hundreds of clerks were thrown on the streets with nothing more than a month's pay in their pockets—if that. The lesson taught by the depression was apparently unlearned, for up to the time when Malaya was invaded provident funds for Asiatic employees were still the exception, not the rule. The vast majority of Singapore firms gave their employees no paid vacations other than the public holidays, which annually numbered about six.

467 *Indians.* In contrast to the inchoate and government-shepherded Indian rubber coolies, estate clerks actually possessed their own skeleton organization in the All-Malayan Estate Asiatic Staffs Association, founded in 1935. Theoretically, this organization existed to better conditions for all its members and to serve as liaison between employers and employees, but it could hardly have effectively served such purposes, for it was decidedly neither a benevolent society, an employment bureau, nor a relief agency for its necessitous members. At its inaugural session a dispute ensued as to whether or not it could be called a trade union. One realistic member suggested that the question was quite academic since

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the association was unlikely to get anywhere no matter by what name it was called. 467

The one positive reform which the Estates Association struggled manfully but futilely to effect was the creation of a central provident fund. [466] The powerful UPAM (United Planters Association of Malaya) definitely opposed, although without adequate explanation, the formation of such a fund. Arguments in favor of establishing a provident fund for planters mysteriously lost their validity when applied to a subordinate group of Asiatic employees, despite the fact that the latter were in positions of responsibility and should have been given every inducement to remain honest. A few enlightened companies had provided such funds for their own employees, but the majority of Indian estate clerks remained without such prospects and such protection. The Estates Association took hardly a militant stand on the question, and its meetings were reportedly given over to the discussion of personal humiliations, such as being addressed as "krani" or clerk, or as being the target for a volley of managerial oaths.

Although he enjoyed more amenities than his urban counterpart in such matters as free housing, water supply, fuel, etc., the estate clerk was often ground down between the upper millstone, in the form of the European planter, and the nether millstone of the labor force. His life was monotonous and his only holiday 48 hours at Deepavali; only on the few estates where more than one clerk was employed could alternate week-end leaves be arranged. The clerks resented their employers' opposition to a central provident fund and to regular paid holidays, which they thought should be their right and not a question of paternalism. The fundamental difficulty with the estate clerk's position, as with other clerical employment, was the superabundance of candidates. The constant influx of immigrants into Malaya always made it possible for the planters to have a wide range of choice among those willing to offer maximum labor for a minimum salary. Immigrants from India, skilled as well as unskilled, tended to congregate on the estates, since most of the positions in government service and in commercial houses were monopolized largely by the local-born. The estate clerks represented a somewhat more stable element than did the laborers, as most of them had brought their families to Malaya. Only in very recent years and in a feeble way had they begun to ask for official protection through a restriction on the immigration of skilled laborers and in the establishment of a central provident fund. 466 464 563

The *Straits Times* reporters who investigated working conditions among the Indian as well as the Chinese mercantile community in 1938 found a marked difference in the status of northern and southern Indians in Singapore. The northern group comprised immigrants from Sindh, Gujerat and the United Provinces, whereas the southern element was 466

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made up exclusively of Tamils and Muslims. The more fashionable shops were run by northern Indians, but the majority were owned by the Indians from the south. The former recruited their labor from India on the basis of an agreement whereby assistants were required to work in Singapore for two to three years, and their passage, board and lodging were paid for by the employer. But the quarters provided by the employer—ones which the employee was bound to accept—were usually located on the floor above the shop and consisted of a small, ill-ventilated room situated under the watchful eye of the employer. Working hours were generally from 8 A.M. to 9 P.M. with a half-holiday on Sundays and only one full holiday at Deepavali. Two hours were allotted for lunch and tea but dinner could be eaten only after the shop was closed. Wages were scheduled on a rupee basis. Sindhi merchants paid a minimum salary of 30 rupees monthly, with annual increments ranging from 5 to 10 rupees, and also supplied food and lodging. But half of that salary was sent to the employee's family in India and the remainder credited to the employee's account. No actual money was paid to the employee, in addition to the advance given him before leaving India, unless a specific agreement to that effect had been made in the contract.

Stringent as were such working conditions they were generally far better than those prevailing for southern Indians. The latter not uncommonly had to work from 6 A.M. to 11 P.M., with only three half-hour breaks for food. Most of the Muslim and Tamil employers recruited their Indian assistants locally; nevertheless they, too, forwarded half the salary earned to the employee's family in India. Employers uniformly claimed that they and their assistants were one big, happy family, mutually concerned for each other's moral and physical welfare. They blandly asserted that their assistants loved long hours, disliked holidays, and did not know what to do with what leisure time they had. Their assistants, however, told the investigating reporters another tale. They complained of crowded living accommodations, which also served as dining rooms, of poor food, of a 15-hour working day, of inadequate wages ranging from Straits $7 to $35 irregularly paid, and of punishments meted out to them on the slightest pretext. Their employers took charge of computing salaries and refused to render them any accounting; having no means of redress the employees had to accept all the fines and items marked "personal expenditures" which were chalked up against them. Their chief grievance, however, was the lack of privacy and of leisure time.

The publicity resulting from the *Straits Times'* investigation had the merit of effecting some improvement in Indian shop assistants' working conditions. The South Indians Chamber of Commerce reconsidered its original stand and came out in favor of a reduction of working hours

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and of granting a half day of rest on Sundays. Slight as this concession was, it met with the active opposition of an important section of the Indian mercantile community. 466

3

WORKING CONDITIONS

Wages

WAGE TRENDS in Malaya were related to the amount of tin and rubber the country was allowed to export and to the prices paid for them in world markets. To a certain degree, however, the impact of such forces was mitigated by the establishment of standard wage rates for Indian laborers in certain key districts, and these rates affected adjacent areas and other nationalities of workers. Theoretically this standard wage took into consideration the factors of accessibility, health conditions, local living costs, savings, and a trip to India every three years. The governments of Malaya consistently refused the plea made by Indian nationalists to establish a minimum wage for the whole country, on the ground that inaccessible or undeveloped estates had to pay higher wages in order to attract labor and that wages followed a course generally parallel to that of living costs. That the latter was not always the case was shown by the strikes throughout the 1930's, which were caused by the fact that cuts followed swiftly upon reductions of export quotas but were not as promptly restored when prosperity returned to the country's major industries. The wage reduction effected in 1930 was not generally restored until April 1937 and then only temporarily. In justification of its policy the government underscored the law which entitled Indian workers who were unable to find work at the standard wage to repatriation—which was the recourse for about 190,000 laborers during the depression. In any case, the absence of official cost-of-living and wage indexes prevented any exact appraisal of real wages. The fact that living conditions for workers in Malaya were sufficiently better than those prevailing in India and China to attract a large yearly influx of laborers was regarded by the authorities in Malaya as adequate proof that the wages paid in the country needed no adjustment in the direction of increase or uniformity. 465

Most of the estate laborers were Indians working for daily hire, except for a minority employed on oil-palm and tea plantations who worked on a piece basis. The wages paid to estate laborers were higher than those for men employed on smallholdings, and they were almost always

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465 paid directly to laborers by their employers. Daily wages of 35 to 60
(Straits) cents were representative of the prewar level for unskilled work-
464 ers on Malayan estates. The wages received by Javanese and Malays were generally the same as for Indians. The Chinese, who preferred working on a piecework basis, earned higher sums, averaging 20 per cent more than other laborers in 1938. However, thanks to the prevalence of the contractor system for Chinese labor, the sums earned by workers of that nationality were reduced by commissions paid to such intermediaries. In sparsely settled areas the contractor retained 10 per cent of his workers' wages and in addition received cuts on food and other necessities which perforce they had to buy from him. In the west-coast states such monopolies were not feasible, so there his commission on wages came to about 25 per cent. In mining undertakings the contractors who provided coolie gangs received, in 1936, about Straits $7 for each cubic foot of ground cut and carried away. The great majority of Chinese mining coolies (80 per cent in 1937) were, however, engaged on a piecework basis, and only a small minority according to the tribute system. In the latter case free housing and food were supplied to the laborers by the mine-owner, but the profits they received depended upon how successfully the mine worked out and how large a tribute was taken by the speculator who had advanced the initial capital. In all other types of mining enterprises no accommodations (or medical care) were furnished to laborers, and the lack of such amenities was partly the cause of the higher wages paid for this type of work. No wage-fixing machinery existed for laborers in mines. Wage disputes involving Chinese workers were referred to the Controller of Labor, whose decision was final.

While tin miners received sums substantially higher than those paid to estate laborers, workers in Malaya's few industrial establishments earned still larger wages. In 1938 the daily sums earned by skilled male factory workers ranged from 80 cents to $1.20, and in remote areas and in certain undertakings the daily wage might amount to as much as $3. The Chinese supplied the bulk of the skilled labor employed, and the fewer Indians engaged in such work performed tasks requiring less skill
465 and were accordingly less well remunerated. Unskilled employees in government departments received approximately the same wages as estate
466 laborers, or higher, and wherever the latter was the case, plantation coolies tended to drift into such employment. The provision of free housing and of treatment in government hospitals, as well as the prospect of fairly permanent employment, were additional inducements cited as attractions offered to laborers in government employ. However, the complaints received from such workers by the Agent for the Government of India threw light on some of the unfavorable aspects of their employment. They complained of being arbitrarily fined for trivial causes and contrary to the provisions laid down by the Labor Code; they resented

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being made responsible for proving that they had given continuous service over a minimum ten-year period in order to become eligible for gratuities; they experienced insecurity of tenure as a result of the government's practice of dispensing with an employee's services simply by serving him with a month's notice and without having to prove him to have been in any way blameworthy; and they asserted that dismissal orders should not be based exclusively on *ex parte* investigations. 465 466

Fundamentally, the wages established for the rubber industry set the scale for all types of labor, and the fairly regular excess of supply over demand, through the influx of cheap coolie labor from India and China, tended constantly to depress wages and to make all Malayan employers normally able to resist demands for wage increases.

Hours

Working hours, like wages, varied according to the nationality of the laborer and the type of employment. Where the Labor Code applied, working hours were limited to nine and overtime was paid at double hourly rates. By law no individual was bound to work more than six days a week but no statutory provision was made for a weekly holiday, owing partly to the variety of religions prevailing in the country. 466

The hours actually and regularly worked by laborers in Malaya's different industries were hard to gauge. Sastri reported in 1936 that on estates employing Indian labor, "the nominal day's work of nine hours in practice was reduced to eight and was finished by 2 P.M.; any work done thereafter was in the main voluntary, and invariably paid for as overtime." Harold Butler of the ILO, traveling in Malaya in 1937–38, confirmed the existence of a nine-hour day and the double rates paid for overtime work. "Though mines, plantations, and factories, except Government establishments, usually work seven days a week, the average worker often does not average more than five days' work per week, if account is taken of the numerous religious feasts and holidays. Such opinion as exists in favor of a regular weekly rest-day is probably to be found among the employers rather than the workers." Lennox Mills reported that the working day in mines was usually eight hours, with extra payment for overtime, but as most of the miners were Chinese who, in great majority, were on a piecework basis, the hours of work they put in were a matter of individual industry and probably exceeded eight. Likewise the Chinese rubber tappers, who were paid by the weight of latex collected, undoubtedly labored beyond the nine-hour maximum.

The *Straits Times* investigation of mercantile and clerical workers employed by Chinese and Indians in 1938 stressed the tremendously long working hours required of them and the few holidays that they enjoyed. Assistants in north Indian shops worked from 8 A.M. to 9 P.M., enjoyed

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466 a half day's rest on Sundays, and only one full holiday in the year. South Indian shop assistants not infrequently worked from 6 A.M. to 11 P.M. and had no weekly rest day. In Chinese stores it was found that a seventeen-hour working day was common practice; that women employees in Chinese factories labored for ten hours a day; and that very rare were the Chinese undertakings, either large or small, which operated on an eight-hour day. Pressure brought to bear upon such employers revealed their great recalcitrance to any reduction in working hours or increase in holidays.

Although such varying conditions as prevailed in Malaya make generalizations more than usually inaccurate, it may be said with reasonable safety that European enterprises and a few of their larger Asiatic colleagues probably followed the statutory eight- to nine-hour day and that government departments were the only ones which assured their workers one day's rest in seven. The smaller Asiatic employers and Chinese laborers worked as long as they could.

Housing

[167] For employers, two factors simplified the problem of housing their workers: first, Chinese workers generally lived off the estates and, second, there was an absence of high-caste Indians among the immigrants.
466 Although the inspection of housing conditions for Chinese workers constituted part of the duties of the staff of the Labor Department, the regulations laid down by the Labor Code concerned primarily the accommodation of Indian estate laborers. The Department encouraged replacement of the old coolie lines (barracks-like structures) as no longer as suitable as in the days when few families accompanied immigrant Indians and when the danger of malaria made it imperative to concentrate the labor force while the estate was being opened up. It was found that one of the best means of encouraging family immigration was to provide laborers with cottages. Approval by the Labor and Health Departments was required before new lines could be built, but apart from certain minimum requirements in regard to floor space no fixed standards were imposed and employers were encouraged to submit their own housing plans. The type of accommodation officially blessed consisted of a room not smaller than twelve by ten feet to accommodate a small family or three bachelors, with a front open verandah and with a back verandah, partially enclosed, where laborers could cook and dry their clothes. This type of cottage was built either semidetached style or in small rows and proved to be very popular. Another type which was being tried experimentally in the late 1930's was similar but consisted of a room not less than sixteen by ten feet divided by a partition into two parts.

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The housing situation in the Straits ports resembled that of Rangoon. An effort was being made to eliminate the worst tenements and to replace them by more sanitary buildings at cheap rentals. Good work had been done, but the snail's pace at which it moved prevented any considerable alleviation of a very bad housing situation, especially for the rapidly growing population in Singapore. 466 362

Health and Safety Regulations

Regulations designed to safeguard the health of Indian estate workers were rather minutely prescribed and well enforced. Pre-embarkation medical examinations were required to be made of all Indian laborers bound for Malaya, and employers in that country had to provide sanitary housing, a pure water supply, and a well-equipped hospital or dispensary, and to take specified anti-malarial measures. 466

Among the bouquets Mr. Sastri handed to Malaya's employers of Indian labor was one for the maintenance of excellent hospitals by the larger estates, and another for the custom prevailing in government departments of giving their Indian laborers a sickness benefit of one month's full pay while hospitalized. But he reproached some of the smaller estate-owners for maintaining insufficiently qualified dressers and for saddling them with other than medical duties. Sastri suggested that some technical improvements be made in the quarantine depot at Port Swettenham, but he gave the depots at Penang and Singapore his blessing.

The CIAM was far from being so benevolent. It claimed that the official health measures sounded well enough on paper but that scepticism was justified if one recalled the breakdown in some of the schemes launched by the Federated States Health Board. The CIAM concurred in castigating the small estates as the worst offenders, and believed that the periodical visits made by official inspectors effected only a transient jacking-up of their standards. While all were agreed that the managers of large estates had made great improvements in the health standards prevailing on their plantations, the bald fact remained that there was a decline in the number of estate hospitals, from 232 in 1937 to 211 in 1938, and in the number of medical practitioners in charge of them, from 27 to 22. Although the decrease in the number of hospitals might have been the result of merging several small units into a larger institution, the same explanation was hardly valid for the reduction made in the number of practitioners. When the Medical Department announced that government hospitals were not necessarily available for use by estate laborers, the *Straits Times* stated that the problem of providing adequate medical care, especially on estates not served by any group system of hospitals, was still awaiting a solution.[2] [743]

[2] *Straits Times*, November 25, 1939.

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466 The greatest improvement made was certainly that registered in the realm of malaria control. In 1910, when the death toll from that malady
744 reached the devastating proportion among coolies of 62.9 per 1,000, the Federated States Government led the way by creating a separate unit of its Medical Department to watch over the health of estate laborers. Much of the research which led to malaria-control measures was financed by Malaya's rubber and tin companies. So successful was this work that the death rate among all Indians in the Federated States came to only 7.11 per 1,000 in 1937. Managers, who in earlier years had resented Health Officers as unwarranted intruders, learned to appreciate their efforts because of the economy effected through the improved health of their labor forces. Twice yearly the Medical Officers visited estates, but their inspection of mines was less frequent.

466 The effect upon laborers' health of the toddy consumed on estates was never studied from the medical angle; it was viewed largely from the
276 desirability or otherwise of maintaining toddy shops on plantations. In recent years the government took over the licensing and control of these shops, which, however, were run by estate managers. The state's treasury realized a neat 200 per cent profit on toddy sales—its price policy being based on the theory that it should be sufficiently high to deter the laborer from excessive indulgence but not so high that he would substitute the illicitly distilled and more deleterious *samsu* manufactured by the enterprising Chinese. Estates likewise realized a profit from toddy sales but these were paid into a welfare fund used for its labor force. Sastri recommended that the government cease the manufacture and sale of toddy in certain areas and eventually suppress it wholly for estate laborers. Indian nationalists generally took the stand that toddy was a drain on the laborer's wages (about a tenth of his daily earnings) and also on his health and morale. Planters usually insisted that closing down shops would simply encourage the mushroom growth of illicit *samsu* distilling. The Indian Agent's report for 1939 was a model of impartiality between these divergent views. He did suggest, however, that toddy shops be closed progressively and the hours for sales be shortened as a half-way measure on the road toward eventual total prohibition.

466 In respect to the more solid features of the estate laborer's diet, some but not much progress was registered. Estates were required by law to provide each laborer who applied with a plot covering one-sixteenth of an acre, on which he could raise such foodstuffs as he desired. This law was seriously enforced only during the First World War and the depression periods. The laborers themselves were fairly indifferent. When they could afford to buy additional food they found farming too much trouble; they felt themselves to be transients on estates, and usually they utilized their garden plots only if they were handy to their living quarters. Some employers were alive to the importance of improving their

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laborers' diets; some took care to furnish hand-milled rice and to provide free and nourishing meals to the workers' children. But too many among them, complained the *Straits Times,* still thought that their responsibilities toward their labor force were ended when they had paid their wage bill.[3]

Free medical care was not dispensed to mine laborers, although the health conditions prevailing among mines were the object of official solicitude. Miners, as well as state and industrial workers, were entitled to compensation for injuries received during the course of their employment. The Workmen's Compensation Law of 1932 covered laborers (and their dependents) who earned not more than $200 a month and who received injuries resulting in death or disablement for a period exceeding seven days, or who contracted occupational diseases. Employers were liable for payment of the benefit. Death benefits for an adult worker amounted to a sum equal to thirty months' wages, or $1,800; for a minor the sum was $200. If an adult sustained total permanent disablement the sum paid him was equal to forty-two months' wages, or $2,400. Injuries for which other compensation might be obtained were carefully gauged: loss of an arm, for example, was compensated according to whether it was amputated at or above the elbow, which counted as a 70 per cent reduction in earning capacity; the loss of any finger other than the index was reckoned at a 5 per cent decrease. Temporary disablement was compensated for a period not exceeding five years; semimonthly benefit for an adult was $10 or a sum equal to a quarter of his monthly wage. Minors received money equal to a fifth of the monthly wage. No other system of social insurance was in effect.

Both Malaya's Controller of Labor and Mr. Harold Butler of the ILO, who toured the country in 1937–38, were assured by a number of large employers that the Workmen's Compensation Act had produced excellent results and had no tendency to encourage malingering. Administration of the act was in the hands of commissioners to whom workers could and did apply directly for advice or for the settlement of their disputes without going through legal formalities. Nevertheless, the ILO representative felt that more should be done in Malaya to enforce safety regulations. In most of the factories he visited, the machinery and belts were unfenced, safety posters were entirely lacking, and few or no facilities existed for dealing with accidents. He added, however, that the "existing Labor Code has succeeded in preventing serious abuses and is now under revision with a view to the promulgation of a Factory Ordinance which will permit a higher standard of health and safety in factories." Apparently no such ordinance was passed before the country was invaded by Japan.

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[3] *Straits Times,* January 10, 1939.

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Unemployment

[458] 464 The economic depression of the early 1930's caused widespread unemployment among both Europeans and Asiatics. Reduction of their European staffs by rubber companies, and to a smaller extent by tin mines, created a serious problem among those two groups of the Occidental community. The majority of those discharged left Malaya, and the remainder were cared for largely by a committee formed in Kuala Lumpur, with six branches located in other Malayan centers. The aim of this organization was to retain in the country young planters whose services would be valuable as soon as the major industries recovered. Most of the planters still employed suffered salary cuts of 15 to 25 per cent, and no bonuses were distributed as had happened in prosperous years. A simultaneous decline in the cost of living helped Europeans to weather the storm, though living costs for Asiatics fell far more sharply.

464 167 Repatriation helped to solve the unemployment problem for alien Asiatic laborers. Those refusing repatriation were willing to work for wages often reduced to a point below living costs, eking out a living as best they could by means of side activities. With the return of relative prosperity in 1934, the stream of Indian emigration to Malaya was resumed. And in 1937 the suddenly increased export quotas for the rubber and tin industries brought thousands of additional Indian and Chinese laborers to Malaya. This sudden and large demand created a temporary labor shortage, but the government was too wary to be stampeded into opening the floodgates. Its caution in this instance mitigated the unemployment subsequently induced by the recession in 1938 which, by halving Malaya's export quotas, left many estates and mines with a surplus labor supply. [439] A further aggravation of the unemployment problem was the practice among smallholders of selling their export rubber coupons whenever tapping became unprofitable. [746] The buffer pool scheme, engineered by the tin restrictionists, somewhat alleviated the situation for Malaya's miners but it was the Federated States' relief program which made a more important contribution. It also marked a radical departure in the government's labor policy.

464 746 From the standpoint of human misery the situation of laborers in 1938 was not comparable to that prevailing in either 1921 or 1931, but the solutions tried in those times were no longer practicable. The philanthropic Chinese who had built camps for their jobless compatriots in the postwar depression had been disillusioned by the restlessness and discontent of the laborers found willing to stay in them, and too often those who did not remain embarked on careers of theft and violence. Wholesale repatriation through government agency was no longer feasible because of political repercussions in India and because of the Japanese war

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in China. Moreover, memories of 1934, when Malaya had been caught short of labor by a sudden return to better market conditions, made both planters and mine-owners anxious to maintain their payrolls and to try spreading work around as best they could. The government dared not launch extensive land-settlement schemes because of the Malay's opposition to permitting alien Asiatics to infringe on their monopoly of rice culture. The Federated States initiated a public-works program, as the only solution thus far untried, but unfortunately it failed to absorb even all of those registered as unemployed. Public opinion in Malaya was not yet prepared for a further departure from the country's *laissez-faire* traditions, preferring recourse to the time-honored device of wage-cuts. If the authorities in the Federated States had been gifted with prescience, they would have foreseen from this policy far direr consequences for the rubber industry than the losses that would have ensued from a more comprehensive official relief scheme—even one patterned after the limited efforts of the Straits Settlements.

To any impartial observer the contrast between the relatively liberal relief measures taken in one part of Malaya and the reactionary policy followed in another area was totally incomprehensible. This divergence was clearly underscored in the fall of 1938 by a decision to grant Straits $950,000 from public funds for the relief of unemployment in Penang and by a simultaneous refusal on the part of the Federal Government to sanction spending a single cent for similar purposes in Kuala Lumpur. The explanations usually given were that Penang was a port town to which the destitute naturally drifted and that the chief advocate of unemployment relief in the federal capital had alienated the local authorities by his tactlessness. A report made by the Salvation Army established the fact that, compared with the Straits Settlements, conditions in Kuala Lumpur were far more alarming. The appointment of a committee to investigate the problem was generally regarded in Malaya as so much official eyewash.

In Singapore the Jubilee Fund, capitalized at almost $4,000,000, had supported in the years between 1936 and 1939 about 3,000 persons annually. The skillful way in which it was administered made it a model for the rest of Malaya's towns and the precursor of a more ambitious program of local relief. During the same time-span the corresponding fund in Penang, with capital amounting to $1,400,000, had administered relief to 788 resident families. Thanks to such efforts and to other economic factors it was reported at the end of 1938 that unemployment was at least not increasing among the inhabitants of the Straits Settlements. However, the administrators of the Jubilee Fund did not escape the usual criticism of racial discrimination. The question was fairly academic since the relief so administered was so small in scale as to be called "relief" by

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746 courtesy only. The maximum given ($25 a month) was only for Euro-
563 peans and for those Eurasians whose predepression standard of living approximated Western levels.

657 The whole question of employment relief never progressed beyond the embryonic stage in Malaya. The government was unwilling to face the issue squarely in regard to the white-collar class, among whom the unemployment problem was the most acute, and to initiate a uniform and adequate scheme for the whole country. In this as in other such matters it preferred to let private enterprise lead the way and then to supplement such efforts with piecemeal subsidies if, and only if, a crisis ensued. Only in the case of Indian coolies was the government compelled to take more active steps, owing to the pressure exerted by In~~dia and~~ to the importance of rubber to Malayan revenues and the world economy. The tin industry likewise was important financially, but the government did not fear pressure from China and far fewer laborers were involved.

Labor of Women and Children

[462] When the 1931 census was taken, it was found that women numbered about a fourth of those then gainfully employed, and everywhere they
464 were paid lower wages than men. The abnormal sex ratio characterizing all the immigrant Asiatic communities was in recent years a matter of
466 concern for the governments of Malaya and of India. Measures taken to make immigration to Malaya more attractive to families included differ-
167 ential rates of assessment giving employers an economic incentive to the employment of women; differential recruiting allowances in favor of married couples; payment of $1 bonus to each child of a nonrecruited immigrant; the employment of women traveling inspectors on the immigrant steamers to ensure the welfare of women and children; the provision of crèches, nurseries, and schools on estates; the payment of maternity allowances; the Hindu marriage registration legislation; and the provision of land allotments on estates. An additional attraction was offered by those employers who provided cottages for family occupation. In general the improved health conditions in Malaya were a decisive factor in family settlement and there has been a great increase in the number of children on estates in the past thirty years.

In 1939 the number of children on rubber estates came to between 37
464 and 54 per cent of the adult plantation population. Schools for those between the ages of seven and fourteen were required to be provided by
872 managers, if there were ten children or more on the estate. The education dispensed was admittedly of poor quality, necessarily so in view of the small salaries paid to teachers, and the problem of educating a motley array of Indian, Chinese, and Javanese youth. Another serious drawback was that education was not popular with the Indians, either parents or
children.

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children. Child labor was employed extensively on estates, whole families aiding in weeding and other unskilled tasks, and the sums earned by coolie children in the course of a year made an appreciable contribution to the family exchequer. 464

In the early 1930's an amendment to the Labor Code prohibited night work (defined as between 10 P.M. and 5 A.M.) for women of any age and for young persons under eighteen. Various miscellaneous laws proscribed the employment of children under fourteen years of age on ships, of those under sixteen in places using power-driven machinery, of those under twelve in any places other than estates, and of Indian immigrant children under the age of ten years anywhere.

Beginning in the years just prior to the First World War, Chinese women began coming to Malaya in ever-increasing numbers. For some time the government looked upon such immigration with favor as tending to improve the abnormal sex ratio among the Chinese immigrant community. With the growth of Chinese nationalism in the interwar period it became evident in Malaya, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, that the reconstitution on Malayan soil of Chinese family life was furthering the tendency of the Chinese to form a group apart. It was not until 1938, however, that restrictions were placed upon the entry of Chinese women. No exact data are apparently available as to the number among them who were gainfully employed. The only aspect of the problem that received any publicity was the *mui-tsai* system, whereby girls of poor Chinese families were bound over as domestic servants to those economically better situated than their parents. The abuse of this system brought into effect legislation designed first to restrict and then to abolish the practice. In 1932 an ordinance was passed requiring the registration of all *mui-tsai* and prohibiting the future employment in such a capacity of women not so registered at the time. 167 563 464 357

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LABOR LEGISLATION

THE EARLY ORDINANCES regulating Chinese, Indian, and Javanese labor were codified for the Federated States in 1912 and for the Straits Settlements in 1920. The former code underwent no fewer than twelve modifications before both it and the Straits Code were completely revised in 1923, as a consequence of negotiations with the Government of India. Until 1925, the Controller of Labor, who replaced the Indian Immigration Department founded in 1907, enforced the labor code in both the [671] 466

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466 Straits Settlements and Federated States from his headquarters located at Kuala Lumpur. Thereafter his control was extended to the Unfederated States, where most of the code's main provisions were subsequently enacted. In this way labor policy in regard to housing, sanitation, medical care, and wages was made theoretically uniform through the country, but in application it varied with the nationality of the laborer, the region, and the type of employment. Admittedly, on the protective side of its work, the Labor Department largely dealt with Indian labor; and on the immigration side its energies were exclusively absorbed by Indians. Officials of the Chinese Protectorate (later Secretariat) acted as assistant labor controllers for Chinese workers. An advisory committee on Chinese labor (without statutory powers) was set up for all Malaya in 1937.

466 647 Under the Controller of Labor were eight European and five Indian assistants, who were stationed throughout the peninsula. The Malayan Civil Servants (Cadets) engaged in the Department's work were required to have passed an examination in either the Tamil or Telugu language, and to have spent a minimum of eight months in India studying local dialects and customs. Similarly, officials of the Chinese Protectorate, who were given the powers of assistant labor controllers, had had to spend at least two years in studying Cantonese or Hokkien in China. The comparatively unimportant groups of Javanese and Malay laborers in the country were supervised by the officials in charge of Indian workers, and these officials had to possess a speaking knowledge of Malay in addition to their Indian linguistic equipment. In Kelantan and Trengganu the number of alien laborers was so small that control over them was exercised through the regular district officers.

Labor depots established in India were placed in charge of an Emigration Commissioner stationed at Avadi and of an assistant located at Negapatam. The duties of these officials included interrogating labor recruits to ensure that the conditions of their future employment had not been misrepresented to them, assisting voluntary laborers to reach Malaya, and inspecting labor camps and the ships transporting laborers to Malaya. An agent of the Government of India was stationed at Kuala Lumpur. He had the right to inspect and report upon all conditions affecting Indian labor, but was without executive powers.

466 686 In Malaya the Labor Department sent inspectors to visit estates and mines to see that the Code's provisions were being carried out and to investigate complaints. In 1936 complaints made to labor inspectors numbered 5,000, of which the great majority came from laborers employed on small Asiatic-owned estates and mines. About half of the complaints concerned the nonpayment or delayed payment of wages, and there were 91 convictions of employers or their agents for infringements of the labor laws that year. Simultaneously, 137 undertakings in the Straits Settlements, 731 in the Federated States, 84 in Johore, 282 in Kedah, and 16 in

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Kelantan were visited by the Department's inspectors. The majority of cases dealt with were settled by the Department's officials and only a few were prosecuted in the tribunals. The Sastri Report of 1936 paid a high tribute to the officials of Malaya's Labor Department, and in general gave employers of Indian estate labor a commendation for their adherence to the labor laws and for their good relations with their employees. 466 [686]

So many of the Labor Code's provisions applied only to specific categories of workers and so many departments were involved in their enforcement that detailed discussion of them is relegated in this study to the various headings under Working Conditions. By and large, the Labor, Health, and Education Departments gave most of their attention to Indian estate laborers, to whom the bulk of the laws applied. Mining labor was less closely supervised, although the payment of wages, housing, and health of the working forces were subjected to official inspection. Most of the miners were Chinese, who evinced no desire for Malayan official paternalism and were for the most part employed through the contractor system, and whose government did not intervene in their behalf. Many of the mines were so scattered about the country, often in inaccessible areas, that their inspection became onerous for the responsible officials. Factories, in which the majority of laborers was also Chinese, were more concentrated geographically, but they were not subject to many regulations, and the number of workers employed was so insignificant (compared with those in Malaya's major industries) that they were correspondingly less supervised by the officials. Urban labor, in both private and government undertakings, was nominally under the Labor Department's protection, but its officials admittedly knew little about the prevailing conditions of employment.

5

ORGANIZED LABOR

THE BASIC RIGHT of association was established for all groups by the Societies Ordinance of 1909. Official policy was designed to foster organizations, and the Registrar of Societies used his veto powers sparingly. No anti-strike legislation was enacted, probably because strikes were sporadic before the middle 1930's, and labor was unorganized, largely because immigrant Indian labor received official protection and the traditional Chinese mutual aid societies and guild organization performed a number of functions currently associated with trade unions. 467 468

The series of strike waves which began to affect Malayan industry about

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1936 precipitated government action in initiating a legislative framework for organized labor. The demand for such machinery did not come from the working classes nor from their employers, though the latter group gradually came to admit its necessity. International events inevitably influenced the course of its evolution, since Malay's labor forces were almost wholly alien, and political issues became an increasingly important factor in shaping its development.

Labor unrest during the middle of the last decade differed from its spasmodic predecessors in revealing the country's growing dependence on labor, owing to increased construction work and to a general improvement in the basic industries of tin and rubber. In addition, there was still no adequate machinery for arbitrating labor disputes. While previous strikes had been the logical outcome of certain recognized abuses, such as the contractor system of hiring Chinese labor, the strike of 13,000 coolies employed by the Sanitation Department of Singapore Municipality was a conscious attempt to take advantage of the general labor situation. Tamil coolies might still be called ignorant and illiterate but they were beginning to appreciate the force of the strike weapon and Malaya's dependence on imported labor. Local commentators, although not generally aware of the significance of this development, began to take a serious view of the situation. They found it hard to understand why such widespread discontent should exist among immigrants who had voluntarily come to Malaya to escape starvation conditions in China and India. The government saw more deeply into the problem: wholesale deportations were impractical, expensive, and productive of political repercussions, and the only alternative was to provide permanent industrial arbitration boards consisting of officials, employers, and workers' representatives to deal with the growing number of labor disputes.

The strike of the coolies employed by the Sanitation Department heralded others which, significantly, were not confined to one racial group. In October 1936 both the Indian and Chinese employees of the Singapore traction lines struck for higher wages and shorter hours; after a few days a compromise was reached. More serious was a strike at the Malayan Collieries during the next month, when 4,000 Chinese miners ceased work and prevented mining operations for several days. Their demands were for the usual shorter hours and higher pay, and also for the removal of certain irksome conditions at the mines. Both of these strikes exhibited a lack of organized leadership and some confusion as to the issues at stake. When asked by the Municipal Council to send delegates to discuss these, the Indian strikers replied that one of their delegates was up-country and the other could not be found. Yet despite such loose organization this strike spread rapidly and affected many hundreds of Chinese artisans in private construction works. Only minor acts of violence occurred.

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The more serious strikes among Chinese estate laborers early in 1937 reflected their dissatisfaction over not sharing in the rubber industry's returning prosperity by a restoration of depression wage cuts. In this case London had a share in the responsibility: while the government in Malaya and some of the planting community approved the laborers' demands, the directors of British registered companies were loath to sacrifice the first dividends they were enjoying for some time. Local European sympathy, however, was somewhat dampened by the interjection of politics into the purely labor issues. The strike degenerated into violence and the government felt forced to intervene, but the settlement subsequently negotiated granted most of the strikers' demands and led to the establishment of an advisory committee on Chinese labor, with a competence in the matter of wage regulation analogous to that of the Indian Immigration Committee. The Secretariat for Chinese Affairs, which had waged a long and generally successful battle for the regulation of contract labor, the settlement of local disputes, and the suppression of certain social evils arising from the presence of many thousand Chinese immigrants, was thus plunged further into the field of labor control. In a way the work now cut out for it was reminiscent of its early struggles with the Chinese secret societies in the late nineteenth century.

Though the power of the old secret societies had largely been broken by dispelling the secrecy surrounding their operations, they had continued to exist and were revived by the anti-Japanese boycotts and the forced collection of China Relief Funds throughout the 1930's. During the interwar period nationalist feeling among the Chinese in Malaya was on the increase, and proof of Communist proselytizing appeared in the evidence submitted in labor cases brought before the courts. The dissolution of the local Kuomintang party in 1930 by the Governor of the Straits Settlements contributed largely to the hostility felt by Malayan Chinese toward his major political reforms. The fresh impetus given to nationalist feeling, notably among the less fervent Straits (or second generation) Chinese, by Japanese aggression in 1937 revived local fears lest Malaya come to be looked upon both by the Chungking Government and its overseas nationals as a China Irredenta. Divided loyalties among the resident Chinese raised such delicate problems as their exact politico-economic status in Malaya. The increasingly pro-Malay policy of the government had aggravated the problem of employment for local-born alien Asiatics of the middle class, and in the late 1930's this group was developing a sense of permanent grievance.

Fears lest an uncontrolled labor movement, stimulated by irresponsible individuals and fanned by nationalist ferment in regions near Malaya, should endanger the country's tranquility received confirmation during the two years preceding the outbreak of the European War. In 1938 the recession affecting Malaya's major industries precipitated a new strike

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468 wave. Wage cuts on rubber estates were only partially offset by replanting programs and an unusually large program of public works. Chinese miners did not fare so well. Of the four important strikes which occurred in July and August, the one at the Hong Fatt mines was produced by an actual wage reduction, while the other three—all at Singapore—were apparently due to the city workers' belief that an anticipatory strike could forestall similar action being taken there. When workers at the Hong Fatt mines learned that their daily wage, which had already been cut from 80 to 60 cents during the previous few months, was going to be further reduced to 50 cents, rioting broke out and the police were called in. The strikers categorically refused mediation and the management, threatened with further losses from flooding, not only capitulated but actually increased wages. Although the wage issue had precipitated this strike, another long-standing grievance in regard to the contractor system had to be settled before the miners would agree to return to work. The management of the Hong Fatt mines abolished the contractor system, as the Malayan collieries, also in response to strike demands, had done the year before.

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In Singapore, after the management of the traction lines had refused its laborers' demands, employees of that company went on strike and refused arbitration unless they themselves were permitted to select the arbitrators. Although the traction workers had an organization of their own, it was soon obvious that its members were almost as suspicious of its leadership as they were of company officials, and they insisted that all the decisions be taken at a mass meeting of the workers. The strike dragged on for six weeks before a compromise solution was reached. Public opinion swung away from an early sympathy with the strikers' just grievances and from resentment over the company's long-standing monopoly of transportation in Singapore, to irritation at the inconvenience the strike was causing. Time was on the side of the government, for the public came to feel that this was no ordinary labor dispute between a commercial company and its employees. The government, it was said, could no longer afford to let so vital a public service be at the mercy of a few hotheads among the laborers or of an obstinate and independent business concern. This strike—the longest and most serious in Singapore's history—turned out to be a valuable educational experience: the company learned how quickly and how gladly the public dispensed with its services; the strikers learned the necessity for proper leadership and that all strikes could not be so quickly won as were their two previous walkouts in 1936; and the government was more than ever convinced of the necessity for setting up organized labor machinery.

The most significant aspect of this strike was that it established, for the first time, the principle of arbitration in labor disputes. Yet there were certain important omissions: the company's agreement to arbitrate did

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not include a withdrawal of its refusal to reimburse wage cuts made during the depression or the strike period; and the awards were made by an arbitration tribunal without assigning the reasons for them or setting forth any basic principles which might serve in future industrial disputes. The decision reached represented a compromise designed to settle a controversy that, had it not been promptly disposed of, might have led to further unrest and even produced a solidarity among the formerly scattered elements working for better labor conditions, especially greater security for urban workers. The inter-racial character of the dispute was shown by the active solicitude evidenced by certain Chinese associations for a group of strikers that was predominantly Indian. One cogent and significant argument used in favor of rapid settlement was that a decision adverse to the traction company might create serious discomfiture for other Singapore firms, since the wages and working conditions against which the strike was directed were at least as good as those generally prevailing in the Straits capital. 468

Although the settlement of this strike failed to eliminate the fundamental causes of labor unrest, the fact that it was submitted to arbitration, and that both parties unquestionably accepted the decision, was an important precedent. This strike, as well as two subsequent ones among the night soil coolies and the Singapore rubber factory workers for higher wages, revealed that neither the government nor the employee group was organized to cope with labor disputes. There was no administrative body equipped with either sufficient authority or prestige to influence capital and labor toward a reasonable settlement of contentious issues. Labor was so devoid of responsible leadership that a strike was frequently called before any demands were formulated, and there was no guarantee that the strikers would respect the agreement reached. The government could not but conclude that the day had come for organized trade unionism in Malaya, but its views were regarded as too advanced by the majority of local employers. The growth of strikes during the fall of 1938 and well into 1939 (among ricksha-pullers and sawmill, railroad, and construction coolies) into which the political element was increasingly interjected confirmed the government in its policy and won an ever-larger adherence to it among the general public.

The labor laws drafted by the government, with the advice of official and unofficial elements, were based largely on New Zealand statutes. In 1940–41 the rapidly increasing number of strikes resulted not only in the outlawing of strikes in certain pursuits essential to the war effort but in the promulgation of an Industrial Courts Ordinance. This law, a modified version of United Kingdom legislation of 1919, furnished additions to the existing informal arbitration machinery. It provided for a standing industrial court appointed by the Governor from independent persons and representatives of both employers and workmen, to which labor [671] 466 [468] 698

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698 disputes could be referred. There was also provision for setting up a court of inquiry to investigate matters connected with trade disputes.
466 The Trade Unions Ordinance regulated the organization of trade unions and protected the funds contributed to such organizations by their members. Its complement, the Trade Disputes Ordinance, concerned illegitimate strikes, defined as those unrelated to wages and hours, and the creation of organizations leading to a dislocation of the country's business. These measures required the registration of unions separately from other organizations and made them liable for contracts entered into by them or their agents. Immunity from civil suits for acts performed in connection with labor disputes was granted to registered trade unions and they could not be prosecuted on the ground of restraint of trade. The right of collective bargaining, previously nonexistent in Malaya, was [647] emphasized. It was further stipulated that government employees might not become members of trade unions.

These bills were criticized on all sides. They were condemned on the usual ground of being merely copies of British legislation without their sanctions. It was also said that they provided no protection to workers through their representation by lawyers, and that the courts would be neither representatively chosen nor amenable to the influence of public opinion. Outsiders—defined as employers, agents, or political agitators—were not legally prohibited from gaining ascendancy over a union, it was claimed. Obviously it was not enough that the government recognize trade unions; employers too had to do so if the measure were to be effective. It had long been contended that the mere suspicion of being a union leader frequently led to a laborer's dismissal. The CIAM, in particular, claimed that collective bargaining and the right of association were looked upon with grave distrust by both Malaya's employers and its government, and that until such an attitude was altered no amount of legislation could ever effect a genuine organization of unions. As proof of this contention the CIAM underscored the rejection by the government of its plea to form a wages board on the ground that industry and working conditions throughout Malaya made it impracticable. The government, as the largest single employer of labor, had an obvious interest in keeping wages low.

[185] The government in Malaya had thus pursued a constructive policy in regard to labor organization and legislation in Malaya prior to the Japanese invasion, and it had the courage and sufficient foresight to take the necessary steps in the teeth of opposition from reactionary and myopic groups of employers.

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POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS

AFTER THAT OF BURMA, the labor movement in Malaya is the most advanced of any in Southeast Asia. As in the labor organizations of its regional neighbors, socialist or communist ideology predominates in the political leadership of Malaya's labor organizations. At the same time the fairly equal racial composition of population has given rise to a separatism which distinguishes organized labor's evolution in Malaya from that of analogous movements in adjacent areas. Also, labor organization is widespread in Malaya's rural as well as urban regions in contrast to Siam and Burma, where it is generally restricted to the capital cities. In Malaya the Chinese form the vanguard, the Malays the rearguard, and the Indians occupy a middle position in the present organization of labor. Paralleling the changing political pattern, divergent nationalist sentiments have weakened the united inter-racial character of Malaya's labor movement, which was at its peak immediately following the Japanese surrender. 467 [563]

Labor Shortage and Unemployment

Labor shortages are more acute in Malaya than elsewhere in Southeast Asia inasmuch as the prosperity of the country's two major industries has always been dependent upon imported Chinese and Indian workers. Arrested immigration and the depletion and displacement of existing forces during the Japanese occupation have been aggravated by the unexpected development since 1941 of aggressive nationalism and of radical economic ideologies among all three major ethnic groups. Curtailment of Indian and Chinese immigration into Malaya, which is demanded by Malayans with increasing vehemence, is echoed by nationalists in India and China, but obviously for different reasons. As yet this problem has not been tackled by the British Government and in the meantime the position of the labor forces, whose numbers had been inadequate even before the war, has been strengthened by the increasing demand for their services, which are indispensable to a revival of the all-important tin and rubber industries. 464 167

For a few months after the Japanese surrender, unemployment existed in varying degrees throughout Malaya. Labor forces had been scattered and the wheels of industry not yet set in motion. No steps were taken, however, other than to initiate a registration machinery similar to that 464

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464 established by the CAS/B in Burma, nor were unemployment figures issued by the British Military Administration (BMA), probably because the population was recognized to be in a state of flux and the existing situation temporary. Within a fairly short time the slack was taken up and unemployment largely confined to the clerical class. This group had always numerically exceeded demand, and after 1942 its position worsened since neither the Japanese nor British military administrations had as much need of clerical services as they had before the war. Clerical unemployment may be expected to diminish as the civil government and industrial and mercantile firms resume operations, but at best the status of the white-collar class in Malaya can probably never become much more satisfactory than it was before the war.

465 The prevailing disparity between wage scales in the different parts of Malaya is obviously aggravated by current labor shortages. This situation existed before the war, but it has been rendered acute by the recent recrudescence of labor crimping. The BMA's rates for Indian estate labor were fixed at 70 cents a day for men, 55 cents for women, and 40 cents for children. Since the return of civil government the United Planters Association of Malaya (UPAM) has advocated $1 a day for men, with the addition of a 10-cent daily living allowance. (Chinese rubber tappers were at this time paid at the rate of $1.50 a day.) In the cities the BMA paid higher wages: men doing heavy manual work received 90 cents a day; those doing light labor, 85 cents. Probably urban labor currently employed by the civil administration or by private concerns is paid proportionately higher. Although estate labor is now required to cultivate food crops for its own use one day a week, for which the same wage is paid as for rubber tapping, and although the wage scale is appreciably above the prewar level, there is little doubt that there remains a considerable gap between wages and present living costs.

Strikes

468 Two months after V-J Day a series of strikes began which subsequently gained momentum. Characteristic of Malaya's labor evolution, even the first work stoppages were not confined to any one area, ethnic group, or occupation. Kuala Lumpur's railroad workers, coal miners at Batu Arang, tin miners at Ipoh, and Singapore's dock workers and transport employees—comprising Chinese, Indians, and Malays—were all participants in the early strikes.

Political motivation was lacking at this stage in all the strikes but that affecting the Singapore Harbor Board. Increased wages were the main objective and the strikers were generally willing to return to work pending completion of a peninsula-wide survey which the BMA pledged to undertake for the purpose of fixing a fair wage scale. The strikes which

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occurred in November 1945 were smaller in scope, affected less vital industries, and involved demands for higher pay.

Nevertheless it soon became evident that the strike movement had not lost its vitality. Although all the December 1945 work stoppages were confined to Singapore, they involved approximately 10,000 persons, lasted a number of weeks, and affected principally public utilities. Organized demonstrations and processions accompanied these strikes. Late in January 1946 the largest strike to date was called by the Singapore General Labor Union (GLU); its duration was very brief, but it involved several hundred thousand workers belonging to mercantile concerns and transport and recreation industries. This was the first strike motivated wholly by political considerations and it was called off after only two days, possibly because the local labor leaders felt that so large a strike was premature or because they preferred first to test their organizational strength in the peninsula.

In February the major strike scene shifted to the mainland: even on the east coast, at Kuantan, a strike occurred. At Penang, shipping and the great tin smelter were paralyzed by strikes. It was the western peninsular states, however, particularly Kuala Lumpur, which at this time became the main centers of labor unrest. For several months a strike, which started among the railroad workers at the former capital of the Federated States, spread to all the major peninsular rail centers. By April, when the railroad strike was on the verge of settlement, unrest became evident among the Indian estate workers of the west coast. Singapore simultaneously resumed its position as the nerve center of Malaya's labor movement when it experienced successive strikes at the naval base and among government and municipal workers throughout the summer of 1946.

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The great majority of Malaya's postwar strikes were motivated by genuine labor grievances, inflationary living conditions, and wide variations in the wage scale. The demands were for higher wages, larger rice rations, increasing living allowances, free medical care, paid holidays, and the like. Some strikes also had political coloring. The first strike by the employees of the Singapore Harbor Board was in protest against the loading of ships carrying arms for the suppression of the Indonesians' military activities. Singapore's two-day strike of late January 1946 was designed to bring pressure on the BMA in general and on the Johore police in particular to affect the release of arrested union leaders and to restore confiscated union property. In May striking Chinese wharf coolies asked permission to hoist the Chinese flag in celebration of the restoration of Nanking as China's capital; they also demanded the immediate dissolution of the local gendarmerie. Labor unrest among the Indian estate workers in Malaya paralleled similar movements among laborers in India.

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Labor Organization

467 The outbreak of the Pacific War caught Malaya's labor organizations in a state midway between politico-economic, clandestine activities, and partial recognition by the British Government. The nationalistic and communistic character of such organizations as existed, confined to the immigrant Indian and Chinese laborers, was sufficiently apparent to the British authorities to force a change in their policy from one of suppression to that of grudging and partial recognition for the purpose of more efficiently directing their development along strictly labor lines. The machinery for implementing this altered policy had just been set up prior to the Japanese invasion of Malaya.

[722] During the occupation, the major resistance offered to the Japanese came from the same groups that had organized local labor forces before the war, particularly from the Chinese Communists. The role they played during the occupation gave them greater opportunities for organization and leadership than ever before and also augmented their self-confidence. It subsequently earned the gratitude of the postwar British Government, which by its very nature was committed to encourage labor movements. Further, the interval between the Japanese surrender and the resumption of British control enabled the various racial groups in Malaya, especially the Chinese, to strengthen their ranks openly and to perfect their organization.

Throughout the fall of 1945 innumerable labor unions were formed throughout Malaya. They were organized along minutely divided lines, and few of them embraced even all the workers engaged in the same occupation in a given locality. Gradually greater unity was achieved and by the end of the year General Labor Unions (GLU) had been formed in the various states and in the Straits ports. The culmination of this centralizing trend came on February 15, 1946, with the establishment of the Pan-Malayan General Labor Union by the individual state GLU's.

Inevitably the GLU's have been strongest in the western part of the peninsula and in Singapore, which were the areas most highly developed economically before the war. Leadership in forming the Pan-Malayan GLU was assumed by the General Labor Unions of Singapore and Selangor, both of which showed their strength during the strike wave that began shortly after the establishment of the BMA. The Singapore GLU early in 1946 claimed a membership of about 200,000 laborers of all nationalities; that of Selangor, 38,000; and that of Penang, some 22,000. Solidarity among these nascent GLU's was demonstrated in January 1946, when the Singapore, Selangor and Penang organizations rallied to the support of the Perak GLU after its leading officials had been arrested.

That same month preparations were seriously undertaken for the

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formation of a Pan-Malayan GLU under the chairmanship of Loo Cheng, president of the Singapore GLU. At a two-day conference held at Kuala Lumpur, the Preparatory Committee dispatched a cable to the Security Council of the United Nations and to the International Labor Office requesting the use of their influence in effecting the release of arrested Perak labor leaders, and affirming the democratic character and world interests of Malaya's labor movement. Almost two hundred delegates attended the Pan-Malayan GLU Conference held at Singapore in mid-February. Eight of the fifteen resolutions passed at this session dealt with the political objectives of the newly formed Pan-Malayan GLU. The White Paper on Malaya was denounced: the British Government was requested to evolve a system of democratic self-government for the country, to aid the Indonesian nationalist movement, and to resolve Sino-Malay conflicts. Specific desiderata avowedly embodied the platform of the Malayan Communist Party. The newly formed body expressed its intention of seeking membership in the ILO, and the labor objectives of the Pan-Malayan GLU were stated to be unemployment relief, effective social insurance, paid holidays and sick leave, abolition of the contract and apprenticeship system, minimum wages and maximum hours—Straits $2.15 per eight-hour day—limitation of child labor, provision of schools for laborers, and prohibition of the sale of toddy and narcotics to laborers. 467

Racial Aspects

There is evidence that the racial solidarity manifested in the early labor organizations and strikes of Malaya is being undermined by mutually hostile nationalist and factional sentiments. The centripetal tendency is still embodied in the General Labor Unions, which have a membership (with sectional subdivisions) embracing all the major ethnic groups in the country. The centrifugal trend derives from the nationalist and factional antagonisms which are simultaneously and similarly altering the Malayan political scene. By the spring of 1946 the latter tendency was clearly delineated, particularly with regard to Sino-Indian relations. 467 563

Indian estate laborers were slower to organize in the postwar period than were the Chinese. The delay in resuming plantation activities and in assembling tappers dispersed during the Japanese occupation, the mutual isolation of estate workers—compared with the generally more urban concentration of the Chinese coolies—and the involvement of many Indians in Bose's Azad Hind movement accounted for the failure of Indian workers to become active in the labor movement before the spring of 1946. A stimulus to Indian labor's self-consciousness was doubtless the visit to Malaya of Pandit Nehru, who told the Penang GLU that he 467 563 468

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467 563 468 found workers' conditions in Malaya "shocking." The strikes that occurred subsequently among plantation workers were confined to Indians, and everywhere they complained of discrimination against themselves and in favor of the Chinese. In June the Indian coolies employed at two Chinese oil mills struck, and in neither case were they joined by any Malay or Chinese laborers. That same month J. A. Thivy, Labor Minister for Azad Hind during the Japanese occupation, tried to form an organization that would include all Indian laborers in Malaya. It has not been clear whether or not Thivy intended to set up a rival organization to the Indian sections of the various GLU's, with which he has also been affiliated. His main connection, however, is with the Indian Independence Movement, heir to the Indian Independence Leagues of S. C. Bose and centered in northern Malaya and southern Siam. It is possible that he projects an extension of this movement to mainland Malaya, using organized Indian labor as its spearhead.

The British planting community is well aware of this growing rift between Chinese and Indian laborers. In March 1946 the chairman of the United Planters Association of Malaya (UPAM) stated that Tamil rubber tappers were making a real effort to break away from the labor unions, which have been Chinese-dominated, and that this tendency should be deliberately encouraged by the district planters.

[668] Another trend, even more weakening for labor solidarity in Malaya, is the increasing factionalism within the Chinese and Indian communities, reflecting the transfer to Malaya of the cleavages in political alignments in the home countries. For example, the Penang Engineering Labor Union is pro-Kuomintang in its political sympathies and hostile to the Communist-dominated GLU. Among the Indians there is a growing rivalry between the Indian Independence Movement (IIM), comprising former Azad Hind adherents, and the Indian sections of the GLU for leadership of Malaya's Indian laborers. In July the Singapore police had to intervene between these rival groups after one of them threw bricks at a truckload of Indians on their way to lay a wreath on an INA memorial erected during the war under Japanese auspices.[4]

These developments, taken in conjunction with the longer-standing hostility between the Malays and Chinese, augur ill for the development of a unified, strong labor movement in Malaya and play into the hands of employers, both governmental and private, who care to pursue a divide-and-rule policy.

466 *British Attitudes Toward the Labor Movement*

Shortly after their return to Malaya, the British revived the legislation in force in 1941, which included the Trade Union, Industrial Courts, and

[4] *New York Times*, July 22, 1946.

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Trade Disputes Bills. But, owing to the shortage of trained personnel and preoccupation with more pressing problems, they failed to set up the machinery required to implement such prewar labor legislation. 466

On November 1, 1945, the BMA committed itself to supporting in principle the organization of labor in Malaya, with the proviso that unions must comply with the still wholly theoretical 1941 legislation. In February 1946 the BMA again went on record as willing to encourage the rapid establishment of legitimate trade unions as soon as was feasible after re-establishment of the civil government, but the Trade Union Ordinance, 1945, Malayan Union, was not even officially gazetted until June 21, 1946. A note of warning was sounded in the second official statement of February, to the effect that every effort would be made to prevent registered unions from being used for political purposes by means of extortion and intimidation.

During the preceding December an adviser, J. A. Brazier, was appointed by the Colonial Office to foster the organization of labor unions in Malaya and to assist in setting up machinery for the conciliation of labor disputes. The president of the Singapore GLU, in welcoming the appointment, expressed a hope that the new adviser would not obstruct the organization of Malaya's labor under guise of helping the country's workingmen. In October 1946, the Secretary of State for Colonies announced that a tripartite Labour Advisory Board would shortly be formed in the Malayan Union which would include officers of the Labour Department and employers' and employees' representatives of all races; also, that a similar board was planned for Singapore as well as a Joint Tripartite Labour Advisory Board to deal with the affairs common to both the Malayan territories.

The attitude of the British Government in Malaya toward the local labor movement has been one of decreasing sympathy, bordering recently on hostility. It has taken the general stand that the existing unions are a recent phenomenon born of wartime conditions and that they have become the front for subversive political activities. The British in Malaya seem to believe that Malaya's laborers learned to enjoy inflationary wages and acquired self-importance during the Japanese occupation. Labor strikes and demonstrations did not occur during the occupation, they aver, solely because of Kempei-tai brutality. Now that that agency has been removed, laborers are openly feeling their oats and are primarily concerned to prevent a complete return to postwar imperialism and capitalism, and the immigration of hordes of coolies. Their fears have made them ready to listen to any agitator who will help them retain and perhaps strengthen their privileged position, and they have become malleable puppets in the hands of alien Communists.[5] [668]

[5] *Straits Times*, July 10, 1946.

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This attitude, which is largely a survival of the prewar concept of Malaya's labor movement, was for some time mitigated by respect for the effective resistance put up by the Chinese Communists to the Japanese during the war. But it has been rapidly wearing thinner as strikes have increased in number, union organization has gained in strength, and the movement's political objectives have become more evident. The antagonism toward existing labor organizations felt by the BMA has been inherited by the civil administration which succeeded it in April 1946. Neither government nor private employers have apparently felt any scruples about using Japanese prisoners-of-war to break strikes, arresting and banishing labor leaders, raiding union premises, and thwarting labor demonstrations. The British are evidently willing to tolerate and even to encourage the growth of unionism in the Western sense of the term, but they seem equally determined to divorce the labor movement from its present political leadership.

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CHAPTER IV · INDONESIA

1

GENERAL LABOR CONDITIONS

THE WORKING POPULATION of the Indies is usually divided into three categories. By far the largest group consists of the agriculturists working either on their own lands or for other farmers; the second comprises laborers on estates and in transport, and the third is made up of those employed in industries. The classification followed by the NEI official statistics is based on technical lines and largely corresponds to the Indonesian social structure. Primary industry is defined as including sugar refineries, the tea and coffee industries, and in general all the productive activities of estates or plantations; secondary industry is taken to include the output of factories or workshops which use mechanical aids and employ fifty or more laborers. Cottage and small-scale industries, largely because of the small number of workers involved in the individual units and their use of hand tools, are placed in another category. 463

The last occupational census taken in Indonesia before the war (1930) indicated that out of the total population of 60,731,025, 34.4 per cent were gainfully employed—48.5 per cent of all the males and 20.6 per cent of all the females. Agriculture was the occupation of about 60 per cent of the 20.3 million Indonesians earning their own livelihood and farming was shown to be even more important in the Outer Islands than in Java, where the Indies' industrial production was concentrated. Approximately 10 per cent of the Indonesians were engaged in manufacturing, 5 per cent in commerce, and the remainder in a medley of occupations. [241]

Europeans, who formed the small managerial group in both business and government, were more diversified in their occupations. About a fourth of them were employed in the civil service or in the armed forces, and smaller groups were engaged in business and the professions. Some of them belonged to the white collar and laboring classes, especially those employed on estates or in factories as technicians or clerical assistants.

Of the 470,000 Chinese listed as gainfully employed, the largest percentages were engaged in commerce and in primary production. In

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463 general they—together with the Arabs—formed the commercial middle class of the Indies. The occupations of non-indigenous Asiatics were generally mercantile, but their pursuits were more varied in the Outer Islands than in Java. Java's more advanced social organization and denser population compelled a greater proportion of its residents to engage in secondary production, whereas in the Outer Islands 82 per cent of the workers were employed in primary production.

161 Java formed the great labor reservoir and main local market of the Indies; it produced for the islands' needs and for the export trade. Statistics reveal that in 1930 the density of the population in Java ranged from 800 to more than 2,000 persons per square mile, whereas in Borneo the average density was only 10.5; in the Celebes, 58; in Sumatra, about 31; and in the Moluccas the figure was even lower. Only on Bali of all the Outer Islands did the population density approximate that of Java. Thus, in 1930, a population numbering 41,719,000 was concentrated in an area of little more than half the size of Great Britain, and it has been increasing at the rate of about half a million annually. For some time the tremendous growth in population was neutralized to a certain extent by the cultivation of virgin soil, by increase in the land's productivity, and by the development of such export crops as tobacco and sugar which required large labor forces. But in the interwar period there was a growing recognition that the population problem was rapidly becoming critical. The limits of cultivable land had almost been reached; an 311 official commission estimated in 1937 that only about 750,000 acres of 433 unused arable land remained available in Java—or about enough to feed two-fifths of the annual increase in the population over a seven-year period. Further possibilities of increasing production on land already under cultivation would give but meager results because of the high intensity of use already attained. In some areas cultivation had already overreached itself, especially on sloping land where soil erosion was becoming a serious problem.

427 The average holding of a Javanese farmer was less than a hectare, and a considerable amount of the farming land was sharecropped. The de- 654 pression aggravated the problem by returning to their villages many of those who had been working on estates. The government, which years 242 before had prohibited the permanent alienation of native-owned lands 474 to non-Indonesians, stepped in to increase production by extensive irrigation works, distribution of selected seed, and education in scientific farming methods. The organization of Centrals, or cooperatives, enabled the farmer to get more profit from his toil, and credit facilities were established for the rural population. Price fixing, especially for basic crops like rice, was designed to improve the farmers' standard of living, as was also a curtailment in the extension of cultivated acreage in the 1930's.

Nevertheless the two main steps taken by the government to solve the

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Nevertheless the two main steps taken by the government to solve the problem were the emigration of surplus Javanese to agricultural villages in the Outer Islands and an industrialization program for Java itself. Since the development of plantation agriculture in the Outer Islands, notably on Sumatra in the late nineteenth century, Javanese coolies had been recruited to furnish a labor force which the indigenous peoples neither could, nor cared to, supply and which gradually replaced the more expensive and numerically inadequate labor of Chinese workers. Beginning in 1880, successive ordinances were promulgated governing the employment contracts for imported Javanese laborers. Severe penal sanctions were written into their contracts which were designed to ensure the retention of immigrant working forces in the Outer Islands. There were also advantages, which were not yet legally enjoyed by free workers, such as the establishment of maximum hours, rest days, free housing, medical care, and repatriation at the employer's expense. The contract was limited to a three-year period, and the penal sanctions were reduced by degrees almost to total abolition which was scheduled to occur about the date on which the Indies were conquered by Japan. The official program called for a progressive replacement of contract by free workers drawn from among voluntary emigrants to the Outer Islands and from Javanese farmers settled there in villages especially prepared for them by the administration. While this policy was successful in establishing a few thousand Javanese families in the Outer Islands and in contributing to the labor force, it provided no solution for the overpopulation problem of Java. A more hopeful possibility in this regard seemed to lie in the industrialization program for Java.

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Until the world depression, industry had undergone little development in Indonesia. In 1930 such industries as existed—mining and the processing of agricultural products—employed no more than 10.6 per cent of the working population. The ratio was higher in Java (than in the Outer Islands), where industrial employment ranged from 70 per cent of the total engaged in the metals branch to 83 per cent of all those employed in the manufacture of textiles. The depression stimulated Java's industrialization and forced official recognition of the growing gravity of the population problem and the suffering caused by so drastic a curtailment of the Indies' traditional import and export trade. It was also encouraged by an ever-growing Indonesian appreciation of the things which money could buy.

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The government's policy did not aim to alter the fundamentally agricultural character of the Indies nor its major role as an exporter of raw materials, but rather to improve the status of the farming community and to encourage such industries as would require large labor forces, help to create an Indonesian middle class, and make the whole area more self-sufficient. Production of, by, and for the Indonesians through small enterprises widely scattered throughout Java was the official goal. This

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654 policy was pursued even after the depression gave way to improved world economic conditions, and the outbreak of the Second World War provided an additional stimulus.

[438 446] Government activity in this field was manifold throughout the 1930's; it included the virtual creation of a local market, the training of skilled workers, and the restriction of industrialization to specified and appropriate areas. To arouse a wide Indonesian interest in the new commodities being manufactured locally, the government organized small and frequently varied exhibits throughout rural regions, employed native teachers to demonstrate their use, promoted fairs and competitions, and sent out numerous traveling salesmen to familiarize the most inaccessible settlements with the functions of new items and to persuade the people of the desirability of satisfying hitherto unsuspected needs.

[391] Indonesian small-scale industry responded by taking up the manufacture of the officially sponsored articles, at first in a primitive fashion and later in better managed workshops. In the years between 1935 and 1939, 433 Indonesian secondary industry ceased to be ancillary to agriculture and expanded. With the increased mechanization of agriculture, the demand for tools was enlarged and an industry for their manufacture and repair grew up, which in time not only supplied the needs of farmers but the growing shipyard and handicraft industries as well. The "needs" of Indonesians for manufactured goods developed so fast that they could no longer be supplied exclusively by the expanding handicraft arts, and [377] local mechanized production also grew apace. During this period the number of workers engaged in factory production tripled; the number of electric power stations rose from 299 to 458; the number of large weaving mills grew from 9 to 67, and about 700 other types of factories were established. The size and output of such factories was extremely varied (though all of them were of the Westernized type), and the number of workers employed therein ranged from twenty to four or five thousand.

[464] A great many more skilled workers than were available in the early 1930's were required to man the new factories, and the task of training them taxed the government's ingenuity. The supply of graduates from 874 the country's vocational schools was inadequate. Traveling instructors, who were themselves Indonesian skilled craftsmen and not white-collar academicians, were dispatched to train and guide workers in the rural areas. Since more teachers and supervisors were a prerequisite to further industrialization, private initiative was called upon to aid in the task of instruction. Local training schools were set up by the textile, shipbuilding, and other industries; yet the demand for teachers and trained workers continued to outrun the supply. Before the Japanese invasion of the Indies, there were 332 industrial schools giving instruction in the vernacular, and 379 where Dutch was the medium used; 28 Indonesian-language business schools, and 48 business schools in which Dutch was the

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language medium. Special government departments were created to implement the official industrialization policy, to guide vocational training, and to study and draft appropriate legislative measures. In 1934 the government assumed the legal authority to regulate the growth and type of industry to be developed in various areas, in order to prevent destructive competition and to encourage only such commodities as were needed in the different localities. 874 [656]

The Second World War called for an immediate expansion of the program, particularly for supplying defense needs. In 1940 the output from Java's factories rose substantially and employment increased by 12 per cent. In 1941 the new capital made available through the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands intensified production, but the expansion then planned was only getting under way when it was cut short by the Japanese invasion. Nevertheless the industrialization effort made by the NEI Government throughout the 1930's had no comparable counterpart elsewhere in Southeast Asia in respect to careful and intelligent preparation and execution. 433 654

There was, however, a very serious void in the official program in that it provided little legal protection for the industrial worker. A Bureau of Labor had been set up within the Department of Justice, but its special province was the contract estate worker. Undoubtedly official neglect of the factory worker was due to the comparatively recent industrialization of the Indies and the difficulties involved in exercising effective control over workers scattered about innumerable small workshops. 466

The physical and psychological make-up of the Javanese worker affected his status as a laborer and also the employer's and the government's policy toward him. By force of circumstance the Javanese has become as industrious as the Tamil and for much the same reasons, but his short stature and light build make him less suited to heavy work. According to the NEI Labor Inspectorate's reports, the pressure of population upon the soil's productivity and the low level of wages conditioned the Javanese worker to chronic undernourishment and other ailments. Reportedly he was at his best in repetitious tasks involving no great feats of strength, and after a brief training his performance in such operations was as efficient as that of a Western workman. The Javanese proved himself to be a good worker in such industries as cigarette and textile manufacturing, where his manual dexterity and inventiveness found expression, but his performance declined in proportion as the work he performed grew heavier. 461 147

The psychological factor that influenced his working status was his attitude toward wages. The Javanese seemed to experience no spirit of rivalry or of competition; apparently he never begrudged or tried to emulate another worker achieving higher wages. The more skillful worker did not demand better pay because he felt himself no more de- 461 [157]

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[465] 461 serving of it than his less talented colleagues. The prospect of larger income was small stimulus, and employers, who were only too well aware of this viewpoint, were able to maintain appallingly low wage levels. In 1912, for example, when a shortage of coolies occurred, employers did not offer higher wages as an attraction but increased the commission paid to recruiting agents. So long as most Javanese labor was casual and not wholly dependent upon employment for its livelihood, the argument that raising wages simply meant less work being accomplished remained valid. [464] The Javanese did everything to avoid becoming a full-time wage-earner, largely because it involved leaving his village community. The tradition of mutual aid and the prevalence of sharecropping permitted him to retain his freedom, his village life and his sense of dignity. Since the earliest European enterprises in Java were agricultural, the arrangement of part-time work supplied by nearby villagers proved to be fairly satisfactory to both the employer and employee groups. The former always found workers ready to labor temporarily or part-time for the smallest wage. The Indonesian was willing to make a tremendous effort to obtain an insignificant sum in order to satisfy some immediate need, and the European planter was spared the expense of supplying him with housing, medical care, compensation for accidents, and old age pensions.

[178] [427] 464 During the past decade the depression, together with population growth, curtailed employment on plantations and increased the rural element of the population which owned no land and consequently was forced to accept full-time wage employment. It was from this group, the embryo of a rural proletariat, that the growing factory industry of Java could draw its labor supply. Another factor, and one encouraged by the government, was a growing Indonesian interest in acquiring new commodities and in consequence a money-mindedness. [184] The growing group of factory workers came to approximate the status of the estate laborers in the Outer Islands regarding both their standard of living and their outlook. Both groups were sharply differentiated from the mass of Javanese, who if they accepted employment did so only temporarily to satisfy their few cash needs and returned as rapidly as possible to the traditional community life of householder farming.

467 The lack of organization among Javanese labor forces has been another handicap to their advancement. Since most Javanese wage earners were only temporarily associated with an enterprise and since such undertakings were widely scattered, there was little incentive or opportunity for them to organize in order to improve their collective status. Sometimes individuals or small groups practiced a kind of passive resistance by withdrawing to their villages if dissatisfied with working conditions, but this was usually not a concerted action affecting the entire labor force, no positive demands were formulated, and replacements by other laborers were easily effected. Although his village was a source of strength to the

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laborer in distress, yet its existence proved a kind of weakness since employers and the government were not compelled to assume responsibility for unemployed or superannuated workers. Such trade unionism as had gathered strength existed primarily among government workers who felt that they must maintain a living standard commensurate with the prestige which such positions assume in Oriental eyes.

Probably in the long run the intermittent nature of most Javanese employment worked to the disadvantage of employers as well as of workers. Employers of seasonal labor and purchasers of craft output could not count upon either regular or quality production. Because his technique was taught to him by relatives or neighbors and because he traditionally produced for an impoverished and unexacting Oriental clientele, the Indonesian workman took slight interest in turning out a perfect product on time. He made no attempt to compute costs, especially those involving the time factor, or to utilize his skill in the most economical way; only very slightly was he responsive to a decline or rise in the sale price. The result has been a product that usually did not meet the requirements of the Western market. This was met by Westerners who imposed their organization and processes but left only the actual labor involved in the hands of the Oriental producer. In the light of such factors the NEI Government has been wise in its policy of industrializing the Indies solely to supply the local market; in utilizing those features of Indonesian social life and traditions as could be adopted to such production; and in trying to maintain and to improve agricultural methods and living conditions for the mass of the population. Where it principally failed was in solving the overpopulation problem and in protecting by legislative safeguards the great mass of the people who were not contract workers.

2

TYPES OF LABOR

Forced Labor

FORCED LABOR existed in the Indies up to the time of the Japanese invasion but had been progressively reduced, and everywhere money commutation for such services was increasing. For certain local purposes forced labor was traditionally a part of the village system in Java and in the Outer Islands; village chiefs could require that each resident give a certain number of days' free labor for such communal purposes as night watching, sanitation work, and road maintenance.

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466 On certain private lands (*particuliere Landerijen*) owners retained ex-
425 traordinary powers up to the outbreak of the war, including the right to forced labor. Most of such private lands were located in West Java. Between 1910 and 1931 large sums of money were spent by the state to expropriate these private lands, thereby conferring on their laborers the same status as workers on the public domain. After the depression became severe, a semi-private company was formed to purchase the remaining private lands, but its work was never completed.

466 *Heerendiensten*, or forced labor required by the central government, had originated in the barter economy prevailing among Indonesians
651 whereby the only way in which they could fulfil their tax obligations was by the performance of labor on public works. The average number of days required for such labor was about twenty. Theoretically the native taxpayer had the option, with certain exceptions, of substituting money payment, but the majority of Indonesians were too poor to buy off the labor tax. Approximately 600,000 of the three million or so Indonesians subject to forced labor were able to commute it to money payment every year.

Forced labor on directly administered lands was first abolished in Java and Madura, where the inhabitants had more cash reserves than elsewhere and where the labor shortage was less acute. By 1938 the situation in the Outer Islands had become such that the government likewise granted them the right of cash commutation, and it was laid down that compulsory labor could no longer be required even when the supply of local labor was inadequate to carry out works of public utility. The Road Tax Ordinance of 1941 reduced the voluntary substitution of work for taxes in the Outer Islands. Persons whose living standards rose beyond a level determined by public decree for the various areas were required to pay the tax in cash; others were given the choice of paying taxes in money or of working on the public roads. The system was apparently so widely disliked by the Indonesians that their performance of forced labor was described by an American observer as "slow sabotage."

Immigrant Labor

[162] The non-Indonesian component of the Indies' prewar population was very small, forming only about 2.6 per cent of the total, but the political and economic importance of that group far outweighed its actual num-
651 bers. An indication of its relative importance is revealed by its wealth. In 1936 approximately 64,500 Europeans paid about 265 million guilders
434 in income taxes, and 40,155 non-native Asiatics (most of whom were Chinese) paid about 90 million guilders, whereas the money returns from income taxation of Indonesians amounted to only approximately 50.5 millions.

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Europeans. For official purposes the population classified as Europeans included not only all Dutchmen and others of European origin but other groups such as Eurasians and Japanese—those whose family law was considered to approximate that of the Netherlands or those who were by government decree assimilated legally to Europeans. In 1930 the non-native population comprised 208,269 Netherlanders (of whom perhaps 70,000 were "pure" Dutch), and 31,895 of other nationalities, including 7,381 Germans and Austrians, 2,414 British, and 7,159 Japanese and Formosans. Of the entire "European" population only about 36 per cent were gainfully employed in 1930, and of these 84.9 per cent were Dutch, 4.2 per cent Japanese, 3.9 per cent Germans, and 1.4 per cent British. Foreigners were chiefly employed in business concerns and in the production of raw materials—the latter occupation accounting for 49.9 per cent of the Germans, 69.1 per cent of the British, and 70.2 per cent of the Japanese. 563 [162] [463]

About a fourth of the gainfully occupied Europeans were engaged in government service. In western Java, where approximately a third of the entire European population was concentrated, about half of them were in government employ. In Sumatra about a quarter of the European population was engaged in estate agriculture, but both there and in Borneo a considerable proportion was employed in the oil industry. The Crisis Ordinance of 1935 limited the employment of European aliens, and as it worked out this restriction applied chiefly to business firms which habitually recruited their employees from home sources. Alien residents of nine years' standing were accorded special privileges. More than half of the Europeans in Java and Madura, and a somewhat smaller proportion of those living in the Outer Islands, were considered as permanent residents. Most of them were of Dutch origin. One interesting feature of the NEI's Open Door policy, which contrasted sharply with French practice in Indochina, was the number of non-Netherlanders employed in the civil service. Approximately 400 Germans served as functionaries (252 being in the police and in the army) although the German colony was not numerically very large. 647 463

Comprehensive legislation (*assistentenregeling*) passed in 1921 affected a certain group of European employees. The conditions of employment for European managerial staffs on the Sumatran east coast estates were regulated by laws of March 1922. By these laws, employers were required to make individual contracts (excepting with foremen and contractors) in which were stated the monthly salary, perquisites, share in profits, and number of holidays to which the employee was entitled. The obligations of employers in regard to the health and safety of their European staff were extensive, and especially specific were the rules governing termination of the contract. 466

Very different labor standards were applied to indigenous labor, and a 000

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466 Very different labor standards were applied to indigenous labor and a
563 reason for the retarded development of general industrial relations in Indonesia was the reluctance of European workers to make common cause
[464] with the natives to improve their common laboring conditions. Moreover, after the depression Europeans were more and more being replaced by Indonesians, so that by 1941 about a fourth of the managerial and approximately three-fourths of the overseer positions in Javanese factories were occupied by Indonesians. Thus Europeans were increasingly being relegated to the higher technical and top management positions in the factories.

[162] *Chinese.* The Chinese were the largest alien group in Indonesia, num-
563 bering 1,234,000 in 1930, and probably approximating 1½ million in an estimated total population of 70 million in 1940. Although here as elsewhere in Southeast Asia they originated principally in Kwangtung and Fukien and their arrival in the Indies long antedated that of Europeans, their position was different from that of their compatriots in Malaya,
[167] Siam, and Indochina. In the first place they formed only about 2 per cent of the total population and only about a third of them were immigrants. And although in the 1920–30 decade the annual rate of their increase was 4.3 per cent (of the 28,000 immigrants in 1937, 20,000 were Chinese), yet in Java the Chinese colony had existed for about three hundred years in about the same relative strength as in the last ten years. In 1930 nearly half of all the Chinese (582,431) lived in Java and Madura; in the municipalities they formed about 10 per cent of the urban population. On the other islands the largest Chinese colony was to be found in Sumatra (448,431) where they were predominantly immigrant laborers, especially in the tin mines and on the large rubber and tobacco plantations. The 108,000 or so Chinese of Borneo were mainly the descendants of old immigrant families and were engaged in agriculture, lumbering, and the like. In the Outer Islands as a whole only 11 per cent of the Chinese population was urban.

In the early days the Chinese community was organized under its own headmen who were responsible to the Dutch authorities in much the same way that Chinese were governed in Indochina. But in regard to residence and movement, and above all in their legal status, the Chinese suffered serious disabilities. A long-standing Chinese grievance arose out of the grant to the Japanese in the Indies (at about the turn of this century) of the privilege of legal assimilation to Europeans. But the restrictions placed on Chinese were progressively removed and they were granted a privileged position in the *Volskraad,* which in certain respects exceeded that accorded to Indonesians. In 1919 and 1925 the Chinese were by degrees removed from the jurisdiction of native courts and were able to move about with greater freedom, but in regard to procedural

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Chinese

criminal law they were never assimilated to Europeans although this action had long been under consideration. 563

In two other respects friction arose between the Chinese and Dutch authorities. Although China had formally recognized the Netherlands law of 1911, whereby those born in the Indies were regarded as subjects of the local government, the Chinese consuls established in the islands generally acted on the assumption that the local Chinese were still Chinese nationals. A second major difficulty arose from the depression-inspired law of 1931 by which the NEI Government attempted to curb immigration by raising the tax on all immigrants to 150 guilders. The subsequent attempts of the Chinese Government to secure a mitigation of this law were unsuccessful. The double loyalty issue became far more acute after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war and was still unresolved by the time Japan invaded the Indies. [167]

According to the occupational census of 1930, the 470,000 Chinese gainfully employed were distributed as follows: 31 per cent in primary production, 20 per cent in manufacturing, 27 per cent in commerce, a very few in public service, and the remainder scattered in various other occupations. 463

In Java, where there was little opportunity for the Chinese in agricultural work, only 9 per cent of the Chinese were engaged in primary production as compared with 58 per cent in commerce, whereas in the Outer Islands 44 per cent were occupied in the production of raw materials. On the whole the Outer Island Chinese were unskilled, illiterate, and transient laborers, having stronger ties with the homeland than had the Javanese Chinese.

The economic position of the Chinese in the Indies was decidedly higher than that of the Indonesians and out of all proportion to their numbers. It was estimated that 10 per cent of the foreign investment (or about U.S.$150 million) was Chinese capital, which in importance ranked second only to Dutch. Of the 354 persons paying income taxes of 25,000 guilders or over in 1936, 288 were Europeans, 60 were Chinese, and only 6 were Javanese. From the social and cultural as well as economic angles the Chinese were essentially a middle-class group. Their position was the object of resentment and jealousy by the less wealthy and less literate Indonesians and was essentially the cause of the early restrictions placed on Chinese activity. Yet because their total did not outdistance that of the native population; because the number of their immigrant workers rapidly dwindled in relation to the native laboring population; because their activities were more diversified and their geographic distribution more widespread; and finally because a great many more than half of the Chinese in the Indies were settled there and had identified themselves more with the islands than with China—more and more privileges were granted to them. In general the fear and competi- 563 [457 434 651]

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563 tion which the presence of Chinese caused elsewhere in Southeast Asia were in the Indies steadily diminishing forces.

464 The recruitment of Chinese coolie labor for Indonesian mines and plantations ceased in 1934, and by 1939 of the 332,439 coolies employed on European estates in the Outer Islands, only 26,067 were Chinese and about a third of these were contract laborers. Everywhere in the Indies the floating population of Chinese coolies shrank to insignificant proportions. Because of their superior skills and industry the number of Chinese did not dwindle to such a degree in industrial employment, but even there the proportion was not overwhelming. In 1930 there were about 94.000 Chinese among the 2,200,000 industrial workers of the islands, or 4.7 per cent of the whole. In more recent years after the Centrals, or cooperatives, began to flourish, Chinese contractors tried to set
463 up similar businesses but this attempt met with meager success. In small-
288 scale industry, however, and especially in the weaving branch, the Chinese did succeed in obtaining numerous small shops, but in them Indonesians were generally the laborers. Even this penetration aroused
[563] Indonesian nationalists in the *Volskraad* to demand regulations for the control of industrial production, similar to those prohibiting the sale of farmlands to non-Indonesians, but the government took the stand that they were unnecessary as the Indonesian community had evolved sufficiently to look after its own interests. But when an over-rapid expansion in the number of small weaving establishments took place between 1935 and 1940, many of their proprietors were forced to sell out, but not to other Indonesians, who usually possessed neither the capital nor ability to take over. In this way the Chinese became interested in this branch of industry, although they were being displaced in other fields by Indonesians.

178 It has been primarily in the role of middleman and concurrently as moneylenders that the Chinese have flourished in Java. For many years the
442 merchant had no place in the Indonesian community, which was made up
565 of a mass of farmers and a handful of aristocrats. Into this void stepped the Chinese who became the buyers of produce as well as the distributors
426 and collectors of merchandise for European export and import firms. But in almost all these fields the Indonesian, with government aid, was progressively cutting out the Chinese; in consequence the Chinese problem had diminished in the Indies in a manner that exactly reversed the trend elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

167 *Japanese.* In 1930 the Japanese in Indonesia numbered 7,000, but thereafter the tempo of their immigration increased for a few years until it averaged more than 1,000 a year. Most of the newcomers were traders and agents of concerns in the homeland and were very different from the penniless Chinese immigrants whose survival and prosperity in Indonesia depended upon the degree to which they could be absorbed into the Indonesian economic organization and who did not enjoy the legal status

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of "Europeans." After the government took steps to check all immigration, the number of Japanese arrivals dwindled to a few hundred annually, or less than their annual quota of 800—the number to which all immigrants other than those from China and the Netherlands were limited. 167

Indians. The Indian component never formed a large element in the Indonesian population, although in the interwar period increasing numbers were arriving, especially in Sumatra, where they worked on plantations or were employed as overseers, clerks, or police officers. 167 563

Arabs. Arabs formed the second largest foreign Asiatic group and it was larger than the European community. In 1930 they numbered 71,000, of whom 42,000 lived in Java. Even more intensively than the Chinese, Arabs were engaged in trade and as middlemen. As in Malaya, the country of their origin endowed them with a special prestige in the eyes of the Muslim Indonesians. [442 443]

Agricultural Labor

According to the occupational census of 1930 there were in Java and Madura 9.7 million persons gainfully employed. Of these, 62.8 per cent were engaged in native agriculture and market gardening as their main occupation, and 2.5 per cent in cattle breeding. Taking into account undefined allied occupations, probably 69.6 per cent of the male workers in that area were dependent for their livelihood upon agricultural output. Since 1930 this percentage has probably increased. In the Outer Islands at the time of the occupational census the percentages were even more striking: 73 per cent of the working male population was engaged in agriculture and market gardening; 0.25 per cent in cattle husbandry; 0.45 per cent in the collection of forest produce; and 2 per cent in irregular, unskilled employment. If it can be assumed that half of the last mentioned group were engaged in farming, then for 74.7 per cent of the male workers in the Outer Islands agriculture was the main occupation. 241 463

The Javanese cultivator, dependent for his livelihood upon a small patch of *sawah* (flooded fields) and a tiny plot of dry ground, lacked the space to grow extensive crops, and in the past intensive agriculture had often proved all too unprofitable for him. Moreover, marketable crops in Java, such as tea, cinchona and coffee, came from the less densely populated part of the island, so that the average Javanese had to look elsewhere than to estate agriculture for his cash income. On the other hand, the *ladang* cultivator of the Outer Islands, who could use his fields for all types of perennial crops, was able to grow a great variety of commercial produce. Thus the agricultural economy of the main island differed radically from that of the outlying areas. 241 184

Java. Native holdings on Java were very small, amounting on the 000

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311 Java. Native holdings on Java were very small, amounting on the
241 average to no more than 0.9 hectare per landowner liable to pay land tax, and this area included both *sawah* and dry ground. The proportion in which these two types of land occurred on individual holdings was becoming increasingly unfavorable to their holders. Farming *sawahs* still held first place as a means of Javanese livelihood, but the proportion of flooded fields on the whole was declining, fortunately not so much as formerly because of the extensive irrigation works and also because wasteland suitable for cultivation was becoming scarcer and therefore the area of cultivated dry land was also becoming stationary.

427 Official statistics were taken by villages but did not take into account
[434] individual ownership of land in more than a single village. Consequently more landowners were listed than the number actually in existence. In any case the average of 0.38 hectare of *sawah* and 0.5 hectare of dry land for every Javanese landowner was insufficient to provide for his household needs. Probably a considerable proportion of these native landowners possessed merely a compound from which to derive their livelihood and were obliged to supplement their income in other ways.

[134] Two fortunate factors aided Javanese agriculture: one was the fertility of the soil and the propitious climate, and the other was the limited role played by large landed proprietors. Such large landholders as existed were mainly absentee urban dwellers whose properties were principally concentrated in western Java. Many of them were native functionaries who invested their savings in real estate; others were the regents, the landed gentry, and the *hadjis*. Landlordism occurred principally in the malarial districts, which the indigenous population had largely deserted.
[425] Its growth was probably favored by the official ruling that after five years' cultivation of a former government coffee plantation the land must pass into the hands of its cultivator and become part of his patrimonial estate. Although such estates increased rapidly, division by inheritance and the wastefulness of heirs were factors tending toward their subdivision. The
[563] main obstacle to the formation of large estates, however, was the long-standing law against the permanent alienation of native land to non-indigenous persons, so that transfers of that sort were difficult and could be effected only by devious and irregular methods. The native landed gentry seemed to acquire debts more rapidly than property, and the age-old subdivision of property among many owners militated against the amassing of any large number of adjoining ground plots.

[556] Two counteracting factors favored the growth of large estates: one was the belief that ownership of land conferred social standing and the other,
427 that cash income could be derived from extensive production for the ex-
455 port market. In recent years a strong effort was being made by traders and speculators, mostly foreigners, to acquire property or control the
426 marketing of produce. Temporarily these men were willing to retain the local people as farmers but they simultaneously cast covetous eyes

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upon the common village lands that were periodically redistributed. The 427
extent to which these speculators were acquiring a lien on Java's land, 426
especially as the result of moneylending operations throughout the de-
pression, aroused the government to increase its efforts to meet from 455
official sources the peasants' perennial need for money. It was gradually
recognized that the small sums originally loaned to peasants grew rapidly
to disastrous proportions because of usurious interest rates.

The traditional Javanese village had no use for capital, for each fam- 471
ily produced with a view to supplying its own very limited needs. Land
ownership was such a community's indispensable basis, but only to the 421
extent that it could be worked by the household, periodically assisted by
village neighbors. Houses, barns, and farm implements were all very 476
simple affairs and were built by the farming family and its fellow vil- 434
lagers. If a man enjoyed a good income, he was supposed to share it
with his relatives and friends, for wealth had primarily a social signifi- 454
cance. It enhanced a man's standing only in proportion to the generosity
which he displayed in disposing of it to the needy. Surpluses were not 556
retained as capital but were allowed to accumulate as wealth in the form 735
of foodstuffs, cattle, and jewelry. Paupers could count on help from
their fellow-villagers, with the result that no one was actually obliged to
save. Services were repaid by services rendered or by remuneration in
kind.

Western rule and Occidental economy brought with them the first 437
need and use for money. Taxes had to be paid either in cash or in
labor. The rapidly increasing population exerted an even greater pres- 452
sure upon the soil's productivity and produce began to be sold outside of
the village for money in order to obtain the new, imported merchandise. 421
Too often the time when the farmer required money did not coincide
with the period when his income was plentiful, and, unaccustomed to a
money economy, the Javanese cultivator procured loans of cash without
seriously taking into account its actual cost in terms of interest. The
country was entirely devoid of any organized native credit facilities, and
Indonesians were forbidden by law to raise money by mortgaging their
lands. Organized popular credit was supplied only by the government
and was dependent upon formalities and the ability to furnish security.

On the whole, however, the Indonesian community was probably only
superficially affected by the new money economy; during the depression
when money became scarce and many wage-earners returned to their vil-
lages the rural community was able at short notice to revert to barter—
insofar as it was compatible with tax and debt-interest obligations. A
certain type of native credit continued to prevail: loans of paddy for
sowing were usually payable in doubled amounts at harvest times; money
loans were also returned at such times with paddy serving as interest; and
other types of money advances were paid either in labor services or in

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437 cash at the rate of 100 per cent per annum. Various devices were used to
452 get around the land alienation ruling: merchants offered pre-payment
for crops at a discount; coconut palms and fruit trees were sometimes
421 mortgaged to traders; and alien moneylenders acquired a hold on farm-
land through a native middleman. Yet despite such incursions of a money economy, the chief desire of the Javanese villagers was to supply their families' needs by running their own farms with as little outside help as possible.

452 The government developed three forms of popular credit to aid the Javanese. About 500 state pawnshops were maintained by a special service in the more advanced areas and they enjoyed a legal monopoly to lend sums against the security of movable property to a total of 100 guilders. The rate of interest charged was regarded as high, but the institution proved useful in a society traditionally prone to keep most of its wealth in the form of jewelry and gold coin. Rural credit facilities were likewise organized. Of these the village granaries (*dessa lumbungs*) loaned paddy free of interest, to be repaid in kind at the harvest, and village banks were set up to make small money advances which were usually returned in ten weekly installments. These two village institutions were under the supervision of the headman, aided by the village scribe and representatives of the borrowers. Such money loans usually did not amount to more than 5 or 6 guilders, and many of them were made to traders and craftsmen. Larger loans were at first organized in the form of Divisional and Regency credit institutions, placed under the guidance of Dutch and native civil servants, but in 1934 they were merged with the Central Bank for Popular Credit and thereafter they functioned only as branch offices. In Java the average loans from this institution amounted to 53 guilders, but in the Outer Islands they averaged as much as 134
[474] guilders. The central institution supervised the operations of the village granaries and banks and encouraged, albeit without great success, the formation of cooperative societies.

474 Such cooperative societies as existed also furnished a certain amount
[452] of rural credit. In 1935 they numbered some 300, most of them being credit institutions; more recent years were marked by a greater development of producers and marketing cooperatives. But by the end of 1939 the number of all such societies aggregated only 560, of which nearly 90 per cent were located in Java; their total membership came to only 52,555 (422 credit cooperatives with 42,807 members). Consumers' cooperatives had declined in importance until they numbered only seventeen in 1939. The thirty-one industrial and agricultural production cooperatives included a variety of enterprises: twelve were for rubber growing; two for the supply of raw materials used in cotton-textile weaving; one for the weaving of fabrics; and one for the operation of a tea plantation. Government aid was confined to an act promulgated in 1915 which gave

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the cooperatives a legal status and to the establishment of a Board in 1925, which twelve years later became a Cooperative Service Department with educational and supervisory functions. 474

Sharecropping was a native scheme of increasing prevalence, designed to solve many of the farmer's problems and well-adapted to the Javanese milieu. This system, whereby an owner handed over a *sawah* to another farmer in exchange for a predetermined portion of the yield therefrom, permitted individuals without enough land of their own to grow a staple food crop without having to become wage-earners and leave their place in the community life. It also enabled the landowners to acquire additional income without losing their property rights. Sharecropping was usually associated with rice cultivation, largely because that crop regularly enjoyed a steady market and its cultivation permitted a man to make the maximum use of his own and his family's working capacities. Both parties divided the risks and were equally interested in the outcome. Sometimes the owner had to come to the sharecropper's rescue by advancing him seed, implements and draft animals, but he usually lived sufficiently nearby to keep tabs on their use and their social level was not so different as to create a gulf between himself and his *métayeur*. The arrangement between the two was always oral and never covered longer than one crop year; the system was never truly commercialized. While sharecropping made two households largely dependent upon the produce of one plot of ground, it served to a limited extent to solve some of the problems created by the rapid increase in Java's population. 427

Outer Islands. The official answers to Java's growing population pressure were successively emigration to the Outer Island by contract laborers and permanent migration there by settled agricultural communities. The same small percentage of agricultural wage laborers in Java (6.6 per cent of the males gainfully employed on estates in 1930) was reproduced in much the same proportion in the Outer Islands; yet on Sumatra's east coast where two-thirds of them were concentrated the percentage was considerably higher—45 per cent of the 455,000 males there being gainfully employed. In the southern and eastern divisions of Borneo 7.9 per cent of the 277,000 male workers were coolies; in Achin, 7.1 per cent out of 258,000; on Sumatra's west coast, 3.4 per cent out of 491,000, etc. Thus the percentage of coolies in the total male working population of the Outer Islands did not differ sufficiently from the situation in Java to warrant the presumption that the local population could not have supplied all or at least a good proportion of the agricultural laborers required for estate development there. Further, the percentages which were already small in 1930 were subsequently reduced. The total number of wage laborers declined from 354,000 to 219,000 during the depression, whereas the population increased as a whole and with it the potential labor force. The explanation was, obviously, that the autoch- [166] 464 464 461

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464 thonous population did not desire to hire out its labor for wages and, unlike the Javanese, did not have to do so.

461 Usually all the men who wanted work could easily find it in their own village communities and consequently had no need to seek work on European-owned estates. The abundance of land and the small size of the indigenous population enabled the native farmers to concentrate upon cash crops like rubber and copra. But not all the natives of the Outer Islands were interested in, or capable of, producing for the export market. Borneo's population included a large proportion of wild, itinerant Dyaks, and plantation agriculture was almost nil in the Great East both because of the unsuitable terrain and because the few natives living there were "incurably indolent." Although there existed industrious and literate groups like the Minhassas of Northern Celebes, who were in great demand as clerical employees in business and the government, it was generally true that in regard to quantity and quality the labor supply available in the Outer Islands was seriously deficient as compared with that obtainable in Java.

[465 249] Wherever the Outer Island natives concentrated on commercial crops, production was usually carried on by family labor, although in some instances hired help was employed. Such wage laborers were normally paid according to the share-tap (*paroean*) system, by which the tapper received half the latex he gathered in payment for his work. When prices were low and labor scarce, the tapper sometimes received a larger share, and conversely got less when prices rose. Only exceptionally were share-tappers paid a fixed wage.

167 464 The development of estate agriculture in Sumatra about 1870 required the recruitment of labor elsewhere, at first from China and later from Java. Originally private agencies were the medium used for obtaining Chinese coolies, but gradually recruiting was effected either through the Protector of the Chinese at Singapore or through an official bureau established at Swatow. In more recent years the mechanization of the tin mines at Banka and Billiton curtailed the need for contract Chinese laborers, as it also did in Malaya. By 1939 Chinese contract miners numbered only 309; the trend toward recruiting Javanese instead of Chinese prevailed in the tin industry as it had in plantation agriculture.

Until 1909 the recruiting of Javanese estate labor likewise remained in the hands of professional agents, but in that year planters were encouraged by law to appoint their own agents who were often aided by worker-recruiters, who operated like the *kanganies* of Malaya. The Deli Planters' Association led the way by setting up its own agency in Semarang, and direct recruiting by employers gradually became widespread. Nevertheless competition from professional recruiters remained serious enough so that the two principal estate organizations in 1929 bought out the last surviving professional recruiting office and agreed thereafter to supply

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laborers to estates who were not members of their organization. The arrangement for a time proved to be largely academic since the depression curtailed drastically the Outer Islands' need for imported labor. By the time recruiting was seriously resumed, Javanese had not only become by far the largest racial group among the contract laborers but were also emigrating as free laborers and forming colonies in Sumatra which went far to satisfy the labor demands of local estates.

Less enthusiasm was shown by Javanese laborers for emigrating to such distant places as Surinam and New Caledonia, for which the contract period was five years instead of three and the health requirements were higher. As a result of negotiations between the Dutch governments of the East and West Indies, the latter were allowed to recruit 800 laborers a year in Java. British Malaya and New Caledonia likewise received permission to recruit a certain number of Javanese workers annually under very specific conditions, but the expense and the formalities involved were such that Malaya found it easier to fill its labor requirements from India, and New Caledonia from Tonkin. Despite the elaborate regulations established by the NEI Government, certain categories of migrant laborers remained outside the scope of its laws—that is, spontaneous emigrants, even if they had in view employment as plantation coolies, and also recruits for employment on native holdings in the Outer Islands covering less than 71 hectares.

The official agricultural colonization program in the Outer Islands was designed primarily to help solve the labor shortage there and it was applied, though to a far lesser degree, to Borneo and Celebes as well as to Sumatra. In the two former areas exploitation of natural resources was intensified throughout the last decade, but colonies of Javanese workers did not materialize in those islands until 1937 and 1938. By the end of the latter year some 8,000 Javanese colonists had been settled on Borneo and Celebes, and the official program for 1940 called for the settlement of 19,000 additional colonists on the two islands. However, such experiments were dwarfed by those conducted earlier and on a far larger scale in Sumatra.

As long ago as 1905 a start was made with the establishment of colonists in the Lampongs district of Southern Sumatra. Many difficulties were encountered but these colonists weathered the storm, helped by credit and necessities supplied by the government. In 1908 the experiment was extended to Bencoelen, and later to Sumatra's east coast. The government ably took into account the traditional willingness of the Javanese to migrate in order to improve their status, but also recognized that in leaving their home island they required careful handling and suitable conditions. The Javanese could be induced to emigrate only as a group and not as individuals. They wanted *sawah* land, and there was only a limited amount of arable and irrigable soil in the Outer Islands; new

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166 colonists could thrive only under conditions analogous to those in Java. Nor could they be settled if their activities were to conflict with the rights of a rapidly increasing indigenous population.

The Lampongs colonies were moderately successful but by 1927 they comprised only 24,000 members. The fewness of their numbers and the expense involved in their settlement forced the government to seek other means, especially when the depression was rendering Java's overpopulation problems acute. Realizing that the colonists already established in Sumatra required extra help during the harvest, the government selected such periods as the best time to introduce new settlers, and almost at once the traditional Javanese habit of mutual aid operated to the advantage of both groups. Although the initial cost of bringing new settlers to the land remained high, thereafter the expense declined sharply. In 1937 some 4,400 Javanese families were settled in the Lampongs at a cost to the government of only 45 guilders per family, whereas in the 1920's the sum had amounted to 300 guilders per unit. Additional funds were, of course, required to provide irrigation and other types of public works. A more careful selection of colonist material also helped to achieve improved results; candidates were required to be of good behavior, in excellent health, and to be married but with no more than two very young children. These new methods were so successful that colonies were rapidly established in other areas, and the number of emigrant colonists annually settled in the Outer Islands rose from 7,000 in 1932 to 40,000 in 1939. In the latter year there was a total of 76 settlements comprising 164,552 colonists who cultivated an area covering 37,749 hectares.

Handicraft Workers

438 The skills developed in the practice of native arts and crafts were probably more important in the training of Indonesia's future industrial 434 laborers than in terms of actual output, though the income derived from them was an important factor in Indonesian household economy. The working of wood and metal, weaving, and batik production were traditional native crafts which survived because of a steady local market in which European goods did not compete.

Cottage industry, strictly speaking, was the non-agricultural output of farming families in their spare time, produced by hand-tools with primitive techniques, and was designed to augment the household income. The industry was almost wholly in the hands of Indonesians and was usually carried on within the family circle. Most of the output was bartered in the family's own village, though a smaller part was sold elsewhere. Sometimes the raw materials were supplied by a middleman (*bakul*), in which case the article was delivered to him in return for wage payment. Although the sums received by families were individually

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small, they formed a not inconsiderable part of the cultivators' income. 434
An analysis made in 1903 of the budgets of five million farmers in central Java showed that an average of 17 per cent of their revenues came 438
from the proceeds realized from the sale of cottage industry and from the raw materials used therein. A more recent investigation indicated that this percentage had been generally maintained, and it has also been claimed that the addition to the national income from this source might be estimated at 110 million guilders annually. Materials and tools used in cottage industry were imported to the annual value of approximately twenty million guilders.

Many and varied were the forms which cottage industry assumed. [442]
In some instances it was combined with small-scale industry in complex forms. The advantage of such a combination lay in a more efficient division of labor and in the encouragement of collaboration between workers; its main disadvantage was the additional powers it often gave to *bakuls,* who were chiefly concerned with increasing their profits and their hold over such workers.

Industrial

Of the estimated total of about 2,800,000 workers in secondary industry in Indonesia, approximately 2,500,000 were engaged in small-scale 464
enterprises, defined as workshops employing fewer than fifty workers 438
and using hand tools almost exclusively. All but about 100,000 of the workers in small-scale industry were Indonesians, who worked in small 433
shops located on their own land or on that of the workshop's owner. Probably about half of these workers lived in village communities. In addition, a group of *bakul*-workers, perhaps some 40 per cent of the total, sold their products either wholly or principally to middlemen, while some 15 to 20 per cent labored in hand-operated factories employing not more than fifty workers.

The rapid growth of small-scale industry throughout the 1930's has 474
been attributed both to increasing Indonesian "needs" and to the government's encouragement of Centrals, or cooperatives. The success of the 438
Central has been primarily due to its intelligent utilization of two factors in Indonesian life—the tradition of mutual aid among fellow-vil- 433
lagers and the enlistment of cottage industry's cooperation to meet the peak seasons which occurred after harvest times. Under the guidance of an Indonesian artisan-teacher, members of the Central came to look upon their clientele as members of their community and consequently to assume toward them the same responsibilities in regard to perfect output delivered on time. And by concentrating upon articles for which there was a steady demand throughout the year, the Centrals could relegate to cottage industry the production of merchandise that was either

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474 perishable or subject to the vagaries of fashion and for which there was
438 an intensive demand after the harvest had placed additional income in farmers' hands.

433 The decade 1930–1940 also witnessed a phenomenal growth in the number of Western-style factories, independent of those associated with small-scale industry and estate agriculture. In 1930 the total number of mechanized factories came to about 4,800, and four years later they numbered approximately 6,000, with about 300,000 workers.

The government's policy of developing the country industrially is shown even more strikingly if we compare the figures for factories in operation that exclude those connected with agricultural industries, such as rubber and rice, and with transportation—railway shops—and also such small and home industries as most of the textile factories. With these exceptions, the total number of factories on January 1, 1930, was 2,837; on January 1, 1940, it was 4,872, an increase of 71.7 per cent. The war naturally accelerated the industrialization program and in 1940 alone 500 new factories were established, employing some 25,000 additional workers. If the development which occurred in 1939–40 can be taken as a basis, it can be assumed that fully 55,000 workers were being annually assimilated into the factory industry. About 70 per cent of the factories were located in Java, though a few important plants were set up in the Outer Islands. The chief development was registered in the textile weaving and metals branches. An official policy established that none of the factories should be large, and that they should be widely distributed throughout Java, not only because the narrow length of that island rendered transport costs a potent factor but because widespread distribution of employment and output was considered advantageous to the Indonesians from a socio-economic viewpoint.

654 For the growth of industries since 1940 unfortunately no statistics are
433 available comparable with those quoted above, because in that year the basis for enumeration was changed. There is much evidence, however, that the invasion of the Netherlands gave great impetus to the industrial
722 development of her dependencies. The effect was not, however, immediate. In the new type of statistics beginning with 1940, only fifteen new factories are listed for the Netherlands Indies, not including war industrial plants. But the output of existing factories increased substantially. Employment increased by 12 per cent that year, and industrial machinery by 4 per cent. On April 1, 1941, a supplementary budget was approved for the Indies which made government assistance available to industries up to Fl. 10,000,000 (about $5,300,000). This aid did not, however, take the form of cash grants but was to be administered as relief from taxes, duties, ground rents, and other payments. In short, the government encouragement of industry in the Indies was not merely theoretical but practical.

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3

CONDITIONS OF WORKING AND LIVING

Wages

In the Indies no general minimum wage standards were fixed by law. 465
The coolie ordinance of 1931 required employers to pay their contract workers sufficient wages "to provide adequately for the normal necessities of life." The cost of living was periodically established by the Inspectorate after a careful inquiry into prices. When the ordinance was amended in 1936, it was laid down that overtime work should be paid at 1½ times the regular rate and the manner of payments should be stipulated in the worker's contract. Ordinances covering operations in certain specified industries dealt with pay scales: for example, in the sugar industry the government was empowered to fix minimum wage rates for the lower-paid category of laborers but as late as 1936–37 this authority had never been used. However, at that time employer organizations in Java were obliged to submit regular reports on the wages they paid and these were checked by the Labor Inspectorate.

As in other aspects of working conditions, the wages paid to contract laborers tended to set the standard for free workers, but there was no legal compulsion. In general, wages were lower in Java than in the Outer Islands, and the depression forced down wages there to extremely low levels. Not until October 1936 did the government intervene, and although it requested estates to report on the wages they paid, it continued to regard the wage scale prevailing in state mines as confidential. During the months following the inquiry, labor inspectors reported that little improvement had been made in the wages paid on most estates, so that the government in 1937 circularized the planting community, suggesting that improvement be effected. Its argument was not only that wages should be raised in order to help laborers meet the increased cost of living but that they should reflect the better economic conditions generally prevailing in the Indies. According to a statement made by the Minister of Colonies in the States General in November 1937, a wage increase had been granted amounting to as much as 25 per cent for factory labor employed on sugar estates. But since comprehensive statistics of the cost of living were not available, the real significance of these wage increases could not be estimated. In its report for 1939 the Labor Inspectorate summed up the situation as follows: "Although no report is here given of the intrinsic value of earnings, we may, however, say in regard to wages paid on estates and industries in Java that there are

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465 some which anyone with the slightest insight into native living conditions could see are no reasonable compensation for the labor accomplished, especially considering the long hours involved."

[458] Any discussion of wage-paid labor in the Indies necessarily concerns only a very small part of the working population, inasmuch as fully 70 per cent of the Indonesians farmed their own small plots and raised only about enough crops to assure their families' survival. And even for wage-paid employees the data available on earning power are fragmentary. It can, however, probably be safely assumed that the low wages prevailing throughout the depression period would have affected the population more disastrously had not the cost of living also dropped at about the same time. In Batavia, the only city for which cost of living indexes were issued, the fluctuation in living costs ran as follows: 1929—100; 1932—52; 1936—49; 1937—52; 1939—53; 1940—55; 1941—61. The reduction by more than a third in the composite index for Batavia between 1929 and 1932 was smaller than for food prices alone, which declined by about half during the same three years. In 1936 before the currency was devalued in September, the cost of living index reached its lowest point. Thereafter, under the stimulus of devaluation, improved trade and world rearmament programs, the cost of living rose slightly, and official pressure effected some proportionate improvement in wages, ranging generally from 10 to 30 per cent. The outbreak of the Second World War started living costs rapidly on an upward spiral.

Wages for Agricultural Laborers

464 Agricultural workers who were paid cash wages constituted not only the smallest portion of those engaged in farming, but the best-paid mem-
465 bers of this group were concentrated on the Outer Island plantations. However, by no means all of the estate workers were full-time, cash-remunerated laborers. This was particularly true of Java. The sugar industry, for example, employed skilled workmen such as overseers throughout the year; a second group was made up of seasonal hands—factory coolies, garden watchmen, etc.; and the third group consisted mainly of field laborers who worked irregularly and on a piece basis. The last-mentioned group differed from its colleagues primarily in that it remained an integral part of the village community and worked only as much or as little as was required to gratify its few pecuniary needs. Any wage, however small, was acceptable to workers of this group if they needed money, and conscientious scruples on the part of the individual plantation management were the only factor determining the minimum wage paid to them. In the returns for Java in the occupational census of 1930 it was revealed that only 6.6 per cent of the men and women were then reported as gainfully employed in agricultural enterprises,

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that is, as receiving wages from farming as their main occupation. Thus 465
wage-earning on European-type estates in Java occupied a very modest 464
place in the island's agricultural economy, and in the comparatively prosperous year of 1930 the total number so employed did not amount to even five times the average yearly increase in Java's population.

Wages fluctuated so greatly, even for the same type of work in various 465
regions, and all such data are so fragmentary that it is difficult to picture the wage scale as a whole. The lowest daily wage paid in prewar years to agricultural laborers seems to have been a tenth of a guilder, Bantam being the only area where male workers received such a sum for the preparation of copra. In Buitenzorg Residency the same pay was earned by women and children employed part-time in the local tea gardens. A slightly higher wage—G. 0.12 a day—was paid to women preparing cinchona in West Java and also to women rubber tappers in the Buitenzorg area, but women tea sorters in that same Residency received from G. 0.12 to G. 0.15. In general, men received higher wages for the same work than did women, male preparers of cinchona bark in West Java earning G. 0.23 a day as compared with G. 0.12 for women. Male harvesters in that same region were paid G. 0.35 as compared with G. 0.23 for women. In factories processing agricultural products, wages tended to be higher than in direct cultivation. Male workers in Buitenzorg tea factories were paid G. 0.30 to G. 0.45 a day depending on skill, and male clerks and foremen received a daily wage of from G. 0.50 to G. 0.80. Wages for carpenters, truck drivers, and masons ranged between G. 0.60 and G. 1. In computing the real earnings of agricultural laborers, however, account must be taken of certain perquisites and supplements. Some such workers received part of their wages in kind and in some instances free housing, medical care, and a daily meal, in addition to entertainment, were supplied by employers.

For the Outer Islands more information is available on wages paid. In 1939 the wages established or recommended by the DPV and the AVROS on their own estates or on those affiliated with them, fixed G. 0.32 and G. 0.27 as the basic daily wages for male laborers. These earnings were slightly higher than those established for contract workers, because of the requirement for employers of the latter group to pay wages for two monthly holidays and for the religious festivals specified in the contract. Overtime was usually paid at the rate of G. 0.6 per hour for men and G. 0.5 for women. Entertainment, such as shadow-plays and movies, were provided by most estates in North Sumatra but to cover the cost, G. 0.10 and G. 0.25 were often deducted from the laborers' monthly wages; some of the larger plantations provided such recreation gratis. It was not customary for estates to charge laborers a 871
fee for the education provided their children, but many of the estate schools which had been closed during the depression were not reopened, 465

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871 pending a decision by the government to grant subsidies for such facilities.

465 The manner and timing of wage payments for penal sanction workers were itemized in their contracts. New contract laborers were usually given an advance on their wages ranging from G. 0.50 to G. 2.50, repayable in installments of 2 to 5 cents. Contract workers were usually paid monthly; piecework wages were normally paid either by the day or week, and only exceptionally every fortnight or after the accomplishment of a task. Generally speaking, the pay system varied with the nature of the work. Tea and coffee pickers were usually paid by the day; rubber tappers every ten days or two weeks, and in their case it was customary to advance half a month's pay on their average earnings; workers on cinchona estates were paid every fortnight; and harvesters of sugar, fibre, kapok, and cassava crops were paid daily. Sometimes wages were paid by members of the estate staff, and in some cases by the contractor. The Labor Inspectorate was particularly vigilant in instances which involved the deduction of fines from wages.

The report for 1939 by the Labor Inspectorate gives the following wage rates for certain geographical areas in the Outer Islands and for certain industries in Java and Madura:

Outer Islands

West Coast Sumatra: G. 0.30 for men; G. 0.25 for women; a raise of G. 0.03 for re-engagements.
Djambi oilfields: minimum wages, G. 0.35 and G. 0.45; a raise of G. 0.05 twice every five years.
Bencoelen: G. 0.32 for men; G. 0.26 for women.
Palembang: G. 0.36 for men; G. 0.29 for women.
Lampongs: G. 0.33 for men; G. 0.25 for women.
Banka and Billiton mines: G. 0.55 at Banka; G. 0.67 at Billiton.
Riouw and dependencies: the same as the average level in Sumatra.
East Borneo: the same as the average level in Sumatra.
South Borneo: on agricultural estates, G. 0.27 for men and G. 0.22 for women, with a daily G. 0.03 premium; rubber tappers made a monthly premium ranging from G. 0.60 to G. 1. No uniform system of holiday pay and no pay for rainy days' unemployment.

Java and Madura enterprises

Batik: men earned G. 0.18-0.42 for a working day ranging from 7½-11 hours; women earned G. 0.04-0.10 for a working day ranging from 7½-9 hours.
Biscuit factories: G. 0.18-0.20 for men, and G. 0.15-0.18 for women, for an 8-9½-hour working day.
Bakeries: G. 11-18 a month, the working day averaging from 9-10 hours. For minor work in this industry women received G. 4-10 monthly.
Cassava flour mills: male workers received G. 0.15-0.25 for a 7½-10 hour working day.

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Printing shops: men working in European-type shops as compositors and printers received G. 0.34-0.45 for an 8-9½-hour working day. In Asiatic-type shops wages ranged from G. 0.25-0.85 for an 8-9-hour working day.

Metal industries: skilled workers received G. 0.60-0.80 for a 9-hour working day.

Rice mills: in milling work men received G. 0.20-0.30 a day and women G. 0.10-0.20 for the same length of working day of 9-10 hours. Workers engaged in sorting, drying, and storing paddy earned somewhat lower wages.

Cigar factories: men and women workers both earned G. 0.18-0.37 for a 7-9½-hour working day. Laborers in cigarette factories received somewhat lower wages.

Candy factories: men earned G. 0.20-0.38 and women G. 0.15-0.18 for a 9-hour day.

Tile and pottery factories: men received G. 0.30-0.60 for a 7½-9-hour working day. Women received somewhat lower wages.

Textile factories: men and women weavers both received G. 0.14-0.32 for an 8-9-hour day.

Soap factories: male soap makers received G. 0.30-0.40 for an 8½-9½-hour day. Male packers received G. 0.16-0.25 for the same length of working day.

In the section of cottage industry controlled by *bakuls*, the sums earned were so unbelievably small that they could hardly be termed wages; rather they were simply spare-time contributions to the family exchequer. Although earnings wherever cottage industries were allied to the Centrals were also insignificant, they still compared favorably with what was derived from cultivating the soil. Wages paid in small-scale industry were, in general, appreciably higher, although they varied greatly according to the industry and the locality. In the Centrals and in the new industries established during the 1930's, wages ranged from G. 0.3 to G. 0.10 an hour whereas in the *bakul*-controlled enterprises they amounted to only about half these sums.

Only factory workers might have been considered genuine wage-earners among the Indies' industrial laborers. Although the complete totals of wages and salaries paid in industry are not known, the amounts paid out in 1940 by a large percentage of the factories (employing about 146,000 workers) have been published so that a general estimate of the wages earned per worker is possible.

In any general consideration of the factory wage problem, it should be taken into consideration that there were considerable variations according to the industry, the racial group involved, the skills required, and the location of the enterprise. Printing presses, electrical power stations, and various machinery plants had a high proportion of the better-paid European workers, whereas textile factories used many Indonesian women workers who formed the lowest-paid group of all. On a geographical basis the lowest-pay rates were found in the Djokja dis-

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465 trict in Java. Overtime pay was not uniformly regulated; in some cases no extra payment was made; in others, regular hourly rates were earned; and in other instances the overtime rate was as much as 1½ times that paid regularly by the hour. In some industries workers were paid by the day, but in the larger enterprises usually once a week. Piecework laborers were paid either by the day or after the completion of their

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TABLE V: YEARLY INCOME OF NEI INDUSTRIAL WORKERS, 1940 *

Groups	Number of Workers (Jan. 1, 1941)	Estimated Average in 1940	Wages (in 1,000 G.)	Wage in Guilaers † per Worker per Year
Preserves, starch, rice mills, foodstuffs, soft drinks, vegetable oil, etc.	40,918	38,000	7,[illegible]5	202
Alcohol, ice, gas, soap, shoes	7,665	7,120	2,149	302
Rubber, woodwork	19,797	18,420	4,461	242
Dyes, chemical, zincographic, limestones	20,108	18,690	6,524	349
Iron, steel, press work, repair, and other metal constructions	58,283	54,600	22,734	416
Total	146,771	136,830	43,533	318

* Sitsen, P. H. W., *Industrial Development of the Netherlands Indies*, New York, 1942, p. 43.

† A rough calculation made in 1941 indicated that the purchasing power of a guilder in the Indies, in terms of farm produce, clothing, fuel, and other necessities, was about equal to that of two U. S. dollars.

task. A certain category of workers was paid by the month. In general, payment was less regular in the smaller establishments. In the batik industry, for example, wage payment often depended upon the sale of the products. Usually it was the manager or the factory owner who made the payments to the workers.

466 Since the NEI Government had introduced no general system of paid vacations, family allowances, or social insurance other than workman's compensation, the laborers lacked assured supplements to their wages. However, certain employers made grants or gave pensions. Specifically, the enterprises affiliated with the Java Sugar Employers' Organization, some of the railroad and tramway companies, the Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij, and a few other firms provided their employees with pensions and initiated some relief measures for their old employees—but not usually for their coolies. Savings funds were not infrequently established, but some of them were so badly managed that the Labor Inspectorate advised their discontinuance.

Hours

In Java and Madura the working day on estates did not exceed ten hours, and that maximum was reached only during periods of peak pro-

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duction. Normally work hours ranged widely from four to ten. Rubber tapping, for example, occupied from five to seven hours of the laborer's day. Rest periods were commonly granted but there were no regular holidays except those usually given at Lebaran. 466

In the Outer Islands the maximum number of working hours, rest periods and holidays were legally established only for contract workers. This type of laborer was ordinarily entitled to two rest days a month; free laborers usually enjoyed the same respite though they were not guaranteed it by law. Most of the agricultural enterprises kept to a nine-hour day. The majority of industrial establishments in Southern Sumatra maintained an eight-hour day, though the Labor Inspectorate reported two factories there which observed a ten-hour working day in 1939.

Only fragmentary information is available in regard to working hours for industrial laborers; a few clues to the situation prevailing in the various industries are given in the table under the wages section. So much employment was irregular that it is very difficult to generalize; Javanese cigarette workers, for example, were employed on an average of not more than 800 or 900 hours in a year. By the Industrial Cooperation Act of 1940, hours in wartime were limited to nine in any consecutive twenty-four-hour period.

Absenteeism, a charge frequently leveled at the Oriental worker, seems to have been justified in the Indies only in the case of the occasional laborer. Generally speaking, it was not prevalent among the regular labor forces which were dependent upon wage income, nor was it widely found in small-scale industry. An investigation of 300 small weaving establishments made at Madgelaja (Java) showed that, although the weavers worked on an average of not more than 6.4 hours a day, absenteeism was not serious among them. In the first spinning mill established on Java in 1937 absenteeism, exclusive of sickness or accident, amounted to only 3 per cent in 1940. However, absenteeism has been used by employers as an excuse for keeping down the wage level. In general, where it was used it was attributable to the Oriental's precapitalist psychology of expecting a large number of holidays. It derived from the weak physical stamina of many Javanese laborers, who suffered from chronic undernourishment and who kept working for more hours a day than the average European. And it also was connected with the multifarious domestic tasks performed by Indonesian laborers, especially the women, in addition to their wage-work. On the whole absenteeism was not related to wage scales—rises being so small and part-time work so prevalent that money earned did not constitute a major factor in this aspect of the laborer's attitude. [461]

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466 *Health and Safety Regulations*

As regarded health and safety, working conditions were better for contract than for free laborers, and were consequently of a higher standard in the Outer Islands than in Java. In the latter area not only were employers bound by no legal requirements, but so many of the workers were seasonal that any improvement in their health would have had to be extended over a very large proportion of the total population. Although many of the free workers in the Outer Islands enjoyed the same medical care as did contract workers, it could not have been rightly claimed that high health standards were maintained for the bulk of Java's workers.

466 In the case of penal sanction laborers, employers were legally obliged
744 to provide them and their families with free medical treatment and care in hospitals if necessary. During the time a laborer was hospitalized he and his family were entitled to food free of charge. Most of the estates employing free laborers pursued the same policy not solely out of humanitarian considerations but also from economic motives. The enormous improvement effected in health standards noted on estates since the beginning of this century was due not only to official pressure
[165] but to the planters' practical initiative and foresight. Systematic efforts were made by the Health Service established by the planters' associations to such good effect that the death rate among laborers in 1938 had been reduced to less than eight per 1,000. It was calculated that although their health services cost the planters' associations about G. 1,357,000 yearly per 100,000 workers, the reduction thereby effected in labor costs alone amounted to approximately G. 670,000 for the same period and number of laborers.

[742] The Indies' estates put to amazingly fruitful use the advances made throughout recent years in the control of tropical diseases. Particularly notable was the work of East Sumatra's Pathological Laboratory, which was maintained by the Medan Planters' Associations at an annual cost of about G. 100,000. As a result of such intelligent work the laboring population there, which had formerly been ravaged by disease, was probably as healthy as that of any group of workers in Europe.

Small estates and workshops naturally did not give the same medical care to their employees as did the larger enterprises. They could not emulate them in maintaining hospitals, though a number of medium-sized estates subscribed to a group hospital system similar to those in Malaya. Some of the enterprises located near towns were able to send their workers to the urban hospitals. But everywhere, even on the small estates, simple remedies were given out gratis to workers. While full or part-time wages were normally paid to laborers who had suffered accidents during the course of their work and compensation usually took

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the form of cash or rice, illness or accidents not occurring during working hours were not usually compensated for. The Labor Inspectorate was striving to improve and standardize the treatment of laborers in this respect, but it encountered a serious obstacle in the workers' dislike for and distrust of Western medical science. 744 [771]

The Inspectorate had authority to control only the general hygienic conditions prevailing in factories and workshops: the special Safety Control Service, which was also a part of the Labor Bureau, was entrusted with more specific tasks. The Safety Service was one of the oldest departments in the NEI Government, having been in existence since 1852 and having to its credit an admirable record in regard to the prevention of accidents in factories. Its officers dealt not only with the inspection of boilers and steam engines but also with enforcement of the Safety Regulation of 1910 which applied to electrical installations and factories involving dangerous processes. Generally, machinery was well guarded and safety posters were widely displayed, according to the testimony of an ILO representative in 1938. 466

According to the reports of both labor services, health and safety conditions varied greatly; they were usually found to be satisfactory in large undertakings but deficient in the smaller establishments. Provisions for light were lacking, notably, with consequent eyestrain prevalent among the workers, and washrooms were reported by officials given to understatement as often leaving much to be desired. When labor officials felt that conditions called definitely for improvement they reported the matter to the government which then could take drastic action, such as withdrawing the establishment's operating license. Here again, however, lack of workers' cooperation proved a handicap. Many cases were reported by officials where workers refused or neglected to wear such protective items as masks and dust glasses even when they were provided by the plant's management. Legal authority did not exist whereby wide and uniform reforms could have been effected.

Workmen's Compensation

By a law of May 23, 1939, employers were made liable for compensation for injury sustained by laborers working in establishments using one or more power tools; workers using poisonous gases, chemicals, or explosives; engaged in generating or distributing electricity; loading or unloading; in mining; transport, except at sea; construction; forestry; radio; and mechanized farming. Government employees, home workers (with certain exceptions), and a few other categories of working people were excluded. Benefits included transportation either to the injured worker's home or to a hospital, and medical care lasting for at least a year. Cash payments for temporary disability amounted to 80 per

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466 cent of the worker's wage for each day of disability for a month, excluding Sundays, after which the worker received half of his daily wage. Compensation for total permanent disability varied from 1.5 per cent to 37.5 per cent of the worker's wage for each day of disability, according to the extent of his injury. If death ensued in consequence, the funeral expenses and a survivors' benefit were to be paid by the employer.

In calculating cash benefits, workers' wages in kind were converted into money, at the prevailing local prices, and they included cash wages. The compensation accorded to injured seamen was also at the employer's expense, and was covered by a ruling of September 10, 1940. The terms provided by this law were slightly more liberal than those prevailing for *terra firma* laborers.

Housing

As in so many other aspects of labor problems, the law intervened only to assure suitable housing for penal sanction workers. The employer had to supply such laborers with free accommodations, and after five years' service workers were entitled to be provided with separate or semi-detached cottages. Although this was never legally required of employers of free laborers, the general trend throughout the 1930's was for their barrack-like lines also to be progressively displaced by the cottage-type of housing. In 1938 it was estimated that approximately a fourth of all the estate workers were living in cottages, whereas two years before there existed only 12,164 cottages for one family, 15,339 for two families, and 514 for three families. The rapidity with which this housing policy was adopted by planters was due to their general recognition of its importance as a factor in inducing workers to remain on estates and in increasing their general health and efficiency. In Java and Madura employers were under no obligation to provide their workers with housing, though it was voluntarily provided wherever employers were determined to retain a nucleus of their best laborers.

[362] In 1939 the Labor Inspectorate reported that large urban industries usually did not provide living quarters for their employees. In the case of small industries, whenever free housing was provided it was usually poor and little stimulus to improve their living quarters came from the workers themselves, who were quite accustomed to unhygienic surroundings. Moreover, many employers in Java dealt only with seasonal and occasional labor, and consequently were not eager to spend money on providing housing for such transients. In trying to improve workers' housing, the Labor Inspectorate acted in cooperation with the Public Health Services.

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The Employment of Women and Children

A large proportion of the gainfully employed women of the Indies were engaged in cultivating the soil and in cottage industries. In secondary industry they were thought to have numbered about 600,000, about a fourth of all the workers engaged in factory labor. In tobacco factories they were employed to the extent of 39 per cent of all the workers and in the textile industry they supplied 34 per cent of the laboring force. Where women's wages could be compared with men's for the same type of work, they were almost invariably lower. 462 464

Child labor (defined as employment of children under 12) was found to exist in various enterprises in Java and Madura, usually in the form of assistance to the parents. Adolescents between the ages of twelve and sixteen frequently were employed in factories and estates. In the statistics given for factory workers, in the years immediately preceding the war, probably a large number of apprentices was included, since the era was one of rapid industrial expansion. Although their exact number was not known, it has been estimated that from 10 to 15 per cent of the total were boys and girls under fifteen years of age, a considerable proportion of whom probably worked within the family circle. Taken in conjunction with the income earned by women, the joint wages of the female and adolescent component of the population must have formed a fairly sizable contribution to Indonesian family revenues. 464 [883]

Restrictions were first placed upon the employment of women and children in 1925. Thereafter it was forbidden to employ women, and children under twelve years of age, during the hours between 8 P.M. and 5 A.M., except in conformity with the exceptions officially granted for certain enterprises with special requirements. An ordinance of 1930 made sixteen the minimum age of employment for work in underground mines. Child labor was also forbidden in factories where power-driven machinery was used; in workshops habitually employing more than ten persons; in construction work; on railroads and tramways; and in dock work and warehouses. The NEI Government also applied the ILO Conventions relating to the age of admission to the employment of young persons at sea and as trimmers, and relating to the medical examination of young persons working at sea. The only objection offered by the Labor Inspectorate concerned the employment of young persons in tasks beyond their strength. According to its most recent report, the Inspectorate noted a decline in the number of cases where child labor was illegally employed in the Indies, that is, in 1.9 per cent of the undertakings visited in 1939 as against 3.8 per cent in 1938. Women could be legally employed on night shifts during the rush season in certain industries. In 1939, for example, 69 per cent of the sugar factories employed women to work at night. According to the Inspectorate's report.

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464 the total number of night hours worked by women in Java during 1939 was 452,129 as compared with 424,482 the preceding year.

Unemployment

[466] In the Indies, as elsewhere in colonial Southeast Asia, unemployment relief measures were generally confined to depression periods and to the European element of the population. Contract workers enjoyed security for the term of their engagement and were entitled upon its expiration to free repatriation. Discharged free laborers were usually absorbed by their native communities. In their case the government intervened only insofar as it curtailed immigration; it also set up vocational and technical schools, launched an industrialization program, and entered into world agreements regulating the export of some of its main products. [458] The marked prosperity enjoyed by the Indies during the 1920's was followed very swiftly and acutely by depression, since the islands' economy 166 was then largely dependent upon the sale of their produce in foreign markets. By 1931 there was considerable unemployment among both 464 Europeans and natives. Among the latter were thousands of contract workers who were repatriated to their homes and additional thousands of free workers who likewise returned to their villages. In fact the stream of unemployed which flowed back to the rural communities became such that the government feared it would flood even the traditionally self-sufficient Indonesian village, especially as the districts to which most of the workers returned were those which were already the most densely populated. But when even the poorest villages seemed able to absorb the influx without apparent signs of congestion, the government concentrated its few relief measures chiefly on that element of the population legally classified as Europeans.

464 The employment agencies established under government subsidy in the 1920's became more active during the depression but were never very effective. The number of persons registered with them was not large in relation to the total population or even to those unemployed. In one of the worst years, 1934, the total listed by the agencies as unemployed amounted to only 39,039. Government workers formed a very large proportion of the registered unemployed, accounting for 6,270 out of the 19,233 applicants reported at the end of 1939. Skilled manual workers came next in order of numerical importance, with a total of 3,676 registrants at that same time. But very few of those registered were placed, ranging from only 14 per cent of the total in 1934 to 20 per cent in 1940. It is interesting to note that the percentage of native applicants for jobs was generally much smaller than for Europeans, and that the rate of placement for the comparatively few women applicants was far larger than for men.

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In addition to the legal restriction placed upon the entry of alien Asiatics,[1] two other measures were passed in 1932 affecting transient workers. The first established the right of discharged European employees to repatriation at the employer's expense or to a month's salary. The second measure regulated dismissal notifications for employees on indefinite contract, the time period required depending upon the length of service already given. In 1935 restrictions were placed upon the immigration of Europeans into the Indies; thereafter employers desiring to hire European immigrants had to obtain a permit before their prospective employees could enter the country. And such permits were refused if an unemployed Netherlander could be found on the spot to fill the position. In 1937 this regulation was strengthened and extended to cover non-indigenous Asiatic immigrants. 464 167

Other types of government action in regard to unemployment included the establishment of an officially controlled and financed organization called *Maatschappij voor Werkloosheidsbestrijding* (MBWM). A public works program was initiated but limited to European unemployed and to Asiatics legally assimilated to Europeans. In general, direct relief measures were regarded by the NEI Government, as they were in Malaya, to be the province of private benevolence.

4

LABOR LEGISLATION

In 1854 the public sale of slaves became illegal and provision was made for the gradual abolition of slavery, beginning about 1860. The progressive elimination of debtor-bondage throughout the archipelago was initiated in 1872. But a more modern form of encroachment on personal liberty began at about the same time, originally in the guise of regulating domestic service. A police ruling for Soerabaja in 1829 endowed masters with legal powers over their servants through the imposition of a penalty for the non-observance of agreements, and by 1851 this penal sanction had been extended throughout most of Java and a part of the Outer Islands. 567 357 686

Almost thirty years later a shifting emphasis in the form of labor control had occurred through the development of the underpopulated Outer Islands by workers imported from other areas. It was at first concentrated on the Chinese coolies brought in for work on tobacco plantations in East Sumatra, and later it was applied also to Javanese coolies im- 466

[1] See p. 127.

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466 ported for the development of the Outer Islands' export crops and industries. Successive coolie ordinances, promulgated in 1880, 1884 and 1893, gave employers effective legal control over their imported labor forces. Contracts providing for free transportation, housing, medical care, and the regular payment of wages were limited to a three-year period, at the end of which a coolie might sign for another period or be gratuitously [686] repatriated to his native village. The terms appeared to be fair enough and to offer some slight relief for Java's surplus millions, but the growing opposition to them centered around the penal sanction by which, if a contract laborer refused to work or ran away from his job, he could be fined or imprisoned—the latter being usually the case because of the coolies' obvious impecunity—and then sent back to work off the balance of his term on the plantation.

466 The controversy which raged around the penal sanction began in 1900. Though it was not finally resolved until the 1930's, the govern-686 ment, embarrassed by criticism both at home and abroad, began to modify the sanction in 1909 by progressive restrictions imposed upon the 166 recruitment of coolies under contracts involving the penal sanction. The arguments generally used in favor of its retention were several. It supported Dutch claims to the Outer Islands by insuring their development, which could not be accomplished by the indigenous population. Since the great mass of Indonesians were of little account as taxpayers and the estates very much so, both the treasury and the people stood to benefit by a government with plenty of funds to dispose of. Emigration to the Outer Islands helped to solve Java's increasingly acute overpopulation problem, and moreover, the removal of some of its manpower would produce a favorable reaction on Java's labor market. The Javanese regarded penal sanctions as natural because they were accustomed to the investiture of the master-employer with punitive powers. The penal sanction rested upon a contractual agreement freely entered into by the coolie. The entrepreneur had made sacrifices to bring the laborer to his plantation and was therefore entitled to be guaranteed against his decamping without recompense. If foreign capital were not given every possible assurance of making profits the NEI Government would have to renounce its Open Door policy and the pecuniary benefits therefrom. And finally, newly engaged Javanese (and Chinese) coolies were not yet sufficiently mature to work under private agreements and the penal sanction provided a salutary and educational discipline.

The main arguments for abolition of the penal sanction were the following. The wisdom of forcing the development of Western enterprise in the Outer Islands by such artificial means was dubious, especially in view of its probable disturbing effects upon the indigenous peoples and of the many current instances of world over-production. Western enterprises were prone to demand an expensive government, whose support

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would be largely shouldered by the native population. Coolie emigration to the Outer Islands afforded little relief to Java, where the annual increase in population amounted to about 600,000 and whither coolies were repatriated when depression conditions struck the export industries. Contract coolies who returned to their homes found it hard to adjust to village life and formed centers of nefarious discontent. If the penal sanction were abolished, employers in the Outer Islands would be compelled to break with the recruiting system and offer working conditions that would tempt the indigenous population to labor for them. A tractable, docile labor force like the Javanese should not be subjected to control by youthful Europeans who were too often enervated by the climate and abused their power. Basically the coolie did not enter freely into his contract since it was well known that the Javanese never accepted wage labor except from dire economic necessity. The relations between employer and employee created by the penal sanction were unworthy of free men, demoralizing to both parties, and made virtual slaves of the laborers. And finally, the penal sanction weakened the international position of the government by giving foreign critics ammunition as well as opportunities to create difficulties for the regime and for its export trade.

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Gradually abolition of the penal sanction gained headway, thanks to the ethical policy of the Dutch liberals, the depression which reduced the demand for laborers, the success of agricultural colonies in the Outer Islands which increased the local supply of free labor, and, finally, a proposal made in the United States Congress to exclude Sumatra products from the U. S. market because they were produced by forced labor. In 1931 a measure became effective whereby the older enterprises were required to reduce the proportion of contract coolies in their employ to 50 per cent within five years; the cases to which the penal sanction was applied were limited; and re-engagement contracts were declared to fall outside its scope. A fresh order in 1936 hastened abolition of the penal sanction. According to its provisions no laborers working under the penal sanction might, after January 1, 1940, be in the employ of any concern established before or during 1921 (which included the majority of enterprises operating in the Outer Islands), and estates dating from 1922–1927 were required to abolish the penal sanction by 1941–1946. In October 1939 an ordinance was issued requiring abolition of the penal sanction in all contracts of re-engagement, the reduction to two years of the limit of labor contracts including such sanctions, and the restriction of the system as a whole to agricultural and industrial undertakings. When the Second World War broke out, the number of employees subject to the penal sanction came to only 6,531 as compared with 327,405 non-contract workers, and in November 1941 the Governor General was able to announce the system's total demise as of January 1, 1942.

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[686] 466 464 166 One contradictory consequence of the labor contract system was that the standards set for that category of workers became generally higher than those for free labor, and the latter's great advantage come to lie simply in its freedom from the penal sanction. The methods of recruiting contract labor were revamped and its working conditions steadily improved. In 1936 more specific regulations affected the drawing-up of contracts. Thereafter all contracts had to be signed in Java; the prospective employee was required to appear armed with a permit of emigration from his village headman (*loelasns*) at the port of embarkation; and married women emigrating without their husbands had to have a special certificate of authorization. At the port of departure the recruit was required to sign a written contract under the eye of an official, who twenty-four hours before had read and explained its terms to him. Any worker refusing to sign had to be repatriated at the expense of his prospective employer or the recruiting agency. All recruiting operations were now in the hands of employers' associations which had been approved by the Department of Justice. In 1939, 25,347 laborers were recruited for work in the Outer Islands. Estate employers' organizations were not allowed to receive any remuneration for this type of work, and their native agents were not permitted to operate in a region to which they were not indigenous. Recruiting agents were required to maintain transit camps both in the interior and at the port of embarkation. There, candidates' fingerprints were taken, medical examinations given, and new clothing was presented to recruits emigrating for the first time. In 1939 the comparatively small number of recruits rejected on grounds of physical debility indicated a better selection of candidates at the hinterland depots.

466 Legally, free laborers were not entitled to the same protection as safeguarded the contract worker, although in practice the standards set up for the latter tended to prevail for the former category. In Java, particularly, no such regulations existed for the protection of local workers as existed for their compatriots working under contract in the Outer Islands. Although a labor inspectorate functioned in Java, its staff was small, its work complicated by the great number of scattered enterprises, and its effectiveness based on its powers of persuasion and suggestion rather than on law enforcement. In recent years the reports of the Labor Inspectorate on the whole commended the working conditions on the large estates and in big industries, but were much less favorable to small enterprises. Labor inspectors in Java were hampered by the fact that the workers there seldom lodged complaints or would give any relevant information even when undesirable conditions were found to exist. Javanese workers were not as yet well enough acquainted with the service to trust it completely. The Inspectorate received many anonymous letters, usually from coolies in urban industrial enterprises who

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complained chiefly of long working hours and arbitrary fines. In 1939 466
only 115 cases of undesirable working conditions were brought formally to the attention of the Java Inspectorate—chiefly "slap-cases"—so the Inspectorate concluded that maltreatment on that island did not assume alarming proportions. In the Outer Islands the substitution of free for contract workers was regarded by the Inspectorate as responsible for a reduction of bad treatment and absenteeism, and the chief complaints to the Inspectorate there were in regard to personal violence, failure to pay wages in full, and excessive prices prevailing in estate stores.

By the Ordinance of December 17, 1925, the NEI Government gave 464
effect to the ILO Convention relating to the employment of women and children at night, subject to certain reservations. The local government also applied the conventions regarding the age of admission to employment at sea, that of young persons as trimmers or stokers, and medical examinations for adolescents working at sea. Employment in the tin mines of Banka and Billiton, in great majority of Chinese coolies, was carefully regulated by the ordinances of 1927 and 1932, and some additional legislation in regard to mines was also issued. The Safety Regulations of 1910 applied to electrical installations and to factories involving dangerous processes.

Apart from such provisions there was no further regulation of indus- 466
trial employment. Hours of work were not regulated by law and, with the exception of workmen's compensation for accidents, there was no public social insurance protection for Indonesian workers prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War. The question of establishing old age pensions and unemployment insurance for wage-earners was under discussion for some time but no action had been taken. Such protective systems as existed were for government workers and employees of private enterprises which had of their own volition set up insurance projects. It should be noted, however, that in the Indies as everywhere throughout the Far East health standards and minimum wages and hours were more satisfactory in the large European enterprises and were far harder to establish and enforce in small scattered undertakings with fragile capital structures and a majority of part-time workers. Also there was little incentive to improve working standards in a country where concerns offering the lowest wages and most unattractive working conditions were able to obtain almost all the labor they ever required.

Prior to the depression, government intervention had been largely 656
negative, and the most constructive of its efforts was the prohibition, 421
dating from the latter part of the nineteenth century, of the sale of native 471
lands to non-Indonesians. Other early government action had been confined to regulating the ownership and control of such enterprises as public utilities and of certain estates and mines. And in the 1920's 468
official control continued mainly to be repressive: for example, its curtailment of unionization and the severe penalties imposed upon strikers.

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tailment of unionization and the severe penalties imposed upon strikers. But the depression and later the war greatly increased government enterprise and intervention. The government's policy of industrializing Java, as discussed above, affected the island's working population and the Second World War ushered in a great many more measures, which had both direct and indirect consequences for labor.

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In September 1939 the prices of a number of commodities were fixed, although a stringent control of all domestic price levels was not considered necessary up to the time of the Japanese invasion. The government bought and stored some surpluses which had accumulated, owing to the enforced curtailment of the export trade. A General Authorization Ordinance of that same month empowered the Governor General to promulgate any law necessary for the defense or economic mobilization of individuals, groups, or industries during the emergency period, and toward the end of the year a draft project was completed for the establishment of labor rules in industrial enterprises. When the Netherlands fell in May 1940, martial law was declared and two other ordinances were issued, one of which related to the mobilization of industry and the other to the institution of compulsory service by civilians.

According to the Industrial Cooperation Ordinance, which authorized the government to make stipulations in regard to pay scales, the voluntary cooperation of all industries in the defense effort was called for, but compulsion was officially authorized wherever investigation should prove it indispensable. The government could compel cooperation in the regulation, employment, dismissal, and transfer of labor; the regulation of conditions of employment, and of the production and distribution of goods; and the conversion, unification, and expropriation of plants. The Civilians Service Ordinance provided for the enlistment of labor in carrying out the defense program; on July 11, 1941, the government introduced compulsory military service for natives. (The latter law was made popular by the provision that Indonesians were to receive the same treatment as did their European colleagues.)

Laws that were more strictly labor legislation were also inspired by wartime conditions. A Workman's Compensation Act became effective as of January 1, 1940. A special Labor Relations Law was passed on December 16, 1940, to regulate the wartime relations between employers and employees, though it was not proposed that this law should supersede existing labor legislation except in points where a conflict arose between new and old conditions. To carry out its provisions a Commission on Labor Affairs was set up with twenty members; six were government officials, seven represented employers, and seven the employees. The new law provided that if an employer of fewer than twenty persons discharged a worker or effected an unfavorable change in the conditions of employment, the employee might appeal to the commission, from whose deci-

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sion there could be no appeal. Employers of more than twenty persons were required to serve the commission with a written notice and await its decision before discharging an employee or making unfavorable changes in their laborers' conditions of work. The last-mentioned provision applied only to establishments engaged in producing for the war effort but in all other such undertakings, although the employer was free to act as he saw fit, he nevertheless had to report within a month on such steps as he had taken to the commission. The payment of pensions, allowances, and other occasional expenditures in connection with labor also fell within the competence of the commission, and if circumstances required it, the commission was also free to submit its suggestions on labor affairs to the Governor General.

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In 1941 additional regulations established conditions for the employment of native or foreign Asiatic labor, but the specific branches of industry to which these new laws would apply were to be itemized by government order. Hours were in general limited to nine in any consecutive twenty-four, and unfair practices in the dismissal of non-European agricultural and mining workers were legally guarded against. Thus, the war stimulated the promulgation of important measures affecting the conditions of labor in the Indies, albeit without as yet establishing any minimum wage standards. Probably most of them would have survived the emergency period, since many provided basic labor legislation long overdue.

Labor Bureau and Inspectorate

The Labor Bureau was set up in the Department of Justice in 1921 for the purpose of drafting labor laws and compiling statistics. Two years later the Labor Inspection Service, which had been in existence since 1908, was placed under this bureau, but it did not begin to function seriously until 1930. In 1925 the Safety Inspection Service was likewise transferred to the Labor Bureau. Subsequent legislation expanded its competence to include eventually every phase of the government's interest in labor problems.

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The Labor Inspectors and other officials of the bureau were responsible for supervising the observance of such laws as those regulating the employment of women and children and of the Coolie Ordinances. In investigating certain industrial disputes which affected the public interest, the Labor Inspectorate was consulted. Further, in certain enterprises the Labor Bureau had regulatory powers, which included the granting of such exemptions as were authorized by law. Although the number of inspectors was gradually increased they were even in 1939 too few to be widely effective. The task of controlling the numerous small enterprises of Java and of visiting at least once yearly all the estates in the Outer

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647 466 Islands was admittedly too great for the personnel. Moreover much of their work consisted of suggestion and persuasion rather than of law enforcement, and they encountered a certain amount of hostility from planters who resented visits to estates under their management without warning, and interviews with their coolies without their overseers and European staff being present.

The Commission for Labor Affairs established in December 1940 marked a promising reorientation in the handling of Indonesia's labor problems. It was the first such agency in the Indies to embody the principle of tripartite representation and it possessed wide supervisory powers and advisory functions in labor matters.

5

ORGANIZED LABOR

467 THE GROWTH of trade unionism in the Indies has been slow in tempo and small in scope, owing to the predominance of peasant agriculture; the prevalence of part-time employment; the very recent development of industrialization; the government's policy; and the inclusion among unions of such strictly non-labor elements as civil servants and government employees generally.

The first union was formed in 1908 by employees of the railroads and tramways for the protection of their interests. This beginning was followed in 1911 by the formation of a union among customs officials, and in 1912 by two unions of functionaries of the Education and Treasury Departments. Although some members of these unions were Indonesians, other wholly native unions were soon formed. In fairly rapid succession customs officers (1911), education officials (1912), the state pawnshop staff (1913), the opium *régie* employees (1916) and officials of the Public Works and Treasury Departments (1917) established their own unions. Under the influence of the nationalist organizations *Boedi Oetomo* and *Sarikat Islam* successively, Indonesians employed in private undertakings formed similar organizations, as, for example, the union of agricultural laborers in 1915 and that of factory workers in 1917. An important influence was beginning to be exerted at about this time by H. J. F. M. Sneevliet and other advanced Socialists over certain of the unions. By the end of 1919 twenty-two native unions with a total membership of 72,000 convened in a conference at which a central union was established. The first assembly of this central union precipitated a struggle between the Socialist and Communist elements for the controlling influence, with the result that

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fourteen of the unions broke away to form a Revolutionary Central Union. This admixture of politics with economic issues long proved fatal for the development of trade unionism in the NEI, as it provoked government intervention and alienated the sympathies of many potential supporters.

Official intervention originally took the form of requiring all unions' articles of association to receive official approval, and subsequently other restrictions were imposed. It was decreed that meetings might be held only by official permission in enclosed places and in the presence of police officers. In fact, representatives of the Labor Bureau were reportedly also present at every union meeting and took notes upon the proceedings. The strikes called by the unions throughout the 1920's were attributed by the government to Communist influence, and twice it intervened to end such activities. Following the second official intervention in 1929, union development was further restricted and subsequently the government banished or imprisoned a number of labor leaders. Unionism's wings were successfully clipped.

By 1930 the Federation of European Employees comprised eight unions with a total membership of 4,473. The Central Association of Native Official Organizations (PVPN) was made up of fourteen unions (and 29,000 members). The largest single unit was that of the elementary school teachers who numbered 9,000. The Association of Native Employees in Private Undertakings (PSSI) comprised six unions having a membership of 3,000. Total union membership fluctuated somewhat but remained small, rising from 13,282 in 1924 to 111,344 in 1931, but dropping to and remaining below 100,000 until 1939. In that year union membership took an upward turn, reaching the figure of 109,547; by the following year 200 additional members were registered but the total number of unions had declined from 111 to 75. Unofficial estimates placed the 1941 membership at 123,500, and this comparatively rapid growth was probably attributable to the increased activity of wartime industry.

Even the small size of union membership in relation to the total of the Indies' gainfully employed did not accurately reflect the insignificant status of unionism in the islands. As had already been indicated many of the nominal unions were associations normally unclassified as labor organizations, and a good number of them partook principally of the character of social clubs. Another retarding feature to their growth as labor unions in fact as well as name was that promotion of measures to improve working conditions came principally from government employees, who possessed by far the largest number of unions and were naturally concerned simply with improving their own status. Separate unions were formed by Europeans, natives, and a few Chinese, and these groups were in turn subdivided into more specialized types of workers with the result that little solidarity cemented the various units. Moreover, the

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467 government, by assuming responsibility for much of the welfare work performed by unions in other countries, deprived those of the Indies of some of their normal objectives and attractions.

468 The NEI Government did not favor joint negotiations by employers and employees for the regulation of working conditions. No public machinery existed for the arbitration of management-labor differences. Before 1926 individual contracts were covered by law, but no provision was made for collective agreements other than those falling within the competence of the Coolie Ordinances. Agreements entered into between native employers and employees were governed mainly by Indonesian customary law, and were regarded as outside the province of the central government. In 1926 amendments to the Civil Code recognized the validity of collective agreements, but these new measures applied only to Europeans. On the whole the Indies Government continued to regard collective agreements as matters for arrangement by the parties concerned, and as recently as 1938 refused to intervene in an industrial dispute involving the negotiation of a collective agreement.

The Indies' early labor laws, providing as they did for individual contracts and ignoring collective disputes, made no reference to strikes. The first legislation on that subject came in 1923 when, as the result of a railroad dispute, provisions limiting the right to strike were written into the Penal Code. Any labor agitation that tended to disturb public order or contravene a labor contract was liable to penalization. Theoretically this legislation aimed to prevent political agitators from vitiating economic issues, but in practice its terms could be applied to prohibit any organization of strikes. Up to the time of the Japanese invasion, no modification of the law had been made that would have rendered permissible any kind of work stoppage. Official statistics indicate how effectual was such legislation in preventing the occurrence of strikes. Between 1936 and 1940 strikes were few, affected only a small number of undertakings, and involved perhaps only a fourth of all the workers employed in them. During that period the largest number of workers on strike in any one year was 2,115.

TABLE VI: NUMBER OF NEI WORKERS ON STRIKE, 1936–40

Year	Number of Establishments Involved	Number of Strikers	Percentage of Strikers to Total Workers	Days of Work Lost
1936	6	872	33.7	4
1937	22	1,357	15.0	100
1938	15	741	20.8	40
1939	18	1,628	15.8	36
1940	42	2,115	22.6	32

Until very recent years no official machinery was set up for the settlement of labor disputes; the only recourse open to workers with a labor

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grievance was to go to the regular courts, from whose decisions there was no appeal. Conciliation machinery was provided for disputes involving railroad employees by a law of November 24, 1937, and for other industries by regulations dated July 20, 1939. The 1937 law required that a board be set up which would be composed of employers, employees, and government officials. In case of disputes involving the public interest, a committee composed of representatives of each group was to try to arrive at a voluntary settlement and in any case to submit a report of its findings to the government. By the 1939 regulations, disputes in private undertakings which involved the public interest, other than those in the railroads, were to be investigated by a committee composed of officials who would be named when deemed necessary by the Director of the Justice Department. If possible this committee was to reach a voluntary settlement and in any case to submit a report on its action. 468

The outbreak of war in Europe and its economic repercussions in the Indies stimulated the local government to enact a labor relations law on December 16, 1940, in which an arbitral system was basic. By this law the government assumed power to settle disputes arising out of wartime conditions and it included such items as the dismissal of workers, consideration of unfavorable changes made in working conditions, and the payment of pensions and allowances to workers. A Commission for Labor Affairs was to hear and decide such cases and to advise the Governor General on labor matters generally. Firms whose output was connected with the war effort and which had more than twenty persons in their employ were required to inform and to obtain the approval of this commission before making any alteration in working conditions. In cases where it failed to reach an agreement, the Director of Justice had final authority to make a decision. Workers in enterprises in which fewer than twenty persons were employed likewise acquired the right to appeal to this commission for decisions in regard to altered working conditions. [722]

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POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS

So LITTLE INFORMATION is available in regard to current labor conditions in Indonesia that it is not yet possible to draw any picture of the situation as a whole. Apparently both the Anglo-Dutch and Indonesian Republican authorities have resorted to compulsion in the handling of workers. Labor shortages seem to exist, owing to the wide-scale displacement and depletion of Java's manpower during the Japanese occupation 464 [466]

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464 and to the refusal of some native Nationalists to work for the British and the Dutch. However, because of the chaotic conditions generally prevailing throughout the Indies, demands for labor cannot yet be great. Economic incentives are still operative, although they vary widely with local conditions, and Japanese troops are still available for use in areas critically short of workers. So involved is the whole area in the current politico-military struggle that the labor position as such cannot be delineated apart from it. The Nationalist regime has shown a certain amount of interest in organizing labor in Indonesia, but it seems to envisage the labor movement almost exclusively as an agency for furthering its political and socio-economic objectives rather than as an embryonic trade unionism in the Western sense of the term. The Nationalists' current program envisages the use of labor as a spearhead for effecting an economic revolution along socialistic, and possibly communistic lines, and as one sector of a single-party system. The Dutch, on the other hand, will probably use their influence to foster the labor movement along the tripartite and paternalistic lines foreshadowed on the eve of the Pacific War.

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Forced Labor

728 Some evidence has come to hand that, throughout the first months of their occupation of a part of Java, the British utilized the labor groups organized by the Japanese during the war. Probably in order to mitigate Indonesian resentment of this perpetuation of forced labor for all classes of native society, and in proportion as localized labor shortages became less acute and their need for the cooperation of educated Indonesians grew, the British showed a willingness to exempt former officials and professional men. The Dutch, apparently, were at the outset unwilling to employ those who had collaborated with the Japanese even in minor capacities, but in recent months they have welcomed back into their service those willing to return in numbers sufficient to staff offices. Recent reports from a Republican source claim that the Dutch have been compelling the Timorese to work for them under penalty of being deported to Samaoe Island. On September 11, 1946, it was reported that an agreement had been reached between the international oil companies and the Republican-appointed governor at Palembang (Sumatra), whereby the former would obtain the services of Indonesian laborers. In general, however, the retention of Japanese troops for labor services and the limited areas under Allied control have rendered it unnecessary for the Anglo-Dutch authorities either to come to terms with the Republicans in order to secure workmen or to resort to forced Indonesian labor on an appreciable scale.

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The Republicans have repeatedly protested against the Anglo-Dutch

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The Republicans have repeatedly protested against the Anglo-Dutch use of Japanese forced labor but themselves feel under no ideological compulsion to avoid coercive measures. Being engaged in a life-and-death struggle for survival, they see no alternative to the regimentation of every potential supporter of their cause. They have reportedly enacted a Compulsory Civil Service Act compelling all Indonesians between the ages of 16 and 50 who are subject to judicial penalties to work in such industries and undertakings as are deemed indispensable to their country's defense. It may be presumed that application of this measure will be expanded or restricted according to the fortunes of their cause. 466 668 681

Labor Shortages and Unemployment

Until December 1945 there seems to have existed a shortage of laborers, particularly of dock coolies, for the unloading of ships' cargoes. In large part this was attributable to the displacement and depletion of Java's best manpower during the war. A high Dutch official has estimated that after the Japanese surrender there were from 10 to 30 per cent fewer laborers available in the Indies than in 1940–41. Approximately one million, among them the strongest and most able Indonesian workers, were dispersed by the Japanese. Of these probably several hundred thousand were shipped outside the Indies and, to date, the fate of about 90 per cent of them is still unknown. Approximately 10,000 have thus far been repatriated, and in such poor physical condition as to be valueless as laborers for some time to come, although they are a potentially useful group for political propaganda purposes. The Republicans have welcomed them warmly and have organized committees for their rehabilitation and conversion to the cause of Indonesian independence. It is possible that they may also serve to keep alive anti-Japanese sentiment in the Indies. 464 [728]

The varying economic conditions prevailing in the different parts of Indonesia have operated to affect the labor market. In Java the food resources held by the British army toward the end of 1945 proved to be an effective means of attracting sufficient labor to work for the occupation forces. At the same time in most of the Outer Islands food was plentiful enough and constituted no such incentive, and the lack of consumer goods and the breakdown in transportation further curtailed use of the limited manpower available. In West Borneo the local shortage of labor among the sparse native population was attributed to their need to cultivate their fields because of inadequate rice imports. Conversely, in the Moluccas the food situation was comparatively satisfactory but the native population has been showing a diminishing interest in agricultural production ever since 1944–45 when the American army began attracting laborers to nearby islands by offering wages higher than the prevailing local scale.

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Chinese

464 Judging by the denunciations of Antara, the Indonesian Republic's
186 press agency, the Anglo-Dutch authorities must have been fairly successful in procuring the labor services of Indonesians. Antara has attributed this to the unsatisfactory living conditions prevailing in Dutch-occupied territory, and not to voluntary cooperation. A minor propaganda battle has been waged over this issue. The Republicans have naturally been appealing to Indonesian patriotism to persuade their compatriots not to work for the Dutch. The Dutch have shrewdly tried to counteract this by stressing the prospect of bigger and better than prewar employment opportunities which will be offered in the Netherlands-controlled Indies of the future. A resolution adopted at the Malino Conference, held in July 1946, stated that Indonesians should be employed in enterprises both within the Indies and abroad in order to acquire wider business experience. This question will doubtless become of increasing importance, but for the present, labor shortages are apparently not acute and such unemployment as exists is probably of a voluntary nature.

Strikes

468 There is an almost total absence of information about strikes in post-
563 war Indonesia. Obviously little industrial production is being attempted in the unsettled state of affairs that prevails. Almost the only strike recorded to date has been that of some Chinese coolies engaged in rehabilitating the tin mines of Banka. For a five-day period in April 1946, about 700 Chinese miners struck for an increase in pay, which then was 42 cents daily, with a rice ration. Netherlands troops were reportedly called to the scene and, in consequence, the strikers returned to work without receiving the increase demanded. According to the Netherlands news agency,[2] Indonesian workers did not join in this strike because they had just been accorded a wage increase along with free distribution of food and clothing. This situation, if accurately reported, suggests either a lack of spontaneous identification of labor interests on the part of Chinese and Indonesians, or a deliberate policy on the part of the Dutch to split labor along racial lines and to favor the Indonesian group at the expense of the Chinese. Although Aneta was careful to point out that
[465] the Chinese coolies' current wage represented almost a 100-per-cent increase over the prewar rate of 24 cents a day (with an increment up to 51 cents after five years of service), no indication was given of the extent to which local living costs have become inflated.

467 A certain amount of activity on the part of the Indonesian Labor Front has been reported. This organization is believed to have been introduc-
668 ing agents into several Dutch camps for the purpose of organizing strikes

[2] Aneta, May 6, 1946.

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and generally fostering a spirit of non-cooperation. If this report is true, the results of such efforts are not yet evident.

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Labor Organizations

An Indonesian Labor Front (*Barisan Boeroeh Indonesia,* or BBI) has been organized in the Indies with a branch at Singapore. The origins of this movement are obscure. It is not yet known whether its nucleus was a resistance group formed during the Japanese occupation or whether the BBI dates from the prewar period. Its leader, Koesoema Soemantri, was a labor organizer in the 1930's and after V-J Day became the Republican Minister of Social Affairs. The BBI seems to have been undermined by factionalism, particularly in its Singapore branch, and Republican officials have made efforts to bring unity within its ranks and to fuse it into the one-party system that is apparently in process of formation.

At the present time it is difficult to discern any spontaneous trend toward organization on the part of Indonesian laborers themselves. Trade unionism was not strong in the Indies before the war and seems to have experienced no further development subsequently as a movement apart from the struggle for Indonesian independence. Soemantri and Maria Ulfah Santoso, his successor as Minister of Social Affairs, have revealed the Republican government's intention of absorbing and utilizing the labor movement—such as they may create—for the purpose of spearheading a revolution along socialistic lines. In principle, the Labor Front is anti-imperialistic and anti-capitalistic and aims to cooperate with other Indonesian organizations, such as youths' and peasants' associations, for the establishment of a new state through revolutionary means. Its ultimate aim is to aid in the formation of labor parties and trade unions and to establish contacts with labor organizations abroad toward the realization of a socialistic world structure. The few policy statements made by Republican officials regarding labor have been confined to generalizations of this nature, in which confusion and verbosity indicate the absence as yet of any concrete program. Last November a conference was held by the BBI at Solo, which was apparently designed primarily to enlist the support of Indonesian labor for the nationalist cause rather than to strengthen and expand the labor movement *per se.* Reportedly the Internationale was sung and the hammer-and-sickle symbol was much in evidence. No other meetings of this nature have been reported, possibly because of the unresolved rift between the Communists and Socialists within the Republican ranks.

To date the Indonesian labor movement as such seems to have registered no advance, and the Republican government has shown no slackening of its intention to absorb and utilize labor for political ends. In a

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467 speech made early in August 1946 before the All-Java Conference of Social Organizations, Madame Santoso stated that "the aim of the labor
668 struggle identifies itself with the target of the Republican government's labor policy."[3] She was, however, even less specific than her predecessor in office had been as to the means which would be taken to realize that goal, and it remains doubtful whether any such program has actually been drawn up by the Indonesian Republicans.

[3] Jogjakarta Radio, August 2, 1946.

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CHAPTER V · INDOCHINA

1

GENERAL LABOR CONDITIONS

466 241 433 PRIOR TO THE THIRD QUARTER of the nineteenth century no authentic labor problem existed in Indochina. Local warfare was the rule and in the comparatively peaceful interludes the population lived almost entirely by and from agriculture and fishing. Conditions were such that large landholdings and trade, in the modern sense, could not exist. Domestic industries were the only ones existing and the few established craftsmen and the small property owners employed very few workers. Most workers were domestic servants. The agricultural laborer (*dan*) received food and lodging and a very low wage, and his general position was that of a member of the family, to whose head he was attached by debts which he or his parents had contracted.

177 461 101 The ethnic diversity of Indochina's population is matched, and strongly influenced by, the country's topographical variations, which have fairly effectively sealed off the different regions from mutual contacts. The Annamites—the largest (17 to 18 millions), the most intelligent and industrious component—are concentrated in the three eastern seaboard states of Cochinchina, Tonkin, and Annam. Although they are the country's best farmers, they suffer from psychological as well as economic handicaps. Their life is impregnated with Chinese-inspired ritual and reverence for the past. The traditional techniques are good to them simply because they are ancient; and new crops, the regular care of animals, and the use of fertilizers are all suspect. Rice farming because of its periodicity has developed in them no discipline of regular, unremitting toil; it is a type of work well suited to intermittent family labor. The Annamite cultivator works within the strict orbit of his needs and takes no thought of the morrow if his meager desires are satisfied today. This attitude is historically explicable by the long-standing exactions of the mandarins and by the sumptuary laws curtailing the enjoyment of possessions. Combined with their chronic economic misery and indebtedness, it has placed the Annamite peasants in almost inextricable servitude. Despite their dexterity and their docility to technical guidance, they aspire to clerical

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positions in preference to any forms of manual toil, even those higher paid. They respect Chinese culture but their regard for the superior organization, adaptability, and commercial talents of the Chinese in their country is tinged by fear and some hostility.

The far less numerous Cambodians (2.5 millions) are the gentle, religious, and artistic descendants of the more talented, Indianized empire-builders of Angkor. They are indifferent farmers, incapable traders and unpersevering and indolent workmen, but are skilled in the artistic crafts. Their relations with the Chinese are more amicable than with the Annamites, from whom the Cambodians have suffered militarily in the past and economically in the present. The Cambodians fear the aggressive and prolific Annamites and their land hunger to such an extent that they move away from villages where Annamites have settled in large numbers.

This fear and dislike is also felt by Cambodia's northern neighbors, the Laotians, who are even less able to resist Annamite infiltration. The Laotians do not appear to share the capabilities of their relatives in Siam and resemble the Cambodians in regard to farming and industrial incompetence. Although they are less talented as craftsmen, they are more skillful as boatmen and as merchants. Under sympathetic tutelage, however, they have shown some ability in forestry and even in mining.

Indochina's population density averages higher than that of its western neighbors (31 persons to the square kilometer) but it is very unevenly distributed. Three-fourths of the whole population live on the plains bordering the sea—that is, on a tenth of the total surface. Ninety per cent of the Indochinese are rural and only in very recent years has there been any appreciable trend toward urban centers. The densest areas are the deltas of the Red and Mekong Rivers, the former comparing in populousness with teeming Java. Despite the fertility of the Tonkin delta, which permits two rice harvests annually, this region cannot feed its population, whereas in the south large tracts of arable land remain unutilized for lack of labor to cultivate them. The two obvious solutions —intensifying the area under cultivation and the transfer of populations from the north to the south—have been attempted, but they have been tried out on too small a scale and have encountered too many obstacles to be considered, as yet, a satisfactory answer to the problem.

For many years the inadequacy of the colony's means of communication was a major handicap to populations transfers, but, even when this was partially remedied, there remained serious psychological impediments. The Annamite is notoriously reluctant to leave his native village to which he is tied by religious rites, his fear of mountains and malaria, and of the unknown generally. His traditions require numerous progeny to provide for his spiritual comfort in the next world and his economic well-being in this sphere. Even if the expense factor in birth control were eliminated, considerable time and education would be required to change so fundamental a viewpoint.

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change so fundamental a viewpoint. The French authorities consider the only possible solution lies in a more rational redistribution of the population within the individual states, and possibly by the transfer of sizable groups from Tonkin and North Annam to the southern regions. 166

Even before the conquest was completed in the north, the French tried to attract the Red River delta population to middle Tonkin through a system of sharefarming. Unfortunately they did not realize that the population already established there had only temporarily left their properties during the period of hostilities, and they doled out the whole region in twenty large concessions. The new incumbents were unable to work most of their lands not only because they lacked the necessary capital but because they could not attract sufficient labor. The former proprietors refused to work for those whom they regarded as usurpers, and the relationship between the colonists and the local mandarins was so unfriendly that the latter would not exert the pressure which alone could have produced the labor force required. Moreover, the large public works program launched about 1900 attracted the floating delta population by offering higher wages and greater proximity to population centers. The Annamite has regularly preferred seasonal labor that would permit him to return periodically to his native village. Most of the workers who did go to middle Tonkin were from the undesirable elements whom the village mandarins were so anxious to be rid of that they coerced them into the colonists' service. Metayage did not succeed in solving any major problem and survived only on a very small scale and on the largest northern plantations. 166 464 [653]

This experiment was not tried again until after the First World War, when metayage proved unable to solve the problem of disposing of returned veterans, despite the publicity given to the scheme and a simplification of the formalities involved in applying for small holdings. During the depression it was again put forward, this time more scientifically. Officials were asked to collect information about the land suitable for colonization in the mountainous districts of Tonkin and the alluvial areas newly won from the sea and rivers. Results of this inquiry were discouraging. Most of the region's fertile valleys and irrigated fields were already occupied and the suitable land available allowed for the transfer of only a few thousand persons annually. Since a comprehensive scheme was impossible, the government tried to foster individual settlements through subsidies, but this also proved to be impractical because it was not on a communal scale and had not been preceded by adequate antimalarial measures. 166

The government now tried still another solution—that of collective concessions under the aegis of a new agent, the founder-benefactor, a remarkably ingenious attempt to combine the traditional village chief with a functionary of the Third Republic. While this last experiment

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166 looked promising, its achievements have been on too small a scale to be regarded as definitive. Annam has been experimenting with an analogous scheme, in an even more limited way, through provincial settlement offices. In Cochinchina two agricultural villages have been set up, at Rachgia and Ha-tien, with slightly differing techniques but with the same aim of stabilizing the landless and preserving the traditional family and communal organization in a new setting. They are officially regarded as sufficiently encouraging to serve as models for other parts of Indochina.

166 The steps taken by the individual states to solve their own population distribution problems have been dispersed and have affected only a small 464 segment of their peoples. On a far bigger scale, but almost equally unsystematic, have been the successive transfers of surplus northern Annamites to the southern plantations. Desultory efforts in this sphere date back to 1907, but they did not achieve significant proportions until the 1920's. Unfortunately the first immigrants were so carelessly recruited that the original plan ended in a dismal failure. The second, more systematic, attempt took the form of contract labor, which tended to create an agricultural proletariat. By and large the administration has never favored any scheme that would not encourage agricultural colonization and stimulate the flow of voluntary labor to the south. But such a program not only encountered the Annamites' deep-rooted distaste for distant lands but also aroused the opposition of Tonkinese employers, who wanted to retain in the north an abundant supply of cheap labor, and of the Cambodians (and Laotians) to the settlement of Annamites in their country.

Even before completion of the Trans-Indochinese Railroad in 1936, it was apparent that improving the means of communication alone was not going to provoke a large-scale, spontaneous flow of Annamites southward. When plantations there began to expand, in the first years of this century, the indigenous population no longer sufficed as a source of labor. The Cambodians and Laotians are few in number, live scattered throughout the countryside, and in any case are reluctant to work. As laborers the mountain people of the south are regarded as the most unreliable and [461] unstable of all. Not only do they dislike regular work but also they distrust outsiders to whom they will hire out their services at most for a few days at certain seasons and only to fill their immediate needs. While they are reasonably good at woodcutting, they hate road building and resist instruction.

166 The Office for Tonkinese Emigration and Settlement established in 1937 conducted a long and careful study, with the object of using northern Annamites to supplement the fitful and inadequate labor resources provided by the local inhabitants in the south. The Office decided to experiment on a very modest scale by settling some six hundred individ-

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uals in Rachgia province. The Founder-Benefactor Agency was selected as the method best adapted to take into account the Annamite's ties with his native village, his want of initiative and adventurous spirit, and his fear of evil spirits and illness in a distant land. So wary has the government been in its desire to avoid repeating earlier mistakes that its accomplishments through this new agency were almost wholly in the realm of theory before the outbreak of the Second World War. 166

The discovery of valuable mining deposits in the north brought about a slight shift in the center of Indochina's economic gravity. Not only did this create new export industries but it produced fuel for the establishment of new local industries like those of paper, glass, cement factories, and textile mills. The rapid tempo of Indochina's economic expansion during the interwar period attracted more and more French capital and colonists, but at the same time the employer group ceased to be exclusively European. A small but growing Annamite bourgeoisie came into being made up of landholders in the south and of industrialists and merchants in the north. Simultaneously an industrial proletariat, drawn chiefly from the fantastically increasing population in the northern delta, was being transformed into a wage-earning class. It had become discernible during the First World War when the colony's isolation from the mother country perforce developed the local mining and rubber industries, but it grew in numbers and self-consciousness after the return from France of the 50,000 or so Indochinese laborers, who had worked there in war industries and who brought back with them new skills and new ideas derived from their contacts with Occidental workers. In the south the long-standing indebtedness of the peasantry reached an acute stage, particularly during the economic depression, and resulted in a dangerously rapid growth of tenancy and a landless proletariat. 433 471 178 [565] [464] [426] [427]

Out of the misery of the humblest agricultural classes and the breakdown of the two bulwarks of Annamite society—the family and the commune—there was shaping an industrial working class. The existence of such a class has often been openly doubted because of the small number, a few hundred thousand individuals, classified as wage earners by census-takers. But the official statistics of Indochina show only the indigenous workers employed in European undertakings and do not take into account the increasing body of agricultural wage earners who form the most numerous section of the new working class. Moreover, the figures show only those wage earners employed at the time the census was taken, and ignore the intermittent character of much of the colony's employment. In 1933 it was estimated that two-thirds of the Tonkinese were workers for wages during at least part of the year. They lived from day to day, eating well only at harvest time, eking out an existence by crafts, commerce, and by seasonal migrations which preferably would not take them far from home. They lived in a chronic state of underemployment 464 [178]

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464 and had no opportunity, even during the best years, to set aside savings.
[465] The wage earner averages an annual income estimated in prewar years at forty-nine piastres. He is still primarily a peasant, which accounts for his
[177] lack of industrial skills. His instability in an industrial environment is due not only to his being rooted in his native soil but to the breakdown in the basic family and communal units, which are tottering from the impact of French colonial policy and Western ideas.

464 Although the masses still outwardly preserve the traditions of the family and commune, obviously the coherence of those institutions cannot
467 withstand the increasing and prolonged absence of many of their members or the psychological changes wrought in them thereby. The wage earners are becoming conscious of themselves as a group apart. The rapid industrialization of Indochina was marked in the 1920's by the first disputes between laborers and employers, by more comprehensive labor laws designed to protect them as a class, and by greater migrations southward where the rubber industry, in particular, was achieving boom proportions. Other expanding industries were demanding a variety of skilled labor. Although the industrialization of Indochina was retarded by French policy and received a setback during the depression, the capital-labor problems long familiar to the West were discernible locally and the formation of both an agricultural and an industrial wage-earning class was well under way when war broke out in the Pacific.

2

TYPES OF LABOR

463 INDOCHINA'S OFFICIAL STATISTICS seldom give detailed figures in regard to the occupations of the indigenous peoples, although Europeans are
241 classified according to occupations in the *Annuaire Statistique* (1936–37). Probably about twenty million out of a total population of more than twenty-three million are engaged in farming, either as laborers or as peasant proprietors, concentrating principally upon the production of rice, corn, and rubber. The balance of the colony's workers are employed in fishing, forestry, mining, and in the industries processing raw materials.

433 The cultivation of rice has normally accounted for about three-fifths of Indochina's total agricultural output. The production of paddy and, far less important, that of corn is almost wholly in the hands of the native peoples. Predominance of the former crop is accounted for by the marshy nature of the delta lands and by its popularity as a foodstuff for both

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home and foreign consumption, whereas the latter was, in prewar years, grown primarily for export. 433

Agricultural

The theoretical ownership of all land by the Emperor in Annamite countries has evolved with time and for all practical purposes into possession by those who worked the soil. The commune—the basic administrative, social, and economic unit of old Annam—still exercised outright ownership for religious purposes over part of the village land (*huong hoa*), and its chief had the right to dispose of the remainder through periodical distributions among the heads of the families listed on the tax register (*dia bo*). Like that of the commune, a portion of this family property consisted of the *huong hoa,* which must be bequeathed intact to the eldest son; the balance was divided equally among all the male offspring. The *huong hoa* and the obligation to care for the family tombs, under pain of perpetual spiritual discomfort, have made all Annamites loath to sell or leave their land. Thus religion, reinforced by traditional peasant conservatism, compelled the Annamite to remain on his property even as tenant if the extortionate demands of the moneylenders had undermined his title to it. Those not registered as village taxpayers formed an unstable, floating population from which has derived the present-day agricultural and industrial proletariat. The varying degree to which the peasants were indebted and the relative scrupulousness with which the tax register was kept, as well as differing soil and climatic conditions, have created marked regional differences in the status of the Annamite masses. 421 428 769 651 464

In the more populous north, the land has been increasingly subdivided, whereas in the more recently colonized south the average holding is larger. In Tonkin, 98 per cent, and in Annam, 89 per cent, of the proprietors cultivated their own lands but their minute capital consisted only of seeds, a few pigs, and an ox or buffalo. Sometimes they engaged in a little trade on the side or practiced crafts to augment their incomes. Their constant need of credit led them ever deeper into debt by pledging the crops ahead of the harvest and at a low price. (Any extra cash which these farmers managed to accumulate they loaned out at the same usurious rates from which they themselves had suffered.) In northern Indochina family cultivation was the rule and neighbors rendered mutual help at harvest time. Implements were primitive and draft animals scarce. More often than not the northern farmer suffered from chronic undernourishment and the exactions of moneylenders, and was well on the way to becoming a tenant farmer. Sharefarming in this area was still comparatively rare, but the payment of rent in kind or in cash was beginning to be common. 427 421 426 241 476 426

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421 Large holdings were much more frequently found among the southern Annamites, 45 per cent of the rice fields there forming estates ranging from fifty to two thousand hectares and only slightly over 12 per cent being small farms of less than five hectares. Of the 6,690 landowners with holdings covering more than fifty hectares throughout all Indochina, 427 6,300 occurred in Cochinchina. As in the north, farms of under ten hectares were usually worked by the owner himself, but the great majority were divided into lots of five to ten hectares and farmed by tenants (*ta-dien*). Almost inescapably this tenant farmer fell into the usurious hands of the property owner and of the Chinese trader, and he was overwhelmed by his debts to both for such necessities as seed, implements, and draft animals. Miserable as was the *ta-dien's* status, it should be noted that his strictly agricultural work occupied only a few months of the year and that his landlord had comparatively little protection against the unscrupulous among them who pocketed the advances and absconded at harvest time.

421 In Cambodia family smallholdings remained the rule. The area cul- [427] tivated was normally less than a hectare along the river valleys and not more than five hectares in the interior. Tenancy and sharefarming were rarely found in Cambodia, and there were few agricultural laborers available for daily hire. Mutual aid was common, as among the northern Annamites, but there was no tradition of periodical redistribution of communal lands. In Laos, where there has always been plenty of unoccupied arable land, every type of ownership may be found—family possession and cultivation, communal lands, and shifting agriculture.

427 Everywhere, thanks to the development of an export trade and to the French policy of individualizing property and of favoring a native elite, 565 two distinct elements have come into existence. On the one hand there 177 were the large landholders, both French and Annamite, who exercised their influence through the mandarins, the local councils, the chambers of commerce, the press, and the credit agencies; on the other, there were the working farmers and the smallholders who had come into the power [668] of the first group. Doubts as to the existence of an Annamite peasantry were dispelled by the uprisings of 1930–31, when the village registers and records were destroyed by the landless or the overwhelmingly indebted in violent protest against those who had monopolized the best lands. These jacqueries at least made the government aware of the social, economic, and political danger latent in a situation that in the north and south alike compelled the masses to live in direst poverty.

184 The problem has been attacked officially with a threefold aim: to im- prove the conditions of land tenure by removing uncertainties in regard 422 to title deeds through a system of survey and registration; to increase the 653 soil's productivity through extensive hydraulic works appropriate to the varying regional conditions; and to offer a better credit system to loosen

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the usurers' grip. The institution of land registers, cadastral surveys, and villages of colonization have been too limited in scope and hampered by too many needs, especially in regard to financing, and imagination and psychological cooperation on the part of the northern Annamites, to have achieved a success commensurate with the administration's frequently declared policy of granting smallholdings to the landless in underdeveloped areas. Far more effective have been such public works as dredging Cochinchina's canals (albeit more for transportation than for cultivation purposes), dyking Tonkin's turbulent rivers, and generally improving irrigation facilities to create additional ricelands. Some efforts were made to teach native farmers more scientific methods, but only one agricultural school was established, in Cochinchina, and its graduates preferred instructing others to applying their new knowledge directly to the soil. School gardens and propaganda pamphlets distributed by itinerant officials have had little more success.

The technical services have achieved more concrete results through the distribution of selected seed, demonstration of improved equipment, campaigns against animal and plant diseases, introduction of new crops, and the institution of agricultural fairs and competitions. In practice the administration has concentrated upon increasing and bettering rice production through a specialized Office du Riz and the Institut des Recherches Agricoles (before its dissolution in 1932). Some, but not enough, progress has been made in reducing unduly high production costs and in raising the per hectare yield, and the use of modern cultivation methods was making headway until greatly retarded by the depression (as evidenced by the declining imports of mechanical equipment and fertilizers). Perhaps most important of all, it was at least officially recognized that any fundamental improvement in Indochina's agricultural output was tied up with the organization of a credit system that would improve the status of the masses.

Unlike Chinese usurers and Indian chettyars, the large Annamite owners of Cochinchina were eager to control even more property than what they acquired through loaning out money to their tenants. They conceived of wealth largely in terms of land and, being absentee proprietors themselves, they envisaged rice cultivation only through their *ta-dien* to whom they made advance in money and in kind, which the latter were compelled to accept and which eventuated in the loss of their land. The more prosperous among the big landowners might also derive additional income from operating oil, rice, and sawmills, lime kilns, and sometimes a rubber plantation. The Annamite tradition has bred a perpetual land-hunger among rich and poor alike, because it has meant that the property owner need do nothing himself since the landless have no alternative but to work for him.

The efforts of the French to provide cheaper credit than that offered

426 The efforts of the French to provide cheaper credit than that offered by Asiatic usurers have not reached down to the neediest classes, who have continued in large measure to borrow from the old sources because they have lacked the required security, because they have been discouraged by the formalities involved, and because of the system's defective financing and organization. More fundamental, perhaps, has been the failure to instill in them the principles of thrift and cooperation, and to utilize as a foundation such elements of native life as could be adapted.

[686] In July 1926 the problem was directly attacked by restricting imprisonment for debt, and in May 1934 by fixing the legal rate of interest chargeable on loans at 5 per cent to 8 per cent. To do away with the legal loopholes, of which the usurers quickly took advantage, a decree of October 9, 1936, stipulated that private loan contracts required the approval of an official who must be satisfied that the signatures had been properly exchanged, that the money had been paid over, and that the sum transferred was identical with that acknowledged by the debtor. Supplementary measures, enacted December 2, 1936, were designed to bear down even harder on loan sharks. Interest illegally charged might be recovered out of the normal interest still due and subsidiarily out of the capital amount of the claim; moneylenders convicted of an infringement of the law might be fined from 100 to 5,000 francs, and second offenders were to be imprisoned (six days to six months) and also fined (500 to 10,000 francs).

452 Recognizing that such laws at best were only a negative means of help-
652 ing the native farmers and that some credit must be provided to them at moderate rates, which would automatically obviate recourse to usurers,
474 official agencies for agricultural credit were set up. As early as 1907 mutual agricultural credit societies had been formed in Cochinchina, and in 1912 native agricultural syndicates were also established there. But it was not until after the First World War that the system developed significantly. In the interwar period about twenty societies were created, one for each of Cochinchina's provinces, with a membership of about 13,000 and credits totalling 12 million piastres. Membership was open to all farmers working one or more hectares, whether as tenants or proprietors, upon payment of a one-piastre fee. The formalities for obtaining a loan were made simple and cheap: loans up to 8,000 piastres were available to those offering property security, and up to 500 piastres for those possessing only personal security. The rate of interest was restricted to 12 per cent annually, and the risks of the operation were borne by the colony's budget. Despite the novelty of this system, its success was so rapid that it almost jeopardized the whole undertaking. It stimulated an over-rapid expansion of the area under rice, which had serious repercussions during the depression, aggravated by faulty organization and bad management. The government had to step in and establish an Agricultural Credit Inspectorate in 1931 and a Central Fund in 1932, to investi-

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gate all loans above the sum of 3,000 piastres, to assure uniformity of 452
policy, and to supervise the individual society's management.

In northern Indochina, the even direr poverty of its farmers and the 652
lack of any large-scale land survey provided no such nucleus as in Cochin- 474
china on which to build up a similar system. So the government in 1926
introduced a People's Agricultural Credit scheme based on that of the
NEI Government to administer credits granted to mutual aid societies
set up under Annamite (or Cambodian) law. Theoretically the system
comprised three grades of banks—communal, provincial, and central—but
only the immediate group came into existence. Membership fees were
set at 10 piastres, the interest rate was 12 per cent granted on personal
security, land, or movable assets, and loans were restricted to an 18
months' period and to 500 piastres. Ultimately these loans were granted
out of the colony's budget, and they followed the same general develop-
ment as in Cochinchina. Too many loans were outstanding when the
depression struck; there was a regrettable absence of supervision and cen-
tralized machinery, and the native officials in these organizations, like the
landowners of Cochinchina, were usually usurers themselves and suc-
ceeded in preventing the neediest farmers from benefiting as they should
have from the system.

Before the outbreak of the Second World War there was some indica-
tion that the government recognized the basic defects in its credit policy.
The system had been kept alive by budgetary support and not by the
members' savings which it had meant to encourage. No specialized corps
had been set up as supervisors, the task having been left to administrators
who had neither the time nor the training to exercise effective control.
The government had simply substituted itself for the Chinese trader and
chettyar as the peasants' creditor. Opponents of developing a genuine
cooperative, as against a purely credit, system underscored the Annamites'
fatalism, their absence of initiative, their lack of taste and opportunities
for exercising thrift, and their tradition of relying upon family or public
authorities for aid in emergencies. But advocates of cooperatives pointed [735]
to the utilizable elements in native life, such as villagers' responsibility
for certain duties benefiting the whole community, the communal lands
used for collective purposes, and above all the *tontine*, a sum collected in
driblets through family contributions which the village chief controlled
and which was available to needy members with repayment on the in-
stalment plan. Nowhere before hostilities engulfed Indochina had such
ideas borne actual fruit, but a realization was evident that the state had
played too heavy a financial role and too light a supervisory function,
and that it had transplanted ready-made into Indochina a system which
should have been built up on indigenous institutions and entrusted to
trained advisers. A better credit-cooperative system remains the most
acute need of farmers throughout Indochina.

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Handicrafts

438 [517] 463

In Indochina, both before and after the French occupation, almost every farmer was a craftsman in his leisure time. Needs were few and easily satisfied, communications were difficult, and traditions—sometimes religious rites—established the simple techniques that required little training or division of labor. In addition, there were groups of specialized artisans whose existence was due to a regional need for greater technical skills or to the location of certain raw materials. In 1938 it was estimated that about 1,350,000 persons in Indochina were completely dependent upon the traditional handicrafts for their livelihood. In some of the larger towns the most specialized of the skilled craftsmen found a market for their wares, and particularly in Cambodia, the artistic crafts flourished through the patronage of courts, monasteries, and the aristocracy. In general, craftsmen conceived of no industrial life other than that of artisans working individually or as families for clients or patrons. Large undertakings and accumulations of capital were non-existent.

The French regime has had virtually no effect upon the peasant craftsmen, who have continued to build the same type of primitive house, weave the traditional cotton or silk clothing of unchanging and simple style, and to make their own rudimentary agricultural implements, furniture, and fishing tackle. The peasants have been too poor to adopt any other pattern of living or to purchase imported goods. The small artisan, especially in the deltas where a dense population has encouraged specialization, gave only somewhat less time to agriculture than did the peasant farmers, and as soon as possible he bought land and devoted himself almost wholly to it. This trend is due to the Annamites' inbred land-hunger and not because the craftsmen among them are regarded as socially inferior or are formed into castes.

Of the 6.5 million Annamites living in Lower Tonkin it has been estimated that 200,000 of them devote the greater part of their time to family industries, and that perhaps 800,000 engage in such activities for at least a few weeks of every year. The whole area sells and purchases little and is virtually self-sufficing. Small-scale industries in Tonkin were village industries which had attained a certain degree of specialization. By their poverty workers were compelled to use only rudimentary equipment. Too poor and too thriftless to improve their techniques and sales, they were also too unsophisticated and too unimaginative to band together or to calculate production costs. A certain division of labor was achieved—a simple article being produced in various parts by different villages—but it was no indication of specialization; rather, it was attributable to their inability to see the process as a whole and their need to realize a quick turnover in order to purchase more raw materials. The distribution of Tonkin's industries in some cases seems to have been more a matter of

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chance than of the location of the required materials. Perhaps in ancient 438
times some skilled craftsmen obtained a practical local monopoly, through 463
appropriate patronage and trained assistant workers in their vicinity. In the order of their economic importance textiles, especially silk, took first place, and were followed by basketry, woodwork, and lacquered articles. Less widespread was the pottery industry, and villages of metal-founders or tinsmiths were very rare. The blacksmiths were ambulatory and tinsmiths have been using gasoline cans as their raw material. Particularly simple work, like certain bamboo and paper items used in rites, were left to women and children.

TABLE VII: ARTISANS IN INDOCHINA *

Principal Crafts	*Tonkin*	*Annam*	*Cochinchina*	*Cambodia*	*Laos*	*Total*
Basketry	15,521	277	357	416	53	16,624
Woodworking	1,426	2,783	4,347	911	265	9,732
Textile	56,850	2,988	303	1,029	90	61,260
Embroidery	2,315	62	81	5	16	2,479
Lace making	2,833	..	..	..	..	2,833
Leather work and tanning	1,057	117	277	4	9	1,464
Metal work	1,143	994	1,554	40	189	3,920
Silver and jewelry	471	333	843	169	59	1,875
Paper making	2,771	41	97	..	..	2,909
Pottery	522	460	145	788	104	2,019
Mother-of-pearl	232	20	..	..	..	252
Food processing	1,004	427	193	..	56	1,680
Miscellaneous (hats, lacquer, dye, etc.)	9,525	4,150	10,837	11,961	384	36,857
Total	95,670	12,652	19,034	15,323	1,225	143,904

* *Bulletin Economique de l'Indochine*, 1939.

In Cambodia the most important indigenous industries were the manufacture of fish products, silk textiles, pottery, boat building, and—above [531]
all—the artistic crafts like wood carving, goldsmithery, and the making of jewelry. But until they were revived by the School for Cambodian Arts many of the latter crafts had been dying out because they could no longer find customers. In Laos, the local industries were little developed and the population's needs slight. With few exceptions connected with house-building, the manufacture of utensils, weaving, and the like, there were no workers engaged in any given trade.

The French introduced certain changes, particularly in the status of [463]
the specialist craftsman whose production and techniques were altered to meet the demands of the new European and Occidentalized customers. 177
In the larger towns novel skills were introduced—those of photography, 438
watchmaking, and printing. Lace-making and embroidery were two of the new industries that attained the largest scope. A growing number of 555
Europeanized Annamites in the urban centers have supplied a clientele

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177 438 556 for the output of the more up-to-date craftsmen, who have also been officially encouraged by patronage and the granting of honors to the point where they have gradually developed into a bourgeoisie.

177 [439] 643 438 While the country's rapid westernization created some new industries, it also killed others through the importation of competitive goods. Such industries as those of tiles and mat-making have proved to be especially vulnerable; others, especially those whose output was destined for strictly local use and not subject to fashion, such as the manufacture of religious articles, have been more resistant. So long as the traditional agricultural, family system survives so will the crafts, but they will die rapidly when large-scale industrialization sets in. The government has tried to delay their decay by emphasizing the important economic and artistic role played by artisans and by dwelling on the dangers attendant upon their elimination. It has been recognized that the hundreds of thousands of craftsmen living in close contact with the rural population are a factor making for stability and calm, and also, that their output fills the needs of the majority of Indochinese who cannot afford imported merchandise.

461 177 To assure their survival some of the craftsmen have been guided into new forms of production and some improvement has been effected in their equipment and techniques. The Annamites are cooperative to the extent that they are dexterous and easily taught, and they are eager to make money. But simultaneously they always want to establish a monopoly in their particular field, and they are thriftless and lack organizing ability. In some instances the French have established new crafts which have brought additional cash incomes to villagers, and in certain cases there has been an exchange of ideas and techniques between individual [439] craftsmen and private French industrialists. Only in the field of the artistic crafts has the government seriously tried to find markets for indigenous output, and it was not until the recent war threatened to cut 654 217 874 off imported goods that the administration organized a credit system for craftsmen and set up special agencies for their encouragement. As far back as 1907 an Inspectorate of the Fine Arts was established in Cochinchina, Tonkin, and Cambodia. Subsequently museums of outstanding specimens of native crafts were established, a school of fine arts attached to the University of Hanoi, local as well as European exhibits organized, and in 1939 traveling teaching staffs were dispatched to improve village [467] crafts. Probably the outstanding achievement has been that of organizing the Cambodian artisans into elastic self-governing guilds, for whom standards of workmanship were set up and sales facilities established.

Industrial

433 By far the most important industry in Indochina was that of mining. However in recent years other industries have also developed, chiefly

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those immediately connected with raw materials. The food industries include the processing of rice, rubber, sugar, coffee, tea, and of oleaginous products. Cholon was the center of the rice-milling industry where the factories, most of them Chinese-owned, handled 300 to 1,300 tons of paddy daily. Rice also served as the basic material used by alcohol distilleries and breweries. Sugar was manufactured by small indigenous establishments and by some large European refineries in the south. Silk and cotton were worked by the widespread textile industry, both as handicrafts and in modern factories operated with French capital and techniques. Other industries included paper and sawmills, match factories, soap works, tanneries, pottery manufacture, and tobacco plants. Engineering works included ship building and repair yards, iron works, chemical factories, and electric power stations. Transport also employed considerable numbers of workers, upwards of 10,000 in prewar years. In addition, such public works as the construction of dykes, canals, roads, and railroads regularly employed large labor forces. 433 [489]

The output from Indochina's mines consisted very largely of coal, tin, and zinc, and almost all of it was concentrated in Tonkin. Laos, possibly possessing great undiscovered mineral resources, actually produced only tin in the interwar period. Cambodia mined precious stones exclusively; Annam, coal, phosphates, and ochres; and no mines at all had been developed in Cochinchina. With the exception of somewhat under 2,000 miners, those employed in working mines were located in Tonkin. Until 1929 the number of mining coolies employed rose rapidly until they totalled 53,000, and after a sharp decline to 34,800 in 1934, they again increased to approximately 50,000 on the eve of the Second World War. Tonkinese coal mines were particularly fortunate in being situated near the dense delta population and in a region well endowed with the means of communication. 316 464

Until the depression struck hard at Indochina's mining industry, the perennial mine workers were supplemented by seasonal laborers recruited twice a year, in February and in July. The recruiting agents employed were the most trusted *cais* (foremen), who received an expense account of 10 to 20 piastres and an additional 50 cents for each coolie recruited, a bonus being added if their recruits remained for a certain length of time at the mines. Although the several thousand Chinese coolies employed in the mines were valued for their superior endurance and output, their higher premium had resulted in the increasing employment of Annamites drawn from the overpopulated provinces of Nam Dinh, Ninh Binh, and Thai Binh. Recruits were conducted to a camp at Nam Dinh, whence the company provided free transport to the mines, fed the workers during their journey, and inoculated them upon arrival. The depression put an end to seasonal recruiting and placed major dependence upon the settled supply of perennial miners. This was comparatively easy for the acces-

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316 464 [466] sibly located coal mines but difficult for those isolated in the mountains, particularly the zinc mines which in the 1930's employed about 5,500 men.

Because of the reluctance of the Annamites to work in the mountains and of the Laotians to work at all, most of the mining companies have tried to reduce their heavy labor turnover by settling and stabilizing their permanent workers. The outstanding development has been that of the Tonkinese coal company, which alone produced more than half of Indochina's total output of that mineral, which has constructed villages for its laborers containing a water supply system, hospitals, cinemas, schools, and markets that are also patronized by nearby villagers. Other mining companies have followed the same principles on a more modest scale, and in the last years before the war the establishment of laborers' villages came to be the accepted practice for those undertakings located in isolated regions which could afford thus to stabilize their labor forces.

Immigrant Labor

167 464 Immigrant labor in Indochina is such an unimportant element in the colony's economy that it has not been included in the general discussion of Indochina's labor problems. Nevertheless it exists and has historical importance, particularly as related to the minorities' situation. Of the three groups of foreign workers in the colony, the Chinese are by far the most important and are followed at a considerable distance by the Javanese and Indians.

167 563 *Chinese.* As elsewhere in Southeast Asia Chinese immigration into Indochina antedated that of Europeans, but in the Annamite countries China's erstwhile sovereignty extending over a thousand-year period had created for the Chinese in Indochina a special status. Spiritually and economically they remained masters in the country. Legally, they enjoyed the same civil rights as the Annamites (and the Cambodians) although they were organized into *bangs* according to dialect and the province of their origin. The heads of the *bangs* were selected by their members, and were responsible to the government for the maintenance of order and for the collection of taxes.

The Chinese came into Indochina both overland and by sea, but it was not until the early nineteenth century that their inflow assumed the character of a migration. They settled principally in Cochinchina, because it was less densely populated than Tonkin and Annam and because that area was endowed with the most extensive natural network of water communications. In Cambodia the Chinese immigrants mingled with the native population and devoted themselves more to farming and fishing than to commerce. In almost all cases the Chinese arrived in groups and spread out through the towns and country markets to acquire a hold on whatever form the dominant economy assumed locally.

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The French did little to change the position of the Chinese and probably strengthened it, because—like the Annamite government before them—they found the Chinese indispensable, first as provisioners to the army of occupation and then as farmers of indirect taxes, and finally as money-lenders and middlemen serving as a link between themselves and the indigenous population. Juridically they came under French commercial law, and in criminal cases under the native or French code depending upon whether the other litigant were Asiatic or European. The *bang* organization was retained but the French tried to control and supervise it more than the Annamite government had done. In return for exemption from military and corvée service, the Chinese were required to pay a higher poll tax than that imposed on other Asiatics. Although since 1920 Europeans paid a similar tax, this impost remained a grievance to the Chinese and even after the Sino-French treaty of 1935 they received only the moral satisfaction of having it designated as being imposed on "aliens granted a privileged status." [463] 563 [651]

The French never allowed Chinese immigration into Indochina to assume the same dimensions as in Siam and Malaya, and as early as 1870 they established a Bureau of Immigration as a controlling authority. This Bureau showed such zeal in insuring the identification of Chinese immigrants that it aroused Chinese opposition, particularly to such measures as fingerprinting and personal investigations, and in 1907 the features most objectionable to the Chinese were suppressed. Nevertheless the French insisted that the Chinese should enter the colony only in proportion as they were needed there, and they were required to be sponsored by a Chinese already established in Indochina who could answer for their good conduct and for their solvency. Thus the Chinese component within the colony was steadily fed and supplemented from identical groups in China; the heavy tax required of them kept the most impoverished from seeking admission, and the number of Chinese residents (about half a million) was considered to be of a manageable size and not disproportionate to the total population (about 23 million). According to the 1936 census there were 171,000 Chinese in Cochinchina; 108,000 in Cambodia, 35,000 in Tonkin, 11,000 in Annam, and 3,000 in Laos. 167 [162]

It was, however, not their numerical preponderance but the economic grip which the Chinese enjoyed and the contempt with which they treated the Annamites that aroused the latter's animosity, as well as their admiration, and led to occasional demands for a more drastic curtailment of their immigration. The Chinese aptitude for trading and money making generally placed the Annamites, who were singularly deficient in such talents, very much at their mercy. The annual interest rate on loans charged by the Chinese came to approximately 60 per cent, and the naïveté, improvidence, and perennial need for money of the native peo- 563 426 [441] [461]

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Chinese

563 426 [435] ples caused the latter to be hopelessly in debt to the former. By tidily combining trade with usury the Chinese loaned ready money to needy farmers against the security of their next harvest and were thus able to regulate prices and to sell in European as well as Far Eastern markets. Annamite resentment of this stranglehold sometimes took violent forms, particularly in Tonkin, but it became a trump card for the French and one of the major guarantees against either group's becoming a political menace.

563 Most Frenchmen in Indochina have continued to regard the Chinese as indispensable and as stimulators of the country's productivity although there were others, notably the merchant class, who have been made increasingly uncomfortable by Chinese competition and who join the Annamite nationalists in advocating a curb on their activities. Their argument follow a pattern familiar in Southeast Asia among opponents of unrestricted Chinese immigration, i.e., that the Chinese are only transients in the country; that they drain out of it their enormous profits through remittances to the homeland; and that they form a state-within-a-state, one whose loyalties are oriented toward Chungking's imperialist ambitions regarding Tonkin. The government has not concurred in this viewpoint but has kept a watchful eye on Chinese political and economic [648] activities. Little success has been registered through its attempts to control Chinese business methods. Only slight inroads have been made on their usury through the establishment of official credit agencies, and the *bang* organization has been strengthened, despite the treaty of 1935, which established Chinese consulates in Indochina and which granted the most-favored-nation treatment to the local Chinese.

[563] Although Chinese labor was widely used in the early days by the French in such public works as building the Yunnan railroad and though 464 at that time French colonists tried to recruit Chinese to work on plantations, it was soon evident that once the Chinese laborers had saved a little money they would set themselves up as merchants. The *bang* organization under which the Chinese lived made this transition easy, for it replaced the charitable and mutual aid associations to which the immigrants were accustomed in China and provided the newly arrived with food, shelter, and advice until—and after—the latter obtained employment. Usually the Chinese started humbly as coolies, food vendors, and peddlers, and, working in every trading center where they acquired an intimate knowledge of the district, learned the language and needs of the people, and profitably undertook to satisfy their requirements first in manufactured goods and later in credit. A certain number of them became farmers, chiefly those who owned and worked the pepper plantations along the Gulf of Siam and those who became specialized market gardeners for the main cities. Chinese craftsmen also were to be found in the towns. But only in Tonkin did the Chinese remain as coolies in the

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local mines. Although the Annamites now predominate in such labor, 464
because they are more numerous, cheaper, and less prone to agitation, 463
nevertheless there remain large groups of Chinese miners there whose assets are a robust physique, great productivity, and a liking for the risks and profits inherent in such work.

Javanese. A census of foreign laborers taken in 1928 revealed that a [464]
vast majority of them—12,000—were Chinese, and that the remaining few were chiefly Javanese. An article written in 1903, which compared 167
Javanese labor favorably to that of the Chinese, early awakened the interest of Cochinchina's planters. The Javanese, it was claimed, were more attached to the soil, had little commercial aptitude, and were more manageable than the more robust but less stable Chinese. However, it required three years for the government of Indochina to overcome the reluctance of the NEI authorities to permit Javanese emigration, and consent was given only after certain specific guarantees were arranged with their future employers. These conditions were subsequently embodied in the decrees of March 8, 1910, and October 28, 1916.

All employers desirous of obtaining Javanese laborers were required to 464
apply to the senior administrator in their district, giving details regarding their undertaking and the number of workers desired. The mini- 466
mum age for Javanese recruits was set at 18. Their contracts had to contain details regarding the worker's identity, the nature, duration, and 167
place of his future employment, the number of holidays, the maximum number of working hours (10), the methods of computing and paying wages, and the total of the advances he had received. Further stipulated were the laborer's right to be accompanied by his family, to be given free lodging, food, and medical attendance (if an operation was required it must be performed by a European surgeon), to repatriation at the employer's expense if he were incapacitated for work, to free food during recovery from an illness, and to decent burial for one who died in service. Javanese women were not to be employed in tasks beyond their strength and were entitled to a month's rest after confinement. No foreman was allowed to trade in any way with the workers employed in the same undertaking as himself. Contracts might be terminated by mutual consent, by a worker's physical incapacitation, and after a year's work, provided the laborer had given three months' notice and had reimbursed the advances made to him plus an indemnity of 50 piastres. Every worker could lodge complaints with a representative of the administration, and breaches of contract were referred to the regular courts and punishable by simple police penalties.

Thanks to these minute regulations, to the services of the Falkenberg 464
Agency, and to the Dutch Government's cooperation in the matter of transport, the first experiments proved highly successful. Of the original 167
group of Javanese workers 45 per cent renewed their contracts, and of

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464 the second, 85 per cent. The First World War, however, again made the
167 NEI authorities unwilling to have Javanese emigrate in large numbers. The stricter conditions subsequently imposed for the emigration of a much more limited quota of Javanese workers as well as certain local complications, such as the special food preparation required to meet their Muslim prejudices, reduced the number of Javanese entering Indochina. By 1934 there only remained 210 on Cochinchina's plantations, and the following year the number still further declined to 79, including eight women.

463 *Indians.* Aside from such minor activities as coachmen, night watch-
426 men, and merchants, the vast majority of Indians in Indochina have been moneylenders (chettyars). In 1933 there were more than 300 chettyars
563 working in about 100 separate establishments. Some were French citizens from India but most of those who claimed such privileges—to the outrage of the Annamites—had achieved the status through counterfeit papers. There has been no group in Indochina so heartily hated by Annamites and Cambodians alike as the chettyars, for whom is felt none of the admiration and kinship which partially alleviates the native peoples' dislike of the Chinese usurers.

Forced Labor

466 During the interwar period forced labor still existed but only as a
476 vestige and in remote parts of the colony. In principle, it was forbidden save as an exceptional, transitional measure under carefully specified con-
651 ditions.[1] Among certain primitive, isolated tribes, like the Muongs, custom has permitted the hereditary chieftains (Thoti) to require some of their dependent families to supply labor for the cultivation of their fields and for the building and repair of their houses. Compensation was made in terms of food, and in famine periods the chief was required to feed his dependents, pay their taxes, and advance to them enough seed and draft animals to plant the next harvest. Among the Annamites there have always been communal duties, like night watching in the fields and the upkeep of roads and wells. In the more advanced areas these are paid for by village dues but elsewhere they are the unrecompensed responsibility of the inhabitants. The physiographical conditions prevalent throughout Indochina have imposed heavy obligations upon the people in such matters as the defense of dykes during flood periods.

631 The French have not attempted to intervene in the feudal relation-
466 ships prevailing among the more remote tribes, believing that they are still adapted to the present stage of development and that they will eventually and automatically disappear through contacts with their more
advanced neighbors,

[1] Decrees of August 21, 1930, February 5, 1932, and December 30, 1936.

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advanced neighbors. In only two other forms has compulsory labor survived, as dues and in the obligation to labor on certain public works. The 1936 decree ruled that labor dues might everywhere be commuted for cash payment. Compulsory labor on public works has been minutely regulated and has followed generally analogous lines in all the states of the Union. The length of annual service required was reduced to sixteen to twenty days and the work restricted to the district in which the worker lived. Mass levies were avoided so as not to empty villages of their able-bodied men during the active agricultural seasons. Appropriate tools were supplied, and health conditions imposed. Generally the requisitioning of labor has been restricted to porterage service in remote regions without other means of transportation. Broadly speaking, the corvée has been as humanized as minute regulations can make it, and the principle has been established that it should be recompensed at regular wages, confined to areas where no free labor is available, and where its use remains indispensable for works of recognized public utility.

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3

WORKING CONDITIONS

Wages

In Indochina wages were made up of remuneration in cash and in kind. Payment exclusively in kind prevailed, for example, in undertakings set up in isolated regions where the employer had to provide his workers with both food and lodging. It also was customary for agricultural laborers, whose status was unregulated by law, to be given a quantity of paddy in return for their help at harvest time. Under the contract system employers were bound to supply food. The law prescribed that daily rations for laborers had to contain 3,200 calories and include a certain proportion of fresh foodstuffs. Every worker over fourteen years of age was entitled to receive 700 grams of dry rice, of which a part must be unpolished. In outlying districts employers had to maintain a store selling food and other necessities at the locally prevailing prices. Debts contracted at such stores could not be deducted from the workers' wages. On almost every large plantation hot tea was distributed to laborers, and a daily minimum of 5 litres of pure drinking water. Figures dating from 1930 show that on the eve of the depression 42,664 out of the 81,188 contract workers registered were receiving a free rice ration or a rice ration plus lodgings.

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For most contract workers wages were paid largely in money but were

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465 often deferred because planters tended to remunerate their workers as infrequently as possible on the ground that when a plantation owed its laborers a sufficiently large sum they were less likely to desert. The law of 1927 aimed to rectify this by specifying that wages must be paid at least once a month, in Indochinese currency, and in the presence of the employer or of his representative. The Labor Inspectorate was charged [454] with the enforcement of this ruling. The deferred payment system (*pecule*), was also made compulsory at this time. The amount of the *pecule* was made up of 5 per cent of the net wages due to the worker with an equal contribution made by the employer. The sums deducted from the worker's wages were withheld every pay day and entered in his work-book. They were paid out to him upon the expiration of his contract. The aim of this measure was to protect the worker so that he might not dissipate all his earnings in gambling or pledge them to the usurer, and might have a considerable sum upon his return home. When first applied the system was regarded with suspicion by the workers, but subsequently it became well liked and survived a threat made during the depression to abolish it. From 1932 to 1934 the sums brought back to Tonkin in the form of *pecule* amounted to about 2 million piastres.

The major lacuna of the 1927 legislation was the lack of a minimum wage regulation, although the fact that any change in the contractual wage-scale had to be approved by the Governor General created in effect a minimum wage for that category of worker. However, contract laborers who failed to appear on working days for certain specified reasons, who refused to work or were unjustifiably absent, or who were ill (not as the result of an industrial accident), were not entitled to receive wages. On the other hand, workers who refused to accept a reduction in their contractual wage were entitled to free repatriation. Cash advances, not exceeding a sum equivalent to two months' wages, might be granted to contract workers, except during the three months preceding the expiration of their contract. Such loans were refunded by monthly deductions which could not exceed a quarter of the worker's wages for that period.

In Indochina wages have varied enormously according to region and occupation. The data amassed by the series of official inquiries into the wages paid in the main areas of employment during the depression furnish some clues as to the conditions prevailing in the early 1930's. In general workers fell into two main categories: those in industrial and agricultural enterprises whose wages were based on daily rates, and salaried employees and domestic servants who were paid by the month. Lowest paid of all were the unskilled workers, in industry and agriculture. In 1933 the current wage amounted to 0.22 piastres a day for men and 0.16 piastres for women in the employment of Asiatics. Theoretically these wages were augmented by 0.02 piastres if the employer were a European. For contract labor employed in the south the guaranteed

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minimum wage was reduced in May 1935 from 0.30 piastres to 0.27 for men, and from 0.23 piastres to 0.20 for women—but in their case a rice ration and lodgings were supplied gratuitously. In Tonkinese mines during the same period the daily wage varied from 0.20 to 0.30 piastres, but for other types of employment in the north the average daily pay amounted to 0.35 piastres for men and 0.21 piastres for women. Skilled laborers in the north received 0.68 piastres a day and women, 0.25 piastres. In the Saigon-Cholon region the average daily wage for this category of worker came to 1.25 piastres. Native foremen (*cais*) received 1.12 piastres a day, which approximated the income of the lowest stratum of the middle class. 465

Workers paid by the month were well off compared with day-wage laborers. In 1932 servants in northern Indochina received a monthly wage varying from 12 to 30 piastres. Office boys and night watchmen drew pay ranging from 20 to 30 piastres a month, and for the same time period clerks were paid about 50 piastres. Wages for these categories of workers in the south were higher by 40 to 60 per cent.

The greatest regional variations in wage-rates were probably the most marked between Tonkin and Cochinchina. In 1931 the wages paid in Saigon were about double those current in Hanoi, and the great distance between those two cities militated against any equalization between. In the north there were a large majority of miserably paid workers and a small minority of skilled laborers earning somewhat higher wages. In Cochinchina, on the other hand, the wage-scale was higher all around, and the most skilled workers there merged with the petit bourgeois in income-earning capacity. [184]

From 1925 to 1930 a general rise in wages occurred in both the north and the south, but then a rapid decline took place, particularly among the miners in Tonkin whose wages declined by 36 per cent between 1930 and 1933. During the same period other laborers' wages fell by 28 per cent. In estimating the level of real wages it should be noted that the wage rise which occurred between 1925 and 1930 corresponded to a very similar rise in the cost of living, and that beginning in 1930 both wages and cost of living followed a parallel decline. One important factor during the depression, however, was the large number of workers dismissed, so that those who retained their jobs experienced less of a cut than would have been the case had the work been spread out to include a larger personnel.

Even under the comparatively favorable conditions prevailing throughout the 1920's it had never been possible for workers to set aside savings from their surplus income. At all times the average wage in Indochina has been very low, and many workers earned money only during six months of the year. Wages were still further reduced by the squeeze exacted by *cais*, by late wage payments, and by the arbitrary fines too [454] 465 511

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often imposed by employers. Moreover the Annamite laborer too often succumbed to the temptation to spend his earnings on drink, gambling, or opium. Even if he resisted such lures, the cost of food was such that it accounted for three-fourths of many laborers' expenditures. From almost every point of view the status of the average Annamite worker was a very wretched one. The remuneration for agricultural labor apparently left workers with no wider margins. Even in good crop years farmers were unable to save, and after a poor harvest, sickness, or any untoward circumstance he was brought to the verge of starvation. The wage reductions effected during the depression years cut so near the quick that they led in some cases to violence and bloodshed.

One of the most debated points in the labor legislation transplanted under the Front Populaire legislation to Indochina was the decision to

TABLE VIII: AVERAGE DAILY WAGES PAID BY COAL MINING AND METAL MINING COMPANIES IN TONKIN AND LAOS, 1931, AND 1933 TO 1936 *

	In Piastres				
Occupation	*1931*	*1933*	*1934*	*1935*	*1936*
		Société Française des Charbonnages du Tonkin			
Miners	0.59	0.45	0.35	0.32	0.38
Timbermen	.66	.45	.35	.32	.38
Trammers	.45	.36	.26	.23	.29
Blacksmiths †	1.20	.75	.70	.63	.69
Laborers	.36	.28	.28	.24	.26
		Société des Charbonnages du Tuyen-quang			
Miners	.42	.42	.41	.40	.38
Timbermen	.48	.48	.36	.35	.38
Trammers	.32	.33	.27	.22	.27
Blacksmiths	.52	.50	.67	.60	.58
Laborers	.38	.30	.27	.23	.23
		Mines de Chodien (Tonkin)			
Miners	.40	.39	.28	.28	.30
Timbermen	.40	.39	.28	.28	.30
Trammers	.36	.37	.28	.28	.30
Blacksmiths	1.00	.80	.80	.60	.70
Laborers	.34	.34	.27	.27	.30
		Société de Dong-trien			
Miners	.70	.50	.40	.35	.38
Timbermen	.60	.50	.40	.35	.38
Trammers	.50	.40	.20	.20	.23
Blacksmiths	.85	.70	.50	.45	.50
Laborers	.36	.28	.20	.20	.22
		Mines de Tinh-Tue (Tonkin)			
Miners	..	.38	.42	.38	.38
Timbermen	..	.41	.60	..	..
Trammers	..	.34	.35	.35	.38
Blacksmiths	..	.77	.74	.65	.85
Laborers	..	.31	.35	.30	.34

* *Civil Affairs Handbook, French Indo-China, Labor,* Army Forces Manual, Washington, D.C., 1944, p. 32.

† Chinese blacksmiths employed at this mine.

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TABLE IX: DAILY WAGES OF NATIVE WORKERS IN DIFFERENT INDUSTRIES IN COCHINCHINA (OCTOBER 1938) *

Occupation	Railway and Other Transportation	Building	Printing and Book Binding
	In Piastres		
Sawyers	0.80–1.40	..	..
Carpenters	.80–1.50	.60–1.40	..
Joiners	.75–1.40	.80–1.00	1.10
Painters	.55–1.20	..	..
Other wood workers	.70–1.10	..	..
Fitters	.50–1.90	1.10–1.65	..
Foundrymen	..	.85–1.40	..
Boilermakers	.50–2.10	.50–2.00	..
Blacksmiths	.80–1.90	.50–2.00	..
Tinsmiths	.55–1.20	..	..
Turners	.60–1.90	.90–2.00	..
Riveters	1.20–1.30	..	..
Coppersmiths	.90–2.10	..	..
Solderers	1.20–1.80	..	..
Other metal workers	.50–1.50	.55–1.75	..
Locomotive engineers	1.30–1.50	..	..
Locomotive firemen	.65–1.30	..	..
Motor truck drivers	.70–1.40	..	..
Electricians	.65–1.80	.75–1.35	..
Rivet heaters	.80–1.00	..	..
Masons	.85–1.30	..	..
Millers	.50–1.60	..	..
Foremen	1.00–1.50	.90–1.60	..
Laborers, skilled	.90–1.50	1.20–1.30	..
Laborers, skilled, female	.65– .95	1.00–1.60	..
Coolies	.65–1.40	.50–1.60	.60–1.10
Cement makers	..	.90	..
Firemen	..	.90–1.20	..
Printing machine operators	..	..	.60–2.20
Compositors	..	..	.60–2.10
Type founders	..	..	1.00–1.60
Book binders and sewers	..	..	.60–2.30
Draftsmen	..	..	1.20–1.80
Lithographers	..	..	2.20

* *Civil Affairs Handbook, cit.*, p. 30.

establish a minimum wage. After much haggling it was laid down, in the decree of December 30, 1936, that compulsory minimum wages would be fixed in all industrial and commercial occupations for men, women and adolescents, and for the various districts in accordance with local variations in the cost of living. Committees appointed by the Governors or Residents Superior and including employers' representatives, native members of elected bodies, and the local labor inspector were to meet annually in order to fix the minimum wage for each district. In exceptional circumstances where there occurred changes in living costs, these committees must be convened to readjust the scale. Piece rates were to be established so as to allow the worker of average ability to earn in a day of statutory length a wage at least equal to the minimum rate laid down for his district. Wages must be paid in legal currency at least once

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465 monthly. No deductions from wages were to be made by the employer for supplying equipment, except in cases where the tools issued to a worker were missing at the time he left his position.

The clause of the 1936 edict forbidding the imposition of fines was the measure against which the employers' organizations in Indochina leveled their most virulent criticism. They claimed, with some justice, that such a prohibition might turn to the worker's disadvantage since, in its absence and for only slight errors, he would be subject to dismissal as the only corrective left open to protect the employer. On the other hand, it was well known that recourse to fines had been a longstanding abuse on the part of many local employers.

While the 1936 legislation marked a great improvement, a number of gaps still needed filling. Moreover, certain situations needing to be rectified could not be met by even the most benevolent legislation. It would not do to suppress the opportunities for gambling and opium dens if alternative and less deleterious recreations were not made available to workers and accessible savings banks were not established. More important, the Indochinese laborer's purchasing power required an appreciable increase in order that he might regularly have some surplus beyond his and his family's most vital needs. Positive action in this field would entail the encouragement of a genuine cooperative thrift movement. Important negative measures would be required, including the withdrawal of licenses for gambling and opium dens and the abolishment of the alcohol excise which has led to the official encouragement of per capita consumption.

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TABLE X: AVERAGE DAILY WAGES IN NORTH AND SOUTH INDOCHINA, 1931, 1934, 1936, AND 1937 *

In Piastres

Class of Workers and Year	*Hanoi*	*Haiphong*	*Other Tonkinese Centers*	*Annam*	*Saigon*	*All North*	*All South*
Skilled Workers							
1931	0.63	0.79	0.62	0.81	1.50	0.74 †	1.50 †
1934	.61	.58	.53	.69	1.22	.62 †	1.19 †
1936	.54	.56	.45	.59	1.13	.56 †	1.10 †
1937	.59	.55	.53	.62	1.12	.63 †	1.17 †
Laborers, male							
1931	.36	.37	.31	.37	.74	.38 †	.74 †
1934	.29	.30	.26	.25	.56	.29 †	.55 †
1936	.26	.26	.27	.24	.54	.26 †	.53 †
1937	.28	.30	.29	.25	.62	.28 †	.61
Laborers, female							
1931	.22	.31	.18	.25	.45	.22	.45
1934	.20	.21	.15	.19	.43	.19	.43
1936	.18	.17	.15	.15	.38	.18	.38
1937	.20	.21	.18	.19	.42	.19	.42

* *Civil Affairs Handbook, cit.*, p. 29.

† Including railroad and street railway workers.

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Hours of Work

Working hours were regulated for contract labor before they were for other forms of labor. If work were carried out on a daily basis, the maximum number of hours permitted was ten, including the time required for the journey between home and the place of work. In effect, this resulted in a nine-hour working day, and in some districts where health conditions had not yet been placed on a satisfactory footing certain managers reduced the working hours to eight. Where work was organized on a task basis, the amount of labor assigned to any worker was required not to exceed what he could reasonably perform in the maximum number of hours fixed on a daily basis. In addition to his regular daily work, each laborer had to spend two hours a week without pay in cleaning his quarters. If a laborer were required to work overtime on some urgent and exceptional task, he was to be paid 1½ times the normal rate. In Cambodia a more specific regulation, of November 2, 1928, decreed that workers might not be awakened before 4:30 A.M. or be returned to their camp later than 5:30 P.M. 466

The law also provided for a two-hour rest period about noon, and, if workers habitually spent this respite at their place of work, shelters against the sun and the rain had to be provided. Workers were entitled to one day of rest weekly, but with their employer's consent they might take two consecutive rest days in a two-week period. In addition they were granted four holidays at Tet (New Year) and on certain festivals which usually fell about June 9 and August 15. No wages were paid or food supplied on these rest days, but employers had to guarantee their laborers not less than twenty-five days of paid employment each month.

The first regulation of working hours for non-contract labor dated from 1933 and applied only to certain categories of industrial workers. This measure specified that boys under fifteen years of age and girls under eighteen might not be employed for more than ten hours a day, during which rest periods must be given totaling a minimum of one hour. Some types of labor could not be employed in night work (11 P.M. to 5 A.M.) and the nightly rest period had to last eleven consecutive hours except in emergencies when it might be reduced to ten. During confinement women were entitled to eight consecutive weeks without work. Not only was this legislation extremely restricted in the categories of laborers to which it was applicable, but also it made no reference to a weekly rest day. [464]

When a study of Front Populaire legislation was being made in 1936 for application to the colony, the native Indochina Congress adopted a series of demands which included a 40-hour week for miners and a 48-hour week for other classes of workers, prohibition of night work, a compulsory weekly rest day, and a fortnight's paid vacation each year. The

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466 employer groups, discussing the same subject, were of the opinion that a cut-and-dried limitation of working hours was impossible for most agricultural and industrial undertakings, but they were unanimously agreed upon the principle of a two weeks' paid vacation annually.

When the law was finally promulgated in December 1936, working hours were still fixed at ten a day for all wage-earning employees of either sex and any age, but from January 1, 1938, hours were universally to be reduced to nine, and beginning a year later, to eight. Moreover, night work was now prohibited for all children under fifteen years of age and for women without any age limit. A supplementary decree issued at about the same time made a weekly rest day compulsory in industrial and commercial establishments of all types. Annual holidays with pay became the right of all workers in industry, commerce and the liberal professions. From January 1, 1937, they were fixed at a maximum of five days and from January 1, 1938, at ten days.

Health and Safety Regulations

166 Contract workers were required to undergo two free medical examinations in the north before they were transported to plantations in the
466 south, and they all had to be vaccinated against smallpox and such other epidemic diseases as the local medical authorities deemed necessary. Recruiting agencies were required to maintain camps at the ports of embarkation (Ben-thuy, Tourane, and Quinhon in Annam, and at Haiphong in Tonkin). These camps, of which that of Haiphong was the largest and best, had to be constructed according to specified standards of hygiene and to include a properly equipped hospital. Emigrants from Annam were in the charge of special administrators and those from Tonkin were placed under the Supervisory Office for Workers Emigration —a bureau established in 1929 and attached to the Labor Inspectorate. Every vessel transporting laborers to the south had to be inspected before each sailing by the authorities, including medical officers, who saw to it that the regulations fixing the cubic air space per person, the bedding supplied, and the number of individuals transported, were enforced. Upon embarkation each worker was entitled to receive from the recruiting agent a linen suit, a banana-leaf raincoat, a blanket, a mosquito net, a mat, a ricebowl, and two chopsticks. A government official traveled on the ship to see that the workers' living quarters and food were maintained up to legal standards.

Upon arrival in Saigon, a representative of the Immigration Service boarded the vessel to check on the number of immigrants. Within forty-eight hours of their arrival the immigrants were sent to a camp at Xom-Chieu and were subjected to another medical examination. Workers found to be physically unfit were repatriated at the agent's expense, and

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those passed were at once turned over to their employers, who were required to provide transportation to their place of work. The only additional clothing supplied by the employer was free footgear, which was given only to workers assigned to clearing land. [166] 466

For the duration of their contract, workers remained under the supervision of the chief district medical officer whose responsibilities were discharged either directly through personal visits to plantations or via reports made by the labor inspector. If either official deemed it fit, he could require any enterprise to improve its standards of hygiene and, if employers proved recalcitrant, the local government itself made the necessary improvements at the former's expense. Every employer of contract labor was required to make monthly reports to a representative of the local health services as to the number of cases of illness, death, and the causes thereof. Laborers excused from work on grounds of illness were entitled to free medical care, including hospitalization. The local government fixed the payment to be made by employers to cover the cost of hospital treatment for their workers. Every undertaking employing fewer than 50 workers had to maintain a drug-stocked first aid post; those with more than 50 employees, an emergency room and hospital ward containing a minimum of six beds per 100 workers, and a nursing staff comprising at least one hospital attendant per 300 workers under the direction of a doctor, who was required to visit each month every plantation employing more than 500 laborers. Detailed regulations governed the maintenance of ambulances, the distribution of quinine, the use of mosquito nets, etc., particularly for plantations located in the redlands of Cambodia which were especially unhealthy.

One major factor in the improved health conditions noted on the southern plantations after 1928 was the special prophylactic anti-malarial measures adopted under the auspices of the Pasteur Institute, which operated a special service in all places of public work in Indochina. This service accounted as much for the decline in plantation mortality—5.4 per cent in 1927, 2.83 per cent in 1929, and 2.32 per cent in 1932—as did the reduction in the number of workers. The authorities, however, considered the rate as still far too high considering that it occurred among young persons who had passed three medical examinations. It had been noted that the incidence of sickness and of death was highest among those recently arrived, and in undertakings where land was being cleared preparatory to planting operations. [144] [165]

Some of the most essential health measures initiated by the 1927 decree were not extended to non-contract workers, notably the provisions relating to clothing and housing accommodations, the destruction of mosquitoes, quinine supplies, latrines, etc. Only in the mining industry of Tonkin had the authorities introduced comprehensive regulations. A law of April 7, 1910, stipulated that the provincial commissioner must be

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466 immediately notified of all accidents so that he could send an official to make an on-the-spot report, and in 1912 all mine-owners were required to observe the instructions issued by the Mines Inspection Service in the interests of workers' safety. The law of November 17, 1925, contained a number of provisions regarding recruiting centers, miners' lodgings, drinking water, food supplies, medical attendance, and industrial acci-
[759] dents. A first aid post had to be maintained, irrespective of the number of workers employed, wherever the labor involved was particularly dangerous. As a general rule where there was a fair number of workers there was an infirmary with a male nurse, an ambulance and a doctor. In places where more than 2,000 workers were employed the presence of a doctor on the premises was obligatory. Every accident, whether fatal or not, had to be officially reported both by the employer and by a European doctor. The cost of hospitalization for sick or injured miners was to be borne by the employer, and he was required to repatriate permanently incapacitated employees without charge.

In Annam protective measures for workers engaged in railroad construction were introduced by a law of June 3, 1922. The conditions governing the recruiting, housing, food, and medical care of such workers were carefully defined but no reference was made to accidents. Ten years later this law was made applicable in Laos. A later measure, that of May 29, 1930, required the organization of a medical service for workers employed on the Tanap-Thakkek line. In Cochinchina the same standard regulations regarding recruitment, housing, food, etc., were provided by a law of August 28, 1928, but only for the protection of laborers in public works where more than fifty coolies were employed.

For all Indochina a special order of March 5, 1932, regulated dangerous, unhealthy, or noxious undertakings, such as explosive works, but it was the decree of January 19, 1933, which first specifically laid down the precautions to be taken for the protection of laborers against injuries and occupational diseases. A much more comprehensive decree dated exactly five months later regulated health and safety measures for non-contract workers. It stipulated the installation of protective devices and additional provisions on behalf of women and children. All work likely to "imperil morality or give rise to danger" was forbidden the latter, as well as the general use of lead or lead derivatives in painting operations of any kind.

The main provisions of the local version of the 1936 Front Populaire legislation were concerned with the fencing off of power and other machinery and transmission gear, and with the ventilation and lighting of working premises. In certain cases employers might be required to provide lodgings for all or part of their workers, and all of them had to ensure the supply of pure drinking water, quinine, etc.

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Workmen's Compensation

The regulations discussed under health and safety measures were concerned with compensation for industrial accidents in only an incidental way. The only system of workmen's compensation in Indochina of which the writer is aware was that introduced in 1934 exclusively for the few thousand workmen of French nationality in the colony. This provided for daily compensation and the cost of medical attendance, drugs, funeral expenses, pensions to the incapacitated—all to be borne by the employer whether or not the injured worker had been negligent. This decree not only excluded Asiatic workers but made no reference to occupational diseases because the medical authorities felt that it was practically impossible, in Indochina, to differentiate general tropical from industrial diseases at all accurately. [563] 466

Considerable discussion and dissatisfaction were caused by the exclusion of the bulk of Indochina's workers from benefiting by this law. The employers' argument against extending it to Asiatic laborers was their fear that such workers' natural laziness would induce them to fake accidents in order to obtain the prescribed benefits. The universal application of this measure would have encountered practical difficulties, chiefly because of the lack of vital statistics for the whole population, but it was unlikely that the Annamites would run counter to their religious scruples against bodily mutilation in order to benefit fraudulently by compensation. Many French employers already paid accident compensation to their workmen but a more universal and standardized treatment, as well as the inclusion of all Asiatic employers in such measures, was needed. The extension of the 1934 law to Asiatic workers was seriously considered in the 1930's but such a step was probably prevented by the outbreak of war.

In this field, as in so many others, contract workers were better off than free laborers. One aim of the 1927 law was to provide for the maintenance of a contract worker's full wages during periods of absence caused by accidents, but it did not ensure actual compensation for the injury sustained. Some employers indemnified their injured workmen by paying a very small lump sum. Compensation claims made by the injured party on the basis of ordinary law were handled in different ways, depending upon the nationality of both the employer and the employee. When one of the parties was French, the Code Napoleon was applied. When both parties were natives, the various laws of the different states of the Union were applicable, and the concept upon which they rested was not dissimilar to that which lay behind analogous French legislation. [671]

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Housing

342 The average Indochinese peasant has always lived in a house of his own primitive construction. Its basic material was mud or wood, covered with thatch, and without flooring or tiles. The framework was assembled by the owners, his family, and sometimes his neighbors, without benefit of nails. In this way housing for the mass of the people, who lived in rural areas, presented no special problem.

362 The urban situation was different and as long ago as 1928 Saigon was [651] experiencing a housing shortage. That year the French law of December 5, 1922, was adapted to local needs, and provision was made for tax abatements on cheap dwellings. These were also exempted from the land tax for a period of fourteen years after their construction. The high rentals in the southern capital induced the government to aid natives and Europeans with small incomes to find decent lodgings. The same measures were not extended to other cities of the Union—possibly because the housing situation was more acute in Saigon than elsewhere but more likely because Cochinchina could far better afford such a program than the other states. In more recent years the housing shortage has become acute elsewhere, particularly in Hanoi.

466 Contract workers were legally entitled to free accommodations, for themselves and for their families. Such housing had to be built for them 362 before they arrived, and it could not be occupied until a written permit was issued by the district administrator after consultation with a representative of the Public Health Department.

The regulations drew a distinction between permanent and provisional dwellings (collective buildings with walls and roofs of straw or woven bamboo). The latter were permitted to be used only for a period of three years on a new plantation or on sections of old estates where development was still going on. Permanent lodgings (collective or individual buildings of wood, brick, or mud, with a roof of straw, tiles, or corrugated iron) were the officially accepted form of housing. In both types of quarters there had to be provided a minimum of three square meters of covered surface per adult occupant, and the surroundings had to be cleared within a radius of not less than 300 meters. Generally, contract workers on southern plantations were accommodated in individual huts, grouped together to form a camp or village, or in well [563] equipped barracks. The regulations stipulated that separate groups of dwellings had to be provided for workers of different nationalities.

The law of October 25, 1927, extended a limited number of these protective measures to free laborers, but an important omission was that requiring clearance of the vegetation from the vicinity of workers' dwellings. Some employers in sparcely settled areas, notably the coal mines of Tonkin, have built very well equipped villages to stabilize their labor

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forces. Certain of these settlements include electrical plants, a cinema, and markets, in addition to the other amenities required by law. 466

Apparently workers' housing has not been considered of outstanding importance. No mention of it was made in the list of demands presented by the Indochina Congress, nor in the comprehensive law of December 1936, except in connection with contract workers. 632

Unemployment

In the discussion of recruiting it was noted that Indochina's employers have advocated as an alternative to strict governmental control the establishment of public employment exchanges in Tonkin. The Governor General turned down this suggestion on the ground that Indochina's rural population was not as yet sufficiently developed to permit such organizations to work effectively. In 1929, when the depression was beginning to strike the colony, employment agencies were set up in Saigon and Hanoi for the exclusive purpose of assisting discharged war veterans and other unemployed Europeans to find work. 464

In the years immediately following, most business firms and the administration drastically reduced their personnel. Beginning with the middle of 1931 dismissal in Tonkin affected 103 Europeans and 9,758 Annamites (or 17 per cent and 9.2 per cent of those so employed). In Cochinchina the percentage of dismissals was about the same for Europeans but much higher for Annamite and Chinese workers. The industrial districts of North Annam and the mining enterprises of Laos were both affected, but few enterprises in Cambodia. The dismissed native workers apparently adapted themselves to the situation by returning to agricultural and other types of family work in their native villages, and unemployment affected Europeans far more acutely.

The employment exchanges set up in the commercial centers of Saigon and Hanoi in 1929 tried to find work for the large number of French citizens registered with them. But at the end of 1930, 162 Europeans were still out of work in southern Indochina, and the Hanoi bureau had been able to find jobs for only 21 out of the 113 applicants on its books. The following year the Governor General asked the Labor Inspectorate to collect data in regard to the employment agencies. A considerable effort was also made to repatriate unemployed Frenchmen. At the beginning of 1932 unemployed Europeans in Indochina totaled 746 and their number increased during the following year.

A French decree of 1933, designed to protect indigenous workers by restricting the employment of foreigners, was applied in Indochina the following year. By this law the great majority of positions in Indochina's enterprises, both public and private, were reserved to French citizens by limiting the proportion of aliens employable in public works 464 563

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464 563 to 33 per cent for those entailing an expenditure of 30,000 piastres; to 50 per cent for public works employing less than six Europeans or assimilated persons; to 10 per cent for enterprises working state land covering more than 300 hectares; to 20 per cent for all privately owned undertakings of an industrial, commercial, or agricultural nature; and to 10 per cent for fuel mines and 25 per cent for all other types of mining enterprises. At the same time a census was taken of the foreign staff employed in all private undertakings and on concessions.

466 No system of unemployment insurance was established in Indochina but a law of February 1937 provided for the grant of a wage bonus of 100 piastres yearly to manual workers or salaried employees of French nationality subject to the risk of unemployment far from home. The bonus was payable when a worker left his employment. This measure led to the extension or, in some cases, to the establishment in Indochina of numerous welfare and superannuation funds for such persons.

Women and Children

464 466 In the decree of 1927 it was stipulated that women and adolescents might not be employed in industrial work beyond their strength and women were entitled to a month's rest with pay after childbirth. The employment of children under twelve was prohibited by a decree of January 1933 in all establishments except family workshops and handicraft industries in which not more than ten workers were employed. The same law specified that the maximum number of working hours for this category of workers was ten, and that the daily rest periods should total a one-hour minimum. No night work was permitted between the hours of 11 P.M. and 5 A.M. except in emergencies.

[874] The decree of December 30, 1936, marked a great advance in the legislation governing the work of women and children, and in it appeared the first law regarding apprenticeship. No child thenceforth might be employed as an apprentice under the age of twelve, and, when apprentices reached twenty years of age, they were to be classed as adult workers. In workshops other than those of craftsmen the number of apprentices might not exceed one-third of the total number of workers employed. All commercial or industrial enterprises requiring technically trained workers and employing more than thirty skilled laborers were compelled to hire a number of apprentices equal to one-tenth of the total number of workers employed.

This same decree forbade employing women of any age and boys under eighteen years in night work, except in cases specifically authorized by the Governor General, and any women and boys under fifteen in mines and quarries. Children under twelve years of age might not be employed in theatres or in itinerant occupations. Women working in stores were

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to be furnished with seats or stools. Pregnant women were granted eight consecutive weeks for their confinement—during which period they were not subject to dismissal but received no wages—and after their return to work they were to be allowed rest periods to nurse their child until it was one year old. Labor inspectors at any time could require the medical examination of young workers to determine whether or not they were physically equal to their tasks. 464 466

Comprehensive as was this legislation, it failed to cover women and children engaged in agriculture.

Intermediaries

As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, employers in Indochina have been led by their lack of knowledge of native languages and customs to employ intermediaries, or *cais*. The functions of the *cai* varied—he might be a recruiting agent, a foreman, or an estate shopkeeper—but always he was interposed between the employer and his employees. As a subcontractor the *cai* engaged and paid the required number of workers and he organized their output. On other estates he might only recruit laborers. In still other cases, he simply directed their work. At times the *cai* was only the laborers' provisioner of food. But in each of these capacities he had opportunities to make illicit gains; he was often brutal and unscrupulous in forcing deductions from wages, withholding provisions, etc. The government intervened only to check the abuses perpetrated by the *cai* as recruiting agent and to prevent his profiteering at company stores. The government justified its continued toleration of the *cai* in his other capacities on the grounds that it was obviously to the employers' interest to eliminate the whole system so that with time the *cai* would be voluntarily dispensed with. [571] 464 445 563

The curtailment of the *cai's* activities as recruiting agent has already been described among the earlier official attempts at labor legislation. The effort to release laborers from the *cai's* stranglehold on company stores dated from the 1936 decree. Therein it was laid down that such stores might be operated only on condition that the local employees be not compelled to buy from them, that neither the employer nor the *cai* derive profits therefrom, and that store accounts be kept entirely separate from the payroll. A subcontractor might not run a store for his employees, either directly or indirectly, the price of goods sold in the store had to be posted conspicuously and printed both in French and the vernacular, and labor inspectors were entitled to inspect stores and to close down those which persistently disregarded these regulations. 466 444

As in so many other aspects of the local labor problem, the best legislation can be of only negative effectiveness. When Indochina's employer class becomes a stable, experienced, and linguistically trained group, 466

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466 the *cai* will automatically cease to exercise his malevolent influence over the laboring population.

4

LABOR LEGISLATION

In Indochina labor legislation was fragmentary until the close of the First World War, when the development of plantations and the return of Annamite laborers from France required the institution of more comprehensive measures. Such legislation was first concerned almost exclusively with the stabilization of contract labor and then with the protection of contract workers. Only in the late 1930's was there discernible an analogous legal framework designed for the benefit of free workers.

466 Labor was first subjected to regulation in Tonkin. As has already been
166 mentioned, the administration was so eager to repopulate the middle region devastated by the conquest that it gave away huge concessions
425 without realizing that such lands had been only temporarily abandoned by their native owners. Upon their return, these ousted proprietors refused to work for the French colonists whom they regarded as usurpers, and the local mandarins were generally uncooperative about using their influence to secure a labor force for the concessionaires. The colonists, already aggrieved that Tonkin had been misrepresented to them as a land teeming with manpower, turned to the administration, demanding that it requisition laborers. The administration refused this but did feel sufficient responsibility toward the colonists to make identity cards compulsory for laborers and to bring to justice those proven to have broken their contractual obligations. The colonists felt this to be totally inadequate, claiming that the procedure involved was expensive, time-consuming, and ineffectual. In 1896, when French law was substituted for the Annamite code, thereby abrogating all but the ultimate physical penalty for offenders, they felt that they had lost the last shred of legal protection against delinquent laborers.

466 Two years later when the government did occupy itself with labor contracts, its main objective was to force employers to recompense the state for the loss of their laborers' corvée services, and only a subsidiary clause required that a copy of all labor contracts be deposited with the local administrator. However, the following year a more comprehensive edict was promulgated establishing the conditions for labor contracts in Tonkin. The identity card obligation was retained, contracts might not be made for more or for less than a year, and imprison-

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ment (one to five days) and fines (one to fifteen francs) were imposable 466
upon the laborer who broke his agreement.

In 1902 this edict was extended to Cochinchina, Annam, and Cambodia, and nine years later to Laos. Until the eve of the war it remained the only labor charter Indochina possessed. In 1898 a ruling applicable [651]
exclusively to Asiatic laborers employed by French planters and ranchers in Cambodia had exonerated workers from payment of the poll tax and all labor dues and corvées, in substitution for which the employers were required to pay two francs per worker to the state and to register a copy of their labor contracts with the highest local administrator.

In Cochinchina the government's earliest intervention in labor problems had been to regulate the status of domestic servants by the com- [357]
pulsory issue of identity cards. At first the area developed so slowly that the 1896 edict of Tonkin was not applied until Cochinchina's western provinces were opened up to colonization. As in the north such measures failed to satisfy the local planters and in addition they were unable to recruit laborers from the north for an indefinite period and by individual contracts. They felt that the administration's measures were not taken in their interests but were designed primarily to remove both workers and European agricultural holdings from the jurisdiction of the Annamite authorities.

The first labor law applicable to the whole Union was the edict of March 6, 1910. This measure for the first time brought labor recruiting under the control of the local administration, set up supervising labor inspectorates, required that labor contracts be first registered at Saigon and then sent to the Resident Superior of the province in which the worker was to be employed, and regulated such working conditions as the employment of women, repatriation, and the like. This law marked [178]
the second major step in Indochina's labor legislation and remained in force until the wartime development of such local industries as rubber and coal, of large stock companies in which the old-time personal relationships between employer and employee were largely eliminated, and class consciousness on the part of Annamite laborers returned from France. These all necessitated the framing of new measures.

On Armistice Day itself Governor Sarraut drew up a code so comprehensive that its provisions have not yet been totally superseded, despite the increased tempo of Indochina's subsequent development. State control was established from the moment a labor contract was signed to the day when the worker was returned to his native village. The contract had to be deposited with the authorities, its duration was not to exceed three years of labor, and work was limited to a ten-hour day with extra pay for overtime. Contract coolies had the right to free medical care, lodgings, and the presence of their families, but also more specific penalties were imposed upon those breaking their contracts. Desertion was

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466 defined as an unauthorized absence of forty-eight hours or more from the plantation and was punishable by six to sixty days' imprisonment and a fine of 16 to 20 francs. To assure execution of the law, Residents Superior were empowered to inspect plantations and were required to see that a quarterly statement regarding laborers' accounts was forwarded to Saigon.

The expansion of Indochina's industries in the 1920's, the continuing complaints of Cochinchina's employers as to the costliness and delays involved in imposing penal sanctions upon delinquent coolies, and the first appearance of serious labor disputes in the colony—all demanded the revision and amplification of the 1918 regulations. Governor Varenne devoted serious study to the situation before drafting his important edict of October 25, 1927. He tried to simplify and improve the formalities regulating recruiting but refused the planters' request to recruit labor without preliminary authorization and in any numbers and areas they could. Recruiting was more closely supervised than theretofore, the maximum duration of a contract was fixed at five years for labor in foreign countries and at three years for Indochina. The legal working day remained fixed at ten hours, minimum food rations were established, the payment of wages and workers' housing were minutely regulated, a system of workmen's savings (*pecule*) was made obligatory, and a special labor inspectorate was created to deal with offenses against contracts of employment.

464 Recruiting workers from the densely populated north for labor on the plantations of the underpopulated south did not become a serious prob-
[445] lem until the First World War period. By that time professional recruiting had developed very rapidly in Tonkin and Annam. Recruiting agencies undertook to get workers' contracts signed, made the necessary advances to the recruits, and shipped them to their place of future work. The methods applied by all of these professional recruiters were identical since they had to employ Annamite intermediaries, who alone were able to persuade their compatriots to sign labor contracts. In turn these intermediaries usually employed indigenous agents who, more often than not, had neither knowledge of the laws governing contracts nor conscientious scruples against misrepresenting the conditions of living and of working involved.

464 The rubber boom of the mid-1920's stimulated a rapid expansion of the southern plantations and consequently an increase in the number
166 of coolies recruited in the north. In 1927, when the number of contract workers employed in the south had risen to more than 20,000, the government undertook an inquiry to determine exactly what were that area's requirements in agricultural workers and to what extent Tonkin and Annam could meet this demand without depleting their own labor supply. The conclusion reached was that if the demand were spread

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over four years and if allowances were made for desertions, repatriations, etc., about 25,000 immigrant workers would have to be brought south annually. Moreover it was concluded that the north provided ample labor reserves for southern needs, especially if recruiting were to include northern Annam as well as Tonkin. 464 166

In consequence of this report the administration placed no limit upon recruiting in Tonkin but restricted such activities in northern Annam to 8,000 workers annually, of whom only 1,000 could be sent to labor in the Pacific Islands. Permits were to be granted by the Governor General for recruiting laborers to work outside the colony, and by the Residents Superior for those recruited to work within Indochina. It was stated that the sole purpose of controlling the issue of permits was to enable the government to keep tabs on the operations of recruiting agents and the degree to which employers were complying with the regulations. Such supervision entailed satisfying the administration that the conditions of employment stipulated in the contract were in accordance with the laws and were agreed to voluntarily by the recruit, and that the laborers so hired were physically fit and adequately cared for by the agents at the ports of embarkation and on the ships transporting them to the south.

Before these regulations governing recruiting could be put into effect, an active campaign against the whole principle spread rapidly among the employer group in Tonkin. The official view was that this campaign was inspired by anti-French elements and that ammunition for it derived from only a small group of disgruntled workers who had returned from working in southern plantations. Nevertheless it was admitted that bad conditions existed in the south, particularly on hastily developed plantations and during the clearing operations that preceded rubber planting.

Tonkinese employers were less concerned with the humanitarian aspect of the question than with the fear lest large-scale recruiting deplete their local supply of cheap labor. Southern planters, on their side, resented such obstacles as were placed in the way of their freely recruiting labor where they pleased, complaining that the laws enacted for the protection of their working forces were already increasing their costs to such an extent that the labor accounted for three-fourths of the production price of rubber. They claimed that the administration itself did not feel bound to provide the same amenities for its own laborers as were required of private employers, and that it should assume some of the expense involved, such as the building of hospitals in the plantation areas. The northern states, they asserted, did not lose financially by the exodus of laborers, thanks to the tax imposed upon emigrant workers, and the 3 per cent increase annually registered by Tonkin's population was so large that the emigration of workers was a blessing to that state rather than a drain on its manpower. The assassination of the director of a

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464 private recruiting agency in Tonkin, at the height of this controversy in
166 1929, pointed up the issues and led the government to reorganize the recruiting system the following year.

Governor Pasquier, in a circular written in 1929 to local administrators, asked them to publicize the official policy in regard to labor relations. He stressed that the government's role was that of supervision and inspection, and that it in no way encouraged recruiting. The law he proposed (July 16, 1930) laid down the principle that only recruiting agents recognized as satisfactory would be licensed and that they must be responsible for the actions of their employees. Recruiting permits were valid for a maximum of six months and specified the area in which recruiting could be done. Previous measures to ensure the recruit's voluntary adherence to and understanding of his contract, his physical fitness for the work specified and his care at the hands of the agent were reinforced. The information volunteered by the recruit, and particulars about his physical condition and the medical care he had received, were all entered upon his work-book, copies of which were to be deposited with the employer, the local police, the labor inspectorate and the immigration service. Once the contract was signed, the recruit had to be fed, housed, clothed to a specific extent, and transported in ships meeting the official requirements—all at the agent's expense.

The depression, by automatically reducing the number of workers recruited for southern plantations, eased some of the difficulties involved in applying these regulations. But the government was not fully satisfied that recruiting could be solved by appropriate regulations well enforced. The attention of southern planters was officially called to their failure to make conditions of employment sufficiently satisfactory psychologically to attract recruits. But the planters did not, and possibly could not, heed such appeals. Economic conditions became such that the recruiting of contract labor declined until it stopped altogether in 1931–1932. When it was resumed in 1933 a reduction in the minimum wage had been sanctioned.

Labor Inspectorates

[647] To see that its measures were enforced, the 1927 edict had established
466 a General Labor Inspectorate to secure uniform protection for contract laborers throughout the Union and to replace the individual inspectorates that had been previously set up in some of the states. The first such inspectorate in Cochinchina dated from 1918, and subsequently similar services were set up in Tonkin (1926), Annam (1927), and Cambodia (1927). The competence of the new General Inspectorate extended throughout Indochina and included contract, non-contract, and compulsory labor. Legally it was responsible for the management and cen-

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tralization of governmental control over labor and the coordination of measures regulating contracts, savings schemes, social welfare, and the like. The inspection of plantations was generally left to the state inspectorates. 466

Local inspectors investigated the conditions of employment and the enforcement of regulations and conducted such specific inquiries as were ordered. At first these inspectors were to act under the authority of the local administrations, but during the depression, because of the Governor General's need to obtain direct reports, they were routed thither through the General Inspectorate office.

The presence of large labor forces in Cochinchina and Cambodia necessitated the appointment of assistant inspectors, who were concerned primarily with the supervision of contract laborers. They had the right to inspect plantations whenever they deemed it advisable, though this privilege was of limited utility since they were required to give prior notice to employers. They had to visit at least twice yearly all establishments employing contract workers and report upon all infringements of the regulations. Their other multifarious duties included explaining to the workers their rights and obligations, investigating complaints, and auditing all books concerned with labor payments, especially the deferred pay accounts. Since such activities implied an extensive knowledge of native languages and psychology, inspectors were generally recruited from the administrative staff. A decree of January 30, 1929, invested labor inspectors with simple police powers for the punishment of such infringements as an unjustified refusal to obey orders, unauthorized absence from work for more than twenty-four hours, etc. The penalties within their power to inflict were fines of one to fifteen francs, and imprisonment lasting from one to five days.

Unfortunately in 1932 retrenchments relegated the General Labor Inspectorate to a subordinate position and it became the first bureau of the Department of Economic and Administrative Affairs. In consequence there was a marked decline in the activities of the labor services during the next few years. The administrators now charged with them had little time, no special training in the field, were frequently shifted to other posts, and were usually on such friendly terms with the managers of the plantations within their jurisdiction that they exercised little independent, on-the-spot supervision. [647]

Complaints from two divergent quarters militated against the reconstitution of a labor inspectorate on the pre-depression status. In 1936 the Indochinese Congress, representing all native parties, demanded the institution of an efficient labor inspectorate and one to which Indochinese would be admitted on a footing equal to that of European inspectors. The conservative planters, on the other hand, apparently wanted a less powerful inspectorate, for they complained that inspectors abused

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466 their privileges and had failed to punish recalcitrant laborers adequately. One of the grievances of the employer group was the decree of January 24, 1933, which had permitted labor inspectors to act for contract workers when the latter brought suit—a measure designed to enable the workers who were generally too ignorant of their legal rights and of the judicial system to compel their employers through court action to fulfil their obligations.

[686] The employer group was somewhat mollified by the government's support of the penal sanction by more stringent punishment and more effective enforcement. A decree of June 2, 1932 (amended January 28, 1933), penalized laborers for the fraudulent retention of advances given them by imprisonment of not less than two months or more than two years and fines ranging from 25 to 3,000 francs. Any laborer, after traveling at his employer's expense to the place of work, who willfully evaded the obligations undertaken was liable to the same penalties. Subsequently all contracts of workers engaged for southern Indochina have contained a clause itemizing the penalties to which a worker is subject if he breaks the terms of his contract. The government also tightened up its legislation regarding deserters who returned to Tonkin. After 1934 any worker reported as a deserter in the *Bulletin de Police Criminelle* would be summarily arrested for breach of trust.

In promulgating these stringent measures for the protection of the employer group the government on more than one occasion emphasized that the law's function in this respect could not be merely negative. It was the task of the European staff on a large plantation to become acquainted with the workers, to look after their needs, to protect them against the tyranny of the indigenous foreman (*cai*), and to treat them firmly and justly. Such functions required long experience and a knowledge of the native languages and customs that was generally lacking. Desertions were less likely to occur on medium-sized plantations where the planter had had long contacts with his workers, and they were most frequent on large plantations with an excessively high mortality rate. Other explanations were crimping, the exactions of older workers imposed on new arrivals, the tyranny of *cais*, and inability to give compensation for advances received.

While the abolishment of an independent labor inspectorate was a retrogressive step, the edict of 1933 regulating for the first time the status of free labor marked a resumption of the forward movement. Much greater progress, however, was realized by the legislation inspired by the Front Populaire Government in 1936. Although opposition from the employer group in Indochina delayed its promulgation locally until January 27, 1937, the measure adopted was extremely comprehensive in its provisions for a 40-hour week, paid vacations, collective bargaining, the protection of women and child laborers, apprentice legislation, the

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prohibition of fines, the regulation of industrial accidents, the reduction effected in maximum hours of work and, finally, the institution of a regional minimum wage. 466

5

ORGANIZED LABOR

TRADE UNIONS did not develop in Indochina for the excellent reason that they were prohibited by law. Moreover the formation of a wage-earning class is of recent date and has included only a very small part of the population. The problem was complicated by the existence, side by side with the permanent workers, of a large body of floating laborers who accepted employment only during the slack season. Not only would the incorporation of so large an element within a union movement be difficult, but the extremely low wages earned by all laborers in Indochina hardly enabled them to accumulate enough money to pay union dues, establish a strike fund, etc. 467

The chief obstacle, however, has been the ability of local employers to block the introduction of appropriate legislation in Indochina. The suspected existence of political agitators behind the strikes of the 1930's kept the employer group so antagonistic and the administration so alarmed that unionization was postponed. The arguments of union advocates—that the absence of unions had not prevented strikes, and that their existence would have the advantage of bringing labor leadership into the open—did not immediately prevail, but there were signs before war broke out that the stand taken by the anti-unionists was becoming less impregnable.

The right to strike in Indochina was closely restricted by the system of penal sanctions introduced for contract laborers. The law of 1918 provided penal sanctions for agricultural workers in Cochinchina who broke their agreement. In 1927 these sanctions were made applicable to all the states of the Union. A clause of the Penal Code, canceled in France as long ago as 1884 but still applicable in Indochina, forbade the blacklisting of an undertaking or the prohibiting of workers from going there to labor for any reason, as well as the blacklisting of a worker dismissed by his employer under the threat of a strike. 468 686

A 1932 decree affecting free labor introduced a system of conciliation and arbitration for individual disputes and punished by imprisonment (six days to two years) and a fine (16 to 2,000 francs) any collective stoppage of work which did not tend to settle an occupational dispute or

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[686] 468 which was likely to exert pressure on government policy by hindering services useful to the public. Moreover, those penalties were applied without prejudice to any sanctions contained in the Penal Code, and the persons adjudged guilty might be expelled from the country for a period ranging from two to five years.

Despite the severity of the law, a strike movement grew in strength throughout the interwar period and indicated an increasing solidarity among Indochina's workers and students. Between 1922 and February 1934 about 100 strikes occurred, most of which had been caused by either a reduction in wages, a refusal to increase wages, or by the severity of *cais* and employers. The number of strikes was not large, but in view of the overwhelmingly agricultural character of the country, it was sufficient to be considered indicative of the existence of a genuine labor movement.

The delay in applying the Front Populaire social legislation to Indochina, and the acrimonious debates it provoked, inspired a series of strikes which assumed a violent character in Tonkin and Cochinchina. The strikers claimed that their employers were not fully applying such reforms as had been sanctioned by law and that current wages did not reach subsistence levels owing to devaluation of the currency and the steep rise in living costs. In almost all cases the strikers confined their demands to increased wages and in only a few instances was their violence directed toward individuals. On November 27, 1936, there were 1,700 workers on strike, a number never previously equalled in Indochina's labor history. The local press claimed the next month that the number of strikers had risen to 50,000. The most serious outbreaks occurred at the Campha coal mines in Tonkin, where 6,000 workers were affected. Noteworthy was the moderate nature of their demands—small wage rises, the future assumption of the cost of oil and of greasing wagons by the company and of half the price of tools in cases of loss, the right to paid employment every day of the month—and the modest role of referee played by the local administration.

Settlement of Disputes

After long discussion of the problem, conciliation boards, rather than labor courts, were established for the settlement of individual disputes. It was ruled that such disputes might not be brought into the courts until the defendant had been summoned before one of the conciliation boards. The board's membership was to include a justice of the peace, or substitute official, and two members representing the employers and employees respectively, chosen from lists drawn up by the states' Governors and Residents Superior. Disputes between employers and workers were referred to the French members of the board, those between Asiatic

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employers and employees to the native section, and those involving both Europeans and Asiatics to a section composed of members of both groups. The conciliation procedure was made compulsory if both parties were domiciled within the jurisdiction of one of the boards. If such were not the case, the procedure was made optional, in order not to place too great a burden upon disputants living far away.

By 1930 conciliation boards had been established in Hanoi, Haiphong and Nam-dinh (Tonkin), in Saigon (Cochinchina) and Pnom-Penh (Cambodia). All the claims subsequently introduced were by wage-earners and concerned payment of arrears and dismissal allowances. Unfortunately only a small proportion of these disputes was settled by the boards, from whose decisions no appeal could be made.

As a result of this very meager success, the Mutual Association of Commercial and Industrial Workers of Cochinchina demanded the introduction of labor courts, and the Governor General deemed the suggestion worthy of consideration. He submitted a proposal drafted by the Labor Inspectorate regarding the establishment of such courts to the heads of the local governments, but nothing further developed.

The conciliation and arbitration of collective disputes was the object of a draft decree submitted to the Grand Conseil in 1930. Theretofore workers had had no peaceful and legal means of getting their claims examined without recourse to a stoppage of work, which rendered them liable to dismissal. After approval by the Metropolitan authorities, the decree was promulgated locally in 1932. It established the principle of compulsory and gratuitous conciliation of collective labor disputes and introduced optional arbitration. It became applicable as soon as a dispute affected not less than a fourth of the employees in an undertaking, or not less than 10 per cent of the wage-earning employees. The Labor Inspector assumed the title of Conciliator, and either party might submit disputes to him by a simple petition embodying the complaint and supporting evidence. If he were unable to effect a settlement, the dispute could be submitted to the head of the local government for arbitration. The same decree also covered work stoppages in private utility services affecting the general public, and dealt with penalties for any "unlawful" cessation of work, that is, for any purpose other than the settlement of a trade dispute and deliberately entailing prolonged public inconvenience.

The legislation concerning settlement of collective disputes was as barren of results as that designed for conciliating individual disputes. A decree of October 1937 made another attempt to strengthen and reorganize the procedure involved in settling individual disputes, but it was promulgated so near to the eve of the war that its achievements are unknown.

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POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS

127 VIRTUALLY NOTHING is known here about labor conditions in postwar Indochina. Since the Japanese surrender, Cochinchina has been the scene of intermittent conflict which still continues in guerilla form. Laos experienced a military campaign which ended only in March 1946 and which is still reflected in the unsettled living conditions prevailing in that area. Shortly before, Cambodia came to terms with the French occupation forces and as a consequence escaped much destruction, but tension in the western frontier region increased with the long delay in [467] settling the border dispute with Siam. Only in the northern provinces controlled by the Viet-Nam Republic has there been opportunity for the growth of a labor movement, but even there the presence first of Chinese and then of French occupation forces has been far from propitious.

654 The curtain which descended upon Tonkin and northern Annam at the time of the Japanese coup of March 9, 1945, has been only occasionally raised to permit glimpses of the functioning of the Viet-Nam party in that area. From intermittent reports made by neutral observers and from Radio Hanoi's broadcasts, it is apparent that the Annamite Government launched an extensive and largely successful agricultural program designed to relieve the country of the periodic famines which in [466] the past have decimated the population of the delta and coast. Reportedly new crops have been introduced, rice cultivation has expanded, and the great dyke system of the Red River has been repaired and enlarged. Such projects obviously have required the use of large labor forces. Appeals to patriotism and an intensive revival of the old village conscription system have probably been the means used to achieve the 467 desired results. However, if a report published in the Hanoi newspaper, *La République*, on October 28, 1945 (to the effect that the first labor convention of north Viet-Nam had been held two days before), was accurate, labor seems to have been organized to some extent. Shortly afterward, Ho Chi Minh, president of the Viet-Nam Republic, called a two-day general strike in protest against a currency move by the Banque de l'Indochine; this, and subsequent work stoppages, have been politically motivated and designed largely to impress the foreign powers with the disciplinary organization controlled by the Viet-Minh party. Although no further word of organized labor's activities in Viet-Nam controlled territory has filtered through, it may be assumed that political

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preoccupations are still paramount in northern Indochina as elsewhere throughout Southeast Asia. 467

It is known with greater accuracy that the rubber and other plantations of Cochinchina have been suffering from a shortage of labor. To some extent this has been due to the refusal of many Annamites to work for the French despite the latter's frequent appeals to them to return to "normal life"; to the unsettled conditions, prevailing particularly in the rural areas, which make it unsafe for French planters to return to their estates; and to the anti-Tonkinese campaign which has been launched locally for the purpose of setting up the "autonomous Republic of Cochinchina." Because the Viet-Nam Government, with its headquarters in Tonkin, opposes the separation of the richest Annamite area from its control, the French have been using propaganda and more forcible methods to make the Tonkinese unpopular in the south so that all possible Viet-Nam agents will be compelled to leave Cochinchina. Furthermore, the breakdown of the north-south transportation system, due to Allied bombing during the war and to guerilla operations since the Japanese surrender, has made it physically impossible to import Tonkinese laborers to work in the south. To remedy the serious labor shortage in rural Cochinchina, it is reported that the local gendarmes have been rounding up any Annamites in and around Saigon on whom they can lay hands and have been transporting them to work on the deserted French-owned plantations. 727 464

In the fall of 1945 a brief strike by Cambodian workers in Pnon Peuh, as a protest against the reassertion there of French sovereignty, and by Chinese coolies in Cholon, against the irresponsible behavior of the British Indian and French occupation troops in Cochinchina, were transient manifestations almost exclusively motivated by nationalist sentiments. 467 668

Under the political and military conditions currently prevailing in Indochina, no genuine labor movement is likely to develop, except perhaps in those portions of Tonkin and Annam where the Viet-Nam Government has been in effective control for more than a year.

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CHAPTER VI · SIAM

1

GENERAL LABOR SITUATION

567 IN ANCIENT SIAM the services owed by every freeman to the state and to his patron, as well as the legal existence of seven classes of slaves, obviated the existence of what are known today as labor problems. The abolition of slavery by stages was not finally completed, even legislatively, until 1906.

[177] The enslavement of war prisoners was an ancient Thai practice, but it owed its real development to contacts with the neighboring Khmers and Peguans, who had already made slavery a legal institution.[1] Indeed, the Siamese soon became distinguished for the ease with which anyone might become and remain a slave. Fathers could sell their children, a husband his wife, and all could and frequently did sell themselves into slavery, owing to the prevalence of indebtedness and feudal patronage. [721] The universal attraction of gambling and the more potent need for protection were in good part responsible for this situation. Chronic warfare was one of the main causes of Siam's underpopulation; to remedy this underpopulation, the Siamese indulged in periodic slave raids, chiefly among the primitive Khas. They transplanted whole communities of vanquished people and, when this failed to meet their needs, bought supplementary slaves from professional Chinese slave hunters.[2] The government in those days not only condoned but often furthered this slave trade, and not until the late nineteenth century did it attempt to intervene in the relations between master and slave. In the middle of that century, slaves were the chief wealth of many a prosperous family. They formed from a fourth to a third of the total population and when sold cost about Tcs. 100 apiece.[3] Although their condition varied, both in regard to individual treatment and at different periods of history,

[1] Lingat, R., in the *Siam Society Journal*, 1933.

[2] Crawfurd, John, *Journal of an Embassy to the Courts of Siam and Cochin-China*, 2nd edition (2 vols.), London, 1830, Vol. I, p. 227.

[3] Pallegoix, Mgr., *Description du Royaume Thai ou Siam* (2 vols.), Paris, 1854, Vol. I, p. 234.

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their status was not necessarily unfortunate and their treatment was generally humane. 567

During the Bangkok period, when the remnants of Ayuthia's laws were gathered together for codification, legislation began to supplant custom, especially in regard to debt slavery. With the growth of Siam's export trade and the subsequent rise in land values that occurred after the opening of the Suez Canal and development of steam navigation, slavery lost its economic necessity and could be abolished without disturbing deeply the country's economy. But the process took almost a century. Permission to purchase their freedom was extended to war prisoners in 1805, and shortly thereafter to all the children of slaves. Some sixty-five years elapsed before the government took another forward step; it was gradually being realized that before the administration could be reorganized and Siam's prestige raised in the eyes of the world, slavery must be totally eliminated. This was not accomplished until the early twentieth century and about a quarter of the Siamese nation was disoriented economically and socially; the natural improvidence of the Siamese—a product of their former social and political system—aggravated the results of such a change.

A certain intermediary stage continued to exist between free and slave labor, which took the form of corvée service. The harshest form this assumed was the hereditary obligation to serve in the army or navy. Until the navy was modernized under Danish auspices, the only escape for a man and his descendants from this hated service was to acquire a certain degree of education, which brought with it automatic exemption. The same element of compulsion prevailed among Siamese artisans and was a major cause of the decline in indigenous arts and crafts. Talent was rewarded by forced service in the patron's household. Under these disadvantageous social and economic conditions, artisans lost their initiative and whatever creative impulses they had. This inheritance of trades and professions gave a form of stability to Thai society, except for the class of public officials, where functionaries might train their sons to follow in their profession and then find themselves dismissed by the king for having incurred his displeasure. In practice the whole system severely restricted labor and professional services. 466 [702] 567 651 [463]

The enlightened King Mongkut was the first to modify the services owed by individuals to the state (*rachakan*) when he decreed that men no longer had to perform work gratuitously which might be done by paid laborers. This limited emancipation was confined largely to Bangkok. The rural populace was still constrained to perform police work, road building, and canal cutting—perhaps a little less at the arbitrary pleasure of the local governors, but the latter could always plead the genuine difficulty of finding local free labor available for public works. As the law was hard to enforce in isolated up-country regions, officials were able to 466 651 369

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466 continue requisitioning materials and services for their personal benefit.
651 Gradually, however, the state managed to require that conscripted work
369 should have public utility, be paid at fixed market prices, and be used only when free labor was not available. This final condition proved the hardest to satisfy. Officials traveling in the interior were often stranded or seriously delayed because of the impossibility of finding coolies.

461 A story long current among Bangkok foreigners relates that a Siamese who was indignant that his people should be described as "incorrigibly idle" could only offer as a counter-characterization that they were "incurably indolent." Unless Siamese were in desperate straits they would not hire out their services. The bounty of tropical nature made it superfluous for them to work for the necessities of life; they wanted to be their own masters and to be under no compulsion—except that imposed by nature—in regard to working hours and place. When they finally accepted outside employment, they preferred agricultural piecework to be done in their own way and at their good pleasure. They found congenial the irregularity of the rice-farming season and, rather than specialize in any one form of occupation, preferred to supplement their main source of livelihood with part-time activities. Like the Annamites they feared unfamiliar terrain, especially the mountains, and only as farmers and boatmen would they labor hard and willingly.

461 The shortage of labor available for public works caused the govern-
ment to modify its early legislation by reasserting the state's right to requi-
651 sition labor—but at fixed pay. The preamble to this legal amendment stated that, since some people were by nature industrious and others lazy,
466 the former must needs be encouraged. A High Commissioner was appointed to use his discretion in regard to exempting from compulsory labor any person especially industrious in useful works or those who had performed *rachakan* for a prolonged period. Official ideas were gradually assuming a more Occidental cast; the idea of public responsibility was slowly seeping into the legislation of the land and the feeling that poverty was tantamount to failure became vaguely discernible. Yet for years after the introduction of a poll tax had emancipated the person paying it from having to perform labor for the state there were still many Thais who preferred working off their tax to paying it, since they could make money off the government's food allowance by bringing their own provisions from home. Patronage has been dying an even more lingering death, for individuals even in the days of the constitutional regime still sought out influential persons to whom they offered their services in return for "protection."

697 Originally convict labor was drafted as the only means of getting certain types of public works accomplished, but subsequently it came to be employed in crafts. In the country jails of Siam, hats, wicker furniture, basketry, and lacquer work of fine quality were made, largely with the

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Chinese

idea of developing industries at low cost and training craftsmen. Inevitably this has competed with local tradesmen; there was no standardization or large-scale production; and marketing methods were poor. A revival of the use of convict labor occurred in 1937 when the newborn municipalities found regular labor too expensive to hire, and the government loaned them the inmates of the local jails at the rate of 10 *satangs* a day. The policy of the Penitentiary Department, as stated in 1941, was to make convicts self-supporting to the point where the proceeds from their labor would supply the funds required for building modern prisons. 697

Regional differences and natural propensities for certain forms of occupation led long ago to a slight division of labor. Moreover the revolution in Siam's economy effected by the development of an export trade created new work in connection with the growth of building and transportation industries, in addition to more agricultural employment as the land under cultivation increased. Agricultural commercialization, in turn, brought in its wake a marked specialization in the crafts. In certain occupations, however, the Siamese made no effort to compete with foreigners, particularly the Chinese, into whose hands came more and more of the expanding industries. By the turn of the century the Chinese were dominant among the port coolies, boat builders, carpenters, market gardeners, tradesmen, and miners, constituting some 70 per cent of the non-agricultural laborers; the Malays worked their paddy fields, performed machine labor in a few mills, and shared with the Siamese in the fishing industry; the few Javanese were specializing in market gardening; the Burmese and Shans were withdrawing from the teak industry and beginning to traffic more in gems and general peddling; the Ceylonese were among Siam's foremost jewelers and goldsmiths; the Bombay Indians went in for retail merchandising, the Bengalis for tailoring, and the ubiquitous Tamils were either cattlemen or shopkeepers.[4] 463 563

It was the Chinese employers who profited most from the steady stream of Chinese immigrants whose labor supplemented the reluctant native services. Chinese coolies would work an intensive 12-hour day at a cost of Tcs. 20 a year, in addition to board and lodging. In prosperous times the Menam Valley farmers used to get Lao labor from the northeast at an annual cost of Tcs. 120 per head, and they were far inferior to the Chinese in regard to both endurance and perseverence. The Chinese themselves preferred non-agricultural work because it was more remunerative, and no effort was made to encourage the emigration of Chinese farmers to Siam through proper recruiting agents in China. As a rule those Chinese who had saved enough money from coolie work entered trade and, after they had prospered, returned home, though they were thought to be less transient in the years prior to the present war. 167 464 463

[4] Smyth, H. Warrington, *Five Years in Siam* (2 vols.), New York, 1898, Vol. I, p. 14.

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Chinese

167 The successive attempts made to restrict Chinese immigration over the 1927–37 decade were aided by the depression which forced the return of
464 many Chinese to their homeland. The combined effect was to leave certain employers shorthanded while still not satisfying the Siamese nationalists. On some of the smaller peninsular rubber estates tapping ceased entirely because of the labor shortage which was estimated in 1935 at between 30 and 40 per cent.[5] Yet the government, despite its dependence upon revenue from the tin and rubber industries, rejected a petition signed principally by Chinese mine-owners and endorsed by the Siamese High Commissioner asking permission to reimport, tax-exempt, the 5,000 Chinese coolies who had left their employ and the country during the depression. The government claimed that the law discriminated against no single nationality and simply aimed to maintain high living standards for Siamese labor, which had been suffering from unemployment on a minor scale. The subsequent attempt to substitute imported Lao laborers on the southern rubber plantations was reported only partially successful.

563 The synchronization of the labor shortage, restriction laws, rice mill strikes, and publicity regarding Chinese remittances precipitated a gen-
464 eral discussion regarding the merits of Chinese labor. Restrictionists argued that the Chinese formed a state-within-a-state and were steadily undermining the position of the Siamese laboring and artisan class; that the current laws were not severe enough to cope with this menace; that the Chinese propensity to form secret societies, go on strike, and boycott other countries' merchandise was a threat not only to Siam's internal order but to her harmonious foreign relations; and that, if Siam had been prudent enough to ward off the danger of foreign investments in the country, she ought to be equally so in regard to alien labor.

Advocates of Chinese immigration, few and dwindling in official influence, replied that without adequate labor there was little prospect of attracting capital of any nationality, and that the restrictions on Chinese immigration were simply retarding development and pointlessly foregoing national wealth. They claimed that all of Siam's unexploited land could not be properly farmed by family labor. The alternative to abundant immigrant labor was mechanization, and this would be complicated by Siam's lack of fuel resources, her farmers' impecuniousness, and the general difficulties of power-farming on ricelands.

563 The first of these schools of thought rode to triumph on the rising tide
[186] of Siamese nationalism. Beginning in the middle 1930's and reaching a crescendo in the spring of 1939, the government passed a series of laws
464 which had the effect of eliminating overnight many of the traditional sources of livelihood of the Chinese with the expressed design of replac-

[5] *Bangkok Times*, July 10, 1935.

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ing them by Siamese. When industries tried to fill the required quota 464
of their labor forces with Siamese, they encountered difficulties.

In Siam the labor situation was in some ways the reverse of that in the [517]
West, for it has been the Siamese bourgeois who traditionally worked
whereas the peasant had many idle months which he spent in gaming, 461
crafts, drinking, and occasional dacoity. The mild exhortations made to
the middle classes to take up scientific farming—in which a royal prince
gave a unique example—fell on the deaf ears of Siamese who continued
to aspire after government jobs. No one denied that Siamese skilled
labor was as good as foreign; the survival of a number of crafts revealed
the indigenous artisan's dexterity and artistry. And almost any Siamese
could and did garden, cook, sew, and carry on carpentry work in his spare
time. Nor was the long-standing inadequacy of technical training facili-
ties held responsible, for they had trouble in attracting students and in
some cases of placing them. Nearly all of the rural Siamese employed in [465]
skilled or semi-skilled occupations were paid on a share basis and classi-
fied as artisans rather than laborers even in the rare cases where wages
were paid.

Nationalism, however, was not the only force working toward an occu- 178
pational change in the habits of the Siamese. Rice farmers in the central
zone were seriously affected by the drastic fall in world prices in the early 464
1930's, and white-collar jobs were becoming scarce even before the depres-
sion created a modest unemployment problem, chiefly in Bangkok. The
overstaffing of the civil service under Rama VI was followed by Prajadhi-
pok's purge, which made clear for the first time that the bourgeoisie could
not expect, as in the past, that there would always be positions in the
bureaucracy for those educationally qualified. They would have to an-
ticipate either much lower salaries or prepare for technical employment.

Attempts to relieve unemployment were begun by the absolute mon-
archy and carried on by the constitutional regime in only slightly less
spasmodic fashion. The new administration showed more initiative, but
not commensurate results, in drafting a ten-year plan for land develop-
ment, in initiating a labor and other economic surveys, and in generally
underscoring the importance of technical instruction. But because the
need for labor never became very acute in Siam and the government was
faced with even more pressing problems, only half-measures were exe-
cuted and no systematic plan was carried through to cope with such labor
problems as existed. Such steps as were taken were largely negative—the
curtailment of foreign labor, capital and advisers. The stage was legally
cleared for a greater participation by Siamese in their country's develop-
ment; but the means to achieve it had not been worked out from either
the psychological, the technical, or the economic angle before war broke
out in the Pacific.

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TYPES OF LABOR

463 At the time the 1937–38 census was taken, occupations were divided into ten main groups as follows:

TABLE XI: TYPES OF LABOR IN SIAM, 1937–38

Occupations	*Males*	*Females*	*Total*
Agriculture and fishery	3,018,892	3,009,903	6,028,795
Forestry	15,012	5,395	20,407
Commerce	221,461	135,875	357,336
Industries, crafts, and engineering	96,840	33,114	129,954
Mining	13,807	1,264	15,071
Transport and communications	56,568	2,289	58,857
Public services	62,162	716	62,876
Professions	41,604	8,143	49,747
Household and private affairs	54,404	28,186	82,590
Clerical	17,499	424	17,923
Total	3,598,249	3,225,309	6,823,556

Agricultural

241 Siam was made up, roughly, of three regions of almost self-sufficing agriculture and one commercialized agricultural district in the center. In the self-sufficing areas commercialized farming existed sporadically near the larger settlements. Throughout those regions the major problem for the farmers was the development of other sources of cash income. The chief need of the commercialized area, on the other hand, was to produce more diversified crops, with a greater emphasis on items required for home consumption. By raising more foodstuffs the farmers of central Siam could have lowered their living costs and increased their cash incomes without necessarily diminishing their rice output for export.

[433 241] Since the late nineteenth century the farmers of the central valley have been concentrating on growing rice for export. Hired labor became indispensable, and land values high. Where crops were raised for sale and all surplus became profit, there was no limit to the amount of land a 427 householder wanted to possess.[6] Gradually with the increase of irrigation projects large tracts of land came into the hands of private interests and many former peasant proprietors became tenant farmers or agricultural

[6] Andrews, James M., *Siam: Second Rural Economic Survey, 1934–35*, Bangkok, 1935, p. 155 *et seq.*

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North
South

laborers. The poor farmer, if he were not dispossessed for debts, found it increasingly hard to acquire additional property of his own. Indebtedness thrived on traditional Siamese improvidence, and increased with the habit rapidly acquired by the central farmers of buying luxuries as well as necessities from their cash incomes. The large landed proprietor had to hire labor, originally from among the Lao migrants and later from among the growing group of local, landless proletariat. The constitutional government, which came into being during the depression, recognized the seriousness of the land-tenure situation in central Siam, but never got very far with its projects for a large-scale redistribution of land. 427 [464]

The economy of the northern regions has remained almost wholly self-sufficient, and individual holdings have been subdivided to the point of being uneconomic. The nearby jungle furnished enough bamboo to build a house and a fence. Paddy seed was available at all times and for nothing, and a man could easily grow enough rice for his own family's needs. Neighbors generally helped each other during the harvest. In the rare instances where a metayage system prevailed, the owner provided the land and sometimes the draft animals, in return for which he retained a part of the crop. Hired labor usually was paid in rice rather than in money, little of which was in circulation. Cash wages, when paid, were lower than in the south. 241 427 [476] [465]

Farming costs, although hard to estimate accurately, were believed to be about double those in the south because of the greater amount of human labor employed. The home-made implements generally used were inefficient, and the threshing was done by hand. Fish abounded in handy streams. Livestock was kept around the house. Tobacco grew almost wild, and the women of the household spun and wove the family's clothes. If the farmer wanted additional commodities he simply bartered his surplus products. Whatever time was left over after the farming families were fed, housed, and clothed, was spent in handicraft activities, in recreation, and in warding off evil spirits. For many years money seemed superfluous in this economy. Not very long ago some Lao villagers in astonishment inquired of a traveling official how he could possibly spend all his salary.[7] However, the rapid growth in the means of communication during the interwar period was changing this picture. 241 511 [178]

Among the Malay communities of the south family labor sufficed, for the Malays produced just enough for their own subsistence and generally resisted the introduction of supplementary, commercialized crops. Outside the Malay communities, hired labor was almost wholly Chinese. The Thais, like the Malays, enjoyed an easy farming existence. When they wanted additional income they tapped rubber trees or fished to sell [464] 241

[7] Le May, R., *Siamese Tales Old and New*, London, 1930, p. 187.

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Thailand AO1
South
Chinese

241 part of the catch. Their farming activities consisted of turning loose a herd of water buffaloes to trample on a small piece of ground which thereafter was subjected to only a little additional harrowing and plowing. Both men and women performed the tasks—the men doing only the plowing and threshing, however. Almost all the local farmers used their immediate family's labor, worked as little as possible, and survived pleasantly and effortlessly on a diet of rice, fish, and fruit.

Industrial

471 Most of Siam's industrial development has taken place in Bangkok, ex-
654 cept for the tin and rubber industries located in the peninsula and forestry in the north. Until recent years the capital, labor, and management of such industries have been almost wholly foreign. The advent of the nationalistic constitutional regime, along with the world depression, made the project of industrializing Siam to the point of local self-sufficiency rapidly popular. The lack of Siamese capital, skilled labor, technicians, fuel, and transportation facilities was not regarded as a sufficient deterrent by nationalists. In the late 1930's a considerable number of industrial ventures were sponsored by the government, which theretofore had given direct employment almost exclusively to functionaries and laborers for the Public Works Department. A certain amount of circum-
[563] spection was observed in the displacement of Western firms, but virtually none in regard to the Chinese, who had been even longer entrenched in Siam as laborers, capitalists, and middlemen but who lacked the support of diplomatic representation.

654 Prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War most of the constructive work
874 in the direction of industrialization had been preparatory. To overcome the Thais' traditional disinclination toward technical and commercial undertakings the government offered more facilities for vocational training. Its earlier efforts to induce Siamese to accept training by the Survey and Forestry Departments had met with discouraging results; even the more popular Arts and Crafts School had difficulty in finding a market for its graduates. In the mid-1930's a greater effort was made to develop a large group of technicians. Courses in science and engineering were added to the curriculum of Chulalongkorn University; the government announced its intention of opening a technical institute and agricultural, mining, forestry, and rubber schools, and more students were sent abroad for advanced study. A feeler was put out to the foreign firms in Bangkok to foster an apprenticeship system, but otherwise little effort was made to coordinate the larger anticipated supply with the industrial demand.

167 Legislation was the instrument used not only to clear but to force the
464 way for the greater employment of Siamese. The augmented immigra-

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Chinese

tion fee and literacy tests were instituted to cut down the influx of Chinese laborers. As this did not prove effectual for long a series of laws was passed, mostly in 1939, which eliminated the Chinese from many of their traditional means of livelihood and which required the employment of a certain proportion of Siamese in a number of industries. The Birds' Nest Concession, Food Vending, Salt, and Tobacco Acts cut deeply at established Chinese monopolies. The Vehicles Act aimed to displace Chinese by Siamese taxi-drivers, and the substitution of Siamese butchers coincided with the government's assumption of control over all animals to be slaughtered. Although the curtailment of teak concessions effected when forest leases were renewed in November 1939 principally concerned European companies, the government's acquisition of a number of sawmills foreshadowed its control over an industry that had been Chinese-dominated, particularly in regard to the labor employed. Even more drastically anti-Chinese in its implications was the creation of the official Thai Rice Company which almost immediately took over 11 mills from their Chinese owners and cast its shadow over the 600 or more rice mills located in the provinces. At about the same time the government announced its intention of opening a rubber factory and centers for training Siamese for this industry. Only tin mining, where foreign capital was deeply entrenched and the only skilled laborers available were Chinese, seemed left off the official agenda. But even there the government invited tenders for the construction of a local smelter. The Siamese Vessels Act, also of 1939, took the more positive step of requiring that shipping crews must be 75 per cent Siamese.

In a third way the government sought to provide for a greater participation by Siamese in their country's development. Various industries were launched by the state, of which perhaps the most successful was the Bawn Rood Brewery. Tariff rates were successively raised to protect the new local industries—though some, like the manufacture of matches and cigarettes, were set up by European companies. The other official ventures, such as factories for the manufacture of paper, sugar, textiles, etc., were of too recent vintage to have appreciably affected the labor market. The total of 129,954 persons reported as engaged in industry and engineering in 1938 indicates the slight importance such labor forces continued to have in Siam, despite all the government's programs and legislation.

Mining. Just prior to the depression all but 5 per cent of southern Siam's 729,000 miners were Chinese. To obviate the wholesale desertions characteristic of the first years of commercialized mining in Siam, chiefly because of the bad health conditions prevalent, the Chinese mine owners gave their laborers a stake in the outcome by paying them on the basis of the ore produced. They preferred hiring cheap labor to buying costly machinery, whereas the Europeans who subsequently competed with them

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Thailand AO1
Chinese
Lao

316 466 [276] preferred and were financially able to install machinery and cut down their labor requirements. But the Chinese owners made profits through the stores which they set up at the mines for the laborers, usually on elastic and elusive credit terms. A League of Nations survey, made on the eve of the world slump, estimated that the average Chinese mining coolie spent half of his earnings on opium and remained, as a rule, indefinitely at the mine and in his employer's debt.

464 313 167 *Forestry.* In the northern teak forests of Siam labor in the 1930's was still by preference Khamu, though the supply was getting shorter every year and their place was being increasingly taken by Laos and various nearby tribes. Although there was a Khamu village near Ubol, the majority of the Khamu forest laborers came over every year from Indochina. Each group was organized under a headman who arranged his workers' contracts, was responsible for their remaining at the camp, and collected for this service an enormous commission taken from their minuscule wages. The Khamus accepted this exploitation without a murmur. The two ticals which the headman advanced for the passport fee and his handling of their provisions netted him additional profits and placed the laborers further in his power.

563 167 These Khamu foresters earned as little as 100 rupees a year, but this was a fortune to them in Indochina, where the cost of living was lower than in Siam. When they returned home, they could buy a piece of land and marry. A humble, easily dominated, and illiterate group, the Khamus were ideal laborers from the employer's viewpoint. Their greatest drawback was a tendency to run away if they felt unhappy, and this could be caused by a mere threatening glance of the headman's eye. Only on the rare occasions when they married Lao women and adopted the Siamese dress did they lose their inferiority complex.

313 483 Labor for felling, logging and dragging timber was organized and housed in regular camps, each under the control of a headman and his assistant.[8] The work was done in gangs in which the axe-men worked in pairs, each pair felling from three to five trees a day. The carting was chiefly in Lao hands, as was that of elephant driving and rafting, though the latter was confined to families who lived along the river banks in the various localities where the rafts were made up. Engaged in this business from father to son, these river Laos acquired a unique knowledge of lumber operations and of their river's eccentric behavior.

Handicrafts

517 463 Since the vast majority of Siamese were engaged in farming and fishing, leaving them with periodic leisure, they could devote part of their time

[8] Bourke-Borrowes, D., *The Teak Industry of Siam*, Bangkok, 1927, p. 31.

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517 to such crafts as weaving, boat building, jewelry manufacture, and brick 463 making. Very few of these occupations were performed as full-time activities. In his economic survey, made in 1934, J. Andrews came to the 434 conclusion that virtually no Siamese family derived its main income from handicrafts. In the three self-sufficing areas crafts accounted for more 438 income than did agriculture because there a less regular market existed for agricultural produce than for manufactured articles, and more families were self-sufficient in foodstuffs than in utensils. Few artisans earned 184 a living in the commercialized central region, where the residents bought manufactures imported from other areas.

The class of craftsmen who had formerly worked for their patrons and 438 taught their sons to follow in their professional footsteps did not long survive the break-up of the feudal system, and in any case their output 868 had largely lacked spontaneity and imagination. The gradual replacement of the aristocrat-patron by the commercialized farmer as the buyer 466 of handicraft produce inevitably affected the craft output. Farmers' surpluses, even in the commercialized center of Siam, have been neither 517 regular nor large enough to guarantee a steady market, nor has their 531 artistic taste been impeccable. From both the quantitative and aesthetic angles crafts declined and artisans could not ply their skills as a full-time occupation.

Most rural Siamese families still make most of the articles in daily use. 463 Generally, the women of the family do the weaving and pottery-making. Weaving remains probably the principal domestic industry, but it has 286 almost disappeared from the center and south of Siam, where homemade textiles have been largely displaced by gayer, cheap foreign imports, 439 mostly of Japanese origin. A revival of weaving occurred in the northeast where some enterprising Chinese effected a great improvement in the industry by introducing the percussion shuttle and it was the Chinese themselves who succeeded in spreading their dominion westward. Up to the war's outbreak, however, they had not succeeded in displacing the fine Siamese textiles woven at Lampun.

Many years ago Siamese pottery declined from a fine art to the making 438 of crude earthenware utensils for domestic use. Only in some of the Mon villages is a superior pottery produced and in some instances where com- 531 mercialization has developed hired labor is used. Lacquer making is 323 concentrated in the region around Chiengmai, where it is done to some extent in factories, albeit on a modest scale. Probably the total employed 322 by this industry does not exceed 600, and the number varies from day to 462 day. Many of the preliminary tasks are performed by women in their homes. Basketry and carpentry are done almost universally throughout 326 Siam but not on a commercial basis. Metal work has been one of the few truly specialized crafts, both for personal and temple ornamentation and for household articles.

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Chinese

438 306 531 and for household articles. Niello work is outstanding for its fineness, and is one of the few authentically indigenous Siamese arts.

654 The constitutional government, as in Burma, has officially adopted a policy of encouraging cottage industries but without achieving notable [674] results. Both governments have been animated principally by nationalistic feeling but they have also recognized the relationship between rice-farming leisure and the rural crime rate. The Ministry of Defense in 1936 announced its intention of improving the weaving industry by building a series of textile factories, and also of encouraging fine silver [874] work. In more recent years the government has increased facilities for training in the arts and crafts, and in certain areas weaving has been added to the regular school curriculum. At the top of the system is an Arts and Crafts School, with certain formal-education prerequisites, which offers a five-year course in carpentry, basketry, painting, sculpture, etc. In some of Siam's jails such crafts as carpentry and furniture-making were taught, partly with the idea of eventually disseminating such skills among [722] the rural populace by chastened ex-convicts. Undoubtedly the war, by cutting off imports, has given a far greater stimulus to indigenous handicraft industries in Siam than any amount of government exhortation or patronage, as it has done elsewhere throughout Southeast Asia.

3

IMMIGRANT LABOR

167 THE CHINESE FORMED the only important group of immigrant laborers in Siam. In 1938 the Japanese residents numbered only 514 and the far more numerous Indian community (about 100,000) was mainly merchants and included very few laborers.

563 Although Sino-Thai relations antedated by many centuries the advent of Europeans in Siam, the "Chinese problem" did not come into existence 167 until just before the First World War. The fertility of underpopulated Siam was irresistibly attractive to its industrious, numerous, and underfed 463 neighbors to the north. In the old days the Thai aristocrats, born to landed wealth and power, were glad to leave degrading tasks, including money-making, to the Chinese, and the latter proved themselves so useful as to win for themselves a privileged position in Siam. The Thai peasant too, contentedly raised his rice crop and turned it over to the Chinese to transport, mill, and export.

Most of the early immigrants arrived from southern China indebted for their passage and had to work off their obligation by doing the hardest

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kind of labor in the ports, in rail and road building, in mining, and the like. Those impecunious coolies, who succeeded in finding jobs and lodging in Bangkok, were increasingly crowded with new waves of immigrants. But they saved a little capital through their amazing energy, tight social organization, and frugality. They soon rose to join the shop-owning class, of which the Sampeng district became the center. The Chinese have had no clear-cut geographical location in Siam and though primarily urban they have indulged in minor agricultural activities (market gardening, and some sugar, pepper, and tapioca plantations). They were to be found in almost every part of the country. They pushed into the interior, at first along the rivers and canals where they often established floating markets, and later they followed or even anticipated rail and road construction. In the country markets the Chinese began buying up agricultural produce, chiefly rice, and were soon able to monopolize the position of middleman. In this way the country's most important commodity, rice, was controlled by the Chinese in all phases but that of its production. In the peninsula the Chinese came to constitute the bulk of laborers in the mining industries and a majority of the rubber planters (though not the tappers) and in the north formed part of the foresters in the teak industry. In brief, they entered into and tended to control almost every category of labor and all such enterprises as were not preempted by Europeans with their superior financial resources and techniques.

If the Chinese had remained willing to identify themselves with the land of their adoption and profits, no problem would have arisen, for the Siamese and Chinese have gotten along well together and intermarriage was common. The children from such unions were absorbed into the Siamese milieu. But the birth of Chinese nationalism and the emigration of Chinese women, beginning about 1912, altered the picture and the Chinese began to appear to Siamese eyes not only as transient profiteers but as an increasingly unassimilable bloc in the country. The Chinese secret societies, which they had brought with them, led to perennial violence and were too elusive for the Siamese to obliterate or control. During the interwar period they were used to enforce anti-Japanese boycotts and to further Kuomintang activities. The steadily strengthening ties between the overseas Chinese and the homeland were regarded with growing suspicion by the Siamese, whose nationalism, if tardier, had rapidly gathered analogous momentum. The Chinese had long been denied diplomatic or consular representation, chiefly because of the contradictory claims by Chinese and by Siamese law in regard to the nationality of the Chinese born in Siam.

The first law to control Chinese immigration, which antedated the constitutional regime by five years, was a mild measure barring any entrants suffering from trachoma and unable to pay fees amounting to

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563 167 the modest sum of Tcs. 11.50. The depression not only caused the repatriation of many Chinese but in 1931 provoked a tightening up of the immigration regulations against those designated as Communists, diseased, indigent, and undesirable aliens. The landing tax was raised and another much larger sum required for the right of domicile. An elastic literacy clause was added to bar Chinese transients and women. A return passport, valid for two years, was also made obligatory and cost an additional ten ticals. After a temporary setback, caused probably as much by depression conditions as by the new laws, the stream of immigration picked up again. Inaccurate and incomplete statistics made it difficult to appraise the transiency of these entrants. It was believed that five Chinese entered the country for every four who left it but no one knew what [186] proportion of these emigrants were commuters. The incandescent nationalism aggressively displayed by the new rulers of Siam was fed by a growing resentment against the position the Chinese had achieved in their country. In 1937 the immigration fee was again raised, this time to the very high figure of Tcs. 200, and, though not immediately applied, it stimulated a great increase in the number of Chinese smuggled into Siam.

[464] This curtailment of immigration was accompanied by new labor legislation which, like so many other measures, discriminated against the Chinese in practice without doing so verbally. In 1935–36 laws were passed requiring rice mills to employ a minimum of 50 per cent of Siamese workers and in 1938 another bill reserving additional types of work for Siamese labor proved equally impracticable to enforce because of the lack of available indigenous labor forces.

The last years before the outbreak of the Second World War were marked by an outbreak of anti-foreign legislation, most of which hit the Chinese specifically, as was the intention. Various measures were passed, many in secret session and reportedly by a large majority of the legislators, aimed at facilitating the taxation of Chinese incomes, the control of their remittances to China, and the type of education in Chinese schools. More stringent steps were taken when many Chinese opium addicts and "agitators" were deported, Chinese newspapers suppressed, Chinese schools closed down, and—most important from the economic angle—more occupations were reserved to Siamese nationals. The Chinese protest was long and vociferous, but the vast majority preferred to remain in Siam. They had come to make money and they continued to do so though with more difficulty and smaller profits than theretofore. In 1941 [464] the *Bangkok Times* estimated that the Chinese made up about 60 per cent of the non-agricultural laboring population, if those employed by the timber industries were excluded.

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Europeans
Chinese

4

LABOR LEGISLATION AND WORKING CONDITIONS

ASIDE FROM the regulation of the traditional forms of compulsory labor, one of the first official steps taken to control workers—resembling similar measures in neighboring countries possessing sizable European populations—was regulation of the servant problem. Foreigners had become so vocal in denouncing the thievery of their servants and the lack of adequate means to bring these delinquents to justice that the Police Department in May 1901 circularized Bangkok's foreign residents in regard to a servants registration bureau. Initiative was thereby forced upon the employer group, who were required to bring their servants to the bureau for fingerprinting and later to supply information as to the time and cause of their dismissal. This proved to be too great a burden. Two months after the bureau was opened only 67 out of the 209 employers who had promised to support the system had even partially complied with the rules. The Hylam Chinese, who formed the vast bulk of the servant element, objected effectively, and nobody cared to trouble to register the occasional Malay, Thai, or Indian servants who had shown themselves recalcitrant to the idea. Employers suddenly felt themselves capable of managing their own domestic affairs, and the servant problem remained without official regulation. 466 357

The second step taken in government labor control was an attempt to regulate the ricksha traffic. The frequent accidents resulting from the ricksha coolies' assertion of the principle of free will could not be obviated since there were no traffic rules to be broken, and even if the coolie had been brought to court he would have had nothing to lose but a day's wages. Not until 1913 were measures enacted by which ricksha pullers were obliged to register, to pay a fee of three santangs for a license, which was issued only if the coolie were pronounced to be physically fit, between the ages of eighteen and forty, and conversant enough with Siamese to follow directions. 466 494

The only other attempt made by the absolute monarchy to deal legislatively with labor problems was to curb the activities of the Chinese secret societies which were held responsible for the few strikes that occurred around the turn of the century. A law of 1897 required all societies to register, but four years later only two had complied with the ruling and there was little inclination to take the stern measures required to enforce its observance. Strikes and famines were rare, and the government simply dealt with them as they occurred. 468 575

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Chinese

464 Inasmuch as unemployment had been a major factor in bringing the
667 constitutional regime into being, the men who engineered the *coup d'état*
575 of June 1932 promised to cope with it. However, this was done belatedly and incompletely by furnishing some relief to unemployed laborers, by sponsoring two economic surveys of the country, by placing more emphasis on technical education, and by opening a few labor bureaus. To meet the general unrest, the new administration forbade the formation of political parties and the continuation of secret societies. The supervision of all associations and clubs became so strict that it was virtually impossible to hold meetings except for religious purposes or sports activities.

[467] At the request of the laborers themselves the government sponsored the
466 formation of the first trade union and subsequently intervened in several of Bangkok's more serious strikes. Early in the regime wages were fixed for certain types of government employees, and functionaries were protected by a social insurance system. But no minimum wages or hours were ever fixed for employees in private industry and the labor of women and children was never officially regulated. Finally, in 1937, the government announced that it would make a labor survey, but no report of it was published before war broke out in the Far East. In January 1938 the National Assembly turned down a comprehensive labor law, designed to cover the whole field of wages, hours, woman and child labor, old age pensions, and workmen's insurance, by the overwhelming majority of 62 to 28 votes.

464 The crux of the Thai attitude lay in the fact that a large proportion of
563 the country's laboring force was Chinese, and the nationalistic government had no intention of spending large sums for the improvement of
466 their conditions of living and work. Thai legislators favored any enterprise, alien or indigenous, that would employ a certain proportion of Thai workers, and only the recognized unavailability of such labor prevented the Assembly from making it compulsory in all industrial undertakings. Attempts were made to oust the Chinese middleman so that the Thai farmer would receive more profit from his toil, but the serious problems of agricultural tenancy in the Menam valley and the general status of the rural Thai laborers were not directly tackled save for paper plans and the backing of a small-scale, albeit sound, cooperative movement. Such labor bills as were introduced into the Assembly were either disapproved or were shelved on the ground that they were too rigid to meet Siam's varying labor conditions. In any case, it was claimed, additional legislation should await the outcome of the labor survey under investigation. Whenever the ILO submitted conventions to the Siamese government for approval, the invariable response made was that under existing labor conditions such agreements were as yet unnecessary and in no case was a convention ever ratified.

000 Because the labor laws were so few, the lack of a single enforcing

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Because the labor laws were so few, the lack of a single enforcing agency was relatively unimportant. The Ministers of the Interior, Agriculture, Industry, Economic Affairs, and Mining handled any labor law enforcement which arose in connection with their areas of competence. 466

Working Conditions

Wages. Early in its regime the National Assembly set Tcs. 30 as the minimum rate of pay for those in government service, but it refused to do likewise for other types of labor including the workmen hired by some of its departments. When the permanent laborers of the state railways petitioned that their daily pay of 50 satangs (foremen received an additional 30 satangs) be doubled, the government replied that if the increase were granted the laborers would simply spend it on gaming and opium. Despite the paternalistic administration's efforts to teach them thrift, the workers—if they were Thais—were simply incurring more debts, and—if they were Chinese—were sending money out of the country. They were reminded that the supply of unskilled labor was unlimited as compared with the number of trained workers, and that should they become too demanding they could easily be replaced by machines. 465

Although the functionaries were comparatively well remunerated and enjoyed the only real legal protection vouchsafed to workers, their status could hardly have been described as satisfactory. In 1938–39 almost 90 per cent of the civil servants were receiving salaries of less than Tcs. 980, and even this modest sum represented an improvement over the depression years. The number of functionaries had dropped from 78,343 in 1928–29 to 71,209 in 1933–34, rising only gradually to total a little over 100,000 individuals in the last year before the Second World War. The average annual salaries had declined commensurately from Tcs. 471.25 in 1929 to Tcs. 435.16, increasing somewhat in the years following the world slump to average Tcs. 469.61 in 1938–39. 647 465

The remuneration for rural labor varied from region to region and could not always be represented in terms of money. Most Thai farmers were peasant proprietors, who were part-time craftsmen and who usually worked for pay only temporarily and for some particular objective. In 1933–34 crops and handicrafts formed the chief source of farmers' incomes throughout Siam. In the south, crops and handicrafts were almost equal in importance, with work on the railroads and roads accounting for about half of an average of almost Tcs. 6 annually earned by those gainfully employed. In the north and center, labor's largest source of income was derived from agricultural work. In general, Thai farmers did odd jobs when they needed cash, the excess of earnings over expenditures differing according to the geographical region. In the northeast, annual profits in terms of ticals came to 0.58; in the south, 15.30; in the north, 13.27, and in the center and southeast, 7.10. 465 434 [84]

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Lao
Malay

166 In former times when the Laos migrated to the central plains for the
464 six months' paddy season, they were lodged and fed at their employers'
465 expense and returned home with a sum equivalent to $35 or $40—sufficient to last a man and his family for about three years. But these gullible Lao migrants were often the victims of professional sharks who so successfully fleeced them that they arrived home satang-less and were much less likely to migrate the following year. Consequently they were being more and more replaced by the local agricultural proletariat of the central valley which was rapidly growing because of the serious tenancy situation there. In good years a farm worker in central Siam might get from Tcs. 80 to 120 for the six months' agricultural season, in addition to free board and lodging.

464 In farming villages of the south where Malays predominated, less labor was hired than in the Thai regions, for the Malay social organization made it possible for a householder to get his dependents to work for him gratuitously. When fishing was done by groups exceeding the family unit, labor was hired but the pay consisted simply in a proportion of the catch.[9] Outside the Malay communities, hired labor was almost exclusively Chinese, but largely confined to the mines. The Thais, who nowhere cared to work for others, in the peninsula experienced even less compulsion to do so because of the cooperative abundance of nature. Peninsular employers found it almost impossible to get laborers for agricultural tasks because mining and rubber tapping were so much more remunerative; where it was available wages amounting to Tc. 1 a day were paid.

Apart from civil servants and occasional agricultural laborers, the only genuine wage-earners in Siam were employed in Bangkok, in the mines and plantations of the south, and in the teak forests of the north. The labor employed by the government was engaged almost wholly in the construction and maintenance of communications.

465 Wages paid by firms in the capital remained fairly stable during the period from 1933 to 1939, the daily pay of coolies averaging about 75-80 satangs for men and 60 satangs for women for a day's work of eight to nine hours. In 1938–39 the highest paid class of workers, such as fitters (Tcs. 2.11), turners (Tcs. 2.34), and blacksmiths (Tcs. 2.47), received approximately the same wages as during the period immediately following the depression. The pay of other workers remunerated on a monthly basis, such as watchmen (Tcs. 25.46) and head coolies (Tcs. 71), represented a slight increase over the years 1933 to 1934. In the interior districts the average pay for unskilled labor was about 65 satangs for men and 50 for women. European firms were reputed to pay the highest wages.

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[9] Andrews, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

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Chinese

In the mines where Chinese labor was almost exclusively employed no 465
data are available as to rates of pay or the amounts earned, but it was believed that both Chinese employers and coolies generally preferred the tribute system. And the Chinese usually preferred piecework to daily hire. Thais, on the other hand, resisted all efforts to place their labor on the piecework basis, despite the higher incomes it would have brought to the laborer. In 1933 it was claimed that an energetic coolie, on a piecework basis, could earn as much as Tcs. 167 a month simply for dumping paddy into baskets, whereas a day laborer would receive only Tcs. 22-46 for the same time-span. Such workers were lodged but not fed, and fluctuations in the weather and in the market made almost all of this type of employment irregular. During the depression, when the price of paddy slumped badly, the Thai farmers succeeded in reducing the cost of their labor from 60 to 70 per cent, and at the processing end of the industry the laborers also suffered since the bonuses paid by Chinese millers to loading coolies were likewise reduced, the employer pocketing the difference.[10] No official efforts were made to compute living costs, which admittedly varied regionally and according to nationality. In larger up-country towns in 1941 the average cost of living for a "decent 369
married couple" with one child would be upwards from Tcs. 400 a 434
month, and for a bachelor, from Tcs. 300. The same couple living in Bangkok would require Tcs. 500-600, and a bachelor, Tcs. 400.[11]

Hours. The authors of the two economic surveys of Siam found it im- 243
possible to ascertain the number of hours regularly spent on the fields by 466
the agricultural population—that is, the very great majority of the people living in Siam. By its nature rice-farming is obviously seasonal, with periods of idleness alternating with others of arduous labor.

In Bangkok industrial laborers averaged a 50-hour week during the 466
years from 1936 to 1938, but in the latter year and in 1939 the working week was increased to 54 hours, except in the case of a few categories of skilled laborers. Office clerks worked a 44½-hour week. All workers seem to have enjoyed a weekly holiday and, in addition, 17 other days were observed as national holidays as well as 15 commercial holidays. No information is available as to whether paid vacations were widely prevalent. Presumably they depended upon the generosity of the individual employer. As has been previously noted, the hours of work and of leisure were customary and not generally based upon legal provisions. A law introduced into the Assembly in 1938 to reduce universally the working day to 8 hours was turned down. In July 1940 a member of the Assembly introduced a labor bill to make uniform and regulate hours of work, to require a written contract between employers and employees that would

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[10] *Bangkok Times*, November 25, 1933.
[11] *Ibid.*, March 28, 1941.

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466 specify the type of work to be done and the hours and wages therefor, and would provide for termination of the contract upon a month's notice being given by either party. The bill's sponsor also intimated that he would like to insert clauses providing for a fortnight's paid vacation annually, and for overtime and sick leave with compensation. The government asked that the bill be withdrawn; just when the country was being industrialized was no time to introduce such legislation. The majority of laborers, it asserted, were treated as members of the employer's family; the majority of employers—and this included the administration—treated their laborers fairly and justly. The bill was duly withdrawn.

464 *The labor of women and children.* The extent to which women and children were employed as laborers in Siam is not known, for labor surveys, reports and statistics are lacking. Women and children certainly performed a considerable amount of agricultural labor in the rural areas, and Thai women were active as small-scale vendors in the local markets. In Bangkok it was brought to the Assembly's attention that the match factories employed boys five or six years of age, who should have been in school had the law for universal primary education been strictly enforced. Either the problem of woman and child labor was not sufficiently acute, or in its extreme forms involved only aliens, or Thai legislators were too apathetic in their attitude—whatever may have been the chief causes, the Assembly turned down a bill introduced by the government in January 1938 to set 15 years as the minimum age of employment. In 1941, when the government was making a serious attempt to solve the unemployment problem, it was stated that men would be preferred to women applicants for positions in the bureaucracy unless the latter offered special qualifications.

466 362 *Housing.* No material seems to be available regarding the housing specifically supplied to laborers. The *Bangkok Times,* in March 1941, said with its usual conservatism, "free housing is not always provided laborers." Presumably it was no problem in most rural areas except in the isolated peninsular mines and in the northern lumber camps. Tenements *(hong tao)* were a familiar eyesore and menace to public health [548] in most Thai towns. (One of the chief attractions furnished by opium [652] dens has been the free lodging supplied to addicts.) The government not only did virtually nothing to improve the housing situation but in the [423] capital the Privy Purse became one of the biggest owners of that unfortu- [731] nate type of real estate. Bangkok's regular and devastating fires did much to clear out some of its rookeries but what was hastily built to replace them marked little improvement either from the aesthetic or the hygienic viewpoint. In the years just prior to the war the municipalities had taken over and were showing more interest in town planning, but 000 little more than paper projects had resulted. Rents in Bangkok have

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Rents in Bangkok have regularly been higher than elsewhere in Siam, and in 1941 it was claimed that there were very few houses there available at a rent lower than Tcs. 85 to 100 a month. 427 369

Government and Labor

Under the absolute monarchy the government felt that it had little cause to intervene in the employment situation. The type of agricultural employment widely prevalent in Siam generally confined such labor problems as existed to the capital. Economic conditions were not consistently bad in any part of the country, so that only an occasional and localized rice famine moved the government to action. In 1917, when the seasonal Lao laborers could find no work in the central provinces, the government took the novel step of providing some relief. The Irrigation Department agreed to offer work at regular wages together with food and lodging to all laborers who offered their services. The provincial authorities were asked to publicize the offer in the distressed areas and to provide transport for those wishing to avail themselves of the opportunity. The number of applicants reached 2,500 at the Nong Quai project, and the authorities declared themselves satisfied with the results. 731 464 746

Until the end of the 1920's the government confined its intervention to specific emergencies, although the closing of gaming houses in 1917 and the growth of crime in the provinces induced some slight consciousness of their general relationship to the economic and social status of rural labor. There was little appreciation of the danger of forming too large a white-collar class; no serious or consistent attempt was made to train Thais in technical fields nor to overcome the bourgeoisie's long-standing reluctance to seek other than civil service employment. It was not until King Prajadhipok pruned the bureaucracy, which his predecessor had permitted to expand, that it became apparent that every year an increasing number of Thai youths were being educated for a civil service that was contracting rather than expanding. A proposal made in 1929 to create a Labor Bureau proved abortive. In the final year of the absolute monarchy the Minister of the Interior made a limited survey of coolie unemployment, which revealed that there were, at a conservative estimate, 4,267 unskilled workers without jobs in Bangkok alone. [548] [674] 464 874 647

Although the revolutionaries of 1932 in their first manifesto accused the absolute monarchy of having neglected the unemployment problem and promised to solve it, nothing was immediately done and what was later accomplished applied chiefly to unskilled laborers. A month after its assumption of power the new government enacted regulations for the creation of labor bureaus under the Minister of the Interior, but the first step toward their establishment was not taken until the end of 1932 and then only because uncontrolled agencies were believed to be unscrupu- 647 464

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464 lously exploiting the jobless. For the next three years little was publicly
made known of these bureaus' accomplishments. When the Minister of
647 Economic Affairs was under fire in the Assembly in October 1935, he claimed that they had helped over 3,000 laborers find employment in the departments of public works, railroads, and on the rubber estates, and that only 200 still remained on the unemployed registers. When the question was brought up again in January 1938, the government evaded the issue.

746 In reply to its critics the government could justly assert that Siam had
464 not felt the economic slump until late, that many unemployed aliens had been repatriated, that much of the country's agriculture was still self-sufficing and therefore unaffected by world prices, and that the monasteries regularly absorbed a certain proportion of the unemployed. In the spring of 1933 the government initiated a relief measure by providing work for 1,200 laborers in constructing a road from Paknam to Bangsue. However, not only did this fail to absorb a good proportion of the unemployed but the government had tactlessly placed in the road gangs minor criminals and tax defaulters. The government persisted in sending out a second batch, despite open criticism and the escape of some 300 from the original group of laborers. The criticism offered in this instance did not concern the government's motives but was leveled against the average wage rate (given above) paid to these workers, the poor living and working conditions prevailing, and the inclusion of numerous Chinese. By the following August the government decided that the limit of this type of relief employment had been reached and circularized the Ministries to discover how to meet the continuing unemployment problem in other directions.

Although nothing visible materialized as a result of this questionnaire, the government in 1934 did make an attempt to collect more complete statistics on unemployment by opening fee-less registers for jobless workers at the various local headquarters and by requiring all who sought government employment to register there. Judging from the scanty data available, the number so registered, in both the skilled and unskilled categories, amounted to only a few thousand. Private employment agencies were legally placed under the Minister of the Interior and were required to obtain operating permits which were liable to cancellation if proof were forthcoming that these agencies had abused their privileges.

464 A seeming admission that the government was unable unaided, or
874 within the emergency period, to find a solution to the unemployment problem, was to be found in the official appeal for assistance made to private industry. Firms in Bangkok were requested to train youths for commercial and industrial careers through a pseudo-apprenticeship arrangement pending termination of the time-lag required before the revised curriculum in government schools oriented students toward such

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fields. This shift in emphasis in the state educational program represented the first constructive official effort to eliminate the plethora of white-collar candidates, but probably the apprenticeship scheme was a failure as nothing further was heard about it. Undoubtedly the constitutional regime's trend toward state industries, then gathering momentum, was already alarming foreign businessmen in Bangkok who would have been correspondingly averse to furthering the government's program. Although the economic schemes of Luang Pradit and Phra Sarasati were duly shelved, the handwriting on the wall was unmistakable, and those with sufficient vision to read it began prudently withdrawing from Siam. 464 874

Problems of rural unemployment were theoretically to be met by a ten-year plan launched in 1936. Farmers were to be helped to acquire more land and scientific knowledge, chiefly through the agency of the cooperative societies. This movement, begun in 1917, received a great impetus during the 1930's and while successful it has necessarily been slow and affected only a small portion of the agricultural population. By the end of 1936–37 a total of only 770 societies had been formed in 18 *changvads* with a membership of more than 11,000 farmers. Nevertheless, for members of these societies interest rates on long-term loans had been brought down to 7½ per cent and on short-term loans to 9 per cent, thanks to outright grants by the government to the Cooperative Department. Although the Thai peasantry was generally inarticulate and totally unorganized, the existence of rural unemployment was widely recognized. Assembly members and the premier alike received many petitions and some delegations of agriculturists who were not wholly satisfied with speeches, paper plans, and signed photographs, and whose discontent was pointed up by the bad rice harvest of 1936–37. But the government's and the public's attention was more directly focussed in the late 1930's on the growing number of strikes, on the Chinese boycotts of Japanese merchandise, and on the draining off of the profits made by foreigners to their homelands. 474 452 464 [468]

To meet the growing urgency of labor problems, to resolve questions which were being approached almost exclusively from the emotional angle, and to acquire some of the hard facts requisite to drafting appropriate legislation, the government determined to undertake a detailed labor survey. An accurate analysis was hard to make because of the prevalence of part-time labor, the Chinese talent for evasion, and the Thai addiction to bluff about capacities and training. Although the results of this survey were not publicly known before the Japanese occupation of Siam, the census taken in 1937–38 furnished the most recent information available on the country's unemployment situation. In the following table the unemployed are defined as those who used to work before but were without employment at the time the census was taken: 464

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464 if the figures accurately represent the situation, unemployment can hardly be said to have been a major problem in Siam.

TABLE XII: UNEMPLOYMENT IN SIAM, 1937–38

Occupations	*Males*	*Females*	*Total*
Agriculture and fishery	4,849	2,292	7,141
Forestry	454	94	548
Commerce	532	303	835
Industries, crafts, and engineering	800	106	906
Mining	52	17	69
Transport and communications	419	19	438
Public services	127	3	130
Professions	146	52	198
Household and private affairs	704	361	1,065
Clerical	94	1	95
Total	8,177	3,248	11,425

647 In the spring of 1941 the government created a new division, under the
464 Ministry of Economic Affairs, which was to deal exclusively with labor
746 problems in its three sections entitled Labor Registrations, Unemployment, and Relief. Its chief function was, frankly, that of finding work for unemployed laborers and, as a minor activity, "moral and health control especially in regard to female and child labor." The following October a law was promulgated requiring every male between the ages of twenty-one and fifty-five to have either regular employment or an assured income. Students, monks, disabled and deranged individuals were exempted from this ruling but all unemployed persons were required to report their status to the local authorities. Commissions in each *changwad* were set up to find jobs for them and penalties were established for non-compliance with the new law. Two days later another bill was passed to prohibit begging—almshouses were to be founded by the government for incapacitated paupers, but the able-bodied would be sent by the new employment exchange to work peninsular mines, presumably to displace the Chinese laborers there.

5

ORGANIZED LABOR

468 THE FEW STRIKES instigated by Chinese coolies around the turn of the
[668] century were treated as part of the activities of secret societies, not as
563 labor problems. Despite their periodic violence, the Chinese were regarded as industrious citizens, easily assimilated, who were the mainstay

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in solving Siam's only labor problem—at that time one of shortage and not of competition.

Apart from white-collar unemployment and a few anti-Japanese boycotts by the Chinese, other types of labor problems were virtually unknown under the absolute monarchy. In general the people accepted whatever their superiors chose to deal out to them. But the *coup d'état* of 1932 encouraged opposition to all forms of authority, and the prevailing unrest affected a wide range of society, from Buddhist monks to schoolboys. The very lavishness of the new government's promises to better conditions provoked a series of strikes, beginning in August 1932, among Bangkok's ricksha pullers, tramway employees, and women dyers.

The most remarkable of these was that of the ricksha coolies, who were aliens without insurance against starvation or deportation, and with no legal protection except on grounds of assault and battery. Yet these men, who fought each other over a single satang, finally united to demand better treatment from the owners of the rickshas who charged them the outrageous rental of 40 satangs a day. This in itself was evidence of the spread of new ideas, as was also the government's willingness to mediate in a wholly Chinese labor dispute. The results, however, were somewhat disappointing and the compromise reached was effected partly through the pressure of hunger. In contrast to this halfway success, the women dyers won their strike, but not on the basis of any principle but because through the delay the fruit used in dyeing was spoiling.

Beginning in November 1932, a strike simmered in the oldest of Bangkok's industrial enterprises, the Siam Electric Company, over the dismissal of some workmen accused of dishonest practices, and an alteration in contracts. The employers' proposal to solve this strike was to insist that the suspects take an oath that they had not robbed the company; an oath was of paramount importance to Buddhists. By this time the government felt that it must take some stand not only against strikes but also to curb the innumerable petitions it was receiving from every group with a grievance. The police were deprived of their power to deal with labor troubles, for the administration was determined to be the sole agent handling workers' disputes.

No doubt because their skeleton organization was the oldest in Bangkok, dating back to 1897, the tramway workers were the first labor group to organize themselves into a pseudo trade union, comprising about 300 men. The union's avowed aim was to teach thrift, help the aged and the crippled, and promote harmony among the Siamese—chiefly by stabilizing their livelihood. The government could not but approve such worthy objectives and granted the union's request to register its association. This was done with great ceremony, including an address by the Minister of the Interior and incantations by monks. Not wishing to appear indifferent to, or over-enthusiastic about, this first legal association of Siamese

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467 workers, the government decided to try transforming it into a super Boy Scout movement—to the workers' distress. When the Siam Electric Com-
[468] pany refused to recognize the association's committee, in connection with a dismissal grievance, the government was twice asked by the workmen to intervene. Although Phya Mano's government protested that the association's registered aims did not include such interference, the Minister of the Interior was assigned to review the situation. What he actually did was little more than to ask the company to do the square thing by the workers and to tell the association that the government saw nothing unreasonable in the company's regulations—in short, the men were merely advised to return to work. But the most important part of the Minister's action was his promise that in the future, if any injustice were done, the State Councilor would take the matter under consideration. Thus it can be said that the administration did not follow the company's lead in ignoring the association, and it definitely encouraged the workers to look to the government for mediation and counsel. The association responded by taking a more active interest in the political situation. When it was rumored that Phya Bahol was about to resign from the Cabinet, it sent a telegram to the king asking him to return to the capital.

468 During the next few years a series of minor strikes occurred which were no longer confined to Bangkok. In December 1934 the capital's taxi-drivers struck for higher wages and against the parking regulations. In July 1935, the drivers of the hundred buses running between Chiengrai and Lampang, after calling a strike, received a wage rise. In August 1936 two hundred mining coolies at Yala went on strike because of a 10 per cent wage cut, which, however, was not restored.

In contrast to these isolated strikes which established no decisive trend, two others of major importance occurred in Bangkok early in 1934. Mill strikes were not a complete novelty in Siam, but never before had one occurred on so large a scale, or at a time when the mills were running at a loss because of the fall in paddy prices in the world market. The millers claimed that the coolies struck because they lacked the money to spend on the usual entertainments marking the Chinese New Year. The coolies, believing that their employers were stalling, asserted that they must be making money as there were ships in the river waiting to load cargo. After a brief impasse the strikers made two rather surprising moves. They asked the head of the Tramway Association, representing the only organized labor in the country, to intercede in their behalf, and they petitioned the government not only to mediate but to take over the mills if necessary. In a public statement issued simultaneously, the strikers announced that they were mainly concerned with the welfare of the Siamese nation. The administration was willing enough to mediate but it was so slow in obtaining results that violence broke out—five cases of stabbings occurring on a single day. A by-product of this strike (char-

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acteristically overseas-Chinese) was the forced collections of money taken up on behalf of the strikers through the sale of Phya Bahol's and Luang Pradit's photographs. 468

Before this strike was settled, a similar but shorter-lived disturbance occurred among the railroad employees. One morning, without warning, the train service in Bangkok was suspended, and the laborers took over the trains and railroad offices in the city. Like the mill strikers they made an appeal to public opinion. They put up a poster stating that the railroad authorities lacked any sense of justice and that the government should see that order was restored by replacing them with army officers. The Minister of Economic Affairs hastened to address the assembled company but he was shouted down. The strikers would not be placated until the premier himself appeared upon the scene. He said that he would meet their demands half-way by appointing officers to run the railroads temporarily and by setting up a committee to study the strikers' grievances. The crowd accepted the proposals and promised to return to work. As a military man the premier could not help being pleased by their obvious faith in the army's integrity, but as head of the state he could not condone their strike nor their distrust of the higher civil appointees.

The government's handling of the railroad strike was in marked contrast with its attitude toward the striking Chinese rice coolies. In neither case was the strike called for higher wages and the government's intervention was not only accepted but solicited. Out of the railroad strike came the creation of a permanent committee to deal with labor problems under the chairmanship of the governor of Bangkok—tantamount to the official recognition of the existence of standing labor problems. But rural labor problems were still ignored and the fact that the railroad strikers worked under far better conditions was apparently not appreciated. Even this embryonic labor department caused some misgivings. Many seemed to fear that the very existence of such a committee would encourage labor to think itself badly treated and to conjure up imaginary grievances. The best paid labor was undeniably that of private firms; and since the government had no spotless record as an employer, its assumption of the moral right to arbitrate in all labor cases was criticized. The conservatives and general disparagers of the constitutional regime claimed that labor was no legitimate experimental field for Siam's apprentice-politicians.

But it was the laborers themselves who more and more forced their way into the political arena. In the elections for the National Assembly held in 1937 thirteen labor candidates presented themselves. One group, composed chiefly of taxi-drivers, formed themselves into the Winged Wheel party and raised enough money to sponsor a candidate. To the astonishment of Bangkok, labor was awakening, at least locally, to a sense of its own importance. 467 665

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468 The rice-mill coolies' strike had different implications and even wider
186 repercussions. Its immediate result was the deportation of seven of its
464 ringleaders to China. This strike, indeed, precipitated the whole issue of foreign labor in Siam. The government realized that it must move warily, since the numerical predominance and indispensability of Chinese laborers at this time gave them the power to create an unpleasant situation. One of the administration's major motives in instigating an accurate and detailed survey of the labor situation was its desire to replace Chinese labor by Siam labor as far as possible. Nationalism, rather than the wish to improve the status of labor as such, lay behind such legislation as Siam built up.

[467] The whole labor movement, insofar as it has grown into self-consciousness and received official sanction in Siam, has been confined to some of the industrial workers in Bangkok, who form only about 1 per cent of the total laboring population. Conditions among the agricultural workers have been not only different but probably also far worse, especially in the Rangsit area. Little has been done either to improve their status or to assure the country of a more abundant supply of labor generally. The negative policy of drastically curtailing Chinese immigration has done anything but help to further Siam's self-imposed, nationalistic goal of economic autarchy.

6

POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS

465 LABOR IN POSTWAR SIAM has undergone no marked development and, as in prewar days, still lags far behind all other countries in Southeast Asia. Such progress as has been made is largely due to the increased demand on a smaller labor supply, owing to the needs of reconstruction and the delayed resumption of Chinese immigration. In view of this bargaining advantage, laborers in Siam can command wages roughly five times the prewar rate. Also, the abundant food supply, which Siam alone in Southeast Asia enjoys, affords workers the option of demanding supplementary allowances or turning to other employment. However, current high wages are actually only small inducement to laborers for the stocks of consumer goods are extremely limited, housing is very short in the towns, and living costs are inflationary.

464 A certain amount of unemployment exists, partly voluntary and partly due to the heavy influx of labor from the rice fields to the cities during
000 the Japanese occupation. Strikes have been more frequent than during

POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS

Strikes have been more frequent than during a comparable prewar period, chiefly among the Chinese. These strikes have been caused by the widening gap between wages and living costs and, to a lesser extent, by political stimuli. The latter are related exclusively to the Chinese and to politics in China and not in Siam. Siamese laborers remain singularly unresponsive to the appeals which local politicians are beginning to make for their vote and are only beginning to show an interest in the improvement of working conditions in their country and in their status as compared with that of workers in foreign lands. Generally speaking, labor in Siam remains almost wholly unorganized and without political representation or consciousness. 468 466

Forced Labor

The military labor battalions conscripted during the war have presumably been disbanded concurrently with the recent, large-scale demobilization of the Siamese army. Some of these labor conscripts probably have returned to their farms but, judging from frequent official appeals to "return to the land," many of them must have drifted to the towns and remained there. Those who were drafted for the Petchabun project are slated to receive special compensation for their services and suffering, although the issue has become a political football because of its association with the discredited Pibul regime. 466 722

On December 7, 1944, half a year before the war ended, the Aphaiwong Government presented to the Assembly a plan to abolish labor conscription; those who had violated or evaded the law were to go unpunished. More than a year later a proposal was made to the same body that compensation be given to those who had worked at Petchabun or to the families of those who had died from forced labor there. During the discussions of this plan, which was finally accepted by the Assembly, the Minister of the Interior stated that the number of laborers conscripted to work at Petchabun had totalled 100,000, of whom 10,316 deserted and 4,000 died. It is safe to assume that any future attempt to levy labor forces from local sources will be rejected because of its association with an unpopular, dictatorial regime.

Estimates differ widely as to the number of workers brought by the Japanese to Siam for labor on defense and communications projects. But it may be deduced that somewhat fewer than 100,000 Malays, Koreans, Chinese, and prisoners of war were imported for that purpose by the Japanese military authorities. After V-J Day, the British occupation forces rounded up the survivors and sent them to camps located in Bangkok and in the peninsula. According to reports, repatriation of these laborers did not begin until the end of January 1946. Many thousands are still missing and the repatriation process will undoubtedly take a long time. [728] [727]

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Japanese

466 During the past year the tables were turned on the Japanese and great
727 numbers of them were compelled to work on the restoration of Siam's communications and agricultural output. Following a schedule of priority projects, British supervisors assigned Japanese units to such work. For some time the question of payment was debated on the grounds that the Japanese being so used were not prisoners of war but surrendered troops. It is reported that the problem was solved by paying Japanese farm laborers at the rate of about a baht a day; but no information is available as to the wages earned by Japanese working on reconstruction projects. An important function of this forced Japanese labor has been
[468] its use on occasion, along with convicts, as strike breakers, particularly in work stoppages affecting the movement of paddy and rice. It is believed that some 10,000 Japanese will be retained, perhaps indefinitely, in Siam for labor purposes.

Labor Shortages and Unemployment

727 The dislocations suffered by labor during the Japanese occupation have
464 not yet been remedied. The President of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, after an extended tour throughout Southeast Asia during the summer of 1946, reported that as yet only half of Siam's prewar farm workers had returned to agricultural production.[12] Many, he said, had been displaced or had died—either from harsh treatment or simply from lack of medical care—and the remainder were demanding prohibitively high wages as the price of their return to rice cultivation. High Siamese officials have frequently maintained that a major cause of Siam's failure to meet its rice commitments to the United Nations has been the continuing shortage of agricultural labor.

166 A contradictory phenomenon, which has not yet achieved the propor-
[369] tions of a national problem, is the existence of unemployment. This, perhaps more than any other contemporary factor, indicates a changing
464 attitude on the part of Siamese workers. Before the war a Bangkok employer was compelled to offer wages large enough to meet the higher cost of urban living in order to retain workers who, without such an inducement, tended to gravitate back to more congenial rural areas and cultivation of the soil. Now, however, the laborer in Siam not only has the option between urban and rural employment but has a wider choice of occupation in the cities where he has apparently elected to stay and where there is a greater demand than ever before for his services. Many Bangkok employers, complaining of the prevailing scarcity and choosiness of domestic help, attribute it to the Japanese habit of "spoiling servants." In December 1945, Pradit Manudharm, Siam's senior statesman, censured

[12] *Liberty*, July 31, 1946.

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the "finicky" attitude of those complaining of unemployment, attributing 166
their status solely to their desire to "pick and choose their jobs."[13] Some 464
unemployment, however, was certainly due to the involuntary wartime displacement of laborers, which left workers stranded far from home because of the breakdown in the country's transportation system.

The government, which is in desperate need of workers for its recon- 464
struction and agricultural programs, has taken a few steps to provide 746
employment for those willing but unable to find work. In March 1946, 3,000 or more openings were publicized as available to unemployed Siamese through the Department of Public Welfare. Since that time no further such news items have appeared, possibly because of a poor response to the original announcement. Retention of Japanese troop labor and the utilization of some of the thousands of refugees from Indochina on road projects along the eastern frontier[14] indicate that there is still a serious shortage of Siamese labor and that such unemployment as still prevails is voluntary.

Strikes

Siam's labor shortage, inflationary living costs, and, to a lesser extent, 468
unsettled political conditions have been responsible for the few strikes that have occurred in Bangkok since the Japanese surrender. The first important work stoppage occurred on November 16, 1945, when the Chinese rice coolies employed by the Thai Rice Company struck for higher wages. Originally about 2,000 stevedores and mill workers were involved, but their number was at one point increased by a one-day sympathy strike staged by the convicts who had been brought in, at first unknowingly, as scabs. Shortly thereafter employees of the government and of Chinese rice mills also struck. At its peak, the strike possibly involved some 4,000 participants.

Negotiations between representatives of the laborers, the government, and the mill proprietors resulted in a compromise. This agreement, reached on November 28, provided for a wage increase, the right to stop work at midnight, and extra pay for Sunday labor.

Workers at the Chinese mills, owners of which were the most prompt to meet the strikers' demands, were the first to return to their jobs. The Thai Rice Company, on the other hand, refused to accept the compromise terms and referred the issue back to the Minister of the Interior. Eventually this company, too, fell into line.[15]

Considerable speculation surrounded the motivation of this strike.

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[13] *Ibid.*, December 22, 1945.
[14] *Ibid.*, May 3, 1946.
[15] *Democracy*, December 17, 1945.

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468 Rumors circulated in Bangkok to the effect that it had been government-inspired, as part of the stalling tactics currently employed to impede the export of the free rice levies then being demanded by Britain. Since the strike was confined to Bangkok, and essentially to Chinese stevedores, it was also popularly assumed to be related to the recent Sino-Siamese disorders. Still other rumors claimed that this work stoppage had been Communist-inspired and alleged that the hammer-and-sickle symbol had appeared on the document listing the strikers' demands. Almost no purely economic explanation of the strike was offered or accepted, but none of the foregoing assumptions or allegations was subsequently substantiated.

In February 1946 the porters in Bangkok's lumber yards went on strike, and a political motivation was also found for this action. It was said that the opposition party, then that of Pradit, was fomenting unrest among the coolies. Later in the year, mostly in June, other strikes occurred among the workers on the state railroads, naval dockyards, and tobacco factories. The most important of these was one by the laborers at the Makasan railroad workshops, involving some 2,000 workers. Strikers presented six demands to the authorities which included full wages and living allowances during officially ordered work stoppages and during a two-week holiday period as well as throughout the course of the current strike, and the same rations in foodstuffs and other commodities as were allotted to government officials. On the second day of the strike two assemblymen belonging to the Democratic (then opposition) Party harangued the laborers and tried in vain to induce them to return to work.[16] But the strikers marched to Premier Pradit's residence and presented their grievances to him. The Premier summoned for consultation the Minister of Communications and the Director General of the Railroads and told the strikers that he would soon settle the matter. They promised to return to work the next day and presumably received satisfaction, for nothing further was heard of the strike or even of the terms of settlement.

Simultaneously with the railroad strike, 1,500 workers at the Bangkok naval docks went on strike in protest against a recently revised method of computing their living allowances. They also demanded free medical care and the distribution of clothing at reduced prices.[17] As the result of mediation by an assemblyman, an amicable settlement was reached; the method of computing allowances was altered, the men returned to work, and nothing further was heard of their other demands. However, workers in other government defense departments—those of transport and the air-force workshop—were voluntarily accorded identical benefits.

000 The most significant strikes of the spring and summer of 1946 were

[16] *Ibid.*, June 8, 1946.
[17] *Ibid.*

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The most significant strikes of the spring and summer of 1946 were those again staged by the Chinese rice coolies who, intermittently from April to August, stopped work for a combination of political and economic reasons. As such strikes drastically affected Siam's rice exports, which had become a major factor in Siam's relations with Britain and the United States, and as the strikers were exclusively Chinese, the situation took on a serious political character. In the April strike, the workers insisted that the rice they were loading on ships destined for Chinese ports should not be used for troops fighting for the Central Government and that it should be honestly distributed among the famine-stricken people of their homeland.[18] It was reported that a Chinese merchant in Bangkok had diverted some of the rice to the black market and the profits therefrom to his own pocket and had substituted inferior grades in the relief shipment. Subsequently the delinquent merchant was forced to make an appropriately large donation to the local relief fund for China. 468 668 439

The second strike, which began in June, also concerned the mishandling and the destination of the rice relief shipments to China. When going on strike, the coolies stated that they would return to work only if future rice relief shipments were handled by the Southern China Relief Committee of Siam, of which Mme. Sun Yat-sen had recently accepted honorary chairmanship, and if representatives of that organization were sent to China to supervise the distribution. Messages were dispatched by the strikers to the Generalissimo, the Minister of Food, and the chief administrator of Canton province requesting the assurance that the strikers' demands would be met. Only vague replies were received, and in consequence the strikers, at least up to mid-August, had not returned to work.[19] In connection with this second strike a new and significant development was evident. A news item [20] announced the arrest of "two other Siamese on a charge of instigating rice-loading coolies to strike." This is the first public indication of Siamese participation in a Chinese strike, and it may substantiate the rumors of a recent increase in the Siamese membership of the local Communist party, which heretofore had been almost exclusively Chinese.

Political Consciousness of Laborers in Siam

The conditions now prevailing for laborers in Siam are in general so favorable to them that comparatively few strikes have taken place, and those that have occurred resulted in major concessions to the strikers. The political orientation of the rice coolies' strike indicates their pre- 468 668

[18] *Liberty*, April 23, 1946.
[19] *Bangkok Post*, August 13, 1946.
[20] *Liberty*, August 20, 1946.

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468 occupation with China's internal struggle but offers no evidence of any
668 connection with domestic Siamese politics.

The strikes initiated by Siamese workers seem to have been wholly motivated by current inflationary conditions. Their only political implication seems to lie in the amenability of both employers and employees alike to accepting a settlement by the government authorities. Such docility on the part of the Siamese laborers is of growing interest to local politicians. Various assemblymen have assumed the role of labor conciliators and sponsors. For the first time in Siam's history May Day was celebrated this year in Bangkok—and under the auspices of the Sahacheep Cooperative Party. Prince Sakol Varavarn, the party's advisor, addressed a throng (variously estimated to number 300 or 3,000 persons) and bewailed the lack of any provision in Siam's new constitution guaranteeing labor's right to collective bargaining and of any labor representative in the newly elected Parliament. He and the succeeding speaker denied any affiliation with communism and urged their listeners to support the Sahacheep Party. The response to such efforts cannot have been very great as there was no vote in the by-elections of August 5 which could be interpreted as having voiced the aspirations of labor. Laborers in Siam still seem to be politically passive, and no large-scale attempt has yet been effective in making them more self-conscious as a class or as a potential force in the government.

Labor Organizations

667 Since the Japanese surrender, increasing efforts, although still few in number, have been made by Siamese labor to organize into unions. The government has shown some recognition of the need to set up machinery for handling labor disputes, but as yet in only a half-hearted fashion.

Chinese laborers in Siam have organized themselves into groups which are sometimes referred to in the local press as unions but which have received no official recognition as registered associations. Presumably they have more the character of the traditional Chinese guilds or secret societies, and bear only an embryonic relationship to unions. They seem to fulfil, however, some of the functions of unions. In August a delegation of laborers, its national composition unknown, called upon D. H. Blellock, an ILO counselor who was visiting Bangkok. Blellock reported himself "delighted to find in existence a spontaneous movement on the part of labor to advance its own interests. I sensed from their conversation that a movement for the formation of labor unions is taking shape and will soon be an accomplished fact."[21] Blellock added, however, that labor conditions in Siam were very unsatisfactory—"far worse than in Malaya, Ceylon or South Africa"—and commented

[21] *Ibid.*, August 31, 1946.

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that such legislation as existed was futile unless officials were trained to apply it and made a regular study of local labor conditions.[22] It is interesting to note that this delegation was escorted to the conference with Blellock by an assemblyman and that some interest was expressed in ILO activities and in labor conditions in other countries. 667

Since the end of the war, a few trade unions have been organized among Siamese workers. In January 1946 a printers' union was said to be in process of formation, with a membership of approximately 2,000.[23] Two months later a union of samlor drivers was successfully organized by a prominent politician after an abortive attempt to accomplish the same feat just prior to the January elections.[24] In May another group of transport workers met to form themselves into a union and, reportedly, before taking the step sought the approval of the opposition leader, Khuang Aphaiwong. Early in August, still a third group of laborers in the same industry—bus drivers—were said to be organizing a union on a nation-wide scale.[25]

Taking its cue from the apathy of laborers toward organizing themselves and preoccupied with more urgent problems, the government has made virtually no move to deal with labor problems. There is no Department of Labor and no machinery for handling disputes; when a conciliation is required a variety of officials try their hand at effecting a settlement. Usually the more important disputes are referred to the premier, who must take time out to handle matters which should have been settled far down the hierarchical scale. Spasmodic paternalism remains the Siamese Government's only answer to local labor's demands. To be sure, last August a committee representing seven Ministries, but no representative of labor, was appointed by the government "to study various aspects of Siam's labor problems"—but not primarily for labor's welfare. The appointment was made "in preparation for the arrival of an ILO representative" in Bangkok and for Prince Sakol's representation of Siam in the forthcoming ILO conference at Montreal. It has long been the Siamese Government's policy to participate in all international bodies and to represent the country as in the vanguard of all progressive movements. It is barely possible that these two last-mentioned events will precipitate studies preparatory to the improvement of labor conditions in Siam. More likely, not until large groups of Siamese are themselves involved in strikes or show a more lively interest in domestic politics as a labor group, or until striking Chinese coolies interfere more seriously with Siam's rice exports, will the Siamese Government set about formulating a labor policy in earnest. 647 668 [648]

[22] *Democracy*, September 2, 1946.
[23] *New World*, January 4, 1946.
[24] *Suphaburut*, March 16, 1946.
[25] *Democracy*, August 9, 1946.

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SUPPLEMENT

NOTES ON LABOR DEVELOPMENTS IN 1946–47

121 A JOURNEY UNDERTAKEN by the author between December 1946 and June 1947 to some of the principal cities of Southeast Asia had for one of its objects the collection of information on the latest developments in the region's labor conditions and labor movements. Although it proved not yet possible to secure detailed statistical data on employment, wages, and other indices for the postwar period, this investigation helped to confirm the existence of certain trends previously observed and to open up, in a few instances, new vistas of a vigorous pursuit of progress, either on the part of a government or on that of organized labor.

467 On the whole, the period was found to be one of great uneasiness.
727 There was throughout the region a sense of insecurity because of the distorted structure of its major export industries. There was a sense of insecurity also in circles which, unable to accept the radical change in political and economic power that had come over large parts of the world, feared any movement which might tend to increase the political orientation of organized labor. On the other hand, there was also the natural hesitation of those seriously devoted to the promotion of progressive and liberalizing labor legislation to promote or enact measures which, with the present disturbance of social relations, it might prove difficult to enforce. Organized labor itself reflected the cleavage, to be found at this time also in industrially more advanced parts of the world, between a leadership satisfied to do the best it could within the technical limits of traditional trade union practices and one primarily thinking in political terms and desiring the most rapid possible assimilation of the local labor forces to the revolutionary international labor movement.

121 Only a few illustrations can here be given of these various tendencies as the author observed them or heard of them from authoritative spokesmen for government, labor, and professional management. These notes are offered as carrying a little further into the uncertain future the picture presented in the major part of this book. They sketch a passing phase in one of the most dramatic developments of our time: the effort of an important section of the world's workers to raise their status from an age-old level of oppression and neglect to one of worthwhile human existence.

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an age-old level of oppression and neglect to one of worthwhile human existence. 000

BURMA

Since October 1946, when the general strike was organized jointly by the All-Burma Trade Union Congress and the Trade Union Congress of Burma (see p. 58), the main feature in Burma's labor picture has been the struggle between the Socialists and the Communists for the control of organized labor. This trial of strength was precipitated by political events: first, the split in the Communist Party between the groups led by Thakin Than Tun and by Thakin Soe, and second, the ousting of Communists from the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (p. 54 *ff.*). The rift in Communist ranks was deepened by the death of their foremost labor organizer, Ba Hein, in January 1947, which seriously weakened the All-Burma Trade Union Congress. At the same time, the Socialist trade unions under the Trade Union Congress of Burma, with active support from the Anti-Fascist League, forged ahead and in the spring of 1947 were regarded as of about equal strength with the Communist-sponsored unions which had got off to an earlier start. 467 668

Since Thakin Soe's party was declared illegal and went underground, it has become impossible to obtain reliable data about the unions still under its auspices. Thakin Than Tun, for his part, proved to be interested in the unionization of labor primarily for political purposes, and unwilling to express himself about it except for its part in the Communist Party's general struggle. He hoped eventually to organize a single trade union organization in Burma and to reunite it with the Anti-Fascist League.

This league, indeed, is likely to become the leading force in Burma's organized labor. It exercises some control over the Trade Union Congress of Burma and also won an overwhelming victory in the elections of April 9, 1947. The Congress at that time included 157 unions with about 30,000 members, about two-thirds of them employed in factories and in the provinces. Previously, organization had been by individual factories, but in 1947 the Congress adopted the policy of re-organizing the union structure by trades. General congresses are called once in eighteen months, and are attended by delegates in the ratio of one for every hundred members. These delegates form a central committee which elects a permanent executive body for the inter-congress periods.

The Socialist Party has affiliated with it a separate Peasants' Organization, composed of some four hundred thousand "tested" members and a fringe of six hundred thousand or more "sympathizers." Its form of organization is similar to that of the Trade Union Congress. Socialist labor leaders take pride in the democratic procedures followed by both

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467 the labor and peasant organizations and contrast them with the domination of the Communist unions by their political leaders. Yet, the Socialist [668] politicians admitted that the political objectives of the Trade Union Congress were no different from those of the Anti-Fascist League, and that in the last analysis it was the AFL which decided the policy of the Congress.

Apart from the political objectives, it is interesting to note that the improvement of working and living conditions has for the time being been subordinated to a program designed to raise the educational level of Burma's laborers. Classes in reading and writing are held in almost every factory; but attendance suffers from the fact that they cannot meet during working hours and that there is no remuneration for the time spent in learning.

Among the more orthodox trade-union functions, negotiation for improvements in working conditions takes first place. The Congress prefers the organization of a permanent committee for the compulsory arbitration of disputes to the system at present in vogue, under which conciliation committees are set up in each specific dispute. It also would like to see the provisions of the Factory Act (p. 45 *ff.*) applied more widely and more strictly throughout the country. Furthermore, it favors—under present conditions—a minimum wage of Rs. 35 per month for unskilled labor. This seems a remarkably modest demand when one considers that in April 1947 the prevailing monthly wage for that category of labor in Rangoon was from Rs. 70 to Rs. 80 (including cost-of-living allowance —see p. 60), and that the cost-of-living index was then 315, taking 1941 as the base year. However, as far as could be ascertained, Burma's Socialist leaders had not, in the spring of 1947, drafted legislation to embody these various desires, although Parliament after the April elections was going to be dominated by the Anti-Fascist League.

468 It is worth noting, too, that since the signing of the London Agreement, [648] of January 29, 1947,[1] that League has brought its labor policy more into line with that of the British Labor Government. Mr. A. C. Baker, the 467 Trade Union Adviser appointed for Burma by that government, like his colleague in Malaya, has attempted to divorce labor legislation from politics and to organize a full-fledged department of labor. The Anti-Fascist League, which had been using the strike weapon for political purposes, had learned that such methods can backfire and had become convinced that they could be dispensed with. Strikes promoted as part of a general anti-British demonstration had stimulated demands for higher wages on the part of the laborers, and these demands now proved a serious drain on Burma's exchequer; not only this, but the wage-earners had awakened

[1] See Clarence Hendershot, "Burma Compromise," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVI, 12, June 18, 1947, pp. 133-138.

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B

to a realization of their strength through threats of violence and had become difficult to control. Moreover, the Anti-Fascist League had come to see eye to eye with the governments of Burma and India in the matter of race discriminations and now desired to organize labor without regard to ethnic divisions, since this would mean the continued domination of the existing unions by Burmans—both as regards numbers and leadership. There are only about five thousand Indians (and five hundred Chinese) in the Trade Union Congress of Burma; and these, mindful of the anti-Indian riots of the 1930's (p. 20), are afraid to oppose Burmese leadership.

[468] 467 [563]

Some of the measures advocated by the British Trade Union Advisers had not yet, in the spring of 1947, won the complete support of the politically preoccupied Anti-Fascist League. Mr. Baker had suggested efforts to decasualize the dock labor of Rangoon, to install a more effective labor inspectorate, and to round out Burma's piecemeal labor laws. He took the view that the problem of unemployment could be tackled more effectively. While all of Burma's leaders agreed on the need for a large program of economic reconstruction, thousands of laborers were involuntarily idle; and the imminent withdrawal of the British Army threatened to throw thousands more out of work. Apart from the Army's provision to keep "coolie" gangs on tap, there was only one labor exchange; and there was an obvious need for more. These and other proposals of a technical character in the field of labor had won a fair measure of AFL approval; but in 1947 the energies of the league's leaders still were so taken up with political questions that the will to carry out these measures was largely lacking.

Given the basic agreement then prevailing between the British authorities and the AFL on labor policy, there was good reason to expect that trade unionism of the occidental type might develop rapidly in Burma. Yet it appeared probable that the AFL—if it should run into trouble either with these authorities or with rival factions in Burma—would again resort to the use of organized labor for political purposes. At any rate, its ever tightening control over the growing Socialist unions appeared to increase the temptation to do so.

MALAYA [2]

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Labor difficulties continued, in the spring of 1947, to be one of Malaya's main problems. There were indications that the British Government was preparing for a trial of strength with the organized forces of immigrant labor, chiefly Chinese and Indian. Its declared policy even before the

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[2] The substance of this section has appeared as an article in the *Christian Science Monitor* for April 24, 1947.

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467 war had been to foster the growth of trade unionism in the Western sense of that term, but to divorce it from politics (p. 115). To this end, the
468 Labor Government in 1945 sent trade union advisers from England and helped to revive laws requiring the registration of unions and the establishment of an industrial court. As has already been shown, these moves were made against a background of strikes, both in Singapore and on the peninsula, and after independent unions had been set up by Chinese and Indian labor leaders. The demands made by union members in the post-war strikes had provoked charges in employer and government circles that the Malayan Communist Party had been molding and utilizing the labor movement for its own purposes.

[674] Since the end of the war there also had been a considerable increase in lawlessness which not surprisingly was attributed by some to trade
[668] union activity. Whether this was the case or not, British apprehension grew that behind the strikes there was an organized onslaught against the established government, and that not only the country's industrial
468 production but also its inner peace and order were threatened. With the new orientation in the Colonial Office, the government naturally was opposed to compulsory arbitration, but it set up tripartite arbitration boards to deal with particular disputes. Subsequently it also established labor advisory councils to assist the administration in arriving at policy decisions and to help in bridging the gap between employers and wage-earners. Unfortunately, as already noted (p. 115), the hostility between government and organized labor increased in spite of such measures as these, and during the early months of 1947 the government arrested many trade union and youth organization leaders as well as striking workers.

466 Little effective action had been taken to meet the economic grievances of the workers which occasionally expressed themselves in unlawful be-
5,11 havior. These grievances stemmed in the main from the inflated living costs, and especially from the shortage of rice. Some employers used the situation to resist demands for increased money wages, saying that a more generous rice allowance was a more effective inducement to workers. A laborer who depended on the government ration at that time was obliged either to buy three-fourths of his rice requirements at "black market" prices or to subsist at a standard of nutrition lower than that current before the war.

464 Mention has been made of the shortage of labor throughout Malaya
[467] since the Japanese surrender (p. 109). This circumstance helps to explain the force with which organized labor was able to press it claims. The unions were in a far more favored position than ever before. They were supported, too, by the attitude of the Government of India which was even less inclined than in the years immediately preceding the war to permit its nationals to emigrate to Malaya without guarantees of better treatment and improved political status. Some of the new and sharpened

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Indian conditions the Malayan Government and employers felt unable or were unwilling to meet. At the same time, the local sultans continued to oppose strongly a resumption of large-scale Chinese immigration. Hence, the Javanese remained the only acceptable immigrant labor group; but a large transfer of Javanese migrants was not immediately practicable either, mainly because no clear labor policy could emerge pending the settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, and also because the actual facilities for large-scale labor migration were not available. Thus, during the period of economic rehabilitation, when Malaya required larger labor forces than in normal times, there was a painful shortage, and the organized workers remained in a favorable position.

M 467 563

The government had become well aware of the new power of labor and of the political uses to which this might be put. In the spring of 1947, the circumstances foreshadowed something more than a passing situation. Some officials viewed with alarm, for example, the acceptance—perhaps not altogether voluntary—of Chinese leadership by unions composed of Indian workers, a conspicuous sign that the former sharp division between the Chinese and the Indian communities—so advantageous to the large employers—was breaking down. Another source of trouble looming ahead was the danger that the arrival of more labor immigrants from Java and Sumatra might infect the native Malay population with their own recalcitrance to colonial rule. Already the Malays were watching events in Indonesia with avid interest.

INDONESIA [3]

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To understand recent developments of the labor situation in Indonesia, it is important to remember that in the early part of 1947 no settlement had yet been reached of issues between the Indonesian and the Netherlands Governments—precisely in the field of economic relations. Moreover, the Republican Government itself had started its career with a multiplicity of parties, reflecting not only diverging political ideologies but also to no small extent differences in material interests. For example, the left-wing group, Sajap-Kiri, included the Communist (PKI) and Socialist parties; and the membership of these parties still was fluctuating considerably, with a general tendency toward the growth of the Communist ranks. The Barisan Boeroeh Indonesia (BBI, see p. 165), formerly the political party of the labor movement and a supporter of left-wing politics, was dissolved in December 1946. Its membership was absorbed into the central labor organization, SOBSIE, which eschews all political activity. The Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), with a member-

[3] Some of the material used in this section has also appeared in articles in the *Christian Science Monitor* for February 27, April 19, and April 23, 1947.

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665 ship of about half a million in Java, 100,000 in Sumatra, and 80,000 in
Celebes, fills the role of the major opposition party and represents the
[467] intellectual middle class. Led mainly by lawyers, this party represents
no clear-cut economic interest but is regarded as mildly socialistic. Its
main emphasis is on national unity and a jealous regard for sovereignty.
Outlawed by the Netherlands authorities and with a reduced number of
delegates to the national convention, this party had lost in influence by
the spring of 1947.

[186] Similarly on the surface somewhat remote from economic conflict is
Masjoemi, a loosely organized Japanese-created federation of Islamic
[779] groups which claims a membership of fifteen million in Java alone, with
another two and a half million in Sumatra. The uniting bond here is
a religious and social antagonism to Western civilization. To the extent
that it reflects the desires of millions of tradition-minded peasants, this
group, too, though hardly a political party, may be said to represent a
distinctive set of material interests. But already this young and unwieldy
organization (it became organized as a party only in September 1945) with
its diversified membership is cleft by inner discord. A left wing, Moham-
medijah, which interprets socialism and internationalism as in confor-
mity with the teaching of Islam, is in head-on collision with a right wing,
Nahdatoeloelana, which consists of the older and more conservative ele-
ments and tends to become more reactionary.

665 Distinct ethnic groups also have come to organize politically to protect
their special interests. Both in Netherlands-held territory and in the
563 Republic, Eurasians are organized in pro-Republican parties: the Demo-
cratic Party and Indonesia Merdeka respectively. The Chinese, always
strongly organized, have formed themselves into a number of unfeder-
ated groups called Chung Hwa Tsung Hui, one of the principal objects
of which is the furtherance of Chinese economic interests in connection
with Indonesia's reconstruction. In March 1947, the Republican Govern-
ment assigned a minister without portfolio, Dr. Tan Po Goan, to the
difficult task of promoting the integration into the Republic of the whole
Chinese population which as yet was standing somewhat aloof. Passing
reference should be made also to the numerous women's and youth or-
ganizations which, even though federated in the Congress Kowanita Indo-
nesia and the Federation of Indonesian Youth Associations, can hardly
be counted yet as effective instruments of national representation.

668 It is true, nevertheless, that in the Indonesian Republic the accent is
883 strongly on youth. A story was circulating early in 1947 at Jogjakarta
to the effect that the Republican Government had issued an order re-
quiring all government officials under fourteen years of age to resign
their jobs and go back to school. Indonesia's outstanding political lead-
ers had been youth leaders before the revolution; and many of the youth
had been deeply concerned with causes which have since entered

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into the programs of organized labor: economic co-operation, combat of illiteracy, social welfare, as well as the struggle for national expression in art, literature, and education. During the Japanese occupation, efforts to replace these organizations with others more receptive to the doctrines favored by the conquerors produced a corresponding sharpening of patriotic objectives and the formation of many clandestine youth organizations which, some of them trained and equipped with arms for resistance to the Dutch, have become important in the Republic's early struggle for survival. The subsequent development and diversification of the Indonesian youth movement must be told elsewhere; here it is pertinent to state, however, that even the more "moderate" youth organizations are, generally speaking, socialistic and democratic in their thinking—equally opposed to the formation of a bourgeois or of a Communist state.

In a revolutionary experience, such as that through which Indonesia has passed in recent years, political, cultural and economic movements form an amalgam which does not bear too minute a classification of objects and motives. With the rise of political parties and a wide fringe of organizations which, though politically active, do not deserve the name of party, there also took place a spontaneous mushroom growth of the labor movement. In the first eighteen months of Indonesia as a republic, the number of trade unionists in Java and Sumatra swelled from a few hundred thousand (it had been less than 150,000 in 1941) to three and a half million. Organized labor in the spring of 1947 encompassed twenty-six major fields of economic enterprise, including the oil fields and refineries and the rubber, tea, and sugar plantations.

> "When a political agreement finally is reached and Europeans return to their estates and industries, they will find that the days of Asiatic coolie labor have disappeared."

With these words, Harjono Hardjokoesoemi, a leader of the Indonesian labor movement, indicated the central fact in reply to questions put to him by the author.

> "We demand the same working conditions for Indonesians which exist in other countries—for example, a forty-hour, six-day working week. We will not permit children under fifteen years of age to work outside their parents' homes and farms. Night work for women will not be permitted. Wage rates cannot be settled until currency and food prices have been stabilized; but we certainly shall insist that the laborers are not exploited."

These demands, far-reaching though they may be, appear practical and realistic when it is remembered that, since the early 1920's, the movement has for the most part been under Communist control until it was broken up by the Netherlands Indies Government in 1930, when it sent

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Ine 467 668 a thousand Communists into exile to the Digeol Internment Camp in New Guinea. There had remained, it is true, some forty unfederated unions, but these were almost all made up of government employees and at that time had a combined membership of only thirty thousand.

In its present reincarnation, the Indonesian labor movement has been greatly influenced by European and Australian examples. It may be dated from August 17, 1945, when Ir. Soekarno proclaimed the republic—with constitutional provisions favoring the organization of genuinely autonomous trade unions. In the autumn of 1946, the two branches of the movement—comparable with the AFL and CIO in the United States—combined into one central organization, called SOBSIE. Like the Republican Government which encourages it, this federation is orientated toward socialism and under strong Western influence. Communist influence appeared to be small in the spring of 1947, although Communists were known to have infiltrated, particularly into the unions of petroleum workers. The closed-shop question had not yet arisen.

INDOCHINA [4]

Ich 467 The effect of the war and of the Japanese occupation on the labor situation in Indochina resembled more that in Malaya than that in Indonesia. On the one hand, the influence of the great European enterprises still was dominant; on the other, the trade union movement had tended to assume a more political coloration and, indeed, had to some extent been organized for political purposes through the medium of strikes. The President of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, Ho Chi Minh, is credited (or charged) with having called into being nominal trade unions which actually are little more than instruments of political action. He formed a central organization which he called Confédération Générale de Travail (CGT) after the French prototype and for the purpose of international affiliation.

Ich 467 166 It has been said that "l'Annamite est un monsieur qui adore les associations—plus elles sont secrètes, plus il les aime"; but it does not follow that the wide network of unions that has sprung into being with the Republic's encouragement is so organized that it can effectively serve the social welfare in general and the improvement of working conditions in particular. The sudden transplantation by the government of large numbers of laborers from the Tonkin delta area to malaria-infested inland areas in need of development is cited as the sort of measure which was neither well planned nor carried out by means of a democratic procedure,

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[4] This section is based to a large extent on an interview with M. Guiriec, Directeur de l'Action Sociale et du Travail, Saigon, on May 28, 1947. M. Guiriec has spent many years in Tonkin as an Inspector of Labor, and has been charged with the drafting of a trade-union law for the whole of French Indochina.

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and which can hardly be expected to be successful in its social results. 467
However, unofficial movements affecting population transfers during and 166
since the Japanese occupation were not adequately planned, either. Thus, while about one-half of the prewar labor forces of the plantations are still in residence, the other half has simply melted away and is believed to have drifted back to Tonkin. An exception is the Rach-gia colonization scheme (p. 170) which continued throughout the war and has considerably expanded.

As in Malaya, so in Indochina one of the returning colonial govern- 464
ment's chief concerns has been the procurement of an adequate labor supply for the large European enterprises. Although rumors circulated 167
to the effect that the Governments of India and China had been approached with a view to new facilities for the importation of contract labor have proved inaccurate, such inquiries in India had been made by an Indian firm in Saigon; and the Cochin-Chinese authorities had, without committing themselves, asked for information about the reliability of the firm in question. Chinese migrants continued to stream into the peninsula by the thousands, but the total number of these newcomers was insignificant compared with the labor requirements of the large corporations. Moreover, most of the Chinese, even when willing to work for wages, are embryo merchants who hope gradually to establish themselves in business and perhaps to become big merchants and capitalists in years to come. When they do find employment, it is for the most part with Chinese firms in Cholon, Haiphong, and Hanoi. Hardly any of them become rubber tappers or miners.

Programs of economic development promulgated by Vietnamese au- 185
thorities say little or are vague about the use of resettlement as a means of providing labor resources for large-scale enterprise. But in the spring of 1947 it was considered probable that the systematic migration of Tonkinese laborers to the less populated parts of Indochina would be resumed, as a matter of policy, when conditions became more stable. Such resettlement would be bound up with the transformation of Indochina's colonial economy into a national economy. In the past, the industries, under the influence of colonial trade, have been concentrated, for the most part, along the coast of Tonkin, except for such processing industries as rice and lumber milling which can best be carried on nearer the sources of supply. Industrialization is an accepted end of Vietnamese economic policy; and connected with it is the declared purpose of intensifying and mechanizing many of the small crafts and industries diffused over the country and of creating more schools for the training of technicians and skilled workers. It is recognized in Vietnamese circles that the Annamese trained in the technical schools of prewar Indochina have proved valuable carriers of economic progress.

The total effect of the Japanese occupation upon the distribution and 000

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The total effect of the Japanese occupation upon the distribution and condition of labor does not appear to have been as great as might have
464 been supposed. At first, the wages paid by the conquerors were higher
727 than those previously current; but toward the end of the occupation they
[465] were lower. There was no general movement from the rural areas to the towns, as took place in Siam—probably because of the Annamite's conservatism and attachment to his native village. Nor do the Japanese seem to have found themselves as much in need of large labor forces. For example, there was only one ship-building yard on the south coast of the peninsula; only a very few men were trained ther.. It cannot be said that the Japanese did anything to increase the indigenous supply of skilled labor in Indochina.

467 In the field of organized labor, the most interesting development early
185 in 1947 was the initiative taken by Emile Bollaert, the High Commissioner for Indochina, in the preparation of legislation to encourage the formation of trade unions. The Director of Social Action and Labor, in drafting this legislation, took his inspiration from minimum standards for dependent territories set up at International Labor Conferences in which, in fact, French representatives of government, management, and labor had fully collaborated. On some matters, the labor laws current in the metropolis also served as models, as did those on the statute books of neighboring colonial countries. The projected legislation will necessarily be on rather general lines, leaving more detailed measures of enforcement to the separate states of the Indochinese Federation. That there will be some differences in the speed and thoroughness with which the general provisions of the federal law will be administered is probable because of the considerable variations in the industrial development of the several parts of Indochina. For example, if the Moi were to be drawn more fully into industrial life, it would probably not be practicable to subject them to exactly the same rules as the industrially more experienced Annamite workers.

At the same time, French official opinion was opposed to the formation of separate trade unions for members of different national groups. When this question was first studied, in 1937, the opposite decision had been reached; its reversal corresponds to a general trend in Southeast Asia. Likewise in keeping with the prevailing tendency in colonial labor legislation is the provision that unions must be devoted solely to the improvement of working and living conditions, and making it illegal for them to pursue political aims. It should be added, however, that the drafters of this legislation are not very sanguine that such legislation, going contrary to the trend of trade unionism the world over, will be easy to enforce. As a matter of fact, although few in number, French workers resident in Indochina are determined to preserve for their own unions the character taken over from their parent bodies in France.

000 A slight but not negligible influence on Indochina of French labor

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A slight but not negligible influence on Indochina of French labor opinion is expected also from a new land settlement scheme for French soldiers of General Leclerc's Second Division established in South Annam. These veterans have been offered free land, a certain amount of equipment, and other privileges, provided they undertake to engage in agriculture. In the spring of 1947, about one hundred and fifty of them had taken up land and, although as yet living in a military type of barracks, were engaged in growing coffee, cocoa, and rubber—doing all the labor themselves.

I 425 166

SIAM

T 467 [466]

The efforts of Siamese labor since the withdrawal of the Japanese to organize in modern trade unions (see above, p. 248) appeared well advanced when the author visited Siam in May 1947. But there seemed not as yet to have occurred a corresponding progress in the legislative field. Local labor leaders continued to rely upon the fitful patronage of individual politicians and to eschew the organization of labor as a political force. The Siamese Government had not as yet made any strong effort to improve working conditions even in the capital, although as a step in that direction responsibility for the enforcement of existing labor regulations had, in November 1946, been transferred to the Ministry of Industry which also was charged with the labor survey previously mentioned (p. 237).

With the hesitant attitude of both government and labor leaders, no serious attempt had been made to erase from the statute book the long-standing prohibition against the formation of labor associations for other than benevolent purposes. Nor had any of the three major political parties openly championed the cause of organized labor or done anything appreciable to advance it. For reasons already indicated, particularly the sharp cleavage between indigenous and Chinese workers (p. 242), Siamese labor had not been able as yet to formulate a joint program, to stand solidly together behind specific demands for improvements in working and living conditions, or to ally itself with kindred movements in other countries. However, a trend toward greater cohesion was under way.

In January 1947, a central labor union, the Saha Asheewah Kamakorn Hang Thai, was officially registered. In May it comprised 51 unions. Its relatively small revenue was derived in part from membership dues (one-fourth of the dues collected by the individual unions, ranging from 50 satangs to 5 baht) and in part from voluntary contributions of workers and "kind-hearted capitalists." The leaders claimed not to know the numerical strength of the organization, and their estimates ranged from 12,000 to 100,000. As other efforts in the past, the organization depended for its strength largely on the public employees and industrial workers of

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Chinese

467 Bangkok. Indeed, it rested on the skeleton framework of unions which existed before the war and continued to expand chiefly among the skilled workers of the capital. In the rural areas, where a branch was reported for each province, the structure utilized was that of the wartime resistance movement, and little effective effort had as yet been made to strengthen or enlarge this organization. However, leaders of the central union were making their services readily accessible to laborers in various parts of the country seeking their advice on methods of organization. Moreover, a string of reading and meeting rooms had been provided all over Bangkok, where workers might come for discussion of their problems or for recreation.

Only about two out of every five of the central union's total membership, and only a small proportion of its leadership, were Chinese, even though numerically these still dominated the labor field in Bangkok. Leaders of the central union asserted that they knew of the existence of no unions of Chinese workers other than those affiliated with their own organization. If they exist, they probably should be considered part of the labyrinth of Chinese guilds and secret societies that cover almost every part of Southeast Asia, and not, strictly speaking, labor organizations. There was evidence, too, that the labor leaders of Siam were determined to eliminate from their central union any Chinese who showed a marked interest in the politics of their mother country, and to check the possible growth of a labor movement along "racial" lines.

This desire to avoid political complications stems from the central union's unhealthy domination by, or fear of, the Siamese Government. [468] Although the Government had not as yet done anything helpful for the cause of labor (nor had the opposition party), the officers of the central union seemed afraid, in mid-1947, that it might move to crush their incipient organization. Mainly for this reason, the central union had failed to support openly, in January 1947, the demonstration made by civil servants against the current scale of salaries, and against the disciplinary measures subsequently taken by the Government against those who had registered their protest. Nor had the central union as yet drafted any legislative program concerning minimum wages, maximum work days, or other improvements in living and working conditions, although the translation of such a program into bills supported by one party or other might well have been demanded as the price for organized labor's support at the polls.

With the shortage of qualified labor after the war (p. 242), the quasi-passive attitude of organized labor in Siam cannot be wholly attributed to widespread unemployment; nor on the other hand have labor conditions improved so much as to eliminate serious evils in any part of the country. The fact that foreigners form a majority of the urban working forces is not a sufficient explanation, either. Rather, it appears to the

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observer that the labor movement, such as it is, may have been brought into being and may be kept under control by one of the major parties now supporting the Government as a means of preventing the growth of a more militant labor movement—a movement composed of unions conscious of their political power and liable to come under the domination of radical or foreign elements. 467

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[No. 16.]

000

JOURNAL

OF THE

STRAITS BRANCH

OF THE

ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY.

DECEMBER, 1885.

PUBLISHED HALF-YEARLY.

SINGAPORE:

PRINTED AT THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.

1886.

AGENTS OF THE SOCIETY:

London and America, ... TRÜBNER & Co.
Paris, ... ERNEST LEROUX & CIE.
Germany, ... K. F. KOEHLER'S ANTIQUARIUM, Leipzig.

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Chinese

A DESCRIPTION OF THE CHINESE LOTTERY KNOWN AS HŪA-HOEY.

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HUA-HOEY* or the thirty-six Animals Lottery is so extensively played in the Straits Settlements, Burma, Siam and wherever the Chinese settle, that some description of its origin and of the way in which it is carried on here may prove not altogether uninteresting.

From a small book "On the Interpretation of Dreams with Illustrations of Hua Hoey" we learn that the game was invented in the time of the second Han dynasty. In this book there is a short sketch of the lives of the thirty-six mythical personages (who had previously existed as animals) and directions are given as to staking. The order in which the characters are described is different from that employed in the staking papers of which a specimen is given below.

King Thai Peng, being the most celebrated character, is placed first instead of being No. 26.

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* *Lit.* Play Society.

[P. 205. P 204 is blank]

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1.—*Thai Peng* was, in a former state of existence, a dragon. He served in the Chow Kingdom under King Hooi Lian till it was conquered by the Chinese, when he escaped, and having raised an army under Generals Kun San (No. 9) and Chi Koh (No. 11), he proclaimed himself King, but he afterwards led such a dissolute life that Kun San put an end to his existence. Kun Giok (No. 22) was his sister.

Thai Peng was born again as Guan Kui. Stake on Thai Peng, Guan Kui, Kong Beng and the 5 dragons when you dream of the coronation of a sovereign, cash, or an execution.

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2.—*Sam Wei* was formerly a monkey. He served Thai Peng as Prime Minister and became very wealthy. He had three sons Hap Hai (No. 7) Guan Kiat (No. 19) and Ban Kim (No. 32.)

Sam Wei was born again as Cheng Li. Stake on Sam Wei, Guan Kui and Cham Khoi when you dream of a wicked man, a man hanging himself, three ghosts, three stars, woods, or a performing monkey.

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3.—*Kong Beng* was formerly a horse. He became a priest and was employed by Thai-Peng as a political adviser, being gifted with supernatural powers. He was slain in battle with the Chinese.

Kong Beng was born again as Hong Chun. Stake on Kong Beng, Thai Peng, Hong Chun, Siang Chiow and Hoey Kwan when you dream of bright objects such as flames, brilliant pearls, lamps, or sunshine.

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4.—*Kiu Kwan* was a hawk. He became a Mandarin and was very rich and married a princess of the Han dynasty. He had a younger brother named Hoey Kwan (No. 28.)

Kiu Kwan was born again as Kiat Pin. Stake on Kiu Kwan, Hoey Kwan, Kiat Pin and Cheng Sun when you dream of drinking samsu, riding, sleeping, sitting at leisure, water up to the shoulder, a dog biting a man or a coffin with a dead body.

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5.—*Pan Kwi* was formerly a dragon. He took a high literary and military degree and was slain by the Chinese.

Pan Kwi was born again as Mow Lim. Stake on Pan Kwi, Guan Kwi, Mów Lim and the five dragons when you dream of picking flowers, a young man, witnessing a theatrical performance, climbing trees, or adopting a child.

Pan Kwi is usually called "The Shell."

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6.—*Hong Chun* was once a peacock and was the brother of Eng Seng (No. 7). He took the first literary degree. His whole family were massacred by the Chinese. He married Siang Chiow (No. 23).

Hong Chun was born again as Kong Beng. Stake on Hong Chun, Kong Beng, Han Hun and Ban Kim when you dream of a flower, a man ploughing, a bambu shoot, geese or ducks, a marriage ceremony, a girl worshipping idols, or a buffalo.

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7.—*Eng Seng* was originally a goose. His mother was Kun Giok (No. 22). He took the same honours as his brother (No. 6).

Eng Seng was born again as Ban Kim. Stake on Eng Seng, Ban Kim and Hong Chun when you dream of drinking tea, killing poultry, an examination, selling spirits, a flea, a pen, a pair of candles, a water-lily, or giving an animal its life.

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8.—*Cham Khoi* was a white fish. He took the first military and literary degree and became judge of three provinces. He and his whole family, more than 300 in number, were slain by the Chinese.

Cham Khoi [illegible] born again as Chi Koh. Stake on Cham Khoi, Sam Wei, Chi Koh and Hong Chun when you dream of a white fish, a buffalo, a gantang of white rice, or 36 pigs.

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9.—*Kun San* was originally a tiger. An intimate friend of Chi Koh (No. 11) he became so powerful as the chief of a band of robbers that the Imperial troops dared not attack him. He was afterwards one of Thai Peng's Generals.

Kun San was born again as Cheng Hun. Stake on Kun San, Cheng Hun, Jit San and Hok Sun when you dream of fighting or robbery, the sun rising, a yellow object, or a hill on fire.

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10.—*Cheng Sun* was a pig. He served with Kun San (No. 9) as a General.

Cheng Sun was born again as Hap Hai. Stake on Cheng Sun, Pit Taik, Chit Taik, Siang Chiow and Kun San when you dream of a boat sailing on a river, a man in the water, sending a present, a wedding, a pig, sailing with a favourable wind in the first moon, a boat going with the current, or 300 cash.

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11.—*Chi Koh* was once a lion. He was a native of Tong King and an intimate friend of Kun San (No. 9) and one of Thai Peng's Generals.

Chi Koh was born again as Cham Khoi. Stake on Chi Koh, Kun San, Cham Khoi and Kiat Pin when you dream of ascending a height, a red face, a tall man, a youth, seeing the moon, a cool breeze, ascending a tower or stairs, an examination, or a lion fight.

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12.—*Pit Taik* was a mouse. Although very powerful, he remained a ferryman till Kun San (No. 9) appointed him the sixth General under King Thai Peng.

Pit Taik was born again as Hok San. Stake on Pit Taik, Guat Poh, Hok Sun and Chi Taik when you dream of a blossom, a tiger, people in a boat, a mouse eating rice, demanding money, eating tortoise, finding an article of value on the road, letting go a snake, or two brothers quarrelling.

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13.—*Guat Poh* was formerly a tortoise. His special duty was to guard the Imperial Palace. He had a son Han Hun (No. 14) and a daughter Beng Chu (No. 21).

Guat Poh was born again as Beng Chu. Stake on Guat Poh, Beng Chu, Han Hun and Pit Tark when you dream of a man with a hat but no coat, a woman preparing rice, vermicelli, red objects, money, or valuables.

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14.—*Han Hun* was a buffalo. He was afterwards a Mandarin, and while guarding the sea coast was defeated, for which he was sentenced to be torn in pieces by five horses. His father was Guat Poh (No. 13) and his sister Beng Chu (No. 21).

Han Hun was born again as Cheng Guan. Stake on Han Hun, Cheng Guan, Cheng Hun and Hoey Kwan when you dream of a dead body, a hill on fire, a man killing a horse, or a cow.

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15.—*Kang Su* was a dragon of the Southern Sea. He was a friend of Pit Taik and was killed by the Chinese.

Kang Su was born again as Thian Sin. Stake on Kang Su, Thian Sin and the five dragon when you dream of a ferry-boat, a vessel bound for a foreign port, being in the sea, or seeing vessels, things or persons there.

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16.—*Hok Sun* was a dog. He then kept a medical shop and was killed by a tiger when employed in gathering herbs on the woods.

Hok Sun was born again as Pit Taik. Stake on Hok Sun, Kiu Kwan, Pit Taik and Kun San when you dream of a woman crying or carrying a baby, planting, a tiger's roar, a dog's bite, eating dog's flesh, or a row in a medicine shop.

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17.—*Cheng Guan* was once a spider. He was a great spendthrift while at college and became a beggar. He then took to stealing fowls.

Cheng Guan was born again as Han Hun. Stake on Cheng Guan, Han Hun, Cheng Hun and Kong Beng when you dream of literary competition, herbs, a green coat, a green pear, eating fruit, a fish with a horn, a fowl stealer, or a scholar.

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18.—*Guan Kwi* was once a prawn. He took to gambling and had a monkey which brought him in money by performing tricks.

Guan Kwi was born again as Thai Peng. Stake on Guan Kwi, Thai Peng, Sam Wei, Cheng Guan and Guan Kiat when you dream of a man singing about flowers, rice being dear, dear things, a beggar, a scholar in a ragged coat, a dog stealing rice carving mutton, a flag, a pomegranate, or a lame woman.

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Chinese

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19.—*Guan Kiat* was a sheep. He became a Mandarin and was reduced to beggary by being robbed on his way to see his friend Thian Liang.

Guan Kiat was born again as An Su. Stake on Guan Kiat, An Su, Kiat Pin and Thian Liang when you dream of a reception of a General, a great excitement, a fire, dirt, an offering, a new born child eating, a jar of spirits with fruit, or a clear view.

Il: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

525

20.—*Kiat Pin* was once a deer. He became very rich, but was reduced to poverty by the Chinese.

Kiat Pin was born again as Kiu Kwan. Stake on Kiat Pin, Kiu Kwan, Sam Wei, Ban Kim and Guan Kiat when you dream of three cups of spirit, three men, three eggs, an old man, or three objects.

Il: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

525

21.—*Beng Chu* was once a fish (usually called "The Stone"). She was the daughter of Guat Poh (No. 13) and the wife of Pan Kwi (No. 15) and the mother of Hong Chun (No. 6). She was a lady of the highest rank. The whole family were killed by the Chinese.

Beng Chu was born again as Guat Poh. Stake on Beng Chu, Guat Poh, Kong Beng and Hoey Kwan when you dream of anything red, spectacles, a women reading, wearing a gown, coming out of a door, or looking into a glass.

Il: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

525

22.—*Kun Giok* or *Gin Giok* was a butterfly. She and her brother Thai Peng escaped from the conquering Chinese. When he became King he raised her to the second rank. Eng Seng (No. 7) was her son.

Kun Giok was born again as Hoey Kwan. Stake on Kun Giok, Hoey Kwan, Cheng Guan, Cheng Hun, Thai Peng and Mow Lim when you dream of a man eating meat, a woman combing her hair, a girl of loose character, a woman carrying a child or running.

1k Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

525

23.—*Siang Chiow* was a swallow. When she was a girl she picked up on a mountain a book from which she learnt sorcery and was able to raise storms. Kun San (No. 9) regarded her as his sister. She married Hong Chun (No 6).

Siang Chiow was born again as Hap Tong. Stake on Siang Chiow, Kong Beng, Hap Tong and Kun San when you dream of meeting a Magistrate, a marriage ceremony, a woman riding, rain coming down, an amazon, or beating a drum.

ll: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

525

24.—*Hap Tong* was the name of a spirit-shop kept by two sisters-in-law Sit and Kiu. Chi Koh (No. 11) tried to force them to marry him and they jumped into a well and were drowned. They had previously existed as pigeons.

Hap Tong was born again as Siang Chiow. Stake on Hap Tong, Hap Hai, Kiu Kwan and Cheng Li when you dream of drinking milk and sleeping, an elder brother's wife and his younger sister walking together, a woman selling spirits, two persons under one covering, women drinking together, or two sisters marrying at the same time.

1l: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 All Southeast Asia All
Chinese

525

25.—*Mow Lim* was a bee. He was poor and got his livelihood by charcoal burning.

Mow Lim was born again as Pan Kwi. Stake on Mow Lim Pan Kwi and Hoey Kwan when you dream of heavy rain, branches weighed down, a hill on fire, the sky darkened, a temple, bee's-nest, cutting grass, a priest, charcoal burning, a piece of timber or hail.

ll: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

525

26.—*Yu Li* was an elephant. He afterwards started a hotel and was a fisherman.

Yu Li was born again as Chit Taik. Stake on Yu Li, Chit Taik, Pit Taik and Cheng Li when you dream of cotton clothes, clearing jungle, making an oven, building a house, putting up beams, digging a grave, rearing ducks, an actor, ducks laying eggs, catching fish, paying money, or eating rice.

Il: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

525

27.—*Hap Hai* was originally a frog. He was the son of Sam Wei (No. 2) and brother to Guan Kiat (No. 19) and Ban Kim (No. 32). He was killed by the Chinese.

Hap Hai was born again as Cheng Sun. Stake on Hap Hai Hap Tong and Pit Taik when you dream of a foreign vessel at sea, a louse, or an inundation.

ll: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 All Southeast Asia All
Chinese

525

28.—*Hoey Kwan* was a duck. His elder brother was Kiu Kwan (No. 4). He became a Judge. His whole family were massacred by the Chinese.

Hoey Kwan was born again as Kun Giok. Stake on Hoey Kwan, Kiu Kwan, Kun Giok, Eng Seng and Mow Lim when you dream of a coffin on fire, a house on fire, a Magistrate approaching, a kitchen fire, burning crackers, fighting, a Magistrate seeing blood, the light of a lantern, a burning corpse, or a person dressed in cotton.

lk Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

525

29.—*Chit Taik* was once a dog. He became a pork-butcher and was slain by order of Chen Kwi.

Chit Taik was born again as Yu Li. Stake on Chit Taik, Yu Li, Pit Taik, Kiu Kwan and Cheng Sun when you dream of fortune-telling, murder and blood, a butcher's shop, chess playing, much meat, a pomegranate, pointing to a pork butcher, beating a gong or drum, or a man becoming a pig.

ll: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

525

30.—*Thian Liang* was once an eel. He was a Sin Chei, but seeing he could rise no higher, he shaved his head and became a monk. He was employed by people to supplicate the gods to grant blessings, wealth and children.

Thian Liang was born again as Jit San. Stake on Thian Liang, Jit San, Thian Sin and Cheng Li when you dream of taking medicine, two men in the water, a large and small hat, digging a grave, a monk, rice, or an eel becoming a snake.

1l: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 All Southeast Asia All
Chinese

525

31.—*Cheng Hun* was a Sonk. Owing to the intrigues of Chen Kwi he retired from Court and became a monk among the mountains.

Cheng Hun was born again as Kun San. Stake on Cheng Hun, Kun San and Cheng Guan when you dream of heavy rain, the death of a relative, meeting parents, smoke without flame, heavy clouds, a river with no means of crossing, acting, or a monk.

Il: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

525

32.—*Ban Kim* was formerly a snake. He was the son of Sam Wei (No. 4) and the younger brother of Hap Hai (No. 27) and Guan Kiat (No. 19). He led a retired life.

Ban Kim was born again as Eng Seng. Stake on Ban Kim, Eng Seng and the five dragons when you dream of a rich man, much money, collecting rent, a pair of gold flowers, a tortoise, a slave burning a coffin, or putting out a light.

1l: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 All Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

525

33.—*Cheng Li* was a turtle. His house of business having been burnt down he turned priest.

Cheng Li was born again as Sam Wei. Stake on Cheng Li, Sam Wei and Yu Li when you dream of being carried in a chair, a corpse in a well, cutting timber, creatures of the sea, murder and blood, a chair coolie, a marriage, a chair, baling water, a spirit-shop, a fire, or a turtle.

Il: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

525

An Su previously existed as a fox. She was the wife of Guan Kwi (No. 18) and as her husband was poor, she shaved her head and became a nun.

An Su was born again as Guan Kiat. Stake on An Su, Kong Beng, Beng Chu, Guan Kiat and Guan Kwi when you dream of a happy nun, an old woman, a woman in man's attire, lighting joss sticks, meeting a raft, or a horse in motion.

1l: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

525

35.—*Thian Sin* was originally a wild cat. Having served under King Siong Ki, he turned monk.

Thian Sin was born again as Kang Su. Stake on Thian Sin, Thian Liang, Kang Su and Hoey Kwan when you dream of something in the sky, a water-pot, thunder, pointing to the sky, a horse running, or a woman without clothing.

Il: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 All Southeast Asia All
Chinese

525

Jit San was once a cock. He was extremely wealthy. but having been plundered by the Chinese he turned priest,

Jit San was born again as Thian Liang. Stake on Jit San, Thian Liang, Kun San and Eng Seng when you dream of wood and fire, going to school, the sun rising in the East and setting in the West, a man entering and coming out of a wood, a high hill or sunset.

1k Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 All Southeast Asia All
Chinese

525 The accompanying diagram contains the names of all the thirty-six Hua-Hoey characters together with another Im Hoey not included in the ordinary lists. Each character is associated with a particular part of the human frame and this diagram is extensively used in interpreting dreams. Thus if you dream of ears you should stake on Thai Peng or Kun Giok, if of the neck on Jit San, and so on. The characters are here classified as follows :—

Four of the highest degree (Chong Guan), viz. :—

Tan Hong Chun, Tan Eng Seng, Tan Pan Kwi and Gaw Cham Khoi.

Seven Traders, viz. :—

Ang Yu Li, Chu Kong Beng, Chan Hok Sun, Liong Keng Su, Hong Mow Lim, Teh Pit Taik and Loh Chit Taik.

Four Priests, viz. :—

Low Cheng Li, Teh Thian Liang, Tan Jit San and Tioh Hocy Kwan.

Five Generals, viz. :—

Li Han Hun, Wi Kun San, Song Cheng Sun, Li Guat Poh and Wi Chi Koh.

Four Ladies, viz. :—

Siang Hap Tong, Beh Siang Chiow, Li Beng Chu and Lim Gin Giok.

Four Happy-lot, viz. :—

Lim Thai Peng, Tioh Kiu Kwan, Tioh Hap Hai and Tioh Sam Wei.

One Nun, viz. :—

Tan An Su.

Two Friars, viz. :—

Tioh Tian Sin and Chiu Cheng Hun.

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Chinese

525

四狀元
吳占魁 白魚
陳拳桂 田螺
陳榮生 白鵝
陳逢春 孔雀

七生理
龍江祠 兆龍
田福孫 白狗
朱光明 白馬 軍師
翁有利 大象

羅只得 野猫
鄭必得 老鼠
方茂林 黃蜂

四和尚
張火官 龜
陳日山 鶴
鄭天良 螺
劉井利 鯉

五乞食
徐元貴 猴公
張萬金 大蛇
蘇青元 和尚
張元吉 虎
陳吉品 羊

五虎將
黃志高 地龍 師傅
李月寶 兎
宋正順 猪
黃坤山 虎
李淇雲 牛

四夫人
林良玉 蚨螺
李明珠 玉石
馬上招 白蕊
雙合同 白蛤

四好命
張三槐 猴子
張合海 蛤蟆
張九官 鳥鷹
林太平 龍

二道士
周青雲 白鶴
趙天申 金蟬 猫
一師姑
陳安士 林理

音光會明
上招 福孫
坤山 正順 月寶
逢春 江祠
吉品 元貴
茂林 得必
明珠 良天

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1L Kynnersley 3 (no date)1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl Chinese
[R2422B]

占魁	艮玉
板桂	明珠
榮生	上招
逢春	合同
志高	三槐
月寶	合海
正順	九官
坤山	太平
漢雲	火官
江祠	日山
福孫	天良
光明	井利
有利	元貴
只得	萬金
必得	青元
茂林	元吉
青雲	吉品
天申	安士

音會 合共銀

525

Il: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

525 Five Beggars, viz. :—

Tan Kiat Pin, Tioh Guan Kiat, So Cheng Guan, Tioh Ban Kim and Chi Guan Kwi.

The Lottery is thus conducted in the Straits :—A person wishing to open it, issues a notice that on a certain date he will open Hua-Hoey under a certain chop and that he will be responsible to all winners who stake up to such and such an amount either with him or his agents.

These Agents go round, and, according to agreement, are allowed to receive stakes up to a certain limit, say $2, but on their own account they may receive larger stakes. They carry what are usually termed *hongs*, *i. e.*, papers on which the stakes are entered. In case the staker is well known to the agent, no acknowledgment is given, but the staker may receive a ticket or scrap of paper, or else he writes down on a slip of paper, which he hands to the agent, the names of the animals he wishes to stake on and the amount. The accompanying is a specimen of the staking papers used in Hua-Hoey.

1	White fish—Cham Khoi
2	Shell or Dragon—Pan Kwi
3	Goose (White)—Eng Seng
4	Peacock—Hong Chun
5	Lion or Earth-worm—Chi Koh
6	Rabbit or Tortoise—Guat Poh
7	Pig—Cheng Sun
8	Tiger—Kun San
9	Buffalo—Han Hun
10	Alligator or Dragon—Kang Su
11	White Dog—Hok Sun
12	White Horse—Kong Beng
13	Elephant—Yu Li
14	White Cat or Dog—Chi Taik
15	Mouse—Pit Taik
16	Wasp or Bee—Mow Lim
17	Stork—Cheng Hun
18	Cat—Thian Sin

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Chinese

525

19	Butterfly—Kun Giok
20	Stone or Cricket—Beng Chu
21	Swallow—Siang Chiow
22	Pigeon—Hap Tong
23	Monkey—Sam Wei
24	Frog—Hap Hai
25	Sea Hawk—Kim Kwan
26	Dragon—Thai Peng
27	Tortoise or Duck—Hoey Kwan
28	Cock—Jit San
29	Eel—Thian Liang
30	Turtle or Carp—Cheng Li
31	Lobster—Guan Kwi
32	Snake—Ban Kim
33	Spider—Cheng Guan
34	Sheep or Deer—Guan Kiat
35	Deer or Goat—Kiat Pin
36	Ghost or Fox—An Su

There are, it will be seen, thirty-six columns, at the head of each of which is the sign of one of the Hua-Hoey characters. The marks* (which have a conventional meaning) and figures (Chinese) represent the amount either cents or dollars staked on each animal and the last column is the total of stakes received. A person wishing to stake a large amount, say $5 or $10, on an animal will sometimes write the name on a piece of paper and seal it up, delivering it with the stake to the manager of the Hua-Hoey or an agent.

The lottery is opened twice a day, usually at noon and 6. P.M., and at the appointed hour the winning number (animal) is exhibited, and the result declared in the streets. Previously to this, the agents have brought in their staking papers. If the lottery is worked fairly, of course the manager who declares the winning number should be ignorant as to the amounts staked on the different animals. In China, the papers on which the stakes are entered are folded up in a packet and are not inspected till the winner has been declared, when the winning tickets are chopped and the owners of them are paid.

* Generally entered in pencil.

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Chinese

525

In the Straits, these lotteries are not fairly worked, and the animal least favoured by the public is often the winner. Stakers receive thirty times their stake, less a small commission paid to the agent, from whom they receive their winnings, and this leaves a good margin of profit for the bank. A manager, for the sake of gain, or out of spite, has been known to stake by deputy a large amount with one of his agents on the animal which he means to declare as the winner. The agent is "broke" and those who have staked on the winning animal are defrauded of their gains. This is only one of the many ways of swindling practised in regard to these lotteries in the Straits.

It must not be supposed that it is only the Chinese who gamble at Hua-Hoey. The wealthy Baba, born in the Straits, the respectable trader, their wives and daughters, the petty shopkeeper and the coolie who works by the day, Klings and Malays, women and children, all alike are unable to resist the temptation to gamble. The Manila lottery is only drawn once a month. Manila is a long way off, and the chance of winning a prize is very remote, still it has its fascinations for the practical Englishman and even the cautious Scotchman has been known to invest his money in this speculation year after year. The Hua-Hoey lottery is drawn twice every day in different parts of the town and the excitement is ever fresh. An outlay of 10 cents, which is within the means of any coolie, may bring in $3.

Women are largely employed in the Hua-Hoey business, while their husbands are at the shop or sailing (as they appear to be very often). They spend their idle time in collecting stakes and staking themselves. They have diamonds and gold ornaments in profusion, and while any of these remain, they can gamble to their heart's content.* Those lower in the social scale, unblessed with diamonds or ready money, beg, borrow or steal in order that they may gamble.

Dreams play a great part in Hua-Hoey and the confirmed Hua-Hoey player gets to think of nothing else but the chance of his winning on the morrow. According to his dreams, he stakes.

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* A few days ago the wife of a trader in Penang having lost at Hua-Hoey ever $1,000 during his absence tried to commit suicide.—(Febuary, 1886.)

lk Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 All Southeast Asia All
Chinese

525 It is no exaggeration to say that Hua-Hoey gambling corrupts and brings to ruin thousands of people—men, women and children but how to check it and minimise the evil is a very difficult question.

The common gaming houses in town are well known to the Police They are defended by strong iron barred doors, have ladders, trap-doors and escapes and are always ready for a raid by the Police. Premises have to be hired and fitted up for the purpose, and there is a certain amount of risk in the undertaking, but a Hua-Hoey lottery can be opened anywhere, in a shop, a private house or a Kampong. The result is not often declared at the same place and without a warrant the Police cannot enter a building. All kinds of artifices are practised when the winning number is exhibited in order to escape detection by the Police. Sometimes the character is marked on a piece of yam or sweet potato and swallowed if the Police appear: or it is written on the palm of the hand or on the sand and quickly rubbed out. Instead of the well known Hua-Hoey characters the numbers corresponding with them on the lottery papers are now frequently used and it is extremely difficult for the Police to procure satisfactory evidence against the principals engaged in the business.

The agents with their lottery papers, pencil and stakes collected are sometimes arrested and fined, but it has been held by a learned Judge that the possession of these "tickets," as they are called, is no offence. In Burma it was held by one high judicial functionary that the thirty-six animals game was not gambling within the meaning of the Act in force there.

The more respectable Chinese are fully alive to the widespread mischief caused by these Hua-Hoey lotteries and a memorial, printed as an Appendix[1] to this paper, has been recently addressed to the Legislative Council by certain Chinese inhabitants of Penang praying that most stringent measures should be adopted for their suppression.

C. W. SNEYD KYNNERSLEY.

1 [omitted from file -- Analyst]

11: Kynnersley
563, 773, 787

ALl Southeast Asia ALl

[For information concerning mythical beings, and the role of dream interpretation in relation to "a description of the Chinese lottery known as Hua-Hoey", see category 116, the entire source.]

12: Sherborn N-4 (no date) 1890 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MALAYA,*

113

FROM JANUARY, 1888, TO JUNE, 1890.

BY

C. DAVIES SHERBORN, F.Z.S., F.G.S.

IN compiling this Bibliography, all sources of information have been utilized. In inserting, therefore, every publication that has come under his notice, the compiler hopes that the entries will prove of considerable assistance; but, as a large proportion of the literature of this district, either never reaches England at all, or else arrives so long after as to be too late for examination for this purpose, he begs the reader's indulgence for any error that may be present. His thanks are are due to M. Martinus Nijhoff of The Hague for information as to some of the more recent books.

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[Reprint from *Ned. milit. geneesk. Arch.,* 1888.]

* By "Malaya" is here meant that part of the Archipelago enclosed in a line drawn round the North of Siam and the Philippines, through Macassar Strait between Lombok and Bali, round the outlying Islands of Java and Sumatra and to the East of Nicobar and Andaman Islands.

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The Far Eastern Quarterly

REVIEW OF EASTERN ASIA AND THE
ADJACENT PACIFIC ISLANDS

Volume II · Number 4
August · 1943

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THE LANGUAGES OF SOUTHEASTERN ASIA

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197 THE origin of the various languages of Southeastern Asia is veiled by the same mist, broken by only occasional glimmers of light, which hides from the ethnologist and even the historian the steps by which the territory was populated, its culture diffused. Nevertheless, a rough outline appears practicable.

Among the most ancient inhabitants of the area are the various tribes of Negritos, the Eta, the Semang, and the Andaman Islanders. One of their characteristics, in this region just as in Africa, seems to be that, with the exception of but one group, they everywhere abandoned their original language and adopted in its place that spoken by their respective neighbors, that is, the Sakai, Malayan, or African Negro dialects.

The one notable, and scientifically most valuable, exception is the language spoken by the Andaman Islanders. Excellent though the available ethnological material is, the linguistic reports are rather poor. So far as one can gather, there are two main groups of dialects: the languages spoken by the ten tribes of the Great Andaman; and the Önge language, spoken by the peoples of the South Andaman and the Little Andaman. For further information about them, the reader may refer with profit to A. R. Brown's "Notes on the languages of the Andaman Islands" (*Anthropos* 9 (1914), 36–52). Attempts were made, especially by Blagden, to discover remnants of an ancient Negrito vocabulary among the Semangs, and subsequently to compare these with Andamanese word lists—but these attempts have borne little fruit so far.

THE MON-KHMER LANGUAGES

The first Mongoloids to reach Southeastern Asia seem to have spoken a branch of the Mon-Khmer language family. The Semangs, pygmies of the Malay Peninsula, and the Sakai. another non-Malay group of the mainland, speak what appears to be the most archaic of all the Mon-Khmer tongues, even more so than the stilted forms of written Mon and Khmer. Other members of this family that survive to this day are: Khasi, spoken in Assam; Nicobarese, with half a dozen dialects, spoken in the Nicobar Islands; the languages spoken by some tribes along the basin of the Salween River,

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197 particularly the Palaung, Wa, and Riang; and finally the Mon-Khmer group proper.

The language of the Mon is spoken on the coast of the gulf of Pegu. Inscriptions date from as far back as the 11th century. They are in Myazediin script. Khmer is spoken in Cambodia, and its inscriptions are available from about the first half of the 7th century. There are also about a dozen other dialects spoken by scattered tribes throughout this area.

The Mon-Khmer languages are sometimes grouped together with Munda, a large family of languages spoken in the Northeastern sector of India today —but this is not supported by evidence. Similarly, it may be doubted if dialects of this language family have really spread into Yunnan in Southwest China. For example, Wen Yu showed recently that Min-chia, long held to have been a Mon-Khmer dialect, belongs in reality to Tibeto-Burman ("A study of synonyms in the Min-chia language," *Studia Serica* 1 (1940), 1–28). The term "Austroasiatic"—if it means more than just Mon-Khmer—covers a multitude of linguistic methodological sins. And if the existence of an "Austroasiatic" family of languages is doubtful, an "Austric" superstock, combining the former with Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian), is much more improbable still. For further information on Mon-Khmer consult the writer's "Examination of the Austroasiatic language family" (*Language* 18 (1942), 206–17), which contains references as well as a lengthy list of languages, and further his "Bibliography of Mon-Khmer linguistics" (*Studies in Linguistics*, Vol. 1, No. 11, 1943).

It is only fair to point out, however, that in a recent paper, "Thai, Kadai, and Indonesian: A new alignment in Southeastern Asia" (*American Anthropologist* 44 (1942), 576–601), Paul Benedict attempted boldly to combine into a single language family Thai, Indonesian and "Kadai"—and further to add this hypothetical family to Mon-Khmer-Annamite, and in a further synthesis, Miao-Yao. "Kadai" is a new term of the author's for Kelao, Laqua, and Lati of the mainland, that is, in Southcentral China and the China-Tonkin border region, and Li of Hainan. This writer regards Benedict's interesting attempt with a good deal of scepticism, for the type of evidence he uses to prove his hypothesis is not altogether satisfactory. Further judgment may well be postponed until new and better material to work with has been collected.

THE INDONESIAN LANGUAGES

197 Indonesian (Malayan) is a family of languages spoken over an enormous
171 territory: the Malay Peninsula, the East Indies, the Philippine Islands,
184

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Madagascar, and Formosa. Furthermore, a distant but clear relationship exists between Indonesian on the one hand, and the Oceanic languages, Melanesian, Micronesian, Polynesian, on the other. 197 171 184

The dialect spoken on the mainland, around, say, Perak, is known simply as Malay; this is, moreover, something of a *lingua franca:* "bazaar" or "pidgin" Malay and is understood throughout the Indies, except in some of the interior districts.

The large number of dialects in this area—there are 87 in the Philippine Islands alone—cannot be accounted for in terms of separate waves of migrations, for ethnology recognizes no more than three major ones; the distinctions become less puzzling, however, if we consider the geographical factors which resulted in ethnic isolation of more or less small groups. Perhaps the most isolated, and hence the most divergent, dialects of Indonesian are spoken in Madagascar; the Hova dialect of the Malagasy group is the literary one. 197

The chief groups on the Philippine Islands are four: the Luzon group (chief dialects, Iloco, Ibanag, Apayao, Kalinga, Tingguian, Bontoc, Ifugao, Igorot, Ilongot, Tagalog), second, the Bisaya group (chief dialects, Cebu-Bisaya, Panay-Bisaya), third, Mindoro-Palawan (chief dialects, Mangyan, Kuyónon, Tagbanua), and finally, the Mindanao-Sulu group (chief dialects, Lanao, Magindanao, Subanon, Mandaya, Bagobo, Kulaman, Tiruray). For a map of distribution of these and other dialects see Herbert W. Krieger, "Peoples of the Philippines" (*Smithsonian Institution, War Background Studies No. 4*, Washington, 1942, Fig. 4).

Some of the dialects in the East Indies are as follows. Sumatra: Minangkabau, Karo and Toba (together known as Batak), Gayo, Kubu, etc. Mentawey is spoken on the island by that name. Dayak and Punan are spoken in Borneo. Java: Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese. Celebes: Toradja, Bulu, Tontemboan, Bugis, Makassa, Bareqe. Balinese is the language of Bali. There are a good many others as well.

Several members of the Indonesian family, Malay in particular, have been studied with more or less thoroughness. But the best material is in Dutch and available only with difficulty here. For an excellent recent contribution in America cf. the outline of Iloco (a Philippine dialect) syntax (*Language* 18 (1942), 193–200), by Leonard Bloomfield.

The empires of the Mon and the Khmer were shattered in relatively recent times by folks who spoke Burmese and Thai respectively. The speakers of these languages dominate Burma and Thailand today, and Mon-Khmer is rapidly disappearing.

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THE INDO-CHINESE LANGUAGES

197 Both these dialect groups belong to the Indo-Chinese family of languages.
184 Chinese, of course, is the best known member of this family. Thai, as far as evidence now indicates, may be said to be another member. Thai is generally divided into two groups, the Chuang group, spoken chiefly in Kwangsi and southern Kweichow and in parts of Hainan, and the Southwestern group.

This Southwestern group itself divides into several dialects. One of these is Shan, spoken in the Shan states of the north by about one million souls; some of whom inhabit parts of Yunnan province. The P'o, the Kamti, and related tribes also speak dialects of Shan. Ahom, formerly spoken throughout Assam, is another member of this Southwestern group. Tai Blanc, Nung, Tho, and others, form a third grouping, and are spoken in French Indo-China as well as the southwestern part of Kwangsi. Finally, and chiefly, there is Thai itself, the official language (Bangkok dialect) of Thailand, and its closest relative, Lao, spoken by the Laos of the North. The first Siamese writing that we possess dates from the period of the famous king Ram Gamheng, with inscriptions of the 13th century.

197 Some recent studies on certain aspects of Thai may be recommended to the interested reader: they are, "Types of reduplication in Thai" (*Studies in Linguistics*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1942), and "The use of numeral classifiers in Thai" (*Language* 18 (1942), 201–05), both by Mary Haas. The best short discussion of the position of Thai in the Indo-Chinese family may be found in the 1938–39 issue of the *Chinese year book*, by a very reliable scholar, Li Fang Kuei ("Languages and Dialects," pp. 43–51).

Annamese is another bone of contention between scholars. On the one hand stands Maspero, linking this group definitely with Thai, and on the other hand stands Przyluski, supported recently by Benedict, linking it with Mon-Khmer. That the latter are wrong and Maspero is right, as far as evidence now indicates, was demonstrated by the brilliant Chinese scholar Wen Yu ("On the kinship of the Annamitic language," *Meridio-Occidentale Sinense*, 1 (1940), 66–73). Wen Yu rightly rejects, and effectively, Przyluski's lexical and morphological arguments; then he shows that Maspero's phonological arguments can fully be supported from the morphology, concluding that "from morphological study the Annamitic is completely in harmony with the Thaic."

Tibeto-Burman seems to be another branch of the Indo-Chinese family. Among the languages of the Burman side is, of course, Burmese itself. About sixteen dialects of this language are spoken by approximately ten

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million people. Of Karen, a related language, there are some one and a half 197
million still left, with about seventeen dialects. The Nosu (Lolo) may speak a related tongue: they occupy a large part of Yunnan, the northwest of Kweichow, and portions of southern Sikiang. Their position, however, is rather anomalous.

The Miao-Yao group is the most controversial of all the languages of this territory, as far as historical relationships go. It must be remembered throughout that the linguist's first task is to describe the languages of a given area. Only after careful and scientifically comparable records have been prepared must he make statements of a historical character. Since there are no reliable descriptions of the great majority—almost all—the languages of Southeastern Asia, every statement concerning relationships must be carefully and critically scrutinized before accepted. The Miao-Yao controversy is only one of those which may well be postponed until its dialects are adequately described.

The above is the merest sketch outlining the languages of Southeastern Asia: the list is by no means exhaustive; and the references are intended to guide the reader to further material. Paul Benedict gave his permission to this writer to announce that he will shortly publish a bibliography of Southeast Asiatic linguistics, devoted, however, mainly to dialects of the Tibeto-Burman stock, though also dealing with Thai, Miao-Yao, and "Kadai." The most complete list of books (but not of periodical literature) pertaining to the entire Southeast Asiatic field will be found in the appropriate section of Heine-Geldern and Poleman's *Selected list of books on India, Ceylon, Tibet, and Southeast Asia* to appear soon under the auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies.

From the point of view of practical considerations as distinct from sci- 000
entific interests there are three languages in the territory under survey which are of primary importance: Malay, Thai, and Burmese. When the war in the Far East broke out the situation with regard to instruction in these languages, not to mention the others, was quite deplorable. In an important article (*Asia* 42. 375–78) in June 1942, Mortimer Graves wrote as follows: "Not one American is a recognized scholar in the field or equipped to teach Malay intensively for the emergency. Moreover, not only are there no teachers; there are none of the paraphernalia of instruction—no adequate grammars, dictionaries for students, books of readings, phonograph records and so on, which make possible the modern teaching of a language. . . . Even though Java has fallen, our relations with Malay-speaking peoples have just begun. Much the same is to be said about Thai, or Siamese," and, Mr.

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Graves might have added, about Burmese and all the other Southeast Asiatic languages as well.

COURSES NOW OFFERED

This writer is happy to report that the situation may be said to have definitely improved. To the best of his knowledge (this article was written in January, 1943-Ed. Note), the following courses in the languages of the area may now be taken or are about to be given.

Malay

1. Isidore Dyen offers an elementary course at Yale University. This course is especially noteworthy because the student divides his time equally between it and an ethnological course on Malaysia by Raymond Kennedy.
2. W. M. Senstius offers a course at the University of Michigan.
3. Claire Holt's course in Colloquial Malay is offered for the Navy only, at the School of International Administration of Columbia University.
4. George Devereux teaches an elementary course at the University of Wyoming.
5. Vernon E. Hendershot offers a course at Walla Walla College.
6. A course at the New York Berlitz School is given by Tassilo Adam.

Tagalog

1. Frank R. Blake announced a course, "given if requested," at the Johns Hopkins University.

Thai

1. Mary Haas teaches intensively an elementary and an advanced course at the University of Michigan.

Burmese

1. Preparations to offer a course are in progress at Yale University, to be given by W. Cornyn, under the direction of Leonard Bloomfield and the assistance of R. I. McDavid Jr.

The writer wishes to express his sincere thanks to the two sources whence he gathered the above data, and at the same time to direct the interested reader for further information to them. They are, first, a report prepared for the East Indies Institute of America by Dr. Robert Heine-Geldern, surveying Southeast Asiatic studies at American universities and colleges; and second, a report of the first year's operation of the intensive language program of the American Council of Learned Societies 1941–1942, prepared by Mortimer Graves and J. M. Cowan, published on December 20, 1942.

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THE INTENSIVE LANGUAGE PROGRAM

The Intensive Language Program calls for further comment. The details of the operation are in the hands of, Dr. Cowan, Secretary of the Linguistic Society of America, and two committees of the Council are in charge of its administration, namely, the Committee of the National School of Modern Oriental Languages and the Committee on Intensive Language Instruction. By definition of the committees, an intensive course "occupies the full time of the student, generally computed at about fifteen hours of classroom instruction, fifteen hours of drill with native speakers, and from twenty to thirty hours of individual preparation per week."

The essence of the program consists of the work with native speakers to whom the linguist refers as "informants." An informant is not a teacher but a storehouse of a set of linguistic habits which the trained student extracts, records, codifies, absorbs, and then transmits to other students. The informant will generally not possess a knowledge of the system of the language he speaks for he is not linguistically trained. It is the linguist who, after transcribing his utterances, arranges them in a pattern. There is a standard technique of phonetic recording and of the rearrangement of the material thus obtained into functional units which are easily teachable and scientifically comparable, and anyone can master it. The steps are explained in Leonard Bloomfield's *Outline guide for the practical study of foreign languages* and in Bernard Bloch and George I. Tragar's *Outline of linguistic analysis* (Linguistic Society of America, Baltimore 1942). The two booklets supplement each other. This method has been applied with considerable success to many languages, including Thai, Malay, Burmese, Ilocano, Tagalog, and so forth. Once an informant as well as a trained linguist to work with him, becomes available it is possible within a relatively short time to prepare the wherewithal for teaching the language intensively. In a field, like Southeast Asiatic linguistics, indeed no other method is possible under the present circumstances. Fortunately, Thai, Malay, and Philippine informants were found quite easily, though there was some trouble in getting a Burmese. So far no other languages of the area have been "implemented" in the way described largely because no informants are available in this country. It may be pointed out, by the way, that the grammars thus prepared are scientific and generally superior to those written by missionaries, government workers, or ethnologists.

A study of the languages of Southeastern Asia, provided the work is scientifically carried out, is of great importance apart from the practical urgency. Until the linguistic picture of the area is cleared up it is impossible

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000 to understand fully the history, the ethnology, the social anthropology not only of the Southeastern Asia and of Malaysia, but also of China and Japan. It was an outstanding ethnologist and Sinologue who said, with relation to China (Wolfram Eberhard, "Early Chinese cultures and their development: A new working hypothesis," *Smithsonian Report for 1937*, p. 530): "We must learn the true nature of the original relationship among the Austro-asiatic, the Austronesian, the Tibeto-Burman, and the Sino-T'ai groups of languages. Then only shall we be in a position to proceed further with our study."

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The Far Eastern Quarterly

REVIEW OF EASTERN ASIA AND THE ADJACENT PACIFIC ISLANDS

遠東季刊

Volume II · Number 1

November · 1942

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CONCEPTIONS OF STATE AND KINGSHIP IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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121 643 AT A time when the whole political system of Southeast Asia seems to be on the verge of complete reshapement and when a new cycle of development, dominated by native forces, may be expected to emerge from the present turmoil, an inquiry into the ideological foundations of native government will not be out of place and, perhaps, will even be of more than purely theoretical interest. What were the religious and philosophical conceptions which underlay and shaped the states of Southeast Asia? Are they still living forces with which we have to count or are they dead and gone? Is it possible to inoculate new ideas into old traditions, thereby avoiding a complete break with the past, a dangerous uprooting of oriental thought and culture?

In view of the limited space I shall confine myself to a discussion of some fundamental conceptions of state and kingship in those parts of Southeast Asia where Hindu-Buddhist civilization prevailed.

MACROCOSMOS AND MICROCOSMOS

772 643 The primary notion with which we shall have to deal is the belief in the parallelism between Macrocosmos and Microcosmos, between the universe and the world of men. According to this belief humanity is constantly under the influence of forces emanating from the directions of the compass and from stars and planets. These forces may produce welfare and prosperity or work havoc, according to whether or not individuals and social groups, above all the state, succeed in bringing their lives and activities in harmony with the universe. Individuals may attain such harmony by following the indications offered by astrology, the lore of lucky and unlucky days and many other minor rules. Harmony between the empire and the universe is achieved by organizing the former as an image of the latter, as a universe on a smaller scale.

171 772 643 It is well known that this astrological or cosmo-magic principle, as we may call it, originated somewhere in the Near East. It was well established in Babylonia in the 3rd millennium B.C. and there are indications that it may go back there at least as far as the middle of the 4th millennium, and possibly farther. Again, we have indications that it existed in Northwest India in the

171 first half of the 3rd millennium. It influenced Europe in various ways and at
772 various times, specially during the periods of Hellenism and of the Roman
643 empire and in the Middle Ages. It is difficult to tell when it first reached China. Anyway it had developed there into a highly specialized system during the Chou and Han periods. It came to Southeast Asia by way of India as well as of China, and this double influence may account for its prominence there and for the strong hold it had on the minds of the peoples of Farther India and Indonesia. Its long life-span and its spread over vast regions with divergent cultures, and even more so the fact that it had to adapt itself to the locally dominant religions, to various forms of paganism as well as to Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism, and occasionally even to Christianity and to Islam, naturally resulted in the development of numerous variant with often widely differing traits. It is with the special aspect of the cosmo magic principle as expressed in the organization of Hindu and Buddhist king doms in Southeast Asia (and to some extent in their Mohammedan successors in Malaya and Indonesia), that we are here concerned.

RELATION BETWEEN STATE AND UNIVERSE

772 Whereas speculations pertaining to the relation between state and uni-
643 verse formed an important subject of ancient Chinese literature, we would look in vain for a theoretical treatise on this topic in the various literatures of Southeast Asia.[1] Yet, there is overwhelming evidence of the cosmological basis of state and kingship in this area. This evidence is found in numerous passages in literature and inscriptions, in the titles of kings, queens and officials, in the "cosmic" numbers of queens, ministers, court priests, provinces, etc., in rites and customs, in works of art, in the lay-out and structure of capital cities, palaces and temples. One need only put these various items together to obtain a relatively clear picture. This picture will be more complete in continental Southeast Asia, where the old forms of Buddhist state and kingship survived into very recent times. It will be hazier in the Archipelago as a result of Mohammedan and European influences.

According to Brahmanic doctrine the world consists of a circular central continent, Jambūdvīpa, surrounded by seven annular oceans and seven annular continents. Beyond the last of the seven oceans the world is closed by an enormous mountain range. In the center of Jambūdvīpa, and thus in the center of the world, rises Mount Meru, the cosmic mountain around which sun, moon and stars revolve. On its summit lies the city of the gods sur-

[1] However, it must be taken into account that Burmese, Mon and Thai literatures are still very imperfectly known.

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rounded by the abodes of the eight Lokapālas or guardian gods of the world. 772

In the Buddhist system, too, Mount Meru forms the center of the universe. It is surrounded by seven mountain ranges separated from each other by seven annular seas. Beyond the last of these mountain chains extends the Ocean and in it lie four continents, one in each of the cardinal directions. The continent south of Mount Meru is Jambūdvīpa, the abode of men. Here, too, the universe is surrounded by an enormous wall of rocks, the Chakravāla range. On the slopes of Mount Meru lies the lowest of the paradises, that of the four Great Kings or guardians of the world, on its summit the second paradise, that of the thirty-three gods with Sudarśana, the city of the gods, where Indra reigns as king. Above Mount Meru tower one above the other the rest of the heavenly abodes.[2] 643

It will be seen that the Brahman and the Buddhist systems, in spite of differences in detail, agree in fundamental traits: their circular form and the arrangement in concentric zones around Mount Meru. An abbreviated image of either of them thus has the same symbolic meaning for devotees of both faiths.

THE CAPITAL AS THE MAGIC CENTER OF EMPIRE

In Southeast Asia, even more than in Europe, the capital stood for the whole country. It was more than the nation's political and cultural center: it was the magic center of the empire. The circumambulation of the capital formed, and in Siam and Cambodia still forms, one of the most essential parts of the coronation ritual. By this circumambulation the king takes possession not only of the capital city but of the whole empire. Whereas the cosmological structure of the country at large could be expressed only by the number and location of provinces and by the functions and emblems of their governors, the capital city could be shaped architecturally as a much more "realistic" image of the universe, a smaller microcosmos within that microcosmos, the empire. The remains of some of the ancient cities clearly testify to the cosmological ideas which pervaded the whole system of government. Fortunately, a number of inscriptions and some passages in native chronicles may help us in interpreting archaeological evidence. 361 772 643

As the universe, according to Brahman and Buddhist ideas, centers around Mount Meru, so that smaller universe, the empire, was bound to have a Mount Meru in the center of its capital which would be if not in the coun-

[2] There usually are twenty-six heavens in all, including those on Mount Meru, but the number occasionally varies.

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try's geographical, at least in its magic center. It seems that at an early period natural hillocks were by preference selected as representatives of the celestial mountain. This was still the case in Cambodia in the 9th century A.D. Yaśodharapura, the first city of Angkor, founded towards 900 A.D., formed an enormous square of about two and a half miles on a side, with its sides facing the cardinal points and with the Phnom Bakheng, a small rocky hill, as center. An inscription tells us that this mountain in the center of the capital with the temple on its summit was "equal in beauty to the king of mountains," i.e. to Mount Meru.[3] The temple on Phnom Bakheng contained a Lingam, the phallic symbol of Śiva, representing the Devarāja, the "God King," i.e. the divine essence of kingship which embodied itself in the actual king. More frequently the central mountain was purely artificial, being represented by a temple only. This was quite in accordance with prevailing ideas, practically every temple in Southeast Asia, whether Hindu or Buddhist, whether built of stone, brick or wood, being considered as the image of a mountain, usually, though not invariably, of Mount Meru. In ancient Cambodia a temple was quite ordinarily referred to as "giri," mountain, and the many-tiered temples of Bali are still called Meru. The Cambodian inscriptions are very explicit with regard to such identifications. Thus, to give an example, one of them says that King Udayādityavarman II (11th century) "seeing that the Jambudvīpa had in its center a mountain of gold, provided for his capital city, too, to have a golden mountain in its interior. On the summit of this golden mountain, in a celestial palace resplendent with gold, he erected a lingam of Śiva."

THE LAY-OUT OF ANGKOR THOM

The actual ruins of Angkor Thom are the remains of the latest city on this site, built by king Jayavarman VII in the second half of the 12th century A.D. As Jayavarman was an adherent of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the central "mountain" in this case was a temple not of Śiva, but of the Bodhisatva Lokeśvara, the "Lord of the World," whose four faces adorn its numerous towers. The city was surrounded with a wall and moat forming a square almost two miles on each side, its sides being directed towards the four cardinal points. There are gates in the middle of each side and a fifth one on the East leading to the entrance of the royal palace. The towers above the gates are crowned with the same four-fold faces of Lokeśvara as those of the central

[3] Although Brahman and Buddhist cosmologies usually ascribe to the world a circular shape, the "cosmic" cities of Southeast Asia, with rare exceptions, affect the square form. It would take too long to explain this apparent, but not very important discrepancy.

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temple. Thus, that smaller world, the city of Angkor, and through its means the whole Khmer empire were both put under the protection of the "Lord of the Universe." The cosmic meaning of the city was further emphasized by a curious device. The balustrades of the causeways leading over the moat to the city gates were formed by rows of giant stone figures, partly gods, partly demons, holding an enormous nine-headed serpent. The whole city thus became a representation of the churning of the primeval milk ocean by gods and demons, when they used the serpent king Vāsuki as a rope and Mount Meru as churning stick.[4] This implies that the moat was meant to symbolize the ocean, and the Bayon, the temple in the center of the city, on which all the lines of churning gods and demons converged, Mount Meru itself.

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THE CAPITALS OF BURMA

Burmese chronicles say that Śrīkshetra (Old Prome) on the lower Irrawaddy, the capital city of the ancient kingdom of the Pyu, was built by the gods themselves with Indra at their head, built as an image of Indra's city Sudarśana on the summit of Mount Meru, with thirty-two main gates and a golden palace in its center. The remains of the city show in fact a decided attempt at a circular lay-out though complete regularity has not been achieved. It seems to have been an old custom in Burma that each of the capital's gates corresponded to one of the empire's provinces or vassal states. Thirty-two vassals or heads of provinces with the king as thirty-third in the center would of course correspond to the thirty-three gods who reside on the summit of Meru and among whom Indra is king. Thus not only the capital city but the whole empire of the Pyu must have been organized as an image of the heavenly realm of Indra.

In later capitals of Burma the square form was substituted for the circular one though the cosmological principle as such was retained. It will suffice to say a few words about Mandalay, the last capital of independent Burma, built by king Mindon in 1857 A.D. The inner city was surrounded by a wall and moat forming a square of more than a mile on each side, its sides facing the cardinal points. The royal palace, which occupied the center of the city, and more specifically the seven-tiered tower over the throne in the great audience hall, was identified with Mount Meru. There were three gates on each side of the city, twelve in all, and they were marked with the signs of the zodiak, thereby indicating that the city was meant to be an image of heaven with its stars spread out around the celestial mountain in its center.

[4] In the original myth Mount Mandara is used as churning stick. In Southeast Asiatic variants of the myth Mount Meru usually takes its place.

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COSMIC ROLES OF KING, COURT AND GOVERNMENT

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Thus the stage was set for the enacting of the cosmic roles of king, court and government. We may choose Burma as an example. There, the king was supposed to have four principal queens and four queens of secondary rank whose titles, "Northern Queen of the Palace," "Queen of the West," "Queen of the Southern Apartment," etc., show that they originally corresponded to the four cardinal points and the four intermediary directions. There are indications that at an earlier period their chambers actually formed a circle around the hall of the king, thereby emphasizing the latter's role as center of the universe and as representative of Indra, the king of the gods in the paradise on the summit of Mount Meru. Sir James George Scott's observation that king Thibaw's (the last Burmese king) failure to provide himself with the constitutional number of queens caused more concern to decorous, law-abiding people than the massacre of his blood relations, shows how important this cosmic setting was considered to be.[8] There were four chief ministers each of whom, in addition to their functions as ministers of state, originally had charge of one quarter of the capital and of the empire. They obviously corresponded to the four Great Kings or Lokapālas, the guardian deities of the four cardinal points in the Buddhist system. However, the task of representing the four Lokapālas had been delegated to four special officers, each of whom had to guard one side of the palace and of the capital. They had flags in the colors attributed to the corresponding sides of Mount Meru, the one representing Dhattarattha, the Lokapāla of the East, a white one, the officer representing Kubera, the Lokapāla of the North, a yellow flag, etc. The cosmological principle was carried far down through the hierarchy of officialdom, as revealed by the numbers of office bearers. Thus, there were four under-secretaries of state, eight assistant secretaries, four heralds, four royal messengers, etc.

Very much the same kind of organization existed in Siam, Cambodia and Java. Again and again we find the orthodox number of four principal queens and of four chief ministers, the "four pillars" as they were called in Cambodia. In Siam, as in Burma, they originally governed four parts of the kingdom lying toward the four cardinal points.

There are indications that in ancient times the cosmological structure of the state was carried even farther. I have already mentioned the probability that the old kingdom of the Pyu in Burma had thirty-two provinces or vassal states, their governors together with the king having corresponded to the

[8] Similarly, H. G. Quaritch Wales comments on the bad impression created among the people by the abolition of the harem system by king Rama VI of Siam.

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thirty-three gods of the paradise on the summit of Mount Meru. Similarly the kingdom of Pegu in the 14th century had thirty-two provinces. The principality of Keng Tung, one of the largest Shan States, significantly is called "The Thirty-two Towns of the Khün," the Khün being the ruling tribe in that state. A passage in the New History of the T'ang Dynasty indicates that the kingdom of Java in the 9th century was divided into twenty-eight provinces, their governors together with the four ministers again having numbered thirty-two high officials. This may have been a somewhat older form of the same system, in which the provinces corresponded to constellations, the twenty-eight "Houses of the Moon," and the four ministers to the guardian gods of the cardinal points. It is clear that in all these cases the empire was conceived as an image of the heavenly world of stars and gods.

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Throughout the kingdoms of Farther India the system based on the compass was largely supplemented and modified by the division into offices of the right and left hand, right and left in this case referring to the place on the side of the king due to the respective office bearer on ceremonial occasions. As the king, when sitting on the throne, always faced the East, right corresponded to the South and left to the North. In Siam, for instance, there were a major and a lesser queen each of the right and of the left. Civilian officers had their places on the left of the king, officers of the army on his right, i.e. "in the South," because the planet Mars, connected with war, was considered to be the planet of the South. Indeed, the population of Siam was divided into the two classes of the right (South) and of the left (North). The former had to render military and the latter civilian services.

INFLUENCE ON CORONATION RITUAL

The cosmic and divine role of the king was and still is specially emphasized in the coronation ritual. In Burma the structure erected for this purpose was significantly called Thagya-nan, "Indra's Palace."[6] Even in the Buddhist kingdoms of Farther India the ritual is conducted by Brahmans. One of its principal features consists in the king sitting on a throne representing Mount Meru and being surrounded by eight Brahmans as representatives of the eight Lokapālas, the guardian gods of the eight directions in the Brahman world system. Moreover, four maids of honor, representing the four cardinal points, render homage to the king.

An official document published on the occasion of the coronation of king Sisowath of Cambodia in 1906 gives a slightly different explanation of the cosmic role of the king. According to this document the king is identified

[6] Thagya is the Burmese form of Sanskrit Śakra, the Buddhist designation for Indra.

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643 with Mount Meru itself, his right eye representing the sun, his left eye the
772 moon, his arms and legs the four cardinal points, the six-tiered umbrella above his head the six lower heavens, his pointed crown the spire of Indra's palace on the summit of the Meru and his slippers the earth. This means that the king is identified with the axis of the universe. The same idea seems to be expressed by the title Paku Buwono, "Nail of the World," of the Susuhunan of Solo in Java. However, the identification of the king with the Meru is in no way incompatible with that with Indra. Plural symbolism is very frequent in Buddhist Farther India. Thus in Burma, where the king has all the attributes of Indra, he was also identified with Viśvakarma, the divine architect and shaper of the world. Moreover, there is strong evidence of his having been identified also with the sun.

THE COSMIC STATE AND THE DIVINE KING

771 The cosmic state, as it existed in Southeast Asia, was intimately bound up
643 with the idea of divine kingship. The divinity of kings was conceived in various ways according to the prevailing religion. Where Hinduism prevailed the king was considered to be either an incarnation of a god or a descendant from a god or both. Mostly it was Śiva who was thought to incarnate himself in kings or to engender dynasties. Thus in a Cham inscription of the 9th century Uroja, the founder of the royal dynasty, is said to have been a son of Śiva. The Javanese poem Nāgarakrtāgama (14th century) says bluntly that all kings are incarnations of Śiva. The same poem tells us more specially that king Rājasanagara of Majapahit (1350–1389 A.D.), as proved by various portents which occurred about the time of his birth, among others a volcanic eruption, was an incarnation of Bhatāra Girinātha, i.e. Śiva as "Lord of the Mountain." In the Javanese chronicle Pararaton king Krtajaya of Kadiri (13th century) on one occasion even shows himself in the superhuman form of Śiva with four arms and a third eye in the middle of the forehead and floating in the air. In ancient Cambodia and Champa the monarchy was intimately bound up with the cult of a lingam which was considered the seat of the divine essence of kingship. As we have seen, in Cambodia this lingam, representing the Devarāja, the "God King," was adored in the temple in the center of the capital. The actual king was considered to be a manifestation of the divine power of the Devarāja and therefore, as the latter's visible form, the lingam, implies, obviously of Śiva himself.

However, Śiva was not the only god to incarnate himself in kings. King Airlangga of Java (11th century) considered himself an incarnation of Vishnu. His memorial monument shows him in the form of Vishnu riding on

the latter's man-eagle Garuda. Another noteworthy example of an incarnation of Vishnu was king Sūryavarman II of Cambodia (12th century) who erected his own memorial monument as a gigantic temple of Vishnu: the famous Angkor Vat. We find further the idea of plural incarnation, also known from ancient India. Thus the Pararaton tells us that Angrok (13th century), the founder of the dynasty of Singasari and ancestor of the kings of Majapahit, was an incarnation of Vishnu, begotten by Brahmā from a mortal woman, and at the same time a son of Śiva. King Kṛtarājasa (died 1316 A.D.), the founder of the empire of Majapahit, is immortalized by a statue representing him as Harihara, a compound of Vishnu and Śiva. Even the simultaneous incarnation of Hindu and Mahāyāna Buddhist deities occurs. Thus, to quote only one example, the Javanese king Kṛtanagara (killed 1292 A.D.) was considered as an incarnation of Śiva as well as of the Dhyāni Buddha Akshobhya. Accordingly, he became known in Javanese tradition under the name of Śiva-Buddha.

It may be added that the theory of divine incarnation could be used not only as a means to exalt the position of the legitimate king, but equally well as a justification for usurpation of the throne. Thus the above mentioned Angrok, the founder of the kingdom of Singasari, was an usurper with a long criminal career as embezzler, robber and murderer. Yet, in spite of his criminal past, he became king, according to the Pararaton, because he was an incarnation of the gods.

The theory of divine incarnation as found in Hinduism and Mahāyāna Buddhism is incompatible with the doctrine of the Buddhism of the Hīnayāna. This difference in tenets is clearly expressed even in the lay-out of capital cities. In ancient Cambodia a temple formed the center of the capital and thus the Mount Meru of city and empire. In Burma the center of the capital is invariably occupied by the royal palace, and it is this latter which is identified with Mount Meru. In ancient Cambodia either Śiva in his form as Devarāja, the eternal essence of kingship, or the Bodhisatva Lokeśvara, the "Lord of the Universe," inhabited the "central mountain" and from there pervaded the empire. Hīnayānist Buddhism does not recognize an eternal deity. Indra is but the king of one of the lowest heavens, the second one from the earth. He is as little exempt from death and rebirth as any human being, except that his life lasts longer. The same may be said of the inhabitants of the higher heavens. All these "gods" of Hīnayāna Buddhism should more appropriately be called angels. They have no temples and no cults. Thus it is easy to understand why in Burma no temple could be set in the center of the capital city. The adaptation to cosmological principles and

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361 the deification of the king here had to be attempted by other means. By erect-
771 ing the palace in the center of the city and by identifying it with Mount
643 Meru, the lord of the palace, i.e. the king became automatically the repre-
184 sentative of Indra. We might even say that he was "the Indra" of this smaller
772 universe, the Burmese empire but he held his place only by the magic of parallelism and he was no incarnation of the real Indra as the ancient Javanese and Cambodian kings had been incarnations of Śiva and Vishnu.[7] This scheme explains the great sanctity in which the royal palace was held in the Buddhist empires of Farther India. The palace was the symbol of the celestial mountain, nay, more than a mere symbol: it was "the Mount Meru" of the microcosmos Burma, or Siam, or Cambodia. Anybody nearing the palace had to show his reverence by dismounting from his horse, by shutting his parasol, by bowing to the palace spire or even kneeling down. Attempts to exact the same expressions of reverence from British envoys led to endless negotiations and frictions as the latter refused to comply with a demand which they
643 considered humiliating. "King of the Golden Palace" was one of the most
771 important titles of Burmese monarchs. Yet, the fact that the king "was Indra" and therefore ruler of the country only as possessor of the empire's Meru, the palace, involved great dangers. It worked as a constant temptation for would-be usurpers, be it from the ranks of the royal family or outsiders, as the occupation of the palace might be achieved by a coup-de-main with relatively small forces and usually meant the conquest of the whole empire. Many Burmese and Siamese kings therefore were virtual prisoners in their palace which they did not dare to leave for fear it might be seized by an usurper. The last king of Burma, Thibaw, preferred even to forego the important coronation ritual of the circumambulation of the capital to offering one of his relatives a chance to make himself master of the palace while he was away.

In Hīnayāna Buddhism the idea of divine incarnation as justification of kingship is replaced by that of rebirth and of religious merit. It is his good karma, his religious merit acquired in previous lives, which makes a man be born a king or makes him acquire kingship during his lifetime, be it even by rebellion and murder. A typical instance is that of king Nyaung-u Sawrahan (10th century) as told in the Glass Palace Chronicle of the Kings of Burma. Nyaung-u Sawrahan, a farmer, kills the king who has trespassed on his garden and whom he had not recognized. Thereupon he is himself made king against his wish. So strong is his karma that, when one of the ministers ob-

[7] However, strong traces of the belief that Śiva and Vishnu incarnate themselves in the king survive in the coronation rituals of Siam and Cambodia.

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jects to his installation, the stone statue of a guardian deity at the palace door becomes alive and kills the minister. The chronicle's comment is significant: "Although in verity king Sawrahan should have utterly perished, having killed a king when he was yet a farmer, he attained even to kingship simply by strong karma of his good acts done in the past." But the moment the karma of his past good acts is exhausted, that same stone statue which formerly had killed his adversary becomes alive again and hurls him from the palace terrace.

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No merit could exceed that of a service rendered to the Buddha himself. Thus the Glass Palace Chronicle tells us that the ogre-guardian of a mountain, who had shielded the Buddha from the sun with three leaves, had received from the latter a prophecy that he would thrice become king of Burma. In the 10th century he is reborn in lowly surroundings as Saleh Ngahkwe, who later becomes king by murdering his predecessor and, "being reborn from the state of an ogre, was exceeding wrathful and haughty," indulging in gluttony and sadistic murder, till he is at last killed by his own ministers. One should think that the merit of having shaded the Buddha would have been exhausted by a life full of crimes. However, according to the Burmese chronicle, this is not so. The former mountain spirit is reborn in the 12th century as prince Narathu who becomes king by murdering his father and brother and throughout his reign excells by bloody deeds, and in the 13th century as king Narathihapate. This leads us to a very characteristic conception of historical events as based on the enormous importance attributed to prophecies and portents. Indeed, one could say that, especially as far as alleged prophecies of the Buddha are concerned, in the view of Burmese historians events are not prophesied because they will happen, but they happen because they have been prophesied. The "discovery" of ancient prophecies and the "observation" of contemporary portents was a generally used expedient in Burmese politics and still forms a potent factor in what we may call political folk-lore.

The whole idea and outward form of kingship in Southeast Asia, and specially in the Buddhist kingdoms of Farther India, was of course based on the conception of the Chakravartin, the Universal Monarch. Now it is known that a Chakravartin is the worldly alternative to a Bodhisatva, a future Buddha. Under these circumstances the theory of rebirth and of karma was bound to induce monarchs with a very high idea of their religious merits to consider themselves as Bodhisatvas. Thus, Oung Zaya, the founder of the last dynasty of Burma, took as king the name Alaungpaya which designated him as an Embryo Buddha. His son, king Bodawpaya (1782–1819), claimed outright to be the Bodhisatva Maitreya. However, his claim was rejected by the clergy

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and he dropped it. A similar claim was put forth by king Taksin of Siam (1767–1782).

The theory of vocation to kingship either on the basis of divine incarnation, as in Java and ancient Cambodia, or by karma acquired in former lives, as in Burma, Siam and modern Cambodia, did not deprive that of the heredity of the right to the crown of its importance. Again and again usurpers have striven for a semblance of legitimacy by construing genealogies linking themselves either to the dynasty they had overthrown or to a dynasty which at an earlier period had governed the country. Occasionally, phantastic genealogies were constructed deriving native Southeast Asiatic dynasties from some famous dynasty of ancient India. The best known case is that of the recent kings of Cambodia who claim descent from the ancient kings of Indraprastha (Delhi). The last Burmese dynasty, founded by a village headman in the 18th century, claimed descent from the Sakya kings of Kapilavatthu, a claim which would have made them blood relatives of the Buddha himself. One type of such fictitious genealogies deserves special attention as it has a deeper meaning than merely to serve the glorification of the dynasty. The kings of Funan (3rd to 7th centuries A.D.) and those of ancient Cambodia were said to descend from a Brahman who had come from India and from the daughter of the serpent king of the country. The legend is still alive in Cambodia, the Brahman being replaced in the modern version by a prince of Indraprastha. It seems that similar dynastic legends existed in most parts of Southeast Asia. The meaning is clear. The Nāgas, the serpent demons, are the original masters of the soil. By his descent from the daughter of the Nāga king the monarch had a legitimate claim to the soil of his kingdom which, in theory at least, thereby became his personal property. A Chinese report tells us that in the 13th century the people of Cambodia believed that the king nightly cohabited with the serpent goddess of the soil who visited him in his palace in human form. Obviously he was thought thereby to renew the connection between himself and the soil of his kingdom. Thus the king in ancient Cambodia, as an incarnation of the Devarāja and as a descendant and at the same time spouse of the goddess of the soil, formed a real magic center linking the empire to the divine forces of the heavens as well as of the earth.

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Any account of the conceptions of state and kingship in Southeast Asia would be incomplete without at least mentioning the great importance of the regalia. Some of these, as the umbrella and the crown, have cosmological meaning as noted above. Moreover, the umbrella was thought to be the seat of a protective genius who favored the king with his advice and who in critical moments might even actively intervene on behalf of the dynasty. Other

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regalia are thought to be possessed of magic forces, such as the royal sword of Cambodia which, it is believed, if drawn from its scabbard without the prescribed ritual, would bring disaster upon the country. This magical character of the regalia is even more stressed in the Malay Peninsula and in Indonesia. It culminates in the curious conception prevalent among the Bugis and Makassarese of Celebes, according to which it is really the regalia which reign, the prince governing the state only in their name. 643 772

The deification of the king, while raising him to an almost unbelievably exalted position with regard to his subjects, has in no way succeeded in stabilizing government, rather the contrary. As explained above, the theory of divine incarnation, and even more so that of rebirth and of karma, provided an easy subterfuge for usurpers. The fact that the relatively easy task of seizing the palace, as in Burma and Siam, of or seizing the regalia, as in certain parts of Indonesia, often sufficed to be accepted as king by the whole nation, was bound to act as an additional incitement to rebellion. Moreover, the immense power and the lack of restrictions which the king enjoyed invited to abuses which in the end made the monarch obnoxious to his subjects and hastened his downfall. To this came the vagueness of the rules of succession. Sometimes the king himself chose his successor. Sometimes the ministers appointed a prince as king. Then again the queens unofficially but efficiently exercised their influence in favor of a prince of their choice. Often the crown simply fell to the prince who was the quickest to seize the palace and to execute his brothers. Under these circumstances it is no wonder that the empires of Southeast Asia from the very beginning were torn by frequent rebellion, often resulting in the overthrow of kings or even dynasties. The earliest reports we have, those from Chinese sources on the kingdom of Funan, reveal such conditions to have existed as early as the 3rd century A.D. If there was a long period of oppression and unrest, rebellion and its concomitant, dacoity, could become practically a popular tradition which it was difficult to eradicate. Such was the case, for instance, in Burma during the 18th and 19th centuries, and it is in the light of such a past that recent events in that country ought to be seen. 643 771

SURVIVAL OF TRADITIONS

In order to realize how deeply the populations of Farther India were affected by the cosmological structure of the state one need only think of the division of the Siamese people into the classes of the right and of the left which, not long ago, determined the services each person was obliged to render to the state. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the cosmomagic 643 772

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643 principle as applied to the state really forms only part of a much wider com-
772 plex and resulted from a conception of the universe and of human existence which regulated, and to a large extent still regulates, also the private lives of individuals. When in Siam and Cambodia people wore cloths of different color on different days of the week according to the color ascribed to the planet for whom the day is named, or when in Burma before any important undertaking they examine their horoscope and the lore of lucky and unlucky days, or when they kneel down for prayer on that side of the pagoda which in the cosmological system corresponds to the planet of the weekday on which they were born, they act on the same principle which governed the structure of their empires, their ideas of kingship and the ritual of their royal courts. It is clear then that the cosmomagic ideas, until a very recent past, had an extremely strong hold on the minds of the people.

Is all this a crumbling structure, giving way under the impact of modern civilization or may it still influence the political activities of the peoples concerned? The question is not easily answered. Information on this point is scarce. There are, however, a few indications.

669 We have it on the authority of H. G. Quaritch Wales that the people of
643 Siam, around 1930, still held the ancient state ceremonies in high esteem, those
772 ceremonies which to a large extent are governed by cosmological ideas. One may ask oneself, how much of this old tradition may have been at the bottom of the royalist rebellion of 1933.

In Burma the following cases may be considered as significant. In 1897, twelve years after the annexation of Upper Burma by the British, a Buddhist monk, U Kelatha, fell in love with a princess of the dethroned dynasty who promised to marry him if he became king of Burma. There followed the usual dreams or visions which revealed to him that in a former life he had been a Burmese prince and, moreover, that he would be king the moment he sat on the throne of the palace in Mandalay. With eighteen followers, all armed with swords only, he rushed through the city gates and tried to reach the royal palace, at that time seat of the English club. A few English officers armed with hunting rifles made an end to his attempt. The incident proves the extreme vividness of cosmomagic ideas at the close of the 19th century. As we have seen, whoever held the palace, the Mount Meru of the Burmese empire, thereby became the representative of Indra and king. It is completely in accord with the cosmomagic way of thinking that U Kelatha and his followers believed the mere occupation of the throne would make him automatically lord of the whole empire.

Unfortunately, very little authentic information is available on the Burmese

rebellion of 1930–31. However, the following detail, as revealed at the time 643
by newspaper dispatches, is significant. One of the first actions of Saya San, 772
the leader of the rebellion, was to build a "palace," in reality a bamboo hut 669
somewhere in the jungle, with an inscription designating it as the "Palace of the Buddhist King." It is, of course, very easy to ridicule such pretensions, but it is more important to understand them. We have seen how inseparable king and palace were according to Burmese ideas. No kingdom could exist without a palace representing Mount Meru and forming its magic center, and the king, the "Lord of the Golden Palace," was king in the first line by his possession of the palace. Saya San's action in building a palace, a magic center for his embryonic empire, therefore corresponds closely to that of U Kelatha when he wanted to seat himself on the throne of the palace in Mandalay.

The story of the Myinmu rebellion of 1910, as told by Paul Edmonds in his book *Peacocks and Pagodas*, if it does not directly contribute to our knowledge of cosmomagic ideas, at least gives a significant instance of the power of the belief in rebirth, prophecies and portents. A young man of eighteen years, Maung Than, was returning from work in the fields smoking a cigar. Some people who passed him thought they saw smoke issuing from his arms. They talked about it in the village and the rumour reached some elders who were familiar with an old tradition according to which a former king of Burma, Chanyeiktha, would be reborn in the shape of a youth who had the power of making smoke issue from his arms. "Other signs and portents were looked for. Needless to say, they were forthcoming. The griffins at the foot of an old pagoda were seen to shake; gold showers fell on another pagoda; and everywhere omens multiplied which pointed to young Maung Than as the long-foretold reincarnation of king Chanyeiktha." Maung Than entered into the spirit of the game and put forth the usual claims of being invulnerable and of possessing the power to make himself invisible. With a crowd of a thousand followers armed with swords and spears he attacked the police station at Myinmu but was repulsed and eventually captured.

These incidents may suffice to show how lively the ideas of cosmic state and kingship, of rebirth and prophecy still are in Burma. I have little doubt that they played a role in the events accompanying the Japanese invasion. It can easily be predicted that whatever government will exist in Burma after the war, will have to reckon with these ideas and with the possibility of similar outbreaks as those mentioned above, perhaps even on a larger scale owing to the emotions stirred up by the present turmoil.

While certain dangers for peace and order inherent in the cosmomagic 000
conception thus must be said to persist, one may ask whether there is any

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000 possibility of this same conception becoming the basis of future constructive developments. The question is difficult to answer. Orientals with western education, and above all the leaders of nationalist movements, tend to disregard and to despise the "superstitions" which governed their nations in the past. Yet, there is the vast mass of the common people, grown up in the old traditions, people to whom the modern ideas of democracy and representative government mean little or nothing and who cannot be educated overnight. A sudden complete break of cultural traditions has almost always proved disastrous to national and individual ethics and to the whole spirit of the peoples affected. A compromise between old and new conceptions therefore would seem desirable. Many, at least, of the outward expressions of the old ideas could easily be kept intact and gradually filled with new meaning, without in the least impairing educational and material progress. After all, the case of Japan shows that an idea decidedly more primitive than that of the cosmic state and less adaptable to ethical reinterpretation than the latter, the belief in the descent of the Mikado from the Sun Goddess (or at least the fiction of such belief) may very well survive and coexist with all the refinements of modern science and technique. The current problems of Southeast Asia hitherto have been discussed almost exclusively from the point of view of economics and of political science. It would be a grave mistake to disregard the importance of native culture and tradition for a future satisfactory reorganization of that region.

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AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST

Vol. 50 APRIL-JUNE, 1948 No. 2

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RICE CULTIVATION IN ASIA

By INEZ ADAMS

243 THE terminology employed by writers discussing Asiatic rice agriculture has raised a problem: are the cultivated varieties of rice distinctly separable into one group that will grow under none but irrigated conditions, and another that demands moderate amounts of moisture but is successfully produced only by dry farming? The terms used in the literature frequently bear this implication. They include references to "wet" and "dry," "dryland," "lowland," "upland" and "mountain" rice. In anthropological studies whose purpose is merely descriptive this creates confusion. When extended to comparative studies and historical reconstructions, with the two methods of cultivation treated as distinct for the conclusions reached, it becomes necessary to examine the distinctions that might justify such use.

101 As early as 1820, John Crawfurd, writing his "History of the Indian Archi-
171 pelago," observed that rice is known as "padi . . . in all languages and dialects
243 from Madagascar to the Philippines."[1] He distinguished in Java a "marsh"
184 rice, sown in nurseries and transplanted to flooded fields, and a "mountain" or "dryland" rice, grown on arable uplands. These terms remain current. Lowie defines them thus:

243 The innumerable variations of the plant fall broadly into two categories, with corresponding techniques of husbandry. "Swamp" rice can be grown only in marshes or under irrigation. "Mountain" rice yields smaller crops, but can be grown anywhere with normal precipitation.[2]

Wilhelm Wagner[3] speaks in a similar sense of "den gewöhnliche Wasserreis" and "den sogenanten Bergreis," in his account of Chinese agriculture. C. Daryll Forde makes the same general differentiation of cultivated rices falling[4] into two groups due to the physical requirements of the plant. Wissler[5] mentions "The cultivated varieties known as 'hill,' 'upland,' or 'dryland' rice," in contradistinction to the "aquatic varieties." Keesing,[6] in one work on the Philippines, employs "wet" and "dry" rice; elsewhere[7] he speaks of "dry agriculture" in Indonesia, as distinguished from the practice of terracing with irrigation.

E. M. Loeb,[8] in his general ethnography of Sumatra, notes rice raised in both flooded and dry fields by the Bataks; in the Minangkabau, . . . "wet and dry rice fields are worked together by the men and women . . . ";[9] in Nias, . . . "both the wet and dry variety are grown . . . ";[10] in Atjeh, "Rice is of both the wet and dry variety. The wet rice fields, when not laid in swamps, are irrigated

[1] Crawfurd, 1820, Vol. I, p. 358. [2] Lowie, 1938, p. 294. [3] Wagner, 1926.
[4] Forde, 1934. [5] Wissler, 1946. [6] Keesing, 1937. [7] *Idem.*, 1934.
[8] Loeb, 1935. [9] *Ibid.*, p. 101. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 132.

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by rain water which is allowed to trickle down from dams . . . ";[11] among the Gajo and Alas, "Usually wet rice is cultivated, water being obtained from the rivers . . . ";[12] in southern Sumatra, the land is unsuitable for irrigation, so little "wet" rice is cultivated. In a historical note,[13] Loeb concludes that the Malaysians of Sumatra had learned to grow rice, ". . . at least the dry variety," before the Hindu occupancy. Cora Du Bois[14] believes that "dry" rice was the original staple of the Alorese. With reference to other descriptions, "dry" rice could be severally interpreted as the "dry-weather paddy" described by Scott[15] in Upper Burma; or as the "dry paddy" described in Mysore by Iyengar[16]—here referring to a district heavily watered by the monsoon rains, where artificial irrigation is not necessary. It could also be interpreted as the "dry-land" rice used by Fay-Cooper Cole.[17]

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The Indian Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics[18] gives three classes of rice, according to their season of growth. The Philippine Department of Agriculture and Commerce[19] lumps all of the rice as "palay," taking the local variant of the widely used native term "paddy." From Oriental usage, Wickizer[20] defines "paddy" as an inclusive term for the growing plants, the harvested stalks, and the threshed, unhusked, grain. Keesing[21] gives "palay" as the native name for rice on the stalk. Some of the literature extends "paddy" to include irrigated rice fields; in this sense Keesing[22] uses it. Wickizer[23] adds that "wet paddy" and "dry paddy" are terms commonly used in Malaya to denote both the system of culture and the product.

The terms "upland" and "lowland" rice are even more current than "wet" and "dry." Verrier Elwin[24] uses them in describing the Baiga; R. F. Barton[25] for the Mountain Province of the Philippines, and Krieger[26] for the Philippines in general. Agronomists who use them include Camus[27] in the Philippines, and Jacobson[28] in the same area. Pelzer,[29] in his recent geographical study, considers them convenient, and Wickizer[30] likewise. Camus[31] adds "mountain" rice to "upland" rice, observing that the same varieties can be grown in both habitats, though some adapt best under the methods of cultivation obtaining in the mountains, others to those used in the uplands. His separation of "upland" and "lowland" rices is complicated by the fact that some of the Philippine "lowland" rices that are grown under irrigation are raised in non-irrigated nurseries or dry farmed previous to transplanting. "Dryland" nurseries for "wet

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[11] *Ibid.*, p. 224. [12] *Ibid.*, p. 248. [13] *Ibid.*, p. 301. [14] DuBois, 1944.
[15] Scott, 1911. [16] Iyengar, 1927. [17] Cole, 1945.
[18] India Dept. of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, 1940.
[19] Philippine Islands, Dept. of Agriculture and Commerce, 1935.
[20] Wickizer and Bennett, 1941. [21] Keesing, 1937. [22] *Ibid.*
[23] Wickizer and Bennett, 1941. [24] Elwin, 1939. [25] Barton, 1930.
[26] Krieger, 1942. [27] Camus, 1921. [28] Jacobson, 1915. [29] Pelzer, 1945.
[30] Wickizer and Bennett, 1941. [31] Camus, 1921.

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243 paddy" are also described in an official report[32] on the Pahang district in Malaya. Ethel Simkins,[33] in an article on the coastal plains of south India, designates "hill" rice, "upland" rice, and "lowland" rice. R. L. Pendleton[34] uses "upland" and "lowland" for Mindanao.

Detailed ethnographic accounts, especially those using native classifications of rice, multiply both the varieties and the methods of cultivation. Instances are Albert E. Jenks'[35] account of the Bontoc Igorot, Ralph Linton's[36] of the Tanala, and Nevill Parry's[37] of the Lakher. These enumerate the native names for the kinds of rice, the dates of sowing and harvest, the number of crops grown per year, the kinds of soil used and their preparation, with other details of cultivation. Parry[38] lists fourteen varieties distinguished by the Lakher and Lushai, with native descriptions of each, and of soil preferences. An elaborate but less satisfying description is Grierson's,[39] of Bihar. He classifies rice as sown broadcast or transplanted, lists over fifty varieties sown broadcast and over eighty transplanted, then proceeds to state that practice varies with the locality, a variety broadcast in one locale being sometimes treated by transplanting in another. Even if true for Bihar, this distinction would make nonsense elsewhere. Thus, in the Konkan, Ranade[40] describes seedlings grown for transplanting in nurseries, that are sown broadcast.

The agronomists have done their best to clear up the confusion.[41] First, as to kinds of rice: O. T. Faulkner,[42] in discussing West Africa, observes that the terms "hill" or "dryland" rice are deceptive, since all rice (*sic*) yields better in very wet soil. The latter is not a matter of general agreement, but Pelzer says:

> The remarkably large number of distinct varieties of cultivated rice . . . may be divided into two main classes: upland, or dry rice, and lowland, or wet rice. The division, based on the two main types of agronomic practice, is not a very sharp one.

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[32] Malaya, Dept. of Agriculture, 1939. [33] Simkins, 1933. [34] Pendleton, 1942.
[35] Jenks, 1905. [36] Linton, 1933. [37] Parry, 1933. [38] *Ibid.*
[39] Grierson, 1926. [40] Ranade, 1927.

[41] Jenkin W. Jones, Principal Agronomist in charge of Rice Investigations, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, says the following in a letter to the writer:

"It is now generally understood that lowland ('wet') rice is grown on land submerged during a portion of the growing season. The land is submerged either by seasonal rainfall or by artificial irrigation. A large percentage of the world's rice crop—in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Western Hemisphere, is grown in this manner. In much of Asia the lowland (irrigated) rice is transplanted. Some of the lowland acreage also is transplanted in Africa, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere, but in these parts of the world much of it is sown in the same manner as other small grains, and irrigated. Rice grown on land not submerged, for any appreciable period during the growing season, that is, 'mountain,' 'dry,' 'dryland,' and 'hill,' and not provided with levees, dikes or terraced to hold water, now is generally known as upland rice. In my opinion . . . the terms used should be lowland (irrigated) or upland (non-irrigated) rice."

[42] Faulkner, 1935.

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Some upland varieties can be grown in flooded fields; however, it is said to be easier to grow dry rices in water than to grow wet rices on dry land.[42] 243

Wickizer[44] observes that "upland" rice, whatever its variety, is grown without irrigation, i.e., not in surface water; while "lowland" rice of all varieties is grown either under artificial irrigation or in natural swamps where there is standing water at appropriate seasons. Commonly, the varieties grown as "upland" rice are not the same as those grown as "lowland" rice, as they each adapt best to special conditions. A single variety can however often be grown under either system of cultivation.[45]

The kinds of rice set up by the agronomists are thus based upon the plant's adaptations. Hedayetullah[46] and Copeland[47] agree in stressing its tremendous adaptability. The latter emphasizes adaptation to varying amounts of water. He classifies as "upland" rice all varieties which are grown without artificial irrigation, but stipulates a considerable range of water tolerance between "lowland" rices. Wild varieties of rice are bearded, as are some cultivated ones, and these reportedly can stand flooding better and for longer periods of time than non-bearded varieties do. Some "lowland" rices grow even in salty water —these are grown in fields visited by the tides, in India, Siam and Annam. Copeland[48] reiterates Wickizer[49] to the effect that the "upland" and "lowland" varieties are:

> . . . groups not sharply separated in nature, being blended by many varieties which thrive with or without irrigation; but the division is practical by definition and conforms with agronomic practice.[50]

Wild rice, and many cultivated varieties, shed the seed upon maturity.[51]

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[42] Pelzer, 1945, p. 10.

[44] Wickizer and Bennett, 1941.

[45] Jenkin W. Jones states further:

"Lowland (irrigated) rice is more productive than upland (non-irrigated) rice, but land suitable for irrigation plus irrigation water—rainfall and irrigation systems—is limited in all parts of the world. Hence, in regions, particularly in Asia, having relatively high precipitation well distributed during the growing season, upland rice is grown. Upland rice cannot be grown except where the rainfall is rather heavy and well distributed. The varieties grown as upland rice yield more when grown under irrigation, but upland varieties are apparently somewhat more drought-resistant than are lowland varieties. Some lowland varieties, however, have a wide range of adaptation and will yield reasonably well when grown as upland rice."

[46] Hedayetullah, 1946.

[47] Copeland, 1924, p. 125.

[48] Copeland, 1924.

[49] Wickizer and Bennett, 1941.

[50] Copeland, 1924, p. 125.

[51] Jenkin Jones notes that:

"Red rice, a cultivated variety, is also the most serious weed in our Southern States. There is nothing unusual about rice shattering; most wild species have this characteristic."

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243 In this connection, Copeland[52] mentions wild rice as the most annoying weed in Philippine rice fields. M. Mène,[53] writing in regard to introducing "le riz sec de Chine" to the Midi, notes that it can resist violent winds without shedding its grain or collapsing. Further, the harvest need not be on a fixed date, but is amenable to the grower's convenience. Here, Hedayetullah[54] points to the duration of the maturation period as a foremost adaptation of the plant to environment. For the early rices, the date varies with the date of sowing; during their growth temperatures do not drop sharply. The transplanted winter rice, India's main crop, ripens when temperatures begin to drop and, despite variation in sowing dates, it matures on almost a fixed day. For cultivated varieties in general, Copeland[55] gives the range of the growth and maturation period as two[56] to ten months, remarking that it is an important varietal characteristic. He believes that there is probably an inherited ability to develop at a given rate, but since environmental conditions, such as seasonal fluctuations in temperature and precipitation, cause the period of development to vary also, the inherited limits are obscured.

The altitudinal limit of rice planting in the Philippines is 1500 feet; Wickizer[57] gives 7500 feet as the limit for "upland" rice in the tropics. Most varieties require four months of hot weather, at a temperature averaging 22°C., without sharp drops from day to night. "Upland" rice thrives at somewhat lower temperatures, "lowland" rice typically requiring two to three months at a temperature of 20°C. during growth.[58] Rice will not develop normally in shade, and most varieties cannot endure cold nights. "Upland" rice prefers light, loamy soils. Clay soils, which occur widely in the tropics, are well suited to irrigated rice culture, and where a substratum of hardpan occurs, downward seepage is prevented, which may be beneficial provided this is not too near to the surface of the soil. Coraline soils do not hold moisture long enough to raise a crop of "lowland" rice, and the limestones, as in eastern Java, are too porous to permit economical irrigation.

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[52] Copeland, 1910.

[53] Mène, 1873.

[54] Hedayetullah, 1946.

[55] Copeland, 1924.

[56] Jenkin Jones comments:

"I have often heard of 60-day rice, but we have had over 8000 varieties of rice from various parts of the world, none of which have matured in 60 days under our conditions. . . . It has been our experience that in Asia at times the word 'plant' is used when 'transplanted' is the term meant; hence, if the rice matures in 60 days from the time it is transplanted, it was 30 to 60 days old when transplanted."

He refers to agricultural experiment stations in the United States, which can nowhere duplicate by any means the climatic, hence growing, conditions in Monsoon Asia.

[57] Wickizer and Bennett, 1941.

[58] Jenkin Jones would extend the estimated growing season of "lowland" rice to from three to six months, from his experience in the United States.

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Rice has food preferences. It does not require much nitrogen in order to survive, and it will grow in soils that are deficient in calcium and in phosphates.[59] Wells, Agcaoili and Feliciano[60] concluded that the chemical content of the grain is influenced by climatic conditions during growth; by type of soil, nature of fertilizers, and seasonal variation. Much[61] has been written about the improvement of the nutritional qualities of rice by modifying such factors as are controllable in cultivation. The plant apparently obtains only carbonaceous elements by photosynthesis from air, sunlight and water. Therefore, according to Albrecht,[62] the most important factors contributing to the proteinaceous and mineral content of the grain, and hence to its fertility, are soil composition and fertilizers. Transplanting and irrigation cannot supply elements lacking in the soil, though the algal film may make some oxygen available for irrigated rice. 243

The botanists have made only a beginning in tracing the origin of the cultivated varieties of rice. All ascribe it to one species—*Oryza sativa* Linnaeus. A few advance a polyphyletic origin. Not many surveys have been made in the Old World homes of wild rice. In the New World, the so-called wild rice gathered for food by some American Indians is not a true rice, but is a wild grass known to botanists as *Zizania aquatica*. Of the botanical investigations, Roschevicz'[63] studies are the most suggestive. Placing the origin of rice cultivation in Asia, he at the same time makes a case for some of the cultivated African rices having originated from wild African species—these akin to *Oryza sativa* L. *f. spontanea*. Further, he believes the latter to be a complex of small independent species. Its center of diversity is very possibly India, where

[59] Jones states as to food preferences of rice:

"Rice can, it is true, be grown on soils that are low in nitrogen, phosphorus, and potash, but the yields are certainly low also. Kelly has shown that with yields of 2400 to 3600 pounds of rice, 40 to 65 pounds of nitrogen, 26 to 41 pounds of phosphorus, and 60 to 113 pounds of potash per acre are removed. These amounts are not available in poor soils, and hence, yields as large as these are not obtained under such conditions. Rice responds to favorable conditions the same as do other crops . . . nitrogen . . . is most extensively applied to rice land where high yields are produced."

[60] Wells, Agcaoili and Feliciano, 1922.

[61] *See*: McCarrison, Robert, "Pathenogenesis of Deficiency Disease. XIV—On the Occurrence of Ophthalmia in Pigeons Fed Exclusively on Parboiled Rice and Its Prevention by the Addition of Soil to the Food," *Indian Journ. Medical Research*, 11 (2): 323–335, 1923; "The Relationship of Rice-beriberi in India," *Indian Med. Research Memoirs*, No. 2, 1924; and "Influence of Irrigation on the Nutritive Value of Rice," *Indian Journ. Med. Research*, 15: 915–920, 1928. Also: *see* Vedder, Edward B., and R. T. Feliciano, "An Investigation to Determine a Satisfactory Standard for Beri-beri-Preventing Rices," *Philippine Journ. Science*, 35 (4): 351–389, 1928; Hermano, A. J., "The Nutritive Protein Value of Five Varieties of Rice," *Philippine Journ. Science*, 51: 567–572, 1933; Sreenivasan, A., "Nutritive Value of the Protein and Mineral Constituents of Rice Varieties," *Cereal Chemistry*, 19 (1): 36–47, 1942; Sreenivasan, A., and V. Sadasivan, "Nutritive Value of the Protein and Mineral Constituents of Dry and Wet Rices," *Cereal Chemistry*, 19 (1): 47–55, 1942.

[62] Albrecht, 1944.

[63] Roschevicz, 1931.

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243 he maintains that conditions favor mass mutation, and where he believes that such mutations have been utilized by rice growers since ancient times.[64] At any rate, and most likely in Africa, a number of the cultivated varieties have possibly originated from wild species such as *O. breviligulata*, *O. glaberrima*, and *O. officinalis*, which are related to *O. sativa* L. *f. spontanea*. The small-grained rices "very probably have taken rise from *Oryza minuta* Presl."[65] At least some of the multitudinous cultivated varieties could stem from the hybridization of these species with cultivated rices, the majority of which do owe their origin to *O. sativa* L. *f. spontanea*. The latter is referred to by Roschevicz[66] as a wild species; much of the literature does not specify it as wild, but lumps all cultivated rice as *O. sativa* L. Roschevicz[67] concludes:

> The botanic-morphological and the botanic-geographical methods of investigation applied to the material available to us, lead us to the following conclusions: (1) our cultivated rice belongs to section *Sativa* Roschev., having for its center of origin tropical Africa; (2) by far not all the cultivated rices have originated from *Oryza sativa* L. *f. spontanea;* many of them have their origin from species akin to *Oryza sativa* L., as *O. breviligulata* A. Cheval. et Roehr., *O. glaberrima* Stend., *O. minuta* Presl., *O. officinalis* Wall., etc., either by way of being introduced into cultivation along with *O. sativa* L., or by way of hybridization with the latter; (3) the great varietal diversity of cultivated rice in India and Indo-China may be explained not only by the ancientness of rice cultivation in these countries, but also by the fact that wild rice *Oryza sativa* L. *f. spontanea* has found there suitable conditions for the production of a considerable number of mutants (which did not take place in Africa) and that these mutants have been introduced into cultivation.
>
> The Asiatic origin of rice cultivation is equally confirmed by the multifariousness of the varietal material which in China, Indo-China and India, and in general the whole of south-eastern Asia, is immensely rich in varieties and races, while the number of varieties and races known for Africa is inconsiderable . . . that the cultivation of rice as a world crop is due to China or to Indo-China, does not mean that rice did not thrive somewhere in the heart of central Africa, whose ancient history has remained a mystery to us, without having become known to ancient Egypt . . . as we know that rice was cultivated in Africa from the most ancient times, which is confirmed by the

[64] Jenkin Jones says concerning mutations:

"Mutations in rice probably occur much more frequently than was formerly supposed. . . . Most mutations in rice are recessive to normal. . . . on the basis of my observations over the past few years, mutations in rice, at least in this country, occur rather frequently.

"The rate of mutation no doubt depends upon the environment and the varieties of material grown. This also is true with respect to the extent of natural crossing between varieties, which also is more common than was formerly expected. These two factors, mutation and natural crossing, have no doubt been very active in the origin of the numerous varieties of rice present in Asia. . . . I am certain that the plant produces a greater number of varieties under domestication than in the wild."

[65] Roschevicz, p. 123.

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] *Ibid.*, pp. 123 ff.

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fact that Africa, as we have seen above, possesses varieties of its own, grown from local wild rices, the question where wild rice was first introduced into cultivation remains unsolved. 243

Though there are many more recent discussions than that of the Russian botanist, none consulted takes in as wide a range of material with comparable care. It is interesting to note that Roschevicz,[68] at least in the English summary of his text, makes no point of the physiological adaptations that lead agronomists to distinguish "wet" or "lowland," and "dry" or "upland," and deep-water rices. Parnell,[69] with the Indian botanists Ayyangar and Ramiah, remarks the existence of probably several thousand varieties of rice in India, and finds that the characteristics in which they differ are extremely varied, some being morphological and others physiological. Cross-fertilization would account for some of this great number of varieties. Burkhill is cited by Pelzer[70] as giving a polyphyletic origin for cultivated rice; *O. fatua* Koen. and *O. minuta* Presl. probably ancestors of *O. sativa* L.

Disregarding its botanical identity, the literature persists in classifying rice according to the methods employed in its cultivation. As to the "dry" or "upland" rice, the wide practice of shifting cultivation in conjunction with the cutting and burning of forest jungle or brush previous to cultivation may have helped to obscure the variant methods employed. This general practice, under such blanket designations as "jhum" (India), or "the milpa system" (Middle America), is used and abused in regard to its own variations, as well as in loose descriptions of the methods of rice cultivation. In Korea, where the technique has great antiquity, the Chinese refer to it as "fire field" agriculture. Common in southeast Asia, its historical connection with the development of rice cultivation has interested others than anthropologists. Pelzer[71] treats it elaborately, and semi-popular works like Bruno Lasker's[72] make the anthropologist desire a more careful understanding of the whole problem. Here, shifting cultivation is pertinent only insofar as it is one of the techniques employed in rice cultivation.

Chinese methods of rice cultivation were first widely discussed by French agronomists, whose practical interests led them there a hundred years ago. They also used the terms "wet" and "dry" rice. They were interested in introducing new varieties into the Midi, and for over forty years the Bulletin de la Société Zoologique d'Acclimatisation buzzed with discussions of "le riz sec de Chine." Notable among these is the account by E. H. de Méritens,[73] who

[68] Roschevicz, 1931.
[69] Parnell, Ayyangar, and Ramiah, 1917–1922.
[70] Pelzer, 1945.
[71] *Ibid.*
[72] Lasker, 1944.
[73] De Méritens, 1855.

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243 translated sections of a Chinese encyclopedia of agriculture, the Shou-shih T'ung-Kao, a work completed in 1742, and based on the H'su-Kuang-chi, which was compiled from original manuscripts and edited by one Ch'ên Tzu-lüng, on imperial orders. M. de Méritens,[74] writing in 1855, credits Leon d'Hervey Saint-Denys with the first interest in "le riz sec" among his countrymen. Baron d'Hervey Saint-Denys, in 1850, published "Recherches sur l'agriculture et l'horticulture des Chinois." As early as 1842, however, S. Julien[75] in a communication addressed to l'Académie des Sciences described "le riz que se culture à sec dans la Mongolie," and referred to the same Chinese source used by de Méritens.[76] The Shou-shih T'ung-Kao gives a classification based not only on methods of cultivation, but on the period required for the maturation of rice varieties. It accounts for two main groups of rice cultivated in China besides "le riz aquatique."

TABLE I. CHINESE VARIETIES, ACCORDING TO THE SHOU-SHIH T'UNG-KAO

Variety	*Date Sown*	*Date Harvested*
I. Sien-tao, or early rice, including:		
1. Lou-che-ji-tao, or 60-day rice[77]	April 5	June 5
2. Pe-ji-tao, or 100-day rice	April 5	July 5
3. Ta-sien, a large-grained variety	May 5	Early September
4. Siao-sien, a small-grained variety	April 5	August 5
II. Kang-tao, or late rice, including:		
1. Hanno		
2. A two-crop variety:—		
Crop one	March 21 to April 5	Summer
Crop two	Fall	Winter

Besides Sien-tao and Kang-tao, there is Ho-tao, or "riz de feu," suggestive of the "fire fields," but according to the source it was so called in China from its origin in the southwestern mountains, where the climate is hot and where rice is grown under difficult conditions from a Chinese standpoint. Suggestively again, fire fields are found today in the southwest. Ho-tao is transplanted in

[74] *Ibid.*

[75] Julien, 1842.

[76] De Méritens, 1855.

[77] Jenkin Jones comments here: "Unless it refers to a period from the time of transplanting, it is probably like our Sixty-day or Kherson oats which mature in 90 to 100 days. . . . In this connection, too, some of the authors quoted may refer to Rattoon crops of rice, that is, a second crop from one planting as the result of tillering under favorable conditions following the harvest of the first crop. Rice of this nature can mature in 60 days."

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China now, but in olden times this was not done. It includes varieties that vary 243 in shape, color and size of grain, and in consistency. Some varieties are fragrant. In Fukien, a plant known as "riz de Cochinchine" is cultivated on the uplands; this Julien[78] considers the best of all of "le riz sec." For one variety he gives the period of growth and maturation as 50 days, others maturing in 60, 80, and 100 days, in the main being harvested in August and September. This corresponds with the time given for Sien-tao. Julien[79] describes another "dry" rice from Jehol, a sample of which he sent to Paris, informing l'Académie des Sciences that it requires neither natural nor artificial irrigation.

The Shou-shih T'ung-kao, and a Chinese agriculturist of note, one Si-Hien-Tchong, relate how the Emperor Chin-Tsoung (A.D. 996–1021), to alleviate famine in eastern and western Chekiang, ordered the purchase of 30,000 bushels of drought-resisting rice from Fukien, distributing it to the poor people to plant under the instruction of his inspector of transport for grains. Again in the Sung Dynasty, Kiang-Ngao, a subprefect in Jouou-Tcheou, sent to his native Kien-ngan for drought-resisting rice to relieve famines, and thus introduced it to the uplands of the north Chinese valleys. This rice was found to yield abundantly, by local standards at the time. According to the encyclopedia both Sien-tao and Kang-tao were introduced from Cochinchina. The two groups differ in certain physical properties: Sien-tao is the smaller, brighter grained, and is nonglutinous. Kang-tao is sometimes bearded, includes glutinous varieties, and is found in many colors of awn, while Sien-tao is either red or white.[80]

The Chinese method of cultivation for "dry" rice, as given in the source, is different from that used for the "wet" rice. For "dry" rice the nurseries are tilled once in preparation for the seed, which previous to sowing is soaked for one night in water to hasten germination. Seed is not sown broadcast, but in small holes, a few grains to each; wet ashes, the product of burned plants or rice straw, are spread over the whole area sown; the nurseries are weeded three times, and subsequent to each weeding liquid manure is scattered on them. By this time the blade is above ground, and grows with great strength and rapidity. "Le riz sec" is said to thrive equally well on the plains or in the mountains. De Méritens[81] gives another method for its cultivation. Before sowing, the soil is moistened and manured thickly, sometimes with oil cakes, sometimes with

[78] Julien, 1842.

[79] *Ibid.*

[80] Jenkin Jones states in regard to this: "There are two kinds of rice based upon the nature of the endosperm—nonglutinous, which is grown most extensively, and glutinous (waxy). Both may be bearded or beardless, early or late, of poor or good quality, and have red, purple, brown or white bran coats. Kang-tao apparently was a mixture of nonglutinous and glutinous types similar in appearance and color, for rice, like other plants, does not change from one form to another except through hybridization and mutation."

[81] De Méritens, 1855.

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243 leaves and the bark of trees, in addition to animal manures. For the preparation of hard soils brushwood may be gathered and burned, and then plowed under. The rice is transplanted when it is about 20 cm. high. The fields in which it is set out must not be inundated, nor too dry. For "le riz sec," as for "le riz aquatique," the soil is usually prepared in spring. M. de Méritens[82] notes the greater labor involved in transplanting the latter. He draws on d'Hervey Saint-Denys for his information here. The main fields, after tilling, are flooded to receive the transplanted seedlings. First the laborer and his oxen tread the submerged mud, puddling it to a depth of 15 to 20 cm. The plow is not used in this process. The field is then harrowed to level it, and flooded again. The rice is then transplanted from the nurseries to the inundated fields, its roots immediately covered with mud by the action of the water. The roots are planted in holes prepared after the field is flooded, and just when the plants are being set out in rows. It goes without saying that transplanting to unsubmerged fields is less work.

In contemporary accounts there is unanimity on the fact that most Chinese rice is transplanted,[83] but there is less detail as to varieties. Wagner[84] gives "den gewöhnliche Wasserreis," "den sogenanten Bergreis," and "den Klebreis" (glutinous), but fails to distinguish methods of cultivation. His "mountain" rice ripens in four months, and his "water" rice (irrigated) subdivides into early, medium and late varieties. John L. Buck[85] describing land utilization in China, gives regional differences in agricultural techniques. In the Yangtze region, the slopes are terraced above the flood plains. In the southwest, terraced fields occupy fifteen per cent of the area cultivated, and some of the Lolos and Miao grow rice on terraced land. Szechwan is a frostless area where a spring crop is grown in addition to the main one, and is the only part of China where the soil is rich enough not to need fertilizers, although they are used to some extent. In what Buck[86] designates as the "rice-tea" area, much of which is hilly, the bottom lands are planted in rice. R. H. Tawney[87] remarks the use of "water farming" in the Yangtze region, and in the south, where double cropping of rice is a regular practice, together with more intensive cultivation. George Cressey,[88] like Buck,[89] divides China into agricultural regions. He blames the poor soil and the limited supply of water for the scanty planting

[82] *Ibid.*

[83] *See*: Martin Yang, 1945, *A Chinese Village. Taitou, Shantung Province*, pp. 22–23. The rice is sown in small holes, after plowing; it is not transplanted or irrigated; in a considerable area around Taitou no rice is grown. Fertilizers are employed, including ashes mixed with dung.

[84] Wagner, 1926.

[85] Buck, 1937.

[86] *Ibid.*

[87] Tawney, 1932.

[88] Cressey, 1934.

[89] Buck, 1937.

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of rice in northern China, stating that it can be grown as far north as Vladivostok. He summarizes: 243

> The most conspicuous boundary is the northern limit of continuous rice cultivation, with its flooded fields, canals and water buffalo, near latitude 33° North . . . this line es midway between the Yangtze and Hwang rivers along the crest of the Tsingling in the west and near the Hwai River in the east. South China is a green, humid, subtropical riceland, while the north is a dry brown wheatland under the influence of the desert . . . Major contrasts appear between the wheat and rice provinces . . . .The growing season in north China is five to eight months, while in south China it is ten months to a year, so that double cropping is more widespread and the same land can support more people. Rainfall is over twice as heavy in the south. The gross area of the south is larger but the presence of extensive plains in the north gives it a greater cultivated area. Nevertheless, the higher productivity of the rice lands enables them to support nearly twice the total population of the wheat-producing section.[90]

The Yangtze Valley is subject to the hazards of over-flooding and droughts, but the rice crop usually stands to benefit by the three-month flood period. This region yields one rice crop annually.[91] Terraces occupy the south Yangtze hills. Two, and sometimes three crops of rice per year are grown in southern China, where the yield per acre is second—in Asia—only to that of Japan, and is three times that of all India or Java. The lower and central Yangtze and the western and southern area of China lead in rice production. In the Canton delta the first crop is set out in March and harvested in July; a second crop is then transplanted to the main fields to be harvested in November. In eastern Chekiang an early crop is harvested in July, a late crop in October. Terraced lands are cultivated mainly in Szechwan, especially on the slopes of its Red Basin. Agriculture is most intensive in southern China, where the double cropping of rice is the regular practice. On the southwest tableland, rice is the dominant summer crop; it is often dependent entirely on rain for its water supply, excepting in the mile-high plateau, where flooded fields prevail. A description of Yunnan, edited by H. T. Fei,[92] notes that the southwest tableland and the valleys are diverse in both crops and population; here begins the altitudinal stratification of peoples and cultures that is so very characteristic of Farther India. The Lolos adhere to maize as their staple, growing some rice on terraced land. The Chinese immigrants grow mostly rice. They prepare the land in April, and bring off the crop in autumn.

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[90] Cressey, 1944, pp. 91–93.

[91] Jenkin Jones notes: "In much of the Yangtze Valley and from Central Japan to the southern part only one rice crop is grown a year but the land is double cropped, wheat, barley and vegetables often being the second crop. In this connection, N. Jasny, in his *Competition among Grains*, Stanford University, 1940, p. 7, explains: 'Where the cool season is too cold and/or too dry for rice, fall-sown wheat or barley is frequently rotated with it on the same land and in the same crop year'."

[92] Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943.

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243 These few surveys are fairly compatible with that of the Shou-shih T'ung-Kao. The practical universality of transplanting in China is worthy of a remark. It has been demonstrated by agronomists that transplanting increases the yield per plant and per acre.[83] The seedling develops new grain-bearing tillers when it is transplanted, so that even double transplanting[84] has been found rewarding.[85] It economizes seed: in China one acre of nursery seedlings plants from ten to twenty-five acres of rice; and it permits double cropping, the second rice crop getting its start in the nursery while the first crop of rice, or in some cases another plant, as wheat or barley, matures in the field.[86] Transplanting can mitigate the dangers of drought and flood in the main fields by delay until favorable conditions return. In India and in the Philippines the rice transplanted is sometimes raised in a dry-farmed nursery.

Tanaka and Yekoussima,[87] writing in 1867, describe "dry" rice grown in Japan. The plant needs a certain amount of water, but it is not grown on flooded fields. In Jeddo (Yeddo) it is planted in March and harvested in October or November, at the same time when the irrigated rice is taken off.

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[83] Jenkin Jones interpolates here: "This is true in some tests, not so in others. Transplanting does save seed, irrigation water, makes the crop easier to fertilize and weed, and to double crop. These and not increased yields account for the practice in Central Japan and the Yangtze Valley."

[84] Hedayetullah, 1943.

[85] Jones says, to the contrary: "Tillering is associated with the variety, the conditions under which the rice is grown, spacing, number of plants per hole, climatic conditions and other factors, and if rice is transplanted rather close together you get essentially the same amount of tillering as if you had sown directly at the same spacing. That transplanting does not necessarily result in high yields is evident from the fact that much of the rice crop is transplanted in the Philippine Islands, Indo-China, Siam, Burma, and India, but the average yields in these countries are relatively low, ranging from 22 to 36 bushels per acre in the pre-war period; whereas, in California, Italy, Egypt, Spain, yields often range from 60 to 75 or 80 bushels per acre without transplanting."

[86] F. H. King, *Farmers of Forty Centuries*, Madison, Wis., 1911, includes increased yields in the benefits due to transplanting, to wit, p. 284: "Extensive as is the acreage of irrigated rice in China, Korea and Japan, nearly every spear is transplanted; the largest and best crop possible, rather than the least labor and trouble, as is so often the case with us, determining their methods and practices." *Ibid.*, pp. 288–289: "More than a month is saved for maturing and harvesting winter and early spring crops, or in fitting the fields for rice, by this planting in nursery beds. The irrigation period for most of the land is cut short a like amount, saving in both water and time. It is cheaper and easier to highly fertilize and prepare a small area for the nursery, while at the same time much stronger and more uniform plants are secured than would be possible by sowing in the field. The labor of weeding and caring for the plants in the nursery is far less than would be required in the field. It would be practically impossible to fit the entire rice areas as early in the season as the nursery beds are fitted, for the green manure is not yet grown and time is required for composting and for decaying, if plowed under directly. The rice plants in the nursery are carried to a stage where they are strong feeders and when set into the newly prepared, fertilized clean soil of the field they are ready to feed strongly, under these most favorable conditions. Both time and strength of plant are thus gained . . . the best possible practices under their condition of small holdings and dense population."

[87] Tanaka and Yekoussima, 1867.

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Remote from the main rice fields, it is grown on hill slopes where, when the summer is very hot, the Japanese have means to irrigate it. Before it is planted the ground is enriched with night soil. The seed is prepared by soaking for three days in water and then exposing to the sun. When sown it is mixed with ash and powdered fish refuse and scattered in furrows. It is subsequently weeded and cultivated. Transplanting is not mentioned in connection with this crop.

R. B. Hall[98] assigns only local importance to "upland" rice in Japan, where it now occupies in all 206,500 cho. In order of importance, the main producing areas are: the diluvial terraces of Kwanto, the dry central part of the Taiwan plain, and the ash plateau of southern Kyushu. A little is grown in Ou, the northernmost district of Old Japan, where the growing season is short and the climate relatively cold. The diluvial terraces of Kwanto have a " . . . cool, moist sprouting season and . . . a hot, dry ripening period."[99] In Hokkaido the growing season is short, "upland" rice is not cultivated, but quick-maturing "lowland" varieties have been established. Rice cultivation is only a recent development on the island, and the northern limit is set by a 90-day growing season. No altitudinal limit is mentioned for the Japanese islands. In Tokai, the East Sea district, there is " . . . irrigated rice on the delta plains and specialized dry land production on the terraces. . . . "[100] A variety known as "Izumo" is grown in San-in and along the Sea of Japan coast, a relatively cool region with a short growing season, where there is little level or arable land; we are left in doubt as to whether this is an "upland" variety of rice. Double cropping of rice, wheat, barley, and other crops is practiced in northern Kyushu (Kita), in southern Taiwan, and in the Nanki, Setouchi, and Tokai districts of Old Japan. The Hokuroku district, situated in the west central plains south of Ou, embraces " . . . the most specialized paddy areas in Japan."[101] The Kwanto plain produces almost as much "paddy" as Hokuroku and more than half of the "upland" rice crop of Japan. In the Imperial district of Kinai, the " . . . alluvial basin floors constitute vast paddy fields, and the average yield is the highest in Japan."[102] In Kinai a few terraces are cultivated.

In Korea, half the rice grown is dependent on rain for its water supply. In the north the growing season lasts only 100 days, the terrain is rugged, and "lowland" rice occupies a little over one tenth of the farm land. The northeastern people, who are shifting cultivators, grow no rice at all, while in the northwestern section there is " . . . a relatively important production of 'dry'

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[98] Hall, 1934, 1935.
[99] *Idem*, 1935, p. 133.
[100] *Idem*, 1934, p. 339.
[101] *Ibid.*, p. 327.
[102] *Ibid.*, p. 336.

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243 rice."[103] As in his description of Japan, Hall[104] omits any mention of transplanting, though double cropping may be taken to infer it. He takes the southern boundary of central Korea as the line separating modernized (Japanese) rice cultivation and double cropping from simpler methods employed with single cropping in the north. In southern Korea the growing season lasts 150 days, and a higher proportion of rice fields is irrigated than elsewhere.

The Malay Peninsula presents a wide variety of agricultural methods. Here the "wet" system obtains for ninety per cent of the rice fields:

> But there are variations of both these main systems to suit local conditions: wet systems involving considerable preliminary cultivation as opposed to systems where cultivation is practically impossible owing to the soft nature of the land; dry systems which include both ploughing and raking, and a dry system which merely entails the clearing and burning the jungle in preparation for the crop.
>
> In the cultivation of "wet" padi the general procedure (of course with local variants) is to plough or dig the land once or twice, and rake or smooth it with a roller. The seed is planted in a nursery and is ready for transplanting in the field after 40 days. The seedlings are planted three or more per hill, about one foot apart. After cultivation consists of weeding.
>
> In dry padi cultivation the land is sometimes ploughed twice, raked and the seed sown by hand or drilled; or seed planted in clumps about a foot apart, or in hill cultivation, virgin land is cleared, burned, and the seed broadcast.
>
> Generally speaking, manuring is not a common practice in padi cultivation. In Kedah and Perlis, where bat guano is easily procured, the land is periodically manured. In Kelantan a system exists in which each plant, after transplanting, receives a small application of burnt mixture of cowdung and earth, coconut and arecanut leaves. In parts of Perak and in Province Wellesley and Malacca, the seedlings are steeped in a mixture of mud, phosphate and ashes immediately after removal from the nursery.[105]

In the Krian district of the Malay Peninsula, a floating seedbed is used. Weeds are cut, plastered together with clay, and piled in a long strip, to float as a platform on the surface of a flooded field, the top staying two inches above the water level. A thin layer of mud is applied to sow the seed in. The plot rises and falls with the water in the field, keeping the seedlings above water while their roots develop in the submerged layers. The seed is germinated prior to sowing by three days' soaking in water, and two more days in a moist condition. The germinated seed is broadcast on the nursery and a layer of leaves is put over it for ten days to protect it from the sun and from birds. In two weeks the plants are six to eight inches high. A similar nursery is used on the west coast of India. In the Malay Peninsula, the plants are set out first in clumps of 150 to 200, and partially submerged. At the second transplanting, ten days later, these clumps are broken into smaller ones that are placed in rows. Forty

[103] *Idem.*, 1935, p. 48.

[104] *Ibid.*

[105] Malaya, Dept. of Agriculture, 1939, p. 42.

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days later, at the third and final transplanting, the tops of the seedlings are cut back, and the roots are pruned and dibbled in. Two or three weedings take place after this. As soon as the plants flower, the water is gradually drained off the fields, to be gone when the grain has set and is ripening. The varieties that are planted in the best soil, in June, ripen in the short dry season early in the year, about February. The period of growth for irrigated rice may be said in general to last from seven to eight months. 243

In the district of Kelantan, "dry-land" nurseries are used for "wet padi." The site is plowed and harrowed twice, the seed broadcast thinly and harrowed in. Usually the single transplanting takes place forty days later, though adverse weather conditions may delay it as much as three months. The main fields cannot be cultivated until the July rains soften the soil. Preparation of the land and planting proceed from then until November, the low-lying areas being completed first, followed by the higher and drier areas. Plowing is not possible in all types of Kelantan soil. The transplanted rice crop is drained if there is an excess of rain. The crop is not weeded, but is manured as described above. In this district:

> Two distinct types of padi are cultivated, namely wet padi or padi chedongan, and dry padi, padi tugalan. This dry padi must not be confused with the dry or hill padi, padi huma, found in various parts of Malaya, as the methods of cultivation are distinct.[106]

Further:

> The land planted with dry padi falls into two groups, that habitually under the dry crop and that which may be utilized for either the wet or dry type. The latter forms but a small proportion of the whole and comprises the lower lying dry padi, or tugalan lands, the choice of wet or dry padi for any particular year usually depending on the inclination of the cultivator. Generally speaking, the fields are flat or slightly sloping and in the latter case wet padi is found at the bottom of the slope, dry padi land over the main area and the intermediate or alternating type mentioned above in a narrow strip between the two. . . .
>
> The soil throughout the dry padi lands is markedly homogeneous and . . . a heavy loam predominates.
>
> In view of the localized nature of the crop it is not surprising to find that there are only some twelve distinct varieties cultivated. The maturation periods of these varieties vary from 173 to 197 days and, though the majority can only be used as dry padi, there are some which can also be successfully planted on wet land.
>
> The success or otherwise of the dry padi crop is dependent on a favorable monsoon. Dry padi calls for an amount of labor and care which is greatly in excess of that required to produce a crop of the wet type.[107]

In Kelantan the dry season lasts from the middle of February until the end of May. After the early showers in July and August, the "dry padi" land

[106] *Ibid.*, pp. 48, 49.
[107] *Ibid.*

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243 is plowed and harrowed four times, and the seed dibbled in lines, before the monsoon rains come. Land must not be plowed or weeded when too wet, since packing or puddling this soil injures the plants.

A simpler method, like the one called "padi huma" in Trengganu, is used in farming "dry-land" rice in Province Wellesley North. It consists in cutting and burning the standing vegetation, followed sometimes by a light hand-digging after the April rains; the seed is dibbled into holes and covered, with no subsequent care. In Trengganu, four types of rice are distinguished locally

(1) Padi chedongan—"wet," transplanted rice.
(2) Padi taboran—rice broadcast on non-irrigated land.
(3) Padi tugalan—rice dibbled into dry land.
(4) Padi huma—rice dibbled in on burned off jungle land which is left to revert to jungle after one season's use.

The first is dependent chiefly on rain for irrigation. Type 3 is on the lines of the Kelantan "dry padi," described above. Type 2 is planted either because the owner knows no alternative method of cultivation, or because he has too much land to care for by the superior tugal method. Type 2 fields are plowed and harrowed three times; the seed is broadcast and covered with a harrow instead of dibbled in, and the crop is subsequently untended until harvest. The land is used and fallowed rotationally for type 2. Type 4 represents what some writers distinguish as true shifting cultivation: the fields are not re-used, new jungle being cleared and prepared annually.

In the Pahang district, after two or three crops of "dry padi," newly reclaimed land is often planted permanently with crops other than rice. Methods here are " . . . the most primitive of any of the four Federated Malay States." "Wet padi" is sown in nurseries in February and March, harvested in December and January. Planting periods vary with local seasonal differences. Pahang crops do not depend completely on rain water. Nurseries:

> . . . for any types of "wet" cultivation are usually situated, on dry land . . . Secondary jungle is usually selected, felled and burnt shortly before sowing the seed. A few larger trees are usually left to afford light shade. The seed, previously soaked in water, is broadcast after the soil has been lightly cultivated, the area than raked to bury the seed. A small amount of weeding is done later if necessary and in the event of dry weather the beds may be watered. . . . The seedlings remain in the nursery for six to seven weeks, or much longer if weather is unsuitable for transplanting.[108]

"Wet padi" land in Pahang is locally differentiated as: (1) Paya, or natural swamp, subdivided into that which is at least partially fed by a stream, and that fed by rains alone; (2) Paya sawah, or artificially irrigated, often flat land, not always swampy; it may include terraced land, and most of it is provided with some form of water supply. Three methods are given for cultivating these two types of "wet padi" land. One involves transplanting, and is like Type 1

[108] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

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above in Trengganu. The standing grass is cut and left to rot. The soil may be worked by hand, or plowed. Sometimes " . . . buffaloes are employed to trample the grass on the paya and puddle the soil."[109] A second method includes presoaking the seed for two nights. The land is prepared as above, and the seed broadcast. A third method is attributed to the Sakai, many of whom live upstream on the main rivers. Virgin or secondary jungle is cut and burned in the dry season, the land then cultivated for two or three years successively. The moist seed is sown broadcast on the semi-wet swamp land (paya), after the rains begin. Crops receive no further care.

In areas marginal to mainland Asia, the evidence is that practice runs as wide a gamut as in the Malay Peninsula. For Madagascar we have Linton's[110] account. Mainland Africa, though having both "wet" and "dry" farming of rice, is not considered here. Going from Madagascar to the Philippines,[111] the Indonesians are found farming rice by both the "wet" and "dry" systems. The Philippines, best known for their elaborate terraced areas, include tribes that farm dry only with shifting cultivation, tribes that use both this and terracing with irrigation, and tribes that irrigate without terraces. In Java[112] and in Madura "upland" rice is grown on non-irrigated terraced land, besides the "wet" rice of the terraced and dyked flat lands. Shifting cultivation and dry farming obtain in the Lesser Soendas. Celebes farms rice by both irrigated and non-irrigated methods. So does Borneo:[113] the Dusuns and Muruts irrigate, the Dyaks elsewhere usually plant with the seasonal rhythms of the monsoons and rely on rain water.

Farther India presents varied environmental conditions; thus it is not surprising to find Estèbe[114] describing for Tonkin, Annam, Cambodia and Cochinchina these diverse groups of rice:

TABLE II. FARTHER INDIAN VARIETIES, AFTER ESTÈBE

Variety and Method of Cultivation	*Date Sown*	*Date Harvested*
1. Early rice. Transplanted once, in July, it matures in four to five months. It is cultivated on small fields for home use. It is hard to harvest because the rains come when it is ripe.	April	October

[109] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

[110] Linton, 1933.

[111] *See:* Barton, 1930; Christie, 1909; Cole, 1922; Garvan, 1941; Jenks, 1905; Pendleton, 1942; and Pelzer, 1945.

[112] *See:* Cole, 1945; Koch, 1930; Pelzer, 1945; Van Eerde, 1937; Van Valkenburg, 1935; and Wickizer and Bennett, 1941.

[113] *See:* Elshout, 1926; Hose and McDougall, 1912; and Rutter, 1929.

[114] Estèbe, 1934.

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2. Midseason rice ("Riz de demisaison"). It takes six months to mature. Grown on high and intermediate fields—high ones depend on rains. Highland varieties are grown much in north and east of Cochinchina, and on high fields in Cambodia during the rainy season.	June to July	December to January
3. Main crop ("Riz de saison"). Some varieties are transplanted once, some twice. It takes seven to eight months to mature. Grown on flooded and the richest alluvial soils; main crop on low fields of deltas and coast—some varieties are salt-tolerant, tides visit twice a day. Some 700 varieties grown in Indochina. Manures are much used. Rain-fed varieties are grown on high fields.	June to July	January to February
4. Twice-transplanted rice. Matures in nine months. Transplanted first in August, and again in October–November.	June to July	February to March
5. Floating rice.[114] Not transplanted. Grown in lake and delta regions, especially in Cambodia and Cochinchina. The seed is broadcast before the rains, the field cultivated once. Keeps on growing after floods, in depths *c.* three meters. When floods subside, the plants collapse, develop new roots and raise themselves, then flower and mature rapidly.	End of April	December to January
6. Post-flood rice. A secondary crop. Transplanted from highland nurseries to the banks of streams after the floods subside. Flowers in February–March, then matures rapidly. Sown on less productive lands after their main crop is off. It is being replaced with floating rice.	October to November	March to April
7. Two-crop rice:		
Crop one	May	October
Crop two	End of June	—
Crop two is transplanted in October to fields just harvested. Two-crop varieties are rare; they are grown in the Tonkin delta, and in Annam and Cochinchina. Some, on the coast, are salt-resistant.		

[114] Jenkin W. Jones comments: "Some varieties or types of rice are restricted to certain areas, including the so-called 'floating rice,' because of environmental conditions. The outstanding characteristic of floating rices is that they are able to grow rapidly as the water level rises, and hence, to survive. As a group, floating rices are relatively unimportant except in limited areas where, owing to floods, the usual types cannot be grown."

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Most of the rice is intermediate in its water requirement between the floating rice and the "riz de terrains sec," but does require a plentiful supply. Here, as in China, there are some varieties said to be of Siamese origin. Double cropping is rare in Cochinchina. 243

Estèbe[116] notes that "upland" varieties are grown to a great extent in northern and eastern Cochinchina, in the Mekong region, and in Cambodia on the high fields. In the Mekonga delta and elsewhere, such fields are dependent on rain for water supply, and it is sometimes retained in ditches in the Mekong region. These remarks are interesting in view of the Chinese account of rice introduced from Cochinchina. Chevey[117] gives an interesting account of the floods of the Tonle Sap, where floating, or deep-water, rice flourishes.

Van Valkenburg's[118] classification of rice in Farther India supplements Estèbe's,[119] but does not conflict. His includes: For Cambodia and Cochinchina, a floating rice (sometimes transplanted before the floods), and a dry season or post-flood rice; on the coasts of Annam, an "eighth month" rice and a "tenth month" rice; for the Tonkin delta, in addition to the two last named, a "twelfth month" rice, which includes "lowland" and "upland" varieties, and a "fifth month" rice, including the same, and also a two-crop rice. He allots the irrigated rices of Annam to the coastal plains and fertile valleys, the Tai in the upland valleys raising it also. Pierre Gourou's[120] survey of the Tonkin delta gives a "fifth month" rice, covered by deep water in summer, grown on the lowest lands, including salt-tolerant varieties, and harvested in June. He parallels Van Valkenburg[121] with an "eight month" rice that is harvested in September, and a ubiquitous "tenth month" rice, harvested in November. He mentions a "dry" rice harvested in September along with the "eighth month" rice. In the Tonkin delta, the two-crop rice is the most extensively cultivated. The second crop, in the nurseries during September, is weeded and irrigated while the first crop flowers and matures in the fields. There is also a "rice of three moons," that is reaped in August. The "fifth month," "tenth month," and two-crop rice are all intensively cultivated and grown in irrigated fields where the soil is periodically aerated and kept thoroughly manured.

Among the Karen[122] of Burma, the hill people plant, cut, and burn the upland fields; the lowlanders plow, harrow, puddle with buffalo, and plant nurseries, transplanting to flooded fields. Credner[123] makes a contrast in the methods of the Tai, who live where irrigation is possible, and those of their neighbors in the hills—Lolo, Lissu and Minchia, whose agriculture is "many-sided." Maître[124] mentions "les hommes des rizieres," or of the "wet" rice fields, among the Moi; J. H. Hoffet[125] lists tribes of Moi who plant "rizieres" and those who plant "rai," or fired upland fields. Charles Robequain,[126] men-

[116] Estèbe, 1934. [117] Chevey, 1934. [118] Van Valkenburg, 1933.
[119] Estèbe, 1934. [120] Gourou, 1936. [121] Van Valkenburg, 1933.
[122] Marshall, 1922, pp. 67, 88, and pl. opp. p. 82. [123] Credner, 1935.
[124] Maître, 1922. [125] Hoffett, 1933, pp. 8–29. [126] Robequain, 1939, p. 74.

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243 tioning unspecified back-country tribes in Indochina, makes the same distinction. Paul Palté[127] says that the hinterland Moi lack "les rizieres Annamites." Virginia Thompson[128] differentiates between the main crop and the fast-growing rice varieties in Siam. Zimmerman[129] details the local differences in practice among the Tai, and mentions several rices that mature in three, four, and five months in northeastern Siam, while in the south a few people grow "upland padi," but most rice is transplanted. Double cropping is rare here, and so are the refinements of southern Chinese rice culture, especially manuring.

In Assam, as wide a variation of practices exists as we noted for the Malay Peninsula. One nucleus of such variations clusters around a general pattern of shifting upland cultivation, here including terracing, and excluding the use of buffaloes and the plow. The wide altitudinal range of climate puts emphasis on suitability of the varieties planted to the particular locale. The Angami Nagas exemplify this situation. To cite Hutton:[130]

> The rice grown in wet fields is of several varieties, some sorts being suitable to low and hot situations, and others doing better in cold and high fields. The varieties differ also in the time taken to mature.

His "wet" rice refers to artificial irrigation. Though he lists native-named varieties, Hutton[131] employs "dry" and "wet," as:

> In some villages . . . terraces built for jhum . . . [are] almost as elaborate as those made for wet cultivation.

"Jhum" refers to the fire fields. The dry-farmed (non-irrigated) land gets good care. Seven of the native-named varieties are dry farmed, though one of these is grown also on irrigated terraced land. Mills,[132] in describing the Lhota, enumerates twelve native-named varieties of rice. In the Konyak villages, according to Fürer-Haimendorf,[133] the fields are non-irrigated; he makes no mention of rice varieties. Leaving the Nagas, we find the Lakher sowing their lightly hoed fields in April, the seed left exposed for rain to cover. They weed two or three times, and begin their harvest in October, pulling up the whole plants! Parry[134] gives fourteen native-named varieties with soil preferences, some maturing as late as December and January.

Cultivation in India may be equally diversified, but the material is more difficult of access. For Bengal, Hedayetullah[135] gives a five-fold classification, based upon methods of cultivation and season of growth. Thousands of varieties fall within these well-marked agricultural groups, which include some that are indistinguishable morphologically, but are physiologically distinct.

Sarat Chandra Roy[136] gives a good account of cultivation for the Orāons of Chota Nagpur. Other reports may be given: Grigson[137] describes the Maria

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[127] Palté, 1906, p. 220. [128] Thompson, 1941, pp. 354–357. [129] Zimmerman, 1931.
[130] Hutton, 1921, p. 76. [131] *Ibid.* [132] Mills, 1922. [133] Fürer-Haimendorf, 1939.
[134] Parry, 1932. [135] Hedayetullah, 1946. [136] Roy, 1915. [137] Grigson, 1938.

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TABLE III. BENGAL VARIETIES, AFTER HEDAYETULLAH

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Variety and Method of Cultivation	*Date Sown*	*Date Harvested*
1. Early rice. Not transplanted. Grown on the highlands. Sown broadcast. Dependent on rain for water supply, and not ordinarily grown in flooded fields.	April to May	July to September
2. Winter rice. Transplanted into flooded fields in July and August. This constitutes the main crop.	June to July	October
3. Lowland rice. Not transplanted. Grown on low bhil lands. Sown before the heavy rains. Harvested in standing water, it grows in depths to six feet.	February to March	July to August
4. Floating rice. Not transplanted. Grown on the lowest floodlands. Sown broadcast before the rains. Collapses and reroots when the floods recede (as described by Estèbe in Farther India). Grows in depths to thirty feet, keeping the top above water.	February to March	November to July
5. Post-flood, or spring rice. Sown in nurseries and transplanted to river banks when the floods subside, or to lowlands that retain moisture throughout the winter. Sometimes irrigated.	October	March to April

Gonds of Bastar cultivating "light mountain rice," which produces three crops: early, main, and late. Some Marias are shifting cultivators, some have the beginnings of permanent cultivation with irrigation. The Hos in Kolhan[138] plow and transplant; when the land is hilly, they sometimes terrace it. Elwin[139] gives the Baiga sowing "upland" rice on fire fields, with hand tillage and water supplied by rains. Grierson[140] reports 60-day rice in Bihar, which is rain fed; other kinds are transplanted here, once or twice; these varieties mature at different periods from July through December. In the Konkan, on the west coast of India, Ranade[141] reports painstaking farming from the village of Roth Khurd. This is a fertile region where rain is abundant. Most of the rice grown here belongs to early varieties that are sown in May, after the rains set in, and are harvested in October. This rice is locally called "halvi." All of the fields depend on the monsoon rains for their water supply. The rice is transplanted. Nurseries are tilled by hand, and elaborately fertilized, first with a dressing of

[138] Majumdar, 1937. [139] Elwin, 1939. [140] Grierson, 1926. [141] Ranade, 1927.

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243 dung which is covered with grass and branches, then with fine dust, and on top of this with liquid manure. This preparation is made to ensure slow combustion. Then the whole field is fired in April or May, and is ready for sowing. The nursery is hastily plowed before the rains set in, and the seed is broadcast on it. If the monsoon rains hold off, the plot is irrigated. With regular rains, the plants are a foot high in two weeks. The main fields are prepared by several light plowings, and after they are flooded the seedlings are transplanted to them. The plant-tops reach above the water, and their roots become established in about two weeks. The fields are drained occasionally and weeded, and by harvest time are drained completely dry.

Ethel Simkins,[142] in a geographical survey of rice cultivation on the coastal plains of south India, finds that on the western coasts rice is grown the year around, as it is in Java. This does not hold true for the Madras coast, though the spring rains there do allow an early-season crop to be cultivated. The west coast, having dependable rains, needs little irrigation, whereas a large percentage of the east coast is irrigated. In the deltas, rice is grown on "wet paddy" land. Where the fields are irrigated, three crops a year are sometimes grown The main crop relies on rains.

> The "lowland" varieties are always transplanted; the "upland" rice is sown broadcast . . . [it is] a poor and coarse-grained variety, usually grown unirrigated.[143]

Wickizer[144] likewise remarks great variety in Indian agricultural practice.

In Asia the descriptions of rice cultivation have been over-simplified in the literature. Actually no sharp division in agronomic practices exists between the more and the less sophisticated peoples. The transitions between the methods employing irrigation and dry farming are too numerous to justify the continued use of "wet" and "dry." Classifications according to habitat, as "upland," "lowland," "mountain," and "swamp" are useless because the plant adapts so readily to varied environments. In comparative work and historical reconstructions such terms alone are inadequate.

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[142] Simkins, 1933.
[143] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[144] Wickizer and Bennett, 1941.

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The Geographical Review

VOLUME XLIII October, 1953 NUMBER 4

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THE "MILLION CITY" IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

D. W. FRYER

361 162 IN A world survey of cities with a population of one million or more, made in 1931, Mark Jefferson[1] could not include a single representative from Southeast Asia. Since 1945 five cities in this area have attained the million status—Jakarta, Manila, Saigon, Bangkok, and Singapore. Of all the major political units in this part of Asia, only Burma has failed to produce a "million city." In Malaya, the most highly urbanized country, 35 per cent of the population live in towns of 5000 or more, and towns of more than 10,000 increased their population by 52.6 per cent in the last intercensal period, 1931–1947. But the concept of Southeast Asia as an area of rural peoples with a rhythm of life determined by rice cultivation is still largely correct. The proportion of urban dwellers is about the average for the Asian continent, and, except possibly in Java, there are far fewer cities, in relation to the level of population, than in either South or East Asia.

361 By Western standards the countries of Southeast Asia had only one city apiece until very recently. Most of the other settlements of any size were overgrown villages, and in some degree they still retain aspects of their village origin. In Southeast Asia the evolution of indigenous cities on the Chinese or Indian scale was not possible. Chesneaux[2] suggests that many of the large indigenous Asian cities grew up within "the traditional framework of the great agricultural empires," but in both peninsular and archipelagic Southeast Asia physical fragmentation, reinforced by a great diversity of peoples, hindered the development of large states. Though occasionally established, they were highly unstable and of short duration. The princely houses of the petty native states were insufficient stimuli to city growth, and commerce was equally inadequate. The only effective impulse, as Credner[3] points out, was a favorable combination of trade foci with administrative, military, and religious functions of the highest order. Dependence on changeable watercourses for irrigated rice culture and transportation, and the personal whim of the ruler, produced a marked arbitrariness

[1] Mark Jefferson: Distribution of the World's City Folks, *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 21, 1931, pp. 446–465.

[2] J. E. Spencer: Changing Asiatic Cities, *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 41, 1951, pp. 336–337, discussing Jean Chesneaux: Notes sur l'évolution récente de l'habitat urbain en Asie, *L'Information Géographique*, Vol. 13, 1949, pp. 169–175, and Vol. 14, 1950, pp. 1–8.

[3] Wilhelm Credner: Siam, das Land der Tai (Stuttgart, 1935), p. 366.

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in city location, and the small extent of states ensured that cities could only be of moderate size, grouped around the *kraton*, or palace. 361

Thus the integration of several small territorial units into a political state was a necessary preliminary to the appearance of the large city. But even the extensive colonial possessions created by the European powers could not, with their comparatively simple economies, support more than one large city each. This was inevitably located at the point of entry. Singapore, however, is anomalous: its external lines of communication have more than compensated for its earlier lack of direct access into the Malay Peninsula.

The large city, then, is a foreign innovation, possessing a high proportion of nonindigenous inhabitants, serving mainly foreign interests, and tacked onto a rural background. The achievement of independence in much of Southeast Asia, and its approach elsewhere, must bring many changes in the relations of the large city with the rest of the country.

Fulfilling similar functions as administrative, judicial, and above all commercial centers, and providing other specialized services mainly for their own inhabitants and the outside world rather than for the country as a whole, the "million" cities thus present many similar features of morphology and development, despite variations in their historical and cultural backgrounds. It is not surprising that the two oldest cities, Manila (1571) and Jakarta (1619), founded in the era of Mercantilism, possess the greatest similarities and are apparently to continue comparable development as the capitals of new states. On the other hand, the two nineteenth-century cities, Singapore (1819) and Saigon (1859), are strikingly different. Bangkok (1782) is the only indigenous city in Southeast Asia that has attained first rank, but until comparatively recently it functioned rather as the focus of what has often been described as an economic appendage of the British Empire than as the capital of an independent state. Though the smallest of the five cities in numbers, Singapore is the most important, both economically and strategically. More than any of the others it serves the whole of Southeast Asia, and its future is perhaps the most obscure.

The Foundation of the Cities

The sites of the great cities were places of little importance, selected by foreigners on technical considerations that had no validity for the indigenous inhabitants. The aim of the Europeans was to create economic bases at tidewater, and only later did the administrative function become equally significant. Singapore was virtually uninhabited, though a flourishing commercial center had existed on approximately the same site some centuries

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361 before. Manila and Jakarta, though located in populous countrysides, arose from minor settlements, and Saigon was nothing more than a village surrounding an Annamese imperial fortress. Bangkok illustrates the arbitrariness of city location dependent on the personal decision of the ruler; for though founded on the site of an earlier settlement, this possessed no particular geographical significance and was unoccupied by indigenous peoples at the time.

361 With the exception of Saigon, all the great cities were founded in the
504 days of sail, but, despite the unexacting requirements of sailing vessels, good harbors with safe anchorages, facilities for carcening, and easy access into the interior were not readily found in Southeast Asia, where the modest tides of the shallow seas on the Sunda Shelf only occasionally bring deep water close inshore. It cannot be said that the sites selected by the Europeans were always the best. Silting has been a problem, and technological changes have necessitated almost everywhere the creation of virtually new ports close to the old towns to cope with the increasing size and draft of vessels, and to expedite the handling of new export commodities. It is not surprising, therefore, that the indigenous Bangkok has tended to lag behind.

Manila, the oldest of the five cities, is perhaps also the most interesting. It did not begin primarily as a port and commercial base, nor did its early start confer the usual advantages, in spite of the possession of what is probably the best natural harbor in the whole of Southeast Asia. Manila Bay, protected by the mountainous Bataan Peninsula, and with a relatively narrow entrance, gives shelter from the prevailing winds and the occasional typhoons that cross Luzon. Its north shore is formed by the swamps of the delta of the Pasig and Pampanga Rivers, but on the east a narrow strip of plain lies between it and the southern Sierra Madre. Part of this plain is occupied by the extensive but shallow Laguna de Bay, whose outlet is the short and meandering Pasig River. At its mouth were two stockaded Muslim settlements, from the southerly of which the present city takes its name. The potentialities of Manila as a fortress and administrative center were at once recognized, and its splendid harbor and nodality in relation to the productive plains gave it an ascendancy over the earlier Cebu city (1565). But in a colony that was itself a dependency of another colony, and separated from the homeland by two oceans, economic development was retarded.

361 The objective of Jan Pieterszoon Coen, the founder of Batavia, was the establishment of an economic base[4] that would free the Dutch East India

[4] B. H. M. Vlekke: Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago (Cambridge, Mass., 1943), pp. 122–123.

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Company from English and Chinese competition and be strong enough to 361
deter native princes from interfering in the Company's activities. Essentially, commerce was of greater importance than administration in old Batavia, though the Company could hardly avoid participation in politics; the recent change of the city's name to Jakarta, the name of the native settlement on whose site the city arose, is indicative of a change of function as well as of political control. The city began its life as a storehouse, which was secretly fortified and after a successful defense against the English and the local ruler was made the nucleus of a new town. Expediency seems to have been the principal reason for selection of the site. Certainly the harbor had little to commend it, and early in the eighteenth century silting was already a problem.

Bangkok is the only indigenous city of Southeast Asia to attain a population of one million, at least in modern times, though Jogjakarta is estimated to have reached this level during the postwar Indonesian movement for independence. The geographical focus of Thailand is clearly in the lower Menam plain, but for four centuries the capital was Ayutthaya, some 60 miles upstream (1350–1767). After the destruction of Ayutthaya by the Burmese, Thonburi, a fort on the west bank of the Menam Chao Phraya, was selected as the new national capital, but in 1782 a further dynastic change led to the establishment of a new administrative capital on the opposite bank, then unoccupied save for a small community of Chinese traders. Situated on a bend in the river some 20 miles from the sea and surrounded by marshland, the site of Bangkok possessed the sole but great advantage of being easily defended. [162]

Saigon, like Bangkok, is a riverine city and tidal port set in a broad alluvial lowland, but it is more than twice as far removed from the sea. When captured by the French in 1859, it was the main political center of the newly colonized Annamese land of Cochin China and consisted of an agglomeration of native huts around the imperial fortress, with virtually no permanent buildings. The French immediately began its reconstruction as a modern city, so that, unlike the other four cities, Saigon has no old core. Nothing is left at present of the native town. Cholon, the "great market" some three miles to the west along the Arroyo Chinois, is an entirely separate Chinese foundation dating from about 1778. Though the cities have now coalesced, each retains its own distinctive character and functions, and the "Région de Saigon-Cholon" is thus a true twin city, unique in Southeast Asia.

Singapore is anomalous in being situated on an island, and, like Bangkok,

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361 it did not arise on a previous settlement. The modern development of the Malay Peninsula could not have been imagined by Raffles in 1819; he intended that his city should achieve pre-eminence by its policy of free trade, which would attract the Chinese entrepôt trade from Batavia. The site selected lay on the south coast of Singapore Island, where the mangrove-lined Singapore River discharged into the sea. Here was situated what was probably the best anchorage in the days of sail; for the roads between Tanjong Rhu and Tanjong Pagar gave good protection from all but southeast winds, and the force of these was broken by islands to the south.

The Old Towns

361 The great cities were developed on a plan, rather than allowed to grow
503 haphazardly, but it is hardly surprising that technological and sociological changes have defeated the aims of the early planners. The old towns represented the transplanting of the city forms of contemporary Europe to Southeast Asia. The walled city of Intramuros, the older section of Manila, was a replica of the fortified town of sixteenth-century Europe, as was the earlier Portuguese Malacca. Batavia was likewise a fortified city, but the low terrain and abundant water encouraged the Dutch to copy the characteristic features of the cities of Holland. Thus old Batavia, the *Benedenstad,* was constructed on both sides of the Tjiliwong, and canals on a rectangular pattern were excavated.

Nearness to water, yet with freedom from flooding, was the essential requirement of all the cities, but seasonal variations in precipitation and periodic torrential downpours continue from time to time to defeat even modern techniques of civil engineering. The Batavian canals were only partly successful: in the wet seasons they flooded, and in dry periods they degenerated into a "dismal succession of filthy bogs and stagnant pools."[5] Pollution of the canals and the extension of the coastal swamps due to sedimentation gave old Batavia an evil reputation for disease.

Bangkok and Saigon, on low alluvial plains, with great seasonal fluctuations in river levels, were confronted with difficult problems. Official buildings commanded the little higher ground that was available, and the great bulk of the population lived in wooden houses built on stilts or on pontoons. Early Bangkok had no street pattern. The Royal City, or "Grand Palace," was a self-contained walled city, about a square mile in area, with palaces, temples, and administrative buildings. A canal across the neck of the bend in the Chao Phraya converted the old city into an island, outside which

[5] J. J. Stockdale: Sketches of the Island of Java (London, 1811), p. 129.

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permanent buildings and roads did not exist and all communication was by boat along the canals, or "klongs." [503] 361

Singapore possessed the advantage of greater topographic variety. Eminences of granite formed good sites for public buildings, and the city spread out over the land above flood level on both sides of the swampy Singapore River.

All the old towns, with the exception of the architecturally exotic Bangkok, have a gridiron layout, which has meant the maximum of congestion in modern times. Racial zonation, well marked in the old towns, has tended to persist. Europeans have long since abandoned their old quarters, but the Chinese have remained in strength; indigenous peoples, however, are significantly absent. In Manila and Bangkok the old cores have been retained intact and new business and financial quarters have been created away from the old cities. Though Intramuros has lost its military functions and most of its administrative ones, it still keeps, in part, those of a judicial and religious nature. Old Bangkok, however, has lost little of its earlier importance and is one of the greatest tourist attractions in Southeast Asia. In Singapore and Jakarta the old core has been reconstructed as the business district, but since this took place before the advent of the motor vehicle, congestion is still acute. Saigon, having no old core and therefore able to plan its development without encumbrances, nevertheless also adopted a gridiron layout, but it is not easy to suggest an alternative that would have made better use of the environment. 162 361

The Expansion of the Cities

The rapid growth of the cities in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries has been due to the investment of capital, largely from the mother country, in production for export; the consequent improvement of the ports and the creation of a communications network focusing on them; a considerable increase in the scope of administrative activities; and, more recently, the establishment of secondary industries. Though these have provided the impetus, expansion has been possible only through the application of new techniques of engineering (particularly in drainage and water supply) and preventive medicine, making the cities as healthy as those of the West. 361

The three centuries of stagnation in Manila is a remarkable historical record. Expansion beyond the walls of Intramuros began almost a century later than the growth of old Batavia, which too had suffered a period of stagnation in the seventeenth century. Even the short British occupation (1762–1764) and the revolt of the American colonies failed to arouse Spanish interest in the distant possession, and the growth of Manila in the latter half

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361 of the nineteenth century was a reflection of the investment of foreign capital in the archipelago, stimulated by the opening of the Suez Canal. In 1863 relocation of the administrative area began, with the move of the Governor to the Malacañan Palace, north of the river, and in the last three decades of Spanish rule development on the north bank of the Pasig was rapid. [504] After the American occupation Manila grew quickly. A modern harbor was constructed on reclaimed land on the seaward side of Intramuros (1903), and the main development of the city was shifted south of the Pasig, where new [162] administrative and residential districts were created. Since World War II the city has again expanded, owing partly to an influx of population from the country, and partly to the use of reconstruction funds for development. The built-up area is now practically continuous from the swamps of the Bitas River mouth in the north to Parañaque in the south, a distance of about 10 miles. Northeast and southeast of the urban fringe, rice fields still cover the plain, and parts of the city itself are regularly flooded in the rainy season (April-October). Development has proceeded farthest inland on the higher ground between the coastal plain and the Marikina River, which drains southward to the Pasig. Here are the newer districts of Mandaluyong, San Juan del Monte, and Quezon City, the last virtually a satellite town, which is the new administrative center of the Republic.

341 As a result of its long history and changing administration, Manila has 361 a greater variety of architectural styles and street patterns than the other four cities. Old buildings of wood and adobe in the colonial style were found in Intramuros (which was largely destroyed in 1945) and occasionally outside, but in the main business district in Binondo and in the administrative quarter of Ermita modern steel-framed concrete buildings now predominate. Manila is not a city of skyscrapers. Good foundations are impossible in the alluvial sediments, and deep piling to reach the underlying granite or "floating" on enormous cellular rafts of concrete is necessary for large buildings in all the great cities. In the districts of earliest expansion, radiating plazas and boulevards are to be seen; elsewhere the gridiron layout of the typical American city has been adhered to, except in the newer areas to the east, where attempts have been made to relate development to 162 topography. Racial zonation is well marked. The Chinese community in- 361 habits the narrow streets north of the Escolta in the business quarter, and the principal indigenous residential areas lie north of the city in the crowded districts of Tondo, Sampaloc, and Santa Cruz. Europeans, Americans, and wealthy Filipinos reside on the higher ground in the districts of Ermita and Malate, south of the river.

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

FIG. 1—Location sketch map of Manila.

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361 Modern Batavia, the immediate forebear of Jakarta, dated from the reconstruction of the old city in the early nineteenth century. The expansion of trade and growth of population in the eighteenth century had made necessary the redevelopment of the town, still closely confined around the old fort. In 1808, Governor General Daendels moved the administrative headquarters to Buitenzorg (now Bogor), pulled down the old fort, and used the material for the construction of a new residential district some three miles south of the old town, on the higher ground of Weltevreden. Three miles south of the new district the military camp of Meester Cornelis was established, and thus the axis of future development was aligned north–south, avoiding the low rice-growing plains on each side.

Weltevreden, like the old town, was laid out on a rectangular pattern around large open squares, the Koningsplein and the Waterlooplein. Later in the nineteenth century the old city itself was largely rebuilt, and many of the canals were filled in, but the Town Hall and the buildings of the East India Company still remain. The old town is now the main business and financial district. Weltevreden has experienced several changes in the present century. The northern part between the Koningsplein and the Molenvliet, one of the surviving canals, has become a secondary business district, and its residential character is tending to disappear. The main European residential districts were in south Weltevreden and the newer Gondangdia and Menteng, where the street pattern is not so uniformly rectilinear. These new districts eventually linked up with the development around the military base of Meester Cornelis, and in 1935 the three old foci, Batavia, Weltevreden, and Meester Cornelis, were united in the Municipality of Batavia. [162] As in Manila, racial segregation was pronounced; the Chinese lived in the old town, and in the lacunae between the developments along the roads the indigenous peoples lived in kampongs, a veritable *rus in urbe*. Since the establishment of the Republic, the city, renamed Jakarta, has changed considerably. The kampong area has been greatly enlarged, and old Dutch street and district names have been discarded. Weltevreden has ceased to have a separate identity, and Meester Cornelis has become Djatinagara.

Bangkok owes its transformation from an overgrown floating village into a modern metropolis to the activities of King Chulalongkorn (1868–1910), the creator of modern Siam, whose reign marked the beginning of commercial rice cultivation in the Menam plain and the teak industry in the north. The development of Bangkok was closely bound up with the exporting and processing of both commodities. The Klong Ong Ang marks the first stage in the expansion of the city, to the east of the Grand Palace; development on the right bank was retarded by the absence of bridges over

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FIG. 2—Location sketch map of Jakarta.

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

FIG. 3—Location sketch map of Bangkok.

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the Chao Phraya, and even now there has been little expansion in that direction. At the end of the nineteenth century the filling in of the klongs and their replacement by roads were begun. The main axis of development was to the southeast, along the "New Road," as well as along the river. The expansion of commerce necessitated a business district, which was created in the Bangrak area, south of the Chinese quarter of Sampeng, and the increase in government functions led to an expansion of administration into Samsen and Dusit, to the north, while new European residential districts arose in the southeast. The west bank of the river, however, where the high tower of Wat Arun forms the most conspicuous landmark in the city, long remained an indigenous area, with a large population living in boats. The port has lagged behind in adaptation to changed technologies, and improved facilities are long overdue.

Saigon is virtually a twentieth-century city, though the construction of a business quarter and a modern port was begun shortly after the French occupation, and, as in the case of Bangkok, growth has been linked with the rice export trade. However, administration has been relatively more important than in any of the other cities. Before the creation of Vietnam, Cochin China was a French colony, governed from Saigon by French officials exclusively, and the city alternated with Hanoi as the residence of the Governor General of Indochina. With the loss of effective control over most of Tonkin, Saigon has become the main French base and center of power in Indochina.

The direction of expansion of the city has been westward toward Cholon, but Saigon is much more compact than any of the other great cities. The main business district lies in the southern part, close to the Arroyo Chinois, which links the Saigon River with Cholon. The shopping and administrative areas, characterized by wide boulevards, are a little to the northwest, and the European residential area lies on the "Plateau" to the north, a few feet above sea level. Cholon is a complete contrast, and until the war it had a much larger population. Unlike Saigon, which has a rectangular pattern of broad streets, Cholon has grown haphazardly along its many waterways. In 1932 the two cities were combined in a special administrative area, but they have remained largely independent of each other. Saigon is mainly concerned with administration and port activities, whereas Cholon has developed as the principal industrial area of Indochina. As in Jakarta, the enormous postwar increase in population has resulted in a great expansion in the area occupied by temporary dwellings, around the city margins.

The founder of Singapore did not omit to provide his city with a plan

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

FIG. 4—Location sketch map of Saigon-Cholon.



FIG. 5—Location sketch map of Singapore.

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for development.[6] The early mercantile and financial quarter was on the right bank of the Singapore River, where it has remained ever since. Raffles planned a racial residential zonation, the Chinese to be confined to the right bank above the business district, the Europeans to inhabit the opposite bank. Though this was eventually abandoned, Singapore's "Chinatown," with the highest population density in the city, still marks the old Chinese area. The early gridiron pattern was continued in the development to the east, the first direction of expansion. In the nineteenth century the city began to expand onto the somewhat higher land to the north, and here the new European residential district of Tanglin arose; but commercial interests are steadily invading the older part of the better residential areas to the north. With the reclamation in the last 50 years of the numerous swamps that set limits to expansion the lacunae in development have been filled in, and the city sprawls along the south coast of the island for more than 10 miles. Indeed, at no great date in the future the whole island will be effectively urbanized. The Armed Services occupy large areas, and their establishments constitute in effect separate towns. Room for expansion is becoming increasingly difficult to find, but the city's public housing achievements, particularly the new development at Tiong Bahru, on the west side, are worthy of note as being among the best in Asia.

In appearance the five cities are not greatly dissimilar to cities of the West, but there is a more clearly defined zonation of commercial, industrial, and residential development, the last showing a racial differentiation, which, though everywhere tending to break down, is nevertheless still conspicuous. Differences are also discernible in the suburbs, with their two-story "shophouses," and above all in the outer margins, where "temporary" houses of wood thatched with nipa palm cluster together in overgrown kampongs or barrios, engulfed by the outward sprawl of the cities. Here large numbers of indigenous people live in an environment that is neither urban nor rural.

The central business and "downtown" districts are entirely nonindigenous. International banks, commodity exchanges, and great mercantile houses reproduce all the features of the business quarter of the Western city, though there is a steady infiltration by Indian and Chinese financial and mercantile interests. The main shopping areas are also predominantly European, though here again Chinese and Indian establishments are numerous. Congestion is proportionately as great as in the Western city, and none suffers worse in this respect than Manila. Binondo, the main business district, lies on the

[6] For a full account see E. H. G. Dobby: Singapore: Town and Country, *Geog. Rev.*, Vol. 30, 1940, pp. 84–109.

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361 north bank of the Pasig, and circulation is impeded by the bridges over the river; approach from the north is slowed by bottlenecks where narrow bridges span the many small canals, or *esteros*, which make the district virtually an island.

Administration is a main function of the five cities. So far as Jakarta and Singapore are concerned, it is highly likely that the gradual growth of a parliamentary democracy in the mother country, which necessitated an increase in the size of the colonial administration,[7] was a dominant factor in city growth; similar tendencies have been observed in the other cities, though the degree varies considerably. The administrative areas are distinct, but the enormous growth in official business in the last 25 years and the expansion of the cities have necessitated some decentralization of administrative functions. Only Singapore is not an official capital, but despite the creation of an administrative capital for the Federation of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur, Singapore is unlikely to suffer from this apparent loss of government business.[8]

The Ports and Their Functions

504 In the cities of Southeast Asia, lacking the heavy industrialization that has
361 accompanied the development of ports in the West, port functions are relatively more important. Nevertheless, in any great port a certain amount of industrialization is inevitable, and the cities already possess a considerable industrial variety.

Unlike the smaller ports of their respective territories, which serve mainly local needs, the five cities are international ports, with a commerce that is becoming more widespread as the ties of former colonies with the homeland are loosened. The ports handle a large proportion of the export trade of their territories, but an even larger proportion of the import trade; distribution is thus a principal function in the economic life of the cities.

The modern ports, constructed on reclaimed land, are entirely artificial, but nowhere, even in the tidal ports of Bangkok and Saigon, are enclosed basins necessary. The modern ports, however, have not completely succeeded in displacing the old harbors; the Pasig and Singapore Rivers continue to carry a heavy lighter traffic from vessels in the Roads, with a great saving in port dues.

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[7] Amry Vandenbosch: The Dutch East Indies (3rd edit., Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1942), p. 75.

[8] Nevertheless, Singapore still is, as it always was, an administrative center of the first importance. The Colony has its own government offices, and also those of the Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South-East Asia. It contains the headquarters of the Far Eastern Naval, Military, and Air Forces of the British Commonwealth, and many Commonwealth and foreign consular and diplomatic offices. Finally, the City of Singapore has its own Municipal Council, which is responsible for the administration of many public utilities.

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Manila is unusual in possessing two harbors, one north of the Pasig, which handles the large interisland traffic, and the main harbor for transoceanic vessels, south of the entrance to the river. The Pasig itself is dredged to a depth of 18 feet as far as Jones Bridge, and is lined with quays. Native craft carry a considerable traffic upstream and along the many esteros. Manila normally handles about 30 per cent of the total export trade of the Philippine Republic, and more than 90 per cent of the imports.

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With some 30 million tons of shipping entering and clearing annually, Singapore is one of the world's great ports. The functional pattern is similar to that of Manila. The modern port of Keppel Harbor handles most of the trade with the more distant parts of Asia and the rest of the world, and much of the entrepôt trade with South China and the rest of Southeast Asia is handled in the Roads. The political separation of Singapore from the Federation of Malaya complicates assessment of the trade of the port, since official statistics now exclude trade with the Federation; though it is not quite clear what proportion of Singapore's trade is conducted with the Federation. in 1951 the port handled 74 per cent of Malaya's imports and 67 per cent of the exports. Singapore shares with Bangkok the distinction of exporting more by value than it imports; the other ports all have an "unfavorable" trade balance. The great naval base, considerably enlarged since the war, is well removed from the commercial port; it lies on Johore Strait, some 17 miles from the city, almost as far distant as the Cavite base is from Manila.

Tanjoengpriok, the port of Jakarta, is of all the modern ports the farthest from the city center. Its construction some six miles northeast of the city was necessitated by the silting of the Tjiliwong, which has built up an expanse of mud flats along the coast more than a mile in width; the flats have, however, been put to productive use through the excavation of fishponds. The old harbor, connected with the modern port by the Antjol Canal, does not compare in importance with the Singapore River or the Pasig, nor does the rather large coastal and interisland trade have an independent harbor, as in Manila, though one of the Tanjoengpriok basins is used almost exclusively for this purpose. In the unrest that preceded the formation of the Indonesian Republic, the trade of Tanjoengpriok decreased greatly, but since 1950 recovery has been rapid. Some ground, however, has been lost to other ports: in 1951 Tanjoengpriok handled only 10 per cent of the exports of Indonesia, though its share of the imports was better maintained, with some 52 per cent of the national total.

Saigon is both a commercial and a naval port, though as a naval base it cannot rival Singapore or Cavite. It is approached by way of the Saigon

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504 River, which, though possessing adequate depth for vessels up to 30 feet in
361 draft, has a sinuous channel, which prevents ships longer than 550 feet from ascending to the port. The strong scour of the semidiurnal tides reduces the necessity for dredging. The port occupies about three miles of the right bank of the river and is divided into three sections. Overseas trade is handled by the quays between the Arroyo Chinois and the Canal de Dérivation, in the Khan Hoi district; smaller vessels use the quays nearer the city; and the naval port lies farthest upstream, close to the Arroyo de l'Avalanche. Lighters convey cargoes from ships anchored in the river below the city to wharves along the Arroyo Chinois and the Canal de Dérivation, the twin waterways that link Saigon with Cholon. Before 1939, Saigon handled about 40 per cent of the total foreign trade of Indochina; rice formed about 50 per cent by weight of the exports. At the present time the military operations taking place in the country have greatly reduced the trade of Saigon, and the rice export is only some 100,000 tons a year.

Bangkok alone of all the ports is still inaccessible to large ocean-going vessels. A bar at the mouth of the Menam Chao Phraya prevents entry, and the terminal for large vessels has long been Gaw Si Kang, an island in the Gulf of Siam east of the river mouth. From Gaw Si Kang strings of lighters are drawn by tugs to the wharves of Bangkok, which extend for about six miles along the left bank below the Grand Palace. The dredging of the bar to allow ocean-going vessels to reach the port would have presented no great difficulties, but opposition from the lightering interests prevented anything from being done until shortly before the war, when work was begun on a new port at Klong Toi, about five miles below the city. It is now proposed, as part of a plan to expand rice cultivation in Thailand, to deepen the channel so that vessels of 26-foot draft can ascend to the port. Bangkok has an almost complete monopoly of the foreign trade of Thailand, and in a real sense it is the only port of the country.

Industrial Development

32 The five cities contain a large proportion of the total industrial capacity
361 of their respective territories. Industry is well represented, though much of
38 it is better described as processing than as manufacturing, and its range of
39 activities is continually increasing. The primary processing of foodstuffs and raw materials is dominant; rice milling is particularly important, except in Singapore, but rubber, copra, sago, tapioca, hemp, sugar, and tobacco all assume considerable local significance. A beginning has been made with the higher stages of manufacturing, such as rubber products and even foam

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rubber, in Singapore; other manufactures are furniture, boats, footwear, glass, bricks and tiles, oils and soaps, electric batteries, and certain chemical products. Manufacturing industries proper use relatively little machinery and power and produce for the home market, in which there is a considerable element of local protection. Food and drink industries are well developed (including brewing and distilling); textiles are poorly developed. Heavy industry is confined to the repair and refitting of vessels. All the ports have forges and foundries for making minor repairs; Singapore and Jakarta, which have dry-dock facilities, can undertake more extensive work. Repair shops for maintenance of railway equipment are located in all the cities except Singapore; the assembly of imported motor vehicles is carried on in Manila, Jakarta, and Singapore. Industry relies largely on electric power, which is expensive because of the paucity of local coal supplies.

Small-scale industry is almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese; the larger undertakings are overwhelmingly European-owned, though there are some large Chinese industrial establishments. Only a small proportion of the inhabitants of the cities are engaged in industry: in Singapore, where industry is expanding rapidly, only 11 per cent of the adult working population were employed in industrial establishments in the census of 1947. This unduly low figure does not take account of the large employment in the establishments of the Armed Services, much of which was industrial.

The industrial areas lie close to the port or along the rivers and canals. They are surrounded by areas of high population density; for the relatively high cost and limited availability of public transport operate to retard the divorce of place of work and residence, which is so conspicuous a feature of the Western city. Newer industrial areas, however, are appearing on the margins of the cities, and as the range of industrial activity grows, industry is likely to become more widely dispersed.

Population

All the five cities would have probably reached the one-million level in a comparatively short period if the war had not intervened. During the Japanese occupation, population decreased in the cities because of the shortage of food, and the wartime dislocation that elsewhere in Asia resulted in a large influx of rural dwellers into the cities did not operate here. With the end of the war the tide set strongly in the opposite direction. The breakdown of effective administration in many parts of Southeast Asia following the Japanese surrender, armed insurrections against the central governments, the struggle for independence, the depredations of extreme

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factions, and the difficulty of protecting disliked minorities, particularly the Chinese, all combined to attract many rural dwellers to the comparative safety of the cities. This immigration of refugees was perhaps greatest in Saigon-Cholon: from a population of about 300,000 at the time of the Japanese occupation the twin cities have increased to an estimated 1,400,000. Jakarta has grown almost as spectacularly. At the census of 1930 the city of Batavia had a population of a little more than half a million; by 1950 the Indonesian government estimated Jakarta's population to be not less than two million; and at present the city may well contain nearer three million. Even on the most conservative estimate it is by far the most populous city in the whole of Southeast Asia.

In the census of 1948, Greater Manila had a population of 1,180,000; however, several separately recorded districts of Rizal Province are integral parts of the built-up area, and their inclusion raises the total to more than a million and a quarter. The 14 districts of the City of Manila proper showed a 58 per cent increase over the 1939 census figures. Singapore and Bangkok have been relatively unaffected by postwar immigration from the country. In the intercensal period 1931–1947 the population of the island of Singapore grew by some 68 per cent, owing to the gradual establishment of an equality in the sex composition of the Chinese population, together with a steady decline in the death rate; allowing for natural increase since the census, the population of Singapore Colony at present is about 1,100,000, of whom about 70 per cent reside in the municipal area. Before the war Bangkok was approaching 900,000, but in the census of 1947 the population was only 1,116,600;[9] hence the war may have somewhat retarded the city's growth.

The present rate of growth due to natural increase seems to be about 3 per cent a year in all the cities, which is much higher than the rate in their respective national territories. This will present many difficult problems of development. As might be expected, the already overcrowded districts have experienced the greatest increases; in Manila, for example, the districts of Tondo, Sampaloc, and Santa Cruz have increased their populations by 80 per cent or more since 1939. As compared with Western cities, densities in the poorest areas are extremely high; 1500 persons to an acre would not be excessive for the net density of the worst blocks.[10] On the other hand, density

[9] With Thonburi. According to the *Statistical Year Book of Thailand*, N.S., Vol. 1, 1952, recently received, the total for the two is 1,178,881.

[10] Net density is the average density of the population of a given residential area, which consists solely of the dwellings and one-half of the width of streets giving access thereto. The figure quoted here is an estimate by the Singapore Improvement Trust of the situation in the most overcrowded part of the city.

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development in the best residential districts is very low, frequently one or two houses to an acre, so that the cities sprawl widely. 361

From the beginning, Chinese immigrants have constituted an important element of the cities. At first encouraged, and later feared, by the authorities, the Chinese were confined to special quarters, such as the famous Parián of Manila, where they have tended to remain. Dislike of them has been a universal rallying point of numerous indigenous politicians, and the murder of many Chinese in the period following the Japanese collapse recalls the massacres of the early history of Manila and Batavia. Where immigration has been comparatively free, at least until fairly recent times, the Chinese have become a majority: Singapore is more than 77 per cent Chinese—the largest Chinese community outside China—and in Bangkok more than 60 per cent of the population are Chinese or of mixed Chinese-Thai ancestry. The lower proportions of Chinese in the other three cities are due to the earlier restrictions on immigration, together with an influx of indigenous peoples from rural areas in the postwar period. Events in China, however, have everywhere increased illegal Chinese immigration. The removal of many Chinese from rural Cochin China to the Saigon-Cholon area has raised the percentage of Chinese in Cholon to about 60, and it is probably not less than 30 in the combined cities. In Manila and Jakarta it is much lower, and the total number of Chinese is not easy to estimate; both cities contain more than 50,000, and the number of persons of mixed Chinese and indigenous blood is undoubtedly much larger. Despite many vicissitudes, the Chinese have proved indispensable, and their importance in the economic life of the cities can hardly be overstated.

Europeans constitute only a very small proportion of the population of the cities. Only in prewar Batavia did they amount to as much as 5 per cent of the total, and this was in part due to the inclusion of Eurasians as Europeans in the Dutch statistics. Of the other immigrant groups, the most numerous are Indians and Pakistanis, who in Singapore made up 7 per cent of the population in 1947. Jakarta has a small community of Arabs, engaged in shopkeeping or moneylending.

The indigenous peoples have a higher birth rate than the immigrant peoples, but also a higher death rate, so that the relative proportions of the two groups have tended to remain the same. Lately the migration of indigenous peoples to the cities, especially in the new independent states, has altered the balance somewhat, and the partly alien character of the cities may tend to decline. Simultaneously, restrictions have been placed on the economic activities of the Chinese in the Philippines and Thailand, but the outcome of these measures is unlikely to be that intended.

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The Future of the Cities

361 The future of the great cities remains problematic. They have attained their present size and pre-eminence through their role as intermediaries in the interchange of foodstuffs and raw materials with the manufactured products of the West, but this activity has been carried on entirely by aliens. So long as this economic pattern persists, the great port cities will continue to occupy a leading position in the life of Southeast Asia. But the pattern may not persist, and it is clear that the economic development of Southeast Asia will include an increasing attention to home production of both foodstuffs and manufactures. Southeast Asia may return to the political instability of precolonial times; it may become part of the Communist sphere; or it may succeed in maintaining neutrality between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. In any event, the great cities cannot escape some readjustment, and they may well lose ground to other centers. Already there is opposition to the dominant position of the great city in national affairs. If extremist elements prevail, it appears likely that other cities may come to the fore; just as Shanghai has been supplanted by a revived Peking, so the victory of Vietminh would be likely to confer supremacy on Tonkin. The future of Singapore is particularly difficult to forecast, since it is the only city that is not an administrative capital of a state. Its integration into the Federation of Malaya would give the immigrant Chinese numerical superiority and would be strongly resisted by the Malays of the peninsula. Political changes in China and Southeast Asia itself may make the entrepôt trade difficult to maintain, and as a center of world communications Singapore has already lost ground to Bangkok, which is better placed for trans-Asian and trans-Pacific air routes. Moreover, its utter dependence on outside sources for food,[11] and to some extent for water, must greatly limit its usefulness as a strategic base—problems that have already given rise to some concern. Of all the cities, only Bangkok appears to be without a potential rival, despite an attempt in 1945 to relocate the administrative capital.[12] It may well be that the great cities' brightest future lies in an increase in the range and pace of industrialization.

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[11] "Food Supplies for Singapore," Singapore, 1951.

[12] Bangkok's central position in Southeast Asia, equidistant from South and Far East Asia, is reflected in its selection as the headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

000 Volume LX MARCH 1955 Number 5

17: Ginsburg E-4 (no date)1955 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

THE GREAT CITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA[1]

NORTON S. GINSBURG

ABSTRACT

361 A major characteristic of urbanization in Southeast Asia is the functional dominance, with two minor exceptions, of one great metropolis in each of the countries of the region. These cities have acted as the head-links between the West and the indigenous societies. They are in a state of rapid social change, associated with the granting of political autonomy to the former colonial nations, with the accelerated rise of nationalism, and the increasing centralization of political functions in the national capitals.

162 369 361 Standards for defining urban populations differ, but it can be assumed safely that no more than 15 per cent of the 175 million people of Southeast Asia belong in an urban category.[2] In contrast, in the United States, with a population somewhat smaller than that of Southeast Asia as a whole, over 64 per cent of the population is classified as urban.

Estimates for 1952 indicate only 30 cities or urban agglomerations with populations of 100,000 or more.[3] In the United States, however, there are 160 such urban areas; in the Soviet Union, with a population of 200 millions, there are about 120; and in Japan, with one-half the population of Southeast Asia, there are 64. In Southeast Asia only an estimated 7 per cent of the total population lives in cities of 100,000 or more; less in Burma, Indochina, Thailand, and Indonesia; somewhat more in the Philippines. Only Malaya, including Singapore, departs

[1] Revised from a paper read before the Far Eastern Association in Spring, 1954.

[121] As used here, "urbanization" connotes not only mere numerical increases in the population of cities but also the development of an urban way of life and the accompanying changes in value orientation (cf. Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1938).

[2] Census data for Southeast Asia are notably incomplete. In Burma, Thailand, and the Associated States of Indochina the "urban" population is estimated to be little more than 10 per cent of the whole; in Indonesia still less; but in the Philippines some 24 per cent of the population is classified as urban; and in Malaya, including the Crown Colony of Singapore, about 35 per cent. Without Singapore, only 27 per cent of the Malayan population is classified as urban.

[113] [3] *United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1952.*

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significantly from the norm, with 18 per cent of its population living in large urban clusters. In the United States, on the other hand, nearly 30 per cent of the population lives in such large cities.

Southeast Asia retains many characteristics of a frontier region, with large areas of sparse population, and so it seems paradoxical that its population density is 95 per square mile, as compared with 50 in the United States, 23 in the Soviet Union, and 617 in Japan. Clearly there is no single correlation between densities and urbanization. The explanation lies in the structure of the urban hierarchy within the region. Whereas in the United States there is a notable gradation of cities from larger to smaller, and only 18 per cent of the urban population lives in cities of one million population or more, in Southeast Asia the urban population is most clearly associated with the largest cities. For example, in Thailand, half of the urban population lives in one metropolis, Bangkok, and the rest is distributed among a large number of smaller cities and towns, the largest of which contains no more than 35,000 people. Bangkok, therefore, may be regarded as a true Primate City, that is, a city with many times the population of the next largest city and a multiplicity of functions and attractions which give it dominance.[4] The Primate City is characteristic of the so-called "great cities" in Southeast Asia, with few exceptions.[5] Such are, in

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[4] Mark Jefferson, "The Law of the Primate City," *Geographical Review*, April, 1939.

[5] For an excellent description of several of these great cities upon which this paper is based in part see D. W. Fryer, "The 'Million City' in Southeast Asia," *Geographical Review*, October, 1953.

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

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162 Burma, Rangoon; in Thailand, Bangkok; in
369 the Philippines, Manila; and in Malaya,
Singapore. In Indochina, however, there are
361 two major core regions, each with its region-
al capital, but Saigon is clearly dominant
over Hanoi, which for reasons of population
size alone must be regarded as a lesser city.[6]
In Indonesia densely populated Java has
two large cities, Jakarta and Surabaya, the
first only twice the size of the second, but
Jakarta is the Primate City, if less clearly
than Bangkok or Rangoon. In each case,
other than Indonesia, the Primate City is
from five to ten times as large as the next
largest city, and there is no such graded
hierarchy of urbanization as in the United
States and to a considerable degree in West-
ern European countries and Japan. Second-
ary cities, such as Mandalay in Burma,
Makassar and Jogjakarta in Indonesia, and
Cebu in the Philippines, tend to be regional
capitals subordinate to a great metropolis.

178 The rapid population growth of the six
162 greatest metropolitan centers—Rangoon,
Bangkok, Saigon, Manila, Singapore, and
369 Jakarta—suggest that national urbanization
may be proceeding as rapidly in Southeast
361 Asia as in any other part of the world.[7] This
may be true, but it can be argued also that
the overwhelming dominance of the Primate
City inhibits the growth of lesser cities and
that the largest cities will expand more
rapidly than the lesser ones.[8] There are in
effect only a limited number of services to be
performed by cities within a predominantly
village and folk society, although it may be
industrializing slowly, and the great cities
continue to possess a virtual monopoly of
these services. Thus, even as a society
changes, new and increasingly complex func-
tions tend to be performed by institutions

[113] [6] According to the *Annuaire statistique du Vietnam, 1949–50*, the population of Hanoi was 216,900 in 1950. Its port, Haiphong, had a population of 146,000. The total population of the two is only about one-fifth that of the twin cities of Saigon-Cholon.

[7] Between 1939 and 1948 the population of Greater Manila increased by 55 per cent. Between 1931 and 1947 the population of Singapore Town (now City) increased by 52.5 per cent.

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178 already established in the Primate cities. So,
162 to a very large degree, in Southeast Asia
369 growth is primarily in the great cities,[9]
361 whereas in the United States in the last three decades at least growth has been more rapid in the small and intermediate cities.

Although the rates of urbanization are high, being, in the case of the Philippines nearly twice the rate of population growth,[10] no sudden transformation to an urbanized society can be envisaged. The percentage of total population classified as urban is in general so low and the normal rates of population increase so high that the growth of urban population *as a percentage of total population* has not been spectacular. In the Philippines, for example, the urban population increased merely from 23.3 per cent in 1939 to 24.1 per cent in 1948, largely in the Manila area. The apparent positive correlation between social change and rates of urban population growth also is exceptionally high. To illustrate with a negative example, in Thailand, where recent social change has been minimal, the rapid population growth of Bangkok has been equaled and even exceeded by that of a number of rural *changwats* in the central and southeastern parts of the country. Under at least two conditions, however, the great cities have increased their populations enormously and at shocking rates: (1) where enlarged political functions have been acquired since the war and (2) where rural unrest and insecurity have

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[8] The only apparent major exception to this generalization is Singapore and Malaya, where the lesser towns have tended to increase their populations equally rapidly since 1931. This situation may be explained by the special political and economic status of Singapore, the entrepôt for much of archipelagic Southeast Asia, and the exceptional degree of commercialization in the Malayan economy as a whole (see M. V. del Tufo, *A Report on the 1947 Census of Population [Malaya, Comprising the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore]* [London, 1949]).

[9] E.g., Greater Manila accounted for 89 per cent of the 1939–48 growth of the seven largest cities in the Philippines.

[10] Between 1939 and 1948 the approximate rate of total population growth was 20 per cent; that of urban population growth, nearly 40 per cent.

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178 caused or hastened a flight to the relative
162 security of the city. These forces have been
369 operating in combination particularly in
361 Rangoon, Jakarta, Saigon, and Manila and largely are responsible for their extremely rapid postwar growth. Lesser cities in Java, for example, such as Surabaya, Jogjakarta, Semarang, and Surakarta, also have increased in population because of rural insecurity; and in Burma in several towns and cities up to 50 per cent of the population has been resident less than four years, for the same reasons. These migrations have not, however, necessarily been accompanied by greater employment opportunities and consequently cannot be regarded as indexes of more rapid urbanization and associated socioeconomic change.

184 The great cities of Southeast Asia possess
361 many features in common, not the least of
369 which is their youth. This quality they share
175 also with several of the great cities of the
178 United States, but there the resemblance ceases.[11] In 1800 Rangoon, Saigon, and Singapore did not yet exist in city form; Bangkok, the new capital of Thailand, was less than twenty years old; Manila and Batavia (Jakarta), though then about two hundred years old, were merely small coastal towns. They began to grow rapidly after the middle of the nineteenth century, as a consequence of the development of the treaty ports in China, the opening of Japan, the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown by the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, the opening of the

[11] For the most part the growth of the Southeast Asian cities was not associated with a total transformation of society but with a strong indigenous tradition, as in the case of Bangkok, or with the juxtaposition of a segment of a new civilization alongside the old, as in the case of Rangoon. In America the cities represented the culmination of a social transformation in a virtually unoccupied frontier region. The same is true of Manchuria, the northeastern frontier of pioneer settlement in China, which is more recently, and more highly, urbanized than any other part of China. In Manchuria, as in the United States, there is a quite regular gradation of city sizes, and the Primate City cannot be clearly identified.

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Suez Canal in 1869, and the consolidation of Western control, direct or indirect, over most of Southeast Asia in the 1890's, followed by American acquisition of the Philippines at the turn of the century.

More important, the great cities were, and to a large degree still are, foreign creations, essentially alien to the Southeast Asian landscape. Although several began as native settlements, they developed as foreign exclaves on the margins of Asia, in much the same way as did the plantation system and mining operations. With the exception of Bangkok, they represented and functioned as the overseas appendages of Western, not indigenous, interests, being what Spate has called "head-links"—the gates by which Western concepts entered to destroy and build and in which a new system of economic organization evolved.[12] Indeed, the concept of the Asian plural society was inspired by the contrast between the basically foreign great city and the indigenous agricultural village. The ties of the great city with its hinterland were primarily commercial and associated with foreign-controlled mining and plantation interests and with Chinese-dominated rice trade. Such direct political-administrative ties as did exist were restricted primarily to indigenous elites, small in number, which allied themselves with Western interests. Where the indigenous rural populations were affected by these urban-rural relations, it was primarily through the plantation or the mining system, both of which needed a large labor force, or through Indian or Chinese intermediaries.

On the other hand, the relations between an indigenous capital, like Bangkok in its earlier period, or Kyoto or Peking, and the agrarian society upon which it was based were of quite a different order. In these cases the capital represented the culmination of what might be termed a national *ethos*, the epitome of what Redfield has

[12] O. H. K. Spate, "Factors in the Development of Capital Cities," *Geographical Review*, October, 1942, p. 628.

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called the "Great Tradition" in an agrarian society.[13] 361

The links between country and city in this basically feudal relationship were clear, consecutive, and relatively simple to define. To be sure, the villager would regard the capital as a different world from his own, but it was nevertheless a largely comprehensible world, if associated with abstractions and refinements beyond his immediate ken.[14] 369 184 181

The modern great city of Southeast Asia, however, not only was different but was also incomprehensible to the child of the folk society, who came to regard it not merely as strange and foreign but also as hostile. The "foreignness" is reflected in their ethnic composition. Until the second World War at least the largest population group in Rangoon was Indian; Singapore is primarily a Chinese city; Bangkok is very largely Chinese, as is Saigon if Cholon, its twin city, is included; both Manila and Jakarta have large foreign and Chinese elements. To this extent the great city is more metropolitan than national. Each has its Chinese, European, and native quarters, for example, although in many instances the lines of division have become blurred, especially since the close of the war.[15] Furthermore, wherever Chinese populations are large, a predominant type of house is the so-called "shophouse," a two-or-more-story building with shops on the first floor, built to a standard width originally dictated by the length of the average fir-log lintel as used in South China, and with residential flats and 631 361 369 184 578 162 563 342 347 563 369 184

[13] See Robert Redfield and Milton Singer, "A Cultural Role of Cities," a working paper for the Conference on the Role of Cities in Economic Growth and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, May 24–26, 1954. [113]

[14] Cf. J. M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian City: Its Culture and Evolution," *Asia*, March, 1953.

[15] In Singapore the Chinese are localized according to the various so-called "clans," e.g., Hokkien, Cantonese, Tiuchiu, Hailams, and Hakka (see B. W. Hodder, "Racial Groupings in Singapore," *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, October, 1953).

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342 cubicles behind and above.[16] Usually con-
347 structed in continuous rows and back to
back, this type of tenement is among the
563 more conspicuous evils in Southeast Asian
369 cities. On the urban peripheries and wher-
ever interstices appear in the modern street
184 and housing pattern, slum villages appear
which consist of house clusters usually con-
structed of bamboo and *atap* palm, highly
inflammable and unsanitary.[17] These also
are found in and on the margins of the lesser
cities but are most striking in juxtaposition
to the sleek boulevards of Singapore, Bang-
kok, and Jakarta.

184 A further index of the cultural and eco-
369 nomic pluralism of the great cities is their
361 frequent division into old and new towns.
In China, especially in the treaty ports, this
distinction is usually between an old Chinese
and a modern foreign city. The same is true
of India. In Southeast Asia the contrast is
most often between an old and a modern
town, both of Western origin, as in Jakarta,
Manila, Singapore, and Rangoon. To a not-
able degree each of these is also a planned
city. In Saigon the contrast is between pre-
dominantly Chinese Cholon and Saigon it-
self. In Bangkok, however, there are the old
Siamese castle town, a new town of indig-
enous origin, though of European design,
and a Chinese town or quarter nearly as old
as the castle town itself. Pluralism is seen
not merely in the division of a city into old
and new parts or into quarters but also in
the separation of the predominantly out-
ward-oriented great city from an up-coun-

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[16] For a description of the "shophouse" see R. H. Hughes, "Hong Kong: An Urban Study," *Geographical Journal*, March, 1951, pp. 9–10.

[17] These areas, the so-called "kampongs," are historically enclaves of the countryside within the city. They form small social cells which together cover most of the surface area in and on the margins of the great cities. Separately, they constitute the rural villages, which in the densely settled portions of Java, for example, are so closely spaced that they collectively exhibit population densities as high as those in many cities (see photographs in J. M. Fraser, "Town Planning and Housing in Singapore," *Town Planning Review*, January, 1953).

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184 try, indigenous, cultural or political sub-
369 center. Just as Shanghai had its Nanking
and Peking, so Rangoon has its Mandalay,
361 Jakarta its Jogjakarta, Manila its Cebu,
and, in a variant form, Singapore its Kuala Lumpur.

177 In the past these cities sited along the
Asian littoral have been the funnels through
184 which produce from the interiors have
reached tidewater and the world of com-
369 merce and Western manufactures have pen-
etrated. Through the increasingly metro-
361 politan channels have flowed the ideas of the
West as well as its material goods. In a sense
they have acted both as a catalyst for social
and economic change and as a cushion which
modified the shock of the earlier cultural
contacts.

361 With the exception of Singapore, the site
of each of the great cities of Southeast Asia
is an ill-drained riverine or coastal lowland
strategically placed in relation to an excep-
tionally productive agricultural region.
[504] Again, with the exception of Singapore, none
possesses a deep natural harbor suitable for
modern ocean-going shipping. The three
mainland ports are both river and ocean
ports and must be reached through tortuous
and shallow river channels. All are entre-
pôts. Jakarta and Manila are located on the
most highly developed islands of the archi-
pelagoes, for which they act as entrepôts.
Only in Indonesia and Indochina are there
major competitors for the two greatest ports
—Haiphong, the outlet for the densely pop-
ulated Tonkin delta, and Surabaya, the re-
gional capital for the Great East of the In-
dies, itself an empire. Each great port vir-
[439] tually dominates the national import trade;
all tend, however, to share some part of the
504 national export trade with lesser ports. In
361 spite of these great similarities, the nature
and functions of the ports differ markedly.
As Allen observes: "All ports are individual.
History, geography, politics, and economics
all contribute to making them as they are.
Few universal principles apply, and at-
tempts to force uniformity on ports which
have grown up differently are bound to
fail."[18] Singapore, for example, is one of the

504 world's great ports and the most Western of
361 the great cities of Southeast Asia. A Crown Colony, it is the only great city without a large administrative hinterland, although it is the seat of the British High Commissioner
[175] for Southeast Asia. Since its founding by Raffles in 1819, it has been a free port and an entrepôt for much of archipelagic Southeast Asia. About half of the 5.5 million tons of cargo that pass over Singapore's modern wharves originates outside of the Malayan peninsula, and it was not until 1924 that the island of Singapore was connected by causeway with the mainland. At the same time it handles two-thirds of Malaya's exports and about three-fourths of its imports by value. Increasingly, its interests have tended to focus upon Malaya itself, as its entrepôt functions have been cut into by the other great ports within the region, especially Jakarta. What has kept Singapore the largest port in Southeast Asia (over 20 million net tons of shipping entered in 1952) is its status as a free port and its strategic location at the western entrance to the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean basin. As a crossroad between the Pacific and Indian oceans, it attracts shipping from great distances. It
[508] also has become an important air center, and a new airfield is under construction north-
[368] east of the city. Finally, the concentration of banking, insurance, light industry, docking, repair, and outfitting facilities have fortified its dominant position.

361 Singapore City was originally laid out with due regard for ethnic quarters.[19] The
563 oldest section of the city, however, has become the business center, but the rest of the older town is a densely populated Chinese section, and much of the newer town to the northeast also is Chinese. Each of these areas is in turn divided on the basis of Chinese clan categories. The European residen-

[18] D. F. Allen, *Report on the Major Ports of Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1951), p. 128.

[19] For a general description of the city see E. H. G. Dobby, "Singapore: Town and Country," *Geographical Review*, January, 1940, and the *Colony of Singapore Annual Report*.

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tial area is primarily on higher ground in the 361
northern part of the city. The University of 563
Malaya is located in Singapore, though
plans are being made to move it to Johore
Baru on the Malayan mainland. Being 162
largely a Chinese city, Singapore has come 361
to act as a center for the Nan Yang expatri- 184
ate Chinese, and the city has been chosen as 563
the site of a new Chinese-language regional
university.[20] Nevertheless, its air is not that
of a Chinese city, nor, for that matter, is it
English. Like all great cities, it is cosmopoli-
tan, but it is also culturally rootless, perhaps
more so than any of the other great cities of
the region.

At the other extreme is Bangkok, most 361
indigenous of the great cities. Founded as 184
the last of a series of "forward capitals"[21] by 175
the Thai in 1783, after the destruction of
Ayuthia by the Burmese, the city has never
lost its native quality. The soaring rooftrees
of *bot* and the spires of stupa stamp the
Bangkok skyline with a character of its own.
The city is located on the left bank of the
Menam Chao Phya within the southern-
most great bend of the river some twenty
miles from its mouth. Exceptional prob- [364 312a]
lems of poor drainage plagued the city from
the start, and its numerous *klongs* or canals
have given it the rather misleading title of
the "Venice of the East."

A Chinese city early appeared to the 361
southeast of the original castle town and in 34
time became part of the central business 184
district. As the lesser *klongs* were filled in to
become roads, the city continued to expand.
A new city appeared on the northern out-
skirts of the old, a planned creation built in
the reign of Rama VI with broad boulevards
and buildings ranging from shocking Vic-
torian variations on Italian Renaissance to
more recent battleship modern. The con-
trast between the façade of modern build-
ings fronting these boulevards and the stilt-
ed, bamboo, thatch, and tin-roofed houses

[20] Richard Butwell, "A Chinese University for Malaya," *Pacific Affairs*, December, 1953.

[21] See reference to Cornish in Spate, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

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Bang Kok

361 behind them is one of the most striking
34 demonstrations of cultural dualism in South-
184 east Asia.

Unlike the other great cities, Bangkok
175 originated as the capital of a land-oriented
361 agrarian state. Its proximity to tidewater
was accidental. In 1822 the ship bearing the
504 Crawfurd mission to the Thai court barely
177 was able to cross the bar at the mouth of the
Menam, then covered by only four feet of
178 water.[22] Its poor harbor and its remoteness
from the major shipping routes of the South China Sea conspired to retard the development of the city as a port until the end of the nineteenth century and to retain it as an anachronism in Southeast Asia—a growing city, nearly great, surely primate, but indigenous rather than Western. Nevertheless, since it was through Bangkok that Western influences filtered into Thailand, it is a case of an indigenous capital acting as a revolutionary medium for socioeconomic change.

504 Bangkok is still the least convenient port
of the great cities in Southeast Asia. The bar
361 across the mouth of the Chao Phya was
dredged through only in 1952, and port facilities are modest as compared with the other cities. Indeed, most vessels still anchor in the Bight of Bangkok in the lee of the island, Kao Hsi Kang, at the mouth of the Chao Phya and transship their cargoes to and from river barges and country boats which link the island with Bangkok. Surprisingly, the freight tonnage handled at Bangkok is about one-third that of Singapore, although the volume of shipping is only one-tenth as large. The explanation lies partly in the large bulk shipments of rice which form the main export. Partly, also, there is a lower load factor at Singapore, since much of the shipping which enters its harbor is as much dependent on the local complex of service facilities as on cargo potential. At Bangkok, peripheral as it is to the main trade routes, few vessels call without assurances of sizable cargoes.

[22] See J. Crawfurd, *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China* (London: H. Colburn & R. Bentley, 1830).

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Bangkok

On the other hand[1] changes in transportation have elevated Bangkok to a new importance. It lies astride the main air route between Europe and the Far East, and the Australia-Europe services also pass through it. It is now the leading international air center in Southeast Asia, with 42 international departures a week in 1953 as compared with Singapore's 27, and its airport is one of the larger commercial fields in the Orient. 361 508 369

The role of the Southeast Asian great city has been modified by the Pacific war and the granting of independence to Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and partial independence to Vietnam. Five of the six great cities are now capitals of the independent states. Each of these merits the title "link capital"; that is, they are the media through which the newly independent states are linked with the outside world. At the same time, they have begun to assume an increasingly indigenous character. The substitution of Malay for Dutch names and street signs in Indonesia is only one evidence of cultural change. The in-migration of petty officials, tradesmen, and refugees from the beleaguered rural areas has given the urban populations a new and more homogeneous native cast. The fevers of nationalism have made the large minorities more cautious about flaunting their ethnic independence. 361 178 184 162 563 177 631 369

1 [i.e. as compared to the inconvenient port facilities -- Analyst]

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361 On the other hand, the war also brought in-
178 creased American influence into the region,
631 and the ubiquitous Coca-Cola sign is one of
184 the symbols of change that sooner or later
162 will be followed by changes in urban facili-
583 ties and urban organization.
171 More important, the present period is as-
369 sociated with an increasing intensification of the economic activities of government and a corresponding diminution of foreign enterprise. Political and administrative functions have become increasingly important since the war. Since the main governmental organs are concentrated in the largest centers, the direct influence of the great city upon the country in which it is primate is likewise increasing. Relations between nationalized city and an increasingly money-oriented countryside are becoming more intimate, and the formerly clear-cut cultural distinctiveness of city and country is rapidly becoming blurred. Therefore, the likelihood of the great city's leading a revival of ancient value systems, as some extreme ethnocentrists hope it will, is small. Only one prediction can be made: the days of the culturally alien and ethnically distinct urban center are numbered in Southeast Asia; and a city like Singapore becomes increasingly an anomalous relict of an age now past.

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000 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

VOLUME XXVI

1950

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
CHATHAM HOUSE, ST JAMES'S SQUARE,
LONDON, S.W.1

[Title page]

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THE PEASANTRY OF SOUTH EAST ASIA [1]

PROFESSOR RAYMOND FIRTH, F.B.A.

000 IF it is not wholly true that the social and economic reconstruction which is so necessary in Asia today must begin with the peasant, it is certain that no programme which omits the peasant can be on firm foundations. The recent history of China is evidence enough for this. My concern, as a social anthropologist, is with the analysis and classification of social relations between people and groups of people, rather than with political or economic affairs as such, although inevitably I cannot dis-
128 regard them. So my aim is to show briefly some of the most important
121 aspects of the social organization of the South East Asian peasant communities, and of the values by which this organization works. Though the details in my paper refer mainly to Malaya and Indonesia, I think the generalizations have some value for the South East Asian region as a whole.

If the basic features of the peasant society are ignored, one can understand neither the peculiar tenacity which it still possesses in modern conditions, nor the reactions of its members to the increasing impact of ex-
121 ternal economic and political forces. The definition of a peasant is a
565 countryman—a man engaged in rural pursuits, primarily agriculture, with a comparatively simple technology and a special interest in the land he
463 works. In South East Asia one may extend the application of the term to
241 cover the majority of fishermen and even village craftsmen too. They are
226 of the same social class as the agriculturalists, and often members of the same families. As occupational groups, they may even be separable only
32 in theory, since many a peasant farmer is also a fisherman or craftsman by turns, as his seasonal cycle or his cash-needs influence him. What R. H. Tawney has said of agriculture—that it is at once a craft, a business, and a manner of life—can be applied more widely here; the problems of all these peasants alike are partly technical, partly financial and commercial, and partly cultural and social.

162 It is difficult to say just what proportion of the present population of
565 South East Asia may be classed as peasants. It would seem that in nearly
241 every South East Asian country two-thirds or more of the total population is to be found in agricultural communities, tilling the soil. In 1930 the
463 census of Java and Madura in Indonesia gave about 70 per cent of the male
32 workers as dependent for their livelihood on native agricultural output, and
462 about 75 per cent in the regions of Indonesia outside Java and Madura, while large numbers of women were engaged in home craft production. In Siam, in about 1930, almost 90 per cent of the population lived in agricultural communities, rice production providing the living of about 80 per

[1] Originally delivered at a meeting at Chatham House on 21 February 1950.

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162 cent of the population. Malaya, of course, is exceptional, because of the
565 especially heavy concentration on the production of rubber and tin. Ac-
241 cording to the 1947 census of Malaya, about 34 per cent of the working
463 population were classed as cultivators and fishermen working on their own
32 account or as unpaid members of families. In all, I think one could reckon
462 that rather more than 100 million people in South East Asia can be regarded as peasantry.

[412] Throughout all this region, peasant technology is simple; skills, though
134 traditionally well adapted to the job in hand, are of limited range. Soils,
241 despite the richness of some of the swamps and river flood-plains, are generally of poor quality. The system of felling and burning the jungle, taking off crops for a few years, and then moving away to cultivate fresh clearings while the old ones revert to jungle, is still common in the mountain areas of Burma, Malaya, and Siam, in part of West Java, in much of Borneo, and in the outer islands of Indonesia. It is known as shifting cultivation or jungle-fallowing. Although regarded as extremely primitive, it is an economic use of land in areas of low population density, where plentiful land allows of long rotation of clearings and consequent restoration of soil fertility. But where population is dense, the system cannot provide the necessary volume of production without endangering the future soil capital, and that is one of the major problems of the area. In the more sedentary forms of agriculture, fertility is conserved with a great deal of care, by manuring, by water control, and so on. Sometimes there is very elaborate and spectacular terracing, as in parts of the Philippines or in Bali, where the native cultivator through his own efforts through generations has known how to make the best of the land with his available techniques. Yet many of these techniques are only of limited efficiency, and custom may be a barrier to improvement. For large masses of the Muslim peasantry of South East Asia, for instance, the pig, an excellent economic converter of resources, is taboo for religious reasons.

433 Productivity of the South East Asian peasant is apt to be low, whether
241 considered in terms of the margins required above subsistence to give him
565 and his family the range of goods and services they want, or by comparison with Western results. It is hard to make this last comparison significant because of the differing bases, but the following figures will give, perhaps rather superficially, some idea of the comparison. In terms of cwt. of cropping per acre, for instance, the rice crop of part of South East Asia can be compared roughly with the wheat crop of Western Europe. The figures are taken from different years, but they can be regarded as significant averages. Java at 12 cwt. of rice to the acre corresponds with France at 12 cwt. of wheat to the acre; Siam at 14 cwt. to the acre with the United Kingdom at 18 cwt. and Germany at a little less; Japan at 27 cwt. of rice per acre corresponds to Denmark with 27 cwt. of wheat per acre. Yet rice is supposed to be a crop of much higher yield. What is more significant is that productivity per acre in both Malaya and Indo-China is only 10 cwt. on the average, or only between one-third and one-half of the average in Japan.

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on the average, or only between one-third and one-half of the average in Japan. 000

Moreover, in any comparison between South East Asia and the peasantry of Europe, quite apart from differences in the production of crops other than the staple grain, there is an important difference in the average size of the holdings worked. The South East Asian peasant has fewer acres than the peasantry of Europe. In France, a country of peasant agriculture, about 40 per cent of the total number of agricultural holdings in 1931 were less than 2½ acres apiece; the average size of this group of holdings was 1½ acres each. But about 45 per cent of the total holdings were between 2½ and 22½ acres, with an average of about 10 acres each. There are areas in South East Asia where the average size of peasant holdings is fairly large. In Cochin China, while 72 per cent of the landowners have holdings between 2½ and 12 acres, there are provinces where more than half of them have holdings above 12 acres in size. In Siam, too, the average peasant holding seems of tolerable size—4 acres or so in the south and north east, 5½ acres in the north, and 10½ acres in central Siam, where more than one-third of the rural families live. But in Java, in 1938, the average size of holdings was only just over 2 acres for all tax-paying landowners in the country. In the Tonkin delta of Indo-China, another large area of heavy concentration of peasantry, as much as 60 per cent of the peasants have been reckoned to own holdings of less than nine-tenths of an acre, and 90 per cent to have holdings of under 4½ acres apiece. It has been estimated that a peasant family needs for adequate support 2½ to 5 acres of land, cultivating it by 'wet rice' methods. Many sections of the farming population in Java and Indo-China, for instance, are obviously well below this critical level. Even though large-scale irrigation and very intensive land use, including double cropping of rice in the year and much use of secondary crops, may lower the critical figure considerably, the peasant in such conditions is always liable to have to seek work outside his holding or to put up with inadequate living standards, even in nutrition. 311 241 433 565 361

The difficulties of agriculture in such conditions are further increased by the fact that a man's holding is often not a single undivided farm, but a set of dispersed fields, some of very small size. This dispersion and fragmentation of holdings allows for some advantages in adapting crops to soil and water variations, and is some security against wholesale raids by pests, but it makes for technical difficulties in the use of implements and labour on any scale. Since the dispersion is due primarily to traditional customs of inheritance and marriage, efforts to secure consolidation are apt to be only of temporary benefit, though some success has attended administrative action against undue fragmentation.

The same comparatively low level of productivity is seen in fishing, which gives the one great source of animal protein to the South East Asian peasant's diet. Before the war a Malay peasant fisherman produced on the average 1½ tons of fish per head per annum and in 1947 nearly 1 ton per 433 226 565

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433 annum. Productivity in the British fishing industry was, and probably still
226 is, at least eight times as great per man. In the United States' fishing in-
565 dustry it is much greater still. This immensely greater productivity per man is of course achieved only by a much heavier use of capital equipment. Technological investment, then, is an obvious method of trying to raise peasant production.

434 Peasant income in this region is thus low by most standards. Adequate
511 information about this is lacking, but there is no reason to doubt the indi-
565 cative character of what has been collected. For instance, an inquiry in Java in 1926 showed that over 60 per cent of the people had in cash and in kind incomes of less than £12 10s. a year (150 Dutch florins), and 80 per cent had incomes of less than £25 a year (300 florins). In Malaya in 1940 I calculated that the fishermen of the east coast earned on the average about £12 a year. This does not mean much without consideration of the prices of goods on which the income was spent. But any such comparison would soon make it clear that a man with such an income was hard put to it to keep his family in comfort. Cash incomes have risen steeply during and since the war, but so have the prices of consumer goods, and many peasants are probably rather worse off than before, unless they have been able to sell rice or other scarcity goods.

433 The peasant economy of South East Asia uses abundant labour and has
565 a low level of capital equipment. Even then, owing to lack of efficient
461 organization, one can point to a great amount of unused man-hours. Yet these features must not be over-stressed. It is common to blame the peasant for a *dolce far niente* attitude, and attribute his poverty to his idleness. What J. Johnston Abraham, the author of the well-known travel book, *Surgeon's Log*,[1] wrote forty years ago of the Malay is often quoted in essence still:

> The Malay . . . has the aristocratic contempt for toil . . . [he] is of all things a philosopher. He squats in the warm sun and chews betel contentedly. He sees the obvious foolishness of working in a country too hot for toil, when the earth is so prolific that a fortnight's leisurely labour will produce food for a year, and the water is so plentifully supplied with fish that an hour, in the cool of the evening with a net, will supply luxury for a fortnight.

Anyone who has lived among the Malay peasantry and has seen their back-breaking work of rice-planting, or their long hours at sea in the broiling sun hauling the nets for fish, will know what a parody this is. The working rhythm of the Asiatic peasant is different from that of the European. The economic system is not well enough geared to alternative employment when technical hitches occur in his ordinary occupation. But the peasant is not simply thriftless of his time and his money. He plans with care his ploughing, sowing, weeding, and harvesting; he is assiduous in searching for fodder for his animals, in watering his vegetable garden, in repairing his fishing-boat or his net. If he can scrape together some extra cash above the daily needs of his family, he may spend it on clothes for his child or jewellery

[1] London, Chapman & Hall (14th rev. ed., 1929) pp. 69–70.

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for his wife—but he is equally likely to put it into a piece of equipment or 433
to hire some land. To understand the position of the peasant one must 565
realize the structure of the economic system of which he is a part, and the 461
values of his social system.

The peasant economy must not be thought of as simply a subsistence 433
economy. It has a complex marketing structure which, even apart from 565
Western influences, had an elaborate series of middlemen for making possible the diffusion of cloth, salt, iron, dried fish, spices, and other goods. 439
The system of exchange has been intensified, and the reactions of different 177
types of producers made more sensitive by the influence of the West. On the one side are the Western markets for primary products—coffee, spices, tobacco, copra, kapok, and, above all, rubber—the quick response to which has demonstrated how alive the Asiatic peasant is to making money if the opportunity offers. On the other side are the Western types of consumer goods, novel, attractively presented, easy to use—ranging from lamp oil, imported cigarettes, and cornflour for babies, to electric torches, bicycles, and the cinema. Conservative in his techniques of production, the peasant has shown himself enterprising in his consumption. The result has been that at many points, almost without realizing it, the peasant has become geared to the Western economic system. In the early days of European contact, he had often to be pushed as well as tempted into producing for the Western market. The scathing book, *Max Havelaar*, by the author calling himself 'Multatuli'—later known to be Douwes Dekker—has shown the kind of abuses that resulted from pushing the peasant into an enforced relation to the Western market. But naturally many of these links have been of his own seeking. In the last resort, it is the peasant's own scheme of values, his degree of acceptance of the goods and services which the West offers and which he transmutes to some extent in receiving, which determines his economic destiny.

But for the most part, the peasant has been incapable of perceiving the processes at work. The field is too vast for his comprehension. His reactions to the crisis and depression of the nineteen-thirties were direct and rational as they came under his personal observation. When prices fell he increased production of the export crops to maintain his cash returns; when that failed he retired from the struggle to utilize his backlog of subsistence cropping. But like many a farmer elsewhere, he had not understood much more than the immediate market situation. The pressure of the West has provided the peasant with a new range of wants from which he cannot rid himself even should he wish, and markets for his labour and raw materials which are an inducement to him to modify his habits. A new administrative system has given him fresh legal framework for many of his acts. A new system of taxation, though often lighter than before, is more methodical in its pursuit of defaulters. His land, the foundation of his [427]
existence, has for the most part been preserved to him, and indeed the
security for his legal title to it has been much improved. But alien planta- 000

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427 But the alien planta-
565 tions and even alien smallholders have threatened to grasp at it, and the
177 advances of Western medicine, so beneficial in many ways, have only accelerated the rate of increase of the population which has to seek a livelihood from it. In most parts of South East Asia the peasant is the actual owner of the land he tills, often legally under some agreement with
426 the State. But his rights to the produce are often severely limited by a heavy burden of indebtedness. The real effects of this may be less than people sometimes think, because when the debts are spread among neighbours and kinsfolk interest may be waived, repayment is sometimes protracted or ignored, and the debt may be serviced by other than material means. But there is no doubt that the peasant producer is badly hampered by his debt load. It is most pressing when debt is contracted to a member of an alien ethnic group, an Indian or a Chinese, for whom the transaction is a purely commercial one.

563 The role of alien Asiatic ethnic groups is one of the most significant
565 features in the economic and political life of the peasantry of South East
177 Asia today. For many centuries, Indian and Chinese trading influences
178 have met in the South East Asian region, and Indian religious concepts
439 have penetrated deep into many of its social systems. But for more than four hundred years the dominant commercial and political note has tended to be sounded by Europeans. Now the balance is altering. Colonialism may have set the modern structure of South East Asian society, but the patterns will persist when the colonial Powers have withdrawn. To this new society the Chinese above all have the economic key. In Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, the Philippines, and Java, the Chinese have penetrated the economic system and taken over crucial functions. They have shared in much of the wholesale import trade, they have attained pre-eminence in retailing vital imported goods to the peasant, and they act as middlemen for the collection, storage, and processing of peasant export products. As part of this process they often finance the peasant producer by advances on his crop, gaining a double profit by giving part of these advances in goods, not cash. The Chinese achievement has been remarkable. They have been kept on the margin both of the peasant society with which they deal, and of the European society with which at a later stage their growing wealth would allow them to associate. Though lacking any formal political power, which in the Orient as elsewhere is so often the passport to success, they have built up a trading structure of extraordinary toughness, elasticity, and elaboration.

565 The wider political implications of this are not my concern here. But
609 it is important to note three points in connexion with the peasant theme.
186 One is the xenophobic reaction of the local urban dwellers and of peasants too, which has periodically found expression against the Chinese, as traders
578 or residents in South East Asia, in the form of riots and other disturbances.
563 Another is the reaction of the Chinese, whose economic strength has given
241 them confidence, and who are now prepared to stand by their claim to a

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real stake in the countries of the Nan Yang, as settled members of the local 565
society, and not as aliens. The third point is that the Chinese community 609
has never been one of middlemen only; there has always been a fair pro- 186
portion of cultivators within it. The poor peasantry of South East Asia 578
now includes a Chinese as well as an indigenous element. The 1947 census 563
of Malaya shows 45,000 Chinese engaged in rice growing, and another 241
100,000 in market gardening and fishing, essentially peasant pursuits.

The pressure to which the South East Asian peasant has been subjected 177
by the combination of Western and other alien influences has been severe. 565
But we must beware lest we misinterpret it. In a recent book which gives a 166
comparative analysis of the agrarian situation in the countries of South East Asia, appears a striking statement about Malaya—that development of mining and rubber industries has pushed the native Malay population more and more towards the east, into the areas of the former Unfederated Malay States: 'The Malays', it is said, 'considered the east as safe from Western penetration, and therefore preferred this undeveloped area to the irrigated lands on the western coast, mainly because there they could get only temporary land licences, since a complete survey of all potential tin-bearing regions had not yet been made'.[1]

It is true that the eastern States are predominantly Malay in population, and that the greater part of the vast immigrant population of Malaya is densely settled on the western side of the peninsula, where the resources are richer and access easier than on the eastern side. It is also true that there has been some lack of enthusiasm among Malay peasants to colonize the new Government-developed irrigation areas, for complex reasons, including lack of capital in the past, and disinclination to move from their ancestral homes. But it is quite incorrect to put these facts together and to argue that the Malay has been pushed by alien pressure over from the west to the east of the peninsula. Apart from some seasonal movement for rice harvesting or fishing, the internal migration of Malays is inconsiderable, despite the rapid development of communications in recent years. Both the 1931 and the 1947 census show that whatever movement takes place—well under 10 per cent—is almost wholly from one State to another, either on the west coast or on the east coast, or to Singapore. Hardly any movement at all occurs from the west to the east. Moreover, the 1947 census shows that between 1931 and 1947 the Malay population of the western States increased by about one-third, at a rate slightly higher than that of the eastern States. The proportion of Malays in these western States, in terms of the total population of all ethnic groups, also increased slightly during this period, due primarily to the decline of Indians and Indonesians. In other words, though foreign economic penetration has immersed the western Malay in a flood of alien elements, it has not driven him away. On the contrary, he has preferred to stay and await events.

[1] Erich H. Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia* (New York, Colombia University Press, 1949) p. 113.

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[438] One reason for this is economic advantage. The coming of rubber, in particular, has given to the Malay peasant of the west coast an income considerably higher, on the whole, than that of the east coast peasant.

177 565 [166] The effects of Westernization are profound. But they do not lie in crude physical displacement of the peasant or degradation of his living conditions. They lie in the widening of the gap between his expanding range of wants and his level of productivity, and in his inability to measure and in any way control the economic forces operating in his field. Westernization has meant for the peasant an enlargement of the social horizon—more knowledge, through better communications and education, of other places, of other peoples of kindred and dissimilar interests. It has created new ambitions: for different clothing, for new uses of leisure, for a better status for his children, for a position of power in the political scene. All this has disturbed the traditional patterns of peasant society. These patterns, and the class structure of South East Asian society of which they were a part, were probably never too satisfactory to the peasant. Anxiety and evasion must have often been the response to either too rigid or too elastic a rule—and the peasant seems often to have suffered from the exactions of his superior in the social scale. But the scope of the system was known, if not its precise implications. Nowadays the scope of the system has for the most part passed beyond the peasant's grasp, and much of it has become de-personalized.

To illustrate this by giving a more concrete analysis of some of the values in the peasant's life, let me take the area of Malaya and Indonesia where Islam is the major religion of the people.

181 177 565 602 776 779 671 182 In his daily life the Indonesian or Malay peasant is governed largely by the canons of behaviour, the ties of friendship and neighbourliness, the relations of work and social intercourse of his village community. So much is this so that in Java the *desa*, the village, was crystallized by the Dutch into an administrative and developmental unit, and its communal structure strengthened for welfare purposes. But as important as the village, and indeed often basic to its structure, are the family and larger kin organizations. From these a person gets his social status and much of his land and other property, and they have the primary role in his marriage and other crucial events in his progress through life.

Such domestic and local relationships also provide a framework for the peasant in his attempts to come to terms with the forces of nature and human destiny. His world of spirits is a local world. In Indonesia the ancestors do not play the predominant role which they do, for instance, in Annam. But the village, the seashore, the surrounding jungle, wells, trees, and stones are the home of many kinds of spirits, which afflict man with sickness or misfortune, or stand by him as his familiars to guard him. Basic in the religion of the Indonesian peasant is this local, essentially parochial, spirit element. All these values guide his economic and social conduct, and mean a great deal to him.

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But the situation is complex, even in village life. The system of rules governing domestic and local relations—marriage, adoption, inheritance, rights over land, succession to local office, rules of etiquette, and behaviour to superiors—is generally known as the *adat*, the custom. The nature of this custom, and what should be its relation to a more fully developed legal system, have been elaborately studied by the Dutch in Indonesia. At times indeed they have seemed to give the *adat* almost a mystical connotation. Alongside this body of custom, which of course varies from one peasant area to another, is the *shari'a*, the religious rule of Islam. On the one hand this is a unifying force, extra-village and extra-national in character, linking even the remotest mountain farmer spiritually or emotionally with the farmer or townsman of other Muslim communities in South East Asia, and far beyond. On the other hand, the Muslim religious law blends into the field of the *adat*, laying down rules about marriage, inheritance, and other family matters. Then there are the Western rules of law and administrative procedure, laying down just how land is to be acquired, held, and transferred, giving regulations for village management, and imposing penalties for certain kinds of breach of good relations. Yet the Western system offers also inducement to use the law, to protect one's interests firmly, to take advantage of situations where the *adat* has left rights undefined. So three factors—the custom, the Muslim religious rule, and the Western system of law—interact even in the heart of peasant society.

The result is a complex set of forces in dynamic operation, with the peasant being pressed by one or other of them or championing one or other as circumstances arise. In Negri Sembilan, for instance, there has come to be what is almost now a classic case of this interaction. In former times the valuable lands were for the most part those on which 'wet rice' could be cultivated. By the matrilineal system ancestrally operative in that area, these lands were handed down in the female line, from mother to daughter, or from aunt to niece. They were also cultivated largely by women. As rubber came to be developed, however, other lands on the hill-sides, previously of much less value, came to have worth too. For the most part these had to be cleared before being planted in rubber, and this clearing was a task that only men could do properly. Hence men came to have a more direct interest in this land. When questions of inheritance began to arise, divergent views became manifest. Some argued for treating new lands like the old, and handing them down in the female line like the rice lands. Yet there was a strong case for not including these rubber lands in the category of ancestral land, but for letting them be transmitted from a father to his children and through the male line in general. This principle of male inheritance is in line with the emphasis of the Muslim law. This not only gives guidance of the patrilineal kind for distribution of the property of the deceased in cases of dispute, but in all its provisions tends to stress the status of the male against that of the female.

Within the peasant society itself the potential clash of the two systems,

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181 local custom and religious rule, had been present for centuries. But there
177 was little in the economic situation to sharpen it, and the Muslim leaders
565 themselves were often so steeped in the local ways that they allowed as the
602 religious law what was, in fact, the local custom. With the growth of
776 Western processes, the perception of new economic advantages tended to
779 change the equilibrium of the two principles. The advance of education
671 and heightened consciousness of Islam as a world faith also tended to make
182 the religious leaders themselves much more keenly aware of any divergence. Wealthy men who want to leave property to their sons, men with a strong religious sense, men who regard themselves as progressive, or who are in revolt against their clan leaders, therefore tend to be protagonists of the Muslim law. The conservatives, those who see in the custom a defence for women, those who see in it a symbol of an essentially Malay way of life, argue for the retention of the custom. Contact with the West, they say, is changing the structure of the peasant society enough already. The issue has also entered the modern political scene, since the search for factors to increase Malay integration tends to stress the national and extra-national character of Islam at the expense of the more local qualities of the *adat*. Here too it is growing Westernization which has sharpened the issue.

184 In a general discussion such as this, one may be allowed to refer to the
565 peasantry of South East Asia as a body. But they are not uniform in ethnic composition, in national interests, in language, in religion, or in general culture. Moreover, within any local community, there are competing, even conflicting, interests and opinions. The peasant may be unable to face up to the general issues which affect his life so deeply, but in so far as he understands his own interests he is very alive to them and capable of exercising keen judgement in them. It is the small scale of his organization for the most part which renders him so vulnerable.

000 What is likely to be the future of South East Asia from the peasant angle? Prediction is not worth much, since so many elements in the situation are imperfectly known, but there are a few which seem to be significant.

565 The peasant has no native middle class, of the same society as himself,
185 to give a lead to his development and stability in any wider economic
656 organizations that may be set up for his benefit. To improve his economic lot, and in particular to give him a larger fraction of his product through control of marketing, co-operative societies have often been proposed and sometimes tried. Their success has been only limited, partly because the peasant has not been fully persuaded of their attractions as against what the alien middleman can offer, and partly because of the difficulty of securing adequate technical supervision and administration at a sufficiently low official level. Much is now apt to be made of the colonial or semi-colonial status of the South East Asian peasant as a drag upon his development. There is no doubt that colonialism, as a specific form of political control of under-developed territories by a metropolitan Power, is

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nearing the end of its historical phase. How far it is likely to be replaced 565
by a more insidious form of satellitism is not relevant here. But to talk 185
about political emancipation of South East Asia being the prime require- 656
ment for the solution of the problems of the peasantry must not obscure the economic factors involved. Nor is fresh capital all that is needed. For the economy of the peasant to attain a relative stability a great development of technical and administrative skills in the commercial field is necessary. The building of a native professional class would seem to be an important element in the construction of a more integrated economic and political system. To concentrate attention on the political factors alone is to overlook the fact that most of the sinews of the economic organism are now provided by the one group which does not have overt political power—the Chinese.

What remains of the traditional class structure in South East Asian 565
society is not of much avail as a defence of the peasant from alien exploita- 578
tion. In any case, though the rulers and traditional nobility still command 668
much respect, and provide symbols for the unity of the people, there are 186
stirrings of resentment among the people against the perpetuation of a system in which these aristocrats do not perform recognizable services at commensurate incomes. But such resentment does not mean that the peasantry are dry tinder for the spark of Communism to set alight. Communism as yet does not seem to have any great attraction for the mass of the local peasantry of the South East Asian region. The lack of popular response to the Malayan insurrection has shown this. It is presumably true to say that the interest of the peasant can always be secured in any movement which promises to give him greater control of the land—more land more secure tenure, freedom from land debt, and better returns for his produce. But to most of the Indonesian peasants these aims are likely to be sought in nationalism, which can be largely given both an ethnic base and the religious sanctions of Islam. The person to whom the cry for a solution of the land problem is likely to make a most definite appeal, especially in Malaya, is not the Indonesian but the Chinese peasant, who sees himself as excluded from full participation in the land rights of the country folk. Over and over again one hears the cry, ill-founded as it is, that the Chinese have not been allowed to grow rice in Malaya.

Here may well come one of the acute pressure points in the South East 000
Asian scene. The analysis might go as follows. Nationalism is a powerful political force because of its appeal to the individual in a projected, enlarged form of his desires and strivings. But by itself it is an aggressive rather than a constructive force. It lacks a coherent theory for the use of the resources at its control. An ideology containing such theory, and an equally ardent emotional charge on the part of many of its adherents, is provided by Communism. If Communism can work through nationalism it has a most powerful combination. Yet Communism in South East Asia lacks organization of any scale. The optimum conditions for its success are

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provided by the Chinese. The Chinese in South East Asia have a highly developed political and economic organization, they are politically underprivileged still, and some sections of them can lay claim to a redress of industrial workers' and agricultural grievances. Moreover, their nationalism is such that large sections of them would seem to be willing to accept any Government in China as their Government. It seems likely then that the advance of Communism in South East Asia may be attempted not through the mass of local peasants directly—or not perhaps primarily through the industrial and rural proletariat of all ethnic groups—but through the Chinese as a national group. There are certain difficulties here. The Chinese are not of uniform social composition. In particular there is cleavage of interest, possibly a growing one, between the Chinese families of long residence in South East Asia and those of more recent arrival. The former, known commonly as the Straits Chinese in Malaya, have somewhat vague but real allegiance to the country of their adoption, which would militate against an uncritical acceptance of mainland Chinese political patterns. Again, it is one thing to use allegiance to a metropolitan Power as a spearhead for one's own political advancement; it is another to adopt the metropolitan ideology when it implies the destruction of one's own class position—and no thesis of 'good' or 'national' or other ethical capitalism could surely quieten entirely the misgivings of a wealthy Singapore or Bangkok Chinese. Then again there are quite a number of Indonesian Communists. But assuming that attempts to seize power fairly rapidly fail, infiltration through Chinese nationalism is plausible, in the guise of claims for peasant reform.

Were a Communist control to be established over the South East Asian peasant, this in itself would be no final solution of his difficulties. If the organization through which it came were Chinese it might be doubted if there would be any real loosening of the restrictions under which peasant production operates. But even if all inequalities in distribution were severely rectified, by cancellation of rural indebtedness, expropriation of landlords, levelling down of richer peasants by sharing of their capital, and substitution of a co-operative marketing system, this could only give some temporary raising of general peasant standards. The basic problem is not simply unequal distribution, but poverty, and a value system not well adapted to the requirements of modern technological change. Any measures of real improvement that can be adopted must be slow, and Communism is an advancing ideology. But for some of the reasons I have indicated its progress in South East Asia may be slower than is sometimes thought. It has been said that the clock in South East Asia now stands at five minutes to twelve. The real trouble may be not this urgency, but that we still do not know how to tell the time!

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Published by
THE ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INSTITUTE
21 Bedford Square, London, W.C.1

Each Issue 2s. 6d. Annual Subscription 30s.

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/Article 23/

Anthropological Blood-Grouping in South-East Asia

By P.H.A. Sneath, M.A., M.B. (Cantab.)

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Summary of a communication to the Institute, 4 February, 1954

Four aboriginal tribes in Malaya and Borneo were studied in association with Dr. I. Polunin of the University of Malaya, as part of the programme of anthropological blood-grouping organized by Dr. A. E. Mourant. Blood samples were collected from the settlements and were tested for the ABO, MNS, Rhesus, P, Lutheran, Kell and Duffy groups and for the sickle-cell trait. Specimens of saliva were also tested for ABH secretion. The more important results are summarized in the table (page 2), in which the salient blood-group features of the main racial types of man are noted for comparison. About 100 samples from each tribe were tested.

The Negritos of Malaya.

The high incidence of the Rhesus gene Ro (cDe) supports the belief that the Negritos and Africans are descended from a common stock. The sickle-cell trait was absent, but there is some doubt whether this trait is a safe criterion of African ancestry. A more serious objection to an African origin for the Negritos is the low frequency of Ro and the absence of the trait in the Andaman Negritos, recently reported by Lehmann and Ikin (personal communication).

The Malayan Senoi.

The racial affinities of the Senoi have been much discussed, and some have suggested that they are related to the Veddas or to the Australoids. The blood groups of the Senoi are quite different from those of the Australian aborigines; the latter lack the genes B and S and have low M, while the Senoi possess considerable amounts of all three. There are few data on Veddoid blood groups. The groups of the Senoi are similar to those of Mongoloids, and this strongly supports the theory that the Senoi are closer to the Mongoloids

TABLE I. RACIAL FREQUENCIES OF BLOOD-GROUP GENES AND FREQUENCIES IN FOUR ABORIGINAL TRIBES OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA

System	Gene	Caucasoids	Australoids	Negroids	Mongoloids	Negritos	Senoi	Aboriginal Malays	Land Dayaks
ABO	A	High (0.3)	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	0.15	0.05	0.12	0.21
	B	Low	ABSENT	High (0.3)	High*	0.09	0.24	0.20	0.31
	A_2	Moderate	Absent	High (0.0[illegible])	Absent	0	0	0	0
MNS	N	Moderate	HIGH (0.9)	Moderate	Low	0.27	0.28	0.21	0.33
	S	HIGH (0.3)	ABSENT	Moderate	Low	0.14	0.09	0.03	0.01
Rh	r (cde)	HIGH (0.4)	Absent	Moderate	Absent	0	0	0	0
	Ro (cDe)	Low	Moderate	HIGH (0.[illegible])	Low	0.27	0.01	0.01	0.07
	R_1 (CDe)	Moderate	Moderate	LOW	HIGH (0.8)	0.63	0.93	0.94	0.85
	R_2 (cDE)	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Moderate ‡	0.10	0.07	0.04	0.08
Duffy	Fy^a	Moderate	High (0.9)	Low	High	0.5		0.7	
Sickle-cell trait		Absent	Absent	High †	Absent	Absent		Absent	

* Absent in America

† Also in Veddoids

‡ High in America (0.4)

The figures in parentheses after "High" show the average gene frequency of the gene in that race which possesses the highest frequency.

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than to any other race.

The Aboriginal Malays.

The blood groups confirm that these people are Mongoloids, being similar to those of most peoples of Malaysia.

The Land Dayaks of Borneo.

The blood groups of the Land Dayaks were found to be of the Malaysian type.

Variability in Blood Groups of Settlements.

Great variation was found in blood groups between settlements of the same tribe. It was noted in all four peoples, and is presumably due to settlement endogamy (known to be common in Land Dayaks and Aboriginal Malays). Although this lessens the value of blood-grouping as a means of tracing racial ancestry, it may throw light on the way in which races arise: for instance, the suggestion that the American Indians lack blood group B because they are descended from a few small tribes who, by chance, lacked the gene is supported by examples of the virtual absence of common genes in some settlements which we studied.

The variability is thought to be due largely to genetic drift, though doubtless other factors are also responsible. The possibility of such variation, usually ignored in blood-group work, should always be considered in surveys of this area (see Polunin, Man, 1952, 104).

A full account of this work is to be published.

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[No. 26.]

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JOURNAL

OF THE

STRAITS BRANCH

OF THE

Royal Asiatic Society

JANUARY, 1894.

Agents of the Society:

London and America ... ... TRUBNER & Co.
Paris ... ... ERNEST LEROUX & CIE.
Germany ... K. F. KOEHLER'S ANTIQUARIUM, Leipzig.

SINGAPORE:
PRINTED AT THE AMERICAN MISSION PRESS.

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A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MALAYA,*

FROM JULY, 1891, TO JUNE, 1892.

BY

C. DAVIES SHERBORN, F.G.S., F.Z.S.

113 In compiling this Bibliography all sources of information have been utilised. In inserting, therefore, every publication that has come under his notice, the compiler hopes that the entries will prove of considerable assistance; but as a large proportion of the literature of this district either never reaches England at all, or else arrives so long after as to be too late for examination for this purpose, he begs the reader's indulgence for any error that may be present. His thanks are due to M. Martinus Nijhoff, of the Hague, for information as to some of the more recent books.

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*By "Malaya" is here meant that part of the Archipelago enclosed in a line drawn round the north of Siam and the Philippines, through Macassar Strait, between Lombok and Bali, round the outlying islands of Java and Sumatra, and to the east of the Nicobar and Andaman Islands.

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[No. 27.]

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JOURNAL
OF THE
STRAITS BRANCH
OF THE
Royal Asiatic Society

OCTOBER, 1894.

Agents of the Society:

London and America .. .. TRUBNER & Co.
Paris ... ... ERNEST LEROUX & CIE.
Germany ... K. F. KOEHLER'S ANTIQUARIUM, Leipzig.

SINGAPORE:
PRINTED AT THE AMERICAN MISSION PRESS.

Sherborn N-3 (no date) 1894 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MALAYA,*

FROM JUNE, 1892. TO JULY, 1893.

BY

C. DAVIES SHERBORN, F.Z.S., R.G.S.

113 IN compiling this Bibliography, all sources of information have been utilized. Inserting therefore, every publication that has come under his notice, the compiler hopes that the entries will prove of considerable assistance; but, as a large proportion of the literature of his district, either never reaches England at all, or else arrives so long after as to be too late for examination for this purpose, he begs the reader's indulgence for any error that may be present. His thanks are are due to M. Martinus Nijhoff of The Hague for information as to some of the more recent books.

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* By "Malaya" is here meant that part of the Archipelago enclosed in a line drawn round the north of Siam and the Philippines, through Macassar Strait, between Lombok and Bali, round the outlying islands of Java and Sumatra, and the east of the Nicobar and Andaman Islands.

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[For additional bibliography covering both the social and natural sciences, commerce, and travel accounts, see 12, 20, 21, and 22: Sherborn, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116. These bibliographies are neither selected nor annotated, and most of the entries are in Dutch.]

113, 787, 773, 563, 525 Malaya AN1

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[No. 29.]

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JOURNAL

OF THE

STRAITS BRANCH

OF THE

ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY.

JULY, 1896.

SINGAPORE:

PRINTED AT THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

AGENTS OF THE SOCIETY:

London and America, ... TRÜBNER & Co.
Paris, ... ERNEST LEROUX & CIE.
Germany, ... OTTO HARRASSOWITZ, Leipzig.

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A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MALAYA.*

FROM JULY, 1893, TO JUNE, 1894.

BY

C. DAVIES SHERBORN, F.G.S., F.Z.S.

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In compiling this Bibliography, all sources of information have been utilized. In inserting, therefore, every publication that has come under his notice, the compiler hopes that the entries will prove of considerable assistance; but as a large proportion of the literature of this district, either never reaches England at all, or else arrives so long after as to be too late for examination for this purpose, he begs the reader's indulgence for any error that may be present. His thanks are due to M. Martinus Nijhoff of The Hague for information as to some of the more recent books.

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* By "Malaya" is here meant that part of the Archipelago enclosed in a line drawn round the North of Siam and the Philippines, through Macassar Strait, between Lombok and Bali, round the outlying islands of Java and Sumatra and to the East of the Nicobar and Andaman Islands.

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KINSHIP IN SOUTHEASTERN ASIA

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Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
Department of Anthropology, Harvard University.

Cambridge
1941.

A

23: Benedict E-5 (no date) 1941 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

ABBREVIATIONS OF TITLES

113

AA	American Anthropologist
AM	Asia Major
AO	Acta Orientalia
ASB	Academia Sinica, Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology
BEFEO	Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient
BSOS	Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies
CR	China Review
HJAS	Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies
IA	India Antiquary
IAE	Internationales Archiv für Ethnographie
JAOS	Journal of the American Oriental Society
JASB	Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal
JBRS	Journal of the Burma Research Society
JRAI	Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
JRAS	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
JRASB	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal
JSS	Journal of the Siam Society
LSI	Linguistic Survey of India
MAAA	Memoirs of the American Anthropological Society
MASB	Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal
MI	Man in India
MS	Monumenta Serica
MSOS	Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen

B

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NTF	Nordisk Tidskrift for Filologi
SAJS	South African Journal of Science
TP	T'oung Pao
UCJDL	University of Calcutta, Journal of the Department of Letters
ZDMG	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft
ZE	Zeitschrift für Ethnologie

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D

INTRODUCTION

121 The present study is in many ways a by-product of the writer's work in the general field of Far-Eastern linguistics. While engaged in investigations on the phonological systems of the Tibeto-Burman languages, Karen, Chinese, and Thai, the writer was obliged to devote a good share of his attention to the intricate and varied problems raised by semantic shifts occurring within widespread roots for kinship terms. The consideration of some of these more elementary problems led to attempts at working out individual kinship nomenclatures, and beyond this to a correlation of the results thus obtained. The approach, then, has been linguistic in every sense of that term.

A cursory glance at the history of kinship theory suffices to show that a truly linguistic approach in this field is something of an anomaly. Morgan may be said to have initiated a 'sociological' rather than 'linguistic' tradition, and this tradition has been perpetuated by Rivers, Radcliffe-Brown, Seligman, Spier, Gifford, and indeed the vast majority of all anthropologists who have actively concerned themselves with kinship problems. It is not so much that the relevancy and value of linguistic evidence has been denied as it is that linguists have not been interested specifically in kinship, nor kinship theorists in linguistics. Indications are not lacking that this historical dissociation is on the road to disappearance, but for the immediate present, at any rate, we must bear with it.

121 The need for a reorientation in kinship theory was
114 first expressed by Kroeber in a classic article that appeared over thirty years ago (1909). This analysis led to much controversy on the general topic of sociological vs. psychological causation, with Radcliffe-Brown joining in the chorus, and the "eight categories" set up by Kroeber have exerted some influence, e.g. they have been applied by Feng to the Chinese terminology system. The theoretical implications were developed much later, and along altogether different lines, by Davis and Warner. Kroeber himself, building on an earlier analysis by Opler, has reconstructed the main features of the Athabascan kinship terminology, while Shimkin, one of his pupils, has made a more intensive study of the Uto-Aztecan system. Insofar as the writer is aware, none of the remaining American language groups has received similar attention, despite the fact that ample material, and in some instances linguistic studies, are available. Aside from the above, only Seligman's review of the Semitic terms, and Milke's analysis of the Melanesian and Polynesian sibling terms, have come to the writer's attention.

In the above studies by Kroeber, Shimkin, Seligman, and Milke, the historical relationships of the terms themselves are considered and some use is made of linguistic generalizations. Shimkin in particular has profited from Sapir's and Whorf's work on Uto-Aztecan phonology, and has thus been able to incorporate a fair body of linguistic information into his work. Seligman's article is deficient from the linguistic

121 point of view, and it is apparent that the author lacks
114 even a partial command of comparative Semitic philology. Kilbe's work shows the same shortcoming, despite the availability of Dempwolff's epoch-making studies on Austronesian phonology. Kroeber has stressed the point that even non-specialists can profitably engage in comparative studies of this type, and the point is well taken. There remains, however, the fact that the risk of grievous misinterpretations is greatly heightened under these conditions, and that many fine points, often of crucial importance, must be missed altogether.

121 The writer has attacked his problem from the same general linguistic angle but in a somewhat different manner. A vast and sprawling linguistic structure such as Tibeto-Burman cannot successfully be attacked simply by seizing upon a few roots, or upon a few English equivalents, and tracing their vagaries from language to language. This methodological eclecticism might prove to be 'convenient', but would be about as effective as delapidating a skyscraper with the aid only of a pickaxe. Again, one might compile interminable lists of terms for some two hundred Tibeto-Burman languages and dialects, which would be unintelligible to everyone with the possible exception of the compiler. Once more, one might draw up elaborate maps showing the distribution of certain roots for kinship terms, or of certain terminological features, and attempt to derive various conclusions therefrom. This last approach, at any rate, is not to be

121 summarily dismissed, but the writer fails to see how the expenditure of time and effort involved in such work can be justified in the present connection.

The approach adopted in the present work might be termed the 'direct method', in that each language or language-group is handled as a unit, along with the relevant ethnographic data, and an attempt is made to view each nomenclature as a functional entity with intra-relationships as well as extra-relationships. In this way a succession of patterns is presented rather than a series of disembodied etymologies or disjointed sets of sibling terms, grandparent terms, and the like. The comparative side is not lost sight of, however, and the writer does not shy at historical reconstruction. His approach is based, not on any metaphysic of kinship, but on practical expediency. He simply sees no other way of creating a complete picture of the culturo-linguistic situation with which he is faced. The linguistic material has been made especially full with the same end in mind. It must not be forgotten that kinship terms are, after all, linguistic elements, even though often handled more as if they were fish-traps or types of arrow release, and that linguistic coloring is all-important in shaping the semantic associations of any given term. It is hoped that what may at times seem to be extraneous matter will be regarded in this light.

Theoretical discussions are in general avoided, since one easily strays from the immediate problem at hand. Problems

12 are met as they arise, but the solutions offered are not generalized in any way. Thus, in the Tibeto-Burman area the collateral and affinal terminology seems to reflect marriage and descent patterns fairly, and a correlation between unilateral (asymmetric) cross-cousin marriage and the Omaha type of nomenclature is suggested. A comparison is made en passant with a similar association of traits found at Pentecost, and parallels can be adduced from elsewhere (e.g. the Hopi, if Tetiev's inferences are correct), but no attempt is made to develop this thesis.

The more general problem in re the relationship of kinship nomenclature to social organization, marriage practices, and the like, has been attacked only indirectly. Kroeber (1936) has compared this relationship with that of dress to body, with the remark that "one expects normally a considerable degree of fit". One might elaborate on this apt comparison by likening the fit of the "basic" terms ("father", "mother", "brother", "son", etc.) to that of the undergarments, and the fit of the collateral and affinal terms to that of the exterior garments, the latter showing much the greater variability. Aginsky has begged the question by applying the term "basic terminology" to the affinal nomenclature, and "superstructure" to the consanguineal. Aginsky undoubtedly has made a contribution in his analysis of the process whereby the child takes over the terms employed by its mother or father, but his elaborate treatment of this thesis does not appear to be justified, and the designations that he has introduced certainly cannot be accepted.

121 The exclusive emphasis on marriage as a causative factor
114 in kinship terminology, found both in Rivers and Aginsky though in different form, appears to be losing ground steadily; cf. the excellent studies by Tax, Eggan, McAllister, Opler, and Gilbert (in Eggan, 1937) and Opler (1937).

121 No use has been made of the terms "classificatory" and
128 "descriptive", each of which has acquired so wide a range of
601 connotations as to have lost all preciseness. The term "analytical" is used in its basic linguistic sense, e.g. "father's brother" is an analytical term, whereas "uncle" is a primary term. Note that a term may be only partly analytical, e.g. "uncle's son", where the fully analytical term would be "father's brother's son" or "mother's brother's son".

Three types of terminological equations are distinguished, as follows:

1. Categorical equation: equation of members of the two different categories of kin (consanguineal and affinal), e.g. "mother's brother"= "father-in-law".

2. Lineal equation: equation of members of two different lines of descent, e.g. "brother"= "father's sister's son", "son"= "brother's son".

3. Serial equation: equation of members of two different generations, e.g. "son"= "grandson".

These terms are to be regarded as convenient tags of some use in describing patterns of nomenclature, e.g. the Omaha and Crow types are characterized by serial equations in the cross collateral lines. The equation may rest on the extension

121 of a term through analogy or teknonymy, e.g. "grandfather" =
128 "father-in-law" (teknonymy) or on the merging of the referents,
601 e.g. "mother's brother" = "father-in-law" in a group practising cross-cousin marriage. One's explanation of a given system of nomenclature depends in large measure on his analysis of these factors, and one must guard against a premature assumption in either direction. Other equation categories can be established, e.g. the equation of elder and younger siblings, but those cited above have proved to be the most useful.

A final word remains to be said with regard to the system of notation employed. For each language considered in detail, a table of terms is drawn up, with those referring to female kin on the left, those referring to male kin on the right, and those without sex specification (neuter) in the center. This simple arrangement permits of rapid inspection of the table, and is more convenient than the charts of which kinship theorists are so fond. In the notation itself an attempt has been made to get away from the "bastard algebra of kinship", to use Malinowski's phrase (p. 19). Primary English terms are represented by capital letters, and English categorical terms by small letters. Since terms such as "aunt", "uncle", and "cousin" are often found in our sources, these have been retained in our notation. The letter N is used for "nephew, niece" (i.e. neuter), Ne for "nephew", Ni for "niece", and the cousin terms are formed analogically, viz. C "cousin (neuter)", Ce "cousin (male)", Ci "cousin (female)". Cf. also the parallelism in Si "sister" (S "son").

Kinship Notation

121 A aunt
128 B brother
197 C cousin
601 Ce cousin (male)
Ci cousin (female)
Ch child
D daughter
(ds) (different sex from speaker's)
F father
G grand-
I -in-law
M mother
N nephew or niece
Ne nephew
Ni niece
(os) (older than speaker)
P parallel
P parent
S son
Sb sibling
Si sister
Sp spouse
(ss) (same sex as speaker's)
U uncle
X cross
(ys) (younger than speaker)

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SECTION A

TIBETO-BURMAN

1. Introduction

121 The Tibeto-Burman family of languages represents the
128 center of gravity of the Sino-Tibetan-Karen-Thai linguistic complex (Indo-Chinese) and thus makes an ideal focal point in our study of kinship terminology in southeastern Asia. The diversity within this family, roughly comparable with that of Indo-European, has given rise to great terminological variation, the interpretation of which involves an historical perspective. Tibeto-Burman, therefore, provides a testing-ground for methods as well as a point of departure, and an analysis of kinship nomenclature in this Western division of Indo-Chinese yields a framework within which the nomenclatures of Karen, Chinese, and Thai, or the Eastern division of the group, can be defined.

Tibeto-Burman studies have suffered somewhat from the undue prominence given to Chinese by the epoch-making work of Bernhard Karlgren and Henri Maspero. The classic contribution in the field, Conrady's analysis of the so-called "causative-denominative" formation, is concerned almost exclusively with morphological aspects. The same may be said of the more recent and much more substantial studies by Wolfenden, while Houghton's interesting article on

121 "linguistic palaeontology" is essentially devoted to
128 semantics. Other studies in the general field, with the exception of those noted below, are entirely superficial and need not be cited here. The fact that a sound morphological and semantic analysis can proceed only from a sound phonological basis has gone largely unheeded by students of Tibeto-Burman linguistics. The writer, working in collaboration with Mr. Robert Shafer, has attempted to supply this basis. The fruit of their joint effort is embodied in the Sino-Tibetan Linguistics series as well as in individual articles by the co-authors. This series of volumes, as specified in the bibliography appended to the present introduction, covers most of the Tibeto-Burman divisions, the major exceptions being Miri-Dafla, Konyak (East Naga), Lepcha (Rong), and Lui (Kadu). The results achieved in the Sino-Tibetan Linguistics series are in no sense definitive, but a number of broad phonetic generalizations have been attained and in some instances rather detailed phonetic analyses have been completed. In the present study the writer has refined the analysis at many points and has in some places arrived at new interpretations, while the phonological treatment of Miri-Dafla, Lepcha, and other groups is presented here for the first time.

197 The Tibeto-Burman languages, like Karen, Chinese, and Thai, are characterized by the presence of monosyllabic roots and the employment of distinctive tones (tonemes).

194 Tones appear to be lacking in a few members of the family, notably in the generally archaic West Tibetan dialects (Balti and Purik), hence only a tendency to develop tonal systems rather than a tonal system itself can definitely be postulated for the parent speech. Monosyllabic roots, however, of the type *k'wi "dog", *mig "eye", *ni "sun, day", are of absolute diagnostic value. The phonemic scheme of the parent language seems to have been relatively simple. The stop and affricate series included both aspirated and unaspirated surds and at least one sonant member. To these were added four nasals (ng, ñ, n, m), probably four sibilants (s, z, š, ž), the liquids l and r, and consonantal y, w, and h. The final consonants, however, were limited to -g, -d, -b; -ng, -n, -m; -r, -l, and probably -s. Initial consonantal clusters were restricted to combinations of stops, affricates, sibilants, or nasals + r, l, or y, e.g. kl-, mr-, py-, but prefixed groupings complicated the onset in many roots, making possible forms such as Tib. brgyad "8". The vocalic system included a, i, and u, probably with a simple "long" vs. "short" quantitative distinction, and e and o, which seem secondary in many instances. The parent language also had diphthongs both of rising type, e.g. wa (u̯a), wi (u̯i), and of falling type, e.g. au̯, ei̯, the latter type appearing only in final position, as in *ts'au "fat", *mei "fire".

193 On the morphological side the parent Tibeto-Burman speech showed almost as great simplicity. It was primarily a prefixing language with isolating characteristics and a

193 fixed word order: subject + object + verb. The verbal prefix apparatus, which is especially prominent in Tibetan and Kachin, consisted of "subjective" prefixes m-, b-, and "directive" prefixes d-, g-, r-, l-, s-. The s- prefix often appears as a true causative morpheme, as in Kachin in the form ǰa, dǰa, e.g. bra "to be scattered", ǰa-bra "to scatter"; k'rit "to fear", dǰa-k'rit "to frighten", and in Burmese, in which the initial of the transitive form has been aspirated by the loss of prefixed s-, e.g. pran "to be full", p'ran "to fill"; lwat "to be free", hlwat "to set free". Prefixed m- is "stative" (neutral), as in Tib. mnam-pa "to smell, stink", mt'o-ba "to be high", often with reflexive force, as in Tib. mnab-pa "to put on garments, dress oneself". This prefix seems to represent an ancient demonstrative pronoun, which still functions independently in Meithei (Manipuri) and can be traced elsewhere. It often imparts substantival value, e.g. *m-ǰin (Tib. mtǰ'in) "liver" "its-bitter (ǰin)-part" (see the discussion in Benedict, 1939), Kachin pyen "to fly", ma-pyen "wings" < "its-flying", rut "to rub", ma-rut "a grater" < "its-rubbing". In many instances prefixes occuring with substantival forms cannot be analyzed, e.g. *r-mei "tail", *d-gu "9", while occasionally there is fluctuation in prefix usage, e.g. *l-nga or *b-nga "5".

601 The existence of the m- pronominal prefix discussed
193 above is of some importance in the analysis of kinship terms in Tibeto-Burman. Kinship terms, like words for parts of the

body, are especially susceptible to prefixation of this type. Thus Meithei has ma-pa "father", ma-ma "mother" just as it has ma-sa "body", ma-mei "tail", ma-hau "fat", ma-hei "fruit", etc. The most widespread prefix of this type is the prefix a-, as in Tib. ʾa-p'a "father", ʾa-ma "mother", Lepcha a-bo "father", a-mo "mother", Kachin a-wa "father", a-nu " mother", Burmese a-p'a "father, a-ma^{3} "mother". As Laufer has shown, this a- prefix usage extends even into Chinese. In Tibetan this prefix is used only with kinship terms, but in Kachin, Burmese, and some of the Kukish languages it has retained its old pronominal function in its use with words for parts of the body, e.g. Southern Chin a-mi^{3} "eye", a-ho "tooth" along with a-no "father", a-nü "mother", and Lhota Naga o-k'e "hand", o-sok "belly" along with o-po "father, o-pvü "mother" (Lhota o < a). Wolfenden (1929, pp. 177 and ff.) sought to distinguish between pronominal and non-pronominal usages of this prefix, but failed to note its use with parts of the body in Kachin (e.g. a-mun "hair of the body", a-nu "brain") and in Burmese (e.g. a-mwe^{3} "hair of the body", a-mri^{3} "tail"), hence his argument must be discarded <u>in toto</u>. A third prefix of pronominal origin, k- or ka-, is also used with relationship terms, e.g. Kachin ka-wa "(his) father" along with n-wa "(your) father" and a-wa "(its) father" and wa "father", Thado (Khongzai dialect) ka-pa "father, ka-nu "mother". In the separate discussions that follow, pronominal prefixes of this type will be enclosed within parentheses, e.g. Tib. (ʾa-)p'a "father".

601 In striking contrast to this rather elaborate prefix
193 apparatus Tibeto-Burman shows almost no true morphological suffixation. A characteristic "final dental morphology", however, appears in Tibetan, Kachin and elsewhere and undoubtedly must be postulated for the parent speech. In this series Tibetan has -n, -d, and -s, the latter in some instances derived from -ds. Cf. the following examples: Tib. za-ba, gza-ba "to eat", gzan-pa "to eat, devour, gnaw", bzan "food of animals, pasturage", zan "pap, fodder", zas "food, nourishment", and Kachin ǰa "to eat", ǰat "boiled rice", i.e. "food"; Tib. bgo-ba "to put on clothes", gon-pa "to put on clothes; clothing", gos "garment"; Tib. dro-ba "to be warm, warm, warmth", dro, dros "the hot part of the day", dros-pa "heated", dron-mo "warm", drod "warmth, heat". As indicated by the above series, these derivatives in -n, -d, -s are often substantival, the typical formation being of the type na-ba "to be ill", nad "disease". The connection between the verbal root and the derived form with final dental is not always clear, especially in languages in which this morphology no longer functions, e.g. Burmese na "to be ill", nat "demon" < "spirit of disease" (see the discussion in Benedict, 1939). The importance of this morphology in connection with kinship terminology will be made clear in the discussion of the Tibetan system.

197 The classification of the Tibeto-Burman languages presents a number of serious problems which admit of no solution at the present time. The general picture is much

197 like that in Indo-European linguistics, i.e. several large well-defined groups and various smaller groups can be pointed out, but, with the exception of a few specific similarities, the exact genealogies of these groups cannot be traced. The 128 main divisions of Tibeto-Burman and the approximate positions 197 of some of the key languages are indicated on the appended language list and map. This list includes only those languages for which kinship material is given and is in no sense complete. This material has been arranged with a view to guiding the reader through the maze of Tibeto-Burman linguistics, hence the transitions are both geographical and philological. First the important Tibetan group and its aberrant dialects are considered, thus yielding a yardstick of comparison against which other systems can be collated. Proceeding then to the south, we discuss the chain of languages spoken in the sub-Himalayan area, from west to east, ending with the Miri group in northern Assam. The linguistic affiliations follow much the same pattern, inasmuch as the languages of Kanauri type in the western sub-Himalayas approach Tibetan while those in the eastern sub-Himalayas (Nepal) show affiliations rather with the languages of Assam and Burma. The Kachin group, which stands at the "linguistic crossroads" of Tibeto-Burman, forms the natural transition to Nung and Burmese on the one hand, and to Konyak and Barish on the other. Lastly, the Kukic complex of languages, including Kuki-Chin, Naga,

128 Mikir, and Meithei, round out our picture of Tibeto-Burman
197 kinship terminology as a whole. As new material is presented in connection with each group taken up for discussion, recapitulatory remarks are added to tie the argument together, and a general summary is offered at the end.

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1. Tibetan	12. Dafla	23. Lisu	33. Lushei
2. Tsangla	13. Digaru	24. Nyi	34. Lakher
3. Gyarung	14. Aka	25. Ahi	35. Thado
4. Kanauri	15. Dhimal	26. Moso	36. Sho
5. Byangsi	16. Kachin	27. Chang	37. Khami
6. Bahing	17. Nung	28. Garo	38. Tangkhul
7. Vayu	18. Burmese	29. Bodo	39. Empeo
8. Newari	19. Maru	30. Mikir	40. Angami
9. Magari	20. Phunoi	31. Meithei	41. Sema
10. Lepcha	21. Akha	32. Mru	42. Ao
11. Abor-Miri	22. Lahu		

Language List:

Abor-Miri 11. Ahi 25. Aka 14. Akha 21. Angami 40. Ao 42. Bahing 6. Bodo 29. Burmese 18. Byangsi 5. Chang 27. Dafla 12. Dhimal 15. Digaru 13. Empeo 39. Garo 28. Gyarung 3. Kachin 16. Kanauri 4. Khami 37. Lahu 22. Lakher 34. Lepcha 10. Lisu 23. Lushei 33. Magari 9. Maru 19. Meithei 31. Mikir 30. Moso 26. Mru 32. Newari 8. Nung 17. Nyi 24. Phunoi 20. Sema 41. Sho 36. Tangkhul 38. Thado 35. Tibetan 1. Tsangla 2. Vayu 7.

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197

10B

2. The Tibetan Group

197 The Tibetan (Bodish) group of languages consists of Classical Tibetan, the modern Tibetan dialects, and a number of speeches of aberrant type, the most important of which are Gyarung, Tsangla, Murmi, and Gurung, all spoken on the eastern or southeastern fringes of Tibet. The orthography of the Classical language, or Old Tibetan, reflects the phonology of the 8th century. The morphological apparatus of the language had become "congealed" even at that early period, yet the archaic forms that it exhibits constitute one of our principal sources for the reconstruction of Tibeto-Burman. Of the modern dialects, only the westernmost (Balti and Purik) and the easternmost spoken in Khams are of much help in reconstituting pre-Classical forms, and the Khams dialects are virtually unknown. Of the aberrant Bodish languages, Gyarung is the best known but at the same time the most divergent and the most difficult to analyze.

Our sources for Tibetan lexicography are relatively good. The most important dictionaries are those of Csoma de Körös, Schmidt, Jaeschke, Das, and the Missionaires Catholiques du Tibet (generally known under the name of Desgodins, the final editor of the work), all of which are devoted primarily to the Classical language. The archaic western dialects of Balti and Purik are known through the fairly good studies of Read and Bailey, while a large number of sources, none of first-rate value, exist for the less important central and

197 southern dialects. On the strictly lexical side, therefore, Tibetan kinship terminology must be regarded as sufficiently well known. Singularly little information is at hand, however, on the ethnological aspects. The numerous writers on Tibet have in general been preoccupied with the highly publicized subject of polyandry and sundry oddities to the exclusion of the anthropologically more significant fields of marriage regulation and clan organization. Thus Sir Charles Bell's standard ethnography of Tibet (The People of Tibet, Oxford, 1928) gives no information on these important points. This general discrepancy obtains in our information on almost all the Tibeto-Burman groups but nowhere else does it attain such striking proportions.

601 **Classical Tibetan Consanguineal Terms**

gzi-mes-mo ggM		gzi-mes ggF	
yang-mes-mo ggM		yang-mes-po ggF	
p'yi-mo gM		mes-po gF	
(ʔa-)ma M		(ʔa-)p'a F	
(ʔa-)ne FSi, MSW		k'u-bo FB	
sru-mo MSi		zang-po MB	
(ʔa-)c'e OSi(ws)		p'u-bo / (ʔa-)jo	oB(ms)
nu-mo ySi(ws)		nu-bo yB(ms)	
sring-mo Si(ms)		sing-po B(ws)	
bu-mo D	bu Ch	bu(-p'o) S	
ts'a-mo Ni,gD	ts'a N,gCh	ts'a-bo Ne,gS	
	yang-ts'a ggCh,ggS		
	yung-ts'a / gzi-ts'a ggCh		

601

Classical Tibetan Affinal Terms

{gyos-mo {sgyug-mo	M1	gyo: gyos-po	F1
		skud skud-po	S1,F1
mes-ma	SW,gSW	mag- mag-pa	DH

Notes:

As shown below, mes-po (gF) is perhaps a respectful word that has displaced the older colloquial term. The original term seems to have been *(ʔa-)po, or *spo-bo. It is found as the term for gF in the archaic Western dialects of Balti and Purik (a-po) and in Central Tibetan as recorded by Bell (po-o) and Henderson (po). The intervening dialects of Nyamskad (by Gerard) and Spiti (by Cunningham), however, have the term me-me (meh-meh), which is the colloquial variant of mes-po. For the Classical language, Desgodins cites spo-bo "sous (aïeul)" as the equivalent of mes-po. Schmidt gives ʾa-bo "der ältere Bruder; Herr" as the equivalent of ʾa-jo, and Desgodins confirms this, with the additional note that in Bathang (eastern Tibet) the term (ʾa-bo) is used for the wife or daughter of a chief. Das further complicates the picture by citing ʾa-po as "junior husband of a woman", also "youthful husband of an elderly woman", also "address for an elderly man". This secretion of meanings is best explained on the assumption that the term, having been displaced by the respectful appellation mes-po, has undergone extreme semantic specialization in parts of the Tibetan linguistic area.

601 There is some evidence for a correlative term *rmo-mo (gM) along with *spo-bo (gF). Schmidt cites rmo-mo (also ma-mo) as gM, and Das cites the variant rmo-ma as FM, also as " old woman". Desgodins gives the reduplicated form rmo-rmo "avia materna" (MM), but notes that in Bathang it has the meaning "noverca, socrus (belle-mère)" (Ml). Csoma equates rmo-mo with ma-o'ung (MySi); cf. Das' definition of 'a-po as "junior husband of a woman". For Central Tibetan Bell cites mo-o < rmo-o gM, paralleling po-o gF, and Henderson cites mo gM and po gF, hence the correlative nature of the two terms is assured. The western dialects, however, all have a root *a-pi (cited as a-bi in Spiti) representing a variant of the Classical form 'a-p'yi < *'a-p'i (= p'yi-mo). The unaspirated variant is found also in the Gyarung cognate, a-pi "old woman" (voc.) (in von Rosthorn).

The paternal and maternal lines are not generally distinguished in Tibetan, yet the combined terms p'a-mes FF and ma-mes MF are cited by Csoma.

The terms given for relatives of the 3rd and 4th asc. gen. are not in general use. With the exception of yang-mes (for yang-mes-po), which occurs in the Gyalrabs (native Tibetan history), these terms have been taken from Schmidt's dictionary. The element yang is perhaps to be identified with yang "again", while gźi is connected with gźi(-ma) "original cause" used in the sense of time, e.g. gźi-ning "two years ago". The variant źe-ning (Csoma gźes-rnying) also means

601 "two years ago", but gňes as an independent word means "the second day after tomorrow", which seems more applicable to terms for the 4th asc. and desc. gen. (Schmidt cites both gňi-mes and ňe-mes for ggg̃).

Schmidt gives an additional term, be-log, for ggg̃, but this cannot be analyzed (for -log, cf. logs "side"). The interesting combined form yes-mes, the first element of which is unanalyzable, is defined by Schmidt as "Stammvater", by Desgodins as "antecessores, avus (vulg.)".

A root *'a-ta "father", though scarcely part of the Classical language, is well represented in Tibetan in general. Csoma, Das, and Desgodins all cite 'a-ta F, while Desgodins defines the term more precisely as "vox puerorum pro p'a et 'a-p'a". Das adds the interesting comment that in Kong-po 'a-ta is equivalent to 'a-jo (oB); cf. 'a-bo supra. Balti and Purik both have a-ta as the standard term for F, while in Balti ba-wa, the sonant variant of p'a, is regarded as a respectful term.

The term 'a-ma M has no serious rival within Tibetan. Balti has zi-zi M along with a-ma (cf. the aberrant form a-si ggM cited for Balti by Austen), and Lhoke, the Tibetan dialect spoken in Bhutan, has a-yi.

The four terms for "uncle" and "aunt" extend throughout most of the Tibetan dialects with little variation. These primary terms, however, are often replaced by combined forms, especially in western Tibet. The combining element is

601 generally c'ung "small" or c'en "large". Thus, ʾa-pa (for ʾa-p'a) c'en-po "the elder husband of a person's mother", ʾa-pa c'ung-ngu "the younger husband of id.", hence occasionally "uncle". For Lahuli, de Roerich defines the corresponding ʾa-wa c'ed-mo and ʾa-wa c'u/um as "older uncle" and " younger uncle", respectively, while ʾa-ma c'u/um is defined simply as "aunt". Csoma defines ma-c'en as MeSi and ma-c'ung as MySi, but Jaeschke interprets these combined forms rather as "father's principal wife" and "father's secondary wife", respectively. Balti has a-ta ts'ar-ma and a-ta tsun-tse for FB, where ts'ar-ma means "old" and tsun-tse means "young, small" , hence one can interpret the former as FoB and the latter as FyB. Austen cites a parallel form, viz. a-ngo tsun-tse MSi (a-ngo < a-ma). For Purik, Bailey defines a-ta both as "father" and as "uncle", but in the illustrative sentence on p. 29 the combined form a-ta ts'un-tse is given for "uncle". Cunningham cites ma-jung "aunt" for Spiti.

The use of combined terms of this type is certainly to be associated with polyandrous and polygynous practices. The West Tibetan terms for "uncle", in particular, must be explained on the basis of the fraternal polyandry prevalent in that area. Not only a-ta, properly F, but also a-gu or a-ku (Classical k'u-bo), properly FB, may be extended to cover the F = FB equivalence. The latter extension is found in Nyamskad and Spiti, the westernmost dialects of Central Tibetan type. Thus Nyamskad has a-gu "father, male",

601 and u-gu FB, while Spiti has a-ku F,FB. For the meaning "male", cf. Classical p'a-glang "bull", p'a-rta "stallion". The equivalence F = FB is thus linguistically a two-way one.

In West Tibetan a-ku is further extended to cover the affinal relationship "husband, consort" (Jaeschke). Under fraternal polyandry a-ku becomes "husband of the mother" and, through teknonymy, "husband". A parallel is furnished by a-ne or ne-ne-mo, regularly FSi (and so Balti ne-ne), but in West Tibetan used for "wife, partner, spouse" (Jaeschke). Das cites the meaning FBW for 'a-ne (the term is defined by Jaeschke as FSi,MBW). The term has the additional meaning "woman, female" (cf. Nyamskad a-ne "father's sister, female"), paralleling the use of a-gu (supra), and even "nun" (Csoma) and "grandaunt" (Gyalrabs). Since 'a-ne FSi stands outside F's group of marriageable females, one must conclude that this semantic development in the direction of "wife, woman, female" has proceeded through analogy with a-ku FB.

A notable West Tibetan irregularity is presented by Balti mo-mo MB, independently attested by Austen and Read. The form must be compared with Kanauri mo-ma ~ ma-ma MB, Byangsi and Chaudangsi ma-ma MB, which are clearly loan-words from Ind. māmā, id. The borrowing has probably been made via the Kanauri group of Himalayish (vide infra). Nyamskad has the standard term, a-žang, along with a new term, e-bi (= a-bi). It would seem that the MB term is unstable in West Tibetan, and we shall see that this condition obtains elsewhere.

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Csoma and Schmidt cite ʾa-bang ~ bang-po FSiH, MSiH, but the term is poorly attested and does not seem to have survived in the modern Tibetan dialects.

The sibling terms are reducible to a root for ySb (*nu ~ no) and especial terms for oSb. The root *nu usually appears in the form *no, e.g. Spiti no B, Nyamskad no yB, Purik no-mo ySi, p'o-no B, Balti no-ngo < no-mo ySi (cf. the remarks on Balti infra). One is tempted to connect this term with the root represented by nu-ma "breast", nu-ba "to suck", nud-pa, snun-pa "to suckle" (note the morphology), but the etymological relation is not certain.

The terms for oSb make up a distinct class. Sororal polygyny is reflected in the West Tibetan use of a-ce or a-se (a-ce) as "wife, mistress, madam", and in the meaning "elder wife" assigned by Schmidt to the Classical form c'e-se. The term may be derived from c'e-ba "great" (cf. the respectful term gcen-po oB), but note that a root *c'e "woman" appears in the Kanauri group (infra). The basic term for oB is p'u-bo, as shown in part by its morphological relationship to sbun (vide infra). The term a-jo, also jo-jo and jo-bo, must be regarded as an intruder from the respectful language; cf. its common meaning "lord, master", and jo-mo "mistress, the female head of a household". The word t'u-bo "chief" (cf. t'u-mo "lady, mistress") is used in the Dsanglun and Taranatha (Buddhist works) in the meaning oB, thus paralleling the semantic development of ʾa-jo.

601 Balti has an especial term for oB, viz. ka-ka. Jaeschke cites only West Tibetan (i.e. Ladakhi) ga-ga "a title of honour: the old squire". He equates this term with Central Tibetan a-jo-lag (from 'a-jo oB), and contrasts it with Ladakhi no-no "title of young nobleman" (from nu-bo ~ no-bo yB), hence there can be no question as to the identity of Jaeschke's ga-ga with Read's ka-ka, despite the semantic discrepancy. This term also occurs in the contiguous Himalayish group (infra), viz. Chamba Lahuli kag < ka-ga, Manchati ka-ka oB. Like no-no ~ na-na YB, it is an Indic loan-word; cf. Hindustani kākā oB, FyB, Persian kākā oB, FB. The Indic term ordinarily has the meaning "FyB", and it is in this sense that it has been borrowed by the Almora languages (infra, pt. 3).

Age distinctions among siblings are occasionally indicated by combined terms. Thus Purik has p'o-no "brother", co p'o-no " big brother", ts'un-tse p'o-no " little brother" (text, p. 32), yet retains a-ce and no-no for oSi and ySi. Rockhill cites cung-wa yB for Central Tibetan, probably from c'ung-ba " small" , and lo-c'ung yB for East Tibetan, literally "young in years" ("years-small"). The latter may explain the puzzling Lhoke form, a-lo "son", cited in the LSI.

The ms vs. ws distinction in Tibetan appears to be well retained in the modern dialects, but the information on this point is generally not precise. Bailey does not mention the distinction for Purik, nor de Roerich for Lahuli,

601 but Read specifically states that Balti no-ngo ysi and a-ǰe osi are women's terms, whence it may be inferred that Balti string-mo si is a man's term. The cross terms, sring-mo and ming-po, are well represented in the modern dialects and the former, as will be shown, even has some Tibeto-Burman extension. In Sikkim sring-mo has the meaning ysi (Desgodins), while for Nyamskad Gerard similarly limits the meaning of sǎng-mo (< sring-mo) to ysi. Desgodins defines ming-po as "ejusdem nominis, consanguineus frater", indicating that he believed it to be related to ming "name", as used, for example, in p'a-ming "relations on the father's side". For sring-mo, however, no comparable derivation can be suggested, and the etymological connections of the two terms remain uncertain.

The term bu Ch offers no especial difficulties. The primary term itself is used also in the meaning "son" and enters into compounds such as bu-sring "S and Si" (= ming-sring), while bu-p'o, formed with p'o "male" in contradistinction to the enclitic particle -po of ming-po, etc., is a secondary formation based on analogy with bu-mo "daughter". The latter term is frequently used in the meaning "girl, maiden, virgin", and in West Tibetan generally stands also for bud-med "woman, wife".

Several less important terms exist in Tibetan for relatives of the 1st desc. gen. The most notable of these is p'rug (also p'rug-gu, p'ru-gu) "child". The root is perhaps *p'ru rather than *p'rug; cf. p'ru-ma "uterus", and the Purik form p'ru S,Ch. The term byis-pa is used in the

601 more specific sense of "little child" (byi-bo in Schmidt and the native lexicons). Milaraspa (poetic work) has mo-byis "female child", but the Central Tibetan form is mo-yi, which indicates an original *mo-dbyis (db- drops in this dialect, as in u "head" for Classical dbu). The form mo-yi must be compared with Lhoke (Bhutan) a-yi "mother" (vide supra). Desgodins cites ʾa-kwa-ba, ʾa-k'wa-be "puerulus (petit enfant)", as well as ʾa-be-wa, a-be-mu, a-ba-kwa " puerulus" and ʾa-we "infantulus". The ʾa-ba~ʾa-wa type is represented also in Central Tibetan a-wa (Henderson) "child" and the respectful form a-wa se-sö (for * ʾa-ba sras-sras) cited by Bell. One naturally compares this type with ʾa-p'a~ʾa-ba "father", which exists also in the form ʾa-wa (Lahuli). There are thus some meagre indications of reciprocal parental terminology in Tibetan.

The term ts'a, which equates the 1st descending collateral and the 2nd descending central generations, presents something of a semantic problem. Etymologically the word is related to btsa-ba "to bear, bring forth", btsas-pa " what is begotten, new-born children or animals", btsa-ma "fruit", btsas-ma "harvest". The combined term bu-ts'a is used in the Thargyan (native scientific work) in the meaning "gCh", but in the modern dialects, especially West Tibetan, it has the meaning "son" and is used as a correlative of bu-mo, e.g. bu-ts'a dang bo-mo "S and D". In Lahuli bu-mo is defined as "girl, woman, niece", and bu-ts'a

601 as "son, nephew", thus merging the collateral and central lines. Ladakhi distinguishes between me-me ts'a-wo gS (me-me gF) and a-žang ts'a-wo Ne (a-žang MB). In this connection note that ts'a is combined with ʾa-žang MB but not with k'u FB (though Jaeschke gives ts'a-bo Ne,BS from the Dzanglun). The combined term žang-ts'a is defined as "SiS" (probably xNe), but ts'a-žang means "nephew and uncle by the mother's side", and in the works of the poet Milarespa it is employed in the connotation "spiritual brotherhood". An additional meaning, viz. "Sl and Bl", is provided from the Gyalrabs, an historical work; in this usage ts'a equates Ne and Sl (under cross-cousin marriage, [illegible] becomes Sl), and žang equates MB with Bl (under cross-cousin marriage, MB becomes Fl, and the affinal term proper, skud-po, equates Fl with Bl). Lahuli offers a curious variation in its use of ts'a-o < ts'a-bo for gS, but ts'a-mo for [illegible], while a new combined term, ts'a-mo-tsi, is used for gD. This usage of ts'a-mo parallels the West Tibetan use of bo-mo (supra); the element -tsi is probably a diminutive (cf. be-ci "little boy", in Das).

The terms yang-ts'a ggCh and gži-ts'a gggCh parallel yang-mes-po ggF and gži-mes gggF. Thus yang can be considered a categorical term for the 3rd asc. or desc. generation, and gži for the 4th asc. or desc. generation. Rockhill gives yang-tsa (for yang-ts'a) as the East Tibetan term for gS,gD, suggesting an original ts'a Ch. Schmidt cites gži-ts'a gggCh, but the common term is yung-ts'a (yung cannot be analyzed).

601 Several Tibetan kinship terms of unusual interest exhibit the characteristic "dental morphology" of this language (vide Introduction). An -n or -d suffix is added to the root, and, when the root has an initial stop consonant, an s- is prefixed. Thus, smad < ma M, spad < p'a F, spun < p'u(-bo) oB, skud(-po) < k'u(-bo) FB, but ts'an < ts'a B, gCh, and mc'ed < c'e oSi (with m- prefix). The loss of aspiration after prefixed s- is a regular Tibetan phenomenon; cf. 'k'or-ba "to turn round", skor-ba "to surround"; 'p'ur-ba "to fly", spur-ba "to make fly". These derived forms are used as collectives. Thus, smad "children, in relation to their mother", in combination with bu or ma. Contrast bu-smad "family, children, wife and children" with ma-bu "mother and son, capital and interest, original and copy, principal and cross beam" (bu seems never to be combined with p's F). For the use of ma-smad, cf. nged ma-smad "I and my mother" (nged "I or we"); rgan-mo ma-smad gsum "the old woman with her (two) sons" (rgan-mo "old woman", gsum "three"). The corresponding masculine phrase is p'a-spad "father and children", perhaps formed secondarily on analogy with ma-smad. Csoma also cites a combined term span-spun "brothers, relatives".

The terms spun and ts'an are applied to relatives in Ego's generation. Spun is defined as "children of the same parents, brothers, sisters", also "cousins, brothers- or sisters-in-law". It is used for siblings of the same sex; cf. nged spun gsum "we three brothers", k'yed bu-mo spun lnga-po

601 "you five sisters". A distinction is drawn between p'a-spun "brothers and sisters of the same father" and ma-spun "brothers and sisters of the same mother" (for p'a-spun, vide infra). A feminine form, spun-ma, has been developed for "sister". The development of spun from p'u-bo oB is exactly paralleled in the respectful term, mo'ed, from (ʾa-)c'e oBi.

The term ts'an, like ts'a, shows a tendency to equate different generations. In the combined form k'u-ts'an "uncle and nephew", to be contrasted with ts'a-žang and žang-ts'a (supra), the meaning "nephew" is faithfully reflected. The terms p'a-ts'an "cousin by the father's side" and ma-ts'an "cousin by the mother's side" (Central Tibetan p'a-tsen and ma-tsen), however, indicate ts'an ~ ts'a "child" rather than "nephew". Jaeschke even equates p'a-ts'an with p'a-spun " brothers and sisters of the same father". The term ts'an has acquired a wide range of meanings, which have proved puzzling to the lexicographers of Tibetan. Jaeschke defines it in one sense as "termination of some collective nouns", and cites gnyen-ts'an, nye-ts'an "kindred, relations" (gnyen "relations"), and blon-po-ts'an " embassies" (blon-po "officer"). Ts'an also has the connotations "series, order, class" (e.g. bži-ts'an "collection of four things"), "much, large, copious, great" (e.g. ts'an c'e-ba "very much"), and ts'an-po is used as a title: "dignitary, grandee".

601 Our information on terms used for "cousins" in Tibetan is none too clear. Rockhill (1895, p. 679) states that Tibetan "has only one word for 'nephew' or 'niece', and this is also used for 'grandson' and 'granddaughter' [ts'a], and it has none to express 'cousin', but the word non (snun), 'brothers' or 'sisters', is sometimes used to express this relationship". In his list of Central Tibetan kinship terms, however, Rockhill gives the analytical forms akou-gi puga (< 'a-k'u-gyi p'rug-gu), lit. FBCh, and ane-gi puga (< 'a-ne-gyi p'rug-gu), lit. FSiCh, for "cousin". Schmidt cites a similar term, viz. 'a-ne-i-bu "son of the aunt" (FSiS). Analytical terms of this type may be a feature of Central Tibetan; cf. the terms for "grandchildren" cited by Bell, viz. pu-i pu (< bu-i bu) SS, pu-i pu-mo (< bu-i bu-mo) gD (lit. SD), pu-mö pu (< bu-mo-i bu) DS, and pu-mö pu-mo (< bu-mo-i bu-mo) gD (lit. DD), rather than the standard ts'a-bo, ts'a-mo. In any event, it is clear that the ordinary sibling terms, either wa or ma, are never extended to include "cousins".

The especial affinal terms in Tibetan are not numerous and our data on them are rather meagre. The evidence indicates that the same terms are used by husband and wife. The most interesting of the lot is skud-po, a secondary formation from k'u-bo FB (vide supra), ordinarily defined as Bl,Fl. Das, however, specifies WB, and notes that in Sikkim the term is used for HyB, and Desgodins gives only "frater uxoris,

601 levir". The term is probably more closely associated with B1 than with F1, yet the compound term mag-skud (vide infra) means S1 and F1, not S1 and B1. Tibetan appears to lack any other terms for B1 or S1l. Spun is sometimes used in the sense "brothers- or sisters-in-law" (vide supra). The term p'u-nu-mo in a passage from the Dzanglun is translated by Jaeschke as S1l, yet p'u-nu is defined simply as "the elder and the younger brother, i.e. the two brothers". If Jaeschke's translation is correct, one must infer that p'u-nu and p'u-nu-mo may be extended to include affinal relatives of Ego's gen.

The two primary parents-in-law terms are gyos-po F1 and sgyug-mo M1. The term gyos-mo M1 has probably arisen secondarily on analogy with gyos-po. Jaeschke notes that in Ladakhi "this word is rather avoided, sounding, as it is pronounced there, much like the obscene rgyo-ba" [coitus], but the nature of the substitution is not stated. Sgyug-mo rather than gyos-mo is used in compound phrases, e.g. gyos-sgyug "parents-in-law", mna-sgyug D1 and M1. A term *skud-mo M1, based on skud-po (supra), though lacking in the lexicons can be reconstructed on the basis of Central Tibetan gü-mo M1, gü-po F1 (Sandberg) (in this dialect final -d regularly drops, palatalizing the preceding vowel). Lahuli uses ʾa-ǰang for F1 as well as for "uncle" (MB, since Lahuli also has ʾa-gu < ʾa-k'u), and a combined term ʾa-ǰang ʾa-ni for M1 (ʾa-ni < ʾa-ma "aunt", i.e. FSi). This

601 remarkable variation, clearly indicating cross-cousin marriage, makes it all the more regrettable that dialectical affinal terms are almost entirely unknown. Nyamskad has ʼsak-po B1, a loan-word from Kanauri (vide infra), also min-dok-po B1, perhaps connected with dagh-po H.

The remaining affinal terms, mag-pa and mna-ma, are much better attested than the foregoing. Both terms are used with reference to the newly-married couple, hence mean "bridegroom" and "bride" as well as S1 and D1. The betrothed girl, or "daughter-in-law <u>in spe</u>", is also termed mna-ma. The term is also applied to gSW, and Das even specifies "bride of one's younger brother". Etymologically the term may be related to mna "oath", i.e. "one who takes an oath". Tibetan possesses distinct words for "bridegroom" and "bride", however, viz. bag-po and bag-ma, respectively, perhaps connected with bag, an ill-defined root having the general connotation "reverential fear".

A number of distinct terms are employed for H and W, in addition to those noted above (ts'a-mo, bo-mo, etc.). The usual term for H is k'yo(-p'o) "man", whence k'yo-mo W, but bdag-po "proprietor, master, lord" is also used in the sense "husband, spouse, lord" (< bdag "self, I"). Jaeschke notes that ʼa-ma dag-po, or sring-mo dag-po, is "a vulgar and obscene word of abuse", apparently through implication of incest with ʼa-ma M, or sring-mo Si (ms). One's wife may be called mdun-ma (mdun "a high civil officer"), btsun-mo

601 (btsun-pa "noble, reverend"), or c'ung-ma (c'ung "small"; cf. ma-c'ung MySi). Of greater interest is the common term bud-med "wife, spouse", also "woman". This compound word has puzzled several Tibetan scholars, including Laufer, who originally (1914) sought to derive it from bu(d) "child" + med "without" or "not", i.e. "not a child", but later (1915) recognized in the element med a true root for "woman". The analysis is not difficult in view of our remarks supra in re derived forms showing final dental morphology. One must postulate a root *me "woman, mother" parallel to *ma, and a formation bu-mod parallel to bu-mad ~ bu-smad (the former in Csoma) "family, wife and children", followed by an assimilatory phonetic shift bu-med > bud-med and a semantic shift to "wife, woman".

In addition to the consanguineal and affinal terms discussed above, Tibetan has a set of terms from the so-called "respectful" language, for members of the immediate family, excluding collateral lines and relatives by marriage. These respectful words, e.g. spyan "eye" for mig, p'yag "hand" for lag-pa, are probably periphrastic in most instances, though ordinarily no analysis is possible. The respectful kinship terms, which are listed below, conform in every way to the general class of respectful words.

Classical Tibetan Respectful Terms

601

yum M			yab F	
			goen(-po)	oB(ms)
			gsung(-po)	yB(ms)
lcam-mo	Si(ms)	mc'ed (= spun)	drel(-po)	B(ws)
sras-mo	D		sras(-po)	S
dbon-mo	Ni,gD		dbon-po	Ne,gS

Notes:

It will be noted that the above terms form a system exactly parallel to that of the ordinary terms. Lacking are terms for oSi(ws) and ySi(ws), and for gF and gM. The former have probably never been developed - an important point, inasmuch as it reflects a distinct sister-and-sister behaviour pattern as compared with brother-and-brother. It is quite unlikely, however, that no respectful term for grandparent should have been developed. As suggested above, the regular gF term, mes-po, is best regarded as a respectful term that has displaced an original *spo-bo or *(ʾa-)po. Note the use of the term in compound phrases such as mes-dbon gF and gCh, and yab-mes F and gF, also "ancestors", and in the phrase mes rgyal-po (in Gyalrabs), lit. "grandfather king" but stated to be equivalent to "the old king".

Mc'ed, as noted above, is a derivative from c'e oSi, but the remaining respectful terms are distinct from the regular terms. Yum M may stand for rum "womb", and yab F for rab(s) "lineage". Initial y- ~ r- alternation is not

601 typical for Tibetan but may occur, e.g. Schmidt cites ral-ga "branch" for yal-ga. In these two instances a shift to y- may have been initiated by the palatalizing influence of -i, a genitive case particle; thus mai rum (ma-i rum) is the common phrase for rum "womb", and pai rab(s) might stand for "father's lineage".

Gcen-po oB is a derivative of c'e-ba ~ c'en-po "great, old", and goung-po is a parallel derivative of c'ung-ba "little, young" (the aspiration is regularly dropped after prefixed g-). The terms lcam-mo and dral-po (fully defined only in Desgodins) show a curious history. The former, often written p'yam or even k'yam (both are pronounced c'am in modern dialects), is connected with lcam "lath, pole, rafter, spar of a roof", and the latter with gral-ma "a small beam, rafter", from gral "row, series, class", i.e. "things in a row". Dral is a variant of gral, the initial dr- ~ gr- alternation in Tibetan being rather well attested, e.g. 'dril-ba ~ 'gril-ba "to be turned around, twisted". The compound phrase lcam-dral, also mc'ed-lcam-dral, defined as B and Si, is matched by gral-p'yam (= gral-lcam) "roof-laths". Cf. also the respectful term gdung, for rus-pa "lineage", where gdung-ma means "beam, piece of timber". The metaphor involved in this bit of constructional terminology is that of a series of siblings arrayed in proper order; cf. the semantic development of ts'an (supra) in the sense "series, order, class".

601 The two remaining terms, sras and dbon, are scarcely analyzable. Sras may originally have stood for "fruit"; cf. sra-ba ~ sran-pa "hard, firm, solid, compact", and sran-ma, srad-ma "pease, lentils", also "grain", and Lushei (Kuki group) ra³ < *ras "fruit". Tibetan 'bras "rice", 'bras-bu "fruit, grain" (bu "son"), may also be from this root (*ras, *s-ras, *b-ras).

Within the Tibetan dialects proper, the maximum amount of specialization is found in the archaic Western dialect, Balti. The Balti terms are as follows:

Balti Consanguineal Terms

a-pi gM	a-po gF
a-ngo a-ma M si-si	a-ta ba-wa F (resp.)
ne-ne FSi	no-no MB
a-ngo ts'ar-ma MoSi	a-ta ts'ar-ma FaB
a-ngo tsun-tse MySi	a-ta tsun-tse FyB
a-ye oSi(ws)	ka-ka oB(ms)
no-ngo ySi(ws)	no yB(ms)
string-mo Si(ms)	ming-po B(ws)
bo-ngo D	ku S
ts'a-ngo gD	ts'e gS

601 Notes:

The above table has been completed in part by inference, in part by correction. Austen's work is especially careless, e.g. the columns are reversed on p. 260. Austen cites a-ngo tsun-tse as FSi, following a-ta(h) tsun-tse FB, and ne-ne as MSi, following mo-mo MB, whereas a-ngo tsun-tse can mean only "little mother (a-ngo)" and ne-ne stands for Classical ne-ne-mo FSi. The term a-ngo tsun-tse is interpreted as MySi, and a correlative term *a-ngo ts'ar-ma MoSi is added, on the analogy of a-ta ts'ar-ma and a-ta tsun-tse. Similarly, a-ze and no-ngo are defined as women's terms, hence string-mo is interpreted as a man's term, and the terms for B, viz. ka-ka, no, and ming-po (Austen ming-mo), are interpreted analogically. The system thus reconstructed is consistent throughout, and may with some confidence be regarded as correct. The collateral and affinal terms are not known. Austen cites nes-po ggF (cf. mes-po) and a-si (asai) ggM (cf. zi-zi M).

The most notable differences in the Balti system are the use of combined terms showing age distinctions for MSi and FB (i.e., parent's siblings of same sex), and the appearance of dialectical terms for gF (a-po) and F (a-ta) and of Indic loan-words for MB (mo-mo) and oB (ka-ka). Note that these distinct terms refer exclusively to male relatives, indicating that the terminology for female relatives is relatively stable. On the phonetic side, the

601 feminine ending -ngo has been developed from -mo (cf. bya-ngo "hen" for Classical bya-mo), whence a-ngo < a-ma through analogy (a-ma must be considered a literary form), while ts'o gB stands for ts'a-wo < ts'a-bo. The form no yB for nu(-bo) represents a significant dialectical divergence which establishes the connection of the term with the Tibeto-Burman root *nau.

We are now in a position to point out the essential features of the Tibetan terminology. The paternal and maternal lines are merged in the two primary grandparent terms. In contrast, there are four primary terms for "uncle" and "aunt", but with some tendency to substitute combined terms showing age distinctions, especially in West Tibetan. The speaker's sex is distinguished in the sibling terms, in which the cross terms without age distinctions (sring-mo and ming-po) are opposed to the parallel terms with age distinctions (c'e and nu-ma, p'u and nu-bo). There are primary neuter terms for younger sibling (nu ~ no), child (bu), and grandchild, nephew (ts'a). There is a serial equation in ts'a N,gCh, and indications that ts'a and ('a-)lang were originally reciprocal terms for SiS and MB. Collective terms showing final dental morphology are applied to especial groupings of relatives, and two of these (ts'an, spun) are extended to include collateral relatives (cousins), whereas the ordinary sibling terms are never extended in this manner.

601 Categorical equations are shown by skud-po F1,B1, developed from k'u-bo FB, and by 'a-ne (m-ne-mo) FS1,MB7. Finally, Tibetan has a fairly full set of respectful terms, which exactly parallel the ordinary kinship terms.

As noted above, our information on Tibetan marriage regulation and clan organization is relatively meagre. The best accounts are those given by Francke, which refer to Ladakh, in western Tibet. His account of the pha-spun-ship is of especial interest:

> The individuality of a Tibetan is fixed by three names: (1) by his personal name, (2) by his house name, (3) by his clan name. The latter name is the name of the pha-spun-ship ("father-brothership") to which he belongs.....the pha-spun-ship is an exogamic institution, i.e. a boy of a certain pha-spun-ship is not allowed to marry a girl of the same pha-spun-ship" (1914, 47-48).

The pha-spun-ship thus appears to be a patrilineal exogamic clan (gens). Francke (1904, 364-65) describes in some detail the organization in Khalatse, a Ladakhi town. Here there are four pha-spun-ships, with a variable number of families in each (9, 6, 3, 2), as well as three families that do not belong to any pha-spun-ship. Francke shows that the two largest pha-spun-ships are of Dard origin, e.g. one is named Pakorapa <Dard pakor "meadow". Francke (1914), apparently basing his remarks on observations by Lyall, notes that there are six of these gens in Spiti (west-central Tibet), where they are called rus-pa. The Spiti rus-pa have indigenous names, e.g. rgya-shing-pa "large field owners", blon-chen-pa "great ministers", etc. The functions of the

601 pha-spun or rus-pa are not described in any detail, though Francke (1914) notes that the Ladakhi pha-spun-ship has charge of the cremation of the dead and the erection of memorials (mchod-rten).

The term pha-spun (p'a-spun), which has already been discussed, is not generally used in the sense of "clan" or "lineage", but rus(-pa) is well known in the general meaning "lineage, family". An important account of the rus-pa is contained in the work of Ippolito Desideri of Pistoia, an early 18th century traveller in Tibet, who supplied the Western world with its first complete description of that country. For a good general account, see Wessels (Chap. VII, 205-72). Desideri's "Relations" have been translated by Puini and Filippi, and some of his letters and papers by Hoosten. The following extract is from Filippi's translation (p. 192):

> The Thibettans recognize two classes of kinship. The first are called relations of the Rupa-cik, or of the same bone; the second, relations of the Scia-cik, or of the same blood. They recognize, as relations of Rupa-cik, or the same bone, those who descend from a common ancestor, however remote, even when they have been divided into different branches during many generations. Relations of the Scia-cik, or the same blood, are those created by legitimate marriages. The first, though it may be exceedingly distant, is looked upon as an absolute and inviolable bar to matrimony, and any intercourse between two relations of the Rupa-cik, or of the same bone, is regarded as incestuous, and they are shunned and loathed by everyone. The second is also a bar to marriage in the first degree of relationship; thus an uncle may not marry his niece, but marriages [sic] with a first cousin on the mother's side is allowed, and frequently occurs.

Puini's translation is much freer, e.g. scia-cik is translated as "d'una medesma carne" with a view to the

601 Tibetan original (ša "flesh"), and the last phrase of the extract runs thus: ma è molto frequente il congiugersi insieme in matrimonio d'un fratello cugino con una sorella cugina (i.e. cousins in general).

Desideri's use of the term rupa-cik (Central Tibetan rü-cig-pa, West Tibetan rus-pa cig-cig) for "lineage" is in accord with general Tibetan practice, but the application of scia-cig (Italian scia = ša) to an affinal grouping is not so readily understood. The word ša "flesh" is generally used only in its literal signification, but Csoma uses the compound ša-k'rag ("flesh-blood") with reference to children born of the same parents, and Jaeschke cites from Gyalrabs the phrase ša-nas c'ad-pa bu "the child of my own flesh and blood", lit. "flesh-begotten-child". Ahmed Shah (p. 53) states that Tibetan children swear by their mother's flesh ('a-ma ša, written ame-she by Shah). Of paramount importance is Desideri's statement regarding cousin-marriage on the mother's side (we assume that Filippi's more precise translation is correct), which may safely be interpreted as the typical SiS and BD cross-cousin marriage.

Most of our authorities on Tibet stress the exagamous nature of Tibetan marriage regulations but without specifying whether the paternal or the maternal lineage, or both is used for reckoning. Thus Grenard:

> Tibetan marriage is exogamous: marriages do not take place within the fourth degree of consanguinity and the nomad chiefs have to marry outside their clan. (p. 257)

601 Cf. the statements by Rockhill in re the eastern nomads:

The offspring from the polyandrous marriages treat as father whomsever their mother teaches them to recognize by that name; the other husbands are the children's 'uncles'. Family names are unknown in Tibet, and children are spoken of as of such and such a woman; hardly ever is the father's name mentioned. (1891, p. 212)

.....all the members of a clan have no family name except that of the chief or clan which is prefixed to their own.....While a man may marry a woman of his own tribal name or one of another, he may not marry a relative within at least three degrees, and chiefs do not marry, I think, in their clans. (1895, p. 678)

Grenard's account seems to be over-generalized and in general based on secondary sources of an unreliable nature. He describes a gens organization of patriarchal type showing great solidarity, but identifies this as the brgyud rather than the rus-pa. The former term, however, belongs in a distinct category along with rigs and rabs, all used of "lineage" in a rather general sense. Grenard does make one interesting statement, however, viz.

Tibetan polyandry has no kind of relation with matriarchism: it is only a form of patriarchism no less absolute than the Chinese or Roman form. Those who imagine that polyandry marks a transition between matriarchism and patriarchism might lay stress, in support of their theory, that in Tibet, or at least, in several parts of that country, the consent of the brother of a girl's mother is required before she can be given in marriage. (p. 262)

For the role of MB described by Grenard, cf. the translation by de Roerich (pp. 71-74) of a Lahuli wedding ceremony text, which reads in part: "the uncle ('a-žang) declares that he will give the girl in marriage". This role of MB acquires additional significance when it is recalled that in Lahuli 'a-žang is used both for MB and for F1 (vide supra).

601 For only one group of modern Tibetans do we have any direct evidence for cross-cousin marriage. This is the [101] group of Tibetan immigrants into Sikkim, or the "Bhotias of Sikkim" (the dialect is termed Dānjongkā), described by O'Malley in the following terms:

> The rules regulating cousin marriage among the Bhotias of Sikkim are probably connected with the institution of fraternal polyandry. There it is not considered right that a man should marry his cousin on the father's side, though recently there have been a few cases where a man had married his father's sister's daughter. He may marry his cousin on his mother's side, whether the daughter of his mother's brother or of his mother's sister. The reason given is that the bone descends from the father's side and the flesh from the mother's. Should cousins on the paternal side marry, it is said that the bone is pierced, resulting in course of time in various infirmities. (p. 326)

As is usually true of census reports, the source of information is not stated by the compiler (O'Malley), and the inclusion of mother's sister's daughter as a potential spouse makes the whole statement somewhat suspect. A partial confirmation is afforded, however, by a statement en passant made by Gorer (Himalayan Village, p. 163):

> The Lepchas of Zongu themselves are culturally tolerant and know that their neighbours have different rules of conduct; for example the Tibetans forbid the marriage of aunt and nephew, but both they and the Nepali permit the marriage of first cousins which for the Lepchas is the most horrifying form of incest.

Since Gorer worked among the Lepchas of Sikkim, it may be assumed that this reference is to the Tibetans of Sikkim.

The rather long account of the Sikkim Tibetans by Earle (in Gait), however, does not mention the existence of cross-cousin marriage, yet does not preclude the possibility of it.

601 Earle describes clans that are imperfectly exogamous:

> But marriages occasionally occur within the clan, if the parties are removed by at least seven or more generations. The children take the clan name of the father, which is the same as that of the group of brothers. (p. xxvii).

The phrase "group of brothers" refers to the polyandrous group married to a single woman. Earle notes that both the fraternal and maternal cousins can be admitted as members of this group of brothers, but only if the husband proper (i.e. the eldest brother) agrees and has no brothers of his own. According to the same authority, there is no regular system of brother-sister exchange, but sometimes after the eldest sister has been married to a group of brothers, her younger sister will marry one of the younger brothers and this younger couple will set up a household of their own. Cf. the marriage practices of the Lepcha (pt. 5). In view of the great emphasis on age distinctions, the full significance of the semantic developments spun < p'u(-bo), so'ed < (a-)c'e becomes apparent.

Two native Tibetans have given us accounts of their own customs, but without clarifying matters. Dorje Zödba (vide C. A. Combe) states (p. 59) that "the child bears no relation to its parents, so surnames do not exist", and Rin-chen lha-mo similarly states (p. 136) that "Surnames in the sense in which you use them do not obtain in Tibet. If we want to know who somebody is we ask of what house is his father and of what his mother". The same authoress

601 further relates (p. 130) that "Tibetan ideas on marriage are strict, you cannot marry a cousin or any relative, even the most distant".

The interpretation of the Tibetan kinship terminology appears to require the postulation of cousin-marriage, which apparently is not generally permitted at the present time but which may have been in vogue as late as the 18th century (Desideri). The practice of polyandry or polygyny (vide the accounts in Bell, Puini, et al.) suffices to explain only some of the more superficial features of the system, especially in Western Tibet. As noted above, one categorical equation is found in ʾa-ne (ne-ne-mo) FSi,MBW, indicative of cross-cousin marriage. This term has undergone extensive semantic specialization, however; thus Das defines it as FBW, and in West Tibetan it is used for "wife" (vide supra). The development may have been FSi > "wife" (through analogy with a-ku FB) > FBW, MBW (i.e. wife of any uncle). The affinal terms used in Lahuli, however, offer direct evidence for cross-cousin marriage, viz. ʾa-žang MB,Fl and ʾa-žang ʾa-ni Ml (ʾa-ni FSi), the former being properly a husband's term (mother's brother equated with wife's father), the latter a wife's term (father's sister equated with husband's mother). The Classical Tibetan term skud-po Fl,Bl, a collective formed from k'u-bo FB, also certainly equates affinal and collateral relatives, but in this instance FB rather than MB is involved. It is entirely unlikely, in view of the Tibetan <u>rus-pa</u> and <u>pha-spun</u> organization, that

601 marriage should ever have been countenanced between the offspring of brothers (parallel cousins on the father's side). Nor can we disregard the linguistic relationship of skud-po to k'u-bo, however unlikely it may seem to the student unacquainted with Tibetan morphology. We are faced with the alternatives of explaining skud-po in terms of an analogical development from k'u-bo, or assigning to k'u-bo the original meaning MB, whence skud-po Fl as a result of cross-cousin marriage. No choice of alternatives will be made until the other Tibeto-Burman terminologies have been analyzed.

The other major problem presented by the Tibetan terminology is the serial-lineal equation shown by ts'a N,gCh. In the discussion of this term above it was shown that its semantic associations in general are with bu Ch, e.g. in the combined term bu-ts'a S, and Lahuli ts'a-bo F, paralleling West Tibetan bo-mo (bu-mo). It was further pointed out that the well-established compound phrases ts'a-žang and žang-ts'a, as contrasted with k'u-ts'an in which the collective term ts'an is employed, indicate a close linking of the two terms. The basic meaning of ts'a may actually be "man's child through his nearest female consanguineal relatives" (sister, daughter), thus accounting for the serial equation (sister's child, daughter's child) as well as the lineal. The term bu, on the other hand, is applied to "child of the nearest female affinal relative

601 (wife)", i.e. to a man's own child. Jaeschke even notes that bu is used "esp. in reference to the mother", and compound phrases such as ma-bu, bu-smad (vide supra), in conjunction with the lack of any comparable phrases involving p'a and bu, support his observation. From a general point of view, therefore, bu may be regarded as "child of a woman", ts'a as "child of a man through his nearest female consanguineal relatives".

The semantic associations of some of the Tibetan terms are of interest. The term žang MB is commonly used in titles in early Tibetan texts, e.g. žang-žang, rgya-žang ("chief-uncle"), žang-long ("councillor"), žang-blon "a kind of title given to a minister" (Gyalrabs) (vide Francke 1914a, Thomas). The term is so frequently employed that the earlier students of the bilingual Tibetan-Chinese inscriptions sought to identify it as a transliteration of the Chinese title žiang (將). Francke compares it with the term a-gu "uncle" used as a title of heroes in the Kesar-saga (cf. our remarks supra on West Tibetan a-ku, a-gu). Francke comments (1914a, p. 43) "In the old days it was apparently customary to call a superior by a familiar name".

The terms k'u-bo FB, skud-po F1,B1 may be compared with gus-pa "respect, reverence, devotion", and p'u-bo oB(ms) with p'u-dud "honour, respect, esteem" (dud prob. for 'dud-pa "to make a bow") and its derivative spun with p'un(-sum)-ts'ogs-pa "perfect, complete". A different type of behaviour is

601 indicated by srun-pa "calm, soft, mild; gentleness, meekness" (sru MSi). These remarks should be compared with those on Chinese (Section B).

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Our knowledge of the kinship terminolpgy of related languages in the Bodish group, viz. Murmi, Gurung, Tsangla (Nepal-Bhutan area), and Gyarung (Tibeto-Chinese area), though fragmentary, is sufficient to show that they employ widely different terms. Murmi and Gurung (vide A. Campbell and the LSI) have ja S, ja-me D (but Gurung ca-me "woman"), a widespread variant form of the root represented also by Tibetan ts'a. Note also Murmi ma-ring, Gurung mi-ring "woman", perhaps a compound of *mi or *ma "woman, mother" (Murmi has a-mi ") and *ring; cf. Tibetan sring Si(ma). The sibling terms are unusual: Murmi jyo-jyo oB (cf. Tib. jo-jo), a-la yB (Gurung a-li), na-na oSi (cf. Tib. mna), a-nga ySi (Gurung id.).

According to Risley, the Gurung are organized into two endogamous castes and a number of septs. The same writer ascribes exogamous descent-groups to the Murmi:

> The form of exogamy observed is the simple one that a man may not marry a woman of his own <u>thar</u>. For the rest marriage is regulated by the standard formula <u>pamera, chachera</u>, etc., calculated to seven generations in the descending line. In the case of descent through females these prohibitions are not strictly observed, and public opinion does not disapprove of marriages with tolerably near relatives, provided that the primary rule of marrying outside the <u>thar</u> is not departed from.

601 Risley's observations indicate that cross-cousin marriage may be permissible or even normal among the Murmi, but our lack of knowledge of Murmi affinal terms precludes the possibility of any check on this point.

The Tsangla terms are as follows (Stabk, Robinson):

Tsangla Consanguineal Terms

		me-mi	gF
(a-)ma	M	(a-)pa	F
(a-)nye	FSi	(a-)cung	FB
(a-)zim	MSi	(a-)jim	MB
(a-)no	oSi	(a-)ta	oB
nan-ying	ySi	bön-ying	yB
{za-min / nyi-min	D	za	S

Notes:

The grouping of terms is similar to that in Tibetan, and several terms are held in common (me-mi, also mi-me, gF; cf. Tib. mes-po, Coll. me-me; a-ma M, a-pa F, a-nye FSi). A-cung FB (defined only as "uncle", but FB by inference) may really mean FyB and be connected with Tib. c'ung-ba "small" (cf. Tib. ma-c'ung), while a-zim MSi and a-jim MB may represent a single term for MSb. A similar alternation is found in za S, also ǰa and even ja in ja-min D (Robinson). Note that this term is used as in Gurung and Murmi rather than as in Tibetan. The analysis of the sibling terms is

60 uncertain. For the use of a-ta as oB rather than as F, cf. Das' equation of ʾa-ta with ʾa-jo oB (supra), as well as Schmidt's equation of ʾa-bo (for ʾa-po gF) with ʾa-jo (supra).

The Gyarung dialects, spoken in western Szechuan, have been recorded by Hodgson, von Rosthorn, Wolfenden, and Edgar, the last three of whom cite a number of kinship terms. The material is scattered, however, and dialectical divergences add to the difficulties of analysis, hence it is not feasible to draw up a table of Gyarung terms.

The grandparent terms are not known. Von Rosthorn cites the vocative terms a-wu "old man" and a-pi "old woman". The former may stand for a-wa; cf. go-mu < *ma M, ko-mu < *k-nga "5", while the latter is cognate with Tib. (ʾa-)p'yi gM. Wolfenden gives a-ta-ta and ta-ta for F, a-ma and mai for M (Tib. ʾa-ta, ʾa-ma). The root *me "woman", reconstructed above on the basis of Tib. bud-med, is represented by Gyarung (te-)mi. Gyarung has -i for Tib. -e in most dialects, but -e is retained in the Pati dialect, as shown in the following table:

	Tibetan	Gyarung	
		Wassu dialect	Pati dialect
fire	me	(te-)mi	(te-)me
FSi	(ʾa-)ne	(a-)ni	-
woman	-me(d)	(te-)mi	(te-)me

As in Tsangla, a-ni FSi (in von Rosthorn; Edgar "aunt") is the only "aunt" or "uncle" term with a direct Tib. cognate. Edgar gives war p'u " uncle", probably for wa r-p'u (cf. Tib. p'u-bo oB).

601 The sibling terms are puzzling, though age distinctions are in evidence. Wolfenden cites ko-ko oB, ce-ce oSi, which are loan-words from modern Chinese (Mandarin ko-ko 哥哥 oB, chieh-chieh 姐姐 oSi), also ne-c'i yB and ne-c'i mö-pö ySi (mö-pö "female"). Similarly, Edgar has (ti-)mi g-ti oSi (g-ti "big") and (ti-)mi ki g-tsei ySi (ku-tsei "small", wa bli ki g-tsei "young"), and von Rosthorn has ngai oB, nga-ci yB. Von Rosthorn also cites a-zie oB for the Mup'ing dialect, while Wolfenden gives ai-zi (in text) as a vocative term for oB. Edgar also has (ti-)snom Si, perhaps for *snam; cf. mi-nom "to smell", Tib. m-nam-pa. In view of the distinct terms for oSi and ySi (supra), it may be inferred that this is the man's term, comparable with Tib. sring-mo.

The element -c'i, -ci found in the terms for yB and ySi (supra) is found isolated in c'i, also ka-ci, S, with adjectival ka-, as in ka-tsai "small, child" (Edgar ku-tsei), ka-woi "old". The term a-cie Ch in von Rosthorn is connected with te-ciä "young" and the term ka-tse Ch cited by Wolfenden. Gyarung (ta-)pu, (ta-)pö S,Ch, (ti-)mi pu "girl", mi tsa-pu D, contain an element *pu cognate with Tib. bu Ch. Edgar also gives (ti-)b tsei Ne, probably for (ti-)bu tsei, and (ti-)mi tsoi Ni; cf. the sibling terms.

The Tibetan terms mna-ma and mag-pa, used both for Dl,Sl and "bride and bridegroom", are paralleled by Gyarung ǰab-pye Dl, also "bride" (in ǰab-pye ko-kro "to marry", i.e. "to take

601 a bride"; Edgar cites ǰabs-pye "bride"). This term is perhaps from Tibetan ǰabs-p'yi "servant, retinue". For "bridegroom" Edgar cites ki-c'i, perhaps connected with ka-ci or c'i "son" (Wolfenden).

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1 [For abbreviations, see this source in cat. 113 ALI Southeast Asia ALI-Analyst]

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3. The Western Sub-Himalayas

197

The languages of the Western sub-Himalayas constitute a single linguistic bloc (Himalayish) of the Tibeto-Burman family. Both morphologically and lexically they stand closer to Tibetan (Bodish) than to the Tibeto-Burman languages of Nepal, Assam, and Burma. Their complex pronominal system and their use of a vigesimal system of counting led Grierson and Konow (in the LSI) to posit a Munda substratum, and this view has become almost a dogma with later writers. These features are paralleled elsewhere in Tibeto-Burman, however, and the general hypothesis should be abandoned. The languages of this group show a number of peculiar phonetic features which have as yet been only imperfectly analyzed, hence our discussion is incomplete in some respects. On the lexical side, they have borrowed rather freely from Indic, and a number of these loan-words appear in the kinship terms cited below.

The Himalayish languages fall into two broad subdivisions, one of which is represented by Kanauri in the Kanawar State, United Provinces, the other by the languages of Almora State (Rangkas, Darmiya, Chaudangsi, Byangsi). The Kanauri group includes Kanauri (Lower and Upper dialects), Chitkhuli, Thebor, Kanashi, Bunan, Manchati, and Chamba Lahuli (the order of listing gives the approximate degree of affinity with Kanauri). Of these languages, Kanauri is by far the best known. The Kanauri terms in the following

197 table have been excerpted from the works of Tika Ram Joshi, Bailey, Gerard, and the two Cunninghams.

Kanauri Consanguineal Terms

601

(a-)yo SgN

te-go FM,MM

(a-)pi MM

mum M

(a-)ma M,MSi

(a-)mots MSi

(a-)ne
ne-ne FSi,MBW

(a-)pu
dam oSi

bypts ySi

ringz Si

ei-med D,ED

bamu MBD,SiD

mönth spats gD

te-te FF,MF

me-me FF

bum F

(a-)pa
bo-ba F

(a-)pats
bo-bats FB

me-ma MB,FSiH

(a-)te
(a-)ce oS

baya(bya)
baits
bai yS

e'ang S,BS

bamza MBS,SiS

skyo spats gS

spats gCh

Kanauri Affinal Terms

yu-med M1

bore W,HSi,BW(ws)

boosa HB,WSi,SiH(ws),BW(ms)

stem(tem) D1

pu F1

sak-po WB,SiH(ms)

e'ad S1

601 Notes:

The basic grandparent terms seem to be te-te and te-go. The terms me-me (cited by Bailey as Upper Kanauri) and a-pi, which means "midwife" as well as MM, may be loan-words from Tib. mes-po (Coll. me-me) and a-p'yi ~ a-pi. An additional Upper Kanauri term, ai gM, is cited by Joshi. Gerard distinguishes between te-te FF, te-go FM, and bu-dui MF, bu-di MM (perhaps only a single term), while J. D. Cunningham cites both te-te(h) and me-me(h) for gF, te(h)-go and a-pi for gM. It is likely, therefore, that in some Kanauri dialects, at any rate, the ascendant lines are partially or completely distinguished in the grandparent terms. The ggF term corresponding to a-yo ggM is not known.

Of the two sets of parent terms, a-ma and a-pa are basic, while mann F and bonn M (both with short vowels) may be collectives derived from ma+n and bo+n, comparable with Tib. span, spun. The root *bo thus reconstructed can be used to explain bo-ba (also bo-wa, ba-ba, ba-wa, bau) F, but this may have been influenced by Ind. bābu (Joshi gives ba-wa and ban rather than bo-wa and bonn). The term mann is also found in mönth (Bailey), manth, mants (Joshi) "female" and mönringx "woman" (-th is a form of -ts, the diminutive suffix; cf. yang ~ yangth "fly, bee"). The latter term is thus composed of mann M and ringx Si (vide infra).

The term a-mats MSi (defined in Bailey only as Sil of F) is formed with the diminutive suffix -ts, as are a-pats and

601 bo-bats FB. They represent a type of extension of M and F terms, which appears in pure form in a-ma M,MSi (Bailey) and ba-ba FB (J. D. Cunningham). Gerard cites a-ku FB, and Joshi has a-ku "uncle", but one must suspect that this is a loan-word from Tib. a-k'u ~ a-ku FB. On the other hand, a-ne ~ na-ne FSi,MBW is best regarded as original. The problem of determining the status of terms of this sort is a delicate one in which the general linguistic setting must be taken into account. Thus, mo-ma (Joshi ma-ma) MB would seem to be a loan-word from Ind. mamā, id., yet the vocalism presents something of a problem, especially in view of Balti mo-mo (vide supra). Joshi, however, cites ma-ma MB, ma-mi MBW, a typically Indic and utterly non-Kanauri gender distinction, hence mo-ma can safely be regarded as an Indic loan-word, with a strong inference that Balti mo-mo is of similar origin.

In the sibling terms, bai yB (diminutive baita) is a loan-word from Ind. bhai B, while beya (or bya) includes an element -ya found also in (a-)ya-mong "infant". The form bya has given rise to byats ySi (only in Gerard and A. Cunningham). For the connection between a-ta oB and te-te gF, cf. the remarks supra on Tsangla a-ta oB, Tib. a-ta F. The term a-co oB (only in Gerard and A. Cunningham) is probably a loan-word from Tib. a-jo. Gerard cites the compound term ste-bya in the general meaning "relations". The term ringz Si, with a suffixed -z which may be merely a

601 sonant form of the diminutive suffix -ts, is defined as ysi in the LSI (a meaning also held by Tib. sring in the Sikkim and Nyamskad dialects) but as osi by Gerard. It is the direct cognate of Tib. sring(-mo) si(ms); cf. the Kanauri alternation in kyo ~ skyo "male", ten ~ sten Dl, til ~ stil "gums", kar ~ skar "star" (Tib. skar-ma), gui ~ sgui "9" (Tib. dgu), but there is no evidence to suggest that it is a man's term. The terms for osi are not well attested. For a-pu osi (Gerard), cf. Tib. p'u(-bo) oB. Dau osi (LSI) is represented in the Lower Kanauri dialect (Bailey, 1920) by das osi. This dialect also has a-te oB, and baits ~ bhasts yB,ysi, as well as rings si. In addition to the above Kanauri also has the two curious terms nuzbas "full brother", nunnasig "full sister" (Joshi nun-nasik "sisters one to another"). These words seem to contain an element *nu; cf. nuni "breast", Tib. nu-ma "breast", nu ~ no "younger sibling".

The Kanauri terms for Ch and gCh are of unusual type. The root *c'ang Ch,S (c'angts "infant") appears also in mor-c'ang "man (vir)", while ci-med D is formed from an element *ci and a feminine suffix -med < *me+d (Tib. bud-med). The morphological nature of the final -d is clearly revealed in Kanauri, which has -mets < *me+ts as its regular feminine suffix, and alternates between ci-me and ci-med(t) D, also yu-me and yu-med Nl. The element *ci appears in Chitkhuli (aberrant Kanauri dialect) a-ci "boy", and the

601 compound ci-cang " girl" cited by J. D. Cunningham, perhaps also in pa-ji ~ pan-ji S, cited by Joshi as a Bunche dialectical form. Both c'ang and ci-med are extended to include BD and BS, whence one can infer that they are used for pN in general. The terms banu (also banuts) and banza (also banzats; Joshi banjo), applied to cross C and N on the maternal side, are Indic loan-words. The term spats gCh, with -ts diminutive suffix, appears to contain the root *pa F; cf. Tib. spad.

The affinal terms are entirely distinct from those used in Tibetan. Yu-med Wl contains the suffix -med discussed above, but *yu is a new element, perhaps connected with Chitkhuli dyu-cang "girl, woman". Ru Fl must be compared with Tib. sru(-mo) MSi; cf. Kanauri ringz Si, Tib. sring(-mo), etc., but a semantic connection is not easily established. Similarly, c'ad Sl can be derived from *c'a+d and thus compared with Tib. ts'a N,gCh, but again there is a semantic discrepancy. As shown above, Tib. ts'a may have originally been applied to the SiS in relation to MB. Under cross-cousin marriage SiS becomes Sl to MB, hence c'ad perhaps represents a formation analogous to Tib. skud-po. Under the same marriage system MB becomes Fl to SiS, and thus ru Fl can be related to Tib. sru MSi by postulating a shift from MSi to MB, or perhaps an archaic root *sru MSb. Kanauri sten ~ ten Dl may be from *snem; cf. sting "heart", Tib. snying; stil ~ til "gum (of tooth)", Tib. snyil. For the root thus reconstructed, cf. Gyarung snom < *snam Si.

601 The Kanauri B1 and S11 terms distinguish sex of speaker, viz. ǰab-po B1(ms), bore S11(ws), bocar B1(ws), S11(ms). The latter two terms are phonetically not of Kanauri type, and may be Indic loan-words; cf. the affinal terms bo oSW, buari SW,ySW, borrowed by Johar (Almora group, infra) from the neighboring Indic language, Khasiya (note that bore is also defined as "wife"). The regular Kanauri terms for "wife" are also of Indic origin, viz. nar and gone (cf. Assamese ghaini). Kanauri dato E, however, seems to be of native origin, from the root *da "he" and the diminutive suffix -ta.

Joshi cites an additional S1 term, viz. mak-pa "a son-in-law who lives entirely in his father-in-law's house", and appends the note (p. 100) that "In Tibet and Kanaur it is the custom to adopt a son-in-law as a son, when there is no male heir". The term itself is unquestionably a loan-word from Tib. mag-pa S1, but has acquired a specific connotation unknown in the Tibetan prototype.

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The Thebor terms, given by Gerard and the Cunninghams, show a general agreement with Kanauri. There are only two grandparent terms (ma-ma gF, a-pi gM). The three aunt-uncle terms cited by Gerard, viz. a-ku FB, a-ǰang ME, a-ma FBi, are of the Tibetan variety. J. D. Cunningham cites ci-pa FB, and Bailey in his Kanauri glossary cites e'i-ma MBi as a Thebor form. These terms are clearly derivatives of *pa F

601 and a-ma M, in combination with the Kanauri-Chitkuli element eci "child" or "small", and hence are analogous to Kanauri a-mts and a-pats. The sibling terms show age distinctions, viz. a-co oB, bya yB (as in Kanauri), ǰing oSi (as in Kanauri by Gerard), be-te ySi (Gerard), but be-te(h) B (J. D. Cunningham); cf. Kanauri a-te oB. The form ǰing oSi, though identical with that found in many modern Tibetan dialects, is not evidence of borrowing, since ǰ- < sr- is regular for Thebor; cf. ǰang < *srang "horse", ǰing < *sring "to live". Thebor mun "female" is cognate with Kanauri mann M. The children terms are p'asli oang S (p'asli ~ p'asri "male"), and esri-oang ~ sri-oang D (esri ~ sri "woman"). The only affinal terms known are ǰak-po Bl (as in Kanauri), co-ga H, and yo-lat W.

We have even scantier data on the kinship terms of the remaining languages of Kanauri type, viz. Kanashi (in the LSI), Bunan (Jaeschke and the LSI), Manchati (Francke and the LSI), and Chamba Lahuli (Bailey, 1908). Manchati, Kanashi, and Chamba Lahuli all have ya M (cf. Kanauri yas W), ba F, but Bunan has a-ma M, a-wa F. Chamba Lahuli co-je ba FyB, lit. "little father", exactly corresponds to Balti a-ta tsun-tha (supra). Bunan and Manchati have the Tibetan term, a-gu "uncle" (LSI, p. 470 in sentence no. 225). All four languages show age distinctions in the B terms but not in the Si terms, viz. Bunan a-c'e oB (Tib. a-je, Kanauri a-co), bed yB (probably be+d), ǰring Si; Kanashi

601 bau oB, bheiyts yB (Kanauri baits), rings Si; Manchati ka-ka oB, no-a yB, hring Si; Chamba Lahuli kag < ka-ga oB, nu-a yB, hrĩ Si (cf. Balti ka-ka oB, no yB). For the phonetic treatment of *sring Si, cf. that shown in *srang "horse":

	Bunan	Kanashi	Manchati	Chamba Lahuli
sister	ʸring	rings	hring	hrĩ
horse	ʸrangs	rang	hrang	hrã

A root *yo Ch is represented by Manchati yo S, mi-yo (Francke), me-o < me-yo (LSI) D; Chamba Lahuli yo S, mil-yo D; cf. Kanauri a-yo ggM. Bunan has tsi-tsi Ch (Kanauri *ci), bu-ts'a S (Tibetan loan-word), and tse-med D, while Kanashi has c'anga Ch (Kanauri c'ang), c'e S, and ci-me D (Kanauri ci-med ~ ci-me). The root *me "woman" is represented by Manchati me-tsi-mi "woman", me-tsa "wife"; Chamba Lahuli mes "wife", mes-mi "woman", and me "bitch", lit. "mother(-dog)", cf. ba "male dog", lit. "father(-dog)" (but k'ui "dog" as generic term). Kanashi c'ets "wife" is cognate with Kanauri c'ets "female, woman", ts'ets'ats "girl", ts'esmi "woman"; cf. Tib. ʾa-c'e oSi.

Affinal terms are represented by Bunan meag "bridegroom" (loan-word from Tibetan mag-pa) and yug M1 (loan-word from Tibetan sgyug-mo), as well as by Chamba Lahuli ru F1. The form here should be *hru rather than ru, on the assumption of a derivation from a root *sru (vide supra); cf. Chamba Lahuli hrĩ < *sring Si, hrã < *srang "horse", hence ru may be a Kanauri loan-word.

601 In review, the Kanauri group exhibits a number of new terminological features as compared with Tibetan. There is a tendency to distinguish between paternal and maternal grandparent terms, perhaps with the help of Tibetan loan-words (ma-ma and a-pi). The M and F terms tend to be extended, especially in the form of diminutives (Kanauri a-mats and a-pats, bo-bats; Thebor c'i-ma and ci-pa), and c'ang S, ci-med D are extended to include pN. Age distinctions are more commonly expressed in the B terms than in the Si terms, and the sex of speaker seems not to be distinguished. New or unusual roots include te-te gF and a-te oB (cf. Tibetan a-ta), ya H, ci Ch (cf. Gyarung c'i) and yo Ch, c'ang S. The affinal terms are altogether distinct from the Tibetan, and show a new distinction of speaker's sex in the Bl, Sl terms.

The sharp distinction drawn between the cross and parallel collateral lines is another Kanauri feature. If the analysis of ru Fl and c'ad Sl (supra) is correct, the practice of cross-cousin marriage is indicated for an earlier period, while the categorical equations in a-ne ~ na-ne FSi,MBW, and mo-ma ~ ma-ma MB,FSiH point in the same direction. This type of marriage is known to occur in the Almora group of Himalayish (infra), but the little information on Kanauri that we possess is of no help in this connection. The section on Kanauri in the census report by Ross (pp. 221-22). which is in the main

601 based on a report by G. G. Minniken, includes a description of a system of fraternal polyandry of Tibetan type. According to this account, all the brothers are recognized as "father", but for the sake of distinction, the eldest brother is called teg babach (teg "big"; bobach = bo-bats), and the younger is called gato babach (gato "small"; J. D. Cunningham cites gate FB). The children are said to take the clan-name of the father. We can conclude that the Kanauri clan organization is modelled after the Tibetan, but can arrive at no conclusion *in re* cousin marriage.

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197 [101] The languages spoken in the state of Almora, considerably to the east of the Kanauri region, make up a distinct subgroup within Himalayish. Our linguistic information on this subgroup is exceedingly scant. Four Almora languages, viz. Rangkas, Darmiya, Chaudangsi, and Byangsi, are represented in the LSI by texts and brief word-lists, which include a few kinship terms. In the important article by Lall, however, we find almost complete terminologies for the "Bhotias of Chaudas" (Chaudangsi) and the "Bhotias of Bians" (Byangsi), as well as for the "Bhotias of Johar". The last-named group cannot be identified with any of the Almora groups represented in the LSI. Rangkas is said to be spoken in Upper Johar, but the Rangkas kinship terms are of normal Almora type while the Johar terms are almost all of Indic origin.

601 The Johar terms reflect the selective nature of the borrowing process and thus merit a brief examination. Most

601 of the borrowings have been made from Khasiya, the Indic language of Almora, as shown by the list of Khasiya terms given by Lall, while others resemble Nepali forms. Straight borrowings from Khasiya include bubu FF, kaka FyB, mama MB, cela S, bhadiya BS(ws), bhanj SiCh(ms), nati gS, and, in the affinal terms, ǰaǰu Ml, ǰaura Fl, jamai Sl, buari Dl, sala WyB, sali WySi, dewar HyB. Johar t'uli ama MoSi is the Nepali term ṭ'uli ā̃mā, lit. "big mother" (Khasiya has thulija FoBW), while Johar nanhi ama MySi is perhaps a local formation based on Nepali nā̃ni "baby, small child; girl; term of affection for a young woman" (e.g. nā̃ni sāhib "resp. term for the Prime Minister's concubines"). The sibling terms are more distinctive, yet dada oB is found in a number of Indic languages (Bengali, Hindustani, Oriya) and bhuli yB,ySi seems to have been derived from Nepali bhura ~ bhuro "small boy", bhuri "small girl".

Of the native Tibeto-Burman terminology Johar has preserved only a handful of terms, viz. a-ce FM, a-ma M, a-pa F, ma-pa MF, a-ni FSi, and a-ta oSi (cf. Tsangla a-ta oB). Johar a-ce FM can be compared with Tib. 'a-c'e oSi (cf. Kanauri te-te gF, a-te oB), and a-ni FSi is the direct cognate of Tib. a-ne ~ a-ni. The term a-ma M might be regarded as Indic (Nepali ā̃mā), but a-pa F is of Tibeto-Burman type and hence a-ma, the corresponding term, is more likely of native origin. The interesting combined term ma-pa MF, lit. "mother('s)-father", exhibits a mixture of influences, since the lexical elements are Tibeto-Burman

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but the phrasing is Indic (contrast Tib. p'a-ma "parents"). Note that of the five native roots retained, four (ce, ma, ni, ta) have reference to female relatives (cf. the selection in West Tibetan and Kanauri).

The Byangsi-Chaudangsi terminology, which includes only a few Indic loan-words, shows a number of distinctive and highly interesting features. The Byangsi terms are more fully known and hence have been selected for tabulation, while the Chaudangsi discrepancies are given in the notes.

Byangsi Consanguineal Terms

la-la FM,MM

ma M

pe-ci MoSi

čen-ci MySi

ci-ni FSi

pe-ta oSi(ms)

ta-ta oSi(ws)

ring-ča ySi

c'e-main xCi(ms)

ti-ti FF,MF

ba F

<u>baba</u> FoB

<u>kaka</u> FyB,MSiH

t'ang-mi MB,FSiH

kya oB,pC

nu-nu yB,pC

pe-a xCe(ws)

te-te xCe(ms),xCi(ws)

ca-main D,pNi

ari S,pNe

pi-j BS(ws)

<u>bhanj</u> SiCh (= SiS) (ms)

k'we SS,DS

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Byangsi Affinal Terms

ci-ni (= FSi) / pu-ni HM

pu-na FoBW

ci-ci FyBW

c'e-main WSi,oBW(ms)

po-ta (= oSi,ms) WoBW

ta-ta (= oSi,ws) HoBW

ring-ša (= ySi) HyBW

t'ang-si WF,FSiH (= MB)

kaku MSiH (= FyB)

po-a HB,SiH(ws)

c'ar-peu WSiH

ma-se HyB

te-te WB,SiH(ms),HSi,BW(ws)

pi-ma HSiD,WSiD

pi-j HSiS,WSiS

bhanj WBCh (= WBS)

nam-sia SW

ma-yeh DH

Notes:

Both Byangsi and Chaudangsi have only two grandparent terms (ti-ti gF and la-la gM), thus agreeing with Tibetan and Kanauri rather than with Johar. Johar may have been influenced in this respect, as in others, by the Indic terminology, e.g. Hindustani dādā FF, dādi FM, nānā MF, nāni MM. The Almora root *na M, usually with prefixed m- (Chaudangsi, Darmiya mi-nə, Rangkas min), must be placed in the "nursery word" class along with ti-ti gF and la-la gM.

Byangsi babu FoB is certainly from Ind. babu F and thus represents a type of extension of F term. Byangsi and Chaudangsi kaku FyB are likewise from Ind. kākā, with

601 -u < -a by analogy with babu, the unchanged Indic form being found in Johar (supra), Rangkas, and Darmiya (the two latter in the LSI, sentence no. 225). Byangsi, Chaudangsi t'ang-mi MB may be of periphrastic origin.

The terms for " aunt" in the Almora group present a difficult problem of analysis. An element *ci appears in most of these terms, viz. ci-ni FSi (Byangsi, Chaudangsi), po-ci (Byangsi), pu-ci ~ pu-ci-ci (Chaudangsi) MoSi, šen-ci (Chaudangsi also šen-ci-ci) MySi, ci-ci (Byangsi, Chaudangsi) FyBW. The element -ni is cognate with Tib. (a-)ne, Johar (a-)ni FSi, while pu ~ po appears also in pó-ta oSi(ms) (Byangsi), and šen- may be compared with Darmiya sen-can, Rangkas syan-can Ch. The element *ci may be a diminutive; cf. Kanauri *ci Ch. The affinal terms for FoBW are distinct in the two languages, viz. Byangsi pu-na, Chaudangsi ta-mla.

Both age and sex distinctions comparable with those made in Tibetan are reflected in the sibling terms, but the recording has been faulty and hence the complete system must be reconstructed by inference. The use of ring-ša (Byangsi and Chaudangsi) for ySi (but Rangkas and Darmiya rang-sya Si in the LSI) is paralleled in the cognate Tib. sring(-mo) (Sikkim and Nyamskad dialects) and Kanauri ringa (LSI). Chaudangsi has the interesting term bhuli WyBW, evidently the same term as Johar bhuli "younger sibling", probably an Indic loan-word (vide supra). Under the

601 Byangsi-Chaudangsi marriage system (vide infra) WyBW would normally be a man's yBi. Chaudangsi has only a-ta oBi corresponding to Byangsi po-ta oBi(ms) and ta-ta oBi(ws). For po-ta, cf. po-ci ZoBi, indicating a partial equation of oBi(ms) with ZoBi.

In the brother terms, Chaudangsi (Lall) has hya oB, but yB is said to be called by name. Yet in the Chaudangsi text in the LSI (pp. 512-13) na-nu is used in the meaning "yB". In the word-lists of the LSI only a single term, *pi, is cited for B in the Almora languages, viz. Byangsi, Chaudangsi pi, Rangkas pi-k'an, Darmiya pe (< *pi; cf. Darmiya ca-me D, Rangkas ca-mi). In the LSI texts, however, we find Chaudangsi na-nu (supra), Byangsi nu-nu (p. 524), Darmiya mu-nu (p. 497), all used in the meaning "younger brother" (translated simply "brother" in the LSI, but the context is specific). Byangsi, however, has pi-j BS(ws), also pi-ma BD(ms) as inferred from the meaning HSiD (vide infra), from the same root *pi. If we assign to pi B the specific meaning B(ws), we can explain both the LSI entries and the development of the terms pi-j and pi-ma (B > BS,BD). A perfect parallel is furnished by Chaudangsi, which has nu-nu BS(ws), a simple extension from na-nu ~ mu-nu yB. Byangsi and Chaudangsi agree with Kanauri and Johar in employing an Indic loan-word (bhanj) for SiS(ms), whence perhaps pi-j through analogy. Chaudangsi has further extended the term bhanj to include DH, equated with SiS through cross-cousin marriage (vide infra).

601 The Byangsi-Chaudangsi cousin terms are of especial interest. The parallel cousin terms are cited by Lall only in part, but we know that Byangsi hya oB and nu-nu yB, Chaudangsi a-ta oSi, ring-ya ySi are extended to include pC (age distinctions as in sibling terms), hence we may infer that this holds for all sibling terms. Byangsi has three xC terms, viz. te-te xCe(ms) or xCi(ws), i.e. xC(ss), c'e-main xCi(ms), i.e. xCi(ds), and po-a xCe(ws), i.e. xCe(ds). These distinctions, which have not appeared in the material previously examined, are connected with the Almora institution of cross-cousin marriage (vide infra). On the linguistic side, te-te is to be compared with Kanauri a-te oB, while po-a appears to contain the po ~ pu element found also in po-ci ~ pu-ci MoSi and po-ta oSi(ms). The term c'e-main, with the feminine suffix -main, presupposes a root *c'e xCe(ws) that has been replaced by po-a. This root actually appears in Chaudangsi, in the form c'e FSiS or MBS(os). The term is also used in the meaning HB(os), hence we may safely infer that it is the woman's term corresponding to Byangsi po-a. Lall cites a number of terms as applying only to relatives(os), and the corresponding relatives(ys) are said to be "called by name". This distinction perhaps obtains only in address, since we have seen that a term for yB (na-nu), though omitted in Lall, is found in the Chaudangsi text of the LSI. Lall states (p. 195) that he has "forgotten" the term for FSiD, MBD, yet cites the term c'e-main WSi(os), oBW(os), exactly the affinal usage of

601 Byangsi c'e-main (vide infra). We thus have Chaudangsi c'e xCe(ws) for Byangsi po-a, and Chaudangsi c'e-main xCi(ms) for Byangsi c'e-main, but lack the Chaudangsi term corresponding to Byangsi te-te.

The Almora Ch and gCh terms differ considerably from those previously encountered. The root *sri S (Byangsi, Chaudangsi siri ~ sri, Darmiya seri, Rangkas seri) is apparently cognate with Thober (Kanauri group) p'asri "male", esri ~ sri "woman". The term for D, viz. Byangsi ca-main (LsII), ca-me (LSI), Chaudangsi, Darmiya ca-me, Rangkas ci-mi (< ca-mi through assimilation) consists of the element ca Ch (Tib. ts'a) plus the feminine suffix. The LSI cites an additional term, viz. Byangsi senad, Chaudangsi baln-send Ch, perhaps a collective morphological formation from na N; cf. Tib. snad < na. The only gCh term known is Byangsi k'we, Chaudangsi k'e SS,DS; cf. Tib. ʾa-k'wa-ba "petit enfant" (Desgodins).

The affinal terms of Byangsi reflect the marriage institutions of that people in a most direct way. The numerous categorical equations attest not only to cross-cousin marriage, as in t'ang-mi MB,FSiH,WF, ci-ni FSi,HM, but also to brother-sister exchange, as in kaku MSiH,FyB, c'e-main WSi,oBW(ms), po-a HB,SiH(ws). It is observed that c'e-main denotes marriageable females (ms), that po-a denotes marriageable males (ws), and that te-te denotes brothers of marriageable females (ms) or sisters of marriageable males (ws), i.e. sibling (of same sex as speaker)

601 of marriageable males or females, and that all these terms refer to cross-cousins exclusively. Under a system of cross-cousin marriage, HSiH becomes Ego's B(ws), hence pi-ma, defined in Lall only as HSiD, becomes also BD, paralleling pi-j BS(ws). Because of the numerous categorical equations only a handful of new terms are presented in the affinal group. Both Byangsi and Chaudangsi have an alternative term for HM, viz. pu-ni, which combines both the elements associated with aunt's terms (supra). Byangsi has especial terms for WSiH (c'ar-psu), HyB (ma-se), and Chaudangsi has especial terms for HyB (defined as yS of HM!), SiH (pu-ga), and for HoSi (defined as oD of HM!) (mun-ci). Note that in both languages it is HyB for whom an especial term is reserved. We are expressly told by Lall that polyandry is not practised by the Almora people, yet the existence of especial HyB terms leads one to believe that HyB is or has been functionally specialized in some degree (in the Lepcha, described below, as in many peoples practising polyandry, HyB is the potentional husband of a woman). The Byangsi term cannot be analyzed (it may be connected with ma-yeh Sl), but the Chaudangsi term, pu-ga, must be regarded as directly cognate with Byangsi po-a, as shown by the agreement in affinal meanings. We have every reason to believe, furthermore, that the Chaudangsi terms for xC(ds), viz. o'e and c'e-main, are original with respect to the corresponding Byangsi terms, po-a and c'e-main (see the discussion above). It is thus evident that Byangsi

601 has extended the term pu-a ~ pu-ga HB,SiH(ws) to include xCe(ws), since under cross-cousin marriage the referent of these terms is identical. One may thus envisage a connection between pu-ga HB and pu-ni HM, but the semanticization here is not clear. The root *pu itself must be compared with Kanauri a-pu oSi (in Gerard only) and Tibetan p'u-bo oB(ms). It is perhaps merely coincidental that the Byangsi-Chaudangsi xC(ds) term, c'e, should have as a possible cognate Tib. (ʾa-)c'e oSi(ws); the Tibetan term corresponding to p'u-bo. Cf. also the Kanauri root *c'e "female" represented by Kanauri c'ets "female, woman", Kanashi c'ets "wife" (with -ts as a diminutive suffix).

Byangsi c'ar-psu *SiH is perhaps cognate with Tib. ǰar-pa "young men, grown-up youth" (collective noun), Bunan (Kanauri group) ǰar-pa "youth, boy" (cf. Tib. 'c'ar-ba, Pf. ǰar "to rise, appear, become visible"). Note that under brother-sister exchange this term would also connote B(ms).

Byangsi and Chaudangsi nam-sia SW, with a feminine suffix -sia found also in rit'i-ǰia W and perhaps in ring-ǰa ~ rang-sya Si, is directly comparable with Kanauri stem < *sanam SW, and may be cognate with Gyarung snom < *snam Si. Byangsi ma-yeh DH, with an unanalyzed suffix -yeh, is probably cognate with Tib. mag-pa, id. Byangsi regularly drops final -g; cf. Byangsi la " hand" , Tib. lag-pa; Byangsi sai-p'a "swine" (LSI text, p. 523), Tib. p'ag.

The evidence for cross-cousin marriage and brother-sister exchange offered by the Byangsi-Chaudangsi terminology is

601 supported by Lall's statements in regard to the Almora marriage customs. Cross-cousin marriages "are common - nay they are the rule - among the Bhotias of this district", and brother-sister exchange "is the rule among the Bhotias, and is not unknown even amongst the Khas Rajputs and the Brâhmans of the district" (p. 193).

The only other available account of the Almora group is that found in Sherring (pp. 56 sq.). Sherring notes the practice of the levirate, and supports Lall's statement that polyandry is found only among the Tibetans. Of unusual interest is his description of a building (rambang) set apart for the carrying on of sexual intrigues, where girls resort from the age of ten and from which even married women are not excluded until after the birth of their first child. Sherring's statement with regard to restrictions must be interpreted as referring to parallel cousins as opposed to cross cousins:

> Only those persons resort there who can marry one another, such as the boys of a neighboring village, or, if of the same village, only those who are not relations. (p. 106)

The Almora rambang is strikingly like the institutions found among the Tibeto-Burman peoples of Burma and Assam (vide infra).

The Almora marriage regulations and kinship terminology seem out of place in the Tibetan-Kanauri setting earlier described, but comparable features are found among groups living far to the south and east, in Burma and Assam. The

601 Almora evidence, relating as it does to tribes on a cultural level decidedly inferior to that of the Tibetans, thus fills an important place in our general picture of Tibeto-Burman. Lexically, however, Almora is rather divergent; note the roots *hya oB (hardly an archaic form), *ari S, *pi B(ws), *k'we gS, *na N (this root has some extension), the "nursery terms" la-la gN and ti-ti gF, and the semantic development shown by *c'e gCe(ws), apparently connected with Kanauri *c'e "woman", Tib. 'a-c'e oSi(ws).

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4. The Eastern Sub-Himalayas (Nepal)

197 The field of Nepal linguistics has remained a virtual terra incognita to the present day, and hence our discussion of the terminologies employed in this region must necessarily be incomplete and largely unproductive. Hodgson, a pioneer in Tibeto-Burman linguistics, did yeoman service in collecting word-lists nearly a century ago, but our knowledge of most of the Nepal languages has scarcely progressed since his time. The majority of these languages belong to a single well-knit group, Kiranti, which includes Bahing, Sunwari, Limbu, Rai, Khambu, Yakha, Thami, and a number of minor dialects. With the exception of Bahing, the subject of an especial study by Hodgson (1857), these languages are known only fragmentarily. The Kiranti group shows many lexical affinities with the languages of Assam and Burma, and is in some respects transitional between the Bodish-Kanauri and the Assam-Burma groups of languages. Hodgson also selected for especial examination Vayu, spoken somewhat to the west of the Kiranti area. Although some of the Vayu and Bahing kinship terms are identical (vide infra), the relationship between the two languages is in general not especially close, and at best Vayu must be regarded only as an aberrant member of the Kiranti group. The little-known Chepang language appears to be closer to Vayu than to Kiranti. Two additional Nepal languages, viz. Newari, the old State language, and Magari, show no

marked affinities for either Bahing or Vayu and must, for the present, be classified as small independent groups. 197

In the Kiranti group only the Bahing terms are known in any detail, and even here Hodgson's lists are far from complete. The Limbu terms have been extracted from Campbell's vocabulary, while the Sunwari, Rai, Khambu, Yakha, and Thami entries are from the LSI. 601

Bahing Consanguineal Terms

pi-pi gM	ki-ki gF
a-mo M	a-po F
mo-mo FSi, MSi	po-po FB
	ku-ku MB
ya-wa oB, oSi	
lo-ba yB, ySi	
ngwap-nya C	
ta-mi D	ta-wa S
ca-ca-nima gD	ca-ca gS

Bahing Affinal Terms

	yep-pa Fl
wa-dyal-mi Sil	cai-wa / wa-dyal-ca Bl
dyal-mi Dl	dyal-ca Sl

601 Notes:

Bahing pi-pi gM is cognate with Tib. ʾa-p'yi ~ a-pi, while ki-ki gF is of the "nursery word" type; cf. Byangsi (Almora) ti-ti. The grandparent terms for the other Kiranti languages are not known.

The Kiranti parent terms are based on *ma M and *pa F. Bahing a-mo M and a-po F reflect the occasional -o <-a shift in that language; cf. Bahing ngo "5", Tib. l-nga. Hodgson (note to p. 499) makes the interesting observation that in the 1st person the -a form is retained; thus, wa-ma "(my) mother", and wa-pa "(my) father". Rai has pu F, mu M, just as it has eu <*ea S; cf. Rai u-mu "nose", Tib. s-na. Unlike many of the other terms, these parent terms are not ordinarily susceptible to reduplication, yet Limbu has pa-pa, also pa, F, and ma-ma, also ma, M, and reduplication is at the basis of the unusual forms found in Dumi and Khaling, two minor Kiranti languages, viz. Khaling u-pap F, u-man M, and Dumi u-pyap F, u-myan M (the palatization here cannot be explained).

Bahing is exceptional in having merged the FSi and MSi terms in a single term, mo-mo, apparently derived from mo M, thus paralleling po-po FB, from po F. These terms represent a type of extension of M and F terms. Bunwari, which stands very close to Bahing, has po-po F (cf. Bunwari ngo "5", as in Bahing) but a-ma M. Reduplication also appears in ku-ku MB, cognate with Tib. ʾa-k'u ~ a-ku FB. This marks the initial appearance of this root in the

601 connotation "MB" rather than "FB". For Limbu, Campbell cites the interesting term (am-)panga "uncle", with prefix as in (am-)ba F. This term appears to be directly cognate with Chepang (infra) pang "uncle", and perhaps with Tib. 'a-bang, an affinal term (FSH,MSiH).

Bahing is further exceptional in having a single term, ya-wa, for oSb, and a single term, lo-ba, for ySb. The element -wa, of which -ba appears to be a variant, is the regular masculine suffix (fem. -mi), whence it may be inferred that these terms originally stood for oB and yB, respectively. The collective terms cited by Hodgson, viz. lo-ba-bum "brotherhood, brethern", and ya-ba-lo-ba-bum "sisterhood", scarcely agree with his sibling terms. For ya-wa ~ ya-ba oSb, cf. Almora *hya oB. In the LSI vocabularies, Sunwari has Thep B, a-la Si, but in the Sunwari text lo-ba is used for B, and a-la-ne lo-ba for yB (p. 205); cf. also a-la-ne tau "younger son" (p. 204). Sunwari a-la Si seems to form part of a-la-ne "younger" and may be compared with Murmi a-la yB (supra, pt. 2).

The sibling terms in the other Kiranti languages differ considerably from those in Bahing and Sunwari. An age distinction appears in Limbu (am-)pu (Campbell), p'u (LSI) oB, ni-sǎ (Campbell), nu-sa (LSI) yB, and in Khambu bu oB, ne-c'a yB. The root *p'u oB, represented also by Yakha p'u B, Thami bu-bu B, is cognate with Tib. p'u-bo oB(ms); for the initial of Khambu bu, cf. Khambu bo "pig" (text, p. 323),

601 Tib. p'ag. Limbu (in the LSI) distinguishes also between ne-ne oSi and nu-sa men-c'e-ma ySi (men-c'e-ma "woman", cf. Kanauri *c'e, id.); Campbell cites only nusa-emperca B, nusa-numcema Si, which contain the same element, nu-sa "younger sibling". This element can be further analyzed as *nu "younger sibling" (Tib. nu ~ no), and *sa Ch. The LSI cites men-c'e-ma sa D, em-be-c'a sa S (Campbell ku-sa). The complete Limbu sibling and children terminology is as follows:

Limbu

ne-ne oSi	p'u oB
nu-sa men-c'e-ma ySi	nu-sa yB
men-c'e-ma sa D	em-be-c'a sa S

For Limbu ne-ne oSi, cf. Tib. ne-ne-mo FSi, an analogy being furnished by Byangsi po-ta oSi(ms), po-ci WoSi.

The Bahing root *ta Ch appears also in Sunwari a-ta Ch, tau < ta-ma S, ta-mi D. The remaining Kiranti languages, however, show a root *c'a, viz. Khambu c'a S, c'e-ku-me c'a D, c'a c'a-ma Ch; Thami ca S, ca-mai D, hu-ca Ch (cf. hu-mi Si); Yakha pio-c'a Ch, cya S; Rai cu S, cu mi-cum D, cũ-cu Ch (cf. pu F, mu M). The Tibetan cognate is ts'a Ne, gCh; note that Bahing ca-ca gS, ca-ca-nima gD, show a similar use of the term.

The Limbu terms *sa Ch, nu-sa ySb, em-be-c'a sa S (LSI), nusa-emperca B (Campbell) confront us with the problem of

601 making a distinction between two roots or varieties of a single root, viz. *c'a or *ca vs. *sa. Both Campbell and the LSI make the distinction within a single term involving an identical element (em-be-ca ~ em-per-ca), hence we must regard it as a legitimate one. This form may be compared with Bahing be-ba-ca "infant", fem. be-ba-ca-nima, parallel with ca-ca gB, ca-ca-nima gD. In Bahing ca and mi-ca are a pair of "formative" suffixes, respectively masc. and fem., e.g. li-ca "a bowman", from li "bow", as contrasted with the regular sex-suffixes found in ta-wa S, ta-mi D. Bahing employs the suffix -ca in mĩ-ca "female" (prob. the same as mi-ca), wan-ca H (cf. wal-ca "male"), dyal-ca Sl, ca-ca gB, and be-ba-ca "infant". Bahing mĩ-ca "female" is paralleled by Sunwari mi-ca W, Yakha met-c'a W (cf. Limbu a-met ~ met W), Thami ca-mi-ca "woman" (cf. ca-mi D), Rai mi-cum "woman" (cf. cu mi-cum D, cũ-cu Ch), and Khambu mim-c'a "woman". Khambu further has ne-c'a yB, c-ne-c'a-nga Sl (cf. Limbu ne-ne oSl), as well as c'a c'a-ma Ch. It is fairly evident that the above forms all involve a single root *c'a, which frequently functions as a suffix (cf. Tib. ts'a as used in the very stable compound, bu-ts'a). Limbu em-be-c'a ~ em-per-ca certainly contains this root *c'a, while *sa Ch must represent either another root or a distinct variety of this same root.

Some support for this thesis can be adduced from the aberrant Bodish languages, Murmi, Gurung, and Tsangla

601 (analyzed supra, ot. 2). These languages all have sonant initial forms in their terms for Ch, viz. Murmi, Gurung ja S, ja-me D, Tsangla za ~ ǰa S, za-min ~ ja-min D (in two different recorders, Robinson and Stack). Surd initial forms, however, appear in Gurung ca-me W and in Tsangla ok-tsa ~ o-sa, wok-tsa ~ wak-sa "child, boy, girl", za-sa "child(baby)", and the last-named form even contrasts the sonant and surd initial varieties. The distinction thus arrived at, viz. between sonant initial forms (ja, za) and surd initial forms (c'a, sa), will prove to be of considerable utility in our treatment of the languages of Assam and Burma, and obviates the necessity of making forced comparisons between sonant and surd initial forms.

Bahing ngwap-sya, defined as "paternal or maternal cousin", is the only collateral term known for the Kiranti group. It cannot be analyzed on the basis of the available Bahing material.

Our knowledge of the Kiranti affinal terminology is likewise confined to the Bahing terms yap-pa Fl, wa-dyal-ca Sl and wa-dyel-mi (= wa-dyal-mi) Sil, dyal-ca Sl and dyal-mi Bl. Yap-pa Fl, probably for *ye-pa, may be related to Byangsi (Almora group) ma-yeh Sl. The element *dyal of the remaining terms is in all probability the Bahing word dyal "village", which extends through almost all the Kiranti languages (Kachereng tyal, Khaling del, etc.). It is perhaps cognate with Lepcha tyol < *tyal "to be in company, associate", a-tyol "companionship, assistance".

601 Most of the Kiranti terms for "spouse" have been cited above. Exceptional are Bahing ming W, Rai me-ya W (cf. Kanauri yas W), and Thami u-ma, Khambu yuh W (cf. Kanauri yu-and Hl).

We have almost no information on the marriage regulations of the Kiranti tribes. Risley reports that among the Limbu marriage is forbidden within the thar (patrilineal sib), but "there seems to be much uncertainty about prohibited degrees, and I believe near alliances with the mother's kindred are by no means uncommon", indicating possible marriage with MBD. Adam describes 62 clans among the Limbu, with several "kindred" in each, but makes no precise statement with regard to marriage practices. Both Risley and Adam indicate that the impact of Indian culture has produced a general confusion among clans and castes.

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The Vayu terms, like those of Bahing, are known only from Hodgson's record of the language (1857).

Vayu Consanguineal Terms

pâ-pi	gM	ki-ki	gF
u-mu	M	u-pu	F
yong-yong	MBi	pong-pong	FB
ni-ni	FBi	ma-ma	MB
mu-mu	eBi	[illegible]	eB,Y
di-yu	yBi	ba-lu	yB,C
ta-mi	D	ta-wo	S

601

Vayu Affinal Terms

ca-k'i F1

co-yong-mi D1 janwai S1

Notes:

The Vayu terminology is notable for its predilection for reduplicated forms and for balanced forms, as in yeng-yeng MSi and pong-pong FB, bo-lo oB and ba-lu yB. Correspondences with Bahing include pi-pi gH and ki-ki gF, ku-ku MB, and ta-mi D, ta-wo S. The vocalism shown by u-mu M, u-pu F, is comparable with that of Bahing a-mo, a-po; cf. Vayu u(ng) "5", Tib. l-nga. Vayu pong-pong FB may correspond to Bahing po-po (a type of extension of F term); cf. the secondary nasals developed in the collective terms bo-lung-co "uterine brethern", nu-nung-co "sisterhood". Under this analysis the term yeng-yeng MSi would represent a secondary development from a reduplicated root *ye. In view of Chepang pang "uncle", however, it is perhaps preferable to reconstruct a Vayu root *pang, comparable also with Limbu (am-)panga, Tib. 'a-bang. For the o < a development of the medial vowel cf. Vayu nomo "sky", Tib. g-nam; Vayu lom "road", Tib. lam. Vayu departs from Bahing in its retention of ni-ni FSi (Tib. ne-ne-mo).

In the Vayu sibling terms, bo-lo oB and ba-lu yB must be compared with Bahing lo-ba yB. Nu-nu oSi is probably from *na-na (Murmi na-na oSi), paralleling u-mu M and u-pu F, while di-yu ySi resembles Chitkhuli (Kanauri group) dyu-cang

601 "girl, woman" (both seem to contain the root *yu "woman"). Both bo-lo and ba-lu are extended to include "maternal and paternal cousin", probably to be interpreted as including both parallel and cross cousins.

In addition to ta-mi D, ta-wo S, Vayu has co-o "child, boy", co-mi, mes-co-co-o "girl". As observed by Hodgson (note to p. 373), cho-o stands for cho-wo (cf. ta-wo). Hodgson states that "cho'mi is now chiefly used for a little one and rather adjectively than substantively". The root here is *ca, the o < a development being shown also in ta-wo S, Bahing ta-wa. The diminutive connotation of the term also agrees with the Bahing meaning "gCh". The Kiranti use of *c'a, *ca as a suffix is paralleled by the Vayu terms, mes-co "female, woman", lō-co "male" (cf. bo-lo oB), bo-lung-co "brethern", nu-nung-co "sisterhood" , and ro-co H, corresponding to ro-mi W.

In the Vayu affinal terms, janwai S1 is an Indic loan-word (cf. Assamese jowai, Khasiya jamai, ic.). The two remaining terms, ca-k'i F1 and co-yong-mi D1, cannot be analyzed, though the latter contains the element *co < *ca (supra) and the fem. suffix -mi.

The Vayu terminology in general, except for the affinal terms, stands unexpectedly close to the Bahing, the most important difference lying in its retention of the root for FS1 (ni-ni). Both languages present analogous periphrastic terms for "parent" and "child", viz. Vayu p'ok-vi "parent"

60/ (p'ok "to beget", cf. Burmese p'ok "to hatch"), bok-ping-vi "child" (bok "to be begotten"); Bahing kik-ba "parent" (kik "to beget", cf. Lepcha gyek ~ gak), gik-ba "child" (gik "to be begotten"); the surd vs. sonant initial alternation here is a characteristic Tibeto-Burman transitive vs. intransitive distinction.

Chepang, which in general stands closer to Vayu than to Bahing, shows no especial relationship to either in its kinship terms as recorded by Hodgson (1848). Its grandparent terms, viz. to gF, aie gM, are distinct; with the latter cf. Upper Kanauri ai gM. The sibling terms are hou B, hou dhiang Si; cf. co "child, boy", co riang "girl". Chepang mum "aunt" may be based on an original *mu-mu, but Chepang has ma M, pa F rather than the -u forms of Vayu. Chepang pa-lam H, ma-lam W, are of unusual type.

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The Magari terms are of interest only in showing the extreme to which the process of taking over Indic loan-words can be carried. Aside from kinship terminology, Magari has preserved a fair proportion of native Tibeto-Burman roots, hence the contrast in this respect is striking. Almost all the terms cited in Beames and the LSI are of Indic origin. They include the following: boju gM and baju gF, mai M and bai F (not typically Indic, but the vocalism points in this direction), bhai B and bhain ~ bahini Si, nati gS and natini gD, and nani "child (familiar)". Indeed, only one native

601 Tibeto-Burman kinship root has been retained, viz. *za Ch, which appears in za, mi-za, len-za S, len-za-za "boy" (len-za "male", ren-za "young man"), za-za-ko "boy, child", masto mi-za, mahaza za D (masto "woman, mahaza W). In addition Magari has the feminine suffix man (used with animals), cognate with Kanauri mann, Thebor man "female" (Kanauri "mother"), and ar-nam ~ ar-num (for ar-nam) "girl, maiden", comparable with Byangsi and Chaudangsi (Almora group) nam-sia Dl, Kanauri stem < *snem Dl, Gyarung snom < *snam Si. Note especially the appearance of the r- prefix, which Magari has preserved in several other roots, including ar-ghan "wasp", ar-kin "fingernail", ar-min "name", la-wat (for *ar-wat) "leech".

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197 Newari, the last of the Nepal languages to be examined, was the State language until the overthrow of the Newar dynasty in 1769 (cf. Nepal ~ Newar). The language is still of some importance, and boasts of an indigenous literature of considerable antiquity. This literature, like the Newari language itself, has been thoroughly impregnated with Indic elements, including even some grammatical
601 features. The kinship terminology shows a curious mixture of native and alien elements somewhat different from any previously encountered. Our sources on Newari are of a most heterogeneous nature. Conrady and Jörgensen have compiled glossaries based on Newari words, while the lists

601 in Wright and the LSI are supposedly based on the spoken language. Many of the forms appear only in a single source, and the orthographies are widely fluctuating. It is with many reservations, therefore, that the following table is presented. Terms that are known to be, or can be inferred to be, Indic loan-words are underlined. It can be assumed that most of these loan-words are from Nepali, for which an excellent source exists (R. L. Turner, A Comparative and Etymological Dictionary of the Nepali Language, London, 1931).

Newari Consanguineal Terms

aji gM	aja gF
ma M	ba F
dhom ma MoSi	abaju FoB
camaju MySi	kakaju FyB
ni-ni FSi	paju / mu-pa MB
ta-ta oSi	daju oB
ke-he ySi	ki-ja yB
hmya-ca D	ka-ya S
	c'ay(a) gS

Newari Affinal Terms

dhoma ma FoBW	sāsul Fl
samaju FyBW	jilacapaju FSiH
mĕle MBW	
pilili HBW	
i-ni Dl	jil(i) Sl

601 **Notes:**

It is seen that approximately half the Newari terms are of Indic origin. Newari shows some originality in its treatment of these loan-words; thus, the suffix -ju (Nepali -jiu ~ -ju "particle of assent or respect, used after names to express respect") is employed more extensively than in Nepali, and the Tibeto-Burman a- prefix is sometimes added. Curiously enough, the single comparable form in Nepali, viz. āmā M, is not paralleled in Newari, which uses reduplicated forms, viz. ma-ma ~ mam ~ mã, as well as ma. The variant F terms, viz. ba ~ ba-ba ~ bau ~ bu-ba ~ a-bu, parallel the Nepali series: bā ~ bābā ~ bābai ~ bābu ~ buba (bābā and buba are described as "children's" terms). The terms (a-)ji gM, (a-)ja gF, and (a-)baju FoB (also ba-ju F) show recombining of the elements found in Nepali jiju ggF, jiju-āmā ggM, jibā < jyu-bābu gF, baṛajyu ~ bājye gF, bājyu ~ bājyei gM. The addition of the prefix -ju is the only change made in kakaju FyB, Nepali kākā, and camaju MySi, Nepali chyāmā < kānchi āmā. Newari dhom ma MoSi (cited only by Wright) has not yet been identified, but phonetically it is of Indic type. Unlike the West Tibetan and Kanauri groups, Newari has not borrowed the Indic term māmā MB, though mu-pa (Jörgensen) may be an analogous formation (cf. Nepali muma M, an "affectionate" term). The other MB term, paju (Wright), showing a categorical equation in jilacapaju (jilaca-paju) FSiH, is connected with Nepali p'u-pāju FSiH (p'u-p'u FSi).

601 The standard oB term, daju, as well as the alternative term, dada (Jörgensen), are Indic loan-words (Nepali dājyu; Bengali, Oriya dādā), but ki-ja yB appears to be native. The root *p'u oB (Tib. p'u-bo), however, is represented in the compound term p'u-kij (for p'u-ki-ja) "brothers" (Gebrüder) cited by Jörgensen. Neither ki-ja nor the corresponding feminine term, ke-he (also ke-he) ySi, can be analyzed. Newari ka-ya S and c'a-y gS contain a suffixed element -ya, often abbreviated to -y, as in the phrase t'yaka-ka-y "full (leiblicher) son". This element is perhaps the same as that found in Kanauri ba-ya yB, (a-)ya-nöng "infant". Jörgensen cites ka D, but the ordinary term is hmya-ca ~ hma-ca, probably to be analyzed hm- (fem. element) + ya + ca. The root *ca is also represented in ca "boy", ma-ca ~ mo-ca "child, boy", lya-ca "young one" (masc.), and in c'a-y gS (cf. Tib. ts'a). Wright also cites ka-ya ma-ca "boy", hmya-ya ma-ca "girl", thus supporting the analysis of hmya-ca offered above. The root *ka Ch, like the Vayu-Bahing root *ta (supra), is a new element. Jorgensen further cites ghăl ~ ghăli "enkelhaft", ghăli-cayapu "das Enkelhafte". This term, which is phonetically not of Newari type, must be compared with Indic ghar " home, family"; for the -l < -r shift, cf. Newari săsăl ~ săsul Fl, Indic sasura; Newari tal "relative (Verwandter)", Indic thar "clan".

The only collateral term known is p'u-kĩ-j-ya ka-y (for p'u-k'i-ja-ya ka-ya) BS, which is simply a descriptive phrase.

601

The affinal terms show categorical equations in dhoma ma FoEW and dhom ma MoSi, jilacapaju FSiH (apparently containing the same element as jil ~ jili Sl) and paju MB. Newari sasal ~ sasul Fl is an Indic loan-word (supra), suggesting a corresponding term *sāsu Ml (not given in our sources). The terms jil ~ jili Sl, male MBW, and pilili HBW, defy all efforts at analysis. Only i-ni Dl, which under cross-cousin marriage would be a reciprocal term to ni-ni FSi, offers any hope of explanation. This type of reciprocal terminology has not yet been encountered, but there are indications of it elsewhere in Tibeto-Burman (see especially the Kachin discussion).

To review this discussion, Newari offers relatively little new material in our study of Tibeto-Burman kinship terminology, aside from the borrowing processes that it illustrates. The lack of ethnographic data and the exiguousness of our lexical material precludes the possibility of any general interpretation. The language has retained a number of Tibeto-Burman kinship roots, viz. *ma M, *ba F, *ni FSi, *ta oSi, *p'u oB, *c'a ~ *ca Ch, and has developed at least one new root (*ka Ch) and some especial terms (ke-he ySi, ki-ja yB, perhaps also ma-pa MB).

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5. Lepcha

197 The Lepcha kinship terminology presents a distinctive set of problems not previously encountered in our review of the field. Our data on the Lepcha, both linguistic and ethnographic, are fairly adequate, and this situation in [101] itself constitutes something of a novelty. Gorer has contributed a remarkable study of Lingthem, a Lepcha village in Zongu (Sikkim) in which Lepcha culture has been preserved as a relatively homogeneous unit. Morris has written a popular account involving some of the same material, and the folklore has been studied by Stocks. Both Gorer and Stocks give lists of kinship terms, which agree in most respects and tend to supplement one another. On the ethnographic side, Gorer gives us a complete picture of clan organization, marriage regulations, kin behaviour, etc. Stocks' article includes scattered notes on Lepcha customs, and marriageable and non-marriageable kin are indicated as such in her list of terms, but this material includes a number of obvious errors and is not entirely trustworthy; Gorer remarks (p. 41) that her notes "correspond in practically no particular with my observations" . On the linguistic side, the grammar and dictionary of Mainwaring, the latter carefully edited by Grünwedel, supply a rich storehouse of raw material, perhaps as important a single source as any in this general field. Gorer's unkind remarks (pp. 39 sq.) can scarcely be justified, especially in view of the fact that his own incorrect forms

197 and generally deficient linguistic handling of the material can be interpreted only through recourse to the works of these two scholars. The forms cited below are those that appear in the dictionary by Mainwaring and Grünwedel (cited as MG), though the aberrant forms given by Gorer and Stocks are occasionally noted. The Lepcha lists in Campbell and the LSI are of no especial importance (Campbell has evidently confused some of the terms).

193 Lepcha is one of the most unusual, as well as one of the most important, languages in the Tibeto-Burman family. It parallels Tibetan in its well preserved but rather rigid morphology, and exhibits an even more extensive system of prefixes. Initial and final consonants, including initial clusters, have in general been retained, but note final -s > -t, as in hrăt "bone", Tib. rus; nyăt "2", Tib. gnyis. Two sets of vocalic shifts are in operation in Lepcha. The first of these is medial or final a > o, as in klo "to fall", Tibeto-Burman (TB) *kla; zo "to eat", TB *za; ngo "fish", TB *ngya; (a-)tsom "hair", TB *ts'am; lom "road", TB *lam; (a-)rong "horn", TB *rang. The second is medial u (occasionally i) > ă (distinct from a), as in (a-)hrăt "bone", TB *rus; măt "to blow", TB *mut; lăng "stone", TB *lung; (tă-)băk "stomach", TB *buk; tă-răk "6", TB *d-rug; săm "3", TB *g-sum; nyăt "2", TB *g-nis; nyăl ~ nyel "gums", TB *s-nil. The medial ă thus developed tends to become e before final velar consonants, resulting in doublets of the

193 type ring ~ rong "a Lepcha", sǎ-t'ǎng ~ sǎ-t'ong "tiger". The medial ǔ is often retained in composition, e.g. ǔng-mǔt "wind" (mǔt "to blow"), lǔng- rather than lǎng- in names for varieties of stone.

The final dental morphology of Tibet (vide pt. 1) is exactly paralleled in Lepcha, in which final -t stands for -d, and final -n and -m for -n, the -m ordinarily being adjectival. Thus, zo "to eat", (a-)zom "food", zot "to graze", (a-)zot "pasture, food for cattle"; hru "to be hot", (a-)hrum "hot", (a-)hrun "heat"; bu "to carry", (a-)bum "vehicle"; t'yo "to hear", t'yom "hearing" (n.); ya "to know", (a-)yam "knowledge", ǎi "to be", ǎim "a being" (the -m substantival forms have been selected because of their bearing on the discussion that follows, but -n is the typical suffix here, as in (a-)hrun "heat").

197 In Lepcha we are faced with the problem of Tibetan rather than Indic loan-words. The Lepcha have been in continuous contact with the Tibetans for many centuries, hence we must dissect out several strata of loan-words reflecting both the period of borrowing and the dialect (including the Classical language) from which the borrowing has been made. Many of these loan-words are easily identified, e.g. nya "fish" alongside the native form ngo (supra), but those from an earlier stratum may conform to Lepcha linguistic patterns and consequently pass for native forms. Thus, nok "black" would appear to be the native term cognate with Tib. nag (o < a, vide supra), contrasting with the

197 borrowed form nak as found in nak-c'o "the black arts" (Tib. nag-p'yogs) and other obviously recent loan-words. Yet the true native form is rather (a-)tyang "black, dark", cognate with Tsangla tsang, Kachin cang "black" (Lepcha has medial a, probably from TB *ā, in a number of important roots). So also nok "ink" from Tib. snag, unquestionably a loan-word but showing the o < a shift (if truly cognate the form would be

601 *nyok rather than nok, vide infra). It is apparent, then, that the general semantic setting as well as the phonological development of a given Lepcha word must be considered in making our identification of it as native or Tibetan. That this is especially true of kinship terminology will be shown in the annotations below.

Lepcha Consanguineal Terms

		(a-)zo gGF	
nyi-kung gM		t'i-kung gF	
(a-)mo M		(a-)bo F	
(a-)mo tim(-bo) FoSi,MoSi		(a-)bo tim(-bo) FoB	
(a-)mo cum(-bo) MySi		(a-)bo cum(-bo) FyB	
(a-)nyu FSi,MSi		(a-)ku FB	
		(a-)ŏong MB	
(a-)nom oSi,pxC		(a-)nŭm oB,pxC	
	yeng ySb,pxC	nu yB	
	(a-)kŭp Ch		
	nŭm-kŭp / nom-kŭp SbCh		
	kŭp-zong / (a-)zon gCh		
	nyi-t'i ggCh		

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Lepcha Affinal Terms

fyăt-nyo M1 (a-)fyăt F1

(a-)yu W (a-)vo H

{(a-)zong FyBW,MyBW,oBW,WySi(all ms);
{(a-)ngop MoBS,HyB,oSiH(all ws)

ong-zong SbL(ss)

nyom SW,ySW(ms),SbSW(ms) nyok DH,ySiH(ws),SbDH(ws)

Notes:

The two grandparent terms include the element kung "tree", which functions here as a categorical term. The element t'i is identical with t'i "to be related", cognate with Tib. t'e-ba "to appertain to", and appears also in t'it-bo "a relative" (with morphological -t suffix). The element nyi is not so readily analyzed. It is represented in a-nyi, an expletive for a-go "love", and tă-nyi, an expletive for tă-yu "woman", as well as in nyit "to cherish" (with -t suffix). For the Lepcha system of expletives (semantic doublets), e.g. man ~ kit "flesh", făt ~ lek "earth" (pă-lek "a parcel of ground"), fo ~ yu "bird", vyeng ~ grong "door,window" (tă-grong "ladder"), see Mainwaring's Grammar, 136-37. This root (*nyi) must be compared with Tib. nye-ba "to be near", nye-mo "near" , used figuratively, as in nye-mo je-pa "to love, e.g. parents loving their children or vice versa" (Central Tibetan), nye-ba-rnams "relations, sanguinity", nye-ts'an, nye-rigs "relative, kinsman", and gnyen "kinsman, relative"; for

the vocalism, cf. Lepcha mi "fire", Tib. me; Lepcha a-li "tongue", Tib. lce < *c-le. The elements *nyi and *t'i are combined in the term nyi-t'i ~ nyi-t'ĭ, probably ggCh, ggS (Stocks), but defined also as gCh and as gggCh (MB, in different places), and nyi-t'o ggD (Stocks).

Both grandparent terms are extended, e.g. t'i-kung denotes also "any man irrespective of age who traces relationship to a common ancestor and who is two generations nearer this ancestor than the speaker" (Gorer). In Lepcha folktales and mythology, t'i-kung stands for the "Old Man" (Gorer) or the "progenitor of the Rong-folk" (t'i-kung-tek, Stocks), and nyi-kung-ngal (Stocks) for his wife.

The parallelism in grandparent-grandchild terms indicated above can be traced further. Thus, MG gives the following scheme:

nyi-t'i gCh	t'i-kung gF
nyi-t'ing ggCh	t'i-kung-t'ing ggF
nyi-t'it gggCh	t'i-kung-t'in gggF
nyi-t'it-tek ggggCh	t'i-kung-tek ggggF

Most of these terms are primarily literary. Both t'in and t'it are probably derivatives of t'i "to be related", but note also (a-)t'in "a time, a generation". The other elements are t'ing "lord, master", tek "to be finished or ended", tek-bo "the last", as in yeng tek-bo "the last child". MG further cites nyi-kung-nyo ggM, nyi-kung-ngal gggM, and nyi-kung-pum ggggM, as well as t'i-kung-pum gggggF (also

601 "the head of the ancestors"). The botanical semasiology of kung "tree" (supra) is continued in the above terms; cf. ngal "to be short and thick", a-ngal "the head end, a short end of yam or other vegetable" (tek-ngal "progenitors, founders of a race"), and pum "to issue from, be the origin", a-pum "the chief sprout of plants", pum-bo "the chief, the principal, God".

Of especial interest is the term (a-)zo ggF (Stocks), which is certainly a direct representative of Tibeto-Burman *za Ch,gCh. The derivative in final -n is (a-)zon "grandchild, posterity", zon-kŭp ~ zon-nyin ~ zon-nyin-kŭp "offspring, descendants" (nyin is the derivative in final -n from *nyi, supra), a-kŭp a-zon "my own child (an expression of endearment of mother)", but zon defined simply as "creatures, men" (cf. Spanish criatura, Italian creatura). In the Lepcha term (a-)zo, therefore, we have strong evidence for grandparental reciprocity.

The terms used for the paternal and maternal pedigrees reflect Lepcha notions of physiology similar to those held by the Tibetans. The term for pedigree itself is (a-)gyit, from gyit "to follow"; cf. Tib. brgyud "lineage", rgyud "string", rgyud-pa "to file on a string", rgyun "a continual flowing, the flow, current or stream", rgyu-ba "to go, move, wander". For "male pedigree", Lepcha has t'ing gyit (t'ing "lord", supra), also a-hrăt a-gyit, a-hrăt zong "male branch of family", from (a-)hrăt "bone". The corresponding

601 feminine term is nyo gyit "pedigree on female side", whence the alternative terms nyo-kung ~ nyi-kung gM, nyo-kung-nyo nyi-kung-nyo ggM. Etymologically, nyo is an expletive of vi "blood", but the Tibetan cognate is nya "tendon, sinew, muscle", hence the term refers fundamentally to the flesh rather than to the blood. The parallelism with Tib. rus(-pa) "bone" and sa "flesh" is complete. The native theory is thus expressed by Gorer (p. 283):

> .....the father's semen provides the bones and brain, the mother's vaginal secretions the flesh and blood.

Stocks (p. 465) makes a similar statement:

> .....the mother's relations are considered to be of much nearer kin than the father's. The Lap-cha believe it to be only the father who transmits bone to his offspring, while from the mother they obtain their flesh and blood.

The alternation of nyo with nyi in the gM, ggM terms suggests that nyi is associated with the maternal side (cf. Tib. nye-ba "to be near", supra), t'i with the paternal side (cf. t'i "to be related"). The merging of the ascending lines would thus appear to be analogical, contrasting with the real merging of the descending lines shown in the "fused" terms nyi-t'i gCh, nyi-t'it gggCh, and nyi-t'ing ggCh (t'ing for t'i, vide supra).

Lepcha (a-)mo M and (a-)bo F (often mu, bu in modern pronunciation) represent the regular Tibeto-Burman roots *ma and *ba. These terms in themselves, unlike the grandparent terms, are not extended, but a type of quasi-extension is found in (a-)mo tim(-bo) FoSi, MoSi, (a-)bo tim(-bo) FoB

601 (ti-m "great, large"), (a-)mo cum(-bo) MyZi, (a-)bo cum(-bo) FyB (cu-m "small, little"). It is clear from Gorer's annotations that these combined terms are used only when the relatives in question reside in or near the house of the speaker. Thus, Gorer defines a-mo cum-bo (a-mu chishu) only as "younger co-wife", and "wife of father's younger brother; only used if living chiefly in same house as speaker", but among the Lepcha the younger co-wife is ordinarily MyZi (real or classificatory). Of a-bo tim-bo Gorer remarks: "always used if the two brothers live in the same house or neighborhood, not usually if they live in different villages"; a-bo cum-bo is said to be "only used if the two brothers live in the same house"; a-mo tim-bo is defined as "elder sister of father or mother if living in same house or neighborhood". In affinal usage, a-bo tim-bo is "elder co-husband", a-bo cum-bo is "younger co-husband", and a-mo tim-bo is "elder co-wife".

Lepcha (a-)ku FB, (a-)ǰong MB, and (a-)nyu FZi, MZi constitute an entirely distinct set of terms. Like the grandparent terms, they are subject to extension. Gorer defines a-ku as "any man whom father calls 'brother'; any male irrespective of age who traces relationship to a common ancestor and who is one generation nearer this ancestor than speaker; any man mother calls 'aku'", a-ǰong as "mother's brother; may be, but is not always, applied to any man one generation older than speaker whose

601 relationship, however distant, is traced through a woman", and a-nyu as "younger sister of parent; also any woman whom father or mother calls 'sister'; also any woman irrespective of age who traces a relationship to a common ancestor and who is one generation nearer this ancestor than speaker". The status of the terms a-ku and a-žong is debatable, in view of the close correspondences with Tib. 'a-k'u and 'a-žang. The initial aspirated k' of Tibetan loan-words is usually retained in Lepcha, in which it is phonemically aberrant, e.g. k'e ~ k'o "mouth" (Tib. k'a), k'u "bread" (Tib. k'ur), k'ye ~ k'e "profit" (Tib. k'ye ~ k'e), but Tibetan itself has the fluctuation 'a-k'u ~ a-ku (produced by the a- prefix) and the Lepcha form a-ku may be based on the latter. The term a-žong is rendered somewhat suspect by the initial ž-, which is on the whole an atypical element in Lepcha but is standard in Tibetan loan-words, e.g. ži "4" (Tib. bži), žung "middle" (Tib. gžung). Lepcha a-nyu FSi,MSi is a variant of nyo, a categorical term applied to relatives of the uterine line (vide supra); the phonetic development parallels that shown by mu < mo M, bu < bo F, tau < tao "to cook", un < on "horse", and others. MG cites a-nyu "aunt", but a-nyo "lady, queen", but Gorer has a-nyu also in the meaning "the most respectful form of address to any socially superior woman: is used as a title for female supernaturals and Queens". It is the female equivalent of a-t'ing "the most respectful term for a man; used for high

601 officials and male supernaturals". Since t'ing has a categorical usage exactly paralleling that of nyo (supra), the equivalence nyo = nyu is established.

The three sibling terms, also extended to include parallel and cross cousins, are (a-)nom oSi, (a-)nŭm oB, and yeng (also eng, ing) ySb. The additional term, nu (Tib. nu ~ no), though defined in MG as yB, seems to be used only in the stable compound nŭm-nu "blood relation (implying a person with whom sexual intercourse would be incestuous)" (Gorer), "relations, relatives" (MG), nŭm-nu mim-yeng "relatives, connexions", nŭm-nu-ka t'i "to be related", nŭm-nu tyol-nu "friends and acquaintances", and in stereotyped phrases of the type bo-nu "father and family", mo-nu "mother and children". The term nŭm oB itself is a derivative in -m from the root *nu (see the discussion above). The combined term nŭm-nu is formally comparable with Tib. p'u-nu but functionally comparable with Tib. spun. Lepcha a-nom < *nam oSi is cognate with Gyarung snom < *snam Si (and cf. the discussion of nyom below), while yeng ySb appears to be related to Tsangla -ying (cf. nyel "gums", Tib. smyil). MG cites yeng tă-yu ySi, yeng tă-gri yB, with the sex-suffixes, but this distinction is not ordinarily made. As in Tibetan, the age distinction is of primary importance. According to Gorer (p. 166), the Nepali terms for oSi and ySi have been borrowed as descriptive terms for the co-wives:

601 This [that the co-wife should be the ySi of the first wife] is recognized in the terms with which co-wives are always referred to; the Nepali words jethi and kanchi, meaning 'eldest sister' and 'youngest sister' are always used; Lepcha has no equivalent terms to indicate the position of a child in the order of birth.

Gorer's statement is perhaps inexact, since both MG and Stocks cite analogous native Lepcha terms, e.g. nŭm-fren oB, nŭm-hlep-bo yB (Stocks). Since almost no Nepali loan-words exist in the language, the use of Nepali terms in this specific connection presents a definite problem, much as Kanauri bai yB and other loan-words already encountered.

The neuter sibling term, (a-)kŭp, is a new element. The terms ta-yŭ kŭp D, ta-gri kŭp S, are used only in a descriptive way, according to Gorer. A-kŭp itself can be extended (Gorer defines it as "any child"), but the extended usage is more properly represented by nom-kŭp SiCh, nŭm-kŭp BCh (Gorer and Stocks tend to confuse these two terms under the single form nŭm-kŭp, which is merely a variant of nŭm-kŭp, but the distinction is clearly made in MG). MG also cites a-ku kŭp "paternal cousin" and a-ŭong kŭp "maternal cousin" (probably descriptive), as well as a-nyu kŭp "nephew, niece, child of elder brother" (perhaps through the honorific nature of the term a-nyu). The normal gCh term is kŭp-zong, in which kŭp is combined with the element zong (analyzed below). It is extended to include "any child two generations younger than ego" (Gorer), and can show sex distinction (probably descriptive only), viz. kŭp-zong tŭ-yu gD, kŭp-zong tŭ-gri gS. For the terms (a-)zon and nyi-t'i, see the discussion above.

601 The affinal terminology presents several new terms (listed in the table) and a number of consanguineal terms used affinally. The terms used in any given instance depend in large measure on the composition of the family and the residence of the spouse's kin. The following excerpt from Gorer (p. 143) gives the essential points:

Old age is considered by the Lepchas to be a desirable quality; the polite term of address to anybody you are not related to is 'old man'; and there is a tendency to push anybody older than the speaker into a higher generation. Thus, when a man has had a child he calls his wife's parents 'grandfather' and 'grandmother', and the parents call their own elder brothers and sisters 'father' and 'mother'; the wife's elder brother, or her elder sister's husband (and conversely) are equated with her father. The opposite tendency is also manifested towards the wives of younger brothers (the elder brother calls them 'daughters-in-law') and the husbands of younger sisters (the elder sister calls them 'sons-in-law'). In the joint family which dwells under a single roof only nine terms are normally used: 'grandfather', 'grandmother', 'father', 'mother', 'elder brother', 'elder sister', 'younger brother-or-sister', 'child' and 'grandchild'. It does not matter how many brothers and their wives live together; all the brothers are called 'father', all their wives 'mother' by all the children; if it is necessary to distinguish which 'mother' or 'father' is meant, the child will say 'big mother', 'little mother', and if necessary 'middle mother'; his own mother he will call his 'real mother'. If the married brothers live in different houses the children of the younger brother will still call the elder brother and his wife 'father' and 'mother'; but the sons of the elder brother will call the younger brother 'uncle', and his wife 'potential spouse' (azong), for, as will be seen later, they may under certain circumstances inherit her.

In this extension of consanguineal terms, the use of teknonymy and the equation of elder sibling of spouse with parent of spouse are prominent features. Thus, before the birth of a child, a-bo is used for SpF, SpoB, SpoSiH, while after the birth of a child t'i-kung is used to denote these

601 same affinal kin. The definitions of affinal kin in Stocks and Gorer are not sufficiently precise to enable us to fix the status of (a-)fyăt Fl, fyăt-nyo Ml (only in MG), and (a-)nyu Ml. Gorer specifies that a-fyăt is a descriptive term not used in address, and notes that, like a-bo and t'i-kung, it denotes WoSiH and WoB as well as "father of spouse", while a-nyu denotes both WM and WoSi. The avuncular terms, a-ku and a-ǩong, are not used to denote kin of spouse (contrast a-ku cum-bo FyB, a-fyăt cum-bo WFyB, in Stocks), but a-nyu is used for FBW and MBW as well as for FSi, MSi, and Ml. Since a-nyu is not matched by a corresponding masculine term (a-fyăt is descriptive), it is likely that its use for Ml merely represents one aspect of its general honorific application.

The reciprocal term a-ǩong ~ a-ngop is defined by Gorer as "levirate or sororate spouse", since it denotes the marriageable affinal kin of Ego. Gorer observes that "Azong is more commonly used when there is a generation between the speakers; Oong-op when they are of the same generation, but there is no uniformity about this". He further notes that the term is used for "wife of younger brothers of father or mother, of any man called 'aku' or 'ajong'". The implication here must be that the terms a-ku and a-ǩong are applied only to FyB and MyB, respectively; yet Gorer, after giving "father's (younger) brother" as the "direct meaning" of the term a-ku, notes that it is applied to "any man whom father calls 'brother'". Similarly,

601 a-nyu is defined as "(1) younger sister of parent; also any woman whom father or mother calls 'sister'". As explained by Gorer in the excerpt cited above, the term "father" (i.e. a-bo tim-bo) is applied to the father's elder brother even when living in a different house, while the father's younger brother under the same circumstances is called "uncle" (i.e. a-ku). Neither Stocks nor MG, however, make any similar distinction in the terms a-ku and a-zong. The apparent discrepancy is perhaps to be explained on the assumption that these terms in address are used only for FyB and MyB but in reference are applied to FB and MB without age distinction.

The term a-ngop < *ngap (oong-op in Gorer) is linguistically isolated (it may be cognate with Bahing ngwap-sya "cousin"), but a-zong has an interesting connection with the final element of kŭp-zong gCh and ong-zong Sbl (vide infra). It is quite distinct from a-ž̌ong MB, which is either cognate with or borrowed from Tib. ʾa-ž̌ang (but MG mistakenly cites the meaning FSiH for a-zong rather than for a-ž̌ong). The basic meaning of zong ~ zăng is "like, after the manner of", as in bik zong "like a cow" (bik "cow"). It is used also in the meaning "fellow, companion, one's own kind or sex", e.g. lom-zong "fellow-traveller" (lom "road"), tă-do zong "one's own people" (tă-do "self"), nŭm-zong "friends, relatives", nŭm-[illegible]-zong "relatives (all the people with whom relation by descent can be traced)"

601 (contrast nŭm-nu "blood relation", implying a person with whom sexual intercourse would be incestuous), a-hrăt-zong "male branch of family" (a-hrăt "bone", vide supra). The basic signifiestion of the term a-zong is thus "the coupler", "one with whom coupling (copulation) is allowed". The o ~ ă alternation points to an original ŭ vocalism (vide the introductory remarks), hence we can safely identify this root with Tib. zung "a pair, a couple".

The reciprocal term ong-zong Sbl(ss) is applied both to SpSb(ss) and SbSp(ss). The element zong is here combined with ong "a child", which appears in a number of combinations, e.g. ong-kŭp "child", ong tă-yu (fem.) and ong tă-gri (masc.) "child from the ages of 3-10", ong nŭm-lyeng (fem.) and ong fă-lyeng (masc.) "young person from the age of 10 to maturity" (note nŭm-lyeng "girl, young female", but nŭm oS), ong-lot "children in a general sense". MG cites ong-zong simply as "companion, comrade, fellow-workman". The development of ong-zong Sbl from ong Ch parallels the use of nyom SW for ySW and of myok DH for ySiH (vide infra).

The terms nyom SW and myok DH have been analogously extended to include non-marriageable affinal kin of different sex from speaker, primarily ySW(ms) and ySiH(ws). The tendency toward serial equations in the affinal terminology thus appears here also; Ego(ms) equates his WF with his WoB, and his DH with his ySW.

It will be observed that a medial y element appears in three affinal terms, viz. a-fyăt, nyom, and myok. The

601 linguistic clue to these forms is given by the Lepcha causative formation with a so-called "infixed y", e.g. pok "to cast down", pyok "to cause to cast down"; t'or "to escape, get free", t'yor "to let go, set free" (Tib. t'ar-ba "to become free"); rop "to stick, adhere", ryop "to affix, attach"; nak "to be straight" , nyak "to make straight". Since infixation is entirely foreign to Tibeto-Burman morphology, these verbal forms stand in need of explanation. As described in the Introduction (pt. 1), the regular Tibeto-Burman causative formation involves the prefix s-, as in Tib. 'k'or-ba "to turn round", skor-ba "to surround"; 'p'ur-ba "to fly", spur-ba "to make fly" (Tibetan regularly has '- or m- intransitive prefix). The loss of prefixed s- may affect the initial; thus in Burmese the initial is aspirated, e.g. pran "to be full", p'ran "to fill"; lwat "to be free", hlwat "to set free". This phonetic effect is seen also in nominal forms, e.g. Burmese (a-)t'ong "1,000", Tib. stong; Burmese hna "nose", Tib. sna. Lepcha has only a few s- prefixed forms, of secondary origin, and there can be no question but that the loss of original s- prefix has palatalized the initials. The parallelism is sometimes seen in the same root, e.g. Lepcha nom "to smell" (intr.), nyom (tr.); Tib. snam-pa "to smell" (intr.), snam-pa ~ snom-pa ~ snum-pa (tr.). The point is neatly demonstrated in the Lepcha form myǎn "to be ripe" (also a-mǎn "ripe,cooked"), which theoretically should be transitive rather than intransitive;

601 the anamoly is explained by Tib. smin-pa "to be ripe, ripen" (intr.), Burmese hmaṅ ~ hmyaṅ "to be ripe", which are similarly intransitive in meaning though transitive in form. Cf. also Lepcha nyo "snot", Tib. sna "nose", Burmese hna "nose" ; the semantic shift in the Lepcha word is indicated by (a-)nyo, expletive of (a-)mik "eye", which parallels Burmese myak-hna "face".

This long digression is required to clarify the terms a-fyăt F1, nyom D1, and myok S1. The derivation nyom < *snam makes possible a direct comparison with Kanauri stem < *snem D1 and Gyarung snom < *snam S1, while myok < *smak (Tib. mag-pa) must be interpreted as an analogous development (but cf. Burmese sa-mak). The term (a-)fyăt indicates an original *sput (Lepcha f- and p- often interchange, e.g. far ~ a-far "price", par "to buy", cognate with Tib. p'ar "exchange, agio", Gyarung m-p'ar "to be for sale"), and *sput can be only a collective term (with morphological -t) parallelling Tib. spun Sb(ss), derived from p'u-bo oB. The equation of SpoB with SpF has been noted above. Lepcha (a-)fyăt < *sput F1 is thus partly analogical with (and cognate with) Tib. spun < p'u(-bo) oB, and partly analogical with Tib. skud-po F1,B1 < k'u(-bo) FB.

The remaining affinal terms are (a-)yu W and (a-)vo H. The former is simply the root for "female" (tă-yu), cognate with the root *yu "female" that has appeared elsewhere (e.g. Kanauri yu-med M1), perhaps also with Tib. yu-bo ~ yu-mo "ox or cow having no horns; hind, female of a stag". Lepcha

601 a-vo H is from a root *wa (v- < w-, as in vi "blood", TB *wi; vot "bee", Kanauri wăs "honey"), which appears in the meaning "male", also "father" in some of the groups discussed below. Lepcha tă-gri "male" is probably cognate with Tib. bgre-ba "to grow old" (Lepcha i = Tib. e, supra). The term bo F appears in the sense "entire non-emasculated animal", e.g. mon-bo "boar" (mon "pig"), and the variant (a-)bu is used for "male sex of animals". Lepcha also has (a-)tsu "the male of goats, pigs, sheep", e.g. lŭk a-tsu "ram" (lŭk "sheep").

Morphological -t suffixes appear in (a-)mit "female, woman of superior beings", e.g. rŭm-mit "goddess" (rŭm "god"), from a form *mi cognate with Tib. *me (in bud-med), which is represented also in the phrase nŭm-nu mim-yeng " relatives, connexions" (MG); and in (a-)mot "the female of animals" (sometimes of human beings, as in yu-mot "woman"), which is from a form *mo identical with mo < *ma M. The morphological -t group of terms in Lepcha thus includes (a-)fyăt < *sput Fl, (a-)mit "female (human)", and (a-)mot "female (animal)".

The Tibetan loan-words in the Lepcha kinship terminology merit especial examination. The following terms have been recorded (we omit a-ku FB and a-zong MB, which are of doubtful status):

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Lepcha < Tibetan Terms

ma M	p'a F
yŭm M (resp.)	yap F (resp.)
mo-sŭng-mo Si	p'a-ming B
pŭn Sb	
se Ch (resp.)	
	ku-mok Sl

The terms ma M and p'a F, with the respectful equivalents yŭm (also yăm) M and yap F, closely correspond to their Tibetan prototypes, while se "son or daughter of a great man" is merely a dialectical form of sras. Lepcha mo-sŭng-mo has been borrowed from Tib. sring-mo Si(ms) via a dialect of Central Tibetan ty[illegible] (probably Dänjonkä, spoken in Sikkim), as shown by the treatment of initial sr-; Lepcha has prefixed mo, and has changed the vocalism as in many other Tibetan loan-words, e.g. tsŭk-po < rtsig-pa "wall", k'yŭm < k'yim "house", yŭk < yig "letter". Lepcha p'a-ming is from Tib. p'a-ming "relations on the father's side". Gorer lists the Lepcha term as descriptive, and gives the following definition: "a collective word meaning either all true siblings or more usually all the males the person referred to calls anum ani ing." The same authority defines mo-sŭng-mo (m'sung-mu) as "parallel to pa-ming, but referring exclusively to women and usually employed by women". Stocks gives mu-sang-mu FBD,FSiD, a-num p'a-ming FBS,MBS, i.e. exclusively collateral terms, yet on p. 469 she states

601 that "Tha-ming is an idiom.....meaning the elder or younger brother, and the word musang-mu is another word denoting a sister of any age". MG defines mo-sŭng-mo as "sister, female cousin" (agreeing rather with Gorer), but for p'a-ming offers only the literal Tibetan translation "paternal name", though Grünwedel brings Tib. ming-po B(sw) into comparison. On the analogy with p'a-ming, the term mo-sŭng-mo can be analyzed as mo + sŭng-mo, with mo M for Tib. ma through the influence of the final -mo suffix. Tibetan does not have the compound ma-sring-mo, and employs p'a-ming only in its literal connotation ("father's name"). Gorer indicates that mo-sŭng-mo is employed by women rather than by men, whereas the Tibetan term (sring-mo) is exclusively a man's term. The Lepcha term nŭm-mu, lit. "oB and yB", has been extended to include blood relatives in general, hence a need may have been felt for a descriptive collective sibling term. In any case it is evident that considerable semantic distortion has taken place.

Lepcha pŭn, defined by MG as "brother and sister, hospitality", and used in the phrases ma-pŭn-zong "relations on mother's side", p'a-pŭn-zong (also p'a-pŭn-zăng) "paternal, belonging to the father", constitutes another good example of shift of meaning in loan-words. The Tibetan original is spun "brother, sisters (same sex); cousins, brothers- or sisters-in-law", and the corresponding phrases in Tibetan are ma-spun "brothers and sisters of the same

601 mother", p'a-spun "brothers and sisters of the same father". The Tibetan word can be applied only to siblings of the same sex, while the Lepcha term includes siblings of both sexes (Tibetan renders this idea by ming-sring). The element pun further appears to enter into pun-se "relations" (MG), which must be equated with Gorer's term ptso, the designation for the exogamous patrilineal group. The form cited by Gorer is of non-Lepcha type and a borrowing is clearly indicated, though the final element -se (or -tso) has not yet been identified. Cf. Tibetan p'a-spun, similarly used for the patrilineal group (see the discussion in pt. 2).

The remaining Tibetan loan-word, ku-mok Sl, is defined by MG as "a man who has not paid his marriage-fee", and ku-mok myok as "a son-in-law who has not paid his marriage-fee". In this source the term is derived from Tib. rku-mag(-pa), the first element standing for Tib. rku-ba "to steal". This compound does not exist in Tibetan, however, and is scarcely of Tibetan type. The form -mok must be regarded as a loan-word, contrasting with the native term myok (analyzed above), but the first element cannot be identified. Gorer (pp. 156-57) explains <u>komok myok</u> as a "resident son-in-law":

> In a family where there are no sons it is possible, if the parents so wish, that the groom, instead of taking the daughter away to his home, shall live permanently in the home of his parents-in-law, acting as their son, and eventually inheriting their property.

Gorer further observes that this arrangement "is not very popular or very common", and adds that there are only

601 two komok nyok in the village of Lingthem, both maladjusted individuals. As shown above (pt. 3), Kanauri has similarly borrowed the Tibetan term in the form mak-pa, used in precisely the same sense. The inference must be that this cultural item has diffused from Tibet along with the term used to designate it, though the Tibetan term itself naturally lacks this precise connotation. The parallelism in groups so distinct as Kanauri and Lepcha is especially worthy of attention.

The Lepcha kinship terminology, which has been presented above in some detail, closely reflects the marriage regulations and incest ideas of this people. The patrilineal clan (ptso) is an exogamic unit, in practice if not strictly in theory:

> In theory people of the same ptso are allowed to marry if they are separated by nine generations from a common ancestor, and to indicate that a person of the same ptso is very far removed a Lepcha will always say 'we can marry'; but in point of fact I did not come upon nor hear of a single instance of two people of the same ptso marrying. It was generally stated that though such a marriage was permissive, people would feel shame in it. (Gorer, p. 148)

There are also matrilineal restrictions on marriage, though these are apparently less severe. Gorer (p. 148) states:

> It is allowable to marry back into a mother's ptso after four generations; but so near a connection is considered somewhat shameless. Datoop's father, the first Dorje Lapoon, took as his second wife a woman he called 'aunt' (a-nyou); his grandmother was a sister of her mother. This marriage was considered quite shameless, and even nearly sixty years later was a subject for embarrassment; but it demanded no sanctions against it, such as would have been invoked if the connection had been on the father's side.

601 Stocks (p. 469) states that cross-cousin marriage (assumedly MBCh) is permitted on rare occasions:

.....the Lep-cha is not permitted to marry his cross-cousin, though should one be a widow having no children, the matter could be gone into by a council of the village folk, who would come together and discuss it, permitting it to take place on occasions.

The lack of cross-cousin marriage is correlated with the lack of any significant categorical equations. As indicated above, the use of a-nyu for Zi, FBW, and MBW, as well as FSi, MBi, merely reflects the peculiarly honorific nature of this term, which in turn is dependent on its etymology (a-nyo, an expletive of vi "blood", used to denote the uterine lineage). The merging of the collateral and the central lines in the sibling terms is also consistent with these bilateral marriage restrictions.

The Lepcha regulations affecting affinal kin reflect a single fundamental distinction, viz. that between siblings of different birth order. The Lepcha are ordinarily monogamous, though (sororal) polygyny and even polyandry may be practised under certain conditions. Both the levirate and sororate are in force, however, and a man has free sexual access to all his potentially hereditable wives. Gorer (p. 169) states the regulations as follows:

Among the Lepchas a man can inherit the wives of all his elder brothers, real or classificatory, the wives of all his paternal and maternal uncles real or classificatory, provided these 'uncles' are younger than his parents but not younger than himself, and all the younger sisters of his wife, real or classificatory. Conversely a woman can be inherited by all her husband's younger brothers, all the sons of her husband's uncles, and all the husbands of her elder sisters, real or classificatory.

601 Infractions of these regulations are regarded as fully incestuous, even though no blood relatives are involved. Terminologically, the potential spouse is designated by an especial term, a-zong ~ a-ngop, which may have originally shown a distinction between potential spouses of the same generation as Ego and those of a different generation (see the discussion above), and the remaining affinal kin, of different sex from Ego, are equated in accordance with age distinctions. Thus, a man equates his yBW and SbSW with his SW (nyom), and his WoSi with his WM (a-nyu), while a woman equates her ySiH and SbDH with her DH (myok), and her HoB with her HF (a-bo, before birth of child; t'i-kung, after birth of child).

Gorer develops the theory that the jus connubii enjoyed by the younger brother represents a social device serving to reduce intra-group friction. The gist of his argument is given in the following excerpt:

> I have already suggested that the ptso was possibly earlier a geographical unit; if this were the case, it seems to me possible that these permissive regulations [jus connubii] were evolved to meet the special circumstances. For, with the ptso as the geographical unit, the young men would have had no possible sexual partners except through adultery or incest; and, as numerous examples show, such situations inevitably lead to jealousy, fighting, and the splitting of the group. By their regulations, the Lepchas have reduced intra-group aggression to the minimum. The potential rivalry between father and son is mitigated by taking the arrangements for the child's marriage entirely out of the parents' hands [they are in the hands of the paternal or maternal uncles]; the potential rivalry between brothers is mitigated by allowing the younger brother access to his more favoured and stronger elder brother's wife, while making the relationship between an elder brother and his younger sister-in-law strongly incestuous. (pp. 161-62)

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This explanation appears to be something of a rationalization, i.e. the fact that the younger brother may have exclusive rights to certain females seems to be incidental. The Lepcha regard marriage as "not only a contract between two individuals, but also a contract between two groups" (Gorer, p. 158). The rights to sexual intercourse merely represent one aspect of the group rights in general, but these rights are regulated by the dominant age distinctions, hence the general preferential status of the elder sibling (elder child) is reflected in the marriage regulations. Thus, a man has sexual access to his ♀ySi but not to his ♀oSi, and a woman is accessible to her HyB but not to her HoB. From the purely masculine point of view (that in Gorer), however, the yB (HyB) has access to his oB♀, while the oB (HoB) does not have access to his yB♀; from the feminine point of view, the ySi (♀ySi) is accessible to her oSiH, while the oSi (♀oSi) is not accessible to her ySiH. The Lepcha point of view is not so much that of two lines (bilateral) as of two lineages or clans (ptso), each of whom contributes a partner to the marriage; the age distinctions must be observed regardless of whether this partner is male or female.

Where affinal kin of two different generations are involved the principle of age distinctions is applied somewhat differently. The gap of a generation necessitates an adjustment in the concept of age. Actually, a man

601 equates his FyB(os) with his own oB, and his FyB(ys) with his own yB. A man may inherit his FyBW only if his FyB is not younger than himself. Neither FoBW nor FyBW are listed by Gorer (p. 151) as blood relatives with whom sexual relations are considered incestuous, hence we can assume that a man has sexual access to but may not marry the wife of his FyB(ys). At one point the age principle comes into conflict with a Lepcha aversion toward the sharing of a single female by a father and son. The situation is not regarded as really incestuous, but is socially frowned upon. Gorer makes the following observation:

> It is considered very wicked, though the act will only affect the actual performers [incest affects the community as a whole], for a man and his son to sleep with the same woman, or a mother and her daughter with the same man; if this is done the line will die out. This situation does however occur occasionally.....Although such behaviour is very disgraceful instances of it are recounted with considerable relish, and not with the shocked embarrassment with which stories of true incest are recounted; it is a bad thing to do, but there is something rather attractive and dare-devil about it. (p. 152)

Since a son theoretically has access to his father's elder brothers' wives, it is apparent that a conflict can sometimes arise. The Lepcha solve the problem in a rather awkward fashion, by having the father inform his son as to which of these potential spouses he has slept with; if the father has slept with any of these wives, the son is forbidden access to her (Gorer, p. 153). Since the Lepcha male seldom fails to take full advantage of his fraternal rights (cf. Gorer, pp. 160 sq.) the theoretical conflict must fail to

601 materialize in most instances, provided that the son be adequately forewarned. In any event the situation is an awkward one, even though the Lepcha are not reticent about their sexual life. It indicates, perhaps, that the principle of age-distinction is not yet fully integrated in a society which in most respects forms a well-knit unit (Gorer does not develop the point).

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6. Miri and northern Assam

197 The mountainous country of northern Assam, dissected by a number of small river valleys opening southward on the plain of the Brahmaputra, is inhabited by several distinct [101] Tibeto-Burman-speaking groups. From west to east, these groups are as follows: Aka, Dafla, Abor-Miri, and Mishmi, the last-named being an inclusive term for two distinct groups, viz. Digaro and Miju. Dafla and Abor-Miri constitute a single linguistic unit (Mirish), but Aka, Digaro, and Miju are all independent. The last three languages have not been well recorded, and hence it is possible that additional information will enable us to reduce the number of distinct linguistic entities in this area. The Dhimal language, spoken in the Darjeeling Terai, has also been considered in this connection (Toto, a little known language of Dhimal type, is spoken in the Bana subdivision of Jalpaiguri, i.e. in northeastern Assam). Like Aka, Digaro, and Miju, the Dhimal group has no especial affinities for any of the surrounding languages.

The Mirish complex includes at least two distinct languages, viz. Abor-Miri and Dafla, and at least two distinct dialects within each of these languages. Abor-Miri is fairly well known through the works of Lorrain and Needham. Lorrain's dictionary is based on Miri, which is essentially the language of the plains people as opposed to Abor, the language of the hills people. Needham's work is in the main

197 based on Miri, with a scattering of Abor forms, as can be determined through collation with the forms for Abor cited in Needham and with the Abor and Miri lists in Robinson.

Abor-Miri is clearly allied with Kachin, Burmese, Kuki and the other languages to the south rather than with Tibetan and the languages of the sub-Himalayas. It is phonetically aberrant, having undergone a number of secondary sound-shifts particularly as a result of fluctuation in prefixes. There have also been changes of vocalism in this group, which in many cases have resulted in the development of mixed or rounded front vowels (especially ü ~ ui), and final -a is sometimes shifted to -o (as in Lepcha). Some of these features are discussed in the annotations below.

601 **Miri Consanguineal Terms**

(a-)yo yo-ku ggM	(a-)to to-ku ggF
(a-)yo gM	(a-)to gF
(a-)nǎ M,MSi	(a-)bu F,FB
	(a-)bu bot-tǎ(-nǎ) FoB
	(a-)bu riang / (a-)bu ame(-nǎ) FyB
(a-)nyi FSi	(a-)kü MB
buir-mǎ Si,pC	buir-o B,pC
ǎsa-ǎi oEb / ǎng-ǎ ySb	kakai oB
ma-mo xCi(os)	mag-be xCe(os)
ying-nǎ xCi(ys)	yi-go xCe(ys)
o-mǎ D,pNi	a-o S,pNe
ü-mǎ xNi,gD	ü-yo xNe,gS
	nati gS

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Miri Affinal Terms

(a-)nyi	Ml	(a-)kü	Fl
ma-mo	oSil	mag-bo	oBl
ying-nă	ySil	yi-go	yBl
ya-mang	Dl	mag-bo	Sl

Notes:

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The forms given in the above table are those with a-prefix. Miri has a curious tendency to prefix a reduplicated version of the root, substituting a for the vowel of the root. Alternative forms developed in this way exist for almost all the primary terms cited above; thus, a-to ~ ta-to gF, a-yo ~ ya-yo (also written a-io ~ ya-io) gM, a-bu ~ ba-bu F, a-nă ~ na-nă M, a-kü ~ ka-kü MB, a-nyi ~ nya-nyi FSi, and a-o S (coinciding with the a-prefix form). Instead of reduplicating the consonant as an initial, Miri often simply doubles the consonant as a medial, e.g. a-to ~ at-to gF, a-bu ~ ab-bu F, a-nă ~ an-nă M, o-me ~ om-me D (in which the first element is o Ch). A further distinctive feature is the occasional addition of a suffix ă (distinct from a), which is both a vocative and nominative case particle as well as the standard copula ("to be"). This suffix appears alone in ăng-ă ySb, which should perhaps on this account be classified as a term used only in address. Final -o becomes -u before this suffix, e.g. buir-o B, but no ngok buir-u ă "you are my brother"; a-o S, but bui ngok a-u ă "he is my son".

601 The grandparent terms, a-to and a-yo, must be referred back to the roots *ta (cf. Tibetan, Tsangla) and *ya (cf. Himalayish), both of which are used as P rather than as gP terms (Tib. ʾa-ta F, Himalayish ya M). These terms are almost certainly of teknonymous origin, in view of the exact parallel furnished by Abor (infra); note also that Pagro Miri (in Lorrain) uses yo as the vocative term for M. As a verb, the term to means "to care for, respect, fear, revere, regard". The ggP terms can be abbreviated to to-ku ggF and yo-ku ggM, the element -ku standing for ku "full-grown (as tree); old; original, ancient". According to the material cited by Lorrain, Abor applies teknonymous terms based on a-bu F and a-nă M, viz. a-bu gF, a-nă gM, a-bu bu-ku ~ bu-ku ggF, a-nă na-ku ~ nă-ku ggM, though ta-ta (Miri ta-to) is retained as the vocative term for gF.

Miri a-nă M illustrates the short final -ă that occasionally appears in this language (cf. an-nă "leaf", TB *na). This term is of the "nursery word" type; cf. Almora na (pt. 3). Abor, which uses a-nă for gM (supra), has retained a form with labial initial, viz. ma-mi, from TB *me. The term a-bu ~ ba-bu F stands in need of explanation, since the form should be *a-bo (Lorrain does cite an alternative form ab-bo). The sex-suffixes, used primarily with the names of lower animals, are bo (masc.) and nă (fem.), which are here, as in many other Tibeto-Burman languages, equivalent to the terms for "father" and "mother", respectively. Furthermore,

60| Miri -u < TB -a is not a recognized phonetic development for this language, whereas -o < -a is of frequent occurence; cf. a-to gF, TB *ta; a-yo gM, TB *ya M; ngo "I", TB *nga; a-ngo "5", TB *nga; o-ngo "fish", TB *ngya; no "thou", TB *na; yo "night", TB *ya; a-lo "salt", TB *la. The influence of a final suffixed -a might be suspected (see the discussion above), yet this suffix does not actually appear in either parent term. We are forced to conclude that the phonetic form has been influenced by the Indic term babu F, the reduplicated term *ba-bo serving as a basis. Lorrain cites ya-yi as the Abor term for F, a-bu having been employed in the meaning gF (supra); it appears to be identical with Miri yai FoB.

Both a-nă M and a-bu F are extended to include the parallel aunt and uncle, but combined terms showing age distinctions are also used for FB. The Miri distinguish among a-bu bottă-nă FoB (bottă-nă "great, large, big"), a-bu riang FyB (next younger) (apparently from a verbal root meaning "overshadow"), and a-bu ame-nă FyB (younger than above) (ame-nă "small, little"). Whether these distinctions, which are of a type not previously met, are connected with any social functions cannot be determined. Needham cites yai FoB, pai FyB (Robinson pai "uncle"). The former is evidently the same as Abor ya-yi F, reduplicated from *yi. The latter agrees with Abor pai-ong FyB (next younger) (ong "to fall, decrease"), pai-i FyB (younger than

601 above) (i "down"). These Abor phrases parallel the Miri vocative terms o-lum-ǎ oCh (lum "on"), oi-ǎ yCh (o-i "youngest, last born"), based on o Ch. The roots yai and pai cannot be analyzed, however; the latter may have been influenced by Assamese (Indic) bopai F, which in Miri etymologizing might readily yield bo F plus an element pai.

Miri has retained both TB terms for "aunt" and "uncle", viz. a-nyi FSi, a-kü MB (as in Bahing and Vayu, rather than FB). Robinson cites a-nye "aunt", which agrees in vocalism with Tib. ʼa-ne. The -ü < -u shift and loss of aspiration found in the term a-kü (Tib. ʼa-k'u) are typical of Miri phonology; cf. Miri (mik-)ki ~ Abor (mui-)kü "smoke", TB *(mei-)k'u; Miri (pǎ-)kü "dove, pigeon", TB *k'u.

Miri is unusual in possessing the general terms buir-o B and buir-mǎ Si (cf. o S, a-mǎ "small", used as suffix). The element buir- cannot be identified; the original may have been either *bur or *bir, cf. the alternation shown in Miri a-min, Abor a-muin "name", Tib. *ming; pui-nyi "8" for pi-nyi ("4 x 2"), etc. It appears also in a-buir "friend", and Abor a-buil "slave" (cf. Miri a-muir "body", Abor a-muil). Age distinctions are shown only by the neuter terms ǎa-ǎi oSb (reduplicated from a form *ǎi) and ǎng-ǎ ySb (with vocative suffix -ǎ). The former appears also in ǎi-rum "a generation" (rum "layer, storey"). The latter may be cognate with Lepcha ong < *ang Ch, but cf. also Murmi, Gurung a-nga ySi. Needham gives yai oB (= FoB),

601 buir-mǎ yai oSi, and Abor has bui-buing (Robinson a-bing "brother") oB (a-bui "to be elder or eldest"). Lorrain, however, cites only the Assamese (Indic) loan-word kakai oB.

The sibling terms are extended to include parallel cousins. Needham cites buir-o kum-šu "cousin", but for the same term Lorrain gives only "brothers", parallel with buir-mǎ kum-šu "sisters". The term kum-šu "together" (šu "self or selves", as verbal particle; also "a couple, pair") appears also in other collective terms, viz. a-bu kum-šu "father and children", a-nǎ kum-šu "mother and children", a-o kum-šu "mother and son", om-mǎ kum-šu "mother and daughter".

Cross-cousins are denoted by an entirely distinct set of terms, in which both age and sex are distinguished. Ma-mo xCi(os) stands for *mang-mo, the feminine of mag-bo xCe(os). The assimilation of final -g to -ng before a following nasal is regular for Miri (cf. rok-po "cock", rong-na "hen"), and the dropping of final -ng is of frequent occurrence; cf. a-rung "hole", but a-ru lo "in the hole"; a-pong "beer", but a-po si "that beer". These two terms have been introduced from the affinal terminology (infra). Ying-nǎ xCi(ys) and yi-go xCe(ys) form another pair, but the analysis here is more difficult. If the root be regarded as *ying, a development ying-go > yig-go > yi-go can be postulated, the final -go perhaps standing for ko Ch in the sense "male child". The root *ying thus extracted is comparable with Tsangla ying, Lepcha yeng ySb.

601 The basic root for " child" is o, which is used verbally in the meaning "to bear, give birth to", also "to feed, rear". Another root, ko "child, baby, young", yields ko mi-long "boy", ko mi-ma "girl" (in Needham, but Abor forms). These roots both illustrate the o < s shift found in Miri; they can be compared with Digaro a Ch and Newari ka Ch, respectively.

The Miri equation of gCh with xN closely parallels the Tibetan use of ts'a for gCh,N. Abor, if we can rely on the material in Lorrain, employs o for S,gS,pxNe, and om-mǎ o for D,gD,pxNi, thus extending the primary term o Ch in two directions. Miri not only distinguishes between S and gS,xNe, but also between xNe and pNe. The terms o-ǎng pNe, om-mǎ o-ǎng pNi (ǎng "up") give us a clue to the peculiar ü- of the gCh,xN terms. As indicated above in the discussion of FB terms, Miri tends to identify "elder" with "up", and "younger" with "down", whence the vocative terms o-lum-a oCh (a-lum "on") and oi-a yCh (o-i "youngest, last born", from i "down"). As shown above, o becomes u before the final particle -ǎ, and the addition of the element i (i "down") would certainly yield the ü- found in ü-yo and ü-ma. Thus it would seem that in Miri the parallel nephew is called "child-above" (= "elder child"), while the cross nephew is equated with the grandson and called "child-below" (= "younger child"). It is clear that Miri lacks a primary term for gCh. Both Lorrain and Needham cite the Assamese loan-word nati gS, and Needham

601 adds the remarks that the "Miris have no word [for this English meaning]". In this instance the borrowing seems to have been made in response for a need, and the same can be said of kakai oB (supra).

The affinal terminology exhibits so many categorical equations that no new primary terms appear. Needham distinguishes between mak-bo oBl and o-mǎ mak-bo Sl (i.e. the mak-bo of o-mǎ D). Lorrain gives mak-bo xCe(os) but mag-bo oBl,Sl. We can safely infer that a single term, mak-bo ~ mag-bo, blankets all three relationships (xCe(os), oBl,Sl). The term ya-mǎng Dl probably is to be analyzed ya ~ mang(-mo), the second element being identical with ma-mo < *mang-mo xCi(os). The element ya- appears also in ya-mǎ "youth, young man", but cannot be analyzed further. Abor meng T may be connected with -mǎng; Miri has nǎng ~ nǎng "wife, female, woman"; cf. Lepcha mo-nang "female who has reached the highest point of youth and is commencing to descend to senility", Byangsi mi-nang ǎri "wife". Abor mi-long H, also used as a masculine suffix, is composed of (a-)mi "man (homo)" and -long < *lang "male", a root found also in Nung and Burmese. The Miri form mil-bong H appears to have been metathesized.

As in Lepcha, the grandparent terms may teknonymously be applied to the parents-in-law. Miri has a-to gF, also Fl, and a-yo gM, also Ml. Abor uses the vocative gF term, ta-ta, for Fl (rather than the descriptive term, a-bu).

601 The virtually complete equation of consanguineal and affinal terms, the distinction between parallel and cross cousins, and the strong emphasis on age distinctions, are the outstanding features of Miri kinship terminology. Cross-cousin marriage can be predicted on the basis of this terminology, and does in fact occur. Dunbar makes two different statements that point in this direction:

> I have gathered, but I am not altogether satisfied, that the Galongs intermarry with their maternal, and not with their paternal relations. (p. 9)

> I was told by the Dobangs that they are prohibited from marrying blood connexions on the male side, which means women of their own group. They marry from amongst their mother's people, who are as a rule of the same clan..... If his mother has a married brother, he may marry a daughter of the marriage.

The last statement indicates that the marriage of SiS to BD is the preferred type. Lorrain makes the following annotations on the cross-cousin terms: "A man may marry his yingne" (p. 236); "A man may marry his mano" (p. 131); "A girl's yigo is supposed to marry her" (p. 236); "A girl's mâkbo is supposed to marry her" (p. 130). The last two annotations suggest that cross-cousin marriage is obligatory rather than optional.

We unfortunately have no exact information on Abor-Miri marriage practices. Dunbar notes the existence of polygyny, including sororal polygyny, but not of polyandry, and describes what may be the practice of sister exchange:

> When he marries, an Abor incurs the obligation to provide, from among his immediate relations, a wife for some member of his bride's family. (p. 56)

601 No material is at hand for an explanation of the marked age distinctions shown in the Abor-Miri terminology and the equation of D1, S1 with oS1i, oB1, respectively (contrast Lepcha). If we assume that the eldest son and eldest daughter are ordinarily married before their younger siblings, the terms D1 and S1 might be tagged on them as epithets, and the younger sibling would simply employ the term used by his father. This inverse teknonymy also appears in the grandparent terms (supra). In any event, we can be sure that these terms (mag-bo, ma-mo ~ ya-mǎng) were originally affinal, in view of their connection with the Tibeto-Burman root *mag S1. The corresponding terms, ying-nǎ and yi-go, however, may originally have been consanguineal; cf. Tsangla ying, Lepcha yeng ySb.

Dunbar describes exogamous septs among the Abor and Galongs (a division of the Abor), and similar descriptions are given by Allen, Cumming (in Lloyd), and Baraloi (in Lloyd). Allen states that the exogamous group consists of "persons who claim descent from a common ancestor in the male line" (p. 139). The Miri term for this patrilineal group is perhaps o-puin, defined by Lorrain as "clan, tribe, species, kind, sort, relation, fellow tribesman or clansman, descendants", apparently derived from o "child" and puin "to agree, to arrange (used of large number of people" (cf. Tib. p'a-spun, Lepcha pun-so ~ p-tso). Dunbar gives an interesting piece of information in this connection,

601 namely that the prefix used in the father's personal name is retained in the son's name, e.g. Ma-du is the son of Ma-lut, Du-ten is the son of Du-gong, whereas the women's names all have the prefix ya- (among the Minyong, a division of the Abor); the prefix ya- used in this manner is comparable with the first element of ya-mang Dl.

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197 The Dafla language is spoken west of the Miri, in the area between the Subansiri and Borheli rivers. It exists in two main dialects, viz. a western (Yano) and an eastern (Tagen), both recorded by Hamilton and Bor, and the former
601 also by Robinson. Dafla stands so close to Abor-Miri that its kinship terminology should be of especial interest, yet the recording has been so poor and the variation in forms is so great that little of value can be extracted from it. An examination of the tables in McSwiney, for Dafla, Miri, Kachin, and other languages, has shown that this source is untrustworthy. The terminological equations given there (without the terms) offer occasional clues, but these clues must be checked from other sources.

The Yano Dafla consanguineal terms are listed below (the affinal are too poorly known to repay listing):

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Miri ARll
Dafla

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Dafla Consanguineal Terms

(a-)yo gM	(a-)to gF
(a-)nĕ M	(a-)bo F
	(a-)bong FoB
hmoi MSi	tĕ-tĕ FyB
(a-)ma FSi	kĕi MB
	(a-)bong oB
(a-)mĕ oSi,FBD(os)	tĕ-tĕ oB,FBS(os)
bŏr-mĕ ySi,FBD(ys)	bŏr-o yB,FBS(ys)
(a-)mo MSiD	hen-yeng MSiS
mao xCi	yao xCe
nyĕ-mĕ kao D	ngĕ-ga kao S

Notes:

The forms given above have been normalized, e.g. the secondary doubling of consonants has been disregarded (a-ma for am-ma, tĕ-tĕ for tĕt-tĕ). Bor often makes imaginary distinctions and frequently cites a single term under two or more forms; thus, ayo FM but aio ~M (for a-yo gM), abong FoB but abung ~ abŏng oB.

The tendency to equate parents' siblings with Ego's siblings is a distinctive Dafla feature. Thus, tĕ-tĕ FyB (Bor), oB (Robinson), and a-bong FoB,oB, connected with Abor bui-buing oB. Robinson cites a-ma (rather than a-mĕ) oSi, a-bo a-ma FSi, a-nĕ a-ma MSi, i.e. purely descriptive terms. Robinson further gives pai FB (Abor pai FyB), and nĕ-ta MB (apparently nĕ M plus the augmentative suffix -ta).

601 The latter is comparable with Tagen (Eastern Dafla) a-ta FSi, and the form at-tĕ FSi cited in Bor (p. 46). Tagen also has p'ĕ-di FoB, p'ai-lyo FyB. Miri a-nyi FSi is unrepresented in Dafla, but Miri a-kū MB is matched by Yano kūi, Tagen ak-kŏ.

The Dafla sibling and cousin terminology differs considerably from that found in Abor-Miri. The element bŏr (Miri buir) is restricted to the ySb terms, separate terms are used for oSi and oB, and neuter terms are lacking. The sibling terms are applied only to the parallel cousins on the paternal side (FBD, FBS), distinct terms are used for the corresponding maternal cousins (MSiD, MSiS), and age distinctions are not made in the xC terms. The Dafla nephew and grandson terms are not known.

Most of the lexical elements that appear in these terms cannot be identified with any certainty. The term kao Ch combines both the *ka and *a (o) roots; the Tagen dialect has simply ko (Bor), ka (Hamilton). The xC terms yao and mao also seem to contain the element o Ch; cf. Tagen ko nya-ga FSiS, ko nyŏm' FSiD (but Tagen equates cross and parallel cousins in the terms nyŏb-bĕ MBS, MSiS, nyĕn-nĕ ~ nyĕn-ni MBD, MSiD). Dafla ang-a Ch (Robinson) appears to be connected with Miri ăng-ă ySb.

Only a few affinal terms are known. Dafla a-yo (aio) Ml, MBW (= gH) shows that teknonymy is in force here as in Abor-Miri (according to the tables in McSwiney, Fl = gF). Tagen also equates Ml and gM (ai), but classifies MBW with

Mr 601 FBW (nyĕ-xĕ). Zemo has nyĕ-tĕ FBW (cf. tĕ-tĕ), and ma-cung FBiH, MBiH (cf. a-ma FBi, and the diminutive suffix -cung). Tagen ma-be FBiH, ma-pa MBiH, are similarly based on (a-)ma. Dafla nyĕ-lo H (Tagen nyo-lĕ) is perhaps directly cognate with Miri ñil-bong, Abor ni-long, but nyĕ-fung (Tagen nyi-xĕ) is new. The Dafla terms for Sil, Sl and Dl, Sl have not been recorded.

The significance of those deviations from the Abor-Miri terminology shown by Dafla cannot be gauged, inasmuch as we know almost nothing of Dafla marriage regulations and clan organization. Newill (in Lloyd) reports (p. xi) that they are "hardly divided into clans but certain sections are given a general name", also "They are divided into many exogamous groups called nyobu" (Bor cites nyĕ-bu "clan").

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Ms 101] 197 601 The so-called Mishmi tribes inhabit the country north of the Brahmaputra and east of the Dibang, extending eastwards around the great bend of the Brahmaputra and thus coming into contact with the Kachin and Nung of Upper Burma. The tribes variously called Digaru, Chulikata, Midu, Medu, constitute a single linguistic unit (Digaro), while the Miju (M'ju) make up an entirely distinct linguistic unit (Miju). As indicated by the general application of a single name, Mishmi, these several tribes appear to have undergone considerable ethnic fusion, without, however, a loss of linguistic distinction. Our scant information is derived

Mishmi AR12

197 from the works of Needham (s. a.) and Robinson, the LSI
601 having supplied no original material. We shall tabulate only the consanguineal terms of Digaro (the Taying rather than the Chulikata dialect).

601

Digaro Consanguineal Terms

(na-)iya	gM	(na-)ta	gF
(na-)ma	M, MSi	(na-)ba	F
		(na-)da	FB
		(na-)ku	MB
(na-)bi	oSi	(na-)pu	oB
na-t'ie	ySi	pa-mro	yB
mi-ya a	D	na-wa a.	S

Notes:

The prefix na- that appears in many of the above terms stands for na "thy". Note that Digaro, which has retained final -a, shows some of the Abor-Miri terms in their pristine forms; thus, (na-)iya (=ya) gM, Abor-Miri a-yo; (na-)ta gF, Abor-Miri a-to; (na-)ba F, Abor-Miri a-bu < a-bo, Dafla a-bo; a Th, Abor-Miri o. The sibling terms are all distinct; except for (na-)pu oB, Tib. p'u-bo (cf. the unaspirated initial of na-ku MB), they are of uncertain origin. Digaro mi-ya "woman" (mi-ya a "daughter, girl", ha-mi-ya ~ ha-mya "wife") seems to be identical with Rai me-ya, Burmese ma-ya3 "wife", while ma-wa ~ mo-wa "male" (ma-wa a S, ha-ma-wa H) contains an element -wa that appears

601 also in Kachin (infra). The Tibeto-Burman root *la "male", which plays an important role in the languages to the south, appears in Digaro only in connection with "fowl" (inteo tala "cock").

Our gleanings from Miju are even more meagre. A curious -ai vocalization appears in (ka-)pai F, (k-)mai "woman" (ka-k-mai "wife", sa-mai "daughter"), (ka-)ro-wai "husband" (ro-wai "male"); cf. lai "moon", and the short vowels in Burmese b'aʔ F, maʔ "female", laʔ "moon". The Tibeto-Burman root *mu "mother" appears here for the first time (Robinson mu-mu, Needham nau̯, with secondary nasalization after the nasal initial). We also find sa S (mai-sa D), probably from Tibeto-Burman *za rather than *ts'a. The masculine suffix, nga-long, is connected with a root *lang "male" found also in Nung (infra), and compare the Lepcha suffix -long, as in tyang-mo long "male elephant" (Lepcha long < *lang).

A brief note on the clan organization of the Mishmi tribes has been contributed by O'Callaghan (in Lloyd). The following item refers to the Chulikata and Bebejiya (Digaro group):

> They are divided into septs or families rather than clans. They are numerically small tribes and endogamous. When the septs were smaller, they had to marry out; now men take wives of the same sept if they are only distantly related. (p. xii)

Of the Taroan and Miji (Miju group), the same authority writes:

> These tribes are divided into endogamous groups and exogamous septs or families. (p. xiii)

Miri ARII
AKa

[101]
197

The Aka (Hrusso) are a hill people living in the angle formed by Assam and Bhutan, between the latter country and the Dafla Hills. They are thus the westernmost of the northern Assam tribes. Their language, which has suffered extreme phonetic change, has been most inadequately recorded by Anderson and Hesselmeyer, and a little original material is found in the LSI. Only the consanguineal terms have been sufficiently well recorded to be tabulated.

601

Aka Consanguineal Terms

(a-)ni	M	au	F
(a-)ma	oSi	(a-)lu	oB
nu-mi	ySi	nu	yB
sa-mi	D	sau	S
		sau-dau	gS

Notes:

The termination -au has been derived from a-wa; thus, au < *a-wa F, sau < *sa-wa S, sau-dau < *sa-wa-da-wa gS. The term sa-mi (also sam) D is directly comparable with Nung za-mi, Burmese sa-mi3. The combined terms muhu-sa S (muhu "male"), mimi-sa D (mi-mi "woman") are also in use, while anga-sa Ch contains an element comparable with Dafla ang-a Ch, Miri ʼng-ʼ ySb. Anderson (text, p. 18) cites the curious term ma-p'u-za mim-da "boys and girls"; for -da, cf. sau-dau (written seudeu) "grandchild". The affiliations

Kachari AR6
Miri AR11
Dhimal

M
601

of (a-)ni N and (a-)mu oSi are uncertain. The terms nu yB, nu-mi ySi, exactly parallel Tib. nu and nu-mo.

Our ethnographic information on the Aka is correspondingly meagre. Nevill's description (in Lloyd) is not very clear:

> There are strictly neither exogamous or endogamous divisions, but social grades exist and one sub-clan will not marry, into another lower (socially) clan or sub-clan; an equal clan or a different tribe, e.g. Miri, will be chosen. (p. x)

It is greatly to be regretted that we lack adequate material on the marriage regulations of these northern Assam peoples, who are both geographically and linguistically intermediate between the peoples of Tibet and the sub-Himalayas and those of Assam and Burma.

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K
197

Dhimal, spoken in the Darjeeling Terai, is known only from the record made by Hodgson almost a century ago. It is a small independent linguistic unit of much the same type as the languages which have just been examined. Toto, which is spoken to the south in the Baxa subdivion of Jalpaiguri (Assam), is an outlying member of the Dhimal stock. Dhimal has been strongly influenced by the neighboring Koch (Indic) language, from which it has borrowed about half its kinship terms. These loan-words are underlined in the table below.

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Dhimal

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Dhimal Consanguineal Terms

ajei gM		aju gF	
(a-)ma M		(a-)ba F	
mauǰi MSi		jet'a / dado	FB
pisai FSi		nanu MB	
ri-ma Si		yo-la B	
	dai C		
cam-di D		can S	
		nati gS	
bhatij BD		bhatija BS	
		bhagina SiS	

Dhimal Affinal Terms

		ju-wa Fl	
		piǰa FSiH	
be W		ke H	
sali Sil		sala Bl	
		hma-wa Sl	

601 Notes:

Unlike some of the terminologies previously examined, that of Dhimal shows an equal distribution of loan-words in the masculine and feminine terms. All the parents' siblings terms have been borrowed. Although defined by Hodgson simply as "uncle", the terms jet'a and dado undoubtedly stand for jet'o FoB (Koch) and dadai FyB

Kachari AR6
Dhimal

601 (Assamese). Mamu MB is based on Koch mama, with a shift from -a to -u that is reminiscent of that found in Byangai kaku FyB (supra), perhaps through analogy with babu F (Indic). Ri-ma Si can be compared with Tib. sring-mo Si(ms), the final -ng having perhaps been absorbed in the nasal suffix. Toto has ing Si, perhaps from hring < sring, and a-pu oB (Tib. p'u-bo), e⁷ yB. Dhimal can S represents a morphological development from Tibeto-Burman *ts'a (cf. Tib. ts'an); Toto has ca-ɔ̃ ~ ca-ca S, cai-me⁷ D.

The affinal terms ju-wa Fl and hma-wa Sl contain the Tibeto-Burman root *wa "male" (cf. Digaro), which appears also in wa-jan "boy (jan=can), wa-val "man". The term be W similarly appears in be-jan "girl", be-val "woman", but be H cannot be analyzed. Dhimal hma-wa Sl must be regarded as directly cognate with Tib. mag-pa, though the initial unvoiced consonant (hm-) indicates an original *smag rather than *mag (cf. Lepcha myok < *smag). The loss of the final velar stop is regular for Dhimal; cf. Dhimal mi, Toto mi(-cui) "eye", Tib. mig; Dhimal tu(-long), Toto ṭu "6", Tib. drug; Dhimal pa(-ya) "hog", Tib. p'ag.

Risley describes the Dhimal as having four exogamous septs, and as reckoning prohibitive degrees of marriage down to seven generations on the paternal side and three on the maternal side. A statement found in Hodgson, however, does not thus preclude the possibility of cousin marriage.

> Neither Bodo nor Dhimal can marry beyond the limits of his own people.....Within those limits only two or three of the closest natural ties are deemed a bar to marriage. (p. 159)

Miri AR11
Mishmi AR12
Kachari AR6

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1 [For abbreviations, see this source in cat. 113, All Southeast Asia All-Analyst]

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Mishmi ARI2
Kachari ARG

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7. Kachin (with a note on Kadu)

197 Kachin may conveniently be regarded as the 'hub' of the
[101] Tibeto-Burman linguistic 'wheel'. It is the dominant language of northern Burma, and thus is so placed as to have connections with the northern Assam languages on the west, the Konyak and Barish languages on the southwest, Nung on the north, and the Burmese-Lolo languages on the east and south. Lexically it is perhaps the most valuable single language of the family, since it has retained a large proportion of Tibeto-Burman roots. Its nearest relatives are Nung and Burmese, with which it combines to form the Burmic division of Tibeto-Burman, but it also has numerous points of resemblance with Konyak and Barish, as well as with Mikir, Meithei, and Kuki-Chin. It is rather well preserved phonetically, with the exception of a tendency to unvoice initial sonants and to drop final velars (-k, -ng). Like the Kuki-Chin languages, and in contrast to most of the groups previously considered, it has a set of final
[193] diphthongs: -ai, -oi, -au. Kachin morphology is especially rich, and the system of prefixes is the fullest to be found in the family. Curiously enough, the final dental morphology which we have seen in operation elsewhere does not appear in Kachin kinship terms, though it appears in other elements of the language, e.g. ka "to eat", kat "boiled rice, food"; pa-si "a comb, rake", ma-sit "to comb, rake; a rake"; ma-ni "to laugh", ma-nit "to laugh at".

197 The standard Kachin dialect is described in the dictionaries by Hanson and Hertz, while Cushing's account is based on the slightly different Hkauri dialect (east of Bhamo). The dialect spoken in upper Assam, which forms the basis for Needham's work, differs considerably from the standard dialect, but these differences scarcely affect the terms under consideration. A convenient, but incomplete, list of terms is found in Hanson's ethnography (1913), and three other lists, equally incomplete, are given by [illegible] (pp. xlvii-iii, lviii, and lxxiii). The list on p. [illegible], of the Lahkawng dialect spoken in the Northern Shan States, contains so many misprints and questionable forms that it cannot be utilized.

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Kachin Consanguineal Terms

woi-ke FFM

woi-ke-dwi MFM

woi-k'ai FM

woi-dwi MM

nu M

nu-tung MoSi

nu-doi MyBi

noi FSi

na oSi,pC

jan Si(ms)

ning xCi(ws)

k'ri FSiD(ms),SiCh(ms)

rat MBD(oms)

nam MBD(yms),BCh(ws)

ji-ke FFF

ji-ke-dwi MFF

ji-k'ai FF

ji-dwi MF

wa F

wa-di FoB

wa-doi FyB

ts'a MB,MBS(ws)

p'u oB,pC

nam ySb,pC

yung B(ws)

k'au xCe(ms)

ǰa Ch,pN

ǰu gCh

ǰu na-ǰi ggCh

ǰu na-ǰa gggCh

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Kachin Affinal Terms

mi WM,MBW,WBW

moi HM

mu-tung FoBW

mu-doi FyBW

ning HSi,BW(ws)

na HoBW

nan WySiH,HyBW

rat WoSi,ySiH(ws),oBW(ms),HyB

ǰa HBCh,WSiCh

nam DI, WySi,yBW(ms),WBCh

ku HF,FSiH,HoB,oSiH(ws)

ts'a WF,BWB(ws)

wa-di MoSiH

wa-doi MySiH

k'au WB,SiH(ms)

p'u WoSiH,oSiH(ws)

k'ri SI,HSiCh,FSiHSi

da-ma SI(resp.)

Notes:

The Kachin terms are frequently prefixed with a- (generic), na- ("thy"), or ka- ("his"), and contractions are commonly employed, e.g. n-doi for nu-doi MySi, and di, doi, and tung, for wa-di, wa-doi, and mu-tung, respectively.

The primary gP terms are woi gM (cf. Gyarung ka-woi "old"), and ji gF (also "ancestral spirit"). The categorical terms ko, k'ai, and dwi cannot be interpreted with any degree of certainty; k'ai also appears in k'ai-dwi WM (resp.) and k'ai-tung "aunt" (= mu-tung), and can be compared with k'ai "to plant, as seed; to bear children or young". This distinction between the paternal and maternal lines in the grandparent terms is an outstanding Kachin feature.

601 Of the three categorical terms di, doi, and tung, only the last remains unidentified. For di, cf. Lepcha ti(-m) " great, large", a-bo tim-bo FoB, and for doi cf. Burmese t'we³ used in exactly the same manner as the Kachin term (pt. 9). The element doi also appears in ga-doi "the last born child in a family". An especial categorical term, dim, is used in wa-dim "father's youngest brother" and nu-dim "mother's youngest sister", also in p'ung-dim "the last born child" (p'ung "a gathering"). One is tempted to compare Lepcha di(-m) "to be small" (e.g. a-kup di "little children"), but final -m is not a Kachin morphological element.

The cross FSb terms, viz. moi FSi and te'a MB, are distinct from anything previously encountered, and indeed cannot be matched in the whole range of Tibeto-Burman terminologies. The standard TB roots are found only in the affinal terminology (infra), and our problem therefore is to identify the antecedents of these terms. Te'a phonetically in every way conforms with Tib. te'a Ne,gS, but in Kachin this term is used only for MB,MBS(ws). A possible line of development is suggested below in the discussion of collateral terms. Moi cannot definitely be identified with any term elsewhere in Tibeto-Burman.

The regular Sb terms, which are extended to include pC, have been developed from the widespread TB roots *ma oSi, *p'u oB, and *nau ySb. The form nau ySb is original, as compared with Tib. mu ~ mo; Tibetan and most of the languages

601 to the north lack final -au and have substituted either -o or -u, but the diphthong is preserved in many of the Burma and Assam languages. Note Kachin p'u-wa (or p'ǔ-wa) "to be related", paralleling Tib. p'a-spun ("lineage") but with the elements reversed.

The cross terms yung and jan, which match Tib. ming-po and sring-mo, are new elements. According to Hanson, jan is generally applied to yŠi; cf. the use of sring-mo for yŠi in the Dānjongkā and Nyamskad dialects of Tibetan. It is also a respectful term for a grown or married woman, and is used in phrases such as ma-nang jan "a female companion" (ma-nang "companion"), n-ja jan "a sweet-heart" (n-ja "affectionate"), ma-du jan (also jan) "wife". Kachin, which regularly substitutes final -n for -r, has developed this term from a root *jar (Kuki *zar ~ *dzar); cf. ǎa-gan "star", Tib. skar-ma; pan "flower", Tib. 'bar-ba "to open, begin to bloom", Barish *bar "flower"; ngun "to growl, grumble", Tib. ngur-ba "to grunt". The term yung B(wa), which is found only in Hanson's dictionary, appears to be seldom used. The best outside comparison is furnished by the Barish root *yung (pt. 11).

Kachin ǎa Ch, from TB *za, shows the characteristic Kachin unvoicing of the initial; cf. Kachin ǎa "to eat", Tib. za-ba. A sex distinction is effected with the aid of the affixes ǎa-yi ~ ǎa-wi "female" (but yi ~ wi is the feminine suffix used only of animals) and ǎa-dang (perhaps

601 from dang "to be able"), viz. ǎa-yi ǎa D, ǎa-dang ǎa S. Kachin also employs the terms num-ǎa ma "girl", la-ǎa "boy", with the regular sex-affixes num (fem.) and la (masc.). The element ma stands for mang ~ ma Ch, used in a generic sense, with the additional meanings "servant, personal attendant; the inhabitants of a village, or members of a family; young and inexperienced people in general"; cf. Tib. dmangs "the common people, multitude", mang-po "much, many".

ǎu gCh marks the first appearance of a root which is rather well represented in the languages of Burma and Assam. ǎu ma-ǎi ggCh and ǎu ma-ǎa gggCh are of the alliterative couplet type so favored by the Kachin. For the former, however, cf. Chang (pt. 10) ǎi gCh, also Kachin ai ~ a-ai "fruit" and Dimasa (pt. 11) bu-mu-t'ai gCh (ba-t'ai "fruit").

The most distinctive features of Kachin appear in the collateral and affinal terminologies. The new terms, most of which have cognates elsewhere are: ni WM,MBW,WBW, TB *ni ~ *ne FBi; ku HF,FSiH,HoB,oSiH(ws), TB *k'u ~ *ku MB; ning xCi(ws),Sil(ws), Chang (pt. 10) nyǎng < *ning xCi, Sil(ws); k'au xCe(ms),Bl(ms); nam Dl,WySi,yBW(ms),WBCh,MBD(yms), BCh(ws), TB *nam ~ *anam Dl; k'ri Sl,HSiCh,FSiHSi,FSiD(ms), SiCh(ms), Burmese k'rwe-ma' < *k'rwi-ma' Dl (with feminine suffix -ma'); rat oSil(ms),ySl(ws). Of the above terms only k'au and rat (cf. dǎ-rat "commoner") cannot be placed in relation to other TB terminologies.

601 The two sets of Pl terms are the natural result of the Kachin unilateral cross-cousin marriage (SiS-BD, i.e. a man marries his MBD, a woman her FSiS). To account for the terms ni and ku, however, which originally must have meant FSi and MB, respectively, we must assume that both types of cross-cousin marriage were permitted, so that ni was used for WM, HM as well as for FSi, MBH, and ku for WF, HF as well as for MB, FSiH. K'ri SiCh(ms), Sl, and nam BCh(ws), Dl also reflect the practice of SiS-BD marriage.

The collateral terms show serial equations of the type found in the so-called 'Omaha' system, viz. ts'a MB, MBS(ws), k'ri FSiD(ms), SiCh(ms). Thus ts'a and k'ri are the terms applied to the non-marriageable cross-cousins (ds), and both are defined by Hanson as "respectful appellations" used between these cross-cousins. The corresponding terms for cross-cousins (ss) are ning (ws) and k'au (ms), which through cross-cousin marriage are also applied to Sil(ws) and Sl(ms), respectively. The terms used for marriageable cross-cousins are uncertain, and those used by a woman have not been recorded at all (the key definition of ts'a as MBS(ws) is given only in Hertz, who does not cite the FSiS term). The terms cited by Webb (p. xlvii), viz. rat and nam, are simply the terms for WoSi and WySi, respectively. Note, however, ku HoB = HF, contrasting with nam WySi = Dl. The same contrast is carried through in the reciprocal term rat oSil(ms), ySl(ws).

601 As shown above, k'ri is properly the man's term for Sl, in view of the equation with SiCh(ns). Theoretically, therefore, da-ma Sl, the respectful term, should be the woman's term, and in fact da-ma is used primarily in the phrase da-ma ni (ni is plural suffix) "husband's family or clan" (also da-ma da-ni, probably alliterative). In this usage it is contrasted with ma-yu ni " wife's family or clan" (cf. yu "ordinary, common", yu ma-ya "the common people"). The last element of da-ma Sl can be compared with TB ~mag ~ ~smag, since Kachin drops the final velar stop; cf. myi "eye", Tib. mig; wa "pig", Tib. p'ag; la "hand", Tib. lag-pa.

The Kachin terminology outlined above presents several complex problems that can best be viewed in retrospect (pt. 17). The appearance of 'Omaha' features in the cousin terminology, and the apparent connection of one of the terms in question (ts'a) with a root denoting Ne,go elsewhere, are especially worthy of attention and shall be discussed below. The nature of the correlation with marriage regulations etc. can be seen, however, from the following account, based on the descriptions given by Macgregor, Scott, Carrapiett, Hanson, Gilhoder, and Wehrli (the last named is secondary, but includes a good bibliography).

The Kachin are divided into five large sections, viz. Mǎrip, Mǎran, N-hkum, Lǎhpai, and Lǎhtaw. These sections are (theoretically) exogamous only for the ruling families

601 of chieftains (du-wa; cf. Tib. t'u-po "chief"), who as a rule do not intermarry with the families of commoners (dǎ-rat, dǎ-rat dǎ-roi; cf. rat Sbl). The commoners are organized into a large number of exogamous patrilineal lineages (see the list of 97 lineages in Scott, p. 402), many of which extend across the division lines. The sections are primarily geographical units, while the lineages are primarily exogamous marriage units.

Both the sections and the lineages are arranged in pairs, one member of each pair providing wives for the second, the second providing husbands for the first. The sections are paired as follows: Mǎrip ~ Mǎran, Mǎran ~ N-hkum, N-hkum ~ Lǎhpai, Lǎhpai ~ Lǎhtaw, Lǎhtaw ~ Mǎrip (the first of each pair supplies husbands for the second, i.e. is the da-ma ni of the second, while the second of each pair supplies wives for the first, i.e. is the ma-yu ni of the first). The above regulations, which hold only for the ruling families, have been relaxed, and it is now customary for an additional section to be added to the pair, e.g. a N-hkum man may marry a woman from the Lǎhpai or Mǎrip sections. The lineages have not been described in detail, with the exception of Gilhodes's account of the village of Matan, which has the following three pairs of lineages: Chyamma ~ Latsin, Latsin ~ Kawlu, Kawlu ~ Chyamma. Even these smaller pairings cannot be

601 permanent, however, since Gilhodes notes (p. 364) that, when a first wife has no children, or dies young, or becomes crazy, a man may take a new wife from a different family, which is then added to the number of ma-yu ni.

The system described above is correlated with BiS-BD marriage, i.e. a Mǎrip man may marry the daughter of his mother's brother (a Mǎran) but not the daughter of his father's sister (a Lǎhtaw). It can be seen that a Kachin society must have at least three marriage classes (lineages) in order to be effective. Marriage with MBD is apparently optional rather than compulsory at the present time (cf. the definite statement to this effect in Barta, p. 148), but there are indications that regulations were formerly more severe. According to Hanson (p. 181), even marriage with a woman of the same surname, though irregular, occasionally occurs. Hanson gives the following account:

> All relationship is reckoned from the male side; the woman's identity is lost the moment she unites with her husband and his family. As a rule both a chief and a commoner aim to marry a first cousin, the daughter of the mother's brother. There is from a Kachin point of view no relationship between these children. The mother has come from a family with a different name, and her brothers cannot marry into the family she has become identified with, but must go in a different direction; thus there are no family relations (mǎyu dama) in the way, they are only incidentally (tǎwu lǎhta) connected. But it is not compulsory, and no customs are violated if a wife is sought somewhere else. (p. 181)

Scott gives much the same description:

> A man may not marry a woman of the same surname. It seems to be a general rule that a man should marry a first cousin on the female side, or more precisely the daughter of a mother's brother. He may not, however, marry his father's

601 sister's child, who is regarded as closely related. Blood connection is generally traced through the female.....This rule seems much relaxed among the Southern Kachins, but it is said that farther north, if there is a marriageable first cousin whom a man does not want to marry, he can marry elsewhere only after paying a fine to the injured parents of the damsel. (p. 404)

Gilhodes (p. 363) notes that "il est bon, mais pas obligitaire, que son choix tombe sur l'une d'elles [MBD]". Macgregor seems to place the onus of responsibility on the maternal uncle's shoulders:

A youth should marry his cousin, his mother's niece if possible. Should a cousin not be available, the maternal uncle should arrange for a girl of his class. Should he be unable to procure one, the uncle goes to another family and says, "If you give me a girl for my nephew, I will pay you back in kind when one of your family requires a bride" (p. 23)

The distinction made between k'ri FSiD and ret, nas MBD (probably ms), is directly correlated with the marriage regulations described above. The evidence for brother-sister marriage, in the affinal terminology, is contradicted, however, by Gilhodes' statement that two brothers may not marry two sisters, though both the levirate and sororate are in force. The age distinctions shown in the Sbl terms are likewise not supported by our information on Kachin practices. The seeming incongruencies here would perhaps be dispelled were more complete data on the Kachin available.

The Kachin are normally patrilocal, but a curious exception is pointed out by Gilhodes. When the wife's parents have no son, the son-in-law may live with them, yet he keeps his own name and takes with him some of his domestic nats. This practice is known as da-ma lung (Hanson), lit. "the Da-ma (Sl) ascends".

601 Kachin shows a marked tendency to semanticize some of its kinship terms as verbs. Thus, k'au "to be on friendly, intimate terms", ǰu "to take care of, nurse, tend, as young children", nau "to have younger brothers or sisters", ku "to show reverence, and thus homage and worship", perhaps also p'u "to be of value, worth". This is in keeping with the free formative spirit of the language, and resembles somewhat the phenomenon found in Chinese (cf. Section B).

It is not a little strange that Kachin, which has been heavily influenced by Shan (a Thai language), has made almost no use of Shan kinship terms. The Shan loan-words include luk-k'i Sl, apparently employed only in the phrase luk-k'i k'in (= ma-ma lung, supra), and sau 'son (of a chief)", i.e. "a prince", nang "daughter (of a chief)", i.e. "a princess". Contrast the borrowings made by Lepcha from Tibetan, where the general linguistic situation is comparable with that which obtains here.

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197 [101] Kadu is a little known language spoken in the Katha district of Upper Burma, east of Manipur. Short word-lists have been gathered by Houghton, Grant Brown, and Taylor (in the LSI). Grant Brown established the connection of this group, who call themselves A-sak, with the Sak described by Hodgson, living some 200 miles away in Arakan. Grierson further showed a relationship with Andro and Bengmai, small servile tribes in the valley of Manipur, described by McCulloch

in the middle of the 19th century but perhaps now extinct. These languages, which are clearly of marginal type, constitute the so-called Lui group. Since Lui seems to stand closer to Kachin than to any other group, a discussion of the Kadu terms has been inserted at this point. Most of the terms in the following table have been taken from the list in Webb (p. lxxi), but some of the forms have been corrected from other sources.

Kadu Consanguineal Terms

(a-)t'aung FM,WM	ok-paing FF
	ok-t'aung LF
(a-)me M	(a-)wa F
(a-)si MSi	ok-si FB
na-ton FSi	wan-si MB
(a-)te oSi	(a-)mu oB
san ySi	na-si yB
sa Ch	
yon pxN	
sa-ton gCh	

Kadu Affinal Terms

so-saung M1	po-saung F1
(a-)si FBW	yauk-p's FDiH,YB,WS1H
na-ton MBW	wan-si HS1H
(a-)te HSi,HBW,BW	ok-si WB
naung-saung WSi	pi-kwe SiH
yon WSbCh	lok-kwe S1

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601 Notes:

The native elements are restricted to the following: me, wa, si, te, mu, sa, yon, na-, and -ton (-don). A-wa P agrees with Kachin, but Sak has a-ba, Andro has a-pa, and Sengmai has a-po. A-me (a-mǐ) has perhaps been influenced by Shan mǎ, yet Andro and Sengmai both have a-me, while Sak has a-mu (as in Kachin). A-te oSi can be compared with Dafla te-te oB, but a-mu oB seems to be new. Andro has pa-hu oB, a-na oSi, while Sengmai has a-ni oSb, a loan-word from Shan. A-na can thus be interpreted as the original term for oSi, and a-si as the original term for ʼSi (cf. Hung a-si gǐ). Both terms seem to denote merely "sibling" in combination, but these combined terms are puzzling (wan-si MB perhaps stands for *wa-si). Si appears also in i-si "woman". San ysi can be compared directly with Kachin jan, since Kadu parallels Kachin in the development -r > -n; cf. Kadu, Kachin wan "fire", Tibeto-Burman *war ~ *bar. Andro lu-cǐl, Sengmai cǐl ysi have perhaps been influenced by Meithei cal ysi, yet both languages have final -l for -r, as in wal "fire". Sa Ch is probably from Tibeto-Burman *za rather than *ts'a. The feminine form is sa-ek D, the latter element apparently identical with ek "wife". The root here may be *ik; cf. mek "eye", Tib. mig. The role of -ton (-don) in sa-ton gCh is not clear, and yon pxN seems to be isolated. Some categorical equations appear in the affinal terminology, but most of the key terms have been replaced by loan-words.

Kadu is of little interest apart from the borrowing phenomena it exhibits. Shan has exercised the dominant influence on this language, but at least one Burmese term (yauk-p'a) has been taken over, and even Meithei (in Manipur) may have exerted some influence, as noted above in connection with the term cal ySi. Yauk-p'a stands for Burmese yok-p'a Bl. In taking over Shan terms, Kadu has sometimes prefixed the native prefix a-, has regularly nasalized diphthongal finals, and has often made new combinations. The following borrowings involve only phonetic shifts: a-pi oSb (Sengmai, with a- prefix); pi-kwe SiH (Shan pi-k'we); lok-kwe Sl (Shan luk-k'we; Kachin luk-k'i); me-saung ʼl (Shan mǎ-sǎu); po-saung Fl (Shan pǒ-sǎu). Naung-saung WSi has been formed through analogy with me-saung and po-saung from Shan nong ySb. A-t'aung gW is a development from Shan t'ǎu "old", and ok-t'aung combines this element with Shan ok, used as an appellation for females. Ok is further combined with Shan nai gW in ok-naing FF, and with the native Kadu element si in ok-si FB. It is doubtful whether any of these latter terms would be recognized by a Shan, yet the elements are certainly of Shan origin. For this originality in treatment of loan-words, cf. the Newari remaking of Indic loan-words (pt. 4).

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8. Nung (with a note on Pyu)

197 [101] The Nung tribes inhabit the upper reaches of the Nmai Kha, the great eastern tributary of the Irrawaddy flowing just west of the Burma-China border. Secluded in this inaccessible region, they remained virtually unknown for many years, and were ordinarily referred to under their Chinese name, Lu-tzu (倮子). The recent work by Barnard throws much needed light on their language, and includes a few notes on their customs. The Nung appear to represent the last wave of Burmese peoples moving down the Irrawaddy valley. The language is not of true Burmese type, but is transitional between Kachin and Burmese, with the more basic elements approaching the latter rather than the former.

601 The kinship terminology is not fully given in Barnard, but many of the main features can be established. Barnard has recorded another Nung word-list, which appears in the LSI (No. 277a); this does not entirely agree with his general vocabulary. Other word-lists, of minor importance, appear in Desgodins (1872, 1873), Prince d'Orléans (Nos. 25, 27, 28, 30, on pp. 359-61), and in Peal. Some of the dialects reflected in these lists vary considerably from the standard Rǎwang dialect described by Barnard. The Melam dialect in Desgodins, 1872, is especially aberrant. The forms in the following table are from the Rǎwang dialect.

601

Nung Consanguineal Terms

(a-)si gM	(a-)k'ang gF
(a-)me M	(a-)p'e F
(a-)tsim MSi	(a-)wang FB
(a-)ni FSi	(a-)k'ö MB
	nam a-lat oB
(a-)nam me Si	p'eng a-rem yB

(a-)nam C

pa-du me BD	pa-du p'e BS
(a-)sang me SiD	(a-)sang p'e SiS
{sa-ma sel / za-mi} D	nang-la sel S

p'a-li gCh

Nung Affinal Terms

(a-)hi Ml	(a-)k'ö Fl
(a-)la me Sil	(a-)la p'e Bl
(a-)sang me Dl	(a-)sang p'e Sl

Notes:

Nung has four terms for parents' siblings, as in Tibetan, but only two grandparent terms. The terms a-si, a-k'ang, a-tsim, and a-wang are all new elements, unless a-wang be regarded as cognate with Tib. 'a-bang FSH, MSiH (cf. Nung w'arr "to burn", Tib. 'bar-ba; Nung t'a-wa "bamboo", Tib. spa ~ sba "cane"; Nung wa "pig", Tib. p'ag). Unlike Kachin, Nung has retained a-ni and a-k'ö as

601 consanguineal terms for FSi and MB, respectively; for the development a-k'ŏ < a-k'u, cf. ta-gŏ "9", Tib. dgu; bŏ "snake", Tib. 'bu.

Nung a-si gM can be compared with Balti as-si (= a-si) ggM (in Austen). A-k'ang gF seems to be connected with ang-k'ang "maître" (Desgodins), ang-k'ang p'e "master", ang-k'ang me "mistress" (ang- is a Nung prefix of uncertain function), and compare k'ang "altar, idol".

The terms cited for siblings vary greatly, even in the two sources by Barnard. The term a-nam seems to stand simply for Sb, whence by extension "cousin" (Barnard). The Melam dialect has a-nam pe B, which corresponds to a-nam me Si (Peal a-nam). In the LSI Barnard gives a-lat oB (for nam a-lat), ti-na yB, and a-nang oSi. For ti-na yB, cf. na-go D, Ch (d'Orléans). P'ang a-ram yB is evidently a periphrastic term, from p'ang "below", also "second", and perhaps a-ram "each". The element lat is identical with Kachin lat "to be first-born", a-lat "the first-born".

The terminology for the collateral lines is uncertain. Pa-du and a-sang may both be men's terms. The former is from a root *tu found in Burmese and Kuki, while the latter seems to be identical with a-sang "person" (Kachin ma-šang). A-nam is defined simply as "cousin", hence we cannot be sure whether or not parallel and cross cousins are distinguished.

The element sel is found alone only as a diminutive suffix, while the prefixed form, ang-sel, has the meaning "baby". The semantic associations of the term are puzzling:

601 cf. sil sel "soldier" (sil "enemy"), p'a-la sel "spirit, soul" (p'a-la "demon"), a-sel ang-p'e "husband", a-sel ang-me "wife". The (original) unpalatalized form *kiel is still preserved dialectically, e.g. o-kiel Ch, pu-me kiel ra (d'Orléans), lang kie ra S (Desgodins). Peal cites a-can S, from *cel; cf. san "10", from sel (standard).

Tibeto-Burman *za Ch is represented only by za-mi D (sa-mi in LSI), directly cognate with Burmese sa-mi³.

Nung p'a-li < *ma-li gCh constitutes an important connecting link with Burmese. It is used also in the couplet p'a-li p'a-la "descendant", analogous to Kachin ǰu ma-ǰi, ǰu ma-ǰi ǰu ma-ǰa. Nung regularly has p'a- prefix for the ma- prefix of Kachin and the Kuki languages, hence the reconstruction *ma-li is reasonably secure.

	Kuki	Kachin	Nung
door, mouth	*ma-k'a	ma-k'a	p'ang-k'a
ghost, spirit	-	ma-la	p'a-la
to smell	*ma-nam	ma-nam	p'a-nam

Similar alternations between Nung and Kachin may in some instances involve an original ba- prefix, e.g. Nung p'ung-nga ~ pa-nga "5", Kachin ma-nga; Nung a-ba-li "4", Kachin ma-li.

The Kachin cognate appears to be ma-li "young man", also "father-in-law", as a couplet of ma-yu. ma-yu ma-li, however, is defined as "wife's relatives", i.e. the same as ma-yu ni. The unprefixed form appears in li-ma ~ a-li a-ma

601 "attendant, servant", and in a-li "proper name applied to a chief's male children". The semantic connection between "child" and "servant" is also shown in a-ma ~ a-mang (see pt. 7). A likely etymological connection is that with li "seed"; cf. Miri am-li " seed for sowing" (am "rice"), also employed in the meaning "tribe, clan, breed, species, sort, kind; a relation, fellow tribesman, fellow clansman", Abor a-li " seed; descendants, posterity", and Lepcha li(-m) "to be ripe", a-li "seed, produce" (a-li ǰu t'o "to keep up race", from ǰu t'o "to cherish").

The affinal terminology shows categorical equations indicative of cross-cousin marriage, and the new term a-la. Barnard (Appendix, pp. 114-18) describes marriage with the mother's brother's daughter as the preferred type among the Nung, but no particulars are given.

The only clear examples of Kachin loan-words are ma-yŏ "wife's family" (Kachin ma-yu) and ǰa-wi sel ri " husband's family", from ǰa-wi "woman" (Kachin) and sel (supra) plus the plural suffix ri (the Kachin term da-ma is not used). The terms for H and W are merely the general words for "male" (nang-la) and "female" (sa-ma). A possible Tibetan loan-word is represented by pu-ma ra D (Desgodins), pu-ma ra woman", pu-ma kiel ra D (d'Orléans), formed with the collective plural affix -ra; cf. pu-mo D, in modern Tibetan dialects.

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197 The Pyu were the pre-Burmese people of Burma, identified
[101] by Luce with the P'iao (骠) of the Chinese annals. The most important Pyu archaeological site is Śrī Kṣetra, some five miles southeast of Prome. The Pyu language has been partly deciphered by Blagden with the aid of the quadrilateral inscription in Pyu, Burmese, Mon, and Pali from the Myazedi pagoda at Pagan, dated 1113 by Luce. A series of funeral urn inscriptions have yielded a few more clues, but this material is less reliable than that from the Myazedi inscription. This note on Pyu has been inserted here because Nung seems to have greater affinity for Pyu than do any of the other Tibeto-Burman languages.

601 Only four Pyu kinship terms are known, and two of these may be Burmese loan-words, viz. sa^3 "son" (Burmese sa^3), ma-ya^3 "wife" (Burmese ma-ya^3). The two remaining terms appear in l. 24 of the Pyu inscription, which parallels l. 36 of the Burmese version:

Pyu: gi sa; da gi pli da gi sru:

Burmese: nga sa láng̀ong nga mliy langong ats'uy

Cf. note in Blagden, 1919, p. 42. The symbol : stands for visarga.

Pyu gi = Burmese nga "my". Pyu da = Burmese langong "and, or" (modern Burmese lan̂^{3}-kong^3).

Translation: "my son and (or) my grandson and (or) my relatives".

601 Thus, Pyu sa: stands for Burmese sa3 "son", Pvu pli stands for Burmese mliy (modern mre3) "grandson", and Pyu sru: stands for Burmese ats'uy (modern a-ts'we) "relatives". Pyu agrees with Nung in having p- rather than m- prefix in pli gB (Nung p'a-li); cf. also Pyu pla "4", Nung a-ba-li, Kachin ma-li; Pyu pi-nga "5", Nung p'ung-ngs ~ pa-ngs, Kachin ma-nga. Pyu sru: "relative" is of even greater interest because of its seeming connection with Tib. sru-mo MSi, Kanauri, Chamba Lahuli ru Fl. It has been suggested (pt. 3) that *sru may originally have denoted MSb, thus accounting for the semantic developments represented by Tib. sru-mo MSi, Kanauri ru Fl < MB (identified through cross-cousin marriage). The Pyu term may have denoted "mother's relatives" in general.

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9. Burmese and the Lolo Languages

101 Burmese and the Lolo languages of southwestern China,
197 northern Tonkin and Siam, and the Shan States, constitute one of the largest single blocs in the Tibeto-Burman family (Burmish-Loloish). The center of dispersion for this group seems to have been southwestern China, whence have proceeded successive waves of migration to the south and east. The trail of the Burmese southward down the Irrawaddy valley is today marked by a series of tribes of Burmese stock, viz. Maru, Lashi, Atsi, Achang, Hpön. The Lolo movements southward and eastward have continued down to the present time, even in the face of strongly entrenched Thai populations. The process has been one of infiltration rather than of displacement, since these immigrant Lolo groups almost invariably constitute a depressed economic class under the control of their Chinese or Thai neighbors.

197 Burmese is a literary language of some antiquity (its inscriptions extend back to the 11th century), and hence is of great value in comparative Tibeto-Burman studies. The written forms, especially those in the inscriptions, contain many archaic features not found in Tibetan, but the modern spoken language has undergone extensive phonetic modification. The non-standard dialects, viz. Arakanese, Taungyo, Intha, Danu, and Tavoyan, in general tend to retain older forms. Hpön is transitional to the Maru group (supra), while the latter is again transitional to the Lolo languages. The

197 latter may conveniently be divided into a Southern Lolo division (Phunoi, Akha, Lahu, Woni, Black and White Lolo) and a Northern Lolo division (Lisu, Ahi, Nyi, Lolopho). The so-called "Independent Lolo" tribes of western Szuchuan are linguistically akin to the latter, to judge from what little we know of their speech. The Moso (Nakhi) language of western Yunnan, which is likewise only imperfectly known, must be reckoned an independent unit of Burmish-Loloish.

Our discussion falls naturally under the four headings indicated above, viz. Burmese and its dialects, the Maru group, Southern Lolo, and Northern Lolo. Our sources are in general of mediocre quality, but for Burmese itself we are in a somewhat better position. The standard dictionary by Judson (1911 edition) gives a large number of carefully defined terms, and these can be checked against the convenient tables in Brown (pp. 119-20). Variant spellings and forms are given in other works, e.g. that of Bennett, but Judson's dictionary is the locus classicus. The forms cited below are those of the written language, in the orthography developed by the writer after a detailed study of the Burmese group (Judson does not transliterate the originals in Burmese script, and Brown gives only the modern spoken forms, which would be misleading in the present study). The principal sources for the dialects of Burmese are Taylor, the LSI (by Taylor), Scott, Houghton, Konow, and Tin.

601

Burmese Consanguineal Terms

(a-)p'ɨ-ma³ ggsM
(a-)p'o³-ma³ ggM
(a-)p'wa³ gM
(a-)mi³ / (a-)ma M
mi-kri³ MoSi,FoSW
mɨ-t'we³ MySi,FySW
(a-)ri³ FSi,MSW
ats-ma³ oSi
ɔ́i-ma yBi(ws)
hnats-ma³ yBi(ms)
sa-mi³ D,pNi
tu-ma³ xNi

(a-)p'i³ ggsF
(a-)p'e³ ggF
(a-)p'ui³ gF
(a-)p'a³ / (a-)p'e³ F
p'ɨ-kri³ FoB,MoSiH
p'ɨ-t'we³ FyB,MySiH
u³-ri³ MoB,FoSiH
a³-mang³ MyB,FySiH
ats-kui oB
ɔ́i yB(ms)
(a-)mong yB(ws)
sa³ S,pNe
tu xNe

mre³ gCh
mrats ggCh

Burmese Affinal Terms

yok-k'a-ma³ Pl

mɨ-ya³ W
yok-ma³ SiI(ws)
mɨ-ri³ oSiI(ms)
k'ai-ma³ ySiI(ms)
k'rwe³-ma³ DI

lang H
yok-p'a³ BI(ms)
k'ai³-wi oBI(ws)
mat yBI(ws)
sa-mak SI

601 Notes:

The final glottalized vowels appear in combination as ordinary short vowels, as in a-p'i' ggg̃ but a-p'ĩ-ma' ggg̃. a-ma' "female" but mĩ-ya³ W. The superscript 3 symbol (a³) stands for the heavily stressed falling tone of Burmese, which plays an important role in that language. Surd phonemes in unstressed medial position in Burmese are regularly transformed into sonants, and many of the terms in the above table have been affected in this way through the initial prefixed a-, the effect persisting even when the prefix is dropped. Thus, p'ĩ-kri³ FoB is now pronounced bĩ-gyi³ ~ bĩ-dyi³. This sonantization is even reflected in the written forms, in doublets such as a-p'i³ ~ a-b'i' ggg̃, a-p'a' ~ a-b'a' F. In the above table and in the discussion that follows only the surd initial forms are cited.

The parent and grandparent terms show the typically Burmese development of multiple variant forms, as in re³-re³ ~ ri-ri "obscurely", lya³ "thin" ~ lya' "thin, flimsy", k'a³ "bitter" ~ k'a'-k'a' "bitterish", ln "man" ~ lu' id. (contemptuous). Both a-p'i' ggg̃ and a-p'e³ ggg̃ have been developed from the root represented by Tib. 'a-p'yi gĩ. Burmese -e regularly stands for Tib. -i (TB -i) and Burmese -i regularly stands for Tib. -e (TB -ei); cf. Burmese k'ye³ "to borrow", Tib. skyi-ba; Burmese ne "sun", Tib. nyi-ma; Burmese k'we³ "dog", Tib. k'yi; and Burmese ni³ "near", Tib. nye-ba; mi³ "fire", Tib. me. Burmese a-p'e³ is best regarded as the direct cognate of Tib.

601 ʾa-p'yi (the medial y is secondary), and a-p'iʾ ggF as a secondary form. Note that above gM there are only the corresponding feminine terms (p'ǐ-miʾ is given as an alternative for a-p'ǐ-maʾ). A-p'wa³ gM is connected with p'wa³ "to bear (children)", a root for which no comparisons have been found. A-p'ui gF is from TB *p'u, Burmese final -ui being the normal equivalent of final -u elsewhere; cf. Burmese ngui "to weep", Tib. ngu-ba; Burmese k'rui³ "dove", Kachin k'ru; Burmese pui³ "insect", Tib. ʾbu; Burmese kui³ "9", Tib. dgu, Kachin ja-k'u. For the semantic connection with Tib. p'ú-bo, Kachin p'u oB, cf. Tib. ʾa-bo ~ ʾa-po, Tib. ʾa-ta and Tsangla a-ta, which show a similar equivalence. The latter root appears in the Lolo languages in regular usage, but in Burmese is represented only by t'a³-t'a³ F, said to be used by "male members of the royal family in Mandalay" (see Judson, note 7); cf. Arakanese a-da gM, a-dwa "old woman" (Houghton). Burmese may have a cognate to Rung a-k'ang gF in the element k'ang, found only in combination, viz. k'ang-pwan³ "spouse", k'ang-b'ya "sir madam" (polite), p'ǎ-k'ang F, mǐ-k'ang M.

In addition to a-miʾ and a-me M, Burmese has a-maʾ "female, feminine suffix", which corresponds to a-p'aʾ "father, masculine suffix for birds", and maʾ Si. A fourth term is a-mai M, which in Tavoyan (Mergui) is used to denote oSi (ats-maʾ); mai alone is prefixed to names of women to indicate seniority or respect (cf. a-pai "madam",

601 an address used by husband to wife). The regular term for M, however, is a-mi^{3}, from the Tibeto-Burman root *me "woman". It appears in combinations such as mǐ-p'a^{3} ~ p'ǎ-mi^{3} "parents", mǐ-sa^{3} "mother and son", and in min^{3}-ma^{3} "woman" (nasalized by the following m). In isolated form (mi^{3}), it is used for "daughter", and is prefixed to names of girls and young women to indicate superiority on the part of the speaker (contrast mai). A variant of this term is found in sa-mi^{3} D, also written saw-mi^{3}, the falling tone perhaps having been transferred from sa^{3} S.

The Kachin and Kadu term wa F is represented in Burmese by wa-kri^{3} and wa-kri^{3}-ma^{3}, terms of address (not polite) applied to elderly men and women, respectively (Arakanese dialect). Cf. also wǎ-ri^{3} MB, a variant of u^{3}-ri^{3}.

The terms for MSi and FB are of the periphrastic type that has been so often encountered in this review. mǐ-kri^{3} and p'ǎ-kri^{3} are formed with kri^{3} "big" (cf. Lepcha tǎ-gri "male", Tib. bgre-ba "to grow", and perhaps Kachin k'ri S1). mǐ-t'we^{3} and p'ǎ-t'we^{3} are combined with the element t'we^{3} " to be the youngest", found also in sa^{3}-t'we^{3} "youngest son". These combined terms exactly parallel Kachin nu-doi, wa-doi, and ǎ-doi, and the roots themselves are probably cognate; cf. Burmese krwe "shellfish", Kachin k'oi; Burmese krwe^{3} "a debt", Kachin k'oi "to borrow or lend"; Burmese krwe^{3} "to scream", Kachin ma-groi; Burmese bwe "cowlick", Kachin boi; Burmese twe^{3} ~ t'we^{3} "scarlet" (intensive), Kachin t'oi "to

601 light, shine". mɣ-t'we^3 and p'ɣ-t'we^3 are commonly used in the meanings "step-mother" and "step-father", respectively, thus perhaps producing some of the variations noted below.

The terms for MB and FSi are extremely puzzling, partly because of the difficulty in the linguistic analysis per se. The element ri^3 is conceivably a doublet form of kri^3 "big"; cf. krwap-krwap ~ rwap-rwap ~ krwap-rwap ~ rwap-krwap "violently", krwa^3-rwa^3 "vain, boastful", k'ram-ram "to surround with a fence", k'rum-rum "to cover", but the relationship is doubtful at best. The element u^3 appears to be identical with u^3 "head, beginning" (cf. Classical Tib. dbu, Central Tib. u, id.). As an isolated term it is prefixed to names of men considerably older than the speaker. The element mang^3 is comparable with mang^3 "ruler, governor, official".

The sibling terms present further difficulties of analysis. The terms tabulated above show the arrangement in Brown, with sex of speaker distinguished only for the ySb terms. Ats-ma' is used by speakers of both sexes, as definitely stated by Judson, but Judson cites ats-kui as a man's term. Judson further gives mong-ngai yB(ws) (ngai "small") and mong-kri^3 oB(ws) (kri^3 "big"), and defines mong simply as B(ws), but notes its use as an "appellative for young men, rather respectful". It seems likely, therefore, that ats-kui originally paralleled ats-ma' as a term used by speakers of both sexes, but has come to be regarded as a man's term through the development of mong-kri^3, a woman's term.

601 It is tempting to identify the elements ats- and hnats- (pronounced ʔ-, hnʔ- in modern speech) with ats "unit, one", hnats "two". Burmese final -ats and -ań are substitutes for -ik, -ing, which are lacking in this language; cf. Burmese ts'ats "joint", Tib. ts'igs; Burmese sats "small animal of the tiger genus", Tib. gzig "leopard"; Burmese hmyats "bamboo sprouts", Tib. smyig-ma; and Burmese tsan̋ "to bind", Tib. 'c'ing-ba; Burmese mań "name", Tib. ming; Burmese hrań "long", Tib. ring-ba "long", sring-ba "to extend". Burmese ats- in ats-kui, ats-ma³ can thus readily be identified with Mikir ik oB(ms), yB(ws); the early pronunciation (*ik-kui) appears to have been partly retained in Taungyo, which has ik-kur oB.

The element kui does not appear alone, though it is prefixed to names of "persons older or of higher rank than the speaker, or politely of his equals" (Brown, p. 104). It is thus contrasted with mong, prefixed to names of "persons younger than the speaker or inferior to him in status, also frequently to equals" (ibid.), and tends to parallel u³, prefixed to names of "old men and men of much higher rank than the speaker" (ibid.). We must, indeed, identify this term as the Burmese representative of Tibeto-Burman *k'u MB; the final -ui <-u shift is regular (supra) and the unaspirated initial is paralleled by Kachin ku ~ gu. Some confirmation of this view is offered by the combined term kui-hrang MB (nephew's term).

601 An additional Sb term, apparently obsolescent, is represented by nong oB (cited in Tin, 1915), nong-to oB (royal or divine), used also in the combined term ní-nong "older and younger brothers". The latter usage suggests that it is properly a man's term. The term is used dialectically in Tavoyan and Intha in the form *nong-kri^{3} oB (Tavoyan a-nong gui, Intha nong kuw). Tavoyan further has a-ngt < a-ngai yB (ngai "small"), while Intha has (nga-)mong yB. Taungyo uses mong for Si rather than B, in the terms lă-mo gwi < *lă-mong-kri^{3} oSi and la-mong nga < *la-mong-ngai ySi; lă- is probably a substitute for lu "man (homo)"; cf. Taungyo, Danu lu pă, Tavoyan lu θa ~ lu θa-ngt Ch.

Burmese ní yB(ms), ní-ma' ySi(ws) closely parallel Tib. nu, nu-mo, but are cognate rather with Lepcha nyi, as in nyi-t'i ggCh. They can further be compared with ní "to be even, equal; to be united, clannish".

The Si terms show some dialectical variation. Tavoyan and Intha make use of the term a-mai H (supra), viz. Tavoyan a-mt Si, a-mt gui oSi, a-mt θa ySi, Intha mă kuw oSi. Oddly enough, Judson notes that the Mon, who live in the Tavoyan area, use ats-ma' oSi for "mother". Cf. also Burmese ma' Si (a-ma' "female"), Arakanese ma-ma oSi.

Both Tib. ming-po B(ws) and sring-mo Si(ms) may have cognates in Burmese, though in well disguised form. The former may lie behind Burmese k'ă-man^{3} < *k'ă-ming "father"

601 (honorific), k'ǎ-man³-to "God", k'ǎ-man¹³-lu³-lang "a young unmarried man" (poetic) (for k'ǎ-, vide infra). The latter may explain the puzzling Burmese term (a-)hrang "lord, master", hrang-ma³ "Miss" (used by women to female members of royal family and to wives of officials, also among ordinary people towards wives or other women). Burmese hrang indicates an original *srang rather than *sring, yet a perfect phonetic parallel is furnished by Burmese hrang "to live", Himalayish *sring. We have further support for this derivation in the inscriptions, where both srwang and srwing occur (Seidenstücker). The term is still written a-hsyang when it has reference to a monarch.

We have very little data on the Burmese terminology for collateral kin (entirely neglected by Brown). The terms cited in Judson are formed with the element to "to be related" (used also in terms for "aunt", supra), viz. ní-ats-mǎ-to, hnats-mǎ-to "female cousin", ní-ats-kui-to "male cousin", and mong-to "cousin". It can be inferred that the distinctions in the corresponding sibling terms are also in effect here, e.g. ní-ats-mǎ-to "older or younger female cousin"(ws), hnats-ma³ "younger female cousin"(ms). In view of the N terms (infra) one would expect to find a distinction made between parallel and cross cousins, but the evidence for this is limited to the single term sa-ni³-mrok-sa³ "cousin of a different sex, and having a parent of a different sex from the parent of the other"

601 (fully defined only in Judson's English-Burmese Dict.). The first part of this combined term is sa-mi^3 D, while the second part can be identified with myok-sa^3 (or myok-sa^3-to) "spouse" (medial r and y are interchangeable in most instances). The element mrok may be honorific; cf. mrok "to be raised, elevated" (sa^3= S).

Burmese sa^3 S is from Tibeto-Burman *za, the unvoicing of the initial being a regular Burmese phenomenon. The sonant initials are preserved in the Lolo languages discussed below; cf. Tib. za-ba "to eat", Magari jya, Burmese tsa^3, but Lisu, Nyi dza, Ahi, Lolopho dzo; Magari za "son", Burmese sa^3, but Lisu za ~ ra, Nyi za, Ahi, Lolopho zo (Ahi, Lolopho final -o <-a). The feminine is formed with -mi^3 rather than -ma^3 (mi^3 is used for "D" as well as for "M"), thus paralleling Nung za-mi, Aka sa-mi. The term for xM, tu ~ tu-ma^3, is cognate with Nung pa-du, and may further be connected with tu "to be like, similar" . The combined term is tu-sa^3 "nephews and sons collectively, posterity". Burmese pyui < *pru "young, in the prime of life", s-pyui "young unmarried woman", offers a comparison for Tib. p'rug-gu ~ p'ru-gu "child, young one".

The archaic form of mre^3 gCh is mliy, and the term is thus directly related to Nung p'a-li, Pyu pli, and Kachin ma-li (see the discussion in pt. 8). As suggested above, the basic meaning of the root seems to be "seed". Similarly, mrats ggCh is probably connected with a-mrats "root", yet a

601 comparison can also be made with Sho (Southern Kuki) a-mlek "small, young" (mrats <*mrik or *mlik). The complete terminology for the first seven generations, ascending and descending, is given below:

Ascending	Descending
(a-)p'a^{7} "father"	sa^{3} "son"
(a-)p'ui^{3} "g. father"	mre^{3} "g. son" ["seed"]
(a-)p'e^{3} "g.g. father"	mrats "g.g. son" ["root"]
(a-)p'i^{7} "g.g.g. father"	ti "g.g.g. son"
(a-)p'ang "g.g.g.g. father" ["plant"]	krwat "g.g.g.g. son"
(a-)hnok "g.g.g.g.g. father" ["sprout"]	ts'at "g.g.g.g.g. son"
(a-)tse^{7} "g.g.g.g.g.g. father" ["seed"]	ts'ak "g.g.g.g.g.g. son"

A-tse^{7} "seed", a-hnok "germ, sprout from a seed", a-pang "plant, tree" (note the development of aspiration in the kinship term). Thus, the ggggF is the "plant" developed from the "sprout" (gggggF), in turn developed from the "seed" (ggggggF), just as the ggS is the "root" developed from the "seed" (gS). This botanically oriented terminology is comparable with that found in Lepcha (pt. 5), and can be traced also in myui^{3} "seed, seed grain", a-myui^{3} "race, kind, class", Kachin myu ~ a-myu "race, tribe; relative, kinsman". Burmese ti gggS and krwat ggggS are not so easily identified, though the former is perhaps cognate with Lepcha t'i "to be related". The two remaining terms, however, show

601 interesting connections with Tibetan. For ts'at ggggD, cf. Tib. c'ad-pa " begotten, born, descended from", and for ts'ak ggggS (also "to connect, join, unite by the ends or in continuation"), cf. Tib. c'ags-pa "to be begotten, produced".

The above terms for members of the descending generations are properly neuter rather than masculine (unlike sa^3, which has come to have the specific meaning "son"). A distinction can be drawn, however, between mre^3-yok-kya^3 gS (yok-kya^3 "male") and mre^3-min^3-ma$^?$ gD (min^3-ma$^?$ "female").

The affinal terminology of Burmese is something of an olla podrida of diverse elements. mi-ya^3 "wife", apparently identical with Rai (Kiranti) me-ya, Digaro mi-ya, includes an element -ya^3 which appears elsewhere only in yok-ya^3 (also written yok-kya^3) "male (human)"; it is probably cognate with Tib. ya "one of two things that belong together as being of one kind, or forming a pair", West Tibetan ya-de "associate, companion". If this derivation is correct, it suggests that yok-kya^3 originally meant "husband" rather than "male". The actual term for "husband", viz. lang, is connected with the Tibeto-Burman root *lang "male" (cf. Miju).

Sa-mak Sl is a combined term, in which the Tibeto-Burman root *mag ~ *smag is combined with sa^3 "son". K'rwe^3-ma$^?$ < *k'rwi-ma$^?$ Dl presupposes a term *k'rwi Sl, coinciding with Kachin k'ri Sl. The etymological affinities of this root cannot be traced. Tibeto-Burman *snam Dl is represented by mong-hnam, in the modern language used for "husband" but in

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the earlier language used for "husband and wife" (in Tin, 1915, where it is equated with lang-mŭ-ya^3). Since mong is used for yB(ws), it is possible that hmam was originally the complementary term for yS1(ms); cf. Gyarung snom < *snam S1.

The Sbl terms fall into two classes, viz. those for Sbl(ss) and those for Sbl(ds). Age distinctions appear in the latter class, both in the men's and women's terms. K'ai^3-ui oS1(ws) and k'ai-ma' yS1l(ms) suggest an original reciprocal term *k'ai ~ k'ai^3 to cover this relationship. This root is isolated in Burmese, but can be connected with Maru yauk-kai (for *yauk-k'ai) "male (human)", where yauk is cognate with Burmese yok (vide infra). The element -ui is identical with ui "old", and is found also in p'ui^3-mang^3-ui "familiar term of compellation, used by young men to elderly men". The term mŭ-ri^3 oS1l(ms) shows a partial equation of WoS1 with FS1, while mat yB1(ws), connected with mat ~ a-mat "nobleman", has a generic resemblance with u^3-mang^3 "yB, connected with mang^3 "ruler, governor, official". A-mat is of some purely linguistic interest, since it has been derived from Indic sources (Sk, amātya), yet it has been reinterpreted as a native term with a- prefix. This is the only Burmese kinship term of foreign origin, insofar as the writer is aware; note that it was borrowed as a title, not as a kinship term.

The most prominent elements of the affinal terminology are yok and k'ŭ, which appear in a number of combined terms. Yok is the numerary adjunct for mankind or superior beings,

601 while k'ǎ is related to a similar prefixed element k'a- found in Southern Lolo (infra). The Sbl(ms) terms alternate with longer forms combined with sa-mi^{3} D, viz. sa-mi^{3}-yok-ma$^{\flat}$ Sil(ws) and sa-mi^{3}-yok-p'a$^{\flat}$ Bl(ms). If yok-p'a$^{\flat}$ and yok-ma$^{\flat}$ originally meant Fl and Ml, respectively, their present meanings might have been developed through teknonymy, since, under cross-cousin marriage, a man's daughter's father-in-law becomes his own brother-in-law (WB). The use of a single term (yok-k'ǎ-ma$^{\flat}$) for both Fl and Ml can hardly be regarded as an original trait, even though a secondary distinction can be made (yok-k'ǎ-ma$^{\flat}$-yok-p'a$^{\flat}$ Fl, yok-k'a-mǎ$^{\flat}$-min^{3}-ma$^{\flat}$ Ml). The element k'ǎ also appears in k'ǎ-mi$^{\flat}$ "M of Dl or Sl", and in k'ǎ-mak "F of Dl or Sl", used only in combination with each other.

The only outside comparison that can be suggested for yok is that with Tib. g-yog "servant". Cf. Gyarung zabs-pye "Dl, bride", Tib. zabs-p'yi "servant", and Miri pag-bo "male slave or servant", Tib. bag-po "bridegroom".

Burmese a-ts'we "relative", which appears as early as the Myazedi inscription (ats'uy), is linguistically isolated. It is used in several obsolete terms cited by Tin (1915), viz. ts'we-nan$^{/3}$ "a beloved person", ts'we-mai-nan$^{/3}$ "a beloved man", ts'we-mong-nan$^{/3}$ "a beloved man", and ts'we-san$^{/}$ "wife, husband and wife".

Burmese a-rui^{3}, like the cognate Tib. rus-pa, is used in the meaning "lineage" as well as "bone". Kachin has a-ru

601 hereditary stock", apparently identical with a-ru "root", while n-rut, the direct cognate of Tib. rus-pa, is used only in the literal meaning "bone".

Our information on Burmese marriage regulations and practices is of the cursory sort found in general works like those of Sangermano (the classical early account), Forbes, and Shway Yoe, supplemented by occasional bits from elsewhere. The material that we do have is of little interest. Surnames are not used, and no clan organization has been reported. Marriages are allowed with close blood kin on either side, the only forbidden degrees of relationship (for a man) being those of M, D, Si, A, gM, and gD (listed by Yoe). On the other hand, no especial preference for cousin marriage has been noted.

One outstanding feature of Burmese culture, however, is the custom of matrilocal residence, described as early as ca. 1800 (by Sangermano). The period of matrilocal residence lasts for two or three years (Yoe), or three years (Sangermano), during which time the son-in-law serves his father-in-law (no details are given). If the wife is the only daughter of her parents, the husband may remain with her parents and inherit their property; cf. the Kachin practice called da-ma lung ("the son-in-law ascends"). Furnivall points out that marriage between residents of the same village is the rule, but that there is a "large proportion" of marriages between residents of different villages, and that it is

601 then the "almost if not quite invariable custom" for the man to settle in his wife's village (p. 84).

Cross-cousin marriage has been reported only for the Arakanese, who speak one of the most archaic of Burmese dialects. Risley, who describes them under the name "Magh", reports the existence of three endogamous groups, each divided into a number of septs. The following is said of their marriage regulations:

> They observe the simple rule that a man may not marry a woman of his own sept, supplemented by a table of prohibited degrees, which does not differ materially from that arrived at by the standard formula already referred to [the Hindu formula]. In applying these prohibitions, however, there seems to be some laxity when descent is traced through females, for I am informed that a man may marry the daughters of his father's sister and of his mother's brother, a connexion which would not ordinarily be allowed.

Mills specifies that these endogamous clans are patrilineal, and that a single village, unless big, is usually inhabited by members of one clan only. Mills does not record cross-cousin marriage, and his discussion in this respect is not at all clear:

> A man may marry a woman of his own clan who is not a near blood relation. Marriage outside the clan used to be strictly forbidden and I was told that members of different clans would not even eat together in the old days. Now, however, these restrictions have been greatly relaxed and marriage outside the clan is by no means uncommon. (p. 119)

It is difficult to know how to interpret these Arakanese features, which are not known to occur elsewhere within the Burmese culture proper. Endogamy in particular is out of place in this area, and the commensal restrictions open up the possibility of influence from the Hindu caste system (the Arakanese have been heavily Indianized).

601 The Chaungtha, described in Lewin (pp. 36-62) under the variant name 'Khyoungtha', are of Arakanese stock. To judge from the badly recorded list in Webb, p. lxvii, Chaungtha equates MB with WF,HF in the term a-k'an (Burmese k'ang), and FSi with WM,HM in the term a-ri (Burmese a-ri^{3}), as well as FSiCh,MBCh with Bl(ms) in the term yauk-pa (Burmese yok-p'a^{7}). These categorical equations, which are so distinct from anything in Burmese proper, lend strong support to the evidence for cross-cousin marriage cited above. The term for FBCh and MSiCh, i.e. pC, is nyi (Burmese nyi yB,ms), hence we can be sure that Chaungtha drews a distinction between the parallel and cross collateral lines. Especially noteworthy is the use of a-k'an <*a-k'ang (cf. lan < *lang H) for MB in view of Nung a-k'ang gF, and Kuki (e.g. Lushei) pu gF,MB. Chaungtha also has a distinct term for MSi, viz. a-ywai (Arakanese a-ywe), as well as for oSi, viz. a-mai (Arakanese ma-ma, Burmese ma^{7}). In general, however, Chaungtha shows remarkably few deviations from the standard Burmese pattern, hence the categorical equations outlined above are all the more significant.

The Arakanese and Chaungtha material together tends to link Burmese with the groups previously studied. Some of the features present here appear elsewhere in Burmish-Loloish, as is shown in the following discussion.

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The linguistic bridge between Burmese and the Lolo languages is supplied by the Maru group of languages, spoken in the upper Irrawaddy valley. The Maru proper are found in the Myitkyina and Bhamo districts of Upper Burma, their true home being the valley and watershed of the Nmai Kha, or eastern tributary of the Irrawaddy (south of the Hung), while the closely affiliated Lashi and Atsi are found scattered all along the Burma-China frontier. Hpön is transitional between Burmese and Maru, to judge from what little we know of its two dialects (Megyaw and Samong), spoken by nearly extinct groups living in the defile of the Irrawaddy between Bhamo and Myitkyina. A few kinship terms are cited in our Hpön sources (Scott, Davies, LSI). Noteworthy are Megyaw ma-mo cB, Samong a-mo-ku; Megyaw pi-pi cSi, Samong a-pi-ku; Megyaw a-sa Ch, ni-sa D, i-sa ySb; and Megyaw a-yi ~ a-ye M (Samong a-mi).

Maru, Lashi, and Atsi are closely related languages or perhaps dialects of a single language. All three have been heavily influenced by Kachin, with whom they are often mistakenly grouped (as in Hanson). In Atsi this influence has been felt much more strongly, and hence the Atsi terminology is best examined apart from the Maru-Lashi system. Our material on the Maru group, which includes two dictionaries of Maru (Clerk, Abbey), some word-lists in the works of Scott and Davies, and tables of terms in the census report

197 by Webb, is relatively complete, but the recording is so poor
that linguistic analysis is difficult (the tables in Webb
601 fairly bristle with misprints and other mistakes). The Mayu
terms are tabulated below, while Lashi differences are
treated in the notes.

Mayu Sensational Terms

(a-)p'yit gN	(a-)p'uk gP
(a-)ni N	(a-)p'e P
ne NeSl,FeNW	p'a-ne FeS,NeSlH
t'ang NySl	p'a-lat FyS,NySlH
na FSl	nyi NS
pai eSl,pC	wang eN,pC
nam ysh,pS	mang yS(ma)
uk FNlD(na)	k'an FNlS,NeS
nyi NNS(na)	
ne Ch	
tan xN	
nyit gCh	

Mayu Affical Terms

na WN,HN	nyi WP
uk NNW	vang NF,FSlH
pai WeSl,eNW(ne),NeNW	mang eSlH(ne),NyS,WeSlH
nam ySbl	
yah-ne NeSl	k'an Sl(ne)
tan-ne Sl	uk Sl

601 Notes:

The terms for parents and grandparents agree with those in Burmese, except for a-p'yit gN (Tib. ʾa-p'yi). The Burmese cognate here is a-p'e^3(-mʾ) ggN; cf. Maru k'it ~ cit "foot" Burmese k'ra; Maru pyit "to give", Burmese pe^3; Maru rit "water", Burmese re (Maru -it, also written -ik, probably for -iʾ). This shift is also operative in Maru myit gCh, Burmese mre^3. Similarly, Maru -uʾ (also -ok) stands for Burmese -ui (TB -u), while Lashi has -au(-ou) ~ -uk; cf. Maru p'uk ~ p'ok gF, Lashi p'au, Burmese a-p'ui^3; Maru uk, Lashi ou, Burmese ui^3 "chatty"; Maru k'uk, Lashi k'au, Burmese k'ui^3 "to steal"; Maru nguk ~ ngok, Lashi ngau, Burmese ngui "to weep"; Maru coung-suk, Lashi caung-sauk, Burmese k'yong^3-ts'ui^3 "to cough". A third Maru-Lashi feature is the replacement of final -a by -o (usually written -ɔ); cf. kyo "to hear", Burmese kra^3; tso "to eat", Burmese tsa^3; no "ill", Burmese na; pyo "bee", Burmese pya^3. This correspondence is noted in p'o F, Burmese p'aʾ; so ~ tso (Lashi zo) S, Burmese sa^3. Finally, Maru -au, Lashi -u correspond to Burmese -u; cf. Maru tau, Lashi tu, Burmese tu xNe; Maru au, Lashi u, Burmese u "intestines"; Maru kau, Lashi ku, Burmese ku^3 " to cross"; Maru tau, Lashi tu, Burmese tu^3 "to dig".

The parents' siblings' terms are modelled after those of Burmese, but different elements are involved. Lashi has mye-mo MoSi, mye-t'ang MySi (cf. meye "women"), and p'a-t'ang

601 yu. For Maru t'ong (also t'o), Lashi t'ang, cf. Maru nang ~ no "thou", Lashi nang, Burmese nang³; Maru myong ~ myo "horse", Lashi myang, Burmese mrang³ (Lashi is more archaic in its retention of medial vowels in general). The element mo < *ma can be identified with Burmese a-ma' "female", ma' Si, though here it seems to represent merely an extension of the Tibeto-Burman term for M. The element let ~ le is cognate with Burmese let "to be middling", a-let "middle (as of three sons)", Kachin let "to be first-born", a-let "the first-born", Nung nam a-let oB; on the phonetic side, cf. Maru ts'o "deer", Burmese ts'at; Maru se "to kill", Burmese set; Maru wet ~ we "to wear", Burmese wat. The categorical equations that appear in these terms are similar to those found in Burmese; the apparent lacuna in t'ong MySi is filled by a-let FyBW, corresponding to p'a-let FyB (Clerk cites let MySi).

Maru na FSi,WM and nyi (also ngi, ni) MB,WF appear to present the unusual circumstance of a language's retaining a term in one sense and borrowing it in altered form in another sense. Maru na indicates an original Burmese *ne, as in na "to remain", Burmese ne; na "day" (Davies), Burmese ne', and can thus be directly compared with Kachin ni WM, Tibeto-Burman ne ~ ni FSi. Lashi ning-ne FoSi, ning-t'ang FySi seem to include the same term *ni, with secondary nasalization produced by the nasal initial (final -ing is phonemically anomalous in Lashi). Similarly, the form nyi

601 (MB) scarcely fits into the Maru phonetic pattern, since after initial n- the final -i of Burmese is represented by -e rather than -i; cf. Maru ne "red", Burmese ni; Maru ne "near", Burmese ni^3. We must conclude that the term has been borrowed from Kachin, the semantic link being found in Lashi yuk-ni WM,MBW (Kachin ni means MBW as well as FBi, WM). For MB Lashi uses the affinal term yuk-p'o (infra).

The sibling terms likewise show striking differences from those in Burmese. Nau yBb (also sW-nau "infant", in Clerk), which often appears in the nasalized form naung, can be identified as a Kachin loan-word, since Lashi has ne rather than *nu (see the discussion above), and the same can be said of the term k'au xCe, Lashi k'ou. Pai ~ bai oSi (Lashi pe ~ be) is perhaps connected with Burmese a-pai "madam" (used by husband to wife). The especial term for yB(ws), viz. naung (Lashi mung), exactly agrees with Burmese mong; cf. Maru t'aung "1,000", Burmese t'ong^3; Maru paung "thigh", Burmese pong. Maru mong, Lashi mang oB seems to be identical with the element -mang^3 of Burmese u^3-mang^3 MyB. Lashi has a term for ySi, viz. nam-mo (vide infra).

As noted above, Maru k'au xCe is a Kachin loan-word. The distinctions between parallel and cross cousins, and between FSiD and MBD, are found also in Kachin, hence one must suspect that influences from that language have been at work here. Nyi equates MB with MBD, or, in view of Lashi yuk-ni (supra), MBW with MBD. Another serial equation

601 is found in uk ~ ok FSiD (Webb) but defined in Clerk as "nephew, niece", and Lashi so-ok FSiD(ms),SiGh(ms). The etymology of this term is not apparent, though phonetically it corresponds to Burmese ui ("old"), used in k'ai^3-ui oSi(ms).

The categorical equations found in the affinal terminology sharply sets off the Maru system from the Burmese. The further distinction between nyi WF and vung HF points to Kachin influence, yet note that, unlike Kachin, a single term (Maru na, Lashi ning-mo) covers WM and HM. Maru vung ~ vum HF,FSiH, Lashi vang-mo HF,FoSiH, vang-t'ang FySiH, indicate an original *wang; cf. Maru p'ung "to open", Burmese p'wang^5; Maru dung "hole, pit", Burmese twang^3; for the root thus reconstructed, cf. Nung wang FB.

The material on SbI terms is somewhat confusing and hence a complete description cannot be given. Kachin influence is much in evidence, however, both in loan-words (k'au BI, nau ySbI) and in native terms (pai HoBW = oSi, Kachin na HoBW = oSi). Clerk also cites rat ~ km-rat oSiI, from Kachin rat, id., as shown both by the presence of the non-Maru prefix km- and by the phonetic development (-at < -e in native words, vide supra, but -at retained in loan-words, as in pat "to read", Burmese pat; myat "profit", Burmese mrat; pu̍-ost "womb", Kachin pu̍-jat). Lashi differs from Maru in equating oSiH(ms) with HF (a-vang oSiH, vang-mo HF) rather than with oB (mong ~ mo), yet Lashi does retain mang (Maru mong) in the meaning "HyB".

601 Yuk-mo MoSi is found in Lashi in the general meaning "Sil". Phonetically, this term belongs in the series Maru -auk, Lashi -uk ~ -ok, Burmese -ok; cf. Maru lauk "stone", Lashi luk, Burmese kyok < *k-lok; Maru kyauk "to fear", Lashi kyuk, Burmese krok; Maru ǰauk "to drink", Lashi ǰiuk ~ ǰok, Burmese sok. The term is therefore directly connected with the element yok of Burmese yok-k'ǰ-ma˺ Pl, yok-ma˺ Sil(ws), yok-p'a˺ Bl(ms). The Maru word yuk-mo rather than *yauk-mo must, if correctly recorded, be considered a loan from Lashi. Maru has yauk-kai "male (human)", and yauk-p'o "husband", yauk-p'o ryi "husband's relations" (ryi is plural suffix). In Lashi, however, the corresponding term yuk-p'o is used for MB,WF (= Maru nyi); cf. so-p'o (lit. "son's father"), cited in Abbey both for H and for Fl. We thus have the following series: Burmese yok-p'a˺ Bl(ms), Maru yauk-p'o H, Lashi yuk-p'o MB,WF, all three terms directly cognate. Since *yok is fundamentally an affinal element, the Lashi term yuk-p'o can be regarded as basically referring to WF rather than to MB. The above series can then be restated as follows: Burmese yok-p'a˺ MB, Maru yauk-p'o "brother's WB", Lashi yuk-p'o WF, i.e. affinal male relative through wife. Maru yauk-p'o H is thus to be regarded as secondary, i.e. a woman borrows her brother's term in referring to her own husband.

Maru uk ~ ok and tau parallel Kachin k'ri and nan in showing categorical equations between Sl, Dl and xCi, XN. Lashi so-auk Sl is simply a variant of so-ok FSiD(ms), SiCh(ms).

601 Maru tam-mo Dl is replaced in Lashi by tu-mam, while Lashi also has mam-mo ySi(ms). Kachin mam, on the other hand, denotes Dl, WySi, MBD(ys), but never ySi. We had inferred above, from the use of Burmese -hmam in the combination mong-hmam, that hmam was originally used for ySi(ms), and this view is corroborated by the Lashi evidence.

The Maru-Lashi terminology in general shows marked deviations from the Burmese, both lexically and structurally. A number of Kachin loan-words have been taken over, often with semantic changes, and the equating of consanguineal and affinal relatives is much like that in Kachin. These features appear in exaggerated form in the terminology of the Atsi, a frontier tribo of Maru-Lashi stock who have identified themselves with the Lhupai branch of the Kachin. The Atsi terms, with Kachin loan-words underlined, are given belo

Atsi Consanguineal Terms

(i-)wai gM	(i-)gi gF
(i-)ma M	(i-)ma F
mi-mo MoSi,FoBW	p'a-mo FoB,MoSiH
mi-t'ang MySi,FyBW	p'a-t'ang FyB,MySiH
(i-)mai FSi	(i-)ma MB
(i-)ma oSi,MBD,pC	(i-)mang oB,MBS,pC
ho ySb,MBCh,pC	
ning FSiD	k'an FSiS
na Ch,pN	
tu BCh(ys)	
sa-ou SiCh(ms)	
ka gCh	

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Atsi Affinal Terms

(i-)noi	NN	(i-)na	NY
ou-mo	WN,NBW	(i-)ma	NW,FZiN,MoB,oSiN(ws)
(i-)ning	SiI(ws)	k'an	BI(ms)
	(i-)rni	WoSi,ySiN(ws),oBW(ms),HyB	
tu-mo	DI, WySi,yBW(ms)	sa-ou	SI,NBiCh

Notes:

The concentration of Kachin loan-words in the terminology for relatives older than Ego is immediately apparent from a glance at the above table. These borrowed terms are generally prefixed with i-, yet the native term mang oB also has this prefix, which can thus be regarded as a type of honorific. Similarly, the remaining terms, applied to relatives younger than Ego, are generally prefixed with nga- ("my"), e.g. nga-so Ch, nga-gu (for nga-ko) ySb (but a-ko in Davies), nga-du (for nga-tu) BCh(ws), yet the Kachin loan-word ~~ku~~ gCh also has this prefix. Note also the distinction drawn between i-so oBCh and nga-so yBCh (Webb).

It is of interest that the Maru-Lashi root *mang oB should have been retained while *pai oSi was being replaced by Kachin na. Perhaps mang was felt to have honorific significance; cf. Burmese mang[3] "ruler, governor, official". The retention of native terms for MSi and FB may reflect a behavior pattern of informality towards these relatives.

The grouping of MBCh with parallel cousins appears to be an Atsi innovation, but our material on Atsi is not sufficiently full to appraise the possible significance of this change.

601 The term ko ysb (written gu in Webb) cannot be placed. Sa-ou closely parallels Lashi so-ok, and corresponds to Burmese *ui; cf. Atsi au "pot", Burmese ui^3; Atsi k'au "to steal", Burmese k'ui^3; Atsi ngau "to weep", Burmese ngui; Atsi t'au "to pierce", Burmese t'ui^3; Atsi kau "9", Burmese kui^3 (ou and au are interchangeable). For the relationship between sa-ou Sl and ou-mo WM, MBW, cf. Maru uk Sl, MBW. It would seem that an original reciprocal element *ui is involved here. The retention of the native term for WM rather than substitution by the Kachin term ni can be explained in terms of this connection with sa-ou Sl, a term for a relative younger than Ego.

The root *mi M is retained in (nga-)mi W, while (nga-)lang H agrees with the Maru-Burmese root *lang. Webb cites the teknonymous terms nga-zo yang-nu M ("my-child his-mother") and nga-zo yang-wa F ("my-child his-father").

We have no ethnographic material on the Maru or Lashi, but a brief note on the Atsi appears in Scott (p. 404). Scott describes an arrangement whereby "one family is so to speak general parents-in-law to another family and gives females only to members of the latter family", and adds that there is a "well recognized series of families among which women are regularly given or taken in marriage". It is apparent from the foregoing that the Atsi have marriage regulations of Kachin type. In the case of the Maru and Lashi, however, who have been less strongly influenced by the Kachin, no

601 conclusions can be drawn, despite the categorical equations in their kinship terminology.

Achang (Hotha Shan, Maingtha Shan), spoken in the Möng Hsa valley of the Southern Shan States, is a fourth language of Maru type. A few of its kinship terms have been recorded by Davies, Anderson, and Tayler (in the LSI). Achang is unusual in having preserved the Burmese root ní ysb, in the terms a-nyi yB, a-nyi a-nyo yo ysi (cf. i-nyo "woman, wife"). Be oSi (Davies, in Scott) belongs with Lashi pe, Maru pai, and a-mong B (Anderson) with either *mang or *mong. In contrast to the languages just examined, no Kachin loan-words appear in Achang, spoken south of the Kachin area. Some Shan loan-words may occur, however; note especially tsai oB, Shan pi-sai; sau-ke oSi, Shan s'au "young unmarried woman".

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197 601 [101] The Southern Lolo languages, spoken in the Southern Shan States, Laos, and Tonkin, are phonetically intermediate between Burmese-Maru and the Northern Lolo languages of southwestern China. The best preserved of these languages are Phunoi, in the French Laos, and the closely related Pyen, in Kengtung State, but our knowledge of the kinship terms of these languages is incomplete (Phunoi has been recorded only by Roux, and Pyen only by Stirling, in Scott). Akha (Kaw), which is spoken in the 5th Military District of the Laos and in Kengtung, has been recorded by Roux, Antisdel,

197 Stirling (in Scott), and Taylor (in the LSI), while Stirling
601 has also given us a record of Akö, a dialect of Akha. Lahu, another language of Kengtung State, has been described by Stirling, Davies, Antisdel, and Taylor (in the LSI). Both Akha and Lahu have been phonetically altered to such a degree that analysis is difficult, especially with the meagre material at our disposal. A list of Lahu kinship terms appears in the census report by Webb (p. lxiii), in the columns headed 'Myen' and 'Muhso' (Shan terms for the Lahu), but this material cannot be trusted. The writer has not been able to make use of the recently published Lahu grammar and dictionary by J. H. Telford, but has had the opportunity of discussing Lahu with the author (Harvard, March 17, 1941) and has thus been led to be skeptical of the terms cited in Webb. A group of four Southern Lolo languages spoken in the canton of Tsöng-yên, Haut-Tonkin, have been recorded by Bonifacy, who has added a few ethnographic notes on these tribes (Black Lolo, Man Khoanh, White Lolo, and Ming). Still other Southern Lolo languages, such as the Woni of southern China, are too little known to merit consideration.

601 Of the material mentioned above, only that relating to Lahu approaches completeness. We have indicated, however, that the Lahu data are not reliable, and we have hence refrained from tabulating the Lahu terms. Our remarks must of necessity, therefore, be confined to more general observations.

The Southern Lolo kinship terminologies are on the whole of Burmese type and many of the Burmese-Naru roots are represented, as shown by the following list:

601 gF *p'ui: Akha a-p'o, Lahu a-p'u, Man Khoanh, Black Lolo po, White Lolo pö, and perhaps Phunoi a-hu, Mŭng hŏu (cf. Mŭng ngŏu "to weep", Burmese ngui; Mŭng yŏu "breast", Black and White Lolo yu).

gH *p'i: Phunoi, Akha, Lahu a-p'i, Mŭng p'i, and perhaps Man Khoanh pe. A distinct root is represented by Black and White Lolo te.

F *p'a: Lahu a-p'a, Man Khoanh p'a, White Lolo pa, Black Lolo po, Mŭng pö mŏ̄ (Black Lolo, Mŭng -o < -a in most instances; cf. Black Lolo, Mŭng so "salt", Burmese ts'a; Black Lolo, Mŭng lo "to come", Burmese la; Black Lolo, Mŭng ngo "5", Burmese nga^3). Akha has a-ta ~ a-da F, comparable with Burmese (Mandalay) t'a^3-t'a^3.

H *ma: Akha, Akö a-ma, Man Khoanh, White Lolo ma, Black Lolo mo. Phunoi, Pyen a-ba also belong here, since stops have in some instances been developed from nasals in these languages; cf. Phunoi, Pyen ga "I", Burmese nga; Phunoi da "sick", Burmese na; Phunoi bi "fire", Burmese mi^3. Mŭng bo H may also belong here. Note that in Southern Lolo a-ma rather than a-mi or a-me is employed, with the exception of Lahu, which has both a-me (Burmese a-me or a-mai) and a-ye (cf. Arakanese a-ywe "maternal aunt").

ySb *ni: Akha, Lahu nyi ySb (Lahu also nyi-ma ySi), White Lolo ni ySi (also oSi), Black Lolo ne ySi.

Ch *za, D *za-mi: Akha za Ch, za-mi ~ ya-mi "girl", za-mi a-bu D, za-mi-za ~ ya-mi-ya "woman", mi-za ~ mi-ya W, Lahu ya-pa S, ya-mi ~ za-mi D, Phunoi ya-kat-ya Ch, Pyen

601 ya-plong S, ya-bye D, Ndng sio Ch. This alternation between initial z- and y- has not been observed in other roots, but the material is not abundant. Some of the ya forms are perhaps related rather to the element -ya^3 of Burmese yok-ya^3 "man", mǔ-ya^3 "wife" (Akha mi-sa ~ mi-ya); note especially Akö ya-yu S, ya-mi D, ya-yo "man" (yok-ya^3 reversed), ya-me "woman" (mǔ-ya^3 reversed), but ka-me "wife (Burmese yok-k'ǔ-ma^3 "parents-in-law"). White Lolo z, Man Khoanh a-mi, Black Lolo o, perhaps belong with the same root, but cf. the Abor-Miri root *a Ch.

Other Burmese roots are represented only in a single language. Akha a-kö B (Roux) can be compared with the element -kui of Burmese ats-kui; cf. Akha gö "9", Burmese kui^3; Akha pö " silk", Burmese pui^3 "silk, insect". Burmese mre^3 < *m-li is perhaps represented by Akha (nga-)li S (Stirling), a-li "boy" (Antisdel), and Burmese tu-ma^3 xNi by Akha tu-ma ~ to-ma Si. Pyen bong (< *mong), Phunoi a-mo (< *mong) F appear to be cognate with Burmese a-mong yB. Note that Pyen and Phunoi retain *p'a, the regular root for F, as a suffixed element in the word for "cock", viz. Pyen ya-pa, Phunoi k'ia-p'a (Burmese krak-p'a^3).

Only a few of the parents' siblings' terms are known, and these few are of little value. According to the lists in Webb, Lahu distinguishes between maternal and paternal aunts and uncles, viz. vi pau mo e tari MSi, vi ya FSi; vi pau ho e tari MB, p'au vi-pa FB. Despite this, however, a single term ni vi pa ya (with a- or nga- prefix) is

601 cited for the cousins of all four collateral lines, and (nga-)vi ya mi is cited both for BCh(ms) and BCh(ws), i.e. both parallel and cross nephew.

Lahu vyi(-pa) oB, vyi(-ma) oSi (identical with vi of the above terms), belongs with Man Khoanh, Black and White Lolo vi, Mông bdöi oB, Man Khoanh sa-vi, Mông bidi-a oSi. For the phonetic development, cf. Man Khoanh, White Lolo vi, Black Lolo u-vi, Mông vöi "snake". Note also Phunoi a-ö "uncle", ö "snake". This root cannot be traced in Burmese, unless it be connected with we < *wi "an inelegant term of compellation, masculine or feminine, used by men or women". Another prominent root, perhaps cognate with Achang tsi "wife", is represented by Phunoi a-tsu Si, Pyen a-tsi oSi, Akö a-su oSi. Cf. also Phunoi lu ai B, Pyen a-ai oB, Akö ai-i oB, perhaps a loan-word from Shan ai (applied to eldest son); and Man Khoanh lu yB, ySi, Black Lolo lu ~ lung yB.

The affinal terminology of the Southern Lolo languages is still more obscure than the consanguineal. The Lahu list in Webb is fairly extensive, but untrustworthy. The teknonymous use of a-p'i gM for Ml, and a-p'u gF for Fl, however, has been checked by information received from Telford. Akha (nga-)mi la ma Ml (Stirling) probably stands for (nga-)mi-ya ma, lit. "wife of mother" (Stirling cites la-gu la Ch, with la for za ~ ya). Pyen has yok-pa Fl, agreeing with Lashi yuk-p'o WF rather than with Burmese yok-p'a' WB. The k'ö- prefix of the Burmese affinal terminology is represented here by Phunoi k'ö-ba < *k'ö-ma,

601 Pyen ka-ba < *ka-ma, Akö ka-ma W. This element has a much more generalized usage in Southern Lolo, however; cf. Phunoi ya-kat k'ɤ-p'ai-a "boy", yat-kat k'ɤ-bai-a "girl", Pyen ka-pa-la "man", ka-be-la "woman", Akha (nga-)ka-so-ya H (Stirling), ka-se-ya "man" (Stirling), k'a-je-sa "man" (Antisdel), Man Khoanh sa-pua-k'a, White Lolo sa-ka, Black Lolo sa-ko "boy", Black Lolo ko-pu "male" (ko < *ka). Some of the Sbl terms appear to be identical with consanguineal terms; cf. Phunoi a-tsü Sil, a-tsu Si; Akha a-yö Bl, a-yu oB, a-nyi Sil, yBb.

The above rather heterogeneous array of material serves the purpose of establishing the Burmese affinities of Southern Lolo kinship terminology and of indicating the nature of this link between Burmese and the better known Northern Lolo languages. It is doubtful whether the general problems in connection with Burmish-Loloish terminology as a whole can be solved without some detailed information on these southern members of the group. The ethnographic sources on these tribes (Lunet de Lajonquière, Diguet, Telford, Scott, Bonifacy, Roux) contribute very little toward the filling of these lacunae, since topics such as clan organization and marriage regulations are scrupulously avoided by these authorities. There are no indications of cousin marriage, with the exception of the statement made by Telford to the writer, that the Lahu Shi (one of the two main Lahu divisions, the other being the

601 Lahu Na) sometimes marry their cousins (unspecified) but that the practice is frowned upon. For the Lolo of Tonkin, Bonifacy reports the practice of the levirate (with widow of oB only) and the sororate (a man may marry his wife's sister). Bonifacy also notes that people of the same tinh (Annamite loan-word, ultimately from Chinese 姓 hsing "family name") cannot marry, but offers no details.

The matrilocal custom of the Burmese is found among several of these tribes, sometimes in what appears to be vestigial form. Among the Lahu, the S1 serves his F1 for a period of 1-3 years (Lahu Na) or 7 years (Lahu Shi), according to verbal information received from Telford (cf. also Telford, 1937, p. 96, and Scott, p. 586). The same practice (period of 3 years) formerly obtained among the Phunoi (until ca. 1900), but now the daughter-in-law must serve her husband's parents for one year (Roux, pp. 466,473). The Akha are patrilocal (the couple live in a small house near the groom's parents, vide Telford). After the marriage ceremony, the Akha bride weeps and sings a song telling of her sadness, after which she promises to return after her parent's death to pay the last duties; the bridegroom, furthermore, returns to the home of his bride's parents and presents offerings. In view of the matrilocal customs of their neighbors, it is not hard to look upon these features as transitional elements. Among the Lolo of Tonkin, the couple return to the bride's parents' home for

601 a two-day visit, and the bride returns again alone and remains with her parents until she becomes pregnant (Lunet de Lajonquière, pp. 322 and sq.). This practice is also found among the Tai peoples of Tonkin (ibid.), from whom it may have been borrowed, yet it can well be interpreted along the lines suggested above. Writing of the same Lolo groups, Bonifacy observes that a man may earn his wife by working for his father-in-law and taking the family name (姓 tính) of the latter, or that he may obtain his wife without changing his name, and without paying for her, by supporting his aged parents-in-law.

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197 [101] The Northern Lolo languages fall into several large groups, viz. Lisu, a central bloc (Ahi, Nyi, Lolopho), a southeastern bloc (Chôko, Phupha), an eastern bloc (Ulu, Nasö), and the Independent Lolo dialects of Szuchuan. Of the above languages, Lisu, Ahi, and Nyi are fairly well known and Lolopho is somewhat less fully known, while the remaining languages have been recorded only in fragments. The general linguistic picture, however, is much clearer than in the case of the Southern Lolo languages, e.g. tonal equations have been worked out for Lisu, Ahi, and Nyi (in relation to Burmese). The bulk of the literature on the Lolo is entirely disproportionate to its value, largely because of the failure to recognize the thoroughgoing Burmese affiliations of these peoples. Much of it is

197 occupied with the futile question of the etymology of the name "Lo-lo", and with (largely) sterile discussions of Chinese sources. The most valuable of a number of articles of this type is the scholarly contribution by Feng and Shryock (cited infra).

One of the most useful criteria in distinguishing among these languages is found in the treatment of final -a, which is ordinarily retained in Lisu, Nyi, and Phuphe, is shifted to -o in Ahi, Lolopho, and Chôke (somewhat irregularly here), to -u in the Ulu-Nasû dialects, and is retained or shifted to -ɔ̃, -ɔ in the Independent Lolo group. These correspondences are illustrated by the following table:

	Lisu	Nyi	Phuphe	Ahi	Lolopho	Chôke	Ulu	Ind. Lolo
eat	dza	dza	dza	dzo	dzo	zo	dzu	dzɔ̃
salt	ts'a	ts'a	-	ts'o	ts'o	-	ts'u	tsɔ̃
five	ngua	ngu	ngu	ngo	ngo	ngo	ngu	ngu>

This criterion is not absolute, e.g. the Lisu dialect recorded in Clarke (Appendix II) has -o rather than -a, but is useful as a rule-of-thumb procedure.

60] In the present discussion the Lisu terminology will be analyzed first, followed by the Ahi-Nyi-Lolopho terminology [101] and annotations on the remaining groups. The Lisu (Lisaw) are primarily a Salween valley people, but have colonized extensively throughout most of Yunnan and have penetrated into northern Burma and the Shan States. The primary sources are the works of Fraser and Rose and Brown, but a number of

601 word-lists are available, those in Liétard (1909), Anderson, Davies, Scott, and the LSI (by Taylor) being the most important. Four different lists of kinship terms are given in Webb (pp. xlvii, xlix, lxii, lxiii), each showing many discrepancies, most of which are the result of the bizarre orthographies employed. Some ethnographic material is included in the first two sources and in Scott, and a sketch of the Lisu is given by Guibaut (pp. 316 and sq.).

Lisu Consanguineal Terms

(a-)lǐ-ma ggzN	(a-)lǐ ggzF
(a-)p'i-ma ggN	(a-)p'i ggF
(a-)za gN	(a-)pa gF
(a-)ma N	(a-)ba F
(a-)wo-ma NBi,FBW	(a-)wo FB,MSiH
(a-)nyi[4] FSi,MBW	(a-)vǔ MB,FSiH
(a-)tsi oSi,pC	(a-)yi / ko-ko oB,pC
nyi[3]-ma ySi,pC	nyi[3]-za yB,pC
kua-c'e-ma xCi	kua-c'o xCo
(a-)mi D,pNi	za S,pNe
mǐ-du Ni	za-du Ne,C
ma-ma xNi	za-[illegible] xNe
li-ma gD	li-pa gS
lǐ-ma ggD	lǐ-pa ggS

Lisu Affinal Terms

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ma-ma	M1	ba-ba	F1
sa-mõ	W	sa-gu	H
ma-la	oBW,HoBW	ci-fũ	oSiH(ws),WoSiH
c'i-ma	D1	ma	S1

Notes:

The grandparent terms are those cited in Fraser. Three different arrangements appear in the lists in Webb, viz. a-la gF, a-pye gM (p. xlix); a-p'a FF, a-na FM, a-p'i MF,MM (p. lxiii); a-pa gF, a-ma FM, a-p'o MM (pp. lxii, xlvii). There is thus some evidence for a distinction between maternal and paternal grandparents. A-pa gF belongs in the a-ba F series, other variants of which are a-p'a F, p'a "male suffix for birds", a-pa^{1} "male suffix for animals" (on different tone from a-pa^{3} gF); it thus parallels Miri a-to gF, a-yo gM, developed from roots meaning "F" and "M", respectively. A-p'i ggF is exactly equivalent to Burmese a-p'e^{3} < sa-p'i, but in some dialects, at any rate, it may be applied to gF rather than to ggF (as elsewhere in Lolo). The regular root for gF, as found in Burmese a-p'ui^{3}, is represented only in the phrase a-p'ũ a-pa "ancestors" (Lisu -ũ corresponds to Burmese -ui after initial labials, e.g. p'ũ "price", Burmese a-p'ui; bũ "silk", Burmese pui^{3}; mũ "sky", Burmese mui^{3}); it is perhaps related to p'ũ "price, to be precious" via p'ũ " to honour, esteem, respect" (cf. the remarks on Kachin, pt. 7). Reciprocal terminology

601 As reflected in a-lì ggF, lì-ga ggS, a-za gM, za S (note that in each case the ascending generation is one more removed from Ego than the descending generation).

The Lisu feeling for reciprocity can also be seen in the collective terms pa-la "father and children", ma-la "mother and children", pi-li "grandparent and grandchild" (pi^1-li^5, tonally distinct from $p'i^2$ gF, li^1 gCh), and note also ts'i-za lì-za "posterity, descendants" (ts'i "age"). The element -la appears elsewhere only in la-ts'o "person"; it may be connected with the Tibeto-Burman root *la "male" (Burmese a-la^3), and yields a better etymology than any other for the ethnic term La-la ~ Lo-lo ~ Ln-ln (root *la-la, vide supra), meaning simply "the people" (as Lolopho "a man of the Lolo tribe").

A-nyi FSi, written nye-nye, ni-nye in Webb, is from one standard Tibeto-Burman root (Tib. 'a-ne), but the affinities of a-wo FB and a-vì are not apparent, and the discussion of these terms has been reserved for the following section (on Ahi and Nyi). The MSi terms are uncertain, since Fraser cites a-wo-ma only for FBW, but in Webb we find o-ma MoSi, FoBW, along with zu-so MySi, FyBW (the latter has not been identified). According to Fraser (p. 64), an especial term, viz. a-wo-p'a (p'a is male suffix) is used for father's eldest brother, while the remaining brothers are counted in Chinese fashion, with the aid of Chinese numerals, e.g. a-wo-lye "second uncle", a-wo-se "third uncle", a-wo-si

601 "fourth uncle". Webb cites a-p'a ~ u-p'a (= a-wo-p'a) FoB,MoSiH, a-wo ~ wo-wo FyB,MySiH, and Scott gives wu-p'a "uncle". The reduplication shown by wo-wo FyB is rather characteristic of Lisu; cf. a-ba ~ ba-ba F, a-ma ~ ma-ma H, vi-vi (for a-vü) MB, e'a-e'o (for kua-d'o) xCa, ko-ko oB, ci-ci (for a-tsi) oSi.

Lisu ʷnyi ySb, which is totally differentiated from a-nyi FSi, shows the extension of the Burmese-Akha root into Northern Lolo, while a-yi must be derived from the Southern Lolo root ʷwi oB (Lisu lacks the combination wi, and hence has substituted yi). A-tsi oSi, which often appears in reduplicated form (ci-ci, je-je, si-se, si-ce, ci-ce) resembles a root found in Southern Lolo (e.g. Pyen a-tsi oSi), but seems at least to have been influenced by Chinese chieh-chieh (姐姐) oSi. The parallel term ko-ko oB is unquestionably a Chinese loan-word (哥哥 ko-ko). There is no sure evidence that sex of speaker is distinguished in the sibling terms. The native term a-yi is used in the phrase yi-za nyi-za "relations".

Lisu za S (often written ra ~ la), a-mi D, and li gCh are directly cognate to Burmese za³, mi², and mre³, respectively. Lisu has an alternative term for S, a-hi, which cannot be identified. Paralleling Burmese mre³ < ʷm-li gCh, mrats < ʷm-lik ggCh, Lisu has li gCh, lü < ʷlak ggCh (for -ü < -ak, cf. nyü "bird", Burmese hngak; t'ü "up", Burmese a-t'ak; nü "black", nü "deep", Burmese nak; nyü "eye", Burmese ʷnyak; syü "breath", Burmese a-sak.

601 Our data on the collateral terms of Lisu are so inconsistent and conflicting that no certain conclusions can be reached. Fraser (p. 64) states that cousins on the father's side are called "brothers and sisters", and in his list of terms restricts the terms kwa-o'o and kwa-o'o-ma to cousins on the mother's side. The latter terms, however, are used for FSiCh as well as MBCh, according to the material in Webb, and the siblings terms are extended to include MSiCh as well as FBCh. The element -o'o appears also in o'o-pá "friend, companion, mate", but is otherwise isolated.

Sa-za and za-ma, formed with a za- element found also in Kyi, can definitely be placed as xN terms. As shown in the above table, za S and a-mi D are extended to include pNe and pNi, respectively, yet za-du and mi-du are also employed in this sense as well as for "cousin". Neither term appears in the list in Webb, p. xlvii, yet in the list on p. xlix we find za-du used for BCh(mms),SiCh(mms), WBCh,WSiCh,WSiCh,FBCh,MBCh,MSiCh! Significantly enough, however, in this same list a separate term (a-pa) is employed for FSiCh (a man marries his FSiD, vide infra). Since the cognate Burmese-Maru term ɛtu is applied specifically to xN, it would seem that Lisu has transferred this term to pN or to G while developing a new set of terms (za-za, za-ma) for xN.

As shown by the terms ma-ma zl, ba-ba Fl, consanguineal and affinal kin are commonly equated in Lisu. Fraser (p. 64) makes the following statement:

601 It should also be noted that the Lisu has no term for any relation-in-law, except daughter-in-law (hehi-ma) and elder sister-in-law (ma-la). A daughter-in-law refers to her father and mother, brothers and sisters-in-law as her own father, mother, brothers and sisters respectively. Her own brothers, after her marriage, are referred to as her hpa-mu, and her own sisters as her pe-mu.

This statement is not entirely accurate, inasmuch as at least two other affinal terms are in use (ci-fü, me), in addition to the terms p'a-mu and ne-mu cited in the last sentence. Fraser's definition of the latter two terms is not clear. Webb gives nye-mu yBW(ms), contrasting with ma-la oBW(mwo), apparently the same as Fraser's ne-mu, but p'a-mu does not appear in other sources. The terms seem to be identical with Nyi p'a-mu yB(ws), nö-mu ySi(ms), hence it is particularly regrettable that our information on them is not more precise.

Ma-la oBW,HoBW (but defined in Anderson as "Si") is the collective term for "mother and children" (supra), employed here as an honorific. The corresponding term ci-fü (ci-fi, ci-fu, je-fü) oSiH(ws),WoSiH is a Chinese loan-word (姐夫 chieh-fu). C'i-mu (si-ma) is directly cognate with Burmese k'rwe^3-ma^3 < ok'rwi^3-ma^3 (Lisu o'- < k'r-- cf. o'i "foot", Burmese k're; o'o "6", Burmese k'rok), and marks the only appearance of this root in Northern Lolo. Fraser does not cite the term for Si, but does give ma-lü-p'a "bridegroom", o'i-ma-lü "bride" (lü^1 "young", tonally distinct from lü^2 "ggCh"), while the forms (ngo-)mi; nye; nyur (cf. nur for

601 za S) Sl are found in Webb. This term cannot be equated with Burmese sa-mak, since final -ak yields -ä rather than -o in Lisu (supra), and its affiliations remain in doubt.

Both sa-mö W (sa-mö za "woman", za-mö-lä-za "maiden") and za-gu H (za-gu-lä "youth") contain the element za S in combination, indicating that they may be of teknonymous origin. The element -gu can be compared with Burmese -kui in sts-kui oS and Akha a-kö B (cf. Lisu hu "9", Burmese kui^3; k'u "to steal", Burmese k'ui^3; tu "short", Burmese tui). The Burmese-Maru element *yok, used for affinal relatives, is represented by mö-ro-ma "2nd wife", mö-ro-p'a "2nd husband", the terms for "1st wife" and "1st husband" being mö-wu-ma and mö-wu-p'a, respectively (wu "big"). Ro, like the cognate Burmese yok, is the numerary adjunct for mankind. The phonetic shifts are regular, since r- has been developed from y- in some instances (ru "to take", Burmese yu; rä ~ yä "to hit, as a bullet", Burmese yak; a-ro "sheep", early loan-word from Chinese 羊 yang), and -o stands for final -ok, as in go "to pick up", Burmese kok; o'o "6", Burmese k'rok; to "poison", Burmese tok; lo "enough", Burmese lok. For the semantics, cf. Maru yauk-p'o H.

The Lisu terminology outlined above has much in common with that of the central bloc of Lolo languages, viz. Ahi, Nyi, and Lolopho, spoken in central and east-central Yunnan. The Ulu-Nesö languages of the Yunnan-Kueichou border area, and the Independent Lolo languages of Szuchuan, are of the

601 same general type, while the Chêng and Phupha languages of Tonkin show only minor aberrancies. All these languages will be considered together in connection with the Nyi terminology tabulated below. The Nyi terms, which are rather carefully defined in the classic source by Vial (1909), are the best known of the lot, but Liétard has given us valuable studies on Ahi (1909, 1911, 1912) and Lolppho (1909, 1913). Schirokogoroff's study of the Buš dialect is of some value in interpreting the orthographies employed by Vial and Liétard. Chêng and Phupha have been recorded by Bonifacy (in Liétard, 1909). The Ulu-Nasŏ and Independent Lolo terms cited below have been excerpted from scattered word-lists in Liétard (1909), Madrolle, Boell, Clarke, and d'Ollone (Kophu-Nasŏ no. 15, Ulu nos. 16 and 19, Independent Lolo nos. 30, 31, 32).

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Nyi

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Nyi Consanguineal Terms

(a-)du-ma ggsM

(a-)be-ma ggM

(a-)p'i gM

(a-)ma M

(a-)ma-gi̱ MoSi

(a-)ma-ɣə WySi

(a-)nyi FoSi

(a-)nyi-zà FySi

(a-)ǰa oSi,pC

(a-)du gggF

(a-)be ggF

(a-)bu gF

(a-)ba F

(a-)ba-gi̱ FoB

(a-)ba-ɣə FyB

(a-)hngə MoB

(a-)hngə-ɣə MyB

(a-)pu oB,pC

ngə̱-k'e yBb(ss),pC

mə̱-ma ySi(ms)

(a-)mə̱ FSiD,MBD

(á-)mə̱ D

ɣə-a-mə̱ gD

p'a-ma yB(ws)

(a-)nyi-zá FSiS

(a-)nhgə-zá MBS

za S

za-tu Ne

ɣə-za gS

ɣe-za ggS

Nyi Affinal Terms

(a-)nyi-mo WM

ǰu-ma HM

(a-)mi oBW

(a-)mə̱ HSi

[illegible]-mə̱-ɣe DI

(a-)hngə-mo WF

ǰu-p'a HF

(a-)pu WoB

(a-)hngə-zá ZyB

za-hngə Sl,SiH(ms)

601 Notes:

The terms a-be ggF, a-bu gF, and a-p'i gM closely parallel Burmese a-p'e^3, a-p'ui^3, and (Maru) a-p'yit < *a-p'yi, respectively. Ahi has a-p'i gM, a-pu gF, and Ulu has pie gM, bu gF, while Ind. Lolo has a-p'u gF. Chôko and Phupha a-p'e gM are perhaps cognate with Burmese a-p'wa^3, a root which is otherwise absent in the Lolo languages. Lolopho has a distinct set of terms, viz. a-le gF, a-nê gM, and Ind. Lolo has a-ma gM (cf. Lisu a-pa gF). Indications of distinctions between the paternal and maternal lines are lacking.

A-bo F and a-ma M are of almost universal occurrence, e.g. Lolopho a-bo < *ba F, a-mo < *ma M. Ahi has a-mo M, but a-ba rather than *a-bo F, the regular -o vocalism appearing only in the male suffixes -po and p'o; cf. mê "woman" (= Burmese mi^3). Ulu-Bassô has a-da ~ a-di F (cf. Akha) and a-nye ~ a-ye M (cf. Lahu), while in Ind. Lolo a-ts is used by children, a-bu ~ a-bo ~ a-pa by adults. The alternate Ulu term, viz. tie F, has been borrowed from Chinese (爹 tieh).

Both Ahi and Nyi describe the birth-order of FB, MBi in Chinese fashion, but with native terms. Nyi a-ba-giê FoB is identical with Burmese p'ê-kri^3 (cf. dê "to beat", Burmese ti^3, a-mê-mê "self", Burmese mi^3-mi^3; mê "tail", Burmese mri^3; a-mê "daughter", Burmese a-mi^3), with Ahi giê, Burmese kri^3 "big". The element -ie is likewise comparable with the -le^3 of Burmese u^3-le^3 FyB. The terms

601 for the youngest siblings are formed with nya "small", viz. a-ba-nya, a-ma-nya, and a-hngə-nya, and an especial term, a-ma-ka, is used for the next-to-youngest sister of M. Ahi has mo M,ESi, mo-li (= Nyi a-ma-le) "2nd oldest Si of M", mo-cu "3rd oldest Si of M", and mo-na (= Nyi a-ma-nya) "youngest Si of M"; also a-bo bi-ta FoB (bi-ta "big"), and a-ra FyS, on the same tone as ra "big" (e.g. zo ra "eldest son"). It is tempting to connect this term with Burmese a-ri^3 FSi, u^3-ri^3 MoB, ʔ̃-ri^3 oSil, since Ahi -a regularly corresponds to Nyi -ɨ, Burmese -i; cf. ka "big", Burmese kri^3; k'a "to lift", Burmese k'yi; da "to boat", Burmese ti^3; na "near", Burmese ni^3; a-ma "self", Burmese mi^3-mi^3; ma "tail", Burmese mri^3; sa "to know", Burmese si^3; sa "fruit", Burmese si^3 (Tibeto-Burman *-si in this series).

The important FSi and MB terms are known only for Nyi, but the latter can be inferred for Ahi. Nyi a-nyi FSi (but used for FoSi) agrees with Lisu a-nyi, and shows age distinctions just as the other FSb terms do; note the tonal difference between a-nyi-zà FyBi, with the diminutive suffix -zà, and a-nyi-zá FSiS, with zá S (we retain Vial's tonal notation). For Ahi we have only a-vu-mu Fl, but from the Nyi affinal terminology (infra) we can infer that a-vu is the term for MB, thus agreeing with Lisu a-vǔ MB. The initial v- tends to obscure the phonetic picture here, but the root is perhaps cognate with Maru vung, Lashi vang-mo HF,FSiH, from *-wang. For the analysis of hngə, vide infra. Lolopho has borrowed Chinese terms, viz. a-kyu MB (舅 ahiu ~ kiu), a-kn "aunt" (姑 kn, FSi).

601 Both Nyi and Ahi parallel Burmese in distinguishing sex of speaker in ySb but not in oSb terms. Ahi shows some interesting discrepancies with Nyi, yet has the Nyi rather than the Lisu pattern.

Ahi Sibling Terms

(a-)vi oSi	(a-)mu oB
nö-mo ySi(ws)	ni-k'ye yB(ms)
na-mo ySi(ms)	p'o-mo-ze yB(ws)

Ahi ni-k'ye apparently belongs with Burmese ní, Lisu nyi ySb, and this root is also represented by Ulu ni-pa (d'Ollone, no. 19), Ind. Lolo nie-mö ySi (also oSi), and Lolopho nye-ma yB, nye-mo ySi. Nyi ngä-k'e contains the same suffixed element, but ngä must be compared rather with Burmese ngai "small"; cf. ngä "to laugh", Burmese rai; ǎä "to change", Burmese lai^3; a-vä "left (hand)", Burmese wai^3; vä "to buy", Burmese wai. Nyi has the root *nyi, however, in the combinations nyi-fä "oSi and ySi; oB and yB", nyi mu-nö "oB and ySi; oSi and yB". Similarly, Ahi na-mo ~ na-mo-ze ySi(ms) is from na "small" (Nyi nya), represented also by Chöko a-nya ySi, nya-pa yB, Phupha nya-nö yB (a-nö ySi).

Ahi a-mu ~ a-mö oB (cf. a-pu ~ a-pö gF) points to an original *a-mu, Burmese *a-mui (cf. Kadu a-mu oB), but is perhaps to be connected with Maru mong, Lashi mang oB (the initial m- obscures the phonetic correspondence here). Nyi a-pu oB, is reminiscent of Tib. p'u-bo, Kachin p'u oB, but

601 here it must be regarded as a development from the root represented by a-bu gF (on the same tone), i.e. the appearance of these two terms in Nyi does not constitute an argument against the identification of Burmese a-p'ui^3 gF with Tib. p'a-bo, Kachin p'u oB. Nyi a-ʔa oSi has probably been developed from a root *a-ya M, while Ahi a-vi oSi (a-vi p'o-mo "Si and B") is connected with the Southern Lolo root *wi oB. Nyi has retained this root only in the combination vi-ngɯ "oB and yB", and Lolopho in a-vi Bl; note also Lolopho a-yi oB, a-ts'ɔ oSi, Lisu a-yi, a-tsi, id. Lolopho, the westernmost of the central Lolo bloc, has been influenced by Lisu, and this influence may account for the above terms. The root *wi is further represented by Ulu vyi-mo ~ (na-)vi oB, Ind. Lolo vi-van oB (Mudrolle). Chŏko and Phupha a-tsi oSi agree with Lisu a-tsi. The Chinese loan-word ko ~ ko-ko, which has already been noted in Lisu, appears also in Chŏko, Phupha a-ko, Ulu ko. Ulu has also borrowed the Chinese term 弟 ti yB; note especially ti-ko-ko oB, ti-ko-ti yB (Mudrolle).

Both Ahi and Nyi enumerate brothers (but apparently not sisters) after the fashion of aunts and uncles. In Ahi the series is as follows: a-mu bi-ta "1st oB" (bi-ta "big"), a-mu li "2nd oB" (li^1 on same tone as so-li^1 gB), a-mu ce "3rd oB", a-mu ja "4th oB", a-mu na "last oB" (na "small"). Nyi uses a-pu alone for "1st oB", and a- prefixed or -la suffixed forms for the remaining terms, viz. a-ʔa ~ ʔa-la

601 "2nd oB" (cf. ʎa-na gS), a-ka ~ ka-la "3rd oB", a-ja ~ ja-la "4th oB", a-ki ~ ki-la "5th oB". Nyi also has the corresponding series: ngä-k'e "1st yB", ngä-k'e ʎa-la "2nd yB", etc.

Nyi, Lisu p'a-mu, Ahi p'o-mo(-so) point to an original *p'a-mong; cf. Nyi, Lisu tu, Ahi to "1,000", Burmese a-t'ong; Nyi tu, Lisu du, Ahi to "wing", Burmese a-tong. Nyi nö-ma, Lisu no-ma, Ahi nö-mo suggests an original *nam-mo; cf. Nyi, Ahi nö-gu, Lisu no-gu, Burmese nam-rui^3 "ribs" (nam "side of body"); Nyi, Ahi nö, Lisu no "to smell", Burmese nam^3; Nyi tlö, Ahi t'ö, Lisu bye "to fly", Burmese pyam. The forms thus reconstructed, viz. *p'a-mong and *nam-ma, closely parallel Burmese-Maru *mong yB(ws), Lashi nam-mo ySi(ms), Burmese -hnam, id. (inferred from mong-hnam). The Lisu terms are of uncertain meaning (vide supra), and Ahi appears to have transferred nö-mo from ySi(ms) to ySi(ws), but the Nyi terms are exactly equivalent to the Burmese. Ahi also has the root *nam in isolation, in the form nö ~ nä "girl", used in poetry, in some current expressions (e.g. a-mu nö-mo "brothers and sisters"), and in girls' names, while the same term in Lolopho is said to be used only in songs and as a prefix to girls' names (Liétard, 1913, p. 166). Ahi further has so-nä ~ a-nä-so Ch, paralleling Nyi a-nö-nä, Lisu sa-ne, id. The Lolo languages are thus seen to throw valuable light on the elusive root *nam ~ *snam, which has been encountered in a variety of meanings.

601 The Northern Lolo terms for S and D generally parallel Burmese za^3, $za\text{-}mi^3$, though the first element may be dropped in the latter term, e.g. Nyi a-mö, Ind. Lolo a-mi ~ a-ma ~ a-mö, Ulu mö. Cf. Nyi za S, Ahi a-zo S, a-mö-zo D, Lolopho zo S, zo-mö D, Chöko za S, za-mi D, Phupha za-za S, za-mi D, Ulu-Nazö za ~ (na-)zu S, Ind. Lolo zö ~ ze S. The gS terms, from Burmese mre^3 < *m-li, usually coincide phonetically with the forms of the word for "4", from Burmese le^3 < *b-li, viz.

	Nyi	Ahi	Lolopho	Ulu	Ind. Lolo
four	ɣə	li	li	ɣi	ɔl
gCh	ɣə	li	li	ɣi	ɔl

Nyi ɣe-za, Ahi lye-zo gsS correspond to Lisu lö-za, the phonetic correspondences being regular, viz.

	Burmese	Lisu	Ahi	Nyi
ascend	tak	dö	dye	de
black	nak	nö	nye	ne
leaf	p'ak	p'yö	p'ye	p'e
eye	myak	myö	nye	ne

We can thus safely reconstruct *lak ~ *m-lak gsS, paralleling Burmese mrats < *m-lik.

The collateral terminology is represented by Nyi a-nyi-zá FSiS and a-hngö-zá MBS, which are literally descriptive terms, and a-mö FSiD,MBD, tonally distinct from á-mö D (Vial notes that "entre elles, les jeunes filles s'appelent ami et non ámi"). Nyi thus agrees with Lisu in distinguishing between parallel and cross cousins. The

601 descriptive cousin terms in Nyi are tsʰ-ve vi-ngɯ̃ pOa, tsʰ-ve nu-nɯ̃ pOi; according to Vial, tsʰ-ve signifies that one belongs to the "same degree" (cf. tsʰ "generation", ve "family"). It is not known whether Nyi also distinguishes between pN and xN, since we have only the single term za-tu "nephew". Ahi zo-to Ne can be inferred from zo-to li-ze "grand-nephew", zo-to a-nɯ̃ "grand-niece" (Ahi -o < -u, cf. o "head", Burmese u³; t'o "thick", Burmese t'u; mo "to do", Burmese mu; ro "mad", Burmese ru³). The root *tu also appears in Uin (n-)tu Ne, a-ze(n-)tu Ni, ba(n-)tu C (cf. Lisu za-du used for C as well as for Ne), Ind. Lolo ze(n-)tu Ne (zɯ̃ ~ ze S), Lolopho zo-du Ne, zo-mɯ̃-du Ni (d'Ollone, no. 26). For Lolopho, d'Ollone also cites lao-piao C, a Chinese loan-word (老表 lao piao).

The Nyi distinction in Fl terms resembles that of Maru (na < *ni FBi,WM,HM, nyi MB,WF, vung <*wang MF) but is sharper, since WM and HM are differentiated. A-nyi-mo WM and a-hngɯ̃-mo WF are based on, but not equated with, a-nyi FBi and a-hngɯ̃ MB, the additional element being mo "old", which appears also in a-mo (fem. a-mo-ma) "ancestor" (Phunoi ya mǎng "old man"). The terms ǔ-ma and ǔ-p'a, used by a man's wife, contain the characteristic Burmish-Loloish *yok, used as a numerary adjunct for mankind (Nyi ǔ, Lolopho yo); Nyi, Ahi -u, Lolopho -o correspond to Burmese -ok, as in Nyi ǔ-ma, Ahi ǔ-mo "ladle", Burmese yok-ma³; Nyi a-nu, Ahi nu, Lolopho nyo "monkey", Burmese nyok;

601 Nyi k'u, Ahi c'u, Lolopho c'o "6", Burmese k'rok. This root has the specific meaning "male" (vir) in Nlu yo (also used for H), and in Nyi za-ǔu (mountain dialect). In Lolopho, yo-p'o-so and yo-mo-mǐ are defined simply as "Fl" and "Ml", respectively (Liétard, 1913, p. 159), but the corresponding Ahi terms, viz. ǔu-p'o and ǔu-mo, are used for WF and WM, i.e. the reverse of the Nyi usage. Yet Ahi ǔu-p'o is also used in the meaning "paternal ancestor". Liétard also cites a-lye-mo ~ a-lye-mu WM and a-vu-mu Fl, a-vu a-lye-mu "parents-in-law", hence Ahi makes a distinction similar to that found in Nyi (a-vu is perhaps the term for MB, comparable with Lisu a-vǔ, but the word is not cited in Liétard).

Both Nyi and Ahi have an especial term, viz. a-mi, for oBW, distinct from a-mǐ D (cf. Phupha mi "woman, wife", za-mi "daughter"). In Nyi, a man equates his sister's husband with his daughter's husband (za-hngə), while in Ahi a man refers to his oSiH as the "son-in-law" (sǒ-rǒ) of his oSi (a-vi), or as the "husband" (ǔǒ-ca-p'o) of his oSi (a-vi sǒ-rǒ ~ a-vi ǔǒ-ca-p'o), showing the semantic equivalence of "Sl" and "H" (bridegroom). In Nyi the WoB has the respectful appellation a-pu (oB), but WyB is significantly equated with MBS (a-hngə-zá) (under cross-cousin marriage WyB becomes MBS,ys). After the birth of the first child, however, the husband adopts the teknonymous term k'a-hngə WyB, from kə a-hngə "his MB". Teknonymous terms can also be applied to Ml and Fl, viz. a-ma M and

601 a-ba F. In Lolopho a husband is addressed by his wife as a-po-ma (apparently from *pa F), and the wife is addressed by her husband as a-pi-ma (apparently from *p'i gM), but the descriptive term for a married couple is ni mǐ-yo, lit. "two wife-husband". The k'ə- prefix noted above may explain some or all the prefixed k'a- forms found in Burmese and Southern Lolo, e.g. Burmese yok-k'ǎ-ma³ Pl, but the point cannot be demonstrated with the available material. Both Nyi za-mǐ-ʎe and Ahi zo-mǐ-lye Dl are descriptive terms formed with the term for "wife" (Nyi mǐ-ʎe, Ahi mǐ-lye). In both languages, furthermore, the final element is gCh (Nyi ʎe, Ahi lye), used here as a diminutive. In Ahi, at any rate, this final element is not an essential part of the word and is dropped in phrases, e.g. k'ə mǐ "his wife", to be contrasted with k'ǎ-mǐ < k'ə ǎ-mǐ "his daughter". Nyi equates HSi with FSiD, MBD in the term a-mǐ (distinct from ǎ-mǐ D), just as it equates WyB with MBS (a-hngə-zǎ).

The descriptive term for WB, SiH in Nyi is hngə-sa, in which hngə is said by Vial to refer to WB, and sa to SiH. The element hngə thus refers to MB and WB, or, under cross-cousin marriage, to WF and WB. On the phonetic side, initial hng- stands for ng- before the mixed vowels, and, like the latter, represents initial r-; cf. the following series, in which Ahi shows the retention of r-: Nyi ngiǎ, Ahi re, Burmese rai "to laugh"; Nyi nga, Ahi ro, Burmese ra³ "to obtain"; Nyi hngə(-pu), Ahi rǒ, Burmese a-rui³ "bone";

601 Nyi hngə, Ahi rö, Burmese re "to count"; Nyi hngə, Ahi rö, Burmese rit "to cut". Nyi -ə, Ahi -ö are the regular correspondences for Burmese -ui; cf. Nyi k , Ahi kö, Burmese kui^3 "9"; Nyi k'ə, Ahi k'ö, Burmese k'ui^3 "to steal; Nyi ngə, Ahi ngö, Burmese ngui "to weep"; Nyi ts'ə, Ahi ts'ö, Burmese k'yui "to bathe". Nyi sa-hngə is thus directly comparable with Ahi sö-rö ~ sö-ngö S1 and with the first element of Ahi rö-ni HoB. The sa- element of Nyi appears to be identical with the sa- of Lisu sa-za, sa-ma (xNe,xNi), but Ahi sö- is perhaps distinct (it is on the same tone as sö^4 " blood", from Burmese swe^3, but Nyi has sə, and Lisu has si). Lisu a-wo FB can be connected with the hypothetical Burmese *rui reconstructed from Nyi hngə, Ahi rö; cf. the parallel series furnished by "bone", viz.

	Burmese	Lisu	Ahi	Nyi
bone	a-rui^3	wo(-to)	rö	hngə(-pu)
	*rui	a-wo (FB)	rö (S1)	hngə (S1,MB).

The Tibeto-Burman original for this root would be *ru, which leads to Tib. sru-mo MSi, Kanauri ru F1 (< MB), and Pyu sru "relatives" (< "mother's relatives").

Ahi kö-pu-li ySiH is an unusually interesting term, combining as it does (a-)pu gF and (zo-)li gS with a new element kö-. For pu-li, cf. the Lisu collective term pi-li "grandparent and grandchild". Kö- is isolated in Ahi, but may represent the root *kui < *ku found in Burmese ats-kui oB, Akha a-kö B (for the vocalism, vide supra).

601 There remains for consideration only the language of the
[101 Moso (Nakhi) of western Yunnan, which differs rather widely
197] from the Northern Lolo languages just discussed. Only a few Moso terms, all badly recorded, are known; these have been taken from the works of Bacot, Rock, and Madrolle (by Monbeig) (note that in Madrolle the Moso and Kutsong = Tibetan lists have been accidentally reversed on pp. 564-65). The following terms are of Lolo type: a-ba F; a-mä ~ mä .. (also mi "female", in Rock); a-p'u gF (but a-tsö gM); a-bu oB (Nyi a-pu); so S, mi ~ mi-so D (also su Ch, in Bacot). Note Moso a-p'u gF, a-bu oB, but Nyi a-bu gF, a-pu oB. The Sb terms are generally distinct from those in Lolo; Madrolle cites gö-sö yB, ma-ma oSi, ku-ma ySi. Of primary importance, however, is the term a-gu Bl (Bacot), cognate with Ahi kö-pu-li ySiH, Akha a-kö B, and Burmese ats-kui oB; cf. Moso gu "9", Burmese kui^3; Moso k'u "to steal", Burmese k'ui^3; Moso hngu "to weep", Burmese ngui.

Despite the extent of literature on the Lolo, almost no material bearing on our problem can be found. Ahi and Nyi, which linguistically are fairly well known, are ethnographic blanks. Cross-cousin marriage can be established only for the Lisu, and even here the source is linguistic (Fraser) rather than ethnographic (Rose and Brown). Fraser's remarks in this connection are worth quoting <u>in extenso</u>, since the work is rare:

> Sometimes an exchange will be made between two families, a man giving his daughter to another's son in exchange for the latter's daughter for his own son; this arrangement

601 cancels the bridal prices and none is given by either party. In most cases a Lisu will require the same sum of money for his daughter that he himself gave for his wife, the mother. This is often tantamount to an exchange, for the custom in most districts is that the girl, or at any rate one girl in the family - be given back in marriage to her mother's people. But she must never be given to a member of her own clan, even if the relationship is too remote to be traced. Indeed if two Lisu families live in widely separated districts between which there is no intercommunication, so that it may be safely inferred that they are not related at all, they must not intermarry if they happen to have the same clan surname. Possibly this custom also is to be put down to Chinese influence, for the Chinese are equally strict in this regard. Yet a Lisu may marry his father's sister's daughter without any thought of inconsistency. E.g. a Lisu Macdonald will give his sister in marriage to a Lisu Macgregor. His son may marry a daughter of the latter marriage, because she is a Macgregor and he a Macdonald. That such a union is undesirable from the standpoint of consanguinity does not occur to his, yet by some peculiar mental kink he would stoutly object to marrying his son to a Miss Macdonald, even though the relationship might be nil, because he and she are both Macdonalds. In some districts certain clans are said to be related to certain other clans, and they are not supposed to intermarry. But there is no arrangement whereby a certain clan is permanent parent-in-law to another clan, as there seems to be among some tribes of Kachins. (p. ix)

Fraser further states (note to p. ix) that "There are cases of Lisu marrying their own father's sisters, but this is rare and looked down upon". In a note to the term sa-ma SiD (p. 65), Fraser observes that "A Lisu can demand her [SiD] in marriage for his son; to refuse to give her means a lawsuit and the payment of a fine". We thus have compulsory cross-cousin marriage in combination with occasional marriage to FSi. The latter does not appear to be reflected in the Lisu terminology, but the former is correlated with the sharp distinction drawn between parallel and cross cousins and nephews. A distinction between FSiD and MBD is found only in the Lisu list in Webb, p. xlvii, which has sa-du

601 FDCh, MBCh, WBiCh, but a-pa FBiCh. Under the Lisu system of sister exchange, FBi becomes MBW (a-nyi^{A}, used for both) and hence FBiD is equivalent to MBD, i.e. both collateral lines are merged. Note that despite these marriage practices Lisu lacks categorical equations in the Fl terms, using only the consanguineal terms ma-ma Ml, ba-ba Fl. It can be inferred that these are used only in address, just as Nyi uses e-ma (= a-ma) and e-ba (= a-ba) in address, but a-nyi-mo WF (a-nyi FoSi), a-hngo-mo WF (a-hngo MoB), ǔ-ma HW, and ǔ-p'a HF in description.

Liétard (1913) has given us a lengthy account of the Lolopho, in which an unusual marital pattern is described, but without specific information on marriage regulations. The Lolopho have taken over the Chinese surnames (姓 hsing) but, according to this authority, attach no importance to them in marriage. Patrilineal inheritance of property is mentioned, but no actual clan nor lineage organization is described. The familial situation, which is altogether remarkable, is attributed by Liétard to the practice of child marriage in combination with the recognition only of Chinese marriage laws. A woman normally has a lover, who is the actual father of her children. The legal father and husband of the woman supports the children in the main, and they take his name and inherit his property. The duties of the lover are to make sandals for the woman and her children and to buy clothes for the latter. The terminology used is of some interest. The children address the legal husband as

a-bo F (the native term), the lover as ta-tie, a Chinese loan-word (大爷 ta tieh gF, but tieh F). Descriptively, the former is called a-bo mi "father-nourisher", the latter a-bo k'a "father-true". 601

A brief description of the Szuchuan (Independent) Lolo by Martin appears in the above source (pp. 31-32). The so-called "family" (kye, from Chinese 家 chia~kia) is described as a patrilineal exogamous sort of tribal unit. A single village often contains two tribes, which may intermarry even though related on the mother's side within the 2nd degree. We can infer that cross-cousin marriage, probably with first as well as with second cousins, occurs among these Szuchuan Lolo.

The organization of the Independent Lolo into the "Black Bone" or noble caste, and "White Bone" or lower caste, has been a perennial source for learned discussions of the Lolo and their origin (usually placed in Central Asia or some other conveniently distant place). The terms in general use are Chinese, viz. hei ku-t'ou (黑骨頭)" Black Bone", pai ~pe ku-t'ou (白骨頭)"White Bone", but the use of "bone" in this connection cannot be explained on the basis of Chinese. On the Tibeto-Burman side, however, we have an obvious explanation in Tibetan rus(-pa) "bone, lineage", Burmese a-rui^{3}, id. This identification can be traced in Lolo itself, since Nyi uses hnga (cf. hnga-pu " bone") as a numerary adjunct for ve "family", e.g. ve t'i hng "one family", lit. "family one bone", also abbreviated to

601 t'i hngə "one bone" The Chinese terms hei ku-t'ou and pe ku-t'ou must be regarded simply as translations of native Lolo terms. Insofar as the writer is aware, this obvious explanation has not been suggested by previous writers in the field.

The custom whereby the bride returns for a visit to her parent's home, already observed among the Southern Lolo, is also in evidence among their northern neighbors. Among the Lolopho (Lietard, 1913, pp. 152 and sq.), the bride is carried to the groom's home by her elder sister, and remains there for from two to four days, in the company of her elder sister. The couple then pass several days with the bride's parents, after which the bride returns to her husband's home to stay. Madrolle (p. 539) records a similar custom for the Eul-yi-tseu (= Uln), but states that this is now disappearing in the face of Chinese influence. Here the couple remain three days with the family of the groom, then return to the bride's home, where the groom remains only overnight but the bride lingers for from eight to ten days before rejoining her husband.

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16. Konyak

101 The route followed during the last two sections, through
197 Hung, Burmese, and the Lolo languages, may be considered a 'dead-end' street leading away from Kachin, the nexus of the Tibeto-Burman group. The second main route from Kachin takes us across the Patkoi Range into northern Assam and thence down the Brahmaputra valley to the Garo Hills. The little known transitional area is occupied by the Konyak tribes, often referred to as the "Naked Naga". In the LSI they are classified as "Eastern Naga", and in general are regarded as a variety of Naga. Closer examination of the extant material, however, has revealed that linguistically they are quite distinct from the typical Naga (Ao, Angami, Sema, etc.) and affiliated rather with the Kachin on one hand, the Garo and Bodo on the other. It is for this reason that they have been discussed in this section, apart from the Naga section.

197 Our material on the Konyak, both linguistic and ethnographic, is fragmentary and superficial. The only ethnographic study of any merit is that by Fürer-Haimendorf (1938), who has also written a popular account (1939). Hutton (1921, App. III, pt. 4) has given us a hasty survey of the Konyak tribes on the Assam side of the Patkoi range, and a more detailed account of the Chang (ibid., pp. 376-82), while Mills has made a few observations on the same groups. The trans-Patkoi tribes of Upper Burma have been described by T. P. Dewar, who has made an attempt to classify them.

197 The Konyak of the Naga Hills District and the adjoining area are conventionally divided into two groups, viz. the Thendu and the Thenkoh (Tamlu terms, as is also the term Konyak). These terms refer to the face tattoo of the Thendu men, and the lack of it among the Thenkoh men, who tattoo only their chest and arms. The native chiefs (ang) wield great power among the Thendu, whereas they are mere figure-heads among the Thenkoh. The division is not absolute, since Fürer-Haimendorf cites two tribes (Tanhai, Punkhung) who are Thendu in speech and custom and yet do not tattoo the face. The same author states that the division is linguistic as well as ethnographic, but the fragmentary nature of our material does not permit of a check on this. Hutton notes (p. 385) that a Thendu tribe and a Thenkoh tribe may live side by side in the same village. Fürer-Haimendorf is unable to confirm this observation, but does state that there is little intermarriage between the two divisions. Of whatever local value this distinction may be, it is certainly not valid for the Konyak as a whole, and is of no utility in our present investigation.

For only one Konyak language do we possess even approximately adequate material, viz. Chang, the subject of an especial study by Hutton (1929), who had listed the kinship terms in an earlier paper (1922). Unfortunately Chang, which is spoken just east of the Dikhu across from Ao territory, is not typical of the Konyak group, since the

197 Chang have come under the influence of their Naga neighbors to the west and south. Similarly, the Meehang and Shangge languages recorded by Needham show strong Kachin influence (they are trans-Patkoi tribes under Kachin political domination). Of the more typical Konyak languages, we have material on Banpara (Brown, Peal), Namsang (Robinson, Brown, Butler), Tablang (Brown, LSI), Mutom (Brown), Mulung (Brown),
601 and Tamlu (LSI). Only the Chang terminology is sufficiently well known to be tabulated.

Chang Consanguineal Terms

(a-)pi gP

(a-)nyu N,MSi,FBW	(a-)po F,FB,MSiH
(a-)nyi FSi,MSW	(a-)ko MB,FSiH
(a-)no oSi,pC	(a-)jei oB,pC

(a-)ma ySb,pC

nyŭng-sau xCi	nyŭng-i xCe
ŭo-mau-nyu BD(ms)	ŭo-mau-po BS(ms)

ŭo Ch,SiCh(ws)

ii xN

ŭi gCh

Chang Affinal Terms

(a-)nyi WM,HM	(a-)ko WF,HF
yak W	lau H
hau-nyi SiI(ws)	hau-po BI(ms)
hau-nya WSi	
po-nyu 'SiI(ms)	po-po BI(ws)
(a-)nyŭng SiI(ws)	

ii DI,SI,WBCh

ŭo WSiCh

601 Notes:

The appearance of a neuter term (a-pi) for gP is worthy of attention. The root is evidently cognate with Burmese a-p'ɔ̃ ggF, Tib. ʾa-p'yi gN (aspiration is regularly dropped in Chang; cf. a-po F, a-ko MB). A-pi is the term employed in address; descriptively, pi-mai (mai "true") is used in the restricted sense for the actual gP, pi in the extended sense. The distinction between gN and gP is handled differently for the paternal and maternal lines, viz. po-ǒo-pi FF and yak-sa-pi FM (with po-ǒo ~ po-su "male", yak-sa "woman"), but nyu-bu-po MF ("mother-of father") and nyu-bu-nyu MM "mother-of mother") (the latter form is inferred from the account in Hutton, p. 51). Thus unusual type of construction has been encountered only once before (Johar, in the Almora group, ma-pa MF).

Most of the Konyak languages show the roots *nu M, *pa F; cf. Banpara, Hutom, Tableng a-pa, Mulung o-pa, Tamlu pa F, and Banpara a-nu, Hutom an-nu, Mulung o-nu, Moshang nyu M. The presence of the root *nu affords a direct link with Kachin, as well as with the Kuki languages to the south. Moshang and Namsang wa ~ va F appear to have been influenced by Kachin wa. The seemingly aberrant Namsang i-n-yong M (cf. i-va F, i-p'o oB, i-ma yB) has been developed from *nyong (used as a fem. suffix) < *nyung < *nyu, through secondary nasalization produced by the nasal initial; for -eng <-ung, cf. Namsang long "stone", TB *lung; Namsang tong "to sit", TB *tung; Namsang pong "air, wind", TB *pung.

601 A separate root *ya is found, however, in Tableng ni-ya M (cf. ni-ye B), matching the fem. suffix -ya (kui-ya "bitch", mahu a-ya "cow"); cf. the Almora root *ya M.

Chang a-po F belongs in a phonetic series showing alternation with -ou and -au, involving TB roots in final -a, e.g. nou "ear", TB *na; ngau "fish", TB *ngya; ngau "5", TB *nga; hau "tooth", TB *ha; kau ~ gau "earth", TB *ka; ǰau ~ sau "to eat", TB *dza. Hutton writes a-po or a-pou F, a-ko or a-kou MB, a-no or a-nou oSi, and ǰo or ǰou Ch, which would theoretically yield the roots *pa F, *ka MB, *na oSi, and *za Ch (cf. sau < *dza "to eat"). Since a-nyi FSi (Banpara a-ni-oum "aunt") agrees with the general TB root (Tib. 'a-ne, Kachin ni) one would anticipate a derivation a-ko < a-ku ~ a-k'u MB. Chang appears to retain TB final -u, however, as in guh "9", Tib. dgu, hence we must postulate either a separate root (*ku) or an analogical phonetic development based on a-po ~ a-pou F. Comparative material from other Konyak languages that might clarify this point is lacking (Mamsang di-di "uncle" is of no help).

Chang a-no oSi and a-na ySb agree with Kachin na and nau, respectively, while the affiliations of a-jei oB are uncertain. For the development a-no < *na, vide supra; cf. Banpara a-na, Mamsang i-ngya < *i-na oSi. Chang -a < -au is the exact reverse of -au ~ -ou < -a (supra); it is attested also by ha(-ba) "fat", TB *sau (h- < s-, vide infra). This root is well represented in Konyak; cf. Hutton nau-cong-pa yB (cf. tai-cong-pa oB), nau-sa "boy".

601 (probably for yS1), nau-tak "boy", Tableng nau-i-pa yB (Brown), Banpara kǔ-nau yB,yS1, nau-sa "boy"; Namsang i-na yB, na-ta "boy", Moshang i-no yB, no-yã̌ Ch (able to walk), no-sã̌ "baby". A-jei oB, also pronounced jai, compares with ch- and t- initial forms elsewhere in Konyak, but the latter may be cognate rather with Chang mǔ-tei "lass, lad". Note the following forms: Tableng a-cei oB, o-ca-cei oS1 (Brown), Mulung cei oB, and Banpara a-tai oB, Muton tai-cong-pa oB (cf. nau-cong-pa yB). Comparisons can be made with 11b. 'a-c'e oS1 and Kanauri a-te oB, both of which indicate TB roots in final -ei. Moshang i-p'u, Namsang i-p'o oB appear to have been borrowed from Kachin p'u, id. (cf. Moshang and Namsang wa ~ va, Kachin wa F). Distinctions in sex of speaker for sibling terms have not been recorded. Moshang, however, has a feminine suffix -ǎrr (e.g. ko-ǎrr "female goat") which seems to be connected with Kachin jan <*jar, Lushei (Kuki group) far <*dzar S1(ma); cf. Moshang rong-ǎrr "sun" (rong "sky"), Kachin jan, id.

The root *za Ch, represented in Chang by ǎo ~ ǎou, appears in all the Konyak languages, viz. Banpara kǔ-sa S, nau-sa " boy", Muton ko-sa S, nau-sa "boy", Mulung ho-lom S, Tableng na-ha "boy", a-ha D, ta-ha S, Tamlu ha-ǎi Ch, pa-ha-ha S, ngu-ha-ha D, Namsang ca S, de-hiek ca D, Moshang ǎã̌ S, no-ǎã̌ "baby" , ya-ǎik ǎã̌ D. The form ha, found in Mulung, Tableng, and Tamlu, shows the h- < s-, z- shift which is typical of Konyak phonology in general; cf. Mulung,

601 Tableng, Tamlu ha "to eat", TB *dza; Mulung tik-ha, Tableng tik-ha-tua "ant", Banpara tik-sa; Mulung, Tableng hum "salt", Banpara sum. In Chang itself initial h- has been developed from original surd sibilants and affricates; cf. hai ~ hei "to die", Kachin si; ha(-bu) "fat", Kachin sau; hak "life, breath", Burmese a-sak, Kachin sa < *sak; hak " louse", Tib. ǰig, Kachin tsi *tsik; hau "nerve, tendon, vein", Tib. rtsa, Kachin lǎ-sa < *rǎ-sa; hǎp "nest", Kachin taip. ǰi gCh is comparable with Kachin ǰu ma-ǰi ggCh (ǰu gCh), and cf. Tamlu ha-ǰi < *ǰa-ǰi Ch.

Fürer-Haimendorf (texts on pp. 259-60, 74, 78) cites the following terms from the language spoken at Nakohing (Thenkoh): e-nau yB, e-cei cB, a-ha S, ou-hu ~ o-hu gS. These terms are of Mulung-Tableng type, and show the same h- < s- shift. The term o-hu gS can thus be regarded as a direct cognate of Kachin ǰu, id.

The parallel and cross collateral lines are sharply distinguished with the use of the two primary terms nyǎng xC and li xN. The descriptive terms for the former are nyǎng-i-po xCs, nyǎng-sau-nyu xCi. Hutton also cites a term nyǎng-e "a form of address between persons of two classes which can intermarry", and the vocative form a-nyǎng "cousin" appears in the Chang text on p. 47. Nyǎng must be regarded as cognate with Kachin ning xCi(ws), Sil(ws). Chang regularly has medial ǎ for original i and u, thus paralleling the Lepcha development: cf. hǎp "nest", TB *tsip; cǎm " house", TB *k'yim; lǎm "to smell", TB *rim (initial r-

601 is lacking in Chang), sǎn "liver", TB *m-ʔin; lǎk "6", TB *d-rug; sǎm "3", TB *g-sum; mǎt "to blow", TB *mut; lǎm "heat", TB *lum. Chang li xN is etymologically associated with li(-bu) "ripe", li-la "seed", thus nicely fitting into the series Burmese mre^{3} < *m-li, Nung p'a-li < *m-li gCh, Kachin m-li "young man", Kachin li, Abor a-li "seed", Lepcha li(-m) "to be ripe", a-li "seed" (see the discussion under Nung, pt. 8). For the transference from gCh to xN, cf. Kuki *tu xN,gCh (inffa), Burmese tu xN.

The affinal terminology presents three basic categorical equations in the terms a-nyi, a-ko, and li. Chang li D1,S1 marks the first occurrence of a neuter term for this affinal relationship. Another categorical equation is found in a-nyǎng, one of the alternative terms for S1l(ws), agreeing with the cognate Kachin ning, id. When the S1l is much older than the (female) speaker, she is addressed as a-no (oS1). The remaining Sbl terms are of teknonymous origin. Thus, hau-ko is "his (hau) WB", i.e. WB; hau-nyi is "his FSi", i.e. HSi; hau-nyu is "his W or WSi", i.e. WSi. Pe-nyu and pe-po, the terms for Sbl(ds), are clearly of similar origin, though the element pe- cannot be analyzed; it is perhaps cognate with Banpara a-p'e D (Peal), Maton a-p'e oSi, and cf. Burmese a-pai "madam", Maru pai, Lushi pe oSi.

Chang lau H is a variant of -lo, a masculine suffix, from TB *la; cf. Tablong kui-la "male dog", Hoahang gui-ha la "male dog", Hamsang de-la H (cf. de-hiek "woman"). Chang yak W, yak-sa "woman", though written without a short mark,

601 has perhaps been developed from a root with final -ik; cf. Moshang ya-ǰik ~ yal-ǰik "woman", Namsang de-hiek "woman", and the Garo-Bodo root *jik "female" (vide pt. 11). Moshang has another pair of sex-suffixes, viz. -pi (fem.) and -pang (masc.), the latter found also in Tableng and Namsang (pong), Tamlu (bong), Banpara (pang), and Moshang (pung).

Our information on the Chang (Mills, Hutton) is not very full. Hutton (1929, p. 50) gives the following account:

> The Chang Nagas are as at present constituted, an exogamous and stoutly patrilineal tribe, and are of mixed origin. They prohibit marriage between a man and his immediate relations on his mother's side, though this prohibition seems to be in the process of breaking down, as such unions nowadays take place in spite of the disapproval of the older generation. The tribe is composed of a number of different clans each of which claims descent from a common ancestor. Property passes through the male line, and women cannot ordinarily inherit at all.

Hutton (1921, p. 379) names five exogamous clans, but gives no additional details. The existence of cross-cousin marriage is indicated by the statement cited above, but in view of the Chang terminology this practice must be regarded as ancient rather than as new. The categorical equations in a-nyi FSi,MBW,Hl, a-ko MB,FSiH,Fl and li xH,Dl,Sl, along with sharp distinction drawn between the parallel and cross collateral lines, reflect cross-cousin marriage almost as clearly as any Tibeto-Burman terminology elsewhere.

Cousin marriage of Kachin type can be inferred for the trans-Patkoi tribes, on the basis of the following statement by Dewar (p. 274):

601 The Nagas marry with certain recognised families, thus reviving every second or third generation connection by marriage originally established by their ancestors, any breaking-away from this custom leading to a debt ease with the family from whom the bride should have been asked.

On p. 279 Dewar cites the expression k'ao wing k'ao wang k'ao ting k'ao sang (unanalyzed) in use among the Pyengoo, said to denote "close connectionship in their tribes through inter-marriage". Dewar further notes the custom of matrilocal residence among the Rasa, a tribe of the Haimi group (p. 282).

Fürer-Haimendorf has contributed a fairly full account of the Morung (men's house) institution among the Konyak in the Naga Hills District, with especial reference to Wakching, a Thenkoh village. A single village may have as many as 11 morung (Wakching has 5 morung, or ban), which may or may not constitute exogamous units. Among the Thendu, who have a highly developed ang chieftainship, a type of class exogamy is practised, e.g. in Oting an Ang man must marry a Ben (commoner) girl of his own village or an Ang girl of another village. Of the five morung of Wakching, four are exogamous while the fifth morung, that of the Ang, which was founded much later than the other four, can intermarry with any of the others. The Oukheang morung and its offshoot, the Thepong, constitute an exogamous unit as opposed to the Balang morung and its offshoot, the Bala. Each morung includes several clans, which are likewise exogamous. A single clan may be found in two or more Morung.

601 but none is common to the two original morung (Oukheang and Balang). The Ang or ruling clan is outside the system just described, since the Ang are endogamous though not within the same village. Mills refers to this as a "unique example of endogamy in a Naga clan" (p. 145). The Oukheang and Balang morung tend to intermarry, as do the Thepong and Bala morung, which are offshoots of the former pair. These reciprocal relationships are also in evidence in other cultural features, e.g. the Balang men build the ro (girl's dormitory) of the Oukheang girls, and the Balang girls are obliged to take part in the funeral ceremonies for an Oukheang man.

The system described above may be regarded as a dual organization, with some tendencies to develop into a four-class system, on which a political chieftainship (ang) has been superimposed. In view of the fact that the Chang are "stoutly patrilineal" (Hutton) we can assume that descent in both the morung and the clans is reckoned in the male line, though the matter is not discussed in our sources. One might expect to find cross-cousin marriage in this system of reciprocally related morung, but here again our sources are of no avail, and we know nothing of the affinal terminology of the groups described by Fürer-Haimendorf. The appearance of exogamous moieties in this transitional Konyak group is worth noting, however, since the dual organization is found in a number of groups in Assam and Burma (see pt. 11).

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1 [For abbreviations, see this source in cat. 113, ALl Southeast Asia ALl -- Analyst]

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Kachari AR6
Garo AR5
Bodo

11. Garo and Bodo

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Garo and Bodo are the two principal languages of the Barish stock of Tibeto-Burman. The Barish languages, spoken in the Brahmaputra valley in Assam, are the southwesternmost members of the family, with Aka, Abor-Miri, and Dafla on the north, Konyak on the northeast, and the Kuki languages on the east and southeast. The Indic-speaking Assamese have displaced the earlier Tibeto-Burman population in the plains and disrupted what was undoubtedly at one time a fairly continuous Barish distribution throughout the valley. Mikir, which belongs with the Kuki languages in the supergroup Kukic, stands as an island in the northern sector of the Barish area. Khasi, an Austroasiatic language spoken in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills east of the Garo Hills, is a second intrusive element in this area.

Barish stands closer to Konyak and Kachin than to the Kuki and Naga languages which border it on the east. This affinity for Kachin is especially notable in the lexical elements of the kinship terminology presented below. The Barish stock itself is a well-knit unit with two big divisions, viz. Garo and Bodo. The Garo, in the Garo Hills south of the Brahmaputra, appear to represent the earliest wave of immigrants into this valley area (vide infra). The remaining Barish languages (Bodo, Dimasa, Lalung, Moran, Tipura, Deori Chutiya) are quite distinct and seem to have been derived from an ancestral speech (Bodo-Dimasa) already

K 101 197 G 101 197 differentiated from Garo. The Bodo (Boro, Bare) proper are found north and west of the Brahmaputra, while Dimasa and the closely related Lalung and Moran are spoken east of this river. Tipura, spoken far to the south in the Tipperah Hills District and Chittagong Hills Tracts, must be regarded as a kind of advance-guard of this group. In general, this Bodo-Dimasa (Kachari) group represents a second wave of Barish peoples moving down the Brahmaputra valley in the wake of the Garo. Deori Chutiya, spoken in the Lakhimpur and Sibsagar Districts, is the northeasternmost of the Barish languages and can be classified as a sub-type of Bodo-Dimasa, showing extensive phonetic modification.

K 601 G 601 Our sources on the Barish languages are fairly numerous but of uniformly poor quality. Material on the Bodo-Dimasa terminology, which will be treated as a unit in contrast to the Garo terminology, has been extracted from the following: Bodo (Hodgson, Robinson, Endle, Skrefsrud), Dimasa (Stewart, Butler, Dundas), Lalung (LSI), Moran (Gurdon), Tipura (Endle, LSI), Deori Chutiya (N. Brown, W. Brown, LSI). The terminology given below is that of Bodo proper, the best known of these languages. K 601

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Bodo Consanguineal Terms

(a-)boi gM		(a-)bou gF	
{ai / (bi-)ma} M		(a-)p'a F	
ma-yong MoSi,FoBW		(a-)yong FoB,MoBW	
ma-doi MySi,FyBW		(a-)doi FyB,MySiH	
(a-)noi FSi,MBW		(a-)mai MB,FSiH	
(a-)bo oSi		(a-)da oB	
(bi-)ma nau ySi	a-goi ySb	p'ong-bai yB	
{(bi-)ǰu / hinjau ǰa} D		{(bi-)ǰa / howa ǰa} S	
	(bi-)ǰou gCh		

Notes:

The kinship terms in Bodo and the other Barish languages show a full set of prefixes corresponding to those in Kachin, viz. a-, nang- ~ nam- ~ na- ("thy"), and bi- ("his"). The bi- prefix appears under a variety of forms (p'i-, pi-, fi-), and in Dimasa reflects the feeling for vocalic harmony that has been developed in that language, e.g. ba-sa S, bu-su D, bi-di FyB, be-de MB.

Two of the most prominent vocalic shifts in Bodo are found in the gP terms, viz. a-bou < *bu gF, a-boi < *bi gM. Bodo has developed -ou (-au) ~ -o from final -u, and -oi from final -i, as shown in the following tables:

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	Kachin	Garo	Bodo	Dimasa	Deori
nine	jǎ-k'u	s-ku	s-ko	su-gu	d-gu
snake	lǎ-pu	ci-p'u	{ji-bou ji-bo	ju-bu	du-bu
water	mǎ-di*	ci	doi	di	ji
sweet	{dǎ-wi dwi	ci	ga-doi	gi-di	ji
die	si	si	t'oi	t'i	ci

*Note: Kachin mǎ-di "wet", but Nung t'i "water".

Gurdon cites a-bau (= a-bou) as a reciprocal term for gF, gCh, and for Moran cites a-lu as a similar reciprocal term (Moran a-le gM), but Hodgson gives separate terms for gF and gCh. Gurdon gives a single term, dai-dai (cf. da-da oB), for gF, gM in Dimasa, but this likewise cannot be supported from other sources. The reduplication, however, is typical of Dimasa; cf. Dimasa ba-ba F, ma-ma M, da-da oB, bi-bi oSi (Stewart). In other Dimasa sources we find a-ju gF, agreeing with Garo st-cu, and a-bi gM (Butler), agreeing with Bodo a-boi < *bi. The Bodo-Dimasa roots *bu gF and *bi gM parallel Burmese-Lolo *p'u gF, *p'i gM and are quite distinct from the Kachin terms ji gF, woi gM.

The term a-p'a ~ a-pa ~ a-fa ~ a-ba F is common to all the Bodo-Dimasa languages. Deori distinguishes between ci-pa F (2nd and 3rd persons) and ba-ba (1st and 2nd persons), the latter also used as a vocative. Ai M, found only in Bodo and Moran, has been tabulated as an (underlined) loan-word, from Assamese ai. Hodgson cites a-ya rather than ai,

601 and ai is used for a-ma in the 1st person, contrasting with bi-ma used in the 3rd person (vide the LSI), paralleling a-fa F (1st person), bi-fa (3rd person) (LSI). It would seem, therefore, that this Assamese loan-word ai has been analyzed a-i and equated with native terms with prefixed a-. Dimasa, Lalung, and Tipura, which have been much less influenced by Assamese, have only the native term a-ma ~ bo-ma. Deori has both ci-ma (cf. ci-pa F) and yo-yo (W. Brown), go-yo (LSI).

The PSb terms show so much variation from source to source that one must resort to a certain amount of reconstruction, as has been done in the table given above. Thus, Skrefsrud cites a-yong both as oA and oU, but Hodgson restricts the meaning to FB, and Robinson gives simply U. On the other hand, Skrefsrud cites bi-ma-yong both as FoB and MoSi, but in view of the feminine prefix (bi-ma) this term can hardly mean other than MoSi. Gurdon cites ai-yang (= ai-yong) FoSi, MoSi, where the same affixed element is combined with ai rather than ma M. The hypothetical combined term *pa-yong FoB has not been recorded for Bodo, but in Deori we find ma-yung A, pa-yung U. Finally, Dimasa has mai-yung MySi (also FoSi, MoSi in Gurdon), apparently for *ma-yung. The corresponding affixed element is -di ~ -doi, which appears in the following: Bodo a-doi FyB, also (nam-)p'-t'oi (for *p'a-t'oi), ma-doi MySi, bi-ma-doi MSi, FBF (Robinson has a-dei MSi paralleling a-nei FSi, and Gurdon has a-de MySi paralleling a-ne FySi); Moran ma-di FBF (= MSi); Dimasa bi-di FyB, ma-di UY, FySi.

601 The above material indicates that the MSi and FB terms are types of extensions from the M and F terms, with an element *yung used for the oSb of P, and *di used for ySb of P. In Dimasa yung is used as a magnitive suffix, e.g. mi-yung "elephant" < "large animal" (Garo mong < *m-yong), dau-yung "the greater horn-bill" < "large bird", and this would seem to explain the kinship term -yung. Yet Dimasa mai-yung seems to mean MySi rather than MoSi, and this element also appears in the term bu-p'i-yung yB (Dundas), bu-fai-yung (Gurdon), boi-fiang (LSI), pu-fuang (Hojai dialect, in LSI), Tipura no-fsung (LSI, text on p. 115), whence Bodo p'ong-bai yB, formed with the help of the Indic loan-word bhai yB. Dimasa also has the combined terms k'ai p'i-yung "relative", k'hi p'i-yung t'u "brothers born of the same mother", where k'ai must be understood as referring to oB (Assamese kaki oB). Here -yung seems to be cognate with Kachin yung B(ws). Bodo-Dimasa *di is both phonetically and semantically close to Kachin doi, Burmese t'we^3. Kachin ǎ-doi, Burmese sa^3-t'we^3 "youngest son" are matched by Bodo un-doi "a babe, little" (Skrefsrud), u-dui (= u-doi) "to be young" (Anderson, in LSI), Dimasa gi-di "younger child".

Bodo a-noi FSi (Robinson a-nai), na-ma-noi MBW represent the regular TB root *ni ~ *ne. Gurdon gives a-ne FySi, but ai-yang (= ai-yong) FoSi (= MoSi), and similarly for Moran cites ma-ni FySi but barai FoSi (= MoSi), a loan-word

601 from Assamese bar ai FoBW. Bodo a-mai MB,FSiH is a fully naturalized borrowing from Assamese mamai, id. Assamese characteristically has final -ai for Indic -a in its kinship terms; cf. also bopai F, dadai FyB, kakai oB, and these -ai forms are faithfully reflected in the Barish loan-words. Dimasa has a native term, viz. be-de MB, apparently connected with de-de FySi (Gurdon). Final -e is relatively rare in Dimasa, and these terms cannot be placed with any assurance.

The Sb terms show a like mixture of native and Assamese elements. Assamese bhai yB is represented by Bodo bahai (= bhai) "brother, friend", p'ong-bai < *p'i-yong-bai (vide supra) yB, and Moran bhai yB; Assamese bai oSi by Bodo bai, id. (Robinson); and Assamese kakai oB by Moran a-kai, id. (cf. a-mai < mamai MB), Dimasa k'ai p'i-yung "relative" < "oB and yB" (vide supra). The last example is somewhat doubtful, in view of the general scarcity of Assamese loan-words in Dimasa. Deori gogoi B (Sibsagar dialect) may also belong with Assamese kakai. Bodo a-bo oSi, cited only by Skrefsrud, cannot be placed, since the regular root is *bi, as in Moran ʔ-bi, Dimasa bi-bi oSi, Deori (Lakhimpur dialect) ci-bi Si (cf. *bi gM). Bi-ma nau ySi contains the TB root *nau ySb and is formed with the feminine affix bi-ma < ma N; the alternative forms bi-na nau, nang-na nau (Lalung na-nau) appear to have arisen through assimilation to the initial n- of the root. The root *nau does not appear in any other Barish kinship terms, having been displaced in

601 the original meaning "ySb" by Bodo a-goi (< *gi). The other languages of this group appear to lack any neuter term for ySb, but it must be remembered that our record of them is not complete. The root *da oB (Dimasa da-da), like *bi oSi, shows a connection with a gP term (cf. Tibetan, Tsangla, Abor-Miri). Dimasa has distinct terms both for yB (a-jang) and for ySi (ba-han-dau). The former seems to be entirely isolated in Barish and neighboring groups, and can be compared only with Tib. 'a-žang MB. Initial ž- is lacking in Dimasa and might well be represented by j-; cf. Dimasa k'a-jǎ "to be happy, merry", Tib. gža-ba "to sport, play", ga-ža ~ ga-gža "a jest, joke, laughter". In view of the extreme rarity of this element, however, the comparison is of no great value. Dimasa ba-han-dau ySi has been derived from *ba-ham-dau through assimilation to the initial d-, and perhaps ultimately from *ba-ham-nau (cf. Bodo bi-ma nau). For ba-ham < *ba-snam, vide the discussion infra of ba-ham-jik Dl.

We have no direct evidence for distinctions of speaker's sex in the Bodo-Dimasa Sb terms. One might suppose that in Bodo bi-ma nau is ySi(ms), p'ong-bai is yB(ws), and a-goi is ySb(ss), but no support for such an interpretation can be gained from the available sources.

Bodo bi-sa S is probably from TB *sa rather than *ts'a Ch (surd and sonant initials fluctuate in Barish). This term forms part of the name used by the Bodo for themselves, viz. Bara fi-sa "sons of the Bara", where Bara (=Boro, Bodo) is

601 connected with Tipura borok "human being". Wolfenden (1929a,b) correctly analyzed the element Bara, but attempted to connect fi-za directly with Tib. bu-ts'a "son", where the correct interpretation is simply "Bara-his-sons". Sex is distinguished with the aid of the affixed elements hows ~ hiwa "male" jala "male", jau ~ hinjau ~ jo "female", as in hows-ǎa p'i-ǎa-hows S, nang-ǎa-jala "(thy) S", hinjao-ǎa ~ p'i-ǎa-hinjao D, nang-ǎa-jo "(thy) D". The corresponding forms elsewhere are: Moren bi-sa S, bi-sa-ci D; Dimasa sa "diminutive suffix", an-sa Ch, ba-sa "son, nephew, young of animals"; Lalung sa Ch,S, sa-jao D; Tipura ba-sa Ch, ba-sa-la ~ sa-la S, ba-sa-juk ~ sa-juk D; Deori so-ǎa Ch, pi-ǎa S, pi-ǎa-si D. Tipura ba-sa-la ~ sa-la S gives a clue to the development of the masculine suffix represented by Bodo ja-la ~ za-la, Dimasa je-la, Garo ca-ra (rare) from TB *la, i.e. the first element of this affix may stand for TB *za Ch. The original form of the feminine suffix can be fixed as *juk or *jik (cf. Moshang, in Konyak group, ya-ǎik "woman"), since Dimasa shows the typical fluctuation between final -u (Plains dialect) and -ik (Hills dialect), e.g. kaing-a-ju ~ kaing-a-jik "married woman", ba-ham-ju ~ ba-ham-jik Di; ji-ru ~ ji-rik "to call"; ju ~ jik "to kick"; ha-ju ~ ha-jik " hill" (Garo a-cu "hill", but a-cik "hill-man" = Achik, the Garo term for themselves). Bodo bi-ǎu, Dimasa ba-su (Hojai dialect pu-su), sa-su D appear to be based on this same feminine affix, but the phonetic development is not clear.

601 Bodo bi-šou gCh, nang-šou-jala "(thy) gS", nang-šou-jo "(thy) gD" is directly cognate with Kachin šu gCh (Bodo -ou <-u, vide supra). Dimasa bu-su-t'ai gCh (Gurdon) contains the same root (su) plus the suffixed element -t'ai "fruit"; cf. Tib. sras Ch (respectful language), Lushei (Kuki group) ra' < *ras "fruit", and Nung, Burmish-Loloish *m-li gCh < *li "seed". Dimasa t'ai ~ ba-t'ai "fruit" (< TB *sei) has a number of figurative usages of this type, e.g. long-t'ai "stone" ("fruit of stone"), lum-t'ai "smallpox" ("fruit of fever"), wai-t'ai "embers" ("fruit of fire"), a-bo-t'ai "breast" ("fruit of breast" = "nipple"). Deori also has the root in the form pi-šu gS, pi-šu-ai gD.

The material on collateral terms is so poor that it has not been used in the above table of the Bodo nomenclature. Hodgson cites a-da and a-gai (= a-goi) as terms for "cousin (maternal, paternal)", and Dimasa ba-da is defined as "cousin" as well as "oB", whence we can infer that the Sb terms are extended to include parallel cousins. Skrefsrud cites nam-ba-noi "(thy) SiS", nang-a-noi "(thy) SiD", and nang-a-doi "(thy) oBCh", while Hodgson distinguishes among ba-nai-co (= ba-noi-co) SiS, bi-ya noi SiD, and bi-ya doi BS,BD. Since these are all probably men's terms, it can be inferred that pN and xN are differentiated. There is a hint here of reciprocal terminology, e.g. a-doi FyB and nang-a-doi oBCh are reciprocal kin, but a-noi FSi and nang-a-noi SiD do not fit into this scheme. Perhaps nang-a-noi is used for

601 BCh(ws) as well as for SiCh(ms), the former showing the reciprocal relationship with a-moi FSi. For Dimasa we have only ba-sa S,Ne (Dundas), bi-ǎa Nl (Butler), extended terms probably used only for pN. Butler also cites lura Ne, a loan-word from Assamese lora "boy".

The affinal terms have not been listed for Bodo, as our material again is of too poor quality. The few terms that have been recorded are difficult to analyze, with the exception of several Assamese borrowings. The latter include bainai ySiH, boinai WyB < Assamese bhainai ySiH; k'oinǎ W (said by oB to yB) < Assamese ghaini W; ǎali Sil (used in abuse) < Assamese sali WySi; apparently also beoai oSil,oBl < Assamese bau oBW; ǎalt'i ~ bi-ǎalt'i WSiH < Assamese salpati, id. Bajai oBW has every appearance of being a loan-word but its Assamese prototype has not yet been identified. The following are probably of native origin: bi-hau Fl, bi-k'un jo Nl, gu-moi oSiH, WoB (i.e. oBl), bi-b-nang Fl,Sil, bi-ja ma-doi Sl, bi-ǎai H, and bi-hi W. Bi-hau Fl (Skrefsrud) perhaps stands for *bi-hows ~ *bi-houa, lit. "his male" or "his father" (cf. Kachin wa, etc.). Gu-moi oBl, Moran ku-mi, Dimasa bi-gi-mi, id. appears to be a combined term formed from the elements *gu (Dimasa gi-mi < *gu-mi through vocalic harmony) and *mi; for the former, cf. Moso (Burmish-Loloish) a-gu Bl. Hodgson cites a-p'a Fl (= F), and Deori uses the vocative term ba-ba ~ ba-bi for Fl as well as F. For Dimasa, Gurdon

601 notes a distinction between bi-gi-si ySiH (=oSiH, WoB, vide supra) and be-brun-lung wyB (unanalyzed); cf. Moran lun-da ySiH. Bodo bi-ja ma doi Sl (Hodgson) is perhaps connected with bi-ya doi BCh (Hodgson), indicating a possible categorical equation Sl = xNo. The corresponding term in Dimasa, viz. bu-ja ma-di, is defined as "Dl" in the Dimasa-English vocabulary of Dundas, but as "Sl" in the English-Dimasa vocabulary; the latter must be accepted as the true meaning, since Dimasa has a distinct term (infra) for Dl. Deori pi-ji ~ a-ji Sl contains the same element doi < *di; cf. Deori ji "water", Bodo doi < *di; Deori ji "sweet", Bodo ga-doi < *ga-di. Finally, Dimasa ba-ham-ju ~ ba-ham-cik Dl contains the element ham < *sanam, represented also by Garo nam-cik Dl. The a- prefix form must be reconstructed to account for the h- < n- shift in Dimasa; cf. also Dimasa ham "good", Garo nam, id. For Dimasa ba-ham-jik Dl, ba-ham-dau ySi (supra), cf. Lashi (Maru group of Burmish-Loloish) tu-nam Dl, nam-mo ySi. Deori also has this root in the form ci-na (cf. ci-ma M, ci-pa F). Deori final -a regularly corresponds to Garo and Dimasa -am, e.g. Deori ma-tsa "otter", Garo mat-ram, Dimasa ma-t'am (Tib. sram); Deori li-ba-ji "dew", Garo ri-pam-ci, Dimasa ra-bam-di (-ji ~ -ci ~ -di "water"); Deori su-ta-si "a [illegible]", Garo tam-pi, Dimasa t'am-pi ~ t'am-su-ma.

The three best established affinal terms can thus be tabulated as follows:

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	Bodo	Dimasa	Deori
B1	gu-moi	(bi-)gi-m	-
S1	[illegible]-ja ma-doi	ba-ja ma-di	(pi-)ji
D1		ba-bam-cik	(ci-)na

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The Garo division of Barish includes two distinct subtypes, which the writer has named Garo A and Garo B. Of the five groups commonly called Garo, viz. Abeng, Achik, Awe, Atong, and Ruga, the first three belong to Garo B (Achik has become the standard Garo dialect and the last two to Garo A. All of these are spoken in the Garo Hills, but Atong and Ruga, of Garo A type, have a somewhat marginal distribution in the southwestern section of the area. The Garo dialect spoken in Jalpaiguri north of the Brahmaputra is also of Garo A type. The remaining Garo A languages are Tintekiya Koch and Rabha, which are spoken in the Garo foothills and the neighboring plains. The distinction made here was recognized in a general way by Playfair (pp. 18-22), but the point has never been elaborated. The evidence for two distinct movements of Garo-speaking peoples into the Garo Hills is unmistakable, with the Garo A peoples representing the older stratum, the Garo B peoples the newer. Both the Koch and Rabha have traditions of having been driven from the Garo Hills, and the Rabha are definitely connected with the Atong (vide Pereira). Despite the scarcity of sources for the Garo A languages, one can establish both

197 phonetic and lexical differences between the two types. Thus, Garo B (Achik) final -l is represented by -n (-ng in Rabha), e.g. Achik sal "sun", Atong rang-san, Ruga ra-san-a, Koch (Tintekiya) ra-ǰan, Jalpaiguri Garo ra-san, Rabha rang-ǰang (rang is root for "heaven"); Achik cel-a <*cal "far", Atong jan-a, Ruga jan-o, Koch jan-au, Jalpaiguri Garo pi-jan, Rabha jang-au. Lexical distinctions appear in some of the most common words:

	Achik	Atong	Ruga	Koch	Rabha	J. Garo
dog	a-cak	kai	kui-a	kui	ki	kni
head	sko	dikim	dukum-a	-	dikam	dakam
hair	kni	kau	kau	k'au	k'oro*	hauru*
moon	ja	cangae	ra-rek	na-rek	-	rang-ret

*Note: cf. Dimasa koro "head".

Garo is a language of some political importance and hence has been described by a number of writers, both in English and Assamese. None of the sources examined by the writer, however, is satisfactory from the present point of view. The pretentious work of Bonnerjea is incomplete in the lexicographic sense and misleading in the linguistic sense. Bonnerjea had no first-hand knowledge of the language, yet employed a meticulous phonetic orthography which lends a specious accuracy to the forms cited. A single word is often cited under two or more forms, and in general there is an entire lack of critical acumen. The most complete source for Garo is the English-Garo Dictionary published by the

197 Garo Mission (GM), intended for the use of native Garo pupils. The definitions are all in Garo and this dictionary is therefore difficult to handle, but this source must not be neglected, as Bonnerjea appears to have done. Garo (Achik) word-lists also are found in Williamson and Robinson, and the LSI presents material both for Achik and Abeng (Garo B). No new material is presented in Hodson's article on Garo and Khasi. The sources for Garo A are the following: LSI (Jalpaiguri Garo, Dacca Koch, Atong, Ruga, and, in the text on p. 89, Cooch Behar Garo), Hodgson, 1849 (Garo list; forms agree with those of Jalpaiguri Garo), Williamson (Tintekiya Koch), and Playfair (Appendix F contains lists of Ruga, 601 Rabha, and Tintekiya Koch). In kinship nomenclature the Garo A languages exhibit only minor discrepancies with the Garo B, which is tabulated below.

<u>Garo Consanguineal Terms</u>

(a-)bi FM		(a-)cu FF
(am-)bi MM		(ang-)cu MF
(a-)ma M		(a-)p'a F
(a-)jong MoSi		p'a-jong FoB
(a-)di MySi		(a-)wang FyB
ma-ni FSi		<u>mama</u> MB
(a-)bi oSi		(a-)da oB
no ySi		jong yB
de-me-cik D	bi-sa Ch	de-p'an-te S
		(ang-)ri SiS
	su gCh	

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Garo Affinal Terms

ma-ni Kl		a-bu-di Fl	
jik W		se H	
	bo-ning Sil,Bl	gu-me Bl	
		isnek WB	
sari HSl		sadhu WSiH	
nam-cik Dl		nok-rong / cowari	Sl

Notes:

Bonnerjea records four gP terms, as listed above, and the GM cites both a-bi and am-bi gM, but the evidence cannot be regarded as altogether convincing. Am-bi can be derived from *ang-bi through assimilation to the initial b- of the root, thus yielding the parallel forms ang-bi "my gM", ang-cu "my gF" (ang "my"), and note also ang-ri "my SiS". The distinction is perhaps of some significance in view of the matrilineal bias of Garo society. Garo a-cu gF corresponds to Dimasa a-ju, but the GM also cites a term bu-de gF, which agrees with Bodo a-bou < *bu. Possible Tibeto-Burman cognates to the root cu ~ ju gF are represented by Lepcha a-tsu "male suffix", and Kachin a-ts'u " disembodied spirit, ghost", Burmese a-ts'u "numerary adjunct for deities".

The Garo A languages ordinarily have a-wa F in place of Garo a-p'a, viz. Koch a-wa (Williamson), Jalpaiguri and Cooch Behar Garo a-wa, Atong wa, but Koch (Hodgson) a-ba,

601 Ruga a-ba ~ ba-baa; cf. Kachin wa, and Bodo howa "male". Robinson cites both a-ma and ai for standard Garo (Achik), but this Assamese loan-word (ai) does not appear in other Garo sources.

With the exception of a-wang FyB, the PSb terms are of Bodo-Dimasa type. Garo jong is exactly cognate with Bodo yong, Dimasa yung; cf. Garo jong "insect" (GM), Bodo gu-yong "locust", Dimasa, Deori yung "insect". Note that Garo employs the a- prefix forms for MSi, whereas Bodo employs them for FB, but prefixes ma- in at least one instance (ma-jong "aunt", in GM). Robinson cites a-de MSi, and the GM gives ma-de "aunt" (cf. the discussion of de infra). Robinson also cites am-bi FSi (= MM) rather than the regular term ma-ni. Garo a-oang (= a-wang) FyB (Bonn), a-wang FB (Robinson) appears to be cognate with Mung a-wang FB, but the root is not well represented in Tibeto-Burman. In the Cooch Behar Garo text (LSI, p. 89) we find ei-ti MSi, apparently for *ai-di (Assamese ai M). Garo ma-ni FSi, MBW (Cooch Behar Garo mo-ni MBW) agrees with Koran ma-ni FySi rather than Bodo *a-noi < *ni in having ma M prefixed in combination. Mama MB appears to have been derived from Indic mAmA rather than from the specifically Assamese form mamai (Bodo a-mai). Note that the full form has been retained in Garo.

The Garo Sb terms closely agree with those of Bodo-Dimasa, with the neuter term for ySb lacking as in Dimasa. Garo no ySi < TB *nau ySb, as in Bodo-Dimasa; cf. Garo do

601 "bird", Bodo and Dimasa dau; Garo so "to rot", Bodo seau, Dimasa sau; Garo t'o "oil", Bodo and Dimasa t'au (Kachin sau "oil, fat, grease"). The -au vocalism is retained in Tintekiya Koch ja-nau, Cooch Behar Garo ji-nau, Jalpaiguri Garo a-nau, Atong nau Si (probably for ySi). Jong yB is not connected with Dimasa a-jang, id., since Garo has -ang, -eng, and -ing all corresponding to Dimasa -ang, but never -ong. The Dimasa cognate, as shown above, is bu-p'i-yung yB, perhaps the woman's term as contrasted with a-jang, the man's term (sex of speaker is not specified in our Dimasa sources). Kachin jung B(ws) is a likely extra-Bariah cognate. Assamese borrowings in the Sb terms are limited to Ruga bai oSi < Assamese bai, id., Dacca Koch boin Si < Assamese bhain ySi, and Tintekiya Koch bhai B < Assamese bhai yB.

The Bodo-Dimasa root sa < *za Ch is represented by Achik bi-sa, Tintekiya Koch sa-sa, Ruga pi-sa, Jalpaiguri Garo, Atong sa Ch. An alternative term, viz. de, appears in Achik and Abeng de Ch, de-p'an-te ~ de-pan-te S, de-me-cik D. The CM cites ma-de "aunt, step-mother", where -de seems to function as a diminutive (cf. Burmese mǎ-t'we^{3} "MySi, step-mother"), and one is tempted to bring into comparison Dimasa de-de FSi, be-de MB. Garo final -e, however, has in most instances been derived from TB -ai and corresponds to -ai in Bodo-Dimasa; cf. Garo sre "tongue", Bodo si-lai, Moran se-lai, Dimasa sa-lai (Tib. lce < *s-lei);

601 Garo bi-t'e ~ bi-te "fruit", Bodo, Moran bi-t'ai, Dimasa ba-t'ai (TB *sai). The Garo B languages generally retain a final diphthong (-ai, -oi) in this series; cf. Ruga telai "tongue" (Achik sre), and Atong, Koch, Jalpaiguri Garo goi, Ruga gai, corresponding to the Achik numerary adjunct ge (generic classifier). Dacca Koch has doi (= Garo de) Ch, mi-ã-doi S (mi-ã "male", cf. Jalpaiguri Garo mi-wa "male", a-wa F), jong-doi yB, no-ga-doi yBi, showing the fullest development of this element. We can further trace it in Garo p'an-te ~ pan-te "unmarried young man" (da-p'an-te S), man-dè "man (homo)". The latter is commonly etymologized as "child of Man" (Man = Burmese), but the correct analysis seems to be p'an-te < *p'a-ni-te "father-of child", man-de < *ma-ni-de "mother-of child" (ni is the Garo genitive particle); cf. Bara fi-sa = Bodo (supra). If this interpretation is correct, de must be regarded as a secondary sonant variant of te; cf. jik "wife", me-cik "wife, woman, female". In view of the Dimasa use of "fruit" for "gCh", we can further connect this term te ~ de with bi-t'e ~ bi-te "fruit" (Dimasa ba-t'ai).

Of the Garo collateral terminology we know only the single term (ang-)ri "(my) SiS", probably to be interpreted as a man's term for his xNe. This lone term is unusually interesting, however, for it constitutes an important link with Chang (Konyak) li xNe. The initials are regular, since Garo lacks initial l- and has replaced it with r-, as in sre "tongue", Dimasa sa-lai; srak "to lick", Dimasa sa-lau < *sa-lak; cri "bow", Dimasa jili.

601 Garo su gCh (Playfair, texts, p. 119) (su-gi-pa in GM) is directly linked with Bodo šou < šu, Dimasa bu-su-t'ai, and Kachin šu. Thus Garo has (ang-)ri < *li xNe, as in Chang, but šu gCh, as in Kachin, while Chang has ši gCh paralleling Kachin šu ma-ši ggCh.

The affinal nomenclature is a medley of native and Assamese terms, such as was found in Bodo-Dimasa. The native terms include se H (Dimasa sai), jik W, me-cik "woman" (Dimasa ju ~ jik), gu-me Bl (GM) (Dimasa bi-gi-mi oSiH,ySiH,WoB), and bo-ning WSi (Bonn), Bl (GM). Bo-ning is apparently connected with Bodo bi-b-nang Bl,Sil, and must be compared with Chang (Konyak) a-nyang < *ning Sil(we), Kachin ning, id. The nature of the distinction between bo-ning and gu-me is not known, nor is the latter term analyzable, though the element -me is perhaps identical with the first element of me-cik "woman". The Garo and Bodo-Dimasa terms are not strictly comparable, since Garo me should correspond to Bodo-Dimasa *mai, and Garo *mi to Bodo-Dimasa mi. Garo se H = Bodo-Dimasa sai shows the normal correspondence, however; cf. Garo se-a "to select Bodo and Dimasa sai ("husband" < "the selected one").

Garo ma-ni Hl,FSi,MBW constitutes the most important categorical equation yet uncovered in the Barish group. Compare also a-jong MoSi,FoBW, and the corresponding terms in Bodo. As in Indic, the term mama is used only for MB, not for Fl. Garo a-bu-di Fl looks like a development from

601 the root bu gF (bu-de gF, in GM), perhaps "little gF" (cf. a-di MySi). According to the tables in McSwiney, both Abeng (Garo B) and Atong (Garo A) equate WF and HF with MB and FSiH, and WM and HM with FSi and MBW, but the terms involved are not given. Since Garo has replaced the native term for MB with the Indic loan-word mama, we might regard a-bu-di Fl as the original term for MB, and this view is strengthened by the appearance of the term be-de MB in Dimasa (the indicated etymology is not thereby ruled out). Cf. also the term o-bi-te Fl found in the GM dictionary, with the ordinary prefix bi- ("his"). For the o- element here, cf. ni-o Ml cited by Playfair (text on p. 119) and the GM.

Nam-cik Dl (Dimasa be-ham-ju ~ ba-ham-jik) is from the TB root *nam ~ *snam, but the parallel TB root *mag ~ *smag is nowhere in evidence. Nok-rong (Bonn) ~ nok-rom (Bose) and cowari (Bose) are applied to two distinct types of son-in-laws, which have been described by Bose in some detail. The <u>cowari</u> (< Assamese jowain Sl, apparently influenced by Assamese bowari Dl) is the ordinary son-in-law, who receives no especial favors from his father-in-law and lives in a separate house in his wife's village. The <u>nok-rong</u>, on the other hand, is especially selected, usually from among a man's sister's sons, and lives in the home of his parents-in-law. After the death of his father-in-law, he manages the property which is inherited by his wife. If his mother-in-law is still living and thus still in charge

601 of the property, he must marry her as a second wife or else lose his claim to the property. The nok-rong of a nok-ma (head-man) succeeds to the latter's office. The institution of the nok-rong may be regarded as a device for transmitting control over property in the male line (a man selects his nok-rong from among his sister's sons), even though the property itself is inherited in the female line. Playfair, who writes nok-rom rather than nok-rong, derives the term from nok "house" and krong "house-post", i.e. "support of the house" (p. 73), and this explanation is better than any other that can be suggested.

In addition to cowari Bl, Indic loan-words are represented by sari HBi < Indic sali FyBi, sadhu WSiH, apparently derived from Assamese sahu Fl, and isnok WB (unidentified).

In general, Garo has been less influenced than Bodo by the Assamese terminology. The Assamese borrowings reach their peak in Moran, which has a-bai F (bopai), barai FoSi, MoSi, MySi (bar ai FoBW), ai M (ai), a-kai oB (kakai), bhai yB (bhai), and probably also a-mai MB as in Bodo (mamai), though Gurdon does not cite the terms for "uncle".

The matrilineal society of the Garo is well known to anthropologists and need not be described here in any detail. Our Garo sources (Playfair, Bose, Walker) are not altogether in agreement with one another, and our information on the other Barish groups, in Endle, 1911 (Kachari = Bodo, Rabha, Moran, Deori Chutiya), Allen (Lalung), Grace (Hill Kachari = Dimasa), Lewin (Tipura), and Pereira (Rabha), is not very extensive.

601 For the Garo, Playfair (p. 64) recognizes three exogamous septs (katchi), viz. Momin, Marak, and Sangma, the first of which (Momin) is confined to the Awe section of the Garo. Walker recognizes only two exogamous groups, the Marak and Sangma, but notes that in some tribes of the Garo (unspecified) Momin Marak. Bose (1934) makes the following statement:

> We have been able to complete the investigation of the social system of the Garos, specially [sic] amongst the Abengs, the Atongs and the Ganchings in southern central part of the Garo Hills. The Garos, as far as our informations [sic] show, definitely possess a tripartite system instead of a dual which Hodson ascribes to them on the authority of the Census Report of 1911. (p. 28)

Each of these exogamous divisions, whether two or three, is made up of a number of exogamous matrilineal clans or 'motherhoods', which are called ma-chong or ma-sa (Playfair, note to text on p. 134), the latter formed from (a-)ma M and (bi-)sa Ch. According to the clan names listed in Playfair, Appendix A (Walker states that his own list, which is not given, differs from Playfair's in many details), most of the clans are limited to a single katchi, and none is found in all three katchi.

Walker describes exogamous moities (Sinching and Ajum) for the Tintiki (=Tintikiya) Koch (Garo A). The Rabhas are said to have exogamous clans but no generic terms for them (Walker). Pereira states that these clans (barai) are matrilineal and exactly correspond to the Garo ma-chong. He further notes that two barai may unite to form a single ex-

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egamous unit. Walker indicates a dual organisation for the Rabha, perhaps even a four- or eight-class system, but his account is not clear:

> They have subdivisions in two groups, anyone of one subdivision being restricted in choice of mate to a subdivision of the other group. (p. 1[illegible]8)

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The Bodo-Dimasa tribes appear to lack the dual or tripartite divisions found among the Garo groups, but do possess exogamous clans. Engle (1911, pp. 24 and ff.) describes a number of sub-tribes among the Kachari or Bodo, and states that these were formerly endogamous, yet at a later point (p. 27) mentions the existence of 16 exogamous subdivisions among the Gowalpara Mech (Mech= Bodo or Kachari). P. T. Gurdon, the editor of Endle's work, notes this inconsistency and questions the existence of endogamous groups among the Bodo at any period. The accounts of the Dimasa (Endle, pp. 27-28, Grace) are equally vague. Endle states that this tribe has some 80 clans, of which 40 are known as men's clans (gang-fang) and 40 as women's clans (zŭlu), and Grace refers to the same distinction, but nothing is said of the nature of the organization of these clans. All the Dimasa clans, with the exception of the Ha-chum-sa (royal clan), are said to be exogamous (Endle). The Lalung clans are likewise exogamous, with the exception of the Hasorang (P. M. Moore, in Allen).

The Garo and Rabha are known to be matrilineal, but we lack specific information on descent reckoning in the Bodo-Dimasa group. As noted above, among the Garo property is

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transmitted from mother to daughter but the actual control over it is passed down in the male line, from father to father's sister's son (belonging to the same ma-chong). The Rabha have matrilineal descent, as among the Garo, but property is handed down from father to son and women are completely barred from inheritance, as in Hindu law. Pereira calls this a "transitional" stage, but it would be more natural to regard the Garo condition as a transitional stage from which the Rabha has been developed. The Lalung, who belong to the Bodo-Dimasa stock, show another sort of compromise, if we can rely on the account given by Moore (in Allen). Among this tribe a man may enter his wife's clan or a woman may enter her husband's clan, but all property and children of the marriage belong to the clan adopted at the time of the wedding. Furthermore, a man may leave his adopted wife's clan on her death, but loses all claim to the property and children.

A third feature which can be established for the Garo but not for the Bodo-Dimasa groups is cross-cousin marriage. The Garo nok-rong institution involves the marriage of a man with his mother's brother's daughter, but since there is only one nok-rong per family of daughters it follows that most Garo marriages do not involve cross-cousins. The term ma-ni FSi,Ml undoubtedly reflects this practice, and a-bu-di Fl can perhaps be interpreted in a similar manner (vide supra). It is unfortunate that our information on the Garo nomenclature

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for collateral and affinal kin is so meagre, for we should expect to find some distinctive features here. The Rabha, of Garo A type, prohibit marriage with "paternal cousins" even though the couple are of different baria, but marriage with either FSiD or MBD is permitted. Pereira notes that a man having only one daughter and no son may adopt his sister's son, to whom he gives his daughter in marriage; cf. the Garo nok-rong institution. Among the Hill Kachari (= Dimasa), a man may not marry into his mother's clan, nor a daughter into her father's clan, according to the account given by Grace; the latter restriction, with matrilineal descent, would rule out marriage of a woman with her FSiS, hence also marriage of a man with his MBD.

The nok-rong institution of the Garo seems to represent merely the formalization of a basic pattern of the Barish-speaking peoples, whence we can infer that the cross-cousin marriage associated with it likewise represents a pattern of cross-cousin marriage in general. The Rabha custom described above represents one facet of this pattern, and the Bodo practice of son-in-law service represents another. Hodgson (p. 178), who gives from 2 to 5 or 7 years as the term of service, states that the native term for this custom is gaboi, undoubtedly derived from boi "to serve as a slave, to lend oneself as slave in return of money taken" (Skrefsrud), and cf. Lushei (Kuki group) boi' "slave". Endle (pp. 44-45) draws a distinction between two types of son-in-law service,

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viz. giao ghar-jiya and mal ghar-jiya. In the former type, the term lasts from 3 or 4 to 12 or 15 years, after which the couple are free to depart (cohabitation is allowed after about 12 or 18 months' service). In the latter type, the man severs all connection with his own family and completely identifies himself with that of his bride, in whose house he serves until the death of her parents, when with his wife he is entitled to the whole or the usual share of their property (and retains no claim on the property of his own parents). This second type narrowly approaches the Garo nok-rong institution, despite the fact that the Bodo transmit property from father to sons (Endle, p. 32), though we do not know whether or not a man selects his sister's son to play this role. The interesting account of the Tipura given by Lewin (pp. 80-82) includes mention of a period of three years' service by the future son-in-law. Matrilocal residence is indicated by the last few lines of the autobiographical account of a young Tipura man, viz:

> I slept there [in girl's parents' house] that night, and many nights afterwards, till at last the old people [i.e. the girl's parents] called me son, and I left my father's house and lived there for good. She is my wife now. (p. 82)

We have seen that the Garo division of the Barish-speaking peoples (Garo and Rabha) exhibit three prominent features, viz. dual or tripartite organization, matrilineal reckoning of descent, and cross-cousin marriage, none of which can be established for the Bodo-Dimasa division. The

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inadequacy of our sources may account for some of these differences, yet we must recognize the existence of a cultural cleavage paralleling the linguistic division.

Linguistic note: Dimasa ba-haing "relations, kindred", from haing "flesh" (Garo be-en). Cf. the Tibetan-Lepcha use of ša "flesh" for relatives on mother's side, and rus-pa "bone" for relatives on father's side. The Dimasa term suggests matrilineal reckoning.

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12. Mikir

197 Mikir is the first of the Kuki-type languages to be considered in the present survey. It is spoken in the Mikir Hills, south of the Brahmaputra, and adjacent areas, i.e. northwest of the main body of the Kuki languages proper (vide the diagram in pt. 15). The writer has classified this language as Kukic, in contradistinction to the Kukish languages (Kuki, Naga, and transitional groups). Early writers, apparently influenced by geographical considerations, compared Mikir with the Bodo (Barish) languages, and in the LSI the misleading term "Bodo-Naga" was applied to the language. The true affinities of the Mikir, both linguistic and cultural, were first pointed out by Sir Charles Lyall in a final chapter (VII) on "Affinities" in the standard Mikir ethnography The Mikirs, based on material collected by Stack but edited by Lyall (cited as SL). Lyall made a number of comparisons with the Kuki languages, most of which are acceptable, and the writer has examined Mikir phonology at some length. The lexical resemblances are predominantly with Kuki, but many important links also exist with Barish, Kachin, and Burmish-Loloish. In its far-reaching affiliations Mikir can be compared with Kachin, the 'nexus' of Tibeto-Burman.

The most complete source for Mikir is the dictionary by Walker, which is much more extensive than the earlier work by
601 Neighbor. A list of kinship terms appears in SL, p. 20, and additional information can be gleaned from the annotated texts

601 included in this work. The list by Robinson, recorded ca. 1850, is of especial interest because of its early date. Of minor importance is the Mikir material in Butler, Stewart, and the LSI.

Mikir Consanguineal Terms

p'i gM		p'u gF
pei, pi M		po F
pi-nu MSi		pu-nu FB
ni FSi		ong, ni-hu MB
te oSi(ws)		ik oS
ing-jir-pi oSi(ms)	mu ySb; kor, kor-te Sb	cek-le B(ws)
		kor-po MBS(ws)
so-pi D	so Ch	so-po S
p'i-li-pi Ni		p'i-li-po Ne
		kor-a-so BS
		o-sa SiS(ms)
su-pi gD		su-po gS

Mikir Affinal Terms

ni-pi, ni-hai WH	hu-po, ong-hai WF
ni MBW, WBW	lok-hai HF
te-pi BW(ms)	ong-so WB
neng · BW(ws)	me, kor-po SiH
kor-pi WSi	o-sa Si

601 **Notes:**

Standard TB roots are represented by Mikir p'u gF, p'i gM, and p'o F < TB *p'a; cf. Mikir p'a-ngo < *ba-nga "5", a-vo < *wa "bird", co < *dza "to eat". Pei ~ pe M (the second form is perhaps the more common) can be reconstructed either as *pei or *pai, since Mikir, like Tibetan, substitutes final -e for these two diphthongs, e.g. Mikir me, Tib. me, TB *mei "fire"; Mikir de, Tib. lce (< c-le), TB *s̆-lei "tongue", and Mikir ei "I" , Kachin ai ~ ngai; Mikir ce-te "navel", Tib. lte-ba, Kachin s̆a-dai; Mikir prei "botch, mar, spoil", Burmese prai "to waste"; Mikir re "cunning, skilful, clever, sharp", Burmese rai^3 "bold"; Mikir se "sound, noise, voice, tone", Burmese sai^3 "to be noisy"; Mikir me "good, beautiful , Kachin mai. If the form is reconstructed as *pai, a comparison is available with Burmese a-pai "madam". Mikir pi M has the basic meaning "female", the regular feminine suffix being a-pi, paired with a-lo (masc.), from TB *la. Pi is directly cognate with the Kukish root *pui; Mikir lacks this final diphthong and has substituted -i, as in ti "egg", Kukish *tui. The appearance of this distinctively Kukish root in Mikir is worthy of notice. Pei ~ pe is used in address for "D" (note to text on p. 148 in SL), paralleling Burmese mi^3 M,D, and pe is similarly applied to "S" or "gS" (SL, texts on p. 99, 101, 121).

The terms pi-nu MSi (a-nu in Robinson) and pu-nu FB appear to contain the Kukish root *nu M. The latter stands

601 for *po-nu, the modern form reflecting the vocalic harmony characteristic of Mikir; Butler cites the earlier form po-nu. The two terms are thus exactly analogous. If the above derivation is correct, the element -nu has retained its feminine force only in pi-nu MSi, whence perhaps pu-nu < *po-nu through analogy.

Mikir ni FSi and ni-hu MB are from the standard TB roots *ni and *k'u, respectively, the latter being a novel combination of the two roots. The development h- < k'- is normal for Mikir; cf. Mikir a-hem <*k'yim "house"; ing-ho <*ma-k'a "mouth"; ho <*k'a "bitter"; hi <*k'wi "dog" (hi cited only in Robinson, our earliest Mikir source). The alternative term ong MB, for which no comparisons have been found, seems to have an essentially honorific connotation.

The Mikir Sb terms show an unusual arrangement, though one essentially of Tibeto-Burman type, with distinctions both of sex of speaker and of age. The definitions in the above tabulation are those given by SL, who specify that ik and mu are used by both sexes. Walker, however, defines ik as "oB(ms),yB(ws),FyBS(os)", as well as "sir", and in SL (text on p. 111) this term is used in address to MB. The comparison with Burmese ats-kui < *ik-kui oB has already been made (pt. 9); note Burmese -kui < *ku, apparently related to the TB root for "MB". Mikir te oSi(ws) can be derived from TB *tei, with irregular representation, e.g. Kanauri a-te oB, Kadu a-te oSi. Robinson, our earliest Mikir source, cites a-te oB, suggesting an original meaning "oSb". Note that in Mikir, at any rate,

601 this root is distinct from TB *t'ei "big", as represented by Mikir t'e "great, large, big", Nung t'e, id., and Tib. mt'e-bo ~ t'e-bo "thumb, big toe". For "oSi" the same authority gives bai, an Assamese loan-word. The phrase bhin (kali) bha (kali), in SL, text, p. 119, is defined as "Si"; it appears to have been derived from Assamese bhain ySi and bhai yS. Aside from these terms, Assamese loan-words do not appear in the Mikir kinship nomenclature, and this despite the considerable body of Assamese words in the language as a whole.

Mikir mu ySb is of uncertain affiliations. The original may have been *mu, *mou, or *mau, since these three finals are confused in Mikir. The most likely comparison, perhaps, is with the root *mu "seed", found in Lushei (mu) and Lakher (hmo) as well as in Mikir itself (mu), and in Khami (Southern Kuki) represented by the word a-mu "clan". For the semantics involved, cf. the discussion supra (pt. 8) of the Mung-Burmese root *mə-li gCh. Kadu, which has retained the term a-te oSi, also has a-mu oS, which may or may not be cognate with the Mikir term.

The remaining Sb terms do not lend themselves to analysis. The use of an especial term (kor ~ kor-te) for "Sb" is most unusual. Stewart cites the term in the meaning "friend", and it is reasonably certain that this general connotation was the earlier one. Ing-jir-pi has been derived from *ing-jil(-pi), the final -l being retained in the early record by Robinson (Butler cites the odd variant form ning-jir-pi Si). Cek-le B(ws) cannot be analyzed.

601 Mikir so Ch can be compared with either TB *ts'a or *za, since Mikir substitutes s- for either initial (e.g. sek "joint", Tib. ts'igs, Burmese ts'ats < *ts'ik), and -o < -a is the normal Mikir shift (supra). So < *za is the more likely derivation, in view of the general Tibeto-Burman evidence. The xN term o-sa is difficult to interpret, since final -a is rare in Mikir and cannot be placed within the normal Tibeto-Burman phonetic framework. If the obvious comparison with Tib. ts'a Ne,gCh be made, some non-phonetic factor or factors must be invoked to explain the development so < *za Ch but o-sa < *ts'a Ne. The first element of this term may be connected with ong MB; cf. the vacillation in ong ~ o "much", lang ~ la "verbal continuative affix".

Almost nothing is known of the Mikir collateral terminology. Kor-po MBS(ws) is found in SL, text. p. 127, where the meaning is clear from the context (and cf. Lyall's note to this page). Walker cites ik in the meaning "FyBS(os)", and mu in the meaning "FBS", showing that Sb terms are extended to include parallel cousins. Kor-a-so BS is an analytical term, as is ik-a-so oBS; Butler cites ko-a-so Mi, (no-)kor-a-so Ne. Since o-sa is used for SiS(ms), it can be inferred that p'i-li-po and p'i-li-pi are a woman's terms for BS and ZD, respectively. The basic term *p'i-li xN is most significant, since we can relate it directly to the Mung-Burmese root *ma-li gCh and the Konyak root *li xN. In Mikir prefix p'- (vocalised to harmonize with vowel of root) stands for the TB prefix b- as represented in Kukish, while ing- stands for the prefix ma-,

601 e.g. Mikir ing-ho "mouth", Kachin ma-k'a. Nung also has a labial stop prefix, while Kachin has ma-. In Burmese both prefixes are ordinarily dropped, but m- may be retained before r- (probably when the original prefix was ma- rather than ba-, but this point has not yet been settled).

	Kukish	Mikir	Kachin	Nung	Burmese
five	*ba-nga	p'o-ngo	ma-nga	pa-nga	nga^3
four	*ba-li	p'i-li	ma-li	a-ba-li	le^3
gCh, xN	-	p'i-li	ma-li*	p'a-li	mre^3
snake	*ba-rul	{p'u-rul {p'u-rui	-	-	mrwe

*Note: Kachin ma-li "young man".

Mikir agrees with Meithei and differs from Kukish in its retention of the root *su gCh, which has been encountered in Kachin, Konyak, and Barish.

The affinal terminology presents several categorical equations or partial equations. The WP terms are formed from ni FSi and (ni-)hu MB with the aid of the sex-suffixes -pi and -po or the unanalyzed suffix -hai. The latter may be essentially honorific, to judge from its association with ong MB, and its use in the new term lok-hai WF. It would seem that the term ni FSi is used affinally, without suffixed elements, only in the meanings "MBW" and "WBW" (Walker), but we should expect it to have the additional meaning "HM" (this term has not been recorded). Both ni and pi-nu are incorrectly defined in the table in SL, p. 20, but corrections can be made from the list on p. 155 and the Mikir texts (pp. 111 and 141).

601 The term ong-so WB is to be interpreted analytically as "S of MB", and thus presents an equation MBS = WB. Similarly, kor-po SiH is a woman's term (vide SL, text, p. 127 and note) and thus presents another equation MBS(ws) = SiH(ws). Me SiH is probably a man's term (it can be reconstructed either *mei or *mai, vide supra). A third term is cited for SiH, viz. ing-jir-ar-lo, containing the element ing-jir-pi oSi(ms). Another categorical equation is found in o-sa Sl = SiS(ms).

Mikir neng BW(ws) is directly related to Kachin ning, id. Mikir has medial e for i in a number of roots, e.g. kep < *kip "10"; a-mek < *mik "eye"; a-hem < *k'yim "house"; neng(-kan) < *ning "year"; rek < *s-rik "louse"; sek < *ts'ik "joint".

The nomenclature analyzed above agrees rather closely with the Mikir marriage practices as described in SL (the only ethnographic source of any importance in this connection). The Mikirs are divided into three large sections, viz. the Amri, Chintong, and Ronghang, which are primarily geographical and of no consequence as regards marriage. The exogamous unit is the patrilineal kur. SL describe four kur (Ingti, Terang = "bachelor's house", Lekthe, Timung), but a fifth (Teran ~ Teron) is described by other authorities (vide the full discussion in SL, Appendix on pp. 23-27). There are no indications that the kur are grouped in any manner. Preferential marriage with MBD can be inferred from the following statement in SL:

> The children are counted to the father's kur, and cannot marry within it. They may, however, marry their first cousins on the mother's side, and indeed this appears to have been formerly the most usual match. (p. 17)

601 In the Mikir story of The Orphan and his Uncles (SL, pp. 53 and ff.) we find an incident in which the orphan, shut up in an iron cage by his maternal uncles, blames his plight on his refusal to marry one of his uncles' daughters. The categorical equations in the Mikir nomenclature all point to cross-cousin marriage, and the presence of separate terms for WF (hu-po ~ ong-hai) and HF (lok-hai) indicate that it is of unilateral type. The Mikir features in general, then, strictly conform to the wider Tibeto-Burman pattern that has gradually emerged from the present study.

The Mikir material provides some valuable points in re the general problem of borrowing. Mikir has been heavily influenced by Khasi, the Mon-Khmer language spoken in the neighboring Khasi and Jaintia Hills, both in language and in culture. Thus, the word kur "clan" has been borrowed from Khasi, and the ka- prefix used in women's names, along with a large number of Khasi words of other types and some grammatical elements, e.g. the prefixed imperative particle to- (vide SL, text on p. 139, note). Cultural borrowings include dress (in general), divination methods, and funeral ceremonies and the erection of a stone memorial (cf. SL, p. 152). Yet Mikir has retained intact its patrilineal mode of reckoning descent, and appears not to have borrowed a single Khasi kinship term. Contrast the situation that obtains among the Garo, who in general perhaps show less Khasi influence (certainly as regards language), yet have a fully developed matrilineal kinship system of Khasi type.

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13. Meithei

[101] 197 The Meithei (Manipuri) are the ruling people of the Native State of Manipur, which is centrally located in the general Burma-Assam area under surveillance. On the west is the British District of Cachar, on the north the Naga Hills, on the east the Upper Chindwin District of Burma, and on the south the Chin and Lushai Hills, hence it can be seen that the Meithei are completely surrounded by Tibeto-Burman speaking peoples of several varieties. The Meithei are a people of relatively high culture and have exerted no little influence on some of these peoples within the borders of their own state (vide pt. 15). The language is written in a native script of Indic origin, and possesses a literature of some antiquity. As has long been recognized, Meithei is a divergent member of the Kuki stock. The writer has classified both Meithei and Mikir (supra) as independent members of the Kukic supergroup (vide the diagram in pt. 15), but it must be pointed out that Meithei approaches the Kuki languages proper more nearly than does Mikir. Note that Meithei and Mikir, the two outlying members of the Kukic division, are separated by the main body of Kuki and Naga languages (Kukish).

197 601 Our material on Meithei is not of the best, since no true dictionary of the language has appeared and we accordingly are forced to rely on grammars (Primrose, Pettigrew) and word-lists (McCulloch, Stewart, LSI). The earlier

197 literature is said to be written in an archaic form of the
601 language, but this "archaic Meithei" has never been described in any detail. A few terms from this language, which must have differed considerably from the modern speech, have been taken from the text in Hodson (Appendix II) and from the LSI word-list (1928).

601

Meithei Consanguineal Terms

(i-)bel-bok ggM	(i-)pu-bok ggF
(i-)bel gM	(i-)pu gF
(i-)ma M	(i-)pa F
(i-)n-dol MSi	(i-)tol FB
(i-)nem FSi	
(i-)cem oSi	ya-ma oB
(i-)cal ySi	(i-)nau yB
(i-)ca nu-pi D,Ni	(i-)ca ni-pa S,Ne
(i-)su nu-pi gD	(i-)su ni-pa gS

Meithei Affinal Terms

(i-)nem Ml	(i-)ku Fl
(ma-)tu W	(ma-)wa H
(i-)nau nu-pi (i-)tei-ma oSil	(i-)nau ni-pa Bl
	(i-)bai WoB
	(i-)šen WyB
(i-)mau Dl	(i-)mak Sl

601 Notes:

The prefix i- of the above forms is really the 1st person affix, corresponding to ai "I", while ma- is the 3rd person affix, e.g. ai-gi i-pa "my father", nan-gi na-pa "thy father", ma-gi ma-pa "his father" (gi is genitive suffix).

Three of the four P and gP terms are from standard TB roots. Note the lack of aspiration in i-pu gP, i-pa P, as well as in i-cem oSi, i-ku Fl (infra). As in Kachin, the existence of these unaspirated forms is of some significance, since initial aspiration is ordinarily in Meithei. I-bel gM is one of several Meithei kinship terms that show the final -l ~ -n alternation typical of this language; cf. i-bel ~ i-ben gM, i-tol ~ i-ton FB, in-dol ~ in-don MSi, and i-cil i-can ySi (Primrose usually has -n, Pettigrew -l). In reconstructing the original forms of these terms one has a choice between final -r and -l, since Meithei shifts -r to -l; cf. Meithei yol ~ yon "to sell", Kuki *yuar; Meithei na-ton na-k'ul "nostril" ("nose-its-hole"), Kuki *k'ur "hole"; Meithei sa-gol ~ sa-gon "horse", Kuki *sa-ger, from Indic ghora plus the "animal prefix" sa-. I-bel gM seems to be isolated in Tibeto-Burman, but cf. Assamese buri ai gM (ai M). The categorical term bok, used for the 3rd ascending generation, has not been identified. It has an honorific force in the terms i-nem-bok Ml (= i-nem) and i-ku-bok Fl (= i-ku) cited by Pettigrew.

Our data on PSb terms are vague and incomplete. Primrose cites i-ton FyB, in-dol FyBW, while Pettigrew gives i-tol FB,

601 in-dol MSi. The form in-dol is probably to be analyzed *i-ma-tol (n < m through assimilation to d, and d < t through assimilation to the sonant nasal). The element -tol appears also in na-tol ~ na-ton "nose" (TB *s-na); cf. Kachin wa-di FoB and la-di "nose". Primrose cites the two additional terms i-pan "uncle", im-han "uncle's wife". The former seems to be identical with Old Meithei a-pal F (Hodson ma-pal, text on p. 188), and the latter can be analyzed *i-ma-han, from a-hal "old", Kuki *sar, id. It is perhaps legitimate to infer that these are the terms for FoB and MoSi, respectively, and that i-tol and in-dol are the corresponding terms for FyB and MySi. Pettigrew cites khura as an alternative term for i-tol FB, but this is from Assamese khura FyB, hence i-tol= FyB.

I-nem FSi and i-cem oSi make up a sub-type of their own, since each has suffixed -m. Pettigrew cites doublet forms for each, viz. i-nem ~ i-ne, i-cem ~ i-ce, and the terms are directly cognate with Tib. ʾa-ne FSi, ʾa-c'e oSi. The final -m is perhaps the remnant of an original feminine suffix -ma.

Of the remaining sibling terms, i-cal ~ i-can ySi is referable to the Kuki root *zar ~ *dzar and Kachin jan < *jar Si(ms), the latter often employed in the meaning "ySi", while i-nau yB is from TB *nau ySb (contrast Barish *nau ySi). Meithei ya-ma (also yam-ma ~ yam-ba) oB, however, seems to lack cognates in neighboring languages, but cf. Almora *hya

601 oB (pt. 3). Old Meithei has an entirely distinct term, viz. a-sa-bi oB, paralleling a-sa-nau yB. Finally, Primrose cites a third term, ta-da oB, apparently connected with the TB root ta ~ da, yet the reduplicated form is not of Meithei type.

Meithei i-ca Ch is from TB *za rather than *ts'a; cf. ca-ba "to eat", Tib. za-ba, as contrasted with a-sa-ba "hot", TB *ts'a; sam "hair", TB *ts'am. I-su gCh marks the southernmost extension of this Tibeto-Burman root. Meithei also has a-ngang "infant" (Stewart cites a-ngang-ni-pa "boy", a-ngang-nu-pi "girl"). The term nu-pi "woman", used as a suffix in the D and gD terms, combines the two Kuki roots *nu " and *pui "female" (Meithei lacks the diphthong -ui). The alternative term for "woman", viz. ning-ol, seems to contain the TB root *ning xCi(ws),Sil(ws). Note that pi also appears in pi-ba "male" (= ni-pa). The contrast between -pi ~ -bi and -pa ~ -ba is carried through in a number of Meithei words, e.g. han-u-ba "old man", han-u-bi "old woman" (a-hal "old"); mai-ba "native doctor" (masc.), mai-bi, id. (fem.); ma-pa "parent" (masc.), ma-pi, id. (fem.); yen-ba "cock", yen-bi "hen" (yel "fowl"), san-bi "cow" (sal is generic term). Note the application of these prefixes to the word for "fowl", where the regular sex-suffixes for names of animals are la-ba (masc.) and a-mom (fem.).

The collateral terms are not known, but i-ca ni-pa S,Ne and i-ca nu-pi D,Ni indicate that the Sb and Ch terms are extended to include parallel C and N, respectively.

601 The affinal terminology shows a categorical equation in i-nem M1 = FSi, and partial equations in i-nau ni-pa B1, i-nau mu-pi oSil (perhaps for ySil) = i-nau yB. The use of sex-suffixes with the latter term shows that it was originally neuter (TB *nau ySb). I-ku F1, connected with TB *k'u ~ *ku MB, parallels a-nem, but unfortunately the Meithei term for MB does not appear in any of our sources. The phrase <u>mamaga</u> <u>pokminaba</u> <u>mamada</u>, translated "maternal.... ....uncle", is included in the Meithei text in Hodson, p. 191, but one cannot be sure of the interpretation of this passage (cf. Indic māmā MB).

Of the remaining affinal terms, two exactly correspond to Kuki terms, viz. i-mak S1 (Kuki *mak) and i-mau D1 (Kuki *mou). I-tei-ma oSil agrees with Mikir te oSi(ws), te-pi Sil(ws); cf. Meithei lei, Mikir de, Tib. lce "tongue"; Meithei mei, Mikir, Tib. me "fire". I-bai WoB and i-šen WyB are more difficult to place, though the former can be compared with Maru (Burmish-Loloish) pai oSi, Burmese a-pai "madam". Ma-wa H apparently contains the TB element *wa "father, male"; cf. Bodo howa ~ hiwa "male", and ma-tu W must be compared with Kuki *tu Ne,gS (under cross-cousin marriage xNi = SW). Note that both these terms have ma-prefix, never i-, hence we have ma-wa "her husband (male)" and ma-tu "his wife (xNi)".

The Meithei are divided into seven large sections (<u>salei</u>), which are exogamous, according to our best sources (Hodson, Shakespear), but are described in McSwiney as

601 endogamous. Shakespear employs the term yek rather than salei, and seeks to connect it with Lushei ziak "to write", on the basis that each yek is associated with a certain letter, e.g. Angom has the letter ko, for kok "head" (the comparison is phonetically likely, since Lushei initial z- is derived from y-, and Meithei has medial e for ia, as in lek "to pass the night", Lushei riak; ta-ret "7", Lushei riat "8").

The salei are made up of exogamous clans or yumnak (yum "house", nak "near"; cf. Tib. nye-ba "to be near", gnyen "kinsman"). McSwiney recognizes a further subdivision into sagei or families, but Hodson states that this term, literally "relationship" ("relations" in Primrose), is normally used in reference to a Naga clan. Both salei and sagei seem to contain the element ŠA "flesh" (Tib. sa, used with reference to matrilineal descent). The Meithei apparently reckon descent only on the father's side, as shown by the patrilineal bias of their culture in general (e.g. only the sons share in inheritance), but our authorities have deemed it unnecessary to record this point.

The number of yumnak in each of the seven salei (Mingthaja, Kumul, Luang, Angom, Moirang, Khabananba, Chenglei) varies from 115 to 17. It is not known whether or not a single yumnak extends into two or more salei. It seems likely that the salei were originally geographical or even tribal units rather than marriage groups. According

601 to McCulloch (p. 4) some of these sections have distinct migration traditions, and Hodson notes that the Moirang still preserve a considerable degree of independence and autonomy and are mainly settled in the immediate vicinity of their eponymous village. The Ningthaja or "Royal clan" (section, or salei) may intermarry with any of the other sections, the lone exception being the Laipham clan of the Moirang section (cf. the similar lack of restrictions in the case of the Ang, the chiefly clan of the Konyak). The remaining sections are all restricted as to intermarriage, e.g. the Angom can marry only with the Kumul or Chenglei, the Kumul and Lusng may not intermarry (they have a tradition of common ancestry); cf. the ill-arranged account in Hodson, p. 75. The sections of the Meithei are thus seen to have much in common with the five divisions of the Kachin.

It is not to be expected that the Meithei, who have long been under direct Indian influence, should have maintained the practice of cross-cousin marriage so clearly reflected in their kinship terminology. If we may rely on a statement made by Hodson (p. 76), marriage with a woman of one's mother's clan is forbidden, but Hodson adds that the prohibition goes no further than the first generation, hence second-cousin marriage on the mother's side would theoretically be possible. The same writer makes the following assertion in regard to the Ningthou or "king":

601 There seems to be a rule requiring the Meithei Ningthou to be a close connection by marriage of the Angom Ningthou, and by custom the formal coronation of the latter precedes by a few days that of the former. The relationship between the Meithei Ningthou and the Angom Ningthou, the heads, one of the Ningthaja, or Royal clan, and the other of one of the most important clans, is generally that of son-in-law and father-in-law. (p. 76)

This passage is certainly very suggestive, at least, of the familiar avunculate relationship.

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14. Mru

[101] 197 The Mru are a small marginal group in the Chittagong Hills Tract and the Chin Hills, where they live in close communication with the Khami, a Southern Kuki people. The fullest early account of the Mru is given by Lewin (pp. 92-4), while for more recent information we are indebted to J. P. Mills and three Burmese district officials: Myaing, Thin, and Pe.

Our linguistic data on the Mru are derived from Hodgson, Lewin, Myaing, and Pe. To judge from this meagre material, the language represents an early offshoot from the Kukic stock but has retained a number of distinctive roots (e.g. luk "1", pre "2", dam "fish", pram "ear"). It also shows many lexical resemblances with the Southern Kuki languages (Khami, Sho), in kinship nomenclature as in other aspects of the vocabulary. Many of these are doubtless to be interpreted as borrowings, especially those involving kinship terms. A list of Mro (= Mru) terms is given by Webb (p. lxvii), but the language is Khami rather than Mru (cf. The Gospel of St. Mathew in Mro, published by the American Baptist Missionary Society, which is actually in Khami).

601 The following tables have been compiled mainly from the lists in Myaing and Pe, which are in agreement on most points. The LSI material is of value primarily in establishing the forms themselves.

601

Mru Consanguineal Terms

pe gM			pu gF,MB
u M			pa F
u-rum MSi			pa-ma FB
na-ko FSi			
toa-ma Si	a-tai	oB(mws),oSi(ms)	
yo-ma ySi(ms)			nau-ma yB
tsa-ma D	tsa	Ch	tsa-pa S

Mru Affinal Terms

na-ko-ke HM			ta-rang HF
			pu WF
a-tai BW(mws)			nai WB,SiH(ms)
to-mo HSi			mo-mo SiH(ws)
yo-la Sil	no-mo	WSi,HB	
yauk-sa Dl			mauk-sa Sl

Notes:

Tibeto-Burman roots are represented by pu gF,MB, pe gM (Pe cites a-pi), pa F, nau-ma yB, tsa Ch. The term u M (Hodgson, Lewin a-u, Pe a-o) seems to be connected with the root represented by Burmese u^3 "uncle", Kuki *u oSb, while the standard root *ma is found only in -ma, the feminine suffix (-la is the masculine suffix, from TB *la). The PSb terms u-rum, na-ko, and pa-ma cannot be analyzed on the basis of the available material.

601 The Sb terms have been poorly recorded, yet it is apparent that age and sex of speaker distinctions are made. The LSI cites nau-ma as "B", but in the Mru text on p. 393 the term is used in the meaning "yB", and Pe gives nauk-ma yB (cf. a-taik oB = a-tai, and naik [illegible] = nai, in Pe). Cf. the Meithei use of the root *nau ySb for yB. Little can be made of toa-ma (= twa-ma in LSI, sentence no. 225) Si, and yo-ma ySi(ms), but the oSb term a-thi is directly comparable with the TB root *tei used both for oB and oSi (e.g. Mikir te oSi); cf. Mru mai "fire", TB *mai, Mikir me.

The term tsa (also written ca) Ch is from TB *za; cf. ca "to eat", Tib. za-ba. The gCh terms have not been recorded.

In the affinal terminology, Mru has distinct terms for HF and WF, perhaps also for HM and WM, but the latter has not been recorded. Mru pu gF,MB,HF exactly parallels the Kukish term *pu (pt. 15), and the partial equation shown in na-ko-ke (or perhaps na-kok) HM, na-ko FSi is of Kukish type. Mru ta-rang HF is also of Kukish type; cf. Chawte rang FSiH, a-rang HF. It is possible that the Mru term is also applied to FSiH, since Pe cites ta-ran (for ta-rang) "uncle", and in the LSI, sentence no. 225, we find the phrase ung ta-rang tsa "my uncle's son" (ung "my", tsa "son"). The presence of these Kukish features in Mru is especially striking in view of the fact that they are poorly represented in the Southern Kuki subgroup with which Mru is in contact.

601 Mauk-sa S1 is probably from TB *mag, though the vocalism is not normal (contrast Mru pak "hog", Tib. p'ag), while yauk-sa D1 may include an element *yok related to the Burmese affinal term yok. The remaining affinal terms cannot be interpreted to advantage.

Mills gives us our best account of the Mru social organization. Pe reports the lack of an absence of clans among the Mru, but states that there are four classes, which he does not describe. Myaing denies the existence of such groupings altogether. Mills, however, states that exogamous clans do exist among the Mru, and describes four such clans (Shimlung, Chingnao, Nirincha, Shitnma) for the village of Bali. Marriage regulations resemble those found among the Old Kuki (pt. 15), e.g. a Shimlung man may marry a Chingnao woman, but a Chingnao man may not marry a Shimlung woman (Mills does not give further details). Large clans may be subdivided into sub-clans (kuchi; cf. Lushei chi, id.), which are exogamous, i.e. a man may marry a woman of his own clan provided that she is of a different kuchi (cf. the Kachin regulations).

The marriage regulations described by Mills, if truly analogous with those found among the Old Kuki tribes, imply marriage with MBD but notwith FSiD. Mills is silent on this point, but Myaing explicitly states that a man may not marry his FSiD or MSiD, his yB's widow, or any female of the family into which any woman of his own family has married, while he

601 may marry his FBD or MBD or his oB's widow. We must question the marriage with FBD, since this is out of place in the culture area under consideration, but the preferential marriage with MBD supports the inference made above. A reference to the levirate appears also in Lewin, and this writer further records the practice of son-in-law service.

The Mru material in general adds little to our general picture of Tibeto-Burman kinship terminology, but does show interesting connections with Kukish, both in terminology and in the marriage practices associated therewith. Unfortunately we lack the Mru cousin terms and hence cannot be sure that the 'Omaha' features of the Kukish system are also present here.

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15. THE KUKIC LANGUAGES



305(A)

15. The Kuki Languages [1]

197

The Kuki languages are spoken throughout most of the mountainous country between the Brahmaputra and Irrawaddy valleys. They constitute the southern half of the Kukish linguistic group, as indicated in the subjoined table, in which the aporoximate geographical locations of the various Kukish languages are indicated. On the north they are connected through the transitional Luhupa and Western Kuki groups with the Naga languages. All of those languages, from Khami in the south to Ao Naga in the north, constitute a single linguistic entity, Kukish. Kukish, in turn, combines with Mikir and Meithei to form the Kukic supergroup, the largest single unit in the Tibeto-Burman family.

The Kukish group thus established is of a type paralleling that of Burmish-Loloish, i.e. one characterized by an essential unity in the face of far-flung geographical dispersion and seemingly endless phonetic and morphological specialization or degeneration. Just as the conventional demarcation between "Burmese" and "Lolo-Moso" corresponds to no real linguistic boundary and has accordingly been abandoned, so the "Naga" and "Kuki-Chin" rubrics, as set up in the LSI, must be discarded as antiquated philological paraphernalia. This new classification is one of the most important of the many conclusions reached in the Sino-Tibetan Linguistics series.

The core of the Kukish group may be said to consist of Old, Northern, and Central Kuki, which must have been derived

1 [See also pp. 280-9, in cat. 116 -- Analyst]

197 from a common ancestor of no great antiquity. Lushei, in the Central Kuki subgroup, which has become the lingua franca of the Lushai Hills, is the key language of the entire group because of its almost complete preservation of archaic finals. The Old Kuki languages, which are known only in fragments, have retained prefixes dropped in Central Kuki (except in Lakher and occasionally elsewhere). The Northern Kuki subgroup is of little importance from the phonetic point of view but supplies a good share of lexical elements. The Southern Kuki subgroup, which is none too well unified in itself, stands somewhat in opposition to the Old Kuki, Northern Kuki, and Central Kuki subgroups, with Khami in particular revealing a number of distinctive traits.

The four remaining Kukish subgroups exhibit more variation than those discussed above, and the relationships among them are not so readily analyzed. All four subgroups tend to preserve prefixes and initials at the sacrifice of finals. The process of phonetic degeneration reaches its peak in Southern Naga (Angami, Sema), which thus stands in relation to the Kuki languages proper much as the typical Lolo languages (Ahi, Nyi) stand in relation to Burmese. The Luhupa subgroup, in which the key language is Tangkhul, most nearly approaches the Kuki languages, with Maring and the closely related Khoibu showing especially strong Kuki influence. In no direction, however, are the transitions very great, and it is not unlikely that more detailed information on some of these languages in the future will necessi-

197 tate a revision of our classification at some points. Champhang, for example, is known only from a list of a few dozen words, and Poeron, which has generally been classed with Kabui (as in McCulloch) but which seems to represent merely an aberrant variety of Old Kuki, might show marked Luhupa or Western Kuki affinities were more material on it available. Despite these uncertainties, however, this scheme, in its main outlines, should survive for some time.

601 In the present review, the terminologies of the Kuki languages are first examined in some detail, after which attention is directed to the less well known Luhupa and Western Kuki subgroups. The Naga languages, though forming part of the Kukish group, are treated separately (pt. 16) for the sake of convenience.

113 We are fortunate in having relatively good sources, and
601 in some instances tables of kinship terms, for a number of the Kuki languages, including Lushei, Haka, Lakher, Thado, Siyin, and Sho. The sources utilized are listed below.

Central Kuki:

Lushei (Lorrain and Savidge); Haka or Lai (MacNabb, Newland, Webb, LSI); Laiyo or Zo (Webb); Shonshe (Scott); Hmar (LSI); Zahao (Stevenson, LSI); Danjogi and Pankhu (Lewin, LSI); Taungtha (Scott, Tin, LSI); Lakher or Mara (Hughes, Savidge, Parry).

Northern Kuki:

Thado (Hodson, Shaw, Hutton, Soppitt, Stewart, Butler, McCulloch, LSI); Siyin (Rundall, Naylor, Webb); Ralte and Paite (LSI

60A
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Old Kuki:

Rangkhol and Hallam (Soppitt, LSI); Bete (Soppitt, Stewart); Kyaw (Latter, Webb); Poeron (McCulloch); Anal (McCulloch, LSI); Langrong, Chiru, Kolhreng, Kom, Purum, and Lamgang (LSI); Vaiphei (Roy); Charte (Roy, Hodson [1922]), Tarau (Hodson); Aimol (Bose, LSI).

Southern Kuki:

Khami (Latter, Hughes, Myaing, Pe, Houghton [1895a], Stilson, Webb, LSI); Sho (Houghton [1892, 1895b], Dryer, LSI); Chinbon (Webb, Pru, LSI); Chinbok (Webb, Scott, Tim); Yawdwin (Scott); Yindu and Anu (Webb); Ledu (Pru).

The distinctive pattern of the Kuki kinship terminology can be illustrated by almost any Kuki language selected at random, though numerous variations do occur. The Lushei nomenclature is not known quite so thoroughly as some of the others, but Lushei is the key language of the group, as noted above, and hence it is useful to have in mind the forms found in this language.

601

Lushei Consanguineal Terms

pi ggM,gM,MBW,MBD		pu ggF,gF,MB,MBS
nu M,MSi,FBW		pa F,FB,MSiH
ni FSi		
	u oSb,pC	
far-nu Si(ms)		nu-ta M(ws)
lai-zon Si(ws)	nau ySb,pC	
fa-nu D,BD(ms)	fa Ch,FCh(ms)	fa-pa S,FS(ms)
	tu FSiCh,SiCh(ms),gCh	
tu-nu FSiD,SiD(ms),gD		tu-pa FSiS,SiS(ms),gS
va'-nu BD(ws)	va' BCh(ws)	va'-pa BS(ws)

Lushei Affinal Terms

pi-zon WM,WSi		pu-zon WF, B
nu HM		pa HF
pa-sal H		nu-bui
	u HoSb,oBW	
	nau HySb,yBW	
fa-nu HBD	fa HBCh	fa-pa HFS
tu-nu HSiD	tu HSiCh	tu-pa HSiS
mo SW,BW		mak-pa DH,SiW

Notes:

The paucity of terms is one of the most striking features of the system. Twelve primary roots appear in the consanguineal nomenclature (pi, pu, nu, pa, ni, far, ta, u, nau, fa, tu, va'), and two more in the affinal (mo, mak). Most of these terms can be identified with Tibeto-Burman roots already encountered, viz. pi and pu for gM and gF, nu and pa for M and F; nau ySb;

601 tu xN (as in Burmish-Loloish). Fǎr-mu S1(ws) and fa Ch illustrate the Lushei shift from an initial sonant (z or dz) to f-; cf. Lushei fa' "to feed", Tib. za-ba, Burmish-Loloish *dza "to eat"; fai "clean", Kachin tsai < *dzai; fal "separated, apart", Kachin tsan < *dzal, Barish *dzal "far"; funl "to sag", Tib. 'jol-ba < *jul "to hang down". Thus, fǎr-mu constitutes a direct link with Kachin jan < *jar S1(ms), and fa Ch with TB *za, id. Hu-ṭa D(ws) is written with a cerebral ṭ, indicating an original cluster type of initial, probably tr- (an excessively rare combination in Kukish, hence one which cannot be well established). The obb term u can be compared only with Burmese u^3 used in combined terms for MB. The woman's xN term, va', must be reconstructed *was; cf. Lushei ru' "bone", Tib. rus-pa; Lushei ra' "fruit", Tib. s-ras "child"; Lushei hni' "2", Tib. g-nyis; Lushei hu' "wet", Tib. hus "moisture".

In the affinal terminology, mak-pa S1 is standard (TB *mag), while mo D1 corresponds to Meithei i-mau, id. The Tibetan cognate here seems to be mo "woman, female"; cf. Thado mau "woman", but mau pui "to marry" (pui has not been analyzed). Lushei final -o fits into the Kuki *-ou series, which narrowly approaches the *-au series. Thado ordinarily has -ou in the former, -au in the latter, but note Thado t'ou rather than *t'au "fat" in the table below.

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	Bete	Lushei	Lakher	Thado
fly n.	i-t'oi	t'o	ma-t'eu	t'ou
white*	a-ngoi	ngo	ngeu	ngou

*Note: Bete "yellow", Thado "clean".

fat n.	t'ai	t'au	t'o	t'ou
younger Sb	nai	nau	no	nau
bamboo	ro-mai	mau	ro-mo	-

The two series have been confused in the roots *nau ySb and *nou, which in Lushei (in the form no) is defined as "the young of birds, animals; young, soft, tender". Siyin has no "to be little", nau-sen no "baby", and Lushei has nau-šen "baby", but Thado uses nou-šen rather than *nau-šen "baby". Lushei nau is used for "Ch" as well as for "ySb", especially in the combined term nau-pang, and the Old Kuki languages commonly replace the root *za Ch with *nau; cf. Langrong nai-pang Ch, nai-pa S, nai-nu D; Rangkhol nai-pang "boy", nai-nu-pang D, nai-te nai-pang Ch, while Hallam has both nai-nu-pang and sa-nu D, the latter corresponding to Lushei fa-nu (-ai < -au in these languages, as in Bete).

Lai-zon Si(ws) is almost certainly a periphrasis, but the analysis is uncertain; cf. lai-cin "a relation, a fellow clansman" (cin cannot be analyzed), and lai "centre, middle navel". The element -zon, which appears also in pu-zon WF and pi-zon WL, is perhaps the word zon "opposite to" (the Kukish root is *yon; Lushei z- y-).

601 Pa-sǎl H can be analyzed as a combination of pa F and sǎl "captive taken in war". The term is widespread in Kukish, often in the meaning "male, man" (e.g. in Thado), but the semantics are difficult to explain. The term is quite distinct from cǎl, the common masculine suffix, e.g. Siyin has pa-sǎl "husband, male", but tǎl "masculine suffix" (Siyin t- < c-). Another widespread masculine suffix, used especially with the names of birds, is ɬaɬui, which in Lushei means simply "old". Curiously enough, the 15 root ʼla, ordinarily employed as a masculine suffix, in Kukish is applied to the "immature female of an animal" (Siyin); cf. Lushei nu-la "maiden, young woman". The feminine suffix -pui, which appears in nu-pui ʼ, is applied to animals who have had young; the same root is also semanticized "big", e.g. mei-pui "bonfire" (mei "fire"), mi-pui "multitude" (mi "man"). In the Kukish languages, then, it would seem that the notions of feminine maturity and pregnancy are closely associated.

Lushei and the Kuki languages in general appear to lack especial terms of any kind for relatives of the 3rd or higher ascending or descending generations. Lushei has only t'laʾ-tu "an ancestor, progenitor", t'laʾ "a descendant, posterity", connected with t'laʾ ~ t'lak (TS ʰt'lǎ) "to let go, let fall", employed as an affix in the meaning "to create, beget" (note the reciprocity). Lushei also has the combined terms ci-t'laʾ "descendants, posterity", formed with ci "seed, sort, caste, clan" (Burmese tsʰaʾ < taiʾ "seed; [illegible]"), and

601 hnaʔ-t'lak "descendants, various clans of a single tribe", formed with hnaʔ "leaf" (Burmese a-hnáʔ "petiole"). The former is paralleled in Lakher in the term ci-pa-t'la "posterity, a descendant", where pa- is the Lakher causative verbal prefix. Cf. also Khami a-mu "clan" (Stilson), Nikir and Lushei mu "seed".

The TB root *snam D1 is perhaps represented by Lushei hnǎm "a clan, nation" (hnam-com "the common people"), Siyin nǎm "nation", Sho nam (Fryer), nan (Houghton) "village". Lushei, like Burmese, regularly unvoices initial nasals preceded by prefixed s-; cf. Lushei hmǐn "ripe", Tib. smin-pa; Lushei hnǎp "snot", Tib. snabs. A possible analogy is furnished by Kachin da-ma, from TB *mag S1, used primarily with reference to the extended family group of a woman's husband (vide the discussion in pt. 7).

The most striking feature of the Lushei nomenclature is the classing of MBS with MB, MBD with MBW, and FSiCh with SiCh(ms), i.e. the 'Omaha' pattern. Note, however, that the terms used in the first two equations are properly gP terms, while the term used in the third equation is applied also to gCh. Pu is defined as "wife's male relation, one in charge of anything, a term of respect for a man", and pi as "wife's female relation, a term of respect for a women". Hence pu-zon and pi-zon are applied to "wife's parents", while the consanguineal terms pa and nu are used for "husband's parents". In the affinal terminology note also the equation of SW with BW (mo), and of DH with SiH (mak-pa).

601 The general pattern outlined above can be traced through all the Kuki languages, but not without numerous and sometimes extensive variations. Within the Kuki group proper, these variations attain their peak in the Southern Kuki speeches, especially in Khami. The Central Kuki languages conform to general type with the exception of Taungtha, which has been dealt with in connection with the Southern Kuki group. Taungtha in general is of transitional type, however, and hence these Southern Kuki features in its kinship terminology are not unexpected. Hmar, Banjogi, and Tankhu show no variations which require comment. The Zahao terminology, known only in part from the discussion by Stevenson (diagram on p. 20), has pa-seu FB, pa-pu MB, and nu-pu MBS, nu-pi MBD (for pa-seu, cf. Laiyo, infra). Zahac thus does make a distinction between MB (pa-pu) and MBS (nu-pu). Stevenson (p. 21) defines far-nu as "a classificatory term applying to sisters and female cousins on the patrilineal side", and this extension is also indicated in the Zahao diagram (a similar extension can be inferred for Lushei far-nu). The remaining languages, where sufficiently well known, are separately considered below. In each instance stress is placed on deviations from the general pattern.

Haka

Age distinctions appear in the PSb terms, viz.

(a-)nu-u MoSi	(a-)pa-u FoB
(a-)nu-nau MySi	(a-)pa-nau FyB

601 According to Webb, (k-)pu is used for MSiCh as well as for MBCh, while (k-)tu FSiCh has an alternative term (k-)ni fa (the analytical term). Mak-pa Sl is replaced by (k-)tu, and mo Dl by (k-)fa, but the latter is retained in the meaning "B" (of about same age as speaker).

The proposed root *tra (B(ws) is revealed in Haka (k-)tra B(ws), HB, (k-)nu-pi tra fa WBCh (nu-pi W), though Newland cites the form ta B (ta le ferr "B and Si"). Webb also cites (k-)trang FSiH, while Newland has tang "older male cousin, any older male relative". We lack the Lushei term for FSiH, but can reconstruct the form *tang, with cerebral t, paralleling nu-ṭa B(ws). Haka supplies a valuable link with the term *rang (often prefixed) encountered elsewhere in Kuki. Despite the presence of this especial term for FSiH, Haka agrees with Lushei in using (k-)pa and (k-)nu for HF and HM, respectively.

Haka has a different term for H, viz. va ~ var. The form va is probably the correct one (it is cited in Webb), and can be equated with (k-)va BCh(ws), Lushei va'. MacNabb and Newland cite var, but the latter also gives var as a variant of va "bird", where the standard Kukish root is *wa. Shonshe, which regularly preserves final -r, has wa-pa H rather that *war-pa. The Haka material suggests that the Kukish root should be compared with TB *wa "male, father" (as in Kachin), and one is tempted to identify Kukish *wa "bird" with the same root, in view of the tendency shown by a number of Tibeto-Burman languages to use especial sex-suffixes

601 with names of birds (e.g. Burmese a-p'a' "father, masculine affix for birds"); cf. Lepcha vo < *wa H, fo < *p'a "bird", and yu "female, wife; expletive for bird".

Shonshe, to judge from what little is known of it, shows little variation from Haka. Reduplication, which is rare in Kukish, appears in the Shonshe terms pu-pu "uncle" and ni-ni "aunt".

Laiyo

The Laiyo nomenclature, as recorded by Webb, shows a remarkable development of analytical terms, often formed with the help of a genitive particle -wi ~ -i (Lushei -i). It is difficult to say to what extent these terms are merely artificial fabrications of natives attempting to satisfy the demands of the recorder, as opposed to expressions in current use. The fact that certain primary terms are preserved, however, leads us to believe that the terminology as reported in Webb is correct in most details. The orthography requires some interpretation, however, since 'tar' and 'far' are used for *ta and *fa, respectively, in the British distortion of our English orthography, though the latter may occasionally stand for *far. Several emendations of this type have been made in producing the tabulation below, and the terms have been divided in a manner calculated to make clear their analytical nature.

601

Laiyo Consanguineal Terms

pa nu FM

nu-wi nu MM

nu M

nu-seau MSi

ni FSi

nau-nu ySi(ws)

far-nu-u-pa oSi(ms)

far-nu-nau-ta ySi(ms)

tu-nu FSiD

pa pa FF

nu-wi pa MF

pa F

pa-seau FB

nu-ta-pa MB

nau-pa yB(ms)

ta-pa-u-pa oB(ms)

ta-pa-nau-ta yB(ms)

tu-pa FSiS

u oSb(ss)

pa-seau fa-te FBCh

nu-u(-wi) fa-te MoBCh, MoSiCh

nu-nau(-wi) fa-te MyBCh, MySiCh

fa-nu D

u fa-nu BD(ms)

fa-pa S

u fa-pa BS(ms)

ta-pa fa BCh(ws)

far-nu fa-te SiCh(ms)

fa-pa fa-pa SS

fa-nu fa-pa DS

Laiyo Affinal Terms

nu-pi nu WM

pa-sal nu HM

nu ta-pa nu-pi MBW

nu-pi W

ta-pa nu-pi BW(ws)

fa-pa nu-pi SW

nu-pi pa WF

pa-sal pa HF

rang FSiH

pa-sal H

far-nu pa-sal SiH(ms)

fa-nu pa-sal DH

601 **Notes:**

The individual elements are the same as those previously encountered, with pa-seau FB and nu-seau MSi corresponding to Zahao pa-seu FB (this element appears to be unrepresented in Lushei). The efflorescence of analytical terms, however, has radically altered the whole complexion of the terminology, with the complete loss of the important terms pu and pi and the consequent disappearance of all 'Omaha' features. It is significant that ni FSi, rang FSiH, and tu FSiCh should have been preserved while the rest of the nomenclature was undergoing these changes. Nu-u fa-te and nu-nau fa-te are to be interpreted simply as "mother's elder-sibling's child" and "mother's younger-sibling's child", respectively; cf. Haka nu-u MoSi, nu-nau MySi. Haka also equates MBCh and MSiCh, but in the primary term (k-)pu. Fa-te includes a new element -te, cognate with Lushei te "little"; cf. Shonshe huk-te Ch.

Most of the Laiyo terms are perfectly analytical and thus are exactly defined by the symbols that appear in the table, e.g. nu ta-pa is literally "MB", nu ta-pa nu-pi is literally "MBW". A similar tendency must be present in Haka, since Webb cites (k-)ni fa as an alternative term for FSiCh (oddly enough, this is one of the few relationships which Laiyo expresses through a primary term). Laiyo, which can scarcely be more than a dialect of Haka or Lai, thus presents a beautiful illustration of the influence of purely linguistic factors on kinship terminology.

Lakher

601 The Lakher or Mara nomenclature closely parallels the Lushei-Haka system, but the similarity is in part obscured by the complicated phonetic shifts that the language has undergone. These changes, which involve almost all the finals, have in many instances resulted in the coalescence of originally distinct elements, making reconstruction difficult. Parry (pp. 240-43) gives the fullest set of terms and carefully distinguishes between vocative and descriptive terms, but the forms themselves must be checked against those in the Lakher dictionary by Savidge. Savidge also gives much information not found in Parry.

Lakher pu and pi exactly agree with the Lushei terms, according to Savidge. Pi is also cited in the verbal meaning "to become old". Parry, however, cites what appear to be descriptive terms, viz. ma-po gF, ma-nong (= ma-nau) gM, and Hughes gives ma-naung gM. As vocative terms, Parry gives pa-pa gF, ma-mi gM.

The descriptive parent terms are po F, nau M. Lakher has derived -o (written 'aw') from -ɛ under certain conditions which have not yet been fully explained; cf. ngo < *nga "5", but nga < *nga (Lushei hnga) "fish"; so < *za (Lushei fa) Ch, but sa < *sa "flesh", and the vocative term (i-)pa F as contrasted with the descriptive term po. Nau M, written nong in Parry, is from Kukish *nu; Lakher ordinarily retains -u, but has -au ~ -o after the nasals n- and m-, e.g.

601 hmo < *mu "seed"; pa-hmo < *mu "hawk"; hmau < *hmu "to see, get"; pa-nau < *nu "turbid". Parry cites (i-)na as the vocative term for "M", paralleling (i-)pa F.

As in Lushei, no especial terms are used for FB or MSi. In address, teknonymy is employed, either alone or in combination with the vocative term for F, e.g. i-pa Zahia po "my father, the father of Zahia" = "FB" (Zahia is name of eldest child); note the distinction made between (i-)pa and po.

Parry cites pa-pu MB, MBS (cf. Zahao) and pa-pi MB, while Savidge, as indicated above, cites pu gM, MB, MBS and pi gM, MBW, MBD, as in Lushei. Parry further cites the vocative Sb terms, viz. a-u and i-di, for "FBCh", "FSiCh", and "MSiCh", with age distinctions as in the Sb terms, and notes that these terms may "very rarely" be applied to MBCh. Savidge, on the other hand, cites tu FSiCh, as in Lushei. One must suspect that Savidge, who was well acquainted with Lushei, was influenced by his knowledge of that language. Parry, however, does not cite the descriptive terms for "MBCh" or "FSiCh", hence Savidge's testimony cannot be rejected offhand.

The vocative Sb terms, as cited above, are a-u oSb and i-di ySb. The latter is perhaps cognate with Lushei te "little" (Laiyo fa-te Ch); cf. Lakher di "to crack a flea on the fingernail", Lushei de˺; Lakher ši "to bite, sting", Lushei še˺; Lakher pa-hni "to win", Lushei hne˺. The descriptive Sb terms are as follows:

601 si-ta-nau Si(ms) u-ta oSb(mws) ri-pa-la B(ws)
na-rau Si(ws) no-ta ySb(mws)

The arrangement of terms is the same as that found in Lushei, with an especial term for Si(ws) but none for B(ms). Note that u-ta and no-ta are both men's and women's terms, as are probably Lushei u and nau. The combination no-ta ySb is reminiscent of Laiyo nau-ta as used in the combined terms far-nu-nau-ta and ta-pa-nau-ta. Unlike Lushei, Haka, and Laiyo, the element ta < *tra is not employed in the meaning "B(ws)". The Lakher term for this relationship, viz. ri-pa-la (Parry ri-la-pa), contains a new element ri, which appears also in (i-)ri BS(ws), a vocative term. Lakher -no is from Kukish *nau; cf. t'o < *t'au "fat"; o < *au "to call"; ro-mo < *mau "bamboo". Lakher si- in si-ta-nau Si(ms) can be identified with Lushei far(-nu); for the initial, cf. Lakher so, Lushei fa "son"; for the final, cf. Lakher t'i, Lushei t'ar "new". Na-rau (also na-rau-nau) Si(ws) is another new term, the original form of which cannot be reconstituted with any assurance. The corresponding Lushei term lai-zon may be represented by Lakher lai-sa "maiden, young woman". Both ri and nau appear in the phrase sa-no-ri-nau "a relation, a fellow clansman, a friend" (cf. sa-no-pi "family, household, near relations").

Both Parry and Savidge cite tu in the meaning "SiCh(ms)", but Savidge also defines the term as "gCh", as in Lushei, whereas Parry cites another term for gCh, viz. sa-mang-pa gS,

601 sa-mang-nong (= -nau) gD. Parry further cites sa-la-pa ggS, sa-ci-pa gggS (cf. ci-pa-t'la "descendants", from ci "seed"). The appearance of especial terms for ggCh and gggCh is most unusual for a Kuki language.

The Lakher affinal terminology conforms pretty much to Kuki type, with pa-pu WF,WoB (but WyB called by name), pa-pi WM,WBW, and nang-nang HM (= FSi), (i-)pa-ra-pa FSiH,HF. Lakher nang-nang (Savidge nang) FSi,WM is directly comparable with Lushei ni, the final having been secondarily nasalized after the initial n-; cf. Lakher nang "sun, day", Lushei ni; Lakher nang "2", Lushei hni˥. Pa-ra-pa includes the Kuki element *rang already encountered ; cf. ma < *mang "dream"; a-ra < *rang "horse"; ba < *bang "to stop, cease" ; ca < *cang "hard, ripe". Savidge cites mang-nau MM, MSi, perhaps for *nang-nau. Meu-nau SW,BW(ws) is from *mou-nu (Lushei mo); cf. ma-t'eu-pa "fly", Lushei t'o; pa-t'eu "to arise, awake", Lushei t'o; šaeu "to boil", Lushei šo; ngeu "white", Lushei ngo. According to Parry, the son-in-law is called only by name (both in address and reference), yet Savidge cites the term tu-pa-pa DH,SiH, from tu-pa SiS(ms); cf. Haka (k-)tu Sl. Lakher a-wa-pa H agrees with Haka (va) rather than Lushei (pa-šǎl). La-pi-nau W is from *pui-nu, plus an unidentified prefixed element.

Thado

The Thado terms have been fairly well recorded in Hutton and Shaw (in Appendix C, by Hutton), while numerous other sources of lesser value are available. In most respects the

601 Thado system closely agrees with the Lushei-Haka system, and even the forms themselves exhibit only minor discrepancies, e.g. ca Ch for fa < *za. Separate terms for B(ws) and Si(ms) have not been recorded, but we cannot be sure that such do not exist in the language. A sharp distinction is made between terms applied to relatives older than speaker, prefixed with the honorific particle he-, and those applied to relatives younger than speaker, prefixed with ka- ("my"), e.g. he-u oSb but ka-nau ySb.

The cousin terminology is of Lushei-Haka type, viz. pu gF,MB,MBS, and (ka-)tu FSiCh,SiCh,gCh (note that u oSb is sometimes applied to FSiCh(os) "by courtesy"). MBD, however, is equated not with gM,MBW (pi) but with MSi (nu-nga). Nu-nga is also used for FBW (nu M in address), and for WSi,WBD, but only if these kin are of the speaker's mother's clan, i.e. if the speaker has married his MBD. In other words, WSi is equated with MBD only when WSi <u>is</u> MBD through cross-cousin marriage. This principle is consistently applied throughout the Thado affinal terminology. Thus, the terms pi WM (= MBW), pu WF (= MB), ni HM (= FSi), and gang HF (= FSiH) are used only under conditions of cross-cousin marriages, pa F and nu M being employed under other conditions. One must suspect that this same difference obtains elsewhere in the Kuki group, but the point is brought out only in the Thado material.

The element -nga of ~~nu~~-nga MSi also appears in pa-nga, defined by Hutton as "father's cousin on father's side". Butler cites (he-)nu-nga "MB", (he-)pa-nga "FB", also "aunt". Hutton

601 (in Shaw, note 1 to p. 141) connects this element with the -nga of bong-nga "cow-herd" (bong "cow"), whence he infers a Thado root *nga "to watch over, tend". We may further connect this verbal root with Haka hngak "to look after, guard, watch, take care of", also "to wait"; Lushei hngak, Siyin ngak "to wait"; for the loss of the final velar stop, cf. Thado ba "bat", Lushei bak; Thado ta "body", Lushei tăk-ss; Thado po "to carry", Lushei puăk; Thado vo "to beat", Lushei vuăk. The connection of the kinship term with this verbal root, however, is not altogether certain. Siyin has ngak-nu "girl, maiden, damsel", and in Old Kuki we find Rangkhol ga-pui-nak MySi (nak for *ngak), Chiru a-nu-ngak M, Kyaw pin-ngak MSi, pon-ngak FB, and Vaiphei pa-ngak FyB, nu-ngak MySi. This material suggests that the root *ngak has a basic signification of "young", and this view is supported by the statement made by Bose (p. 9) in re Aimol, viz. 'nga' is added to words denoting younger (as contrasted with 'ter').

Thado gang FSiH,HF, Siyin ngan (= ngang) FSiH represent the root *rang already encountered in Central Kuki; cf. the following table:

	Kuki	Lushei	Thado	Siyin
FSi H	*rang	-	gang	ngang
bowels	*ril	ril	gil	ngil
snake	*rul	rul	gul	ngul
steal	*ruk	ruk	gu	ngu

601 Thado has distinct Sp terms, viz. yi ~ ji, yi-nu ~ ji-nu W, yi-pa H (latter in Hodson only); cf. Kachin yi ~ wi "female", ǰa-yi ~ ǰa-wi "woman, wife". According to Hutton (in Shaw, p. 140), a woman addresses her husband by the name of his first child, of whichever sex, to which -pa is suffixed, i.e. "father of so-and-so". We lack the Thado terms for Sl and Dl; Hutton (in Shaw, p. 142) indicates that the personal name is used. Thado mau "woman" (used in the phrase mau pui "to marry"), however, is cognate with Lushei mo "bride, Dl" (supra). Hodson has the mysterious entry ma-pa "uncle", unlike any term recorded by Hutton. Since Thado often drops final -k (vide supra), we may compare this term with Lushei mak-pa Sl. This comparison is strongly supported by the Siyin evidence outlined below.

Siyin

Siyin, the second and last Northern Kuki language to be considered, resembles Thado in most respects yet has its individual features, some of which are purely phonetic, e.g. ta Ch, Thado ca, Lushei fa. The Siyin distinction between pa-lien FoB (lien "large") and pa-no FyB (no "small") parallels Thado pa-len FoB, pa-neu FyB (descriptive only). Webb cites pa-niu FB, nu-niu MSi, of uncertain interpretation. Siyin has yi ~ ǰi W, as in Thado, but pa-sal H (Thado pa-sal "male", yi-pa H).

The Siyin affinal terminology presents several problems. Mak-pa (written 'mark-pa' in Webb) is used for MSiH as well as for Sl,SiH(ms); cf. Thado ma-pa < *mak-pa "uncle". Pu is used

601 for gF,MB,MBS, as in Thado, but pi appears only in the meaning "gM", having been replaced by son-nu in the meanings "MBW", "WM", and "WBD". Similarly, pu has been replaced by son-pa in the meanings "WF", "WB", and "WBS". Naylor, on the other hand, cites both mak-pa and sŭng-pa (= son-pa) for Bl,Fl, and sŭng-nu (= son-nu) for Sil,Ml. This element son ~ sung is perhaps identical to the word sŭng-a "inside", but no good comparisons can be suggested. Siyin also has especial terms for a woman's HF, viz. to-pa-sal HF (pa-sal H), to-nu-pi HM (cf. Kuki *nu-pui W); the to- element cannot be analyzed. It is apparent that Siyin avoids making categorical equations in the SpP terms. Siyin has the standard Kuki Dl term, viz. mo-nu Dl, mo HSi,BW(ws).

Naylor records a distinction between ta-sel Ne (ta Ch), and nu-sel Ni (cf. ta-nu Ch), while Webb cites tu-pa SiS(ms), tu-nu SiD(ms), but ta BCh(ws), i.e. xN(ws) is equated with Ch, contrary to the Central Kuki pattern (our Thado material does not cover this point). Naylor gives tu-son rather than tu gCh (cf. son ~ sŭng, supra), and cites the interesting reciprocal term tu-k'an ta-k'an "descendant; ancestor", where a play has been made on the secondarily developed alliteration in tu (< *tu) gCh and ta (< *za) Ch. Note also the term pu-te pa-te "ancestor" (pu gF, pa F).

Old Kuki

197 Relatively little material is available for the numerous
601 Old Kuki dialects. Only Kyaw (Webb), Chawte (Roy, Hodson),

197 Vaiphei (Roy), and Aimol (Bose) are known in sufficient detail
601 to merit individual attention. Soppitt's grammar and vocabulary of Rangkhol offers little of value. Note, however, the unusual Rangkhol terms ǔsum-pa yB, ǔsum-ǔsŏk No, the latter apparently containing the word ǔsŏk "slave" (Thado souk). The Kuki root *te "little, child" is represented by Rangkhol dong-ma-te "girl", nai-te-nai-peng "child".

601 Sex distinctions in the Sb terms have not been recorded for any of the Old Kuki languages, but Lushei far-nu < *dzar Si(ms) is almost everywhere present in the meaning "Si" (perhaps actually Si,ms), viz. Langrong far-nu, Purum, Chiru sarr-nu, Hallam, Kom sar-nu, Kolhreng carr-nu, Aimol car-nu, Lamgang (a-)car, Anal a-cal; for Anal a-cal, cf. Anal hǎl < *ar "hen", k'al < *k'ar "window". Peoron has a-wu (= a-u) oB, a-nau yB, but a-wa oSi, sa-nu ySi, the last apparently from Kuki *za-nu D.

Kyaw

[101] The Kyaw (= Chaw) are a small Old Kuki tribe in the Arakan hills, far to the south of the main body of the Old Kuki peoples, as shown on the diagram above. According to the tradition recounted in Hughes (p. 16), they were offered by a Burmese queen as pagoda slaves some three hundred and fifty years ago. The Kyaw terminology, as recorded by Webb and Latter, differs notably from that of the other Old Kuki tribes, perhaps because of this relatively long period of separation.

601

Kyaw pon-ngak FB, pin-ngak MSi contain the *ngak element already encountered in Thado and Siyin. Kyaw has final -e for -i in the terms (ka-)ne HM (but ka-no FSi, probably by error for ka-ne), (ka-)pe gM, and na-pwe W (Latter na-poi W; cf. toi < *tui "water"). In contrast to (ka-)pu gF and (ka-)pe gM, Kyaw has tara-pu MB,WF and tara-pe MBW,WM, where tara- seems to represent the Kukish root *tra B(ws); cf. the analytical Laiyo term nu ta-pa MB. Kyaw mrun FSiH,HF perhaps stands for Kuki *m-rang, but appears to have been influenced by Khami prun < *mrun, id. Note also Kyaw ma-sal (Latter m-cal) H in place of the standard Kuki *pa-sal.

Cross-cousins are distinguished in the terms (ka-)wei MBCh, (ka-)m-wei FSiCh,WB,SiH(ms), neither of which can be placed. Kyaw equates Dl with WBCh (ra-wa), and Sl with SiCh(ms),HSiCh (sa-mǎk). These terms are to be compared with Lushei wa' BCh(ws) and mak-pa Sl, respectively. Kyaw further equates yB(ms) with S in the term sa-pa; cf. Poeron sa-nu ySi, from Kuki *za-nu D.

Vaiphei

The Vaiphei nomenclature presents still another variation of the stable Kuki system. Pa-ngak FyB (but pa FoL = F) and nu-ngak MySi (but nu MoSi = M) are reminiscent of Thado, as is zi-nu W. Note also the Thado-like forms ca Ch and gang FSiH,HF. Unlike Thado, which equates MBD with MSi (nu-nga), Vaiphei has pi gM,MBW,MBD and pu gF,MB,MBS, as in Lushei. Yet Vaiphei equates BCh(ws) with FyBCh (nau), in

601 contrast to tu-pa FSiS,SiS(ms),gS, i.e. xN(ws) is equated with pC. Roy cites u-pa oB, nau-nu ySi, and nau-pa yB,oSi, a most unusual type of arrangement (cf. the Chawte Sb terms, infra).

The affinal terminology is of normal type, with retention of the terms mo-nu D1 (cited by mistake as "DH") and mak-ta S1,SiH(ms). Nu and pa are cited as alternative terms for ni HM and gang HF, respectively, the latter set probably used only under conditions of cross-cousin marriage (vide the Thado discussion). Vaiphei tar-pu-nu WF, tar-pu-pa WB, and tar-pi-nu WM appear to be identical to Kyaw tara-pu and tara-pe (supra), suggesting a metathesis tar < *tra (tara). A root tar "old (in age)" appears in the Kuki group (e.g. Lushei tǔr), and it is possible that the above terms have been derived from this root rather than from *tra B(ws). Cf. also Aimol ter, which is added to words denoting elder (Bose, p. 9), and Rangkhol ga-pa-ter "uncle" (ga-pa F). The initial cluster tr- is so rare in Kukish, however, that the matter cannot be settled on phonological grounds.

Chawte

The Chawte terminology as recorded by Roy shows many striking departures from the Kuki systems previously examined, and even on purely internal evidence one would be inclined to mistrust this material. These suspicions are strengthened when one reads (Roy, p. 154) that the information was obtained in "broken Hindi" from a Vaiphei informant

601 who knew no Chawte, the conversation between the Vaiphei and Chawte natives being held in Meithei, a language which presumably neither fully commanded! This employment of a Vaiphei informant also explains the relatively satisfactory record of the Vaiphei nomenclature.

We are fortunate in having a check on Roy's material in the short Chawte and Tarau lists presented in Hodson, 1922 (p. 94). Both are of conventional Kuki type, viz. Chawte pu MB,WF; pi MBW,WM; ni FSi,HM; rang FSiH, a-rang HF; Tarau pu-te MB, pu WF; pi-te MBW, pi WM; ni FSi,HM; ma-rang FSiH,HF (Hodson notes that "te is a plural form"). Roy, however, cites (a-)pu as gF,MB,HF,WF,FSiH, and (a-)pi as gM,HM,WM, thus confusing a number of distinct terms, while the root *rang appears only in the term a-rang-a HyB.

In view of the above discrepancies, the material presented by Roy cannot be regarded as trustworthy, and the following observations based thereon must be duly discounted.

Both the PSb and Sb terms present aberrant features. Roy cites a-te FoB,MoSi (i.e. PoSb), a-nu-te MySi,FBW, and a-tum FyB; cf. the Tarau suffix -te (supra), explained by Hodson as a "plural form" (Lushei has tĕ as a plural suffix, also te "little"). The Chawte Sb and collateral terms cited by Roy are so remarkable that they merit tabulation, depite the fact that they may be partly or wholly erroneous.

Aimol

601

ai-ya oSi(mws),xCi(os) a-ya B(ms),xCe(ms)

(ka-)nau-ma ySi(mws),xCi(ys) (ka-)nau-pa B(ws),xCe(ws)

ai-va FSiD(ms) a-va FSiS(ws)

(ka-)c'uau BCh(mws)

(ka-)tu SiCh(mws),gCh

It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that this arrangement is unparalleled within Kukish, probably even within Tibeto-Burman. Yet one can also readily see how a few mistaken definitions might have distorted an ordinary Kuki-type arrangement almost beyond recognition. The roots *ya and *c'uau differ from any previously encountered in Kukish, but cf. Meithei ya-ma oB. The root *va is apparently related to Lushei va' BCh(ws), but note its use here in the meaning FSiCh(ds).

In the affinal nomenclature, Chawte has mo Dl, as in most Kuki languages, but (ka-)tu-pa Sl, as in Haka.

Aimol

The Aimol terminology, recorded rather fully by Bose, is of straight Kuki type in most respects, yet shows some odd deviations. Above all, (ka-)pu is used for FSiS (= gF,MB) and (ka-)tu-pa for MBS (= SiS,gS), i.e. precisely the reverse of the Kuki system. One would wish for a check on this point before accepting it in full. Aimol (a-)ou (= a-u) oSb is also applied to FSiCh(os),MSiCh(os); cf. Thadu u (supra). Note also the equation of FBCh and SbCh (probably pN) with Ch (ka-nai < *nau).

601 The affinal nomenclature includes (ka-)pu WF, (ka-)pi WM (ordinary Kuki pattern), and (ka-)tar-pu HF, (ka-)tar-pi HM,HoBW (as in Kyaw and Chawte). This additional Aimol evidence suggests that the root involved here is *tar "old" rather than *tra B(ws). Aimol is unusual in preserving both the D1 and S1 terms, viz. (ka-)moi-mu D1 (< *mou), (ka-)map-pa S1 (< *mak-pa, through assimilation). The root *rang FSiH,HF is found only in (ka-)moi-rang HB,BW (probably ms, making this a reciprocal term); cf. Chawte a-rang-a HyB. On the semantic side, cf. Lushei pu-zon WF,WB, etc. Bose cites (ka-)car-nu in the meaning "SiH", but the LSI gives car-nu Si (probably ms), agreeing with the other Kuki languages, and Bose's definition must be provisionally rejected.

Southern Kuki

197 601 The Southern Kuki terminologies show the maximum number of differences from the Central, Northern, and Old Kuki terminologies discussed above. Aside from Sho, the Southern Kuki languages are not well known, and much of our material has been taken from the census report by Webb and the word-lists in Scott. Yindu and Anu are known only from the terms listed by Webb. In view of this dearth of general linguistic information, our analysis of most of these terminologies must be confined to singling out some of the more obvious points.

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Taungtha
Yawdwin

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Taungtha

Taungtha, which presents both Central and Southern Kuki features, is something of a puzzle. The Taungtha have come under Chinbok influence (cf. the discussion in Tin), but their speech is devoid of any specifically Chinbok features. Taungtha i M can be compared with the Northern Kuki root *yi W. The terms pa-lin "uncle" and i-lin "aunt" are to be interpreted "FoB" and "MoSi" (lin "big", Lushei liⁿn). Taungtha θit < mi³ oSi is connected with Sho and Chinbon si; cf. -a S, θa-mi D (the latter perhaps influenced by Burmese ʌa-mi³, pronounced θa-mi³). The LSI cites the terms θet-nu ySi, θet-nu-len oSi (len = lin "big"). Taungtha a-te Ch (also "young") is from the Kuki root *to "little, child". Of far greater interest than any of the above, however, is the term lwi Ne,Ml, perhaps from *m-li (Taungtha does not preserve prefixes), which fits with the Kung-Burmese root *m-li gCh, Konyak li xN. The term is so isolated here, however, that one hesitates to draw any final conclusions, yet we do have a parallel in Yindu (ka-)li BD(ws). Taungtha wa H agrees with Haka and Lakher, but u M represents the Kuki root *u oSb in a novel setting (cf. Mru u M).

Yawdwin

Yawdwin is of general Chinbok-Yindu type, to judge from the meagre material available. Puk-tum "uncle" and nuk-tum "aunt", formed with (a-)tum "large", are of the same type as Taungtha pa-lin, i-lin (supra), but with a Southern Kuki

601 rather than Central Kuki element. The Sb terms, viz. ka-pe oB, ka-pe-nu oSi, and ka-na yB, paik-θa ySi, are typically Southern Kuki. Kawdwin pu-k'o Fl, pyi-k'o Nl, from Kuki *pu and *pi, respectively, contain an unanalyzed affixed element -k'o.

Chinbok

Chinbok is perhaps the most representative of all the Southern Kuki languages, but the material is difficult to analyze, partly because of our deficient knowledge of the language. The terms cited in Webb have been freely interpreted in drawing up the tabulation below, in which all the forms have been normalized (Webb confuses initial surds and sonants, z- and θ-, final o and u, etc.). The ka- ("my") prefix has been dropped, and the medial element -k- treated as an adjectival prefix; cf. bak-tum "uncle", mik-tum "aunt" (Scott), formed with ak-tum "big".

601

Chinbok Consanguineal Terms

pi-šrö MM

nu pa FM

nu M

dai-za k-döm MoSi

dai-za MySi,MSiD,MBD

ni-ko FoSi

ko-za FySi

pai oSi(ws)

be oSi(ms)

nau hmu-mi ySi(ws)

be hmo ySi(ms)

za k-hmu-mi FBD

tu hmu-mi FSiD

tu hmu SiD(ms)

za k-hmu BD(ws),SiD(ws)

za hmu-mi D

pu-šrö FF,MF,MoB

pa F

pa k-döm FoB

pa k-cwi FyB

pu-ko MyB

pwe oB(ms)

beng wai oB(ws)

nau yB(ms)

beng hmo yB(ws)

pu-za MSiS

za k-hmo FBS

pu-ko-za MBS

tu FSiS,SiS

za n-šuan SiS(ws)

za k-wai BS(ws)

za S

n-šuan SS

za k-hmu n-šuan DS

Chinbok Affinal Terms

pi-šrö WM,HM

pi-ko MoBW

pi-ko-za MyBW

ni-ko HoSi

ni-ko hmo HySi

za hmu-mi DI

k-we WF,WoB

pu-šrö HF

hmak FSiH,SiH(mws),WySiH

k-we hmo WyB

tu k-we SI

601 Notes:

The extraordinary development of age distinctions and the complete absence of neuter terms are the most striking traits of this Chinbok nomenclature. These combined terms showing age distinctions are formed with k-dŏm (Scott k-tum, from a-K-tum "big"), k-ewi (unanalyzed, but apparently "little"), -ko (also unanalyzed), and -za (from za Ch, in diminutive sense; cf. Nyi Lolo). The distinction of age even in the terms for MB and FSi is especially noteworthy. Note that only MoB is equated with gF (pu-ǰrŏ), indicating the honorific nature of this equation. Ko-za FySi stands for *ni-ko-za. The separate term for FM (written ka-nu ka-ba, apparently from ka-nu M and ka-ba F but in reverse order) is paralleled elsewhere in Southern Kuki (Yindu, Amu).

The eight-term Sb nomenclature contains only one recognizable element, viz. nau yB, from Kuki *nau ySb. Pai oSi is comparable with Maru pai oSi, Burmese a-pai "madam", but little can be made of the remaining terms. Hmo is perhaps used in a diminutive sense; cf. za k-hmo FBS. Scott cites kap-p'we oB, kap-pe oSi.

The separate gCh terms, viz. n-ǰuan SS and za k-hnu nuan DS, constitute another Chinbok innovation. The latter term, which is formed with the element za k-hnu SbD(ws), presents a partial equation of the type represented by Kuki tu SiCh,gCh. Webb writes ka-n-ǰuan gS, ka-za k-hnu n-ǰuan gD, but ka-za n-ǰuan SiS(ws), and ka-dai-za k-p-ǰrum YSiD; cf. Rangkhol ǰum-pa yB, ǰum-ǰuŏk Me.

601 The collateral terminology exhibits 'Omaha' features, but in modified form. Note that MBD is equated with MySi (dai-za ~ dai-θa as written in Webb), whereas MBS (pu-ko-za) is a diminutive of MyB (pu-ko). FSiS and SiS(ms) are equated (ka-tu ~ ka-du as written in Webb), while tu k-hnu FSiD is semantically equivalent to tu hmu-mi FSiD (hnu is perhaps only a variant of hmu). Note that the maternal collateral lines tend to be equated (dai-za MSiD, MBD, and pu-za MSiS, pu-ko-za MBS). Za k-wai BS(ws) can be compared with Kyaw (ka-)wei MBCh, (ka-)m-wei FSiCh. The affinal element k-we is perhaps only a variant of k-wai.

In the affinal terminology, note pu-šrö HF rather than WF; hmak FSiH, SiH but tu k-we Sl; za hmu-mi Dl (= D), probably a vocative term; ni-ko HoSi (= FoSi), but pi-šrö HM.

Yindu

The Yindu nomenclature is of general Chinbok type, but with some Sho features, e.g. the development of final -o from -a, as in (ka-)po F, (ka-)zo S. Age distinctions are made in the PSb and Sb terminology, much as in Chinbok.

pa oSi(ws)	pwe oB(ms)
pa-š oSi(ms)	pe-š oB(ws)
ba k-sung ySi(ws)	n-ka-bwi yB(ms)
ba k-ši-š ySi(ms)	pe-zš yB(ws)

Pwe oB(ms) is identical with the Chinbok term pwe, but the remaining Sb terms are distinct. The element -sung also appears in (ka-)pu k-sung-zo MyB, where zo Ch functions as a

601 diminutive suffix. For the element -ǰi, cf. (ka-)pi k-ǰwi MyBW, and Chinbok pa k-ewi FyB. A third affixed element, -bwi, is found in (ka-)bwi-ŏ FyB, and apparently also in (ka-)pa-bwi MM.

Yindu further resembles Chinbok in distinguishing between (ka-)pu-bu MoB,WF and (ka-)pu k-sung-zo MyB, and between (ka-)pi-bi MoBW,WM and (ka-)pi k-ǰwi MyBW. The gP terms, however, are distinct, viz. (ka-)mo FF,MF, also FoB, (ka-)pa-bwi MM, and (ka-)hnu-bo FM, the latter distinction occurring also in Chinbok (supra).

A new term *zi, found also in Sho, is represented by (ka-)zi FySi, (ka-)zi-ŏ FoSi. According to the material in Webb, (ka-)zi is also used for FBD and HF, (ka-)zi-ŏ for HM. The equation FySi = HF is puzzling, but FoSi = HM conforms to the general Kuki pattern.

The term (ka-)du (= ka-tu) is applied to FSiD,SiS(mws),DS, while for SS the analytical term (ka-)zo a-zo is employed. The corresponding feminine terms, however, are kang-mo FSiD, ka-du ba-zo SiD(ms) (the gD terms are not given). The Chinbok affinal element k-we also appears in Yindu, but in a different setting, viz. (ka-)k-we-zo MBS,WB,WSiH,SiH(mws), also Sl (Chinbok tu k-we Sl). The Yindu material suggests that the root is *kwe rather than *k-we, but comparative material is lacking. The term has conceivably been borrowed from Shan (k'we), but the distinctive Shan combined terms are not present; contrast the Kadu loan-words pi-kwe SiH, lok-kwe, based on Shan pi-k'we and luk-k'we, respectively. It will be

601 noted that one-half the 'Bunks' features have been eliminated through the employment of this new term (Ka-po-ka BUN,"F, but Ka-kwe-so KHS). A distinct term, Ka-a-kang-ma, is used for HSD. The term cited for DL is Ka-sub-ma, probably "wife of son"; cf. Chinbok ca (Webb Ka-k-ca) "wife".

Yingtu (ka-)li UD(we) has been mentioned above in connection with Taungtha lui Ka,KL. No other traces of this root have been uncovered in Southern Kuki.

Sho

197 Sho or Khyeng includes two main dialect groups, a northern and a southern. The latter dialect, spoken in Sandoway District, has been described by Houghton (1892) and Fryer, while the former is known only from word-lists in Houghton (1895b) and the LSI (the 'Thayetmyo Chin'
601 dialect belongs in this group). The tabulation below is based on the Sandoway dialect.

601

Sho Consanguineal Terms

(a-)nü mon-s'o ggM	(a-)pö mon-s'o ggF
(a-)pö s'an-nü gM	(a-)pö gF
(a-)nü (a-)ü M	(a-)po F
(a-)ü-hlän MoSi	pa-hlän FoB,MoSiH
(a-)ü-t'oi MySi	pa-t'oi FyB,MySiH
(a-)si FoSi	(a-)pu MoB
(a-)si-mlik FySi	(a-)pu-mlik MyB
	(a-)ta oB
(a-)nü-bi Si	(a-)nau-ü yB
s'o-nü D,oBD	s'o S,oBS
(a-)tü-nü SiD,yBD,gD	(a-)tü SiS,yBS,gS

Sho Affinal Terms

(a-)pö WM,MBW	(a-)pu WF
p'a-ya W	p'o-wa H
(a-)si WoSi,oBW	in-goi-hlän WoB,oSiH
(a-)nau-hni WySi,yBW	in-goi-mlik WyB,ySiH
(a-)hmö-ü WBW	
no D1	(a-)tü S1

Notes:

Sho has final -o for -a (as in Yindu) and final -ü for -u; cf. a-po F, s'o S; a-nü and a-ü M (Houghton writes a-u M, but Fryer cites the form a-ü), a-tü SiS,gS. Both -a and -u may be retained, however, though the factors involved here are not understood; cf. a-ta oB; a-pu MoB.

601 A-pŏ is often used as the neuter t[illegible] for gP, according to Houghton, the affixed element s'an-nŭ merely standing for "old woman" (s'an-bo "old man"). Thus is explained the term a-pŏ WM,MBW, for which a-pŏ s'an-nŭ is cited as an alternative. The form itself is not easy to explain, since the short final -ŏ, entirely distinct from ordinary -o (< -a), is a rare element. Fryer often has -ŏk where Houghton has -ŏ, e.g. a-pŏk gF for a-pŏ, a-yŏk "corpse" for a-yŏ, wŏk "pig" for wŏ; cf. also Minbu (northern Sho dialect) a-pŏ gF, but a-pŏt "aunt" (= a-pŏ MBW). It will be noted that a-pŏ has replaced both *pu gF and *pi gM, the former surviving only in the meanings "MoB", "WF". In view of the undoubted Burmese influence on Sho, it is not unlikely that this term has at least been influenced by Burmese a-p'ui^{3} ~ a-b'ui^{3} gF, pronounced a-bo^{3}. In addition to the terms just discussed, Minbu also has pa-mu gM (lit. "father's mother") and pak-to gF (unanalyzed). Sho is exceptional in having especial terms for ggW and ggF, formed with the element mon-s'o "a relation", apparently derived from mon "an owner, a person" (e.g. nan-mon "a villager", from nan "village") and a-s'o "clan". This term for "clan" seems to be identical to the Arakanese term o-sa, id., cited in Mills (supra, pt. 9); one may derive it either from TB *sa "flesh" or TB *za Ch, the former being the more likely solution.

Sho has both a-nŭ W, from the regular Kuki root *nu, and a-ŭ W, agreeing with Mru a-u (cf. also Taungtha u "wife").

601 Age distinctions appear in the PSb terms, as elsewhere in Southern Kuki; note that ŭ rather than nŭ is employed in the MSi terms, also that po F becomes pa in combination (unstressed position). The affixed element -hlǎn is of Kuki origin (Lushei lǐǎn, Sho hlǎn "big"), while -mlik is the Sho word mlik (Houghton), mlek (Fryer) "small". The writer has already compared this word with Burmese mrats < *m-lik "ggCh" (the root seems not to be of Kukish provenance). Finally, -t'oi is to be regarded as a loan-word from Burmese t'we^3, as it appears in p'ǎ-t'we^3 FyB, mǐ-t'we^3 MySi. The borrowing has been made, however, from one of the archaic Arakanese dialects which preserve final -wi (> -we in standard Burmese), since Sho -oi sometimes corresponds to Kuki -ui (= -wi), as in a-toi "egg" < *tui, noi "to laugh" < *nui. In Burmese loan-words, -oi is substituted both for -we (< -wi) and -wai; cf. loi "to be easy" < Burmese lwai; poi "a feast" < Burmese pwai^3; woih "eddy" < Burmese wai^3; and moi "to bear (children)" < Burmese mwe^3; moi "to be happy" < Burmese mwe'.

The term a-si FoSi has completely ousted the Kuki root *ni, which does not appear in any of the Sho material. Fryer cites a-si as "oSi" rather than as "FoSi", and the term shows a similar extension in Chinbon (infra), while Yindu has (ka-)si FSi,FBD. Extra-Kukish comparisons are furnished by Kadu a-si MSi (i-si "woman") and Nung a-si gǐ (cf. Kuki *pu gF,'MB).

The Sb terms are much simpler than those in use among other Southern Kuki groups. Houghton explains a-nŭ-bi Si as "other mother" (bi "other"), but the LSI cites the form be Si,

601 and the term must be compared with Chinbok be oSi(ms). Fryer draws a distinction between a-si oSi (= FoSi) and a-nau-be ySi (a-nau yB), while Thayetmyo Chin (northern Sho dialect) has na-bi oSi, na-au (= nau) ySi (= yB). Note a-ta oB, as elsewhere in Tibeto-Burman, as contrasted with the Kukish term ~~a~~tra B(ws).

Of the collateral nomenclature we have only a-tŭ SiS (probably ms), gS, which conforms to the Kuki pattern. The stress on age distinctions, however, has resulted in the equation of oBS with S, yBS with SiS, and of oBD with D, yBD with SiD, partially breaking down the demarcation between the parallel and cross collateral lines. Sho thus furnishes a good illustration of the overriding of a basic kinship pattern by a secondary principle. Houghton states that "cousins are called brothers and sisters", but offers no details, hence we cannot be sure that both cross and parallel cousins are included.

The affinal terms a-pŏ WM, HBW and a-pu WF are of Kuki type (the HM and HF terms are not cited), while a-tŭ Sl (= SiS) has also been encountered (e.g. in Haka). No Dl, cited only in Houghton, 1895b, cannot be explained. Sho a-nau-hni WySi, yBW points to a basic meaning "ySb" for the term a-nau (cf. Thayetmyo Chin, supra). In the closely related Chinbon language, the same term (ka-nau-hni) is used for "Dl". The element in-goi in the terms for WB (note the age distinctions) appears to contain the word in "house" (Lushei ĭn), but

601 -goi cannot be analyzed Sho a-hmö-u WBW, Chinbon ka-hmö BW(ws), are cognate with Lushei mo (Kukish *mou) SW,BW; cf. a-lö "taungya" (field), Lushei lo; ʌö "to go to meet", Lushei do "to go or be out"; lö-e "to bring, take", Lushei lo "to pluck", also "verbal prefix signifying motion towards the speaker"; sö "to dig", Lushei co "to dig a hole"; t'ö "to rise, awake", Lushei t'o; p'ö "to put out to dry", Lushei p'o.

Sho p'o-wa (also p'o-ha) H includes the Kuki root *wa H (as in Haka), perhaps plus the element p'o "old". Sho also has the alternative term lang H, used only in the phrase lang-p'a-ya "H and ", which can be placed as a loan from Burmese lang-mǎ-ya³, id. Sho appears to avoid the combination of m- before initial y-, but does allow p- in this position, as in pa-yo "bird", pa-yü "rat". It would thus seem that the Burmese term mǎ-ya³ has been altered in order to conform with Sho phonemic patterns.

Chinbon

[197] Chinbon belongs in the Sho group, e.g. it shows the same shift from final -s to -o (ka-po F, ka-zo S), but appears to have been less influenced by Burmese and in general it possesses more points of contact with the other Southern Kuki groups. The simple Sb nomenclature, however, is specifically of Sho type, viz. (ka-)t'a oB, (ka-)si oSi, (ka-)nau ySb. Age distinctions are made in the FB terms, viz. (ka-)po-lin FoB (= Sho pa-hlän), (ka-)po-ǰwi FyB (cf. Chinbok pa k-cwi, id.). FSi and MSi are equated in the term (ka-)zi, which corresponds

601 to Sho a-si FoSi. The Chinbon term is probably identical to (ka-)si oSi, Sho a-si, id. (in Fryer). An interesting distinction is made between (ka-)pu MyB (Sho a-pu) and (ka-)mu-bok MoB, probably identical to (ka-)mo-pauk gF.

The gP terms (ka-)mo-psuk gF (pauk, in Pru) and (ka-)mo gM are reminiscent both of Sho (a-pŏk ~ a-pŏ gF,gM) and Yindu (ka-mo gF). Ledu has mwa gM=Chinbon mo; cf. Ledu pwa F= Chinbon po.

Our fuller information on the collateral nomenclature of Chinbon shows that the Kuki 'Omaha' features are retained, whence we can infer that they are also present in the closely related Sho terminology. Chinbon has (ka-)tu FSiCh,SiCh(ms), gCh, also Sl (cf. Sho a-tŭ), and (ka-)pu MyB,MoBS,WBS, while MyBS is equated with WB in the term (ka-)goi (Sho in-goi WB).

In the affinal terminology, WF is equated with gF (ka-mo-pauk) rather than with MB, and WM is equated with gM (ka-mo) rather than with MoBW (ka-mok) or MyBW (ka-mo-t'a; cf. ka-t'a oB). Chinbon further equates HM with FSi (ka-zi), but employs a new term for HF,WSiH,SiH(ws), viz. ka-ze, apparently connected with ka-ze MBD; cf. also Sho a-se-zan WoSiH (note the parallelism in ka-zi ~ ka-ze). Chinbon ka-mok, apparently based on Kuki *mak Sl,SiH, is applied to FBW,MoBW,MoSiH; it is probably the same term as ka-hmauk FSiH and ko-hmauk SiH(ms). There is no trace of the Kukish root *rang FSiH,HF in the Sho-Chinbon group.

Anu

601 Anu, which is known only from the list of kinship terms in Webb, stands somewhat closer to Khasi than any of the Southern Kuki languages previously examined. Final -i has been replaced by -e, as in (a-k'a-)ne FSi, pe MM. The record of Sb terms is not altogether clear, but it is apparent that they are of Southern Kuki type, e.g. ta at oB(ms), pa e oSi(ws), hnau yB(ms). The gP terms show further Southern Kuki affinities, viz. pu FF,MF, nu FM (=M), pe MM. The categorical equations are typically Kuki, viz. pu gF,MB, pu u WF,WB; pe MM, pe e WM (but pa e MBW=oSi,ws); (a-k'a-)ne FSi, ne HM. The element e in the terms pe e, pa e can be compared with Taungtha i M (Anu -e < -i). Significantly enough, Anu has a separate term, run, for FSiH,HF, which corresponds to Kyaw m-run, Khasi p-run < *m-run (infra). This term is probably to be connected with the Kuki root *rang, as in Tarau (Old Kuki) ma-rang, but the relationship cannot be demonstrated on phonetic grounds.

The most noteworthy Anu feature, however, is the term su, which is used for FSiCh,MBCh,ySi(ws),SiCh(ws),HSiCh,gS and appears also in a-su-lai SiCh(ms). This term covers some of the same ground as Kukish *tu, but includes also MBCh (i.e. a single term is applied to both types of xC) as well as ySi(ws). The only likely comparison is with Kachin su, Mikir and Meithei su gCh, since a phonetic development t- > s- is highly improbable. Anu su cannot in any sense be regarded as a link between the TB roots *su and *tu, despite its isolated appearance here in Southern Kuki.

601 The Kukish root *mak Sl is retained in the form mok, but Ann ya-wa Dl seems to be connected with Kyaw ra-wa, id., and cf. Ann a-wa H.

Khami

191 Khami is the most aberrant of the Southern Kuki languages and at the same time the most difficult to handle. Despite the relatively large number of Khami sources, none of the available material affords an adequate basis for an analysis of the language. Khami is spoken in two primary dialects, viz. a northern (Ayaing) and a southern (Awa), which are really distinct speeches, and in a number of sub-dialects. Material on both dialects is presented by Pe, Myaing, and Webb (Khami list on p. lxvii is Ayaing Khami, Kro list on same page is Awa Khami). The Ayaing Khami material is the more consistent, hence the terms from this dialect have been selected for tabulation.

601

Ayaing Khami Consanguineal Terms

(a-)um-si gP

neik N

nga-ai F

nik-to MSi

nga-ai-hmo FB

(a-)ni FSi

um-pu MB

yik oSb

um-bai ySb,pC,BCh(ws)

mok-sa FSiCh,SiCh(ms)

nat-sa MBCh

(ka-)tu SiCh(ws),gS

sa-mok D

sa-po S,BCh(ms)

601

Ayaing Khami Affinal Terms

um-pe MBW,WM

(a-)ni HM

(a-)yu W

um-pu WF

p-run FSiH,HF

yo-o H

um-bai Sil(ms),Bl(ws)

tek-so HSi

(a-)mok BW(ws)

sin-ngo Dl(ms)

lin-ngo Dl(ws)

nat-sa WB,SiH(ms)

mok-sa Sl

Notes:

At first glance the Khami nomenclature appears to bear little resemblance to the Kuki terminology, but a number of Kuki features appear on closer investigation and others have doubtless been disguised by the unorthodox Khami phonetic behaviour. The single gP term is cited both by Webb (a-um-si) and Pe (na-si), while Myaing cites a-um-si MF,MM, bum-su FF,FM (for -si, cf. Thado ta-si "old", in Shaw, text, p. 107, ta-si-pu "old man"). Awa Khami has pa-we gF, pa-e gM. Kukish *pu gF,MB is preserved in the term um-pu MB, perhaps from *u-pu (cf. um-bai ySb), and Houghton cites pu-u gF for Awa Khami. The Awa Khami list in Webb has pa-we gF,MB. Phonetically this form parallels pa-e gM, na-e FSi, and na-pe ySi(ms), all from the Awa dialect; Pe cites pi-e gM, na-i "aunt" , na-pi yB. Exactly how these terms were developed from Kuki *pi and *ni cannot be stated, though the -e < -i shift can be traced in other Awa Khami words, e.g. ma-le < *ba-li "4".

601 The Khami parent terms are different from any previously encountered in Southern Kuki, and little can be made of the FB and MSi terms. Neik M stands for nei' (pe ne, LSI ne'), Awa Khami na-we ~ na-ăi. The form na-ăi is cited by Stilson, whose record of Khami (Awa) is the most accurate that we have. Stilson also cites măi "fish" < Kukish *me "flesh", as contrasted with māi "fire" < Kukish *mei, a-ma-lāi "tongue" < Kukish *ma-lei, hence we can regard the root as *ne rather than *nei. According to the LSI, na-ai (= nga-ai) F is used only in address, the descriptive term being am-p'o (< *a-p'o; cf. um-pu < *u-pu MB); Houghton cites am-po F without comment. This term is from the Kuki root *p'a or *pa, for Ayaing, unlike Awa, has developed final -o from -a, e.g. ho < *ha "tooth", lo < *la "moon", and contrast Ayaing sa-po S, Awa sa-pa. The Kukish root *nu M is found in Awa sa-nu D, Ayaing sa-nok (cf. neik < *ne M).

The two Sb terms yik (Pe yaik) and um-bai are matched by Awa Khami ya-at oSb, na-pe ySb (Webb); cf. pa-at F. One of the roots appears to be *ya (plus a suffixed element); cf. Pe ya-a', Houghton ya-ă oB, LSI ya, Houghton am-yo < *am-ya B; cf. Chawte a-ya B(ms), Meithei ya-ma oB.

The Kuki 'Omahr' features do not appear in Khami in typical form, since (ka-)tu is applied to SiCh(ws) rather than to SiCh(ms), while the (properly affinal) term mauk-sa (< Kuki *mak Sl, TB) is applied both to FSiCh and to SiCh(ms), i.e. Ayaing Khami has reversed the widespread Kuki practice of applying tu SiS(ms) to Sl (equated through cross-cousin marriage).

601 Awa Khami has mauk-pe FSiCh SiH(ms), mauk-sa Sl, but a distinct term lo-k'e SiCh(ms). Both Ayaing and Awa have a separate term for MBCh (Ayaing nat-sa, Awa ma-kon), the former appearing also as an affinal term (the correct form is *nai-sa, to judge from nai-sa ~ nai-tsa Bl, cited by Pe and Houghton, respectively).

The categorical equations are of Kuki type, including the employment of a separate term for FSiH,HF; for Ayaing p-run < *m-run (cf. Ayaing pa-lai, Awa a-ma-lai "tongue"; Ayaing pa-lung, Awa a-ma-lung "heart"), cf. Kyaw m-run, Anu run, and perhaps Tarau ma-rang, Kuki *rang (vide the discussion supra). Awa Khami has puk-pre FSiH,HF = B(ms), and cf. pa-pre WB,WBCh (Stilson cites pro-pri B). The distinction between Dl(ms) and Dl(ws) appears also in Myaing's record of Awa Khami, in the terms lein-ngo Dl(ms), nein-ngo Dl(ws), but Myaing cites a single term, na-sein, for Ayaing, and Webb cites ma-sein Dl for Awa. The elements involved cannot be analyzed, and it is uncertain whether the distinction really exists or is simply the result of poor recording.

Luhupa

197 601 The Luhupa languages are the first outside the Kuki group proper to be examined. Tangkhul, which exists in a number of well marked dialects, constitutes the core of this group, while Maring-Khoibu forms a bridge to Kuki proper. Of the Tangkhul dialects, Ukhrul is by far the best known through the voluminous but badly organized dictionary by

197 Pettigrew, as well as by the supplementary account in the LSI.
601 Three other Tangkhul dialects, viz. Khangoi, Phadang, and Kupome, have been recorded by McCulloch. Our Maring material likewise comes from McCulloch and the LSI. Khoibu and Champhang are too little known to merit consideration in this review.

601 The Maring terms include the following: (nai-)pa F, (nai-)pui M, mo-mo oB, nau yB, čǎr Si, ca-u-pa S, ca-nu-pui-a D. The use of the Kuki feminine affix *pui in the meaning "M" is typical of both the Luhupa and Western Kuki groups; McCulloch cites pa-ma F, wa M, the latter apparently a distinct term. Čǎr Si is probably a man's term, as in Kuki proper; cf. a-čǎr "his Si" in sentence no. 225 of the LSI (but kai-čǎl ySi in the LSI word-lists). Of the above terms, only mo-mo oB has not been previously encountered.

The Tangkhul terminology is difficult to analyze, largely because of the nature of our sources. Pettigrew cites so many variant forms for the Ukhrul dialect, often with discrepancies in the English-Tangkhul and Tangkhul-English vocabularies, and defines the terms so badly, that one is forced to select both forms and meanings. Furthermore, the forms cited in the LSI for the same dialect (Ukhrul) sometimes disagree with those in Pettigrew. The Khangoi, Phadang, and Kupome dialectical material is of only minor assistances. The following tabulation, therefore, is presented with some reservations.

601

Tangkhul (Ukhrul) Consanguineal Terms

(a-)yi ggM,gM,MBW	(a-)wŏ ggF,gF,MB
(a-)vă M	(a-)va F
(a-)vă k'ă-răr MoSi	(a-)va k'ă-răr FoB
(a-)vă ma-tui MySi	(a-)va ma-tui FyB
(a-)ni FSi	
(i-ŏa-)oei nga-la-vă oSi	(i-ŏa-)oei oB
(a-)zăr-vă Si(ms)	
(i-ci-)nau-vă Si(ws)	
(a-)ma-tui-vă ySi	(i-)mă-tŏ yB,Ne
(i-)rŭ FSiCh,SiCh,gCh	
(a-)nau nga-la-vă D	(a-)nau ma-yar-ŭ S

Tangkhul (Ukhrul) Affinal Terms

(a-)ni Ml	(a-)wŏ Fl
(a-)prei-vă W	(a-)ma-hăr-ŭ H
(a-)mui HSi,BW	(i-)mak WB,SiH
(i-)rŭ HSiCh,WBCh	
(i-)ri-ha-vă Dl	(i-)ri-ha Sl

Notes:

In general pattern the Kuki affinities of the Tangkhul nomenclature are unmistakable, but the terms themselves offer some difficulties. All the gF and F terms require investigation. The latter can be derived from Kuki *pa F and *pui "female", since the initial stop is preserved in Kupome a-pa F, a-p'ŭ M (a-ja p'ŭ ySi, a-ne ni-p'u D, as contrasted with a-ne ni-pa S). Final -ui is not preserved in Ukhrul, which

601 may have -ă, as in k'ă-mă-nă "to laugh" < Kukish *ma-nui, and p'ă-ră "snake" < Kukish *pa-rul via *pa-rui, or -û (a mixed vowel), as in fû "dog" < Kukish *ui ~ *k'ui, and mă-hwû "elephant" < Kukish *ma-wi ~ *ma-k'wi; cf. Kachin gwi "dog", ma-gwi "elephant". Phadang, which preserves final -ui, has (i-)ui M, nui "to laugh". Note the perfect parallelism in the following roots:

	Kukish	Ukhrul	Khangoi	Kupome	Phadang
mother	*pui	a-vă	a-wu	a-p'ö	i-ui
snake	*pa-rui (pa-rul)	p'ă-ră	p'u-ru	p'rö	p'ui

Tangkhul thus follows the general Luhupa and Western Kuki pattern in using the root *pui (Ukhrul vă) both for "I" and as a feminine affix, at the sacrifice of the root *nu.

Ukhrul (a-)yi gH and (a-)wŏ gF are not so easily identified, though it is tempting to derive them from Kukish *pi and *pu, respectively. Other possibilities exist, however, e.g. the former may be connected with the Northern Kuki root *yi "woman, wife", and the latter with Kuki *u oSb. In this connection note Burmese u^{3} MB, also "head", and Ukhrul kui < *ku "head", TB *ku MB. Ukhrul final -ŏ is almost as rare as final -ă, our only good comparison being Ukhrul ci-kŏ "9", Kuki *kua, comparing with Tib. go as used in go-gcig "91", yet some Kukish forms may have been derived from the regular TB root *d-gu (Tib. dgu, Kachin ja-k'u), e.g. Ao tă-ku, Sema tu-ku, Empeo su-gui. Ukhrul has k'û "village" < Kukish *k'ua, further indicating a development -ŏ < -u rather than -ŏ < -ua.

601 Still another possibility exists, viz. that Ukhrul (a-)wŏ may reflect a variant of the standard root *pu, as represented also by Sho pŏ ~ pŏk gF (supra), and cf. the Tibetan dialectical term a-po gF.

In the PSb terminology, the grouping of MB with gF (a-wŏ), of MBW with gM (a-yi), and the retention of a seperate FSi term (a-ni), are Kuki features. The age distinctions in the MSi and FB terms are also of Kuki type, but different elements are involved. K'ă-răr is connected with k'ă-răr-ă "elder, adult, old", but ka-tui (or ga-tui) does not exist as an independent element in Ukhrul. A comparison can be made with Kachin doi and Burmese t'we^3, used in the same sense as Ukhrul (in all three languages the combined terms are also used for "stepfather" and "stepmother"), and can be further extended to include Lushei tuai "of medium growth, not full grown", toi "short" (Lushei has several -uai ~ -oi doublets). Tangkhul final -ui corresponds to Lushei -uai ~ -oi, as in k'ui "bee", Lushei k'uai ~ k'oi, and k'ă-ngă-hui "to fade", Lushei uai, and Kachin -oi to Burmese -we (vide pt. 9). Note that the Tangkhul element ka-tui also appears in (a-)ka-tui-vă ySi (as defined in LSI; Pettigrew gives Si,Sil), while one must suspect that (i-)ka-tŏ (written i-ga-tŏ) yB is simply a variant of the same element; cf. Khangoi (i-)ka-do, Kupome (e-)ka-dau-a, and Phadang (i-)tau yB, Khangoi (i-)ca-do ySi.

601 Three roots can be distinguished in the Ukhrul Sb terms, viz. *cei oSb, *zǎr Si(ws), and *nau ySb, which appear in Pettigrew's dictionary in various combinations. To the terms cited above, add the following: (a-)cei Bl,Ne, also "name given to all, male and female, below the rank of chiefs"; (a-)cei-vǎ Si,Sil; cei-ci-nau "brethern"; ci-nau-ni "cousins" (ni is dual suffix); cǎr-pa ci-nau "brothers and sisters" (a-cǎr-vǎ is given as a variant of a-zǎr-vǎ Si,ms); zǎr-pa-ni "B and Si". The LSI cites the form (a-)cài oSi, and Khangoi has (i-)joi oSi, but cei is the basic form, since TB final -ei is preserved in Ukhrul, e.g. t'ei "fruit", mei "fire". This is a non-Kuki root, but is widespread in Western Kuki.

A curious "infix" ǎsa ~ ci occurs in (i-ǎsa-)cei oB, (i-ci-)nau-vǎ Si(ws), cei-ci-nau "brethern", etc. The LSI (p. 465) makes the following remark in this connection (apparently based on communication from Pettigrew, who contributed the Ukhrul text):

> The insertion of sha or shi [= ci] in this connexion refers to direct relatives and is used, Mr. Pettigrew supposes, to distinguish between real relations, and those who are not.

This interesting suggestion cannot be further developed because of lack of material.

An additional Tangkhul Sb term is represented by Ukhrul (a-)ma (in LSI only), Khangoi (a-)ma, Kupome (a-)mai, Phadang (i-)mi oB. Inasmuch as Pettigrew does not cite this term, it is difficult to fix its affiliations. If the LSI citation is correct, a root *mui is indicated (vide the discussion supra), but the other dialectical forms point rather to *mei (cf. Khangoi a-t'a, Kupome t'ai, Phadang t'i "fruit" = Tangkhul t'ei).

601 The replacement of the Kukish root *za Ch by *nau ySb represents the peak of a development already noted in Old Kuki. Ukhrul nau (also written no) is defined as "common gender form for the infant or the young" (Pettigrew, p. 7), also as "young, young ones, children". The terms for "S" and "D" are formed with the sex-suffixes ma-yar-ǎ (masc.) and nga-la-vǎ ~ nga-la (fem.). Ma-yar-ǎ has not been analyzed, but nga-la includes the Kukish root *la used as a feminine suffix for names of animals (immature), in Lushei appearing only in the term nu-la "maiden".

The term (i-)rǎ ~ (a-)rǎ FSiCh,SiCh,gCh indicates that the Ukhrul collateral nomenclature is of 'Omaha' type as found in the Kuki languages proper. To make the parallelism with Kuki complete, (a-)wǒ would have to be extended to include MBS as well as MB, but Pettigrew does not cite any term for MBCh. On the analogy of vǎ < *pui M, the form (i-)rǎ must be derived from a root *rui, yet phonetically this word is identical with a-rǎ "bone" (both are on low tone), from *rus (Tib. rus-pa, Lushei ru'), and distinct from a-rǎ "liquid" (on high tone). The initial r- appears to have played a role here, since final -u is usually represented by -ui (infra).

The Ukhrul affinal terminology shows the typical Kuki equations Hl=FSi and Fl=MB (apparently applied both to HP and WP). The roots *mak and *mou are used only in the meanings "Bl" and "Sil", respectively; cf. Lushei mak-pa DH,SiH, mo SW,BW: Ukhrul final -ui regularly represents Kukish -u, as in a-bui "skin", Nikir hu and tui "word,

601 language", Kukish -t'u, but may also stand for -uai ~ -oi (vide supra) and for -ou (Lushei -o). In the following table Ukhrul -ui corresponds to Tibetan -o, Kachin -au, Lushei -o, and Meithei -au.

	Tibetan	Kachin	Lushei	Meithei	Ukhrul
BW	mo*	-	mo	i-mau	a-mui
field	-	-	lo	lau	lui
to fry	rngo	kǎ-ngau	-	-	k'ǎ-ngui

*Note: Tib. mo "female"

The term (i-)ri-ha S1 (also D1 on p. 132 of English-Tangkhul vocabulary) does not yield to analysis. It is perhaps the same term as (i-)rǎ SiCh, with an original final -i preserved because of the presence of a final affixed element (cf. a-rǎ "liquid", tǎ-rǎ "water", Burmese re < *ri, Tsangli ri "water").

The following Tangkhul (Ukhrul) terms are worthy of notice in view of what we already have seen of Tibeto-Burman semasiology: a-t'ei ~ t'ei "fruit" (TB *sei), vû-t'ei "seed, family, relations" (vû has not been analyzed), a-t'ei a-sa "seed, progeny, offspring, descendants, relations on the female side" (a-sa "flesh; cf. semantic associations of Tib. ǰsa); a-ǰi "blood, family" (TB *sǎ-wi "blood"), a-ǰi-t'ei "genealogy, pedigree", a-ǰi-ǰim "abode, home" (ǰim < TB *k'yim "house"); a-ǰi-ǰǎng-nau "relative, connexion"; a-ǰǎng "herd", a-ǰǎng a-rǎm "khel (section of village containing a number of families)", ǰǎng-nau "lineage, khel", ǰǎng-kui "penis" (kui "head"

Western Kuki

601 [197] For the five languages which have been classified under the above title we have only scattered and incomplete material. Western Kuki as a whole tends to link the Kuki and Luhupa languages with the Naga languages to the north, hence this lacuna in our data is particularly regrettable. The affinities of the kinship terms in this group are somewhat obscured by the peculiar phonetic shifts found here, but the Kuki resemblances are sufficiently well marked. The sources employed in the discussion below are as follows: Empeo (Soppit, Stewart, Butler); Kabui (McCulloch and LSI); Khoirao (McCulloch and LSI); Maram (McCulloch); Kwoireng (McCulloch). In McCulloch's work, the identifications are: Koupooee Songboo (Kabui), Tukaime (Khoirao), Muram (Maram), and Loeyang or Quoireng (Kwoireng).

As in Luhupa, the Kuki feminine affix *pui is used for "M", viz. Empeo, Kabui, Maram, Kwoireng a-pui, Khoirao pui M. Kukish *nu is retained in Kabui (hai-)nu, Kabui nau, Empeo (ba-)nau "wife" (cf. Empeo jau < Kukish *yu "liquor"). All five languages have the regular root *pa F, but with the bizarre set of Western Kuki correspondences for final -a, viz. Khoirao -a, Empeo -eu, Kabui and Maram -u, Kwoireng -yu.

	Kukish	Khoirao	Empeo	Kabui	Maram	Kwoireng
father	*pa	a-pa	a-peu	a-pu	a-p'u	a-pyu
five	*ba-nga	ma-nga	mi-ngeu	pa-ngu	mi-ngu	ma-ngyu
eat	*dza	ta	teu	tu	tu	tyu

We have almost no information on PSb terms in Western Kuki. For Empeo, Soppitt cites (ba-)peu "uncle" and (a-)bui

601 (= a-pui) "aunt", indicating that the F and M terms are extended to include FB and MSi. For the same language, Butler cites a-na "aunt", which can be compared with Kukish *ni FSi; cf. Empeo ga-na "2" < *g-ni ~ *g-nis; Empeo se-na "7" < *s-ni ~ *s-nis.

The Lukupa term *cei oSb is found in all the Western Kuki languages, viz. Empeo a-si B, a-si-pui Si; Kabui a-cai oB, a-cai-pi oSi (a-cai also oSi in McCulloch); Khoirao cai oB,oSi; Maram a-ti-pui oSi,ySi (uncertain); Kwoireng a-ci oB,oSi. The phonetic correspondences are regular; cf. Empeo si, Kwoireng ca-si, Kabui mai "fire" < TB *mei; Kwoireng pǎ-si, Kabui kǎ-mai "tail" < TB *r-mei; Kwoireng pǎ-si, Kabui kǎ-t'ai "fruit" < TB *sei.

Lushei fǎr-nu < *dzǎr Si(ws) occurs in Western Kuki with the suffix -pui (pui = Lushei nu M) and in the meaning "ySi" (cf. Tib. sring-mo, Kachin jan), viz. Kabui a-tǎn-pui, Khoirao (hai-)tam-bui, Kwoireng a-tǎn-pui ySi (for Khoirao the LSI cites the meaning "Si", but comparison with the material in McCulloch shows that "ySi" is the correct meaning). The initial t- from an original sonant spirant or affricate (z-, dz-) is regular for Western Kuki; cf. the root for "eat" cited above. The replacement of final -r by -n is another standard Western Kuki feature; cf. Khoirao ca-gǎn, Kwoireng ca-ghan "star", Tib. skar-ma; Kabui, Kwoireng, Khoirao yon "to sell", Lushei zuar < *yuar; Kabui ta-kon, Khoirao ta-gon, Kwoireng ca-gon "horse", Lushei sa-kor (< Indic ghoṛa).

601 The root *nau yBb is also represented in Western Kuki, generally in the meaning "Ch", as in Lahupa; cf. Khoirao (hai-)nau B (LSI), a-nau yB (McCulloch), (hai-)nau ca-pa-ni S (ca-pa-ni "man"), (hai-)nau sa-nui-ni D (sa-nui-ni "woman") (McCulloch cites ca-nui-nau D, ca-pa-nau S); Kabui a-na-pu S, a-na-pui D; Kwoireng a-na n-pyu nai S, a-na n-pui nai D; Nerau a-na sa-p'u-ne S, a-na sa-pui-ne D; Empeo a-na Ch, ba-na "babe", ha-na-ne "boy" (for the -a < -au developments in these languages, cf. Kwoireng pǎ-sa, Kabui kǎ-t'a "f[illegible]" TB *sau). This root also appears in Empeo a-ki-na Si, K[illegible]i a-kai-na yB (cf. Empeo a-si B, Kabui a-cai oB).

Nothing is known of the Western Kuki affinal nomenclature, except for the lone Empeo term a-li-pui Sil, cited by Butler. The consanguineal terminology, however, insofar as it is known, stands unexpectedly close to that of the Lahupa group (Tangkhul), especially in the use of the root *pui for "W" and in the appearance of the term *cei oSb.

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Before discussing the clan organization and marriage regulations of the Kuki peoples it should not be amiss to point out some of the generalizations that emerge from the complex mass of linguistic material analyzed above. The outstanding Kuki feature, of course, is the 'Omaha' type of collateral nomenclature, of a specialized variety in which MBS is equated with MB and gF, and FSiS with SiS and gS. This system is subject to numerous variations and can even disappear on occasion, yet it attains a much greater development

601 than the writer could have foreseen after completing general work in Kuki linguistics. Age distinctions are prominent throughout, and analytical tendencies are in evidence, with their peak attained in Laiyo (Central Kuki). The numerous aberrant features of the Southern Kuki terminologies are in accord with the general linguistic picture. Very few new roots have been noted, the most conspicuous being *rang FSiH, and *tra B(ws), the latter a somewhat questionable entity.

Our ethnographic material on the Kuki tribes is of a varied nature, yet relatively full for all except the Southern Kuki groups. The best general account is that in Shakespear, who devotes most of his attention to the Lushei. Another useful general account is given by Carey and Tuck, while the best single monographs are those of Parry on the Lakher, and Shaw on the Thado (the latter with valuable notes by Hutton). For the Old Kuki tribes we have material from Shakespear, Mills, and several Indian ethnologists. Hodson's general work on the Manipur tribes, which is based in good measure on an earlier and little known account by R. Brown (Selections from the Records of the Government of India, No. LXXVIII, 1870), provides some all too meagre data on the Luhupa (Tangkhul and Maring) and Kabui (Western Kuki group).

Patrilineal descent reckoning seems to be universal throughout the area under consideration, and probably patrilineal residence as well, though the latter is seldom

601 specified. The preference for patrilocal residence is reflected in the interesting Lushei term mo-ŏil "daughter's or sister's husband who goes to live in his wife's house", lit. "male bride"! Son-in-law service is general among the Old Kuki, and there are indications that residence may be temporarily matrilocal in other groups. The latter is best exemplified by the Sho practice described by Fryer (p. 42):

> When a young man wishes to court a girl, he visits her by appointment at night in her parents' dwelling, taking with him some trifling present; if subsequently approved by the parents, he lives in the house. After some months, and indeed if poor, after the birth of one or two children, the ceremony of taking the girl to his house takes place amid much feasting and dancing.

Stevenson has given us an excellent account of the factors connected with choice of resilence among the Zahau, a Central Kuki tribe. Stevenson points out that though descent, succession, and inheritance are patrilineal, a man is closely bound through numerous social obligations to his galu zawn, a group including his mother's brothers, wife's brothers, and sister's households (cf. Zahau pa-pu [illegible], nu-pu [illegible]) and naturally prefers to have this group near at hand, for convenience in attending to kinship reciprocities. Marrying within the village is one solution to the problem, and has led to the village endogamy noted by Stevenson, but the alternative solution of migration to the wife's village also occurs, especially after quarrels have arisen with the patrilineal kin group.

The bachelor's house (Lushei zawlbuk) is another widespread feature, though lacking among some groups, e.g. the

601 Thado, Kom, Vaiphei, Purum. Where the bachelor's house is lacking, the young unmarried men usually sleep either in the houses of rich men or in the houses of unmarried girls (see the discussion in Gupta). In the Old Kuki area, at any rate, there is a conscious avoidance of having an unmarried brother and sister sleep under a single roof; both Gupta and Shakespear (p. 182) see in this avoidance a fear of incest. As throughout the Tibeto-Burman area in general, pre-marital sexual laxity is much in evidence.

Clan exogamy prevails everywhere except in the central area of the Lushai and Chin Hills, i.e. among the Central Kuki groups, and perhaps among the Southern Kuki tribes, though our data here are too meagre to permit of definite conclusions. A sharp contrast exists between politically powerful groups such as the Lushei or Lakher, with emphasis on wealth and social distinctions, and the small, democratic Old Kuki tribes. It is the latter among whom the complicated patterns of clan exogamy are found (infra). Simple clan exogamy probably is practised by the Northern Kuki tribes, certainly among the Thado (Shaw, Appendix C by Hutton). For the Siyin we have only the statement in Carey and Tuck (p. 189) that "The four clans of the Siyin tribe intermarry". The same authors also state of the "Chin" (perhaps Haka) that they "understand that it is unwise for those too closely related to marry" (p. 188). Of the Lakher, Parry states that it is not ana ("tabu") to marry within the clan, yet he notes that "marriages within the clan seem less frequent", and concludes that "it seems probable that formerly an exogamous system was in vogue" (p. 232).

601 The categorical equations in the Kuki kinship terminology indicate the unilateral type of cross-cousin marriage (with MBD), and for this we have ample evidence. This practice exists even among the Central Kuki, though apparently not in typical form. Shakespear's description of the Lushei practices is worth quoting at some length:

> The Lushais have wide views as to matrimony. A young man is not hampered in his choice by any table of prohibited degrees, nor is his choice confined to any particular family or clan; in fact, he can practically marry any woman he chooses except his sister or his mother [in the account of the Lushei in the Census of India, 1901, Vol. IV, Assam, also by Shakespear, "daughter" and "aunt" are included in this list]. There is, however, a certain amount of prejudice against first cousins on the father's side marrying, but the reason generally given for this is that when a girl's parents have to consider the question of marriage they naturally try to dispose of her outside the family, in order that her price may increase the wealth of the family, not merely transfer it from one brother to another. I have, however, been told that girls object to marrying their "brothers" [classificatory, Lushei u and nau, hence FSiS and not MBS]. Among the chiefs the desire to marry another chief's daughter limits the young man's choice, and marriage among first cousins is more frequent than among commoners. (p. 50)

It is clear that Shakespear has in mind marriage with FBD, which is certainly not a genuine Kuki trait. The same general statement is made of the Paite, a Northern Kuki tribe:

> The marriages of paternal first cousins are allowed - in fact, among chiefs they are the rule. (p. 142)

The Lushei and Paite practice, largely confined to the ruling clans, seems to have resulted from the breakdown of clan exogamy, and has nothing in common with the typical cross-cousin marriage with MBD, as found among the Thado and other Kuki peoples.

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Our Thado sources constitute a good illustration of the discrepancies often encountered in material of this sort. In the first account of the Thado (called "Kookie"), by Lieutenant Stewart, we find the statement (p. 640) that "The most strict rules exist forbidding too close intermarriage in families; cousins cannot be so allied". Shakespear, writing over half a century later, qualifies Stewart's conclusion with the remark: "My enquiries tend to show that at present the prohibition only extends to paternal cousins to the third generation" (p. 198). Actually, the Thado have the typical form of marriage with MBD, which has been described by Hutton (in Shaw, Appendix C):

> The Thado are patrilineal and exogamous and their terms of relationship are of course classificatory. The proper marriage for a man is with his mother's brother's daughter, while that preferred for a girl is with her father's sister's son. The latter however is much less important. But marriage of a girl to her mother's brother's son is prohibited, and marriage into the mother's clan is eschewed for women for at least two generations as a rule. (p. 140)

Cross-cousin marriage cannot be established for any of the remaining Central or Northern Kuki tribes, but this negative evidence cannot be regarded as of much significance. The especial role of the mother's brother in Lushei and Lakher, however, strongly suggests an original avunculate pattern with marriage to MBD. The essentially honorific nature of the Kuki term *pu* gF,MB,MBS is apparent wherever adequate material is available. Thus, Lushei pu is defined as "one in charge of anything, a term of respect for a man", and of Thado he-pu (with honorific prefix) Hutton (1922, p. 110) makes the following comment:

601 Hepu is a term of very great respect, and if used outside its genealogical applicability, would only be so used to very old or great men, to whom it was desired to show particular respect.

Lakher appears to have many features of a true avunculate, but without marriage to MBD, if we can trust Parry's account. The MB and MBW (Lakher pa-pu and pa-pi, respectively) are rated almost on a par with one's parents, and FSi (na-nang) and FSiH (pe-re-pa) are next in order of respect. Parry offers the following description of the avunculate relationship:

> The most striking feature of Lakher relationship is the very close connection between the maternal uncle (puna) and his nieces (tunongnong) and nephews (tunana). The maternal uncle is regarded as very nearly as closely related to a person as his parents, and is treated with deep respect and veneration, and has definite rights and privileges. When a girl marries, her puna [MB's portion of marriage price; cf. puna] is payable to her maternal uncle, and the puna is often larger than a father's share in his daughter's price, as he has to divide up his share with his sons, the bride's brothers. When a man dies his death du (ru) is payable to his maternal uncle, who is also entitled to a share in any wild animals shot by his nephews.....He is also bound to help his nephews and nieces if they are in distress, and it is to him that they turn for help even more than to their parents, and vice versa. At a funeral it is the puna, the maternal uncle, of his son who plays the leading part, calls out the names of deceased's ancestors.....It is absolutely prohibited for a nephew to marry his deceased puna's widow... ...(p. 244)

Parry indicates (p. 245) that a similar situation obtains among the Lushei, and further traces are found among the Zahau (vide the discussion supra). Though the inference of cross-cousin marriage from especial position or functions of mother's brother is perhaps no longer in fashion, anthropologically speaking, in the present instance one can scarcely avoid it, particularly in view of the presence of cross-cousin marriage in contiguous Kuki groups.

601 For the Southern Kuki tribes we possess only scraps of information gleaned from a variety of sources. The Chinbok, Yindu, and Chinbon are described in the Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States (Scott), but clan groupings are not mentioned. With regard to the Chinbon and Ledu, Pru writes: "I find these tribes marry with any of their own relatives except mother, sister and niece" (cf. Lushai). Aung, in describing the Ledu marriage arrangements, notes that most of the dowry goes to the bride's father, but that one gong is given to MB and another to oB of bride (cf. Lakher).

The Taungtha, described by Tin, are said to have two subdivisions, viz. Kokkhan (four clans) and Mondon (three clans). It is not stated whether either the subdivisions or the clans are exogamous, hence one must not prematurely conclude that a true dual organization is involved. Tin mentions two distinctions between the subdivisions, viz. the Kokkhan use only white unvarnished coffins, and offer dogs to nats, while the Mondon use decorated coffins, and offer bullocks to nats.

Our sources for Khami do not agree with one another. Nyaing denies the existence of exogamous groupings altogether, while Hughes states that the Khami are divided into 22 clans, each with a distinct name and chief, and Thin describes 36 exogamous clans for the Awa Khami, 5 for the Ahraing Khami (exogamy is mentioned only by Thin). Nyaing, as already noted in the section on Mru (pt. 14), specifies marriage with FSiD or MSiD as prohibited, and marriage with FBD or MBD as per-

601 mitted. Marriage with FBD seems unlikely, despite the fact that this practice exists among the Lushei, but marriage with MBD as opposed to FSiD fits into the general Kuki pattern.

One of the most important sources for the Southern Kuki, Browne's "statistical account" of the District of Thayetmyo, seems to have escaped the notice of writers in this general field. Browne gives an interesting account of the Khyeng (= Sho) of this district, who speak a southern Sho dialect (word-list in the LSI, 1928). The three statements reproduced below are of especial importance;

> Khyeng girls are given in marriage by their brothers, not by their parents. When a girl is born she is specially assigned to one of her brothers, or if she has none to one of her father's sister's sons, whose consent has to be obtained by any one who aspires to her hand. Even after marriage the husband has to treat his wife's brother with inordinate respect. (p. 50)

> Girls as a rule are affianced early to one of their cousins; the correct thing being to marry in one's own family. (p. 51)

> Hence arose the Khyeng customs of offering up a dog to the household spirits, and of giving the daughters of brothers in marriage to brother's sister's sons [in re origin myth incest theme]. (p. 49)

This material is just sufficient to establish the practice of preferential marriage with MBD. The role of WB should be noted, in view of the common Kuki equation of WB with WF,MB (pu). Browne's description is supported by the following statement found in Carey and Tuck (p. 190):

> The eldest brother in the Southern Hills [i.e. the Sho area] is the guardian of his sisters, and if a man aspires to the hand of a woman, he must address himself to the brother and not to the parents.

The additional information supplied by Browne, viz. that FSiS may be substituted for B, cannot be verified from other

601 sources, yet we have no reason to doubt its accuracy, since FSiS is thereby classed as a non-marriageable male, in conformity with the general Kuki pattern.

For the Old Kuki groups a surprisingly large body of material is available, largely through the efforts of a group of Indian ethnographers headed by Bose, Roy, and Das. This material falls short of the most exacting standards of modern anthropological field-work, yet it throws valuable light on the complex kin groupings characteristic of this division of the Kuki peoples. Data have been uncovered for most of the Old Kuki tribes in Manipur, viz. Purum, Chiru, Chawte, Ismau, Aimol, Ronte, Kolhreng, Anal, Mantak, and Lamgang (Ronte and Mantak are linguistically unknown, but are said to be of Old Kuki stock), and for two Old Kuki tribes in Northern Cachar, viz. Bete and Hallam (the latter called "Khelma" in Mills' account).

The Hallam system, as described by Mills, diverges from the Old Kuki pattern, notably in the practice of clan endogamy. The Kyaw, living far to the south in the Arakan Hills, are said to "contract marriage strictly among their own clan" (Hughes, p. 16), but clan exogamy is the rule among all other Old Kuki tribes. Mills described 13 or possibly more patrilineal clans among the Hallam, and adds the following comment:

> The clans are strictly speaking endogamous. Though marriage with a person of another clan is frequent it is definitely regarded as entailing defilement, a man contracting such a marriage cannot perform the funeral rites of his parents. Each family therefore sees to it that one member at least marries within the clan. (p. ix)

601 The Bete, who are neighbors of the Hallam in the Northern Cachar Hills, are described by the same writer in somewhat similar terms, but the account is not at all clear. The Bete have four clans (Chungal, Darnei, Ngamlai, Klete), while a fifth (Klangpa) is said to be extinct. The Chungal and Darnei are regarded as superior to the other two, e.g. the chief (khalim), both of whose parents must be of the same clan, is chosen from the Chungal and Darnei clans alternately. All of this is highly reminiscent of the moiety pattern found among the Old Kuki tribes of Manipur, but Mills indicates that the Chungal and Darnei constitute an endogamous rather than exogamous moiety:

> Strictly speaking the clans are endogamous, but marriage between clans is not infrequent, the woman being received into the clan of her husband. Marriages between members of the Chungal and Darnei clans are common, and these two clans less frequently intermarry with the other two clans. (p. viii)

Two types of clan grouping can be recognized among the Old Kuki groups of Manipur. In the first type moities, named or unnamed, are present, and (with one exception) each moiety is divided into two or more clans, with a maximum of eight. Both the moieties and clans are exogamous, though often only imperfectly so as regards the former. In the second type no dual organization is apparent, but marriage is regulated through exogamous clans (4-6). Asymmetrical descent is characteristic of this type; a man avoids marrying into his father's clan, while a woman avoids marrying into either her father's or her mother's clan, i.e. a man observes unilateral (patrilineal) descent while a woman observes bilateral descent.

601 The complete list of sub-types is as follows:

Named moieties - no clans: Ronte.

Named moieties - eight clans in each: Anal.

Unnamed moieties - two clans in each: Mantak.

Unnamed moieties - four clans in each: Lamgang.

Unnamed moieties - two phratries, four clans in each: Aimol.

Unnamed moieties - six clans in each: Kolhreng.

Four clans - asymmetrical descent: Tarau.

Five clans - asymmetrical descent: Chiru.

Five or six clans - asymmetrical descent: Chawte, Purum.

The simple dual organization is found only among the Ronte (written Lonte in Hodson, 1922, p. 89), who possess two exogamous moieties (Lanu and Changom) but no clans (Shakespear, p. 173). The Anal agree with the Ronte in having named moieties, viz. Murchel (superior moiety) and Murshom (inferior moiety), which are rigidly exogamous (Bose, 1934a, pp. 12-13), but each of these divisions includes eight exogamous clans. The sixteen marriage groups thus formed constitute the largest number found among the Old Kuki tribes.

In the remaining groups with dual organization the moieties are not named, and it would appear that the rules of exogamy are in the process of disappearing. Of 33 Mantak marriages recorded by Bose (1934b, pp. 14-15), 8 were within the moiety, i.e. almost a third of all marriages did not observe the exogamous restrictions. Among the Lamgang, with an "eight-class" system, the "rigidity of marriage rules forcing one moiety to seek partners in the other has been

601 relaxed", but no details are offered (see the discussion in Bose, 1934b, pp. 15-17). Our information on the Kolhreng, with a "twelve-class" system, does not specify to what extent exogamous rules are applied, yet it is noted that the Chongthu or chief's clan does not observe moiety exogamy at all and may marry into any of the other clans (Shakespear, pp. 153 and 167); cf. the similar exemption enjoyed by the Ang clan among the Konyak (pt. 10) and the Ningthaja clan among the Meithei (pt. 13). The Aimol differ from the above in having four named phratries (Chonghom, Chonghomlaita, and Lanoo, Chaithu), each with two clans, thus differing somewhat from the Lamgang who lack phratry groupings. Of 53 marriages recorded by Bose (1934a), 43 were between moieties, 10 within the moiety. Bose indicates that the whole system is in a state of semi-collapse. The above evidence suggests that the retention of moiety names is correlated with the preservation of exogamous rules.

Note the seeming connection between the Chonghom and Lanoo (= Lanu in Bose's transcription) phratries of the Aimol, the former belonging to the superior moiety and the latter to the inferior, with the Changom and Lanu moieties of the Ronte. The Ronte organization is perhaps the prototype of the more elaborate Aimol system (this view is favored by Bose).

In all the above groups except the Ronte, on which our data are exceedingly scant, one moiety is regarded as superior to the other, and village officers are ordinarily elected from this moiety. This pattern has already been noted for

60/ the Bete of Northern Cachar, and is paralleled in the Old Kuki tribes with asymmetrical descent (among the Chiru, where the Danla clan is the "royal clan").

Asymmetrical descent is found in three foci, viz. Tarau, Chiru, and Chawte-Purum, each with a distinct set of clan names. The four-clan system of the Tarau is described by Shakespear (p. 173), who gives the following grouping (males of first of pair marry females of second): Pachana ~ Tlangsha, Tlangsha ~ Thimasha, Thimasha ~ Khulpu-in, Khulpu-in ~ Pachana. According to Bose (1937a), there are at present only three clans, two of the original four having merged, but the same system is in operation.

The accounts of the Chiru system, by the same authorities (Shakespear, p. 154; Bose 1937b), are slightly discrepant, yet are in agreement on essential points. Five standard marriage groups are recognized, viz. Danla, Dingthoi, Rezar, Shampar (Shakespear writes Shangpa), and Chongdur. According to Shakespear, the choice is not always restricted to a single clan, e.g. a Danla man may marry either a Dingthoi or Shampar woman, a Dingthoi man may marry either a Chongdur or Danla woman, and a Shampar man may marry either a Dingthoi or Danla woman, while a Rezar or Chongdur man may marry only a Danla woman. It will be noted that, according to this description, a Danla woman may be married by the men of all the other four clans. This suggests that the Danla or "royal clan" is not entirely bound by the standard marriage restrictions; cf. the Chongthu clan of the Kolhreng (supra). Shakespear's account is obviously inaccurate or at any rate incomplete, since no marriages are indicated for Rezar women.

601 Bose made an intensive study of the Chiru village of Bungsha, a settlement of 30 families (10 Khurung, 6 Danla, 5 Shamper, 4 Chongdur, 5 Rezar). In this village the Dingthei clan had become extinct, and the Khurung, probably a "family-group" of one of the traditional clans, had been elevated to the rank of clan. Bose found the pairings to be as follows: Rezar ~ Danla, Danla ~ Shamper, Shamper ~ Chongdur, Chongdur ~ Khurung, Khurung ~ Rezar, i.e. in each case the choice is restricted to a single clan. Bose's material does not necessarily invalidate the information given by Shakespear some twenty-five years earlier, since each Chiru village probably has its individual features. The Chiru system in general appears to be identical with that of the Kachin (pt. 7), even as to the number of marriage groups involved.

The Chawte-Purum system has been described by Das (1935, 1939) and Roy (1936), as well as by Shakespear (p. 154). Das' account of Purum is the best of any of the material on the Old Kuki tribes, but Roy's article on Chawte is confused and does not agree with the description given by Shakespear. Das describes six clans among the Purum, but refers to the "five Chawte clans". Shakespear describes only five Chawte clans, and Roy in several places writes of five clans yet actually describes six! According to Das, all the Chawte clan names, with the exception of "Iring", are used by the Purum. The name "Iring", however, is written "Irung" by Shakespear and "Jurung" by Roy, and must be equated with the name "Julhung" of the Purum, just as Chawte "Piring" must be identified with Purum "Pilling" (Chawte r = Purum l). The following identifications of clan names can be made:

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Purum	Chawte (Roy)	Chawte (Shakespear)
Makan	Makhang	Makhan
Marrim	Marim	Marem
Khyeng	Hiyang	Kiang
Thao	Thao	Thao
Julhung	Jurung	Irung
Pilling	Piring	

The Purum system, which is the most complicated Old Kuki arrangement of which we have any knowledge, merits especial consideration. The following marriage restrictions are indicated by Das:

Clan	Married by men	Married by women
1. Makan	Marrim, Parpa, Khyeng, Julhung	Thao
2. Parpa	Marrim, Khyeng	Makan, Thao
3. Thao	Parpa, Makan	Marrim, Khyeng, Julhung
4. Marim, 5. Khyeng	Thao	Parpa, Makan
6. Julhung	Thao	Makan

Das noted the identity of choice for the Marim and Khyeng clans, and the similarity of the Julhung to these two clans, whence he drew the natural conclusion that all three clans had originally been one. A further inference, however, was missed by Das, viz. that the Makan and Parpa have been derived from

601 a single group, and this despite the fact that Mahan men are now permitted to marry Parpa women. The pairing of Mahan and Parpa in the Thao, Marim and Khyeng columns is quite conclusive on this score. If Julhung be regarded as the latest offshoot of the Marrim-Khyeng-Julhung group, its position becomes comparable with that of Parpa, an offshoot of the Mahan-Parpa group, and the lack of intermarriage between these two clans assumes some significance. In the manner just outlined the Purum system can be derived from a tripartite scheme with asymmetric descent, grouped as follows: Mahan-Parpa ~ Marrim-Khyeng-Julhung ~ Thao.

The process of the evolution of new clans can still be traced in Purum, as made clear by Das. Three new marriage groups are described, viz. Ingte (< Khyeng), Pilling (< Marrim), and Teyu (< Thao), with mention of a fourth named Aihung, said to be extinct. The marriage restrictions indicated by Das are not altogether consistent, but it would appear that the Ingte and Pilling, despite their derivation, are permitted to intermarry (Ingte men marry Pilling and Teyu women), while Pilling men marry Khyeng and Thao women; cf. the intermarriage between the Mahan and Parpa, derived from a single marriage group.

The Chawte material is of uncertain value and would not repay detailed examination. According to Roy, each clan has a choice of marrying into two or more clans, but in Shakespear's scheme only two clans enjoy this freedom. The Piring (=Purum Pilling) clan is mentioned only by Roy, thus substantiating

601 the Purum evidence as to its relatively late origin. According to Roy, a Marim man may marry a Jurung, Thao, or Piring woman, hence it does not appear that Piring has been derived from Marim (but Purum Pilling < Marrim). The basic Purum tripartite pattern is perhaps represented in Chawte in the groupings Makhan ~ Irung, Irung ~ Thao, Thao ~ Makhan (in Shakespear, where Irung = Jurung = Purum Julhung), but it is impossible to establish any exact correspondences between the Chawte and Purum systems. One suspects that a better description of the Chawte regulations would clear up many points now obscure.

The unilateral type of cross-cousin marriage with MBD is characteristic of the Old Kuki tribes in general, regardless of the type of social organization. This practice is the natural concomitant of asymmetrical descent, which permits a man to marry into his mother's clan but forbids a woman to do so. Among the Chiru, the MBD is the "preferential mate", while the FSiD is "totally forbidden" (Bose, 1937b). The same writer (1934b) observed "several cases" of marriage with MBD among the Anal. Roy writes (p. 141) that cross-cousin marriage (unspecified) "is actually in vogue to this day among the Chawte" Among the Aimol, "a man's proper marriage is with his mother's brother's daughter but he is never allowed to marry his father's sister's daughter" (Bose, 1934a, p. 9). Bose notes, however, that this type of marriage is "not very common". Bose explains this on the theory that the practice of three years' son-in-law service (observed also among the

601 Chawte by Roy) leads a man to attempt to find a wife nearby and discourages marriage with MBD, who normally lives in another village (through village exogamy, which is not fully described in our sources). Finally, the Purum are said to permit marriage with MBD and to forbid marriage of brother and sister to brother and sister (which would entail marriage with FSiD if the other marriage were with MBD).

The position of the mother's brother among the Old Kuki is probably much the same as that already noted among the Lushei and Lakher, but our sources are inadequate on this point. Among the Aimol, the mother's brother has a "special right" to the bride-price or man (Bose, 1934a, p. 15). Bose also describes in-law taboos observed by the Aimol, viz. a woman may not speak to her father-in-law or mother-in-law except "when necessity arises", and is forbidden to speak to her husband's elder brother under any conditions. This point is of some interest in view of the general Kuki equation of HB or HoB with HF.

A story recorded by Das illustrates the recognition of matrilineal descent among the Purum. The following explanation is said to have been made by Das' informant in re the marriage restrictions of the Ingte and Marrim clans:

> Ingte lads and Marrim lads marry Thao girls. So they are born of mothers of the same clan and have the same blood. So Ingte and Marrim lads and girls are like brothers and sisters. Therefore they cannot marry one another. (p. 7)

The Old Kuki (and general Kuki) distinction between WM and HM, and between WF and HF, together with the categorical equations displayed by all these terms, directly reflect the

601 practice of unilateral cross-cousin marriage with MBD. The distinction drawn between FSiCh and MBCh is in keeping with this same system. Das, who supplies some rather vague information on the Purum terms involved in this distinction, postulates an original dual organization, but this explanation is quite unnecessary. Das cites the terms katunu "applied by a man to non-marriageable girls", kapu "applied by a woman to non-marriageable boys", kanaunu "applied by a man to marriageable girls", and kupa "applied by a woman to marriageable boys". These terms can be identified with Kuki (ka-)tu-nu FSiD (unmarriageable), (ka-)pu MBS (unmarriageable), (ka-)nau-nu ySi, and (k-)u-pa oB, respectively. Das states that these are kinship terms, but offers no details. If the above identifications are correct, Purum equates MBD(ms) with ySi, and FSiS(ws) with oB; cf. the Chawte equation of xCi with ySi, in the same term as used in Purum (ka-nau-nu). Das also cites the Purum term mak-sa (Kuki *mak DH,SiH), defined as "the husbands of the daughters of a family of all generations possible", and notes that the mak-sa play an important role in marriage and funeral ceremonies (in the role of SiH, to judge from the parallel situation that obtains among the Central Kuki tribes).

For the Luhupa and Western Kuki tribes we have only scattered bits of information, with the lone exception of Bose's description of the Maring organization (Bose, 1934b, 22-26). Bose draws a distinction between an "elder branch" (Khoibu) and a "younger branch" (Maring), which are said to be

601 strictly endogamous. Bose states that the two branches have the same culture yet do not understand each other's language. This statement is open to question, since the Khoibu language, known only from a brief word-list published by N. Brown over one hundred years ago, is scarcely more than a dialect of Maring. In any case, it seems preferable to regard the Khoibu and Maring as separate tribes. Within the Maring branch (tribe) two endogamous territorial divisions are recognized, one with seven villages under the Koba chingsanglakpa (headman), the other with five villages under the Koba chingsanglakpa. According to Bose, "this grouping originated perhaps from two rival factions and subsequently took over the marital functions of the kinship groups, prohibiting marriage between the two". The kinship groups referred to are the Khulpua, Dangsoa, Kansoa, and Koninga, each having two additional clans, the whole forming a kind of "twelve-class" system. Bose states that these are "entirely on kinship basis and perhaps important in social functions", but adds no details. It would seem that these kinship groups no longer regulate marriage, but information on this point is lacking.

It is difficult to find any specific Kuki features in the above system, unless one makes a comparison with the Bete and Hallam of Northern Cachar, to whom endogamous clans have been ascribed (supra). Hodson (1911, p. 75) reconstructs a system of endogamous moieties with exogamous clans, on the

601 basis of the Maring material (as reported by R. Brown) and the reputed division of the Kabui into two sections. McCulloch describes these sections under the names "Koupooee Songboo" and "Koupooee Pooeeron". The former are the Kabui proper, a Western Kuki tribe, while the latter are the Poeron, who speak an entirely distinct language with basic affinities for Old Kuki. Here, as in the case of Maring ~~and Khoibu~~, separate tribes are involved. Bose (1934b, p. 22) found a definite clan organization with tripartite division in Kabui villages near Bishnupore, and clan names, but without any system of grouping, in Kabui villages near Imphal (the capital of Manipur). The Maram are said to have three exogamous khels, two of which form an exogamous group, i.e. a moiety system, though not described as such (note by Shakespear in Hutton, 1921, p. 117). For the Empeo, we have information only on three divisions in the Naga Hills (Hutton, 1921, p. 352, under the name "Kacha"). These Empeo groups have come under Angami influence, and Hutton describes some of the Empeo exogamous clans as having Angami names, but nothing is said of the nature of these clans.

The information on clan organization in Hodson's general review of the Manipur tribes (1911) is disappointingly meagre. A number of general statements are made, most of which can be interpreted as applying to the Tangkhul, but details are omitted. The following is typical:

> All the villages consist of a number of "clans", which are groups of agnatic kindred who must marry outside the clan. Kinship is not reckoned through females, and rights of succession, both to village office and to movable or personal property, are vested in males. (p. 21)

601 Cross-cousin marriage has not been reported for any of the Luhupa or Western Kuki tribes, but the following statement made by Hodson (p. 89) implies that this type of marriage is not uncommon:

> I have heard in a few villages that marriages with girls of the mother's clan [i.e. with MBD] are not liked. And also that marriages with the children of aunts on the father's side [i.e. with FSiD] are viewed with disfavor.

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16. The Naga Languages

197 The Southern and Northern Naga languages are the northernmost units of the widespread Kukish group (vide the diagram in the preceding part). They are closely related to one another, but present the maximum number of differences from the Kuki languages proper to the south. Ao and Lhota, though phonetically much better preserved than the Southern Naga languages, yet show many aberrant features and are extremely difficult to analyze. Angami, Sema, and Rengma have been phonetically distorted almost beyond recognition, and at times one despairs of ever arriving at any phonological generalizations for this group. Much of our trouble, however, lies in our inadequate sources. Hutton, a fine ethnographer in many respects, is lamentably weak on the linguistic side, and other authorities
601 are equally poor from this point of view. It is not a little ironic, therefore, that our best data on kinship nomenclature within the Tibeto-Burman field are for these very Naga languages. From what has already been said, it follows that we must for the greater part confine ourselves to an analysis of the terminologies <u>per se</u>, with only occasional attempts at comparison.

197 It must be remembered that the Naga languages handled in this part of the paper are entirely distinct from the so-called "Eastern Naga" languages spoken to the north and east of the Ao country. The latter have already been examined in part 10 (on Konyak). This division of the "Naga" tribes into

197 two separate groups, one with Kuki and the other with Kachin-Barish affinities, is of fundamental importance, and has far-reaching implications in the general field of Assam-Burma ethnology. The linguistic division seems assured, but the parallel problem in cultural affinities has not yet been worked out. The Angami, Sema, Rengma, Lhota, and Ao all have traditions of having migrated from the south (vide Hutton, 1921a, Introductory), and both the Angami and Sema have intimate connections with Khoirao and Maram (Western Kuki) villages in northern Manipur (vide Hutton, 1921b, pp. 376 and ff.). Within the Kuki group, the Thado and Old Kuki tribes have been displaced northward under pressure of the dominant Lushei clans, perhaps as part of the same general northward movement. The Konyak ("Eastern Naga") tribes, on the other hand, appear to have crossed the Patkoi divide from the east and north. In general, then, different directions of migration are indicated for the two divisions of the "Naga" tribes.

A connecting link between Angami and the Kuki-affiliated peoples of Manipur is furnished by Sopvoma, often called Mao (the Meithei name of their chief village). In the LSI this language is classified as "Naga-Kuki" (approximately our Luhupa group), but this is unquestionably a mistake, since the language is fairly close to Angami. Hutton (1921a), who uses the term "Memi", regards this group as a branch of the Angami (vide the map facing p. 15). The Kezhama (Kezama ~ Kezami in Hutton), who are southeast of the main body of the Angami, are also classed by Hutton as a branch of this large tribe (vide the map supra).

000 tribe (vide the map supra). A few Sopvoma and Kezhama kinship
601 terms are cited in the LSI. The Kezhama terms are especially
close to the Angami, e.g. a-zo M (Angami zo), ka-mi W (Angami
ki-ma), e-no-mi S, e-no-pi D (Angami a-no Ch). Sopvoma has a
distinct term (a-pe) for M, and apparently also distinct Sb
terms, viz. a-t'e-hu B (but ni-t'e-hu "your yB" in text on p.
460, as shown by context), t'e-hu ~ t'i-hu ySi, a-tui oSi.
Sopvoma a-ke W is similar to Angami ki-ma, and cf. the feminine
suffix -kru with Angami -krü, id.

Detailed information is available on the terminologies of six Naga languages, viz. Angami, Sema, Rengma (two languages), Lhota, and Ao. The data in the main have been drawn from the standard works by Hutton and Mills, but much supplementary material has come from grammars, dictionaries, and word-lists. The terminologies of the several languages are presented below as units, with limited annotations, while the problem of the affinities of the terms is reserved for a final discussion. It is characteristic of the Naga languages that many consanguineal kin are addressed and spoken of by the personal name only, and that certain kinship terms are applied only in address. The latter distinction is so significant that it has been incorporated into the tabulations presented below, in which definitions followed by an asterisk are those found only in address.

Angami

197 Two major dialectical divisions are recognized within Angami proper, viz. an eastern or Chakrima, and a western or

197 Tengima, each with several sub-dialects. Aside from three unimportant Chakrima sub-dialects recorded in the LSI, viz. Dzuna, Kehena, and Nima, our Angami material relates to the Tengima group of dialects. The major sources are Hutton (1921a), McCabe, and Butler (1875b), all of whom have described this standard Tengima speech (probably the Khonoma sub-dialect).

Angami Consanguineal Terms

601

zo-tsa, tsa-prü	gM	pu-tsa-o, pvu-tsa	gF
zo, prü	M,MSi*	po, pvu	F,FoB*
		nyie	FyB
nye	FSi	mi	MB
dze-re-prü	oSi(ws)	dze-re-o	oB(ms)
sie-ze-prü	ySi(ws)	sie-ze-o	yB(ms)
lu-prü	Si(ms)	pru	B(ws)
cu-prü	FSiD,ySiD(ms),gD	cu	FSiS,ySiS(ms),gS
no-prü	D,SiD(ws)	no	S,SiS(ws)

Angami Affinal Terms

nye	WM,HM	mi	FSiH,WF,HF
	t'i	FBW(ms),MBW,WoSb,HoB,oSiH,oBW(ms)	
	ni	FBW(ws),MSiH,HoSi(os),oBW(ws)	
sie-ze-prü	WySi		
mie-prü	yBW(ms),SW	ma	ySiH,DH

601

Notes:

Zo M and po F are used by the Pezoma (< zo) or Pepoma (< po) division of the Angami, and pfü M and pvu F by the Pepfüma (< pfü) or Pepvuma (< pvu) division (vide Hutton, pp. 110-111). For a fuller discussion of this point, see the last part of this section. Zo-tsa gM and pu-tsa-o gF are Pezoma terms, while tsa-pfü (or pfü-tsa) gM and pvu-tsa gF are Pepfüma terms (note Pezoma pu-tsa-o rather than *po-tsa-o).

Zo ~ pfü are applied to MSi, also to FBW, in address only, the descriptive term being zo-pfü (or pfü-zo) ~ pfü-pfü. Similarly, the descriptive term for FoB is po dze-re-o ~ pvu dze-re-o. Hutton gives only the single term nyie (or nyie-di) for FyB (Butler a-ne FB), but McCabe cites a-po dzü-rau and a-po sa-zau "uncle", formed with dze-rau oB and (a-)sa-zau yB, respectively.

Hutton cites both nye and nya FSi, the latter agreeing with the form na given by McCabe and Butler. The form nye has been retained in order to avoid confusion with na DH. The term is entirely distinct from nyie FyB, for which Butler has a-ne. Mi-yu is given as an alternative form of mi MB, and Butler cites the form a-mi.

The Sb terms are as cited in Hutton. Lu-pfü, cited by Hutton in brackets, is the basic form and is found in all the other sources, while ü-pfu, the form given preference in Hutton, is secondary (lü-pfü ~ wü-pfü in the LSI). Distinctions in sex of speaker are recorded only by Hutton.

601 Hutton explicity states (p. 134) that only personal names are applied to FBCh, MBCh, and MSiCh, but that the exact relationship can be specified if necessary, e.g. a-mi u-no-pfü "MB his-D" = MBD. Personal names are also used for oSiCh(ms) and BCh(mws). McCabe cites tsu (= cu) gS but tsu-a-no Ne (Hutton cu ~ cu-no), and tsu-pfü Ni,gD. Both Butler and McCabe cite the interesting analytical term no-no gS ("son's son").

In the affinal terminology, t'i is seen to be primarily a man's term (but note HoB) and ni primarily a woman's term. Both refer exclusively to older affinal kin, e.g. ni is applied to MSiH only when older than F, the term a-po ~ a-pvu being employed when younger than F. Personal names are applied to the affinal relatives not represented in the above table. McCabe cites the analytical term ki-ma-no-pru Bl (ki-ma W), and me ~ a-me Sil, for mie-pfü. Butler defines mi as "Bl", a meaning not indicated in Hutton.

Sema

197 601 In Sema, as in Angami, two principal dialects can be distinguished, viz. the Lazmi (Lozemi) dialect spoken in the Dayang valley in the western part of Sema territory, and the Zümomi dialect spoken in the Tizu valley to the east, the latter being the dominant dialect. Our main Sema sources, viz. Hutton (1916, 1921b) and Bor and Pawsey, all are based on the Zümomi dialect. Sema is fairly close to Angami, with Kezhama somewhat intermediate between the two, but some striking differences appear in the kinship terminology.

601

Sema Consanguineal Terms

(a-)pu-za gP

(a-)za M,WSi,WBD

(a-)ni FSi

(a-)fu oSi,FBD(os)

(a-)tsü-ni-pfu ySi(ws),FBD(yws)

(a-)ce-pfu ySi(ms),FBD(yms)

(a-)pu F,FB

(a-)ngu MB,MBS

(a-)mu oB,FBS(os)

(a-)tü-ku-xu yB(ms),FBS(yms)

(a-)pe-u yB(ws),FBS(yws)

(a-)ti-ke-šiu FSiCh(ms),SiCh(ms)

(a-)mu Ch,yBCh(ms),gCh

Sema Affinal Terms

(a-)ni WM,HM,HoSi,oBW(ws),HoBW

(a-)ngu WF,HF,WB,HB

(a-)ci FSiH,WB,oSiH(ms),oBW(ms),SiH(ws)

(a-)fu WSi

(a-)ma-ke-šiu ySiH(ms)

(a-)mu-ke-šiu yBW,HyBW,SW

(a-)ni-pa WSiH,HyBW(ys),SW

Notes:

The neuter gP term is found only in Sema in the Naga group. Hutton also cites a-sü "paternal grandfather or other ancestor", lit. "tree, stock" (cf. Lepcha, Burmese), and in another place (1916, p. 42) the same authority states that this term is used in address to one's own grandfather.

The Sb terms are grouped somewhat differently than in Angami, and 'Omaha' features are present in full rather than only in part. The term a-tsü-ni-pfu (Bor and Pawsey, but a-tsü-nu-pfu in Hutton) apparently contains the element ni-pfu W. Especial collective terms are cited for "brothers"

601 and "sisters" "brethern", viz. a-te-zü-mi(ms) and a-pe-li-mi (ws) (a-p'e-li-mi in Bor and Pawsey); cf. a-pe-u yB(ws). Sema also has a collective term for "grandchildren", viz. a-ti-li-mi, from a-ti "seed, fruit" (< TB *sei); cf. the TB root *ma-li gCh < *li "seed". Still another collective term is represented by a-ngu-li-mi "male relations by marriage, in particular the males of a man's mother's family, but also those of his wife's family or of a woman's husband's family", based on a-ngu MB,MBS,Fl. Hutton's discussion of the suffix -li-mi (1921b, pp. 131-32) is not very enlightening; it occurs in the term a-li-mi "girl" (also used for "D"), in almost all feminine names, and in many clan names. The element -li, moreover, is used as a plural suffix, and a-li is a masculine suffix for names of domestic animals (e.g. a-tsü-li "dog", a-wo-li "hog"), while -mi is probably for (ti-)mi "man (homo)".

The term a-te-ke-ʌ̌siu is also used in a collective sense, viz. "persons related to the speaker through their mother, who is a woman of his family", i.e. FSiCh(ms),SiCh(ms). Note that this term is not extended to include gCh, the latter being grouped with Ch (a-nu). Hutton interprets this term as "come of (our) seed", yet a-mu-ke-ʌ̌siu yBW, with the same final element, is interpreted as "one who makes or is made (keshiu) an elder brother (amu)", as if from the verbal root ʌ̌si "to make" plus the verbal-adjectival prefix ke-.

In the affinal terminology, which greatly differs from that of Angami, Hutton notes a difference between the Western

601 (Lazmi) and Eastern (Zŭmomi) dialects, the former employing a-ngu for WB, the latter a-ci. A-mu-ke-šiu is said to be used for Dl in some villages, and a-ni-pa (cf. a-ni-pfu W) in others; the former term is further used in the village of Seromi for HyBW(ys). Hutton (1916, p. 42) cites mai-ki-šiu Sl,Dl, apparently the same term as a-ma-ke-šiu (also simply a-ma) ySlH(ms); cf. Angami na ySlH,DH.

The Sema nomenclature stresses age distinctions in much the same way as the Angami, e.g. a-nu yBCh(ms) where oBCh(ms) is called by name, and referred to by the analytical term i-mu nu; a-fu WSi but called by name if younger than speaker; a-mu-ke-šiu HyBW(ys) but a-ni HyBW(os)= HoBW=HM.

Rengma

101 197 The Rengma tribal complex includes three divisions speaking two distinct languages. The main body of the Rengma are north of the Angami and east of the Dayang (Brahmaputra drainage). The northern group (Ntenyi) and the southern group (Nzong) are culturally unified and hence have been lumped by Mills under the term "Western Rengma", but they speak distinct languages, as recognized by Mills himself. The so-called "Naked Rengma", who call themselves Anyo, represent an offshoot from the Ntenyi group who have crossed the Assam-Burma watershed and established themselves in three villages near the Tizu-Tiho junction (Chindwin 197 drainage). This emigrant group, which has long been cut off from all contact with the main body of Rengma by the powerful Angami and Sema tribes, shows many striking differences in

197 culture yet retains a speech that is little more than a dialect of Ntenyi. The Ntenyi-Anyo language is perhaps closer to Sema and Kezhama, the Nzong language to Angami, though this point is still in doubt. Ntenyi-Anyo is notable for its retention of original final -a, as in a-sa "flesh" (Nzong te); a-o-wa "bird" (Nzong te-gü); a-nga "fish" (Nzong tsü-hü); a-ha "tooth" (Nzong hü).

601 Full kinship terminologies for all three groups (Nzong, Ntenyi, Anyo) are presented by Mills (1937), and the LSI and Butler (1873) give word-lists for Nzong. Our general linguistic information on these languages, however, is even poorer than that on Angami, Sema, and the other Naga languages.

Rengma (Nzong) Consanguineal Terms

(a-)ši, (a-)gü gM — (a-)vong gF

(a-)vyü M,MSi,FBW,MBD(os)* — (a-)pfü F

(a-)psü M

(a-)da FoB,MoSiH

(a-)nyo FyB,MySiH

(a-)nü FSi — (a-)mi MB,MBS(os)*

(a-)tsa oSb,pC

(a-)le-gi ySi,pC — (a-)si-ko-zu-ngü yB,pC

(a-)cu-gü FSiCh,SiCh(ms),gCh

(a-)šen-nü D,BD(ms) nyo Ch — (a-)šen-vu S,BS(ms)

Rengma (Nzong) Affinal Terms

601 (a-)nü WM,HM

(a-)zu-gi WoSi

(a-)mo yBW(ms),SW

(a-)mi WF,HF,HoB,WB(os)*

(a-)mu FSiH,oSiH(ows)

(a-)sü-tü WSiH

ta-mu SiH(ms),DH

Notes:

A-ši (Butler a-t'i) is the regular term for gM, paired with a-vong (Butler a-bang) gF, while a-vyü is the regular term for M, paired with a-pfü F. A-gü and a-psü are obligatory terms of address in the Tselangu clan, and are optional in three other clans. In the "outer range" of clans, a-pfü is used as a neuter term for P, sex being distinguished in the terms a-pfü pe-ce-gü F, a-pfü te-mu-gü M. Nzong is exceptional in having primary terms for FoB and FyB; the latter (a-nyo; Butler a-nio FB) seems to be identical to the term nyo Ch, not found in Mills but reconstructed from the term nio S,D in Butler (a-nyu S in the LSI). The terms cited by Mills, viz. a-šen-vu S and a-šen-nü D, appear to be based on (ke-)šen "small".

Nzong differs from other Naga languages in lacking sex-of-speaker distinctions in the Sb nomenclature. A-si-ke-zu-ngü yB is of periphrastic origin, according to Mills' interpretation: "the one coming after". The collateral terminology is of 'Omaha' type, but note that a-vyü M and a-mi MB are applied only to MBCh(os) and in address only, personal names being used in reference. Personal names are also used for MBCh(ys),

601 and for BCh(ws),SiCh(ws). Butler cites distinct gCh terms, viz. a-ninga gS (cf. a-nin Ch, also Ntenyi a-nga Ch), a-niu-gi gD.

Personal names are employed for many affinal relatives, as indicated by the scarcity of terms in the above tabulation; even ta-mu DH is ordinarily replaced by the personal name, according to Mills. Mills further notes that when children are betrothed in infancy, parents on both sides address them as "son" and "daughter" rather than by the affinal terms. The term a-zu-gi WoSi (cf. a-le-gi ySi) is used only when WoSi is of the speaker's mother's clan, i.e. it could be used if speaker had married his MBD. A fine distinction is drawn between a-mu (am-mu in Mills) oSiH(ws) when this relative is "much older" than speaker (equated with FSiH), and a-tsa, id., when this relative is "a little older" than speaker (equated with oSb). For the relationship of a-mu FSiH to ta-mu SiH(ms),DH, cf. the Ao term a-nok (probably a direct cognate).

601

Rengma (Ntenyi) Consanguineal Terms

(a-)la ggM

(a-)za-k'i gM

(a-)za gM,M,MySi,FBW,MBD(os)*

(a-)pfu M

(a-)za-k'e MoSi

(e-)nyi FSi

(a-)mui ggF,MB,MBS(os)*

(a-)pa gF,F

(a-)pa-k'e FoB,MoSiH

(a-)pe-za FyB,MySiH

(a-)pi oSb,pC

(e-)tsü-k'e-gu-wa ySi(ms),pC

(e-)ci-no-wa yB,pC

(a-)zu-wa FSiCh,SiCh(ms),gCh

(a-)nga
(a-)tsa } Ch,BCh(ms)

Rengma (Ntenyi) Affinal Terms

(e-)nyi MBW,WM,HM

(e-)nyong HSi

(e-)tsü WoSi,oBW(os)

(e-)tsü-nyi yBW,SW

(a-)mui FSiH,WF

(e-)k'u HF,WB(os)*

(e-)k'u-za HyB

(e-)zü WSiH

(e-)ta-myua SiH(ms),DH

Notes:

Ntenyi, like Nzong, has especial terms both for gM (a-za-k'i) and M (a-pfu). These are used by a person whose eyes have become irritated; cf. the employment of like terms in the Tselangu clan of the Nzong, on the basis that one's eyes will become inflamed unless these especial terms are used. Ntenyi is aberrant in equating gM with M (a-za) and gF with F (a-pa), as well as in equating MB with ggF (cf.

L01 the Kuki term *pu gF,MB). The terms a-la and a-mui strictly refer to "female ancestors on both sides higher than gM" and "male ancestors on both sides higher than gF", respectively.

In the PSb nomenclature, the element -k'e seems to have a magnitive force, while -za is used as a diminutive (cf. e-k'u-za HyB). The Sb terms are arranged as in Nzong, but e-di-no-wa yB is used only in reference (name used in address), and the name only is used for ySi(ws); cf. the Nzong term a-le-gi ySi, which is used by a woman only in reference, the name being used in address. The Iseni-kotsenu (= Ntenyi) dialect recorded by Hutton (1921a, p. 329) has a-tsü-no-a yB, a-tsü-ghü ySi.

The collateral terms conform in every detail to the Nzong pattern, even to the lack of terms for BCh(ws) and SiCh(ws). A sub-dialectical variation is represented by a-nga Ch (Tesophenyu sub-dialect), a-tsa Ch (Kotsenyu sub-dialect); for the former, cf. Sema a-nga "baby".

The distinction drawn between WF (a-mui) and HF (e-k'u) is the outstanding feature of the affinal terminology; Mills notes that a-mui is often used for HF as well as for WF. The term e-k'u-za FyB, with a diminutive element -za (supra), suggests an original e-k'u HoB = HF, a Kuki-type equation. The term e-tsü WoSi,oBW(ms) is described as "obsolete", having been replaced by the personal name. In Ntenyi the Naga tendency to replace kinship terms by personal names is especially well marked.

601

Rengma (Anyo) Consanguineal Terms

(a-)la gM

(a-)za
(a-)wo } M

(a-)za-k'ru MoSi,FoBW

(a-)za-tsü MySi,FyBW,MBD*

(a-)mi gF,MB,MBS(os)*

(a-)pa F

(a-)pa-ci FoB,MoSiH

(a-)pe-za FyB,MySiH

(a-)ce oSb,FBCh(os)

(a-)nu ySb,FBCh(ys)

(a-)zü FSiCh,xpN,gCh

(e-)nyi
(a-)vo-le } MSiD

(a-)tsa Ch

(e-)nyu-pa
(e-)ci-pa } YSiS

Rengma (Anyo) Affinal Terms

(e-)nyi-tsü MBW,WM,HM

(e-)nyi MBW

(a-)mi FSiH,WF

(e-)k'u HF,WSiH

(e-)tsü WoSi,oBW(ms),HoB

(e-)nyo HSi

(a-)za-vu WySi,yBW(ms)

(e-)tsü-nyi Dl

(e-)nyi-pa WB,SiH(ms)

(a-)zu-pa WyB

(e-)ta-mu Sl

Notes:

The Anyo nomenclature is closely related to the Ntenyi, yet presents a number of important variations that demand our attention. The gP terms seem to represent the basic arrangement from which the Ntenyi terms were developed; note a-mi gF,MB, precisely as in Kuki, but applied to MBS(os) only in address, as in Ntenyi and Nzong. Anyo parallels Ntenyi and Nzong in having an especial term for M (a-wo), used only by the Tsori clan.

601 The terms a-za-k'ru MoSi and a-za-tsü MySi are interpreted as "great mother" and "little mother", respectively; cf. nyi-tsü FSi, perhaps also e-tsü WoSi and e-tsü-nyi Dl. The appearance of only two Sb terms, apparently distinct from any in Ntenyi, is worthy of attention.

The collateral nomenclature shows two points of contrast with the Ntenyi system, viz. the equation of FSiCh with both xN and pN rather than simply with SiCh(ms), and the use of distinct terms for MSiCh(personal name used in Ntenyi). Two sets of terms appear here, the usage being dependent on the clan affiliations of the relative in question. When MSiS and MSiD are of speaker's clan (i.e. both M and MSi have married into the same clan), the terms e-ci-pa and a-vo-le are used, whereas when MSiS and MSiD are not of speaker's clan, the terms e-nyu-pa (cf. the affinal use of this term) and e-nyi are used. The term e-nyi is applied to elderly females of neither the speaker's father's nor mother's clan, and is used for MBW only under these conditions, while e-nyi-tsü (probably "little aunt", vide supra) is used for MBW when of speaker's father's (i.e. speaker's) clan.

A similar distinction is drawn between a-mi "elderly male of mother's clan" and e-k'ü (= e-k'u) "elderly male of neither father's nor mother's clan" (vide Mills, 1937, note to p. 136). Mills notes that a-mi is often used for HF (cf. Ntenyi a-mui), indicating that a woman may on occasion marry her MBS, and note the equation of FSiH with WF rather than with HF. E-k'u is applied to WSiH only when of a clan different from that of speaker (i.e. when sisters have married into different clans).

Lhota

[101] 197 The Lhota inhabit the area west of the Ao and Sema and north of the Rengma, in the middle and lower Dayang drainage. Hutton and Mills have emphasized the cultural affinities of the Lhota with the Rengma, Sema, and Angami, but the language stands nearer to Ao, as recognized by the compilers of the LSI. Lhota is much better unified than the Naga languages discussed above, and the two sub-dialects (Liye, spoken north of the Dayang, and Ndrung, spoken south of the Dayang) differ only slightly from each other. Mills (1922) cites a few terms as "Southern Lhota", and others as "Northern Lhota", but this division does not correspond to the dialectical division, for Witter, whose work is based on the Liye (northern) dialect, cites forms which agree with Mills' "Southern Lhota" forms. Our only source for the Ndrung dialect is Butler (1875a), who recorded a number of unusual terms. In general, our Lhota sources show an unduly large proportion of discrepancies, 601 making it difficult to establish standard forms. In the tabulation presented below the forms are mainly those cited by Mills, but with some corrections from Witter. Only Southern Lhota forms are included, but the Northern Lhota equivalents are indicated in the notes.

601

Lhota Consanguineal Terms

(o-)tsü gM

{(o-)ye / (o-)pfu} M

(o-)yo-ra-mo MoSi

(o-)yo-mung-owo MySi,MBD

(a-)no FSi

(o-)mo-tsü gF

(o-)po F

(o-)po-ra-mo FoB

(o-)po-ro FyB

(o-)mo MB,MBS

(o-)ta oSb(wws),pC

(o-)nyi-ro ySi(ws),pC

(o-)yi-lo ySi(ms),pC

(o-)hro-vo FSiD,SiD(ms)

(o-)ka MSiD(ys),BD(ws)

(o-)tso-lo-vo D,pNi

(o-)hro-vo gD

(o-)nyu-ro yS(ms),pC

(o-)pye yS(ws),pC

(o-)hro FSiS,SiS(ms)

(o-)ngo MSiS(ys),BS(ws)

(o-)tso-tyu-ngo S,pNe

(o-)hro gS

Lhota Affinal Terms

(o-)no MBW,WM,HM

(o-)mo WF,HF

(a-)nang FSiH,WoB,SiH(ms),HSi,BW(ws)

(o-)hrã e-ra-mo WoSi

(o-)hrã nung-owo WySi

(a-)nang-nung-owo WyB

(o-)hrã SiH(ws),HB

(o-)zi WSiH

(o-)hro-vo BW(ms),SW(ms)

(o-)ka SW(ws)

(o-)myak-o DH(ws)

eng DH(ms)

Notes:

Northern Lhota o-tyo gM; cf. Thukomi i-tya M. Witter cites both o-tsü and o-pvü, the latter equated with o-pvü M (Witter). Butler cites a-io-ro gM (= a-yo-ro; cf. o-no-ro FySi), a-me-tu gF (= o-mo-tsü). The distinction between o-yo and o-pfu M is

601 one both of clan and of dialect (area); o-yo is the Northern term for women of the Izumonsterre phratry, and o-pfu is the general term for women of the Tompyaktserre phratry and of the Ezong clan of the Mipongsandre phratry, as well as the Southern term for women of the Izumonsterre phratry.

Age distinctions in Lhota are made with the aid of the elements -ra-mo (e-ra-mo "older"), -nung-owo ∼ nung-howo (nung-owo "younger"), and -ro (unanalyzed, but cf. nga-ro "babe", in Butler). Northern Lhota has o-po-nung-owo FyB for o-po-ro, and distinguishes between o-no-ra-mo FoSi and o-no-ro ∼ o-no-nung-owo FySi. The forms o-nyu-ro yB(ms) and o-nyi-ro ySi(ws) perhaps represent a single term for ySb(ss). The term o-yi-lo ySi(ms) includes a feminine suffix -lo; cf. Butler a-i-loi Si (e-loi "female, woman"), Witter o-yu-lüe ySi (e-lüe "female suffix"). Hutton (1921a, p. 329) cites o-ngo yB (="boy, son"), and Butler cites a-ngo, id.; cf. the equation of ySb with Ch in Ao.

The terms o-hro FSiS,SiS(ms) and o-hre gS are distinct, as cited by Mills, yet the similarity leads one to suspect that a single root, if not a single term, may be involved. Butler cites ar-ru gS, arr gD, while Witter cites o-rü-wo gS, o-sü-wo gD (cf. Anyo Rengma a-xü). Witter also cites o-tso-erri gS, the same word as o-tso-eri "family, generations, descendants", based on o-tso Ch (Witter). The terms o-ngo BS(ws) and o-ka BD(ws) are the ordinary words for "boy" and "lass", respectively. O-ta oSb is applied to MSiCh(os), as contrasted with MSiCh(ys).

601 Affinal terms are affected by the clan affiliations of the relative in question, though this feature is not so prominent as in Ao (infra). O-no Ml is used for MBW only when of a clan different from that of speaker, and a-nang (a-nung in Mills) is applied to FSiH only when of a clan different from that of speaker's mother. Northern Lhota has a-ngi MBW,Ml rather than o-no, hence does not show the equation Ml=FSi. O-zi is used for WSiH only when of a clan different from speaker's; this term appears in Butler in the forms o-a-zi Bl, o-a-zi-o Sil (not represented in Witter).

The term o-hrã, with typical Lhota nasalized final, has been reconstructed from forms o-hram ~ o-hrang in Mills, o-hram ~ o-hra in Witter. Note that the fundamental meaning is Bl(ws),WSi(ms), i.e. approximately Sbl(ds), as opposed to a-nang Sbl(ss). Where WBW is of a clan different from speaker's, a-nang is applied to WBS, and o-rhã to WBD.

Northern Lhota has a separate term for BW(ms),SW(ms), viz. o-mi (in Southern Lhota equated with SiD,ms). Witter cites o-hram (= o-hrã) Dl, from which an equation of WSi with BW(ms) can be inferred (paralleling a-nang WB,SiH,ms). Witter also cites o-ryu-wõ Sl; cf. o-rü-wo gS (Witter) and o-hro SiS(ms).

Ao

101 197 The Ao are the last of the Naga tribes to be considered in this review. As among the Angami and Rengma, two sharply defined linguistic groups exist. The older Ao group is the Mongsen, in the west, which includes Changki as a sub-group.

[101] The more recent and now dominant Ao group is the Chongli, immediately west of the Dikhu River and thus on the east of the Mongsen. The Mongsen dialect is still used in traditional songs, even among the Chongli clans, but in daily life is rapidly being superseded by Chongli. Changki, spoken only in a few small villages in the southwest corner of the Ao region, is even more moribund. Mills has described still other Ao groups living on the east bank of the Dikhu, viz. Longla and Yacham, but gives us little information on them. The Tengsa dialect recorded by N. Brown is merely a sub-dialect of Yacham (the contrary view in the LSI, pp. 290-91 notwithstanding). Yachumi and Thukomi (Sangtam) are fairly close to Ao, to judge from the meagre material on them (in the LSI), but are best regarded as separate languages.

Mills (1926) gives detailed lists of kinship terms for the three principal Ao groups, viz. Chongli, Mongsen, and Changki. Additional material is available in the important dictionary by E. W. Clark (1911) and the grammar by Mrs. Clark (1893), as well as in the LSI account (by A. W. Davis). Ao is the best known of all the Naga languages, yet the obscure vowels of the language have played havoc with the conventional systems of orthography employed in this area, with the result that many matters <u>in re</u> Ao phonology still remain to be cleared up. In the discussion that follows the vowel written ɣ by the Clarks is interpreted as ü, thus bringing more nearly into line the Clark and Mills systems of orthography.

601 The Ao terms used in address differ at many points with those used in reference, the two sets of terms tending to complement each other. Mills has separated these two sets and has given complete data on each of them, hence we have followed his lead in the tabulation below. The affinal nomenclature of Ao presents especial problems, which are reserved for discussion in the notes.

Ao (Chongli) Consangùineal Terms

(address)

(o-)tsü gM	(o-)pu gF
(u-)ca M	(o-)ba F
(u-)ca-tan-zü MoSi	(o-)ba-tam-bu FoB
(u-)ca-ta-nu-zü MySi,MBD	(o-)ba-ta-mu-bu FyB
(o-)nü FSi	(o-)k'u MB,MBS
(o-)ya oSi,pC	(u-)ti oB,pC
(tü-)nü ySi,pC,D,pNi,BD(ws)	(to-)pu yB,pC,S,pNe,BD(ws)
(a-)mu FSiD,SiD(ms)	(a-)nok FSiS,SiS(ms)

sam-cir gCh

(reference)

(to-)tsü gM	(to-)pu gF
(te-)tsü M	(to-)bu F
(tü-)yi oSi	(ti-)ti oB

(to-)mu ySb

(i-)cir te-tsü D	(i-)cir S

Notes:

The elements within parentheses are all to be regarded as prefixes of (ultimately) pronominal origin. Mongsen makes a

601 distinction between a- (= Chongli -a, -o, -u) and kü-, e.g. a-ba "my father" (address or reference) in speaking to an intimate acquaintance, but kü-ba "my father" in speaking as a witness in court, etc. (vide Mills, 1926, p. 345). For some terms only the kü- (or tü- in description) prefix is available, e.g. kü-nu "my yB" (cf. Thado ka-nau yB as opposed to he-e oB, etc.). A third prefix, i-, is used in i-ear "my child"; contrast kü-nok "my dao", kü-k'et "my hand", with i-ki "my house", i-cau "my cooking pot" (kü- implies more intimate contact).

The arrangement of the Ao terms is clear enough, and an interesting pattern is presented, with 'Omaha' features in the collateral nomenclature and equation of ySb with Ch and all N except SiCh(ms), this latter in the vocative terminology only. The analysis of the individual terms, however, presents almost insuperable difficulties (vide supra). Clark writes many forms with an -r suffix, which has both a verbal "existential" force and a nominal collective force, e.g. Sangtam-r "a Sangtam" (i.e. "one of a body of Sangtam men"), sāmen-r "a village councillor" (cf. Mills, p. 337). In Mills' list this suffix appears only in the term i-cir Ch (sam-cir gCh), te-cir "young (humans)", as contrasted with te-ca-nu "young (of beasts)". The original form with final -a is retained in te-ca-nu and in za-la D, ja-ba-so S (Clark), cf. Mongsen i-car Ch (kü-sam-car gCh), and Thukomi a-zarr Ch (TB *za). In Chongli final -a has been replaced by -i after affricates and sibilants, as in ci "to eat", Mongsen ca; ši "flesh", Mongsen a-sa.

601 Te-tsü M corresponds to the feminine suffix (animals) te-tsür cited by Clark, and [illegible]-tsü ~ to-tsü gM appears to contain the same element. Clark cites te-bur "male (human)", te-bu F (te-tsü M), o-bu gF (o-tsü gM), and te-bu ~ te-bu-ti "familiar term for boy", indicating that Mills' distinction between -pu and -bu forms is not justified. The term o-ba F, used in address only, shows a retention of the original -a vocalism of this root (cf. Ahi Lolo a-ba F rather than the expected form *a-bo). Ao also uses -ba as a masculine suffix (persons), paired with -la (feminine), directly connected with the Kuki feminine suffix *la (a-nü-la "girl", za-la D).

Ao tü-nü ySi and to-nu ySb must be regarded as distinct terms, despite their similarity. Clark cites te-nü ~ te-nü-la "familiar term for girl", o-nü-la Ni, apparently from nü "man (homo)" < TB *mi (vide infra), but te-nu yB, ta-nu-tsü ySi (with -tsü feminine suffix), ta-nur Ch (but nu in many combinations), te-ca-nu "young (of beasts)", and la-nu Ch, also "tender" (cf. Kuki *nou, showing a like semantic association).

The two terms for oSi, viz. o-ya and tü-yi, are perhaps from a single root, but this cannot be demonstrated; Clark has te-yi oSi, a-yir "unmarried girl" (Mongsen la-ya-ti).

The FB and MSi terms are purely analytical formations; cf. tam-bur "old", ta-nur "young", tan-tsür "old" (Clark). The roots are *tan (-n > -m before b-) "old" and (ta-)*nu "young" (supra), to which have been added the elements -bu (male) and -sü (= -tsü) (female). Ao *tan "old" is directly

601 comparable with Kuki *tar, id., since Ao regularly replaces final -r by -n, e.g. an ~ en "fowl" < Kuki *ar; ben "flower" < Kuki *bar; sen "new", Kuki *sar (with an assimilative e < a shift before the final dental).

The Ao affinal nomenclature reflects the clan affiliations of the relatives in question and hence cannot conveniently be tabulated. A few affinal terms are constant, but most of them vary as indicated. The four key terms are o-k'u "male of the speaker's mother's phratry", o-nü "female of speaker's phratry, first ascending generation", a-nok "son of a woman of the speaker's phratry", and a-mu "daughter of a woman of the speaker's phratry" (cf. Mills, p. 175). As stressed by Mills, the Ao tend to interpret all affinal relationships in terms of consanguineal:

> If no relationship can be traced through the father, some can be traced through the mother if you go back far enough. The Ao simply does not contemplate relationships solely by marriage, with no blood-relationship whatever on either side. (p. 175)

Thus, o-k'u is used for FSiH, WF, HF, SiH when of Ego's M's phratry, and o-nü is used for MBW, WM, HM when of Ego's phratry (o-nü is restricted to relatives of first ascending generation, hence a-mu rather than o-nü is used for BW). In a more extended sense, o-k'u is also applied to FSiH when descended from a man of Ego's M's phratry. A-nok is generally employed in a contrasting sense, e.g. it is used for Fl when not of Ego's M's phratry, "it being assumed in this case that his mother must be of speaker's phratry" (Mills, p. 165), and

601 for FSiH when descended through his mother from a man of Ego's phratry. O-k'u, however, is generally applied to HB, regardless of clan affiliation, though in some villages a-nok is used if his mother is of Ego's phratry; this points to the honorific nature of the term o-k'u (cf. Euki pu gF,MB,MBS).

Even three or four possibilities appear in some of the affinal terms for female kin, e.g. MBW is called o-nü̃ (=FSi) if of Ego's phratry, o-tsü̃ (=gM) if of Ego's gM's phratry, and a-mu if descended through her mother from a man of Ego's phratry. In addition to these three terms, a fourth possibility exists in the case of M1, who is called u-ca-tan-zü̃ or u-ca-ta-nu-zü̃ (=MoSi,MySi) if of Ego's M's phratry (these terms are also applied to FBW under like conditions). Note also that MBS is called o-pu (=gF) if of Ego's gF's phratry, and that MBD is called o-tsü̃ (=gM) if of Ego's gM's phratry, while a-nok and a-mu are applied otherwise, "the necessary descent being assumed".

The distinct affinal terms in Ao include the following: (kü̃-)za-ba WSiH (descr. tü̃-za-ba); (ka-)bang SiH(oms) when not of Ego's M's phratry (a-nok used for SiH,yms), (o-)bang S1 (descr. ta-bang) if his mother is not of Ego's phratry (a-nok is the other term here, as above); (kü̃-)t'ang SiH(ws) when not of Ego's M's phratry (o-k'u is the other term). D1 is called u-ca-ta-mu-zü̃ (= MySi) if of Ego's M's phratry, otherwise a-mu, "the necessary relationship being assumed", while ta-mu is the descriptive term.

601 It is evident that, in addressing or referring to affinal kin, the Ao are more concerned with clan affiliations than with generations. Note that o-nü is restricted to relatives of the first ascending generation, both in the consanguineal and the affinal nomenclature, as contrasted with o-k'u, which cuts across generation lines in both nomenclatures (as is consistent with the Omaha system).

Mongsen and Changki agree in many respects as opposed to Chongli, with Changki showing the more interesting variations of the two.

Ao (Changki) Consanguineal Terms

(address)

(a-)zü gM

(a-)ya
(a-)la M

(a-)ya-ja-mu MoSi

(a-)nu-zai MySi,MBD

(a-)ta FSi,oSi,pC

(a-)owo gF

(a-)ba F

(a-)ba-jam-ba FoB

(a-)sa FyB

(a-)k'u MB,MtS

(a-)nga oB,pC

(kü-)nu ySb,pC

(kü-)mi FSiD,SiD(ms)

(a-)ti SiD(ws)

(kü-)mnak FSiS,SiS(ms)

(a-)ki SiS(ws),S

(kü-)ca-ba Ch,pM,BCh(ws)

(kü-)sam-cür gCh

601

Ao (Changki) Consanguineal Terms

(reference)

(te-)nü gM		(tü-)wo gF	
(ti-)yu M		(tü-)ba F	
(te-)ta oSi		(tü-)nga oB	
	(tü-)mu ySb		
(te-)ca-la		(te-)ca-ba S	
	(tü-)sam-cür gCh		

Notes:

For the distinction between the prefixes a- (used with terms for relatives older than Ego) and kü- (used with terms for relatives younger than Ego), see the discussion above.

A-ya is the standard term for "M", but a-la is used for women of the Lungchari clan; in Mongsen the standard term is a-ü (a-vu by Davis in LSI), while a-la is used for women of the Achamr, Alapachar, and Yimchenchar clans.

Changki has an especial term for FyB (a-sa), but Mongsen conforms to the Chongli pattern (a-ba-zam-ba FoB, a-ba-nü-za-ba FyB). Changki equates FoSi with oSi (a-ta), while Mongsen equates FSi with oSb (a-ti), i.e. these terms are applied to "females older than Ego of Ego's clan". The tendency to disregard generations, already noted in Chongli, is here carried to its logical extreme, resulting in the complete loss of the basic term for FSi (Chongli o-nü).

Changki has a different term for oB, viz. a-nga (cf. Mtenyi Rengma a-nga Ch), and a neuter term for ySb (kü-mu).

601 Mongsen approaches Chongli in distinguishing between tü-ba or kü-nu yB and tü-ti-la ySi (with feminine suffix -la), which are partially equated with the Ch terms, viz. tü S, tü-ti-la D (i-ear in reference). Changki (a-)ta appears to be distinct from Mongsen (a-)ti, the latter being represented by Changki (a-)ti SiD(ws), (kü-)ti WSiS, (a-)ti-nu WSiD, of Ego's phratry and of the same age as Ego. The ordinary Sb terms are applied to WSiCh when either older or younger than Ego. Changki (a-)ki SiS(ws),S cannot be matched in Chongli or Mongsen.

Changki and Mongsen kü-mnak, Changki kü-mi and Mongsen kü-mo, closely parallel Chongli a-nok and a-mu, respectively. Mongsen has kü-bang SiH(ms), for Chongli ka-bang SiH(oms), but Changki uses the term kü-ca-nak-ba (SiH,ms), based on kü-ca-ba S and kü-mnak. Changki also has a distinct term kü-hram, applied to WB (Chongli o-k'u or a-nok, Mongsen a-k'u) and to SiH(ws), i.e. Bl(ws), which can be directly related to Lhota o-hrã. Mongsen has kü-t'ung SiH(ws), for Chongli kü-t'ang, id., but in Changki this term is represented by i-t'ung BW(ws). Kü-za-ba WSiH extends unaltered through all three Ao dialects.

In general, the Changki nomenclature is an archaic and rather distinct variant of the standard (Chongli) Ao, with Mongsen displaying a mixture of Changki and Chongli features, e.g. equating FSi with oSi as in Changki but distinguishing between yB and ySi as in Chongli.

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The identification of the individual terms of the several Naga languages with TB or Kukish roots is a matter of utmost difficulty, and in many cases no definite conclusions can be reached. A few noteworthy results have been attained here, however, and are presented in the following discussion.

The P and gW terms are especially difficult, though the root *pa F can be traced with some assurance. The correspondences for original final -a are indicated in the following table, in which the terms for "Ch" are included (Chongli vacillates between -u and -o as recorded in various sources, and has -i after c-); note the peculiar treatment of initials in Nzong Rengma. Angami and Sema have the Chongli type of shift, e.g. Sema pu F, po-ngu "5".

	Kukish	Nzong	Ntenyi-Anyo	Lhota	Chongli	Tonggen-Chongli
father	*pa	pfü	pa	po	bu	ba
five	*ba-nga	pfü	ma-nga	mu-ngo	po-ngo	p'a-nga
fish	*ngya	tsü-hü	a-nga	o-ngo	a-ngo	a-nga
ten	*ta-ra	tsa-rü	{te-ra {ta-a	ta-ro	tü-r	te-ra
child	*za	-	tsa	tso	ci-r	ca-r
eat	*dza	-	tsa	tso	ci	ca

It is more than likely that the Kukish and TB root *pu ~ *p'u gF is represented in these Naga languages, but the point is difficult to establish. Sema has pu F (< *pa), a-pu-za gF, but Angami distinguishes between po F (< *pa) and pu-tsa-o gF. The Pepfüma clans of the Angami, however, use pvu F, pvu-tsa gF;

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cf. the Ntenyi Rengma equation of gF with F (a-pa). Changki has a-owo gF but a-ba F, and Mongsen has a-ow gF, a-ba F, but in Chongli the distinction is less sure (vide supra). Ntenyi a-la ggM, Anyo a-la gM, and Mongsen-Changki a-la M apparently have been derived from the general Kukish root *la "female". Cf. also Lhota o-tsü gM, o-mo-tsü gF, and Chongli o-tsü (Mongsen-Changki a-zü) gM (descr. to-tsü), te-tsü M (descr.), also "feminine suffix".

At least two roots for "M" are present in these languages. Of the two sets of terms found throughout most of this area, the more "standard" set point to a root *ya (cf. Abor-Miri yo < *ya gM), viz. Angami zo, Sema za, Ntenyi a-za (also applied to gM), Anyo a-za, Lhota o-yo, Chongli u-ez, Changki a-ya. Secondary M terms are represented by Angami pfü, Ntenyi a-pfu, Anyo a-wo, Lhota o-pfu, perhaps all from the Kukish root *pui "female, mother". The "standard" Mzong term a-vyü may also belong here, as well as the "standard" Mongsen term a-vü ~ a-vu. As in Kukish, the TB root *ma F is not represented.

TB *ni FSi is represented by Angami nya ~ nye, Sema ni, Mzong a-nü, Ntenyi-Anyo e-nyi, and Chongli o-nü. Lhota has o-no FSi, with aberrant vocalism; cf. also Southern Lhota a-ngi MBW, M1 (Northern o-no FSi).

The Naga languages, like the Tibeto-Burman languages in general, show more diversity in the terms for M than in those for FSi. The most widespread root is that represented by Angami mi, Mzong and Anyo a-mi, Ntenyi a-mi (also used for ggF),

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Lhota o-mo (also used in o-mo-tsö gF). This root cannot be reconstructed with any certainty, nor can any comparisons be suggested. The Sema term a-ngu MB is certainly distinct from the above, but Sema a-mu OB may belong there (cf. Mongsen-Changki FSi = oSi).

Of especial importance is the appearance of the TB root *k'u MB in three of these Naga languages, since this root does not occur elsewhere in Kukish, though present both in Mikir and Meithei (Kukis). Chongli o-k'u, Mongsen-Changki a-k'u MB,Fl show the root in its typical setting, and Ntenyi e-k'u HF,WB(os), Anyo e-k'u HF,WSiH show the same root in a Kachin-type setting. A third type of setting is found in the Sema term a-ci FSiH,WB. The phonetic development here is perfectly regular (-i < -u after k-, c-, ǩ-), initial c- having been developed from k- before the front vowel -i, resulting in occasional doublet forms (c- in Eastern Sema, k- in Western Sema, according to Bor and Pawsey's notation on the word "smoke").

	Tibeto-Burman	Lushei	Meithei	Sema
uncle (MB)	*k'u	-	i-ku	a-ci
smoke	*mei-k'u	mei-k'u	k'u	a-m-ci (E.S.) a-m-ki (W.S.)
cough	*k'ǔ	k'u'	k'u	i-ci ik-ki
liquor	*yu	zu	yu	a-ǩi*
rat	*yu	(sa-)zu	-	a-ǩi*

*Note: Sema a-ǩi "liquor" (high tone), "rat" (low tone).

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In the Sb nomenclature, only the Kukish and TB root *nau yBb can be traced with certainty. As in Lushpa and Western Kuki, the root is often used here in the meaning "Ch". The forms are as follows: Angami no, Sema and Ao nu, Anyo e-nu, Lhota nyu(-ro). Some of these forms may have been derived from the parallel Kukish root *nou "young, tender" rather than from *nau, but we have very little comparative material bearing on this point (cf. Sema a-nau "monkey", Lushei ngau). For the root *na Ch, vide supra. Another root for "Ch" can be traced in Ntenyi Rengma a-nga Ch, Sema a-nga "baby", Lhota o-ngo (< *nga) "boy", and perhaps Changki a-nga oB. Lhota o-ta oBb, Changki a-ta oBl, and Nsong Rengma a-da FoB, are comparable with the TB root *ta ~ *da oB,gV. Of all the Naga languages, Anyo appears to have the most "normal" Sb and Ch terminology, with a-ee oBb, e-nu yBb, a-tsa Ch.

Angami eu ~ tsu FSiB,ySiB(ms),gS, Nsong Rengma a-eu-gŭ and Ntenyi Rengma a-su-ea FSiCh,SiCh(ms),gCh, Anyo Rengma a-zŭ FSiCh,xpB,gCh suggest that the TB root *su gCh has been preserved in these languages. The initial z- of the Ntenyi and Anyo forms further suggest that the TB original was *zu rather than *su, but none of this evidence is conclusive.

The Naga languages appear to retain the Kukish affinal roots *nou Dl and *nak Sl. The latter is represented by Angami na, Sema a-na(-ka-ziu), Nsong ta-nu, Ntenyi e-ta-nyua, Anyo e-ta-nu, Lhota e-nyak-o, Nongsem-Changki kŭ-nnak, Chongli a-nok. The initial n- < m- shift reflected in the Angami and Chongli forms is one of the more striking

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peculiarities of Naga phonology. In Chongli this shift is ordinarily conditioned by a following -i vowel (Clark writes a-nick-ba "bride", ta-nick-ba "bridegroom"), as shown in the table below:

	Kukish	Lhota	Chongli	Mongsen
SI	*nak	e-nyak-e	a-nok	kŭ-nnak
man (homo)	*ni	-	nĭ	a-ni
name	*ning	e-nyang	te-nŭng	-
eye	*nik	e-nyek	te-nok	te-nik
ripe	*nin	e-hne	ta-nen*	te-ning
spear	-	-	nĭ	a-ni

*Note: Irregular in Chongli, perhaps because of the vocalism.

Kukish *mou DI is represented by Angami mie(-pfŭ) ~ me, Sema a-mu(-ke-ǎiu), Nzong Rengma a-mo, Chongli a-mu, and Mongsen kŭ-mo (Changki kŭ-mi is probably distinct). The vocalic correspondences with Kukish -ou (Meithei -au, Lushei -o) can be established for Angami and Sema, with one parallel also for Chongli and Nzong.

	Meithei	Lushei	Angami	Sema	Nzong	Chongli
DI	i-mau	mo	{me / mie	a-mu	a-mo	a-mu
field (jhum)	lau	lo	le	lu	lo	a-lu
call	hau	ho	he	hu	-	-
fly n.	-	t'e	t'e	a-m-t'u*	-	-

*Note: Angami t'e as found in t'e-vi and t'e-ze "fly"; Sema "horse-fly, gadfly" (prefix as in Lakher ma-t'eu-pa, Khami ma-t'au ~ pa-t'au "fly").

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197 Mongsen a-lu "field" as in Chongli (Mills, note 2 to p. 111), but Mongsen ngo "to bite", Chongli ngu (Mills, text on p. 361), showing the same correspondence as Mongsen mü-mo Dl, Chongli a-mu.

Chongli ma-bang S1H(oms), a-bang S1, Mongsen mü-bang S1H(ms) can be compared with Tib. 'a-bang FS1H,MS1H. Lhota o-hrü B1(ws), Changki mü-hram, id. are perhaps connected with the Kukish root 'rang FS1H,HF. Other affinal terms appear to be local formations restricted to a single language.

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601 The Naga tribes, like the linguistically related Kuki tribes to the south, are without exception patrilineal and patrilocal, to judge from the available material. Both Hutton and Mills, our chief authorities on these tribes, stress the fact that descent through females is not recognized in any way.

Exogamous clans, which tend to break down into exogamous kindreds, are everywhere present. There are also indications of moiety divisions among some tribes, but the material is difficult to interpret. Hutton tends to exaggerate the correlation of these divisions with the distribution of the terms for "Y" and "F", e.g. in his discussion of the Rengma organization in his introduction to Mill's work on the Lhota (1922), as emphasized by Mills himself. The data may be resumed as follows:

Angami: Two kelhu ("generations", a makeshift term, vide Hutton, 1921a, note 1 to p. 113), the Pezoma and Pepfüma. The

601 Pezoma use the terms no M, po F, while the Pepfüma use the terms pfü M, pvu F. The Chakrima section of the Angami are almost all Pezoma, while the Tengima are mixed. The kelhu are not exogamous now, but perhaps formerly were (cf. the pedigrees collected by Hutton). The real exogamous units are the clan (thino), or the kindred (putsa, from a-po F and tsa "side", according to Hutton, note 1 to p. 115). Hutton notes, however, that "marriages even within the kindred are not nowadays unknown" (p. 114).

Kezhama: According to Hutton (1921a), probably to be grouped with the Pezoma division of the Angami, since they employ the terms a-no M, a-pfo F (= a-po).

Sopvoma (Mao, Nemi): Our four sources on this tribe (Hutton, Hodson, Shakespear, Bose) all differ. Hutton (1921a, pp. 111-12) describes three divisions, one of which (Kachima) does not intermarry with the other two (Chakrima, Chovoma). The Kachima are thus endogamous (not within village), but may marry outside the tribe. Hodson (p. 75) describes four clans in the Sopvoma village of Liyai, grouped in pairs (Doe and Korumai, Yema and Bekon). The two groups are said to intermarry, "but not to any very great extent", indicating that these moieties tend to be endogamous rather than exogamous. Shakespear, in a note to Hutton's work on the Angami (1921a, p. 117), states that different systems are in vogue in different Sopvoma villages; thus, at Shongashon there are four khels arranged in two exogamous pairs; at Kalanamei there are six khels, two of which form an exogamous group in opposition

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to three others, while the sixth intermarries with both groups; three other villages are divided into khel which are exogamous but not grouped (the Assamese term khel, properly used only in the sense of a geographical unit within a village, is here employed in the [illegible] "clan"). Bose, our fourth authority, states (pp. 20-21) that lower and upper khels are found in the villages of Sungsung, Robonamai, and Kalinamai, but gives no further details.

Sema: Twenty-two main clans, with no trace of dual organization and with only one set of terms for "A" and "F". These clans may be grouped in a number of different ways according to ceremonies, food taboos, etc., but none of these divisions is of basic type. Many of the clans have split into two or more exogamous divisions, as among the Angami. Several different clans (ayeh-ayah, cf. Angami haiyeh "family") may be represented in a single khel (asah) within a given village.

Rengma: Six exogamous groups are found among the Western Rengma (Nzong and Ntenyi), each with two or more clans, with the exception of the large Kentennenyu clan (Group VI). The employment of P terms follows a rather complicated pattern, according to Mills (the account in Hutton, 1921a, p. 361, must be entirely discarded). The Ntenyi ordinarily use the terms a-za M, a-la gM, but a person whose eyes have become irritated uses the terms a-pfu M, a-za-k'i gM, regardless of the clan affiliations either of the speaker or of the woman addressed. The regular terms among the Nzong clans are

601 a-vyŭ M, a-ŭi gM. Women of the Tsolangu clan, however, must be addressed as a-puŭ (M) and a-gŭ (gM), while women of the Sangdingu, Tepingu, and Khimsongu clans may be addressed with either set of terms. Among the Eastern Rangma (Anyo), several clans are found in each village. With the exception of three "linked" clans found at the village of Lephori, these clans are not grouped in any manner. The Tsori clan, however, is recognized as quite distinct from the other clans, e.g. it uses the term a-wo M rather than a-ma, and has different gennas.

Lhota: Three phratries (Tompyaktserre, Izumonsterre, Mipongsandre), each with several clans (chibo), which in turn are in some cases split up into kindreds (whitso = "tail"). Mills writes (p. 87): "Strictly speaking a man ought to take his wife from a phratry other than his own", but goes on to state that simple clan exogamy is common, especially among the Southern Lhota, and that marriage between different kindreds of a single clan is sometimes permitted. This disregard of phratry affiliations is believed to be of recent origin, and to be motivated by economic factors connected with the practice of son-in-law service, i.e. a man selects a girl nearby so that he may work both his father-in-law's and his own parents' fields (the same explanation is given by Bose in re the tendency toward village endogamy among the Aimol, an Old Kuki tribe). The term o-yo M is applied by the Northern Lhota to women of the Izumonsterre phratry, while o-pfu is the general term for women of the

601 Tempyakstarre phratry and of the Ezong clan of the Mipongsandre phratry, as well as the Southern Lhota term for women of the Izumonsterre phratry. Usage is said to vary among three other Mipongsandre clans (Mills apparently had no data on a few clans).

Sangtam (Thukomi): Several exogamous groups of clans (i.e. phratries), viz. Tongre, Chingre, Lebitongre, Mongsarre, Lemkitongre, Anarre (Mills, 1931); cf. the Lhota -rre ~ -re suffix, and the Ao -r collective termination.

Ao: Each of the Chongli and Mongsen sections has three strictly exogamous phratries, with several clans in each phratry. The Mongsen phratries are unnamed, while the Chongli phratries are known by the name of the principal clan, viz. Pongenr, Lungkam, and Chamir (note -r termination). The phratries of the two sections are equated, and intermarriage is forbidden between two phratries so equated. Many of the clan names have a final element -cir (Chongli) or -car (Mongsen), connected with the root for "Ch" (vide supra); cf. also Mongsen pa-car "clan"(ms), pa-ca-lar, id. (ws), where Chongli has ki-dong "clan" (ms), apparently derived from ki "house" and s'ong-dong "tree". The Ao are guilty of a bit of etymologizing here, since they identify this element with the phonetically identical root for "eat" (Chongli ci, Mongsen ca), and invent stories to explain clan names such as o-ci-car "sparrow-eaters", and even a-ni-car "sun-eaters"! Hutton (Mills, 1926, note to p. 21) is misled by this quasi-totemistic interpretation, but Mills seems to have grasped the true significance of the names. The Chongli and Mongsen

601 sections are often represented in a single village, and freely intermarry. Mills discounts reports that these sections are exogamous, or have been so within recent times. The Changki section, linguistically akin to the Mongsen, lacks phratries but is divided into five exogamous groups, one of which consists of four linked clans, the others of one clan each. Mills states (p. 162) that "custom ordains what clans may intermarry", but gives no further details. Each of the Ao sections (dialects) has its own terms for "M" and "P", with no distinctions based on clan affiliations.

In general, the Naga tribes show several types of social organization rather than a single pattern. Dual organization is more in evidence in the south among the Angami and Sopvoma, and tripartite organization in the north among the Ao and Lhota, with Sema and Rengma having distinctive patterns of their own. Exogamous moieties cannot be established for any of the Naga tribes, nor can any general correlation be made between dual groupings and the employment of two sets of P terms.

The several Naga nomenclatures resemble one another in showing 'Omaha' features, usually complete, and numerous categorical equations indicative of cross-cousin marriage. The 'Omaha' features tend to be of Kuki type. In Angami, Nsong, Ntenyi, Anyo (i.e. Angami and Rengma), gCh is equated with FSiCh,SiCh(ms), and in Lhota the terms for gCh are suspiciously like those for FSiCh,SiCh(ms), but Sema equates gCh with Ch, and Ao has a distinct term for gCh. Anyo is

601 exceptional in equating both pN and xN with FSiCh,gCh. The equation of MB with gF, a Kuki trait, is not characteristic of these Naga languages, yet does occur in Anyo, while Ntenyi equates MB with ggF and Lhota shows a partial equation of MB with gF (o-mo MB and o-mo-tsü gF). MBD is equated with MSi or MySi rather than with gM, thus contrasting with the Kuki system. In the Rengma group the equations of MBS with MB and MBD with MSi appear only in the terms used in address and (with one exception) only when the person addressed is older than speaker. In Angami these equations do not appear in any form, only personal names being applied to MBCh. Note that in collateral terminology Angami and Rengma tend to resemble each other, both in equating FSiCh,SiCh(ms) with gCh (perhaps both retain the TB root *su gCh, vide supra) and in weakening or dispensing with the equation of MBS with MB.

In Angami and Sema only two Fl terms are in use (MB and FSi). Ntenyi and Anyo have three Fl terms, viz. WF (= MB), HF, and WM,HM (= FSi), while FSiH is equated with WF,MB. Sema has an especial term for FSiH (a-ci), etymologically related to the Ntenyi-Anyo term for HF (a-k'u), but has only a single term for WF,HF. Nzong and Lhota also have distinct terms for FSiH, not related to the above. In Ao the terms for Ml and Fl are dependent on the clan affiliations of these affinal kin, and no exclusively affinal terms are used in this connection. The Ao terms a-mu FSiD,SiD(ms) and a-nok FSiS, SiS(ms) are properly affinal, as shown in the comparative study

601 above, and have here displaced a consanguineal term (probably *seu*) through the equation of SiS(ms) with Sl (cf. Kachin).

Cross-cousin marriage is certainly present among most of the Naga peoples, though perhaps lacking in the south among the Angami and Sopvoma. Hutton (1921a) does not bring up this point in his discussion of Angami marriage practices, but Butler, an older and less reliable authority, writes that " it is altogether forbidden for cousins to intermarry" (p. 322). Bose states that cross-cousin marriage is not practised by the Sopvoma (Mao), but notes that the Sopvoma nomenclature is indicative of it. A Soma man may not marry his wife's mother, but may marry practically any other female relative of his own mother on her father's side, and may even marry his MSiD or his FSiD, though marriage with FSiD is regarded as unfertile; the preferred marriage, however, is with MBD (vide Hutton, 1921b, pp. 131-32). Marriage with MBD can be inferred for the Rengma from the following statement in Mills (1937, p. 137): "Nor may a man quarrel with his wife's father, who is classed with, and often is, his MB" (Mills makes no explicit reference to the type of marriage indicated here). Among the Lhota, a man may not marry his MSiD, his FSiD, or his SiD (cf. o-hro-vo FSiD,SiD,ms), but is permitted to marry his MBD, and is "rather expected to take his wife from his mother's clan" (Mills, 1922, p. 95). Mills' account of the Ao marriage restrictions (1926, p. 163) appears to be confused. According to this source, an Ao man may not marry his FSiD, nor a woman

601 her FSiS. If the latter be true, it follows that a man may not marry his MBD, yet Mills deliberately omits this in his list of restrictions for a man. Both Hutton and Mills seem to have slighted the question of marriage with collateral and affinal kin, as is amply evident from the above account, and it seems certain that better information on this problem will reveal a number of significant features.

The mother's brother occupies an especial position both among the Sema (Hutton, 1921b, p. 137) and the Rengma (Mills, 1937, p. 137). He must be respectfully addressed, and on no account is to be offended or quarreled with. According to the Rengma, he is "like a god", and can even demand small presents from his nephew (SiS). Among the Sema, a man gives a present (aghasho) to his SiD upon her marriage, and her husband is obliged to make a return. After the death of his father, a man is under the same obligation toward his FSiD, i.e. his FSiD is equated (ceremonially) with his own SiD (cf. Sema a-ti-ke-ǎiu FSiCh,SiCh,ms) and, from the woman's point of view, her MBS is equated with her MB (cf. Sema a-neu MB,MBS).

A final point to be considered here is the occasional marriage with F's widow (other than one's own M), which has been reported for the Sema (Hutton, 1921b, p. 136) and the Lhota (Mills, 1922, p. 95), but is definitely stated to be forbidden among the Ao (Mills, 1926, p. 163). Among the Sema this practise is largely confined to chiefly or rich families, and appears as a device whereby a widow retains some control over

601 her husband's property (inheritance among the Naga tribes is everywhere restricted to the male line). Among the Lhota, "such marriages, though pretty common, are viewed with a certain amount of disfavor" (Mills, op. cit.). Majumder has applied Rivers' theories to the Sema, with emphasis on this practice of marriage with F's widow, e.g. a-ngu is used both for WB and MB because these two relatives are identical after marriage to F's widow. The inadequacy of this ad hoc explanation should be sufficiently clear from the present study as a whole, and more especially from the sections devoted to the Kuki and Naga groups.

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The present section has been written with a two-fold view in mind, viz. a provisional reconstruction of the archaic Tibeto-Burman kinship nomenclature and a synthesis of material bearing on the general problem of the factors that have produced changes in this archaic system. It is of course impossible to realize either of these goals in any complete sense. The reconstruction of a set of kinship terms differs very little from the reconstruction of any other group of terms, e.g. those for animals. In each case certain phonetic generalizations must be followed, and in each case original meanings must be assigned to roots on the basis of a series of fluctuating connotations. The difficult problem of "partial equations", in which a given root has a limited distribution, arises here precisely as in any other linguistic field (for a good recent discussion, vide Scherer, 1941). A distinction between the two types of reconstruction can be drawn, however, in the fact that kinship terms constitute a definite system whereas those for animals, parts of the body, or the like, do not constitute such a system. It is fairly evident that, within kinship nomenclature, a semantic shift at one point is likely to be reflected at another, or, in sociological terms, a single factor, e.g. cross-cousin marriage, is likely to produce a series of interrelated changes, whereas this in general does not hold true within other linguistic spheres. In this respect a kinship nomenclature might be compared with

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a phonemic system, in which similar integration appears. The point is not worth elaborating, since the fact that a kinship terminology does constitute a system hardly relieves us of the task of investigating each element of that system, both independently and correlatively.

In any piece of historical reconstruction, linguistic or other, the natural tendency is to make the prototype unduly complex. The writer has often been struck by the complexities shown by hypothetical reconstructed languages as compared with their actual living descendants, as though linguistic evolution always proceeded in the direction of simplification. The number of distinct roots assigned to these reconstructed languages is sometimes of staggering magnitude, and no ingenuity is spared in augmenting this lexicographical harvest. In the present study it would be easy to reconstruct an archaic nomenclature with two or more terms for most relationships, yet such a procedure patently would be futile. It is far better to determine, firstly, which elements are relatively certain, and, secondly, which elements are based largely on "partial equations" and must thus be held in reserve until a basic framework has been set up. Nine roots, eight of which are applied to consanguineal relatives, stand out in our complete Tibeto-Burman series as culled from the foregoing review. These roots constitute the following system:

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Tibeto-Burman Terms

*p'i	gN	*p'u	gF
*ma	N	*p'a	F
*ni	FS1	*k'u	KN
*mau	yGb		
*sa	Ch		
		*mak	S1

The forms given above can be accepted with some confidence as fair approximations of the archaic Tibeto-Burmen roots. All except the affinal term *mak have vocalic finals, and it was on the basis of finals or "rhymes" (medial vowel + final consonant), especially of vocalic finals, that Shafer and the writer were able to work out the main features of Tibeto-Burmen phonology. Earlier writers had in general attacked the problem from the most difficult angle, that of initials and tones. Thus, no less a scholar than Laufer is responsible for the following absurd dictum:

> Prefixes as well as final consonants....are of minor importance in the comparative study of Indo-Chinese languages.... the staff of comparison remains the initial consonant, and the tone conditioned by it. (TP 17, p. 115).

Prefixes have shown to be of basic importance, while both the initials and the tones have been so influenced by the prefixes that our analysis of them still lags far behind our analysis of the finals. In the above set of terms, however, the only problems <u>in re</u> initials concern the aspiration or lack of aspiration, voicing or unvoicing, of the stop initials of *p'i, *p'u, *p'a, and *k'u. Kukish has *pi gN and *pu gF,

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but initial aspiration is not well preserved in this group. Mikir has p'i gH, p'u gF, hu < *k'u HB, but po < *pa F. Meithei, which ordinarily preserves aspiration, has pu gF, pa F, and hu F1 (< HB). Kachin has hu HF (< HB) rather than the anticipated *k'u, and Burmese has (ata-)hui oB rather than *k'ui. Tibetan has p'yi gL, p'a F, and k'u FB (< HB), while both Tibetan and Kachin have p'u oB (< gF). It may be that one or more of these roots had a sonant rather than a surd initial. Initial g-, a rare element in our comparative material, is perhaps indicated for the HB root (*gu ~ *g'u), but at present nothing definite can be said on this point.

Only one of the above terms is uncertain as regards final, viz. *ni FS1. Classical Tibetan has no rather than *ni, and Meithei has nem ~ ne rather than *ni, both of which point to an archaic form *nei rather than *ni. The weight of evidence, however, speaks in favor of the reconstruction *ni, from which *nei may have been developed as a doublet root; cf. Kukish *nun yBb, *nou "young, tender", which tend to be confused (vide pt. 15).

The basic gF terms *p'i and *p'u are found together in Garish, Mikir, Meithei, Nru, Kukish, and Burmish-Loloish (but p'e^3 gGF < *p'i in Burmese itself, which has a new term [p'we^3] for gE). The root *p'i is further retained in its basic meaning in Tibetan, Garauri (perhaps Tibetan loan-word), Bahing, and Vayu, while Chang has retained it in the meaning "gF". In northern TB groups the root *p'u has been applied

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to oB, viz. in Tibetan, Limbu, Newari (only in combination), Digaro, and Kachin. This semantic interchange also appears in Burmish-Loloish, viz. Moso p'u gF, bu oB, Nyi bu gF, pu oB. The interplay of surd and sonant initials in these Moso and Nyi forms indicates that doublets are involved. In Barish the root *p'i gW (in the form bi) has been applied to oSi, both in the Bodo-Dimasa and Garo divisions of this group, and also retained in its basic meaning. It is clear that these usages are connected with the especial position held by oSb, and that the gP terms function here simply as honorifics. Other TB roots, less widely distributed than the above, show the same type of semantic shift (vide infra). In societies with a patrilineal bias it is only natural that the role of oB should be of more significance than that of oSi, thus perhaps accounting for the relative stability of *p'i as compared with *p'u. It can hardly be without significance that in the single matrilineal group encountered (Barish) the term *p'i gW should have been applied to oSi, in contrast to all other TB groups.

Of the two basic P terms *p'a F and *ma Z, the former is the most widely distributed and shows fewer variations. The following groups have this root (*p'a): Tibetan, Kanauri, Byangsi, Bahing, Vayu, Newari, Lepcha, Miri, Dhimal, Burmish-Loloish, Konyak, Barish, Mikir, Meithei, Kru, and Kukish. This root commonly appears as a masculine affix, but no instance of a transference to "oB" has been uncovered. The

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root *ma M appears in Tibetan, Kanauri, Baking, Vayu, Newari, Lepcha, Dhimal, Burmish-Loloish, Barish, and Meithei. In Burmese itself it is retained only in the terms ma' Si and a-ma' "feminine suffix", and in the closely-related Maru only in the meaning "MSi". Yru has preserved this root only in the feminine suffix -ma. A transference to the meaning "oSi" is found in the contiguous North Assam groups Dafla and Aka. In Kachin and the extensive Kukish group this root appears to have vanished without leaving a trace.

The two PSb terms *ni and *k'u are also unequally represented in Tibeto-Burman. The root *ni FSi is of almost universal occurrence. In its basic meaning it appears in Tibetan, Gyarung, Kanauri, Thebor, Vayu, Newari, Abor-Miri, Nung, Burmish-Loloish (but not in Burmese itself), Konyak, Barish, Mikir, Meithei, and Kukish. Kachin has retained it only in the affinal meaning "WM". Aka, if we can trust our inadequate sources, has applied this root to M, while Limbu has applied it to oSi. Replacement by the term for "oSi" is seen in Dafla, Sho, Changki (Ao), and probably Kadu, while Mongsen (Ao) shows replacement by the term for "oSb". The Dafla material indicates that this is an analytical development ("oSi of F"). Lepcha equates FSi with MSi in the term nyu ~ nyo, applied to female relatives in the uterine line. This unusual equation also appears in Baking, which has mo-mo MSi,FSi (from mo < *ma M), and po-po FB (from po < *pa F), yet has ku-ku MB. Distinct terms have been

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developed in Kachin (mui), which preserves *mi as an affinal term (WM), and in Burmese (mi³), but *mi is retained in the closely related Maru. The Dimasa term de-de FSi (be-de MS) is likewise distinct.

The much more restricted root *k'u MB is found in its primary meaning in Bahing, Vayu, Abor-Miri, Dafla, Digaro, Mung, Mikir, and Ao. Tibetan has k'u FB, but skui < *k'u F1,B1. Himalayish and Lepcha also have k'u FB, probably because of Tibetan influence. Kachin, Meithei, Mtenyi Rengma, and Anyo Rengma have retained the term in the affinal meaning "HF" (Meithei F2), and Sema in the affinal meaning "FSiH". Chang (Konyak) has the form ko MB, which cannot with certainty be connected with this root. In the Burmish-Loloish group we can cite only Burmese kui "prefix used with names of persons older or of higher rank than the speaker, or politely of his equals" (ats-kui oB), Akha a-kö B, Ahi kö-pu-li ySiH, and Moso a-gu B1. The Moso usage is paralleled in the Barish group, where we find Bodo gu-mai, Garo gu-ma B1. This root cannot be traced in the Kuki languages proper, yet can be reconstructed for Kukish on the basis of the Naga terms (supra), and for Kukis in general on the basis of the Mikir and Meithei terms.

The root *nau ySb, occasionally applied either to yB or ySi alone, also to Ch, is well represented in Tibeto-Burman. It appears in the following groups: Tibetan (nu ∼ no), Byangsi (yB), Limbu, Lepcha, Aka, Kachin, Konyak, Barish (ySi), Meithei, Mru (yB), and Kukish (ySb ∼ Ch). The most conspicuous gaps are those in Abor-Miri-Dafla, Mung, and Burmish-Loloish.

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The eighth and last of the basic consanguineal terms is *sa Ch, which is found in Tsangla, Magari, Miju, Aka, Kachin, Kadu, Nung (sa-mi D), Pyu, Burmish-Loloish, Konyak, Barish, Nikir, Meithei, Mru, and Kukish (rarely used for ySb, as in Poeron and Kyaw). Lepcha has a-so < *sa ggF, a-son gCh (with suffixed -n). This root is conspicuously absent in Tibetan and its dialects (but present in Tsangla, a Bodish language), Himalayish, and Kiranti, i.e. the northern or northwestern band of Tibeto-Burman languages, as well as in the Abor-Miri-Dafla group.

The affinal term *mak Sl appears in Tibetan, Lepcha (< *smak), Dhimal (< *smak), Miri, Kachin (da-sa < *da-mak), Burmese (sa-mak), Meithei, Mru, and Kukish, with an additional uncertain occurrence in Byangsi. In view of our generally inadequate data on affinal nomenclatures (e.g. we do not have the term for "Sl" in Nung, where we should expect to find this root), the widespread distribution of this root is of increased significance. It would appear that the root is lacking in Himalayish, Nikir, Konyak, and Barish.

The above set of basic terms is supplemented by a series of roots of restricted distribution. Some of these serve mainly as replacements for the basic roots, while others are functionally more independent. Since our set of basic terms is not complete, we must assume that some of these roots represent archaic Tibeto-Burman elements, but this point is best discussed after the various secondary roots have been analyzed.

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The gP roots *p'i gM and *p'u gF have no serious rivals in Tibeto-Burman. A curious link between Tibetan and Southern Kuki is suggested by the following set of terms: Tib. po ~ spo gF (literary or dialectical), rmo gM (literary), and Sho a-pŏ ~ a-pŏk gF, Chinbon ka-mo gM, Yindu ka-mo gF. A possible root *si is indicated by Balti as-si (= a-si) ggM, Nung a-si gM, Khami a-um-si gP, and Kadu a-si MSi (i-si "woman"), Yindu ka-si FSi, Sho a-si FSi, cSi (cf. the roots *ta and *tei, infra). In general, gP terms show more variation than do P terms; thus, Kachin has developed distinct terms for both gM (woi) and gP (ji), and note forms such as Byangsi ti-ti gF, Bahing and Vayu ki-ki gF.

The most conspicuous of the secondary P roots is *nu M, which appears in Kachin, Miju, Sak, Konyak, Kukish, and perhaps Mikir and Meithei (in combination). The root *pui "mother, female" is restricted to Mikir and Kukish. The Kukish feminine affix *la, used especially of young females, seems to have given rise to Mongsen-Changki (Ao) a-la M, Ntenyi Rengma a-la ggM, Anyo Rengma a-la gM, and cf. Byangsi la-la gM, Sunwari a-la Si. The same root (*la) appears in Kachin, Burmish-Loloish, and elsewhere as a masculine affix. The Tibeto-Burman root *wa "male" serves to explain both Bunan and Kachin wa, Kadu a-wa, Garo (dialects of A type) a-wa F (Moshang and Ramsang wa F probably through Kachin influence), Aka au < *a-wa F, Burmese wa-kri^3 "term of address to old men" (Arakanese dialect), and Lepcha a-wo < *wa, Meithei (ma-)wa, Kukish wa H; cf. also Digaro ma-wa "male",

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Bhimal -ma "masculine suffix", Bodo hma "male". Some of these forms, however, may have resulted from a phonetic development from *p'a F (probably via *ba).

A root *mei or *me appears sporadically in Tibeto-Burman, sometimes with a dental suffix. This root is parallel to, but distinct from, TB *ma M. The following forms belong here: Tibetan -med "woman" (in bud-med < *bu-med, paralleling bu-mmd), Gyarung te-mi ~ te-me "woman", Kanauri -med (suffix in "D" and "Ml"), Chamba Lahuli me "bitch", Limbu met W, Lepcha a-mit "woman", Kadu a-me M, Rung a-me M (cf. Rung a-p'e F), Burmese a-mi^{3} ~ a-me M, and Garo me-sik "woman, wife". Note also the series formed by Burmese sa-mi^{3}, Akha sa-mi, Rung za-mi D (from *sa Ch). Garo gi-me Bl, Mikir me SiH correspond phonetically but seem scarcely to be fitted in otherwise.

In addition to the above, there are traces of a set of roots *ya and *yu, both applied to female relatives. The former is better attested than the latter; cf. Himalayish (Kanashi, Kanashi, Chamba Lahuli) ya M, Abor-Miri and Dafla yo < *ya gM (but in Pagri Miri used for "M" in address), Tshileng (Konyak group) ya M, Naga *ya M, also Kanauri yas, Rai (Kiranti) me-ya, Burmese ma-ya^{3} W, Digaro mi-ya "woman", ha-mi-ya W. The root *yu is represented only by Kanauri ya-med, Khambu (Kiranti) yuh, Lepcha a-yu W, Lepcha tk-yu "woman", and perhaps Tibetan yu-mo "female of a stag".

Nothing has yet been said of oSb terms, which show a wide variety of forms contrasting with the standard ySb root (*mau)

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Much of the material in this connection is of a scattered nature from which it is difficult to draw any conclusions. Thus, Byangsi hpa, Bahing ya oB, Maithei ya-ma oB, Chawte (Old Kuki) a-ya B, ai-ya oSi, and Khami ya-at ~ ya-i oB suggest an archaic root *ya oB, yet this same element appears in another setting (supra). Burmese ata-kui < *ik-kui oB, Mikir ik oB lack cognates elsewhere, as do Maru pai oSi, Chonbok pai oSi(ws), unless the latter pair be connected with Burmese a-pai "madam" and perhaps Mikir pei ~ pe M. The characteristic Kukish root u oSb (Central, Northern, and Old Kuki groups only) does not appear elsewhere in this setting, yet appears to be identical to Sha ü M, Taungtha u W, Mru u M, and Burmese u^3 MB (prefixed to names of men considerably older than the speaker), perhaps also Tangkhul a-wŏ gF,MB.

Three or four roots, however, stand out more prominently than the above lot and deserve especial consideration. Tibetan c'e oSi(ws) has been compared with Himalayish *c'e "female" as represented by Kanauri c'ets "female, woman", Kanashi c'ets W (with diminutive suffix -ts) and with the Byangsi-Chaudangsi term c'e xC, as well as with Johar a-ce F" The above terms all point to a TB root *c'ei. A similar root, but apparently with unaspirated initial (*cei), is represented by Konyak jei ~ cei oSb ~ oB, Maithei ce oSi, Tangkhul cei oSb, Western Kuki *cei oSb, Anyo Rangma a-ce oSb. The Tibetan term appears to be etymologically connected with the word c'e-ba "great", from which the respectful term gcen-po oB has been developed.

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A root *na oS1 appears in Murmi, Vayu, Kachin, Andro, and Konyak, while the Aluaru and Abor-Miri-Dafla groups have *na M, and Lakher has the vocative term i-na M. Tibetan mna D1 perhaps also belongs here, though it may be of periphrastic origin (< mna "oath").

The Tibeto-Burman root *ta (often in the form da) is consistently applied to relatives older than Ego, if one regards the Bahing-Vayu root *ta CR as of distinct origin. The following terms can be grouped with this root: Tibetan 'a-ta F (dialectical), oB (Eastern Tibet), Tsangla a-ta oB, Gyarung a-ta-ta F, Johar a-ta oS1, Byangsi ta-ta oS1, Newari ta-ta oS1, Miri and Dafla a-te < *ta gF, Digaro ta gF, da oB, Burmese t'a^3-t'a^3 F (dialectical), Akha a-ta F, Independent Lolo a-ta F, Sho a-ta oB, Ghinbon (ha-)t'a oB, Lhota o-ta oSb, Changhi (Ao) a-ta PS1,oS1, Naong Rengma a-da FoB. Doublet forms are found only in Digaro (ta gF, da oB). Unlike *p'u gF,oB this root has also been applied to F in some languages (Tibetan, Gyarung, Burmese, Akha). Desgodins describes the Tibetan term 'a-ta as a "children's word" (vox puerorum), and in Independent Lolo a distinction is made between a-ta F (used by children) and a-bu ~ a-bo F (used by adults).

Kanauri to-te gF, a-te oB are clearly of a type paralleling that described above. The suggested TB root is *tei, with which can be grouped Byangsi te-te zC(es), Dafla tĕ-tĕ FyB,oB (in different sources), Kadu a-te oS1, Banpara a-tai oB, Nikir te oS1(ws), Meithei i-tei-ma oS1l, and Kru a-tai BW.

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An objection might be raised to the above discussion on the ground that forms such as *na, *ta, and *tai (te) are of "nursery word" type and should not be regarded as representing actual TB roots. The writer himself originally ascribed to this general point of view, but the collection of material on which this study is based has led him to discard it. Thus, ta F appears both in the West Tibetan dialects (Balti, Purik) and in the nomad dialects of Eastern Tibet, as well as in the aberrant Gyarung language, whence we can safely infer a Bodish root *ta F. The term na oSi appears in five distinct languages representing two different foci (Murmi-Vayu and Kachin-Andro-Konyak), and na M in two isolated groups (Almora and Abor-Miri-Dafla). Distributions of this type are scattered, to be sure, yet not entirely random. The cluster of connotations (gP,P,oSb) around these roots is also not without significance.

The majority of the terms for Sb(ds) are of limited distribution. Tibetan sring-mo Si(ms), dialectically used for ySi, appears also in Himalayish (Si) and Byangsi (ySi), with an additional possible occurrence in Dhimal-Toto (Si). Kachin jan < *jar Si(ms), often used for ySi, is directly related to Kukish *dzar Si(ms), which in Western Kuki is used for ySi, and to Meithei i-cel ~ i-can ySi, Kadu sen, Sengmai cǐl ySi. Kachin yung B(ws) has been compared with the Garo-Dimasa root *yung yB. The tendency to equate Sb(ds) with ySb is reflected in all three roots.

The roots *nau ySb and *za Ch are of almost universal occurrence and have no serious rivals. The former is

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conspicuously absent in Burmish-Loloish, which has a root *nyi (ní), comparable with Lepcha nyi-t'i gCh. A root *nga is suggested by Murmi and Gurung a-nga ySi, Miri ăng-ă ySb, Dafla ang-a Ch, Naga *nga Ch. Isolated roots *a Ch and *ka Ch are represented by Digaro a, Abor-Miri o < a Ch, and Newari ko, Abor-Miri ko < *ka Ch, respectively.

It will be noted that the set of basic terms presented above lacks all collateral terms as well as a gCh term. Our data on collateral terms are incomplete for many groups, so that negative evidence here is of relatively little value, but it would seem that no root or roots for xC have been developed. The only root of any extension here is *ning, which appears in Kachin (xCe,ws), Chang (xC), Mikir BW(ws), and perhaps Garo (Sbl). The Mikir and Garo affinal meanings can be explained in terms of cross-cousin marriage.

Three or perhaps four TB roots show a tendency to equate N with gCh. Tibetan ts'a Ne (probably SiS,ms),gCh furnishes an example of this tendency. Bahing and Newari have this root (*ts'a) in the meaning "gS", but in the Kiranti languages in general it is used for "S" (see the discussion in pt. 4). Kanauri c'ad Sl (with suffixed -d) has been brought into comparison via SiS(ms), equated with Sl under cross-cousin marriage. Kachin ts'a MB,MBS(ws) can be explained only on the basis of a reciprocal development from SiS(ms). Mikir c-sa SiS(ms),Sl shows an ideal agreement on the semantic side, but the comparison is phonetically dubious. The root *ts'a appears to be lacking in other groups.

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The roots *su and *tu have distributions which are almost, if not quite, mutually exclusive. *Su gCh appears in Kachin, Bodo, Mikir, and Meithei, while *tu appears in Nung (N), Burmish-Loloish (xN), and Kukish (FSiCh,SiCh,ms,gCh). Anu, a Southern Kuki language, has su xC,ySi(ws),SiCh(ws),gCh, and a-su-lai SiCh(ms), covering much the same ground as Kukish *tu. The roots *su and *tu must be regarded as distinct on general phonetic grounds, and this view is strengthened by the evidence from Meithei, which has i-su gCh as well as (ma-)tu W (cf. the Kuki use of *tu in the meaning "Sl", through cross-cousin marriage). The root *su is perhaps also represented in the Naga languages, in much the same setting as Anu su, viz. Angami cu ~ tsu FSiS,ySiS(ms),gS, Nzong Rengma a-cu-gü, Ntenyi Rengma a-zu-wa, Anyo Rengma a-zü FSiCh,SiCh(ms),gCh, but our knowledge of Naga phonology is not sufficiently advanced to establish this comparison.

A fourth root of the same general type is *ma-li, which is found in Nung (gCh), Burmish-Loloish (gCh), Pyu (gCh), Chang (xN), Garo (SiS,ms), Mikir (xN, probably BCh,ws), and has an additional cognate in Kachin (ma-li "young man"). This root is in general lacking in Kukish, but may be represented by Taungtha lwi Ne,Ni and Yindu (ka-)li BD(ws). It cannot be traced in Tibetan or any of the northern languages.

The affinal root corresponding to *mak Sl is perhaps *nam Dl, but the evidence for the latter root is not altogether satisfactory. Lepcha has nyom < *snam Dl paralleling myok < *smak Sl, and s- prefixed forms are also represented by

SA Kanauri stem < *snem (probably for snăm) D1, and Barish
601 *snam D1 (based on Dimasa ba-ham, Garo nam). Cf. also
193 Gyarung snom < *snam S1, Burmese hnam < *snam ySi(ms)
197 (inferred from mong-hnam "H and W", where mong means "yB,wa"),
ST Lashi tu-nam D1, nam-mo ySi(ms), Nyi nŏ-mo < *nam-mo ySi(ms),
601 and Lushei hnăm < *snăm "clan". The unprefixed form appears
193 in Byangsi nam-sia D1, Kachin nam D1,ySi1, and Nung nam Sb,
197 while Lepcha has both nyom < *snam D1 and nom < *nam oSi.
Magari ar-năm "girl" also belongs in this series.

Of more restricted distribution are the roots *mou D1, represented by Kukish mou (Lushei mo), Meithei i-mau, and perhaps Tibetan mo "woman", and *k'rwi S1, represented by Kachin k'ri S1,SiCh(ms), Burmese k'rwe^{3}-ma^{1} < *k'rwi^{3}-ma^{1}, Lisu c'i-ma D1 (with feminine suffix -ma), and perhaps Lepcha tă-gri "male". The original meanings of these roots may have been simply "female" and "male", respectively.

There remain for consideration a few poorly represented roots connected primarily with the PSb nomenclature. Nung a-tsim MSi is comparable with Tsangla a-tim, id., and Nung a-wang FB with Garo a-wang FyB, also Lashi vang-mo HF,FoSiH, Maru vung ~ vun HF,FSiH (but the Lashi and Maru terms suggest a meaning "MB" rather than "FB"). The *wang series is perhaps connected with Tibetan 'a-bang FSiH,MSiH (literary), Limbu (am-)pang-a "uncle", Vayu pong-pong < *pang-pang FB.

Tibetan sru MSi has been compared with Kanauri and Chamba Lahuli ru F1, Pyu sru "relatives", and the reconstructed

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Lolo root *ru MB. If these terms actually constitute a true series, we must reconstruct a root *sru ~ *ru "mother's relatives" (neuter), whence Kanauri ru F1 < MB through cross-cousin marriage, paralleling Kanauri c'ad S1 < SiS(ms). The presence of this root in Pyu, at approximately the year A.D. 1000, lends some weight to this view.

The fourth Tibetan PSb term, viz. ʾa-žang MB, is found in this form in Thebor and Lepcha, where it must be regarded as a loan-word, but not elsewhere. This form can be derived from an original *srang and thus compared with Mru ta-rang FSiH,HF, Kukish ta-rang ~ ma-rang, id., and probably Lhota o-nrã, Changki (Ao) (kŭ-)hram B1(ws). Burmese a-hrang < *srang (archaic spelling is a-hsyang) "lord, master" also perhaps belongs here rather than with sring-mo S1 (supra). The writer has long suspected that Tibetan initial ž- and š- have in many instances been derived from zr- and sr-, respectively, partly because of the general instability of these clusters in Tibetan (cf. srab-srib ~ hrab-hrib ~ rab-rib "dim, obscure"), and partly on the basis of comparative material, viz. Tib. šig "louse", Bunan šrig, Lushei hrik < *srik; Tib. žag "day (24 hours)", Burmese rak, id.; Tib. šags "joke, jest" (in sense of "ridicule"), Bunan šrag "shame", Burmese hrak < *srak "to be ashamed". The root *-rang (prefixed) must have had a generalized honorific force (still retained in Burmese), and thus was admirably suited as a periphrastic term either for MB or for FSiH,HF (= MB under cross-cousin marriage).

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Having completed our review of Tibeto-Burman kinship roots, we are now faced with the problem of fixing the basic pattern of nomenclature for this linguistic family. The terms designating relatives in the central line of descent naturally form the most stable segment of the nomenclature, while the collateral terms show an intermediate, and the affinal terms a maximum, amount of variation.

Within this stable core of nomenclature we are able to distinguish two primary gP terms (gM and gF), two primary P terms (M and F), a neuter yGb term, and a neuter Ch term. The two neuter terms are often employed in a masculine sense (yB and S), with sex affixes used in forming the corresponding feminine terms (yBi and D), e.g. Tibetan bu S, bu-mo D, Burmese sa^3 S, $sa-mi^3$ D. No neuter P terms have been uncovered, but Chang has a neuter gP term (a-pi < ap'i gM) used only in address, and a neuter gP term is also found in Sema (a-pu-sa), and in the Southern Naki language Sho (a-pó) and Ayaing Khami (a-um-si). Three Southern Naki languages (Chinbok, Yindu, Anu) make a distinction between FM and MM, but have a single term for gP (Anu FM < M, MM < gM). Four gP terms appear only in rare instances, and are never all primary. Both Tibetan and Kanauri show traces of three or four gP terms, but Kanauri has probably borrowed one or more of its gP terms from Tibetan, and the Tibetan material itself can be interpreted in more than one way. Kachin seems to employ four gP terms, perhaps because of Shan influence, but has only two primary terms (ji gF and woi gM). Garo distinguishes

SA between "gP" (= FF) and "gM" (= FM), and "my gF" (= MF) and
601 "my gM" (= MM), if we can trust our sources for this language.
193 In view of the fact that the Garo are a matrilineal group,
197 this point is of some interest. Chang, which uses the neuter
ST term a-pi gP in address, employs four terms in reference, the
601 FF and FM terms being formed through affixed sex elements,
193 and the MF and MM terms through analysis. Finally, Laiyo,
197 which has an almost exclusively analytical nomenclature,
employs four analytical gP terms.

A number of different arrangements of Sb terms have been encountered. Age distinctions appear everywhere and are, in general, more prominent than sex distinctions. Despite this, however, it would appear that the basic pattern has two primary terms for oB and oSi, contrasting with the single neuter ySb term (*mzu). As has been shown above, the widespread tendency to equate oB and oSi with terms for relatives of ascending generations has obscured the general picture here and has made analysis almost impossible. The simplest possible arrangement (oSb and ySb) has been found only in Khami (Ayaing and Awa) and Angu Rengma. A single primary term for oSb appears also in Kuki proper (u) and in Burmese (ate-), but Burmish-Loloish in general has two primary oSb terms. Nzong Rengma shows a complete reversal of the ordinary pattern, with terms for oSb, yB, and ySi. Tibetan, Lepcha, Dafla, Kachin, Aka, Liau, Chang, Chinbon, Ao and probably other less accurately recorded languages have what appears to be the basic arrangement, viz. oB, oSi, and ySb (three primary

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terms). The Barish languages in general employ the root *nau ySb in the meaning "ySi" and have developed a new term for yB (perhaps connected with the Kachin term for B,ws), while Meithei reverses this process in employing *nau for "yB" and the Kukish root *dzar·Si(ms) for ySi. Simple terms for either B or Si are almost entirely lacking in Tibeto-Burman. Abor-Miri has terms for B and Si based on a root *buir (cf. a-buir "friend"), while in Dafla the cognate form *bŏr is used as the root for ySb, but note that Abor-Miri also possesses especial terms for oSb and ySb. Mikir kor Sb, like Abor-Miri buir, also has the more general meaning "friend".

Though the principle of age distinctions can be established as a basic feature of Tibeto-Burman kinship terminology, the status of sex-of-speaker distinctions is not so readily settled. We are handicapped here by the fact that most of our sources can not be depended upon in showing non-European distinctions of this type, and that negative evidence is therefore of little value. Distinct terms for Si(ms) and B(ws) are found in Tibetan, Kachin, Lushei and Lakher (and probably other Kuki languages), and Angami. Lushei and Lakher also have a distinct term (of periphrastic origin) for Si(ws). In Burmese and Nyi the distinction is applied only to ySb, viz. Burmese yB(ms), yB(ws),ySi(ws),ySi(ms), Nyi ySb(ms),yB(ws),ySi(ms), and Maru, in the same linguistic group, has a distinct term for yB(ws). Mikir distinguishes between oSi(ms) and oSi(ws), and has a distinct term for B(ws). Chinbok and Yindu, in the Southern

SA 601 193 197 ST 601 193 197 Bahi group, have a full set of eight Sb terms, showing complete distinctions both for age and for sex-of-speaker. The Chinbok system can be reduced to five primary terms, viz. pai oSi(ws), pwo oS(ms), mau ySb(ss), be Si(ms), and beng B(ws), i.e. the Tibetan-Kachin arrangement. Sex of speaker appears not to be distinguished in Kanauri, Abor-Miri, Dafla, Barish, Meithei, and some other languages, but our sources, as mentioned above, are not of the most dependable sort. In view of the weight of evidence above, from such key languages as Tibetan, Kachin, Burmese, Mikir, and Lushei, the writer is inclined to regard the sex-of-speaker distinction as an archaic Tibeto-Burman feature.

Despite the fact that no single gCh root can with certainty be reconstructed for Tibeto-Burman, one can surely regard the presence of a primary gCh term as a basic feature for this linguistic family. Aside from the tendency to equate gCh with N or C (vide infra), it can be stated that most Tibeto-Burman languages have a distinct, usually primary, term for gCh, e.g. Kachin ǰu, Burmese mre^{3}, Byangsi k'we, Newari e'ay, Lepcha a-son, Chang ǰi, Garo and Mikir su, Meithei i-su. If a single gCh root must be predicated, TB *su must be regarded as the most likely selection. Equations of gCh other than with N are exceptional, but note Sema a-nu gCh = Ch(< TB *nau ySb).

The above discussion is resumed in the following diagram:

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Tibeto-Burman Basic Pattern

gM (*p'i)		gF (*p'u)
M (*ma)		F (*p'a)
oS1(ws)		oB(ms)
S1(ms)	y3b (*nau)	B(ws)
	Ch (*za)	
	gCh	

It would be a rather hazardous undertaking to attempt any general explanation of the pattern outlined above in terms of sociological factors. A broad theory of this type must be based on a comprehensive comparative survey of Tibeto-Burman with a number of other groups, and as such lies outside the scope of the present study. Many of the variations from this pattern are undoubtedly significant, but they involve those elusive culturo-linguistic intangibles which do not lend themselves to arm-chair analysis. It is only in the collateral and affinal nomenclatures that obvious cultural correlations are available, and it is these that the writer proposes to consider in some detail.

The distinction between cross (FS1 and MB) and parallel (FB and MS1) FSb terms is almost universal in Tibeto-Burman. No instances of an equation of FB with MB have been encountered, but FS1 and MS1 are equated in Bahing, Lepcha, and Chinbon, if we can trust our sources. Note that Lepcha also equates xC with pC, and that cross-cousin marriage is forbidden in this tribe.

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The parallel FB and MSi terms are usually either equated with the F and M terms (as in Chang, Lushei, Angami, Sema) or are based on these terms, with the addition of elements meaning "big" and "little" or the like. In other words, age distinctions are made in the parallel PSb terms precisely as in the Sb terms, though with categorical rather than primary elements. By way of contrast, the cross PSb terms seldom show these age distinctions, but note Burmese u^{3}-ri^{3} MoB (cf. a-ri^{3} FSi), u^{3}-mang^{3} MyB, Chinbok pu-srǒ MoB (= gF), pu-ko MyB (these distinctions are typical of Southern Kuki in general). Some of the more characteristic examples of age distinctions in FB terms are listed below:

Language	FoB	FyB
Balti	a-ta ts'ar-ma	a-ta tsun-tso
Lepcha	a-bo-tim	a-bo-cum
Kachin	wa-di	wa-doi
Burmese	p'ă-kri^{3}	p'ŭ-t'we^{3}
Nyi	a-ba-giä	a-ba-ʎə
Haka	pa-u	pa-nau
Siyin	pa-lien	pa-no
Chinbon	pa k-dŏm	pa k-cwi
Tangkhul	a-va k'ŭ-rŏr	a-va ka-tui
Lhota	o-po-ra-mo	o-po-ro

One occasionally encounters what seem to be primary terms for FB or MSi, but most of these can be explained on the basis of ellipsis, e.g. Maru t'ong MySi but mye-t'ang MySi,

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p'a-t'ang FyB in the closely related Lashi language; Bodo a-yong FoB and a-doi FyB, but ma-yong MoSi and ma-doi MySi; Nsong Rengma a-nyo FyB (nyo Ch), and perhaps Changki (Ao) a-sa FyB < *za Ch. Kanauri has a curious diminutive formation, viz. a-mats MSi < a-ma, and a-pats FB < a-pa. Tibetan and Nung, however, appear to have four true PSb terms. The Nung terms a-tsim MSi and a-wang FB have been compared with Tsangla a-zim MSi and Garo a-wang FyB, respectively. The Tibetan term sru MSi seems to have been derived from a root with the generalized meaning "mother's relatives", or "member of mother's clan, first ascending generation". Tibetan k'u FB, it can now be stated, has been developed from the TB root *k'u MB, and the Himalayish and Lepcha employment of this term in its Tibetan setting must be credited to Tibetan influence, which is conspicuous in both of these areas. Tibetan skud < *k'u Fl,Bl is to be explained in terms of xC marriage and the equation of WB with WF, as elsewhere in Tibeto-Burman. Tibetan 'a-ne FSi,MBW further fits into this picture. In Himalayish, Kanauri ru Fl < *sru MSb, and c'ad Sl < *ts'a SiS(ms) suggest a like reconstruction. We have some material on xC marriage in the Tibetan area, but the term skud itself is, for the writer, the most significant single piece of evidence. Those who minimize the value of linguistic "fossils" in general might well take note of this term.

The semantic shift FB < MB in the Tibetan term k'u still requires explanation. Elsewhere in Tibeto-Burman the term has

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been demoted to affinal rank or dropped altogether, but nowhere else has it been applied to FB. Now there is but one marital feature in which the Tibetan area (including the Kanauri group of Himalayish) significantly differs from the remaining Tibeto-Burman area, viz. polyandry. Fraternal polyandry of Tibetan type is practised by the Kanauri, almost certainly through Tibetan influence, since this custom is explicitly stated to be absent among the Almora peoples (Byangsi, Chaudangsi, Johar). Among the Lepcha polyandry is an abnormal trait and can unhesitatingly be assigned a Tibetan origin. Among other Tibeto-Burman group for which we have any record, polyandry either is said to be lacking or is simply not mentioned. Since Tibetan polyandry is of fraternal type, the importance of FB can readily be understood. It would seem that the MB term, which is unstable in most TB groups, was first replaced by the honorific term ʾa-ʿang and later applied to FB. The collective term skud-po F1,B1, having already been semantically specialized in an affinal sense, was naturally retained.

Primary cross PSb terms are basic TB features, and are represented by the roots *ni FSi and *k'u MB. The first of these two terms, however, is much more stable than the second, and significantly so (if statistically treated). Thus, Tibetan has transferred the MB term to FB and used an honorific for MB; Burmish-Loloish has retained the MB term only as an honorific applied to oB (in Burmese) or as an affinal term

SA (Ahi, Moso) and has developed new terms for MB (Burmese u^{3},
601 Lolo *ru); the Kuki languages proper have dropped the MB term
193 altogether and equated MB with gF; in the Naga group the MB
197 term has been preserved in its original setting only in Ao,
ST while in Rongma and Sema it has been retained only in the
601 affinal nomenclature. All of these groups, however, have the
193 root *ni FSi in its original setting. Burmese (but not
197 Burmish-Loloish) has replaced both the FSi and MB terms and dropped the former altogether, while Kachin has retained both terms only in its affinal nomenclature. The relatively greater stability of the FSi term is also evident in the borrowings made by various TB groups (infra).

This "differential variability" in the FSi and MB terms must be viewed in connection with the affinal application of these terms and the whole problem of cross-cousin marriage. Under bilateral xC marriage MB becomes Fl, and FSi becomes Ml, and it is not unlikely that honorific terms should become associated with these socially "pivotal" relationships. The fact that the MB=Fl term is more susceptible to this process than is the FSi=Ml term merely reflects the general patrilineal bias of Tibeto-Burman societies. The equation of MB with gP, which plays so prominent a role in Kukish, represents one aspect of this whole development, but teknonymy may also be a factor here ("Fl" designated as "gF of my son"). Teknonymy is hardly typical of Tibeto-Burman yet does occasionally occur. Lepcha, for example, employs a-bo F for Fl

SA 601 193 197 ST 601 193 197 where the couple are childless, but t'i-kung gF after the birth of a child, and the descriptive term a-fyat Fl has been derived from an original *sput, which in turn represents a morphological development from the TB root *p'u gF. Vayu ca-k'i Fl appears to be a combination of co < *ca Ch and ki-ki gF. Lahu, in the Southern Lolo group, has a-p'u gF = Fl, a-p'i gM = Ml, and Ahi, in the Northern Lolo group, has zu-p'o WF, also "paternal ancestor". The Chang Sbl terms are of teknonymous origin, e.g. hau-ko Bl(ms) = "his MB", but the Chang Fl terms are simply Fl = MB and Ml = FSi. Chinbon equates WF with gF, and WM with gM (rather than with MB and MBW, as in most Kuki languages), but retains the Kuki pattern in the HM and HF terms (HF = FSi, and especial term for HF), i.e. the teknonymous (or honorific) terms are employed only by the husband. The Mirish languages (Abor, Miri, Dafla) afford the best illustration of teknonymy. In Miri the terms a-bu and a-nǎ are used for F and M, respectively, but in the closely related Abor language these terms are applied to gF and gM, though ta-ta (Miri to-to gF) is retained as the vocative term for gF. In this instance the child has taken over his parents' terms ("reverse teknonymy") rather than the parent his childrens' terms. Abor also uses the vocative gF term (ta-ta) for Fl, while Miri equates Fl either with gF or with MB, and Ml either with gM or with FSi (the equations with MB and FSi are probably only descriptive, though this is not stated in our sources). Dafla equates Ml with gM, probably also Fl with gF.

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Under a system of bilateral xC marriage we should expect to find both WF and HF equated with MB, and both WM and HM equated with FSi. This condition is fulfilled in Byangsi and Abor-Miri, where this type of marriage is in vogue. The terminological equation also appears, however, in Nung, Chang, Sema, Nzong Rengma, and Lhota, for all of which preferential MBD marriage is indicated, and in Tangkhul and Angami, for which xC marriage cannot be established.

A system of unilateral xC marriage with MBD should lead to the equation of WF with MB, HM with FSi, and separate terms for HF and WM, as well as distinctions between FSiH and MB, MBW and FSi. Kachin fulfills all these conditions admirably, with unilateral xC marriage coupled with the terminological equations indicated above. The same can be said for the Kuki pattern, as illustrated in Lakher, Thado, Chawte, Tarau, as well as in Mru and Khami, viz. WF = MB, WM = MBW, HM = FSi, HF = FSiH. Unilateral MBD marriage is found among the Thado, Chiru, Anal, Aimol, Purum, and probably the Anal, Shs, and Khami. In Thado this nomenclature is employed only where MBD marriage has actually occurred, P terms being employed under other conditions.

Ntenyi and Anyo Rengma have an intermediate type, with M1 = FSi but WF = MB and a distinct term for HF, but in both languages the MB term is sometimes applied to HF as well as to WF. The closely related Nzong Rengma has a single term for F1 (WF, HF = MB), but retains a distinct term for FSiH. Sema has the same scheme as Nzong Rengma. The Sema term for FSiH,

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furthermore, is cognate with the Ntenyi and Anyo Rengma term for HF, and in Ao the same term appears in its original setting (MB). This Naga material thus shows various stages of the transformation of the affinal terminology through the development of unilateral xC marriage. The discrepancies found in Nung, Chang, and Lhota are perhaps more apparent than real, and in the case of Nung and Lhota, at any rate, our sources may be faulty. Even in these affinal features, however, we must expect to find a certain amount of disassociation, for we must allow for linguistic "lag", i.e. the simple scheme of equating F1 with MB and M1 with FSi tends to be perpetuated even where the development of a unilateral "skew" has rendered it theoretically illogical. This general point has been raised many times before, but will bear repetition in view of the fact that a number of modern theoreticians seem to object to this sort of reasoning.

It is fairly evident that the abandonment of xC marriage as an instutionalized norm has in several different groups resulted in the disappearance of categorical equations. In Tibetan and Kanauri we have only the "fossilized" terms skud-po and ru, respectively, which require comparative studies for a full appraisal of their significance. In Lahul, however, where we have a hint of xC marriage, the equations F1= MB and M1= FSi are in evidence. In Burmese itself categorical equations are lacking, and here also we have no evidence of xC marriage, but the situation is reversed in Arakanese (Chaungtha).

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Maru and Lashi, which are of Burmese stock, equate M1 with FSi, WF with MB, and have a distinct term for FSiH, HF (as in Maong and Anyo Rengma). Kachin influence perhaps plays a role here, yet the Kachin distinguish between WM and HM, as is consistent with their unilateral xC marriage practice. Nyi, in the Northern Lolo group, has derived its terms for WF and WM from the terms for MB and FSi, respectively, plus the element mo "old", acting here as an honorific, while the Burmish-Loloish affinal root *yok is employed in the terms for HM and HF. Ahi seems to reverse this scheme, to judge from our faulty data on this language. For Lisu we have only what appear to be the vocative terms for F1 and M1 (ma-ma < a-ma M, ba-ba < a-ba F), and hence are not in a position to interpret this Lolo material. The use of respectful designations may be a complicating factor here; cf. Lushei pu-zon WF, pi-zon WM, conforming to the Kuki pattern (from pu MB and pi MBW plus an added element -zon), but pa HF (= F) and nu HM (= M), i.e. a woman equates her husband's relatives with her own blood kin.

Categorical equations in the P1 terms are present elsewhere, but our sources are often incomplete. Garo equates M1 with FSi, MBW, but has a distinct term for F1 (a-bu-di, perhaps "little gF"). Mikir equates WF with MB, WM with FSi (with or without the addition of an honorific suffix), and has a distinct term for HF. If we assume that HM (not given in our sources) is also equated with FSi, this system can be compared with that found in Rengma and Maru. Both Garo and Mikir have

SA 601 193 197 preferential MBD marriage. Meithei equates M1 with FSi, and has i-ku F1 < TB *k'u MB (the MB term is not known for sure, but may be the Indic loan-word māmā); the Meithei are not known to practice xC marriage.

ST 601 193 197 The rest of the collateral terminology (C and N terms) is even more poorly known than the PSb terminology, and presents even more serious problems. In view of the presence of basic TB roots for MB (*k'u) and FSi (*ni) one might expect to find one or more roots for xC, but such is hardly the case. The extension of Sb terms to include pC is practically universal and need not be examined in detail. The lack of especial xC terms is probably associated with the lack of xC marriage, but there are too many lacunae in our data to permit of any final judgment here. Tibetan apparently fails to distinguish between pC and xC, but Burmese perhaps has a distinct xC term (sa-ni^3-mrok-sa^3, lit. "D's spouse"!). By way of contrast, Chaungtha, one of the Arakanese dialects, has yauk-pa B1,xC corresponding to Burmese yok-p'a' B1(ms), in conformity with its equation of F1 with MB and M1 with FSi, i.e. an affinal term has "invaded" the consanguineal nomenclature.

Terms for xCe and xCi in conjunction with xC marriage are found in Byangsi-Chaudangsi, Abor-Miri, Lisu, and Chang, while Dafla has this terminological pattern but without data on xC marriage. Chang appears to have preferential MBD marriage, but the bilateral type is found among the others.

SA 601 193 197 ST 601 193 197 Byangsi-Chaudangsi makes a sex-of-speaker distinction, viz. xCi(ms), xCe(ws), xC(ss), and Abor-Miri makes an age distinction. None of the terms involved is associated with a PSb term or a N term. The Abor-Miri terms show "invasion" from the affinal terminology, as in Chaungtha, e.g. mag-bo xCe(os)= oB1,S1, from TB *mak S1. Note that in Byangsi-Chaudangsi, Abor-Miri, and Chang this xC pattern is associated with the simple P1= PSb categorical equations (for Lisu we lack full information on the P1 terms).

Cross-cousin terminologies of Omaha type are found in two primary <u>foci</u>, viz. Kachin and Kukish. The correlation between the Omaha nomenclature and patrilineal descent, one of the few widely accepted anthropological generalizations, obtains both among the Kachin and the various Kuki and Naga tribes. Of the Tibeto-Burman peoples only the Garo and Khasi, in the Barish group, are known to have matrilineal descent, and unfortunately we know nothing of the cousin terminology in use among these tribes. There is a hint of the Crow type of terminology in Bodo, also in the Barish group, but we cannot be sure that the Bodo reckon descent in the matrilineal line. Bodo (nang-)a-doi "(thy) oBCh", (a-)doi FyB show reciprocity, as has already been pointed out, but Bodo nam-ba-noi "(thy) SiS", (nang-)a-noi "(thy) SiD", and a-noi FSi cannot be explained on this basis and suggest rather the Crow pattern. It is greatly to be regretted that our Garo sources fail us at this critical point.

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The Kachin system, which is quite distinct from that found in Kukish, merits especial examination. The key terms are as follows:

Kachin Omaha Pattern

(Consanguineal)

moi	FSi	ts'a	MB,MBS(ws)
ning	xCi(ws)	k'au	xCe(ms)
k'ri	FSiD(ms),SiCh(ms)		
rat	MBD(oms)		
nam	MBD(yms),BCh(ws)		

(Affinal)

ni	WM,MBW,WBW	ku	HF,FSiH,HoB,oSiH(ws)
moi	HM	ts'a	WF,BWB(ws)
ning	HSi,BW(ws)	k'au	WB,SiH(ms)
nam	Dl,WySi,yBW(ms),WBCh	k'ri	Sl,HSiCh,FSiHSi
rat	WoSi,ySiH(ws),oBW(ms),HyB		

The main features of this system have already been discussed in pt. 7. It will be observed that the lineal equations characteristic of the Omaha pattern appear only in the terms for non-marriageable cross-cousins under the Kachin unilateral xC marriage arrangement, i.e. a man equates his (non-marriageable) FSiD with his SiCh, while a woman equates her (non-marriageable) MBS with her MB. The terms applied by a woman to her (marriageable) FSiS are not known, but a man equates his (marriageable) MBD with his WSi. Distinct terms are used by speakers of each sex for xC(ss).

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On the basis of comparative material, the terms nam and k'ri must be regarded as originally affinal (D1 and S1, respectively). Both terms have "invaded" the consanguineal nomenclature via the categorical equations D1=BD(ws) and S1=SiS(ms), as are consistent with the practice of MBD marriage. Note that both terms have become neuter in the course of this transformation. We must next enquire of the fate of the original xN terms thus displaced. The terms moi FSi and ts'a MB can be called upon at this point. We lack comparative material on moi, but Tibetan has ts'a SiS(ms) corresponding to the Kachin term, and we can therefore interpret Kachin ts'a MB as a product of reciprocal usage. We have conclusive support for this view in the term k'ri HSiCh,FSiHSi, which at first puzzled the writer. Under the Kachin tripartite organization, as described by Gilhodes, FSiHSi becomes MBW, and MBW ~ HSiCh are reciprocal terms. Since moi FSi closely parallels ts'a MB, we are justified in interpreting this term analogically as a reciprocal development from BD(ws).

To continue our analysis, moi and ts'a have displaced the original cross PSb terms ni and ku, which are retained in the affinal nomenclature. An original system of bilateral xC marriage must be postulated to account for ni WM,MBW < FSi, and ku HF,FSiH < MB. The categorical equations shown by ning xCi(ws)=Sil(ws) and k'au xCe(ms)=Bl(ms) also call for this type of marriage.

To complete our reconstruction, the terms ning, k'au, and rat must be regarded as originally consanguineal rather

SA 601 193 197 than affinal. We have comparative material only for ning, which is represented by Chang (Konyak) nyăng < *ning xC, Nikir nang < *ning BW(ws). We must further reconstruct rat as the term for xC(ds), i.e. the marriageable xC under the original bilateral xC marriage arrangement. This yields the theoretical categorical equations xCi(ms)=Sil(ms) and xCe(ws)= Bl(ws). Under the conventional type of levirate, which is found among the Kachin, a distinction must be made between the (marriageable) oBW and the (non-marriageable) yBW. In Kachin this distinction is made, in the case of a man, by equating yBW with Dl (nam) and in retaining the term rat for oBW, and, in the case of a woman, by equating HoB with HF (km) and in retaining the term rat for HyB. Since a man marries his MBD, the distinction between rat MBD(oms) and nam MBD(yms) is the natural result of that described above. It is a fair inference that the missing terms for FSiS(ws) are km FSiS(ows) and rat FSiS(yws). Note that the equation of MBD(yms) with BCh(ws) is a by-product, so to speak, and is not to be taken as a 'Crow' feature.

We are now in a position to evaluate the Omaha features of the Kachin system. It has been demonstrated that the Kachin have developed a unilateral xC marriage system from an original bilateral arrangement, and that this shift has produced a profound transformation in the kinship terminology. The equating of MBS(ws) with MB, and of FSiD(ms) with SiCh(ms) serves to distinguish the non-marriageable from the marriageable

SA 601 193 197 cross-cousins. These equations closely parallel those already noted in the Sbl terminology, and appear to form part of the same pattern. If this inference be correct, we must regard the institution of the levirate as a contributing factor here.

ST 601 193 197 The Kachin terminology under the original bilateral xC marriage system can be reconstructed as follows:

<u>Reconstructed Kachin System</u>

(Consanguineal)

ni FSi	ku MB
ning xCi(ws)	k'au xCe(ms)
rat xC(ds)	
moi BD(ws)	ts'a SiS(ms)

(Affinal)

ni MBW,Ml	ku FSiH,Fl
ning Sil(ss)	k'au Bl(ss)
rat Sbl(ds)	
nam Dl	k'ri Sl

Maru and Lashi, which are of Burmese stock, show Omaha features of Kachin type, e.g. Lashi so-ok FSiD(ms),SiCh(ms) and zo-auk Sl (a variant of so-ok), directly comparable with the Kachin term k'ri. Our material here is too uncertain to justify any further investigation of this point, and we have no data on the Maru and Lashi marriage practices. Both tribes are closely identified with the Kachin, and have even incorporated Kachin loan-words into their kinship nomenclatures, so that direct Kachin influence must be reckoned with in this

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matter. To judge from what little we know of the collateral terms of other Burmish-Loloish languages, Omaha features are not present. There is some evidence suggesting that the root *tu is applied both to N and C in Lisu and in Ulu (Northern Lolo), but the Lisu material is inconsistent and the Ulu material is not precise

The Omaha nomenclatures found among the Kukish tribes are quite distinct in type from the Kachin nomenclature. The Kuki tribes proper, including Southern Kuki and Tangkhul, employ the following basic scheme (in many varieties):

<u>Kuki Omaha Pattern</u>

(Consanguineal)

pi gH,MBD pu gF,MB,MBS

ni FSi

tu FSiCh,SiCh(ms),gCh

(Affinal)

pi MBW,WZ,WSi pu WF,WB

ni HM -rang FSiH,HF

mou DI,BW(ws) mak SI,SiH(ws)

Lushei has an especial term for BCh(ws), viz. va' (apparently connected with the root *wa H), and Yindu has an especial term for BD(ws), viz. (ka-)li, which has been compared with the root *ma-li gCh (Burmese, Nung), xH (Mikir). In Siyin and Charte, however, BCh(ws) is equated with Ch. The analyzing development in Laiyo has entirely obliterated all traces of the Omaha system, yet the term tu FSiCh is

SA 601 193 197 ST 601 193 197 retained. Haka has both (k-)tu FSiCh and the analytical term (k-)ni fa as an alternative. Lakher applies Sb terms (in address) to FSiCh and occasionally to MBCh, and both Thado and Aimol sometimes apply the oSb term to FSiCh(os). Chinbok employs an analytical term for MBS, but equates MBD with MySi. Thado resembles Chinbok in equating MBD with MSi, but elsewhere the regular equation is with MBW = gM. Chinbok is further aberrant in equating FSiS with SiS(ms) but having a distinct term for gS. Yindu equates DS with SiS, FSiS, but employs an analytical term for SS. Yindu has distinct terms for MBCh, and Kyaw has distinct terms both for MBCh and FSiCh(i.e. Omaha features are lacking). Aimol, if we can trust our sources, has reversed the Kuki pattern, with (ka-)pu FSiS and (ka-)tu-pa MBS. Chinbon has MoBS = MyB, MyBS = WB, reflecting the stress placed on age distinctions in Southern Kuki. Our Chawte material, which is not reliable, indicates a distinction between FSiS(ws) and FSiD(ms), and the equation of SiCh(mws) with gCh. The affinal term mak Sl is commonly replaced by the consanguineal term tu SiS(ms), as in Haka, Chawte, and Sho, and the reverse process whereby an affinal term "invades" the consanguineal nomenclature (as in Kachin) is illustrated by Kyaw sa-mǎk SiCh(ms) = Sl, and Ayaing Khami mok-sa FSiCh, SiCh(ms) = Sl, both from the root *mak Sl. The latter language has retained the root *tu, however, in the term (ka-)tu FSiCh(ws), gS.

It is evident from the above citations that this Omaha pattern is extremely susceptible to variation at all points.

SA Nothing approaching the specific Kachin variety has been
601 encountered, however, and the two systems seem to have little
193 in common. In the Kuki system the equations FSiCh = SiCh(ms)
197 and MBS = MB obtain regardless of the sex or speaker, there are
ST additional equations of MB with gF and SiCh(ms) with gCh,
601 and ni FSi is retained as a consanguineal term. In addition,
193 distinct terms for xC(ss) and Sbl are lacking. The historical
197 developments of the two systems have been quite different, if
we are permitted to draw inferences from comparative data.
The terms pi and pu are the original gP terms (TB *p'i gM,
*p'u gF), and the term -rang (prefixed) can be regarded as the
original term for MB, cognate with Tibetan ʾa-žang < *zrang MB
(cf. Kachin ku HF, FSiH = MB). The term tu occasions some
difficulty, since we have only the Burmish-Loloish root *tu
and the Nung term pa-du, both applied to N (xN in Burmese)
for comparison. In view of the parallelism in the equations
MB = gF and xN = gCh, however, we must fix the original meaning
of tu as "gCh" rather than "xN". The clue to these equations
seems to be teknonymy in conjunction with xC marriage, i.e.
we must suppose that a man applied the teknonymous terms pu
gF and pi gM to his wife's parents, whereas a woman applied
the consanguineal terms ni FSi and -rang MB. With the develop-
ment of unilateral marriage with MBD, a feature found in the
Kuki area as well as in Kachin, the two sets of Pl terms were
fully differentiated in function, and the term pu Fl = gF
replaced the consanguineal term -rang MB, with pi coming into

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use for MBW. The equation of SiCh(ms) with gCh was the natural result of the above development. Since the term ni FSi was retained in its original setting, no comparable term was developed for the reciprocal relationship BCh(ws). The evidence for the use of teknonymous terms in Tibeto-Burman in general has been resumed above and need not be discussed at this point. Within the Kuki group, note Chinbon (ka-)mo-pauk WH=gF and (ka-)mu-bok MoB (probably a variant of the foregoing), (ka-)mo WM=gM and (ka-)mok MoBW (probably a variant of the foregoing), but (ka-)ze HF (analysis uncertain), (ka-)zi HM=FSi. Chinbon thus makes use of teknonymous terms precisely as suggested above for the Kuki group in general.

We are still faced with the problem of explaining the equations MBS=MB, MBD=MBW (or MSi), and FSiCh=SiCh(ms). Here again we must take into account the affinal setting of these terms under a system of unilateral xC marriage with MBD. The fundamental equation seems to have been that between WF and WB (pu) rather than between MB and MBS, i.e. these kin were identified because of the similarity of their roles as wife's father and brother rather than as mother's brother and mother's brother's son. In other terms, the especial position of MB and MBS among the Kuki groups seems in large measure to have arisen through xC marriage. The equation of FSiCh with SiCh(ms) reflects the equation of MBS with MB, just as the equation of SiCh(ms) with gCh reflects the equation of MB with gF.

It is possible to conceive of the Kuki development without recourse to teknonymy simply by assuming that pu gF was

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applied to MB and MBS in an honorific sense, with tu gCh SiCh(ms)=FSiCh as a complementary equation. In any event, the equation in the MB line must be regarded as the primary one, and the equation in the FSi line as complementary. The same situation was found to obtain among the Kachin (supra).

The Naga languages, which make up the northern division of the Kukish group, also reveal Omaha features, which are of Kuki rather than Kachin type. MBD is equated with MSi or MySi rather than with gM=MBW. In Ao (all three dialects) the terms for gF (o-pu) and gCh (sam-cir) are distinct, i.e. there is no teknonymy, the TB root *k'u is retained in the consanguineal nomenclature (o-k'u MB,MBS) while MBD is equated with MySi, and the affinal terms for Sl (a-nok) and Dl (a-mu) are applied to FSiS,SiS(ms) and FSiD,SiD(ms), respectively, precisely as in Ayaing Khami. Sema has a distinct term for gF (neuter) and equates gCh with Ch, but has developed a new root for MB,MBS (a-ngu) and has retained the root *k'u only in the affinal meaning "FSiH" (a-ci). Thus both Ao and Sema show full Omaha features without distinction of sex of speaker (as in Kuki) but also without teknonymy (as in Kachin). The Angami, Rengma, and Lhota systems, however, all show teknonymous features. Rengma (all three dialects) equates MB,MBS(os) with gF (ggF in Nzong), and FSiCh,SiCh(ms) with gCh. Lhota shows a partial equation of MB,MBS with gF (o-mo and o-mo-tsü) and at least similar terms for FSiS,SiS(ms) and gS (o-hro and o-hre). Angami equates FSiS,ySiS(ms) with gS, but distinguishes between

SA gF and MB, yet the term for the latter (mi) is connected with
601 the Rengma term for gF,MB (a-mi ~ a-mui) and the Lhota term
193 for MB (o-mo) and gF (o-mo-tsü). We can thus interpret Angami
197 mi MB as the original term for gF,MB and in this way explain
ST the lack of symmetry in the Angami nomenclature as it now
601 stands (a man calls his sister's child "gCh", but a child
193 calls his mother's brother "uncle"). Angami lacks the Omaha
197 traits on one side, since MBCh is addressed or described by name, or analytically if the need arises. The Rengma equations on the MB side appear only in the vocative nomenclature, and only when the cousin (MBS or MBD) addressed is older than speaker.

As noted in pt. 16, Majumder attempted to explain some of the features of the Sema nomenclature in terms of marriage with F's widow, after the fashion instituted by Rivers. Almost no instances of marriages of this type have been encountered in the Tibeto-Burmen area, however, and the writer fails to see how Rivers' theories are of any relevancy in the present situation. The most curious form of marriage noted is the Lisu marriage with FSi cited by Fraser, and this is not reflected in the Lisu nomenclature. Omaha features among the Omaha and Miwok are perhaps based on WBD marriage, but for the American evidence there is no unanimity of opinion, and at least three recent writers on the subject (White, Gifford, Tax) have attacked this as a general explanation. Of this trio White alone suggests a general explanation, viz. that the Omaha type

SA 601 193 197 ST 601 193 197 is developed from the Dakota-Iroquois type (pC = Sb, xC distinct term) under the influence of a mature and vigorous patrilineal clan system. Gifford has successfully attacked this view on the basis of the American material, and the same general strictures are applicable in the Tibeto-Burman field, where no correlation can be established between strong patrilineal clans and the Omaha type of terminology.

The Kuki equation of xN with gCh is also encountered in Miri (ā < o-i "child below") and Tibetan (ts'a). Miri has retained the TB root *k'u MB (a-kū), but does apply teknonymous terms to Fl and Ml (= MB and FSi under the Miri bilateral xC marriage system). In Tibetan, however, teknonymy has been found only in the dialect of Bathang (eastern Tibet) as recorded by Desgodins, who cites rmo-rmo Ml = MM (hence a man's term for his WM). Abor shows reverse teknonymy in the shifts a-bu gF < F and a-nā gM < M, reflected in the equation o Ch = N = gCh (Abor, like Miri, applies teknonymous terms to Fl and Ml).

SA 601 ST 601 We are perhaps not justified in concluding that all equations of xN with gCh are based on teknonymy involving the affinal nomenclature (gF > Fl = MB), but no better general explanation can be suggested. The general thesis outlined above conforms to the basic Tibeto-Burman sociological pattern of cross-cousin marriage, and thus enjoys an initial advantage over any alternative theories of a more <u>ad hoc</u> nature.

Reciprocal terminology has already been mentioned in connection with Kachin ts'a MB < SiCh(ms), k'ri HBiCh, FSiHBi,

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and Bodo a-doi FyB, nang-a-doi oBCh. This phenomenon is not typical of Tibeto-Burman but can be traced in a few languages. Newari ni-ni FSi, i-ni D1 (< BD,ws) is comparable with Kachin ts'a. The following instances of grandparental reciprocity have been noted: Lepcha a-so ggF ∼ a-zon gCh (with -n suffix); Bodo a-bau gF,gCh, Moran a-lu gF,gCh (as cited by Gurdon); Lisu a-lɨ ggF, lɨ-pa gS (and perhaps a-za gM, za S), which are not strictly reciprocal. Note also Lushei t'la' "a descendant, posterity", t'la'-tu "an ancestor, progenitor" (apparently formed with the root *tu gCh), Siyin tu-k'an ta-k'an "descendant; ancestor", based on tu < *tu gCh and ta < *za Ch. Lisu also has the combined terms pa-la "F and Ch", ma-la "M and Ch", and pi-li "gF and gCh", all used in a collective sense. Kanauri spats gCh seems to have been derived from a-pa F, with the diminutive suffix -ts as in a-pats FB and the s- prefix as in Tib. p'a-sped "F and Ch" (collective).

To resume the foregoing discussion, we have reconstructed for the Tibeto-Burman peoples a sociological pattern of bilateral xC marriage and a corresponding linguistic pattern with primary terms for MB and FSi, for S1, and perhaps for D1, but with the affinal nomenclature in general based on categorical equations. In the Lowie system this pattern would be designated "bifurcate merging". The breakdown of the xC marriage pattern is shown to have directly influenced the affinal nomenclature but to have exerted little effect on the consanguineal nomenclature. The development of unilateral xC

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marriage with MBD in Kachin and the Kuki and Naga tribes is associated with the presence of two sets of P1 terms and of Omaha features in the collateral terminology. This association naturally has no statistical significance, yet fits very well into the general picture.

The practice of unilateral xC marriage with MBD is to be interpreted in terms of asymmetric reckoning of descent, as has been brilliantly pointed out by B. Z. Seligman with especial reference to River's Pentecost material. The Pentecost society has matri-moieties with three patri-sections in each, and the Pentecost terminology shows Crow features, viz. ratahina M,MSi,FSi,FSiD, and nituna MBCh,Ch. The Pentecost pattern is thus the reverse of the Kachin-Kuki-Naga.

The Tibeto-Burman evidence is surprising, perhaps, in failing to suggest a basic pattern of dual organization. Rivers regarded xC marriage as the result of dual organization, and Radcliffe-Brown has expressed the belief that the "Dravidian-Australian" kinship system (xC marriage) is in some way correlated with dual organization. The latter point of view is perhaps that shared by the majority of anthropologists. In the Tibeto-Burman area, however, dual organization has been recorded only for some of the Old Kuki groups and for Garo and Rabha, with additional evidence from the Naga group. Bose (1934) has collected much material bearing on this point, but largely from inadequate sources and in wholly uncritical fashion. In a later article (1937) the same writer places

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emphasis rather on the tri-clan arrangement as found among at least some sections of the Garo, and suggests that an originally matrilineal people had been submerged in a wave of patrilineal peoples coming from the north, and that the restriction against a woman's marrying into her mother's clan is a reflection of this matrilineal substratum. Another Indian ethnologist, Das (1935), postulates a mixture of a patrilineal people with dual organization and a matrilineal people. The Khasi are typically matrilineal, and hence one can easily envisage an archaic Khasi-Mon matrilineal substratum in the Assam-Burma area. The Tibeto-Burman peoples, on the other hand, were and are patrilineal, though practising xC marriage. The Garo, Rabha, and probably other members of the Barish linguistic stock are matrilineal, however, apparently through direct Khasi influence. The theory of a miscegenation between patrilineal and matrilineal peoples, as advocated by Bose and Das, is therefore likely enough, and serves as well as any other as a partial explanation of the development of the asymmetric mode of reckoning descent. It does not explain, however, why the Kachin, living in the upper Irrawaddy valley, should have adopted this feature, nor, inversely, why the Mikir, in close contact with the Khasi, should not have adopted it.

In the present study no effort can be made to follow through the historical and other implications raised by the postulation of an early Tibeto-Burman-speaking population with patrilineal descent and xC marriage. It is difficult to see

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any historical connection with the "Dravidian-Australian" system suggested by Radcliffe-Brown (see also the articles by Hodson and Rivers), inasmuch as an intervening population of matrilineal Mon-Khmer-speaking peoples must also be postulated. From another point of view, the writer is unable to suggest any striking correlation between xC marriage and other cultural traits. According to the view expressed by Kroeber in a recent article (1938), this form of marriage would form part of the "secondary pattern" and would be (ultimately) referable to factors of residence or other elements of the "basic pattern". The argument seems to be that one must live somewhere, but can live without exogamic groupings, totems, and the like - that one must have kin, but not clans. It is equally true, however, that one must marry someone, and that his choice must lie either within the kin group or without, just as residence must be either patrilocal, matrilocal, or neither, with various combinations possible. This point of view seems to be implied in Seligman's (1929) discussion of incest and descent factors.

It is perhaps of some interest to point out that premarital sexual promiscuity and the institution of a bachelor's house or its equivalent are characteristic Tibeto-Burman traits. The writer has not collected data on either of these specific points, yet has been impressed by the almost universal distribution of these features. It is primarily among acculturated groups such as the Tibetans or Burmese that these traits are in abeyance. Contrast, for example, the primitive Almora

SA 601 ST 601 group with xC marriage and a type of bachelor's house with their immediate neighbors, the Tibetans, who practise polyandry rather than xC marriage (traces of the latter persist) and have nothing suggesting a bachelor's house. The same type of contrast is presented by the primitive Arakanese with xC marriage and premarital sexual freedom (Hutchinson, p. 113) and the sophisticated Burmese, who lack xC marriage and whose courtship pattern had become highly formalized even in medieval times (vide the interesting account by Kin). It is not suggested that xC marriage and premarital sexual laxity are necessarily correlated in any way, but, in the area under consideration, both appear to belong to the same general cultural stratum.

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SA [121] ST [121] The present study is of limited scope and comparative material has therefore been eliminated. The parallelism between the Kuki Omaha pattern and that found among the BaThonga and Nama Hottentot of South Africa, however, is too attractive to be omitted. The Nama Hottentot (Schapera, pp. 230 and ff.) employ the terms //náob gF,MB; //náos gM,MBW (but MB is now called omeb < Dutch oom "uncle", and MBW is now called mugis < Dutch moekie "little mother"); //núrib xCe,SiS(ms),gS; //núris xCi,SiD(ms),gD. This system can be converted into the Kuki type by limiting //núrib and //núris to FSiCh and applying //náob and //náos to MBCh. Schapera describes xC marriage of bilateral type, but notes that among

SA 601 ST 601 some tribes of the Nama marriage with MBD "is said to have been far more common" (p. 244). For the replacement of the MB term by the Dutch loan-word (omeb < oom), cf. the widespread Tibeto-Burman borrowing of the Indic term māmā MB (infra).

The BaThonga evidence (Junod, pp. 216 and ff.) is complicated by the existence of dialectical differences. The regular MB term is malume (Zulu malume MB), applied also to MBS. The Northern BaThonga, however, have kokwana gF,MB,MDS, ntukulu SiS(ms),gS. The BaRonga clans are in a neatly transitional stage, with alternative sets of terms. Radcliffe-Brown (1924) has made an illuminating analysis of the BaThonga material, in which the significance of the terms malume ("male mother") and rarana ("female father") is pointed out (cf. also Firth's discussion of the FSi as "male father" in Tikopia). The BaThonga do not practice xC marriage, according to Junod, and the parallelism with Kuki thus breaks down at this point. Since the application of kokwana gF to MB is apparently of late origin here, the teknonymy principle is of no avail in this instance, and we must accept Radcliffe-Brown's mode of reasoning. Note that neither the Nama nor the BaThonga system is of true Omaha type.

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SA 197 601 ST 197 601 Loan-words appear in many of the Tibeto-Burman kinship terminologies, and include terms of Indic, Chinese, and Shan origin, as well as of Tibeto-Burman origin. Indic loan-words are found in a string of languages extending from Baltistan

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and Kanawur in the northwest to the Garo Hills in the southeast, all exposed to direct Indian influence. The extent of borrowing in kinship nomenclature is in general correlated with the rate of borrowing in general, but this is not necessarily so, e.g. Magari has preserved a large proportion of its original TB vocabulary yet has retained only a single kinship term (za Ch), if we can trust our sources. The tendency to borrow terms for male kin rather than female kin has been observed in Balti, Kanauri, Newari (less well marked), Miri, and Barish. Terms for relatives older than speaker are also more likely to be borrowed than those for relatives younger than speaker. Probably both points can be explained on the basis of the honorific connotations associated with loan-words in general, which go to make up the "respectable" idiom as opposed to the vulgar. The term mama MB has been borrowed by Balti, Kanauri, Dhimal, Bodo, Garo, and perhaps Meithei, whereas the Indic FSi term has been borrowed only once (Dhimal).

The most prominent instances of borrowings made within Tibeto-Burman are those of Lepcha from Tibetan, and Atsi from Kachin. To illustrate the vagaries in the borrowing process, Atsi borrows its MB and FSi terms from Kachin but retains its native FB and MSi terms, whereas Byangsi (Almora group) borrows from Indic (Khasiya) its terms for FoB and FyB but employs a native term for MB. The borrowing of a term in a specialized sense only is exemplified by the following curious series: Kanauri mak-pa "Sl living in Fl's house" (from Tibetan); Lepcha km-mok, id. (from Tibetan); Kachin

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luk-k'i, id. (from Shan). All three languages have distinct S1 terms applied under normal conditions. Contrast Garo nok-rong "S1 living in F1's house" (native term), cowari "S1 other than above" (from Indic); note that among the Garo the nok-rong is a formalized institution in a matrilineal society. It would be difficult to find a more ideal illustration of the mirroring of sociological features in linguistic phenomena.

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SECTION B

KAREN AND CHINESE

1. Introduction

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Having completed a review of the Tibeto-Burman kinship terminologies, the writer now proposes to discuss in summary fashion the salient points of the Karen and Chinese nomenclatures. Karen and Tibeto-Burman together constitute the western branch of the Sino-Tibetan stock, the eastern branch of which is represented by Chinese (Sinitic) and the Sinitic element in Thai. The term "Indo-Chinese" has been employed in a somewhat broader sense to include Thai itself, and the latter family is commonly coupled with Chinese in contrast to Tibeto-Burman. This view has been developed in a masterly study by Wulff and is shared by Maspero, a pioneer in Thai linguistics. The writer himself was originally partial toward this view, but more intensive investigations of the Thai languages have led to the conviction that a wholly distinct substratum is involved here, and that the Sinitic elements constitute little more than a veneer, albeit an ancient one. A rapprochement with Indonesian has been initiated, largely on the basis of a newly discovered linguistic group in southern China, northern Tonkin, and the island of Hainan. This newly recognized group, consisting of Kelao (southern China), Laqua (northern Tonkin), and Dai or Loi (Hainan), has been named "Kadai". Kadai is notable for its retention

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of a numeral system based on Indonesian roots in connection with numerous Thai features, and serves to explain certain resemblances between Thai and Indonesian.

The connection between Tibeto-Burman and Chinese, long a favorite theme with philological speculators, can now be regarded as established (Simon, Shafer, Benedict). The relationship is an ancient one, however, comparable with that between Indo-European and Hittite or between Semitic and Hamitic, and generalizations covering the phonological relations of the two families can be drawn only with the utmost difficulty. Karen stands in an altogether different type of relationship with Tibeto-Burman, and these two families must be derived from a common origin (Tibeto-Karen) as opposed to Chinese (vide the discussion in pt. 2). The following set of roots illustrates the lexical affinities of Chinese with Tibeto-Burman and Karen; forms are cited for Ancient Chinese (6th century), Archaic TB (as reconstructed by the writer), and five Karen dialects.

	Chinese	TB	Taungthu	Zayein	Sgaw	Pwo	Mopgha
five	nguo (五)	*l-nga *b-nga	ngat	ngä nyä	yä	yai	zä
I	nguo (吾)	*nga	-	nga nya	ya	ya	za
fish	ngiwo (魚)	*ngya	-	-	nya	ya	-
plantain	-	*ngak	nga	-	ya	ya	za

Note Sgaw y- < ng- but ny- < ngy-, and cf. Tib. nga < *nga "I" but nya < *ngya "fish". The root for "plantain" illustrates the type of "partial equation" between Tibeto-Burman and Karen

ST 197 which is frequently encountered (in this instance the root is perhaps an old loan-word in Karen).

K 197 The relationships among Tibeto-Burman, Karen, Chinese, and Thai can conveniently be diagrammed as follows:



Sh 197 601 In view of the peculiar linguistic position occupied by Thai, the kinship terminologies of the several Thai languages have been omitted from consideration in the present study. The writer has examined the kinship terms used in Siamese, Lao, Shan, Khamti, Ahom, Black Tai, Tho, Nung, and Dioi, however, and is thus able to make a few general observations. The Thai system is remarkable for its uniformity from group to group, though it must be remembered that the Thai languages in general are fairly uniform. Age distinctions are even more prominent than in Tibeto-Burman, and appear both in the Sb and PSb terms (*bi oSb, *nong ySb; *lung FoB,MoB, *pa MoSi,FoSi). The collateral lines tend to be merged in the PSb terminology, as in Lowie's "lineal" type, yet the Sb terms are extended to include both pC and xC, e.g. Siamese nong is defined as "kindred of a younger branch, ycunger brother or sister, cousins, spouse, mistress" (in the standard Siamese lexicon by Pallegoix). Four gP terms are found in some Thai languages though not in all and undoubtedly must be regarded as forming part of the basic pattern, e.g.

23:Benedict E-5 (no date)1941 ALl Southeast Asia
Sino-Tibetan Border Peoples AE3
Karen AP7
Shan-Thai AL3

Sh 197 601

Siamese has pu FF, ya FM, ta MF, yai MM. Affinal terms are formed with the aid of various honorific elements, but at least two primary affinal roots exist (*k'ŏi S1 and baŭ D1). The equation of N with gCh in the root *hlan is an outstanding Thai feature, and is reminiscent of Tibetan ts'a, Kuki tu, and the like. Categorical equations indicative of xC marriage are conspicuously absent. In general, the Thai terminology is suggestive of a bilateral kindred grouping rather than a unilateral clan or lineage grouping.

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1 [For abbreviations, see this source in cat. 113, ALl Southeast Asia ALl -- Analyst]

2. Karen

101 The Karen dialects are spoken in Lower Burma and the
197 Shan States. Our studies of Karen are still in a preliminary stage, but enough work has been done to show that this family represents an archaic offshoot from the Tibeto-Burman stock. The present position of the Karen groups, in the lower Salween valley and the Salween-Mekong divide, suggests that the Karen became detached from the main body of Tibeto-Burman-speaking peoples at a relatively early date and migrated southward, probably via the Salween valley, at a period considerably antedating that of the general Burmish-Lolcish expansion. At present the Karen are hemmed in on all sides by groups speaking quite distinct languages, viz. the Tibeto-Burman-speaking Burmese and Southern Lolo, the Thai-speaking Shan, and the Mon-Khmer-speaking Wa and Palaung. The Mon, also of Mon-Khmer stock, must have exerted considerable influence on the Karen at a somewhat earlier period.

193 Karen agrees with Chinese and Thai, and sharply differs
197 from Tibeto-Burman, in placing the object after rather than before the verb. It is on the basis of this feature, and of this feature alone, that Karen has generally been grouped with Chinese and Thai. On the lexical side, however, Karen is basically affiliated with Tibeto-Burman, though it has developed a considerable body of distinctive roots of its own and occasionally shows some affinity for Chinese, e.g. the Karen root *su "hand" corresponds to Chinese shou (手). The

193 numerals are distinctly Tibeto-Burman rather than Chinese-
197 Thai. Tones are more prominent in Karen than in Chinese, Thai, or Tibeto-Burman. The modern Karen dialects are characterized by elaborate tonal systems and abound in phrases composed of two or more vocables, each often representing a distinct root. Prefixes are employed to a limited degree, but on the whole appear to belong to a later morphological stratum than those found in Tibeto-Burman. All the Karen dialects have experienced great phonetic degeneration, especially with respect to finals. Final nasals seem to have fallen together at an early period, and even this secondary nasalization is now maintained only in Pwo and Taungthu, while final stops are represented only in Taungthu. The following sets of roots show the Karen correspondences for final -um and -ung, as reconstructed on the basis of the TB cognates:

	TB	Pwo	Taungthu	Sgaw	Bghai	Karenni
			Final -um			
three	*(g-)sum	θũ	θũ	θõ	θõ	θõ
ant	-	t'ũ	t'ũ	tõ	tõ	tõ
			Final -ung			
stone	*lung	lõ	lũ	lõ	lõ	lau
horn	-	nõ	nũ	nõ	nõ	nau

Note that the two series are distinguished only in Pwo and Karenni. Note also θ- < s-, a Karen feature.

197 The Karen dialectical divisions are in general of minimal significance, as indicated in the above tabulations. Taungthu,

197 which preserves final stop consonants in some instances, is the aberrant member of the group, though it approaches Pwo in many respects. The literary dialects are Sgaw, spoken throughout the Irrawaddy Delta, and Pwo, spoken primarily in coastal districts. The remaining Karen dialects, spoken in the Karenni Subdivision and other mountainous inland areas, are often grouped together under the general term "Bwe" (as in Marshall), but several distinct dialectical groups are included. The best list is that given by Taylor, who cites five groups (in addition to Sgaw, Pwo, and Taungthu), viz. Mopwa (= Mopgha); Karenbyu ("White Karen"), Bwe, and Brek; Karenni ("Red Karen"); Padaung, Yinbaw, and Gheko; Zayein. Gilmore and Mason have contributed brief discussions of the phonetic shifts that obtain among the several Karen dialects, but this linguistic field otherwise remains untouched. Most of the observations made in the present study are based on the writer's own studies.

601 Of primary importance for Karen kinship terminology are the lists of terms in Webb's census report. Much additional material has been obtained from the word-lists in Scott's Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States, but relatively few kinship terms are included in these lists. The best recorded terms are those found in the LSI (1928), by L. F. Taylor, but these are of similarly restricted scope. The Sgaw terms have been checked from the standard Sgaw dictionaries (in Karen script) by Wade, a pioneer in this field, while some use has also been made of the Pwo dictionary by Duffin.

601 Variant Sgaw terms, and additional definitions of terms, are based on Wade. Account has also been taken of the description of Sgaw terms given by Marshall. Minor sources include the Red Karen vocabulary by Houghton, and the Red Karen and White Karen (= Sgaw Karen) vocabularies by Walton (in Siamese script).

Since Sgaw is the best known Karen dialect, the terms from this language have been selected for tabulation. The pattern shown here may be regarded as typical for the family as a whole, though minor variations do appear in various dialects, as pointed out in the annotations below.

Sgaw Consanguineal Terms

p'i gM			p'ü gF
mo M			pa F
mü-gha PSi			p'a-ti PB
	wü oSb,PoSbCh		
	pü ySb,PySbCh		
	(tǔ-)k'wa pxC		
	p'o Ch		
	p'o-do pxN		
	li pxN,gCh		
	lo ggCh		

Sgaw Affinal Terms

	mi-pgha P1		
ma W			wa H
mi S1l			yɔ B1
	nü WSb		k'i-nü WS1H
dü D1			ma^{4} S1

601 Notes:

Sgaw p'i gM and p'ü gF represent the standard Karen roots *p'i and *p'u, directly cognate with the Tibeto-Burman gP roots. The only variations noted are Bre (Webb lxiv) a-p'i gF, a-p'i-ma-mu gM (as if based on a neuter term p'i gP), and Taungthu (Webb lxi) me taru FM,MM, p'a p'ra FF, me p'ra MF, based on me M and p'a F; for the element p'ra, cf. Sgaw pgha "old" (note Taungthu p'a= Sgaw pa F), and the Sgaw term mü-li p'i-pgha gM (Wade).

The terms mo M and pa F extend throughout the Karen dialects with little change. Karenni has pe F, just as it has pre < pra (= pgha) F1, we < wa H, me < ma M. Parallel roots are represented by the Sgaw terms mü "female" and p'a "male". Pa and p'a are comparable with TB *p'a F (commonly used as male affix), while mo can be connected with Tib. mo "woman, female" and the Kukish root *mou D1. Karen mu (Sgaw mü) "female" is apparently not represented in Tibeto-Burman. The TB root *wa (but "father" in Kachin and elsewhere) appears in Karen in the meaning "husband", while TB *ma M appears in the meaning "wife". These spouse terms are constant for all the Karen dialects examined by the writer, with one partial exception (Kemoo pwe W, in Webb lxxiv), and must be taken as true primary roots. The primary signification of all these roots, both in Tibeto-Burman and Karen, seems to have been "female" rather than "mother" in a specific kinship sense. The relationships existing between the TB and Karen sets of roots are indicated in the following table:

601

Tibeto-Burman		Karen	
*ma	mother, female	*ma	wife
*mou	female (Tibetan) Dl (Kukish)	*mo	mother
-		*mu	female
*p'a	father, male	*pa *p'a	father male
*wa	father, male	*wa	husband

Taungthu and perhaps other Karen dialects have employed *mu rather than *mo as the term for M. In the following table the words for "mother" and "sun" are given for six dialects, four of which have parallel forms (Karen *mu "sun, sky", corresponding to the Kachin-Hung-Burmese root *mu "sky").

	Pwo	Sgaw	Taungthu	Yintale	Padaung	Yinbaw
mother	mo	mo	mu	mün	mäö	mög
sun	mu	mü	mu	mün	mäü	mäg

Sgaw we, pü, and p'o represent the three widely distributed Karen roots *wai oSb, *pu ySb, and *p'o Ch. Sex distinctions are made with the aid of the k'wa "male" (rather than p'a) and mü "female", e.g. p'o-k'wa S, p'o-mü D. There are no indications of more than two primary Sb terms, nor of sex-of-speaker distinctions (contrast Tibeto-Burman). Neither *wai nor *pu appears to have TB cognates, unless one compares the latter with Tib. bu Ch. Wade further defines Sgaw pü ySb as "tender, fresh, soft, yielding"; cf. the Kukish doublet roots *mau ySb and *mou "young, tender". The neuter term p'o Ch, which is also used in the meaning "young, small", is

601 to be compared with Tib. p'o "male", paralleling mo "female". If this comparison is correct, the Karen term must have originally stood for "male Ch".

The basic terms just outlined, which are applied to relatives in Ego's line of descent, show great stability in all the Karen dialects. In contrast to this, the collateral nomenclature varies from dialect to dialect, with numerous variant terms in use. The pattern itself, however, everywhere conforms to a single type, with the exception of that found in Taungthu (the Taungthu terms are presented below and will not be discussed at this point). The collateral lines are merged in most cases, though distinctions are sometimes made in the PSb terms. In sharp contrast to Tibeto-Burman, primary collateral terms are lacking, and the single forms that appear in some dialects are best interpreted as elliptical formations. The Sgaw terms mü-gha PSi and p'a-ti PB reflect the use of the roots *mu and *p'a in the meaning "M" and "F", in place of the normal terms mo M and pa F. For the analysis of the element -gha, vide infra. The element -ti can be identified with the word ti "closeness, compactness; own or blood relation", as used in ti-nɔ "closest kindred". Mü-gha also appears in the abbreviated forms mgha and even ma. The term ya "stepfather", cited by Wade, is probably a variant of gha, on the same tone (mü-gha is used for "stepmother" as well as for "PSi").

The Sgaw development mü-gha > mgha > ma explains Mopwa and Bwe ma-ma PSi (Webb lxxiv). Mopwa a-pwa FB, pwa-pwa MB,

601 however, are connected with Sgaw pgha (infra), and are of some aid in interpreting that term. Bres (Webb lxxiv) has ma-ma PSi and a-pwa MB, paralleling Mopwa, but a curious neuter term a-si FB,MSi, i.e. parallel PSb. Yinbaw sa PSi,MB, Padaung sa PSi (Webb lxiv) cannot be identified, nor Padaung nä MB. Konoo and Gaiko a-to ~ a-do PSb (Webb lxxiv) are based on the Karen root do "relationship by marriage", also used as an honorific affix (vide infra). Bre mo-du PSi, p'a-du PB (Webb lxiv) contain the same element. More unusual than any of the above are the Yangalai terms mein PSi, (ka-)maik MB (Webb lxiv), corresponding to Yintale men "aunt", mai "uncle" (Scott). The first of these terms is apparently connected with Pwo meĩ, Sgaw mi (infra).

In Sgaw the Sb terms can be extended to include pxC, according to Marshall. Note that distinctions are made according to the relative ages of Ego's P and PSb rather than of Ego and PSbCh. This feature, which has not been encountered in the Tibeto-Burman material, is of 'Yuma' type (Spier's classification). The alternative term (tǎ-)k'wa pxC is based on the male affix k'wa; cf. p'o "Ch" < "male Ch" (supra). Wade also cites a term k'wä, defined only as "of the relation of cousins" (cf. k'wa and wa H, k'wä and wä oSb). A third term is po-k'wa "cousin", based on po "human species, male or female". Pwo has (ta-)k'wa pxC as in Sgaw, but most of the remaining dialects have a distinct term, e.g. Hano pu-bu, Karenni pö-bu, Bwe (g-)bö, Gaiko nga-bu, Bres a-bö. This term has not yet been identified with anything in Sgaw or Pwo.

601 Sgaw p'o-do pxN represents the normal Karen usage. It is based on p'o S plus the element do "relationship by marriage". Burmese to "to be related", as in hnats-mǎ-to "female cousin", would appear to be the same element, and one must suspect that borrowing has taken place, probably on the part of the Karen. Wade cites the combined term wǎ-p'o "Ch of oB or oSi", indicating that analytical terms are often applied. Webb cites a distinct N term for Pwo, viz. mu-ru.

According to Marshall, the term li gCh is applied to Ne and Ni. This equation also appears in Taungthu, and is discussed below in connection with that language. The root *li extends throughout the Karen dialects, following the standard phonetic shifts, e.g. Karenni lǒ < *li gCh paralleling p'ǒ < *p'i gN, Yangalai lai < *li gCh paralleling p'ai(k) < *p'i gN. The obvious comparison is with the TB root *ma-li gCh (Rung, Burmese), xN (Kikir). The lack of a prefix in the Karen root is fairly conclusive evidence that this root has not been borrowed from Tibeto-Burman, as one might otherwise suggest. For the alliteration shown by Sgaw li gCh, lo ggCh, cf. the following series:

	TB	Kachin	Burmese	Lolo	Thai	Sgaw
gCh	*za	ǰu	mre^3	*m-li	*hlan	li
ggCh	*ts'a	ǰi	mrats	*m-lak	*hlen	lo

Siamese has a full series: hlan gCh, hlen ggCh, hlom gggCh, and Kachin has ǰa Ch, ǰu gCh, ǰu ma-ǰi ggCh, ǰu ma-ǰǎ gggCh.

601 The Karen affinal nomenclature includes several primary terms in addition to ma W and wa H discussed above. The neuter P1 term is found in all the Karen dialects, occasionally with the suffixed elements k'wa "male" or mu "female" to effect a distinction between F1 and M1 (as in the Pwo list in Webb). The combined form is less common than the isolated form; cf. Bre mü-pra, Nano mi-pwa, Padaung and Yinbaw pra, Yangalai (ka-)pra, Karenni p're < *p'ra. Pwo has mei-sa P1, the exact equivalent of Sgaw mi-pgha. The basic meaning of pgha (Pwo sa) is "mature, old; head man, elder", whence its application to P1 as a respectful appellation. The tone is the same as that of the element -gha as found in mü-gha PS1, and gha has the additional meaning "maturity". We can safely infer that pgha represents *pa-gha from *pa F, paralleling mü-gha > mgha PS1. Formations of this type are not unknown in Karen; cf. Sgaw pgha ∼ gha "person" (on different tone from above root). If this derivation is correct, one should expect to find pgha used in the meaning "FB", and this condition is fulfilled in Mopwa and Bres a-pwa FB (supra).

The terms for S1 and D1 are constant in the Karen dialects, with the partial exception of Taungthu (infra). The roots are *dai D1 and *mak S1, the latter corresponding to TB *mak S1. The forms for *dai D1 parallel those for *wai oSb, e.g. Karenni dia < *dai D1, via < *wai oSb, nya < *ngai "five". The final consonant of the root *mak is retained in Taungthu (mak), and is reflected also in the abrupt tone of the Pwo and Sgaw forms, represented by superscript 4 (a^4) in the writer's tonal

601 notation (the root is entirely distinct from *ma W). The Sgaw evidence is especially clear; cf. ya < TB *ngak "plantain" (vide the table in pt. 1), mǎ < TB *mik "eye" (or perhaps Burmese myak), and the loan-words li "book" (Indic lik), mlo "cannon" (Burmese a-mrok), all with the abrupt Sgaw tone (5).

Our data on the Karen Sbl terms is not complete, and the terms that we do have are difficult to interpret. The term mi Sil (unspecified) appears also in the combined term mi-pgha Pl, Pwo meĩ-sa, which has already been analyzed. The phonetic correspondence suggests an original root *ming or *min:

	Tibeto-Burman	Sgaw	Pwo
year	*ning	ni	neĩ
name	*ming	mi	meĩ
ripe	*smin	mi	meĩ

Sgaw nǎ is defined as "x's P or Si" (Wade), and the combined term k'i-nǎ as "the relation of persons whose wives are sisters". Both k'i ~ c'i and nǎ ~ ne ~ nai appear as independent Sbl terms in the various Karen dialects, the latter having the wider distribution. Mano distinguishes between nǎ Bl(ms) and k'i Sbl(ss), and similar distinctions are made in other dialects, but there is much diversity here and no generalizations can be made. Sgaw also makes use of the element de "collateral part or branch of a thing", as in pǎ-de yBW, pǎ-de-nǎ WySi(ms), and of analytical terms, e.g. ma-wǎ WeSb, ma-pǎ WySb.

601 Sgaw yɔ Bl is perhaps a Burmese loan-word (yok-p'aˀ Bl,ms). This term is confined to Mopwa, Bwe, Konoo, and Bres, all of which show the form yo-pa (Mopwa WB, Bwe WB,WSiH, Bres WB,HB, WSiH, Konoo WB,HB). Sgaw also has the term yɔ "male cousin", found only in the combination k'wa-yɔ ~ k'a-yɔ, id. This term is on a different tone from yɔ Bl, however, and neither has the abrupt tone which should be expected if a final stop consonant had been dropped. On still other tones Sgaw has yɔ "reverence, treat with respect", and yɔ "term of friendship between young women".

The Taungthu nomenclature has been reserved for especial consideration because of its generally aberrant nature. The only source of importance is Webb, who gives two lists of Taungthu kinship terms (pp. lxi and lxv). The latter list, called "Paungthu", the more satisfactory of the two, yields the following pattern.

<u>Taungthu Consanguineal Terms</u>

p'i gM,FSi		p'u gF,MB
mu M		p'a F
mu-tan MoSi,FoBW		p'a-tan FoB,MoSiH
mu-nang MySi,FyBW		p'a-nang FyB,MySiH
ve-mu oSi		ve-k'o oB
p'u-mu ySi		p'u-k'o yB
	ve FBCh	
	mak FSiCh,MSiCh,MBCh	
po-mu D	po BCh(mws)	po-k'o S
	li SiCh(mws),gCh	

601

Taungthu Affinal Terms

p'i MBW,Ml

(a-)ma W

(ka-)ning HBi

mu-tan WBi,HBW,oBW(mws)

mu-nang yBW(mws)

p'a-nan Dl

p'u FSiH,Fl

wa H

mak WoB,SiH(mws),Sl

p'u WyB,WySiH

p'a-tan HoB,WoSiH

p'a-nang HyB

Notes:

The terms are in the main the same as those found in other Karen dialects, with minor phonetic shifts of Pwo type, e.g. p'a < *pa F, p'u < *pu ySb, but po < *p'o Ch; -k'o < *k'wa "male". As mentioned above, Taungthu has *mu M rather than *mo. The age distinctions made in the PSb terms are altogether exceptional for Karen, and are perhaps indicative of Thai or Burmese influence (morphologically they are of Burmese rather than Thai type). The most striking feature of the Taungthu pattern, however, is the equation of FSi with gM, of MB with gF, and the further categorical equation of these terms with Ml and Fl, respectively. The Taungthu list in Webb, p. lxi, does not show these equations and has simply Fl= F, Ml= M, but a third Taungthu list (in Scott) has pu Fl, pyi Ml, so that the reality of this equation is assured. The general picture is comparable with that found in Kuki, but note that bilateral rather than unilateral xC marriage is reflected, along with teknonymy ("Fl"="gF of S"). The

601 equation of mak Sl with Bl is also suggestive of the Kuki pattern, and the further equation with xC, through "invasion" of the consanguineal nomenclature, can also be matched in Kuki. Taungthu p'a-nam Dl suggests a comparison with the TB root *nam, but in the list on p. lxi the form is cited as pa-nein and thus the form remains in doubt. Taungthu (ka-)ning HSi further suggests a comparison with Kachin ning xCi(ws), Sil(ws); cf. also Pwo k'ei-nin Sbl(ds), as cited in Webb.

The equation of N with gCh has already been noted for Sgaw, and is found also in Padaung, along with a further equation with C, viz. li SS, p'ok-li DS,pxN,PSiCh (p'ok= p'auk S< Karen *p'o). Yinbaw, a closely related dialect, has li gS, p'auk-du pxN,PSiCh (-du < Karen *do). The Taungthu list on p. lxi similarly has li gS,pxN,FSBCh (the terms for MSbCh are omitted from this list). The equation of pxN with gCh can be accounted for on the basis of the equation of MB with gF and FSi with gN, but the additional equation with pxC cannot be thus explained. The same sort of equations are met with in the Shan lists presented by Webb (pp. liii, lxv), as well as in the Pale and Palaung lists (pp. l, li, lix) and the Yang Lam list (pp. lx, lxv). Pale and Palaung, of Mon-Khmer stock, have borrowed the Shan term lan, while Yang Lam, a third member of this stock, has retained the native term pli (used only for gCh,pxN). As stated above, the pxN=gCh equation is typical of the Thai system of nomenclature in general, but the Thai terms for "C" are distinct. It may be that the Karen nomenclature has at this point undergone Thai

601 or Mon-Khmer influence. More reliable data on this polyglot area should yield many important facts with regard to the nature of the borrowing process.

In review, it has been shown that the Karen system of kinship nomenclature, though built up on the basis of a fair proportion of TB roots, yet is quite distinct as to pattern. The key TB roots for "MB" and "FSi" are not present, nor do any primary FSb roots appear to have been developed. The collateral lines are distinguished from the central line more carefully than in Tibeto-Burman, but the cross and parallel lines are merged. With the exception of Taungthu, an aberrant member of the family, there are but scant suggestions of categorical equations of TB type. The equation of pxN with gCh has TB analogies, but in Karen this feature is of restricted distribution and is perhaps to be explained in terms of diffusion. The stressing of age distinctions rather than sex distinctions constitutes another link with the TB system, but the use of a single term for "oSb" is a Thai rather than TB feature.

The Karen terminology thus presents the problem of genetic linguistic affiliations vs. structural divergences. While, on the linguistic side, Karen was experiencing a radical shift in syntactical pattern (object after rather than before verb), on the cultural side the system of patrilineal clans with xC marriage seems to have been breaking down into something approaching a bilateral kindred organization.

601 Either Thai or Mon-Khmer influence can be invoked to account for this transformation, the latter appearing to the writer the more likely. It is well to note which terms have survived during this process: *p'i gM, *p'u gF, *p'a F, *mak Sl, but not *mi FSi nor *k'u MB (contrast Chinese, vide pt. 3).

The Karen have, for some unaccountable reason, succeeded in escaping study by a professional anthropologist, and remain to the present day a choice field for scientific exploitation. The well known monograph by Marshall is not more than a fair missionary effort, and aside from this we have only the scattered notes in Scott's Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States. The little that we know of Karen social organization, however, is in general accordance with the Karen kinship nomenclature that has just been analyzed. Descent appears to be reckoned bilaterally, and clans are presumably lacking. Residence is normally matrilocal, on the testimony both of Marshall (p. 190) and of Scott (pp. 527-5[illegible]), in contrast to the patrilocal residence found among most Tibeto-Burman-speaking peoples (but there are indications of matrilocal residence among the Burmish-Loloish tribes, including the Burmese themselves, and this feature has been recorded for the Rasa, a Konyak tribe). The Karen originally had the bachelor's house (blaw) institution, much as that found in the Tibeto-Burman area, but this is now obsolescent (Marshall 62, 138 and ff.).

All of our authorities on the Karen have remarked on the tendency toward cousin marriage among this people. The most

601 specific statement that has been found is that made by Mason (1866) with reference to the Bghai:

> First cousins may marry, but that relation is considered undesirably close. Second cousins are deemed most suitable for marriage. Third cousins may marry without impropriety, although that relation is considered as undesirably remote. Beyond third cousins marriages are prohibited. (pp. 18, 19).

Marshall reports (p. 176) that it is "not uncommon" for second and third cousins to marry, but rare for first cousins to do so. In Scott we find the statement, with reference to the Zayein, that marriages are permitted only between "near relatives, such as cousins" (p. 540). Marriage beyond the limits of this immediate kindred group is deemed worthy of especial mention by Scott:

> Exogamy is the rule among these tribes Pedaung ; they are allowed to marry any women they please and are not tied down to blood relations as is customary among other Karen tribes. (p. 537).

These marriage restrictions appear to have been carried to a pathological extreme among the Zayein and Monyang (or Banyok), according to the account in Scott. The Monyang inhabit a single village (Banyin), which formerly intermarried with the village of Pahlaing but is now completely endogamous. Their numbers are said to be rapidly dwindling because of the rarity of marriages - a result of the regulations described above. If we can trust our author, "the men are said to be very averse to marriage", and "have frequently to be taken by force to the bride's house" (p. 547). The Zayein are described in even more vivid terms. The young men of a Zayein village are completely segregated from the unmarried women of the village, and are forced to live in a bachelor's house (hay = bley)

601 outside the village limits. They are not permitted to enter the homes of their parents, nor to speak to any of the young women of the village. The proportion of aged bachelors and spinsters is said to be high, as is the proportion of couples of unequal age. If an unmarried woman becomes pregnant, she and her lover are forced to commit suicide (suicide was once very common among the Sgaw, according to Marshall, p. 150). If this description is even approximately correct, the Banyang and Zayein should repay study in terms of frustration, incest taboos, and the like.

The presence of preferential marriage with second cousin suggests interesting possibilities, but the value of this information is greatly diminished by the fact that we do not know whether pC or xC, or both, are involved. Scott notes that among the Zayein intermarriage is permitted only between members of certain villages, and describes six exogamous groups of villages, each including from two to six villages. No further details are offered, however, and Marshall gives no hint of groupings of this kind. It is evident that our Kachin material cannot be fully evaluated until more ethnographic data are made available.

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3. Chinese

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In the present section the writer proposes to examine the Chinese system of nomenclature with reference to the basic Tibeto-Burman system reconstructed above. Our interest naturally lies in the early Chinese system rather than in the later developments, for it is here that significant points of resemblance can be expected to appear. We shall devote our attention, therefore, to " ncient Chinese" rather than to "Chinese" in general.

Our analysis has been made possible by the definitive work by Feng, to whom the anthropological world owes a lasting debt of gratitude. Just how great a debt this is can be realized only after a comparison has been made with the early crude account by Morgan (based on material supplied by Hart, an English customs official), the not-so-early but equally inadequate description by Hu, and even the more recent work by Chen and Shryock, which suffers from a grievous want of historical perspective. Feng has provided us with a detailed account of Chinese kinship nomenclature from the earliest period down to the present, based on carefully checked sources which are handled in the competent manner seldom attained even by our foremost European sinologues. A fair proportion of illustrative material is incorporated, and Chinese characters are cited. It is from this excellent source that the writer has drawn most of the material cited in this study.

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601

Feng's work is incomplete only with respect to the modern dialects of China. Dialectical vocative terms are cited, and the developments behind some of the modern terms are brought to light, but the treatment is essentially literary throughout. For the modern dialects as such we must turn to isolated descriptions of individual dialectical patterns, e.g. May's account of Cantonese nomenclature. The single exception here is furnished by Fei's analysis of the kinship terms employed in the dialects of Wukiang (Kiangsu), Shanghai, Hangchow (Chekiang), Tungchow (Hopei), Quemoy (Fukien), and Lanchow (Kansu), representing three major dialectical groups (Mandarin, Shanghai, Fukien). Fei devotes most of his attention to the vocative terms, which he regards as "more directly connected with the social organization" (p. 128).

From the present point of view, the main defect in Feng's work lies in the almost entire absence of linguistic treatment. Feng refers to his own method of approach as "primarily historical and linguistic" (p. 147), but from his footnote to this page we can see that he employs the term 'linguistic' in a greatly generalized sense. A truly linguistic approach calls for the use of archaic forms rather than of the phonetically degenerate Mandarin forms of the present day, and for an attempt, at least, to point out the affinities of these terms, both within and without Chinese. The employment of archaic forms, even in a

121 601 normalized orthography, would have removed the confusion produced by (modern) homogyns such as fu < b'iu (父) F, fu < piu (夫) H, fu < b'i u (婦) SM; cf. Brooter's uncertainty on this point in his analysis of the material presented by Chen and Shryock (p. 152).

601 [121] The writer has attempted to supply the linguistic treatment lacking in Feng's work. The forms cited are those of Ancient Chinese, as reconstructed for approximately A. D. 600. The still earlier Archaic Chinese language of the first millenium B. C. has also been reconstructed in part, but our authorities in this field (notably Karlgren, Simon, Li Fang-kuei, and Chou Tsu-jên) disagree on many important points. The problems of a purely linguistic nature in this connection are manifold and cannot be entered upon in the present review, though occasional points are discussed below. The Ancient Chinese forms cited are slightly normalized variants of those found in Karlgren's well known Analytic Dictionary. In Karlgren's orthography, adopted here in the interest of uniformity, ə represents the vowel of Eng. 'but', and a the vowel of Eng. 'all'.

The ancient system of nomenclature is that recorded in the Êrh Ya and the early ritual works (Li Chi), supplemented by occasional gleanings from other classical works such as the Tso Chuan and Mencius. Our data on this ancient system are not complete, but enough of it is known to provide a good basis for discussion. In the tabulation below only the more significant terms are included. Modern Mandarin forms are cited within parentheses.

601

Ancient Chinese Consanguineal Terms

yiwang-mou (王 wang) gM	tsuo (祖 tsu) gF yiwang-b'iu (王 wang) gF
mou (母 mu) M	b'iu (父 fu) F
ds'iwong-mou (姪 ts'ung) MSi	ds'iwong-b'iu (姪 ts'ung) FB
	ziêi-b'iu (世 shih) FoB
kuo (姑 ku) FSi	g'iou (舅 chiu) MB
tsi (姊 tsǐ) oSi	xiwong (兄 hsiung) oB
	kuon (昆 k'un) oB
muâi (妹 mei) ySi	d'iei (弟 ti) yB
ds'iwong-b'iu tsi-muâi FBD	ds'iwong-b'iu kuon-d'iei FBS
ds'iwong-mou tsi-muâi MSiD	ds'iwong-mou kuon-d'iei MSiS
	gong (甥 shêng) xCo,SiS(ms)
	ts'iuǒt (出 ch'u) SiS(ms)
d'iǒt (姪 chih) BCh(ms)	
niwo (女 nü) D,BD(ms)	tsi (子 tsǔ) S,BS(ms)
	suon (孫 sun) gS

Ancient Chinese Affinal Terms

kuo Hl	g'iou Fl
i (姨 i) WSi	a (亞 ya) WSiH
sêu (嫂 sao) oSW	gong Sl(ms)
b'iou (婦 fu) Dl	siwo (婦 hsü) Sl

Notes:

The term tsuo gF has the basic signification of "ancestor", while yiwang < *gwang is the word for "king", cognate with ywang (皇 huang) "sovereign, imperial, august". The Erh Ya

601 prefixes the element ngûi (外 wai) when these terms are applied to WF and WM, just as it prefixes ngûi to the terms hue and g'iou when applied to WM and WF, respectively, but the unprefixed terms are also employed. In general, this early system dispenses with the use of categorical terms of this type, except in describing kin of the more remote collateral lines. It is only in the later systems that this type of descriptive nomenclature is fully developed.

The vocative terminology, both ancient and modern, shows much more variation than the descriptive (cf. Fei). Some of the more important F and gF terms are: kung (公 kung) gF (used as a title in early times); ung (翁 wûng) gF (probably etymologically related to the foregoing; cf. Pelliot, also Feng, note 55 to p. 215); ia (爺 yeh) F,gF; t'ia < *tia (爹 tieh) F (apparently developed in North China); pa (爸 pa) F (apparently developed in South China); b'uâ (婆 p'o) gM; nâi (奶 nai) gM (also applied to M in state of Ch'u); niang (娘 niang) M (also "young lady"); ma (媽 ma) M (the most common term).

The PSb terms in use at this early period in China conform fundamentally to Lowie's "bifurcate merging" type rather than to his "bifurcate collateral" type. The most common terms for MBd and FB appear to have been da'iwong-mòu and da'iwong-b'iu, respectively, based on the words for M and F plus the element da'iwong "following". The term śiâi-b'iu FoB, formed with the element śiâi < *śiâd "generation", was also in general use. These combined terms were

601 gradually replaced by the terms pak (伯 po) "older" and ŝiuk (叔 shu) "younger", first in combination with b'iu F (as in the Li Chi) and later independently. Pak, one of the feudal titles, is also found in combination with xiwong oB and tai oSi, as if reinforcing the age distinctions implied in those terms, while ŝiuk was originally the categorical term applied to the third of a series of brothers. Paralleling the development of these independent terms for FoB and FyB, the affinal term i was applied to MSi as early as ca. 500 B. C. (the earliest recorded instance is found in the Tso Chuan) and has been retained in this meaning to the present day. The modern Chinese system is therefore of "bifurcate collateral" type, as pointed out by Kroeber and Chen and Shryock.

The four Sb terms appear in the earliest material and must be regarded as basic to the system. Of the pair of terms for oB, kuon seems to have been the older and xiwong the more recent; note that kuon-d'iei rather than xiwong-d'iei is employed in the cousin nomenclature. There are indications that d'iei could be used for "ySi" as well as "yB", and an especial character (娣) for the term in this connotation is found in the Shih Ming (ca. A. D. 200).

In the modern dialects, the old terms for oSi and oB have in vocative usage been replaced by tsia (姐 chieh) and kû (哥 ko), respectively, whereas the terms for ySi and yB have been retained even in address. Thus Chinese, like Tibeto-Burman, attests to the generalization that terms

601 applied to kin older than speaker (or otherwise in a position calling for respect) are more susceptible to change than their complementary terms. Tsia is perhaps a variant of tsi (tsia< tsi-a). The term kâ appears in T'ang times in the meaning "F", and was only later (9th to 10th centuries) applied to "oB". Pelliot has compared the prefixed form a-kâ with Turkic and Mongol aqa oB, but this Altaic form is relatively late. The equation oB= F also appears in xiwong (5th century A. D., as used among some royal families), and the parallel equation oSi= M both in tsi (applied to M in state of Ch'i) and tsia (applied to M throughout the Yangtze valley down to the 13th century). Comparable equations have been noted above for Tibeto-Burman (Section A).

The terms tsi S (tonally identical with tsi oSi) and suən gS are basically neuter (Ch and gCh), but are commonly employed in a masculine sense. Niwo D functions in combined terms as a feminine affix, e.g. suən-niwo (or niwo-suən) gD. Other terms for Ch are ńźie < ńia (兒 êrh) (a diminutive suffix in the modern language) and nuo (奴 nu), apparently the same word as nuo (奴 nu) "slave, servant" (this semantic association is found also in Kachin).

The collateral nomenclature presents an interesting contrast between the pC terms, formed in an analytical manner, and the xCe term peng. Feng (p. 171) is inclined to dismiss the Êrh Ya statement equating xCe with xNe as a later interpolation, and is unable to interpret the alternative term

601 ts'iuŏt xNe cited in the same source. In Mencius, however, ʂʊng is used in the meaning "Sl", which can be explained only if we assign the basic meaning "xNe" to this term. It would appear to the writer that ʂʊng and g'iəu are conceptually reciprocal terms paralleling d'iŏt and kuo, and that the use of ʂʊng in the meaning "xCe" represents an extension of the term. In the Êrh Ya classification, ʂʊng is placed in the Ch'i tang (妻黨) category, "Relatives through wife", hence the affinal affiliations of the term seem to have been uppermost in the minds of the compilers of this classic. The application to xCe perhaps represents an "invasion" of the consanguineal nomenclature via the equation of WH with DH. According to this interpretation, ʂʊng would originally have stood for "husband of a woman of Ego's clan"; cf. the development of the TB root *mak Sl in Kuki and Abor-Miri. Ts'iuŏt < t'iuŏt S15(ms) and d'iŏt BCh(ws) appear to be variants of a single root, perhaps for xN(mws). The former is cited only in the Êrh Ya (the root is regularly used in the meaning "go out"), and thus can be regarded as of dialectical origin. The xN distinctions are reflected also in the terms lyie-suən (離住 li) S1SS(ms), lit. "departing gS", and kywie-suən (歸 kuei) BSS(ws), lit. "returning gS".

The classing of BCh (ms) with Ego's Ch, though not shown in the Êrh Ya (where these terms are lacking), can safely be inferred from the data supplied by Feng. A distinction began to appear in Han times, with the result that the term d'iŏt was shifted from BCh(ws) to BCh(ms) during the Chin period (265-420).

601 The affinal nomenclature presents basic categorical equations at three points (Z1= FSi, F1=MB, E1= xCo), all indicating xC marriage of bilateral type. Sân oBW is perhaps a woman's term (Êrh Ye). This term is also employed in the meaning "matron", and may originally have been a general honorific; cf. sou (叟 sou) "old man, sir" (on same tone and with same phonetic element). The term i < tdi WSi appears to have been applied only when the sisters married different men, i.e. under non-sororate conditions. This term has from early times been used for "MSi" (vide supra). The terms b'iau D1 and siwo S1 are also employed for W and H, respectively, along with numerous other terms which do not merit consideration in this brief review. Finally, a WSiH can be interpreted as an extension of the word in its fundamental meaning "second, younger, inferior", since under a system of brother-sister exchange WSiH becomes Ego's B (we must suppose that the term was applied to WySiH=yB).

The correlation of the system of nomenclature just described with the ancient Chinese practices of cross-cousin marriage and the sororate has been noted by several writers on the subject, with Feng giving the most thorough account. Feng has further invoked the principle of teknonymy to account for a number of later developments in the system, notably the application of kuo FSi to MSi (from the 4th century on) and of g'iau MB to WB (from the 10th century on). Granet has attempted to explain the same features in terms of irregular marriages between members of different generations,

601 e.g. the marriage of oSiD by a Han emperor, and of FFSiD (i.e. F's paternal xCi) by a T'ang emperor. Feng has convincingly refuted the arguments brought forward by Granet, and the writer has nothing to add on this point. Insofar as the present limited field of enquiry is concerned, Granet and his theories can be dismissed without loss.

A comparison of the ancient Chinese nomenclature with that reconstructed for Tibeto-Burman brings out some points of capital interest. Basically the two systems are identical or very nearly so. Both have primary terms for FSi and MB, as contrasted with MSi and FB terms formed through extensions of the terms for M and F, plus categorical elements of various types. Age distinctions are on the whole more prominent in Chinese, but not significantly so, e.g. the age distinctions in the PSb terms can be more than matched in Burmese and Southern Kuki. The two most serious points of discrepancy occur in the gP and Sb sets of terms. Chinese has nothing to match the TB primary roots *p'i gP and *p'u gP, though it must be noted that vocative terms are not lacking (vide supra). Chinese distinguishes between muâi ySi and d'iei ySb, as opposed to the TB neuter term *nau ySb, yet there are indications that d'iei was originally a neuter term (ySb), as noted above. Muâi ySi was perhaps secondarily developed from the root represented by mau M, from a basic connotation "female" (Li Fang-kuei has suggested reconstructions calling for mau < *mwɔk, muâi < *mwɔk, the vocalism being determined by tone

601 The sex-of-speaker distinctions found in a number of TB languages do not appear in the Chinese Sb terms. Chinese has two well-attested terms for oB, however, and it might be argued that one of these was originally a man's term, the other a woman's term.

The agreement of the two systems in the affinal terminology, each showing categorical equations indicative of cross-cousin marriage, is undoubtedly the most significant single fact that has been unearthed in the course of our survey of Asiatic kinship. Since we have abundant evidence for cross-cousin marriage itself in both areas, as well as the terminologies in both linguistic families, the inference of an ancient cross-cousin marriage pattern becomes virtually inevitable.

This inference is further supported by an amazing piece of linguistic evidence. Scarcely any of the Chinese kinship terms can be identified as cognates of TB roots, despite the close agreements of the two kinship patterns (contrast Karen). The vocative terms ma M and pa F are of TB type, but the descriptive terms mau M (perhaps from kawak or kmak) and b'iu F are apparently distinct from any roots in TB or Karen. The linguistic problems in connection with these terms, however, are extremely intricate, and it is doubtful whether they can successfully be attacked at the present stage of investigation. Thus, tsi S would appear to be cognate with a similar root found in Gyarung and Kanauri, but the archaic Chinese form may have been ctaig, since in the Shih Ching

601 (Book of Odes) tsi (子) rhymes with tək (德), and its cognate dz'i (字) "to nourish, breed, cherish" rhymes with iək (翼). In the midst of all this uncertainty, however, we encounter the term g'iəu MB = Fl, which can beyond any reasonable doubt be identified with the TB root *k'u MB = Fl. As in other roots (cf. the root for "9" infra) the correspondence shown by the initials cannot be analyzed, though the unaspirated forms in Burmese and Kachin suggest that the TB root may have been *gu or *g'u rather than *k'u (both these languages regularly preserve initial aspiration). The finals, however, belong to one of the best established of all Sino-Tibetan phonetic series. The following set of roots is presented by way of illustration:

	Chinese	Tibetan	Kachin	Burmese
MB = Fl*	g'iəu (舅)	k'u	ku	kui
owl	g'iəu (雊)	-	k'u	-
nine	kiəu (九)	dgu	jǎ-k'u	kui[3]
pigeon	kiəu (鳩)	k'u-**	-	k'ui

*Note: Tib. k'u FB; Kachin ku FSiH,HF,Bl; Burmese B (honorific prefix).

**Note: Tib. k'u-byug "cuckoo" (affiliation uncertain)

Such are the "fact in the case", whatever may be their significance. In Tibeto-Burman, as has been shown, the root *k'u MB is much less stable than *ni FSi, yet in the linguistic substratum common to Tibeto-Burman and Chinese it is the former and not the latter root that has been preserved. Under a system of cross-cousin marriage in conjunction with patrilineal

601 descent, however, MB=F1 rather than FBi=Mi should be the pivotal relationship, hence the problem is a two-sided one. No likely solution is at hand, and the writer will content himself merely by posing this as a final problem.

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ALl Southeast Asia
Kuki-Lushai AR8

/For a linguistic reconstruction of the kinship terminology of the Kuki, see ALl Southeast Asia, 23: Benedict, category 116, chapter 12, pp. 280-289./

23: Benedict
601

ALl Southeast Asia
Kuki-Lushai AR8

/For a linguistic confirmation of the kinship terms used in this source, see category 197./

23: Benedict
184, 192, 582, 591, 602, 611, 613, 614, 616, 618, 621

A L1 Southeast Asia
Kuki-Lushai AR8

/For lists of kinship terms, and for excellent and detailed information concerning correlations between kinship terminology, patterns of behavior, and social institutions, see category 601./

23: Benedict
197, 113, 601

ALl Southeast Asia
West Tibetans AJ4
Northern Tribes AW45
Pahari AW14

/For a linguistic reconstruction of kinship terminology of several Tibetan-speaking peoples of India, see ALl Southeast Asia, 23: Benedict, category 116, pp. 52-74./

23: Benedict
113, 601

ALl Southeast Asia
Sikkim AK3

/For kinship terms, see ALl Southeast Asia, 23: Benedict, category 116, pp. 38-39, and for the bibliography cited, see same source, pp. 47-51./

23: Benedict
601, 113

AL1 Southeast Asia
Balti AV2

/For kinship terms, see AL1 Southeast Asia, 23: Benedict, category 116, pp. 31-33, and for the bibliography cited, see same source, pp. 47-51./

23: Benedict
601

ALl Southeast Asia
Burmese AP4

/For a linguistic confirmation of the kinship terms used in this source, see category 197./

23: Benedict
601

AL1 Southeast Asia
Tibet AJ1

/For a linguistic confirmation of the kinship terms used in this source, see category 197./

23: Benedict
184, 192, 582, 591, 602, 611, 613, 614, 616, 618, 621

ALl Southeast Asia
Tibet AJl

/For lists of kinship terms, and for excellent and detailed information concerning correlations between kinship terminology, patterns of behavior, and social institutions, see category 601./

23: Benedict
601, 113

AL1 Southeast Asia
Bhutan AK2

/For kinship terms in the Tsangla dialect, see AL1 Southeast Asia; 23: Benedict, category 116, pp. 43-47, and for bibliography cited, see same source, pp. 47-51./

23: Benedict
113, 197, 601

ALl Southeast Asia
Assam ARl

/For a linguistic reconstruction of the kinship terminology of the Aka people of Assam, see ALl Southeast Asia, 23: Benedict, category 116, pp. 138-139, 142-143./

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23: Benedict
113, 197, 601

ALl Southeast Asia
Prehistoric Burma AP3

/For information on the kinship terminology of the Pyu, see ALl Southeast Asia, 23: Benedict, category 116, pp. 167-169./

23: Benedict
113, 197, 601

AL1 Southeast Asia
Lolo AE4

/For a linguistic reconstruction of the kinship terminology of the Lolo, see AL1 Southeast Asia, 23: Benedict, category 116, pp. 198-235./

23: Benedict
113, 197, 601

AL1 Southeast Asia
Lahu AP13
Laotians AM8

/For a linguistic reconstruction of the kinship terminology of the Lahu and Laotians, see AL1 Southeast Asia, 23: Benedict: category 116, pp. 198-205, 230-235./

23: Benedict
184, 192, 582, 591, 602, 611, 613, 614, 616, 618, 621

A L1 Southeast Asia
Kachin AP6

/For lists of kinship terms, and for excellent and detailed information concerning correlations between kinship terminology, patterns of behavior, and social institutions, see category 601./

23: Benedict
113, 197, 601

ALl Southeast Asia
Kachin AP6

/For a linguistic reconstruction of kinship terminology of the Maru and Atsi, see ALl Southeast Asia, 23: Benedict, category 116, pp. 188-198, 230-235./

23: Benedict
601

ALl Southeast Asia
Kachin AP6

/For a linguistic confirmation of the kinship terms used in this source, see category 197./

23: Benedict
601

AL1 Southeast Asia
Sino-Tibetan Border
Peoples AE3

/For a linguistic confirmation of the kinship terms used in this source, see category 197./

23: Benedict
113, 197, 601

ALl Southeast Asia
Sino-Tibetan Border
Peoples AE3

/For a linguistic reconstruction of the kinship terminology of the Moso, Lisu, Nyi, Ahi, and Lolopho, see ALl Southeast Asia, 23: Benedict, category 116, pp. 205-235./

23: Benedict
184, 192, 582, 591, 602, 611, 613, 614, 616, 618, 621

ALl Southeast Asia
Sino-Tibetan Border
Peoples AE3

/For lists of kinship terms, and for excellent and detailed information concerning correlations between kinship terminology, patterns of behavior, and social institutions, see category 601./

23: Benedict
184, 192, 582, 591, 602, 611, 613, 614, 616, 618, 621

ALl Southeast Asia
Burmese AP4

/For lists of kinship terms, and for excellent and detailed information concerning correlations between kinship terminology, patterns of behavior, and social institutions, see category 601./

23: Benedict
601

ALl Southeast Asia
Kachari AR6

/For a linguistic confirmation of the kinship terms used in this source, see category 197./

23: Benedict
184, 192, 582, 591, 602, 611, 613, 614, 616, 618, 621

AL1 Southeast Asia
Kachari AR6

/For lists of kinship terms, and for excellent and detailed information concerning correlations between kinship terminology, patterns of behavior, and social institutions, see category 601./

23: Benedict
601

ALl Southeast Asia
Mikir AR10

/For a linguistic confirmation of the kinship terms used in this source, see category 197./

23: Benedict
184, 192, 582, 591, 602, 611, 613, 614, 616, 618, 621

ALl Southeast Asia
Mikir AR10

/For lists of kinship terms, and for excellent and detailed information concerning correlations between kinship terminology, patterns of behavior, and social institutions, see category 601./

23: Benedict
601

AL1 Southeast Asia
Nepal AK1

/For a linguistic confirmation of the kinship terms used in this source, see category 197./

23: Benedict
184, 192, 582, 591, 602, 611, 613, 614, 616, 618, 621

ALl Southeast Asia
Nepal AKl

/For lists of kinship terms, and for excellent and detailed information concerning correlations between kinship terminology, patterns of behavior, and social institutions, see category 601./

23: Benedict
601

ALl Southeast Asia
Meithei AR9

/For a linguistic confirmation of the kinship terms used in this source, see category 197./

23: Benedict
184, 192, 582, 591, 602, 611, 613, 614, 616, 618, 621

AL1 Southeast Asia
Meithei AR9

/For lists of kinship terms, and for excellent and detailed information concerning correlations between kinship terminology, patterns of behavior, and social institutions, see category 601./

23: Benedict
601

AL1 Southeast Asia
Lepcha AK5

/For a linguistic confirmation of the kinship terms used in this source, see category 197./

23: Benedict
184, 192, 582, 591, 602, 611, 613, 614, 616, 618, 621

ALl Southeast Asia
Lepcha AK5

/For lists of kinship terms, and for excellent and detailed information concerning correlations between kinship terminology, patterns of behavior, and social institutions, see category 601./

23: Benedict
601

ALl Southeast Asia
Chittagong AR4

/For a linguistic confirmation of the kinship terms used in this source, see category 197./

23: Benedict
184, 192, 582, 591, 602, 611, 613, 614, 616, 618, 621

ALl Southeast Asia
Chittagong AR4

/For lists of kinship terms, and for excellent and detailed information concerning correlations between kinship terminology, patterns of behavior, and social institutions, see category 601./

23: Benedict
601

ALl Southeast Asia
Miri ARll

/For a linguistic confirmation of the kinship terms used in this source, see category 197./

23: Benedict
184, 192, 582, 591, 602, 611, 613, 614, 616, 618, 621

ALl Southeast Asia
Miri ARll

/For lists of kinship terms, and for excellent and detailed information concerning correlations between kinship terminology, patterns of behavior, and social institutions, see category 601./

23: Benedict
601

A L1 Southeast Asia
Naga AR13

/For a linguistic confirmation of the kinship terms used in this source, see category 197./

23: Benedict
184, 192, 582, 591, 602, 611, 613, 614, 616, 618, 621

AL1 Southeast Asia
Naga AR13

/For lists of kinship terms, and for excellent and detailed information concerning correlations between kinship terminology, patterns of behavior, and social institutions, see category 601./

23: Benedict
601

AL1 Southeast Asia
Mishmi AR12

/For a linguistic confirmation of the kinship terms used in this source, see category 197./

23: Benedict
184, 192, 582, 591, 602, 611, 613, 614, 616, 618, 621

A L1 Southeast Asia
Mishmi AR12

/For lists of kinship terms, and for excellent and detailed information concerning correlations between kinship terminology, patterns of behavior, and social institutions, see category 601./

23: Benedict
601

AL1 Southeast Asia
Garo AR5

/For a linguistic confirmation of the kinship terms used in this source, see category 197./

23: Benedict
184, 192, 582, 591, 602, 611, 613, 614, 616, 618, 621

ALl Southeast Asia
Garo AR5

/For lists of kinship terms, and for excellent and detailed information concerning correlations between kinship terminology, patterns of behavior, and social institutions, see category 601./

23: Benedict
601

ALl Southeast Asia
Karen AP7

/For a linguistic confirmation of the kinship terms used in this source, see category 197./

23: Benedict
184, 192, 582, 591, 602, 611, 613, 614, 616, 618, 621

ALl Southeast Asia
Karen AP7

/For lists of kinship terms, and for excellent and detailed information concerning correlations between kinship terminology, patterns of behavior, and social institutions, see category 601./

23: Benedict
601

AL1 Southeast Asia
Shan-Thai AL3

/For a linguistic confirmation of the kinship terms used in this source, see category 197./

23: Benedict
184, 192, 582, 591, 602, 611, 613, 614, 616, 618, 621

AL1 Southeast Asia
Shan-Thai AL3

/For lists of kinship terms; and for excellent and detailed information concerning correlations between kinship terminology, patterns of behavior, and social institutions, see category 601./

1: Pelzer S-8 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

114 For a number of years I have been deeply interested in problems of pioneering, especially of pioneering in the tropics. My earlier studies were concerned with the possibilities of settlement in the tropics by peoples of other latitudes, both Westerners and Asiatics. In the course of these studies I became more and more interested in the fact that in many parts of the tropics, above all in the Asiatic tropics, there has been a great need for alleviation of the pressure of population. Occasionally this has led to spontaneous pioneering by small groups of settlers, but more frequently to the encouragement and support of pioneering by governments.

•121 It was my original plan to visit all of the countries around the South China Sea and to study government-sponsored settlement activities in the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, Malaya, and Indochina at first hand. The war, however, prevented me from visiting the mainland of Southeastern Asia; instead, I had to limit myself to the island world of the Philippines and the Netherlands Indies. From May 1940 to May 1941 I traveled throughout the islands of Luzon, Negros, Cebu, Mindanao, Java, Sumatra, and Bali. The war has also made impossible a rechecking of many of the references.

000 In the field I enjoyed the generous help of a large number of government officials as well as of private persons. In the Philippines I turned frequently for advice and assistance to Mr. Arthur F. Fischer, then President Quezon's adviser, who, as former Director of the Bureau of Forestry, has an unrivaled knowledge of the Philippine Islands. I am especially grateful to the staff of the National Land Settlement Administration.

In the Netherlands Indies I found the officials of the departments of Economic Affairs and of the Interior most kind and helpful. I wish to express thanks especially to Dr. H. J. van Mook, then Director of the Department of Economic Affairs, and to Messrs. A. Luytjes, J. J. Ochse, E. de Vries, A.M.M.P. Scheltema, A. K. Pringgodigdo, Th. J. Odenkirchen, P. Creutzberg, J. C. L. Götz van der Vet, J. F. Dekker, H. A. A. M. Wirtz, L. Gonggrijp, J. F. Kools, W. F. H. van Ameron, L. H. Vreeling, H. Loos, and W. E. K. Baron van Lynden, all of the Department of Economic Affairs. I am also greatly indebted to Governors C. O. van der Plas and L. Adam and to the following members of the Department of the Interior: Messrs. C. C. J. Maassen, J. M. Pieters, H. J. Friedericy, A. Jonkers, J. van der Zwaal, A. Deelemen, G. Ijsselstijn and G. de Lassequere.

To my wife, who accompanied me, I am deeply indebted for inspiration and encouragement as well as for keen criticism of the manuscript. Dr. Robert Bowman read the first part of the book with painstaking care; his criticism and suggestions were of great value to me. The late G.H.C. Hart read and criticized the chapters on the Netherlands Indies. I wish also to express my gratitude to Professor Leo Waibel, Dr. George F. Carter, and Messrs. Bruno Lasker and Philip Lilienthal for their helpful suggestions and to the editors for their work. The guidance of the U.S. Board

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and they are now less than one and a half million compared with the Chinese eight and a half or so in a total population approaching one hundred and sixty million. Nor can they compare with their fellow immigrants in wealth and influence. The Chinese in Southeast Asia are of the greatest political, economic, and social significance to the region and, indirectly, to the world as a whole, but until now no comprehensive study of them has been attempted. The considerations that have led me to venture to provide what is at least an outline of the subject are as follows.

To carry out the research necessary for an adequate history of the Chinese in the seven countries of the region (counting 'British Borneo' as one), together with a basic study of Chinese emigration into Southeast Asia and its causes, to collate the material, and to write the work itself would, in all reasonableness, take some seven or eight years. Moreover, the qualifications for embarking on such an enterprise should include, first, an extensive background knowledge of China and the Chinese, secondly, a close acquaintance with the several countries of Southeast Asia and their histories, and, thirdly, at least a working knowledge of a score of languages and dialects. Since no person of the necessary qualifications, leisure, or ambition appeared to be forthcoming, and the need for a primer on Chinese affairs in this region was urgent, I decided to be greatly daring and to try my hand at a single impressionistic volume. My qualifications fell far short of the desideratum, but among them were two years of study in Canton, a period of attachment to the Hong Kong Government, and an intimate contact with the Chinese in Malaya, as a Colonial official, for over a quarter of a century.[1] I had visited the countries themselves at different times (the last occasion being as consultant to the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in 1947), and I had an acquaintance with the Chinese written language and the Cantonese and Mandarin dialects as well as a working knowledge of French, Spanish, Italian, and Malay, with some German, Portuguese, and Dutch. I had also served an apprenticeship in the subject by writing a study of the Chinese in one country of the area.[2]

[1] Many appointments, held during this period, included those of magistrate, Protector of Chinese, Assistant Director of Education (Chinese), and Director-General of Information. Under the British Military Administration (1945–6) I was Colonel, Principal Adviser on Chinese affairs.

[2] *The Chinese in Malaya* (London, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948).

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115 and the Colonial Office, and, notably, from Miss Barbara Kyle,
127 librarian of Chatham House, and her staff who seemed never at a
122 loss to produce the most out-of-the-way books and periodicals, and from Miss K. M. L. Simpson, press librarian of Chatham House, whose staff were unfailing in providing cuttings on all sorts of subjects and at the shortest notice. The entire work has been edited by Mrs Dorothy A. Cannell with a care that has increased its precision and improved the diction.

Finally I should thank Miss Margaret Cleeve, the Research Secretary of Chatham House, and Mr W. L. Holland, the Secretary General of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, for their invaluable assistance. Without them and the machinery of their institutions I should have been unable to solicit the help of the above-mentioned experts and the project would have been stillborn.[1]

In order to bring the survey as up to date as possible, a Postscript is added, written in the course of a visit to all the countries of Southeast Asia in the second half of 1950. This visit was made possible by a grant for the purpose from the Rockefeller Foundation to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

August 1950 VICTOR PURCELL

● 121 [1] Since the main object of this study is to throw light on contemporary happenings, more attention has been paid to the history of the past two or three hundred years than to the earlier Chinese contacts with Southeast Asia. Indeed, as in my work on the Chinese in Malaya, interest in the Chinese begins in earnest from the time when they formed more or less settled communities in the region, and minor account is taken of trading voyages or isolated travellers.

The story is brought up to the moment of writing, which differs, of course, in the several parts. The section on Indonesia, for example, stops just before the second Dutch 'police action'; for Malaya the narrative is taken to February 1949.

That the authorities are mostly European rather than Chinese is due to the fact that the analytic and descriptive habit is of only recent growth among the Chinese of Southeast Asia.

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symbols of our age—the Petrol Pump, the Pylon, the 'Dust Bowl', 184
the Automat, 'Mass Media', the chilling Neon Sign—there is a 178
shrinking of the soul and a poignant yearning for the glory that was Angkor and the grandeur that was Chang An. Yet it is in its effective organs—the Assembly Line, the Tennessee Valley Authority, 'E.R.P.', and the Research Stations—that our robotic civilization throbs; not in the cult of lost causes or impossible loyalties, nor in our academies, our museums, nor our half-empty cathedrals.

At least it is the material aspects of our civilization which appeal to the awakening consciousness of the peoples of the Far East. Whether they will adopt capitalist, socialist, or communist social organization as a means of securing the coveted gadgets of the West that mean a higher standard of living is another matter. Dr Joseph Needham, for example, says that there is no reason to think that the Chinese will not make as convinced socialists as anybody else, but that there are certain directions in which Chinese thinking might have a profound effect upon the nature of the society of the future, perhaps in the matter of juristic security of the individual, and in the forms which the numinous will take in that society. However, there is far less reason to believe that they will adopt democracy, and Communism, being dictatorial, they will probably find more natural and acceptable than democratic socialism.[1]

This survey is of the Chinese in the regions of Tropical Asia, 121 ●
and often in the course of our narrative the question already posed 177
as to the power of this and other peoples to absorb Western ideas without changing their own essential nature will arise either tacitly or explicitly. In other words, can the basic institutions of these peoples meet the impact of Western industrial civilization or of Marxism without disintegrating?

Chinese civilization is based on ancestor worship, the family 000
system, on Confucianism (which incorporates these principles), and on Buddhism and Taoism. The staunchest supporters of these religions could scarcely deny that Buddhism and Taoism as moral forces are in complete decay in China and have been so for a very long time.[2] Whatever their surviving effectiveness they cannot by

[1] J. Needham, 'Confucianism after 2000 Years', in the *Manchester Guardian*, 29 August 1949.

[2] To realize the formalism and religiosity into which Buddhism had declined by last century, one has only to observe the *chü-jen* (M.A.) of the late Ch'ing dynasty who, to prepare his character for office, suddenly takes an interest in practical benevolence. He ostentatiously burns incense and gives alms. If he sees

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heart to the terrorists in their 'hide-outs' in the almost limitless jungles of Malaya.

Such is the outline of the story we shall have to tell. What, then, is the philosophy of this Chinese migration?

If they had been called upon to deal with the Chinese of Southeast Asia, the great historians would have treated it according to their enlightenment and the age they lived in. Gibbon, for example, if he were restored from the grave, would assuredly regard the activities of all modern Chinese as a progressive falling away from the Chinese Age of the Antonines, the dynasty of T'ang. It is unlikely that he would show any undue sympathy for the colonists who were so little steeped in the national culture. Mommsen would find no Chinese Caesar overseas, and would assuredly disdain these simple annals. Macaulay, brought back to life, most probably would have dutifully accepted the task of writing the history of the Chinese in the Nanyang were it imposed upon him, and he would assuredly have devoted his opening chapters to describing the squalid sufferings of the pioneer coolie in his blue trousers, rope-soled shoes, and broad-brimmed hat, his naked body sweating under a tropical sun, and more chapters to an imposing picture of his magnificent mansion,[1] his fleet of shining motor-cars, and (maybe?) his bevy of concubines after he had got on in the world.

But we must pass from this diverting speculation to an interpretation of our task stated in our own terms. It is to make actual an important and striking phenomenon of recent times, the overflow of the Chinese in large numbers into Southeast Asia, to demonstrate the problems caused by this overflow, and, if possible, to help place the general historian, the politician, the administrator, the diplomat, and the merchant in a state of mind congenial to a better understanding of the Chinese overseas. This understanding may suggest an approach to the practical questions of the area in the next decade or so which will benefit both West and East.

If one fact has impressed the writer of this survey more than another in the course of his study, it is the feebleness of the attempt made by the Colonial Powers and the indigenous Governments in this area to understand the overseas Chinese and their problems.

[1] The lesser, but less awestruck, Lytton Strachey would probably make a sly reference to the electro-plated vacuum cleaner or thermos flasks, for ornament and not for use, in the drawing-room of the self-same mansion.

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to survival, and, if the latter is the choice, to what modifications will it be subjected by the genius of the race.[1]

What now follows is a summary of the distribution of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, an account of the earlier contacts, and of some aspects of the subject common to the area. The separate country studies will then ensue followed by a concluding chapter with a summary and a balance-sheet.

[1] In a cable of 6 October to Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Chinese People's Government, thirty Chinese associations, schools, and newspapers in Batavia expressed satisfaction at the formation of the new Chinese central Government and promised it support. *The Times*, 7 October 1949.

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609 their numbers are at present not very great in comparison with the
167 Filipinos, the economic position of the Chinese in the Philippines
162 based, as ever, on their control of trade (they owned, before 1941 at least, three-quarters of the rice-mills), has been maintained in the face of determined attempts by Filipino Nationalists to oust them from it.

121 So much will serve as a general introductory survey of the distribution of the Chinese in Southeast Asia: in the first chapter of each country study contained in the successive parts of this survey, the subject will be dealt with in much greater detail.

167 The sketch-map of the principal places of origin in China of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, reproduced on p. 9, has been de-
162 signed by the author and executed by Geographia Ltd., and is subject to the following considerations. The shading indicates roughly the distribution in China of the several tribes represented overseas, but in the case of the Hakkas, of whom small communities are to be found throughout Kwangtung intermingled with the Cantonese,[1] only the areas most densely populated by them are shown in the map. Nor must it be assumed that the overseas Chinese come equally from all over the shaded areas. The fact (as Dr Ta Chen has pointed out) is that the communities from which the emigrants are drawn exist side by side with non-emigrant communities, and enjoy a higher standard of living than the latter.

[1] See L. Richard, *Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese Empire and Dependencies* (Shanghai, Tu-se-wei Press, 1908) p. 207.

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•121 What has been given above is only a brief outline of a vast sub-
167 ject of which the facts are, for many periods, largely unprecipitated.
In an attempt to confine this survey to manageable proportions and
177 to give it a contemporary focus, we have adopted the principle that our interest in the Chinese of Southeast Asia begins in earnest only when they had formed permanent settlements, and it is true to say that the majority of such settlements still remaining, outside Annam and Tongking, were founded within the last 350 years. Nevertheless, we should not forget that the stream of Chinese immigration into the region, swelling into spate in the second and third decades of the present century, was but an expansion of long pre-existing rivulets of intercourse.

167 After the great military expeditions of the early Mings, the urge
to imperial expansion overseas appears to have gone out of the
175 Chinese. The self-contained spirit of the Middle Kingdom reas-
177 serted itself and the Emperors were content with adventures by land. It would indeed be harder to explain why the urge arose at all than why it subsided so soon. The fact remains that whereas the colonization of the Europeans followed in the wake of their fleets and soldiers or to lands obtained by treaty from the native rulers, the Chinese in the last three and a half centuries have entered Southeast Asia either as visiting merchants or as suppliants for permission to remain from the Javanese Sultans, or from the Spanish, Dutch, British, or French. They came no more as haughty emissaries of the Dragon Throne, armed to the teeth to enforce the imperial will, but as humble and peaceable shiploads of traders, artisans, or coolies, waiting, like Czech or Italian peasants on Ellis Island, for permission to enter the land of promise. But their meekness and peaceableness were in the long run to be far more forceful than the militancy of the Europeans; for where the latter came in their tens the Chinese came in their thousands, and when the Europeans have gone, they will remain.[1]

[1] While this Survey was in the press there appeared 'The Khmer Empire and the Malay Peninsula', by Lawrence Palmer Briggs, *Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. ix, no. 3, May 1950, which adds valuable source material for Sino-Southeast Asia contacts.

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CHAPTER IV

SPECIAL ASPECTS OF CHINESE SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MOST readers of this survey will be acquainted, at least in a general way, with the problems of China itself and with the direction in which the people of that country have moved in the last fifty years. What will be attempted in this chapter will be to illustrate the way in which the Chinese of Southeast Asia have in some respects deviated from the central pattern under the influence of local conditions. We shall select for this purpose the special aspects of the family, marriage, religion, and education, with some remarks on the opium question. As regards politics, Chapter XXXI, dealing with Chinese political organization in Malaya, brings out the developments which are typical of the area as a whole, and to this the reader is referred should he wish to gain a general impression of the matter before proceeding to the separate country studies.

The Family. An excellent starting-point for our chapter is the work of Dr Ta Chen, who, in 1934 and 1935 was in charge of a group of investigators studying the emigrant communities in eastern Kwangtung and southern Fukien under the auspices of the International Research Committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations.[1] The area selected for study was a region from which many of the emigrants to the Nanyang originated and where their families mostly live. It is on the sea coast of the two southernmost maritime provinces and consists of ten *hsien* (counties). Roughly speaking, it includes a long strip of territory beginning at Chao An (formerly Chao Chou), passing through Swatow on the Kwangtung border, and through Amoy, and ending at Chuan Chou (Ch'üan-chow) in Fukien. It is an area of a little less than 5,000 square miles with a total population of a little over 4·6 million in 1935.[2]

[1] Ta Chen (the name is properly Chen Ta, Chen being the surname, and it is thus given in some library catalogues), *Emigrant Communities in South China: a Study of Overseas Migration and its Influence on Standards of Living and Social Change*, English ed. by Bruno Lasker (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940).

[2] Though all the *hsien* have sent emigrants to the Nanyang the area does not constitute the sole source of emigration to the south, even from these two provinces. For example, Mei Hsien and vicinity, the principal home of the Hakkas and the largest source of Hakka emigration, is not included in this area.

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permissible to take immediate steps to introduce the necessary measures to prevent the manufacture of and trade in prepared opium for the purpose of smoking. 276

It remains to be seen how far this complete prohibition can succeed. Everything turns on the ability of the Governments to control smuggling and, in the final issue, on the effectiveness of international control of the manufacture and distribution of narcotics. It is not only opium that is the problem, but also an increasing number of even more harmful substitutes.

A number of other matters have strong claims for inclusion as 'special aspects of Chinese society in Southeast Asia', but it is thought desirable to limit this chapter to its present dimensions (for enough has been said to illustrate the general nature of the deviations from the central problems in China itself) and to start in the next Part the detailed narrative of the Chinese in Burma, Siam, Indochina, Malaya, British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines.[1] In journeying with them for three centuries or more through jungle and defile, over the mountain passes of the Shan States or through the myriad islands of the Philippines, in sojourning with them in tin mine, on rubber estate, or in godown, in listening to what they have to say and what is said of them, we shall learn much and prepare ourselves better for our final task of assessing the advantage or the detriment of this people to the countries in which they have come to work or trade, and often to settle, and of adumbrating (if we dare) the future of the race in Southeast Asia. 121

[1] The order is arbitrary.

[p. 54 is blank]

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China AF1

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a state of flux. This is no new phenomenon: it has happened a score of times in Chinese history and each time China has found a new level of stability. It was (it has been said) like a cube; overthrown by civil convulsion it falls flat on another side and is once more the same solid mass. Will it be so again? This is the moot question. The forces causing the upheaval are more powerful and destructive than ever before. They are the same forces which have shaped and are shaping the materialistic, sceptic, technological method of life that we in the West know as civilization. Can China receive the full impact of these forces and remain essentially the China of all time? The event alone will answer this, though it may be nearer than we imagine in the ever-accelerating tempo of change.

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These are long-term, philosophical questions. The more immediate practical question for the Chinese of Southeast Asia, for the peoples among whom they live, and for the rest of the world that has contact or dealings with this area (which is, in effect, everyone), is how this vital and active people will fit into the dispensation of to-morrow. It is a question that every diplomat, administrator, merchant, or student of international affairs should tax his mind to answer in advance of the event, and for this task a necessary preliminary is some knowledge of the nature, the development, and the aspirations of the overseas Chinese. This is what this work, in small compass, attempts to supply.

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China AF1
Burma AP1

A visit to Southeast Asia during the third quarter of 1950 after an absence of nearly three years brought home to the writer the accelerated tempo of the change that the countries were undergoing, and, in particular, the dominant role which the politics of China were playing therein. As a tailpiece to this survey he has recorded the impressions of his visit, bringing the account as nearly up to date as the exigencies of publishing would allow. The observations are set down in the order in which the countries were visited.

In his many discussions with statesmen, diplomats, officials, business men, and others in these Southeast Asian countries, the writer became aware of a considerable disagreement among them regarding the number of Chinese in the area. There was, in the case of Siam and Indochina in particular, no figure that was generally accepted. The definition of 'Chinese' was an initial difficulty (as it has so often been in the course of this survey) for many Chinese appeared to possess a dual racial character, discarding one aspect and assuming the other as circumstances suggested.[1] It seemed also that that clandestine immigration into Siam, Indochina, and the Philippines and (perhaps) Indonesia within the last two or three years, had been very considerable, for during this period the immigration laws had been greatly tightened. The writer was compelled, therefore, to revise the estimates he had made in the demographic chapters of the survey to suit the probable facts of 1950 and to adopt a total not very far short of 10 million ethnic Chinese for the whole of Southeast Asia. This estimate, however, does not materially alter the ratio of Chinese to other races in the area and has no very important bearing on the general political and economic considerations which have been described in the text.

Burma. In July 1950 the Chinese Nationalist ambassador had left Burma, and one other official of the embassy had also gone away, but the remainder of both the embassy and consular staff had agreed to serve under the People's Government of China which was now recognized by the Burmese Government. Two of the staff had already been summoned to Peking for indoctrination. The new ambassador, Dr Yu, was expected to arrive in Rangoon in August. In the meantime the staffs were not being paid and the only income available was that derived from the sale of (Nationalist) passports.

At this time an incident in the Burmese Shan State of Keng-tung near Siam was the subject of a number of rumours. A force of Chinese

[1] Thus in Siam, the President of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, of very obvious Chinese race or extraction but with a Thai name, denounced vehemently the tactics of business men of acknowledged Chinese nationality in their dealings with the Thais.

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PREFACE.

The three studies which comprise this report constitute part of a larger study of the development of self-government and independence in dependent and formerly dependent countries of the Pacific area. The original intention of the American Institute of Pacific Relations was to publish a single volume covering all of these areas, and including chapters on American policy with respect to dependencies and trusteeship. Because of the rapid development of nationalist movements and steps towards self-government or independence in many parts of the Far East, it has now been decided to issue the report of the project in several volumes. Those dealing with such important areas as Indonesia and Indochina will be published as books during 1948. Plans for completion of the volume on Indochina by Professor Lauriston Sharp and Miss Ellen Hammer are already well advanced. Arrangements are also being made for a volume on Indonesia by Professor Raymond Kennedy, Mr. Paul Kattenburg and Miss Jeanne Mintz.

The present volume dealing with Burma, Malaya and the Philippines provides a useful comparative sketch of the policies followed by the British and American Governments in fostering the development of self-government and independence under markedly differing conditions. The three essays do not claim to be comprehensive inquiries into the political development of the three areas, but it is hoped that they will serve a useful purpose in providing a concise comparative survey of the main lines of policy followed in three areas where the development of self-rule has proceeded in a more peaceful and orderly fashion than in such areas as Indochina and Indonesia.

Two of the authors, Mr. Cady and Mrs. Barnett, are members of the research division of the State Department and because of this they have not always been in a position to write as freely about certain controversial points as might otherwise have been the case. The American I.P.R. is grateful to them for their cooperation in revising and expanding earlier drafts of their reports. Thanks are also due to Mrs. Jenkins and to several other persons who kindly aided her in the preparation of the chapter on the Philippines. For a much more detailed analysis of recent American relations with the Philippines the reader may be referred to Mrs. Jenkins's mimeographed report, "United States Economic Policy towards the Philippine Republic" prepared for the Stratford Conference of the I.P.R. in September, 1947. A revised and enlarged version of this report is now being prepared for publication in book form by the American I.P.R., about March, 1948. Those readers who desire a full account of the development of Burma may be referred to the forthcoming volume, "An Economic Handbook of Burma", by J. Russell Andrus, to be published shortly for the American I.P.R by the Stanford University Press.

The American I.P.R. is deeply indebted to Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore for her excellent work as general editor of this project in its earlier stages. Thanks are also due to several members of the International Secretariat of the I.P.R., particularly to Mr. William L. Holland, Mr. Philip E. Lilienthal and Miss Mary F. Healy for assistance in editing and production of this report. Though it appears under the auspices of the American I.P.R., it should be emphasized that the authors alone are responsible for statements of fact, or opinion in their respective chapters.

New York,
January 5, 1948.

EDWARD C. CARTER
Executive Vice-Chairman
American Institute of Pacific Relations.

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PREFACE

121 THE aim of this book is to present a picture of environmental conditions and human adaptations in Southeast Asia which shall provide the student with a basic text and at the same time stimulate the sociologist, the administrator, the politician and the businessman to see the relation of their work to the general field. It is assumed that readers will already know modern writings on the physical, environmental and social aspects of geography, and the text dwells at length only on those circumstances peculiar to Southeast Asia and its people.

This book is not a dictionary, a gazetteer or an encyclopaedia. It is one of the first studies of locational perspectives in Southeast Asia, the critical importance of which became apparent during the last war when the scarcity of information demonstrated how little study had been given to the region as a whole.

128 The book is divided into three parts. The first pictures the natural setting, the second goes from this basis into the human details of each political unit, and the third ties together the social geography of Southeast Asia, to pose some of its present problems.

All money references have been converted into Straits dollars (2s. 4d. or U.S. 47 cents) partly because this currency had wide pre-war usage in the region, partly because it is the one with a simple and fixed relation between its post- and pre-war values. The object has been not to overload the text with statistics which are best obtained fresh from the latest year-books. At every stage in reading this book, reference should be made to the topographic maps of Southeast Asia, which now exist in fair quantity.

000 The author thanks Professor E. G. R. Taylor for her advice on this work and her encouragement at many stages of his career, and Professor L. D. Stamp for his kindness in reading and advising on the manuscript. Those pioneer scholars of the area, whose papers are listed in the bibliography, and upon whose work the author has of necessity drawn liberally for facts, are also thanked. In addition he is heavily indebted to his wife for her continued patience and co-operation at every stage in the production of this book.

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PREFACE

●121 642 THIS book originated in a request from the Government of Burma at the end of 1942 for my views on reconstruction, with particular reference to features of colonial rule in Netherlands India that might suitably be adopted in Burma. One cannot transplant administrative machinery without reference to the environment; in a new environment it may work better or worse, but it certainly will not work in the same way. It was necessary therefore to emphasize the fact that British and Dutch colonial policy are founded on different traditions. Two basic principles of British colonial policy are the rule of law and economic freedom, whereas Dutch colonial policy has aimed at imposing restraints on economic forces by strengthening personal authority and by conserving the influence of custom.

121 642 182 In modern Burma under British rule there were five notorious evils: the failure of western self-governing institutions; the growth of debt and agrarian distress; the multiplication of litigation and crime; the rise of disaffection and unrest among the Buddhist clergy; and widespread corruption in the judicial and administrative services. I suggested that these can all be traced to a common cause: the disintegration of social life through the inadequacy of law to control the working of anti-social economic forces. Although in other respects Dutch rule is open to criticism which does not apply to Burma, yet in all these matters Netherlands India presents a notable contrast. We would not, even if we could, abandon what is valuable in the traditions of British rule, and in any case we cannot break suddenly with old traditions, or escape the consequences of the past. But the contrast indicates that we ought to incorporate in our policy the principle of controlling economic forces in the interest of social welfare. I tried accordingly to show how, by adapting certain devices of Dutch administrative machinery, this principle might be applied to cure the ills of modern Burma, and to lay the basis of a new and constructive policy.

121 While formulating these proposals it occurred to me that the comparison between Burma and Netherlands India might be of somewhat more general interest. In presenting it to a wider public there was,

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121 however, one obvious difficulty. The officials for whom the original note was written shared with the writer a common knowledge of Burma and its administration. For readers without such special knowledge it was necessary to trace the course of development more closely and to illustrate the results more clearly, even at the risk of multiplying tedious detail. Another difficulty, still more formidable, may be less obvious. For undesirable features of British rule in Burma, British officials, conscious of their good intentions, naturally tend to blame the Burman; Burmans, no less naturally, blame the British. Similarly in Netherlands India we find mutual recriminations between Dutch and Indonesians. Only by eliminating so far as possible all personal and local factors can one arrive at a just estimate of any particular experiment in colonial rule. It seemed necessary therefore to frame the comparison between Burma and Netherlands India in a general survey of colonial policy and practice. For such a survey, however, they provide a convenient introduction by presenting respectively extreme types of the alternative systems of direct and indirect rule.

114 In venturing further afield one was inevitably treading on uncertain ground. I was at home in Burma. After more than twenty years in the Civil Service, I was occupied for some time in business and in the direction of an agricultural bank, and also had the privilege of being associated with the University of Rangoon and the Education Department in various educational experiments. With the ready assistance of Dutch and Indonesian authorities I have made some study of Netherlands India, and I have visited Malaya, Siam and Cochin China. I also have some personal acquaintance with administration in British India. But of Africa, the other great field of colonial rule, I knew nothing at first hand. Fortunately it was possible to turn for information to Lord Hailey's great *African Survey*, and the extent of my debt to it will be readily apparent. It would be hard to say how much I owe to the voluminous writings of Dutch colonial experts, but among them I must mention in particular Dr J. H. Boeke, Professor of Tropical Economy in Leiden University, and Mr Meijer Ranneft, formerly Vice-President of the Raad van Indië. It is impossible for me to express adequately my gratitude to my friend Mr G. E. Harvey, for the care with which he read the first proofs of this book and for his

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NOTE

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THIS BOOK constitutes a report of a longterm project in the international research program of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The disturbed conditions in Southeast Asia have made it impossible to deal as fully as had originally been hoped with the wartime and postwar labor problems of the area. Many of these more recent developments, however, will be discussed in the author's forthcoming study of the effects of the Japanese occupation in Southeast Asia. This new study will probably be published under the auspices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations during 1948.

Thanks are due to Mr. Bruno Lasker for editorial and other assistance in the preparation of the supplement to the book, and also to Mr. Wilfrid Benson for his Preface. Although the book is issued under the auspices of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the author alone is responsible for statements of fact or opinion presented in it.

William L. Holland
Secretary-General

New York
July 1947

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In this general problem of Southeast Asia, it would be dangerous to neglect the contributing problems of labor standards and labor policies. It is true that the population is predominantly peasant, that the wage earner usually comes from and returns to his land and that wage standards must remain low so long as peasant standards of living are low. Yet with all this, a social revolution was taking place during the colonial period and will spread if the expanding population is to live. In Southeast Asia, as in the rest of the world, this will involve an exodus from the country to the town and to a certain extent, from agriculture to industry. In the country, it will involve the acceleration of the change from subsistence to cash farming, an increase of wage earning as a normal means of making a living, and the penetration of the effects of employment to villages which are as yet remote. And neglect is more than possible. Whereas under colonial rule indigenous leaders were being increasingly associated in the political functions of government, their participation in and training for the complexities of modern production were hopelessly inadequate. Now, not only are the trained technicians scanty, but it is possible that the feudal, static traditions of the countries will leave local opinion indifferent to the lot of the men and women laboring outside the established practices.

Miss Virginia Thompson's studies on labor problems in Southeast Asia are therefore not merely of value to the labor expert and the sociologist; they are of political importance. Despite the difficulties of research when many of the detailed reports were unobtainable and few persons could be consulted on practical conditions, so that some of her statements may be open to question, she has been able to present a valuable synthesis of labor laws and of the problems confronting the administrations, managements and workers in Western undertakings. She has also sketched with skill the postwar developments which appear to be of greatest significance. Whether or not the future will bring out other changes than those she indicates, it seems certain that throughout the period of settlement there will be a close connection between political peace and progress and labor peace and progress. Therefore, that she has political opinions which color her judgment on labor conditions is not a criticism. Without political opinions, any survey of the labor situation would be merely academic.

As Miss Thompson indicates, in many respects the labor policies of the colonial powers were progressive. For some time attention was confined to the regulation of plantation and mining labor, but from the late thirties the importance of a comprehensive labor policy was receiving increased recognition. It could no longer be thought that the administrations' chief responsibility was for conditions of employment on the estates and mines in respect of which they controlled the labor supply. Problems of modern employment were being tackled through minimum wage

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SUPPLEMENT

NOTES ON LABOR DEVELOPMENTS IN 1946–47

●121 A JOURNEY UNDERTAKEN by the author between December 1946 and June 1947 to some of the principal cities of Southeast Asia had for one of its objects the collection of information on the latest developments in the region's labor conditions and labor movements. Although it proved not yet possible to secure detailed statistical data on employment, wages, and other indices for the postwar period, this investigation helped to confirm the existence of certain trends previously observed and to open up, in a few instances, new vistas of a vigorous pursuit of progress, either on the part of a government or on that of organized labor.

467 On the whole, the period was found to be one of great uneasiness.
727 There was throughout the region a sense of insecurity because of the distorted structure of its major export industries. There was a sense of insecurity also in circles which, unable to accept the radical change in political and economic power that had come over large parts of the world, feared any movement which might tend to increase the political orientation of organized labor. On the other hand, there was also the natural hesitation of those seriously devoted to the promotion of progressive and liberalizing labor legislation to promote or enact measures which, with the present disturbance of social relations, it might prove difficult to enforce. Organized labor itself reflected the cleavage, to be found at this time also in industrially more advanced parts of the world, between a leadership satisfied to do the best it could within the technical limits of traditional trade union practices and one primarily thinking in political terms and desiring the most rapid possible assimilation of the local labor forces to the revolutionary international labor movement.

121 Only a few illustrations can here be given of these various tendencies as the author observed them or heard of them from authoritative spokesmen for government, labor, and professional management. These notes are offered as carrying a little further into the uncertain future the picture presented in the major part of this book. They sketch a passing phase in one of the most dramatic developments of our time: the effort of an important section of the world's workers to raise their status from an age-old level of oppression and neglect to one of worthwhile human existence.

M: Heine-Geldern E-4 (no date) 1942 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

CONCEPTIONS OF STATE AND KINGSHIP IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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•121 643 AT A time when the whole political system of Southeast Asia seems to be on the verge of complete reshapement and when a new cycle of development, dominated by native forces, may be expected to emerge from the present turmoil, an inquiry into the ideological foundations of native government will not be out of place and, perhaps, will even be of more than purely theoretical interest. What were the religious and philosophical conceptions which underlay and shaped the states of Southeast Asia? Are they still living forces with which we have to count or are they dead and gone? Is it possible to inoculate new ideas into old traditions, thereby avoiding a complete break with the past, a dangerous uprooting of oriental thought and culture?

In view of the limited space I shall confine myself to a discussion of some fundamental conceptions of state and kingship in those parts of Southeast Asia where Hindu-Buddhist civilization prevailed.

MACROCOSMOS AND MICROCOSMOS

772 643 The primary notion with which we shall have to deal is the belief in the parallelism between Macrocosmos and Microcosmos, between the universe and the world of men. According to this belief humanity is constantly under the influence of forces emanating from the directions of the compass and from stars and planets. These forces may produce welfare and prosperity or work havoc, according to whether or not individuals and social groups, above all the state, succeed in bringing their lives and activities in harmony with the universe. Individuals may attain such harmony by following the indications offered by astrology, the lore of lucky and unlucky days and many other minor rules Harmony between the empire and the universe is achieved by organizing the former as an image of the latter, as a universe on a smaller scale.

171 772 643 It is well known that this astrological or cosmo-magic principle, as we may call it, originated somewhere in the Near East. It was well established in Babylonia in the 3rd millennium B.C. and there are indications that it may go back there at least as far as the middle of the 4th millennium, and possibly farther. Again, we have indications that it existed in Northwest India in the

162 369 361 Standards for defining urban populations differ, but it can be assumed safely that no more than 15 per cent of the 175 million people of Southeast Asia belong in an urban category.[2] In contrast, in the United States, with a population somewhat smaller than that of Southeast Asia as a whole, over 64 per cent of the population is classified as urban.

Estimates for 1952 indicate only 30 cities or urban agglomerations with populations of 100,000 or more.[3] In the United States, however, there are 160 such urban areas; in the Soviet Union, with a population of 200 millions, there are about 120; and in Japan, with one-half the population of Southeast Asia, there are 64. In Southeast Asia only an estimated 7 per cent of the total population lives in cities of 100,000 or more; less in Burma, Indochina, Thailand, and Indonesia; somewhat more in the Philippines. Only Malaya, including Singapore, departs

[1] Revised from a paper read before the Far Eastern Association in Spring, 1954.

[121] As used here, "urbanization" connotes not only mere numerical increases in the population of cities but also the development of an urban way of life and the accompanying changes in value orientation (cf. Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1938).

[2] Census data for Southeast Asia are notably incomplete. In Burma, Thailand, and the Associated States of Indochina the "urban" population is estimated to be little more than 10 per cent of the whole; in Indonesia still less; but in the Philippines some 24 per cent of the population is classified as urban; and in Malaya, including the Crown Colony of Singapore, about 35 per cent. Wjthout Singapore, only 27 per cent of the Malayan population is classified as urban.

[113] [3] *United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1952.*

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THE PEASANTRY OF SOUTH EAST ASIA [1]

PROFESSOR RAYMOND FIRTH, F.B.A.

000 IF it is not wholly true that the social and economic reconstruction which is so necessary in Asia today must begin with the peasant, it is certain that no programme which omits the peasant can be on firm foundations. The recent history of China is evidence enough for this. My concern, as a social anthropologist, is with the analysis and classification of social relations between people and groups of people, rather than with political or economic affairs as such, although inevitably I cannot dis-
128 regard them. So my aim is to show briefly some of the most important
121 aspects of the social organization of the South East Asian peasant communities, and of the values by which this organization works. Though the details in my paper refer mainly to Malaya and Indonesia, I think the generalizations have some value for the South East Asian region as a whole.

If the basic features of the peasant society are ignored, one can understand neither the peculiar tenacity which it still possesses in modern conditions, nor the reactions of its members to the increasing impact of ex-
121 ternal economic and political forces. The definition of a peasant is a
565 countryman—a man engaged in rural pursuits, primarily agriculture, with a comparatively simple technology and a special interest in the land he
463 works. In South East Asia one may extend the application of the term to
241 cover the majority of fishermen and even village craftsmen too. They are
226 of the same social class as the agriculturalists, and often members of the
32 same families. As occupational groups, they may even be separable only in theory, since many a peasant farmer is also a fisherman or craftsman by turns, as his seasonal cycle or his cash-needs influence him. What R. H. Tawney has said of agriculture—that it is at once a craft, a business, and a manner of life—can be applied more widely here; the problems of all these peasants alike are partly technical, partly financial and commercial, and partly cultural and social.

162 It is difficult to say just what proportion of the present population of
565 South East Asia may be classed as peasants. It would seem that in nearly
241 every South East Asian country two-thirds or more of the total population
463 is to be found in agricultural communities, tilling the soil. In 1930 the
32 census of Java and Madura in Indonesia gave about 70 per cent of the male
462 workers as dependent for their livelihood on native agricultural output, and about 75 per cent in the regions of Indonesia outside Java and Madura, while large numbers of women were engaged in home craft production. In Siam, in about 1930, almost 90 per cent of the population lived in agricultural communities, rice production providing the living of about 80 per

[1] Originally delivered at a meeting at Chatham House on 21 February 1950.

INTRODUCTION

•/2/ The present study is in many ways a by-product of the writer's work in the general field of Far-Eastern linguistics. While engaged in investigations on the phonological systems of the Tibeto-Burman languages, Karen, Chinese, and Thai, the writer was obliged to devote a good share of his attention to the intricate and varied problems raised by semantic shifts occurring within widespread roots for kinship terms. The consideration of some of these more elementary problems led to attempts at working out individual kinship nomenclatures, and beyond this to a correlation of the results thus obtained. The approach, then, has been linguistic in every sense of that term.

A cursory glance at the history of kinship theory suffices to show that a truly linguistic approach in this field is something of an anomaly. Morgan may be said to have initiated a 'sociological' rather than 'linguistic' tradition, and this tradition has been perpetuated by Rivers, Radcliffe-Brown, Seligman, Spier, Gifford, and indeed the vast majority of all anthropologists who have actively concerned themselves with kinship problems. It is not so much that the relevancy and value of linguistic evidence has been denied as it is that linguists have not been interested specifically in kinship, nor kinship theorists in linguistics. Indications are not lacking that this historical dissociation is on the road to disappearance, but for the immediate present, at any rate, we must bear with it.

●121 The need for a reorientation in kinship theory was
114 first expressed by Kroeber in a classic article that appeared over thirty years ago (1909). This analysis led to much controversy on the general topic of sociological vs. psychological causation, with Radcliffe-Brown joining in the chorus, and the "eight categories" set up by Kroeber have exerted some influence, e.g. they have been applied by Feng to the Chinese terminology system. The theoretical implications were developed much later, and along altogether different lines, by Davis and Warner. Kroeber himself, building on an earlier analysis by Opler, has reconstructed the main features of the Athabascan kinship terminology, while Shimkin, one of his pupils, has made a more intensive study of the Uto-Aztecan system. Insofar as the writer is aware, none of the remaining American language groups has received similar attention, despite the fact that ample material, and in some instances linguistic studies, are available. Aside from the above, only Seligman's review of the Semitic terms, and Nilke's analysis of the Melanesian and Polynesian sibling terms, have come to the writer's attention.

In the above studies by Kroeber, Shimkin, Seligman, and Nilke, the historical relationships of the terms themselves are considered and some use is made of linguistic generalizations. Shimkin in particular has profited from Sapir's and Whorf's work on Uto-Aztecan phonology, and has thus been able to incorporate a fair body of linguistic information into his work. Seligman's article is deficient from the linguistic

121 114 point of view, and it is apparent that the author lacks even a partial command of comparative Semitic philology. Nilke's work shows the same shortcoming, despite the availability of Dempwolff's epoch-making studies on Austronesian phonology. Kroeber has stressed the point that even non-specialists can profitably engage in comparative studies of this type, and the point is well taken. There remains, however, the fact that the risk of grievous misinterpretations is greatly heightened under these conditions, and that many fine points, often of crucial importance, must be missed altogether.

121 The writer has attacked his problem from the same general linguistic angle but in a somewhat different manner. A vast and sprawling linguistic structure such as Tibeto-Burman cannot successfully be attacked simply by seizing upon a few roots, or upon a few English equivalents, and tracing their vagaries from language to language. This methodological eclecticism might prove to be 'convenient', but would be about as effective as delapidating a skyscraper with the aid only of a pickaxe. Again, one might compile interminable lists of terms for some two hundred Tibeto-Burman languages and dialects, which would be unintelligible to everyone with the possible exception of the compiler. Once more, one might draw up elaborate maps showing the distribution of certain roots for kinship terms, or of certain terminological features, and attempt to derive various conclusions therefrom. This last approach, at any rate, is not to be

121 summarily dismissed, but the writer fails to see how the expenditure of time and effort involved in such work can be justified in the present connection.

The approach adopted in the present work might be termed the 'direct method', in that each language or language-group is handled as a unit, along with the relevant ethnographic data, and an attempt is made to view each nomenclature as a functional entity with intra-relationships as well as extra-relationships. In this way a succession of patterns is presented rather than a series of disembodied etymologies or disjointed sets of sibling terms, grandparent terms, and the like. The comparative side is not lost sight of, however, and the writer does not shy at historical reconstruction. His approach is based, not on any metaphysic of kinship, but on practical expediency. He simply sees no other way of creating a complete picture of the culturo-linguistic situation with which he is faced. The linguistic material has been made especially full with the same end in mind. It must not be forgotten that kinship terms are, after all, linguistic elements, even though often handled more as if they were fish-traps or types of arrow release, and that linguistic coloring is all-important in shaping the semantic associations of any given term. It is hoped that what may at times seem to be extraneous matter will be regarded in this light.

Theoretical discussions are in general avoided, since one easily strays from the immediate problem at hand. Problems

are met as they arise, but the solutions offered are not generalized in any way. Thus, in the Tibeto-Burman area the collateral and affinal terminology seems to reflect marriage and descent patterns fairly, and a correlation between unilateral (asymmetric) cross-cousin marriage and the Omaha type of nomenclature is suggested. A comparison is made en passant with a similar association of traits found at Pentecost, and parallels can be adduced from elsewhere (e.g. the Hopi, if Tetiev's inferences are correct), but no attempt is made to develop this thesis.

The more general problem in re the relationship of kinship nomenclature to social organization, marriage practices, and the like, has been attacked only indirectly. Kroeber (1936) has compared this relationship with that of dress to body, with the remark that "one expects normally a considerable degree of fit". One might elaborate on this apt comparison by likening the fit of the "basic" terms ("father", "mother", "brother", "son", etc.) to that of the undergarments, and the fit of the collateral and affinal terms to that of the exterior garments, the latter showing much the greater variability. Aginsky has begged the question by applying the term "basic terminology" to the affinal nomenclature, and "superstructure" to the consanguineal. Aginsky undoubtedly has made a contribution in his analysis of the process whereby the child takes over the terms employed by its mother or father, but his elaborate treatment of this thesis does not appear to be justified, and the designations that he has introduced certainly cannot be accepted.

121 The exclusive emphasis on marriage as a causative factor
114 in kinship terminology, found both in Rivers and Aginsky though in different form, appears to be losing ground steadily; cf. the excellent studies by Tax, Eggan, McAllister, Opler, and Gilbert (in Eggan, 1937) and Opler (1937).

121 No use has been made of the terms "classificatory" and
128 "descriptive", each of which has acquired so wide a range of
601 connotations as to have lost all preciseness. The term "analytical" is used in its basic linguistic sense, e.g. "father's brother" is an analytical term, whereas "uncle" is a primary term. Note that a term may be only partly analytical, e.g. "uncle's son", where the fully analytical term would be "father's brother's son" or "mother's brother's son".

Three types of terminological equations are distinguished, as follows:

1. Categorical equation: equation of members of the two different categories of kin (consanguineal and affinal), e.g. "mother's brother"= "father-in-law".

2. Lineal equation: equation of members of two different lines of descent, e.g. "brother"= "father's sister's son", "son"= "brother's son".

3. Serial equation: equation of members of two different generations, e.g. "son"= "grandson".

These terms are to be regarded as convenient tags of some use in describing patterns of nomenclature, e.g. the Omaha and Crow types are characterized by serial equations in the cross collateral lines. The equation may rest on the extension

121 of a term through analogy or teknonymy, e.g. "grandfather"=
128 "father-in-law" (teknonymy) or on the merging of the referents,
601 e.g. "mother's brother"= "father-in-law" in a group practising cross-cousin marriage. One's explanation of a given system of nomenclature depends in large measure on his analysis of these factors, and one must guard against a premature assumption in either direction. Other equation categories can be established, e.g. the equation of elder and younger siblings, but those cited above have proved to be the most useful.

A final word remains to be said with regard to the system of notation employed. For each language considered in detail, a table of terms is drawn up, with those referring to female kin on the left, those referring to male kin on the right, and those without sex specification (neuter) in the center. This simple arrangement permits of rapid inspection of the table, and is more convenient than the charts of which kinship theorists are so fond. In the notation itself an attempt has been made to get away from the "bastard algebra of kinship", to use Malinowski's phrase (p. 19). Primary English terms are represented by capital letters, and English categorical terms by small letters. Since terms such as "aunt", "uncle", and "cousin" are often found in our sources, these have been retained in our notation. The letter N is used for "nephew, niece" (i.e. neuter), Ne for "nephew", Ni for "niece", and the cousin terms are formed analogically, viz. C "cousin (neuter)", Ce "cousin (male)", Ci "cousin (female)". Cf. also the parallelism in Si "sister" (S "son").

VIII

Kinship Notation

121	A aunt	Ni	niece
128	B brother	(os)	(older than speaker)
197	C cousin	p	parallel
601	Ce cousin (male)	P	parent
	Ci cousin (female)	S	son
	Ch child	Sb	sibling
	D daughter	Si	sister
	(ds) (different sex from speaker's)		
	F father	Sp	spouse
	G grand-	(ss)	(same sex as speaker's)
	l -in-law	U	uncle
	M mother	x	cross
	N nephew or niece	(ys)	(younger than speaker)
	Ne nephew		

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SECTION A

TIBETO-BURMAN

1. Introduction

●121 128 The Tibeto-Burman family of languages represents the center of gravity of the Sino-Tibetan-Karen-Thai linguistic complex (Indo-Chinese) and thus makes an ideal focal point in our study of kinship terminology in southeastern Asia. The diversity within this family, roughly comparable with that of Indo-European, has given rise to great terminological variation, the interpretation of which involves an historical perspective. Tibeto-Burman, therefore, provides a testing-ground for methods as well as a point of departure, and an analysis of kinship nomenclature in this Western division of Indo-Chinese yields a framework within which the nomenclatures of Karen, Chinese, and Thai, or the Eastern division of the group, can be defined.

Tibeto-Burman studies have suffered somewhat from the undue prominence given to Chinese by the epoch-making work of Bernhard Karlgren and Henri Maspero. The classic contribution in the field, Conrady's analysis of the so-called "causative-denominative" formation, is concerned almost exclusively with morphological aspects. The same may be said of the more recent and much more substantial studies by Wolfenden, while Houghton's interesting article on

121 "linguistic palaeontology" is essentially devoted to
128 semantics. Other studies in the general field, with the exception of those noted below, are entirely superficial and need not be cited here. The fact that a sound morphological and semantic analysis can proceed only from a sound phonological basis has gone largely unheeded by students of Tibeto-Burman linguistics. The writer, working in collaboration with Mr. Robert Shafer, has attempted to supply this basis. The fruit of their joint effort is embodied in the Sino-Tibetan Linguistics series as well as in individual articles by the co-authors. This series of volumes, as specified in the bibliography appended to the present introduction, covers most of the Tibeto-Burman divisions, the major exceptions being Miri-Dafla, Konyak (East Naga), Lepcha (Rong), and Lui (Kadu). The results achieved in the Sino-Tibetan Linguistics series are in no sense definitive, but a number of broad phonetic generalizations have been attained and in some instances rather detailed phonetic analyses have been completed. In the present study the writer has refined the analysis at many points and has in some places arrived at new interpretations, while the phonological treatment of Miri-Dafla, Lepcha, and other groups is presented here for the first time.

197 The Tibeto-Burman languages, like Karen, Chinese, and Thai, are characterized by the presence of monosyllabic roots and the employment of distinctive tones (tonemes).

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17. Review of Tibeto-Burman

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The present section has been written with a two-fold view in mind, viz. a provisional reconstruction of the archaic Tibeto-Burman kinship nomenclature and a synthesis of material bearing on the general problem of the factors that have produced changes in this archaic system. It is of course impossible to realize either of these goals in any complete sense. The reconstruction of a set of kinship terms differs very little from the reconstruction of any other group of terms, e.g. those for animals. In each case certain phonetic generalizations must be followed, and in each case original meanings must be assigned to roots on the basis of a series of fluctuating connotations. The difficult problem of "partial equations", in which a given root has a limited distribution, arises here precisely as in any other linguistic field (for a good recent discussion, vide Scherer, 1941). A distinction between the two types of reconstruction can be drawn, however, in the fact that kinship terms constitute a definite system whereas those for animals, parts of the body, or the like, do not constitute such a system. It is fairly evident that, within kinship nomenclature, a semantic shift at one point is likely to be reflected at another, or, in sociological terms, a single factor, e.g. cross-cousin marriage, is likely to produce a series of interrelated changes, whereas this in general does not hold true within other linguistic spheres. In this respect a kinship nomenclature might be compared with

SA a phonemic system, in which similar integration appears. The
121 point is not worth elaborating, since the fact that a kinship
601 terminology does constitute a system hardly relieves us of the
ST task of investigating each element of that system, both inde-
121 pendently and correlatively.
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In any piece of historical reconstruction, linguistic or other, the natural tendency is to make the prototype unduly complex. The writer has often been struck by the complexities shown by hypothetical reconstructed languages as compared with their actual living descendants, as though linguistic evolution always proceeded in the direction of simplification. The number of distinct roots assigned to these reconstructed languages is sometimes of staggering magnitude, and no ingenuity is spared in augmenting this lexicographical harvest. In the present study it would be easy to reconstruct an archaic nomenclature with two or more terms for most relationships, yet such a procedure patently would be futile. It is far better to determine, firstly, which elements are relatively certain, and, secondly, which elements are based largely on "partial equations" and must thus be held in reserve until a basic
SA framework has been set up. Nine roots, eight of which are
601 applied to consanguineal relatives, stand out in our complete
193 Tibeto-Burman series as culled from the foregoing review.
197 These roots constitute the following system:
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SA 601 ST 601 group with xC marriage and a type of bachelor's house with their immediate neighbors, the Tibetans, who practise polyandry rather than xC marriage (traces of the latter persist) and have nothing suggesting a bachelor's house. The same type of contrast is presented by the primitive Arakanese with xC marriage and premarital sexual freedom (Hutchinson, p. 113) and the sophisticated Burmese, who lack xC marriage and whose courtship pattern had become highly formalized even in medieval times (vide the interesting account by Kin). It is not suggested that xC marriage and premarital sexual laxity are necessarily correlated in any way, but, in the area under consideration, both appear to belong to the same general cultural stratum.

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SA [121] ST [121] The present study is of limited scope and comparative material has therefore been eliminated. The parallelism between the Kuki Omaha pattern and that found among the BaThonga and Nama Hottentot of South Africa, however, is too attractive to be omitted. The Nama Hottentot (Schapera, pp. 230 and ff.) employ the terms //náob gF,MB; //náos gM,MBW (but MB is now called omeb < Dutch oom "uncle", and MBW is now called mugis < Dutch moekie "little mother"); //núrib xCe,SiS(ms),gS; //núris xCi,SiD(ms),gD. This system can be converted into the Kuki type by limiting //núrib and //núris to FSiCh and applying //náob and //náos to MBCh. Schapera describes xC marriage of bilateral type, but notes that among

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and they are now less than one and a half million compared with the Chinese eight and a half or so in a total population approaching one hundred and sixty million. Nor can they compare with their fellow immigrants in wealth and influence. The Chinese in Southeast Asia are of the greatest political, economic, and social significance to the region and, indirectly, to the world as a whole, but until now no comprehensive study of them has been attempted. The considerations that have led me to venture to provide what is at least an outline of the subject are as follows.

To carry out the research necessary for an adequate history of the Chinese in the seven countries of the region (counting 'British Borneo' as one), together with a basic study of Chinese emigration into Southeast Asia and its causes, to collate the material, and to write the work itself would, in all reasonableness, take some seven or eight years. Moreover, the qualifications for embarking on such an enterprise should include, first, an extensive background knowledge of China and the Chinese, secondly, a close acquaintance with the several countries of Southeast Asia and their histories, and, thirdly, at least a working knowledge of a score of languages and dialects. Since no person of the necessary qualifications, leisure, or ambition appeared to be forthcoming, and the need for a primer on Chinese affairs in this region was urgent, I decided to be greatly daring and to try my hand at a single impressionistic volume. My qualifications fell far short of the desideratum, but among them were two years of study in Canton, a period of attachment to the Hong Kong Government, and an intimate contact with the Chinese in Malaya, as a Colonial official, for over a quarter of a century.[1] I had visited the countries themselves at different times (the last occasion being as consultant to the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in 1947), and I had an acquaintance with the Chinese written language and the Cantonese and Mandarin dialects as well as a working knowledge of French, Spanish, Italian, and Malay, with some German, Portuguese, and Dutch. I had also served an apprenticeship in the subject by writing a study of the Chinese in one country of the area.[2]

[1] Many appointments, held during this period, included those of magistrate, Protector of Chinese, Assistant Director of Education (Chinese), and Director-General of Information. Under the British Military Administration (1945–6) I was Colonel, Principal Adviser on Chinese affairs.

[2] *The Chinese in Malaya* (London, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948).

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August 1950 VICTOR PURCELL

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That the authorities are mostly European rather than Chinese is due to the fact that the analytic and descriptive habit is of only recent growth among the Chinese of Southeast Asia.

PREFACE.

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The three studies which comprise this report constitute part of a larger study of the development of self-government and independence in dependent and formerly dependent countries of the Pacific area. The original intention of the American Institute of Pacific Relations was to publish a single volume covering all of these areas, and including chapters on American policy with respect to dependencies and trusteeship. Because of the rapid development of nationalist movements and steps towards self-government or independence in many parts of the Far East, it has now been decided to issue the report of the project in several volumes. Those dealing with such important areas as Indonesia and Indochina will be published as books during 1948. Plans for completion of the volume on Indochina by Professor Lauriston Sharp and Miss Ellen Hammer are already well advanced. Arrangements are also being made for a volume on Indonesia by Professor Raymond Kennedy, Mr. Paul Kattenburg and Miss Jeanne Mintz.

The present volume dealing with Burma, Malaya and the Philippines provides a useful comparative sketch of the policies followed by the British and American Governments in fostering the development of self-government and independence under markedly differing conditions. The three essays do not claim to be comprehensive inquiries into the political development of the three areas, but it is hoped that they will serve a useful purpose in providing a concise comparative survey of the main lines of policy followed in three areas where the development of self-rule has proceeded in a more peaceful and orderly fashion than in such areas as Indochina and Indonesia.

Two of the authors, Mr. Cady and Mrs. Barnett, are members of the research division of the State Department and because of this they have not always been in a position to write as freely about certain controversial points as might otherwise have been the case. The American I.P.R. is grateful to them for their cooperation in revising and expanding earlier drafts of their reports. Thanks are also due to Mrs. Jenkins and to several other persons who kindly aided her in the preparation of the chapter on the Philippines. For a much more detailed analysis of recent American relations with the Philippines the reader may be referred to Mrs. Jenkins's mimeographed report, "United States Economic Policy towards the Philippine Republic" prepared for the Stratford Conference of the I.P.R. in September, 1947. A revised and enlarged version of this report is now being prepared for publication in book form by the American I.P.R., about March, 1948. Those readers who desire a full account of the development of Burma may be referred to the forthcoming volume, "An Economic Handbook of Burma", by J. Russell Andrus, to be published shortly for the American I.P.R by the Stanford University Press.

The American I.P.R. is deeply indebted to Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore for her excellent work as general editor of this project in its earlier stages. Thanks are also due to several members of the International Secretariat of the I.P.R., particularly to Mr. William L. Holland, Mr. Philip E. Lilienthal and Miss Mary F. Healy for assistance in editing and production of this report. Though it appears under the auspices of the American I.P.R., it should be emphasized that the authors alone are responsible for statements of fact, or opinion in their respective chapters.

New York.
January 5, 1948.

EDWARD C. CARTER
Executive Vice-Chairman
American Institute of Pacific Relations.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTES

113 *BEFEO* = *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient*
JASB = *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*
JBRS = *Journal of the Burma Research Society*
JRAS = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*
JRASSB = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Straits Branch*
JRASMB = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Malayan Branch*
JRASNCB = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, North China Branch*
JRGS = *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*

The *Journal of the Indian Archipelago* is sometimes referred to as *Logan's Journal*.

128 CURRENCY

435 The Spanish dollar varied in value, according to the price of silver, between 3*s*. 6*d*. and 4*s*. 6*d*. 4*s*. can be taken as a mean.

436 The rupee = 1*s*. 6*d*. sterling. On 1 April 1947 the currency of Burma ceased to be linked to that of India.

In 1906 the Straits Settlements dollar was fixed at 2*s*. 4*d*. The Straits Settlements dollar was later replaced by the Malayan dollar with the same value, but the sign SS$ is still sometimes used for convenience. M$ is now usual.

At parity there are 11 Siamese bahts (ticals) to the pound sterling.

The official buying rate of the Indochinese piastre in 1949 was 12·55 to the United States dollar.

The official rate of exchange for the guilder (Indonesia) is 10·691 guilders = one pound sterling.

The peso (Philippines) = 50 United States cents.

804 WEIGHTS

128 One picul = 133⅓ lb.[1]
One catty (kati) = 1⅓ lb.
One tahil (tael) = 1⅓ oz.

MEASURES

1 hectare = 2·471 acres.
1 mow = ⅙ of an acre.
1 orlong = (about) ⅔ of an acre.

[1] But the *Statesman's Year-Book* (to which reference should be made for up-to-date information regarding currency, weights and measures, &c.) states that in the Netherlands East Indies 1 picul = 136·16 lb. avoirdupois.

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PREFACE

121 THE aim of this book is to present a picture of environmental conditions and human adaptations in Southeast Asia which shall provide the student with a basic text and at the same time stimulate the sociologist, the administrator, the politician and the businessman to see the relation of their work to the general field. It is assumed that readers will already know modern writings on the physical, environmental and social aspects of geography, and the text dwells at length only on those circumstances peculiar to Southeast Asia and its people.

This book is not a dictionary, a gazetteer or an encyclopaedia. It is one of the first studies of locational perspectives in Southeast Asia, the critical importance of which became apparent during the last war when the scarcity of information demonstrated how little study had been given to the region as a whole.

128 The book is divided into three parts. The first pictures the natural setting, the second goes from this basis into the human details of each political unit, and the third ties together the social geography of Southeast Asia, to pose some of its present problems.

All money references have been converted into Straits dollars (2s. 4d. or U.S. 47 cents) partly because this currency had wide pre-war usage in the region, partly because it is the one with a simple and fixed relation between its post- and pre-war values. The object has been not to overload the text with statistics which are best obtained fresh from the latest year-books. At every stage in reading this book, reference should be made to the topographic maps of Southeast Asia, which now exist in fair quantity.

000 The author thanks Professor E. G. R. Taylor for her advice on this work and her encouragement at many stages of his career, and Professor L. D. Stamp for his kindness in reading and advising on the manuscript. Those pioneer scholars of the area, whose papers are listed in the bibliography, and upon whose work the author has of necessity drawn liberally for facts, are also thanked. In addition he is heavily indebted to his wife for her continued patience and co-operation at every stage in the production of this book.

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THE PEASANTRY OF SOUTH EAST ASIA [1]

PROFESSOR RAYMOND FIRTH, F.B.A.

000 IF it is not wholly true that the social and economic reconstruction which is so necessary in Asia today must begin with the peasant, it is certain that no programme which omits the peasant can be on firm foundations. The recent history of China is evidence enough for this. My concern, as a social anthropologist, is with the analysis and classification of social relations between people and groups of people, rather than with political or economic affairs as such, although inevitably I cannot dis-
●128 regard them. So my aim is to show briefly some of the most important
121 aspects of the social organization of the South East Asian peasant communities, and of the values by which this organization works. Though the details in my paper refer mainly to Malaya and Indonesia, I think the generalizations have some value for the South East Asian region as a whole.

If the basic features of the peasant society are ignored, one can understand neither the peculiar tenacity which it still possesses in modern conditions, nor the reactions of its members to the increasing impact of ex-
121 ternal economic and political forces. The definition of a peasant is a
565 countryman—a man engaged in rural pursuits, primarily agriculture, with
463 a comparatively simple technology and a special interest in the land he works. In South East Asia one may extend the application of the term to
241 cover the majority of fishermen and even village craftsmen too. They are
226 of the same social class as the agriculturalists, and often members of the
32 same families. As occupational groups, they may even be separable only in theory, since many a peasant farmer is also a fisherman or craftsman by turns, as his seasonal cycle or his cash-needs influence him. What R. H. Tawney has said of agriculture—that it is at once a craft, a business, and a manner of life—can be applied more widely here; the problems of all these peasants alike are partly technical, partly financial and commercial, and partly cultural and social.

162 It is difficult to say just what proportion of the present population of
565 South East Asia may be classed as peasants. It would seem that in nearly
241 every South East Asian country two-thirds or more of the total population
463 is to be found in agricultural communities, tilling the soil. In 1930 the
32 census of Java and Madura in Indonesia gave about 70 per cent of the male
462 workers as dependent for their livelihood on native agricultural output, and about 75 per cent in the regions of Indonesia outside Java and Madura, while large numbers of women were engaged in home craft production. In Siam, in about 1930, almost 90 per cent of the population lived in agricultural communities, rice production providing the living of about 80 per

[1] Originally delivered at a meeting at Chatham House on 21 February 1950.

121 The exclusive emphasis on marriage as a causative factor
114 in kinship terminology, found both in Rivers and Aginsky though in different form, appears to be losing ground steadily; cf. the excellent studies by Tax, Eggan, McAllister, Opler, and Gilbert (in Eggan, 1937) and Opler (1937).

121 No use has been made of the terms "classificatory" and
128 "descriptive", each of which has acquired so wide a range of
601 connotations as to have lost all preciseness. The term "analytical" is used in its basic linguistic sense, e.g. "father's brother" is an analytical term, whereas "uncle" is a primary term. Note that a term may be only partly analytical, e.g. "uncle's son", where the fully analytical term would be "father's brother's son" or "mother's brother's son".

Three types of terminological equations are distinguished, as follows:

1. Categorical equation: equation of members of the two different categories of kin (consanguineal and affinal), e.g. "mother's brother"= "father-in-law".

2. Lineal equation: equation of members of two different lines of descent, e.g. "brother"= "father's sister's son", "son"= "brother's son".

3. Serial equation: equation of members of two different generations, e.g. "son"= "grandson".

These terms are to be regarded as convenient tags of some use in describing patterns of nomenclature, e.g. the Omaha and Crow types are characterized by serial equations in the cross collateral lines. The equation may rest on the extension

121 of a term through analogy or teknonymy, e.g. "grandfather" =
128 "father-in-law" (teknonymy) or on the merging of the referents,
601 e.g. "mother's brother" = "father-in-law" in a group practising cross-cousin marriage. One's explanation of a given system of nomenclature depends in large measure on his analysis of these factors, and one must guard against a premature assumption in either direction. Other equation categories can be established, e.g. the equation of elder and younger siblings, but those cited above have proved to be the most useful.

A final word remains to be said with regard to the system of notation employed. For each language considered in detail, a table of terms is drawn up, with those referring to female kin on the left, those referring to male kin on the right, and those without sex specification (neuter) in the center. This simple arrangement permits of rapid inspection of the table, and is more convenient than the charts of which kinship theorists are so fond. In the notation itself an attempt has been made to get away from the "bastard algebra of kinship", to use Malinowski's phrase (p. 19). Primary English terms are represented by capital letters, and English categorical terms by small letters. Since terms such as "aunt", "uncle", and "cousin" are often found in our sources, these have been retained in our notation. The letter N is used for "nephew, niece" (i.e. neuter), Ne for "nephew", Ni for "niece", and the cousin terms are formed analogically, viz. C "cousin (neuter)", Ce "cousin (male)", Ci "cousin (female)". Cf. also the parallelism in Si "sister" (S "son").

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Kinship Notation

121 A aunt
128 B brother
197 C cousin
601 Ce cousin (male)
Ci cousin (female)
Ch child
D daughter
(ds) (different sex from speaker's)
F father
G grand-
l -in-law
M mother
N nephew or niece
Ne nephew
Ni niece
(os) (older than speaker)
p parallel
P parent
S son
Sb sibling
Si sister
Sp spouse
(ss) (same sex as speaker's)
U uncle
x cross
(ys) (younger than speaker)

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SECTION A

TIBETO-BURMAN

1. Introduction

121 128 The Tibeto-Burman family of languages represents the center of gravity of the Sino-Tibetan-Karen-Thai linguistic complex (Indo-Chinese) and thus makes an ideal focal point in our study of kinship terminology in southeastern Asia. The diversity within this family, roughly comparable with that of Indo-European, has given rise to great terminological variation, the interpretation of which involves an historical perspective. Tibeto-Burman, therefore, provides a testing-ground for methods as well as a point of departure, and an analysis of kinship nomenclature in this Western division of Indo-Chinese yields a framework within which the nomenclatures of Karen, Chinese, and Thai, or the Eastern division of the group, can be defined.

Tibeto-Burman studies have suffered somewhat from the undue prominence given to Chinese by the epoch-making work of Bernhard Karlgren and Henri Maspero. The classic contribution in the field, Conrady's analysis of the so-called "causative-denominative" formation, is concerned almost exclusively with morphological aspects. The same may be said of the more recent and much more substantial studies by Wolfenden, while Houghton's interesting article on

121 "linguistic palaeontology" is essentially devoted to
128 semantics. Other studies in the general field, with the exception of those noted below, are entirely superficial and need not be cited here. The fact that a sound morphological and semantic analysis can proceed only from a sound phonological basis has gone largely unheeded by students of Tibeto-Burman linguistics. The writer, working in collaboration with Mr. Robert Shafer, has attempted to supply this basis. The fruit of their joint effort is embodied in the Sino-Tibetan Linguistics series as well as in individual articles by the co-authors. This series of volumes, as specified in the bibliography appended to the present introduction, covers most of the Tibeto-Burman divisions, the major exceptions being Miri-Dafla, Konyak (East Naga), Lepcha (Rong), and Lui (Kadu). The results achieved in the Sino-Tibetan Linguistics series are in no sense definitive, but a number of broad phonetic generalizations have been attained and in some instances rather detailed phonetic analyses have been completed. In the present study the writer has refined the analysis at many points and has in some places arrived at new interpretations, while the phonological treatment of Miri-Dafla, Lepcha, and other groups is presented here for the first time.

197 The Tibeto-Burman languages, like Karen, Chinese, and Thai, are characterized by the presence of monosyllabic roots and the employment of distinctive tones (tonemes).

197 like that in Indo-European linguistics, i.e. several large well-defined groups and various smaller groups can be pointed out, but, with the exception of a few specific similarities, the exact genealogies of these groups cannot be traced. The 128 main divisions of Tibeto-Burman and the approximate positions 197 of some of the key languages are indicated on the appended language list and map. This list includes only those languages for which kinship material is given and is in no sense complete. This material has been arranged with a view to guiding the reader through the maze of Tibeto-Burman linguistics, hence the transitions are both geographical and philological. First the important Tibetan group and its aberrant dialects are considered, thus yielding a yardstick of comparison against which other systems can be collated. Proceeding then to the south, we discuss the chain of languages spoken in the sub-Himalayan area, from west to east, ending with the Miri group in northern Assam. The linguistic affiliations follow much the same pattern, inasmuch as the languages of Kanauri type in the western sub-Himalayas approach Tibetan while those in the eastern sub-Himalayas (Nepal) show affiliations rather with the languages of Assam and Burma. The Kachin group, which stands at the "linguistic crossroads" of Tibeto-Burman, forms the natural transition to Nung and Burmese on the one hand, and to Konyak and Barish on the other. Lastly, the Kukic complex of languages, including Kuki-Chin, Naga,

128 197 Mikir, and Meithei, round out our picture of Tibeto-Burman kinship terminology as a whole. As new material is presented in connection with each group taken up for discussion, recapitulatory remarks are added to tie the argument together, and a general summary is offered at the end.

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

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1.	Tibetan	12.	Dafla	23.	Lisu	33.	Lushei
2.	Tsangla	13.	Digaru	24.	Nyi	34.	Lakher
3.	Gyarung	14.	Aka	25.	Ahi	35.	Thado
4.	Kanauri	15.	Dhimal	26.	Moso	36.	Sho
5.	Byangsi	16.	Kachin	27.	Chang	37.	Khami
6.	Bahing	17.	Nung	28.	Garo	38.	Tangkhul
7.	Vayu	18.	Burmese	29.	Bodo	39.	Empeo
8.	Newari	19.	Maru	30.	Mikir	40.	Angami
9.	Magari	20.	Phunoi	31.	Meithei	41.	Sema
10.	Lepcha	21.	Akha	32.	Mru	42.	Ao
11.	Abor-Miri	22.	Lahu				

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<u>Language List</u>:

Abor-Miri 11. Ahi 25. Aka 14. Akha 21. Angami 40. Ao 42. Bahing 6. Bodo 29. Burmese 18. Byangsi 5. Chang 27. Dafla 12. Dhimal 15. Digaru 13. Empeo 39. Garo 28. Gyarung 3. Kachin 16. Kanauri 4. Khami 37. Lahu 22. Lakher 34. Lepcha 10. Lisu 23. Lushei 33. Magari 9. Maru 19. Meithei 31. Mikir 30. Moso 26. Mru 32. Newari 8. Nung 17. Nyi 24. Phunoi 20. Sema 41. Sho 36. Tangkhul 38. Thado 35. Tibetan 1. Tsangla 2. Vayu 7.

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Chapter One

THE NATURAL LANDSCAPE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

101 SOUTHEAST ASIA is a term which became popular during the Far
●131 Eastern War 1941-45, to describe those territories of Eastern Asia
103 which lie south of the Tropic of Cancer (Burma, Siam, Indochina and Malaya) and the nearby islands spreading eastwards from the Asiatic continent towards New Guinea. The archipelago section merges eastwards into island groups of the West-Central Pacific, for which reason New Guinea itself may best be considered outside the definition "Southeast Asia," an exclusion justified (*a*) by its closer physical association with the Australian Continent, (*b*) by its sparse population of distinctive anthropological type now found principally in Australia, and (*c*) by the close affinities of its flora and fauna with those of Australia. The northern limit of Southeast Asia extends beyond the Tropic of Cancer to include Upper Burma on the western side, and withdraws south of the tropic to the political boundaries of Siam and Indochina farther east. By this definition, "Southeast Asia" and its off-lying islands sprawl asymmetrically across the Equator and cover a zone not far short of 1,500 miles in radius from a point off the mouth of the Mekong, an area comparable to all Europe and its seas north of the African coast. Thus isolation by great distances, as well as by physical obstructions, is a constant factor in the geographical relation between the various parts of Southeast Asia.

133 In Southeast Asia, that which forms its core and constitutes the geological link between its chief parts is the Sunda Platform, the southernmost continental block of Asia, whose integrity as a land mass has continued, with only minor tectonic disturbances on its fringes, through such long geological periods that it may be compared with those other "permanent" massifs, the Deccan, the Arabian Block and the Laurentian Shield. It is this physical feature which underlies Borneo, Eastern Sumatra, Northern Java and Malaya.

A somewhat similar platform is the common physiographic basis of Australia and New Guinea, forming what is known as the Sahul Shelf, to the east of the East Indian Archipelago.

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241 to a group, the individuals of which choose or are given, every now and again, different portions to cultivate for themselves.

231 Within Southeast Asia the shifting cultivation system has no relation to the needs of domesticated animals. There is no evidence here that the simpler tribes have been primarily cattle grazers, except in so far as all Mongoloid types coming south overland

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

FIG. 111.—The Accessibility of Southeast Asia by Land

231 from the grazing grounds of Tibet and farther north may, at remote times outside this territory, have been associated with animals. Inside Southeast Asia, cattle do not fit well into the ecology of climate, vegetation and pests, and the disinterest in animals has become part of the religious tradition; Buddhists and Hindus do not eat beef, Muslims will not eat pork and even the primitive animists have similar inhibitions. Wherever today there has grown up a cattle system, it relates to the ploughing needs and is concerned with buffaloes or small oxen and does not derive from an earlier tradition of cattle farming or nomadism.

241 Shifting cultivation is a system well adapted to large empty areas where soils are poor and the rate of soil erosion high. As soon as population increases, shifting cultivation, which needs each cutover area to stand unused for 7 to 10 years before being

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disparity could be attributed to replacement of capital equipment, yet it may indicate the beginnings of a great change in the function of Southeast Asia in world trade. Postwar revival by 1950 had become most spectacular in Malaya which, though the smallest political unit of the region, had re-established its trade and was responsible for nearly half the total trade of the region. The Philippines also recovered quickly, to be involved in a quarter of the trade. 439

Convergence of Routes

This region stands at zones of convergence for transoceanic routes between the very densely populated areas of India and China, and also between those areas and Europe, Australia and North America, so that international shipping is likely to converge upon Southeast Asia independently of purely colonial considerations which have hitherto specially drawn the Philippines into the U.S. shipping circuits, the East Indies into the Dutch, and the rest of Southeast Asia into the British shipping streams. French shipping has been relatively little involved, certainly not more than Danish, Italian and German and far less than the Japanese. 131 • 439

The convergence of shipping routes has left a heritage of convergent air routes which are tending to follow closely the shipping lanes, making Southeast Asia the terminus of the air lanes from North America down through the belt of narrow seas along the West Pacific (linking the United States with Japan, China and Java population centres) and from Europe across the "Eurasian Mediterranean" of Southwest Asia and India, as well as a junction for lines to Australia, although the population and production of the latter scarcely justifies considering it in the long term as a major objective of airways in the way that India and China must continue to be.

Convergence of Interests

There is thus much to be coveted in Southeast Asia, the raw materials and the food it produces, the manufactured goods it needs, the commission on the coming and going involved, are all desirable and those who share or have shared in its $15,000 million 1950 trade turnover are inevitably defensive of their portion. Colonial powers have jealously divided up these assets in the past and it is to be expected that there will always be from India and 433

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Chapter Two

CLIMATIC FACTORS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

FEW regions comparable in size to Southeast Asia have so uniform a temperature régime over the whole area and throughout the year. Apart from those local variations due to altitude, and in Northern Burma and Siam to continental influences from Tibet, Southeast Asia from Lower Burma to Cochinchina and New Guinea has average monthly temperatures which remain within ten degrees or so of 80° F. at all seasons. Symmetry about the Equator and a set of land units thoroughly broken up by water bodies of greater area than themselves account for this uniformity of warmth in time and from place to place, and in turn mean that the broad human and vegetation variations do not correlate closely with variations of warmth from place to place, nor is the rhythm of vegetation and cultivation in the region as a whole set by an annual procession of temperature changes. 132

The basic rhythm of plants and agriculture through most of Southeast Asia is dominated by rainfall—by its incidence rather than by its volume, though considerable differences in volume make distinct climatic sub-divisions away from the axis of the Equator. Köppen's classification emphasises these climatic differences. In this broken terrain, the pattern of the rainfall and the pattern of its variations within short distances, are set by the wind systems. To understand these is to see the operative factor behind the local differences in rainfall periodicity which very much depend on the aspect of the land masses in relation to the seasonal air currents and to local water areas. [22]

THE WIND RÉGIME

Two similar air masses move across Southeast Asia:

(*a*) The Northern Tropical Air Mass which normally moves from the Tropic of Cancer towards the Equator as the Northeast Trades;

(*b*) The Southern Tropical Air Mass, originating over the Tropic of Capricorn and normally moving towards the Equator as the

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

FIG. 8.—Daily Weather Chart of Southeast Asia with isobars in millibars at 12.00 on 28th September 1946

Southeast Trades.

The physical character of the air is much the same in these two masses, which each have long courses across extensive warm seas, so that each is uniformly warm and uniformly damp. Furthermore, the air masses are both losing impetus as they move into lower latitudes. Where the Northern and Southern Tropical Air Masses converge is thus a front, by analogy with conceptions regarding air convergences worked out in other parts of the world, e.g. the Polar Front. The surface of convergence of the two tropical air-streams may be called "The Intertropical Front" and it shows on the weather map as a line.

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The similarity of physical conditions in these airstreams means that the Intertropical Front is less sharply defined at any one time by comparison with the Polar Front which separates air masses in different physical states. The warmth, the humidity and the loss of horizontal impulse in each of the Tropical Air Masses mean that vertical impetuses are increasing so that the Intertropical Front is marked by upward movements on both sides, tending to a vigorous convectional action. This explains the frequent calms along the Intertropical Front when strongly developed in what may be called its "ideal position," i.e. roughly along the Equator. In the older terminology, the zone of convergence of the Trade Winds was called the Doldrums. Just as the Polar Front has been found extremely useful in forecasting depressions in more northern latitudes, so also the Intertropical Front is a valuable line for forecasting weather, since along it move mild depressions and squalls which may assume great violence. Daily weather charts (synoptic charts) in this zone have so far only been prepared for official use and are not sold publicly (Fig. 8).

This relatively simple pattern is complicated by two other influences. Firstly, the two air masses are displaced across the Equator by the annual migration of the sun. The Intertropical Front is thus pulled south during the Southern Hemisphere summer and north of the Equator during northern summer. When the airstreams cross the Equator, Ferrell's Law operates upon them differentially so that Southeast Trades moving into the Northern Hemisphere become southwesterly winds and Northeast Trades become northwesterly winds when moving into the Southern Hemisphere.

Secondly, the low pressure areas developed over the continents to which Southeast Asia is marginal, induce certain seasonal deviations in the air streams. Summer low pressures over Australia are just strong enough for the Intertropical Front to be pressed abnormally far south over Northern Australia in December. But the summer low pressures over India and the margins of continental Asia, particularly over Central Burma and Central Siam, have more dramatic effect: the Northern India low pressure system draws parts of the South Tropical Air Mass over the Equator in late northern spring, to maintain a parabolic path over the North Indian Ocean until November. The low pressure system which becomes established over the eastern parts of Asia two or three

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

FIG. 9.—The Intertropical Front in Southeast Asia. The front is shown by a heavy line, drawn as continuous where it is sharply defined and persistently located; as an interrupted line where the front is weakly defined and subject to considerable variation in position. The open lines show diagrammatically the manner in which the air masses move

months later than that over India, has a somewhat similar effect, drawing Southern Tropical Air far northwards through the South China Sea during June-July-August.

These influences produce the air streaming analysed in the accompanying four maps (Fig. 9), each representing conditions over three-month periods, which may be summarised thus:

1. December to February. The Southern and Northern Tropical Air Masses at this period move almost on ideal lines. The northern air streams cross the Equator as northwest winds reaching to about 7° S. where the Intertropical Front runs almost latitudinally except for a sag farther south towards the Australian low pressure zone.
2. March to May. Three air streams interact at this time. The Southern Tropical Air presses northward but does not substantially cross the Equator near Southeast Asia. The Northern Tropical Air Masses withdraw towards the northeast and in

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places more towards East Asia as east winds. Over mid-Indian Ocean, a first part of the Southern Tropical Air Mass (under the influence of Indian low pressures) crosses the Equator to blow across the Bay of Bengal as southwest winds, reaching farther eastwards as the season advances. The Intertropical Front at this time has branched form; its trace becomes roughly a cuspate curve pointing northward and prolonged in that direction by one or two arms which mark the convergences of air streams from the Bay of Bengal and from the West Pacific. The crux of this front is over the Central Indian Ocean in March, moving to positions eastward and slightly northward to one off Labuan in May.

3. June to August. Southern Tropical Air increases its migration north and a second major transfer of it into the Northern Hemisphere takes place, driving through the Java Sea and the South China Sea, drawn far northwards by East-Central Asia low pressures. At this time Northern Tropical Air does not reach Southeast Asia. The Intertropical Front opens into two almost symmetrical fronts of hyperbolic shape as a result of the second streaming of South Tropical Air. The double arms of the Fronts are close together at first but the distance between them increases until during August only the western portion lies over Southeast Asia as a roughly N-S. curving front off the coast of Indochina. The Intertropical Front persists over the Malaya-Indochina area throughout this quarter, delimiting two air streams both of which are Southern Tropical in origin yet which have acquired different physical characteristics and directions by taking different courses.
4. September-November. At this season the Northern Tropical Air rapidly increases its pressure from the north, extending its coverage westward and southward. Southern Tropical Air continues to cross the Equator over the Indian Ocean but diminishes in drive, to cease as an air transfer by November. The streaming of Southern Tropical Air through the South China Sea becomes completely occluded and is finally confined below the Equator as the Southeast Trades. Moving southward, the Intertropical Front reverts to the cuspate form of March-May, flattening to a latitudinal alignment. At this transitional period the cuspate curve is much sharper at its beak and less symmetrical than in the spring.

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In considering this analysis of tropical air masses, it must be remembered that the Intertropical Front varies in its preciseness and the positions given here are tendencies often disguised in practice by broad zones of calms. Thus the Doldrums should be considered as the zone within which is located the Intertropical Front, characterised by highly unstable air conditions and traversed by weak depressions moving sometimes westwards, sometimes eastwards, or at certain seasons polewards under the influence of the adjoining continents.

RAINFALL

In Fig. 10 the generalised effect of aspect, relief and these air streams may be seen to produce a rainfall above 80 in. per annum upon most territories of Southeast Asia. The zones of low rainfall are the dry belt of Upper Burma and South-Central Siam which are shielded by relief barriers athwart the air streams. Moreover the total precipitation lessens eastward in the East Indian areas, particularly in the territories and islands east of Central Java.

North of a line from Achin through North Malaya to Mindanao, and east and south of Central Java, very distinct dry seasons appear, the criterion being that of Köppen: at least one month of these areas has less than 2.4 in. of rain. The disposition of these dry zone areas is related to latitudes beyond the equatorial belt and towards the tropical limits. Towards the Equator, precipitation varies seasonally, generally with double wet seasons, though no season is sufficiently rainless to be called dry.

The tropical air masses operating over Southeast Asia are characterised by high temperatures and humidity, coupled with a physical instability which is greatest towards the Equator and decreases towards the continent of Asia. As a result of this instability, relatively weak depressions, small relief features and local overheating by insolation in, say, a town or in bare fields, can act as triggers to stimulate violent vertical air movements. Altitude thus has greater effects proportionally than is normal in other latitudes. Under these conditions cumulo-nimbus clouds of as much as 10,000 ft. depth may develop within half an hour and vertical air currents of 100 m.p.h. inside such clouds are quite common. With the parent air so humid, the precipitation consequent on such updraughts is very heavy (often as much as 2 inches

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

FIG. 10.—Climatic Factors of Southeast Asia

within an hour) even though localised over a small area, and the latent heat deriving from precipitation serves to perpetuate the uprush of air. While all types of initial cause of precipitation occur over Southeast Asia, they tend always to be accompanied by

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

Fig. 11.—Correlation of Rainfall and Wind Direction in Southeast Asia. The bearing of each arm represents the mean monthly direction of the wind (blowing towards the centre) and the length of each is proportional to the mean monthly rainfall. Months of no rainfall are thus no more than points at the compass centre. The numbers on each arm indicate the month (1 Jan., 2 Feb., etc.)

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

FIG. 12.—Structure of a Tropical Thunderstorm

thunderstorms, which towards the Equator are of daily occurrence and great violence (over 320 storms occur at Buitenzorg each year). Thunderstorm frequency decreases in those sub-regions where winter dry seasons are pronounced, yet even there the rainy months have high thunderstorm frequency. These Southeast Asia thunderstorms resemble those of middle latitudes (Fig. 12) and are accompanied by a "chimney" of rapidly rising air at the core, often with downflows of cooler air just in front of the storm. While the up-current of these thunderstorms is strong enough at times to tear an aeroplane apart, the freezing level is so high (above 25,000 feet) that hail, a common feature of similar storms in other latitudes, is here rare. The degree of correlation between rainfall and wind is evident from the combination of wind-roses and rainfall data in Fig. 11 which also demonstrates how emphatic is the dry season at places away from the Equator.

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

FIG. 13.—Theoretical Structure of a Typhoon

TYPHOONS

"Typhoon" is the name given to tropical cyclones which occur off East Asia. Only the northernmost parts of Southeast Asia come under the influence of typhoons which are most frequent over the Philippines and Indochina. A few have been known to cross the Kra Isthmus and pass over Bengal. The Bay of Bengal typhoons, frequenting a restricted area well north in the Bay, do not normally affect Burma, so that only the South China Sea typhoons strongly influence the weather conditions of Southeast Asia territories.

While theories about the origin of typhoons do not reach general agreement in detail, partly due to the difficulty of obtaining full meteorological data about these phenomena whose violence so often destroys instruments and whose variable paths defy advance preparation for tests, they seem to result from a widespread convection of hot, moist, unstable air and may represent extreme variants of the forces arising from convergent air currents. Much has been done to accumulate data about sea level features of

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

FIG. 14.—Typhoon Tracks in the South China Sea

typhoons, but little information is available about their vertical structure apart from navigators' notes on cloud formation. Clines, writing on the basis of U.S. data, seems to have established that typhoons are in fact largely self-perpetuating from the release of much latent heat due to violent precipitation in the front right quadrant, where he suggests a point above the ground at the precipitation level is in effect a constant generator of heat, and a constant low pressure focus towards which the sea-level barometric centre is always moving (Fig. 13). A close relation between the path of typhoons and a front between air masses has also been suggested.

Typhoons of the South China Sea normally originate somewhere east of the Philippines and travel towards those islands and Indochina, along paths which gradually assume that parabolic line peculiar to all tropical cyclones, so that somewhere between the Philippines and Tonkin they begin to recurve on a line towards the northeast (Fig. 14). The seasonal incidence varies. In the period 1918-29, ninety-eight South China Sea typhoons were distributed thus through the year:

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	Jan.	*Feb.*	*Mar.*	*Apr.*	*May*	*June*	*July*	*Aug.*	*Sept.*	*Oct.*	*Nov.*	*Dec.*	*Total*
Number of Typhoons	2	0	0	0	4	6	22	17	11	15	15	6	98

The peak periods, July to November, relate to the abnormal positions of the broken Intertropical Front as shown in Fig. 9. Regarding the mean tracks of these East Asia typhoons, it will be noted that they normally move on paths shifting progressively northward from February to August and shifting southwards thereafter until January, but they never reach much farther south than the Cape of Cambodia. From July to September the maximum danger zone for typhoons is north of latitude 15° (Luzon and the Gulf of Tonkin) while in October and November maximum typhoon risk is on the coasts of Cochinchina and the extreme south of Annam.

South China Sea typhoons have characteristics like those of similar disturbances elsewhere. In advance of them whispy cirrus clouds at high altitude and broken cumulus clouds at lower levels drift across the horizon, the latter becoming dark rugged clouds, more numerous and coalescent in the centre as the typhoon approaches. About 100 miles from the centre, dark nimbus clouds develop and produce torrential rains moving forward with the whole typhoon at rates from 10-20 knots, while the constituent winds often increase to speeds reaching and exceeding 80 knots. Each typhoon has an "eye" of comparatively small area, perhaps 5 miles in diameter where the sky is relatively clear, calmer or only lightly squally and no rain falls, resembling an intensified form of the quiet conditions between the warm and cold fronts of a middle latitude cyclone. Behind the "eye" of the typhoon winds again blow with devastating violence, in a reverse direction to winds in advance of the "eye," with nimbo-stratus clouds producing torrential rains which reduce visibility to nil. These gradually lose intensity and the typhoon passes over, leaving a trail of high cirrus.

In these deep tropical depressions, the great force of the winds involved causes widespread damage in built-up and cultivated areas. Their violence and frequency is particularly great in Luzon and they appear to lose violence over Indochina. They form one of the major hazards of shipping in the South China Sea, particularly

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for native sailing vessels. Most of the first study of these typhoons was contained in European seamen's handbooks which were chiefly concerned with rule of thumb methods by which ships unlucky enough to be caught in a typhoon could avoid the most dangerous parts of them. The coastal zones of Tonkin and Annam experience severe floods in low-lying areas when the typhoon winds set in certain directions which augment the tides. Typhoon winds can, at their worst, lift trains from their rails and cast steamers several hundred yards inland from the shore.

The French observers, Bruzon and Carton, describe thus a typhoon over Nha Trang and Hon Ba in 1926: "The typhoon appeared first on 2nd November, WNW. of Yap and on the 3rd was 700 km. east of Manila. During the night of 5th-6th November it crossed south of Manila. Over the China Sea, its course changed from west to west-southwest and the typhoon struck the coast of Annam on the 7th. At Nha Trang about 16.00 hours on that day, the wind blew violently from WSW. During the night its violence increased and its course changed through NW. and N. to NNE. Minimum pressure was experienced that night (980 m.b.) but at Hon Ba in the mountains (1,480 m.) pressure went down two hours later to 818 m.b. During that one night pressures dropped about 30 m.b. in the path of the typhoon but after a few hours reverted to normal again. Considerable damage was done to Hon Ba forests, many trees were uprooted and in some places entire groves were destroyed. The typhoon brought torrential rain to the whole Annam coast from Faifoo to Cap Padaran."

Certain line squalls moving eastwards to Malaya at very low latitudes in the Malacca Strait have a violence at times approaching that of typhoons and the squalls are in fact related to disturbances on the Intertropical Front: they are not circular in character, have no "eye," are not extensive or persistent features and they have no connection with true typhoons.

Sunshine

Over most Southeast Asia territories for much of the year, the cloud cover is very heavy and the sunshine period is low. This is most emphatic towards the Equator away from which a season of clear skies and continuous sunny weather occurs. The effective sunshine

132 is rendered even less by the high humidity which cuts off many actinic wavelengths. In Singapore over half the sunshine day is obscured by clouds; in Jakarta less than 70 per cent of the possible sunshine hours are sunny. A distinct diurnal rhythm of sunshine incidence is characteristic of the Equator; during the mornings, which frequently begin clear and sunny, cumulus clouds steadily increase to a maximum in the afternoon, when convectional influences are at their peak, often producing thunder-showers followed by a clearing of the sky towards sunset. The amount of sunshine received is normally greater at sea level and decreases with altitude. On the other hand, those districts with distinct dry seasons have high sunshine values in the dry periods, often offset on the average by prolonged obliteration of the sun during the rainy season. These factors have considerable agricultural significance.

Humidity

High average humidity values are normal everywhere in Southeast Asia, but they are subject to frequent variations. Coasts are damper than interiors and highlands are damper than plains. Localities with marked dry seasons have periods of low humidity accompanied by high temperatures. In any one place a few hours sunshine rapidly lowers the relative humidity and it is a fact that even in the wettest places, the ground and wet clothes dry out under direct sunshine. Comparatively minor humidity variations have considerable effects on plants, and from the point of view of human beings it is the humidity rather than the temperature which produces feelings of body heat or body cold. When the relative humidity drops a few points, the skin sensation is one of coolness, due to easy evaporation of perspiration. By the same cause, a site exposed to regular breezes feels drier and cooler than the actual humidity or thermometer figures justify. The generalised rainfall and seasons map (Fig. 10) is a convenient guide to the distribution of humidity.

Altitude Effects

133 Throughout the region altitude is an important factor varying
132 the local weather conditions. While the land masses are relatively small, they are orographically very broken so that (apart from

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East Sumatra) no very extensive plains have developed and mountains are visible from most points. Even the highest peak known (Kinabalu, Br. Borneo, 13,681 ft.) lies well below the snow line but those highlands adjoining Yunnan do receive a brush of snow in winter. The average highland is, however, more

FIG. 15.—Köppen's Climatic Regions in Southeast Asia

of the order 8,000 feet and continuous areas at a high altitude are quite small. These altitudes induce local temperature reduction, more evident at night than during the day, and local high humidities. They cause local rain shadows which, owing to the differing winds through the year, are seasonal rather than permanent, except where double ranges give the intervening lowland a fairly constant rain shadow, as in Central Burma. A major function of the higher altitudes is to cause orographic rains and to lower the temperatures, which latter has less geographical significance than the overall raininess.

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Climatic Regions

132 Raininess is the basic criterion between major parts of this climatic area where temperatures are for most regions never less than warm. Two broad rain types may be distinguished:

(*a*) heavy rains at all times of the year (over 80 inches per annum). In detail there are peaks of raininess, generally double peaks, but between these peaks is a season less rainy, though still without any month which may be called dry. This region is mainly equatorial.

(*b*) rains through most of the year, with at least one month with less than 2.4 inches during these cooler months, the length of dry seasons increasing with latitude and the limits being roughly latitudinal as in Fig. 10. The dry seasons are normally related to wind streams at various times of the year. This zone subdivides into:

1. A subdivision where total rainfall is exceptionally low (below 60 inches per annum) and the drought season long, as in Central Burma and East Siam.
2. A subdivision where the dry season is long and altitude reduces the temperature to less than about 60° for the cool season, but not reaching freezing on the average.

Köppen's classifications for this zone are a convenient but by no means fully checked scheme (Fig. 15).

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Chapter Three

THE DRAINAGE PATTERNS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE Irrawaddy, Salween, Menam Chao Praya and Mekong are remarkable for their length compared with most Southeast Asia rivers, which rarely exceed a few hundred miles long. Those four major rivers are associated with tectonic basins; relief elsewhere only permits short streams. All districts marginal to the Sunda Platform have experienced relatively recent tectonic changes and the rivers developed upon them are youthful as well as short. Upon the Platform itself much more advanced landscape maturity is evident but because this older surface has only limited areas exposed, rivers even there are short. 133

CHARACTERISTICS OF TROPICAL RIVERS

In the régime of tropical rivers several factors have distinctive emphasis compared with conditions in temperate latitude rivers. Firstly the volume of water precipitated into and to be carried from any drainage basin is several times that of equivalent temperate latitude rivers as a result of the much higher rainfall. Moreover the precipitation is more intense. Even the dry interior of Burma experiences falls of rain averaging ·6 inches per rainy day. The water content of those Tropical Air Masses over Southeast Asia is so high and the rising air currents so strong and sustained that several Javanese stations have recorded falls of over 16 inches per day. These violent torrential downpours are often very localised at any one time, yet on an average they affect large areas. Thus the volume of rainwater in any drainage basin is enormous and fluctuates widely within short periods of a few hours. 132 133

A further consequence of these great rainstorms is their powerful erosive effects. Upon cultivated land the force and volume of these downpours cause surface downwash to be large, the soil rapidly washes away and whole hillsides may slip, so that the run-off has a high mud content. Because the rivers are mostly immature, this heavy load may be sustained by turbulence for considerable 134 132 133

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134 132 133

distances. In areas of alternating wet and dry seasons, drought cracks the ground, loosens the top surface and thereby increases the available load when the rains begin. The Dry Zones of Burma and Siam are for this reason areas of most violent surface removal. The very heavy load of Southeast Asia rivers gives them a great capacity for rapidly building up deltas, sedimenting the estuaries and at times causing heavy deposition of silt well inland. Furthermore the rainfall is not only violent and intense, it is also variable in seasonal incidence; thus many streams of Upper Burma, Central Siam and Eastern Java are for months practically dry and then come into spate within a few hours, not unlike the wadis of North Africa. Landform combined with the seasonal rains causes the Salween, for instance, to vary its level 50 feet within a few hours. Such variability of volume induces deposition well inland. Huge silt banks lie across many watercourses, vast alluvial fans develop at the debouchment to plains, and even at the junction of tributaries.

The Irrawaddy presents an example of how the drainage conditions differ at different points in the course of a tropical river. Near and above Bhamo changes of Irrawaddy level directly parallel changes of rainfall. As the stream passes through the Dry Zone of Burma it receives no significant additional water from the tributaries after it passes the confluence of the Chindwin and it is effectively losing water by evaporation. Stamp estimates 45 per cent of Irrawaddy water has been lost by evaporation when the stream finally reaches the head of the Delta. Evaporation rates in the Burmese Dry Zone are little, if at all, less than the precipitation. Farther downstream, in the Delta, heavy precipitation occurs again, so that the Irrawaddy floods arrive at the Delta roughly a month after peak rains in the reaches above Bhamo, to find it already suffering from floods due to local rains and small local streams. These floods of local origin effectively oblige the Irrawaddy water to remain within the main distributaries. Even more interesting is Stamp's evidence that the average annual silt load at the Delta head is 261 million tons, whereas at Mandalay it is only 32 million tons, showing that 229 million tons of silt is added in the Dry Zone. Since the Chindwin provides 109 million tons of silt, the balance of 120 million tons derives from the wadi-like, highly variable streams (chaungs) joining the Irrawaddy in its driest section.

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Chapter Four

SOUTHEAST ASIA'S NATURAL VEGETATION

Tropical Forest Factors

The heavy, evenly distributed rainfall and constant high temperatures of most of Southeast Asia encourage continuous plant growth and a profuse, very varied flora. Because the whole year is here a growing season, plant life becomes almost overpowering in its rate of growth. This region contains more species than any other; the flora is not yet completely known, but some 35,000 species of flowering plants alone are thought to exist there (van Steenis). On Borneo at least 11,000 species have been listed, according to Merrill. This contrasts with the parallel figure of 13,000 species for the whole of Tropical West Africa (Good). Woody plants predominate and 15 per cent of the species are trees whose mature trunks are over 16 in. in diameter. The profusion of species is due to (*a*) the predominantly warm, moist climate, (*b*) the constancy of this climate over long geological periods, (*c*) the variety of relief and islands producing minor adaptations, (*d*) the rapidity with which selective and adaptive evolutionary processes can establish new characteristics in a tropical climate which has no resting season, and (*e*) the migrations of plant types from both Asia and Australia.

Southeast Asia was originally clothed by nature almost entirely by a tree cover. Only in modern times has there been any extensive clearing because apart from firing, primitive people were technically incapable of removing the forest. Some clearings became permanent for cultivation, in recent centuries, but the majority have been temporary and partial clearings, later left to natural replacement by a selective vegetation such as grass, savannah or scrub. Temporary clearings resulted largely from systems of shifting cultivation which finally abandon an area, partially cleared by fire, to a series of quick-growing plants, becoming after a few years a secondary forest which may, over prolonged periods, evolve to be scarcely distinguishable from primary forest.

The system of migrant agriculture or shifting cultivation, in Malaya called *ladang* and in Burma *taungya*, is widespread through

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recuperate quickly when the area is again allowed to revert to bush."[38] 245

Several of the forest services of Southeastern Asia have made a rather [654] successful use of the shifting cultivator in their endeavor to reforest the land. They have combined shifting culture and silviculture by hiring shifting cultivators to cut mature trees and to sow or plant new trees on cut-185 over or burned-over land. For this the cultivators are paid a small wage. In addition they are allowed to grow their own crops for one or two years between the rows of young trees. This system, known as the "taungya forestry system," was developed in 1856 by the German forester, Dietrich Brandis, while he was Superintendent of Forests in Pegu, Burma.[39] It is ingenious in that it recognizes the habits of the shifting cultivator and fits them into a modern forest economy instead of persecuting the cultivator and forcing him to give up his traditional culture. This system has been used in the teak forests of Java since 1871. The forest service makes a contract[40] with the peasants of Java according to which the peasants are to prepare the land and plant and take care of teak trees (*Tectona grandis* L.) in return for a small sum of money and the right to plant such crops as maize and red pepper (*Capsicum annuum* L.) between the rows of teak. The cultivation of upland rice is discouraged, and the planting of cassava, peanuts, castor beans, and tobacco usually is not allowed (Figs. 40, 41). 1/A

The taungya forestry system is an excellent way of getting pure stands [313] of commercial timber. The typical forest of the tropics is expensive to exploit because of the large variety of trees which it contains, many of which have little or no commercial value.[41]

As important as reforestation is soil erosion control. Where shifting 134 cultivation is practiced in mountainous regions it often causes such accel- 133 • eration in the rate of erosion that the rivers are choked with sediment and periodically do great flood damage. Flood control could be achieved in 185 most cases by completely closing the headwaters and watershed areas to cultivators. On more gentle slopes the clearings should be rather narrow, should parallel the contours, and be separated by belts of forest. If at the same time the forest uphill were protected by fireguards, the clearings would have a chance to close quickly again so that the soil would be

[38] Worthington: Science in Africa, 1938, pp. 378–379.

[39] *Taungya* is the Burmese term for the temporary field of the shifting cultivator, a term that the foresters have adopted. E. P. Stebbing in his work, The Forests of India, Vol. 1, 1922, p. 376, writes:

"Brandis, moreover, recognized that the very system which, till then, had destroyed teak forests might be utilized to produce them, . . . and as early as 1856 an attempt was made in Prome district to sow teak in regular rows, together with the rice scattered by the teungya [*sic*] cutters. Twenty years afterwards this attempt had grown into a regular system, by which areas were being annually stocked with teak at a cost far below that of regular plantations." See also *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, 1926, pp. 415–428.

[40] Becking: "De djaticultuur op Java," 1928, pp. 50–52.

[41] Heske: "Der tropische Wald," 1939, p. 414. Heske's article gives an excellent short account of the forests of Southeastern Asia and points out that they are on the whole much easier to exploit than are the forests of tropical America because of the abundance of cheap labor.

1/A [See p. 41; cat ... analyst]

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185 134 138 protected against abnormal erosion. Terracing would be the most effective method of checking soil erosion, but this requires a good deal of labor, which is scarce in areas of shifting cultivation.

654 134 185 133 The Forestry Service of the Indies started an interesting soil-erosion experiment near Tjiwidej in the mountains south of Bandoeng at an elevation of 1800 meters. Two adjacent parcels of forest land, lying on rather steep slopes, are drained separately—out of each parcel comes a little brook—and thus form separate drainage units. Both parcels were used by shifting cultivators who had cut and burned the forest. In one case the slope was left undisturbed; in the other the slope was terraced. At the foot of each slope catch basins were constructed to retain the sediment that was washed down by rain water and transported by the brooks. The amount of water that drains out of each unit was measured and the sediment weighed. The purpose of this experiment was to get quantitative measurements of the amount of erosion that is caused by shifting cultivation and to study the effect of terracing in reducing soil loss. During the first year both parcels lost very little soil, because the humus layer protected it; but in the second year the unterraced parcel lost 5.065 kg. of silt per square meter whereas the terraced parcel lost only one-half as much, or 2.524 kg.[42] (Figs. 42-45). 1

Under the conditions that we have discussed so far, no radical change in the system of cultivation is required. If, however, the population increases to such an extent that there is no longer enough available land to allow for a sufficiently long rotation cycle, more drastic remedies are necessary.

654 185 245 134 Such a situation arose in parts of the Outer Islands and attracted the attention of government specialists. Legal experts familiar with Indonesian customary law, foresters, and agricultural advisers collaborated to seek a solution.[43] Realizing that shifting cultivators are usually reluctant to give up their traditional form of land use, the specialists approached the ladang problem by searching for means of reforesting ladangs quickly. Experiments were made with the planting of quick-growing leguminous and non-leguminous trees, bushes, and shrubs to shorten the fallow period, restore the humus, protect the soil against accelerated erosion, eliminate the grasses, and, in the case of leguminous species, improve the soil by adding nitrogen.[44] We have already seen, however, that artificial refor-

[42] I was able to visit the Tjiwidej experiment with Mr. L. Gonggrijp, under whose supervision the work was carried out. For a detailed report on the project see Gonggrijp: "Het erosie-onderzoek," 1941, pp. 200–220.

[43] H. J. Friedericy of the Department of the Interior and H. Vonk and E. J. Wind of the Department of Economic Affairs, for example, worked together on the problem of ladang culture in the residency of Palembang.

[137] [44] Experimental plantings included, among others, *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., a light-loving tree which is typical in Southeastern Asia of dry, rather open climax forests and of second-growth forests; *Hibiscus tiliaceus* L.; *Albizzia falcata* Backer, one of the fastest-growing trees of Southeastern Asia, used widely as a shade tree on coffee plantations; *Aleurites moluccana* Willd., a tree at home in the drier parts of the East Indies; *Leucaena glauca* Benth.; *Pterocarpus indicus* Willd., a large tree frequently used along roadsides as

1 [see p. 42, category 116 -- Analyst]

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estation is not a discovery of Western-trained scientists but has long been practiced by certain groups in Southeastern Asia. It was the plan of the government to spread and enforce this practice of artificial reforestation wherever advisable. This practice, whereby the cultivator determines the vegetative cover during the fallow period instead of abandoning the ladang to chance growth, brings him to a transition stage between shifting cultivation and permanent cultivation. From there the step to permanent cultivation with crop rotation is but a short one.

Permanent cultivation requires repeated tilling and therefore more labor and tools than the shifting cultivator is accustomed to. Work animals are also desirable. An important obstacle to intensification of agriculture in wide areas of Southeastern Asia, however, is the fact that hill and mountain regions [up to about 1500 meters in elevation] are frequently infested with malaria so that the energy of the people is greatly reduced.[45] Moreover, the acquisition of such implements as plows, harrows, and hoes, and especially of work animals, calls for financial resources or credit, both of which the average shifting cultivator lacks. Some shifting cultivators do own livestock, such as cattle or carabaos, but utilize neither their labor nor their manure. Groups of the Mois in the mountains of Annam have carabaos, but they do not use the animals in their agricultural activities because they "cannot talk" to them.[46] On the Lesser Sunda Islands livestock is kept because it gives social prestige to the owner. Overstocking of the pasture areas on these islands has led to overgrazing and has cut into the forest area until there has developed a scarcity of land suitable for ladang cultivation. The same has happened in large areas in Africa. There it has been necessary to teach the native peasant the use of cattle and make him familiar with the plow. This was done successfully in northern Nigeria by combining the animal husbandry of the nomadic Fulani with the indigenous shifting cultivation of the Hausa peasant, thus developing "a system of permanent farming whereby a man with cattle of his own, say two working oxen and a few cows, can plough and maintain in fertility an area of land sufficient to supply all the requirements of himself and his family, and to obtain a surplus balance as a return for his labour. . . . Thus mixed farming represents a gradual evolution from the shifting methods of cultivation to a static type of agriculture, by the introduction of animal husbandry, and with the use of animal cultivation."[47] Above all, the peasant learns to preserve the animal manure and

a shade tree; *Dolichos lablab* L., a climbing herb which is valuable as a vegetable; *Crotolaria anagyroides* H.B. and K., a bush of vigorous growth which attains a height of from 12 to 14 feet and forms an excellent green manure; *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., low shrubs useful as green manures; and *Mimosa invisa* Mart., a leguminous creeper which suppresses grasses.

45 Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 181 and 350.

46 *Ibid.*, p. 354.

47 King: "Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1939, p. 271. See also Faulkner and Mackie: West African Agriculture, 1933, and by the same authors: "The Introduction of Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1936, pp. 89–96.

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[133]

FIGS. 22 and 23 illustrate undesirable conditions that may result from shifting cultivation.

FIG. 22—*Cogonales* cut and burned out in a valuable commercial forest before the holder of the timber concession had a chance to exploit it. Negros Occidental Province, Negros. (Courtesy of the Bureau of Forestry.)

FIG. 23—*Cogonales* in the foreground and patches of second-growth forest in the hills. The *cogon* is gaining the upper hand because of repeated fires, which prevent natural reforestation. Near Port Banga, Zamboanga Province, Mindanao. (Courtesy of the Bureau of Forestry.)

FIG. 24—Filipino foresters investigating the extensive *cogonales* of eastern Nueva Ecija Province, Luzon. (Courtesy of the Bureau of Forestry.)

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Chapter One

THE NATURAL LANDSCAPE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

101 SOUTHEAST ASIA is a term which became popular during the Far
131 Eastern War 1941-45, to describe those territories of Eastern Asia
103 which lie south of the Tropic of Cancer (Burma, Siam, Indochina and Malaya) and the nearby islands spreading eastwards from the Asiatic continent towards New Guinea. The archipelago section merges eastwards into island groups of the West-Central Pacific, for which reason New Guinea itself may best be considered outside the definition "Southeast Asia," an exclusion justified (*a*) by its closer physical association with the Australian Continent, (*b*) by its sparse population of distinctive anthropological type now found principally in Australia, and (*c*) by the close affinities of its flora and fauna with those of Australia. The northern limit of Southeast Asia extends beyond the Tropic of Cancer to include Upper Burma on the western side, and withdraws south of the tropic to the political boundaries of Siam and Indochina farther east. By this definition, "Southeast Asia" and its off-lying islands sprawl asymmetrically across the Equator and cover a zone not far short of 1,500 miles in radius from a point off the mouth of the Mekong, an area comparable to all Europe and its seas north of the African coast. Thus isolation by great distances, as well as by physical obstructions, is a constant factor in the geographical relation between the various parts of Southeast Asia.

133 In Southeast Asia, that which forms its core and constitutes the geological link between its chief parts is the Sunda Platform, the southernmost continental block of Asia, whose integrity as a land mass has continued, with only minor tectonic disturbances on its fringes, through such long geological periods that it may be compared with those other "permanent" massifs, the Deccan, the Arabian Block and the Laurentian Shield. It is this physical feature which underlies Borneo, Eastern Sumatra, Northern Java and Malaya.

A somewhat similar platform is the common physiographic basis of Australia and New Guinea, forming what is known as the Sahul Shelf, to the east of the East Indian Archipelago.

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

FIG. 1.—Landforms of Southeast Asia

The three basic physical units (Fig. 1) of this region are, then:

1. The Sunda Platform
2. The Sahul Shelf
3. A "ground swell" of young mountain arcs fringing and lying between the two other units.

1. THE SUNDA PLATFORM

The line of the Himalayan mountain formations extends eastwards to the China Sea to appear in South China as the Nanling and as that line of W-E. mountains forming the watershed between the Red River of Tonkin and the Sikiang of Canton. This chain of fold mountains of Alpine type delimits Southeast Asia geologically from the rest of Asia and is accepted as evidence of mountain building processes related to forces operating from the north.

South of this marginal zone of latitudinal alignments, the structural trends, although varying from place to place, are mainly meridional and modulate the surface of the Sunda Platform itself

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on similar lines. These roughly N-S. ranges are described by Suess as the roots of ancient mountains. They are to be thought of as the denuded vestiges of mountain systems, the inner crystalline cores of which stand revealed by prolonged erosion of the sedimentaries within whose folds they were primarily intruded. These stumps of mountains are typically free from precipices and crags, have gentle slopes but are still fairly high because the parent mountains were huge, probably of Himalayan proportions. Today these "Altaid" relief features, apparent in that mountainous



FIG. 2.—A Section of the Kra Isthmus

country between Burma and Siam, in Indochina, in Malaya and in Borneo, by no means approximate to the towering heights of Himalayan and Alpine mountains, having been denuded to little higher than some 10,000 ft.

Towards the centre of the Platform, in Malaya and Borneo, the characteristically senile, denuded relief (Fig. 2) is most emphatic, extending into the islands of the Lingga and Rhio Archipelagoes, which may be considered as monadnocks. The Altaid trend lines, while mainly meridional, are least so in Borneo, where NE-SW. alignments are apparent. In Indochina, Siam and the Kra Isthmus, the N-S. line is well developed and very pronounced in that closely packed series of ranges among which the Irrawaddy, Salween, Menam, Mekong and Red Rivers have parallel courses. While the Sunda Platform has had a prolonged history of stability, at the present moment it is extensively inundated, so that only its higher parts stand above sea level. The advanced peneplainisation of the Platform as a whole is evidenced by the uniformity in depth of the shallow seas, the South China Sea, Malacca Strait and Java Sea, now spread across the continental shelf.

The Sunda Platform is characteristically free from volcanic

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phenomena of any except very remote geological periods and it is not subject to earthquakes.

2. The Sahul Shelf

Similar to the Sunda Platform in its morphology, the Sahul Shelf is best considered as a northern extension of the Australian continental mass, partially inundated by the shallow Arafura Sea, and terminating south of the main E-W. range of middle New Guinea. This stable land mass is, like the Sunda Platform, free of recent volcanic forms. Evidence of active mountain building on its fringe, in the north of New Guinea, suggests stresses from the Sahul Shelf towards the north.

3. Young Mountains and Insular Arcs

The festoons of mountains which enfold the Sunda Platform and the Sahul Shelf provide much scope for theories about mountain building processes, a matter outside the immediate field of geography. These mountains in many cases rise steeply from the floor of the Indian and Pacific Oceans to heights over 15,000 feet above sea level; in other localities, the greater part of the mountain system is below sea level and only its topmost points emerge as strings of islands. Fault and fold systems on several lines curve and recurve over one another to make an exceptionally involved pattern, in which certain well marked alignments may be distinguished.

(*a*) The Burma-Java loop starts from the India-Burma border and runs through the Arakan Yoma, disappears for some distance as a topographic feature and then continues as the complicated fold-fault systems of Western Sumatra, South Java and eastwards as a string of islands curving back from the Sahul Shelf through the Kei Islands to Ceram. This series on the Indian Ocean fringe of Southeast Asia is paralleled seaward first by a deep oceanic trough and then by an oceanic ridge showing as the Nias-Mentawei Islands off West Sumatra and as the islandless submarine ridge south of Java.

(*b*) The arcs on the Pacific margins run through the Philippines and Northern New Guinea, creating lines of islands enclosing small, deep, square-shaped, oceanic basins. Troughs or trenches much deeper than the Pacific average are situated on the Pacific side of these arcs (the Philippine Trench is over

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7 miles deep), and these resemble in form and location the oceanic trenches off Sumatra and Java. 133

(*c*) The complex of short arcs and knots showing in the Celebes-Moluccas groups have alignments which repeat the patterns of the Pacific and Indian Ocean fringes, and of the inner edges of the Sunda Platform and the Sahul Shelf. Here, too, the arcs



FIG. 3.—East Indies Volcanic Zones

enclose deep geosynclinal oceanic basins, such as the Molucca Sea which is over 16,500 ft. deep. The intersection of these alignments produces the curious shapes of Celebes and Halmahera. This zone may be likened to the "mediterranean seas" between Europe and Africa and between North and South America; in this case it is a mediterranean sea between Asiatic and Australian continental blocks.

Throughout these zones of contemporary crustal deformation, the longitudinal and transverse fractures are dotted with volcanoes, many of which are still active (Fig. 3). Their ejecta further complicate the land forms already made complex by the ravages of violent erosion (Fig. 4). Lava and igneous materials of widely varying ages have flowed over large areas and even on to parts of the Sunda Platform, as in Sumatra. Within the oceanic deeps marginal to these zones of crustal stress are the epicentres of most of those major earthquakes whose frequency is yet another symptom of the instability surrounding the shelves.

Thus the geomorphology of this third zone is transitional,

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

FIG. 4.—Detail of a Volcanic Island in the East Indies

reflecting at once the influence and forms of continental Asia and continental Australia, and of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

ROCK TYPES

135 Profound chemical action caused by tropical and equatorial
133 weathering has two effects on most of Southeast Asia; the destruction of readily accessible fossils by weathering and the concealing of native rocks by great thicknesses of weathered material. Thus the historical geology of Southeast Asia, the dating of the rocks, is not yet fully studied, and the geological interpretations of local rocks are by no means unanimous.

So far as their general character is concerned, however, no appreciable difference can be noted between the rocks of Southeast Asia and those of more intensively studied areas in Europe and North America. The effects of each rock type in conditioning landscape forms appear to be much the same throughout the world, differing in degree, not in character.

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The pattern of rock types may be summed up thus:

1. Within the Sunda Platform quartzites and shales are prominent over large areas, generally producing subdued relief, not closely allied to the fold lines of the strata. These metamorphics often appear at the surface close to a group of limestone rocks of which a calcareous shale, much of it in areas of low elevation, is most extensive. Massive limestone is most common as a landscape feature where least subject to solution weathering,



FIG. 5.—Schematic West-East Section of the Mountain Structures in Malang

towards the drier margins of the Platform (as in East Java and Tonkin) where it stands out as gaunt hills whose features recall those of the Karst, though partly disguised by a wilder profusion of vegetation. Small, slightly metamorphosed limestone formations retain this karstic character even under equatorial rains, as in North Malaya where they still rear prominently above the horizon. A large part of Borneo, the biggest single exposure of the Platform, is built of old sandstone, establishing a flat-topped landscape through which ravine-like valleys have been cut. The higher mountains of the Sunda Platform, the Altaids of Suess, are invariably elongated intrusions of igneous rock, mainly granitic, and this material forms the chief heights of a relief otherwise gently modulated.

2. Upon the young mountain systems marginal to the Platform, the landform owes more to recent tectonic activity than to the nature of the constituent rocks, most of which are also represented on the Sunda Platform. Complex fracturing and folding produce on the young mountains a wild steep landscape which here and there encloses fragments of older continental blocks. The vents and caldera of volcanoes (Fig. 5) add their special forms built from looser, easily eroded rock materials of lava

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133 135 type which have been severely scarred by denudation. Magmatic rocks have flowed extensively from these volcanoes, spreading over a large area and serving to mask relief forms developed upon underlying earlier structures. As a result of these igneous formations throughout the region, contact metamorphosis has taken place on a large scale, which has a major bearing on the frequency of metallic minerals and helps to account for the scarcity of coal formations.

133 134 3. The detail of much of the Southeast Asia landscape is conditioned by contemporary river alluviation and coastal sedimentation (as in Eastern Sumatra and South Borneo) whose thickness and profusion relate to the rapidity of tropical erosion on the one hand and to the stability of the continental platform on the other. Relief upon the great alluviated landscapes is slight. In this zone where there is so much coastline in proportion to the land area, marine accumulations of spits, bars and off-shore beaches are both prominent and important in conditioning coastal topography and the location of settlements. Marine loads tend to be heavy in this zone of violent terrestrial erosion and under certain conditions sediment accumulates quickly owing to the speed with which mangrove establishes itself upon any bank or spit which is built up, thereafter further hastening deposition by hindering the free scouring of normal wave action. Marine sedimentation is greater upon the inner coasts of the Sunda Platform and less upon those coasts facing the Indian and Pacific Oceans where the shore profiles are steep and the waves have maximum fetch.

Character of Seas

133 Three types of seas may be distinguished by the criterion of depth:

1. Shallow seas of the Sunda Platform
2. Shallow seas of the Sahul Shelf
3. The Austro-Asiatic "mediterranean" basins between the Sunda Platform and the Sahul Shelf, and subdivided by island festoons. In this group may be provisionally placed the Sulu Basin, though the South China Basin between the Philippines and the Asiatic mainland may only be included by considerably stretching the "mediterranean" conception.

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1. *Sunda Platform Seas*

These seas, the Malacca Strait, the southern portion of the South China Sea, the Sunda Sea and the Java Sea, are remarkable less for their shallowness than for the uniformity of their shallowness, which is mostly about 120 ft. and only in a few places reaches depths exceeding 150 ft. This derives from the long history of peneplainisation of the whole platform prior to its present partial inundation, which has fairly conclusively been shown to be due to eustatic rather than tectonic changes. The small islands (the Rhio, Lingga, Banka and Billiton islands) within these seas are generally of monadnock type and they have granitic cores. Low profiles characterise the adjoining shore lines where broad estuaries carry low topography far inland and where flat coasts of sedimentation, backed by marshes, are more common than those of marine erosion. Such shallow seas are affected strongly by currents arising from winds and less by the circulatory systems of the surrounding oceans, so that monsoonal wind reversals are the major influences on water movement. The drift of surface water thus relates closely to the wind systems described in Chapter 2. Out of contact with oceanic circulations by reason of the disposition of islands athwart the lines of Indian and Pacific Ocean water movements, and located between equatorial land-masses with a very heavy rainfall draining into them, these shallow seas are abnormally fresh and remain abnormally warm: from salinities of 31 per mille and sea temperatures of 70° F., few parts of the surface waters show any significant deviation from place to place or from season to season.

Enclosed between the Andamans, Burma, Kra and Sumatra is a sea steadily being encroached upon by the Irrawaddy Delta, yet its depth and connection with oceanic circulations external to the Platform relate it chiefly to the Bay of Bengal, except that the huge outpouring from Burmese rivers lowers its surface salinity to figures even below those of the Platform seas.

Further evidence that the existence of these seas derives from eustatic rather than tectonic changes is found in the loose gravels, sands and muds which form most of the beds of Sunda Platform waters and in the absence of raised wave-cut terraces along the coasts. Attached plants may be found almost everywhere on the sea floor, which is entirely eulittoral in character.

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2. *The Sahul Shelf*

123 The Arafura Sea and its extension to the Gulf of Carpentaria have been only sketchily studied and are properly outside Southeast Asia. They broadly repeat the features of the Sunda Platform seas except that the salinities are not so abnormally low because the freshwater inflow is less abundant, since the Australian margin has a lower rainfall.

3. *The "mediterranean seas" of the Indies*

The Snellius Expedition catalogued twenty-six distinct basins and trenches in the 'mediterranean seas' of the Indies, excluding the deep between the Philippines and China which scarcely belongs to the region. Of these, eight are deeper than 15,000 feet while the sills between them are not less than 4,000 feet deep. Within each basin there tend to be two circulatory systems:

(*a*) the surface circulation, relatively fast-moving, connected freely with circulations in adjoining basins and thence with currents in the open ocean. It is confined to an upper layer reaching from the surface to approximately the depth of the sill surrounding the basin, that is, to an average depth of about 5,500 feet. The location of the main island barriers is such that the upper waters are strongly influenced by water from the North Equatorial Current of the Pacific, which presses into the 'mediterranean seas', through those many gaps between Mindanao and New Guinea. Scarcely any similar currents derive from the Indian Ocean, in the direction of which the basins are almost isolated by the continuous Sumatra-Java obstruction. In temperature, these basins have a surface warmth similar to that of all equatorial waters, the great difference between their surfaces and those of the Platform seas being a higher salinity—generally 34.5 per mille—and a diminished influence of monsoon winds.

(*b*) the circulation at depth, a movement so slow that the expression "creep" might be substituted. This movement takes place within each basin or trough, isolated from circulation in neighbouring deeps by the sill, and from the surface movements by a discontinuity plane which develops owing to the greater density of the deep water. For the most part, however, the water moving in these isolated deeps originates from the

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Pacific by creeping into the Northern Banda Basin, then passing through the Southern Banda Basin and the Weber Deep, the Sawoi Basin and the Weker Basin out into the Indian Ocean deeps. All these lower waters have characteristically high salinity and low temperatures, which prevent any continued outward movement from the basins, though there is a steady removal of water drawn in from deep-level Pacific Equatorial water, whose feature is low temperature by comparison with adjoining water at the same depths within the sills. Inside the basins, minimum temperatures are found just below the level of the lowest sill. Farther down this temperature increases adiabatically but the potential temperature (i.e. reduced to sea level) remains low, so that no convectional circulation is induced. Under these conditions of dense water stably stratified, the profound deeps tend to accumulate hydrogen sulphide.

The margins of these 'mediterranean seas' commonly show raised beaches and wave-cut terraces uncorrelating in altitude from point to point owing to the wide variation of amplitude in the tectonic changes over short distances. Shore profiles are normally steep with the result that estuarial sedimentation is negligible.

Tides

Within these partially enclosed seas, the greatest tidal impulse comes from the Pacific, towards which broad openings are presented on either side of the Philippines. Only in the Gulf of Rangoon and in the funnel-shaped Malacca Strait do tidal forces from the Indian Ocean operate, though they do slightly filter through the gaps in the Lesser Sundas, the line of small islands between Java and New Guinea.

Tides in the deep basins and troughs of the mediterranean sector have not been studied in detail. They probably function as standing oscillations, whose periodicity depends on the form and size of the deeps.

Conditions on the Sunda Platform are better known because of their greater importance to international navigation. The tidal impulse comes to the shallow seas mainly from the east and whatever the character of tides in the open ocean or in the mediterranean basins, the impulse is converted into progressive waves by the shallowness of the seas upon the Platform (Fig. 6).

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FIG. 6.—Co-tidal Lines in Southeast Asia seas for 15th March 1947

From the west, tides from the Gulf of Rangoon Deep move down the funnel-shaped Malacca Strait, travelling somewhat faster on the Malayan side than on the Sumatran, and steadily increasing in range. From the east, there is firstly the tide from the Hongkong Basin, which is of Pacific origin, and secondly the tide in the Java Sea deriving from the southernmost ' mediterranean seas ', which take their main impulse from Indian Ocean tidal movements, operating in the Timor Sea and through the Lesser Sundas. The South China Sea tide moves south through the Sunda Sea and travels through the Java Sea along the southern coast of Borneo, whereas the Northern Java coast is for some distance subject to a tidal movement from the east.

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Just west of Singapore Island, the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea tides converge, locally retarding the scouring capacity and apparently favouring heavy marine sedimentation derived from the adjoining land masses. Among the Lingga and Rhio Islands, the actual tidal movements are extremely complicated due to convergent tidal waves from neighbouring seas. Tidal values in all these seas are modified seasonally by winds which practically reverse through the year, working to augment or reduce the tides as the case may be. The South China Seas, whose length parallels the direction of the seasonal wind streams, is particularly subject to this modification in the Northeast Monsoon which very much affects the ease of tidal progression from that sea into the Java Sea. 133

Corals

The polyps and other organisms whose skeletons accumulate to form coral reefs, live in colonies which within four years may grow to two inches in diameter from a single individual. They are exacting in their environmental requirements, needing sea temperatures of at least 58° F. throughout the year, shallow clear water to permit their food processes, which are largely photosynthetic, and fairly high salinity. A live coral colony has a slimy surface which is in fact the living matter; the live cells die if exposed to the air, or if covered with mud. Corals establish themselves for the most part on rocky foundations. Off Southeast Asia distinct differences can be seen in their regional distribution. 136

On the Sunda Platform as a whole corals are only developed well beyond easy access from the shore. The relatively fresh seas with swampy margins heavily charged with fine silts and humic acids are unfavourable to the polyps and the recent history of slow inundation of the Platform operates against them as well, though corals are found at depth along its margins and in broad belts round the rocky islands off South Malaya. Platform corals are exclusively submarine and generally stand below sea level well offshore, so that they are never prominent on a coastal landscape. The great development of coral is on the eastern edge of the Platform, running parallel to the east coast of Borneo and well out into the Macassar Strait (Fig. 7), where broad reefs occur whose proportions resemble those of the Great Barrier Reef on the eastern edge of the Sahul Shelf. These locations are favourable because they are washed by the warm onshore equatorial currents;

132 is rendered even less by the high humidity which cuts off many actinic wavelengths. In Singapore over half the sunshine day is obscured by clouds; in Jakarta less than 70 per cent of the possible sunshine hours are sunny. A distinct diurnal rhythm of sunshine incidence is characteristic of the Equator; during the mornings, which frequently begin clear and sunny, cumulus clouds steadily increase to a maximum in the afternoon, when convectional influences are at their peak, often producing thunder-showers followed by a clearing of the sky towards sunset. The amount of sunshine received is normally greater at sea level and decreases with altitude. On the other hand, those districts with distinct dry seasons have high sunshine values in the dry periods, often offset on the average by prolonged obliteration of the sun during the rainy season. These factors have considerable agricultural significance.

Humidity

High average humidity values are normal everywhere in Southeast Asia, but they are subject to frequent variations. Coasts are damper than interiors and highlands are damper than plains. Localities with marked dry seasons have periods of low humidity accompanied by high temperatures. In any one place a few hours sunshine rapidly lowers the relative humidity and it is a fact that even in the wettest places, the ground and wet clothes dry out under direct sunshine. Comparatively minor humidity variations have considerable effects on plants, and from the point of view of human beings it is the humidity rather than the temperature which produces feelings of body heat or body cold. When the relative humidity drops a few points, the skin sensation is one of coolness, due to easy evaporation of perspiration. By the same cause, a site exposed to regular breezes feels drier and cooler than the actual humidity or thermometer figures justify. The generalised rainfall and seasons map (Fig. 10) is a convenient guide to the distribution of humidity.

Altitude Effects

133 Throughout the region altitude is an important factor varying
132 the local weather conditions. While the land masses are relatively small, they are orographically very broken so that (apart from

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East Sumatra) no very extensive plains have developed and mountains are visible from most points. Even the highest peak known (Kinabalu, Br. Borneo, 13,681 ft.) lies well below the snow line but those highlands adjoining Yunnan do receive a brush of snow in winter. The average highland is, however, more

FIG. 15.—Köppen's Climatic Regions in Southeast Asia

of the order 8,000 feet and continuous areas at a high altitude are quite small. These altitudes induce local temperature reduction, more evident at night than during the day, and local high humidities. They cause local rain shadows which, owing to the differing winds through the year, are seasonal rather than permanent, except where double ranges give the intervening lowland a fairly constant rain shadow, as in Central Burma. A major function of the higher altitudes is to cause orographic rains and to lower the temperatures, which latter has less geographical significance than the overall raininess.

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Chapter Three

THE DRAINAGE PATTERNS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE Irrawaddy, Salween, Menam Chao Praya and Mekong are remarkable for their length compared with most Southeast Asia rivers, which rarely exceed a few hundred miles long. Those four major rivers are associated with tectonic basins; relief elsewhere only permits short streams. All districts marginal to the Sunda Platform have experienced relatively recent tectonic changes and the rivers developed upon them are youthful as well as short. Upon the Platform itself much more advanced landscape maturity is evident but because this older surface has only limited areas exposed, rivers even there are short. 133

CHARACTERISTICS OF TROPICAL RIVERS

In the régime of tropical rivers several factors have distinctive emphasis compared with conditions in temperate latitude rivers. Firstly the volume of water precipitated into and to be carried from any drainage basin is several times that of equivalent temperate latitude rivers as a result of the much higher rainfall. Moreover the precipitation is more intense. Even the dry interior 132
of Burma experiences falls of rain averaging ·6 inches per rainy day. 133
The water content of those Tropical Air Masses over Southeast Asia is so high and the rising air currents so strong and sustained that several Javanese stations have recorded falls of over 16 inches per day. These violent torrential downpours are often very localised at any one time, yet on an average they affect large areas. Thus the volume of rainwater in any drainage basin is enormous and fluctuates widely within short periods of a few hours.

A further consequence of these great rainstorms is their power- 134
ful erosive effects. Upon cultivated land the force and volume of 132
these downpours cause surface downwash to be large, the soil 133
rapidly washes away and whole hillsides may slip, so that the run-off has a high mud content. Because the rivers are mostly immature, this heavy load may be sustained by turbulence for considerable

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distances. In areas of alternating wet and dry seasons, drought cracks the ground, loosens the top surface and thereby increases the available load when the rains begin. The Dry Zones of Burma and Siam are for this reason areas of most violent surface removal. The very heavy load of Southeast Asia rivers gives them a great capacity for rapidly building up deltas, sedimenting the estuaries and at times causing heavy deposition of silt well inland. Furthermore the rainfall is not only violent and intense, it is also variable in seasonal incidence; thus many streams of Upper Burma, Central Siam and Eastern Java are for months practically dry and then come into spate within a few hours, not unlike the wadis of North Africa. Landform combined with the seasonal rains causes the Salween, for instance, to vary its level 50 feet within a few hours. Such variability of volume induces deposition well inland. Huge silt banks lie across many watercourses, vast alluvial fans develop at the debouchment to plains, and even at the junction of tributaries.

The Irrawaddy presents an example of how the drainage conditions differ at different points in the course of a tropical river. Near and above Bhamo changes of Irrawaddy level directly parallel changes of rainfall. As the stream passes through the Dry Zone of Burma it receives no significant additional water from the tributaries after it passes the confluence of the Chindwin and it is effectively losing water by evaporation. Stamp estimates 45 per cent of Irrawaddy water has been lost by evaporation when the stream finally reaches the head of the Delta. Evaporation rates in the Burmese Dry Zone are little, if at all, less than the precipitation. Farther downstream, in the Delta, heavy precipitation occurs again, so that the Irrawaddy floods arrive at the Delta roughly a month after peak rains in the reaches above Bhamo, to find it already suffering from floods due to local rains and small local streams. These floods of local origin effectively oblige the Irrawaddy water to remain within the main distributaries. Even more interesting is Stamp's evidence that the average annual silt load at the Delta head is 261 million tons, whereas at Mandalay it is only 32 million tons, showing that 229 million tons of silt is added in the Dry Zone. Since the Chindwin provides 109 million tons of silt, the balance of 120 million tons derives from the wadi-like, highly variable streams (chaungs) joining the Irrawaddy in its driest section.

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Load and the Erosion of Basins

Acting as a brake on the destructiveness of the rivers and on the changes of river levels, the dense forest cover of most of the landscape breaks the force of the downpours and provides roots and undergrowth to act as a spongelike retainer of water and as a partial filter of sediment. Under natural conditions, where the forest is undisturbed by man, this influence is so strong that even minor brooks are relatively clear, but where the natural cover is removed by burning to permit cultivation or mining, the brooks are thick and opaque with sediment, a condition rapidly extending as more and more surface is exposed for farming or for alluvial mining. Wherever there are active volcanoes, great quantities of loose ash are thrown out regularly; Southeast Asia volcanoes typically eject ash rather than lava. Unconsolidated ash without vegetation cover is rapidly washed into the streams and by these agents spread out over the estuaries. A new volcanic outburst is at once followed by heavier loads in the local rivers and increased estuarial deposition (Fig. 19) and greater danger of silting up irrigation and drainage canals which may have been built downstream for cultivating rice. That so much of Java's volcanic ash cones are terraced may only partly be ascribed to agricultural pressure; the terracing is equally necessary to control slip of the ash and to prevent sedimentation by waterborne ash from completely overwhelming the lowlands. Largely as a result of heavy ash loads, the Solo River, for example, carries some sixty times as much sediment as the Rhine, though it has only 40 per cent of its length. 134

The heavy load being carried away by the rivers lowers the surface of the drainage basin over most of its area, even though part of the lower basin is being built up a little by sediment. The rate of destruction of the drainage basin in the tropics is far higher than anywhere else. The Chindwin is removing the surface of its basin by .78 mm. per annum, the Irrawaddy above Prome by .52 mm. per annum, the Loesi in Java by .87 mm. In some small Javanese streams the destruction of the drainage basin has reached as much as 3 mm. per annum. As standards of comparison, the annual lowering of the Danube basin is at the rate of .006 mm., and of the Marne, .005 mm.

As a region, Southeast Asia is thus one of the least stable in the world, as far as orographic form and drainage patterns are 133 134

concerned. Erosion here works faster and the associated deposition occurs at a greater rate than temperate latitude geographers allow for. This adds only a further variant to the general tectonic instability of all the zone fringing the Sunda Platform, but in the case of the Platform itself, its great age and relative stability plus the intensity of river erosion, provide an excellent case of a landscape exposed continuously to subaerial erosion for a period long enough to indicate an approach to the peneplainised state. The Malayan landscape, central to this continental Platform and exposed fully to continuous, powerful and prolonged river action, has special interest in this connection. In Malaya, large alluviated plains dominate the landscape and the hills rise sharply from these plains, yet the features of normal river types still persist. Rapids exist in a number of Malayan rivers, profiles are slightly broken at a number of levels, trellis drainage patterns have persisted on tilted strata (Fig. 32) and river capture goes on even at this advanced stage, as in the capture of the Bera headwaters by the Muar (Fig. 16). Lakes, however, are unusual on the main Sunda Platform; this negative point is at once a symptom of erosional senility and of the ability of tropical vegetation to build out into the lakes, hastening their sedimentation until the standing water disappears. Thus the Bera Lake of Malaya is really a large swamp periodically inundated; the Tonle Sap of Indochina is rapidly filling to become a similar swamp-lake varying with the seasons. Infilled swamp-lakes appear also in Borneo and the Shan Plateau.

The Glacial Period and Southeast Asia Drainage

While tectonic and erosional changes have produced most variations in river forms of those parts of Southeast Asia fringing the Sunda Platform, *upon* the Platform itself, rivers have been more recently affected by a process of marine inundation. There is general agreement that the history of the Platform is one of stability or possibly of slight sinking; the uniform depth and terrigenous bottom material of the Sunda Platform seas, and also the fully-developed river valleys upon their floors, combine to support the view that a rise of sea level has taken place, associated with continental icemelt which took place in northern latitudes when the last Glacial Period closed. De Geer estimates that the last Scandinavian glaciation reached its peak some 25,000 years

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

FIG. 16.—River Capture in Central Malaya. The Palong, tributary of the Muar, is drawing off headwaters of the Bera system

ago, at which time maximum water would be withdrawn from oceanic circulation and locked up as ice, thereby lowering the average sea level. Daly calculates that this withdrawal of water would mean a lowering of sea level (relative to present level) at the Equator by between 250 ft. and 300 ft. The average depth of

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133 water in the Sunda Platform seas today is 180 ft., so that on Daly's figures the whole Platform would be exposed and drainage lines developed upon it. Molengraaf's work (Fig. 18) suggests the drainage lines of the exposed Sunda continental surface formed two river systems flowing roughly north-eastwards from the Singapore area and roughly due east through what is now the [136] Java Sea. To support this conception he instances the striking likeness between fish of the Moesi in Sumatra and those of the Kapuas in Borneo and suggests the similarity derives from association through the main stream developed during the Glacial period. Because there have been in fact several glacial advances in northern latitudes (the Gunz, Mindel, Riss and Wurm Glaciation) his theory implies at least four periods of water withdrawal from the Sunda Platform (and of course from all equatorial areas): that is, four periods when the Sunda sea-floors were exposed to subaerial erosion.

Thus the broad history of recent river development has been one of periodical lowering of sea level, in effect a lowering of erosion base levels for all Sunda Platform rivers, which means four intervening periods of rejuvenation of Southeast Asia rivers and corresponding periods of rising sea level when rivers diminished their cutting power and became senescent, owing to rising erosional base level (Fig. 17). While the world glacial periods varied in duration, they appear not to have differed very widely in extent of greatest development, so that present sea level at the Equator probably represents roughly the level towards which the erosional base rose at each interglacial phase. Those early periods of rising sea could not, on present facts, have reached higher than 100 ft. above present sea level and it is almost certain the variation was much less. It is therefore difficult to accept any theorising which postulates during the last million years over the Sunda Platform sea level positions 100 ft. higher than the present one.

The landscapes carved by river systems over the older parts of Southeast Asia are conditioned in their recent forms by circumstances of a rising sea level, quite different from Europe and North America where a relatively rising land surface has had the latest influence on landscape form. A recent history of rising sea level implies:

(*a*) rising base levels to river erosion;

(*b*) diminution of downcutting power by existing streams;

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

FIG. 17.—Diagram explaining the Development of Inselberge and Concave Profiles typical of the Sunda Platform

(*c*) diminution of load-carrying power and an increase of upstream sedimentation, due to loss of grade in the theoretical profiles;
(*d*) shallow offshore coastal profiles and consequent increase of coastal sedimentation;
(*e*) detrunking of streams as the inundation formed new marine gulfs (see Molengraaf);
(*f*) the rapid sedimentation of the estuaries produces in river profiles an abnormal flattening at lower levels while the upper profile retains the acute forms developed at lower sea level positions. This produces "sagging profiles," concave or flattened outlines (Fig. 17), as contrasted with kinked, faceted and convex profiles of contemporary streams in Europe;
(*g*) mountains in the form of "inselberge," that is, standing like islands surrounded by low-level alluvial plains.

During the glacial periods, when downcutting to a lower base level was the major influence, considerable upstream terraces could develop at all altitudes, but this aspect of Sunda Platform geography is difficult to study owing to the intensive weathering since that time and the heavy vegetation now masking any benches built or carved during the period. Such upstream terraces have been noted by Richardson and Scrivenor in Malaya.

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

FIG. 18.—Drainage and Shallow Seas of Southeast Asia. Seas now shallower than 200 ft. were probably land areas in the Glacial Periods

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

FIG. 19.—Coast Changes at the Mouth of R. Tjimanoek (Hoek van Indramajoe). This shows the rapid changes of the Java coast as a result of sedimentation

The history of inundation at first glance makes it surprising that ria forms have not appeared on the Sunda Platform; the explanation lies in the heavy sedimentation by the rivers and in the relatively soft laterised surface which would be presented to the rising sea and quickly moulded by it.

The glacial periods had little other effect in Southeast Asia; Weissman estimates the snow line in Northern Burma to have descended to about 9,000 ft. during the Glacial Periods. If this lowering of the snow line by about 3,500 ft. compared with today roughly indicates the condition for all Southeast Asia at the time of maximum glaciation, then in the equatorial zone where the present snowline is about 16,000 ft., no mountain tops of Borneo, Java, Sumatra and Malaya could have been seriously affected by snows, let alone by mountain glaciation. Interpretation of land forms in these units on the assumption of glaciation must therefore produce overwhelming evidence to counter such arguments.

SEDIMENTATION

Very heavy river loads, the decreasing carrying power of rivers, 134
and the shallow seas of the Platform zone, combine to make rapid 133
sedimentation of estuarial and coastal regions the characteristic

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of contemporary relief forms and drainage patterns. The rate of coastal advance seaward upon the Platform is in places phenomenally rapid; the Tjimanoek (Fig. 19) and Solo deltas in Java are extending at the rate of 100 metres annually, the Mekong at 60–80 metres annually. An outburst of volcanic ash increases the deposition by neighbouring rivers at the coast, though the behaviour of sea currents moulds the riberine deposit in detail on reaching the sea. Mangroves and associated vegetation quickly establish themselves on sandbanks and cays so that at the mouth of the Perak, for example, an exposure of a bank for only a few days at a low water season is enough to permit vegetation to start there, hastening the rate of deposition by offering an obstruction to river outflow and thereby perpetuating the bank which in other settings might disappear by erosion during the next high water spell.

Where streams debouch into deep seas the rate of coastal extension is inevitably less, due to the greater thicknesses which must be laid for every outward extension, yet the Irrawaddy Delta is building outward at the rate of about 60 metres per annum; that the Irrawaddy can maintain this rate of building into a deep basin reflects its tremendous load and a physical condition which concentrates the deposition of this load at the outer edge of the Delta rather than over its surface. (See Chapter 9.)

Because the rivers are steadily sedimenting the bed of their lower reaches, these are in fact generally being raised in level. Such a process cannot continue very far; when its bed is raised slightly above the surrounding land, the river easily changes course, and every large delta of Southeast Asia shows signs of frequent migration of distributaries. Old channels and distributaries in various phases of abandonment may be seen at nearly every river mouth. Most deltas suffer regular inundation at various times of the year facilitating farming for rice, which depends on either natural or artificially induced floods, in most cases derived from rivers. The process of spreading sediment over the whole delta zone goes on both by migration of distributaries and by seasonal inundations, so that the deltaic surface over a wide area is being slowly raised by sedimentation, making it progressively more difficult to irrigate the inner and higher sections of the deltas and in the long run causing the centre of gravity of irrigation steadily to move

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

FIG. 20.—Flood Zones at the Junction of the Lipis-Pahang Rivers

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133 134 downstream, where also the newer unexhausted soils are to be found.

Marshes and Swamps

133 All land masses whose rivers empty on to the Sunda Platform are thus characteristically fringed with flat landscapes of marshes on a large scale. East Sumatra is an outstanding example of prolonged sedimentation by tropical rivers moving into shallow seas; this coastal marsh, at least 60,000 square miles in area, about a third of Sumatra, indicates what may result from equatorial sedimentation, here probably aided by a volcanic outburst in inner Sumatra during historic time (possibly during the century or so prior to A.D. 1000) and facilitated by the shallow Malacca Strait where the main tidal scour is to the east rather than to the Sumatra side. Huge flat islands have been formed off East Sumatra and they are regularly inundated by tides even now, so that they are in effect amphibious areas. The speed with which these coasts of sedimentation can advance and change should be taken into account when attempting to correlate historic place-names with sites and settlements of today. It may be that the decline of large principalities in Eastern Sumatra, reported in the first millennium by Oriental travellers, should be attributed to changes of coastline and to rapid deterioration of old site values.

Floods

A further feature of old drainage forms in Southeast Asia is the large size of inland swamps, as apparent in Malaya and Borneo. These arise from a combination of several factors:

(*a*) the torrential downpours are often so intense that for a few hours the surface water is greater than streams can carry off, or subsoil can absorb;

(*b*) the density of the vegetation cover impedes run-off;

(*c*) differences of downpours in nearby rivers frequently cause a swift rise of level in one stream and not in another which it joins, so that at the confluence (Fig. 20) the stream in spate dams back the other and the flood may even flow into it, or build bars of silt across it. The Tonle Sap marshes suffer from Mekong floods in this way;

(*d*) where a drainage system has cluse (as in Malayan streams) or similar constrictions (as in the Irrawaddy gorges) these features

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may induce flooding of the valley above the narrows. The Tasek Bera of Malaya in this way reflects constrictions in the Pahang Valley;

(*e*) the presence of levees means that the zone between them and the foothills has difficulty in draining to the river after a flood or during a downpour, so the levees are generally lined landwards by broad freshwater marshes, as by the rivers across the Korat Plateau in Siam (Fig. 90);

(*f*) where local rain seasons coincide with the arrival of spates, originating elsewhere in the local rivers, the landscape cannot shed the direct rainfall rapidly and it induces marshes.

Most of the freshwater marshes are seasonally flooded, drying out quickly in spells of drought, draining when local streams are low, but then flooding to depths up to 10 ft. during wet seasons.

Some types of swamp are man-induced. When alluvial mining is being carried on, dredges and gravel pumps effectively stir up large quantities of river sediment which is carried downstream as the mining effluent (Fig. 21).



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FIG. 21.—Alluvial Fans being thrust across Bentong Valley

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311 This artificially stirred sediment is agriculturally negative and
133 it penetrates the ditches and drains of rice growing areas,
241 gradually silting them up, often spectacularly raising the
134 local river bed (at Serendah in Malaya, the river bed was raised 21 ft. by sedimentation over the decade 1923-33), as well as sterilising fields on which the silt spreads so that cultivation becomes more difficult as the river can no longer be kept out. The yields decrease and the fields are abandoned, swamp vegetation gradually obliterating signs of cultivation. Round the lower Malacca River may be found signs of the old field bundings within the tangle of swamp vegetation now growing there, a sign of the effects of mining higher in the river whose effluent is obliterating cultivation in lower areas. This type of swamp comes slowly and has all the appearance of nature overcoming men's efforts to farm, but it is fundamentally a result of man-induced erosions or abrasions elsewhere. Thus interference, by mining and forest clearing, with landforms stabilised over long periods, not only goes on by removal of silt and gravels carried from mining areas and topsoils removed by torrential rains on clean-weeded agricultural areas as a mark of transfer of surface materials from one area, but it also causes the obliteration of cultivation and an extension of useless marsh in the areas where this material is deposited.

133 Because these tropical marshes occur in zones of human signifi-
361 cance, that is, in the flatter areas with agricultural possibilities, and along the coasts where settlement from overseas might take place, they have played a major part in conditioning the distribution of human beings in Southeast Asia. Both the coastal and inland marshes are tree-covered, making it even more difficult to penetrate, control, or cultivate them. Varying degrees of swampiness often account for the ease of development of farming in one place rather than another in Southeast Asia and a broad belt of marsh has generally proved a greater human impediment than any other topographic feature.

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

FIG. 113.—Historic Pattern of Southeast Asia during Indian Colonial Period

implements had not in any case developed far enough to deal with stone. Hence monumental evidence in Southeast Asia is so largely Indian, an introduction by foreigners using styles and techniques developed in their home settings, and most developed in the drier parts of this region, where stone is more accessible. On the clay lands, historic brick structures, also an Indian innovation, weather to nothing very quickly. At Angkor may be seen the power of quick-growing tropical trees to shatter and break down temples and palaces built of stone and lateritic blocks.

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This, too, is a region of natural calamities, difficult though it is to pin-point them. Little kingdoms have been wiped out in a few hours by Javanese volcanoes, as in A.D. 1006 when the flourishing city of Dharmavamsa (a great king of Central Java) was reduced to ashes by "a great calamity," probably an explosion and lava outflow of the Merapi volcano. Settlements along rivers have been obliterated when huge mud-flows swept down from loose ashes on the flanks of new eruptions, possibly accounting for our ignorance of east Sumatran kingdoms. Coasts have altered through the years

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133 and deltas have changed; areas which once were shallow sea have
175 become sedimented to swamps, a process by which Cambodia has been cut off as the Lower Mekong built up mud-flats isolating Tonle Sap from contact with the sea. The evolution of new routes has caused some old centres of power to fade into mere fishing villages, evidenced in the decline of Takhola and Bandon after the sea route through the Straits of Malacca became more generally

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

FIG. 114.—Historic Pattern of Southeast Asia at the Islamisation Period

175 used than that across Kra. Plagues have laid waste whole cities, as
164 when Uthong in about 1350 was devastated by cholera and its population fled. The region is still one where malaria, dysentery, cholera and plague are endemic, more especially in the older, more congested territories like Java. These diseases have frequently flared up into appalling epidemics killing thousands of people, epidemics reflecting a relation between bacteria and the climate (which encourages bacterial reproduction), the population density, the difficulties of sewage disposal and social habits of indifference to hygiene (which has no ill effects among lonely settlements in the forest but becomes a social menace in towns). Fevers and virulent diseases have frequently ravaged the local people, debilitated them, and wiped out their settlements. The region is strewn with ruins of towns now abandoned, and with ruined groups of people who have degenerated physically by disease and under-nourishment. Southeast Asia proved capable of engulfing rather than enshrining those moving into it to live.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

[See pp. 35 ff., category 241 or 116. -- Analyst]

Chapter II

THE SHIFTING CULTIVATOR [p. 16]

241 361 311 The field of the shifting cultivator is known by various local terms. It is called *caiñgin* in the Philippines, *humah* in Java, *ladang* in the Indies as a whole and in Malaya, *taungya* in Burma, *tamrai* in Thailand, and *rây* in Indochina.[1] Practically without exception, it is a clearing in either primeval or second-growth forest. The use of grassland is so unusual that we shall limit the following discussion to shifting cultivation on forest land.

As his name indicates, the shifting cultivator does not use the same piece of land every year; instead, he kills or cuts down at regular intervals —every year, every other year, or every third year—the trees of a small forest patch. He burns as much of the woody growth as is possible or convenient. Among the charred stumps and half-burned tree trunks he plants his favorite crops, be they cereals such as millet, upland rice, or maize; or tubers such as yams or sweet potatoes (Figs. 4–10). The latter are planted extensively by the *caiñgero*, the shifting cultivator in the Philippines. In planting cereals it is usually the men who take the planting stick to make little holes and the women who drop in a few seeds, using their feet to cover the seed with soil (Figs. 11–13). As forest land is generally free from weeds or grasses and the soil is usually rich in humus and well supplied with the ash of burned plant matter after clearing, it produces a very good, or even excellent, first harvest; the second harvest begins to show a decline in yield, and thereafter the returns diminish rapidly.[2] Grasses and weeds invade the clearing. Rather than battle these, the peasant abandons his old ladang and cuts and burns a new patch of forest (Fig. 15). The old plot reverts, under favorable conditions, to second-growth forest, the so-called *blukar* of the Malays, and is not cleared again for a period, the length of which may vary from 8 to 15 years, or more.

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Shifting cultivation is characterized by a lack of tillage; the soil is hardly disturbed, as no plow turns it. There is less labor involved than in other methods of cultivation, and the work is more evenly spread over the year—an advantage where labor is relatively scarce. The tasks involved are cutting, burning, and planting; sometimes simple fencing of the field against animals, guarding—especially before the harvest and usually by women and children—and, finally, harvesting. In addition, there may be some weeding in the first year and certainly during the second.

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[1] In British India *jhum*, *kumri*, *dhya*, *bewar*, or *dullee*; in Ceylon *chena*; in Japan, Korea, and Formosa *haren* (a Japanese term); in Central America *milpa*; in parts of Africa *chitemene*.

[2] Danhof reports for parts of the Lampoeng Districts that a ladang will produce from 15 to 25 quintals of rice in the first year and approximately 5 in the second year. In areas where the second yield shows such a serious decline the peasants usually prefer to make a new ladang—Danhof: "Bijdrage," 1940, p. 199.

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241 of the new ladang be a poor one. After three days the same person returns,
·787 and if he finds that the offerings have been scattered a new location is chosen and a new attempt is made to get a favorable answer from the spirits. In case the betel leaves have been found undisturbed, all male members of the village have a meal on the chosen land. Then the area is divided among the villagers by the headman. Each individual appeals to the spirits by placing a betel leaf with lime and areca nut on the ladang that has been turned over to him. If the answer is unfavorable he tries again. The betel leaf may be placed three times. If the offering is disturbed each time, the headman turns over a part of his share, which is considerably larger than any of the others, to the less fortunate villager. Throughout the following agricultural year with its stages of clearing, planting, and harvesting, the peasant repeatedly requires the services of the dukun, or *shaman*, as well as the betel leaf.

In other regions details differ, but the essential fact remains that the social-religious life and thinking of the shifting cultivator is bound up with his characteristic form of cultivation.

423 Shifting cultivators have no concept of private land ownership. The land
241 belongs to the community, the tribe, or the village, and each member has the right to use as much land as he needs and can cultivate. The location
621 of the land that he is to use may be decided upon by the village council or the headman. The person who clears the land and plants the crop gets the produce. Nobody has the right to plant a plot that has been cleared by someone else. As soon as the land is abandoned all rights are forfeited, except the right of the community. However, if trees have been planted, the ownership of the trees and their produce remains with the person who planted them, and he is given preference when the land has had a sufficient fallow period and can again be cultivated.

The Effect of Shifting Cultivation on the Land

241 As has been stated above, ladangs decline in fertility after the first crop,
•134 and obnoxious grasses and weeds appear among the stooling tree stumps.
311 As long as there is an abundance of forest land at his disposal the cultivator prefers to abandon the ladang. Under favorable conditions the grasses will, in turn, give way to second-growth forest. In the course of centuries this second-growth forest may develop into a climax forest, that is, a forest having the same composition as the primeval forest. In any case, when tall forest growth again occurs, the land will have had time to recover its original fertility.

Unfortunately, however, conditions are often not sufficiently favorable for a regeneration of soil fertility and the development of a good second-growth forest. As a matter of fact, the practice of shifting cultivation has altered the character of vegetation beyond recognition over wide areas in Southeastern Asia. Instead of a dense primeval rain-forest, we now find

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 ALl Southeast Asia AL1

extensive open grasslands resulting from the most important tool of the shifting cultivator, fire. 241 134 311

Generally, the fallow period allows time only for the evolution of mediocre second-growth forest, for the shifting cultivator usually returns to an old ladang before even a small percentage of those tree species that made up the original stand have had a chance to come back. Repeated cultivations further impoverish the forest and reduce the number of species. Certain light-loving trees that played a minor role in the climax forest will spread rapidly and dominate, together with those species that show a resistance to fire and those that are capable of sending new sprouts out of the old stumps.[5]

If fire repeatedly invades an abandoned ladang, the tree flora is reduced until finally only grasses and herbs survive. These persist because their root systems, tubers, or bulbs send out new shoots after the fire. The [137] more important grasses and herbs that finally triumph over forest vegetation are *Imperata cylindrica* Beauv., *Imperata constricta* Hitchc., *Saccharum spontaneum* L., *Themeda gigantea* Hack, and *Eupatorium odoratum* L. These burn very rapidly and with a hot flame, even when still green. After they are well established they catch fire or are set afire every year, almost without exception; this prevents natural reforestation. Furthermore, the fire will also invade the neighboring forest and force it gradually back, so that the grass area steadily increases. This is especially true in hilly or mountainous country. In the Philippines about 18 per cent of the total area is covered with grass vegetation as a result of shifting cultivation and fires. These grass areas are known locally as *cogonales*. In the Indies, where they are called *alang-alang*,[6] they are also extensive, as in southern Sumatra. While I was traveling through southern Sumatra by rail during the dry season I counted twenty grass fires started within the space of an hour by sparks from our locomotive. In Thailand there is as yet very little cogonal land, according to Pendleton.[7] In Indochina culturally induced grasslands, either pure or with scattered trees—the latter called by the French *forêts claires* or *savanes-parcs*—are very extensive[8] (Figs. 23, 24).

Once the vegetation of an area has been changed from forest to grass, [224] the land is of no more agricultural use to the shifting cultivator. The only benefit that he then gets out of the land is for hunting. For this, too, he often utilizes fire—either to drive wild animals out of hiding or to get a growth of young grass to attract his prey.

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[5] In Malaya and Sumatra the spread of such bushes and trees as *Lantana camara* L., *Schima bancana* Miq., *Peronema canescens* Jack, *Vitex pubescens* Vahl, *Melastoma malabathricum* L., and *Lagerstroemia speciosa* Pers. is due to the cutting of clearings.

[6] *Imperata* (both *constricta* and *cylindrica*) is known in the Philippines by the Spanish term *cogon*, in the East Indies as *alang-alang*, and in Malaya as *lalang*. The last two are Malay words.

[7] Pendleton: "Some Interrelations between Agriculture and Forestry," 1939, p. 41.

[8] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 368–372.

[See p. 38, cat. 241 or 116 -- Analyst]

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241 When fires no longer ravage the grasslands, however, trees return and finally drive out the grasses completely, for the latter cannot stand shade.[9]

311 The spread of grass is especially rapid in regions with a long, pronounced dry season, whereas reforestation is more likely to take place in areas with a well distributed, high annual rainfall. This may explain why the Philippines and Indochina have a larger percentage of open grasslands than do Malaya and the Netherlands Indies.

134 A relatively high density of population is an important factor in preventing successful reforestation and encouraging grasses. In a thinly settled forest area there is sufficient land to allow for a long rest period, but an increasing density of population results in the shortening of the fallow period to such a degree that the soil is given insufficient time to recover its fertility. The shorter the fallow period the poorer the succeeding forest —if any—and the poorer the following crop yields, until finally the land can no longer satisfy the needs of the shifting cultivator.

174 Pendleton believes that this cycle may have contributed materially to the downfall of the Khmers in Cambodia (Cambodge). He states that although the Khmers used the plow on very limited areas of wet riceland, they had largely to depend on the planting stick and shifting cultivation for their food supply. As the demands for more food arose from the rapidly increasing population concentrated in the city of Angkor, the fallow period granted to the uplands had to be progressively shortened. At the same time fires became so frequent that culturally induced grasslands spread while the cultivable area decreased, thus further diminishing the food supply available to the people of Angkor. "While the actual fall of Angkor is ascribed to the superior military power of invaders, the resistance of the inhabitants was doubtless much less than it would have been had the lands been productive and they had had adequate supplies of food."[10]

000 Declining crop yields and the spread of grasses have been advanced as important reasons for the breakdown of the Mayan civilization,[11] and Pendleton further raises the question "whether the development of cogonals might not have been an important contributing factor in the dying out of some of the other civilizations of the tropics, notably that of Anuradapura, in Ceylon."[12]

Today the ruins of the Mayan cities, as well as those of Angkor, are surrounded by relatively luxuriant forest vegetation, which has had time to displace the pernicious grasses since man and his tool, fire, have abandoned the inhospitable grasslands.

Not only does shifting cultivation alter the character of the vegetation,

[32] 9 When an old ladang remains unburned for several years the following trees spring up in addition to those already mentioned in footnote 5: *Erechthites hieracifolia* Rafin., *Blumea balsamifera* DC., *Peltophorum dasyrachis* Kurz, *Macaranga tanarius* Muell. Arg., and *Piper aduncum* L.

10 Pendleton: *op. cit.*, pp. 46 and 47.

11 Cook: "Milpa Agriculture," 1921, pp. 303–326.

12 Pendleton: *op. cit.*, p. 47.

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Not only does shifting cultivation alter the character of the vegetation, but also it may induce soil erosion, especially when it is practiced on slopes. Forest vegetation keeps the soil from being washed or blown away, but at the end of the dry season, when the trees have been cut and burned, the soil lies exposed. Consequently, during the early days of the rainy season large quantities of topsoil are washed downhill and carried by rivers to the plains. Erosion, by lowering the moisture-holding capacity of the soil as well as the rate of absorption, may thus cause further acceleration of run-off and lead finally to destructive floods on the plains. Such floods are frequent in the Philippines and parts of the East Indies. Pendleton points out that in Thailand the main rivers receive their great load of silt from the more steeply sloping mountains of northern Thailand where shifting cultivators have started the forces of accelerated erosion.[13]

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The large quantities of valuable timber destroyed year after year by the shifting cultivators in virgin areas and the prevention of reforestation by the fires that spread through the abandoned fields (Fig. 22) cause the forester to regard the shifting cultivator as his enemy. In the Philippines the forester has for many years been pleading for strictly enforced laws and severe penalties against shifting cultivators.

> The greatest enemy of our forest is caingin making. It is to the persistent practice of this crude form of agriculture from time immemorial that the existence of vast areas of denuded waste lands is attributable. Much of our valuable timber has been and is still being wasted by this illegal form of forest clearing. There are actually over five and a half million hectares of open lands that are practically idle. Due to continued caingins and the recurrence of fires on these open lands, the forest area is decreasing year after year. . . . Destructive floods in various parts of the Islands and the yearly appearance . . . of locust pest, the extermination of which is costing the Government hundreds of thousands of pesos yearly, are chiefly the direct results of this obnoxious practice.[14]

Conflicting Views on the Merits of Shifting Cultivation

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Judgments on the merits of shifting cultivation have been rather contradictory since the practice first came to the attention of scientific observers. During the past century the Dutch in Java spoke of it as *Raubbau* (robber economy), and one still finds the expression used. Sauer protests against this term. According to him, shifting cultivation is a "primitive economy, in which the per capita area of land needed for a community is rather large and in which the forest growth is to be considered as a part of a long term rotation of fields." He is of the opinion that it is "an excellent device for maintaining permanent productivity."[15]

Lord Hailey calls shifting cultivation "less a device of barbarism than a concession to the character of a soil which needs long periods for recovery and regeneration; and the trekking habit, whether of Dutch farmers

[13] Pendleton: "Soil Erosion in the Tropics," 1940, p. 757.

[14] Letter of the Director of the Bureau of Forestry to the Secretary of Justice, September 10, 1934.

[15] Sauer: "Destructive Exploitation," 1938, p. 496.

[See p. 38 cat. 241 or 116 -- Analyst]

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The Areal Extent of Shifting Cultivation in Southeastern Asia

It is difficult to form an idea of the areal extent of shifting cultivation because of its migratory nature and the fact that it is often practiced in remote regions. The only country of Southeastern Asia in which an attempt has been made to estimate the area used for shifting cultivation is the Netherlands Indies, but even there it was not possible to include all

Table II—Philippine Islands: Illegal Caiñgins Detected, 1914-1940

Year	Illegal Caiñgins Number	Illegal Caiñgins Area in Hectares
1914	895	....
1915	1 198	....
1916	845	....
1917	665	....
1918	776	....
1919	603	....
1920	721	....
1921	1 602	1 429.48
1922	3 110	2 803.55
1923	1 759	1 516.33
1924	1 753	1 396.90
1925	1 762	1 391.29
1926	1 829	1 476.61
1927	2 002	1 743.92
1928	1 774	1 602.95
1929	1 312	1 370.41
1930	3 227	3 279.77
1931	2 534	3 345.74
1932	2 547	5 586.27
1933	2 427	2 831.38
1934	3 207	3 215.46
1935	2 631	2 455.73
1936	2 314	2 510.59
1937	1 967	2 308.24
1938	1 766	2 029.68
1939*	906	1 331.12
1940†	2 646	4 416.56
Total	48 778	48 071.98

Source: Data supplied by the Bureau of Forestry, Manila.
*Six months only, ending June 30, 1939, because of change of fiscal year.
†From July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1940.

parts of the Outer Islands in the estimate. Van Beukering concluded that one-third of all food consumed in the Outer Islands was grown on ladangs; this would require a total of 1,100,000 hectares of land. If we assume that all ladangs are occupied for 2 years and lie fallow for 12 years, the shifting cultivation system would need seven times 1,100,000, or 7,700,000, hectares. This estimate does not include the ladang area under coffee and pepper cultivation. (Rubber, coconut, and benzoin cannot be considered because they are, for practical purposes, permanent crops.)

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1 [See p. 26, category 241 or 116. -- Analyst]

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Van Beukering allowed an additional 200,000 hectares for coffee and pepper ladangs; so that the total area amounts to about 8,000,000 hectares. If we assume that the population of the Outer Islands increases at the rate of 1½ to 2½ per cent each year, it would double in from 29 to 47 years. This would mean that after about 30 to 50 years 16,000,000 hectares would come within the scope of shifting cultivation.

In Malaya ladang cultivation is illegal, but it is practiced in the hinterland well away from roads and railways, in eastern sections of the peninsula. Dobby recently described it in Pahang and northeastern Kedah, near the Thai border.[30] The Sakai of Pahang regularly abandon their primitive huts as well as the clearings when they shift to a new field (Map, Fig. 2). The Malays of northeastern Kedah, on the other hand, as a rule live permanently in one place and change only their fields (Map, Fig. 3). There are no statistics available on the areal extent to which shifting cultivation is carried on in Malaya, but according to Dobby the system gives way to permanent culture "as the standard of cultivation rises and as the effect of law becomes stronger."[31]

In Thailand shifting cultivation is extensively practiced by the tribes of the mountains of the north and west, on the eastern part of the Khorat Plateau, and on the peninsula. Probably about 1,600,000 people depend upon it. According to the same kind of calculation that Van Beukering made for the Indies, a total of 1,400,000 hectares would be required, or 200,000 hectares annually, if we allow five persons per household and consider that one hectare covers the needs of a family for 2 years.[32]

[162]

In Indochina only the tribes of the mountains of Tongking, Laos, and Annam now practice rây, or shifting, cultivation. The people of the plains, Annamese and Cambodians, who represent 84 per cent of the population, practice a more intensive form of agriculture. Gourou has estimated the areal extent of shifting cultivation in Indochina. He states that a rây is used for 2 years and has to lie fallow for at least 20 years, which seems a rather long period as compared with other countries. In addition to its extensive plains, Indochina has a mountainous or hilly area of 580,000 square kilometers. Only one per cent of this land is permanently cultivated. Gourou estimates that about 40 per cent of the mountainous country is suitable for rây cultivation and he assumes that one-tenth of this, or 4 per cent of the total mountain land, is under rây cultivation in any one year.[33] If this calculation is correct it would mean that 23,200 square kilometers, or 2,320,000 hectares, are occupied annually by shifting cultivators. The numerical strength of the shifting tribes shows, however, that this estimate cannot be correct. Their number is not much greater than

[30] Dobby: "Settlement Patterns in Malaya," 1942, p. 222.

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] For an excellent description of the life of the shifting cultivators in Thailand, see Credner: Siam, 1935, pp. 148–173.

[33] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 177–181, especially pp. 180 and 181.

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[See p. 27, category 116. -- Analyst]

1,500,000, or at the most 2,000,000, which would mean about 300,000 to 400,000 households. This number of households could hardly occupy such a large rây area as Gourou assumes. 241 311

In Formosa only the Malay tribes of the mountains in the eastern half of the island practice shifting cultivation. They number, according to estimates, about 150,000. From this we may assume that not more than 30,000 to 50,000 hectares are occupied annually by shifting cultivators. 134

In the Philippines it is unlawful to make caiñgins on public land without the permission of the Bureau of Forestry.[34] Permission will be given if the forest on the land involved is of no commercial value and if the caiñgero accepts the obligation to reforest his patch with seeds supplied by the forest service. Several hundred caiñgeros are brought annually before the justices of the peace, who in the past, because their sympathy was with the caiñgeros, were usually rather reluctant to fine the culprits (Table II). Nobody knows, of course, how many illegal caiñgins escape detection, but it is certain that they greatly outnumber those that are made with the permission of the foresters added to those that have been brought to the attention of the courts. Special consideration is given to the "non-Christian" tribes, for whom tracts of land have been set aside within which they continue their age-old system of cultivation. In Mindanao probably three-fourths of the population, from the primitive Manobos to the more advanced Moros, practice the caiñgin system of cultivation. Other regions where this system is practiced extensively are Mindoro, Cebu, southern Negros, and parts of Luzon—the central and eastern cordillera and the Camarines. About 10 per cent of the population of the Philippines obtain a part or all of their food from caiñgins, most of which are made either on private land or on land that belongs to non-Christian tribes who know no other form of agriculture. [162]

Methods of Eliminating the Undesirable Aspects of Shifting Cultivation

In regions where the density of population exceeds 50 persons per square kilometer, shifting cultivation becomes wasteful and destructive. It is imperative in such areas that the system be either modified or else replaced by more conserving and, where possible, more intensive forms of land use. For most backward tribes this involves fundamental changes in their mode of life, religious ideas, and concepts of land rights. 241 311 161

In some instances it should suffice to adopt measures that eliminate the harmful or wasteful after effects of the system without requiring that this kind of land use be given up completely. Let us assume that we have a somewhat thinly settled region containing a forest that is not particularly valuable and the exploitation of which is impracticable or at present inexpedient. Deforestation and the spread of grasses are undesirable aspects 185 241 311

[34] Nano: "Kaiñgin Laws," 1939, pp. 87–92.

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recuperate quickly when the area is again allowed to revert to bush."[38] 245

Several of the forest services of Southeastern Asia have made a rather successful use of the shifting cultivator in their endeavor to reforest the land. They have combined shifting culture and silviculture by hiring shifting cultivators to cut mature trees and to sow or plant new trees on cut-over or burned-over land. For this the cultivators are paid a small wage. In addition they are allowed to grow their own crops for one or two years between the rows of young trees. This system, known as the "taungya forestry system," was developed in 1856 by the German forester, Dietrich Brandis, while he was Superintendent of Forests in Pegu, Burma.[39] It is ingenious in that it recognizes the habits of the shifting cultivator and fits them into a modern forest economy instead of persecuting the cultivator and forcing him to give up his traditional culture. This system has been used in the teak forests of Java since 1871. The forest service makes a contract[40] with the peasants of Java according to which the peasants are to prepare the land and plant and take care of teak trees (*Tectona grandis* L.) in return for a small sum of money and the right to plant such crops as maize and red pepper (*Capsicum annuum* L.) between the rows of teak. The cultivation of upland rice is discouraged, and the planting of cassava, peanuts, castor beans, and tobacco usually is not allowed (Figs. 40, 41). 1/A

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The taungya forestry system is an excellent way of getting pure stands of commercial timber. The typical forest of the tropics is expensive to exploit because of the large variety of trees which it contains, many of which have little or no commercial value.[41] [313]

As important as reforestation is soil erosion control. Where shifting cultivation is practiced in mountainous regions it often causes such acceleration in the rate of erosion that the rivers are choked with sediment and periodically do great flood damage. Flood control could be achieved in most cases by completely closing the headwaters and watershed areas to cultivators. On more gentle slopes the clearings should be rather narrow, should parallel the contours, and be separated by belts of forest. If at the same time the forest uphill were protected by fireguards, the clearings would have a chance to close quickly again so that the soil would be

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[38] Worthington: Science in Africa, 1938, pp. 378–379.

[39] *Taungya* is the Burmese term for the temporary field of the shifting cultivator, a term that the foresters have adopted. E. P. Stebbing in his work, The Forests of India, Vol. 1, 1922, p. 376, writes:

"Brandis, moreover, recognized that the very system which, till then, had destroyed teak forests might be utilized to produce them, . . . and as early as 1856 an attempt was made in Prome district to sow teak in regular rows, together with the rice scattered by the toungya [*sic*] cutters. Twenty years afterwards this attempt had grown into a regular system, by which areas were being annually stocked with teak at a cost far below that of regular plantations." See also *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, 1926, pp. 415–428.

[40] Becking: "De djaticultuur op Java," 1928, pp. 50–52.

[41] Heske: "Der tropische Wald," 1939, p. 414. Heske's article gives an excellent short account of the forests of Southeastern Asia and points out that they are on the whole much easier to exploit than are the forests of tropical America because of the abundance of cheap labor.

1/A [See p. 41, cat. 111 -- Mimeo. 1]

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185 134 133 protected against abnormal erosion. Terracing would be the most effective method of checking soil erosion, but this requires a good deal of labor, which is scarce in areas of shifting cultivation.

654 134 185 133 The Forestry Service of the Indies started an interesting soil-erosion experiment near Tjiwidej in the mountains south of Bandoeng at an elevation of 1800 meters. Two adjacent parcels of forest land, lying on rather steep slopes, are drained separately—out of each parcel comes a little brook—and thus form separate drainage units. Both parcels were used by shifting cultivators who had cut and burned the forest. In one case the slope was left undisturbed; in the other the slope was terraced. At the foot of each slope catch basins were constructed to retain the sediment that was washed down by rain water and transported by the brooks. The amount of water that drains out of each unit was measured and the sediment weighed. The purpose of this experiment was to get quantitative measurements of the amount of erosion that is caused by shifting cultivation and to study the effect of terracing in reducing soil loss. During the first year both parcels lost very little soil, because the humus layer protected it; but in the second year the unterraced parcel lost 5.065 kg. of silt per square meter whereas the terraced parcel lost only one-half as much, or 2.524 kg.[42] (Figs. 42–45).

Under the conditions that we have discussed so far, no radical change in the system of cultivation is required. If, however, the population increases to such an extent that there is no longer enough available land to allow for a sufficiently long rotation cycle, more drastic remedies are necessary.

654 185 245 134 Such a situation arose in parts of the Outer Islands and attracted the attention of government specialists. Legal experts familiar with Indonesian customary law, foresters, and agricultural advisers collaborated to seek a solution.[43] Realizing that shifting cultivators are usually reluctant to give up their traditional form of land use, the specialists approached the ladang problem by searching for means of reforesting ladangs quickly. Experiments were made with the planting of quick-growing leguminous and non-leguminous trees, bushes, and shrubs to shorten the fallow period, restore the humus, protect the soil against accelerated erosion, eliminate the grasses, and, in the case of leguminous species, improve the soil by adding nitrogen.[44] We have already seen, however, that artificial refor-

[42] I was able to visit the Tjiwidej experiment with Mr. L. Gonggrijp, under whose supervision the work was carried out. For a detailed report on the project see Gonggrijp: "Het erosie-onderzoek," 1941, pp. 200–220.

[43] H. J. Friedericy of the Department of the Interior and H. Vonk and E. J. Wind of the Department of Economic Affairs, for example, worked together on the problem of ladang culture in the residency of Palembang.

[137] [44] Experimental plantings included, among others, *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., a light-loving tree which is typical in Southeastern Asia of dry, rather open climax forests and of second-growth forests; *Hibiscus tiliaceus* L.; *Albizzia falcata* Backer, one of the fastest-growing trees of Southeastern Asia, used widely as a shade tree on coffee plantations; *Aleurites moluccana* Willd., a tree at home in the drier parts of the East Indies; *Leucaena glauca* Benth.; *Pterocarpus indicus* Willd., a large tree frequently used along roadsides as

1. [see p. 42, category 116 -- Analyst]

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estation is not a discovery of Western-trained scientists but has long been practiced by certain groups in Southeastern Asia. It was the plan of the government to spread and enforce this practice of artificial reforestation wherever advisable. This practice, whereby the cultivator determines the vegetative cover during the fallow period instead of abandoning the ladang to chance growth, brings him to a transition stage between shifting cultivation and permanent cultivation. From there the step to permanent cultivation with crop rotation is but a short one.

Permanent cultivation requires repeated tilling and therefore more labor and tools than the shifting cultivator is accustomed to. Work animals are also desirable. An important obstacle to intensification of agriculture in wide areas of Southeastern Asia, however, is the fact that hill and mountain regions [up to about 1500 meters in elevation] are frequently infested with malaria so that the energy of the people is greatly reduced.[45] Moreover, the acquisition of such implements as plows, harrows, and hoes, and especially of work animals, calls for financial resources or credit, both of which the average shifting cultivator lacks. Some shifting cultivators do own livestock, such as cattle or carabaos, but utilize neither their labor nor their manure. Groups of the Mois in the mountains of Annam have carabaos, but they do not use the animals in their agricultural activities because they "cannot talk" to them.[46] On the Lesser Sunda Islands livestock is kept because it gives social prestige to the owner. Overstocking of the pasture areas on these islands has led to overgrazing and has cut into the forest area until there has developed a scarcity of land suitable for ladang cultivation. The same has happened in large areas in Africa. There it has been necessary to teach the native peasant the use of cattle and make him familiar with the plow. This was done successfully in northern Nigeria by combining the animal husbandry of the nomadic Fulani with the indigenous shifting cultivation of the Hausa peasant, thus developing "a system of permanent farming whereby a man with cattle of his own, say two working oxen and a few cows, can plough and maintain in fertility an area of land sufficient to supply all the requirements of himself and his family, and to obtain a surplus balance as a return for his labour. . . . Thus mixed farming represents a gradual evolution from the shifting methods of cultivation to a static type of agriculture, by the introduction of animal husbandry, and with the use of animal cultivation."[47] Above all, the peasant learns to preserve the animal manure and

a shade tree; *Dolichos lablab* L., a climbing herb which is valuable as a vegetable; *Crotolaria anagyroides* H.B. and K., a bush of vigorous growth which attains a height of from 12 to 14 feet and forms an excellent green manure; *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., low shrubs useful as green manures; and *Mimosa invisa* Mart., a leguminous creeper which suppresses grasses.

[45] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 181 and 350.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 354.

[47] King: "Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1939, p. 271. See also Faulkner and Mackie: West African Agriculture, 1933; and by the same authors: "The Introduction of Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1936, pp. 89–96.

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who does not know where he will be the next year cannot be expected to plant fruit trees. Under these conditions the diet is reduced to the simplest foods and is usually deficient.

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Zimmerman criticizes some of the characteristics of garden culture in the Thai part of the Malay Peninsula. The improvements that he recommends show that he has approached the gardens with a Western eye, looking for fruit trees "in rows at proper spaces, not scattered as is the case now." [6] He notices lack of tilling, an observation that could be duplicated in every country of Southeastern Asia. As a matter of fact, it is fortunate that the gardens—especially those that have many fruit trees and palms—are not clean-cultivated; otherwise erosion would have caused the same damage here that it has caused in the Westerners' rubber, tea, and coffee plantations—these were planted in rows and kept clean until the discovery was made that soil erosion is extremely severe under such conditions. Pendleton remarks:

> The average Occidental, accustomed as he is to clean cultivated orchards and vineyards in temperate zones, is inclined to keep a plantation in the tropics likewise cultivated. This is now quite generally recognized as a mistake. . . . Near Songkla [in southern Thailand] . . . are considerable plantings of fruit trees, planted as if they were forest trees. . . . Annually, before harvesting the fruit, the undergrowth is slashed and left on the ground, but there is no stirring of the soil or other cultivation. The results are excellent, and there is no soil deterioration, no catastrophic erosion, no expense for cultivation.[7]

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There is little literature on the importance of garden culture among the Malays of British Malaya. According to Grist,

> fruit cultivation is of little more than local importance. The total area under fruit, other than pineapples, is estimated to be 63,000 acres. . . . This area does not take into account the numerous small compounds surrounding Malay homesteads, in which a few fruit trees are planted and which, in the aggregate, must amount to a very considerable area. Although certain fruits acquire a reputation in particular localities, the distribution of the fruits is scattered throughout the country. For instance, North Johore is noted for its durians, Malacca for dukus [*Lansium domesticum* Jack], Penang for rambutans, but in point of fact, equally good quality fruit of these kinds can be found in other areas.[8]

Malaya lacks the detailed information about gardens and their economic importance that is found in Java, for instance, where the garden area of each village is known, because in Malaya there is no population pressure and therefore no need for exact field studies and careful inventories of the source of food supply.

The Philippines are like Malaya in respect to garden culture. Some districts around Manila Bay have specialized in such fruits as mangoes,

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 163.
[7] Pendleton: "Some Interrelations," 1939, p. 50.
[8] Grist: An Outline of Malayan Agriculture, 1936, p. 228.

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Irrigation systems also fall into two categories: peasant irrigation works and technical irrigation works. The former have existed throughout Southeastern Asia for more than a thousand years. In recent times scientifically trained engineers have designed large-scale systems with concrete weirs and locks. Fields solely dependent upon impounded rain water produce one rice crop a year, whereas irrigated fields often yield two crops. If even with irrigation only one crop can be produced, yet the irrigation system assures proper water control, whereas without it irregularities in the course of the rainy season may damage, or destroy, the crop. 243 312 [177]

Wet fields are protected against erosion by leveling, terracing, and dyking. But how does continued cropping affect the fertility of wet-rice fields? Diverse environments and cultural practices in Southeastern Asia create considerable differences in this respect. Much of the paddy land of the Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, and Burma has lost a good deal of its original fertility because the peasants have not used manures, fertilizers, or crop rotation. In many instances, however, soil fertility has been preserved by the mineral matter dissolved in the irrigation water and by the silt deposited on those fields that are supplied with irrigation water coming from streams. The value of the water and silt depends, of course, upon the nature of the parent material from which it is derived. Rivers from a young volcanic region supply much richer water and silt than do those that drain a mountain region consisting of sedimentary rock or granite. For this reason, the Irrigation Service of the Netherlands Indies before making final plans for a new irrigation system takes samples of water and silt carried by rivers at different times of the year. The samples are analyzed in order to determine their influence upon the soil to be irrigated. A river found to be carrying water and silt that would lower the value of paddy land would be eliminated as a source of irrigation water, or its use would be limited as much as possible. 243 134 312 [654]

Irrigated fields of which the water supply does not contain minerals in quantities necessary for continuous satisfactory plant growth and paddy land that depends exclusively upon rain, both require other techniques for maintaining fertility. In many regions cultivators cut the rice stems just far enough below the ear to allow bundling. This practice makes possible the return of the rest of the plant matter to the soil. From this it is only one more step to work household refuse into the ground together with ashes of burned rubbish, rice husks, leaves, and manure.

As stable manure is not available in adequate quantities, intensive studies of the application of green manures to the cultivation of rice have been made in a number of countries of Southeastern Asia. A recent article by W. Bally reviews the results of these studies.[14] In a few rice-growing regions the peasants, on their own initiative, have learned to use legumes to improve rice soil. In wet fields the decomposition of green manure takes place under anaerobic conditions, and the final product is ammonia. Since 243 134 242

[14] Bally: "The Employment of Green Manures," 1936, pp. T10–T31.

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243 [137] 242 134

rice takes up nitrogen in the form of ammonia, the value of green manures on wet-rice fields is apparent.[15] In the Indies, *Crotolaria* species are the most frequently used green manures, the favored one being *Crotolaria juncea* L.; but *Phaseolus lunatus* L., *Dolichos lablab* L., and *Pachyrrhizus erosus* Urban are also used. The peasants of the Red River delta in Tongking are in the habit of working into the ground the wilted matter of a number of legumes that have been grown primarily for seed. The peasants of the province of Nam Dinh have developed a technique that may be unique. They push handfuls of indigo branches into the ground between the rows of rice a few days after the latter has been transplanted, for they believe that indigo is superior to pig manure or human excreta. In Indochina rice-growers frequently cultivate green manure, especially *Crotolaria* species, on dry fields and carry it to the rice fields at the time when these fields are being prepared for the seedlings. A green manure used exclusively in a few districts of the delta land of Tongking is the small aquatic plant, *azolla*.[16] Certain villages, thanks to favorable circumstances, have specialized in the growing of azolla to sell to the surrounding country, while other villages reproduce the plant until sufficient quantities of green manure have been obtained to cover all needs. The life cycle of azolla is completed in the months from November to April or May. Only the villagers of LaVan know the secret of maintaining and multiplying the plant during the hot season. They guard this secret jealously since it is the basis of their livelihood.

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Further studies are needed to establish which varieties of green manure plants are best suited to the various environmental conditions. It is important to find plants that grow rapidly and can be sown when the rice is still on the field, just after the water has been drained off to allow the grain to ripen. Experiments should also be made in the timing of the application of green manure. Should it be early, or just before the transplanting of the seedlings? Should it be on dry or on wet land?

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Crop rotation also has its place as a means of keeping up the fertility of wet-rice fields. This practice seems to be better developed and more prevalent in Java than in any other country of Southeastern Asia. Extensive areas of *sawah*, as the Javanese call their wet riceland, are planted with dry-field crops such as maize, legumes, and other vegetables during the dry season, a practice that has a beneficial effect upon the soil. This form of double cropping is probably better than raising two rice crops in one year, because—although a different variety of rice is chosen for each season—both make essentially the same demands upon the soil; whereas a peanut crop, for example, grown during the dry season will enlarge the nitrogen content of the soil. In some areas of Java lowland rice is rotated

[15] Imperial Bureau of Soil Science: Tropical Soils in Relation to Tropical Crops, 1936, p. 11.

[16] For a map showing the extent of the use of azolla, see Gourou: Les paysans, 1936, p. 392. For further discussion see Nguyên-cọng-Tiêu: "L'azolle," 1930, B, pp. 335–350 (also in *Proc. Fourth Pacific Science Congress, Java, 1929*, Vol. 4, 1930, pp. 355–370).

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with sugar or tobacco grown under plantation management. But is the high fertility of the soil due to this crop rotation, or is it rather the result of the heavy application of commerical fertilizer and the thorough cultivation of the soil under Western management? 242 134 249

In no country of Southeastern Asia is there so great a variety or so intensive a use of commercial fertilizers as in Japan.[17] In general, the peasants of Southeastern Asia lack money for commercial fertilizers. In Indochina local phosphates are within reach of some of the Annamese, but the costs of imported fertilizers are prohibitive. In Java, although attempts to make possible the use of fertilizers through the agency of public credit institutions were successful in some special instances, not more than one per cent of the cultivated area received any commercial fertilizer in 1939. On the other hand, estimates indicate that more than 1,000,000 hectares of sawah have a phosphate deficiency and that a moderate application of phosphate would augment the yield by 25 to 50 per cent.[18] 242 [654]

The Agricultural Advisory Service was able to raise the productivity of wet-rice fields in West Java by about 10 per cent. It encouraged the peasants to use fertilizer on seedbeds, to sow rice more thinly on the beds (thus producing stronger seedlings), and to plant the seedlings in rows so that weeding could be done with a special instrument, the *landak* (Fig. 59).[1] This weeder was developed in Japan. During the years immediately preceding 1939, these improvements in West Java resulted in an increase in output of unhusked rice amounting to 300,000 quintals, or 30,000 metric tons, with a value of nearly 1,000,000 guilders. This shows that some improvements in cultivation may increase production without a great capital outlay.[19] 242 243 [412]

Java may be compared only with southern China and with Japan in the cleanness of its rice fields. The Filipino does not pay much attention to weeding. The Malayan, Thai, Cambodian, Cochinchinese, and Filipino rice farmers have more flooded riceland per capita at their disposal than the people of Java and can thus afford to cultivate their land less intensively. 243

Irrigation Problems

Peasant irrigation works usually take care of the fields of only one village or of a small group of people who have joined together for the specific purpose of building and maintaining an irrigation system. These works consequently are small and usually inadequate, but nevertheless they de- 312 [476] 243

17 "The chief commercial fertilizers used in Japan are pressed herrings, pressed sardines, dried sardines, other fish cakes, bone meal, soybean cake, rapeseed cake, cottonseed cake, other vegetable-oil cakes, ammonium sulphate, calcium cyanamide, calcium phosphate, and potassium phosphate. Calcium phosphate and ammonium sulphate are probably the most representative chemical fertilisers."—Wickizer and Bennett: The Rice Economy, 1941, p. 252, footnote 33.

18 Departement van Economische Zaken: Voedselproblemen, 1940, p. 28.

19 *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28.

1 [See p. 117, category 116. -- Analyst]

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yields. On the whole, the farmers of Cochinchina cultivate their fields much less intensively than do those of Tongking and Annam. Hardly any double cropping of rice is practiced in Cochinchina, nor is much of the riceland cultivated during the dry season.

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In 1941 changes in the political boundary between Thailand and French Indochina reduced the importance of Cambodia as a rice-surplus region of Indochina. Cambodia lost the Battambang area, west of the Tonle Sap, which in recent years had developed into a prosperous rice-growing district, possessing one of the most modern rice mills of Indochina.[47] The province of Battambang has a rice area of 134,000 hectares, whereas Cambodia, before the boundary change, had about 800,000 hectares of riceland.[48] Most of this is cultivated during the rainy season and depends entirely upon the rain caught in the fields. Around the Tonle Sap and along the Mekong a good deal of floating rice is grown, and some riceland is planted after the summer flood has receded. The crop from this land is harvested in the dry season and may be considered a dry-season crop, although it begins to grow during the latter part of the rainy season and profits from the floodwater that has spread over the land.

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The deltas of the Red River and of the Mekong, the two "rice baskets" of Indochina, differ greatly when it comes to the final disposal of the crop. The contents of the Tongkingese basket barely meet the needs of the local population, whereas a large part of the Cochinchinese rice may be exported, since the production far exceeds the local consumption. The delta of the Red River is densely settled; but Cochinchina, especially the western part, is still a pioneer country with a relatively low population density. The importance of Indochina as a rice-exporting region is based entirely on the production of rice in the south, particularly in Cochinchina and, to a lesser extent, in Cambodia.

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Dry Fields

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Dry fields[49] represent the third type of land under permanent cultivation in Southeastern Asia. The steady increase in the foreign demand for tropical products raised on dry fields, combined with the growth in local food requirements, has led to a great expansion of the area under permanent cultivation. The continuous use of unirrigated land, however, offers one of the most troublesome problems of tropical agriculture, because of the difficulty of preventing soil depletion. Erosion is especially active in a

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47 Thompson: "War and Further India's Rice," 1941, p. 185.

48 Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, p. 309.

49 In the following discussion we shall exclude non-irrigated or dry land that comes under the regime of shifting cultivation. Sometimes a non-irrigated field lying fallow may have the same appearance as a recently abandoned ladang. But the essential difference is that under permanent culture land tenure is more highly developed than under shifting culture; so that a permanent field lying fallow belongs to an individual who, after a short period, will again cultivate it, whereas an abandoned ladang gives the former cultivator no claims for the future.

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climate characterized by heavy rainfall often concentrated in one season, and it will, unless checked, lead to the exhaustion of the fertility of the soil at a comparatively rapid rate in the tropics. In Southeastern Asia permanent dry fields are usually found on sloping ground exposed, much more than in the case of garden or wet-rice land, to the danger of erosion. Garden land is protected by dense stands of perennials, while terracing and dyking guard wet fields against destructive erosion. The terracing of dry fields is one of the most effective ways to control the loss of soil, but, since terracing requires so much labor, we find terraced dry fields only in densely settled regions, and even there the peasants often will not undertake this additional labor unless they are urged to do so by the authorities. As long as there is enough land available, the peasants prefer to let dry land recuperate by lying fallow for short periods rather than to protect it by terraces; but with the increasing density of population and the consequent shrinkage in the size of individual farms this practice is no longer possible (Figs. 61–64). [1]

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As early as the second half of the nineteenth century, K. F. Holle, the agricultural adviser in the Netherlands Indies, constantly stressed the need of controlling erosion on dry fields. Following his advice, the government, in Article 5 of the 1874 Ordinance on Alienation of Domain Forest Land, stipulated that permission to clear domain land on sloping terrain be given to the peasants only on condition that they terrace the slopes and thus control erosion.[50]

I 654 [245] 134 242

The need for the terracing of slopes became especially apparent in Java in the coffee lands that the peasants had to plant under the forced-culture system. Many of these lands were completely exhausted after a few years, and Holle showed that this rapid exhaustion occurred because the topsoil had been washed away by heavy rains. In 1873 he wrote detailed instructions for the terracing and cultivation of coffee lands.[51] However, Holle's instructions and the stipulations of the Ordinance of 1874 were subjected to criticism and often ignored. In 1889, therefore, the Government of the Indies asked Forester Berkhout to investigate the practical results of the application of terracing to tegalans. Berkhout's report summarizes the arguments for and against terracing; these still make interesting reading.[52] The arguments against terraces on tegalans were put forth as follows:

1. The people are not used to terracing dry land.
2. Terracing demands more labor.
3. It reduces productivity in the first year if the land is rather steep and the humus layer thin.

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[50] Article 5 reads: "Dat bij hellend terrein zoo er gevaar bestaat voor afspoeling van de bouwkruin, de aanleg geschiede terrasgewijze, en voorts onder zoodanige voorwaarden als plaatselijke omstandigheden wenschelijk maken." Ontginnings-Ordonnantie, *Staatsblad 1874*, No. 79.

[51] Nederlandsch-Indische Maatschappij: Handleiding, 1873.

[52] Berkhout: "Terrassenaanleg," 1892, pp. 139–141.

[1] [See p. 117, cat. 116 -- Analyst]

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia A-1

ing crops. The process can be adapted to climate by manufacture either in shallow pits or low heaps."[64] 241 242

Dry-Field Crops Cultivated by Peasants

The list of dry-field crops cultivated in Southeastern Asia is rather large, but there are regional variations. Cassava, for example, is commonly grown on tegalans in Java (2,300,000 acres), whereas it is unimportant in Sumatra, Borneo, the Philippines (40,000 acres), Malaya (24,000 acres), and Indochina (75,000 acres). The most important dry-field crops are up- 241 311

TABLE IV—CHEMICAL COMPOSITION OF CASSAVA AND IMPORTANT CEREAL FLOURS [146]

	CASSAVA (PER CENT)	MAIZE (PER CENT)	WHEAT (PER CENT)	RICE (PER CENT)
Moisture	10.75	13.41	13.65	13.12
Protein	0.87	7.56	12.35	9.85
Crude fat	1.19	2.79	1.75	0.88
Ash	1.24	1.78	1.81	1.51
Crude fiber	6.12	3.19	2.53	0.63
Carbohydrates	79.83	71.27	67.91	74.01

Source: The Cassava Industry in the Philippines, 1939, p. 7.

land rice, maize, cassava, sweet potatoes, peanuts, soy beans and other pulses, tobacco, and sugar cane, all of which are annuals. Of the first four, only upland rice is a native of Southeastern Asia, whereas the other three are natives of the New World and were introduced into Southeastern Asia by the Spaniards in the sixteenth century.

The inhabitants of Southeastern Asia have long relied upon root crops, fruits, leaves of various plants, and wild roots and tubers gathered in the forests, as well as upon rice. Scheltema refers to a number of early statements which indicate that "rice was not yet the principal food for a large portion of the native population [of Java] as late as the first part of the 19th century and that the rice diet has become much more important in the course of the past hundred years" as a result of the great extension of the cultivation of irrigated rice fields.[65] If it is correct that the rice consumption per capita increased during the past century, the opposite trend has been evident during the present century. For a while the increase in the area of irrigated land was great enough to allow for a larger rice production, but with the steadily increasing pressure of population the peasants now have to depend more and more upon unirrigated land. Thus the production of dry-field crops is gaining in importance. 241 262

Authorities in Southeastern Asia have been especially worried over the increase of cassava production and consumption. Because of the exhaustion of the soil fertility on many dry fields, the growing of upland rice and 241 134

[64] Worthington: Science in Africa, 1938, p. 387.
[65] Scheltema: The Food Consumption, 1936, p. 10.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

241 134 [146]

maize has become unprofitable, and many peasants have changed over to cassava, which makes lesser demands upon soil fertility. The per acre yields of cassava are high, and the plant is a source of carbohydrates, fat, and protein. From the standpoint of dietary needs, however, the ratio between carbohydrates on the one hand and protein and fat on the other is unfavorable. People who live on cassava merely fill their stomachs. The insufficiency of protein intake is detrimental to their health. Table IV compares the chemical composition of cassava, maize, wheat, and rice.

243 146 262

Maize, as the table indicates, compares quite favorably in protein content with wheat and rice and is especially rich in fat. It has gained an important position in the diet of the people of central and eastern Java, Madura, the island of Cebu, and the Cagayan Valley in the island of Luzon. Both maize and cassava are easy to store and therefore have a great advantage over sweet potatoes, which must be consumed soon after they ripen.

241

In Thailand maize is an important crop on the Khorat plateau and in other regions where dry land is available. Among the root crops cassava has gained a greater importance than taro and yams. The last two are grown mainly by Chinese gardeners in the neighborhood of large towns. Cassava, too, is grown commercially by Chinese, especially near the railroad on the peninsula.

[311]

Most of the so-called dry-field crops are grown in Indochina during the dry season on land that is flooded during the rainy season and at that time produces rice. Gourou has estimated that in Tongking 100,000 hectares of land are used exclusively for the production of dry-field crops and that 350,000 hectares of irrigated land are occupied by such crops during the dry season.[66]

This practice of growing dry-field crops on irrigated land during the dry season is especially widespread in Java, where population pressure is so great that the peasants have to use every possible means to enlarge their food supply. If there is not enough water available to grow a second wet-rice crop, they will always try to get a second harvest of quick-growing dry-field crops during the dry season.

In contrast to the peoples of Java, the Filipinos do not, as a rule, go in for the raising of dry-field crops on wet riceland during the dry season, although this should be possible if the land were cultivated. There is enough water in the soil a short distance below the surface for the growing of crops practically everywhere during the dry season. Repeated tilling would keep the soil soft and fine so that water could move upward by capillary action to replace that which is lost through evaporation. Cultivation would enable plants such as maize, peanuts, and soy beans to grow on land that otherwise would be baked dry and hard. Although the ratio between cultivated land and population in the Philippines does not make a dry-season crop a necessity in most regions, there are a number of districts where the peasants traditionally raise a dry-season crop on irrigated

[66] Gourou: Les paysans, 1936, pp. 407–408.

1 [see page 75 cat 116 -- Analyst]

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133 type which have been severely scarred by denudation. Mag-
135 matic rocks have flowed extensively from these volcanoes, spreading over a large area and serving to mask relief forms developed upon underlying earlier structures. As a result of these igneous formations throughout the region, contact metamorphosis has taken place on a large scale, which has a major bearing on the frequency of metallic minerals and helps to account for the scarcity of coal formations.

133 3. The detail of much of the Southeast Asia landscape is condi-
134 tioned by contemporary river alluviation and coastal sedimentation (as in Eastern Sumatra and South Borneo) whose thickness and profusion relate to the rapidity of tropical erosion on the one hand and to the stability of the continental platform on the other. Relief upon the great alluviated landscapes is slight. In this zone where there is so much coastline in proportion to the land area, marine accumulations of spits, bars and off-shore beaches are both prominent and important in conditioning coastal topography and the location of settlements. Marine loads tend to be heavy in this zone of violent terrestrial erosion and under certain conditions sediment accumulates quickly owing to the speed with which mangrove establishes itself upon any bank or spit which is built up, thereafter further hastening deposition by hindering the free scouring of normal wave action. Marine sedimentation is greater upon the inner coasts of the Sunda Platform and less upon those coasts facing the Indian and Pacific Oceans where the shore profiles are steep and the waves have maximum fetch.

Character of Seas

133 Three types of seas may be distinguished by the criterion of depth:

1. Shallow seas of the Sunda Platform
2. Shallow seas of the Sahul Shelf
3. The Austro-Asiatic "mediterranean" basins between the Sunda Platform and the Sahul Shelf, and subdivided by island festoons. In this group may be provisionally placed the Sulu Basin, though the South China Basin between the Philippines and the Asiatic mainland may only be included by considerably stretching the "mediterranean" conception.

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Chapter Three

THE DRAINAGE PATTERNS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE Irrawaddy, Salween, Menam Chao Praya and Mekong are remarkable for their length compared with most Southeast Asia rivers, which rarely exceed a few hundred miles long. Those four major rivers are associated with tectonic basins; relief elsewhere only permits short streams. All districts marginal to the Sunda Platform have experienced relatively recent tectonic changes and the rivers developed upon them are youthful as well as short. Upon the Platform itself much more advanced landscape maturity is evident but because this older surface has only limited areas exposed, rivers even there are short. 133

CHARACTERISTICS OF TROPICAL RIVERS

In the régime of tropical rivers several factors have distinctive emphasis compared with conditions in temperate latitude rivers. Firstly the volume of water precipitated into and to be carried from any drainage basin is several times that of equivalent temperate latitude rivers as a result of the much higher rainfall. Moreover the precipitation is more intense. Even the dry interior 132
of Burma experiences falls of rain averaging ·6 inches per rainy day. 133
The water content of those Tropical Air Masses over Southeast Asia is so high and the rising air currents so strong and sustained that several Javanese stations have recorded falls of over 16 inches per day. These violent torrential downpours are often very localised at any one time, yet on an average they affect large areas. Thus the volume of rainwater in any drainage basin is enormous and fluctuates widely within short periods of a few hours.

A further consequence of these great rainstorms is their power- 134
ful erosive effects. Upon cultivated land the force and volume of 132
these downpours cause surface downwash to be large, the soil 133
rapidly washes away and whole hillsides may slip, so that the run-off has a high mud content. Because the rivers are mostly immature, this heavy load may be sustained by turbulence for considerable

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distances. In areas of alternating wet and dry seasons, drought cracks the ground, loosens the top surface and thereby increases the available load when the rains begin. The Dry Zones of Burma and Siam are for this reason areas of most violent surface removal. The very heavy load of Southeast Asia rivers gives them a great capacity for rapidly building up deltas, sedimenting the estuaries and at times causing heavy deposition of silt well inland. Furthermore the rainfall is not only violent and intense, it is also variable in seasonal incidence; thus many streams of Upper Burma, Central Siam and Eastern Java are for months practically dry and then come into spate within a few hours, not unlike the wadis of North Africa. Landform combined with the seasonal rains causes the Salween, for instance, to vary its level 50 feet within a few hours. Such variability of volume induces deposition well inland. Huge silt banks lie across many watercourses, vast alluvial fans develop at the debouchment to plains, and even at the junction of tributaries.

The Irrawaddy presents an example of how the drainage conditions differ at different points in the course of a tropical river. Near and above Bhamo changes of Irrawaddy level directly parallel changes of rainfall. As the stream passes through the Dry Zone of Burma it receives no significant additional water from the tributaries after it passes the confluence of the Chindwin and it is effectively losing water by evaporation. Stamp estimates 45 per cent of Irrawaddy water has been lost by evaporation when the stream finally reaches the head of the Delta. Evaporation rates in the Burmese Dry Zone are little, if at all, less than the precipitation. Farther downstream, in the Delta, heavy precipitation occurs again, so that the Irrawaddy floods arrive at the Delta roughly a month after peak rains in the reaches above Bhamo, to find it already suffering from floods due to local rains and small local streams. These floods of local origin effectively oblige the Irrawaddy water to remain within the main distributaries. Even more interesting is Stamp's evidence that the average annual silt load at the Delta head is 261 million tons, whereas at Mandalay it is only 32 million tons, showing that 229 million tons of silt is added in the Dry Zone. Since the Chindwin provides 109 million tons of silt, the balance of 120 million tons derives from the wadi-like, highly variable streams (chaungs) joining the Irrawaddy in its driest section.

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Load and the Erosion of Basins

Acting as a brake on the destructiveness of the rivers and on the changes of river levels, the dense forest cover of most of the landscape breaks the force of the downpours and provides roots and undergrowth to act as a spongelike retainer of water and as a partial filter of sediment. Under natural conditions, where the forest is undisturbed by man, this influence is so strong that even minor brooks are relatively clear, but where the natural cover is removed by burning to permit cultivation or mining, the brooks are thick and opaque with sediment, a condition rapidly extending as more and more surface is exposed for farming or for alluvial mining. Wherever there are active volcanoes, great quantities of loose ash are thrown out regularly; Southeast Asia volcanoes typically eject ash rather than lava. Unconsolidated ash without vegetation cover is rapidly washed into the streams and by these agents spread out over the estuaries. A new volcanic outburst is at once followed by heavier loads in the local rivers and increased estuarial deposition (Fig. 19) and greater danger of silting up irrigation and drainage canals which may have been built downstream for cultivating rice. That so much of Java's volcanic ash cones are terraced may only partly be ascribed to agricultural pressure; the terracing is equally necessary to control slip of the ash and to prevent sedimentation by waterborne ash from completely overwhelming the lowlands. Largely as a result of heavy ash loads, the Solo River, for example, carries some sixty times as much sediment as the Rhine, though it has only 40 per cent of its length.

The heavy load being carried away by the rivers lowers the surface of the drainage basin over most of its area, even though part of the lower basin is being built up a little by sediment. The rate of destruction of the drainage basin in the tropics is far higher than anywhere else. The Chindwin is removing the surface of its basin by .78 mm. per annum, the Irrawaddy above Prome by .52 mm. per annum, the Loesi in Java by .87 mm. In some small Javanese streams the destruction of the drainage basin has reached as much as 3 mm. per annum. As standards of comparison, the annual lowering of the Danube basin is at the rate of .006 mm., and of the Marne, .005 mm.

As a region, Southeast Asia is thus one of the least stable in the world, as far as orographic form and drainage patterns are

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concerned. Erosion here works faster and the associated deposition occurs at a greater rate than temperate latitude geographers allow for. This adds only a further variant to the general tectonic instability of all the zone fringing the Sunda Platform, but in the case of the Platform itself, its great age and relative stability plus the intensity of river erosion, provide an excellent case of a landscape exposed continuously to subaerial erosion for a period long enough to indicate an approach to the peneplainised state. The Malayan landscape, central to this continental Platform and exposed fully to continuous, powerful and prolonged river action, has special interest in this connection. In Malaya, large alluviated plains dominate the landscape and the hills rise sharply from these plains, yet the features of normal river types still persist. Rapids exist in a number of Malayan rivers, profiles are slightly broken at a number of levels, trellis drainage patterns have persisted on tilted strata (Fig. 32) and river capture goes on even at this advanced stage, as in the capture of the Bera headwaters by the Muar (Fig. 16). Lakes, however, are unusual on the main Sunda Platform; this negative point is at once a symptom of erosional senility and of the ability of tropical vegetation to build out into the lakes, hastening their sedimentation until the standing water disappears. Thus the Bera Lake of Malaya is really a large swamp periodically inundated; the Tonle Sap of Indochina is rapidly filling to become a similar swamp-lake varying with the seasons. Infilled swamp-lakes appear also in Borneo and the Shan Plateau.

The Glacial Period and Southeast Asia Drainage

While tectonic and erosional changes have produced most variations in river forms of those parts of Southeast Asia fringing the Sunda Platform, *upon* the Platform itself, rivers have been more recently affected by a process of marine inundation. There is general agreement that the history of the Platform is one of stability or possibly of slight sinking; the uniform depth and terrigenous bottom material of the Sunda Platform seas, and also the fully-developed river valleys upon their floors, combine to support the view that a rise of sea level has taken place, associated with continental icemelt which took place in northern latitudes when the last Glacial Period closed. De Geer estimates that the last Scandinavian glaciation reached its peak some 25,000 years

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

FIG. 19.—Coast Changes at the Mouth of R. Tjimanoek (Hoek van Indramajoe). This shows the rapid changes of the Java coast as a result of sedimentation

The history of inundation at first glance makes it surprising that ria forms have not appeared on the Sunda Platform; the explanation lies in the heavy sedimentation by the rivers and in the relatively soft laterised surface which would be presented to the rising sea and quickly moulded by it.

The glacial periods had little other effect in Southeast Asia; Weissman estimates the snow line in Northern Burma to have descended to about 9,000 ft. during the Glacial Periods. If this lowering of the snow line by about 3,500 ft. compared with today roughly indicates the condition for all Southeast Asia at the time of maximum glaciation, then in the equatorial zone where the present snowline is about 16,000 ft., no mountain tops of Borneo, Java, Sumatra and Malaya could have been seriously affected by snows, let alone by mountain glaciation. Interpretation of land forms in these units on the assumption of glaciation must therefore produce overwhelming evidence to counter such arguments.

SEDIMENTATION

Very heavy river loads, the decreasing carrying power of rivers, and the shallow seas of the Platform zone, combine to make rapid sedimentation of estuarial and coastal regions the characteristic

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134 133 of contemporary relief forms and drainage patterns. The rate of coastal advance seaward upon the Platform is in places phenomenally rapid; the Tjimanoek (Fig. 19) and Solo deltas in Java are extending at the rate of 100 metres annually, the Mekong at 60–80 metres annually. An outburst of volcanic ash increases the deposition by neighbouring rivers at the coast, though the behaviour of sea currents moulds the riberine deposit in detail on reaching the sea. Mangroves and associated vegetation quickly establish themselves on sandbanks and cays so that at the mouth of the Perak, for example, an exposure of a bank for only a few days at a low water season is enough to permit vegetation to start there, hastening the rate of deposition by offering an obstruction to river outflow and thereby perpetuating the bank which in other settings might disappear by erosion during the next high water spell.

Where streams debouch into deep seas the rate of coastal extension is inevitably less, due to the greater thicknesses which must be laid for every outward extension, yet the Irrawaddy Delta is building outward at the rate of about 60 metres per annum; that the Irrawaddy can maintain this rate of building into a deep basin reflects its tremendous load and a physical condition which concentrates the deposition of this load at the outer edge of the Delta rather than over its surface. (See Chapter 9.)

Because the rivers are steadily sedimenting the bed of their lower reaches, these are in fact generally being raised in level. Such a process cannot continue very far; when its bed is raised slightly above the surrounding land, the river easily changes course, and every large delta of Southeast Asia shows signs of frequent migration of distributaries. Old channels and distributaries in various phases of abandonment may be seen at nearly every river mouth. Most deltas suffer regular inundation at various times of the year facilitating farming for rice, which depends on either natural or artificially induced floods, in most cases derived from rivers. The process of spreading sediment over the whole delta zone goes on both by migration of distributaries and by seasonal inundations, so that the deltaic surface over a wide area is being slowly raised by sedimentation, making it progressively more difficult to irrigate the inner and higher sections of the deltas and in the long run causing the centre of gravity of irrigation steadily to move

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

FIG. 20.—Flood Zones at the Junction of the Lipis-Pahang Rivers

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133 downstream, where also the newer unexhausted soils are to be
●134 found.

Marshes and Swamps

133 All land masses whose rivers empty on to the Sunda Platform are thus characteristically fringed with flat landscapes of marshes on a large scale. East Sumatra is an outstanding example of prolonged sedimentation by tropical rivers moving into shallow seas; this coastal marsh, at least 60,000 square miles in area, about a third of Sumatra, indicates what may result from equatorial sedimentation, here probably aided by a volcanic outburst in inner Sumatra during historic time (possibly during the century or so prior to A.D. 1000) and facilitated by the shallow Malacca Strait where the main tidal scour is to the east rather than to the Sumatra side. Huge flat islands have been formed off East Sumatra and they are regularly inundated by tides even now, so that they are in effect amphibious areas. The speed with which these coasts of sedimentation can advance and change should be taken into account when attempting to correlate historic place-names with sites and settlements of today. It may be that the decline of large principalities in Eastern Sumatra, reported in the first millennium by Oriental travellers, should be attributed to changes of coastline and to rapid deterioration of old site values.

Floods

A further feature of old drainage forms in Southeast Asia is the large size of inland swamps, as apparent in Malaya and Borneo. These arise from a combination of several factors:

(*a*) the torrential downpours are often so intense that for a few hours the surface water is greater than streams can carry off, or subsoil can absorb;

(*b*) the density of the vegetation cover impedes run-off;

(*c*) differences of downpours in nearby rivers frequently cause a swift rise of level in one stream and not in another which it joins, so that at the confluence (Fig. 20) the stream in spate dams back the other and the flood may even flow into it, or build bars of silt across it. The Tonle Sap marshes suffer from Mekong floods in this way;

(*d*) where a drainage system has cluse (as in Malayan streams) or similar constrictions (as in the Irrawaddy gorges) these features

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may induce flooding of the valley above the narrows. The Tasek Bera of Malaya in this way reflects constrictions in the Pahang Valley;

(*e*) the presence of levees means that the zone between them and the foothills has difficulty in draining to the river after a flood or during a downpour, so the levees are generally lined landwards by broad freshwater marshes, as by the rivers across the Korat Plateau in Siam (Fig. 90);

(*f*) where local rain seasons coincide with the arrival of spates, originating elsewhere in the local rivers, the landscape cannot shed the direct rainfall rapidly and it induces marshes.

Most of the freshwater marshes are seasonally flooded, drying out quickly in spells of drought, draining when local streams are low, but then flooding to depths up to 10 ft. during wet seasons.

Some types of swamp are man-induced. When alluvial mining is being carried on, dredges and gravel pumps effectively stir up large quantities of river sediment which is carried downstream as the mining effluent (Fig. 21).



FIG. 21.—Alluvial Fans being thrust across Bentong Valley

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311 This artificially stirred sediment is agriculturally negative and
133 it penetrates the ditches and drains of rice growing areas,
gradually silting them up, often spectacularly raising the
241 local river bed (at Serendah in Malaya, the river bed was
• 134 raised 21 ft. by sedimentation over the decade 1923-33), as well as sterilising fields on which the silt spreads so that cultivation becomes more difficult as the river can no longer be kept out. The yields decrease and the fields are abandoned, swamp vegetation gradually obliterating signs of cultivation. Round the lower Malacca River may be found signs of the old field bundings within the tangle of swamp vegetation now growing there, a sign of the effects of mining higher in the river whose effluent is obliterating cultivation in lower areas. This type of swamp comes slowly and has all the appearance of nature overcoming men's efforts to farm, but it is fundamentally a result of man-induced erosions or abrasions elsewhere. Thus interference, by mining and forest clearing, with landforms stabilised over long periods, not only goes on by removal of silt and gravels carried from mining areas and topsoils removed by torrential rains on clean-weeded agricultural areas as a mark of transfer of surface materials from one area, but it also causes the obliteration of cultivation and an extension of useless marsh in the areas where this material is deposited.

133 Because these tropical marshes occur in zones of human signifi-
361 cance, that is, in the flatter areas with agricultural possibilities, and along the coasts where settlement from overseas might take place, they have played a major part in conditioning the distribution of human beings in Southeast Asia. Both the coastal and inland marshes are tree-covered, making it even more difficult to penetrate, control, or cultivate them. Varying degrees of swampiness often account for the ease of development of farming in one place rather than another in Southeast Asia and a broad belt of marsh has generally proved a greater human impediment than any other topographic feature.

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137 extensively because of their usefulness structurally and domestically, but continuous stands become established only where the 313 dry season is very marked and where shifting cultivation is known to have been practised extensively. Bamboos are giant perennial grasses of about a hundred species, with woody stems and woody 137 roots. They grow in clumps and may be evergreen or deciduous. Some bamboos flower at long intervals (25-70 years) and their seeds are fire-resisting. Constant friction between the dry woody stems may cause forest fires and help to produce that selective process which leads to stands of bamboo.

[134] Monsoon Dry Forest, an open wooded landscape containing very few species, may be found over large areas of Burma, Siam and Indochina in association with poor soils. Known as *indaing* in Burma and *padeng* in Siam, this forest develops where rainfalls are not much above 40 in. per annum, and it may merge on the equatorial side into Tropical Rain Forest and on the other into dry or thorny savannah vegetation. Within Monsoon Dry Forest trees are widely spaced, tending to be stunted forms of Dipterocarpaceae and distinctly deciduous.

Secondary Monsoon Forests.—Considerable areas of savannah found in Burma, Siam, Indochina and the Eastern Indies are secondary growths after a removal of the natural Monsoon Forest. Savannah is open country of tall, coarse grasses, occasionally having a few scattered bamboos or low trees and very much associated with long dry seasons whose effects are aggravated by poor or porous soils. Savannah merges into Monsoon Dry Forest and is often covered with low palms (Borassus flabellifer), and contains prickly pears, spiny cactus-like plants, and similar thorny scrub.

(3) Mountain Vegetation

Vegetation steadily and often imperceptibly changes with altitude and the resulting types are much the same, level for level, throughout Southeast Asia. All but the very highest mountains are forested, though the trees on exposed summits are dwarfed; only in New Guinea and Yunnan are the heights great enough entirely to prevent tree growth and produce an alpine vegetation. Young volcanoes may be treeless for pedological, rather than for climatic reasons.

Above about 2,000 ft., at most points of Southeast Asia, large

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Chapter Five

SOUTHEAST ASIA SOILS

Factors in Tropical Soil Development

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While most soils of Southeast Asia have in common the fact that they have been evolved under conditions of plentiful moisture, they vary very considerably and the term "laterites," frequently used to describe them, is so broad that it misleads. In the tropics, as elsewhere, soils represent a synthesis of the inter-related factors of climate, parent rock, plants and animals, relief and drainage; a change in any one of these factors will cause a change of soil character. Time, too, plays a considerable part. If the factors operate for a period indefinitely long, the soil type conditioned by them will evolve until the soil represents a perfect balance or end product of them. When the forest cover is removed or a volcanic eruption throws out new rock material, certain of the factors are changed, the soil reverts to a more juvenile stage and its evolution begins again on different materials and may take a different form. Thus soil differences from place to place are often due to differences in stage of evolution, in the time factor.

Southeast Asia weathering is fairly uniform from place to place. It occurs without exposure to frosts or to wide alternations of heat and cold, but under conditions of warmth and heavy rainfall. Hence the weathering process is chemical rather than mechanical.

Those regions of Southeast Asia away from the Equator and having a markedly seasonal rainfall (as in the dry belts of Burma and Siam) may be described as subject for part of the year to equatorial soil processes where surface evaporation is nearly nil and for part to desertic soil processes in which surface evaporation is at a maximum.

The warm rainwater of tropical conditions, well carbonated and charged with the biochemicals of vegetal disintegration, breaks down the silicates, which form most rocks, into salts which are leached away, leaving the complex sesquioxides to accumulate in the soil. These may in turn undergo selective changes, all leading to the accumulation of clays. In the tropical heat of Southeast Asia

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lowlands these changes, known as the hydrolysis of the silicates, most involved phases of soil chemistry, take place very fast compared with those of European latitudes or of high mountains, and reach the "end-product" or mature stage quickly. On the Sunda Platform and the Sahul Shelf, prolonged geological stability has in any case brought the mature stage in local soils, but even the more juvenile types of soil on the younger volcanic structures are rapidly evolving towards maturity. Adding further to the complexity of Southeast Asia soils is the variety of rock types and the varied lengths of dry season towards the margins of the region. Thus the diversity is great, although differences in the soil end-products is lessened to some extent by rapid maturity under a single broad weathering type—the warm, damp tropical.

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Tropical Groundwater

With certain local exceptions, Southeast Asia experiences an annual excess of rainfall over evaporation. This means that there is a steady movement of rainwater downwards, percolating through the soil as a dilute solution of chemicals from the air and from plants, capable in turn of dissolving some solids in the soil. While some of the soil compounds are produced by the decay of vegetation, the plants depend on the groundwater to dissolve those which become plant nutrients and are absorbed through the root systems. Not all solubles enter plants; most of them are just carried away. The continued downward movement of the soil water effects a steady removal (leaching) of the solubles in Southeast Asia soils. While a thick vegetation cover continues to be in place upon the surface, replacement of some solubles by humus renewal goes on all the time, but once that vegetation is removed, the surface soil rapidly loses its existing soluble elements, receives no renewals, and becomes infertile, a factor making continuous agriculture a drain upon the soil which not only loses its qualities by greater leaching but in addition loses by that which is absorbed into the cultivated plant. Where, however, there are breaks in the cycle of leaching, as in areas having a dry season, the soil water is for a time subject to a condition where evaporation exceeds rainfall, the leaching ceases and there begins the accumulation of soluble plant nutrients or even the drawing up of solubles from depth by capillary processes. These zones, where soil impoverishment is seasonally checked, are those with dry seasons, i.e. from Central Java eastwards, in the

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monsoon zones of the Kra Isthmus and northward into Burma, Siam, Indochina, a factor in the greater fertility, agriculture and population of those zones compared with the equatorial areas.

Solution by groundwater, however, is not peculiar to tropical latitudes—it goes on elsewhere. The distinctive point is that high tropical temperatures and heavy rainfalls give groundwater great power both to dissolve and to carry away special selections of the solubles. Easily soluble components of the soil disappear wherever rainfall and groundwater are ample, but the order in which sandy elements, clay elements and iron oxides (the main colouring element) are leached depends on the organic content and temperature of the groundwater. Water containing large quantities of organic material is a rapid solvent of clay and iron compounds; when groundwater is of this type, the silica occurring in the soil in the form of quartz remains scarcely touched for a long period, according to Glinka, causing the mature topsoil to consist largely of sandy elements bleached white by the removal of iron oxide colouring and the mature subsoil to show signs of re-precipitation of the iron oxide at lower levels. This is the process of *podsolisation*. On the other hand, where its organic content is low, groundwater breaks down any silica in the form of complex aluminium silicates faster than the other compounds and removes certain elements of it, so that there remains an upper soil consisting at maturity largely of stable clays and iron compounds, strongly coloured red, yellow or brown. This process is *laterisation*, the dominant soil process in Southeast Asia. The end-product of laterisation may be called laterite, a porous, crumbly-textured, bright red soil often hardening on exposure to the air and composed almost exclusively of clays and iron compounds, and much the same whatever the parent rock. Only in limited areas is this laterite fully developed; elsewhere the process has not reached its final or mature stages so that most Southeast Asia soils may more aptly be called laterised, that is, at an intermediate stage of laterisation. This stage may be assessed by measuring the proportion of silica to the alumina; the higher the silica content, the less laterisation has taken place (Polynov).

The whole process of laterisation involves very special aspects of complex chemical and physical changes which await the researcher for clarification.

The organic content of soils depends in turn on temperature

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which conditions the rate at which soil bacteria and fungi can break down dead leaves and other plant remains, first to the dark-coloured humus and then to chemical compounds. Thus there is a steady addition of decaying vegetable matter to the soil as trees and plants drop their leaves or die, and a continuous depletion of it as bacteria complete its breakdown. The balance between them is established by temperature and in the tropics where soil temperatures remain so steadily above 75° F. the breakdown by micro-organisms is considerably faster than the vegetation, profuse as it may appear, can replace. Thus the organic content of laterised soils is relatively small, and confined to a few inches of topsoil, beneath which practically no humic solids or liquids will be found. In vegetation-covered localities, shielded by the canopy of trees, where average soil temperatures may be well below 75° F., accretion of organic matter exceeds depletion, enabling humus to accumulate and form black-coloured soils.

Where the soil is waterlogged, a widespread condition in western Southeast Asia, bacterial action is hindered by the exclusion of oxygen so that, whatever the soil temperature, dead vegetation accumulates, often in the form of thick layers of peat. Altitude, by lowering the soil temperature for periods below the critical 75° F. (Glinka), is also responsible for variations in the humus content of soils. In Preanger (Java) for example, the top soil gradually changes from one with a slow humus content and red colour on the foothills, through brownish, with an increasing humus content at altitudes of 5,000 ft., to become dark brown or black at higher levels on mountains. The relative subsoils are red in the foothills, where laterisation predominates, and gradually change to dirty white at higher levels where podsolisation and bleaching are aided by the lower temperatures.

Examples of local podsolisation in the tropics have been observed upon parent rocks of exceptionally porous character, as in the coarse sands and sandstones of Banka, Borneo and Malaya over which distinct bleached earths occur. Why laterisation should be replaced by podsolisation under these conditions is not clear, but the sandy, white or bleached soils are unmistakable. Thin Secondary Forest is normally the vegetation cover of such districts, whether as cause or effect of the podsolisation has not been determined. Glinka quotes examples where excessive moisture and humus have bleached certain soils among laterites and notes that

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•/34 podsols developed under these conditions in the tropics differ chemically from analogous types in temperate climates. He reports the possibility that white laterised soils may derive from rocks containing magnetite forms of iron, which will not break down into ordinary brownish oxides under weathering.

Laterised Soils

While the characteristic colour of laterised soils is red, some of them have bright yellow colours which, however, do not indicate major chemical differences, except that the various types of iron oxide are more intensely hydrated. The colour distinction is now held to be of minor importance. Sometimes a red mottling breaks the uniformity of the yellow colouring; this is thought (Pendleton) to be connected with aeration along dead roots of plants, which have now disintegrated. Occasionally the fine channel of a root can be seen at the core of such mottlings, cross-sections of which often have ringed or oyster-shell patterns.

Laterisation produces end-products not materially differing however different the parent rocks may be, so that tropical red soils develop to much the same appearance over granite and over limestone, although the rate of maturing varies. On the other hand, the chemical character of parent rock may show for a considerable time in the laterised soils. Thus, the igneous rocks of Sumatra and Java are in some regions basic and in others acid. The more acid type of igneous rock contains very little calcium and phosphorus, weathering slowly into poor soils, whereas the basic rocks initially contain more of these elements and release them readily, to weather in the tropics into soils whose composition makes them more fertile. The leaching continues rapidly, and at a more advanced stage of weathering the soils from basic rocks are no richer in these solubles than those from acid extrusions. This accounts for great differences in the agricultural potential of the flanks of different volcanoes in Java, where any thinly populated zone may safely be interpreted as a zone of soils lying over acid igneous parent rocks, or of overmature soils upon basic parent rocks. Pedologists disagree as to whether mature laterites can be derived from every type of rock but the majority incline to accept this point of view. Pure quartz sandstone, however, resists laterisation and quartz veins persist unweathered long after the original rocks containing them have broken down.

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The term "laterite" (from L. later, brick), now limited to mature laterised soils, has had a history confused by varying definitions. It was used in India by Buchanan in 1807 to describe a tropical soil containing large quantities of iron, soft enough to be cut with a spade or mattock, yet rapidly hardening on exposure to sun and air into an excellent constructional material much used for tropical buildings. Afterwards the term became loosely used for any reddish



FIG. 25.—Section of Laterised Sandstone, Korat. Surface burnt for shifting cultivation. (*a*) Reddish-yellow sandy layer with tubular ironpan along old root-lines. (*b*) Lateritic ironpan and granular concretions, 6-12 inches thick. (*c*) Weathered sandstone, some bedding still showing, tubular passages (old roots), brownish-red. (*d*) Red sandstone of Korat, lightly consolidated, hardly deformed

tropical soils. Discrimination in the use of the word is modern and the standards are by no means uniform.

At best, only certain layers or horizons of laterite will harden on exposure. When this type of laterite is used structurally, being an end-product of weathering, it resists further weathering and buildings made of it stand up to the tropical climate better and longer than any other local material, evidenced by the old fort at Malacca and the temples of Angkor whose laterite slabs are firm and square after centuries of exposure.

Mature laterites may be up to 100 ft. thick, all weathered *in situ* and justifying the word "soil" to describe it. Several distinct horizons occur within this thickness. On top is a few inches of forest soil, dark with humus and partially decayed matter (Fig. 25). Under this is red earth, crumbly and sticky to the hand, permeable to water yet easily "baking" if ever exposed to the direct sun. Much of the water is held colloidally so that percolation wells can rarely be used in laterised ground. Four or five feet below the surface a

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distinct cellular structure develops, consisting of a coarse network of iron compounds round softer cores of clay. This is the horizon which may be of that hardening type suitable for a structural material. Sometimes the iron compounds at this level change *in situ* into hard concretions like a pan roughly paralleling the surface and looking like a lustrous slag. These crusts or concretions ring like hollow iron and might be mistaken for volcanic material. Containing up to 30 per cent of iron, they have at times been smelted, but extensive use for this purpose awaits development of a suitable



FIG. 26.—Section in West Singapore: Hill with Partially Removed Rubber. 1. Lateritic ironpan running across bedding planes. 2. Red subsoil, 3 feet thick. 3. Partially removed shale. 4. Conglomerate

process. Oxide of manganese occurs in these concretions as well. The pan may be continuous beneath a large area and prevent percolation, and in deforested areas the softer topsoil may be washed away, or slide down the surface of the iron pan which then shows as a compact platform inhibiting secondary vegetation.

The concretion of iron compounds is thought to be connected both with seasonal variations of the subsoil water level and with electrolytic changes in descending water heavily charged with solvents. Fracture planes, by creating internal drainage lines, encourage panning to follow lines unrelated to the surface contours. Skew-panning may also develop strongly along lines of quartz which persists undecomposed through thick laterites. While the iron concretion layer has special interest because of its resemblance to pan layers in other latitudes, it is by no means ubiquitous and some writers relate the pan to igneous parent rock. The stratifications of laterised soils are more related to the relief of the surface than to stratifications of the parent material (Fig. 26).

Beneath the concretion layer is another horizon of almost continuous saturation where the coloration tends to be less red and more yellow or whitish right down to the horizon of decomposing rock. These deeper horizons represent less advanced stages of

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weathering, repeating at depth some of the variations noted at the surface in less maturely laterised soils elsewhere.

Cuttings through laterised soil, as for roads and railways, frequently develop a dark crust after exposure, giving the sides of the cuttings an appearance of hardness belying the soft soil beneath it. Occasionally these exposures are honeycombed where softer parts have been washed away by rains, leaving the cellular structure of iron compounds fully evident. Because laterised soils are so wet and thick, the destructive processes of slumping and slipping assert themselves strongly. Soil creep on slopes operates relatively fast, particularly if an iron pan exists not far below the surface. Whole sections of a hillside may thus slump down into a valley leaving a scar which wild vegetation needs a long time to conceal. Road cuttings frequently slump at the sides as though huge spoons had been used upon them. Almost any ditch will show soil creep in the form of root-matted topsoil hanging well out over the side of the ditch.

Polynov and Laterisation

Polynov in his "Cycle of Weathering" has discussed a new interpretation of lateritic soils. Previous pedologists have considered laterisation to be a process peculiar to the high temperature and heavy rainfalls of the tropics. Polynov produces an argument to show that laterised soils may result as the end-product of weathering in any latitude, given a sufficiently long time for the process to operate. In his view the frequency with which laterites occur in the tropics now is due less to the special character of weathering there, and more to its rapidity, which brings soil maturity very much faster than in cooler latitudes. The age and stability of the Sunda Platform and the Sahul Shelf fit into both schemes since soils upon them may be considered to be brought to maturity by uninterrupted weathering during prolonged geologic time, and by the intense and continuous nature of tropical weathering. Whatever the value of Polynov's theory from the soil chemist's point of view, it helps to account for red soils of lateritic aspect outside tropical areas without needing to postulate major climatic changes.

Soils in the Drier Zones of Southeast Asia

Northward from the Equator, Southeast Asia is subject to a longer and longer dry season during which soil leaching diminishes. On exposed soils, the high surface evaporation of dry periods even

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134 induces an upflow of groundwater which evaporates and thereby precipitates solubles in the topsoil. These have sometimes been called the Savannah Soils, found extensively in Siam and Indochina. The type occurs not only where the climate permits but also where destruction of marginal Tropical Rain Forest has gone on at a rate faster than natural replacement. Because tropical forest soil works with a very small quantity of plant nutrients circulating rapidly in a cycle from soil to leaves and back again to soil, the balance is delicate. Where the forest is almost virgin, natural fires do little damage, but persistent burning by men may break the cycle of nutrients and release altogether the small initial capital of solubles. The iron concretions under such conditions become firmly cemented into subsurface platforms inimical to anything except coarse tropical grass and the topsoil is exposed to rapid removal by torrential storms. The more accessible laterites which received early examination were often under vegetation of the savannah type and they were thought at one time to be signs of a change of local climate, from Equatorial to Savannah, whereas in fact they reflect over-destruction of the original tropical forest, followed by such a change of soil type that the forest cannot re-establish itself. Because laterite is very porous, rain falling upon it may be heavy yet quickly passes beyond the reach of plants, carrying all plant nutrients away, thereby preventing regrowth of the original vegetation cover.

Natural savannahs in Southeast Asia are noteworthy for their extensive iron concretion layers which provide support for the view that vertical fluctuation of subsoil water is a factor in the formation of lateritic iron-pan.

Soils and Agriculture

134 241 The different types of tropical forest induce minor differences in the soils beneath them, which assume major significance when the forest is cleared for cultivation. The limited supply of plant nutrients explains that paradox between the apparent fertility of an elaborate and profuse forest vegetation and the poverty of the soil when the forest is removed, the cycle of nutrients broken and most solubles washed away. Eventually clearances in the forest mean an increase in the outflow of nutrients in solution or suspension which are finally distributed into the swamps, the estuaries and the sea. To some extent the practice of burning, which reduces the forest to

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ash, lying for a while upon the surface, returns to the soil part of the chemicals of plant structure, yet unless steps are taken to retain this "capital" by terracing or cover crops, the ash quickly dissolves and disappears into the streams. Good crops may be obtained by utilising this soil capital immediately, but it can last only for a season or two, after which the natural infertility of laterised soils becomes apparent. It is not so serious with isolated native clearings, done under the shifting cultivation system, because each clearing is so small, and surrounded by forest, that lost soil nutrients are not carried far before they are recaptured into the forest ecology by the tangle of adjoining vegetation. When shifting cultivation is done too frequently over the one patch, that is, more frequently than, say, once in twenty years or so, then progressive impoverishment of the soil takes place. Maintenance of fertility in clearings is easier in less maturely laterised areas and where there is at least a short, dry season to interrupt the depletion processes.

The basic volcanic rocks of Java as well as the recent ash and mud flows contain chemicals which weather to plant nutrients and, being in addition very young in the laterising cycle, they produce fertile soils. On the older lavas and on the acid outpourings, a maturer stage of laterisation has been reached to produce soils no better for agriculture than other parts of the Sunda Platform. A new volcanic outburst, while creating temporary havoc, may ultimately produce local agricultural prosperity because it brings a new supply of plant nutrients. The elaborate terracing of new volcanic ash landscapes is only partly due to population pressure: it equally reflects the need to restrain the run-off and to hold back the solubles as long as possible.

Apart from the loss of soil fertility due to rapid solution, all bare or clean-weeded soils in the tropics suffer from mechanical erosion by the violent torrential rainstorms. Rainfall of tropical intensity rapidly gullies all bare landscapes and is particularly evident on the less cohesive ashes of volcanic cones, so that another reason for terracing is to offset gullying. Tangled vegetation prevents mechanical soil erosion having any great significances in forested areas, but in Java, where recent ash and intensive cultivation combine to facilitate this type of erosion, rivers contain from 300 to 2,000 gms. of silt per cubic metre; the Irrawaddy has about 750 gms. suspended in each cubic metre. (The Seine and Rhine only contain about 50 gms. of silt per cubic metre.) From tropical forest in a

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134 natural state the soil loss is mainly by solution, and streams running from the jungles are either clear or black with humus content. From clearings, whether natural or artificial, subsoil solution is supplemented by violent mechanical erosion, and streams from these zones are thick and muddy, often tinted red.

Since both the subsoil processes and the surface erosion have water as their principal vector, the solubles and the silt are carried to the deltas and to the freshwater swamps which are the depositories of plant nutrients from all the forested soils. The coastal and freshwater swamps are not subject to rapid decomposition and they progressively accumulate plant foods, hence they function as the chief agricultural areas, continuing to produce without serious soil exhaustion through years of productiveness, as in the Irrawaddy and Menam Chao Praya valleys. These sticky wet soils are black or dark brown, often containing lenses of peat, and completely unlike the laterised soils around them. They are all transported soils, both fluvial and marine sedimentation playing some part in building and shaping them.

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162 cent of the population. Malaya, of course, is exceptional, because of the
565 especially heavy concentration on the production of rubber and tin. Ac-
241 cording to the 1947 census of Malaya, about 34 per cent of the working
463 population were classed as cultivators and fishermen working on their own
32 account or as unpaid members of families. In all, I think one could reckon
462 that rather more than 100 million people in South East Asia can be regarded as peasantry.

[412] Throughout all this region, peasant technology is simple; skills, though traditionally well adapted to the job in hand, are of limited range. Soils,
● 134 despite the richness of some of the swamps and river flood-plains, are
241 generally of poor quality. The system of felling and burning the jungle, taking off crops for a few years, and then moving away to cultivate fresh clearings while the old ones revert to jungle, is still common in the mountain areas of Burma, Malaya, and Siam, in part of West Java, in much of Borneo, and in the outer islands of Indonesia. It is known as shifting cultivation or jungle-fallowing. Although regarded as extremely primitive, it is an economic use of land in areas of low population density, where plentiful land allows of long rotation of clearings and consequent restoration of soil fertility. But where population is dense, the system cannot provide the necessary volume of production without endangering the future soil capital, and that is one of the major problems of the area. In the more sedentary forms of agriculture, fertility is conserved with a great deal of care, by manuring, by water control, and so on. Sometimes there is very elaborate and spectacular terracing, as in parts of the Philippines or in Bali, where the native cultivator through his own efforts through generations has known how to make the best of the land with his available techniques. Yet many of these techniques are only of limited efficiency, and custom may be a barrier to improvement. For large masses of the Muslim peasantry of South East Asia, for instance, the pig, an excellent economic converter of resources, is taboo for religious reasons.

433 Productivity of the South East Asian peasant is apt to be low, whether
241 considered in terms of the margins required above subsistence to give him
565 and his family the range of goods and services they want, or by comparison with Western results. It is hard to make this last comparison significant because of the differing bases, but the following figures will give, perhaps rather superficially, some idea of the comparison. In terms of cwt. of cropping per acre, for instance, the rice crop of part of South East Asia can be compared roughly with the wheat crop of Western Europe. The figures are taken from different years, but they can be regarded as significant averages. Java at 12 cwt. of rice to the acre corresponds with France at 12 cwt. of wheat to the acre; Siam at 14 cwt. to the acre with the United Kingdom at 18 cwt. and Germany at a little less; Japan at 27 cwt. of rice per acre corresponds to Denmark with 27 cwt. of wheat per acre. Yet rice is supposed to be a crop of much higher yield. What is more significant is that productivity per acre in both Malaya and Indo-China is only 10 cwt. on the average, or only between one-third and one-half of the average in Japan.

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

FIG. 4.—Detail of a Volcanic Island in the East Indies

reflecting at once the influence and forms of continental Asia and continental Australia, and of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

ROCK TYPES

135 133 Profound chemical action caused by tropical and equatorial weathering has two effects on most of Southeast Asia; the destruction of readily accessible fossils by weathering and the concealing of native rocks by great thicknesses of weathered material. Thus the historical geology of Southeast Asia, the dating of the rocks, is not yet fully studied, and the geological interpretations of local rocks are by no means unanimous.

So far as their general character is concerned, however, no appreciable difference can be noted between the rocks of Southeast Asia and those of more intensively studied areas in Europe and North America. The effects of each rock type in conditioning landscape forms appear to be much the same throughout the world, differing in degree, not in character.

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The pattern of rock types may be summed up thus:

1. Within the Sunda Platform quartzites and shales are prominent over large areas, generally producing subdued relief, not closely allied to the fold lines of the strata. These metamorphics often appear at the surface close to a group of limestone rocks of which a calcareous shale, much of it in areas of low elevation, is most extensive. Massive limestone is most common as a landscape feature where least subject to solution weathering,



FIG. 5.—Schematic West-East Section of the Mountain Structures in Malang

towards the drier margins of the Platform (as in East Java and Tonkin) where it stands out as gaunt hills whose features recall those of the Karst, though partly disguised by a wilder profusion of vegetation. Small, slightly metamorphosed limestone formations retain this karstic character even under equatorial rains, as in North Malaya where they still rear prominently above the horizon. A large part of Borneo, the biggest single exposure of the Platform, is built of old sandstone, establishing a flat-topped landscape through which ravine-like valleys have been cut. The higher mountains of the Sunda Platform, the Altaids of Suess, are invariably elongated intrusions of igneous rock, mainly granitic, and this material forms the chief heights of a relief otherwise gently modulated.

2. Upon the young mountain systems marginal to the Platform, the landform owes more to recent tectonic activity than to the nature of the constituent rocks, most of which are also represented on the Sunda Platform. Complex fracturing and folding produce on the young mountains a wild steep landscape which here and there encloses fragments of older continental blocks. The vents and caldera of volcanoes (Fig. 5) add their special forms built from looser, easily eroded rock materials of lava

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133 type which have been severely scarred by denudation. Mag-
135 matic rocks have flowed extensively from these volcanoes, spreading over a large area and serving to mask relief forms developed upon underlying earlier structures. As a result of these igneous formations throughout the region, contact metamorphosis has taken place on a large scale, which has a major bearing on the frequency of metallic minerals and helps to account for the scarcity of coal formations.

133 3. The detail of much of the Southeast Asia landscape is condi-
134 tioned by contemporary river alluviation and coastal sedimentation (as in Eastern Sumatra and South Borneo) whose thickness and profusion relate to the rapidity of tropical erosion on the one hand and to the stability of the continental platform on the other. Relief upon the great alluviated landscapes is slight. In this zone where there is so much coastline in proportion to the land area, marine accumulations of spits, bars and off-shore beaches are both prominent and important in conditioning coastal topography and the location of settlements. Marine loads tend to be heavy in this zone of violent terrestrial erosion and under certain conditions sediment accumulates quickly owing to the speed with which mangrove establishes itself upon any bank or spit which is built up, thereafter further hastening deposition by hindering the free scouring of normal wave action. Marine sedimentation is greater upon the inner coasts of the Sunda Platform and less upon those coasts facing the Indian and Pacific Oceans where the shore profiles are steep and the waves have maximum fetch.

Character of Seas

133 Three types of seas may be distinguished by the criterion of depth:

1. Shallow seas of the Sunda Platform
2. Shallow seas of the Sahul Shelf
3. The Austro-Asiatic "mediterranean" basins between the Sunda Platform and the Sahul Shelf, and subdivided by island festoons. In this group may be provisionally placed the Sulu Basin, though the South China Basin between the Philippines and the Asiatic mainland may only be included by considerably stretching the "mediterranean" conception.

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Just west of Singapore Island, the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea tides converge, locally retarding the scouring capacity and apparently favouring heavy marine sedimentation derived from the adjoining land masses. Among the Lingga and Rhio Islands, the actual tidal movements are extremely complicated due to convergent tidal waves from neighbouring seas. Tidal values in all these seas are modified seasonally by winds which practically reverse through the year, working to augment or reduce the tides as the case may be. The South China Seas, whose length parallels the direction of the seasonal wind streams, is particularly subject to this modification in the Northeast Monsoon which very much affects the ease of tidal progression from that sea into the Java Sea.

Corals

The polyps and other organisms whose skeletons accumulate to form coral reefs, live in colonies which within four years may grow to two inches in diameter from a single individual. They are exacting in their environmental requirements, needing sea temperatures of at least 58° F. throughout the year, shallow clear water to permit their food processes, which are largely photosynthetic, and fairly high salinity. A live coral colony has a slimy surface which is in fact the living matter; the live cells die if exposed to the air, or if covered with mud. Corals establish themselves for the most part on rocky foundations. Off Southeast Asia distinct differences can be seen in their regional distribution.

On the Sunda Platform as a whole corals are only developed well beyond easy access from the shore. The relatively fresh seas with swampy margins heavily charged with fine silts and humic acids are unfavourable to the polyps and the recent history of slow inundation of the Platform operates against them as well, though corals are found at depth along its margins and in broad belts round the rocky islands off South Malaya. Platform corals are exclusively submarine and generally stand below sea level well offshore, so that they are never prominent on a coastal landscape. The great development of coral is on the eastern edge of the Platform, running parallel to the east coast of Borneo and well out into the Macassar Strait (Fig. 7), where broad reefs occur whose proportions resemble those of the Great Barrier Reef on the eastern edge of the Sahul Shelf. These locations are favourable because they are washed by the warm onshore equatorial currents;

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FIG. 7.—The Borneo Bank and the Great Sunda Barrier Reef on the East of the Sunda Platform

similar extensive developments on the western side of the continental shelf are prevented by slight upwellings of water produced behind offshore currents.

Within the 'mediterranean seas', the occurrences of coral are less extensive at any one point but they show much greater variety of form. Atolls, barriers and reefcaps at varying levels above, below and inclined to present sea levels and in varying degrees of symmetry to existing islands, may be found in this zone where there has been steady and repeated displacement of the geanticlines which form the chains of islands.

Several theories have been devised to account for the formation of coral. All of them start from the environmental requirements of the live polyp, which is eulittoral, and go on to account for the shape and extent of the accumulations of skeletons by some change of water level. In the Southeast Asia seas may be found examples to support those coral formation theories stressing sea level or eustatic change, a dominant process on the Sunda Platform, and also examples of corals associated with secular changes of the earth's crust, the chief physical factor operating among islands of the 'mediterranean seas' and the basis of theories attributing coral formations to submarine tectonic changes.

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133 water in the Sunda Platform seas today is 180 ft., so that on Daly's figures the whole Platform would be exposed and drainage lines developed upon it. Molengraaf's work (Fig. 18) suggests the drainage lines of the exposed Sunda continental surface formed two river systems flowing roughly north-eastwards from the Singapore area and roughly due east through what is now the Java Sea. To support this conception he instances the striking likeness between fish of the Moesi in Sumatra and those of the Kapuas in Borneo and suggests the similarity derives from association through the main stream developed during the Glacial period. Because there have been in fact several glacial advances in northern latitudes (the Gunz, Mindel, Riss and Wurm Glaciation) his theory implies at least four periods of water withdrawal from the Sunda Platform (and of course from all equatorial areas): that is, four periods when the Sunda sea-floors were exposed to subaerial erosion.

Thus the broad history of recent river development has been one of periodical lowering of sea level, in effect a lowering of erosion base levels for all Sunda Platform rivers, which means four intervening periods of rejuvenation of Southeast Asia rivers and corresponding periods of rising sea level when rivers diminished their cutting power and became senescent, owing to rising erosional base level (Fig. 17). While the world glacial periods varied in duration, they appear not to have differed very widely in extent of greatest development, so that present sea level at the Equator probably represents roughly the level towards which the erosional base rose at each interglacial phase. Those early periods of rising sea could not, on present facts, have reached higher than 100 ft. above present sea level and it is almost certain the variation was much less. It is therefore difficult to accept any theorising which postulates during the last million years over the Sunda Platform sea level positions 100 ft. higher than the present one.

The landscapes carved by river systems over the older parts of Southeast Asia are conditioned in their recent forms by circumstances of a rising sea level, quite different from Europe and North America where a relatively rising land surface has had the latest influence on landscape form. A recent history of rising sea level implies:

(*a*) rising base levels to river erosion;

(*b*) diminution of downcutting power by existing streams;

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trees of Dipterocarp type gradually disappear and temperate trees of the oak and chestnut type become commoner, though the landscape continues full of giant bracken and tree ferns. Higher still the vegetation dwarfs considerably, shadiness diminishes, and woody plants become twisted and gnarled. This often turns into a moss or "elfin" forest above 5,000 ft., in localities where the air is constantly cool and saturated, to produce thick blankets of wet mosses and liverworts upon all other vegetation. Mosses hang in fantastic festoons everywhere and sometimes (as in Borneo) form walls or platforms under which other vegetation, such as dwarf oaks and rhododendrons, are buried (Harrison). Moss forest will not occur in localities with a noticeable dry season: in monsoon areas it is replaced in succession by pine forest, in which, however, some broadleaved trees persist. Above both these mountain forest types (above 6,500 ft.), mountain grasses and shrubs form landscapes of rolling downlike appearance. 137

Fauna

Between the western and eastern fringes of Southeast Asia there are greater differences zoologically than between Asia and South America, even though these are separated by the Atlantic (Merrill). The differences derive from the long separation of Australia from Asia. Migration has gone on from Asia and Australia into the islands and peninsulas of Southeast Asia which is thus a transitional zoogeographical region (Fig. 24). 136

The Tropical Rain Forest has complicated ecologies of living creatures associated with the various storeys and the variety of these creatures parallels the variety of vegetation. Large animals such as elephants, tigers, rhinoceros, etc., are relatively few and confined to the coastal sections. Specially numerous are arboreal and flying creatures, butterflies, birds, moths and insects. These are able to migrate from place to place with considerable ease so that the convergence of Asiatic and Australian species has gone on fairly freely. The contrasting zoological types are summed up in the difference between mammals; in Australia, except for a few bats and rodents, mammals are marsupial (pouched) or monotreme (single vented); in Asia these groups are entirely lacking and are replaced by placental mammals, monkeys, shrews, squirrels and ungulates.

By far the richest zoological group is that spreading from Asia.

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

FIG. 24.—Biological Regions of Southeast Asia

136 For a long time Wallace's Line was held to demarcate these zoological types; Wallace himself drew the boundary just west of Lombok and Celebes but Huxley later extended it to include the Philippines in the "Australian" zone. Geographically the boundary clearly correlates with the limits of the Sunda Platform and the interglacial connection between Malaya, Borneo, Sumatra and Java appears to have permitted zoological migration fairly uniformly among them, whereas there has been no continued land connection between the "mediterranean islands" east of the Platform. Later more detailed study of the fauna has produced criticisms of the Wallace Line. The steady pressure of zoological types eastward has been demonstrated and Weber laid down another limit which he showed more closely to accord with the balance between Asiatic and Australian fauna. East of it Australian types dominate. Wallace's Line thus is now best thought of as the eastward limit of the typically Asiatic zoological types; it is matched by a line just west of the Sahul Shelf which is the westward limit of exclusively Australian and New Guinea faunal types.

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Between this and the Wallace Line is the zone of tectonic instability, the "mediterranean" zone, where faunal destruction followed by re-population from nearby continents has gone on fairly frequently, but irregularly and without uniformity from place to place; Weber's Line is roughly marginal to this "mediterranean" faunal zone. 136

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Chapter Twenty-three

THE FISHERIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Fish Population

136 Because equatorial waters have low salinity and low oxygen content, it has frequently been assumed that they have a low fish population. That view is difficult to maintain for the shallow waters of Southeast Asia where, according to Herre, the number of kinds of fish and their diversification is unrivalled by that of any other marine region. Whether this paradox disproves the theoretical view about equatorial seas or shows that the fish population depends more on the local supply of nutrients which so broken and well-watered a region as Southeast Asia discharges to the sea in extraordinarily large quantities, has yet to be demonstrated. There is no co-ordinated study of the fishing industry as a whole in this region.

Until recently, only the generic character of these Southeast Asia fish had been studied, from which it appears that, while by no means all of them have been named and identified, over 1,500 varieties are normally fished round Java, over 500 have been named as economically valuable round Malaya, and similar large varieties are reported from all territories. Most of the fish known are inshore fish, closely dependent on food particles carried from shore to sea and on the great growth of plankton, seaweeds and corals which supply fish food. Because the shores of the landmasses in most of this region are frequently backed by swamps, there is a very considerable fish population on the land surface itself, in a gradual transition between shallow water marine fish and swamp or riverine fish. Thus the fishing industry is not merely an inshore activity: it continues very vigorously inland, in the swamps, in the flooded paddyfields and their canals, in the lakes and lagoons, and in the rivers.

Though the deep-water fish of Southeast Asia have only in recent years been exploited commercially, by Japanese trawlers, they exist in these waters in surprising numbers. Schools of sardines some 10 miles long have been seen, together with frequent

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great shoals of mackerel and bonito. Porpoises (mammals which live on fish and are a guide to the fish density) have been seen in a school which packed an area 15 miles long and 2 miles broad. Plankton occurs at times in astounding quantities, practically smothering all other fish life in the neighbourhood. The movements and migrations of these fish of deeper waters have been little studied and the inshore fishing has been enough to meet local food needs, as well as not demanding too complex a technique or too great a capital outlay by the local fishermen who are generally very few, and too poor to equip themselves for long distance deepwater trips. A major impediment to introducing the elaborate systems of trawling and seining which have been developed in temperate seas is the frequency of coral reefs and knolls which, although attracting fish, catch the nets and ruin them.

Fish as a Staple Food

Fish is a staple in the Southeast Asia diet as complement to rice. It supplies calcium, iodine and salt as well as animal protein, items otherwise not easily come by in these areas, or too expensive for the peasants. By habit Southeast Asia people are rice-fish-curry eaters and vegetables in the European sense enter very little into their meals. They are largely vegetarian but not interested in vegetables. Fishing has an importance in local ecologies second only to rice. In Malaya, for example, well over 80 lbs. of fish is normally consumed by every man, woman and child every year. When looking through the records of any one territory, however, the great significance of fish is not apparent because fishing is a mobile and widely dispersed activity not easily checked, the more illusive statistically because it plays little or no part in revenues.

Several stages of commercialisation are met with but subsistence fishing predominates. In every paddyfield and swamp, villagers go fishing for their personal needs; on the coast many fishermen are part-time, sharing their labour between a paddyfield and a fishing boat. Some villages have specialised fishermen whose produce goes into exchange among the landsmen to make the village self-supporting. Gradually fishing for sale has become possible, yet there are major difficulties of transport to consuming centres, of organisation between fishermen and consumer, and of preserving the fish in good condition during transport.

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by Westerners. This may be explained by the assumption that the ancestors of the Polynesians migrated from Southeastern Asia to the islands of the Pacific before cereals had replaced root crops as dominant plants.[13]

In Southeastern Asia we find both shifting and sedentary cultivators who depend exclusively upon root crops as a source of starch. The Nias, Mentawei, and Engano islanders off the western coast of Sumatra grew no grains until recently. Beside such root crops as taro (*Colocasia esculenta* Schott), yams (*Dioscorea* sp.), and *bira* (*Alocasia macrorhiza* (L.) Schott), they cultivated such other foods as bananas (*Musa sapientum* L.), sugar cane (*Saccharum officinarum* L.), and coconuts (*Cocos nucifera* L.). In the eastern parts of the Malay Archipelago and New Guinea the inhabitants depend chiefly on the starch of the sago palm (*Metroxylon sagu* Rottb.) which they either plant or collect in the wild state. Here, again, taro, yams, and bira are other sources of starch, as are such imported American plants as cassava (*Manihot utilissima* Pohl) and sweet potatoes (*Ipomoea batatas* Poir.). The folklore and religious practices of many tribes in Borneo and Celebes who today grow cereals recall the time when these tribes had only root crops.

In many parts of the Pacific taro is grown by sedentary cultivators on terraced, flooded fields.[14] We do not know whether the techniques of terracing and irrigation developed independently in Oceania and on the mainland, or whether the ancestors of the Polynesians brought their techniques with them from Southeastern Asia. If the latter be true, they must have left before the cultivation of rice was known to them; otherwise rice would have been among their crops. That it was not among them suggests that

[13] Forde: Habitat, Economy and Society, 1934, pp. 428–430. In remote centuries the Polynesians lived in the Malay Archipelago, where they cultivated such root crops as taro, yams, "arrowroot" (*Canna orientalis* Rosc.), and turmeric (*Curcuma* sp.), in addition to bananas and plantains (*Musa paradisiaca* L.), breadfruit (*Artocarpus communis* Forst.) and coconuts, all of which, according to the botanists, are natives of the forest regions of Southeastern Asia, whether the mainland or the Malayan Archipelago. All these plants were probably carried to Polynesia, either via a northern route through Micronesia or by a more southerly course through New Guinea and Melanesia. See Buck: Vikings of the Sunrise, 1938, pp. 305–309. The names of these plants were also carried into the islands of the Pacific. Variants of the names "taro" and "bira," to mention two examples, range from the Malay Archipelago far into Oceania. *Colocasia* is *talo* in Nias, *tales* in Sundanese, *tales* in Javanese, *dalo* in Fiji, *talo* in Samoan, *kalo* in Hawaiian, *taro* in Maori. *Alocasia* is known as *birah* or *bira* in Batak, *bira* in Madurese, *biga* in the Philippines, *piga* in Guam, and *via* in Fiji. Later, the Polynesians, following the example of other peoples of the Pacific, were quick to adopt such New World crops as cassava and sweet potatoes as well as American fruit trees into their economy because these are closely related to their customary crops, but they still remain most reluctant to change from roots to grains as staple, possibly because "the cultivation of roots and fruit trees has little technical relation to the raising of grains, for they are not grown from seed but from eyes and cuttings." See Forde: *op. cit.*, p. 380. Another illustration of the fact that a plant, the introduction of which involves a change in methods of cultivation, is accepted only under pressure, is found in the history of the introduction of the potato into Europe.

[14] Krämer: "Der Taro und die Nasskultur," 1928, pp. 165–172; Rivers: "Irrigation and the Cultivation of Taro," 1926, pp. 262–287.

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000 taro had been cultivated on permanent flooded fields earlier than had rice. Another possibility would be that taro, together with the technique of irrigation, was introduced into Oceania later than were the yams and alocasia, and the Polynesians' more important fruit trees.

173 A folktale of the Bontocs in the mountains of northern Luzon furnishes us with another clue. According to Bontoc lore, their hero, Lumauig, taught them agriculture in a tiny irrigated garden, which is still tended from generation to generation by a special priest. The crop of this garden is taro and not rice.[15] This would seem to lend support not only to the thesis that the cultivation of root crops preceded that of grain but also to the thesis that terracing and irrigation were already being practiced by cultivators of root crops.

241 A beautiful example of sedentary cultivation with root crops as a staple has recently been discovered in the remote Grand Valley of the Balim River in the highlands of Netherlands New Guinea. On the valley floor of the Balim and its tributaries neolithic people practice intensive cultivation, including such techniques as the use of green and animal manure, deep tillage with stone adzes, the digging of ditches to improve the run-off and drainage of swampy land, and the construction of terraces.[16] On the slopes they practice shifting cultivation. In both their shifting and their sedentary agriculture the staple crop is the sweet potato, while taro is a secondary crop. Also subsidiary are bananas, sugar cane, and pandanus.

243 105 [137] In most parts of Southeastern Asia, however, root crops have been replaced by such cereals as millet, Job's tears, upland and lowland rice,[17] and maize. There seem to be good reasons to believe that the first cereals cultivated in Southeastern Asia under the system of shifting cultivation were foxtail, also known as Italian millet (*Setaria italica* Beauv.), and Job's tears (*Coix lacryma-jobi* L.). Before their domestication these grasses, like the root crops and fruit trees of Southeastern Asia, had been used by alithic and palaeolithic hunting and gathering people. Shifting cultivators succeeded in domesticating these plants by selecting over the course of years the species most valuable to them. Although foxtail and Job's tears have largely been replaced by the more valuable grains, rice and maize, there are still shifting cultivators in India, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya, the Indies, and the Philippines who raise the former cereals. Burkill says of foxtail,

> Such a crop as this probably came into cultivation before man had settled enough to grow the better cereals. Its grain ripens in even as little as two months and a half from sowing, and the wandering tribes of the Malay forests are able to remain in one neighbourhood long enough to catch a crop: but the usual duration of the crop seems to be four months.[18]

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15 Keesing and Keesing: Taming Philippine Headhunters, 1934, p. 56.

16 Brass: "Stone Age Agriculture in New Guinea," 1941, pp. 555–569.

17 Upland rice is also known as hill, mountain, dry-land, or dry, rice; lowland rice is also known as irrigated, wet-land, or wet, rice.

18 Burkill: *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 1999.

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Probably the grain known as Job's tears was originally domesticated somewhere in the area between India and southern China, and it is still of importance in this area, although maize has competed with it since the latter's introduction into Southeastern Asia in the sixteenth century.[19]

Rice, The Basis of the Agricultural Economy of Southeastern Asia

By far the most important grain of both shifting and permanent cultivators in Southeastern Asia is rice, which occurs in the wild state in Africa as well as in various parts of southern Asia. The cultivated species (*Oryza sativa* L.) is probably descended principally from two Asiatic wild rices, *Oryza fatua* Koen. and *Oryza minuta* Presl. *Oryza fatua* is thought to be the dominant ancestral strain. These two ancestors are found in moist places from the Himalaya Mountains to Ceylon and from southern China through Indochina, Thailand, Burma, and Malaya to Java, Borneo, and the Philippines.[20] Rice was probably first domesticated in northeastern India, somewhere north of the Bay of Bengal, whence the domesticated varieties have spread in all directions: southeastward through Burma into the Malay-inhabited areas, eastward and northward into Farther India, China, Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines, and westward into the Near East and beyond.

The remarkably large number of distinct varieties of cultivated rice[21] has been interpreted as evidence of the great antiquity of its domestication. In the course of thousands of years of selection, varieties have been developed that are adapted to a wide range of natural conditions and especially to varying amounts of water. These varieties may be divided into two main classes: upland, or dry, rice and lowland, or wet, rice. The division, based on the two main types of agronomic practice, is not a very sharp one. Some upland varieties can be grown in flooded fields, and some lowland varieties can be grown in dry fields; however, it is said to be easier to grow dry rices in water than to grow wet rices on dry land.[22] In general, the areas suitable for the cultivation of upland rice are much more limited than those suitable for lowland rice, which can be grown outside the regions of assured rains, provided that water is available for irrigation; whereas upland rice must be grown in a humid atmosphere with an assured rainfall over a three- to four-month period.[23]

Upland rice is grown by the shifting cultivator, into whose economy it

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19 *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 629–631.

20 *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 1593–1595.

21 According to Copeland (Rice, 1924, p. 131) some 3500 varietal names are known in the Philippines; these may be presumed to describe more than 2000 different varieties; in India, where conditions seem to favor mass mutation, some 8000 varietal names have been recorded, but we do not know how many distinct varieties these represent.

22 Burkill: *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 1595.

23 Lacking direct evidence, students of rice and its cultivation have frequently speculated on the comparative age of the two types. Some argue that the cultivation of wet rice preceded that of dry rice. They maintain that rice is, by nature, an aquatic plant. There are, however, grounds for thinking that the cultivation of dry rice is the older form. For one thing, there are wild varieties of upland rice.

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extensive open grasslands resulting from the most important tool of the shifting cultivator, fire. 241 134 311

Generally, the fallow period allows time only for the evolution of mediocre second-growth forest, for the shifting cultivator usually returns to an old ladang before even a small percentage of those tree species that made up the original stand have had a chance to come back. Repeated cultivations further impoverish the forest and reduce the number of species. Certain light-loving trees that played a minor role in the climax forest will spread rapidly and dominate, together with those species that show a resistance to fire and those that are capable of sending new sprouts out of the old stumps.[5]

If fire repeatedly invades an abandoned ladang, the tree flora is reduced until finally only grasses and herbs survive. These persist because their root systems, tubers, or bulbs send out new shoots after the fire. The [37] more important grasses and herbs that finally triumph over forest vegetation are *Imperata cylindrica* Beauv., *Imperata constricta* Hitchc., *Saccharum spontaneum* L., *Themeda giganiea* Hack, and *Eupatorium odoratum* L. These burn very rapidly and with a hot flame, even when still green. After they are well established they catch fire or are set afire every year, almost without exception; this prevents natural reforestation. Furthermore, the fire will also invade the neighboring forest and force it gradually back, so that the grass area steadily increases. This is especially true in hilly or mountainous country. In the Philippines about 18 per cent of the total area is covered with grass vegetation as a result of shifting cultivation and fires. These grass areas are known locally as *cogonales*. In the Indies, where they are called *alang-alang*,[6] they are also extensive, as in southern Sumatra. While I was traveling through southern Sumatra by rail during the dry season I counted twenty grass fires started within the space of an hour by sparks from our locomotive. In Thailand there is as yet very little cogonal land, according to Pendleton.[7] In Indochina culturally induced grasslands, either pure or with scattered trees—the latter called by the French *forêts claires* or *savanes-parcs*—are very extensive[8] (Figs. 23, 24).*

Once the vegetation of an area has been changed from forest to grass, [24] the land is of no more agricultural use to the shifting cultivator. The only benefit that he then gets out of the land is for hunting. For this, too, he often utilizes fire—either to drive wild animals out of hiding or to get a growth of young grass to attract his prey.

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[5] In Malaya and Sumatra the spread of such bushes and trees as *Lantana camara* L., *Schima bancana* Miq., *Peronema canescens* Jack, *Vitex pubescens* Vahl, *Melastoma malabathricum* L., and *Lagerstroemia speciosa* Pers. is due to the cutting of clearings.

[6] *Imperata* (both *constricta* and *cylindrica*) is known in the Philippines by the Spanish term *cogon*, in the East Indies as *alang-alang*, and in Malaya as *lalang*. The last two are Malay words.

[7] Pendleton: "Some Interrelations between Agriculture and Forestry," 1939, p. 41.

[8] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 368–372.

*[See p. 37, cat. 241 or 116 -- Analyst]

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When fires no longer ravage the grasslands, however, trees return and finally drive out the grasses completely, for the latter cannot stand shade.[9]

The spread of grass is especially rapid in regions with a long, pronounced dry season, whereas reforestation is more likely to take place in areas with a well distributed, high annual rainfall. This may explain why the Philippines and Indochina have a larger percentage of open grasslands than do Malaya and the Netherlands Indies.

A relatively high density of population is an important factor in preventing successful reforestation and encouraging grasses. In a thinly settled forest area there is sufficient land to allow for a long rest period, but an increasing density of population results in the shortening of the fallow period to such a degree that the soil is given insufficient time to recover its fertility. The shorter the fallow period the poorer the succeeding forest —if any—and the poorer the following crop yields, until finally the land can no longer satisfy the needs of the shifting cultivator.

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Pendleton believes that this cycle may have contributed materially to the downfall of the Khmers in Cambodia (Cambodge). He states that although the Khmers used the plow on very limited areas of wet riceland, they had largely to depend on the planting stick and shifting cultivation for their food supply. As the demands for more food arose from the rapidly increasing population concentrated in the city of Angkor, the fallow period granted to the uplands had to be progressively shortened. At the same time fires became so frequent that culturally induced grasslands spread while the cultivable area decreased, thus further diminishing the food supply available to the people of Angkor. "While the actual fall of Angkor is ascribed to the superior military power of invaders, the resistance of the inhabitants was doubtless much less than it would have been had the lands been productive and they had had adequate supplies of food."[10]

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Declining crop yields and the spread of grasses have been advanced as important reasons for the breakdown of the Mayan civilization,[11] and Pendleton further raises the question "whether the development of cogonals might not have been an important contributing factor in the dying out of some of the other civilizations of the tropics, notably that of Anuradapura, in Ceylon."[12]

Today the ruins of the Mayan cities, as well as those of Angkor, are surrounded by relatively luxuriant forest vegetation, which has had time to displace the pernicious grasses since man and his tool, fire, have abandoned the inhospitable grasslands.

Not only does shifting cultivation alter the character of the vegetation,

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[9] When an old ladang remains unburned for several years the following trees spring up in addition to those already mentioned in footnote 5: *Erechthites hieracifolia* Rafin., *Blumea balsamifera* DC., *Peltophorum dasyrachis* Kurz, *Macaranga tanarius* Muell. Arg., and *Piper aduncum* L.

[10] Pendleton: *op. cit.*, pp. 46 and 47.

[11] Cook: "Milpa Agriculture," 1921, pp. 307–326.

[12] Pendleton: *op. cit.*, p. 47.

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241 311 185 of shifting cultivation in the area. In such a case reforestation would be assured by keeping fire out of the old clearings. This could be done by leaving relatively non-inflammable forest belts at least 60 feet wide between individual clearings. These forest belts would offer some protection against the spread of grass fires and at the same time would be a source of seed for further reforestation. Reforestation under such circumstances would be much easier and cheaper than if large contiguous areas were to be cleared and used.

245 185 [137] Where natural reforestation is particularly slow, cultivators should be required to practice artificial reforestation. In scattered regions in Southeastern Asia tribesmen do this on their own initiative. Pendleton reports such a case in Burma.[35] Certain Dyak tribes in Borneo plant seeds of the candlenut tree (*Aleurites moluccana* Willd.) about 3 meters apart in a freshly cleared ladang before it has even been burned. In the eastern part of the Malay Archipelago shifting cultivators plant such trees as *Aleurites moluccana* Willd., *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Hibiscus similis* Bl., *Casuarina equisetifolia* L., *Macaranga* species, *Euphorbia* species, *Sesbania grandiflora* Pers., and *Desmodium timoriense* DC. for the purpose of restoring the forest.

In Sumatra Deli tobacco planters initiated artificial reforestation after alang-alang had regularly invaded their fallow fields and caught fire so frequently that second-growth forest could not get a start. In Deli the tobacco fields are in use only 1 year and lie fallow 7 to 10 years. They should be protected by forest growth during that period. Therefore, in order to make this possible, the planters controlled fires by planting belts of teak along the highways and roads. These belts served as fireguards [137] and at the same time provided lumber for tobacco-drying sheds. On the tobacco fields themselves they planted especially *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Cassia siamea* Lam., *Pithecellobium saman* Benth., and *Leucaena glauca* Benth., which drive out the alang-alang[36] (Figs. 34–39).

Another way of speeding up reforestation is to spare a few of the larger trees at the time of the clearing. This is done by the Malays of [137] Sumatra. They do not cut down *Koompassia parvifolia* Prain, *Arenga saccharifera* Labill., *Durio zibethinus* Murr. (durian), *Parkia* species, or *Garcinia grandifolia* Pierre.[37] The last three are fruit trees that are numerous [314] in the forest, whereas the second is a palm whose flower stalk is tapped for its sugary sap and the first is preferred by bees as a hiving tree, which gives it its name, "bee-tree." This tree is preserved because the people want the honey. Worthington reports that in Africa "some tribes appear to realize the necessity of maintaining tree growth on their clearings and merely top the trees and lop the branches, so that the trees are enabled to

[35] Similar cases are known in the residency of Benkoelen in Sumatra, in central Celebes, and in Flores. See Hagreis: "Ladangbouw," 1930, p. 631.

[36] Jochems: "De begroeiing der tabakslanden," n.d., pp. 77–89.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 30–32.

[See p 40 ff, cat. 116 --Analyst]

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185 134 133 protected against abnormal erosion. Terracing would be the most effective method of checking soil erosion, but this requires a good deal of labor, which is scarce in areas of shifting cultivation.

654 134 185 133 The Forestry Service of the Indies started an interesting soil-erosion experiment near Tjiwidej in the mountains south of Bandoeng at an elevation of 1800 meters. Two adjacent parcels of forest land, lying on rather steep slopes, are drained separately—out of each parcel comes a little brook—and thus form separate drainage units. Both parcels were used by shifting cultivators who had cut and burned the forest. In one case the slope was left undisturbed; in the other the slope was terraced. At the foot of each slope catch basins were constructed to retain the sediment that was washed down by rain water and transported by the brooks. The amount of water that drains out of each unit was measured and the sediment weighed. The purpose of this experiment was to get quantitative measurements of the amount of erosion that is caused by shifting cultivation and to study the effect of terracing in reducing soil loss. During the first year both parcels lost very little soil, because the humus layer protected it; but in the second year the unterraced parcel lost 5.065 kg. of silt per square meter whereas the terraced parcel lost only one-half as much, or 2.524 kg.[42] (Figs. 42–45). 1

Under the conditions that we have discussed so far, no radical change in the system of cultivation is required. If, however, the population increases to such an extent that there is no longer enough available land to allow for a sufficiently long rotation cycle, more drastic remedies are necessary.

654 185 245 134 Such a situation arose in parts of the Outer Islands and attracted the attention of government specialists. Legal experts familiar with Indonesian customary law, foresters, and agricultural advisers collaborated to seek a solution.[43] Realizing that shifting cultivators are usually reluctant to give up their traditional form of land use, the specialists approached the ladang problem by searching for means of reforesting ladangs quickly. Experiments were made with the planting of quick-growing leguminous and non-leguminous trees, bushes, and shrubs to shorten the fallow period, restore the humus, protect the soil against accelerated erosion, eliminate the grasses, and, in the case of leguminous species, improve the soil by adding nitrogen.[44] We have already seen, however, that artificial refor-

[42] I was able to visit the Tjiwidej experiment with Mr. L. Gonggrijp, under whose supervision the work was carried out. For a detailed report on the project see Gonggrijp: "Het erosie-onderzoek," 1941, pp. 200–220.

[43] H. J. Friedericy of the Department of the Interior and H. Vonk and E. J. Wind of the Department of Economic Affairs, for example, worked together on the problem of ladang culture in the residency of Palembang.

[137] [44] Experimental plantings included, among others, *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., a light-loving tree which is typical in Southeastern Asia of dry, rather open climax forests and of second-growth forests; *Hibiscus tiliaceus* L.; *Albizzia falcata* Backer, one of the fastest-growing trees of Southeastern Asia, used widely as a shade tree on coffee plantations; *Aleurites moluccana* Willd., a tree at home in the drier parts of the East Indies; *Leucaena glauca* Benth.; *Pterocarpus indicus* Willd., a large tree frequently used along roadsides as

1 [see p. 42, category 116 -- Analyst]

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

estation is not a discovery of Western-trained scientists but has long been practiced by certain groups in Southeastern Asia. It was the plan of the government to spread and enforce this practice of artificial reforestation wherever advisable. This practice, whereby the cultivator determines the vegetative cover during the fallow period instead of abandoning the ladang to chance growth, brings him to a transition stage between shifting cultivation and permanent cultivation. From there the step to permanent cultivation with crop rotation is but a short one.

Permanent cultivation requires repeated tilling and therefore more labor and tools than the shifting cultivator is accustomed to. Work animals are also desirable. An important obstacle to intensification of agriculture in wide areas of Southeastern Asia, however, is the fact that hill and mountain regions [up to about 1500 meters in elevation] are frequently infested with malaria so that the energy of the people is greatly reduced.[45] Moreover, the acquisition of such implements as plows, harrows, and hoes, and especially of work animals, calls for financial resources or credit, both of which the average shifting cultivator lacks. Some shifting cultivators do own livestock, such as cattle or carabaos, but utilize neither their labor nor their manure. Groups of the Mois in the mountains of Annam have carabaos, but they do not use the animals in their agricultural activities because they "cannot talk" to them.[46] On the Lesser Sunda Islands livestock is kept because it gives social prestige to the owner. Overstocking of the pasture areas on these islands has led to overgrazing and has cut into the forest area until there has developed a scarcity of land suitable for ladang cultivation. The same has happened in large areas in Africa. There it has been necessary to teach the native peasant the use of cattle and make him familiar with the plow. This was done successfully in northern Nigeria by combining the animal husbandry of the nomadic Fulani with the indigenous shifting cultivation of the Hausa peasant, thus developing "a system of permanent farming whereby a man with cattle of his own, say two working oxen and a few cows, can plough and maintain in fertility an area of land sufficient to supply all the requirements of himself and his family, and to obtain a surplus balance as a return for his labour. . . . Thus mixed farming represents a gradual evolution from the shifting methods of cultivation to a static type of agriculture, by the introduction of animal husbandry, and with the use of animal cultivation."[47] Above all, the peasant learns to preserve the animal manure and

a shade tree; *Dolichos lablab* L., a climbing herb which is valuable as a vegetable; *Crotolaria anagyroides* H.B. and K., a bush of vigorous growth which attains a height of from 12 to 14 feet and forms an excellent green manure; *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., low shrubs useful as green manures; and *Mimosa invisa* Mart., a leguminous creeper which suppresses grasses.

45 Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 181 and 350.

46 *Ibid.*, p. 354.

47 King: "Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1939, p. 271. See also Faulkner and Mackie: West African Agriculture, 1933; and by the same authors: "The Introduction of Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1936, pp. 89–96.

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[p. 43]

Chapter III

THE SEDENTARY CULTIVATOR

241 Sedentary, or permanent, cultivation of land is much more vital to the economy of the countries of Southeastern Asia than is shifting cultivation. The majority of peasant cultivators obtain their livelihood by tilling the same piece of land year after year. The continuously utilized arable land, however, is not all cultivated in the same way throughout Southeastern Asia. We may distinguish three main categories of arable land: garden land, surrounding the houses and villages; wet land; and dry land. These three classes of land are devoted to different crops and vary so much from one another in size and reliability of yields, and therefore in value that in Java, for example, the social status of a man depends upon the type of land that he cultivates. There are districts in Java where only those peasants who own wet land, houses, and garden land have the full rights of a villager.

554 621

The Garden Plot

244 Garden culture on land surrounding peasant houses in Java is devoted to a large variety of crops, ranging from fruit trees to plants that are not required in large quantities but only to supplement the diet and add flavor to the daily rice meal. Ochse and Terra, who have made exhaustive studies of garden culture, are of the opinion that it is a remnant of "primitive grainless hoe culture," in which all the useful plants found in the forest were concentrated in plots near the dwellings. Originally, the number of plants grown in the garden was greater than it is today, for some plants have been taken out of this economy to be grown on a larger scale in fields. The origin of garden culture explains, according to Ochse and Terra, the truly amazing variety of plants that are found on garden land.[1] Sollewijn Gelpke, a leading expert on native agriculture in Java during the past century, remarked on the richness of the gardens:

> Whoever strolls around a compound and takes things in with a botanical eye will see before him a variety of plants of which the uninitiated can have no conception. . . . Such wealth of vegetation is still more impressive to him who approaches it from an economic point of view. He sees palms, bamboo, bananas, and other trees that resemble each other closely, bearing fruit and giving support to various climbing plants.[2]

244 137 Often one is able to distinguish three levels, or stories, in a garden. The ground story consists of low-growing plants, especially tuberous plants that tolerate shade, such as elephant yam (*Amorphophallus campanulatus* Bl.), white arrowroot (*Maranta arundinacea* L.), "purple arrowroot" (*Can-*

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1 Ochse and Terra: "Het onderzoek," 1934. See also Terra: "De voeding der bevolking," 1932, pp. 552–593.

2 Sollewijn Gelpke: Naar aanleiding, 1901, p. 203.

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na edulis Ker), sweet potato (*Ipomoea batatas* Poir.), taro (*Colocasia esculenta* Schott), *Curcuma* species, Goa bean (*Psophocarpus tetragonolobus* DC.), bitter cucumber (*Momordica charantia* L.), snake gourd (*Trichosanthes anguina* L.), Lima bean (large) (*Phaseolus lunatus* L.), Goa potato (*Dioscorea aculeata* L.), wild yam (*Dioscorea hispida* Dennst.), and sweet yam (*Dioscorea alata* L.). The middle story contains taller-growing plants, such as cassava (*Manihot utilissima* Pohl), citrus varieties such as *Citrus nobilis* Lour. and *Citrus aurantifolia* Swingle, papaya (*Carica papaya* L.), banana (*Musa* species), rose apple (*Eugenia aquea* Burm.), and soursop (*Anona muricata* L.). The upper story is formed by tall fruit trees, such as coconut (*Cocos nucifera* L.), jackfruit (*Artocarpus integra* Merr.), sapodilla or chico (*Achras zapota* L.), pomelo (*Citrus maxima* Merr.), of which numerous forms, differing in size and color, are known in the Indies, *belinju* (*Gnetum gnemon* L.), mango (*Mangifera indica* L.), durian (*Durio zibethinus* Murr.), candlenut tree (*Aleurites moluccana* Willd.), tamarind (*Tamarindus indica* L.), *pete* (*Parkia speciosa* Hassk.), stinkbean tree (*Pithecellobium lobatum* Benth.), and *santol* (*Sandoricum koetjape* Merr.).

This list does not by any means include all the plants that appear in the gardens. The plants vary in number and type from region to region in accordance with differences in soil, climate (elevation), and the taste of the owners.

311 244 161 369

Estimates indicate that about 15 per cent of the cultivated land in Java and Madura is taken up by gardens. Unfortunately, there have been no detailed studies of garden culture outside of Java, although the products of the garden play an important role in the diet of all the peoples of Southeastern Asia. Terra, who compared garden culture in various districts of Java, found that the share of land allotted to gardens, together with the intensity of their cultivation, increases as the total amount of crop land per head decreases, down to the point where the average amount of crop land per head is only 0.15 hectare. Where the amount of land is even less than this the share of garden land decreases, although there is a tendency at first to increase the intensity of the garden culture. Close to the larger cities, the amount of crop land per person, together with the amount devoted to gardens and the intensity of the latter's cultivation, falls off to a minimum since the population here has supplementary sources of income.

With the development of a money economy appears a specialization that is directed toward the urban centers. There has always been some natural specialization inasmuch as some plants do not grow well everywhere. The coconut, for example, does best in the lowlands. But the new specialization depends not only upon such natural factors as soil and climate, but also upon economic factors such as marketing facilities and the development of communications. This specialization can be observed generally in Southeastern Asia.

146 244

Ochse and Terra found that in calories of food value the returns of the gardens proved to be slightly higher per hectare than those of the irri-

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

gated fields. One of the great advantages of garden culture over field culture is that there is always something ready to harvest from the former and therefore something to sell when money for daily household needs becomes scarce. Another advantage is that the garden supplies the family with a great variety of side dishes rich in vitamins; the vegetable proteins of the garden produce are also of high value. 146 244

As to the possibilities of improving garden culture, these two authors state: 000

> It is very evident that an improvement of the compound horticulture is a very difficult problem through the highly varied and dense planting of these compounds as a result of which they come to resemble a very complicated symbiosis. But for all this it must be possible by systematic investigation to improve not only the quality but also the quantity of the production. It may be said that the compounds with their story or layer formation superficially considered will find no favour in the eyes of western agriculture, but they are an essential link in the native production apparatus.[3]

The alarming decline in the welfare of the people of Java in the face of a mounting population prompted Netherlands Indies officials to examine every possibility of improving the peasants' condition. This accounts for the studies of Ochse and Terra. Lacking detailed studies outside Java, we are obliged to depend upon scattered references of uneven value. 654 241

Credner states that in Thailand practically every house has a few trees on the lot, and the villages are often hidden by tree clusters. The greatest intensification of garden culture is found on the right bank of the Mae Nam Chao Phraya (the Menam) in Bangkok Noi, just opposite Bangkok. Here irrigation is employed in garden culture, a technique not usually found in Southeastern Asia. The gardens are surrounded by walls 1 meter high and are traversed by trenches 2 meters apart. The beds between the trenches are elevated. The trenches work both as drains and as irrigation ditches. Small sluices control the water. In the gardens there is a great variety of fruit trees and palms which climbers, such as *Piper betle* L., use as supports. In the trenches the peasants grow lotus and water chestnut (*Trapa natans* L.).[4] Zimmerman, in his survey of rural Thailand, points out that in most regions the peasants rely too much on one crop, rice, and he recommends in several instances improvements in the cultivation of the home lots so that families may have a better supply of fruits and, above all, of vegetables. In the Khlong Rangsit section he observed that "on account of the lack of homestead and village sites among the people there is no gardening and home production of food."[5] This observation may be applied to Southeastern Asia in general. Wherever the dominant form of land tenure is tenancy the flimsy shack of the tenant has no mixed fruit and vegetable garden around it, for his status is much too uncertain. A tenant 244 312 [137] 244 427

[3] Ochse and Terra: *op. cit.*, pp. 371–372.
[4] Credner: Siam, 1935, p. 246.
[5] Zimmerman: Siam, 1931, p. 307.

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243 [137] 242 134

rice takes up nitrogen in the form of ammonia, the value of green manures on wet-rice fields is apparent.[15] In the Indies, *Crotolaria* species are the most frequently used green manures, the favored one being *Crotolaria juncea* L.; but *Phaseolus lunatus* L., *Dolichos lablab* L., and *Pachyrrhizus erosus* Urban are also used. The peasants of the Red River delta in Tongking are in the habit of working into the ground the wilted matter of a number of legumes that have been grown primarily for seed. The peasants of the province of Nam Dinh have developed a technique that may be unique. They push handfuls of indigo branches into the ground between the rows of rice a few days after the latter has been transplanted, for they believe that indigo is superior to pig manure or human excreta. In Indochina rice-growers frequently cultivate green manure, especially *Crotolaria* species, on dry fields and carry it to the rice fields at the time when these fields are being prepared for the seedlings. A green manure used exclusively in a few districts of the delta land of Tongking is the small aquatic plant, *azolla*.[16] Certain villages, thanks to favorable circumstances, have specialized in the growing of azolla to sell to the surrounding country, while other villages reproduce the plant until sufficient quantities of green manure have been obtained to cover all needs. The life cycle of azolla is completed in the months from November to April or May. Only the villagers of LaVan know the secret of maintaining and multiplying the plant during the hot season. They guard this secret jealously since it is the basis of their livelihood.

[137] [438] [621]

Further studies are needed to establish which varieties of green-manure plants are best suited to the various environmental conditions. It is important to find plants that grow rapidly and can be sown when the rice is still on the field, just after the water has been drained off to allow the grain to ripen. Experiments should also be made in the timing of the application of green manure. Should it be early, or just before the transplanting of the seedlings? Should it be on dry or on wet land?

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Crop rotation also has its place as a means of keeping up the fertility of wet-rice fields. This practice seems to be better developed and more prevalent in Java than in any other country of Southeastern Asia. Extensive areas of *sawah*, as the Javanese call their wet riceland, are planted with dry-field crops such as maize, legumes, and other vegetables during the dry season, a practice that has a beneficial effect upon the soil. This form of double cropping is probably better than raising two rice crops in one year, because—although a different variety of rice is chosen for each season—both make essentially the same demands upon the soil; whereas a peanut crop, for example, grown during the dry season will enlarge the nitrogen content of the soil. In some areas of Java lowland rice is rotated

[15] Imperial Bureau of Soil Science: Tropical Soils in Relation to Tropical Crops, 1936, p. 11.

[16] For a map showing the extent of the use of azolla, see Gourou: Les paysans, 1936, p. 392. For further discussion see Nguyên-cong-Tiêu: "L'azolle," 1930, B, pp. 335–350 (also in *Proc. Fourth Pacific Science Congress, Java, 1929*, Vol. 4, 1930, pp. 355–370).

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Chapter Four

SOUTHEAST ASIA'S NATURAL VEGETATION

Tropical Forest Factors

The heavy, evenly distributed rainfall and constant high temperatures of most of Southeast Asia encourage continuous plant growth and a profuse, very varied flora. Because the whole year is here a growing season, plant life becomes almost overpowering in its rate of growth. This region contains more species than any other; the flora is not yet completely known, but some 35,000 species of flowering plants alone are thought to exist there (van Steenis). On Borneo at least 11,000 species have been listed, according to Merrill. This contrasts with the parallel figure of 13,000 species for the whole of Tropical West Africa (Good). Woody plants predominate and 15 per cent of the species are trees whose mature trunks are over 16 in. in diameter. The profusion of species is due to (*a*) the predominantly warm, moist climate, (*b*) the constancy of this climate over long geological periods, (*c*) the variety of relief and islands producing minor adaptations, (*d*) the rapidity with which selective and adaptive evolutionary processes can establish new characteristics in a tropical climate which has no resting season, and (*e*) the migrations of plant types from both Asia and Australia.

Southeast Asia was originally clothed by nature almost entirely by a tree cover. Only in modern times has there been any extensive clearing because apart from firing, primitive people were technically incapable of removing the forest. Some clearings became permanent for cultivation, in recent centuries, but the majority have been temporary and partial clearings, later left to natural replacement by a selective vegetation such as grass, savannah or scrub. Temporary clearings resulted largely from systems of shifting cultivation which finally abandon an area, partially cleared by fire, to a series of quick-growing plants, becoming after a few years a secondary forest which may, over prolonged periods, evolve to be scarcely distinguishable from primary forest.

The system of migrant agriculture or shifting cultivation, in Malaya called *ladang* and in Burma *taungya*, is widespread through-

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out Southeast Asia and it may be this form of nomadism has in fact operated so long that it affects nearly every acre of the region, thereby exercising a distinct selective action on the whole forest (Sauer). Much forest which we call "primary" may be senile secondary. This is evident in more densely populated areas such as Java and Tonkin, and over the centuries may have no less influenced the forest types of even thinly populated zones, as Borneo still is. In this sense "primary forest" is a relative term, to be retained for convenience rather than as presupposing an absolutely virgin tropical forest.

Two main types of primary lowland forest may be distinguished, the critical factor being drought:

1. In those zones astride the Equator where no season may be called dry, the natural forest is a tall, leafy, congested and evergreen type known as Tropical Rain Forest, sometimes called Equatorial Rain Forest. It may even occur well away from the Equator, towards the northern limit of Southeast Asia, where certain local conditions create a more continuously wet climate than is normal for the latitude.
2. In localities where there are several consecutive months practically without rain, a shorter and more open forest type develops: it has deciduous foliage on the whole, and considerably fewer species. Deciduous Tropical Forest is more generally known as 'Monsoon Forest' and occurs over huge areas in eastern Java, Burma, Siam and Indochina.

Between these Tropical Rain Forests and Monsoon Forests, there are intermediate types and transitional areas where no single meteorological criterion can be used to define the boundary sharply. Within both types, local peculiarities of soil porosity, number of rain-days, relief, exposure and aspect all induce minor variations. In any given unit of this mountainous region, three zones of vegetation may be distinguished within both main forest types, these zones being more distinctive in their differences than the variations of vegetation from one part to another of this huge region. These zones are: (1) coastal vegetation, (2) lowland vegetation, (3) mountain vegetation.

(1) Coastal Vegetation

On shores predominantly sandy, short herbs, grasses and shrubs with creeping stems and fleshy leaves are found; these plant

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groups resemble those of salt-tolerant vegetation on European beaches of which spinifex is a sample. Behind this shore grows a distinctive strip of what may be called *beach woodland*, sometimes referred to as beach forest. On reefs, on muddy shores and estuaries, where there is diurnal flooding at high tide, the *mangrove* forest develops. When the shore is rocky, lowland forest may reach high tide mark. In this vegetation seeds and fruit are water-borne so that currents are an important means of dispersion. 137●

Well-developed beach woodland forms as a ribbon rarely more than 200 ft. inland from the shore and contains tree types not usually seen elsewhere and often reaching 90 ft. in height. The typical tree, the casuarina (Equisetifolia, rhu, ru, tjemara) is rather like a conifer to look at and is related to Australian she-oaks. Sometimes the casuarina is in pure stands; at places the strip includes screw pines (Pandanus), the leathery-leaved Calophyllum, Inophyllum and Barringtonia. Coconut palms, which can take root after nuts have been dispersed by sea-currents, are now prominent in beach woodland areas as a planted crop, but they occur self-sown everywhere through the islands.

Mangrove forests are widely distributed on sedimenting shores throughout Southeast Asia. The fringe of mangroves is interrupted where rocks or cliffs come to the sea and when drainage control has diminished the silt from terrestrial sources. Where mangroves develop, silt is being deposited at a fast rate (sometimes to a thickness of 1½ in. annually); the mangrove thus both raises the surface level and progressively presses farther seaward. Whether mangroves grow only where silt is being deposited or whether they cause silt deposition by their root system, obstructing tidal currents and flood run-off, is still disputed. Possibly both processes operate together. The net effect is one of raising the land level and reclaiming land from the sea. In addition, the wood of mangroves is valued for firewood and charcoal; the bark is sold extensively for tanning. The mangrove trees are of some thirty species, all with structural adaptations enabling them to root in unstable muds and to tolerate daily inundation of their root system by saline tidal water. In addition to the tree, there are shrubs, herbaceous plants and ferns (particularly Aerostichum aureum). The trees are evergreen, sometimes 100 ft. tall, mostly with shining, leather-like leaves, small flowers, and unusual root systems. Some (as Rhizophora) have many roots supporting the trunk which begins well [313 314 281]

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

FIG. 22.—Mangrove Root Types. (*a*) The stilted roots of Rhizophora. (*b*) The knee-roots of Bruguiera. (*c*) The up-growing roots of Avicennia

above mud level, as though supported by flying buttresses (Fig. 22). In others (Avicennia and Sonneratia), the main roots are horizontal with many small branches exposing themselves through the mud to stand up above its surface in great numbers covering a wide area round the tree. Another mangrove, Bruguiera, has lateral roots which bend in loops showing above the mud; these loops are called knees and make a great obstacle to movement between the trees. These special root adaptations protrude through the mud to reach free air and they have breathing pores (lenticels); their function may be to oxygenate the roots but they also enable fresh rootlets to be put out at higher and higher levels as the mud and silt increases and stifles the older roots. Many mangrove plants have seeds which germinate before leaving the parent tree. Being heavy and fleshy, they can stick firmly in the mud at low tide or may float away in the tidal currents for considerable distances; other germinated seedlings are shaped like darts to pierce deeply into the mud when they fall.

The main differences between mangrove species are the result of selection according to the amount of tidal inundation they can tolerate; the tide is the chief selective factor in the vegetation pattern from place to place in any one mangrove forest and results in a belt zonation of types roughly paralleling the shoreline. The seaward plants, the pioneers, are most tolerant of salt water; the inland fringe is of the least salt-tolerant types and, as the silt is progressively built up, tidal effects diminish and the vegetation gradually turns into a freshwater swamp with different associations.

The nipa palm (Nipa fruticans), with short stem and feathery leaves often 18 ft. long, lines many estuaries where tidal influence is weakening. It is a palm of brackish but not saline preferences and is extensively used for thatching huts.

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(2) Lowland Vegetation

Tropical Rain Forest.—This primary forest is evergreen, tall and profusely-leaved, but by no means gloomy; the forest floor is usually dappled with sunlight at midday and the undergrowth is fairly thin, except at the edges of roads, paths or rivers, where extra 137



Fig. 23.—Tropical Rain Forest in Profile. The diagram represents a strip of forest 180 ft. in width. Note: (i) the height of the trees; (ii) the crowns are represented in a conventional manner

light induces dense ground vegetation. Within the forest, air is still and constant at temperatures as much as 10° F. below those at the top of the forest. Plants with showy flowers are unusual; variegated and multicoloured foliage is common, while not modifying the general impression of a dark green landscape.

It is the Tropical Rain Forest which most often gets called "jungle." This word, however, has been applied so loosely from district to district, to vegetation types ranging from forest to dry scrub, that it has lost precise meaning and should be avoided.

A distinct structure shows in Tropical Rain Forest, based on height and light. Trees some 190 ft. high are scattered throughout the forest, jutting their isolated heads through a layer of foliage some 60 ft. high, where the crowns of trees touch one another to form a canopy or storey (Fig. 23). Below this are shrubs, saplings and herbaceous plants, all shade-loving types and thinly scattered. On the whole the trees are evergreen, though there are distinct

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137 leaf changes in individual trees. This change of leaves is not regional and some trees retain old leaves until new ones are well formed. The general impression of evergreen persists as a result of a non-synchronous leaf rhythm. The degree of correlation between flowering, leafing and climate varies considerably; certain of the forest plants flower after a few days of drought or a slight local drop of temperature, as in thunderstorms, others persist in annual rhythms whatever the local weather may be, some correlate with the local peaks of rainfall, and some assume a fifteen months' periodicity. Each storey of trees has special features; the topmost storey has thin straight boles despite the great height of the trees, and is inclined to flattened crowns of undivided, tough, oval leaves. Many of the tall trees have plank buttresses, thin outgrowths extending up to 15 ft. from the ground, stabilising the relatively thin boles in soils not well suited for root anchoring, and presenting a major difficulty when the trees are to be felled. Second storey trees are in general smaller in every respect; their leaves are proportionately larger, extending to long fine points.

Two groups of plants fit into this tree ecology: (*a*) the lianes, (*b*) the epiphytes.

Lianes are woody creepers, often several hundred feet long, which climb from the ground using hooks and tendrils on the tree-trunks in order to reach the sunlit crowns. They use trees as supports only and spread in great festoons from tree to tree; their flowers are in the upper storeys and their stems may be from finger thickness to as much as 10 in. in diameter. Rattans are typical lianes, their strong thorny stems being much used as native ropes and wires.

Epiphytes include orchids, ferns and wild figs. Their seeds become established in high branches and are adapted either to live self-contained above ground, or as in the case of the strangling fig (Ficus), to send down very long roots which ultimately fasten in the ground. Only certain of these epiphytes are truly parasitic, feeding on the sap of a host; most of them are merely supported by the host-tree. The fig sends down tough quick-growing roots round the trunk of another tree, finally strangling the host until it rots away, leaving the fig tree sustained by a hollow network of roots. This particular plant, the seeds of which are both bird-carried and wind-borne, may prove highly destructive to stone structures, as in the case of the Angkor temples.

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Tropical Rain Forest is remarkable for the number of tree-types which go to make it and for its heterogeneous composition. Continuous stands of any single tree species very rarely occur, and often thirty may be found in a forest patch 100 yds. square. While the trees differ widely, the family group Dipterocarpaceae, gigantic in dimensions and bearing winged seeds like shuttlecocks, is the most prominent. Within the forest individual trees are restricted by the congestion so that the shape of high trees in tropical gardens or along roads is no guide to their shape when in their natural setting. 137

From the thousands of tree types in this forest some commercially valuable timbers, gums, resins and camphor can be obtained. Most of the trees, however, are commercially useless; the heterogeneous composition and density of the forest operates against exploitation of even those species which could prove useful. 314

Within the Tropical Rain Forest, several subsidiary types may be recognised. 137

(*a*) Parts of Borneo, Sumatra and Malaya have a white, porous, sandy subsoil thought to be a tropical podsol (see Chapter 5). Upon this, pitcher plants, conifers and a treeless, heathlike ecology of grasses and shrubs may develop.

(*b*) Upon porous limestone landscapes, the trees are short and epiphytic plants are most common, since these can tolerate the absence of groundwater.

(*c*) Behind the mangroves and transitional between them and the true lowland Tropical Rain Forest, are Freshwater Swamp Forests, extensively developed in Sumatra, Malaya and Borneo. The plants peculiar to this swamp setting vary with the duration of freshwater flooding. Trees here are shorter, fewer in species, well-buttressed and often stilt-rooted. Over considerable areas stands of a single type of palm may occur and palms of short varieties cover the ground to impede movement. Sometimes on the east coast of Sumatra the Freshwater Swamp Forest produces a tropical bog on peat soil formed by rotting vegetal remains several yards deep.

Secondary Forest.—The sequence of vegetation which replaces Tropical Rain Forest after removal is called Secondary Forest, made up of ferns, tropical grasses and scrub. It may be subdivided into distinct vegetation types which are various stages in the transition from naked ground to tropical forest. The process of replace-

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137 ment depends for its character in detail on the length of time the forest clearing has continued in cultivation, the extent of soil erosion, the clearing suffered, the original soil type and the proximity of natural forest from which seeds may be derived. To go through these replacement phases, natural vegetation is thought to need at least two centuries of most favourable conditions before it will become anything like Primary Tropical Rain Forest again. During the transitional stages spontaneous fires often occur, to prolong the replacement period; grazing animals have similar selective effects.

The normal replacement succession is first herbaceous grassland, then shrubs and finally trees. Tropical grasses, coarse, tough and in tussocks, quickly appear on any newly exposed ground and reach a height of 5 ft. These grass landscapes, on which Imperata Cylindrica is typical, often resemble savannah. The grass burns rapidly and regrows quickly because it spreads by subsurface root runners shielded from the effects of burning. Quick-growing tropical grass stifles most other vegetation, so that it is both a sign of inferior soils and may even be the cause of them. While grass is the most prominent type, sometimes wild sugar canes establish themselves.

The scrub consists of wild ginger and a tropical rhododendron (Melastoma malabathricum). Giant ferns spread rapidly and compactly in some districts as pure stands in which bracken (Pteridium) appears prominently.

Young Secondary Forest develops trees some 30 ft. high in a few years but the earlier successions leave behind a dense undergrowth and many giant creepers. Stands of the same species persist for some time and the trees are at first of fast growing, soft wooded varieties. Pines are fairly common in some local secondary vegetation, the older types of which are scarcely distinguishable from Primary Forest except for the thick undergrowth.

Monsoon Forest.—Because Monsoon Forest has a distinct dry season, it is subject to widespread and frequent fires which exercise a selection in favour of deep-rooted or thick-seeded types which can regrow after a forest fire. Shifting cultivation is thought to have had a greater effect in Monsoon Forest areas than on the Tropical Rain Forest, so that Monsoon Forest may be largely a secondary rather than a primary forest type. The type stretches across Southeast Asia in two broad zones, roughly symmetrical to the Equator. The

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argest zone covers Burma, Siam and Indochina, while the counterpart in Eastern Java, the Sunda Islands and New Guinea covers a much smaller area, with local variants due to insularity. These zones are identical with the dry areas of Fig. 10. 137

In the rainy season, Monsoon Forest resembles Tropical Rain Forest. Its tree heights are less, the foliage not so profuse, and the spacing more open. Only the undergrowth remains fairly green for the whole year; the rest of the vegetation sheds leaves in the dry season, when the forest has a bare, stark appearance. Herbaceous plants, lianes and bamboo are common but epiphytes are unusual and the herbs almost disappear in the very hot dry season. Among the trees, Acacias and Albizzias are especially common and Leguminosae are prominent.

Some observers distinguish between wetter and drier types of Monsoon Forest, both transitional from Tropical Rain Forest to Tropical Desert, the latter being outside Southeast Asia.

Monsoon Forest is mostly of mixed species but sometimes a single species dominates, possibly as a result of selection through repeated burning. Of these, teak forests (Tectona grandis) are characteristic and important commercially, occurring in Northern Burma, Northern Siam, Eastern Java and the Moluccas. So valuable has teak proved itself that some existing forest areas are actually re-plantations of it. Teak has thick hard-cased seeds which are fire resistant. Its saplings come through fire successfully and the pure stands are thought to have been the result of natural selection on these lines, since it is fairly certain that forests of teak alone do not occur under natural conditions. Teak reaches to heights of over 120 ft., the lower half of the tree being straight and unbranched under forest conditions. Undergrowth is negligible and the ground is covered with brittle teak leaves which often cup, forming mosquito-breeding places in the wet season. [313]

Resembling the teak forests in origin, eucalyptus forests have developed in the eastern islands as migrants from Australia, occurring naturally only in New Guinea, Timor, the Lesser Sundas, Celebes and the Philippines.

Another single stand deriving from the Monsoon Forest by selection, is bamboo forest. Considerable areas almost exclusively occupied by bamboos are found in the northern parts of Southeast Asia, with small patches in East Java. Bamboos in great variety grow everywhere in Southeast Asia and they have been planted 313 137

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137 extensively because of their usefulness structurally and domestically, but continuous stands become established only where the 313 dry season is very marked and where shifting cultivation is known to have been practised extensively. Bamboos are giant perennial grasses of about a hundred species, with woody stems and woody 137 roots. They grow in clumps and may be evergreen or deciduous. Some bamboos flower at long intervals (25-70 years) and their seeds are fire-resisting. Constant friction between the dry woody stems may cause forest fires and help to produce that selective process which leads to stands of bamboo.

[134] Monsoon Dry Forest, an open wooded landscape containing very few species, may be found over large areas of Burma, Siam and Indochina in association with poor soils. Known as *indaing* in Burma and *padeng* in Siam, this forest develops where rainfalls are not much above 40 in. per annum, and it may merge on the equatorial side into Tropical Rain Forest and on the other into dry or thorny savannah vegetation. Within Monsoon Dry Forest trees are widely spaced, tending to be stunted forms of Dipterocarpaceae and distinctly deciduous.

Secondary Monsoon Forests.—Considerable areas of savannah found in Burma, Siam, Indochina and the Eastern Indies are secondary growths after a removal of the natural Monsoon Forest. Savannah is open country of tall, coarse grasses, occasionally having a few scattered bamboos or low trees and very much associated with long dry seasons whose effects are aggravated by poor or porous soils. Savannah merges into Monsoon Dry Forest and is often covered with low palms (Borassus flabellifer), and contains prickly pears, spiny cactus-like plants, and similar thorny scrub.

(3) Mountain Vegetation

Vegetation steadily and often imperceptibly changes with altitude and the resulting types are much the same, level for level, throughout Southeast Asia. All but the very highest mountains are forested, though the trees on exposed summits are dwarfed; only in New Guinea and Yunnan are the heights great enough entirely to prevent tree growth and produce an alpine vegetation. Young volcanoes may be treeless for pedological, rather than for climatic reasons.

Above about 2,000 ft., at most points of Southeast Asia, large

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trees of Dipterocarp type gradually disappear and temperate trees of the oak and chestnut type become commoner, though the landscape continues full of giant bracken and tree ferns. Higher still the vegetation dwarfs considerably, shadiness diminishes, and woody plants become twisted and gnarled. This often turns into a moss or "elfin" forest above 5,000 ft., in localities where the air is constantly cool and saturated, to produce thick blankets of wet mosses and liverworts upon all other vegetation. Mosses hang in fantastic festoons everywhere and sometimes (as in Borneo) form walls or platforms under which other vegetation, such as dwarf oaks and rhododendrons, are buried (Harrison). Moss forest will not occur in localities with a noticeable dry season: in monsoon areas it is replaced in succession by pine forest, in which, however, some broadleaved trees persist. Above both these mountain forest types (above 6,500 ft.), mountain grasses and shrubs form landscapes of rolling downlike appearance. 137

Fauna

Between the western and eastern fringes of Southeast Asia there are greater differences zoologically than between Asia and South America, even though these are separated by the Atlantic (Merrill). The differences derive from the long separation of Australia from Asia. Migration has gone on from Asia and Australia into the islands and peninsulas of Southeast Asia which is thus a transitional zoogeographical region (Fig. 24). 136

The Tropical Rain Forest has complicated ecologies of living creatures associated with the various storeys and the variety of these creatures parallels the variety of vegetation. Large animals such as elephants, tigers, rhinoceros, etc., are relatively few and confined to the coastal sections. Specially numerous are arboreal and flying creatures, butterflies, birds, moths and insects. These are able to migrate from place to place with considerable ease so that the convergence of Asiatic and Australian species has gone on fairly freely. The contrasting zoological types are summed up in the difference between mammals; in Australia, except for a few bats and rodents, mammals are marsupial (pouched) or monotreme (single vented); in Asia these groups are entirely lacking and are replaced by placental mammals, monkeys, shrews, squirrels and ungulates.

By far the richest zoological group is that spreading from Asia.

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

FIG. 24.—Biological Regions of Southeast Asia

136 For a long time Wallace's Line was held to demarcate these zoological types; Wallace himself drew the boundary just west of Lombok and Celebes but Huxley later extended it to include the Philippines in the "Australian" zone. Geographically the boundary clearly correlates with the limits of the Sunda Platform and the interglacial connection between Malaya, Borneo, Sumatra and Java appears to have permitted zoological migration fairly uniformly among them, whereas there has been no continued land connection between the "mediterranean islands" east of the Platform. Later more detailed study of the fauna has produced criticisms of the Wallace Line. The steady pressure of zoological types eastward has been demonstrated and Weber laid down another limit which he showed more closely to accord with the balance between Asiatic and Australian fauna. East of it Australian types dominate. Wallace's Line thus is now best thought of as the eastward limit of the typically Asiatic zoological types; it is matched by a line just west of the Sahul Shelf which is the westward limit of exclusively Australian and New Guinea faunal types.

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Chinese

their native country; moreover they have a stubbornness of disposition which distinguishes them from their fellow Chinese. (It is worthy of note that the most numerous among the early Communists in the Nanyang were the Hailams and Hakkas.)[1]

Sun Yat-sen said: 'The Chinese people are of the Han or Chinese race with common blood, common language, common religion, and common customs—a single race.' As regards 'blood' in any scientific sense this is manifestly untrue; on the contrary,

> The modern Chinese people is an amalgamation of many elements originally different from one another. . . . In colour; in stature, above all in cephalic indices, about 42 per cent are mesocephalic and about 43 per cent are brachycephalic, and about 15 per cent dolichocephalic. Even these classes are distinctly subdivided into dolicho-leptorrhinic and dolicho-platyrrhinic. There is also a low-headed type, and, in the South, a trace of a dwarf element. . . . Prehistory points to a race already mixed in the basin of the Yellow River. . . .[2]

In spite, however, of a number of modifications and reservations, the remainder of the statement of the Father of the Revolution, especially regarding religion and customs, could be convincingly maintained. Allowing for the numerous variations which have been suggested above, the Chinese of Southeast Asia, drawn mostly from Fukien and Kwangtung, are quite remarkably homogeneous. Not only have they marked physical characteristics in common; their customs, their religion, their attitude of mind have an almost uncanny similarity. What Clement Williams remarked of their shops in Bhamo on the Yunnan-Burma frontier nearly ninety years ago—'the likeness of one Burmese to another is striking, but the absolute sameness of one Chinese shop to another is truly wonderful'—is equally true of the 'sameness' of Chinese temples, houses, ornaments, customs, methods of mining and agriculture, and handicrafts all over the Southeast Asian area, from the city of Cholon to a remote *tienda* in Mindanao, or from the tin-fields of Larut to the pepper plantations of Cambodia. Nor is this merely a superficial impression (such as 'all Chinese look alike'); it derives from their common steeping in Chinese culture, even though the latter's springs of inspiration have ceased to well up from the depths and it has been for long (as Professor Toynbee says) in a state of petrification.

[1] See p. 370 regarding the Japanese identification of Hailams with Communism.

[2] *China Year Book* 1932.

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/Article 23/

Anthropological Blood-Grouping in South-East Asia

By P.H.A. Sneath, M.A., M.B. (Cantab.)

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Summary of a communication to the Institute, 4 February, 1954

Four aboriginal tribes in Malaya and Borneo were studied in association with Dr. I. Polunin of the University of Malaya, as part of the programme of anthropological blood-grouping organized by Dr. A. E. Mourant. Blood samples were collected from the settlements and were tested for the ABO, MNS, Rhesus, P, Lutheran, Kell and Duffy groups and for the sickle-cell trait. Specimens of saliva were also tested for ABH secretion. The more important results are summarized in the table (page 2), in which the salient blood-group features of the main racial types of man are noted for comparison. About 100 samples from each tribe were tested.

The Negritos of Malaya.

The high incidence of the Rhesus gene Ro (cDe) supports the belief that the Negritos and Africans are descended from a common stock. The sickle-cell trait was absent, but there is some doubt whether this trait is a safe criterion of African ancestry. A more serious objection to an African origin for the Negritos is the low frequency of Ro and the absence of the trait in the Andaman Negritos, recently reported by Lehmann and Ikin (personal communication).

The Malayan Senoi.

The racial affinities of the Senoi have been much discussed, and some have suggested that they are related to the Veddas or to the Australoids. The blood groups of the Senoi are quite different from those of the Australian aborigines; the latter lack the genes B and S and have low M, while the Senoi possess considerable amounts of all three. There are few data on Veddoid blood groups. The groups of the Senoi are similar to those of Mongoloids, and this strongly supports the theory that the Senoi are closer to the Mongoloids

TABLE I. RACIAL FREQUENCIES OF BLOOD-GROUP GENES AND FREQUENCIES IN FOUR ABORIGINAL TRIBES OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA

System	Gene	Caucasoids	Australoids	Negroids	Mongoloids	Negritos	Senoi	Aboriginal Malays	Land Dayaks
ABO	A	High (0.3)	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	0.15	0.05	0.12	0.21
	B	Low	ABSENT	High (0.3)	High*	0.09	0.24	0.20	0.31
	A_2	Moderate	Absent	High (0.0[illegible])	Absent	0	0	0	0
MNS	N	Moderate	HIGH (0.9)	Moderate	Low	0.27	0.28	0.21	0.33
	S	HIGH (0.3)	ABSENT	Moderate	Low	0.14	0.09	0.03	0.01
Rh	r (cde)	HIGH (0.4)	Absent	Moderate	Absent	0	0	0	0
	Ro (cDe)	Low	Moderate	HIGH (0.[illegible])	Low	0.27	0.01	0.01	0.07
	R_1 (CDe)	Moderate	Moderate	LOW	HIGH (0.8)	0.63	0.93	0.94	0.85
	R_2 (cDE)	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Moderate ‡	0.10	0.07	0.04	0.08
Duffy	Fy^a	Moderate	High (0.9)	Low	High	0.5		0.7	
Sickle-cell trait		Absent	Absent	High †	Absent	Absent		Absent	

* Absent in America † Also in Veddoids ‡ High in America (0.4)

The figures in parentheses after "High" show the average gene frequency of the gene in that race which possesses the highest frequency.

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than to any other race.

The Aboriginal Malays.

The blood groups confirm that these people are Mongoloids, being similar to those of most peoples of Malaysia.

The Land Dayaks of Borneo.

The blood groups of the Land Dayaks were found to be of the Malaysian type.

Variability in Blood Groups of Settlements.

Great variation was found in blood groups between settlements of the same tribe. It was noted in all four peoples, and is presumably due to settlement endogamy (known to be common in Land Dayaks and Aboriginal Malays). Although this lessens the value of blood-grouping as a means of tracing racial ancestry, it may throw light on the way in which races arise: for instance, the suggestion that the American Indians lack blood group B because they are descended from a few small tribes who, by chance, lacked the gene is supported by examples of the virtual absence of common genes in some settlements which we studied.

The variability is thought to be due largely to genetic drift, though doubtless other factors are also responsible. The possibility of such variation, usually ignored in blood-group work, should always be considered in surveys of this area (see Polunin, Man, 1952, 104).

A full account of this work is to be published.

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[For information on the distribution of techniques and habits of tooth-blackening in Indochina, especially Tonkin, and distributional comparisons with other parts of Indochina, Southeast and East Asia, and for hypotheses about racial and cultural-historical interrelations on the basis of these distributions, see 95: Huard, AMl Indochina, category 116.]

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

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In spite, however, of a number of modifications and reservations, the remainder of the statement of the Father of the Revolution, especially regarding religion and customs, could be convincingly maintained. Allowing for the numerous variations which have been suggested above, the Chinese of Southeast Asia, drawn mostly from Fukien and Kwangtung, are quite remarkably homogeneous. Not only have they marked physical characteristics in common; their customs, their religion, their attitude of mind have an almost uncanny similarity. What Clement Williams remarked of their shops in Bhamo on the Yunnan-Burma frontier nearly ninety years ago—'the likeness of one Burmese to another is striking, but the absolute sameness of one Chinese shop to another is truly wonderful'—is equally true of the 'sameness' of Chinese temples, houses, ornaments, customs, methods of mining and agriculture, and handicrafts all over the Southeast Asian area, from the city of Cholon to a remote *tienda* in Mindanao, or from the tin-fields of Larut to the pepper plantations of Cambodia. Nor is this merely a superficial impression (such as 'all Chinese look alike'); it derives from their common steeping in Chinese culture, even though the latter's springs of inspiration have ceased to well up from the depths and it has been for long (as Professor Toynbee says) in a state of petrification.

[1] See p. 370 regarding the Japanese identification of Hailams with Communism.

[2] *China Year Book* [illegible]

18: Kleiweg De Zwaan E-5 (1906-1910) 1925 CB: Indonesia

Borneo OC1 Southeast Asia AL1
Punan OC10 Kalamantan OC7

B 142 144 These Indonesians (i.e., Aboriginal Malays) are believed to distinguish themselves from the coastal Malays by a shorter stature, longer head, darker skin, broader and more concave nose and a broader mouth.

P K 141 Later, also in Sarawak tribes were found who were clearly dolichocephalic. (1) The Punan of Sarawak were

1. E. B. Haddon, "Note on the Peoples of Borneo," Man, Vol. V, 1905.

found to be brachycephalic, the Kalamantan, on the other hand, dolichocephalic. Haddon considers the Muruts and the other dolichocephalic elements among /157/ the Kalamantans as well as the Ulu-Ajar Dyaks to be the least modified members of the Indonesian (i.e., Proto-Malay) race.

K 144

B 144 In the work of Charles Hose (1), A. C. Haddon processed

1. Charles Hose and William Mc Dougall, The Pagan Tribes of Borneo, London, 1912.

the anthropological data and he, too, became convinced that in that area one can distinguish the dolichocephalic from the brachycephalic elements.

SA 144 According to Hose and Mc Dougall, a racial miscegenation must have taken place in Southeast Asia far back in the past when Borneo still formed a part of the Asian continent. This miscegenation involved a people of Caucasian race coming

Bahau OC5 Southeast Asia AL 1
Borneo OC 1 Prehistoric Borneo OC 3
Malayo-Polynesians 04

from the west on the one hand, and a Mongolian population element originating from the north on the other. Both the Indonesians (Proto-Malay) and the Polynesians are supposed to belong to this mixed race in which the Caucasian elements are predominant. At the time when Borneo became separated from the Asian continent, it must already have been populated by a part of those Indonesians (Proto-Malays). Only in the more recent past, that primitive population must have obtained a higher culture, viz., through the Kajan /158/ coming from the south and perhaps also from the southeast and through the Iban or Sea Dyaks from the southwest. The Kajan moved, presumably around 700 A. D., from their country of origin, more specifically the valley of the Irrawadi, to Borneo, whereas the immigration of the Muruts must have originated from the Philippines or directly from Annam. The Sea Dyaks are assumed to be descendants of the Malays of Sumatra. (1)

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PB 144
PE 174
BA 174
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1. T. J. Bezemer, "De binnenlandsche stammen van Borneo /The Tribes of the Interior of Borneo/," De Volken van Nederlandsch Indië, published under the direction of Professor J. C. Van Eerde, Amsterdam, 1920.

It is difficult to say with certainty whether this theory of Hose and Mc Dougall is correct. Anthropologically, many objections could be raised against such a connection between the Indonesians and the Polynesians. The Polynesians

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1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL4

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na edulis Ker), sweet potato (*Ipomoea batatas* Poir.), taro (*Colocasia esculenta* Schott), *Curcuma* species, Goa bean (*Psophocarpus tetragonolobus* DC.), bitter cucumber (*Momordica charantia* L.), snake gourd (*Trichosanthes anguina* L.), Lima bean (large) (*Phaseolus lunatus* L.), Goa potato (*Dioscorea aculeata* L.), wild yam (*Dioscorea hispida* Dennst.), and sweet yam (*Dioscorea alata* L.). The middle story contains taller-growing plants, such as cassava (*Manihot utilissima* Pohl), citrus varieties such as *Citrus nobilis* Lour. and *Citrus aurantifolia* Swingle, papaya (*Carica papaya* L.), banana (*Musa* species), rose apple (*Eugenia aquea* Burm.), and soursop (*Anona muricata* L.). The upper story is formed by tall fruit trees, such as coconut (*Cocos nucifera* L.), jackfruit (*Artocarpus integra* Merr.), sapodilla or chico (*Achras zapota* L.), pomelo (*Citrus maxima* Merr.), of which numerous forms, differing in size and color, are known in the Indies, *belinju* (*Gnetum gnemon* L.), mango (*Mangifera indica* L.), durian (*Durio zibethinus* Murr.), candlenut tree (*Aleurites moluccana* Willd.), tamarind (*Tamarindus indica* L.), *pete* (*Parkia speciosa* Hassk.), stinkbean tree (*Pithecellobium lobatum* Benth.), and *santol* (*Sandoricum koetjape* Merr.).

This list does not by any means include all the plants that appear in the gardens. The plants vary in number and type from region to region in accordance with differences in soil, climate (elevation), and the taste of the owners.

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Estimates indicate that about 15 per cent of the cultivated land in Java and Madura is taken up by gardens. Unfortunately, there have been no detailed studies of garden culture outside of Java, although the products of the garden play an important role in the diet of all the peoples of Southeastern Asia. Terra, who compared garden culture in various districts of Java, found that the share of land allotted to gardens, together with the intensity of their cultivation, increases as the total amount of crop land per head decreases, down to the point where the average amount of crop land per head is only 0.15 hectare. Where the amount of land is even less than this the share of garden land decreases, although there is a tendency at first to increase the intensity of the garden culture. Close to the larger cities, the amount of crop land per person, together with the amount devoted to gardens and the intensity of the latter's cultivation, falls off to a minimum since the population here has supplementary sources of income.

With the development of a money economy appears a specialization that is directed toward the urban centers. There has always been some natural specialization inasmuch as some plants do not grow well everywhere. The coconut, for example, does best in the lowlands. But the new specialization depends not only upon such natural factors as soil and climate, but also upon economic factors such as marketing facilities and the development of communications. This specialization can be observed generally in Southeastern Asia.

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Ochse and Terra found that in calories of food value the returns of the gardens proved to be slightly higher per hectare than those of the irri-

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

gated fields. One of the great advantages of garden culture over field culture is that there is always something ready to harvest from the former and therefore something to sell when money for daily household needs becomes scarce. Another advantage is that the garden supplies the family with a great variety of side dishes rich in vitamins; the vegetable proteins of the garden produce are also of high value.

As to the possibilities of improving garden culture, these two authors state:

> It is very evident that an improvement of the compound horticulture is a very difficult problem through the highly varied and dense planting of these compounds as a result of which they come to resemble a very complicated symbiosis. But for all this it must be possible by systematic investigation to improve not only the quality but also the quantity of the production. It may be said that the compounds with their story or layer formation superficially considered will find no favour in the eyes of western agriculture, but they are an essential link in the native production apparatus.[3]

The alarming decline in the welfare of the people of Java in the face of a mounting population prompted Netherlands Indies officials to examine every possibility of improving the peasants' condition. This accounts for the studies of Ochse and Terra. Lacking detailed studies outside Java, we are obliged to depend upon scattered references of uneven value.

Credner states that in Thailand practically every house has a few trees on the lot, and the villages are often hidden by tree clusters. The greatest intensification of garden culture is found on the right bank of the Mae Nam Chao Phraya (the Menam) in Bangkok Noi, just opposite Bangkok. Here irrigation is employed in garden culture, a technique not usually found in Southeastern Asia. The gardens are surrounded by walls 1 meter high and are traversed by trenches 2 meters apart. The beds between the trenches are elevated. The trenches work both as drains and as irrigation ditches. Small sluices control the water. In the gardens there is a great variety of fruit trees and palms which climbers, such as *Piper betle* L., use as supports. In the trenches the peasants grow lotus and water chestnut (*Trapa natans* L.).[4] Zimmerman, in his survey of rural Thailand, points out that in most regions the peasants rely too much on one crop, rice, and he recommends in several instances improvements in the cultivation of the home lots so that families may have a better supply of fruits and, above all, of vegetables. In the Khlong Rangsit section he observed that "on account of the lack of homestead and village sites among the people there is no gardening and home production of food."[5] This observation may be applied to Southeastern Asia in general. Wherever the dominant form of land tenure is tenancy the flimsy shack of the tenant has no mixed fruit and vegetable garden around it, for his status is much too uncertain. A tenant

[3] Ochse and Terra: *op. cit.*, pp. 371–372.
[4] Credner: Siam, 1935, p. 246.
[5] Zimmerman: Siam, 1931, p. 307.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia A-1

ing crops. The process can be adapted to climate by manufacture either in shallow pits or low heaps."[64] 241 242

Dry-Field Crops Cultivated by Peasants

The list of dry-field crops cultivated in Southeastern Asia is rather large, but there are regional variations. Cassava, for example, is commonly grown on tegalans in Java (2,300,000 acres), whereas it is unimportant in Sumatra, Borneo, the Philippines (40,000 acres), Malaya (24,000 acres), and Indochina (75,000 acres). The most important dry-field crops are up- 241 311

TABLE IV—CHEMICAL COMPOSITION OF CASSAVA AND IMPORTANT CEREAL FLOURS [146]

	CASSAVA (PER CENT)	MAIZE (PER CENT)	WHEAT (PER CENT)	RICE (PER CENT)
Moisture	10.75	13.41	13.65	13.12
Protein	0.87	7.56	12.35	9.85
Crude fat	1.19	2.79	1.75	0.88
Ash	1.24	1.78	1.81	1.51
Crude fiber	6.12	3.19	2.53	0.63
Carbohydrates	79.83	71.27	67.91	74.01

Source: The Cassava Industry in the Philippines, 1939, p. 7.

land rice, maize, cassava, sweet potatoes, peanuts, soy beans and other pulses, tobacco, and sugar cane, all of which are annuals. Of the first four, only upland rice is a native of Southeastern Asia, whereas the other three are natives of the New World and were introduced into Southeastern Asia by the Spaniards in the sixteenth century.

The inhabitants of Southeastern Asia have long relied upon root crops, fruits, leaves of various plants, and wild roots and tubers gathered in the forests, as well as upon rice. Scheltema refers to a number of early statements which indicate that "rice was not yet the principal food for a large portion of the native population [of Java] as late as the first part of the 19th century and that the rice diet has become much more important in the course of the past hundred years" as a result of the great extension of the cultivation of irrigated rice fields.[65] If it is correct that the rice consumption per capita increased during the past century, the opposite trend has been evident during the present century. For a while the increase in the area of irrigated land was great enough to allow for a larger rice production, but with the steadily increasing pressure of population the peasants now have to depend more and more upon unirrigated land. Thus the production of dry-field crops is gaining in importance. 241 262

Authorities in Southeastern Asia have been especially worried over the increase of cassava production and consumption. Because of the exhaustion of the soil fertility on many dry fields, the growing of upland rice and 241 134

[64] Worthington: Science in Africa, 1938, p. 387.
[65] Scheltema: The Food Consumption, 1936, p. 10.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia ALI

241 134 [146] maize has become unprofitable, and many peasants have changed over to cassava, which makes lesser demands upon soil fertility. The per acre yields of cassava are high, and the plant is a source of carbohydrates, fat, and protein. From the standpoint of dietary needs, however, the ratio between carbohydrates on the one hand and protein and fat on the other is unfavorable. People who live on cassava merely fill their stomachs. The insufficiency of protein intake is detrimental to their health. Table IV[1] compares the chemical composition of cassava, maize, wheat, and rice.

243 146 262 Maize, as the table indicates, compares quite favorably in protein content with wheat and rice and is especially rich in fat. It has gained an important position in the diet of the people of central and eastern Java, Madura, the island of Cebu, and the Cagayan Valley in the island of Luzon. Both maize and cassava are easy to store and therefore have a great advantage over sweet potatoes, which must be consumed soon after they ripen.

241 In Thailand maize is an important crop on the Khorat plateau and in other regions where dry land is available. Among the root crops cassava has gained a greater importance than taro and yams. The last two are grown mainly by Chinese gardeners in the neighborhood of large towns. Cassava, too, is grown commercially by Chinese, especially near the railroad on the peninsula.

Most of the so-called dry-field crops are grown in Indochina during the dry season on land that is flooded during the rainy season and at that time [311] produces rice. Gourou has estimated that in Tongking 100,000 hectares of land are used exclusively for the production of dry-field crops and that 350,000 hectares of irrigated land are occupied by such crops during the dry season.[66]

This practice of growing dry-field crops on irrigated land during the dry season is especially widespread in Java, where population pressure is so great that the peasants have to use every possible means to enlarge their food supply. If there is not enough water available to grow a second wet-rice crop, they will always try to get a second harvest of quick-growing dry-field crops during the dry season.

In contrast to the peoples of Java, the Filipinos do not, as a rule, go in for the raising of dry-field crops on wet riceland during the dry season, although this should be possible if the land were cultivated. There is enough water in the soil a short distance below the surface for the growing of crops practically everywhere during the dry season. Repeated tilling would keep the soil soft and fine so that water could move upward by capillary action to replace that which is lost through evaporation. Cultivation would enable plants such as maize, peanuts, and soy beans to grow on land that otherwise would be baked dry and hard. Although the ratio between cultivated land and population in the Philippines does not make a dry-season crop a necessity in most regions, there are a number of districts where the peasants traditionally raise a dry-season crop on irrigated

[66] Gourou: Les paysans, 1936, pp. 407–408.

1 [see page 75 cat 116 -- Analyst]

7: Furnivall G-4,5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

Pestiferous slums compel attention in the larger towns, but conditions may be worse in the smaller towns up-country where they escape notice; even the villages often suffer from congestion. Food is less abundant, because cultivation for export reduces the area under subsistence crops, and the greater pressure on this smaller area diminishes the outturn; the demands of western enterprise for labour have a similar effect. Often the people take to cheaper or to more palatable but less nutritious food; thus groundnut oil replaces sesamum oil, cassava replaces rice, polished rice spreads beri-beri; sometimes the food is adulterated with imported products as when for some years large quantities of mineral oil were imported into Burma to mix with native vegetable oils. The natural effect of the economic forces released in the course of development is to lower the standard of health.[1]

Again, with man, as with crops and cattle, there is an intimate link between material development and infection. The improvement of communications and the mass migration of labourers spread old diseases and bring in new diseases. In Africa 'diseases have been introduced to which the African was formerly a stranger, and fresh strains of parasites cause attacks to which he was formerly immune; further, Africans now contract diseases common to temperate zones, and it is possible that the intensity of these is increased owing to the lack of acquired immunity'. The spread of sleeping sickness 'must in many cases be associated with the opening of new communications and the development of trading facilities'. The conditions under which labour is employed foster venereal disease, which in modern Africa seems to have an incidence ranging from 50 to 90 %.[2]

For various reasons also native medical skill deteriorates. The patronage of native rulers encourages the most successful physicians, and helps to maintain traditions, in Burma reminiscent of the Hippocratic oath, that make for professional self-respect. Under western rule the native doctors lose their best and most remunerative clients. Moreover the herbs, formerly gathered in the fields, come to be purchased in the market, and are liable to adulteration, so that the practitioner no longer knows what he prescribes. This applies also to modern substitutes for native drugs, such as cheap brands of quinine tabloids which, if they contain any quinine, are of little use except as marbles owing to the thickness of the coating; prac-

[1] *ISC*, 1, 21; Mills, p. 321; *RAB*, 1915–16, p. 30; 1918–19, p. 41.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1129, 1144–6, 1199.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

economic development tends to spread disease and foster ill-health; the more enlightened employers recognize the need for measures to improve the health of their labourers, and support the Government in taking steps to enforce similar measures on other employers; and attempts to raise the standard of health on western enterprise bring to light the need to raise the standard of health among the great mass of the people.

One aspect of this problem is nutrition. It is now recognized that in lands developed by native enterprise, cultivation for export tends to grow at the expense of cultivation for food, and it seems that during recent years, even where food grains constitute the staple export, less has been available for local consumption.[1] Moreover, the expansion of cultivation deprives the people of spontaneous products of the waste, formerly used to supplement their diet. Naturally problems of nutrition engage most attention where the profits of western enterprise are closely linked with the supply of food. We have noticed that in Malaya the loss to the Government and employers occasioned by the shortage of rice after the war of 1914 led to renewed insistence on the compulsory cultivation of rice. Especially in Africa the inefficiency of native labour is regarded as largely due to inadequate or unsuitable diet, and so 'nutritional problems are now much in the minds of administrations: whether the African eats enough food and, if he does, whether it is the right kind, and whether the attack on nutrition may not be the most important factor in reducing disease'. In the past Africans have adopted new kinds of food, but whether they will be so willing to accept the advice of dieticians would seem doubtful. In Malaya where the polished rice that has recently gained favour is regarded as a cause of beri-beri, attempts to induce the people to revert to roughly husked rice appear to have had little more success than the propaganda for standard bread in England, and it is unlikely that the African will be more responsive. It is unlikely also that the African will be able to afford more nutritious food, if it is more costly; normally, as we have noticed, in the process of economic development, cheap food drives out good food. Moreover, dietetics is a new science, and 'some African tribes seem to maintain physical fitness on food which is, according to nutritionists, wanting in certain constituents essential to health'.[2] Caution would seem necessary, therefore, in introducing innovations, and in any case no one can force the people to eat proper food.

[1] Wickizer and Bennett, p. 188. [2] *African Survey*, pp. 1122, 1194.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

CHAPTER X

WELFARE: HEALTH AND EDUCATION

1. Health and Progress

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Good health is a condition of both human welfare and economic progress. Most people would agree that, if there is one sphere of human life in which the West can promote greater material welfare in the tropics, it is in the conquest of disease. For whereas western medicine rests on modern science and, by applying reason to the cure and prevention of disease, daily performs new miracles, the native medicine of the tropics is pre-scientific. Its practitioners inherit a traditional knowledge of herbs and rules of healing, and probably acquire some skill from clinical experience; even in Africa not all those who practise native medicine can be dismissed as witch-doctors,[1] but native medical practice is empirical, and its sovereign remedy is faith. Not infrequently it cures where western science fails because western medicine still calls, as it has always done, for faith, and the people trust their own doctors rather than Europeans. But if medical treatment in the tropics is to reach a higher standard, the empirical methods of native practitioners must be corrected, supplemented or replaced by methods based on scientific principles. This is the more urgent because economic development, unless kept under control, fosters unhealthy conditions, spreads disease and makes for the deterioration of native medical practice.

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Doubtless under native rule the standard of health varied greatly from one place to another according to the climate, soil and native social customs, and the good physique and healthiness of tropical peoples have often attracted favourable comment. In Burma Europeans have been puzzled to reconcile the sparse population with the robust constitution of the Burmese. In Malaya 'the general good health and freedom from tuberculosis'[2] have been attributed to the fact that the villagers usually choose a site where air, light and water are abundant and build their houses in a manner that ensures good ventilation. In Africa 'early European travellers speak of the magnificent physique of the Ngoni warriors and their amazing feats of endurance'.[3] Economic development changes the environment.

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1198. [2] Mills, p. 320. [3] Read, p. 21.

p 355

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

Pestiferous slums compel attention in the larger towns, but conditions may be worse in the smaller towns up-country where they escape notice; even the villages often suffer from congestion. Food is less abundant, because cultivation for export reduces the area under subsistence crops, and the greater pressure on this smaller area diminishes the outturn; the demands of western enterprise for labour have a similar effect. Often the people take to cheaper or to more palatable but less nutritious food; thus groundnut oil replaces sesamum oil, cassava replaces rice, polished rice spreads beri-beri; sometimes the food is adulterated with imported products as when for some years large quantities of mineral oil were imported into Burma to mix with native vegetable oils. The natural effect of the economic forces released in the course of development is to lower the standard of health.[1]

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[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1129, 1144–6, 1199.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
[Filed in category 253.--Analyst]
[see p. 11, category 116.--Analyst]

suffer a certain amount of damage. The seedlings must therefore be given 243
time to grow strong enough to endure the temporary uprooting. They usually need from 30 to 40 days before they are ready for transplanting. Whenever early transplanting is necessary a technique is employed which is known in the Philippines as *dapog*. The puddled seedbed is completely covered with banana leaves, which are pressed slightly into the mud so that a thin layer of mud spreads over the leaves. On top of this is placed a layer, an inch thick, of rice hulls or finely cut straw. The whole is thoroughly soaked and sown with seeds. The banana leaves prevent the roots of the seedlings from growing into the ground and suffering the usual damage when transplanted, but the seedlings must be transplanted within two weeks after the sowing of the seed.

In the riparian marshes of Sumatra and Borneo—the *lebak* areas—all the land is flooded at the time when the rice seed should be put into the ground. The inhabitants of these districts, however, have found an ingenious solution to their problem: the floating seedbed. They build small rafts of bamboo, reed, banana stems, or the leaf-ribs of the sago palm, on which they place a layer of rush, or some other aquatic plant, and then a thick layer of fine mud. As the water level rises and falls the seedlings have a chance to develop on the float unharmed.

Numerous also are the techniques employed to supply wet-rice fields with the necessary water (see pp. 47–51). These reflect the nature of the terrain, the social organization, and the stage of technical development of the inhabitants. For it is obvious that the cultivation of wet rice on the plains of the Red River in Tongking would require very different techniques from those required on the steep mountain slopes of northern Luzon.

Culture, Types of Land Use, and Population Pressure

One of the most striking characteristics of Southeastern Asia is the great 101
variation in the density of the population (Map, Fig. 1B). This variation 161
reflects differences in culture as well as differences in physical environment. The culture and social organization of a people are intimately linked 361
to their technique and the intensity of their land use, which in turn guide the people in their selection of new land when it becomes necessary for them to seek new homes. The Cambodians, for example, when living in an environment similar to that of the Annamese, do not create the large rural settlements characteristic of areas inhabited by the latter.[28] Likewise, the Madurese prefer to settle in small hamlets or in isolated homesteads (*Einzelhof*) and to till unirrigated land, whereas the Javanese live in large villages and are by preference wet-field cultivators. Again, while the Bontocs and Ifugaos of northern Luzon build terraces and cultivate wet rice 000
as their primary crop, the neighboring Apayaos, most of the Kalingas, the Tinggians, and the Gaddangs have so far resisted all attempts on the

[28] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, p. 94.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

000 part of the government and of missionaries to introduce terracing and wet-rice cultivation but, instead, continue to practice shifting cultivation and to depend upon dry rice as their staple food.

•161 Wherever we find shifting cultivation the density of population is low; on the other hand, permanent cultivation provides the basis for higher
241 densities. The higher the density, the greater is the care bestowed upon
311 the cultivation of the soil. The development of permanent-field cultivation, the construction of terraces on mountainsides and hillsides, the dyking and draining of plains, and other complex techniques associated with wet-rice cultivation are but expressions of a population density that demands an intensive utilization of the soil and a maximum production of food crops.

000 The areas where wet rice was first cultivated were probably hollows and small valleys and the well watered slopes of low hills rather than the great plains and wide valleys that are today the rice granaries of the world. The utilization of extensive plains and broad river valleys for the cultivation of wet rice requires a social organization unknown to the peoples who first began wet-rice culture.

243 It is thought that the cultivation of wet rice originated in days when the hoe and the dibble stick were the only agricultural tools, that is, before the
231 animal-drawn plow reached Southeastern Asia. The broadcasting of seeds is held to be characteristic of plow culture, whereas the cultivators of wet rice in Monsoon Asia generally plant their rice seedlings in the manner of shifting cultivators,[29] a circumstance that would seem to support the hypothesis that the carabao and the plow were not a part of the original technique but were adopted later. Even today wet rice is raised in some parts of Southeastern Asia without the use of the plow. For example, peoples in central Celebes prepare their fields for cultivation by driving carabaos back and forth until the fields are thoroughly puddled.[30] In other areas where wet-rice fields are built on such steep slopes that it is impossible to get carabaos to the terraces, farmers are frequently obliged to till their land entirely by hand—employing only such tools as wooden spades and sticks, which may be shod with iron. The Ifugaos of northern Luzon, for example, have terrace walls reaching, in some cases, heights of 60 feet or more that can be scaled only by means of rocks jutting out from the faces of the walls.

000 Although most sedentary cultivators in Southeastern Asia make use of

[29] Although rice growers in other parts of the world generally use the broadcast method of sowing, one finds it in Southeastern Asia only as a rare exception. According to Copeland (*op. cit.*, p. 224) the *sabog*, or broadcasting method, is used in the Philippines over a rather limited area. This method produces lower yields but its advantages are "some saving of time, saving the labour of transplanting, and the possibility of maturing a crop with less water; rice grown directly in its place can get along with less water than transplanted rice." According to Kruyt ("De To Rongkong in Midden-Celebes," 1920, p. 380), the To Rongkong of central Celebes transplant their wet rice only in exceptional cases but usually broadcast it.

[30] Kruyt: "De To Seko in Midden-Celebes," 1920, p. 409.

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always sufficient land for the population without undue pressure on the forests. A result of British rule has been to increase the population and correspondingly to reduce the rest period of the soil. The consequences have been deforestation and soil erosion. For that reason the authorities have attempted to stop this mode of land use.

In Java shifting cultivation attracted the attention of the government as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century. It was practiced especially in the mountains. The fact that a shifting cultivator required more land than a peasant who cultivated the same piece of land year after year made shifting cultivation extremely undesirable to a colonial administration that wanted to use all available land for the production of cash crops—either under the "forced culture system" of 1830 to 1870[21] or under the private plantation system that has existed since 1870. This circumstance, together with an alarming increase in population, prompted the government to do everything possible to stop the practice of shifting cultivation in Java, and today it is found only in the quite thinly settled residency of Bantam in West Java.[22] In the Outer Islands, with their sparse population and large forest areas, it is widely practiced. But, in contrast to their predecessors, Dutch officials of recent times rarely use the term *Raubbau* for shifting cultivation. Instead they consider this form of land use justifiable if the abandoned fields revert to forest and have the possibility of regaining their former fertility. In the past fifteen years, however, warning voices have pointed out that in large parts of the Outer Islands ladang culture has become a source of destruction, for the forest is no longer being given an opportunity to recuperate.[23] Both agricultural and forestry officials have consequently become concerned over shifting cultivation. In 1930 Hagreis presented a paper on ladang culture before the congress of officials of the Agricultural Advisory Service in the Netherlands Indies.[24] At that time it was decided to appoint a special commission to study ladang culture.[25] The foresters, also, devoted a good deal of attention to the problem during their congress in 1937. In 1940 Van Beukering of the Department of Economic Affairs summarized the result of the ladang *enquête*.[26] He came to the conclusion that shifting cultivation is a logical and economically justifiable form of land use wherever there is a large amount of land available and a primitive economy exists. From a social point of view no objection can be raised if, after each occupation, the fertility of the soil is regained. There is no reason to insist upon more intensive forms of land use so long as the population density does not increase beyond 50 persons per square kilometer, or 130 persons per square mile. If at this density we

[21] From 1830 to 1870 the peasants of Java were forced, under the notorious "culture system," to devote part of their land and labor to producing crops for the government.
[22] Kools: Hoema's, 1935.
[23] Gonggrijp: "Soil Management," 1938, pp. 397–404.
[24] Hagreis: "Ladangbouw," 1930, pp. 43–75 and 629–642.
[25] "Enquête betreffende het ladangvraagstuk," 1931, pp. 1022–1033.
[26] Van Beukering: Het ladangvraagstuk. Unpublished typescript, 1940.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
[See p. 27, category 116. -- Analyst]

1,500,000, or at the most 2,000,000, which would mean about 300,000 to 400,000 households. This number of households could hardly occupy such a large rây area as Gourou assumes. 241 311

In Formosa only the Malay tribes of the mountains in the eastern half of the island practice shifting cultivation. They number, according to estimates, about 150,000. From this we may assume that not more than 30,000 to 50,000 hectares are occupied annually by shifting cultivators. 134

In the Philippines it is unlawful to make caiñgins on public land without the permission of the Bureau of Forestry.[34] Permission will be given if the forest on the land involved is of no commercial value and if the caiñgero accepts the obligation to reforest his patch with seeds supplied by the forest service. Several hundred caiñgeros are brought annually before the justices of the peace, who in the past, because their sympathy was with the caiñgeros, were usually rather reluctant to fine the culprits (Table II). Nobody knows, of course, how many illegal caiñgins escape detection, but it is certain that they greatly outnumber those that are made with the permission of the foresters added to those that have been brought to the attention of the courts. Special consideration is given to the "non-Christian" tribes, for whom tracts of land have been set aside within which they continue their age-old system of cultivation. In Mindanao probably three-fourths of the population, from the primitive Manobos to the more advanced Moros, practice the caiñgin system of cultivation. Other regions where this system is practiced extensively are Mindoro, Cebu, southern Negros, and parts of Luzon—the central and eastern cordillera and the Camarines. About 10 per cent of the population of the Philippines obtain a part or all of their food from caiñgins, most of which are made either on private land or on land that belongs to non-Christian tribes who know no other form of agriculture. [162]

Methods of Eliminating the Undesirable Aspects of Shifting Cultivation

In regions where the density of population exceeds 50 persons per square kilometer, shifting cultivation becomes wasteful and destructive. It is imperative in such areas that the system be either modified or else replaced by more conserving and, where possible, more intensive forms of land use. For most backward tribes this involves fundamental changes in their mode of life, religious ideas, and concepts of land rights. 241 311 161

In some instances it should suffice to adopt measures that eliminate the harmful or wasteful after effects of the system without requiring that this kind of land use be given up completely. Let us assume that we have a somewhat thinly settled region containing a forest that is not particularly valuable and the exploitation of which is impracticable or at present inexpedient. Deforestation and the spread of grasses are undesirable aspects 185 241 311

[34] Nano: "Kaiñgin Laws," 1939, pp. 87–92.

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na edulis Ker), sweet potato (*Ipomoea batatas* Poir.), taro (*Colocasia esculenta* Schott), *Curcuma* species, Goa bean (*Psophocarpus tetragonolobus* DC.), bitter cucumber (*Momordica charantia* L.), snake gourd (*Trichosanthes anguina* L.), Lima bean (large) (*Phaseolus lunatus* L.), Goa potato (*Dioscorea aculeata* L.), wild yam (*Dioscorea hispida* Dennst.), and sweet yam (*Dioscorea alata* L.). The middle story contains taller-growing plants, such as cassava (*Manihot utilissima* Pohl), citrus varieties such as *Citrus nobilis* Lour. and *Citrus aurantifolia* Swingle, papaya (*Carica papaya* L.), banana (*Musa* species), rose apple (*Eugenia aquea* Burm.), and [illegible]ursop (*Anona muricata* L.). The upper story is formed by tall fruit trees such as coconut (*Cocos nucifera* L.), jackfruit (*Artocarpus integra* Merr.), sapodilla or chico (*Achras zapota* L.), pomelo (*Citrus maxima* Merr.), of which numerous forms, differing in size and color, are known in the Indies, *belinju* (*Gnetum gnemon* L.), mango (*Mangifera indica* L.), durian (*Durio zibethinus* Murr.), candlenut tree (*Aleurites moluccana* Willd.), tamarind (*Tamarindus indica* L.), *pete* (*Parkia speciosa* Hassk.), stinkbean tree (*Pithecellobium lobatum* Benth.), and *santol* (*Sandoricum koetjape* Merr.).

This list does not by any means include all the plants that appear in the gardens. The plants vary in number and type from region to region in accordance with differences in soil, climate (elevation), and the taste of the owners.

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Estimates indicate that about 15 per cent of the cultivated land in Java and Madura is taken up by gardens. Unfortunately, there have been no detailed studies of garden culture outside of Java, although the products of the garden play an important role in the diet of all the peoples of Southeastern Asia. Terra, who compared garden culture in various districts of Java, found that the share of land allotted to gardens, together with the intensity of their cultivation, increases as the total amount of crop land per head decreases, down to the point where the average amount of crop land per head is only 0.15 hectare. Where the amount of land is even less than this the share of garden land decreases, although there is a tendency at first to increase the intensity of the garden culture. Close to the larger cities, the amount of crop land per person, together with the amount devoted to gardens and the intensity of the latter's cultivation, falls off to a minimum since the population here has supplementary sources of income.

With the development of a money economy appears a specialization that is directed toward the urban centers. There has always been some natural specialization inasmuch as some plants do not grow well everywhere. The coconut, for example, does best in the lowlands. But the new specialization depends not only upon such natural factors as soil and climate, but also upon economic factors such as marketing facilities and the development of communications. This specialization can be observed generally in Southeastern Asia.

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Ochse and Terra found that in calories of food value the returns of the gardens proved to be slightly higher per hectare than those of the irri-

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SOUTHEAST ASIA NUTRITION DENSITIES
(Average number of persons per rice-acre per annum)

Quinquennium	*Burma*	*Indo-china*	*Siam*	*Java and Madoera*	*Philip-pines*	*Malaya*
1916–20	1.23	1.75	1.66	4.12	3.13	—
1921–25	1.19	1.67	1.57	4.27	2.67	5.61
1926–30	1.14	1.61	1.57	4.50	2.69	6.13
1931–35	1.19	1.64	1.63	4.60	2.76	6.42
1936–40	1.25	1.63	1.74	4.96	2.79	7.02
1946–50	2.0	2.1	1.6	5.9	3.9	7.2

Because population and the net production of food have increased *pari passu*, it is important to examine the "nutrition density" (persons per acre under rice) since the surplus for export depends on low internal consumption of the Southeast Asia staple and high internal production. The countries of Southeast Asia pre-war showed considerable differences in nutrition density, from Malaya (the plantation-mining specialist) with 7.2 persons per rice-acre, to Siam (the rice-surplus specialist) with 1.6. Malaya, Java and the Philippines had nutrition densities much higher than the rest of neighbouring countries and in the case of Malaya and Java the nutrition density had been steadily rising, whereas in Burma, Indochina and Siam it was fairly static. Over the same period, the domestic consumption of rice per person sharply dropped (by 20-25 per cent) in Burma, Siam and Java and rose about 10 per cent in Indochina, Philippines and Malaya. The postwar figures available show considerable increases of nutrition density everywhere except in Siam, yet these were changes of degree, not of pattern.

Changing Internal Emphasis

Today the very crowded places are firstly, Middle and North Java, Lower Siam and the Red River Delta, where densities of over 1,500 people per square mile occur, with secondary crowdings in Lower Burma, the Lower Mekong, Central Luzon and the Visayas. These concentrations of people are pre-eminently in agricultural areas (Fig. 116), and they are in fact largely made possible by exceptional soil qualities within an area whose general soil fertility is low. These crowded areas have taken part in a commercialisation of local agriculture and their subsequent history has been firstly a

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369 than their elongated forms, difficult interiors and cliffed, marsh or
631 forest edges in fact justify. Rarely has any one of the major islands been the locale of a single people singly governed, homogeneous
184 and integrated into an island-state. These large islands have been dispersive and fragmentive to the peoples in them.

Postwar Nationalism

186 The postwar effusion of nationalism in Southeast Asia is thus a paradox. It is a nationalism of plural societies and substantial minorities, without homogeneity inside the states, and without a nation, as understood in Europe, and very much a culmination of the insecurity and uncertainty produced by the divergent influences which have long been at work, breaking down old social integrations and their warm, human associations, substituting for them nothing but commerce and the new myth "economic man," cold, inexorable and not adequately or fully integrated with Southeast Asia people and their setting.

The devolution of Southeast Asia from colonial into nationalist units takes place at no propitious time. The cultivation of rice has been predatory, the accumulated effects of which are now showing in diminishing yields; new paddylands before the war were ceasing to be so easily available and the war threw a large proportion of the old lands out of cultivation. Rubber has found a competitor in synthetic rubber, and its production may repeat the history of sugar. Tin recovers from the war slowly because equipment has been lost. Plantation crops have lost labour, markets and opportunities. Yet Southeast Asia is still increasing its people faster than
161 the world average. Its increase, however, has gone on at a slower rate in the already congested areas and at a faster rate in what had been the emptier areas of South Sumatra (with Javanese migrants), in Mindanao (with Filipinos), in Johore (by Chinese immigrants), as well as in Laos, Dutch Borneo and Inner Siam, by local increases. Thus Southeast Asia has been filling up, though there is little prospect yet of an even distribution.

Devolution

000 The Southeast Asia population is expanding now as the trade systems which provided its first impetus to expansion shrink and lose coherence. The atmosphere is one of relinquishing colonies, but under circumstances when they are involved in an international

foreign army of occupation has preserved it from disruption. The essential and distinctive character of a plural society is that it is dominated by economic forces, and, outside a few partly sheltered oases, Southeast Asia illustrates the capitalist system in its purest form.[18]

Another common feature is the dominance of the agricultural section of the population. The latest available figures show the percentage proportions of population dependent on agriculture in the area as follows: Burma, 68; Indonesia, 66; Philippines, 69; Thailand, 85.[19] The same source indicates the proportions for various regions of the world as follows: North America, 20; Oceania, 30; Europe, 33; South America, 60; Asia, 70; and Africa, 74.

With the prevailing techniques of production and the consequent low productivity per man, dominance of agriculture means low per capita national income. When countries are grouped by level of economic development on the basis of per capita national income as of 1950, all the six countries of Southeast Asia -- Burma, Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaya, Philippines, and Thailand -- fall in the underdeveloped group.[20] Moreover, there is in Southeast Asia a true surplus population on the land in the sense that even under the present methods of cultivation a sizeable fraction of the

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18. Ibid., p. 77.

19. Food and Agriculture Organization, 1953 Yearbook, Vol. VII.

20. Eugene Staley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), pp. 16-17.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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man-power could be removed without significantly reducing food output. Under this circumstance, not only the productivity of agriculture but also the opportunity for urban industry to grow and flourish is hampered. A major obstacle to development of efficient manufacturing in underdeveloped countries is the small size of the market, which is in turn a consequence of the low purchasing power of the bulk of the people, most of whom get their living from the land.[21]

Southeast Asia has been characterized by its rapid growth in population. Broadly speaking, the region has been until recently one of very thin population. It seems probable that the whole of Southeast Asia in 1800 contained only about ten million people. Malaya then contained about a quarter million people, Java about four million, and Burma probably less than two million. It was, even at the end of the 18th century, a zone of labor shortage. But the last 150 years brought tremendous changes in population. It has been a period of tremendous population increases, causing people to swarm upon the more fertile areas, upon deltas and volcanic cones where people had not clustered before. By the quinquennium 1916-20, the total population of Southeast Asia had become 84 million, by 1936-40, 120 million, and by 1946-50 it was nearly 145 million.[22] This rapid population growth has been a great concern to students in economic

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21. Ibid., p. 253.

22. E. H. G. Dobby, Southeast Asia (London: University of London Press Ltd., 1951), p. 386.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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161 development who fear that these countries might not be able
433 to expand their production faster than population expands, in which case the result of economic development efforts will be a greater quantity of people with little or no gains in the quality of living conditions. In Zinkin's words, "The growth of population and the impact of the West have between them, in the last hundred years, so upset the delicate balance that most of the Asian countryside is now bankrupt . . . . The alarming feature of the peasant economy of Asia is not simply that it is desparately poor. It is that in recent decades, and in most countries of Asia, it has been growing poorer. It is a changing, dynamic economy. But it has been changing for the worse."[23]

433 Poverty is not new in Southeast Asia. What is new
829 is the awareness of poverty and the conviction that something
178 can be done about it. "A great change", reported Harold Butler, "is stirring Eastern society. The consciousness of misery has been created by the growing realization that it is not the inescapable lot of the poor and that chances
654 of better life now exist."[24] All of the countries in South-
648 east Asia have within the past decade set up official agen-
185 cies charged with planning and promoting economic development; and for international assistance to hasten it, is the constant

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23. Zinkin, op. cit., p. 34.

24. Harold Butler, Problems of Industry in the East (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1938, Studies and Reports, Series B, No. 29), pp. 65-66.

1: Pelzer 5-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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

FIG. 1B—Population Density in Southeastern Asia. This map, like the one opposite, was originally prepared for Professor Jan O. M. Broek's article, "Diversity and Unity in Southeast Asia." He has described his method of compiling the data on densities as follows: "In order to present a comparable picture for the whole of Southeast Asia, the year 1940 or 1941 was chosen, and densities were calculated for administrative districts. This use of administrative districts for the sake of uniformity explains, for instance, the rather low density of the Annam coastal region, where the districts include large areas of sparsely settled uplands adjacent to the crowded coastal strip. The scale of the map required, of course, some generalizations where there were many small districts with differing densities (Tongking, Cochinchina, Java). Cities, where they formed separate census units, were included in the adjacent districts." A list of the sources used and further notes about the compilation are given by Professor Broek in his article (p. 180). (Reproduced by courtesy of the *Geographical Review*).

[p. 11]

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
1 [See p. 26, category 241 or 116. -- Analyst]

241 Van Beukering allowed an additional 200,000 hectares for coffee and pepper
311 ladangs; so that the total area amounts to about 8,000,000 hectares. If we
assume that the population of the Outer Islands increases at the rate of
134 1½ to 2½ per cent each year, it would double in from 29 to 47 years.
This would mean that after about 30 to 50 years 16,000,000 hectares
would come within the scope of shifting cultivation.

361 In Malaya ladang cultivation is illegal, but it is practiced in the hinterland well away from roads and railways, in eastern sections of the peninsula. Dobby recently described it in Pahang and northeastern Kedah, near the Thai border.[30] The Sakai of Pahang regularly abandon their primitive huts as well as the clearings when they shift to a new field (Map, Fig. 2). 1 The Malays of northeastern Kedah, on the other hand, as a rule live permanently in one place and change only their fields (Map, Fig. 3). 1 There are no statistics available on the areal extent to which shifting cultivation is carried on in Malaya, but according to Dobby the system gives way to permanent culture "as the standard of cultivation rises and as the effect of law becomes stronger."[31]

In Thailand shifting cultivation is extensively practiced by the tribes of the mountains of the north and west, on the eastern part of the Khorat Plateau, and on the peninsula. Probably about 1,000,000 people depend upon it. According to the same kind of calculation that Van Beukering made for the Indies, a total of 1,400,000 hectares would be required, or 200,000 hectares annually, if we allow five persons per household and consider that one hectare covers the needs of a family for 2 years.[32]

[162] In Indochina only the tribes of the mountains of Tongking, Laos, and Annam now practice rây, or shifting, cultivation. The people of the plains, Annamese and Cambodians, who represent 84 per cent of the population, practice a more intensive form of agriculture. Gourou has estimated the areal extent of shifting cultivation in Indochina. He states that a rây is used for 2 years and has to lie fallow for at least 20 years, which seems a rather long period as compared with other countries. In addition to its extensive plains, Indochina has a mountainous or hilly area of 580,000 square kilometers. Only one per cent of this land is permanently cultivated. Gourou estimates that about 40 per cent of the mountainous country is suitable for rây cultivation and he assumes that one-tenth of this, or 4 per cent of the total mountain land, is under rây cultivation in any one year.[33] If this calculation is correct it would mean that 23,200 square kilometers, or 2,320,000 hectares, are occupied annually by shifting cultivators. The numerical strength of the shifting tribes shows, however, that this estimate cannot be correct. Their number is not much greater than

[30] Dobby: "Settlement Patterns in Malaya," 1942, p. 222.
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] For an excellent description of the life of the shifting cultivators in Thailand, see Credner: Siam, 1935, pp. 148–173.
[33] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 177–182, especially pp. 180 and 182.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
[See p. 27, category 116. -- Analyst]

1,500,000, or at the most 2,000,000, which would mean about 300,000 to 400,000 households. This number of households could hardly occupy such a large rây area as Gourou assumes. 241 311

In Formosa only the Malay tribes of the mountains in the eastern half of the island practice shifting cultivation. They number, according to estimates, about 150,000. From this we may assume that not more than 30,000 to 50,000 hectares are occupied annually by shifting cultivators. 134

In the Philippines it is unlawful to make caiñgins on public land without the permission of the Bureau of Forestry.[34] Permission will be given if the forest on the land involved is of no commercial value and if the caiñgero accepts the obligation to reforest his patch with seeds supplied by the forest service. Several hundred caiñgeros are brought annually before the justices of the peace, who in the past, because their sympathy was with the caiñgeros, were usually rather reluctant to fine the culprits (Table II). Nobody knows, of course, how many illegal caiñgins escape detection, but it is certain that they greatly outnumber those that are made with the permission of the foresters added to those that have been brought to the attention of the courts. Special consideration is given to the "non-Christian" tribes, for whom tracts of land have been set aside within which they continue their age-old system of cultivation. In Mindanao probably three-fourths of the population, from the primitive Manobos to the more advanced Moros, practice the caiñgin system of cultivation. Other regions where this system is practiced extensively are Mindoro, Cebu, southern Negros, and parts of Luzon—the central and eastern cordillera and the Camarines. About 10 per cent of the population of the Philippines obtain a part or all of their food from caiñgins, most of which are made either on private land or on land that belongs to non-Christian tribes who know no other form of agriculture. [162]

Methods of Eliminating the Undesirable Aspects of Shifting Cultivation

In regions where the density of population exceeds 50 persons per square kilometer, shifting cultivation becomes wasteful and destructive. It is imperative in such areas that the system be either modified or else replaced by more conserving and, where possible, more intensive forms of land use. For most backward tribes this involves fundamental changes in their mode of life, religious ideas, and concepts of land rights. 241 311 161

In some instances it should suffice to adopt measures that eliminate the harmful or wasteful after effects of the system without requiring that this kind of land use be given up completely. Let us assume that we have a somewhat thinly settled region containing a forest that is not particularly valuable and the exploitation of which is impracticable or at present inexpedient. Deforestation and the spread of grasses are undesirable aspects 185 241 311

[34] Nano: "Kaiñgin Laws," 1939, pp. 87–92.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

241 to apply it regularly to his fields in order to keep up the fertility which formerly was restored through long forest fallow. This animal fertilizer
231 is more important than the help the peasant gets from his animals in the
185 way of labor. Thus the area to be cultivated may be limited by the amount of manure available, rather than by the extent of land that can be plowed.

Van Beukering, in his summary of the results of the ladang *enquête*, is of the opinion that similar practices should be introduced in the Outer Islands of the Netherlands Indies; but the pasture problem must first be carefully studied before mixed farming can be widely established in the Indies. Where animal manure is not available, the composting of vegetable waste, or even of crops grown for this specific purpose, supplies an excellent fertilizer.

The intensification and modification of shifting cultivation are less difficult in flat country than on sloping land where there is the hazard of soil erosion. Perhaps the most obvious solution would be to move the population from mountainous land to the plains and valley floors, but this can be done only in areas where population density is low. In Southeastern Asia
[62] the density of population on the plains is usually so high that, should it be possible to bring malaria under control, a movement from the plains to the uplands and mountains would be desirable rather than a migration in the opposite direction. Another solution would be to have the shifting cultivator plant permanent tree crops to protect the soil against accelerated erosion. Steep slopes which now produce but a single moderate rice crop every few years could be made more productive if planted with perennials. The cultivator could then buy his staple food with the money obtained from the sale of the crops harvested from his trees.

The speed with which the change from shifting cultivation to permanent cultivation may be made will depend both on the geographical environment and the cultural level of the community. Shifting cultivators with permanent villages and a regularly established rotation of fields will respond much more readily to a reform brought from the outside than a group that is always ready to abandon its dwellings and move to a new locality.

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PART I

THE AREA AS A WHOLE

CHAPTER I

THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

162 At the present time the number of persons regarding themselves as of Chinese race in Southeast Asia—Burma, Siam, Indochina, Malaya, British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines—probably exceeds 8½ million in a total population of about 157 million. This means that the Chinese account for only 5 or 6 per cent. of the total, but, as will appear from the following pages, their importance, economically and politically, is out of all proportion to their numbers and is likely to be increasingly great.

The table on p. 2 represents the distribution of the Chinese in this area with what is thought to be a fair degree of probability.[1]

Having committed ourselves to this table, we should now try to justify it. There has been a great deal of loose statement regarding the number of Chinese in Southeast Asia, especially in Siam and the Philippines, which has been due to political motivation as well as to misapprehension. The validity of our arguments in attempting to arrive at something near the real figure will depend rather on a general knowledge of what has been happening in the area in the last few years and a feeling for the probabilities than on an application of demographic equations to statistics of varying value.

The first difficulty arises from the definition of 'Chinese'; the second from the up-to-dateness or otherwise of the censuses or enumerations.

The census officials in Burma, Malaya, British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines have always apparently regarded 'Chinese' in an ethnographical sense, or rather, any person regarding him or herself as a Chinese, or who is so regarded by the head of the household or the enumerator completing the return, is so accounted for
641 in the census. In Siam and Indochina, however, persons born in
162 the country have been regarded as citizens of the country unless

[1] But see discussion in Postscript.

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their births have been registered with the consulates of their country of origin (in Indochina there was no Chinese consulate before 1935 and in Siam before 1946). In Burma the census report for 1931 stated that for some years it had been the custom for the male offspring of unions between Chinese men and Burmese women to assume the race of the father and for the female offspring to assume the race of the mother, so that, if we are to regard all offspring of the second generation of mixed marriages as Chinese, a considerable compensation has here to be made to the existing figures.

Ethnic[1] *Chinese in Southeast Asia*

Census figures in ordinary type: estimates in italics

	Chinese				Total population (all races)	
	1921 or circa	*1931 or circa*	*1937 or circa*	*1947*		*1947*[2]
Burma	149,000	194,000	..	*300,000*	16,824,000 (1941)	*17,000,000*
Siam	260,000[3] (1919)	445,000[3] (1929)	524,000[3]	*2,500,000*	14,464,000 (1937)	*17,359,000*
Indochina	293,000[3]	418,000[3]	326,000[3] *467,000* (1940)	*850,000*	23,030,000 (1937)	*27,000,000*
Malaya	1,172,000	1,704,000	*2,379,000* (1941)	*2,615,000*[4]	5,849,000[5] (1947)	5,849,000
British Borneo[6]	..	..	..	*220,000*	..	*878,000*
Indonesia	809,000 (1920)	1,233,000 (1930)	..	*1,900,000*	60,727,000 (1930)	*69,000,000*
Philippines	44,000 (1918)	*72,000* (1933)	117,487 (1939)	*120,000*[7]	*18,846,800*[8] (1946)	*19,511,000*
			Total: Ethnic Chinese (say	*8,505,000* *8,500,000*)	All races (say	*156,597,000* *160,000,000*)

[1] Except where marked 3 (see below).

[2] In this column all the totals by countries, except for Malaya where the 1947 census is followed, are those of the United Nations Statistical Office for mid-1947, cited at p. 13 of *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1948* (Lake Success, United Nations, 1949).

[3] 'Legal' Chinese (i.e. according to local law), i.e. Chinese citizens, or 'Immigrants from China'.

[4] Federation of Malaya 1,885,000; Colony of Singapore 730,000.

[5] Federation of Malaya 4,908,000; Colony of Singapore 941,000.

[6] 1921 census for North Borneo gave only 38,000; 1931 census gave North Borneo 48,000, Brunei 3,000, Labuan 2,000; an enumeration in 1939 gave 124,000 Chinese for Sarawak; 1947 census gave Sarawak 145,000. (Labuan was returned to North Borneo in 1946. 1941 estimate gave North Borneo Chinese 59,000.)

[7] An estimate of the Immigration Bureau (1948) gave 101,000 but 120,000 is here given to allow for illegal immigration, &c. (see text below).

[8] Estimate of Immigration Bureau.

Let us now consider the situation country by country.

In Malaya, at the census of 1947, 2,615,000 Chinese were counted. In this country 'Chinese' is more ethnographically exact than in any other country of Southeast Asia because since large-scale immigration from China began over half a century ago there has been

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Chinese

no miscegenation of any importance. Before then it was comparatively small.[1] 162

Siam, which next to Malaya has probably the greatest number of Chinese in the area, offers far greater difficulty. The Siamese census of 1937 placed the *immigrant* Chinese at 524,000. It is common knowledge, however, that the number of persons in the country who in appearance, custom, language, and sentiment are of the Chinese race is far greater than this. Indeed, now that the 'Chinese question' looms large in Siam, it is often whispered (and sometimes in responsible circles) that the number of Chinese in the country is 'over four million'. This figure the writer believes to be a great exaggeration. For one thing, the 1937 figure for 'legal' Chinese was probably not far from the mark,[2] and even if we included all persons of the second and even third generation (at which stage assimilation to the Siamese was usually complete) we should probably not reach a figure for that time greater than two million.[3] Since the census of 1937 the immigration of Chinese into Siam has been strictly controlled and was in 1949 subject to a quota of 200 per annum. Even allowing for a considerable illegal entry and a natural increase of 1·5 per cent. per annum it is not thought likely that the present figure is more than two and a half million—in all probability it is appreciably less. A different test that we may apply is this. For reasons of prestige the Chinese National Government has tended to state the number of its nationals abroad (and China, as we know, follows the *jus sanguinis* and not the *jus soli*) at the highest possible figure, but the official *China Handbook*, 1937–43, compiled by the Chinese Ministry of Information in Chungking, gives the figure as two and a half million for 1943, though the *Chinese Year Book*, 1943, compiled by the Council of International Affairs, Chungking, states it as three million.[4] 162 167

[1] The main reason is the Mohammedan religion with the alternatives of 'pork or no pork', 'dogs or no dogs'. Mr del Tufo doubts whether the number of Chinese Malay 'crosses' exceeds one or two in a thousand of the whole population.

[2] The Siamese census of 1947 gave Chinese in Bangkok, 284,519, Chinese in the provinces, 508,172, total, 792,691. These were Chinese holding aliens' registration certificates.

[3] This is the figure given by Mr Leonard Unger in his article 'The Chinese in Southeast Asia', *The Geographical Review*, vol. xxxiv, no. 2 (1944) p. 199.

[4] Mr Unger (ibid.) reasonably says of the Chinese in Siam: 'If to the immigrants are added a second generation and those individuals in a third generation who still speak the language and keep up the customs of, and main-

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In the Philippines Filipino nationalism has for many years tended to magnify the number of Chinese in the islands since this was a matter of political capital, and before the Americans came certain Spanish interests had reasons of their own for stating the number as high as possible. But the numbers undoubtedly decreased during the war with Japan and since the liberation the Philippines Government has refused to allow the return of Chinese displaced persons except as part of a small annual quota.[1] Early in 1948 the Philippine Immigration Bureau gave the total number of Chinese in the islands as 101,000, but although to this figure a certain percentage should be added for illegal immigration (which is much easier to accomplish than in Siam, the Philippines being so near to China) it is thought that by adopting a figure of 120,000 a sufficient allowance has been made both for this and for any error in enumeration.

In Indochina where 'immigrants from China' are the only ones included in the census returns as Chinese, there have nevertheless been partial attempts in 1921 and 1931 to count the number of second generation *métis*, or offspring of Chinese fathers and Annamite or Cambodian mothers, and, making the necessary compensations and adjustments, we get a figure for 1937 of 326,000 'legal' Chinese plus 141,000 *métis* and a total of 467,000. This figure incidentally is about 40,000 in excess of that given by the *China Handbook*, 1937–43. (The official French figure for 1931 had been 418,000 'legal' Chinese, but the numbers had dropped considerably by 1937.) The official estimate by the Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer was 850,000 Chinese in Indochina in 1947.

Other difficulties turn on the variation in the years of the available censuses. Malaya and Sarawak are the only two countries in the area which have taken censuses since the Japanese surrender.[2]

tain a loyalty to, their ancestral homeland, the total rises to about one million. This approaches two million if there are also included those who might be called "ethnic" Chinese—offspring of mixed Chinese and their parentage who show in their physical appearance and cultural characteristics an affinity with Chinese.'

Ta Chen, *Emigrant Communities in South China* (London, Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 264, quotes Lin Yu, 'Twin Loyalties in Siam', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. ix, no. 2 (June 1936) p. 191, as giving 2,500,000 as the number of ethnic Chinese in Siam and adds 'or about one-fourth of the population of Siam'—which involves a considerable under-estimate of Siam's population at the time of writing (1935).

[1] See Appendix III.

[2] A census was taken in Siam in 1947, but the only details of Chinese published so far are those on p. 3, n. 2.

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For the other countries we have only censuses and enumerations of differing stages of remoteness. The problem is how to bring the figures up to date by estimation. 162

We may take it that in the undoubtedly favourable conditions afforded by Southeast Asian countries generally, a 'natural' Chinese population would increase by 1·5 to 2 per cent. per annum (and, remember, at compound interest). But one has to be careful because these immigrant populations are often not natural, i.e. they may have a lop-sided sex ratio and the age structure might be grossly distorted. Thus, to take an extreme example, you might have 800 men, 100 girls under 10, 50 women between 15 and 45, and the others women over 50—giving a crude birth-rate about 10 per mille—and natural increase nil! The Chinese in Malaya have increased by 1·8 per cent. per annum since 1931, and with a 1:1 sex ratio and settled conditions that figure might pass 2 per cent. But elsewhere sex ratio must be considered. All in all, it seems pretty safe to assume a 1·5 increase. But since the definition of 'Chinese' rules out any close estimation of their numbers, this rough-and-ready formula we have arrived at should be applied only where no estimate based on other considerations is acceptable. This is the case only with Indochina, British Borneo, and Indonesia and here it has, subject to known factors, been utilized.[1]

Mr Unger's map (reproduced as a separate folder)[2] will assist us to gain an idea of 'ethnic' Chinese in the region. It must be kept in mind (a warning repeated in Part VII, The Chinese in Indonesia) that it represents only the chief areas of concentration and has no reference to the comparative numbers of the Chinese and native population—the former being only 5 per cent. of the latter.

In Southeast Asia the Chinese are scattered through the countries in which they live, in large towns, villages, peasant farms, plantations, and mining communities. Sometimes the Chinese have come to an area already well populated and developed; sometimes they have opened up an almost uninhabited region. Java, perhaps the most densely populated area in the world, has at least three-quarters of a million Chinese, if not considerably more; the coastlands of Western Borneo, almost uninhabited before Chinese 361 162

[1] I am indebted for these views to conversations with Mr M. V. del Tufo, Superintendent of the 1947 Census for Malaya.

[2] By permission of Mr Leonard Unger and of the American Geographical Society.

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361 immigration, are also the site of a large Chinese immigrant com-
162 munity. Burma and Siam exhibit similar contrasts within themselves: between the densely settled delta of the Irrawaddy and the almost uninhabited Northern Shan States (where the Bawdwin mines are located), the two focuses of Chinese settlement in Burma; in Siam, between the thickly populated Menam delta and the Isthmus of Kra, almost empty until the advent of the Chinese.[1] In central Siam the Chinese live closely associated with the Siamese people by whom, until recent decades, they were completely absorbed within a few generations. In Siam about half the Chinese live in the lower delta of the Menam, in the neighbourhood of Bangkok; the remainder of the race are scattered through the country, living in villages and towns rather than rural communities and tending to concentrate in the more commercialized districts. A notable concentration of Chinese, consisting of the more recent immigrants, is to the southwest of Siam, where they work in the mines, on the rubber plantations, and as merchants in the villages.

162 Apart from the concentration in the Kra Isthmus region, the
442 chief occupations of the Chinese in Siam are the various forms of retail and wholesale trade. The Chinese, in fact, control most of
443 the retail trade in the country. In particular they have the lion's share in the rice distribution and milling, and there is scarcely a commodity from pepper to sugar in which they are not interested as middlemen. They also make up a large part of the class of skilled craftsmen.

167 Most of the Chinese in Siam originally came from Hainan, Mei Hsien, and Chao Chou (including the city of Swatow) in east Kwangtung. The last-named group is apparently in the majority, especially those from Chin Hai, Yao P'ing, Chi Yang, and Chao An.

162 In Malaya the Chinese have a special significance in that they are here the majority community and have been so since before 1941. In that year there were for the whole of Malaya 2,379,000 Chinese as compared with 2,279,000 Malays, though, excluding Singapore, which is virtually a Chinese city, the Malays still outnumbered them. By 1947 they had still further strengthened their position so that they accounted for 2,615,000 of the population, whereas the Malays were now 2,544,000. This outnumbering of the native population (though the Malays themselves have multiplied their numbers several-fold within the last few decades by natural

[1] Unger, op. cit.

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increase and by the reinforcement of Indonesians, mostly Javanese) 162 has given rise to one of the most perplexing political problems in the Far East.

Malaya's Chinese are largely urban and are occupied in trade, [361] but they also supply the bulk of the labour in the tin mines of which they own about a third. There is a large Chinese labour force on the rubber estates where, however, before the war with Japan, they were outnumbered by the Indians. In addition to these occupations, the Malayan Chinese are actively engaged in every branch of the trades and crafts, from agriculture (squatters) and pig keeping and poultry rearing (which they almost monopolize) to the building and skilled artisan trades, tailoring, dressmaking, and cobbling, and managing or working in oil mills, soap factories, shipping firms, sawmills, and many other undertakings. The pineapple industry is entirely a Chinese enterprise.

Most numerous of the Chinese tribes in Malaya are the Hokkiens, after them come the Cantonese, followed by the Hakkas (Khehs), Tiuchius, and Hailams (Hainanese), and in much smaller numbers by the Kwongsai, Hokchius, Hokchias, and others. The Hokkiens, being the pioneer community in Malaya and the principal merchants, are more numerous in the Settlements of Singapore, Penang, and Malacca, and the Cantonese more numerous in the remainder of the country.

A census was taken in 1947 for the first time since 1931 and tables and abstracts from this census, together with some observations of the Superintendent, Mr del Tufo, are included in Chapter XXV of this survey. The facts revealed are of key importance and those regarding the sex ratio are highly significant.

In Java the Chinese live throughout the island, usually in cities [361] and towns rather than in the rural areas, and they are the middle-class merchants who control much of the wholesale and retail trade. Commerce and transport occupied 61 per cent. of the Chinese in Java in 1930: sugar processing, food industries, and timber were next among their occupations. In Batavia the Chinese formed 15 per cent. of the total population.

The people of south Fukien were among the earliest immigrants 167 to Indonesia, especially Java. Some of the families have been there 162 for almost two centuries (the founder of the Tsai (Tsoa) house landed in Java five generations ago, in 1753).[1] The Hakkas and the

[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 266.

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Chinese

167 people from Chao Chou (including the city of Swatow), the Teochius, and from southern Kwangtung, followed the Hokkiens.
162 The Hakkas began to settle in West Borneo between 1740 and 1745, and were followed thither by Teochius. At first they were employed in gold-mining or were agriculturists, engaged in cultivation of rubber, pepper, and tobacco; but towards the end of the nineteenth century, when both plantations and mines grew up under European management, the Teochius and many Hakkas moved on to colonize Bangka, Billiton, and east Sumatra.

162 The Chinese of Indonesia, especially those of Java, have a much more noticeable admixture of native blood than have the Chinese of the other Southeast Asian countries.[1]

167 Chinese immigration into Indochina was directed principally towards Cochinchina and Cambodia and comparatively little towards
162 Annam and Tongking which were already thickly populated, or towards Laos which was hard of access and little developed. In Cochinchina and Cambodia, however, the Chinese pervade every phase of economic life. The largest concentration of them is in the city-continuum of Saigon-Cholon. In these countries they have a virtual monopoly of the rice trade, just as they have in Siam (though attempts have been made to limit their share of the trade in both countries, especially in Siam). They are also engaged in pepper planting and vegetable gardening, but have taken practically no part in the newer estate agriculture of rubber, cotton, tea, and palm oil—indeed as aliens they were barred from the lands most suitable for this purpose.

As in other countries of the area, the trade depression of 1929–32 had a greatly restricting effect on immigration to Indochina, but in the few years before the Allied war with Japan this was recovering.

It has been convenient to summarize the distribution and occupation of the overseas Chinese country by country, but it should be remarked that this distribution is always dictated by economic considerations, as, for example, the belt of mining activity which extends from Burma round about Moulmein to the southward along the west coast of the Malay Peninsula through Siam and Malaya and then crops up again in the Dutch islands of Bangka and

[1] When attending a meeting of the Chung Hua Hui at Leyden in 1946, at which a hundred or so Indonesian Chinese resident in the Netherlands were present, the writer was struck with the dark complexion so common among them which was in marked contrast with the lighter complexion of the Chinese of most of Malaya, except parts of Penang and Malacca.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

Billiton, among the bauxite deposits of the Rhio Archipelago off Singapore, and finally among the oil wells of Palembang in Sumatra. 167 162

The Chinese of the Philippines form a group somewhat isolated from the main body, so to speak. They have traded with and emigrated to these islands for some centuries and they persevered

The Hakkas often inhabit the same areas as the Cantonese, Hokkien, and other tribes.

The following authorities, among others, have been followed: (1) Linguistic Map of China, *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cii, no. 2 (August 1943) p. 5; (2) Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 23; (3) W. J. Cator, *The Economic Position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1936) p. 28 (map).

in their intercourse in spite of the intermittent severity and grudging tolerance of the Spanish. When, however, in 1898 the Americans assumed control of the islands, they extended to them the exclusion laws against Chinese immigration which were already in force in the United States. When the Filipinos took over the administration of their own country the term 'exclusion' (which had been subject at least to some liberal exceptions under the Americans) was more and more literally interpreted. But although 609 167 162

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 A1.1 Southeast Asia A1.1
Chinese

their numbers are at present not very great in comparison with the Filipinos, the economic position of the Chinese in the Philippines based, as ever, on their control of trade (they owned, before 1941 at least, three-quarters of the rice-mills), has been maintained in the face of determined attempts by Filipino Nationalists to oust them from it.

So much will serve as a general introductory survey of the distribution of the Chinese in Southeast Asia: in the first chapter of each country study contained in the successive parts of this survey, the subject will be dealt with in much greater detail.

The sketch-map of the principal places of origin in China of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, reproduced on p. 9, has been designed by the author and executed by Geographia Ltd., and is subject to the following considerations. The shading indicates roughly the distribution in China of the several tribes represented overseas, but in the case of the Hakkas, of whom small communities are to be found throughout Kwangtung intermingled with the Cantonese,[1] only the areas most densely populated by them are shown in the map. Nor must it be assumed that the overseas Chinese come equally from all over the shaded areas. The fact (as Dr Ta Chen has pointed out) is that the communities from which the emigrants are drawn exist side by side with non-emigrant communities, and enjoy a higher standard of living than the latter.

[1] See L. Richard, *Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese Empire and Dependencies* (Shanghai, Tu-se-wei Press, 1908) p. 207.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

CHAPTER III

EMIGRATION TO THE 'NANYANG'

THE overseas Chinese are almost exclusively drawn from the southeastern provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Kwangsi—the great majority from the first two. This has mainly been due to population pressure and to the contiguity of these provinces to Southeast Asia.[1] This emigration was accentuated by internal troubles in China. In the Ming dynasty there had already been substantial emigration to the Nanyang, but a new wave was set up by the civil strife consequent on the change-over from the Ming to the Ch'ing, or Manchu, dynasty.[2] For example, the anti-Manchu pirate and patriot Koxinga, who had occupied Formosa, made descents on the coasts of Fukien in order to replenish his stores and at the same time embarrass the Manchu Government. Partly to cut off his supplies and partly to intimidate the population of these regions whose sympathies were anti-dynastic, the Manchus made the latter forsake a zone of country from about eight to thirty miles deep on the coasts of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Chekiang. This zone was denuded of its crops and its villages were burnt down. A reference was made to this in the reign of the first Manchu Emperor when governors were ordered to give houses and land to such persons who had moved into the interior 'so that they might be satisfied'. The harsh treatment they received was undoubtedly an encouragement to many in these parts of China to seek refuge overseas.

Contacts with Europeans were also a subsidiary encouragement to emigration. The first European efforts to trade were centred in Kwangtung. In 1516 Perestrello came from Malacca to China; in 1517 de Andrada arrived in Canton and received permission from the viceroy to trade. The attitude of the Portuguese soon aroused the hostility of the Chinese and their trading depot was attacked and destroyed in 1522. They retired to Lampa in Kwangtung where

[1] Population pressure in China, especially in the nineteenth century, is instructively dealt with by G. E. Tyler, 'The Taiping Rebellion, its economic background and social theory', *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. xvi (1933) pp. 545–614.

[2] See J. J. L. Duyvendak, 'Chinese in the Dutch East Indies', ibid. vol. xi. (1927) pp. 1–15.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Indonesia OB1
Chinese

has been taken since then, and until a lasting peace has been established in Indonesia it is unlikely that any thorough census will again be attempted. This means that the figures concerning the Chinese in Indonesia were in 1949 already eighteen years out of date. However, since there had been no essential alteration in the distribution in this period[1] we may, by taking into consideration the increase of other Chinese communities in the region as well as sex ratios, immigration, and other factors, hazard a guess that the ethnic Chinese population of Indonesia was by 1947 in the neighbourhood of 1·9 million.

The 1930 census of the Netherlands Indies, then, deals with 'ethnic' Chinese, as do those of Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines, whereas the censuses of Siam nd Indochina deal in terms of nationality and not of race.

Mr Unger's map of the distribution of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia which is reproduced as a separate folder[2] is a very useful companion for a survey of the Chinese in Indonesia, but certain facts regarding it must be borne in mind when it is used.[1] It shows the areas in which the Chinese are most concentrated, but it must by no means be presumed from this that the Chinese are not resident in other parts of the region, for indeed they do exist there and in considerable numbers. For example, the areas shown white in Mr Unger's map prove on reference to the map accompanying the 1930 census to be dotted with a considerable number of isolated groups of Chinese, some numbering between 250 and 500 persons and a few of between 1,250 and 3,000. But these two maps have different purposes—the first conveys a general impression and the second the minute detail in which only the specialist is interested (it indicates every group from one person upwards).

In considering the settlements in which the Chinese have attained considerable numerical strength there are only four which call for attention—one in a great circle round Singapore, another in the western part of Borneo, in the tin islands of Bangka and Billiton, and the Rhio (Riouw) Archipelago, a third in the Division of the East Coast of Sumatra, and the fourth in Batavia and its environs. In the first three areas live about 450,000 Chinese, or 17 per cent. of the total population of these parts: in Batavia and its environs their percentage of the total is 5. In the remainder of the

1 [i.e. 1930-49 -- Analyst]

[1] *See* Leonard Unger, 'The Chinese in Southeast Asia', *Geographical Review*, vol. xxxiv, no. 2 (1944) pp. 196–217.

2 [See end papers, cat. 116 - Analyst]

CONCLUSION

162 198 It will have been observed that the Chinese of Southeast Asia are, in essence, the same people over the entire area, in spite of a considerable diversity in occupation and dialect, and variation in purity of blood. There is a concentration of Yunnanese in the Shan States, but this tribe does not occur in any numbers elsewhere, and the other tribes are unequally distributed. For example, the Hokkiens and persons of mixed race of Hokkien origin form the majority community in Malaya and Indonesia, being outnumbered by the Cantonese, however, in the Malay States. In Siam the Teochius and the Hakkas are more numerous than the Hokkiens, and Hailams are also a large community. In the Philippines three-quarters of the Chinese are Hokkiens, and most of the remainder Cantonese. In Indochina the Hokkiens, though numerically seeming to yield first place to the Cantonese, are the principal Chinese merchants: indeed they were the pioneering tribe in the Nanyang and they are still, on the whole, the wealthiest.

So much may be said to illustrate the diversity of the tribal distribution of these Chinese who, but for a few exceptions (such as a tiny freak pocket of Shantung people in North Borneo) originate from the southeast corner of China—a small bit of Marco Polo's 162 'Mangi'. Diversity of occupation again is very pronounced among 463 these emigrants. Hailams, for instance, tend to be pig and poultry rearers, small cultivators, and domestic servants; in Borneo the Hakkas are the most numerous community and here they are largely agriculturists. Cantonese and Hakkas supply most of the Chinese labour for tin-mines and rubber estates. Nor should we 181 accept the naïve statement that 'all Chinese are alike' (which is but an extension of the unobservant conclusion of the European tenderfoot that 'all Chinese *look* alike'). There is a notable psychological difference between, say, the volatile, nimble-witted Cantonese and the more phlegmatic Hokkien or Teochiu; the Hailams have usually quite distinct physical characteristics from other Chinese, being more delicately made and exhibiting marked cranial differences from their brethren from the mainland. As for the Hakkas, they are in some ways a people apart, of northern origin and later immigrants than the other tribes and deriving from islands of population surrounded by Cantonese or Hokkiens in

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL
Chinese
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APPENDIX III

DISPLACED OVERSEAS CHINESE[1]

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THE largest group of externally displaced persons in China after the war with Japan consisted of overseas Chinese. These people, mostly small traders or labourers from the countries of Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, and islands of the southwest Pacific, were born abroad of Chinese parents or had worked abroad for years and had established domiciles in their adopted countries. Some were visiting their families in China and found return to their domiciles blocked after the extension of the Second World War to the Pacific in December 1941. About 3,000 skilled mechanics had gone to China earlier to help in the war effort against the Japanese, and these, too, were cut off from their homes abroad. Some had fled into China before the advancing Japanese and were cut off mainly in Hong Kong, Indochina, and Burma.

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Distribution of Displaced Overseas Chinese in China on 18 April 1946

Domicile	*Szechwan*	*Yunnan*	*Fukien*	*Kwangtung*	*Total*
Burma	873	5,794	20,626	2,098	29,391
Borneo	12	1	1,656	..	1,669
Hong Kong	619	..	879	101,185	102,683
Indochina	274	336	3,736	1,453	5,799
Malaya	737	665	23,426	2,486	27,314
Indonesia	194	181	14,640	167	15,182
Philippines	109	4	19,115	115	19,343
Siam	200	565	913	1,508	3,186
Other countries	344	..	..	..	344
	3,362	7,546	84,991	109,012	204,911

Thus stranded, the displaced overseas Chinese were scattered in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Fukien, Kweichau, Yunnan, and Szechwan provinces, and in Taiwan. The principal concentrations were in or near the southern ports of Canton, Swatow, Amoy, and Foochow, the native districts and traditional embarkation points of most of the overseas Chinese, and in or near Kunming at the eastern end of the Burma Road. According to the Chinese Overseas Affairs Commission, there were, on 1 April 1946, approximately 200,000 displaced overseas Chinese in

[1] Authorities: Katrine R. C. Greene, 'Repatriating China's Expatriates', *Far Eastern Survey*, vol. xvii, no. 4 (25 February 1948). *New York Times* (6 April 1948). *Rehabilitation of Overseas Chinese* (in Chinese) (Nanking, Government Information Office, July 1947). *Negotiation of Immigration Problems* (in Chinese) (Nanking. Government Information Office, October 1947). *Preparatory Commission for International Refugee Organization*, Prep/32 (25 April 1947). Also information supplied to the writer by UNRRA officials.

[p. 682]

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast As: . AL1
Chinese
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the four southern provinces. About 100,000 were from Hong Kong and most of these would be expected to return by their own resources.

Since the above figures were found to include old registrations of persons who had returned home before the war reached the Pacific, or who had settled permanently in China, the Displaced Persons Division of UNRRA in co-operation with CNRRA undertook downward revision resulting in an estimate of 42,000[1] as the number needing assistance in returning from China to their domiciles abroad. The number actually aided slightly exceeded this estimate, and the work involved in doing so was long and complex.

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For displaced persons going to some countries, especially Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines, there ensued long periods of waiting in refugee camps while permission to land was being sought, and this led frequently to severe hardships. Some persons thus delayed found employment locally or, in desperation, tried to get back to their homes by any means they could, legal or otherwise; others endured privations until the necessary negotiations and arrangements could be concluded.

With some Governments there was no question regarding the granting of permission to return (e.g. Hong Kong), but the Philippines Government refused to receive any displaced persons except as part of the five hundred quota. With other countries there was a variation between these two extremes. In Indonesia and Indochina civil disturbances upset arrangements. Rising nationalism and the desire to establish greater internal control of economic and commercial life produced in some countries resistance to the readmission of overseas Chinese.

The UNRRA visa, recognized by five out of seven of the countries, was devised as a substitute for the consular visa in the absence of consular authorities at the port of embarkation in China. The cost of transport was U.S. $1 million.

Let us now consider the position in reverse—namely, the number of Chinese in Southeast Asian countries displaced from China and awaiting repatriation. The table on p. 684 shows the position on 30 June 1947.

In view of the refusal of the Philippines Government to permit Chinese displaced persons to return legally to the islands (except as immigrants on a strictly quota basis), the considerable number of Chinese returned to China from the Philippines appears outstanding; UNRRA used this figure as a bargaining point in Manila, but without success.

In Malaya, of the 78,502 persons (of all races, but the majority Chinese) *known* to have been sent to Siam by the Japanese to work on the Siam–Burma railway, 23,351 are recorded as having died, 15,987

[1] The analysis is not available.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

Chinese
Indians

APPENDIX V

INDIANS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE following note is appended to facilitate comparison between the Chinese and Indians in the area.[1] 162

Ethnic Indians in Southeast Asia

			1947
Burma	1,017,825 (1931)	887,000 (1941)	700,000
Siam	..	..	100,000
Indochina	..	..	5,000
Malaya	624,000 (1931)	744,000 (1941)	600,000
British Borneo	..	..	Few
Indonesia	..	..	30,000
Philippines			Very few
			1,435,000

Possibly because of the historic relations of ancient Hindu India with Southeast Asia, the prohibition of travel overseas imposed by the Hindu Shastras has not been taken to apply to Java, Sumatra, and Ceylon. 162 167 There were early Hindu settlements, too, in Malaya, but these disappeared long ago and Indian immigration into the region dates virtually from the nineteenth century.

The only country in Southeast Asia in which the Indians are more numerous than the Chinese is Burma. After India and Burma were separated in 1936 uncertainty as to their future status caused thousands of immigrants to return home to India. Indian landlords and money-lenders liquidated their Burma holdings wherever possible. In 1931 there were 1,018,000 Indians in Burma; in 1947, in spite of natural increases, their number was probably not over 900,000. They retained, however, much of their economic importance. In 1931, 200,000 of the Indians in Burma lived in the Arakan Division nearest India. Of the total 618,000 were born in India—566,000 were Hindus; 397,000 were Muslims; the remainder were Sikhs, Christians, and others. Parsees were prominent in the professions; chetties (chettiars) from South India were the leading bankers with a big hold on the peasantry; Muslims from the Madras Presidency ran restaurants; the Gujeratis and Muslim Chooliahs from Madras had a large share in the hardware trade; Hindus from Upper India were the principal jewellers. Most of the common labour was performed by Hindu Telegus or Tamils. [463]

[1] I am indebted to Mr Edwin Haward for most of the material utilized in this note. V. P.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese; Indians
India AW1

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After Burma, the Indians in Southeast Asia are most numerous in Malaya, though here their numbers have dropped from 744,000 in 1941 to 600,000 in 1947. The great majority of them are Tamil labourers on the rubber estates, but there is also a considerable community of merchants and chetties who are the money-lenders of Malaya, lawyers, &c. The Sikhs number a few thousands and are agriculturists as well as watchmen and the like. Before the war Sikhs were more numerous in the Malayan Police than they had become by 1949. They made themselves exceedingly unpopular with the Chinese during the Japanese occupation.

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In recent times Indian public opinion has been exceedingly critical of Indian emigration to Southeast Asia in the form of unskilled labour, alleging unfair conditions. The Indian Emigration Act of 1922 was amended in 1938 to give the Government of India power to prohibit even unassisted emigration (assisted emigration was that which took the place of indentured labour) for the purpose of unskilled work. The result has been the virtual drying-up of India as a source of supply for labour, and many Indians have also returned to their homes. During the Japanese occupation casualties among Tamils were especially heavy. But now that India is independent her policy may develop on different lines—the economic pressure of population on her soil may tend to make her less critical of emigration, and as the most powerful State in the Southeast Asia area she may find it expedient to resort to something like the pre-war 'imperialism' which the party now in power in India was, during its period in the wilderness, so concerned to condemn. But the whole turn of events in Southeast Asia is bound to be profoundly affected by the success of the Communists in China, and in the attempts to oppose or to compromise with them India is bound to be a factor of the greatest importance.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese
China AF1
Burma AP1

A visit to Southeast Asia during the third quarter of 1950 after an absence of nearly three years brought home to the writer the accelerated tempo of the change that the countries were undergoing, and, in particular, the dominant role which the politics of China were playing therein. As a tailpiece to this survey he has recorded the impressions of his visit, bringing the account as nearly up to date as the exigencies of publishing would allow. The observations are set down in the order in which the countries were visited.

In his many discussions with statesmen, diplomats, officials, business men, and others in these Southeast Asian countries, the writer became aware of a considerable disagreement among them regarding the number of Chinese in the area. There was, in the case of Siam and Indochina in particular, no figure that was generally accepted. The definition of 'Chinese' was an initial difficulty (as it has so often been in the course of this survey) for many Chinese appeared to possess a dual racial character, discarding one aspect and assuming the other as circumstances suggested.[1] It seemed also that that clandestine immigration into Siam, Indochina, and the Philippines and (perhaps) Indonesia within the last two or three years, had been very considerable, for during this period the immigration laws had been greatly tightened. The writer was compelled, therefore, to revise the estimates he had made in the demographic chapters of the survey to suit the probable facts of 1950 and to adopt a total not very far short of 10 million ethnic Chinese for the whole of Southeast Asia. This estimate, however, does not materially alter the ratio of Chinese to other races in the area and has no very important bearing on the general political and economic considerations which have been described in the text.

Burma. In July 1950 the Chinese Nationalist ambassador had left Burma, and one other official of the embassy had also gone away, but the remainder of both the embassy and consular staff had agreed to serve under the People's Government of China which was now recognized by the Burmese Government. Two of the staff had already been summoned to Peking for indoctrination. The new ambassador, Dr Yu, was expected to arrive in Rangoon in August. In the meantime the staffs were not being paid and the only income available was that derived from the sale of (Nationalist) passports.

At this time an incident in the Burmese Shan State of Keng-tung near Siam was the subject of a number of rumours. A force of Chinese

[1] Thus in Siam, the President of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, of very obvious Chinese race or extraction but with a Thai name, denounced vehemently the tactics of business men of acknowledged Chinese nationality in their dealings with the Thais.

2: Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL
Chinese

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

[end map A]

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 All Southeast Asia All

Further to complicate the historic geography was the fact that the literary people, the monks and religious men, were Indian or Indian-minded for long periods, disinterested in mundane records, and following the custom, still evident among many Southeast Asia people today, of avoiding personal names, so that anonymity, obscurity and confused nomenclature veil the past even in such records as do exist. Many experiments in writing styles were developed among these isolated and complex peoples and often inscriptions made in them cannot be translated today. Because of the dispersal tendencies within the territories themselves and the lack of focus to the region as a whole, no great depositories of learning were established in Southeast Asia to gather and conserve the record of its past.

Population Changes

Broadly speaking, the region has been until recently one of very thin population and large patches of it still contain populations of remarkably low density. Direct evidence of densities are scanty for periods farther back than this century, yet it seems probable that the whole of Southeast Asia in 1800 contained only about ten million people, when the region was probably as thinly peopled in its most attractive areas as Upper Burma and Upper Siam, the least attractive and developed areas, are today; Malaya then contained about a quarter million people, Java about four million, Burma probably less than two million. It was, even at the end of the 18th century, a zone of labour shortage and the objective of the local princelings of the times was to get hands, the basic power resource of their time, the one way of securing a small surplus from their fundamentally subsistent territories. Outsiders were not greatly attracted to Southeast Asia itself, as apart from the routes through it. To Spain its old colony, the Philippines, was no great asset and more related to Mexico than to Spain, remote and ready to drop from the Spanish orbit during the 19th century. To Holland, its colony in Java was a company venture that yielded little direct profit for many years and was at times on the verge of bankruptcy.

But the last 150 years brought tremendous changes in population. First, on the heels of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, came a revival and an expanded volume of trade between the Indian Ocean and the Far East, a stream which threaded the seaways of

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

FIG. 115.—Population Expansions of Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia, diffusing new conceptions as it passed, re-establishing trading centres, drawing out the produce of Southeast Asia people and stimulating development of Southeast Asia as a source of trade rather than a passage for traders. It has been a century and a half of tremendous population increases, causing people to swarm upon the more fertile areas, upon deltas and volcanic cones where people had not clustered before. In these choice areas, the new deltas and the newer ejecta, the bulk of the great population increase has concentrated, so that upon them live teeming multitudes in limited zones separated by stretches of forest-covered space scarcely more populated now than they were several centuries ago. By the quinquennium 1916-20, the total population of Southeast Asia had become 84 million, by 1936-40, 120 million, and in this present quinquennium (1946-50) it is nearly 145 million. The increases, while general, have not been even (Fig. 115). Over the present century, of the political units, Java has been increasing very much faster than any other, and Siam has since 1911 so increased that its population exceeded that of the Philippines by 1933 and by now exceeds also that of Burma.

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

SOUTHEAST ASIA NUTRITION DENSITIES
(Average number of persons per rice-acre per annum)

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Quinquennium	*Burma*	*Indo-china*	*Siam*	*Java and Madoera*	*Philip-pines*	*Malaya*
1916–20	1.23	1.75	1.66	4.12	3.13	—
1921–25	1.19	1.67	1.57	4.27	2.67	5.61
1926–30	1.14	1.61	1.57	4.50	2.69	6.13
1931–35	1.19	1.64	1.63	4.60	2.76	6.42
1936–40	1.25	1.63	1.74	4.96	2.79	7.02
1946–50	2.0	2.1	1.6	5.9	3.9	7.2

Because population and the net production of food have increased *pari passu*, it is important to examine the "nutrition density" (persons per acre under rice) since the surplus for export depends on low internal consumption of the Southeast Asia staple and high internal production. The countries of Southeast Asia pre-war showed considerable differences in nutrition density, from Malaya (the plantation-mining specialist) with 7.2 persons per rice-acre, to Siam (the rice-surplus specialist) with 1.6. Malaya, Java and the Philippines had nutrition densities much higher than the rest of neighbouring countries and in the case of Malaya and Java the nutrition density had been steadily rising, whereas in Burma, Indochina and Siam it was fairly static. Over the same period, the domestic consumption of rice per person sharply dropped (by 20-25 per cent) in Burma, Siam and Java and rose about 10 per cent in Indochina, Philippines and Malaya. The postwar figures available show considerable increases of nutrition density everywhere except in Siam, yet these were changes of degree, not of pattern.

Changing Internal Emphasis

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Today the very crowded places are firstly, Middle and North Java, Lower Siam and the Red River Delta, where densities of over 1,500 people per square mile occur, with secondary crowdings in Lower Burma, the Lower Mekong, Central Luzon and the Visayas. These concentrations of people are pre-eminently in agricultural areas (Fig. 116), and they are in fact largely made possible by exceptional soil qualities within an area whose general soil fertility is low. These crowded areas have taken part in a commercialisation of local agriculture and their subsequent history has been firstly a

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

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

FIG. 116.—Distribution of People in Southeast Asia

rapid increase in people to a point where the new agricultural development ceased to be enough for the large population, leading to the second stage of slow migration and emphasis on commercial agriculture upon newer zones of similar type. Hence the change of emphasis from Tonkin to the Annam coastal plains and then to the Lower Mekong; from the Central Luzon area to Visayan Islands;

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

from the plains of Java to the dangerous upper limits of the volcanic country; and from Dry Burma to the Irrawaddy Delta. Sometimes there has been a little agricultural migration—very largely this change has been brought about by different rates of growth rather than movement of people to new places. Everywhere commercialisation of agriculture has led to population increase, because the agricultural technique has not changed from the Southeast Asia tradition of manual work at every stage. The bringing of new areas into cultivation has been followed by an increase in the number of hands to do the cultivating, partly a response to the need and partly made possible by additional nourishment and an added vitality arising from lower disease rates natural to the less populated area, because human diseases are diffused more slowly where people are isolated from one another, as in new areas. Thus Southeast Asia has been the scene of intense pioneering by people seeking, developing and filling new agricultural areas, to create for a time the eldorado of rice-eating peoples and the one safeguard of Indians and Chinese against the vagaries of their own harvests and against the congestions of their home districts.

Minerals in turn have attracted external interest. There has been the pull of gold in the Philippines, of tin in Malaya and nearby islands, of petroleum in Sumatra and Borneo. These great gambles drew capital and pulled in crowds of labourers, wage-earners who were unavailable from local people so tightly held in their manual agricultural systems. Minerals drew millions of Chinese through the South China Sea in the tin rushes and oil rushes of the last hundred years.

Yet another form of commercialised agriculture developed, to provide the industrial raw materials of distant factories in Europe and America and based on crops entirely foreign to Southeast Asia. Sugar, coffee, hemp, rubber, oil palm proved highly successful in this terrain where they had never existed before. Large plantations of them were laid out, still more wage-earning labour was absorbed, a still greater production was obtained, drawing more and more people into virgin areas. Migrations from India and China were further stimulated to work upon the plantations whose uneven development, in successions of booms and depressions, alternately attracted migrants in the boom years and sent them home again in the depressions.

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

Political Convergence

438 These local products for commerce not only stimulated export trade; they stimulated import trades to feed the migrant peoples, to dress them, and to dress the agriculturists so preoccupied that they could no longer spare time to weave for themselves. And trade itself drew external interests; Chinese and Indian traders came in to monopolise middleman functions and Europeans came in and worked out here the complex balancing of their own industrial systems far away. Britain stimulated the commercialisation of Burmese rice production as an assurance of cheap food for an industrialising, overpopulated India. The Dutch fanned out from Java into the adjoining islands. Not to be outdone, the French moved into Indochina as a base for their China trade. Germans for a time controlled the copra trade of the farther eastern islands. Thus all the major Western European powers had colonial interests in the expanding peoples, the expanding production and the expanding needs of Southeast Asia. And the major oriental powers, India, China and Japan, had equally direct interest in Southeast Asia (Fig. 117) as an outlet for their people, a source of rice, a source of raw materials for their industries, and finally as outlet for their own industrial products, India and Japan being mostly involved in this, the latest phase.

Internal Divergences

The resulting pattern of people is one of unparalleled diversity in stages of evolution from subsistence to commerce, in densities of people, in ethnic types, in languages (Fig. 118). The similarity of setting, circumstance and products have disrupted Southeast Asia within itself by economic rivalry in producing similar commodities, and the divergencies of overseas connections with different colonial powers established divergent trade streams, currency differences, educational differences and political differences. Political and economic forces released in Europe and America had their repercussion within Southeast Asia, by means of which French protectionist policies virtually isolated Indochina from its neighbours and Filipinos turned their backs upon Asia. Siam has been wooed, ignored or bullied, depending on the fluctuation of Anglo-French relations in Europe and the opportunism of the U.S. in building up its bloc in East Asia. All sorts of colonial systems have been

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 All Southeast Asia All

FIG. 117.—Pattern of Modern Migrations

experimented with, so that Southeast Asia has a great range of constitutional forms, from fossilised oriental aristocracies to democracies of a few intelligentsia and to would-be republics trying to combine the gestures of democracies with the powers of autocracies, the whole being permeated by complex trading systems of both Western and Oriental types. All this may be summed up by saying that the cross-currents and backlashes of the world's political and economic systems of the present and past still move

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
Southeast Asia AL1

563 foreign army of occupation has preserved it from disruption.
565 The essential and distinctive character of a plural society
433 is that it is dominated by economic forces, and, outside a
571 few partly sheltered oases, Southeast Asia illustrates the capitalist system in its purest form.[18]

162 Another common feature is the dominance of the agri-
171 cultural section of the population. The latest available
433 figures show the percentage proportions of population dependent
171 on agriculture in the area as follows: Burma, 68; Indonesia, 66; Philippines, 69; Thailand, 85.[19] The same source indicates the proportions for various regions of the world as follows: North America, 20; Oceania, 30; Europe, 33; South America, 60; Asia, 70; and Africa, 74.

171 With the prevailing techniques of production and the
433 consequent low productivity per man, dominance of agriculture
434 means low per capita national income. When countries are grouped by level of economic development on the basis of per capita national income as of 1950, all the six countries of Southeast Asia -- Burma, Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaya, Philippines, and Thailand -- fall in the underdeveloped
443 group.[20] Moreover, there is in Southeast Asia a true surplus
464 population on the land in the sense that even under the
161 present methods of cultivation a sizeable fraction of the

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18. Ibid., p. 77.

19. Food and Agriculture Organization, 1953 Yearbook, Vol. VII.

20. Eugene Staley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), pp. 16-17.

16: Fryer K-3 (no date)1953 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

THE "MILLION CITY" IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

D. W. FRYER

361 IN A world survey of cities with a population of one million or more, made in 1931, Mark Jefferson[1] could not include a single representative from Southeast Asia. Since 1945 five cities in this area have attained the million status—Jakarta, Manila, Saigon, Bangkok, and Singapore. Of all the major political units in this part of Asia, only Burma has failed to produce a "million city." In Malaya, the most highly urbanized country, 35 per cent of the population live in towns of 5000 or more, and towns of more than 10,000 increased their population by 52.6 per cent in the last intercensal period, 1931–1947. But the concept of Southeast Asia as an area of rural peoples with a rhythm of life determined by rice cultivation is still largely correct. The proportion of urban dwellers is about the average for the Asian continent, and, except possibly in Java, there are far fewer cities, in relation to the level of population, than in either South or East Asia.

361 By Western standards the countries of Southeast Asia had only one city apiece until very recently. Most of the other settlements of any size were overgrown villages, and in some degree they still retain aspects of their village origin. In Southeast Asia the evolution of indigenous cities on the Chinese or Indian scale was not possible. Chesneaux[2] suggests that many of the large indigenous Asian cities grew up within "the traditional framework of the great agricultural empires," but in both peninsular and archipelagic Southeast Asia physical fragmentation, reinforced by a great diversity of peoples, hindered the development of large states. Though occasionally established, they were highly unstable and of short duration. The princely houses of the petty native states were insufficient stimuli to city growth, and commerce was equally inadequate. The only effective impulse, as Credner[3] points out, was a favorable combination of trade foci with administrative, military, and religious functions of the highest order. Dependence on changeable watercourses for irrigated rice culture and transportation, and the personal whim of the ruler, produced a marked arbitrariness

[1] Mark Jefferson: Distribution of the World's City Folks, *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 21, 1931, pp. 446–465.

[2] J. E. Spencer: Changing Asiatic Cities, *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 41, 1951, pp. 336–337, discussing Jean Chesneaux: Notes sur l'évolution récente de l'habitat urbain en Asie, *L'Information Géographique*, Vol. 13, 1949, pp. 169–175, and Vol. 14, 1950, pp. 1–8.

[3] Wilhelm Credner: Siam, das Land der Tai (Stuttgart, 1935), p. 366.

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Company from English and Chinese competition and be strong enough to deter native princes from interfering in the Company's activities. Essentially, commerce was of greater importance than administration in old Batavia, though the Company could hardly avoid participation in politics; the recent change of the city's name to Jakarta, the name of the native settlement on whose site the city arose, is indicative of a change of function as well as of political control. The city began its life as a storehouse, which was secretly fortified and after a successful defense against the English and the local ruler was made the nucleus of a new town. Expediency seems to have been the principal reason for selection of the site. Certainly the harbor had little to commend it, and early in the eighteenth century silting was already a problem.

Bangkok is the only indigenous city of Southeast Asia to attain a population of one million, at least in modern times, though Jogjakarta is estimated to have reached this level during the postwar Indonesian movement for independence. The geographical focus of Thailand is clearly in the lower Menam plain, but for four centuries the capital was Ayutthaya, some 60 miles upstream (1350–1767). After the destruction of Ayutthaya by the Burmese, Thonburi, a fort on the west bank of the Menam Chao Phraya, was selected as the new national capital, but in 1782 a further dynastic change led to the establishment of a new administrative capital on the opposite bank, then unoccupied save for a small community of Chinese traders. Situated on a bend in the river some 20 miles from the sea and surrounded by marshland, the site of Bangkok possessed the sole but great advantage of being easily defended.

Saigon, like Bangkok, is a riverine city and tidal port set in a broad alluvial lowland, but it is more than twice as far removed from the sea. When captured by the French in 1859, it was the main political center of the newly colonized Annamese land of Cochin China and consisted of an agglomeration of native huts around the imperial fortress, with virtually no permanent buildings. The French immediately began its reconstruction as a modern city, so that, unlike the other four cities, Saigon has no old core. Nothing is left at present of the native town. Cholon, the "great market" some three miles to the west along the Arroyo Chinois, is an entirely separate Chinese foundation dating from about 1778. Though the cities have now coalesced, each retains its own distinctive character and functions, and the "Région de Saigon-Cholon" is thus a true twin city, unique in Southeast Asia.

Singapore is anomalous in being situated on an island, and, like Bangkok,

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permanent buildings and roads did not exist and all communication was by boat along the canals, or "klongs." [503] 361

Singapore possessed the advantage of greater topographic variety. Eminences of granite formed good sites for public buildings, and the city spread out over the land above flood level on both sides of the swampy Singapore River.

All the old towns, with the exception of the architecturally exotic Bangkok, have a gridiron layout, which has meant the maximum of congestion in modern times. Racial zonation, well marked in the old towns, has tended to persist. Europeans have long since abandoned their old quarters, but the Chinese have remained in strength; indigenous peoples, however, are significantly absent. In Manila and Bangkok the old cores have been retained intact and new business and financial quarters have been created away from the old cities. Though Intramuros has lost its military functions and most of its administrative ones, it still keeps, in part, those of a judicial and religious nature. Old Bangkok, however, has lost little of its earlier importance and is one of the greatest tourist attractions in Southeast Asia. In Singapore and Jakarta the old core has been reconstructed as the business district, but since this took place before the advent of the motor vehicle, congestion is still acute. Saigon, having no old core and therefore able to plan its development without encumbrances, nevertheless also adopted a gridiron layout, but it is not easy to suggest an alternative that would have made better use of the environment. 162 361

The Expansion of the Cities

The rapid growth of the cities in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries has been due to the investment of capital, largely from the mother country, in production for export; the consequent improvement of the ports and the creation of a communications network focusing on them; a considerable increase in the scope of administrative activities; and, more recently, the establishment of secondary industries. Though these have provided the impetus, expansion has been possible only through the application of new techniques of engineering (particularly in drainage and water supply) and preventive medicine, making the cities as healthy as those of the West. 361

The three centuries of stagnation in Manila is a remarkable historical record. Expansion beyond the walls of Intramuros began almost a century later than the growth of old Batavia, which too had suffered a period of stagnation in the seventeenth century. Even the short British occupation (1762–1764) and the revolt of the American colonies failed to arouse Spanish interest in the distant possession, and the growth of Manila in the latter half

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361 of the nineteenth century was a reflection of the investment of foreign capital in the archipelago, stimulated by the opening of the Suez Canal. In 1863 relocation of the administrative area began, with the move of the Governor to the Malacañan Palace, north of the river, and in the last three decades of Spanish rule development on the north bank of the Pasig was rapid. [504] After the American occupation Manila grew quickly. A modern harbor was constructed on reclaimed land on the seaward side of Intramuros (1903), and the main development of the city was shifted south of the Pasig, where new administrative and residential districts were created. Since World War II the [162] city has again expanded, owing partly to an influx of population from the country, and partly to the use of reconstruction funds for development. The built-up area is now practically continuous from the swamps of the Bitas River mouth in the north to Parañaque in the south, a distance of about 10 miles. Northeast and southeast of the urban fringe, rice fields still cover the plain, and parts of the city itself are regularly flooded in the rainy season (April-October). Development has proceeded farthest inland on the higher ground between the coastal plain and the Marikina River, which drains southward to the Pasig. Here are the newer districts of Mandaluyong, San Juan del Monte, and Quezon City, the last virtually a satellite town, which is the new administrative center of the Republic.

341 As a result of its long history and changing administration, Manila has
361 a greater variety of architectural styles and street patterns than the other four cities. Old buildings of wood and adobe in the colonial style were found in Intramuros (which was largely destroyed in 1945) and occasionally outside, but in the main business district in Binondo and in the administrative quarter of Ermita modern steel-framed concrete buildings now predominate. Manila is not a city of skyscrapers. Good foundations are impossible in the alluvial sediments, and deep piling to reach the underlying granite or "floating" on enormous cellular rafts of concrete is necessary for large buildings in all the great cities. In the districts of earliest expansion, radiating plazas and boulevards are to be seen; elsewhere the gridiron layout of the typical American city has been adhered to, except in the newer areas to the east, where attempts have been made to relate development to
162 topography. Racial zonation is well marked. The Chinese community in-
361 habits the narrow streets north of the Escolta in the business quarter, and the principal indigenous residential areas lie north of the city in the crowded districts of Tondo, Sampaloc, and Santa Cruz. Europeans, Americans, and wealthy Filipinos reside on the higher ground in the districts of Ermita and Malate, south of the river.

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361 Modern Batavia, the immediate forebear of Jakarta, dated from the reconstruction of the old city in the early nineteenth century. The expansion of trade and growth of population in the eighteenth century had made necessary the redevelopment of the town, still closely confined around the old fort. In 1808, Governor General Daendels moved the administrative headquarters to Buitenzorg (now Bogor), pulled down the old fort, and used the material for the construction of a new residential district some three miles south of the old town, on the higher ground of Weltevreden. Three miles south of the new district the military camp of Meester Cornelis was established, and thus the axis of future development was aligned north-south, avoiding the low rice-growing plains on each side.

Weltevreden, like the old town, was laid out on a rectangular pattern around large open squares, the Koningsplein and the Waterlooplein. Later in the nineteenth century the old city itself was largely rebuilt, and many of the canals were filled in, but the Town Hall and the buildings of the East India Company still remain. The old town is now the main business and financial district. Weltevreden has experienced several changes in the present century. The northern part between the Koningsplein and the Molenvliet, one of the surviving canals, has become a secondary business district, and its residential character is tending to disappear. The main European residential districts were in south Weltevreden and the newer Gondangdia and Menteng, where the street pattern is not so uniformly rectilinear. These new districts eventually linked up with the development around the military base of Meester Cornelis, and in 1935 the three old foci, Batavia, Weltevreden, and Meester Cornelis, were united in the Municipality of Batavia. [162] As in Manila, racial segregation was pronounced; the Chinese lived in the old town, and in the lacunae between the developments along the roads the indigenous peoples lived in kampongs, a veritable *rus in urbe*. Since the establishment of the Republic, the city, renamed Jakarta, has changed considerably. The kampong area has been greatly enlarged, and old Dutch street and district names have been discarded. Weltevreden has ceased to have a separate identity, and Meester Cornelis has become Djatinagara.

Bangkok owes its transformation from an overgrown floating village into a modern metropolis to the activities of King Chulalongkorn (1868–1910), the creator of modern Siam, whose reign marked the beginning of commercial rice cultivation in the Menam plain and the teak industry in the north. The development of Bangkok was closely bound up with the exporting and processing of both commodities. The Klong Ong Ang marks the first stage in the expansion of the city, to the east of the Grand Palace; development on the right bank was retarded by the absence of bridges over

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for development.[6] The early mercantile and financial quarter was on the right bank of the Singapore River, where it has remained ever since. Raffles planned a racial residential zonation, the Chinese to be confined to the right bank above the business district, the Europeans to inhabit the opposite bank. Though this was eventually abandoned, Singapore's "Chinatown," with the highest population density in the city, still marks the old Chinese area. The early gridiron pattern was continued in the development to the east, the first direction of expansion. In the nineteenth century the city began to expand onto the somewhat higher land to the north, and here the new European residential district of Tanglin arose; but commercial interests are steadily invading the older part of the better residential areas to the north. With the reclamation in the last 50 years of the numerous swamps that set limits to expansion the lacunae in development have been filled in, and the city sprawls along the south coast of the island for more than 10 miles. Indeed, at no great date in the future the whole island will be effectively urbanized. The Armed Services occupy large areas, and their establishments constitute in effect separate towns. Room for expansion is becoming increasingly difficult to find, but the city's public housing achievements, particularly the new development at Tiong Bahru, on the west side, are worthy of note as being among the best in Asia.

In appearance the five cities are not greatly dissimilar to cities of the West, but there is a more clearly defined zonation of commercial, industrial, and residential development, the last showing a racial differentiation, which, though everywhere tending to break down, is nevertheless still conspicuous. Differences are also discernible in the suburbs, with their two-story "shophouses," and above all in the outer margins, where "temporary" houses of wood thatched with nipa palm cluster together in overgrown kampongs or barrios, engulfed by the outward sprawl of the cities. Here large numbers of indigenous people live in an environment that is neither urban nor rural.

The central business and "downtown" districts are entirely nonindigenous. International banks, commodity exchanges, and great mercantile houses reproduce all the features of the business quarter of the Western city, though there is a steady infiltration by Indian and Chinese financial and mercantile interests. The main shopping areas are also predominantly European, though here again Chinese and Indian establishments are numerous. Congestion is proportionately as great as in the Western city, and none suffers worse in this respect than Manila. Binondo, the main business district, lies on the

[6] For a full account see B. H. G. Dobby: Singapore: Town and Country, *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 30, 1940, pp. 84–109.

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rubber, in Singapore; other manufactures are furniture, boats, footwear, glass, bricks and tiles, oils and soaps, electric batteries, and certain chemical products. Manufacturing industries proper use relatively little machinery and power and produce for the home market, in which there is a considerable element of local protection. Food and drink industries are well developed (including brewing and distilling); textiles are poorly developed. Heavy industry is confined to the repair and refitting of vessels. All the ports have forges and foundries for making minor repairs; Singapore and Jakarta, which have dry-dock facilities, can undertake more extensive work. Repair shops for maintenance of railway equipment are located in all the cities except Singapore; the assembly of imported motor vehicles is carried on in Manila, Jakarta, and Singapore. Industry relies largely on electric power, which is expensive because of the paucity of local coal supplies.

Small-scale industry is almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese; the larger undertakings are overwhelmingly European-owned, though there are some large Chinese industrial establishments. Only a small proportion of the inhabitants of the cities are engaged in industry: in Singapore, where industry is expanding rapidly, only 11 per cent of the adult working population were employed in industrial establishments in the census of 1947. This unduly low figure does not take account of the large employment in the establishments of the Armed Services, much of which was industrial.

The industrial areas lie close to the port or along the rivers and canals. They are surrounded by areas of high population density; for the relatively high cost and limited availability of public transport operate to retard the divorce of place of work and residence, which is so conspicuous a feature of the Western city. Newer industrial areas, however, are appearing on the margins of the cities, and as the range of industrial activity grows, industry is likely to become more widely dispersed.

Population

All the five cities would have probably reached the one-million level in a comparatively short period if the war had not intervened. During the Japanese occupation, population decreased in the cities because of the shortage of food, and the wartime dislocation that elsewhere in Asia resulted in a large influx of rural dwellers into the cities did not operate here. With the end of the war the tide set strongly in the opposite direction. The breakdown of effective administration in many parts of Southeast Asia following the Japanese surrender, armed insurrections against the central governments, the struggle for independence, the depredations of extreme

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factions, and the difficulty of protecting disliked minorities, particularly the Chinese, all combined to attract many rural dwellers to the comparative safety of the cities. This immigration of refugees was perhaps greatest in Saigon-Cholon: from a population of about 300,000 at the time of the Japanese occupation the twin cities have increased to an estimated 1,400,000. Jakarta has grown almost as spectacularly. At the census of 1930 the city of Batavia had a population of a little more than half a million; by 1950 the Indonesian government estimated Jakarta's population to be not less than two million; and at present the city may well contain nearer three million. Even on the most conservative estimate it is by far the most populous city in the whole of Southeast Asia.

In the census of 1948, Greater Manila had a population of 1,180,000; however, several separately recorded districts of Rizal Province are integral parts of the built-up area, and their inclusion raises the total to more than a million and a quarter. The 14 districts of the City of Manila proper showed a 58 per cent increase over the 1939 census figures. Singapore and Bangkok have been relatively unaffected by postwar immigration from the country. In the intercensal period 1931–1947 the population of the island of Singapore grew by some 68 per cent, owing to the gradual establishment of an equality in the sex composition of the Chinese population, together with a steady decline in the death rate; allowing for natural increase since the census, the population of Singapore Colony at present is about 1,100,000, of whom about 70 per cent reside in the municipal area. Before the war Bangkok was approaching 900,000, but in the census of 1947 the population was only 1,116,600;[9] hence the war may have somewhat retarded the city's growth.

The present rate of growth due to natural increase seems to be about 3 per cent a year in all the cities, which is much higher than the rate in their respective national territories. This will present many difficult problems of development. As might be expected, the already overcrowded districts have experienced the greatest increases; in Manila, for example, the districts of Tondo, Sampaloc, and Santa Cruz have increased their populations by 80 per cent or more since 1939. As compared with Western cities, densities in the poorest areas are extremely high; 1500 persons to an acre would not be excessive for the net density of the worst blocks.[10] On the other hand, density

[9] With Thonburi. According to the *Statistical Year Book of Thailand*, N.S., Vol. 1, 1952, recently received, the total for the two is 1,178,881.

[10] Net density is the average density of the population of a given residential area, which consists solely of the dwellings and one-half of the width of streets giving access thereto. The figure quoted here is an estimate by the Singapore Improvement Trust of the situation in the most overcrowded part of the city.

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development in the best residential districts is very low, frequently one or two houses to an acre, so that the cities sprawl widely. 361 162 167

From the beginning, Chinese immigrants have constituted an important element of the cities. At first encouraged, and later feared, by the authorities, the Chinese were confined to special quarters, such as the famous Parián of Manila, where they have tended to remain. Dislike of them has been a universal rallying point of numerous indigenous politicians, and the murder of many Chinese in the period following the Japanese collapse recalls the massacres of the early history of Manila and Batavia. Where immigration has been comparatively free, at least until fairly recent times, the Chinese have become a majority: Singapore is more than 77 per cent Chinese—the largest Chinese community outside China—and in Bangkok more than 60 per cent of the population are Chinese or of mixed Chinese-Thai ancestry. The lower proportions of Chinese in the other three cities are due to the earlier restrictions on immigration, together with an influx of indigenous peoples from rural areas in the postwar period. Events in China, however, have everywhere increased illegal Chinese immigration. The removal of many Chinese from rural Cochin China to the Saigon-Cholon area has raised the percentage of Chinese in Cholon to about 60, and it is probably not less than 30 in the combined cities. In Manila and Jakarta it is much lower, and the total number of Chinese is not easy to estimate; both cities contain more than 50,000, and the number of persons of mixed Chinese and indigenous blood is undoubtedly much larger. Despite many vicissitudes, the Chinese have proved indispensable, and their importance in the economic life of the cities can hardly be overstated.

Europeans constitute only a very small proportion of the population of the cities. Only in prewar Batavia did they amount to as much as 5 per cent of the total, and this was in part due to the inclusion of Eurasians as Europeans in the Dutch statistics. Of the other immigrant groups, the most numerous are Indians and Pakistanis, who in Singapore made up 7 per cent of the population in 1947. Jakarta has a small community of Arabs, engaged in shopkeeping or moneylending.

The indigenous peoples have a higher birth rate than the immigrant peoples, but also a higher death rate, so that the relative proportions of the two groups have tended to remain the same. Lately the migration of indigenous peoples to the cities, especially in the new independent states, has altered the balance somewhat, and the partly alien character of the cities may tend to decline. Simultaneously, restrictions have been placed on the economic activities of the Chinese in the Philippines and Thailand, but the outcome of these measures is unlikely to be that intended.

162 369 361 Standards for defining urban populations differ, but it can be assumed safely that no more than 15 per cent of the 175 million people of Southeast Asia belong in an urban category.[2] In contrast, in the United States, with a population somewhat smaller than that of Southeast Asia as a whole, over 64 per cent of the population is classified as urban.

Estimates for 1952 indicate only 30 cities or urban agglomerations with populations of 100,000 or more.[3] In the United States, however, there are 160 such urban areas; in the Soviet Union, with a population of 200 millions, there are about 120; and in Japan, with one-half the population of Southeast Asia, there are 64. In Southeast Asia only an estimated 7 per cent of the total population lives in cities of 100,000 or more; less in Burma, Indochina, Thailand, and Indonesia; somewhat more in the Philippines. Only Malaya, including Singapore, departs

[1] Revised from a paper read before the Far Eastern Association in Spring, 1954.

[121] As used here, "urbanization" connotes not only mere numerical increases in the population of cities but also the development of an urban way of life and the accompanying changes in value orientation (cf. Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1938).

[2] Census data for Southeast Asia are notably incomplete. In Burma, Thailand, and the Associated States of Indochina the "urban" population is estimated to be little more than 10 per cent of the whole; in Indonesia still less; but in the Philippines some 24 per cent of the population is classified as urban; and in Malaya, including the Crown Colony of Singapore, about 35 per cent. Without Singapore, only 27 per cent of the Malayan population is classified as urban.

[113] [3] *United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1952.*

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significantly from the norm, with 18 per cent of its population living in large urban clusters. In the United States, on the other hand, nearly 30 per cent of the population lives in such large cities.

Southeast Asia retains many characteristics of a frontier region, with large areas of sparse population, and so it seems paradoxical that its population density is 95 per square mile, as compared with 50 in the United States, 23 in the Soviet Union, and 617 in Japan. Clearly there is no single correlation between densities and urbanization. The explanation lies in the structure of the urban hierarchy within the region. Whereas in the United States there is a notable gradation of cities from larger to smaller, and only 18 per cent of the urban population lives in cities of one million population or more, in Southeast Asia the urban population is most clearly associated with the largest cities. For example, in Thailand, half of the urban population lives in one metropolis, Bangkok, and the rest is distributed among a large number of smaller cities and towns, the largest of which contains no more than 35,000 people. Bangkok, therefore, may be regarded as a true Primate City, that is, a city with many times the population of the next largest city and a multiplicity of functions and attractions which give it dominance.[4] The Primate City is characteristic of the so-called "great cities" in Southeast Asia, with few exceptions.[5] Such are, in

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[4] Mark Jefferson, "The Law of the Primate City," *Geographical Review*, April, 1939.

[5] For an excellent description of several of these great cities upon which this paper is based in part see D. W. Fryer, "The 'Million City' in Southeast Asia," *Geographical Review*, October, 1953.

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

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162 Burma, Rangoon; in Thailand, Bangkok; in the Philippines, Manila; and in Malaya, 369 Singapore. In Indochina, however, there are two major core regions, each with its region- 361 al capital, but Saigon is clearly dominant over Hanoi, which for reasons of population size alone must be regarded as a lesser city.[6] In Indonesia densely populated Java has two large cities, Jakarta and Surabaya, the first only twice the size of the second, but Jakarta is the Primate City, if less clearly than Bangkok or Rangoon. In each case, other than Indonesia, the Primate City is from five to ten times as large as the next largest city, and there is no such graded hierarchy of urbanization as in the United States and to a considerable degree in Western European countries and Japan. Secondary cities, such as Mandalay in Burma, Makassar and Jogjakarta in Indonesia, and Cebu in the Philippines, tend to be regional capitals subordinate to a great metropolis.

178 The rapid population growth of the six greatest metropolitan centers—Rangoon, 162 Bangkok, Saigon, Manila, Singapore, and Jakarta—suggest that national urbanization 369 may be proceeding as rapidly in Southeast 361 Asia as in any other part of the world.[7] This may be true, but it can be argued also that the overwhelming dominance of the Primate City inhibits the growth of lesser cities and that the largest cities will expand more rapidly than the lesser ones.[8] There are in effect only a limited number of services to be performed by cities within a predominantly village and folk society, although it may be industrializing slowly, and the great cities continue to possess a virtual monopoly of these services. Thus, even as a society changes, new and increasingly complex functions tend to be performed by institutions

[13] [6] According to the *Annuaire statistique du Vietnam, 1949–50*, the population of Hanoi was 216,900 in 1950. Its port, Haiphong, had a population of 146,000. The total population of the two is only about one-fifth that of the twin cities of Saigon-Cholon.

[7] Between 1939 and 1948 the population of Greater Manila increased by 55 per cent. Between 1931 and 1947 the population of Singapore Town (now City) increased by 52.5 per cent.

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178 162 369 361

already established in the Primate cities. So, to a very large degree, in Southeast Asia growth is primarily in the great cities,[9] whereas in the United States in the last three decades at least growth has been more rapid in the small and intermediate cities.

Although the rates of urbanization are high, being, in the case of the Philippines nearly twice the rate of population growth,[10] no sudden transformation to an urbanized society can be envisaged. The percentage of total population classified as urban is in general so low and the normal rates of population increase so high that the growth of urban population *as a percentage of total population* has not been spectacular. In the Philippines, for example, the urban population increased merely from 23.3 per cent in 1939 to 24.1 per cent in 1948, largely in the Manila area. The apparent positive correlation between social change and rates of urban population growth also is exceptionally high. To illustrate with a negative example, in Thailand, where recent social change has been minimal, the rapid population growth of Bangkok has been equaled and even exceeded by that of a number of rural *changwats* in the central and southeastern parts of the country. Under at least two conditions, however, the great cities have increased their populations enormously and at shocking rates: (1) where enlarged political functions have been acquired since the war and (2) where rural unrest and insecurity have

[113]

[8] The only apparent major exception to this generalization is Singapore and Malaya, where the lesser towns have tended to increase their populations equally rapidly since 1931. This situation may be explained by the special political and economic status of Singapore, the entrepôt for much of archipelagic Southeast Asia, and the exceptional degree of commercialization in the Malayan economy as a whole (see M. V. del Tufo, *A Report on the 1947 Census of Population* [*Malaya, Comprising the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore*] [London, 1949]).

[9] E.g., Greater Manila accounted for 89 per cent of the 1939–48 growth of the seven largest cities in the Philippines.

[10] Between 1939 and 1948 the approximate rate of total population growth was 20 per cent; that of urban population growth, nearly 40 per cent.

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178 caused or hastened a flight to the relative security of the city. These forces have been 162 operating in combination particularly in 369 Rangoon, Jakarta, Saigon, and Manila and largely are responsible for their extremely 361 rapid postwar growth. Lesser cities in Java, for example, such as Surabaya, Jogjakarta, Semarang, and Surakarta, also have increased in population because of rural insecurity; and in Burma in several towns and cities up to 50 per cent of the population has been resident less than four years, for the same reasons. These migrations have not, however, necessarily been accompanied by greater employment opportunities and consequently cannot be regarded as indexes of more rapid urbanization and associated socioeconomic change.

The great cities of Southeast Asia possess 184 many features in common, not the least of 361 which is their youth. This quality they share also with several of the great cities of the 369 United States, but there the resemblance ceases.[11] In 1800 Rangoon, Saigon, and 175 Singapore did not yet exist in city form; 178 Bangkok, the new capital of Thailand, was less than twenty years old; Manila and Batavia (Jakarta), though then about two hundred years old, were merely small coastal towns. They began to grow rapidly after the middle of the nineteenth century, as a consequence of the development of the treaty ports in China, the opening of Japan, the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown by the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, the opening of the

[11] For the most part the growth of the Southeast Asian cities was not associated with a total transformation of society but with a strong indigenous tradition, as in the case of Bangkok, or with the juxtaposition of a segment of a new civilization alongside the old, as in the case of Rangoon. In America the cities represented the culmination of a social transformation in a virtually unoccupied frontier region. The same is true of Manchuria, the northeastern frontier of pioneer settlement in China, which is more recently, and more highly, urbanized than any other part of China. In Manchuria, as in the United States, there is a quite regular gradation of city sizes, and the Primate City cannot be clearly identified.

called the "Great Tradition" in an agrarian society.[13] 361

The links between country and city in this basically feudal relationship were clear, consecutive, and relatively simple to define. To be sure, the villager would regard the capital as a different world from his own, but it was nevertheless a largely comprehensible world, if associated with abstractions and refinements beyond his immediate ken.[14] 369 184 181

The modern great city of Southeast Asia, however, not only was different but was also incomprehensible to the child of the folk society, who came to regard it not merely as strange and foreign but also as hostile. The "foreignness" is reflected in their ethnic composition. Until the second World War at least the largest population group in Rangoon was Indian; Singapore is primarily a Chinese city; Bangkok is very largely Chinese, as is Saigon if Cholon, its twin city, is included; both Manila and Jakarta have large foreign and Chinese elements. To this extent the great city is more metropolitan than national. Each has its Chinese, European, and native quarters, for example, although in many instances the lines of division have become blurred, especially since the close of the war.[15] Furthermore, wherever Chinese populations are large, a predominant type of house is the so-called "shophouse," a two-or-more-story building with shops on the first floor, built to a standard width originally dictated by the length of the average fir-log lintel as used in South China, and with residential flats and 621 361 369 184 578 162 563 342 347 563 369 184

[13] See Robert Redfield and Milton Singer, "A Cultural Role of Cities," a working paper for the Conference on the Role of Cities in Economic Growth and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, May 24–26, 1954. [113]

[14] Cf. J. M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian City: Its Culture and Evolution," *Asia*, March, 1953.

[15] In Singapore the Chinese are localized according to the various so-called "clans," e.g., Hokkien, Cantonese, Tiuchiu, Hailams, and Hakka (see B. W. Hodder, "Racial Groupings in Singapore," *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, October, 1953).

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tial area is primarily on higher ground in the 361
northern part of the city. The University of 563
Malaya is located in Singapore, though
plans are being made to move it to Johore
Baru on the Malayan mainland. Being 162
largely a Chinese city, Singapore has come
to act as a center for the Nan Yang expatri- 361
ate Chinese, and the city has been chosen as 184
the site of a new Chinese-language regional
university.[20] Nevertheless, its air is not that 563
of a Chinese city, nor, for that matter, is it
English. Like all great cities, it is cosmopoli-
tan, but it is also culturally rootless, perhaps
more so than any of the other great cities of
the region.

At the other extreme is Bangkok, most 361
indigenous of the great cities. Founded as 184
the last of a series of "forward capitals"[21] by
the Thai in 1783, after the destruction of 175
Ayuthia by the Burmese, the city has never
lost its native quality. The soaring rooftrees
of *bot* and the spires of stupa stamp the
Bangkok skyline with a character of its own.
The city is located on the left bank of the
Menam Chao Phya within the southern-
most great bend of the river some twenty
miles from its mouth. Exceptional prob- [364 312]
lems of poor drainage plagued the city from
the start, and its numerous *klongs* or canals
have given it the rather misleading title of
the "Venice of the East."

A Chinese city early appeared to the 361
southeast of the original castle town and in 34
time became part of the central business
district. As the lesser *klongs* were filled in to 184
become roads, the city continued to expand.
A new city appeared on the northern out-
skirts of the old, a planned creation built in
the reign of Rama VI with broad boulevards
and buildings ranging from shocking Vic-
torian variations on Italian Renaissance to
more recent battleship modern. The con-
trast between the façade of modern build-
ings fronting these boulevards and the stilt-
ed, bamboo, thatch, and tin-roofed houses

[20] Richard Butwell, "A Chinese University for Malaya," *Pacific Affairs*, December, 1953.

[21] See reference to Cornish in Spate, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

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Bangkok

On the other hand[1] changes in transportation have elevated Bangkok to a new importance. It lies astride the main air route between Europe and the Far East, and the Australia-Europe services also pass through it. It is now the leading international air center in Southeast Asia, with 42 international departures a week in 1953 as compared with Singapore's 27, and its airport is one of the larger commercial fields in the Orient. 361 508 369

The role of the Southeast Asian great city has been modified by the Pacific war and the granting of independence to Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and partial independence to Vietnam. Five of the six great cities are now capitals of the independent states. Each of these merits the title "link capital"; that is, they are the media through which the newly independent states are linked with the outside world. At the same time, they have begun to assume an increasingly indigenous character. The substitution of Malay for Dutch names and street signs in Indonesia is only one evidence of cultural change. The in-migration of petty officials, tradesmen, and refugees from the beleaguered rural areas has given the urban populations a new and more homogeneous native cast. The fevers of nationalism have made the large minorities more cautious about flaunting their ethnic independence. 361 178 184 162 563 177 631 369

1 [i.e. as compared to the inconvenient port facilities -- Analyst]

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361 On the other hand, the war also brought in-
178 creased American influence into the region,
631 and the ubiquitous Coca-Cola sign is one of
184 the symbols of change that sooner or later
will be followed by changes in urban facili-
ties and urban organization.

162 More important, the present period is as-
563 sociated with an increasing intensification of
171 the economic activities of government and a
corresponding diminution of foreign enter-
369 prise. Political and administrative functions
have become increasingly important since
the war. Since the main governmental or-
gans are concentrated in the largest centers,
the direct influence of the great city upon
the country in which it is primate is likewise
increasing. Relations between nationalized
city and an increasingly money-oriented
countryside are becoming more intimate,
and the formerly clear-cut cultural distinc-
tiveness of city and country is rapidly be-
coming blurred. Therefore, the likelihood of
the great city's leading a revival of ancient
value systems, as some extreme ethnocen-
trists hope it will, is small. Only one predic-
tion can be made: the days of the culturally
alien and ethnically distinct urban center
are numbered in Southeast Asia; and a city
like Singapore becomes increasingly an
anomalous relict of an age now past.

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THE PEASANTRY OF SOUTH EAST ASIA [1]

PROFESSOR RAYMOND FIRTH, F.B.A.

000 IF it is not wholly true that the social and economic reconstruction which is so necessary in Asia today must begin with the peasant, it is certain that no programme which omits the peasant can be on firm foundations. The recent history of China is evidence enough for this. My concern, as a social anthropologist, is with the analysis and classification of social relations between people and groups of people, rather than with political or economic affairs as such, although inevitably I cannot dis-
128 regard them. So my aim is to show briefly some of the most important
121 aspects of the social organization of the South East Asian peasant communities, and of the values by which this organization works. Though the details in my paper refer mainly to Malaya and Indonesia, I think the generalizations have some value for the South East Asian region as a whole.

If the basic features of the peasant society are ignored, one can understand neither the peculiar tenacity which it still possesses in modern conditions, nor the reactions of its members to the increasing impact of ex-
121 ternal economic and political forces. The definition of a peasant is a
565 countryman—a man engaged in rural pursuits, primarily agriculture, with a comparatively simple technology and a special interest in the land he
463 works. In South East Asia one may extend the application of the term to
241 cover the majority of fishermen and even village craftsmen too. They are
226 of the same social class as the agriculturalists, and often members of the same families. As occupational groups, they may even be separable only
32 in theory, since many a peasant farmer is also a fisherman or craftsman by turns, as his seasonal cycle or his cash-needs influence him. What R. H. Tawney has said of agriculture—that it is at once a craft, a business, and a manner of life—can be applied more widely here; the problems of all these peasants alike are partly technical, partly financial and commercial, and partly cultural and social.

162 It is difficult to say just what proportion of the present population of
565 South East Asia may be classed as peasants. It would seem that in nearly
241 every South East Asian country two-thirds or more of the total population
463 is to be found in agricultural communities, tilling the soil. In 1930 the
32 census of Java and Madura in Indonesia gave about 70 per cent of the male
462 workers as dependent for their livelihood on native agricultural output, and about 75 per cent in the regions of Indonesia outside Java and Madura, while large numbers of women were engaged in home craft production. In Siam, in about 1930, almost 90 per cent of the population lived in agricultural communities, rice production providing the living of about 80 per

[1] Originally delivered at a meeting at Chatham House on 21 February 1950.

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162 cent of the population. Malaya, of course, is exceptional, because of the
565 especially heavy concentration on the production of rubber and tin. Ac-
241 cording to the 1947 census of Malaya, about 34 per cent of the working
463 population were classed as cultivators and fishermen working on their own
32 account or as unpaid members of families. In all, I think one could reckon
462 that rather more than 100 million people in South East Asia can be regarded as peasantry.

[412] Throughout all this region, peasant technology is simple; skills, though
134 traditionally well adapted to the job in hand, are of limited range. Soils,
241 despite the richness of some of the swamps and river flood-plains, are generally of poor quality. The system of felling and burning the jungle, taking off crops for a few years, and then moving away to cultivate fresh clearings while the old ones revert to jungle, is still common in the mountain areas of Burma, Malaya, and Siam, in part of West Java, in much of Borneo, and in the outer islands of Indonesia. It is known as shifting cultivation or jungle-fallowing. Although regarded as extremely primitive, it is an economic use of land in areas of low population density, where plentiful land allows of long rotation of clearings and consequent restoration of soil fertility. But where population is dense, the system cannot provide the necessary volume of production without endangering the future soil capital, and that is one of the major problems of the area. In the more sedentary forms of agriculture, fertility is conserved with a great deal of care, by manuring, by water control, and so on. Sometimes there is very elaborate and spectacular terracing, as in parts of the Philippines or in Bali, where the native cultivator through his own efforts through generations has known how to make the best of the land with his available techniques. Yet many of these techniques are only of limited efficiency, and custom may be a barrier to improvement. For large masses of the Muslim peasantry of South East Asia, for instance, the pig, an excellent economic converter of resources, is taboo for religious reasons.

433 Productivity of the South East Asian peasant is apt to be low, whether
241 considered in terms of the margins required above subsistence to give him
565 and his family the range of goods and services they want, or by comparison with Western results. It is hard to make this last comparison significant because of the differing bases, but the following figures will give, perhaps rather superficially, some idea of the comparison. In terms of cwt. of cropping per acre, for instance, the rice crop of part of South East Asia can be compared roughly with the wheat crop of Western Europe. The figures are taken from different years, but they can be regarded as significant averages. Java at 12 cwt. of rice to the acre corresponds with France at 12 cwt. of wheat to the acre; Siam at 14 cwt. to the acre with the United Kingdom at 18 cwt. and Germany at a little less; Japan at 27 cwt. of rice per acre corresponds to Denmark with 27 cwt. of wheat per acre. Yet rice is supposed to be a crop of much higher yield. What is more significant is that productivity per acre in both Malaya and Indo-China is only 10 cwt. on the average, or only between one-third and one-half of the average in Japan.

/Article 23/

Anthropological Blood-Grouping in South-East Asia

By P.H.A. Sneath, M.A., M.B. (Cantab.)

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Summary of a communication to the Institute, 4 February, 1954

Four aboriginal tribes in Malaya and Borneo were studied in association with Dr. I. Polunin of the University of Malaya, as part of the programme of anthropological blood-grouping organized by Dr. A. E. Mourant. Blood samples were collected from the settlements and were tested for the ABO, MNS, Rhesus, P, Lutheran, Kell and Duffy groups and for the sickle-cell trait. Specimens of saliva were also tested for ABH secretion. The more important results are summarized in the table (page 2), in which the salient blood-group features of the main racial types of man are noted for comparison. About 100 samples from each tribe were tested.

The Negritos of Malaya.

The high incidence of the Rhesus gene Ro (cDe) supports the belief that the Negritos and Africans are descended from a common stock. The sickle-cell trait was absent, but there is some doubt whether this trait is a safe criterion of African ancestry. A more serious objection to an African origin for the Negritos is the low frequency of Ro and the absence of the trait in the Andaman Negritos, recently reported by Lehmann and Ikin (personal communication).

The Malayan Senoi.

The racial affinities of the Senoi have been much discussed, and some have suggested that they are related to the Veddas or to the Australoids. The blood groups of the Senoi are quite different from those of the Australian aborigines; the latter lack the genes B and S and have low M, while the Senoi possess considerable amounts of all three. There are few data on Veddoid blood groups. The groups of the Senoi are similar to those of Mongoloids, and this strongly supports the theory that the Senoi are closer to the Mongoloids

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TABLE I. RACIAL FREQUENCIES OF BLOOD-GROUP GENES AND FREQUENCIES IN FOUR ABORIGINAL TRIBES OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA

System	Gene	Caucasoids	Australoids	Negroids	Mongoloids	Negritos	Senoi	Aboriginal Malays	Land Dayaks
ABO	A	High (0.3)	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	0.15	0.05	0.12	0.21
	B	Low	ABSENT	High (0.3)	High*	0.09	0.24	0.20	0.31
	A_2	Moderate	Absent	High (0.0[illegible])	Absent	0	0	0	0
MNS	N	Moderate	HIGH (0.9)	Moderate	Low	0.27	0.28	0.21	0.33
	S	HIGH (0.3)	ABSENT	Moderate	Low	0.14	0.09	0.03	0.01
Rh	r (cde)	HIGH (0.4)	Absent	Moderate	Absent	0	0	0	0
	Ro (cDe)	Low	Moderate	HIGH (0.[illegible])	Low	0.27	0.01	0.01	0.07
	R_1 (CDe)	Moderate	Moderate	LOW	HIGH (0.8)	0.63	0.93	0.94	0.85
	R_2 (cDE)	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Moderate ‡	0.10	0.07	0.04	0.08
Duffy	Fy^a	Moderate	High (0.9)	Low	High	0.5		0.7	
Sickle-cell trait		Absent	Absent	High †	Absent	Absent		Absent	

* Absent in America † Also in Veddoids ‡ High in America (0.4)

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The figures in parentheses after "High" show the average gene frequency of the gene in that race which possesses the highest frequency.

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than to any other race.

The Aboriginal Malays.

The blood groups confirm that these people are Mongoloids, being similar to those of most peoples of Malaysia.

The Land Dayaks of Borneo.

The blood groups of the Land Dayaks were found to be of the Malaysian type.

Variability in Blood Groups of Settlements.

Great variation was found in blood groups between settlements of the same tribe. It was noted in all four peoples, and is presumably due to settlement endogamy (known to be common in Land Dayaks and Aboriginal Malays). Although this lessens the value of blood-grouping as a means of tracing racial ancestry, it may throw light on the way in which races arise: for instance, the suggestion that the American Indians lack blood group B because they are descended from a few small tribes who, by chance, lacked the gene is supported by examples of the virtual absence of common genes in some settlements which we studied.

The variability is thought to be due largely to genetic drift, though doubtless other factors are also responsible. The possibility of such variation, usually ignored in blood-group work, should always be considered in surveys of this area (see Polunin, Man, 1952, 104).

A full account of this work is to be published.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL 1

estation is not a discovery of Western-trained scientists but has long been practiced by certain groups in Southeastern Asia. It was the plan of the government to spread and enforce this practice of artificial reforestation wherever advisable. This practice, whereby the cultivator determines the vegetative cover during the fallow period instead of abandoning the ladang to chance growth, brings him to a transition stage between shifting cultivation and permanent cultivation. From there the step to permanent cultivation with crop rotation is but a short one.

Permanent cultivation requires repeated tilling and therefore more labor and tools than the shifting cultivator is accustomed to. Work animals are also desirable. An important obstacle to intensification of agriculture in wide areas of Southeastern Asia, however, is the fact that hill and mountain regions [up to about 1500 meters in elevation] are frequently infested with malaria so that the energy of the people is greatly reduced.[45] Moreover, the acquisition of such implements as plows, harrows, and hoes, and especially of work animals, calls for financial resources or credit, both of which the average shifting cultivator lacks. Some shifting cultivators do own livestock, such as cattle or carabaos, but utilize neither their labor nor their manure. Groups of the Mois in the mountains of Annam have carabaos, but they do not use the animals in their agricultural activities because they "cannot talk" to them.[46] On the Lesser Sunda Islands livestock is kept because it gives social prestige to the owner. Overstocking of the pasture areas on these islands has led to overgrazing and has cut into the forest area until there has developed a scarcity of land suitable for ladang cultivation. The same has happened in large areas in Africa. There it has been necessary to teach the native peasant the use of cattle and make him familiar with the plow. This was done successfully in northern Nigeria by combining the animal husbandry of the nomadic Fulani with the indigenous shifting cultivation of the Hausa peasant, thus developing "a system of permanent farming whereby a man with cattle of his own, say two working oxen and a few cows, can plough and maintain in fertility an area of land sufficient to supply all the requirements of himself and his family, and to obtain a surplus balance as a return for his labour. . . . Thus mixed farming represents a gradual evolution from the shifting methods of cultivation to a static type of agriculture, by the introduction of animal husbandry, and with the use of animal cultivation."[47] Above all, the peasant learns to preserve the animal manure and

a shade tree; *Dolichos lablab* L., a climbing herb which is valuable as a vegetable; *Crotolaria anagyroides* H.B. and K., a bush of vigorous growth which attains a height of from 12 to 14 feet and forms an excellent green manure; *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., low shrubs useful as green manures; and *Mimosa invisa* Mart., a leguminous creeper which suppresses grasses.

[45] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 181 and 350.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 354.

[47] King: "Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1939, p. 271. See also Faulkner and Mackie: West African Agriculture, 1933; and by the same authors: "The Introduction of Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1936, pp. 89–96.

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133 and deltas have changed; areas which once were shallow sea have
175 become sedimented to swamps, a process by which Cambodia has been cut off as the Lower Mekong built up mud-flats isolating Tonle Sap from contact with the sea. The evolution of new routes has caused some old centres of power to fade into mere fishing villages, evidenced in the decline of Takhola and Bandon after the sea route through the Straits of Malacca became more generally

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

FIG. 114.—Historic Pattern of Southeast Asia at the Islamisation Period

175 used than that across Kra. Plagues have laid waste whole cities, a
164 when Uthong in about 1350 was devastated by cholera and its population fled. The region is still one where malaria, dysentery, cholera and plague are endemic, more especially in the older, more congested territories like Java. These diseases have frequently flared up into appalling epidemics killing thousands of people, epidemics reflecting a relation between bacteria and the climate (which encourages bacterial reproduction), the population density, the difficulties of sewage disposal and social habits of indifference to hygiene (which has no ill effects among lonely settlements in the forest but becomes a social menace in towns). Fevers and virulent diseases have frequently ravaged the local people, debilitated them, and wiped out their settlements. The region is strewn with ruins of towns now abandoned, and with ruined groups of people who have degenerated physically by disease and under-nourishment. Southeast Asia proved capable of engulfing rather than enshrining those moving into it to live.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

744 and prevention of tropical disease which revolutionized or rather created the science of tropical medicine. The Malay States were able to take advantage of this situation without having first to spend large sums in remedying the effects of previous indifference. Tin, and later, rubber provided revenue on a scale which many older colonies lacked; and the administration was generous and far-sighted in its expenditure.'[1]

Moreover, in comparison with many tropical dependencies, the area of the Malay States is small, and the population, though not dense, is mainly concentrated in certain areas, and therefore the people as a whole are readily accessible. The local Sultans are men educated on modern lines, who can appreciate western medicine and can use their influence to recommend it to their people. Probably there is no region in the tropics where conditions are so favourable to the improvement of public health as in the Malay States.

744 164

As we have noticed, the rural population is said formerly to have enjoyed general good health. Tuberculosis was almost unknown until fostered by the congestion in the towns consequent on economic development. Similarly venereal diseases have multiplied with the mass importation of male coolies. The rice plains, in which most of the people lived and worked, 'were practically free from malaria'.[2] But when mines and rubber land were opened up to western enterprise, malaria was a formidable obstacle. Klang, the station at the coastal end of the railway to the mines, was very malarious, and the adjacent shipping centre, Port Swettenham, was so deadly that the Government directed its abandonment. But campaigns against malaria proved successful at both these places, and were extended to other towns.[3] At that time rubber plantations were being laid out, and malaria took a heavy toll among both Europeans and coolies, 'as high as one-fifth of the labour force'. Measures for the prevention of malaria were accordingly extended from the towns to rural areas. In 1910 a separate Health Branch of the Medical Departments was established to supervise anti-malarial and other health work in the interior, but its operations were hindered by the lack of adequate control over labour conditions. In 1912 accordingly the numerous separate ordinances for different classes of immigrants were consolidated in a Labour Code, which has since then regulated the conditions of labour on the plantations and mines. 'In earlier years some managers opposed the "interference" of the Health Branch, and failed to realize the

[1] Mills, p. 298.
[2] *Ib.* p. 301.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 299ff., 328.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

economic value of maintaining their labourers in good health.' The opposition, however, had some justification, as the measures that had proved efficacious in preventing malaria in the towns, had a contrary effect on the plantations, and 'resulted merely in heavy expenditure and increased mortality'. Patient research discovered and removed the defects, and by 1935 the protection against malaria was as complete on the larger estates as in the towns.[1] Another disease that has received special attention is hookworm. This is generally prevalent, and a special element of contagion exists in the Indian estate labourers, among whom a high percentage are infected, despite the treatment given to immigrants at the quarantine stations. It is not serious in itself, but it causes physical and mental fatigue, and consequently reduces the efficiency of labour. Strict provisions in the Labour Code regulated sanitary conditions on the plantations, but they were sometimes disregarded, especially on Indian properties. A campaign against the disease from 1926 to 1929, partly financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, effected a temporary improvement, but probably its chief permanent value was to direct renewed attention to the importance of rural sanitation. The Government decided accordingly to enlarge the health service, to enforce the Labour Code more strictly on estates, to provide sanitary latrines in rural schools and other Government buildings, and to persuade the villagers to build latrines and wear shoes.[2]

The beneficent activities of the public health service have gained the confidence of European employers, who now recognize its value in improving the health and enhancing the efficiency of their employees, and many provide hospitals and other amenities in excess of official requirements. But 'many Asiatic-owned plantations frequently evade the regulations, and have to be closely supervised by the Health Branch. They are a menace to their neighbours who have obeyed the regulations'. Yet the chief difficulty has been among the villagers, who 'are the worst offenders against the anti-malarial and other health measures and require constant supervision'.[3] They can be compelled or encouraged to build latrines, but, as has been found also in Java and Ceylon, they cannot be compelled to use them. In the towns shoes are a sign of higher social status, and every one wears them who can afford the money, but Government pressure has met with little success in inducing the villagers to wear shoes, which

[1] Mills, pp. 225, 234, 299, 300.
[2] *Ib.* 234, 316, 17.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 234, 316–17; *Netherlands India*, p. 363.

7: Purnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

744 indeed are hardly suited to the cultivation of rice in mud and water. Much of the expenditure incurred in improving conditions on western enterprise is wasted if the adjacent villages continue to be sources of infection. But 'the Health Branch has to contend against the dead weight of a naturally indifferent and insanitary population' that, perversely, enjoyed 'general good health' without their attentions. Constant inspection is costly, and penalties are apt to raise the pitch of corruption rather than the standard of health. Even in a wealthy dependency with conditions so generally favourable as in Malaya, it has not been possible to do much towards improving the health of the ordinary villager.[1]

744 165 Yet one finds Malaya cited as 'one instance where the whole population benefited from medical and health organization assisted by economic development',[2] and it may be well to examine the evidence more closely. According to the Census Report on Malaya for 1931 the death-rate for Malaysians was 22·4 per 1000, for Chinese 24·3 and for Indians 29·8.[3] Since Malaysians receive least attention from the health service, it would seem that its activities play a minor part in reducing the bills of mortality. In Burma for the same year the provincial death-rate was returned as 17·36 and for rural areas, where western medicine and hygiene are practically inoperative, the death-rate, according to the official returns, was only 15·87.[4] But in Burma the apparently low death-rate was explained as due in part to 'slackness in registration', and this probably holds true also of Malaysians. It has been claimed that, in Malaya, 'the fall in infantile mortality is one of the best indications of what has been accomplished'.[5] Of recent years there has indeed been a marked downward trend in the figures, and this has coincided with greater activity in welfare work. In the Federated Malay States, the recorded death-rate for infants under twelve months fell from 218 per 1000 births in 1917 to 147 in 1937, and in the Straits Settlements during the same period it fell from 267 per 1000 to 156. But the first result of greater attention to vital statistics is an improvement in registration, and 'there is unfortunately no doubt that, even in such an area as Singapore Municipality, registration of births has up to quite recent years been very far from complete, and that even to-day it leaves a good deal to be desired'. The failure in registration in Singapore was estimated

[1] Mills, pp. 314–16, 320. [2] *Social Policy in Dependent Territories* (1944), p. 6.
[3] Malaya Census, 1931, p. 10.
[4] *RAB*, 1931–2, p. 130. [5] Mills, p. 328.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

at 10 % in 1931, over 20 % in 1921 and over 35 % in 1911; yet 'the relevant statistics for Singapore are probably the best available'.[1] Death registration, however, is far more complete than birth registration, and it is certain that no inconsiderable part of the apparent decline of infantile mortality must be ascribed to the more accurate registration of births rather than to the attention to child welfare. Here, again, the figures for Burma are suggestive. In 1931 child welfare work did not extend beyond the towns, but the infantile mortality rate in rural areas was returned as 178 per 1000, whereas the corresponding figure for urban areas was 277. These figures may not prove that most children die where they receive most attention, but they do at least suggest a need for caution in accepting the figures for infantile mortality in Malaya as proof of the benefits accruing from the health service. If those figures are 'the best indication of what has been accomplished', it is unsound, in the face of evidence to the contrary, to conclude that the whole population has benefited.

In Malaya attention was directed to public health by the needs of private enterprise, and by the spread of disease as a result of economic development. European employers often go beyond the official minimum, and expenditure on the enforcement of regulations, as distinct from the provision of amenities, is chiefly incurred on western enterprises managed by non-Europeans, who cannot afford to comply with them or do not believe in them. Experience shows that the problem of improving the standard of health and the efficiency of labour on mines and plantations is ultimately linked up with the improvement of health among the people in general. But an improvement in the general standard of health among the people would seem to require that they shall comply with regulations in which they have no faith, and voluntarily accept rules which they are unable to obey and which the government is equally unable to enforce. In Singapore, as in Rangoon, conditions preclude the enforcement of the housing by-laws.[2] Where ill-health is the direct result of economic circumstances, the remedy lies not in legislation but in changing the environment. To most reforms, however, the chief obstacle is apathy. Without a change of attitude, expenditure on a health service as an instrument of welfare, or even as an instrument of economic progress, is largely wasted; given a change of attitude, most of the urgent reforms could be effected without spending large sums on a public health service, because common sense is sufficient to recommend

[1] Malaya Census, 1931, pp. 106, 108.

[2] Mills, p. 321 n.

1: Pelzer ALl Southeast Asia ALl
166, 727

/For author's recommendations regarding post-World War II rehabilitation and reconstruction in Southeast Asia and particularly regarding future agricultural colonization schemes, see category 116, pp. 232-242./

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL4

Although most sedentary cultivators in Southeastern Asia make use of the animal-drawn plow, in the densely populated regions the parcelling of land has proceeded so far that many peasants, whose fathers, or ancestors, owned draft animals (carabaos or oxen) and used plows, have farms so diminished in size that they cannot afford to keep draft animals and therefore must till their fields entirely with hand tools. In spite of the fact that they often make very intensive use of their fields, still they are not able to produce enough to meet the modest needs of their families. 241 231 311

In nearly all instances, however, where the governments concerned have attempted to solve this problem by opening up land suitable for sedentary cultivation to settlers coming from problem areas, the governments have been confronted by the fact that these districts, which might offer outlets for the congested areas, are inhabited by shifting cultivators or in some cases by food gatherers. The danger is then that the proposed migration may infringe upon the rights of the indigenous peoples, whose economy and mode of life, as we have noticed, require considerably more land than those of the incoming settlers, who are accustomed to permanent-field cultivation. It is, therefore, necessary for us to understand the various forms of land use in Southeastern Asia and their peculiar exigencies in order rationally to approach the problems of pioneering in the countries around the South China Sea. 311 241 166

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SOUTHEAST ASIA NUTRITION DENSITIES
(Average number of persons per rice-acre per annum)

Quinquennium	*Burma*	*Indo-china*	*Siam*	*Java and Madoera*	*Philip-pines*	*Malaya*
1916–20	1.23	1.75	1.66	4.12	3.13	—
1921–25	1.19	1.67	1.57	4.27	2.67	5.61
1926–30	1.14	1.61	1.57	4.50	2.69	6.13
1931–35	1.19	1.64	1.63	4.60	2.76	6.42
1936–40	1.25	1.63	1.74	4.96	2.79	7.02
1946–50	2.0	2.1	1.6	5.9	3.9	7.2

Because population and the net production of food have increased *pari passu*, it is important to examine the "nutrition density" (persons per acre under rice) since the surplus for export depends on low internal consumption of the Southeast Asia staple and high internal production. The countries of Southeast Asia pre-war showed considerable differences in nutrition density, from Malaya (the plantation-mining specialist) with 7.2 persons per rice-acre, to Siam (the rice-surplus specialist) with 1.6. Malaya, Java and the Philippines had nutrition densities much higher than the rest of neighbouring countries and in the case of Malaya and Java the nutrition density had been steadily rising, whereas in Burma, Indochina and Siam it was fairly static. Over the same period, the domestic consumption of rice per person sharply dropped (by 20-25 per cent) in Burma, Siam and Java and rose about 10 per cent in Indochina, Philippines and Malaya. The postwar figures available show considerable increases of nutrition density everywhere except in Siam, yet these were changes of degree, not of pattern.

Changing Internal Emphasis

Today the very crowded places are firstly, Middle and North Java, Lower Siam and the Red River Delta, where densities of over 1,500 people per square mile occur, with secondary crowdings in Lower Burma, the Lower Mekong, Central Luzon and the Visayas. These concentrations of people are pre-eminently in agricultural areas (Fig. 116), and they are in fact largely made possible by exceptional soil qualities within an area whose general soil fertility is low. These crowded areas have taken part in a commercialisation of local agriculture and their subsequent history has been firstly a

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

FIG. 116.—Distribution of People in Southeast Asia

rapid increase in people to a point where the new agricultural development ceased to be enough for the large population, leading to the second stage of slow migration and emphasis on commercial agriculture upon newer zones of similar type. Hence the change of emphasis from Tonkin to the Annam coastal plains and then to the Lower Mekong; from the Central Luzon area to Visayan Islands;

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from the plains of Java to the dangerous upper limits of the volcanic country; and from Dry Burma to the Irrawaddy Delta. Sometimes there has been a little agricultural migration—very largely this change has been brought about by different rates of growth rather than movement of people to new places. Everywhere commercialisation of agriculture has led to population increase, because the agricultural technique has not changed from the Southeast Asia tradition of manual work at every stage. The bringing of new areas into cultivation has been followed by an increase in the number of hands to do the cultivating, partly a response to the need and partly made possible by additional nourishment and an added vitality arising from lower disease rates natural to the less populated area, because human diseases are diffused more slowly where people are isolated from one another, as in new areas. Thus Southeast Asia has been the scene of intense pioneering by people seeking, developing and filling new agricultural areas, to create for a time the eldorado of rice-eating peoples and the one safeguard of Indians and Chinese against the vagaries of their own harvests and against the congestions of their home districts.

Minerals in turn have attracted external interest. There has been the pull of gold in the Philippines, of tin in Malaya and nearby islands, of petroleum in Sumatra and Borneo. These great gambles drew capital and pulled in crowds of labourers, wage-earners who were unavailable from local people so tightly held in their manual agricultural systems. Minerals drew millions of Chinese through the South China Sea in the tin rushes and oil rushes of the last hundred years.

Yet another form of commercialised agriculture developed, to provide the industrial raw materials of distant factories in Europe and America and based on crops entirely foreign to Southeast Asia. Sugar, coffee, hemp, rubber, oil palm proved highly successful in this terrain where they had never existed before. Large plantations of them were laid out, still more wage-earning labour was absorbed, a still greater production was obtained, drawing more and more people into virgin areas. Migrations from India and China were further stimulated to work upon the plantations whose uneven development, in successions of booms and depressions, alternately attracted migrants in the boom years and sent them home again in the depressions.

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Political Convergence

438 These local products for commerce not only stimulated export trade; they stimulated import trades to feed the migrant peoples, to dress them, and to dress the agriculturists so preoccupied that they could no longer spare time to weave for themselves. And trade itself drew external interests; Chinese and Indian traders came in to monopolise middleman functions and Europeans came in and worked out here the complex balancing of their own industrial systems far away. Britain stimulated the commercialisation of Burmese rice production as an assurance of cheap food for an industrialising, overpopulated India. The Dutch fanned out from Java into the adjoining islands. Not to be outdone, the French moved into Indochina as a base for their China trade. Germans for a time controlled the copra trade of the farther eastern islands. Thus all the major Western European powers had colonial interests in the expanding peoples, the expanding production and the expanding needs of Southeast Asia. And the major oriental powers, India, China and Japan, had equally direct interest in Southeast Asia (Fig. 117) as an outlet for their people, a source of rice, a source of raw materials for their industries, and finally as outlet for their own industrial products, India and Japan being mostly involved in this, the latest phase.

Internal Divergences

The resulting pattern of people is one of unparalleled diversity in stages of evolution from subsistence to commerce, in densities of people, in ethnic types, in languages (Fig. 118). The similarity of setting, circumstance and products have disrupted Southeast Asia within itself by economic rivalry in producing similar commodities, and the divergencies of overseas connections with different colonial powers established divergent trade streams, currency differences, educational differences and political differences. Political and economic forces released in Europe and America had their repercussion within Southeast Asia, by means of which French protectionist policies virtually isolated Indochina from its neighbours and Filipinos turned their backs upon Asia. Siam has been wooed, ignored or bullied, depending on the fluctuation of Anglo-French relations in Europe and the opportunism of the U.S. in building up its bloc in East Asia. All sorts of colonial systems have been

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

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FIG. 117.—Pattern of Modern Migrations

experimented with, so that Southeast Asia has a great range of constitutional forms, from fossilised oriental aristocracies to democracies of a few intelligentsia and to would-be republics trying to combine the gestures of democracies with the powers of autocracies, the whole being permeated by complex trading systems of both Western and Oriental types. All this may be summed up by saying that the cross-currents and backlashes of the world's political and economic systems of the present and past still move

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

Chinese
Indians

464 years of the present century, the flow of immigration has been large and
167 comparatively steady except during the depression and the two world wars. Chinese and Indian immigrants usually could better their position soon after arrival because their industry and organization were superior to those of the indigenous peoples. Partly because of this, there were constantly new arrivals willing to do coolie work until they too could
[178] rise economically. Except for the large-scale repatriations to China and India caused by the depression, the flow of labor thus set into motion was adequate for the economy prevailing in the underpopulated areas until changing conditions created a growing class of landless proletariat and
[668] dissatisfaction among both the indigenous and immigrant peoples. This dissatisfaction often became associated with other motivations in nationalist movements.

Controlled migrations occurred only between regions under the same government or those held by governments of the same nationality, except for a limited migration of Javanese labor to Malaya (and to New Cale-
[166] donia). In the Netherlands Indies and in Indochina the governments endeavored to transplant groups of laborers from overpopulated to underpopulated areas, but in so doing they learned that the process required careful organization, was expensive, and raised serious economic, social, and psychological problems. Such movements could be effected successfully on a limited scale only. This fact obviated the possibility of their contributing substantially to solution of the problem of overpopulation. As labor supply, such migrations were only temporarily satisfactory, because social and religious ties inclined the workers to return to their home villages immediately upon the expiration of their contracts or even to desert. To stabilize this labor force some of the governments tried after the depression to obtain a better adjusted sex ratio in the migrant population by encouraging the immigration of workers' families and the establishment of agricultural villages—a program too recently initiated to make possible a definite appraisal of its comparative success or failure. In Malaya, with the exception of a few Javanese, planned immigration was confined to Indian laborers. It was arranged and operated jointly by the two British governments concerned. There, however, the depression, the growth in voluntary Indian immigration, and India's ban in 1938 on assisted emigration to Malaya tended to render many of the official controls unnecessary. The unplanned and uncontrolled movement of labor across the Burma-India frontier was the sole migration of its type in Southeast Asia.

563 The indigenous populations in general hold themselves socially aloof
609 from the alien Asiatics. To the Muslim Malays the Chinese were materialistic, pork-eating idolators; and the Indians, with the exception of the small Islamic minority, were similarly disdained, though regarded as less aggressive. To the sinicized Annamites, the Burmese, and the Siamese,

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LABOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION

JAPAN'S TREATMENT of labor throughout Southeast Asia varied according to the military situation, the political relations of Japan with the individual country, and the availability of manpower. Everywhere, however, labor suffered from dislocations, regimentation, and general deterioration in working conditions except for the limited amount of technical training dispensed by the Japanese to create a needed nucleus of skilled workers. The information required to draw a complete picture of the labor situation during the war in each of the countries of this region is not yet available, but from such data as exist—drawn chiefly from former enemy sources—the outlines are reasonably clear. 727 466

By mid-1943 their military position in the Pacific War led the Japanese to alter their policy in Southeast Asia. Labor in the area had not previously been regimented on a nation-wide basis, although attempts to register the available manpower and use it for individual projects had been made as the need arose. But the critical shipping situation, which prevented both exports from Southeast Asia to Japan and imports needed in those countries, of necessity changed the objective of Japanese policy from one of economic exploitation for the benefit of the homeland to maintaining Japanese troops in the area and achieving local self-sufficiency and defense.

In June 1943 new labor measures were widely introduced; these foreshadowed large-scale forced labor and indicated that the Japanese realized that patriotic as well as economic and prestige incentives had to be offered to secure native cooperation. Soon after, the transplanting of laborers from the most populous areas to those requiring workers for defense projects and economic development was systematically undertaken. This policy prevailed until V-J Day at a tempo which kept pace with the worsening military situation of Japan. [166]

Japan's political aims were reflected in marked differences in policy in each of the countries of eastern Asia, and also toward separate groups within each state. The comparatively good treatment meted out to the Siamese derived from Japan's need, for propaganda purposes, to maintain the fiction of Siam's voluntary alliance in the Greater East Asia war. Being unwilling, for political reasons, to coerce masses of Siamese workers, and for economic reasons to rely on their small, unskilled and re- 727 167 464

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

727 luctant services, the Japanese imported prisoners of war and Javanese
167 laborers for the construction of the Burma and Kra Isthmus railroads.
464 Even after the pro-Japanese dictator, Pibul Songgram, had been ousted by a resistance government, the Japanese tolerated the change so long as they retained military and economic control over the country.

727 Malaya, on the other hand, received the least favored treatment. The only country in the area to which the Japanese did not promise "independence," it was earmarked as a Japanese colony. The Japanese were faced with a small, foreign labor supply whose special skills were adapted
[464] 466 almost exclusively to the tin and rubber industries. Since they could utilize only a small proportion of the country's major produce, there occurred tremendous dislocation and unemployment of labor. The Chinese, as the largest, most skilled, and most hostile group, were subjected successively to brutal treatment, registration and regimentation, and transportation to farming colonies on the peninsula. The Indians were similarly organized along racial lines through the Japanese-sponsored Indian Independence Leagues and the Indian National Army. The Malays escaped the more rigorous forms of coercion because of their negligible importance as a source of labor.

[167] Despite the tight network of organization developed by the Japanese, Malaya's labor problem was never satisfactorily solved; guerilla ranks were strengthened by recalcitrants of all races and eventually the occupying forces had to import Japanese and Javanese workers in order to strengthen the defenses of that vitally strategic area.

727 Indochina, thanks to the survival of the French administration until the Japanese coup of March 1945, was treated only slightly less favorably
466 than Siam. The Japanese found there a more abundant labor supply than in immediately neighboring countries but were hampered by the necessity of working indirectly through French officials, by the concentration of labor in the north, and its antipathy to furthering Japan's war
[167] aims. As in Malaya, the inadequacy and indifference of the local labor supply compelled the Japanese to import a few thousand Chinese and Malay coolies as well as some Japanese technicians and supervisors. A certain number of local laborers were conscripted to work on defense
• [166] and industrial projects and an undetermined number of Tonkinese were transported to work on plantations in the south. Unemployment seems
[464] not to have become a major factor, although as the war progressed there was a marked shift of agricultural workers to the cities, only partially offset by the evacuation of some laborers from heavily bombed urban areas. In common with the other laborers of Southeast Asia, Indochinese workers suffered from coercion and inflation but apparently not from nation-wide regimentation or transportation to work outside their own country.

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Indians

Next to the Javanese, the Burmese endured the greatest hardships during the Japanese occupation. Burma was more completely devastated by military campaigns than any other country in the area, and its proximity to India made it Japan's frontier zone. The need to win Burmese cooperation led Japan to grant Burma "independence" on August 1, 1943, and thereafter the local intelligentsia were placated by a Burmanization of the administrative services. But the country's laborers were in a far worse plight than they had been under the British administration. The Indians, whose number in Burma had been halved during the 1942 campaign, were immediately thereafter exposed to persecution by the Burmese. Virtual pogrom conditions in the delta compelled them to flee to Rangoon for Japanese protection and employment. Indian coolies supplied the casual labor needed in the nation's capital, and most of the white-collar class was absorbed into the Indian Independence Leagues and Indian National Army. Burmese laborers, who had long agitated for a restriction of Indian immigration, now found themselves bearing the brunt of Japanese requisitioning, which was represented by the puppet native government as a patriotic service. They had to perform heavy manual labor far from home, for low wages, and under alien and often harsh supervision. They suffered, in addition, from the knowledge that their own fields were neglected and their homes unprotected. Burma was frequently praised by the Japanese for having supplied more cooperative labor service than any other area in the southern regions, but nevertheless Javanese workers had to be brought in.

727 563 [464] [466]

Java, with the greatest labor reservoir of the area, was inevitably the country whose manpower was most intensively exploited by the Japanese. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Javanese served as coolie labor for the construction of defense works and means of communication and also were trained by the Japanese for more technical work in shipyards and in factories. They were shipped by the thousands to areas outside their island as local needs and the exigencies of the military situation dictated.

727 466 167

Originally the Japanese planned to perpetuate, on a far vaster scale, Dutch colonization schemes in Sumatra; in this they not only encountered the same obstacles as had their predecessors, but they found they could exploit all of the island's resources they could use with the manpower and machinery locally available. In mid-1943 they seem to have transferred the plan to Borneo, where additional labor was required to develop such local industries as timber. Many hundreds of male Javanese workers were shipped to Borneo, while smaller groups were sent to other areas.

727 464 166

Unemployment during the Japanese occupation was serious only in Malaya. Elsewhere the defense and economic programs of the Japanese,

727 464

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Malaya

real stake in the countries of the Nan Yang, as settled members of the local 565
society, and not as aliens. The third point is that the Chinese community 609
has never been one of middlemen only; there has always been a fair pro- 186
portion of cultivators within it. The poor peasantry of South East Asia 578
now includes a Chinese as well as an indigenous element. The 1947 census 563
of Malaya shows 45,000 Chinese engaged in rice growing, and another 241
100,000 in market gardening and fishing, essentially peasant pursuits.

The pressure to which the South East Asian peasant has been subjected 177
by the combination of Western and other alien influences has been severe. 565
But we must beware lest we misinterpret it. In a recent book which gives a 166
comparative analysis of the agrarian situation in the countries of South East Asia, appears a striking statement about Malaya—that development of mining and rubber industries has pushed the native Malay population more and more towards the east, into the areas of the former Unfederated Malay States: 'The Malays', it is said, 'considered the east as safe from Western penetration, and therefore preferred this undeveloped area to the irrigated lands on the western coast, mainly because there they could get only temporary land licences, since a complete survey of all potential tin-bearing regions had not yet been made'.[1]

It is true that the eastern States are predominantly Malay in population, and that the greater part of the vast immigrant population of Malaya is densely settled on the western side of the peninsula, where the resources are richer and access easier than on the eastern side. It is also true that there has been some lack of enthusiasm among Malay peasants to colonize the new Government-developed irrigation areas, for complex reasons, including lack of capital in the past, and disinclination to move from their ancestral homes. But it is quite incorrect to put these facts together and to argue that the Malay has been pushed by alien pressure over from the west to the east of the peninsula. Apart from some seasonal movement for rice harvesting or fishing, the internal migration of Malays is inconsiderable, despite the rapid development of communications in recent years. Both the 1931 and the 1947 census show that whatever movement takes place—well under 10 per cent—is almost wholly from one State to another, either on the west coast or on the east coast, or to Singapore. Hardly any movement at all occurs from the west to the east. Moreover, the 1947 census shows that between 1931 and 1947 the Malay population of the western States increased by about one-third, at a rate slightly higher than that of the eastern States. The proportion of Malays in these western States, in terms of the total population of all ethnic groups, also increased slightly during this period, due primarily to the decline of Indians and Indonesians. In other words, though foreign economic penetration has immersed the western Malay in a flood of alien elements, it has not driven him away. On the contrary, he has preferred to stay and await events.

[1] Erich H. Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia* (New York, Colombia University Press, 1949) p. 113.

18: Firth E-4 (no date) 1950 All Southeast Asia All

[438] One reason for this is economic advantage. The coming of rubber, in particular, has given to the Malay peasant of the west coast an income considerably higher, on the whole, than that of the east coast peasant.
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565

[166] The effects of Westernization are profound. But they do not lie in crude physical displacement of the peasant or degradation of his living conditions. They lie in the widening of the gap between his expanding range of wants and his level of productivity, and in his inability to measure and in any way control the economic forces operating in his field. Westernization has meant for the peasant an enlargement of the social horizon—more knowledge, through better communications and education, of other places, of other peoples of kindred and dissimilar interests. It has created new ambitions: for different clothing, for new uses of leisure, for a better status for his children, for a position of power in the political scene. All this has disturbed the traditional patterns of peasant society. These patterns, and the class structure of South East Asian society of which they were a part, were probably never too satisfactory to the peasant. Anxiety and evasion must have often been the response to either too rigid or too elastic a rule—and the peasant seems often to have suffered from the exactions of his superior in the social scale. But the scope of the system was known, if not its precise implications. Nowadays the scope of the system has for the most part passed beyond the peasant's grasp, and much of it has become de-personalized.

To illustrate this by giving a more concrete analysis of some of the values in the peasant's life, let me take the area of Malaya and Indonesia where Islam is the major religion of the people.

181 In his daily life the Indonesian or Malay peasant is governed largely
177 by the canons of behaviour, the ties of friendship and neighbourliness, the relations of work and social intercourse of his village community. So much
565 is this so that in Java the *desa*, the village, was crystallized by the Dutch
602 into an administrative and developmental unit, and its communal struc-
776 ture strengthened for welfare purposes. But as important as the village,
779 and indeed often basic to its structure, are the family and larger kin or-
671 ganizations. From these a person gets his social status and much of his land and other property, and they have the primary role in his marriage
182 and other crucial events in his progress through life.

Such domestic and local relationships also provide a framework for the peasant in his attempts to come to terms with the forces of nature and human destiny. His world of spirits is a local world. In Indonesia the ancestors do not play the predominant role which they do, for instance, in Annam. But the village, the seashore, the surrounding jungle, wells, trees, and stones are the home of many kinds of spirits, which afflict man with sickness or misfortune, or stand by him as his familiars to guard him. Basic in the religion of the Indonesian peasant is this local, essentially parochial, spirit element. All these values guide his economic and social conduct, and mean a great deal to him.

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Indochina AM1
Malaya AN1

thinly settled areas of Laos, Cambodia, western Cochinchina, and the mountainous regions of Annam and Tongking are comparable to the Outer Islands. Moreover, the Annamese is as reluctant as the Javanese to leave his native village and settle among people who do not speak his language nor follow his customs. The few colonization experiments[4] that have been made in Indochina in recent years have brought out many of the same lessons as did the early trial period in the Indies.

The necessity was felt for organizing this movement carefully, preferably by groups of families from the same village headed by their chiefs, who alone are capable of maintaining the cohesion necessary if the Tonkinese are to settle down to their ordinary way of living immediately after their establishment in the settlement areas.[5]

Here, too, the need for population adjustment has become so pressing that resettlement measures will have to be started on a large scale after the war.

Industrialization also has been advocated for Indochina. In contrast to the Philippines and the Indies, Indochina has most of the basic raw materials for heavy as well as for secondary industry. Mercantilistic considerations, however, deterred France from industrializing the country. It was not until 1938 that growing unemployment and population pressure finally led the government to initiate a compromise program of promoting secondary industries.

Migration across international boundaries in Southeastern Asia was, and probably will be, negligible; almost all such migrants who had before the war entered the countries encircling the South China Sea came from China or India, the principal exception being the Javanese in Malaya. Most of the latter entered the country as plantation laborers but ultimately settled on the land and engaged in rice cultivation. This development was beneficial to both countries; on the one hand the laborers and their families did not return to their overcrowded villages in Java and on the other hand they increased the rice production of Malaya. The Malays accept the Javanese readily as both are Moslem and of the same racial stock. There would be no reason to advocate a settlement of Javanese in the Philippines or Thailand or of Annamese in Malaya or Borneo, or of Filipinos in Cambodia or New Guinea so long as there was sufficient suitable agricultural land available within the boundaries of the native countries of the prospective pioneers.

In the past, Southeastern Asia did not to any great extent enjoy a free exchange of ideas and information. Identical problems were often tackled without the benefit of knowledge gained from the experience of a neighbor-

[4] International Labour Office: Labour Conditions in Indo-China, 1938, pp. 216–241. See also Brévié: "Conseil supérieur de la colonisation," 1938, pp. 715–756; and Services du Protectorat: "Activité colonisatrice du Tonkin," 1938, pp. 757–779.

[5] International Labour Office: *op. cit.*, p. 236.

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000 So in extending the practice, the kings of Pegu or Ayuthia need not be suspected of mere obsequiousness, although their motives in sending missions were diplomatic as well as commercial. Later (the dynastic histories record) the incursions of the Portuguese and other barbarians into Southeast Asia caused an interruption of the tribute, but before this dilatory vassals had occasionally been reminded of their manners by punitive expeditions from the Dragon Throne.[1]

After the establishment of the Ming dynasty, the emperor Yung Lo[2] and his successor dispatched to the West a series of great expeditions of up to sixty-two ships filled with as many as 37,000 soldiers. They got as far afield as Ormuz on the Persian Gulf, the east coast of Africa,[3] Calicut in India, the east coast of Java, and Ceylon. They went as armadas and returned as argosies. The most famous of the commanders was the Grand Eunuch, Cheng Ho. Either he or his associate Grand Eunuchs carried out seven voyages between 1405 and 1433, bringing the glory and, when necessary, the terror of the Imperial Ming name to all the potentates of the archipelago and far beyond.[4] A prince of Ceylon and a local chief in Sumatra who failed to submit to the Emperor's power were seized and carried off to China; a Chinese pirate with a lair in the archipelago who tried to combine humble submission to the Emperor with theft of the tribute consigned to his Imperial Majesty was run to earth and taken to Peking for a lingering execution.

●167 Other, more orthodox, Chinese traders had in the interim been feeling out on their own *in partibus infidelium* in search of gain. They went down to the Nanyang with the northeast monsoon about February and returned with the southwest monsoon in April. From about the thirteenth century they began to form settlements in such places as Tumasik, or Old Singapore, Malacca, and Java. In the earlier days they lived where they chose, but in more modern times these overseas Chinese were relegated, it must

[1] See J. J. L. Duyvendak, *Chinese Discovery of Africa* (London, Probsthain, 1949) (in the press) who says, 'Recognition by the Chinese Court gave "face" to these minor Kings. Also, it was the primitive form in which officially-sanctioned trade could be carried on. As early as the Han dynasty the Chinese sent ships overseas to collect precious objects.'

[2] In Giles's romanization Yung Lê.

[3] Duyvendak, op. cit.

[4] Cheng Ho did not personally take part in all the voyages—certainly not in the second (1407–9).

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be confessed, to what were often sorry ghettoes. Those who settled intermarried with the native women and laid the beginnings of a new race whose culture remained Chinese. Individuals rose to positions of eminence in the native courts, and one Chinese, Peja Jummeraad, was chief justice in seventeenth-century Siam. 167

It was the arrival of the Europeans, however, which created the conditions favourable to Chinese settlement on a larger scale. The Spanish, the Dutch, and the British subdued large areas and established the security necessary for profitable trade and a bearable life. Nevertheless, friction between themselves and the ruling race in the Philippines and later in Java resulted in Chinese rebellions and the large-scale massacre of this people, showing that the security was only provisional; but they were soon back again in their old numbers as if nothing had happened. Broadly speaking, the Chinese became the middlemen, the intermediaries between the Europeans and the native peoples. Their popularity with the ruling race fluctuated according as they were valued for their services or feared for their political or economic power; the nature of their function was such as to bring them increasingly under native suspicion.

It is here that we should refer briefly to the case of the Chinese in Burma which was apart from the main course of Chinese migration—apart, that is, before the maritime arrivals of the nineteenth century. The trade route by way of the Shan States had been open at least from the time of the Mongol dynasty. The staple import from China for centuries was silk, raw and manufactured, just as the staple import from Burma into China was cotton. The study of the commerce of this route is one of the most fascinating features of this survey, for the change in the nature of the commodities about the middle of last century is a striking index to the advance of the industrial West. Before this time China was the factory of Southeast Asia, and, indeed, of countries far remote. Chinese textiles, destined in great degree for Mexico, poured into the emporium of Manila: not only manufactured silk and cotton nankeens were loaded on to pack-mules and carrying-coolies for transport over the passes of Yunnan, but also iron *quallies*, or pots, and brassware. By the second half of the nineteenth century the flow of goods changes, and it is Manchester cottons, Bradford woollens, and Birmingham pots and pans which go to China, and the flow of nankeens and *quallies* the other way has practically ceased. It is 487 000

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like watching a stream change its watershed. But remember at the same time that it was a stream, not a river, for the overland route never gained the importance the British hoped and the principal routes of commerce continued to be by sea.

We return now to the main story of Chinese migration: the seasonal influx of a few Chinese traders and labourers cannot compare with the mass movement we are about to describe. It needed the nineteenth- and twentieth-century capitalistic imperialism to open up the colonial countries for the supply of raw materials to the Western industrial machine. Chinese labour has now found its fullest scope in the tin mines and the rubber plantations of South-east Asia; Chinese artisans were in demand for the urban handicrafts; Chinese merchants and shopkeepers flocked in to the centres to expand the retail trade. In some countries the number of Chinese was multiplied several times; in Siam they were said to have passed he two million mark by the 1930s; in Indonesia at this period a million and a quarter were distributed through Java, Sumatra, and the Outer Islands; in Malaya they reached their greatest numbers, nearly two and half millions, by 1941 and outnumbered the Malays for the first time. In bringing in Chinese for Malaya's mines and plantations and opening the doors to Chinese traders, the British had created for themselves a political problem of the first magnitude and one that will loom large in our pages to come. This was the era of the 'battalions' as distinguished from the small expeditions, and, long, long after the 'single spies'.

Meanwhile another evolutionary process was at work in the Far East. Peoples were becoming aware that they were separate culture-groups as well as being (as they thought) separate blood-groups—namely, that they were nations. For Japan, insular, centralized, with a compact social system, the transition from race-consciousness to nation-consciousness was not a difficult one: for China it was otherwise. Separated immemorially by mountain and river, by lake or marsh, the prefectures, the districts, and the villages were self-absorbed. At most a common dialect would give them a qualified sense of brotherhood: usually it was the family that was the largest social unit. At the same time they were aware, of course, that they were all members of the Blackhaired Race and not to be confused with the barbarian devils—but that was scarcely more of a bond of union than being human is to the modern world of *homo sapiens*. In 1840 British troops on their way to the 'Opium

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heart to the terrorists in their 'hide-outs' in the almost limitless jungles of Malaya.

Such is the outline of the story we shall have to tell. What, then, is the philosophy of this Chinese migration?

If they had been called upon to deal with the Chinese of Southeast Asia, the great historians would have treated it according to their enlightenment and the age they lived in. Gibbon, for example, if he were restored from the grave, would assuredly regard the activities of all modern Chinese as a progressive falling away from the Chinese Age of the Antonines, the dynasty of T'ang. It is unlikely that he would show any undue sympathy for the colonists who were so little steeped in the national culture. Mommsen would find no Chinese Caesar overseas, and would assuredly disdain these simple annals. Macaulay, brought back to life, most probably would have dutifully accepted the task of writing the history of the Chinese in the Nanyang were it imposed upon him, and he would assuredly have devoted his opening chapters to describing the squalid sufferings of the pioneer coolie in his blue trousers, rope-soled shoes, and broad-brimmed hat, his naked body sweating under a tropical sun, and more chapters to an imposing picture of his magnificent mansion,[1] his fleet of shining motor-cars, and (maybe?) his bevy of concubines after he had got on in the world.

But we must pass from this diverting speculation to an interpretation of our task stated in our own terms. It is to make actual an important and striking phenomenon of recent times, the overflow of the Chinese in large numbers into Southeast Asia, to demonstrate the problems caused by this overflow, and, if possible, to help place the general historian, the politician, the administrator, the diplomat, and the merchant in a state of mind congenial to a better understanding of the Chinese overseas. This understanding may suggest an approach to the practical questions of the area in the next decade or so which will benefit both West and East.

If one fact has impressed the writer of this survey more than another in the course of his study, it is the feebleness of the attempt made by the Colonial Powers and the indigenous Governments in this area to understand the overseas Chinese and their problems.

[1] The lesser, but less awestruck, Lytton Strachey would probably make a sly reference to the electro-plated vacuum cleaner or thermos flasks, for ornament and not for use, in the drawing-room of the self-same mansion.

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no miscegenation of any importance. Before then it was comparatively small.[1] 162

Siam, which next to Malaya has probably the greatest number of Chinese in the area, offers far greater difficulty. The Siamese census of 1937 placed the *immigrant* Chinese at 524,000. It is common knowledge, however, that the number of persons in the country who in appearance, custom, language, and sentiment are of the Chinese race is far greater than this. Indeed, now that the 'Chinese question' looms large in Siam, it is often whispered (and sometimes in responsible circles) that the number of Chinese in the country is 'over four million'. This figure the writer believes to be a great exaggeration. For one thing, the 1937 figure for 'legal' Chinese was probably not far from the mark,[2] and even if we included all persons of the second and even third generation (at which stage assimilation to the Siamese was usually complete) we should probably not reach a figure for that time greater than two million.[3] Since the census of 1937 the immigration of Chinese into Siam has been strictly controlled and was in 1949 subject to a quota of 200 per annum. Even allowing for a considerable illegal entry and a natural increase of 1·5 per cent. per annum it is not thought likely that the present figure is more than two and a half million—in all probability it is appreciably less. A different test that we may apply is this. For reasons of prestige the Chinese National Government has tended to state the number of its nationals abroad (and China, as we know, follows the *jus sanguinis* and not the *jus soli*) at the highest possible figure, but the official *China Handbook*, 1937–43, compiled by the Chinese Ministry of Information in Chungking, gives the figure as two and a half million for 1943, though the *Chinese Year Book*, 1943, compiled by the Council of International Affairs, Chungking, states it as three million.[4] 162 167

[1] The main reason is the Mohammedan religion with the alternatives of 'pork or no pork', 'dogs or no dogs'. Mr del Tufo doubts whether the number of Chinese Malay 'crosses' exceeds one or two in a thousand of the whole population.

[2] The Siamese census of 1947 gave Chinese in Bangkok, 284,519, Chinese in the provinces, 508,172, total, 792,691. These were Chinese holding aliens' registration certificates.

[3] This is the figure given by Mr Leonard Unger in his article 'The Chinese in Southeast Asia', *The Geographical Review*, vol. xxxiv, no. 2 (1944) p. 199.

[4] Mr Unger (ibid.) reasonably says of the Chinese in Siam: 'If to the immigrants are added a second generation and those individuals in a third generation who still speak the language and keep up the customs of, and main-

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In the Philippines Filipino nationalism has for many years tended to magnify the number of Chinese in the islands since this was a matter of political capital, and before the Americans came certain Spanish interests had reasons of their own for stating the number as high as possible. But the numbers undoubtedly decreased during the war with Japan and since the liberation the Philippines Government has refused to allow the return of Chinese displaced persons except as part of a small annual quota.[1] Early in 1948 the Philippine Immigration Bureau gave the total number of Chinese in the islands as 101,000, but although to this figure a certain percentage should be added for illegal immigration (which is much easier to accomplish than in Siam, the Philippines being so near to China) it is thought that by adopting a figure of 120,000 a sufficient allowance has been made both for this and for any error in enumeration.

In Indochina where 'immigrants from China' are the only ones included in the census returns as Chinese, there have nevertheless been partial attempts in 1921 and 1931 to count the number of second generation *métis*, or offspring of Chinese fathers and Annamite or Cambodian mothers, and, making the necessary compensations and adjustments, we get a figure for 1937 of 326,000 'legal' Chinese plus 141,000 *métis* and a total of 467,000. This figure incidentally is about 40,000 in excess of that given by the *China Handbook*, 1937–43. (The official French figure for 1931 had been 418,000 'legal' Chinese, but the numbers had dropped considerably by 1937.) The official estimate by the Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer was 850,000 Chinese in Indochina in 1947.

Other difficulties turn on the variation in the years of the available censuses. Malaya and Sarawak are the only two countries in the area which have taken censuses since the Japanese surrender,[2]

tain a loyalty to, their ancestral homeland, the total rises to about one million. This approaches two million if there are also included those who might be called "ethnic" Chinese—offspring of mixed Chinese and their parentage who show in their physical appearance and cultural characteristics an affinity with Chinese.'

Ta Chen, *Emigrant Communities in South China* (London, Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 264, quotes Lin Yu, 'Twin Loyalties in Siam', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. ix, no. 2 (June 1936) p. 191, as giving 2,500,000 as the number of ethnic Chinese in Siam and adds 'or about one-fourth of the population of Siam'—which involves a considerable under-estimate of Siam's population at the time of writing (1935).

[1] See Appendix III.

[2] A census was taken in Siam in 1947, but the only details of Chinese published so far are those on p. 3, n. 2.

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361 immigration, are also the site of a large Chinese immigrant com-
162 munity. Burma and Siam exhibit similar contrasts within themselves: between the densely settled delta of the Irrawaddy and the almost uninhabited Northern Shan States (where the Bawdwin mines are located), the two focuses of Chinese settlement in Burma; in Siam, between the thickly populated Menam delta and the Isthmus of Kra, almost empty until the advent of the Chinese.[1] In central Siam the Chinese live closely associated with the Siamese people by whom, until recent decades, they were completely absorbed within a few generations. In Siam about half the Chinese live in the lower delta of the Menam, in the neighbourhood of Bangkok; the remainder of the race are scattered through the country, living in villages and towns rather than rural communities and tending to concentrate in the more commercialized districts. A notable concentration of Chinese, consisting of the more recent immigrants, is to the southwest of Siam, where they work in the mines, on the rubber plantations, and as merchants in the villages.

162 Apart from the concentration in the Kra Isthmus region, the
442 chief occupations of the Chinese in Siam are the various forms of retail and wholesale trade. The Chinese, in fact, control most of
443 the retail trade in the country. In particular they have the lion's share in the rice distribution and milling, and there is scarcely a commodity from pepper to sugar in which they are not interested as middlemen. They also make up a large part of the class of skilled craftsmen.

•167 Most of the Chinese in Siam originally came from Hainan, Mei Hsien, and Chao Chou (including the city of Swatow) in east Kwangtung. The last-named group is apparently in the majority, especially those from Chin Hai, Yao P'ing, Chi Yang, and Chao An.

162 In Malaya the Chinese have a special significance in that they are here the majority community and have been so since before 1941. In that year there were for the whole of Malaya 2,379,000 Chinese as compared with 2,279,000 Malays, though, excluding Singapore, which is virtually a Chinese city, the Malays still outnumbered them. By 1947 they had still further strengthened their position so that they accounted for 2,615,000 of the population, whereas the Malays were now 2,544,000. This outnumbering of the native population (though the Malays themselves have multiplied their numbers several-fold within the last few decades by natural

[1] Unger, op. cit.

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increase and by the reinforcement of Indonesians, mostly Javanese) has given rise to one of the most perplexing political problems in the Far East.

Malaya's Chinese are largely urban and are occupied in trade, but they also supply the bulk of the labour in the tin mines of which they own about a third. There is a large Chinese labour force on the rubber estates where, however, before the war with Japan, they were outnumbered by the Indians. In addition to these occupations, the Malayan Chinese are actively engaged in every branch of the trades and crafts, from agriculture (squatters) and pig keeping and poultry rearing (which they almost monopolize) to the building and skilled artisan trades, tailoring, dressmaking, and cobbling, and managing or working in oil mills, soap factories, shipping firms, sawmills, and many other undertakings. The pineapple industry is entirely a Chinese enterprise.

Most numerous of the Chinese tribes in Malaya are the Hokkiens, after them come the Cantonese, followed by the Hakkas (Khehs), Tiuchius, and Hailams (Hainanese), and in much smaller numbers by the Kwongsai, Hokchius, Hokchias, and others. The Hokkiens, being the pioneer community in Malaya and the principal merchants, are more numerous in the Settlements of Singapore, Penang, and Malacca, and the Cantonese more numerous in the remainder of the country.

A census was taken in 1947 for the first time since 1931 and tables and abstracts from this census, together with some observations of the Superintendent, Mr del Tufo, are included in Chapter XXV of this survey. The facts revealed are of key importance and those regarding the sex ratio are highly significant.

In Java the Chinese live throughout the island, usually in cities and towns rather than in the rural areas, and they are the middle-class merchants who control much of the wholesale and retail trade. Commerce and transport occupied 61 per cent. of the Chinese in Java in 1930: sugar processing, food industries, and timber were next among their occupations. In Batavia the Chinese formed 15 per cent. of the total population.

The people of south Fukien were among the earliest immigrants to Indonesia, especially Java. Some of the families have been there for almost two centuries (the founder of the Tsai (Tsoa) house landed in Java five generations ago, in 1753).[1] The Hakkas and the

[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 266.

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167 people from Chao Chou (including the city of Swatow), the Teochius, and from southern Kwangtung, followed the Hokkiens. 162 The Hakkas began to settle in West Borneo between 1740 and 1745, and were followed thither by Teochius. At first they were employed in gold-mining or were agriculturists, engaged in cultivation of rubber, pepper, and tobacco; but towards the end of the nineteenth century, when both plantations and mines grew up under European management, the Teochius and many Hakkas moved on to colonize Bangka, Billiton, and east Sumatra.

162 The Chinese of Indonesia, especially those of Java, have a much more noticeable admixture of native blood than have the Chinese of the other Southeast Asian countries.[1]

167 Chinese immigration into Indochina was directed principally towards Cochinchina and Cambodia and comparatively little towards 162 Annam and Tongking which were already thickly populated, or towards Laos which was hard of access and little developed. In Cochinchina and Cambodia, however, the Chinese pervade every phase of economic life. The largest concentration of them is in the city-continuum of Saigon-Cholon. In these countries they have a virtual monopoly of the rice trade, just as they have in Siam (though attempts have been made to limit their share of the trade in both countries, especially in Siam). They are also engaged in pepper planting and vegetable gardening, but have taken practically no part in the newer estate agriculture of rubber, cotton, tea, and palm oil—indeed as aliens they were barred from the lands most suitable for this purpose.

As in other countries of the area, the trade depression of 1929–32 had a greatly restricting effect on immigration to Indochina, but in the few years before the Allied war with Japan this was recovering.

It has been convenient to summarize the distribution and occupation of the overseas Chinese country by country, but it should be remarked that this distribution is always dictated by economic considerations, as, for example, the belt of mining activity which extends from Burma round about Moulmein to the southward along the west coast of the Malay Peninsula through Siam and Malaya and then crops up again in the Dutch islands of Bangka and

[1] When attending a meeting of the Chung Hua Hui at Leyden in 1946, at which a hundred or so Indonesian Chinese resident in the Netherlands were present, the writer was struck with the dark complexion so common among them which was in marked contrast with the lighter complexion of the Chinese of most of Malaya, except parts of Penang and Malacca.

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Billiton, among the bauxite deposits of the Rhio Archipelago off Singapore, and finally among the oil wells of Palembang in Sumatra. 167 162

The Chinese of the Philippines form a group somewhat isolated from the main body, so to speak. They have traded with and emigrated to these islands for some centuries and they persevered

The Hakkas often inhabit the same areas as the Cantonese, Hokkien, and other tribes.

The following authorities, among others, have been followed: (1) Linguistic Map of China, *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cii, no. 2 (August 1943) p. 5; (2) Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 23; (3) W. J. Cator, *The Economic Position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1936) p. 28 (map).

in their intercourse in spite of the intermittent severity and grudging tolerance of the Spanish. When, however, in 1898 the Americans assumed control of the islands, they extended to them the exclusion laws against Chinese immigration which were already in force in the United States. When the Filipinos took over the administration of their own country the term 'exclusion' (which had been subject at least to some liberal exceptions under the Americans) was more and more literally interpreted. But although 609 167 162

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609 their numbers are at present not very great in comparison with the
•167 Filipinos, the economic position of the Chinese in the Philippines
based, however, on their control of trade (they owned, before 1941
162 at least, three-quarters of the rice-mills), has been maintained in the face of determined attempts by Filipino Nationalists to oust them from it.

121 So much will serve as a general introductory survey of the distribution of the Chinese in Southeast Asia: in the first chapter of each country study contained in the successive parts of this survey, the subject will be dealt with in much greater detail.

167 The sketch-map of the principal places of origin in China of
the Chinese in Southeast Asia, reproduced on p. 9, has been de-
162 signed by the author and executed by Geographia Ltd., and is subject to the following considerations. The shading indicates roughly the distribution in China of the several tribes represented overseas, but in the case of the Hakkas, of whom small communities are to be found throughout Kwangtung intermingled with the Cantonese,[1] only the areas most densely populated by them are shown in the map. Nor must it be assumed that the overseas Chinese come equally from all over the shaded areas. The fact (as Dr Ta Chen has pointed out) is that the communities from which the emigrants are drawn exist side by side with non-emigrant communities, and enjoy a higher standard of living than the latter.

[1] See L. Richard, *Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese Empire and Dependencies* (Shanghai, Tu-se-wei Press, 1908) p. 207.

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121 What has been given above is only a brief outline of a vast sub-
•167 ject of which the facts are, for many periods, largely unprecipitated.
177 In an attempt to confine this survey to manageable proportions and to give it a contemporary focus, we have adopted the principle that our interest in the Chinese of Southeast Asia begins in earnest only when they had formed permanent settlements, and it is true to say that the majority of such settlements still remaining, outside Annam and Tongking, were founded within the last 350 years. Nevertheless, we should not forget that the stream of Chinese immigration into the region, swelling into spate in the second and third decades of the present century, was but an expansion of long pre-existing rivulets of intercourse.

167 After the great military expeditions of the early Mings, the urge
to imperial expansion overseas appears to have gone out of the
175 Chinese. The self-contained spirit of the Middle Kingdom reas-
177 serted itself and the Emperors were content with adventures by land. It would indeed be harder to explain why the urge arose at all than why it subsided so soon. The fact remains that whereas the colonization of the Europeans followed in the wake of their fleets and soldiers or to lands obtained by treaty from the native rulers, the Chinese in the last three and a half centuries have entered Southeast Asia either as visiting merchants or as suppliants for permission to remain from the Javanese Sultans, or from the Spanish, Dutch, British, or French. They came no more as haughty emissaries of the Dragon Throne, armed to the teeth to enforce the imperial will, but as humble and peaceable shiploads of traders, artisans, or coolies, waiting, like Czech or Italian peasants on Ellis Island, for permission to enter the land of promise. But their meekness and peaceableness were in the long run to be far more forceful than the militancy of the Europeans; for where the latter came in, their tens the Chinese came in their thousands, and when the Europeans have gone, they will remain.[1]

[1] While this Survey was in the press there appeared 'The Khmer Empire and the Malay Peninsula', by Lawrence Palmer Briggs, *Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. ix, no. 3, May 1950, which adds valuable source material for Sino-Southeast Asia contacts.

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CHAPTER III

31

EMIGRATION TO THE 'NANYANG'

THE overseas Chinese are almost exclusively drawn from the southeastern provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Kwangsi—the great majority from the first two. This has mainly been due to population pressure and to the contiguity of these provinces to Southeast Asia.[1] This emigration was accentuated by internal troubles in China. In the Ming dynasty there had already been substantial emigration to the Nanyang, but a new wave was set up by the civil strife consequent on the change-over from the Ming to the Ch'ing, or Manchu, dynasty.[2] For example, the anti-Manchu pirate and patriot Koxinga, who had occupied Formosa, made descents on the coasts of Fukien in order to replenish his stores and at the same time embarrass the Manchu Government. Partly to cut off his supplies and partly to intimidate the population of these regions whose sympathies were anti-dynastic, the Manchus made the latter forsake a zone of country from about eight to thirty miles deep on the coasts of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Chekiang. This zone was denuded of its crops and its villages were burnt down. A reference was made to this in the reign of the first Manchu Emperor when governors were ordered to give houses and land to such persons who had moved into the interior 'so that they might be satisfied'. The harsh treatment they received was undoubtedly an encouragement to many in these parts of China to seek refuge overseas.

Contacts with Europeans were also a subsidiary encouragement to emigration. The first European efforts to trade were centred in Kwangtung. In 1516 Perestrello came from Malacca to China; in 1517 de Andrada arrived in Canton and received permission from the viceroy to trade. The attitude of the Portuguese soon aroused the hostility of the Chinese and their trading depot was attacked and destroyed in 1522. They retired to Lampa in Kwangtung where

[1] Population pressure in China, especially in the nineteenth century, is instructively dealt with by G. E. Tyler, 'The Taiping Rebellion, its economic background and social theory', *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. xvi (1933) pp. 545–614.

[2] See J. J. L. Duyvendak, 'Chinese in the Dutch East Indies', ibid. vol. xi. (1927) pp. 1–15.

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175 they maintained a trading post for the next fifty years. Another ex-
pedition reached the coast of Fukien in 1518 and established depots
•167 at Ch'üanchowfu, north of Amoy, at Foochow, and at Ningpo in
441 Chekiang. Between 1545 and 1549 an imperial edict for the exter-
mination of the Portuguese was enforced wherever possible. Nevertheless Macao was founded as a trading post in 1557. The Portuguese paid rent for the Macao Peninsula until 1849. During the eighteenth century Macao was the chief port for the Western trade in China. The Spanish next opened up direct relations with the Chinese, using Manila as their base, but the trade between the Philippines and Amoy was almost entirely in Chinese hands. The port of Amoy from 1730 to 1842 was closed to all foreigners except Spaniards. The Dutch made attempts to open up trade at Canton in 1604 and 1607 but were defeated by the Portuguese interests at Macao. Though they eventually occupied Formosa, they were driven out by Koxinga in 1661. Further efforts made by the Dutch to obtain recognition of their trade were without success, and it was not until 1762 that they were able to establish a factory at Canton. The English made their first essay to join in the trade in 1596, but it was a failure. They tried in 1647 to operate under Portuguese auspices, meeting, however, with little success. The East India Company renewed the attempt to trade with Canton in 1664 and 1674, but were foiled, mainly by the Portuguese. The Company did, however, succeed in 1667 and 1670 in trading at Amoy and Formosa, but their factory in the latter place was closed in 1681. In 1685 an imperial decree opened all the ports of China to foreign trade; but Canton and Amoy remained the principal trading entrepôts.

A circumstance which tended towards centring the foreign trade on Canton and eventually confining it to this one port was the establishment of a monopoly by the Chinese Government. In 1702 an official called a Hoppo, or emperor's merchant, was appointed at Canton and became the sole broker for all purchases and sales. Two years later the Hoppo had to admit certain other merchants into a share of his monopoly. Henceforth the trade increased in bulk and flourished, though subject to very severe restrictions and a rigorous disciplining of the foreign merchants, most of whom had to withdraw to Macao in the non-trading season. In 1757 an imperial edict prohibited all foreign trade at any port other than Canton. Attempts to improve the conditions of trade and to establish relations on a proper footing led to the sending of embassies to

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Peking by the Dutch and the British, but without concrete result. The situation continued down to the First China War of 1839–42. 175 1670 441

It will be seen, then, that Chinese contacts with foreign traders were practically confined to the Kwangtung and Fukien ports, though the intercourse was even then a restricted one. It was not the policy of the Spanish or of the Dutch (except at the beginning) to attract the Chinese to their colonies; it was only after 1786, when the British began to make settlements in the Malay Peninsula, that the Chinese found an unqualified welcome. The capitalistic development of colonies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had not yet begun, and there was no demand for coolie labour on a large scale before then. The Americans first traded with Canton in 1784, but it was not until 1848 that the first Chinese immigrants arrived at San Francisco.[1]

Such were some of the circumstances which induced, or paved the way for, Chinese emigration to the Nanyang. Our task must now be to investigate the factors which discouraged this emigration.

Ancestor worship was a strong force in discouraging the Chinese from emigrating. The spirits of the dead needed the constant attendance of the living to ensure their welfare, and those who deserted the vicinity of the graves of their ancestors and left their spirits without sacrificial offerings and ritual attention were guilty of unfilial conduct. Thus it was at all times that only those who were forced by dire necessity left their native villages, and they were regarded as outcasts and vagabonds. It was natural, therefore, that a great many refugees and criminals should have been included among the emigrants.[2] 167

Religion was reinforced by Government policy. The Emperors took the view that the loss of subjects was not a loss to be compensated for by any trade advantages. Under the Mings the law was not so strict as it became later under the Ch'ings (the Manchus were also more orthodox Confucians than the Mings—and aliens are frequently more orthodox and conservative than the people

[1] So it is commonly stated, but in the correspondence relating to a project to send Chinese to Trinidad in 1806 ('Notices of Pinang', *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, vol. vi (1852) pp. 145–72) it is mentioned that Chinese had already been taken to Nootka Sound in North America. The writer has so far been unable to discover the facts of this matter.

[2] H. Gottwaldt, *Die Uberseeische Auswanderung der Chinesen* (Bremen, Max Moessler, 1903), insists that 'only the scum of the Chinese go abroad'.

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167 they live amongst). The Laws of the Ch'ing dynasty, section ccxxv, are explicit:[1]

> All officers of government, soldiers, and private citizens, who clandestinely proceed to sea to trade, or who remove to foreign islands for the purpose of inhabiting and cultivating the same, shall be punished according to the law against communicating with rebels and enemies and consequently suffer death by being beheaded. The governors of cities of the second and third orders shall likewise be beheaded, when found guilty of combining with, or artfully conniving at the conduct of such persons . . .

Thereupon ensues a long list of penalties, but the officials who had offended by allowing the emigration to occur were to be pardoned if they afterwards succeeded in securing the offenders and bringing them to condign punishment.

The Manchu policy was dictated largely by the consideration that emigrants from the disaffected south would almost certainly be anti-Manchu and, once out of reach of the Manchu officials, would undoubtedly be plotting among themselves and with their friends inside the country for the overthrow of the dynasty. Those who enlisted under Koxinga would be a case in point. And in maintaining this policy the officials were helped by the sentiment of the Chinese that all beyond the confines of the Middle Kingdom were barbarians and were not to be consorted with. The law could never be enforced because economic stress and hope of gain were the more powerful forces, but the principle was held in theory until 1860 when it was disposed of in the treaties with foreign Powers, though the law was not actually repealed until 1894. The officials reaped a big harvest from it, for they collected large sums from returning immigrants as a price of inaction, and they also made levies on the same account on the families in China of emigrants overseas; for in China responsibility is a very far-reaching principle.

The attitude of the Government being as it was, it can readily be understood that little attention was paid to the misfortunes and persecutions of overseas Chinese. The massacre of the Chinese in the Philippines in 1603 and 1639, and in Java in 1740, caused no great concern to the Chinese Emperors. There are instances of reprisals in the Ming dynasty, but even these are few and far between.

[1] Sir George Thomas Staunton, *Ta Tsing Leu Lee; being the Fundamental Laws of the Penal Code of China* (London, T. Cadell & W. Davies, 1810).

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We shall see how the value of the foreign trade was too great an inducement for officials and others to ignore, and the profits to be obtained by the Chinese themselves when they made trading voyages led to connivance on the part of the Governors: in 1567 the Governor of Fukien allowed his provincials to go abroad to trade with all foreigners except the Japanese, who were the arch-pirates of the period and who ravaged the Chinese coasts. Traders had, however, to get licences to leave the country. 167

In 1717 the Emperor K'ang Hsi summoned those of his subjects who had been residing in foreign countries to return to their homes, but consented to pardon all who had been abroad since the beginning of his reign some fifty-six years before. His successor, Yung Cheng, allowed the inhabitants of the coast provinces to go abroad to trade under licence on condition that they subsequently returned home; but in 1728 he forbade those who were unlicensed to come back at all.

A proclamation by Ch'en Hung-mou, Governor of Fukien, in 1754, continues the story of the official attitude towards emigration:[1]

. . . A large proportion of the maritime population of Fukien is beholden for its subsistence to trade beyond the sea. The southern seas having at an earlier period been closed to trade (by a law that) provided that all persons who had gone abroad before its enactment might return home within three years, but that no one should go abroad after its enactment should be allowed to return at all. In the fifth year of the reign of Yung Cheng (1727) this interdict was removed, and there has been, from that time, a movement of traders from the Inner Land abroad unceasing as the welling of a spring. Feeling, however, that there must be some who, with sea upon sea between (China, and) the distant (land where they were), could not have returned home within the appointed time, the late Governor-General, Hao, first in one memorial, and then in a second, moved His Majesty to allow such persons to return; which proposition was sanctioned. But in the 14th year of Ch'ien Lung (1749) there occurred the case of Chen I-lao. . . .

Chen I-lao was a native of the district of Lung-ch'i, who having unauthorizedly proceeded from Kwangtung to Batavia had become headman of the Chinese at that port, and had there collected duties on foreign trade. As he could not belong to the class of honest

[1] Sir Thomas Francis Wade, *Tzŭ Erh Chih*, Documentary Series (London, Trübner, 1867), gives the Chinese original of the proclamation and a translation on p. 33 of the Key.

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trader (says the proclamation), but was the sort of man who would be laying hold of some pretext or other to give trouble, as soon as this came out he was tried (by the Chinese authorities) and sentenced to banishment; and since then such traders who are still detained abroad, being filled by his trial with doubt and fears, have not ventured to return home.

> . . . the Governor, humbly reflecting [the proclamation goes on] that it is because of our Emperor's treatment of the natives and foreigners as one, that the trade of the foreigner is enabled to continue, as thread joined to thread, uninterrupted; that alike cherishing those from afar, and benefiting by his bounty the (native) merchant, his Majesty shows a consideration that leaves nothing untouched, did (as the records show) explain the matter in a memorial. . . .

The result of which was that those Chinese residing abroad, providing that their reason for not returning within the allotted time was 'the inability to close their accounts' were to be permitted to return to their homes and to bring with them any wives or concubines they had acquired abroad, together with their children.

This represents the situation until the First China War of 1839–42. The war has been stigmatized as the 'Opium War', and indeed opium was its occasion, but among the objects of the British was to force the Chinese Government to permit diplomatic contacts and to improve the insupportable conditions under which foreigners were required to trade. The Nanking Treaty which followed the war was unilateral; that is to say, the Chinese undertook to make concessions to the British without obtaining corresponding advantages. The Chinese gained no right to send consuls abroad, but at this time they did not want to do so. Treaty ports were established under the treaty, but the determination of the Chinese Government not to allow diplomatic intercourse led to a further war in 1858–60, in which Great Britain was partnered by France.

Morse[1] and MacNair[2] give in detail the history of how the Chinese were eventually brought to recognize the principle that their nationals had a right to emigrate. The Second China War was concluded by the Treaty of Tientsin. The French made their own separate treaty, and the Americans, though not participants in the war, also obtained a treaty of their own. The Chinese recognition

[1] See H. B. Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire. The Period of Conflict 1834–60* (London, Longmans, 1910) passim.

[2] H. F. MacNair, *The Chinese Abroad* (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1925).

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to the three Powers of the right of their people to emigrate took place about the same time (by the two conventions of Peking, 1860), but, owing to some complications and difference in procedure, the first incorporation of the principle in a treaty was in the Burlingame Treaty of 1870 with America when the Chinese Emperor 'cordially recognised the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free migration of aliens and subjects respectively from one country to another for the purpose of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residence'. A similar principle was embodied in agreements with Great Britain and France, but the method of promulgation was to be by imperial decree to the high authorities in every province, who should issue proclamations within their jurisdiction. The first official recognition of the right of the Chinese to leave their homeland is found in these proclamations.[1]

It was but slowly that the Chinese began to see the advantages of having diplomatic and consular representatives in foreign countries where they had nationals or with which they had trading relations. The first permanent legation was established in London in 1877. The minister was accredited both to London and Paris. A Chinese legation was opened at Washington in 1878, in Tokyo in the same year, and in 1879 at St. Petersburg. Consuls were established at various ports in the next decade or so.

But the sentiment of the Chinese against emigration persisted throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, and it still persists. The popular attitude can well be illustrated by extracts from two American writers—the first referring to about the middle of the nineteenth century and the second to its last quarter:

[1] George F. Seward, *Chinese Immigration* (New York, Scribners, 1881), chap. vi, discusses the emigration of Chinese to the Nanyang and the question of their disposition to emigrate. His thesis is that, through growing northern influences and more amalgamation with northern stock, the people of the southern part of China are losing their migratory tendency. When they are not recruited, as for the more distant continents, they go only to nearby countries. Emigration to California was an episode only; the Chinese naturally go where the native peoples are less vigorous than they. In spite of great inducements held out to them, their numbers in the Dutch East Indies have remained small. During the same period in which Europeans changed the face of America, the Chinese in Java had made a lodgement only. They have not mongolized it.

This was written before the large-scale emigrations of the twentieth century, and the 'loss of migratory tendency' has certainly not been true so far as Southeast Asia is concerned. Nevertheless the thesis is worthy of consideration in the other respects.

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. . . if they [the Chinese emigrants] return with wealth enough to live upon, they are liable to the vexatious extortions of needy relatives, sharpers, and police, who have a handle for their fleecing whip in the law against leaving the country, although this clause has been neutralized by subsequent acts, and is not in force, the power of public opinion is against going.[1]

II

To the foreigner, acquainted with the experience of other lands in modern times, the simple, obvious, indispensable recipe for the relief of many of the ills to which the Chinese are subject, is emigration. . . . But this is an expedient which the Chinese themselves will never adopt, for the reason that it will take them away from the graves of their ancestors, to which, by the theory of Confucianism, they are inexorably linked. Generally speaking, no Chinese will leave his home to seek a fortune at a distance unless he is in some way driven to do so. His ideal in life is to be

'Fixed like a plant on his peculiar spot,
To draw nutrition, propagate, and rot.'

Generally speaking, no Chinese leaves his home not intending to return. His hope is always to come back rich, to die and be buried where his ancestors are buried.[2]

But in noting these impressions of competent observers we should bear in mind that they are speaking of China as a whole: the sentiment against emigration in the specifically emigrant communities of the Kwangtung and Fukien seaboard was certainly not great, if it existed at all: indeed there is reason to believe that, in the last few decades at least, they regarded themselves as having a privileged entrée to the good things that came from the Nanyang.

[1] S. Wells Williams, *The Middle Kingdom* (London, W. H. Allen, 1883) i. 279.
[2] A. H. Smith, *Chinese Characteristics* (New York, Fleming H. Revell, 1894) p. 165–6.

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CHAPTER IV

SPECIAL ASPECTS OF CHINESE SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MOST readers of this survey will be acquainted, at least in a general way, with the problems of China itself and with the direction in which the people of that country have moved in the last fifty years. What will be attempted in this chapter will be to illustrate the way in which the Chinese of Southeast Asia have in some respects deviated from the central pattern under the influence of local conditions. We shall select for this purpose the special aspects of the family, marriage, religion, and education, with some remarks on the opium question. As regards politics, Chapter XXXI, dealing with Chinese political organization in Malaya, brings out the developments which are typical of the area as a whole, and to this the reader is referred should he wish to gain a general impression of the matter before proceeding to the separate country studies.

The Family. An excellent starting-point for our chapter is the work of Dr Ta Chen, who, in 1934 and 1935 was in charge of a group of investigators studying the emigrant communities in eastern Kwangtung and southern Fukien under the auspices of the International Research Committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations.[1] The area selected for study was a region from which many of the emigrants to the Nanyang originated and where their families mostly live. It is on the sea coast of the two southernmost maritime provinces and consists of ten *hsien* (counties). Roughly speaking, it includes a long strip of territory beginning at Chao An (formerly Chao Chou), passing through Swatow on the Kwangtung border, and through Amoy, and ending at Chuan Chou (Ch'üan-chow) in Fukien. It is an area of a little less than 5,000 square miles with a total population of a little over 4·6 million in 1935.[2]

[1] Ta Chen (the name is properly Chen Ta, Chen being the surname, and it is thus given in some library catalogues), *Emigrant Communities in South China: a Study of Overseas Migration and its Influence on Standards of Living and Social Change*, English ed. by Bruno Lasker (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940).

[2] Though all the *hsien* have sent emigrants to the Nanyang the area does not constitute the sole source of emigration to the south, even from these two provinces. For example, Mei Hsien and vicinity, the principal home of the Hakkas and the largest source of Hakka emigration, is not included in this area.

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Here two distinct aggregations of Chinese live side by side—the non-emigrant and the emigrant community—from which a large proportion of the emigrants to the Nanyang are drawn and the income of whose families is (except under unusual circumstances such as the later war with Japan) augmented by remittances from their menfolk overseas. These two communities in a clear way illustrate many of the differences that distinguish the stay-at-home Chinese from those who have sought their fortunes abroad.

Judged from the natural and socio-economic facts, the non-emigrant community was (at the time of Dr Ta Chen's investigations) typical of farm life in south China. The principal occupation was the cultivation of rice, and this was supplemented by many subsidiary occupations, including poultry raising and fruit growing. After the harvest, men and women of the poorer classes picked up fuel and burned charcoal in the mountains for sale in the village market. It was a simple pattern of livelihood not differing in any essential from that of thousands of villages in any other part of rural China. The emigrant community, too, had a variety of occupations, but these did not yield them sufficient income to maintain their present style of living. To quote an experienced physician with Western training who had for many years resided in such a community: 'The children of the well-to-do emigrant families are well fed and clothed. They are easy-going and usually without a definite occupation. If by mischance the family's business in the Nanyang should be bankrupt, these people will be obliged to support themselves by begging.'[1] This statement was thought to be something of an exaggeration, but to bring out the variable factor in the life of an emigrant community. (There were, of course, also families with no sons abroad living in the emigrant community. In these families the pattern of livelihood was much the same as that in a non-emigrant community.)

Before proceeding with a summary comparison of these two sets of families, it is appropriate to remark that those who emigrated from China usually did so to improve their social status. They were, on the whole, therefore, drawn from the less prosperous families, and the process to be described was not merely that of subjecting identical social material to different influences.

In the non-emigrant community, out of 725 families studied, 650 were engaged in growing rice. One hundred and thirty of these owned

[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. pp. 59, 60.

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the land they occupied, 280 owned part of it, and 240 rented all the land they used. Crop sharing was the most widespread form of tenancy, the crop usually being divided equally between the owner and tenant at harvest time. The farm holdings varied in size, a poor family occupying three or four *mow*, a middle-class family from eight to ten, and a well-to-do family about fifteen (2·5 acres). In the non-emigrant community about one-half were engaged in rice growing, 3·6 *mow* (0·6 acres) being the average per family. The poorest tilled one or two *mow*, those of the middle class seven or eight, and the well-to-do about ten. Proprietary farmers constituted about 1 per cent. of the total number of farmers, part owners about 5 per cent., and the remainder were tenants. Crop sharing also was the rule here, from two-fifths to one-half of the crop going to the landlord at harvest time.

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Other occupations followed by the non-emigrant community included the timber business and the trade in incense sticks. Income was supplemented in some villages by planting a crop of wheat after the rice harvest, growing vegetables and sugar-cane, and rearing poultry, and the girls and married women spent part time on drawn-thread and embroidery work. Emigrant families added to the remittances they received from overseas in several ways. Trade attracted a great deal of the interest and energy even of families that depended mainly on agriculture for their livelihood. For the returned emigrants, residence abroad had usually meant a change of occupation according to their inclination and the opportunities available in the foreign community. A larger proportion were engaged in trade after their return to China than before leaving for the Nanyang, that is to say about half the total—shop assistants (there were no apprentices among them), merchants, and pedlars being added together. This was due to the greater opportunity for trade offered in the Nanyang than at home, and the ambitious Chinese naturally chose the opening with the greatest chances of profit. Nevertheless, there was still a large number of labourers among those who returned home, representing those who were labourers before they left and those who had struggled to emancipate themselves from working with their hands and had failed to do so. Farming showed a startling decline as an occupation among the returned emigrants, having fallen to last place.

Among the subsidiary occupations followed by the emigrant community were those in which women and girls could add to their

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incomes by work at home or in local workshops. The drawn-thread and embroidery work engaged in by the girls and middle-aged women in their spare time earned them about twenty cents a day per person. Others wove cloth at small weaving-shops or sewed in tailors'-shops, earning about thirty cents a day. None of these occupations were, in fact, particularly remunerative. Older women were engaged in making joss-paper or in knitting fishing-nets. Apart from farming and trade, the men were engaged in relatively few occupations—there were coolies, barbers, carpenters, school-teachers, and fishermen.

We come now to the subject of remittances from the Nanyang regarding which there has been much conflicting evidence. No satisfactory estimate of these remittances has been made for South-east Asia as a whole, and in any case their value has varied greatly with the fluctuation in trade.[1] There had been a time when the ownership of a few rubber-trees had meant affluence, when Chinese importers in the Nanyang could undersell those of all other nationalities and still make a large profit, 'and when they had the native peasants so under control through indebtedness that they could sell them almost anything at any price'.[2]

There had been times when labour was so scarce that Chinese coolies could in a few years accumulate savings enough to start in business, and when employees of Chinese retailers could force up wages to the point where it was more economical for the employer to take them in as partners. But by 1935 all this had changed. New immigration restrictions, motivated by the depression, had cut large numbers of Chinese labourers off from labour opportunities abroad while, at the same time, life had become, perhaps, a little more secure in this time of general débâcle for a certain privileged few—for example, the small retail traders already established in the Nanyang who had less competition to meet from their countrymen and who could circumvent the new head tax on males by bringing women and children from China to take the place of male assistants.

(This investigation, we must remember, dates from a time when Southeast Asia was only just beginning to recover from the trade depression of 1929–32.)

[1] In 1941 about SS$10 million was remitted to China from Malaya, but there is nothing to indicate how much of this was in the ordinary way of trade.

[2] This is placed in quotation marks to indicate that it represents the views of Dr Ta Chen.

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Dr Ta Chen gives a table (p. 83) of the sources of income of 100 emigrant families from October 1934 to September 1935 which shows that the average monthly remittance per family was 81·4 per cent. of the total income, ranging between 75·5 per cent. for incomes below $20 per mensem, and 84·1 per cent. for incomes between $125 and $250. This enabled the emigrant families to maintain a much higher standard of living as a whole than those families which had no source of assistance from abroad.

Apart from the purely economic effects of overseas migration upon these communities of east Kwangtung and south Fukien, there is evidence to show that intercourse with Southeast Asia was having a considerable modifying effect on the social institutions, religion, and general outlook both of the emigrants themselves and of the families in China whence they came and to which usually they eventually returned.

In China the social unit has immemorially been the family, and it remains so except to the extent that it has broken down in Communist areas under the influence of Communist ideology. The system which has as its object the perpetuation of the family tree, to a considerable extent subordinates the individual to its needs. But in these emigrant communities in China and in the Nanyang itself, it has had to undergo a great deal of modification to survive. Where resources permit, a dual family system has grown up, whereby one section lives in China and the other in the Nanyang. This dual, or joint family, takes a number of forms which may vary; in the case of a well-off family (to give an example) the head of the family aged 61 lives in Siam, his wife (aged 58) lives in the ancestral village in China and is the acting head of the family, the first concubine (56) is a Siamese and lives in Siam, the second concubine (44) is in the village, and the third and fourth concubines (both Chinese, aged 30 and 19) are also in Siam, and the children of the unions are, except for the son by the wife who is with his father in Siam, all with their mothers, either in Siam or in China. An example of a middle-class family is of a father aged 77 in the village, his son aged 50, the head of the family, in Singapore, and his wife (the acting head of the family) in the village in China. The head of the family had his concubine in Singapore, and the offspring, either of the head of the family or his brothers (who belong to the family) were either in Singapore or at home. A third case of a lower-class family is a more simple pattern with the head of

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the family in Siam, his wife (acting head of the family) in the village in China, and most of the children of the marriage in China.

Such arrangements obviously call for careful financing. The emigrant abroad, after deducting what he needs to meet his expenses, usually remits his savings periodically to his home in China for the support of the family there and to meet extraordinary expenses, such as of a marriage in the family. At the same time the family home in China is a kind of insurance for the emigrant, for he can always return there if he is unemployed.

The influence of the emigrant on the age-old ideas and customs of his home village has been great. If he has had much foreign experience he almost invariably condemns the traditional family arrangement. In the words of a returned tin-miner from Malaya:[1]

> The joint family is an obnoxious social institution. When a member of such a family earns money he is obliged to support all the rest of it and to carry a heavy economic burden. I have had a very bitter experience and always felt that I am virtually the slave of my family. They are of no help to me at all.

A critical attitude towards the family and marriage systems is very general among returned emigrants. They remark that living in the modern world is a complicated affair, and that the joint family is no longer practicable. Many of them felt (in 1935) that an early disintegration of the family in south China was inevitable. Moreover, many of the emigrants have seen what marriage may mean in modern Western life when love and courtship enter into the marriage preliminaries and the union is (or should be) based on affection. An emigrant inevitably contrasts this with the Chinese system wherein the husband and wife are often unknown to one another before marriage. Stubborn and resistant as the traditional family system is, there is evidence from all over the Nanyang that as regards marriage the traditional procedure is in retreat before the modern marriage, and that the joint family system is being strained in some cases almost to breaking-point. Again, in the Nanyang itself, the increased mobility of members of the family is a force threatening to loosen its bonds.

In spite of these tendencies, marriage custom among the Chinese in the Nanyang at the time of the outbreak of the war between Japan and the Allies in 1941 generally followed Chinese traditional

[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 142.

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custom.[1] All this ceremonial was very expensive and involved the family in a burden of debt. 167 178

One result of the Revolution in China was to initiate a changing attitude towards family institutions. Books IV and V of the Civil Code of the Republic of China deal with the family and succession. 582 593 The law was promulgated on 26 December 1930 and came into force on 5 May 1931. Polygamy was abolished, and though concubinage in many cases continued, the concubine was now a mistress without legal rights.[2] According to the new law the parties to a marriage were empowered to make the marriage agreement of their own accord, the sole restrictions being that a man who had not completed his eighteenth year and a woman not yet sixteen must obtain the consent of their parents or guardian. No registration of marriage was provided for.

In the Straits Settlements a Chinese Marriage Committee, appointed in 1925 by the Government, recommended that there should be registration for both new- and old-style marriages.[3] The old-style marriage would be valid if the marriage ceremony was carried out with all the essentials required by custom in the district of China from which the bridegroom and bride or their ancestors came, or by such modified custom as was observed by the Chinese residents of the Colony for that district. The committee found it impossible to submit proposals for legislation as to what forms or ceremonies should constitute marriage, because the evidence disclosed the fact that there were no essentials for Chinese marriages in the old style common to all the districts of south China or to the locally born descendants of emigrants from these districts, while the new style of marriage did not require any particular form.

The evidence taken by the committee revealed a practically unanimous opposition among Chinese residents in the Straits Settlements to any divorce legislation.[4]

[1] For a description of these customs see G.B., Colonial Office, *Report of the Commission on Mui Tsai in Hong Kong and Malaya*, Colonial no. 125 (1937), and Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, pp. 148–50.

[2] cf. M. H. van der Valk, 'The New Chinese Criminal Code', *Pacific Affairs* (1936) pp. 76, 77. Under the new Chinese Criminal Code which became operative in July 1935 husband and wife are equally liable to a year's imprisonment for committing adultery, and moreover the person with whom the adultery is committed incurs the same punishment. Complaint can be laid only by the injured spouse.

[3] *Chinese Marriage Committee*, Singapore 1926.

[4] The position in the Federated Malay States, however, was temporarily revolutionized by the Secretary for Chinese Affairs Enactment which was passed

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167 178 582 593 The new-style marriage, based on the consent of the parties, and often arranged by themselves, has gradually been spreading in popularity among the better educated. The cost of the wedding and its preliminaries has also been much reduced. This is a consequence, too, of the growing equality between the sexes.

871 212 167 *Education.* It was only by dint of continual defeat at the hands of foreign Powers that China realized that her traditional literary system of education, which had endured for over a thousand years, did not fit her to withstand the assaults of her enemies. At long last she decided to adopt an educational system on modern lines. The greatest obstacle in doing this was the classical language. The literary language in which all education was conducted had become completely divorced from the spoken language, and it needed many years of study before a student could obtain anything like command of it. Whilst it remained, a democratic system of education was out of the question.[1] So it was that in 1917 there occurred the most revolutionary happening in the history of Chinese education, the initiation of the *pai hua* movement.[2]

Pai hua, or written vernacular, had existed in China for centuries. Most popular novels were written in it, but it had never obtained the recognition of the literati. Corresponding, as it did, to the spoken language, it was much more easily learnt than *wen li*, the Chinese literary language, though it was clumsier and more discursive. So when Dr Hu Shih maintained that the literary language should be abolished in schools and that *pai hua* should be elevated to the rank of a literary medium, the proposal was considered as threatening the very foundations of Chinese culture. But the movement obtained powerful political support and in January 1920, the Minister of Education ordered that the spoken language should be used in the teaching of Chinese in primary schools. The form of *pai hua* approved for this purpose became known as *Kuo Yü*, or the National Language.[3]

in 1899 and repealed in 1932. By this enactment the Secretary for Chinese Affairs had powers to decide the custody and guardianship of women and children, and to order divorce, separation, adoption, and betrothal.

[1] Dr W. A. P. Martin estimated about 1880 that the proportion of Chinese who could read and understand what they read was about one in twenty.

[2] For a full exposition of the subject see Victor Purcell, *Problems of Chinese Education* (London, Kegan Paul, 1936).

[3] See Hu Shih, *The Chinese Renaissance*. The Haskell Lectures, 1933 (University of Chicago Press, 1934).

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The adoption of *Kuo Yü* as a medium of instruction in schools is about one-half of the story of education in China under the Kuomintang: the other half is the adoption in 1928 of the Three Principles of the People of Dr Sun Yat-sen as the foundation of the education system.

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The overseas Chinese of the Nanyang adopted with fervour the new style of education which the Revolution had brought into being. They started and ran their own schools, and the resultant rise of Nationalist feeling made the Governments of the several countries more and more apprehensive of the creation of an *imperium in imperio* in their midst.[1] Such was particularly the case in Malaya and Siam, and the crux of the friction between the China-born Chinese and the local administration has been their differences regarding the aim and control of this education. This will emerge in the course of the individual country studies of our survey.

The majority of the emigrants had little or no schooling before going abroad. It is reasonably certain that until quite recently the average emigrant was not a man of education at all, or at most he had had a very inadequate schooling before emigrating.

Religion. On going overseas to the Nanyang the Chinese took with them their religious beliefs. Be the principle of Buddhism, Taoism, or Confucianism effective or ossified, there can be no doubt at all that the world of spirits, demons, gods, and heroes is still a very real thing to the majority of Chinese and goes with them wherever they go. Dr Ta Chen notes that among the items of household expenditure other than food, clothing, and shelter, that for religious practices predominates over all others both in the emigrant and non-emigrant families of east Kwangtung and south Fukien. ('These expenditures', he says, 'are a good index of the prevalence of religious concern.') Scepticism has assuredly grown with the advance of education, but for the majority it would seem that 'keeping in' with the Great Unseen was as much a matter of insurance as of piety and ethics.

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Broadly speaking, the religion of the villagers of south China consists of the worship of Shen, Fu, and Yao in addition to the cult of their own ancestors. Shen and Fu are spirits from Buddhism and Taoism (especially the popular, corrupted, and confused aspects of

[1] See Cyrus H. Peake, *Nationalism and Education in Modern China* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1932).

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the two religious systems); whereas Yao, a ghost, is from primitive ancestor worship via Confucianism. In one emigrant community in south Fukien Dr Ta Chen's investigators found that of 224 persons questioned, 154 expressed belief in Shen and Fu, 60 had no religious preferences, 5 believed in Christianity, and 5 seemed to be wavering between acceptance and rejection of Shen and Fu. Comparative popularity would, we may be sure, depend largely on results; for, like the Roman gods, a Chinese god is expected to render a return for respect accorded and the offerings made to him. A Roman observed his rites with scrupulous adherence to the letter of the law, expecting that if he did not the gods would make it an excuse to wriggle out of the bargain, and the Chinese regard their gods in much the same spirit.[1]

Amongst the most popular goddesses in the Buddhist pantheon both in China and overseas is Kwan Yin, the goddess of mercy, 'she who hears the sounds (prayers) of mortals—she who looks down on the world and hears its cries'. She is the counterpart of the Taoist goddess T'ien Hou Sheng Mu, Holy Mother, queen of heaven, and she is credited with attributes similar to those of the Virgin Mary. Kwan Yin was originally the Buddhist male god, Avalokiteswara, who changed his sex to female some centuries after his arrival in China.

Another popular god among the overseas Chinese is Kwan Ti, the god of war.

Each craft or guild has its own patron saint—Wu Ku Lao Yeh for farmers, Chiao Sheng Lao Yeh (whose festival is on the 7th of the 5th moon) for carpenters, Shui Hsin Lao Yeh for incense-stick makers, Kwan Ti, the god of war, in his capacity of god of wealth, for tradesmen, and T'ien Hou Sheng Mu, the Taoist queen of heaven, for fishermen and sailors (but overseas her name is changed to Ma Tsu (Ma Chew Poh)), which is also popular in Amoy. In many Cantonese houses the image of the household god of the earth, T'o Yei Shan or Tei Chu, is placed *underneath* a table! The god is not worshipped in Hokkien households.

In addition to the worship of the standard deities of the Buddhist and Taoist cults, the Chinese of the Nanyang have special deities

[1] See Ta Chen, op. cit. chap. x, and Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, chap. vi. There is an instructive article, 'Chinese Contemporary Cults', by Clarence Burton Day in the *Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. vi, no. 3 (May 1947), which covers a number of the gods and heroes worshipped in south China and the Nanyang.

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of their own which are worshipped by them only overseas or in the emigrant communities from which they sprang. The outstanding examples are Sam Po Tai Shan for the Shen, and Toh Peh Kong (Hokkien), Ta Pai Kung (Mandarin), or Tai Pak Kung (Cantonese) for the Fu. 771 167

Sam Po Tai Shan is none other than the spirit of the famous Grand Eunuch Cheng Ho of the Ming dynasty who visited Malacca in the early years of the fifteenth century.[1] He is particularly worshipped in Malacca. Crawfurd remarks, 'Sam Po Kung (Sam Po Tai Shan) is evidently a name to be conjured with among the illiterate classes. The miracles which he performed to save his countrymen from the perils of their travels in unknown lands are among the marvels of romance, illustrating, in a striking way, one of the factors in a genesis of a myth.'

Toh Peh Kong, however, is the most popular hero among the overseas Chinese. But one may search for him in vain in the standard books on Chinese religion.[2] In Siam he is known as Pan Tou Kung. He probably derives from Tu Ti (earth god), but overseas he is primarily the spirit of the pioneers. The Chinese pioneers of the early days suffered terrible hardships and were honoured in memory by those who came after them. Toh Peh Kong seems to be the personification of the pioneer spirit generally and is not the deification of a special person as Sam Po Tai Shan is of Cheng Ho.

A worship of very long standing in Malaya is that of Wang Yeh, who has the spiritual function of visiting the universe as the representative of heaven. The early settlers brought the worship with them from Fukien province.[3]

Opium and other narcotics. The use of the poppy and coca leaf goes back to time immemorial.[4] In 1783 Warren Hastings pro- 276 167

[1] See pp. 22, 23.

[2] In particular the monumental work by Henri F. S. Doré, *Recherches sur les superstitions en Chine* (Shanghai, Tu-se-wei Press, 1911–38).

[3] Wang Yeh was worshipped from early days but the Wang Kang Festival in Malacca wherein five images of this deity were carried does not seem to have originated until 1886.

Chinese Mohammedans exist in the Shan States and in Indonesia, though in the latter country their numbers are not great. Chinese Christians are not very numerous in Southeast Asia, though in Malaya, for example, they increased between 1901 and 1931 by one-half (50·2 per cent.) to 30,738, while during the same period the Chinese population increased by only 45·5 per cent. Among the Churches the Roman Catholic Church has the strongest hold.

[4] Opium comes from a certain variety of the poppy plant grown principally

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nounced opium to be 'a pernicious article of luxury which ought not to be permitted, but for the purposes of foreign commerce only'. A debate in the House of Commons on the eve of the First China War (the 'Opium War') of 1839 showed that the great majority of the members of Parliament were prepared to countenance the opium traffic as a necessary evil, but a few enlightened voices were lifted against it, including that of Macaulay. The fact, however, that opium-smoking was a vice to which the Chinese were addicted made it valuable as a source of revenue to the Governments of Southeast Asia. The usual method of obtaining this revenue was to farm out the sale of the drug to private persons or firms. Administrators (including Raffles) had grave misgivings regarding the effect of opium-smoking on the health of the Chinese community, but it was not until about the beginning of this century that the various Governments began to take steps towards controlling the sale of the drug.

A Commission appointed in 1907 in the Straits Settlements to ascertain the extent to which opium-smoking was indulged in, whether its prevalence was on the increase, and what means should be taken towards its restriction or suppression, made a report to the following effect:[1]

The habit in the case of the majority of smokers in Malaya was acquired during residence in these parts. The labour in Malaya was mostly drawn from the impecunious farmer class, and the ruling price of chandu in China, though low compared with the price in Malaya, was sufficiently high to place it beyond their reach while they were in their native land. Moreover, the influence of the elder over the younger members of the families of China, one of the most striking characteristics of Chinese family life, was removed in Malaya, and thereby a powerful deterrent to the acquisition of the opium habit disappeared. Nor was the view commonly held among the Chinese of Malaya that the habit was injurious—indeed the general sentiment was to the exact contrary. It was regarded as a panacea for many common ailments and was often recommended by Chinese doctors. These facts, in the opinion of the Commissioners, largely contributed to the commencement of the habit.

in India, China, Persia, Greece, and Yugoslavia. Cocaine is derived from an entirely different plant, the coca leaf, grown in South America and Java in particular.

Report of the Opium Commission (Singapore, 1908), vols. i and iii were published as Cmd. 4321 and Cmd. 4322 (1909).

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Those *habitués* who were questioned said that they had started to smoke 'as a remedy for sickness', 'as an antidote to sorrow', or 'from bad example'. Brothels were a common place in which Chinese learned to smoke.

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The Commissioners summed up their views as to the motive for the habit in these words: 'We are firmly convinced that the main reason for taking to the habit of smoking opium is the universal tendency of human nature to some form of indulgence.' Or, less sententiously expressed, they did it because they liked it!

A man was less likely to become an inveterate opium-smoker than a drunkard.

As to the evil results of opium-smoking the Commissioners took a moderate view. As regards the physical evils, with the exception of medical practitioners who held strong views opposed to opium, the medical witnesses were practically unanimous in expressing the opinion that opium-smoking in moderation was relatively harmless. Even if the indulgence were carried to an excess, there was (so said the witnesses) no organic change in the body. The general impression, however, was that in tasks requiring severe physical exertion the smoker was not equal to the non-smoker; in the case of the skilled artisan, opium-smoking made little or no difference to his relative value; opium-smokers and non-opium-smokers in an industry worked the same number of hours and earned the same wages.

These views (in the experience of the writer) represent the general views of European administrators who, on the whole, incline to consider opium-smoking as a symptom rather than a cause of misfortune. Education and improved living conditions in the last forty years have had more effect in decreasing the number of smokers than any other factor.

While the Commission was unwilling to recommend prohibition (which in any case would be possible only by international agreement, as the poppy was then cultivated in India, China, Turkey, and Persia), it recommended the abolition of the opium farmer and the establishment of a Government monopoly for the manufacture and sale of chandu.

The international control of the manufacture and sale of deleterious drugs has a very extensive literature of its own, and all that we need do here is to refer to the main facts.[1]

[1] See Herbert L. May, 'Narcotic Drug Control', *International Conciliation*

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children's future with Malaya alone, were attracted to, or forced into, the Nationalist camp.

Malaya has for long been the 'test case' of Chinese affairs and a focus of interest in Southeast Asia. The situation as it was tending was very clearly described by a distinguished traveller many years ago; Professor Arnold Toynbee records the impression of his visit to the Straits Settlements in these words:

> And China is not only enormous already; it is rapidly getting more enormous (if logically that adjective can be put in the comparative degree). When I touched at the Straits Settlements on my way out east I realized that British Malaya is destined, by 'peaceful penetration', to become a Chinese province, and I fancy, from what I have heard, that the same destiny may be in store for Burma, Siam, French Indo-China, Dutch Indonesia, and the Philippines. In the end the current of Chinese expansion in the Tropics will meet the current of Hindu expansion over the submerged heads of the smaller and weaker and less efficient peoples in between, who are already fast going under. And, after what has happened, I surmise that the new frontier between China and India will tend, slowly but surely, to travel westward at India's expense and in China's favour.

What happened in Malaya, we cannot too frequently remind ourselves, was not the result of military conquest, not the territorial spoils of a Kublai Khan, but because the British had welcomed the immigration of a couple of million Chinese. For long after the intervention in the Malay States it had been found difficult to attract the British capital needed for the opening up of the country: it was not until a plentiful supply first of Indian and then of Chinese labour was assured that such capital was forthcoming, and it was not until the end of the 1920s that there was any control at all of Chinese immigration.

The British Colonial Office and the Malayan Governments must have seen that the admission of Chinese in such numbers that they would eventually be the majority community was bound to create a problem of tremendous magnitude. Even the degree of assimilation taking place in Siam and Indochina was out of the question because of the barrier of the Mohammedan religion. The only hope now for the future of Malaya in the interest of its diverse peoples was to promote a feeling of common Malayan citizenship to counter the claim, tacit or express, of Chinese Nationalism to consider Malaya as a new province of China. In the pre-war years

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this was a policy which the British neglected to pursue with any conviction, and the post-war experiment in this direction, the Malayan Union, was abandoned at the first sign of opposition. Unless a true 'Malayan citizenship' can be made effective, the ideal of a Malayan nation forming, as it were, a buffer State between China, Indonesia, and India, with bonds with all three but belonging to none, will remain a phantom.

In the present crisis the great and deplorable weakness of the Chinese in Southeast Asia is the absence of effective leadership (and the few notable exceptions to this generalization do not affect its truth). This is due in large part to the fact that there has grown up no Chinese middle class of sufficient proportions to provide disinterested, well-educated, and competent individuals in the numbers needed to guide their community through the reefs of politics towards a safe anchorage. The business leaders are so busy making money (or endeavouring not to lose it) that few of them have time to devote to public affairs even if they had the will and the knowledge. In Malaya, at least, the Indian stands in sharp contrast to the Chinese, and in Singapore Indian representation on the various bodies is vastly greater in proportion to their numbers than is the case with the much more numerous Chinese. This is not explicable solely by Chinese political pique but must be due largely to the training in politics and administration the Indians received in their own country during the British Raj. In Malaya, Indonesia, and Indochina the British, Dutch, and French have neglected to afford opportunities for the Chinese residents to acquire a knowledge of affairs. The penalty of this neglect is that now, when European control is loosening, the mass of the Chinese have few leaders to take control and to consolidate their community in face of the Communist advance. The lack of experience and education determines also the quality of the Communist leadership in these regions. Among the Malayan Communists are no Mao Tse-tungs or Chou En-lais and scarcely any individuals with more than the rudimentary mis-education obtainable in Chinese vernacular schools. The result is that the old professional bandit (always a feature of Malaya's jungle-fringe) is more prominent than he would otherwise be, and terrorism is unmitigated by constructive politics. Is it, therefore, strange that in 1949 the majority of Nanyang Chinese were 'sitting on the fence' awaiting the final upshot in China and its repercussions overseas? In such

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APPENDIX III

DISPLACED OVERSEAS CHINESE[1]

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THE largest group of externally displaced persons in China after the war with Japan consisted of overseas Chinese. These people, mostly small traders or labourers from the countries of Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, and islands of the southwest Pacific, were born abroad of Chinese parents or had worked abroad for years and had established domiciles in their adopted countries. Some were visiting their families in China and found return to their domiciles blocked after the extension of the Second World War to the Pacific in December 1941. About 3,000 skilled mechanics had gone to China earlier to help in the war effort against the Japanese, and these, too, were cut off from their homes abroad. Some had fled into China before the advancing Japanese and were cut off mainly in Hong Kong, Indochina, and Burma.

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Distribution of Displaced Overseas Chinese in China on 18 April 1946

Domicile	*Szechwan*	*Yunnan*	*Fukien*	*Kwangtung*	*Total*
Burma	873	5,794	20,626	2,098	29,391
Borneo	12	1	1,656	..	1,669
Hong Kong	619	..	879	101,185	102,683
Indochina	274	336	3,736	1,453	5,799
Malaya	737	665	23,426	2,486	27,314
Indonesia	194	181	14,640	167	15,182
Philippines	109	4	19,115	115	19,343
Siam	200	565	913	1,508	3,186
Other countries	344	..	..	..	344
	3,362	7,546	84,991	109,012	204,911

Thus stranded, the displaced overseas Chinese were scattered in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Fukien, Kweichau, Yunnan, and Szechwan provinces, and in Taiwan. The principal concentrations were in or near the southern ports of Canton, Swatow, Amoy, and Foochow, the native districts and traditional embarkation points of most of the overseas Chinese, and in or near Kunming at the eastern end of the Burma Road. According to the Chinese Overseas Affairs Commission, there were, on 1 April 1946, approximately 200,000 displaced overseas Chinese in

[1] Authorities: Katrine R. C. Greene, 'Repatriating China's Expatriates', *Far Eastern Survey*, vol. xvii, no. 4 (25 February 1948). *New York Times* (6 April 1948). *Rehabilitation of Overseas Chinese* (in Chinese) (Nanking, Government Information Office, July 1947). *Negotiation of Immigration Problems* (in Chinese) (Nanking, Government Information Office, October 1947). *Preparatory Commission for International Refugee Organization*, Prep/32 (25 April 1947). Also information supplied to the writer by UNRRA officials.

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the four southern provinces. About 100,000 were from Hong Kong and most of these would be expected to return by their own resources.

Since the above figures were found to include old registrations of persons who had returned home before the war reached the Pacific, or who had settled permanently in China, the Displaced Persons Division of UNRRA in co-operation with CNRRA undertook downward revision resulting in an estimate of 42,000[1] as the number needing assistance in returning from China to their domiciles abroad. The number actually aided slightly exceeded this estimate, and the work involved in doing so was long and complex.

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For displaced persons going to some countries, especially Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines, there ensued long periods of waiting in refugee camps while permission to land was being sought, and this led frequently to severe hardships. Some persons thus delayed found employment locally or, in desperation, tried to get back to their homes by any means they could, legal or otherwise; others endured privations until the necessary negotiations and arrangements could be concluded.

With some Governments there was no question regarding the granting of permission to return (e.g. Hong Kong), but the Philippines Government refused to receive any displaced persons except as part of the five hundred quota. With other countries there was a variation between these two extremes. In Indonesia and Indochina civil disturbances upset arrangements. Rising nationalism and the desire to establish greater internal control of economic and commercial life produced in some countries resistance to the readmission of overseas Chinese.

The UNRRA visa, recognized by five out of seven of the countries, was devised as a substitute for the consular visa in the absence of consular authorities at the port of embarkation in China. The cost of transport was U.S. $1 million.

Let us now consider the position in reverse—namely, the number of Chinese in Southeast Asian countries displaced from China and awaiting repatriation. The table on p. 684 shows the position on 30 June 1947.

In view of the refusal of the Philippines Government to permit Chinese displaced persons to return legally to the islands (except as immigrants on a strictly quota basis), the considerable number of Chinese returned to China from the Philippines appears outstanding; UNRRA used this figure as a bargaining point in Manila, but without success.

In Malaya, of the 78,502 persons (of all races, but the majority Chinese) *known* to have been sent to Siam by the Japanese to work on the Siam–Burma railway, 23,351 are recorded as having died, 15,987

[1] The analysis is not available.

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were repatriated, and 39,164 are shown as having absconded or are otherwise not accounted for.

Deaths from this tragic happening could not, therefore, have been fewer than 25,000 and may well have reached 50,000. The death-roll from air-raids and associated causes is variously estimated as being between 5,000 and 10,000; while the number executed is placed at between 10,000 and 20,000.[1]

Repatriation of Displaced Persons to China

From:	*Returned during UNRRA programme (Sept. 1945–30 June 1947)*	*Awaiting repatriation (approx. number on 30 June 1947)*
British North Borneo	15	1,200
Burma	46	50
India	0	562
Indochina	1	280
Italy	171	0
Malayan Union	22	100
Indonesia	692	1,217
New Britain	750	0
Philippines	6,587	0
Siam	65	0
Singapore	300	100
Solomon Islands	0	9
Still 'unscreened' (i.e. examined to decide whether or not they are genuinely 'displaced persons')	..	3,000
	8,649	6,518

[1] M. V. del Tufo, *Malaya: a Report of the 1947 Census of Population*, p. 29.

1 [See 26: del Tufo, AN1 Malaya -- Analyst]

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Chinese
Indians

APPENDIX V

INDIANS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE following note is appended to facilitate comparison between the Chinese and Indians in the area.[1] 162

Ethnic Indians in Southeast Asia

			1947
Burma	1,017,825 (1931)	887,000 (1941)	700,000
Siam	..	..	100,000
Indochina	..	..	5,000
Malaya	624,000 (1931)	744,000 (1941)	600,000
British Borneo	..	..	Few
Indonesia	..	..	30,000
Philippines	..	..	Very few
			1,435,000

Possibly because of the historic relations of ancient Hindu India with Southeast Asia, the prohibition of travel overseas imposed by the Hindu Shastras has not been taken to apply to Java, Sumatra, and Ceylon. There were early Hindu settlements, too, in Malaya, but these disappeared long ago and Indian immigration into the region dates virtually from the nineteenth century. 162 167

The only country in Southeast Asia in which the Indians are more numerous than the Chinese is Burma. After India and Burma were separated in 1936 uncertainty as to their future status caused thousands of immigrants to return home to India. Indian landlords and money-lenders liquidated their Burma holdings wherever possible. In 1931 there were 1,018,000 Indians in Burma; in 1947, in spite of natural increases, their number was probably not over 900,000. They retained, however, much of their economic importance. In 1931, 200,000 of the Indians in Burma lived in the Arakan Division nearest India. Of the total 618,000 were born in India—566,000 were Hindus; 397,000 were Muslims; the remainder were Sikhs, Christians, and others. Parsees were prominent in the professions; chetties (chettiars) from South India were the leading bankers with a big hold on the peasantry; Muslims from the Madras Presidency ran restaurants; the Gujeratis and Muslim Chooliahs from Madras had a large share in the hardware trade; Hindus from Upper India were the principal jewellers. Most of the common labour was performed by Hindu Telegus or Tamils. [463]

[1] I am indebted to Mr Edwin Haward for most of the material utilized in this note. V. P.

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After Burma, the Indians in Southeast Asia are most numerous in Malaya, though here their numbers have dropped from 744,000 in 1941 to 600,000 in 1947. The great majority of them are Tamil labourers on the rubber estates, but there is also a considerable community of merchants and chetties who are the money-lenders of Malaya, lawyers, &c. The Sikhs number a few thousands and are agriculturists as well as watchmen and the like. Before the war Sikhs were more numerous in the Malayan Police than they had become by 1949. They made themselves exceedingly unpopular with the Chinese during the Japanese occupation.

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In recent times Indian public opinion has been exceedingly critical of Indian emigration to Southeast Asia in the form of unskilled labour, alleging unfair conditions. The Indian Emigration Act of 1922 was amended in 1938 to give the Government of India power to prohibit even unassisted emigration (assisted emigration was that which took the place of indentured labour) for the purpose of unskilled work. The result has been the virtual drying-up of India as a source of supply for labour, and many Indians have also returned to their homes. During the Japanese occupation casualties among Tamils were especially heavy. But now that India is independent her policy may develop on different lines—the economic pressure of population on her soil may tend to make her less critical of emigration, and as the most powerful State in the Southeast Asia area she may find it expedient to resort to something like the pre-war 'imperialism' which the party now in power in India was, during its period in the wilderness, so concerned to condemn. But the whole turn of events in Southeast Asia is bound to be profoundly affected by the success of the Communists in China, and in the attempts to oppose or to compromise with them India is bound to be a factor of the greatest importance.

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CHAPTER I · INTRODUCTION

I

LABOR SUPPLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

464 467 TWO MAJOR LABOR PROBLEMS, which have confronted Southeast Asia in the past and which remain unsolved, are the inadequacy and irregularity of labor supply and the dearth of organized labor movements having objectives like those of Occidental labor unions.

464 Except in such overpopulated areas as Java, the Tonkin delta, and Northern Annam, labor is generally inadequate in quantity and in quality to meet the requirements of large-scale enterprise. Where numerically adequate, the labor supply is either poorly distributed in relation to areas of employment or fails to respond to opportunities offered. The industrial development of the entire area suffers from lack of full-time services of skilled laborers. Some of the factory employees form the only stable, trained groups of workers. They comprise a small proportion of the population.

[874 461] Few facilities have existed for the training of skilled workers, and the association in Oriental minds of manual labor with the humblest social classes has limited wage-labor largely to those driven by economic necessity. Handicrafts are carried on principally by agriculturists in their [476] leisure time and by other "non-professionals." Farmers form the bulk of the workers. Only during the slack agricultural season or after a disastrous harvest are they willing to perform labor for others.

464 167 Supplementation of the inadequate labor force has been effected in various ways—some spontaneous, others planned. The starvation conditions chronic in south China and in India have caused emigration of workers to the underpopulated but richer regions of Southeast Asia, whence they usually repatriate their savings and eventually their persons to the home country. With the exception of Burma, which by reason of its geographic and administrative relations with India formed a special category, the prosperity which prevailed at times in Southeast Asia was less a factor in stimulating this flow than were conditions in the homeland.

Accelerated by the boom in plantation industries during the early

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Chinese
Indians

464 years of the present century, the flow of immigration has been large and
•167 comparatively steady except during the depression and the two world wars. Chinese and Indian immigrants usually could better their position soon after arrival because their industry and organization were superior to those of the indigenous peoples. Partly because of this, there were constantly new arrivals willing to do coolie work until they too could
[178] rise economically. Except for the large-scale repatriations to China and India caused by the depression, the flow of labor thus set into motion was adequate for the economy prevailing in the underpopulated areas until changing conditions created a growing class of landless proletariat and
[668] dissatisfaction among both the indigenous and immigrant peoples. This dissatisfaction often became associated with other motivations in nationalist movements.

Controlled migrations occurred only between regions under the same government or those held by governments of the same nationality, except for a limited migration of Javanese labor to Malaya (and to New Cale-
[166] donia). In the Netherlands Indies and in Indochina the governments endeavored to transplant groups of laborers from overpopulated to underpopulated areas, but in so doing they learned that the process required careful organization, was expensive, and raised serious economic, social, and psychological problems. Such movements could be effected successfully on a limited scale only. This fact obviated the possibility of their contributing substantially to solution of the problem of overpopulation. As labor supply, such migrations were only temporarily satisfactory, because social and religious ties inclined the workers to return to their home villages immediately upon the expiration of their contracts or even to desert. To stabilize this labor force some of the governments tried after the depression to obtain a better adjusted sex ratio in the migrant population by encouraging the immigration of workers' families and the establishment of agricultural villages—a program too recently initiated to make possible a definite appraisal of its comparative success or failure. In Malaya, with the exception of a few Javanese, planned immigration was confined to Indian laborers. It was arranged and operated jointly by the two British governments concerned. There, however, the depression, the growth in voluntary Indian immigration, and India's ban in 1938 on assisted emigration to Malaya tended to render many of the official controls unnecessary. The unplanned and uncontrolled movement of labor across the Burma-India frontier was the sole migration of its type in Southeast Asia.

563 The indigenous populations in general hold themselves socially aloof
609 from the alien Asiatics. To the Muslim Malays the Chinese were materialistic, pork-eating idolators; and the Indians, with the exception of the small Islamic minority, were similarly disdained, though regarded as less aggressive. To the sinicized Annamites, the Burmese, and the Siamese,

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Chinese
Indians

464 tries. Although this was truer of the immigrant Chinese than of the
668 immigrant Indians, the comparative inertia of the latter was compen-
563 sated for by a more aggressive championship of their cause on the part of their compatriots at home. In the case of Malaya, where the indigenous population was numerically weak and psychologically passive, the Central Indian Association of Malaya and the Congress Party leaders prodded the Government of India to exert pressure upon the officials at Singapore and Kuala Lumpur to grant greater economic and political
[167] privileges to the Indians in Malaya. The governments and planters of Malaya, however, with the curtailment in their labor needs resulting from the current cut in rubber export, felt free to resist this pressure, even at the price of the embargo placed in 1938 on emigration to Malaya of assisted Indian labor.

464 In the case of the Chinese the situation was different. Smaller num-
668 bers were employed in the rubber industry and larger ones in mining.
563 More of them were able to graduate from contract labor into other occupations, especially retail business, farming, and small trades. They
167 tended to stay longer because of the insecurity of enterprise in south China. Moreover, the home government was in a much weaker position than that of India to exert pressure on the governments of Malaya. These remained free to regulate at their pleasure the spontaneous flow of Chinese immigrants and to keep watch on the political activities of resident Chinese. In Burma, however, the British authorities were unable to keep the situation so well in hand. Serious anti-Indian rioting broke out in 1938, and the strength of the Burman nationalists in the government (especially after separation from India in 1937) enabled it to negotiate an agreement with India restricting the number of Indian immigrants and permitting the exercise of more control over those domiciled in the country.

In Indochina and the Netherlands Indies the governments were able to keep the immigrant problem from assuming intensity because of the smaller proportion of Chinese in relation to the native populations. In all these countries, however, Chinese laborers suffered somewhat from the bad reputation of those of their countrymen who as merchants and moneylenders had acquired an economic power which differed from that of other aliens in that it affected directly and visibly the welfare of large numbers.

464 All the governments, including that of Siam, were compelled by public
668 opinion to exert more control over the immigrant minorities. In so do-
563 ing, they faced unpleasant alternatives. The demand of Chinese and
167 Indian laborers for better working conditions and improved political
468 status was accompanied by a threat to cut off entirely the flow of emigration. Encouraged by nationalist groups, they engaged in strikes and boycotts. If these succeeded, other demands would probably be made; and

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Chinese
Indians

the indigenous peoples were not sufficiently willing, numerous, or skilled 464
to replace the immigrant laborers. A higher wage scale, they feared, 668
might compel many firms either to go out of business or to install expen- 563
sive machinery. Already local nationalists, succumbing to the philosophy 167
of economic self-sufficiency, were demanding intensive programs of gov-
ernment-aided industrialization. If such demands were acceded to, the 468
industrialists and labor leaders in the home country could be expected to
protest strongly against the new competition.

In this complex situation, the colonial governments of Southeast Asia [664]
gradually yielded to the popular demands, although loath to abandon
their traditional function as instruments of capitalist planning in the
home countries. With the exception, however, of the embryonic and
ineffective industrial programs of the Siamese and Burmese governments
and the more constructive policy of the Netherlands Indies for a planned
industrialization, none of the countries did much in this direction. None
was forced as yet to consider very seriously that change in colonial rela-
tionship which would result from general economic development in the
world and specifically from the new role that China and India would
inevitably play before long in Southeast Asia. The Japanese invasion
interrupted the efforts of local governments toward a solution of these
labor problems. It also injected new elements into the situation.

2

LABOR ORGANIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

FOR VARIOUS REASONS an organized labor movement has never developed 467
in Southeast Asia to notable dimensions. In large part this was because 575
of the predominance of alien, transient, and illiterate labor forces, di- 563
vided—even when of the same nationality—by geographical and linguistic
differences. The Indians were further subdivided by caste and religious 668
sect. The Chinese had a far better family, guild, and secret-society
organization; but the antagonisms imported as an integral part of these
organizations provoked periodic violence. Later the political and gang-
ster elements which operated within their framework impelled all the
governments throughout Southeast Asia to control them severely.

National solidarity among the immigrant labor groups was further 466
broken up by the methods of recruitment and management. Agents and 167
foremen exploited their compatriots for their own personal gain, until
the governments concerned were gradually and reluctantly forced to
intervene. Asiatic agents behaved much as recruiting agents of emi-

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Chinese Indians

466 167 grants to the United States did in Europe until they were checked. They consistently misrepresented to prospective recruits the conditions of work that awaited them, herded them aboard ships and in lodgings under conditions of filth and crowding, and tried to crimp their competitors' labor forces. Immigrant Asiatic foremen also were similar to their prototypes among immigrant foremen in the United States. They were notorious for the "cuts" they took from their crews' wages, for their unscrupulous profiteering from the sale of food and other necessities to the workers, and for their brutality toward those recalcitrant under arbitrary rule. Nor were alien Asiatic employers liberal in their relations with compatriots among their labor forces. Small Chinese-owned estates and mines were regularly cited in the reports of independent labor inspectors as the most delinquent in their observance of health and safety regulations. Singapore Indian shop-owners were the object of unpleasant publicity regarding the long working days, irregular and inadequate wages, and general tyranny meted out to their compatriot assistants. Disinterested labor leadership or even employer paternalism was conspicuously absent among the immigrant groups.

466 Working conditions were not much better in the enterprises owned by indigenous employers; but they were less conspicuous than those of the immigrant employer's shop, as most of the native workers are farmers scattered over the land and cared for, when in need, by the traditional village and family organization. Little was done by the native governments, whenever they were in power, to better the lot of the small native farmer-artisan. The Siamese and Burmese governments falteringly attempted to introduce scientific agriculture, to improve cottage industries and to reduce the landless proletariat; but their efforts were directed more toward ousting foreigners who preyed on the people, particularly alien landowners and moneylenders, than toward improving labor conditions of those working for indigenous employers. The Siamese National Assembly, in 1938, turned down a proposal for labor legislation designed to set maximum hours and minimum wages and to restrict child labor. Its policy on labor organization was much the same as that of the colonial governments, that is, to keep the labor forces under control and to exhibit, at most, a certain indulgence toward the formation of unions in some trades or localities where this seemed advantageous.

[563 654]

Wherever labor legislation was introduced in Southeast Asia, the initiative came from the government and not from the workers. Originally it was the difficulties which European employers experienced in retaining their workers (at first domestic servants and later plantation laborers) that inspired legislation which imposed a penalty upon employees for their non-observance of agreements. Gradually, throughout the region, this penal sanction was abolished and more beneficial types of legislation were introduced to reduce the labor turnover. Considerations of

[686]

3

LABOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION

JAPAN'S TREATMENT of labor throughout Southeast Asia varied according to the military situation, the political relations of Japan with the individual country, and the availability of manpower. Everywhere, however, labor suffered from dislocations, regimentation, and general deterioration in working conditions except for the limited amount of technical training dispensed by the Japanese to create a needed nucleus of skilled workers. The information required to draw a complete picture of the labor situation during the war in each of the countries of this region is not yet available, but from such data as exist—drawn chiefly from former enemy sources—the outlines are reasonably clear. 727 466

By mid-1943 their military position in the Pacific War led the Japanese to alter their policy in Southeast Asia. Labor in the area had not previously been regimented on a nation-wide basis, although attempts to register the available manpower and use it for individual projects had been made as the need arose. But the critical shipping situation, which prevented both exports from Southeast Asia to Japan and imports needed in those countries, of necessity changed the objective of Japanese policy from one of economic exploitation for the benefit of the homeland to maintaining Japanese troops in the area and achieving local self-sufficiency and defense.

In June 1943 new labor measures were widely introduced; these foreshadowed large-scale forced labor and indicated that the Japanese realized that patriotic as well as economic and prestige incentives had to be offered to secure native cooperation. Soon after, the transplanting of laborers from the most populous areas to those requiring workers for defense projects and economic development was systematically undertaken. This policy prevailed until V-J Day at a tempo which kept pace with the worsening military situation of Japan. [166]

Japan's political aims were reflected in marked differences in policy in each of the countries of eastern Asia, and also toward separate groups within each state. The comparatively good treatment meted out to the Siamese derived from Japan's need, for propaganda purposes, to maintain the fiction of Siam's voluntary alliance in the Greater East Asia war. Being unwilling, for political reasons, to coerce masses of Siamese workers, and for economic reasons to rely on their small, unskilled and re- 727 167 464

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727 luctant services, the Japanese imported prisoners of war and Javanese
●167 laborers for the construction of the Burma and Kra Isthmus railroads.
464 Even after the pro-Japanese dictator, Pibul Songgram, had been ousted by a resistance government, the Japanese tolerated the change so long as they retained military and economic control over the country.

727 Malaya, on the other hand, received the least favored treatment. The only country in the area to which the Japanese did not promise "inde-
[464] pendence," it was earmarked as a Japanese colony. The Japanese were faced with a small, foreign labor supply whose special skills were adapted
466 almost exclusively to the tin and rubber industries. Since they could utilize only a small proportion of the country's major produce, there occurred tremendous dislocation and unemployment of labor. The Chinese, as the largest, most skilled, and most hostile group, were subjected successively to brutal treatment, registration and regimentation, and transportation to farming colonies on the peninsula. The Indians were similarly organized along racial lines through the Japanese-sponsored Indian Independence Leagues and the Indian National Army. The Malays escaped the more rigorous forms of coercion because of their negligible importance as a source of labor.

[167] Despite the tight network of organization developed by the Japanese, Malaya's labor problem was never satisfactorily solved; guerilla ranks were strengthened by recalcitrants of all races and eventually the occupying forces had to import Japanese and Javanese workers in order to strengthen the defenses of that vitally strategic area.

727 Indochina, thanks to the survival of the French administration until the Japanese coup of March 1945, was treated only slightly less favorably
466 than Siam. The Japanese found there a more abundant labor supply than in immediately neighboring countries but were hampered by the necessity of working indirectly through French officials, by the concentration of labor in the north, and its antipathy to furthering Japan's war
[167] aims. As in Malaya, the inadequacy and indifference of the local labor supply compelled the Japanese to import a few thousand Chinese and Malay coolies as well as some Japanese technicians and supervisors. A
[166] certain number of local laborers were conscripted to work on defense and industrial projects and an undetermined number of Tonkinese were transported to work on plantations in the south. Unemployment seems
[464] not to have become a major factor, although as the war progressed there was a marked shift of agricultural workers to the cities, only partially offset by the evacuation of some laborers from heavily bombed urban areas. In common with the other laborers of Southeast Asia, Indochinese workers suffered from coercion and inflation but apparently not from nation-wide regimentation or transportation to work outside their own country.

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Indians

Next to the Javanese, the Burmese endured the greatest hardships during the Japanese occupation. Burma was more completely devastated by military campaigns than any other country in the area, and its proximity to India made it Japan's frontier zone. The need to win Burmese cooperation led Japan to grant Burma "independence" on August 1, 1943, and thereafter the local intelligentsia were placated by a Burmanization of the administrative services. But the country's laborers were in a far worse plight than they had been under the British administration. The Indians, whose number in Burma had been halved during the 1942 campaign, were immediately thereafter exposed to persecution by the Burmese. Virtual pogrom conditions in the delta compelled them to flee to Rangoon for Japanese protection and employment. Indian coolies supplied the casual labor needed in the nation's capital, and most of the white-collar class was absorbed into the Indian Independence Leagues and Indian National Army. Burmese laborers, who had long agitated for a restriction of Indian immigration, now found themselves bearing the brunt of Japanese requisitioning, which was represented by the puppet native government as a patriotic service. They had to perform heavy manual labor far from home, for low wages, and under alien and often harsh supervision. They suffered, in addition, from the knowledge that their own fields were neglected and their homes unprotected. Burma was frequently praised by the Japanese for having supplied more cooperative labor service than any other area in the southern regions, but nevertheless Javanese workers had to be brought in.

727 563 [464] [466]

Java, with the greatest labor reservoir of the area, was inevitably the country whose manpower was most intensively exploited by the Japanese. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Javanese served as coolie labor for the construction of defense works and means of communication and also were trained by the Japanese for more technical work in shipyards and in factories. They were shipped by the thousands to areas outside their island as local needs and the exigencies of the military situation dictated.

727 466 167

Originally the Japanese planned to perpetuate, on a far vaster scale, Dutch colonization schemes in Sumatra; in this they not only encountered the same obstacles as had their predecessors, but they found they could exploit all of the island's resources they could use with the manpower and machinery locally available. In mid-1943 they seem to have transferred the plan to Borneo, where additional labor was required to develop such local industries as timber. Many hundreds of male Javanese workers were shipped to Borneo, while smaller groups were sent to other areas.

727 464 166

Unemployment during the Japanese occupation was serious only in Malaya. Elsewhere the defense and economic programs of the Japanese,

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been traditionally most dependent on imported labor and their prewar labor movements were the most highly developed of any throughout the region. 467 464

Nevertheless, the labor movements in these two countries have taken different paths. Burma is made up of one predominant race, overwhelmingly agricultural and guided by strong nationalist leadership. Development of solidarity among Malaya's laboring class has been retarded by the tripartite ethnic composition of its population and by the country's traditional dependence upon two export industries. Accordingly, Malaya's labor movement has developed schismatic tendencies bordering on mutual hostility and has been influenced by alien Asiatic leadership. While in both countries the British Government has not as yet formulated any policy toward immigrant workers and has thus played into the hands of labor, already in short supply, the effects in the two countries have been quite different. Because of Malaya's lack of a self-sufficient economy, its laborers are in a more favorable position to press their demands. At the same time they suffer from serious internal weaknesses not found in Burma. The government and private firms in Malaya—if the planting-mining economy is to survive—will have to make greater concessions in order to reconstitute an adequate labor force than will the analogous authorities in Burma and Siam.

The special composition of Malaya's population and the organization of its industries are probably responsible for the development of its labor movement from many small unions, organized by subdivisions within trades, into a central association. This pyramidal set-up has been turned upside down in Burma, where labor was at first organized on a very broad basis and then divided into smaller units. In both areas the British Government has been making a marked effort to foster labor unions and at the same time to divorce them from political programs and ideologies. But since the nationalists throughout the area have chosen the labor movement as their chief medium for the achievement of the socio-political revolution they desire, it is unlikely that this attempt will prove successful. The laborers of Southeast Asia still feel themselves to be, above all, members of their own national or ethnic communities and have only secondarily developed a consciousness of a class apart. The whole area is too little industrialized to be fertile ground for a labor movement, strictly speaking. When trade unionism is discussed in referring to the labor movements now budding in Southeast Asia, it should be borne in mind that little more than its nomenclature has been borrowed from Occidental labor organization. 467 [668] [565] [563]

Throughout Southeast Asia the various governments have begged two outstanding questions affecting local labor problems—agricultural indebtedness and land tenancy, and the control of Asiatic immigration. In regard to the former, nothing has been done thus far and one can 466 426 167

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167 426 466 [563] only surmise that a development of the cooperative movements will be furthered as the one policy free from international complications. As to the immigration of Indians and Chinese, the local governments seem unable to chart a course between the Scylla of indigenous nationalist sentiment and the Charybdis of demands from the governments of India and China. The latter today are in a far stronger position than before the war to insist that improved working conditions and greater political privileges be accorded to such of their nationals as they permit to emigrate to Southeast Asia.

466 167 563 Any restoration of the prewar planting-mining economy will depend upon the resumption of Asiatic immigration. But management will be forced to grant better working and living conditions and possibly the governments will have to concede a more privileged political position to immigrant Indian and Chinese laborers. On the other hand, native nationalists throughout the area will try to curtail such immigration and will oppose granting political privileges to alien Asiatics who, they believe, will continue to feel a primary loyalty to their homelands. These opposing forces have already locked horns on the citizenship clause embodied in the Malayan Union plan—the first postwar attempt to ameliorate the political position of alien Asiatics—and the British Government has not yet resolved the equally important immigration issue.

433 No matter what constitutional changes emerge from the current political crisis in Southeast Asia, the governments set up throughout the area will have to face the same labor and minority problems as did their predecessors. The urge toward industrialization received an impetus from the Japanese occupation, though the synchronous growth in the industries of China and India (not to mention Japan's continuing need for export markets) will offer sharper competition to the nascent industries of the region. Moreover, shortages of labor and fuel in most of Southeast Asia cannot but curtail the expansion of even light industries and may prevent any immediate and effective way of satisfying the desire of nationalists for the establishment of large-scale and heavy industries.

[439] The region seems destined to remain for some time predominantly a source of raw materials and a market for the industrial output of its neighbors. Before the war certain sections of these countries had entered the phase of commercialized agriculture and mining, and of processing the output—distinct advances over the traditional economies. This trend is now being accentuated, although it is influenced by such wartime developments as that of the synthetic-rubber industry. In any case the form of international organization set up to control production and sales will be different from that of the past, in which the colonial producer interests predominated. In the immediate postwar period, world shortages of the commodities produced by Southeast Asia have created a market eager for all its major output.

16: Fryer K-3 (no date)1953 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

rubber, in Singapore; other manufactures are furniture, boats, footwear, glass, bricks and tiles, oils and soaps, electric batteries, and certain chemical products. Manufacturing industries proper use relatively little machinery and power and produce for the home market, in which there is a considerable element of local protection. Food and drink industries are well developed (including brewing and distilling); textiles are poorly developed. Heavy industry is confined to the repair and refitting of vessels. All the ports have forges and foundries for making minor repairs; Singapore and Jakarta, which have dry-dock facilities, can undertake more extensive work. Repair shops for maintenance of railway equipment are located in all the cities except Singapore; the assembly of imported motor vehicles is carried on in Manila, Jakarta, and Singapore. Industry relies largely on electric power, which is expensive because of the paucity of local coal supplies. 32 38 39 361

Small-scale industry is almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese; the larger undertakings are overwhelmingly European-owned, though there are some large Chinese industrial establishments. Only a small proportion of the inhabitants of the cities are engaged in industry: in Singapore, where industry is expanding rapidly, only 11 per cent of the adult working population were employed in industrial establishments in the census of 1947. This unduly low figure does not take account of the large employment in the establishments of the Armed Services, much of which was industrial.

The industrial areas lie close to the port or along the rivers and canals. They are surrounded by areas of high population density; for the relatively high cost and limited availability of public transport operate to retard the divorce of place of work and residence, which is so conspicuous a feature of the Western city. Newer industrial areas, however, are appearing on the margins of the cities, and as the range of industrial activity grows, industry is likely to become more widely dispersed.

Population

All the five cities would have probably reached the one-million level in a comparatively short period if the war had not intervened. During the Japanese occupation, population decreased in the cities because of the shortage of food, and the wartime dislocation that elsewhere in Asia resulted in a large influx of rural dwellers into the cities did not operate here. With the end of the war the tide set strongly in the opposite direction. The breakdown of effective administration in many parts of Southeast Asia following the Japanese surrender, armed insurrections against the central governments, the struggle for independence, the depredations of extreme 162 361 167

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factions, and the difficulty of protecting disliked minorities, particularly the Chinese, all combined to attract many rural dwellers to the comparative safety of the cities. This immigration of refugees was perhaps greatest in Saigon-Cholon: from a population of about 300,000 at the time of the Japanese occupation the twin cities have increased to an estimated 1,400,000. Jakarta has grown almost as spectacularly. At the census of 1930 the city of Batavia had a population of a little more than half a million; by 1950 the Indonesian government estimated Jakarta's population to be not less than two million; and at present the city may well contain nearer three million. Even on the most conservative estimate it is by far the most populous city in the whole of Southeast Asia.

In the census of 1948, Greater Manila had a population of 1,180,000; however, several separately recorded districts of Rizal Province are integral parts of the built-up area, and their inclusion raises the total to more than a million and a quarter. The 14 districts of the City of Manila proper showed a 58 per cent increase over the 1939 census figures. Singapore and Bangkok have been relatively unaffected by postwar immigration from the country. In the intercensal period 1931–1947 the population of the island of Singapore grew by some 68 per cent, owing to the gradual establishment of an equality in the sex composition of the Chinese population, together with a steady decline in the death rate; allowing for natural increase since the census, the population of Singapore Colony at present is about 1,100,000, of whom about 70 per cent reside in the municipal area. Before the war Bangkok was approaching 900,000, but in the census of 1947 the population was only 1,116,600;[9] hence the war may have somewhat retarded the city's growth.

The present rate of growth due to natural increase seems to be about 3 per cent a year in all the cities, which is much higher than the rate in their respective national territories. This will present many difficult problems of development. As might be expected, the already overcrowded districts have experienced the greatest increases; in Manila, for example, the districts of Tondo, Sampaloc, and Santa Cruz have increased their populations by 80 per cent or more since 1939. As compared with Western cities, densities in the poorest areas are extremely high; 1500 persons to an acre would not be excessive for the net density of the worst blocks.[10] On the other hand, density

[9] With Thonburi. According to the *Statistical Year Book of Thailand*, N.S., Vol. 1, 1952, recently received, the total for the two is 1,178,881.

[10] Net density is the average density of the population of a given residential area, which consists solely of the dwellings and one-half of the width of streets giving access thereto. The figure quoted here is an estimate by the Singapore Improvement Trust of the situation in the most overcrowded part of the city.

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development in the best residential districts is very low, frequently one or two houses to an acre, so that the cities sprawl widely. 361

From the beginning, Chinese immigrants have constituted an important element of the cities. At first encouraged, and later feared, by the authorities, the Chinese were confined to special quarters, such as the famous Parián of Manila, where they have tended to remain. Dislike of them has been a universal rallying point of numerous indigenous politicians, and the murder of many Chinese in the period following the Japanese collapse recalls the massacres of the early history of Manila and Batavia. Where immigration has been comparatively free, at least until fairly recent times, the Chinese have become a majority: Singapore is more than 77 per cent Chinese—the largest Chinese community outside China—and in Bangkok more than 60 per cent of the population are Chinese or of mixed Chinese-Thai ancestry. The lower proportions of Chinese in the other three cities are due to the earlier restrictions on immigration, together with an influx of indigenous peoples from rural areas in the postwar period. Events in China, however, have everywhere increased illegal Chinese immigration. The removal of many Chinese from rural Cochin China to the Saigon-Cholon area has raised the percentage of Chinese in Cholon to about 60, and it is probably not less than 30 in the combined cities. In Manila and Jakarta it is much lower, and the total number of Chinese is not easy to estimate; both cities contain more than 50,000, and the number of persons of mixed Chinese and indigenous blood is undoubtedly much larger. Despite many vicissitudes, the Chinese have proved indispensable, and their importance in the economic life of the cities can hardly be overstated.

Europeans constitute only a very small proportion of the population of the cities. Only in prewar Batavia did they amount to as much as 5 per cent of the total, and this was in part due to the inclusion of Eurasians as Europeans in the Dutch statistics. Of the other immigrant groups, the most numerous are Indians and Pakistanis, who in Singapore made up 7 per cent of the population in 1947. Jakarta has a small community of Arabs, engaged in shopkeeping or moneylending.

The indigenous peoples have a higher birth rate than the immigrant peoples, but also a higher death rate, so that the relative proportions of the two groups have tended to remain the same. Lately the migration of indigenous peoples to the cities, especially in the new independent states, has altered the balance somewhat, and the partly alien character of the cities may tend to decline. Simultaneously, restrictions have been placed on the economic activities of the Chinese in the Philippines and Thailand, but the outcome of these measures is unlikely to be that intended.

113, 241, 171 Southeast Asia AL1

[For comparison of systems of land tenure in Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Sumatra, Java, Borneo and of the hill tribes of India with that of Malaya, see Source 58: Maxwell, pp. 82-89, category 116, AN1 Malaya. --Analyst]

171, 144, 302 ALl Southeast Asia

[For information on the distribution of techniques and habits of tooth-blackening in Indochina, especially Tonkin, and distributional comparisons with other parts of Indochina, Southeast and East Asia, and for hypotheses about racial and cultural-historical interrelations on the basis of these distributions, see 95: Huard, AMl Indochina, category 116.]

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
Southeast Asia AL1

foreign army of occupation has preserved it from disruption. The essential and distinctive character of a plural society is that it is dominated by economic forces, and, outside a few partly sheltered oases, Southeast Asia illustrates the capitalist system in its purest form.[18]

Another common feature is the dominance of the agricultural section of the population. The latest available figures show the percentage proportions of population dependent on agriculture in the area as follows: Burma, 68; Indonesia, 66; Philippines, 69; Thailand, 85.[19] The same source indicates the proportions for various regions of the world as follows: North America, 20; Oceania, 30; Europe, 33; South America, 60; Asia, 70; and Africa, 74.

With the prevailing techniques of production and the consequent low productivity per man, dominance of agriculture means low per capita national income. When countries are grouped by level of economic development on the basis of per capita national income as of 1950, all the six countries of Southeast Asia -- Burma, Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaya, Philippines, and Thailand -- fall in the underdeveloped group.[20] Moreover, there is in Southeast Asia a true surplus population on the land in the sense that even under the present methods of cultivation a sizeable fraction of the

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18. Ibid., p. 77.

19. Food and Agriculture Organization, 1953 Yearbook, Vol. VII.

20. Eugene Staley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), pp. 16-17.

13:Sebeok L-3 (no date)1943 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

197 particularly the Palaung, Wa, and Riang; and finally the Mon-Khmer group proper.

The language of the Mon is spoken on the coast of the gulf of Pegu. Inscriptions date from as far back as the 11th century. They are in Myazediin script. Khmer is spoken in Cambodia, and its inscriptions are available from about the first half of the 7th century. There are also about a dozen other dialects spoken by scattered tribes throughout this area.

The Mon-Khmer languages are sometimes grouped together with Munda, a large family of languages spoken in the Northeastern sector of India today —but this is not supported by evidence. Similarly, it may be doubted if dialects of this language family have really spread into Yunnan in Southwest China. For example, Wen Yu showed recently that Min-chia, long held to have been a Mon-Khmer dialect, belongs in reality to Tibeto-Burman ("A study of synonyms in the Min-chia language," *Studia Serica* 1 (1940), 1–28). The term "Austroasiatic"—if it means more than just Mon-Khmer—covers a multitude of linguistic methodological sins. And if the existence of an "Austroasiatic" family of languages is doubtful, an "Austric" superstock, combining the former with Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian), is much more improbable still. For further information on Mon-Khmer consult the writer's "Examination of the Austroasiatic language family" (*Language* 18 (1942), 206–17), which contains references as well as a lengthy list of languages, and further his "Bibliography of Mon-Khmer linguistics" (*Studies in Linguistics*, Vol. 1, No. 11, 1943).

It is only fair to point out, however, that in a recent paper, "Thai, Kadai, and Indonesian: A new alignment in Southeastern Asia" (*American Anthropologist* 44 (1942), 576–601), Paul Benedict attempted boldly to combine into a single language family Thai, Indonesian and "Kadai"—and further to add this hypothetical family to Mon-Khmer-Annamite, and in a further synthesis, Miao-Yao. "Kadai" is a new term of the author's for Kelao, Laqua, and Lati of the mainland, that is, in Southcentral China and the China-Tonkin border region, and Li of Hainan. This writer regards Benedict's interesting attempt with a good deal of scepticism, for the type of evidence he uses to prove his hypothesis is not altogether satisfactory. Further judgment may well be postponed until new and better material to work with has been collected.

THE INDONESIAN LANGUAGES

197 Indonesian (Malayan) is a family of languages spoken over an enormous
●171 territory: the Malay Peninsula, the East Indies, the Philippine Islands,
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Madagascar, and Formosa. Furthermore, a distant but clear relationship exists between Indonesian on the one hand, and the Oceanic languages, Melanesian, Micronesian, Polynesian, on the other. 197 171 184

The dialect spoken on the mainland, around, say, Perak, is known simply as Malay; this is, moreover, something of a *lingua franca:* "bazaar" or "pidgin" Malay and is understood throughout the Indies, except in some of the interior districts.

The large number of dialects in this area—there are 87 in the Philippine Islands alone—cannot be accounted for in terms of separate waves of migrations, for ethnology recognizes no more than three major ones; the distinctions become less puzzling, however, if we consider the geographical factors which resulted in ethnic isolation of more or less small groups. Perhaps the most isolated, and hence the most divergent, dialects of Indonesian are spoken in Madagascar; the Hova dialect of the Malagasy group is the literary one. 197

The chief groups on the Philippine Islands are four: the Luzon group (chief dialects, Iloco, Ibanag, Apayao, Kalinga, Tingguian, Bontoc, Ifugao, Igorot, Ilongot, Tagalog), second, the Bisaya group (chief dialects, Cebu-Bisaya, Panay-Bisaya), third, Mindoro-Palawan (chief dialects, Mangyan, Kuyónon, Tagbanua), and finally, the Mindanao-Sulu group (chief dialects, Lanao, Magindanao, Subanon, Mandaya, Bagobo, Kulaman, Tiruray). For a map of distribution of these and other dialects see Herbert W. Krieger, "Peoples of the Philippines" (*Smithsonian Institution, War Background Studies No. 4*, Washington, 1942, Fig. 4).

Some of the dialects in the East Indies are as follows. Sumatra: Minangkabau, Karo and Toba (together known as Batak), Gayo, Kubu, etc. Mentawey is spoken on the island by that name. Dayak and Punan are spoken in Borneo. Java: Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese. Celebes: Toradja, Bulu, Tontemboan, Bugis, Makassa, Bareqe. Balinese is the language of Bali. There are a good many others as well.

Several members of the Indonesian family, Malay in particular, have been studied with more or less thoroughness. But the best material is in Dutch and available only with difficulty here. For an excellent recent contribution in America cf. the outline of Iloco (a Philippine dialect) syntax (*Language* 18 (1942), 193–200), by Leonard Bloomfield.

The empires of the Mon and the Khmer were shattered in relatively recent times by folks who spoke Burmese and Thai respectively. The speakers of these languages dominate Burma and Thailand today, and Mon-Khmer is rapidly disappearing.

Mr Heine-Geldern E-4 (no date) 1942 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

CONCEPTIONS OF STATE AND KINGSHIP IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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121 643 AT A time when the whole political system of Southeast Asia seems to be on the verge of complete reshapement and when a new cycle of development, dominated by native forces, may be expected to emerge from the present turmoil, an inquiry into the ideological foundations of native government will not be out of place and, perhaps, will even be of more than purely theoretical interest. What were the religious and philosophical conceptions which underlay and shaped the states of Southeast Asia? Are they still living forces with which we have to count or are they dead and gone? Is it possible to inoculate new ideas into old traditions, thereby avoiding a complete break with the past, a dangerous uprooting of oriental thought and culture?

In view of the limited space I shall confine myself to a discussion of some fundamental conceptions of state and kingship in those parts of Southeast Asia where Hindu-Buddhist civilization prevailed.

MACROCOSMOS AND MICROCOSMOS

772 643 The primary notion with which we shall have to deal is the belief in the parallelism between Macrocosmos and Microcosmos, between the universe and the world of men. According to this belief humanity is constantly under the influence of forces emanating from the directions of the compass and from stars and planets. These forces may produce welfare and prosperity or work havoc, according to whether or not individuals and social groups, above all the state, succeed in bringing their lives and activities in harmony with the universe. Individuals may attain such harmony by following the indications offered by astrology, the lore of lucky and unlucky days and many other minor rules Harmony between the empire and the universe is achieved by organizing the former as an image of the latter, as a universe on a smaller scale.

171 772 643 It is well known that this astrological or cosmo-magic principle, as we may call it, originated somewhere in the Near East. It was well established in Babylonia in the 3rd millennium B.C. and there are indications that it may go back there at least as far as the middle of the 4th millennium, and possibly farther. Again, we have indications that it existed in Northwest India in the

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●171 first half of the 3rd millennium. It influenced Europe in various ways and at
772 various times, specially during the periods of Hellenism and of the Roman
643 empire and in the Middle Ages. It is difficult to tell when it first reached China. Anyway it had developed there into a highly specialized system during the Chou and Han periods. It came to Southeast Asia by way of India as well as of China, and this double influence may account for its prominence there and for the strong hold it had on the minds of the peoples of Farther India and Indonesia. Its long life-span and its spread over vast regions with divergent cultures, and even more so the fact that it had to adapt itself to the locally dominant religions, to various forms of paganism as well as to Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism, and occasionally even to Christianity and to Islam, naturally resulted in the development of numerous variants with often widely differing traits. It is with the special aspect of the cosmo magic principle as expressed in the organization of Hindu and Buddhist king doms in Southeast Asia (and to some extent in their Mohammedan successors in Malaya and Indonesia), that we are here concerned.

RELATION BETWEEN STATE AND UNIVERSE

772 Whereas speculations pertaining to the relation between state and uni-
643 verse formed an important subject of ancient Chinese literature, we would look in vain for a theoretical treatise on this topic in the various literatures of Southeast Asia.[1] Yet, there is overwhelming evidence of the cosmological basis of state and kingship in this area. This evidence is found in numerous passages in literature and inscriptions, in the titles of kings, queens and officials, in the "cosmic" numbers of queens, ministers, court priests, provinces, etc., in rites and customs, in works of art, in the lay-out and structure of capital cities, palaces and temples. One need only put these various items together to obtain a relatively clear picture. This picture will be more complete in continental Southeast Asia, where the old forms of Buddhist state and kingship survived into very recent times. It will be hazier in the Archipelago as a result of Mohammedan and European influences.

According to Brahmanic doctrine the world consists of a circular central continent, Jambūdvīpa, surrounded by seven annular oceans and seven annular continents. Beyond the last of the seven oceans the world is closed by an enormous mountain range. In the center of Jambudvīpa, and thus in the center of the world, rises Mount Meru, the cosmic mountain around which sun, moon and stars revolve. On its summit lies the city of the gods sur-

[1] However, it must be taken into account that Burmese, Mon and Thai literatures are still very imperfectly known.

15:Adams E-4 (no date)1948 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

RICE CULTIVATION IN ASIA

By INEZ ADAMS

243 THE terminology employed by writers discussing Asiatic rice agriculture has raised a problem: are the cultivated varieties of rice distinctly separable into one group that will grow under none but irrigated conditions, and another that demands moderate amounts of moisture but is successfully produced only by dry farming? The terms used in the literature frequently bear this implication. They include references to "wet" and "dry," "dryland," "lowland," "upland" and "mountain" rice. In anthropological studies whose purpose is merely descriptive this creates confusion. When extended to comparative studies and historical reconstructions, with the two methods of cultivation treated as distinct for the conclusions reached, it becomes necessary to examine the distinctions that might justify such use.

101 As early as 1820, John Crawfurd, writing his "History of the Indian Archi-
● 171 pelago," observed that rice is known as "padi . . . in all languages and dialects
243 from Madagascar to the Philippines."[1] He distinguished in Java a "marsh"
184 rice, sown in nurseries and transplanted to flooded fields, and a "mountain" or "dryland" rice, grown on arable uplands. These terms remain current. Lowie defines them thus:

243 The innumerable variations of the plant fall broadly into two categories, with corresponding techniques of husbandry. "Swamp" rice can be grown only in marshes or under irrigation. "Mountain" rice yields smaller crops, but can be grown anywhere with normal precipitation.[2]

Wilhelm Wagner[3] speaks in a similar sense of "den gewöhnliche Wasserreis" and "den sogenanten Bergreis," in his account of Chinese agriculture. C. Daryll Forde makes the same general differentiation of cultivated rices falling[4] into two groups due to the physical requirements of the plant. Wissler[5] mentions "The cultivated varieties known as 'hill,' 'upland,' or 'dryland' rice," in contradistinction to the "aquatic varieties." Keesing,[6] in one work on the Philippines, employs "wet" and "dry" rice; elsewhere[7] he speaks of "dry agriculture" in Indonesia, as distinguished from the practice of terracing with irrigation.

E. M. Loeb,[8] in his general ethnography of Sumatra, notes rice raised in both flooded and dry fields by the Bataks; in the Minangkabau, . . . "wet and dry rice fields are worked together by the men and women . . . ";[9] in Nias, . . . "both the wet and dry variety are grown . . . ";[10] in Atjeh, "Rice is of both the wet and dry variety. The wet rice fields, when not laid in swamps, are irrigated

[1] Crawfurd, 1820, Vol. I, p. 358. [2] Lowie, 1938, p. 294. [3] Wagner, 1926.
[4] Forde, 1934. [5] Wissler, 1946. [6] Keesing, 1937. [7] *Idem.*, 1934.
[8] Loeb, 1935. [9] *Ibid.*, p. 101. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 132.

31:Scherman--4A E-4 (no date) 1915 AP1 Burma
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

[For description see page 4, category 116.—Analyst]

43: Jenks E-5 (1902-1903) 1905 OA1 Philippines
Bontok OA12
Malayo-Polynesians 04
Southeast Asia AL 1

The a′-to ceremonials of Chakong are held in the pa-ba-fu′-nan of neighboring a′-to, as in Sigichan, Pudpudchog, or Filig, and this seems partially to destroy the *esprit de corps* of the unfortunate a′-to.

Each a′to has a fa′-wi building—a structure greatly resembling to the pa-ba-fu′-nan, and impossible to be distinguished from it by one looking at the structure from the outside. The fa′-wi and pa-ba-fu′-nan are shown in Pls. XXX, XXXI, and XXXII. Pl. XXIX shows a section of Sipaat a′-to with its fa′-wi and pa-ba-fu′-nan. The fa′-wi is the a′-to council house; as such it is more frequented by the old men than by the younger. The fa′-wi also shelters the skulls of human heads taken by the a′-to. Outside the pueblo, along certain trails, there are simple structures also called "fa′wi," shelters where parties halt for feasts, etc., while on various ceremonial journeys.

The fa′-wi and pa-ba-fu′-nan of each a′-to are near together, and in five they are under the same roof, though there is no doorway for intercommunication. What was said of the pa-ba-fu′-nan as a social center is equally true of the fa′-wi; each is the lounging place of men and boys, and the dormitory of unmarried males.

In Samoki each of the eight a′-to has only one public building, and that is known simply as "a′-to."

One is further convinced of an extensive early movement of the primitive Malayan from its pristine nest by the presence of institutions similar to the pa-ba-fu′-nan and fa′-wi over a vast territory of the Asiatic mainland as well as the Asiatic Islands and Oceania. That these widespread institutions sprang from the same source will be seen clearly in the quotations appearing in the footnote below.[1] The visible exponent of the institutions is a building forbidden to women, the functions of which are several; it is a dormitory for men—generally unmarried men—a council house, a guardhouse, a guest house for men, a center for ceremonials of the group, and a resting place for the trophies of the chase and war—a "head house."

[1] Major Godwin-Austen says of the Gāro hill tribes, Bengal, India:

"In every village is the 'bolbang,' or young men's house. * * * In this house all the unmarried males live, as soon as they attain the age of puberty, and in this any travelers are put up."—The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, vol. II, p. 393. See also op. cit., vol. XI, p. 199.

S. E. Peal says:

"Barracks for the unmarried young men * * * are common in and around Assam among non-Aryan races. The institution is here seen in various stages of decline or transition. In the case of 'head-hunters' the young men's barracks are invariably guardhouses, at the entrance to the village, and those on guard at night keep tally of the men who leave and return."—Op. cit., vol. XXII, p. 248.

Gertrude M. Godden writes at length of the young men's house of the Nágá and other frontier tribes of northeast India: "Before leaving the Nágá social customs one prominent feature of their village society must be noticed. This is the *dekha chang*, an institution in some respects similar to the bachelors' hall of the Melanesians, which again is compared with the *balai* and other public halls of the Malay Archipelago. This building, also called a *Morang*, was used for the double purpose of a sleeping place for the young men and as a guard or watch house for the village. The custom of the young men sleeping together is one that is constantly noticed in accounts of the Nágá tribes, and a like custom prevailed in some, if not all, cases for the girls. * * *

43: Jenks E-5 (1902-1903) 1905 OA1 Philippines
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OLAG

The o'-lâg is the dormitory of the girls in an a'-to from the age of about 2 years until they marry. It is a small stone and mud-walled structure, roofed with grass, in which a grown person can seldom

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"The young men's hall is variously described and named. An article in the Journal of the Indian Archipelago, 1848, says that among the Nágás the bachelors' hall of the Dayak village is found under the name of 'Mooring.' In this all the boys of the age of 9 or 10 upward reside apart. In a report of 1854 the 'morungs' are described as large buildings generally situated at the principal entrances and varying in number according to the size of the village; they are in fact the main guardhouse, and here all the young unmarried men sleep. In front of the morung is a raised platform as a lookout, commanding an extensive view of all approaches, where a Nágá is always kept on duty as a sentry. * * * In the Morungs are kept skulls carried off in battle; these are suspended by a string along the wall in one or more rows over each other. In one of the Morungs of the Changuae village, Captain Brodie counted one hundred and thirty skulls. * * * Besides these there was a large basket full of broken pieces of skulls. Captain Holroyd, from whose memorandum the above is quoted, speaks later of the Morung as the 'hall of justice' in which the consultations of the clan council * * * are held. * * *

"The *'Morangs'* of another tribe, the 'Naked' Nágá, have recently been described as situated close to the village gate, and consist of a central hall, and back and front verandas. In the large front veranda are collected all the trophies of war and the chase, from a man's skull down to a monkey's. Along both sides of the central hall are the sleeping berths of the young men. * * *

"Speaking of the Mao and Muran tribes [continues Miss Godden], Dr. Brown says, 'the young men never sleep at home, but at their clubs, where they keep their arms always in a state of readiness.' * * *

"With the Aos at the present day the custom seems to be becoming obsolete; sleeping houses are provided for bachelors, but are seldom used except by small boys. Unmarried girls sleep by twos and threes in houses otherwise empty, or else tenanted by one old woman.

"The analogy between the *Dakha Chang*, or *Morang*, of the Nágás and the men's hall of the Melanesians is too close to be overlooked, and in view of the significance of all evidence concerning the corporate life of early communities a description of the latter is here quoted. I am aware of no recorded instance of the women's house, other than these Nágá examples. 'In all the Melanesian groups it is the rule that there is in every village a building of public character where the men eat and spend their time, the young men sleep, strangers are entertained; where as in the Solomon Islands the canoes are kept; where images are seen, and from which women are generally excluded; * * * and all these no doubt correspond to the *balai* and other public halls of the Malay Archipelago.' "—Op. cit., vol. XXVI, pp. 179-182.

Similar institutions appear to exist also in Sumatra.

In Borneo among the Land Dyaks "head houses," called "pangah," are found in each village Low says of them: "The Pangah is built by the united efforts of the boys and unmarried men of the tribe, who, after having attained the age of puberty, are obliged to leave the houses of the village; and do not generally frequent them after they have attained the age of 8 or 9 years."—Sir Hugh Low, Sarawak, Its Inhabitants and Productions (London, 1848), p. 280.

Lieutenant F. Elton writes of the natives of Solomon Islands: "In every village they have at least one so-called tamboo house of *tohe*, generally the largest building in the settlement. This is only for the men, it being death for a female to enter there. It is used as a public place and belongs to the community. Any stranger coming to the village goes to the tamboo house and remains there until the person he is in quest of meets him there."—The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, vol. XVII, p. 97.

Mr. H. O. Forbes writes of the tribes of Timor (islands between New Guinea and Australia) that they have a building called "Uma-lulik." He says: "The *lulik* can be at once recognized, were it by nothing else than by the buffalo crania with which it is decorated on the outside. An officer who holds one of the highest and certainly the most influential positions in the kingdom has charge of the building, and presides over the sacred rites which are conducted in them. * * * The building is cared for by some old person, sometimes by a man and his wife, but they must not both—being of opposite sex—stay all night."—Op. cit., XIII, pp. 411, 412.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

000 taro had been cultivated on permanent flooded fields earlier than had rice. Another possibility would be that taro, together with the technique of irrigation, was introduced into Oceania later than were the yams and alocasia, and the Polynesians' more important fruit trees.

•173 A folktale of the Bontocs in the mountains of northern Luzon furnishes us with another clue. According to Bontoc lore, their hero, Lumauig, taught them agriculture in a tiny irrigated garden, which is still tended from generation to generation by a special priest. The crop of this garden is taro and not rice.[15] This would seem to lend support not only to the thesis that the cultivation of root crops preceded that of grain but also to the thesis that terracing and irrigation were already being practiced by cultivators of root crops.

241 A beautiful example of sedentary cultivation with root crops as a staple has recently been discovered in the remote Grand Valley of the Balim River in the highlands of Netherlands New Guinea. On the valley floor of the Balim and its tributaries neolithic people practice intensive cultivation, including such techniques as the use of green and animal manure, deep tillage with stone adzes, the digging of ditches to improve the run-off and drainage of swampy land, and the construction of terraces.[16] On the slopes they practice shifting cultivation. In both their shifting and their sedentary agriculture the staple crop is the sweet potato, while taro is a secondary crop. Also subsidiary are bananas, sugar cane, and pandanus.

243 105 [137] In most parts of Southeastern Asia, however, root crops have been replaced by such cereals as millet, Job's tears, upland and lowland rice,[17] and maize. There seem to be good reasons to believe that the first cereals cultivated in Southeastern Asia under the system of shifting cultivation were foxtail, also known as Italian millet (*Setaria italica* Beauv.), and Job's tears (*Coix lacryma-jobi* L.). Before their domestication these grasses, like the root crops and fruit trees of Southeastern Asia, had been used by alithic and palaeolithic hunting and gathering people. Shifting cultivators succeeded in domesticating these plants by selecting over the course of years the species most valuable to them. Although foxtail and Job's tears have largely been replaced by the more valuable grains, rice and maize, there are still shifting cultivators in India, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya, the Indies, and the Philippines who raise the former cereals. Burkill says of foxtail,

> Such a crop as this probably came into cultivation before man had settled enough to grow the better cereals. Its grain ripens in even as little as two months and a half from sowing, and the wandering tribes of the Malay forests are able to remain in one neighbourhood long enough to catch a crop: but the usual duration of the crop seems to be four months.[18]

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15 Keesing and Keesing: Taming Philippine Headhunters, 1934, p. 56.

16 Brass: "Stone Age Agriculture in New Guinea," 1941, pp. 555–569.

17 Upland rice is also known as hill, mountain, dry-land, or dry, rice; lowland rice is also known as irrigated, wet-land, or wet, rice.

18 Burkill: *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 1999.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

[p.3]

Chapter I

FROM HUNTING AND GATHERING TO AGRICULTURE

Hunting and Gathering

101 In Southeastern Asia today there are peoples of different cultural levels
●174 carrying on some of the major economies that man has developed in the
222 course of time. The first people to invade the tropical forest regions around
105 the South China Sea were alithic, or prepalaeolithic, food gatherers,[1] who obtained their food by collecting edible wild plants and by hunting and fishing. Today geographically separated peoples are still living in a prepalaeolithic or palaeolithic food-gathering and hunting stage.[2] In Southeastern Asia they are represented by the Semang of the Malay Peninsula, the Andaman Islanders, and the Aeta of the Philippines—all of whom are Negritos, or dwarfed Negroids—the Kubu of Sumatra, the Sakai of the Malay Peninsula, the Toala of Celebes,[3] and the Punan of Borneo.[4]

222 The degree to which collecting, hunting, or fishing contributes to the
462 food supply varies with the season; it also varies with different peoples,
105 depending upon the resources of the region, the type of equipment the people may possess, and the skills they may have acquired. Food-gathering and hunting peoples have a division of labor under which the men hunt while the women and children gather vegetable matter and catch insects and small animals. The men may lend a helping hand, however, in digging up some of the very deep-growing yams. Men will also participate in the
621 picking of fruits, especially when it is necessary to climb tall trees. The food gatherers and hunters of Southeastern Asia are nomadic in the sense that they do not remain long in one place. However, they do not wander aimlessly through the jungle. Each group has its definite territory—among

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Note: The titles of the works here cited in footnotes have been abbreviated, whenever possible. The full titles may be found in the Bibliography, p. 269 ff.

[1] Nippold (Rassen- und Kulturgeschichte der Negrito-Völker, 1936, pp. 253–255 and 398–400) considers the alithic wood culture of the Negritos of Southeastern Asia to be older than palaeolithic culture. These people use wood rather than stone as raw material for their tools. Because of the perishable nature of wood, archaeologists and prehistorians have not yet been able, so far as I know, to go farther back than the palaeolithic age and therefore have not been able to confirm the hypothesis of an alithic age. Menghin (Weltgeschichte der Steinzeit, 1931, p. 91) believes that, from an archaeological point of view, an alithic wood culture may be regarded only as a possibility, but Kern (Die Anfänge der Weltgeschichte, 1933, p. 35), who compared pygmy culture with palaeolithic cultures, comes to the conclusion that alithic wood cultures probably preceded palaeolithic culture.

[2] By divesting the word "palaeolithic" of its specific chronological connotation the term may be used for present-day peoples who have a food-gathering and hunting culture.

[3] The racial affinities of the Kubu, the Sakai, and the Toala are not clear; by some they are called Veddoids, by others, Australoids.

[4] They are considered to be Proto-Malays.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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ing, cultivation. In contrast to this method, advanced agriculture is practiced year after year on the same well tended plot, the fertility of which is maintained by manuring, crop rotation, intensive cultivation, terracing, and often the regular addition of mineral matter in the form of silt deposited on the land by irrigation water. Only occasionally may the land be allowed a short fallow period. This type of tillage may be called permament-field, or sedentary, cultivation.[10]

Shifting cultivation and sedentary cultivation are generic terms used to describe fundamental differences in land use, differences that find their outward expression in the cultural landscape created by those who maintain these economies.[11] Can there be a greater contrast than that between the shifting cultivators' small, irregular, temporary clearings with their chaotic jumble of fallen and half-fallen tree trunks and stumps, on the one hand, and, on the other, an irrigated plain, subdivided into small fields, each surrounded by a dyke—or a steep slope where a succession of beautifully built terraces leads up for several hundreds or even thousands of feet? These kinds of landscape are physical expressions of totally different economies, or modes of life, with different cultural patterns, concepts of land tenure, attitudes toward the soil, and material equipment.

Historically, shifting cultivation without doubt antedates sedentary cultivation, which requires among other things more elaborate techniques and deeper insight into the relationships between soil, tillage, and yields.

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Shifting and sedentary cultivation may each be further classified in terms of tools, as we have seen, or in terms of crops, systems of rotation, and the like.[12] For instance, in terms of crops, we may distinguish between grain and grainless culture. Of the two, grainless culture is generally conceded to be the older. One argument for this thesis is that fruits and many of the root and leaf crops may be eaten raw or simply prepared, whereas cereals require more elaborate preparation. The fact that grainless agriculture is largely confined to the fringes of Southeastern Asia also supports the thesis that, at least in this region, grainless agriculture preceded the cultivation of cereals. Still further substantiation is found in Polynesia, where the inhabitants cultivated no cereals when they were first visited

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[10] Although sedentary cultivation is commonly practiced by people who use plows drawn by animals, there are large areas where it is practiced with little or no use of the plow. Such areas are found in parts of the Philippines, Java, Sumatra, and southern China, where steep hillsides have been terraced and where the nature of the terrain makes the use of work animals impossible. Sometimes individual farms or patches of land are so small that they must be tilled with hoes, even though plows may be used on adjacent farms. In places custom and religious tradition forbid the use of plows and draft animals.

[11] Waibel: Probleme der Landwirtschaftsgeographie, 1933, p. 11.

[12] For example, we may distinguish: (a) shifting dibble cultivation, shifting hoe cultivation, and shifting plow cultivation; (b) grainless shifting cultivation and shifting grain cultivation; (c) shifting field-forest cultivation and shifting field-grass cultivation; (d) permanent plow cultivation and permanent planting-stick cultivation; (e) permanent four-field cultivation, and so on. Not all of these are found in Southeastern Asia.

1: Peizer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia A4

by Westerners. This may be explained by the assumption that the ancestors of the Polynesians migrated from Southeastern Asia to the islands of the Pacific before cereals had replaced root crops as dominant plants.[13] 174

In Southeastern Asia we find both shifting and sedentary cultivators who depend exclusively upon root crops as a source of starch. The Nias, Mentawei, and Engano islanders off the western coast of Sumatra grew no grains until recently. Beside such root crops as taro (*Colocasia esculenta* Schott), yams (*Dioscorea* sp.), and *bira* (*Alocasia macrorhiza* (L.) Schott), they cultivated such other foods as bananas (*Musa sapientum* L.), sugar cane (*Saccharum officinarum* L.), and coconuts (*Cocos nucifera* L.). In the eastern parts of the Malay Archipelago and New Guinea the inhabitants depend chiefly on the starch of the sago palm (*Metroxylon sagu* Rottb.) which they either plant or collect in the wild state. Here, again, taro, yams, and bira are other sources of starch, as are such imported American plants as cassava (*Manihot utilissima* Pohl) and sweet potatoes (*Ipomoea batatas* Poir.). The folklore and religious practices of many tribes in Borneo and Celebes who today grow cereals recall the time when these tribes had only root crops. 241 137 262

In many parts of the Pacific taro is grown by sedentary cultivators on terraced, flooded fields.[14] We do not know whether the techniques of terracing and irrigation developed independently in Oceania and on the mainland, or whether the ancestors of the Polynesians brought their techniques with them from Southeastern Asia. If the latter be true, they must have left before the cultivation of rice was known to them; otherwise rice would have been among their crops. That it was not among them suggests that 000

[13] Forde: Habitat, Economy and Society, 1934, pp. 428–430. In remote centuries the Polynesians lived in the Malay Archipelago, where they cultivated such root crops as taro, yams, "arrowroot" (*Canna orientalis* Rosc.), and turmeric (*Curcuma* sp.), in addition to bananas and plantains (*Musa paradisiaca* L.), breadfruit (*Artocarpus communis* Forst.) and coconuts, all of which, according to the botanists, are natives of the forest regions of Southeastern Asia, whether the mainland or the Malayan Archipelago. All these plants were probably carried to Polynesia, either via a northern route through Micronesia or by a more southerly course through New Guinea and Melanesia. See Buck: Vikings of the Sunrise, 1938, pp. 305–309. The names of these plants were also carried into the islands of the Pacific. Variants of the names "taro" and "bira," to mention two examples, range from the Malay Archipelago far into Oceania. *Colocasia* is *talo* in Nias, *tales* in Sundanese, *tales* in Javanese, *dalo* in Fiji, *talo* in Samoan, *kalo* in Hawaiian, *taro* in Maori. *Alocasia* is known as *birah* or *bira* in Batak, *bira* in Madurese, *biga* in the Philippines, *piga* in Guam, and *via* in Fiji. Later, the Polynesians, following the example of other peoples of the Pacific, were quick to adopt such New World crops as cassava and sweet potatoes as well as American fruit trees into their economy because these are closely related to their customary crops, but they still remain most reluctant to change from roots to grains as staple, possibly because "the cultivation of roots and fruit trees has little technical relation to the raising of grains, for they are not grown from seed but from eyes and cuttings." See Forde: *op. cit.*, p. 380. Another illustration of the fact that a plant, the introduction of which involves a change in methods of cultivation, is accepted only under pressure, is found in the history of the introduction of the potato into Europe. [137]

[14] Krämer: "Der Taro und die Nasskultur," 1928, pp. 165–172; Rivers: "Irrigation and the Cultivation of Taro," 1926, pp. 262–287.

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When fires no longer ravage the grasslands, however, trees return and finally drive out the grasses completely, for the latter cannot stand shade.[9]

The spread of grass is especially rapid in regions with a long, pronounced dry season, whereas reforestation is more likely to take place in areas with a well distributed, high annual rainfall. This may explain why the Philippines and Indochina have a larger percentage of open grasslands than do Malaya and the Netherlands Indies.

A relatively high density of population is an important factor in preventing successful reforestation and encouraging grasses. In a thinly settled forest area there is sufficient land to allow for a long rest period, but an increasing density of population results in the shortening of the fallow period to such a degree that the soil is given insufficient time to recover its fertility. The shorter the fallow period the poorer the succeeding forest —if any—and the poorer the following crop yields, until finally the land can no longer satisfy the needs of the shifting cultivator.

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Pendleton believes that this cycle may have contributed materially to the downfall of the Khmers in Cambodia (Cambodge). He states that although the Khmers used the plow on very limited areas of wet riceland, they had largely to depend on the planting stick and shifting cultivation for their food supply. As the demands for more food arose from the rapidly increasing population concentrated in the city of Angkor, the fallow period granted to the uplands had to be progressively shortened. At the same time fires became so frequent that culturally induced grasslands spread while the cultivable area decreased, thus further diminishing the food supply available to the people of Angkor. "While the actual fall of Angkor is ascribed to the superior military power of invaders, the resistance of the inhabitants was doubtless much less than it would have been had the lands been productive and they had had adequate supplies of food."[10]

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Declining crop yields and the spread of grasses have been advanced as important reasons for the breakdown of the Mayan civilization,[11] and Pendleton further raises the question "whether the development of cogonals might not have been an important contributing factor in the dying out of some of the other civilizations of the tropics, notably that of Anuradapura, in Ceylon."[12]

Today the ruins of the Mayan cities, as well as those of Angkor, are surrounded by relatively luxuriant forest vegetation, which has had time to displace the pernicious grasses since man and his tool, fire, have abandoned the inhospitable grasslands.

Not only does shifting cultivation alter the character of the vegetation,

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[9] When an old ladang remains unburned for several years the following trees spring up in addition to those already mentioned in footnote 5: *Erechthites hieracifolia* Rafin., *Blumea balsamifera* DC., *Peltophorum dasyrachis* Kurz, *Macaranga tanarius* Muell. Arg., and *Piper aduncum* L.

[10] Pendleton: *op. cit.*, pp. 46 and 47.

[11] Cook: "Milpa Agriculture," 1921, pp. 307–326.

[12] Pendleton: *op. cit.*, p. 47.

Chapter Twenty-five

PEOPLES, POLITICS AND PROSPECTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

101 THE setting of Southeast Asia may be summed up as one of extremes of relief (deltaic plains and mountains) and climate mostly approaching the wet limit for plant life but merging into monsoonal types. To this setting the people have made varying responses, ranging from migrant food gatherers and hunters in the jungles, to subsistence farmers in the plains, but all turning upon woody materials for weapons, implements, house-structures and domestic utensils, upon rice, the cereal of the wet extreme, and upon social systems of communal help. The whole social and economic life has been galvanised over the past century or two by being more and more drawn into commercial and industrial activities developed in response to and on the basis of external needs for the minerals and agricultural products of Southeast Asia, whereas prior to that time the region was touched only by a trickle of traders moving between India and China.

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FACTORS IN THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY

174 Several factors account for the difficulty of obtaining firm data to fill in our general picture of the historical geography of Southeast Asia. In the first place, there grew up no strong literary tradition to last through the centuries and record the past in a form other than mythical. Here tradition is largely oral and literature essentially Indian rather than indigenous. And whatever there was of local record and history has rotted away quickly, the climate, the ants, insects and moulds soon destroying anything on wood, paper, leather or cloth. Moreover, in this setting of swamps and forest, the most easily available material is wood, and artistic tradition expressed in wood, whether in carvings, buildings or tools, rapidly disintegrates, leaving little of that sort of evidence which is the basis of our facts about early periods in other regions. Buildings and carvings on stone were not normal expressions of Southeast Asia people where over large areas stone is not easily come by and where

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

FIG. 113.—Historic Pattern of Southeast Asia during Indian Colonial Period

implements had not in any case developed far enough to deal with stone. Hence monumental evidence in Southeast Asia is so largely Indian, an introduction by foreigners using styles and techniques developed in their home settings, and most developed in the drier parts of this region, where stone is more accessible. On the clay lands, historic brick structures, also an Indian innovation, weather to nothing very quickly. At Angkor may be seen the power of quick-growing tropical trees to shatter and break down temples and palaces built of stone and lateritic blocks.

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This, too, is a region of natural calamities, difficult though it is to pin-point them. Little kingdoms have been wiped out in a few hours by Javanese volcanoes, as in A.D. 1006 when the flourishing city of Dharmavamsa (a great king of Central Java) was reduced to ashes by "a great calamity," probably an explosion and lava outflow of the Merapi volcano. Settlements along rivers have been obliterated when huge mud-flows swept down from loose ashes on the flanks of new eruptions, possibly accounting for our ignorance of east Sumatran kingdoms. Coasts have altered through the years

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Further to complicate the historic geography was the fact that the literary people, the monks and religious men, were Indian or Indian-minded for long periods, disinterested in mundane records, and following the custom, still evident among many Southeast Asia people today, of avoiding personal names, so that anonymity, obscurity and confused nomenclature veil the past even in such records as do exist. Many experiments in writing styles were developed among these isolated and complex peoples and often inscriptions made in them cannot be translated today. Because of the dispersal tendencies within the territories themselves and the lack of focus to the region as a whole, no great depositories of learning were established in Southeast Asia to gather and conserve the record of its past.

Population Changes

Broadly speaking, the region has been until recently one of very thin population and large patches of it still contain populations of remarkably low density. Direct evidence of densities are scanty for periods farther back than this century, yet it seems probable that the whole of Southeast Asia in 1800 contained only about ten million people, when the region was probably as thinly peopled in its most attractive areas as Upper Burma and Upper Siam, the least attractive and developed areas, are today; Malaya then contained about a quarter million people, Java about four million, Burma probably less than two million. It was, even at the end of the 18th century, a zone of labour shortage and the objective of the local princelings of the times was to get hands, the basic power resource of their time, the one way of securing a small surplus from their fundamentally subsistent territories. Outsiders were not greatly attracted to Southeast Asia itself, as apart from the routes through it. To Spain its old colony, the Philippines, was no great asset and more related to Mexico than to Spain, remote and ready to drop from the Spanish orbit during the 19th century. To Holland, its colony in Java was a company venture that yielded little direct profit for many years and was at times on the verge of bankruptcy.

But the last 150 years brought tremendous changes in population. First, on the heels of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, came a revival and an expanded volume of trade between the Indian Ocean and the Far East, a stream which threaded the seaways of

113, 648, 721, 175, 563 Southeast Asia AL1

[For information on the history of the distribution of peoples and political entities in Southeast Asia, and for the history of relations amongst the states of Southeast Asia and the relations between the French in Indochina and the states of Southeast Asia, see 115: Le Boulanger, AM1 , Indochina, category, 116. --Analyst]

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CHAPTER II

EARLY CHINESE CONTACTS WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA[1]

CHINA'S intercourse overland with the countries on her southern border is of a much greater order of antiquity than her contacts by sea. Her soldiers were in Tongking and Annam in the third century B.C.; thereafter they penetrated to Cambodia, then to Siam, the last-named being reached by sea. Here there was a halt for a considerable time before her navigators went on to Malaya, Sumatra, and Java. The process took many centuries, and for long intervals there is a complete lack of information regarding the Southeast Asian countries.[2] Merchants

[1] Much of our information regarding the earlier history of Southeast Asia is derived from Chinese sources, but we should in this chapter be on our guard against identifying Chinese *knowledge* of the region with Chinese *contacts* with it. No doubt, of course, some of the information was obtained from Chinese who had actually visited the countries of the region, but much also was at second-hand and, at that, recorded often a considerable period after the time to which it relates.

In recent years a great deal has been added to our knowledge by the researches of orientalists and archaeologists, but these additions have often been independent and disassociated from one another, and the problem of the identification of geographical names has meant that places—often whole countries—have moved their location all over the map as learned discussion has displaced or refixed them. There has for long been a crying need to systematize the existing knowledge of Southeast Asia and to give more certainty and coherence to the early history, and this is what Sir Roland Braddell has been attempting to do since 1935 in his series of studies on 'Ancient Times in the Malay Peninsula' in the *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*. ('An Introduction to the Study of Ancient Times in the Malay Peninsula and the Straits of Malacca, continued as Notes on Ancient Times in Malaya'; *JRASMB*, vol. xiii, pt. 2, vol. xiv, pt. 3, vol. xv, pt. 3, vol. xvii, pt. 1, vol. xix, pt. 1.) Our concern is not directly with the subject of these inquiries, but we shall keep these studies closely in mind when outlining Chinese contacts with the southeastern areas of the Asiatic continent. What we shall have to say will often be in repetition or in summary of the remarks made in the separate country studies, but this is with the intention of giving the reader at the outset a glance over the entire area.

[2] This seems to be true as a generalization, though the *Han Shu*, vol. xxviii, speaks of voyages in the Han dynasty to Jihnan and Hsüwenhopu taking five months, to Touyüankuo taking four months, and to Ilumeikuo taking about twenty days. See Feng Ch'eng-chün, *Nan Yang Chiao T'ung Shih* (History of Chinese Relations with the Nanyang) p. 1 (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1937). (The place-names are here given in mandarin, but the foreign investigator who endeavours to identify ancient Chinese place-names in Southeast Asia would be well advised first to give the characters their phonetic equivalents in ancient

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from the West passed across Central Asia into China in the Han and later dynasties by routes that skirted the northern and southern slopes of the Tarim river basin, but they also came into the empire by way of the south, up the rivers of what is now Burma and across the hills into the present Yunnan, and by the longer sea route to the south coast. As early as the second century B.C. there appear to have been Chinese trade routes through Yunnan to the Irrawaddy and Salween valleys. For a time the main port in the south was in the future Tongking, and it was not until later centuries that it was supplanted by Canton. It was to Loyang that in A.D. 166 came an embassy of Westerners claiming to be sent by their King, who is supposed to have been the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (An-tun).[1]

Our earliest and surest information is of the Chinese intercourse with the countries sharing a land frontier with China on the south-west, and first of all in point of time comes Annam.

During the Han dynasty there existed a kingdom known as Nan-Yüeh (Nam-Viet) which extended from the region of Canton far into the Indo-Chinese peninsula to the present central Annam.[2] In 111 B.C. this kingdom was conquered by the Chinese and was divided into nine districts, one of which, Chiuchen (Annamese Cu'uchan), corresponds roughly to the present province of Thanh-hoa in northern Annam.[3] It is likely that Chinese suzerainty ex-

Chinese according to Karlgren's *Analytical Dictionary of Sino-Japanese* (Paris, 1923).

[1] See Kenneth Scott Latourette, *The Chinese: their History and Culture*, 3rd ed. (New York, Macmillan, 1946) p. 123.

Among the recent finds at Go Oc Eo was a gold medal bearing an image of Antoninus Pius with a date which corresponds to A.D. 152, showing that at an early date Funan (the ancient State in southern Annam) had connexions, direct or indirect, with the western Mediterranean. See G. Coedès, *Les états hindouisés d'Indochine et d'Indonésie* (Paris, E. de Boccard, 1948) pp. 38–9, 89.

[2] The recently published work of Professor Olov R. T. Janse, *Archaeological Research in Indo-China* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1947), greatly extends our existing knowledge of the Chinese remains in the region. Professor Janse's historical summary is here followed.

[3] Édouard Chavannes, trans., *Les Mémoires Historiques de Se-Ma T'sien* (Paris, Laroux, 1895–1905) i. 87 and ii. 168, cited by Janse, op. cit. p. xvi. And Léonard Aurousseau, 'La Première Conquête des Pays Annamites', *BEFEO*, vol. xxii, pp. 137–264, and vol. xiv, pp. 9, 13. Cited by Janse at same place.

Wang Wen-yuan (op. cit. p. 4), citing Wang Ton-lin, *Histoire du Peuple Chinois* (in Chinese), and H. Maspero, 'Étude d'Histoire d'Annam, III, Commanderie de Siang', *BEFEO*, vol. iii (Hanoi, 1918) pp. 11–28, gives a somewhat different account of this early period. He says that in the year 214 B.C. the first Emperor of the Chin dynasty, Shih Huangti, sent 500,000 Chinese—soldiers,

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tended even farther south, though in an indefinite way. However, to date there has been no archaeological evidence of any Chinese settlement of the Han dynasty farther south than a spot immediately below Thanhhoa in the provinces of Nghean and Hatinh.

After the native chief of Chiuchen had yielded to the Chinese without putting up any resistance, he was retained in his position with the title of T'aishou.[1]

The new masters of the southern territory, the 'Sons of Han' as they called themselves, ruled at first with moderation, allowing to the natives a considerable degree of freedom, but about the beginning of the Christian era they adopted a sterner attitude. At least this was so in the case of Tongking where, according to Chinese records, the Emperor Hsi Kuang (A.D. 1–25)[2] 'transformed the people through the rites and by justice', and it is most probable that the Chinese attitude towards the natives of Chiuchen was the same. It was this heavier hand of alien government, aiming at securing the rapid sinicization of the subdued barbarians, which no doubt aroused the spirit of resistance, for in A.D. 40 Cheng-Tse (Tr'ung-Trac in Annamese), the daughter of a native chief of Tongking from Mileng (Annamese, Milinh), stirred up a rebellion which succeeded temporarily in driving out the Chinese, and the native chiefs of Chiuchen joined in the struggle.

In the present state of knowledge it is impossible to establish with precision the dates of the earlier Chinese settlements in Chiuchen, but Professor Janse thinks it very likely that some pioneers ventured to immigrate thither in the third century B.C., and this is the time when the Chinese began to infiltrate into northern Indochina, especially Tongking. In any case there must have been a considerable intercourse between southern China and Thanhhoa at the end of the third or at least at the beginning of the second century B.C. To a certain extent this supposition can be corroborated by archaeology (e.g. from examples in the 'Huai Valley' style).

peasants, and those condemned to banishment, to take possession of Nam-Viet 'the land beyond the southern border'. After the conquest the country was divided into three commands, that of Nanhai, corresponding probably to the present province of Kwangtung, that of Kweilin in the present-day Kwangsi, and that of Shiang in Tongking and north Annam. These (says Wang Wen-yuan) marked the foundation of the first important Chinese colony in Indochina.

[1] H. Maspero, *BEFEO*, vol. xxxvii, pp. 263, 264, note 5, cited by Janse, loc. cit.

[2] H. A. Giles lists seven Emperors from A.D. 1 to 25, but not this one.

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Professor Janse makes the following interesting observations on the period:[1]

It can be assumed that the first Chinese who ventured into the country and mingled with the natives were journeying merchants or artisans. Even to-day Chinese peddlers are highly regarded among the natives because of their skill in commerce and craftsmanship. As they are generally fairly well-to-do, they are much sought after by the families of the aboriginal chieftains. Thus many of these modern settlers bring with them into Tongking and Northern Annam Chinese crafts and customs. What is happening to-day in this respect has certainly been going on not merely for centuries but for millenia. . . . In the wake of these tradesmen certainly came the civil and military mandarins, accompanied by the less welcome tax-collector, and by political refugees.

At this early time (Henri Maspero points out) the entire territory was covered with marshes and forests in which elephants, rhinoceroses, and tigers abounded and in which the aboriginals lived by hunting and fishing, eating pythons and wild beasts killed by their bone-tipped arrows. To this diet they added small crops from their primitive rice-fields which they prepared by burning down a part of the forest before the rainy season, without cultivating or irrigating the area. Only around the centres of administration, under the influence of the Chinese governors, especially the prefect Jen Yen, had they begun to till the soil in the manner of the Chinese.[2]

Such was the land which the Chinese called the 'Kingdom of the Naked'. It was not until after the victorious campaign of Ma Yuan at the beginning of the Christian era that the Chinese settled on any large scale. Archaeological evidence of this is to be found on the brick tombs of the later Han discovered in Thanhhoa. Among the most fascinating funerary objects unearthed by Dr. Janse are models of farm-houses or, in some cases, probably manor-houses, consisting of quadrangular yards surrounded by walls and a variety of buildings. Some are even provided with furniture, such as ovens, troughs, &c. They give an excellent picture of early Chinese settlements in Annam.

It will be convenient here to discontinue the outline of Sino-Annamese contacts and to resume it in the part of this survey dealing with Indochina, turning our attention to the question of the antiquity of Chinese intercourse with Malaysia far away to the

[1] op. cit. p. xvi.
[2] H. Maspero, op. cit. p. 12, cited by Janse, op. cit. p. xvi.

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south. According to the consensus of opinion, the date of the first Chinese association with these regions goes back to the third and even fourth centuries B.C. Dr Heine-Geldern in 1934 pointed out the stylistic similarities between some of the prehistoric stone sculptures of the Pasemah region in southern Sumatra and those standing at the tomb of the Chinese general Huo K'iu-ping in Shensi province in China, erected in 117 B.C. This, he says, seemed to indicate more or less intimate contacts with China, to be dated probably in the second and first centuries B.C. A decade later the same authority again referred to his own statement and pointed out that since then Chinese objects of the Han dynasty had actually been found in Indonesia. Moreover, a considerable number of Chinese sepulchral pottery vessels of the Han period had been excavated in Sumatra, Java, and Borneo, and one of them, from Sumatra, bore an inscription dating it 45 B.C.[1] From these finds, De Flines inferred, no doubt correctly, that Chinese colonists or merchants must have lived in Indonesia as early as the Han period. Also from Sumatra comes a bowl engraved with designs of persons in Chinese dresses and of horses in Han style, and other pieces of evidence included a Chinese bronze dagger-axe (*ko*) which was said to have come from Sumatra, and another from Java.

Taking all into account [Dr Heine-Geldern writes] one may come to the conclusion that direct Chinese influence in Indonesia goes back at least to the early Han period, that is at the very latest to the 1st century B.C. However, the ornamental designs of the Dyak tribes of Borneo and of the Ngada of Flores are so clearly related to Chinese designs of the late Chou period that one can hardly avoid the inference that Chinese contacts started as early as the beginning of the third century B.C., and probably earlier.

The investigation of this very early period of intercourse is almost exclusively a monopoly of the archaeologist and of the anthropologist, and what conclusions are to be drawn from the finds must remain a matter of some delicacy to the non-expert in these fields. Nevertheless it is important to note the difference of opinion between some of the schools of thought concerning the degree of Chinese influence on the regions of Southeast Asia. Speaking of

[1] R. Heine-Geldern, *Prehistoric Research in the Netherlands Indies* (New York, Southeast Asia Institute, 1945) p. 147. See also the same author, *The Archaeology and Art of Sumatra.*

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the intercourse of a much later period, the second Sung dynasty onwards, Fay Cooper Cole remarks:

> These early contacts were primarily for trade and, while they did help to shape the history of Malaysia, they seldom were intimate enough to introduce Chinese methods, such as the potter's wheel; few Chinese words entered the language; and the influence of their political and religious ideas was nil.[1]

To this we may object that Chinese methods of agriculture, at least, through these same contacts had a profound effect on the economy of the Southeast Asian countries. None the less, Hindu influence upon Southeast Asia has been culturally much more important than Chinese, and in the sphere of navigation in the first centuries of the Christian era it was the Arabs, the Indians, and the Persians who made their way to China and the Chinese who, generally speaking, stayed at home. There was a colony of Arabs in Sumatra at a very early date, and they had a counting-house at Canton as early as A.D. 300.[2]

Latourette says that 'Chinese merchants seem not to have ventured very far afield, and to have left chiefly to strangers the initiative in foreign trade, but outsiders found China a profitable country with which to deal'. Lack of enterprise is also attributed to the Chinese by Groeneveldt, the pioneer writer on Chinese intercourse with Southeast Asia, who remarks:

> A careful perusal of the geographical literature of the ancient Chinese has shown that they have not gained their knowledge of Southeastern Asia by bold voyages of discovery: slowly and cautiously they have crept along its shores, probably not venturing to a country before they have become acquainted with it through others.[3]

And Kuwabara (cited by Braddell) says, 'the Chinese trading ships before the T'ang era were inferior in all respects to those of the South Sea countries'. Although it must be conceded that the Chinese were behind the Middle Eastern races in enterprise or curiosity, the remarks of Groeneveldt apply in a measure to all other peoples who have come into Southeast Asia. Were their

[1] Fay Cooper Cole, *The Peoples of Malaysia* (New York, Van Nosstrand, 1945) p. 27.

[2] Braddell, op. cit. *JRASMB*, vol. xx, pt. 2 (1947) p. 8.

[3] W. P. Groeneveldt, *Notes on the Malay Archipelago and Malacca; Miscellaneous papers relating to the Indian Archipelago* (London, Trübner, 1887) i. 126–262.

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explorations of the coasts of Borneo (asks Mr Tom Harrisson) any slower or more cautious than those of the Portuguese? On the contrary there is every indication that there was a regular trade on a mass scale for centuries back. Certainly by the fourth and fifth centuries Chinese ships were feeling their way along the coasts and over the seas to meet the Arabs, Persians, and Indians part way.

The reason for Chinese comparative dilatoriness in utilizing the sea routes on their own account may have been their sense of national sufficiency, and the feeling that they had nothing of great value to obtain from the regions of the south, but none the less their influence spread out over the land routes through the agency of the Arab and Indian traders. 'It is clear that at the time when the European barbarians of the north were conquering Rome, a southward movement in the Far East was taking place—the flow of the cultured Chinese into Malay lands, and the spread of Chinese civilization in Malaysia.'[1] At the same time the main colonizing activity was by Indians. Individual Chinese pilgrims and travellers, such as the Buddhist monk, Fa Hsien (or Fa Hien), went overland to India, visited Ceylon by sea, and arrived in what was either Java or Malaya in A.D. 413, and I-tsing, much later, in A.D. 692, reached Lang-ya-si, identified as Langkasuka, a kingdom in the Malay peninsula. Fa Hsien found no Chinese in Java or Malaya (whichever it may have been), though his eyes filled with tears, he tells us, at the sight of a Chinese taffeta fan, for he had been away from home for thirteen years.[2]

It is not perhaps remarkable that the Chinese of the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries left most of the colonizing initiative to others, for, quite apart from their self-sufficiency, these were the Dark Ages of Chinese history when warfare and foreign invasion were almost incessant. Nevertheless, in the first Sung dynasty (A.D. 420–

[1] G. Nye Steiger, H. Otley Beyer, and Conrado Benitez, *A History of the Orient* (Boston, Ginn & Co., 1926) p. 202 and passim.

[2] *Fa Hsien Fo Kuo Chi*, the record of Fa Hsien's voyages, has been translated by Samuel Beal as 'An Account of the Buddhist Countries' (London, Trübner, 1869), by J. Legge (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1866), and re-translated by H. A. Giles (Cambridge University Press, 1923). Rémusat's French translation is earlier (1836).

Giles gives the track of the voyage of Fa Hsien from Ceylon to China as being via the Straits of Sunda, whereas W. A. Grimes (*JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (February 1941)), a meteorologist, basing his views on a study of the winds near the equator, considers that he went via the Straits of Malacca. This is also the view of Braddell, who thinks that Fa Hsien's *Ye-po-ti* was not Java but Malaya. (*JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (1947) p. 25.)

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79) missions from these southeastern countries made their appearance in China, and after the Liang dynasty (A.D. 502–57) envoys came from over the sea every year for the purpose of getting an almanac and of acquitting themselves of the duty of tribute in greater number than in any former time.[1]

Reference in Chinese history to countries and places in these territories does not necessarily mean that they were known to the Chinese by direct contact. An early voyage, however, was in A.D. 607 when the Emperor Sui Yang-ti sent a mission by sea to Siam to open up commercial relations with that country.[2] But the sprinkling of references to places, probably in this Southeast Asian area, of obscure identity which may be found in the History of the Liang Dynasty (502–57) is succeeded in the History of the T'ang Dynasty (618–907) by information regarding definite countries which has a much surer feel. For example, we hear (and believe) that between 756 and 779 three envoys of Java arrived in China and that in the year 813 further envoys arrived at the capital with presents of four negro slaves, parrots of different colours, pinka-birds (not identified), and other gay trifles. The Emperor honoured the envoy with the title of Left Defender of the Office of the Four Inner Gates, and when the recipient wanted to waive the title in favour of his younger brother, the Emperor praised him for his unselfishness and bestowed a title on both of them.[3]

We are now definitely in the era of the tribute-bearing missions which soon took on the character of trading expeditions since the Emperor invariably presented to the envoys gifts equal to or greater in value than those they had brought. The missions were very numerous and a mere recital of them would not add much to our enlightenment. They had always, of course, a purely diplomatic appearance, especially those sent on the accession of a new Emperor or a new dynasty.

Between 1209 and 1214 a book was written by Chao Ju-kua, a member of the imperial family of the Sung dynasty (960–1280) and superintendent and commissioner of Customs at Ch'üanchowfu, a coast town to the north of Amoy. This book, based on information

[1] Braddell, op. cit. *JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (1941) p. 21.

[2] *Chau* [*sic*] *Ju-kua* (late Sung Dynasty): *His work on the Chinese and Arab trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries*, translated from the Chinese and annotated by Friedrich Hirth and W. W. Rockhill (St. Petersburg, Academy of Science, 1911) p. 8. The name of the work in Chinese is *Chu Fan Chi*.

[3] *T'ang History*, Book 222, Part 2, Groeneveldt, p. 140.

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gained from merchants from India, Persia, Syria, and Arabia, gives facts concerning the countries and peoples of the West, including Spain, and of the Chinese trade with the Malaysian islands. (Some details from this work are cited both above and later in this chapter.)

In the History of the Sung Dynasty we have a detailed account of Java, including the observation: 'Their houses are handsome and are adorned with yellow and green tiles: when Chinese merchants arrive they are received as guests in a public building and what they eat and drink is copious and clean.'[1]

In 1291 Angkor was visited by Marco Polo and the Lady Kutai, whom the Mongol Emperor of China was sending as a bride for the Khan of Persia, there to behold the fast-fading glories of the Khmer empire.[2] Five years later, one Chou Ta-kwan was a member of the Chinese mission sent to acquaint the King of Cambodia with the accession of Yüan Cheng, the new Emperor of China and grandson and successor of Kublai Khan. To this same Chou Ta-kwan we owe a vivid and detailed account of the Khmer empire.[3] What concerns us here, however, is his remarks concerning his own countrymen who visited or were resident in Cambodia. Here are some of them rendered into English from Pelliot's translation.

> The Chinese who follow the sea as a profession take advantage of their being in this country to dispense with wearing clothes. Rice is easy to obtain, women are easy to find, the houses are easy to run, personal property is easy to come by, commerce is easy to engage in. Thus there are constantly those who direct themselves towards this country.
>
> In this country it is the women who are skilful in commerce. Thus a Chinese who arrives down there and take a wife profits in addition by her commercial aptitude.

This Chinese chronicler (says Mr Brodrick), with the typical prejudice of his people against frequent washing, wrote that, 'the people are often ill, owing to their too frequent baths and the incessant wasting of the heat'.

According to Chou Ta-kwan, the embassy to Cambodia in 1296 was entirely successful and homage was rendered to China, but (says Pelliot) '*peut être est-il trop intéressé dans l'affaire pour que nous accordions pleine créance à ses dires. En fait il n'y a aucune trace que des relations officielles régulières aient suivi la mission de 1296*'.

[1] Book 489. Groeneveldt, p. 141.
[2] A. H. Brodrick, *Little Vehicle* (London, Hutchinson, n.d. (1949?)) p. 156.
[3] 'Tcheou-Ta-Kouan, Mémoires sur les coutumes de Cambodge' (trans. by Paul Pelliot), *BEFEO*, vol. ii, no. 2 (1902).

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177 There is certainly no mention of Cambodia in the History of the
175 Yüan Dynasty.

It is first in the Yüan dynasty (A.D. 1280–1368) that action combines with colour to make real the machinations of Chinese imperial politics in these waters. In the year 1292 the Emperor Kublai Khan, no doubt envious of the growing influence of Java in further India and the eastern part of the archipelago, sent an expedition against the Javanese State of Singosari. He ordered the Governor of Fukien to send Shih Pi, Ike Mese, and Hau Hsing to collect from Kiangsi and Kiukiang soldiers to the number of 20,000 who were to be embarked in a thousand ships for the Southern Ocean. Shih Pi sailed with 5,000 men from Ch'üanchow, probably via the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank (to give them their modern names), Annam (Giau-chi), and Champa, encountering bad weather on the way, and in the first moon of the following year they passed the Natuna Islands to a place which was probably Billiton in Java where the fleet stopped to cut timber to make small boats suitable for going up the rivers. An internal feud was in progress between native potentates and in this Shih Pi took sides, routing the army of Daha (Kediri).[1]

But Shih Pi lost 3,000 of his men (largely, it seems, through sickness) and for this he was disgraced and ordered to receive seventeen strokes. But in 1295 he was restored to favour, and he died, high in honours, at the age of eighty-six.

The Ming History records that at this time Java was subdued,[2] but the truth is that the great expedition had failed and no new one was undertaken. The military expeditions of the Mongols had nowhere more than a temporary influence.

The empire of Sri Vijaya, which endured for many centuries, had its capital in Sumatra in the neighbourhood of Palembang. It included the Malay Peninsula under its sway. Eventually it decayed under Chola (Coromandel) raids, the revolt of Melayu (Jambi), and attacks from neighbouring kingdoms. The Sung chronicles have many references to Sri Vijaya's wars. The empire eventually disappeared and was succeeded by Jambi. Jambi in turn (between

[1] For an account of the complex politics and strategy of this expedition see E. S. de Klerck, *History of the Netherlands Indies* (Rotterdam, W. L. & J. Brusse, 1938) i. 139–40.

[2] Book 324. It appears from Chinese records and the account of Marco Polo that Tuban, Sedayu, and Tjanggu were at that time prosperous commercial towns. De Klerck, op. cit. p. 140.

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1338 and 1365) succumbed to Majapahit, whose seat of government was in Java. Majapahit was warlike and destructive: it sacked ports in Borneo, Surabaya, Ceram, and Lombok, and finally subjected Sri Vijaya's colonies in the Malay Peninsula.[1]

Palembang, near the east coast of Sumatra, fell into Chinese hands on the decay of Sri Vijaya and remained under them for about two hundred years. The Chinese who lived there followed piracy as a calling, using the port as a retreat and strongpoint. This town, then, was one of the earliest places in Southeast Asia where the Chinese settled in any numbers. San-fo-ts'i is a rival for the distinction (if, indeed, it were a Malayan territory distinct from Sri Vijaya), and when it faded in importance about the same time as Sri Vijaya, several thousand Chinese from Fukien and Canton who lived there began to govern themselves. In 1377 they had as their leader a man named Liang Tau-ming from Namhoi in Kwangtung.

Meanwhile, in 1349, Wang Ta-yuan, a Chinese merchant, writes of Tumasik, or Old Singapore.[2] His account gives the very definite impression that here also was a fairly large settlement of Chinese. This is the first colony of Chinese in the Malay Peninsula of which we have any record.

In a later chapter in the history of the Chinese in Malaya we shall discuss the question whether the Chinese formed any permanent settlement in the Malay kingdom of Malacca, which was founded about A.D. 1400 and endured until the Portuguese conquest of 1511. The chances are (we shall decide) that the merchants who visited the place were merely seasonal visitors, coming down from China with one monsoon and going back with the other. But it was in the early years of the Malay kingdom that the Emperors of the Ming dynasty began to send expeditions to the Southern Ocean and beyond on a grand scale.[3]

In 1403, says the Ming History,[4] the Emperor sent the eunuch

[1] See Sir Richard Winstedt, *Malaya and its History* (London, Hutchinson, 1948) p. 29 ff.

There are maps showing the probable extent of Sri Vijaya and Majapahit accompanying H. Otley Beyer, 'The Philippines before Magellan', *Asia*, vol. xxi (1921).

[2] See p. 282.

[3] In summarizing the Ming voyages the writer has to be much on his guard. The facts and translations of the authorities of last century, particularly Rockhill, have been subjected to the searching scrutiny of Professor Duyvendak, and many errors and slips have been revealed.

[4] J. J. L. Duyvendak, 'The true dates of the Chinese Maritime Expeditions in the early fifteenth century', *T'oung Pao*, xxxiv (Leyden, 1939).

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Yin Ch'ing as envoy to Malacca with presents of silk brocade.[1] But more noteworthy was the visit a few years afterwards by the famous Grand Eunuch, Cheng Ho, later deified as Sam-po-kung.

Altogether Cheng Ho and his colleagues, the Grand Eunuch Wang Chin, and the assistant envoys, the Grand Eunuchs Hung Pao and Yung Chen, together with the Senior Lesser Eunuch Chang Ta, commanding the fleet, made seven voyages, in 1405, 1407, 1409, 1414, 1417, 1421, and 1431 (these being the years in which the expeditions set out).[2] The account published by them in 1431 is in their collective name, but it is not clear which of them took part in the several voyages. The following is abstracted from their account as quoted by Professor Duyvendak:

Voyage I

In the third year of Yung Lo (1405), 'commanding the fleet', we went to Ku-li (Calicut) and other countries. At that time the pirate Ch'en Tsu-yi and his followers were assembled at San-fo-ts'i (Palembang) where they plundered the native merchants. We captured the leader alive and returned in the fifth year (1407).

Voyage II

In the fifth year of Yung Lo (1407), 'commanding the fleet', we went to Kua-Wa (Java), Ku-li (Calicut), Ko-chih (Cochin), and Hsien-lo (Siam). The kings of these countries all presented us as tribute with local products, precious birds, and (rare) animals. We returned in the seventh year (1409).

Voyage III

In the seventh year of Yung Lo (1409), 'commanding the fleet', we went to the countries visited before and took our route by the country of Hsi-lan-shan (Ceylon). Its King Ya-lieh-jo-nai-erh (Alagakkonara) was guilty of a gross lack of respect and plotted against the fleet. Owing to the manifest answer (to prayer) of the divine power (the plot) was discovered and thereupon the king was captured alive. In the ninth year (1411), on our return, he was presented (to the throne as a prisoner). Subsequently he received the imperial favour of returning to his own country.

[1] Ming History, Book 325.

[2] 'What are today called the Indian Ocean or the Nanyang were formerly called the Nan Hai (Southern Sea) or the Nan-hsi Hai (Southwestern Sea). The sea to the south of the Gulf of Siam was given the special name of Ch'ang Hai.' Feng Ch'eng-chün, *Nan Yang Chiao T'ung Shih* (*History of Chinese Relations with the Nanyang*) (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1937) p. 91.

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The fourth voyage (1414) was to Ormuz and other places and the fleet returned in 1415. In that year the king of the country of Man-la-Chia (Malacca) came in person with his wife and son to present tribute. On the fifth voyage (1417–19) the envoys visited Ormuz again and also Aden, Mogadisho, Calicut, &c., bringing back zebras, lions, camels, and ostriches. Ormuz figured once more in the sixth voyage (1421–2) and in the sixth year of Hsüan-ti (1431), 'starting once more for the barbarian (countries) in order to make known the imperial commands', the fleet sailed for the Western Ocean, returning in 1433.

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The object of the voyages was to enhance the prestige of the Ming dynasty and, incidentally, to keep a look out for any rebels against the dynasty who might have taken refuge in the Nanyang. 'The Imperial Ming dynasty', proclaimed the high envoys, 'in unifying seas and continents, surpasses the Three Dynasties and even goes beyond the Han and the T'ang. The countries beyond the horizon and from the ends of the earth have all become subjects (of the Imperial Ming). . . . The barbarians from beyond the seas . . ., have come to audience bearing precious objects and presents.'

Says Professor Duyvendak in another place:[1]

> These embassies must have been stupendous undertakings; fleets are described of 62 vessels carrying 37,000 soldiers; more than 20 countries in the Indian archipelago and the Indian Ocean were visited; chiefs and kings, like those of Palembang and of Ceylon, were deposed and sent as captives to China, and members of the expeditions went as far as Aden and Mecca, bringing messages from the Chinese court. Most surprising of all, these fleets were commanded by eunuchs, of whom none is more famous than Cheng Ho, known as San-Pao-T'ai-Ch'ien.

The dynastic histories have a good deal to say of Java during the period of Cheng Ho's voyages. The denizens of the country were divided into three kinds of people—first, the Chinese who resided there temporarily and whose clothes and food were fine and nice; secondly, the traders from other countries, who resided there for a longer time, and who also were quite civilized and clean; and thirdly, the natives of the country, who were very dirty and were fond of eating snakes, insects, and worms, and who slept and ate together with the dogs. From Grissé, in 1411, a Chinese from Canton sent representatives to the Chinese court and a letter offer-

[1] 'Ma Huan Re-examined', *Proceedings of the Royal Academy of Science* (Amsterdam, 1933). (On the *Ying yai sheng lan*, ascribed to Ma Huan.)

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ing produce of the country as tribute. Tuban was the native name of a place near Grissé where more than a thousand families lived, all under one chief. Amongst them were many Chinese from Canton and Changchow (near Amoy) who were settled there. Fowls, goats, fish, and vegetables were cheap there. Surabaya was another place where there were many Chinese. Later it seems that Tuban was deserted by them because of its insecurity (there being numerous robbers) and all trade went to a new place, Yortan (situated in the present district of Paduran), but it subsequently disappeared.

There is in the Chinese records a large number of references to the Chinese in Java and Sumatra in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries on the eve of the European incursions into these waters. Many pirates are mentioned, including Ch'en Tsu-yi who was seized by Cheng Ho. Later on, in the reign of Chia Ching (1522–66), another notorious Cantonese robber flourished. Besides his main business of robbery, he had a large commercial establishment in which many Hokkiens were employed.

Regarding the Chinese navigation of these seas, it has been remarked that their junks always sailed with the trade winds, going with the northeast monsoon and returning home with the southwest monsoon. On the outward voyage it was the custom to follow the Asiatic coast, but on the home trip the ships of Amoy probably sailed along the west coasts of Borneo, Palawan, Luzon, and Formosa. Moreover, the sailing directions in Chinese books indicate that ships bound for the Sulu Archipelago, eastern Borneo, and, in later centuries, even for Banjermassin and Java, first crossed over to the island of Luzon and sailed southwards through the Philippines.[1]

This opinion is consistent with that of Sir Roland Braddell who says:

> Summarizing, we suggest that both *a priori* reasoning and such data as we possess lead to a very early knowledge of Borneo on the part of the Indians and Chinese and that in the case of both of them probably, but the latter certainly, they must have been familiar with Borneo before they became familiar with Java, the navigation to which was far more difficult and more dangerous.[2]

[1] G. N. Steiger, op. cit. pp. 202, 203. See also p. 679 of this Survey, and the remarks on Chinese navigation of Southeast Asian waters in J. V. Mills, 'Malaya in the Wu-pei-chih Charts', *JRASMB*, vol. xv, pt. 3 (December 1937).

[2] op. cit. *JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (February 1941) p. 72.

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Let us now go back for a while and consider the early history of the Chinese contacts with Borneo in more detail, keeping in mind the implications raised by Dr Heine-Geldern's revelations of the finds there and in Indonesia. 177 175.

The credit for bringing Brunei to the official notice of China seems to have been due to neither the Chinese nor the Borneans, but rather to the enterprising Arab traders of Canton and Ch'üan-chow. It is not known just how early these Arabs began trading in Brunei, but in 977 a certain Abu Ali and two other Arabs came to the Chinese court as envoys from the king of Brunei. From the twelfth to the fifteenth century accounts of Brunei, Sulu, Mindoro, and others of the Philippine Islands became more numerous. Before 1225 Chinese vessels were making trading trips to nearly all parts of the Philippines. Apart from Sulu, which had always maintained closer relations with Borneo than with the Philippines, the most important trade centre appears to have been Mindoro.[1]

The traditions of Borneo and Sulu indicate that a Chinese province was established some centuries ago in the neighbourhood of the Kinabatangan River, and the province had dominion over the Sulu River. It is mainly accepted, too, that a daughter of a Chinese 'prince', who was in all probability the governor of the province referred to, came from the Kinabatangan River to marry the second sultan of Brunei, and from that couple originated the royal family of Brunei of the present day.

The statement that the Dusuns are 'half-Chinese' is frequently made by residents of Borneo. This theory has led to much controversy. In the middle of the last century a traveller in Sarawak, a Mr Witti, expressed himself strongly against any supposed Chinese mixture in the blood of the Dusuns, saying, 'I think no Chinese colonies ever existed in the north of Borneo', but the same traveller in a journey up the Pagalan River speaks of a tribe that was 'probably the result of an infusion of Chinese blood with the aboriginal races of Borneo'.[2] Regarding the Dyaks, Earl remarks that the Chinese of his time supposed them to be descended from a large body of their countrymen left by accident on the island, but this belief, he says, was entertained solely on the basis of the Chinese legend of the Kuni Balu snake whose stone was stolen by the

[1] Steiger, Otley Beyer, Benitez, op. cit. p. 205.
[2] Cited by Ling Roth, *The Natives of Sarawak and British North Borneo* (London, Truslove & Hanson, 1896) i. 24.

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177 Emperor of China by the agency of Chinese who formed a chain from the snake's lair to waiting junks. The stone was recovered
175 by the snake, but the human chain of Chinese remained to colonize the country. Another legend of this nature concerned the origin of the Bolupih race from a Chinese native union. C. A. de Crespigny could see no similarity between the natives and the Chinese except a turning-in of the upper eyelid in childhood, whereas St John observed that the 'features of many are very like the Chinese—perhaps a trace of that ancient kingdom that tradition fixes in this neighbourhood'.[1] In the present century I. H. N. Evans has pronounced strongly against the theory of Chinese admixture with the Dusuns though he admits Chinese admixtures on the Klias Peninsula and the Kinabatangan River.[2]

But whatever the truth regarding the Chinese colonization of Borneo in remoter times, it is certain that by the early nineteenth century a considerable admixture of the races was in progress. Intermarriage between Chinese men and Dyak women was common and St John, at the request of the Raja, opened a school for the benefit of the offspring of such unions.

Truly speaking (St John adds) the Chinese women up here are themselves the offspring of mixed marriages, but having been brought up in all the manners and customs of the Chinese, are looked upon as Chinese. The settled agricultural tribes between the Brunei and Murudu Rivers were considered good examples of Chinese and natives intermarrying.

Of special interest to the students of Chinese contacts with Borneo is the evidence afforded by native agricultural methods and the 'sacred jars'.

Sir Spenser St John describes the methods used by the native

[1] Ling Roth, op. cit. i. 57; ibid. p. 59.

[2] I. H. N. Evans, *Among Primitive Peoples in Borneo* (London, Seeley Service, 1932) p. 274 ff.

Mr Tom Harrisson comments: 'How is it possible to conclude that the theory is not true, while at the same time admit Chinese admixtures on the Klias Peninsula and the Kinabatangan River? Such traditions do not persist unless there is some reason for them. In fact, they are to be found in some form or other, over a much wider area of Borneo, and were recorded by some of the very earliest travellers, such as the anonymous writer in the *Chinese Repository* of 1834, and Earl in 1837. The most that can be said is that the matter is not proven either way. . . . St John in 1858 found remains of extensive pepper gardens in the Madihit, ten days by canoe, through rapids etc., right up the Limbang and right in the interior. The oldest Muruts could then just remember these Chinese. The present inhabitants of the area have *no idea* there were ever Chinese there—a good example of the negative negative.'

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people of Tumposok where he first saw natives ploughing. The plough was of a very simple construction, serving rather to scratch the ground than to turn it over, was entirely of wood, and was drawn by a buffalo, and its action was the same as if a pointed stick had been dragged through the land to a depth of about four inches. After ploughing, they used a rough kind of harrow. 'I think this superior agriculture', says St John, 'is obviously a remnant of Chinese civilization.'[1]

Tangible evidence of Chinese contact with Sarawak is afforded by the 'sacred jars', undoubtedly of Chinese origin. The 'jar cult' played an important role not only in Borneo but also among the Moi of southern Indochina, in the Philippines, in Formosa, and various other parts of the Indonesian region. (Dr Heine-Geldern remarks that Professor Janse's recent discoveries in Indochina may help to solve the origin of this cult.) St John describes the several kinds of jars existing in Sarawak. The best known were the Gusi, the Rusa, and the Naga. The most valuable, the Gusi, was a green colour, about 18 inches in height, and was, from its medicinal properties, exceedingly sought after. One fetched at Tawaran the price of £400 to be paid in produce. The Naga was a jar two feet in height ornamented with Chinese dragons. This was at this time worth only £7–8; while the Rusa, covered with the figures of some kind of deer, was worth £15–16.[2] Another jar, the Ningkah, mentioned in another contemporary account, fetched $150.[3]

These jars were the principal commodity in the Chinese trade with Borneo and other islands. This trade may have been of the 'silent' variety, when Chinese junks, laden with silk, beads, iron,

[1] It is interesting to compare this description with that of a native plough of supposedly Chinese origin in the Philippines (see p. 613), and there is a reference to another plough not of local design in Malaya (see p. 314).

[2] Ling Roth, op. cit. ii. 284.

Every Dyak tribe possessed some jars according to their riches or importance, though, as one European lady remarks, 'no one would suppose from their appearance that they were worth more than the common earthenware water-pots we use in our bath-houses'. They were, in fact (to judge from examples in the Sarawak Museum), of as cheap a quality as the Chinese trader could persuade the natives to purchase. Examples of these jars are illustrated in Plate 159 of N. Ottema, *Ceramiek Handboek*, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam, J. H. de Bussy, 1946).

One special jar, owned by the Sultan of Brunei, was supposed to have magical qualities, and Bisayas used to come with presents for the Sultan to obtain in return a little water from the jar with which to sprinkle their rice-fields to ensure good crops.

[3] L. W. Helms, *Pioneering in the Far East* (W. H. Allen, London, 1882) p. 153, cited by Ling Roth, op. cit. ii. 280.

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copper pots, and many kinds of jars arrived off the coast and made their presence known by beating on gongs. The natives would bring to the beach whatever they had to trade and then retire to a distance. The traders would take ashore what they considered the proper equivalent in terms of their own goods, and if this proved satisfactory they took the native articles and moved on to the next settlement.[1] But whether or no this method of trading was usual in later times, it seems that in the time spoken of by Chao Ju-kua (12th–13th centuries) buying and selling were carried on in a more friendly and civilized way. After a ship had arrived and had been boarded by the natives they mingled freely with the ship's folk. The custom was for native traders to assemble in crowds and carry the goods away with them in baskets, 'and even if one cannot at first know them and can but slowly distinguish the men who remove the goods there will be no loss'.[2]

More impressive, aesthetically speaking, than the jars are the pottery and china revealed by the pick and spade in mineral exploration. Mr Helms records that on one occasion his party found a number of paving tiles four inches thick, 'beautifully made of pebbles, concrete, quartz, etc. They had been polished, were clearly very old, and made by people of a higher civilization.' Were these, by any chance, relics of Chinese settlement?

The coming of the Europeans caused a break in the trading relations between China, Borneo, and the other Malaysian islands which had gone on for so long. In the year 1530 one of the functionaries in the capital addressed a memorial to the throne respecting the discontinuance of the tribute from Borneo. This memorial says:

> During the period Cheng-tc (1506–1521) the Franks (Portuguese) had been violently spreading their influence and the tribute had ceased. A few years afterwards the natives had tried to begin sending it again, but it was evident that their regard for the Chinese empire had suffered very much.

Finally, let us summarize what is known of Chinese intercourse with the Philippines prior to the Spanish period.

It is at a comparatively late date that the Philippines are first mentioned in Chinese history; and the fact is the more striking (says Laufer) since some of the adjacent isles to the south are touched upon much earlier. In the fifth year of Hung-wu (1372) the first embassy arrived in China with tribute, and the Emperor

[1] Fay Cooper Cole, op. cit. p. 28. [2] G. N. Steiger, op. cit. p. 205.

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reciprocated by dispatching an official with presents of silk gauze woven of gold and coloured threads to the king of the country. But (Laufer warns us) 'From this first mention of the Philippines in Chinese history we should not be so narrow-minded as to infer that Chinese intercourse with the Philippines dates from just the year 1372; on the contrary, the fact that there was a Philippine embassy in that year points to a long commercial intercourse between the two peoples which had escaped the knowledge of the court historiographers at Peking.'[1] The statement made in the Imperial Geography of the Ming (*Ta Ming I Feng Chi*) that no investigation of Luzon had been made by previous generations is contradicted by the fact that Philippine tribes are described in Chao Ju-kua's work of the thirteenth century.

Since Laufer wrote there has been considerable further investigation of the subject, and the present state of knowledge can best be summarized in the words of Dr H. Otley Beyer:

> It is improbable that many Chinese ships were engaged in this trade with the Philippines during the early period (at least before the late 11th–12th century part of it) and it is unlikely that there were any Chinese residents in the islands at that time . . . [re 12th–14th centuries] Chinese merchant colonies began to establish themselves in a few places where a fairly strong or well-organized native government gave prospect of protection. . . . With the death of Cheng Ho, however, and the passing of the Yung Lo regime, this Chinese attempt at dominions overseas also passed away . . . [re A.D. 1430–1450]. As Mohammedan influence spread eastward through the southern Philippines, and northward from Borneo into Luzon, the Siam and Indo-China trade was at first cut off, while the Chinese merchant vessels were forced to seek new trading routes leading around the eastern side of Luzon, and into the eastern Visayan Islands etc., where Islamic beliefs had not yet penetrated. . . . While the Chinese settlers intermarried freely in the country, built good houses, and taught their families better ways of living, they were not otherwise interested in converting or spreading new ideas among the native folk. Their influence was chiefly economic, and aside from the brief period of Yung Lo's empire, made no attempt to meddle or interfere with native political constitutions, social customs, or beliefs. . . .[2]

[1] Berthold Laufer, 'The Relations of the Chinese to the Philippine Islands', *Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections* (quarterly issue), vol. 1 (September 1907) p. 251.

[2] H. Otley Beyer, *Early History of Philippine Relationships to Foreign Countries, especially China* (Manila, National Printing Company for the University of the Philippines Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, 1948).

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121 What has been given above is only a brief outline of a vast sub-
167 ject of which the facts are, for many periods, largely unprecipitated.
In an attempt to confine this survey to manageable proportions and
177 to give it a contemporary focus, we have adopted the principle that our interest in the Chinese of Southeast Asia begins in earnest only when they had formed permanent settlements, and it is true to say that the majority of such settlements still remaining, outside Annam and Tongking, were founded within the last 350 years. Nevertheless, we should not forget that the stream of Chinese immigration into the region, swelling into spate in the second and third decades of the present century, was but an expansion of long pre-existing rivulets of intercourse.

167 After the great military expeditions of the early Mings, the urge to imperial expansion overseas appears to have gone out of the
•175 Chinese. The self-contained spirit of the Middle Kingdom reas-
177 serted itself and the Emperors were content with adventures by land. It would indeed be harder to explain why the urge arose at all than why it subsided so soon. The fact remains that whereas the colonization of the Europeans followed in the wake of their fleets and soldiers or to lands obtained by treaty from the native rulers, the Chinese in the last three and a half centuries have entered Southeast Asia either as visiting merchants or as suppliants for permission to remain from the Javanese Sultans, or from the Spanish, Dutch, British, or French. They came no more as haughty emissaries of the Dragon Throne, armed to the teeth to enforce the imperial will, but as humble and peaceable shiploads of traders, artisans, or coolies, waiting, like Czech or Italian peasants on Ellis Island, for permission to enter the land of promise. But their meekness and peaceableness were in the long run to be far more forceful than the militancy of the Europeans; for where the latter came in their tens the Chinese came in their thousands, and when the Europeans have gone, they will remain.[1]

[1] While this Survey was in the press there appeared 'The Khmer Empire and the Malay Peninsula', by Lawrence Palmer Briggs, *Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. ix, no. 3, May 1950, which adds valuable source material for Sino-Southeast Asia contacts.

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CHAPTER III

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EMIGRATION TO THE 'NANYANG'

THE overseas Chinese are almost exclusively drawn from the southeastern provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Kwangsi—the great majority from the first two. This has mainly been due to population pressure and to the contiguity of these provinces to Southeast Asia.[1] This emigration was accentuated by internal troubles in China. In the Ming dynasty there had already been substantial emigration to the Nanyang, but a new wave was set up by the civil strife consequent on the change-over from the Ming to the Ch'ing, or Manchu, dynasty.[2] For example, the anti-Manchu pirate and patriot Koxinga, who had occupied Formosa, made descents on the coasts of Fukien in order to replenish his stores and at the same time embarrass the Manchu Government. Partly to cut off his supplies and partly to intimidate the population of these regions whose sympathies were anti-dynastic, the Manchus made the latter forsake a zone of country from about eight to thirty miles deep on the coasts of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Chekiang. This zone was denuded of its crops and its villages were burnt down. A reference was made to this in the reign of the first Manchu Emperor when governors were ordered to give houses and land to such persons who had moved into the interior 'so that they might be satisfied'. The harsh treatment they received was undoubtedly an encouragement to many in these parts of China to seek refuge overseas.

Contacts with Europeans were also a subsidiary encouragement to emigration. The first European efforts to trade were centred in Kwangtung. In 1516 Perestrello came from Malacca to China; in 1517 de Andrada arrived in Canton and received permission from the viceroy to trade. The attitude of the Portuguese soon aroused the hostility of the Chinese and their trading depot was attacked and destroyed in 1522. They retired to Lampa in Kwangtung where

[1] Population pressure in China, especially in the nineteenth century, is instructively dealt with by G. E. Tyler, 'The Taiping Rebellion, its economic background and social theory', *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. xvi (1933) pp. 545–614.

[2] See J. J. L. Duyvendak, 'Chinese in the Dutch East Indies', ibid. vol. xi. (1927) pp. 1–15.

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they maintained a trading post for the next fifty years. Another expedition reached the coast of Fukien in 1518 and established depots at Ch'üanchowfu, north of Amoy, at Foochow, and at Ningpo in Chekiang. Between 1545 and 1549 an imperial edict for the extermination of the Portuguese was enforced wherever possible. Nevertheless Macao was founded as a trading post in 1557. The Portuguese paid rent for the Macao Peninsula until 1849. During the eighteenth century Macao was the chief port for the Western trade in China. The Spanish next opened up direct relations with the Chinese, using Manila as their base, but the trade between the Philippines and Amoy was almost entirely in Chinese hands. The port of Amoy from 1730 to 1842 was closed to all foreigners except Spaniards. The Dutch made attempts to open up trade at Canton in 1604 and 1607 but were defeated by the Portuguese interests at Macao. Though they eventually occupied Formosa, they were driven out by Koxinga in 1661. Further efforts made by the Dutch to obtain recognition of their trade were without success, and it was not until 1762 that they were able to establish a factory at Canton. The English made their first essay to join in the trade in 1596, but it was a failure. They tried in 1647 to operate under Portuguese auspices, meeting, however, with little success. The East India Company renewed the attempt to trade with Canton in 1664 and 1674, but were foiled, mainly by the Portuguese. The Company did, however, succeed in 1667 and 1670 in trading at Amoy and Formosa, but their factory in the latter place was closed in 1681. In 1685 an imperial decree opened all the ports of China to foreign trade; but Canton and Amoy remained the principal trading entrepôts.

A circumstance which tended towards centring the foreign trade on Canton and eventually confining it to this one port was the establishment of a monopoly by the Chinese Government. In 1702 an official called a Hoppo, or emperor's merchant, was appointed at Canton and became the sole broker for all purchases and sales. Two years later the Hoppo had to admit certain other merchants into a share of his monopoly. Henceforth the trade increased in bulk and flourished, though subject to very severe restrictions and a rigorous disciplining of the foreign merchants, most of whom had to withdraw to Macao in the non-trading season. In 1757 an imperial edict prohibited all foreign trade at any port other than Canton. Attempts to improve the conditions of trade and to establish relations on a proper footing led to the sending of embassies to

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Peking by the Dutch and the British, but without concrete result. The situation continued down to the First China War of 1839–42.

It will be seen, then, that Chinese contacts with foreign traders were practically confined to the Kwangtung and Fukien ports, though the intercourse was even then a restricted one. It was not the policy of the Spanish or of the Dutch (except at the beginning) to attract the Chinese to their colonies; it was only after 1786, when the British began to make settlements in the Malay Peninsula, that the Chinese found an unqualified welcome. The capitalistic development of colonies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had not yet begun, and there was no demand for coolie labour on a large scale before then. The Americans first traded with Canton in 1784, but it was not until 1848 that the first Chinese immigrants arrived at San Francisco.[1]

Such were some of the circumstances which induced, or paved the way for, Chinese emigration to the Nanyang. Our task must now be to investigate the factors which discouraged this emigration.

Ancestor worship was a strong force in discouraging the Chinese from emigrating. The spirits of the dead needed the constant attendance of the living to ensure their welfare, and those who deserted the vicinity of the graves of their ancestors and left their spirits without sacrificial offerings and ritual attention were guilty of unfilial conduct. Thus it was at all times that only those who were forced by dire necessity left their native villages, and they were regarded as outcasts and vagabonds. It was natural, therefore, that a great many refugees and criminals should have been included among the emigrants.[2]

Religion was reinforced by Government policy. The Emperors took the view that the loss of subjects was not a loss to be compensated for by any trade advantages. Under the Mings the law was not so strict as it became later under the Ch'ings (the Manchus were also more orthodox Confucians than the Mings—and aliens are frequently more orthodox and conservative than the people

[1] So it is commonly stated, but in the correspondence relating to a project to send Chinese to Trinidad in 1806 ('Notices of Pinang', *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, vol. vi (1852) pp. 145–72) it is mentioned that Chinese had already been taken to Nootka Sound in North America. The writer has so far been unable to discover the facts of this matter.

[2] H. Gottwaldt, *Die Uberseeische Auswanderung der Chinesen* (Bremen, Max Moessler, 1903), insists that 'only the scum of the Chinese go abroad'.

Chapter Twenty-five

PEOPLES, POLITICS AND PROSPECTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

101 THE setting of Southeast Asia may be summed up as one of extremes of relief (deltaic plains and mountains) and a climate mostly approaching the wet limit for plant life but merging into monsoonal types. To this setting the people have made varying responses, ranging from migrant food gatherers and hunters in the jungles, to subsistence farmers in the plains, but all turning upon woody materials for weapons, implements, house-structures and domestic utensils, upon rice, the cereal of the wet extreme, and upon social systems of communal help. The whole social and economic life has been galvanised over the past century or two by being more and more drawn into commercial and industrial activities developed in response to and on the basis of external needs for the minerals and agricultural products of Southeast Asia, whereas prior to that time the region was touched only by a trickle of traders moving between India and China.

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FACTORS IN THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY

174 Several factors account for the difficulty of obtaining firm data to fill in our general picture of the historical geography of Southeast Asia. In the first place, there grew up no strong literary tradition to last through the centuries and record the past in a form other than mythical. Here tradition is largely oral and literature essentially Indian rather than indigenous. And whatever there was of local record and history has rotted away quickly, the climate, the ants, insects and moulds soon destroying anything on wood, paper, leather or cloth. Moreover, in this setting of swamps and forest, the most easily available material is wood, and artistic tradition expressed in wood, whether in carvings, buildings or tools, rapidly disintegrates, leaving little of that sort of evidence which is the basis of our facts about early periods in other regions. Buildings and carvings on stone were not normal expressions of Southeast Asia people where over large areas stone is not easily come by and where

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

FIG. 113.—Historic Pattern of Southeast Asia during Indian Colonial Period

implements had not in any case developed far enough to deal with stone. Hence monumental evidence in Southeast Asia is so largely Indian, an introduction by foreigners using styles and techniques developed in their home settings, and most developed in the drier parts of this region, where stone is more accessible. On the clay lands, historic brick structures, also an Indian innovation, weather to nothing very quickly. At Angkor may be seen the power of quick-growing tropical trees to shatter and break down temples and palaces built of stone and lateritic blocks.

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This, too, is a region of natural calamities, difficult though it is to pin-point them. Little kingdoms have been wiped out in a few hours by Javanese volcanoes, as in A.D. 1006 when the flourishing city of Dharmavamsa (a great king of Central Java) was reduced to ashes by "a great calamity," probably an explosion and lava outflow of the Merapi volcano. Settlements along rivers have been obliterated when huge mud-flows swept down from loose ashes on the flanks of new eruptions, possibly accounting for our ignorance of east Sumatran kingdoms. Coasts have altered through the years

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133 and deltas have changed; areas which once were shallow sea have
175 become sedimented to swamps, a process by which Cambodia has been cut off as the Lower Mekong built up mud-flats isolating Tonle Sap from contact with the sea. The evolution of new routes has caused some old centres of power to fade into mere fishing villages, evidenced in the decline of Takhola and Bandon after the sea route through the Straits of Malacca became more generally

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

FIG. 114.—Historic Pattern of Southeast Asia at the Islamisation Period

175 used than that across Kra. Plagues have laid waste whole cities, as
164 when Uthong in about 1350 was devastated by cholera and its population fled. The region is still one where malaria, dysentery, cholera and plague are endemic, more especially in the older, more congested territories like Java. These diseases have frequently flared up into appalling epidemics killing thousands of people, epidemics reflecting a relation between bacteria and the climate (which encourages bacterial reproduction), the population density, the difficulties of sewage disposal and social habits of indifference to hygiene (which has no ill effects among lonely settlements in the forest but becomes a social menace in towns). Fevers and virulent diseases have frequently ravaged the local people, debilitated them, and wiped out their settlements. The region is strewn with ruins of towns now abandoned, and with ruined groups of people who have degenerated physically by disease and under-nourishment. South-east Asia proved capable of engulfing rather than enshrining those moving into it to live.

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Further to complicate the historic geography was the fact that the literary people, the monks and religious men, were Indian or Indian-minded for long periods, disinterested in mundane records, and following the custom, still evident among many Southeast Asia people today, of avoiding personal names, so that anonymity, obscurity and confused nomenclature veil the past even in such records as do exist. Many experiments in writing styles were developed among these isolated and complex peoples and often inscriptions made in them cannot be translated today. Because of the dispersal tendencies within the territories themselves and the lack of focus to the region as a whole, no great depositories of learning were established in Southeast Asia to gather and conserve the record of its past.

Population Changes

Broadly speaking, the region has been until recently one of very thin population and large patches of it still contain populations of remarkably low density. Direct evidence of densities are scanty for periods farther back than this century, yet it seems probable that the whole of Southeast Asia in 1800 contained only about ten million people, when the region was probably as thinly peopled in its most attractive areas as Upper Burma and Upper Siam, the least attractive and developed areas, are today; Malaya then contained about a quarter million people, Java about four million, Burma probably less than two million. It was, even at the end of the 18th century, a zone of labour shortage and the objective of the local princelings of the times was to get hands, the basic power resource of their time, the one way of securing a small surplus from their fundamentally subsistent territories. Outsiders were not greatly attracted to Southeast Asia itself, as apart from the routes through it. To Spain its old colony, the Philippines, was no great asset and more related to Mexico than to Spain, remote and ready to drop from the Spanish orbit during the 19th century. To Holland, its colony in Java was a company venture that yielded little direct profit for many years and was at times on the verge of bankruptcy.

But the last 150 years brought tremendous changes in population. First, on the heels of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, came a revival and an expanded volume of trade between the Indian Ocean and the Far East, a stream which threaded the seaways of

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642 sections with an elaborate western superstructure over native life; in both native welfare has lagged behind economic progress, and, in both, during the present century, a growing impatience of western rule has found expression in a nationalist movement. These features are characteristic of tropical dependencies in general. Since Burma and Java furnish extreme types of direct and indirect rule, and of development by native and by western enterprise, the comparison between them would seem to furnish a useful starting point for a more general enquiry into colonial policy and practice. Such an enquiry is indeed necessary if we are to understand the problems of either Burma or Java or of any tropical dependency, for it is only against a background of general principles that the phenomena of western rule in any region of the tropics assume their due proportions, and that we can reasonably anticipate finding a satisfactory solution for the many weighty problems of colonial policy and practice. The enquiry may well seem, and is indeed, beyond the competence of any single student, whose intimate acquaintance with practical administration must of necessity be limited. But one conclusion to which the following enquiry points is the need for better knowledge of the facts and better understanding of their implications, and to the urgency of international co-operation in the comparative study of colonial affairs.

2. Survey of Colonial Policy

175 Of late years there has been a growing interest in colonial policy and colonial relations. To this many factors have contributed. Prominent among them are unrest in the tropics, consequent on the rise of modern nationalism, and the jealousy of non-colonial powers. Thus colonial policy has a double aspect, domestic and international. These are interrelated, for, while the advantages accruing to colonial powers from their dependencies arouse envy, and stimulate other powers to assert their claims by force of arms, tropical unrest serves as a pretext and a tool for intervention. The international aspect of colonial relations will require attention in due place, but it is convenient first to discuss the relations between colonial powers and their dependencies.

Discussions of this matter often contrast the high aspirations of modern colonial policy with the selfish exploitation of the past. Thus, according to Lord Hailey, 'the imperialist sentiment which animated much of our public policy in the latter part of the last century led us along paths some of which we should not be inclined to follow

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to-day'.[1] And a well-known Dutch colonial statesman says, 'He who would maintain that in the best colonial empires this predatory but profitable policy belongs to history will have to admit that it is in several respects not too remote history.'[2] This view hardly does justice to our fathers and grandfathers, who indeed themselves put forward similar pretensions. Dutch writers admit as not without validity the charges levelled against western enterprise in Java at the onset of the great depression of the thirties. But that was the generation of the Ethical leaders who aspired to build a brave new world in 1900. They in turn succeeded the Liberals who had thought to introduce a golden age in 1870 on the principle of freedom. The Liberals condemned, as rooted in unrighteousness, the system by which Van den Bosch had expected to restore prosperity to a country ruined by the reforms that Raffles, a generation earlier, had claimed would bestow liberty and welfare on millions of his fellow human beings. We may, and should be, wiser than our fathers, and should have learned from their mistakes; but it would be wise to bear in mind the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican. Although chartered companies may have disregarded the moral obligations of sovereignty, European powers which have accepted responsibility for dominion in the tropics have always claimed a moral basis for their activities.

Spain and Portugal. The earliest system of colonial rule may indeed be distinguished as the religious system. It has been well said that the colonial adventure of the Portuguese was also the last of the crusades. When Alexander VI in 1493 adjudicated on the rival claims of Spain and Portugal to undiscovered heathen continents and islands, he made it a condition that they should exert all diligence to convert their subjects to Christianity and 'instruct them in the Catholic Faith and good manners'.[3] They both took this injunction seriously. Paraguay under the Jesuits has often been cited as a model of colonial rule; in Manila the Spaniards founded the oldest western university in Asia, and by the end of the nineteenth century western culture was more widely spread in the Philippines than in any part of Asia. In the Moluccas the Portuguese established a Christian seminary within a few years of their arrival, and their claim that, if they did not aim solely at conversion, neither did they aim solely at commerce, is justified by the fact that, long after they have lost their colonies, many of their former subjects still retain their Christian faith.

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 46. [2] Hart, *Asiatic Review*, 1941, p. 629.
[3] Danvers, F. C., *The Portuguese in India* (1894), II, 483.

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175 *Chartered Companies.* The chartered companies, which mark the next stage of western tropical enterprise, were professedly mercantile associations, and, so long as they prospered, were practically independent of the state. Their object was to pay good dividends to their shareholders, and they subordinated political considerations to economic ends. Yet the Dutch in early days were zealous for the conversion of their subjects, and it was only later, when religious enthusiasm had declined, that they came to disregard everything but profit. Even so, during the eighteenth century, there were aspirations after a more generous conception of colonial rule, and the high official who bequeathed his estate as a permanent heritage for his Christian slaves was not alone in caring for the welfare of the people.[1] Still one must accept the verdict on the Dutch East India Company that 'its polestar was profit and the lodestone greed'; and in the eighteenth century this was notoriously true also of the English Company. It is not without significance that in both cases this concentration on economic ends led to bankruptcy, and at about the same time; the English Company was brought under State control, and the Dutch Company was taken over by the State.

Liberalism. In both countries the assumption of effective state control over tropical administration synchronized with the dawn of modern Liberalism. We have already remarked that Liberalism had a double aspect, material and moral, economic and social. Liberals believed in economic freedom—freedom of person, property and trade—and trusted to economic freedom as a guarantee of progress. When the English Government assumed control over India by Pitt's Act of 1784, the Industrial Revolution was already presaging a revolution in colonial relations. Manchester cotton goods were beginning to compete successfully with Indian calicoes and muslins in England; the first consignment reached India in 1786, and from 1814 onwards they rapidly displaced native products. During the same period the ideas that subsequently came to be termed Liberal were making headway, and the East India Company, after a vain effort to retain its monopoly, adopted them. The doctrine of economic freedom implied the introduction of a money economy, and the encouragement of native enterprise which would enable the people to buy imported goods. In assuming that, equally with western peoples, the oriental was alive to the desire of improving his condition, and in introducing the principle of equality before the

[1] Vlekke, p. 187.

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law, Liberalism, even in its economic aspect, was strongly coloured by humanitarian ideals. 175

These ideals were carried further in its social doctrine that all men were equal and had a natural right to freedom of speech and religion. Liberals believed that men had a right to political freedom, to live their own life in their own way under their own national institutions. They hoped to see India free, and tied to England only by ties of interest and affection. If the maintenance of law and order were the sole functions of the state, it seemed that the replacement of British magistrates by Indians should make India capable of self-government. Moreover, with the introduction of direct rule on western principles, economy demanded the employment of natives as officials. This made rapid progress and was adopted as a principle in 1833 when, on the renewal of the Company's charter, it was laid down that 'no native of the said Indian territories shall, by reason only of his place of birth, descent, colour or any of them be disabled from holding any place, office or employment under the Company'. By the end of the century the subordinate establishment was almost wholly Indian, and many Indians held high judicial and executive appointments. The Liberal faith included also a belief in the virtue of self-governing institutions on the English model. The largely European Presidency towns already enjoyed self-government; from 1842 attempts were made to apply the principle of local self-government in the interior, and it was widely extended from 1881–2. Meanwhile Indians had already been admitted to the Central Legislature from 1861 and at the same time Provincial Legislative Councils were established. This project of self-government reached its logical conclusion in 1917, when the Secretary of State for India announced responsible government as the goal of British policy.

While Liberals believed in economic freedom as good business, and in political freedom as a natural right, they looked on education as the main instrument of freedom. They held that the wide diffusion of western education would inspire the masses with the desire of improving their condition, dispel superstition, substitute Christianity for idolatry, and promote affection towards British rule. So early as 1793 Wilberforce tried to interest Parliament in the education of Indians. In 1815 the Governor-General declared his anxiety to see some system of public instruction established.[1] In 1854 the East India Company, in a despatch which laid the foundations of the

[1] *IG*, IV, 409, 413, 417.

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175 modern system of public instruction, proclaimed the advancement of the people through primary education as its main objective, and in all subsequent pronouncements on the subject this leading principle has been reaffirmed. Thus for about a hundred years from 1813 the lofty sentiments of Liberalism inspired British rule in India.

Meanwhile Britain had been carving out a vast new colonial empire in Africa under conditions very different from those of India. Instead of a populous country with an ancient agricultural civilization, there were empty lands and backward peoples. But the empty lands contained resources needed on a large scale for industry in Europe, and capital was available in Europe for the development of these resources by western enterprise. The Ashanti War of 1874 marked the beginning of British penetration into the interior of Africa. It was closely followed by the flotation of numerous large companies to develop the new territories under a charter from the State, as this 'offered a means of asserting British sovereignty without the expense and responsibility that sovereignty usually entails'.[1] The companies appealed to Parliament and the public for support not merely as commercial projects, but as instruments for spreading light in 'the dark continent' and as a response to Livingstone's appeal for commerce and Christianity. But they lacked the resources of a sovereign power and, in the interest of the shareholders, had to keep down the cost of administration. 'Every Government in Africa has been faced with the initial difficulty of administering an extensive area with a small European staff, frequently ignorant of local native custom and language; in every case it has found itself obliged, in the early days of its rule, to make use of chiefs or other native authorities, and the extent to which it has done so has depended on circumstances rather than on any difference of principle.'[2] It was the economic environment and not national political philosophy that dictated the adoption of the system of indirect rule.

In Nigeria, however, Sir George Goldie found a virtue in necessity.

'Even an imperfect and tyrannical native African administration, if its extreme excesses were controlled by European supervision, would be, in the early stages, productive of far less discomfort to its subjects than well-intentioned but ill-directed efforts of European magistrates, often young and headstrong, and not invariably gifted with sympathy and introspective powers. If the welfare of the native is to be considered, if dangerous revolts

[1] Burns, p. 163.
[2] *African Survey*, p. 527.

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are to be obviated, the general principles of ruling on African principles through native rulers must be followed for the present.'[1]

As a corollary it followed that, alongside the native administration, there should be 'colonial' courts to deal according to western law and procedure with 'cases involving non-natives, to exercise jurisdiction over natives in areas where native courts do not exist, and, where native courts exist, to deal with cases involving natives which are held to be unsuitable for these courts'.[2] As in Netherlands India there arose a system of indirect rule and dual administration. But the system is notably different in Dutch and British practice. In Britain there is a stronger tradition of the rule of law than on the continent of Europe, and British colonial administration owes much to preconceptions based on direct rule in India. Thus British colonial administration on the system of indirect rule emphasizes the judicial aspect of native authority, encourages greater formality in native courts, and insists on close supervision over native judicial procedure by British officials. On the Dutch system even the European officials are policemen, agents of policy; on the British system even native officials tend to become magistrates and judges, servants of the law.

The adoption of indirect rule in Africa did not, however, involve a departure from the principle of *laissez-faire*; rather it carried this principle still further by abstaining from intervention in native ways of life. But whether under direct or indirect rule, the lofty aspirations of Liberals were disappointing in practice, and, beyond narrow limits, conduced neither to economic progress nor to native welfare. For a time the prospect of easy money that had attracted capital in the first instance was realized, but 'the earliest attempts to develop trade sometimes involved the destructive spoliation of the resources of the colony. Rubber or forest timber was exhausted without proper replacement; accumulations of ivory were for a period obtained by exchange for cheap imports. Such a policy of exploitation could not continue indefinitely. Once the realities of the situation were understood, capital was less easily attracted.'[3] Moreover, the concentration of political and economic power in the same hands had shown 'the difficulties of reconciling the responsibilities of the administration with the interests of shareholders, and of demarcating justifiable administrative compulsion from forced labour for the purpose of profit making'.[4] Thus, during the last quarter of the nineteenth

[1] *African Survey*, p. 417.
[2] *Ib.* pp. 286ff.
[3] *Ib.* p. 1314.
[4] *Ib.* p. 1314.

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175 century, initial progress was followed by stagnation, and the aspirations of improving native welfare proved illusive. In India likewise under direct rule, Liberal hopes and forecasts proved illusive. The cultivators, burdened with debt, were losing their land to money-lenders, and public instruction, so far from dispelling the superstition of the masses, did not even reach them, while among the middle classes, who went to school to earn a living, the spread of education, instead of fostering goodwill to Britain and diffusing Christianity, bred growing disaffection and a reaction to an aggressive Hinduism. After the roseate dawn of early Liberalism the sky turned dark and stormy, and the century closed in 'gloom and depression'.[1] Liberals, regarding economic freedom as the key to progress and welfare, released economic forces which for a time furthered economic progress, but, at the same time, preyed on social welfare, setting bounds to progress, leading to stagnation and foreshadowing decline.

Under Dutch rule Liberal principles were differently applied, and colonial practice evolved in a contrary direction, but with similar results. On the restoration of the Dutch possessions in 1816–18, the leading statesmen from the King downwards admired all that was 'brave and liberal' and professed warm sympathy for 'the little man'. The King drafted a constitution along these lines for the Indies, and the commissioners sent to introduce it 'decided at once that the time had come when the Indies should be governed for the sake of its own people and not for that of the Netherlands'.[2] They found that Raffles had introduced, at least on paper, a system of direct rule, applying Liberal individual principles, far more thoroughly than any Dutch statesman had ever contemplated. Brief experience showed that 'measures that if seen at three thousand miles apparently are liberal, here prove to be highly illiberal in their effects' and implied 'the protection of European landowners at the expense of the native population'. Affairs drifted in confusion until the arrival of Van den Bosch in 1830. He also claimed Liberal views, but denounced the 'perverted Liberalism' of Raffles as unsuited to the Javanese, and propounded 'a Liberal policy adapted to their character and institutions'. He reverted to the Dutch system of indirect rule through native chieftains, which the commissioners, though recognizing in policy, had departed from in practice. While repudiating the Liberal principle of individual freedom under western law, he appealed, more

[1] *IG*, II, 526.
[2] Vlekke, pp. 254, 256.

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logically, to the principle of *laissez-faire* as justifying non-interference with native institutions. It is, however, no fortuitous coincidence that indirect rule in Java was profitable to the Dutch and direct rule in India profitable to the British.

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The Culture system introduced by Van den Bosch gave a temporary stimulus to economic progress, but in the long run proved detrimental to native welfare and led to economic stagnation. Also it was unprofitable to a later generation of more orthodox Liberals, who came into power in the Netherlands in 1848 and during the next twenty years gradually obtained control over colonial policy. They substituted private enterprise for state enterprise, and thereby gave a new impulse to economic progress. Like Liberals in Britain they believed in education 'to spread light in India'. But under indirect rule there was little demand for natives educated on western lines, and, with little to gain from schooling, there was little demand among the natives for schools. Western education made slow progress in Java as compared with India. On the other hand, western enterprise in Java required a large and healthy population and, in respect of medical assistance and a care for hygiene in rural areas, Java was ahead of India. The system of rule through native chieftains, introduced by Van den Bosch, made inadequate provision for the Europeans who crowded in when Java was thrown open to western private enterprise, and the dual character of the administration, with different laws for Europeans and natives, became more prominent. Liberals of all hues wanted an administration along western lines for the European community, and urged the need for decentralization—the delegation of power from the home to the colonial Government, from the colonial Government to departments and local officials, and from the bureaucracy to local bodies. From 1848 onwards various aspects of decentralization were discussed, and every year, with the growth of western enterprise, it became more urgent. Finally, in 1903, western political institutions were introduced in local government, and in 1918 the creation of the Volksraad as an advisory body marked a long stride towards the adoption of Liberal principles in the central government. Thus, whereas in British dependencies the system of administration developed during the nineteenth century from direct towards indirect rule, in Netherlands India the tendency was in the contrary direction.

The Liberalism of Van den Bosch was profitable to the Dutch of 1830 and the later individualist Liberalism profited the Dutch of 1870,

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

175 but in neither case need one question that the appeal to humanitarian ideals was genuine. The Liberals, like those in England, looked forward, in two senses, to a golden age. But in Java, as in India, the century ended in stagnation and depression, with chambers of commerce in the Netherlands demanding an enquiry into the 'decline of welfare'. Under Dutch rule, as under British rule, the Liberal policy of *laissez-faire* gave place to a constructive policy of efficiency and social justice.

Construction. In 1900 the British Government was less reluctant than in 1870 to accept imperial responsibilities, and Joseph Chamberlain, as an apostle of efficiency and social justice, was trying to put the British Empire on a business footing, with Kipling as the popular exponent of the 'White Man's Burden'. This 'involved a new philosophy of [colonial] politics and an ethical standard, serious and not ignoble'.[1] The failure, economic and political, of the chartered companies in Africa, implied that the State, on taking over charge of the colonies, should intervene actively to promote economic development and to enhance native welfare. This new constructive policy with its double aspect came to be known as 'the dual mandate'. In India, under direct rule, the administration, chiefly at the instance of Lord Curzon, proliferated new economic and welfare services, while in Africa and elsewhere the conception of indirect rule acquired a new character. Formerly indirect rule had been justified as a means of protecting the natives from the impact of the west, now it was conceived as a means 'to graft our higher civilization upon the soundly rooted native stock . . . moulding it and establishing it into lines consonant with modern ideas and higher standards'.[2] It was no longer a negative system of *laissez-faire*, but an active policy of economic and social construction. Liberals looked to freedom as a key to economic progress, and regarded economic progress as a *cause* of native welfare, leading *automatically* to political independence. Modern colonial theory regards economic progress as a *condition* of native welfare, and native welfare as a *condition* of political advancement, but recognizes the need for state intervention to further economic progress. Liberals thought to promote welfare through freedom; the modern tendency is to promote welfare, even at the expense of freedom.

Simultaneously, with this new trend in British colonial policy, Dutch colonial policy turned from Liberalism to a new constructive

[1] Buchan, J., *Memory-Hold-the-Door* (1943), p. 125.
[2] *African Survey*, p. 432.

7. Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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policy avowedly based on 'ethical' principles. This found its first practical expression in the Village Act of 1906, intended to strengthen corporate village life and thereby 'stimulate the process of social growth and enable local officials to cope with their prime function, the care of public welfare'. Thus both Dutch and English may fairly claim that, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, their colonial policy has always been inspired by high ideals, and has kept in sight the dual aim of increasing the contribution of the tropics to the welfare of the world, while promoting the welfare of the people. Yet even the 'ethical' system and the theory of the 'White Man's Burden' are now disavowed, as illustrating the predatory past when we followed paths that we should now be reluctant to pursue. How far this criticism may be justified we shall have to examine more closely when dealing with modern colonial policy and practice. All we are now trying to show is that the inspiration of colonial policy by humanitarian ideals is no modern invention, but as old as western rule.

'But policy is a matter not only of purpose but performance, and it must be judged by its operation in practice.' In politics, as in law, men must be held to intend the natural consequences of their acts, and the natural consequences of colonial practice have differed widely from the humanitarian aims set forth in colonial policy. This has often been attributed to hypocrisy. On the suppression of the slave trade in 1807, humanitarians advocated the encouragement of commerce as a means of creating an interest which would have a strong motive for co-operating with the abolition of slavery. 'Thus at an early date that intimate connection between idealism and commerce was established which has exposed African administration to the easy cynicism of those who see in every declaration of interest in the African's welfare the veiled intention to secure benefits for the mother country.' In French colonial policy there is often a note of warm cordiality, 'qui *parfois* part vraiment du cœur'.[1] Raffles had a sincere liking for Malays, and claimed 'the happiness to release several millions of his fellow creatures from a state of bondage and oppression' under the Dutch; but Van den Bosch regarded him as solely concerned to build up British trade. Van den Bosch was unquestionably a philanthropist who, long before he ruled Java, had shown practical sympathy with the Socialist experiments of Robert Owen, yet, according to his Liberal successors, he 'wrapped a gilt

[1] *African Survey*, p. 133; Bousquet, p. 156 (italics *sic*).

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175 coating of philanthropic theory round a bitter pill of practice'. The Liberal leader, Van de Putte, was genuinely convinced that economic individualism would create welfare in Java, but Ethical critics remarked that Liberals 'balanced their love for the natives against regard for their own pockets'. The Ethical reformers in their turn were charged by a later generation with 'hoisting the Cross in place of the Jolly Roger, but without changing the sailing orders'.

Yet charges of conscious hypocrisy cannot be sustained. In almost every generation there have been reformers sincerely zealous for native welfare but, while picturing a golden future in the warm glow of their imagination, they have judged their predecessors in the cold light of actual achievement. In colonial relations a wide gap between policy and practice seems perennial, as if there were some factor in the nature of such relations by which the lofty aims of policy are continually frustrated in their practical application. Let us try to elucidate the cause of this divergence by studying the evolution of tropical economy under the rule of *laissez-faire*, when economic forces were left uncontrolled.

3. Tropical Economy

000 In the study of tropical economy it seems necessary, even at the risk of emphasizing platitudes, to go back to elementary principles of economic activity. The endeavours of all colonial powers to enhance progress and welfare in their tropical dependencies are of necessity conditioned by certain economic laws. One fundamental principle is the economic process of natural selection by the survival of the cheapest, known technically as the Law of Substitution. This does not imply deliberate substitution, but is a natural law operating independently of human volition; it is the economic aspect of the evolutionary principle of natural selection by the survival of the fittest. In times of famine, the man or beast that needs less for subsistence is, other things being equal, most likely to survive. Stronger men may take the food out of his mouth, but the ability to sustain life on a minimum of nourishment has in itself survival value. In Burma some poor flooded areas gave a yield below the margin of subsistence for Burmans, and they are cultivated by Indians who can make a living on them. This process of natural selection is reinforced by reason. Everyone would pay twopence rather than threepence for the same thing; that is rational, a matter of universal common sense. There is an economic process, active everywhere and always, tending in all

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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Southeast Asia and World History

648 175 At the present time the whole of Southeast Asia is obviously and dangerously entangled in world history. Often it is suggested that this is quite a new thing. Actually, there is nothing new in the entanglement of Southeast Asia in world history. After pointing out that the Southeast Asian states derived their civilization from India but fell within the political orbit of China, Professor Coedes summarizes the consequences:

> Most of these states have reacted to the great shocks that have disturbed the Indian peninsular and the Middle Kingdom. The conquests of Samudragupta in the Ganges Valley and South India in the 4th century and the expansionist policy of Chola emperors of Tanjore in the 11th century have had their repercussions on the other side of the Bay of Bengal. Even more markedly has the history of Further India been influenced by affairs in China. The Chinese have never looked favorably on the growth of strong powers in the southern seas, and it deserves notice that Funan, Cambodia, and the Javanese and Sumatran realms reached the zenith of their prosperity during just those epochs when the great dynasties of China were enfeebled. Also these countries are mutually linked together by numerous ties, geographic and economic, and every revolution in any one of them, by disturbing the whole region, has had repercussions on the others.[5]

Similarly, Krom suggests links between the course of events in India and the spread of Indian settlements over Southeast Asia.[6]

648 439 In a talk on the Tropical Far East and world history at the Siam Society, Bangkok, Furnivall pointed to economic

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5. J. S. Furnivall, "The Tropical Far East and World History," Journal of the Siam Society, Volume 39, Part 2 (January 1952), pp. 120-21.

6. Ibid., p. 121.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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648 geography for an explanation of the relations between South-
439 east Asia and the outer world. The history of the China trade and the spice trade, Furnivall indicated, had revealed that Southeast Asia was of minor importance in each trade route, but it was significant as a byway along both routes, and it was sensitive accordingly to convulsions affecting the course of trade along either route. In Furnivall's words:

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> For China there have always been two main lines of communication with the West: the land route across central Asia, and the sea route round the coast. Throughout the ages traders have followed whichever route seemed easier. Both routes, however, are liable to interruption. The land route is exposed to wild hordes in central Asia and to the results of political catastrophes in the Middle and Near East. The sea route can easily be blocked at its main gateway, the Straits of Malacca. Yet, when both these two main routes are blocked, there is still a byway. Traffic can still find a way down the great rivers of Southeast Asia -- the Irrawaddy, the Salween, the Mekong, and the Red River -- diverging when convenient to the shorter rivers, the Sittang and the Menam. Time and again these rivers, and especially the Irrawaddy, have played a part in history.
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> For the trade in spices from the Moluccas, the Straits of Malacca are of supreme importance; there is only one main route. But this narrow channel can easily be held against outsiders. When it is blocked, however, there are two byways. One byway is through the Sunda Straits between Java and Sumatra; repeatedly throughout the course of history we find mention of Bantam under various names, and of places close to Bantam -- Jakarta or Batavia, and Benkulen. There is also a second byway, from various points along the western coast of Burma and Malaya cutting across the mainland to the Gulf of Siam or continuing further to the Mekong and Annam.[7]

Colonization, Old and New

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The search for gold following Vespasian's placing of an embargo on this precious metal from Rome during 69-79 A.D.

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7. Ibid., p. 121-22.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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175 was suggested by Furnivall as a cause of the foundation of
439 Indian trading centers at convenient sites along the coasts
648 and main rivers of Southeast Asia. The same author places the date of the first Indian colonization in the area at about 150 A.D.[8] Harrison, however, maintains that the first definite Indian settlements were established in the first century A.D.[9]

175 Indian settlements were typically colonial in the
177 old sense of foreign settlement without foreign rule. The
563 settlers came as traders, intermarried with the local people,
648 acquired wealth, and formed an aristocracy. Then, as new migration ceased, the Indian rulers and aristocracy were absorbed into the people. In the inscriptions, the language and written characters took on native forms, and the names of persons and places were no longer Indian but native. Similarly, in the religious monuments and other buildings a native style was superimposed on the earlier Indian models.

175 Most authors have credited these Indian settlers
177 with having brought Indian culture to Southeast Asia. Harrison,
648 for example, takes for granted that "Indians who voyaged overseas to Southeast Asia naturally brought with them the ideas and practices of Hinduism and Buddhism."[10] He further speculates that "traders, adventurers and craftsmen were followed by Brahman and Buddhist priests and teachers,

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8. Ibid., p. 127.

9. Brian Harrison, South-east Asia (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1954), p. 10.

10. Ibid., p. 12.

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175 carrying the civilizing influence of Indian cultural and
177 spiritual life and implanting it in these new lands by
648 introducing the art of writing and the classical Sanskrit language and literature; bringing as well their own vernacular languages to enrich the vocabularies of Southeast Asia.[11]

175 It may be argued, nevertheless, that since there is little
177 good evidence for any large Indian emigration to Southeast
439 Asia, much Indian culture could have been brought back by
648 cosmopolitanized Southeast Asian traders who often spent months in India waiting for the monsoons to change their direction.[12] It should be noted in this connection that during this time of early Indian colonization trade relations were also extended westward by Indonesians (who earlier reached Madagascar) and other Southeast Asians.

175 During the expansion of Islam, from 1350 to 1500,
648 Moslem colonization followed the Indian pattern. Thus we may say that formerly a colony was merely a settlement in a foreign land and the settler had little or no political
[797] connection with the home land. The Indian and Moslem became foreign rulers, but they did not establish foreign rule. Subsequently, the Portuguese and Spaniards came as royal agents and with a warrant from the Pope to undertake both
175 the conquest and conversion of the people. The old idea
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563 of a colony as a settlement survived: there were grandees

11. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

12. The author is indebted to Professor Lauriston Sharp for the development of this idea.

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175 648 569 with large estates, permanent immigrants of lower rank who married native women, and priests spending a lifetime in their parishes. But the colonies were ruled by Governors from Europe. They were both settlers and rulers. The Dutch came merely as traders, but they could obtain tropical produce only in the form of tribute; economic circumstances required them to accept sovereignty on behalf of the home company and to rule the people indirectly through native chieftains, and also to settle permanently, though on a comparatively small scale, to supervise native cultivation. They were primarily rulers and were settlers only by force of circumstance. In the 19th century the English carried the process a stage further. Through the industrial revolution they had goods to sell, and the object of their policy was not tribute but trade. This required direct rule, but not settlement, except in the ports. Finally, with the growth of capitalism and the opening of the Suez Canal, the typical system of colonial development was by foreign capital with European management and imported Asian labor. Thus there was a process of development from the old colonial system of foreign settlement without foreign rule to a new system of foreign rule without settlement.[13]

Impact of the Changing Trend of Trade with the West

175 177 648 In the nineteenth century, the age-old means of communication between the different parts of Southeast Asia

13. Furnivall, op. cit.

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648 were revolutionized by the techniques and aims of the West.
175 After 1850, European-owned steamships began the gradual
177 process of taking over the bulk of the inter-port trade
648 from native sailing boats and Chinese junks. The opening
439 of the Suez Canal in 1869 made possible the great modern
505 expansion of Western rule and trade, and thereby brought about the economic and social revolution which has created the Southeast Asia of today. The year 1870 is the real dividing-line between medieval and modern in the history of Southeast Asia.[14]

175 Whereas during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eight-
177 eenth centuries the various European nations active in South-
433 east Asia had, on the whole, limited themselves to trading
439 and acquisition of high-priced nonbulky commodities, such
648 as spices, the economic policy of the nineteenth century called for large quantities of bulky goods, such as sugar, fibers, oil seeds, coffee, and copra. Since the peasantry of Southeast Asia, almost without exception, raised only subsistence crops and had only limited surplus, it became necessary for the colonial powers to increase agricultural production. This was done in two ways: through the application of pressure on the peasantry to produce for export, and through the development of large-scale plantation agriculture.[15] The shift of emphasis from trade to production

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14. Harrison, op. cit., p. 197.

15. Karl J. Pelzer, "The Resource Pattern of Southeast Asia," Southeast Asia in the World Today, ed. Phillips Talbot. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 109.

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175 thus set a new stage -- the development of the natural
177 resources of the whole region.
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439 This change-over from a subsistence economy to a
648 commercial economy involved the large-scale expansion of traditional crops or the development of new commercial crops.
[436] It was stimulated by the introduction or expansion of a money
[489] economy, the flow of capital and the development of land and
[69] sea transport. It was supported by Western technology, methods of administration and systems of justice. This whole process greatly affected the traditional institution, up-
175 setting the balance of a medieval world. The free, indi-
177 vidualist spirit of Western rule and commerce cut at the
[59] roots of traditional social life, undermining the corporate
[423] strength of family and village. But the most serious direct
[426] threat of the new economic forces was to the peasant's owner-
[566] ship of land. Expanding economies, new money taxes and cheap imports meant better business than ever for the money lender. Many peasants became ruined by debt and lost their lands. Indebtedness and debt slavery were not new in Southeast Asia; the latter was fairly soon stamped out, but the former now became much more widespread than before, resulting in the creation of a landless proletariat.[16]

184 Characteristics of Current Southeast Asian Economy

In spite of all the differences among the countries of Southeast Asia in the natural environment, ethnic

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16. Harrison, op. cit., p. 210.

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ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

ITS HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY AND DIPLOMATIC CLIMATE

John L. Christian

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AN apposite instance of the interdependence of geography and history is provided by the tense rivalry between Great Britain and France in Southeast Asia before 1910. This rivalry, which was essentially a problem in the historical geography and diplomatic climate of the times, had its origin in the astonishingly persistent belief that somewhere between the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea would be found a short route to the wealth and trade of interior China, particularly Yunnan and Szechwan.

Contemporaries regarded it as axiomatic that a Sino-French or Siamese-French war over French aggressions in Indochina would result in an Anglo-French war. Indeed, twice (in 1893 and 1896) the two countries were on the verge of battle for control of the Menam and Mekong routes to Yunnan. But geography and malaria were against the diplomats. These routes never have come into use; and the area where Burma, French Indochina, and Thailand now march in a common frontier is today one of the least-known regions of all Asia.

Largely because of the existence of close ties between the two countries since the maturing of the Entente Cordiale of 1904, it is easy to forget that they were in acrimonious rivalry in Southeast Asia for decades, particularly from 1862 to 1904, when Britain kept careful watch over French activities from Oman and Afghanistan in the Middle East to New Caledonia and the New Hebrides in the South Seas. In this instance certain historicogeographical aspects of the problem are basically more important than the usual facets of diplomacy and politics.

Beginnings of French and British Interests

Historically, French interest in the lands east of Suez began with the organization of the French East India Company, in 1604, the dispatch of the first French ships to the Orient, in 1611, and the beginnings of the French Oriental establishments, in the middle of the century. As early as 1631 the French regarded Madagascar as of particular value because of its favorable location for extending their trade to Southeast Asia.[1] By 1663 French priests were acquainted with coastal Burma, Siam, and Cambodia and in that year made their first crossing of the Malay Peninsula, near modern Tenasserim, while

[1] The Cambridge History of India, Vol. 5, British India, 1497–1858, edited by H. H. Dodwell, London, 1929, p. 62.

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en route to Siam.[2] Shortly thereafter the French, hard pressed on the mainland of India, proposed that their headquarters be moved to the Pegu coast. The French naval expedition of six ships that reached the Bay of Bengal in 1690 had as its object the establishment of commerce with Burma and Siam. In fact, the failure of the trade of the British East India Company in Burma and Siam in the seventeenth century was traced to the superiority of French influence in those states.[3]

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In the eighteenth century Dupleix was interested in Burma and Siam because of the abundance there of teakwood for shipbuilding, and he suggested to his superiors that they acquire a portion of the Burmese coast.[4] During Burma's internal strife that resulted in the establishment of the Alaungpaya dynasty in 1755, the French made the mistake of aiding the defeated Talaings, while the British aided the conquerors. As a result, Alaungpaya acquired a supply of French arms, including 1300 muskets and forty 24-pounders, together with 200 French gunners, with which Burma became the premier state in Southeast Asia. The French, meantime, evened the score by inciting the Burmese to destroy the British colony on Negrais Island.[5]

In the nineteenth century Britain sent to the native states of Southeast Asia numerous embassies that had as their primary or secondary purpose inquiry into the extent of French influence in these states. For example, the missions to Burma of Symes in 1795 and 1802 and of Canning in 1803 and 1809; that of Crawfurd in 1822 to Siam and in 1826 to Burma; that of Finlayson in 1821 and Crawfurd in 1830 to Cochinchina; and those of Captain Burney, Sir James Brooke, and Sir John Bowring to Siam in the first half of the century were all interested in British trade and French ambition.

The Indochinese Peninsula

Ever since the early merchant adventurers were forced to pass through the Strait of Malacca or the Sunda Strait to reach the China coast the great Indochinese peninsula has been of interest to Europeans, principally as an obstacle to a direct route to the Far East, as that term is generally understood. In the past century it became common knowledge among Europeans in the Orient that at one point, far above the head of navigation, the Yangtze flows within 600 miles of the northern reaches of the Bay of Bengal, whereas it is some 4300 miles by sea from Calcutta to Shanghai. It was only natural that

[2] Adrien Launay: Histoire générale de la Société des Missions-Étrangères, 3 vols., Paris, 1894; reference in Vol. 1, p. 74.

[3] D. G. E. Hall: Early English Intercourse with Burma (Rangoon Univ. Publs., No. 1), London, 1928, pp. 138–153.

[4] V. McL. Thompson: Dupleix and His Letters, New York, 1933, p. 721; and Alfred Martineau: Dupleix et l'Inde française, 1749–1754, Paris, 1927, p. 451.

[5] D. G. E. Hall: The Tragedy of Negrais, *Journ. Burma Research Soc.*, Vol. 21, 1931, pp. 1–133.

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FIG. 1.

early cartographers and pioneers of commerce should assume that the most direct route to interior China would be along one of the great meridional rivers of the Indochinese peninsula to the Yangtze.[6] At one point, somewhat north of the present Burma Road, the Yangtze, Mekong, and Salween are compressed within a distance of 48 miles (separated by ridges reaching up to 8000 feet above the floor of the adjacent valley).[7] But the Irrawaddy, contrary to early beliefs, does not rise on the Tibetan plateau as do the other great meridional rivers[8]

[6] Bruno Hassenstein: Some Contributions to the Geographical and Cartographical Literature of the Indo-Chinese Frontier Territories. n. p., n. d., gives a useful list of the principal sources on the area before 1900. Reports of early British attempts to penetrate India's northeastern frontier are summarized in "Selections of Papers regarding the Hill Tracts between Assam and Burmah." 10 vols., Calcutta, 1873.

[7] For a photographic report see J. F. Rock: Through the Great River Trenches of Asia. *Natl. Geogr. Mag.*, Vol. 50, 1926, pp. 133–186.

[8] A fact first noted in Sir Henry Yule: A Narrative of the Mission Sent by the Governor-General of India to the Court of Ava in 1855. London, 1858, p. 272.

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and thus occupies a unique place among the rivers of Southeast Asia, as Professor L. Dudley Stamp has recently pointed out.[9]

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Geographical and historical knowledge of the area within 300 miles of the point where the frontiers of Thailand, French Indochina, and Burma now meet was extremely sketchy until the beginning of the present century. For example, Dupuis, in his study of Tongking in 1872, prepared a map that showed the Burmese possessions reaching to the Black River, within 200 miles of Hanoi, into territory concerning which King Mindon and his successor, Theebaw, had only the slightest knowledge and no jurisdiction.[10] Dupuis was perhaps willing to show extensive Burmese territory in the hope that France would inherit Mindon's holdings; but the map was later to plague the French, who, after the British annexation of Burma, in 1886, found it to their advantage to maintain that Burma had at no time extended even to the Mekong.

Garnier's Expedition

In 1858 France seized Saigon; in 1862 the Court of Hué signed a treaty that surrendered Cochinchina to France; and in 1867 Siam was forced to recognize the French as overlords of Cambodia. As a result of the treaty with Annam, Francis Garnier was appointed Inspector of Native Affairs in the new protectorate, with permission to travel on the Mekong. On June 5, 1866, the De Lagree–Garnier expedition left Saigon in the first organized European exploration of the hinterland of Indochina from the China side.[11] On April 29, 1867, the party reached Luang Prabang, a place seldom visited by Europeans since the Dutch trader Gerard van Wusthof arrived there in 1641.[12] By June the party had reached the point where Burma, Thailand, and French Indochina now meet. Garnier noted there the sale of British cotton goods in the bazaar of Kiang Sen; and De Lagree reported that tribes on the left bank of the Mekong were loyal to Siam. Both explorers observed the presence of Burmese agents with authority at the principal crossings of the Mekong. On August 23, 1867, De Lagree visited Keng Tung, in what was undoubtedly Burmese territory; and thereafter the British in Lower Burma were ever watchful of French designs on territory bordering the upper Mekong. The Frenchmen passed on to Kiang Hung town, which has been under Chinese sovereignty since the Sino-British boundary settlements and

[9] The Irrawaddy River, *Geogr. Journ.*, Vol. 95, 1940, pp. 329–356 (see note elsewhere in this number of the *Geographical Review*).

[10] J. Dupuis: L'ouverture du Fleuve Rouge au commerce et les événements du Tong-Kin, 1872–73, Paris, 1879.

[11] Hugh Clifford: Further India, London, 1904, pp. 129–254, gives a vivid account of the Garnier expedition. The basic source is Francis Garnier: Voyage d'exploration en Indo-Chine effectué pendant les années 1866, 1867 et 1868 . . . , 2 vols. and atlas, Paris, 1873.

[12] Garnier seems to have been the first to make readily available a translation of Van Wusthof's diary. The translation, which was made for Garnier by M. P. Vœlkel, was printed, with Garnier's annotations, in the *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie*, Ser. 6, Vol. 2, 1871, pp. 249–289.

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487 treaties of 1894 and 1897, where they noted that both Burma and
175 China had agents in the court. On March 2, 1868, the party left the
439 Mekong, and they reached Talifu by a journey that took them
648 directly across the route followed by British and Burmese trade to interior Yunnan. The Moslem Sultan of Tali ordered the Garnier party away from his territory. Garnier explained the action: The Sultan has mistaken us for Englishmen. After the death of De Lagree in Yunnan young Garnier took the party out by way of Hankow, whence they traveled on to Shanghai by the American steamer *Plymouth Rock*. The Garnier expedition touched the Mekong at no point above Kiang Hung, a city to which the Britisher Captain McLeod had preceded them by thirty years. McLeod made his remarkable journey from Moulmein to Kiang Hung with six elephants and was the first European to penetrate China by the Salween route for purposes of examining trade routes.

When once it had been reported[13] that Garnier intended to "strike the Irrawaddy at Bhamo" and that he was expected also at Keng Tung and Mandalay, British interest in French activities in Southeast Asia was keen. Major General Albert Fytche, Chief Commissioner of British Burma, proceeded to Mandalay and secured Mindon's signature to a treaty that compromised Burma's independence.[14] Extraterritoriality was secured (abandoned in 1879). British agents were permitted to sit in Burmese customhouses; and Burma's power to control commerce across her territory to China was further restricted. A Resident was authorized for Mandalay, and the Irrawaddy was opened for navigation by British steamers. Captain Strover was stationed as agent in Bhamo and traveled up in November, 1868, by the first British steamer to reach that river port 40 miles from the Chinese frontier.[15] He was not, however, provided with a gunboat, as had at first been suggested; nor did Britain assume control of Burma's foreign relations, as her officers in British Burma had urged.[16]

The Sladen and Browne Expeditions

After much patient work, General Fytche in 1868 obtained permission from the King of Burma and authorization from the government of India for the dispatch of an expedition from Bhamo to Tali. Colonel E. B. Sladen, Political Agent at Mandalay, set out[17] with a group of six Europeans and a guard of 50 sepoys toward the same

[13] The London *Times*, June 7, 1868.

[14] Albert Fytche: Burma, Past and Present, 2 vols. (in 1), London, 1878. See the Anglo-Burmese treaty of Oct. 25, 1867, in *British and Foreign State Papers, 1870–71*, pp. 61 and 1305–1308.

[15] J. G. Scott, assisted by J. P. Hardiman: Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States, 2 parts in 5 vols., Rangoon, 1900–1901; reference in Part I, Vol. 1, p. 64.

[16] Alexander Bowers: Bhamo Expedition: A Report on the Practicability of Re-opening the Trade Route between Burma and Western China, Rangoon, 1869, p. 100.

[17] The official account is E. B. Sladen: Narrative of the Expedition to Explore the Trade Routes to China via Bhamo, Rangoon, 1869.

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goal as the Garnier party that had left Saigon two years before. The Sladen party reached Momein (modern Tengyueh) in September, 1868, three months after Garnier's return to Saigon. Colonel Sladen could get no farther than Tengyueh, however, because of the disturbed state of the country as a result of the Panthay rebellion.[18]

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Eventually Lord Salisbury yielded to the fears of British commercial interests that the French would entirely absorb the markets of Yunnan and neighboring provinces and sent an expedition to reopen British trade routes (1875). Colonel Horace Browne, accompanied by the geographer Ney Elias, who is remembered for his journey through Mongolia and his survey of the Yellow River, succeeded in getting farther than Manwyne, to Serai, where they learned that Augustus Margary, who had gone on ahead, had been murdered (1875).[19] Browne's party thereupon returned to Bhamo as the last official British attempt to open a direct route to interior China. As a matter of fact, the reports of Grosvenor, Baber, and Davenport, who were sent from Hankow to Yunnan in connection with the British demand for reparation over the Margary affair, convinced the home government that the topographic difficulties of the route from Bhamo to Yunnan and Szechwan were too great for practical railway construction.[20]

Government of India's Lack of Interest

British officials in Burma frequently complained of the impossibility of getting the government of India to give any attention to the northeastern frontier. That government was wholly occupied with the northwestern frontier and the danger of Russian aggression through Afghanistan and the Khyber Pass. As early as the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1816–1818 Dr. Francis Buchanan, of laterite fame,[21] had advised the East India Company against "giving the Chinese any just reason for suspicion by forming pretensions to any part of the mountainous region which separates the two Empires."[22] Lord Lawrence, the Viceroy, had advised against the Sladen expedition: "His Excellency can hardly conceive any step more imprudent than for British merchants to settle in Bhamo or a British official to be stationed there for any purpose."[23] In the short viceroyalty of Lord

[18] This disturbance hindered the British and aided the French. Captain Strover reported that during his first three years in Bhamo "not a single consignment belonging to British firms had reached Bhamo."

[19] The resultant British demand for compensation gave rise to the famed Chefoo Convention, a recent study of which is S. T. Wang: The Margary Affair and the Chefoo Agreement, New York, 1940.

[20] Particularly E. Colborne Baber: Travels and Researches in the Interior of China, *Royal Geogr. Soc. Suppl. Papers*, Vol. 1, 1882–1885, pp. 1–201, especially pp. 154–192, "Notes on the Route Followed by Mr. Grosvenor's Mission through Western Yünnan," reprinted from *Parliamentary Rept., China, No. 3 (1878)*.

[21] See this number of the *Geographical Review*, p. 177.

[22] Papers respecting the Nepaul War, London, 1824, p. 45.

[23] Letter from the government of India to Fytche, dated Simla, July 18, 1867, in Sladen, *op. cit.*, appendix T.

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487 Mayo the government of India, even at the risk of losing control over
175 the trade routes to Yunnan, again stated its policy:[24] "The future annexation of Burma, or any of its adjacent states, is not an event
439 which I . . . desire; . . . I should view with extreme regret . . .
648 the necessity of occupation, or of assuming, even in a temporary manner, the government of any of the states lying adjacent to the province now in your charge." In short, the official attitude of the government of India has been summarized as follows: "The condition of the Northeastern frontier caused no Governor-General a single sleepless night."[25]

Railways Suggested

496 Meantime, British commercial interests continued to demand
487 that the Indian government provide facilities for trade to western China in order to forestall any French plans to acquire prior advan-
175 tages in Yunnan and Szechwan. The *Parliamentary Papers* alone
439 contain nearly twenty reports on expeditions and proposals with
648 respect to trans-Burma trade with western China and the upper Mekong from 1824 to 1900. The most persistent advocates of British penetration of Yunnan, Szechwan, and Kwangsi from the Bay of Bengal were Captain Richard Sprye and his son, who for half a century (1840–1890) presented numerous proposals for railways and highways into western Siam, to the Shan and Laos States, and to southern China.

Perhaps the best-publicized effort was that by Archibald R. Colquhoun, a deputy commissioner in British Burma, and Holt S. Hallett, a civil engineer. Colquhoun, who was ardently anti-French, resigned his office when the government of Burma refused him leave to survey a railway route from Moulmein to Szemao by way of Chiengmai in Siam. He became a special correspondent for the London *Times*, traveled overland from Canton to Bhamo, and wrote voluminously against French designs on Southeast Asia.[26] The Colquhoun-Hallett railway plan suffered from a general suspicion that it was merely a means for "taking the King of Siam by the hand and leading him into the great British Indian family."[27] Although Colquhoun's line is actually the shortest practicable route from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnanfu (Kunming), it passes through sparsely settled country that is everywhere malarial below 4000 feet. There is not today a railway line, caravan route, or highway, British or French or Siamese, that anywhere follows the Colquhoun-Hallett survey.

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[24] Fytche, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 124–125 (letter from Lord Mayo).

[25] D. G. E. Hall, edit.: The Dalhousie-Phayre Correspondence, 1852–1856, London, 1932, p. xv.

[26] A. R. Colquhoun: Across Chryse, 2 vols., 2nd edit., London, 1883; A. R. Colquhoun and H. S. Hallett: Report on the Railway Connexion of Burmah and China, London, 1887. See also H. S. Hallett: A Thousand Miles on an Elephant in the Shan States, Edinburgh and London, 1890.

[27] Philippe Lehault: France et Angleterre en Asie, Paris, 1892, p. 562.

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British Annexation of Upper Burma

French intrigue in Upper Burma, with its consequent danger to British commercial interests, was the principal reason for the annexation of independent Burma, in 1886.[28] Jules Ferry had pledged repeatedly that no French arms should be supplied Burma through Tongking. But British suspicions were aroused upon the discovery that a Franco-Burmese agreement had been signed providing for the construction of a railway, the establishment of a Bank of Burma with French capital, control of the Burmese postal system, and establishment of a line of French steamers on the Irrawaddy.[29] The die was cast when the British learned of a secret agreement to supply arms from Tongking after the signing of the Franco-Burmese treaty of January 15, 1885.[30]

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The Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, sent a message to the senior official in Lower Burma: "If, however, the present proceedings should eventuate in any serious attempt [by the French] to forestall us in Upper Burma I should not hesitate to annex the country."[31] After the publication of a "remarkably indiscreet" report by M. de Lanessan on the progress of French activities in Burma,[32] the Secretary of State on November 11, 1886, wired the Viceroy: "Please instruct General Prendergast to advance on Mandalay at once."[33]

British occupation of Upper Burma was followed by expeditions into the various Shan States tributary to King Theebaw. In 1890 a British party under Sir George Scott reached Keng Tung. Meantime both the French and the Siamese had asserted claims to parts of the former Burmese possessions. During the Franco-Burmese negotiations of 1885 Burma purported to cede part of Kiang Hung across the Mekong to the French. The British, as heirs to Theebaw's dominions, claimed the area but later awarded Kiang Hung to China on condition that it should never be ceded to another power.[34] However, the Chinese almost immediately gave part of Kiang Hung to the French.

Further difficulty arose over the substate of Mong Hsing, a trans-Mekong territory ruled by a junior branch of the governing family of Keng Tung. In March, 1894, Mr. Stirling of the Burma

[28] The British were fully aware of Burmese and French plans, which were reported in detail to the government of India. The Blue Book "Correspondence Relating to Burmah since the Accession of King Theebaw, in October, 1878," has 266 pages of dispatches, C. 4614 in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1886.

[29] Comte A. Mahé de la Bourdonnais: Un français en Birmanie, Paris, 1891, pp. 295–306.

[30] C. 4614 (*op. cit.*, footnote 28), No. 105.

[31] Sir Alfred Lyall: Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, 2 vols., London, 1905; reference in Vol. 2, p. 118.

[32] J. L. de Lanessan: Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée d'examiner le projet de loi portant approbation de la convention complémentaire de commerce, signée à Paris le 15 janvier 1885, entre la France et la Birmanie, Paris, 1885. Lanessan became an aggressive governor general of French Indochina (1891 to 1894).

[33] C. 4614 (*op. cit.*), No. 122.

[34] Sir Edward Hertslet: Hertslet's China Treaties, 3rd edit., revised by G. E. P. Hertslet, with the assistance of Edward Parkes, 2 vols., London, 1908; reference in Vol. 1, pp. 90–109.

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487 Commission visited Mong Hsing; and he was followed, on Christmas
175 Day, 1894, by Sir George Scott and Mr. Wharry, Chinese Political
439 Adviser to the government of Burma, in connection with the Anglo-
648 French Mekong Commission. M. Pavie, the French commissioner, had sent the French flag to Mong Hsing before the arrival of the British party, and the sawbwa had hoisted the tricolor over his palace. Pavie, who reached Mong Hsing on New Year's Day, had intended to welcome Sir George Scott to French territory. However, Scott had the French flag lowered and ran up his own. For a few months the incident had all the possibilities of an Oriental Fashoda nearly five years before the famous incident on the Nile.[36] The London *Times* had columns about the Mong Hsing incident; and Pavie in private conversation with Scott doubted the validity of French claims to the bazaar town. On January 15, 1895, a telegraphic message from the Viceroy announced an agreement with France that set mid-channel of the Mekong as the boundary.[36] Thus Mong Hsing, which had flown the British flag and had had a British post office for a year, was acquired by France. Siam's claims were quieted by the Treaty of Chantabun, which transferred all Siamese rights east of the Mekong to France. The remainder of the subordinate state of Keng Cheng went first to Siam but was acquired by France in May, 1896. British interests with respect to the Mekong frontier suffered from frequent changes of policy: Lord Roseberry favored the buffer-state idea;[37] Lord Kimberley ordered the occupation of Mong Hsing; then Lord Salisbury, "without exception the worst Foreign Secretary we ever had for matters east of Suez,"[38] gave up the state to France. The French secured a strategic, natural frontier for their Indochinese holdings and had the "further gratification of having enlarged them beyond all expectation."[39]

Later Rivalries

Anglo-French rivalry continued in Yunnan along Burma's northern frontiers until well into the present century. Rival railway and mining claims were the most frequent causes of friction. Article XII of the Anglo-Chinese agreement of February 4, 1897, contemplated

[36] The Mong Hsing–Keng Cheng incident is treated definitively by Clarence Hendershot: The Conquest, Pacification, and Administration of the Shan States by the British, 1886–1897 (Diss., Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1936). The best French account is contained in "Mission [Auguste] Pavie Indo-Chine, 1879–1895: Géographie et Voyages," Vol. 5, Paris, 1902, pp. 264–284.

[36] "Livre Jaune: Affaires du Haute-Mekong et de Siam, 1893–1902." By Article IV of the declaration, the two governments agreed that all commercial and other advantages conceded in the two Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Szechwan either to France or to Great Britain by their respective conventions of March 2, 1894, and June 20, 1895, and future privileges should "be extended and rendered common to both powers."

[37] G. L. LaFuze: Great Britain, France, and the Siamese Question, 1885–1904 (Diss., Ph.D., Univ. of Illinois, 1935), discusses the various proposals for a buffer state.

[38] G. E. Mitton [Lady Scott], edit.: Scott of the Shan Hills, London, 1936, p. 166.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 215.

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railway construction in Yunnan and provided for connection with Burmese lines.[40] No development, however, took place and the British abandoned their surveys beyond Bhamo and Lashio. The agreement between France and China of April 10, 1898, authorized the French to construct a railway from the Tongking frontier to Yunnanfu.[41] This was carried out, but the plans for carrying the line farther were discarded. Activities of French explorers and missionaries in Yunnan along the Burma frontier were watched closely; the British in Burma were only mildly enthusiastic about the explorations of Prince Henry of Orleans from the Mekong to Assam across the top of Burma in 1895. The British were careful to open consulates in Szemao (Es-mok) and other inland treaty ports of Yunnan and Kwangsi that had little trans-Burma trade.

Siam probably owed her independence to the desire of both her neighbors to have a buffer state between them, the British having decided that Burma was "too soft and pulpy" to serve in that capacity. As matters turned out, France got much the lion's share of territory shorn from Siam. There is not in Burma today any area that was for any length of time Siamese territory, a fact recognized by the present Thai minister to the United States, who issued a communiqué indicating that, in contrast with her present demands upon the French possessions, Thailand is entirely satisfied with her Burma frontier.[42]

British development of Singapore after 1819, introduction of steam navigation to the Orient, the opening of the Suez Canal and the American transcontinental railway in 1869 only heightened the rivalry for alternate short cuts to "the greatest market in the world." By 1882 French engineers had completed surveys of a proposed Kra canal; and on June 8, 1883, Ferdinand de Lesseps presented the completed plans to the King of Siam as "la route Français au Tonkin." That distinguished Frenchman spoke of Bangkok as "the beginning of the Menam route to Yunnan."[43]

By about 1910 the epic age of European imperialism had come to an end; and since that time there have been no considerable additions to the French and British empires east of the Red Sea. Yunnan and Kweichow, for which the rivalry was particularly acute, during the past decade were perhaps less subject to foreign influence than any other provinces of China proper. Lord Curzon (Viceroy of

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[40] J. V. A. MacMurray, edit.: Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China 1894-1919 (Publs. Carnegie Endowment for Internatl. Peace. Division of Internatl. Law, Washington), 2 vols., New York, 1921; reference in Vol. 1, pp. 96-97.

[41] *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 124.

[42] *The New York Times*, Oct. 6, 1940. Britain took compensation in the Malay states of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perak, which had been under loose Siamese protection before their cession to Britain in 1909.

[43] La Bourdonnais, *op. cit.*, pp. 232-241 and 265-284, discusses French interest in a Kra canal and contains a copy of De Lesseps' report.

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India from 1898 to 1905), for whom frontiers and imperialism in the grand manner had great fascination, forced the Iman of Muscat to renounce the lease of a coaling site to France,[44] saw the Hague Court decide in Britain's favor in 1905 the question of the grant of the French flag to Muscat dhows, carried on an intimate correspondence with King Chualalongkorn of Siam, and considered that country an outpost of the British Empire.[45] From the Olympian heights of Simla Lord Curzon took pride in Britannia's supremacy in Southeast Asia. The Indian Ocean was a British preserve: "At no point in the long stretches of British territory washed by its surf has the flag of any European rival ever been hoisted since the French colours were struck over Cuddalore in 1783."[46] Curzon dreamed of a grand trunk railway from Calais to Shanghai by way of British India and sent Major Davies to do the necessary survey work in Yunnan.[47] He believed mistakenly that India and China, the two most populous countries in the world, would in his time be joined by steel rails.

The great delusion that the Irrawaddy, the Salween, the Menam, or the Mekong would provide the entrepôt to interior China was the key to Anglo-French policy and rivalry in Southeast Asia for a century. The delusion died hard. Eventually, however, "loath as most Englishmen are to admit it," trade decided that none of these river valleys provided an economical entrance to China.[48] Likewise, it was at length realized that Indochina was not the path of empire. Both Britishers and Frenchmen, learning lessons from geography and history, agreed with Sir Henry Yule: At no time has a conqueror from India or Burma passed on to China, nor (with one minor exception) from China to India or Burma; nor did the conquests of any one of the great warriors of medieval Asia embrace any part of both countries.[49]

But the delusion was so persistent and complete that it amounted to a perfect case of mistaken identity. Meantime, "England annexed areas where she had interests to protect, France annexed areas where she *wished* to have interests to protect."[50]

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[44] Lovat Fraser: India under Curzon and After, New York, 1911, pp. 86–91, gives a convenient summary of French attempts to secure a base at the mouth of the Persian Gulf.

[45] Curzon wrote a brilliant defense of Britain's record in Siam (G. N. Curzon: The Siamese Boundary Question, *The Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 34, 1893, pp. 34–55).

[46] G. A. Ballard: Rulers of the Indian Ocean, London, 1927, p. 287.

[47] H. R. Davies: Yün-nan: The Link between India and the Yangtze, Cambridge, 1909. Davies urged construction, for political reasons, of a meter-gauge line from Burma to China at a cost of £30,000,000.

[48] Clifford (quoting Colborne Baber), *op. cit.*, p. 294. A governor general of French Indochina came to the same conclusion. "French Indochina cannot be considered as a country of commercial transit. Saigon can never compete with Singapore" (J. L. de Lanessan: L'Indo-Chine Française, Paris, 1889, p. 478).

[49] Yule's introduction to William Gill: The River of Golden Sand, 2 vols., London, 1880

[50] E. V. G. Kiernan: British Diplomacy in China, 1880–1885, London, 1939, p. 187.

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178 caused or hastened a flight to the relative
162 security of the city. These forces have been
369 operating in combination particularly in
361 Rangoon, Jakarta, Saigon, and Manila and largely are responsible for their extremely rapid postwar growth. Lesser cities in Java, for example, such as Surabaya, Jogjakarta, Semarang, and Surakarta, also have increased in population because of rural insecurity; and in Burma in several towns and cities up to 50 per cent of the population has been resident less than four years, for the same reasons. These migrations have not, however, necessarily been accompanied by greater employment opportunities and consequently cannot be regarded as indexes of more rapid urbanization and associated socioeconomic change.

184 The great cities of Southeast Asia possess
361 many features in common, not the least of
369 which is their youth. This quality they share also with several of the great cities of the United States, but there the resemblance
175 ceases.[11] In 1800 Rangoon, Saigon, and
178 Singapore did not yet exist in city form; Bangkok, the new capital of Thailand, was less than twenty years old; Manila and Batavia (Jakarta), though then about two hundred years old, were merely small coastal towns. They began to grow rapidly after the middle of the nineteenth century, as a consequence of the development of the treaty ports in China, the opening of Japan, the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown by the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, the opening of the

[11] For the most part the growth of the Southeast Asian cities was not associated with a total transformation of society but with a strong indigenous tradition, as in the case of Bangkok, or with the juxtaposition of a segment of a new civilization alongside the old, as in the case of Rangoon. In America the cities represented the culmination of a social transformation in a virtually unoccupied frontier region. The same is true of Manchuria, the northeastern frontier of pioneer settlement in China, which is more recently, and more highly, urbanized than any other part of China. In Manchuria, as in the United States, there is a quite regular gradation of city sizes, and the Primate City cannot be clearly identified.

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Suez Canal in 1869, and the consolidation of Western control, direct or indirect, over most of Southeast Asia in the 1890's, followed by American acquisition of the Philippines at the turn of the century.

More important, the great cities were, and to a large degree still are, foreign creations, essentially alien to the Southeast Asian landscape. Although several began as native settlements, they developed as foreign exclaves on the margins of Asia, in much the same way as did the plantation system and mining operations. With the exception of Bangkok, they represented and functioned as the overseas appendages of Western, not indigenous, interests, being what Spate has called "head-links"—the gates by which Western concepts entered to destroy and build and in which a new system of economic organization evolved.[13] Indeed, the concept of the Asian plural society was inspired by the contrast between the basically foreign great city and the indigenous agricultural village. The ties of the great city with its hinterland were primarily commercial and associated with foreign-controlled mining and plantation interests and with Chinese-dominated rice trade. Such direct political-administrative ties as did exist were restricted primarily to indigenous elites, small in number, which allied themselves with Western interests. Where the indigenous rural populations were affected by these urban-rural relations, it was primarily through the plantation or the mining system, both of which needed a large labor force, or through Indian or Chinese intermediaries.

On the other hand, the relations between an indigenous capital, like Bangkok in its earlier period, or Kyoto or Peking, and the agrarian society upon which it was based were of quite a different order. In these cases the capital represented the culmination of what might be termed a national *ethos*, the epitome of what Redfield has

[13] O. H. K. Spate, "Factors in the Development of Capital Cities," *Geographical Review*, October, 1942, p. 628.

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504 world's great ports and the most Western of
361 the great cities of Southeast Asia. A Crown Colony, it is the only great city without a large administrative hinterland, although it is the seat of the British High Commissioner for Southeast Asia. Since its founding by [175] Raffles in 1819, it has been a free port and an entrepôt for much of archipelagic Southeast Asia. About half of the 5.5 million tons of cargo that pass over Singapore's modern wharves originates outside of the Malayan peninsula, and it was not until 1924 that the island of Singapore was connected by causeway with the mainland. At the same time it handles two-thirds of Malaya's exports and about three-fourths of its imports by value. Increasingly, its interests have tended to focus upon Malaya itself, as its entrepôt functions have been cut into by the other great ports within the region, especially Jakarta. What has kept Singapore the largest port in Southeast Asia (over 20 million net tons of shipping entered in 1952) is its status as a free port and its strategic location at the western entrance to the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean basin. As a crossroad between the Pacific and Indian oceans, it attracts shipping from great distances. It [508] also has become an important air center, and a new airfield is under construction northeast of the city. Finally, the concentration [368] of banking, insurance, light industry, docking, repair, and outfitting facilities have fortified its dominant position.

361 Singapore City was originally laid out with due regard for ethnic quarters.[19] The
563 oldest section of the city, however, has become the business center, but the rest of the older town is a densely populated Chinese section, and much of the newer town to the northeast also is Chinese. Each of these areas is in turn divided on the basis of Chinese clan categories. The European residen-

[18] D. F. Allen, *Report on the Major Ports of Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1951), p. 128.

[19] For a general description of the city see E. H. G. Dobby, "Singapore: Town and Country," *Geographical Review*, January, 1940, and the *Colony of Singapore Annual Report*.

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tial area is primarily on higher ground in the northern part of the city. The University of Malaya is located in Singapore, though plans are being made to move it to Johore Baru on the Malayan mainland. Being largely a Chinese city, Singapore has come to act as a center for the Nan Yang expatriate Chinese, and the city has been chosen as the site of a new Chinese-language regional university.[20] Nevertheless, its air is not that of a Chinese city, nor, for that matter, is it English. Like all great cities, it is cosmopolitan, but it is also culturally rootless, perhaps more so than any of the other great cities of the region.

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At the other extreme is Bangkok, most indigenous of the great cities. Founded as the last of a series of "forward capitals"[21] by the Thai in 1783, after the destruction of Ayuthia by the Burmese, the city has never lost its native quality. The soaring rooftrees of *bot* and the spires of stupa stamp the Bangkok skyline with a character of its own. The city is located on the left bank of the Menam Chao Phya within the southernmost great bend of the river some twenty miles from its mouth. Exceptional problems of poor drainage plagued the city from the start, and its numerous *klongs* or canals have given it the rather misleading title of the "Venice of the East."

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A Chinese city early appeared to the southeast of the original castle town and in time became part of the central business district. As the lesser *klongs* were filled in to become roads, the city continued to expand. A new city appeared on the northern outskirts of the old, a planned creation built in the reign of Rama VI with broad boulevards and buildings ranging from shocking Victorian variations on Italian Renaissance to more recent battleship modern. The contrast between the façade of modern buildings fronting these boulevards and the stilted, bamboo, thatch, and tin-roofed houses

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[20] Richard Butwell, "A Chinese University for Malaya," *Pacific Affairs*, December, 1953.

[21] See reference to Cornish in Spate, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

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Bangkok

361 behind them is one of the most striking
34 demonstrations of cultural dualism in South-
184 east Asia.

Unlike the other great cities, Bangkok
175 originated as the capital of a land-oriented
361 agrarian state. Its proximity to tidewater
504 was accidental. In 1822 the ship bearing the
177 Crawfurd mission to the Thai court barely
178 was able to cross the bar at the mouth of the Menam, then covered by only four feet of water.[22] Its poor harbor and its remoteness from the major shipping routes of the South China Sea conspired to retard the development of the city as a port until the end of the nineteenth century and to retain it as an anachronism in Southeast Asia—a growing city, nearly great, surely primate, but indigenous rather than Western. Nevertheless, since it was through Bangkok that Western influences filtered into Thailand, it is a case of an indigenous capital acting as a revolutionary medium for socioeconomic change.

504 Bangkok is still the least convenient port
361 of the great cities in Southeast Asia. The bar across the mouth of the Chao Phya was dredged through only in 1952, and port facilities are modest as compared with the other cities. Indeed, most vessels still anchor in the Bight of Bangkok in the lee of the island, Kao Hsi Kang, at the mouth of the Chao Phya and transship their cargoes to and from river barges and country boats which link the island with Bangkok. Surprisingly, the freight tonnage handled at Bangkok is about one-third that of Singapore, although the volume of shipping is only one-tenth as large. The explanation lies partly in the large bulk shipments of rice which form the main export. Partly, also, there is a lower load factor at Singapore, since much of the shipping which enters its harbor is as much dependent on the local complex of service facilities as on cargo potential. At Bangkok, peripheral as it is to the main trade routes, few vessels call without assurances of sizable cargoes.

[22] See J. Crawfurd, *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China* (London: H. Colburn & R. Bentley, 1830).

[For a general discussion of the effect of the policies of the colonial government on the education system, and on divers aspects of the native society, see table of contents for pertinent sections in 8: Furnivall, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116.]

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fits perfectly, for it does not require a permanent field but can be grown anywhere, on flat land or steep slopes, provided that the rainfall is sufficiently heavy and the temperature and soil are suitable. In contrast, the cultivation of wet rice requires a sophisticated technique. To adapt to agriculture in Southeastern Asia Owen Lattimore's remark on the place of irrigation in Chinese agriculture,[24] we may say that the cultivation of wet rice lies at the core of agriculture in Southeastern Asia but not at the very roots.[25]

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The sedentary cultivators of Southeastern Asia have developed not only a notable range of varieties of wet rice adapted to varying natural conditions but also many differing techniques of rice culture, which embody the experience of generations of cultivators. Every important phase of the cultivation of wet rice has many variants. The reasons for these are often hidden to the casual observer, but Western agricultural specialists after painstaking research and experimentation have been forced to concede their value.

The ordinary varieties of wet rice differ greatly in respect to the time required for maturing and the amount of water needed. Selection has led to such remarkable achievements as the development of floating rice and of salt-loving varieties. The floating rice of Thailand and Cochinchina can be grown on land subject to prolonged high floods, a condition that ordinary varieties of wet rice do not tolerate. The growing plants are able to keep up with the rising floodwater; in extreme cases, the stems may reach a length of as much as 12 or 15 feet.[26] Salt-loving rices, which can be grown on saline soils or in brackish water, are cultivated along coasts or estuaries.

The raising of seedlings in seedbeds, after which they are transplanted to the field, is the main characteristic of most Oriental wet-rice culture. This practice has given Oriental rice relatively high yields. The preparation of the seedbed itself varies considerably.[27] The commonest method of raising rice seedlings is to make the seedbed on thoroughly soaked and puddled ground. Frequently the seed is soaked and allowed to germinate before it is sown in the bed. In the northern Philippines the seedlings are raised in seedbeds that are not flooded and puddled but are left dry. When the seedlings are pulled up from either a wet or a dry seedbed their roots

[24] Lattimore: Inner Asian Frontiers of China, 1940, p. 312. Elsewhere (p. 29) he says, "To assume the working out of such a technique [irrigated rice-growing] at the earliest stages of cultural and social development implies the ability to take a second major step forward at a time when the first tentative step had barely become possible."

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[25] In Java, for example, the cultivation of wet rice has spread only relatively recently into Sundanese territory and did not reach northern Bantam until the sixteenth century. Even today the Badoei of West Java have religious scruples against the planting of wet rice as well as against the use of the hoe or of the plow and carabao. Notwithstanding strenuous efforts on the part of the government to induce the Badoei to adopt a more intensive form of agriculture they continue to practice shifting cultivation and in the main to plant upland rice, using the dibble stick. See Kools: Hoema's, 1935, pp. 22–23.

[26] Tran-van-Huu: "Note sur la culture du riz flottant en Cochinchine," 1920, pp. 46–54.

[27] Copeland: *op. cit.*, pp. 226–229.

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Irrigation systems also fall into two categories: peasant irrigation works and technical irrigation works. The former have existed throughout Southeastern Asia for more than a thousand years. In recent times scientifically trained engineers have designed large-scale systems with concrete weirs and locks. Fields solely dependent upon impounded rain water produce one rice crop a year, whereas irrigated fields often yield two crops. If even with irrigation only one crop can be produced, yet the irrigation system assures proper water control, whereas without it irregularities in the course of the rainy season may damage, or destroy, the crop. 243 312 [177]

Wet fields are protected against erosion by leveling, terracing, and dyking. But how does continued cropping affect the fertility of wet-rice fields? Diverse environments and cultural practices in Southeastern Asia create considerable differences in this respect. Much of the paddy land of the Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, and Burma has lost a good deal of its original fertility because the peasants have not used manures, fertilizers, or crop rotation. In many instances, however, soil fertility has been preserved by the mineral matter dissolved in the irrigation water and by the silt deposited on those fields that are supplied with irrigation water coming from streams. The value of the water and silt depends, of course, upon the nature of the parent material from which it is derived. Rivers from a young volcanic region supply much richer water and silt than do those that drain a mountain region consisting of sedimentary rock or granite. For this reason, the Irrigation Service of the Netherlands Indies before making final plans for a new irrigation system takes samples of water and silt carried by rivers at different times of the year. The samples are analyzed in order to determine their influence upon the soil to be irrigated. A river found to be carrying water and silt that would lower the value of paddy land would be eliminated as a source of irrigation water, or its use would be limited as much as possible. 243 134 312 [654]

Irrigated fields of which the water supply does not contain minerals in quantities necessary for continuous satisfactory plant growth and paddy land that depends exclusively upon rain, both require other techniques for maintaining fertility. In many regions cultivators cut the rice stems just far enough below the ear to allow bundling. This practice makes possible the return of the rest of the plant matter to the soil. From this it is only one more step to work household refuse into the ground together with ashes of burned rubbish, rice husks, leaves, and manure.

As stable manure is not available in adequate quantities, intensive studies of the application of green manures to the cultivation of rice have been made in a number of countries of Southeastern Asia. A recent article by W. Bally reviews the results of these studies.[14] In a few rice-growing regions the peasants, on their own initiative, have learned to use legumes to improve rice soil. In wet fields the decomposition of green manure takes place under anaerobic conditions, and the final product is ammonia. Since 243 134 242

[14] Bally: "The Employment of Green Manures," 1936, pp. T10–T31.

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mand respect and admiration for the ingenuity displayed.[20] "The serious imperfections which characterize native irrigation works and make rice culture uncertain, particularly in the plains, can assuredly not be charged to the account of these who constructed them." [21] The weirs, by means of which the peasants raise the water of small rivers, are especially weak. The construction material consists of bamboo, trunks of coconut and other trees, and boulders. At times great bamboo baskets are filled with heavy stones and placed in the river, or large stones are laid loosely across the channel. Where the rivers are wide the people drive two rows of tree trunks into the river bed and fill the space between the rows with whatever debris they have at hand. These weirs frequently break because of river floods as they have no provision for allowing passage of flood waters; yet repair is often impossible for the duration of the rainy season, so that the crop is ruined. Another constructional disadvantage is the open intakes. During floods large quantities of water flow through these and cause an excessive soaking of the fields and damage to the canals. Wherever a canal has to cross a depression, a road, or another watercourse, bamboo or hollowed tree trunks are used to carry the water overhead. This often leads to large losses of water, especially during floods. Poor drainage is another weakness of peasant irrigation systems.

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Scientifically trained engineers have come to the aid of peasant communities in Southeastern Asia and have designed irrigation systems based on technological principles and free from the weaknesses of peasant irrigation works. One of these technical irrigation systems may take care of tens of thousands of hectares of riceland belonging to hundreds of villages. In many instances the engineers have improved existing peasant irrigation works; more often they have made irrigation possible where peasant communities did not have the financial and technical resources to overcome natural obstacles. Technical irrigation works are usually government-financed.

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In the Philippines most of the wet-rice fields are dependent exclusively upon the rain that falls directly on them. One centimeter of rain a day is said to be necessary for a healthy rice growth. But there is always the possibility that, particularly in the months of May and June, there may be so little rain that the peasants cannot prepare their fields. A shortage of rain in October is also dangerous as it may seriously damage, or even destroy, the crop, even though the precipitation during the rainy season may have been enough for the production of a satisfactory crop. To guard against an insufficiency of water for the wet-rice crop, therefore, the fields should be supplied by irrigation systems. The Philippines, however, do

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[20] The *subaks* of Bali are agricultural cooperative societies that have been formed to construct, maintain, and administer irrigation systems. The achievements of the Balinese subaks are very remarkable in a number of ways. Thus, the men of certain villages are especially skillful builders of irrigation works and are able to construct long canals and even tunnels of considerable length. These men are hired by the subaks and help them to solve their irrigation problems.

[21] Van der Meulen: "Irrigation in the Netherlands Indies," 1940, p. 146.

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land. An example is *mongo* (*Phaseolus mungo* L.), grown in Pangasinan and Batangas. Alarmed by the poor rice crops in 1940 and the difficulty of importing rice from Indochina and Thailand, the Philippine Bureau of Plant Industry, early in 1941, started to distribute seed of quick-growing dry-field crops, especially maize and legumes, in order to supplement the nation's rice bowl. But the average Filipino farmer is reluctant to accept this new practice, because "it is not the custom"—a powerful argument not to be easily overcome.

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Dry-Field Crops Cultivated by Plantations

The discussion thus far has been limited to the native cultivation of dry land and to annual crops. However, extensive areas of non-irrigated land are occupied by perennial crops that are grown on plantations owned by Westerners. The crops produced include tea, coffee, cacao, quinine, rubber, palm oil, coconuts, kapok, sisal, and other fibre plants. Some of these crops were cultivated for a long time without the proper measures being taken to protect the soil against accelerated erosion. Although the detrimental effects of plantation agriculture in Ceylon and southern India are notorious in the plantation history of southern Asia, results were just as disastrous in Malaya and in the Netherlands Indies. Westerners, accustomed to clean cultivation or clean weeding in the temperate zone, carried this practice over into the tropics, with the result that soil erosion was very severe on steep slopes and led to great losses in soil fertility. Today, however, these mistakes have been recognized; there is hardly a plantation that has not adopted measures to protect sloping land against erosion and level land against soil exhaustion. The planters of Java were the pioneers in this field, introducing or developing most of the protective measures. These measures include contour drains, silt pits, contour ridges, terraces, hedges, shade trees, and especially cover crops. The use of these measures varies according to the crop, or crops, produced and according to climate, soil, and slope; but the purpose of all of them is to encourage an effective ground cover and to check the rate of water run-off. The financial depression of the 1930's—resulting in the need for very strict economy and a decrease in production costs—has helped considerably to reduce the amount of clean weeding and to convince conservative planters of the value of preserving a ground cover, litter, and mulch. Such measures help not only to retard erosion but also to enrich the soil. The first Western planter who broke away from the custom of keeping the ground of his plantation free from weeds was L. M. Tyl, who in the years 1890–96 developed the "weed-system" and thus introduced the idea of a ground cover into plantation circles of Southeastern Asia. But it took many years before his idea was generally accepted. It is interesting to note here that the Asiatic-owned plantations and the small holdings producing perennial crops, such as rubber, usually did not practice clean weeding. This, in the early days, was regarded by European observers as a sign of laziness and

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poor management, but, as has been so often the case, the Westerners were finally forced to admit the soundness of Oriental cultivation practices.

As we have seen, there are two principal means of protecting the soil between tree crops: by allowing the growth of indigenous plants or weeds (in other words the development of a natural mixed cover), or by establishing a pure cover of leguminous plants, many of which came originally from the New World. Rubber planters in Malaya seem to have had more success with the first method, which has been called "the forestry method of cultivation" or "rubber forestry." [67] Of course, the growth of indigenous plants or weeds must be controlled, and this is done by slashing the undergrowth from time to time. Frequently it is necessary to practice selective weeding in order to suppress undesirable plants and encourage more valuable ones.

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Much research has been directed toward the study of leguminous cover crops which supply nitrogen, as well as foliage for green manure. This research was started in 1910 in the Botanical Garden at Buitenzorg. Some of the cover crops that have proved especially valuable and are widely used on modern plantations are *Calopogonium mucunoides* Desv., *Centrosema pubescens* Benth., *Centrosema plumierii* Benth., *Desmodium* species, *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., *Mimosa invisa* Mart., *Cassia* species, and *Vigna oligosperma* Backer.[68] Several of these have already been mentioned in the foregoing discussion on the use of green manure crops in native agriculture.

Because a number of perennials such as tea, coffee, and cacao are commonly grown under shade trees, many writers seem to believe that these plants need shade. This may be true in part, but more important is the fact that the shade trees protect the soil against excessive losses of moisture and undesirable changes in soil composition, texture, and structure and thus prevent a reduction of the quantity of humus in the soil. Most of the commonly used shade trees are legumes which, in addition to shade, supply litter and nitrogen and help to increase the moisture-holding capacity of the soil, thus reducing the danger of erosion. *Erythrina micropteryx* Poepp., *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., *Leucaena glauca* Benth., *Albizzia moluccana* Miq., *Albizzia chinensis* Merr., *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Pithecellobium dulce* Benth., or Manila tamarind, and *Peltophorum pterocarpum* Backer are especially useful in this respect.

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[67] Haïnes: "The Uses and Control of Natural Undergrowth," 1934.

[68] For a very extensive list of cover crops, green manures, and shade trees, see Heyne: De nuttige planten van Nederlandsch-Indië, Vol. 3, 1927. See also International Institute of Agriculture: *op. cit.*

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thinly settled areas of Laos, Cambodia, western Cochinchina, and the mountainous regions of Annam and Tongking are comparable to the Outer Islands. Moreover, the Annamese is as reluctant as the Javanese to leave his native village and settle among people who do not speak his language nor follow his customs. The few colonization experiments[4] that have been made in Indochina in recent years have brought out many of the same lessons as did the early trial period in the Indies.

The necessity was felt for organizing this movement carefully, preferably by groups of families from the same village headed by their chiefs, who alone are capable of maintaining the cohesion necessary if the Tonkinese are to settle down to their ordinary way of living immediately after their establishment in the settlement areas.[5]

Here, too, the need for population adjustment has become so pressing that resettlement measures will have to be started on a large scale after the war.

Industrialization also has been advocated for Indochina. In contrast to the Philippines and the Indies, Indochina has most of the basic raw materials for heavy as well as for secondary industry. Mercantilistic considerations, however, deterred France from industrializing the country. It was not until 1938 that growing unemployment and population pressure finally led the government to initiate a compromise program of promoting secondary industries.

Migration across international boundaries in Southeastern Asia was, and probably will be, negligible; almost all such migrants who had before the war entered the countries encircling the South China Sea came from China or India, the principal exception being the Javanese in Malaya. Most of the latter entered the country as plantation laborers but ultimately settled on the land and engaged in rice cultivation. This development was beneficial to both countries; on the one hand the laborers and their families did not return to their overcrowded villages in Java and on the other hand they increased the rice production of Malaya. The Malays accept the Javanese readily as both are Moslem and of the same racial stock. There would be no reason to advocate a settlement of Javanese in the Philippines or Thailand or of Annamese in Malaya or Borneo, or of Filipinos in Cambodia or New Guinea so long as there was sufficient suitable agricultural land available within the boundaries of the native countries of the prospective pioneers.

In the past, Southeastern Asia did not to any great extent enjoy a free exchange of ideas and information. Identical problems were often tackled without the benefit of knowledge gained from the experience of a neighbor-

[4] International Labour Office: Labour Conditions in Indo-China, 1938, pp. 216–241. See also Brévié: "Conseil supérieur de la colonisation," 1938, pp. 715–756; and Services du Protectorat: "Activité colonisatrice du Tonkin," 1938, pp. 757–779.

[5] International Labour Office: *op. cit.*, p. 236.

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symbols of our age—the Petrol Pump, the Pylon, the 'Dust Bowl', the Automat, 'Mass Media', the chilling Neon Sign—there is a shrinking of the soul and a poignant yearning for the glory that was Angkor and the grandeur that was Chang An. Yet it is in its effective organs—the Assembly Line, the Tennessee Valley Authority, 'E.R.P.', and the Research Stations—that our robotic civilization throbs; not in the cult of lost causes or impossible loyalties, nor in our academies, our museums, nor our half-empty cathedrals.

At least it is the material aspects of our civilization which appeal to the awakening consciousness of the peoples of the Far East. Whether they will adopt capitalist, socialist, or communist social organization as a means of securing the coveted gadgets of the West that mean a higher standard of living is another matter. Dr Joseph Needham, for example, says that there is no reason to think that the Chinese will not make as convinced socialists as anybody else, but that there are certain directions in which Chinese thinking might have a profound effect upon the nature of the society of the future, perhaps in the matter of juristic security of the individual, and in the forms which the numinous will take in that society. However, there is far less reason to believe that they will adopt democracy, and Communism, being dictatorial, they will probably find more natural and acceptable than democratic socialism.[1]

This survey is of the Chinese in the regions of Tropical Asia, and often in the course of our narrative the question already posed as to the power of this and other peoples to absorb Western ideas without changing their own essential nature will arise either tacitly or explicitly. In other words, can the basic institutions of these peoples meet the impact of Western industrial civilization or of Marxism without disintegrating?

Chinese civilization is based on ancestor worship, the family system, on Confucianism (which incorporates these principles), and on Buddhism and Taoism. The staunchest supporters of these religions could scarcely deny that Buddhism and Taoism as moral forces are in complete decay in China and have been so for a very long time.[2] Whatever their surviving effectiveness they cannot by

[1] J. Needham, 'Confucianism after 2000 Years', in the *Manchester Guardian*, 29 August 1949.

[2] To realize the formalism and religiosity into which Buddhism had declined by last century, one has only to observe the *chü-jen* (M[illegible]) of the late Ch'ing dynasty who, to prepare his character for office, suddenly takes an interest in practical benevolence. He ostentatiously burns incense and gives alms. If he sees

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that the Chinese Communists consider the present revolution as an indigenous movement—*not* Russian-inspired—and at the same time they have no difficulty in regarding themselves as orthodox Marxists.

In the area covered by this study the main trend of European colonial policy has been in the direction of encouraging the forces of native conservatism to resist innovation. European colonial administrators frequently evince an affection for feudal institutions, a reverence for Mohammedanism, a respect for *adat* law and for princely succession and privilege in excess of that of the native aristocracies themselves. It happens sometimes that existing institutions which had been crystallized by European intervention are sustained only by foreign authority, and in extreme cases, if the sustentation ceased, would dissolve into nothingness as in Poe's *Case of Dr. Valdemar* when death had occurred but dissolution was temporarily suspended by a hypnotic trance.[1]

So much discussion of the general considerations governing the area of our inquiry has been necessary to give a background for our survey of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. But before proceeding to give an outline of our subject, there is one further observation we should make. This is that the survival of particular forms of organization is one thing; the survival of the race or community is another. It is likely that whatever happens the Chinese, both at home and overseas, will retain considerable social and cultural coherence, besides a strong sense of being 'Chinese'. It is his patience in adversity, his adaptability, his determination, his good humour, and his resilience that makes the individual Chinese, male or female, such an admirable biological specimen, and it is his social qualities (given proper treatment) that make him such a valuable unit in this Southeast Asian society. At the present time the Chinese of the Nanyang are in a dilemma, but this work should show that it is their superiority in resource, ability, and industry to the people among whom they live rather than their vicious propensities that makes them constitute a 'problem'.

The cartoon for our picture stands before us in bold charcoal

[1] Poe's description was more vivid but perhaps a little too strong for the present context. British policy in British India favoured 'modernization (e.g. Dalhousie's policy) while in the Indian States it generally favoured 'traditionalism'.

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CHAPTER II

EARLY CHINESE CONTACTS WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA[1]

CHINA'S intercourse overland with the countries on her southern border is of a much greater order of antiquity than her contacts by sea. Her soldiers were in Tongking and Annam in the third century B.C.; thereafter they penetrated to Cambodia, then to Siam, the last-named being reached by sea. Here there was a halt for a considerable time before her navigators went on to Malaya, Sumatra, and Java. The process took many centuries, and for long intervals there is a complete lack of information regarding the Southeast Asian countries.[2] Merchants

[1] Much of our information regarding the earlier history of Southeast Asia is derived from Chinese sources, but we should in this chapter be on our guard against identifying Chinese *knowledge* of the region with Chinese *contacts* with it. No doubt, of course, some of the information was obtained from Chinese who had actually visited the countries of the region, but much also was at second-hand and, at that, recorded often a considerable period after the time to which it relates.

In recent years a great deal has been added to our knowledge by the researches of orientalists and archaeologists, but these additions have often been independent and disassociated from one another, and the problem of the identification of geographical names has meant that places—often whole countries—have moved their location all over the map as learned discussion has displaced or refixed them. There has for long been a crying need to systematize the existing knowledge of Southeast Asia and to give more certainty and coherence to the early history, and this is what Sir Roland Braddell has been attempting to do since 1935 in his series of studies on 'Ancient Times in the Malay Peninsula' in the *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*. ('An Introduction to the Study of Ancient Times in the Malay Peninsula and the Straits of Malacca, continued as Notes on Ancient Times in Malaya'; *JRASMB*, vol. xiii, pt. 2, vol. xiv, pt. 3, vol. xv, pt. 3, vol. xvii, pt. 1, vol. xix, pt. 1.) Our concern is not directly with the subject of these inquiries, but we shall keep these studies closely in mind when outlining Chinese contacts with the southeastern areas of the Asiatic continent. What we shall have to say will often be in repetition or in summary of the remarks made in the separate country studies, but this is with the intention of giving the reader at the outset a glance over the entire area.

[2] This seems to be true as a generalization, though the *Han Shu*, vol. xxviii, speaks of voyages in the Han dynasty to Jihnan and Hsüwenhopu taking five months, to Touyüankuo taking four months, and to Ilumeikuo taking about twenty days. See Feng Ch'eng-chün, *Nan Yang Chiao T'ung Shih* (History of Chinese Relations with the Nanyang) p. 1 (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1937). (The place-names are here given in mandarin, but the foreign investigator who endeavours to identify ancient Chinese place-names in Southeast Asia would be well advised first to give the characters their phonetic equivalents in ancient

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from the West passed across Central Asia into China in the Han and later dynasties by routes that skirted the northern and southern slopes of the Tarim river basin, but they also came into the empire by way of the south, up the rivers of what is now Burma and across the hills into the present Yunnan, and by the longer sea route to the south coast. As early as the second century B.C. there appear to have been Chinese trade routes through Yunnan to the Irrawaddy and Salween valleys. For a time the main port in the south was in the future Tongking, and it was not until later centuries that it was supplanted by Canton. It was to Loyang that in A.D. 166 came an embassy of Westerners claiming to be sent by their King, who is supposed to have been the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (An-tun).[1]

Our earliest and surest information is of the Chinese intercourse with the countries sharing a land frontier with China on the south-west, and first of all in point of time comes Annam.

During the Han dynasty there existed a kingdom known as Nan-Yüeh (Nam-Viet) which extended from the region of Canton far into the Indo-Chinese peninsula to the present central Annam.[2] In 111 B.C. this kingdom was conquered by the Chinese and was divided into nine districts, one of which, Chiuchen (Annamese Cu'uchan), corresponds roughly to the present province of Thanh-hoa in northern Annam.[3] It is likely that Chinese suzerainty ex-

Chinese according to Karlgren's *Analytical Dictionary of Sino-Japanese* (Paris, 1923).

[1] See Kenneth Scott Latourette, *The Chinese: their History and Culture*, 3rd ed. (New York, Macmillan, 1946) p. 123.

Among the recent finds at Go Oc Eo was a gold medal bearing an image of Antoninus Pius with a date which corresponds to A.D. 152, showing that at an early date Funan (the ancient State in southern Annam) had connexions, direct or indirect, with the western Mediterranean. See G. Coedès, *Les états hindouisés d'Indochine et d'Indonésie* (Paris, E. de Boccard, 1948) pp. 38–9, 89.

[2] The recently published work of Professor Olov R. T. Janse, *Archaeological Research in Indo-China* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1947), greatly extends our existing knowledge of the Chinese remains in the region. Professor Janse's historical summary is here followed.

[3] Édouard Chavannes, trans., *Les Mémoires Historiques de Se-Ma T'sien* (Paris, Laroux, 1895–1905) i. 87 and ii. 168, cited by Janse, op. cit. p. xvi. And Léonard Aurousseau, 'La Première Conquête des Pays Annamites', *BEFEO*, vol. xxii, pp. 137–264, and vol. xiv, pp. 9, 13. Cited by Janse at same place.

Wang Wen-yuan (op. cit. p. 4), citing Wang Ton-lin, *Histoire du Peuple Chinois* (in Chinese), and H. Maspero, 'Étude d'Histoire d'Annam, III, Commanderie de Siang', *BEFEO*, vol. iii (Hanoi, 1918) pp. 11–28, gives a somewhat different account of this early period. He says that in the year 214 B.C. the first Emperor of the Chin dynasty, Shih Huangti, sent 500,000 Chinese—soldiers,

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tended even farther south, though in an indefinite way. However, to date there has been no archaeological evidence of any Chinese settlement of the Han dynasty farther south than a spot immediately below Thanhhoa in the provinces of Nghean and Hatinh.

After the native chief of Chiuchen had yielded to the Chinese without putting up any resistance, he was retained in his position with the title of T'aishou.[1]

The new masters of the southern territory, the 'Sons of Han' as they called themselves, ruled at first with moderation, allowing to the natives a considerable degree of freedom, but about the beginning of the Christian era they adopted a sterner attitude. At least this was so in the case of Tongking where, according to Chinese records, the Emperor Hsi Kuang (A.D. 1–25)[2] 'transformed the people through the rites and by justice', and it is most probable that the Chinese attitude towards the natives of Chiuchen was the same. It was this heavier hand of alien government, aiming at securing the rapid sinicization of the subdued barbarians, which no doubt aroused the spirit of resistance, for in A.D. 40 Cheng-Tse (Tr'ung-Trac in Annamese), the daughter of a native chief of Tongking from Mileng (Annamese, Milinh), stirred up a rebellion which succeeded temporarily in driving out the Chinese, and the native chiefs of Chiuchen joined in the struggle.

In the present state of knowledge it is impossible to establish with precision the dates of the earlier Chinese settlements in Chiuchen, but Professor Janse thinks it very likely that some pioneers ventured to immigrate thither in the third century B.C., and this is the time when the Chinese began to infiltrate into northern Indochina, especially Tongking. In any case there must have been a considerable intercourse between southern China and Thanhhoa at the end of the third or at least at the beginning of the second century B.C. To a certain extent this supposition can be corroborated by archaeology (e.g. from examples in the 'Huai Valley' style).

peasants, and those condemned to banishment, to take possession of Nam-Viet 'the land beyond the southern border'. After the conquest the country was divided into three commands, that of Nanhai, corresponding probably to the present province of Kwangtung, that of Kweilin in the present-day Kwangsi, and that of Shiang in Tongking and north Annam. These (says Wang Wen-yuan) marked the foundation of the first important Chinese colony in Indochina.

[1] H. Maspero, *BEFEO*, vol. xxxvii, pp. 263, 264, note 5, cited by Janse, loc. cit.

[2] H. A. Giles lists seven Emperors from A.D. 1 to 25, but not this one.

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177 Professor Janse makes the following interesting observations on the period:[1]
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It can be assumed that the first Chinese who ventured into the country and mingled with the natives were journeying merchants or artisans. Even to-day Chinese peddlers are highly regarded among the natives because of their skill in commerce and craftsmanship. As they are generally fairly well-to-do, they are much sought after by the families of the aboriginal chieftains. Thus many of these modern settlers bring with them into Tongking and Northern Annam Chinese crafts and customs. What is happening to-day in this respect has certainly been going on not merely for centuries but for millenia. . . . In the wake of these tradesmen certainly came the civil and military mandarins, accompanied by the less welcome tax-collector, and by political refugees.

At this early time (Henri Maspero points out) the entire territory was covered with marshes and forests in which elephants, rhinoceroses, and tigers abounded and in which the aboriginals lived by hunting and fishing, eating pythons and wild beasts killed by their bone-tipped arrows. To this diet they added small crops from their primitive rice-fields which they prepared by burning down a part of the forest before the rainy season, without cultivating or irrigating the area. Only around the centres of administration, under the influence of the Chinese governors, especially the prefect Jen Yen, had they begun to till the soil in the manner of the Chinese.[2]

Such was the land which the Chinese called the 'Kingdom of the Naked'. It was not until after the victorious campaign of Ma Yuan at the beginning of the Christian era that the Chinese settled on any large scale. Archaeological evidence of this is to be found on the brick tombs of the later Han discovered in Thanhhoa. Among the most fascinating funerary objects unearthed by Dr. Janse are models of farm-houses or, in some cases, probably manor-houses, consisting of quadrangular yards surrounded by walls and a variety of buildings. Some are even provided with furniture, such as ovens, troughs, &c. They give an excellent picture of early Chinese settlements in Annam.

It will be convenient here to discontinue the outline of Sino-Annamese contacts and to resume it in the part of this survey dealing with Indochina, turning our attention to the question of the antiquity of Chinese intercourse with Malaysia far away to the

[1] op. cit. p. xvi.
[2] H. Maspero, op. cit. p. 12, cited by Janse, op. cit. p. xvi.

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south. According to the consensus of opinion, the date of the first Chinese association with these regions goes back to the third and even fourth centuries B.C. Dr Heine-Geldern in 1934 pointed out the stylistic similarities between some of the prehistoric stone sculptures of the Pasemah region in southern Sumatra and those standing at the tomb of the Chinese general Huo K'iu-ping in Shensi province in China, erected in 117 B.C. This, he says, seemed to indicate more or less intimate contacts with China, to be dated probably in the second and first centuries B.C. A decade later the same authority again referred to his own statement and pointed out that since then Chinese objects of the Han dynasty had actually been found in Indonesia. Moreover, a considerable number of Chinese sepulchral pottery vessels of the Han period had been excavated in Sumatra, Java, and Borneo, and one of them, from Sumatra, bore an inscription dating it 45 B.C.[1] From these finds, De Flines inferred, no doubt correctly, that Chinese colonists or merchants must have lived in Indonesia as early as the Han period. Also from Sumatra comes a bowl engraved with designs of persons in Chinese dresses and of horses in Han style, and other pieces of evidence included a Chinese bronze dagger-axe (*ko*) which was said to have come from Sumatra, and another from Java.

Taking all into account [Dr Heine-Geldern writes] one may come to the conclusion that direct Chinese influence in Indonesia goes back at least to the early Han period, that is at the very latest to the 1st century B.C. However, the ornamental designs of the Dyak tribes of Borneo and of the Ngada of Flores are so clearly related to Chinese designs of the late Chou period that one can hardly avoid the inference that Chinese contacts started as early as the beginning of the third century B.C., and probably earlier.

The investigation of this very early period of intercourse is almost exclusively a monopoly of the archaeologist and of the anthropologist, and what conclusions are to be drawn from the finds must remain a matter of some delicacy to the non-expert in these fields. Nevertheless it is important to note the difference of opinion between some of the schools of thought concerning the degree of Chinese influence on the regions of Southeast Asia. Speaking of

[1] R. Heine-Geldern, *Prehistoric Research in the Netherlands Indies* (New York, Southeast Asia Institute, 1945) p. 147. See also the same author, *The Archaeology and Art of Sumatra.*

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the intercourse of a much later period, the second Sung dynasty onwards, Fay Cooper Cole remarks:

> These early contacts were primarily for trade and, while they did help to shape the history of Malaysia, they seldom were intimate enough to introduce Chinese methods, such as the potter's wheel; few Chinese words entered the language; and the influence of their political and religious ideas was nil.[1]

To this we may object that Chinese methods of agriculture, at least, through these same contacts had a profound effect on the economy of the Southeast Asian countries. None the less, Hindu influence upon Southeast Asia has been culturally much more important than Chinese, and in the sphere of navigation in the first centuries of the Christian era it was the Arabs, the Indians, and the Persians who made their way to China and the Chinese who, generally speaking, stayed at home. There was a colony of Arabs in Sumatra at a very early date, and they had a counting-house at Canton as early as A.D. 300.[2]

Latourette says that 'Chinese merchants seem not to have ventured very far afield, and to have left chiefly to strangers the initiative in foreign trade, but outsiders found China a profitable country with which to deal'. Lack of enterprise is also attributed to the Chinese by Groeneveldt, the pioneer writer on Chinese intercourse with Southeast Asia, who remarks:

> A careful perusal of the geographical literature of the ancient Chinese has shown that they have not gained their knowledge of Southeastern Asia by bold voyages of discovery: slowly and cautiously they have crept along its shores, probably not venturing to a country before they have become acquainted with it through others.[3]

And Kuwabara (cited by Braddell) says, 'the Chinese trading ships before the T'ang era were inferior in all respects to those of the South Sea countries'. Although it must be conceded that the Chinese were behind the Middle Eastern races in enterprise or curiosity, the remarks of Groeneveldt apply in a measure to all other peoples who have come into Southeast Asia. Were their

[1] Fay Cooper Cole, *The Peoples of Malaysia* (New York, Van Nosstrand, 1945) p. 27.

[2] Braddell, op. cit. *JRASMB*, vol. xx, pt. 2 (1947) p. 8.

[3] W. P. Groeneveldt, *Notes on the Malay Archipelago and Malacca; Miscellaneous papers relating to the Indian Archipelago* (London, Trübner, 1887) i. 126–262.

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explorations of the coasts of Borneo (asks Mr Tom Harrisson) any slower or more cautious than those of the Portuguese? On the contrary there is every indication that there was a regular trade on a mass scale for centuries back. Certainly by the fourth and fifth centuries Chinese ships were feeling their way along the coasts and over the seas to meet the Arabs, Persians, and Indians part way.

The reason for Chinese comparative dilatoriness in utilizing the sea routes on their own account may have been their sense of national sufficiency, and the feeling that they had nothing of great value to obtain from the regions of the south, but none the less their influence spread out over the land routes through the agency of the Arab and Indian traders. 'It is clear that at the time when the European barbarians of the north were conquering Rome, a southward movement in the Far East was taking place—the flow of the cultured Chinese into Malay lands, and the spread of Chinese civilization in Malaysia.'[1] At the same time the main colonizing activity was by Indians. Individual Chinese pilgrims and travellers, such as the Buddhist monk, Fa Hsien (or Fa Hien), went overland to India, visited Ceylon by sea, and arrived in what was either Java or Malaya in A.D. 413, and I-tsing, much later, in A.D. 692, reached Lang-ya-si, identified as Langkasuka, a kingdom in the Malay peninsula. Fa Hsien found no Chinese in Java or Malaya (whichever it may have been), though his eyes filled with tears, he tells us, at the sight of a Chinese taffeta fan, for he had been away from home for thirteen years.[2]

It is not perhaps remarkable that the Chinese of the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries left most of the colonizing initiative to others, for, quite apart from their self-sufficiency, these were the Dark Ages of Chinese history when warfare and foreign invasion were almost incessant. Nevertheless, in the first Sung dynasty (A.D. 420–

[1] G. Nye Steiger, H. Otley Beyer, and Conrado Benitez, *A History of the Orient* (Boston, Ginn & Co., 1926) p. 202 and passim.

[2] *Fa Hsien Fo Kuo Chi*, the record of Fa Hsien's voyages, has been translated by Samuel Beal as 'An Account of the Buddhist Countries' (London, Trübner, 1869), by J. Legge (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1866), and re-translated by H. A. Giles (Cambridge University Press, 1923). Rémusat's French translation is earlier (1836).

Giles gives the track of the voyage of Fa Hsien from Ceylon to China as being via the Straits of Sunda, whereas W. A. Grimes (*JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (February 1941)), a meteorologist, basing his views on a study of the winds near the equator, considers that he went via the Straits of Malacca. This is also the view of Braddell, who thinks that Fa Hsien's *Ye-po-ti* was not Java but Malaya. (*JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (1947) p. 25.)

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79) missions from these southeastern countries made their appearance in China, and after the Liang dynasty (A.D. 502–57) envoys came from over the sea every year for the purpose of getting an almanac and of acquitting themselves of the duty of tribute in greater number than in any former time.[1]

Reference in Chinese history to countries and places in these territories does not necessarily mean that they were known to the Chinese by direct contact. An early voyage, however, was in A.D. 607 when the Emperor Sui Yang-ti sent a mission by sea to Siam to open up commercial relations with that country.[2] But the sprinkling of references to places, probably in this Southeast Asian area, of obscure identity which may be found in the History of the Liang Dynasty (502–57) is succeeded in the History of the T'ang Dynasty (618–907) by information regarding definite countries which has a much surer feel. For example, we hear (and believe) that between 756 and 779 three envoys of Java arrived in China and that in the year 813 further envoys arrived at the capital with presents of four negro slaves, parrots of different colours, pinka-birds (not identified), and other gay trifles. The Emperor honoured the envoy with the title of Left Defender of the Office of the Four Inner Gates, and when the recipient wanted to waive the title in favour of his younger brother, the Emperor praised him for his unselfishness and bestowed a title on both of them.[3]

We are now definitely in the era of the tribute-bearing missions which soon took on the character of trading expeditions since the Emperor invariably presented to the envoys gifts equal to or greater in value than those they had brought. The missions were very numerous and a mere recital of them would not add much to our enlightenment. They had always, of course, a purely diplomatic appearance, especially those sent on the accession of a new Emperor or a new dynasty.

Between 1209 and 1214 a book was written by Chao Ju-kua, a member of the imperial family of the Sung dynasty (960–1280) and superintendent and commissioner of Customs at Ch'üanchowfu, a coast town to the north of Amoy. This book, based on information

[1] Braddell, op. cit. *JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (1941) p. 21.

[2] *Chau [sic] Ju-kua* (late Sung Dynasty): *His work on the Chinese and Arab trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries*, translated from the Chinese and annotated by Friedrich Hirth and W. W. Rockhill (St. Petersburg, Academy of Science, 1911) p. 8. The name of the work in Chinese is *Chu Fan Chi*.

[3] *T'ang History*, Book 222, Part 2, Groeneveldt, p. 140.

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gained from merchants from India, Persia, Syria, and Arabia, gives facts concerning the countries and peoples of the West, including Spain, and of the Chinese trade with the Malaysian islands. (Some details from this work are cited both above and later in this chapter.)

In the History of the Sung Dynasty we have a detailed account of Java, including the observation: 'Their houses are handsome and are adorned with yellow and green tiles: when Chinese merchants arrive they are received as guests in a public building and what they eat and drink is copious and clean.'[1]

In 1291 Angkor was visited by Marco Polo and the Lady Kutai, whom the Mongol Emperor of China was sending as a bride for the Khan of Persia, there to behold the fast-fading glories of the Khmer empire.[2] Five years later, one Chou Ta-kwan was a member of the Chinese mission sent to acquaint the King of Cambodia with the accession of Yüan Cheng, the new Emperor of China and grandson and successor of Kublai Khan. To this same Chou Ta-kwan we owe a vivid and detailed account of the Khmer empire.[3] What concerns us here, however, is his remarks concerning his own countrymen who visited or were resident in Cambodia. Here are some of them rendered into English from Pelliot's translation.

The Chinese who follow the sea as a profession take advantage of their being in this country to dispense with wearing clothes. Rice is easy to obtain, women are easy to find, the houses are easy to run, personal property is easy to come by, commerce is easy to engage in. Thus there are constantly those who direct themselves towards this country.

In this country it is the women who are skilful in commerce. Thus a Chinese who arrives down there and take a wife profits in addition by her commercial aptitude.

This Chinese chronicler (says Mr Brodrick), with the typical prejudice of his people against frequent washing, wrote that, 'the people are often ill, owing to their too frequent baths and the incessant wasting of the heat'.

According to Chou Ta-kwan, the embassy to Cambodia in 1296 was entirely successful and homage was rendered to China, but (says Pelliot) '*peut être est-il trop intéressé dans l'affaire pour que nous accordions pleine créance à ses dires. En fait il n'y a aucune trace que des relations officielles régulières aient suivi la mission de 1296*'.

[1] Book 489. Groeneveldt, p. 141.
[2] A. H. Brodrick, *Little Vehicle* (London, Hutchinson, n.d. (1949?)) p. 156.
[3] 'Tcheou-Ta-Kouan, Mémoires sur les coutumes de Cambodge' (trans. by Paul Pelliot), *BEFEO*, vol. ii, no. 2 (1902).

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177 There is certainly no mention of Cambodia in the History of the
175 Yüan Dynasty.

It is first in the Yüan dynasty (A.D. 1280–1368) that action combines with colour to make real the machinations of Chinese imperial politics in these waters. In the year 1292 the Emperor Kublai Khan, no doubt envious of the growing influence of Java in further India and the eastern part of the archipelago, sent an expedition against the Javanese State of Singosari. He ordered the Governor of Fukien to send Shih Pi, Ike Mese, and Hau Hsing to collect from Kiangsi and Kiukiang soldiers to the number of 20,000 who were to be embarked in a thousand ships for the Southern Ocean. Shih Pi sailed with 5,000 men from Ch'üanchow, probably via the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank (to give them their modern names), Annam (Giau-chi), and Champa, encountering bad weather on the way, and in the first moon of the following year they passed the Natuna Islands to a place which was probably Billiton in Java where the fleet stopped to cut timber to make small boats suitable for going up the rivers. An internal feud was in progress between native potentates and in this Shih Pi took sides, routing the army of Daha (Kediri).[1]

But Shih Pi lost 3,000 of his men (largely, it seems, through sickness) and for this he was disgraced and ordered to receive seventeen strokes. But in 1295 he was restored to favour, and he died, high in honours, at the age of eighty-six.

The Ming History records that at this time Java was subdued,[2] but the truth is that the great expedition had failed and no new one was undertaken. The military expeditions of the Mongols had nowhere more than a temporary influence.

The empire of Sri Vijaya, which endured for many centuries, had its capital in Sumatra in the neighbourhood of Palembang. It included the Malay Peninsula under its sway. Eventually it decayed under Chola (Coromandel) raids, the revolt of Melayu (Jambi), and attacks from neighbouring kingdoms. The Sung chronicles have many references to Sri Vijaya's wars. The empire eventually disappeared and was succeeded by Jambi. Jambi in turn (between

[1] For an account of the complex politics and strategy of this expedition see E. S. de Klerck, *History of the Netherlands Indies* (Rotterdam, W. L. & J. Brusse, 1938) i. 139–40.

[2] Book 324. It appears from Chinese records and the account of Marco Polo that Tuban, Sedayu, and Tjanggu were at that time prosperous commercial towns. De Klerck, op. cit. p. 140.

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1338 and 1365) succumbed to Majapahit, whose seat of government was in Java. Majapahit was warlike and destructive: it sacked ports in Borneo, Surabaya, Ceram, and Lombok, and finally subjected Sri Vijaya's colonies in the Malay Peninsula.[1]

Palembang, near the east coast of Sumatra, fell into Chinese hands on the decay of Sri Vijaya and remained under them for about two hundred years. The Chinese who lived there followed piracy as a calling, using the port as a retreat and strongpoint. This town, then, was one of the earliest places in Southeast Asia where the Chinese settled in any numbers. San-fo-ts'i is a rival for the distinction (if, indeed, it were a Malayan territory distinct from Sri Vijaya), and when it faded in importance about the same time as Sri Vijaya, several thousand Chinese from Fukien and Canton who lived there began to govern themselves. In 1377 they had as their leader a man named Liang Tau-ming from Namhoi in Kwangtung.

Meanwhile, in 1349, Wang Ta-yuan, a Chinese merchant, writes of Tumasik, or Old Singapore.[2] His account gives the very definite impression that here also was a fairly large settlement of Chinese. This is the first colony of Chinese in the Malay Peninsula of which we have any record.

In a later chapter in the history of the Chinese in Malaya we shall discuss the question whether the Chinese formed any permanent settlement in the Malay kingdom of Malacca, which was founded about A.D. 1400 and endured until the Portuguese conquest of 1511. The chances are (we shall decide) that the merchants who visited the place were merely seasonal visitors, coming down from China with one monsoon and going back with the other. But it was in the early years of the Malay kingdom that the Emperors of the Ming dynasty began to send expeditions to the Southern Ocean and beyond on a grand scale.[3]

In 1403, says the Ming History,[4] the Emperor sent the eunuch

[1] See Sir Richard Winstedt, *Malaya and its History* (London, Hutchinson, 1948) p. 29 ff.

There are maps showing the probable extent of Sri Vijaya and Majapahit accompanying H. Otley Beyer, 'The Philippines before Magellan', *Asia*, vol. xxi (1921).

[2] See p. 282.

[3] In summarizing the Ming voyages the writer has to be much on his guard. The facts and translations of the authorities of last century, particularly Rockhill, have been subjected to the searching scrutiny of Professor Duyvendak, and many errors and slips have been revealed.

[4] J. J. L. Duyvendak, 'The true dates of the Chinese Maritime Expeditions in the early fifteenth century', *T'oung Pao*, xxxiv (Leyden, 1939).

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177 Yin Ch'ing as envoy to Malacca with presents of silk brocade.[1] But
175 more noteworthy was the visit a few years afterwards by the famous Grand Eunuch, Cheng Ho, later deified as Sam-po-kung.

Altogether Cheng Ho and his colleagues, the Grand Eunuch Wang Chin, and the assistant envoys, the Grand Eunuchs Hung Pao and Yung Chen, together with the Senior Lesser Eunuch Chang Ta, commanding the fleet, made seven voyages, in 1405, 1407, 1409, 1414, 1417, 1421, and 1431 (these being the years in which the expeditions set out).[2] The account published by them in 1431 is in their collective name, but it is not clear which of them took part in the several voyages. The following is abstracted from their account as quoted by Professor Duyvendak:

Voyage I

In the third year of Yung Lo (1405), 'commanding the fleet', we went to Ku-li (Calicut) and other countries. At that time the pirate Ch'en Tsu-yi and his followers were assembled at San-fo-ts'i (Palembang) where they plundered the native merchants. We captured the leader alive and returned in the fifth year (1407).

Voyage II

In the fifth year of Yung Lo (1407), 'commanding the fleet', we went to Kua-Wa (Java), Ku-li (Calicut), Ko-chih (Cochin), and Hsien-lo (Siam). The kings of these countries all presented us as tribute with local products, precious birds, and (rare) animals. We returned in the seventh year (1409).

Voyage III

In the seventh year of Yung Lo (1409), 'commanding the fleet', we went to the countries visited before and took our route by the country of Hsi-lan-shan (Ceylon). Its King Ya-lieh-jo-nai-erh (Alagakkonara) was guilty of a gross lack of respect and plotted against the fleet. Owing to the manifest answer (to prayer) of the divine power (the plot) was discovered and thereupon the king was captured alive. In the ninth year (1411), on our return, he was presented (to the throne as a prisoner). Subsequently he received the imperial favour of returning to his own country.

[1] Ming History, Book 325.

[2] 'What are today called the Indian Ocean or the Nanyang were formerly called the Nan Hai (Southern Sea) or the Nan-hsi Hai (Southwestern Sea). The sea to the south of the Gulf of Siam was given the special name of Ch'ang Hai.' Feng Ch'eng-chün, *Nan Yang Chiao T'ung Shih* (*History of Chinese Relations with the Nanyang*) (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1937) p. 91.

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The fourth voyage (1414) was to Ormuz and other places and the fleet returned in 1415. In that year the king of the country of Man-la-Chia (Malacca) came in person with his wife and son to present tribute. On the fifth voyage (1417–19) the envoys visited Ormuz again and also Aden, Mogadisho, Calicut, &c., bringing back zebras, lions, camels, and ostriches. Ormuz figured once more in the sixth voyage (1421–2) and in the sixth year of Hsüan-ti (1431), 'starting once more for the barbarian (countries) in order to make known the imperial commands', the fleet sailed for the Western Ocean, returning in 1433.

The object of the voyages was to enhance the prestige of the Ming dynasty and, incidentally, to keep a look out for any rebels against the dynasty who might have taken refuge in the Nanyang. 'The Imperial Ming dynasty', proclaimed the high envoys, 'in unifying seas and continents, surpasses the Three Dynasties and even goes beyond the Han and the T'ang. The countries beyond the horizon and from the ends of the earth have all become subjects (of the Imperial Ming). . . . The barbarians from beyond the seas . . ., have come to audience bearing precious objects and presents.'

Says Professor Duyvendak in another place:[1]

> These embassies must have been stupendous undertakings; fleets are described of 62 vessels carrying 37,000 soldiers; more than 20 countries in the Indian archipelago and the Indian Ocean were visited; chiefs and kings, like those of Palembang and of Ceylon, were deposed and sent as captives to China, and members of the expeditions went as far as Aden and Mecca, bringing messages from the Chinese court. Most surprising of all, these fleets were commanded by eunuchs, of whom none is more famous than Cheng Ho, known as San-Pao-T'ai-Ch'ien.

The dynastic histories have a good deal to say of Java during the period of Cheng Ho's voyages. The denizens of the country were divided into three kinds of people—first, the Chinese who resided there temporarily and whose clothes and food were fine and nice; secondly, the traders from other countries, who resided there for a longer time, and who also were quite civilized and clean; and thirdly, the natives of the country, who were very dirty and were fond of eating snakes, insects, and worms, and who slept and ate together with the dogs. From Grissé, in 1411, a Chinese from Canton sent representatives to the Chinese court and a letter offer-

[1] 'Ma Huan Re-examined', *Proceedings of the Royal Academy of Science* (Amsterdam, 1933). (On the *Ying yai sheng lan*, ascribed to Ma Huan.)

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ing produce of the country as tribute. Tuban was the native name of a place near Grissé where more than a thousand families lived, all under one chief. Amongst them were many Chinese from Canton and Changchow (near Amoy) who were settled there. Fowls, goats, fish, and vegetables were cheap there. Surabaya was another place where there were many Chinese. Later it seems that Tuban was deserted by them because of its insecurity (there being numerous robbers) and all trade went to a new place, Yortan (situated in the present district of Paduran), but it subsequently disappeared.

There is in the Chinese records a large number of references to the Chinese in Java and Sumatra in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries on the eve of the European incursions into these waters. Many pirates are mentioned, including Ch'en Tsu-yi who was seized by Cheng Ho. Later on, in the reign of Chia Ching (1522–66), another notorious Cantonese robber flourished. Besides his main business of robbery, he had a large commercial establishment in which many Hokkiens were employed.

Regarding the Chinese navigation of these seas, it has been remarked that their junks always sailed with the trade winds, going with the northeast monsoon and returning home with the southwest monsoon. On the outward voyage it was the custom to follow the Asiatic coast, but on the home trip the ships of Amoy probably sailed along the west coasts of Borneo, Palawan, Luzon, and Formosa. Moreover, the sailing directions in Chinese books indicate that ships bound for the Sulu Archipelago, eastern Borneo, and, in later centuries, even for Banjermassin and Java, first crossed over to the island of Luzon and sailed southwards through the Philippines.[1]

This opinion is consistent with that of Sir Roland Braddell who says:

> Summarizing, we suggest that both *a priori* reasoning and such data as we possess lead to a very early knowledge of Borneo on the part of the Indians and Chinese and that in the case of both of them probably, but the latter certainly, they must have been familiar with Borneo before they became familiar with Java, the navigation to which was far more difficult and more dangerous.[2]

[1] G. N. Steiger, op. cit. pp. 202, 203. See also p. 679 of this Survey, and the remarks on Chinese navigation of Southeast Asian waters in J. V. Mills, 'Malaya in the Wu-pei-chih Charts', *JRASMB*, vol. xv, pt. 3 (December 1937).

[2] op. cit. *JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (February 1941) p. 72.

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Let us now go back for a while and consider the early history of the Chinese contacts with Borneo in more detail, keeping in mind the implications raised by Dr Heine-Geldern's revelations of the finds there and in Indonesia.

The credit for bringing Brunei to the official notice of China seems to have been due to neither the Chinese nor the Borneans, but rather to the enterprising Arab traders of Canton and Ch'üan-chow. It is not known just how early these Arabs began trading in Brunei, but in 977 a certain Abu Ali and two other Arabs came to the Chinese court as envoys from the king of Brunei. From the twelfth to the fifteenth century accounts of Brunei, Sulu, Mindoro, and others of the Philippine Islands became more numerous. Before 1225 Chinese vessels were making trading trips to nearly all parts of the Philippines. Apart from Sulu, which had always maintained closer relations with Borneo than with the Philippines, the most important trade centre appears to have been Mindoro.[1]

The traditions of Borneo and Sulu indicate that a Chinese province was established some centuries ago in the neighbourhood of the Kinabatangan River, and the province had dominion over the Sulu River. It is mainly accepted, too, that a daughter of a Chinese 'prince', who was in all probability the governor of the province referred to, came from the Kinabatangan River to marry the second sultan of Brunei, and from that couple originated the royal family of Brunei of the present day.

The statement that the Dusuns are 'half-Chinese' is frequently made by residents of Borneo. This theory has led to much controversy. In the middle of the last century a traveller in Sarawak, a Mr Witti, expressed himself strongly against any supposed Chinese mixture in the blood of the Dusuns, saying, 'I think no Chinese colonies ever existed in the north of Borneo', but the same traveller in a journey up the Pagalan River speaks of a tribe that was 'probably the result of an infusion of Chinese blood with the aboriginal races of Borneo'.[2] Regarding the Dyaks, Earl remarks that the Chinese of his time supposed them to be descended from a large body of their countrymen left by accident on the island, but this belief, he says, was entertained solely on the basis of the Chinese legend of the Kuni Balu snake whose stone was stolen by the

[1] Steiger, Otley Beyer, Benitez, op. cit. p. 205.

[2] Cited by Ling Roth, *The Natives of Sarawak and British North Borneo* (London, Truslove & Hanson, 1896) i. 24.

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177 175 Emperor of China by the agency of Chinese who formed a chain from the snake's lair to waiting junks. The stone was recovered by the snake, but the human chain of Chinese remained to colonize the country. Another legend of this nature concerned the origin of the Bolupih race from a Chinese native union. C. A. de Crespigny could see no similarity between the natives and the Chinese except a turning-in of the upper eyelid in childhood, whereas St John observed that the 'features of many are very like the Chinese—perhaps a trace of that ancient kingdom that tradition fixes in this neighbourhood'.[1] In the present century I. H. N. Evans has pronounced strongly against the theory of Chinese admixture with the Dusuns though he admits Chinese admixtures on the Klias Peninsula and the Kinabatangan River.[2]

But whatever the truth regarding the Chinese colonization of Borneo in remoter times, it is certain that by the early nineteenth century a considerable admixture of the races was in progress. Intermarriage between Chinese men and Dyak women was common and St John, at the request of the Raja, opened a school for the benefit of the offspring of such unions.

> Truly speaking (St John adds) the Chinese women up here are themselves the offspring of mixed marriages, but having been brought up in all the manners and customs of the Chinese, are looked upon as Chinese.

The settled agricultural tribes between the Brunei and Murudu Rivers were considered good examples of Chinese and natives intermarrying.

Of special interest to the students of Chinese contacts with Borneo is the evidence afforded by native agricultural methods and the 'sacred jars'.

Sir Spenser St John describes the methods used by the native

[1] Ling Roth, op. cit. i. 57; ibid. p. 59.

[2] I. H. N. Evans, *Among Primitive Peoples in Borneo* (London, Seeley Service, 1932) p. 274 ff.

Mr Tom Harrisson comments: 'How is it possible to conclude that the theory is not true, while at the same time admit Chinese admixtures on the Klias Peninsula and the Kinabatangan River? Such traditions do not persist unless there is some reason for them. In fact, they are to be found in some form or other, over a much wider area of Borneo, and were recorded by some of the very earliest travellers, such as the anonymous writer in the *Chinese Repository* of 1834, and Earl in 1837. The most that can be said is that the matter is not proven either way. . . . St John in 1858 found remains of extensive pepper gardens in the Madihit, ten days by canoe, through rapids etc., right up the Limbang and right in the interior. The oldest Muruts could then just remember these Chinese. The present inhabitants of the area have *no idea* there were ever Chinese there—a good example of the negative negative.'

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people of Tumposok where he first saw natives ploughing. The plough was of a very simple construction, serving rather to scratch the ground than to turn it over, was entirely of wood, and was drawn by a buffalo, and its action was the same as if a pointed stick had been dragged through the land to a depth of about four inches. After ploughing, they used a rough kind of harrow. 'I think this superior agriculture', says St John, 'is obviously a remnant of Chinese civilization.'[1]

Tangible evidence of Chinese contact with Sarawak is afforded by the 'sacred jars', undoubtedly of Chinese origin. The 'jar cult' played an important role not only in Borneo but also among the Moi of southern Indochina, in the Philippines, in Formosa, and various other parts of the Indonesian region. (Dr Heine-Geldern remarks that Professor Janse's recent discoveries in Indochina may help to solve the origin of this cult.) St John describes the several kinds of jars existing in Sarawak. The best known were the Gusi, the Rusa, and the Naga. The most valuable, the Gusi, was a green colour, about 18 inches in height, and was, from its medicinal properties, exceedingly sought after. One fetched at Tawaran the price of £400 to be paid in produce. The Naga was a jar two feet in height ornamented with Chinese dragons. This was at this time worth only £7–8; while the Rusa, covered with the figures of some kind of deer, was worth £15–16.[2] Another jar, the Ningkah, mentioned in another contemporary account, fetched $150.[3]

These jars were the principal commodity in the Chinese trade with Borneo and other islands. This trade may have been of the 'silent' variety, when Chinese junks, laden with silk, beads, iron,

[1] It is interesting to compare this description with that of a native plough of supposedly Chinese origin in the Philippines (see p. 613), and there is a reference to another plough not of local design in Malaya (see p. 314).

[2] Ling Roth, op. cit. ii. 284.

Every Dyak tribe possessed some jars according to their riches or importance, though, as one European lady remarks, 'no one would suppose from their appearance that they were worth more than the common earthenware water-pots we use in our bath-houses'. They were, in fact (to judge from examples in the Sarawak Museum), of as cheap a quality as the Chinese trader could persuade the natives to purchase. Examples of these jars are illustrated in Plate 159 of N. Ottema, *Ceramiek Handboek*, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam, J. H. de Bussy, 1946).

One special jar, owned by the Sultan of Brunei, was supposed to have magical qualities, and Bisayas used to come with presents for the Sultan to obtain in return a little water from the jar with which to sprinkle their rice-fields to ensure good crops.

[3] L. W. Helms, *Pioneering in the Far East* (W. H. Allen, London, 1882) p. 153, cited by Ling Roth, op. cit. ii. 280.

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Chinese

177 copper pots, and many kinds of jars arrived off the coast and made
175 their presence known by beating on gongs. The natives would bring to the beach whatever they had to trade and then retire to a distance. The traders would take ashore what they considered the proper equivalent in terms of their own goods, and if this proved satisfactory they took the native articles and moved on to the next settlement.[1] But whether or no this method of trading was usual in later times, it seems that in the time spoken of by Chao Ju-kua (12th–13th centuries) buying and selling were carried on in a more friendly and civilized way. After a ship had arrived and had been boarded by the natives they mingled freely with the ship's folk. The custom was for native traders to assemble in crowds and carry the goods away with them in baskets, 'and even if one cannot at first know them and can but slowly distinguish the men who remove the goods there will be no loss'.[2]

More impressive, aesthetically speaking, than the jars are the pottery and china revealed by the pick and spade in mineral exploration. Mr Helms records that on one occasion his party found a number of paving tiles four inches thick, 'beautifully made of pebbles, concrete, quartz, etc. They had been polished, were clearly very old, and made by people of a higher civilization.' Were these, by any chance, relics of Chinese settlement?

The coming of the Europeans caused a break in the trading relations between China, Borneo, and the other Malaysian islands which had gone on for so long. In the year 1530 one of the functionaries in the capital addressed a memorial to the throne respecting the discontinuance of the tribute from Borneo. This memorial says:

> During the period Cheng-tc (1506–1521) the Franks (Portuguese) had been violently spreading their influence and the tribute had ceased. A few years afterwards the natives had tried to begin sending it again, but it was evident that their regard for the Chinese empire had suffered very much.

Finally, let us summarize what is known of Chinese intercourse with the Philippines prior to the Spanish period.

It is at a comparatively late date that the Philippines are first mentioned in Chinese history; and the fact is the more striking (says Laufer) since some of the adjacent isles to the south are touched upon much earlier. In the fifth year of Hung-wu (1372) the first embassy arrived in China with tribute, and the Emperor

[1] Fay Cooper Cole, op. cit. p. 28. [2] G. N. Steiger, op. cit. p. 205.

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reciprocated by dispatching an official with presents of silk gauze woven of gold and coloured threads to the king of the country. But (Laufer warns us) 'From this first mention of the Philippines in Chinese history we should not be so narrow-minded as to infer that Chinese intercourse with the Philippines dates from just the year 1372; on the contrary, the fact that there was a Philippine embassy in that year points to a long commercial intercourse between the two peoples which had escaped the knowledge of the court historiographers at Peking.'[1] The statement made in the Imperial Geography of the Ming (*Ta Ming I Feng Chi*) that no investigation of Luzon had been made by previous generations is contradicted by the fact that Philippine tribes are described in Chao Ju-kua's work of the thirteenth century.

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Since Laufer wrote there has been considerable further investigation of the subject, and the present state of knowledge can best be summarized in the words of Dr H. Otley Beyer:

> It is improbable that many Chinese ships were engaged in this trade with the Philippines during the early period (at least before the late 11th–12th century part of it) and it is unlikely that there were any Chinese residents in the islands at that time . . . [re 12th–14th centuries] Chinese merchant colonies began to establish themselves in a few places where a fairly strong or well-organized native government gave prospect of protection. . . . With the death of Cheng Ho, however, and the passing of the Yung Lo regime, this Chinese attempt at dominions overseas also passed away . . . [re A.D. 1430–1450]. As Mohammedan influence spread eastward through the southern Philippines, and northward from Borneo into Luzon, the Siam and Indo-China trade was at first cut off, while the Chinese merchant vessels were forced to seek new trading routes leading around the eastern side of Luzon, and into the eastern Visayan Islands etc., where Islamic beliefs had not yet penetrated. . . . While the Chinese settlers intermarried freely in the country, built good houses, and taught their families better ways of living, they were not otherwise interested in converting or spreading new ideas among the native folk. Their influence was chiefly economic, and aside from the brief period of Yung Lo's empire, made no attempt to meddle or interfere with native political constitutions, social customs, or beliefs. . . .[2]

[1] Berthold Laufer, 'The Relations of the Chinese to the Philippine Islands', *Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections* (quarterly issue), vol. 1 (September 1907) p. 251.

[2] H. Otley Beyer, *Early History of Philippine Relationships to Foreign Countries, especially China* (Manila, National Printing Company for the University of the Philippines Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, 1948).

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What has been given above is only a brief outline of a vast subject of which the facts are, for many periods, largely unprecipitated. In an attempt to confine this survey to manageable proportions and to give it a contemporary focus, we have adopted the principle that our interest in the Chinese of Southeast Asia begins in earnest only when they had formed permanent settlements, and it is true to say that the majority of such settlements still remaining, outside Annam and Tongking, were founded within the last 350 years. Nevertheless, we should not forget that the stream of Chinese immigration into the region, swelling into spate in the second and third decades of the present century, was but an expansion of long pre-existing rivulets of intercourse.

After the great military expeditions of the early Mings, the urge to imperial expansion overseas appears to have gone out of the Chinese. The self-contained spirit of the Middle Kingdom reasserted itself and the Emperors were content with adventures by land. It would indeed be harder to explain why the urge arose at all than why it subsided so soon. The fact remains that whereas the colonization of the Europeans followed in the wake of their fleets and soldiers or to lands obtained by treaty from the native rulers, the Chinese in the last three and a half centuries have entered Southeast Asia either as visiting merchants or as suppliants for permission to remain from the Javanese Sultans, or from the Spanish, Dutch, British, or French. They came no more as haughty emissaries of the Dragon Throne, armed to the teeth to enforce the imperial will, but as humble and peaceable shiploads of traders, artisans, or coolies, waiting, like Czech or Italian peasants on Ellis Island, for permission to enter the land of promise. But their meekness and peaceableness were in the long run to be far more forceful than the militancy of the Europeans; for where the latter came in their tens the Chinese came in their thousands, and when the Europeans have gone, they will remain.[1]

[1] While this Survey was in the press there appeared 'The Khmer Empire and the Malay Peninsula', by Lawrence Palmer Briggs, *Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. ix, no. 3, May 1950, which adds valuable source material for Sino-Southeast Asia contacts.

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S native community. The Chinese National Government manifested
578 an increasing solicitude for the *Hua Ch'iao*, the overseas Chinese,
668 whom it regards almost as its children; it instructed its consular officials to register all the Chinese within their jurisdiction, and they sent missions to inspect every activity of overseas Chinese
[871] life. What is more, the Chinese Government took upon itself to direct the education of Chinese in the Nanyang, laying down the
C curriculum to be followed, and even introducing a system of
578 grants-in-aid in competition with that of the local Government. It
648 often happened that remote officials in Nanking or Chungking,
668 very likely originating from one of the northern provinces and completely out of touch and sympathy with the Chinese of the Nanyang, claimed the right to direct their affairs. Even ethnically speaking the overseas Chinese might be nearer to the Siamese or Burmese, or (by intermarriage) to the Indonesians, than to a Chinese from Honam or Kansu. It was no wonder that Siam, Malaya, and the other countries of Southeast Asia saw an *imperium in imperio* growing up in their midst and began to fear for their
S own eventual safety.

578 This development, then, we are constrained to regard as in
668 many ways a misfortune for the overseas Chinese and for the
177 countries in which they had made their home or wherein they were sojourners. It arrested assimilation and erected a racial wall.
C At the same time the simultaneous growth of local nationalism
578 encouraged the Chinese to look to their own country for pro-
668 tection—a protection, it turned out, it was, because of its own
648 internal division and weakness as a Power, in no position to give. Nor did the authorities in the one country of Southeast Asia
177 where the Chinese now were the majority community offer any real encouragement to the local-born Chinese to regard Malaya as their own country and to resist the claims to control their destinies by a remote Government in a country they had never seen. The chance to extend the teaching of English to the community was lost and for thousands the only means of receiving an education of any sort was in the Chinese Nationalist schools; the doors of the Malayan civil service were opened to Malays but not to Chinese; the whole policy of Federated and Unfederated Malay States was, and is still, pro-Malay. It was surely no wonder that the Malayan-born Chinese who, while proud of their Chinese ancestry and culture, wished to identify themselves and their

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children's future with Malaya alone, were attracted to, or forced into, the Nationalist camp.

Malaya has for long been the 'test case' of Chinese affairs and a focus of interest in Southeast Asia. The situation as it was tending was very clearly described by a distinguished traveller many years ago; Professor Arnold Toynbee records the impression of his visit to the Straits Settlements in these words:

> And China is not only enormous already; it is rapidly getting more enormous (if logically that adjective can be put in the comparative degree). When I touched at the Straits Settlements on my way out east I realized that British Malaya is destined, by 'peaceful penetration', to become a Chinese province, and I fancy, from what I have heard, that the same destiny may be in store for Burma, Siam, French Indo-China, Dutch Indonesia, and the Philippines. In the end the current of Chinese expansion in the Tropics will meet the current of Hindu expansion over the submerged heads of the smaller and weaker and less efficient peoples in between, who are already fast going under. And, after what has happened, I surmise that the new frontier between China and India will tend, slowly but surely, to travel westward at India's expense and in China's favour.

What happened in Malaya, we cannot too frequently remind ourselves, was not the result of military conquest, not the territorial spoils of a Kublai Khan, but because the British had welcomed the immigration of a couple of million Chinese. For long after the intervention in the Malay States it had been found difficult to attract the British capital needed for the opening up of the country: it was not until a plentiful supply first of Indian and then of Chinese labour was assured that such capital was forthcoming, and it was not until the end of the 1920s that there was any control at all of Chinese immigration.

The British Colonial Office and the Malayan Governments must have seen that the admission of Chinese in such numbers that they would eventually be the majority community was bound to create a problem of tremendous magnitude. Even the degree of assimilation taking place in Siam and Indochina was out of the question because of the barrier of the Mohammedan religion. The only hope now for the future of Malaya in the interest of its diverse peoples was to promote a feeling of common Malayan citizenship to counter the claim, tacit or express, of Chinese Nationalism to consider Malaya as a new province of China. In the pre-war years

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to smallholder systems, leading to the smallholder becoming an exponent of diversified rather than single crop cultivation. 245

While the region has sought to escape the consequence of overmuch dependence on one or two cash crops, Southeast Asia subsistence farming is really already highly diversified. Moreover, the region as a whole must be considered reasonably well diversified in the range of commercial crops it produces, even though individual districts within Southeast Asia are monocultivated rather than polycultivated. 241

Effects of the Second World War

During the 1941–42 campaign, battles were fought through Burma, Malaya and the Philippines. More military action took place in Burma and the Philippines over the year 1944–45. The direct long-term effects of these campaigns were not emphatic because agriculture and arboriculture cannot be "scorched" and denied to the enemy on a large scale. The war in these territories devastated internal communications, broke down the systems of internal trade, removed the means of communication between different parts of Southeast Asia and destroyed the channels to those overseas markets which had been the principal destination of commercial agricultural produce. Breakdown of external trade channels occurred in all Southeast Asia territories whether campaigns took place in them or not. 241 177

The first consequences of this disruption, as distinct from destruction, were to place a premium on subsistence farming, to cause all commercial cultivation to fall into desuetude, to undermine confidence in agriculture for cash, to cause the loss or destruction of draught cattle which were taken away for military use, to disperse labour forces, and to stimulate self-sufficiency policies. Very little of the perennial tree acreage, such as of rubber, was cut down—only 6 per cent in the case of Malayan rubber—yet it was the commercial production which suffered most from disruption, which created in the postwar period considerable difficulties for those territories needing imported rice for the labour to rehabilitate commercial farming and industries. Agriculture itself, where labour was available, rehabilitated quickly; all but 2 per cent of Malayan rice acreages were back in cultivation during 1945–46 and rubber made an equally quick comeback, so

241 that about one-third of its prewar estate area was being tapped in 1947, representing two-thirds of the area tappable.

439 In the food crops, surplus margins were more slowly restored. Exports of Southeast Asia rice totalled about a million tons during 241 1946, as against a combined export of 5.7 million tons annually for 1936–40. The drop in production of this staple was greatest 243 in the case of Burma because there the dislocation by war had 177 been greatest, but by the 1946–47 season, about two-thirds of Lower Burma rice acreages were back in cultivation, as against half in 1945–46. In Cochinchina over 70 per cent of the rice area was being cultivated in 1946–47. Siam which was untouched by military campaigns reported 10.6 million acres under cultivation in rice for 1946–47 (22 per cent more than 1939–40)—the only territory to show a substantial increase of rice acreage in the immediate postwar years.

243 A postwar feature has been the general decline in rice yields, mostly an effect of loss of draught cattle, though to report low 177 yields was a convenient cover for black market sales. The consequence of lost production in local food was felt more in places like Malaya which has specialised in non-food commercial agriculture, than in any other territories of Asia, which customarily needed to import only a small margin and not the majority of their rice. For the Philippines in 1947, the United Nations reported that *per capita* consumption of rice was actually higher than in 1939 by about 5 per cent.

464 Since labour shortage has been prominent as a factor operating against postwar commercial agriculture, the subsistence farmer 241 and the diversified smallholder have assumed far greater significance than before. Over 55 per cent of Malaya's rubber production for 1946 was from smallholders, a proportion which had been as much as 85 per cent in the early months of that year, yet fell to 45 per cent in 1950 (cf. 39 per cent in 1940).

249 The vegetable oils soon came back into production and by early 1947 monthly production in Southeast Asia was not far short of 1941 production and now exceeds it.

241 The general lowering of food acreages and of yields, combined with the enforced reversion to subsistence agricultural forms, has 178 a special significance for Southeast Asia food supplies over the next few years, because the restricted food supply comes at a time when population is rapidly increasing, at the rate of about 20

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Chapter Twenty-five

PEOPLES, POLITICS AND PROSPECTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

101 THE setting of Southeast Asia may be summed up as one of
184 extremes of relief (deltaic plains and mountains) and a climate
361 mostly approaching the wet limit for plant life but merging into
105 monsoonal types. To this setting the people have made varying responses, ranging from migrant food gatherers and hunters in the jungles, to subsistence farmers in the plains, but all turning upon woody materials for weapons, implements, house-structures and domestic utensils, upon rice, the cereal of the wet extreme, and upon social systems of communal help. The whole social and economic life has been galvanised over the past century or two by being more and more drawn into commercial and industrial activities developed in response to and on the basis of external needs for the minerals and agricultural products of Southeast Asia, whereas prior to that time the region was touched only by a trickle of traders moving between India and China.

FACTORS IN THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY

174 Several factors account for the difficulty of obtaining firm data
177 to fill in our general picture of the historical geography of South-
311 east Asia. In the first place, there grew up no strong literary tradi-
175 tion to last through the centuries and record the past in a form other than mythical. Here tradition is largely oral and literature essentially Indian rather than indigenous. And whatever there was of local record and history has rotted away quickly, the climate, the ants, insects and moulds soon destroying anything on wood, paper, leather or cloth. Moreover, in this setting of swamps and forest, the most easily available material is wood, and artistic tradition expressed in wood, whether in carvings, buildings or tools, rapidly disintegrates, leaving little of that sort of evidence which is the basis of our facts about early periods in other regions. Buildings and carvings on stone were not normal expressions of Southeast Asia people where over large areas stone is not easily come by and where

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

FIG. 113.—Historic Pattern of Southeast Asia during Indian Colonial Period

implements had not in any case developed far enough to deal with 174
stone. Hence monumental evidence in Southeast Asia is so largely 177
Indian, an introduction by foreigners using styles and techniques 211
developed in their home settings, and most developed in the drier
parts of this region, where stone is more accessible. On the clay 175
lands, historic brick structures, also an Indian innovation, weather
to nothing very quickly. At Angkor may be seen the power of
quick-growing tropical trees to shatter and break down temples and
palaces built of stone and lateritic blocks.

This, too, is a region of natural calamities, difficult though it is [731]
to pin-point them. Little kingdoms have been wiped out in a few
hours by Javanese volcanoes, as in A.D. 1006 when the flourishing 133
city of Dharmavamsa (a great king of Central Java) was reduced to 175
ashes by "a great calamity," probably an explosion and lava out-
flow of the Merapi volcano. Settlements along rivers have been
obliterated when huge mud-flows swept down from loose ashes on
the flanks of new eruptions, possibly accounting for our ignorance
of east Sumatran kingdoms. Coasts have altered through the years

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133 and deltas have changed; areas which once were shallow sea have
175 become sedimented to swamps, a process by which Cambodia has been cut off as the Lower Mekong built up mud-flats isolating Tonle Sap from contact with the sea. The evolution of new routes has caused some old centres of power to fade into mere fishing villages, evidenced in the decline of Takhola and Bandon after the sea route through the Straits of Malacca became more generally

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

FIG. 114.—Historic Pattern of Southeast Asia at the Islamisation Period

175 used than that across Kra. Plagues have laid waste whole cities, as
164 when Uthong in about 1350 was devastated by cholera and its population fled. The region is still one where malaria, dysentery, cholera and plague are endemic, more especially in the older, more congested territories like Java. These diseases have frequently flared up into appalling epidemics killing thousands of people, epidemics reflecting a relation between bacteria and the climate (which encourages bacterial reproduction), the population density, the difficulties of sewage disposal and social habits of indifference to hygiene (which has no ill effects among lonely settlements in the forest but becomes a social menace in towns). Fevers and virulent diseases have frequently ravaged the local people, debilitated them, and wiped out their settlements. The region is strewn with ruins of towns now abandoned, and with ruined groups of people who have degenerated physically by disease and under-nourishment. Southeast Asia proved capable of engulfing rather than enshrining those moving into it to live.

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Further to complicate the historic geography was the fact that the literary people, the monks and religious men, were Indian or Indian-minded for long periods, disinterested in mundane records, and following the custom, still evident among many Southeast Asia people today, of avoiding personal names, so that anonymity, obscurity and confused nomenclature veil the past even in such records as do exist. Many experiments in writing styles were developed among these isolated and complex peoples and often inscriptions made in them cannot be translated today. Because of the dispersal tendencies within the territories themselves and the lack of focus to the region as a whole, no great depositories of learning were established in Southeast Asia to gather and conserve the record of its past.

Population Changes

Broadly speaking, the region has been until recently one of very thin population and large patches of it still contain populations of remarkably low density. Direct evidence of densities are scanty for periods farther back than this century, yet it seems probable that the whole of Southeast Asia in 1800 contained only about ten million people, when the region was probably as thinly peopled in its most attractive areas as Upper Burma and Upper Siam, the least attractive and developed areas, are today; Malaya then contained about a quarter million people, Java about four million, Burma probably less than two million. It was, even at the end of the 18th century, a zone of labour shortage and the objective of the local princelings of the times was to get hands, the basic power resource of their time, the one way of securing a small surplus from their fundamentally subsistent territories. Outsiders were not greatly attracted to Southeast Asia itself, as apart from the routes through it. To Spain its old colony, the Philippines, was no great asset and more related to Mexico than to Spain, remote and ready to drop from the Spanish orbit during the 19th century. To Holland, its colony in Java was a company venture that yielded little direct profit for many years and was at times on the verge of bankruptcy.

But the last 150 years brought tremendous changes in population. First, on the heels of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, came a revival and an expanded volume of trade between the Indian Ocean and the Far East, a stream which threaded the seaways of

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000 The dualisms and pluralities of Southeast Asia society are relatively modern, becoming emphatic only over the past three hundred years, but plural societies and changing values within the units have been apparent in their changing political patterns. First there were the inland political nuclei; the kingdoms of Middle Burma, Upper Siam, Inner Cambodia were matched among the islands by principalities set in the mountains of Sumatra and Java. Then came the little powers related more to the sea than to the land; the Sailendra kingdoms using the Malacca Strait as their bond and artery, the Majapahit sea kingdom whose territories in Borneo, Celebes, Java and South Sumatra may be thought of as footholds for a sailing people, fringing rather than entrenched in the islands (Fig. 113). At a later phase the move of power centres was to the lower rivers of the continental edge, to Lower Burma and Lower Siam. In these historic patterns of political units may be seen operating the influences and traditions of widely differing human types, one rooted in the land, coming overland, depending on agriculture for its welfare and power; the other of seafaring people, many kinds and grades of them, coming to the lands of Southeast Asia by water, relatively mobile on their seaways, fishing and trading through the seas, and always peripheral to the land.

Dual National Foci

369 184 177 631 In most of the constituent political units of Southeast Asia there is thus a split of interest (Fig. 117). Burma has a focus at Mandalay and a commercial-administrative focus at Rangoon; the Philippines has a dual nodality round Manila and round the Visayan Islands; Malaya, which has only recently acquired clear internal focus, has two centres of different interest, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, the former exclusively peninsular, the latter as much involved with all Southeast Asia as with Malaya; Indochina has the double pull of the Tonkin (Hanoi) area and the Mekong Delta (Saigon); Java, its old internal focus at Jogjakarta, with Batavia acting as external point of attraction. Sumatra is in the strange position of having several inland nuclei plus the tendency to use Singapore as its outport and route to Batavia. Only Siam can claim to have no second focus, yet even there the channelling toward Bangkok is only natural for the Chao Praya Basin; the Korat Plateau topography leads human and commercial interests towards the Mekong and the border country towards the northwest was once focused on

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the historic kingdoms at Chiengmai. Borneo is laid out so far entirely under centrifugal influences, complicated by the split into British and Dutch zonations. 369 184

If this "balkanisation" be true of the individual political units, it is equally strong in the region as a whole, except that the intersection of major seaways and airways tends to make an internal regional focus on Singapore, a tendency diminished by India's economic pull on Burma and South China's pull on the people, trade and foods of Siam and Indochina. 177 631

To some extent these dual foci to each territory have been stimulated by the arrival of Western trading systems which pulled in one direction while the traditional interests pull in another, yet in a sense all these political units have been created by colonial powers administering as a unit territories not previously politically unified or previously using the present boundaries. Spain and the United States enforced unity upon what is now the Philippines and in practice had continued difficulty in keeping Mindanao, for example, within the unit. France has imposed a uniformity and a certain coherence upon Indochina which was novel to the constituent units. Malaya as it exists today is a British political creation. Before the Dutch colonial period of the present century, all the islands of the East Indies had never been controlled as one whole.

Environment and States

The continental political units, Burma, Siam and Indochina in some ways may be likened to little Egypts—nucleations of people within attractive, fertile valleys protected in these cases by the nearly empty space of forests and mountains. The combination of natural encouragement and natural protection conditioned major civilisations in Egypt and in Mesopotamia at one phase in history and appears to be equally encouraging in this tropical setting except for one difference, that although this environment on the southeastern fringe of Asia certainly suited the growth of states, its protective isolation was incomplete. In the north the growing riverine states were exposed to intruders. Thus in these riverside nurseries, states were environmentally encouraged to grow in a setting attractive as breeding grounds for nations, though the environment was not sufficiently isolating nor sufficiently protective to enable the nascent states to persist. So far as the main islands were concerned, on our maps they appear as more emphatic units 369 631 184

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

Enquiry' by Wellenstein, a technique has been developed for turning to the best account such statistics as have any bearing on native welfare.[1] 803

Lord Hailey has remarked that in Africa the existing statistics might be considerably improved without additional expense, and that a comparatively small expenditure would make them much more useful. That remark applies also to Burma and probably to most other tropical dependencies. Unsatisfactory as the statistics for Netherlands India are in some respects, they do at least serve to illuminate many corners that are left dark elsewhere, and the general neglect to provide means for judging how far the benevolent aspirations expressed in statements of colonial policy bear fruit in practice, naturally affords a handle for critics of colonial administration to suggest that it is more keenly interested in economic progress than in native welfare. It is not enough that material should be available for measuring individual welfare. The analysis of welfare demands a suitable technique for measuring social welfare by presenting accurate and intelligible information regarding debt, civil litigation, crime, health, education and other matters that find no place in individual budgets of income and expenditure. There would still remain imponderable elements, those cultural and religious aspects of social life in the tropics which are the first to suffer from the economic struggle for survival of the cheapest consequent on the impact of the West. But this is no reason for neglecting to carry so far as possible the objective scientific measurement of welfare.

4. The Machinery of Welfare

The deficiency of statistical material is a notable defect in the machinery of welfare. But it is not the only, and not the chief, defect. It may seem that no special machinery is necessary, that the care for welfare may be left to the local official charged with the maintenance of order. That is very largely true. Any European official can tell the people that dirt breeds disease, or explain the benefit of vaccination, or advise them to destroy mosquitoes and rats, or bring to their knowledge new and more profitable crops, or suggest new breeds of cattle, or inculcate the advantages of thrift and the danger of getting entangled with money-lenders. None of the most urgent reforms in the daily life of tropical peoples calls for special scientific equipment beyond the stock of knowledge common to educated Europeans. Natives have frequently 657 654 177 647

[1] Furnivall, *Economic Journal of India*, 1934, p. 295.

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adopted of their own accord innovations which appeal to them, and it would seem possible for European officials to recommend European standards of hygiene and other reforms with little or no expenditure on welfare services. It is true that modern science has done much and can do more for the welfare of tropical peoples. The connection between rats and plague and between mosquitoes and malaria are recent scientific discoveries, and scientists have traced the origin of hookworm and beri-beri. There is unbounded scope for research, and useful expenditure on it is limited only by the funds available. But it is well to remember that research does not bear fruit until it is applied to daily life; its practical application depends on the efficiency of the machinery of welfare.

It is true also that administrative officials should be better able to promote welfare if they have the assistance of departmental specialists. But departmental specialists will usually need the help of administrative officials if they are to get into touch with the people in their daily life. The departmental specialist is probably an expert in his own line, but one can hardly expect him also to be expert in native economy and customs or to be proficient in native languages. It is useless for the medical officer to advocate shoes for hookworm if the people cannot afford to buy shoes, or for the sanitary department to devise modern latrines which the people will not use, or for the agriculturist to recommend crops which local conditions of labour or water supply do not allow the people to grow. Although the specialist may try to adapt native life to scientific principles, the administrative official should be capable of adapting scientific principles to native life. Thus the welfare specialist must ordinarily work in double harness with the administrative official by his side. But the administrative official can do little to promote welfare unless he knows the locality, and what needs doing; has influence that will lead the people to attend to his advice; and remains among them long enough to make certain that they act on it. All these conditions must be fulfilled if welfare work is to succeed.

The machinery ordinarily employed differs according as the system of rule is direct or indirect. In the adoption of direct rule one object was to promote greater welfare through liberating the people from arbitrary oppression by their own chieftains. On this plan all the administrative officials, European and native, became servants of the law, charged with administering equal law to all. When it became apparent that the law, while liberating the people from arbitrary will,

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subjected them to mechanical economic forces, attempts were made to protect them against the action of these forces. That is the distinctive character of welfare machinery under direct rule; it allows free play within the law to economic forces, but attempts to mitigate their consequences. This is directly contrary to the method of indirect rule, systematized by Van den Bosch in Java, which tries to soften the impact of economic forces by leaving the people under their own chieftains and their own customs, while aiming to protect them against arbitrary oppression. Direct rule attempts to mitigate the action of economic forces; indirect rule aims at providing a buffer against their action. There is a corresponding difference in the machinery of welfare.

(*a*) *Direct Rule.* It is often suggested or implied that the promotion of welfare in the tropics requires nothing more than the provision of funds for the services of experts. But this view disregards the conditions limiting their activities. The application of science to the affairs of daily life is quite a novel idea even in Europe; each generation of doctors regards its predecessors as unscientific, and in agriculture, hygiene, dietetics and other studies, what is held for true to-day may be out of date to-morrow. But the tropics are still almost virgin lands in science; experience in Europe may be misleading and conclusions based on it invalid. Conditions are different or even contrary. Cultivation requires a cool soil instead of a warm soil; natives apparently maintain good health on a diet that, according to western science, is defective; plague and malaria were spread by measures intended to prevent them. The application of modern science to tropical problems requires long and patient research, and continuity of experiment. But tropical life is adverse to continuity; men go on leave or are transferred for administrative convenience. Lack of continuity nullified experiments on rice cultivation in Malaya, and official transfers hampered the researches of Ross on malaria. Moreover, any single problem may, and often does, require a whole staff of experts for its solution. In agriculture the investigation of a single crop disease may need the collaboration of agricultural experts, botanists, entomologists and so on. The same principle applies in almost all departments of economic and social life. If the agricultural expert, by patient research breeds a more productive variety of some generally grown crop, the people may be unable to take advantage of it because of difficulties in the supply of labour, water or credit; his work raises new problems for a wide circle of other departmental specialists and it will be wasted without their co-operation.

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657 It is easy, given the funds, to multiply economic and social services. But the multiplication of service tends to defeat its own ends, and
654 greater expenditure gives worse results through excessive departmentalism. Each specialist looks at life through departmental
177 blinkers. The agriculturist sees nothing but the crops, the veterinary expert only the cattle; to the sanitary inspector the latrine is more
647 important than the home, and the policeman would guarantee security more confidently if the whole population were in jail. Often the experts are at issue. The agriculturist advocates grazing reserves to provide fodder, while the veterinary officer wants to close them to prevent infection; the fishery officer advises the people to breed fish, and the medical officer drains the ponds to kill mosquitoes. Everywhere the specialist inclines to a narrow view of life, but in the tropics departmentalism has peculiar dangers; in Europe the expert looks at a familiar world, but in the tropics, owing to his ignorance of native life, the field is out of focus. In Europe the expert understands the public and the public understands the expert, because they have a common background, but in the tropics it is only the European community in the towns and western enterprise that has a mutual understanding with the expert and values his assistance. Thus the natives in towns prefer to live in the native quarter, where they can escape the unwelcome attentions of the sanitary inspector, 'whose unreasonable prejudice against picturesque filth is never understood';[1] and plantation coolies, on returning home, lapse into their old comfortable ways. Moreover in Europe there is an organic community, living its own life, which can decide for itself what it wants most; but in the tropics, where innovations are pressed on the people from outside, there naturally ensues a lack of co-ordination between the competing and often contrary activities of the departmental specialists; too many cooks, as usual, spoil the broth. The confusion may be mitigated on the Dutch plan by grouping allied services in large departments under a single head. But this device alone is insufficient. What an organic community does by the dynamic force of its inherent vitality must in the tropics be entrusted to some official personifying, as it were, the common social will. There must be someone to co-ordinate the activities of departmental specialists and to foster a demand among the people for their services.

647 Under direct rule the District officer, the local civil servant in charge

[1] Burns, p. 306.

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7. The Concept of Welfare

•177 Between progress and welfare there is a fundamental difference. Economic progress is a matter of universal common sense. It consists essentially in making two blades of grass grow where one grew previously; in widening the margin between yield and cost. Progress is measurable and, if accurately measured, there is little question as to the degree of progress. But welfare is largely a subjective concept; everyone wants different things. Everyone has a different idea of welfare, and it is differently interpreted by successive generations. All colonial powers have claimed in their contemporary idiom a two-fold objective of colonial policy: progress and welfare. On progress there has been general agreement, but in different ages welfare has been identified with salvation, liberty and comfort. The Portuguese and early Dutch both claimed to open the kingdom of heaven to their subjects, but they opened respectively a Roman heaven and a Protestant heaven. The later Dutch and the English both thought to confer freedom on their subjects; but the Dutch allowed them the freedom of their own custom, and the English gave them the freedom of western law. Modern colonial powers aim at promoting comfort, but different ideas of comfort are reflected in Rangoon, Batavia and Saigon. Welfare has been defined as the possibility to satisfy those needs of which one is aware.[1] This definition is not wholly satisfactory, for welfare depends still more closely on those needs of which one is not conscious until they are frustrated, and it is frustration of this type that is largely responsible for unrest among tropical peoples. The definition does, however, suggest that welfare is not wholly subjective; it contains an objective element because it implies a relation between man and his environment. A bullock cart is good enough for those who do not see others ride in motor-cars, but a poor man in a rich country enjoys less welfare than a poor man in a poor country.

Certain things men generally recognize as good. Peace is a good thing. But the nightly drone of planes and the news of battle in the daily papers reminded us that it can be priced too highly. Order and security are good things, but under foreign rule their value as elements of welfare is debatable. In India it was questioned so far back as 1817 by Munro, who was no idealist but a highly competent administrator, able from his own experience to compare the welfare of Indian peoples

[1] Visman, I, 69.

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under their own rulers and under the greater security and order enforced by a paternal British Government. The advantages, he wrote, 'are dearly bought. They are purchased by the sacrifice of independence, of national character and of whatever renders a people respectable....The effect of this state of things is observable in all the British provinces, where the inhabitants are certainly the most abject race in India.'[1] (It should be noted that he was not contrasting the peoples of southern India with what we now regard as the more virile races of the north, at that time not yet under British rule, but with one another.) Gouger about the same time was struck by the difference between the free and easy bearing of the Burmans under their own king and the cringing humility of the peoples of Bengal. A recent traveller contrasts the Annamese with the Chinese and Siamese.[2] 'I must confess', he says, 'that I like my Orientals free.' There was greater security and order on slave plantations than in Africa, but this was not regarded by the conscience of mankind as sufficiently justifying slavery. Peace, security and order usually promote welfare, but, as may be seen from the *pax Japonica* in Korea, they are not identical with or even a guarantee of welfare.

Economic progress is still often confused with welfare, and it is assumed that because a country produces more the people will be better fed, better clothed and better housed. But, as we have seen already, this belief is contradicted by the facts. More commonly it is suggested that the standard of living can be measured by the demand for European goods, and a rise in imports is taken as an index of welfare, although they may consist largely of production goods for western enterprise. The import of foreign cloth is claimed as an increase of welfare, even when it deprives people of employment, and is perhaps of inferior quality to native cloth. Rather surprisingly, the import of tinned foods is said to be a means of 'strengthening tribal life'.[3] Imports of sewing machines, bicycles, gramophones, motor cars and other western products for natives show that some can afford to buy things of which formerly they were unaware, but at the same time make the general public aware of things that they cannot afford to buy. The sewing machine, the bicycle and the petrol engine are probably the greatest boons which modern invention has placed at the disposal of tropical peoples, and an enquiry

[1] Gleig, p. 249.
[2] Gouger, p. 10; Brodrick, A. H., *Little China* (1942), pp. 157, 172.
[3] *African Survey*, p. 690; Mayhew, *Colonial Empire*, p. 82.

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177 into their spread and its effects would be of great interest and also of practical importance. But not infrequently such imports merely show that some people have more money than they know how to use; they indicate superfluity rather than welfare among those who buy them, and at best they do not compensate for the decay of social goods that money cannot buy. Even careful attempts to measure welfare in terms of income and expenditure may be misleading, for they omit all those goods that have no price. Probably in Africa, as in Burma, few people are so well fed or so well-housed as the prisoners in jail, but the only people who appreciate the comforts of prison life are the warders. If welfare signifies harmony between man and his environment he may be better fed, better clothed and better housed under foreign rule, and still enjoy less welfare than under native rule.

Perhaps we shall obtain a clearer notion of welfare as an object of colonial policy if we try to look at it from the standpoint of the dependent people. Although between individuals in any land there may be a wide range of preference for one thing rather than another, their general idea of welfare conforms to a common pattern which can be seen by looking at what they themselves make of their own social life under favourable circumstances. The ordinary Burman villager, for example, wants to be well fed and well clad according to Burmese ideas, and to live in a dwelling that is comfortable by Burmese standards. These requirements he can satisfy as an individual, but he has other wants, social wants, that he can realize only as a member of the community. He wants his village, also according to his own standards, to have sufficient house room, good roads and paths, a good water supply for men and cattle, adequate sanitary convenience, shady open spaces for social intercourse, and common land for general village amenities in respect of grazing, fuel and so on. High up on his list of social wants is a monastery, with a monastic school and with pagodas and rest houses in pleasant surroundings. He also values opportunities for recreation and for religious and social festivities and entertainments. This may be taken as an outline sketch of the Burmese idea of welfare, which found material expression in the more prosperous villages under Burmese rule, and was probably diffused more widely in the early days of British rule. The Burman wants these things, and he wants, chiefly, to get them to his own liking and in his own way and, beyond that, to have no more to do with Government than necessary. Production is a social function and welfare is a social attribute; in both his work and leisure he is a member of the village and does not live alone.

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Such a conception of welfare is quite different from that which ordinarily finds expression in modern welfare legislation. Much of this is based on western models designed to protect labour against capital and, though less effective in the tropics, does something to prevent a reduction in the standard of living in industrial employment below the minimum essential to efficiency. So far as it aims at more than this, it is for the most part unwelcome. The Burman does not want to eat food that Europeans may regard as more nutritious, to observe sanitary precautions that accord with European ideas, or to cultivate his land in ways that Europeans may think more desirable or profitable. His ideas differ in many ways from ours, and where they differ, he is not always mistaken. Native rule in the tropics gives the people more or less what they want, and allows them in great measure to realize their ideas of welfare. But native authority is liable to abuse, and native custom may unconsciously be irksome. So far as foreign rule, by removing abuses and abolishing irksome customs, confers on the people greater freedom to realize their idea of welfare, they accept it more readily. That was what formerly gave strength to British and Dutch colonial rule. As in Lower Burma until about 1880 and in Upper Burma up to about 1910 the people acquiesce in foreign rule because they are hardly conscious of it. It has always been the set policy of Dutch rule to conserve the native social order, however far they may have departed from this principle in practice. The same principle has found expression in some interpretations of indirect rule in British territories,[1] and apparently is still favoured in parts of Africa. If, then, the earlier days of British administration are the happiest, and it is most successful in dealing with primitive and backward peoples, this is probably because the people have been unaware of a change in their environment, except in some ways for the better.

Yet all the time, and even though they do not notice it, the environment is changing. Gradually these changes impinge on native consciousness; the people no longer feel at home, even in their own homes, and increasingly resent foreign rule and foreign ways. For various reasons, humanitarian and practical, colonial powers endeavour to counteract the ill effect of the forces which they have liberated, and to promote native welfare. But this involves closer and more frequent interference with native life and provides fuel for disaffection. In the homogeneous society of the West reforms which raise the individual standard of living tend also to promote social

[1] *African Survey*, p. 134.

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177 welfare, and it seems not unreasonable to assume that similar results will follow in the tropics. Schools, sanitary regulations, the improvement of agriculture, and so on, appeal to humanitarians as likely to improve individual welfare, and by making for economy in administration and business, they appeal to reason as well as to sentiment. Naturally colonial governments conceive of welfare on western lines, and administrative practice is concentrated on enhancing the welfare of the people as individuals.

These attempts to promote welfare are effective only so far as the people will respond to them. The West may scatter pearls, or what it takes for pearls, about the tropics, but the people will not pick them up unless they appreciate their value. Scientific agriculture, modern schools, western medicine and sanitary regulations may not conduce to, and frequently conflict with, what the people regard as welfare, but if they cannot get what they want they must take what they can get. Agricultural and other economic services may enable them to earn more as individuals; modern schools may provide their youngsters with 'a decent job'; they may adopt some western foods or remedies for illness, and they may, perhaps, go to hospitals to be cured of their complaints. But these are all individual benefits, and have no relation to welfare as a social good. Welfare consists essentially in harmony between the individual and the environment; the environment must allow him to obtain both what he knows he wants and also what he wants without being aware of it. Economic progress enlarges the possibility of welfare by increasing the command of man over material resources, but it profits the native as an individual only so far as he participates in the larger surplus, and it enhances his welfare only so far as it contributes, directly or indirectly, to the enrichment of his social life.

8. Welfare and Autonomy

647 There is, as we have noticed, a growing recognition of the complexity
657 of welfare problems. 'The problems of development touch upon the work of officers in various departments, such as administrative officers,
654 both at headquarters and in the districts, and the technical officers in the agricultural, veterinary, medical and other services. There is need for machinery to provide complete co-ordination between these separate
177 departmental staffs.'[1] The health officer finds that he must seek assistance from the chemist and entomologist, and the veterinary officer

[1] 1940, Cmd. 6175, p. 7; *African Survey*, p. 1612.

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looks to the forest officer to provide grazing for the stock. As experts come more and more to recognize the need for special knowledge outside their own branch of study, there is an increasing demand for the creation of new services, and welfare work is distributed among departmental officials who are unable to see life as a whole. At the same time there is a growing recognition that all aspects of life are closely interrelated. In Malaya the improvement of paddy is found to require co-ordinated action by the agricultural irrigation, co-operative credit, education and other services.[1] In Nyasaland the Welfare Committee comprises representatives of the Medical, Agricultural and Public Works Department together with non-officials. In Southern Rhodesia there is a Director of Native Development in charge of all native affairs.[2] The Dutch in Netherlands India minimize sectionalism by grouping the various services in large departments and, further, link up some of the departments by liaison officers. All these expedients may improve the co-ordination of the welfare machinery. But it still remains machinery, and acts mechanically on the people taken in the mass as an aggregate of individuals. Each group of specialists takes snapshots of the people from its own angle, but the composite photograph obtained by fitting the results together bears as little relation to the native world as a Hollywood film to life. It shows native life from an alien western standpoint and, however lifelike, it never comes to life. The more elaborate the machinery, the more mechanically it functions, driven by economic forces and not by human will. Improvements in the administrative machinery merely effect reforms which adapt the people better to the economic forces that dominate life in tropical dependencies. Evolution along this line leads to a dead end. It is the type of evolution characteristic of the lower forms of life which have survived by adapting their way of life to their environment; to adapt his environment to his way of life is the prerogative of man, and reforms adapting him to an uncongenial environment produce not harmony but discontent. The impact of the West has liberated forces which were formerly kept under control by custom; for the enhancement of welfare it is necessary that the people shall be enabled to regain control over these forces, that they shall regain their former autonomy. That a higher standard of welfare is a condition of autonomy is alleged as one ground for the elaboration of welfare machinery. But improvements in welfare machinery resemble improvements in applied science. Research in applied science may increase the efficiency of

[1] Mills, pp. 255, 262.

[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1197, 1227, 1230.

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current practice, but the great scientific achievements come from research in pure science, which revolutionizes practice by attacking old problems along new lines. Similarly the elaboration of welfare machinery can have no appreciable effect on welfare, and still less can it promote autonomy. It will not give them what they want unless they want what it can give, and the promotion of welfare must be approached from a new angle by a revolution in method. The machinery is not only defective, but is applied on a wrong principle.

But, in the modern world, how is it possible for tropical peoples to get what they want? For the environment has changed, and not the people; they still, if left to themselves, would try to reproduce their old environment. But they have been brought into contact with the modern world and cannot get away from it. All the king's horses and all the king's men cannot set the clock back. They can get what they want only if they want what in the conditions of the modern world they *must* want. A fundamental problem of autonomy is to change the people so that they shall come to want, or at least voluntarily to accept, those conditions which the welfare of the modern world requires. Some light should be thrown upon this problem from an examination of attempts already made to introduce self-government among dependent peoples in various projects of colonial autonomy.

9. Autonomy

Colonial autonomy is closely linked with the Liberal tradition, which had two aspects. On the economic side it stood for economic freedom, freedom of person, property and trade; on the political side it stood for freedom of thought, speech and religion. Political freedom was regarded as the natural fruit of economic freedom. In the nineteenth century Liberalism was in the air. British and Dutch colonial statesmen alike claimed Liberal ideals though interpreting them differently; French Liberals recognized their colonial subjects as citizens of France, and Liberalism in Spain, suppressed at home, took refuge in the Spanish territories overseas.

During a great part of the century Liberals in Britain thought colonies a burden, and often cited Turgot's dictum comparing them to fruit that would fall from the parent tree when ripe. Men looked forward to the day when India should be able to stand alone as the proudest day in the story of British rule. Practical administrators like Sir Thomas Munro argued that when Indians were sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for themselves, it would

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13. Progress, Welfare and Autonomy

It would seem then that the machinery of western democracy, like the machinery of western welfare, operates merely to further economic progress. Idealists pleaded the cause of education, but the effective stimulus was the need for educated officials. Humanitarians denounced the conditions of labour, but with little effect until employers came to recognize that more efficient labour was cheaper. Arguments for the employment of natives in the higher ranks of private enterprise found a hearing only when the recent depression necessitated the substitution of natives for Europeans in order to cut down expenses. In India Liberals urged the employment of Indians in Government service, but this came about through the impossibility of entertaining a sufficient staff of Europeans. Liberals advocated also the principle of self-government, but the machinery of self-government was not introduced until there was a need for better sanitation. Reforms have been conceived in a spirit of idealism, but they have had to wait on occasion for the midwife. It is true that humanitarian ideals have done much to accelerate the adoption of reforms by creating a favourable climate of opinion. And they have done more than that; they have encouraged Liberal experiments. It was hope rather than any confidence in their ability that led to the first employment of Burmans as magistrates.[1] Shortage of labour may have encouraged employers to examine the possibility of improving the efficiency of labour, but human sympathy and faith in native potentialities were needed to justify expenditure on providing costly amenities. It was faith in the Javanese that inspired the reforms of Raffles in Java. He believed that they would respond to the desire of gain, and work harder in order to make more money; the Dutch at that time were firmly convinced that they would not work except under compulsion. But Raffles wanted the Javanese to make more money so that they could buy British goods; the Dutch had no manufactures to sell and wanted the Javanese to provide them with tropical produce as cheaply as possible. Projects of enhancing welfare may be inspired by high ideals, but they are conditioned, and therefore frustrated, by economic circumstances. It is of little avail to attempt social reforms without first creating a suitable environment in which they may achieve their purpose.

This principle applies throughout the whole range of colonial policy.

[1] *SL*, p. 127.

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177 So long as Britain looked on India mainly as a market and enjoyed a natural monopoly of tropical markets, British manufacturers and merchants cared little who should govern India, provided that it was governed well and cheaply and set up no barriers to trade; they looked forward to withdrawing from India and could envisage its independence with equanimity. But, with the growth of overseas investments and of capitalist enterprise in the tropics, there were stronger grounds for retaining political control; at the same time Britain lost its natural monopoly of commerce in the tropics, and had to safeguard the political connection in order to fend off foreign powers with a protective policy. Synchronizing with this change in the economic environment there was a corresponding transformation of opinion, a new pride in imperial responsibilities and a new reluctance to sever colonial relations. The goal of policy was no longer independence but responsible government 'within the empire', or 'partnership'. Dutch colonial policy also reflects changes in the economic environment, but in a contrary direction. Under the Culture system and for some years later the Dutch treasury looked to the produce of Java to maintain financial solvency; the Home Government maintained a strict control over colonial administration, and the British policy of training the people for independence was expressly repudiated. But with the development of Java by private enterprise and the growth of its importance as a market, opinion shifted in the direction of autonomy; Batavia wished to shake off the fetters of The Hague. French colonial policy has fluctuated with each change in the balance of power between industry and agriculture. In the United States the strong tradition against imperialism could achieve nothing for Filipino independence until a combination of dairy farmers, Cuban sugar planters and Labour leaders turned it to account for the furtherance of their economic interests. Whatever lofty sentiments may inspire pronouncements on colonial policy, its practical application is coloured and conditioned by interest. But this interest is not often avowed, and is very largely subconscious. It is important therefore, when examining statements on colonial policy, to scrutinize the means designed to give effect to it.

In Britain all parties, with unanimity if with diversity of emphasis, look forward to making the dependencies capable of independence as 'partners' in the Empire. They agree also that economic development is the means by which this end may be attained; the modern constructive policy regards economic development as leading in-

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directly through welfare to self-government. Yet we have seen that economic development is, at best, no guarantee of welfare; also that it makes the people less capable of self-government, increases the difficulty of self-government, and makes the colonial power more reluctant to grant self-government. There is no reason to doubt that the policy is stated with all good faith, and there are plausible arguments for regarding it as sound. Yet general considerations suggest that the means usually advocated would defeat the end proposed. Experience confirms this doubt. Let us examine these matters rather more closely.

Economic development, it is said, is a condition of welfare, and welfare a condition of autonomy, because self-governing institutions cannot be built on a foundation of ignorance and ill-health. We have found, however, that there may be great and rapid economic progress with little or no enhancement of welfare; that economic progress is not a condition of greater welfare but, on the contrary, welfare is a condition of economic progress; and that whereas economic progress is ordinarily a by-product of welfare, it may be, and, unless kept under control, is usually if not invariably prejudicial to welfare. So far then as economic progress fails to enhance welfare, the view that it leads through welfare to self-government cannot be sustained.

But, quite apart from its effect on welfare, economic development hinders the attainment of self-government. Everyone now recognizes that it disintegrates and atomizes native society and, obviously, a crowd of individuals is less capable of self-government than an organic social structure. In regions developed by native enterprise, economic development produces a middle class of landlords and moneylenders, possibly native, often or usually foreign orientals. These, in virtue of their economic strength, tend to acquire political importance. But considerations of welfare, and also of political stability, call for measures to protect the peasantry against debt and the loss of land. Such measures hinder the emergence of a middle class, or tend to eliminate it, leaving nothing between the peasant and the western merchants, a situation that is incompatible with popular self-government. On the other hand, in regions developed by western enterprise, there comes into existence a middle class of petty capitalists, possibly native, often or usually foreign orientals. Considerations of welfare call for measures to protect labour against exploitation. But only western men of business apprehend the advantage of welfare measures and have command over sufficient capital to adopt them, and here again the

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177 effect of welfare measures is to hinder the emergence of, or to eliminate, the middle class, leaving nothing between the coolie and the representatives of western capital, interested in the dependency solely as a business proposition. Thus economic progress necessitates welfare measures that hinder political advancement. Indeed economic progress makes self-government by the people as a whole impossible, for in place of a whole people it creates a plural society devoid of any common social will and incapable, therefore, of governing itself; in this plural society, moreover, all those sections which are mainly interested in economic progress are in general content that the dependency should be managed as a business proposition, and included among them are some natives, officials and others, who fear to lose the crumbs that fall from the capitalist tables. Economic development creates a plural society not only incapable of self-government, but divided against itself and in part undesirous of self-government.

Again, economic development not only makes a dependency less capable of self-government, but even makes government more difficult. For it builds up above the native world an elaborate superstructure of western economic enterprise in which the people have little or no part; corresponding to this economic superstructure, and as a necessary corollary of its existence, there arises an administrative superstructure wholly foreign to the people, directed and in great part staffed by Europeans. As we have already noticed the administrative machinery finally becomes so elaborate as to be unmanageable, but long before this stage is reached it is beyond popular control. Every new administrative development which does not proceed from the people themselves in response to social will, raises another barrier against self-government. Moreover, the agents of administrative machinery are not merely passive; a steam engine is indifferent whether it enters or leaves its yard, but a horse goes more willingly towards its stable. Similarly officials apply rules in accordance with their inclinations. Under both British and Dutch rule, when officials were converted from mercantile agents into civil servants, it was recognized that, in order to ensure impartial administration, they must be debarred from mercantile transactions. In British dependencies regulations, inherited from the eighteenth century, forbid officials to own land or to engage in trade. This restriction was found essential to uncorrupt administration. But with the growth of joint stock companies it is no longer effective. European officials belong to the same class as men engaged in western enterprise and

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naturally tend to have similar preconceptions. This natural tendency for them to identify themselves with the cause of economic development is strengthened by material interest where they invest in local companies or can look forward to employment by such companies on retirement from official life. Both environment and interest encourage them to look favourably on economic development, and to be suspicious of entrusting the people with powers that may seem prejudicial to economic progress. While co-operating wholeheartedly with measures to increase production or trade by developing material and human resources, they will tend, even unconsciously, to hamper the transfer of control over development to the natives. Friction of this type is not reduced but rather enhanced by the substitution of native officials for Europeans. Europeans, by their tradition and education, are more likely than natives to oppose measures that they regard as unsound, and by their status can do so with less risk to their careers; for similar reasons there would seem to be especial need for the control over investments by native officials. Thus the personnel of the administrative machinery, whether European or native, hinders smooth progress towards self-government. And in any case, the administrative machinery grows so cumbrous in the course of economic progress that all, together with the leviathan that they seem to guide, are carried along by the current of economic forces. With every forward step in economic progress self-government becomes more difficult.

Again, the ordinary course of economic progress extends the circle of people in the colonial power whose interests would seem to be prejudiced if the dependencies had full control over their own affairs. In Britain comparatively few people used to have any great interest in India. Before the Industrial Revolution the profit derived from the Indian connection went mainly to the directors and shareholders in the East India Company, and to the small class that supplied recruits for mercantile, civil and military appointments. After the Industrial Revolution this small class expanded to include the manufacturers of cotton goods, and to those providing capital and labour to the cotton trade or otherwise benefiting directly or indirectly by its prosperity. With the growth of overseas investment and of capitalist enterprise in the tropics, the development of trade stimulated the growth of shipping, and the multiplication of public and private enterprise was profitable to banks and financiers, so that the circle of those interested in maintaining control over dependencies expanded further to include almost

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177 everyone in Britain who was engaged in any form of production or commerce. Tropical education opened up lucrative prospects to the great publishing firms, and a variety of welfare measures provided openings for the professional middle class, and encouraged a sympathetic attitude towards colonial relations in universities and other institutions training men for scientific or social activities in the tropics. If England had lost its tropical possessions at the beginning of the nineteenth century, few people would have felt the loss, but now it would threaten the material interest of almost everyone throughout the British Isles.

Colonies, regarded as a business proposition, need capital for their economic development, and can raise funds in the home money market on more favourable terms than some independent powers. But the financial houses which provide the money allow favourable terms on the strength of the imperial connection, and must naturally view with apprehension any change which weakens their security. Manufacturing interests in the colonial power may seem to be threatened if dependencies are enabled to restrict the import of their manufactures, or to foster industries likely to compete with them. During the recent depression, grants under the Colonial Development Act of 1929 made a considerable contribution to employment in this country. Similar conditions will probably recur, and 'if at any time the existence of an unemployment problem requires the examination of providing work in Great Britain, the possibility of further grants to assist African Governments to purchase railway, bridging or other capital equipment might perhaps be considered'.[1] All parties, Conservative, Liberal, and Socialist, are agreed that such assistance should be provided, and all agree that measures are needed to ensure full employment in Great Britain. If dependencies attain independence, it will not be so easy to control them in the interests of Britain or to fit them into comprehensive projects for ensuring employment in this country. Thus we are in much the same position as the Dutch in Java a hundred years ago when the Dutch people as a whole profited by the Culture system. So far as economic development diffuses in the colonial power a material interest in maintaining colonial relations, it must of necessity increase the reluctance of the colonial power to make its colonies capable of independence. Modern colonial policy advocates economic development as a road to the independence of colonies. But if every step along the road to self-government strengthens and

[1] 1940, Cmd. 6928; *African Survey*, p. 1321.

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diffuses those interests in the colonial power which self-government imperils, makes self-government more difficult and dependencies less capable of self-government, there would seem good reason to ask whether it is the right road.

Experience supplies the answer to this question. In few British dependencies, if any, has there been such vast and rapid economic progress as in Malaya during the first quarter of the present century. If economic development leads to self-government, no dependency should be more capable of independence. In the Federated Malay States, however, it has created a plural society in which the natives contribute only 26 % to the general population, and there is no dependency where self-government presents more difficult problems. In Netherlands India economic progress up to 1930 was even more conspicuous. The Government had not disregarded native welfare and, especially from 1900 under Ethical inspiration, it had been zealous in benevolent activities. But the country was run on business principles as a business concern, and it was the huge scale of the western superstructure that made the depression of the thirties so disastrous. For the collapse of the whole edifice seemed imminent, and capital had to seek the aid of Government; it was no longer a master but a mendicant. The Government took this opportunity to impose restrictions on capitalist activities in accordance with a policy of directing economic development in the interest of Netherlands India as a nation. Dutch writers claim that the ten years before the Japanese attack witnessed the 'birth of a nation' in Netherlands India, not merely an alliance of local peoples, creeds and castes agreeing only in a sectional opposition to foreign ways and foreign rule, but the amalgamation of all the distinct constituent elements of a plural society into one society with a common social will. History will test this claim, but the point immediately relevant is that the transformation was effected not by 'injections of western capital', but by restricting capitalist activities in the interest of a common nation.

In other dependencies various new developments during the recent war point in a similar direction:

'In all colonies the restrictions on imports have stimulated the growth of local industries both for making household and other articles of common use and for the processing of local produce. In West and East Africa, for example, among the articles now being made in addition to food products are the following: rope and twine, starch, shingles and tiles for roofing, shoe-leather and shoes, boot polish. These industries have been part of a

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temporary war time plan to supply local needs as far as possible from local resources.'[1]

In many or most of these new ventures western enterprise has taken a leading part. For the time being, and under the pressure of economic circumstances, capitalists have been transfigured as nationalists. But so far as these enterprises are run by western capitalists, it is doubtful how long they will survive the circumstances to which they owe their birth. During the war of 1914–18 there was a similar expansion of local industry in Netherlands India, but when communications with Europe were restored, western enterprise found other activities more profitable and local industries collapsed.

There is a greater chance for the survival of local industries when they are in native hands. In the Tropical Far East the recent depression which stimulated western enterprise to develop local industries also provided new opportunities for native enterprise. In Burma, for instance, as in Netherlands India, high taxation on matches impelled the natives to manufacture cheap cigarette lighters.[2] The encouragement of native manufactures was an outstanding feature of economic policy in Netherlands India during this period.[3] Between 1930 and 1940 the number of modern handlooms rose from 500 to 49,000, and of mechanical looms from 40 to 9800; the import of cotton thread for weaving rose from 3000 to 28,000 tons and created a spinning industry. By 1936 the local production of *sarongs* had risen to 5·6 million kgs. and imports had fallen to 2·35 million and by 1940 to 0·33 million. The import of caustic soda for soap manufacture rose from 4000 tons in 1930 to 18,000 tons in 1940. The manufacture of native cigarettes and of native straw hats showed similar progress. And a native bank came into existence to finance the various native enterprises. After the war such purely native industries have a much better prospect of survival than local industries in the hands of European capitalists who will find other forms of enterprise more profitable. Moreover, any tendency to restore the conditions that existed before

[1] *Mass Education*, p. 48.

[2] The sequel is of some general interest. In both countries the finance department urged that the manufacture of lighters should be prohibited in order to safeguard the revenue from matches. In Netherlands India the Government, though not responsible to the people, resisted the proposal on the ground that in the current depression anything which gave employment was beneficial. In Burma, with nominally a much greater measure of self-government, the proposal was accepted, and the enterprising and ingenious Burman manufacturers of lighters were subjected to heavy penalties by Burman magistrates.

[3] Sitsen, pp. 19, 20n., 47; Mitchell, pp. 197ff.

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1930 will encounter formidable resistance because economic power implies political power. 177

In Netherlands India, then, recent economic circumstances, by imposing restrictions on economic progress, have favoured national solidarity, the enhancement of welfare and economic development on a broader basis, and therefore, in the long run, greater progress. In the first throes of the depression the vision of impatient idealists seemed to be eclipsed. But reality lay below the surface, and even men of shorter vision 'learned that ideals should find their place in practical policy'.[1] As so often in colonial history, humanitarian ideals proved plain common sense. The lesson taught by Netherlands India is reinforced by the course of affairs in China and Russia. Forty years ago European powers were greedily expecting the 'break-up of China' to provide new opportunities for western capital. Twenty years ago Russia seemed to have collapsed. But China and Russia have been restored to greater vigour, not by the medicaments of capital, but by the vivifying tonic of a new idea. The plural society of tropical dependencies is dominated by economic forces, and, as recognized by the Statutory Commission, foreign rule is impotent to counter social and economic evils. Only some force transcending the economic sphere can bring them under control. Christians, Buddhists, Moslems and Hindus accept the principles of their religion as of greater validity than economic forces, but, in religious allegiance as in other matters, the plural society is divided, and there is no principle of social life, transcending merely economic considerations, that all will accept as valid except the principle of nationalism. In Europe at the present time the principle of nationalism is suspect. Men see in it a force stronger than self-interest, but for the same reason they fear it, and seek an alternative in a vague and ineffectual humanitarianism based on Christian tradition but disclaiming Christian doctrine. We may readily grant that 'patriotism is not enough', but one need not reject patriotism in order to rise above it. Economic forces operate everywhere alike, but social and political conditions in the tropics are directly contrary to those prevailing in homogeneous western lands, and in almost all matters it is necessary to apply contrary remedies to get the same results. That is especially true of nationalism as a principle of action. In the West we assume without question that 'defence is more than opulence', and that the individual should subordinate his personal interests to the common weal. In tropical

[1] Hart, p. 54.

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177 dependencies the conception of a commonwealth has been destroyed, and only an explicit acceptance of the principle of nationalism can restore it; only by aiming directly to make them capable of independence can we enhance welfare and lay secure foundations for economic progress.

14. The Problem of Autonomy

If, then, we are to aim at making dependencies capable of independence, how should we set about it? Experience shows that it is futile to proclaim ideals without creating the conditions which make them practicable. If we would make dependencies capable of independence, we must first achieve those conditions which make it possible. The problem of conferring autonomy on a tropical dependency is not merely a problem of mechanical contrivance, of ingeniously constructing political machinery that can be worked by natives, or despite native opposition; it is a problem of creative will. In the colonial power there must be an impulse to create a tropical society capable of political autonomy, and in the dependency a society capable of responding to this impulse, a society with a common social will that accepts the conditions of the modern world. This is so obvious that it would not be worth saying if its implications were not so generally disregarded.

Self-government implies the existence of a common social will, and a colonial power which aims at making its dependencies self-governing must aim directly at promoting a common social will, and must foster the social, economic and political reintegration of the whole community which economic development disintegrates. Further, self-government in the modern world requires the acceptance of the conditions of the modern world, and implies therefore a process of social education so that the common social will shall be informed with those principles on which modern western civilization is founded. The transformation of the environment through the reintegration of the plural society and through social education represents one aspect of the problem.

But the problem has another aspect. In the colonial power the creative impulse is weakened by considerations of national prestige, and by the economic motive which tempts all to pursue their immediate and obvious economic advantage, and by the rational appeal which economic efficiency makes to universal common sense. We find a law that when we would do good, evil is present with us, and may exclaim,

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with the apostle, the good that we would we do not: but the evil which we would not, that we do. It is very easy to deceive ourselves, and we have observed that each generation of colonial reformers is apt to accuse its predecessors of hypocrisy. Clearly then, if we aim at making dependencies capable of independence, we must take such measures as are possible to strengthen our good intentions by creating such an environment as is most likely to fortify our will. 177

Thus the problem of autonomy has two distinct aspects which we consider separately in the following chapters.

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175 was suggested by Furnivall as a cause of the foundation of
439 Indian trading centers at convenient sites along the coasts
648 and main rivers of Southeast Asia. The same author places the date of the first Indian colonization in the area at about 150 A.D.[8] Harrison, however, maintains that the first definite Indian settlements were established in the first century A.D.[9]

175 Indian settlements were typically colonial in the
177 old sense of foreign settlement without foreign rule. The
563 settlers came as traders, intermarried with the local people,
648 acquired wealth, and formed an aristocracy. Then, as new migration ceased, the Indian rulers and aristocracy were absorbed into the people. In the inscriptions, the language and written characters took on native forms, and the names of persons and places were no longer Indian but native. Similarly, in the religious monuments and other buildings a native style was superimposed on the earlier Indian models.

175 Most authors have credited these Indian settlers
177 with having brought Indian culture to Southeast Asia. Harrison,
648 for example, takes for granted that "Indians who voyaged overseas to Southeast Asia naturally brought with them the ideas and practices of Hinduism and Buddhism."[10] He further speculates that "traders, adventurers and craftsmen were followed by Brahman and Buddhist priests and teachers,

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8. Ibid., p. 127.

9. Brian Harrison, South-east Asia (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1954), p. 10.

10. Ibid., p. 12.

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175 carrying the civilizing influence of Indian cultural and
177 spiritual life and implanting it in these new lands by
648 introducing the art of writing and the classical Sanskrit language and literature; bringing as well their own vernacular languages to enrich the vocabularies of Southeast Asia.[11]

175 It may be argued, nevertheless, that since there is little
177 good evidence for any large Indian emigration to Southeast
439 Asia, much Indian culture could have been brought back by
648 cosmopolitanized Southeast Asian traders who often spent months in India waiting for the monsoons to change their direction.[12] It should be noted in this connection that during this time of early Indian colonization trade relations were also extended westward by Indonesians (who earlier reached Madagascar) and other Southeast Asians.

175 During the expansion of Islam, from 1350 to 1500,
648 Moslem colonization followed the Indian pattern. Thus we may say that formerly a colony was merely a settlement in a foreign land and the settler had little or no political
[797] connection with the home land. The Indian and Moslem became foreign rulers, but they did not establish foreign rule. Subsequently, the Portuguese and Spaniards came as royal agents and with a warrant from the Pope to undertake both
175 the conquest and conversion of the people. The old idea
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563 of a colony as a settlement survived: there were grandees

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11. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

12. The author is indebted to Professor Lauriston Sharp for the development of this idea.

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175 with large estates, permanent immigrants of lower rank who
648 married native women, and priests spending a lifetime in
563 their parishes. But the colonies were ruled by Governors from Europe. They were both settlers and rulers. The Dutch came merely as traders, but they could obtain tropical produce only in the form of tribute; economic circumstances required them to accept sovereignty on behalf of the home company and to rule the people indirectly through native chieftains, and also to settle permanently, though on a comparatively small scale, to supervise native cultivation. They were primarily rulers and were settlers only by force of circumstance. In the 19th century the English carried the process a stage further. Through the industrial revolution they had goods to sell, and the object of their policy was not tribute but trade. This required direct rule, but not settlement, except in the ports. Finally, with the growth of capitalism and the opening of the Suez Canal, the typical system of colonial development was by foreign capital with European management and imported Asian labor. Thus there was a process of development from the old colonial system of foreign settlement without foreign rule to a new system of foreign rule without settlement.[13]

Impact of the Changing Trend of Trade with the West

175 In the nineteenth century, the age-old means of com-
177 munication between the different parts of Southeast Asia
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13. Furnivall, op. cit.

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648 were revolutionized by the techniques and aims of the West.
175 After 1850, European-owned steamships began the gradual
177 process of taking over the bulk of the inter-port trade
648 from native sailing boats and Chinese junks. The opening
439 of the Suez Canal in 1869 made possible the great modern
505 expansion of Western rule and trade, and thereby brought about the economic and social revolution which has created the Southeast Asia of today. The year 1870 is the real dividing-line between medieval and modern in the history of Southeast Asia.[14]

175 Whereas during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eight-
177 eenth centuries the various European nations active in South-
433 east Asia had, on the whole, limited themselves to trading
439 and acquisition of high-priced nonbulky commodities, such
648 as spices, the economic policy of the nineteenth century called for large quantities of bulky goods, such as sugar, fibers, oil seeds, coffee, and copra. Since the peasantry of Southeast Asia, almost without exception, raised only subsistence crops and had only limited surplus, it became necessary for the colonial powers to increase agricultural production. This was done in two ways: through the application of pressure on the peasantry to produce for export, and through the development of large-scale plantation agriculture.[15] The shift of emphasis from trade to production

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14. Harrison, op. cit., p. 197.

15. Karl J. Pelzer, "The Resource Pattern of Southeast Asia," Southeast Asia in the World Today, ed. Phillips Talbot. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 109.

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175 thus set a new stage -- the development of the natural
• 177 resources of the whole region.
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648 This change-over from a subsistence economy to a commercial economy involved the large-scale expansion of traditional crops or the development of new commercial crops.
[436] It was stimulated by the introduction or expansion of a money
[489] economy, the flow of capital and the development of land and
[69] sea transport. It was supported by Western technology, methods of administration and systems of justice. This whole process greatly affected the traditional institution, up-
175 setting the balance of a medieval world. The free, indi-
177 vidualist spirit of Western rule and commerce cut at the
[59] roots of traditional social life, undermining the corporate
[423] strength of family and village. But the most serious direct
[426] threat of the new economic forces was to the peasant's owner-
[566] ship of land. Expanding economies, new money taxes and cheap imports meant better business than ever for the money lender. Many peasants became ruined by debt and lost their lands. Indebtedness and debt slavery were not new in Southeast Asia; the latter was fairly soon stamped out, but the former now became much more widespread than before, resulting in the creation of a landless proletariat.[16]

184 Characteristics of Current Southeast Asian Economy

In spite of all the differences among the countries of Southeast Asia in the natural environment, ethnic

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16. Harrison, op. cit., p. 210.

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PREFACE[1]

IMPERIALISM, IN THE FORM of the government of weaker peoples by the peoples of the West, was an element in the explosion which rent an explosive world economy. Western society had failed to control its own inventions. The palliative of geographical expansion had produced a struggle for trade and raw materials which at a late date led to Western rule. Through this expansion the world was ringed by a powder train leading from and back to the Western countries. 177

There is now a recession of this form of imperialism. In the strength of its industrial revolution, Western Europe had gained the economic and political control of much of the world and of its products. To some extent, it had won spiritual control. The system which seemed nearly all-powerful was nearly all-desirable; and the West, out of the abundance of its adventurers and its adventures, produced men of outstanding character and ideas and inventions of outstanding value. Now in Southeast Asia the tide has turned. As the London *Times* reported in 1942, the fall of Singapore was something "more than the evacuation of a city; it was the end of an epoch."

Long-term factors, such as the spread of industrial techniques to other civilizations, the decline of the Western birth-rate and the very success with which some of the most valid Western conceptions had been received, together with immediate circumstances, such as the failure of Europe and of America to protect their interests, the success, short-lived though it was, of an Asiatic power and the rapidity of the Japanese surrender, make impossible a return to pre-1942 conditions and assure the determined resistance of Southeast Asia to any reimposition of former colonial rule.

Account needs also to be taken of other features in the change. Western Europe resents the criticisms directed against her past record. Western Europe reached a high stage of civilization, has suffered grievously, and can claim that its contribution to world progress has been considerable and includes many achievements in its colonial policies. There is indeed something of a Greek tragedy in the decline of power due to the fulfilment of the Western destiny as the awakener of aspirations inherent in Western thought. The results are a sensitiveness which cannot stomach ill-considered condemnations of "colonial exploitation" and a determination to resist criticism by counter-criticism and force by counter-force. Secondly, if a vacuum of political anarchy comes about in any

[1] The views expressed in this preface are those of the writer alone.

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177 part of Southeast Asia for even short periods, new forces may fill it, while avoiding the responsibilities of government provided by the colonial system. The new or re-established nations cannot avoid contact with the old and the new forces. The tools, the experience and perhaps the doctrines they need are to be found abroad, for the vast increase in their peoples has added to the problem of poverty so that it can only be solved by the increasing use of perfected forms of production in agriculture and in industry.

177 648 The independence of the Philippine Republic, the preparations for independence in Indonesia, the recognition of Viet Nam, the constitutional progress of Burma, thus not only mark a local epoch; they are of worldwide significance. In many cases, they represent a change of national policies. Internationally, in Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter, countries responsible for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories have undertaken "to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions." Events in Southeast Asia and the course of discussions at the General Assembly of the United Nations suggest that the general principles of Chapter XI cannot be relegated to the future as pious aspirations. For good or for insufficient reasons, the pattern of past colonial rule has been broken, and the trend of world policy presupposes the relaxation of the political controls established by the Western powers in Southeast Asia and the rapid emergence of new sovereign states.

Even so, the basic problem of Southeast Asia in relation to world affairs is not the passing of the colonial stage of government. It is the broader problem of the evolution towards self-reliance of communities which in the past were largely controlled by outside forces in their economic and social, as well as in their political life, and which at present must seek some adjustment with these and other world forces. The political aspects of the problem are narrowing. They mainly relate to the detailed questions of when, where and how political autonomy will be established. On the other hand, Southeast Asia may long remain under foreign domination in matters of economic and social policy, with the danger that indirect control will be established without responsibility and that the next center of world rivalries will be found in the region.

The countries of Southeast Asia will be unable to play their part in the peace and prosperity of the world without drastic improvements in the economic and social life of their peoples. Poverty, unbalanced economic development, ill health, ignorance, labor difficulties and the exploitation of the weak by the strong, which were problems during the period of European control, will not be abolished by the abolition of such control. The change is that the countries will need economic and social assistance which can aid their political evolution.

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Chinese

religion was no barrier between themselves and the Chinese; all were Buddhists, though of differing sects. Chinese culture had long been admired by the peoples of Farther India, and had influenced them. Moreover, the Chinese were regarded as distant and desirable relatives. With the advent, however, of Chinese women and the accelerated growth of Chinese nationalism after the first world war, intermarriage occurred less frequently (though it continued to be common in Burma and Cambodia), and the indigenous peoples had few social contacts with the Chinese in their midst. The cleavage between the ethnic groups was further widened in the British colonies by the official policy of representation of various communities on legislative and advisory bodies. 563 609

Economically, relations between the indigenous and the immigrant peoples altered from a mosaic of non-conflicting occupations to one of rapidly increasing competition. For years the native peoples had contentedly seen the arrival of thousands of immigrants annually who were able and willing to perform the hard labor for which they themselves had neither inclination nor compulsion. Through much of the region, however, during the inter-war period an indigenous proletariat was developing as a result of the transfer of farm land from the indebted native peasantry to non-agriculturists, often to alien moneylenders, and also because of the growth of a Western-inspired individualism which was weakening family ties once paramount. The trend was apparent chiefly in parts of Burma, Siam, and Indochina. 464 477 178 425 177

This development did not assume significant proportions until the world economic depression, when considerable unemployment arose out of the drop in prices and the curtailment of foreign markets for products of Southeast Asia. The result was a swift increase in the number of natives seeking to return to their villages and, on the other hand, of those forced to seek part-time or full-time employment away from their villages in competition with immigrant laborers for work previously scorned as arduous, monotonous, and underpaid. 464 458 178

Meanwhile the native middle classes for the first time faced a serious unemployment problem. Until the depression years, the opportunities for desirable though moderately paid employment in government or business had seemed to exceed the number of qualified candidates. The depression made it clear that the saturation point had been reached, and each year an increasing number of educated youths would be thwarted in their expectation of employment or, if given a job, in their rise to higher positions. Thus two groups of economically frustrated natives developed simultaneously in numbers and in consciousness in the decade prior to the second world war. 464 178 563

Nascent political factors became significant during that period. The struggles of the Chinese against the Japanese and of Indians against British rule were reflected in the attitudes of the emigrants from those coun- 464 668

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Suez Canal in 1869, and the consolidation of Western control, direct or indirect, over most of Southeast Asia in the 1890's, followed by American acquisition of the Philippines at the turn of the century.

More important, the great cities were, and to a large degree still are, foreign creations, essentially alien to the Southeast Asian landscape. Although several began as native settlements, they developed as foreign exclaves on the margins of Asia, in much the same way as did the plantation system and mining operations. With the exception of Bangkok, they represented and functioned as the overseas appendages of Western, not indigenous, interests, being what Spate has called "head-links"—the gates by which Western concepts entered to destroy and build and in which a new system of economic organization evolved.[12] Indeed, the concept of the Asian plural society was inspired by the contrast between the basically foreign great city and the indigenous agricultural village. The ties of the great city with its hinterland were primarily commercial and associated with foreign-controlled mining and plantation interests and with Chinese-dominated rice trade. Such direct political-administrative ties as did exist were restricted primarily to indigenous elites, small in number, which allied themselves with Western interests. Where the indigenous rural populations were affected by these urban-rural relations, it was primarily through the plantation or the mining system, both of which needed a large labor force, or through Indian or Chinese intermediaries.

On the other hand, the relations between an indigenous capital, like Bangkok in its earlier period, or Kyoto or Peking, and the agrarian society upon which it was based were of quite a different order. In these cases the capital represented the culmination of what might be termed a national *ethos*, the epitome of what Redfield has

[12] O. H. K. Spate, "Factors in the Development of Capital Cities," *Geographical Review*, October, 1942, p. 628.

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184 try, indigenous, cultural or political sub-
369 center. Just as Shanghai had its Nanking
361 and Peking, so Rangoon has its Mandalay, Jakarta its Jogjakarta, Manila its Cebu, and, in a variant form, Singapore its Kuala Lumpur.

●177 In the past these cities sited along the Asian littoral have been the funnels through
184 which produce from the interiors have reached tidewater and the world of com-
369 merce and Western manufactures have pen-
361 etrated. Through the increasingly metropolitan channels have flowed the ideas of the West as well as its material goods. In a sense they have acted both as a catalyst for social and economic change and as a cushion which modified the shock of the earlier cultural contacts.

361 With the exception of Singapore, the site of each of the great cities of Southeast Asia is an ill-drained riverine or coastal lowland strategically placed in relation to an exceptionally productive agricultural region.
[504] Again, with the exception of Singapore, none possesses a deep natural harbor suitable for modern ocean-going shipping. The three mainland ports are both river and ocean ports and must be reached through tortuous and shallow river channels. All are entrepôts. Jakarta and Manila are located on the most highly developed islands of the archipelagoes, for which they act as entrepôts. Only in Indonesia and Indochina are there major competitors for the two greatest ports —Haiphong, the outlet for the densely populated Tonkin delta, and Surabaya, the regional capital for the Great East of the Indies, itself an empire. Each great port vir-
[439] tually dominates the national import trade; all tend, however, to share some part of the
504 national export trade with lesser ports. In
361 spite of these great similarities, the nature and functions of the ports differ markedly. As Allen observes: "All ports are individual. History, geography, politics, and economics all contribute to making them as they are. Few universal principles apply, and attempts to force uniformity on ports which have grown up differently are bound to fail."[18] Singapore, for example, is one of the

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Bang Kok

361 behind them is one of the most striking
34 demonstrations of cultural dualism in South-
184 east Asia.

Unlike the other great cities, Bangkok
175 originated as the capital of a land-oriented
361 agrarian state. Its proximity to tidewater
was accidental. In 1822 the ship bearing the
504 Crawfurd mission to the Thai court barely
177 was able to cross the bar at the mouth of the
Menam, then covered by only four feet of
178 water.[22] Its poor harbor and its remoteness
from the major shipping routes of the South China Sea conspired to retard the development of the city as a port until the end of the nineteenth century and to retain it as an anachronism in Southeast Asia—a growing city, nearly great, surely primate, but indigenous rather than Western. Nevertheless, since it was through Bangkok that Western influences filtered into Thailand, it is a case of an indigenous capital acting as a revolutionary medium for socioeconomic change.

504 Bangkok is still the least convenient port
of the great cities in Southeast Asia. The bar
361 across the mouth of the Chao Phya was dredged through only in 1952, and port facilities are modest as compared with the other cities. Indeed, most vessels still anchor in the Bight of Bangkok in the lee of the island, Kao Hsi Kang, at the mouth of the Chao Phya and transship their cargoes to and from river barges and country boats which link the island with Bangkok. Surprisingly, the freight tonnage handled at Bangkok is about one-third that of Singapore, although the volume of shipping is only one-tenth as large. The explanation lies partly in the large bulk shipments of rice which form the main export. Partly, also, there is a lower load factor at Singapore, since much of the shipping which enters its harbor is as much dependent on the local complex of service facilities as on cargo potential. At Bangkok, peripheral as it is to the main trade routes, few vessels call without assurances of sizable cargoes.

[22] See J. Crawfurd, *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China* (London: H. Colburn & R. Bentley, 1830).

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Bangkok

On the other hand[1] changes in transportation have elevated Bangkok to a new importance. It lies astride the main air route between Europe and the Far East, and the Australia-Europe services also pass through it. It is now the leading international air center in Southeast Asia, with 42 international departures a week in 1953 as compared with Singapore's 27, and its airport is one of the larger commercial fields in the Orient.

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The role of the Southeast Asian great city has been modified by the Pacific war and the granting of independence to Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and partial independence to Vietnam. Five of the six great cities are now capitals of the independent states. Each of these merits the title "link capital"; that is, they are the media through which the newly independent states are linked with the outside world. At the same time, they have begun to assume an increasingly indigenous character. The substitution of Malay for Dutch names and street signs in Indonesia is only one evidence of cultural change. The in-migration of petty officials, tradesmen, and refugees from the beleaguered rural areas has given the urban populations a new and more homogeneous native cast. The fevers of nationalism have made the large minorities more cautious about flaunting their ethnic independence.

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1 [i.e. as compared to the inconvenient port facilities -- Analyst]

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361 On the other hand, the war also brought in-
178 creased American influence into the region,
631 and the ubiquitous Coca-Cola sign is one of
184 the symbols of change that sooner or later
162 will be followed by changes in urban facili-
563 ties and urban organization.

More important, the present period is as-
•171 sociated with an increasing intensification of
369 the economic activities of government and a corresponding diminution of foreign enterprise. Political and administrative functions have become increasingly important since the war. Since the main governmental organs are concentrated in the largest centers, the direct influence of the great city upon the country in which it is primate is likewise increasing. Relations between nationalized city and an increasingly money-oriented countryside are becoming more intimate, and the formerly clear-cut cultural distinctiveness of city and country is rapidly becoming blurred. Therefore, the likelihood of the great city's leading a revival of ancient value systems, as some extreme ethnocentrists hope it will, is small. Only one prediction can be made: the days of the culturally alien and ethnically distinct urban center are numbered in Southeast Asia; and a city like Singapore becomes increasingly an anomalous relict of an age now past.

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for his wife—but he is equally likely to put it into a piece of equipment or 433
to hire some land. To understand the position of the peasant one must 565
realize the structure of the economic system of which he is a part, and the 461
values of his social system.

The peasant economy must not be thought of as simply a subsistence 433
economy. It has a complex marketing structure which, even apart from 565
Western influences, had an elaborate series of middlemen for making possible the diffusion of cloth, salt, iron, dried fish, spices, and other goods. 439
The system of exchange has been intensified, and the reactions of different 177
types of producers made more sensitive by the influence of the West. On the one side are the Western markets for primary products—coffee, spices, tobacco, copra, kapok, and, above all, rubber—the quick response to which has demonstrated how alive the Asiatic peasant is to making money if the opportunity offers. On the other side are the Western types of consumer goods, novel, attractively presented, easy to use—ranging from lamp oil, imported cigarettes, and cornflour for babies, to electric torches, bicycles, and the cinema. Conservative in his techniques of production, the peasant has shown himself enterprising in his consumption. The result has been that at many points, almost without realizing it, the peasant has become geared to the Western economic system. In the early days of European contact, he had often to be pushed as well as tempted into producing for the Western market. The scathing book, *Max Havelaar*, by the author calling himself 'Multatuli'—later known to be Douwes Dekker—has shown the kind of abuses that resulted from pushing the peasant into an enforced relation to the Western market. But naturally many of these links have been of his own seeking. In the last resort, it is the peasant's own scheme of values, his degree of acceptance of the goods and services which the West offers and which he transmutes to some extent in receiving, which determines his economic destiny.

But for the most part, the peasant has been incapable of perceiving the processes at work. The field is too vast for his comprehension. His reactions to the crisis and depression of the nineteen-thirties were direct and rational as they came under his personal observation. When prices fell he increased production of the export crops to maintain his cash returns; when that failed he retired from the struggle to utilize his backlog of subsistence cropping. But like many a farmer elsewhere, he had not understood much more than the immediate market situation. The pressure of the West has provided the peasant with a new range of wants from which he cannot rid himself even should he wish, and markets for his labour and raw materials which are an inducement to him to modify his habits. A new administrative system has given him fresh legal framework for many of his acts. A new system of taxation, though often lighter than before, is more methodical in its pursuit of defaulters. His land, the foundation of his [427]
existence, has for the most part been preserved to him, and indeed the
security for his legal title to it has been much improved. But alien planta- 000

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427 But the alien planta-
565 tions and even alien smallholders have threatened to grasp at it, and the
177 advances of Western medicine, so beneficial in many ways, have only accelerated the rate of increase of the population which has to seek a livelihood from it. In most parts of South East Asia the peasant is the actual owner of the land he tills, often legally under some agreement with
426 the State. But his rights to the produce are often severely limited by a heavy burden of indebtedness. The real effects of this may be less than people sometimes think, because when the debts are spread among neighbours and kinsfolk interest may be waived, repayment is sometimes protracted or ignored, and the debt may be serviced by other than material means. But there is no doubt that the peasant producer is badly hampered by his debt load. It is most pressing when debt is contracted to a member of an alien ethnic group, an Indian or a Chinese, for whom the transaction is a purely commercial one.

563 The role of alien Asiatic ethnic groups is one of the most significant
565 features in the economic and political life of the peasantry of South East
177 Asia today. For many centuries, Indian and Chinese trading influences
178 have met in the South East Asian region, and Indian religious concepts
439 have penetrated deep into many of its social systems. But for more than four hundred years the dominant commercial and political note has tended to be sounded by Europeans. Now the balance is altering. Colonialism may have set the modern structure of South East Asian society, but the patterns will persist when the colonial Powers have withdrawn. To this new society the Chinese above all have the economic key. In Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, the Philippines, and Java, the Chinese have penetrated the economic system and taken over crucial functions. They have shared in much of the wholesale import trade, they have attained pre-eminence in retailing vital imported goods to the peasant, and they act as middlemen for the collection, storage, and processing of peasant export products. As part of this process they often finance the peasant producer by advances on his crop, gaining a double profit by giving part of these advances in goods, not cash. The Chinese achievement has been remarkable. They have been kept on the margin both of the peasant society with which they deal, and of the European society with which at a later stage their growing wealth would allow them to associate. Though lacking any formal political power, which in the Orient as elsewhere is so often the passport to success, they have built up a trading structure of extraordinary toughness, elasticity, and elaboration.

565 The wider political implications of this are not my concern here. But
609 it is important to note three points in connexion with the peasant theme.
186 One is the xenophobic reaction of the local urban dwellers and of peasants too, which has periodically found expression against the Chinese, as traders
578 or residents in South East Asia, in the form of riots and other disturbances.
563 Another is the reaction of the Chinese, whose economic strength has given
241 them confidence, and who are now prepared to stand by their claim to a

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real stake in the countries of the Nan Yang, as settled members of the local society, and not as aliens. The third point is that the Chinese community has never been one of middlemen only; there has always been a fair proportion of cultivators within it. The poor peasantry of South East Asia now includes a Chinese as well as an indigenous element. The 1947 census of Malaya shows 45,000 Chinese engaged in rice growing, and another 100,000 in market gardening and fishing, essentially peasant pursuits.

The pressure to which the South East Asian peasant has been subjected by the combination of Western and other alien influences has been severe. But we must beware lest we misinterpret it. In a recent book which gives a comparative analysis of the agrarian situation in the countries of South East Asia, appears a striking statement about Malaya—that development of mining and rubber industries has pushed the native Malay population more and more towards the east, into the areas of the former Unfederated Malay States: 'The Malays', it is said, 'considered the east as safe from Western penetration, and therefore preferred this undeveloped area to the irrigated lands on the western coast, mainly because there they could get only temporary land licences, since a complete survey of all potential tin-bearing regions had not yet been made'.[1]

It is true that the eastern States are predominantly Malay in population, and that the greater part of the vast immigrant population of Malaya is densely settled on the western side of the peninsula, where the resources are richer and access easier than on the eastern side. It is also true that there has been some lack of enthusiasm among Malay peasants to colonize the new Government-developed irrigation areas, for complex reasons, including lack of capital in the past, and disinclination to move from their ancestral homes. But it is quite incorrect to put these facts together and to argue that the Malay has been pushed by alien pressure over from the west to the east of the peninsula. Apart from some seasonal movement for rice harvesting or fishing, the internal migration of Malays is inconsiderable, despite the rapid development of communications in recent years. Both the 1931 and the 1947 census show that whatever movement takes place—well under 10 per cent—is almost wholly from one State to another, either on the west coast or on the east coast, or to Singapore. Hardly any movement at all occurs from the west to the east. Moreover, the 1947 census shows that between 1931 and 1947 the Malay population of the western States increased by about one-third, at a rate slightly higher than that of the eastern States. The proportion of Malays in these western States, in terms of the total population of all ethnic groups, also increased slightly during this period, due primarily to the decline of Indians and Indonesians. In other words, though foreign economic penetration has immersed the western Malay in a flood of alien elements, it has not driven him away. On the contrary, he has preferred to stay and await events.

[1] Erich H. Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia* (New York, Colombia University Press, 1949) p. 113.

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[438] One reason for this is economic advantage. The coming of rubber, in particular, has given to the Malay peasant of the west coast an income considerably higher, on the whole, than that of the east coast peasant.

177 565 [166] The effects of Westernization are profound. But they do not lie in crude physical displacement of the peasant or degradation of his living conditions. They lie in the widening of the gap between his expanding range of wants and his level of productivity, and in his inability to measure and in any way control the economic forces operating in his field. Westernization has meant for the peasant an enlargement of the social horizon—more knowledge, through better communications and education, of other places, of other peoples of kindred and dissimilar interests. It has created new ambitions: for different clothing, for new uses of leisure, for a better status for his children, for a position of power in the political scene. All this has disturbed the traditional patterns of peasant society. These patterns, and the class structure of South East Asian society of which they were a part, were probably never too satisfactory to the peasant. Anxiety and evasion must have often been the response to either too rigid or too elastic a rule—and the peasant seems often to have suffered from the exactions of his superior in the social scale. But the scope of the system was known, if not its precise implications. Nowadays the scope of the system has for the most part passed beyond the peasant's grasp, and much of it has become de-personalized.

To illustrate this by giving a more concrete analysis of some of the values in the peasant's life, let me take the area of Malaya and Indonesia where Islam is the major religion of the people.

181 177 565 602 776 779 671 182 In his daily life the Indonesian or Malay peasant is governed largely by the canons of behaviour, the ties of friendship and neighbourliness, the relations of work and social intercourse of his village community. So much is this so that in Java the *desa*, the village, was crystallized by the Dutch into an administrative and developmental unit, and its communal structure strengthened for welfare purposes. But as important as the village, and indeed often basic to its structure, are the family and larger kin organizations. From these a person gets his social status and much of his land and other property, and they have the primary role in his marriage and other crucial events in his progress through life.

Such domestic and local relationships also provide a framework for the peasant in his attempts to come to terms with the forces of nature and human destiny. His world of spirits is a local world. In Indonesia the ancestors do not play the predominant role which they do, for instance, in Annam. But the village, the seashore, the surrounding jungle, wells, trees, and stones are the home of many kinds of spirits, which afflict man with sickness or misfortune, or stand by him as his familiars to guard him. Basic in the religion of the Indonesian peasant is this local, essentially parochial, spirit element. All these values guide his economic and social conduct, and mean a great deal to him.

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But the situation is complex, even in village life. The system of rules governing domestic and local relations—marriage, adoption, inheritance, rights over land, succession to local office, rules of etiquette, and behaviour to superiors—is generally known as the *adat*, the custom. The nature of this custom, and what should be its relation to a more fully developed legal system, have been elaborately studied by the Dutch in Indonesia. At times indeed they have seemed to give the *adat* almost a mystical connotation. Alongside this body of custom, which of course varies from one peasant area to another, is the *shari'a*, the religious rule of Islam. On the one hand this is a unifying force, extra-village and extra-national in character, linking even the remotest mountain farmer spiritually or emotionally with the farmer or townsman of other Muslim communities in South East Asia, and far beyond. On the other hand, the Muslim religious law blends into the field of the *adat*, laying down rules about marriage, inheritance, and other family matters. Then there are the Western rules of law and administrative procedure, laying down just how land is to be acquired, held, and transferred, giving regulations for village management, and imposing penalties for certain kinds of breach of good relations. Yet the Western system offers also inducement to use the law, to protect one's interests firmly, to take advantage of situations where the *adat* has left rights undefined. So three factors—the custom, the Muslim religious rule, and the Western system of law—interact even in the heart of peasant society.

The result is a complex set of forces in dynamic operation, with the peasant being pressed by one or other of them or championing one or other as circumstances arise. In Negri Sembilan, for instance, there has come to be what is almost now a classic case of this interaction. In former times the valuable lands were for the most part those on which 'wet rice' could be cultivated. By the matrilineal system ancestrally operative in that area, these lands were handed down in the female line, from mother to daughter, or from aunt to niece. They were also cultivated largely by women. As rubber came to be developed, however, other lands on the hill-sides, previously of much less value, came to have worth too. For the most part these had to be cleared before being planted in rubber, and this clearing was a task that only men could do properly. Hence men came to have a more direct interest in this land. When questions of inheritance began to arise, divergent views became manifest. Some argued for treating new lands like the old, and handing them down in the female line like the rice lands. Yet there was a strong case for not including these rubber lands in the category of ancestral land, but for letting them be transmitted from a father to his children and through the male line in general. This principle of male inheritance is in line with the emphasis of the Muslim law. This not only gives guidance of the patrilineal kind for distribution of the property of the deceased in cases of dispute, but in all its provisions tends to stress the status of the male against that of the female.

Within the peasant society itself the potential clash of the two systems,

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181 local custom and religious rule, had been present for centuries. But there
177 was little in the economic situation to sharpen it, and the Muslim leaders
565 themselves were often so steeped in the local ways that they allowed as the
602 religious law what was, in fact, the local custom. With the growth of
776 Western processes, the perception of new economic advantages tended to
779 change the equilibrium of the two principles. The advance of education
671 and heightened consciousness of Islam as a world faith also tended to make
182 the religious leaders themselves much more keenly aware of any divergence. Wealthy men who want to leave property to their sons, men with a strong religious sense, men who regard themselves as progressive, or who are in revolt against their clan leaders, therefore tend to be protagonists of the Muslim law. The conservatives, those who see in the custom a defence for women, those who see in it a symbol of an essentially Malay way of life, argue for the retention of the custom. Contact with the West, they say, is changing the structure of the peasant society enough already. The issue has also entered the modern political scene, since the search for factors to increase Malay integration tends to stress the national and extra-national character of Islam at the expense of the more local qualities of the *adat*. Here too it is growing Westernization which has sharpened the issue.

184 In a general discussion such as this, one may be allowed to refer to the
565 peasantry of South East Asia as a body. But they are not uniform in ethnic composition, in national interests, in language, in religion, or in general culture. Moreover, within any local community, there are competing, even conflicting, interests and opinions. The peasant may be unable to face up to the general issues which affect his life so deeply, but in so far as he understands his own interests he is very alive to them and capable of exercising keen judgement in them. It is the small scale of his organization for the most part which renders him so vulnerable.

000 What is likely to be the future of South East Asia from the peasant angle? Prediction is not worth much, since so many elements in the situation are imperfectly known, but there are a few which seem to be significant.

565 The peasant has no native middle class, of the same society as himself,
185 to give a lead to his development and stability in any wider economic
656 organizations that may be set up for his benefit. To improve his economic lot, and in particular to give him a larger fraction of his product through control of marketing, co-operative societies have often been proposed and sometimes tried. Their success has been only limited, partly because the peasant has not been fully persuaded of their attractions as against what the alien middleman can offer, and partly because of the difficulty of securing adequate technical supervision and administration at a sufficiently low official level. Much is now apt to be made of the colonial or semi-colonial status of the South East Asian peasant as a drag upon his development. There is no doubt that colonialism, as a specific form of political control of under-developed territories by a metropolitan Power, is

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/For remarks on changing labor standards in Southeast Asia, see Bruno Lasker's foreword to 25: Kurihara, pp. v-viii, category 116, file OA1 Philippines.--Analyst/

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INTRODUCTION

SOUTHEAST ASIA has known its 'empires' of Sri Vijaya and Majapahit, of wide but indefinite sway, and its great kingdoms of the Khmers and of the Thais; but long before the arrival of the Europeans the peninsula of Indo-China and the Malay archipelago had broken up again into isolated fragments. The Spanish, the Dutch, the British, and the French brought large areas under their control and gave them a political and administrative unity they had never known before. Now, under the pressure of new-born nationalisms, the grip of the Western powers is relaxing, and it seems certain that fragmentation will take place all over again. Yet what is happening is no mere repetition of an ancient sequence; nor is it a reversion to a previously existing state.

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Evolution, said Herbert Spencer in his celebrated definition, is a change from a relatively indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a relatively definite coherent heterogeneity.[1] He was thinking primarily of biological organisms but he extended the idea by analogy to human society (an operation with many pitfalls). Yet in some striking way his definition does seem to illuminate what is in process in this Southeast Asia area. Side by side with integration goes differentiation; the scission of wholes into parts, and parts into smaller parts. The old states of East, Central, and West Java and of Sumatra—Jambi, Melayu, Minangkabau—and the Malay kingdom of Malacca were separate, isolated entities with only fitful contacts and associations, yet similarities of race, custom, and language gave

[1] *First Principles*, 6th ed. (London, Williams & Norgate, 1900) pp. 351, 367. Spencer adds, 'accompanied by integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion', but Dr Joseph Needham in quoting this definition ('Integrative Levels; a Revaluation of the Idea of Progress', pp. 233 ff. of *Time: the Refreshing River*) (London, Allen & Unwin, 1937) says that it is important to note that much of Spencer's argumentation depended on assumptions about energy which antedated the modern statistical interpretation of the second law of thermodynamics. Commenting on the definition as a whole, Dr Needham says: 'We may smile at what we may suppose to be the presumption of such a cosmic formula, but we may find ourselves smiling on the wrong side of our faces if, as is not unlikely, Herbert Spencer has hold of the right end of the stick.'

It is perhaps a tactical error to appeal to Herbert Spencer in a period when his ideas are widely regarded as obsolete; but any theory which appears to make some sense of a situation where others fail to do so cannot be disregarded for any such consideration. Spencer derived his definition from the German biologist, von Baer.

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184 them a certain homogeneity:[1] under the Dutch and the British, the
178 Javanese, the Sundanese, the Amboynese, the Achinese, the Peninsular Malays, and some others have become aware of their identities and, while they share the common aim of independence, they have asserted their claims to separate nationhood.

Evidences of scission are patent over all the area, from the Karen and Arakan secession movements to the division between Annam and Cambodia: the higher integrative level to which the area is tending is not so immediately to be seen. Nevertheless, it exists, and is, in the view of the writer, essentially that of Western political, social, economic, and technological ideas. The whole of the Far East, indeed, is asserting its independence of the West in terms of the principles that the West has taught it—self-determination, human rights, democracy, female emancipation, constitutionalism, economic planning, and industrialization, and this is true even when the insurgents appeal to the inverted-Hegelian, Karl Marx, or to the Communism of Mao Tse-tung. It is so in spite of the efforts of these Far Eastern peoples to give such aspirations a local and national appearance. Just as in Rome the new *jus gentium* was eventually hailed as the natural law and Rousseau in France harked back to Man the Noble Savage, so have the Chinese played the same game from the time when Confucius and Mo Tzŭ under traditional appearances introduced ideas that were essentially new. In 1865 Prince Kung relied on historical argument to advocate the introduction of mathematics into the purely literary civil service examinations (mathematics, he said, were a Chinese invention), and in Java the Nationalists interpret each phase of their revolutionary campaign as the realization of the native pro-

[1] Sir Richard Winstedt, in a letter to the writer, classifies the similarities between the peoples of Malaysia as follows:

(*a*) Homogeneity of race modified by different admixture of negrito, Indonesian, and Mongol blood according to the time and place of migration and by geographical isolation in forests.

(*b*) One language family—modified by the same conditions and by acceptance of Hinduism and Islam on coasts.

(*c*) *One identical body of primitive beliefs* brought down from Central Asia where Babylonian influence had introduced cultural features like haruspicy (taking of omens from livers of animals), god-king, respect for the number 7, the incantation, the pyramid, &c.

(*d*) One material culture. (This also was affected by the influences of the Yuës (bringers of bronze), of Chinese of the Chou period (especially in Borneo, *vide* Dyak testiles), Indians, Arabs, Portuguese, Dutch, and British.)

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phecy of Chayabaya.[1] But the fact remains that, in spite of the traditionalist imprint on the revolution, what these peoples are aiming at, consciously or unconsciously, is not the recovery of a fabulous age but the achievement for their country and people of a new integration. The recently independent countries of India, Pakistan, Burma, and the Philippines aim at large-scale development of their resources in terms of Western techniques; they insist on industrialization (especially the establishment of heavy industries as a foundation of political power), and they talk of reconstruction and development and of raising the standard of living for the millions of their population. At every international conference, from Lake Success to Havana and Baguio to Lapstone, this is the burden of the refrain, be the discussion on trade, health, currency, or civil aviation. Nor is it purely on the material level that this revolution is planned; it demands at the same time reforms of political and social organization that will bring the Far Eastern nations into an equality with the West. The long-term question is whether it is possible to graft Western technology and institutions on to Far Eastern society without altering its essential nature.

China Proper and her neighbours—Tibet, Annam, Korea—all belong to the Far Eastern Civilization (Main Body) of which Dr Arnold Toynbee says, 'the moment of the breakdown may be equated with the break-up of the T'ang Empire in the last quarter of the ninth century of the Christian Era'.[2] As the 'universal state' of the civilization he gives the Mongol and Manchu empires, and he speaks of the history of the existence of the civilization after its breakdown as 'the survival of Far Eastern Society in its petrified state'. But at the same time he points out that, in general, the breakdown of the civilization is not necessarily followed by a disintegration that runs into dissolution. This would suggest that China is in a condition when her institutions have not the vitality or resilience to meet the challenge of external forces.

Commenting on this passage in the original draft, Mr Tom

[1] Chayabaya is a legend-prophecy amalgamating legends of Siva, Adam, and Allah (*not* Mohammed) in Java into a single national legend of a Javanese millennium and a prophecy of a return to it. It assumed protean forms each of which is invoked as political expediency demands. So far as I am aware, the only exposition of Chayabaya is that of Dr C. C. Berg, of Leyden University, which in 1950 had not yet been published.

[2] A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1934–46) iv. 86–7. vi. 306. D. C. Somervell's abridgement of the work, 1947, p. 361.

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Harrisson (whose approach is primarily that of the anthropologist) remarks that it 'always seems dangerous to equate the culture of the ruling dynasty with the whole of a huge country', and adds that some areas of China have, perhaps, never had a culture at all in the sense intended by Professor Toynbee and they cannot be said to have decayed in the least, but rather to have advanced in historical times. The answer to that is that what is referred to here is a single, integrated culture codified in the ancient canonical writings, permeating the whole of the Chinese people who emigrate overseas (the aboriginal tribes of China do not come within our purview), and expressed down to this very day in the family institutions and moral system of the Chinese both in China and overseas. 'China' in the present text is, however, nearly always the Mangi of Marco Polo, namely South China, and only part of it at that, namely the province of Fukien and Kwangtung and parts of Kwangsi and Kiangsi, and not the Cathay, or North China, of the Venetian traveller. The culture, none the less, is that of China as a whole, and the languages (especially Cantonese) are nearer than those of the north to the ancient language of China.

The reader may feel a protest against the affirmation of the continued advance of the West rising in his mind when he recollects the recent strong, often violent, reaction against the West that is so apparent in Asia—the retreat from the English language as a medium of instruction in post-liberation India, or the cry of 'the West must go' in Burma. The answer is that these incidents are partly the normal 'die-hard' gestures of resistance to change, and partly the expressions of resentment of economic control or political pressure by Europeans as persons, politicians, administrators, or companies. For the revolution set in train by Western ideas is now directed, as we have said at the outset, against Western individuals and nations. The West itself is in a state of flux, shaping its industrial civilization to the standards set largely by America, but challenged by Russia, and the Far East flows willy-nilly with the contemporary current. It is indeed a case, in a special sense, of 'Westward the course of empire takes its way'.[1]

This triumph of the West, however, is affirmed here in no spirit of exultation but with deep anxiety. As there rise up before us the

[1] 'Of all the civilizations, dead or living, of which we know our own is the only one which is possibly still not in decline.' A. J. Toynbee, *The Prospects of Western Civilization* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1949) p. 5.

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symbols of our age—the Petrol Pump, the Pylon, the 'Dust Bowl', the Automat, 'Mass Media', the chilling Neon Sign—there is a shrinking of the soul and a poignant yearning for the glory that was Angkor and the grandeur that was Chang An. Yet it is in its effective organs—the Assembly Line, the Tennessee Valley Authority, 'E.R.P.', and the Research Stations—that our robotic civilization throbs; not in the cult of lost causes or impossible loyalties, nor in our academies, our museums, nor our half-empty cathedrals.

At least it is the material aspects of our civilization which appeal to the awakening consciousness of the peoples of the Far East. Whether they will adopt capitalist, socialist, or communist social organization as a means of securing the coveted gadgets of the West that mean a higher standard of living is another matter. Dr Joseph Needham, for example, says that there is no reason to think that the Chinese will not make as convinced socialists as anybody else, but that there are certain directions in which Chinese thinking might have a profound effect upon the nature of the society of the future, perhaps in the matter of juristic security of the individual, and in the forms which the numinous will take in that society. However, there is far less reason to believe that they will adopt democracy, and Communism, being dictatorial, they will probably find more natural and acceptable than democratic socialism.[1]

This survey is of the Chinese in the regions of Tropical Asia, and often in the course of our narrative the question already posed as to the power of this and other peoples to absorb Western ideas without changing their own essential nature will arise either tacitly or explicitly. In other words, can the basic institutions of these peoples meet the impact of Western industrial civilization or of Marxism without disintegrating?

Chinese civilization is based on ancestor worship, the family system, on Confucianism (which incorporates these principles), and on Buddhism and Taoism. The staunchest supporters of these religions could scarcely deny that Buddhism and Taoism as moral forces are in complete decay in China and have been so for a very long time.[2] Whatever their surviving effectiveness they cannot by

[1] J. Needham, 'Confucianism after 2000 Years', in the *Manchester Guardian*, 29 August 1949.

[2] To realize the formalism and religiosity into which Buddhism had declined by last century, one has only to observe the *chü-jen* (M.A.) of the late Ch'ing dynasty who, to prepare his character for office, suddenly takes an interest in practical benevolence. He ostentatiously burns incense and gives alms. If he sees

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themselves form a pillar of the Chinese social system. This leaves only the family system as a core of resistance, for much of Confucianism, too, has fallen into formalism or, more often, into disuse. While political structures of the wider integration (except, so far, Communism) have in post-revolutionary China shown no great effectiveness, the clan and the family have demonstrated a remarkable resistance to change. Yet even these institutions have undergone considerable modification, especially in south China under the influence of the emigrant communities to the Nanyang.[1] Moreover, the experience abroad of Chinese women has made them discontented with many features of the old marriage system. But the influence of example and sometimes of education, which is operating in Southeast Asia, is of small effect as compared with the impact of militant Communism on these institutions in the Communist areas of China—and before long the Communists may overrun the whole of that vast country.[2] All the evidence from Communist China goes to suggest that the age-old 'familism' of the country is not able in this crisis to withstand the force of Communist propaganda. Take, for instance, what an English university lecturer and his wife from Peking, who escaped from the Japanese in 1941 and spent over two years among the Communists, have to say:

> Most spectacular of all has been the success of the Women's Mass Association. Before 1937 the social status of women in country districts of North China, like the rest of the country, was controlled by patriarchal familism. . . . The liberation movement spread like a forest fire through the villages.[3]

Evidence on every hand confirms this experience: the case of hard-working, filial peasant girls carried off to be 'indoctrinated' at Communist schools and returning a year later with a militant sense

a fish in the markets floundering on the hooks, he pays its price and restores it to its native element; he picks struggling ants out of a rivulet made by a recent shower, distributes moral tracts, or, better still, rescues chance bits of paper inscribed with the sacred written character (be it only a discarded bill) from being trodden in the mire of the streets. W. A. P. Martin, *Lore of Cathay* (London, 1901) p. 317. Analogies could, alas, be found in our Christian civilization.

[1] This word, which will recur often in this survey, means literally 'Southern Ocean', but is applied to the whole area of Southeast Asia and even to Australia and other territories to the southward where Chinese emigrants are located.

[2] Written in February 1949.

[3] Claire and William Band, *Dragon Fangs* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1948) p. 128.

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of equality with their fathers and brothers and refusing to accept a system they had never questioned a year before. On hearing these things we might even inquire whether the intense conservatism of China is not rather the *vis inertiae* of dead or moribund forms and not a force for the renewal and remoulding of living tissue.

Yet many Chinese and several leading European authorities adhere to the belief that the present crisis may bring forth a Confucian revival. Sir John Pratt, for example, tells us that many of the best elements in the Kuomintang, together with the intellectual, industrial, and other leaders, may link with the Communists in finding a way for saving the country from destruction; 'they cling [he says] to the hope that the Confucian harmony, which is still the basis of Chinese thought, would soften the worst features of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and that communism in becoming Chinese would become more human'.[1]

'Confucian harmony', perhaps, will have its softening influence, but can there by any large-scale revival of the teaching of the Sage as a positive movement? There have been attempts to bring this about, but none has succeeded. The Four Books (the Analects, the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and Mencius), which contain the body of the Confucian doctrine and which were the substance of the traditional curriculum, are not taught in the modern educational system and have not been taught for many years. How then is this teaching to be transmitted? Certainly if the Communists can work on the women of China in the mass the whole face of Chinese society will be changed. In such circumstances a Confucian revival would be unthinkable.

Much of what has been said above may sound controversial, but it all turns on the meaning of words. Sir George Sansom in his new book, *The Western World and Japan*, says, 'In a limited sense the Japanese came under Western influence, but . . . what was finally adopted was, if Western in shape, thoroughly Japanese in colour and substance.' If we try to apply this to China in accordance with our own definitions, it is the shape and the colour which remain Chinese while the substance becomes more and more 'Western'. After all, modern capitalistic England has very little in common with feudal England, yet the shape and the colour of the two ages have strong similarities. What matters politically is

[1] 'The Chinese Cauldron', *Everybody's Weekly* (29 January 1949).

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that the Chinese Communists consider the present revolution as an indigenous movement—*not* Russian-inspired—and at the same time they have no difficulty in regarding themselves as orthodox Marxists.

In the area covered by this study the main trend of European colonial policy has been in the direction of encouraging the forces of native conservatism to resist innovation. European colonial administrators frequently evince an affection for feudal institutions, a reverence for Mohammedanism, a respect for *adat* law and for princely succession and privilege in excess of that of the native aristocracies themselves. It happens sometimes that existing institutions which had been crystallized by European intervention are sustained only by foreign authority, and in extreme cases, if the sustentation ceased, would dissolve into nothingness as in Poe's *Case of Dr. Valdemar* when death had occurred but dissolution was temporarily suspended by a hypnotic trance.[1]

So much discussion of the general considerations governing the area of our inquiry has been necessary to give a background for our survey of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. But before proceeding to give an outline of our subject, there is one further observation we should make. This is that the survival of particular forms of organization is one thing; the survival of the race or community is another. It is likely that whatever happens the Chinese, both at home and overseas, will retain considerable social and cultural coherence, besides a strong sense of being 'Chinese'. It is his patience in adversity, his adaptability, his determination, his good humour, and his resilience that makes the individual Chinese, male or female, such an admirable biological specimen, and it is his social qualities (given proper treatment) that make him such a valuable unit in this Southeast Asian society. At the present time the Chinese of the Nanyang are in a dilemma, but this work should show that it is their superiority in resource, ability, and industry to the people among whom they live rather than their vicious propensities that makes them constitute a 'problem'.

The cartoon for our picture stands before us in bold charcoal

[1] Poe's description was more vivid but perhaps a little too strong for the present context. British policy in British India favoured 'modernization (e.g. Dalhousie's policy) while in the Indian States it generally favoured 'traditionalism'.

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[p.39]

CHAPTER IV

SPECIAL ASPECTS OF CHINESE SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MOST readers of this survey will be acquainted, at least in a general way, with the problems of China itself and with the direction in which the people of that country have moved in the last fifty years. What will be attempted in this chapter will be to illustrate the way in which the Chinese of Southeast Asia have in some respects deviated from the central pattern under the influence of local conditions. We shall select for this purpose the special aspects of the family, marriage, religion, and education, with some remarks on the opium question. As regards politics, Chapter XXXI, dealing with Chinese political organization in Malaya, brings out the developments which are typical of the area as a whole, and to this the reader is referred should he wish to gain a general impression of the matter before proceeding to the separate country studies.

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The Family. An excellent starting-point for our chapter is the work of Dr Ta Chen, who, in 1934 and 1935 was in charge of a group of investigators studying the emigrant communities in eastern Kwangtung and southern Fukien under the auspices of the International Research Committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations.[1] The area selected for study was a region from which many of the emigrants to the Nanyang originated and where their families mostly live. It is on the sea coast of the two southernmost maritime provinces and consists of ten *hsien* (counties). Roughly speaking, it includes a long strip of territory beginning at Chao An (formerly Chao Chou), passing through Swatow on the Kwangtung border, and through Amoy, and ending at Chuan Chou (Ch'üan-chow) in Fukien. It is an area of a little less than 5,000 square miles with a total population of a little over 4·6 million in 1935.[2]

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[1] Ta Chen (the name is properly Chen Ta, Chen being the surname, and it is thus given in some library catalogues), *Emigrant Communities in South China: a Study of Overseas Migration and its Influence on Standards of Living and Social Change*, English ed. by Bruno Lasker (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940).

[2] Though all the *hsien* have sent emigrants to the Nanyang the area does not constitute the sole source of emigration to the south, even from these two provinces. For example, Mei Hsien and vicinity, the principal home of the Hakkas and the largest source of Hakka emigration, is not included in this area.

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Dr Ta Chen gives a table (p. 83) of the sources of income of 100 emigrant families from October 1934 to September 1935 which shows that the average monthly remittance per family was 81·4 per cent. of the total income, ranging between 75·5 per cent. for incomes below $20 per mensem, and 84·1 per cent. for incomes between $125 and $250. This enabled the emigrant familiies to maintain a much higher standard of living as a whole than those families which had no source of assistance from abroad.

Apart from the purely economic effects of overseas migration upon these communities of east Kwangtung and south Fukien, there is evidence to show that intercourse with Southeast Asia was having a considerable modifying effect on the social institutions, religion, and general outlook both of the emigrants themselves and of the families in China whence they came and to which usually they eventually returned.

In China the social unit has immemorially been the family, and it remains so except to the extent that it has broken down in Communist areas under the influence of Communist ideology. The system which has as its object the perpetuation of the family tree, to a considerable extent subordinates the individual to its needs. But in these emigrant communities in China and in the Nanyang itself, it has had to undergo a great deal of modification to survive. Where resources permit, a dual family system has grown up, whereby one section lives in China and the other in the Nanyang. This dual, or joint family, takes a number of forms which may vary; in the case of a well-off family (to give an example) the head of the family aged 61 lives in Siam, his wife (aged 58) lives in the ancestral village in China and is the acting head of the family, the first concubine (56) is a Siamese and lives in Siam, the second concubine (44) is in the village, and the third and fourth concubines (both Chinese, aged 30 and 19) are also in Siam, and the children of the unions are, except for the son by the wife who is with his father in Siam, all with their mothers, either in Siam or in China. An example of a middle-class family is of a father aged 77 in the village, his son aged 50, the head of the family, in Singapore, and his wife (the acting head of the family) in the village in China. The head of the family had his concubine in Singapore, and the offspring, either of the head of the family or his brothers (who belong to the family) were either in Singapore or at home. A third case of a lower-class family is a more simple pattern with the head of

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the family in Siam, his wife (acting head of the family) in the village in China, and most of the children of the marriage in China.

Such arrangements obviously call for careful financing. The emigrant abroad, after deducting what he needs to meet his expenses, usually remits his savings periodically to his home in China for the support of the family there and to meet extraordinary expenses, such as of a marriage in the family. At the same time the family home in China is a kind of insurance for the emigrant, for he can always return there if he is unemployed.

The influence of the emigrant on the age-old ideas and customs of his home village has been great. If he has had much foreign experience he almost invariably condemns the traditional family arrangement. In the words of a returned tin-miner from Malaya:[1]

> The joint family is an obnoxious social institution. When a member of such a family earns money he is obliged to support all the rest of it and to carry a heavy economic burden. I have had a very bitter experience and always felt that I am virtually the slave of my family. They are of no help to me at all.

A critical attitude towards the family and marriage systems is very general among returned emigrants. They remark that living in the modern world is a complicated affair, and that the joint family is no longer practicable. Many of them felt (in 1935) that an early disintegration of the family in south China was inevitable. Moreover, many of the emigrants have seen what marriage may mean in modern Western life when love and courtship enter into the marriage preliminaries and the union is (or should be) based on affection. An emigrant inevitably contrasts this with the Chinese system wherein the husband and wife are often unknown to one another before marriage. Stubborn and resistant as the traditional family system is, there is evidence from all over the Nanyang that as regards marriage the traditional procedure is in retreat before the modern marriage, and that the joint family system is being strained in some cases almost to breaking-point. Again, in the Nanyang itself, the increased mobility of members of the family is a force threatening to loosen its bonds.

In spite of these tendencies, marriage custom among the Chinese in the Nanyang at the time of the outbreak of the war between Japan and the Allies in 1941 generally followed Chinese traditional

[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 142.

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custom.[1] All this ceremonial was very expensive and involved the family in a burden of debt. 167

One result of the Revolution in China was to initiate a changing attitude towards family institutions. Books IV and V of the Civil Code of the Republic of China deal with the family and succession. The law was promulgated on 26 December 1930 and came into force on 5 May 1931. Polygamy was abolished, and though concubinage in many cases continued, the concubine was now a mistress without legal rights.[2] According to the new law the parties to a marriage were empowered to make the marriage agreement of their own accord, the sole restrictions being that a man who had not completed his eighteenth year and a woman not yet sixteen must obtain the consent of their parents or guardian. No registration of marriage was provided for. 178 582 593

In the Straits Settlements a Chinese Marriage Committee, appointed in 1925 by the Government, recommended that there should be registration for both new- and old-style marriages.[3] The old-style marriage would be valid if the marriage ceremony was carried out with all the essentials required by custom in the district of China from which the bridegroom and bride or their ancestors came, or by such modified custom as was observed by the Chinese residents of the Colony for that district. The committee found it impossible to submit proposals for legislation as to what forms or ceremonies should constitute marriage, because the evidence disclosed the fact that there were no essentials for Chinese marriages in the old style common to all the districts of south China or to the locally born descendants of emigrants from these districts, while the new style of marriage did not require any particular form.

The evidence taken by the committee revealed a practically unanimous opposition among Chinese residents in the Straits Settlements to any divorce legislation.[4]

[1] For a description of these customs see G.B., Colonial Office, *Report of the Commission on Mui Tsai in Hong Kong and Malaya*, Colonial no. 125 (1937), and Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, pp. 148–50.

[2] cf. M. H. van der Valk, 'The New Chinese Criminal Code', *Pacific Affairs* (1936) pp. 76, 77. Under the new Chinese Criminal Code which became operative in July 1935 husband and wife are equally liable to a year's imprisonment for committing adultery, and moreover the person with whom the adultery is committed incurs the same punishment. Complaint can be laid only by the injured spouse.

[3] *Chinese Marriage Committee*, Singapore 1926.

[4] The position in the Federated Malay States, however, was temporarily revolutionized by the Secretary for Chinese Affairs Enactment which was passed

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167 The new-style marriage, based on the consent of the parties, and
178 often arranged by themselves, has gradually been spreading in
582 popularity among the better educated. The cost of the wedding
593 and its preliminaries has also been much reduced. This is a consequence, too, of the growing equality between the sexes.

871 *Education.* It was only by dint of continual defeat at the hands of
212 foreign Powers that China realized that her traditional literary sys-
167 tem of education, which had endured for over a thousand years, did not fit her to withstand the assaults of her enemies. At long last she decided to adopt an educational system on modern lines. The greatest obstacle in doing this was the classical language. The literary language in which all education was conducted had become completely divorced from the spoken language, and it needed many years of study before a student could obtain anything like command of it. Whilst it remained, a democratic system of education was out of the question.[1] So it was that in 1917 there occurred the most revolutionary happening in the history of Chinese education, the initiation of the *pai hua* movement.[2]

Pai hua, or written vernacular, had existed in China for centuries. Most popular novels were written in it, but it had never obtained the recognition of the literati. Corresponding, as it did, to the spoken language, it was much more easily learnt than *wen li*, the Chinese literary language, though it was clumsier and more discursive. So when Dr Hu Shih maintained that the literary language should be abolished in schools and that *pai hua* should be elevated to the rank of a literary medium, the proposal was considered as threatening the very foundations of Chinese culture. But the movement obtained powerful political support and in January 1920, the Minister of Education ordered that the spoken language should be used in the teaching of Chinese in primary schools. The form of *pai hua* approved for this purpose became known as *Kuo Yü*, or the National Language.[3]

in 1899 and repealed in 1932. By this enactment the Secretary for Chinese Affairs had powers to decide the custody and guardianship of women and children, and to order divorce, separation, adoption, and betrothal.

[1] Dr W. A. P. Martin estimated about 1880 that the proportion of Chinese who could read and understand what they read was about one in twenty.

[2] For a full exposition of the subject see Victor Purcell, *Problems of Chinese Education* (London, Kegan Paul, 1936).

[3] See Hu Shih, *The Chinese Renaissance*. The Haskell Lectures, 1933 (University of Chicago Press, 1934).

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this was a policy which the British neglected to pursue with any conviction, and the post-war experiment in this direction, the Malayan Union, was abandoned at the first sign of opposition. Unless a true 'Malayan citizenship' can be made effective, the ideal of a Malayan nation forming, as it were, a buffer State between China, Indonesia, and India, with bonds with all three but belonging to none, will remain a phantom.

In the present crisis the great and deplorable weakness of the Chinese in Southeast Asia is the absence of effective leadership (and the few notable exceptions to this generalization do not affect its truth). This is due in large part to the fact that there has grown up no Chinese middle class of sufficient proportions to provide disinterested, well-educated, and competent individuals in the numbers needed to guide their community through the reefs of politics towards a safe anchorage. The business leaders are so busy making money (or endeavouring not to lose it) that few of them have time to devote to public affairs even if they had the will and the knowledge. In Malaya, at least, the Indian stands in sharp contrast to the Chinese; and in Singapore Indian representation on the various bodies is vastly greater in proportion to their numbers than is the case with the much more numerous Chinese. This is not explicable solely by Chinese political pique but must be due largely to the training in politics and administration the Indians received in their own country during the British Raj. In Malaya, Indonesia, and Indochina the British, Dutch, and French have neglected to afford opportunities for the Chinese residents to acquire a knowledge of affairs. The penalty of this neglect is that now, when European control is loosening, the mass of the Chinese have few leaders to take control and to consolidate their community in face of the Communist advance. The lack of experience and education determines also the quality of the Communist leadership in these regions. Among the Malayan Communists are no Mao Tse-tungs or Chou En-lais and scarcely any individuals with more than the rudimentary mis-education obtainable in Chinese vernacular schools. The result is that the old professional bandit (always a feature of Malaya's jungle-fringe) is more prominent than he would otherwise be, and terrorism is unmitigated by constructive politics. Is it, therefore, strange that in 1949 the majority of Nanyang Chinese were 'sitting on the fence' awaiting the final upshot in China and its repercussions overseas? In such

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circumstances a handful of Chinese Communists, many of them uneducated youths with a strong professional bandit element as just mentioned, had almost complete freedom of action through the time-honoured weapons of intimidation and extortion. With this insidious pressure, and with little support or sympathy from the European Powers or the native peoples, the Chinese of Southeast Asia were indeed in a dilemma.

With the advent of militant Communism came a final complication to the lives of the overseas Chinese. The appeal of the Communists is to the idea of a society horizontally but not vertically divided—that is, divided into classes, but with a proletariat which cuts across racial and community divisions. So far this appeal had been listened to by only a small minority of the Chinese, and with the Malays and other races it has been an almost complete failure. But let no one underestimate the attraction it might have for the masses of Southeast Asia if they were simultaneously convinced of the sincerity of the Communist professions and of the bankruptcy of 'bourgeois' promises.

The only way to stem the advance of Communism in Southeast Asia is to raise the standard of living. The irony of such a course for the colonial Powers is that in promoting a rise in the standard of living they are hastening their own departure. Improved material welfare stimulates political awareness. Whereas in the grand old days of their trading companies they could lord it over a province with a garrison of a score of soldiers, to-day with armies of a hundred thousand they remain only on sufferance. It is of no use, however, their elder statesmen and administrators of a bygone age urging the Governments to 'go slow'. The idea of representative government came from the West, but the rate of approach to it is largely fixed by the peoples themselves. All that the colonial Powers can aim at is to leave their ex-dependencies able to decide their own future and not at the mercy of new imperialisms.

We take leave of the Chinese in Southeast Asia at a time when they are undergoing one of the greatest trials in their history. The whole of the Far East is disintegrating as it moves towards a new and mysterious synthesis. These emigrants belong to a race which for at least one hundred and twenty generations, through the rise, flowering, decline, and petrifaction of the Chinese culture, has preserved a unified attitude of mind towards life and reality, and they look towards their parent civilization and see it once more in

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a state of flux. This is no new phenomenon: it has happened a score of times in Chinese history and each time China has found a new level of stability. It was (it has been said) like a cube; overthrown by civil convulsion it falls flat on another side and is once more the same solid mass. Will it be so again? This is the moot question. The forces causing the upheaval are more powerful and destructive than ever before. They are the same forces which have shaped and are shaping the materialistic, sceptic, technological method of life that we in the West know as civilization. Can China receive the full impact of these forces and remain essentially the China of all time? The event alone will answer this, though it may be nearer than we imagine in the ever-accelerating tempo of change.

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These are long-term, philosophical questions. The more immediate practical question for the Chinese of Southeast Asia, for the peoples among whom they live, and for the rest of the world that has contact or dealings with this area (which is, in effect, everyone), is how this vital and active people will fit into the dispensation of to-morrow. It is a question that every diplomat, administrator, merchant, or student of international affairs should tax his mind to answer in advance of the event, and for this task a necessary preliminary is some knowledge of the nature, the development, and the aspirations of the overseas Chinese. This is what this work, in small compass, attempts to supply.

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A visit to Southeast Asia during the third quarter of 1950 after an absence of nearly three years brought home to the writer the accelerated tempo of the change that the countries were undergoing, and, in particular, the dominant role which the politics of China were playing therein. As a tailpiece to this survey he has recorded the impressions of his visit, bringing the account as nearly up to date as the exigencies of publishing would allow. The observations are set down in the order in which the countries were visited.

In his many discussions with statesmen, diplomats, officials, business men, and others in these Southeast Asian countries, the writer became aware of a considerable disagreement among them regarding the number of Chinese in the area. There was, in the case of Siam and Indochina in particular, no figure that was generally accepted. The definition of 'Chinese' was an initial difficulty (as it has so often been in the course of this survey) for many Chinese appeared to possess a dual racial character, discarding one aspect and assuming the other as circumstances suggested.[1] It seemed also that that clandestine immigration into Siam, Indochina, and the Philippines and (perhaps) Indonesia within the last two or three years, had been very considerable, for during this period the immigration laws had been greatly tightened. The writer was compelled, therefore, to revise the estimates he had made in the demographic chapters of the survey to suit the probable facts of 1950 and to adopt a total not very far short of 10 million ethnic Chinese for the whole of Southeast Asia. This estimate, however, does not materially alter the ratio of Chinese to other races in the area and has no very important bearing on the general political and economic considerations which have been described in the text.

Burma. In July 1950 the Chinese Nationalist ambassador had left Burma, and one other official of the embassy had also gone away, but the remainder of both the embassy and consular staff had agreed to serve under the People's Government of China which was now recognized by the Burmese Government. Two of the staff had already been summoned to Peking for indoctrination. The new ambassador, Dr Yu, was expected to arrive in Rangoon in August. In the meantime the staffs were not being paid and the only income available was that derived from the sale of (Nationalist) passports.

At this time an incident in the Burmese Shan State of Keng-tung near Siam was the subject of a number of rumours. A force of Chinese

[1] Thus in Siam, the President of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, of very obvious Chinese race or extraction but with a Thai name, denounced vehemently the tactics of business men of acknowledged Chinese nationality in their dealings with the Thais.

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that about one-third of its prewar estate area was being tapped in 1947, representing two-thirds of the area tappable.

In the food crops, surplus margins were more slowly restored. Exports of Southeast Asia rice totalled about a million tons during 1946, as against a combined export of 5.7 million tons annually for 1936–40. The drop in production of this staple was greatest in the case of Burma because there the dislocation by war had been greatest, but by the 1946–47 season, about two-thirds of Lower Burma rice acreages were back in cultivation, as against half in 1945–46. In Cochinchina over 70 per cent of the rice area was being cultivated in 1946–47. Siam which was untouched by military campaigns reported 10.6 million acres under cultivation in rice for 1946–47 (22 per cent more than 1939–40)—the only territory to show a substantial increase of rice acreage in the immediate postwar years.

A postwar feature has been the general decline in rice yields, mostly an effect of loss of draught cattle, though to report low yields was a convenient cover for black market sales. The consequence of lost production in local food was felt more in places like Malaya which has specialised in non-food commercial agriculture, than in any other territories of Asia, which customarily needed to import only a small margin and not the majority of their rice. For the Philippines in 1947, the United Nations reported that *per capita* consumption of rice was actually higher than in 1939 by about 5 per cent.

Since labour shortage has been prominent as a factor operating against postwar commercial agriculture, the subsistence farmer and the diversified smallholder have assumed far greater significance than before. Over 55 per cent of Malaya's rubber production for 1946 was from smallholders, a proportion which had been as much as 85 per cent in the early months of that year, yet fell to 45 per cent in 1950 (cf. 39 per cent in 1940).

The vegetable oils soon came back into production and by early 1947 monthly production in Southeast Asia was not far short of 1941 production and now exceeds it.

The general lowering of food acreages and of yields, combined with the enforced reversion to subsistence agricultural forms, has a special significance for Southeast Asia food supplies over the next few years, because the restricted food supply comes at a time when population is rapidly increasing, at the rate of about 20

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million people per decade, and when social policy is for raising the standard of nutrition. These two factors mean that the prewar rice exporters are on every score likely to continue to have less margin for export. How the communities will meet this basic difficulty of supply in their staple food is not clear ; mechanisation is scarcely a solution, yields are very difficult to raise on a large scale, and there are few unused areas of high potential for rice farming, yet unless improvement is reached the labour force is unlikely to remain in non-food producing territories, rice may be for such areas a luxury and not a cheap staple, and the costs of any production must remain high. Influences of this sort in a region where average productive skill is low and slow, may cause it to become one of the world's most costly producer zones and hasten in Europe and the United States the exploitation of substitute commodities which lend themselves to mechanisation more than is the case with typical Southeast Asia agricultural products. It may happen that rapid peopling of Sumatra, Borneo and New Guinea deltas may take place, much as the continental deltas of Southeast Asia were quickly filled with people over the last 50 years; the fact that there has been previous reluctance to go to these places is no guarantee that there will be continued reluctance. Southeast Asia may even become a consumer for rice cultivated in the new areas of South America and Northern Australia. Perhaps some startling innovation of crop or technique will change the otherwise rather gloomy picture, much as the opening up of Canadian, Australian and Argentine wheatlands speedily altered the similarly gloomy outlook for European wheat-eating peoples at the end of last century.

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Directions in these trends of Southeast Asia agriculture are difficult to determine because there are major stratifications of local society both vertically and horizontally which are in process of readjustment, aggravated by currency confusion and widespread ignorance. These will take time to reach an equilibrium and during that period subsistence farming and its nationalist corollary, territorial self-sufficiency, are likely to be strong influences working against a great revival of commercial activity of any sort, with the result that Southeast Asia may not continue indefinitely in its prewar role of one of the world's major sources of supply. Against this must be weighed the proved ability of tropical agriculture to respond quickly to new impetuses.

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Further to complicate the historic geography was the fact that the literary people, the monks and religious men, were Indian or Indian-minded for long periods, disinterested in mundane records, and following the custom, still evident among many Southeast Asia people today, of avoiding personal names, so that anonymity, obscurity and confused nomenclature veil the past even in such records as do exist. Many experiments in writing styles were developed among these isolated and complex peoples and often inscriptions made in them cannot be translated today. Because of the dispersal tendencies within the territories themselves and the lack of focus to the region as a whole, no great depositories of learning were established in Southeast Asia to gather and conserve the record of its past.

Population Changes

Broadly speaking, the region has been until recently one of very thin population and large patches of it still contain populations of remarkably low density. Direct evidence of densities are scanty for periods farther back than this century, yet it seems probable that the whole of Southeast Asia in 1800 contained only about ten million people, when the region was probably as thinly peopled in its most attractive areas as Upper Burma and Upper Siam, the least attractive and developed areas, are today; Malaya then contained about a quarter million people, Java about four million, Burma probably less than two million. It was, even at the end of the 18th century, a zone of labour shortage and the objective of the local princelings of the times was to get hands, the basic power resource of their time, the one way of securing a small surplus from their fundamentally subsistent territories. Outsiders were not greatly attracted to Southeast Asia itself, as apart from the routes through it. To Spain its old colony, the Philippines, was no great asset and more related to Mexico than to Spain, remote and ready to drop from the Spanish orbit during the 19th century. To Holland, its colony in Java was a company venture that yielded little direct profit for many years and was at times on the verge of bankruptcy.

But the last 150 years brought tremendous changes in population. First, on the heels of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, came a revival and an expanded volume of trade between the Indian Ocean and the Far East, a stream which threaded the seaways o

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

FIG. 115.—Population Expansions of Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia, diffusing new conceptions as it passed, re-establishing trading centres, drawing out the produce of Southeast Asia people and stimulating development of Southeast Asia as a source of trade rather than a passage for traders. It has been a century and a half of tremendous population increases, causing people to swarm upon the more fertile areas, upon deltas and volcanic cones where people had not clustered before. In these choice areas, the new deltas and the newer ejecta, the bulk of the great population increase has concentrated, so that upon them live teeming multitudes in limited zones separated by stretches of forest-covered space scarcely more populated now than they were several centuries ago. By the quinquennium 1916-20, the total population of Southeast Asia had become 84 million, by 1936-40, 120 million, and in this present quinquennium (1946-50) it is nearly 145 million. The increases, while general, have not been even (Fig. 115). Over the present century, of the political units, Java has been increasing very much faster than any other, and Siam has since 1911 so increased that its population exceeded that of the Philippines by 1933 and by now exceeds also that of Burma.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA NUTRITION DENSITIES
(Average number of persons per rice-acre per annum)

Quinquennium	*Burma*	*Indo-china*	*Siam*	*Java and Madoera*	*Philip-pines*	*Malaya*
1916–20	1.23	1.75	1.66	4.12	3.13	—
1921–25	1.19	1.67	1.57	4.27	2.67	5.61
1926–30	1.14	1.61	1.57	4.50	2.69	6.13
1931–35	1.19	1.64	1.63	4.60	2.76	6.42
1936–40	1.25	1.63	1.74	4.96	2.79	7.02
1946–50	2.0	2.1	1.6	5.9	3.9	7.2

Because population and the net production of food have increased *pari passu*, it is important to examine the "nutrition density" (persons per acre under rice) since the surplus for export depends on low internal consumption of the Southeast Asia staple and high internal production. The countries of Southeast Asia pre-war showed considerable differences in nutrition density, from Malaya (the plantation-mining specialist) with 7.2 persons per rice-acre, to Siam (the rice-surplus specialist) with 1.6. Malaya, Java and the Philippines had nutrition densities much higher than the rest of neighbouring countries and in the case of Malaya and Java the nutrition density had been steadily rising, whereas in Burma, Indochina and Siam it was fairly static. Over the same period, the domestic consumption of rice per person sharply dropped (by 20-25 per cent) in Burma, Siam and Java and rose about 10 per cent in Indochina, Philippines and Malaya. The postwar figures available show considerable increases of nutrition density everywhere except in Siam, yet these were changes of degree, not of pattern.

Changing Internal Emphasis

Today the very crowded places are firstly, Middle and North Java, Lower Siam and the Red River Delta, where densities of over 1,500 people per square mile occur, with secondary crowdings in Lower Burma, the Lower Mekong, Central Luzon and the Visayas. These concentrations of people are pre-eminently in agricultural areas (Fig. 116), and they are in fact largely made possible by exceptional soil qualities within an area whose general soil fertility is low. These crowded areas have taken part in a commercialisation of local agriculture and their subsequent history has been firstly a

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

FIG. 116.—Distribution of People in Southeast Asia

rapid increase in people to a point where the new agricultural development ceased to be enough for the large population, leading to the second stage of slow migration and emphasis on commercial agriculture upon newer zones of similar type. Hence the change of emphasis from Tonkin to the Annam coastal plains and then to the Lower Mekong; from the Central Luzon area to Visayan Islands;

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from the plains of Java to the dangerous upper limits of the volcanic country; and from Dry Burma to the Irrawaddy Delta. Sometimes there has been a little agricultural migration—very largely this change has been brought about by different rates of growth rather than movement of people to new places. Everywhere commercialisation of agriculture has led to population increase, because the agricultural technique has not changed from the Southeast Asia tradition of manual work at every stage. The bringing of new areas into cultivation has been followed by an increase in the number of hands to do the cultivating, partly a response to the need and partly made possible by additional nourishment and an added vitality arising from lower disease rates natural to the less populated area, because human diseases are diffused more slowly where people are isolated from one another, as in new areas. Thus Southeast Asia has been the scene of intense pioneering by people seeking, developing and filling new agricultural areas, to create for a time the eldorado of rice-eating peoples and the one safeguard of Indians and Chinese against the vagaries of their own harvests and against the congestions of their home districts.

Minerals in turn have attracted external interest. There has been the pull of gold in the Philippines, of tin in Malaya and nearby islands, of petroleum in Sumatra and Borneo. These great gambles drew capital and pulled in crowds of labourers, wage-earners who were unavailable from local people so tightly held in their manual agricultural systems. Minerals drew millions of Chinese through the South China Sea in the tin rushes and oil rushes of the last hundred years.

Yet another form of commercialised agriculture developed, to provide the industrial raw materials of distant factories in Europe and America and based on crops entirely foreign to Southeast Asia. Sugar, coffee, hemp, rubber, oil palm proved highly successful in this terrain where they had never existed before. Large plantations of them were laid out, still more wage-earning labour was absorbed, a still greater production was obtained, drawing more and more people into virgin areas. Migrations from India and China were further stimulated to work upon the plantations whose uneven development, in successions of booms and depressions, alternately attracted migrants in the boom years and sent them home again in the depressions.

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Political Convergence

438 These local products for commerce not only stimulated export trade; they stimulated import trades to feed the migrant peoples, to dress them, and to dress the agriculturists so preoccupied that they could no longer spare time to weave for themselves. And trade itself drew external interests; Chinese and Indian traders came in to monopolise middleman functions and Europeans came in and worked out here the complex balancing of their own industrial systems far away. Britain stimulated the commercialisation of Burmese rice production as an assurance of cheap food for an industrialising, overpopulated India. The Dutch fanned out from Java into the adjoining islands. Not to be outdone, the French moved into Indochina as a base for their China trade. Germans for a time controlled the copra trade of the farther eastern islands. Thus all the major Western European powers had colonial interests in the expanding peoples, the expanding production and the expanding needs of Southeast Asia. And the major oriental powers, India, China and Japan, had equally direct interest in Southeast Asia (Fig. 117) as an outlet for their people, a source of rice, a source of raw materials for their industries, and finally as outlet for their own industrial products, India and Japan being mostly involved in this, the latest phase.

Internal Divergences

The resulting pattern of people is one of unparalleled diversity in stages of evolution from subsistence to commerce, in densities of people, in ethnic types, in languages (Fig. 118). The similarity of setting, circumstance and products have disrupted Southeast Asia within itself by economic rivalry in producing similar commodities, and the divergencies of overseas connections with different colonial powers established divergent trade streams, currency differences, educational differences and political differences. Political and economic forces released in Europe and America had their repercussion within Southeast Asia, by means of which French protectionist policies virtually isolated Indochina from its neighbours and Filipinos turned their backs upon Asia. Siam has been wooed, ignored or bullied, depending on the fluctuation of Anglo-French relations in Europe and the opportunism of the U.S. in building up its bloc in East Asia. All sorts of colonial systems have been

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Exchange and Market; a capitalist structure, with the business concern as subject, far more typical of Capitalism than one can imagine in the so-called "capitalist lands" which have grown slowly out of the past and are still bound to it by a hundred roots'. He was writing with special reference to the European element, but his remarks apply with equal force to the Chinese element, and to the growing number of natives 'who have adopted a western mentality as their own, and who possess and use those qualities which modern capitalism requires of its representatives'.[1] Dr Boeke and other Dutch economists tend to contrast this rationalist material attitude of western enterprise with the disregard of economic values that they regard as characteristic of the native element. That will need further consideration; here it will suffice to note that during the present century, up to the depression of the thirties, the foreign elements were growing more numerous and more powerful, and that political reforms did nothing to check this process. On these points Netherlands India resembles Burma; what is distinctive of the social order in Netherlands India is that, for good or ill, the native community has largely been cut off from and protected against the working of economic forces, which in other tropical regions, as in Burma, have been allowed free play.

13. Netherlands India and Burma

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In the foregoing pages I we have tried to bring out some of the more important points of similarity and contrast between Java and Burma. In both there has been rapid progress; both countries have been thrown freely open to the modern world under the policy of the 'open door', and both now make a valuable contribution to the material resources of the world. In both alike the process of development under foreign rule has resulted in a racially mixed community in which economic forces are abnormally active, and in both a nationalist movement voices a reaction against foreign rule.

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We have seen, however, that in the principles and machinery of administration a superficial resemblance conceals a profound difference. British rule in Burma rests on the principles of economic freedom and equality before the law, and there is a single uniform system of direct rule in which the administrative officers are essentially servants of the law. Dutch rule in Java rests on the principle of 'like over like', and there is a dual administration

[1] Boeke, cited *Netherlands India*, pp. 452, 457.

I [See category 116, pp. 23–264 for description of Colonial policy and administration in Java and Burma — Analyst]

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

656 of their value by example and experience. Apathy betokens the failure of welfare measures, and the resort to compulsion is not only a sign but a confession of their failure. When measures that would really promote welfare fail, the explanation must be sought in some defect in the machinery of welfare, and as we have seen, this is defective because it works mechanically in response to the will of Government and not as an expression of organic social will. Compulsion can, within limits, be exercised effectively in the interest of economic progress, but to raise the standard of living among people in general it is necessary to organize a demand for welfare. Where an effective majority demands welfare measures, compulsion by penal regulations will give strength to their demand; beyond that, except so far as such measures are needed for the health of Europeans or the efficiency of western enterprise, attempts to promote welfare by compulsion almost certainly do more harm than good.

6. The Relation between Progress and Welfare

178 Indirect rule as we have noticed, although originally adopted for convenience, has been justified as a means of softening the impact of Europe on the tropics by leaving the people under their own rulers, laws and customs, and thereby moderating the pace of change so that they can adapt themselves to their new environment. Indirect rule does, in fact, provide machinery which should enhance welfare, and we may find cases where it has been effective. But the machinery often fails because the motive principle is unsound; it is applied to further progress rather than welfare. The growing tenderness towards legal compulsion under a penal correction is a tacit confession that, even under the stimulus of gentle pressure, adjustment fails to keep pace with the ever-increasing rate of change. Despite aspirations to moderate the rate of change in the interest of human welfare, there is constant pressure to hasten it for the sake of economic progress. 'A striking feature of most European economic enterprise in Africa has been the constant effort of Governments, companies and individuals to achieve specific developments in particular directions as rapidly as possible.'[1] That is true of modern colonial expansion in general. Governments are expected to bring new territories to a state of financial independence as soon as may be; the numerous departmental heads call for reports on this, that and the other sub-

[1] Frankel, p. 10.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

ject, and officials in charge of a district for only a few months must act quickly if they are to do anything and show results; shareholders in private enterprise look for quick returns. 'Means, speedy means', is the motto of tropical development in all its aspects. 178

The rapid development of tropical resources is not only profitable to the colonial power but helps to justify its position under the 'dual mandate' to the outer world. At the first international conference on colonial affairs held at Berlin in 1884–5, the development of dependencies was laid down as a condition on which their tenure should receive international recognition. The modern world demands access to backward regions, and the pace at which their resources, human and material, are made available for world welfare steadily grows faster. Before the days of steam, the funds derived from the taxation of native enterprise were sufficient to meet the charges of development. With the construction of railways and the growth of western enterprise, the demand for speedier development compelled dependencies to raise loans from or through the colonial power. Now this also is regarded as too slow, and there is general agreement that colonial powers should expedite development by loans free of interest or by outright gifts. The Dutch contribution of f. 40 million to Netherlands India in 1904, for promoting irrigation, emigration and agricultural credit services, was regarded as exceptional and as justified by special circumstances.[1] So likewise was a recent contribution of f. 25 million. But in British colonial policy the grant of financial assistance to dependencies found acceptance as a matter of principle. This is the basis of the Colonial Development Act of 1929, supplemented and extended by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940.

It is not without significance that, in the title of this Act, development precedes welfare, and that aviation has been recognized as one of the objects having a prior claim on the funds which it provides. Air services have proved useful for the conveyance to Europe of gold and diamonds. They may in future contribute to economy in administration by allowing the concentration of the forces maintained for preserving order, and by reducing the time required for the journeys of officers on furlough, but hitherto the demand for air transport for civil purposes has come from a comparatively small group among the European community.[2] The issue is primarily between transport by air and by sea, but ranged on either side are all those who stand to profit by these

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 236.

[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1602–3.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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respective forms of transport. Even before the present war, a situation was arising which called for measures to prevent wasteful competition between air and rail. It is not improbable that the powerful and vocal interests pressing for air services will obtain for them an undue share of the funds available for economic development, but doubtless all the rival interests will finally reach some form of agreement. Yet whatever agreement may be reached, one thing is certain: that the provision of air services will not 'moderate the pace of change'; on the contrary it will hasten economic development and increase the urgency of social services to mitigate its consequences. Already the subsidy to air transport constitutes a relatively heavy charge on the revenue in some territories, thereby diminishing the funds available for welfare services, and one may assume that, in the conflict of rival interests, the grant of funds for aviation (so far as it is not affected by lobbying) will be determined on purely economic grounds, and that the natives, who are least powerful and least vocal, will not have much influence on the decision.

Although the Act provides for expenditure on welfare services, it is based on the assumption that economic development is a condition of welfare. 'It can hardly be anticipated', says Sir Alan Pim, 'that the taxpayers of the Colonial Powers will, after the war, consent to such an annual levy on them as would meet the colonial needs either free of interest or at a nominal rate.'[1] Although additional expenditure on the development of dependencies does, or should, make them more profitable, it is doubtful how far grants or cheap loans for the purpose of development would benefit the British taxpayer. On the other hand, they would expedite the pace of change, and thereby enhance the difficulty of natives in adjusting themselves to their new environment. Grants made in the name of welfare will have a similar effect. However much may be available from public revenue or private charity for expenditure on social services, its effect on promoting welfare is conditioned by the demand for welfare, which in tropical dependencies, as we have seen, is effective only so far as welfare is necessary to development. Development creates a demand for social services, for the protection of land and labour, for the improvement of health and the multiplication of schools; but these services are transformed from instruments of welfare into instruments of progress. It is not true, as Liberals held, that development is a cause of welfare or, as modern colonial policy holds, a condition of

[1] *Colonial Review*, Sept. 1944, p. 203.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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welfare. On the contrary, welfare is a condition of economic progress, and has economic progress as a by-product. We have noticed a striking instance of this principle in Burma, where the people wanted to decorate the local pagoda with electric light. Their interest was primarily in religion and, without any help or subsidy from Government, they illuminated the pagoda. But, incidentally, they also provided electric lighting for the town. It is a matter of general experience that many, probably most, utilitarian reforms have originally been conceived as humanitarian ideals and, indeed, so far as our western civilization has a Christian origin, we may claim that it is based securely on the rock of vision.

Everywhere in the tropics there is abundant scope and need for the enhancement of welfare. But, as Lord Hailey has remarked, little can be done to promote welfare until the people themselves, or at least their leaders, are conscious of their needs.[1] Economic progress under western rule should provide the means for enhancing welfare, but we cannot enhance welfare merely through economic progress. The problem of enhancing welfare has some analogies with the problem of encouraging scientific research. Sir Joseph Thomson made some wise remarks on this matter in connection with the use of Röntgen rays in war. Administrations and employers want research in applied science that will give practical results, and the scientists whom they employ are expected to show results and, indirectly at least, are paid according to results. Research in applied science, starting to find an improved method of locating bullet wounds might, he suggested, have led to the invention of better probes; but the improvement of war surgery was mainly due to the apparently quite useless, unpractical research that led to the discovery of Röntgen rays. He drew the moral that 'research in applied science leads to reform, research in pure science leads to revolutions'.[2] For the enhancement of welfare in the tropics nothing less than such a revolutionary change in our attack upon the problem will suffice. One cannot achieve it by attempting to mitigate the consequences of economic progress. It is necessary both to organize a positive demand for welfare and to control economic development in the interest of welfare. We must go outside the domain of economics to find some dynamic principle, stronger than economic forces, which all accept as of superior validity to the desire of gain. But if we are looking for some principle of welfare, we should have a clear understanding of what we mean by welfare.

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1206. [2] Rayleigh, Lord, *Life of Sir J. J. Thomson* (1942), p. 199.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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161 development who fear that these countries might not be able
433 to expand their production faster than population expands, in which case the result of economic development efforts will be a greater quantity of people with little or no gains in the quality of living conditions. In Zinkin's words, "The growth of population and the impact of the West have between them, in the last hundred years, so upset the delicate balance that most of the Asian countryside is now bankrupt . . . . The alarming feature of the peasant economy of Asia is not simply that it is desparately poor. It is that in recent decades, and in most countries of Asia, it has been growing poorer. It is a changing, dynamic economy. But it has been changing for the worse."[23]

433 Poverty is not new in Southeast Asia. What is new
829 is the awareness of poverty and the conviction that something
178 can be done about it. "A great change", reported Harold Butler, "is stirring Eastern society. The consciousness of misery has been created by the growing realization that it is not the inescapable lot of the poor and that chances
654 of better life now exist."[24] All of the countries in South-
648 east Asia have within the past decade set up official agen-
185 cies charged with planning and promoting economic development; and for international assistance to hasten it, is the constant

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23. Zinkin, op. cit., p. 34.

24. Harold Butler, Problems of Industry in the East (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1938, Studies and Reports, Series B, No. 29), pp. 65-66.

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

Chinese
Indians

464 years of the present century, the flow of immigration has been large and
167 comparatively steady except during the depression and the two world wars. Chinese and Indian immigrants usually could better their position soon after arrival because their industry and organization were superior to those of the indigenous peoples. Partly because of this, there were constantly new arrivals willing to do coolie work until they too could
[178] rise economically. Except for the large-scale repatriations to China and India caused by the depression, the flow of labor thus set into motion was adequate for the economy prevailing in the underpopulated areas until changing conditions created a growing class of landless proletariat and
[668] dissatisfaction among both the indigenous and immigrant peoples. This dissatisfaction often became associated with other motivations in nationalist movements.

Controlled migrations occurred only between regions under the same government or those held by governments of the same nationality, except for a limited migration of Javanese labor to Malaya (and to New Cale-
[166] donia). In the Netherlands Indies and in Indochina the governments endeavored to transplant groups of laborers from overpopulated to underpopulated areas, but in so doing they learned that the process required careful organization, was expensive, and raised serious economic, social, and psychological problems. Such movements could be effected successfully on a limited scale only. This fact obviated the possibility of their contributing substantially to solution of the problem of overpopulation. As labor supply, such migrations were only temporarily satisfactory, because social and religious ties inclined the workers to return to their home villages immediately upon the expiration of their contracts or even to desert. To stabilize this labor force some of the governments tried after the depression to obtain a better adjusted sex ratio in the migrant population by encouraging the immigration of workers' families and the establishment of agricultural villages—a program too recently initiated to make possible a definite appraisal of its comparative success or failure. In Malaya, with the exception of a few Javanese, planned immigration was confined to Indian laborers. It was arranged and operated jointly by the two British governments concerned. There, however, the depression, the growth in voluntary Indian immigration, and India's ban in 1938 on assisted emigration to Malaya tended to render many of the official controls unnecessary. The unplanned and uncontrolled movement of labor across the Burma-India frontier was the sole migration of its type in Southeast Asia.

563 The indigenous populations in general hold themselves socially aloof
609 from the alien Asiatics. To the Muslim Malays the Chinese were materialistic, pork-eating idolators; and the Indians, with the exception of the small Islamic minority, were similarly disdained, though regarded as less aggressive. To the sinicized Annamites, the Burmese, and the Siamese,

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Chinese

religion was no barrier between themselves and the Chinese; all were Buddhists, though of differing sects. Chinese culture had long been admired by the peoples of Farther India, and had influenced them. Moreover, the Chinese were regarded as distant and desirable relatives. With the advent, however, of Chinese women and the accelerated growth of Chinese nationalism after the first world war, intermarriage occurred less frequently (though it continued to be common in Burma and Cambodia), and the indigenous peoples had few social contacts with the Chinese in their midst. The cleavage between the ethnic groups was further widened in the British colonies by the official policy of representation of various communities on legislative and advisory bodies. 563 609

Economically, relations between the indigenous and the immigrant peoples altered from a mosaic of non-conflicting occupations to one of rapidly increasing competition. For years the native peoples had contentedly seen the arrival of thousands of immigrants annually who were able and willing to perform the hard labor for which they themselves had neither inclination nor compulsion. Through much of the region, however, during the inter-war period an indigenous proletariat was developing as a result of the transfer of farm land from the indebted native peasantry to non-agriculturists, often to alien moneylenders, and also because of the growth of a Western-inspired individualism which was weakening family ties once paramount. The trend was apparent chiefly in parts of Burma, Siam, and Indochina. 464 477 178 425 177

This development did not assume significant proportions until the world economic depression, when considerable unemployment arose out of the drop in prices and the curtailment of foreign markets for products of Southeast Asia. The result was a swift increase in the number of natives seeking to return to their villages and, on the other hand, of those forced to seek part-time or full-time employment away from their villages in competition with immigrant laborers for work previously scorned as arduous, monotonous, and underpaid. 464 458 178

Meanwhile the native middle classes for the first time faced a serious unemployment problem. Until the depression years, the opportunities for desirable though moderately paid employment in government or business had seemed to exceed the number of qualified candidates. The depression made it clear that the saturation point had been reached, and each year an increasing number of educated youths would be thwarted in their expectation of employment or, if given a job, in their rise to higher positions. Thus two groups of economically frustrated natives developed simultaneously in numbers and in consciousness in the decade prior to the second world war. 464 178 563

Nascent political factors became significant during that period. The struggles of the Chinese against the Japanese and of Indians against British rule were reflected in the attitudes of the emigrants from those coun- 464 668

162 Burma, Rangoon; in Thailand, Bangkok; in
369 the Philippines, Manila; and in Malaya,
361 Singapore. In Indochina, however, there are two major core regions, each with its regional capital, but Saigon is clearly dominant over Hanoi, which for reasons of population size alone must be regarded as a lesser city.[6] In Indonesia densely populated Java has two large cities, Jakarta and Surabaya, the first only twice the size of the second, but Jakarta is the Primate City, if less clearly than Bangkok or Rangoon. In each case, other than Indonesia, the Primate City is from five to ten times as large as the next largest city, and there is no such graded hierarchy of urbanization as in the United States and to a considerable degree in Western European countries and Japan. Secondary cities, such as Mandalay in Burma, Makassar and Jogjakarta in Indonesia, and Cebu in the Philippines, tend to be regional capitals subordinate to a great metropolis.

178 The rapid population growth of the six
162 greatest metropolitan centers—Rangoon,
369 Bangkok, Saigon, Manila, Singapore, and
361 Jakarta—suggest that national urbanization may be proceeding as rapidly in Southeast Asia as in any other part of the world.[7] This may be true, but it can be argued also that the overwhelming dominance of the Primate City inhibits the growth of lesser cities and that the largest cities will expand more rapidly than the lesser ones.[8] There are in effect only a limited number of services to be performed by cities within a predominantly village and folk society, although it may be industrializing slowly, and the great cities continue to possess a virtual monopoly of these services. Thus, even as a society changes, new and increasingly complex functions tend to be performed by institutions

[13] [6] According to the *Annuaire statistique du Vietnam, 1949–50*, the population of Hanoi was 216,900 in 1950. Its port, Haiphong, had a population of 146,000. The total population of the two is only about one-fifth that of the twin cities of Saigon-Cholon.

[7] Between 1939 and 1948 the population of Greater Manila increased by 55 per cent. Between 1931 and 1947 the population of Singapore Town (now City) increased by 52.5 per cent.

17: Ginsburg E-4 (no date) 1955
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already established in the Primate cities. So, to a very large degree, in Southeast Asia growth is primarily in the great cities,[9] whereas in the United States in the last three decades at least growth has been more rapid in the small and intermediate cities.

Although the rates of urbanization are high, being, in the case of the Philippines nearly twice the rate of population growth,[10] no sudden transformation to an urbanized society can be envisaged. The percentage of total population classified as urban is in general so low and the normal rates of population increase so high that the growth of urban population *as a percentage of total population* has not been spectacular. In the Philippines, for example, the urban population increased merely from 23.3 per cent in 1939 to 24.1 per cent in 1948, largely in the Manila area. The apparent positive correlation between social change and rates of urban population growth also is exceptionally high. To illustrate with a negative example, in Thailand, where recent social change has been minimal, the rapid population growth of Bangkok has been equaled and even exceeded by that of a number of rural *changwats* in the central and southeastern parts of the country. Under at least two conditions, however, the great cities have increased their populations enormously and at shocking rates: (1) where enlarged political functions have been acquired since the war and (2) where rural unrest and insecurity have

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[9] The only apparent major exception to this generalization is Singapore and Malaya, where the lesser towns have tended to increase their populations equally rapidly since 1931. This situation may be explained by the special political and economic status of Singapore, the entrepôt for much of archipelagic Southeast Asia, and the exceptional degree of commercialization in the Malayan economy as a whole (see M. V. del Tufo, *A Report on the 1947 Census of Population [Malaya, Comprising the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore]* [London, 1949]).

[9] E.g., Greater Manila accounted for 89 per cent of the 1939–48 growth of the seven largest cities in the Philippines.

[10] Between 1939 and 1948 the approximate rate of total population growth was 20 per cent; that of urban population growth, nearly 40 per cent.

17: Ginsburg E-4 (no date) 1955
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178 caused or hastened a flight to the relative security of the city. These forces have been 162 operating in combination particularly in 369 Rangoon, Jakarta, Saigon, and Manila and largely are responsible for their extremely 361 rapid postwar growth. Lesser cities in Java, for example, such as Surabaya, Jogjakarta, Semarang, and Surakarta, also have increased in population because of rural insecurity; and in Burma in several towns and cities up to 50 per cent of the population has been resident less than four years, for the same reasons. These migrations have not, however, necessarily been accompanied by greater employment opportunities and consequently cannot be regarded as indexes of more rapid urbanization and associated socioeconomic change.

184 The great cities of Southeast Asia possess many features in common, not the least of 361 which is their youth. This quality they share also with several of the great cities of the 369 United States, but there the resemblance ceases.[11] In 1800 Rangoon, Saigon, and 175 Singapore did not yet exist in city form; 178 Bangkok, the new capital of Thailand, was less than twenty years old; Manila and Batavia (Jakarta), though then about two hundred years old, were merely small coastal towns. They began to grow rapidly after the middle of the nineteenth century, as a consequence of the development of the treaty ports in China, the opening of Japan, the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown by the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, the opening of the

[11] For the most part the growth of the Southeast Asian cities was not associated with a total transformation of society but with a strong indigenous tradition, as in the case of Bangkok, or with the juxtaposition of a segment of a new civilization alongside the old, as in the case of Rangoon. In America the cities represented the culmination of a social transformation in a virtually unoccupied frontier region. The same is true of Manchuria, the northeastern frontier of pioneer settlement in China, which is more recently, and more highly, urbanized than any other part of China. In Manchuria, as in the United States, there is a quite regular gradation of city sizes, and the Primate City cannot be clearly identified.

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Suez Canal in 1869, and the consolidation of Western control, direct or indirect, over most of Southeast Asia in the 1890's, followed by American acquisition of the Philippines at the turn of the century.

More important, the great cities were, and to a large degree still are, foreign creations, essentially alien to the Southeast Asian landscape. Although several began as native settlements, they developed as foreign exclaves on the margins of Asia, in much the same way as did the plantation system and mining operations. With the exception of Bangkok, they represented and functioned as the overseas appendages of Western, not indigenous, interests, being what Spate has called "head-links"—the gates by which Western concepts entered to destroy and build and in which a new system of economic organization evolved.[12] Indeed, the concept of the Asian plural society was inspired by the contrast between the basically foreign great city and the indigenous agricultural village. The ties of the great city with its hinterland were primarily commercial and associated with foreign-controlled mining and plantation interests and with Chinese-dominated rice trade. Such direct political-administrative ties as did exist were restricted primarily to indigenous elites, small in number, which allied themselves with Western interests. Where the indigenous rural populations were affected by these urban-rural relations, it was primarily through the plantation or the mining system, both of which needed a large labor force, or through Indian or Chinese intermediaries.

On the other hand, the relations between an indigenous capital, like Bangkok in its earlier period, or Kyoto or Peking, and the agrarian society upon which it was based were of quite a different order. In these cases the capital represented the culmination of what might be termed a national *ethos*, the epitome of what Redfield has

[12] O. H. K. Spate, "Factors in the Development of Capital Cities," *Geographical Review*, October, 1942, p. 628.

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Bang Kok

361 behind them is one of the most striking
34 demonstrations of cultural dualism in South-
184 east Asia.

Unlike the other great cities, Bangkok
175 originated as the capital of a land-oriented
361 agrarian state. Its proximity to tidewater
504 was accidental. In 1822 the ship bearing the Crawfurd mission to the Thai court barely
177 was able to cross the bar at the mouth of the Menam, then covered by only four feet of
178 water.[22] Its poor harbor and its remoteness from the major shipping routes of the South China Sea conspired to retard the development of the city as a port until the end of the nineteenth century and to retain it as an anachronism in Southeast Asia—a growing city, nearly great, surely primate, but indigenous rather than Western. Nevertheless, since it was through Bangkok that Western influences filtered into Thailand, it is a case of an indigenous capital acting as a revolutionary medium for socioeconomic change.

504 Bangkok is still the least convenient port
361 of the great cities in Southeast Asia. The bar across the mouth of the Chao Phya was dredged through only in 1952, and port facilities are modest as compared with the other cities. Indeed, most vessels still anchor in the Bight of Bangkok in the lee of the island, Kao Hsi Kang, at the mouth of the Chao Phya and transship their cargoes to and from river barges and country boats which link the island with Bangkok. Surprisingly, the freight tonnage handled at Bangkok is about one-third that of Singapore, although the volume of shipping is only one-tenth as large. The explanation lies partly in the large bulk shipments of rice which form the main export. Partly, also, there is a lower load factor at Singapore, since much of the shipping which enters its harbor is as much dependent on the local complex of service facilities as on cargo potential. At Bangkok, peripheral as it is to the main trade routes, few vessels call without assurances of sizable cargoes.

[22] See J. Crawfurd, *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China* (London: H. Colburn & R. Bentley, 1830).

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Bangkok

On the other hand[1] changes in transportation have elevated Bangkok to a new importance. It lies astride the main air route between Europe and the Far East, and the Australia-Europe services also pass through it. It is now the leading international air center in Southeast Asia, with 42 international departures a week in 1953 as compared with Singapore's 27, and its airport is one of the larger commercial fields in the Orient. 361 508 369

The role of the Southeast Asian great city has been modified by the Pacific war and the granting of independence to Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and partial independence to Vietnam. Five of the six great cities are now capitals of the independent states. Each of these merits the title "link capital"; that is, they are the media through which the newly independent states are linked with the outside world. At the same time, they have begun to assume an increasingly indigenous character. The substitution of Malay for Dutch names and street signs in Indonesia is only one evidence of cultural change. The in-migration of petty officials, tradesmen, and refugees from the beleaguered rural areas has given the urban populations a new and more homogeneous native cast. The fevers of nationalism have made the large minorities more cautious about flaunting their ethnic independence. 361 178 184 162 563 177 631 369

1 [i.e. as compared to the inconvenient port facilities -- Analyst]

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361 On the other hand, the war also brought in-
178 creased American influence into the region,
631 and the ubiquitous Coca-Cola sign is one of
184 the symbols of change that sooner or later
162 will be followed by changes in urban facili-
ties and urban organization.

More important, the present period is as-
563 sociated with an increasing intensification of
171 the economic activities of government and a
369 corresponding diminution of foreign enter-
prise. Political and administrative functions have become increasingly important since the war. Since the main governmental organs are concentrated in the largest centers, the direct influence of the great city upon the country in which it is primate is likewise increasing. Relations between nationalized city and an increasingly money-oriented countryside are becoming more intimate, and the formerly clear-cut cultural distinctiveness of city and country is rapidly becoming blurred. Therefore, the likelihood of the great city's leading a revival of ancient value systems, as some extreme ethnocentrists hope it will, is small. Only one prediction can be made: the days of the culturally alien and ethnically distinct urban center are numbered in Southeast Asia; and a city like Singapore becomes increasingly an anomalous relict of an age now past.

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Chinese

427 But the alien planta-
565 tions and even alien smallholders have threatened to grasp at it, and the
177 advances of Western medicine, so beneficial in many ways, have only accelerated the rate of increase of the population which has to seek a livelihood from it. In most parts of South East Asia the peasant is the actual owner of the land he tills, often legally under some agreement with
426 the State. But his rights to the produce are often severely limited by a heavy burden of indebtedness. The real effects of this may be less than people sometimes think, because when the debts are spread among neighbours and kinsfolk interest may be waived, repayment is sometimes protracted or ignored, and the debt may be serviced by other than material means. But there is no doubt that the peasant producer is badly hampered by his debt load. It is most pressing when debt is contracted to a member of an alien ethnic group, an Indian or a Chinese, for whom the transaction is a purely commercial one.

563 The role of alien Asiatic ethnic groups is one of the most significant
565 features in the economic and political life of the peasantry of South East
177 Asia today. For many centuries, Indian and Chinese trading influences have met in the South East Asian region, and Indian religious concepts
178 have penetrated deep into many of its social systems. But for more than
439 four hundred years the dominant commercial and political note has tended to be sounded by Europeans. Now the balance is altering. Colonialism may have set the modern structure of South East Asian society, but the patterns will persist when the colonial Powers have withdrawn. To this new society the Chinese above all have the economic key. In Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, the Philippines, and Java, the Chinese have penetrated the economic system and taken over crucial functions. They have shared in much of the wholesale import trade, they have attained pre-eminence in retailing vital imported goods to the peasant, and they act as middlemen for the collection, storage, and processing of peasant export products. As part of this process they often finance the peasant producer by advances on his crop, gaining a double profit by giving part of these advances in goods, not cash. The Chinese achievement has been remarkable. They have been kept on the margin both of the peasant society with which they deal, and of the European society with which at a later stage their growing wealth would allow them to associate. Though lacking any formal political power, which in the Orient as elsewhere is so often the passport to success, they have built up a trading structure of extraordinary toughness, elasticity, and elaboration.

565 The wider political implications of this are not my concern here. But
609 it is important to note three points in connexion with the peasant theme.
186 One is the xenophobic reaction of the local urban dwellers and of peasants too, which has periodically found expression against the Chinese, as traders
578 or residents in South East Asia, in the form of riots and other disturbances.
563 Another is the reaction of the Chinese, whose economic strength has given
241 them confidence, and who are now prepared to stand by their claim to a

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CONCLUSION

162 198 It will have been observed that the Chinese of Southeast Asia are, in essence, the same people over the entire area, in spite of a considerable diversity in occupation and dialect, and variation in purity of blood. There is a concentration of Yunnanese in the Shan States, but this tribe does not occur in any numbers elsewhere, and the other tribes are unequally distributed. For example, the Hokkiens and persons of mixed race of Hokkien origin form the majority community in Malaya and Indonesia, being outnumbered by the Cantonese, however, in the Malay States. In Siam the Teochius and the Hakkas are more numerous than the Hokkiens, and Hailams are also a large community. In the Philippines three-quarters of the Chinese are Hokkiens, and most of the remainder Cantonese. In Indochina the Hokkiens, though numerically seeming to yield first place to the Cantonese, are the principal Chinese merchants: indeed they were the pioneering tribe in the Nanyang and they are still, on the whole, the wealthiest.

So much may be said to illustrate the diversity of the tribal distribution of these Chinese who, but for a few exceptions (such as a tiny freak pocket of Shantung people in North Borneo) originate from the southeast corner of China—a small bit of Marco Polo's 162 'Mangi'. Diversity of occupation again is very pronounced among 463 these emigrants. Hailams, for instance, tend to be pig and poultry rearers, small cultivators, and domestic servants; in Borneo the Hakkas are the most numerous community and here they are largely agriculturists. Cantonese and Hakkas supply most of the Chinese labour for tin-mines and rubber estates. Nor should we 181 accept the naïve statement that 'all Chinese are alike' (which is but an extension of the unobservant conclusion of the European tenderfoot that 'all Chinese *look* alike'). There is a notable psychological difference between, say, the volatile, nimble-witted Cantonese and the more phlegmatic Hokkien or Teochiu; the Hailams have usually quite distinct physical characteristics from other Chinese, being more delicately made and exhibiting marked cranial differences from their brethren from the mainland. As for the Hakkas, they are in some ways a people apart, of northern origin and later immigrants than the other tribes and deriving from islands of population surrounded by Cantonese or Hokkiens in

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their native country; moreover they have a stubbornness of disposition which distinguishes them from their fellow Chinese. (It is worthy of note that the most numerous among the early Communists in the Nanyang were the Hailams and Hakkas.)[1]

Sun Yat-sen said: 'The Chinese people are of the Han or Chinese race with common blood, common language, common religion, and common customs—a single race.' As regards 'blood' in any scientific sense this is manifestly untrue; on the contrary,

> The modern Chinese people is an amalgamation of many elements originally different from one another. . . . In colour; in stature, above all in cephalic indices, about 42 per cent are mesocephalic and about 43 per cent are brachycephalic, and about 15 per cent dolichocephalic. Even these classes are distinctly subdivided into dolicho-leptorrhinic and dolicho-platyrrhinic. There is also a low-headed type, and, in the South, a trace of a dwarf element. . . . Prehistory points to a race already mixed in the basin of the Yellow River. . . .[2]

In spite, however, of a number of modifications and reservations, the remainder of the statement of the Father of the Revolution, especially regarding religion and customs, could be convincingly maintained. Allowing for the numerous variations which have been suggested above, the Chinese of Southeast Asia, drawn mostly from Fukien and Kwangtung, are quite remarkably homogeneous. Not only have they marked physical characteristics in common; their customs, their religion, their attitude of mind have an almost uncanny similarity. What Clement Williams remarked of their shops in Bhamo on the Yunnan-Burma frontier nearly ninety years ago—'the likeness of one Burmese to another is striking, but the absolute sameness of one Chinese shop to another is truly wonderful'—is equally true of the 'sameness' of Chinese temples, houses, ornaments, customs, methods of mining and agriculture, and handicrafts all over the Southeast Asian area, from the city of Cholon to a remote *tienda* in Mindanao, or from the tin-fields of Larut to the pepper plantations of Cambodia. Nor is this merely a superficial impression (such as 'all Chinese look alike'); it derives from their common steeping in Chinese culture, even though the latter's springs of inspiration have ceased to well up from the depths and it has been for long (as Professor Toynbee says) in a state of petrification.

[1] See p. 370 regarding the Japanese identification of Hailams with Communism.

[2] *China Year Book* [illegible]

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Chinese

were almost entirely uninterested in them except as traders, labourers, or agents for dealing with the native peoples. In the last capacity the Chinese were very useful, for they had a knowledge of native ways which the Europeans lacked and in any case had no leisure to gain, being occupied so much of their time in warfare among themselves. The Chinese, in their turn, were interested in these white barbarians only to the extent that it was expedient to know their peculiarities. They showed themselves, however, much more adaptable to learning about the white race than the Europeans did to learning about them, for, generally speaking, the Spanish, the Dutch, the British, and the French were almost completely ignorant of the Chinese language and *mores*, and the Chinese were happy that it should be so. Another reason for the failure of Europeans to acquire any real knowledge of the people among whom they lived was that for the European life in the tropics—at any rate from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth century—was short, and he either returned home with a competence within a few years or else perished. Thus it was found convenient by the Company and early colonial Governments to leave the conduct of their community affairs to the Chinese headmen, except in the more serious cases, and this gave the Chinese much liberty of action. Unfortunately the fears of the tiny minority such as were the Europeans, especially in face of the increasing numbers of the Chinese, put them in a very anxious and suspicious frame of mind. The Chinese ethos, usually so serene, was subject to occasional social squalls or typhoons when the community was seized with mass hysteria. This was really only a means of dispersal of an accumulation of real or imaginary grievances and the trouble subsided, if handled with reason and tolerant firmness, almost as quickly as it had arisen. But in the minds of the Europeans with their tiny garrisons the outbreaks were often interpreted as signs of rebellion. Indeed in some cases they were rightly so interpreted, and there can be no doubt that when fear and distrust had dried up relationship into a tinder a spark would fire it into a rebellion, as was the case in Manila on St Francis's Eve 1603, when things had gone so far that it was either the Chinese or the Spanish who had to be destroyed. It is equally certain that a greater degree of understanding on either side would have averted this and later disasters.

Whilst thus simplifying the situation, it must be conceded that

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Whilst thus simplifying the situation, it must be concede that the Chinese social organization overseas early revealed serious deficiencies. It was not a complete unit of China transplanted, but fragments from various settings placed together in one spot. Different tribes and classes were put into unwonted juxtaposition, and the criminal and unruly element was disproportionately strong (this last fact needs emphasis). Embryo communal or municipal systems were often taken charge of by the deadly Triad society which used them for its own purposes. At the same time, too rigid a distinction has been drawn between the 'benevolent' *kongsis* and the 'malevolent' *huis*, or secret societies: it seems that the two were not separated in this categorical fashion and in fact were sometimes distinct associations with benevolent functions and Triad societies at one and the same time.[1] The shortcomings of the system became very manifest at certain times, as in Java when Chinese secret societies plotted to seize power from the Dutch, and in the Straits Settlements when these societies under the Triad societies got much out of hand and caused riots and practised intimidation for many years, later extending their activities to Perak where they added to the existing disorder until it approached anarchy.

This, however, is a special aspect of Chinese society in the Nanyang and is by no means typical. By and large, the Chinese were very law-abiding and gave the ruling Powers little trouble. Schlegel was right when he said that the Chinese were 'easy to govern'. Indeed this quality has brought them, at times, into the contempt of rough European individualists who have dismissed this tractableness as the characteristic of 'sheep'.

Students of the Chinese language who have ploughed through the *Tsŭ Erh Chih*, Sir Francis Wade's Documentary Series, will remember a number of memorials in which prefects or intendants

[1] The writer, after extensive experience of secret societies and district and clan organization, is sceptical of many of the theories advanced by observers. Schlegel (as we have seen in the chapters on the Kongsis of Borneo) has definitely regarded the Kongsis as a transplanting of municipal organization necessary to the functioning of Chinese society. Yet they were certainly 'secret societies' under Triad or Heaven and Earth League control. Only when countries, such as Malaya, began to legislate to control these societies was a distinction made between 'good' and 'bad' societies: the former were granted registration; the latter, if they functioned without registration, were illegal and, of course, definitely 'secret societies'. The writer is of opinion that a great deal more research into the matter is called for. (W. L. Blythe, 'The Interplay of Chinese Secret and Political Societies in Malaya', in *Eastern World*, March and April 1950, adds considerably to our knowledge.)

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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433 affected by these few importing countries' determination
648 to be self-sufficient in food.

181 A dual economy as a distinctive character of colonial
433 rule is a theory propounded by some Dutch economists who contend that in tropical dependencies there are two distinct systems of economy. In the Western sector economic forces act in strict accordance with the economic laws enunciated by the earlier classical economists; but in the Eastern sector these laws have no force, and Western economic principles are inapplicable. The Western sector is ultra-capitalist since economic forces act freely, not even subject to the social inhibitions which still restrain them in Europe or the Western world; the Eastern sector, on the other hand, is precapitalist, with prestige carrying more weight than profit and communal influence restraining the individual desire of gain.[17] One
433
438 of the consequences of a dual economy is that it is difficult
439 to conduct business because the people will not trade on
648 Western lines. Inefficiency in trade leads to high operational cost and thus to social waste. Moreover, there is a likelihood of exploitation of indigenous people by Western traders as well as by foreigners of Asian origin who are free from social restraint.

563 One feature that has long been common to the countries of Southeast Asia and is so obvious that it could not fail

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17. J. S. Furnivall, "Cooperation, Competition, and Isolation," Southeast Asia in the World Today, ed. Phillips Talbot, op. cit., p. 71.

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Suez Canal in 1869, and the consolidation of Western control, direct or indirect, over most of Southeast Asia in the 1890's, followed by American acquisition of the Philippines at the turn of the century.

More important, the great cities were, and to a large degree still are, foreign creations, essentially alien to the Southeast Asian landscape. Although several began as native settlements, they developed as foreign exclaves on the margins of Asia, in much the same way as did the plantation system and mining operations. With the exception of Bangkok, they represented and functioned as the overseas appendages of Western, not indigenous, interests, being what Spate has called "head-links"—the gates by which Western concepts entered to destroy and build and in which a new system of economic organization evolved.[12] Indeed, the concept of the Asian plural society was inspired by the contrast between the basically foreign great city and the indigenous agricultural village. The ties of the great city with its hinterland were primarily commercial and associated with foreign-controlled mining and plantation interests and with Chinese-dominated rice trade. Such direct political-administrative ties as did exist were restricted primarily to indigenous elites, small in number, which allied themselves with Western interests. Where the indigenous rural populations were affected by these urban-rural relations, it was primarily through the plantation or the mining system, both of which needed a large labor force, or through Indian or Chinese intermediaries.

On the other hand, the relations between an indigenous capital, like Bangkok in its earlier period, or Kyoto or Peking, and the agrarian society upon which it was based were of quite a different order. In these cases the capital represented the culmination of what might be termed a national *ethos*, the epitome of what Redfield has

[12] O. H. K. Spate, "Factors in the Development of Capital Cities," *Geographical Review*, October, 1942, p. 628.

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called the "Great Tradition" in an agrarian society.[13] 361

The links between country and city in this basically feudal relationship were clear, consecutive, and relatively simple to define. To be sure, the villager would regard the capital as a different world from his own, but it was nevertheless a largely comprehensible world, if associated with abstractions and refinements beyond his immediate ken.[14] 369 184 181

The modern great city of Southeast Asia, however, not only was different but was also incomprehensible to the child of the folk society, who came to regard it not merely as strange and foreign but also as hostile. The "foreignness" is reflected in their ethnic composition. Until the second World War at least the largest population group in Rangoon was Indian; Singapore is primarily a Chinese city; Bangkok is very largely Chinese, as is Saigon if Cholon, its twin city, is included; both Manila and Jakarta have large foreign and Chinese elements. To this extent the great city is more metropolitan than national. Each has its Chinese, European, and native quarters, for example, although in many instances the lines of division have become blurred, especially since the close of the war.[15] Furthermore, wherever Chinese populations are large, a predominant type of house is the so-called "shophouse," a two-or-more-story building with shops on the first floor, built to a standard width originally dictated by the length of the average fir-log lintel as used in South China, and with residential flats and 621 361 369 184 578 162 563 342 347 563 369 184

[13] See Robert Redfield and Milton Singer, "A Cultural Role of Cities," a working paper for the Conference on the Role of Cities in Economic Growth and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, May 24–26, 1954. [113]

[14] Cf. J. M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian City: Its Culture and Evolution," *Asia*, March, 1953.

[15] In Singapore the Chinese are localized according to the various so-called "clans," e.g., Hokkien, Cantonese, Tiuchiu, Hailams, and Hakka (see B. W. Hodder, "Racial Groupings in Singapore," *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, October, 1953).

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[438] One reason for this is economic advantage. The coming of rubber, in particular, has given to the Malay peasant of the west coast an income considerably higher, on the whole, than that of the east coast peasant.
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[166] The effects of Westernization are profound. But they do not lie in crude physical displacement of the peasant or degradation of his living conditions. They lie in the widening of the gap between his expanding range of wants and his level of productivity, and in his inability to measure and in any way control the economic forces operating in his field. Westernization has meant for the peasant an enlargement of the social horizon—more knowledge, through better communications and education, of other places, of other peoples of kindred and dissimilar interests. It has created new ambitions: for different clothing, for new uses of leisure, for a better status for his children, for a position of power in the political scene. All this has disturbed the traditional patterns of peasant society. These patterns, and the class structure of South East Asian society of which they were a part, were probably never too satisfactory to the peasant. Anxiety and evasion must have often been the response to either too rigid or too elastic a rule—and the peasant seems often to have suffered from the exactions of his superior in the social scale. But the scope of the system was known, if not its precise implications. Nowadays the scope of the system has for the most part passed beyond the peasant's grasp, and much of it has become de-personalized.

To illustrate this by giving a more concrete analysis of some of the values in the peasant's life, let me take the area of Malaya and Indonesia where Islam is the major religion of the people.

181 In his daily life the Indonesian or Malay peasant is governed largely
177 by the canons of behaviour, the ties of friendship and neighbourliness, the
565 relations of work and social intercourse of his village community. So much
602 is this so that in Java the *desa*, the village, was crystallized by the Dutch
776 into an administrative and developmental unit, and its communal struc-
779 ture strengthened for welfare purposes. But as important as the village,
671 and indeed often basic to its structure, are the family and larger kin or-
182 ganizations. From these a person gets his social status and much of his land and other property, and they have the primary role in his marriage and other crucial events in his progress through life.

Such domestic and local relationships also provide a framework for the peasant in his attempts to come to terms with the forces of nature and human destiny. His world of spirits is a local world. In Indonesia the ancestors do not play the predominant role which they do, for instance, in Annam. But the village, the seashore, the surrounding jungle, wells, trees, and stones are the home of many kinds of spirits, which afflict man with sickness or misfortune, or stand by him as his familiars to guard him. Basic in the religion of the Indonesian peasant is this local, essentially parochial, spirit element. All these values guide his economic and social conduct, and mean a great deal to him.

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But the situation is complex, even in village life. The system of rules governing domestic and local relations—marriage, adoption, inheritance, rights over land, succession to local office, rules of etiquette, and behaviour to superiors—is generally known as the *adat*, the custom. The nature of this custom, and what should be its relation to a more fully developed legal system, have been elaborately studied by the Dutch in Indonesia. At times indeed they have seemed to give the *adat* almost a mystical connotation. Alongside this body of custom, which of course varies from one peasant area to another, is the *shari'a*, the religious rule of Islam. On the one hand this is a unifying force, extra-village and extra-national in character, linking even the remotest mountain farmer spiritually or emotionally with the farmer or townsman of other Muslim communities in South East Asia, and far beyond. On the other hand, the Muslim religious law blends into the field of the *adat*, laying down rules about marriage, inheritance, and other family matters. Then there are the Western rules of law and administrative procedure, laying down just how land is to be acquired, held, and transferred, giving regulations for village management, and imposing penalties for certain kinds of breach of good relations. Yet the Western system offers also inducement to use the law, to protect one's interests firmly, to take advantage of situations where the *adat* has left rights undefined. So three factors—the custom, the Muslim religious rule, and the Western system of law—interact even in the heart of peasant society.

The result is a complex set of forces in dynamic operation, with the peasant being pressed by one or other of them or championing one or other as circumstances arise. In Negri Sembilan, for instance, there has come to be what is almost now a classic case of this interaction. In former times the valuable lands were for the most part those on which 'wet rice' could be cultivated. By the matrilineal system ancestrally operative in that area, these lands were handed down in the female line, from mother to daughter, or from aunt to niece. They were also cultivated largely by women. As rubber came to be developed, however, other lands on the hill-sides, previously of much less value, came to have worth too. For the most part these had to be cleared before being planted in rubber, and this clearing was a task that only men could do properly. Hence men came to have a more direct interest in this land. When questions of inheritance began to arise, divergent views became manifest. Some argued for treating new lands like the old, and handing them down in the female line like the rice lands. Yet there was a strong case for not including these rubber lands in the category of ancestral land, but for letting them be transmitted from a father to his children and through the male line in general. This principle of male inheritance is in line with the emphasis of the Muslim law. This not only gives guidance of the patrilineal kind for distribution of the property of the deceased in cases of dispute, but in all its provisions tends to stress the status of the male against that of the female.

Within the peasant society itself the potential clash of the two systems,

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181 local custom and religious rule, had been present for centuries. But there
177 was little in the economic situation to sharpen it, and the Muslim leaders
565 themselves were often so steeped in the local ways that they allowed as the religious law what was, in fact, the local custom. With the growth of
602 Western processes, the perception of new economic advantages tended to
776 change the equilibrium of the two principles. The advance of education
779 and heightened consciousness of Islam as a world faith also tended to make the religious leaders themselves much more keenly aware of any divergence.
671 Wealthy men who want to leave property to their sons, men with a strong
182 religious sense, men who regard themselves as progressive, or who are in revolt against their clan leaders, therefore tend to be protagonists of the Muslim law. The conservatives, those who see in the custom a defence for women, those who see in it a symbol of an essentially Malay way of life, argue for the retention of the custom. Contact with the West, they say, is changing the structure of the peasant society enough already. The issue has also entered the modern political scene, since the search for factors to increase Malay integration tends to stress the national and extra-national character of Islam at the expense of the more local qualities of the *adat*. Here too it is growing Westernization which has sharpened the issue.

184 In a general discussion such as this, one may be allowed to refer to the
565 peasantry of South East Asia as a body. But they are not uniform in ethnic composition, in national interests, in language, in religion, or in general culture. Moreover, within any local community, there are competing, even conflicting, interests and opinions. The peasant may be unable to face up to the general issues which affect his life so deeply, but in so far as he understands his own interests he is very alive to them and capable of exercising keen judgement in them. It is the small scale of his organization for the most part which renders him so vulnerable.

000 What is likely to be the future of South East Asia from the peasant angle? Prediction is not worth much, since so many elements in the situation are imperfectly known, but there are a few which seem to be significant.

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185 to give a lead to his development and stability in any wider economic
656 organizations that may be set up for his benefit. To improve his economic lot, and in particular to give him a larger fraction of his product through control of marketing, co-operative societies have often been proposed and sometimes tried. Their success has been only limited, partly because the peasant has not been fully persuaded of their attractions as against what the alien middleman can offer, and partly because of the difficulty of securing adequate technical supervision and administration at a sufficiently low official level. Much is now apt to be made of the colonial or semi-colonial status of the South East Asian peasant as a drag upon his development. There is no doubt that colonialism, as a specific form of political control of under-developed territories by a metropolitan Power, is

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PREFACE

121 642 THIS book originated in a request from the Government of Burma at the end of 1942 for my views on reconstruction, with particular reference to features of colonial rule in Netherlands India that might suitably be adopted in Burma. One cannot transplant administrative machinery without reference to the environment; in a new environment it may work better or worse, but it certainly will not work in the same way. It was necessary therefore to emphasize the fact that British and Dutch colonial policy are founded on different traditions. Two basic principles of British colonial policy are the rule of law and economic freedom, whereas Dutch colonial policy has aimed at imposing restraints on economic forces by strengthening personal authority and by conserving the influence of custom.

121 642 182 In modern Burma under British rule there were five notorious evils: the failure of western self-governing institutions; the growth of debt and agrarian distress; the multiplication of litigation and crime; the rise of disaffection and unrest among the Buddhist clergy; and widespread corruption in the judicial and administrative services. I suggested that these can all be traced to a common cause: the disintegration of social life through the inadequacy of law to control the working of anti-social economic forces. Although in other respects Dutch rule is open to criticism which does not apply to Burma, yet in all these matters Netherlands India presents a notable contrast. We would not, even if we could, abandon what is valuable in the traditions of British rule, and in any case we cannot break suddenly with old traditions, or escape the consequences of the past. But the contrast indicates that we ought to incorporate in our policy the principle of controlling economic forces in the interest of social welfare. I tried accordingly to show how, by adapting certain devices of Dutch administrative machinery, this principle might be applied to cure the ills of modern Burma, and to lay the basis of a new and constructive policy.

121 While formulating these proposals it occurred to me that the comparison between Burma and Netherlands India might be of somewhat more general interest. In presenting it to a wider public there was,

691 indicated, education tends to flood the land with lawyers, who foster litigation for their living. The growth of litigation in India has long been deplored. In Burma there was little litigation until rapid economic development began in 1870, and so late as 1886 it could still be said that Burmans were not litigious. That is no longer true. We find the same plague of lawyers in Indo-China and the Philippines, and in Africa litigation has been described as the curse of the country. 674 The law breeds litigation and this, married to poverty by agrarian distress, breeds crime. Here again Burma is exceptional, but it appears that of the four countries in the world with the highest proportionate jail population, three are British dependencies.[1] All this is nothing new. In Burma, as far back as 1883, dacoit bands flourished just outside the capital. So they did in Java in 1830, when the introduction of western law by Raffles created a 'proletariat who go about and steal'. Still earlier in Madras, on the introduction of the rule of law from Bengal at the end of the eighteenth century, 'the same results', says Munro, 'followed here which had occurred elsewhere; justice ceased in great measure to be administered and the increase of crime was appalling'.[2] These words might have been taken from any report on the administration of Burma from the eighties onwards.

696 Under native rule disputes are usually settled by arbitration. Under European rule it is at first only in cases with foreigners that natives come to court. Naturally Europeans best understand their own laws, and the middlemen and moneylenders learn it in the course of business, but the cultivator neither understands the law nor how it works and, as a rule, is least able to afford a skilful advocate. The decision usually goes in favour of the longer purse. Men who lose their case against a wealthier opponent and without understanding that a decision, apparently arbitrary and in their view unjust, may none the less be good law, naturally attribute the result to bribery, and this is the readiest excuse given by their advocate for his failure. Nothing is so favourable to judicial corruption as a belief that it is general. That is a principle which works in Africa as in Asia.[3] It seems, indeed, to be generally true in tropical dependencies that western law encourages litigation, crime and corruption.

182 The substitution of the rule of law for the rule of custom naturally expedites the disintegration of the customary social structure. But it also reacts more directly on the social structure. The former native

[1] Barnes, L., *Skeleton of the Empire* (1937), p. 60.
[2] Gleig, pp. 221–2. [3] *Colonial Review*, 1944, June, p. 170.

authorities, who could maintain order in their own way, are unable to apply western principles of rule and must be replaced by Europeans, or by native officials trained on western lines. We have noticed this in Burma, and also as one outcome of the reforms introduced by Raffles in Java. It had already happened still earlier in India. Formerly, under native rule, there were 'large tracts of country, embracing, according to circumstances, ten, twenty, forty or a hundred villages. At the head of each of these was a Zemindar, Poligar, Tehsildar or Amildar who...was to his district in almost every respect what the potail (headman) was to his village.'[1] He was the natural, organic, representative and leader of his people. By the reforms of Cornwallis all power was withdrawn from these local chieftains and made over to the officials of the central government. Under direct rule the whole organic edifice of native polity collapses, and there remains no unit more comprehensive than the village. The introduction of the rule of law is necessary as an instrument in the liberation of economic forces, but it breaks up the country into villages. On this plan the people are easier to govern, as they have no bond of union, but the same process, as we shall notice later, makes them less capable of self-government. The point immediately relevant, however, is that it constitutes the first, or political, stage in the disintegration of society.

The dissolution of the political structure is only the first stage in social dissolution, and it is completed by the second, or economic, stage, breaking up the village into individuals. In this process two factors are operative: economic forces are released; and the checks controlling their action are relaxed. Where, under native rule, an agricultural economy obtains, and the village has replaced the tribe, the village still retains tribal features and resembles a large family in which, by gradual evolution through long ages, economic relations are adjusted by the growth of custom to the common social welfare. The village conducts its affairs in its own way, and the headman derives his authority from the people. But under the rule of law he becomes a servant of the law, an instrument of government, occupying the same position as before, but hanging from above instead of standing on his own feet. The village survives, but from an organic social unit it is transformed into an administrative unit. In Burma the richest man, as the largest taxpayer, was appointed village headman, but the so-called 'largest taxpayer' soon became 'the village drudge'.

[1] Gleig, p. 217.

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182 Similarly in Africa, leadership passes from the hereditary authorities to men with more money or better education.[1] In such circumstances there remains no embodiment of social will or representative of public welfare to control the economic forces which the impact of the West releases.

So long as communal feeling survives, no one thinks of encroaching on land set apart for village amenities, and villagers cultivating for subsistence have little motive to extend their holdings; if, however, anyone should encroach on public land, he will be turned out by the headman with the support of public opinion. But men who cultivate for the market want more land in order to make more money; the headman and public opinion are no longer able to prevent them; the law, without the support of custom, is ineffective to prevent encroachments, and may even sanction or encourage them because they produce more crops for sale. If anyone encroaches it is easier and more profitable for others to follow his example, and before long the village common land is taken up for private cultivation. The village may produce more than before, but at the expense of social welfare. Not infrequently the total produce of the village is reduced. If a man encroaches on the catchment area left waste for the irrigation of crops depending on it, his gain is at the cost of those who lose their water. Or again, one or two members of a common irrigation system may take to cultivating some new crop that gives them larger profit but disturbs the equitable distribution of the water. In these, and many other ways, the economic motive, the desire of individual gain, reduces the total output of the village, and social will, public opinion embodied in the headman, is no longer able to control it in the public interest. The produce available for export rises, and this is taken as an index of prosperity, but social welfare deteriorates.

Even when there is no decline in material welfare, the village is deprived of these social amenities that money cannot buy. The village community is transformed into a crowd, and social recreations and pastimes disappear with social life. That is the natural sequence of the liberation of economic forces from the control of village custom. In the rice lands of Lower Burma, where the process has been carried to a logical conclusion, the village is no longer a family but a factory. In Indo-China we are told that nothing remains between the Government and twenty-three million individuals. In Africa 'atomization' is a well-known symptom of social disease. So far as economic forces

[1] Read, M., p. 21; Wilson, p. 7.

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are allowed free play, the disintegration of society is an inevitable sequel. They work, subject to economic friction, towards giving the maximum net produce of commodities for the market, but most of the profit goes to those engaged in commerce and, even if a few cultivators make more money, they are poorer for the loss of things that are bought without money and without price.

It is not merely village life but the whole of native social life that is deprived of its amenities. In every society successive generations make their contributions to the art of living, and the most congenial survive to enrich the social heritage that builds up its distinctive civilization. The process of civilization may be regarded from the economic standpoint as the gradual evolution of the social demand for better living, and it is through the leaders of the people that this demand acts most effectively. Foreign rule inevitably undermines native social values, for common standards disappear and a foreign Governor can never wield the power behind a throne. In Burma, the King, merely as a Buddhist sovereign, was the Defender of the Faith and the lynchpin of the Buddhist hierarchy; he was the natural patron of religion, learning and the arts. The most learned monks, the most successful doctors, and the most skilful artists and craftsmen looked to the Crown for recognition. Now the monastic order has collapsed, the native practitioners of medicine have degenerated, and the artistic genius of the craftsmen is confused by the flood of cheap foreign manufactures.[1] In all such matters Europeans have their own standards, and so also have other immigrants such as foreign orientals, Indian or Chinese. Contact with the outer world should furnish new sources of inspiration and enrich native social life, art and religion. But the people are not brought into contact with the outer world except in the sphere of economics; they remain imprisoned in a dying civilization and their social life is impoverished and not enriched.

In another way also foreign rule is detrimental to native social life, for by the normal working of the process of the survival of the cheapest, economic forces act, directly, rapidly and effectively to eliminate all non-economic values. In Burma, for example, during the past half-century, the native cargo boat, modelled on the graceful lines of the medieval galleon, with decorative figure-head and an elaborately carved and ornamental castle in the stern, a joy to build, to sail and to behold, has disappeared. It has been

[1] See also *African Survey*, p. 1290,

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182 replaced by squat hulks that have no advantage except as cheaper means of transport. Merely for carrying paddy the modern barges are the more commodious, but they add nothing to the beauty of the river scene or to the delight of the builders and the boatmen in their work, and on any reckoning that includes such items they are worse than useless. Everywhere throughout the tropics, apart from the buildings that advertise imperial power or mercantile prosperity, the process of natural selection by the survival of the cheapest operates to strip life of its amenities and reduce it to a struggle for bare subsistence.

Not only does this process impoverish the social life of the people, it imposes restrictions on their economic activities. For another aspect of the same process is the specialization of function by the division of labour. This was favoured by Adam Smith and his disciples as a corner-stone of the wealth of nations. Liberal economists in England could rightly insist on this principle because they could take the stability of social life for granted, but in a tropical dependency this basic assumption is invalid. The development of a tropical dependency as a market for imported goods leads to the elimination of local manufactures and a corresponding contraction in the range of economic activities and of social interest in the native community. We shall return to this point later; here it requires notice as illustrating how the horizon of the native world is narrowed not only by the elimination of non-economic values, but by restrictions on the content of their economic life.

Development by Western Enterprise. If we turn now to examine the alternative method of development through western enterprise, we find that along different lines it arrives at similar results. The great distinction between development by native and by western enterprise is that, as already noticed, with the former, economic forces dissolve native society by direct action from within, whereas with the latter, though gradually permeating native society, they attack it in the first instance from without.

182 466 The primary requirement of western enterprise in the tropics is cheap labour. This can be obtained most easily through native chieftains and accordingly, except where large tracts are set aside for European settlement, indirect rule tends to prevail. Netherlands India provides the classic illustration of tropical development by western enterprise. In Java at the beginning of the nineteenth century the people were unaccustomed to work for wages and, even if they

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could have been induced to do so, the Netherlands produced nothing that they would buy. 'All wise men' were agreed that the native would not respond to the desire of gain, and that he would work only under compulsion.[1] People were none the less sincere in this belief, because it suited them to believe it. Under the Culture system the Dutch used the authority of the native chieftains to obtain labour both for public works and for export crops for the Government. Subsequently under Liberal rule compulsory labour was still used for public works (despite the protests of Liberals who wanted more labour for private enterprise), and the planters employed the native chieftains as agents for recruiting labour. But paid labour was found more efficient than compulsory labour whether on public works or private enterprise, and the people became accustomed to working for wages. In Africa development by private capitalist enterprise has followed similar lines. 'The introduction of capitalist undertakings in Africa found a population that had little incentive to improve its subsistence by wage-earning, and, since it was inexperienced in the use of money it was slow to react to the stimulus of cash inducements.'[2] Moreover, there was 'a popular belief that the "collectivist" organization of African society implied the absence of those individual ambitions in the material sphere which are the mainspring of European development'. Custom supported the use of unpaid labour for the common purposes of the tribe, and this furnished a precedent for using compulsory labour on public works 'such as the construction of railways or major roads for long distance transport which were outside the range of even an extended definition of communal labour, more especially since they at times involved the absence of labour from their homes for considerable periods'. Here there is a significant contrast with Burma, where the object of policy was trade, and therefore of development by native enterprise; compulsory labour interfered with native enterprise and was soon abolished. But in Africa, although 'the wide use of impressed labour for railway construction...led to many incidents which reflected grave discredit on the administration',[3] it did not wholly cease until railway construction came to an end with the depression of the thirties. Again, in Africa as in Java, the people were accustomed under native rule to render tribute in kind or service to the local chieftains. This interferes with the supply of labour to private enterprise, and in Java measures to restrict it were among the

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 59.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 604, 694.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 613, 615.

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earliest fruits of Liberal reforms. In Tanganyika such tribute was commuted for a tax in money in 1926.[1]

Employers, while sympathizing with humanitarian protests against compulsion to obtain labour for Government or native chieftains, are not averse from measures which provide labour for private enterprise. In Africa, as in Java, 'if there is now little use of direct pressure by government in order to secure labour for private employment, this was a marked feature of policy in the past....A complete history of this aspect of labour development would comprise the use of means so various as slavery, direct statutory compulsion, the curtailment of native lands, assistance given by administrative officials to the efforts of private recruiters, and the use of chiefs to recruit their people as labourers.' Now in Africa, as long ago in Java, it is 'generally recognized that, apart from any grounds of equity or humanity, labour done under compulsion is uneconomic';[2] yet the use of compulsory labour appears to save trouble and money, and employers are reluctant to abandon it. With compulsory labour wages tend towards the minimum of bare subsistence for a man without a family. The conditions are worst where no single employer stands to gain by healthy labour, and the death roll in the coolie barracks of Rangoon is typical of the impoverishment which naturally results from the exposure of unskilled labour to the unmitigated action of economic forces.

Even where action is taken to protect the individual labourer, the mass recruitment of unskilled labour, especially if recruited through local chieftains, naturally disintegrates native social life. 'The most characteristic results which have followed from the introduction of capitalist enterprise (are) the depopulation of certain areas or the deterioration of local subsistence conditions owing to the migration of labour, the social evils due to the removal from their families of large numbers of adult males, and the difficult situations created by the aggregation of industrial population divorced from the traditional controls of tribal life.'[3] At the same time the use of native chieftains to provide land for concessions and labour to work the concessions conflicts with native custom, and weakens the authority of the chieftains as it makes them look for support to Government instead of standing on their own feet. Then, in a later stage, when an ample supply of labour is assured and the awakening of the desire of gain

[1] *African Survey*, p. 437.
[2] *Ib.* pp. 628, 635, 636.
[3] *Ib.* p. 699.

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allows the replacement of compulsion by wages, the effect on native society and welfare is much the same as when development proceeds by private enterprise.

General Course of Development. Thus, whether the method of development be through native enterprise working for the market, or through western enterprise employing native labour, 'the disintegration of social life is an almost inevitable result of the contact of primitive peoples with European civilization'. In either case the liberation of economic forces from the moral restraint imposed by social obligations is detrimental to social and individual welfare. During the first stage there may be, and usually is, a rise in the standard of individual welfare through the removal of the abuses normally inherent in native social life. For a still longer period there is an increase in production, by the exploitation of social welfare for material ends. But, as such forces gain in strength, they tend to restrict and even to reduce production, and thus defeat the hopes of gain which set them working. Forests are laid waste and valuable lodes of ore are buried beneath surface workings. Cultivation, as in the delta of Lower Burma, aims at the maximum net outturn by the smallest number necessary to produce it, instead of at the maximum gross outturn by the largest number that the land will maintain at the customary level of social life. Human resources are wasted by under-employment or by unemployment and, as in the Congo under Leopold, so many people may be killed off that capitalist enterprise is no longer profitable or even possible.[1] Both the two great East India companies went bankrupt, and the modern chartered companies had to surrender their concessions because they could no longer pay their way. Profit, progress and welfare, are all linked together on a single chain, and economic forces, unless controlled by social will, corrode the chain that links them. Man is a social animal, but economic forces tend to convert human society into a business concern. In tropical dependencies the outward and visible sign of this is the evolution of a plural society.

4. The Plural Society[2]

All tropical dependencies, and indeed all tropical countries, so far as they have been brought within the modern world, have in common certain distinctive characters in their social structure. In Dutch

[1] Frankel, pp. 36, 37.
[2] Furnivall, *Economic Journal*, 1910, pp. 23 ff; *JRCAS*, 1942, p. 195.

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[438] One reason for this is economic advantage. The coming of rubber, in particular, has given to the Malay peasant of the west coast an income considerably higher, on the whole, than that of the east coast peasant.

177 565 [166] The effects of Westernization are profound. But they do not lie in crude physical displacement of the peasant or degradation of his living conditions. They lie in the widening of the gap between his expanding range of wants and his level of productivity, and in his inability to measure and in any way control the economic forces operating in his field. Westernization has meant for the peasant an enlargement of the social horizon—more knowledge, through better communications and education, of other places, of other peoples of kindred and dissimilar interests. It has created new ambitions: for different clothing, for new uses of leisure, for a better status for his children, for a position of power in the political scene. All this has disturbed the traditional patterns of peasant society. These patterns, and the class structure of South East Asian society of which they were a part, were probably never too satisfactory to the peasant. Anxiety and evasion must have often been the response to either too rigid or too elastic a rule—and the peasant seems often to have suffered from the exactions of his superior in the social scale. But the scope of the system was known, if not its precise implications. Nowadays the scope of the system has for the most part passed beyond the peasant's grasp, and much of it has become de-personalized.

To illustrate this by giving a more concrete analysis of some of the values in the peasant's life, let me take the area of Malaya and Indonesia where Islam is the major religion of the people.

181 177 565 602 776 779 671 ●182 In his daily life the Indonesian or Malay peasant is governed largely by the canons of behaviour, the ties of friendship and neighbourliness, the relations of work and social intercourse of his village community. So much is this so that in Java the *desa*, the village, was crystallized by the Dutch into an administrative and developmental unit, and its communal structure strengthened for welfare purposes. But as important as the village, and indeed often basic to its structure, are the family and larger kin organizations. From these a person gets his social status and much of his land and other property, and they have the primary role in his marriage and other crucial events in his progress through life.

Such domestic and local relationships also provide a framework for the peasant in his attempts to come to terms with the forces of nature and human destiny. His world of spirits is a local world. In Indonesia the ancestors do not play the predominant role which they do, for instance, in Annam. But the village, the seashore, the surrounding jungle, wells, trees, and stones are the home of many kinds of spirits, which afflict man with sickness or misfortune, or stand by him as his familiars to guard him. Basic in the religion of the Indonesian peasant is this local, essentially parochial, spirit element. All these values guide his economic and social conduct, and mean a great deal to him.

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But the situation is complex, even in village life. The system of rules governing domestic and local relations—marriage, adoption, inheritance, rights over land, succession to local office, rules of etiquette, and behaviour to superiors—is generally known as the *adat*, the custom. The nature of this custom, and what should be its relation to a more fully developed legal system, have been elaborately studied by the Dutch in Indonesia. At times indeed they have seemed to give the *adat* almost a mystical connotation. Alongside this body of custom, which of course varies from one peasant area to another, is the *shari'a*, the religious rule of Islam. On the one hand this is a unifying force, extra-village and extra-national in character, linking even the remotest mountain farmer spiritually or emotionally with the farmer or townsman of other Muslim communities in South East Asia, and far beyond. On the other hand, the Muslim religious law blends into the field of the *adat*, laying down rules about marriage, inheritance, and other family matters. Then there are the Western rules of law and administrative procedure, laying down just how land is to be acquired, held, and transferred, giving regulations for village management, and imposing penalties for certain kinds of breach of good relations. Yet the Western system offers also inducement to use the law, to protect one's interests firmly, to take advantage of situations where the *adat* has left rights undefined. So three factors—the custom, the Muslim religious rule, and the Western system of law—interact even in the heart of peasant society.

The result is a complex set of forces in dynamic operation, with the peasant being pressed by one or other of them or championing one or other as circumstances arise. In Negri Sembilan, for instance, there has come to be what is almost now a classic case of this interaction. In former times the valuable lands were for the most part those on which 'wet rice' could be cultivated. By the matrilineal system ancestrally operative in that area, these lands were handed down in the female line, from mother to daughter, or from aunt to niece. They were also cultivated largely by women. As rubber came to be developed, however, other lands on the hill-sides, previously of much less value, came to have worth too. For the most part these had to be cleared before being planted in rubber, and this clearing was a task that only men could do properly. Hence men came to have a more direct interest in this land. When questions of inheritance began to arise, divergent views became manifest. Some argued for treating new lands like the old, and handing them down in the female line like the rice lands. Yet there was a strong case for not including these rubber lands in the category of ancestral land, but for letting them be transmitted from a father to his children and through the male line in general. This principle of male inheritance is in line with the emphasis of the Muslim law. This not only gives guidance of the patrilineal kind for distribution of the property of the deceased in cases of dispute, but in all its provisions tends to stress the status of the male against that of the female.

Within the peasant society itself the potential clash of the two systems,

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181 local custom and religious rule, had been present for centuries. But there
177 was little in the economic situation to sharpen it, and the Muslim leaders
565 themselves were often so steeped in the local ways that they allowed as the
602 religious law what was, in fact, the local custom. With the growth of
776 Western processes, the perception of new economic advantages tended to
779 change the equilibrium of the two principles. The advance of education
671 and heightened consciousness of Islam as a world faith also tended to make
182 the religious leaders themselves much more keenly aware of any divergence. Wealthy men who want to leave property to their sons, men with a strong religious sense, men who regard themselves as progressive, or who are in revolt against their clan leaders, therefore tend to be protagonists of the Muslim law. The conservatives, those who see in the custom a defence for women, those who see in it a symbol of an essentially Malay way of life, argue for the retention of the custom. Contact with the West, they say, is changing the structure of the peasant society enough already. The issue has also entered the modern political scene, since the search for factors to increase Malay integration tends to stress the national and extra-national character of Islam at the expense of the more local qualities of the *adat*. Here too it is growing Westernization which has sharpened the issue.

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Chinese

that the Chinese Communists consider the present revolution as an indigenous movement—*not* Russian-inspired—and at the same time they have no difficulty in regarding themselves as orthodox Marxists.

In the area covered by this study the main trend of European colonial policy has been in the direction of encouraging the forces of native conservatism to resist innovation. European colonial administrators frequently evince an affection for feudal institutions, a reverence for Mohammedanism, a respect for *adat* law and for princely succession and privilege in excess of that of the native aristocracies themselves. It happens sometimes that existing institutions which had been crystallized by European intervention are sustained only by foreign authority, and in extreme cases, if the sustentation ceased, would dissolve into nothingness as in Poe's *Case of Dr. Valdemar* when death had occurred but dissolution was temporarily suspended by a hypnotic trance.[1]

So much discussion of the general considerations governing the area of our inquiry has been necessary to give a background for our survey of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. But before proceeding to give an outline of our subject, there is one further observation we should make. This is that the survival of particular forms of organization is one thing; the survival of the race or community is another. It is likely that whatever happens the Chinese, both at home and overseas, will retain considerable social and cultural coherence, besides a strong sense of being 'Chinese'. It is his patience in adversity, his adaptability, his determination, his good humour, and his resilience that makes the individual Chinese, male or female, such an admirable biological specimen, and it is his social qualities (given proper treatment) that make him such a valuable unit in this Southeast Asian society. At the present time the Chinese of the Nanyang are in a dilemma, but this work should show that it is their superiority in resource, ability, and industry to the people among whom they live rather than their vicious propensities that makes them constitute a 'problem'.

The cartoon for our picture stands before us in bold charcoal

[1] Poe's description was more vivid but perhaps a little too strong for the present context. British policy in British India favoured 'modernization (e.g. Dalhousie's policy) while in the Indian States it generally favoured 'traditionalism'.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL

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ing, cultivation. In contrast to this method, advanced agriculture is practiced year after year on the same well tended plot, the fertility of which is maintained by manuring, crop rotation, intensive cultivation, terracing, and often the regular addition of mineral matter in the form of silt deposited on the land by irrigation water. Only occasionally may the land be allowed a short fallow period. This type of tillage may be called permament-field, or sedentary, cultivation.[10]

Shifting cultivation and sedentary cultivation are generic terms used to describe fundamental differences in land use, differences that find their outward expression in the cultural landscape created by those who maintain these economies.[11] Can there be a greater contrast than that between the shifting cultivators' small, irregular, temporary clearings with their chaotic jumble of fallen and half-fallen tree trunks and stumps, on the one hand, and, on the other, an irrigated plain, subdivided into small fields, each surrounded by a dyke—or a steep slope where a succession of beautifully built terraces leads up for several hundreds or even thousands of feet? These kinds of landscape are physical expressions of totally different economies, or modes of life, with different cultural patterns, concepts of land tenure, attitudes toward the soil, and material equipment.

Historically, shifting cultivation without doubt antedates sedentary cultivation, which requires among other things more elaborate techniques and deeper insight into the relationships between soil, tillage, and yields.

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Shifting and sedentary cultivation may each be further classified in terms of tools, as we have seen, or in terms of crops, systems of rotation, and the like.[12] For instance, in terms of crops, we may distinguish between grain and grainless culture. Of the two, grainless culture is generally conceded to be the older. One argument for this thesis is that fruits and many of the root and leaf crops may be eaten raw or simply prepared, whereas cereals require more elaborate preparation. The fact that grainless agriculture is largely confined to the fringes of Southeastern Asia also supports the thesis that, at least in this region, grainless agriculture preceded the cultivation of cereals. Still further substantiation is found in Polynesia, where the inhabitants cultivated no cereals when they were first visited

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[10] Although sedentary cultivation is commonly practiced by people who use plows drawn by animals, there are large areas where it is practiced with little or no use of the plow. Such areas are found in parts of the Philippines, Java, Sumatra, and southern China, where steep hillsides have been terraced and where the nature of the terrain makes the use of work animals impossible. Sometimes individual farms or patches of land are so small that they must be tilled with hoes, even though plows may be used on adjacent farms. In places custom and religious tradition forbid the use of plows and draft animals.

[11] Waibel: Probleme der Landwirtschaftsgeographie, 1933, p. 11.

[12] For example, we may distinguish: (a) shifting dibble cultivation, shifting hoe cultivation, and shifting plow cultivation; (b) grainless shifting cultivation and shifting grain cultivation; (c) shifting field-forest cultivation and shifting field-grass cultivation; (d) permanent plow cultivation and permanent planting-stick cultivation; (e) permanent four-field cultivation, and so on. Not all of these are found in Southeastern Asia.

1: Peizer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL-1

lanzones, papayas, and chicos, which find a good market in Manila, but on the whole we rarely meet in the Philippines such intensive garden culture as in Java. The diet of the average Filipino is not well balanced and is particularly deficient in fruits and vegetables. In recognition of this fact the Bureau of Education and the Bureau of Plant Industry have both done much to impress the peasants with the need for fruit and vegetable gardens. Although the situation has improved during the past forty years and a large variety of fruits is now produced, the country still depends upon imports, whereas with a little effort most of the imported fruits could be produced locally and would furnish an additional source of income. It would be well to encourage the peasants to grow more fruits and to advise them on the most suitable varieties. In the other countries of Southeastern Asia, also, with the possible exception of Java, such advice would be valuable. 245 [654]

The published material available on the importance of gardens in Indochina is similarly limited in quantity. Even Gourou in his study of land utilization restricts himself chiefly to listing the fruits and vegetables found in the gardens and to stating that certain districts are renowned for the quality of their garden fruits. Gourou's list of fruits and vegetables is as varied and extensive, however, as similar lists for any of the other countries of Southeastern Asia. 114

Wet Fields

Throughout the countries bordering the South China Sea most of the cultivated land is used for the growing of lowland, or wet, rice. For this purpose the fields must be leveled and surrounded by earth dams to impound rain water during the rainy season or to confine the water that is carried to the fields through irrigation canals or lifted to the fields by mechanical means. If a field is properly leveled the surrounding dyke will keep the water everywhere at the same depth. The size of the wet-rice, or paddy, fields, and the amount of labor that is required to make them, depend upon the topography of the region. In the lowlands, where no terracing is required, there is relatively little labor involved in the making of paddies, which are frequently large. A hilly, or mountainous, terrain necessitates terracing, which demands greater effort and reduces the size of individual fields; the steeper the slope, the narrower the paddies. We have only to see the rice terraces of the mountains of northern Luzon, southern Bali, the Preanger districts of West Java, or Sumatra's West Coast in order to realize how much effort has been expended in building these terraces and how much energy must be devoted to their upkeep. The terraces, as well as the wet-rice fields of the plains, represent the accumulated efforts of generations of peasants, each of which has helped to extend the area devoted to the cultivation of wet rice (Figs. 50–58).[1] 101 243 312

Not all people show the same skill in the making of paddies. According to Credner, the Thai are quite helpless on sloping land that requires terracing before wet rice may be planted. They would prefer to migrate to a 243 184

[1] [See pp. 115 ff. category 116. -- Analyst]

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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region where level land is available rather than undertake the terracing of a hillside; on the other hand, they have been successful in building innumerable canals to tap rivers and spread the water over the plains.[9] However, they do not seem to be able to fight great floods. In contrast, the Annamese of Tongking have built huge dykes against destructive floods and the attack of the sea.

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The problems presented by the cultivation of wet, or lowland, rice change from country to country, from region to region, and sometimes even from village to village. Lowland rice demands a soil thoroughly soaked with water and worked into "a fine soft mud by hoeing, plowing, trampling, or harrowing, and . . . free from weeds." [10] The field must remain under water until the ears of rice begin to fill and harvest time approaches. The amount of water required to grow lowland rice depends upon the variety of rice, the length of its growing period, and the nature of the soil. There are innumerable varieties of lowland rice. One way of grouping them is according to the number of days they take to mature, which ranges from 60 to 300 days. In the Philippines varieties that require less than 150 days are considered early maturing, those that need from 150 to 190 days medium-late maturing, and those needing more than 190 days late maturing.[11] The longer the growing period, the greater the water requirements and, generally, the higher the yields. Normally the water covering the field has a depth of from 10 to 15 centimeters. But "floating rice" can keep pace with a slowly rising flood and reach the amazing height of 4 meters or more. The stems settle on the mud when the water recedes, and new roots start at the upper nodes, while the lower parts of the stems rot away. Floating rice is especially well known in Cochinchina, and I have seen it in the Philippines. In 1939 the Department of Economic Affairs in Batavia sent a rice expert to Cochinchina to study floating rice and the possibility of introducing it into southern Borneo.

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Lowland rice can be grown on many types of soil as long as a heavy clay subsoil is present to prevent the loss of water through percolation. Copeland states that lowland rice does best in heavy soils that hold water securely, and he adds that it is desirable "that there be, at a depth below the reach of the roots, but not too much further down, an impervious substratum-subsoil or hard-pan." [12] We distinguish between two main types of wet-rice fields: those that depend exclusively upon the rain that is impounded by their dykes, and those that are supplied by an irrigation system and are therefore no longer subject to the irregularities of rainfall.[13]

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[9] Credner: Siam, 1935, pp. 203 and 217.

[10] Wickizer: "Rice and Wheat," 1941, p. 272.

[11] University of the Philippines: Handbook of Philippine Agriculture, 1939, pp. 7–11.

[12] Copeland: Rice, 1924, p. 45.

[13] An important variation of the second type is the cultivation of wet riceland that has been flooded by rivers rising above their natural levels. This mode of cultivation, which is found especially in the residency of Palembang in Sumatra, in southeastern Borneo, in Thailand, and in Indochina, is not so dependable as irrigation because of the irregularities of the river floods.

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INTRODUCTION

SOUTHEAST ASIA has known its 'empires' of Sri Vijaya and Majapahit, of wide but indefinite sway, and its great kingdoms of the Khmers and of the Thais; but long before the arrival of the Europeans the peninsula of Indo-China and the Malay archipelago had broken up again into isolated fragments. The Spanish, the Dutch, the British, and the French brought large areas under their control and gave them a political and administrative unity they had never known before. Now, under the pressure of new-born nationalisms, the grip of the Western powers is relaxing, and it seems certain that fragmentation will take place all over again. Yet what is happening is no mere repetition of an ancient sequence; nor is it a reversion to a previously existing state.

Evolution, said Herbert Spencer in his celebrated definition, is a change from a relatively indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a relatively definite coherent heterogeneity.[1] He was thinking primarily of biological organisms but he extended the idea by analogy to human society (an operation with many pitfalls). Yet in some striking way his definition does seem to illuminate what is in process in this Southeast Asia area. Side by side with integration goes differentiation; the scission of wholes into parts, and parts into smaller parts. The old states of East, Central, and West Java and of Sumatra—Jambi, Melayu, Minangkabau—and the Malay kingdom of Malacca were separate, isolated entities with only fitful contacts and associations, yet similarities of race, custom, and language gave

[1] *First Principles*, 6th ed. (London, Williams & Norgate, 1900) pp. 351, 367. Spencer adds, 'accompanied by integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion', but Dr Joseph Needham in quoting this definition ('Integrative Levels; a Revaluation of the Idea of Progress', pp. 233 ff. of *Time: the Refreshing River*) (London, Allen & Unwin, 1937) says that it is important to note that much of Spencer's argumentation depended on assumptions about energy which antedated the modern statistical interpretation of the second law of thermodynamics. Commenting on the definition as a whole, Dr Needham says: 'We may smile at what we may suppose to be the presumption of such a cosmic formula, but we may find ourselves smiling on the wrong side of our faces if, as is not unlikely, Herbert Spencer has hold of the right end of the stick.'

It is perhaps a tactical error to appeal to Herbert Spencer in a period when his ideas are widely regarded as obsolete; but any theory which appears to make some sense of a situation where others fail to do so cannot be disregarded for any such consideration. Spencer derived his definition from the German biologist, von Baer.

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184 178 them a certain homogeneity:[1] under the Dutch and the British, the Javanese, the Sundanese, the Amboynese, the Achinese, the Peninsular Malays, and some others have become aware of their identities and, while they share the common aim of independence, they have asserted their claims to separate nationhood.

Evidences of scission are patent over all the area, from the Karen and Arakan secession movements to the division between Annam and Cambodia: the higher integrative level to which the area is tending is not so immediately to be seen. Nevertheless, it exists, and is, in the view of the writer, essentially that of Western political, social, economic, and technological ideas. The whole of the Far East, indeed, is asserting its independence of the West in terms of the principles that the West has taught it—self-determination, human rights, democracy, female emancipation, constitutionalism, economic planning, and industrialization, and this is true even when the insurgents appeal to the inverted-Hegelian, Karl Marx, or to the Communism of Mao Tse-tung. It is so in spite of the efforts of these Far Eastern peoples to give such aspirations a local and national appearance. Just as in Rome the new *jus gentium* was eventually hailed as the natural law and Rousseau in France harked back to Man the Noble Savage, so have the Chinese played the same game from the time when Confucius and Mo Tzū under traditional appearances introduced ideas that were essentially new. In 1865 Prince Kung relied on historical argument to advocate the introduction of mathematics into the purely literary civil service examinations (mathematics, he said, were a Chinese invention), and in Java the Nationalists interpret each phase of their revolutionary campaign as the realization of the native pro-

[1] Sir Richard Winstedt, in a letter to the writer, classifies the similarities between the peoples of Malaysia as follows:

(*a*) Homogeneity of race modified by different admixture of negrito, Indonesian, and Mongol blood according to the time and place of migration and by geographical isolation in forests.

(*b*) One language family—modified by the same conditions and by acceptance of Hinduism and Islam on coasts.

(*c*) *One identical body of primitive beliefs* brought down from Central Asia where Babylonian influence had introduced cultural features like haruspicy (taking of omens from livers of animals), god-king, respect for the number 7, the incantation, the pyramid, &c.

(*d*) One material culture. (This also was affected by the influences of the Yuēs (bringers of bronze), of Chinese of the Chou period (especially in Borneo, *vide* Dyak testiles), Indians, Arabs, Portuguese, Dutch, and British.)

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phecy of Chayabaya.[1] But the fact remains that, in spite of the traditionalist imprint on the revolution, what these peoples are aiming at, consciously or unconsciously, is not the recovery of a fabulous age but the achievement for their country and people of a new integration. The recently independent countries of India, Pakistan, Burma, and the Philippines aim at large-scale development of their resources in terms of Western techniques; they insist on industrialization (especially the establishment of heavy industries as a foundation of political power), and they talk of reconstruction and development and of raising the standard of living for the millions of their population. At every international conference, from Lake Success to Havana and Baguio to Lapstone, this is the burden of the refrain, be the discussion on trade, health, currency, or civil aviation. Nor is it purely on the material level that this revolution is planned; it demands at the same time reforms of political and social organization that will bring the Far Eastern nations into an equality with the West. The long-term question is whether it is possible to graft Western technology and institutions on to Far Eastern society without altering its essential nature.

China Proper and her neighbours—Tibet, Annam, Korea—all belong to the Far Eastern Civilization (Main Body) of which Dr Arnold Toynbee says, 'the moment of the breakdown may be equated with the break-up of the T'ang Empire in the last quarter of the ninth century of the Christian Era'.[2] As the 'universal state' of the civilization he gives the Mongol and Manchu empires, and he speaks of the history of the existence of the civilization after its breakdown as 'the survival of Far Eastern Society in its petrified state'. But at the same time he points out that, in general, the breakdown of the civilization is not necessarily followed by a disintegration that runs into dissolution. This would suggest that China is in a condition when her institutions have not the vitality or resilience to meet the challenge of external forces.

Commenting on this passage in the original draft, Mr Tom

[1] Chayabaya is a legend-prophecy amalgamating legends of Siva, Adam, and Allah (*not* Mohammed) in Java into a single national legend of a Javanese millennium and a prophecy of a return to it. It assumed protean forms each of which is invoked as political expediency demands. So far as I am aware, the only exposition of Chayabaya is that of Dr C. C. Berg, of Leyden University, which in 1950 had not yet been published.

[2] A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1934–46) iv. 86–7. vi. 306. D. C. Somervell's abridgement of the work, 1947, p. 361.

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184 178 Harrisson (whose approach is primarily that of the anthropologist) remarks that it 'always seems dangerous to equate the culture of the ruling dynasty with the whole of a huge country', and adds that some areas of China have, perhaps, never had a culture at all in the sense intended by Professor Toynbee and they cannot be said to have decayed in the least, but rather to have advanced in historical times. The answer to that is that what is referred to here is a single, integrated culture codified in the ancient canonical writings, permeating the whole of the Chinese people who emigrate overseas (the aboriginal tribes of China do not come within our purview), and expressed down to this very day in the family institutions and moral system of the Chinese both in China and overseas. 'China' in the present text is, however, nearly always the Mangi of Marco Polo, namely South China, and only part of it at that, namely the province of Fukien and Kwangtung and parts of Kwangsi and Kiangsi, and not the Cathay, or North China, of the Venetian traveller. The culture, none the less, is that of China as a whole, and the languages (especially Cantonese) are nearer than those of the north to the ancient language of China.

The reader may feel a protest against the affirmation of the continued advance of the West rising in his mind when he recollects the recent strong, often violent, reaction against the West that is so apparent in Asia—the retreat from the English language as a medium of instruction in post-liberation India, or the cry of 'the West must go' in Burma. The answer is that these incidents are partly the normal 'die-hard' gestures of resistance to change, and partly the expressions of resentment of economic control or political pressure by Europeans as persons, politicians, administrators, or companies. For the revolution set in train by Western ideas is now directed, as we have said at the outset, against Western individuals and nations. The West itself is in a state of flux, shaping its industrial civilization to the standards set largely by America, but challenged by Russia, and the Far East flows willy-nilly with the contemporary current. It is indeed a case, in a special sense, of 'Westward the course of empire takes its way'.[1]

This triumph of the West, however, is affirmed here in no spirit of exultation but with deep anxiety. As there rise up before us the

[1] 'Of all the civilizations, dead or living, of which we know our own is the only one which is possibly still not in decline.' A. J. Toynbee, *The Prospects of Western Civilization* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1949) p. 5.

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symbols of our age—the Petrol Pump, the Pylon, the 'Dust Bowl', 184
the Automat, 'Mass Media', the chilling Neon Sign—there is a 178
shrinking of the soul and a poignant yearning for the glory that was Angkor and the grandeur that was Chang An. Yet it is in its effective organs—the Assembly Line, the Tennessee Valley Authority, 'E.R.P.', and the Research Stations—that our robotic civilization throbs; not in the cult of lost causes or impossible loyalties, nor in our academies, our museums, nor our half-empty cathedrals.

At least it is the material aspects of our civilization which appeal to the awakening consciousness of the peoples of the Far East. Whether they will adopt capitalist, socialist, or communist social organization as a means of securing the coveted gadgets of the West that mean a higher standard of living is another matter. Dr Joseph Needham, for example, says that there is no reason to think that the Chinese will not make as convinced socialists as anybody else, but that there are certain directions in which Chinese thinking might have a profound effect upon the nature of the society of the future, perhaps in the matter of juristic security of the individual, and in the forms which the numinous will take in that society. However, there is far less reason to believe that they will adopt democracy, and Communism, being dictatorial, they will probably find more natural and acceptable than democratic socialism.[1]

This survey is of the Chinese in the regions of Tropical Asia, 121
and often in the course of our narrative the question already posed 177
as to the power of this and other peoples to absorb Western ideas without changing their own essential nature will arise either tacitly or explicitly. In other words, can the basic institutions of these peoples meet the impact of Western industrial civilization or of Marxism without disintegrating?

Chinese civilization is based on ancestor worship, the family 000
system, on Confucianism (which incorporates these principles), and on Buddhism and Taoism. The staunchest supporters of these religions could scarcely deny that Buddhism and Taoism as moral forces are in complete decay in China and have been so for a very long time.[2] Whatever their surviving effectiveness they cannot by

[1] J. Needham, 'Confucianism after 2000 Years', in the *Manchester Guardian*, 29 August 1949.

[2] To realize the formalism and religiosity into which Buddhism had declined by last century, one has only to observe the *chü-jen* (M.A.) of the late Ch'ing dynasty who, to prepare his character for office, suddenly takes an interest in practical benevolence. He ostentatiously burns incense and gives alms. If he sees

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[p.39]

CHAPTER IV

SPECIAL ASPECTS OF CHINESE SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MOST readers of this survey will be acquainted, at least in a general way, with the problems of China itself and with the direction in which the people of that country have moved in the last fifty years. What will be attempted in this chapter will be to illustrate the way in which the Chinese of Southeast Asia have in some respects deviated from the central pattern under the influence of local conditions. We shall select for this purpose the special aspects of the family, marriage, religion, and education, with some remarks on the opium question. As regards politics, Chapter XXXI, dealing with Chinese political organization in Malaya, brings out the developments which are typical of the area as a whole, and to this the reader is referred should he wish to gain a general impression of the matter before proceeding to the separate country studies.

The Family. An excellent starting-point for our chapter is the work of Dr Ta Chen, who, in 1934 and 1935 was in charge of a group of investigators studying the emigrant communities in eastern Kwangtung and southern Fukien under the auspices of the International Research Committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations.[1] The area selected for study was a region from which many of the emigrants to the Nanyang originated and where their families mostly live. It is on the sea coast of the two southernmost maritime provinces and consists of ten *hsien* (counties). Roughly speaking, it includes a long strip of territory beginning at Chao An (formerly Chao Chou), passing through Swatow on the Kwangtung border, and through Amoy, and ending at Chuan Chou (Ch'üan-chow) in Fukien. It is an area of a little less than 5,000 square miles with a total population of a little over 4·6 million in 1935.[2]

[1] Ta Chen (the name is properly Chen Ta, Chen being the surname, and it is thus given in some library catalogues), *Emigrant Communities in South China: a Study of Overseas Migration and its Influence on Standards of Living and Social Change*, English ed. by Bruno Lasker (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940).

[2] Though all the *hsien* have sent emigrants to the Nanyang the area does not constitute the sole source of emigration to the south, even from these two provinces. For example, Mei Hsien and vicinity, the principal home of the Hakkas and the largest source of Hakka emigration, is not included in this area.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

their native country; moreover they have a stubbornness of disposition which distinguishes them from their fellow Chinese. (It is worthy of note that the most numerous among the early Communists in the Nanyang were the Hailams and Hakkas.)[1]

Sun Yat-sen said: 'The Chinese people are of the Han or Chinese race with common blood, common language, common religion, and common customs—a single race.' As regards 'blood' in any scientific sense this is manifestly untrue; on the contrary,

> The modern Chinese people is an amalgamation of many elements originally different from one another. . . . In colour; in stature, above all in cephalic indices, about 42 per cent are mesocephalic and about 43 per cent are brachycephalic, and about 15 per cent dolichocephalic. Even these classes are distinctly subdivided into dolicho-leptorrhinic and dolicho-platyrrhinic. There is also a low-headed type, and, in the South, a trace of a dwarf element. . . . Prehistory points to a race already mixed in the basin of the Yellow River. . . .[2]

In spite, however, of a number of modifications and reservations, the remainder of the statement of the Father of the Revolution, especially regarding religion and customs, could be convincingly maintained. Allowing for the numerous variations which have been suggested above, the Chinese of Southeast Asia, drawn mostly from Fukien and Kwangtung, are quite remarkably homogeneous. Not only have they marked physical characteristics in common; their customs, their religion, their attitude of mind have an almost uncanny similarity. What Clement Williams remarked of their shops in Bhamo on the Yunnan-Burma frontier nearly ninety years ago—'the likeness of one Burmese to another is striking, but the absolute sameness of one Chinese shop to another is truly wonderful'—is equally true of the 'sameness' of Chinese temples, houses, ornaments, customs, methods of mining and agriculture, and handicrafts all over the Southeast Asian area, from the city of Cholon to a remote *tienda* in Mindanao, or from the tin-fields of Larut to the pepper plantations of Cambodia. Nor is this merely a superficial impression (such as 'all Chinese look alike'); it derives from their common steeping in Chinese culture, even though the latter's springs of inspiration have ceased to well up from the depths and it has been for long (as Professor Toynbee says) in a state of petrification.

[1] See p. 370 regarding the Japanese identification of Hailams with Communism.

[2] *China Year Book* [illegible]

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Chapter Twenty-five

PEOPLES, POLITICS AND PROSPECTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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THE setting of Southeast Asia may be summed up as one of extremes of relief (deltaic plains and mountains) and a climate mostly approaching the wet limit for plant life but merging into monsoonal types. To this setting the people have made varying responses, ranging from migrant food gatherers and hunters in the jungles, to subsistence farmers in the plains, but all turning upon woody materials for weapons, implements, house-structures and domestic utensils, upon rice, the cereal of the wet extreme, and upon social systems of communal help. The whole social and economic life has been galvanised over the past century or two by being more and more drawn into commercial and industrial activities developed in response to and on the basis of external needs for the minerals and agricultural products of Southeast Asia, whereas prior to that time the region was touched only by a trickle of traders moving between India and China.

FACTORS IN THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY

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Several factors account for the difficulty of obtaining firm data to fill in our general picture of the historical geography of Southeast Asia. In the first place, there grew up no strong literary tradition to last through the centuries and record the past in a form other than mythical. Here tradition is largely oral and literature essentially Indian rather than indigenous. And whatever there was of local record and history has rotted away quickly, the climate, the ants, insects and moulds soon destroying anything on wood, paper, leather or cloth. Moreover, in this setting of swamps and forest, the most easily available material is wood, and artistic tradition expressed in wood, whether in carvings, buildings or tools, rapidly disintegrates, leaving little of that sort of evidence which is the basis of our facts about early periods in other regions. Buildings and carvings on stone were not normal expressions of Southeast Asia people where over large areas stone is not easily come by and where

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000 The dualisms and pluralities of Southeast Asia society are relatively modern, becoming emphatic only over the past three hundred years, but plural societies and changing values within the units have been apparent in their changing political patterns. First there were the inland political nuclei; the kingdoms of Middle Burma, Upper Siam, Inner Cambodia were matched among the islands by principalities set in the mountains of Sumatra and Java. Then came the little powers related more to the sea than to the land; the Sailendra kingdoms using the Malacca Strait as their bond and artery, the Majapahit sea kingdom whose territories in Borneo, Celebes, Java and South Sumatra may be thought of as footholds for a sailing people, fringing rather than entrenched in the islands (Fig. 113). At a later phase the move of power centres was to the lower rivers of the continental edge, to Lower Burma and Lower Siam. In these historic patterns of political units may be seen operating the influences and traditions of widely differing human types, one rooted in the land, coming overland, depending on agriculture for its welfare and power; the other of seafaring people, many kinds and grades of them, coming to the lands of Southeast Asia by water, relatively mobile on their seaways, fishing and trading through the seas, and always peripheral to the land.

Dual National Foci

369 In most of the constituent political units of Southeast Asia there
184 is thus a split of interest (Fig. 117). Burma has a focus at Mandalay
177 and a commercial-administrative focus at Rangoon; the Philippines
631 has a dual nodality round Manila and round the Visayan Islands; Malaya, which has only recently acquired clear internal focus, has two centres of different interest, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, the former exclusively peninsular, the latter as much involved with all Southeast Asia as with Malaya; Indochina has the double pull of the Tonkin (Hanoi) area and the Mekong Delta (Saigon); Java, its old internal focus at Jogjakarta, with Batavia acting as external point of attraction. Sumatra is in the strange position of having several inland nuclei plus the tendency to use Singapore as its outport and route to Batavia. Only Siam can claim to have no second focus, yet even there the channelling toward Bangkok is only natural for the Chao Praya Basin; the Korat Plateau topography leads human and commercial interests towards the Mekong and the border country towards the northwest was once focused on

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the historic kingdoms at Chiengmai. Borneo is laid out so far entirely under centrifugal influences, complicated by the split into British and Dutch zonations. 369 184

If this "balkanisation" be true of the individual political units, it is equally strong in the region as a whole, except that the intersection of major seaways and airways tends to make an internal regional focus on Singapore, a tendency diminished by India's economic pull on Burma and South China's pull on the people, trade and foods of Siam and Indochina. 177 631

To some extent these dual foci to each territory have been stimulated by the arrival of Western trading systems which pulled in one direction while the traditional interests pull in another, yet in a sense all these political units have been created by colonial powers administering as a unit territories not previously politically unified or previously using the present boundaries. Spain and the United States enforced unity upon what is now the Philippines and in practice had continued difficulty in keeping Mindanao, for example, within the unit. France has imposed a uniformity and a certain coherence upon Indochina which was novel to the constituent units. Malaya as it exists today is a British political creation. Before the Dutch colonial period of the present century, all the islands of the East Indies had never been controlled as one whole.

Environment and States

The continental political units, Burma, Siam and Indochina in some ways may be likened to little Egypts—nucleations of people within attractive, fertile valleys protected in these cases by the nearly empty space of forests and mountains. The combination of natural encouragement and natural protection conditioned major civilisations in Egypt and in Mesopotamia at one phase in history and appears to be equally encouraging in this tropical setting except for one difference, that although this environment on the southeastern fringe of Asia certainly suited the growth of states, its protective isolation was incomplete. In the north the growing riverine states were exposed to intruders. Thus in these riverside nurseries, states were environmentally encouraged to grow in a setting attractive as breeding grounds for nations, though the environment was not sufficiently isolating nor sufficiently protective to enable the nascent states to persist. So far as the main islands were concerned, on our maps they appear as more emphatic units 369 631 184

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369 than their elongated forms, difficult interiors and cliffed, marsh or
631 forest edges in fact justify. Rarely has any one of the major islands
184 been the locale of a single people singly governed, homogeneous and integrated into an island-state. These large islands have been dispersive and fragmentive to the peoples in them.

Postwar Nationalism

186 The postwar effusion of nationalism in Southeast Asia is thus a paradox. It is a nationalism of plural societies and substantial minorities, without homogeneity inside the states, and without a nation, as understood in Europe, and very much a culmination of the insecurity and uncertainty produced by the divergent influences which have long been at work, breaking down old social integrations and their warm, human associations, substituting for them nothing but commerce and the new myth "economic man," cold, inexorable and not adequately or fully integrated with Southeast Asia people and their setting.

The devolution of Southeast Asia from colonial into nationalist units takes place at no propitious time. The cultivation of rice has been predatory, the accumulated effects of which are now showing in diminishing yields; new paddylands before the war were ceasing to be so easily available and the war threw a large proportion of the old lands out of cultivation. Rubber has found a competitor in synthetic rubber, and its production may repeat the history of sugar. Tin recovers from the war slowly because equipment has been lost. Plantation crops have lost labour, markets and opportunities. Yet Southeast Asia is still increasing its people faster than
161 the world average. Its increase, however, has gone on at a slower rate in the already congested areas and at a faster rate in what had been the emptier areas of South Sumatra (with Javanese migrants), in Mindanao (with Filipinos), in Johore (by Chinese immigrants), as well as in Laos, Dutch Borneo and Inner Siam, by local increases. Thus Southeast Asia has been filling up, though there is little prospect yet of an even distribution.

Devolution

000 The Southeast Asia population is expanding now as the trade systems which provided its first impetus to expansion shrink and lose coherence. The atmosphere is one of relinquishing colonies, but under circumstances when they are involved in an international

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allows the replacement of compulsion by wages, the effect on native society and welfare is much the same as when development proceeds by private enterprise.

General Course of Development. Thus, whether the method of development be through native enterprise working for the market, or through western enterprise employing native labour, 'the disintegration of social life is an almost inevitable result of the contact of primitive peoples with European civilization'. In either case the liberation of economic forces from the moral restraint imposed by social obligations is detrimental to social and individual welfare. During the first stage there may be, and usually is, a rise in the standard of individual welfare through the removal of the abuses normally inherent in native social life. For a still longer period there is an increase in production, by the exploitation of social welfare for material ends. But, as such forces gain in strength, they tend to restrict and even to reduce production, and thus defeat the hopes of gain which set them working. Forests are laid waste and valuable lodes of ore are buried beneath surface workings. Cultivation, as in the delta of Lower Burma, aims at the maximum net outturn by the smallest number necessary to produce it, instead of at the maximum gross outturn by the largest number that the land will maintain at the customary level of social life. Human resources are wasted by under-employment or by unemployment and, as in the Congo under Leopold, so many people may be killed off that capitalist enterprise is no longer profitable or even possible.[1] Both the two great East India companies went bankrupt, and the modern chartered companies had to surrender their concessions because they could no longer pay their way. Profit, progress and welfare, are all linked together on a single chain, and economic forces, unless controlled by social will, corrode the chain that links them. Man is a social animal, but economic forces tend to convert human society into a business concern. In tropical dependencies the outward and visible sign of this is the evolution of a plural society.

4. The Plural Society[2]

All tropical dependencies, and indeed all tropical countries, so far as they have been brought within the modern world, have in common certain distinctive characters in their social structure. In Dutch

[1] Frankel, pp. 36, 37.
[2] Furnivall, *Economic Journal*, 1910, pp. 23 ff; *JRCAS*, 1942, p. 195.

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184 colonial literature they are often said to present a dual economy, comprising two distinct economic systems, capitalist and pre-capitalist, with a western superstructure of business and administration rising above the native world in which the people, so far as they are left alone, lead their own life in their own way according to a traditional scale of values in which economic values rank so low as to be negligible. It is unquestionably true that there is a wide difference between the social standards of tropical peoples and those of the modern West, that the natives are slow to assimilate western values, and that over native life there is a western superstructure representing an outpost of Europe and not rooted in the soil. Yet the Dutch picture of a native world, in which economic values are disregarded, seems, so far as it is based on facts, to be drawn from Java, where for some two hundred years employers secured labour through compulsion rather than by appealing to the desire of gain. In Africa likewise, as we have just noticed, a popular belief in the native disregard of economic values has been held to justify compulsion as a means of securing labour. But everywhere experience has shown that the desire of gain can easily be stimulated or, rather, liberated from the control of custom. In British colonies under indirect rule, interpreted according to the British tradition of the rule of law, economic forces soon permeate the native world and, in colonies under direct rule, it is just in the economic world that all men meet, if not on equal, yet on the same terms. Even in respect of Dutch dependencies some of their own writers vehemently dispute the theory of a dual economy.[1] Yet in all tropical dependencies the western superstructure over native life is a prominent feature in the economic landscape.

But the western superstructure is only one aspect of a distinctive character, common to all tropical dependencies, that cannot fail to impress even the most casual observer; the many-coloured pattern of the population. In Burma, as in Java, probably the first thing that strikes the visitor is the medley of peoples—European, Chinese, Indian and native. It is in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market-place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit. Even in the economic sphere there is a division of labour along racial lines.

[1] Meijer Ranneft, J. W., *Koloniale Studiën*, 1928, p. 151.

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Natives, Chinese, Indians and Europeans all have different functions, and within each major group subsections have particular occupations. There is, as it were, a caste system, but without the religious basis that incorporates caste in social life in India. One finds similar conditions all over the Tropical Far East—under Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, British, French or American rule; among Filipinos, Javanese, Malays, Burmans and Annamese; whether the objective of the colonial power has been tribute, trade or material resources; under direct rule and under indirect. The obvious and outstanding result of contact between East and West has been the evolution of a plural society; in the Federated Malay States the indigenous inhabitants number barely a quarter of the total population. The same thing has happened in the South Pacific. The Fiji chieftains invited British protection, and one result has been that half the inhabitants are immigrants from India. In African dependencies there are Indian immigrants in East Africa and Syrians in West Africa, and in some regions the 'coloured', or Eurafrican, population forms a separate caste. Sometimes a section of the native population is westernized: 'there are some territories, of which those in West Africa are perhaps most typical, in which sections of the population most closely in contact with European influences have attained a development out of all relation to the rest of the population . . . which is often still living in primitive conditions and has interests different from those of an urban or industrial society'.[1] One finds much the same thing in Java, and in all tropical dependencies 'westernized' natives are more or less cut off from the people, and form a separate group or caste. The plural society has a great variety of forms, but in some form or other it is the distinctive character of modern tropical economy.

Outside the tropics society may have plural features, notably in South Africa, Canada and the United States, and also in lands where the Jew has not been fully assimilated into social life; in other countries also there are mixed populations with particularist tendencies. But in general these mixed populations have at least a common tradition of western culture, and, despite a different racial origin, they meet on equal terms and their relations are not confined solely to the economic sphere. There is a society with plural features, but not a plural society. It is significant that, in Canada and the United States, and also in Australia, when the influx of alien elements threatened national life and common social standards, barriers were raised against free

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, pp. 34, 44; Teeling, L. W. B., p. 126.

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•184 immigration. In tropical dependencies there was no common social will to set a bar to immigration, which has been left to the play of economic forces. The plural society arises where economic forces are exempt from control by social will. It is general in the modern tropics because everywhere and always the social order seems to have had plural features. In Burma under native rule the people were not organized territorially but on quasi-feudal lines by race and occupation, and that is the normal character of tropical society based on personal authority. But in such lands, apart from minor backward groups, there is a common cultural tradition; there is a society with plural features but not a plural society. Again, in the great fairs held annually in medieval times in ports and market towns, each company of merchants was governed by its own heads according to its own customs. But the concourse did not form a plural society, because it lasted no longer than the fair. All that happened was that, during the fair, the town was transformed into a bazaar. In the modern tropics the bazaar lasts throughout the year, and the whole country is converted into a shop or factory; from a social organism into a business concern. Despite certain plural features, tropical society was distinct from the plural society which has been created by economic forces. This is a modern invention because, only in modern times, have economic forces been set free to remould the social order. The result is a social structure quite distinct in its political and economic properties from the homogeneous unitary society of western lands and, for a solution of colonial problems, it is essential that its properties should be clearly understood. Let us examine it first in its political aspect and then in its economic aspect.

Political Features. On looking at a plural society in its political aspect one can distinguish three characteristic features: the society as a whole comprises separate racial sections; each section is an aggregate of individuals rather than a corporate or organic whole; and as individuals their social life is incomplete.

To Europeans the incompleteness of individual social life is most readily apparent in the European section. The European works in the tropics, but does not live there. His life in the tropics centres round his business, and he looks at social problems, political or economic, not as a citizen but as a capitalist or an employer of labour. Many Europeans spend twenty years or more in the tropics, and, on retiring from work to live at home, they know no more of the country than on the day they landed; nothing of the people or even of the

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language. Foreign orientals, likewise, are transient; they come merely to make money and their interest in the country is purely economic. The life of the ordinary native is similarly incomplete. He is a cultivator and nothing more. Under native rule the people lived within a little world, but their cultural horizon was co-extensive with its boundaries; under western rule their horizon is contracted to their life as cultivators and their social life is less comprehensive than before.

If we look above the individual to the group in which he forms a unit, we find a similar contrast between the plural society of tropical dependencies and the unitary society that western peoples take for granted. In all accounts of the modern tropics we read of the collapse of corporate tribal or village life and the atomization of society. In the foreign sections the individual stands even more alone; even among Indians caste loses its validity, and in every census in Burma it has been found impossible to compile useful returns of Indian castes. Among the Indian immigrants in South Sea Islands one may even find mixed marriages between Muslims and Hindus. Europeans often deplore the isolation of the individual in their own section. Men are continually on the move; they form business acquaintances but not friends; there are no children in the home; the club and not the home is the centre of social life, and all look more or less eagerly to going 'home' on retirement. Each section in the plural society is a crowd and not a community.

On a wider survey of the plural society as a whole comprising separate groups, we may find the nearest analogy in a confederation of allied states, united by treaty or within the limits of formal constitution merely for certain common ends, but otherwise, in matters outside the terms of union, each living its own life as a separate province. Yet this analogy fails to bring out the full complexity of a plural society. In a confederation each unit is segregated within its own territorial limits; there is contact between the states but not between their members as individuals; the union is voluntary; the terms of union are definite and limited; and any party can at will withdraw from the confederacy. In a plural society the sections are not segregated; the members of the several units are intermingled and meet as individuals; the union is not voluntary but is imposed by the colonial power and by the force of economic circumstances; and the union cannot be dissolved without the whole society relapsing into anarchy.

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Like a confederation, a plural society is a business partnership rather than a family concern, and the social will linking the sections does not extend beyond their common business interests. It might seem that common interest should tie them closely, for a dissolution would involve the bankruptcy of all the partners. But the tie is strong only so far as this common interest is recognized. Perhaps the only plural society inherently stable is the Hindu society in India. Here there are separate groups or classes, partly racial, with distinct economic functions. But in India caste has a religious sanction, and in a plural society the only common deity is Mammon. In general, the plural society is built on caste without the cement of a religious sanction. In each section the sectional common social will is feeble, and in the society as a whole there is no common social will. There may be apathy even on such a vital point as defence against aggression. Few recognize that, in fact, all the members of all sections have material interests in common, but most see that on many points their material interests are opposed. The typical plural society is a business partnership in which, to many partners, bankruptcy signifies release rather than disaster.

Economic Features. The political aspect of the plural society is reflected in its economic aspect. A plural society is no ordinary business partnership. In form it is also a political society and is, or should be, organized for 'the good life', the welfare of the people, enabling them to live as well as possible. As a business partnership its function is solely economic, to produce goods as profitably as possible. But as a social institution also it has an economic aspect, and is concerned with both production and consumption, supply and demand. It is in the interest of a society that its members shall get what is best and not merely what is cheapest; by custom or law it must regulate demand. It is also in the interest of society that in the supply of goods, production for profit shall be regulated by custom or law on behalf of social welfare. In a plural society both supply and demand take on a special character.

Let us first consider the matter of demand. In buying goods it is only common sense to pay no more than necessary. But purchasers are not always guided solely by common sense. Some will pay a higher price for home products than for foreign products, or for goods untainted by sweated labour. In such cases there is a social demand for home manufactures, or for a higher standard of wages. In this matter there is a difference between the plural society and the homo-

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geneous society. When the recent depression flooded Java with cheap cottons from Japan, European merchants tried to boycott Japanese goods; but the boycott collapsed because Chinese merchants bought them and seemed likely to capture all the trade. When Britain annexed Upper Burma the British Government contemplated retaining the Burmese prohibition of trade in opium and alcohol, but this was impossible because the demand of the Chinese and Indians had to be met. In a plural society the feebleness of social will is reflected in the weakness of social demand, which is the economic aspect of social will. Economists deal in great detail with problems of aggregate demand but, partly it may be because they take a homogeneous society for granted, they have not given social demand so much attention as it deserves. If any town or village in the western world wants better sanitation, it can spend more on conservancy. There is a collective demand which may conflict with individual demand, and at periodical elections people can choose between better conservancy and having more money in their pockets. Economists can measure this collective demand with their supply and demand curves and schedules, but collective demand is only one form of a social demand that, in general, defies measurement. The monastic schools in Burma were a response to social demand, but no one could estimate their cost, or balance it against their value. In tropical countries social demand usually takes effect through custom. Sometimes a patch of scrub jungle round a village is reserved as a public convenience and is closed to fuel cutting. People could get their fuel with less trouble, more cheaply, by cutting timber there, but social demand, taking effect through village custom, prevails over individual demand. So long as custom retains its force, no one would think of cutting down the scrub. But we have noticed that in Rangoon Indian immigrants saw a way to make easy money, and cleared the scrub to sell fuel in the market. Individual demand for private gain prevailed over the social demand for common welfare, and prevailed the more readily because society was no longer homogeneous. Even in the West social demand is most effective when it requires no stronger support than custom, because no one thinks of encroaching on it. In London rickshaws might be cheaper than taxis, but we would walk rather than use them. The individual demand for cheaper transport is overborne by the social demand for human dignity. And because we resist the temptation of cheapness we finally attain better, and probably cheaper, transport in tubes and motor-buses. During

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184 the present century Rangoon, in common with most eastern towns, has been flooded with rickshaws. In Batavia the Dutch refused to sanction them; they disliked seeing Javanese between the shafts and already had too many Chinese. Now motor transport in the towns of Java is probably better and cheaper than in any country in the tropics. Social demand can take effect only through organic social will as embodied in the social structure, and, in default of social will, individual demand prevails over social demand. A villager in Burma may wish to spend money on schooling for his children, but the maintenance of a school is conditional on the existence of social demand and, if there is no village school, he may spend his money on giving them new clothes, or on furniture that he does not use, or even on English books that he cannot read.[1] If he cannot satisfy those wants which he has as a member of society, he will satisfy his individual wants; he must take what he can get.

Here is one of the distinctions between a homogeneous society and a plural society. A plural society is broken up into groups of isolated individuals, and the disintegration of social will is reflected in a corresponding disorganization of social demand. Even in a matter so vital to the whole community as defence against aggression, the people are reluctant to pay the necessary price. In religion and the arts, in the graces and ornaments of social life, there are no standards common to all sections of the community, and standards deteriorate to such a level as all have in common. And because each section is merely an aggregate of individuals, those social wants that men can satisfy only as members of a community remain unsatisfied. Just as the life of an individual in a plural society is incomplete, so his demand tends to be frustrated. Civilization is the process of learning to live a common social life, but in a plural society men are decivilized. All wants that all men want in common are those which they share in common with the animal creation; on a comprehensive survey of mankind from China to Peru these material wants, essential to the sustenance of life, represent the highest common factor of demand. In the plural society the highest common factor is the economic factor, and the only test that all apply in common is the test of cheapness. In such a society the disorganization of social demand allows the economic process of natural selection by the survival of the cheapest to prevail.

If, again, we examine plural economy from the standpoint of production or supply, we find a similar predominance of economic forces.

[1] Furnivall, *Economic Review*, 1912, pp. 380 ff.

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In selling goods it is common sense to charge as much as one can. All those engaged in production have in common, in greater or less degree, the desire for gain, to get as much as possible while giving as little as possible. But, in a plural society, that is almost all they have in common. Everywhere, in all forms of society, the working of economic forces makes for tension between groups with competing or conflicting interests; between town and country, industry and agriculture, capital and labour. In a homogeneous society the tension is alleviated by their common citizenship, but in a plural society there is a corresponding cleavage along racial lines. The foreign elements live in the towns, the natives in rural areas; commerce and industry are in foreign hands and the natives are mainly occupied in agriculture; foreign capital employs native labour or imported coolies. The various peoples meet only in the market, as competitors or as opponents, as buyers and sellers. In Burma the Indian and Chinese middlemen form combines against both the cultivator and the European miller, and Europeans form combines against both middleman and native. In Java the nationalist movement first assumed a popular character in action against the Chinese, whom Europeans at the same time were describing as worse than ten epidemics. In Indo-China Annamese and Europeans regard the Indian moneylender as a pest. It might seem that, on a long view, all sections have a common interest in the common welfare, but the foreign elements, European or oriental, mostly need not look beyond the day when they will leave the country. In any case, the end is so remote that it is out of sight; so far as the horizon of the business man extends sectional interests are opposed. It is true that big business with large capital investments in the country must take long views, and sees further than the cultivator who does not look beyond the harvest and the coolie who looks only for to-morrow's rice, but it looks on the country as a business enterprise.

Moreover, within the economic sphere there are no common standards of conduct beyond those prescribed by law. The European has his own standard of decency as to what, even in business, 'is not done'; so also have the Chinese, the Indian and the native. All have their own ideas as to what is right and proper, but on this matter they have different ideas, and the only idea common to all members of all sections is the idea of gain. In a homogeneous society the desire of profit is controlled to some extent by social will, and if anyone makes profits by sharp practice he will offend the social conscience and incur

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184 moral, and perhaps legal, penalties. If, for example, he employs sweated labour, the social conscience, if sufficiently alert and powerful, may penalize him because aware, either instinctively or by rational conviction, that such conduct cuts at the root of common social life. But in the tropics the European who, from humanitarian motives or through enlightened self-interest, treats his employees well, risks being forced out of business by Indians or Chinese with different standards. The only deterrent to unsocial conduct in production is the legal penalty to which those are liable who can be brought to trial and convicted according to the rules of evidence of infringing some positive law. In supply as in demand, in production as in consumption, the abnormal activity of economic forces, free of social restrictions, is an essential character of a plural society.

In colonial relations then, economic forces both create a plural society and, because unrestrained by social will, continue to prevail. The dictum of Dr Boeke, that we have already noted with reference to Java, applies to tropical economy in general: 'there is materialism, rationalism, individualism, and a concentration on economic ends far more complete and absolute than in homogeneous western lands; a total absorption in the exchange and market; a capitalist structure, with the business concern as subject, far more typical of capitalism than one can imagine in the so-called "capitalist" countries, which have grown up slowly out of the past and are still bound to it by a hundred roots'.[1] In the first half of the nineteenth century economists eulogized economic man; in the last half they said he was a myth. Unfortunately they were mistaken. When cast out of Europe he found refuge in the tropics, and now we see him returning with seven devils worse than himself. These are the devils which devastated the tropics under the rule of *laissez-faire* and which it is the object of modern colonial policy to exorcise.

5. Modern Colonial Policy

000 The foregoing analysis of the course of social evolution in tropical dependencies under a regime of *laissez-faire* may perhaps appear superfluous, for *laissez-faire* is dead, and modern colonial policy aspires to be constructive. The constructive policy, as originally conceived, reflected popular Darwinism, the survival of the fittest, and looked mainly to efficiency. Gradually however it was permeated by the idea of social justice which gathered force in Europe with the re-

[1] Boeke, cited *Netherlands India*, p. 452.

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175 thus set a new stage -- the development of the natural
177 resources of the whole region.
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439 This change-over from a subsistence economy to a
648 commercial economy involved the large-scale expansion of traditional crops or the development of new commercial crops.
[436] It was stimulated by the introduction or expansion of a money
[489] economy, the flow of capital and the development of land and
[69] sea transport. It was supported by Western technology, methods of administration and systems of justice. This whole process greatly affected the traditional institution, up-
175 setting the balance of a medieval world. The free, indi-
177 vidualist spirit of Western rule and commerce cut at the
[59] roots of traditional social life, undermining the corporate
[423] strength of family and village. But the most serious direct
[426] threat of the new economic forces was to the peasant's owner-
[568] ship of land. Expanding economies, new money taxes and cheap imports meant better business than ever for the money lender. Many peasants became ruined by debt and lost their lands. Indebtedness and debt slavery were not new in Southeast Asia; the latter was fairly soon stamped out, but the former now became much more widespread than before, resulting in the creation of a landless proletariat.[16]

• 184 Characteristics of Current Southeast Asian Economy

In spite of all the differences among the countries of Southeast Asia in the natural environment, ethnic

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16. Harrison, op. cit., p. 210.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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184 distribution, and aspects of Western colonial policy which have tended to increase the contrasts between parts of the region, there are certain considerations of broader nature and of far-reaching significance that give validity to the concept of Southeast Asia as a regional unit possessing certain common features which will be discussed in brief as follows:

a. Common heritage of colonialism.

b. Dual economy.

c. Plural society.

d. Dominance of the agricultural section.

e. High rate of population growth.

f. Determination to industrialize.

g. Small size of market and slow rate of capital formation.

433 648 The direction as well as the pace of economic development in the colonial or protected areas of Southeast Asia has been primarily determined by the overriding economic interests of the imperial powers. Even in Thailand, where political independence was preserved, economic dependence upon European capital resulted in the creation of a characteristically 'colonial' economy. This is exemplified by the following conditions: (1) producer of raw materials; (2) concentration on a few export products; and (3) lack of manufacturing industries. As a consequence, these countries are highly affected by substitution, price fluctuations, and changes in consumer demand. Furthermore, they are dependent on limited markets for export, and hence are adversely

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197 particularly the Palaung, Wa, and Riang; and finally the Mon-Khmer group proper.

The language of the Mon is spoken on the coast of the gulf of Pegu. Inscriptions date from as far back as the 11th century. They are in Myazediin script. Khmer is spoken in Cambodia, and its inscriptions are available from about the first half of the 7th century. There are also about a dozen other dialects spoken by scattered tribes throughout this area.

The Mon-Khmer languages are sometimes grouped together with Munda, a large family of languages spoken in the Northeastern sector of India today —but this is not supported by evidence. Similarly, it may be doubted if dialects of this language family have really spread into Yunnan in Southwest China. For example, Wen Yu showed recently that Min-chia, long held to have been a Mon-Khmer dialect, belongs in reality to Tibeto-Burman ("A study of synonyms in the Min-chia language," *Studia Serica* 1 (1940), 1–28). The term "Austroasiatic"—if it means more than just Mon-Khmer—covers a multitude of linguistic methodological sins. And if the existence of an "Austroasiatic" family of languages is doubtful, an "Austric" superstock, combining the former with Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian), is much more improbable still. For further information on Mon-Khmer consult the writer's "Examination of the Austroasiatic language family" (*Language* 18 (1942), 206–17), which contains references as well as a lengthy list of languages, and further his "Bibliography of Mon-Khmer linguistics" (*Studies in Linguistics*, Vol. 1, No. 11, 1943).

It is only fair to point out, however, that in a recent paper, "Thai, Kadai, and Indonesian: A new alignment in Southeastern Asia" (*American Anthropologist* 44 (1942), 576–601), Paul Benedict attempted boldly to combine into a single language family Thai, Indonesian and "Kadai"—and further to add this hypothetical family to Mon-Khmer-Annamite, and in a further synthesis, Miao-Yao. "Kadai" is a new term of the author's for Kelao, Laqua, and Lati of the mainland, that is, in Southcentral China and the China-Tonkin border region, and Li of Hainan. This writer regards Benedict's interesting attempt with a good deal of scepticism, for the type of evidence he uses to prove his hypothesis is not altogether satisfactory. Further judgment may well be postponed until new and better material to work with has been collected.

THE INDONESIAN LANGUAGES

197 Indonesian (Malayan) is a family of languages spoken over an enormous
171 territory: the Malay Peninsula, the East Indies, the Philippine Islands,
184

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Madagascar, and Formosa. Furthermore, a distant but clear relationship 197
exists between Indonesian on the one hand, and the Oceanic languages, 171
Melanesian, Micronesian, Polynesian, on the other. 184

The dialect spoken on the mainland, around, say, Perak, is known simply as Malay; this is, moreover, something of a *lingua franca:* "bazaar" or "pidgin" Malay and is understood throughout the Indies, except in some of the interior districts.

The large number of dialects in this area—there are 87 in the Philippine 197
Islands alone—cannot be accounted for in terms of separate waves of migrations, for ethnology recognizes no more than three major ones; the distinctions become less puzzling, however, if we consider the geographical factors which resulted in ethnic isolation of more or less small groups. Perhaps the most isolated, and hence the most divergent, dialects of Indonesian are spoken in Madagascar; the Hova dialect of the Malagasy group is the literary one.

The chief groups on the Philippine Islands are four: the Luzon group (chief dialects, Iloco, Ibanag, Apayao, Kalinga, Tingguian, Bontoc, Ifugao, Igorot, Ilongot, Tagalog), second, the Bisaya group (chief dialects, Cebu-Bisaya, Panay-Bisaya), third, Mindoro-Palawan (chief dialects, Mangyan, Kuyónon, Tagbanua), and finally, the Mindanao-Sulu group (chief dialects, Lanao, Magindanao, Subanon, Mandaya, Bagobo, Kulaman, Tiruray). For a map of distribution of these and other dialects see Herbert W. Krieger, "Peoples of the Philippines" (*Smithsonian Institution, War Background Studies No. 4*, Washington, 1942, Fig. 4).

Some of the dialects in the East Indies are as follows. Sumatra: Minangkabau, Karo and Toba (together known as Batak), Gayo, Kubu, etc. Mentawey is spoken on the island by that name. Dayak and Punan are spoken in Borneo. Java: Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese. Celebes: Toradja, Bulu, Tontemboan, Bugis, Makassa, Bareqe. Balinese is the language of Bali. There are a good many others as well.

Several members of the Indonesian family, Malay in particular, have been studied with more or less thoroughness. But the best material is in Dutch and available only with difficulty here. For an excellent recent contribution in America cf. the outline of Iloco (a Philippine dialect) syntax (*Language* 18 (1942), 193–200), by Leonard Bloomfield.

The empires of the Mon and the Khmer were shattered in relatively recent times by folks who spoke Burmese and Thai respectively. The speakers of these languages dominate Burma and Thailand today, and Mon-Khmer is rapidly disappearing.

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THE INDO-CHINESE LANGUAGES

197 Both these dialect groups belong to the Indo-Chinese family of languages.
184 Chinese, of course, is the best known member of this family. Thai, as far as evidence now indicates, may be said to be another member. Thai is generally divided into two groups, the Chuang group, spoken chiefly in Kwangsi and southern Kweichow and in parts of Hainan, and the Southwestern group.

This Southwestern group itself divides into several dialects. One of these is Shan, spoken in the Shan states of the north by about one million souls; some of whom inhabit parts of Yunnan province. The P'o, the Kamti, and related tribes also speak dialects of Shan. Ahom, formerly spoken throughout Assam, is another member of this Southwestern group. Tai Blanc, Nung, Tho, and others, form a third grouping, and are spoken in French Indo-China as well as the southwestern part of Kwangsi. Finally, and chiefly, there is Thai itself, the official language (Bangkok dialect) of Thailand, and its closest relative, Lao, spoken by the Laos of the North. The first Siamese writing that we possess dates from the period of the famous king Ram Gamheng, with inscriptions of the 13th century.

197 Some recent studies on certain aspects of Thai may be recommended to the interested reader: they are, "Types of reduplication in Thai" (*Studies in Linguistics*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1942), and "The use of numeral classifiers in Thai" (*Language* 18 (1942), 201–05), both by Mary Haas. The best short discussion of the position of Thai in the Indo-Chinese family may be found in the 1938–39 issue of the *Chinese year book*, by a very reliable scholar, Li Fang Kuei ("Languages and Dialects," pp. 43–51).

Annamese is another bone of contention between scholars. On the one hand stands Maspero, linking this group definitely with Thai, and on the other hand stands Przyluski, supported recently by Benedict, linking it with Mon-Khmer. That the latter are wrong and Maspero is right, as far as evidence now indicates, was demonstrated by the brilliant Chinese scholar Wen Yu ("On the kinship of the Annamitic language," *Meridio-Occidentale Sinense*, 1 (1940), 66–73). Wen Yu rightly rejects, and effectively, Przyluski's lexical and morphological arguments; then he shows that Maspero's phonological arguments can fully be supported from the morphology, concluding that "from morphological study the Annamitic is completely in harmony with the Thaic."

Tibeto-Burman seems to be another branch of the Indo-Chinese family. Among the languages of the Burman side is, of course, Burmese itself. About sixteen dialects of this language are spoken by approximately ten

the latter's man-eagle Garuda. Another noteworthy example of an incarnation of Vishnu was king Sūryavarman II of Cambodia (12th century) who erected his own memorial monument as a gigantic temple of Vishnu: the famous Angkor Vat. We find further the idea of plural incarnation, also known from ancient India. Thus the Pararaton tells us that Angrok (13th century), the founder of the dynasty of Singasari and ancestor of the kings of Majapahit, was an incarnation of Vishnu, begotten by Brahmā from a mortal woman, and at the same time a son of Śiva. King Krtarājasa (died 1316 A.D.), the founder of the empire of Majapahit, is immortalized by a statue representing him as Harihara, a compound of Vishnu and Śiva. Even the simultaneous incarnation of Hindu and Mahāyāna Buddhist deities occurs. Thus, to quote only one example, the Javanese king Krtanagara (killed 1292 A.D.) was considered as an incarnation of Śiva as well as of the Dhyāni Buddha Akshobhya. Accordingly, he became known in Javanese tradition under the name of Śiva-Buddha.

It may be added that the theory of divine incarnation could be used not only as a means to exalt the position of the legitimate king, but equally well as a justification for usurpation of the throne. Thus the above mentioned Angrok, the founder of the kingdom of Singasari, was an usurper with a long criminal career as embezzler, robber and murderer. Yet, in spite of his criminal past, he became king, according to the Pararaton, because he was an incarnation of the gods.

The theory of divine incarnation as found in Hinduism and Mahāyāna Buddhism is incompatible with the doctrine of the Buddhism of the Hīnayāna. This difference in tenets is clearly expressed even in the lay-out of capital cities. In ancient Cambodia a temple formed the center of the capital and thus the Mount Meru of city and empire. In Burma the center of the capital is invariably occupied by the royal palace, and it is this latter which is identified with Mount Meru. In ancient Cambodia either Śiva in his form as Devarāja, the eternal essence of kingship, or the Bodhisatva Lokeśvara, the "Lord of the Universe," inhabited the "central mountain" and from there pervaded the empire. Hīnayānist Buddhism does not recognize an eternal deity. Indra is but the king of one of the lowest heavens, the second one from the earth. He is as little exempt from death and rebirth as any human being, except that his life lasts longer. The same may be said of the inhabitants of the higher heavens. All these "gods" of Hīnayāna Buddhism should more appropriately be called angels. They have no temples and no cults. Thus it is easy to understand why in Burma no temple could be set in the center of the capital city. The adaptation to cosmological principles and

361 the deification of the king here had to be attempted by other means. By erect-
771 ing the palace in the center of the city and by identifying it with Mount
Meru, the lord of the palace, i.e. the king, became automatically the repre-
643 sentative of Indra. We might even say that he was "the Indra" of this smaller
●184 universe, the Burmese empire but he held his place only by the magic of
772 parallelism and he was no incarnation of the real Indra as the ancient Javanese and Cambodian kings had been incarnations of Śiva and Vishnu.[7] This scheme explains the great sanctity in which the royal palace was held in the Buddhist empires of Farther India. The palace was the symbol of the celestial mountain, nay, more than a mere symbol: it was "the Mount Meru" of the microcosmos Burma, or Siam, or Cambodia. Anybody nearing the palace had to show his reverence by dismounting from his horse, by shutting his parasol, by bowing to the palace spire or even kneeling down. Attempts to exact the same expressions of reverence from British envoys led to endless negotiations and frictions as the latter refused to comply with a demand which they
643 considered humiliating. "King of the Golden Palace" was one of the most
771 important titles of Burmese monarchs. Yet, the fact that the king "was Indra" and therefore ruler of the country only as possessor of the empire's Meru, the palace, involved great dangers. It worked as a constant temptation for would-be usurpers, be it from the ranks of the royal family or outsiders, as the occupation of the palace might be achieved by a coup-de-main with relatively small forces and usually meant the conquest of the whole empire. Many Burmese and Siamese kings therefore were virtual prisoners in their palace which they did not dare to leave for fear it might be seized by an usurper. The last king of Burma, Thibaw, preferred even to forego the important coronation ritual of the circumambulation of the capital to offering one of his relatives a chance to make himself master of the palace while he was away.

In Hīnayāna Buddhism the idea of divine incarnation as justification of kingship is replaced by that of rebirth and of religious merit. It is his good karma, his religious merit acquired in previous lives, which makes a man be born a king or makes him acquire kingship during his lifetime, be it even by rebellion and murder. A typical instance is that of king Nyaung-u Sawrahan (10th century) as told in the Glass Palace Chronicle of the Kings of Burma. Nyaung-u Sawrahan, a farmer, kills the king who has trespassed on his garden and whom he had not recognized. Thereupon he is himself made king against his wish. So strong is his karma that, when one of the ministers ob-

[7] However, strong traces of the belief that Śiva and Vishnu incarnate themselves in the king survive in the coronation rituals of Siam and Cambodia.

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RICE CULTIVATION IN ASIA

By INEZ ADAMS

243 THE terminology employed by writers discussing Asiatic rice agriculture has raised a problem: are the cultivated varieties of rice distinctly separable into one group that will grow under none but irrigated conditions, and another that demands moderate amounts of moisture but is successfully produced only by dry farming? The terms used in the literature frequently bear this implication. They include references to "wet" and "dry," "dryland," "lowland," "upland" and "mountain" rice. In anthropological studies whose purpose is merely descriptive this creates confusion. When extended to comparative studies and historical reconstructions, with the two methods of cultivation treated as distinct for the conclusions reached, it becomes necessary to examine the distinctions that might justify such use.

101 As early as 1820, John Crawfurd, writing his "History of the Indian Archi-
171 pelago," observed that rice is known as "padi . . . in all languages and dialects
243 from Madagascar to the Philippines."[1] He distinguished in Java a "marsh"
● 184 rice, sown in nurseries and transplanted to flooded fields, and a "mountain" or "dryland" rice, grown on arable uplands. These terms remain current. Lowie defines them thus:

243 The innumerable variations of the plant fall broadly into two categories, with corresponding techniques of husbandry. "Swamp" rice can be grown only in marshes or under irrigation. "Mountain" rice yields smaller crops, but can be grown anywhere with normal precipitation.[2]

Wilhelm Wagner[3] speaks in a similar sense of "den gewöhnliche Wasserreis" and "den sogenanten Bergreis," in his account of Chinese agriculture. C. Daryll Forde makes the same general differentiation of cultivated rices falling[4] into two groups due to the physical requirements of the plant. Wissler[5] mentions "The cultivated varieties known as 'hill,' 'upland,' or 'dryland' rice," in contradistinction to the "aquatic varieties." Keesing,[6] in one work on the Philippines, employs "wet" and "dry" rice; elsewhere[7] he speaks of "dry agriculture" in Indonesia, as distinguished from the practice of terracing with irrigation.

E. M. Loeb,[8] in his general ethnography of Sumatra, notes rice raised in both flooded and dry fields by the Bataks; in the Minangkabau, . . . "wet and dry rice fields are worked together by the men and women . . . ";[9] in Nias, . . . "both the wet and dry variety are grown . . . ";[10] in Atjeh, "Rice is of both the wet and dry variety. The wet rice fields, when not laid in swamps, are irrigated

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[1] Crawfurd, 1820, Vol. I, p. 358. [2] Lowie, 1938, p. 294. [3] Wagner, 1926.
[4] Forde, 1934. [5] Wissler, 1946. [6] Keesing, 1937. [7] *Idem.*, 1934.
[8] Loeb, 1935. [9] *Ibid.*, p. 101. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 132.

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178 caused or hastened a flight to the relative
162 security of the city. These forces have been
369 operating in combination particularly in
361 Rangoon, Jakarta, Saigon, and Manila and largely are responsible for their extremely rapid postwar growth. Lesser cities in Java, for example, such as Surabaya, Jogjakarta, Semarang, and Surakarta, also have increased in population because of rural insecurity; and in Burma in several towns and cities up to 50 per cent of the population has been resident less than four years, for the same reasons. These migrations have not, however, necessarily been accompanied by greater employment opportunities and consequently cannot be regarded as indexes of more rapid urbanization and associated socioeconomic change.

184 The great cities of Southeast Asia possess
361 many features in common, not the least of
369 which is their youth. This quality they share also with several of the great cities of the United States, but there the resemblance
175 ceases.[11] In 1800 Rangoon, Saigon, and
178 Singapore did not yet exist in city form; Bangkok, the new capital of Thailand, was less than twenty years old; Manila and Batavia (Jakarta), though then about two hundred years old, were merely small coastal towns. They began to grow rapidly after the middle of the nineteenth century, as a consequence of the development of the treaty ports in China, the opening of Japan, the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown by the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, the opening of the

[11] For the most part the growth of the Southeast Asian cities was not associated with a total transformation of society but with a strong indigenous tradition, as in the case of Bangkok, or with the juxtaposition of a segment of a new civilization alongside the old, as in the case of Rangoon. In America the cities represented the culmination of a social transformation in a virtually unoccupied frontier region. The same is true of Manchuria, the northeastern frontier of pioneer settlement in China, which is more recently, and more highly, urbanized than any other part of China. In Manchuria, as in the United States, there is a quite regular gradation of city sizes, and the Primate City cannot be clearly identified.

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Suez Canal in 1869, and the consolidation of Western control, direct or indirect, over most of Southeast Asia in the 1890's, followed by American acquisition of the Philippines at the turn of the century.

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More important, the great cities were, and to a large degree still are, foreign creations, essentially alien to the Southeast Asian landscape. Although several began as native settlements, they developed as foreign exclaves on the margins of Asia, in much the same way as did the plantation system and mining operations. With the exception of Bangkok, they represented and functioned as the overseas appendages of Western, not indigenous, interests, being what Spate has called "head-links"—the gates by which Western concepts entered to destroy and build and in which a new system of economic organization evolved.[12] Indeed, the concept of the Asian plural society was inspired by the contrast between the basically foreign great city and the indigenous agricultural village. The ties of the great city with its hinterland were primarily commercial and associated with foreign-controlled mining and plantation interests and with Chinese-dominated rice trade. Such direct political-administrative ties as did exist were restricted primarily to indigenous elites, small in number, which allied themselves with Western interests. Where the indigenous rural populations were affected by these urban-rural relations, it was primarily through the plantation or the mining system, both of which needed a large labor force, or through Indian or Chinese intermediaries.

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On the other hand, the relations between an indigenous capital, like Bangkok in its earlier period, or Kyoto or Peking, and the agrarian society upon which it was based were of quite a different order. In these cases the capital represented the culmination of what might be termed a national *ethos*, the epitome of what Redfield has

[12] O. H. K. Spate, "Factors in the Development of Capital Cities," *Geographical Review*, October, 1942, p. 628.

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called the "Great Tradition" in an agrarian society.[13] 361

The links between country and city in this basically feudal relationship were clear, consecutive, and relatively simple to define. To be sure, the villager would regard the capital as a different world from his own, but it was nevertheless a largely comprehensible world, if associated with abstractions and refinements beyond his immediate ken.[14] 369 184 181

The modern great city of Southeast Asia, however, not only was different but was also incomprehensible to the child of the folk society, who came to regard it not merely as strange and foreign but also as hostile. The "foreignness" is reflected in their ethnic composition. Until the second World War at least the largest population group in Rangoon was Indian; Singapore is primarily a Chinese city; Bangkok is very largely Chinese, as is Saigon if Cholon, its twin city, is included; both Manila and Jakarta have large foreign and Chinese elements. To this extent the great city is more metropolitan than national. Each has its Chinese, European, and native quarters, for example, although in many instances the lines of division have become blurred, especially since the close of the war.[15] Furthermore, wherever Chinese populations are large, a predominant type of house is the so-called "shophouse," a two-or-more-story building with shops on the first floor, built to a standard width originally dictated by the length of the average fir-log lintel as used in South China, and with residential flats and 621 361 369 184 578 162 563 342 347 563 369 184

[13] See Robert Redfield and Milton Singer, "A Cultural Role of Cities," a working paper for the Conference on the Role of Cities in Economic Growth and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, May 24–26, 1954. [113]

[14] Cf. J. M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian City: Its Culture and Evolution," *Asia*, March, 1953.

[15] In Singapore the Chinese are localized according to the various so-called "clans," e.g., Hokkien, Cantonese, Tiuchiu, Hailams, and Hakka (see B. W. Hodder, "Racial Groupings in Singapore," *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, October, 1953).

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342 cubicles behind and above.[16] Usually con-
347 structed in continuous rows and back to
back, this type of tenement is among the
563 more conspicuous evils in Southeast Asian
369 cities. On the urban peripheries and wher-
184 ever interstices appear in the modern street
and housing pattern, slum villages appear
which consist of house clusters usually con-
structed of bamboo and *atap* palm, highly
inflammable and unsanitary.[17] These also
are found in and on the margins of the lesser
cities but are most striking in juxtaposition
to the sleek boulevards of Singapore, Bang-
kok, and Jakarta.

184 A further index of the cultural and eco-
369 nomic pluralism of the great cities is their
361 frequent division into old and new towns.
In China, especially in the treaty ports, this
distinction is usually between an old Chinese
and a modern foreign city. The same is true
of India. In Southeast Asia the contrast is
most often between an old and a modern
town both of Western origin, as in Jakarta,
Manila, Singapore, and Rangoon. To a not-
able degree each of these is also a planned
city. In Saigon the contrast is between pre-
dominantly Chinese Cholon and Saigon it-
self. In Bangkok, however, there are the old
Siamese castle town, a new town of indig-
enous origin, though of European design,
and a Chinese town or quarter nearly as old
as the castle town itself. Pluralism is seen
not merely in the division of a city into old
and new parts or into quarters but also in
the separation of the predominantly out-
ward-oriented great city from an up-coun-

[113] [16] For a description of the "shophouse" see R. H. Hughes, "Hong Kong: An Urban Study," *Geographical Journal*, March, 1951, pp. 9–10.

[17] These areas, the so-called "kampongs," are historically enclaves of the countryside within the city. They form small social cells which together cover most of the surface area in and on the margins of the great cities. Separately, they constitute the rural villages, which in the densely settled portions of Java, for example, are so closely spaced that they collectively exhibit population densities as high as those in many cities (see photographs in J. M. Fraser, "Town Planning and Housing in Singapore," *Town Planning Review*, January, 1953).

184 try, indigenous, cultural or political sub-
369 center. Just as Shanghai had its Nanking
361 and Peking, so Rangoon has its Mandalay, Jakarta its Jogjakarta, Manila its Cebu, and, in a variant form, Singapore its Kuala Lumpur.

177 In the past these cities sited along the Asian littoral have been the funnels through
184 which produce from the interiors have reached tidewater and the world of com-
369 merce and Western manufactures have pen-
361 etrated. Through the increasingly metropolitan channels have flowed the ideas of the West as well as its material goods. In a sense they have acted both as a catalyst for social and economic change and as a cushion which modified the shock of the earlier cultural contacts.

361 With the exception of Singapore, the site of each of the great cities of Southeast Asia is an ill-drained riverine or coastal lowland strategically placed in relation to an exceptionally productive agricultural region. Again, with the exception of Singapore, none
[504] possesses a deep natural harbor suitable for modern ocean-going shipping. The three mainland ports are both river and ocean ports and must be reached through tortuous and shallow river channels. All are entrepôts. Jakarta and Manila are located on the most highly developed islands of the archipelagoes, for which they act as entrepôts. Only in Indonesia and Indochina are there major competitors for the two greatest ports —Haiphong, the outlet for the densely populated Tonkin delta, and Surabaya, the regional capital for the Great East of the Indies, itself an empire. Each great port vir-
[439] tually dominates the national import trade; all tend, however, to share some part of the
504 national export trade with lesser ports. In
361 spite of these great similarities, the nature and functions of the ports differ markedly. As Allen observes: "All ports are individual. History, geography, politics, and economics all contribute to making them as they are. Few universal principles apply, and attempts to force uniformity on ports which have grown up differently are bound to fail."[18] Singapore, for example, is one of the

tial area is primarily on higher ground in the 361
northern part of the city. The University of 563
Malaya is located in Singapore, though
plans are being made to move it to Johore
Baru on the Malayan mainland. Being 162
largely a Chinese city, Singapore has come
to act as a center for the Nan Yang expatri- 361
ate Chinese, and the city has been chosen as
the site of a new Chinese-language regional 184
university.[20] Nevertheless, its air is not that 563
of a Chinese city, nor, for that matter, is it
English. Like all great cities, it is cosmopolitan, but it is also culturally rootless, perhaps more so than any of the other great cities of the region.

At the other extreme is Bangkok, most 361
indigenous of the great cities. Founded as
the last of a series of "forward capitals"[21] by 184
the Thai in 1783, after the destruction of 175
Ayuthia by the Burmese, the city has never lost its native quality. The soaring rooftrees of *bot* and the spires of stupa stamp the Bangkok skyline with a character of its own. The city is located on the left bank of the Menam Chao Phya within the southernmost great bend of the river some twenty miles from its mouth. Exceptional problems of poor drainage plagued the city from [364 312a]
the start, and its numerous *klongs* or canals have given it the rather misleading title of the "Venice of the East."

A Chinese city early appeared to the 361
southeast of the original castle town and in
time became part of the central business 34
district. As the lesser *klongs* were filled in to 184
become roads, the city continued to expand. A new city appeared on the northern outskirts of the old, a planned creation built in the reign of Rama VI with broad boulevards and buildings ranging from shocking Victorian variations on Italian Renaissance to more recent battleship modern. The contrast between the façade of modern buildings fronting these boulevards and the stilted, bamboo, thatch, and tin-roofed houses

[20] Richard Butwell, "A Chinese University for Malaya," *Pacific Affairs*, December, 1953.

[21] See reference to Cornish in Spate, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

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Bangkok

361 behind them is one of the most striking
34 demonstrations of cultural dualism in South-
184 east Asia.

Unlike the other great cities, Bangkok
175 originated as the capital of a land-oriented
361 agrarian state. Its proximity to tidewater
was accidental. In 1822 the ship bearing the
504 Crawfurd mission to the Thai court barely
177 was able to cross the bar at the mouth of the
Menam, then covered by only four feet of
178 water.[22] Its poor harbor and its remoteness
from the major shipping routes of the South China Sea conspired to retard the development of the city as a port until the end of the nineteenth century and to retain it as an anachronism in Southeast Asia—a growing city, nearly great, surely primate, but indigenous rather than Western. Nevertheless, since it was through Bangkok that Western influences filtered into Thailand, it is a case of an indigenous capital acting as a revolutionary medium for socioeconomic change.

504 Bangkok is still the least convenient port
of the great cities in Southeast Asia. The bar
361 across the mouth of the Chao Phya was
dredged through only in 1952, and port facilities are modest as compared with the other cities. Indeed, most vessels still anchor in the Bight of Bangkok in the lee of the island, Kao Hsi Kang, at the mouth of the Chao Phya and transship their cargoes to and from river barges and country boats which link the island with Bangkok. Surprisingly, the freight tonnage handled at Bangkok is about one-third that of Singapore, although the volume of shipping is only one-tenth as large. The explanation lies partly in the large bulk shipments of rice which form the main export. Partly, also, there is a lower load factor at Singapore, since much of the shipping which enters its harbor is as much dependent on the local complex of service facilities as on cargo potential. At Bangkok, peripheral as it is to the main trade routes, few vessels call without assurances of sizable cargoes.

[22] See J. Crawfurd, *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China* (London: H. Colburn & R. Bentley, 1830).

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Bangkok

On the other hand[1] changes in transportation have elevated Bangkok to a new importance. It lies astride the main air route between Europe and the Far East, and the Australia-Europe services also pass through it. It is now the leading international air center in Southeast Asia, with 42 international departures a week in 1953 as compared with Singapore's 27, and its airport is one of the larger commercial fields in the Orient. 361 508 369

The role of the Southeast Asian great city has been modified by the Pacific war and the granting of independence to Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and partial independence to Vietnam. Five of the six great cities are now capitals of the independent states. Each of these merits the title "link capital"; that is, they are the media through which the newly independent states are linked with the outside world. At the same time, they have begun to assume an increasingly indigenous character. The substitution of Malay for Dutch names and street signs in Indonesia is only one evidence of cultural change. The in-migration of petty officials, tradesmen, and refugees from the beleaguered rural areas has given the urban populations a new and more homogeneous native cast. The fevers of nationalism have made the large minorities more cautious about flaunting their ethnic independence. 361 178 184 162 563 177 631 369

[1] [i.e. as compared to the inconvenient port facilities -- Analyst]

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361 On the other hand, the war also brought in-
178 creased American influence into the region,
631 and the ubiquitous Coca-Cola sign is one of
•184 the symbols of change that sooner or later will be followed by changes in urban facilities and urban organization.

162 More important, the present period is as-
563 sociated with an increasing intensification of
171 the economic activities of government and a corresponding diminution of foreign enter-
369 prise. Political and administrative functions have become increasingly important since the war. Since the main governmental organs are concentrated in the largest centers, the direct influence of the great city upon the country in which it is primate is likewise increasing. Relations between nationalized city and an increasingly money-oriented countryside are becoming more intimate, and the formerly clear-cut cultural distinctiveness of city and country is rapidly becoming blurred. Therefore, the likelihood of the great city's leading a revival of ancient value systems, as some extreme ethnocentrists hope it will, is small. Only one prediction can be made: the days of the culturally alien and ethnically distinct urban center are numbered in Southeast Asia; and a city like Singapore becomes increasingly an anomalous relict of an age now past.

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181 local custom and religious rule, had been present for centuries. But there
177 was little in the economic situation to sharpen it, and the Muslim leaders
565 themselves were often so steeped in the local ways that they allowed as the
602 religious law what was, in fact, the local custom. With the growth of
776 Western processes, the perception of new economic advantages tended to
779 change the equilibrium of the two principles. The advance of education
671 and heightened consciousness of Islam as a world faith also tended to make
182 the religious leaders themselves much more keenly aware of any divergence. Wealthy men who want to leave property to their sons, men with a strong religious sense, men who regard themselves as progressive, or who are in revolt against their clan leaders, therefore tend to be protagonists of the Muslim law. The conservatives, those who see in the custom a defence for women, those who see in it a symbol of an essentially Malay way of life, argue for the retention of the custom. Contact with the West, they say, is changing the structure of the peasant society enough already. The issue has also entered the modern political scene, since the search for factors to increase Malay integration tends to stress the national and extra-national character of Islam at the expense of the more local qualities of the *adat*. Here too it is growing Westernization which has sharpened the issue.

184 In a general discussion such as this, one may be allowed to refer to the
565 peasantry of South East Asia as a body. But they are not uniform in ethnic composition, in national interests, in language, in religion, or in general culture. Moreover, within any local community, there are competing, even conflicting, interests and opinions. The peasant may be unable to face up to the general issues which affect his life so deeply, but in so far as he understands his own interests he is very alive to them and capable of exercising keen judgement in them. It is the small scale of his organization for the most part which renders him so vulnerable.

000 What is likely to be the future of South East Asia from the peasant angle? Prediction is not worth much, since so many elements in the situation are imperfectly known, but there are a few which seem to be significant.

565 The peasant has no native middle class, of the same society as himself,
185 to give a lead to his development and stability in any wider economic
656 organizations that may be set up for his benefit. To improve his economic lot, and in particular to give him a larger fraction of his product through control of marketing, co-operative societies have often been proposed and sometimes tried. Their success has been only limited, partly because the peasant has not been fully persuaded of their attractions as against what the alien middleman can offer, and partly because of the difficulty of securing adequate technical supervision and administration at a sufficiently low official level. Much is now apt to be made of the colonial or semi-colonial status of the South East Asian peasant as a drag upon his development. There is no doubt that colonialism, as a specific form of political control of under-developed territories by a metropolitan Power, is

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always sufficient land for the population without undue pressure on the forests. A result of British rule has been to increase the population and correspondingly to reduce the rest period of the soil. The consequences have been deforestation and soil erosion. For that reason the authorities have attempted to stop this mode of land use. 241 [185]

In Java shifting cultivation attracted the attention of the government as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century. It was practiced especially in the mountains. The fact that a shifting cultivator required more land than a peasant who cultivated the same piece of land year after year made shifting cultivation extremely undesirable to a colonial administration that wanted to use all available land for the production of cash crops—either under the "forced culture system" of 1830 to 1870[21] or under the private plantation system that has existed since 1870. This circumstance, together with an alarming increase in population, prompted the government to do everything possible to stop the practice of shifting cultivation in Java, and today it is found only in the quite thinly settled residency of Bantam in West Java.[22] In the Outer Islands, with their sparse population and large forest areas, it is widely practiced. But, in contrast to their predecessors, Dutch officials of recent times rarely use the term *Raubbau* for shifting cultivation. Instead they consider this form of land use justifiable if the abandoned fields revert to forest and have the possibility of regaining their former fertility. In the past fifteen years, however, warning voices have pointed out that in large parts of the Outer Islands ladang culture has become a source of destruction, for the forest is no longer being given an opportunity to recuperate.[23] Both agricultural and forestry officials have consequently become concerned over shifting cultivation. In 1930 Hagreis presented a paper on ladang culture before the congress of officials of the Agricultural Advisory Service in the Netherlands Indies.[24] At that time it was decided to appoint a special commission to study ladang culture.[25] The foresters, also, devoted a good deal of attention to the problem during their congress in 1937. In 1940 Van Beukering of the Department of Economic Affairs summarized the result of the ladang *enquête*.[26] He came to the conclusion that shifting cultivation is a logical and economically justifiable form of land use wherever there is a large amount of land available and a primitive economy exists. From a social point of view no objection can be raised if, after each occupation, the fertility of the soil is regained. There is no reason to insist upon more intensive forms of land use so long as the population density does not increase beyond 50 persons per square kilometer, or 130 persons per square mile. If at this density we 241 185 311 [61]

[21] From 1830 to 1870 the peasants of Java were forced, under the notorious "culture system," to devote part of their land and labor to producing crops for the government.
[22] Kools: Hoema's, 1935.
[23] Gonggrijp: "Soil Management," 1938, pp. 397–404.
[24] Hagreis: "Ladangbouw," 1930, pp. 43–75 and 629–642.
[25] "Enquête betreffende het ladangvraagstuk," 1931, pp. 1022–1033.
[26] Van Beukering: Het ladangvraagstuk. Unpublished typescript, 1940.

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allow for five persons per family and assume that the family shifts its cultivation plot annually but returns to the same plot after an average period of 10 years, each family could occupy annually one hectare, or 2.47 acres. This is the amount of land that an average shifting cultivator in the Indies needs in order to cover the food requirements of his family.

This calculation does not make any allowance for permanent forests. Actually, however, the land requirements are not quite so high, because very often the same land is used for two years instead of one, which would either allow for a longer period of fallow or keep a part of the virgin forest intact. The latter is improbable because of the shifting cultivator's preference for virgin forest.

To summarize these opinions, shifting cultivation from the agricultural point of view is not considered objectionable so long as vegetation and the fertility of the soil are restored by nature. The opinion of those who regard it as a fatal agricultural system under all circumstances is widely felt to be unjustified. From the silvicultural point of view, shifting cultivation is held to be objectionable if it destroys timber that would otherwise be exploited by the forest service or by private concessionaries.

Supplementing Shifting Cultivation With Cash Crops in the Netherlands Indies

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The products of the typical shifting cultivator never reach a distant market. There is seldom any surplus, for the shifting cultivator is a subsistence farmer who lives from hand to mouth. In the Outer Islands of the Netherlands Indies, however, the shifting cultivator has been drawn into modern economy and has modified this age-old system. In parts of Sumatra and Borneo he has begun to diversify his economy by planting tree crops on the ladang among his rice or maize. After one or two harvests the fields are abandoned and left to the trees that have been planted. The trees then furnish an additional source of income as soon as they reach the bearing stage. Pepper has been raised as a ladang crop for many centuries, especially in the Lampoeng Districts. Coffee was introduced in the days of the Dutch East India Company and adopted as a commercial crop by the peasants. Benzoin (*Styrax benzoin* Dryander), also, has long been grown in this manner. More recently coconuts and, since about 1905, rubber have become ladang crops (Figs. 25–33).[1]

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A shifting cultivator may, over a period of years, convert his old ladangs into rubber gardens, for example, until he is assured of a sufficient income from his permanent tree crop to buy his food from the outside and no longer requires a ladang for the production of food. This process has led to the creation of the large native rubber areas in Borneo and Sumatra, where some shifting cultivators have become dependent upon the market price of rubber and upon the policy of the government in regard to taxation and export control. In times of low prices and export restrictions they may suffer severe economic setbacks and even hardship. In Bengkalis

[1 See p. 39 ff, cat. 241 or 116 -- Analyst]

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[See p. 27, category 116. -- Analyst]

1,500,000, or at the most 2,000,000, which would mean about 300,000 to 400,000 households. This number of households could hardly occupy such a large rây area as Gourou assumes. 241 311

In Formosa only the Malay tribes of the mountains in the eastern half of the island practice shifting cultivation. They number, according to estimates, about 150,000. From this we may assume that not more than 30,000 to 50,000 hectares are occupied annually by shifting cultivators. 134

In the Philippines it is unlawful to make caiñgins on public land without the permission of the Bureau of Forestry.[34] Permission will be given if the forest on the land involved is of no commercial value and if the caiñgero accepts the obligation to reforest his patch with seeds supplied by the forest service. Several hundred caiñgeros are brought annually before the justices of the peace, who in the past, because their sympathy was with the caiñgeros, were usually rather reluctant to fine the culprits (Table II). Nobody knows, of course, how many illegal caiñgins escape detection, but it is certain that they greatly outnumber those that are made with the permission of the foresters added to those that have been brought to the attention of the courts. Special consideration is given to the "non-Christian" tribes, for whom tracts of land have been set aside within which they continue their age-old system of cultivation. In Mindanao probably three-fourths of the population, from the primitive Manobos to the more advanced Moros, practice the caiñgin system of cultivation. Other regions where this system is practiced extensively are Mindoro, Cebu, southern Negros, and parts of Luzon—the central and eastern cordillera and the Camarines. About 10 per cent of the population of the Philippines obtain a part or all of their food from caiñgins, most of which are made either on private land or on land that belongs to non-Christian tribes who know no other form of agriculture. [162]

Methods of Eliminating the Undesirable Aspects of Shifting Cultivation

In regions where the density of population exceeds 50 persons per square kilometer, shifting cultivation becomes wasteful and destructive. It is imperative in such areas that the system be either modified or else replaced by more conserving and, where possible, more intensive forms of land use. For most backward tribes this involves fundamental changes in their mode of life, religious ideas, and concepts of land rights. 241 311 161

In some instances it should suffice to adopt measures that eliminate the harmful or wasteful after effects of the system without requiring that this kind of land use be given up completely. Let us assume that we have a somewhat thinly settled region containing a forest that is not particularly valuable and the exploitation of which is impracticable or at present inexpedient. Deforestation and the spread of grasses are undesirable aspects 185 241 311

[34] Nano: "Kaiñgin Laws," 1939, pp. 87–92.

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of shifting cultivation in the area. In such a case reforestation would be assured by keeping fire out of the old clearings. This could be done by leaving relatively non-inflammable forest belts at least 60 feet wide between individual clearings. These forest belts would offer some protection against the spread of grass fires and at the same time would be a source of seed for further reforestation. Reforestation under such circumstances would be much easier and cheaper than if large contiguous areas were to be cleared and used.

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Where natural reforestation is particularly slow, cultivators should be required to practice artificial reforestation. In scattered regions in Southeastern Asia tribesmen do this on their own initiative. Pendleton reports such a case in Burma.[35] Certain Dyak tribes in Borneo plant seeds of the candlenut tree (*Aleurites moluccana* Willd.) about 3 meters apart in a freshly cleared ladang before it has even been burned. In the eastern part of the Malay Archipelago shifting cultivators plant such trees as *Aleurites moluccana* Willd., *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Hibiscus similis* Bl., *Casuarina equisetifolia* L., *Macaranga* species, *Euphorbia* species, *Sesbania grandiflora* Pers., and *Desmodium timoriense* DC. for the purpose of restoring the forest.

In Sumatra Deli tobacco planters initiated artificial reforestation after alang-alang had regularly invaded their fallow fields and caught fire so frequently that second-growth forest could not get a start. In Deli the tobacco fields are in use only 1 year and lie fallow 7 to 10 years. They should be protected by forest growth during that period. Therefore, in order to make this possible, the planters controlled fires by planting belts of teak along the highways and roads. These belts served as fireguards and at the same time provided lumber for tobacco-drying sheds. On the tobacco fields themselves they planted especially *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Cassia siamea* Lam., *Pithecellobium saman* Benth., and *Leucaena glauca* Benth., which drive out the alang-alang[36] (Figs. 34–39). !

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Another way of speeding up reforestation is to spare a few of the larger trees at the time of the clearing. This is done by the Malays of Sumatra. They do not cut down *Koompassia parvifolia* Prain, *Arenga saccharifera* Labill., *Durio zibethinus* Murr. (durian), *Parkia* species, or *Garcinia grandifolia* Pierre.[37] The last three are fruit trees that are numerous in the forest, whereas the second is a palm whose flower stalk is tapped for its sugary sap and the first is preferred by bees as a hiving tree, which gives it its name, "bee-tree." This tree is preserved because the people want the honey. Worthington reports that in Africa "some tribes appear to realize the necessity of maintaining tree growth on their clearings and merely top the trees and lop the branches, so that the trees are enabled to

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[35] Similar cases are known in the residency of Benkoelen in Sumatra, in central Celebes, and in Flores. See Hagreis: "Ladangbouw," 1930, p. 631.

[36] Jochems: "De begroeiing der tabakslanden," n.d., pp. 77–89.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 30–32.

! [See p 40 ff, cat 116 --Analyst]

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recuperate quickly when the area is again allowed to revert to bush."[38] 245

Several of the forest services of Southeastern Asia have made a rather successful use of the shifting cultivator in their endeavor to reforest the land. They have combined shifting culture and silviculture by hiring shifting cultivators to cut mature trees and to sow or plant new trees on cut-over or burned-over land. For this the cultivators are paid a small wage. In addition they are allowed to grow their own crops for one or two years between the rows of young trees. This system, known as the "taungya forestry system," was developed in 1856 by the German forester, Dietrich Brandis, while he was Superintendent of Forests in Pegu, Burma.[39] It is ingenious in that it recognizes the habits of the shifting cultivator and fits them into a modern forest economy instead of persecuting the cultivator and forcing him to give up his traditional culture. This system has been used in the teak forests of Java since 1871. The forest service makes a contract[40] with the peasants of Java according to which the peasants are to prepare the land and plant and take care of teak trees (*Tectona grandis* L.) in return for a small sum of money and the right to plant such crops as maize and red pepper (*Capsicum annuum* L.) between the rows of teak. The cultivation of upland rice is discouraged, and the planting of cassava, peanuts, castor beans, and tobacco usually is not allowed (Figs. 40, 41). 1/A

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The taungya forestry system is an excellent way of getting pure stands of commercial timber. The typical forest of the tropics is expensive to exploit because of the large variety of trees which it contains, many of which have little or no commercial value.[41] [313]

As important as reforestation is soil erosion control. Where shifting cultivation is practiced in mountainous regions it often causes such acceleration in the rate of erosion that the rivers are choked with sediment and periodically do great flood damage. Flood control could be achieved in most cases by completely closing the headwaters and watershed areas to cultivators. On more gentle slopes the clearings should be rather narrow, should parallel the contours, and be separated by belts of forest. If at the same time the forest uphill were protected by fireguards, the clearings would have a chance to close quickly again so that the soil would be

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[38] Worthington: Science in Africa, 1938, pp. 378–379.

[39] *Taungya* is the Burmese term for the temporary field of the shifting cultivator, a term that the foresters have adopted. E. P. Stebbing in his work, The Forests of India, Vol. 1, 1922, p. 376, writes:

"Brandis, moreover, recognized that the very system which, till then, had destroyed teak forests might be utilized to produce them, . . . and as early as 1856 an attempt was made in Prome district to sow teak in regular rows, together with the rice scattered by the toungya [*sic*] cutters. Twenty years afterwards this attempt had grown into a regular system, by which areas were being annually stocked with teak at a cost far below that of regular plantations." See also *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, 1926, pp. 415–428.

[40] Becking: "De djaticultuur op Java," 1928, pp. 50–52.

[41] Heske: "Der tropische Wald," 1939, p. 414. Heske's article gives an excellent short account of the forests of Southeastern Asia and points out that they are on the whole much easier to exploit than are the forests of tropical America because of the abundance of cheap labor.

1/A [See p. 41, cat. 1H -- Analysis]

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•185 134 133 protected against abnormal erosion. Terracing would be the most effective method of checking soil erosion, but this requires a good deal of labor, which is scarce in areas of shifting cultivation.

654 134 185 133 The Forestry Service of the Indies started an interesting soil-erosion experiment near Tjiwidej in the mountains south of Bandoeng at an elevation of 1800 meters. Two adjacent parcels of forest land, lying on rather steep slopes, are drained separately—out of each parcel comes a little brook—and thus form separate drainage units. Both parcels were used by shifting cultivators who had cut and burned the forest. In one case the slope was left undisturbed; in the other the slope was terraced. At the foot of each slope catch basins were constructed to retain the sediment that was washed down by rain water and transported by the brooks. The amount of water that drains out of each unit was measured and the sediment weighed. The purpose of this experiment was to get quantitative measurements of the amount of erosion that is caused by shifting cultivation and to study the effect of terracing in reducing soil loss. During the first year both parcels lost very little soil, because the humus layer protected it; but in the second year the unterraced parcel lost 5.065 kg. of silt per square meter whereas the terraced parcel lost only one-half as much, or 2.524 kg.[42] (Figs. 42–45). 1

Under the conditions that we have discussed so far, no radical change in the system of cultivation is required. If, however, the population increases to such an extent that there is no longer enough available land to allow for a sufficiently long rotation cycle, more drastic remedies are necessary.

654 185 245 134 Such a situation arose in parts of the Outer Islands and attracted the attention of government specialists. Legal experts familiar with Indonesian customary law, foresters, and agricultural advisers collaborated to seek a solution.[43] Realizing that shifting cultivators are usually reluctant to give up their traditional form of land use, the specialists approached the ladang problem by searching for means of reforesting ladangs quickly. Experiments were made with the planting of quick-growing leguminous and non-leguminous trees, bushes, and shrubs to shorten the fallow period, restore the humus, protect the soil against accelerated erosion, eliminate the grasses, and, in the case of leguminous species, improve the soil by adding nitrogen.[44] We have already seen, however, that artificial refor-

[42] I was able to visit the Tjiwidej experiment with Mr. L. Gonggrijp, under whose supervision the work was carried out. For a detailed report on the project see Gonggrijp: "Het erosie-onderzoek," 1941, pp. 200–220.

[43] H. J. Friedericy of the Department of the Interior and H. Vonk and E. J. Wind of the Department of Economic Affairs, for example, worked together on the problem of ladang culture in the residency of Palembang.

[137] [44] Experimental plantings included, among others, *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., a light-loving tree which is typical in Southeastern Asia of dry, rather open climax forests and of second-growth forests; *Hibiscus tiliaceus* L.; *Albizzia falcata* Backer, one of the fastest-growing trees of Southeastern Asia, used widely as a shade tree on coffee plantations; *Aleurites moluccana* Willd., a tree at home in the drier parts of the East Indies; *Leucaena glauca* Benth.; *Pterocarpus indicus* Willd., a large tree frequently used along roadsides as

1 [see p. 42, category 116 -- Analyst]

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estation is not a discovery of Western-trained scientists but has long been practiced by certain groups in Southeastern Asia. It was the plan of the government to spread and enforce this practice of artificial reforestation wherever advisable. This practice, whereby the cultivator determines the vegetative cover during the fallow period instead of abandoning the ladang to chance growth, brings him to a transition stage between shifting cultivation and permanent cultivation. From there the step to permanent cultivation with crop rotation is but a short one.

Permanent cultivation requires repeated tilling and therefore more labor and tools than the shifting cultivator is accustomed to. Work animals are also desirable. An important obstacle to intensification of agriculture in wide areas of Southeastern Asia, however, is the fact that hill and mountain regions [up to about 1500 meters in elevation] are frequently infested with malaria so that the energy of the people is greatly reduced.[45] Moreover, the acquisition of such implements as plows, harrows, and hoes, and especially of work animals, calls for financial resources or credit, both of which the average shifting cultivator lacks. Some shifting cultivators do own livestock, such as cattle or carabaos, but utilize neither their labor nor their manure. Groups of the Mois in the mountains of Annam have carabaos, but they do not use the animals in their agricultural activities because they "cannot talk" to them.[46] On the Lesser Sunda Islands livestock is kept because it gives social prestige to the owner. Overstocking of the pasture areas on these islands has led to overgrazing and has cut into the forest area until there has developed a scarcity of land suitable for ladang cultivation. The same has happened in large areas in Africa. There it has been necessary to teach the native peasant the use of cattle and make him familiar with the plow. This was done successfully in northern Nigeria by combining the animal husbandry of the nomadic Fulani with the indigenous shifting cultivation of the Hausa peasant, thus developing "a system of permanent farming whereby a man with cattle of his own, say two working oxen and a few cows, can plough and maintain in fertility an area of land sufficient to supply all the requirements of himself and his family, and to obtain a surplus balance as a return for his labour. . . . Thus mixed farming represents a gradual evolution from the shifting methods of cultivation to a static type of agriculture, by the introduction of animal husbandry, and with the use of animal cultivation."[47] Above all, the peasant learns to preserve the animal manure and

a shade tree; *Dolichos lablab* L., a climbing herb which is valuable as a vegetable; *Crotolaria anagyroides* H.B. and K., a bush of vigorous growth which attains a height of from 12 to 14 feet and forms an excellent green manure; *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., low shrubs useful as green manures; and *Mimosa invisa* Mart., a leguminous creeper which suppresses grasses.

[45] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 181 and 350.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 354.

[47] King: "Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1939, p. 271. See also Faulkner and Mackie: West African Agriculture, 1933; and by the same authors: "The Introduction of Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1936, pp. 89–96.

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to apply it regularly to his fields in order to keep up the fertility which formerly was restored through long forest fallow. This animal fertilizer is more important than the help the peasant gets from his animals in the way of labor. Thus the area to be cultivated may be limited by the amount of manure available, rather than by the extent of land that can be plowed.

Van Beukering, in his summary of the results of the ladang *enquête*, is of the opinion that similar practices should be introduced in the Outer Islands of the Netherlands Indies; but the pasture problem must first be carefully studied before mixed farming can be widely established in the Indies. Where animal manure is not available, the composting of vegetable waste, or even of crops grown for this specific purpose, supplies an excellent fertilizer.

The intensification and modification of shifting cultivation are less difficult in flat country than on sloping land where there is the hazard of soil erosion. Perhaps the most obvious solution would be to move the population from mountainous land to the plains and valley floors, but this can be done only in areas where population density is low. In Southeastern Asia the density of population on the plains is usually so high that, should it be possible to bring malaria under control, a movement from the plains to the uplands and mountains would be desirable rather than a migration in the opposite direction. Another solution would be to have the shifting cultivator plant permanent tree crops to protect the soil against accelerated erosion. Steep slopes which now produce but a single moderate rice crop every few years could be made more productive if planted with perennials. The cultivator could then buy his staple food with the money obtained from the sale of the crops harvested from his trees.

The speed with which the change from shifting cultivation to permanent cultivation may be made will depend both on the geographical environment and the cultural level of the community. Shifting cultivators with permanent villages and a regularly established rotation of fields will respond much more readily to a reform brought from the outside than a group that is always ready to abandon its dwellings and move to a new locality.

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land. An example is *mongo* (*Phaseolus mungo* L.), grown in Pangasinan and Batangas. Alarmed by the poor rice crops in 1940 and the difficulty of importing rice from Indochina and Thailand, the Philippine Bureau of Plant Industry, early in 1941, started to distribute seed of quick-growing dry-field crops, especially maize and legumes, in order to supplement the nation's rice bowl. But the average Filipino farmer is reluctant to accept this new practice, because "it is not the custom"—a powerful argument not to be easily overcome. [249] [654] 241

Dry-Field Crops Cultivated by Plantations

The discussion thus far has been limited to the native cultivation of dry land and to annual crops. However, extensive areas of non-irrigated land are occupied by perennial crops that are grown on plantations owned by Westerners. The crops produced include tea, coffee, cacao, quinine, rubber, palm oil, coconuts, kapok, sisal, and other fibre plants. Some of these crops were cultivated for a long time without the proper measures being taken to protect the soil against accelerated erosion. Although the detrimental effects of plantation agriculture in Ceylon and southern India are notorious in the plantation history of southern Asia, results were just as disastrous in Malaya and in the Netherlands Indies. Westerners, accustomed to clean cultivation or clean weeding in the temperate zone, carried this practice over into the tropics, with the result that soil erosion was very severe on steep slopes and led to great losses in soil fertility. Today, however, these mistakes have been recognized; there is hardly a plantation that has not adopted measures to protect sloping land against erosion and level land against soil exhaustion. The planters of Java were the pioneers in this field, introducing or developing most of the protective measures. These measures include contour drains, silt pits, contour ridges, terraces, hedges, shade trees, and especially cover crops. The use of these measures varies according to the crop, or crops, produced and according to climate, soil, and slope; but the purpose of all of them is to encourage an effective ground cover and to check the rate of water run-off. The financial depression of the 1930's—resulting in the need for very strict economy and a decrease in production costs—has helped considerably to reduce the amount of clean weeding and to convince conservative planters of the value of preserving a ground cover, litter, and mulch. Such measures help not only to retard erosion but also to enrich the soil. The first Western planter who broke away from the custom of keeping the ground of his plantation free from weeds was L. M. Tyl, who in the years 1890–96 developed the "weed-system" and thus introduced the idea of a ground cover into plantation circles of Southeastern Asia. But it took many years before his idea was generally accepted. It is interesting to note here that the Asiatic-owned plantations and the small holdings producing perennial crops, such as rubber, usually did not practice clean weeding. This, in the early days, was regarded by European observers as a sign of laziness and 241 177 185 242

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poor management, but, as has been so often the case, the Westerners were finally forced to admit the soundness of Oriental cultivation practices.

As we have seen, there are two principal means of protecting the soil between tree crops: by allowing the growth of indigenous plants or weeds (in other words the development of a natural mixed cover), or by establishing a pure cover of leguminous plants, many of which came originally from the New World. Rubber planters in Malaya seem to have had more success with the first method, which has been called "the forestry method of cultivation" or "rubber forestry." [67] Of course, the growth of indigenous plants or weeds must be controlled, and this is done by slashing the undergrowth from time to time. Frequently it is necessary to practice selective weeding in order to suppress undesirable plants and encourage more valuable ones.

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Much research has been directed toward the study of leguminous cover crops which supply nitrogen, as well as foliage for green manure. This research was started in 1910 in the Botanical Garden at Buitenzorg. Some of the cover crops that have proved especially valuable and are widely used on modern plantations are *Calopogonium mucunoides* Desv., *Centrosema pubescens* Benth., *Centrosema plumierii* Benth., *Desmodium* species, *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., *Mimosa invisa* Mart., *Cassia* species, and *Vigna oligosperma* Backer.[68] Several of these have already been mentioned in the foregoing discussion on the use of green manure crops in native agriculture.

Because a number of perennials such as tea, coffee, and cacao are commonly grown under shade trees, many writers seem to believe that these plants need shade. This may be true in part, but more important is the fact that the shade trees protect the soil against excessive losses of moisture and undesirable changes in soil composition, texture, and structure and thus prevent a reduction of the quantity of humus in the soil. Most of the commonly used shade trees are legumes which, in addition to shade, supply litter and nitrogen and help to increase the moisture-holding capacity of the soil, thus reducing the danger of erosion. *Erythrina micropteryx* Poepp., *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., *Leucaena glauca* Benth., *Albizzia moluccana* Miq., *Albizzia chinensis* Merr., *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Pithecellobium dulce* Benth., or Manila tamarind, and *Peltophorum pterocarpum* Backer are especially useful in this respect.

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[67] Haines: "The Uses and Control of Natural Undergrowth," 1934.

[68] For a very extensive list of cover crops, green manures, and shade trees, see Heyne: De nuttige planten van Nederlandsch-Indië, Vol. 3, 1927. See also International Institute of Agriculture: *op. cit.*

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161 development who fear that these countries might not be able
433 to expand their production faster than population expands, in which case the result of economic development efforts will be a greater quantity of people with little or no gains in the quality of living conditions. In Zinkin's words, "The growth of population and the impact of the West have between them, in the last hundred years, so upset the delicate balance that most of the Asian countryside is now bankrupt . . . . The alarming feature of the peasant economy of Asia is not simply that it is desparately poor. It is that in recent decades, and in most countries of Asia, it has been growing poorer. It is a changing, dynamic economy. But it has been changing for the worse."[23]

433 Poverty is not new in Southeast Asia. What is new
829 is the awareness of poverty and the conviction that something
178 can be done about it. "A great change", reported Harold Butler, "is stirring Eastern society. The consciousness of misery has been created by the growing realization that it is not the inescapable lot of the poor and that chances
654 of better life now exist."[24] All of the countries in South-
648 east Asia have within the past decade set up official agen-
185 cies charged with planning and promoting economic development; and for international assistance to hasten it, is the constant

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23. Zinkin, op. cit., p. 34.

24. Harold Butler, Problems of Industry in the East (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1938, Studies and Reports, Series B, No. 29), pp. 65-66.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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648 theme of their spokesmen in the economic and social organs
185 of the United Nations. It is probably too early at this moment to speculate on the outcome of Southeast Asia's
000 determination to industrialize. Much can be said, however, about the element of urgency and speediness commonly attached to each project of industrial development envisaged by each of these countries. "For successful development," cautions Staley, "two things are necessary: a substantial and continued economic advance -- and a social and political outcome which produces self-reliant citizenship in a free society, stable and responsive democratic government, and cooperation with other free societies."[25] The same writer warns that if capital investment and material technology are puched energetically in an underdeveloped country while little or no attention is given to deliberate promotion of appropriate social and psychological change, the result is likely to be either a failure of the development process to "take" and become "self-generating" or creation of a menace to the free world.[26] Garner also gives similar warning, "People have to develop themselves before they can change their physical environment, and this is a slow process."[27]

43 A most important factor that has kept Southeast Asia
44 economically underdeveloped is the small size of market in

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25. Staley, op. cit., p. 202.

26. Ibid., p. 203.

27. Ibid., p. 203.

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health and welfare induced the governments throughout the region to legislate that laborers be recruited with full knowledge of, and with a physique adequate to, the conditions of their future work; that they receive medical care and compensation for illness and injury; that certain minimum wage standards and a maximum number of working hours be maintained, either by district or by industry; that women and children be not employed in tasks beyond their strength. Everywhere labor inspectorates were created to see that the labor laws were enforced, but because of budgetary limitations they were hardly ever equal to their task. Though these were undoubtedly steps in the right direction they were far from adequate. Much of the legislation in the colonies was taken over from that of the home country or other colonies and only partially adapted to local conditions. Often it was wholly inappropriate to the area where it was applied. Even where it was at first applicable, it did not necessarily remain so, because industries and occupations changed; and invariably it covered only a fraction of the total labor force in the country. Further, inspectors usually lacked the time and the authority to see that even the few laws on the statute books were enforced. More complete, more specifically focussed, and more generally applicable labor laws were needed. 466

Having enacted measures designed to keep order and protect the laborer's physical well-being and the proceeds of his toil, the governments of the region felt that they had few additional obligations toward their wage-earning population. Conditions in Southeast Asia were sufficiently better than those prevailing in southern India and in China to attract all the labor that was needed; and this lulled the governments into believing that even if the territories under their sway had not achieved a labor millennium, there was no urgent need to do more. However, on the eve of the Pacific War, certain of the governments became more active in projecting further labor codes and reforms, long held under consideration. [185]

Although embryonic associations of workers existed in each country of Southeast Asia, they did not grow and coalesce to become important economic entities. No genuine trade-union movement had developed before the war broke out in the Pacific. Such associations as formed invariably occurred first among transport workers, since railroads, tramways and harbor operations were the first industries created in the area and since they could most easily be held up by strikes and found it most difficult to replace their workers even when there was a large surplus supply of general laborers. Moreover, the workers in them were fairly well concentrated geographically. The delayed growth of unionism in others of the larger enterprises is explained by the extremely small minority of industrial workers amid the large and unassimilable blocs of foreign laborers, and by the indifference of the governments to the formation 467

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181 local custom and religious rule, had been present for centuries. But there
177 was little in the economic situation to sharpen it, and the Muslim leaders
565 themselves were often so steeped in the local ways that they allowed as the
602 religious law what was, in fact, the local custom. With the growth of
776 Western processes, the perception of new economic advantages tended to
779 change the equilibrium of the two principles. The advance of education
671 and heightened consciousness of Islam as a world faith also tended to make
182 the religious leaders themselves much more keenly aware of any divergence. Wealthy men who want to leave property to their sons, men with a strong religious sense, men who regard themselves as progressive, or who are in revolt against their clan leaders, therefore tend to be protagonists of the Muslim law. The conservatives, those who see in the custom a defence for women, those who see in it a symbol of an essentially Malay way of life, argue for the retention of the custom. Contact with the West, they say, is changing the structure of the peasant society enough already. The issue has also entered the modern political scene, since the search for factors to increase Malay integration tends to stress the national and extra-national character of Islam at the expense of the more local qualities of the *adat*. Here too it is growing Westernization which has sharpened the issue.

184 In a general discussion such as this, one may be allowed to refer to the
565 peasantry of South East Asia as a body. But they are not uniform in ethnic composition, in national interests, in language, in religion, or in general culture. Moreover, within any local community, there are competing, even conflicting, interests and opinions. The peasant may be unable to face up to the general issues which affect his life so deeply, but in so far as he understands his own interests he is very alive to them and capable of exercising keen judgement in them. It is the small scale of his organization for the most part which renders him so vulnerable.

000 What is likely to be the future of South East Asia from the peasant angle? Prediction is not worth much, since so many elements in the situation are imperfectly known, but there are a few which seem to be significant.

565 The peasant has no native middle class, of the same society as himself,
● 185 to give a lead to his development and stability in any wider economic
656 organizations that may be set up for his benefit. To improve his economic lot, and in particular to give him a larger fraction of his product through control of marketing, co-operative societies have often been proposed and sometimes tried. Their success has been only limited, partly because the peasant has not been fully persuaded of their attractions as against what the alien middleman can offer, and partly because of the difficulty of securing adequate technical supervision and administration at a sufficiently low official level. Much is now apt to be made of the colonial or semi-colonial status of the South East Asian peasant as a drag upon his development. There is no doubt that colonialism, as a specific form of political control of under-developed territories by a metropolitan Power, is

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nearing the end of its historical phase. How far it is likely to be replaced by a more insidious form of satellitism is not relevant here. But to talk about political emancipation of South East Asia being the prime requirement for the solution of the problems of the peasantry must not obscure the economic factors involved. Nor is fresh capital all that is needed. For the economy of the peasant to attain a relative stability a great development of technical and administrative skills in the commercial field is necessary. The building of a native professional class would seem to be an important element in the construction of a more integrated economic and political system. To concentrate attention on the political factors alone is to overlook the fact that most of the sinews of the economic organism are now provided by the one group which does not have overt political power—the Chinese.

What remains of the traditional class structure in South East Asian society is not of much avail as a defence of the peasant from alien exploitation. In any case, though the rulers and traditional nobility still command much respect, and provide symbols for the unity of the people, there are stirrings of resentment among the people against the perpetuation of a system in which these aristocrats do not perform recognizable services at commensurate incomes. But such resentment does not mean that the peasantry are dry tinder for the spark of Communism to set alight. Communism as yet does not seem to have any great attraction for the mass of the local peasantry of the South East Asian region. The lack of popular response to the Malayan insurrection has shown this. It is presumably true to say that the interest of the peasant can always be secured in any movement which promises to give him greater control of the land—more land more secure tenure, freedom from land debt, and better returns for his produce. But to most of the Indonesian peasants these aims are likely to be sought in nationalism, which can be largely given both an ethnic base and the religious sanctions of Islam. The person to whom the cry for a solution of the land problem is likely to make a most definite appeal, especially in Malaya, is not the Indonesian but the Chinese peasant, who sees himself as excluded from full participation in the land rights of the country folk. Over and over again one hears the cry, ill-founded as it is, that the Chinese have not been allowed to grow rice in Malaya.

Here may well come one of the acute pressure points in the South East Asian scene. The analysis might go as follows. Nationalism is a powerful political force because of its appeal to the individual in a projected, enlarged form of his desires and strivings. But by itself it is an aggressive rather than a constructive force. It lacks a coherent theory for the use of the resources at its control. An ideology containing such theory, and an equally ardent emotional charge on the part of many of its adherents, is provided by Communism. If Communism can work through nationalism it has a most powerful combination. Yet Communism in South East Asia lacks organization of any scale. The optimum conditions for its success are

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hostility to the Military Administration and, after it, to the civil 668
Governments of the Malayan Union and Singapore which succeeded it.

Before the war, the Kuomintang had found its chief support in the mercantile class of Chinese. During the Japanese occupation of the Nanyang this class, being urban and static, was an easy prey for Japanese exactions and for this reason its members, after the liberation, were denounced by the Communists as 'collaborators'. They, themselves, had either remained underground and unnoticed because of their lack of property or, in Malaya, in the case of about 3,000–4,000 only out of a total population of over two million, had become guerrillas in the jungle. The post-liberation result of the situation in this country was that many of the old leaders of the Chinese community were, at least temporarily, discredited and the Communists claimed credit for all resistance to the Japanese. After a while, however, the Kuomintang and the San Min Chu I Youth began to reassert themselves, but they had lost much of their pre-war vigour. The course of the civil war in China and the deterioration of the National Government's position had much to do with the change.

In Indonesia and Indochina, where the purely proletarian element among the Chinese was much smaller, the developments after the Japanese had surrendered placed the Chinese in an unenviable position. In Indonesia the 'middleman' nature of so much of the Chinese activity had made them unpopular with the natives, and during the periods after 1945 when the Dutch were in conflict with the Indonesian Republic neither side was able to afford them adequate protection from the aggression of local communities. Uncontrolled elements in the population (often soldiers) massacred the Chinese in considerable numbers. They were, in particular, accused of espionage for the Dutch. It seems, however, that it was the Dutch who afforded them the best protection and with whom, generally speaking, Chinese sympathies therefore lay. In Indochina, where there was also a considerable animus against the Chinese trader and money-lender (i.e. goods-lender), the community suffered greatly in the disorders and in the civil war which was still continuing in 1949. The French, to afford them protection, and to suit their own strategic dispositions, concentrated them in a few centres, notably in Saigon-Cholon where there was much overcrowding. At the same time many other Chinese

609 186 668

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668 moved to Vietminh-controlled areas, and the Vietminh could
609 claim a considerable number of supporters among the younger Chinese.

186 The advances of militant nationalism in some others of the Southeast Asian countries had made the widespread fear of Chinese economic encroachment a ready source of political capital. In both Siam and the Philippines measures to diminish the Chinese share of the retail trade which had been initiated before the war were now intensified and an anti-Chinese plank was inevitable in the platform of every political party. Chinese Communists were said meanwhile to be actively assisting the Hukbalahaps, the agrarian insurgents in Luzon.

668 This was the dilemma in which the Chinese still found them-
669 selves in the fourth year after the Japanese defeat. But in one country, Malaya, their difficulties as a community became most acute when the Malayan Communist Party, consisting itself mostly of Chinese, decided in June 1948 to start an active terrorist campaign against the British. The constitutional experiment of the Malayan Union followed by that of the Federation of Malaya had left the Chinese generally in a state of political apathy (since the new constitution greatly favoured the Malays at their expense). When the terrorists, who were largely the old guerrillas of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, struck, it was the Chinese themselves who provided most of the casualties on both sides. Many *Towkays* (Chinese business men) were intimidated into contributing to the Communists' funds or supplying them with goods and, being largely isolated, were not in a position to resist these demands. This in turn brought them into conflict with the British authorities. The Chinese squatter community, too, being on the fringe of the jungle was readily utilized by the terrorists and suffered accordingly when British troops and police took reprisals against their villages, burning down their houses and destroying
000 their crops. Many squatters were banished to China. The great danger the British ran was that harsh measures might antagonize large sections of the population, for the government of a great majority by a small minority must ultimately depend upon the consent of the governed. Large-scale measures of varying success were in progress against the terrorists in 1949 when the defeat of the Chinese Nationalist armies by those of the Communists in China and the collapse of the Kuomintang Government gave new

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A visit to Southeast Asia during the third quarter of 1950 after an absence of nearly three years brought home to the writer the accelerated tempo of the change that the countries were undergoing, and, in particular, the dominant role which the politics of China were playing therein. As a tailpiece to this survey he has recorded the impressions of his visit, bringing the account as nearly up to date as the exigencies of publishing would allow. The observations are set down in the order in which the countries were visited.

In his many discussions with statesmen, diplomats, officials, business men, and others in these Southeast Asian countries, the writer became aware of a considerable disagreement among them regarding the number of Chinese in the area. There was, in the case of Siam and Indochina in particular, no figure that was generally accepted. The definition of 'Chinese' was an initial difficulty (as it has so often been in the course of this survey) for many Chinese appeared to possess a dual racial character, discarding one aspect and assuming the other as circumstances suggested.[1] It seemed also that that clandestine immigration into Siam, Indochina, and the Philippines and (perhaps) Indonesia within the last two or three years, had been very considerable, for during this period the immigration laws had been greatly tightened. The writer was compelled, therefore, to revise the estimates he had made in the demographic chapters of the survey to suit the probable facts of 1950 and to adopt a total not very far short of 10 million ethnic Chinese for the whole of Southeast Asia. This estimate, however, does not materially alter the ratio of Chinese to other races in the area and has no very important bearing on the general political and economic considerations which have been described in the text.

Burma. In July 1950 the Chinese Nationalist ambassador had left Burma, and one other official of the embassy had also gone away, but the remainder of both the embassy and consular staff had agreed to serve under the People's Government of China which was now recognized by the Burmese Government. Two of the staff had already been summoned to Peking for indoctrination. The new ambassador, Dr Yu, was expected to arrive in Rangoon in August. In the meantime the staffs were not being paid and the only income available was that derived from the sale of (Nationalist) passports.

At this time an incident in the Burmese Shan State of Keng-tung near Siam was the subject of a number of rumours. A force of Chinese

[1] Thus in Siam, the President of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, of very obvious Chinese race or extraction but with a Thai name, denounced vehemently the tactics of business men of acknowledged Chinese nationality in their dealings with the Thais.

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369 than their elongated forms, difficult interiors and cliffed, marsh or
631 forest edges in fact justify. Rarely has any one of the major islands
184 been the locale of a single people singly governed, homogeneous and integrated into an island-state. These large islands have been dispersive and fragmentive to the peoples in them.

Postwar Nationalism

186 The postwar effusion of nationalism in Southeast Asia is thus a paradox. It is a nationalism of plural societies and substantial minorities, without homogeneity inside the states, and without a nation, as understood in Europe, and very much a culmination of the insecurity and uncertainty produced by the divergent influences which have long been at work, breaking down old social integrations and their warm, human associations, substituting for them nothing but commerce and the new myth "economic man," cold, inexorable and not adequately or fully integrated with Southeast Asia people and their setting.

The devolution of Southeast Asia from colonial into nationalist units takes place at no propitious time. The cultivation of rice has been predatory, the accumulated effects of which are now showing in diminishing yields; new paddylands before the war were ceasing to be so easily available and the war threw a large proportion of the old lands out of cultivation. Rubber has found a competitor in synthetic rubber, and its production may repeat the history of sugar. Tin recovers from the war slowly because equipment has been lost. Plantation crops have lost labour, markets and opportunities. Yet Southeast Asia is still increasing its people faster than
161 the world average. Its increase, however, has gone on at a slower rate in the already congested areas and at a faster rate in what had been the emptier areas of South Sumatra (with Javanese migrants), in Mindanao (with Filipinos), in Johore (by Chinese immigrants), as well as in Laos, Dutch Borneo and Inner Siam, by local increases. Thus Southeast Asia has been filling up, though there is little prospect yet of an even distribution.

Devolution

000 The Southeast Asia population is expanding now as the trade systems which provided its first impetus to expansion shrink and lose coherence. The atmosphere is one of relinquishing colonies, but under circumstances when they are involved in an international

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467 try, depending on the stage of development reached before the war, the quality of leadership during and after the Japanese occupation, and the degree of authority and stability achieved by the present governments.

While politics are the overwhelming preoccupation everywhere, Indochina and Indonesia have been the scenes of almost continuous warfare since V-J Day and have been unable—judging from the limited information available—to produce strong, cohesive labor movements. Siam, although not badly damaged by Allied bombing, has been absorbed in achieving administrative stability amid internal political rivalries and in maintaining its sovereign status internationally. The basic reasons which prevented the prewar labor movement in Siam from evolving beyond the embryonic stage remain valid. The greatest progress has been made in Burma and Malaya, where labor movements were comparatively well delineated before the war and where subsequent conditions have combined to further their growth.

467 Nowhere in the area has a labor movement developed without politi-
668 cal implications and inspiration. Nationalism, in the embrace of so-
186 cialism or communism, has been its guiding and dominating force. Political leaders have worked upon laborers as the only have-not group in an area where the majority of the inhabitants are cultivators who possess, or aspire to possess, their own land. It is not accidental that peasant unions have been organized only in Burma, the sole country of the region where absentee and non-agriculturist landlordism has flour-
[464] ished and where there is marked ethnic homogeneity. Labor shortages exist everywhere as a result of the wartime cessation of immigration and the depletion and displacement of existing labor forces, and are aggravated by the desire of business firms to resume their export trade as quickly as possible.

These factors have placed labor in a particularly favorable position. While laborers remain on the whole almost as inarticulate and as closely identified with the mass of the population as before the war, they have acquired a new political consciousness and a sense of their own indispensability, as well as a more aggressive leadership. Everywhere their economic grievances derive from the growing disparity between increasing wages and more rapidly rising living costs and from the absence of consumer goods and adequate housing in urban areas. Their political objectives are those assigned to them by nationalist or communist leaders, who are using labor as the best spearhead available locally for the achievement of their own goals.

467 At the present time Malaya and Burma have the only labor move-
464 ments in the area worthy of the name. Their prewar economies differed widely—Malaya's resembling that of Sumatra more than Burma—but their metropolitan power is parallel and both are committed to a pro-labor policy. They are the two countries of Southeast Asia which have

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427 But the alien planta-
565 tions and even alien smallholders have threatened to grasp at it, and the
177 advances of Western medicine, so beneficial in many ways, have only accelerated the rate of increase of the population which has to seek a livelihood from it. In most parts of South East Asia the peasant is the actual owner of the land he tills, often legally under some agreement with
426 the State. But his rights to the produce are often severely limited by a heavy burden of indebtedness. The real effects of this may be less than people sometimes think, because when the debts are spread among neighbours and kinsfolk interest may be waived, repayment is sometimes protracted or ignored, and the debt may be serviced by other than material means. But there is no doubt that the peasant producer is badly hampered by his debt load. It is most pressing when debt is contracted to a member of an alien ethnic group, an Indian or a Chinese, for whom the transaction is a purely commercial one.

563 The role of alien Asiatic ethnic groups is one of the most significant
565 features in the economic and political life of the peasantry of South East
177 Asia today. For many centuries, Indian and Chinese trading influences
178 have met in the South East Asian region, and Indian religious concepts
439 have penetrated deep into many of its social systems. But for more than four hundred years the dominant commercial and political note has tended to be sounded by Europeans. Now the balance is altering. Colonialism may have set the modern structure of South East Asian society, but the patterns will persist when the colonial Powers have withdrawn. To this new society the Chinese above all have the economic key. In Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, the Philippines, and Java, the Chinese have penetrated the economic system and taken over crucial functions. They have shared in much of the wholesale import trade, they have attained pre-eminence in retailing vital imported goods to the peasant, and they act as middlemen for the collection, storage, and processing of peasant export products. As part of this process they often finance the peasant producer by advances on his crop, gaining a double profit by giving part of these advances in goods, not cash. The Chinese achievement has been remarkable. They have been kept on the margin both of the peasant society with which they deal, and of the European society with which at a later stage their growing wealth would allow them to associate. Though lacking any formal political power, which in the Orient as elsewhere is so often the passport to success, they have built up a trading structure of extraordinary toughness, elasticity, and elaboration.

565 The wider political implications of this are not my concern here. But
609 it is important to note three points in connexion with the peasant theme.
● 186 One is the xenophobic reaction of the local urban dwellers and of peasants too, which has periodically found expression against the Chinese, as traders
578 or residents in South East Asia, in the form of riots and other disturbances.
563 Another is the reaction of the Chinese, whose economic strength has given
241 them confidence, and who are now prepared to stand by their claim to a

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real stake in the countries of the Nan Yang, as settled members of the local society, and not as aliens. The third point is that the Chinese community has never been one of middlemen only; there has always been a fair proportion of cultivators within it. The poor peasantry of South East Asia now includes a Chinese as well as an indigenous element. The 1947 census of Malaya shows 45,000 Chinese engaged in rice growing, and another 100,000 in market gardening and fishing, essentially peasant pursuits.

The pressure to which the South East Asian peasant has been subjected by the combination of Western and other alien influences has been severe. But we must beware lest we misinterpret it. In a recent book which gives a comparative analysis of the agrarian situation in the countries of South East Asia, appears a striking statement about Malaya—that development of mining and rubber industries has pushed the native Malay population more and more towards the east, into the areas of the former Unfederated Malay States: 'The Malays', it is said, 'considered the east as safe from Western penetration, and therefore preferred this undeveloped area to the irrigated lands on the western coast, mainly because there they could get only temporary land licences, since a complete survey of all potential tin-bearing regions had not yet been made'.[1]

It is true that the eastern States are predominantly Malay in population, and that the greater part of the vast immigrant population of Malaya is densely settled on the western side of the peninsula, where the resources are richer and access easier than on the eastern side. It is also true that there has been some lack of enthusiasm among Malay peasants to colonize the new Government-developed irrigation areas, for complex reasons, including lack of capital in the past, and disinclination to move from their ancestral homes. But it is quite incorrect to put these facts together and to argue that the Malay has been pushed by alien pressure over from the west to the east of the peninsula. Apart from some seasonal movement for rice harvesting or fishing, the internal migration of Malays is inconsiderable, despite the rapid development of communications in recent years. Both the 1931 and the 1947 census show that whatever movement takes place—well under 10 per cent—is almost wholly from one State to another, either on the west coast or on the east coast, or to Singapore. Hardly any movement at all occurs from the west to the east. Moreover, the 1947 census shows that between 1931 and 1947 the Malay population of the western States increased by about one-third, at a rate slightly higher than that of the eastern States. The proportion of Malays in these western States, in terms of the total population of all ethnic groups, also increased slightly during this period, due primarily to the decline of Indians and Indonesians. In other words, though foreign economic penetration has immersed the western Malay in a flood of alien elements, it has not driven him away. On the contrary, he has preferred to stay and await events.

[1] Erich H. Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia* (New York, Colombia University Press, 1949) p. 113.

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nearing the end of its historical phase. How far it is likely to be replaced 565
by a more insidious form of satellitism is not relevant here. But to talk 185
about political emancipation of South East Asia being the prime require- 656
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Here may well come one of the acute pressure points in the South East 000
Asian scene. The analysis might go as follows. Nationalism is a powerful political force because of its appeal to the individual in a projected, enlarged form of his desires and strivings. But by itself it is an aggressive rather than a constructive force. It lacks a coherent theory for the use of the resources at its control. An ideology containing such theory, and an equally ardent emotional charge on the part of many of its adherents, is provided by Communism. If Communism can work through nationalism it has a most powerful combination. Yet Communism in South East Asia lacks organization of any scale. The optimum conditions for its success are

[For comparative vocabulary of the following tribes, see 44: Swettenham, AN1 Malaya, category 116: 1. Iranun; 2. Dusun; 3. Bulud-Opie; 4. Sulus; 5. Nias Islands; 6. Kian Dyak; 7. Punan Dyak; 8. Melano Dyak; 9. Bukutan Dyak; 10. Land Dyak; 11. Balau Dyak; 12. Tagbenua; 13. Perak Semang; 14. Perak Semang; 15. Chendariang Sakei; 16. Kinta Sakei; 17. Samoe; 18. Semang of Ijoh; 19. Semang of Ulu Selama. --Analyst]

194 Tones appear to be lacking in a few members of the family, notably in the generally archaic West Tibetan dialects (Balti and Purik), hence only a tendency to develop tonal systems rather than a tonal system itself can definitely be postulated for the parent speech. Monosyllabic roots, however, of the type *k'wi "dog", *mig "eye", *ni "sun, day", are of absolute diagnostic value. The phonemic scheme of the parent language seems to have been relatively simple. The stop and affricate series included both aspirated and unaspirated surds and at least one sonant member. To these were added four nasals (ng, ń, n, m), probably four sibilants (s, z, š, ž), the liquids l and r, and consonantal y, w, and h. The final consonants, however, were limited to -g, -d, -b; -ng, -n, -m; -r, -l, and probably -s. Initial consonantal clusters were restricted to combinations of stops, affricates, sibilants, or nasals + r, l, or y, e.g. kl-, mr-, py-, but prefixed groupings complicated the anlaut in many roots, making possible forms such as Tib. brgyad "8". The vocalic system included a, i, and u, probably with a simple "long" vs. "short" quantitative distinction, and e and o, which seem secondary in many instances. The parent language also had diphthongs both of rising type, e.g. wa (u̯a), wi (u̯i), and of falling type, e.g. au̯, ei̯, the latter type appearing only in final position, as in *ts'au "fat", *mei "fire".

193 On the morphological side the parent Tibeto-Burman speech showed almost as great simplicity. It was primarily a prefixing language with isolating characteristics and a

•193 fixed word order: subject + object + verb. The verbal prefix apparatus, which is especially prominent in Tibetan and Kachin, consisted of "subjective" prefixes m-, b-, and "directive" prefixes d-, g-, r-, l-, s-. The s- prefix often appears as a true causative morpheme, as in Kachin in the form ǰa, dǰa, e.g. bra "to be scattered", ǰa-bra "to scatter"; k'rit "to fear", dǰa-k'rit "to frighten", and in Burmese, in which the initial of the transitive form has been aspirated by the loss of prefixed s-, e.g. pran "to be full", p'ran "to fill"; lwat "to be free", hlwat "to set free". Prefixed m- is "stative" (neutral), as in Tib. mnam-pa "to smell, stink", mt'o-ba "to be high", often with reflexive force, as in Tib. mnab-pa "to put on garments, dress oneself". This prefix seems to represent an ancient demonstrative pronoun, which still functions independently in Meithei (Manipuri) and can be traced elsewhere. It often imparts substantival value, e.g. *m-ǰin (Tib. mtǰ'in) "liver" "its-bitter (ǰin)-part" (see the discussion in Benedict, 1939), Kachin pyen "to fly", ma-pyen "wings" < "its-flying", rut "to rub", ma-rut "a grater" < "its-rubbing". In many instances prefixes occuring with substantival forms cannot be analyzed, e.g. *r-mei "tail", *d-gu "9", while occasionally there is fluctuation in prefix usage, e.g. *l-nga or *b-nga "5".

601 193 The existence of the m- pronominal prefix discussed above is of some importance in the analysis of kinship terms in Tibeto-Burman. Kinship terms, like words for parts of the

body, are especially susceptible to prefixation of this type. Thus Meithei has ma-pa "father", ma-ma "mother" just as it has ma-sa "body", ma-mei "tail", ma-hau "fat", ma-hei "fruit", etc. The most widespread prefix of this type is the prefix a-, as in Tib. ʾa-p'a "father", ʾa-ma "mother", Lepcha a-bo "father", a-mo "mother", Kachin a-wa "father", a-nu " mother", Burmese a-p'a "father, a-maʾ "mother". As Laufer has shown, this a- prefix usage extends even into Chinese. In Tibetan this prefix is used only with kinship terms, but in Kachin, Burmese, and some of the Kukish languages it has retained its old pronominal function in its use with words for parts of the body, e.g. Southern Chin a-miʾ "eye", a-ho "tooth" along with a-po "father", a-nü "mother", and Lhota Naga o-k'a "hand", o-pok "belly" along with o-po "father, o-pvü "mother" (Lhota o < a). Wolfenden (1929, pp. 177 and ff.) sought to distinguish between pronominal and non-pronominal usages of this prefix, but failed to note its use with parts of the body in Kachin (e.g. a-mun "hair of the body", a-nu "brain") and in Burmese (e.g. a-mwe³ "hair of the body", a-mri³ "tail"), hence his argument must be discarded <u>in toto</u>. A third prefix of pronominal origin, k- or ka-, is also used with relationship terms, e.g. Kachin ka-wa "(his) father" along with n-wa "(your) father" and a-wa "(its) father" and wa "father", Thado (Khongzai dialect) ka-pa "father, ka-nu "mother". In the separate discussions that follow, pronominal prefixes of this type will be enclosed within parentheses, e.g. Tib. (ʾa-)p'a "father".

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601 In striking contrast to this rather elaborate prefix
193 apparatus Tibeto-Burman shows almost no true morphological suffixation. A characteristic "final dental morphology", however, appears in Tibetan, Kachin and elsewhere and undoubtedly must be postulated for the parent speech. In this series Tibetan has -n, -d, and -s, the latter in some instances derived from -ds. Cf. the following examples: Tib. za-ba, gza-ba "to eat", gzan-pa "to eat,devour,gnaw", bzan "food of animals, pasturage", zan "pap, fodder", zas "food, nourishment", and Kachin ǰa "to eat", ǰat "boiled rice", i.e. "food"; Tib. bgo-ba "to put on clothes", gon-pa "to put on clothes; clothing", gos "garment"; Tib. dro-ba "to be warm, warm, warmth", dro, dros "the hot part of the day", dros-pa "heated", dron-mo "warm", drod "warmth, heat". As indicated by the above series, these derivatives in -n, -d, -s are often substantival, the typical formation being of the type na-ba "to be ill", nad "disease". The connection between the verbal root and the derived form with final dental is not always clear, especially in languages in which this morphology no longer functions, e.g. Burmese na "to be ill", nat "demon" < "spirit of disease" (see the discussion in Benedict, 1939). The importance of this morphology in connection with kinship terminology will be made clear in the discussion of the Tibetan system.

197 The classification of the Tibeto-Burman languages presents a number of serious problems which admit of no solution at the present time. The general picture is much

SA 121 601 ST 121 601 a phonemic system, in which similar integration appears. The point is not worth elaborating, since the fact that a kinship terminology does constitute a system hardly relieves us of the task of investigating each element of that system, both independently and correlatively.

In any piece of historical reconstruction, linguistic or other, the natural tendency is to make the prototype unduly complex. The writer has often been struck by the complexities shown by hypothetical reconstructed languages as compared with their actual living descendants, as though linguistic evolution always proceeded in the direction of simplification. The number of distinct roots assigned to these reconstructed languages is sometimes of staggering magnitude, and no ingenuity is spared in augmenting this lexicographical harvest. In the present study it would be easy to reconstruct an archaic nomenclature with two or more terms for most relationships, yet such a procedure patently would be futile. It is far better to determine, firstly, which elements are relatively certain, and, secondly, which elements are based largely on "partial equations" and must thus be held in reserve until a basic framework has been set up. Nine roots, eight of which are applied to consanguineal relatives, stand out in our complete Tibeto-Burman series as culled from the foregoing review. These roots constitute the following systems

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Tibeto-Burman Terms

*p'i	gN	*p'u	gF
*ma	N	*p'a	F
*ni	FN1	*k'u	NB
*mma	yCb		
*sa	Ch		
		*mak	S1

The forms given above can be accepted with some confidence as fair approximations of the archaic Tibeto-Burman roots. All except the affixal term *mak have vocalic finals, and it was on the basis of finals or "rhymes" (medial vowel + final consonant), especially of vocalic finals, that Shafer and the writer were able to work out the main features of Tibeto-Burman phonology. Earlier writers had in general attacked the problem from the most difficult angle, that of initials and tones. Thus, no less a scholar than Laufer is responsible for the following absurd dictum:

> Prefixes as well as final consonants....are of minor importance in the comparative study of Indo-Chinese languages.... the staff of comparison remains the initial consonant and the tone conditioned by it. (TP 17, p. 115).

Prefixes have shown to be of basic importance, while both the initials and the tones have been so influenced by the prefixes that our analysis of them still lags far behind our analysis of the finals. In the above set of terms, however, the only problems <u>in re</u> initials concern the aspiration or lack of aspiration, voicing or unvoicing, of the stop initials of *p'i, *p'u, *p'a, and *k'u. Rukish has *pi gV and *pu gF.

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but initial aspiration is not well preserved in this group. Mikir has p'i gL, p'u gF, hu < *k'u HB, but po < *pa F. Meithei, which ordinarily preserves aspiration, has pu gF, pa F, and hu F1 (< HB). Kachin has hu HF (< HB) rather than the anticipated *k'u, and Burmese has (ata-)hui oB rather than *k'ui. Tibetan has p'yi gL, p'a F, and k'u FB (< HB), while both Tibetan and Kachin have p'u oB (< gF). It may be that one or more of these roots had a sonant rather than a surd initial. Initial g-, a rare element in our comparative material, is perhaps indicated for the HB root (*gu ~ *g'u), but at present nothing definite can be said on this point.

Only one of the above terms is uncertain as regards final, viz. *ni FS1. Classical Tibetan has ne rather than *ni, and Meithei has nem ~ ne rather than *ni, both of which point to an archaic form *nei rather than *ni. The weight of evidence, however, speaks in favor of the reconstruction *ni, from which *nei may have been developed as a doublet root; cf. Kukish *nau yOh, *nou "young, tender", which tend to be confused (vide pt. 15).

The basic gF terms *p'i and *p'u are found together in Garish, Mikir, Meithei, Mru, Kukish, and Burmish-Loloish (but p'e^3 gqF < *p'i in Burmese itself, which has a new term [p'wa^3] for gF). The root *p'i is further retained in its basic meaning in Tibetan, Manmuri (perhaps Tibetan loan-word), Bahing, and Vayu, while Chang has retained it in the meaning "gF". In northern TB groups the root *p'u has been applied

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to oB, viz. in Tibetan, Limbu, Newari (only in combination), Digaro, and Kachin. This semantic interchange also appears in Burmish-Loloish, viz. Moso p'u gF, bu oB, Nyi bu gF, pu oB. The interplay of surd and sonant initials in these Moso and Nyi forms indicates that doublets are involved. In Barish the root *p'i gM (in the form bi) has been applied to oSi, both in the Bodo-Dimasa and Garo divisions of this group, and also retained in its basic meaning. It is clear that these usages are connected with the especial position held by oSb, and that the gP terms function here simply as honorifics. Other TB roots, less widely distributed than the above, show the same type of semantic shift (vide infra). In societies with a patrilineal bias it is only natural that the role of oB should be of more significance than that of oSi, thus perhaps accounting for the relative stability of *p'i as compared with *p'u. It can hardly be without significance that in the single matrilineal group encountered (Barish) the term *p'i gM should have been applied to oSi, in contrast to all other TB groups.

Of the two basic P terms *p'a F and *pa M, the former is the most widely distributed and shows fewer variations. The following groups have this root (*p'a): Tibetan, Kanauri, Byangsi, Bahing, Vayu, Newari, Lepcha, Miri, Dhimal, Burmish-Loloish, Konyak, Barish, Mikir, Meithei, Mru, and Kukish. This root commonly appears as a masculine affix, but no instance of a transference to "oB" has been uncovered. The

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root *ma M appears in Tibetan, Kanauri, Bahing, Vayu, Newari, Lepcha, Dhimal, Burmish-Loloish, Barish, and Meithei. In Burmese itself it is retained only in the terms ma' Si and a-ma' "feminine suffix", and in the closely-related Maru only in the meaning "MSi". Nru has preserved this root only in the feminine suffix -ma. A transference to the meaning "oSi" is found in the contiguous North Assam groups Dafla and Aka. In Kachin and the extensive Kukish group this root appears to have vanished without leaving a trace.

The two PSb terms *ni and *k'u are also unequally represented in Tibeto-Burman. The root *ni FSi is of almost universal occurrence. In its basic meaning it appears in Tibetan, Gyarung, Kanauri, Thebor, Vayu, Newari, Abor-Miri, Mung, Burmish-Loloish (but not in Burmese itself), Konyak, Barish, Mikir, Meithei, and Kukish. Kachin has retained it only in the affinal meaning "WM". Aka, if we can trust our inadequate sources, has applied this root to M, while Limbu has applied it to oSi. Replacement by the term for "oSi" is seen in Dafla, Sho, Changki (Ao), and probably Kadu, while Mongsen (Ao) shows replacement by the term for "oSb". The Dafla material indicates that this is an analytical development ("oSi of F"). Lepcha equates FSi with MSi in the term nyu ~ nyo, applied to female relatives in the uterine line. This unusual equation also appears in Bahing, which has mo-mo MSi,FSi (from mo < *ma M), and po-po FB (from po < *pa F), yet has ku-ku MB. Distinct terms have been

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developed in Kachin (mui), which preserves *mi as an affinal term (Wt), and in Burmese (mi³), but *mi is retained in the closely related Maru. The Dimasa term de-de FBi (be-de MB) is likewise distinct.

The much more restricted root *k'u MB is found in its primary meaning in Bahing, Vayu, Abor-Miri, Dafla, Digaro, Mung, Mikir, and Ao. Tibetan has k'u FB, but akud < *k'u Fl,Bl. Himalayish and Lepcha also have k'u FB, probably because of Tibetan influence. Kachin, Meithei, Ntenyi Rengma, and Anyo Rengma have retained the term in the affinal meaning "HF" (Meithei Fl), and Sema in the affinal meaning "FSiH". Chang (Konyak) has the form ko MB, which cannot with certainty be connected with this root. In the Burmish-Loloish group we can cite only Burmese kui "prefix used with names of persons older or of higher rank than the speaker, or politely of his equals" (ate-kui eB), Akha a-kö B, Ahi kö-pu-li ySiH, and Moso a-gu Bl. The Moso usage is paralleled in the Barish group, where we find Bodo gu-mai, Garo gu-me Bl. This root cannot be traced in the Kuki languages proper, yet can be reconstructed for Kukish on the basis of the Naga terms (supra), and for Kukie in general on the basis of the Mikir and Meithei terms.

The root *nau ySb, occasionally applied either to yB or ySi alone, also to Ch, is well represented in Tibeto-Burman. It appears in the following groups: Tibetan (nu ∼ no), Byangsi (yB), Limbu, Lepcha, Aka, Kachin, Konyak, Barish (ySi), Meithei, Mru (yB), and Kukish (ySb ∼ Ch). The most conspicuous gaps are those in Abor-Miri-Dafla, Mung, and Burmish-Loloish.

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The eighth and last of the basic consanguineal terms is *sa Gh, which is found in Tsangla, Magari, Miju, Aka, Kachin, Kaka, Mung (sa-ed D), Pyu, Burmish-Loloish, Konyak, Barish, Nikir, Meithei, Mru, and Kukish (rarely used for ySb, as in Pearen and Kyan). Lepcha has a-so < *sa ggF, a-son gCh (with suffixed -n). This root is conspicuously absent in Tibetan and its dialects (but present in Tsangla, a Bodish language), Himalayish, and Kiranti, i.e. the northern or northwestern band of Tibeto-Burman languages, as well as in the Abor-Miri-Dafla group.

The affinal term *mak Sl appears in Tibetan, Lepcha (< *mmk), Dhimal (< *mmk), Miri, Kachin (da-ma < *da-mak), Burmese (sa-mak), Meithei, Mru, and Kukish, with an additional uncertain occurrence in Byangai. In view of our generally inadequate data on affinal nomenclatures (e.g. we do not have the term for "Sl" in Mung, where we should expect to find this root), the widespread distribution of this root is of increased significance. It would appear that the root is lacking in Himalayish, Nikir, Konyak, and Barish.

The above set of basic terms is supplemented by a series of roots of restricted distribution. Some of these serve mainly as replacements for the basic roots, while others are functionally more independent. Since our set of basic terms is not complete, we must assume that some of these roots represent archaic Tibeto-Burman elements, but this point is best discussed after the various secondary roots have been analyzed.

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The gP roots *p'i gM and *p'u gF have no serious rivals in Tibeto-Burman. A curious link between Tibetan and Southern Naki is suggested by the following set of terms: Tib. po ~ spo gP (literary or dialectical), rmo gM (literary), and Sho a-pŏ ~ a-pŏk gF, Chinbon kh-mo gM, Yindu kh-mo gF. A possible root *si is indicated by Balti as-si (= a-si) ggM, Nung a-si gM, Khami a-um-si gP, and Kadu a-si MSi (i-si "woman"), Yindu kh-si FSi, Sho a-si FSi, oSi (cf. the roots *ta and *tei, infra). In general, gP terms show more variation than do P terms; thus, Kachin has developed distinct terms for both gM (woi) and gF (ji), and note forms such as Byangsi ti-ti gF, Bahing and Vayu ki-ki gF.

The most conspicuous of the secondary P roots is *nu M, which appears in Kachin, Mi ju, Sak, Konyak, Kukish, and perhaps Mikir and Meithei (in combination). The root *pui "mother, female" is restricted to Mikir and Kukish. The Kukish feminine affix *la, used especially of young females, seems to have given rise to Mongsen-Changki (Ao) a-la M, Ntenyi Rengma a-la ggM, Anyo Rengma a-la gM, and cf. Byangsi la-la gM, Sunwari a-la Si. The same root (*la) appears in Kachin, Burmish-Loloish, and elsewhere as a masculine affix. The Tibeto-Burman root *wa "male" serves to explain both Bunan and Kachin wa, Kadu a-wa, Garo (dialects of A type) a-wa F (Moshang and Ramsang wa F probably through Kachin influence), Aka au < *a-wa F, Burmese wa-kri[3] "term of address to old men" (Arakanese dialect), and Lepcha a-vo < *wa, Meithei (ma-)wa, Kukish wa H; cf. also Digaro ma-wa "male",

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Bhimal -wa "masculine suffix", Bodo hawa "male". Some of these forms, however, may have resulted from a phonetic development from *p'a F (probably via *ba).

A root *mei or *me appears sporadically in Tibeto-Burman, sometimes with a dental suffix. This root is parallel to, but distinct from, TB *ma M. The following forms belong here: Tibetan -med "woman" (in bud-med < *bu-med, paralleling bu-smad), Gyarung te-mi ~ te-me "woman", Kanauri -med (suffix in "D" and "Ml"), Chamba Lahuli me "bitch", Limbu met W, Lepcha a-mit "woman", Ekdu a-me M, Rung a-me M (cf. Rung a-p'e F), Burmese a-mi^3 ~ a-me M, and Garo me-cik "woman, wife". Note also the series formed by Burmese sa-mi^3, Ahm sa-mi, Rung za-mi D (from *ma Ch). Garo ga-me Bl, Mikir me SiH correspond phonetically but can scarcely be fitted in otherwise.

In addition to the above, there are traces of a set of roots *ya and *yu, both applied to female relatives. The former is better attested than the latter; cf. Himalayish (Manchati, Kanashi, Chamba Lahuli) ya M, Abor-Miri and Dafla yo < *ya gN (but in Pagri Miri used for "M" in address), Tshaleng (Konyak group) ya M, Naga *ya M, also Kanauri yas, Rai (Kiranti) ma-ya, Burmese ma-ya^3 W, Digaro mi-ya "woman", ha-mi-ya W. The root *yu is represented only by Kanauri yu-med, Khambu (Kiranti) yuh, Lepcha a-yu W, Lepcha th-yu "woman", and perhaps Tibetan yu-mo "female of a stag".

Nothing has yet been said of oSb terms, which show a wide variety of forms contrasting with the standard ySb root (*mau)

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Much of the material in this connection is of a scattered nature from which it is difficult to draw any conclusions. Thus, Byangsi hya, Bahing ya oB, Maithei ye-ma oB, Chawte (Old Kuki) a-ya B, si-ya oSi, and Khami ya-st ~ ya-ŝ oB suggest an archaic root *ya oB, yet this same element appears in another setting (supra). Burmese ats-kui < *ik-kui oB, Mikir ik oB lack cognates elsewhere, as do Maru pai oSi, Chonbok pai oSi(ws), unless the latter pair be connected with Burmese a-pai "madam" and perhaps Mikir pei ~ pe M. The characteristic Kukish root u oSb (Central, Northern, and Old Kuki groups only) does not appear elsewhere in this setting, yet appears to be identical to Sho ŭ M, Taungtha u W, Mru u M, and Burmese u³ MB (prefixed to names of men considerably older than the speaker), perhaps also Tanghkul a-ŭ gF,MB.

Three or four roots, however, stand out more prominently than the above lot and deserve especial consideration. Tibetan c'e oSi(ws) has been compared with Himalayish *c'e "female" as represented by Kanauri c'ets "female, woman", Kanashi c'ets W (with diminutive suffix -ts) and with the Byangsi-Chaudangsi term c'e xC, as well as with Johar a-ce F. The above terms all point to a TB root *c'ei. A similar root, but apparently with unaspirated initial (*cei), is represented by Konyak jei ~ cei oSb ~ oB, Maithei ce oSi, Tanghkul cei oSb, Western Kuki *cei oSb, Anyo Rongma a-ce oSb. The Tibetan term appears to be etymologically connected with the word c'e-ba "great", from which the respectful term gcen-po oB has been developed.

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A root *ma cS1 appears in Nung, Vayu, Kachin, Andro, and Konyak, while the Aluora and Abor-Miri-Dafla groups have *ma M, and Lakher has the vocative term i-ma M. Tibetan mna D1 perhaps also belongs here, though it may be of periphrastic origin (< mna "oath").

The Tibeto-Burman root *ta (often in the form da) is consistently applied to relatives older than Ego, if one regards the Bahing-Vayu root *ta CR as of distinct origin. The following terms can be grouped with this root: Tibetan 'a-ta F (dialectical), cB (Eastern Tibet), Tsangla a-ta cB, Gyarung a-to-ta F, Johar a-ta cS1, Byangsi ta-ta cS1, Newari ta-ta cS1, Miri and Dafla a-to < *ta gF, Digaro ta gF, da cB, Burmese t'a^{3}-t'a^{3} F (dialectical), Akha a-ta F, Independent Lolo a-da F, Sho a-ta cR, Shinhon (ha-)t'a cR, Lhota a-ta cSb, Chenghi (Ao) a-ta PS1,cS1, Naong Rongma a-da PoB. Doublet forms are found only in Digaro (ta gF, da cB). Unlike *p'u gF,cB this root has also been applied to F in some languages (Tibetan, Gyarung, Burmese, Akha). Dengodins describes the Tibetan term 'a-ta as a "children's word" (vox puerorum), and in Independent Lolo a distinction is made between a-da F (used by children) and a-bu ~ a-bo F (used by adults).

Kanauri te-te gF, a-te cB are clearly of a type paralleling that described above. The suggested TB root is *tei, with which can be grouped Byangsi te-te xC(ss), Dafla tĕ-tĕ FyB,cB (in different sources), Kadu a-te cS1, Bangaru a-tai cB, Nahir te cS1(ws), Meithei i-tei-ma cS1l, and Kru a-tai BW.

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An objection might be raised to the above discussion on the ground that forms such as *na, *ta, and *tsi (te) are of "nursery word" type and should not be regarded as representing actual TB roots. The writer himself originally ascribed to this general point of view, but the collection of material on which this study is based has led him to discard it. Thus, ta F appears both in the West Tibetan dialects (Balti, Purik) and in the nomad dialects of Eastern Tibet, as well as in the aberrant Gyarung language, whence we can safely infer a Bodish root *ta F. The term na oSi appears in five distinct languages representing two different foci (Murmi-Vayu and Kachin-Andro-Konyak), and na N in two isolated groups (Almora and Abor-Miri-Dafla). Distributions of this type are scattered, to be sure, yet not entirely random. The cluster of connotations (gP,P,oSb) around these roots is also not without significance.

The majority of the terms for Sb(ds) are of limited distribution. Tibetan sring-mo Si(ms), dialectically used for ySi, appears also in Himalayish (Si) and Byangsi (ySi), with an additional possible occurrence in Dhimal-Toto (Si). Kachin jan < *jar Si(ms), often used for ySi, is directly related to Kukish *dzar Si(ms), which in Western Kuki is used for ySi, and to Meithei i-cal ~ i-can ySi, Kadu san, Sengmai cʌl ySi. Kachin yung B(ws) has been compared with the Garo-Dimasa root *yung yB. The tendency to equate Sb(ds) with ySb is reflected in all three roots.

The roots *nau ySb and *za Gh are of almost universal occurrence and have no serious rivals. The former is

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conspicuously absent in Burmish-Loloish, which has a root *nyi (ní), comparable with Lepcha nyi-t'i gCh. A root *nga is suggested by Murmi and Gurung a-nga ySi, Miri ŋ̆ng-ă̆ ySb, Dafla ang-a Ch, Naga *nga Ch. Isolated roots *a Ch and *ka Ch are represented by Digaro a, Abor-Miri o < a Ch, and Newari ka, Abor-Miri ko < *ka Ch, respectively.

It will be noted that the set of basic terms presented above lacks all collateral terms as well as a gCh term. Our data on collateral terms are incomplete for many groups, so that negative evidence here is of relatively little value, but it would seem that no root or roots for xC have been developed. The only root of any extension here is *ning, which appears in Kachin (xCe,ws), Chang (xC), Mikir BW(ws), and perhaps Garo (Sbl). The Mikir and Garo affinal meanings can be explained in terms of cross-cousin marriage.

Three or perhaps four TB roots show a tendency to equate H with gCh. Tibetan ts'a No (probably SiS,ms),gCh furnishes an example of this tendency. Bahing and Newari have this root (*ts'a) in the meaning "gS", but in the Kiranti languages in general it is used for "S" (see the discussion in pt. 4). Kanauri c'ad Sl (with suffixed -d) has been brought into comparison via SiS(ms), equated with Sl under cross-cousin marriage. Kachin ta'a MB,MBS(ws) can be explained only on the basis of a reciprocal development from SiS(ms). Mikir o-sa SiS(ms),Sl shows an ideal agreement on the semantic side, but the comparison is phonetically dubious. The root *ts'a appears to be lacking in other groups.

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The roots *su and *tu have distributions which are almost, if not quite, mutually exclusive. *Su gCh appears in Kachin, Bodo, Mikir, and Meithei, while *tu appears in Nung (N), Burmish-Loloish (xN), and Kukish (FSiCh,SiCh,ms,gCh). Anu, a Southern Kuki language, has su xC,ySi(ws),SiCh(ws),gCh, and a-su-lai SiCh(ms), covering much the same ground as Kukish *tu. The roots *su and *tu must be regarded as distinct on general phonetic grounds, and this view is strengthened by the evidence from Meithei, which has i-su gCh as well as (ma-)tu W (cf. the Kuki use of *tu in the meaning "Sl", through cross-cousin marriage). The root *su is perhaps also represented in the Naga languages, in much the same setting as Anu su, viz. Angami cu ∼ tsu FSiS,ySiS(ms),gS, Nzong Rengma a-cu-gü, Ntenyi Rengma a-su-wa, Anyo Rengma a-zü FSiCh,SiCh(ms),gCh, but our knowledge of Naga phonology is not sufficiently advanced to establish this comparison.

A fourth root of the same general type is *ma-li, which is found in Nung (gCh), Burmish-Loloish (gCh), Pyu (gCh), Chang (xN), Garo (SiS,ms), Mikir (xN, probably BCh,ws), and has an additional cognate in Kachin (ma-li "young man"). This root is in general lacking in Kukish, but may be represented by Taungtha lwi Ne,Ni and Yindu (ka-)li BD(ws). It cannot be traced in Tibetan or any of the northern languages.

The affinal root corresponding to *mak Sl is perhaps *nam Dl, but the evidence for the latter root is not altogether satisfactory. Lepcha has nyom < *snam Dl paralleling myok < *smak Sl, and s- prefixed forms are also represented by

SA Kanauri stem < *snem (probably for snăm) Dl, and Barish
601 *snam Dl (based on Dimasa ba-ham, Garo nam). Cf. also
●193 Gyarung snom < *snam Si, Burmese hnam < *snam ySi(ms)
197 (inferred from mong-hnam "H and W", where mong means "yB,wa"),
ST Lashi tu-nam Dl, nam-mo ySi(ms), Nyi nŏ-mo < *nam-mo ySi(ms),
601 and Lushei hnăm < *snăm "clan". The unprefixed form appears
193 in Byangsi nam-sia Dl, Kachin nam Dl,ySil, and Nung nam Sb,
197 while Lepcha has both nyom < *snam Dl and nom < *nam oSi.
Magari ar-năm "girl" also belongs in this series.

Of more restricted distribution are the roots *mou Dl, represented by Kukish mou (Lushei mo), Meithei i-mau, and perhaps Tibetan mo "woman", and *k'rwi Sl, represented by Kachin k'ri Sl,SiCh(ms), Burmese k'rwe^{3}-ma^{1} < *k'rwi^{3}-ma^{1}, Lisu c'i-ma Dl (with feminine suffix -ma), and perhaps Lepcha tă-gri "male". The original meanings of these roots may have been simply "female" and "male", respectively.

There remain for consideration a few poorly represented roots connected primarily with the PSb nomenclature. Nung a-tsim MSi is comparable with Tsangla a-tim, id., and Nung a-wang FB with Garo a-wang FyB, also Lashi vang-mo HF,FoSiH, Maru vung ~ vun HF,FSiH (but the Lashi and Maru terms suggest a meaning "MB" rather than "FB"). The *wang series is perhaps connected with Tibetan 'a-bang FSiH,MSiH (literary), Limbu (am-)pang-a "uncle", Vayu pong-pong < *pang-pang FB.

Tibetan sru MSi has been compared with Kanauri and Chamba Lahuli ru Fl, Pyu sru "relatives", and the reconstructed

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Lolo root *ru MB. If these terms actually constitute a true series, we must reconstruct a root *sru ~ *ru "mother's relatives" (neuter), whence Kanauri ru F1 < MB through cross-cousin marriage, paralleling Kanauri c'ad S1 < SiS(ms). The presence of this root in Pyu, at approximately the year A.D. 1000, lends some weight to this view.

The fourth Tibetan PSb term, viz. ʾa-žang MB, is found in this form in Thebor and Lepcha, where it must be regarded as a loan-word, but not elsewhere. This form can be derived from an original *zrang and thus compared with Mru ta-rang FSiH,HF, Kukish ta-rang ~ ma-rang, id., and probably Lhota o-ɲrã, Changki (Ao) (kŭ-)hram B1(ws). Burmese a-hrang < *srang (archaic spelling is a-hsyang) "lord, master" also perhaps belongs here rather than with sring-mo S1 (supra). The writer has long suspected that Tibetan initial ž- and š- have in many instances been derived from zr- and sr-, respectively, partly because of the general instability of these clusters in Tibetan (cf. srab-srib ~ hrab-hrib ~ rab-rib "dim, obscure"), and partly on the basis of comparative material, viz. Tib. šig "louse", Bunan šrig, Lushei hrik < *srik; Tib. žag "day (24 hours)", Burmese rak, id.; Tib. šags "joke, jest" (in sense of "ridicule"), Bunan šrag "shame", Burmese hrak < *srak "to be ashamed". The root *-rang (prefixed) must have had a generalized honorific force (still retained in Burmese), and thus was admirably suited as a periphrastic term either for MB or for FSiH,HF (= MB under cross-cousin marriage).

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Having completed our review of Tibeto-Burman kinship roots, we are now faced with the problem of fixing the basic pattern of nomenclature for this linguistic family. The terms designating relatives in the central line of descent naturally form the most stable segment of the nomenclature, while the collateral terms show an intermediate, and the affinal terms a maximum, amount of variation.

Within this stable core of nomenclature we are able to distinguish two primary gP terms (gM and gF), two primary P terms (M and F), a neuter yBb term, and a neuter Ch term. The two neuter terms are often employed in a masculine sense (yB and B), with sex affixes used in forming the corresponding feminine terms (yBi and D), e.g. Tibetan bu B, bu-mo D, Burmese sa^3 B, sa-mi^3 D. No neuter P terms have been uncovered, but Chang has a neuter gP term (a-pi < ap'i gM) used only in address, and a neuter gP term is also found in Sema (a-pu-za), and in the Southern Kuki languages Sho (a-pǒ) and Ayaing Khami (a-um-si). Three Southern Kuki languages (Chinbok, Yindu, Anu) make a distinction between FM and MM, but have a single term for gF (Anu FM < M, MM < gM). Four gP terms appear only in rare instances, and are never all primary. Both Tibetan and Kanauri show traces of three or four gP terms, but Kanauri has probably borrowed one or more of its gP terms from Tibetan, and the Tibetan material itself can be interpreted in more than one way. Kachin seems to employ four gP terms, perhaps because of Shan influence, but has only two primary terms (ji gF and woi gM). Garo distinguishes

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between "gP" (= FF) and "gM" (= FM), and "my gP" (= MF) and "my gM" (= MM), if we can trust our sources for this language. In view of the fact that the Garo are a matrilineal group, this point is of some interest. Chang, which uses the neuter term a-pi gP in address, employs four terms in reference, the FF and FM terms being formed through affixed sex elements, and the MF and MM terms through analysis. Finally, Laiyo, which has an almost exclusively analytical nomenclature, employs four analytical gP terms.

A number of different arrangements of Sb terms have been encountered. Age distinctions appear everywhere and are, in general, more prominent than sex distinctions. Despite this, however, it would appear that the basic pattern has two primary terms for oB and oSi, contrasting with the single neuter ySb term (*nau). As has been shown above, the widespread tendency to equate oB and oSi with terms for relatives of ascending generations has obscured the general picture here and has made analysis almost impossible. The simplest possible arrangement (oSb and ySb) has been found only in Khami (Ayaing and Awa) and Anyo Rengma. A single primary term for oSb appears also in Kuki proper (u) and in Burmese (ats-), but Burmish-Loloish in general has two primary oSb terms. Nzong Rengma shows a complete reversal of the ordinary pattern, with terms for oSb, yB, and ySi. Tibetan, Lepcha, Dafla, Kachin, Aka, Lisu, Chang, Chinbon, Ao and probably other less accurately recorded languages have what appears to be the basic arrangement, viz. oB, oSi, and ySb (three primary

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terms). The Barish languages in general employ the root *nau yBb in the meaning "yBi" and have developed a new term for yB (perhaps connected with the Kachin term for B,ws), while Maithai reverses this process in employing *nau for "yB" and the Kukish root *dzar·Bi(ms) for yBi. Simple terms for either B or Bi are almost entirely lacking in Tibeto-Burman. Abor-Miri has terms for B and Bi based on a root *buir (cf. a-buir "friend"), while in Dafla the cognate form *bŏr is used as the root for yBb, but note that Abor-Miri also possesses especial terms for oBb and yBb. Mikir kor Bb, like Abor-Miri buir, also has the more general meaning "friend".

Though the principle of age distinctions can be established as a basic feature of Tibeto-Burman kinship terminology, the status of sex-of-speaker distinctions is not so readily settled. We are handicapped here by the fact that most of our sources can not be depended upon in showing non-European distinctions of this type, and that negative evidence is therefore of little value. Distinct terms for Bi(ms) and B(ws) are found in Tibetan, Kachin, Lushei and Lakher (and probably other Kuki languages), and Angami. Lushei and Lakher also have a distinct term (of periphrastic origin) for Bi(ws). In Burmese and Nyi the distinction is applied only to yBb, viz. Burmese yB(ms), yB(ws),yBi(ws),yBi(ms), Nyi yBb(as),yB(ws),yBi(ms), and Maru, in the same linguistic group, has a distinct term for yB(ws). Mikir distinguishes between oBi(ms) and oBi(ws), and has a distinct term for B(ws). Chinbok and Yindu, in the Southern

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Naki group, have a full set of eight Sb terms, showing complete distinctions both for age and for sex-of-speaker. The Chinbok system can be reduced to five primary terms, viz. pai oSi(ws), pee oS(ms), mau ySb(ss), be Si(ms), and bang B(ws), i.e. the Tibetan-Kachin arrangement. Sex of speaker appears not to be distinguished in Kanauri, Abor-Miri, Dafla, Barish, Meithei, and some other languages, but our sources, as mentioned above, are not of the most dependable sort. In view of the weight of evidence above, from such key languages as Tibetan, Kachin, Burmese, Mikir, and Lushei, the writer is inclined to regard the sex-of-speaker distinction as an archaic Tibeto-Burman feature.

Despite the fact that no single gCh root can with certainty be reconstructed for Tibeto-Burman, one can surely regard the presence of a primary gCh term as a basic feature for this linguistic family. Aside from the tendency to equate gCh with N or C (vide infra), it can be stated that most Tibeto-Burman languages have a distinct, usually primary, term for gCh, e.g. Kachin ǰu, Burmese mrǰ, Byangsi k'we, Kanauri e'ay, Lepcha a-son, Chang ǰi, Garo and Mikir su, Meithei i-su. If a single gCh root must be predicated, TB *su must be regarded as the most likely selection. Equations of gCh other than with N are exceptional, but note Sema a-mu gCh= Ch(< TB *mau ySb).

The above discussion is resumed in the following diagram:

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Tibeto-Burman Basic Pattern

gM (*p'i)		gF (*p'u)
M (*ma)		F (*p'a)
oSi(ws)	y3b (*nau)	oB(ms)
Si(ms)		B(ws)
	Ch (*za)	
	gCh	

It would be a rather hazardous undertaking to attempt any general explanation of the pattern outlined above in terms of sociological factors. A broad theory of this type must be based on a comprehensive comparative survey of Tibeto-Burman with a number of other groups, and as such lies outside the scope of the present study. Many of the variations from this pattern are undoubtedly significant, but they involve those elusive culturo-linguistic intangibles which do not lend themselves to arm-chair analysis. It is only in the collateral and affinal nomenclatures that obvious cultural correlations are available, and it is these that the writer proposes to consider in some detail.

The distinction between cross (FSi and MB) and parallel (FB and MSi) FSb terms is almost universal in Tibeto-Burman. No instances of an equation of FB with MB have been encountered, but FSi and MSi are equated in Bahing, Lepcha, and Chinbon, if we can trust our sources. Note that Lepcha also equates xC with pC, and that cross-cousin marriage is forbidden in this tribe.

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The parallel FB and MSi terms are usually either equated with the F and M terms (as in Chang, Lushei, Angami, Sema) or are based on these terms, with the addition of elements meaning "big" and "little" or the like. In other words, age distinctions are made in the parallel PSb terms precisely as in the Sb terms, though with categorical rather than primary elements. By way of contrast, the cross PSb terms seldom show these age distinctions, but note Burmese u^{3}-ri^{3} HoB (cf. a-ri^{3} FSi), u^{3}-mang^{3} MyB, Chinbok pu-srŏ HoB (= gF), pu-ko HyB (these distinctions are typical of Southern Kuki in general). Some of the more characteristic examples of age distinctions in FB terms are listed below:

Language	FoB	FyB
Balti	a-ta ts'ar-ma	a-ta tsun-tso
Lepcha	a-bo-tim	a-bo-cum
Kachin	wa-di	wa-doi
Burmese	p'ă-kri^{3}	p'ŭ-t'we^{3}
Nyi	a-ba-giĕ	a-bo-ɣo
Haka	pa-u	pa-nau
Siyin	pa-lien	pa-no
Chinbon	pa k-dŏm	pa k-cwi
Tangkhul	a-va k'ŭ-rŭr	a-va ka-tui
Lhota	o-po-ra-mo	o-po-ro

One occasionally encounters what seem to be primary terms for FB or MSi, but most of these can be explained on the basis of ellipsis, e.g. Maru t'ong HySi but mye-t'ang HySi,

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p'a-t'ang FyB in the closely related Lashi language; Bodo a-yong FoB and a-doi FyB, but ma-yong MoSi and ma-doi MySi; Nzong Rengma a-nyo FyB (nyo Ch), and perhaps Changki (Ao) a-sa FyB < *za Ch. Kanauri has a curious diminutive formation, viz. a-mats MSi < a-ma, and a-pats FB < a-pa. Tibetan and Nung, however, appear to have four true PSb terms. The Nung terms a-tsim MSi and a-wang FB have been compared with Tsangla a-sim MSi and Garo a-wang FyB, respectively. The Tibetan term sru MSi seems to have been derived from a root with the generalized meaning "mother's relatives", or "member of mother's clan, first ascending generation". Tibetan k'u FB, it can now be stated, has been developed from the TB root *k'u MB, and the Himalayish and Lepcha employment of this term in its Tibetan setting must be credited to Tibetan influence, which is conspicuous in both of these areas. Tibetan skud < *k'u Fl,Bl is to be explained in terms of xC marriage and the equation of MB with MF, as elsewhere in Tibeto-Burman. Tibetan 'a-ne FSi,MBW further fits into this picture. In Himalayish, Kanauri ru Fl < *sru MSb, and c'ed Sl < *ts'a SiS(ms) suggest a like reconstruction. We have some material on xC marriage in the Tibetan area, but the term skud itself is, for the writer, the most significant single piece of evidence. Those who minimize the value of linguistic "fossils" in general might well take note of this term.

The semantic shift FB < MB in the Tibetan term k'u still requires explanation. Elsewhere in Tibeto-Burman the term has

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been demoted to affinal rank or dropped altogether, but nowhere else has it been applied to FB. Now there is but one marital feature in which the Tibetan area (including the Kanauri group of Himalayish) significantly differs from the remaining Tibeto-Burman area, viz. polyandry. Fraternal polyandry of Tibetan type is practised by the Kanauri, almost certainly through Tibetan influence, since this custom is explicitly stated to be absent among the Almora peoples (Byangsi, Chaudangsi, Johar). Among the Lepcha polyandry is an abnormal trait and can unhesitatingly be assigned a Tibetan origin. Among other Tibeto-Burman group for which we have any record, polyandry either is said to be lacking or is simply not mentioned. Since Tibetan polyandry is of fraternal type, the importance of FB can readily be understood. It would seem that the MB term, which is unstable in most TB groups, was first replaced by the honorific term ʾa-žang and later applied to FB. The collective term skud-po F1,B1, having already been semantically specialized in an affinal sense, was naturally retained.

Primary cross PSb terms are basic TB features, and are represented by the roots *ni FSi and *k'u MB. The first of these two terms, however, is much more stable than the second, and significantly so (if statistically treated). Thus, Tibetan has transferred the MB term to FB and used an honorific for MB; Burmish-Lolcish has retained the MB term only as an honorific applied to oB (in Burmese) or as an affinal term

SA (Ahi, Moso) and has developed new terms for MB (Burmese u^3,
601 Lolo *ru); the Kuki languages proper have dropped the MB term
● 193 altogether and equated MB with gF; in the Naga group the MB
197 term has been preserved in its original setting only in Ao,
ST while in Rongma and Sema it has been retained only in the
601 affinal nomenclature. All of these groups, however, have the
193 root *ni FSi in its original setting. Burmese (but not
197 Burmish-Loloish) has replaced both the FSi and MB terms and dropped the former altogether, while Kachin has retained both terms only in its affinal nomenclature. The relatively greater stability of the FSi term is also evident in the borrowings made by various TB groups (infra).

This "differential variability" in the FSi and MB terms must be viewed in connection with the affinal application of these terms and the whole problem of cross-cousin marriage. Under bilateral xC marriage MB becomes Fl, and FSi becomes Ml, and it is not unlikely that honorific terms should become associated with these socially "pivotal" relationships. The fact that the MB=Fl term is more susceptible to this process than is the FSi=Ml term merely reflects the general patrilineal bias of Tibeto-Burman societies. The equation of MB with gP, which plays so prominent a role in Kukish, represents one aspect of this whole development, but teknonymy may also be a factor here ("Fl" designated as "gF of my son"). Teknonymy is hardly typical of Tibeto-Burman yet does occasionally occur. Lepcha, for example, employs a-bo F for Fl

SA 601 193 197 ST 601 193 197 where the couple are childless, but t'i-kung gF after the birth of a child, and the descriptive term a-fyat Fl has been derived from an original *sput, which in turn represents a morphological development from the TB root *p'u gF. Vayu ca-k'i Fl appears to be a combination of co < *ca Ch and ki-ki gF. Lahu, in the Southern Lolo group, has a-p'u gF= Fl, a-p'i gM=Ml, and Ahi, in the Northern Lolo group, has su-p'o WF, also "paternal ancestor". The Chang Sbl terms are of teknonymous origin, e.g. hau-ko Bl(ms)="his MB", but the Chang Fl terms are simply Fl=MB and Ml= FSi. Chinbon equates WF with gF, and WM with gM (rather than with MF and MBW, as in most Kuki languages), but retains the Kuki pattern in the HM and HF terms (HF= FSi, and especial term for HF), i.e. the teknonymous (or honorific) terms are employed only by the husband. The Mirish languages (Abor, Miri, Dafla) afford the best illustration of teknonymy. In Miri the terms a-bu and a-nu are used for F and M, respectively, but in the closely related Abor language these terms are applied to gF and gM, though ta-ta (Miri to-to gF) is retained as the vocative term for gF. In this instance the child has taken over his parents' terms ("reverse teknonymy") rather than the parent his childrens' terms. Abor also uses the vocative gF term (ta-ta) for Fl, while Miri equates Fl either with gF or with MB, and Ml either with gM or with FSi (the equations with MB and FSi are probably only descriptive, though this is not stated in our sources). Dafla equates Ml with gM, probably also Fl with gF.

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Under a system of bilateral xC marriage we should expect to find both WF and HF equated with MB, and both WM and HM equated with FSi. This condition is fulfilled in Byangsi and Abor-Miri, where this type of marriage is in vogue. The terminological equation also appears, however, in Nung, Chang, Sema, Nsong Rengma, and Lhota, for all of which preferential MBD marriage is indicated, and in Tangkhul and Angami, for which xC marriage cannot be established.

A system of unilateral xC marriage with MBD should lead to the equation of WF with MB, HM with FSi, and separate terms for HF and WM, as well as distinctions between FSiH and MB, MBW and FSi. Kachin fulfills all these conditions admirably, with unilateral xC marriage coupled with the terminological equations indicated above. The same can be said for the Kuki pattern, as illustrated in Lakher, Thado, Chawte, Tarau, as well as in Mru and Khami, viz. WF = MB, WM = MBW, HM = FSi, HF = FSiH. Unilateral MBD marriage is found among the Thado, Chiru, Anal, Aimol, Purum, and probably the Anal, Shc, and Khami. In Thado this nomenclature is employed only where MBD marriage has actually occurred, P terms being employed under other conditions.

Ntenyi and Anyo Rengma have an intermediate type, with M1 = FSi but WF = MB and a distinct term for HF, but in both languages the MB term is sometimes applied to HF as well as to WF. The closely related Nsong Rengma has a single term for F1 (WF, HF = MB), but retains a distinct term for FSiH. Sema has the same scheme as Nsong Rengma. The Sema term for FSiH,

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furthermore, is cognate with the Ntenyi and Anyo Rengma term for HF, and in Ao the same term appears in its original setting (MB). This Naga material thus shows various stages of the transformation of the affinal terminology through the development of unilateral xC marriage. The discrepancies found in Nung, Chang, and Lhota are perhaps more apparent than real, and in the case of Nung and Lhota, at any rate, our sources may be faulty. Even in these affinal features, however, we must expect to find a certain amount of dissassociation, for we must allow for linguistic "lag", i.e. the simple scheme of equating Fl with MB and Ml with FSi tends to be perpetuated even where the development of a unilateral "skew" has rendered it theoretically illogical. This general point has been raised many times before, but will bear repetition in view of the fact that a number of modern theoreticians seem to object to this sort of reasoning.

It is fairly evident that the abandonment of xC marriage as an instutionalized norm has in several different groups resulted in the disappearance of categorical equations. In Tibetan and Kanauri we have only the "fossilized" terms skud-po and ru, respectively, which require comparative studies for a full appraisal of their significance. In Lahul, however, where we have a hint of xC marriage, the equations Fl= MB and Ml= FSi are in evidence. In Burmese itself categorical equations are lacking, and here also we have no evidence of xC marriage, but the situation is reversed in Arakanese (Chaungtha).

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Maru and Lashi, which are of Burmese stock, equate M1 with FSi, WF with MB, and have a distinct term for FSiH, HF (as in Maeng and Anyo Rengma). Kachin influence perhaps plays a role here, yet the Kachin distinguish between WM and HM, as is consistent with their unilateral xC marriage practice. Nyi, in the Northern Lolo group, has derived its terms for WF and WM from the terms for MB and FSi, respectively, plus the element mo "old", acting here as an honorific, while the Burmish-Loloish affinal root *yok is employed in the terms for HM and HF. Ahi seems to reverse this scheme, to judge from our faulty data on this language. For Lisu we have only what appear to be the vocative terms for F1 and M1 (ma-ma < a-ma M, ba-ba < a-ba F), and hence are not in a position to interpret this Lolo material. The use of respectful designations may be a complicating factor here; cf. Lushei pu-zon WF, pi-zon WM, conforming to the Kuki pattern (from pu MB and pi MBW plus an added element -zon), but pa HF (= F) and nu HM (= M), i.e. a woman equates her husband's relatives with her own blood kin.

Categorical equations in the P1 terms are present elsewhere, but our sources are often incomplete. Garo equates M1 with FSi, MBW, but has a distinct term for F1 (a-bu-di, perhaps "little gF"). Mikir equates WF with MB, WM with FSi (with or without the addition of an honorific suffix), and has a distinct term for HF. If we assume that HM (not given in our sources) is also equated with FSi, this system can be compared with that found in Rengma and Maru. Both Garo and Mikir have

SA 601 193 197 preferential MBD marriage. Meithei equates Ml with FSi, and has i-ku Fl < TB *k'u MB (the MB term is not known for sure, but may be the Indic loan-word māmā); the Meithei are not known to practice xC marriage.

ST 601 193 197 The rest of the collateral terminology (C and N terms) is even more poorly known than the PSb terminology, and presents even more serious problems. In view of the presence of basic TB roots for MB (*k'u) and FSi (*ni) one might expect to find one or more roots for xC, but such is hardly the case. The extension of Sb terms to include pC is practically universal and need not be examined in detail. The lack of especial xC terms is probably associated with the lack of xC marriage, but there are too many lacunae in our data to permit of any final judgment here. Tibetan apparently fails to distinguish between pC and xC, but Burmese perhaps has a distinct xC term (sa-mi^3-mrok-sa^3, lit. "D's spouse"!). By way of contrast, Chaungtha, one of the Arakanese dialects, has yauk-pa Bl,xC corresponding to Burmese yok-p'a' Bl(ms), in conformity with its equation of Fl with MB and Ml with FSi, i.e. an affinal term has "invaded" the consanguineal nomenclature.

Terms for xCe and xCi in conjunction with xC marriage are found in Byangsi-Chaudangsi, Abor-Miri, Lisu, and Chang, while Dafla has this terminological pattern but without data on xC marriage. Chang appears to have preferential MBD marriage, but the bilateral type is found among the others.

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Byangsi-Chaudangsi makes a sex-of-speaker distinction, viz. xCi(ms), xCe(ws), xC(ss), and Abor-Miri makes an age distinction. None of the terms involved is associated with a PSb term or a N term. The Abor-Miri terms show "invasion" from the affinal terminology, as in Chaungtha, e.g. mag-bo xCe(os) = oBl,Sl, from TB *mak Sl. Note that in Byangsi-Chaudangsi, Abor-Miri, and Chang this xC pattern is associated with the simple Pl= PSb categorical equations (for Lisu we lack full information on the Pl terms).

Cross-cousin terminologies of Omaha type are found in two primary foci, viz. Kachin and Kukish. The correlation between the Omaha nomenclature and patrilineal descent, one of the few widely accepted anthropological generalizations, obtains both among the Kachin and the various Kuki and Naga tribes. Of the Tibeto-Burman peoples only the Garo and Mabha, in the Barish group, are known to have matrilineal descent, and unfortunately we know nothing of the cousin terminology in use among these tribes. There is a hint of the Crow type of terminology in Bodo, also in the Barish group, but we cannot be sure that the Bodo reckon descent in the matrilineal line. Bodo (nang-)a-doi "(thy) oBCh", (a-)doi FyB show reciprocity, as has already been pointed out, but Bodo nam-ba-noi "(thy) SiS", (nang-)a-noi "(thy) SiD", and a-noi FSi cannot be explained on this basis and suggest rather the Crow pattern. It is greatly to be regretted that our Garo sources fail us at this critical point.

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The Kachin system, which is quite distinct from that found in Kukish, merits especial examination. The key terms are as follows:

Kachin Omaha Pattern

(Consanguineal)

moi	FSi	ts'a	MB,MBS(ws)
ning	xCi(ws)	k'au	xCe(ms)
k'ri	FSiD(ms),SiCh(ms)		
rat	MBD(oms)		
nam	MBD(yms),BCh(ws)		

(Affinal)

ni	WM,MBW,WBW	ku	HF,FSiH,HoB,oSiH(ws)
moi	HM	ts'a	WF,BWB(ws)
ning	HSi,BW(ws)	k'au	WB,SiH(ms)
nam	Dl,WySi,yBW(ms),WBCh	k'ri	Sl,HSiCh,FSiHSi
rat	WoSi,ySiH(ws),oBW(ms),HyB		

The main features of this system have already been discussed in pt. 7. It will be observed that the lineal equations characteristic of the Omaha pattern appear only in the terms for non-marriageable cross-cousins under the Kachin unilateral xC marriage arrangement, i.e. a man equates his (non-marriageable) FSiD with his SiCh, while a woman equates her (non-marriageable) MBS with her MB. The terms applied by a woman to her (marriageable) FSiS are not known, but a man equates his (marriageable) MBD with his WSi. Distinct terms are used by speakers of each sex for xC(ss).

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On the basis of comparative material, the terms nam and k'ri must be regarded as originally affinal (D1 and S1, respectively). Both terms have "invaded" the consanguineal nomenclature via the categorical equations D1=BD(ws) and S1=SiS(ms), as are consistent with the practice of MBD marriage. Note that both terms have become neuter in the course of this transformation. We must next enquire of the fate of the original xN terms thus displaced. The terms moi FSi and ts'a MB can be called upon at this point. We lack comparative material on moi, but Tibetan has ts'a SiS(ms) corresponding to the Kachin term, and we can therefore interpret Kachin ts'a MB as a product of reciprocal usage. We have conclusive support for this view in the term k'ri HSiCh,FSiHSi, which at first puzzled the writer. Under the Kachin tripartite organization, as described by Gilhodes, FSiHSi becomes MBW, and MBW ~ HSiCh are reciprocal terms. Since moi FSi closely parallels ts'a MB, we are justified in interpreting this term analogically as a reciprocal development from BD(ws).

To continue our analysis, moi and ts'a have displaced the original cross PSb terms ni and ku, which are retained in the affinal nomenclature. An original system of bilateral xC marriage must be postulated to account for ni WW,MBW < FSi, and ku BF,FSiH < MB. The categorical equations shown by ning xCi(ws)=Sil(ws) and k'au xCe(ms)=Bl(ms) also call for this type of marriage.

To complete our reconstruction, the terms ning, k'au, and rat must be regarded as originally consanguineal rather

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than affinal. We have comparative material only for ning, which is represented by Chang (Konyak) nyŭng < *ning xC, Nikir nang < *ning BW(ws). We must further reconstruct rat as the term for xC(ds), i.e. the marriageable xC under the original bilateral xC marriage arrangement. This yields the theoretical categorical equations xCi(ms)=Sil(ms) and xCe(ws)=Bl(ws). Under the conventional type of levirate, which is found among the Kachin, a distinction must be made between the (marriageable) oBW and the (non-marriageable) yBW. In Kachin this distinction is made, in the case of a man, by equating yBW with Dl (nam) and in retaining the term rat for oBW, and, in the case of a woman, by equating HoB with HF (hu) and in retaining the term rat for HyB. Since a man marries his MBD, the distinction between rat MBD(oms) and nam MBD(yms) is the natural result of that described above. It is a fair inference that the missing terms for FSiS(ws) are hu FSiS(ows) and rat FSiS(yws). Note that the equation of MBD(yms) with BCh(ws) is a by-product, so to speak, and is not to be taken as a 'Crow' feature.

We are now in a position to evaluate the Omaha features of the Kachin system. It has been demonstrated that the Kachin have developed a unilateral xC marriage system from an original bilateral arrangement, and that this shift has produced a profound transformation in the kinship terminology. The equating of MBS(ws) with MB, and of FSiD(ms) with SiCh(ms) serves to distinguish the non-marriageable from the marriageable

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cross-cousins. These equations closely parallel those already noted in the Sbl terminology, and appear to form part of the same pattern. If this inference be correct, we must regard the institution of the levirate as a contributing factor here.

The Kachin terminology under the original bilateral xC marriage system can be reconstructed as follows:

Reconstructed Kachin System

(Consanguineal)

ni FSi	ku MB
ning xCi(ws)	k'au xCe(ms)
rat xC(ds)	
moi BD(ws)	ts'a SiS(ms)

(Affinal)

ni MBW,Ml	ku FSiH,Fl
ning Sil(ss)	k'au Bl(ss)
rat Sbl(ds)	
nam Dl	k'ri Sl

Maru and Lashi, which are of Burmese stock, show Omaha features of Kachin type, e.g. Lashi so-ok FSiD(ms),SiCh(ms) and so-auk Sl (a variant of so-ok), directly comparable with the Kachin term k'ri. Our material here is too uncertain to justify any further investigation of this point, and we have no data on the Maru and Lashi marriage practices. Both tribes are closely identified with the Kachin, and have even incorporated Kachin loan-words into their kinship nomenclatures, so that direct Kachin influence must be reckoned with in this

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matter. To judge from what little we know of the collateral terms of other Burmish-Loloish languages, Omaha features are not present. There is some evidence suggesting that the root *tu is applied both to N and C in Lisu and in Ulu (Northern Lolo), but the Lisu material is inconsistent and the Ulu material is not precise

The Omaha nomenclatures found among the Kukish tribes are quite distinct in type from the Kachin nomenclature. The Kuki tribes proper, including Southern Kuki and Tangkhul, employ the following basic scheme (in many varieties):

Kuki Omaha Pattern

(Consanguineal)

pi gM,MBD — pu gF,MB,MBS

ni FSi

tu FSiCh,SiCh(ms),gCh

(Affinal)

pi MBW,WL,WSi — pu WF,WB

ni HM — -rang FSiH,HF

mou DI,BW(ws) — mak SI,SiH(ws)

Lushei has an especial term for BCh(ws), viz. va' (apparently connected with the root *wa H), and Yindu has an especial term for BD(ws), viz. (ka-)li, which has been compared with the root *ma-li gCh (Burmese, Mung), xM (Mikir). In Siyin and Charto, however, BCh(ws) is equated with Ch. The analyzing development in Laiyo has entirely obliterated all traces of the Omaha system, yet the term tu FSiCh is

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retained. Haka has both (k-)tu FSiCh and the analytical term (k-)ni fa as an alternative. Lakher applies Sb terms (in address) to FSiCh and occasionally to MBCh, and both Thado and Aimol sometimes apply the oSb term to FSiCh(os). Chinbok employs an analytical term for MBS, but equates MBD with MySi. Thado resembles Chinbok in equating MBD with MSi, but elsewhere the regular equation is with MBW = gM. Chinbok is further aberrant in equating FSiS with SiS(ms) but having a distinct term for gS. Yindu equates DS with SiS, FSiS, but employs an analytical term for SS. Yindu has distinct terms for MBCh, and Kyaw has distinct terms both for MBCh and FSiCh(i.e. Omaha features are lacking). Aimol, if we can trust our sources, has reversed the Kuki pattern, with (ka-)pu FSiS and (ka-)tu-pa MBS. Chinbon has MoBS = MyB, MyBS = WB, reflecting the stress placed on age distinctions in Southern Kuki. Our Chawte material, which is not reliable, indicates a distinction between FSiS(ws) and FSiD(ms), and the equation of SiCh(mws) with gCh. The affinal term mak Sl is commonly replaced by the consanguineal term tu SiS(ms), as in Haka, Chawte, and Sho, and the reverse process whereby an affinal term "invades" the consanguineal nomenclature (as in Kachin) is illustrated by Kyaw sa-mǎk SiCh(ms) = Sl, and Ayaing Khami mok-sa FSiCh, SiCh(ms) = Sl, both from the root *mak Sl. The latter language has retained the root *tu, however, in the term (ka-)tu FSiCh(ws), gS.

It is evident from the above citations that this Omaha pattern is extremely susceptible to variation at all points.

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Nothing approaching the specific Kachin variety has been encountered, however, and the two systems seem to have little in common. In the Kuki system the equations FSiCh=SiCh(ms) and MBS=MB obtain regardless of the sex or speaker, there are additional equations of MB with gF and SiCh(ms) with gCh, and ni FSi is retained as a consanguineal term. In addition, distinct terms for xC(ss) and Sbl are lacking. The historical developments of the two systems have been quite different, if we are permitted to draw inferences from comparative data. The terms pi and pu are the original gP terms (TB *p'i gM, *p'u gF), and the term -rang (prefixed) can be regarded as the original term for MB, cognate with Tibetan ʾa-ǰang < *zrang MB (cf. Kachin ku HF,FSiH=MB). The term tu occasions some difficulty, since we have only the Burmish-Loloish root *tu and the Nung term pa-du, both applied to N (xN in Burmese) for comparison. In view of the parallelism in the equations MB=gF and xN=gCh, however, we must fix the original meaning of tu as "gCh" rather than "xN". The clue to these equations seems to be teknonymy in conjunction with xC marriage, i.e. we must suppose that a man applied the teknonymous terms pu gF and pi gM to his wife's parents, whereas a woman applied the consanguineal terms ni FSi and -rang MB. With the development of unilateral marriage with MBD, a feature found in the Kuki area as well as in Kachin, the two sets of Pl terms were fully differentiated in function, and the term pu Fl=gF replaced the consanguineal term -rang MB, with pi coming into

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use for MBW. The equation of SiCh(ms) with gCh was the natural result of the above development. Since the term ni FSi was retained in its original setting, no comparable term was developed for the reciprocal relationship BCh(ws). The evidence for the use of teknonymous terms in Tibeto-Burman in general has been resumed above and need not be discussed at this point. Within the Kuki group, note Chinbon (ka-)mo-pauk WH=gF and (ka-)mu-bok MoB (probably a variant of the foregoing), (ka-)mo WM=gM and (ka-)mok MoBW (probably a variant of the foregoing), but (ka-)ze HF (analysis uncertain), (ka-)zi HM=FSi. Chinbon thus makes use of teknonymous terms precisely as suggested above for the Kuki group in general.

We are still faced with the problem of explaining the equations MBS=MB, MBD=MBW (or MSi), and FSiCh=SiCh(ms). Here again we must take into account the affinal setting of these terms under a system of unilateral xC marriage with MBD. The fundamental equation seems to have been that between WF and WB (pu) rather than between MB and MBS, i.e. these kin were identified because of the similarity of their roles as wife's father and brother rather than as mother's brother and mother's brother's son. In other terms, the especial position of MB and MBS among the Kuki groups seems in large measure to have arisen through xC marriage. The equation of FSiCh with SiCh(ms) reflects the equation of MBS with MB, just as the equation of SiCh(ms) with gCh reflects the equation of MB with gF.

It is possible to conceive of the Kuki development without recourse to teknonymy simply by assuming that pu gF was

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applied to MB and MBS in an honorific sense, with tu gCh SiCh(ms)=FSiCh as a complementary equation. In any event, the equation in the MB line must be regarded as the primary one, and the equation in the FSi line as complementary. The same situation was found to obtain among the Kachin (supra).

The Naga languages, which make up the northern division of the Kukish group, also reveal Omaha features, which are of Kuki rather than Kachin type. MBD is equated with MSi or MySi rather than with gM=MBW. In Ao (all three dialects) the terms for gF (o-pu) and gCh (sam-cir) are distinct, i.e. there is no teknonymy, the TB root *k'u is retained in the consanguineal nomenclature (o-k'u MB,MBS) while MBD is equated with MySi, and the affinal terms for Sl (a-nok) and Dl (a-mu) are applied to FSiS,SiS(ms) and FSiD,SiD(ms), respectively, precisely as in Ayaing Khami. Sema has a distinct term for gF (neuter) and equates gCh with Ch, but has developed a new root for MB,MBS (a-ngu) and has retained the root *k'u only in the affinal meaning "FSiH" (a-ci). Thus both Ao and Sema show full Omaha features without distinction of sex of speaker (as in Kuki) but also without teknonymy (as in Kachin). The Angami, Rengma, and Lhota systems, however, all show teknonymous features. Rengma (all three dialects) equates MB,MBS(os) with gF (ggF in Nzong), and FSiCh,SiCh(ms) with gCh. Lhota shows a partial equation of MB,MBS with gF (o-mo and o-mo-tsü) and at least similar terms for FSiS,SiS(ms) and gS (o-hro and o-hre). Angami equates FSiS,ySiS(ms) with gS, but distinguishes between

SA gF and MB, yet the term for the latter (mi) is connected with
601 the Rengma term for gF,MB (a-mi ~ a-mui) and the Lhota term
● 193 for MB (o-mo) and gF (o-mo-tsü). We can thus interpret Angami
197 mi MB as the original term for gF,MB and in this way explain
ST the lack of symmetry in the Angami nomenclature as it now
601 stands (a man calls his sister's child "gCh", but a child
193 calls his mother's brother "uncle"). Angami lacks the Omaha
197 traits on one side, since MBCh is addressed or described by name, or analytically if the need arises. The Rengma equations on the MB side appear only in the vocative nomenclature, and only when the cousin (MBS or MBD) addressed is older than speaker.

As noted in pt. 16, Majumder attempted to explain some of the features of the Sema nomenclature in terms of marriage with F's widow, after the fashion instituted by Rivers. Almost no instances of marriages of this type have been encountered in the Tibeto-Burman area, however, and the writer fails to see how Rivers' theories are of any relevancy in the present situation. The most curious form of marriage noted is the Lisu marriage with FSi cited by Fraser, and this is not reflected in the Lisu nomenclature. Omaha features among the Omaha and Miwok are perhaps based on WBD marriage, but for the American evidence there is no unanimity of opinion, and at least three recent writers on the subject (White, Gifford, Tax) have attacked this as a general explanation. Of this trio White alone suggests a general explanation, viz. that the Omaha type

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is developed from the Dakota-Iroquois type (pC = Sb, xC distinct term) under the influence of a mature and vigorous patrilineal clan system. Gifford has successfully attacked this view on the basis of the American material, and the same general strictures are applicable in the Tibeto-Burman field, where no correlation can be established between strong patrilineal clans and the Omaha type of terminology.

The Kuki equation of xN with gCh is also encountered in Miri (ü < o-i "child below") and Tibetan (ts'a). Miri has retained the TB root *k'u MB (a-kü), but does apply teknonymous terms to Fl and Ml (= MB and FSi under the Miri bilateral xC marriage system). In Tibetan, however, teknonymy has been found only in the dialect of Bathang (eastern Tibet) as recorded by Desgodins, who cites rmo-rmo Ml = MM (hence a man's term for his WM). Abor shows reverse teknonymy in the shifts a-bu gF < F and a-nǎ gM < M, reflected in the equation o Ch = N = gCh (Abor, like Miri, applies teknonymous terms to Fl and Ml).

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We are perhaps not justified in concluding that all equations of xN with gCh are based on teknonymy involving the affinal nomenclature (gF > Fl = MB), but no better general explanation can be suggested. The general thesis outlined above conforms to the basic Tibeto-Burman sociological pattern of cross-cousin marriage, and thus enjoys an initial advantage over any alternative theories of a more ad hoc nature.

Reciprocal terminology has already been mentioned in connection with Kachin ts'a MB < SiCh(ms), k'ri HBiCh, FSiHSi,

194 Tones appear to be lacking in a few members of the family, notably in the generally archaic West Tibetan dialects (Balti and Purik), hence only a tendency to develop tonal systems rather than a tonal system itself can definitely be postulated for the parent speech. Monosyllabic roots, however, of the type *k'wi "dog", *mig "eye", *ni "sun, day", are of absolute diagnostic value. The phonemic scheme of the parent language seems to have been relatively simple. The stop and affricate series included both aspirated and unaspirated surds and at least one sonant member. To these were added four nasals (ng, ń, n, m), probably four sibilants (s, z, š, ž), the liquids l and r, and consonantal y, w, and h. The final consonants, however, were limited to -g, -d, -b; -ng, -n, -m; -r, -l, and probably -s. Initial consonantal clusters were restricted to combinations of stops, affricates, sibilants, or nasals + r, l, or y, e.g. kl-, mr-, py-, but prefixed groupings complicated the anlaut in many roots, making possible forms such as Tib. brgyad "8". The vocalic system included a, i, and u, probably with a simple "long" vs. "short" quantitative distinction, and e and o, which seem secondary in many instances. The parent language also had diphthongs both of rising type, e.g. wa (u̯a), wi (u̯i), and of falling type, e.g. au̯, ei̯, the latter type appearing only in final position, as in *ts'au "fat", *mei "fire".

193 On the morphological side the parent Tibeto-Burman speech showed almost as great simplicity. It was primarily a prefixing language with isolating characteristics and a

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through Southeast Asia, irrespective of what the parts of Southeast Asia may have in common and overriding their traditional differences.

Every human type is represented in Southeast Asia. Successive peoples from East-Central Asia have filtered overland from the north, ranging from primitive Australoid types who left a few



FIG. 118.—The Pattern of Languages in Southeast Asia

Negrito and Australoid people in the forests as mark of the greater stream which went island hopping to Australia, to the later Tibetan-Mongoloid peoples, forefathers of the Burmese, Siamese and Laos of today. Then there were centuries of Indian migration early in this era, pressing overseas from South India across Kra, along the coasts of Sumatra and Java, into Lower Siam and the Lower Mekong, leaving an indelible mark in the speech, culture and religions of people there today; this was a spread of Indian merchant adventurers and traders, and large-scale colonies exclusively of Indian settlers seem not to have been established, but in time there took place a great blood mixture between Indians and the older indigenous stocks. Later came a similar seaborne migration into Southeast Asia by predominantly Chinese people who first trickled south in the manner of sea gipsies, developed agricultural colonies

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THE LANGUAGES OF SOUTHEASTERN ASIA

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197 THE origin of the various languages of Southeastern Asia is veiled by the same mist, broken by only occasional glimmers of light, which hides from the ethnologist and even the historian the steps by which the territory was populated, its culture diffused. Nevertheless, a rough outline appears practicable.

Among the most ancient inhabitants of the area are the various tribes of Negritos, the Eta, the Semang, and the Andaman Islanders. One of their characteristics, in this region just as in Africa, seems to be that, with the exception of but one group, they everywhere abandoned their original language and adopted in its place that spoken by their respective neighbors, that is, the Sakai, Malayan, or African Negro dialects.

The one notable, and scientifically most valuable, exception is the language spoken by the Andaman Islanders. Excellent though the available ethnological material is, the linguistic reports are rather poor. So far as one can gather, there are two main groups of dialects: the languages spoken by the ten tribes of the Great Andaman; and the Önge language, spoken by the peoples of the South Andaman and the Little Andaman. For further information about them, the reader may refer with profit to A. R. Brown's "Notes on the languages of the Andaman Islands" (*Anthropos* 9 (1914), 36–52). Attempts were made, especially by Blagden, to discover remnants of an ancient Negrito vocabulary among the Semangs, and subsequently to compare these with Andamanese word lists—but these attempts have borne little fruit so far.

THE MON-KHMER LANGUAGES

The first Mongoloids to reach Southeastern Asia seem to have spoken a branch of the Mon-Khmer language family. The Semangs, pygmies of the Malay Peninsula, and the Sakai, another non-Malay group of the mainland, speak what appears to be the most archaic of all the Mon-Khmer tongues, even more so than the stilted forms of written Mon and Khmer. Other members of this family that survive to this day are: Khasi, spoken in Assam; Nicobarese, with half a dozen dialects, spoken in the Nicobar Islands; the languages spoken by some tribes along the basin of the Salween River,

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●197 particularly the Palaung, Wa, and Riang; and finally the Mon-Khmer group proper.

The language of the Mon is spoken on the coast of the gulf of Pegu. Inscriptions date from as far back as the 11th century. They are in Myazediin script. Khmer is spoken in Cambodia, and its inscriptions are available from about the first half of the 7th century. There are also about a dozen other dialects spoken by scattered tribes throughout this area.

The Mon-Khmer languages are sometimes grouped together with Munda, a large family of languages spoken in the Northeastern sector of India today —but this is not supported by evidence. Similarly, it may be doubted if dialects of this language family have really spread into Yunnan in Southwest China. For example, Wen Yu showed recently that Min-chia, long held to have been a Mon-Khmer dialect, belongs in reality to Tibeto-Burman ("A study of synonyms in the Min-chia language," *Studia Serica* 1 (1940), 1–28). The term "Austroasiatic"—if it means more than just Mon-Khmer—covers a multitude of linguistic methodological sins. And if the existence of an "Austroasiatic" family of languages is doubtful, an "Austric" superstock, combining the former with Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian), is much more improbable still. For further information on Mon-Khmer consult the writer's "Examination of the Austroasiatic language family" (*Language* 18 (1942), 206–17), which contains references as well as a lengthy list of languages, and further his "Bibliography of Mon-Khmer linguistics" (*Studies in Linguistics*, Vol. 1, No. 11, 1943).

It is only fair to point out, however, that in a recent paper, "Thai, Kadai, and Indonesian: A new alignment in Southeastern Asia" (*American Anthropologist* 44 (1942), 576–601), Paul Benedict attempted boldly to combine into a single language family Thai, Indonesian and "Kadai"—and further to add this hypothetical family to Mon-Khmer-Annamite, and in a further synthesis, Miao-Yao. "Kadai" is a new term of the author's for Kelao, Laqua, and Lati of the mainland, that is, in Southcentral China and the China-Tonkin border region, and Li of Hainan. This writer regards Benedict's interesting attempt with a good deal of scepticism, for the type of evidence he uses to prove his hypothesis is not altogether satisfactory. Further judgment may well be postponed until new and better material to work with has been collected.

THE INDONESIAN LANGUAGES

197 Indonesian (Malayan) is a family of languages spoken over an enormous
171 territory: the Malay Peninsula, the East Indies, the Philippine Islands,
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Madagascar, and Formosa. Furthermore, a distant but clear relationship exists between Indonesian on the one hand, and the Oceanic languages, Melanesian, Micronesian, Polynesian, on the other.

The dialect spoken on the mainland, around, say, Perak, is known simply as Malay; this is, moreover, something of a *lingua franca:* "bazaar" or "pidgin" Malay and is understood throughout the Indies, except in some of the interior districts.

The large number of dialects in this area—there are 87 in the Philippine Islands alone—cannot be accounted for in terms of separate waves of migrations, for ethnology recognizes no more than three major ones; the distinctions become less puzzling, however, if we consider the geographical factors which resulted in ethnic isolation of more or less small groups. Perhaps the most isolated, and hence the most divergent, dialects of Indonesian are spoken in Madagascar; the Hova dialect of the Malagasy group is the literary one.

The chief groups on the Philippine Islands are four: the Luzon group (chief dialects, Iloco, Ibanag, Apayao, Kalinga, Tingguian, Bontoc, Ifugao, Igorot, Ilongot, Tagalog), second, the Bisaya group (chief dialects, Cebu-Bisaya, Panay-Bisaya), third, Mindoro-Palawan (chief dialects, Mangyan, Kuyónon, Tagbanua), and finally, the Mindanao-Sulu group (chief dialects, Lanao, Magindanao, Subanon, Mandaya, Bagobo, Kulaman, Tiruray). For a map of distribution of these and other dialects see Herbert W. Krieger, "Peoples of the Philippines" (*Smithsonian Institution, War Background Studies No. 4*, Washington, 1942, Fig. 4).

Some of the dialects in the East Indies are as follows. Sumatra: Minangkabau, Karo and Toba (together known as Batak), Gayo, Kubu, etc. Mentawey is spoken on the island by that name. Dayak and Punan are spoken in Borneo. Java: Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese. Celebes: Toradja, Bulu, Tontemboan, Bugis, Makassa, Bareqe. Balinese is the language of Bali. There are a good many others as well.

Several members of the Indonesian family, Malay in particular, have been studied with more or less thoroughness. But the best material is in Dutch and available only with difficulty here. For an excellent recent contribution in America cf. the outline of Iloco (a Philippine dialect) syntax (*Language* 18 (1942), 193–200), by Leonard Bloomfield.

The empires of the Mon and the Khmer were shattered in relatively recent times by folks who spoke Burmese and Thai respectively. The speakers of these languages dominate Burma and Thailand today, and Mon-Khmer is rapidly disappearing.

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THE INDO-CHINESE LANGUAGES

197 Both these dialect groups belong to the Indo-Chinese family of languages.
184 Chinese, of course, is the best known member of this family. Thai, as far as evidence now indicates, may be said to be another member. Thai is generally divided into two groups, the Chuang group, spoken chiefly in Kwangsi and southern Kweichow and in parts of Hainan, and the Southwestern group.

This Southwestern group itself divides into several dialects. One of these is Shan, spoken in the Shan states of the north by about one million souls; some of whom inhabit parts of Yunnan province. The P'o, the Kamti, and related tribes also speak dialects of Shan. Ahom, formerly spoken throughout Assam, is another member of this Southwestern group. Tai Blanc, Nung, Tho, and others, form a third grouping, and are spoken in French Indo-China as well as the southwestern part of Kwangsi. Finally, and chiefly, there is Thai itself, the official language (Bangkok dialect) of Thailand, and its closest relative, Lao, spoken by the Laos of the North. The first Siamese writing that we possess dates from the period of the famous king Ram Gamheng, with inscriptions of the 13th century.

197 Some recent studies on certain aspects of Thai may be recommended to the interested reader: they are, "Types of reduplication in Thai" (*Studies in Linguistics*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1942), and "The use of numeral classifiers in Thai" (*Language* 18 (1942), 201–05), both by Mary Haas. The best short discussion of the position of Thai in the Indo-Chinese family may be found in the 1938–39 issue of the *Chinese year book*, by a very reliable scholar, Li Fang Kuei ("Languages and Dialects," pp. 43–51).

Annamese is another bone of contention between scholars. On the one hand stands Maspero, linking this group definitely with Thai, and on the other hand stands Przyluski, supported recently by Benedict, linking it with Mon-Khmer. That the latter are wrong and Maspero is right, as far as evidence now indicates, was demonstrated by the brilliant Chinese scholar Wen Yu ("On the kinship of the Annamitic language," *Meridio-Occidentale Sinense*, 1 (1940), 66–73). Wen Yu rightly rejects, and effectively, Przyluski's lexical and morphological arguments; then he shows that Maspero's phonological arguments can fully be supported from the morphology, concluding that "from morphological study the Annamitic is completely in harmony with the Thaic."

Tibeto-Burman seems to be another branch of the Indo-Chinese family. Among the languages of the Burman side is, of course, Burmese itself. About sixteen dialects of this language are spoken by approximately ten

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million people. Of Karen, a related language, there are some one and a half million still left, with about seventeen dialects. The Nosu (Lolo) may speak a related tongue: they occupy a large part of Yunnan, the northwest of Kweichow, and portions of southern Sikiang. Their position, however, is rather anomalous. 197

The Miao-Yao group is the most controversial of all the languages of this territory, as far as historical relationships go. It must be remembered throughout that the linguist's first task is to describe the languages of a given area. Only after careful and scientifically comparable records have been prepared must he make statements of a historical character. Since there are no reliable descriptions of the great majority—almost all—the languages of Southeastern Asia, every statement concerning relationships must be carefully and critically scrutinized before accepted. The Miao-Yao controversy is only one of those which may well be postponed until its dialects are adequately described.

The above is the merest sketch outlining the languages of Southeastern Asia: the list is by no means exhaustive; and the references are intended to guide the reader to further material. Paul Benedict gave his permission to this writer to announce that he will shortly publish a bibliography of Southeast Asiatic linguistics, devoted, however, mainly to dialects of the Tibeto-Burman stock, though also dealing with Thai, Miao-Yao, and "Kadai." The most complete list of books (but not of periodical literature) pertaining to the entire Southeast Asiatic field will be found in the appropriate section of Heine-Geldern and Poleman's *Selected list of books on India, Ceylon, Tibet, and Southeast Asia* to appear soon under the auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies.

From the point of view of practical considerations as distinct from scientific interests there are three languages in the territory under survey which are of primary importance: Malay, Thai, and Burmese. When the war in the Far East broke out the situation with regard to instruction in these languages, not to mention the others, was quite deplorable. In an important article (*Asia* 42. 375–78) in June 1942, Mortimer Graves wrote as follows: "Not one American is a recognized scholar in the field or equipped to teach Malay intensively for the emergency. Moreover, not only are there no teachers; there are none of the paraphernalia of instruction—no adequate grammars, dictionaries for students, books of readings, phonograph records and so on, which make possible the modern teaching of a language. . . . Even though Java has fallen, our relations with Malay-speaking peoples have just begun. Much the same is to be said about Thai, or Siamese," and, Mr. 000

VIII

Kinship Notation

121 A aunt
128 B brother
● 197 C cousin
601 Ce cousin (male)
Ci cousin (female)
Ch child
D daughter
(ds) (different sex from speaker's)
F father
g grand-
l -in-law
M mother
N nephew or niece
Ne nephew
Ni niece
(os) (older than speaker)
p parallel
P parent
S son
Sb sibling
Si sister
Sp spouse
(ss) (same sex as speaker's)
U uncle
x cross
(ys) (younger than speaker)

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121 "linguistic palaeontology" is essentially devoted to
128 semantics. Other studies in the general field, with the exception of those noted below, are entirely superficial and need not be cited here. The fact that a sound morphological and semantic analysis can proceed only from a sound phonological basis has gone largely unheeded by students of Tibeto-Burman linguistics. The writer, working in collaboration with Mr. Robert Shafer, has attempted to supply this basis. The fruit of their joint effort is embodied in the Sino-Tibetan Linguistics series as well as in individual articles by the co-authors. This series of volumes, as specified in the bibliography appended to the present introduction, covers most of the Tibeto-Burman divisions, the major exceptions being Miri-Dafla, Konyak (East Naga), Lepcha (Rong), and Lui (Kadu). The results achieved in the Sino-Tibetan Linguistics series are in no sense definitive, but a number of broad phonetic generalizations have been attained and in some instances rather detailed phonetic analyses have been completed. In the present study the writer has refined the analysis at many points and has in some places arrived at new interpretations, while the phonological treatment of Miri-Dafla, Lepcha, and other groups is presented here for the first time.

197 The Tibeto-Burman languages, like Karen, Chinese, and Thai, are characterized by the presence of monosyllabic roots and the employment of distinctive tones (tonemes).

601 In striking contrast to this rather elaborate prefix
193 apparatus Tibeto-Burman shows almost no true morphological suffixation. A characteristic "final dental morphology", however, appears in Tibetan, Kachin and elsewhere and undoubtedly must be postulated for the parent speech. In this series Tibetan has -n, -d, and -s, the latter in some instances derived from -ds. Cf. the following examples: Tib. za-ba, gza-ba "to eat", gzan-pa "to eat, devour, gnaw", bzan "food of animals, pasturage", zan "pap, fodder", zas "food, nourishment", and Kachin ǰa "to eat", ǰat "boiled rice", i.e. "food"; Tib. ɡo-ba "to put on clothes", gon-pa "to put on clothes; clothing", gos "garment"; Tib. dro-ba "to be warm, warm, warmth", dro, dros "the hot part of the day", dros-pa "heated", dron-mo "warm", drod "warmth, heat". As indicated by the above series, these derivatives in -n, -d, -s are often substantival, the typical formation being of the type na-ba "to be ill", nad "disease". The connection between the verbal root and the derived form with final dental is not always clear, especially in languages in which this morphology no longer functions, e.g. Burmese na "to be ill", nat "demon" < "spirit of disease" (see the discussion in Benedict, 1939). The importance of this morphology in connection with kinship terminology will be made clear in the discussion of the Tibetan system.

197 The classification of the Tibeto-Burman languages presents a number of serious problems which admit of no solution at the present time. The general picture is much

197 like that in Indo-European linguistics, i.e. several large well-defined groups and various smaller groups can be pointed out, but, with the exception of a few specific similarities, the exact genealogies of these groups cannot be traced. The 128 main divisions of Tibeto-Burman and the approximate positions 197 of some of the key languages are indicated on the appended language list and map. This list includes only those languages for which kinship material is given and is in no sense complete. This material has been arranged with a view to guiding the reader through the maze of Tibeto-Burman linguistics, hence the transitions are both geographical and philological. First the important Tibetan group and its aberrant dialects are considered, thus yielding a yardstick of comparison against which other systems can be collated. Proceeding then to the south, we discuss the chain of languages spoken in the sub-Himalayan area, from west to east, ending with the Miri group in northern Assam. The linguistic affiliations follow much the same pattern, inasmuch as the languages of Kanauri type in the western sub-Himalayas approach Tibetan while those in the eastern sub-Himalayas (Nepal) show affiliations rather with the languages of Assam and Burma. The Kachin group, which stands at the "linguistic crossroads" of Tibeto-Burman, forms the natural transition to Nung and Burmese on the one hand, and to Konyak and Barish on the other. Lastly, the Kukic complex of languages, including Kuki-Chin, Naga,

128 Mikir, and Meithei, round out our picture of Tibeto-Burman
197 kinship terminology as a whole. As new material is presented in connection with each group taken up for discussion, recapitulatory remarks are added to tie the argument together, and a general summary is offered at the end.

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23: Benedict E-5 (no date) 1941 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

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23: Benedict E-5 (no date) 1941 All Southeast Asia All

1. Tibetan	12. Dafla	23. Lisu	33. Lushei
2. Tsangla	13. Digaru	24. Nyi	34. Lakher
3. Gyarung	14. Aka	25. Ahi	35. Thado
4. Kanauri	15. Dhimal	26. Moso	36. Sho
5. Byangsi	16. Kachin	27. Chang	37. Khami
6. Bahing	17. Nung	28. Garo	38. Tangkhul
7. Vayu	18. Burmese	29. Bodo	39. Empeo
8. Newari	19. Maru	30. Mikir	40. Angami
9. Magari	20. Phunoi	31. Meithei	41. Sema
10. Lepcha	21. Akha	32. Mru	42. Ao
11. Abor-Miri	22. Lahu		

Language List:

Abor-Miri 11. Ahi 25. Aka 14. Akha 21. Angami 40. Ao 42. Bahing 6. Bodo 29. Burmese 18. Byangsi 5. Chang 27. Dafla 12. Dhimal 15. Digaru 13. Empeo 39. Garo 28. Gyarung 3. Kachin 16. Kanauri 4. Khami 37. Lahu 22. Lakher 34. Lepcha 10. Lisu 23. Lushei 33. Magari 9. Maru 19. Meithei 31. Mikir 30. Moso 26. Mru 32. Newari 8. Nung 17. Nyi 24. Phunoi 20. Sema 41. Sho 36. Tangkhul 38. Thado 35. Tibetan 1. Tsangla 2. Vayu 7.

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a phonemic system, in which similar integration appears. The point is not worth elaborating, since the fact that a kinship terminology does constitute a system hardly relieves us of the task of investigating each element of that system, both independently and correlatively.

In any piece of historical reconstruction, linguistic or other, the natural tendency is to make the prototype unduly complex. The writer has often been struck by the complexities shown by hypothetical reconstructed languages as compared with their actual living descendants, as though linguistic evolution always proceeded in the direction of simplification. The number of distinct roots assigned to these reconstructed languages is sometimes of staggering magnitude, and no ingenuity is spared in augmenting this lexicographical harvest. In the present study it would be easy to reconstruct an archaic nomenclature with two or more terms for most relationships, yet such a procedure patently would be futile. It is far better to determine, firstly, which elements are relatively certain, and, secondly, which elements are based largely on "partial equations" and must thus be held in reserve until a basic framework has been set up. Nine roots, eight of which are applied to consanguineal relatives, stand out in our complete Tibeto-Burman series as culled from the foregoing review. These roots constitute the following systems

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Tibeto-Burman Terms

*p'i	gH	*p'u	gF
*ma	K	*p'a	F
*ni	FBi	*k'u	KB
*mau	yGh		
*ma	Ch		
		*mak	Bl

The forms given above can be accepted with some confidence as fair approximations of the archaic Tibeto-Burman roots. All except the affinal term *mak have vocalic finals, and it was on the basis of finals or "rhymes" (medial vowel + final consonant), especially of vocalic finals, that Shafer and the writer were able to work out the main features of Tibeto-Burman phonology. Earlier writers had in general attacked the problem from the most difficult angle, that of initials and tones. Thus, no less a scholar than Laufer is responsible for the following absurd dictum:

> Prefixes as well as final consonants....are of minor importance in the comparative study of Indo-Chinese languages.... the staff of comparison remains the initial consonant and the tone conditioned by it. (TP 17, p. 115).

Prefixes have shown to be of basic importance, while both the initials and the tones have been so influenced by the prefixes that our analysis of them still lags far behind our analysis of the finals. In the above set of terms, however, the only problems <u>in re</u> initials concern the aspiration or lack of aspiration, voicing or unvoicing, of the stop initials of *p'i, *p'u, *p'a, and *k'u. Rukish has *pi gV and *pu gF,

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but initial aspiration is not well preserved in this group. Mikir has p'i gH, p'u gF, ku < *k'u HB, but po < *pa F. Meithei, which ordinarily preserves aspiration, has pu gF, pa F, and ku Fl (< HB). Kachin has ku HF (< HB) rather than the anticipated *k'u, and Burmese has (ate-)kui oB rather than *k'ui. Tibetan has p'yi gL, p'a F, and k'u FB (< HB), while both Tibetan and Kachin have p'u oB (< gF). It may be that one or more of these roots had a sonant rather than a surd initial. Initial g-, a rare element in our comparative material, is perhaps indicated for the HB root (*gu ~ *g'u), but at present nothing definite can be said on this point.

Only one of the above terms is uncertain as regards final, viz. *ni FSl. Classical Tibetan has ne rather than *ni, and Meithei has nem ~ ne rather than *ni, both of which point to an archaic form *nei rather than *ni. The weight of evidence, however, speaks in favor of the reconstruction *ni, from which *nei may have been developed as a doublet root; cf. Kukish *nau yOb, *nou "young, tender", which tend to be confused (vide pt. 15).

The basic gF terms *p'i and *p'u are found together in Barish, Mikir, Meithei, Mru, Kukish, and Burmish-Loloish (but p'e^{3} ggF < *p'i in Burmese itself, which has a new term [p'we^{3}] for gH). The root *p'i is further retained in its basic meaning in Tibetan, Manauri (perhaps Tibetan loan-word), Bahing, and Vayu, while Chang has retained it in the meaning "gP". In northern TB groups the root *p'u has been applied

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to oB, viz. in Tibetan, Limbu, Newari (only in combination), Digaro, and Kachin. This semantic interchange also appears in Burmish-Loloish, viz. Moso p'u gF, bu oB, Nyi bu gF, pu oB. The interplay of surd and sonant initials in these Moso and Nyi forms indicates that doublets are involved. In Barish the root *p'i gM (in the form bi) has been applied to oSi, both in the Bodo-Dimasa and Garo divisions of this group, and also retained in its basic meaning. It is clear that these usages are connected with the especial position held by oSb, and that the gP terms function here simply as honorifics. Other TB roots, less widely distributed than the above, show the same type of semantic shift (vide infra). In societies with a patrilineal bias it is only natural that the role of oB should be of more significance than that of oSi, thus perhaps accounting for the relative stability of *p'i as compared with *p'u. It can hardly be without significance that in the single matrilineal group encountered (Barish) the term *p'i gM should have been applied to oSi, in contrast to all other TB groups.

Of the two basic P terms *p'a F and *na M, the former is the most widely distributed and shows fewer variations. The following groups have this root (*p'a): Tibetan, Kanauri, Byangsi, Bahing, Vayu, Newari, Lepcha, Miri, Dhimal, Burmish-Loloish, Konyak, Barish, Mikir, Meithei, Mru, and Kukish. This root commonly appears as a masculine affix, but no instance of a transference to "oB" has been uncovered. The

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root *ma M appears in Tibetan, Kanauri, Bahing, Vayu, Newari, Lepcha, Dhimal, Burmish-Loloish, Barish, and Meithei. In Burmese itself it is retained only in the terms ma' Si and a-ma' "feminine suffix", and in the closely-related Maru only in the meaning "MSi". Kru has preserved this root only in the feminine suffix -ma. A transference to the meaning "oSi" is found in the contiguous North Assam groups Dafla and Aka. In Kachin and the extensive Kukish group this root appears to have vanished without leaving a trace.

The two PSb terms *ni and *k'u are also unequally represented in Tibeto-Burman. The root *ni FSi is of almost universal occurrence. In its basic meaning it appears in Tibetan, Gyarung, Kanauri, Thebor, Vayu, Newari, Abor-Miri, Nung, Burmish-Loloish (but not in Burmese itself), Konyak, Barish, Mikir, Meithei, and Kukish. Kachin has retained it only in the affinal meaning "WM". Aka, if we can trust our inadequate sources, has applied this root to M, while Limbu has applied it to oSi. Replacement by the term for "oSi" is seen in Dafla, Sho, Changki (Ao), and probably Kadu, while Mongsen (Ao) shows replacement by the term for "oSb". The Dafla material indicates that this is an analytical development ("oSi of F"). Lepcha equates FSi with WSi in the term nyu ~ nyo, applied to female relatives in the uterine line. This unusual equation also appears in Bahing, which has mo-mo MSi,FSi (from mo < *ma M), and po-po FB (from po < *pa F), yet has ku-ku MB. Distinct terms have been

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developed in Kachin (mui), which preserves *ui as an affinal term (WM), and in Burmese (ri^{3}), but *ui is retained in the closely related Maru. The Dimasa term de-de FBi (be-de MB) is likewise distinct.

The much more restricted root *k'u MB is found in its primary meaning in Bahing, Vayu, Abor-Miri, Dafla, Digaro, Mung, Mikir, and Ao. Tibetan has k'u FB, but akud < *k'u Fl,Bl. Himalayish and Lepcha also have k'u FB, probably because of Tibetan influence. Kachin, Meithei, Htenyi Rengma, and Anyo Rengma have retained the term in the affinal meaning "HF" (Meithei Fl), and Sema in the affinal meaning "FSiH". Chang (Konyak) has the form ko MB, which cannot with certainty be connected with this root. In the Burmish-Loloish group we can cite only Burmese kui "prefix used with names of persons older or of higher rank than the speaker, or politely of his equals" (ats-kui oB), Akha a-kö B, Ahi kö-pu-li ySiH, and Moso a-gu Bl. The Moso usage is paralleled in the Barish group, where we find Bodo gu-mai, Garo gu-ma Bl. This root cannot be traced in the Kuki languages proper, yet can be reconstructed for Kukish on the basis of the Naga terms (supra), and for Kukis in general on the basis of the Mikir and Meithei terms.

The root *nau ySb, occasionally applied either to yB or ySi alone, also to Ch, is well represented in Tibeto-Burman. It appears in the following groups: Tibetan (nu ∼ no), Byangsi (yB), Limbu, Lepcha, Aka, Kachin, Konyak, Barish (ySi), Meithei, Mru (yB), and Kukish (ySb ∼ Ch). The most conspicuous gaps are those in Abor-Miri-Dafla, Mung, and Burmish-Loloish.

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The eighth and last of the basic consanguineal terms is *wa Gh, which is found in Tsangla, Magari, Miju, Aka, Kachin, Hadu, Mung (sa-mi D), Pyu, Burmish-Loloish, Konyak, Barish, Mikir, Meithei, Mru, and Mukish (rarely used for ySb, as in Pocren and Kyaw). Lepcha has a-so < *sa ggF, a-son gCh (with suffixed -n). This root is conspicuously absent in Tibetan and its dialects (but present in Tsangla, a Bodish language), Himalayish, and Kiranti, i.e. the northern or northwestern band of Tibeto-Burman languages, as well as in the Abor-Miri-Dafla group.

The affinal term *mak Sl appears in Tibetan, Lepcha (< *smak), Dhimal (< *smak), Miri, Kachin (da-ma < *da-mak), Burmese (ma-mak), Meithei, Mru, and Mukish, with an additional uncertain occurrence in Byengni. In view of our generally inadequate data on affinal nomenclatures (e.g. we do not have the term for "Sl" in Mung, where we should expect to find this root), the widespread distribution of this root is of increased significance. It would appear that the root is lacking in Himalayish, Mikir, Konyak, and Barish.

The above set of basic terms is supplemented by a series of roots of restricted distribution. Some of these serve mainly as replacements for the basic roots, while others are functionally more independent. Since our set of basic terms is not complete, we must assume that some of these roots represent archaic Tibeto-Burman elements, but this point is best discussed after the various secondary roots have been analyzed.

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The gP roots *p'i gM and *p'u gF have no serious rivals in Tibeto-Burman. A curious link between Tibetan and Southern Naki is suggested by the following set of terms: Tib. po ~ spo gF (literary or dialectical), rmo gM (literary), and Sho a-pŏ ~ a-pŏk gF, Chinbon kh-mo gM, Yindu ka-mo gF. A possible root *si is indicated by Balti as-si (= a-si) ggM, Nung a-si gM, Khami a-um-si gP, and Kadu a-si MSi (i-si "woman"), Yindu ka-si FSi, Sho a-si FSi,oSi (cf. the roots *ta and *tei, infra). In general, gP terms show more variation than do P terms; thus, Kachin has developed distinct terms for both gM (woi) and gF (ji), and note forms such as Byangsi ti-ti gF, Bahing and Vayu ki-ki gF.

The most conspicuous of the secondary P roots is *nu M, which appears in Kachin, Miju, Sak, Konyak, Kukish, and perhaps Mikir and Meithei (in combination). The root *pui "mother, female" is restricted to Mikir and Kukish. The Kukish feminine affix *la, used especially of young females, seems to have given rise to Mongsen-Changki (Ao) a-la M, Ntenyi Rengma a-la ggM, Anyo Rengma a-la gM, and cf. Byangsi la-la gM, Sunwari a-la Si. The same root (*la) appears in Kachin, Burmish-Loloish, and elsewhere as a masculine affix. The Tibeto-Burman root *wa "male" serves to explain both Bunan and Kachin wa, Kadu a-wa, Garo (dialects of A type) a-wa F (Moshang and Namsang wa F probably through Kachin influence), Aka au < *a-wa F, Burmese wa-kri[3] "term of address to old men" (Arakanese dialect), and Lepcha a-vo < *wa, Meithei (ma-)wa, Kukish wa H; cf. also Digaro ma-wa "male",

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Rhimal -ma "masculine suffix", Bodo hma "male". Some of these forms, however, may have resulted from a phonetic development from *p'a F (probably via *ba).

A root *mei or *me appears sporadically in Tibeto-Burman, sometimes with a dental suffix. This root is parallel to, but distinct from, TB *ma M. The following forms belong here: Tibetan -med "woman" (in bud-med < *bu-med, paralleling bu-mmed), Gyarung to-mi ~ to-me "woman", Kanauri -med (suffix in "D" and "Ml"), Chamba Lahuli me "bitch", Limbu met W, Lepcha a-mit "woman", Ende a-me M, Rung a-me M (cf. Rung a-p'e F), Burmese a-mi³ ~ a-me M, and Garo me-cik "woman, wife". Note also the series formed by Burmese sa-mi³, Aka sa-mi, Rung za-mi D (from *ma Ch). Garo ga-me Bl, Mikir me SiH correspond phonetically but can scarcely be fitted in otherwise.

In addition to the above, there are traces of a set of roots *ya and *yu, both applied to female relatives. The former is better attested than the latter; cf. Himalayish (Kanashi, Kanashi, Chamba Lahuli) ya M, Abor-Miri and Dafla yo < *ya gM (but in Pagri Miri used for "M" in address), Tabloeng (Konyak group) ya M, Naga *ya M, also Kanauri yas, Rai (Kiranti) me-ya, Burmese ma-ya³ W, Digaro mi-ya "woman", ka-mi-ya W. The root *yu is represented only by Kanauri yu-med, Khambu (Kiranti) yuh, Lepcha a-yu W, Lepcha tá-yu "woman", and perhaps Tibetan yu-mo "female of a stag".

Nothing has yet been said of oSb terms, which show a wide variety of forms contrasting with the standard ySb root (*mau

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Much of the material in this connection is of a scattered nature from which it is difficult to draw any conclusions. Thus, Byangsi hya, Bahing ya oB, Maithri ya-ma oB, Chaute (Old Kuki) a-ya B, ai-ya oSi, and Khami ya-at ~ ya-i oB suggest an archaic root *ya oB, yet this same element appears in another setting (supra). Burmese ate-kui < *ik-kui oB, Mikir ik oB lack cognates elsewhere, as do Maru pai oSi, Chonbok pai oSi(ws), unless the latter pair be connected with Burmese a-pai "madam" and perhaps Mikir pei ~ pe M. The characteristic Kukish root u oSb (Central, Northern, and Old Kuki groups only) does not appear elsewhere in this setting, yet appears to be identical to Sho ü M, Taungtha u W, Mru u M, and Burmese u^3 MB (prefixed to names of men considerably older than the speaker), perhaps also Tanghkhul a-wŏ gF,MB.

Three or four roots, however, stand out more prominently than the above lot and deserve especial consideration. Tibetan c'e oSi(ws) has been compared with Himalayish *c'e "female" as represented by Kanauri c'ets "female, woman", Kanashi c'ets W (with diminutive suffix -ts) and with the Byangsi-Chaudangsi term c'e xC, as well as with Johar a-ce F. The above terms all point to a TB root *c'ei. A similar root, but apparently with unaspirated initial (*cei), is represented by Konyak jei ~ cei oSb ~ oB, Maithei ce oSi, Tanghkhul cei oSb, Western Kuki *cei oSb, Anyo Rongma a-ce oSb. The Tibetan term appears to be etymologically connected with the word c'e-ba "great", from which the respectful term gcen-po oB has been developed.

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A root *na oSi appears in Maruai, Vayu, Kachin, Andro, and Konyak, while the Aluora and Abor-Miri-Dafla groups have *na M, and Lakher has the vocative term i-na M. Tibetan mna D1 perhaps also belongs here, though it may be of periphrastic origin (< sna "nath").

The Tibeto-Burman root *ta (often in the form da) is consistently applied to relatives older than Ego, if one regards the Bahing-Vayu root *ta CR as of distinct origin. The following terms can be grouped with this root: Tibetan 'a-ta F (dialectical), oB (Eastern Tibet), Tsangla a-ta oB, Gyarung a-da-ta F, Jokar a-ta oSi, Byangsi ta-ta oSi, Newari ta-ta oSi, Miri and Dafla a-to < *ta gF, Digaro ta gF, da oB, Burmese t'a^{3}-t'a^{3} F (dialectical), Akha a-ta F, Independent Lolo a-ta F, Sho a-ta oB, Chinhon (ka-)t'a oB, Lhota o-ta oSb, Changki (Ao) a-ta FSi,oSi, Nzong Rongma a-da FoB. Doublet forms are found only in Digaro (ta gF, da oB). Unlike *p'a gF,oB this root has also been applied to F in some languages (Tibetan, Gyarung, Burmese, Akha). Desgodins describes the Tibetan term 'a-ta as a "children's word" (vox puerorum), and in Independent Lolo a distinction is made between a-ta F (used by children) and a-bu ~ a-bo F (used by adults).

Kanauri te-te gF, a-te oB are clearly of a type paralleling that described above. The suggested TB root is *tei, with which can be grouped Byangsi te-te xC(ws), Dafla tĕ-tĕ FyB,oB (in different sources), Kadu a-te oSi, Bangara a-tai oB, Mikir te oSi(ws), Maithei i-tei-ma oSil, and Mru a-tai BW.

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An objection might be raised to the above discussion on the ground that forms such as *na, *ta, and *tsi (ts) are of "nursery word" type and should not be regarded as representing actual TB roots. The writer himself originally ascribed to this general point of view, but the collection of material on which this study is based has led him to discard it. Thus, ta F appears both in the West Tibetan dialects (Balti, Purik) and in the nomad dialects of Eastern Tibet, as well as in the aberrant Gyarung language, whence we can safely infer a Bodish root *ta F. The term na oSi appears in five distinct languages representing two different foci (Murmi-Vayu and Kachin-Andro-Konyak), and na E in two isolated groups (Almora and Abor-Miri-Dafla). Distributions of this type are scattered, to be sure, yet not entirely random. The cluster of connotations (gP,P,oSb) around these roots is also not without significance.

The majority of the terms for Sb(ds) are of limited distribution. Tibetan sring-mo Si(ms), dialectically used for ySi, appears also in Himalayish (Si) and Byangsi (ySi), with an additional possible occurrence in Dhimal-Toto (Si). Kachin jan < *jar Si(ms), often used for ySi, is directly related to Kukish *dzar Si(ms), which in Western Kuki is used for ySi, and to Meithei i-cal ~ i-can ySi, Kadu san, Sengmai cil ysi. Kachin yung B(ws) has been compared with the Garo-Dimasa root *yung yB. The tendency to equate Sb(ds) with ySb is reflected in all three roots.

The roots *nau ySb and *za Ch are of almost universal occurrence and have no serious rivals. The former is

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conspicuously absent in Burmish-Loloish, which has a root *nyi (ní), comparable with Lepcha nyi-t'i gCh. A root *nga is suggested by Murmi and Gurung a-nga ySi, Miri ăng-ă ySb, Dafla ang-a Ch, Naga *nga Ch. Isolated roots *a Ch and *ka Ch are represented by Digaro a, Abor-Miri o < a Ch, and Newari ka, Abor-Miri ko < *ka Ch, respectively.

It will be noted that the set of basic terms presented above lacks all collateral terms as well as a gCh term. Our data on collateral terms are incomplete for many groups, so that negative evidence here is of relatively little value, but it would seem that no root or roots for xC have been developed. The only root of any extension here is *ning, which appears in Kachin (xCe,ws), Chang (xC), Mikir BW(ws), and perhaps Garo (Sbl). The Mikir and Garo affinal meanings can be explained in terms of cross-cousin marriage.

Three or perhaps four TB roots show a tendency to equate N with gCh. Tibetan ts'a Ne (probably SiS,ms),gCh furnishes an example of this tendency. Bahing and Newari have this root (*ts'a) in the meaning "gS", but in the Kiranti languages in general it is used for "S" (see the discussion in pt. 4). Kanauri c'ad Sl (with suffixed -d) has been brought into comparison via SiS(ms), equated with Sl under cross-cousin marriage. Kachin ta'a MB,MBS(ws) can be explained only on the basis of a reciprocal development from SiS(ms). Mikir c-sa SiS(ms),Sl shows an ideal agreement on the semantic side, but the comparison is phonetically dubious. The root *ts'a appears to be lacking in other groups.

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The roots *su and *tu have distributions which are almost, if not quite, mutually exclusive. *Su gCh appears in Kachin, Bodo, Mikir, and Meithei, while *tu appears in Mung (N), Burmish-Loloish (xN), and Kukish (FSiCh,SiCh,mS,gCh). Anu, a Southern Kuki language, has su xC,ySi(ws),SiCh(ws),gCh, and a-su-lai SiCh(ms), covering much the same ground as Kukish *tu. The roots *su and *tu must be regarded as distinct on general phonetic grounds, and this view is strengthened by the evidence from Meithei, which has i-su gCh as well as (ma-)tu W (cf. the Kuki use of *tu in the meaning "Sl", through cross-cousin marriage). The root *su is perhaps also represented in the Naga languages, in much the same setting as Anu su, viz. Angami cu ~ tsu FSiS,ySiS(ms),gS, Nzong Rengma a-cu-gü, Ntenyi Rengma a-su-wu, Anyo Rengma a-zü FSiCh,SiCh(ms),gCh, but our knowledge of Naga phonology is not sufficiently advanced to establish this comparison.

A fourth root of the same general type is *ma-li, which is found in Mung (gCh), Burmish-Loloish (gCh), Pyu (gCh), Chang (xN), Garo (SiS,ms), Mikir (xN, probably BCh,ws), and has an additional cognate in Kachin (ma-li "young man"). This root is in general lacking in Kukish, but may be represented by Taungtha Lwi Ne,Ni and Yindu (ka-)li BD(ws). It cannot be traced in Tibetan or any of the northern languages.

The affinal root corresponding to *mak Sl is perhaps *nam Dl, but the evidence for the latter root is not altogether satisfactory. Lepcha has nyom < *snam Dl paralleling myok < *smak Sl, and s- prefixed forms are also represented by

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Kanauri sten < *snem (probably for snăm) D1, and Barish *snam D1 (based on Dimasa ba-ham, Garo nam). Cf. also Gyarung snom < *snam S1, Burmese hnam < *snam yS1(ms) (inferred from mong-hnam "H and W", where mong means "yB,ws"), Lashi tu-nam D1, nam-mo yS1(ms), Nyi nŏ-mo < *nam-mo yS1(ms), and Lushei hnăm < *snăm "clan". The unprefixed form appears in Byangsi nam-sia D1, Kachin nam D1,yS1l, and Nung nam Sb, while Lepcha has both nyom < *snam D1 and nom < *nam oS1. Magari ar-nam "girl" also belongs in this series.

Of more restricted distribution are the roots *mou D1, represented by Kukish mou (Lushei mo), Meithei i-mau, and perhaps Tibetan mo "woman", and *k'rwi S1, represented by Kachin k'ri S1,S1Ch(ms), Burmese k'rwe^{3}-ma^{7} < *k'rwi^{3}-ma^{7}, Lisu c'i-ma D1 (with feminine suffix -ma), and perhaps Lepcha tă-gri "male". The original meanings of these roots may have been simply "female" and "male", respectively.

There remain for consideration a few poorly represented roots connected primarily with the PSb nomenclature. Nung a-tsim MS1 is comparable with Tsangla a-zim, id., and Nung a-wang FB with Garo a-wang FyB, also Lashi vang-mo HF,FoS1H, Maru vung ~ vun HF,FS1H (but the Lashi and Maru terms suggest a meaning "MB" rather than "FB"). The *wang series is perhaps connected with Tibetan 'a-bang FS1H,MS1H (literary), Limbu (am-)pang-a "uncle", Vayu pong-pong < *pang-pang FB.

Tibetan sru MS1 has been compared with Kanauri and Chamba Lahuli ru F1, Pyu sru "relatives", and the reconstructed

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Lolo root *ru MB. If these terms actually constitute a true series, we must reconstruct a root *sru ~ *ru "mother's relatives" (neuter), whence Kanauri ru Fl < MB through cross-cousin marriage, paralleling Kanauri c'ad Sl < SiS(ms). The presence of this root in Pyu, at approximately the year A.D. 1000, lends some weight to this view.

The fourth Tibetan PSb term, viz. ʾa-žang MB, is found in this form in Thebor and Lepcha, where it must be regarded as a loan-word, but not elsewhere. This form can be derived from an original *zrang and thus compared with Mru ta-rang FSiH,HF, Kukish ta-rang ~ ma-rang, id., and probably Lhota o-ṙa, Changki (Ao) (kŭ-)hram Bl(ws). Burmese a-hrang < *srang (archaic spelling is a-hayang) "lord, master" also perhaps belongs here rather than with sring-mo Si (supra). The writer has long suspected that Tibetan initial ž- and š- have in many instances been derived from zr- and sr-, respectively, partly because of the general instability of these clusters in Tibetan (cf. srab-srib ~ hrab-hrib ~ rab-rib "dim, obscure"), and partly on the basis of comparative material, viz. Tib. šig "louse", Bunan šrig, Lushei hrik < *srik; Tib. žag "day (24 hours)", Burmese rak, id.; Tib. šags "joke, jest" (in sense of "ridicule"), Bunan šrag "shame", Burmese hrak < *srak "to be ashamed". The root *-rang (prefixed) must have had a generalized honorific force (still retained in Burmese), and thus was admirably suited as a periphrastic term either for MB or for FSiH,HF (= MB under cross-cousin marriage).

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Having completed our review of Tibeto-Burman kinship roots, we are now faced with the problem of fixing the basic pattern of nomenclature for this linguistic family. The terms designating relatives in the central line of descent naturally form the most stable segment of the nomenclature, while the collateral terms show an intermediate, and the affinal terms a maximum, amount of variation.

Within this stable core of nomenclature we are able to distinguish two primary gP terms (gM and gF), two primary P terms (M and F), a neuter yBb term, and a neuter Ch term. The two neuter terms are often employed in a masculine sense (yB and B), with sex affixes used in forming the corresponding feminine terms (yBi and D), e.g. Tibetan bu B, bu-mo D, Burmese sa^3 B, $sa\text{-}mi^3$ D. No neuter P terms have been uncovered, but Chang has a neuter gP term (a-pi < *p'i gM) used only in address, and a neuter gP term is also found in Sema (a-pu-sa), and in the Southern Kuki languages Sho (a-pǒ) and Ayaing Khami (a-um-ai). Three Southern Kuki languages (Chinbok, Yindu, Anu) make a distinction between FM and MM, but have a single term for gF (Anu FM < M, MM < gM). Four gP terms appear only in rare instances, and are never all primary. Both Tibetan and Kanauri show traces of three or four gP terms, but Kanauri has probably borrowed one or more of its gP terms from Tibetan, and the Tibetan material itself can be interpreted in more than one way. Kachin seems to employ four gP terms, perhaps because of Shan influence, but has only two primary terms (ji gF and woi gM). Garo distinguishes

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between "gP" (= FF) and "gM" (= FM), and "my gF" (= MF) and "my gM" (= MM), if we can trust our sources for this language. In view of the fact that the Garo are a matrilineal group, this point is of some interest. Chang, which uses the neuter term a-pi gP in address, employs four terms in reference, the FF and FM terms being formed through affixed sex elements, and the MF and MM terms through analysis. Finally, Laiyo, which has an almost exclusively analytical nomenclature, employs four analytical gP terms.

A number of different arrangements of Sb terms have been encountered. Age distinctions appear everywhere and are, in general, more prominent than sex distinctions. Despite this, however, it would appear that the basic pattern has two primary terms for oB and oSi, contrasting with the single neuter ySb term (*nsu). As has been shown above, the widespread tendency to equate oB and oSi with terms for relatives of ascending generations has obscured the general picture here and has made analysis almost impossible. The simplest possible arrangement (oSb and ySb) has been found only in Khami (Ayaing and Awa) and Anyo Rengma. A single primary term for oSb appears also in Kuki proper (u) and in Burmese (ats-), but Burmish-Loloish in general has two primary oSb terms. Nzong Rengma shows a complete reversal of the ordinary pattern, with terms for oSb, yB, and ySi. Tibetan, Lepcha, Dafla, Kachin, Aka, Lisu, Chang, Chinbon, Ao and probably other less accurately recorded languages have what appears to be the basic arrangement, viz. oB, oSi, and ySb (three primary

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terms). The Barish languages in general employ the root *nau ySb in the meaning "ySi" and have developed a new term for yB (perhaps connected with the Kachin term for B,ws), while Meithei reverses this process in employing *nau for "yB" and the Kukish root *dzar·Si(ms) for ySi. Simple terms for either B or Si are almost entirely lacking in Tibeto-Burman. Abor-Miri has terms for B and Si based on a root *buir (cf. a-buir "friend"), while in Dafla the cognate form *bŏr is used as the root for ySb, but note that Abor-Miri also possesses especial terms for oSb and ySb. Mikir kor Sb, like Abor-Miri buir, also has the more general meaning "friend".

Though the principle of age distinctions can be established as a basic feature of Tibeto-Burman kinship terminology, the status of sex-of-speaker distinctions is not so readily settled. We are handicapped here by the fact that most of our sources can not be depended upon in showing non-European distinctions of this type, and that negative evidence is therefore of little value. Distinct terms for Si(ms) and B(ws) are found in Tibetan, Kachin, Lushei and Lakher (and probably other Kuki languages), and Angami. Lushei and Lakher also have a distinct term (of periphrastic origin) for Si(ws). In Burmese and Nyi the distinction is applied only to ySb, viz. Burmese yB(ms), yB(ws),ySi(ws),ySi(ms), Nyi ySb(ms),yB(ws),ySi(ms), and Maru, in the same linguistic group, has a distinct term for yB(ws). Mikir distinguishes between oSi(ms) and oSi(ws), and has a distinct term for B(ws). Chinbok and Yindu, in the Southern

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Bahi group, have a full set of eight Sb terms, showing complete distinctions both for age and for sex-of-speaker. The Chimbok system can be reduced to five primary terms, viz. pai oSi(ws), pwo oB(ms), mau ySb(ss), be Bi(ms), and beng B(ws), i.e. the Tibetan-Kachin arrangement. Sex of speaker appears not to be distinguished in Kanauri, Abor-Miri, Dafla, Barish, Meithei, and some other languages, but our sources, as mentioned above, are not of the most dependable sort. In view of the weight of evidence above, from such key languages as Tibetan, Kachin, Burmese, Mikir, and Lushei, the writer is inclined to regard the sex-of-speaker distinction as an archaic Tibeto-Burman feature.

Despite the fact that no single gCh root can with certainty be reconstructed for Tibeto-Burman, one can surely regard the presence of a primary gCh term as a basic feature for this linguistic family. Aside from the tendency to equate gCh with N or C (vide infra), it can be stated that most Tibeto-Burman languages have a distinct, usually primary, term for gCh, e.g. Kachin ǰu, Burmese mrə̰, Byangsi k'we, Newari c'ay, Lepcha a-son, Chang ǰi, Garo and Mikir su, Meithei i-su. If a single gCh root must be predicated, TB *su must be regarded as the most likely selection. Equations of gCh other than with N are exceptional, but note Sema a-nu gCh= Ch(< TB *nau ySb).

The above discussion is resumed in the following diagram:

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Sino-Tibetan Border Peoples AE3

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Tibeto-Burman Basic Pattern

gM (*p'i)		gF (*p'u)
M (*ma)		F (*p'a)
oSi(ws)		oB(ms)
Si(ms)	yBb (*nau)	B(ws)
	Ch (*za)	
	gCh	

It would be a rather hazardous undertaking to attempt any general explanation of the pattern outlined above in terms of sociological factors. A broad theory of this type must be based on a comprehensive comparative survey of Tibeto-Burman with a number of other groups, and as such lies outside the scope of the present study. Many of the variations from this pattern are undoubtedly significant, but they involve those elusive culturo-linguistic intangibles which do not lend themselves to arm-chair analysis. It is only in the collateral and affinal nomenclatures that obvious cultural correlations are available, and it is these that the writer proposes to consider in some detail.

The distinction between cross (FSi and MB) and parallel (FB and MSi) PSb terms is almost universal in Tibeto-Burman. No instances of an equation of FB with MB have been encountered, but FSi and MSi are equated in Bahing, Lepcha, and Chinbon, if we can trust our sources. Note that Lepcha also equates xC with pC, and that cross-cousin marriage is forbidden in this tribe.

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The parallel FB and MSi terms are usually either equated with the F and M terms (as in Chang, Lushei, Angami, Sema) or are based on these terms, with the addition of elements meaning "big" and "little" or the like. In other words, age distinctions are made in the parallel FSb terms precisely as in the Sb terms, though with categorical rather than primary elements. By way of contrast, the cross FSb terms seldom show these age distinctions, but note Burmese u^{3}-ri^{3} MoB (cf. a-ri^{3} FSi), u^{3}-mang^{3} MyB, Chinbok pu-ǰrŏ MoB (= gF), pu-ko MyB (these distinctions are typical of Southern Kuki in general). Some of the more characteristic examples of age distinctions in FB terms are listed below:

Language	FoB	FyB
Balti	a-ta ts'ar-ma	a-ta tsun-tso
Lepcha	a-bo-tim	a-bo-cum
Kachin	wa-di	wa-doi
Burmese	p'ǎ-kri^{3}	p'ǎ-t'we^{3}
Nyi	a-ba-gii	a-ba-ʔa
Haka	pa-u	pa-nau
Siyin	pa-lien	pa-no
Chinbon	pa k-dŏm	pa k-cwi
Tangkhul	a-va k'ǎ-rǎr	a-va ka-tui
Lhota	o-po-ra-mo	o-po-ro

One occasionally encounters what seem to be primary terms for FB or MSi, but most of these can be explained on the basis of ellipsis, e.g. Maru t'ong MySi but mye-t'ang MySi,

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p'a-t'ang FyB in the closely related Lashi language; Bodo a-yong FoB and a-doi FyB, but ma-yong MoSi and ma-doi MySi; Nzong Rengma a-nyo FyB (nyo Ch), and perhaps Changki (Ao) a-sa FyB < *za Ch. Kanauri has a curious diminutive formation, viz. a-mats MSi < a-ma, and a-pats FB < a-pa. Tibetan and Nung, however, appear to have four true PSb terms. The Nung terms a-tsim MSi and a-wang FB have been compared with Tsangla a-zim MSi and Garo a-wang FyB, respectively. The Tibetan term sru MSi seems to have been derived from a root with the generalized meaning "mother's relatives", or "member of mother's clan, first ascending generation". Tibetan k'u FB, it can now be stated, has been developed from the TB root *k'u MB, and the Himalayish and Lepcha employment of this term in its Tibetan setting must be credited to Tibetan influence, which is conspicuous in both of these areas. Tibetan skud < *k'u Fl,Bl is to be explained in terms of xC marriage and the equation of WB with WF, as elsewhere in Tibeto-Burman. Tibetan 'a-ne FSi,MBW further fits into this picture. In Himalayish, Kanauri ru Fl < *sru MSb, and c'ad Sl < *ts'a SiS(ms) suggest a like reconstruction. We have some material on xC marriage in the Tibetan area, but the term skud itself is, for the writer, the most significant single piece of evidence. Those who minimize the value of linguistic "fossils" in general might well take note of this term.

The semantic shift FB < MB in the Tibetan term k'u still requires explanation. Elsewhere in Tibeto-Burman the term has

SA 601 193 197 been demoted to affinal rank or dropped altogether, but nowhere else has it been applied to FB. Now there is but one marital feature in which the Tibetan area (including the Kanauri group of Himalayish) significantly differs from the remaining Tibeto-Burman area, viz. polyandry. Fraternal polyandry of Tibetan type is practised by the Kanauri, almost certainly through Tibetan influence, since this custom is explicitly stated to be absent among the Almora peoples (Byangsi, Chaudangsi, Johar). Among the Lepcha polyandry is an abnormal trait and can unhesitatingly be assigned a Tibetan origin. Among other Tibeto-Burman group for which we have any record, polyandry either is said to be lacking or is simply not mentioned. Since Tibetan polyandry is of fraternal type, the importance of FB can readily be understood. It would seem that the MB term, which is unstable in most TB groups, was first replaced by the honorific term ¬a-ǰang and later applied to FB. The collective term skud-po F1,B1, having already been semantically specialized in an affinal sense, was naturally retained.

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Primary cross PSb terms are basic TB features, and are represented by the roots *ni FSi and *k'u MB. The first of these two terms, however, is much more stable than the second, and significantly so (if statistically treated). Thus, Tibetan has transferred the MB term to FB and used an honorific for MB; Burmish-Loloish has retained the MB term only as an honorific applied to oB (in Burmese) or as an affinal term

SA (Ahi, Moso) and has developed new terms for MB (Burmese $u^{\flat}$,
601 Lolo *ru); the Kuki languages proper have dropped the MB term
193 altogether and equated MB with gF; in the Naga group the MB
197 term has been preserved in its original setting only in Ao,
ST while in Rongma and Sema it has been retained only in the
601 affinal nomenclature. All of these groups, however, have the
193 root *ni FSi in its original setting. Burmese (but not
197 Burmish-Loloish) has replaced both the FSi and MB terms and dropped the former altogether, while Kachin has retained both terms only in its affinal nomenclature. The relatively greater stability of the FSi term is also evident in the borrowings made by various TB groups (infra).

This "differential variability" in the FSi and MB terms must be viewed in connection with the affinal application of these terms and the whole problem of cross-cousin marriage. Under bilateral xC marriage MB becomes Fl, and FSi becomes Ml, and it is not unlikely that honorific terms should become associated with these socially "pivotal" relationships. The fact that the MB=Fl term is more susceptible to this process than is the FSi=Ml term merely reflects the general patrilineal bias of Tibeto-Burman societies. The equation of MB with gP, which plays so prominent a role in Kukish, represents one aspect of this whole development, but teknonymy may also be a factor here ("Fl" designated as "gF of my son"). Teknonymy is hardly typical of Tibeto-Burman yet does occasionally occur. Lepcha, for example, employs a-bo F for Fl

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where the couple are childless, but t'i-kung gF after the birth of a child, and the descriptive term a-fyŭt Fl has been derived from an original *sput, which in turn represents a morphological development from the TB root *p'u gF. Vayu ca-k'i Fl appears to be a combination of co < *ca Ch and ki-ki gF. Lahu, in the Southern Lolo group, has a-p'u gF= Fl, a-p'i gM=Ml, and Ahi, in the Northern Lolo group, has zu-p'o WF, also "paternal ancestor". The Chang Sbl terms are of teknonymous origin, e.g. hau-ko Bl(ms)="his MB", but the Chang Pl terms are simply Fl=MB and Ml= FSi. Chinbon equates WF with gF, and WM with gM (rather than with MF and MBW, as in most Kuki languages), but retains the Kuki pattern in the HM and HF terms (HF= FSi, and especial term for HF), i.e. the teknonymous (or honorific) terms are employed only by the husband. The Mirish languages (Abor, Miri, Dafla) afford the best illustration of teknonymy. In Miri the terms a-bu and a-nǎ are used for F and M, respectively, but in the closely related Abor language these terms are applied to gF and gM, though ta-ta (Miri ta-to gF) is retained as the vocative term for gF. In this instance the child has taken over his parents' terms ("reverse teknonymy") rather than the parent his childrens' terms. Abor also uses the vocative gF term (ta-ta) for Fl, while Miri equates Fl either with gF or with MB, and Ml either with gM or with FSi (the equations with MB and FSi are probably only descriptive, though this is not stated in our sources). Dafla equates Ml with gM, probably also Fl with gF.

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Under a system of bilateral xC marriage we should expect to find both WF and HF equated with MB, and both WM and HM equated with FSi. This condition is fulfilled in Byangsi and Abor-Miri, where this type of marriage is in vogue. The terminological equation also appears, however, in Nung, Chang, Sema, Nzong Rengma, and Lhota, for all of which preferential MBD marriage is indicated, and in Tangkhul and Angami, for which xC marriage cannot be established.

A system of unilateral xC marriage with MBD should lead to the equation of WF with MB, HM with FSi, and separate terms for HF and WM, as well as distinctions between FSiH and MB, MBW and FSi. Kachin fulfills all these conditions admirably, with unilateral xC marriage coupled with the terminological equations indicated above. The same can be said for the Kuki pattern, as illustrated in Lakher, Thado, Chawte, Tarau, as well as in Mru and Khami, viz. WF = MB, WM = MBW, HM = FSi, HF = FSiH. Unilateral MBD marriage is found among the Thado, Chiru, Anal, Aimol, Purum, and probably the Anal, Sho, and Khami. In Thado this nomenclature is employed only where MBD marriage has actually occurred, P terms being employed under other conditions.

Ntenyi and Anyo Rengma have an intermediate type, with M1 = FSi but WF = MB and a distinct term for HF, but in both languages the MB term is sometimes applied to HF as well as to WF. The closely related Nzong Rengma has a single term for F1 (WF, HF = MB), but retains a distinct term for FSiH. Sema has the same scheme as Nzong Rengma. The Sema term for FSiH,

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furthermore, is cognate with the Ntenyi and Anyo Rengma term for HF, and in Ao the same term appears in its original setting (MB). This Naga material thus shows various stages of the transformation of the affinal terminology through the development of unilateral xC marriage. The discrepancies found in Nung, Chang, and Lhota are perhaps more apparent than real, and in the case of Nung and Lhota, at any rate, our sources may be faulty. Even in these affinal features, however, we must expect to find a certain amount of disassociation, for we must allow for linguistic "lag", i.e. the simple scheme of equating F1 with MB and M1 with FSi tends to be perpetuated even where the development of a unilateral "skew" has rendered it theoretically illogical. This general point has been raised many times before, but will bear repetition in view of the fact that a number of modern theoreticians seem to object to this sort of reasoning.

It is fairly evident that the abandonment of xC marriage as an instutionalized norm has in several different groups resulted in the disappearance of categorical equations. In Tibetan and Kanauri we have only the "fossilized" terms skud-po and ru, respectively, which require comparative studies for a full appraisal of their significance. In Lahul, however, where we have a hint of xC marriage, the equations F1= MB and M1= FSi are in evidence. In Burmese itself categorical equations are lacking, and here also we have no evidence of xC marriage, but the situation is reversed in Arakanese (Chaungtha).

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Maru and Lashi, which are of Burmese stock, equate Ml with FSi, WF with MB, and have a distinct term for FSiH, HF (as in Mzong and Anyo Rengma). Kachin influence perhaps plays a role here, yet the Kachin distinguish between WM and HM, as is consistent with their unilateral xC marriage practice. Nyi, in the Northern Lolo group, has derived its terms for WF and WM from the terms for MB and FSi, respectively, plus the element mo "old", acting here as an honorific, while the Burmish-Loloish affinal root *yok is employed in the terms for HM and HF. Ahi seems to reverse this scheme, to judge from our faulty data on this language. For Lisu we have only what appear to be the vocative terms for Fl and Ml (ma-ma < a-ma M, ba-ba < a-ba F), and hence are not in a position to interpret this Lolo material. The use of respectful designations may be a complicating factor here; cf. Lushei pu-zon WF, pi-zon WM, conforming to the Kuki pattern (from pu MB and pi MBW plus an added element -zon), but pa HF (= F) and nu HM (= M), i.e. a woman equates her husband's relatives with her own blood kin.

Categorical equations in the Pl terms are present elsewhere, but our sources are often incomplete. Garo equates Ml with FSi, MBW, but has a distinct term for Fl (a-bu-di, perhaps "little gF"). Mikir equates WF with MB, WM with FSi (with or without the addition of an honorific suffix), and has a distinct term for HF. If we assume that HM (not given in our sources) is also equated with FSi, this system can be compared with that found in Rengma and Maru. Both Garo and Mikir have

SA 601 193 197 preferential MBD marriage. Meithei equates Ml with FSi, and has i-ku Fl < TB *k'u MB (the MB term is not known for sure, but may be the Indic loan-word māmā); the Meithei are not known to practice xC marriage.

ST 601 193 197 The rest of the collateral terminology (C and N terms) is even more poorly known than the PSb terminology, and presents even more serious problems. In view of the presence of basic TB roots for MB (*k'u) and FSi (*ni) one might expect to find one or more roots for xC, but such is hardly the case. The extension of Sb terms to include pC is practically universal and need not be examined in detail. The lack of especial xC terms is probably associated with the lack of xC marriage, but there are too many lacunae in our data to permit of any final judgment here. Tibetan apparently fails to distinguish between pC and xC, but Burmese perhaps has a distinct xC term (sa-mi^3-mrok-sa^3, lit. "D's spouse"!). By way of contrast, Chaungtha, one of the Arakanese dialects, has yauk-pa Bl,xC corresponding to Burmese yok-p'a' Bl(ms), in conformity with its equation of Fl with MB and Ml with FSi, i.e. an affinal term has "invaded" the consanguineal nomenclature.

Terms for xCe and xCi in conjunction with xC marriage are found in Byangsi-Chaudangsi, Abor-Miri, Lisu, and Chang, while Dafla has this terminological pattern but without data on xC marriage. Chang appears to have preferential MBD marriage, but the bilateral type is found among the others.

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Byangsi-Chaudangsi makes a sex-of-speaker distinction, viz. xCi(ms), xCe(ws), xC(ss), and Abor-Miri makes an age distinction. None of the terms involved is associated with a PSb term or a N term. The Abor-Miri terms show "invasion" from the affinal terminology, as in Chaungtha, e.g. mag-bo xCe(os) = oBl,Sl, from TB *mak Sl. Note that in Byangsi-Chaudangsi, Abor-Miri, and Chang this xC pattern is associated with the simple Pl = PSb categorical equations (for Lisu we lack full information on the Pl terms).

Cross-cousin terminologies of Omaha type are found in two primary foci, viz. Kachin and Kukish. The correlation between the Omaha nomenclature and patrilineal descent, one of the few widely accepted anthropological generalizations, obtains both among the Kachin and the various Kuki and Naga tribes. Of the Tibeto-Burman peoples only the Garo and Mabha, in the Barish group, are known to have matrilineal descent, and unfortunately we know nothing of the cousin terminology in use among these tribes. There is a hint of the Crow type of terminology in Bodo, also in the Barish group, but we cannot be sure that the Bodo reckon descent in the matrilineal line. Bodo (nang-)a-doi "(thy) oBCh", (a-)doi FyB show reciprocity, as has already been pointed out, but Bodo nam-ba-noi "(thy) SiS", (nang-)a-noi "(thy) SiD", and a-noi FSi cannot be explained on this basis and suggest rather the Crow pattern. It is greatly to be regretted that our Garo sources fail us at this critical point.

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The Kachin system, which is quite distinct from that found in Kukish, merits especial examination. The key terms are as follows:

Kachin Omaha Pattern

(Consanguineal)

moi	FSi	ts'a	MB,MBS(ws)
ning	xCi(ws)	k'au	xCe(ms)
k'ri	FSiD(ms),SiCh(ms)		
rat	MBD(oms)		
nam	MBD(yms),BCh(ws)		

(Affinal)

ni	WM,MBW,WBW	ku	HF,FSiH,HoB,oSiH(ws)
moi	HM	ts'a	WF,BWB(ws)
ning	HSi,BW(ws)	k'au	WB,SiH(ms)
nam	Dl,WySi,yBW(ms),WBCh	k'ri	Sl,HSiCh,FSiHSi
rat	WoSi,ySiH(ws),oBW(ms),HyB		

The main features of this system have already been discussed in pt. 7. It will be observed that the lineal equations characteristic of the Omaha pattern appear only in the terms for non-marriageable cross-cousins under the Kachin unilateral xC marriage arrangement, i.e. a man equates his (non-marriageable) FSiD with his SiCh, while a woman equates her (non-marriageable) MBS with her MB. The terms applied by a woman to her (marriageable) FSiS are not known, but a man equates his (marriageable) MBD with his WSi. Distinct terms are used by speakers of each sex for xC(ss).

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On the basis of comparative material, the terms nam and k'ri must be regarded as originally affinal (D1 and S1, respectively). Both terms have "invaded" the consanguineal nomenclature via the categorical equations D1=BD(ws) and S1=SiS(ms), as are consistent with the practice of MBD marriage. Note that both terms have become neuter in the course of this transformation. We must next enquire of the fate of the original xN terms thus displaced. The terms moi FSi and ts'a MB can be called upon at this point. We lack comparative material on moi, but Tibetan has ts'a SiS(ms) corresponding to the Kachin term, and we can therefore interpret Kachin ts'a MB as a product of reciprocal usage. We have conclusive support for this view in the term k'ri HSiCh,FSiHSi, which at first puzzled the writer. Under the Kachin tripartite organization, as described by Gilhodes, FSiHSi becomes MBW, and MBW ~ HSiCh are reciprocal terms. Since moi FSi closely parallels ts'a MB, we are justified in interpreting this term analogically as a reciprocal development from BD(ws).

To continue our analysis, moi and ts'a have displaced the original cross PSb terms ni and ku, which are retained in the affinal nomenclature. An original system of bilateral xC marriage must be postulated to account for ni WM,MBW < FSi, and ku BF,FSiH < MB. The categorical equations shown by ning xCi(ws) = Sil(ws) and k'au xCe(ms) = Bl(ms) also call for this type of marriage.

To complete our reconstruction, the terms ning, k'au, and rat must be regarded as originally consanguineal rather

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them affinal. We have comparative material only for ning, which is represented by Chang (Konyak) nyang < *ning xC, Nikir neng < *ning BW(ws). We must further reconstruct rat as the term for xC(ds), i.e. the marriageable xC under the original bilateral xC marriage arrangement. This yields the theoretical categorical equations xCi(ms)=Sil(ms) and xCe(ws)=Bl(ws). Under the conventional type of levirate, which is found among the Kachin, a distinction must be made between the (marriageable) oBW and the (non-marriageable) yBW. In Kachin this distinction is made, in the case of a man, by equating yBW with Dl (nam) and in retaining the term rat for oBW, and, in the case of a woman, by equating HoB with HF (ku) and in retaining the term rat for HyB. Since a man marries his MBD, the distinction between rat MBD(oms) and nam MBD(yms) is the natural result of that described above. It is a fair inference that the missing terms for FSiS(ws) are ku FSiS(ows) and rat FSiS(yws). Note that the equation of MBD(yms) with BCh(ws) is a by-product, so to speak, and is not to be taken as a 'Crow' feature.

We are now in a position to evaluate the Omaha features of the Kachin system. It has been demonstrated that the Kachin have developed a unilateral xC marriage system from an original bilateral arrangement, and that this shift has produced a profound transformation in the kinship terminology. The equating of MBS(ws) with MB, and of FSiD(ms) with SiCh(ms) serves to distinguish the non-marriageable from the marriageable

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cross-cousins. These equations closely parallel those already noted in the Sbl terminology, and appear to form part of the same pattern. If this inference be correct, we must regard the institution of the levirate as a contributing factor here.

The Kachin terminology under the original bilateral xC marriage system can be reconstructed as follows:

Reconstructed Kachin System

(Consanguineal)

ni FSi		km MB
ning xCi(ws)		k'au xCe(ms)
	rat xC(ds)	
moi SD(ws)		ts'a SiS(ms)

(Affinal)

ni MSW,Ml		km FSiH,Fl
ning Sil(sW)		k'au Bl(ss)
	rat Sbl(ds)	
nam Dl		k'ri Sl

Maru and Lashi, which are of Burmese stock, show Omaha features of Kachin type, e.g. Lashi so-ok FSiD(ms),SiCh(ms) and so-auk Sl (a variant of so-ok), directly comparable with the Kachin term k'ri. Our material here is too uncertain to justify any further investigation of this point, and we have no data on the Maru and Lashi marriage practices. Both tribes are closely identified with the Kachin, and have even incorporated Kachin loan-words into their kinship nomenclatures, so that direct Kachin influence must be reckoned with in this

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matter. To judge from what little we know of the collateral terms of other Burmish-Loloish languages, Omaha features are not present. There is some evidence suggesting that the root *tu is applied both to N and C in Lisu and in Ulu (Northern Lolo), but the Lisu material is inconsistent and the Ulu material is not precise

The Omaha nomenclatures found among the Kukish tribes are quite distinct in type from the Kachin nomenclature. The Kuki tribes proper, including Southern Kuki and Tangkhul, employ the following basic scheme (in many varieties):

Kuki Omaha Pattern

(Consanguineal)

pi	gH,MBD	pu	gF,MB,MS
ni	FSi		
tu	FSiCh,SiCh(ms),gCh		

(Affinal)

pi	HBY,YI,YSi	pu	YF,YB
ni	HM	-rang	FSiH,HF
mou	DI,BY(ws)	mak	SI,SiH(ws)

Lushei has an especial term for BCh(ws), viz. va' (apparently connected with the root *wa H), and Yindu has an especial term for BD(ws), viz. (ka-)li, which has been compared with the root *ma-li gCh (Burmese, Mung), xH (Akir). In Siyin and Chavto, however, BCh(ws) is equated with Ch. The analyzing development in Laiyo has entirely obliterated all traces of the Omaha system, yet the term tu FSiCh is

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retained. Haka has both (k-)tu FSiCh and the analytical term (k-)ni fa as an alternative. Lakher applies Sb terms (in address) to FSiCh and occasionally to MBCh, and both Thado and Aimol sometimes apply the oSb term to FSiCh(os). Chinbok employs an analytical term for MBS, but equates MBD with MySi. Thado resembles Chinbok in equating MBD with MSi, but elsewhere the regular equation is with MBW = gM. Chinbok is further aberrant in equating FSiS with SiS(ms) but having a distinct term for gS. Yindu equates DS with SiS, FSiS, but employs an analytical term for SS. Yindu has distinct terms for MBCh, and Kyaw has distinct terms both for MBCh and FSiCh(i.e. Omaha features are lacking). Aimol, if we can trust our sources, has reversed the Kuki pattern, with (ka-)pu FSiS and (ka-)tu-pa MBS. Chinbon has MoBS = MyB, MyBS = WB, reflecting the stress placed on age distinctions in Southern Kuki. Our Chawte material, which is not reliable, indicates a distinction between FSiS(ws) and FSiD(ms), and the equation of SiCh(mws) with gCh. The affinal term mak Sl is commonly replaced by the consanguineal term tu SiS(ms), as in Haka, Chawte, and Sho, and the reverse process whereby an affinal term "invades" the consanguineal nomenclature (as in Kachin) is illustrated by Kyaw sa-mǎk SiCh(ms) = Sl, and Ayaing Khami mok-sa FSiCh, SiCh(ms) = Sl, both from the root *mak Sl. The latter language has retained the root *tu, however, in the term (ka-)tu FSiCh(ws), gS.

It is evident from the above citations that this Omaha pattern is extremely susceptible to variation at all points.

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Nothing approaching the specific Kachin variety has been encountered, however, and the two systems seem to have little in common. In the Kuki system the equations FSiCh = SiCh(ms) and MBS = MB obtain regardless of the sex or speaker, there are additional equations of MB with gF and SiCh(ms) with gCh, and ni FSi is retained as a consanguineal term. In addition, distinct terms for xC(ss) and Sbl are lacking. The historical developments of the two systems have been quite different, if we are permitted to draw inferences from comparative data. The terms pi and pu are the original gP terms (TB *p'i gM, *p'u gF), and the term -rang (prefixed) can be regarded as the original term for MB, cognate with Tibetan ʾa-žang < *zrang MB (cf. Kachin ku HF, FSiH = MB). The term tu occasions some difficulty, since we have only the Burmish-Loloish root *tu and the Nung term pa-du, both applied to N (xN in Burmese) for comparison. In view of the parallelism in the equations MB = gF and xN = gCh, however, we must fix the original meaning of tu as "gCh" rather than "xN". The clue to these equations seems to be teknonymy in conjunction with xC marriage, i.e. we must suppose that a man applied the teknonymous terms pu gF and pi gM to his wife's parents, whereas a woman applied the consanguineal terms ni FSi and -rang MB. With the development of unilateral marriage with MBD, a feature found in the Kuki area as well as in Kachin, the two sets of Pl terms were fully differentiated in function, and the term pu Fl = gF replaced the consanguineal term -rang MB, with pi coming into

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use for MBW. The equation of SiCh(ms) with gCh was the natural result of the above development. Since the term ni FSi was retained in its original setting, no comparable term was developed for the reciprocal relationship BCh(ws). The evidence for the use of teknonymous terms in Tibeto-Burman in general has been resumed above and need not be discussed at this point. Within the Kuki group, note Chinbon (ka-)mo-pauk WH=gF and (ka-)mu-bok MoB (probably a variant of the foregoing), (ka-)mo WM=gM and (ka-)mok MoBW (probably a variant of the foregoing), but (ka-)se HF (analysis uncertain), (ka-)si HM=FSi. Chinbon thus makes use of teknonymous terms precisely as suggested above for the Kuki group in general.

We are still faced with the problem of explaining the equations MBS=MB, MBD=MBW (or MSi), and FSiCh=SiCh(ms). Here again we must take into account the affinal setting of these terms under a system of unilateral xC marriage with MBD. The fundamental equation seems to have been that between WF and WB (pu) rather than between MB and MBS, i.e. these kin were identified because of the similarity of their roles as wife's father and brother rather than as mother's brother and mother's brother's son. In other terms, the especial position of MB and MBS among the Kuki groups seems in large measure to have arisen through xC marriage. The equation of FSiCh with SiCh(ms) reflects the equation of MBS with MB, just as the equation of SiCh(ms) with gCh reflects the equation of MB with gF.

It is possible to conceive of the Kuki development without recourse to teknonymy simply by assuming that pu gF was

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applied to MB and MBS in an honorific sense, with tu gCh SiCh(ms)=FSiCh as a complementary equation. In any event, the equation in the MB line must be regarded as the primary one, and the equation in the FSi line as complementary. The same situation was found to obtain among the Kachin (supra).

The Naga languages, which make up the northern division of the Kukish group, also reveal Omaha features, which are of Kuki rather than Kachin type. MBD is equated with MSi or MySi rather than with gM=MBW. In Ao (all three dialects) the terms for gF (o-pu) and gCh (sam-cir) are distinct, i.e. there is no teknonymy, the TB root *k'u is retained in the consanguineal nomenclature (o-k'u MB,MBS) while MBD is equated with MySi, and the affinal terms for Sl (a-nok) and Dl (a-mu) are applied to FSiS,SiS(ms) and FSiD,SiD(ms), respectively, precisely as in Ayaing Khami. Sema has a distinct term for gF (neuter) and equates gCh with Ch, but has developed a new root for MB,MBS (a-ngu) and has retained the root *k'u only in the affinal meaning "FSiH" (a-ci). Thus both Ao and Sema show full Omaha features without distinction of sex of speaker (as in Kuki) but also without teknonymy (as in Kachin). The Angami, Rengma, and Lhota systems, however, all show teknonymous features. Rengma (all three dialects) equates MB,MBS(os) with gF (ggF in Nzong), and FSiCh,SiCh(ms) with gCh. Lhota shows a partial equation of MB,MBS with gF (o-mo and o-mo-tsü) and at least similar terms for FSiS,SiS(ms) and gS (o-hro and o-hre). Angami equates FSiS,ySiS(ms) with gS, but distinguishes between

SA gF and MB, yet the term for the latter (mi) is connected with
601 the Rengma term for gF,MB (a-mi ~ a-mui) and the Lhota term
193 for MB (o-mo) and gF (o-mo-tsü). We can thus interpret Angami
● 197 mi MB as the original term for gF,MB and in this way explain
ST the lack of symmetry in the Angami nomenclature as it now
601 stands (a man calls his sister's child "gCh", but a child
193 calls his mother's brother "uncle"). Angami lacks the Omaha
197 traits on one side, since MBCh is addressed or described by name, or analytically if the need arises. The Rengma equations on the MB side appear only in the vocative nomenclature, and only when the cousin (MBS or MBD) addressed is older than speaker.

As noted in pt. 16, Majumder attempted to explain some of the features of the Sema nomenclature in terms of marriage with F's widow, after the fashion instituted by Rivers. Almost no instances of marriages of this type have been encountered in the Tibeto-Burman area, however, and the writer fails to see how Rivers' theories are of any relevancy in the present situation. The most curious form of marriage noted is the Lisü marriage with FSi cited by Fraser, and this is not reflected in the Lisu nomenclature. Omaha features among the Omaha and Miwok are perhaps based on MBD marriage, but for the American evidence there is no unanimity of opinion, and at least three recent writers on the subject (White, Gifford, Tax) have attacked this as a general explanation. Of this trio White alone suggests a general explanation, viz. that the Omaha type

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is developed from the Dakota-Iroquois type (pC = Sb, xC distinct term) under the influence of a mature and vigorous patrilineal clan system. Gifford has successfully attacked this view on the basis of the American material, and the same general strictures are applicable in the Tibeto-Burman field, where no correlation can be established between strong patrilineal clans and the Omaha type of terminology.

The Kuki equation of xN with gCh is also encountered in Miri (ā < o-i "child below") and Tibetan (ts'a). Miri has retained the TB root *k'u MB (a-kū), but does apply teknonymous terms to Fl and Ml (= MB and FSi under the Miri bilateral xC marriage system). In Tibetan, however, teknonymy has been found only in the dialect of Bathang (eastern Tibet) as recorded by Desgodins, who cites rmo-rmo Ml = MM (hence a man's term for his WM). Abor shows reverse teknonymy in the shifts a-bu gF < F and a-nā gM < M, reflected in the equation o Ch = N = gCh (Abor, like Miri, applies teknonymous terms to Fl and Ml).

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We are perhaps not justified in concluding that all equations of xN with gCh are based on teknonymy involving the affinal nomenclature (gF > Fl = MB), but no better general explanation can be suggested. The general thesis outlined above conforms to the basic Tibeto-Burman sociological pattern of cross-cousin marriage, and thus enjoys an initial advantage over any alternative theories of a more <u>ad hoc</u> nature.

Reciprocal terminology has already been mentioned in connection with Kachin ts'a MB < SiCh(ms), k'ri HSiCh, FSiHSi,

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some tribes of the Nama marriage with MBD "is said to have been far more common" (p. 244). For the replacement of the MB term by the Dutch loan-word (omeb < oom), cf. the widespread Tibeto-Burman borrowing of the Indic term māmā MB (infra).

The BaThonga evidence (Junod, pp. 216 and ff.) is complicated by the existence of dialectical differences. The regular MB term is malume (Zulu malume MB), applied also to MBS. The Northern BaThonga, however, have kokwana gF,MB,MDS, ntuknlu SiS(ms),gS. The BaRonga clans are in a neatly transitional stage, with alternative sets of terms. Radcliffe-Brown (1924) has made an illuminating analysis of the BaThonga material, in which the significance of the terms malume ("male mother") and rarana ("female father") is pointed out (cf. also Firth's discussion of the FSi as "male father" in Tikopia). The BaThonga do not practice xC marriage, according to Junod, and the parallelism with Kuki thus breaks down at this point. Since the application of kokwana gF to MB is apparently of late origin here, the teknonymy principle is of no avail in this instance, and we must accept Radcliffe-Brown's mode of reasoning. Note that neither the Nama nor the BaThonga system is of true Omaha type.

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Loan-words appear in many of the Tibeto-Burman kinship terminologies, and include terms of Indic, Chinese, and Shan origin, as well as of Tibeto-Burman origin. Indic loan-words are found in a string of languages extending from Baltistan

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and Kanawur in the northwest to the Garo Hills in the southeast, all exposed to direct Indian influence. The extent of borrowing in kinship nomenclature is in general correlated with the rate of borrowing in general, but this is not necessarily so, e.g. Magari has preserved a large proportion of its original TB vocabulary yet has retained only a single kinship term (za Ch), if we can trust our sources. The tendency to borrow terms for male kin rather than female kin has been observed in Balti, Kanauri, Newari (less well marked), Miri, and Barish. Terms for relatives older than speaker are also more likely to be borrowed than those for relatives younger than speaker. Probably both points can be explained on the basis of the honorific connotations associated with loan-words in general, which go to make up the "respectable" idiom as opposed to the vulgar. The term mama MB has been borrowed by Balti, Kanauri, Dhimal, Bodo, Garo, and perhaps Meithei, whereas the Indic FSi term has been borrowed only once (Dhimal).

The most prominent instances of borrowings made within Tibeto-Burman are those of Lepcha from Tibetan, and Atsi from Kachin. To illustrate the vagaries in the borrowing process, Atsi borrows its MB and FSi terms from Kachin but retains its native FB and MSi terms, whereas Byangsi (Almora group) borrows from Indic (Khasiya) its terms for FoB and FyB but employs a native term for MB. The borrowing of a term in a specialized sense only is exemplified by the following curious series: Kanauri mak-pa "Sl living in Fl's house" (from Tibetan); Lepcha ku-mok, id. (from Tibetan); Kachin

SA 197 601 ST 197 601 luk-k'i, id. (from Shan). All three languages have distinct Sl terms applied under normal conditions. Contrast Garo nok-rong "Sl living in Fl's house" (native term), cowari "Sl other than above" (from Indic); note that among the Garo the nok-rong is a formalized institution in a matrilineal society. It would be difficult to find a more ideal illustration of the mirroring of sociological features in linguistic phenomena.

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1 [For abbreviations see this source in cat. 113, ALl Southeast Asia ALl -- Analyst.]

CONCLUSION

162 198 It will have been observed that the Chinese of Southeast Asia are, in essence, the same people over the entire area, in spite of a considerable diversity in occupation and dialect, and variation in purity of blood. There is a concentration of Yunnanese in the Shan States, but this tribe does not occur in any numbers elsewhere, and the other tribes are unequally distributed. For example, the Hokkiens and persons of mixed race of Hokkien origin form the majority community in Malaya and Indonesia, being outnumbered by the Cantonese, however, in the Malay States. In Siam the Teochius and the Hakkas are more numerous than the Hokkiens, and Hailams are also a large community. In the Philippines three-quarters of the Chinese are Hokkiens, and most of the remainder Cantonese. In Indochina the Hokkiens, though numerically seeming to yield first place to the Cantonese, are the principal Chinese merchants: indeed they were the pioneering tribe in the Nanyang and they are still, on the whole, the wealthiest.

So much may be said to illustrate the diversity of the tribal distribution of these Chinese who, but for a few exceptions (such as a tiny freak pocket of Shantung people in North Borneo) originate from the southeast corner of China—a small bit of Marco Polo's 'Mangi'. Diversity of occupation again is very pronounced among 162 463 these emigrants. Hailams, for instance, tend to be pig and poultry rearers, small cultivators, and domestic servants; in Borneo the Hakkas are the most numerous community and here they are largely agriculturists. Cantonese and Hakkas supply most of the 181 Chinese labour for tin-mines and rubber estates. Nor should we accept the naïve statement that 'all Chinese are alike' (which is but an extension of the unobservant conclusion of the European tenderfoot that 'all Chinese *look* alike'). There is a notable psychological difference between, say, the volatile, nimble-witted Cantonese and the more phlegmatic Hokkien or Teochiu; the Hailams have usually quite distinct physical characteristics from other Chinese, being more delicately made and exhibiting marked cranial differences from their brethren from the mainland. As for the Hakkas, they are in some ways a people apart, of northern origin and later immigrants than the other tribes and deriving from islands of population surrounded by Cantonese or Hokkiens in

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

Chapter Twenty-five

PEOPLES, POLITICS AND PROSPECTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

101 THE setting of Southeast Asia may be summed up as one of extremes of relief (deltaic plains and mountains) and a climate mostly approaching the wet limit for plant life but merging into monsoonal types. To this setting the people have made varying responses, ranging from migrant food gatherers and hunters in the jungles, to subsistence farmers in the plains, but all turning upon woody materials for weapons, implements, house-structures and domestic utensils, upon rice, the cereal of the wet extreme, and upon social systems of communal help. The whole social and economic life has been galvanised over the past century or two by being more and more drawn into commercial and industrial activities developed in response to and on the basis of external needs for the minerals and agricultural products of Southeast Asia, whereas prior to that time the region was touched only by a trickle of traders moving between India and China.

FACTORS IN THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY

174 Several factors account for the difficulty of obtaining firm data to fill in our general picture of the historical geography of Southeast Asia. In the first place, there grew up no strong literary tradition to last through the centuries and record the past in a form other than mythical. Here tradition is largely oral and literature essentially Indian rather than indigenous. And whatever there was of local record and history has rotted away quickly, the climate, the ants, insects and moulds soon destroying anything on wood, paper, leather or cloth. Moreover, in this setting of swamps and forest, the most easily available material is wood, and artistic tradition expressed in wood, whether in carvings, buildings or tools, rapidly disintegrates, leaving little of that sort of evidence which is the basis of our facts about early periods in other regions. Buildings and carvings on stone were not normal expressions of Southeast Asia people where over large areas stone is not easily come by and where

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

FIG. 113.—Historic Pattern of Southeast Asia during Indian Colonial Period

implements had not in any case developed far enough to deal with stone. Hence monumental evidence in Southeast Asia is so largely Indian, an introduction by foreigners using styles and techniques developed in their home settings, and most developed in the drier parts of this region, where stone is more accessible. On the clay lands, historic brick structures, also an Indian innovation, weather to nothing very quickly. At Angkor may be seen the power of quick-growing tropical trees to shatter and break down temples and palaces built of stone and lateritic blocks.

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This, too, is a region of natural calamities, difficult though it is to pin-point them. Little kingdoms have been wiped out in a few hours by Javanese volcanoes, as in A.D. 1006 when the flourishing city of Dharmavamsa (a great king of Central Java) was reduced to ashes by "a great calamity," probably an explosion and lava outflow of the Merapi volcano. Settlements along rivers have been obliterated when huge mud-flows swept down from loose ashes on the flanks of new eruptions, possibly accounting for our ignorance of east Sumatran kingdoms. Coasts have altered through the years

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Further to complicate the historic geography was the fact that the literary people, the monks and religious men, were Indian or Indian-minded for long periods, disinterested in mundane records, and following the custom, still evident among many Southeast Asia people today, of avoiding personal names, so that anonymity, obscurity and confused nomenclature veil the past even in such records as do exist. Many experiments in writing styles were developed among these isolated and complex peoples and often inscriptions made in them cannot be translated today. Because of the dispersal tendencies within the territories themselves and the lack of focus to the region as a whole, no great depositories of learning were established in Southeast Asia to gather and conserve the record of its past.

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Broadly speaking, the region has been until recently one of very thin population and large patches of it still contain populations of remarkably low density. Direct evidence of densities are scanty for periods farther back than this century, yet it seems probable that the whole of Southeast Asia in 1800 contained only about ten million people, when the region was probably as thinly peopled in its most attractive areas as Upper Burma and Upper Siam, the least attractive and developed areas, are today; Malaya then contained about a quarter million people, Java about four million, Burma probably less than two million. It was, even at the end of the 18th century, a zone of labour shortage and the objective of the local princelings of the times was to get hands, the basic power resource of their time, the one way of securing a small surplus from their fundamentally subsistent territories. Outsiders were not greatly attracted to Southeast Asia itself, as apart from the routes through it. To Spain its old colony, the Philippines, was no great asset and more related to Mexico than to Spain, remote and ready to drop from the Spanish orbit during the 19th century. To Holland, its colony in Java was a company venture that yielded little direct profit for many years and was at times on the verge of bankruptcy.

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2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

167 The new-style marriage, based on the consent of the parties, and
178 often arranged by themselves, has gradually been spreading in
582 popularity among the better educated. The cost of the wedding
593 and its preliminaries has also been much reduced. This is a consequence, too, of the growing equality between the sexes.

871 *Education.* It was only by dint of continual defeat at the hands of
• 212 foreign Powers that China realized that her traditional literary sys-
167 tem of education, which had endured for over a thousand years, did not fit her to withstand the assaults of her enemies. At long last she decided to adopt an educational system on modern lines. The greatest obstacle in doing this was the classical language. The literary language in which all education was conducted had become completely divorced from the spoken language, and it needed many years of study before a student could obtain anything like command of it. Whilst it remained, a democratic system of education was out of the question.[1] So it was that in 1917 there occurred the most revolutionary happening in the history of Chinese education, the initiation of the *pai hua* movement.[2]

Pai hua, or written vernacular, had existed in China for centuries. Most popular novels were written in it, but it had never obtained the recognition of the literati. Corresponding, as it did, to the spoken language, it was much more easily learnt than *wen li*, the Chinese literary language, though it was clumsier and more discursive. So when Dr Hu Shih maintained that the literary language should be abolished in schools and that *pai hua* should be elevated to the rank of a literary medium, the proposal was considered as threatening the very foundations of Chinese culture. But the movement obtained powerful political support and in January 1920, the Minister of Education ordered that the spoken language should be used in the teaching of Chinese in primary schools. The form of *pai hua* approved for this purpose became known as *Kuo Yü*, or the National Language.[3]

in 1899 and repealed in 1932. By this enactment the Secretary for Chinese Affairs had powers to decide the custody and guardianship of women and children, and to order divorce, separation, adoption, and betrothal.

[1] Dr W. A. P. Martin estimated about 1880 that the proportion of Chinese who could read and understand what they read was about one in twenty.

[2] For a full exposition of the subject see Victor Purcell, *Problems of Chinese Education* (London, Kegan Paul, 1936).

[3] See Hu Shih, *The Chinese Renaissance*. The Haskell Lectures, 1933 (University of Chicago Press, 1934).

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Chinese

The adoption of *Kuo Yü* as a medium of instruction in schools is about one-half of the story of education in China under the Kuomintang: the other half is the adoption in 1928 of the Three Principles of the People of Dr Sun Yat-sen as the foundation of the education system.

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The overseas Chinese of the Nanyang adopted with fervour the new style of education which the Revolution had brought into being. They started and ran their own schools, and the resultant rise of Nationalist feeling made the Governments of the several countries more and more apprehensive of the creation of an *imperium in imperio* in their midst.[1] Such was particularly the case in Malaya and Siam, and the crux of the friction between the China-born Chinese and the local administration has been their differences regarding the aim and control of this education. This will emerge in the course of the individual country studies of our survey.

The majority of the emigrants had little or no schooling before going abroad. It is reasonably certain that until quite recently the average emigrant was not a man of education at all, or at most he had had a very inadequate schooling before emigrating.

Religion. On going overseas to the Nanyang the Chinese took with them their religious beliefs. Be the principle of Buddhism, Taoism, or Confucianism effective or ossifed, there can be no doubt at all that the world of spirits, demons, gods, and heroes is still a very real thing to the majority of Chinese and goes with them wherever they go. Dr Ta Chen notes that among the items of household expenditure other than food, clothing, and shelter, that for religious practices predominates over all others both in the emigrant and non-emigrant families of east Kwangtung and south Fukien. ('These expenditures', he says, 'are a good index of the prevalence of religious concern.') Scepticism has assuredly grown with the advance of education, but for the majority it would seem that 'keeping in' with the Great Unseen was as much a matter of insurance as of piety and ethics.

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Broadly speaking, the religion of the villagers of south China consists of the worship of Shen, Fu, and Yao in addition to the cult of their own ancestors. Shen and Fu are spirits from Buddhism and Taoism (especially the popular, corrupted, and confused aspects of

[1] See Cyrus H. Peake, *Nationalism and Education in Modern China* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1932).

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

871 562 will produce better mothers, or birth control and cheaper typists, is a question for the future.

9. Vernacular Education

872 So far we have been dealing in the main with western education, and have seen that the prospect of gain is sufficient to crowd the schools beyond capacity, but only so far, and in such directions, as they lead to a remunerative certificate; and that all values, other than examination values, are at a discount. Primary vernacular education provides the obverse of this picture because, in general, it does not pay; it is merely an instrument of human welfare. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century the diffusion of general enlightenment in India through primary instruction has been a main objective of humanitarian sympathy; this principle was adopted and placed in the forefront of official policy from the middle of the century, and it was reaffirmed by Curzon at its close. Yet the progress achieved 'is shown by statistics admitted by the highest educational authorities to be thoroughly unsatisfactory',[1] and in Burma, which started the nineteenth century under native rule with a literate male population, the picture of primary instruction after a hundred years of British rule is 'one of almost unrelieved gloom'.[2] For over a hundred years there has been general agreement in India that primary instruction is the most effective instrument of material and moral welfare, yet, so far as there has been any progress under either head since the time of Wilberforce and Carey, it certainly cannot be attributed to the spread of primary instruction. This has not spread because there has been no demand for it. Now that it is again proclaimed with new insistence as the chief aim of modern educational policy in the tropics generally, some examination of the grounds on which it has been advocated seems expedient. Apart from humanitarian considerations they fall under two heads, political and economic.

872 212 Many have urged the spread of vernacular instruction on grounds of political convenience. Curzon cited with approval the dictum that 'among all sources of administrative difficulty and political danger, few are so serious as the ignorance of the people'.[3] This view is still widely held. Mass education is recommended as a safeguard against explosive temper liable to produce a social upheaval. One is told that 'an increase of literacy makes the people easier to control and govern',

[1] Mayhew, *India*, p. 226. [2] *CVV*, p. 156.
[3] *RPI* (India), 1897–1902, p. 462; *Mass Education*, p. 7; Mayhew, *India*, p. 226.

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and that 'it is pleasanter and cheaper to mould a literate population by appropriate and intelligent methods of education than to suppress an illiterate mob by machine guns'. There is very little evidence for such assertions, and certainly experience in Netherlands India and Burma contradicts them. The Dutch, when ruling an illiterate people through their native chieftains, had less difficulty in preserving *rust en orde*, and in moulding the people to their will, than in recent years when literacy has been making rapid progress. In the serious outbreak of 1926, though few of the rebels were highly educated, many had gone far beyond the common man in schooling. In Burma, with a high proportion of literates, there has been greater difficulty than in Java in maintaining law and order, and in obtaining a ready compliance with Government policy; on the contrary, districts conspicuous for literacy are also conspicuous for crime, and of the rebels in 1931 most would have passed for highly educated men in Africa. The early Liberals believed that education would automatically strengthen the ties between India and Britain; Curzon, finding this belief mistaken, tried to stimulate loyalty by hanging up portraits of the King in schools. In Burma there were attempts during the war of 1914–18 to use the schools for spreading 'the imperial idea', and 'to foster a sense of personal attachment to the King-Emperor'.[1] In French dependencies the schools try to evoke an admiration of France, and in Belgian dependencies an affection for Belgium.[2] But those who learn to read find little reading matter except newspapers, described in Netherlands India as 'cheap and nasty—like other things intended for tropical consumption', and often disaffected towards Government. Both in Burma and Java, long before the rise of modern Nationalism, the earliest native newspapers were critical of foreign rule, and the figures already given show that in Burma the circulation of periodicals varies directly with the violence of their attacks on Government. Under indirect rule the people learn from the newspapers to criticize not only the foreign Government but their own chieftains. There would seem little reason, therefore, to expect that the spread of primary instruction will increase docility, and even if it were true that primary instruction makes a people easier to control and govern, this would not induce illiterate parents who do not value education to send their children to the schools.

Others hold out a more tempting bait. They argue that undeveloped minds are incapable of political activities, and that 'in order to pro-

[1] *CII*, p. 5. [2] Mayhew, *Colonial Empire*, p. 143.

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gress towards self-government in the modern world colonial peoples must learn to read, and to understand, not only their own local affairs but those of wider import'.[1] Primary instruction is advocated as a first step towards 'responsible government', and therefore a condition of autonomy. But in the early nineteenth century, literacy was far more widely diffused in Burma than in Britain, yet this did not secure its independence. Even now the comparatively greater literacy of Burma does not seem to make it apter for western political institutions than Java, whereas Siam, with a smaller proportion of literates, has managed to remain independent. In Netherlands India, despite the spread of primary instruction during the past generation, it has been estimated that 167 years must elapse before the last illiterate is dragged to school, and in the Gold Coast, the most forward dependency in Africa in respect of education, the period has been put at 600 years.[2] Prospects of self-government at so remote a date are unlikely to kindle much enthusiasm for primary instruction, and critics have not unnaturally enquired whether its advocates wish to diffuse enlightenment or to delay self-government.

The recent project of mass education looks to the elimination of illiteracy in Africa within some thirty years.[3] That project, though optimistic, is not impossible if the people can be induced to want primary instruction. The prospect of self-government is an inducement; but it is also an illusion. 'Self-government' suggests that they will be free to do what they may want to do. But unless they want to do what, in the conditions of the modern world they must do, they will not be free, or even able to do it. To change their wants is much harder than to teach them letters and, without that, literacy may help them to express their dissatisfaction at not getting what they want, but it will make government more difficult and will raise a new obstacle to self-government. Literacy in itself is nothing. If it were possible to make the whole of Africa as literate to-morrow as Burma is to-day, it would be no more capable than Burma of managing western democratic institutions. Literacy may be an instrument of good or evil and, if tropical peoples are induced to acquire letters on the ground that this implies self-government, they will use the power of letters to vent their disappointment on those who have deceived them. Their profit will be that they know how to curse. Primary instruction, if recommended as

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 7; *Mass Education*, p. 14.
[2] *African Survey*, p. 1235; *HIOC*, Résumé, p. 76.
[3] *Mass Education*, pp. 10, 11.

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a step towards self-government, is more likely to cause than to cure an explosive temper and a social upheaval. It may not be impossible to teach tropical peoples their alphabet within a generation, but 'if means must be found and found quickly whereby the people as a *community* can understand and appreciate the forces which have changed and are changing their lives so radically' and 'to call out the ability and will to share in the direction and control of the social, economic and political forces', this end is more likely to be attained by educating the leaders of the community rather than through the mass education of individuals who, taken in the mass, are chiefly concerned, in Africa as elsewhere, with getting their daily bread, and do not hope or wish to meddle in matters that are too high for them. In this matter nationalist opinion, which insists on the education of leaders, is guided by a sound instinct, and the emphasis of colonial powers on primary instruction, however well intended, makes nationalists suspect that leaders are not wanted.

Among the advocates of primary instruction on economic grounds one can also hear two voices. Those who are chiefly concerned with economic progress urge that it will make the native more profitable as a coolie. 'If he is to work harder, longer and more continuously, education must inculcate the ideas of sanctity of contract and of ordinary honesty to his employers.'[1] This appeal to the sanctity of contract—the only saint in the Calendar of Mammon—suggests that the coincidence between the modern emphasis on primary instruction and the discovery that unintelligent labour is uneconomic is not wholly fortuitous. In Malaya the project of opening special schools for immigrants was formerly regarded as a 'fatal error' creating a plural society by 'tending to keep them aliens and encouraging them in the idea that China or India is their home'. But shortly afterwards, the Government decided to open Tamil schools 'with the object of making the F.M.S. from the point of view of the Indian immigrant, an outlying province of India, like Ceylon'.[2] These schools, though recognized as detrimental to social welfare, were created in the interest of economic progress. Experience has shown that Tamil education 'is of value not only as an incentive to recruiting labour for the rubber estates, but as a means of keeping the Tamil labourer happy and contented',[3] and many plantations now have schools for

[1] Mayhew, *Colonial Empire*, p. 141.
[2] 1905, Cmd. 2379, p. 11, and 11 n.
[3] Sir George Maxwell, quoted Sidney, p. 203; Mills, pp. 340, 34[illegible]

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Chapter Two

CLIMATIC FACTORS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

FEW regions comparable in size to Southeast Asia have so uniform a temperature régime over the whole area and throughout the year. Apart from those local variations due to altitude, and in Northern Burma and Siam to continental influences from Tibet, Southeast Asia from Lower Burma to Cochinchina and New Guinea has average monthly temperatures which remain within ten degrees or so of 80° F. at all seasons. Symmetry about the Equator and a set of land units thoroughly broken up by water bodies of greater area than themselves account for this uniformity of warmth in time and from place to place, and in turn mean that the broad human and vegetation variations do not correlate closely with variations of warmth from place to place, nor is the rhythm of vegetation and cultivation in the region as a whole set by an annual procession of temperature changes. 132

The basic rhythm of plants and agriculture through most of Southeast Asia is dominated by rainfall—by its incidence rather than by its volume, though considerable differences in volume make distinct climatic sub-divisions away from the axis of the Equator. Köppen's classification emphasises these climatic differences. In this broken terrain, the pattern of the rainfall and the pattern of its variations within short distances, are set by the wind systems. To understand these is to see the operative factor behind the local differences in rainfall periodicity which very much depend on the aspect of the land masses in relation to the seasonal air currents and to local water areas. [22]

THE WIND RÉGIME

Two similar air masses move across Southeast Asia:

(*a*) The Northern Tropical Air Mass which normally moves from the Tropic of Cancer towards the Equator as the Northeast Trades;

(*b*) The Southern Tropical Air Mass, originating over the Tropic of Capricorn and normally moving towards the Equator as the

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Chapter I

FROM HUNTING AND GATHERING TO AGRICULTURE

Hunting and Gathering

101 In Southeastern Asia today there are peoples of different cultural levels
174 carrying on some of the major economies that man has developed in the
course of time. The first people to invade the tropical forest regions around
●222 the South China Sea were alithic, or prepalaeolithic, food gatherers,[1] who
105 obtained their food by collecting edible wild plants and by hunting and fishing. Today geographically separated peoples are still living in a prepalaeolithic or palaeolithic food-gathering and hunting stage.[2] In Southeastern Asia they are represented by the Semang of the Malay Peninsula, the Andaman Islanders, and the Aeta of the Philippines—all of whom are Negritos, or dwarfed Negroids—the Kubu of Sumatra, the Sakai of the Malay Peninsula, the Toala of Celebes,[3] and the Punan of Borneo.[4]

222 The degree to which collecting, hunting, or fishing contributes to the
462 food supply varies with the season; it also varies with different peoples,
105 depending upon the resources of the region, the type of equipment the people may possess, and the skills they may have acquired. Food-gathering and hunting peoples have a division of labor under which the men hunt while the women and children gather vegetable matter and catch insects and small animals. The men may lend a helping hand, however, in digging up some of the very deep-growing yams. Men will also participate in the
621 picking of fruits, especially when it is necessary to climb tall trees. The food gatherers and hunters of Southeastern Asia are nomadic in the sense that they do not remain long in one place. However, they do not wander aimlessly through the jungle. Each group has its definite territory—among

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Note: The titles of the works here cited in footnotes have been abbreviated, whenever possible. The full titles may be found in the Bibliography, p. 269 ff.

[1] Nippold (Rassen- und Kulturgeschichte der Negrito-Völker, 1936, pp. 253–255 and 398–400) considers the alithic wood culture of the Negritos of Southeastern Asia to be older than palaeolithic culture. These people use wood rather than stone as raw material for their tools. Because of the perishable nature of wood, archaeologists and prehistorians have not yet been able, so far as I know, to go farther back than the palaeolithic age and therefore have not been able to confirm the hypothesis of an alithic age. Menghin (Weltgeschichte der Steinzeit, 1931, p. 91) believes that, from an archaeological point of view, an alithic wood culture may be regarded only as a possibility, but Kern (Die Anfänge der Weltgeschichte, 1933, p. 35), who compared pygmy culture with palaeolithic cultures, comes to the conclusion that alithic wood cultures probably preceded palaeolithic culture.

[2] By divesting the word "palaeolithic" of its specific chronological connotation the term may be used for present-day peoples who have a food-gathering and hunting culture.

[3] The racial affinities of the Kubu, the Sakai, and the Toala are not clear; by some they are called Veddoids, by others, Australoids.

[4] They are considered to be Proto-Malays.

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During untold centuries in which they collected plant matter, women acquired an intimate knowledge of vegetable life. Eduard Hahn and others have therefore reasoned that women were the inventors of the cultivation of plants and hence were the first food producers. Hahn has given the name *Hackbau* (hoe culture or hoe tillage) to primitive cultivation, and maintains that the hoe is woman's implement; he draws a sharp distinction between Hackbau and more advanced cultivation, which he calls *Pflugbau* (plow culture or plow tillage) and ascribes to men.[9] It is indeed true that men generally farm with plows and that many examples may be cited of women using hoes; nevertheless, there are so many instances of male primitive cultivators employing hoes or similar instruments that Hahn's classification should be modified. While there seems to be no reason for abandoning his theory of the invention of plant cultivation by women, the classification of cultivation by tools, such as the hoe and the plow, ascribed to one sex or the other, is unsatisfactory. For, in spite of the fact that the collection of vegetable matter is almost exclusively the woman's task in the gathering economy, among primitive cultivators men either assist women in the cultivation of plants or entirely take over this activity whenever hunting or fishing become less important than soil tillage. Furthermore, many primitive cultivators do not use the hoe, but continue to employ the digging stick, characteristically used by the food-gathering women. From Formosa southward throughout the Malay Archipelago, as well as on the mainland of Southeastern Asia, the digging stick, also known as the dibble stick or planting stick, is frequently used by the primitive cultivator. On the other hand, there are advanced cultivators who till their land intensively with hoes; they use manure, rotate their crops, terrace fields that lie on slopes, and practice irrigation, yet they do not use plows drawn by draft animals (however, in some instances they have livestock). In other words, advanced agriculture does not depend upon the animal-drawn plow nor does primitive agriculture depend upon the hoe.

A more fundamental distinction between primitive and advanced agriculture may be made in terms of land use rather than of tools. Primitive cultivators, with the possible exception of those living in arid regions, raise one or two crops on a given plot of land, then abandon the plot and make a new field, preferably in the forest, so that the old plot lies fallow sometimes for many years and may itself revert to forest; in short, primitive cultivators shift the place of their agricultural activities with regularity. The crop land consists of small patches scattered throughout the forest; these patches are extremely ragged in appearance and do not look at all like fields. A primitive cultivator would never think of removing stumps and fallen trees; instead, he deliberately raises his crop among them. This kind of cultivation is best described as shifting-field, or shift-

[9] Hahn: Das Alter der wirtschaftlichen Kultur, 1905; idem: Die Entstehung der Pflugkultur, 1909; idem: Von der Hacke zum Pflug, 1914; Kolff: "Hahn's hypothese," 1926, pp. 884–907.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 • ALl Southeast Asia AL1

extensive open grasslands resulting from the most important tool of the shifting cultivator, fire. 241 134 311

Generally, the fallow period allows time only for the evolution of mediocre second-growth forest, for the shifting cultivator usually returns to an old ladang before even a small percentage of those tree species that made up the original stand have had a chance to come back. Repeated cultivations further impoverish the forest and reduce the number of species. Certain light-loving trees that played a minor role in the climax forest will spread rapidly and dominate, together with those species that show a resistance to fire and those that are capable of sending new sprouts out of the old stumps.[5]

If fire repeatedly invades an abandoned ladang, the tree flora is reduced until finally only grasses and herbs survive. These persist because their root systems, tubers, or bulbs send out new shoots after the fire. The more important grasses and herbs that finally triumph over forest vegetation are *Imperata cylindrica* Beauv., *Imperata constricta* Hitchc., *Saccharum spontaneum* L., *Themeda gigantea* Hack, and *Eupatorium odoratum* L. These burn very rapidly and with a hot flame, even when still green. After they are well established they catch fire or are set afire every year, almost without exception; this prevents natural reforestation. Furthermore, the fire will also invade the neighboring forest and force it gradually back, so that the grass area steadily increases. This is especially true in hilly or mountainous country. In the Philippines about 18 per cent of the total area is covered with grass vegetation as a result of shifting cultivation and fires. These grass areas are known locally as *cogonales*. In the Indies, where they are called *alang-alang*,[6] they are also extensive, as in southern Sumatra. While I was traveling through southern Sumatra by rail during the dry season I counted twenty grass fires started within the space of an hour by sparks from our locomotive. In Thailand there is as yet very little cogonal land, according to Pendleton.[7] In Indochina culturally induced grasslands, either pure or with scattered trees—the latter called by the French *forêts claires* or *savanes-parcs*—are very extensive[8] (Figs. 23, 24). [137]

Once the vegetation of an area has been changed from forest to grass, the land is of no more agricultural use to the shifting cultivator. The only benefit that he then gets out of the land is for hunting. For this, too, he often utilizes fire—either to drive wild animals out of hiding or to get a growth of young grass to attract his prey. [224]

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[5] In Malaya and Sumatra the spread of such bushes and trees as *Lantana camara* L., *Schima bancana* Miq., *Peronema canescens* Jack, *Vitex pubescens* Vahl, *Melastoma malabathricum* L., and *Lagerstroemia speciosa* Pers. is due to the cutting of clearings.

[6] *Imperata* (both *constricta* and *cylindrica*) is known in the Philippines by the Spanish term *cogon*, in the East Indies as *alang-alang*, and in Malaya as *lalang*. The last two are Malay words.

[7] Pendleton: "Some Interrelations between Agriculture and Forestry," 1939, p. 41.

[8] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 368–372.

[See p. 38, cat. 241 or 116 -- Analyst]

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Chapter Twenty-three

THE FISHERIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Fish Population

136 Because equatorial waters have low salinity and low oxygen content, it has frequently been assumed that they have a low fish population. That view is difficult to maintain for the shallow waters of Southeast Asia where, according to Herre, the number of kinds of fish and their diversification is unrivalled by that of any other marine region. Whether this paradox disproves the theoretical view about equatorial seas or shows that the fish population depends more on the local supply of nutrients which so broken and well-watered a region as Southeast Asia discharges to the sea in extraordinarily large quantities, has yet to be demonstrated. There is no co-ordinated study of the fishing industry as a whole in this region.

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Until recently, only the generic character of these Southeast Asia fish had been studied, from which it appears that, while by no means all of them have been named and identified, over 1,500 varieties are normally fished round Java, over 500 have been named as economically valuable round Malaya, and similar large varieties are reported from all territories. Most of the fish known are inshore fish, closely dependent on food particles carried from shore to sea and on the great growth of plankton, seaweeds and corals which supply fish food. Because the shores of the landmasses in most of this region are frequently backed by swamps, there is a very considerable fish population on the land surface itself, in a gradual transition between shallow water marine fish and swamp or riverine fish. Thus the fishing industry is not merely an inshore activity: it continues very vigorously inland, in the swamps, in the flooded paddyfields and their canals, in the lakes and lagoons, and in the rivers.

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[228] Though the deep-water fish of Southeast Asia have only in recent years been exploited commercially, by Japanese trawlers, they exist in these waters in surprising numbers. Schools of sardines some 10 miles long have been seen, together with frequent

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great shoals of mackerel and bonito. Porpoises (mammals which live on fish and are a guide to the fish density) have been seen in a school which packed an area 15 miles long and 2 miles broad. Plankton occurs at times in astounding quantities, practically smothering all other fish life in the neighbourhood. The movements and migrations of these fish of deeper waters have been little studied and the inshore fishing has been enough to meet local food needs, as well as not demanding too complex a technique or too great a capital outlay by the local fishermen who are generally very few, and too poor to equip themselves for long distance deepwater trips. A major impediment to introducing the elaborate systems of trawling and seining which have been developed in temperate seas is the frequency of coral reefs and knolls which, although attracting fish, catch the nets and ruin them.

Fish as a Staple Food

Fish is a staple in the Southeast Asia diet as complement to rice. It supplies calcium, iodine and salt as well as animal protein, items otherwise not easily come by in these areas, or too expensive for the peasants. By habit Southeast Asia people are rice-fish-curry eaters and vegetables in the European sense enter very little into their meals. They are largely vegetarian but not interested in vegetables. Fishing has an importance in local ecologies second only to rice. In Malaya, for example, well over 80 lbs. of fish is normally consumed by every man, woman and child every year. When looking through the records of any one territory, however, the great significance of fish is not apparent because fishing is a mobile and widely dispersed activity not easily checked, the more illusive statistically because it plays little or no part in revenues.

Several stages of commercialisation are met with but subsistence fishing predominates. In every paddyfield and swamp, villagers go fishing for their personal needs; on the coast many fishermen are part-time, sharing their labour between a paddyfield and a fishing boat. Some villages have specialised fishermen whose produce goes into exchange among the landsmen to make the village self-supporting. Gradually fishing for sale has become possible, yet there are major difficulties of transport to consuming centres, of organisation between fishermen and consumer, and of preserving the fish in good condition during transport.

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Trade in Fish

228 Apart from that fish eaten fresh on the coasts, the bulk is preserved for commerce and for storing during seasons when the sea is too violent, by sun-drying, salting or by conversion into one of the highly-spiced, partly-fermented fish sauces widely admired by Southeast Asia people (i.e. *blachan* in Malaya, *trassie* in Java, *nuoc mam* in Indochina, *kapi* in Siam, *ngapi* in Burma). Huge quantities of fish in these forms move inland within each country and there has developed a considerable movement of preserved fish between the different Southeast Asia territories, to supply the plantation and industrial workers. From Siam and Indochina alone preserved fish to the value of about $12 million was exported each year before the war. That fish preserving is widely practised even for local use means that the activity is very largely buffered from the alternations of glut and scarcity which are common in fishing industries. The transport of the preserved fish both internally and externally tends to be by sea for cheapness, a paramount consideration in a food for peasants, and because there are few alternatives. Only in a few areas is there a speedy land service able to deliver fresh fish to inland urban centres.

563 228 Commercialisation of fishing has brought in foreign personnel. Whenever fishing is carried on for export as cash sales, Chinese are frequently the principal fishermen, as at Bagansiapiapi (Sumatra) and Pangkor (Malaya), in the deep-sea fishing centred on Singapore (once associated with the Japanese) and even in the cultivation of fish in Javanese ponds. Moreover, Chinese are strongly represented as the middlemen who handle the trade from the actual fisherman to the ultimate consumer, and they are generally responsible for processing the wet fish into transportable forms.

Freshwater Fishing

226 While the absence of deep-sea and mechanical mass fishing methods is one peculiarity of Southeast Asia, equally remarkable is the emphasis on freshwater fishing. Very largely the methods of freshwater fishing—traps and small nets—have established the styles used for inshore sea fishing. For the most part the value of this freshwater production cannot be gauged though it has major importance in local diet. Two variations of freshwater fishing

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have exceptional interest. In Indochina the Tonle Sap fisheries represent the most productive of the natural fresh fisheries, and in Java has been developed a large cultivation of fish in ponds. 226

From Tonle Sap over 25 tons of fish are produced annually from each square mile of its surface, a productivity ten times greater than that of the well-fished North Sea of Europe, and unique in its intensity. This exceptional production is possible because the large area covered from early June by shallow floods enables fish to spawn profusely in about 3,000 square miles of inundated forest, where abundance of vegetable matter makes the fish grow larger than those in any of the neighbouring rivers. Over 30,000 persons are normally fishing this lake and the full-time fishermen live in villages of pile dwellings scattered round it; of these lake-side fishing villages Snoc Trou is the most important. A considerable number of migrant fishermen, Annamese, Chinese and Malay, move into this area temporarily for the peak fishing season from October to January. Over 135,000 tons of fish are obtained annually and half of this is dried before leaving the region; some fish are sent alive towards the estuary of the Mekong in floating cages of bamboo enclosing what is virtually an artificial shoal moving through the water to the market, an ingenious device for transporting live fish. The commercial side of this fishing is almost entirely Chinese. Over-fishing has been going on in recent years and controls are becoming necessary. 228 563

In Java two types of pond fishing have been evolved. Near Batavia, Sourabaya and Semarang where the demand for fish is great, mangrove swamps are partially enclosed to control the tidal water and into the enclosures are placed, between April and July, the spawn and young sea fish gathered among bundles of leaves which fishermen have previously placed in the open sea for the purpose. The spawn and young fish are carried to the fishponds in jars and there left to fatten on algae and water weeds cultivated for them. The milkfish (Chanos chanos) is popular for this purpose and reaches marketable size within a year. Elsewhere inland artificial freshwater ponds have been built, covering a total area estimated at over 100,000 acres, in which fish of the carp type are bred and fattened all the year round; 65,000 tons of fish are obtained every year by this means. Freshwater fisheries are now encouraged in every little tank or pond as a form of mosquito control. 228

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Inshore Fishing

• 226 Inshore sea fishing is by far the most usual in Southeast Asia. The boats used are generally very small, often needing only a man and a boy to work them, indicating the small units of the industry. Land and sea breezes play a key part in the rhythm of activity, being the source of power to and from the shore. It is unusual for the boats to move more than a mile from shore and rarely do they lose sight of land. Much inshore fishing is done without boats at all. The beaches are netted by fishermen moving waist deep through water and, wherever fish are known to migrate along the coast, barriers of bamboo are built out, leading the fish into a square enclosure or trap from which they are periodically drawn up in a net by a fisherman who lives with his family on a platform above the trap. Probably three-quarters of Southeast Asia sea fishing is done where the sea is less than 20 ft. deep. The fish thus obtained tend to be of the small type and a large proportion are crustacea, much favoured in local diet. Huge quantities of crabs, shrimps and mussels are obtained, and squids are regularly netted in large numbers for local use. The shells of crustacea are ground to powder and used in conjunction with the areca nut as a favourite old-fashioned chew common to the whole region. Because coastal fishing takes place so close to the shore where breakers are violent, it is markedly seasonal in character, depending on aspect relative to the seasonal winds. This seasonality is a great incentive to preserve the fish to last through that season when the little fishing boats cannot cope with the heavy seas. Inshore fishing closely relates to the shallow waters of the Sunda Platform; where the coast drops away to great depths, the intensity of fishing diminishes.

Distribution of Fisheries

438 226 While fishing commands a wide interest, it is by no means uniformly developed through the region. Broadly, the coasts near densely populated areas are the most intensively fished and estuaries and deltas have major fishing developments, though neither at the Red River mouth nor the Irrawaddy mouth has fishing reached a high pitch of development. The Mekong, particularly at the seasons when the Tonle Sap water is discharging, has great attraction for fish and the whole coastal zone from the Mekong

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round the Gulf of Siam to Singapore is well fished and is one of the few known tracks of fish migration in these seas, possibly relating to the southwesterly drift of the Mekong discharge. The Malacca Strait also has vigorous fishing industries, associated with the fishing at Bagansiapiapi and Pangkor which have been commercialised by Chinese. Along both sides of the Malacca Strait fish traps stand out from the coast almost continuously for mile after mile. Bagansiapiapi fish comes almost entirely from traps set across the creeks of the Rokan River. In the Philippines, themselves spread athwart the equatorial currents of the Pacific like a great trap, the annual catch of fish exceeds that of any other territory, yet the Philippines import much canned fish in addition.

For most Southeast Asia countries information about the significance of fishing activities is sketchy, although in every case fish ranks high in the basic foodstuffs. The total activity in fishing is enormous; probably 3 million people are engaged in Southeast Asia fishing and the amount of internal trade in fish must total far higher than so widely dispersed and so little commercialised an industry might at first suggest. There is always a substantial movement of fish in various forms from the coasts to the interiors and from one territory to another, as the following points indicate:

Burma.—That Burmese developed their tradition well in the interior may explain why it is only in Arakan and Tenasserim there has been intensive sea fishing. Within the Irrawaddy distributaries South Indians have taken to fishing and they deliver fish on ice to the rice farmers of Lower Burma, whose diet is more monotonously rice-and-fish than is the case towards the interior. The Buddhist tradition causes Burmese to disrespect fishermen on the grounds that they are responsible for the destruction of many living creatures. From Tenasserim and Arakan, surplus fish is exported to Malaya and India respectively, the total value (over 1935–40) being of the order $115,000 annually, of which Malaya takes over three-quarters. In net trade Burma is a fish-deficit area, importing over $3½ million of fish (about 12,000 tons), 60 per cent from India.

Malaya.—About 100,000 tons of fish were regularly landed on Malayan coasts by some 20,000 fishing boats (1950) chiefly on the coasts of Selangor, Perak, Trengganu, Pahang and Penang. At Singapore heavy prewar landings were accounted for by the deep-sea trawl-fishing done by Japanese crews working at long range

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THE PEASANTRY OF SOUTH EAST ASIA [1]

PROFESSOR RAYMOND FIRTH, F.B.A.

000 IF it is not wholly true that the social and economic reconstruction which is so necessary in Asia today must begin with the peasant, it is certain that no programme which omits the peasant can be on firm foundations. The recent history of China is evidence enough for this. My concern, as a social anthropologist, is with the analysis and classification of social relations between people and groups of people, rather than with political or economic affairs as such, although inevitably I cannot dis-
128 regard them. So my aim is to show briefly some of the most important
121 aspects of the social organization of the South East Asian peasant communities, and of the values by which this organization works. Though the details in my paper refer mainly to Malaya and Indonesia, I think the generalizations have some value for the South East Asian region as a whole.

If the basic features of the peasant society are ignored, one can understand neither the peculiar tenacity which it still possesses in modern conditions, nor the reactions of its members to the increasing impact of ex-
121 ternal economic and political forces. The definition of a peasant is a
565 countryman—a man engaged in rural pursuits, primarily agriculture, with a comparatively simple technology and a special interest in the land he
463 works. In South East Asia one may extend the application of the term to
241 cover the majority of fishermen and even village craftsmen too. They are
● 226 of the same social class as the agriculturalists, and often members of the
32 same families. As occupational groups, they may even be separable only in theory, since many a peasant farmer is also a fisherman or craftsman by turns, as his seasonal cycle or his cash-needs influence him. What R. H. Tawney has said of agriculture—that it is at once a craft, a business, and a manner of life—can be applied more widely here; the problems of all these peasants alike are partly technical, partly financial and commercial, and partly cultural and social.

162 It is difficult to say just what proportion of the present population of
565 South East Asia may be classed as peasants. It would seem that in nearly
241 every South East Asian country two-thirds or more of the total population
463 is to be found in agricultural communities, tilling the soil. In 1930 the
32 census of Java and Madura in Indonesia gave about 70 per cent of the male
462 workers as dependent for their livelihood on native agricultural output, and about 75 per cent in the regions of Indonesia outside Java and Madura, while large numbers of women were engaged in home craft production. In Siam, in about 1930, almost 90 per cent of the population lived in agricultural communities, rice production providing the living of about 80 per

[1] Originally delivered at a meeting at Chatham House on 21 February 1950.

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on the average, or only between one-third and one-half of the average in Japan.

Moreover, in any comparison between South East Asia and the peasantry of Europe, quite apart from differences in the production of crops other than the staple grain, there is an important difference in the average size of the holdings worked. The South East Asian peasant has fewer acres than the peasantry of Europe. In France, a country of peasant agriculture, about 40 per cent of the total number of agricultural holdings in 1931 were less than 2½ acres apiece; the average size of this group of holdings was 1½ acres each. But about 45 per cent of the total holdings were between 2½ and 22½ acres, with an average of about 10 acres each. There are areas in South East Asia where the average size of peasant holdings is fairly large. In Cochin China, while 72 per cent of the landowners have holdings between 2½ and 12 acres, there are provinces where more than half of them have holdings above 12 acres in size. In Siam, too, the average peasant holding seems of tolerable size—4 acres or so in the south and north east, 5½ acres in the north, and 10½ acres in central Siam, where more than one-third of the rural families live. But in Java, in 1938, the average size of holdings was only just over 2 acres for all tax-paying landowners in the country. In the Tonkin delta of Indo-China, another large area of heavy concentration of peasantry, as much as 60 per cent of the peasants have been reckoned to own holdings of less than nine-tenths of an acre, and 90 per cent to have holdings of under 4½ acres apiece. It has been estimated that a peasant family needs for adequate support 2½ to 5 acres of land, cultivating it by 'wet rice' methods. Many sections of the farming population in Java and Indo-China, for instance, are obviously well below this critical level. Even though large-scale irrigation and very intensive land use, including double cropping of rice in the year and much use of secondary crops, may lower the critical figure considerably, the peasant in such conditions is always liable to have to seek work outside his holding or to put up with inadequate living standards, even in nutrition.

The difficulties of agriculture in such conditions are further increased by the fact that a man's holding is often not a single undivided farm, but a set of dispersed fields, some of very small size. This dispersion and fragmentation of holdings allows for some advantages in adapting crops to soil and water variations, and is some security against wholesale raids by pests, but it makes for technical difficulties in the use of implements and labour on any scale. Since the dispersion is due primarily to traditional customs of inheritance and marriage, efforts to secure consolidation are apt to be only of temporary benefit, though some success has attended administrative action against undue fragmentation.

The same comparatively low level of productivity is seen in fishing, which gives the one great source of animal protein to the South East Asian peasant's diet. Before the war a Malay peasant fisherman produced on the average 1½ tons of fish per head per annum and in 1947 nearly 1 ton per

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433 annum. Productivity in the British fishing industry was, and probably still
226 is, at least eight times as great per man. In the United States' fishing in-
565 dustry it is much greater still. This immensely greater productivity per man is of course achieved only by a much heavier use of capital equipment. Technological investment, then, is an obvious method of trying to raise peasant production.

434 Peasant income in this region is thus low by most standards. Adequate
511 information about this is lacking, but there is no reason to doubt the indi-
565 cative character of what has been collected. For instance, an inquiry in Java in 1926 showed that over 60 per cent of the people had in cash and in kind incomes of less than £12 10s. a year (150 Dutch florins), and 80 per cent had incomes of less than £25 a year (300 florins). In Malaya in 1940 I calculated that the fishermen of the east coast earned on the average about £12 a year. This does not mean much without consideration of the prices of goods on which the income was spent. But any such comparison would soon make it clear that a man with such an income was hard put to it to keep his family in comfort. Cash incomes have risen steeply during and since the war, but so have the prices of consumer goods, and many peasants are probably rather worse off than before, unless they have been able to sell rice or other scarcity goods.

433 The peasant economy of South East Asia uses abundant labour and has
565 a low level of capital equipment. Even then, owing to lack of efficient
461 organization, one can point to a great amount of unused man-hours. Yet these features must not be over-stressed. It is common to blame the peasant for a *dolce far niente* attitude, and attribute his poverty to his idleness. What J. Johnston Abraham, the author of the well-known travel book, *Surgeon's Log*,[1] wrote forty years ago of the Malay is often quoted in essence still:

> The Malay . . . has the aristocratic contempt for toil . . . [he] is of all things a philosopher. He squats in the warm sun and chews betel contentedly. He sees the obvious foolishness of working in a country too hot for toil, when the earth is so prolific that a fortnight's leisurely labour will produce food for a year, and the water is so plentifully supplied with fish that an hour, in the cool of the evening with a net, will supply luxury for a fortnight.

Anyone who has lived among the Malay peasantry and has seen their back-breaking work of rice-planting, or their long hours at sea in the broiling sun hauling the nets for fish, will know what a parody this is. The working rhythm of the Asiatic peasant is different from that of the European. The economic system is not well enough geared to alternative employment when technical hitches occur in his ordinary occupation. But the peasant is not simply thriftless of his time and his money. He plans with care his ploughing, sowing, weeding, and harvesting; he is assiduous in searching for fodder for his animals, in watering his vegetable garden, in repairing his fishing-boat or his net. If he can scrape together some extra cash above the daily needs of his family, he may spend it on clothes for his child or jewellery

[1] London, Chapman & Hall (14th rev. ed., 1920), pp. 69–70.

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Chapter Twenty-three

THE FISHERIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Fish Population

136 Because equatorial waters have low salinity and low oxygen content, it has frequently been assumed that they have a low fish population. That view is difficult to maintain for the shallow waters of Southeast Asia where, according to Herre, the number of kinds of fish and their diversification is unrivalled by that of any other marine region. Whether this paradox disproves the theoretical view about equatorial seas or shows that the fish population depends more on the local supply of nutrients which so broken and well-watered a region as Southeast Asia discharges to the sea in extraordinarily large quantities, has yet to be demonstrated. There is no co-ordinated study of the fishing industry as a whole in this region.

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Until recently, only the generic character of these Southeast Asia fish had been studied, from which it appears that, while by no means all of them have been named and identified, over 1,500 varieties are normally fished round Java, over 500 have been named as economically valuable round Malaya, and similar large varieties are reported from all territories. Most of the fish known are inshore fish, closely dependent on food particles carried from shore to sea and on the great growth of plankton, seaweeds and corals which supply fish food. Because the shores of the landmasses in most of this region are frequently backed by swamps, there is a very considerable fish population on the land surface itself, in a gradual transition between shallow water marine fish and swamp or riverine fish. Thus the fishing industry is not merely an inshore activity: it continues very vigorously inland, in the swamps, in the flooded paddyfields and their canals, in the lakes and lagoons, and in the rivers.

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[228] Though the deep-water fish of Southeast Asia have only in recent years been exploited commercially, by Japanese trawlers, they exist in these waters in surprising numbers. Schools of sardines some 10 miles long have been seen, together with frequent

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great shoals of mackerel and bonito. Porpoises (mammals which live on fish and are a guide to the fish density) have been seen in a school which packed an area 15 miles long and 2 miles broad. Plankton occurs at times in astounding quantities, practically smothering all other fish life in the neighbourhood. The movements and migrations of these fish of deeper waters have been little studied and the inshore fishing has been enough to meet local food needs, as well as not demanding too complex a technique or too great a capital outlay by the local fishermen who are generally very few, and too poor to equip themselves for long distance deepwater trips. A major impediment to introducing the elaborate systems of trawling and seining which have been developed in temperate seas is the frequency of coral reefs and knolls which, although attracting fish, catch the nets and ruin them.

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Freshwater Fishing

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For most Southeast Asia countries information about the significance of fishing activities is sketchy, although in every case fish ranks high in the basic foodstuffs. The total activity in fishing is enormous; probably 3 million people are engaged in Southeast Asia fishing and the amount of internal trade in fish must total far higher than so widely dispersed and so little commercialised an industry might at first suggest. There is always a substantial movement of fish in various forms from the coasts to the interiors and from one territory to another, as the following points indicate:

Burma.—That Burmese developed their tradition well in the interior may explain why it is only in Arakan and Tenasserim there has been intensive sea fishing. Within the Irrawaddy distributaries South Indians have taken to fishing and they deliver fish on ice to the rice farmers of Lower Burma, whose diet is more monotonously rice-and-fish than is the case towards the interior. The Buddhist tradition causes Burmese to disrespect fishermen on the grounds that they are responsible for the destruction of many living creatures. From Tenasserim and Arakan, surplus fish is exported to Malaya and India respectively, the total value (over 1935–40) being of the order $115,000 annually, of which Malaya takes over three-quarters. In net trade Burma is a fish-deficit area, importing over $3½ million of fish (about 12,000 tons), 60 per cent from India.

Malaya.—About 100,000 tons of fish were regularly landed on Malayan coasts by some 20,000 fishing boats (1950) chiefly on the coasts of Selangor, Perak, Trengganu, Pahang and Penang. At Singapore heavy prewar landings were accounted for by the deep-sea trawl-fishing done by Japanese crews working at long range

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438 among the remoter islands and off Borneo. In addition to this home production, over $9 million of fish (1947) was imported dry 228 from the East Indies, Siam and Indochina, mainly as part of Singapore's entrepôt trade; only a small portion of this import was consumed in Malaya.

In Malaya and Burma pond cultivation has been negligible.

East Indies.—In Java intensive fishing is carried on, though its coast is small in proportion to its population and production has rapidly become inadequate, in contrast with the thinly-peopled coastlines of Sumatra, Celebes and Borneo. Java's fishing concentrates upon the northwest coast where 21,000 tons were caught in 1940; farther east along the north coast fishing diminishes. A large part of the catch moves to West Java and the Outer Islands for the plantation workers. Since 1900 the interest in fishing declined until Java became no longer self-supporting in fish and imported from Siam and Indochina which together supplied about 45,000 tons annually in the seasons 1938–40.

To establish commercialised fishing in the Outer Islands was no easy matter, but in Sumatra and Borneo a start had been made. At Bagansiapiapi about 12,000 Chinese had established a large fishery producing annually about 35,000 tons of fish which went to Java (60 per cent), Singapore, Penang and Malacca. To salt the fish nearly 20,000 tons of salt moved into Bagansiapiapi. In Borneo, Soekadana on the west and Pegaban and Kotabaru on the east were fishing centres, supplying the interior and exporting yearly about 4,000 tons of dried fish to Java; Macassar functions as a market for pearl and shell fishing and for the *abalone* (Holothuria) catch of the eastern seas besides exporting annually about 1,300 tons of *agar agar* (a seaweed for jellies).

To Java and Madoera just before the war 49,000 tons of cheap fish were imported from Siam and Indochina by way of Singapore, 46,000 tons from East Sumatra, and 8,000 tons from other Outer Islands. The home catch of sea fisheries totalled about 94,000 tons per annum, and fish weighing nearly 30,000 tons (1947) was obtained from ponds and rivers. Lake Tempe (South Celebes) has been intensively developed for inland fishing and 3,000 tons of dried and salted fish were exported from that district in 1946.

Indochina.—Although the physiography of the Indochina coast appears to favour sea fishing, yet coastal fishing interests local people less than the inland fisheries. A luminant oil for peasants

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is extracted from Indochinese fish. Salt water fishing produced 150,000 tons annually before the war. Only along the Annam coast, particularly near deeper waters round Tanh Hoa, is inshore fishing very active on the basis of trawling and seining, which are unusual styles for Southeast Asia. The Cambodian coast, meeting place of migrant fish from the Mekong mouth and the Siamese and Kra coasts, produces fish of exceptional size. The Mekong distributaries are also considerably fished to supply the Saigon and Cochinchina markets. Of the freshwater fishing that in Tonle Sap is the best known and most productive, but there are others well developed in the streams of Tonkin and along the Mekong, where oxbow lakes and artificial ponds are used for seasonal fish cultivation.

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Fish products rank high in Indochina's exports, though valued only at one per cent of the total exports. Shipments usually go to Malaya and averaged 37,000 tons per annum for the period 1939–41, but they were valued at $2 million in 1950.

Siam.—Every Siamese is said to eat some fish with every meal of rice. At any rate the Siamese consumption of fish is estimated to be larger than for any single Southeast Asia unit. Much of the fish comes from inland fisheries and the floods of the Chao Praya and the Nam Mun create natural ponds which last long enough to fatten many fish. These inland fisheries are not well documented. Fishing is taxed according to the implement used rather than in relation to the amount caught, yielding a revenue of $.9 million (1944). Siamese sea fishing provides that dried fish which is exported. Mackerel, sardine and pilchard types migrate along Siam's attenuated coast and they are exhaustively fished as a whole though individual fishing units are small and poorly organised. At certain seasons the sea offshore is almost solid with squid which are caught in large numbers for eating. Probably 43,000 tons of fish are annually salted on the coast for transport and trade, but poor organisation and careless salting with low-grade brine taken direct from the sea has given Siamese fish a low reputation; it ranks as the lowest grade of salt fish in Southeast Asia markets. The export usually ranks at about $2.5 million annually (100,000 tons 1941), going to Singapore, Penang and Hongkong, largely for re-export from those places. Because the local fish is inferior, higher grade fish are annually imported from surrounding areas to a value of some $1.5 million (1950). The fish

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trade was largely Chinese, but Japanese fishermen had pirated the coast for years, using large trawlers serving markets in Singapore and in Japan.

Philippines.—Fish is as important in Filipino diet as in that of peoples on the mainland, and it is likewise an inadequately documented phase of their activities. Only in 1939 was a census of fishing taken. The amount that went into inter-island trade was small compared with the catch and only 100 out of the 1,600 types of local edible fish were marketed. Filipino fishing resembles that elsewhere in Southeast Asia and both inshore and inland methods are used. In the last decade also, some deep fishing had developed and steam trawlers landed quantities of *bonito*. Deep-sea fishing centres on Batangas, Manila and Sulu, whereas the inshore types are most developed round Mindoro, Batangas and Bulacan. More than 90 per cent of inland fishing (from rivers, ponds and lakes) comes from Batangas, Bulacan, Laguna and Rizal. The Pampanga and Iloilo districts have many fish ponds. Pearl oysters are gathered sporadically round the Palawan and the Sulu Islands.

In 1939 about 180,000 Filipinos were fully engaged in fishing and another 200,000 fished part-time. The total catch was then valued at $150 million. Fish had no significance as an export and about 400,000 tons were imported in 1940.

Postwar Fishing

Casually organised and producing a poorly graded commodity Southeast Asia fishing has everywhere an important place in the diet of local people. The international trade in fish within the region has certain resemblances to the rice trade in direction, in variability from year to year, and in foreign monopolisation of the middleman function and trade organisation. On the other hand, the dispersed and loose organisation of Southeast Asia fishing proved an advantage in the war period. Its simplicity of operation, use of locally-made boats for fishing and bulk transport, and ease of replacement of locally-made equipment, meant it suffered lightly from the war.

The fish trade between Southeast Asia countries was, however, paralysed, owing to difficulties of procuring bulk salt supplies and of transport, but the rice-eating people in rural areas were not seriously deprived of their supplementary fish, so much of which was caught nearby. The large towns which once consumed fresh

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ing, cultivation. In contrast to this method, advanced agriculture is practiced year after year on the same well tended plot, the fertility of which is maintained by manuring, crop rotation, intensive cultivation, terracing, and often the regular addition of mineral matter in the form of silt deposited on the land by irrigation water. Only occasionally may the land be allowed a short fallow period. This type of tillage may be called permament-field, or sedentary, cultivation.[10]

Shifting cultivation and sedentary cultivation are generic terms used to describe fundamental differences in land use, differences that find their outward expression in the cultural landscape created by those who maintain these economies.[11] Can there be a greater contrast than that between the shifting cultivators' small, irregular, temporary clearings with their chaotic jumble of fallen and half-fallen tree trunks and stumps, on the one hand, and, on the other, an irrigated plain, subdivided into small fields, each surrounded by a dyke—or a steep slope where a succession of beautifully built terraces leads up for several hundreds or even thousands of feet? These kinds of landscape are physical expressions of totally different economies, or modes of life, with different cultural patterns, concepts of land tenure, attitudes toward the soil, and material equipment.

Historically, shifting cultivation without doubt antedates sedentary cultivation, which requires among other things more elaborate techniques and deeper insight into the relationships between soil, tillage, and yields.

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Shifting and sedentary cultivation may each be further classified in terms of tools, as we have seen, or in terms of crops, systems of rotation, and the like.[12] For instance, in terms of crops, we may distinguish between grain and grainless culture. Of the two, grainless culture is generally conceded to be the older. One argument for this thesis is that fruits and many of the root and leaf crops may be eaten raw or simply prepared, whereas cereals require more elaborate preparation. The fact that grainless agriculture is largely confined to the fringes of Southeastern Asia also supports the thesis that, at least in this region, grainless agriculture preceded the cultivation of cereals. Still further substantiation is found in Polynesia, where the inhabitants cultivated no cereals when they were first visited

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10 Although sedentary cultivation is commonly practiced by people who use plows drawn by animals, there are large areas where it is practiced with little or no use of the plow. Such areas are found in parts of the Philippines, Java, Sumatra, and southern China, where steep hillsides have been terraced and where the nature of the terrain makes the use of work animals impossible. Sometimes individual farms or patches of land are so small that they must be tilled with hoes, even though plows may be used on adjacent farms. In places custom and religious tradition forbid the use of plows and draft animals.

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12 For example, we may distinguish: (a) shifting dibble cultivation, shifting hoe cultivation, and shifting plow cultivation; (b) grainless shifting cultivation and shifting grain cultivation; (c) shifting field-forest cultivation and shifting field-grass cultivation; (d) permanent plow cultivation and permanent planting-stick cultivation; (e) permanent four-field cultivation, and so on. Not all of these are found in Southeastern Asia.

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000 part of the government and of missionaries to introduce terracing and wet-rice cultivation but, instead, continue to practice shifting cultivation and to depend upon dry rice as their staple food.

161 Wherever we find shifting cultivation the density of population is low; on the other hand, permanent cultivation provides the basis for higher
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243 It is thought that the cultivation of wet rice originated in days when the hoe and the dibble stick were the only agricultural tools, that is, before the
231 animal-drawn plow reached Southeastern Asia. The broadcasting of seeds is held to be characteristic of plow culture, whereas the cultivators of wet rice in Monsoon Asia generally plant their rice seedlings in the manner of shifting cultivators,[29] a circumstance that would seem to support the hypothesis that the carabao and the plow were not a part of the original technique but were adopted later. Even today wet rice is raised in some parts of Southeastern Asia without the use of the plow. For example, peoples in central Celebes prepare their fields for cultivation by driving carabaos back and forth until the fields are thoroughly puddled.[30] In other areas where wet-rice fields are built on such steep slopes that it is impossible to get carabaos to the terraces, farmers are frequently obliged to till their land entirely by hand—employing only such tools as wooden spades and sticks, which may be shod with iron. The Ifugaos of northern Luzon, for example, have terrace walls reaching, in some cases, heights of 60 feet or more that can be scaled only by means of rocks jutting out from the faces of the walls.

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[29] Although rice growers in other parts of the world generally use the broadcast method of sowing, one finds it in Southeastern Asia only as a rare exception. According to Copeland (*op. cit.*, p. 224) the *sabog*, or broadcasting method, is used in the Philippines over a rather limited area. This method produces lower yields but its advantages are "some saving of time, saving the labour of transplanting, and the possibility of maturing a crop with less water; rice grown directly in its place can get along with less water than transplanted rice." According to Kruyt ("De To Rongkong in Midden-Celebes," 1920, p. 380), the To Rongkong of central Celebes transplant their wet rice only in exceptional cases but usually broadcast it.

[30] Kruyt: "De To Seko in Midden-Celebes," 1920, p. 409.

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Although most sedentary cultivators in Southeastern Asia make use of the animal-drawn plow, in the densely populated regions the parcelling of land has proceeded so far that many peasants, whose fathers, or ancestors, owned draft animals (carabaos or oxen) and used plows, have farms so diminished in size that they cannot afford to keep draft animals and therefore must till their fields entirely with hand tools. In spite of the fact that they often make very intensive use of their fields, still they are not able to produce enough to meet the modest needs of their families. 241 231 311

In nearly all instances, however, where the governments concerned have attempted to solve this problem by opening up land suitable for sedentary cultivation to settlers coming from problem areas, the governments have been confronted by the fact that these districts, which might offer outlets for the congested areas, are inhabited by shifting cultivators or in some cases by food gatherers. The danger is then that the proposed migration may infringe upon the rights of the indigenous peoples, whose economy and mode of life, as we have noticed, require considerably more land than those of the incoming settlers, who are accustomed to permanent-field cultivation. It is, therefore, necessary for us to understand the various forms of land use in Southeastern Asia and their peculiar exigencies in order rationally to approach the problems of pioneering in the countries around the South China Sea. 311 241 166

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estation is not a discovery of Western-trained scientists but has long been practiced by certain groups in Southeastern Asia. It was the plan of the government to spread and enforce this practice of artificial reforestation wherever advisable. This practice, whereby the cultivator determines the vegetative cover during the fallow period instead of abandoning the ladang to chance growth, brings him to a transition stage between shifting cultivation and permanent cultivation. From there the step to permanent cultivation with crop rotation is but a short one.

Permanent cultivation requires repeated tilling and therefore more labor and tools than the shifting cultivator is accustomed to. Work animals are also desirable. An important obstacle to intensification of agriculture in wide areas of Southeastern Asia, however, is the fact that hill and mountain regions [up to about 1500 meters in elevation] are frequently infested with malaria so that the energy of the people is greatly reduced.[45] Moreover, the acquisition of such implements as plows, harrows, and hoes, and especially of work animals, calls for financial resources or credit, both of which the average shifting cultivator lacks. Some shifting cultivators do own livestock, such as cattle or carabaos, but utilize neither their labor nor their manure. Groups of the Mois in the mountains of Annam have carabaos, but they do not use the animals in their agricultural activities because they "cannot talk" to them.[46] On the Lesser Sunda Islands livestock is kept because it gives social prestige to the owner. Overstocking of the pasture areas on these islands has led to overgrazing and has cut into the forest area until there has developed a scarcity of land suitable for ladang cultivation. The same has happened in large areas in Africa. There it has been necessary to teach the native peasant the use of cattle and make him familiar with the plow. This was done successfully in northern Nigeria by combining the animal husbandry of the nomadic Fulani with the indigenous shifting cultivation of the Hausa peasant, thus developing "a system of permanent farming whereby a man with cattle of his own, say two working oxen and a few cows, can plough and maintain in fertility an area of land sufficient to supply all the requirements of himself and his family, and to obtain a surplus balance as a return for his labour. . . . Thus mixed farming represents a gradual evolution from the shifting methods of cultivation to a static type of agriculture, by the introduction of animal husbandry, and with the use of animal cultivation."[47] Above all, the peasant learns to preserve the animal manure and

a shade tree; *Dolichos lablab* L., a climbing herb which is valuable as a vegetable; *Crotolaria anagyroides* H.B. and K., a bush of vigorous growth which attains a height of from 12 to 14 feet and forms an excellent green manure; *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., low shrubs useful as green manures; and *Mimosa invisa* Mart., a leguminous creeper which suppresses grasses.

[45] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 181 and 350.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 354.

[47] King: "Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1939, p. 271. See also Faulkner and Mackie: West African Agriculture, 1933; and by the same authors: "The Introduction of Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1936, pp. 89–96.

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241 to apply it regularly to his fields in order to keep up the fertility which formerly was restored through long forest fallow. This animal fertilizer
231 is more important than the help the peasant gets from his animals in the
185 way of labor. Thus the area to be cultivated may be limited by the amount of manure available, rather than by the extent of land that can be plowed.

Van Beukering, in his summary of the results of the ladang *enquête*, is of the opinion that similar practices should be introduced in the Outer Islands of the Netherlands Indies; but the pasture problem must first be carefully studied before mixed farming can be widely established in the Indies. Where animal manure is not available, the composting of vegetable waste, or even of crops grown for this specific purpose, supplies an excellent fertilizer.

The intensification and modification of shifting cultivation are less difficult in flat country than on sloping land where there is the hazard of soil erosion. Perhaps the most obvious solution would be to move the population from mountainous land to the plains and valley floors, but this can be done only in areas where population density is low. In Southeastern Asia [162] the density of population on the plains is usually so high that, should it be possible to bring malaria under control, a movement from the plains to the uplands and mountains would be desirable rather than a migration in the opposite direction. Another solution would be to have the shifting cultivator plant permanent tree crops to protect the soil against accelerated erosion. Steep slopes which now produce but a single moderate rice crop every few years could be made more productive if planted with perennials. The cultivator could then buy his staple food with the money obtained from the sale of the crops harvested from his trees.

000 The speed with which the change from shifting cultivation to permanent cultivation may be made will depend both on the geographical environment and the cultural level of the community. Shifting cultivators with permanent villages and a regularly established rotation of fields will respond much more readily to a reform brought from the outside than a group that is always ready to abandon its dwellings and move to a new locality.

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241 to a group, the individuals of which choose or are given, every now and again, different portions to cultivate for themselves.

231 Within Southeast Asia the shifting cultivation system has no relation to the needs of domesticated animals. There is no evidence here that the simpler tribes have been primarily cattle grazers, except in so far as all Mongoloid types coming south overland

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FIG. 111.—The Accessibility of Southeast Asia by Land

231 from the grazing grounds of Tibet and farther north may, at remote times outside this territory, have been associated with animals. Inside Southeast Asia, cattle do not fit well into the ecology of climate, vegetation and pests, and the disinterest in animals has become part of the religious tradition; Buddhists and Hindus do not eat beef, Muslims will not eat pork and even the primitive animists have similar inhibitions. Wherever today there has grown up a cattle system, it relates to the ploughing needs and is concerned with buffaloes or small oxen and does not derive from an earlier tradition of cattle farming or nomadism.

241 Shifting cultivation is a system well adapted to large empty areas where soils are poor and the rate of soil erosion high. As soon as population increases, shifting cultivation, which needs each cutover area to stand unused for 7 to 10 years before being

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[For comparison of systems of land tenure in Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Sumatra, Java, Borneo and of the hill tribes of India with that of Malaya, see Source 58: Maxwell, pp. 82-89, category 116, AN1 Malaya. --Analyst]

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During untold centuries in which they collected plant matter, women acquired an intimate knowledge of vegetable life. Eduard Hahn and others have therefore reasoned that women were the inventors of the cultivation of plants and hence were the first food producers. Hahn has given the name *Hackbau* (hoe culture or hoe tillage) to primitive cultivation, and maintains that the hoe is woman's implement; he draws a sharp distinction between Hackbau and more advanced cultivation, which he calls *Pflugbau* (plow culture or plow tillage) and ascribes to men.[9] It is indeed true that men generally farm with plows and that many examples may be cited of women using hoes; nevertheless, there are so many instances of male primitive cultivators employing hoes or similar instruments that Hahn's classification should be modified. While there seems to be no reason for abandoning his theory of the invention of plant cultivation by women, the classification of cultivation by tools, such as the hoe and the plow, ascribed to one sex or the other, is unsatisfactory. For, in spite of the fact that the collection of vegetable matter is almost exclusively the woman's task in the gathering economy, among primitive cultivators men either assist women in the cultivation of plants or entirely take over this activity whenever hunting or fishing become less important than soil tillage. Furthermore, many primitive cultivators do not use the hoe, but continue to employ the digging stick, characteristically used by the food-gathering women. From Formosa southward throughout the Malay Archipelago, as well as on the mainland of Southeastern Asia, the digging stick, also known as the dibble stick or planting stick, is frequently used by the primitive cultivator. On the other hand, there are advanced cultivators who till their land intensively with hoes; they use manure, rotate their crops, terrace fields that lie on slopes, and practice irrigation, yet they do not use plows drawn by draft animals (however, in some instances they have livestock). In other words, advanced agriculture does not depend upon the animal-drawn plow nor does primitive agriculture depend upon the hoe.

A more fundamental distinction between primitive and advanced agriculture may be made in terms of land use rather than of tools. Primitive cultivators, with the possible exception of those living in arid regions, raise one or two crops on a given plot of land, then abandon the plot and make a new field, preferably in the forest, so that the old plot lies fallow sometimes for many years and may itself revert to forest; in short, primitive cultivators shift the place of their agricultural activities with regularity. The crop land consists of small patches scattered throughout the forest; these patches are extremely ragged in appearance and do not look at all like fields. A primitive cultivator would never think of removing stumps and fallen trees; instead, he deliberately raises his crop among them. This kind of cultivation is best described as shifting-field, or shift-

[9] Hahn: Das Alter der wirtschaftlichen Kultur, 1905; idem: Die Entstehung der Pflugkultur, 1909; idem: Von der Hacke zum Pflug, 1914; Kolff: "Hahn's hypothese," 1926, pp. 884–907.

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by Westerners. This may be explained by the assumption that the ancestors of the Polynesians migrated from Southeastern Asia to the islands of the Pacific before cereals had replaced root crops as dominant plants.[13] 174

In Southeastern Asia we find both shifting and sedentary cultivators who depend exclusively upon root crops as a source of starch. The Nias, Mentawei, and Engano islanders off the western coast of Sumatra grew no grains until recently. Beside such root crops as taro (*Colocasia esculenta* Schott), yams (*Dioscorea* sp.), and *bira* (*Alocasia macrorhiza* (L.) Schott), they cultivated such other foods as bananas (*Musa sapientum* L.), sugar cane (*Saccharum officinarum* L.), and coconuts (*Cocos nucifera* L.). In the eastern parts of the Malay Archipelago and New Guinea the inhabitants depend chiefly on the starch of the sago palm (*Metroxylon sagu* Rottb.) which they either plant or collect in the wild state. Here, again, taro, yams, and bira are other sources of starch, as are such imported American plants as cassava (*Manihot utilissima* Pohl) and sweet potatoes (*Ipomoea batatas* Poir.). The folklore and religious practices of many tribes in Borneo and Celebes who today grow cereals recall the time when these tribes had only root crops. 24b 137 262

In many parts of the Pacific taro is grown by sedentary cultivators on terraced, flooded fields.[14] We do not know whether the techniques of terracing and irrigation developed independently in Oceania and on the mainland, or whether the ancestors of the Polynesians brought their techniques with them from Southeastern Asia. If the latter be true, they must have left before the cultivation of rice was known to them; otherwise rice would have been among their crops. That it was not among them suggests that 000

[13] Forde: Habitat, Economy and Society, 1934, pp. 428–430. In remote centuries the Polynesians lived in the Malay Archipelago, where they cultivated such root crops as taro, yams, "arrowroot" (*Canna orientalis* Rosc.), and turmeric (*Curcuma* sp.), in addition to bananas and plantains (*Musa paradisiaca* L.), breadfruit (*Artocarpus communis* Forst.) and coconuts, all of which, according to the botanists, are natives of the forest regions of Southeastern Asia, whether the mainland or the Malayan Archipelago. All these plants were probably carried to Polynesia, either via a northern route through Micronesia or by a more southerly course through New Guinea and Melanesia. See Buck: Vikings of the Sunrise, 1938, pp. 305–309. The names of these plants were also carried into the islands of the Pacific. Variants of the names "taro" and "bira," to mention two examples, range from the Malay Archipelago far into Oceania. *Colocasia* is *talo* in Nias, *tales* in Sundanese, *tales* in Javanese, *dalo* in Fiji, *talo* in Samoan, *kalo* in Hawaiian, *taro* in Maori. *Alocasia* is known as *birah* or *bira* in Batak, *bira* in Madurese, *biga* in the Philippines, *piga* in Guam, and *via* in Fiji. Later, the Polynesians, following the example of other peoples of the Pacific, were quick to adopt such New World crops as cassava and sweet potatoes as well as American fruit trees into their economy because these are closely related to their customary crops, but they still remain most reluctant to change from roots to grains as staple, possibly because "the cultivation of roots and fruit trees has little technical relation to the raising of grains, for they are not grown from seed but from eyes and cuttings." See Forde: *op. cit.*, p. 380. Another illustration of the fact that a plant, the introduction of which involves a change in methods of cultivation, is accepted only under pressure, is found in the history of the introduction of the potato into Europe. [137]

[14] Krämer: "Der Taro und die Nasskultur," 1928, pp. 165–172; Rivers: "Irrigation and the Cultivation of Taro," 1926, pp. 262–287.

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000 taro had been cultivated on permanent flooded fields earlier than had rice. Another possibility would be that taro, together with the technique of irrigation, was introduced into Oceania later than were the yams and alocasia, and the Polynesians' more important fruit trees.

173 A folktale of the Bontocs in the mountains of northern Luzon furnishes us with another clue. According to Bontoc lore, their hero, Lumauig, taught them agriculture in a tiny irrigated garden, which is still tended from generation to generation by a special priest. The crop of this garden is taro and not rice.[15] This would seem to lend support not only to the thesis that the cultivation of root crops preceded that of grain but also to the thesis that terracing and irrigation were already being practiced by cultivators of root crops.

241 A beautiful example of sedentary cultivation with root crops as a staple has recently been discovered in the remote Grand Valley of the Balim River in the highlands of Netherlands New Guinea. On the valley floor of the Balim and its tributaries neolithic people practice intensive cultivation, including such techniques as the use of green and animal manure, deep tillage with stone adzes, the digging of ditches to improve the run-off and drainage of swampy land, and the construction of terraces.[16] On the slopes they practice shifting cultivation. In both their shifting and their sedentary agriculture the staple crop is the sweet potato, while taro is a secondary crop. Also subsidiary are bananas, sugar cane, and pandanus.

243 105 [137] In most parts of Southeastern Asia, however, root crops have been replaced by such cereals as millet, Job's tears, upland and lowland rice,[17] and maize. There seem to be good reasons to believe that the first cereals cultivated in Southeastern Asia under the system of shifting cultivation were foxtail, also known as Italian millet (*Setaria italica* Beauv.), and Job's tears (*Coix lacryma-jobi* L.). Before their domestication these grasses, like the root crops and fruit trees of Southeastern Asia, had been used by alithic and palaeolithic hunting and gathering people. Shifting cultivators succeeded in domesticating these plants by selecting over the course of years the species most valuable to them. Although foxtail and Job's tears have largely been replaced by the more valuable grains, rice and maize, there are still shifting cultivators in India, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya, the Indies, and the Philippines who raise the former cereals. Burkill says of foxtail,

> Such a crop as this probably came into cultivation before man had settled enough to grow the better cereals. Its grain ripens in even as little as two months and a half from sowing, and the wandering tribes of the Malay forests are able to remain in one neighbourhood long enough to catch a crop: but the usual duration of the crop seems to be four months.[18]

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15 Keesing and Keesing: Taming Philippine Headhunters, 1934, p. 56.

16 Brass: "Stone Age Agriculture in New Guinea," 1941, pp. 555–569.

17 Upland rice is also known as hill, mountain, dry-land, or dry, rice; lowland rice is also known as irrigated, wet-land, or wet, rice.

18 Burkill: *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 1999.

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000 The areas where wet rice was first cultivated were probably hollows and small valleys and the well watered slopes of low hills rather than the great plains and wide valleys that are today the rice granaries of the world. The utilization of extensive plains and broad river valleys for the cultivation of wet rice requires a social organization unknown to the peoples who first began wet-rice culture.

243 It is thought that the cultivation of wet rice originated in days when the
231 hoe and the dibble stick were the only agricultural tools, that is, before the animal-drawn plow reached Southeastern Asia. The broadcasting of seeds is held to be characteristic of plow culture, whereas the cultivators of wet rice in Monsoon Asia generally plant their rice seedlings in the manner of shifting cultivators,[29] a circumstance that would seem to support the hypothesis that the carabao and the plow were not a part of the original technique but were adopted later. Even today wet rice is raised in some parts of Southeastern Asia without the use of the plow. For example, peoples in central Celebes prepare their fields for cultivation by driving carabaos back and forth until the fields are thoroughly puddled.[30] In other areas where wet-rice fields are built on such steep slopes that it is impossible to get carabaos to the terraces, farmers are frequently obliged to till their land entirely by hand—employing only such tools as wooden spades and sticks, which may be shod with iron. The Ifugaos of northern Luzon, for example, have terrace walls reaching, in some cases, heights of 60 feet or more that can be scaled only by means of rocks jutting out from the faces of the walls.

000 Although most sedentary cultivators in Southeastern Asia make use of

[29] Although rice growers in other parts of the world generally use the broadcast method of sowing, one finds it in Southeastern Asia only as a rare exception. According to Copeland (*op. cit.*, p. 224) the *sabog*, or broadcasting method, is used in the Philippines over a rather limited area. This method produces lower yields but its advantages are "some saving of time, saving the labour of transplanting, and the possibility of maturing a crop with less water; rice grown directly in its place can get along with less water than transplanted rice." According to Kruyt (" De To Rongkong in Midden-Celebes," 1920, p. 380), the To Rongkong of central Celebes transplant their wet rice only in exceptional cases but usually broadcast it.

[30] Kruyt: "De To Seko in Midden-Celebes," 1920, p. 409.

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Although most sedentary cultivators in Southeastern Asia make use of the animal-drawn plow, in the densely populated regions the parcelling of land has proceeded so far that many peasants, whose fathers, or ancestors, owned draft animals (carabaos or oxen) and used plows, have farms so diminished in size that they cannot afford to keep draft animals and therefore must till their fields entirely with hand tools. In spite of the fact that they often make very intensive use of their fields, still they are not able to produce enough to meet the modest needs of their families. 241 231 311

In nearly all instances, however, where the governments concerned have attempted to solve this problem by opening up land suitable for sedentary cultivation to settlers coming from problem areas, the governments have been confronted by the fact that these districts, which might offer outlets for the congested areas, are inhabited by shifting cultivators or in some cases by food gatherers. The danger is then that the proposed migration may infringe upon the rights of the indigenous peoples, whose economy and mode of life, as we have noticed, require considerably more land than those of the incoming settlers, who are accustomed to permanent-field cultivation. It is, therefore, necessary for us to understand the various forms of land use in Southeastern Asia and their peculiar exigencies in order rationally to approach the problems of pioneering in the countries around the South China Sea. 311 241 166

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[See pp. 35 ff., category 241 or 116. -- Analyst]

Chapter II

THE SHIFTING CULTIVATOR [p 16]

241 361 311 The field of the shifting cultivator is known by various local terms. It is called *caiñgin* in the Philippines, *humah* in Java, *ladang* in the Indies as a whole and in Malaya, *taungya* in Burma, *tamrai* in Thailand, and *rây* in Indochina.[1] Practically without exception, it is a clearing in either primeval or second-growth forest. The use of grassland is so unusual that we shall limit the following discussion to shifting cultivation on forest land.

As his name indicates, the shifting cultivator does not use the same piece of land every year; instead, he kills or cuts down at regular intervals —every year, every other year, or every third year—the trees of a small forest patch. He burns as much of the woody growth as is possible or convenient. Among the charred stumps and half-burned tree trunks he plants his favorite crops, be they cereals such as millet, upland rice, or maize; or tubers such as yams or sweet potatoes (Figs. 4–10). The latter are planted extensively by the *caiñgero*, the shifting cultivator in the Philippines. In planting cereals it is usually the men who take the planting stick to make little holes and the women who drop in a few seeds, using their feet to cover the seed with soil (Figs. 11–13). As forest land is generally free from weeds or grasses and the soil is usually rich in humus and well supplied with the ash of burned plant matter after clearing, it produces a very good, or even excellent, first harvest; the second harvest begins to show a decline in yield, and thereafter the returns diminish rapidly.[2] Grasses and weeds invade the clearing. Rather than battle these, the peasant abandons his old ladang and cuts and burns a new patch of forest (Fig. 15). The old plot reverts, under favorable conditions, to second-growth forest, the so-called *blukar* of the Malays, and is not cleared again for a period, the length of which may vary from 8 to 15 years, or more.

[243 462] [134]

Shifting cultivation is characterized by a lack of tillage; the soil is hardly disturbed, as no plow turns it. There is less labor involved than in other methods of cultivation, and the work is more evenly spread over the year—an advantage where labor is relatively scarce. The tasks involved are cutting, burning, and planting; sometimes simple fencing of the field against animals, guarding—especially before the harvest and usually by women and children—and, finally, harvesting. In addition, there may be some weeding in the first year and certainly during the second.

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1 In British India *jhum*, *kumri*, *dhya*, *bewar*, or *dullee;* in Ceylon *chena;* in Japan, Korea, and Formosa *karen* (a Japanese term); in Central America *milpa;* in parts of Africa *chitemene*.

2 Danhof reports for parts of the Lampoeng Districts that a ladang will produce from 15 to 25 quintals of rice in the first year and approximately 5 in the second year. In areas where the second yield shows such a serious decline the peasants usually prefer to make a new ladang—Danhof: "Bijdrage," 1940, p. 199.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
1 [See pp. 37 ff., category 241 or 116.--Analyst]

Shifting cultivation, the most primitive type of agriculture, may be briefly defined as an economy of which the main characteristics are rotation of fields rather than of crops; clearing by means of fire; absence of draft animals and of manuring; use of human labor only; employment of the dibble stick or hoe; short periods of soil occupancy alternating with long fallow periods. Other terms for shifting cultivation are field-forest economy and field-forest rotation. 241 361 311

Shifting cultivators prefer flat land, but in Formosa, the Philippines, Indochina, and Thailand they have been forced back into the hills and mountains and must often be content with fields on steep slopes (Figs. 16, 17). This has led some observers to believe that shifting cultivation is exclusively practiced in hilly or mountainous regions, or that such regions are preferred in this economy. However, in the Outer Islands[3] of the Netherlands Indies, one frequently finds ladangs in flat country (Fig. 18). If the ladang is very steep it is rarely used for more than one crop, so that new clearings must be made every year.

Many shifting cultivators no longer change their dwellings when they turn to new land; they have become sedentary at least as far as their houses are concerned. They may build a hut in the ladang if it is too far away from their village and may occasionally live in such a shelter, especially at the time when the ripening crop has to be guarded against animals, but they will return with the harvest to their permanent houses in the village (Figs. 10, 19–21).

Ladang culture, as is frequently true of any form of agriculture, is intricately interwoven with religion. Magic practices and sacrificial offerings must accompany every step in the culture, even if the people are no longer pagans but, for example, Mohammedans. Friedericy has made a careful study of these magical-religious customs in the Ponre mountains at the head of the Gulf of Bone in southern Celebes.[4] In this region the people live in small permanent villages. Whenever they are in need of new ladangs—every second year—the heads of the families meet to choose new locations. At this stage they try to find out from the spirits if these agree to the clearing of the land that was selected. For this purpose the village headman (*dukun*), or somebody else who is familiar with magic, is sent out to the part of the forest that has been chosen. Here the delegate places betel leaves (*Piper betle* L.), each with a small slab of lime and a piece of areca nut (*Areca catechu* L.), under a tree and expresses the desire of his community to cut the trees and to use the soil. He ends with the wish that the betel leaves and the areca nuts be scattered should the choice 241 787 [361] [824]

[3] I have used the term "Outer Islands" to denote all the islands of the Netherlands Indies not comprised in the jurisdiction of Java and Madura (Madoera). The Dutch administrative term is *Buitengewesten*.

[4] Friedericy: "Ponre," 1932, pp. 1–34; idem: "De taak van het bestuur," 1937, pp. 488–501. For an excellent description of the magical-religious rites that are associated with the agricultural efforts of the Bemba of Northern Rhodesia, see Richards: Land, Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia, 1939, pp. 351–380.

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of the new ladang be a poor one. After three days the same person returns, and if he finds that the offerings have been scattered a new location is chosen and a new attempt is made to get a favorable answer from the spirits. In case the betel leaves have been found undisturbed, all male members of the village have a meal on the chosen land. Then the area is divided among the villagers by the headman. Each individual appeals to the spirits by placing a betel leaf with lime and areca nut on the ladang that has been turned over to him. If the answer is unfavorable he tries again. The betel leaf may be placed three times. If the offering is disturbed each time, the headman turns over a part of his share, which is considerably larger than any of the others, to the less fortunate villager. Throughout the following agricultural year with its stages of clearing, planting, and harvesting, the peasant repeatedly requires the services of the dukun, or *shaman*, as well as the betel leaf.

In other regions details differ, but the essential fact remains that the social-religious life and thinking of the shifting cultivator is bound up with his characteristic form of cultivation.

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Shifting cultivators have no concept of private land ownership. The land belongs to the community, the tribe, or the village, and each member has the right to use as much land as he needs and can cultivate. The location of the land that he is to use may be decided upon by the village council or the headman. The person who clears the land and plants the crop gets the produce. Nobody has the right to plant a plot that has been cleared by someone else. As soon as the land is abandoned all rights are forfeited, except the right of the community. However, if trees have been planted, the ownership of the trees and their produce remains with the person who planted them, and he is given preference when the land has had a sufficient fallow period and can again be cultivated.

The Effect of Shifting Cultivation on the Land

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As has been stated above, ladangs decline in fertility after the first crop, and obnoxious grasses and weeds appear among the stooling tree stumps. As long as there is an abundance of forest land at his disposal the cultivator prefers to abandon the ladang. Under favorable conditions the grasses will, in turn, give way to second-growth forest. In the course of centuries this second-growth forest may develop into a climax forest, that is, a forest having the same composition as the primeval forest. In any case, when tall forest growth again occurs, the land will have had time to recover its original fertility.

Unfortunately, however, conditions are often not sufficiently favorable for a regeneration of soil fertility and the development of a good second-growth forest. As a matter of fact, the practice of shifting cultivation has altered the character of vegetation beyond recognition over wide areas in Southeastern Asia. Instead of a dense primeval rain-forest, we now find

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extensive open grasslands resulting from the most important tool of the shifting cultivator, fire. 241 134 311

Generally, the fallow period allows time only for the evolution of mediocre second-growth forest, for the shifting cultivator usually returns to an old ladang before even a small percentage of those tree species that made up the original stand have had a chance to come back. Repeated cultivations further impoverish the forest and reduce the number of species. Certain light-loving trees that played a minor role in the climax forest will spread rapidly and dominate, together with those species that show a resistance to fire and those that are capable of sending new sprouts out of the old stumps.[5]

If fire repeatedly invades an abandoned ladang, the tree flora is reduced until finally only grasses and herbs survive. These persist because their root systems, tubers, or bulbs send out new shoots after the fire. The [137] more important grasses and herbs that finally triumph over forest vegetation are *Imperata cylindrica* Beauv., *Imperata constricta* Hitchc., *Saccharum spontaneum* L., *Themeda gigantea* Hack, and *Eupatorium odoratum* L. These burn very rapidly and with a hot flame, even when still green. After they are well established they catch fire or are set afire every year, almost without exception; this prevents natural reforestation. Furthermore, the fire will also invade the neighboring forest and force it gradually back, so that the grass area steadily increases. This is especially true in hilly or mountainous country. In the Philippines about 18 per cent of the total area is covered with grass vegetation as a result of shifting cultivation and fires. These grass areas are known locally as *cogonales*. In the Indies, where they are called *alang-alang*,[6] they are also extensive, as in southern Sumatra. While I was traveling through southern Sumatra by rail during the dry season I counted twenty grass fires started within the space of an hour by sparks from our locomotive. In Thailand there is as yet very little cogonal land, according to Pendleton.[7] In Indochina culturally induced grasslands, either pure or with scattered trees—the latter called by the French *forêts claires* or *savanes-parcs*—are very extensive[8] (Figs. 23, 24).*

Once the vegetation of an area has been changed from forest to grass, [224] the land is of no more agricultural use to the shifting cultivator. The only benefit that he then gets out of the land is for hunting. For this, too, he often utilizes fire—either to drive wild animals out of hiding or to get a growth of young grass to attract his prey.

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[5] In Malaya and Sumatra the spread of such bushes and trees as *Lantana camara* L., *Schima bancana* Miq., *Peronema canescens* Jack, *Vitex pubescens* Vahl, *Melastoma malabathricum* L., and *Lagerstroemia speciosa* Pers. is due to the cutting of clearings.

[6] *Imperata* (both *constricta* and *cylindrica*) is known in the Philippines by the Spanish term *cogon*, in the East Indies as *alang-alang*, and in Malaya as *lalang*. The last two are Malay words.

[7] Pendleton: "Some Interrelations between Agriculture and Forestry," 1939, p. 41.

[8] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 368–372.

* [See p. 38, cat. 241 or 116 -- Analyst]

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When fires no longer ravage the grasslands, however, trees return and finally drive out the grasses completely, for the latter cannot stand shade.[9]

The spread of grass is especially rapid in regions with a long, pronounced dry season, whereas reforestation is more likely to take place in areas with a well distributed, high annual rainfall. This may explain why the Philippines and Indochina have a larger percentage of open grasslands than do Malaya and the Netherlands Indies.

A relatively high density of population is an important factor in preventing successful reforestation and encouraging grasses. In a thinly settled forest area there is sufficient land to allow for a long rest period, but an increasing density of population results in the shortening of the fallow period to such a degree that the soil is given insufficient time to recover its fertility. The shorter the fallow period the poorer the succeeding forest —if any—and the poorer the following crop yields, until finally the land can no longer satisfy the needs of the shifting cultivator.

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Pendleton believes that this cycle may have contributed materially to the downfall of the Khmers in Cambodia (Cambodge). He states that although the Khmers used the plow on very limited areas of wet riceland, they had largely to depend on the planting stick and shifting cultivation for their food supply. As the demands for more food arose from the rapidly increasing population concentrated in the city of Angkor, the fallow period granted to the uplands had to be progressively shortened. At the same time fires became so frequent that culturally induced grasslands spread while the cultivable area decreased, thus further diminishing the food supply available to the people of Angkor. "While the actual fall of Angkor is ascribed to the superior military power of invaders, the resistance of the inhabitants was doubtless much less than it would have been had the lands been productive and they had had adequate supplies of food."[10]

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Declining crop yields and the spread of grasses have been advanced as important reasons for the breakdown of the Mayan civilization,[11] and Pendleton further raises the question "whether the development of cogonals might not have been an important contributing factor in the dying out of some of the other civilizations of the tropics, notably that of Anuradapura, in Ceylon."[12]

Today the ruins of the Mayan cities, as well as those of Angkor, are surrounded by relatively luxuriant forest vegetation, which has had time to displace the pernicious grasses since man and his tool, fire, have abandoned the inhospitable grasslands.

Not only does shifting cultivation alter the character of the vegetation,

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[9] When an old ladang remains unburned for several years the following trees spring up in addition to those already mentioned in footnote 5: *Erechthites hieracifolia* Rafin., *Blumea balsamifera* DC., *Peltophorum dasyrachis* Kurz, *Macaranga tanarius* Muell. Arg., and *Piper aduncum* L.

[10] Pendleton: *op. cit.*, pp. 46 and 47.

[11] Cook: "Milpa Agriculture," 1921, pp. 307–326.

[12] Pendleton: *op. cit.*, p. 47.

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Not only does shifting cultivation alter the character of the vegetation, but also it may induce soil erosion, especially when it is practiced on slopes. Forest vegetation keeps the soil from being washed or blown away, but at the end of the dry season, when the trees have been cut and burned, the soil lies exposed. Consequently, during the early days of the rainy season large quantities of topsoil are washed downhill and carried by rivers to the plains. Erosion, by lowering the moisture-holding capacity of the soil as well as the rate of absorption, may thus cause further acceleration of run-off and lead finally to destructive floods on the plains. Such floods are frequent in the Philippines and parts of the East Indies. Pendleton points out that in Thailand the main rivers receive their great load of silt from the more steeply sloping mountains of northern Thailand where shifting cultivators have started the forces of accelerated erosion.[13]

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The large quantities of valuable timber destroyed year after year by the shifting cultivators in virgin areas and the prevention of reforestation by the fires that spread through the abandoned fields (Fig. 22) cause the forester to regard the shifting cultivator as his enemy. In the Philippines the forester has for many years been pleading for strictly enforced laws and severe penalties against shifting cultivators.

> The greatest enemy of our forest is caiñgin making. It is to the persistent practice of this crude form of agriculture from time immemorial that the existence of vast areas of denuded waste lands is attributable. Much of our valuable timber has been and is still being wasted by this illegal form of forest clearing. There are actually over five and a half million hectares of open lands that are practically idle. Due to continued caiñgins and the recurrence of fires on these open lands, the forest area is decreasing year after year. . . . Destructive floods in various parts of the Islands and the yearly appearance . . . of locust pest, the extermination of which is costing the Government hundreds of thousands of pesos yearly, are chiefly the direct results of this obnoxious practice.[14]

Conflicting Views on the Merits of Shifting Cultivation

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Judgments on the merits of shifting cultivation have been rather contradictory since the practice first came to the attention of scientific observers. During the past century the Dutch in Java spoke of it as *Raubbau* (robber economy), and one still finds the expression used. Sauer protests against this term. According to him, shifting cultivation is a "primitive economy, in which the per capita area of land needed for a community is rather large and in which the forest growth is to be considered as a part of a long term rotation of fields." He is of the opinion that it is "an excellent device for maintaining permanent productivity."[15]

Lord Hailey calls shifting cultivation "less a device of barbarism than a concession to the character of a soil which needs long periods for recovery and regeneration; and the trekking habit, whether of Dutch farmers

[13] Pendleton: "Soil Erosion in the Tropics," 1940, p. 757.

[14] Letter of the Director of the Bureau of Forestry to the Secretary of Justice, September 10, 1934.

[15] Sauer: "Destructive Exploitation," 1938, p. 406.

[See p. 38, cat. 241 or 116 -- Analyst]

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000 [in South Africa] or African tribes, has been due to the requirements of that 'extensive' system of occupation which the character of the soil has seemed to demand."[16] But he knows from his African experiences that shifting cultivation has there reached the point where it has become the source of problems that tax the ability of the colonial administrator. "The problems which arise today are mainly due to the changes forced on this system by the restriction of land, the stabilization of populations . . . and the extension of cultivation in order to produce crops for sale."[17] He considers shifting cultivation, or *chitemene* as it is called in parts of Africa, "most wasteful, but, as experience has taught the African that burnt forest land is particularly suited to the staple crop of small millets, it is practised throughout the forest areas of Africa, and in some areas all high forest has already disappeared."[18] Worthington thinks that "shifting cultivation is admirably adapted to the needs of primitive peoples, provided there is sufficient land available"; but he also states that "after a long period of shifting cultivation the whole character of the vegetation may be altered beyond recognition. In countries with an equatorial climate, without a dry season, shifting cultivation usually changes virgin forest into secondary forest and thence to a kind of bush vegetation."[19]

The growth of population and the change from a subsistence to a money economy have increased the land requirements of the African hoe-culture peasant to such an extent that shifting cultivation has led to large-scale deforestation and has brought soil erosion, which today is recognized as one of the main problems of agriculture, in its wake. Deforestation and soil erosion have forced the colonial administrators of Africa to study shifting cultivation carefully in an attempt to find a solution to the problem. The Council of the Royal African Society passed the following resolution on October 20, 1937:

> That this Council views with the gravest concern the widespread destruction of the African soil by erosion consequent on wasteful methods of husbandry [shifting cultivation] which strike at the basis of rural economy and Native welfare, and is of opinion that immediate steps should be taken for the adoption of a common policy and energetic measures throughout British Africa in order to put an effective check upon this growing menace to the fertility of the land and to the health of its inhabitants.[20]

241 Shifting cultivation has been practiced on hilly land for countless centuries in India, where examples are found in Bengal and Assam, and in the northern parts of Burma; but because of disease and feuds, there was

16 Hailey: An African Survey, 1938, p. 1. We refer especially to shifting cultivation in Africa because there it has attracted much more attention than in Southeastern Asia. In the greater part of Africa it is the only form of agriculture, whereas in Southeastern Asia it takes a minor position.

17 *Ibid.*, p. 879.

18 *Ibid.*, pp. 879–880.

19 Worthington: Science in Africa, 1938, pp. 376–377.

20 Land Usage and Soil Erosion in Africa, 1938, p. 3.

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always sufficient land for the population without undue pressure on the forests. A result of British rule has been to increase the population and correspondingly to reduce the rest period of the soil. The consequences have been deforestation and soil erosion. For that reason the authorities have attempted to stop this mode of land use.

In Java shifting cultivation attracted the attention of the government as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century. It was practiced especially in the mountains. The fact that a shifting cultivator required more land than a peasant who cultivated the same piece of land year after year made shifting cultivation extremely undesirable to a colonial administration that wanted to use all available land for the production of cash crops—either under the "forced culture system" of 1830 to 1870[21] or under the private plantation system that has existed since 1870. This circumstance, together with an alarming increase in population, prompted the government to do everything possible to stop the practice of shifting cultivation in Java, and today it is found only in the quite thinly settled residency of Bantam in West Java.[22] In the Outer Islands, with their sparse population and large forest areas, it is widely practiced. But, in contrast to their predecessors, Dutch officials of recent times rarely use the term *Raubbau* for shifting cultivation. Instead they consider this form of land use justifiable if the abandoned fields revert to forest and have the possibility of regaining their former fertility. In the past fifteen years, however, warning voices have pointed out that in large parts of the Outer Islands ladang culture has become a source of destruction, for the forest is no longer being given an opportunity to recuperate.[23] Both agricultural and forestry officials have consequently become concerned over shifting cultivation. In 1930 Hagreis presented a paper on ladang culture before the congress of officials of the Agricultural Advisory Service in the Netherlands Indies.[24] At that time it was decided to appoint a special commission to study ladang culture.[25] The foresters, also, devoted a good deal of attention to the problem during their congress in 1937. In 1940 Van Beukering of the Department of Economic Affairs summarized the result of the ladang *enquête*.[26] He came to the conclusion that shifting cultivation is a logical and economically justifiable form of land use wherever there is a large amount of land available and a primitive economy exists. From a social point of view no objection can be raised if, after each occupation, the fertility of the soil is regained. There is no reason to insist upon more intensive forms of land use so long as the population density does not increase beyond 50 persons per square kilometer, or 130 persons per square mile. If at this density we

[21] From 1830 to 1870 the peasants of Java were forced, under the notorious "culture system," to devote part of their land and labor to producing crops for the government.
[22] Kools: Hoema's, 1935.
[23] Gonggrijp: "Soil Management," 1938, pp. 397–404.
[24] Hagreis: "Ladangbouw," 1930, pp. 43–75 and 629–642.
[25] "Enquête betreffende het ladangvraagstuk," 1931, pp. 1022–1033.
[26] Van Beukering: Het ladangvraagstuk. Unpublished typescript, 1940.

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allow for five persons per family and assume that the family shifts its cultivation plot annually but returns to the same plot after an average period of 10 years, each family could occupy annually one hectare, or 2.47 acres. This is the amount of land that an average shifting cultivator in the Indies needs in order to cover the food requirements of his family.

This calculation does not make any allowance for permanent forests. Actually, however, the land requirements are not quite so high, because very often the same land is used for two years instead of one, which would either allow for a longer period of fallow or keep a part of the virgin forest intact. The latter is improbable because of the shifting cultivator's preference for virgin forest.

To summarize these opinions, shifting cultivation from the agricultural point of view is not considered objectionable so long as vegetation and the fertility of the soil are restored by nature. The opinion of those who regard it as a fatal agricultural system under all circumstances is widely felt to be unjustified. From the silvicultural point of view, shifting cultivation is held to be objectionable if it destroys timber that would otherwise be exploited by the forest service or by private concessionaries.

Supplementing Shifting Cultivation With Cash Crops in the Netherlands Indies

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The products of the typical shifting cultivator never reach a distant market. There is seldom any surplus, for the shifting cultivator is a subsistence farmer who lives from hand to mouth. In the Outer Islands of the Netherlands Indies, however, the shifting cultivator has been drawn into modern economy and has modified this age-old system. In parts of Sumatra and Borneo he has begun to diversify his economy by planting tree crops on the ladang among his rice or maize. After one or two harvests the fields are abandoned and left to the trees that have been planted. The trees then furnish an additional source of income as soon as they reach the bearing stage. Pepper has been raised as a ladang crop for many centuries, especially in the Lampoeng Districts. Coffee was introduced in the days of the Dutch East India Company and adopted as a commercial crop by the peasants. Benzoin (*Styrax benzoin* Dryander), also, has long been grown in this manner. More recently coconuts and, since about 1905, rubber have become ladang crops (Figs. 25–33).[1]

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A shifting cultivator may, over a period of years, convert his old ladangs into rubber gardens, for example, until he is assured of a sufficient income from his permanent tree crop to buy his food from the outside and no longer requires a ladang for the production of food. This process has led to the creation of the large native rubber areas in Borneo and Sumatra, where some shifting cultivators have become dependent upon the market price of rubber and upon the policy of the government in regard to taxation and export control. In times of low prices and export restrictions they may suffer severe economic setbacks and even hardship. In Bengkalis

[1] [See p. 39 ff, cat. 241 or 116 -- Analysis]

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The Areal Extent of Shifting Cultivation in Southeastern Asia

It is difficult to form an idea of the areal extent of shifting cultivation because of its migratory nature and the fact that it is often practiced in remote regions. The only country of Southeastern Asia in which an attempt has been made to estimate the area used for shifting cultivation is the Netherlands Indies, but even there it was not possible to include all

Table II—Philippine Islands: Illegal Caiñgins Detected, 1914-1940

Year	Illegal Caiñgins Number	Illegal Caiñgins Area in Hectares
1914	895	....
1915	1 198	....
1916	845	....
1917	665	....
1918	776	....
1919	603	....
1920	721	....
1921	1 602	1 429.48
1922	3 110	2 803.55
1923	1 759	1 516.33
1924	1 753	1 396.90
1925	1 762	1 391.29
1926	1 829	1 476.61
1927	2 002	1 743.92
1928	1 774	1 602.95
1929	1 312	1 370.41
1930	3 227	3 279.77
1931	2 534	3 345.74
1932	2 547	5 586.27
1933	2 427	2 831.38
1934	3 207	3 215.46
1935	2 631	2 455.73
1936	2 314	2 510.59
1937	1 967	2 308.24
1938	1 766	2 029.68
1939*	906	1 331.12
1940†	2 646	4 416.56
Total	48 778	48 071.98

Source: Data supplied by the Bureau of Forestry, Manila.
*Six months only, ending June 30, 1939, because of change of fiscal year.
†From July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1940.

parts of the Outer Islands in the estimate. Van Beukering concluded that one-third of all food consumed in the Outer Islands was grown on ladangs; this would require a total of 1,100,000 hectares of land. If we assume that all ladangs are occupied for 2 years and lie fallow for 12 years, the shifting cultivation system would need seven times 1,100,000, or 7,700,000, hectares. This estimate does not include the ladang area under coffee and pepper cultivation. (Rubber, coconut, and benzoin cannot be considered because they are, for practical purposes, permanent crops.)

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
1 [See p. 26, category 241 or 116. -- Analyst]

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Van Beukering allowed an additional 200,000 hectares for coffee and pepper ladangs; so that the total area amounts to about 8,000,000 hectares. If we assume that the population of the Outer Islands increases at the rate of 1½ to 2½ per cent each year, it would double in from 29 to 47 years. This would mean that after about 30 to 50 years 16,000,000 hectares would come within the scope of shifting cultivation.

In Malaya ladang cultivation is illegal, but it is practiced in the hinterland well away from roads and railways, in eastern sections of the peninsula. Dobby recently described it in Pahang and northeastern Kedah, near the Thai border.[30] The Sakai of Pahang regularly abandon their primitive huts as well as the clearings when they shift to a new field (Map, Fig. 2). The Malays of northeastern Kedah, on the other hand, as a rule live permanently in one place and change only their fields (Map, Fig. 3). There are no statistics available on the areal extent to which shifting cultivation is carried on in Malaya, but according to Dobby the system gives way to permanent culture "as the standard of cultivation rises and as the effect of law becomes stronger."[31]

In Thailand shifting cultivation is extensively practiced by the tribes of the mountains of the north and west, on the eastern part of the Khorat Plateau, and on the peninsula. Probably about 1,000,000 people depend upon it. According to the same kind of calculation that Van Beukering made for the Indies, a total of 1,400,000 hectares would be required, or 200,000 hectares annually, if we allow five persons per household and consider that one hectare covers the needs of a family for 2 years.[32]

[162]

In Indochina only the tribes of the mountains of Tongking, Laos, and Annam now practice rây, or shifting, cultivation. The people of the plains, Annamese and Cambodians, who represent 84 per cent of the population, practice a more intensive form of agriculture. Gourou has estimated the areal extent of shifting cultivation in Indochina. He states that a rây is used for 2 years and has to lie fallow for at least 20 years, which seems a rather long period as compared with other countries. In addition to its extensive plains, Indochina has a mountainous or hilly area of 580,000 square kilometers. Only one per cent of this land is permanently cultivated. Gourou estimates that about 40 per cent of the mountainous country is suitable for rây cultivation and he assumes that one-tenth of this, or 4 per cent of the total mountain land, is under rây cultivation in any one year.[33] If this calculation is correct it would mean that 23,200 square kilometers, or 2,320,000 hectares, are occupied annually by shifting cultivators. The numerical strength of the shifting tribes shows, however, that this estimate cannot be correct. Their number is not much greater than

[30] Dobby: "Settlement Patterns in Malaya," 1942, p. 222.

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] For an excellent description of the life of the shifting cultivators in Thailand, see Credner: Siam, 1935, pp. 148–173.

[33] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 177–182, especially pp. 180 and 182.

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[See p. 27, category 116. -- Analyst]

1,500,000, or at the most 2,000,000, which would mean about 300,000 to 400,000 households. This number of households could hardly occupy such a large rây area as Gourou assumes. 241 311

In Formosa only the Malay tribes of the mountains in the eastern half of the island practice shifting cultivation. They number, according to estimates, about 150,000. From this we may assume that not more than 30,000 to 50,000 hectares are occupied annually by shifting cultivators. 134

In the Philippines it is unlawful to make caiñgins on public land without the permission of the Bureau of Forestry.[34] Permission will be given if the forest on the land involved is of no commercial value and if the caiñgero accepts the obligation to reforest his patch with seeds supplied by the forest service. Several hundred caiñgeros are brought annually before the justices of the peace, who in the past, because their sympathy was with the caiñgeros, were usually rather reluctant to fine the culprits (Table II). Nobody knows, of course, how many illegal caiñgins escape detection, but it is certain that they greatly outnumber those that are made with the permission of the foresters added to those that have been brought to the attention of the courts. Special consideration is given to the "non-Christian" tribes, for whom tracts of land have been set aside within which they continue their age-old system of cultivation. In Mindanao probably three-fourths of the population, from the primitive Manobos to the more advanced Moros, practice the caiñgin system of cultivation. Other regions where this system is practiced extensively are Mindoro, Cebu, southern Negros, and parts of Luzon—the central and eastern cordillera and the Camarines. About 10 per cent of the population of the Philippines obtain a part or all of their food from caiñgins, most of which are made either on private land or on land that belongs to non-Christian tribes who know no other form of agriculture. [162]

Methods of Eliminating the Undesirable Aspects of Shifting Cultivation

In regions where the density of population exceeds 50 persons per square kilometer, shifting cultivation becomes wasteful and destructive. It is imperative in such areas that the system be either modified or else replaced by more conserving and, where possible, more intensive forms of land use. For most backward tribes this involves fundamental changes in their mode of life, religious ideas, and concepts of land rights. 241 311 161

In some instances it should suffice to adopt measures that eliminate the harmful or wasteful after effects of the system without requiring that this kind of land use be given up completely. Let us assume that we have a somewhat thinly settled region containing a forest that is not particularly valuable and the exploitation of which is impracticable or at present inexpedient. Deforestation and the spread of grasses are undesirable aspects 185 241 311

[34] Nano: "Kaiñgin Laws," 1939, pp. 87–92.

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241 311 185

of shifting cultivation in the area. In such a case reforestation would be assured by keeping fire out of the old clearings. This could be done by leaving relatively non-inflammable forest belts at least 60 feet wide between individual clearings. These forest belts would offer some protection against the spread of grass fires and at the same time would be a source of seed for further reforestation. Reforestation under such circumstances would be much easier and cheaper than if large contiguous areas were to be cleared and used.

245 185 [137]

Where natural reforestation is particularly slow, cultivators should be required to practice artificial reforestation. In scattered regions in Southeastern Asia tribesmen do this on their own initiative. Pendleton reports such a case in Burma.[35] Certain Dyak tribes in Borneo plant seeds of the candlenut tree (*Aleurites moluccana* Willd.) about 3 meters apart in a freshly cleared ladang before it has even been burned. In the eastern part of the Malay Archipelago shifting cultivators plant such trees as *Aleurites moluccana* Willd., *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Hibiscus similis* Bl., *Casuarina equisetifolia* L., *Macaranga* species, *Euphorbia* species, *Sesbania grandiflora* Pers., and *Desmodium timoriense* DC. for the purpose of restoring the forest.

In Sumatra Deli tobacco planters initiated artificial reforestation after alang-alang had regularly invaded their fallow fields and caught fire so frequently that second-growth forest could not get a start. In Deli the tobacco fields are in use only 1 year and lie fallow 7 to 10 years. They should be protected by forest growth during that period. Therefore, in order to make this possible, the planters controlled fires by planting belts of teak along the highways and roads. These belts served as fireguards and at the same time provided lumber for tobacco-drying sheds. On the tobacco fields themselves they planted especially *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Cassia siamea* Lam., *Pithecellobium saman* Benth., and *Leucaena glauca* Benth., which drive out the alang-alang[36] (Figs. 34–39).

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Another way of speeding up reforestation is to spare a few of the larger trees at the time of the clearing. This is done by the Malays of Sumatra. They do not cut down *Koompassia parvifolia* Prain, *Arenga saccharifera* Labill., *Durio zibethinus* Murr. (durian), *Parkia* species, or *Garcinia grandifolia* Pierre.[37] The last three are fruit trees that are numerous in the forest, whereas the second is a palm whose flower stalk is tapped for its sugary sap and the first is preferred by bees as a hiving tree, which gives it its name, "bee-tree." This tree is preserved because the people want the honey. Worthington reports that in Africa "some tribes appear to realize the necessity of maintaining tree growth on their clearings and merely top the trees and lop the branches, so that the trees are enabled to

[137] [314]

[35] Similar cases are known in the residency of Benkoelen in Sumatra, in central Celebes, and in Flores. See Hagreis: "Ladangbouw," 1930, p. 631.

[36] Jochems: "De begroeiing der tabakslanden," n.d., pp. 77–89.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 30–32.

[See p 40 ff, cat. 116 --Analyst]

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estation is not a discovery of Western-trained scientists but has long been practiced by certain groups in Southeastern Asia. It was the plan of the government to spread and enforce this practice of artificial reforestation wherever advisable. This practice, whereby the cultivator determines the vegetative cover during the fallow period instead of abandoning the ladang to chance growth, brings him to a transition stage between shifting cultivation and permanent cultivation. From there the step to permanent cultivation with crop rotation is but a short one.

Permanent cultivation requires repeated tilling and therefore more labor and tools than the shifting cultivator is accustomed to. Work animals are also desirable. An important obstacle to intensification of agriculture in wide areas of Southeastern Asia, however, is the fact that hill and mountain regions [up to about 1500 meters in elevation] are frequently infested with malaria so that the energy of the people is greatly reduced.[45] Moreover, the acquisition of such implements as plows, harrows, and hoes, and especially of work animals, calls for financial resources or credit, both of which the average shifting cultivator lacks. Some shifting cultivators do own livestock, such as cattle or carabaos, but utilize neither their labor nor their manure. Groups of the Mois in the mountains of Annam have carabaos, but they do not use the animals in their agricultural activities because they "cannot talk" to them.[46] On the Lesser Sunda Islands livestock is kept because it gives social prestige to the owner. Overstocking of the pasture areas on these islands has led to overgrazing and has cut into the forest area until there has developed a scarcity of land suitable for ladang cultivation. The same has happened in large areas in Africa. There it has been necessary to teach the native peasant the use of cattle and make him familiar with the plow. This was done successfully in northern Nigeria by combining the animal husbandry of the nomadic Fulani with the indigenous shifting cultivation of the Hausa peasant, thus developing "a system of permanent farming whereby a man with cattle of his own, say two working oxen and a few cows, can plough and maintain in fertility an area of land sufficient to supply all the requirements of himself and his family, and to obtain a surplus balance as a return for his labour. . . . Thus mixed farming represents a gradual evolution from the shifting methods of cultivation to a static type of agriculture, by the introduction of animal husbandry, and with the use of animal cultivation."[47] Above all, the peasant learns to preserve the animal manure and

a shade tree; *Dolichos lablab* L., a climbing herb which is valuable as a vegetable; *Crotolaria anagyroides* H.B. and K., a bush of vigorous growth which attains a height of from 12 to 14 feet and forms an excellent green manure; *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., low shrubs useful as green manures; and *Mimosa invisa* Mart., a leguminous creeper which suppresses grasses.

[45] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 181 and 350.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 354.

[47] King: "Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1939, p. 271. See also Faulkner and Mackie: West African Agriculture, 1933; and by the same authors: "The Introduction of Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1936, pp. 89–96.

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241 to apply it regularly to his fields in order to keep up the fertility which formerly was restored through long forest fallow. This animal fertilizer is more important than the help the peasant gets from his animals in the way of labor. Thus the area to be cultivated may be limited by the amount of manure available, rather than by the extent of land that can be plowed.

Van Beukering, in his summary of the results of the ladang *enquête*, is of the opinion that similar practices should be introduced in the Outer Islands of the Netherlands Indies; but the pasture problem must first be carefully studied before mixed farming can be widely established in the Indies. Where animal manure is not available, the composting of vegetable waste, or even of crops grown for this specific purpose, supplies an excellent fertilizer.

The intensification and modification of shifting cultivation are less difficult in flat country than on sloping land where there is the hazard of soil erosion. Perhaps the most obvious solution would be to move the population from mountainous land to the plains and valley floors, but this can be done only in areas where population density is low. In Southeastern Asia the density of population on the plains is usually so high that, should it be possible to bring malaria under control, a movement from the plains to the uplands and mountains would be desirable rather than a migration in the opposite direction. Another solution would be to have the shifting cultivator plant permanent tree crops to protect the soil against accelerated erosion. Steep slopes which now produce but a single moderate rice crop every few years could be made more productive if planted with perennials. The cultivator could then buy his staple food with the money obtained from the sale of the crops harvested from his trees.

The speed with which the change from shifting cultivation to permanent cultivation may be made will depend both on the geographical environment and the cultural level of the community. Shifting cultivators with permanent villages and a regularly established rotation of fields will respond much more readily to a reform brought from the outside than a group that is always ready to abandon its dwellings and move to a new locality.

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

(Note—All the photographs in this book except those for which acknowledgement is made were taken by the author.)

Fig. 4 (upper left)—*Caiñgin* freshly cut and burned in second-growth forest. Cagayan Province, Luzon. (Courtesy of the Bureau of Forestry.)

Fig. 5 (upper right)—Cutting down the larger trees has been avoided by girdling. The caiñgin is ready for planting. Bataan Province, Luzon. (Courtesy of the Bureau of Forestry.)

Fig. 6 (center left)—Burning a freshly cut caiñgin. Cotabato Province, Mindanao.

Fig. 7 (center right)—Burning *ladangs*. Residency of Palembang, Sumatra.

Fig. 8 (lower left)—Ilongot's caiñgin planted with upland rice. Nueva Vizcaya Province, Luzon. (Courtesy of the Bureau of Forestry.)

Fig. 9 (lower right)—Ladang planted with upland rice. The second-growth forest in the background will be cut in a year or two. Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra.

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

FIG. 10 (upper left)—The temporary tree-house in this *caiingin* provides an excellent lookout as well as protection against wild animals. Cotabato Province, Mindanao.

FIG. 11 (upper right)—Shifting cultivator in a *ladang*, about to plant upland rice seeds. Residency of the Lampoeng Districts, Sumatra.

FIG. 12 (center left)—The man on the right is driving a planting stick into the ground, while the man on the left plants the upland rice seeds.

FIG. 13 (center right)—The holes made with the planting stick are ready for seed.

FIG. 14 (lower left)—Abandoned caiingin invaded by *ungas*. Bukidnon Province, Mindanao.

FIG. 15 (lower right)—Abandoned ladang. Residency of the Lampoeng Districts, Sumatra.

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

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(upper left)—New *ladangs* planted with upland rice and maize on a steep slope. Notice the young second-growth forest on the second slope and the older forest in the background. Residency of Tapanoeli, Sumatra.

(upper right)—New *caingins* on slopes in second-growth forest. West of Baguio, Mountain Province, Luzon.

(center left)— Ladang of upland rice and maize on level land. Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra.

(center right)—New caingin ready for the first planting. The flimsy hut will be abandoned, together with the caingin, after one harvest. South of Sagnay, Camarines Sur Province, Luzon.

(lower left)—Guarding the ripening rice against birds from a temporary shelter in a ladang. The man has a permanent house in the village. Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra.

(lower right)—Well built village house of a shifting cultivator who raises pepper in his old ladangs. Residency of the Lampongs Districts, Sumatra.

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

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FIGS. 22 and 23 illustrate undesirable conditions that may result from shifting cultivation.

FIG. 22—Cutlipino cut and burned out in a valuable commercial forest before the holder of the timber concession had a chance to exploit it. Negros Occidental Province, Negros. (Courtesy of the Bureau of Forestry.)

FIG. 23—*Cogonales* in the foreground and patches of second-growth forest in the hills. The *cogon* is gaining the upper hand because of repeated fires, which prevent natural reforestation. Near Port Bangs, Zamboanga Province, Mindanao. (Courtesy of the Bureau of Forestry.)

FIG. 24—Filipino foresters investigating the extensive *cogonales* of eastern Nueva Ecija Province, Luzon. (Courtesy of the Bureau of Forestry.)

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FIGS. 25 and 28 (upper left and upper right)—Pepper vines growing in an old *ladang*. Residency of the Lampoeng Districts, Sumatra.

FIG. 26 (center left)—Young rubber tree planted in a rice ladang. No more rice will be planted after the second rice harvest. Western Bali.

FIG. 27 (lower left)—Young rubber trees in an old ladang that has produced two rice crops. Residency of Palembang, Sumatra.

FIG. 29 (lower right)—Closer view of a young rubber tree in the ladang shown in Fig. 27.

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

FIG. 30 (upper left)—Batak benzoin collector beside a benzoin tree planted in an old *ladang*. Residency of Tapanoeli, Sumatra. (Courtesy of the Department of Economic Affairs.)

FIG. 31 (upper right)—Peasant-owned rubber garden. Residency of Tapanoeli, Sumatra.

FIG. 32 (center left)—Houses abandoned by shifting cultivators in an exhausted coffee garden. Residency of Palembang, Sumatra. (Courtesy of the Department of Economic Affairs.)

FIG. 33 (center right)—Rubber mangles and sheets of rubber drying in a peasant-owned rubber garden. Residency of Djambi, Sumatra.

FIG. 34 (lower left)—Teak logs lining the road through a tobacco plantation. Between Medan and Arnhemia, Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra.

FIG. 35 (lower right)—Teak logs partially cut down to prepare for a tobacco crop. Between Medan and Arnhemia.

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



Fig. 36 (upper left)—Eight-year-old second-growth forest on a tobacco plantation, being cleared for the raising of a single tobacco crop. Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra.

Fig. 37 (upper right)—After the tobacco crop has been harvested the local population is allowed to raise one upland rice or maize crop. Notice the bushes and trees, which the rice-growers must not destroy lest reforestation be retarded. In the background a tobacco-drying shed. Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra. (Courtesy of the Experiment Station of Deli Planters Vereeniging.)

Fig. 38 (center left)—Upland rice following a tobacco crop. In the background a second-growth forest consisting of *Albizzia falcata* and in front of it a strip of *Leucaena glauca*. Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra. (Courtesy of the Experiment Station of Deli Planters Vereeniging.)

Fig. 39 (center right)—Two-year-old second growth on a tobacco plantation. Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra.

Fig. 40 (lower left)—A section in a teak forest which has been cut by shifting cultivators working under the *tumgya* forestry system. Residency of Madioen, East Java.

Fig. 41 (lower right)—Maize and vegetables between pine trees planted at an altitude of 1900 meters by shifting cultivators working for the Forestry Service. Slope of Goenoeng Tangkoebanprahoe, Residency of Batavia, West Java.

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

This group of photographs was taken at the Soil Erosion Experiment Station near Tjiwidej, Residency of Priangan, West Java.

FIG. 42 (upper left)—Unterraced slope under cultivation.

FIG. 43 (upper right)—Terraced slope under cultivation.

FIG. 44 (lower left)—View of the catch basins.

FIG. 45 (lower right)—Closer view of the upper catch basin shown in Fig. 44.

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Chapter III

THE SEDENTARY CULTIVATOR

241 Sedentary, or permanent, cultivation of land is much more vital to the economy of the countries of Southeastern Asia than is shifting cultivation. The majority of peasant cultivators obtain their livelihood by tilling the same piece of land year after year. The continuously utilized arable land, however, is not all cultivated in the same way throughout Southeastern Asia. We may distinguish three main categories of arable land: garden 554 land, surrounding the houses and villages; wet land; and dry land. These 621] three classes of land are devoted to different crops and vary so much from one another in size and reliability of yields, and therefore in value that in Java, for example, the social status of a man depends upon the type of land that he cultivates. There are districts in Java where only those peasants who own wet land, houses, and garden land have the full rights of a villager.

The Garden Plot

244 Garden culture on land surrounding peasant houses in Java is devoted to a large variety of crops, ranging from fruit trees to plants that are not required in large quantities but only to supplement the diet and add flavor to the daily rice meal. Ochse and Terra, who have made exhaustive studies of garden culture, are of the opinion that it is a remnant of "primitive grainless hoe culture," in which all the useful plants found in the forest were concentrated in plots near the dwellings. Originally, the number of plants grown in the garden was greater than it is today, for some plants have been taken out of this economy to be grown on a larger scale in fields. The origin of garden culture explains, according to Ochse and Terra, the truly amazing variety of plants that are found on garden land.[1] Sollewijn Gelpke, a leading expert on native agriculture in Java during the past century, remarked on the richness of the gardens:

> Whoever strolls around a compound and takes things in with a botanical eye will see before him a variety of plants of which the uninitiated can have no conception. . . . Such wealth of vegetation is still more impressive to him who approaches it from an economic point of view. He sees palms, bamboo, bananas, and other trees that resemble each other closely, bearing fruit and giving support to various climbing plants.[2]

244 Often one is able to distinguish three levels, or stories, in a garden. The 137 ground story consists of low-growing plants, especially tuberous plants that tolerate shade, such as elephant yam (*Amorphophallus campanulatus* Bl.), white arrowroot (*Maranta arundinacea* L.), "purple arrowroot" (*Can-*

[1] Ochse and Terra: "Het onderzoek," 1934. See also Terra: "De voeding der bevolking," 1932, pp. 552–593.

[2] Sollewijn Gelpke: Naar aanleiding, 1901, p. 203.

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gated fields. One of the great advantages of garden culture over field culture is that there is always something ready to harvest from the former and therefore something to sell when money for daily household needs becomes scarce. Another advantage is that the garden supplies the family with a great variety of side dishes rich in vitamins; the vegetable proteins of the garden produce are also of high value. 146 244

As to the possibilities of improving garden culture, these two authors state: 000

> It is very evident that an improvement of the compound horticulture is a very difficult problem through the highly varied and dense planting of these compounds as a result of which they come to resemble a very complicated symbiosis. But for all this it must be possible by systematic investigation to improve not only the quality but also the quantity of the production. It may be said that the compounds with their story or layer formation superficially considered will find no favour in the eyes of western agriculture, but they are an essential link in the native production apparatus.[3]

The alarming decline in the welfare of the people of Java in the face of a mounting population prompted Netherlands Indies officials to examine every possibility of improving the peasants' condition. This accounts for the studies of Ochse and Terra. Lacking detailed studies outside Java, we are obliged to depend upon scattered references of uneven value. 654 241

Credner states that in Thailand practically every house has a few trees on the lot, and the villages are often hidden by tree clusters. The greatest intensification of garden culture is found on the right bank of the Mae Nam Chao Phraya (the Menam) in Bangkok Noi, just opposite Bangkok. Here irrigation is employed in garden culture, a technique not usually found in Southeastern Asia. The gardens are surrounded by walls 1 meter high and are traversed by trenches 2 meters apart. The beds between the trenches are elevated. The trenches work both as drains and as irrigation ditches. Small sluices control the water. In the gardens there is a great variety of fruit trees and palms which climbers, such as *Piper betle* L., use as supports. In the trenches the peasants grow lotus and water chestnut (*Trapa natans* L.).[4] Zimmerman, in his survey of rural Thailand, points out that in most regions the peasants rely too much on one crop, rice, and he recommends in several instances improvements in the cultivation of the home lots so that families may have a better supply of fruits and, above all, of vegetables. In the Khlong Rangsit section he observed that "on account of the lack of homestead and village sites among the people there is no gardening and home production of food."[5] This observation may be applied to Southeastern Asia in general. Wherever the dominant form of land tenure is tenancy the flimsy shack of the tenant has no mixed fruit and vegetable garden around it, for his status is much too uncertain. A tenant 244 312 [137] 244 427

[3] Ochse and Terra: *op. cit.*, pp. 371–372.
[4] Credner: Siam, 1935, p. 246.
[5] Zimmerman: Siam, 1931, p. 307.

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yields. On the whole, the farmers of Cochinchina cultivate their fields much less intensively than do those of Tongking and Annam. Hardly any double cropping of rice is practiced in Cochinchina, nor is much of the riceland cultivated during the dry season.

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In 1941 changes in the political boundary between Thailand and French Indochina reduced the importance of Cambodia as a rice-surplus region of Indochina. Cambodia lost the Battambang area, west of the Tonle Sap, which in recent years had developed into a prosperous rice-growing district, possessing one of the most modern rice mills of Indochina.[47] The province of Battambang has a rice area of 134,000 hectares, whereas Cambodia, before the boundary change, had about 800,000 hectares of riceland.[48] Most of this is cultivated during the rainy season and depends entirely upon the rain caught in the fields. Around the Tonle Sap and along the Mekong a good deal of floating rice is grown, and some riceland is planted after the summer flood has receded. The crop from this land is harvested in the dry season and may be considered a dry-season crop, although it begins to grow during the latter part of the rainy season and profits from the floodwater that has spread over the land.

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The deltas of the Red River and of the Mekong, the two "rice baskets" of Indochina, differ greatly when it comes to the final disposal of the crop. The contents of the Tongkingese basket barely meet the needs of the local population, whereas a large part of the Cochinchinese rice may be exported, since the production far exceeds the local consumption. The delta of the Red River is densely settled; but Cochinchina, especially the western part, is still a pioneer country with a relatively low population density. The importance of Indochina as a rice-exporting region is based entirely on the production of rice in the south, particularly in Cochinchina and, to a lesser extent, in Cambodia.

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Dry Fields

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Dry fields[49] represent the third type of land under permanent cultivation in Southeastern Asia. The steady increase in the foreign demand for tropical products raised on dry fields, combined with the growth in local food requirements, has led to a great expansion of the area under permanent cultivation. The continuous use of unirrigated land, however, offers one of the most troublesome problems of tropical agriculture, because of the difficulty of preventing soil depletion. Erosion is especially active in a

[47] Thompson: "War and Further India's Rice," 1941, p. 185.

[48] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, p. 309.

[49] In the following discussion we shall exclude non-irrigated or dry land that comes under the regime of shifting cultivation. Sometimes a non-irrigated field lying fallow may have the same appearance as a recently abandoned ladang. But the essential difference is that under permanent culture land tenure is more highly developed than under shifting culture; so that a permanent field lying fallow belongs to an individual who, after a short period, will again cultivate it, whereas an abandoned ladang gives the former cultivator no claims for the future.

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climate characterized by heavy rainfall often concentrated in one season, and it will, unless checked, lead to the exhaustion of the fertility of the soil at a comparatively rapid rate in the tropics. In Southeastern Asia permanent dry fields are usually found on sloping ground exposed, much more than in the case of garden or wet-rice land, to the danger of erosion. Garden land is protected by dense stands of perennials, while terracing and dyking guard wet fields against destructive erosion. The terracing of dry fields is one of the most effective ways to control the loss of soil, but, since terracing requires so much labor, we find terraced dry fields only in densely settled regions, and even there the peasants often will not undertake this additional labor unless they are urged to do so by the authorities. As long as there is enough land available, the peasants prefer to let dry land recuperate by lying fallow for short periods rather than to protect it by terraces; but with the increasing density of population and the consequent shrinkage in the size of individual farms this practice is no longer possible (Figs. 61–64). ‡

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As early as the second half of the nineteenth century, K. F. Holle, the agricultural adviser in the Netherlands Indies, constantly stressed the need of controlling erosion on dry fields. Following his advice, the government, in Article 5 of the 1874 Ordinance on Alienation of Domain Forest Land, stipulated that permission to clear domain land on sloping terrain be given to the peasants only on condition that they terrace the slopes and thus control erosion.[50]

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The need for the terracing of slopes became especially apparent in Java in the coffee lands that the peasants had to plant under the forced-culture system. Many of these lands were completely exhausted after a few years, and Holle showed that this rapid exhaustion occurred because the topsoil had been washed away by heavy rains. In 1873 he wrote detailed instructions for the terracing and cultivation of coffee lands.[51] However, Holle's instructions and the stipulations of the Ordinance of 1874 were subjected to criticism and often ignored. In 1889, therefore, the Government of the Indies asked Forester Berkhout to investigate the practical results of the application of terracing to tegalans. Berkhout's report summarizes the arguments for and against terracing; these still make interesting reading.[52] The arguments against terraces on tegalans were put forth as follows:

1. The people are not used to terracing dry land.
2. Terracing demands more labor.
3. It reduces productivity in the first year if the land is rather steep and the humus layer thin.

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[50] Article 5 reads: "Dat bij hellend terrein zoo er gevaar bestaat voor afspoeling van de bouwkruin, de aanleg geschiede terrasgewijze, en voorts onder zoodanige voorwaarden als plaatselijke omstandigheden wenschelijk maken." Ontginnings-Ordonnantie, *Staatsblad 1874*, No. 79.

[51] Nederlandsch-Indische Maatschappij: Handleiding, 1873.

[52] Berkhout: "Terrassenaanleg," 1892, pp. 139–141.

‡ [See p. 117, cat. 116 --Analyst]

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The Agricultural Advisory Service of the Netherlands Indies for many years carried on experiments with green manures and recommended a variety suitable for different conditions, but the main obstacle to the application of their research was the difficulty of introducing green manure into a crop rotation. Some of the green manures used in Java are *Crotolaria anagyroides* H. B. and K., *Crotolaria usaramoensis* Baker, *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., *Calopogonium mucunoides* Desv., *Centrosema pubescens* Benth., *Centrosema plumierii* Benth., and *Mimosa invisa* Mart. Green manure requires a relatively large amount of water in order to produce the desired foliage. If there is sufficient water, the peasants can also grow other crops such as legumes, which supply food as well as fertilizer. Most of the peasants of Java have so little land that they cannot afford to sacrifice a single food crop from a field in spite of the probability of an increased yield after the green manure has been plowed under. Although it is preferable to grow green manure unmixed with other plants, the planting of a green manure crop among the food crops is recommended where land is scarce. This is done in Java, especially in maize and cassava fields. The specific green manure that is chosen should meet the following conditions:[59]

1. It should have a rapid growth,
2. An abundant production of leaves,
3. No excessive development that might harm the main crop,
4. An absence of climbing or trailing stems;
5. The plant should have deep roots with many nodules;
6. It should not become woody too easily—as herbaceous plants decompose much more quickly; and
7. It should be immune from the diseases and insects that attack the main crop.

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Another agricultural practice common to many parts of the world, especially the tropics, is mixed cropping, which seems to bring in its train some of the advantages of rotation.[60] Nicol stresses the great importance of having leguminous plants grown among non-leguminous plants. He points out that the legume component in the mixture provides nitrogen to the non-legume.[61] In various parts of India—for example on the Bombay Deccan—bulrush millet (*Pennisetum typhoideum* Rich.) is grown with various legumes. This can be done year after year without greatly affecting the fertility of the soil. No crop rotation is practiced here. The proportion of bulrush millet to legumes varies according to the quality of the land; the poorer the land, the smaller the proportion of millet and the larger the proportion of legumes. Wallace wrote in 1887:

> The growth of mixed crops is a widespread practice which is well worth consideration and study. . . . The advantages . . . are distinctly great. . . . There is

[59] International Institute of Agriculture: Use of Leguminous Plants, 1936, p. 60.
[60] Willis: Agriculture in the Tropics, 1914, p. 29.
[61] Nicol: "Mixed Cropping," 1935, p. 189.

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but one explanation of the existence of these practices, viz., that they have been found advantageous after long experience and much careful consideration on the part of a body of workers who, for power of observation and an intelligent interest in and knowledge of every day occurrences, would put to shame those classes which hold a corresponding position in educated Europe.[62]

Well known is the American Indian's practice of interplanting maize, beans, and squash. Chinese and Japanese peasants practice mixed cropping widely, and we may observe it almost everywhere in Southeastern Asia. Intensive mixed cropping in the garden culture of Java has already been described (see above, pp. 43–45), but there is relatively little interplanting of legumes with non-legumes. On dry fields the peasants of some parts of Java are accustomed to interplant cassava and maize—both, however, non-legumes. Whereas maize can be harvested after 100 days, cassava needs up to a year or more of growth. Cowpea (*Vigna sinensis* Savi), Goa bean (*Psophocarpus tetragonolobus* DC.), Lima bean (large) (*Phaseolus lunatus* L.), and hyacinth bean (*Dolichos lablab* L.) are also interplanted with cassava. On tegalans in Bali, in 1941, I observed the following crops grown with upland rice: *Eleusine indica* Gaertn., sesame (*Sesamum indicum* L.), and pigeon pea (*Cajanus cajan*). This last enriches the soil as a result of its large production of leaves as well as by the nitrogen in its nodules.

Kaserer has noted that there is little or no interpenetration of plant roots of the same species when they are grown together, whereas a significant degree of root interpenetration takes place when two different species are grown in close association, the degree of interpenetration increasing with the degree of dissimilarity. In one experiment, for example, a legume and a non-legume showed the maximum amount of root interpenetration, the explanation apparently being that one plant takes up the nutrients produced, or made available, by the other.[63] If these observations are correct we have here a scientific argument for the value of mixed cropping. Further studies are needed to determine the desirability of improving and extending it in specific areas.

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Another important method of improving the fertility of dry fields is the use of compost. Vegetable composts are employed extensively in India and Africa. The masters at making compost from household refuse, vegetable waste, and human excreta are the Chinese, who cling to this method of fertilization wherever they practice truck farming in the neighborhood of urban centers in Southeastern Asia. Fungi and bacteria are used to break down suitable mixtures of vegetable and animal wastes. A method that was developed in India is the "Indore process" in which, "by arranging these mixtures in the proper way, and by watering and turning them, to supply moisture and air, the waste materials are transformed in about ninety days into a finely divided humus rich in the foods required by grow-

[62] Wallace: India in 1887, 1888, pp. 196 and 198.
[63] Kaserer: "Beobachtungen," 1911, pp. 1022–1030.

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ing crops. The process can be adapted to climate by manufacture either in shallow pits or low heaps."[64] 241 242

Dry-Field Crops Cultivated by Peasants

The list of dry-field crops cultivated in Southeastern Asia is rather large, but there are regional variations. Cassava, for example, is commonly grown on tegalans in Java (2,300,000 acres), whereas it is unimportant in Sumatra, Borneo, the Philippines (40,000 acres), Malaya (24,000 acres), and Indochina (75,000 acres). The most important dry-field crops are up- 241 311

TABLE IV—CHEMICAL COMPOSITION OF CASSAVA AND IMPORTANT CEREAL FLOURS [146]

	CASSAVA (PER CENT)	MAIZE (PER CENT)	WHEAT (PER CENT)	RICE (PER CENT)
Moisture	10.75	13.41	13.65	13.12
Protein	0.87	7.56	12.35	9.85
Crude fat	1.19	2.79	1.75	0.88
Ash	1.24	1.78	1.81	1.51
Crude fiber	6.12	3.19	2.53	0.63
Carbohydrates	79.83	71.27	67.91	74.01

Source: The Cassava Industry in the Philippines, 1939, p. 7.

land rice, maize, cassava, sweet potatoes, peanuts, soy beans and other pulses, tobacco, and sugar cane, all of which are annuals. Of the first four, only upland rice is a native of Southeastern Asia, whereas the other three are natives of the New World and were introduced into Southeastern Asia by the Spaniards in the sixteenth century.

The inhabitants of Southeastern Asia have long relied upon root crops, fruits, leaves of various plants, and wild roots and tubers gathered in the forests, as well as upon rice. Scheltema refers to a number of early statements which indicate that "rice was not yet the principal food for a large portion of the native population [of Java] as late as the first part of the 19th century and that the rice diet has become much more important in the course of the past hundred years" as a result of the great extension of the cultivation of irrigated rice fields.[65] If it is correct that the rice consumption per capita increased during the past century, the opposite trend has been evident during the present century. For a while the increase in the area of irrigated land was great enough to allow for a larger rice production, but with the steadily increasing pressure of population the peasants now have to depend more and more upon unirrigated land. Thus the production of dry-field crops is gaining in importance. 241 262

Authorities in Southeastern Asia have been especially worried over the increase of cassava production and consumption. Because of the exhaustion of the soil fertility on many dry fields, the growing of upland rice and 241 134

[64] Worthington: Science in Africa, 1938, p. 387.
[65] Scheltema: The Food Consumption, 1936, p. 10.

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●241 134 [146] maize has become unprofitable, and many peasants have changed over to cassava, which makes lesser demands upon soil fertility. The per acre yields of cassava are high, and the plant is a source of carbohydrates, fat, and protein. From the standpoint of dietary needs, however, the ratio between carbohydrates on the one hand and protein and fat on the other is unfavorable. People who live on cassava merely fill their stomachs. The insufficiency of protein intake is detrimental to their health. Table IV[1] compares the chemical composition of cassava, maize, wheat, and rice.

243 146 262 Maize, as the table indicates, compares quite favorably in protein content with wheat and rice and is especially rich in fat. It has gained an important position in the diet of the people of central and eastern Java, Madura, the island of Cebu, and the Cagayan Valley in the island of Luzon. Both maize and cassava are easy to store and therefore have a great advantage over sweet potatoes, which must be consumed soon after they ripen.

241 In Thailand maize is an important crop on the Khorat plateau and in other regions where dry land is available. Among the root crops cassava has gained a greater importance than taro and yams. The last two are grown mainly by Chinese gardeners in the neighborhood of large towns. Cassava, too, is grown commercially by Chinese, especially near the railroad on the peninsula.

Most of the so-called dry-field crops are grown in Indochina during the dry season on land that is flooded during the rainy season and at that time [311] produces rice. Gourou has estimated that in Tongking 100,000 hectares of land are used exclusively for the production of dry-field crops and that 350,000 hectares of irrigated land are occupied by such crops during the dry season.[66]

This practice of growing dry-field crops on irrigated land during the dry season is especially widespread in Java, where population pressure is so great that the peasants have to use every possible means to enlarge their food supply. If there is not enough water available to grow a second wet-rice crop, they will always try to get a second harvest of quick-growing dry-field crops during the dry season.

In contrast to the peoples of Java, the Filipinos do not, as a rule, go in for the raising of dry-field crops on wet riceland during the dry season, although this should be possible if the land were cultivated. There is enough water in the soil a short distance below the surface for the growing of crops practically everywhere during the dry season. Repeated tilling would keep the soil soft and fine so that water could move upward by capillary action to replace that which is lost through evaporation. Cultivation would enable plants such as maize, peanuts, and soy beans to grow on land that otherwise would be baked dry and hard. Although the ratio between cultivated land and population in the Philippines does not make a dry-season crop a necessity in most regions, there are a number of districts where the peasants traditionally raise a dry-season crop on irrigated

[66] Gourou: Les paysans, 1936, pp. 407–408.

1 [see page 75, cat 116 -- Analyst]

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land. An example is *mongo* (*Phaseolus mungo* L.), grown in Pangasinan and Batangas. Alarmed by the poor rice crops in 1940 and the difficulty of importing rice from Indochina and Thailand, the Philippine Bureau of Plant Industry, early in 1941, started to distribute seed of quick-growing dry-field crops, especially maize and legumes, in order to supplement the nation's rice bowl. But the average Filipino farmer is reluctant to accept this new practice, because "it is not the custom"—a powerful argument not to be easily overcome. [249] [654] 241

Dry-Field Crops Cultivated by Plantations

The discussion thus far has been limited to the native cultivation of dry land and to annual crops. However, extensive areas of non-irrigated land are occupied by perennial crops that are grown on plantations owned by Westerners. The crops produced include tea, coffee, cacao, quinine, rubber, palm oil, coconuts, kapok, sisal, and other fibre plants. Some of these crops were cultivated for a long time without the proper measures being taken to protect the soil against accelerated erosion. Although the detrimental effects of plantation agriculture in Ceylon and southern India are notorious in the plantation history of southern Asia, results were just as disastrous in Malaya and in the Netherlands Indies. Westerners, accustomed to clean cultivation or clean weeding in the temperate zone, carried this practice over into the tropics, with the result that soil erosion was very severe on steep slopes and led to great losses in soil fertility. Today, however, these mistakes have been recognized; there is hardly a plantation that has not adopted measures to protect sloping land against erosion and level land against soil exhaustion. The planters of Java were the pioneers in this field, introducing or developing most of the protective measures. These measures include contour drains, silt pits, contour ridges, terraces, hedges, shade trees, and especially cover crops. The use of these measures varies according to the crop, or crops, produced and according to climate, soil, and slope; but the purpose of all of them is to encourage an effective ground cover and to check the rate of water run-off. The financial depression of the 1930's—resulting in the need for very strict economy and a decrease in production costs—has helped considerably to reduce the amount of clean weeding and to convince conservative planters of the value of preserving a ground cover, litter, and mulch. Such measures help not only to retard erosion but also to enrich the soil. The first Western planter who broke away from the custom of keeping the ground of his plantation free from weeds was L. M. Tyl, who in the years 1890–96 developed the "weed-system" and thus introduced the idea of a ground cover into plantation circles of Southeastern Asia. But it took many years before his idea was generally accepted. It is interesting to note here that the Asiatic-owned plantations and the small holdings producing perennial crops, such as rubber, usually did not practice clean weeding. This, in the early days, was regarded by European observers as a sign of laziness and 241 177 185 242

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poor management, but, as has been so often the case, the Westerners were finally forced to admit the soundness of Oriental cultivation practices.

As we have seen, there are two principal means of protecting the soil between tree crops: by allowing the growth of indigenous plants or weeds (in other words the development of a natural mixed cover), or by establishing a pure cover of leguminous plants, many of which came originally from the New World. Rubber planters in Malaya seem to have had more success with the first method, which has been called "the forestry method of cultivation" or "rubber forestry."[67] Of course, the growth of indigenous plants or weeds must be controlled, and this is done by slashing the undergrowth from time to time. Frequently it is necessary to practice selective weeding in order to suppress undesirable plants and encourage more valuable ones.

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Much research has been directed toward the study of leguminous cover crops which supply nitrogen, as well as foliage for green manure. This research was started in 1910 in the Botanical Garden at Buitenzorg. Some of the cover crops that have proved especially valuable and are widely used on modern plantations are *Calopogonium mucunoides* Desv., *Centrosema pubescens* Benth., *Centrosema plumierii* Benth., *Desmodium* species, *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., *Mimosa invisa* Mart., *Cassia* species, and *Vigna oligosperma* Backer.[68] Several of these have already been mentioned in the foregoing discussion on the use of green manure crops in native agriculture.

Because a number of perennials such as tea, coffee, and cacao are commonly grown under shade trees, many writers seem to believe that these plants need shade. This may be true in part, but more important is the fact that the shade trees protect the soil against excessive losses of moisture and undesirable changes in soil composition, texture, and structure and thus prevent a reduction of the quantity of humus in the soil. Most of the commonly used shade trees are legumes which, in addition to shade, supply litter and nitrogen and help to increase the moisture-holding capacity of the soil, thus reducing the danger of erosion. *Erythrina micropteryx* Poepp., *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., *Leucaena glauca* Benth., *Albizzia moluccana* Miq., *Albizzia chinensis* Merr., *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Pithecellobium dulce* Benth., or Manila tamarind, and *Peltophorum pterocarpum* Backer are especially useful in this respect.

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[67] Haines: "The Uses and Control of Natural Undergrowth," 1934.

[68] For a very extensive list of cover crops, green manures, and shade trees, see Heyne: De nuttige planten van Nederlandsch-Indië, Vol. 3, 1927. See also International Institute of Agriculture: *op. cit.*

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may induce flooding of the valley above the narrows. The Tasek Bera of Malaya in this way reflects constrictions in the Pahang Valley;

(*e*) the presence of levees means that the zone between them and the foothills has difficulty in draining to the river after a flood or during a downpour, so the levees are generally lined landwards by broad freshwater marshes, as by the rivers across the Korat Plateau in Siam (Fig. 90);

(*f*) where local rain seasons coincide with the arrival of spates, originating elsewhere in the local rivers, the landscape cannot shed the direct rainfall rapidly and it induces marshes.

Most of the freshwater marshes are seasonally flooded, drying out quickly in spells of drought, draining when local streams are low, but then flooding to depths up to 10 ft. during wet seasons.

Some types of swamp are man-induced. When alluvial mining is being carried on, dredges and gravel pumps effectively stir up large quantities of river sediment which is carried downstream as the mining effluent (Fig. 21).



FIG. 21.—Alluvial Fans being thrust across Bentong Valley

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311 This artificially stirred sediment is agriculturally negative and
133 it penetrates the ditches and drains of rice growing areas,
gradually silting them up, often spectacularly raising the
● 241 local river bed (at Serendah in Malaya, the river bed was
134 raised 21 ft. by sedimentation over the decade 1923-33), as well as sterilising fields on which the silt spreads so that cultivation becomes more difficult as the river can no longer be kept out. The yields decrease and the fields are abandoned, swamp vegetation gradually obliterating signs of cultivation. Round the lower Malacca River may be found signs of the old field bundings within the tangle of swamp vegetation now growing there, a sign of the effects of mining higher in the river whose effluent is obliterating cultivation in lower areas. This type of swamp comes slowly and has all the appearance of nature overcoming men's efforts to farm, but it is fundamentally a result of man-induced erosions or abrasions elsewhere. Thus interference, by mining and forest clearing, with landforms stabilised over long periods, not only goes on by removal of silt and gravels carried from mining areas and topsoils removed by torrential rains on clean-weeded agricultural areas as a mark of transfer of surface materials from one area, but it also causes the obliteration of cultivation and an extension of useless marsh in the areas where this material is deposited.

133 Because these tropical marshes occur in zones of human signifi-
361 cance, that is, in the flatter areas with agricultural possibilities, and along the coasts where settlement from overseas might take place, they have played a major part in conditioning the distribution of human beings in Southeast Asia. Both the coastal and inland marshes are tree-covered, making it even more difficult to penetrate, control, or cultivate them. Varying degrees of swampiness often account for the ease of development of farming in one place rather than another in Southeast Asia and a broad belt of marsh has generally proved a greater human impediment than any other topographic feature.

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Chapter Four

SOUTHEAST ASIA'S NATURAL VEGETATION

Tropical Forest Factors

The heavy, evenly distributed rainfall and constant high temperatures of most of Southeast Asia encourage continuous plant growth and a profuse, very varied flora. Because the whole year is here a growing season, plant life becomes almost overpowering in its rate of growth. This region contains more species than any other; the flora is not yet completely known, but some 35,000 species of flowering plants alone are thought to exist there (van Steenis). On Borneo at least 11,000 species have been listed, according to Merrill. This contrasts with the parallel figure of 13,000 species for the whole of Tropical West Africa (Good). Woody plants predominate and 15 per cent of the species are trees whose mature trunks are over 16 in. in diameter. The profusion of species is due to (*a*) the predominantly warm, moist climate, (*b*) the constancy of this climate over long geological periods, (*c*) the variety of relief and islands producing minor adaptations, (*d*) the rapidity with which selective and adaptive evolutionary processes can establish new characteristics in a tropical climate which has no resting season, and (*e*) the migrations of plant types from both Asia and Australia.

Southeast Asia was originally clothed by nature almost entirely by a tree cover. Only in modern times has there been any extensive clearing because apart from firing, primitive people were technically incapable of removing the forest. Some clearings became permanent for cultivation, in recent centuries, but the majority have been temporary and partial clearings, later left to natural replacement by a selective vegetation such as grass, savannah or scrub. Temporary clearings resulted largely from systems of shifting cultivation which finally abandon an area, partially cleared by fire, to a series of quick-growing plants, becoming after a few years a secondary forest which may, over prolonged periods, evolve to be scarcely distinguishable from primary forest.

The system of migrant agriculture or shifting cultivation, in Malaya called *ladang* and in Burma *taungya*, is widespread through-

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[31 24] 137 out Southeast Asia and it may be this form of nomadism has in fact operated so long that it affects nearly every acre of the region, thereby exercising a distinct selective action on the whole forest (Sauer). Much forest which we call "primary" may be senile secondary. This is evident in more densely populated areas such as Java and Tonkin, and over the centuries may have no less influenced the forest types of even thinly populated zones, as Borneo still is. In this sense "primary forest" is a relative term, to be retained for convenience rather than as presupposing an absolutely virgin tropical forest.

Two main types of primary lowland forest may be distinguished, the critical factor being drought:

1. In those zones astride the Equator where no season may be called dry, the natural forest is a tall, leafy, congested and evergreen type known as Tropical Rain Forest, sometimes called Equatorial Rain Forest. It may even occur well away from the Equator, towards the northern limit of Southeast Asia, where certain local conditions create a more continuously wet climate than is normal for the latitude.
2. In localities where there are several consecutive months practically without rain, a shorter and more open forest type develops: it has deciduous foliage on the whole, and considerably fewer species. Deciduous Tropical Forest is more generally known as 'Monsoon Forest' and occurs over huge areas in eastern Java, Burma, Siam and Indochina.

Between these Tropical Rain Forests and Monsoon Forests, there are intermediate types and transitional areas where no single meteorological criterion can be used to define the boundary sharply. Within both types, local peculiarities of soil porosity, number of rain-days, relief, exposure and aspect all induce minor variations. In any given unit of this mountainous region, three zones of vegetation may be distinguished within both main forest types, these zones being more distinctive in their differences than the variations of vegetation from one part to another of this huge region. These zones are: (1) coastal vegetation, (2) lowland vegetation, (3) mountain vegetation.

(1) Coastal Vegetation

On shores predominantly sandy, short herbs, grasses and shrubs with creeping stems and fleshy leaves are found; these plant

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134 induces an upflow of groundwater which evaporates and thereby precipitates solubles in the topsoil. These have sometimes been called the Savannah Soils, found extensively in Siam and Indochina. The type occurs not only where the climate permits but also where destruction of marginal Tropical Rain Forest has gone on at a rate faster than natural replacement. Because tropical forest soil works with a very small quantity of plant nutrients circulating rapidly in a cycle from soil to leaves and back again to soil, the balance is delicate. Where the forest is almost virgin, natural fires do little damage, but persistent burning by men may break the cycle of nutrients and release altogether the small initial capital of solubles. The iron concretions under such conditions become firmly cemented into subsurface platforms inimical to anything except coarse tropical grass and the topsoil is exposed to rapid removal by torrential storms. The more accessible laterites which received early examination were often under vegetation of the savannah type and they were thought at one time to be signs of a change of local climate, from Equatorial to Savannah, whereas in fact they reflect over-destruction of the original tropical forest, followed by such a change of soil type that the forest cannot re-establish itself. Because laterite is very porous, rain falling upon it may be heavy yet quickly passes beyond the reach of plants, carrying all plant nutrients away, thereby preventing regrowth of the original vegetation cover.

Natural savannahs in Southeast Asia are noteworthy for their extensive iron concretion layers which provide support for the view that vertical fluctuation of subsoil water is a factor in the formation of lateritic iron-pan.

Soils and Agriculture

134 241 The different types of tropical forest induce minor differences in the soils beneath them, which assume major significance when the forest is cleared for cultivation. The limited supply of plant nutrients explains that paradox between the apparent fertility of an elaborate and profuse forest vegetation and the poverty of the soil when the forest is removed, the cycle of nutrients broken and most solubles washed away. Eventually clearances in the forest mean an increase in the outflow of nutrients in solution or suspension which are finally distributed into the swamps, the estuaries and the sea. To some extent the practice of burning, which reduces the forest to

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ash, lying for a while upon the surface, returns to the soil part of the chemicals of plant structure, yet unless steps are taken to retain this "capital" by terracing or cover crops, the ash quickly dissolves and disappears into the streams. Good crops may be obtained by utilising this soil capital immediately, but it can last only for a season or two, after which the natural infertility of laterised soils becomes apparent. It is not so serious with isolated native clearings, done under the shifting cultivation system, because each clearing is so small, and surrounded by forest, that lost soil nutrients are not carried far before they are recaptured into the forest ecology by the tangle of adjoining vegetation. When shifting cultivation is done too frequently over the one patch, that is, more frequently than, say, once in twenty years or so, then progressive impoverishment of the soil takes place. Maintenance of fertility in clearings is easier in less maturely laterised areas and where there is at least a short, dry season to interrupt the depletion processes. 134 241●

The basic volcanic rocks of Java as well as the recent ash and mud flows contain chemicals which weather to plant nutrients and, being in addition very young in the laterising cycle, they produce fertile soils. On the older lavas and on the acid outpourings, a maturer stage of laterisation has been reached to produce soils no better for agriculture than other parts of the Sunda Platform. A new volcanic outburst, while creating temporary havoc, may ultimately produce local agricultural prosperity because it brings a new supply of plant nutrients. The elaborate terracing of new volcanic ash landscapes is only partly due to population pressure: it equally reflects the need to restrain the run-off and to hold back the solubles as long as possible. 134

Apart from the loss of soil fertility due to rapid solution, all bare or clean-weeded soils in the tropics suffer from mechanical erosion by the violent torrential rainstorms. Rainfall of tropical intensity rapidly gullies all bare landscapes and is particularly evident on the less cohesive ashes of volcanic cones, so that another reason for terracing is to offset gullying. Tangled vegetation prevents mechanical soil erosion having any great significances in forested areas, but in Java, where recent ash and intensive cultivation combine to facilitate this type of erosion, rivers contain from 300 to 2,000 gms. of silt per cubic metre; the Irrawaddy has about 750 gms. suspended in each cubic metre. (The Seine and Rhine only contain about 50 gms. of silt per cubic metre.) From tropical forest in a

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Chapter Twenty-two

SOUTHEAST ASIA AGRICULTURE

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SOUTHEAST Asia has several agricultural types which are, however, less related to major climatic or environmental differences between one place and another and more to differing rates of agricultural development. To these rates of development the greatest impulses have derived very largely from conditions outside the region and most of the crops concerned have been introduced from outside. The system of shifting cultivation, often described as indigenous to Southeast Asia, is associated with all tribes and groups entering Southeast Asia overland from continental Asia, and the key crops of today, rice, sugar, tea, coffee cotton, rubber and maize have all been brought from overseas and cultivated largely with the object of sales overseas. Prior to the introduction of these plants, agriculture centred on root crops, on sweet potatoes or yams, which are still staples for the more isolated and hence more primitive groups.

SHIFTING CULTIVATION

Of the agricultural types particular interest attaches to shifting cultivation because it represents a special stage in the evolution from hunting and food gathering to sedentary farming. Within this style considerable variations exist, from the clearing used for cultivating yams and bananas, probably the earliest form of land utilisation by peoples wandering through the jungles, to shifting cultivation of coffee and pepper by farmers intending to sell these crops, which are so exacting in their soil requirements. Some shifting cultivators are true wanderers: the whole group, family or tribe, moves on to a new location when it abandons one clearing for the next. Others are sedentary farmers, staying in one village all their lives, but varying the piece of ground they cultivate from time to time, abandoning the old piece to secondary forest growths, which can be thought of as a form of fallow. This last type has a long tradition in Java, the Philippines and Indochina, and has blended with the custom by which a tract of land belongs

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241 to a group, the individuals of which choose or are given, every now and again, different portions to cultivate for themselves.

231 Within Southeast Asia the shifting cultivation system has no relation to the needs of domesticated animals. There is no evidence here that the simpler tribes have been primarily cattle grazers, except in so far as all Mongoloid types coming south overland

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

FIG. 111.—The Accessibility of Southeast Asia by Land

231 from the grazing grounds of Tibet and farther north may, at remote times outside this territory, have been associated with animals. Inside Southeast Asia, cattle do not fit well into the ecology of climate, vegetation and pests, and the disinterest in animals has become part of the religious tradition; Buddhists and Hindus do not eat beef, Muslims will not eat pork and even the primitive animists have similar inhibitions. Wherever today there has grown up a cattle system, it relates to the ploughing needs and is concerned with buffaloes or small oxen and does not derive from an earlier tradition of cattle farming or nomadism.

241 Shifting cultivation is a system well adapted to large empty areas where soils are poor and the rate of soil erosion high. As soon as population increases, shifting cultivation, which needs each cutover area to stand unused for 7 to 10 years before being

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recultivated, rapidly overtaxes the capacity of the forest vegetation to reassert itself. Hence much of Southeast Asia has been progressively overburnt by the increasing forest population and the natural cover has selectively changed towards the savannah vegetation type, a progress speedier in the drier zones where the regrowth rate is slower. Overburning caused by overpopulation in turn induces rapid soil erosion, affecting the load and silting of river systems, possibly disturbing settled agriculturists far down the valley and remote from the overburnt area. For these reasons shifting cultivation has generally become illegal, yet it still persists in areas not easily accessible or amenable to control and probably even today as much as 5 million acres of temporary clearing each year is being cultivated over Southeast Asia, and between 40 and 50 million acres of clearings in the forests is being cultivated or is recovering from recent temporary cultivation—an area not far short of the total area of Siam. From the shifting agricultural system, very little that is of trading or commercial significance derives; the proportion in coffee and pepper is negligible. As a whole, shifting cultivation is for subsistence only, yet it is an integral part of the regional farming tradition.

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Subsistence Farming

Farming of the ordinary sedentary type has in this region evolved from shifting cultivation as pressure of population on the land increased. Fixed cultivation can only be sustained where local conditions prevent soil exhaustion and soil erosion, or natural conditions counteract these inevitable effects of cultivation. Thus farming gravitates to the localities dry for a part of the year, where leaching is a periodical rather than a permanent process, to localities where erosion and leaching are negatived by altitudes nearly at base level, to zones where the soil is the accumulation of fertile elements from other areas, or to zones of young soils rich in nutrient chemicals. The dry zones are away from the Equator and towards the "monsoonal fringes" of the tropics; flat flood plains beside mature streams are subject to little erosion and leaching; deltaic and basic volcanic soils remain fertile for long periods. These facts underlie the pattern of sedentary farming in Southeast Asia which occupies a total area of almost 97 million acres.

The greater part of this farmland, about two-thirds, is given

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over to subsistence farming, a system where practically nothing leaves the farm, which only grows what the family needs for food, the family needing all that it grows. Subsistence farming is at once deeply rooted in the tradition of the people and at the same time isolation, difficulty of access and absence of communications largely force it upon much of the region, which remains for the greater part as isolated now as it was several centuries ago, and must even grow its own fibres for textiles. On subsistence farms the interest centres on rice, an almost universal staple in Southeast Asia, and only in the most congested areas, such as the Vizayas and Java, is there any well-established practice of growing some other food as substitute for rice. Rice dominates the diet even where local conditions do not seem favourable, as in the dry zones of Burma and Siam or in the relatively gloomy, rain-soaked areas immediately round the Equator. At least 90 per cent of subsistence farmland is under rice, the balance of supplementary food needs (coconuts, spices, fruits and pulses) occupying a very small fraction of any one farm and often being gathered wild rather than cultivated. The dominance of rice, even among the hill peoples, is the more remarkable because the plant was apparently introduced by Indian colonists some time about the middle of the first millennium, since when thousands of varieties have been evolved to suit the subtle differences of local climate, seasons and soil.

In total, Southeast Asia subsistence farming has continued with methods evolved locally centuries back. The hoe or mattock and the dibble are still the only soil-working implements in many areas, even on paddyfields, but ploughs of the soil-opening rather than the soil-turning type have become widespread, generally home-made and entirely of wood, that raw material ubiquitous in this terrain. With the plough came the need for draught animals and most subsistence farms now have one buffalo or ox per family, the former being favoured towards the Equator, the latter in the drier or more seasonal areas.

Commercial Farming

Farming for crops intended to be sold, that is, commercial or cash farming, came late to Southeast Asia. Except in one or two districts of the Philippines and Java, cash basis farming is scarcely a century old and many types of crude adjustment to this innovation

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may be found. The oldest cash farming of Southeast Asia was the spice trade of the Moluccas, but even at its peak that trade involved very few areas given over exclusively to spices, which for the greater part were collected from farmers each with a tree or two, rather than a number of acres devoted to a crop of spices. The crux of the matter at that period was that nothing cultivated in Southeast Asia apart from spice was transportable to or of use to the world's population centres overseas. To a large extent over the present millennium Southeast Asia has been an absorber rather than a supplier of goods or commodities; only in the last hundred years or so has the condition changed, not so much by new demands for Southeast Asia products as for crops transferred to Southeast Asia for production. 241

Rice.—Commercial agriculture in the whole region occupies about 35 million acres and has taken two forms, both strongly influenced by European interests: farming food crops for sale, and farming non-food crops for sale. Of the food crops, sugar was the earliest successful innovation established in Java and the Philippines soon after European colonisation began, and intended for export to Europe. Today at least half the area devoted to crops grown for export is in rice and, taking into account the amount of rice grown for cash sales in deficit regions inside each territory, the proportion may reach as much as three-quarters. Upon commercial rice production depends the possibility of workers leaving their own farms and devoting their full time to non-food cash crops, so that the workers on rubber, cotton, hemp, coffee and sugar plantations have provided a great demand for Asia's staple cereal, supplies of which have been vital to the development of plantation and mining industries of Southeast Asia and, incidentally to the industrialisation of other parts of Asia. The bulk of the rice produced in Southeast Asia for export has gone to India and China, where a condition approaching the limit of rice-growing has been reached, and to Malaya and the Outer Islands of the East Indies. Japan too was becoming a major rice importer until 1941. All this rice export came from Burma, Siam and Indochina in that order of importance, territories which have pioneered in rapidly expanding commercial rice production to form the pool, the only rice-pool in the world, from which other areas have made up their deficits. Moreover the commercial production of rice in Southeast Asia has been steadily increasing over the last 20 years—the average 243

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to smallholder systems, leading to the smallholder becoming an exponent of diversified rather than single crop cultivation.

While the region has sought to escape the consequence of overmuch dependence on one or two cash crops, Southeast Asia subsistence farming is really already highly diversified. Moreover, the region as a whole must be considered reasonably well diversified in the range of commercial crops it produces, even though individual districts within Southeast Asia are monocultivated rather than polycultivated.

Effects of the Second World War

During the 1941–42 campaign, battles were fought through Burma, Malaya and the Philippines. More military action took place in Burma and the Philippines over the year 1944–45. The direct long-term effects of these campaigns were not emphatic because agriculture and arboriculture cannot be "scorched" and denied to the enemy on a large scale. The war in these territories devastated internal communications, broke down the systems of internal trade, removed the means of communication between different parts of Southeast Asia and destroyed the channels to those overseas markets which had been the principal destination of commercial agricultural produce. Breakdown of external trade channels occurred in all Southeast Asia territories whether campaigns took place in them or not.

The first consequences of this disruption, as distinct from destruction, were to place a premium on subsistence farming, to cause all commercial cultivation to fall into desuetude, to undermine confidence in agriculture for cash, to cause the loss or destruction of draught cattle which were taken away for military use, to disperse labour forces, and to stimulate self-sufficiency policies. Very little of the perennial tree acreage, such as of rubber, was cut down—only 6 per cent in the case of Malayan rubber—yet it was the commercial production which suffered most from disruption, which created in the postwar period considerable difficulties for those territories needing imported rice for the labour to rehabilitate commercial farming and industries. Agriculture itself, where labour was available, rehabilitated quickly; all but 2 per cent of Malayan rice acreages were back in cultivation during 1945–46 and rubber made an equally quick comeback, so

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that about one-third of its prewar estate area was being tapped in 1947, representing two-thirds of the area tappable.

In the food crops, surplus margins were more slowly restored. Exports of Southeast Asia rice totalled about a million tons during 1946, as against a combined export of 5.7 million tons annually for 1936–40. The drop in production of this staple was greatest in the case of Burma because there the dislocation by war had been greatest, but by the 1946–47 season, about two-thirds of Lower Burma rice acreages were back in cultivation, as against half in 1945–46. In Cochinchina over 70 per cent of the rice area was being cultivated in 1946–47. Siam which was untouched by military campaigns reported 10.6 million acres under cultivation in rice for 1946–47 (22 per cent more than 1939–40)—the only territory to show a substantial increase of rice acreage in the immediate postwar years.

A postwar feature has been the general decline in rice yields, mostly an effect of loss of draught cattle, though to report low yields was a convenient cover for black market sales. The consequence of lost production in local food was felt more in places like Malaya which has specialised in non-food commercial agriculture, than in any other territories of Asia, which customarily needed to import only a small margin and not the majority of their rice. For the Philippines in 1947, the United Nations reported that *per capita* consumption of rice was actually higher than in 1939 by about 5 per cent.

Since labour shortage has been prominent as a factor operating against postwar commercial agriculture, the subsistence farmer and the diversified smallholder have assumed far greater significance than before. Over 55 per cent of Malaya's rubber production for 1946 was from smallholders, a proportion which had been as much as 85 per cent in the early months of that year, yet fell to 45 per cent in 1950 (cf. 39 per cent in 1940).

The vegetable oils soon came back into production and by early 1947 monthly production in Southeast Asia was not far short of 1941 production and now exceeds it.

The general lowering of food acreages and of yields, combined with the enforced reversion to subsistence agricultural forms, has a special significance for Southeast Asia food supplies over the next few years, because the restricted food supply comes at a time when population is rapidly increasing, at the rate of about 20

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million people per decade, and when social policy is for raising the standard of nutrition. These two factors mean that the prewar rice exporters are on every score likely to continue to have less margin for export. How the communities will meet this basic difficulty of supply in their staple food is not clear ; mechanisation is scarcely a solution, yields are very difficult to raise on a large scale, and there are few unused areas of high potential for rice farming, yet unless improvement is reached the labour force is unlikely to remain in non-food producing territories, rice may be for such areas a luxury and not a cheap staple, and the costs of any production must remain high. Influences of this sort in a region where average productive skill is low and slow, may cause it to become one of the world's most costly producer zones and hasten in Europe and the United States the exploitation of substitute commodities which lend themselves to mechanisation more than is the case with typical Southeast Asia agricultural products. It may happen that rapid peopling of Sumatra, Borneo and New Guinea deltas may take place, much as the continental deltas of Southeast Asia were quickly filled with people over the last 50 years; the fact that there has been previous reluctance to go to these places is no guarantee that there will be continued reluctance. Southeast Asia may even become a consumer for rice cultivated in the new areas of South America and Northern Australia. Perhaps some startling innovation of crop or technique will change the otherwise rather gloomy picture, much as the opening up of Canadian, Australian and Argentine wheatlands speedily altered the similarly gloomy outlook for European wheat-eating peoples at the end of last century.

Directions in these trends of Southeast Asia agriculture are difficult to determine because there are major stratifications of local society both vertically and horizontally which are in process of readjustment, aggravated by currency confusion and widespread ignorance. These will take time to reach an equilibrium and during that period subsistence farming and its nationalist corollary, territorial self-sufficiency, are likely to be strong influences working against a great revival of commercial activity of any sort, with the result that Southeast Asia may not continue indefinitely in its prewar role of one of the world's major sources of supply. Against this must be weighed the proved ability of tropical agriculture to respond quickly to new impetuses.

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profitable and bringing about its extension. The problem must be attacked simultaneously through drainage and irrigation, agricultural betterment and the co-operative department.' One outcome of its recommendations was the reconstitution of the irrigation department in 1932, and the investigations of the new department confirmed the previous impression that 'all over the country padi lands were steadily going out of cultivation.... Even in the fine padi plain of Province Wellesley, ...conditions were steadily deteriorating, the cultivators in debt, and their *kampongs* (villages) often indicating a state verging on poverty.' During the next few years upwards of 40,000 acres were added to the existing irrigation schemes.[1] At the same time, under the influence of the depression there was a fall in the price of rubber, and by 1934 the area under rice had grown by over 100,000 acres. In the following year, however, with a rise in the price of rubber, the area under rice fell by 35,000 acres. Thus although there was a wide area available for extending the cultivation of rice, and the fall in the price of rubber consequent on the depression encouraged cultivators to prefer rice cultivation, which at the same time was stimulated by compulsion, by extensive new irrigation and by the discovery of more productive strains, yet, with a population that increased between 1926 and 1936 by 29 %, the area under rice expanded by only 11 %.[3]

Area under rice[2]

(acres, 000)

1924–5	654
1929–30	657
1933–4	767
1937–8	726

This brief survey of the attempts to foster and improve rice cultivation in Malaya suggests that neither compulsion nor the efforts of the agricultural service to enhance production met with much success, and it contains many lessons of general application regarding the relation between economic services and the increase of production. The failure of agricultural experts to increase native production is often explained on the ground that it is difficult 'to persuade a conservative and easy-going peasantry to improve their methods',[4] and that the economic motive, the desire of gain, does not appeal to 'natives'. This is the easiest and most comfortable explanation of all failures to enhance native welfare; it is their fault and not ours. But it is inconsistent with the facts. While the Malayan was reluctant to grow more rice, he was taking readily to growing rubber. All over the Tropical Far East, native rubber has expanded rapidly, sometimes in the face of opposition. Similarly in Java the opposition of planters and

[1] Mills, pp. 262, 272, 274.
[2] Wickizer and Bennett, p. 314.
[3] *Ib.* p. 195.
[4] Mills, pp. 251, 259.

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of some officials could not stop the people from cultivating sugar instead of the less profitable rice.[1] In Africa as in Asia the people are only too ready to substitute commercial crops for food crops, and in parts of the Gold Coast and Tanganyika the farmers are coming to depend on the market for their food.[2] Everywhere the acreage of new crops under native cultivation rises and falls with the demand. The adoption of new crops is nothing new. In Netherlands India, of all the produce now cultivated by natives, only the coconut, soya and the spices are indigenous, and even rice is an immigrant. All the staple crops have come in from abroad over a period of many centuries, and that is true also of Burma. In Africa bananas, rice, wheat, and sugar were introduced by the Arabs in the seventh century, and the sweet potato, cassava and maize are attributed to the Portuguese. In the most notable modern developments of native production, agricultural services have played a very minor role. In Burma the two outstanding innovations in agricultural practice, the introduction of hard rice for the European market and, later, of groundnut, both preceded the creation of an agricultural department. So also did the substitution of transplanting for broadcasting in rice cultivation, which became general when the price of paddy rose sufficiently to justify the extra cost. In Africa 'the production of cacao in the Gold Coast and of groundnuts in Northern Nigeria are examples of the development of new industries almost without aid, when the African has been satisfied that production is possible and within his capacity...(and)...this wide adoption of maize and other crops, which are comparatively recent introductions is further evidence of capacity of adaptation'.[3] Where new crops or methods of cultivation are profitable, compulsion and expert assistance are unnecessary; where they are unprofitable, compulsion and expert assistance are of no avail.

General experience shows that even if tropical peoples fail to evince a desire of gain before contact with the West, this is one of the earliest lessons which they learn. For the introduction of new and more profitable crops it is not even necessary that the cultivators themselves should make the profit. Where economic development leads to land alienation and rack-renting, or wherever rents are fixed by competition, the land goes to tenants who can pay the highest rent, and cultivators are compelled therefore to adopt new and more productive crops, or cheaper methods of cultiva-

[1] *Netherlands Indie*, p. 321.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 864–7, 961.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 883, 886.

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tion, even though the profit goes to the moneylender or the landlord. If an agricultural service can make the cultivation of any crop more profitable either to cultivators or landowners it will increase production; if it does not increase production, the presumption is that it has not enabled cultivators, working under local conditions and with the means at their disposal, to get a better return.

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Even in Europe the application of modern science to agriculture is comparatively recent, and practical agriculturists are apt to view the suggestions of experts with suspicion not always unjustified. But the scientific study of tropical agriculture is still in its infancy, and experts must be cautious in their recommendations, for, if they base suggestions on experience in Europe, they are liable to make mistakes. For example, in Europe cultivators prize a warm soil and in the tropics a cool soil, and in other ways conditions are reversed, but specialists are not always capable of adapting to a tropical environment what they have been taught in Europe. In Burma deep ploughing was recommended to rice cultivators, until experience showed that this breaks up the hard pan which holds the water. The early rubber leases in Burma required planters to grow at least 400 trees to the acre, whereas the optimum number was about 80. Western planters condemned the neglect of natives to weed their rubber holdings until the recent depression, by precluding expenditure on the weeding of plantations, taught them that it reduced the yield of sap. Mistakes are accepted as inevitable by western planters, but shake the confidence of native cultivators in western science. There is no doubt that modern science can do much to improve agriculture in the tropics. It has already done much in Netherlands India, where the 'great cultures' have been built up on a scientific basis. But it is European agriculture that chiefly benefits from the modern science of the agricultural service. Naturally agricultural experts can do more for planters who believe in them, seek their help and employ methods of cultivation with which they are familiar, than for peasants who have no faith in modern science and believe, often not unjustly, that they know most about their own job; and just as naturally, where, as formerly in Malaya, there is a choice between helping the planter or the peasant, agricultural officials tend to do the work that is more obviously useful, and prefer to help the planter rather than the peasant.

But the immaturity of scientific agriculture in the tropics, the lack of continuity in policy and experiment, and the prior claims of planters

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to assistance are matters of comparatively small importance. A far more serious obstacle to the success of agricultural experts is their ignorance of tropical economy. Everywhere production is a social function. In Europe we are apt to overlook this fact because our methods of production grow out of our established social life, and, because we do not notice it in Europe, we tend to disregard it in the tropics. The agricultural official is usually an expert in scientific agriculture, but one cannot expect him to have an expert knowledge of native social life. That is not his business; he is an agriculturist and not an economist. Consequently he tries to adapt native life to scientific principles instead of adapting scientific principles to native life, and, if the people do not accept his suggestions, he regards them as unreasonable. Under experimental conditions some new crop or new method of cultivation may seem profitable, but under the conditions of village life it must fit in with the established rotation of crops and with the available supplies of water and labour. In Malaya, for instance, if the new strain of paddy, said by the agricultural service to increase the yield by 30 %, had given corresponding results in practical experience, it is difficult to believe that during the next five years the area under rice would have remained practically constant. In Burma at one time there was a suggestion that sugar palms should be cut down or taxed out of existence, the demand on fuel for sugar boiling was considered uneconomic; fortunately before much harm had been done, it was discovered that palm trees were a stand-by of the cultivator against famine, because drought does not affect the yield until the following year. Similarly, in Africa, 'agricultural experts are becoming more chary of introducing sudden changes in African agricultural technique, for, they say, Europeans lack knowledge of local conditions, and the indiscriminate application of European technique, such as the use of the plough, has in some places had disastrous results'.[1] 'An examination of the present methods used by natives to produce food or cash crops will reveal a planned effort, the balance of which may easily be upset by ill-considered innovations.... Such a system is of proved value in native eyes, and is peculiarly adapted to native conditions of life; it needs careful study before improvements can be recommended which are not only sound in themselves but will appeal to the cultivators.'[2] These things lie outside the province of agricultural science, and are not within the competence of experts.

[1] Wilson, p. 118.

[2] *African Survey*, p. 960.

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In other matters not only the agricultural expert but the individual cultivator is helpless, and even the whole village, working as a common unit, can do nothing. Production is a social function that extends beyond the village. In Malaya, as we have noticed, it has been recognized that the problem of making rice cultivation profitable requires the co-operation of numerous departments. (This raises the question of departmentalism, which we shall have to examine more generally.) Another illustration of the wide range of what may appear simple agricultural problems may be found in the marketing of crops. In Burma groundnut, and new varieties of beans and onions spread rapidly, without instigation from the agricultural service, because they found a market and were profitable. But attempts by the agricultural service to introduce chickpea, chillies and tomatoes where there was no market, met with failure, and the cultivators lost their time and labour. Tomatoes are widely grown and in one district cultivators were induced to grow a more productive variety. They obtained larger crops but could not sell them, because the flavour did not appeal to the Burman palate, and there was no local European market. Again, millers wanted a special variety of paddy. The agricultural experts produced a variety to meet their wants, and found cultivators to grow it. But it needed a special adaptation of the milling machinery, and this was impracticable unless the new variety was available in quantities requiring the co-operation of many cultivators over a wide area, so that those who grew it had to accept a lower rate and not, as they had been led to expect, a higher rate for their produce. Every such misadventure shakes confidence.

For these and other reasons the possibility of increasing native agricultural production through the assistance of an agricultural service are very limited. Similar obstacles beset the veterinary and other services. In general, economic services can increase production only where they appeal to the desire of gain by enabling the people *as individuals* to make more money; even this, as will appear below, does not always imply greater welfare. Many improvements, however, as we have seen, are profitable to individuals only through co-operative or collective action, and many, though possibly tending to increase the total volume of production, are prejudicial to the peoples as individuals. In such cases it is necessary either to appeal to some motive other than the desire of gain, or to employ compulsion. An appeal to social welfare requires conditions that are not easily fulfilled, and becomes more difficult with the increasing 'atomization'

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654 of native social life; ordinarily therefore a remedy is sought in compulsion.

The resort to compulsion for improving output raises new difficulties. Where the expert aims at helping the cultivator to earn more, both have a common object, and the results are readily apparent and can be measured by the standard of profit, which both recognize. If the expert tells the cultivator that some new variety will give a larger yield or fetch a better price, the results soon test the value of his counsel. It is a different matter when experts recommend measures that may possibly improve production in general over a long period, but require time to test their value and, in the first instance, entail trouble or loss to individuals.[1] If they advocate the eradication of dangerous weeds, the use of chemicals for spraying, the destruction of diseased crops, the cutting down of oil palms to protect the market, the inoculation of cattle at the risk of death, the castration of undesirable sires, or the slaughter of cattle to prevent infection, the benefits are distant and uncertain, and the disadvantages immediate and obvious. In such matters they cannot expect the co-operation of the people, but must rely on inspection by a costly staff of numerous subordinates on low pay, ignorant and probably corrupt. Under indirect rule they may enlist the help of native chieftains, but this, like all attempts to employ the chieftains as agents of western policy, tends to undermine traditional authority. Finally, the success of measures of this kind depends not on blind obedience but on genuine acceptance through a recognition of their value. If the regulations intended to promote efficiency are sound, one would expect Europeans to comply with them more readily than natives, yet it seems that in some matters there is least progress on European estates, 'where control is much more difficult to exercise'.[2]

654 241 Measures to make production more profitable may gain acceptance if in the long run they show a profit to individuals, even though entailing a temporary loss; it is true also that, so long as a communal sentiment survives, individuals may acquiesce in personal loss for the benefit of the community. In time, if possibly a long time, the value of such measures can be demonstrated, and assessed in terms of money. But it is a different matter to increase the production of unprofitable crops. In such cases the agricultural service and the cultivators have no common standard. If it is difficult and dangerous to interfere in native economy where output and profit, debt and land

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 912, 934, 937. [2] *Ib.* p. 970.

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alienation provide comparatively simple tests of the results, the objections are much stronger where experts run counter to the profit motive, and where their recommendations are based, not on agricultural or veterinary science, but on western views as to the nature and purpose of tropical economy. The attempt has often been made and often, perhaps invariably, failed. In Java in the reaction against the Culture system 'officials were so zealous in promoting the cultivation of rice rather than export crops as to insist on the cultivation of long-lived paddy, even where the soil or water supply was unsuitable'.[1] In Malaya, rice land was found to be going out of cultivation although regulations enforcing the cultivation of rice had been imposed for over thirty years. To-day history is repeating itself in Africa. 'The expansion in the growth of marketable crops has seemed to be leading to a dangerous reduction in subsistence crops', and 'there is to-day a much clearer recognition of the need for organizing subsistence production.' Accordingly provisions for the encouragement of subsistence crops have been framed in Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika and Uganda.[2] Whether they will have greater success in Africa than in Java or Malaya time will show. They are unlikely to strengthen the authority of the native dignitaries enforcing them, or to foster affection towards the western Government responsible for preventing cultivators from turning their labours to the most profitable account; nor are they likely to make the agricultural service popular or to facilitate its work in other matters.

Moreover, in directing economic activities along these lines, it is hard to escape bias, and still harder to escape the suspicion of bias. When Europeans try to 'prevent the unwise extension of the growth of economic crops',[3] they are inevitably exposed to the unpleasant suggestion that they are chiefly considering western interests. We have seen that, in Malaya, it was the loss sustained by Government and the planters through the neglect of subsistence crops, that stimulated activity in promoting rice cultivation. In Africa interest in food crops grew with the need for healthy labour. Measures to encourage subsistence crops may easily be interpreted as meant to discourage unwelcome competition, and the more so because at various times the planting interest has, in fact, opposed the native cultivation of sugar, rubber and coffee. Even with the best intentions

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 167.
[2] *African Survey*, p. 631; *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 23.
[3] *African Survey*, pp. 635, 887, 978.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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it is obviously no easy matter to decide whether the extension of cultivation for the market is wise or unwise, and, in view of the generally inadequate acquaintance with native social and economic life and the deficiency and inaccuracy of tropical statistics, the material for a sound decision is unlikely to be available.

The foregoing remarks deal mainly with native agriculture, but this is the chief occupation in the tropics and has received most attention from colonial administrations. Similar considerations apply to other economic services intended to promote native enterprise. Undoubtedly native production grows, and often very rapidly, under western rule. But this is the natural result of greater security of life and property, and of the opening up of new markets, and in the past it has grown rapidly without the help of economic services, as the stimulus given by western rule to the desire of gain has been sufficient. The application of modern scientific methods to native enterprise should make it more efficient. That is the function of economic services. In practice, however, their contribution to the increase of production is confined within narrow limits. They can increase production only by making it more profitable to individuals and for various reasons, some of which we have noticed, this is rarely possible except in such matters as the introduction of new crops, which does not call for expert knowledge. Economic services can and do render much help to western enterprise, and they are useful instruments of progress; but they can do comparatively little to improve native enterprise. Thus the argument that development is necessary to provide funds for economic services in the interest of native enterprise is of doubtful validity and requires closer scrutiny than it usually receives.

4. Economic Services and Welfare

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Unless economic services make native production more efficient, they obviously must be ineffective in enhancing welfare. But they may promote efficiency by increasing production or in other ways without contributing to native welfare, and may even have contrary results. In Malaya, so far as the agricultural service enabled cultivators to obtain a larger yield, it did not enable them to make a greater profit. One obstacle was a ring of Chinese mill owners.[1] 'The Malay had no option save to sell at the price offered by the middleman

[1] Mills, pp. 255. 261.

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THE PEASANTRY OF SOUTH EAST ASIA [1]

PROFESSOR RAYMOND FIRTH, F.B.A.

000 IF it is not wholly true that the social and economic reconstruction which is so necessary in Asia today must begin with the peasant, it is certain that no programme which omits the peasant can be on firm foundations. The recent history of China is evidence enough for this. My concern, as a social anthropologist, is with the analysis and classification of social relations between people and groups of people, rather than with political or economic affairs as such, although inevitably I cannot dis-
128 regard them. So my aim is to show briefly some of the most important
121 aspects of the social organization of the South East Asian peasant communities, and of the values by which this organization works. Though the details in my paper refer mainly to Malaya and Indonesia, I think the generalizations have some value for the South East Asian region as a whole.

If the basic features of the peasant society are ignored, one can understand neither the peculiar tenacity which it still possesses in modern conditions, nor the reactions of its members to the increasing impact of ex-
121 ternal economic and political forces. The definition of a peasant is a
565 countryman—a man engaged in rural pursuits, primarily agriculture, with a comparatively simple technology and a special interest in the land he
463 works. In South East Asia one may extend the application of the term to
241 cover the majority of fishermen and even village craftsmen too. They are
226 of the same social class as the agriculturalists, and often members of the same families. As occupational groups, they may even be separable only
32 in theory, since many a peasant farmer is also a fisherman or craftsman by turns, as his seasonal cycle or his cash-needs influence him. What R. H. Tawney has said of agriculture—that it is at once a craft, a business, and a manner of life—can be applied more widely here; the problems of all these peasants alike are partly technical, partly financial and commercial, and partly cultural and social.

162 It is difficult to say just what proportion of the present population of
565 South East Asia may be classed as peasants. It would seem that in nearly
241 every South East Asian country two-thirds or more of the total population
463 is to be found in agricultural communities, tilling the soil. In 1930 the
32 census of Java and Madura in Indonesia gave about 70 per cent of the male workers as dependent for their livelihood on native agricultural output, and
462 about 75 per cent in the regions of Indonesia outside Java and Madura, while large numbers of women were engaged in home craft production. In Siam, in about 1930, almost 90 per cent of the population lived in agricultural communities, rice production providing the living of about 80 per

[1] Originally delivered at a meeting at Chatham House on 21 February 1950.

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162 cent of the population. Malaya, of course, is exceptional, because of the
565 especially heavy concentration on the production of rubber and tin. Ac-
241 cording to the 1947 census of Malaya, about 34 per cent of the working
463 population were classed as cultivators and fishermen working on their own
32 account or as unpaid members of families. In all, I think one could reckon
462 that rather more than 100 million people in South East Asia can be regarded as peasantry.

[412] Throughout all this region, peasant technology is simple; skills, though
134 traditionally well adapted to the job in hand, are of limited range. Soils,
241 despite the richness of some of the swamps and river flood-plains, are generally of poor quality. The system of felling and burning the jungle, taking off crops for a few years, and then moving away to cultivate fresh clearings while the old ones revert to jungle, is still common in the mountain areas of Burma, Malaya, and Siam, in part of West Java, in much of Borneo, and in the outer islands of Indonesia. It is known as shifting cultivation or jungle-fallowing. Although regarded as extremely primitive, it is an economic use of land in areas of low population density, where plentiful land allows of long rotation of clearings and consequent restoration of soil fertility. But where population is dense, the system cannot provide the necessary volume of production without endangering the future soil capital, and that is one of the major problems of the area. In the more sedentary forms of agriculture, fertility is conserved with a great deal of care, by manuring, by water control, and so on. Sometimes there is very elaborate and spectacular terracing, as in parts of the Philippines or in Bali, where the native cultivator through his own efforts through generations has known how to make the best of the land with his available techniques. Yet many of these techniques are only of limited efficiency, and custom may be a barrier to improvement. For large masses of the Muslim peasantry of South East Asia, for instance, the pig, an excellent economic converter of resources, is taboo for religious reasons.

433 Productivity of the South East Asian peasant is apt to be low, whether
241 considered in terms of the margins required above subsistence to give him
565 and his family the range of goods and services they want, or by comparison with Western results. It is hard to make this last comparison significant because of the differing bases, but the following figures will give, perhaps rather superficially, some idea of the comparison. In terms of cwt. of cropping per acre, for instance, the rice crop of part of South East Asia can be compared roughly with the wheat crop of Western Europe. The figures are taken from different years, but they can be regarded as significant averages. Java at 12 cwt. of rice to the acre corresponds with France at 12 cwt. of wheat to the acre; Siam at 14 cwt. to the acre with the United Kingdom at 18 cwt. and Germany at a little less; Japan at 27 cwt. of rice per acre corresponds to Denmark with 27 cwt. of wheat per acre. Yet rice is supposed to be a crop of much higher yield. What is more significant is that productivity per acre in both Malaya and Indo-China is only 10 cwt. on the average, or only between one-third and one-half of the average in Japan.

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on the average, or only between one-third and one-half of the average in Japan.

Moreover, in any comparison between South East Asia and the peasantry of Europe, quite apart from differences in the production of crops other than the staple grain, there is an important difference in the average size of the holdings worked. The South East Asian peasant has fewer acres than the peasantry of Europe. In France, a country of peasant agriculture, about 40 per cent of the total number of agricultural holdings in 1931 were less than 2½ acres apiece; the average size of this group of holdings was 1½ acres each. But about 45 per cent of the total holdings were between 2½ and 22½ acres, with an average of about 10 acres each. There are areas in South East Asia where the average size of peasant holdings is fairly large. In Cochin China, while 72 per cent of the landowners have holdings between 2½ and 12 acres, there are provinces where more than half of them have holdings above 12 acres in size. In Siam, too, the average peasant holding seems of tolerable size—4 acres or so in the south and north east, 5½ acres in the north, and 10½ acres in central Siam, where more than one-third of the rural families live. But in Java, in 1938, the average size of holdings was only just over 2 acres for all tax-paying landowners in the country. In the Tonkin delta of Indo-China, another large area of heavy concentration of peasantry, as much as 60 per cent of the peasants have been reckoned to own holdings of less than nine-tenths of an acre, and 90 per cent to have holdings of under 4½ acres apiece. It has been estimated that a peasant family needs for adequate support 2½ to 5 acres of land, cultivating it by 'wet rice' methods. Many sections of the farming population in Java and Indo-China, for instance, are obviously well below this critical level. Even though large-scale irrigation and very intensive land use, including double cropping of rice in the year and much use of secondary crops, may lower the critical figure considerably, the peasant in such conditions is always liable to have to seek work outside his holding or to put up with inadequate living standards, even in nutrition.

The difficulties of agriculture in such conditions are further increased by the fact that a man's holding is often not a single undivided farm, but a set of dispersed fields, some of very small size. This dispersion and fragmentation of holdings allows for some advantages in adapting crops to soil and water variations, and is some security against wholesale raids by pests, but it makes for technical difficulties in the use of implements and labour on any scale. Since the dispersion is due primarily to traditional customs of inheritance and marriage, efforts to secure consolidation are apt to be only of temporary benefit, though some success has attended administrative action against undue fragmentation.

The same comparatively low level of productivity is seen in fishing, which gives the one great source of animal protein to the South East Asian peasant's diet. Before the war a Malay peasant fisherman produced on the average 1½ tons of fish per head per annum and in 1947 nearly 1 ton per

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427 But the alien planta-
565 tions and even alien smallholders have threatened to grasp at it, and the
177 advances of Western medicine, so beneficial in many ways, have only accelerated the rate of increase of the population which has to seek a livelihood from it. In most parts of South East Asia the peasant is the actual owner of the land he tills, often legally under some agreement with
426 the State. But his rights to the produce are often severely limited by a heavy burden of indebtedness. The real effects of this may be less than people sometimes think, because when the debts are spread among neighbours and kinsfolk interest may be waived, repayment is sometimes protracted or ignored, and the debt may be serviced by other than material means. But there is no doubt that the peasant producer is badly hampered by his debt load. It is most pressing when debt is contracted to a member of an alien ethnic group, an Indian or a Chinese, for whom the transaction is a purely commercial one.

563 The role of alien Asiatic ethnic groups is one of the most significant
565 features in the economic and political life of the peasantry of South East
177 Asia today. For many centuries, Indian and Chinese trading influences
178 have met in the South East Asian region, and Indian religious concepts
439 have penetrated deep into many of its social systems. But for more than four hundred years the dominant commercial and political note has tended to be sounded by Europeans. Now the balance is altering. Colonialism may have set the modern structure of South East Asian society, but the patterns will persist when the colonial Powers have withdrawn. To this new society the Chinese above all have the economic key. In Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, the Philippines, and Java, the Chinese have penetrated the economic system and taken over crucial functions. They have shared in much of the wholesale import trade, they have attained pre-eminence in retailing vital imported goods to the peasant, and they act as middlemen for the collection, storage, and processing of peasant export products. As part of this process they often finance the peasant producer by advances on his crop, gaining a double profit by giving part of these advances in goods, not cash. The Chinese achievement has been remarkable. They have been kept on the margin both of the peasant society with which they deal, and of the European society with which at a later stage their growing wealth would allow them to associate. Though lacking any formal political power, which in the Orient as elsewhere is so often the passport to success, they have built up a trading structure of extraordinary toughness, elasticity, and elaboration.

565 The wider political implications of this are not my concern here. But
609 it is important to note three points in connexion with the peasant theme.
186 One is the xenophobic reaction of the local urban dwellers and of peasants
578 too, which has periodically found expression against the Chinese, as traders or residents in South East Asia, in the form of riots and other disturbances.
563 Another is the reaction of the Chinese, whose economic strength has given
241 them confidence, and who are now prepared to stand by their claim to a

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real stake in the countries of the Nan Yang, as settled members of the local society, and not as aliens. The third point is that the Chinese community has never been one of middlemen only; there has always been a fair proportion of cultivators within it. The poor peasantry of South East Asia now includes a Chinese as well as an indigenous element. The 1947 census of Malaya shows 45,000 Chinese engaged in rice growing, and another 100,000 in market gardening and fishing, essentially peasant pursuits.

The pressure to which the South East Asian peasant has been subjected by the combination of Western and other alien influences has been severe. But we must beware lest we misinterpret it. In a recent book which gives a comparative analysis of the agrarian situation in the countries of South East Asia, appears a striking statement about Malaya—that development of mining and rubber industries has pushed the native Malay population more and more towards the east, into the areas of the former Unfederated Malay States: 'The Malays', it is said, 'considered the east as safe from Western penetration, and therefore preferred this undeveloped area to the irrigated lands on the western coast, mainly because there they could get only temporary land licences, since a complete survey of all potential tin-bearing regions had not yet been made'.[1]

It is true that the eastern States are predominantly Malay in population, and that the greater part of the vast immigrant population of Malaya is densely settled on the western side of the peninsula, where the resources are richer and access easier than on the eastern side. It is also true that there has been some lack of enthusiasm among Malay peasants to colonize the new Government-developed irrigation areas, for complex reasons, including lack of capital in the past, and disinclination to move from their ancestral homes. But it is quite incorrect to put these facts together and to argue that the Malay has been pushed by alien pressure over from the west to the east of the peninsula. Apart from some seasonal movement for rice harvesting or fishing, the internal migration of Malays is inconsiderable, despite the rapid development of communications in recent years. Both the 1931 and the 1947 census show that whatever movement takes place—well under 10 per cent—is almost wholly from one State to another, either on the west coast or on the east coast, or to Singapore. Hardly any movement at all occurs from the west to the east. Moreover, the 1947 census shows that between 1931 and 1947 the Malay population of the western States increased by about one-third, at a rate slightly higher than that of the eastern States. The proportion of Malays in these western States, in terms of the total population of all ethnic groups, also increased slightly during this period, due primarily to the decline of Indians and Indonesians. In other words, though foreign economic penetration has immersed the western Malay in a flood of alien elements, it has not driven him away. On the contrary, he has preferred to stay and await events.

[1] Erich H. Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia* (New York, Colombia University Press, 1949) p. 113.

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Irrigation systems also fall into two categories: peasant irrigation works and technical irrigation works. The former have existed throughout Southeastern Asia for more than a thousand years. In recent times scientifically trained engineers have designed large-scale systems with concrete weirs and locks. Fields solely dependent upon impounded rain water produce one rice crop a year, whereas irrigated fields often yield two crops. If even with irrigation only one crop can be produced, yet the irrigation system assures proper water control, whereas without it irregularities in the course of the rainy season may damage, or destroy, the crop. 243 312 [177]

Wet fields are protected against erosion by leveling, terracing, and dyking. But how does continued cropping affect the fertility of wet-rice fields? Diverse environments and cultural practices in Southeastern Asia create considerable differences in this respect. Much of the paddy land of the Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, and Burma has lost a good deal of its original fertility because the peasants have not used manures, fertilizers, or crop rotation. In many instances, however, soil fertility has been preserved by the mineral matter dissolved in the irrigation water and by the silt deposited on those fields that are supplied with irrigation water coming from streams. The value of the water and silt depends, of course, upon the nature of the parent material from which it is derived. Rivers from a young volcanic region supply much richer water and silt than do those that drain a mountain region consisting of sedimentary rock or granite. For this reason, the Irrigation Service of the Netherlands Indies before making final plans for a new irrigation system takes samples of water and silt carried by rivers at different times of the year. The samples are analyzed in order to determine their influence upon the soil to be irrigated. A river found to be carrying water and silt that would lower the value of paddy land would be eliminated as a source of irrigation water, or its use would be limited as much as possible. 243 134 312 [654]

Irrigated fields of which the water supply does not contain minerals in quantities necessary for continuous satisfactory plant growth and paddy land that depends exclusively upon rain, both require other techniques for maintaining fertility. In many regions cultivators cut the rice stems just far enough below the ear to allow bundling. This practice makes possible the return of the rest of the plant matter to the soil. From this it is only one more step to work household refuse into the ground together with ashes of burned rubbish, rice husks, leaves, and manure.

As stable manure is not available in adequate quantities, intensive studies of the application of green manures to the cultivation of rice have been made in a number of countries of Southeastern Asia. A recent article by W. Bally reviews the results of these studies.[14] In a few rice-growing regions the peasants, on their own initiative, have learned to use legumes to improve rice soil. In wet fields the decomposition of green manure takes place under anaerobic conditions, and the final product is ammonia. Since 243 134 242

[14] Bally: "The Employment of Green Manures," 1936, pp. T10–T31.

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243 [137] 242 134

rice takes up nitrogen in the form of ammonia, the value of green manures on wet-rice fields is apparent.[15] In the Indies, *Crotolaria* species are the most frequently used green manures, the favored one being *Crotolaria juncea* L.; but *Phaseolus lunatus* L., *Dolichos lablab* L., and *Pachyrrhizus erosus* Urban are also used. The peasants of the Red River delta in Tongking are in the habit of working into the ground the wilted matter of a number of legumes that have been grown primarily for seed. The peasants of the province of Nam Dinh have developed a technique that may be unique. They push handfuls of indigo branches into the ground between the rows of rice a few days after the latter has been transplanted, for they believe that indigo is superior to pig manure or human excreta. In Indochina rice-growers frequently cultivate green manure, especially *Crotolaria* species, on dry fields and carry it to the rice fields at the time when these fields are being prepared for the seedlings. A green manure used exclusively in a few districts of the delta land of Tongking is the small aquatic plant, *azolla*.[16] Certain villages, thanks to favorable circumstances, have specialized in the growing of azolla to sell to the surrounding country, while other villages reproduce the plant until sufficient quantities of green manure have been obtained to cover all needs. The life cycle of azolla is completed in the months from November to April or May. Only the villagers of LaVan know the secret of maintaining and multiplying the plant during the hot season. They guard this secret jealously since it is the basis of their livelihood.

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Further studies are needed to establish which varieties of green-manure plants are best suited to the various environmental conditions. It is important to find plants that grow rapidly and can be sown when the rice is still on the field, just after the water has been drained off to allow the grain to ripen. Experiments should also be made in the timing of the application of green manure. Should it be early, or just before the transplanting of the seedlings? Should it be on dry or on wet land?

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Crop rotation also has its place as a means of keeping up the fertility of wet-rice fields. This practice seems to be better developed and more prevalent in Java than in any other country of Southeastern Asia. Extensive areas of *sawah*, as the Javanese call their wet riceland, are planted with dry-field crops such as maize, legumes, and other vegetables during the dry season, a practice that has a beneficial effect upon the soil. This form of double cropping is probably better than raising two rice crops in one year, because—although a different variety of rice is chosen for each season—both make essentially the same demands upon the soil; whereas a peanut crop, for example, grown during the dry season will enlarge the nitrogen content of the soil. In some areas of Java lowland rice is rotated

[15] Imperial Bureau of Soil Science: Tropical Soils in Relation to Tropical Crops, 1936, p. 11.

[16] For a map showing the extent of the use of azolla, see Gourou: Les paysans, 1936, p. 392. For further discussion see Nguyên-cong-Tiêu: "L'azolle," 1930, B, pp. 335–350 (also in *Proc. Fourth Pacific Science Congress, Java, 1929*, Vol. 4, 1930, pp. 355–370).

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with sugar or tobacco grown under plantation management. But is the high fertility of the soil due to this crop rotation, or is it rather the result of the heavy application of commerical fertilizer and the thorough cultivation of the soil under Western management? 242 134 249

In no country of Southeastern Asia is there so great a variety or so intensive a use of commercial fertilizers as in Japan.[17] In general, the peasants of Southeastern Asia lack money for commercial fertilizers. In Indochina local phosphates are within reach of some of the Annamese, but the costs of imported fertilizers are prohibitive. In Java, although attempts to make possible the use of fertilizers through the agency of public credit institutions were successful in some special instances, not more than one per cent of the cultivated area received any commercial fertilizer in 1939. On the other hand, estimates indicate that more than 1,000,000 hectares of sawah have a phosphate deficiency and that a moderate application of phosphate would augment the yield by 25 to 50 per cent.[18] 242 [654]

The Agricultural Advisory Service was able to raise the productivity of wet-rice fields in West Java by about 10 per cent. It encouraged the peasants to use fertilizer on seedbeds, to sow rice more thinly on the beds (thus producing stronger seedlings), and to plant the seedlings in rows so that weeding could be done with a special instrument, the *landak* (Fig. 59). This weeder was developed in Japan. During the years immediately preceding 1939, these improvements in West Java resulted in an increase in output of unhusked rice amounting to 300,000 quintals, or 30,000 metric tons, with a value of nearly 1,000,000 guilders. This shows that some improvements in cultivation may increase production without a great capital outlay.[19] 242 243 [412]

Java may be compared only with southern China and with Japan in the cleanness of its rice fields. The Filipino does not pay much attention to weeding. The Malayan, Thai, Cambodian, Cochinchinese, and Filipino rice farmers have more flooded riceland per capita at their disposal than the people of Java and can thus afford to cultivate their land less intensively. 243

Irrigation Problems

Peasant irrigation works usually take care of the fields of only one village or of a small group of people who have joined together for the specific purpose of building and maintaining an irrigation system. These works consequently are small and usually inadequate, but nevertheless they de- 312 [476] 243

17 "The chief commercial fertilizers used in Japan are pressed herrings, pressed sardines, dried sardines, other fish cakes, bone meal, soybean cake, rapeseed cake, cottonseed cake, other vegetable-oil cakes, ammonium sulphate, calcium cyanamide, calcium phosphate, and potassium phosphate. Calcium phosphate and ammonium sulphate are probably the most representative chemical fertilizers."—Wickizer and Bennett: The Rice Economy, 1941, p. 252, footnote 33.

18 Departement van Economische Zaken: Voedselproblemen, 1940, p. 28.

19 *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28.

[See p. 117, category 116. -- Analyst]

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climate characterized by heavy rainfall often concentrated in one season, and it will, unless checked, lead to the exhaustion of the fertility of the soil at a comparatively rapid rate in the tropics. In Southeastern Asia permanent dry fields are usually found on sloping ground exposed, much more than in the case of garden or wet-rice land, to the danger of erosion. Garden land is protected by dense stands of perennials, while terracing and dyking guard wet fields against destructive erosion. The terracing of dry fields is one of the most effective ways to control the loss of soil, but, since terracing requires so much labor, we find terraced dry fields only in densely settled regions, and even there the peasants often will not undertake this additional labor unless they are urged to do so by the authorities. As long as there is enough land available, the peasants prefer to let dry land recuperate by lying fallow for short periods rather than to protect it by terraces; but with the increasing density of population and the consequent shrinkage in the size of individual farms this practice is no longer possible (Figs. 61–64). [1]

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As early as the second half of the nineteenth century, K. F. Holle, the agricultural adviser in the Netherlands Indies, constantly stressed the need of controlling erosion on dry fields. Following his advice, the government, in Article 5 of the 1874 Ordinance on Alienation of Domain Forest Land, stipulated that permission to clear domain land on sloping terrain be given to the peasants only on condition that they terrace the slopes and thus control erosion.[50]

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The need for the terracing of slopes became especially apparent in Java in the coffee lands that the peasants had to plant under the forced-culture system. Many of these lands were completely exhausted after a few years, and Holle showed that this rapid exhaustion occurred because the topsoil had been washed away by heavy rains. In 1873 he wrote detailed instructions for the terracing and cultivation of coffee lands.[51] However, Holle's instructions and the stipulations of the Ordinance of 1874 were subjected to criticism and often ignored. In 1889, therefore, the Government of the Indies asked Forester Berkhout to investigate the practical results of the application of terracing to tegalans. Berkhout's report summarizes the arguments for and against terracing; these still make interesting reading.[52] The arguments against terraces on tegalans were put forth as follows:

1. The people are not used to terracing dry land.
2. Terracing demands more labor.
3. It reduces productivity in the first year if the land is rather steep and the humus layer thin.

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[50] Article 5 reads: "Dat bij hellend terrein zoo er gevaar bestaat voor afspoeling van de bouwkruin, de aanleg geschiede terrasgewijze, en voorts onder zoodanige voorwaarden als plaatselijke omstandigheden wenschelijk maken." Ontginnings-Ordonnantie, *Staatsblad 1874*, No. 79.

[51] Nederlandsch-Indische Maatschappij: Handleiding, 1873.

[52] Berkhout: "Terrassenaanleg," 1892, pp. 139–141.

[1] [See p. 117, cat. 116 --Analyst]

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The Agricultural Advisory Service of the Netherlands Indies for many years carried on experiments with green manures and recommended a variety suitable for different conditions, but the main obstacle to the application of their research was the difficulty of introducing green manure into a crop rotation. Some of the green manures used in Java are *Crotolaria anagyroides* H. B. and K., *Crotolaria usaramoensis* Baker, *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., *Calopogonium mucunoides* Desv., *Centrosema pubescens* Benth., *Centrosema plumierii* Benth., and *Mimosa invisa* Mart. Green manure requires a relatively large amount of water in order to produce the desired foliage. If there is sufficient water, the peasants can also grow other crops such as legumes, which supply food as well as fertilizer. Most of the peasants of Java have so little land that they cannot afford to sacrifice a single food crop from a field in spite of the probability of an increased yield after the green manure has been plowed under. Although it is preferable to grow green manure unmixed with other plants, the planting of a green manure crop among the food crops is recommended where land is scarce. This is done in Java, especially in maize and cassava fields. The specific green manure that is chosen should meet the following conditions:[59]

1. It should have a rapid growth,
2. An abundant production of leaves,
3. No excessive development that might harm the main crop,
4. An absence of climbing or trailing stems;
5. The plant should have deep roots with many nodules;
6. It should not become woody too easily—as herbaceous plants decompose much more quickly; and
7. It should be immune from the diseases and insects that attack the main crop.

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Another agricultural practice common to many parts of the world, especially the tropics, is mixed cropping, which seems to bring in its train some of the advantages of rotation.[60] Nicol stresses the great importance of having leguminous plants grown among non-leguminous plants. He points out that the legume component in the mixture provides nitrogen to the non-legume.[61] In various parts of India—for example on the Bombay Deccan—bulrush millet (*Pennisetum typhoideum* Rich.) is grown with various legumes. This can be done year after year without greatly affecting the fertility of the soil. No crop rotation is practiced here. The proportion of bulrush millet to legumes varies according to the quality of the land; the poorer the land, the smaller the proportion of millet and the larger the proportion of legumes. Wallace wrote in 1887:

> The growth of mixed crops is a widespread practice which is well worth consideration and study. . . . The advantages . . . are distinctly great. . . . There is

[59] International Institute of Agriculture: Use of Leguminous Plants, 1936, p. 60.
[60] Willis: Agriculture in the Tropics, 1914, p. 29.
[61] Nicol: "Mixed Cropping," 1935, p. 189.

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but one explanation of the existence of these practices, viz., that they have been found advantageous after long experience and much careful consideration on the part of a body of workers who, for power of observation and an intelligent interest in and knowledge of every day occurrences, would put to shame those classes which hold a corresponding position in educated Europe.[62]

Well known is the American Indian's practice of interplanting maize, beans, and squash. Chinese and Japanese peasants practice mixed cropping widely, and we may observe it almost everywhere in Southeastern Asia. Intensive mixed cropping in the garden culture of Java has already been described (see above, pp. 43–45), but there is relatively little interplanting of legumes with non-legumes. On dry fields the peasants of some parts of Java are accustomed to interplant cassava and maize—both, however, non-legumes. Whereas maize can be harvested after 100 days, cassava needs up to a year or more of growth. Cowpea (*Vigna sinensis* Savi), Goa bean (*Psophocarpus tetragonolobus* DC.), Lima bean (large) (*Phaseolus lunatus* L.), and hyacinth bean (*Dolichos lablab* L.) are also interplanted with cassava. On tegalans in Bali, in 1941, I observed the following crops grown with upland rice: *Eleusine indica* Gaertn., sesame (*Sesamum indicum* L.), and pigeon pea (*Cajanus cajan*). This last enriches the soil as a result of its large production of leaves as well as by the nitrogen in its nodules.

Kaserer has noted that there is little or no interpenetration of plant roots of the same species when they are grown together, whereas a significant degree of root interpenetration takes place when two different species are grown in close association, the degree of interpenetration increasing with the degree of dissimilarity. In one experiment, for example, a legume and a non-legume showed the maximum amount of root interpenetration, the explanation apparently being that one plant takes up the nutrients produced, or made available, by the other.[63] If these observations are correct we have here a scientific argument for the value of mixed cropping. Further studies are needed to determine the desirability of improving and extending it in specific areas.

241 242

Another important method of improving the fertility of dry fields is the use of compost. Vegetable composts are employed extensively in India and Africa. The masters at making compost from household refuse, vegetable waste, and human excreta are the Chinese, who cling to this method of fertilization wherever they practice truck farming in the neighborhood of urban centers in Southeastern Asia. Fungi and bacteria are used to break down suitable mixtures of vegetable and animal wastes. A method that was developed in India is the "Indore process" in which, "by arranging these mixtures in the proper way, and by watering and turning them, to supply moisture and air, the waste materials are transformed in about ninety days into a finely divided humus rich in the foods required by grow-

[62] Wallace: India in 1887, 1888, pp. 196 and 198.
[63] Kaserer: "Beobachtungen," 1911, pp. 1022–1030.

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ing crops. The process can be adapted to climate by manufacture either in shallow pits or low heaps."[64] 241 242

Dry-Field Crops Cultivated by Peasants

The list of dry-field crops cultivated in Southeastern Asia is rather large, but there are regional variations. Cassava, for example, is commonly grown on tegalans in Java (2,300,000 acres), whereas it is unimportant in Sumatra, Borneo, the Philippines (40,000 acres), Malaya (24,000 acres), and Indochina (75,000 acres). The most important dry-field crops are up- 241 311

TABLE IV—CHEMICAL COMPOSITION OF CASSAVA AND IMPORTANT CEREAL FLOURS [146]

	CASSAVA (PER CENT)	MAIZE (PER CENT)	WHEAT (PER CENT)	RICE (PER CENT)
Moisture	10.75	13.41	13.65	13.12
Protein	0.87	7.56	12.35	9.85
Crude fat	1.19	2.79	1.75	0.88
Ash	1.24	1.78	1.81	1.51
Crude fiber	6.12	3.19	2.53	0.63
Carbohydrates	79.83	71.27	67.91	74.01

Source: The Cassava Industry in the Philippines, 1939, p. 7.

land rice, maize, cassava, sweet potatoes, peanuts, soy beans and other pulses, tobacco, and sugar cane, all of which are annuals. Of the first four, only upland rice is a native of Southeastern Asia, whereas the other three are natives of the New World and were introduced into Southeastern Asia by the Spaniards in the sixteenth century.

The inhabitants of Southeastern Asia have long relied upon root crops, fruits, leaves of various plants, and wild roots and tubers gathered in the forests, as well as upon rice. Scheltema refers to a number of early statements which indicate that "rice was not yet the principal food for a large portion of the native population [of Java] as late as the first part of the 19th century and that the rice diet has become much more important in the course of the past hundred years" as a result of the great extension of the cultivation of irrigated rice fields.[65] If it is correct that the rice consumption per capita increased during the past century, the opposite trend has been evident during the present century. For a while the increase in the area of irrigated land was great enough to allow for a larger rice production, but with the steadily increasing pressure of population the peasants now have to depend more and more upon unirrigated land. Thus the production of dry-field crops is gaining in importance. 241 262

Authorities in Southeastern Asia have been especially worried over the increase of cassava production and consumption. Because of the exhaustion of the soil fertility on many dry fields, the growing of upland rice and 241 134

[64] Worthington: Science in Africa, 1938, p. 387.
[65] Scheltema: The Food Consumption, 1936, p. 10.

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land. An example is *mongo* (*Phaseolus mungo* L.), grown in Pangasinan and Batangas. Alarmed by the poor rice crops in 1940 and the difficulty of importing rice from Indochina and Thailand, the Philippine Bureau of Plant Industry, early in 1941, started to distribute seed of quick-growing dry-field crops, especially maize and legumes, in order to supplement the nation's rice bowl. But the average Filipino farmer is reluctant to accept this new practice, because "it is not the custom"—a powerful argument not to be easily overcome.

[249] [654] 241

Dry-Field Crops Cultivated by Plantations

The discussion thus far has been limited to the native cultivation of dry land and to annual crops. However, extensive areas of non-irrigated land are occupied by perennial crops that are grown on plantations owned by Westerners. The crops produced include tea, coffee, cacao, quinine, rubber, palm oil, coconuts, kapok, sisal, and other fibre plants. Some of these crops were cultivated for a long time without the proper measures being taken to protect the soil against accelerated erosion. Although the detrimental effects of plantation agriculture in Ceylon and southern India are notorious in the plantation history of southern Asia, results were just as disastrous in Malaya and in the Netherlands Indies. Westerners, accustomed to clean cultivation or clean weeding in the temperate zone, carried this practice over into the tropics, with the result that soil erosion was very severe on steep slopes and led to great losses in soil fertility. Today, however, these mistakes have been recognized; there is hardly a plantation that has not adopted measures to protect sloping land against erosion and level land against soil exhaustion. The planters of Java were the pioneers in this field, introducing or developing most of the protective measures. These measures include contour drains, silt pits, contour ridges, terraces, hedges, shade trees, and especially cover crops. The use of these measures varies according to the crop, or crops, produced and according to climate, soil, and slope; but the purpose of all of them is to encourage an effective ground cover and to check the rate of water run-off. The financial depression of the 1930's—resulting in the need for very strict economy and a decrease in production costs—has helped considerably to reduce the amount of clean weeding and to convince conservative planters of the value of preserving a ground cover, litter, and mulch. Such measures help not only to retard erosion but also to enrich the soil. The first Western planter who broke away from the custom of keeping the ground of his plantation free from weeds was L. M. Tyl, who in the years 1890–96 developed the "weed-system" and thus introduced the idea of a ground cover into plantation circles of Southeastern Asia. But it took many years before his idea was generally accepted. It is interesting to note here that the Asiatic-owned plantations and the small holdings producing perennial crops, such as rubber, usually did not practice clean weeding. This, in the early days, was regarded by European observers as a sign of laziness and

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241 poor management, but, as has been so often the case, the Westerners were
177 finally forced to admit the soundness of Oriental cultivation practices.
185 As we have seen, there are two principal means of protecting the soil
242 between tree crops: by allowing the growth of indigenous plants or weeds (in other words the development of a natural mixed cover), or by establishing a pure cover of leguminous plants, many of which came originally from the New World. Rubber planters in Malaya seem to have had more success with the first method, which has been called "the forestry method of cultivation" or "rubber forestry." [67] Of course, the growth of indigenous plants or weeds must be controlled, and this is done by slashing the undergrowth from time to time. Frequently it is necessary to practice selective weeding in order to suppress undesirable plants and encourage more valuable ones.

654 Much research has been directed toward the study of leguminous cover
249 crops which supply nitrogen, as well as foliage for green manure. This research was started in 1910 in the Botanical Garden at Buitenzorg. Some of the cover crops that have proved especially valuable and are widely used on modern plantations are *Calopogonium mucunoides* Desv., *Centrosema pubescens* Benth., *Centrosema plumierii* Benth., *Desmodium* species, *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., *Mimosa invisa* Mart., *Cassia* species, and *Vigna oligosperma* Backer.[68] Several of these have already been mentioned in the foregoing discussion on the use of green manure crops in native agriculture.

Because a number of perennials such as tea, coffee, and cacao are commonly grown under shade trees, many writers seem to believe that these plants need shade. This may be true in part, but more important is the fact that the shade trees protect the soil against excessive losses of moisture and undesirable changes in soil composition, texture, and structure and thus prevent a reduction of the quantity of humus in the soil. Most of the commonly used shade trees are legumes which, in addition to shade, supply litter and nitrogen and help to increase the moisture-holding capacity of the soil, thus reducing the danger of erosion. *Erythrina micropteryx* Poepp., *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., *Leucaena glauca* Benth., *Albizzia moluccana* Miq., *Albizzia chinensis* Merr., *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Pithecellobium dulce* Benth., or Manila tamarind, and *Peltophorum pterocarpum* Backer are especially useful in this respect.

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[67] Haines: "The Uses and Control of Natural Undergrowth," 1934.

[68] For a very extensive list of cover crops, green manures, and shade trees, see Heyne: De nuttige planten van Nederlandsch-Indië, Vol. 3, 1927. See also International Institute of Agriculture: *op. cit.*

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000 taro had been cultivated on permanent flooded fields earlier than had rice. Another possibility would be that taro, together with the technique of irrigation, was introduced into Oceania later than were the yams and alocasia, and the Polynesians' more important fruit trees.

173 A folktale of the Bontocs in the mountains of northern Luzon furnishes us with another clue. According to Bontoc lore, their hero, Lumauig, taught them agriculture in a tiny irrigated garden, which is still tended from generation to generation by a special priest. The crop of this garden is taro and not rice.[15] This would seem to lend support not only to the thesis that the cultivation of root crops preceded that of grain but also to the thesis that terracing and irrigation were already being practiced by cultivators of root crops.

241 A beautiful example of sedentary cultivation with root crops as a staple has recently been discovered in the remote Grand Valley of the Balim River in the highlands of Netherlands New Guinea. On the valley floor of the Balim and its tributaries neolithic people practice intensive cultivation, including such techniques as the use of green and animal manure, deep tillage with stone adzes, the digging of ditches to improve the run-off and drainage of swampy land, and the construction of terraces.[16] On the slopes they practice shifting cultivation. In both their shifting and their sedentary agriculture the staple crop is the sweet potato, while taro is a secondary crop. Also subsidiary are bananas, sugar cane, and pandanus.

•243 105 [137] In most parts of Southeastern Asia, however, root crops have been replaced by such cereals as millet, Job's tears, upland and lowland rice,[17] and maize. There seem to be good reasons to believe that the first cereals cultivated in Southeastern Asia under the system of shifting cultivation were foxtail, also known as Italian millet (*Setaria italica* Beauv.), and Job's tears (*Coix lacryma-jobi* L.). Before their domestication these grasses, like the root crops and fruit trees of Southeastern Asia, had been used by alithic and palaeolithic hunting and gathering people. Shifting cultivators succeeded in domesticating these plants by selecting over the course of years the species most valuable to them. Although foxtail and Job's tears have largely been replaced by the more valuable grains, rice and maize, there are still shifting cultivators in India, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya, the Indies, and the Philippines who raise the former cereals. Burkill says of foxtail,

> Such a crop as this probably came into cultivation before man had settled enough to grow the better cereals. Its grain ripens in even as little as two months and a half from sowing, and the wandering tribes of the Malay forests are able to remain in one neighbourhood long enough to catch a crop: but the usual duration of the crop seems to be four months.[18]

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15 Keesing and Keesing: Taming Philippine Headhunters, 1934, p. 56.

16 Brass: "Stone Age Agriculture in New Guinea," 1941, pp. 555–569.

17 Upland rice is also known as hill, mountain, dry-land, or dry, rice; lowland rice is also known as irrigated, wet-land, or wet, rice.

18 Burkill: *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 1999.

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Probably the grain known as Job's tears was originally domesticated somewhere in the area between India and southern China, and it is still of importance in this area, although maize has competed with it since the latter's introduction into Southeastern Asia in the sixteenth century.[19] 243

Rice, The Basis of the Agricultural Economy of Southeastern Asia

By far the most important grain of both shifting and permanent cultivators in Southeastern Asia is rice, which occurs in the wild state in Africa as well as in various parts of southern Asia. The cultivated species (*Oryza sativa* L.) is probably descended principally from two Asiatic wild rices, *Oryza fatua* Koen. and *Oryza minuta* Presl. *Oryza fatua* is thought to be the dominant ancestral strain. These two ancestors are found in moist places from the Himalaya Mountains to Ceylon and from southern China through Indochina, Thailand, Burma, and Malaya to Java, Borneo, and the Philippines.[20] Rice was probably first domesticated in northeastern India, somewhere north of the Bay of Bengal, whence the domesticated varieties have spread in all directions: southeastward through Burma into the Malay-inhabited areas, eastward and northward into Farther India, China, Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines, and westward into the Near East and beyond. 243 [137] 000

The remarkably large number of distinct varieties of cultivated rice[21] has been interpreted as evidence of the great antiquity of its domestication. In the course of thousands of years of selection, varieties have been developed that are adapted to a wide range of natural conditions and especially to varying amounts of water. These varieties may be divided into two main classes: upland, or dry, rice and lowland, or wet, rice. The division, based on the two main types of agronomic practice, is not a very sharp one. Some upland varieties can be grown in flooded fields, and some lowland varieties can be grown in dry fields; however, it is said to be easier to grow dry rices in water than to grow wet rices on dry land.[22] In general, the areas suitable for the cultivation of upland rice are much more limited than those suitable for lowland rice, which can be grown outside the regions of assured rains, provided that water is available for irrigation; whereas upland rice must be grown in a humid atmosphere with an assured rainfall over a three- to four-month period.[23]

Upland rice is grown by the shifting cultivator, into whose economy it

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19 *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 629–631.

20 *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 1593–1595.

21 According to Copeland (Rice, 1924, p. 131) some 3500 varietal names are known in the Philippines; these may be presumed to describe more than 2000 different varieties; in India, where conditions seem to favor mass mutation, some 8000 varietal names have been recorded, but we do not know how many distinct varieties these represent.

22 Burkill: *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 1595.

23 Lacking direct evidence, students of rice and its cultivation have frequently speculated on the comparative age of the two types. Some argue that the cultivation of wet rice preceded that of dry rice. They maintain that rice is, by nature, an aquatic plant. There are, however, grounds for thinking that the cultivation of dry rice is the older form. For one thing, there are wild varieties of upland rice.

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fits perfectly, for it does not require a permanent field but can be grown anywhere, on flat land or steep slopes, provided that the rainfall is sufficiently heavy and the temperature and soil are suitable. In contrast, the cultivation of wet rice requires a sophisticated technique. To adapt to agriculture in Southeastern Asia Owen Lattimore's remark on the place of irrigation in Chinese agriculture,[24] we may say that the cultivation of wet rice lies at the core of agriculture in Southeastern Asia but not at the very roots.[25]

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The sedentary cultivators of Southeastern Asia have developed not only a notable range of varieties of wet rice adapted to varying natural conditions but also many differing techniques of rice culture, which embody the experience of generations of cultivators. Every important phase of the cultivation of wet rice has many variants. The reasons for these are often hidden to the casual observer, but Western agricultural specialists after painstaking research and experimentation have been forced to concede their value.

The ordinary varieties of wet rice differ greatly in respect to the time required for maturing and the amount of water needed. Selection has led to such remarkable achievements as the development of floating rice and of salt-loving varieties. The floating rice of Thailand and Cochinchina can be grown on land subject to prolonged high floods, a condition that ordinary varieties of wet rice do not tolerate. The growing plants are able to keep up with the rising floodwater; in extreme cases, the stems may reach a length of as much as 12 or 15 feet.[26] Salt-loving rices, which can be grown on saline soils or in brackish water, are cultivated along coasts or estuaries.

The raising of seedlings in seedbeds, after which they are transplanted to the field, is the main characteristic of most Oriental wet-rice culture. This practice has given Oriental rice relatively high yields. The preparation of the seedbed itself varies considerably.[27] The commonest method of raising rice seedlings is to make the seedbed on thoroughly soaked and puddled ground. Frequently the seed is soaked and allowed to germinate before it is sown in the bed. In the northern Philippines the seedlings are raised in seedbeds that are not flooded and puddled but are left dry. When the seedlings are pulled up from either a wet or a dry seedbed their roots

[24] Lattimore: Inner Asian Frontiers of China, 1940, p. 312. Elsewhere (p. 29) he says, "To assume the working out of such a technique [irrigated rice-growing] at the earliest stages of cultural and social development implies the ability to take a second major step forward at a time when the first tentative step had barely become possible."

[243 177]

[25] In Java, for example, the cultivation of wet rice has spread only relatively recently into Sundanese territory and did not reach northern Bantam until the sixteenth century. Even today the Badoei of West Java have religious scruples against the planting of wet rice as well as against the use of the hoe or of the plow and carabao. Notwithstanding strenuous efforts on the part of the government to induce the Badoei to adopt a more intensive form of agriculture they continue to practice shifting cultivation and in the main to plant upland rice, using the dibble stick. See Kools: Hoema'a, 1935, pp. 22–23.

[26] Tran-van-Huu: "Note sur la culture du riz flottant en Cochinchine," 1920, pp. 46–54.

[27] Copeland: *op. cit.*, pp. 226–229.

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[Filed in category 253.--Analyst]
[see p. 11, category 116.--Analyst]

suffer a certain amount of damage. The seedlings must therefore be given time to grow strong enough to endure the temporary uprooting. They usually need from 30 to 40 days before they are ready for transplanting. Whenever early transplanting is necessary a technique is employed which is known in the Philippines as *dapog*. The puddled seedbed is completely covered with banana leaves, which are pressed slightly into the mud so that a thin layer of mud spreads over the leaves. On top of this is placed a layer, an inch thick, of rice hulls or finely cut straw. The whole is thoroughly soaked and sown with seeds. The banana leaves prevent the roots of the seedlings from growing into the ground and suffering the usual damage when transplanted, but the seedlings must be transplanted within two weeks after the sowing of the seed. 243

In the riparian marshes of Sumatra and Borneo—the *lebak* areas—all the land is flooded at the time when the rice seed should be put into the ground. The inhabitants of these districts, however, have found an ingenious solution to their problem: the floating seedbed. They build small rafts of bamboo, reed, banana stems, or the leaf-ribs of the sago palm, on which they place a layer of rush, or some other aquatic plant, and then a thick layer of fine mud. As the water level rises and falls the seedlings have a chance to develop on the float unharmed.

Numerous also are the techniques employed to supply wet-rice fields with the necessary water (see pp. 47–51). These reflect the nature of the terrain, the social organization, and the stage of technical development of the inhabitants. For it is obvious that the cultivation of wet rice on the plains of the Red River in Tongking would require very different techniques from those required on the steep mountain slopes of northern Luzon.

Culture, Types of Land Use, and Population Pressure

One of the most striking characteristics of Southeastern Asia is the great variation in the density of the population (Map, Fig. 18). This variation reflects differences in culture as well as differences in physical environment. The culture and social organization of a people are intimately linked to their technique and the intensity of their land use, which in turn guide the people in their selection of new land when it becomes necessary for them to seek new homes. The Cambodians, for example, when living in an environment similar to that of the Annamese, do not create the large rural settlements characteristic of areas inhabited by the latter.[28] Likewise, the Madurese prefer to settle in small hamlets or in isolated homesteads (*Einzelhof*) and to till unirrigated land, whereas the Javanese live in large villages and are by preference wet-field cultivators. Again, while the Bontocs and Ifugaos of northern Luzon build terraces and cultivate wet rice as their primary crop, the neighboring Apayaos, most of the Kalingas, the Tinggians, and the Gaddangs have so far resisted all attempts on the 101 161 361 200

[28] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, p. 94.

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000 part of the government and of missionaries to introduce terracing and wet-rice cultivation but, instead, continue to practice shifting cultivation and to depend upon dry rice as their staple food.

161 241 311 Wherever we find shifting cultivation the density of population is low; on the other hand, permanent cultivation provides the basis for higher densities. The higher the density, the greater is the care bestowed upon the cultivation of the soil. The development of permanent-field cultivation, the construction of terraces on mountainsides and hillsides, the dyking and draining of plains, and other complex techniques associated with wet-rice cultivation are but expressions of a population density that demands an intensive utilization of the soil and a maximum production of food crops.

000 The areas where wet rice was first cultivated were probably hollows and small valleys and the well watered slopes of low hills rather than the great plains and wide valleys that are today the rice granaries of the world. The utilization of extensive plains and broad river valleys for the cultivation of wet rice requires a social organization unknown to the peoples who first began wet-rice culture.

●243 231 It is thought that the cultivation of wet rice originated in days when the hoe and the dibble stick were the only agricultural tools, that is, before the animal-drawn plow reached Southeastern Asia. The broadcasting of seeds is held to be characteristic of plow culture, whereas the cultivators of wet rice in Monsoon Asia generally plant their rice seedlings in the manner of shifting cultivators,[29] a circumstance that would seem to support the hypothesis that the carabao and the plow were not a part of the original technique but were adopted later. Even today wet rice is raised in some parts of Southeastern Asia without the use of the plow. For example, peoples in central Celebes prepare their fields for cultivation by driving carabaos back and forth until the fields are thoroughly puddled.[30] In other areas where wet-rice fields are built on such steep slopes that it is impossible to get carabaos to the terraces, farmers are frequently obliged to till their land entirely by hand—employing only such tools as wooden spades and sticks, which may be shod with iron. The Ifugaos of northern Luzon, for example, have terrace walls reaching, in some cases, heights of 60 feet or more that can be scaled only by means of rocks jutting out from the faces of the walls.

000 Although most sedentary cultivators in Southeastern Asia make use of

[29] Although rice growers in other parts of the world generally use the broadcast method of sowing, one finds it in Southeastern Asia only as a rare exception. According to Copeland (*op. cit.*, p. 224) the *sabog*, or broadcasting method, is used in the Philippines over a rather limited area. This method produces lower yields but its advantages are "some saving of time, saving the labour of transplanting, and the possibility of maturing a crop with less water; rice grown directly in its place can get along with less water than transplanted rice." According to Kruyt ("De To Rongkong in Midden-Celebes," 1920, p. 380), the To Rongkong of central Celebes transplant their wet rice only in exceptional cases but usually broadcast it.

[30] Kruyt: "De To Seko in Midden-Celebes," 1920, p. 409.

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[See pp. 35 ff., category 241 or 116. -- Analyst]

Chapter II

THE SHIFTING CULTIVATOR [p. 16]

241 361 311 The field of the shifting cultivator is known by various local terms. It is called *caiñgin* in the Philippines, *humah* in Java, *ladang* in the Indies as a whole and in Malaya, *taungya* in Burma, *tamrai* in Thailand, and *rây* in Indochina.[1] Practically without exception, it is a clearing in either primeval or second-growth forest. The use of grassland is so unusual that we shall limit the following discussion to shifting cultivation on forest land.

As his name indicates, the shifting cultivator does not use the same piece of land every year; instead, he kills or cuts down at regular intervals —every year, every other year, or every third year—the trees of a small forest patch. He burns as much of the woody growth as is possible or convenient. Among the charred stumps and half-burned tree trunks he plants his favorite crops, be they cereals such as millet, upland rice, or maize; or tubers such as yams or sweet potatoes (Figs. 4–10). The latter are planted extensively by the *caiñgero*, the shifting cultivator in the Philippines. In planting cereals it is usually the men who take the planting stick to make little holes and the women who drop in a few seeds, using their feet to cover the seed with soil (Figs. 11–13). As forest land is generally free from weeds or grasses and the soil is usually rich in humus and well supplied with the ash of burned plant matter after clearing, it produces a very good, or even excellent, first harvest; the second harvest begins to show a decline in yield, and thereafter the returns diminish rapidly.[2] Grasses and weeds invade the clearing. Rather than battle these, the peasant abandons his old ladang and cuts and burns a new patch of forest (Fig. 15). The old plot reverts, under favorable conditions, to second-growth forest, the so-called *bluhar* of the Malays, and is not cleared again for a period, the length of which may vary from 8 to 15 years, or more.

[243 462] [134]

Shifting cultivation is characterized by a lack of tillage; the soil is hardly disturbed, as no plow turns it. There is less labor involved than in other methods of cultivation, and the work is more evenly spread over the year—an advantage where labor is relatively scarce. The tasks involved are cutting, burning, and planting; sometimes simple fencing of the field against animals, guarding—especially before the harvest and usually by women and children—and, finally, harvesting. In addition, there may be some weeding in the first year and certainly during the second.

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1 In British India *jhum*, *kumri*, *chya*, *beuser*, or *dullee*; in Ceylon *chena*; in Japan, Korea, and Formosa *karen* (a Japanese term); in Central America *milpa*; in parts of Africa *chitemene*.

2 Danhof reports for parts of the Lampoeng Districts that a ladang will produce from 15 to 25 quintals of rice in the first year and approximately 5 in the second year. In areas where the second yield shows such a serious decline the peasants usually prefer to make a new ladang—Danhof: "Bijdrage," 1940, p. 199.

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lanzones, papayas, and chicos, which find a good market in Manila, but on the whole we rarely meet in the Philippines such intensive garden culture as in Java. The diet of the average Filipino is not well balanced and is particularly deficient in fruits and vegetables. In recognition of this fact the Bureau of Education and the Bureau of Plant Industry have both done much to impress the peasants with the need for fruit and vegetable gardens. Although the situation has improved during the past forty years and a large variety of fruits is now produced, the country still depends upon imports, whereas with a little effort most of the imported fruits could be produced locally and would furnish an additional source of income. It would be well to encourage the peasants to grow more fruits and to advise them on the most suitable varieties. In the other countries of Southeastern Asia, also, with the possible exception of Java, such advice would be valuable.

The published material available on the importance of gardens in Indochina is similarly limited in quantity. Even Gourou in his study of land utilization restricts himself chiefly to listing the fruits and vegetables found in the gardens and to stating that certain districts are renowned for the quality of their garden fruits. Gourou's list of fruits and vegetables is as varied and extensive, however, as similar lists for any of the other countries of Southeastern Asia.

Wet Fields

Throughout the countries bordering the South China Sea most of the cultivated land is used for the growing of lowland, or wet, rice. For this purpose the fields must be leveled and surrounded by earth dams to impound rain water during the rainy season or to confine the water that is carried to the fields through irrigation canals or lifted to the fields by mechanical means. If a field is properly leveled the surrounding dyke will keep the water everywhere at the same depth. The size of the wet-rice, or paddy, fields, and the amount of labor that is required to make them, depend upon the topography of the region. In the lowlands, where no terracing is required, there is relatively little labor involved in the making of paddies, which are frequently large. A hilly, or mountainous, terrain necessitates terracing, which demands greater effort and reduces the size of individual fields; the steeper the slope, the narrower the paddies. We have only to see the rice terraces of the mountains of northern Luzon, southern Bali, the Preanger districts of West Java, or Sumatra's West Coast in order to realize how much effort has been expended in building these terraces and how much energy must be devoted to their upkeep. The terraces, as well as the wet-rice fields of the plains, represent the accumulated efforts of generations of peasants, each of which has helped to extend the area devoted to the cultivation of wet rice (Figs. 50–58).[1]

Not all people show the same skill in the making of paddies. According to Credner, the Thai are quite helpless on sloping land that requires terracing before wet rice may be planted. They would prefer to migrate to a

[1] [see pp. 115 ff. category 116. -- Analyst]

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region where level land is available rather than undertake the terracing of a hillside; on the other hand, they have been successful in building innumerable canals to tap rivers and spread the water over the plains.[9] However, they do not seem to be able to fight great floods. In contrast, the Annamese of Tongking have built huge dykes against destructive floods and the attack of the sea.

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The problems presented by the cultivation of wet, or lowland, rice change from country to country, from region to region, and sometimes even from village to village. Lowland rice demands a soil thoroughly soaked with water and worked into "a fine soft mud by hoeing, plowing, trampling, or harrowing, and . . . free from weeds." [10] The field must remain under water until the ears of rice begin to fill and harvest time approaches. The amount of water required to grow lowland rice depends upon the variety of rice, the length of its growing period, and the nature of the soil. There are innumerable varieties of lowland rice. One way of grouping them is according to the number of days they take to mature, which ranges from 60 to 300 days. In the Philippines varieties that require less than 150 days are considered early maturing, those that need from 150 to 190 days medium-late maturing, and those needing more than 190 days late maturing.[11] The longer the growing period, the greater the water requirements and, generally, the higher the yields. Normally the water covering the field has a depth of from 10 to 15 centimeters. But "floating rice" can keep pace with a slowly rising flood and reach the amazing height of 4 meters or more. The stems settle on the mud when the water recedes, and new roots start at the upper nodes, while the lower parts of the stems rot away. Floating rice is especially well known in Cochinchina, and I have seen it in the Philippines. In 1939 the Department of Economic Affairs in Batavia sent a rice expert to Cochinchina to study floating rice and the possibility of introducing it into southern Borneo.

[654]

Lowland rice can be grown on many types of soil as long as a heavy clay subsoil is present to prevent the loss of water through percolation. Copeland states that lowland rice does best in heavy soils that hold water securely, and he adds that it is desirable "that there be, at a depth below the reach of the roots, but not too much further down, an impervious substratum-subsoil or hard-pan." [12] We distinguish between two main types of wet-rice fields: those that depend exclusively upon the rain that is impounded by their dykes, and those that are supplied by an irrigation system and are therefore no longer subject to the irregularities of rainfall.[13]

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[9] Credner: Siam, 1935, pp. 203 and 217.

[10] Wickizer: "Rice and Wheat," 1941, p. 272.

[11] University of the Philippines: Handbook of Philippine Agriculture, 1939, pp. 7–11.

[12] Copeland: Rice, 1924, p. 45.

[13] An important variation of the second type is the cultivation of wet riceland that has been flooded by rivers rising above their natural levels. This mode of cultivation, which is found especially in the residency of Palembang in Sumatra, in southeastern Borneo, in Thailand, and in Indochina, is not so dependable as irrigation because of the irregularities of the river floods.

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Irrigation systems also fall into two categories: peasant irrigation works and technical irrigation works. The former have existed throughout Southeastern Asia for more than a thousand years. In recent times scientifically trained engineers have designed large-scale systems with concrete weirs and locks. Fields solely dependent upon impounded rain water produce one rice crop a year, whereas irrigated fields often yield two crops. If even with irrigation only one crop can be produced, yet the irrigation system assures proper water control, whereas without it irregularities in the course of the rainy season may damage, or destroy, the crop. 243 312 [177]

Wet fields are protected against erosion by leveling, terracing, and dyking. But how does continued cropping affect the fertility of wet-rice fields? Diverse environments and cultural practices in Southeastern Asia create considerable differences in this respect. Much of the paddy land of the Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, and Burma has lost a good deal of its original fertility because the peasants have not used manures, fertilizers, or crop rotation. In many instances, however, soil fertility has been preserved by the mineral matter dissolved in the irrigation water and by the silt deposited on those fields that are supplied with irrigation water coming from streams. The value of the water and silt depends, of course, upon the nature of the parent material from which it is derived. Rivers from a young volcanic region supply much richer water and silt than do those that drain a mountain region consisting of sedimentary rock or granite. For this reason, the Irrigation Service of the Netherlands Indies before making final plans for a new irrigation system takes samples of water and silt carried by rivers at different times of the year. The samples are analyzed in order to determine their influence upon the soil to be irrigated. A river found to be carrying water and silt that would lower the value of paddy land would be eliminated as a source of irrigation water, or its use would be limited as much as possible. 243 134 312 [654]

Irrigated fields of which the water supply does not contain minerals in quantities necessary for continuous satisfactory plant growth and paddy land that depends exclusively upon rain, both require other techniques for maintaining fertility. In many regions cultivators cut the rice stems just far enough below the ear to allow bundling. This practice makes possible the return of the rest of the plant matter to the soil. From this it is only one more step to work household refuse into the ground together with ashes of burned rubbish, rice husks, leaves, and manure.

As stable manure is not available in adequate quantities, intensive studies of the application of green manures to the cultivation of rice have been made in a number of countries of Southeastern Asia. A recent article by W. Bally reviews the results of these studies.[14] In a few rice-growing regions the peasants, on their own initiative, have learned to use legumes to improve rice soil. In wet fields the decomposition of green manure takes place under anaerobic conditions, and the final product is ammonia. Since 243 134 242

[14] Bally: "The Employment of Green Manures," 1936, pp. T10–T31.

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243 [137] 242 134

rice takes up nitrogen in the form of ammonia, the value of green manures on wet-rice fields is apparent.[15] In the Indies, *Crotolaria* species are the most frequently used green manures, the favored one being *Crotolaria juncea* L.; but *Phaseolus lunatus* L., *Dolichos lablab* L., and *Pachyrrhizus erosus* Urban are also used. The peasants of the Red River delta in Tongking are in the habit of working into the ground the wilted matter of a number of legumes that have been grown primarily for seed. The peasants of the province of Nam Dinh have developed a technique that may be unique. They push handfuls of indigo branches into the ground between the rows of rice a few days after the latter has been transplanted, for they believe that indigo is superior to pig manure or human excreta. In Indochina rice-growers frequently cultivate green manure, especially *Crotolaria* species, on dry fields and carry it to the rice fields at the time when these fields are being prepared for the seedlings. A green manure used exclusively in a few districts of the delta land of Tongking is the small aquatic plant, *azolla*.[16] Certain villages, thanks to favorable circumstances, have specialized in the growing of azolla to sell to the surrounding country, while other villages reproduce the plant until sufficient quantities of green manure have been obtained to cover all needs. The life cycle of azolla is completed in the months from November to April or May. Only the villagers of LaVan know the secret of maintaining and multiplying the plant during the hot season. They guard this secret jealously since it is the basis of their livelihood.

[37] [438] [621]

Further studies are needed to establish which varieties of green-manure plants are best suited to the various environmental conditions. It is important to find plants that grow rapidly and can be sown when the rice is still on the field, just after the water has been drained off to allow the grain to ripen. Experiments should also be made in the timing of the application of green manure. Should it be early, or just before the transplanting of the seedlings? Should it be on dry or on wet land?

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Crop rotation also has its place as a means of keeping up the fertility of wet-rice fields. This practice seems to be better developed and more prevalent in Java than in any other country of Southeastern Asia. Extensive areas of *sawah*, as the Javanese call their wet riceland, are planted with dry-field crops such as maize, legumes, and other vegetables during the dry season, a practice that has a beneficial effect upon the soil. This form of double cropping is probably better than raising two rice crops in one year, because—although a different variety of rice is chosen for each season—both make essentially the same demands upon the soil; whereas a peanut crop, for example, grown during the dry season will enlarge the nitrogen content of the soil. In some areas of Java lowland rice is rotated

[15] Imperial Bureau of Soil Science: Tropical Soils in Relation to Tropical Crops, 1936, p. 11.

[16] For a map showing the extent of the use of azolla, see Gourou: Les paysans, 1936, p. 392. For further discussion see Nguyên-cong-Tiêu: "L'azolle," 1930, B, pp. 335–350 (also in *Proc. Fourth Pacific Science Congress, Java, 1929*, Vol. 4, 1930, pp. 355–370).

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with sugar or tobacco grown under plantation management. But is the high fertility of the soil due to this crop rotation, or is it rather the result of the heavy application of commerical fertilizer and the thorough cultivation of the soil under Western management? 242 134 249

In no country of Southeastern Asia is there so great a variety or so intensive a use of commercial fertilizers as in Japan.[17] In general, the peasants of Southeastern Asia lack money for commercial fertilizers. In Indochina local phosphates are within reach of some of the Annamese, but the costs of imported fertilizers are prohibitive. In Java, although attempts to make possible the use of fertilizers through the agency of public credit institutions were successful in some special instances, not more than one per cent of the cultivated area received any commercial fertilizer in 1939. On the other hand, estimates indicate that more than 1,000,000 hectares of sawah have a phosphate deficiency and that a moderate application of phosphate would augment the yield by 25 to 50 per cent.[18] 242 [654]

The Agricultural Advisory Service was able to raise the productivity of wet-rice fields in West Java by about 10 per cent. It encouraged the peasants to use fertilizer on seedbeds, to sow rice more thinly on the beds (thus producing stronger seedlings), and to plant the seedlings in rows so that weeding could be done with a special instrument, the *landak* (Fig. 59).[1] This weeder was developed in Japan. During the years immediately preceding 1939, these improvements in West Java resulted in an increase in output of unhusked rice amounting to 300,000 quintals, or 30,000 metric tons, with a value of nearly 1,000,000 guilders. This shows that some improvements in cultivation may increase production without a great capital outlay.[19] 242 243. [412]

Java may be compared only with southern China and with Japan in the cleanness of its rice fields. The Filipino does not pay much attention to weeding. The Malayan, Thai, Cambodian, Cochinchinese, and Filipino rice farmers have more flooded riceland per capita at their disposal than the people of Java and can thus afford to cultivate their land less intensively. 243

Irrigation Problems

Peasant irrigation works usually take care of the fields of only one village or of a small group of people who have joined together for the specific purpose of building and maintaining an irrigation system. These works consequently are small and usually inadequate, but nevertheless they de- 312 [476] 243

[17] "The chief commercial fertilizers used in Japan are pressed herrings, pressed sardines, dried sardines, other fish cakes, bone meal, soybean cake, rapeseed cake, cottonseed cake, other vegetable-oil cakes, ammonium sulphate, calcium cyanamide, calcium phosphate, and potassium phosphate. Calcium phosphate and ammonium sulphate are probably the most representative chemical fertilizers."—Wickizer and Bennett: The Rice Economy, 1941, p. 252, footnote 33.

[18] Departement van Economische Zaken: Voedselproblemen, 1940, p. 28.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28.

1 [See p. 117, category 116. -- Analyst]

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mand respect and admiration for the ingenuity displayed.[20] "The serious imperfections which characterize native irrigation works and make rice culture uncertain, particularly in the plains, can assuredly not be charged to the account of these who constructed them." [21] The weirs, by means of which the peasants raise the water of small rivers, are especially weak. The construction material consists of bamboo, trunks of coconut and other trees, and boulders. At times great bamboo baskets are filled with heavy stones and placed in the river, or large stones are laid loosely across the channel. Where the rivers are wide the people drive two rows of tree trunks into the river bed and fill the space between the rows with whatever debris they have at hand. These weirs frequently break because of river floods as they have no provision for allowing passage of flood waters; yet repair is often impossible for the duration of the rainy season, so that the crop is ruined. Another constructional disadvantage is the open intakes. During floods large quantities of water flow through these and cause an excessive soaking of the fields and damage to the canals. Wherever a canal has to cross a depression, a road, or another watercourse, bamboo or hollowed tree trunks are used to carry the water overhead. This often leads to large losses of water, especially during floods. Poor drainage is another weakness of peasant irrigation systems.

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Scientifically trained engineers have come to the aid of peasant communities in Southeastern Asia and have designed irrigation systems based on technological principles and free from the weaknesses of peasant irrigation works. One of these technical irrigation systems may take care of tens of thousands of hectares of riceland belonging to hundreds of villages. In many instances the engineers have improved existing peasant irrigation works; more often they have made irrigation possible where peasant communities did not have the financial and technical resources to overcome natural obstacles. Technical irrigation works are usually government-financed.

SEA [652] P

In the Philippines most of the wet-rice fields are dependent exclusively upon the rain that falls directly on them. One centimeter of rain a day is said to be necessary for a healthy rice growth. But there is always the possibility that, particularly in the months of May and June, there may be so little rain that the peasants cannot prepare their fields. A shortage of rain in October is also dangerous as it may seriously damage, or even destroy, the crop, even though the precipitation during the rainy season may have been enough for the production of a satisfactory crop. To guard against an insufficiency of water for the wet-rice crop, therefore, the fields should be supplied by irrigation systems. The Philippines, however, do

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[20] The *subaks* of Bali are agricultural cooperative societies that have been formed to construct, maintain, and administer irrigation systems. The achievements of the Balinese subaks are very remarkable in a number of ways. Thus, the men of certain villages are especially skillful builders of irrigation works and are able to construct long canals and even tunnels of considerable length. These men are hired by the subaks and help them to solve their irrigation problems.

[21] Van der Meulen: "Irrigation in the Netherlands Indies," 1940, p. 146.

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241 134 [146] maize has become unprofitable, and many peasants have changed over to cassava, which makes lesser demands upon soil fertility. The per acre yields of cassava are high, and the plant is a source of carbohydrates, fat, and protein. From the standpoint of dietary needs, however, the ratio between carbohydrates on the one hand and protein and fat on the other is unfavorable. People who live on cassava merely fill their stomachs. The insufficiency of protein intake is detrimental to their health. Table IV compares the chemical composition of cassava, maize, wheat, and rice.

243 146 262 Maize, as the table indicates, compares quite favorably in protein content with wheat and rice and is especially rich in fat. It has gained an important position in the diet of the people of central and eastern Java, Madura, the island of Cebu, and the Cagayan Valley in the island of Luzon. Both maize and cassava are easy to store and therefore have a great advantage over sweet potatoes, which must be consumed soon after they ripen.

241 In Thailand maize is an important crop on the Khorat plateau and in other regions where dry land is available. Among the root crops cassava has gained a greater importance than taro and yams. The last two are grown mainly by Chinese gardeners in the neighborhood of large towns. Cassava, too, is grown commercially by Chinese, especially near the railroad on the peninsula.

Most of the so-called dry-field crops are grown in Indochina during the dry season on land that is flooded during the rainy season and at that time [311] produces rice. Gourou has estimated that in Tongking 100,000 hectares of land are used exclusively for the production of dry-field crops and that 350,000 hectares of irrigated land are occupied by such crops during the dry season.[66]

This practice of growing dry-field crops on irrigated land during the dry season is especially widespread in Java, where population pressure is so great that the peasants have to use every possible means to enlarge their food supply. If there is not enough water available to grow a second wet-rice crop, they will always try to get a second harvest of quick-growing dry-field crops during the dry season.

In contrast to the peoples of Java, the Filipinos do not, as a rule, go in for the raising of dry-field crops on wet riceland during the dry season, although this should be possible if the land were cultivated. There is enough water in the soil a short distance below the surface for the growing of crops practically everywhere during the dry season. Repeated tilling would keep the soil soft and fine so that water could move upward by capillary action to replace that which is lost through evaporation. Cultivation would enable plants such as maize, peanuts, and soy beans to grow on land that otherwise would be baked dry and hard. Although the ratio between cultivated land and population in the Philippines does not make a dry-season crop a necessity in most regions, there are a number of districts where the peasants traditionally raise a dry-season crop on irrigated

[66] Gourou: Les paysans, 1936, pp. 407–408.

1 [see page 75 cat 116 -- Analyst]

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may be found. The oldest cash farming of Southeast Asia was the spice trade of the Moluccas, but even at its peak that trade involved very few areas given over exclusively to spices, which for the greater part were collected from farmers each with a tree or two, rather than a number of acres devoted to a crop of spices. The crux of the matter at that period was that nothing cultivated in Southeast Asia apart from spice was transportable to or of use to the world's population centres overseas. To a large extent over the present millennium Southeast Asia has been an absorber rather than a supplier of goods or commodities; only in the last hundred years or so has the condition changed, not so much by new demands for Southeast Asia products as for crops transferred to Southeast Asia for production.

Rice.—Commercial agriculture in the whole region occupies about 35 million acres and has taken two forms, both strongly influenced by European interests: farming food crops for sale, and farming non-food crops for sale. Of the food crops, sugar was the earliest successful innovation established in Java and the Philippines soon after European colonisation began, and intended for export to Europe. Today at least half the area devoted to crops grown for export is in rice and, taking into account the amount of rice grown for cash sales in deficit regions inside each territory, the proportion may reach as much as three-quarters. Upon commercial rice production depends the possibility of workers leaving their own farms and devoting their full time to non-food cash crops, so that the workers on rubber, cotton, hemp, coffee and sugar plantations have provided a great demand for Asia's staple cereal, supplies of which have been vital to the development of plantation and mining industries of Southeast Asia and, incidentally to the industrialisation of other parts of Asia. The bulk of the rice produced in Southeast Asia for export has gone to India and China, where a condition approaching the limit of rice-growing has been reached, and to Malaya and the Outer Islands of the East Indies. Japan too was becoming a major rice importer until 1941. All this rice export came from Burma, Siam and Indochina in that order of importance, territories which have pioneered in rapidly expanding commercial rice production to form the pool, the only rice-pool in the world, from which other areas have made up their deficits. Moreover the commercial production of rice in Southeast Asia has been steadily increasing over the last 20 years—the average

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

FIG. 112.—Distribution of Rice Cultivation in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia acreage under rice each year of 1916–20 was 38.28 million, and each year of 1936–40 was 51.40 million. These figures of course include both subsistence and commercial production of rice, but they make it clear that by far the most important farming interest was rice, which covered nearly 95 per cent of cultivated land in Siam, 85 per cent in Indochina and 65 per cent in both Burma and the Philippines.

SOUTHEAST ASIA AREAS UNDER RICE (million acres)

	1914–15	1919–20	1924–25	1929–30	1934–35	1939–40	1944–45	1949–50
Burma	10.0	10.5	12.1	12.8	12.7	12.8	8.5	9.0
Indochina	10.4	11.9	11.7	14.0	13.1	14.7	14.1	12.0
Siam	5.0	6.1	6.8	7.5	8.1	8.8	5.5	12 4
Malaya	—	—	.6	.6	.7	.8	.7	.9
Java and Madoera ..	6.9	8.8	8.7	8.8	9.9	10.1	7.7	9.7
Philippines	2.7	3.6	4.2	4.4	4.9	4.9.6	3.6	5.7

SOUTHEAST ASIA RICE PRODUCTION (million metric tons clean rice)

	1914–15	1919–20	1924–25	1929–30	1934–35	1939–40	1944–45	1949–50
Burma	3.73	3.74	5.15	5.07	4.6	4.73	2.4	2.9
Indochina	4.32	2.96	3.54	3.67	3.4	4.00	3.6	3 6
Siam	1.93	1.41	3.08	2.41	2.86	2.86	—	3 7
Malaya	—	—	.24	.16	.33	.34	—	.4
Java and Madoera ..	2.88	3.64	3.43	3.38	3.54	4.09	3.5	4.2
Philippines	.05	1.02	1.28	1.44	1.28	1.5	1.1	1.6

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Cash farming for rice is the only extension of a Southeast Asia subsistence farming crop into commercial farming on a large scale; only a negligible proportion of coconut-growing is for export, though this too, is an extension of Southeast Asia subsistence farming. It has been inevitable that subsistence farmers and the techniques they developed for rice have set the character of commercial rice farming which has been pioneered by local people and continues to be essentially a non-mechanised produce whose volume comes more from area and less from intensive farming.

RICE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
ANNUAL AVERAGES PER QUINQUENNIUM

Period	*Million Acres Under Rice*	*Production Million Tons Clean Rice*	*Net Exports from SE.A. (Million Tons Clean)*	*Per Cap. Utilisation (kgms.)*	*Yield in Tons per Acre*
1916–20	38.3	13.5	3.9	119	.352
1921–25	43.6	15.3	4.6	137	.352
1926–30	47.5	16.5	4.7	131	.348
1931–35	49.6	16.7	5.2	117	.337
1936–40	51.4	17.5	5.0	118	.339
1946–50	48.1	15.6	1.9	98	.325

For 1951 *it is estimated that Southeast Asia sowed about* 50 *million acres of paddy, probably producing* 16 *million tons cleaned rice. The exports may total* 3 *million tons. These figures suggest the consumption had declined to below* 100 *kgms. per person, but this is not reliable since unreported dealings were going on and reported facts were not necessarily the true ones.*

Other Food Crops.—The other commercial food crops, sugar, coffee, tea, cinchona and oil palm total much smaller areas than rice farming. Broadly, these innovations were developed by European colonial planters opening up what were very largely virgin territories, normally in the form of large estates calling for a labour force which derived only in part from local people, the rest being obtained by introducing labour from outside. In the Philippines and in Java the first European essays in agriculture caused serious interactions on local land customs; in Siam an aristocratic feudal system enabled commercialisation to be introduced without external intervention. These crops tended to be perennial cultivations, taking advantage of the continuous growing season of the region. In due course this has led to a large production, causing the external price to drop, especially as there has

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external events and their effects on rubber price, to a degree not paralleled by other types of Southeast Asia farming which were, during a crisis, more closely related to subsistence farming and thereby buffered from external valuations. 249

Trends in Agriculture

Several long-term tendencies in these various farming types have become apparent. For all the commercial crops except rice, external events have obliged experiment and development towards higher and higher production per unit area; yields for commercial crops have progressively increased. In rice farming, however, methods have continued to be extensive, yields have steadily decreased and there has been little advance in either maintaining fertility standards or increasing the yield. Experimental farms exist throughout the territory to promote these improvements, but they have made little impression on the rice-farming community as a whole. 243

RICE YIELDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (hundred lbs. milled per acre)

	1934–35	1939–40	1944–45	1949–50
Burma	8.2	8.4	6.5	7.0
Indochina	5.7	5.5	5.6	6.6
Siam	9.1	8.6	7.5	6.6
Malaya	9.7	9.1	—	10.7
Java and Madoera	9.3	10.0	—	9.5
Philippines	5.8	5.8	6.8	6.6

By the quinquennium 1936–40 annual yields had declined nearly 4 per cent from those of 1916–20 and production had increased solely by increasing the acreages, whose annual average for the same quinquennial periods increased by 34 per cent.

The general movements of rice in Southeast Asia are evident from the table on page 356 which summarises surpluses and deficits over a period.

Commercial rice production was associated almost exclusively with the expansion of agriculture to the deltas of the Irrawaddy, Chao Praya and Mekong and in varying degrees to increased control over flood waters. It is in this large-scale water control that the greatest long-term changes have been set going by western engineering techniques coping with the wide range of circumstances under which Southeast Asia floods occur. Effective

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243 small-scale water-control methods had in fact existed in this region before; the earlier technological interest was to expand rice production by increased water-control on speciàlly fertile, generally volcanic, upland soils. The objective then and now was the same—to cultivate the most fertile areas; the difference was that the volcanic soils attracted local attention and were within the capacity of local people, considerably earlier than the deltaic soils.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA RICE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
(million metric tons clean)

	Exporters			*Importers*		
	Burma	*Indochina*	*Siam*	*East Indies*	*Malaya*	*Philippines*
1915	2.12	1.09	1.0	.55	—	.22
1920	2.0	1.09	.25	.22	—	.07
1925	3.32	1.33	1.18	.50	.41	.10
1930	2.95	1.02	.93	.62	.60	.01
1935	2.93	1.52	1.38	.36	.48	nil
1940	2.50	1.40	2.00	.06	.70	.1
1950	1.17	.09	1.48	.28	.50	.16

A further process at work has been a decline in Southeast Asia consumption of rice per person over the last 30 years, which made possible the expanding exports of rice at a time when population was rapidly increasing. The declining consumption seems to be due to slight changes in diet habit; maize, potatoes and tapioca have steadily entered into local meals and the proportion of vegetables has increased, more especially as it has come to be realised that the dietetic value of meals exclusively based on rice, the custom in Southeast Asia for a long time, is low, as indicated by the small stature and delicate bones of Southeast Asia peoples.

245 Commercial agriculture has largely revolved round tree cultivation (arboriculture rather than agriculture) in which the continuous growing period produces maximum effects. In this tendency may be seen a return to the tree vegetation which is indigenous to equatorial Southeast Asia, and away from the annual and deciduous plants more suited to ecologies associated with the seasonal margins of the tropics. Labour difficulties too are eased to some extent by tree crops whose periodicity is better spread than in the case of annual crops. To the labour difficulty also is due the trend towards devolving arboriculture from plantation systems

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that about one-third of its prewar estate area was being tapped in 1947, representing two-thirds of the area tappable.

In the food crops, surplus margins were more slowly restored. Exports of Southeast Asia rice totalled about a million tons during 1946, as against a combined export of 5.7 million tons annually for 1936–40. The drop in production of this staple was greatest in the case of Burma because there the dislocation by war had been greatest, but by the 1946–47 season, about two-thirds of Lower Burma rice acreages were back in cultivation, as against half in 1945–46. In Cochinchina over 70 per cent of the rice area was being cultivated in 1946–47. Siam which was untouched by military campaigns reported 10.6 million acres under cultivation in rice for 1946–47 (22 per cent more than 1939–40)—the only territory to show a substantial increase of rice acreage in the immediate postwar years.

A postwar feature has been the general decline in rice yields, mostly an effect of loss of draught cattle, though to report low yields was a convenient cover for black market sales. The consequence of lost production in local food was felt more in places like Malaya which has specialised in non-food commercial agriculture, than in any other territories of Asia, which customarily needed to import only a small margin and not the majority of their rice. For the Philippines in 1947, the United Nations reported that *per capita* consumption of rice was actually higher than in 1939 by about 5 per cent.

Since labour shortage has been prominent as a factor operating against postwar commercial agriculture, the subsistence farmer and the diversified smallholder have assumed far greater significance than before. Over 55 per cent of Malaya's rubber production for 1946 was from smallholders, a proportion which had been as much as 85 per cent in the early months of that year, yet fell to 45 per cent in 1950 (cf. 39 per cent in 1940).

The vegetable oils soon came back into production and by early 1947 monthly production in Southeast Asia was not far short of 1941 production and now exceeds it.

The general lowering of food acreages and of yields, combined with the enforced reversion to subsistence agricultural forms, has a special significance for Southeast Asia food supplies over the next few years, because the restricted food supply comes at a time when population is rapidly increasing, at the rate of about 20

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SOUTHEAST ASIA NUTRITION DENSITIES
(Average number of persons per rice-acre per annum)

Quinquennium	*Burma*	*Indo-china*	*Siam*	*Java and Madoera*	*Philip-pines*	*Malaya*
1916–20	1.23	1.75	1.66	4.12	3.13	—
1921–25	1.19	1.67	1.57	4.27	2.67	5.61
1926–30	1.14	1.61	1.57	4.50	2.69	6.13
1931–35	1.19	1.64	1.63	4.60	2.76	6.42
1936–40	1.25	1.63	1.74	4.96	2.79	7.02
1946–50	2.0	2.1	1.6	5.9	3.9	7.2

Because population and the net production of food have increased *pari passu*, it is important to examine the "nutrition density" (persons per acre under rice) since the surplus for export depends on low internal consumption of the Southeast Asia staple and high internal production. The countries of Southeast Asia pre-war showed considerable differences in nutrition density, from Malaya (the plantation-mining specialist) with 7.2 persons per rice-acre, to Siam (the rice-surplus specialist) with 1.6. Malaya, Java and the Philippines had nutrition densities much higher than the rest of neighbouring countries and in the case of Malaya and Java the nutrition density had been steadily rising, whereas in Burma, Indochina and Siam it was fairly static. Over the same period, the domestic consumption of rice per person sharply dropped (by 20-25 per cent) in Burma, Siam and Java and rose about 10 per cent in Indochina, Philippines and Malaya. The postwar figures available show considerable increases of nutrition density everywhere except in Siam, yet these were changes of degree, not of pattern.

Changing Internal Emphasis

Today the very crowded places are firstly, Middle and North Java, Lower Siam and the Red River Delta, where densities of over 1,500 people per square mile occur, with secondary crowdings in Lower Burma, the Lower Mekong, Central Luzon and the Visayas. These concentrations of people are pre-eminently in agricultural areas (Fig. 116), and they are in fact largely made possible by exceptional soil qualities within an area whose general soil fertility is low. These crowded areas have taken part in a commercialisation of local agriculture and their subsequent history has been firstly a

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

654 their attention. When, therefore, economic development is advocated on the ground that it provides funds for economic services, it is well to enquire how far these services are concerned with native rather than with western enterprise, and how far they do in fact make native enterprise more efficient. Information on such matters is not readily obtainable, but some light is thrown on them by a recent study of Malaya.

243 654 Formerly the natives of British Malaya cultivated little but rice. Conditions did not favour the growth of a large export market such as stimulated cultivators in other parts of Indo-China to extend their holdings, and the Government tried to encourage the cultivation of rice by regulations making it compulsory. In the early years of the present century, when the doctrine of efficiency was beginning to replace the principle of *laissez-faire* as the motto of colonial rule, an agricultural service was created. This included a paddy experimental station, but no one was appointed to specialize in rice, and experiments in the improvement of rice cultivation were discontinuous. About the same time plantation rubber was coming into favour, and the agricultural experts 'gave most of their time to the European and Chinese rubber planters'. Malays also found rubber profitable, and tended to substitute rubber for rice. Thus, with the influx of many hundred thousand coolies to the mines and plantations, the country became increasingly dependent on imported rice. When the war of 1914 and post-war developments stopped these imports, the Government had to import rice and lost £42 million on the transaction, while the estates and mines also lost heavily on importing rice for their coolies. 'The result of this experience was the decision that rice cultivation must be increased and more attention paid to native agriculture.'[1]

Accordingly the regulations for compulsory rice cultivation were enforced more stringently, and experiments were undertaken with a view to make it more profitable by improving the yield. Under the latter head progress was slow, as frequent changes in the agricultural staff hindered continuity of policy. By about 1925, however, the agricultural department claimed to have discovered new varieties that would enhance the yield by 30 %. This had little effect on extending cultivation, and in 1930 a committee was appointed to examine the situation. It estimated that the area under rice could be more than doubled by the addition of some 600,000 to 1,000,000 acres of potential rice land, but 'there was no one way of making paddy growing

[1] Mills, pp. 250ff.

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profitable and bringing about its extension. The problem must be attacked simultaneously through drainage and irrigation, agricultural betterment and the co-operative department.' One outcome of its recommendations was the reconstitution of the irrigation department in 1932, and the investigations of the new department confirmed the previous impression that 'all over the country padi lands were steadily going out of cultivation.... Even in the fine padi plain of Province Wellesley, ...conditions were steadily deteriorating, the cultivators in debt, and their *kampongs* (villages) often indicating a state verging on poverty.' During the next few years upwards of 40,000 acres were added to the existing irrigation schemes.[1] At the same time, under the influence of the depression there was a fall in the price of rubber, and by 1934 the area under rice had grown by over 100,000 acres. In the following year, however, with a rise in the price of rubber, the area under rice fell by 35,000 acres. Thus although there was a wide area available for extending the cultivation of rice, and the fall in the price of rubber consequent on the depression encouraged cultivators to prefer rice cultivation, which at the same time was stimulated by compulsion, by extensive new irrigation and by the discovery of more productive strains, yet, with a population that increased between 1926 and 1936 by 29 %, the area under rice expanded by only 11 %.[3]

Area under rice[2]

(acres, 000)

1924–5	654
1929–30	657
1933–4	767
1937–8	726

This brief survey of the attempts to foster and improve rice cultivation in Malaya suggests that neither compulsion nor the efforts of the agricultural service to enhance production met with much success, and it contains many lessons of general application regarding the relation between economic services and the increase of production. The failure of agricultural experts to increase native production is often explained on the ground that it is difficult 'to persuade a conservative and easy-going peasantry to improve their methods',[4] and that the economic motive, the desire of gain, does not appeal to 'natives'. This is the easiest and most comfortable explanation of all failures to enhance native welfare; it is their fault and not ours. But it is inconsistent with the facts. While the Malayan was reluctant to grow more rice, he was taking readily to growing rubber. All over the Tropical Far East, native rubber has expanded rapidly, sometimes in the face of opposition. Similarly in Java the opposition of planters and

[1] Mills, pp. 262, 272, 274.
[2] Wickizer and Bennett, p. 314.
[3] *Ib.* p. 195.
[4] Mills, pp. 251, 259.

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RICE CULTIVATION IN ASIA

By INEZ ADAMS

243 THE terminology employed by writers discussing Asiatic rice agriculture has raised a problem: are the cultivated varieties of rice distinctly separable into one group that will grow under none but irrigated conditions, and another that demands moderate amounts of moisture but is successfully produced only by dry farming? The terms used in the literature frequently bear this implication. They include references to "wet" and "dry," "dryland," "lowland," "upland" and "mountain" rice. In anthropological studies whose purpose is merely descriptive this creates confusion. When extended to comparative studies and historical reconstructions, with the two methods of cultivation treated as distinct for the conclusions reached, it becomes necessary to examine the distinctions that might justify such use.

101 As early as 1820, John Crawfurd, writing his "History of the Indian Archi-
171 pelago," observed that rice is known as "padi . . . in all languages and dialects
243 from Madagascar to the Philippines."[1] He distinguished in Java a "marsh" rice, sown in nurseries and transplanted to flooded fields, and a "mountain"
184 or "dryland" rice, grown on arable uplands. These terms remain current. Lowie defines them thus:

243 The innumerable variations of the plant fall broadly into two categories, with corresponding techniques of husbandry. "Swamp" rice can be grown only in marshes or under irrigation. "Mountain" rice yields smaller crops, but can be grown anywhere with normal precipitation.[2]

Wilhelm Wagner[3] speaks in a similar sense of "den gewöhnliche Wasserreis" and "den sogenanten Bergreis," in his account of Chinese agriculture. C. Daryll Forde makes the same general differentiation of cultivated rices falling[4] into two groups due to the physical requirements of the plant. Wissler[5] mentions "The cultivated varieties known as 'hill,' 'upland,' or 'dryland' rice," in contradistinction to the "aquatic varieties." Keesing,[6] in one work on the Philippines, employs "wet" and "dry" rice; elsewhere[7] he speaks of "dry agriculture" in Indonesia, as distinguished from the practice of terracing with irrigation.

E. M. Loeb,[8] in his general ethnography of Sumatra, notes rice raised in both flooded and dry fields by the Bataks; in the Minangkabau, . . . "wet and dry rice fields are worked together by the men and women . . . ";[9] in Nias, . . . "both the wet and dry variety are grown . . . ";[10] in Atjeh, "Rice is of both the wet and dry variety. The wet rice fields, when not laid in swamps, are irrigated

[1] Crawfurd, 1820, Vol. I, p. 358. [2] Lowie, 1938, p. 294. [3] Wagner, 1926.
[4] Forde, 1934. [5] Wissler, 1946. [6] Keesing, 1937. [7] *Idem.*, 1934.
[8] Loeb, 1935. [9] *Ibid.*, p. 101. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 132.

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by rain water which is allowed to trickle down from dams . . . ";[11] among the Gajo and Alas, "Usually wet rice is cultivated, water being obtained from the rivers . . . ";[12] in southern Sumatra, the land is unsuitable for irrigation, so little "wet" rice is cultivated. In a historical note,[13] Loeb concludes that the Malaysians of Sumatra had learned to grow rice, ". . . at least the dry variety," before the Hindu occupancy. Cora Du Bois[14] believes that "dry" rice was the original staple of the Alorese. With reference to other descriptions, "dry" rice could be severally interpreted as the "dry-weather paddy" described by Scott[15] in Upper Burma; or as the "dry paddy" described in Mysore by Iyengar[16]—here referring to a district heavily watered by the monsoon rains, where artificial irrigation is not necessary. It could also be interpreted as the "dry-land" rice used by Fay-Cooper Cole.[17]

The Indian Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics[18] gives three classes of rice, according to their season of growth. The Philippine Department of Agriculture and Commerce[19] lumps all of the rice as "palay," taking the local variant of the widely used native term "paddy." From Oriental usage, Wickizer[20] defines "paddy" as an inclusive term for the growing plants, the harvested stalks, and the threshed, unhusked, grain. Keesing[21] gives "palay" as the native name for rice on the stalk. Some of the literature extends "paddy" to include irrigated rice fields; in this sense Keesing[22] uses it. Wickizer[23] adds that "wet paddy" and "dry paddy" are terms commonly used in Malaya to denote both the system of culture and the product.

The terms "upland" and "lowland" rice are even more current than "wet" and "dry." Verrier Elwin[24] uses them in describing the Baiga; R. F. Barton[25] for the Mountain Province of the Philippines, and Krieger[26] for the Philippines in general. Agronomists who use them include Camus[27] in the Philippines, and Jacobson[28] in the same area. Pelzer,[29] in his recent geographical study, considers them convenient, and Wickizer[30] likewise. Camus[31] adds "mountain" rice to "upland" rice, observing that the same varieties can be grown in both habitats, though some adapt best under the methods of cultivation obtaining in the mountains, others to those used in the uplands. His separation of "upland" and "lowland" rices is complicated by the fact that some of the Philippine "lowland" rices that are grown under irrigation are raised in non-irrigated nurseries or dry farmed previous to transplanting. "Dryland" nurseries for "wet

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[11] *Ibid.*, p. 224. [12] *Ibid.*, p. 248. [13] *Ibid.*, p. 301. [14] DuBois, 1944.
[15] Scott, 1911. [16] Iyengar, 1927. [17] Cole, 1945.
[18] India Dept. of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, 1940.
[19] Philippine Islands, Dept. of Agriculture and Commerce, 1935.
[20] Wickizer and Bennett, 1941. [21] Keesing, 1937. [22] *Ibid.*
[23] Wickizer and Bennett, 1941. [24] Elwin, 1939. [25] Barton, 1930.
[26] Krieger, 1942. [27] Camus, 1921. [28] Jacobson, 1915. [29] Pelzer, 1945.
[30] Wickizer and Bennett, 1941. [31] Camus, 1921.

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243 paddy" are also described in an official report[32] on the Pahang district in Malaya. Ethel Simkins,[33] in an article on the coastal plains of south India, designates "hill" rice, "upland" rice, and "lowland" rice. R. L. Pendleton[34] uses "upland" and "lowland" for Mindanao.

Detailed ethnographic accounts, especially those using native classifications of rice, multiply both the varieties and the methods of cultivation. Instances are Albert E. Jenks'[35] account of the Bontoc Igorot, Ralph Linton's[36] of the Tanala, and Nevill Parry's[37] of the Lakher. These enumerate the native names for the kinds of rice, the dates of sowing and harvest, the number of crops grown per year, the kinds of soil used and their preparation, with other details of cultivation. Parry[38] lists fourteen varieties distinguished by the Lakher and Lushai, with native descriptions of each, and of soil preferences. An elaborate but less satisfying description is Grierson's,[39] of Bihar. He classifies rice as sown broadcast or transplanted, lists over fifty varieties sown broadcast and over eighty transplanted, then proceeds to state that practice varies with the locality, a variety broadcast in one locale being sometimes treated by transplanting in another. Even if true for Bihar, this distinction would make nonsense elsewhere. Thus, in the Konkan, Ranade[40] describes seedlings grown for transplanting in nurseries, that are sown broadcast.

The agronomists have done their best to clear up the confusion.[41] First, as to kinds of rice: O. T. Faulkner,[42] in discussing West Africa, observes that the terms "hill" or "dryland" rice are deceptive, since all rice (*sic*) yields better in very wet soil. The latter is not a matter of general agreement, but Pelzer says:

> The remarkably large number of distinct varieties of cultivated rice . . . may be divided into two main classes: upland, or dry rice, and lowland, or wet rice. The division, based on the two main types of agronomic practice, is not a very sharp one.

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[32] Malaya, Dept. of Agriculture, 1939. [33] Simkins, 1933. [34] Pendleton, 1942.
[35] Jenks, 1905. [36] Linton, 1933. [37] Parry, 1933. [38] *Ibid.*
[39] Grierson, 1926. [40] Ranade, 1927.

[41] Jenkin W. Jones, Principal Agronomist in charge of Rice Investigations, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, says the following in a letter to the writer:

"It is now generally understood that lowland ('wet') rice is grown on land submerged during a portion of the growing season. The land is submerged either by seasonal rainfall or by artificial irrigation. A large percentage of the world's rice crop—in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Western Hemisphere, is grown in this manner. In much of Asia the lowland (irrigated) rice is transplanted. Some of the lowland acreage also is transplanted in Africa, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere, but in these parts of the world much of it is sown in the same manner as other small grains, and irrigated. Rice grown on land not submerged, for any appreciable period during the growing season, that is, 'mountain,' 'dry,' 'dryland,' and 'hill,' and not provided with levees, dikes or terraced to hold water, now is generally known as upland rice. In my opinion . . . the terms used should be lowland (irrigated) or upland (non-irrigated) rice."

[42] Faulkner, 1933.

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Some upland varieties can be grown in flooded fields; however, it is said to be easier to grow dry rices in water than to grow wet rices on dry land.[43]

Wickizer[44] observes that "upland" rice, whatever its variety, is grown without irrigation, i.e., not in surface water; while "lowland" rice of all varieties is grown either under artificial irrigation or in natural swamps where there is standing water at appropriate seasons. Commonly, the varieties grown as "upland" rice are not the same as those grown as "lowland" rice, as they each adapt best to special conditions. A single variety can however often be grown under either system of cultivation.[45]

The kinds of rice set up by the agronomists are thus based upon the plant's adaptations. Hedayetullah[46] and Copeland[47] agree in stressing its tremendous adaptability. The latter emphasizes adaptation to varying amounts of water. He classifies as "upland" rice all varieties which are grown without artificial irrigation, but stipulates a considerable range of water tolerance between "lowland" rices. Wild varieties of rice are bearded, as are some cultivated ones, and these reportedly can stand flooding better and for longer periods of time than non-bearded varieties do. Some "lowland" rices grow even in salty water —these are grown in fields visited by the tides, in India, Siam and Annam. Copeland[48] reiterates Wickizer[49] to the effect that the "upland" and "lowland" varieties are:

> . . . groups not sharply separated in nature, being blended by many varieties which thrive with or without irrigation; but the division is practical by definition and conforms with agronomic practice.[50]

Wild rice, and many cultivated varieties, shed the seed upon maturity.[51]

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[43] Pelzer, 1945, p. 10.

[44] Wickizer and Bennett, 1941.

[45] Jenkin W. Jones states further:

"Lowland (irrigated) rice is more productive than upland (non-irrigated) rice, but land suitable for irrigation plus irrigation water—rainfall and irrigation systems—is limited in all parts of the world. Hence, in regions, particularly in Asia, having relatively high precipitation well distributed during the growing season, upland rice is grown. Upland rice cannot be grown except where the rainfall is rather heavy and well distributed. The varieties grown as upland rice yield more when grown under irrigation, but upland varieties are apparently somewhat more drought-resistant than are lowland varieties. Some lowland varieties, however, have a wide range of adaptation and will yield reasonably well when grown as upland rice."

[46] Hedayetullah, 1946.

[47] Copeland, 1924, p. 125.

[48] Copeland, 1924.

[49] Wickizer and Bennett, 1941.

[50] Copeland, 1924, p. 125.

[51] Jenkin Jones notes that:

"Red rice, a cultivated variety, is also the most serious weed in our Southern States. There is nothing unusual about rice shattering; most wild species have this characteristic."

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243 In this connection, Copeland[52] mentions wild rice as the most annoying weed in Philippine rice fields. M. Mène,[53] writing in regard to introducing "le riz sec de Chine" to the Midi, notes that it can resist violent winds without shedding its grain or collapsing. Further, the harvest need not be on a fixed date, but is amenable to the grower's convenience. Here, Hedayetullah[54] points to the duration of the maturation period as a foremost adaptation of the plant to environment. For the early rices, the date varies with the date of sowing; during their growth temperatures do not drop sharply. The transplanted winter rice, India's main crop, ripens when temperatures begin to drop and, despite variation in sowing dates, it matures on almost a fixed day. For cultivated varieties in general, Copeland[55] gives the range of the growth and maturation period as two[56] to ten months, remarking that it is an important varietal characteristic. He believes that there is probably an inherited ability to develop at a given rate, but since environmental conditions, such as seasonal fluctuations in temperature and precipitation, cause the period of development to vary also, the inherited limits are obscured.

The altitudinal limit of rice planting in the Philippines is 1500 feet; Wickizer[57] gives 7500 feet as the limit for "upland" rice in the tropics. Most varieties require four months of hot weather, at a temperature averaging 22°C., without sharp drops from day to night. "Upland" rice thrives at somewhat lower temperatures, "lowland" rice typically requiring two to three months at a temperature of 20°C. during growth.[58] Rice will not develop normally in shade, and most varieties cannot endure cold nights. "Upland" rice prefers light, loamy soils. Clay soils, which occur widely in the tropics, are well suited to irrigated rice culture, and where a substratum of hardpan occurs, downward seepage is prevented, which may be beneficial provided this is not too near to the surface of the soil. Coraline soils do not hold moisture long enough to raise a crop of "lowland" rice, and the limestones, as in eastern Java, are too porous to permit economical irrigation.

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[52] Copeland, 1910.

[53] Mène, 1873.

[54] Hedayetullah, 1946.

[55] Copeland, 1924.

[56] Jenkin Jones comments:

"I have often heard of 60-day rice, but we have had over 8000 varieties of rice from various parts of the world, none of which have matured in 60 days under our conditions. . . . It has been our experience that in Asia at times the word 'plant' is used when 'transplanted' is the term meant; hence, if the rice matures in 60 days from the time it is transplanted, it was 30 to 60 days old when transplanted."

He refers to agricultural experiment stations in the United States, which can nowhere duplicate by any means the climatic, hence growing, conditions in Monsoon Asia.

[57] Wickizer and Bennett, 1941.

[58] Jenkin Jones would extend the estimated growing season of "lowland" rice to from three to six months, from his experience in the United States.

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Rice has food preferences. It does not require much nitrogen in order to survive, and it will grow in soils that are deficient in calcium and in phosphates.[59] Wells, Agcaoili and Feliciano[60] concluded that the chemical content of the grain is influenced by climatic conditions during growth; by type of soil, nature of fertilizers, and seasonal variation. Much[61] has been written about the improvement of the nutritional qualities of rice by modifying such factors as are controllable in cultivation. The plant apparently obtains only carbonaceous elements by photosynthesis from air, sunlight and water. Therefore, according to Albrecht,[62] the most important factors contributing to the proteinaceous and mineral content of the grain, and hence to its fertility, are soil composition and fertilizers. Transplanting and irrigation cannot supply elements lacking in the soil, though the algal film may make some oxygen available for irrigated rice. 243

The botanists have made only a beginning in tracing the origin of the cultivated varieties of rice. All ascribe it to one species—*Oryza sativa* Linnaeus. A few advance a polyphyletic origin. Not many surveys have been made in the Old World homes of wild rice. In the New World, the so-called wild rice gathered for food by some American Indians is not a true rice, but is a wild grass known to botanists as *Zizania aquatica*. Of the botanical investigations, Roschevicz'[63] studies are the most suggestive. Placing the origin of rice cultivation in Asia, he at the same time makes a case for some of the cultivated African rices having originated from wild African species—these akin to *Oryza sativa* L. *f. spontanea*. Further, he believes the latter to be a complex of small independent species. Its center of diversity is very possibly India, where

[59] Jones states as to food preferences of rice:

"Rice can, it is true, be grown on soils that are low in nitrogen, phosphorus, and potash, but the yields are certainly low also. Kelly has shown that with yields of 2400 to 3600 pounds of rice, 40 to 65 pounds of nitrogen, 26 to 41 pounds of phosphorus, and 60 to 113 pounds of potash per acre are removed. These amounts are not available in poor soils, and hence, yields as large as these are not obtained under such conditions. Rice responds to favorable conditions the same as do other crops . . . nitrogen . . . is most extensively applied to rice land where high yields are produced."

[60] Wells, Agcaoili and Feliciano, 1922.

[61] *See*: McCarrison, Robert, "Pathenogenesis of Deficiency Disease. XIV—On the Occurrence of Ophthalmia in Pigeons Fed Exclusively on Parboiled Rice and Its Prevention by the Addition of Soil to the Food," *Indian Journ. Medical Research*, 11 (2): 323–335, 1923; "The Relationship of Rice-beriberi in India," *Indian Med. Research Memoirs*, No. 2, 1924; and "Influence of Irrigation on the Nutritive Value of Rice," *Indian Journ. Med. Research*, 15: 915–920, 1928. Also: *see* Vedder, Edward B., and R. T. Feliciano, "An Investigation to Determine a Satisfactory Standard for Beriberi-Preventing Rices," *Philippine Journ. Science*, 35 (4): 351–389, 1928; Hermano, A. J., "The Nutritive Protein Value of Five Varieties of Rice," *Philippine Journ. Science*, 51: 567–572, 1933; Sreenivasan, A., "Nutritive Value of the Protein and Mineral Constituents of Rice Varieties," *Cereal Chemistry*, 19 (1): 36–47, 1942; Sreenivasan, A., and V. Sadasivan, "Nutritive Value of the Protein and Mineral Constituents of Dry and Wet Rices," *Cereal Chemistry*, 19 (1): 47–55, 1942.

[62] Albrecht, 1944.

[63] Roschevicz, 1931.

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243 he maintains that conditions favor mass mutation, and where he believes that such mutations have been utilized by rice growers since ancient times.[64] At any rate, and most likely in Africa, a number of the cultivated varieties have possibly originated from wild species such as *O. breviligulata*, *O. glaberrima*, and *O. officinalis*, which are related to *O. sativa* L. *f. spontanea*. The small-grained rices "very probably have taken rise from *Oryza minuta* Presl."[65] At least some of the multitudinous cultivated varieties could stem from the hybridization of these species with cultivated rices, the majority of which do owe their origin to *O. sativa* L. *f. spontanea*. The latter is referred to by Roschevicz[66] as a wild species; much of the literature does not specify it as wild, but lumps all cultivated rice as *O. sativa* L. Roschevicz[67] concludes:

> The botanic-morphological and the botanic-geographical methods of investigation applied to the material available to us, lead us to the following conclusions: (1) our cultivated rice belongs to section *Sativa* Roschev., having for its center of origin tropical Africa; (2) by far not all the cultivated rices have originated from *Oryza sativa* L. *f. spontanea;* many of them have their origin from species akin to *Oryza sativa* L., as *O. breviligulata* A. Cheval. et Roehr., *O. glaberrima* Stend., *O. minuta* Presl., *O. officinalis* Wall., etc., either by way of being introduced into cultivation along with *O. sativa* L., or by way of hybridization with the latter; (3) the great varietal diversity of cultivated rice in India and Indo-China may be explained not only by the ancientness of rice cultivation in these countries, but also by the fact that wild rice *Oryza sativa* L. *f. spontanea* has found there suitable conditions for the production of a considerable number of mutants (which did not take place in Africa) and that these mutants have been introduced into cultivation.
>
> The Asiatic origin of rice cultivation is equally confirmed by the multifariousness of the varietal material which in China, Indo-China and India, and in general the whole of south-eastern Asia, is immensely rich in varieties and races, while the number of varieties and races known for Africa is inconsiderable . . . that the cultivation of rice as a world crop is due to China or to Indo-China, does not mean that rice did not thrive somewhere in the heart of central Africa, whose ancient history has remained a mystery to us, without having become known to ancient Egypt . . . As we know that rice was cultivated in Africa from the most ancient times, which is confirmed by the

[64] Jenkin Jones says concerning mutations:

"Mutations in rice probably occur much more frequently than was formerly supposed. . . . Most mutations in rice are recessive to normal. . . . on the basis of my observations over the past few years, mutations in rice, at least in this country, occur rather frequently.

"The rate of mutation no doubt depends upon the environment and the varieties of material grown. This also is true with respect to the extent of natural crossing between varieties, which also is more common than was formerly expected. These two factors, mutation and natural crossing, have no doubt been very active in the origin of the numerous varieties of rice present in Asia. . . . I am certain that the plant produces a greater number of varieties under domestication than in the wild."

[65] Roschevicz, p. 123.

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] *Ibid.*, pp. 123 ff.

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fact that Africa, as we have seen above, possesses varieties of its own, grown from local wild rices, the question where wild rice was first introduced into cultivation remains unsolved. 243

Though there are many more recent discussions than that of the Russian botanist, none consulted takes in as wide a range of material with comparable care. It is interesting to note that Roschevicz,[68] at least in the English summary of his text, makes no point of the physiological adaptations that lead agronomists to distinguish "wet" or "lowland," and "dry" or "upland," and deep-water rices. Parnell,[69] with the Indian botanists Ayyangar and Ramiah, remarks the existence of probably several thousand varieties of rice in India, and finds that the characteristics in which they differ are extremely varied, some being morphological and others physiological. Cross-fertilization would account for some of this great number of varieties. Burkhill is cited by Pelzer[70] as giving a polyphyletic origin for cultivated rice; *O. fatua* Koen. and *O. minuta* Presl. probably ancestors of *O. sativa* L.

Disregarding its botanical identity, the literature persists in classifying rice according to the methods employed in its cultivation. As to the "dry" or "upland" rice, the wide practice of shifting cultivation in conjunction with the cutting and burning of forest jungle or brush previous to cultivation may have helped to obscure the variant methods employed. This general practice, under such blanket designations as "jhum" (India), or "the milpa system" (Middle America), is used and abused in regard to its own variations, as well as in loose descriptions of the methods of rice cultivation. In Korea, where the technique has great antiquity, the Chinese refer to it as "fire field" agriculture. Common in southeast Asia, its historical connection with the development of rice cultivation has interested others than anthropologists. Pelzer[71] treats it elaborately, and semi-popular works like Bruno Lasker's[72] make the anthropologist desire a more careful understanding of the whole problem. Here, shifting cultivation is pertinent only insofar as it is one of the techniques employed in rice cultivation.

Chinese methods of rice cultivation were first widely discussed by French agronomists, whose practical interests led them there a hundred years ago. They also used the terms "wet" and "dry" rice. They were interested in introducing new varieties into the Midi, and for over forty years the Bulletin de la Société Zoologique d'Acclimatisation buzzed with discussions of "le riz sec de Chine." Notable among these is the account by E. H. de Méritens,[73] who

[68] Roschevicz, 1931.
[69] Parnell, Ayyangar, and Ramiah, 1917–1922.
[70] Pelzer, 1945.
[71] *Ibid.*
[72] Lasker, 1944.
[73] De Méritens, 1855.

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243 translated sections of a Chinese encyclopedia of agriculture, the Shou-shih T'ung-Kao, a work completed in 1742, and based on the H'su-Kuang-chi, which was compiled from original manuscripts and edited by one Ch'ên Tzu-lüng, on imperial orders. M. de Méritens,[74] writing in 1855, credits Leon d'Hervey Saint-Denys with the first interest in "le riz sec" among his countrymen. Baron d'Hervey Saint-Denys, in 1850, published "Recherches sur l'agriculture et l'horticulture des Chinois." As early as 1842, however, S. Julien[75] in a communication addressed to l'Académie des Sciences described "le riz que se culture à sec dans la Mongolie," and referred to the same Chinese source used by de Méritens.[76] The Shou-shih T'ung-Kao gives a classification based not only on methods of cultivation, but on the period required for the maturation of rice varieties. It accounts for two main groups of rice cultivated in China besides "le riz aquatique."

TABLE I. CHINESE VARIETIES, ACCORDING TO THE SHOU-SHIH T'UNG-KAO

Variety	*Date Sown*	*Date Harvested*
I. Sien-tao, or early rice, including:		
1. Lou-che-ji-tao, or 60-day rice[77]	April 5	June 5
2. Pe-ji-tao, or 100-day rice	April 5	July 5
3. Ta-sien, a large-grained variety	May 5	Early September
4. Siao-sien, a small-grained variety	April 5	August 5
II. Kang-tao, or late rice, including:		
1. Hanno		
2. A two-crop variety:—		
Crop one	March 21 to April 5	Summer
Crop two	Fall	Winter

Besides Sien-tao and Kang-tao, there is Ho-tao, or "riz de feu," suggestive of the "fire fields," but according to the source it was so called in China from its origin in the southwestern mountains, where the climate is hot and where rice is grown under difficult conditions from a Chinese standpoint. Suggestively again, fire fields are found today in the southwest. Ho-tao is transplanted in

[74] *Ibid.*

[75] Julien, 1842.

[76] De Méritens, 1855.

[77] Jenkin Jones comments here: "Unless it refers to a period from the time of transplanting, it is probably like our Sixty-day or Kherson oats which mature in 90 to 100 days. . . . In this connection, too, some of the authors quoted may refer to Rattoon crops of rice, that is, a second crop from one planting as the result of tillering under favorable conditions following the harvest of the first crop. Rice of this nature can mature in 60 days."

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China now, but in olden times this was not done. It includes varieties that vary in shape, color and size of grain, and in consistency. Some varieties are fragrant. In Fukien, a plant known as "riz de Cochinchine" is cultivated on the uplands; this Julien[78] considers the best of all of "le riz sec." For one variety he gives the period of growth and maturation as 50 days, others maturing in 60, 80, and 100 days, in the main being harvested in August and September. This corresponds with the time given for Sien-tao. Julien[79] describes another "dry" rice from Jehol, a sample of which he sent to Paris, informing l'Académie des Sciences that it requires neither natural nor artificial irrigation.

The Shou-shih T'ung-kao, and a Chinese agriculturist of note, one Si-Hien-Tchong, relate how the Emperor Chin-Tsoung (A.D. 996–1021), to alleviate famine in eastern and western Chekiang, ordered the purchase of 30,000 bushels of drought-resisting rice from Fukien, distributing it to the poor people to plant under the instruction of his inspector of transport for grains. Again in the Sung Dynasty, Kiang-Ngao, a subprefect in Jouou-Tcheou, sent to his native Kien-ngan for drought-resisting rice to relieve famines, and thus introduced it to the uplands of the north Chinese valleys. This rice was found to yield abundantly, by local standards at the time. According to the encyclopedia both Sien-tao and Kang-tao were introduced from Cochinchina. The two groups differ in certain physical properties: Sien-tao is the smaller, brighter grained, and is nonglutinous. Kang-tao is sometimes bearded, includes glutinous varieties, and is found in many colors of awn, while Sien-tao is either red or white.[80]

The Chinese method of cultivation for "dry" rice, as given in the source, is different from that used for the "wet" rice. For "dry" rice the nurseries are tilled once in preparation for the seed, which previous to sowing is soaked for one night in water to hasten germination. Seed is not sown broadcast, but in small holes, a few grains to each; wet ashes, the product of burned plants or rice straw, are spread over the whole area sown; the nurseries are weeded three times, and subsequent to each weeding liquid manure is scattered on them. By this time the blade is above ground, and grows with great strength and rapidity. "Le riz sec" is said to thrive equally well on the plains or in the mountains. De Méritens[81] gives another method for its cultivation. Before sowing, the soil is moistened and manured thickly, sometimes with oil cakes, sometimes with

[78] Julien, 1842.

[79] *Ibid.*

[80] Jenkin Jones states in regard to this: "There are two kinds of rice based upon the nature of the endosperm—nonglutinous, which is grown most extensively, and glutinous (waxy). Both may be bearded or beardless, early or late, of poor or good quality, and have red, purple, brown or white bran coats. Kang-tao apparently was a mixture of nonglutinous and glutinous types similar in appearance and color, for rice, like other plants, does not change from one form to another except through hybridization and mutation."

[81] De Méritens, 1855.

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243 leaves and the bark of trees, in addition to animal manures. For the preparation of hard soils brushwood may be gathered and burned, and then plowed under. The rice is transplanted when it is about 20 cm. high. The fields in which it is set out must not be inundated, nor too dry. For "le riz sec," as for "le riz aquatique," the soil is usually prepared in spring. M. de Méritens[82] notes the greater labor involved in transplanting the latter. He draws on d'Hervey Saint-Denys for his information here. The main fields, after tilling, are flooded to receive the transplanted seedlings. First the laborer and his oxen tread the submerged mud, puddling it to a depth of 15 to 20 cm. The plow is not used in this process. The field is then harrowed to level it, and flooded again. The rice is then transplanted from the nurseries to the inundated fields, its roots immediately covered with mud by the action of the water. The roots are planted in holes prepared after the field is flooded, and just when the plants are being set out in rows. It goes without saying that transplanting to unsubmerged fields is less work.

In contemporary accounts there is unanimity on the fact that most Chinese rice is transplanted,[83] but there is less detail as to varieties. Wagner[84] gives "den gewöhnliche Wasserreis," "den sogenanten Bergreis," and "den Klebreis" (glutinous), but fails to distinguish methods of cultivation. His "mountain" rice ripens in four months, and his "water" rice (irrigated) subdivides into early, medium and late varieties. John L. Buck[85] describing land utilization in China, gives regional differences in agricultural techniques. In the Yangtze region, the slopes are terraced above the flood plains. In the southwest, terraced fields occupy fifteen per cent of the area cultivated, and some of the Lolos and Miao grow rice on terraced land. Szechwan is a frostless area where a spring crop is grown in addition to the main one, and is the only part of China where the soil is rich enough not to need fertilizers, although they are used to some extent. In what Buck[86] designates as the "rice-tea" area, much of which is hilly, the bottom lands are planted in rice. R. H. Tawney[87] remarks the use of "water farming" in the Yangtze region, and in the south, where double cropping of rice is a regular practice, together with more intensive cultivation. George Cressey,[88] like Buck,[89] divides China into agricultural regions. He blames the poor soil and the limited supply of water for the scanty planting

[82] *Ibid.*

[83] *See*: Martin Yang, 1945, *A Chinese Village. Taitou, Shantung Province*, pp. 22–23. The rice is sown in small holes, after plowing; it is not transplanted or irrigated; in a considerable area around Taitou no rice is grown. Fertilizers are employed, including ashes mixed with dung.

[84] Wagner, 1926.

[85] Buck, 1937.

[86] *Ibid.*

[87] Tawney, 1932.

[88] Cressey, 1934.

[89] Buck, 1937.

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of rice in northern China, stating that it can be grown as far north as Vladivostok. He summarizes: 243

> The most conspicuous boundary is the northern limit of continuous rice cultivation, with its flooded fields, canals and water buffalo, near latitude 33° North . . . this line es midway between the Yangtze and Hwang rivers along the crest of the Tsingling in the west and near the Hwai River in the east. South China is a green, humid, subtropical riceland, while the north is a dry brown wheatland under the influence of the desert . . . Major contrasts appear between the wheat and rice provinces . . . .The growing season in north China is five to eight months, while in south China it is ten months to a year, so that double cropping is more widespread and the same land can support more people. Rainfall is over twice as heavy in the south. The gross area of the south is larger but the presence of extensive plains in the north gives it a greater cultivated area. Nevertheless, the higher productivity of the rice lands enables them to support nearly twice the total population of the wheat-producing section.[90]

The Yangtze Valley is subject to the hazards of over-flooding and droughts, but the rice crop usually stands to benefit by the three-month flood period. This region yields one rice crop annually.[91] Terraces occupy the south Yangtze hills. Two, and sometimes three crops of rice per year are grown in southern China, where the yield per acre is second—in Asia—only to that of Japan, and is three times that of all India or Java. The lower and central Yangtze and the western and southern area of China lead in rice production. In the Canton delta the first crop is set out in March and harvested in July; a second crop is then transplanted to the main fields to be harvested in November. In eastern Chekiang an early crop is harvested in July, a late crop in October. Terraced lands are cultivated mainly in Szechwan, especially on the slopes of its Red Basin. Agriculture is most intensive in southern China, where the double cropping of rice is the regular practice. On the southwest tableland, rice is the dominant summer crop; it is often dependent entirely on rain for its water supply, excepting in the mile-high plateau, where flooded fields prevail. A description of Yunnan, edited by H. T. Fei,[92] notes that the southwest tableland and the valleys are diverse in both crops and population; here begins the altitudinal stratification of peoples and cultures that is so very characteristic of Farther India. The Lolos adhere to maize as their staple, growing some rice on terraced land. The Chinese immigrants grow mostly rice. They prepare the land in April, and bring off the crop in autumn.

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[90] Cressey, 1944, pp. 91–93.

[91] Jenkin Jones notes: "In much of the Yangtze Valley and from Central Japan to the southern part only one rice crop is grown a year but the land is double cropped, wheat, barley and vegetables often being the second crop. In this connection, N. Jasny, in his *Competition among Grains*, Stanford University, 1940, p. 7, explains: 'Where the cool season is too cold and/or too dry for rice, fall-sown wheat or barley is frequently rotated with it on the same land and in the same crop year'."

[92] Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943.

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243 These few surveys are fairly compatible with that of the Shou-shih T'ung-Kao. The practical universality of transplanting in China is worthy of a remark. It has been demonstrated by agronomists that transplanting increases the yield per plant and per acre.[93] The seedling develops new grain-bearing tillers when it is transplanted, so that even double transplanting[94] has been found rewarding.[95] It economizes seed: in China one acre of nursery seedlings plants from ten to twenty-five acres of rice; and it permits double cropping, the second rice crop getting its start in the nursery while the first crop of rice, or in some cases another plant, as wheat or barley, matures in the field.[96] Transplanting can mitigate the dangers of drought and flood in the main fields by delay until favorable conditions return. In India and in the Philippines the rice transplanted is sometimes raised in a dry-farmed nursery.

Tanaka and Yekoussima,[97] writing in 1867, describe "dry" rice grown in Japan. The plant needs a certain amount of water, but it is not grown on flooded fields. In Jeddo (Yeddo) it is planted in March and harvested in October or November, at the same time when the irrigated rice is taken off.

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[93] Jenkin Jones interpolates here: "This is true in some tests, not so in others. Transplanting does save seed, irrigation water, makes the crop easier to fertilize and weed, and to double crop. These and not increased yields account for the practice in Central Japan and the Yangtze Valley."

[94] Hedayetullah, 1943.

[95] Jones says, to the contrary: "Tillering is associated with the variety, the conditions under which the rice is grown, spacing, number of plants per hole, climatic conditions and other factors, and if rice is transplanted rather close together you get essentially the same amount of tillering as if you had sown directly at the same spacing. That transplanting does not necessarily result in high yields is evident from the fact that much of the rice crop is transplanted in the Philippine Islands, Indo-China, Siam, Burma, and India, but the average yields in these countries are relatively low, ranging from 22 to 36 bushels per acre in the pre-war period; whereas, in California, Italy, Egypt, Spain, yields often range from 60 to 75 or 80 bushels per acre without transplanting."

[96] F. H. King, *Farmers of Forty Centuries*, Madison, Wis., 1911, includes increased yields in the benefits due to transplanting, to wit, p. 284: "Extensive as is the acreage of irrigated rice in China, Korea and Japan, nearly every spear is transplanted; the largest and best crop possible, rather than the least labor and trouble, as is so often the case with us, determining their methods and practices." *Ibid.*, pp. 288–289: "More than a month is saved for maturing and harvesting winter and early spring crops, or in fitting the fields for rice, by this planting in nursery beds. The irrigation period for most of the land is cut short a like amount, saving in both water and time. It is cheaper and easier to highly fertilize and prepare a small area for the nursery, while at the same time much stronger and more uniform plants are secured than would be possible by sowing in the field. The labor of weeding and caring for the plants in the nursery is far less than would be required in the field. It would be practically impossible to fit the entire rice areas as early in the season as the nursery beds are fitted, for the green manure is not yet grown and time is required for composting and for decaying, if plowed under directly. The rice plants in the nursery are carried to a stage where they are strong feeders and when set into the newly prepared, fertilized clean soil of the field they are ready to feed strongly, under these most favorable conditions. Both time and strength of plant are thus gained . . . the best possible practices under their condition of small holdings and dense population."

[97] Tanaka and Yekoussima, 1867.

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Remote from the main rice fields, it is grown on hill slopes where, when the summer is very hot, the Japanese have means to irrigate it. Before it is planted the ground is enriched with night soil. The seed is prepared by soaking for three days in water and then exposing to the sun. When sown it is mixed with ash and powdered fish refuse and scattered in furrows. It is subsequently weeded and cultivated. Transplanting is not mentioned in connection with this crop. 243

R. B. Hall[98] assigns only local importance to "upland" rice in Japan, where it now occupies in all 206,500 cho. In order of importance, the main producing areas are: the diluvial terraces of Kwanto, the dry central part of the Taiwan plain, and the ash plateau of southern Kyushu. A little is grown in Ou, the northernmost district of Old Japan, where the growing season is short and the climate relatively cold. The diluvial terraces of Kwanto have a " . . . cool, moist sprouting season and . . . a hot, dry ripening period."[99] In Hokkaido the growing season is short, "upland" rice is not cultivated, but quick-maturing "lowland" varieties have been established. Rice cultivation is only a recent development on the island, and the northern limit is set by a 90-day growing season. No altitudinal limit is mentioned for the Japanese islands. In Tokai, the East Sea district, there is " . . . irrigated rice on the delta plains and specialized dry land production on the terraces. . . . "[100] A variety known as "Izumo" is grown in San-in and along the Sea of Japan coast, a relatively cool region with a short growing season, where there is little level or arable land; we are left in doubt as to whether this is an "upland" variety of rice. Double cropping of rice, wheat, barley, and other crops is practiced in northern Kyushu (Kita), in southern Taiwan, and in the Nanki, Setouchi, and Tokai districts of Old Japan. The Hokuroku district, situated in the west central plains south of Ou, embraces " . . . the most specialized paddy areas in Japan."[101] The Kwanto plain produces almost as much "paddy" as Hokuroku and more than half of the "upland" rice crop of Japan. In the Imperial district of Kinai, the " . . . alluvial basin floors constitute vast paddy fields, and the average yield is the highest in Japan."[102] In Kinai a few terraces are cultivated.

In Korea, half the rice grown is dependent on rain for its water supply. In the north the growing season lasts only 100 days, the terrain is rugged, and "lowland" rice occupies a little over one tenth of the farm land. The northeastern people, who are shifting cultivators, grow no rice at all, while in the northwestern section there is " . . . a relatively important production of 'dry'

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[98] Hall, 1934, 1935.
[99] *Idem*, 1935, p. 133.
[100] *Idem*, 1934, p. 339.
[101] *Ibid.*, p. 327.
[102] *Ibid.*, p. 336.

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243 rice."[103] As in [illegible] scription of Japan, Hall[104] omits any mention of transplanting, thou[illegible] cropping may be taken to infer it. He takes the southern boundary of [illegible] Korea as the line separating modernized (Japanese) rice cultivation a[illegible] double cropping from simpler methods employed with single cropping in the north. In southern Korea the growing season lasts 150 days, and a higher proportion of rice fields is irrigated than elsewhere.

The Malay Peninsula presents a wide variety of agricultural methods. Here the "wet" system obtains for ninety per cent of the rice fields:

> But there are variations of both these main systems to suit local conditions: wet systems involving considerable preliminary cultivation as opposed to systems where cultivation is practically impossible owing to the soft nature of the land; dry systems which include both ploughing and raking, and a dry system which merely entails the clearing and burning the jungle in preparation for the crop.
>
> In the cultivation of "wet" padi the general procedure (of course with local variants) is to plough or dig the land once or twice, and rake or smooth it with a roller. The seed is planted in a nursery and is ready for transplanting in the field after 40 days. The seedlings are planted three or more per hill, about one foot apart. After cultivation consists of weeding.
>
> In dry padi cultivation the land is sometimes ploughed twice, raked and the seed sown by hand or drilled; or seed planted in clumps about a foot apart, or in hill cultivation, virgin land is cleared, burned, and the seed broadcast.
>
> Generally speaking, manuring is not a common practice in padi cultivation. In Kedah and Perlis, where bat guano is easily procured, the land is periodically manured. In Kelantan a system exists in which each plant, after transplanting, receives a small application of burnt mixture of cowdung and earth, coconut and arecanut leaves. In parts of Perak and in Province Wellesley and Malacca, the seedlings are steeped in a mixture of mud, phosphate and ashes immediately after removal from the nursery.[105]

In the Krian district of the Malay Peninsula, a floating seedbed is used. Weeds are cut, plastered together with clay, and piled in a long strip, to float as a platform on the surface of a flooded field, the top staying two inches above the water level. A thin layer of mud is applied to sow the seed in. The plot rises and falls with the water in the field, keeping the seedlings above water while their roots develop in the submerged layers. The seed is germinated prior to sowing by three days' soaking in water, and two more days in a moist condition. The germinated seed is broadcast on the nursery and a layer of leaves is put over it for ten days to protect it from the sun and from birds. In two weeks the plants are six to eight inches high. A similar nursery is used on the west coast of India. In the Malay Peninsula, the plants are set out first in clumps of 150 to 200, and partially submerged. At the second transplanting, ten days later, these clumps are broken into smaller ones that are placed in rows. Forty

[103] *Idem.*, 1935, p. 48.

[104] *Ibid.*

[105] Malaya, Dept. of Agriculture, 1939, p. 42.

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days later, at the third and final transplanting, the tops of the seedlings are cut back, and the roots are pruned and dibbled in. Two or three weedings take place after this. As soon as the plants flower, the water is gradually drained off the fields, to be gone when the grain has set and is ripening. The varieties that are planted in the best soil, in June, ripen in the short dry season early in the year, about February. The period of growth for irrigated rice may be said in general to last from seven to eight months. 243

In the district of Kelantan, "dry-land" nurseries are used for "wet padi." The site is plowed and harrowed twice, the seed broadcast thinly and harrowed in. Usually the single transplanting takes place forty days later, though adverse weather conditions may delay it as much as three months. The main fields cannot be cultivated until the July rains soften the soil. Preparation of the land and planting proceed from then until November, the low-lying areas being completed first, followed by the higher and drier areas. Plowing is not possible in all types of Kelantan soil. The transplanted rice crop is drained if there is an excess of rain. The crop is not weeded, but is manured as described above. In this district:

> Two distinct types of padi are cultivated, namely wet padi or padi chedongan, and dry padi, padi tugalan. This dry padi must not be confused with the dry or hill padi, padi huma, found in various parts of Malaya, as the methods of cultivation are distinct.[106]

Further:

> The land planted with dry padi falls into two groups, that habitually under the dry crop and that which may be utilized for either the wet or dry type. The latter forms but a small proportion of the whole and comprises the lower lying dry padi, or tugalan lands, the choice of wet or dry padi for any particular year usually depending on the inclination of the cultivator. Generally speaking, the fields are flat or slightly sloping and in the latter case wet padi is found at the bottom of the slope, dry padi land over the main area and the intermediate or alternating type mentioned above in a narrow strip between the two. . . .
>
> The soil throughout the dry padi lands is markedly homogeneous and . . . a heavy loam predominates.
>
> In view of the localized nature of the crop it is not surprising to find that there are only some twelve distinct varieties cultivated. The maturation periods of these varieties vary from 173 to 197 days and, though the majority can only be used as dry padi, there are some which can also be successfully planted on wet land.
>
> The success or otherwise of the dry padi crop is dependent on a favorable monsoon. Dry padi calls for an amount of labor and care which is greatly in excess of that required to produce a crop of the wet type.[107]

In Kelantan the dry season lasts from the middle of February until the end of May. After the early showers in July and August, the "dry padi" land

[106] *Ibid.*, pp. 48, 49.
[107] *Ibid.*

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243 is plowed and harrowed four times, and the seed dibbled in lines, before the monsoon rains come. Land must not be plowed or weeded when too wet, since packing or puddling this soil injures the plants.

A simpler method, like the one called "padi huma" in Trengganu, is used in farming "dry-land" rice in Province Wellesley North. It consists in cutting and burning the standing vegetation, followed sometimes by a light hand-digging after the April rains; the seed is dibbled into holes and covered, with no subsequent care. In Trengganu, four types of rice are distinguished locally

(1) Padi chedongan—"wet," transplanted rice.
(2) Padi taboran—rice broadcast on non-irrigated land.
(3) Padi tugalan—rice dibbled into dry land.
(4) Padi huma—rice dibbled in on burned off jungle land which is left to revert to jungle after one season's use.

The first is dependent chiefly on rain for irrigation. Type 3 is on the lines of the Kelantan "dry padi," described above. Type 2 is planted either because the owner knows no alternative method of cultivation, or because he has too much land to care for by the superior tugal method. Type 2 fields are plowed and harrowed three times; the seed is broadcast and covered with a harrow instead of dibbled in, and the crop is subsequently untended until harvest. The land is used and fallowed rotationally for type 2. Type 4 represents what some writers distinguish as true shifting cultivation: the fields are not re-used, new jungle being cleared and prepared annually.

In the Pahang district, after two or three crops of "dry padi," newly reclaimed land is often planted permanently with crops other than rice. Methods here are " . . . the most primitive of any of the four Federated Malay States." "Wet padi" is sown in nurseries in February and March, harvested in December and January. Planting periods vary with local seasonal differences. Pahang crops do not depend completely on rain water. Nurseries:

> . . . for any types of "wet" cultivation are usually situated, on dry land . . . Secondary jungle is usually selected, felled and burnt shortly before sowing the seed. A few larger trees are usually left to afford light shade. The seed, previously soaked in water, is broadcast after the soil has been lightly cultivated, the area than raked to bury the seed. A small amount of weeding is done later if necessary and in the event of dry weather the beds may be watered. . . . The seedlings remain in the nursery for six to seven weeks, or much longer if weather is unsuitable for transplanting.[108]

"Wet padi" land in Pahang is locally differentiated as: (1) Paya, or natural swamp, subdivided into that which is at least partially fed by a stream, and that fed by rains alone; (2) Paya sawah, or artificially irrigated, often flat land, not always swampy; it may include terraced land, and most of it is provided with some form of water supply. Three methods are given for cultivating these two types of "wet padi" land. One involves transplanting, and is like Type 1

[108] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

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above in Trengganu. The standing grass is cut and left to rot. The soil may be worked by hand, or plowed. Sometimes " . . . buffaloes are employed to trample the grass on the paya and puddle the soil."[109] A second method includes presoaking the seed for two nights. The land is prepared as above, and the seed broadcast. A third method is attributed to the Sakai, many of whom live upstream on the main rivers. Virgin or secondary jungle is cut and burned in the dry season, the land then cultivated for two or three years successively. The moist seed is sown broadcast on the semi-wet swamp land (paya), after the rains begin. Crops receive no further care.

In areas marginal to mainland Asia, the evidence is that practice runs as wide a gamut as in the Malay Peninsula. For Madagascar we have Linton's[110] account. Mainland Africa, though having both "wet" and "dry" farming of rice, is not considered here. Going from Madagascar to the Philippines,[111] the Indonesians are found farming rice by both the "wet" and "dry" systems. The Philippines, best known for their elaborate terraced areas, include tribes that farm dry only with shifting cultivation, tribes that use both this and terracing with irrigation, and tribes that irrigate without terraces. In Java[112] and in Madura "upland" rice is grown on non-irrigated terraced land, besides the "wet" rice of the terraced and dyked flat lands. Shifting cultivation and dry farming obtain in the Lesser Soendas. Celebes farms rice by both irrigated and non-irrigated methods. So does Borneo:[113] the Dusuns and Muruts irrigate, the Dyaks elsewhere usually plant with the seasonal rhythms of the monsoons and rely on rain water.

Farther India presents varied environmental conditions; thus it is not surprising to find Estèbe[114] describing for Tonkin, Annam, Cambodia and Cochinchina these diverse groups of rice:

TABLE II. FARTHER INDIAN VARIETIES, AFTER ESTÈBE

Variety and Method of Cultivation	*Date Sown*	*Date Harvested*
1. Early rice. Transplanted once, in July, it matures in four to five months. It is cultivated on small fields for home use. It is hard to harvest because the rains come when it is ripe.	April	October

[109] *Ibid.*, p. 57.
[110] Linton, 1933.
[111] *See:* Barton, 1930; Christie, 1909; Cole, 1922; Garvan, 1941; Jenks, 1905; Pendleton, 1942; and Pelzer, 1945.
[112] *See:* Cole, 1945; Koch, 1930; Pelzer, 1945; Van Eerde, 1937; Van Valkenburg, 1935; and Wickizer and Bennett, 1941.
[113] *See:* Elshout, 1926; Hose and McDougall, 1912; and Rutter, 1929.
[114] Estèbe, 1934.

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243 2. Midseason rice ("Riz de demisaison"). It takes six months to mature. Grown on high and intermediate fields—high ones depend on rains. Highland varieties are grown much in north and east of Cochinchina, and on high fields in Cambodia during the rainy season.	June to July	December to January
3. Main crop ("Riz de saison"). Some varieties are transplanted once, some twice. It takes seven to eight months to mature. Grown on flooded and the richest alluvial soils; main crop on low fields of deltas and coast—some varieties are salt-tolerant, tides visit twice a day. Some 700 varieties grown in Indochina. Manures are much used. Rain-fed varieties are grown on high fields.	June to July	January to February
4. Twice-transplanted rice. Matures in nine months. Transplanted first in August, and again in October–November.	June to July	February to March
5. Floating rice.[115] Not transplanted. Grown in lake and delta regions, especially in Cambodia and Cochinchina. The seed is broadcast before the rains, the field cultivated once. Keeps on growing after floods, in depths *c.* three meters. When floods subside, the plants collapse, develop new roots and raise themselves, then flower and mature rapidly.	End of April	December to January
6. Post-flood rice. A secondary crop. Transplanted from highland nurseries to the banks of streams after the floods subside. Flowers in February–March, then matures rapidly. Sown on less productive lands after their main crop is off. It is being replaced with floating rice.	October to November	March to April
7. Two-crop rice:		
Crop one	May	October
Crop two	End of June	—
Crop two is transplanted in October to fields just harvested. Two-crop varieties are rare; they are grown in the Tonkin delta, and in Annam and Cochinchina. Some, on the coast, are salt-resistant.		

[115] Jenkin W. Jones comments: "Some varieties or types of rice are restricted to certain areas, including the so-called 'floating rice,' because of environmental conditions. The outstanding characteristic of floating rices is that they are able to grow rapidly as the water level rises, and hence, to survive. As a group, floating rices are relatively unimportant except in limited areas where, owing to floods, the usual types cannot be grown."

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Most of the rice is intermediate in its water requirement between the floating rice and the "riz de terrains sec," but does require a plentiful supply. Here, as in China, there are some varieties said to be of Siamese origin. Double cropping is rare in Cochinchina. 243

Estèbe[116] notes that "upland" varieties are grown to a great extent in northern and eastern Cochinchina, in the Mekong region, and in Cambodia on the high fields. In the Mekonga delta and elsewhere, such fields are dependent on rain for water supply, and it is sometimes retained in ditches in the Mekong region. These remarks are interesting in view of the Chinese account of rice introduced from Cochinchina. Chevey[117] gives an interesting account of the floods of the Tonle Sap, where floating, or deep-water, rice flourishes.

Van Valkenburg's[118] classification of rice in Farther India supplements Estèbe's,[119] but does not conflict. His includes: For Cambodia and Cochinchina, a floating rice (sometimes transplanted before the floods), and a dry season or post-flood rice; on the coasts of Annam, an "eighth month" rice and a "tenth month" rice; for the Tonkin delta, in addition to the two last named, a "twelfth month" rice, which includes "lowland" and "upland" varieties, and a "fifth month" rice, including the same, and also a two-crop rice. He allots the irrigated rices of Annam to the coastal plains and fertile valleys, the Tai in the upland valleys raising it also. Pierre Gourou's[120] survey of the Tonkin delta gives a "fifth month" rice, covered by deep water in summer, grown on the lowest lands, including salt-tolerant varieties, and harvested in June. He parallels Van Valkenburg[121] with an "eight month" rice that is harvested in September, and a ubiquitous "tenth month" rice, harvested in November. He mentions a "dry" rice harvested in September along with the "eighth month" rice. In the Tonkin delta, the two-crop rice is the most extensively cultivated. The second crop, in the nurseries during September, is weeded and irrigated while the first crop flowers and matures in the fields. There is also a "rice of three moons," that is reaped in August. The "fifth month," "tenth month," and two-crop rice are all intensively cultivated and grown in irrigated fields where the soil is periodically aerated and kept thoroughly manured.

Among the Karen[122] of Burma, the hill people plant, cut, and burn the upland fields; the lowlanders plow, harrow, puddle with buffalo, and plant nurseries, transplanting to flooded fields. Credner[123] makes a contrast in the methods of the Tai, who live where irrigation is possible, and those of their neighbors in the hills—Lolo, Lissu and Minchia, whose agriculture is "many-sided." Maitre[124] mentions "les hommes des rizieres," or of the "wet" rice fields, among the Moi; J. H. Hoffet[125] lists tribes of Moi who plant "rizieres" and those who plant "rai," or fired upland fields. Charles Robequain,[126] men-

[116] Estèbe, 1934. [117] Chevey, 1934. [118] Van Valkenburg, 1933.
[119] Estèbe, 1934. [120] Gourou, 1936. [121] Van Valkenburg, 1933.
[122] Marshall, 1922, pp. 67, 88, and pl. opp. p. 82. [123] Credner, 1935.
[124] Maitre, 1922. [125] Hoffett, 1933, pp. 8–29. [126] Robequain, 1939, p. 74.

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tioning unspecified back-country tribes in Indochina, makes the same distinction. Paul Palté[127] says that the hinterland Moi lack "les rizieres Annamites." Virginia Thompson[128] differentiates between the main crop and the fast-growing rice varieties in Siam. Zimmerman[129] details the local differences in practice among the Tai, and mentions several rices that mature in three, four, and five months in northeastern Siam, while in the south a few people grow "upland padi," but most rice is transplanted. Double cropping is rare here, and so are the refinements of southern Chinese rice culture, especially manuring.

In Assam, as wide a variation of practices exists as we noted for the Malay Peninsula. One nucleus of such variations clusters around a general pattern of shifting upland cultivation, here including terracing, and excluding the use of buffaloes and the plow. The wide altitudinal range of climate puts emphasis on suitability of the varieties planted to the particular locale. The Angami Nagas exemplify this situation. To cite Hutton:[130]

> The rice grown in wet fields is of several varieties, some sorts being suitable to low and hot situations, and others doing better in cold and high fields. The varieties differ also in the time taken to mature.

His "wet" rice refers to artificial irrigation. Though he lists native-named varieties, Hutton[131] employs "dry" and "wet," as:

> In some villages . . . terraces built for jhum . . . [are] almost as elaborate as those made for wet cultivation.

"Jhum" refers to the fire fields. The dry-farmed (non-irrigated) land gets good care. Seven of the native-named varieties are dry farmed, though one of these is grown also on irrigated terraced land. Mills,[132] in describing the Lhota, enumerates twelve native-named varieties of rice. In the Konyak villages, according to Fürer-Haimendorf,[133] the fields are non-irrigated; he makes no mention of rice varieties. Leaving the Nagas, we find the Lakher sowing their lightly hoed fields in April, the seed left exposed for rain to cover. They weed two or three times, and begin their harvest in October, pulling up the whole plants! Parry[134] gives fourteen native-named varieties with soil preferences, some maturing as late as December and January.

Cultivation in India may be equally diversified, but the material is more difficult of access. For Bengal, Hedayetullah[135] gives a five-fold classification, based upon methods of cultivation and season of growth. Thousands of varieties fall within these well-marked agricultural groups, which include some that are indistinguishable morphologically, but are physiologically distinct.

Sarat Chandra Roy[136] gives a good account of cultivation for the Oraons of Chota Nagpur. Other reports may be given: Grigson[137] describes the Maria

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[127] Palté, 1906, p. 220. [128] Thompson, 1941, pp. 354–357. [129] Zimmerman, 1931.
[130] Hutton, 1921, p. 76. [131] *Ibid.* [132] Mills, 1922. [133] Fürer-Haimendorf, 1939.
[134] Parry, 1932. [135] Hedayetullah, 1946. [136] Roy, 1915. [137] Grigson, 1938.

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TABLE III. BENGAL VARIETIES, AFTER HEDAYETULLAH

Variety and Method of Cultivation	*Date Sown*	*Date Harvested*
1. Early rice. Not transplanted. Grown on the highlands. Sown broadcast. Dependent on rain for water supply, and not ordinarily grown in flooded fields.	April to May	July to September
2. Winter rice. Transplanted into flooded fields in July and August. This constitutes the main crop.	June to July	October
3. Lowland rice. Not transplanted. Grown on low bhil lands. Sown before the heavy rains. Harvested in standing water, it grows in depths to six feet.	February to March	July to August
4. Floating rice. Not transplanted. Grown on the lowest floodlands. Sown broadcast before the rains. Collapses and reroots when the floods recede (as described by Estèbe in Farther India). Grows in depths to thirty feet, keeping the top above water.	February to March	November to July
5. Post-flood, or spring rice. Sown in nurseries and transplanted to river banks when the floods subside, or to lowlands that retain moisture throughout the winter. Sometimes irrigated.	October	March to April

Gonds of Bastar cultivating "light mountain rice," which produces three crops: early, main, and late. Some Marias are shifting cultivators, some have the beginnings of permanent cultivation with irrigation. The Hos in Kolhan[138] plow and transplant; when the land is hilly, they sometimes terrace it. Elwin[139] gives the Baiga sowing "upland" rice on fire fields, with hand tillage and water supplied by rains. Grierson[140] reports 60-day rice in Bihar, which is rain fed; other kinds are transplanted here, once or twice; these varieties mature at different periods from July through December. In the Konkan, on the west coast of India, Ranade[141] reports painstaking farming from the village of Roth Khurd. This is a fertile region where rain is abundant. Most of the rice grown here belongs to early varieties that are sown in May, after the rains set in, and are harvested in October. This rice is locally called "halvi." All of the fields depend on the monsoon rains for their water supply. The rice is transplanted. Nurseries are tilled by hand, and elaborately fertilized, first with a dressing of

[138] Majumdar, 1937. [139] Elwin, 1939. [140] Grierson, 1926. [141] Ranade, 1927.

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243 dung which is covered with grass and branches, then with fine dust, and on top of this with liquid manure. This preparation is made to ensure slow combustion. Then the whole field is fired in April or May, and is ready for sowing. The nursery is hastily plowed before the rains set in, and the seed is broadcast on it. If the monsoon rains hold off, the plot is irrigated. With regular rains, the plants are a foot high in two weeks. The main fields are prepared by several light plowings, and after they are flooded the seedlings are transplanted to them. The plant tops reach above the water, and their roots become established in about two weeks. The fields are drained occasionally and weeded, and by harvest time are drained completely dry.

Ethel Simkins,[142] in a geographical survey of rice cultivation on the coastal plains of south India, finds that on the western coasts rice is grown the year around, as it is in Java. This does not hold true for the Madras coast, though the spring rains there do allow an early-season crop to be cultivated. The west coast, having dependable rains, needs little irrigation, whereas a large percentage of the east coast is irrigated. In the deltas, rice is grown on "wet paddy" land. Where the fields are irrigated, three crops a year are sometimes grown The main crop relies on rains.

> The "lowland" varieties are always transplanted; the "upland" rice is sown broadcast . . . [it is] a poor and coarse-grained variety, usually grown unirrigated.[143]

Wickizer[144] likewise remarks great variety in Indian agricultural practice.

In Asia the descriptions of rice cultivation have been over-simplified in the literature. Actually no sharp division in agronomic practices exists between the more and the less sophisticated peoples. The transitions between the methods employing irrigation and dry farming are too numerous to justify the continued use of "wet" and "dry." Classifications according to habitat, as "upland," "lowland," "mountain," and "swamp" are useless because the plant adapts so readily to varied environments. In comparative work and historical reconstructions such terms alone are inadequate.

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[142] Simkins, 1933.
[143] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[144] Wickizer and Bennett, 1941.

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Chapter III

THE SEDENTARY CULTIVATOR

241 Sedentary, or permanent, cultivation of land is much more vital to the economy of the countries of Southeastern Asia than is shifting cultivation. The majority of peasant cultivators obtain their livelihood by tilling the same piece of land year after year. The continuously utilized arable land, however, is not all cultivated in the same way throughout Southeastern Asia. We may distinguish three main categories of arable land: garden land, surrounding the houses and villages; wet land; and dry land. These three classes of land are devoted to different crops and vary so much from one another in size and reliability of yields, and therefore in value that in Java, for example, the social status of a man depends upon the type of land that he cultivates. There are districts in Java where only those peasants who own wet land, houses, and garden land have the full rights of a villager.

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The Garden Plot

●244 Garden culture on land surrounding peasant houses in Java is devoted to a large variety of crops, ranging from fruit trees to plants that are not required in large quantities but only to supplement the diet and add flavor to the daily rice meal. Ochse and Terra, who have made exhaustive studies of garden culture, are of the opinion that it is a remnant of "primitive grainless hoe culture," in which all the useful plants found in the forest were concentrated in plots near the dwellings. Originally, the number of plants grown in the garden was greater than it is today, for some plants have been taken out of this economy to be grown on a larger scale in fields. The origin of garden culture explains, according to Ochse and Terra, the truly amazing variety of plants that are found on garden land.[1] Sollewijn Gelpke, a leading expert on native agriculture in Java during the past century, remarked on the richness of the gardens:

> Whoever strolls around a compound and takes things in with a botanical eye will see before him a variety of plants of which the uninitiated can have no conception. . . . Such wealth of vegetation is still more impressive to him who approaches it from an economic point of view. He sees palms, bamboo, bananas, and other trees that resemble each other closely, bearing fruit and giving support to various climbing plants.[2]

244 137 Often one is able to distinguish three levels, or stories, in a garden. The ground story consists of low-growing plants, especially tuberous plants that tolerate shade, such as elephant yam (*Amorphophallus campanulatus* Bl.), white arrowroot (*Maranta arundinacea* L.), "purple arrowroot" (*Can-*

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1 Ochse and Terra: "Het onderzoek," 1934. See also Terra: "De voeding der bevolking," 1932, pp. 552–593.

2 Sollewijn Gelpke: Naar aanleiding, 1901, p. 203.

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na edulis Ker), sweet potato (*Ipomoea batatas* Poir.), taro (*Colocasia esculenta* Schott), *Curcuma* species, Goa bean (*Psophocarpus tetragonolobus* DC.), bitter cucumber (*Momordica charantia* L.), snake gourd (*Trichosanthes anguina* L.), Lima bean (large) (*Phaseolus lunatus* L.), Goa potato (*Dioscorea aculeata* L.), wild yam (*Dioscorea hispida* Dennst.), and sweet yam (*Dioscorea alata* L.). The middle story contains taller-growing plants, such as cassava (*Manihot utilissima* Pohl), citrus varieties such as *Citrus nobilis* Lour. and *Citrus aurantifolia* Swingle, papaya (*Carica papaya* L.), banana (*Musa* species), rose apple (*Eugenia aquea* Burm.), and soursop (*Anona muricata* L.). The upper story is formed by tall fruit trees, such as coconut (*Cocos nucifera* L.), jackfruit (*Artocarpus integra* Merr.), sapodilla or chico (*Achras zapota* L.), pomelo (*Citrus maxima* Merr.), of which numerous forms, differing in size and color, are known in the Indies, *belinju* (*Gnetum gnemon* L.), mango (*Mangifera indica* L.), durian (*Durio zibethinus* Murr.), candlenut tree (*Aleurites moluccana* Willd.), tamarind (*Tamarindus indica* L.), *pete* (*Parkia speciosa* Hassk.), stinkbean tree (*Pithecellobium lobatum* Benth.), and *santol* (*Sandoricum koetjape* Merr.).

This list does not by any means include all the plants that appear in the gardens. The plants vary in number and type from region to region in accordance with differences in soil, climate (elevation), and the taste of the owners.

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Estimates indicate that about 15 per cent of the cultivated land in Java and Madura is taken up by gardens. Unfortunately, there have been no detailed studies of garden culture outside of Java, although the products of the garden play an important role in the diet of all the peoples of Southeastern Asia. Terra, who compared garden culture in various districts of Java, found that the share of land allotted to gardens, together with the intensity of their cultivation, increases as the total amount of crop land per head decreases, down to the point where the average amount of crop land per head is only 0.15 hectare. Where the amount of land is even less than this the share of garden land decreases, although there is a tendency at first to increase the intensity of the garden culture. Close to the larger cities, the amount of crop land per person, together with the amount devoted to gardens and the intensity of the latter's cultivation, falls off to a minimum since the population here has supplementary sources of income.

With the development of a money economy appears a specialization that is directed toward the urban centers. There has always been some natural specialization inasmuch as some plants do not grow well everywhere. The coconut, for example, does best in the lowlands. But the new specialization depends not only upon such natural factors as soil and climate, but also upon economic factors such as marketing facilities and the development of communications. This specialization can be observed generally in Southeastern Asia.

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Ochse and Terra found that in calories of food value the returns of the gardens proved to be slightly higher per hectare than those of the irri-

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gated fields. One of the great advantages of garden culture over field culture is that there is always something ready to harvest from the former and therefore something to sell when money for daily household needs becomes scarce. Another advantage is that the garden supplies the family with a great variety of side dishes rich in vitamins; the vegetable proteins of the garden produce are also of high value. 146 244

As to the possibilities of improving garden culture, these two authors state: 000

> It is very evident that an improvement of the compound horticulture is a very difficult problem through the highly varied and dense planting of these compounds as a result of which they come to resemble a very complicated symbiosis. But for all this it must be possible by systematic investigation to improve not only the quality but also the quantity of the production. It may be said that the compounds with their story or layer formation superficially considered will find no favour in the eyes of western agriculture, but they are an essential link in the native production apparatus.[3]

The alarming decline in the welfare of the people of Java in the face of a mounting population prompted Netherlands Indies officials to examine every possibility of improving the peasants' condition. This accounts for the studies of Ochse and Terra. Lacking detailed studies outside Java, we are obliged to depend upon scattered references of uneven value. 654 241

Credner states that in Thailand practically every house has a few trees on the lot, and the villages are often hidden by tree clusters. The greatest intensification of garden culture is found on the right bank of the Mae Nam Chao Phraya (the Menam) in Bangkok Noi, just opposite Bangkok. Here irrigation is employed in garden culture, a technique not usually found in Southeastern Asia. The gardens are surrounded by walls 1 meter high and are traversed by trenches 2 meters apart. The beds between the trenches are elevated. The trenches work both as drains and as irrigation ditches. Small sluices control the water. In the gardens there is a great variety of fruit trees and palms which climbers, such as *Piper betle* L., use as supports. In the trenches the peasants grow lotus and water chestnut (*Trapa natans* L.).[4] Zimmerman, in his survey of rural Thailand, points out that in most regions the peasants rely too much on one crop, rice, and he recommends in several instances improvements in the cultivation of the home lots so that families may have a better supply of fruits and, above all, of vegetables. In the Khlong Rangsit section he observed that "on account of the lack of homestead and village sites among the people there is no gardening and home production of food."[5] This observation may be applied to Southeastern Asia in general. Wherever the dominant form of land tenure is tenancy the flimsy shack of the tenant has no mixed fruit and vegetable garden around it, for his status is much too uncertain. A tenant 244 312 [137] 244 427

[3] Ochse and Terra: *op. cit.*, pp. 371–372.
[4] Credner: Siam, 1935, p. 246.
[5] Zimmerman: Siam, 1931, p. 307.

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who does not know where he will be the next year cannot be expected to plant fruit trees. Under these conditions the diet is reduced to the simplest foods and is usually deficient.

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Zimmerman criticizes some of the characteristics of garden culture in the Thai part of the Malay Peninsula. The improvements that he recommends show that he has approached the gardens with a Western eye, looking for fruit trees "in rows at proper spaces, not scattered as is the case now." [6] He notices lack of tilling, an observation that could be duplicated in every country of Southeastern Asia. As a matter of fact, it is fortunate that the gardens—especially those that have many fruit trees and palms—are not clean-cultivated; otherwise erosion would have caused the same damage here that it has caused in the Westerners' rubber, tea, and coffee plantations—these were planted in rows and kept clean until the discovery was made that soil erosion is extremely severe under such conditions. Pendleton remarks:

> The average Occidental, accustomed as he is to clean cultivated orchards and vineyards in temperate zones, is inclined to keep a plantation in the tropics likewise cultivated. This is now quite generally recognized as a mistake. . . . Near Songkla [in southern Thailand] . . . are considerable plantings of fruit trees, planted as if they were forest trees. . . . Annually, before harvesting the fruit, the undergrowth is slashed and left on the ground, but there is no stirring of the soil or other cultivation. The results are excellent, and there is no soil deterioration, no catastrophic erosion, no expense for cultivation.[7]

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There is little literature on the importance of garden culture among the Malays of British Malaya. According to Grist,

> fruit cultivation is of little more than local importance. The total area under fruit, other than pineapples, is estimated to be 63,000 acres. . . . This area does not take into account the numerous small compounds surrounding Malay homesteads, in which a few fruit trees are planted and which, in the aggregate, must amount to a very considerable area. Although certain fruits acquire a reputation in particular localities, the distribution of the fruits is scattered throughout the country. For instance, North Johore is noted for its durians, Malacca for dukus [*Lansium domesticum* Jack], Penang for rambutans, but in point of fact, equally good quality fruit of these kinds can be found in other areas.[8]

Malaya lacks the detailed information about gardens and their economic importance that is found in Java, for instance, where the garden area of each village is known, because in Malaya there is no population pressure and therefore no need for exact field studies and careful inventories of the source of food supply.

The Philippines are like Malaya in respect to garden culture. Some districts around Manila Bay have specialized in such fruits as mangoes,

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 163.
[7] Pendleton: "Some Interrelations," 1939, p. 50.
[8] Grist: An Outline of Malayan Agriculture, 1936, p. 228.

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241 311 185 of shifting cultivation in the area. In such a case reforestation would be assured by keeping fire out of the old clearings. This could be done by leaving relatively non-inflammable forest belts at least 60 feet wide between individual clearings. These forest belts would offer some protection against the spread of grass fires and at the same time would be a source of seed for further reforestation. Reforestation under such circumstances would be much easier and cheaper than if large contiguous areas were to be cleared and used.

●245 185 [137] Where natural reforestation is particularly slow, cultivators should be required to practice artificial reforestation. In scattered regions in Southeastern Asia tribesmen do this on their own initiative. Pendleton reports such a case in Burma.[35] Certain Dyak tribes in Borneo plant seeds of the candlenut tree (*Aleurites moluccana* Willd.) about 3 meters apart in a freshly cleared ladang before it has even been burned. In the eastern part of the Malay Archipelago shifting cultivators plant such trees as *Aleurites moluccana* Willd., *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Hibiscus similis* Bl., *Casuarina equisetifolia* L., *Macaranga* species, *Euphorbia* species, *Sesbania grandiflora* Pers., and *Desmodium timoriense* DC. for the purpose of restoring the forest.

In Sumatra Deli tobacco planters initiated artificial reforestation after alang-alang had regularly invaded their fallow fields and caught fire so frequently that second-growth forest could not get a start. In Deli the tobacco fields are in use only 1 year and lie fallow 7 to 10 years. They should be protected by forest growth during that period. Therefore, in order to make this possible, the planters controlled fires by planting belts of teak along the highways and roads. These belts served as fireguards [137] and at the same time provided lumber for tobacco-drying sheds. On the tobacco fields themselves they planted especially *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Cassia siamea* Lam., *Pithecellobium saman* Benth., and *Leucaena glauca* Benth., which drive out the alang-alang[36] (Figs. 34–39).

Another way of speeding up reforestation is to spare a few of the larger trees at the time of the clearing. This is done by the Malays of [137] Sumatra. They do not cut down *Koompassia parvifolia* Prain, *Arenga saccharifera* Labill., *Durio zibethinus* Murr. (durian), *Parkia* species, or *Garcinia grandifolia* Pierre.[37] The last three are fruit trees that are numerous [314] in the forest, whereas the second is a palm whose flower stalk is tapped for its sugary sap and the first is preferred by bees as a hiving tree, which gives it its name, "bee-tree." This tree is preserved because the people want the honey. Worthington reports that in Africa "some tribes appear to realize the necessity of maintaining tree growth on their clearings and merely top the trees and lop the branches, so that the trees are enabled to

[35] Similar cases are known in the residency of Benkoelen in Sumatra, in central Celebes, and in Flores. See Hagreis: "Ladangbouw," 1930, p. 631.

[36] Jochems: "De begroeiing der tabakslanden," n.d., pp. 77–89.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 30–32.

[See p 40 ff, cat. 116 --Analyst]

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recuperate quickly when the area is again allowed to revert to bush."[38] 245 •

Several of the forest services of Southeastern Asia have made a rather [654] successful use of the shifting cultivator in their endeavor to reforest the land. They have combined shifting culture and silviculture by hiring shifting cultivators to cut mature trees and to sow or plant new trees on cut-185 over or burned-over land. For this the cultivators are paid a small wage. In addition they are allowed to grow their own crops for one or two years between the rows of young trees. This system, known as the "taungya forestry system," was developed in 1856 by the German forester, Dietrich Brandis, while he was Superintendent of Forests in Pegu, Burma.[39] It is ingenious in that it recognizes the habits of the shifting cultivator and fits them into a modern forest economy instead of persecuting the cultivator and forcing him to give up his traditional culture. This system has been used in the teak forests of Java since 1871. The forest service makes a contract[40] with the peasants of Java according to which the peasants are to prepare the land and plant and take care of teak trees (*Tectona grandis* L.) in return for a small sum of money and the right to plant such crops as maize and red pepper (*Capsicum annuum* L.) between the rows of teak. The cultivation of upland rice is discouraged, and the planting of cassava, peanuts, castor beans, and tobacco usually is not allowed (Figs. 40, 41). 1/A

The taungya forestry system is an excellent way of getting pure stands [313] of commercial timber. The typical forest of the tropics is expensive to exploit because of the large variety of trees which it contains, many of which have little or no commercial value.[41]

As important as reforestation is soil erosion control. Where shifting 134 cultivation is practiced in mountainous regions it often causes such accel- 133 eration in the rate of erosion that the rivers are choked with sediment and periodically do great flood damage. Flood control could be achieved in 185 most cases by completely closing the headwaters and watershed areas to cultivators. On more gentle slopes the clearings should be rather narrow, should parallel the contours, and be separated by belts of forest. If at the same time the forest uphill were protected by fireguards, the clearings would have a chance to close quickly again so that the soil would be

[38] Worthington: Science in Africa, 1938, pp. 378–379.

[39] *Taungya* is the Burmese term for the temporary field of the shifting cultivator, a term that the foresters have adopted. E. P. Stebbing in his work, The Forests of India, Vol. 1, 1922, p. 376, writes:

"Brandis, moreover, recognized that the very system which, till then, had destroyed teak forests might be utilized to produce them, . . . and as early as 1856 an attempt was made in Prome district to sow teak in regular rows, together with the rice scattered by the toungya [*sic*] cutters. Twenty years afterwards this attempt had grown into a regular system, by which areas were being annually stocked with teak at a cost far below that of regular plantations." See also *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, 1926, pp. 415–428.

[40] Becking: "De djaticultuur op Java," 1928, pp. 50–52.

[41] Heske: "Der tropische Wald," 1939, p. 414. Heske's article gives an excellent short account of the forests of Southeastern Asia and points out that they are on the whole much easier to exploit than are the forests of tropical America because of the abundance of cheap labor.

1/A [See p 41, cat 111 -- Annual]

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185 134 138 protected against abnormal erosion. Terracing would be the most effective method of checking soil erosion, but this requires a good deal of labor, which is scarce in areas of shifting cultivation.

654 134 185 133 The Forestry Service of the Indies started an interesting soil-erosion experiment near Tjiwidej in the mountains south of Bandoeng at an elevation of 1800 meters. Two adjacent parcels of forest land, lying on rather steep slopes, are drained separately—out of each parcel comes a little brook—and thus form separate drainage units. Both parcels were used by shifting cultivators who had cut and burned the forest. In one case the slope was left undisturbed; in the other the slope was terraced. At the foot of each slope catch basins were constructed to retain the sediment that was washed down by rain water and transported by the brooks. The amount of water that drains out of each unit was measured and the sediment weighed. The purpose of this experiment was to get quantitative measurements of the amount of erosion that is caused by shifting cultivation and to study the effect of terracing in reducing soil loss. During the first year both parcels lost very little soil, because the humus layer protected it; but in the second year the unterraced parcel lost 5.065 kg. of silt per square meter whereas the terraced parcel lost only one-half as much, or 2.524 kg.[42] (Figs. 42–45). 1

Under the conditions that we have discussed so far, no radical change in the system of cultivation is required. If, however, the population increases to such an extent that there is no longer enough available land to allow for a sufficiently long rotation cycle, more drastic remedies are necessary.

654 185 245 134 Such a situation arose in parts of the Outer Islands and attracted the attention of government specialists. Legal experts familiar with Indonesian customary law, foresters, and agricultural advisers collaborated to seek a solution.[43] Realizing that shifting cultivators are usually reluctant to give up their traditional form of land use, the specialists approached the ladang problem by searching for means of reforesting ladangs quickly. Experiments were made with the planting of quick-growing leguminous and non-leguminous trees, bushes, and shrubs to shorten the fallow period, restore the humus, protect the soil against accelerated erosion, eliminate the grasses, and, in the case of leguminous species, improve the soil by adding nitrogen.[44] We have already seen, however, that artificial refor-

[42] I was able to visit the Tjiwidej experiment with Mr. L. Gonggrijp, under whose supervision the work was carried out. For a detailed report on the project see Gonggrijp: "Het erosie-onderzoek," 1941, pp. 200–220.

[43] H. J. Friedericy of the Department of the Interior and H. Vonk and E. J. Wind of the Department of Economic Affairs, for example, worked together on the problem of ladang culture in the residency of Palembang.

[137] [44] Experimental plantings included, among others, *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., a light-loving tree which is typical in Southeastern Asia of dry, rather open climax forests and of second-growth forests; *Hibiscus tiliaceus* L.; *Albizzia falcata* Backer, one of the fastest-growing trees of Southeastern Asia, used widely as a shade tree on coffee plantations; *Aleurites moluccana* Willd., a tree at home in the drier parts of the East Indies; *Leucaena glauca* Benth.; *Pterocarpus indicus* Willd., a large tree frequently used along roadsides as

1 [see p. 42, category 116 -- Analyst]

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estation is not a discovery of Western-trained scientists but has long been practiced by certain groups in Southeastern Asia. It was the plan of the government to spread and enforce this practice of artificial reforestation wherever advisable. This practice, whereby the cultivator determines the vegetative cover during the fallow period instead of abandoning the ladang to chance growth, brings him to a transition stage between shifting cultivation and permanent cultivation. From there the step to permanent cultivation with crop rotation is but a short one.

Permanent cultivation requires repeated tilling and therefore more labor and tools than the shifting cultivator is accustomed to. Work animals are also desirable. An important obstacle to intensification of agriculture in wide areas of Southeastern Asia, however, is the fact that hill and mountain regions [up to about 1500 meters in elevation] are frequently infested with malaria so that the energy of the people is greatly reduced.[45] Moreover, the acquisition of such implements as plows, harrows, and hoes, and especially of work animals, calls for financial resources or credit, both of which the average shifting cultivator lacks. Some shifting cultivators do own livestock, such as cattle or carabaos, but utilize neither their labor nor their manure. Groups of the Mois in the mountains of Annam have carabaos, but they do not use the animals in their agricultural activities because they "cannot talk" to them.[46] On the Lesser Sunda Islands livestock is kept because it gives social prestige to the owner. Overstocking of the pasture areas on these islands has led to overgrazing and has cut into the forest area until there has developed a scarcity of land suitable for ladang cultivation. The same has happened in large areas in Africa. There it has been necessary to teach the native peasant the use of cattle and make him familiar with the plow. This was done successfully in northern Nigeria by combining the animal husbandry of the nomadic Fulani with the indigenous shifting cultivation of the Hausa peasant, thus developing "a system of permanent farming whereby a man with cattle of his own, say two working oxen and a few cows, can plough and maintain in fertility an area of land sufficient to supply all the requirements of himself and his family, and to obtain a surplus balance as a return for his labour. . . . Thus mixed farming represents a gradual evolution from the shifting methods of cultivation to a static type of agriculture, by the introduction of animal husbandry, and with the use of animal cultivation."[47] Above all, the peasant learns to preserve the animal manure and

a shade tree; *Dolichos lablab* L., a climbing herb which is valuable as a vegetable; *Crotolaria anagyroides* H.B. and K., a bush of vigorous growth which attains a height of from 12 to 14 feet and forms an excellent green manure; *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., low shrubs useful as green manures; and *Mimosa invisa* Mart., a leguminous creeper which suppresses grasses.

[45] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 181 and 350.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 354.

[47] King: "Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1939, p. 271. See also Faulkner and Mackie: West African Agriculture, 1933; and by the same authors: "The Introduction of Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1936, pp. 89–96.

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who does not know where he will be the next year cannot be expected to plant fruit trees. Under these conditions the diet is reduced to the simplest foods and is usually deficient.

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Zimmerman criticizes some of the characteristics of garden culture in the Thai part of the Malay Peninsula. The improvements that he recommends show that he has approached the gardens with a Western eye, looking for fruit trees "in rows at proper spaces, not scattered as is the case now." [6] He notices lack of tilling, an observation that could be duplicated in every country of Southeastern Asia. As a matter of fact, it is fortunate that the gardens—especially those that have many fruit trees and palms—are not clean-cultivated; otherwise erosion would have caused the same damage here that it has caused in the Westerners' rubber, tea, and coffee plantations—these were planted in rows and kept clean until the discovery was made that soil erosion is extremely severe under such conditions. Pendleton remarks:

> The average Occidental, accustomed as he is to clean cultivated orchards and vineyards in temperate zones, is inclined to keep a plantation in the tropics likewise cultivated. This is now quite generally recognized as a mistake. . . . Near Songkla [in southern Thailand] . . . are considerable plantings of fruit trees, planted as if they were forest trees. . . . Annually, before harvesting the fruit, the undergrowth is slashed and left on the ground, but there is no stirring of the soil or other cultivation. The results are excellent, and there is no soil deterioration, no catastrophic erosion, no expense for cultivation.[7]

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There is little literature on the importance of garden culture among the Malays of British Malaya. According to Grist,

> fruit cultivation is of little more than local importance. The total area under fruit, other than pineapples, is estimated to be 63,000 acres. . . . This area does not take into account the numerous small compounds surrounding Malay homesteads, in which a few fruit trees are planted and which, in the aggregate, must amount to a very considerable area. Although certain fruits acquire a reputation in particular localities, the distribution of the fruits is scattered throughout the country. For instance, North Johore is noted for its durians, Malacca for dukus [*Lansium domesticum* Jack], Penang for rambutans, but in point of fact, equally good quality fruit of these kinds can be found in other areas.[8]

Malaya lacks the detailed information about gardens and their economic importance that is found in Java, for instance, where the garden area of each village is known, because in Malaya there is no population pressure and therefore no need for exact field studies and careful inventories of the source of food supply.

The Philippines are like Malaya in respect to garden culture. Some districts around Manila Bay have specialized in such fruits as mangoes,

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 163.
[7] Pendleton: "Some Interrelations," 1939, p. 50.
[8] Grist: An Outline of Malayan Agriculture, 1936, p. 228.

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lanzones, papayas, and chicos, which find a good market in Manila, but on the whole we rarely meet in the Philippines such intensive garden culture as in Java. The diet of the average Filipino is not well balanced and is particularly deficient in fruits and vegetables. In recognition of this fact the Bureau of Education and the Bureau of Plant Industry have both done much to impress the peasants with the need for fruit and vegetable gardens. Although the situation has improved during the past forty years and a large variety of fruits is now produced, the country still depends upon imports, whereas with a little effort most of the imported fruits could be produced locally and would furnish an additional source of income. It would be well to encourage the peasants to grow more fruits and to advise them on the most suitable varieties. In the other countries of Southeastern Asia, also, with the possible exception of Java, such advice would be valuable.

The published material available on the importance of gardens in Indochina is similarly limited in quantity. Even Gourou in his study of land utilization restricts himself chiefly to listing the fruits and vegetables found in the gardens and to stating that certain districts are renowned for the quality of their garden fruits. Gourou's list of fruits and vegetables is as varied and extensive, however, as similar lists for any of the other countries of Southeastern Asia.

Wet Fields

Throughout the countries bordering the South China Sea most of the cultivated land is used for the growing of lowland, or wet, rice. For this purpose the fields must be leveled and surrounded by earth dams to impound rain water during the rainy season or to confine the water that is carried to the fields through irrigation canals or lifted to the fields by mechanical means. If a field is properly leveled the surrounding dyke will keep the water everywhere at the same depth. The size of the wet-rice, or paddy, fields, and the amount of labor that is required to make them, depend upon the topography of the region. In the lowlands, where no terracing is required, there is relatively little labor involved in the making of paddies, which are frequently large. A hilly, or mountainous, terrain necessitates terracing, which demands greater effort and reduces the size of individual fields; the steeper the slope, the narrower the paddies. We have only to see the rice terraces of the mountains of northern Luzon, southern Bali, the Preanger districts of West Java, or Sumatra's West Coast in order to realize how much effort has been expended in building these terraces and how much energy must be devoted to their upkeep. The terraces, as well as the wet-rice fields of the plains, represent the accumulated efforts of generations of peasants, each of which has helped to extend the area devoted to the cultivation of wet rice (Figs. 50–58).[1]

Not all people show the same skill in the making of paddies. According to Credner, the Thai are quite helpless on sloping land that requires terracing before wet rice may be planted. They would prefer to migrate to a

[1] [See pp. 115 ff. Category 116. -- Analyst]

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243 small-scale water-control methods had in fact existed in this region before; the earlier technological interest was to expand rice production by increased water-control on specially fertile, generally volcanic, upland soils. The objective then and now was the same—to cultivate the most fertile areas; the difference was that the volcanic soils attracted local attention and were within the capacity of local people, considerably earlier than the deltaic soils.

[439]

SOUTHEAST ASIA RICE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
(million metric tons clean)

	Exporters			*Importers*		
	Burma	*Indochina*	*Siam*	*East Indies*	*Malaya*	*Philippines*
1915	2.12	1.09	1.0	.55	—	.22
1920	2.0	1.09	.25	.22	—	.07
1925	3.32	1.33	1.18	.50	.41	.10
1930	2.95	1.02	.93	.62	.60	.01
1935	2.93	1.52	1.38	.36	.48	nil
1940	2.50	1.40	2.00	.06	.70	.1
1950	1.17	.09	1.48	.28	.50	.16

A further process at work has been a decline in Southeast Asia consumption of rice per person over the last 30 years, which made possible the expanding exports of rice at a time when population was rapidly increasing. The declining consumption seems to be due to slight changes in diet habit; maize, potatoes and tapioca have steadily entered into local meals and the proportion of vegetables has increased, more especially as it has come to be realised that the dietetic value of meals exclusively based on rice, the custom in Southeast Asia for a long time, is low, as indicated by the small stature and delicate bones of Southeast Asia peoples.

245 Commercial agriculture has largely revolved round tree cultivation (arboriculture rather than agriculture) in which the continuous growing period produces maximum effects. In this tendency may be seen a return to the tree vegetation which is indigenous to equatorial Southeast Asia, and away from the annual and deciduous plants more suited to ecologies associated with the seasonal margins of the tropics. Labour difficulties too are eased to some extent by tree crops whose periodicity is better spread than in the case of annual crops. To the labour difficulty also is due the trend towards devolving arboriculture from plantation systems

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to smallholder systems, leading to the smallholder becoming an exponent of diversified rather than single crop cultivation. 245

While the region has sought to escape the consequence of overmuch dependence on one or two cash crops, Southeast Asia subsistence farming is really already highly diversified. Moreover, the region as a whole must be considered reasonably well diversified in the range of commercial crops it produces, even though individual districts within Southeast Asia are monocultivated rather than polycultivated. 241

Effects of the Second World War

During the 1941–42 campaign, battles were fought through Burma, Malaya and the Philippines. More military action took place in Burma and the Philippines over the year 1944–45. The direct long-term effects of these campaigns were not emphatic because agriculture and arboriculture cannot be "scorched" and denied to the enemy on a large scale. The war in these territories devastated internal communications, broke down the systems of internal trade, removed the means of communication between different parts of Southeast Asia and destroyed the channels to those overseas markets which had been the principal destination of commercial agricultural produce. Breakdown of external trade channels occurred in all Southeast Asia territories whether campaigns took place in them or not. 241 177

The first consequences of this disruption, as distinct from destruction, were to place a premium on subsistence farming, to cause all commercial cultivation to fall into desuetude, to undermine confidence in agriculture for cash, to cause the loss or destruction of draught cattle which were taken away for military use, to disperse labour forces, and to stimulate self-sufficiency policies. Very little of the perennial tree acreage, such as of rubber, was cut down—only 6 per cent in the case of Malayan rubber—yet it was the commercial production which suffered most from disruption, which created in the postwar period considerable difficulties for those territories needing imported rice for the labour to rehabilitate commercial farming and industries. Agriculture itself, where labour was available, rehabilitated quickly; all but 2 per cent of Malayan rice acreages were back in cultivation during 1945–46 and rubber made an equally quick comeback, so

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

FIGS. 25 and 28 (upper left and upper right)—Pepper vines growing in an old *ladang*. Residency of the Lampoeng Districts, Sumatra.

FIG. 26 (center left)—Young rubber tree planted in a rice ladang. No more rice will be planted after the second rice harvest. Western Bali.

FIG. 27 (lower left)—Young rubber trees in an old ladang that has produced two rice crops. Residency of Palembang, Sumatra.

FIG. 29 (lower right)—Closer view of a young rubber tree in the ladang shown in Fig. 27.

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rice takes up nitrogen in the form of ammonia, the value of green manures on wet-rice fields is apparent.[15] In the Indies, *Crotolaria* species are the most frequently used green manures, the favored one being *Crotolaria juncea* L.; but *Phaseolus lunatus* L., *Dolichos lablab* L., and *Pachyrrhizus erosus* Urban are also used. The peasants of the Red River delta in Tongking are in the habit of working into the ground the wilted matter of a number of legumes that have been grown primarily for seed. The peasants of the province of Nam Dinh have developed a technique that may be unique. They push handfuls of indigo branches into the ground between the rows of rice a few days after the latter has been transplanted, for they believe that indigo is superior to pig manure or human excreta. In Indochina rice-growers frequently cultivate green manure, especially *Crotolaria* species, on dry fields and carry it to the rice fields at the time when these fields are being prepared for the seedlings. A green manure used exclusively in a few districts of the delta land of Tongking is the small aquatic plant, *azolla*.[16] Certain villages, thanks to favorable circumstances, have specialized in the growing of azolla to sell to the surrounding country, while other villages reproduce the plant until sufficient quantities of green manure have been obtained to cover all needs. The life cycle of azolla is completed in the months from November to April or May. Only the villagers of LaVan know the secret of maintaining and multiplying the plant during the hot season. They guard this secret jealously since it is the basis of their livelihood.

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Further studies are needed to establish which varieties of green-manure plants are best suited to the various environmental conditions. It is important to find plants that grow rapidly and can be sown when the rice is still on the field, just after the water has been drained off to allow the grain to ripen. Experiments should also be made in the timing of the application of green manure. Should it be early, or just before the transplanting of the seedlings? Should it be on dry or on wet land?

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Crop rotation also has its place as a means of keeping up the fertility of wet-rice fields. This practice seems to be better developed and more prevalent in Java than in any other country of Southeastern Asia. Extensive areas of *sawah*, as the Javanese call their wet riceland, are planted with dry-field crops such as maize, legumes, and other vegetables during the dry season, a practice that has a beneficial effect upon the soil. This form of double cropping is probably better than raising two rice crops in one year, because—although a different variety of rice is chosen for each season—both make essentially the same demands upon the soil; whereas a peanut crop, for example, grown during the dry season will enlarge the nitrogen content of the soil. In some areas of Java lowland rice is rotated

[15] Imperial Bureau of Soil Science: Tropical Soils in Relation to Tropical Crops, 1936, p. 11.

[16] For a map showing the extent of the use of azolla, see Gourou: Les paysans, 1936, p. 392. For further discussion see Nguyên-cong-Tiêu: "L'azolle," 1930, B, pp. 335–350 (also in *Proc. Fourth Pacific Science Congress, Java, 1929*, Vol. 4, 1930, pp. 355–370).

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with sugar or tobacco grown under plantation management. But is the high fertility of the soil due to this crop rotation, or is it rather the result of the heavy application of commerical fertilizer and the thorough cultivation of the soil under Western management? 242 134 249

In no country of Southeastern Asia is there so great a variety or so intensive a use of commercial fertilizers as in Japan.[17] In general, the peasants of Southeastern Asia lack money for commercial fertilizers. In Indochina local phosphates are within reach of some of the Annamese, but the costs of imported fertilizers are prohibitive. In Java, although attempts to make possible the use of fertilizers through the agency of public credit institutions were successful in some special instances, not more than one per cent of the cultivated area received any commercial fertilizer in 1939. On the other hand, estimates indicate that more than 1,000,000 hectares of sawah have a phosphate deficiency and that a moderate application of phosphate would augment the yield by 25 to 50 per cent.[18] 242 [654]

The Agricultural Advisory Service was able to raise the productivity of wet-rice fields in West Java by about 10 per cent. It encouraged the peasants to use fertilizer on seedbeds, to sow rice more thinly on the beds (thus producing stronger seedlings), and to plant the seedlings in rows so that weeding could be done with a special instrument, the *landak* (Fig. 59).[1] This weeder was developed in Japan. During the years immediately preceding 1939, these improvements in West Java resulted in an increase in output of unhusked rice amounting to 300,000 quintals, or 30,000 metric tons, with a value of nearly 1,000,000 guilders. This shows that some improvements in cultivation may increase production without a great capital outlay.[19] 242 243 [412]

Java may be compared only with southern China and with Japan in the cleanness of its rice fields. The Filipino does not pay much attention to weeding. The Malayan, Thai, Cambodian, Cochinchinese, and Filipino rice farmers have more flooded riceland per capita at their disposal than the people of Java and can thus afford to cultivate their land less intensively. 243

Irrigation Problems

Peasant irrigation works usually take care of the fields of only one village or of a small group of people who have joined together for the specific purpose of building and maintaining an irrigation system. These works consequently are small and usually inadequate, but nevertheless they de- 312 [476] 243

[17] "The chief commercial fertilizers used in Japan are pressed herrings, pressed sardines, dried sardines, other fish cakes, bone meal, soybean cake, rapeseed cake, cottonseed cake, other vegetable-oil cakes, ammonium sulphate, calcium cyanamide, calcium phosphate, and potassium phosphate. Calcium phosphate and ammonium sulphate are probably the most representative chemical fertilizers."—Wickizer and Bennett: The Rice Economy, 1941, p. 252, footnote 33.

[18] Departement van Economische Zaken: Voedselproblemen, 1940, p. 28.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28.

[1] [See p. 117, category 116. -- Analyst]

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The Agricultural Advisory Service of the Netherlands Indies for many years carried on experiments with green manures and recommended a variety suitable for different conditions, but the main obstacle to the application of their research was the difficulty of introducing green manure into a crop rotation. Some of the green manures used in Java are *Crotolaria anagyroides* H. B. and K., *Crotolaria usaramoensis* Baker, *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., *Calopogonium mucunoides* Desv., *Centrosema pubescens* Benth., *Centrosema plumierii* Benth., and *Mimosa invisa* Mart. Green manure requires a relatively large amount of water in order to produce the desired foliage. If there is sufficient water, the peasants can also grow other crops such as legumes, which supply food as well as fertilizer. Most of the peasants of Java have so little land that they cannot afford to sacrifice a single food crop from a field in spite of the probability of an increased yield after the green manure has been plowed under. Although it is preferable to grow green manure unmixed with other plants, the planting of a green manure crop among the food crops is recommended where land is scarce. This is done in Java, especially in maize and cassava fields. The specific green manure that is chosen should meet the following conditions:[59]

1. It should have a rapid growth,
2. An abundant production of leaves,
3. No excessive development that might harm the main crop,
4. An absence of climbing or trailing stems;
5. The plant should have deep roots with many nodules;
6. It should not become woody too easily—as herbaceous plants decompose much more quickly; and
7. It should be immune from the diseases and insects that attack the main crop.

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Another agricultural practice common to many parts of the world, especially the tropics, is mixed cropping, which seems to bring in its train some of the advantages of rotation.[60] Nicol stresses the great importance of having leguminous plants grown among non-leguminous plants. He points out that the legume component in the mixture provides nitrogen to the non-legume.[61] In various parts of India—for example on the Bombay Deccan—bulrush millet (*Pennisetum typhoideum* Rich.) is grown with various legumes. This can be done year after year without greatly affecting the fertility of the soil. No crop rotation is practiced here. The proportion of bulrush millet to legumes varies according to the quality of the land; the poorer the land, the smaller the proportion of millet and the larger the proportion of legumes. Wallace wrote in 1887:

The growth of mixed crops is a widespread practice which is well worth consideration and study. . . . The advantages . . . are distinctly great. . . . There is

[59] International Institute of Agriculture: Use of Leguminous Plants, 1936, p. 60.
[60] Willis: Agriculture in the Tropics, 1914, p. 29.
[61] Nicol: "Mixed Cropping," 1935, p. 189.

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but one explanation of the existence of these practices, viz., that they have been found advantageous after long experience and much careful consideration on the part of a body of workers who, for power of observation and an intelligent interest in and knowledge of every day occurrences, would put to shame those classes which hold a corresponding position in educated Europe.[62]

Well known is the American Indian's practice of interplanting maize, beans, and squash. Chinese and Japanese peasants practice mixed cropping widely, and we may observe it almost everywhere in Southeastern Asia. Intensive mixed cropping in the garden culture of Java has already been described (see above, pp. 43–45), but there is relatively little interplanting of legumes with non-legumes. On dry fields the peasants of some parts of Java are accustomed to interplant cassava and maize—both, however, non-legumes. Whereas maize can be harvested after 100 days, cassava needs up to a year or more of growth. Cowpea (*Vigna sinensis* Savi), Goa bean (*Psophocarpus tetragonolobus* DC.), Lima bean (large) (*Phaseolus lunatus* L.), and hyacinth bean (*Dolichos lablab* L.) are also interplanted with cassava. On tegalans in Bali, in 1941, I observed the following crops grown with upland rice: *Eleusine indica* Gaertn., sesame (*Sesamum indicum* L.), and pigeon pea (*Cajanus cajan*). This last enriches the soil as a result of its large production of leaves as well as by the nitrogen in its nodules.

Kaserer has noted that there is little or no interpenetration of plant roots of the same species when they are grown together, whereas a significant degree of root interpenetration takes place when two different species are grown in close association, the degree of interpenetration increasing with the degree of dissimilarity. In one experiment, for example, a legume and a non-legume showed the maximum amount of root interpenetration, the explanation apparently being that one plant takes up the nutrients produced, or made available, by the other.[63] If these observations are correct we have here a scientific argument for the value of mixed cropping. Further studies are needed to determine the desirability of improving and extending it in specific areas.

241 242

Another important method of improving the fertility of dry fields is the use of compost. Vegetable composts are employed extensively in India and Africa. The masters at making compost from household refuse, vegetable waste, and human excreta are the Chinese, who cling to this method of fertilization wherever they practice truck farming in the neighborhood of urban centers in Southeastern Asia. Fungi and bacteria are used to break down suitable mixtures of vegetable and animal wastes. A method that was developed in India is the "Indore process" in which, "by arranging these mixtures in the proper way, and by watering and turning them, to supply moisture and air, the waste materials are transformed in about ninety days into a finely divided humus rich in the foods required by grow-

[62] Wallace: India in 1887, 1888, pp. 196 and 198.
[63] Kaserer: "Beobachtungen," 1911, pp. 1022–1030.

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land. An example is *mongo* (*Phaseolus mungo* L.), grown in Pangasinan and Batangas. Alarmed by the poor rice crops in 1940 and the difficulty of importing rice from Indochina and Thailand, the Philippine Bureau of Plant Industry, early in 1941, started to distribute seed of quick-growing dry-field crops, especially maize and legumes, in order to supplement the nation's rice bowl. But the average Filipino farmer is reluctant to accept this new practice, because "it is not the custom"—a powerful argument not to be easily overcome. [249] [654] 241

Dry-Field Crops Cultivated by Plantations

The discussion thus far has been limited to the native cultivation of dry land and to annual crops. However, extensive areas of non-irrigated land are occupied by perennial crops that are grown on plantations owned by Westerners. The crops produced include tea, coffee, cacao, quinine, rubber, palm oil, coconuts, kapok, sisal, and other fibre plants. Some of these crops were cultivated for a long time without the proper measures being taken to protect the soil against accelerated erosion. Although the detrimental effects of plantation agriculture in Ceylon and southern India are notorious in the plantation history of southern Asia, results were just as disastrous in Malaya and in the Netherlands Indies. Westerners, accustomed to clean cultivation or clean weeding in the temperate zone, carried this practice over into the tropics, with the result that soil erosion was very severe on steep slopes and led to great losses in soil fertility. Today, however, these mistakes have been recognized; there is hardly a plantation that has not adopted measures to protect sloping land against erosion and level land against soil exhaustion. The planters of Java were the pioneers in this field, introducing or developing most of the protective measures. These measures include contour drains, silt pits, contour ridges, terraces, hedges, shade trees, and especially cover crops. The use of these measures varies according to the crop, or crops, produced and according to climate, soil, and slope; but the purpose of all of them is to encourage an effective ground cover and to check the rate of water run-off. The financial depression of the 1930's—resulting in the need for very strict economy and a decrease in production costs—has helped considerably to reduce the amount of clean weeding and to convince conservative planters of the value of preserving a ground cover, litter, and mulch. Such measures help not only to retard erosion but also to enrich the soil. The first Western planter who broke away from the custom of keeping the ground of his plantation free from weeds was L. M. Tyl, who in the years 1890–96 developed the "weed-system" and thus introduced the idea of a ground cover into plantation circles of Southeastern Asia. But it took many years before his idea was generally accepted. It is interesting to note here that the Asiatic-owned plantations and the small holdings producing perennial crops, such as rubber, usually did not practice clean weeding. This, in the early days, was regarded by European observers as a sign of laziness and 241 177 185 242

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241 poor management, but, as has been so often the case, the Westerners were
177 finally forced to admit the soundness of Oriental cultivation practices.
185 As we have seen, there are two principal means of protecting the soil
242 between tree crops: by allowing the growth of indigenous plants or weeds (in other words the development of a natural mixed cover), or by establishing a pure cover of leguminous plants, many of which came originally from the New World. Rubber planters in Malaya seem to have had more success with the first method, which has been called "the forestry method of cultivation" or "rubber forestry." [67] Of course, the growth of indigenous plants or weeds must be controlled, and this is done by slashing the undergrowth from time to time. Frequently it is necessary to practice selective weeding in order to suppress undesirable plants and encourage more valuable ones.

654 Much research has been directed toward the study of leguminous cover
249 crops which supply nitrogen, as well as foliage for green manure. This research was started in 1910 in the Botanical Garden at Buitenzorg. Some of the cover crops that have proved especially valuable and are widely used on modern plantations are *Calopogonium mucunoides* Desv., *Centrosema pubescens* Benth., *Centrosema plumierii* Benth., *Desmodium* species, *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., *Mimosa invisa* Mart., *Cassia* species, and *Vigna oligosperma* Backer.[68] Several of these have already been mentioned in the foregoing discussion on the use of green manure crops in native agriculture.

Because a number of perennials such as tea, coffee, and cacao are commonly grown under shade trees, many writers seem to believe that these plants need shade. This may be true in part, but more important is the fact that the shade trees protect the soil against excessive losses of moisture and undesirable changes in soil composition, texture, and structure and thus prevent a reduction of the quantity of humus in the soil. Most of the commonly used shade trees are legumes which, in addition to shade, supply litter and nitrogen and help to increase the moisture-holding capacity of the soil, thus reducing the danger of erosion. *Erythrina micropteryx* Poepp., *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., *Leucaena glauca* Benth., *Albizzia moluccana* Miq., *Albizzia chinensis* Merr., *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Pithecellobium dulce* Benth., or Manila tamarind, and *Peltophorum pterocarpum* Backer are especially useful in this respect.

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[67] Haines: "The Uses and Control of Natural Undergrowth," 1934.

[68] For a very extensive list of cover crops, green manures, and shade trees, see Heyne: De nuttige planten van Nederlandsch-Indië, Vol. 3, 1927. See also International Institute of Agriculture: *op. cit.*

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Cash farming for rice is the only extension of a Southeast Asia subsistence farming crop into commercial farming on a large scale; only a negligible proportion of coconut-growing is for export, though this too, is an extension of Southeast Asia subsistence farming. It has been inevitable that subsistence farmers and the techniques they developed for rice have set the character of commercial rice farming which has been pioneered by local people and continues to be essentially a non-mechanised produce whose volume comes more from area and less from intensive farming. 243

RICE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
ANNUAL AVERAGES PER QUINQUENNIUM [439]

Period	*Million Acres Under Rice*	*Production Million Tons Clean Rice*	*Net Exports from SE.A. (Million Tons Clean)*	*Per Cap. Utilisation (kgms.)*	*Yield in Tons per Acre*
1916–20	38.3	13.5	3.9	119	.352
1921–25	43.6	15.3	4.6	137	.352
1926–30	47.5	16.5	4.7	131	.348
1931–35	49.6	16.7	5.2	117	.337
1936–40	51.4	17.5	5.0	118	.339
1946–50	48.1	15.6	1.9	98	.325

For 1951 *it is estimated that Southeast Asia sowed about* 50 *million acres of paddy, probably producing* 16 *million tons cleaned rice. The exports may total* 3 *million tons. These figures suggest the consumption had declined to below* 100 *kgms. per person, but this is not reliable since unreported dealings were going on and reported facts were not necessarily the true ones.*

Other Food Crops.—The other commercial food crops, sugar, coffee, tea, cinchona and oil palm total much smaller areas than rice farming. Broadly, these innovations were developed by European colonial planters opening up what were very largely virgin territories, normally in the form of large estates calling for a labour force which derived only in part from local people, the rest being obtained by introducing labour from outside. In the Philippines and in Java the first European essays in agriculture caused serious interactions on local land customs; in Siam an aristocratic feudal system enabled commercialisation to be introduced without external intervention. These crops tended to be perennial cultivations, taking advantage of the continuous growing season of the region. In due course this has led to a large production, causing the external price to drop, especially as there has 249.

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been similar commercialisation of the same crops in other tropical areas, all quickly reaching large-scale production of commodities which began as expensive luxuries and gradually cheapened to become low-priced semi-staple foods not offering any prospect of large returns for nominal outlays. Rivalries with other producing areas and speedy saturation of the world market has so far given these types of commercial agriculture a confused history of boom and depression, of rapid extension and then dereliction or scientific experiments to cheapen production. In these crops, techniques and methods more western than eastern have been used though mechanisation in the field has not been possible owing to the nature of the crops. The processing involved has often been modern and highly mechanised.

Rubber.—Commercial production of non-food or industrial crops in Southeast Asia has centred on rubber. Rubber has been an innovation peculiar to Southeast Asia (Central Africa and Ceylon took it up later) and its cultivation proved a remarkably successful transfer of a tree from another part of the tropics, developed here on plantation mass production lines, whereas in its original habitat the tree was wild and tapped on the "gatherer" system now only used for gums and damars collected from forest trees. Upon Southeast Asia rubber has depended the popularisation of the petrol driven vehicle, the incentive to petroleum production and the development of world road systems. Its cultivation was on the European orchard pattern and at first it was only possible by companies sufficiently capitalised to wait 7 to 10 years for maturity and to recruit labour from other regions to make the plantations in virgin areas, at a distance from subsistence farmers or cash farmers of foods to suit the plantation workers. Smallholders gradually took up rubber planting as an adjunct to other crops and as part of a mixed farming system. Reversing the history of rice agriculture, rubber started as a large-scale plantation cultivation worked by non-indigenous people and gradually moved towards a smallholder, mixed-farming type. Altogether, some 6 million acres of Southeast Asia are in rubber, the greatest single block being in Malaya. Rubber, too, is a perennial and a long-term crop and its history has been an alternation of high prices and low prices, and of rapidly saturating the market which has throughout been external to Asia. Malaya, by almost exclusively specialising in rubber, proved very highly geared to

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external events and their effects on rubber price, to a degree not paralleled by other types of Southeast Asia farming which were, during a crisis, more closely related to subsistence farming and thereby buffered from external valuations. 249

Trends in Agriculture

Several long-term tendencies in these various farming types have become apparent. For all the commercial crops except rice, external events have obliged experiment and development towards higher and higher production per unit area; yields for commercial crops have progressively increased. In rice farming, however, methods have continued to be extensive, yields have steadily decreased and there has been little advance in either maintaining fertility standards or increasing the yield. Experimental farms exist throughout the territory to promote these improvements, but they have made little impression on the rice-farming community as a whole. 243

RICE YIELDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (hundred lbs. milled per acre)

	1934–35	1939–40	1944–45	1949–50
Burma	8.2	8.4	6.5	7.0
Indochina	5.7	5.5	5.6	6.6
Siam	9.1	8.6	7.5	6.6
Malaya	9.7	9.1	—	10.7
Java and Madoera	9.3	10.0	—	9.5
Philippines	5.8	5.8	6.8	6.6

By the quinquennium 1936–40 annual yields had declined nearly 4 per cent from those of 1916–20 and production had increased solely by increasing the acreages, whose annual average for the same quinquennial periods increased by 34 per cent.

The general movements of rice in Southeast Asia are evident from the table on page 356 which summarises surpluses and deficits over a period.

Commercial rice production was associated almost exclusively with the expansion of agriculture to the deltas of the Irrawaddy, Chao Praya and Mekong and in varying degrees to increased control over flood waters. It is in this large-scale water control that the greatest long-term changes have been set going by western engineering techniques coping with the wide range of circumstances under which Southeast Asia floods occur. Effective

that about one-third of its prewar estate area was being tapped in 1947, representing two-thirds of the area tappable.

In the food crops, surplus margins were more slowly restored. Exports of Southeast Asia rice totalled about a million tons during 1946, as against a combined export of 5.7 million tons annually for 1936–40. The drop in production of this staple was greatest in the case of Burma because there the dislocation by war had been greatest, but by the 1946–47 season, about two-thirds of Lower Burma rice acreages were back in cultivation, as against half in 1945–46. In Cochinchina over 70 per cent of the rice area was being cultivated in 1946–47. Siam which was untouched by military campaigns reported 10.6 million acres under cultivation in rice for 1946–47 (22 per cent more than 1939–40)—the only territory to show a substantial increase of rice acreage in the immediate postwar years.

A postwar feature has been the general decline in rice yields, mostly an effect of loss of draught cattle, though to report low yields was a convenient cover for black market sales. The consequence of lost production in local food was felt more in places like Malaya which has specialised in non-food commercial agriculture, than in any other territories of Asia, which customarily needed to import only a small margin and not the majority of their rice. For the Philippines in 1947, the United Nations reported that *per capita* consumption of rice was actually higher than in 1939 by about 5 per cent.

Since labour shortage has been prominent as a factor operating against postwar commercial agriculture, the subsistence farmer and the diversified smallholder have assumed far greater significance than before. Over 55 per cent of Malaya's rubber production for 1946 was from smallholders, a proportion which had been as much as 85 per cent in the early months of that year, yet fell to 45 per cent in 1950 (cf. 39 per cent in 1940).

The vegetable oils soon came back into production and by early 1947 monthly production in Southeast Asia was not far short of 1941 production and now exceeds it.

The general lowering of food acreages and of yields, combined with the enforced reversion to subsistence agricultural forms, has a special significance for Southeast Asia food supplies over the next few years, because the restricted food supply comes at a time when population is rapidly increasing, at the rate of about 20

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434 averaged below $2 per person per annum and revenues were of that low order for all Southeast Asia countries except Malaya, where it was about $70 per person, a sign that Malaya, of all these countries, was the one where work and activities centred on money and had moved farthest from the subsistence principle.

It has to be noted that the small amount of money involved in such ecologies does not mean poverty in the European sense : it represents only that margin of necessities which is outside the subsistence ecology. In addition to the little money it obtains, each family in general has both its food and its domestic equipment produced by itself, or in conjunction with helpers from the village community. This is a state of society long since outgrown in Europe though we have to allow for it in every phase of Southeast Asia industry and trade and to assume it will continue to play a part in future changes.

Agricultural Processing

256 249 Because Southeast Asia is so overwhelmingly agricultural its mechanical industries relate largely to agricultural processes. Rice mills, sugar mills, starch factories (from sago and tapioca) and sack factories, have all grown up in connection with agricultural processing in every one of these territories. In addition, rubber factories, oil presses and sugar mills have been established on western lines in association with European-style agricultural developments. The fabrication of rubber has not gone far within this region; tyres have been made in Java where also mass-produced rubber shoes were made for Southeast Asia markets. For the most part, mechanical processing industries are located peripherally to the countries concerned and they operate primarily for immediate export, though small rice, brick and sugar factories have spread inland away from coastal sites.

Textiles

439 288 Apart from food, the chief personal need of Southeast Asia people is cloth and the demand for textiles ranks as by far the greatest single item of fabricated goods. Most of the textiles recorded are imported; the domestic industry has tended to disappear except in the remoter districts, and textile factories have not been set up to any extent within Southeast Asia. Cotton spinning at Semarang, Tegal and Damak and some 200 small

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Chapter Twenty-four

INDUSTRY AND TRADE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

39 438 25 If "industry" be taken to include all activities connected with processing, then there is more industry in Southeast Asia than appears at first glance, though not much manufacturing in mechanised factories may be found. The territory is, however, overwhelmingly agricultural and in almost every part of the region it is subsistence agriculture which employs and sustains the largest number of people. Much manual processing is done by these subsistence agriculturists on their own little farms to prepare their production for their family consumption.

Cottage Industries

286 438 472 The tradition of being self-supporting in each territory, the national counterpart of individual subsistence farming, is very strong even today, finding expression in the widespread cottage industry of weaving and in that Southeast Asia custom of making a single length of span-broad, hand-made cloth the basis of a skirt-like dress—the *sarong*, *lungyi*, *panung* and so on. Today this domestic weaving, where it has managed to persist in spite of competition from cheap imported cloths, uses imported cotton yarn, although parts of Burma still weave homegrown silk, and Siam and Indochina continue home-weaving on the basis of Indochinese silk. Only in Java has the "cottage industry" become elaborated into a village factory industry for a more intensified and commercialised production of sarongs. Ninety-two per cent of Java's *batik sarongs* (printed cotton skirts worn by men and women alike) come from factories of less than 80 workers each; this specialised process of dyeing in patterns defined by wax is now done by the small factory working upon imported cotton cloth.

285 415 The other considerable domestic industry deriving from the subsistence tradition is that of making innumerable varieties of articles from plaited palm leaves. Containers of many sorts, hats, domestic utensils, house walls, mats, fish traps and agricultural

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by Westerners. This may be explained by the assumption that the ancestors of the Polynesians migrated from Southeastern Asia to the islands of the Pacific before cereals had replaced root crops as dominant plants.[13]

In Southeastern Asia we find both shifting and sedentary cultivators who depend exclusively upon root crops as a source of starch. The Nias, Mentawei, and Engano islanders off the western coast of Sumatra grew no grains until recently. Beside such root crops as taro (*Colocasia esculenta* Schott), yams (*Dioscorea* sp.), and *bira* (*Alocasia macrorhiza* (L.) Schott), they cultivated such other foods as bananas (*Musa sapientum* L.), sugar cane (*Saccharum officinarum* L.), and coconuts (*Cocos nucifera* L.). In the eastern parts of the Malay Archipelago and New Guinea the inhabitants depend chiefly on the starch of the sago palm (*Metroxylon sagu* Rottb.) which they either plant or collect in the wild state. Here, again, taro, yams, and bira are other sources of starch, as are such imported American plants as cassava (*Manihot utilissima* Pohl) and sweet potatoes (*Ipomoea batatas* Poir.). The folklore and religious practices of many tribes in Borneo and Celebes who today grow cereals recall the time when these tribes had only root crops.

In many parts of the Pacific taro is grown by sedentary cultivators on terraced, flooded fields.[14] We do not know whether the techniques of terracing and irrigation developed independently in Oceania and on the mainland, or whether the ancestors of the Polynesians brought their techniques with them from Southeastern Asia. If the latter be true, they must have left before the cultivation of rice was known to them; otherwise rice would have been among their crops. That it was not among them suggests that

[13] Forde: Habitat, Economy and Society, 1934, pp. 428–430. In remote centuries the Polynesians lived in the Malay Archipelago, where they cultivated such root crops as taro, yams, "arrowroot" (*Canna orientalis* Rosc.), and turmeric (*Curcuma* sp.), in addition to bananas and plantains (*Musa paradisiaca* L.), breadfruit (*Artocarpus communis* Forst.) and coconuts, all of which, according to the botanists, are natives of the forest regions of Southeastern Asia, whether the mainland or the Malayan Archipelago. All these plants were probably carried to Polynesia, either via a northern route through Micronesia or by a more southerly course through New Guinea and Melanesia. See Buck: Vikings of the Sunrise, 1938, pp. 305–309. The names of these plants were also carried into the islands of the Pacific. Variants of the names "taro" and "bira," to mention two examples, range from the Malay Archipelago far into Oceania. *Colocasia* is *talo* in Nias, *talas* in Sundanese, *tales* in Javanese, *dalo* in Fiji, *talo* in Samoan, *kalo* in Hawaiian, *taro* in Maori. *Alocasia* is known as *birah* or *bira* in Batak, *bira* in Madurese, *biga* in the Philippines, *piga* in Guam, and *via* in Fiji. Later, the Polynesians, following the example of other peoples of the Pacific, were quick to adopt such New World crops as cassava and sweet potatoes as well as American fruit trees into their economy because these are closely related to their customary crops, but they still remain most reluctant to change from roots to grains as staple, possibly because "the cultivation of roots and fruit trees has little technical relation to the raising of grains, for they are not grown from seed but from eyes and cuttings." See Forde: *op. cit.*, p. 380. Another illustration of the fact that a plant, the introduction of which involves a change in methods of cultivation, is accepted only under pressure, is found in the history of the introduction of the potato into Europe.

[14] Krämer: "Der Taro und die Nasskultur," 1928, pp. 165–172; Rivers: "Irrigation and the Cultivation of Taro," 1926, pp. 262–287.

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ing crops. The process can be adapted to climate by manufacture either in shallow pits or low heaps."[64] 241 242

Dry-Field Crops Cultivated by Peasants

The list of dry-field crops cultivated in Southeastern Asia is rather large, but there are regional variations. Cassava, for example, is commonly grown on tegalans in Java (2,300,000 acres), whereas it is unimportant in Sumatra, Borneo, the Philippines (40,000 acres), Malaya (24,000 acres), and Indochina (75,000 acres). The most important dry-field crops are up- 241 311

TABLE IV—CHEMICAL COMPOSITION OF CASSAVA AND IMPORTANT CEREAL FLOURS [146]

	CASSAVA (PER CENT)	MAIZE (PER CENT)	WHEAT (PER CENT)	RICE (PER CENT)
Moisture	10.75	13.41	13.65	13.12
Protein	0.87	7.56	12.35	9.85
Crude fat	1.19	2.79	1.75	0.88
Ash	1.24	1.78	1.81	1.51
Crude fiber	6.12	3.19	2.53	0.63
Carbohydrates	79.83	71.27	67.91	74.01

Source: The Cassava Industry in the Philippines, 1939, p. 7.

land rice, maize, cassava, sweet potatoes, peanuts, soy beans and other pulses, tobacco, and sugar cane, all of which are annuals. Of the first four, only upland rice is a native of Southeastern Asia, whereas the other three are natives of the New World and were introduced into Southeastern Asia by the Spaniards in the sixteenth century.

The inhabitants of Southeastern Asia have long relied upon root crops, fruits, leaves of various plants, and wild roots and tubers gathered in the forests, as well as upon rice. Scheltema refers to a number of early statements which indicate that "rice was not yet the principal food for a large portion of the native population [of Java] as late as the first part of the 19th century and that the rice diet has become much more important in the course of the past hundred years" as a result of the great extension of the cultivation of irrigated rice fields.[65] If it is correct that the rice consumption per capita increased during the past century, the opposite trend has been evident during the present century. For a while the increase in the area of irrigated land was great enough to allow for a larger rice production, but with the steadily increasing pressure of population the peasants now have to depend more and more upon unirrigated land. Thus the production of dry-field crops is gaining in importance. 241 262

Authorities in Southeastern Asia have been especially worried over the increase of cassava production and consumption. Because of the exhaustion of the soil fertility on many dry fields, the growing of upland rice and 241 134

[64] Worthington: Science in Africa, 1938, p. 387.
[65] Scheltema: The Food Consumption, 1936, p. 10.

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241 134 [146] maize has become unprofitable, and many peasants have changed over to cassava, which makes lesser demands upon soil fertility. The per acre yields of cassava are high, and the plant is a source of carbohydrates, fat, and protein. From the standpoint of dietary needs, however, the ratio between carbohydrates on the one hand and protein and fat on the other is unfavorable. People who live on cassava merely fill their stomachs. The insufficiency of protein intake is detrimental to their health. Table IV compares the chemical composition of cassava, maize, wheat, and rice.

243 146 262 Maize, as the table indicates, compares quite favorably in protein content with wheat and rice and is especially rich in fat. It has gained an important position in the diet of the people of central and eastern Java, Madura, the island of Cebu, and the Cagayan Valley in the island of Luzon. Both maize and cassava are easy to store and therefore have a great advantage over sweet potatoes, which must be consumed soon after they ripen.

241 In Thailand maize is an important crop on the Khorat plateau and in other regions where dry land is available. Among the root crops cassava has gained a greater importance than taro and yams. The last two are grown mainly by Chinese gardeners in the neighborhood of large towns. Cassava, too, is grown commercially by Chinese, especially near the railroad on the peninsula.

Most of the so-called dry-field crops are grown in Indochina during the dry season on land that is flooded during the rainy season and at that time [311] produces rice. Gourou has estimated that in Tongking 100,000 hectares of land are used exclusively for the production of dry-field crops and that 350,000 hectares of irrigated land are occupied by such crops during the dry season.[66]

This practice of growing dry-field crops on irrigated land during the dry season is especially widespread in Java, where population pressure is so great that the peasants have to use every possible means to enlarge their food supply. If there is not enough water available to grow a second wet-rice crop, they will always try to get a second harvest of quick-growing dry-field crops during the dry season.

In contrast to the peoples of Java, the Filipinos do not, as a rule, go in for the raising of dry-field crops on wet riceland during the dry season, although this should be possible if the land were cultivated. There is enough water in the soil a short distance below the surface for the growing of crops practically everywhere during the dry season. Repeated tilling would keep the soil soft and fine so that water could move upward by capillary action to replace that which is lost through evaporation. Cultivation would enable plants such as maize, peanuts, and soy beans to grow on land that otherwise would be baked dry and hard. Although the ratio between cultivated land and population in the Philippines does not make a dry-season crop a necessity in most regions, there are a number of districts where the peasants traditionally raise a dry-season crop on irrigated

[66] Gourou: Les paysans, 1936, pp. 407–408.

1 [see page 75, cat 116 -- Analyst]

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great shoals of mackerel and bonito. Porpoises (mammals which live on fish and are a guide to the fish density) have been seen in a school which packed an area 15 miles long and 2 miles broad. Plankton occurs at times in astounding quantities, practically smothering all other fish life in the neighbourhood. The movements and migrations of these fish of deeper waters have been little studied and the inshore fishing has been enough to meet local food needs, as well as not demanding too complex a technique or too great a capital outlay by the local fishermen who are generally very few, and too poor to equip themselves for long distance deepwater trips. A major impediment to introducing the elaborate systems of trawling and seining which have been developed in temperate seas is the frequency of coral reefs and knolls which, although attracting fish, catch the nets and ruin them.

Fish as a Staple Food

Fish is a staple in the Southeast Asia diet as complement to rice. It supplies calcium, iodine and salt as well as animal protein, items otherwise not easily come by in these areas, or too expensive for the peasants. By habit Southeast Asia people are rice-fish-curry eaters and vegetables in the European sense enter very little into their meals. They are largely vegetarian but not interested in vegetables. Fishing has an importance in local ecologies second only to rice. In Malaya, for example, well over 80 lbs. of fish is normally consumed by every man, woman and child every year. When looking through the records of any one territory, however, the great significance of fish is not apparent because fishing is a mobile and widely dispersed activity not easily checked, the more illusive statistically because it plays little or no part in revenues.

Several stages of commercialisation are met with but subsistence fishing predominates. In every paddyfield and swamp, villagers go fishing for their personal needs; on the coast many fishermen are part-time, sharing their labour between a paddyfield and a fishing boat. Some villages have specialised fishermen whose produce goes into exchange among the landsmen to make the village self-supporting. Gradually fishing for sale has become possible, yet there are major difficulties of transport to consuming centres, of organisation between fishermen and consumer, and of preserving the fish in good condition during transport.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA NUTRITION DENSITIES
(Average number of persons per rice-acre per annum)

243
161
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Quinquennium	*Burma*	*Indo-china*	*Siam*	*Java and Madoera*	*Philip-pines*	*Malaya*
1916–20	1.23	1.75	1.66	4.12	3.13	—
1921–25	1.19	1.67	1.57	4.27	2.67	5.61
1926–30	1.14	1.61	1.57	4.50	2.69	6.13
1931–35	1.19	1.64	1.63	4.60	2.76	6.42
1936–40	1.25	1.63	1.74	4.96	2.79	7.02
1946–50	2.0	2.1	1.6	5.9	3.9	7.2

Because population and the net production of food have increased *pari passu*, it is important to examine the "nutrition density" (persons per acre under rice) since the surplus for export depends on low internal consumption of the Southeast Asia staple and high internal production. The countries of Southeast Asia pre-war showed considerable differences in nutrition density, from Malaya (the plantation-mining specialist) with 7.2 persons per rice-acre, to Siam (the rice-surplus specialist) with 1.6. Malaya, Java and the Philippines had nutrition densities much higher than the rest of neighbouring countries and in the case of Malaya and Java the nutrition density had been steadily rising, whereas in Burma, Indochina and Siam it was fairly static. Over the same period, the domestic consumption of rice per person sharply dropped (by 20-25 per cent) in Burma, Siam and Java and rose about 10 per cent in Indochina, Philippines and Malaya. The postwar figures available show considerable increases of nutrition density everywhere except in Siam, yet these were changes of degree, not of pattern.

Changing Internal Emphasis

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Today the very crowded places are firstly, Middle and North Java, Lower Siam and the Red River Delta, where densities of over 1,500 people per square mile occur, with secondary crowdings in Lower Burma, the Lower Mekong, Central Luzon and the Visayas. These concentrations of people are pre-eminently in agricultural areas (Fig. 116), and they are in fact largely made possible by exceptional soil qualities within an area whose general soil fertility is low. These crowded areas have taken part in a commercialisation of local agriculture and their subsequent history has been firstly a

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of their own which are worshipped by them only overseas or in the emigrant communities from which they sprang. The outstanding examples are Sam Po Tai Shan for the Shen, and Toh Peh Kong (Hokkien), Ta Pai Kung (Mandarin), or Tai Pak Kung (Cantonese) for the Fu. 771 167

Sam Po Tai Shan is none other than the spirit of the famous Grand Eunuch Cheng Ho of the Ming dynasty who visited Malacca in the early years of the fifteenth century.[1] He is particularly worshipped in Malacca. Crawfurd remarks, 'Sam Po Kung (Sam Po Tai Shan) is evidently a name to be conjured with among the illiterate classes. The miracles which he performed to save his countrymen from the perils of their travels in unknown lands are among the marvels of romance, illustrating, in a striking way, one of the factors in a genesis of a myth.'

Toh Peh Kong, however, is the most popular hero among the overseas Chinese. But one may search for him in vain in the standard books on Chinese religion.[2] In Siam he is known as Pan Tou Kung. He probably derives from Tu Ti (earth god), but overseas he is primarily the spirit of the pioneers. The Chinese pioneers of the early days suffered terrible hardships and were honoured in memory by those who came after them. Toh Peh Kong seems to be the personification of the pioneer spirit generally and is not the deification of a special person as Sam Po Tai Shan is of Cheng Ho.

A worship of very long standing in Malaya is that of Wang Yeh, who has the spiritual function of visiting the universe as the representative of heaven. The early settlers brought the worship with them from Fukien province.[3]

Opium and other narcotics. The use of the poppy and coca leaf goes back to time immemorial.[4] In 1783 Warren Hastings pro- 276 167

[1] See pp. 22, 23.

[2] In particular the monumental work by Henri F. S. Doré, *Recherches sur les superstitions en Chine* (Shanghai, Tu-se-wei Press, 1911–38).

[3] Wang Yeh was worshipped from early days but the Wang Kang Festival in Malacca wherein five images of this deity were carried does not seem to have originated until 1886.

Chinese Mohammedans exist in the Shan States and in Indonesia, though in the latter country their numbers are not great. Chinese Christians are not very numerous in Southeast Asia, though in Malaya, for example, they increased between 1901 and 1931 by one-half (50·2 per cent.) to 30,738, while during the same period the Chinese population increased by only 45·5 per cent. Among the Churches the Roman Catholic Church has the strongest hold.

[4] Opium comes from a certain variety of the poppy plant grown principally

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nounced opium to be 'a pernicious article of luxury which ought not to be permitted, but for the purposes of foreign commerce only'. A debate in the House of Commons on the eve of the First China War (the 'Opium War') of 1839 showed that the great majority of the members of Parliament were prepared to countenance the opium traffic as a necessary evil, but a few enlightened voices were lifted against it, including that of Macaulay. The fact, however, that opium-smoking was a vice to which the Chinese were addicted made it valuable as a source of revenue to the Governments of Southeast Asia. The usual method of obtaining this revenue was to farm out the sale of the drug to private persons or firms. Administrators (including Raffles) had grave misgivings regarding the effect of opium-smoking on the health of the Chinese community, but it was not until about the beginning of this century that the various Governments began to take steps towards controlling the sale of the drug.

A Commission appointed in 1907 in the Straits Settlements to ascertain the extent to which opium-smoking was indulged in, whether its prevalence was on the increase, and what means should be taken towards its restriction or suppression, made a report to the following effect:[1]

The habit in the case of the majority of smokers in Malaya was acquired during residence in these parts. The labour in Malaya was mostly drawn from the impecunious farmer class, and the ruling price of chandu in China, though low compared with the price in Malaya, was sufficiently high to place it beyond their reach while they were in their native land. Moreover, the influence of the elder over the younger members of the families of China, one of the most striking characteristics of Chinese family life, was removed in Malaya, and thereby a powerful deterrent to the acquisition of the opium habit disappeared. Nor was the view commonly held among the Chinese of Malaya that the habit was injurious—indeed the general sentiment was to the exact contrary. It was regarded as a panacea for many common ailments and was often recommended by Chinese doctors. These facts, in the opinion of the Commissioners, largely contributed to the commencement of the habit.

in India, China, Persia, Greece, and Yugoslavia. Cocaine is derived from an entirely different plant, the coca leaf, grown in South America and Java in particular.

[1] *Report of the Opium Commission* (Singapore, 1908), vols. i and iii were published as Cmd. 4321 and Cmd. 4322 (1909).

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Those *habitués* who were questioned said that they had started to smoke 'as a remedy for sickness', 'as an antidote to sorrow', or 'from bad example'. Brothels were a common place in which Chinese learned to smoke.

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The Commissioners summed up their views as to the motive for the habit in these words: 'We are firmly convinced that the main reason for taking to the habit of smoking opium is the universal tendency of human nature to some form of indulgence.' Or, less sententiously expressed, they did it because they liked it!

A man was less likely to become an inveterate opium-smoker than a drunkard.

As to the evil results of opium-smoking the Commissioners took a moderate view. As regards the physical evils, with the exception of medical practitioners who held strong views opposed to opium, the medical witnesses were practically unanimous in expressing the opinion that opium-smoking in moderation was relatively harmless. Even if the indulgence were carried to an excess, there was (so said the witnesses) no organic change in the body. The general impression, however, was that in tasks requiring severe physical exertion the smoker was not equal to the non-smoker; in the case of the skilled artisan, opium-smoking made little or no difference to his relative value; opium-smokers and non-opium-smokers in an industry worked the same number of hours and earned the same wages.

These views (in the experience of the writer) represent the general views of European administrators who, on the whole, incline to consider opium-smoking as a symptom rather than a cause of misfortune. Education and improved living conditions in the last forty years have had more effect in decreasing the number of smokers than any other factor.

While the Commission was unwilling to recommend prohibition (which in any case would be possible only by international agreement, as the poppy was then cultivated in India, China, Turkey, and Persia), it recommended the abolition of the opium farmer and the establishment of a Government monopoly for the manufacture and sale of chandu.

The international control of the manufacture and sale of deleterious drugs has a very extensive literature of its own, and all that we need do here is to refer to the main facts.[1]

[1] See Herbert L. May, 'Narcotic Drug Control', *International Conciliation*

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276 At the time of the Hague Convention in 1912, with provision for the gradual and effective suppression of opium-smoking, all the countries where the problem existed, except China and the Philippines, were using some form of Government monopoly. Most of them had advanced through successive stages from partial to complete control. On the other hand, only a few years prior to 1912, China and the Philippines had skipped most or all of the steps and had jumped straight to (theoretical) prohibition. But what stood in the way of giving prohibition any real effect was the failure, so far, to secure effective control of production. The policy in the Dutch and British colonies was a progressive reduction of opium-smoking (and with it the revenues derived therefrom)[1] side by side with improvement of the preventive measures against illicit importation and sale of the drug.

Efforts to solve the problem of opium-smoking in the Far East were accelerated by the pernicious policy of the Japanese in encouraging the habit in the territories which they occupied. In 1943 the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, and in 1945 the French and Philippines Governments, declared their intention to introduce a policy of absolute prohibition. As a result of this declaration, the only countries in which opium-smoking was still not prohibited at the close of the Japanese war were Siam and certain states in India. At its fourth session, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations adopted a resolution inviting all countries in which opium-smoking was still

(May 1948). This pamphlet gives a concise account of the matter and of the progress of international control. The *League of Nations, Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and other Dangerous Drugs; Summary of Illicit Transactions and Seizures*, for successive years, gives data which show the difficulty of preventing smuggling. See also U.N., Economic and Social Council, *Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Limitation of raw materials 6 April 1948* (E/CN/7/107) and of *25 April 1948* (E/CN/7/121).

The first step in the international campaign against narcotics took place in 1909 when an International Opium Commission met in Shanghai on the initiation of the United States Government which was seriously worried by the problem in the Philippines. In 1912 the Hague Opium Convention bound the parties to adopt measures for the control and regulation of raw opium, prepared opium, morphine, heroin, and cocaine. In 1925 the League of Nations appointed an Advisory Committee to exercise general control of the traffic; in 1925 the Geneva Agreement on Opium was signed; the same year saw the Geneva Convention; the Bangkok Agreement on Opium Smoking was signed in 1931.

[1] For the progressive measures taken in Malaya see Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 190–1. Between 1928 and 1933 the Malayan Governments reduced the opium sold from 1,344,000 taels to 612,000 taels.

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permissible to take immediate steps to introduce the necessary measures to prevent the manufacture of and trade in prepared opium for the purpose of smoking. 276

It remains to be seen how far this complete prohibition can succeed. Everything turns on the ability of the Governments to control smuggling and, in the final issue, on the effectiveness of international control of the manufacture and distribution of narcotics. It is not only opium that is the problem, but also an increasing number of even more harmful substitutes.

A number of other matters have strong claims for inclusion as 'special aspects of Chinese society in Southeast Asia', but it is thought desirable to limit this chapter to its present dimensions (for enough has been said to illustrate the general nature of the deviations from the central problems in China itself) and to start in the next Part the detailed narrative of the Chinese in Burma, Siam, Indochina, Malaya, British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines.[1] In journeying with them for three centuries or more through jungle and defile, over the mountain passes of the Shan States or through the myriad islands of the Philippines, in sojourning with them in tin mine, on rubber estate, or in godown, in listening to what they have to say and what is said of them, we shall learn much and prepare ourselves better for our final task of assessing the advantage or the detriment of this people to the countries in which they have come to work or trade, and often to settle, and of adumbrating (if we dare) the future of the race in Southeast Asia. 121

[1] The order is arbitrary.

[p. 54 is blank]

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tools are all made by villagers using the palms and bamboos of their setting. Boats, shoes and tools are made of wood by peasants, mostly for their own use. While this type of industry usually secures no place in national statistics and has low monetary value, it plays a most important part in Southeast Asia life which may be described as still in the "Wood Age" so far as most peasant and rural life is concerned. Domestically-made cigars and cigarettes supply local needs and rapidly displace the *areca* or *betel* chewing habit. In Burma, the Philippines and Java cigar-making has become commercialised for trade and export; in Java some $9 million of hand-made cigarettes entered trade during 1937.

Throughout the region, too, are scattered remnants of a metal-working industry, as in the beaten silver of Malaya and Java, the niello work of Siam, and the gold settings for precious stones in Burma.

But these domestic industries rank as small by external standards and they play a negligible part in international trade. They must not be forgotten, however, because in the evolution of Southeast Asia we may see grow up forms of industrialisation originating in these domestic industries, as has been the case in the industrial evolution both of Europe and of the Far East. In these domestic industries little or no money is involved. At their simplest they are "subsistence industries" providing the family needs and scarcely anything more.

Thus most Southeast Asia people produce what food their families need and what articles they need. Their requirements from outside are very small and in any case their way of life involves so little money that they have small means to buy anything outside their local subsistence ecology. That was the earlier condition everywhere in Southeast Asia before the industrial revolution in Europe, and it continues both in the simple form and in many variations even today, when there have evolved groups of people in Southeast Asia who are entirely dependent on wages to buy food and what other articles they need. The subsistence principle is still strong in that very little money interchange goes on among the great majority of the population; some of them by doing part-time work earn wages, yet the money they earn has a very low average, indicated by the very low per capita revenues of the various states. Just before the war, Indochina revenue

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147 [362] Pestiferous slums compel attention in the larger towns, but conditions may be worse in the smaller towns up-country where they escape notice; even the villages often suffer from congestion. Food is less abundant, because cultivation for export reduces the area under subsistence crops, and the greater pressure on this smaller area diminishes the outturn; the demands of western enterprise for labour [146] have a similar effect. Often the people take to cheaper or to more palatable but less nutritious food; thus groundnut oil replaces sesamum oil, cassava replaces rice, polished rice spreads beri-beri; sometimes the food is adulterated with imported products as when for some years large quantities of mineral oil were imported into Burma to mix with native vegetable oils. The natural effect of the economic forces released in the course of development is to lower the standard of health.[1]

300 Again, with man, as with crops and cattle, there is an intimate link between material development and infection. The improvement of communications and the mass migration of labourers spread old diseases and bring in new diseases. In Africa 'diseases have been introduced to which the African was formerly a stranger, and fresh strains of parasites cause attacks to which he was formerly immune; further, Africans now contract diseases common to temperate zones, and it is possible that the intensity of these is increased owing to the lack of acquired immunity'. The spread of sleeping sickness 'must in many cases be associated with the opening of new communications and the development of trading facilities'. The conditions under which labour is employed foster venereal disease, which in modern Africa seems to have an incidence ranging from 50 to 90 %.[2]

759 For various reasons also native medical skill deteriorates. The patronage of native rulers encourages the most successful physicians, and helps to maintain traditions, in Burma reminiscent of the Hippocratic oath, that make for professional self-respect. Under western rule the native doctors lose their best and most remunerative clients. 278 Moreover the herbs, formerly gathered in the fields, come to be purchased in the market, and are liable to adulteration, so that the practitioner no longer knows what he prescribes. This applies also to modern substitutes for native drugs, such as cheap brands of quinine tabloids which, if they contain any quinine, are of little use except as marbles owing to the thickness of the coating; prac-

[1] *ISC*, I, 21; Mills, p. 321; *RAB*, 1915–16, p. 30; 1918–19, p. 41.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1129, 1144–6, 1199.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

titioners and patients do not know the difference and buy the cheapest.[1]

These probably are among the chief reasons why 'the systems of oriental medicine have fallen into decay'. The task of improving the standard of health in the tropics is aggravated by the fact that western medical science usually reaches the people as one aspect of economic penetration, and must first be applied towards repairing and preventing the mischief naturally consequent on the process of development. A solution of the problem has been attempted along two lines: the provision of medical assistance; and the introduction of modern hygiene. It is important to notice the essential difference between these alternatives. Medical assistance aims to promote *individual* welfare, and ordinarily requires the voluntary co-operation of the patient; hygiene aims to promote *social* welfare, and necessarily involves a certain measure of compulsion.

2. Medicine

Ordinarily the introduction of western medicine in the tropics originates in the needs of Europeans. From very early days the East India Company arranged with the Apothecaries Company for the supply of barber-surgeons to their ships and settlements. In Africa likewise the various administrations at first confined the provision of medical services to the needs of their own establishments. But administrative establishments are partly native, and non-officials in commerce and industry require medical attention. In Burma the earliest members of the general public to receive the benefits of western medical skill were the convicts in jail, and the expansion of medical services in the interior has been closely bound up with the growth of crime. It is only natural that generally throughout the tropics the provision of medical assistance has developed with the economic demand for doctors, and has been organized so as to cost no more than necessary.

But the spread of western medicine in the tropics has not been due solely to the growing demand for doctors; it has been due in part to the demand for patients. Medical missionaries look for patients. It is true that missionary organizations need doctors to preserve the lives of missionaries. But they have also recognized in western medicine an instrument for extending their influence among the people. To deliver their message they must find some method of

[1] *RPI* (India), 1897–1902, p. 245; *CISM*, pp. 13, 15, 23.

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groups resemble those of salt-tolerant vegetation on European beaches of which spinifex is a sample. Behind this shore grows a distinctive strip of what may be called *beach woodland*, sometimes referred to as beach forest. On reefs, on muddy shores and estuaries, where there is diurnal flooding at high tide, the *mangrove* forest develops. When the shore is rocky, lowland forest may reach high tide mark. In this vegetation seeds and fruit are water-borne so that currents are an important means of dispersion. 137

Well-developed beach woodland forms as a ribbon rarely more than 200 ft. inland from the shore and contains tree types not usually seen elsewhere and often reaching 90 ft. in height. The typical tree, the casuarina (Equisetifolia, rhu, ru, tjemara) is rather like a conifer to look at and is related to Australian she-oaks. Sometimes the casuarina is in pure stands; at places the strip includes screw pines (Pandanus), the leathery-leaved Calophyllum, Inophyllum and Barringtonia. Coconut palms, which can take root after nuts have been dispersed by sea-currents, are now prominent in beach woodland areas as a planted crop, but they occur self-sown everywhere through the islands.

Mangrove forests are widely distributed on sedimenting shores throughout Southeast Asia. The fringe of mangroves is interrupted where rocks or cliffs come to the sea and when drainage control has diminished the silt from terrestrial sources. Where mangroves develop, silt is being deposited at a fast rate (sometimes to a thickness of 1½ in. annually); the mangrove thus both raises the surface level and progressively presses farther seaward. Whether mangroves grow only where silt is being deposited or whether they cause silt deposition by their root system, obstructing tidal currents and flood run-off, is still disputed. Possibly both processes operate together. The net effect is one of raising the land level and reclaiming land from the sea. In addition, the wood of mangroves is valued for firewood and charcoal; the bark is sold extensively for tanning. The mangrove trees are of some thirty species, all with structural adaptations enabling them to root in unstable muds and to tolerate daily inundation of their root system by saline tidal water. In addition to the tree, there are shrubs, herbaceous plants and ferns (particularly Aerostichum aureum). The trees are evergreen, sometimes 100 ft. tall, mostly with shining, leather-like leaves, small flowers, and unusual root systems. Some (as Rhizophora) have many roots supporting the trunk which begins well

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Chapter Twenty-four

INDUSTRY AND TRADE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

39 438 25 If "industry" be taken to include all activities connected with processing, then there is more industry in Southeast Asia than appears at first glance, though not much manufacturing in mechanised factories may be found. The territory is, however, overwhelmingly agricultural and in almost every part of the region it is subsistence agriculture which employs and sustains the largest number of people. Much manual processing is done by these subsistence agriculturists on their own little farms to prepare their production for their family consumption.

Cottage Industries

286 438 472 The tradition of being self-supporting in each territory, the national counterpart of individual subsistence farming, is very strong even today, finding expression in the widespread cottage industry of weaving and in that Southeast Asia custom of making a single length of span-broad, hand-made cloth the basis of a skirt-like dress—the *sarong*, *lungyi*, *panung* and so on. Today this domestic weaving, where it has managed to persist in spite of competition from cheap imported cloths, uses imported cotton yarn, although parts of Burma still weave homegrown silk, and Siam and Indochina continue home-weaving on the basis of Indochinese silk. Only in Java has the "cottage industry" become elaborated into a village factory industry for a more intensified and commercialised production of sarongs. Ninety-two per cent of Java's *batik sarongs* (printed cotton skirts worn by men and women alike) come from factories of less than 80 workers each; this specialised process of dyeing in patterns defined by wax is now done by the small factory working upon imported cotton cloth.

285 415 The other considerable domestic industry deriving from the subsistence tradition is that of making innumerable varieties of articles from plaited palm leaves. Containers of many sorts, hats, domestic utensils, house walls, mats, fish traps and agricultural

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tools are all made by villagers using the palms and bamboos of 285
their setting. Boats, shoes and tools are made of wood by peasants, 415
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434 averaged below $2 per person per annum and revenues were of that low order for all Southeast Asia countries except Malaya, where it was about $70 per person, a sign that Malaya, of all these countries, was the one where work and activities centred on money and had moved farthest from the subsistence principle.

It has to be noted that the small amount of money involved in such ecologies does not mean poverty in the European sense: it represents only that margin of necessities which is outside the subsistence ecology. In addition to the little money it obtains, each family in general has both its food and its domestic equipment produced by itself, or in conjunction with helpers from the village community. This is a state of society long since outgrown in Europe though we have to allow for it in every phase of Southeast Asia industry and trade and to assume it will continue to play a part in future changes.

Agricultural Processing

256 249 Because Southeast Asia is so overwhelmingly agricultural its mechanical industries relate largely to agricultural processes. Rice mills, sugar mills, starch factories (from sago and tapioca) and sack factories, have all grown up in connection with agricultural processing in every one of these territories. In addition, rubber factories, oil presses and sugar mills have been established on western lines in association with European-style agricultural developments. The fabrication of rubber has not gone far within this region; tyres have been made in Java where also mass-produced rubber shoes were made for Southeast Asia markets. For the most part, mechanical processing industries are located peripherally to the countries concerned and they operate primarily for immediate export, though small rice, brick and sugar factories have spread inland away from coastal sites.

Textiles

439 288 Apart from food, the chief personal need of Southeast Asia people is cloth and the demand for textiles ranks as by far the greatest single item of fabricated goods. Most of the textiles recorded are imported; the domestic industry has tended to disappear except in the remoter districts, and textile factories have not been set up to any extent within Southeast Asia. Cotton spinning at Semarang, Tegal and Damak and some 200 small

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weaving factories in Java, were the leading developments in local 439
textile industries, but the bulk of cloth and even of raw cotton has 288
been brought in from abroad. Just before the war Southeast Asia was absorbing textiles to the value of well over $300 million per annum; much of it was cheap cloth from Europe, India and Japan, but there was a substantial need for the very finest cotton cloth produced anywhere and quite an exacting local standard of qualities. Should this huge demand for textiles stimulate local industry within the new nationalist units, Burma, Siam and Indochina may improve the quality and output of their present scanty and very inferior raw cotton.

Road and rail management, engineering maintenance and port 39
industries form a leading group of mechanical industries directly 40
affecting local techniques and introducing forms of industrialisation on western lines. The capital equipment for these activities is imported as are nearly all metal manufactures for other purposes. Manufactured goods form the largest single category of goods moving into Southeast Asia, to a total of nearly $500 million annually before the war. These manufactured imports chiefly went to urban consumers, yet simple farming tools and articles like needles and scissors went in large quantities far into every country. Although this category was broad, the components were very varied so that the value of each ranked comparatively low. Manufactured articles of western type showed little sign of being made locally, except in Java where successful attempts at making electric equipment had gone on for some years to supply the Southeast Asia markets with very cheap electrical goods like lamps and filaments, suggesting the possibility that Java may become industrialised on the Japanese pattern for mass production methods, and using part-time or women workers. In neighbouring territories, however, there are no such immediate prospects because labour has proved costly in proportion to its skill.

Mining Industries and Prospects

Mining industries of great value have developed in Malaya, 316
Burma, Sumatra, Borneo, the Philippines and the small islands 439
east of Sumatra. Tin and petroleum have been the region's specialities so far and these have assumed great importance, combining to be chiefly responsible for the prewar annual exports of about $650 million of mineral products from Southeast Asia

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the resources of temperate forests show signs of exhaustion. The defects of tropical forest for a timber industry have been explained; it is not clear why no interest has been shown in a pulping industry based on tropical trees most of which have the advantage of relatively quick natural replacement. Pulping of tropical woods may yet solve the world paper shortage, especially as woody or fibrous tropical plants might be cropped for pulping instead of depending on predatory deforestation as is the case in the pulping industries of temperate areas today.

The forests, however, supply the basic domestic fuel of the region. Apart from westernised suburbs of the town, charcoal and wood are the normal means of cooking, in which respect the domestic life continues today much as it did two or three centuries ago. Wealthier residences may use electricity which is mostly steam-generated from imported coals, but domestic coal-gas is uncommon. Domestic heating, of course, is a question which does not arise in these climates. For their illuminants the bulk of the people turn to their trees, to coconut oil, second to which is paraffin oil from within the region. Urban areas are electrically lit.

From Commodity Production to Local Processing

Because the production of primary agricultural commodities like rubber, copra, medicinal plants, and tapioca, all the basis of industrial processes elsewhere, has been the function of Southeast Asia territories over the first third of this century, culminating in an immediate prewar export valued at nearly $1,000 million per annum, processing and manufacturing of these commodities may cease to be done overseas and become the basis of industrialisation within Southeast Asia to make use of local power resources and of the margin of time available among rural populations. A tendency in this direction was very evident in Java where skill and incentive were present; rubber goods, textile printing, preparation of medicines, confectionary and refining essential oils had grown to significant proportions by 1941 and the enforced isolation of the war years should have intensified them, though a resumption of normal trading relations will oblige these industries to so organise that they meet the rival processed goods of zones as varied as India, Europe and the Far East. The influence of India as a source of manufactured goods was evident, particularly in textiles, before the war and could become even more prominent after India's

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additional expansion under the almost autarchic conditions of the war period. Political instability within India can, however, offset this advantage.

It is to be noted that the great markets for goods manufactured from Southeast Asia commodities so far have been in Europe and the United States. The little nations of Southeast Asia seem ill-prepared to absorb much of them for some years. Because food is produced in such large quantities in this typically agricultural zone, we may not overlook the possibilities of manufacturing foods in forms such as biscuits, jam and canned varieties. Hitherto the tight association with industrialised colonial powers has to some extent dissuaded intense application to the miscellany of industrial productions possible in Southeast Asia, yet the local nationalisms and the incentive to establish more balanced social and communal systems tend to encourage local industries. Burma, Siam and Indochina before the war were only lightly touched by these tendencies to manufacture.

From the point of view of the rest of the world, a re-orientation of the tremendous quantity of Southeast Asia's primary agricultural materials now handled by processing industries already established in Europe and the United States, would have major effects, not least on the ability of those industries to maintain their manufactured exports at levels which have been increasing over the last century. Thus, a nationalistic Southeast Asia driving towards self-sufficiency industrially is likely to diminish the international trade streams to and from this region, though it may progressively increase the occupational activities and living standards of Southeast Asia people.

Intra-Regional Trade

A total value of about $400 million was involved in the prewar interchange of goods and commodities between one part and another of the Southeast Asia region. This intra-regional trade was relatively small because the component units of the region produced much the same commodities and goods, by reason of which the countries tended to be rivals rather than customers of one another. An additional factor was the pull of several metropolitan areas, Britain, France, Holland and the United States, which acted to lessen intra-regional trade and to lessen the regularisation and rationalisation of production in Southeast Asia as a whole. Food

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[For information on the distribution of techniques and habits of tooth-blackening in Indochina, especially Tonkin, and distributional comparisons with other parts of Indochina, Southeast and East Asia, and for hypotheses about racial and cultural-historical interrelations on the basis of these distributions, see 95: Huard, AMl Indochina, category 116.]

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During untold centuries in which they collected plant matter, women acquired an intimate knowledge of vegetable life. Eduard Hahn and others have therefore reasoned that women were the inventors of the cultivation of plants and hence were the first food producers. Hahn has given the name *Hackbau* (hoe culture or hoe tillage) to primitive cultivation, and maintains that the hoe is woman's implement; he draws a sharp distinction between Hackbau and more advanced cultivation, which he calls *Pflugbau* (plow culture or plow tillage) and ascribes to men.[9] It is indeed true that men generally farm with plows and that many examples may be cited of women using hoes; nevertheless, there are so many instances of male primitive cultivators employing hoes or similar instruments that Hahn's classification should be modified. While there seems to be no reason for abandoning his theory of the invention of plant cultivation by women, the classification of cultivation by tools, such as the hoe and the plow, ascribed to one sex or the other, is unsatisfactory. For, in spite of the fact that the collection of vegetable matter is almost exclusively the woman's task in the gathering economy, among primitive cultivators men either assist women in the cultivation of plants or entirely take over this activity whenever hunting or fishing become less important than soil tillage. Furthermore, many primitive cultivators do not use the hoe, but continue to employ the digging stick, characteristically used by the food-gathering women. From Formosa southward throughout the Malay Archipelago, as well as on the mainland of Southeastern Asia, the digging stick, also known as the dibble stick or planting stick, is frequently used by the primitive cultivator. On the other hand, there are advanced cultivators who till their land intensively with hoes; they use manure, rotate their crops, terrace fields that lie on slopes, and practice irrigation, yet they do not use plows drawn by draft animals (however, in some instances they have livestock). In other words, advanced agriculture does not depend upon the animal-drawn plow nor does primitive agriculture depend upon the hoe.

A more fundamental distinction between primitive and advanced agriculture may be made in terms of land use rather than of tools. Primitive cultivators, with the possible exception of those living in arid regions, raise one or two crops on a given plot of land, then abandon the plot and make a new field, preferably in the forest, so that the old plot lies fallow sometimes for many years and may itself revert to forest; in short, primitive cultivators shift the place of their agricultural activities with regularity. The crop land consists of small patches scattered throughout the forest; these patches are extremely ragged in appearance and do not look at all like fields. A primitive cultivator would never think of removing stumps and fallen trees; instead, he deliberately raises his crop among them. This kind of cultivation is best described as shifting-field, or shift-

[9] Hahn: Das Alter der wirtschaftlichen Kultur, 1905; idem: Die Entstehung der Pflugkultur, 1909; idem: Von der Hacke zum Pflug, 1914; Kolff: "Hahn's hypothese," 1926, pp. 884–907.

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241 ing, cultivation. In contrast to this method, advanced agriculture is practiced year after year on the same well tended plot, the fertility of which
•311 is maintained by manuring, crop rotation, intensive cultivation, terracing, and often the regular addition of mineral matter in the form of silt deposited on the land by irrigation water. Only occasionally may the land be allowed a short fallow period. This type of tillage may be called permament-field, or sedentary, cultivation.[10]

Shifting cultivation and sedentary cultivation are generic terms used to describe fundamental differences in land use, differences that find their outward expression in the cultural landscape created by those who maintain these economies.[11] Can there be a greater contrast than that between the shifting cultivators' small, irregular, temporary clearings with their chaotic jumble of fallen and half-fallen tree trunks and stumps, on the one hand, and, on the other, an irrigated plain, subdivided into small fields, each surrounded by a dyke—or a steep slope where a succession of beautifully built terraces leads up for several hundreds or even thousands of feet? These kinds of landscape are physical expressions of totally different economies, or modes of life, with different cultural patterns, concepts of land tenure, attitudes toward the soil, and material equipment.

Historically, shifting cultivation without doubt antedates sedentary cultivation, which requires among other things more elaborate techniques and deeper insight into the relationships between soil, tillage, and yields.

241 Shifting and sedentary cultivation may each be further classified in terms of tools, as we have seen, or in terms of crops, systems of rotation, and the like.[12] For instance, in terms of crops, we may distinguish between grain and grainless culture. Of the two, grainless culture is generally conceded to be the older. One argument for this thesis is that fruits and many of the root and leaf crops may be eaten raw or simply prepared, whereas
[184] cereals require more elaborate preparation. The fact that grainless agriculture is largely confined to the fringes of Southeastern Asia also supports the thesis that, at least in this region, grainless agriculture preceded the
174 cultivation of cereals. Still further substantiation is found in Polynesia, where the inhabitants cultivated no cereals when they were first visited

[231]

10 Although sedentary cultivation is commonly practiced by people who use plows drawn by animals, there are large areas where it is practiced with little or no use of the plow. Such areas are found in parts of the Philippines, Java, Sumatra, and southern China, where steep hillsides have been terraced and where the nature of the terrain makes the use of work animals impossible. Sometimes individual farms or patches of land are so small that they must be tilled with hoes, even though plows may be used on adjacent farms. In places custom and religious tradition forbid the use of plows and draft animals.

11 Waibel: Probleme der Landwirtschaftsgeographie, 1933, p. 11.

12 For example, we may distinguish: (a) shifting dibble cultivation, shifting hoe cultivation, and shifting plow cultivation; (b) grainless shifting cultivation and shifting grain cultivation; (c) shifting field-forest cultivation and shifting field-grass cultivation; (d) permanent plow cultivation and permanent planting-stick cultivation; (e) permanent four-field cultivation, and so on. Not all of these are found in Southeastern Asia.

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000 part of the government and of missionaries to introduce terracing and wet-rice cultivation but, instead, continue to practice shifting cultivation and to depend upon dry rice as their staple food.

161 Wherever we find shifting cultivation the density of population is low; on the other hand, permanent cultivation provides the basis for higher
241 densities. The higher the density, the greater is the care bestowed upon
311 the cultivation of the soil. The development of permanent-field cultivation, the construction of terraces on mountainsides and hillsides, the dyking and draining of plains, and other complex techniques associated with wet-rice cultivation are but expressions of a population density that demands an intensive utilization of the soil and a maximum production of food crops.

000 The areas where wet rice was first cultivated were probably hollows and small valleys and the well watered slopes of low hills rather than the great plains and wide valleys that are today the rice granaries of the world. The utilization of extensive plains and broad river valleys for the cultivation of wet rice requires a social organization unknown to the peoples who first began wet-rice culture.

243 It is thought that the cultivation of wet rice originated in days when the hoe and the dibble stick were the only agricultural tools, that is, before the
231 animal-drawn plow reached Southeastern Asia. The broadcasting of seeds is held to be characteristic of plow culture, whereas the cultivators of wet rice in Monsoon Asia generally plant their rice seedlings in the manner of shifting cultivators,[29] a circumstance that would seem to support the hypothesis that the carabao and the plow were not a part of the original technique but were adopted later. Even today wet rice is raised in some parts of Southeastern Asia without the use of the plow. For example, peoples in central Celebes prepare their fields for cultivation by driving carabaos back and forth until the fields are thoroughly puddled.[30] In other areas where wet-rice fields are built on such steep slopes that it is impossible to get carabaos to the terraces, farmers are frequently obliged to till their land entirely by hand—employing only such tools as wooden spades and sticks, which may be shod with iron. The Ifugaos of northern Luzon, for example, have terrace walls reaching, in some cases, heights of 60 feet or more that can be scaled only by means of rocks jutting out from the faces of the walls.

000 Although most sedentary cultivators in Southeastern Asia make use of

[29] Although rice growers in other parts of the world generally use the broadcast method of sowing, one finds it in Southeastern Asia only as a rare exception. According to Copeland (*op. cit.*, p. 224) the *sabog*, or broadcasting method, is used in the Philippines over a rather limited area. This method produces lower yields but its advantages are "some saving of time, saving the labour of transplanting, and the possibility of maturing a crop with less water; rice grown directly in its place can get along with less water than transplanted rice." According to Kruyt ("De To Rongkong in Midden-Celebes," 1920, p. 380), the To Rongkong of central Celebes transplant their wet rice only in exceptional cases but usually broadcast it.

[30] Kruyt: "De To Seko in Midden-Celebes," 1920, p. 409.

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Although most sedentary cultivators in Southeastern Asia make use of the animal-drawn plow, in the densely populated regions the parcelling of land has proceeded so far that many peasants, whose fathers, or ancestors, owned draft animals (carabaos or oxen) and used plows, have farms so diminished in size that they cannot afford to keep draft animals and therefore must till their fields entirely with hand tools. In spite of the fact that they often make very intensive use of their fields, still they are not able to produce enough to meet the modest needs of their families. 241 231 311

In nearly all instances, however, where the governments concerned have attempted to solve this problem by opening up land suitable for sedentary cultivation to settlers coming from problem areas, the governments have been confronted by the fact that these districts, which might offer outlets for the congested areas, are inhabited by shifting cultivators or in some cases by food gatherers. The danger is then that the proposed migration may infringe upon the rights of the indigenous peoples, whose economy and mode of life, as we have noticed, require considerably more land than those of the incoming settlers, who are accustomed to permanent-field cultivation. It is, therefore, necessary for us to understand the various forms of land use in Southeastern Asia and their peculiar exigencies in order rationally to approach the problems of pioneering in the countries around the South China Sea. 311 241 166

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[See pp. 35 ff., category 241 or 116 -- Analyst]

Chapter II

THE SHIFTING CULTIVATOR [p. 16]

241 361 311 The field of the shifting cultivator is known by various local terms. It is called *caiñgin* in the Philippines, *humah* in Java, *ladang* in the Indies as a whole and in Malaya, *taungya* in Burma, *tamrai* in Thailand, and *rây* in Indochina.[1] Practically without exception, it is a clearing in either primeval or second-growth forest. The use of grassland is so unusual that we shall limit the following discussion to shifting cultivation on forest land.

As his name indicates, the shifting cultivator does not use the same piece of land every year; instead, he kills or cuts down at regular intervals —every year, every other year, or every third year—the trees of a small forest patch. He burns as much of the woody growth as is possible or convenient. Among the charred stumps and half-burned tree trunks he plants his favorite crops, be they cereals such as millet, upland rice, or maize; or tubers such as yams or sweet potatoes (Figs. 4–10). The latter are planted extensively by the *caiñgero*, the shifting cultivator in the Philippines. In planting cereals it is usually the men who take the planting stick to make little holes and the women who drop in a few seeds, using their feet to cover the seed with soil (Figs. 11–13). As forest land is generally free from weeds or grasses and the soil is usually rich in humus and well supplied with the ash of burned plant matter after clearing, it produces a very good, or even excellent, first harvest; the second harvest begins to show a decline in yield, and thereafter the returns diminish rapidly.[2] Grasses and weeds invade the clearing. Rather than battle these, the peasant abandons his old ladang and cuts and burns a new patch of forest (Fig. 15). The old plot reverts, under favorable conditions, to second-growth forest, the so-called *blukar* of the Malays, and is not cleared again for a period, the length of which may vary from 8 to 15 years, or more.

[243 462] [134]

Shifting cultivation is characterized by a lack of tillage; the soil is hardly disturbed, as no plow turns it. There is less labor involved than in other methods of cultivation, and the work is more evenly spread over the year—an advantage where labor is relatively scarce. The tasks involved are cutting, burning, and planting; sometimes simple fencing of the field against animals, guarding—especially before the harvest and usually by women and children—and, finally, harvesting. In addition, there may be some weeding in the first year and certainly during the second.

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[1] In British India *jhum*, *kumri*, *dhya*, *brwar*, or *dullee*; in Ceylon *chena*; in Japan, Korea, and Formosa *karen* (a Japanese term); in Central America *milpa*; in parts of Africa *chitemene*.

[2] Danhof reports for parts of the Lampoeng Districts that a ladang will produce from 15 to 25 quintals of rice in the first year and approximately 5 in the second year. In areas where the second yield shows such a serious decline the peasants usually prefer to make a new ladang—Danhof: "Bijdrage," 1940, p. 199.

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1 [See pp. 37 ff., category 241 or 116.--Analyst]

Shifting cultivation, the most primitive type of agriculture, may be briefly defined as an economy of which the main characteristics are rotation of fields rather than of crops; clearing by means of fire; absence of draft animals and of manuring; use of human labor only; employment of the dibble stick or hoe; short periods of soil occupancy alternating with long fallow periods. Other terms for shifting cultivation are field-forest economy and field-forest rotation. 241 361 316

Shifting cultivators prefer flat land, but in Formosa, the Philippines, Indochina, and Thailand they have been forced back into the hills and mountains and must often be content with fields on steep slopes (Figs. 16, 17). This has led some observers to believe that shifting cultivation is exclusively practiced in hilly or mountainous regions, or that such regions are preferred in this economy. However, in the Outer Islands[3] of the Netherlands Indies, one frequently finds ladangs in flat country (Fig. 18). If the ladang is very steep it is rarely used for more than one crop, so that new clearings must be made every year.

Many shifting cultivators no longer change their dwellings when they turn to new land; they have become sedentary at least as far as their houses are concerned. They may build a hut in the ladang if it is too far away from their village and may occasionally live in such a shelter, especially at the time when the ripening crop has to be guarded against animals, but they will return with the harvest to their permanent houses in the village (Figs. 10, 19–21).

Ladang culture, as is frequently true of any form of agriculture, is intricately interwoven with religion. Magic practices and sacrificial offerings must accompany every step in the culture, even if the people are no longer pagans but, for example, Mohammedans. Friedericy has made a careful study of these magical-religious customs in the Ponre mountains at the head of the Gulf of Bone in southern Celebes.[4] In this region the people live in small permanent villages. Whenever they are in need of new ladangs—every second year—the heads of the families meet to choose new locations. At this stage they try to find out from the spirits if these agree to the clearing of the land that was selected. For this purpose the village headman (*dukun*), or somebody else who is familiar with magic, is sent out to the part of the forest that has been chosen. Here the delegate places betel leaves (*Piper betle* L.), each with a small slab of lime and a piece of areca nut (*Areca catechu* L.), under a tree and expresses the desire of his community to cut the trees and to use the soil. He ends with the wish that the betel leaves and the areca nuts be scattered should the choice 241 787 [361] [824]

[3] I have used the term "Outer Islands" to denote all the islands of the Netherlands Indies not comprised in the jurisdiction of Java and Madura (Madoera). The Dutch administrative term is *Buitengewesten*.

[4] Friedericy: "Ponre," 1932, pp. 1–34; idem: "De taak van het bestuur," 1937, pp. 488–501. For an excellent description of the magical-religious rites that are associated with the agricultural efforts of the Bemba of Northern Rhodesia, see Richards: Land, Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia, 1939, pp. 351–380.

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241 787 of the new ladang be a poor one. After three days the same person returns, and if he finds that the offerings have been scattered a new location is chosen and a new attempt is made to get a favorable answer from the spirits. In case the betel leaves have been found undisturbed, all male members of the village have a meal on the chosen land. Then the area is divided among the villagers by the headman. Each individual appeals to the spirits by placing a betel leaf with lime and areca nut on the ladang that has been turned over to him. If the answer is unfavorable he tries again. The betel leaf may be placed three times. If the offering is disturbed each time, the headman turns over a part of his share, which is considerably larger than any of the others, to the less fortunate villager. Throughout the following agricultural year with its stages of clearing, planting, and harvesting, the peasant repeatedly requires the services of the dukun, or *shaman*, as well as the betel leaf.

In other regions details differ, but the essential fact remains that the social-religious life and thinking of the shifting cultivator is bound up with his characteristic form of cultivation.

423 241 621 Shifting cultivators have no concept of private land ownership. The land belongs to the community, the tribe, or the village, and each member has the right to use as much land as he needs and can cultivate. The location of the land that he is to use may be decided upon by the village council or the headman. The person who clears the land and plants the crop gets the produce. Nobody has the right to plant a plot that has been cleared by someone else. As soon as the land is abandoned all rights are forfeited, except the right of the community. However, if trees have been planted, the ownership of the trees and their produce remains with the person who planted them, and he is given preference when the land has had a sufficient fallow period and can again be cultivated.

The Effect of Shifting Cultivation on the Land

241 134 311 As has been stated above, ladangs decline in fertility after the first crop, and obnoxious grasses and weeds appear among the stooling tree stumps. As long as there is an abundance of forest land at his disposal the cultivator prefers to abandon the ladang. Under favorable conditions the grasses will, in turn, give way to second-growth forest. In the course of centuries this second-growth forest may develop into a climax forest, that is, a forest having the same composition as the primeval forest. In any case, when tall forest growth again occurs, the land will have had time to recover its original fertility.

Unfortunately, however, conditions are often not sufficiently favorable for a regeneration of soil fertility and the development of a good second-growth forest. As a matter of fact, the practice of shifting cultivation has altered the character of vegetation beyond recognition over wide areas in Southeastern Asia. Instead of a dense primeval rain-forest, we now find

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extensive open grasslands resulting from the most important tool of the shifting cultivator, fire. 241 134 311

Generally, the fallow period allows time only for the evolution of mediocre second-growth forest, for the shifting cultivator usually returns to an old ladang before even a small percentage of those tree species that made up the original stand have had a chance to come back. Repeated cultivations further impoverish the forest and reduce the number of species. Certain light-loving trees that played a minor role in the climax forest will spread rapidly and dominate, together with those species that show a resistance to fire and those that are capable of sending new sprouts out of the old stumps.[5]

If fire repeatedly invades an abandoned ladang, the tree flora is reduced until finally only grasses and herbs survive. These persist because their root systems, tubers, or bulbs send out new shoots after the fire. The [37] more important grasses and herbs that finally triumph over forest vegetation are *Imperata cylindrica* Beauv., *Imperata constricta* Hitchc., *Saccharum spontaneum* L., *Themeda gigantea* Hack, and *Eupatorium odoratum* L. These burn very rapidly and with a hot flame, even when still green. After they are well established they catch fire or are set afire every year, almost without exception; this prevents natural reforestation. Furthermore, the fire will also invade the neighboring forest and force it gradually back, so that the grass area steadily increases. This is especially true in hilly or mountainous country. In the Philippines about 18 per cent of the total area is covered with grass vegetation as a result of shifting cultivation and fires. These grass areas are known locally as *cogonales*. In the Indies, where they are called *alang-alang*,[6] they are also extensive, as in southern Sumatra. While I was traveling through southern Sumatra by rail during the dry season I counted twenty grass fires started within the space of an hour by sparks from our locomotive. In Thailand there is as yet very little cogonal land, according to Pendleton.[7] In Indochina culturally induced grasslands, either pure or with scattered trees—the latter called by the French *forêts claires* or *savanes-parcs*—are very extensive[8] (Figs. 23, 24).

Once the vegetation of an area has been changed from forest to grass, [224] the land is of no more agricultural use to the shifting cultivator. The only benefit that he then gets out of the land is for hunting. For this, too, he often utilizes fire—either to drive wild animals out of hiding or to get a growth of young grass to attract his prey.

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[5] In Malaya and Sumatra the spread of such bushes and trees as *Lantana camara* L., *Schima bancana* Miq., *Peronema canescens* Jack, *Vitex pubescens* Vahl, *Melastoma malabathricum* L., and *Lagerstroemia speciosa* Pers. is due to the cutting of clearings.

[6] *Imperata* (both *constricta* and *cylindrica*) is known in the Philippines by the Spanish term *cogon*, in the East Indies as *alang-alang*, and in Malaya as *lalang*. The last two are Malay words.

[7] Pendleton: "Some Interrelations between Agriculture and Forestry," 1939, p. 41.

[8] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 368–372.

[See p. 38, cat. 241 or 116 -- Analyst]

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241 When fires no longer ravage the grasslands, however, trees return and finally drive out the grasses completely, for the latter cannot stand shade.[9]

311 The spread of grass is especially rapid in regions with a long, pronounced dry season, whereas reforestation is more likely to take place in areas with a well distributed, high annual rainfall. This may explain why the Philippines and Indochina have a larger percentage of open grasslands than do Malaya and the Netherlands Indies.

134 A relatively high density of population is an important factor in preventing successful reforestation and encouraging grasses. In a thinly settled forest area there is sufficient land to allow for a long rest period, but an increasing density of population results in the shortening of the fallow period to such a degree that the soil is given insufficient time to recover its fertility. The shorter the fallow period the poorer the succeeding forest —if any—and the poorer the following crop yields, until finally the land can no longer satisfy the needs of the shifting cultivator.

174 Pendleton believes that this cycle may have contributed materially to the downfall of the Khmers in Cambodia (Cambodge). He states that although the Khmers used the plow on very limited areas of wet riceland, they had largely to depend on the planting stick and shifting cultivation for their food supply. As the demands for more food arose from the rapidly increasing population concentrated in the city of Angkor, the fallow period granted to the uplands had to be progressively shortened. At the same time fires became so frequent that culturally induced grasslands spread while the cultivable area decreased, thus further diminishing the food supply available to the people of Angkor. "While the actual fall of Angkor is ascribed to the superior military power of invaders, the resistance of the inhabitants was doubtless much less than it would have been had the lands been productive and they had had adequate supplies of food."[10]

000 Declining crop yields and the spread of grasses have been advanced as important reasons for the breakdown of the Mayan civilization,[11] and Pendleton further raises the question "whether the development of cogonals might not have been an important contributing factor in the dying out of some of the other civilizations of the tropics, notably that of Anuradapura, in Ceylon."[12]

Today the ruins of the Mayan cities, as well as those of Angkor, are surrounded by relatively luxuriant forest vegetation, which has had time to displace the pernicious grasses since man and his tool, fire, have abandoned the inhospitable grasslands.

Not only does shifting cultivation alter the character of the vegetation,

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[37] [9] When an old ladang remains unburned for several years the following trees spring up in addition to those already mentioned in footnote 5: *Erechthites hieracifolia* Rafin., *Blumea balsamifera* DC., *Peltophorum dasyrachis* Kurz, *Macaranga tanarius* Muell. Arg., and *Piper aduncum* L..

[10] Pendleton: *op. cit.*, pp. 46 and 47.

[11] Cook: "Milpa Agriculture," 1921, pp. 307–326.

[12] Pendleton: *op. cit.*, p. 47.

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Not only does shifting cultivation alter the character of the vegetation, but also it may induce soil erosion, especially when it is practiced on slopes. Forest vegetation keeps the soil from being washed or blown away, but at the end of the dry season, when the trees have been cut and burned, the soil lies exposed. Consequently, during the early days of the rainy season large quantities of topsoil are washed downhill and carried by rivers to the plains. Erosion, by lowering the moisture-holding capacity of the soil as well as the rate of absorption, may thus cause further acceleration of run-off and lead finally to destructive floods on the plains. Such floods are frequent in the Philippines and parts of the East Indies. Pendleton points out that in Thailand the main rivers receive their great load of silt from the more steeply sloping mountains of northern Thailand where shifting cultivators have started the forces of accelerated erosion.[13]

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The large quantities of valuable timber destroyed year after year by the shifting cultivators in virgin areas and the prevention of reforestation by the fires that spread through the abandoned fields (Fig. 22) cause the forester to regard the shifting cultivator as his enemy. In the Philippines the forester has for many years been pleading for strictly enforced laws and severe penalties against shifting cultivators.

> The greatest enemy of our forest is caingin making. It is to the persistent practice of this crude form of agriculture from time immemorial that the existence of vast areas of denuded waste lands is attributable. Much of our valuable timber has been and is still being wasted by this illegal form of forest clearing. There are actually over five and a half million hectares of open lands that are practically idle. Due to continued caingins and the recurrence of fires on these open lands, the forest area is decreasing year after year. . . . Destructive floods in various parts of the Islands and the yearly appearance . . . of locust pest, the extermination of which is costing the Government hundreds of thousands of pesos yearly, are chiefly the direct results of this obnoxious practice.[14]

Conflicting Views on the Merits of Shifting Cultivation

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Judgments on the merits of shifting cultivation have been rather contradictory since the practice first came to the attention of scientific observers. During the past century the Dutch in Java spoke of it as *Raubbau* (robber economy), and one still finds the expression used. Sauer protests against this term. According to him, shifting cultivation is a "primitive economy, in which the per capita area of land needed for a community is rather large and in which the forest growth is to be considered as a part of a long term rotation of fields." He is of the opinion that it is "an excellent device for maintaining permanent productivity."[15]

Lord Hailey calls shifting cultivation "less a device of barbarism than a concession to the character of a soil which needs long periods for recovery and regeneration; and the trekking habit, whether of Dutch farmers

[13] Pendleton: "Soil Erosion in the Tropics," 1940, p. 757.

[14] Letter of the Director of the Bureau of Forestry to the Secretary of Justice, September 10, 1934.

[15] Sauer: "Destructive Exploitation," 1938, p. 496.

[See p. 38, cat. 241 or 116 -- Analyst]

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always sufficient land for the population without undue pressure on the forests. A result of British rule has been to increase the population and correspondingly to reduce the rest period of the soil. The consequences have been deforestation and soil erosion. For that reason the authorities have attempted to stop this mode of land use.

In Java shifting cultivation attracted the attention of the government as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century. It was practiced especially in the mountains. The fact that a shifting cultivator required more land than a peasant who cultivated the same piece of land year after year made shifting cultivation extremely undesirable to a colonial administration that wanted to use all available land for the production of cash crops—either under the "forced culture system" of 1830 to 1870[21] or under the private plantation system that has existed since 1870. This circumstance, together with an alarming increase in population, prompted the government to do everything possible to stop the practice of shifting cultivation in Java, and today it is found only in the quite thinly settled residency of Bantam in West Java.[22] In the Outer Islands, with their sparse population and large forest areas, it is widely practiced. But, in contrast to their predecessors, Dutch officials of recent times rarely use the term *Raubbau* for shifting cultivation. Instead they consider this form of land use justifiable if the abandoned fields revert to forest and have the possibility of regaining their former fertility. In the past fifteen years, however, warning voices have pointed out that in large parts of the Outer Islands ladang culture has become a source of destruction, for the forest is no longer being given an opportunity to recuperate.[23] Both agricultural and forestry officials have consequently become concerned over shifting cultivation. In 1930 Hagreis presented a paper on ladang culture before the congress of officials of the Agricultural Advisory Service in the Netherlands Indies.[24] At that time it was decided to appoint a special commission to study ladang culture.[25] The foresters, also, devoted a good deal of attention to the problem during their congress in 1937. In 1940 Van Beukering of the Department of Economic Affairs summarized the result of the ladang *enquête*.[26] He came to the conclusion that shifting cultivation is a logical and economically justifiable form of land use wherever there is a large amount of land available and a primitive economy exists. From a social point of view no objection can be raised if, after each occupation, the fertility of the soil is regained. There is no reason to insist upon more intensive forms of land use so long as the population density does not increase beyond 50 persons per square kilometer, or 130 persons per square mile. If at this density we

[21] From 1830 to 1870 the peasants of Java were forced, under the notorious "culture system," to devote part of their land and labor to producing crops for the government.
[22] Kools: Hoema's, 1935.
[23] Gonggrijp: "Soil Management," 1938, pp. 397–404.
[24] Hagreis: "Ladangbouw," 1930, pp. 43–75 and 629–642.
[25] "Enquête betreffende het ladangvraagstuk," 1931, pp. 1022–1033.
[26] Van Beukering: Het ladangvraagstuk. Unpublished typescript, 1940.

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allow for five persons per family and assume that the family shifts its cultivation plot annually but returns to the same plot after an average period of 10 years, each family could occupy annually one hectare, or 2.47 acres. This is the amount of land that an average shifting cultivator in the Indies needs in order to cover the food requirements of his family.

This calculation does not make any allowance for permanent forests. Actually, however, the land requirements are not quite so high, because very often the same land is used for two years instead of one, which would either allow for a longer period of fallow or keep a part of the virgin forest intact. The latter is improbable because of the shifting cultivator's preference for virgin forest.

To summarize these opinions, shifting cultivation from the agricultural point of view is not considered objectionable so long as vegetation and the fertility of the soil are restored by nature. The opinion of those who regard it as a fatal agricultural system under all circumstances is widely felt to be unjustified. From the silvicultural point of view, shifting cultivation is held to be objectionable if it destroys timber that would otherwise be exploited by the forest service or by private concessionaries.

Supplementing Shifting Cultivation With Cash Crops in the Netherlands Indies

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The products of the typical shifting cultivator never reach a distant market. There is seldom any surplus, for the shifting cultivator is a subsistence farmer who lives from hand to mouth. In the Outer Islands of the Netherlands Indies, however, the shifting cultivator has been drawn into modern economy and has modified this age-old system. In parts of Sumatra and Borneo he has begun to diversify his economy by planting tree crops on the ladang among his rice or maize. After one or two harvests the fields are abandoned and left to the trees that have been planted. The trees then furnish an additional source of income as soon as they reach the bearing stage. Pepper has been raised as a ladang crop for many centuries, especially in the Lampoeng Districts. Coffee was introduced in the days of the Dutch East India Company and adopted as a commercial crop by the peasants. Benzoin (*Styrax benzoin* Dryander), also, has long been grown in this manner. More recently coconuts and, since about 1905, rubber have become ladang crops (Figs. 25–33).

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A shifting cultivator may, over a period of years, convert his old ladangs into rubber gardens, for example, until he is assured of a sufficient income from his permanent tree crop to buy his food from the outside and no longer requires a ladang for the production of food. This process has led to the creation of the large native rubber areas in Borneo and Sumatra, where some shifting cultivators have become dependent upon the market price of rubber and upon the policy of the government in regard to taxation and export control. In times of low prices and export restrictions they may suffer severe economic setbacks and even hardship. In Bengkalis

[See p. 39 ff, cat. 241 or 116 -- Analysis]

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The Areal Extent of Shifting Cultivation in Southeastern Asia

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It is difficult to form an idea of the areal extent of shifting cultivation because of its migratory nature and the fact that it is often practiced in remote regions. The only country of Southeastern Asia in which an attempt has been made to estimate the area used for shifting cultivation is the Netherlands Indies, but even there it was not possible to include all

Table II—Philippine Islands: Illegal Caiñgins Detected, 1914-1940

Year	Illegal Caiñgins Number	Illegal Caiñgins Area in Hectares
1914	895	....
1915	1 198	....
1916	845	....
1917	665	....
1918	776	....
1919	603	....
1920	721	....
1921	1 602	1 429.48
1922	3 110	2 803.55
1923	1 759	1 516.33
1924	1 753	1 396.90
1925	1 762	1 391.29
1926	1 829	1 476.61
1927	2 002	1 743.92
1928	1 774	1 602.95
1929	1 312	1 370.41
1930	3 227	3 279.77
1931	2 534	3 345.74
1932	2 547	5 586.27
1933	2 427	2 831.38
1934	3 207	3 215.46
1935	2 631	2 455.73
1936	2 314	2 510.59
1937	1 967	2 308.24
1938	1 766	2 029.68
1939*	906	1 331.12
1940†	2 646	4 416.56
Total	48 778	48 071.98

Source: Data supplied by the Bureau of Forestry, Manila.
*Six months only, ending June 30, 1939, because of change of fiscal year.
†From July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1940.

parts of the Outer Islands in the estimate. Van Beukering concluded that one-third of all food consumed in the Outer Islands was grown on ladangs; this would require a total of 1,100,000 hectares of land. If we assume that all ladangs are occupied for 2 years and lie fallow for 12 years, the shifting cultivation system would need seven times 1,100,000, or 7,700,000, hectares. This estimate does not include the ladang area under coffee and pepper cultivation. (Rubber, coconut, and benzoin cannot be considered because they are, for practical purposes, permanent crops.)

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1 [See p. 26, category 241 or 116. -- Analyst]

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Van Beukering allowed an additional 200,000 hectares for coffee and pepper ladangs; so that the total area amounts to about 8,000,000 hectares. If we assume that the population of the Outer Islands increases at the rate of 1½ to 2½ per cent each year, it would double in from 29 to 47 years. This would mean that after about 30 to 50 years 16,000,000 hectares would come within the scope of shifting cultivation.

In Malaya ladang cultivation is illegal, but it is practiced in the hinterland well away from roads and railways, in eastern sections of the peninsula. Dobby recently described it in Pahang and northeastern Kedah, near the Thai border.[30] The Sakai of Pahang regularly abandon their primitive huts as well as the clearings when they shift to a new field (Map, Fig. 2). 1 The Malays of northeastern Kedah, on the other hand, as a rule live permanently in one place and change only their fields (Map, Fig. 3). 1 There are no statistics available on the areal extent to which shifting cultivation is carried on in Malaya, but according to Dobby the system gives way to permanent culture "as the standard of cultivation rises and as the effect of law becomes stronger."[31]

In Thailand shifting cultivation is extensively practiced by the tribes of the mountains of the north and west, on the eastern part of the Khorat Plateau, and on the peninsula. Probably about 1,000,000 people depend upon it. According to the same kind of calculation that Van Beukering made for the Indies, a total of 1,400,000 hectares would be required, or 200,000 hectares annually, if we allow five persons per household and consider that one hectare covers the needs of a family for 2 years.[32]

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In Indochina only the tribes of the mountains of Tongking, Laos, and Annam now practice rây, or shifting, cultivation. The people of the plains, Annamese and Cambodians, who represent 84 per cent of the population, practice a more intensive form of agriculture. Gourou has estimated the areal extent of shifting cultivation in Indochina. He states that a rây is used for 2 years and has to lie fallow for at least 20 years, which seems a rather long period as compared with other countries. In addition to its extensive plains, Indochina has a mountainous or hilly area of 580,000 square kilometers. Only one per cent of this land is permanently cultivated. Gourou estimates that about 40 per cent of the mountainous country is suitable for rây cultivation and he assumes that one-tenth of this, or 4 per cent of the total mountain land, is under rây cultivation in any one year.[33] If this calculation is correct it would mean that 23,200 square kilometers, or 2,320,000 hectares, are occupied annually by shifting cultivators. The numerical strength of the shifting tribes shows, however, that this estimate cannot be correct. Their number is not much greater than

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30 Dobby: "Settlement Patterns in Malaya," 1942, p. 222.

31 *Ibid.*

32 For an excellent description of the life of the shifting cultivators in Thailand, see Credner: Siam, 1935, pp. 148–173.

33 Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 177–182, especially pp. 180 and 182.

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[See p. 27, category 116. -- Analyst]

1,500,000, or at the most 2,000,000, which would mean about 300,000 to 400,000 households. This number of households could hardly occupy such a large rây area as Gourou assumes. 241 311

In Formosa only the Malay tribes of the mountains in the eastern half of the island practice shifting cultivation. They number, according to estimates, about 150,000. From this we may assume that not more than 30,000 to 50,000 hectares are occupied annually by shifting cultivators. 134

In the Philippines it is unlawful to make caiñgins on public land without the permission of the Bureau of Forestry.[34] Permission will be given if the forest on the land involved is of no commercial value and if the caiñgero accepts the obligation to reforest his patch with seeds supplied by the forest service. Several hundred caiñgeros are brought annually before the justices of the peace, who in the past, because their sympathy was with the caiñgeros, were usually rather reluctant to fine the culprits (Table II). Nobody knows, of course, how many illegal caiñgins escape detection, but it is certain that they greatly outnumber those that are made with the permission of the foresters added to those that have been brought to the attention of the courts. Special consideration is given to the "non-Christian" tribes, for whom tracts of land have been set aside within which they continue their age-old system of cultivation. In Mindanao probably three-fourths of the population, from the primitive Manobos to the more advanced Moros, practice the caiñgin system of cultivation. Other regions where this system is practiced extensively are Mindoro, Cebu, southern Negros, and parts of Luzon—the central and eastern cordillera and the Camarines. About 10 per cent of the population of the Philippines obtain a part or all of their food from caiñgins, most of which are made either on private land or on land that belongs to non-Christian tribes who know no other form of agriculture. [162]

Methods of Eliminating the Undesirable Aspects of Shifting Cultivation

In regions where the density of population exceeds 50 persons per square kilometer, shifting cultivation becomes wasteful and destructive. It is imperative in such areas that the system be either modified or else replaced by more conserving and, where possible, more intensive forms of land use. For most backward tribes this involves fundamental changes in their mode of life, religious ideas, and concepts of land rights. 241 311 161

In some instances it should suffice to adopt measures that eliminate the harmful or wasteful after effects of the system without requiring that this kind of land use be given up completely. Let us assume that we have a somewhat thinly settled region containing a forest that is not particularly valuable and the exploitation of which is impracticable or at present inexpedient. Deforestation and the spread of grasses are undesirable aspects 185 241 311

[34] Nano: "Kaiñgin Laws," 1939, pp. 87–92.

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of shifting cultivation in the area. In such a case reforestation would be assured by keeping fire out of the old clearings. This could be done by leaving relatively non-inflammable forest belts at least 60 feet wide between individual clearings. These forest belts would offer some protection against the spread of grass fires and at the same time would be a source of seed for further reforestation. Reforestation under such circumstances would be much easier and cheaper than if large contiguous areas were to be cleared and used.

245 185 [137]

Where natural reforestation is particularly slow, cultivators should be required to practice artificial reforestation. In scattered regions in Southeastern Asia tribesmen do this on their own initiative. Pendleton reports such a case in Burma.[35] Certain Dyak tribes in Borneo plant seeds of the candlenut tree (*Aleurites moluccana* Willd.) about 3 meters apart in a freshly cleared ladang before it has even been burned. In the eastern part of the Malay Archipelago shifting cultivators plant such trees as *Aleurites moluccana* Willd., *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Hibiscus similis* Bl., *Casuarina equisetifolia* L., *Macaranga* species, *Euphorbia* species, *Sesbania grandiflora* Pers., and *Desmodium timoriense* DC. for the purpose of restoring the forest.

In Sumatra Deli tobacco planters initiated artificial reforestation after alang-alang had regularly invaded their fallow fields and caught fire so frequently that second-growth forest could not get a start. In Deli the tobacco fields are in use only 1 year and lie fallow 7 to 10 years. They should be protected by forest growth during that period. Therefore, in order to make this possible, the planters controlled fires by planting belts of teak along the highways and roads. These belts served as fireguards and at the same time provided lumber for tobacco-drying sheds. On the tobacco fields themselves they planted especially *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Cassia siamea* Lam., *Pithecellobium saman* Benth., and *Leucaena glauca* Benth., which drive out the alang-alang[36] (Figs. 34–39). !

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Another way of speeding up reforestation is to spare a few of the larger trees at the time of the clearing. This is done by the Malays of Sumatra. They do not cut down *Koompassia parvifolia* Prain, *Arenga saccharifera* Labill., *Durio zibethinus* Murr. (durian), *Parkia* species, or *Garcinia grandifolia* Pierre.[37] The last three are fruit trees that are numerous in the forest, whereas the second is a palm whose flower stalk is tapped for its sugary sap and the first is preferred by bees as a hiving tree, which gives it its name, "bee-tree." This tree is preserved because the people want the honey. Worthington reports that in Africa "some tribes appear to realize the necessity of maintaining tree growth on their clearings and merely top the trees and lop the branches, so that the trees are enabled to

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[35] Similar cases are known in the residency of Benkoelen in Sumatra, in central Celebes, and in Flores. See Hagreis: "Ladangbouw," 1930, p. 631.

[36] Jochems: "De begroeiing der tabakslanden," n.d., pp. 77–89.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 30–32.

[See p 40 ff, cat. 116 --Analyst]

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244 137 *na edulis* Ker), sweet potato (*Ipomoea batatas* Poir.), taro (*Colocasia esculenta* Schott), *Curcuma* species, Goa bean (*Psophocarpus tetragonolobus* DC.), bitter cucumber (*Momordica charantia* L.), snake gourd (*Trichosanthes anguina* L.), Lima bean (large) (*Phaseolus lunatus* L.), Goa potato (*Dioscorea aculeata* L.), wild yam (*Dioscorea hispida* Dennst.), and sweet yam (*Dioscorea alata* L.). The middle story contains taller-growing plants, such as cassava (*Manihot utilissima* Pohl), citrus varieties such as *Citrus nobilis* Lour. and *Citrus aurantifolia* Swingle, papaya (*Carica papaya* L.), banana (*Musa* species), rose apple (*Eugenia aquea* Burm.), and soursop (*Anona muricata* L.). The upper story is formed by tall fruit trees, such as coconut (*Cocos nucifera* L.), jackfruit (*Artocarpus integra* Merr.), sapodilla or chico (*Achras zapota* L.), pomelo (*Citrus maxima* Merr.), of which numerous forms, differing in size and color, are known in the Indies, *belinju* (*Gnetum gnemon* L.), mango (*Mangifera indica* L.), durian (*Durio zibethinus* Murr.), candlenut tree (*Aleurites moluccana* Willd.), tamarind (*Tamarindus indica* L.), *pete* (*Parkia speciosa* Hassk.), stinkbean tree (*Pithecellobium lobatum* Benth.), and *santol* (*Sandoricum koetjape* Merr.).

This list does not by any means include all the plants that appear in the gardens. The plants vary in number and type from region to region in accordance with differences in soil, climate (elevation), and the taste of the owners.

● 311 244 161 369 Estimates indicate that about 15 per cent of the cultivated land in Java and Madura is taken up by gardens. Unfortunately, there have been no detailed studies of garden culture outside of Java, although the products of the garden play an important role in the diet of all the peoples of Southeastern Asia. Terra, who compared garden culture in various districts of Java, found that the share of land allotted to gardens, together with the intensity of their cultivation, increases as the total amount of crop land per head decreases, down to the point where the average amount of crop land per head is only 0.15 hectare. Where the amount of land is even less than this the share of garden land decreases, although there is a tendency at first to increase the intensity of the garden culture. Close to the larger cities, the amount of crop land per person, together with the amount devoted to gardens and the intensity of the latter's cultivation, falls off to a minimum since the population here has supplementary sources of income.

With the development of a money economy appears a specialization that is directed toward the urban centers. There has always been some natural specialization inasmuch as some plants do not grow well everywhere. The coconut, for example, does best in the lowlands. But the new specialization depends not only upon such natural factors as soil and climate, but also upon economic factors such as marketing facilities and the development of communications. This specialization can be observed generally in Southeastern Asia.

146 244 Ochse and Terra found that in calories of food value the returns of the gardens proved to be slightly higher per hectare than those of the irri-

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ing crops. The process can be adapted to climate by manufacture either in shallow pits or low heaps."[64] 241 242

Dry-Field Crops Cultivated by Peasants

The list of dry-field crops cultivated in Southeastern Asia is rather large, but there are regional variations. Cassava, for example, is commonly grown on tegalans in Java (2,300,000 acres), whereas it is unimportant in Sumatra, Borneo, the Philippines (40,000 acres), Malaya (24,000 acres), and Indochina (75,000 acres). The most important dry-field crops are up- 241 316

TABLE IV—CHEMICAL COMPOSITION OF CASSAVA AND IMPORTANT CEREAL FLOURS [146]

	CASSAVA (PER CENT)	MAIZE (PER CENT)	WHEAT (PER CENT)	RICE (PER CENT)
Moisture	10.75	13.41	13.65	13.12
Protein	0.87	7.56	12.35	9.85
Crude fat	1.19	2.79	1.75	0.88
Ash	1.24	1.78	1.81	1.51
Crude fiber	6.12	3.19	2.53	0.63
Carbohydrates	79.83	71.27	67.91	74.01

Source: The Cassava Industry in the Philippines, 1939, p. 7.

land rice, maize, cassava, sweet potatoes, peanuts, soy beans and other pulses, tobacco, and sugar cane, all of which are annuals. Of the first four, only upland rice is a native of Southeastern Asia, whereas the other three are natives of the New World and were introduced into Southeastern Asia by the Spaniards in the sixteenth century.

The inhabitants of Southeastern Asia have long relied upon root crops, fruits, leaves of various plants, and wild roots and tubers gathered in the forests, as well as upon rice. Scheltema refers to a number of early statements which indicate that "rice was not yet the principal food for a large portion of the native population [of Java] as late as the first part of the 19th century and that the rice diet has become much more important in the course of the past hundred years" as a result of the great extension of the cultivation of irrigated rice fields.[65] If it is correct that the rice consumption per capita increased during the past century, the opposite trend has been evident during the present century. For a while the increase in the area of irrigated land was great enough to allow for a larger rice production, but with the steadily increasing pressure of population the peasants now have to depend more and more upon unirrigated land. Thus the production of dry-field crops is gaining in importance. 241 262

Authorities in Southeastern Asia have been especially worried over the increase of cassava production and consumption. Because of the exhaustion of the soil fertility on many dry fields, the growing of upland rice and 241 134

[64] Worthington: Science in Africa, 1938, p. 387.
[65] Scheltema: The Food Consumption, 1936, p. 10.

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241 134 [146] maize has become unprofitable, and many peasants have changed over to cassava, which makes lesser demands upon soil fertility. The per acre yields of cassava are high, and the plant is a source of carbohydrates, fat, and protein. From the standpoint of dietary needs, however, the ratio between carbohydrates on the one hand and protein and fat on the other is unfavorable. People who live on cassava merely fill their stomachs. The insufficiency of protein intake is detrimental to their health. Table IV compares the chemical composition of cassava, maize, wheat, and rice.

243 146 262 Maize, as the table indicates, compares quite favorably in protein content with wheat and rice and is especially rich in fat. It has gained an important position in the diet of the people of central and eastern Java, Madura, the island of Cebu, and the Cagayan Valley in the island of Luzon. Both maize and cassava are easy to store and therefore have a great advantage over sweet potatoes, which must be consumed soon after they ripen.

241 In Thailand maize is an important crop on the Khorat plateau and in other regions where dry land is available. Among the root crops cassava has gained a greater importance than taro and yams. The last two are grown mainly by Chinese gardeners in the neighborhood of large towns. Cassava, too, is grown commercially by Chinese, especially near the railroad on the peninsula.

Most of the so-called dry-field crops are grown in Indochina during the dry season on land that is flooded during the rainy season and at that time [311] produces rice. Gourou has estimated that in Tongking 100,000 hectares of land are used exclusively for the production of dry-field crops and that 350,000 hectares of irrigated land are occupied by such crops during the dry season.[66]

This practice of growing dry-field crops on irrigated land during the dry season is especially widespread in Java, where population pressure is so great that the peasants have to use every possible means to enlarge their food supply. If there is not enough water available to grow a second wet-rice crop, they will always try to get a second harvest of quick-growing dry-field crops during the dry season.

In contrast to the peoples of Java, the Filipinos do not, as a rule, go in for the raising of dry-field crops on wet riceland during the dry season, although this should be possible if the land were cultivated. There is enough water in the soil a short distance below the surface for the growing of crops practically everywhere during the dry season. Repeated tilling would keep the soil soft and fine so that water could move upward by capillary action to replace that which is lost through evaporation. Cultivation would enable plants such as maize, peanuts, and soy beans to grow on land that otherwise would be baked dry and hard. Although the ratio between cultivated land and population in the Philippines does not make a dry-season crop a necessity in most regions, there are a number of districts where the peasants traditionally raise a dry-season crop on irrigated

[66] Gourou: Les paysans, 1936, pp. 407–408.

1 [see page 75, cat 116 -- Analyst]

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

may induce flooding of the valley above the narrows. The Tasek Bera of Malaya in this way reflects constrictions in the Pahang Valley;

(*e*) the presence of levees means that the zone between them and the foothills has difficulty in draining to the river after a flood or during a downpour, so the levees are generally lined landwards by broad freshwater marshes, as by the rivers across the Korat Plateau in Siam (Fig. 90);

(*f*) where local rain seasons coincide with the arrival of spates, originating elsewhere in the local rivers, the landscape cannot shed the direct rainfall rapidly and it induces marshes.

Most of the freshwater marshes are seasonally flooded, drying out quickly in spells of drought, draining when local streams are low, but then flooding to depths up to 10 ft. during wet seasons.

Some types of swamp are man-induced. When alluvial mining is being carried on, dredges and gravel pumps effectively stir up large quantities of river sediment which is carried downstream as the mining effluent (Fig. 21).



FIG. 21.—Alluvial Fans being thrust across Bentong Valley

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

311 This artificially stirred sediment is agriculturally negative and
133 it penetrates the ditches and drains of rice growing areas,
gradually silting them up, often spectacularly raising the
241 local river bed (at Serendah in Malaya, the river bed was
134 raised 21 ft. by sedimentation over the decade 1923-33), as well as sterilising fields on which the silt spreads so that cultivation becomes more difficult as the river can no longer be kept out. The yields decrease and the fields are abandoned, swamp vegetation gradually obliterating signs of cultivation. Round the lower Malacca River may be found signs of the old field bundings within the tangle of swamp vegetation now growing there, a sign of the effects of mining higher in the river whose effluent is obliterating cultivation in lower areas. This type of swamp comes slowly and has all the appearance of nature overcoming men's efforts to farm, but it is fundamentally a result of man-induced erosions or abrasions elsewhere. Thus interference, by mining and forest clearing, with landforms stabilised over long periods, not only goes on by removal of silt and gravels carried from mining areas and topsoils removed by torrential rains on clean-weeded agricultural areas as a mark of transfer of surface materials from one area, but it also causes the obliteration of cultivation and an extension of useless marsh in the areas where this material is deposited.

133 Because these tropical marshes occur in zones of human signifi-
361 cance, that is, in the flatter areas with agricultural possibilities, and along the coasts where settlement from overseas might take place, they have played a major part in conditioning the distribution of human beings in Southeast Asia. Both the coastal and inland marshes are tree-covered, making it even more difficult to penetrate, control, or cultivate them. Varying degrees of swampiness often account for the ease of development of farming in one place rather than another in Southeast Asia and a broad belt of marsh has generally proved a greater human impediment than any other topographic feature.

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Chapter Four

SOUTHEAST ASIA'S NATURAL VEGETATION

Tropical Forest Factors

The heavy, evenly distributed rainfall and constant high temperatures of most of Southeast Asia encourage continuous plant growth and a profuse, very varied flora. Because the whole year is here a growing season, plant life becomes almost overpowering in its rate of growth. This region contains more species than any other; the flora is not yet completely known, but some 35,000 species of flowering plants alone are thought to exist there (van Steenis). On Borneo at least 11,000 species have been listed, according to Merrill. This contrasts with the parallel figure of 13,000 species for the whole of Tropical West Africa (Good). Woody plants predominate and 15 per cent of the species are trees whose mature trunks are over 16 in. in diameter. The profusion of species is due to (*a*) the predominantly warm, moist climate, (*b*) the constancy of this climate over long geological periods, (*c*) the variety of relief and islands producing minor adaptations, (*d*) the rapidity with which selective and adaptive evolutionary processes can establish new characteristics in a tropical climate which has no resting season, and (*e*) the migrations of plant types from both Asia and Australia.

Southeast Asia was originally clothed by nature almost entirely by a tree cover. Only in modern times has there been any extensive clearing because apart from firing, primitive people were technically incapable of removing the forest. Some clearings became permanent for cultivation, in recent centuries, but the majority have been temporary and partial clearings, later left to natural replacement by a selective vegetation such as grass, savannah or scrub. Temporary clearings resulted largely from systems of shifting cultivation which finally abandon an area, partially cleared by fire, to a series of quick-growing plants, becoming after a few years a secondary forest which may, over prolonged periods, evolve to be scarcely distinguishable from primary forest.

The system of migrant agriculture or shifting cultivation, in Malaya called *ladang* and in Burma *taungya*, is widespread through-

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out Southeast Asia and it may be this form of nomadism has in fact operated so long that it affects nearly every acre of the region, thereby exercising a distinct selective action on the whole forest (Sauer). Much forest which we call "primary" may be senile secondary. This is evident in more densely populated areas such as Java and Tonkin, and over the centuries may have no less influenced the forest types of even thinly populated zones, as Borneo still is. In this sense "primary forest" is a relative term, to be retained for convenience rather than as presupposing an absolutely virgin tropical forest.

Two main types of primary lowland forest may be distinguished, the critical factor being drought:

1. In those zones astride the Equator where no season may be called dry, the natural forest is a tall, leafy, congested and evergreen type known as Tropical Rain Forest, sometimes called Equatorial Rain Forest. It may even occur well away from the Equator, towards the northern limit of Southeast Asia, where certain local conditions create a more continuously wet climate than is normal for the latitude.
2. In localities where there are several consecutive months practically without rain, a shorter and more open forest type develops: it has deciduous foliage on the whole, and considerably fewer species. Deciduous Tropical Forest is more generally known as 'Monsoon Forest' and occurs over huge areas in eastern Java, Burma, Siam and Indochina.

Between these Tropical Rain Forests and Monsoon Forests, there are intermediate types and transitional areas where no single meteorological criterion can be used to define the boundary sharply. Within both types, local peculiarities of soil porosity, number of rain-days, relief, exposure and aspect all induce minor variations. In any given unit of this mountainous region, three zones of vegetation may be distinguished within both main forest types, these zones being more distinctive in their differences than the variations of vegetation from one part to another of this huge region. These zones are: (1) coastal vegetation, (2) lowland vegetation, (3) mountain vegetation.

(1) Coastal Vegetation

On shores predominantly sandy, short herbs, grasses and shrubs with creeping stems and fleshy leaves are found; these plant

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on the average, or only between one-third and one-half of the average in Japan.

Moreover, in any comparison between South East Asia and the peasantry of Europe, quite apart from differences in the production of crops other than the staple grain, there is an important difference in the average size of the holdings worked. The South East Asian peasant has fewer acres than the peasantry of Europe. In France, a country of peasant agriculture, about 40 per cent of the total number of agricultural holdings in 1931 were less than 2½ acres apiece; the average size of this group of holdings was 1½ acres each. But about 45 per cent of the total holdings were between 2½ and 22½ acres, with an average of about 10 acres each. There are areas in South East Asia where the average size of peasant holdings is fairly large. In Cochin China, while 72 per cent of the landowners have holdings between 2½ and 12 acres, there are provinces where more than half of them have holdings above 12 acres in size. In Siam, too, the average peasant holding seems of tolerable size—4 acres or so in the south and north east, 5½ acres in the north, and 10½ acres in central Siam, where more than one-third of the rural families live. But in Java, in 1938, the average size of holdings was only just over 2 acres for all tax-paying landowners in the country. In the Tonkin delta of Indo-China, another large area of heavy concentration of peasantry, as much as 60 per cent of the peasants have been reckoned to own holdings of less than nine-tenths of an acre, and 90 per cent to have holdings of under 4½ acres apiece. It has been estimated that a peasant family needs for adequate support 2½ to 5 acres of land, cultivating it by 'wet rice' methods. Many sections of the farming population in Java and Indo-China, for instance, are obviously well below this critical level. Even though large-scale irrigation and very intensive land use, including double cropping of rice in the year and much use of secondary crops, may lower the critical figure considerably, the peasant in such conditions is always liable to have to seek work outside his holding or to put up with inadequate living standards, even in nutrition.

The difficulties of agriculture in such conditions are further increased by the fact that a man's holding is often not a single undivided farm, but a set of dispersed fields, some of very small size. This dispersion and fragmentation of holdings allows for some advantages in adapting crops to soil and water variations, and is some security against wholesale raids by pests, but it makes for technical difficulties in the use of implements and labour on any scale. Since the dispersion is due primarily to traditional customs of inheritance and marriage, efforts to secure consolidation are apt to be only of temporary benefit, though some success has attended administrative action against undue fragmentation.

The same comparatively low level of productivity is seen in fishing, which gives the one great source of animal protein to the South East Asian peasant's diet. Before the war a Malay peasant fisherman produced on the average 1½ tons of fish per head per annum and in 1947 nearly 1 ton per

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

This group of photographs was taken at the Soil Erosion Experiment Station near Tjiwidej, Residency of Priangan, West Java.

FIG. 42 (upper left)—Unterraced slope under cultivation.

FIG. 43 (upper right)—Terraced slope under cultivation.

FIG. 44 (lower left)—View of the catch basins.

FIG. 45 (lower right)—Closer view of the upper catch basin shown in Fig. 44.

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1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

gated fields. One of the great advantages of garden culture over field culture is that there is always something ready to harvest from the former and therefore something to sell when money for daily household needs becomes scarce. Another advantage is that the garden supplies the family with a great variety of side dishes rich in vitamins; the vegetable proteins of the garden produce are also of high value. 146 244

As to the possibilities of improving garden culture, these two authors state: 000

> It is very evident that an improvement of the compound horticulture is a very difficult problem through the highly varied and dense planting of these compounds as a result of which they come to resemble a very complicated symbiosis. But for all this it must be possible by systematic investigation to improve not only the quality but also the quantity of the production. It may be said that the compounds with their story or layer formation superficially considered will find no favour in the eyes of western agriculture, but they are an essential link in the native production apparatus.[3]

The alarming decline in the welfare of the people of Java in the face of a mounting population prompted Netherlands Indies officials to examine every possibility of improving the peasants' condition. This accounts for the studies of Ochse and Terra. Lacking detailed studies outside Java, we are obliged to depend upon scattered references of uneven value. 654 241

Credner states that in Thailand practically every house has a few trees on the lot, and the villages are often hidden by tree clusters. The greatest intensification of garden culture is found on the right bank of the Mae Nam Chao Phraya (the Menam) in Bangkok Noi, just opposite Bangkok. Here irrigation is employed in garden culture, a technique not usually found in Southeastern Asia. The gardens are surrounded by walls 1 meter high and are traversed by trenches 2 meters apart. The beds between the trenches are elevated. The trenches work both as drains and as irrigation ditches. Small sluices control the water. In the gardens there is a great variety of fruit trees and palms which climbers, such as *Piper betle* L., use as supports. In the trenches the peasants grow lotus and water chestnut (*Trapa natans* L.).[4] Zimmerman, in his survey of rural Thailand, points out that in most regions the peasants rely too much on one crop, rice, and he recommends in several instances improvements in the cultivation of the home lots so that families may have a better supply of fruits and, above all, of vegetables. In the Khlong Rangsit section he observed that "on account of the lack of homestead and village sites among the people there is no gardening and home production of food."[5] This observation may be applied to Southeastern Asia in general. Wherever the dominant form of land tenure is tenancy the flimsy shack of the tenant has no mixed fruit and vegetable garden around it, for his status is much too uncertain. A tenant 244 312 [137] 244 427

[3] Ochse and Terra: *op. cit.*, pp. 371–372.
[4] Credner: Siam, 1935, p. 246.
[5] Zimmerman: Siam, 1931, p. 307.

1: Peizer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL-1

lanzones, papayas, and chicos, which find a good market in Manila, but on the whole we rarely meet in the Philippines such intensive garden culture as in Java. The diet of the average Filipino is not well balanced and is particularly deficient in fruits and vegetables. In recognition of this fact the Bureau of Education and the Bureau of Plant Industry have both done much to impress the peasants with the need for fruit and vegetable gardens. Although the situation has improved during the past forty years and a large variety of fruits is now produced, the country still depends upon imports, whereas with a little effort most of the imported fruits could be produced locally and would furnish an additional source of income. It would be well to encourage the peasants to grow more fruits and to advise them on the most suitable varieties. In the other countries of Southeastern Asia, also, with the possible exception of Java, such advice would be valuable. 245 [654]

The published material available on the importance of gardens in Indochina is similarly limited in quantity. Even Gourou in his study of land utilization restricts himself chiefly to listing the fruits and vegetables found in the gardens and to stating that certain districts are renowned for the quality of their garden fruits. Gourou's list of fruits and vegetables is as varied and extensive, however, as similar lists for any of the other countries of Southeastern Asia. 114

Wet Fields

Throughout the countries bordering the South China Sea most of the cultivated land is used for the growing of lowland, or wet, rice. For this purpose the fields must be leveled and surrounded by earth dams to impound rain water during the rainy season or to confine the water that is carried to the fields through irrigation canals or lifted to the fields by mechanical means. If a field is properly leveled the surrounding dyke will keep the water everywhere at the same depth. The size of the wet-rice, or paddy, fields, and the amount of labor that is required to make them, depend upon the topography of the region. In the lowlands, where no terracing is required, there is relatively little labor involved in the making of paddies, which are frequently large. A hilly, or mountainous, terrain necessitates terracing, which demands greater effort and reduces the size of individual fields; the steeper the slope, the narrower the paddies. We have only to see the rice terraces of the mountains of northern Luzon, southern Bali, the Preanger districts of West Java, or Sumatra's West Coast in order to realize how much effort has been expended in building these terraces and how much energy must be devoted to their upkeep. The terraces, as well as the wet-rice fields of the plains, represent the accumulated efforts of generations of peasants, each of which has helped to extend the area devoted to the cultivation of wet rice (Figs. 50–58).[1] 101 243 312

Not all people show the same skill in the making of paddies. According to Credner, the Thai are quite helpless on sloping land that requires terracing before wet rice may be planted. They would prefer to migrate to a 243 184

[1] [see pp. 115 ff. category 116. -- Analyst]

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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region where level land is available rather than undertake the terracing of a hillside; on the other hand, they have been successful in building innumerable canals to tap rivers and spread the water over the plains.[9] However, they do not seem to be able to fight great floods. In contrast, the Annamese of Tongking have built huge dykes against destructive floods and the attack of the sea.

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The problems presented by the cultivation of wet, or lowland, rice change from country to country, from region to region, and sometimes even from village to village. Lowland rice demands a soil thoroughly soaked with water and worked into "a fine soft mud by hoeing, plowing, trampling, or harrowing, and . . . free from weeds." [10] The field must remain under water until the ears of rice begin to fill and harvest time approaches. The amount of water required to grow lowland rice depends upon the variety of rice, the length of its growing period, and the nature of the soil. There are innumerable varieties of lowland rice. One way of grouping them is according to the number of days they take to mature, which ranges from 60 to 300 days. In the Philippines varieties that require less than 150 days are considered early maturing, those that need from 150 to 190 days medium-late maturing, and those needing more than 190 days late maturing.[11] The longer the growing period, the greater the water requirements and, generally, the higher the yields. Normally the water covering the field has a depth of from 10 to 15 centimeters. But "floating rice" can keep pace with a slowly rising flood and reach the amazing height of 4 meters or more. The stems settle on the mud when the water recedes, and new roots start at the upper nodes, while the lower parts of the stems rot away. Floating rice is especially well known in Cochinchina, and I have seen it in the Philippines. In 1939 the Department of Economic Affairs in Batavia sent a rice expert to Cochinchina to study floating rice and the possibility of introducing it into southern Borneo.

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Lowland rice can be grown on many types of soil as long as a heavy clay subsoil is present to prevent the loss of water through percolation. Copeland states that lowland rice does best in heavy soils that hold water securely, and he adds that it is desirable "that there be, at a depth below the reach of the roots, but not too much further down, an impervious substratum-subsoil or hard-pan." [12] We distinguish between two main types of wet-rice fields: those that depend exclusively upon the rain that is impounded by their dykes, and those that are supplied by an irrigation system and are therefore no longer subject to the irregularities of rainfall.[13]

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[9] Credner: Siam, 1935, pp. 203 and 217.

[10] Wickizer: "Rice and Wheat," 1941, p. 272.

[11] University of the Philippines: Handbook of Philippine Agriculture, 1939, pp. 7–11.

[12] Copeland: Rice, 1924, p. 45.

[13] An important variation of the second type is the cultivation of wet riceland that has been flooded by rivers rising above their natural levels. This mode of cultivation, which is found especially in the residency of Palembang in Sumatra, in southeastern Borneo, in Thailand, and in Indochina, is not so dependable as irrigation because of the irregularities of the river floods.

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Irrigation systems also fall into two categories: peasant irrigation works and technical irrigation works. The former have existed throughout Southeastern Asia for more than a thousand years. In recent times scientifically trained engineers have designed large-scale systems with concrete weirs and locks. Fields solely dependent upon impounded rain water produce one rice crop a year, whereas irrigated fields often yield two crops. If even with irrigation only one crop can be produced, yet the irrigation system assures proper water control, whereas without it irregularities in the course of the rainy season may damage, or destroy, the crop. 243 312 [177]

Wet fields are protected against erosion by leveling, terracing, and dyking. But how does continued cropping affect the fertility of wet-rice fields? Diverse environments and cultural practices in Southeastern Asia create considerable differences in this respect. Much of the paddy land of the Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, and Burma has lost a good deal of its original fertility because the peasants have not used manures, fertilizers, or crop rotation. In many instances, however, soil fertility has been preserved by the mineral matter dissolved in the irrigation water and by the silt deposited on those fields that are supplied with irrigation water coming from streams. The value of the water and silt depends, of course, upon the nature of the parent material from which it is derived. Rivers from a young volcanic region supply much richer water and silt than do those that drain a mountain region consisting of sedimentary rock or granite. For this reason, the Irrigation Service of the Netherlands Indies before making final plans for a new irrigation system takes samples of water and silt carried by rivers at different times of the year. The samples are analyzed in order to determine their influence upon the soil to be irrigated. A river found to be carrying water and silt that would lower the value of paddy land would be eliminated as a source of irrigation water, or its use would be limited as much as possible. 243 134 312 [654]

Irrigated fields of which the water supply does not contain minerals in quantities necessary for continuous satisfactory plant growth and paddy land that depends exclusively upon rain, both require other techniques for maintaining fertility. In many regions cultivators cut the rice stems just far enough below the ear to allow bundling. This practice makes possible the return of the rest of the plant matter to the soil. From this it is only one more step to work household refuse into the ground together with ashes of burned rubbish, rice husks, leaves, and manure.

As stable manure is not available in adequate quantities, intensive studies of the application of green manures to the cultivation of rice have been made in a number of countries of Southeastern Asia. A recent article by W. Bally reviews the results of these studies.[14] In a few rice-growing regions the peasants, on their own initiative, have learned to use legumes to improve rice soil. In wet fields the decomposition of green manure takes place under anaerobic conditions, and the final product is ammonia. Since 243 134 242

[14] Bally: "The Employment of Green Manures," 1936, pp. T10–T31.

1; Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

with sugar or tobacco grown under plantation management. But is the high fertility of the soil due to this crop rotation, or is it rather the result of the heavy application of commerical fertilizer and the thorough cultivation of the soil under Western management? 242 134 249

In no country of Southeastern Asia is there so great a variety or so intensive a use of commercial fertilizers as in Japan.[17] In general, the peasants of Southeastern Asia lack money for commercial fertilizers. In Indochina local phosphates are within reach of some of the Annamese, but the costs of imported fertilizers are prohibitive. In Java, although attempts to make possible the use of fertilizers through the agency of public credit institutions were successful in some special instances, not more than one per cent of the cultivated area received any commercial fertilizer in 1939. On the other hand, estimates indicate that more than 1,000,000 hectares of sawah have a phosphate deficiency and that a moderate application of phosphate would augment the yield by 25 to 50 per cent.[18] 242 [654]

The Agricultural Advisory Service was able to raise the productivity of wet-rice fields in West Java by about 10 per cent. It encouraged the peasants to use fertilizer on seedbeds, to sow rice more thinly on the beds (thus producing stronger seedlings), and to plant the seedlings in rows so that weeding could be done with a special instrument, the *landak* (Fig. 59).[1] This weeder was developed in Japan. During the years immediately preceding 1939, these improvements in West Java resulted in an increase in output of unhusked rice amounting to 300,000 quintals, or 30,000 metric tons, with a value of nearly 1,000,000 guilders. This shows that some improvements in cultivation may increase production without a great capital outlay.[19] 242 243 [412]

Java may be compared only with southern China and with Japan in the cleanness of its rice fields. The Filipino does not pay much attention to weeding. The Malayan, Thai, Cambodian, Cochinchinese, and Filipino rice farmers have more flooded riceland per capita at their disposal than the people of Java and can thus afford to cultivate their land less intensively. 243

Irrigation Problems

Peasant irrigation works usually take care of the fields of only one village or of a small group of people who have joined together for the specific purpose of building and maintaining an irrigation system. These works consequently are small and usually inadequate, but nevertheless they de- 312 [476] 243

[17] "The chief commercial fertilizers used in Japan are pressed herrings, pressed sardines, dried sardines, other fish cakes, bone meal, soybean cake, rapeseed cake, cottonseed cake, other vegetable-oil cakes, ammonium sulphate, calcium cyanamide, calcium phosphate, and potassium phosphate. Calcium phosphate and ammonium sulphate are probably the most representative chemical fertilizers."—Wickizer and Bennett: The Rice Economy, 1941, p. 252, footnote 33.

[18] Departement van Economische Zaken: Voedselproblemen, 1940, p. 28.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28.

1 [See p. 117, category 116. -- Analyst]

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Philippines

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mand respect and admiration for the ingenuity displayed.[20] "The serious imperfections which characterize native irrigation works and make rice culture uncertain, particularly in the plains, can assuredly not be charged to the account of these who constructed them." [21] The weirs, by means of which the peasants raise the water of small rivers, are especially weak. The construction material consists of bamboo, trunks of coconut and other trees, and boulders. At times great bamboo baskets are filled with heavy stones and placed in the river, or large stones are laid loosely across the channel. Where the rivers are wide the people drive two rows of tree trunks into the river bed and fill the space between the rows with whatever debris they have at hand. These weirs frequently break because of river floods as they have no provision for allowing passage of flood waters; yet repair is often impossible for the duration of the rainy season, so that the crop is ruined. Another constructional disadvantage is the open intakes. During floods large quantities of water flow through these and cause an excessive soaking of the fields and damage to the canals. Wherever a canal has to cross a depression, a road, or another watercourse, bamboo or hollowed tree trunks are used to carry the water overhead. This often leads to large losses of water, especially during floods. Poor drainage is another weakness of peasant irrigation systems.

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Scientifically trained engineers have come to the aid of peasant communities in Southeastern Asia and have designed irrigation systems based on technological principles and free from the weaknesses of peasant irrigation works. One of these technical irrigation systems may take care of tens of thousands of hectares of riceland belonging to hundreds of villages. In many instances the engineers have improved existing peasant irrigation works; more often they have made irrigation possible where peasant communities did not have the financial and technical resources to overcome natural obstacles. Technical irrigation works are usually government-financed.

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In the Philippines most of the wet-rice fields are dependent exclusively upon the rain that falls directly on them. One centimeter of rain a day is said to be necessary for a healthy rice growth. But there is always the possibility that, particularly in the months of May and June, there may be so little rain that the peasants cannot prepare their fields. A shortage of rain in October is also dangerous as it may seriously damage, or even destroy, the crop, even though the precipitation during the rainy season may have been enough for the production of a satisfactory crop. To guard against an insufficiency of water for the wet-rice crop, therefore, the fields should be supplied by irrigation systems. The Philippines, however, do

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[20] The *subaks* of Bali are agricultural cooperative societies that have been formed to construct, maintain, and administer irrigation systems. The achievements of the Balinese subaks are very remarkable in a number of ways. Thus, the men of certain villages are especially skillful builders of irrigation works and are able to construct long canals and even tunnels of considerable length. These men are hired by the subaks and help them to solve their irrigation problems.

[21] Van der Meulen: "Irrigation in the Netherlands Indies," 1940, p. 146.

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

134 133 of contemporary relief forms and drainage patterns. The rate of coastal advance seaward upon the Platform is in places phenomenally rapid; the Tjimanoek (Fig. 19) and Solo deltas in Java are extending at the rate of 100 metres annually, the Mekong at 60–80 metres annually. An outburst of volcanic ash increases the deposition by neighbouring rivers at the coast, though the behaviour of sea currents moulds the riberine deposit in detail on reaching the sea. Mangroves and associated vegetation quickly establish themselves on sandbanks and cays so that at the mouth of the Perak, for example, an exposure of a bank for only a few days at a low water season is enough to permit vegetation to start there, hastening the rate of deposition by offering an obstruction to river outflow and thereby perpetuating the bank which in other settings might disappear by erosion during the next high water spell.

Where streams debouch into deep seas the rate of coastal extension is inevitably less, due to the greater thicknesses which must be laid for every outward extension, yet the Irrawaddy Delta is building outward at the rate of about 60 metres per annum; that the Irrawaddy can maintain this rate of building into a deep basin reflects its tremendous load and a physical condition which concentrates the deposition of this load at the outer edge of the Delta rather than over its surface. (See Chapter 9.)

Because the rivers are steadily sedimenting the bed of their lower reaches, these are in fact generally being raised in level. Such a process cannot continue very far; when its bed is raised slightly above the surrounding land, the river easily changes course, and every large delta of Southeast Asia shows signs of frequent migration of distributaries. Old channels and distributaries in various phases of abandonment may be seen at nearly every river mouth. Most deltas suffer regular inundation at various times of the year facilitating farming for rice, which depends on either natural or artificially induced floods, in most cases derived from rivers. The process of spreading sediment over the whole delta zone goes on both by migration of distributaries and by seasonal inundations, so that the deltaic surface over a wide area is being slowly raised by sedimentation, making it progressively more difficult to irrigate the inner and higher sections of the deltas and in the long run causing the centre of gravity of irrigation steadily to move

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17: Ginsburg E-4 (no date) 1955
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tial area is primarily on higher ground in the northern part of the city. The University of Malaya is located in Singapore, though plans are being made to move it to Johore Baru on the Malayan mainland. Being largely a Chinese city, Singapore has come to act as a center for the Nan Yang expatriate Chinese, and the city has been chosen as the site of a new Chinese-language regional university.[20] Nevertheless, its air is not that of a Chinese city, nor, for that matter, is it English. Like all great cities, it is cosmopolitan, but it is also culturally rootless, perhaps more so than any of the other great cities of the region.

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At the other extreme is Bangkok, most indigenous of the great cities. Founded as the last of a series of "forward capitals"[21] by the Thai in 1783, after the destruction of Ayuthia by the Burmese, the city has never lost its native quality. The soaring rooftrees of *bot* and the spires of stupa stamp the Bangkok skyline with a character of its own. The city is located on the left bank of the Menam Chao Phya within the southernmost great bend of the river some twenty miles from its mouth. Exceptional problems of poor drainage plagued the city from the start, and its numerous *klongs* or canals have given it the rather misleading title of the "Venice of the East."

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A Chinese city early appeared to the southeast of the original castle town and in time became part of the central business district. As the lesser *klongs* were filled in to become roads, the city continued to expand. A new city appeared on the northern outskirts of the old, a planned creation built in the reign of Rama VI with broad boulevards and buildings ranging from shocking Victorian variations on Italian Renaissance to more recent battleship modern. The contrast between the façade of modern buildings fronting these boulevards and the stilted, bamboo, thatch, and tin-roofed houses

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[20] Richard Butwell, "A Chinese University for Malaya," *Pacific Affairs*, December, 1953.

[21] See reference to Cornish in Spate, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

recuperate quickly when the area is again allowed to revert to bush."[38] 245

Several of the forest services of Southeastern Asia have made a rather [654] successful use of the shifting cultivator in their endeavor to reforest the land. They have combined shifting culture and silviculture by hiring shifting cultivators to cut mature trees and to sow or plant new trees on cut-over or burned-over land. For this the cultivators are paid a small wage. In addition they are allowed to grow their own crops for one or two years between the rows of young trees. This system, known as the "taungya forestry system," was developed in 1856 by the German forester, Dietrich Brandis, while he was Superintendent of Forests in Pegu, Burma.[39] It is ingenious in that it recognizes the habits of the shifting cultivator and fits them into a modern forest economy instead of persecuting the cultivator and forcing him to give up his traditional culture. This system has been used in the teak forests of Java since 1871. The forest service makes a contract[40] with the peasants of Java according to which the peasants are to prepare the land and plant and take care of teak trees (*Tectona grandis* L.) in return for a small sum of money and the right to plant such crops as maize and red pepper (*Capsicum annuum* L.) between the rows of teak. The cultivation of upland rice is discouraged, and the planting of cassava, peanuts, castor beans, and tobacco usually is not allowed (Figs. 40, 41). 185 1/A

The taungya forestry system is an excellent way of getting pure stands [313] of commercial timber. The typical forest of the tropics is expensive to exploit because of the large variety of trees which it contains, many of which have little or no commercial value.[41]

As important as reforestation is soil erosion control. Where shifting cultivation is practiced in mountainous regions it often causes such acceleration in the rate of erosion that the rivers are choked with sediment and periodically do great flood damage. Flood control could be achieved in most cases by completely closing the headwaters and watershed areas to cultivators. On more gentle slopes the clearings should be rather narrow, should parallel the contours, and be separated by belts of forest. If at the same time the forest uphill were protected by fireguards, the clearings would have a chance to close quickly again so that the soil would be 134 133 185

[38] Worthington: Science in Africa, 1938, pp. 378–379.

[39] *Taungya* is the Burmese term for the temporary field of the shifting cultivator, a term that the foresters have adopted. E. P. Stebbing in his work, The Forests of India, Vol. 1, 1922, p. 376, writes:

"Brandis, moreover, recognized that the very system which, till then, had destroyed teak forests might be utilized to produce them, . . . and as early as 1856 an attempt was made in Prome district to sow teak in regular rows, together with the rice scattered by the toungya [*sic*] cutters. Twenty years afterwards this attempt had grown into a regular system, by which areas were being annually stocked with teak at a cost far below that of regular plantations." See also *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, 1926, pp. 415–428.

[40] Becking: "De djaticultuur op Java," 1928, pp. 50–52.

[41] Heske: "Der tropische Wald," 1939, p. 414. Heske's article gives an excellent short account of the forests of Southeastern Asia and points out that they are on the whole much easier to exploit than are the forests of tropical America because of the abundance of cheap labor.

1/A [See p. 41, cat 41 -- Analyst]

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groups resemble those of salt-tolerant vegetation on European beaches of which spinifex is a sample. Behind this shore grows a distinctive strip of what may be called *beach woodland*, sometimes referred to as beach forest. On reefs, on muddy shores and estuaries, where there is diurnal flooding at high tide, the *mangrove* forest develops. When the shore is rocky, lowland forest may reach high tide mark. In this vegetation seeds and fruit are waterborne so that currents are an important means of dispersion. 137

Well-developed beach woodland forms as a ribbon rarely more than 200 ft. inland from the shore and contains tree types not usually seen elsewhere and often reaching 90 ft. in height. The typical tree, the casuarina (Equisetifolia, rhu, ru, tjemara) is rather like a conifer to look at and is related to Australian she-oaks. Sometimes the casuarina is in pure stands; at places the strip includes screw pines (Pandanus), the leathery-leaved Calophyllum, Inophyllum and Barringtonia. Coconut palms, which can take root after nuts have been dispersed by sea-currents, are now prominent in beach woodland areas as a planted crop, but they occur self-sown everywhere through the islands.

Mangrove forests are widely distributed on sedimenting shores throughout Southeast Asia. The fringe of mangroves is interrupted where rocks or cliffs come to the sea and when drainage control has diminished the silt from terrestrial sources. Where mangroves develop, silt is being deposited at a fast rate (sometimes to a thickness of 1½ in. annually); the mangrove thus both raises the surface level and progressively presses farther seaward. Whether mangroves grow only where silt is being deposited or whether they cause silt deposition by their root system, obstructing tidal currents and flood run-off, is still disputed. Possibly both processes operate together. The net effect is one of raising the land level and reclaiming land from the sea. In addition, the wood of mangroves is valued for firewood and charcoal; the bark is sold extensively for tanning. The mangrove trees are of some thirty species, all with structural adaptations enabling them to root in unstable muds and to tolerate daily inundation of their root system by saline tidal water. In addition to the tree, there are shrubs, herbaceous plants and ferns (particularly Aerostichum aureum). The trees are evergreen, sometimes 100 ft. tall, mostly with shining, leather-like leaves, small flowers, and unusual root systems. Some (as Rhizophora) have many roots supporting the trunk which begins well

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argest zone covers Burma, Siam and Indochina, while the counterpart in Eastern Java, the Sunda Islands and New Guinea covers a much smaller area, with local variants due to insularity. These zones are identical with the dry areas of Fig. 10. 137

In the rainy season, Monsoon Forest resembles Tropical Rain Forest. Its tree heights are less, the foliage not so profuse, and the spacing more open. Only the undergrowth remains fairly green for the whole year; the rest of the vegetation sheds leaves in the dry season, when the forest has a bare, stark appearance. Herbaceous plants, lianes and bamboo are common but epiphytes are unusual and the herbs almost disappear in the very hot dry season. Among the trees, Acacias and Albizzias are especially common and Leguminosae are prominent.

Some observers distinguish between wetter and drier types of Monsoon Forest, both transitional from Tropical Rain Forest to Tropical Desert, the latter being outside Southeast Asia.

Monsoon Forest is mostly of mixed species but sometimes a single species dominates, possibly as a result of selection through repeated burning. Of these, teak forests (Tectona grandis) are characteristic and important commercially, occurring in Northern Burma, Northern Siam, Eastern Java and the Moluccas. So valuable has teak proved itself that some existing forest areas are actually re-plantations of it. Teak has thick hard-cased seeds which are fire resistant. Its saplings come through fire successfully and the pure stands are thought to have been the result of natural selection on these lines, since it is fairly certain that forests of teak alone do not occur under natural conditions. Teak reaches to heights of over 120 ft., the lower half of the tree being straight and unbranched under forest conditions. Undergrowth is negligible and the ground is covered with brittle teak leaves which often cup, forming mosquito-breeding places in the wet season. [313]

Resembling the teak forests in origin, eucalyptus forests have developed in the eastern islands as migrants from Australia, occurring naturally only in New Guinea, Timor, the Lesser Sundas, Celebes and the Philippines.

Another single stand deriving from the Monsoon Forest by selection, is bamboo forest. Considerable areas almost exclusively occupied by bamboos are found in the northern parts of Southeast Asia, with small patches in East Java. Bamboos in great variety grow everywhere in Southeast Asia and they have been planted 313 137

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137 extensively because of their usefulness structurally and domestically, but continuous stands become established only where the
● 313 dry season is very marked and where shifting cultivation is known to have been practised extensively. Bamboos are giant perennial grasses of about a hundred species, with woody stems and woody
137 roots. They grow in clumps and may be evergreen or deciduous. Some bamboos flower at long intervals (25-70 years) and their seeds are fire-resisting. Constant friction between the dry woody stems may cause forest fires and help to produce that selective process which leads to stands of bamboo.

[134] Monsoon Dry Forest, an open wooded landscape containing very few species, may be found over large areas of Burma, Siam and Indochina in association with poor soils. Known as *indaing* in Burma and *padeng* in Siam, this forest develops where rainfalls are not much above 40 in. per annum, and it may merge on the equatorial side into Tropical Rain Forest and on the other into dry or thorny savannah vegetation. Within Monsoon Dry Forest trees are widely spaced, tending to be stunted forms of Dipterocarpaceae and distinctly deciduous.

Secondary Monsoon Forests.—Considerable areas of savannah found in Burma, Siam, Indochina and the Eastern Indies are secondary growths after a removal of the natural Monsoon Forest. Savannah is open country of tall, coarse grasses, occasionally having a few scattered bamboos or low trees and very much associated with long dry seasons whose effects are aggravated by poor or porous soils. Savannah merges into Monsoon Dry Forest and is often covered with low palms (Borassus flabellifer), and contains prickly pears, spiny cactus-like plants, and similar thorny scrub.

(3) Mountain Vegetation

Vegetation steadily and often imperceptibly changes with altitude and the resulting types are much the same, level for level, throughout Southeast Asia. All but the very highest mountains are forested, though the trees on exposed summits are dwarfed; only in New Guinea and Yunnan are the heights great enough entirely to prevent tree growth and produce an alpine vegetation. Young volcanoes may be treeless for pedological, rather than for climatic reasons.

Above about 2,000 ft., at most points of Southeast Asia, large

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industries derived from mining, but also regarding the general prospect of local industrialisation. While good qualities are mined in Tonkin, coals of most Southeast Asia territories are of inferior grade and ill-suited to major industrial uses. This is an obstruction to developing the extensive iron ore deposits because only Tonkin coal can be used for smelting. Mineral oil does not suit heavy industrial processes though diesel type heavy oil engines are widely used in existing local industries, and will probably be the source of power for any new dispersed industries.

Water power resources are huge and widely distributed. So far only minor harnessing of water has been done and it is remarkable that, although Southeast Asia people have evolved skilled techniques of using their water supplies for agriculture, they have shown little traditional interest in its use as power, even for textiles and rice-milling which might seem obvious needs. The high and fairly even rainfalls of the upland areas are assets for water power; only in the loose materials of volcanic flanks, as in Java, is there any great difficulty about the necessary damming. On the other hand, where the rivers have water enough and suitable relief, they are remote from the centres of greatest population concentration, where a labour corps is available. Hence of the 6½ million horse power estimated to be available from the waterways of the East Indies islands, hydro-electric stations with only a capacity of .2 million kilowatts had been installed and three-quarters of them were in Java. Outside the equatorial zone, the irregular régime of rivers renders them less suited for water power, and scarcely any hydraulic power is developed in Burma, Siam and Indochina. A single installation derived from a dam at Chenderoh across a major stream, the Perak River, motivates many tin mines of West Malaya. On the other hand, electrification (from imported coals) has become widespread throughout the urban centres of the whole region. It is possible that a dispersed industrialisation based on water power might rapidly develop on lines apparent in parts of Central Europe, and Southeast Asia might, by industrialising on water power and heavy oils, skip the phase of steam industrialisation through which both Europe and Eastern United States passed. On this basis the bauxites of Southeast Asia could come into full exploitation.

Apart from teak extraction, Southeast Asia forests have provided little international trade, which is more remarkable now that

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the resources of temperate forests show signs of exhaustion. The defects of tropical forest for a timber industry have been explained; it is not clear why no interest has been shown in a pulping industry based on tropical trees most of which have the advantage of relatively quick natural replacement. Pulping of tropical woods may yet solve the world paper shortage, especially as woody or fibrous tropical plants might be cropped for pulping instead of depending on predatory deforestation as is the case in the pulping industries of temperate areas today.

The forests, however, supply the basic domestic fuel of the region. Apart from westernised suburbs of the town, charcoal and wood are the normal means of cooking, in which respect the domestic life continues today much as it did two or three centuries ago. Wealthier residences may use electricity which is mostly steam-generated from imported coals, but domestic coal-gas is uncommon. Domestic heating, of course, is a question which does not arise in these climates. For their illuminants the bulk of the people turn to their trees, to coconut oil, second to which is paraffin oil from within the region. Urban areas are electrically lit.

From Commodity Production to Local Processing

Because the production of primary agricultural commodities like rubber, copra, medicinal plants, and tapioca, all the basis of industrial processes elsewhere, has been the function of Southeast Asia territories over the first third of this century, culminating in an immediate prewar export valued at nearly $1,000 million per annum, processing and manufacturing of these commodities may cease to be done overseas and become the basis of industrialisation within Southeast Asia to make use of local power resources and of the margin of time available among rural populations. A tendency in this direction was very evident in Java where skill and incentive were present; rubber goods, textile printing, preparation of medicines, confectionary and refining essential oils had grown to significant proportions by 1941 and the enforced isolation of the war years should have intensified them, though a resumption of normal trading relations will oblige these industries to so organise that they meet the rival processed goods of zones as varied as India, Europe and the Far East. The influence of India as a source of manufactured goods was evident, particularly in textiles, before the war and could become even more prominent after India's

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241 311 185 of shifting cultivation in the area. In such a case reforestation would be assured by keeping fire out of the old clearings. This could be done by leaving relatively non-inflammable forest belts at least 60 feet wide between individual clearings. These forest belts would offer some protection against the spread of grass fires and at the same time would be a source of seed for further reforestation. Reforestation under such circumstances would be much easier and cheaper than if large contiguous areas were to be cleared and used.

245 185 [137] Where natural reforestation is particularly slow, cultivators should be required to practice artificial reforestation. In scattered regions in Southeastern Asia tribesmen do this on their own initiative. Pendleton reports such a case in Burma.[35] Certain Dyak tribes in Borneo plant seeds of the candlenut tree (*Aleurites moluccana* Willd.) about 3 meters apart in a freshly cleared ladang before it has even been burned. In the eastern part of the Malay Archipelago shifting cultivators plant such trees as *Aleurites moluccana* Willd., *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Hibiscus similis* Bl., *Casuarina equisetifolia* L., *Macaranga* species, *Euphorbia* species, *Sesbania grandiflora* Pers., and *Desmodium timoriense* DC. for the purpose of restoring the forest.

In Sumatra Deli tobacco planters initiated artificial reforestation after alang-alang had regularly invaded their fallow fields and caught fire so frequently that second-growth forest could not get a start. In Deli the tobacco fields are in use only 1 year and lie fallow 7 to 10 years. They should be protected by forest growth during that period. Therefore, in order to make this possible, the planters controlled fires by planting belts of teak along the highways and roads. These belts served as fireguards [137] and at the same time provided lumber for tobacco-drying sheds. On the tobacco fields themselves they planted especially *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Cassia siamea* Lam., *Pithecellobium saman* Benth., and *Leucaena glauca* Benth., which drive out the alang-alang[36] (Figs. 34–39).

Another way of speeding up reforestation is to spare a few of the larger trees at the time of the clearing. This is done by the Malays of [137] Sumatra. They do not cut down *Koompassia parvifolia* Prain, *Arenga saccharifera* Labill., *Durio zibethinus* Murr. (durian), *Parkia* species, or *Garcinia grandifolia* Pierre.[37] The last three are fruit trees that are numerous [314] in the forest, whereas the second is a palm whose flower stalk is tapped for its sugary sap and the first is preferred by bees as a hiving tree, which gives it its name, "bee-tree." This tree is preserved because the people want the honey. Worthington reports that in Africa "some tribes appear to realize the necessity of maintaining tree growth on their clearings and merely top the trees and lop the branches, so that the trees are enabled to

[35] Similar cases are known in the residency of Benkoelen in Sumatra, in central Celebes, and in Flores. See Hagreis: "Ladangbouw," 1930, p. 631.

[36] Joehems: "De begroeiing der tabakslanden," n.d., pp. 77–89.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 30–32.

[See p 40 ff, cat. 116 --Analyst]

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groups resemble those of salt-tolerant vegetation on European beaches of which spinifex is a sample. Behind this shore grows a distinctive strip of what may be called *beach woodland*, sometimes referred to as beach forest. On reefs, on muddy shores and estuaries, where there is diurnal flooding at high tide, the *mangrove* forest develops. When the shore is rocky, lowland forest may reach high tide mark. In this vegetation seeds and fruit are waterborne so that currents are an important means of dispersion. 137

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Tropical Rain Forest is remarkable for the number of tree-types which go to make it and for its heterogeneous composition. Continuous stands of any single tree species very rarely occur, and often thirty may be found in a forest patch 100 yds. square. While the trees differ widely, the family group Dipterocarpaceae, gigantic in dimensions and bearing winged seeds like shuttlecocks, is the most prominent. Within the forest individual trees are restricted by the congestion so that the shape of high trees in tropical gardens or along roads is no guide to their shape when in their natural setting. 137

From the thousands of tree types in this forest some commercially valuable timbers, gums, resins and camphor can be obtained. Most of the trees, however, are commercially useless; the heterogeneous composition and density of the forest operates against exploitation of even those species which could prove useful. 314

Within the Tropical Rain Forest, several subsidiary types may be recognised. 137

(*a*) Parts of Borneo, Sumatra and Malaya have a white, porous, sandy subsoil thought to be a tropical podsol (see Chapter 5). Upon this, pitcher plants, conifers and a treeless, heathlike ecology of grasses and shrubs may develop.

(*b*) Upon porous limestone landscapes, the trees are short and epiphytic plants are most common, since these can tolerate the absence of groundwater.

(*c*) Behind the mangroves and transitional between them and the true lowland Tropical Rain Forest, are Freshwater Swamp Forests, extensively developed in Sumatra, Malaya and Borneo. The plants peculiar to this swamp setting vary with the duration of freshwater flooding. Trees here are shorter, fewer in species, well-buttressed and often stilt-rooted. Over considerable areas stands of a single type of palm may occur and palms of short varieties cover the ground to impede movement. Sometimes on the east coast of Sumatra the Freshwater Swamp Forest produces a tropical bog on peat soil formed by rotting vegetal remains several yards deep.

Secondary Forest.—The sequence of vegetation which replaces Tropical Rain Forest after removal is called Secondary Forest, made up of ferns, tropical grasses and scrub. It may be subdivided into distinct vegetation types which are various stages in the transition from naked ground to tropical forest. The process of replace-

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weaving factories in Java, were the leading developments in local 439
textile industries, but the bulk of cloth and even of raw cotton has 288
been brought in from abroad. Just before the war Southeast Asia was absorbing textiles to the value of well over $300 million per annum; much of it was cheap cloth from Europe, India and Japan, but there was a substantial need for the very finest cotton cloth produced anywhere and quite an exacting local standard of qualities. Should this huge demand for textiles stimulate local industry within the new nationalist units, Burma, Siam and Indochina may improve the quality and output of their present scanty and very inferior raw cotton.

Road and rail management, engineering maintenance and port 39
industries form a leading group of mechanical industries directly 40
affecting local techniques and introducing forms of industrialisation on western lines. The capital equipment for these activities is imported as are nearly all metal manufactures for other purposes. Manufactured goods form the largest single category of goods moving into Southeast Asia, to a total of nearly $500 million annually before the war. These manufactured imports chiefly went to urban consumers, yet simple farming tools and articles like needles and scissors went in large quantities far into every country. Although this category was broad, the components were very varied so that the value of each ranked comparatively low. Manufactured articles of western type showed little sign of being made locally, except in Java where successful attempts at making electric equipment had gone on for some years to supply the Southeast Asia markets with very cheap electrical goods like lamps and filaments, suggesting the possibility that Java may become industrialised on the Japanese pattern for mass production methods, and using part-time or women workers. In neighbouring territories, however, there are no such immediate prospects because labour has proved costly in proportion to its skill.

Mining Industries and Prospects

Mining industries of great value have developed in Malaya, 316
Burma, Sumatra, Borneo, the Philippines and the small islands 439
east of Sumatra. Tin and petroleum have been the region's specialities so far and these have assumed great importance, combining to be chiefly responsible for the prewar annual exports of about $650 million of mineral products from Southeast Asia

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316 439 to the rest of the world. Iron ore and bauxite occur in large quantities, but without location convenient to the power needed to develop them. Gold has had special significance in Philippines mining, yet though found at many points, it ranks low for the region as a whole. Both tin and petroleum give rise to processing industries of smelting and refining which take place close to the streams of international traffic, particularly associated with Singapore and Penang. They play little part in local life, employ few people and go on at isolated points.

These mineral industries (which employed less than 250,000 persons before 1941) suffered from the war both by destruction in denial action and by neglect, so that they practically started anew from 1945. Whether they will all return to their prewar status remains to be seen. Southeast Asia provides the most prolific source of petroleum accessible to the Indian and Far Eastern markets and the wells are rapidly re-opening under the international oil groups which own them (output 1949, 9.0 million tons). Tin is coming back into production again more slowly because it needs more capital equipment such as pumps and dredges, which cannot be readily obtained, and there are some doubts whether world need for tin is likely to continue as great as before. The length of life of Malayan tin mines, the main prewar source, has been questioned, yet the little-known islands just south of Malaya are thought to contain extensive deposits of untouched tin likely to come into production in due course, though carefully screened for the time being from prospectors by local authorities. By 1950 the total tin output of Southeast Asia was about 99,000 tons.

Labour and Power for Industrialisation

464 Whether intensified industrialisation of Southeast Asia on the basis of these minerals is possible, turns upon two factors. Labour continues to be scarce; many prewar mining labourers dispersed during the war years when mining stagnated, and any immediate diversion of labour from agriculture to mining, even if possible under the tight ecology of the prevailing subsistence farming, is likely to prejudice local food supplies which depend basically on hand-grown rice.

316 Furthermore, Southeast Asia has limited sources of mechanical power, a factor not only of consideration regarding expansion of

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industries derived from mining, but also regarding the general prospect of local industrialisation. While good qualities are mined in Tonkin, coals of most Southeast Asia territories are of inferior grade and ill-suited to major industrial uses. This is an obstruction to developing the extensive iron ore deposits because only Tonkin coal can be used for smelting. Mineral oil does not suit heavy industrial processes though diesel type heavy oil engines are widely used in existing local industries, and will probably be the source of power for any new dispersed industries.

Water power resources are huge and widely distributed. So far only minor harnessing of water has been done and it is remarkable that, although Southeast Asia people have evolved skilled techniques of using their water supplies for agriculture, they have shown little traditional interest in its use as power, even for textiles and rice-milling which might seem obvious needs. The high and fairly even rainfalls of the upland areas are assets for water power; only in the loose materials of volcanic flanks, as in Java, is there any great difficulty about the necessary damming. On the other hand, where the rivers have water enough and suitable relief, they are remote from the centres of greatest population concentration, where a labour corps is available. Hence of the 6½ million horse power estimated to be available from the waterways of the East Indies islands, hydro-electric stations with only a capacity of .2 million kilowatts had been installed and three-quarters of them were in Java. Outside the equatorial zone, the irregular régime of rivers renders them less suited for water power, and scarcely any hydraulic power is developed in Burma, Siam and Indochina. A single installation derived from a dam at Chenderoh across a major stream, the Perak River, motivates many tin mines of West Malaya. On the other hand, electrification (from imported coals) has become widespread throughout the urban centres of the whole region. It is possible that a dispersed industrialisation based on water power might rapidly develop on lines apparent in parts of Central Europe, and Southeast Asia might, by industrialising on water power and heavy oils, skip the phase of steam industrialisation through which both Europe and Eastern United States passed. On this basis the bauxites of Southeast Asia could come into full exploitation.

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From Commodity Production to Local Processing

38 248 32 Because the production of primary agricultural commodities like rubber, copra, medicinal plants, and tapioca, all the basis of industrial processes elsewhere, has been the function of Southeast Asia territories over the first third of this century, culminating in an immediate prewar export valued at nearly $1,000 million per annum, processing and manufacturing of these commodities may cease to be done overseas and become the basis of industrialisation within Southeast Asia to make use of local power resources and of the margin of time available among rural populations. A tendency in this direction was very evident in Java where skill and incentive were present; rubber goods, textile printing, preparation of medicines, confectionary and refining essential oils had grown to significant proportions by 1941 and the enforced isolation of the war years should have intensified them, though a resumption of normal trading relations will oblige these industries to so organise that they meet the rival processed goods of zones as varied as India, Europe and the Far East. The influence of India as a source of manufactured goods was evident, particularly in textiles, before the war and could become even more prominent after India's

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additional expansion under the almost autarchic conditions of the war period. Political instability within India can, however, offset this advantage.

It is to be noted that the great markets for goods manufactured from Southeast Asia commodities so far have been in Europe and the United States. The little nations of Southeast Asia seem ill-prepared to absorb much of them for some years. Because food is produced in such large quantities in this typically agricultural zone, we may not overlook the possibilities of manufacturing foods in forms such as biscuits, jam and canned varieties. Hitherto the tight association with industrialised colonial powers has to some extent dissuaded intense application to the miscellany of industrial productions possible in Southeast Asia, yet the local nationalisms and the incentive to establish more balanced social and communal systems tend to encourage local industries. Burma, Siam and Indochina before the war were only lightly touched by these tendencies to manufacture.

From the point of view of the rest of the world, a re-orientation of the tremendous quantity of Southeast Asia's primary agricultural materials now handled by processing industries already established in Europe and the United States, would have major effects, not least on the ability of those industries to maintain their manufactured exports at levels which have been increasing over the last century. Thus, a nationalistic Southeast Asia driving towards self-sufficiency industrially is likely to diminish the international trade streams to and from this region, though it may progressively increase the occupational activities and living standards of Southeast Asia people.

Intra-Regional Trade

A total value of about $400 million was involved in the prewar interchange of goods and commodities between one part and another of the Southeast Asia region. This intra-regional trade was relatively small because the component units of the region produced much the same commodities and goods, by reason of which the countries tended to be rivals rather than customers of one another. An additional factor was the pull of several metropolitan areas, Britain, France, Holland and the United States, which acted to lessen intra-regional trade and to lessen the regularisation and rationalisation of production in Southeast Asia as a whole. Food

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504 River, which, though possessing adequate depth for vessels up to 30 feet in
361 draft, has a sinuous channel, which prevents ships longer than 550 feet from ascending to the port. The strong scour of the semidiurnal tides reduces the necessity for dredging. The port occupies about three miles of the right bank of the river and is divided into three sections. Overseas trade is handled by the quays between the Arroyo Chinois and the Canal de Dérivation, in the Khan Hoi district; smaller vessels use the quays nearer the city; and the naval port lies farthest upstream, close to the Arroyo de l'Avalanche. Lighters convey cargoes from ships anchored in the river below the city to wharves along the Arroyo Chinois and the Canal de Dérivation, the twin waterways that link Saigon with Cholon. Before 1939, Saigon handled about 40 per cent of the total foreign trade of Indochina; rice formed about 50 per cent by weight of the exports. At the present time the military operations taking place in the country have greatly reduced the trade of Saigon, and the rice export is only some 100,000 tons a year.

Bangkok alone of all the ports is still inaccessible to large ocean-going vessels. A bar at the mouth of the Menam Chao Phraya prevents entry, and the terminal for large vessels has long been Gaw Si Kang, an island in the Gulf of Siam east of the river mouth. From Gaw Si Kang strings of lighters are drawn by tugs to the wharves of Bangkok, which extend for about six miles along the left bank below the Grand Palace. The dredging of the bar to allow ocean-going vessels to reach the port would have presented no great difficulties, but opposition from the lightering interests prevented anything from being done until shortly before the war, when work was begun on a new port at Klong Toi, about five miles below the city. It is now proposed, as part of a plan to expand rice cultivation in Thailand, to deepen the channel so that vessels of 26-foot draft can ascend to the port. Bangkok has an almost complete monopoly of the foreign trade of Thailand, and in a real sense it is the only port of the country.

Industrial Development

32 The five cities contain a large proportion of the total industrial capacity
361 of their respective territories. Industry is well represented, though much of
38 it is better described as processing than as manufacturing, and its range of
39 activities is continually increasing. The primary processing of foodstuffs and raw materials is dominant; rice milling is particularly important, except in Singapore, but rubber, copra, sago, tapioca, hemp, sugar, and tobacco all assume considerable local significance. A beginning has been made with the higher stages of manufacturing, such as rubber products and even foam

16: Fryer K-3 (no date)1953 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

rubber, in Singapore; other manufactures are furniture, boats, footwear, glass, bricks and tiles, oils and soaps, electric batteries, and certain chemical products. Manufacturing industries proper use relatively little machinery and power and produce for the home market, in which there is a considerable element of local protection. Food and drink industries are well developed (including brewing and distilling); textiles are poorly developed. Heavy industry is confined to the repair and refitting of vessels. All the ports have forges and foundries for making minor repairs; Singapore and Jakarta, which have dry-dock facilities, can undertake more extensive work. Repair shops for maintenance of railway equipment are located in all the cities except Singapore; the assembly of imported motor vehicles is carried on in Manila, Jakarta, and Singapore. Industry relies largely on electric power, which is expensive because of the paucity of local coal supplies.

Small-scale industry is almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese; the larger undertakings are overwhelmingly European-owned, though there are some large Chinese industrial establishments. Only a small proportion of the inhabitants of the cities are engaged in industry: in Singapore, where industry is expanding rapidly, only 11 per cent of the adult working population were employed in industrial establishments in the census of 1947. This unduly low figure does not take account of the large employment in the establishments of the Armed Services, much of which was industrial.

The industrial areas lie close to the port or along the rivers and canals. They are surrounded by areas of high population density; for the relatively high cost and limited availability of public transport operate to retard the divorce of place of work and residence, which is so conspicuous a feature of the Western city. Newer industrial areas, however, are appearing on the margins of the cities, and as the range of industrial activity grows, industry is likely to become more widely dispersed.

Population

All the five cities would have probably reached the one-million level in a comparatively short period if the war had not intervened. During the Japanese occupation, population decreased in the cities because of the shortage of food, and the wartime dislocation that elsewhere in Asia resulted in a large influx of rural dwellers into the cities did not operate here. With the end of the war the tide set strongly in the opposite direction. The breakdown of effective administration in many parts of Southeast Asia following the Japanese surrender, armed insurrections against the central governments, the struggle for independence, the depredations of extreme

18: Firth E-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

THE PEASANTRY OF SOUTH EAST ASIA [1]

PROFESSOR RAYMOND FIRTH, F.B.A.

000 IF it is not wholly true that the social and economic reconstruction which is so necessary in Asia today must begin with the peasant, it is certain that no programme which omits the peasant can be on firm foundations. The recent history of China is evidence enough for this. My concern, as a social anthropologist, is with the analysis and classification of social relations between people and groups of people, rather than with political or economic affairs as such, although inevitably I cannot dis-
128 regard them. So my aim is to show briefly some of the most important
121 aspects of the social organization of the South East Asian peasant communities, and of the values by which this organization works. Though the details in my paper refer mainly to Malaya and Indonesia, I think the generalizations have some value for the South East Asian region as a whole.

If the basic features of the peasant society are ignored, one can understand neither the peculiar tenacity which it still possesses in modern conditions, nor the reactions of its members to the increasing impact of ex-
121 ternal economic and political forces. The definition of a peasant is a
565 countryman—a man engaged in rural pursuits, primarily agriculture, with
463 a comparatively simple technology and a special interest in the land he works. In South East Asia one may extend the application of the term to
241 cover the majority of fishermen and even village craftsmen too. They are
226 of the same social class as the agriculturalists, and often members of the
32 same families. As occupational groups, they may even be separable only in theory, since many a peasant farmer is also a fisherman or craftsman by turns, as his seasonal cycle or his cash-needs influence him. What R. H. Tawney has said of agriculture—that it is at once a craft, a business, and a manner of life—can be applied more widely here; the problems of all these peasants alike are partly technical, partly financial and commercial, and partly cultural and social.

162 It is difficult to say just what proportion of the present population of
565 South East Asia may be classed as peasants. It would seem that in nearly
241 every South East Asian country two-thirds or more of the total population
463 is to be found in agricultural communities, tilling the soil. In 1930 the
32 census of Java and Madura in Indonesia gave about 70 per cent of the male
462 workers as dependent for their livelihood on native agricultural output, and about 75 per cent in the regions of Indonesia outside Java and Madura, while large numbers of women were engaged in home craft production. In Siam, in about 1930, almost 90 per cent of the population lived in agricultural communities, rice production providing the living of about 80 per

[1] Originally delivered at a meeting at Chatham House on 21 February 1950.

18; Firth E-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

162 cent of the population. Malaya, of course, is exceptional, because of the
565 especially heavy concentration on the production of rubber and tin. Ac-
241 cording to the 1947 census of Malaya, about 34 per cent of the working
463 population were classed as cultivators and fishermen working on their own
●32 account or as unpaid members of families. In all, I think one could reckon
462 that rather more than 100 million people in South East Asia can be regarded as peasantry.

[412] Throughout all this region, peasant technology is simple; skills, though
134 traditionally well adapted to the job in hand, are of limited range. Soils,
241 despite the richness of some of the swamps and river flood-plains, are generally of poor quality. The system of felling and burning the jungle, taking off crops for a few years, and then moving away to cultivate fresh clearings while the old ones revert to jungle, is still common in the mountain areas of Burma, Malaya, and Siam, in part of West Java, in much of Borneo, and in the outer islands of Indonesia. It is known as shifting cultivation or jungle-fallowing. Although regarded as extremely primitive, it is an economic use of land in areas of low population density, where plentiful land allows of long rotation of clearings and consequent restoration of soil fertility. But where population is dense, the system cannot provide the necessary volume of production without endangering the future soil capital, and that is one of the major problems of the area. In the more sedentary forms of agriculture, fertility is conserved with a great deal of care, by manuring, by water control, and so on. Sometimes there is very elaborate and spectacular terracing, as in parts of the Philippines or in Bali, where the native cultivator through his own efforts through generations has known how to make the best of the land with his available techniques. Yet many of these techniques are only of limited efficiency, and custom may be a barrier to improvement. For large masses of the Muslim peasantry of South East Asia, for instance, the pig, an excellent economic converter of resources, is taboo for religious reasons.

433 Productivity of the South East Asian peasant is apt to be low, whether
241 considered in terms of the margins required above subsistence to give him
565 and his family the range of goods and services they want, or by comparison with Western results. It is hard to make this last comparison significant because of the differing bases, but the following figures will give, perhaps rather superficially, some idea of the comparison. In terms of cwt. of cropping per acre, for instance, the rice crop of part of South East Asia can be compared roughly with the wheat crop of Western Europe. The figures are taken from different years, but they can be regarded as significant averages. Java at 12 cwt. of rice to the acre corresponds with France at 12 cwt. of wheat to the acre; Siam at 14 cwt. to the acre with the United Kingdom at 18 cwt. and Germany at a little less; Japan at 27 cwt. of rice per acre corresponds to Denmark with 27 cwt. of wheat per acre. Yet rice is supposed to be a crop of much higher yield. What is more significant is that productivity per acre in both Malaya and Indo-China is only 10 cwt. on the average, or only between one-third and one-half of the average in Japan.

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

tools are all made by villagers using the palms and bamboos of 285
their setting. Boats, shoes and tools are made of wood by peasants, 415
mostly for their own use. While this type of industry usually secures no place in national statistics and has low monetary value, it plays a most important part in Southeast Asia life which may be described as still in the "Wood Age" so far as most peasant and rural life is concerned. Domestically-made cigars and 438
cigarettes supply local needs and rapidly displace the *areca* or 277
betel chewing habit. In Burma, the Philippines and Java cigar-making has become commercialised for trade and export; in Java some $9 million of hand-made cigarettes entered trade during 1937.

Throughout the region, too, are scattered remnants of a metal- 326
working industry, as in the beaten silver of Malaya and Java, the niello work of Siam, and the gold settings for precious stones in Burma.

But these domestic industries rank as small by external standards 438
and they play a negligible part in international trade. They must not be forgotten, however, because in the evolution of Southeast Asia we may see grow up forms of industrialisation originating in these domestic industries, as has been the case in the industrial evolution both of Europe and of the Far East. In these domestic industries little or no money is involved. At their simplest they are "subsistence industries" providing the family needs and scarcely anything more.

Thus most Southeast Asia people produce what food their 433
families need and what articles they need. Their requirements from outside are very small and in any case their way of life involves so little money that they have small means to buy anything outside their local subsistence ecology. That was the earlier condition everywhere in Southeast Asia before the industrial revolution in Europe, and it continues both in the simple form and in many variations even today, when there have evolved groups of people in Southeast Asia who are entirely dependent on wages to buy food and what other articles they need. The subsistence 434
principle is still strong in that very little money interchange goes on among the great majority of the population; some of them by doing part-time work earn wages, yet the money they earn has a very low average, indicated by the very low per capita revenues of the various states. Just before the war, Indochina revenue

tial area is primarily on higher ground in the 361
northern part of the city. The University of 563
Malaya is located in Singapore, though
plans are being made to move it to Johore
Baru on the Malayan mainland. Being 162
largely a Chinese city, Singapore has come 361
to act as a center for the Nan Yang expatri-
ate Chinese, and the city has been chosen as 184
the site of a new Chinese-language regional 563
university.[20] Nevertheless, its air is not that
of a Chinese city, nor, for that matter, is it
English. Like all great cities, it is cosmopoli-
tan, but it is also culturally rootless, perhaps
more so than any of the other great cities of
the region.

At the other extreme is Bangkok, most 361
indigenous of the great cities. Founded as 184
the last of a series of "forward capitals"[21] by 175
the Thai in 1783, after the destruction of
Ayuthia by the Burmese, the city has never
lost its native quality. The soaring rooftrees
of *bot* and the spires of stupa stamp the
Bangkok skyline with a character of its own.
The city is located on the left bank of the
Menam Chao Phya within the southern-
most great bend of the river some twenty
miles from its mouth. Exceptional prob- [364 312a]
lems of poor drainage plagued the city from
the start, and its numerous *klongs* or canals
have given it the rather misleading title of
the "Venice of the East."

A Chinese city early appeared to the 361
southeast of the original castle town and in 34
time became part of the central business
district. As the lesser *klongs* were filled in to 184
become roads, the city continued to expand.
A new city appeared on the northern out-
skirts of the old, a planned creation built in
the reign of Rama VI with broad boulevards
and buildings ranging from shocking Vic-
torian variations on Italian Renaissance to
more recent battleship modern. The con-
trast between the façade of modern build-
ings fronting these boulevards and the stilt-
ed, bamboo, thatch, and tin-roofed houses

[20] Richard Butwell, "A Chinese University for Malaya," *Pacific Affairs*, December, 1953.

[21] See reference to Cornish in Spate, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

17: Ginsburg E-4 (no date) 1955
ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Bang Kok

361 behind them is one of the most striking
34 demonstrations of cultural dualism in South-
184 east Asia.

Unlike the other great cities, Bangkok
175 originated as the capital of a land-oriented
361 agrarian state. Its proximity to tidewater
was accidental. In 1822 the ship bearing the
504 Crawfurd mission to the Thai court barely
177 was able to cross the bar at the mouth of the
Menam, then covered by only four feet of
178 water.[22] Its poor harbor and its remoteness from the major shipping routes of the South China Sea conspired to retard the development of the city as a port until the end of the nineteenth century and to retain it as an anachronism in Southeast Asia—a growing city, nearly great, surely primate, but indigenous rather than Western. Nevertheless, since it was through Bangkok that Western influences filtered into Thailand, it is a case of an indigenous capital acting as a revolutionary medium for socioeconomic change.

504 Bangkok is still the least convenient port
of the great cities in Southeast Asia. The bar
361 across the mouth of the Chao Phya was dredged through only in 1952, and port facilities are modest as compared with the other cities. Indeed, most vessels still anchor in the Bight of Bangkok in the lee of the island, Kao Hsi Kang, at the mouth of the Chao Phya and transship their cargoes to and from river barges and country boats which link the island with Bangkok. Surprisingly, the freight tonnage handled at Bangkok is about one-third that of Singapore, although the volume of shipping is only one-tenth as large. The explanation lies partly in the large bulk shipments of rice which form the main export. Partly, also, there is a lower load factor at Singapore, since much of the shipping which enters its harbor is as much dependent on the local complex of service facilities as on cargo potential. At Bangkok, peripheral as it is to the main trade routes, few vessels call without assurances of sizable cargoes.

[22] See J. Crawfurd, *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China* (London: H. Colburn & R. Bentley, 1830).

16: Fryer K-3 (no date)1953 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

361 of the nineteenth century was a reflection of the investment of foreign capital in the archipelago, stimulated by the opening of the Suez Canal. In 1863 relocation of the administrative area began, with the move of the Governor to the Malacañan Palace, north of the river, and in the last three decades of Spanish rule development on the north bank of the Pasig was rapid. [504] After the American occupation Manila grew quickly. A modern harbor was constructed on reclaimed land on the seaward side of Intramuros (1903), and the main development of the city was shifted south of the Pasig, where new administrative and residential districts were created. Since World War II the [162] city has again expanded, owing partly to an influx of population from the country, and partly to the use of reconstruction funds for development. The built-up area is now practically continuous from the swamps of the Bitas River mouth in the north to Parañaque in the south, a distance of about 10 miles. Northeast and southeast of the urban fringe, rice fields still cover the plain, and parts of the city itself are regularly flooded in the rainy season (April-October). Development has proceeded farthest inland on the higher ground between the coastal plain and the Marikina River, which drains southward to the Pasig. Here are the newer districts of Mandaluyong, San Juan del Monte, and Quezon City, the last virtually a satellite town, which is the new administrative center of the Republic.

341 As a result of its long history and changing administration, Manila has 361 a greater variety of architectural styles and street patterns than the other four cities. Old buildings of wood and adobe in the colonial style were found in Intramuros (which was largely destroyed in 1945) and occasionally outside, but in the main business district in Binondo and in the administrative quarter of Ermita modern steel-framed concrete buildings now predominate. Manila is not a city of skyscrapers. Good foundations are impossible in the alluvial sediments, and deep piling to reach the underlying granite or "floating" on enormous cellular rafts of concrete is necessary for large buildings in all the great cities. In the districts of earliest expansion, radiating plazas and boulevards are to be seen; elsewhere the gridiron layout of the typical American city has been adhered to, except in the newer areas to the east, where attempts have been made to relate development to 162 topography. Racial zonation is well marked. The Chinese community in- 361 habits the narrow streets north of the Escolta in the business quarter, and the principal indigenous residential areas lie north of the city in the crowded districts of Tondo, Sampaloc, and Santa Cruz. Europeans, Americans, and wealthy Filipinos reside on the higher ground in the districts of Ermita and Malate, south of the river.

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



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[illegible] (upper left)—New *ladangs* planted with upland rice and maize on a steep slope. Notice the young second-growth forest on the second slope and the older forest in the background. Residency of Tapanoeli, Sumatra.

[illegible] (upper right)—New *caingins* on slopes in second-growth forest. West of Baguio, Mountain Province, Luzon.

[illegible] (center left)— Ladang of upland rice and maize on level land. Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra.

[illegible] (center right)—New caingin ready for the first planting. The flimsy hut will be abandoned, together with the caingin, after one harvest. South of Sagnay, Camarines Sur Province, Luzon.

[illegible] (lower left)—Guarding the ripening rice against birds from a temporary shelter in a ladang. The man has a permanent house in the village. Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra.

[illegible] (lower right)—Well built village house of a shifting cultivator who raises pepper in his old ladangs. Residency of the Lampoeng Districts, Sumatra.

[p. 37]

called the "Great Tradition" in an agrarian society.[13] 361

The links between country and city in this basically feudal relationship were clear, consecutive, and relatively simple to define. To be sure, the villager would regard the capital as a different world from his own, but it was nevertheless a largely comprehensible world, if associated with abstractions and refinements beyond his immediate ken.[14] 369 184 181

The modern great city of Southeast Asia, however, not only was different but was also incomprehensible to the child of the folk society, who came to regard it not merely as strange and foreign but also as hostile. The "foreignness" is reflected in their ethnic composition. Until the second World War at least the largest population group in Rangoon was Indian; Singapore is primarily a Chinese city; Bangkok is very largely Chinese, as is Saigon if Cholon, its twin city, is included; both Manila and Jakarta have large foreign and Chinese elements. To this extent the great city is more metropolitan than national. Each has its Chinese, European, and native quarters, for example, although in many instances the lines of division have become blurred, especially since the close of the war.[15] Furthermore, wherever Chinese populations are large, a predominant type of house is the so-called "shophouse," a two-or-more-story building with shops on the first floor, built to a standard width originally dictated by the length of the average fir-log lintel as used in South China, and with residential flats and 631 361 369 184 578 162 563 342 347 563 369 184

[13] See Robert Redfield and Milton Singer, "A Cultural Role of Cities," a working paper for the Conference on the Role of Cities in Economic Growth and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, May 24–26, 1954. [113]

[14] Cf. J. M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian City: Its Culture and Evolution," *Asia*, March, 1953.

[15] In Singapore the Chinese are localized according to the various so-called "clans," e.g., Hokkien, Cantonese, Tiuchiu, Hailams, and Hakka (see B. W. Hodder, "Racial Groupings in Singapore," *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, October, 1953).

459

342 347 563 369 184

cubicles behind and above.[16] Usually constructed in continuous rows and back to back, this type of tenement is among the more conspicuous evils in Southeast Asian cities. On the urban peripheries and wherever interstices appear in the modern street and housing pattern, slum villages appear which consist of house clusters usually constructed of bamboo and *atap* palm, highly inflammable and unsanitary.[17] These also are found in and on the margins of the lesser cities but are most striking in juxtaposition to the sleek boulevards of Singapore, Bangkok, and Jakarta.

184 369 361

A further index of the cultural and economic pluralism of the great cities is their frequent division into old and new towns. In China, especially in the treaty ports, this distinction is usually between an old Chinese and a modern foreign city. The same is true of India. In Southeast Asia the contrast is most often between an old and a modern town both of Western origin, as in Jakarta, Manila, Singapore, and Rangoon. To a notable degree each of these is also a planned city. In Saigon the contrast is between predominantly Chinese Cholon and Saigon itself. In Bangkok, however, there are the old Siamese castle town, a new town of indigenous origin, though of European design, and a Chinese town or quarter nearly as old as the castle town itself. Pluralism is seen not merely in the division of a city into old and new parts or into quarters but also in the separation of the predominantly outward-oriented great city from an up-coun-

[113]

[16] For a description of the "shophouse" see R. H. Hughes, "Hong Kong: An Urban Study," *Geographical Journal*, March, 1951, pp. 9–10.

[17] These areas, the so-called "kampongs," are historically enclaves of the countryside within the city. They form small social cells which together cover most of the surface area in and on the margins of the great cities. Separately, they constitute the rural villages, which in the densely settled portions of Java, for example, are so closely spaced that they collectively exhibit population densities as high as those in many cities (see photographs in J. M. Fraser, "Town Planning and Housing in Singapore," *Town Planning Review*, January, 1953).

31:Scherman--4A E-4 (no date) 1915 AP1 Burma

Burmese AP4

Southeast Asia AL1

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[p. 204]



[For description see page 4, category 116.—Analyst]

31: Scherman--74 E-4 (no date) 1915 AP1 Burma
Burmese AP4 Southeast Asia AL1 Khasi AR7

K 342 generally used follows from a once ruling law which forbade the Khasi the use of nails for house construction as being "sang," i.e. taboo (78). It remains a question whether the Khasi

78. Gurdon, pp. 30 ff. Cf. above, p. 206, fn. 1.

K [177] house with its curved roof form reflects the building style of the Bengali, who also in other respects influenced the customs of the Khasi (79),

79. To be sure the roof ridge of the Bengal hut is evenly curved toward both sides and the entrance is from the broad side. This roof style is a distinctive architectural theme with temples and tombs of Bengal, as Monmohan Chakravarti in "Bengali Temples and Their General Characteristics" Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal 5 (Calcutta, 1909), p. 160 explains in detail. But whether the relation with the Pallava architecture of South India exists, as conjectured here on p. 147, seems to me very doubtful.

or whether the roof, sloping down in front and projecting broadly over the entrance wall must be considered as a modification of the veranda awning of the pile dwellings.

* * *

B S 342 From the numerous types presented above is it somehow possible to prove a homogenous development? /234/ Without vague hypotheses, in view of the inadequacy of the historical sources of the Indochinese ethnographical groups, a line of direction

31: Scherman--75 E-4 (no date) 1915 AP1 Burma
Burmese AP4
Southeast Asia AL1
B S 342

can only be hinted at.

Out of the whole series of pile dwellings, I want to lump together as the main types:

1. The Burmese type, i.e. a) the house with its front and entrance at the broad side from where a veranda projects with roof and side walls which give the impression of being an integral part of the house; behind it, above the ground, on a higher level the family rooms; b) the house, consisting of individual roofed sections, surrounded on two or three sides by an open platform. The joining of the posts and roof beams at a) and b) in accordance with the manner indicated above in Figure 1 (80).

80. According to the classification by Frobenius (cf. above, p. 203, fn. 1) the roof support of the central Oceanic architectural area (Barla-Bauten /Barla Buildings/, ibid., p. 577 and atlas, p. 57) No. 5 and 11 "Seram" would have to be used as a parallel.

2. The house of the Shan and of some of the tribes who live in their vicinity (Palaung, Intha, etc.), with a fan-shaped awning which is joined at both gable sides; at the front gable side a veranda over which one reaches the entrance. Post joints and roof beams as in 1.

3. The house with long straight roof, the ridge and sides of which rest on three rows of posts, and which projects far beyond the entrance wall. In front of the entrance often no veranda but more frequently at the rear, sometimes at both places. The Kachin, Chin, and Assam tribes build in this manner.

All the other forms constitute intermediate steps or hybrid types.

The question, what causes the choice of the

31: Scherman--76 E-4 (no date) 1915 AP1 Burma
Southeast Asia AL1 Burmese AP4

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pile dwelling or of the ground level house cannot, in my opinion, be decisively answered. One might be justified to think in certain instances of hygienic measures, of protection against animals or hostile attacks, of floods, etc., and it might be very instructive to observe here and there the disappearance of the pile dwelling with rising civilization; but no generally valid rule can be arrived at from all this. Decisive is only the tribal custom--for the dissemination, spread, or suppression of which similar conditions are responsible, as they are in the adoption of other cultural values.

1· Palmer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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[343]



FIG. 30 (upper left)—Batak benzoin collector beside a benzoin tree planted in an old *ladang*. Residency of Tapanoeli, Sumatra. (Courtesy of the Department of Economic Affairs.)

FIG. 31 (upper right)—Peasant-owned rubber garden. Residency of Tapanoeli, Sumatra.

FIG. 32 (center left)—Houses abandoned by shifting cultivators in an exhausted coffee garden. Residency of Palembang, Sumatra. (Courtesy of the Department of Economic Affairs.)

FIG. 33 (center right)—Rubber mangles and sheets of rubber drying in a peasant-owned rubber garden. Residency of Djambi, Sumatra.

FIG. 34 (lower left)—Teak poles lining the road through a tobacco plantation. Between Medan and Arnhemia, Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra.

FIG. 35 (lower right)—Teak poles partially cut down to prepare for a tobacco crop. Between Medan and Arnhemia.

[p. 4]

43: Jenks E-5 (1902-1903) 1905 OA1 Philippines
Bontok OA12
Malays-Polynesians 04
Southeast Asia AL 1

[Cf. pp. 48(E)-48(H), category 116. -- Analyst]

The a′-to ceremonials of Chakong are held in the pa-ba-fu′-nan of neighboring a′-to, as in Sigichan, Pudpudchog, or Filig, and this seems partially to destroy the *esprit de corps* of the unfortunate a′-to.

Each a′to has a fa′-wi building—a structure greatly resembling to the pa-ba-fu′-nan, and impossible to be distinguished from it by one looking at the structure from the outside. The fa′-wi and pa-ba-fu′-nan are shown in Pls. XXX, XXXI, and XXXII. Pl. XXIX shows a section of Sipaat a′-to with its fa′-wi and pa-ba-fu′-nan. The fa′-wi is the a′-to council house; as such it is more frequented by the old men than by the younger. The fa′-wi also shelters the skulls of human heads taken by the a′-to. Outside the pueblo, along certain trails, there are simple structures also called "fa′wi," shelters where parties halt for feasts, etc., while on various ceremonial journeys.

The fa′-wi and pa-ba-fu′-nan of each a′-to are near together, and in five they are under the same roof, though there is no doorway for intercommunication. What was said of the pa-ba-fu′-nan as a social center is equally true of the fa′-wi; each is the lounging place of men and boys, and the dormitory of unmarried males.

In Samoki each of the eight a′-to has only one public building, and that is known simply as "a′-to."

One is further convinced of an extensive early movement of the primitive Malayan from its pristine nest by the presence of institutions similar to the pa-ba-fu′-nan and fa′-wi over a vast territory of the Asiatic mainland as well as the Asiatic Islands and Oceania. That these widespread institutions sprang from the same source will be seen clearly in the quotations appearing in the footnote below.[1] The visible exponent of the institutions is a building forbidden to women, the functions of which are several; it is a dormitory for men—generally unmarried men—a council house, a guardhouse, a guest house for men, a center for ceremonials of the group, and a resting place for the trophies of the chase and war—a "head house."

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[1] Major Godwin-Austen says of the Gāro hill tribes, Bengal, India:

"In every village is the 'bolbang,' or young men's house. * * * In this house all the unmarried males live, as soon as they attain the age of puberty, and in this any travelers are put up."—The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, vol. II, p. 393. See also op. cit., vol. XI, p. 199.

S. E. Peal says:

"Barracks for the unmarried young men * * * are common in and around Assam among non-Aryan races. The institution is here seen in various stages of decline or transition. In the case of 'head-hunters' the young men's barracks are invariably guard-houses, at the entrance to the village, and those on guard at night keep tally of the men who leave and return."—Op. cit., vol. XXII, p. 248.

Gertrude M. Godden writes at length of the young men's house of the Nāgā and other frontier tribes of northeast India: "Before leaving the Nāgā social customs one prominent feature of their village society must be noticed. This is the *dekha chang*, an institution in some respects similar to the bachelors' hall of the Melanesians, which again is compared with the *balai* and other public halls of the Malay Archipelago. This building, also called a *Morang*, was used for the double purpose of a sleeping place for the young men and as a guard or watch house for the village. The custom of the young men sleeping together is one that is constantly noticed in accounts of the Nāgā tribes, and a like custom prevailed in some, if not all, cases for the girls. * * *

43: Jenks E-5 (1902-1903) 1905 OA1 Philippines
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Malayo-Polynesians 04
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OLAG

The o′-lâg is the dormitory of the girls in an a′-to from the age of about 2 years until they marry. It is a small stone and mud-walled structure, roofed with grass, in which a grown person can seldom

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"The young men's hall is variously described and named. An article in the Journal of the Indian Archipelago, 1848, says that among the Nágás the bachelors' hall of the Dayak village is found under the name of 'Mooring.' In this all the boys of the age of 9 or 10 upward reside apart. In a report of 1854 the 'morungs' are described as large buildings generally situated at the principal entrances and varying in number according to the size of the village; they are in fact the main guardhouse, and here all the young unmarried men sleep. In front of the morung is a raised platform as a lookout, commanding an extensive view of all approaches, where a Nágá is always kept on duty as a sentry. * * * In the Morungs are kept skulls carried off in battle; these are suspended by a string along the wall in one or more rows over each other. In one of the Morungs of the Changuae village, Captain Brodie counted one hundred and thirty skulls. * * * Besides these there was a large basket full of broken pieces of skulls. Captain Holroyd, from whose memorandum the above is quoted, speaks later of the Morung as the 'hall of justice' in which the consultations of the clan council * * * are held. * * *

"The '*Morangs*' of another tribe, the 'Naked' Nágá, have recently been described as situated close to the village gate, and consist of a central hall, and back and front verandas. In the large front veranda are collected all the trophies of war and the chase, from a man's skull down to a monkey's. Along both sides of the central hall are the sleeping berths of the young men. * * *

"Speaking of the Mao and Muran tribes [continues Miss Godden], Dr. Brown says, 'the young men never sleep at home, but at their clubs, where they keep their arms always in a state of readiness.' * * *

"With the Aos at the present day the custom seems to be becoming obsolete; sleeping houses are provided for bachelors, but are seldom used except by small boys. Unmarried girls sleep by twos and threes in houses otherwise empty, or else tenanted by one old woman.

"The analogy between the *Dakha Chang*, or *Morang*, of the Nágás and the men's hall of the Melanesians is too close to be overlooked, and in view of the significance of all evidence converning the corporate life of early communities a description of the latter is here quoted. I am aware of no recorded instance of the women's house, other than these Nágá examples. 'In all the Melanesian groups it is the rule that there is in every village a building of public character where the men eat and spend their time, the young men sleep, strangers are entertained; where as in the Solomon Islands the canoes are kept; where images are seen, and from which women are generally excluded; * * * and all these no doubt correspond to the *balai* and other public halls of the Malay Archipelago.' "—Op. cit., vol. XXVI, pp. 179-182.

Similar institutions appear to exist also in Sumatra.

In Borneo among the Land Dyaks "head houses," called "pangah," are found in each village Low says of them: "The Pangah is built by the united efforts of the boys and unmarried men of the tribe, who, after having attained the age of puberty, are obliged to leave the houses of the village; and do not generally frequent them after they have attained the age of 8 or 9 years."—Sir Hugh Low, Sarawak, Its Inhabitants and Productions (London, 1848), p. 280.

Lieutenant F. Elton writes of the natives of Solomon Islands: "In every village they have at least one so-called tamboo house of *tohe*, generally the largest building in the settlement. This is only for the men, it being death for a female to enter there. It is used as a public place and belongs to the community. Any stranger coming to the village goes to the tamboo house and remains there until the person he is in quest of meets him there."—The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, vol. XVII, p. 97.

Mr. H. O. Forbes writes of the tribes of Timor (islands between New Guinea and Australia) that they have a building called "Uma-lulik." He says: "The *lulik* can be at once recognized, were it by nothing else than by the buffalo crania with which it is decorated on the outside. An officer who holds one of the highest and certainly the most influential positions in the kingdom has charge of the building, and presides over the sacred rites which are conducted in them. * * * The building is cared for by some old person, sometimes by a man and his wife, but they must not both—being of opposite sex—stay all night."—Op. cit., XIII, pp. 411, 412.

called the "Great Tradition" in an agrarian society.[13] 361

The links between country and city in this basically feudal relationship were clear, consecutive, and relatively simple to define. To be sure, the villager would regard the capital as a different world from his own, but it was nevertheless a largely comprehensible world, if associated with abstractions and refinements beyond his immediate ken.[14] 369 184 181

The modern great city of Southeast Asia, however, not only was different but was also incomprehensible to the child of the folk society, who came to regard it not merely as strange and foreign but also as hostile. The "foreignness" is reflected in their ethnic composition. Until the second World War at least the largest population group in Rangoon was Indian; Singapore is primarily a Chinese city; Bangkok is very largely Chinese, as is Saigon if Cholon, its twin city, is included; both Manila and Jakarta have large foreign and Chinese elements. To this extent the great city is more metropolitan than national. Each has its Chinese, European, and native quarters, for example, although in many instances the lines of division have become blurred, especially since the close of the war.[15] Furthermore, wherever Chinese populations are large, a predominant type of house is the so-called "shophouse," a two-or-more-story building with shops on the first floor, built to a standard width originally dictated by the length of the average fir-log lintel as used in South China, and with residential flats and 621 361 369 184 578 162 563 342 341 563 369 184

[13] See Robert Redfield and Milton Singer, "A Cultural Role of Cities," a working paper for the Conference on the Role of Cities in Economic Growth and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, May 24–26, 1954. [113]

[14] Cf. J. M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian City: Its Culture and Evolution," *Asia*, March, 1953.

[15] In Singapore the Chinese are localized according to the various so-called "clans," e.g., Hokkien, Cantonese, Tiuchiu, Hailams, and Hakka (see B. W. Hodder, "Racial Groupings in Singapore," *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, October, 1953).

459

342 cubicles behind and above.[16] Usually con-
347 structed in continuous rows and back to
back, this type of tenement is among the
563 more conspicuous evils in Southeast Asian
369 cities. On the urban peripheries and wher-
ever interstices appear in the modern street
184 and housing pattern, slum villages appear
which consist of house clusters usually con-
structed of bamboo and *atap* palm, highly
inflammable and unsanitary.[17] These also
are found in and on the margins of the lesser
cities but are most striking in juxtaposition
to the sleek boulevards of Singapore, Bang-
kok, and Jakarta.

184 A further index of the cultural and eco-
369 nomic pluralism of the great cities is their
361 frequent division into old and new towns.
In China, especially in the treaty ports, this
distinction is usually between an old Chinese
and a modern foreign city. The same is true
of India. In Southeast Asia the contrast is
most often between an old and a modern
town both of Western origin, as in Jakarta,
Manila, Singapore, and Rangoon. To a not-
able degree each of these is also a planned
city. In Saigon the contrast is between pre-
dominantly Chinese Cholon and Saigon it-
self. In Bangkok, however, there are the old
Siamese castle town, a new town of indig-
enous origin, though of European design,
and a Chinese town or quarter nearly as old
as the castle town itself. Pluralism is seen
not merely in the division of a city into old
and new parts or into quarters but also in
the separation of the predominantly out-
ward-oriented great city from an up coun-

[113]

[16] For a description of the "shophouse" see R. H. Hughes, "Hong Kong: An Urban Study," *Geographical Journal*, March, 1951, pp. 9–10.

[17] These areas, the so-called "kampongs," are historically enclaves of the countryside within the city. They form small social cells which together cover most of the surface area in and on the margins of the great cities. Separately, they constitute the rural villages, which in the densely settled portions of Java, for example, are so closely spaced that they collectively exhibit population densities as high as those in many cities (see photographs in J. M. Fraser, "Town Planning and Housing in Singapore," *Town Planning Review*, January, 1953).

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
[Filed in category 253. -- Analyst]
[see p. 11, category 116. -- Analyst]

suffer a certain amount of damage. The seedlings must therefore be given time to grow strong enough to endure the temporary uprooting. They usually need from 30 to 40 days before they are ready for transplanting. Whenever early transplanting is necessary a technique is employed which is known in the Philippines as *dapog*. The puddled seedbed is completely covered with banana leaves, which are pressed slightly into the mud so that a thin layer of mud spreads over the leaves. On top of this is placed a layer, an inch thick, of rice hulls or finely cut straw. The whole is thoroughly soaked and sown with seeds. The banana leaves prevent the roots of the seedlings from growing into the ground and suffering the usual damage when transplanted, but the seedlings must be transplanted within two weeks after the sowing of the seed. 243

In the riparian marshes of Sumatra and Borneo—the *lebak* areas—all the land is flooded at the time when the rice seed should be put into the ground. The inhabitants of these districts, however, have found an ingenious solution to their problem: the floating seedbed. They build small rafts of bamboo, reed, banana stems, or the leaf-ribs of the sago palm, on which they place a layer of rush, or some other aquatic plant, and then a thick layer of fine mud. As the water level rises and falls the seedlings have a chance to develop on the float unharmed.

Numerous also are the techniques employed to supply wet-rice fields with the necessary water (see pp. 47–51). These reflect the nature of the terrain, the social organization, and the stage of technical development of the inhabitants. For it is obvious that the cultivation of wet rice on the plains of the Red River in Tongking would require very different techniques from those required on the steep mountain slopes of northern Luzon.

Culture, Types of Land Use, and Population Pressure

One of the most striking characteristics of Southeastern Asia is the great variation in the density of the population (Map, Fig. 1B). This variation reflects differences in culture as well as differences in physical environment. The culture and social organization of a people are intimately linked to their technique and the intensity of their land use, which in turn guide the people in their selection of new land when it becomes necessary for them to seek new homes. The Cambodians, for example, when living in an environment similar to that of the Annamese, do not create the large rural settlements characteristic of areas inhabited by the latter.[28] Likewise, the Madurese prefer to settle in small hamlets or in isolated homesteads (*Einzelhof*) and to till unirrigated land, whereas the Javanese live in large villages and are by preference wet-field cultivators. Again, while the Bontocs and Ifugaos of northern Luzon build terraces and cultivate wet rice as their primary crop, the neighboring Apayaos, most of the Kalingas, the Tinggians, and the Gaddangs have so far resisted all attempts on the

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[28] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, p. 94.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
[See pp. 35 ff., category 241 or 116. -- Analyst]

Chapter II

THE SHIFTING CULTIVATOR [p. 16]

241 The field of the shifting cultivator is known by various local terms. It is
361 called *caiñgin* in the Philippines, *humah* in Java, *ladang* in the Indies as a
311 whole and in Malaya, *taungya* in Burma, *tamrai* in Thailand, and *rây* in Indochina.[1] Practically without exception, it is a clearing in either primeval or second-growth forest. The use of grassland is so unusual that we shall limit the following discussion to shifting cultivation on forest land.

As his name indicates, the shifting cultivator does not use the same piece of land every year; instead, he kills or cuts down at regular intervals —every year, every other year, or every third year—the trees of a small forest patch. He burns as much of the woody growth as is possible or convenient. Among the charred stumps and half-burned tree trunks he plants his favorite crops, be they cereals such as millet, upland rice, or maize; or tubers such as yams or sweet potatoes (Figs. 4–10). The latter
[243 are planted extensively by the *caiñgero*, the shifting cultivator in the Phil-
462] ippines. In planting cereals it is usually the men who take the planting
[134] stick to make little holes and the women who drop in a few seeds, using their feet to cover the seed with soil (Figs. 11–13). As forest land is generally free from weeds or grasses and the soil is usually rich in humus and well supplied with the ash of burned plant matter after clearing, it produces a very good, or even excellent, first harvest; the second harvest begins to show a decline in yield, and thereafter the returns diminish rapidly.[2] Grasses and weeds invade the clearing. Rather than battle these, the peasant abandons his old ladang and cuts and burns a new patch of forest (Fig. 15). The old plot reverts, under favorable conditions, to second-growth forest, the so-called *blukar* of the Malays, and is not cleared again for a period, the length of which may vary from 8 to 15 years, or more.

Shifting cultivation is characterized by a lack of tillage; the soil is hardly disturbed, as no plow turns it. There is less labor involved than in other methods of cultivation, and the work is more evenly spread over the year—an advantage where labor is relatively scarce. The tasks involved are cutting, burning, and planting; sometimes simple fencing of the field against animals, guarding—especially before the harvest and usually by women and children—and, finally, harvesting. In addition, there may be some weeding in the first year and certainly during the second.

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[1] In British India *jhum*, *kumri*, *dhya*, *beuar*, or *dullee;* in Ceylon *chena;* in Japan, Korea, and Formosa *karen* (a Japanese term); in Central America *milpa;* in parts of Africa *chitemene*.

[2] Danhof reports for parts of the Lampoeng Districts that a ladang will produce from 15 to 25 quintals of rice in the first year and approximately 5 in the second year. In areas where the second yield shows such a serious decline the peasants usually prefer to make a new ladang—Danhof: "Bijdrage," 1940, p. 199.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia A41
1 [See pp 37 ff., category 241 or 116.--Analyst]

Shifting cultivation, the most primitive type of agriculture, may be briefly defined as an economy of which the main characteristics are rotation of fields rather than of crops; clearing by means of fire; absence of draft animals and of manuring; use of human labor only; employment of the dibble stick or hoe; short periods of soil occupancy alternating with long fallow periods. Other terms for shifting cultivation are field-forest economy and field-forest rotation. 241 361 311

Shifting cultivators prefer flat land, but in Formosa, the Philippines, Indochina, and Thailand they have been forced back into the hills and mountains and must often be content with fields on steep slopes (Figs. 16, 17). This has led some observers to believe that shifting cultivation is exclusively practiced in hilly or mountainous regions, or that such regions are preferred in this economy. However, in the Outer Islands[3] of the Netherlands Indies, one frequently finds ladangs in flat country (Fig. 18). If the ladang is very steep it is rarely used for more than one crop, so that new clearings must be made every year.

Many shifting cultivators no longer change their dwellings when they turn to new land; they have become sedentary at least as far as their houses are concerned. They may build a hut in the ladang if it is too far away from their village and may occasionally live in such a shelter, especially at the time when the ripening crop has to be guarded against animals, but they will return with the harvest to their permanent houses in the village (Figs. 10, 19–21).

Ladang culture, as is frequently true of any form of agriculture, is intricately interwoven with religion. Magic practices and sacrificial offerings must accompany every step in the culture, even if the people are no longer pagans but, for example, Mohammedans. Friedericy has made a careful study of these magical-religious customs in the Ponre mountains at the head of the Gulf of Bone in southern Celebes.[4] In this region the people live in small permanent villages. Whenever they are in need of new ladangs—every second year—the heads of the families meet to choose new locations. At this stage they try to find out from the spirits if these agree to the clearing of the land that was selected. For this purpose the village headman (*dukun*), or somebody else who is familiar with magic, is sent out to the part of the forest that has been chosen. Here the delegate places betel leaves (*Piper betle* L.), each with a small slab of lime and a piece of areca nut (*Areca catechu* L.), under a tree and expresses the desire of his community to cut the trees and to use the soil. He ends with the wish that the betel leaves and the areca nuts be scattered should the choice 241 787 [361] [824]

[3] I have used the term "Outer Islands" to denote all the islands of the Netherlands Indies not comprised in the jurisdiction of Java and Madura (Madoera). The Dutch administrative term is *Buitengewesten*.

[4] Friedericy: "Ponre," 1932, pp. 1–34; idem: "De taak van het bestuur," 1937, pp. 488–501. For an excellent description of the magical-religious rites that are associated with the agricultural efforts of the Bemba of Northern Rhodesia, see Richards: Land, Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia, 1939, pp. 351–380.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL 1

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The Areal Extent of Shifting Cultivation in Southeastern Asia

It is difficult to form an idea of the areal extent of shifting cultivation because of its migratory nature and the fact that it is often practiced in remote regions. The only country of Southeastern Asia in which an attempt has been made to estimate the area used for shifting cultivation is the Netherlands Indies, but even there it was not possible to include all

Table II—Philippine Islands: Illegal Caiñgins Detected, 1914-1940

Year	Illegal Caiñgins Number	Illegal Caiñgins Area in Hectares
1914	895	....
1915	1 198	....
1916	845	....
1917	665	....
1918	776	....
1919	603	....
1920	721	....
1921	1 602	1 429.48
1922	3 110	2 803.55
1923	1 759	1 516.33
1924	1 753	1 396.90
1925	1 762	1 391.29
1926	1 829	1 476.61
1927	2 002	1 743.92
1928	1 774	1 602.95
1929	1 312	1 370.41
1930	3 227	3 279.77
1931	2 534	3 345.74
1932	2 547	5 586.27
1933	2 427	2 831.38
1934	3 207	3 215.46
1935	2 631	2 455.73
1936	2 314	2 510.59
1937	1 967	2 308.24
1938	1 766	2 029.68
1939*	906	1 331.12
1940†	2 646	4 416.56
Total	48 778	48 071.98

Source: Data supplied by the Bureau of Forestry, Manila.
*Six months only, ending June 30, 1939, because of change of fiscal year.
†From July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1940.

parts of the Outer Islands in the estimate. Van Beukering concluded that one-third of all food consumed in the Outer Islands was grown on ladangs; this would require a total of 1,100,000 hectares of land. If we assume that all ladangs are occupied for 2 years and lie fallow for 12 years, the shifting cultivation system would need seven times 1,100,000, or 7,700,000, hectares. This estimate does not include the ladang area under coffee and pepper cultivation. (Rubber, coconut, and benzoin cannot be considered because they are, for practical purposes, permanent crops.)

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
1 [See p. 26, category 241 or 116. -- Analyst]

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Van Beukering allowed an additional 200,000 hectares for coffee and pepper ladangs; so that the total area amounts to about 8,000,000 hectares. If we assume that the population of the Outer Islands increases at the rate of 1½ to 2½ per cent each year, it would double in from 29 to 47 years. This would mean that after about 30 to 50 years 16,000,000 hectares would come within the scope of shifting cultivation.

In Malaya ladang cultivation is illegal, but it is practiced in the hinterland well away from roads and railways, in eastern sections of the peninsula. Dobby recently described it in Pahang and northeastern Kedah, near the Thai border.[30] The Sakai of Pahang regularly abandon their primitive huts as well as the clearings when they shift to a new field (Map, Fig. 2). The Malays of northeastern Kedah, on the other hand, as a rule live permanently in one place and change only their fields (Map, Fig. 3). There are no statistics available on the areal extent to which shifting cultivation is carried on in Malaya, but according to Dobby the system gives way to permanent culture "as the standard of cultivation rises and as the effect of law becomes stronger."[31]

In Thailand shifting cultivation is extensively practiced by the tribes of the mountains of the north and west, on the eastern part of the Khorat Plateau, and on the peninsula. Probably about 1,000,000 people depend upon it. According to the same kind of calculation that Van Beukering made for the Indies, a total of 1,400,000 hectares would be required, or 200,000 hectares annually, if we allow five persons per household and consider that one hectare covers the needs of a family for 2 years.[32]

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In Indochina only the tribes of the mountains of Tongking, Laos, and Annam now practice rây, or shifting, cultivation. The people of the plains, Annamese and Cambodians, who represent 84 per cent of the population, practice a more intensive form of agriculture. Gourou has estimated the areal extent of shifting cultivation in Indochina. He states that a rây is used for 2 years and has to lie fallow for at least 20 years, which seems a rather long period as compared with other countries. In addition to its extensive plains, Indochina has a mountainous or hilly area of 580,000 square kilometers. Only one per cent of this land is permanently cultivated. Gourou estimates that about 40 per cent of the mountainous country is suitable for rây cultivation and he assumes that one-tenth of this, or 4 per cent of the total mountain land, is under rây cultivation in any one year.[33] If this calculation is correct it would mean that 23,200 square kilometers, or 2,320,000 hectares, are occupied annually by shifting cultivators. The numerical strength of the shifting tribes shows, however, that this estimate cannot be correct. Their number is not much greater than

[30] Dobby: "Settlement Patterns in Malaya," 1942, p. 222.

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] For an excellent description of the life of the shifting cultivators in Thailand, see Credner: Siam, 1935, pp. 148–173.

[33] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 177–182, especially pp. 180 and 182.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

For the other countries we have only censuses and enumerations of differing stages of remoteness. The problem is how to bring the figures up to date by estimation. 162

We may take it that in the undoubtedly favourable conditions afforded by Southeast Asian countries generally, a 'natural' Chinese population would increase by 1·5 to 2 per cent. per annum (and, remember, at compound interest). But one has to be careful because these immigrant populations are often not natural, i.e. they may have a lop-sided sex ratio and the age structure might be grossly distorted. Thus, to take an extreme example, you might have 800 men, 100 girls under 10, 50 women between 15 and 45, and one others women over 50—giving a crude birth-rate about 10 per mille—and natural increase nil! The Chinese in Malaya have increased by 1·8 per cent. per annum since 1931, and with a 1:1 sex ratio and settled conditions that figure might pass 2 per cent. But elsewhere sex ratio must be considered. All in all, it seems pretty safe to assume a 1·5 increase. But since the definition of 'Chinese' rules out any close estimation of their numbers, this rough-and-ready formula we have arrived at should be applied only where no estimate based on other considerations is acceptable. This is the case only with Indochina, British Borneo, and Indonesia and here it has, subject to known factors, been utilized.[1]

Mr Unger's map (reproduced as a separate folder)[2] will assist us to gain an idea of 'ethnic' Chinese in the region. It must be kept in mind (a warning repeated in Part VII, The Chinese in Indonesia) that it represents only the chief areas of concentration and has no reference to the comparative numbers of the Chinese and native population—the former being only 5 per cent. of the latter.

In Southeast Asia the Chinese are scattered through the countries in which they live, in large towns, villages, peasant farms, plantations, and mining communities. Sometimes the Chinese have come to an area already well populated and developed; sometimes they have opened up an almost uninhabited region. Java, perhaps the most densely populated area in the world, has at least three-quarters of a million Chinese, if not considerably more; the coastlands of West Borneo, almost uninhabited before Chinese 361 162

[1] I am indebted for these views to conversations with Mr M. V. del Tufo, Superintendent of the 1947 Census for Malaya.

[2] By permission of Mr Leonard Unger and of the American Geographical Society.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

361 immigration, are also the site of a large Chinese immigrant com-
162 munity. Burma and Siam exhibit similar contrasts within themselves: between the densely settled delta of the Irrawaddy and the almost uninhabited Northern Shan States (where the Bawdwin mines are located), the two focuses of Chinese settlement in Burma; in Siam, between the thickly populated Menam delta and the Isthmus of Kra, almost empty until the advent of the Chinese.[1] In central Siam the Chinese live closely associated with the Siamese people by whom, until recent decades, they were completely absorbed within a few generations. In Siam about half the Chinese live in the lower delta of the Menam, in the neighbourhood of Bangkok; the remainder of the race are scattered through the country, living in villages and towns rather than rural communities and tending to concentrate in the more commercialized districts. A notable concentration of Chinese, consisting of the more recent immigrants, is to the southwest of Siam, where they work in the mines, on the rubber plantations, and as merchants in the villages.

162 Apart from the concentration in the Kra Isthmus region, the
442 chief occupations of the Chinese in Siam are the various forms of retail and wholesale trade. The Chinese, in fact, control most of
443 the retail trade in the country. In particular they have the lion's share in the rice distribution and milling, and there is scarcely a commodity from pepper to sugar in which they are not interested as middlemen. They also make up a large part of the class of skilled craftsmen.

167 Most of the Chinese in Siam originally came from Hainan, Mei Hsien, and Chao Chou (including the city of Swatow) in east Kwangtung. The last-named group is apparently in the majority, especially those from Chin Hai, Yao P'ing, Chi Yang, and Chao An.

162 In Malaya the Chinese have a special significance in that they are here the majority community and have been so since before 1941. In that year there were for the whole of Malaya 2,379,000 Chinese as compared with 2,279,000 Malays, though, excluding Singapore, which is virtually a Chinese city, the Malays still outnumbered them. By 1947 they had still further strengthened their position so that they accounted for 2,615,000 of the population, whereas the Malays were now 2,544,000. This outnumbering of the native population (though the Malays themselves have multiplied their numbers several-fold within the last few decades by natural

[1] Unger, op. cit.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

increase and by the reinforcement of Indonesians, mostly Javanese) has given rise to one of the most perplexing political problems in the Far East. 162

Malaya's Chinese are largely urban and are occupied in trade, but they also supply the bulk of the labour in the tin mines of which they own about a third. There is a large Chinese labour force on the rubber estates where, however, before the war with Japan, they were outnumbered by the Indians. In addition to these occupations, the Malayan Chinese are actively engaged in every branch of the trades and crafts, from agriculture (squatters) and pig keeping and poultry rearing (which they almost monopolize) to the building and skilled artisan trades, tailoring, dressmaking, and cobbling, and managing or working in oil mills, soap factories, shipping firms, sawmills, and many other undertakings. The pineapple industry is entirely a Chinese enterprise. [361]

Most numerous of the Chinese tribes in Malaya are the Hokkiens, after them come the Cantonese, followed by the Hakkas (Khehs), Tiuchius, and Hailams (Hainanese), and in much smaller numbers by the Kwongsai, Hokchius, Hokchias, and others. The Hokkiens, being the pioneer community in Malaya and the principal merchants, are more numerous in the Settlements of Singapore, Penang, and Malacca, and the Cantonese more numerous in the remainder of the country.

A census was taken in 1947 for the first time since 1931 and tables and abstracts from this census, together with some observations of the Superintendent, Mr del Tufo, are included in Chapter XXV of this survey. The facts revealed are of key importance and those regarding the sex ratio are highly significant.

In Java the Chinese live throughout the island, usually in cities and towns rather than in the rural areas, and they are the middle-class merchants who control much of the wholesale and retail trade. Commerce and transport occupied 61 per cent. of the Chinese in Java in 1930: sugar processing, food industries, and timber were next among their occupations. In Batavia the Chinese formed 15 per cent. of the total population. [361]

The people of south Fukien were among the earliest immigrants to Indonesia, especially Java. Some of the families have been there for almost two centuries (the founder of the Tsai (Tsoa) house landed in Java five generations ago, in 1753).[1] The Hakkas and the 167 162

[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 266.

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311 This artificially stirred sediment is agriculturally negative and
133 it penetrates the ditches and drains of rice growing areas,
gradually silting them up, often spectacularly raising the
241 local river bed (at Serendah in Malaya, the river bed was
134 raised 21 ft. by sedimentation over the decade 1923-33), as well as sterilising fields on which the silt spreads so that cultivation becomes more difficult as the river can no longer be kept out. The yields decrease and the fields are abandoned, swamp vegetation gradually obliterating signs of cultivation. Round the lower Malacca River may be found signs of the old field bundings within the tangle of swamp vegetation now growing there, a sign of the effects of mining higher in the river whose effluent is obliterating cultivation in lower areas. This type of swamp comes slowly and has all the appearance of nature overcoming men's efforts to farm, but it is fundamentally a result of man-induced erosions or abrasions elsewhere. Thus interference, by mining and forest clearing, with landforms stabilised over long periods, not only goes on by removal of silt and gravels carried from mining areas and topsoils removed by torrential rains on clean-weeded agricultural areas as a mark of transfer of surface materials from one area, but it also causes the obliteration of cultivation and an extension of useless marsh in the areas where this material is deposited.

133 Because these tropical marshes occur in zones of human signifi-
361 cance, that is, in the flatter areas with agricultural possibilities, and along the coasts where settlement from overseas might take place, they have played a major part in conditioning the distribution of human beings in Southeast Asia. Both the coastal and inland marshes are tree-covered, making it even more difficult to penetrate, control, or cultivate them. Varying degrees of swampiness often account for the ease of development of farming in one place rather than another in Southeast Asia and a broad belt of marsh has generally proved a greater human impediment than any other topographic feature.

Chapter Twenty-five

PEOPLES, POLITICS AND PROSPECTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

101 THE setting of Southeast Asia may be summed up as one of extremes of relief (deltaic plains and mountains) and a climate mostly approaching the wet limit for plant life but merging into monsoonal types. To this setting the people have made varying responses, ranging from migrant food gatherers and hunters in the jungles, to subsistence farmers in the plains, but all turning upon woody materials for weapons, implements, house-structures and domestic utensils, upon rice, the cereal of the wet extreme, and upon social systems of communal help. The whole social and economic life has been galvanised over the past century or two by being more and more drawn into commercial and industrial activities developed in response to and on the basis of external needs for the minerals and agricultural products of Southeast Asia, whereas prior to that time the region was touched only by a trickle of traders moving between India and China.

FACTORS IN THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY

Several factors account for the difficulty of obtaining firm data to fill in our general picture of the historical geography of Southeast Asia. In the first place, there grew up no strong literary tradition to last through the centuries and record the past in a form other than mythical. Here tradition is largely oral and literature essentially Indian rather than indigenous. And whatever there was of local record and history has rotted away quickly, the climate, the ants, insects and moulds soon destroying anything on wood, paper, leather or cloth. Moreover, in this setting of swamps and forest, the most easily available material is wood, and artistic tradition expressed in wood, whether in carvings, buildings or tools, rapidly disintegrates, leaving little of that sort of evidence which is the basis of our facts about early periods in other regions. Buildings and carvings on stone were not normal expressions of Southeast Asia people where over large areas stone is not easily come by and where

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rounded by the abodes of the eight Lokapālas or guardian gods of the world. 772 643

In the Buddhist system, too, Mount Meru forms the center of the universe. It is surrounded by seven mountain ranges separated from each other by seven annular seas. Beyond the last of these mountain chains extends the Ocean and in it lie four continents, one in each of the cardinal directions. The continent south of Mount Meru is Jambūdvīpa, the abode of men. Here, too, the universe is surrounded by an enormous wall of rocks, the Chakravāla range. On the slopes of Mount Meru lies the lowest of the paradises, that of the four Great Kings or guardians of the world, on its summit the second paradise, that of the thirty-three gods with Sudarśana, the city of the gods, where Indra reigns as king. Above Mount Meru tower one above the other the rest of the heavenly abodes.[2]

It will be seen that the Brahman and the Buddhist systems, in spite of differences in detail, agree in fundamental traits: their circular form and the arrangement in concentric zones around Mount Meru. An abbreviated image of either of them thus has the same symbolic meaning for devotees of both faiths.

THE CAPITAL AS THE MAGIC CENTER OF EMPIRE

In Southeast Asia, even more than in Europe, the capital stood for the whole country. It was more than the nation's political and cultural center: it was the magic center of the empire. The circumambulation of the capital formed, and in Siam and Cambodia still forms, one of the most essential parts of the coronation ritual. By this circumambulation the king takes possession not only of the capital city but of the whole empire. Whereas the cosmological structure of the country at large could be expressed only by the number and location of provinces and by the functions and emblems of their governors, the capital city could be shaped architecturally as a much more "realistic" image of the universe, a smaller microcosmos within that microcosmos, the empire. The remains of some of the ancient cities clearly testify to the cosmological ideas which pervaded the whole system of government. Fortunately, a number of inscriptions and some passages in native chronicles may help us in interpreting archaeological evidence. 361 772 643

As the universe, according to Brahman and Buddhist ideas, centers around Mount Meru, so that smaller universe, the empire, was bound to have a Mount Meru in the center of its capital which would be if not in the coun-

[2] There usually are twenty-six heavens in all, including those on Mount Meru, but the number occasionally varies.

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try's geographical, at least in its magic center. It seems that at an early period natural hillocks were by preference selected as representatives of the celestial mountain. This was still the case in Cambodia in the 9th century A.D. Yaśodharapura, the first city of Angkor, founded towards 900 A.D., formed an enormous square of about two and a half miles on a side, with its sides facing the cardinal points and with the Phnom Bakheng, a small rocky hill, as center. An inscription tells us that this mountain in the center of the capital with the temple on its summit was "equal in beauty to the king of mountains," i.e. to Mount Meru.[3] The temple on Phnom Bakheng contained a Lingam, the phallic symbol of Śiva, representing the Devarāja, the "God King," i.e. the divine essence of kingship which embodied itself in the actual king. More frequently the central mountain was purely artificial, being represented by a temple only. This was quite in accordance with prevailing ideas, practically every temple in Southeast Asia, whether Hindu or Buddhist, whether built of stone, brick or wood, being considered as the image of a mountain, usually, though not invariably, of Mount Meru. In ancient Cambodia a temple was quite ordinarily referred to as "giri," mountain, and the many-tiered temples of Bali are still called Meru. The Cambodian inscriptions are very explicit with regard to such identifications. Thus, to give an example, one of them says that King Udayādityavarman II (11th century) "seeing that the Jambudvīpa had in its center a mountain of gold, provided for his capital city, too, to have a golden mountain in its interior. On the summit of this golden mountain, in a celestial palace resplendent with gold, he erected a lingam of Śiva."

THE LAY-OUT OF ANGKOR THOM

The actual ruins of Angkor Thom are the remains of the latest city on this site, built by king Jayavarman VII in the second half of the 12th century A.D. As Jayavarman was an adherent of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the central "mountain" in this case was a temple not of Śiva, but of the Bodhisatva Lokeśvara, the "Lord of the World," whose four faces adorn its numerous towers. The city was surrounded with a wall and moat forming a square almost two miles on each side, its sides being directed towards the four cardinal points. There are gates in the middle of each side and a fifth one on the East leading to the entrance of the royal palace. The towers above the gates are crowned with the same four-fold faces of Lokeśvara as those of the central

[3] Although Brahman and Buddhist cosmologies usually ascribe to the world a circular shape, the "cosmic" cities of Southeast Asia, with rare exceptions, affect the square form. It would take too long to explain this apparent, but not very important discrepancy.

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temple. Thus, that smaller world, the city of Angkor, and through its means the whole Khmer empire were both put under the protection of the "Lord of the Universe." The cosmic meaning of the city was further emphasized by a curious device. The balustrades of the causeways leading over the moat to the city gates were formed by rows of giant stone figures, partly gods, partly demons, holding an enormous nine-headed serpent. The whole city thus became a representation of the churning of the primeval milk ocean by gods and demons, when they used the serpent king Vāsuki as a rope and Mount Meru as churning stick.[4] This implies that the moat was meant to symbolize the ocean, and the Bayon, the temple in the center of the city, on which all the lines of churning gods and demons converged, Mount Meru itself.

THE CAPITALS OF BURMA

Burmese chronicles say that Śrīkshetra (Old Prome) on the lower Irrawaddy, the capital city of the ancient kingdom of the Pyu, was built by the gods themselves with Indra at their head, built as an image of Indra's city Sudarśana on the summit of Mount Meru, with thirty-two main gates and a golden palace in its center. The remains of the city show in fact a decided attempt at a circular lay-out though complete regularity has not been achieved. It seems to have been an old custom in Burma that each of the capital's gates corresponded to one of the empire's provinces or vassal states. Thirty-two vassals or heads of provinces with the king as thirty-third in the center would of course correspond to the thirty-three gods who reside on the summit of Meru and among whom Indra is king. Thus not only the capital city but the whole empire of the Pyu must have been organized as an image of the heavenly realm of Indra.

In later capitals of Burma the square form was substituted for the circular one though the cosmological principle as such was retained. It will suffice to say a few words about Mandalay, the last capital of independent Burma, built by king Mindon in 1857 A.D. The inner city was surrounded by a wall and moat forming a square of more than a mile on each side, its sides facing the cardinal points. The royal palace, which occupied the center of the city, and more specifically the seven-tiered tower over the throne in the great audience hall, was identified with Mount Meru. There were three gates on each side of the city, twelve in all, and they were marked with the signs of the zodiak, thereby indicating that the city was meant to be an image of heaven with its stars spread out around the celestial mountain in its center.

[4] In the original myth Mount Mandara is used as churning stick. In Southeast Asiatic variants of the myth Mount Meru usually takes its place.

the latter's man-eagle Garuda. Another noteworthy example of an incarnation of Vishnu was king Sūryavarman II of Cambodia (12th century) who erected his own memorial monument as a gigantic temple of Vishnu: the famous Angkor Vat. We find further the idea of plural incarnation, also known from ancient India. Thus the Pararaton tells us that Angrok (13th century), the founder of the dynasty of Singasari and ancestor of the kings of Majapahit, was an incarnation of Vishnu, begotten by Brahmā from a mortal woman, and at the same time a son of Śiva. King Krtarājasa (died 1316 A.D.), the founder of the empire of Majapahit, is immortalized by a statue representing him as Harihara, a compound of Vishnu and Śiva. Even the simultaneous incarnation of Hindu and Mahāyāna Buddhist deities occurs. Thus, to quote only one example, the Javanese king Krtanagara (killed 1292 A.D.) was considered as an incarnation of Śiva as well as of the Dhyāni Buddha Akshobhya. Accordingly, he became known in Javanese tradition under the name of Śiva-Buddha. 771 643

It may be added that the theory of divine incarnation could be used not only as a means to exalt the position of the legitimate king, but equally well as a justification for usurpation of the throne. Thus the above mentioned Angrok, the founder of the kingdom of Singasari, was an usurper with a long criminal career as embezzler, robber and murderer. Yet, in spite of his criminal past, he became king, according to the Pararaton, because he was an incarnation of the gods.

The theory of divine incarnation as found in Hinduism and Mahāyāna Buddhism is incompatible with the doctrine of the Buddhism of the Hīnayāna. This difference in tenets is clearly expressed even in the lay-out of capital cities. In ancient Cambodia a temple formed the center of the capital and thus the Mount Meru of city and empire. In Burma the center of the capital is invariably occupied by the royal palace, and it is this latter which is identified with Mount Meru. In ancient Cambodia either Śiva in his form as Devarāja, the eternal essence of kingship, or the Bodhisatva Lokeśvara, the "Lord of the Universe," inhabited the "central mountain" and from there pervaded the empire. Hīnayānist Buddhism does not recognize an eternal deity. Indra is but the king of one of the lowest heavens, the second one from the earth. He is as little exempt from death and rebirth as any human being, except that his life lasts longer. The same may be said of the inhabitants of the higher heavens. All these "gods" of Hīnayāna Buddhism should more appropriately be called angels. They have no temples and no cults. Thus it is easy to understand why in Burma no temple could be set in the center of the capital city. The adaptation to cosmological principles and 361 771 643 184 772

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361 the deification of the king here had to be attempted by other means. By erect-
771 ing the palace in the center of the city and by identifying it with Mount
Meru, the lord of the palace, i.e. the king, became automatically the repre-
643 sentative of Indra. We might even say that he was "the Indra" of this smaller
184 universe, the Burmese empire but he held his place only by the magic of
772 parallelism and he was no incarnation of the real Indra as the ancient Javanese and Cambodian kings had been incarnations of Siva and Vishnu.[7] This scheme explains the great sanctity in which the royal palace was held in the Buddhist empires of Farther India. The palace was the symbol of the celestial mountain, nay, more than a mere symbol: it was "the Mount Meru" of the microcosmos Burma, or Siam, or Cambodia. Anybody nearing the palace had to show his reverence by dismounting from his horse, by shutting his parasol, by bowing to the palace spire or even kneeling down. Attempts to exact the same expressions of reverence from British envoys led to endless negotiations and frictions as the latter refused to comply with a demand which they
643 considered humiliating. "King of the Golden Palace" was one of the most
771 important titles of Burmese monarchs. Yet, the fact that the king "was Indra" and therefore ruler of the country only as possessor of the empire's Meru, the palace, involved great dangers. It worked as a constant temptation for would-be usurpers, be it from the ranks of the royal family or outsiders, as the occupation of the palace might be achieved by a coup-de-main with relatively small forces and usually meant the conquest of the whole empire. Many Burmese and Siamese kings therefore were virtual prisoners in their palace which they did not dare to leave for fear it might be seized by an usurper. The last king of Burma, Thibaw, preferred even to forego the important coronation ritual of the circumambulation of the capital to offering one of his relatives a chance to make himself master of the palace while he was away.

In Hīnayāna Buddhism the idea of divine incarnation as justification of kingship is replaced by that of rebirth and of religious merit. It is his good karma, his religious merit acquired in previous lives, which makes a man be born a king or makes him acquire kingship during his lifetime, be it even by rebellion and murder. A typical instance is that of king Nyaung-u Sawrahan (10th century) as told in the Glass Palace Chronicle of the Kings of Burma. Nyaung-u Sawrahan, a farmer, kills the king who has trespassed on his garden and whom he had not recognized. Thereupon he is himself made king against his wish. So strong is his karma that, when one of the ministers ob-

[7] However, strong traces of the belief that Siva and Vishnu incarnate themselves in the king survive in the coronation rituals of Siam and Cambodia.

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THE "MILLION CITY" IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

D. W. FRYER

361 162 IN A world survey of cities with a population of one million or more, made in 1931, Mark Jefferson[1] could not include a single representative from Southeast Asia. Since 1945 five cities in this area have attained the million status—Jakarta, Manila, Saigon, Bangkok, and Singapore. Of all the major political units in this part of Asia, only Burma has failed to produce a "million city." In Malaya, the most highly urbanized country, 35 per cent of the population live in towns of 5000 or more, and towns of more than 10,000 increased their population by 52.6 per cent in the last intercensal period, 1931–1947. But the concept of Southeast Asia as an area of rural peoples with a rhythm of life determined by rice cultivation is still largely correct. The proportion of urban dwellers is about the average for the Asian continent, and, except possibly in Java, there are far fewer cities, in relation to the level of population, than in either South or East Asia.

361 By Western standards the countries of Southeast Asia had only one city apiece until very recently. Most of the other settlements of any size were overgrown villages, and in some degree they still retain aspects of their village origin. In Southeast Asia the evolution of indigenous cities on the Chinese or Indian scale was not possible. Chesneaux[2] suggests that many of the large indigenous Asian cities grew up within "the traditional framework of the great agricultural empires," but in both peninsular and archipelagic Southeast Asia physical fragmentation, reinforced by a great diversity of peoples, hindered the development of large states. Though occasionally established, they were highly unstable and of short duration. The princely houses of the petty native states were insufficient stimuli to city growth, and commerce was equally inadequate. The only effective impulse, as Credner[3] points out, was a favorable combination of trade foci with administrative, military, and religious functions of the highest order. Dependence on changeable watercourses for irrigated rice culture and transportation, and the personal whim of the ruler, produced a marked arbitrariness

[1] Mark Jefferson: Distribution of the World's City Folks, *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 21, 1931, pp. 446–465.

[2] J. E. Spencer: Changing Asiatic Cities, *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 41, 1951, pp. 336–337, discussing Jean Chesneaux: Notes sur l'évolution récente de l'habitat urbain en Asie, *L'Information Géographique*, Vol. 13, 1949, pp. 169–175, and Vol. 14, 1950, pp. 1–8.

[3] Wilhelm Credner: Siam, das Land der Tai (Stuttgart, 1935), p. 366.

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in city location, and the small extent of states ensured that cities could only be of moderate size, grouped around the *kraton*, or palace. 361

Thus the integration of several small territorial units into a political state was a necessary preliminary to the appearance of the large city. But even the extensive colonial possessions created by the European powers could not, with their comparatively simple economies, support more than one large city each. This was inevitably located at the point of entry. Singapore, however, is anomalous: its external lines of communication have more than compensated for its earlier lack of direct access into the Malay Peninsula.

The large city, then, is a foreign innovation, possessing a high proportion of nonindigenous inhabitants, serving mainly foreign interests, and tacked onto a rural background. The achievement of independence in much of Southeast Asia, and its approach elsewhere, must bring many changes in the relations of the large city with the rest of the country.

Fulfilling similar functions as administrative, judicial, and above all commercial centers, and providing other specialized services mainly for their own inhabitants and the outside world rather than for the country as a whole, the "million" cities thus present many similar features of morphology and development, despite variations in their historical and cultural backgrounds. It is not surprising that the two oldest cities, Manila (1571) and Jakarta (1619), founded in the era of Mercantilism, possess the greatest similarities and are apparently to continue comparable development as the capitals of new states. On the other hand, the two nineteenth-century cities, Singapore (1819) and Saigon (1859), are strikingly different. Bangkok (1782) is the only indigenous city in Southeast Asia that has attained first rank, but until comparatively recently it functioned rather as the focus of what has often been described as an economic appendage of the British Empire than as the capital of an independent state. Though the smallest of the five cities in numbers, Singapore is the most important, both economically and strategically. More than any of the others it serves the whole of Southeast Asia, and its future is perhaps the most obscure.

The Foundation of the Cities

The sites of the great cities were places of little importance, selected by foreigners on technical considerations that had no validity for the indigenous inhabitants. The aim of the Europeans was to create economic bases at tidewater, and only later did the administrative function become equally significant. Singapore was virtually uninhabited, though a flourishing commercial center had existed on approximately the same site some centuries

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361 before. Manila and Jakarta, though located in populous countrysides, arose from minor settlements, and Saigon was nothing more than a village surrounding an Annamese imperial fortress. Bangkok illustrates the arbitrariness of city location dependent on the personal decision of the ruler; for though founded on the site of an earlier settlement, this possessed no particular geographical significance and was unoccupied by indigenous peoples at the time.

361 504 With the exception of Saigon, all the great cities were founded in the days of sail, but, despite the unexacting requirements of sailing vessels, good harbors with safe anchorages, facilities for careening, and easy access into the interior were not readily found in Southeast Asia, where the modest tides of the shallow seas on the Sunda Shelf only occasionally bring deep water close inshore. It cannot be said that the sites selected by the Europeans were always the best. Silting has been a problem, and technological changes have necessitated almost everywhere the creation of virtually new ports close to the old towns to cope with the increasing size and draft of vessels, and to expedite the handling of new export commodities. It is not surprising, therefore, that the indigenous Bangkok has tended to lag behind.

Manila, the oldest of the five cities, is perhaps also the most interesting. It did not begin primarily as a port and commercial base, nor did its early start confer the usual advantages, in spite of the possession of what is probably the best natural harbor in the whole of Southeast Asia. Manila Bay, protected by the mountainous Bataan Peninsula, and with a relatively narrow entrance, gives shelter from the prevailing winds and the occasional typhoons that cross Luzon. Its north shore is formed by the swamps of the delta of the Pasag and Pampanga Rivers, but on the east a narrow strip of plain lies between it and the southern Sierra Madre. Part of this plain is occupied by the extensive but shallow Laguna de Bay, whose outlet is the short and meandering Pasig River. At its mouth were two stockaded Muslim settlements, from the southerly of which the present city takes its name. The potentialities of Manila as a fortress and administrative center were at once recognized, and its splendid harbor and nodality in relation to the productive plains gave it an ascendancy over the earlier Cebu city (1565). But in a colony that was itself a dependency of another colony, and separated from the homeland by two oceans, economic development was retarded.

361 The objective of Jan Pieterszoon Coen, the founder of Batavia, was the establishment of an economic base[4] that would free the Dutch East India

[4] B. H. M. Vlekke: Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago (Cambridge, Mass., 1943), pp. 122–123.

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Company from English and Chinese competition and be strong enough to deter native princes from interfering in the Company's activities. Essentially, commerce was of greater importance than administration in old Batavia, though the Company could hardly avoid participation in politics; the recent change of the city's name to Jakarta, the name of the native settlement on whose site the city arose, is indicative of a change of function as well as of political control. The city began its life as a storehouse, which was secretly fortified and after a successful defense against the English and the local ruler was made the nucleus of a new town. Expediency seems to have been the principal reason for selection of the site. Certainly the harbor had little to commend it, and early in the eighteenth century silting was already a problem.

Bangkok is the only indigenous city of Southeast Asia to attain a population of one million, at least in modern times, though Jogjakarta is estimated to have reached this level during the postwar Indonesian movement for independence. The geographical focus of Thailand is clearly in the lower Menam plain, but for four centuries the capital was Ayutthaya, some 60 miles upstream (1350–1767). After the destruction of Ayutthaya by the Burmese, Thonburi, a fort on the west bank of the Menam Chao Phraya, was selected as the new national capital, but in 1782 a further dynastic change led to the establishment of a new administrative capital on the opposite bank, then unoccupied save for a small community of Chinese traders. Situated on a bend in the river some 20 miles from the sea and surrounded by marshland, the site of Bangkok possessed the sole but great advantage of being easily defended.

Saigon, like Bangkok, is a riverine city and tidal port set in a broad alluvial lowland, but it is more than twice as far removed from the sea. When captured by the French in 1859, it was the main political center of the newly colonized Annamese land of Cochin China and consisted of an agglomeration of native huts around the imperial fortress, with virtually no permanent buildings. The French immediately began its reconstruction as a modern city, so that, unlike the other four cities, Saigon has no old core. Nothing is left at present of the native town. Cholon, the "great market" some three miles to the west along the Arroyo Chinois, is an entirely separate Chinese foundation dating from about 1778. Though the cities have now coalesced, each retains its own distinctive character and functions, and the "Région de Saigon-Cholon" is thus a true twin city, unique in Southeast Asia.

Singapore is anomalous in being situated on an island, and, like Bangkok,

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361 it did not arise on a previous settlement. The modern development of the Malay Peninsula could not have been imagined by Raffles in 1819; he intended that his city should achieve pre-eminence by its policy of free trade, which would attract the Chinese entrepôt trade from Batavia. The site selected lay on the south coast of Singapore Island, where the mangrove-lined Singapore River discharged into the sea. Here was situated what was probably the best anchorage in the days of sail; for the roads between Tanjong Rhu and Tanjong Pagar gave good protection from all but south-east winds, and the force of these was broken by islands to the south.

The Old Towns

361 The great cities were developed on a plan, rather than allowed to grow
503 haphazardly, but it is hardly surprising that technological and sociological changes have defeated the aims of the early planners. The old towns represented the transplanting of the city forms of contemporary Europe to South-east Asia. The walled city of Intramuros, the older section of Manila, was a replica of the fortified town of sixteenth-century Europe, as was the earlier Portuguese Malacca. Batavia was likewise a fortified city, but the low terrain and abundant water encouraged the Dutch to copy the characteristic features of the cities of Holland. Thus old Batavia, the *Benedenstad*, was constructed on both sides of the Tjiliwong, and canals on a rectangular pattern were excavated.

Nearness to water, yet with freedom from flooding, was the essential requirement of all the cities, but seasonal variations in precipitation and periodic torrential downpours continue from time to time to defeat even modern techniques of civil engineering. The Batavian canals were only partly successful: in the wet seasons they flooded, and in dry periods they degenerated into a "dismal succession of filthy bogs and stagnant pools."[5] Pollution of the canals and the extension of the coastal swamps due to sedimentation gave old Batavia an evil reputation for disease.

Bangkok and Saigon, on low alluvial plains, with great seasonal fluctuations in river levels, were confronted with difficult problems. Official buildings commanded the little higher ground that was available, and the great bulk of the population lived in wooden houses built on stilts or on pontoons. Early Bangkok had no street pattern. The Royal City, or "Grand Palace," was a self-contained walled city, about a square mile in area, with palaces, temples, and administrative buildings. A canal across the neck of the bend in the Chao Phraya converted the old city into an island, outside which

[5] J. J. Stockdale: Sketches of the Island of Java (London, 1811), p. 129.

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permanent buildings and roads did not exist and all communication was by boat along the canals, or "klongs." [503] 361

Singapore possessed the advantage of greater topographic variety. Eminences of granite formed good sites for public buildings, and the city spread out over the land above flood level on both sides of the swampy Singapore River.

All the old towns, with the exception of the architecturally exotic Bangkok, have a gridiron layout, which has meant the maximum of congestion in modern times. Racial zonation, well marked in the old towns, has tended to persist. Europeans have long since abandoned their old quarters, but the Chinese have remained in strength; indigenous peoples, however, are significantly absent. In Manila and Bangkok the old cores have been retained intact and new business and financial quarters have been created away from the old cities. Though Intramuros has lost its military functions and most of its administrative ones, it still keeps, in part, those of a judicial and religious nature. Old Bangkok, however, has lost little of its earlier importance and is one of the greatest tourist attractions in Southeast Asia. In Singapore and Jakarta the old core has been reconstructed as the business district, but since this took place before the advent of the motor vehicle, congestion is still acute. Saigon, having no old core and therefore able to plan its development without encumbrances, nevertheless also adopted a gridiron layout, but it is not easy to suggest an alternative that would have made better use of the environment. 162 361

The Expansion of the Cities

The rapid growth of the cities in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries has been due to the investment of capital, largely from the mother country, in production for export; the consequent improvement of the ports and the creation of a communications network focusing on them; a considerable increase in the scope of administrative activities; and, more recently, the establishment of secondary industries. Though these have provided the impetus, expansion has been possible only through the application of new techniques of engineering (particularly in drainage and water supply) and preventive medicine, making the cities as healthy as those of the West. 361

The three centuries of stagnation in Manila is a remarkable historical record. Expansion beyond the walls of Intramuros began almost a century later than the growth of old Batavia, which too had suffered a period of stagnation in the seventeenth century. Even the short British occupation (1762–1764) and the revolt of the American colonies failed to arouse Spanish interest in the distant possession, and the growth of Manila in the latter half

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361 of the nineteenth century was a reflection of the investment of foreign capital in the archipelago, stimulated by the opening of the Suez Canal. In 1863 relocation of the administrative area began, with the move of the Governor to the Malacañan Palace, north of the river, and in the last three decades of Spanish rule development on the north bank of the Pasig was rapid. [504] After the American occupation Manila grew quickly. A modern harbor was constructed on reclaimed land on the seaward side of Intramuros (1903), and the main development of the city was shifted south of the Pasig, where new administrative and residential districts were created. Since World War II the [162] city has again expanded, owing partly to an influx of population from the country, and partly to the use of reconstruction funds for development. The built-up area is now practically continuous from the swamps of the Bitas River mouth in the north to Parañaque in the south, a distance of about 10 miles. Northeast and southeast of the urban fringe, rice fields still cover the plain, and parts of the city itself are regularly flooded in the rainy season (April-October). Development has proceeded farthest inland on the higher ground between the coastal plain and the Marikina River, which drains southward to the Pasig. Here are the newer districts of Mandaluyong, San Juan del Monte, and Quezon City, the last virtually a satellite town, which is the new administrative center of the Republic.

341 As a result of its long history and changing administration, Manila has 361 a greater variety of architectural styles and street patterns than the other four cities. Old buildings of wood and adobe in the colonial style were found in Intramuros (which was largely destroyed in 1945) and occasionally outside, but in the main business district in Binondo and in the administrative quarter of Ermita modern steel-framed concrete buildings now predominate. Manila is not a city of skyscrapers. Good foundations are impossible in the alluvial sediments, and deep piling to reach the underlying granite or "floating" on enormous cellular rafts of concrete is necessary for large buildings in all the great cities. In the districts of earliest expansion, radiating plazas and boulevards are to be seen; elsewhere the gridiron layout of the typical American city has been adhered to, except in the newer areas to the east, where attempts have been made to relate development to 162 topography. Racial zonation is well marked. The Chinese community in- 361 habits the narrow streets north of the Escolta in the business quarter, and the principal indigenous residential areas lie north of the city in the crowded districts of Tondo, Sampaloc, and Santa Cruz. Europeans, Americans, and wealthy Filipinos reside on the higher ground in the districts of Ermita and Malate, south of the river.

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

FIG. 1—Location sketch map of Manila.

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361 Modern Batavia, the immediate forebear of Jakarta, dated from the reconstruction of the old city in the early nineteenth century. The expansion of trade and growth of population in the eighteenth century had made necessary the redevelopment of the town, still closely confined around the old fort. In 1808, Governor General Daendels moved the administrative headquarters to Buitenzorg (now Bogor), pulled down the old fort, and used the material for the construction of a new residential district some three miles south of the old town, on the higher ground of Weltevreden. Three miles south of the new district the military camp of Meester Cornelis was established, and thus the axis of future development was aligned north–south, avoiding the low rice-growing plains on each side.

Weltevreden, like the old town, was laid out on a rectangular pattern around large open squares, the Koningsplein and the Waterlooplein. Later in the nineteenth century the old city itself was largely rebuilt, and many of the canals were filled in, but the Town Hall and the buildings of the East India Company still remain. The old town is now the main business and financial district. Weltevreden has experienced several changes in the present century. The northern part between the Koningsplein and the Molenvliet, one of the surviving canals, has become a secondary business district, and its residential character is tending to disappear. The main European residential districts were in south Weltevreden and the newer Gondangdia and Menteng, where the street pattern is not so uniformly rectilinear. These new districts eventually linked up with the development around the military base of Meester Cornelis, and in 1935 the three old foci, Batavia, Weltevreden, and Meester Cornelis, were united in the Municipality of Batavia. [162] As in Manila, racial segregation was pronounced; the Chinese lived in the old town, and in the lacunae between the developments along the roads the indigenous peoples lived in kampongs, a veritable *rus in urbe*. Since the establishment of the Republic, the city, renamed Jakarta, has changed considerably. The kampong area has been greatly enlarged, and old Dutch street and district names have been discarded. Weltevreden has ceased to have a separate identity, and Meester Cornelis has become Djatinagara.

Bangkok owes its transformation from an overgrown floating village into a modern metropolis to the activities of King Chulalongkorn (1868–1910), the creator of modern Siam, whose reign marked the beginning of commercial rice cultivation in the Menam plain and the teak industry in the north. The development of Bangkok was closely bound up with the exporting and processing of both commodities. The Klong Ong Ang marks the first stage in the expansion of the city, to the east of the Grand Palace; development on the right bank was retarded by the absence of bridges over

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

FIG. 2—Location sketch map of Jakarta.

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

FIG. 3—Location sketch map of Bangkok.

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the Chao Phraya, and even now there has been little expansion in that direction. At the end of the nineteenth century the filling in of the klongs and their replacement by roads were begun. The main axis of development was to the southeast, along the "New Road," as well as along the river. The expansion of commerce necessitated a business district, which was created in the Bangrak area, south of the Chinese quarter of Sampeng, and the increase in government functions led to an expansion of administration into Samsen and Dusit, to the north, while new European residential districts arose in the southeast. The west bank of the river, however, where the high tower of Wat Arun forms the most conspicuous landmark in the city, long remained an indigenous area, with a large population living in boats. The port has lagged behind in adaptation to changed technologies, and improved facilities are long overdue.

Saigon is virtually a twentieth-century city, though the construction of a business quarter and a modern port was begun shortly after the French occupation, and, as in the case of Bangkok, growth has been linked with the rice export trade. However, administration has been relatively more important than in any of the other cities. Before the creation of Vietnam, Cochin China was a French colony, governed from Saigon by French officials exclusively, and the city alternated with Hanoi as the residence of the Governor General of Indochina. With the loss of effective control over most of Tonkin, Saigon has become the main French base and center of power in Indochina.

The direction of expansion of the city has been westward toward Cholon, but Saigon is much more compact than any of the other great cities. The main business district lies in the southern part, close to the Arroyo Chinois, which links the Saigon River with Cholon. The shopping and administrative areas, characterized by wide boulevards, are a little to the northwest, and the European residential area lies on the "Plateau" to the north, a few feet above sea level. Cholon is a complete contrast, and until the war it had a much larger population. Unlike Saigon, which has a rectangular pattern of broad streets, Cholon has grown haphazardly along its many waterways. In 1932 the two cities were combined in a special administrative area, but they have remained largely independent of each other. Saigon is mainly concerned with administration and port activities, whereas Cholon has developed as the principal industrial area of Indochina. As in Jakarta, the enormous postwar increase in population has resulted in a great expansion in the area occupied by temporary dwellings, around the city margins.

The founder of Singapore did not omit to provide his city with a plan

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

FIG. 4—Location sketch map of Saigon-Cholon.



FIG. 5—Location sketch map of Singapore.

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for development.[6] The early mercantile and financial quarter was on the right bank of the Singapore River, where it has remained ever since. Raffles planned a racial residential zonation, the Chinese to be confined to the right bank above the business district, the Europeans to inhabit the opposite bank. Though this was eventually abandoned, Singapore's "Chinatown," with the highest population density in the city, still marks the old Chinese area. The early gridiron pattern was continued in the development to the east, the first direction of expansion. In the nineteenth century the city began to expand onto the somewhat higher land to the north, and here the new European residential district of Tanglin arose; but commercial interests are steadily invading the older part of the better residential areas to the north. With the reclamation in the last 50 years of the numerous swamps that set limits to expansion the lacunae in development have been filled in, and the city sprawls along the south coast of the island for more than 10 miles. Indeed, at no great date in the future the whole island will be effectively urbanized. The Armed Services occupy large areas, and their establishments constitute in effect separate towns. Room for expansion is becoming increasingly difficult to find, but the city's public housing achievements, particularly the new development at Tiong Bahru, on the west side, are worthy of note as being among the best in Asia.

In appearance the five cities are not greatly dissimilar to cities of the West, but there is a more clearly defined zonation of commercial, industrial, and residential development, the last showing a racial differentiation, which, though everywhere tending to break down, is nevertheless still conspicuous. Differences are also discernible in the suburbs, with their two-story "shophouses," and above all in the outer margins, where "temporary" houses of wood thatched with nipa palm cluster together in overgrown kampongs or barrios, engulfed by the outward sprawl of the cities. Here large numbers of indigenous people live in an environment that is neither urban nor rural.

The central business and "downtown" districts are entirely nonindigenous. International banks, commodity exchanges, and great mercantile houses reproduce all the features of the business quarter of the Western city, though there is a steady infiltration by Indian and Chinese financial and mercantile interests. The main shopping areas are also predominantly European, though here again Chinese and Indian establishments are numerous. Congestion is proportionately as great as in the Western city, and none suffers worse in this respect than Manila. Binondo, the main business district, lies on the

[6] For a full account see B. H. G. Dobby: Singapore: Town and Country, *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 30, 1940, pp. 84–109.

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361 north bank of the Pasig, and circulation is impeded by the bridges over the river; approach from the north is slowed by bottlenecks where narrow bridges span the many small canals, or *esteros*, which make the district virtually an island.

Administration is a main function of the five cities. So far as Jakarta and Singapore are concerned, it is highly likely that the gradual growth of a parliamentary democracy in the mother country, which necessitated an increase in the size of the colonial administration,[7] was a dominant factor in city growth; similar tendencies have been observed in the other cities, though the degree varies considerably. The administrative areas are distinct, but the enormous growth in official business in the last 25 years and the expansion of the cities have necessitated some decentralization of administrative functions. Only Singapore is not an official capital, but despite the creation of an administrative capital for the Federation of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur, Singapore is unlikely to suffer from this apparent loss of government business.[8]

The Ports and Their Functions

504 In the cities of Southeast Asia, lacking the heavy industrialization that has
361 accompanied the development of ports in the West, port functions are relatively more important. Nevertheless, in any great port a certain amount of industrialization is inevitable, and the cities already possess a considerable industrial variety.

Unlike the smaller ports of their respective territories, which serve mainly local needs, the five cities are international ports, with a commerce that is becoming more widespread as the ties of former colonies with the homeland are loosened. The ports handle a large proportion of the export trade of their territories, but an even larger proportion of the import trade; distribution is thus a principal function in the economic life of the cities.

The modern ports, constructed on reclaimed land, are entirely artificial, but nowhere, even in the tidal ports of Bangkok and Saigon, are enclosed basins necessary. The modern ports, however, have not completely succeeded in displacing the old harbors; the Pasig and Singapore Rivers continue to carry a heavy lighter traffic from vessels in the Roads, with a great saving in port dues.

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[7] Amry Vandenbosch: The Dutch East Indies (3rd edit., Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1942), p. 75.

[8] Nevertheless, Singapore still is, as it always was, an administrative center of the first importance. The Colony has its own government offices, and also those of the Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South-East Asia. It contains the headquarters of the Far Eastern Naval, Military, and Air Forces of the British Commonwealth, and many Commonwealth and foreign consular and diplomatic offices. Finally, the City of Singapore has its own Municipal Council, which is responsible for the administration of many public utilities.

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Manila is unusual in possessing two harbors, one north of the Pasig, which handles the large interisland traffic, and the main harbor for transoceanic vessels, south of the entrance to the river. The Pasig itself is dredged to a depth of 18 feet as far as Jones Bridge, and is lined with quays. Native craft carry a considerable traffic upstream and along the many esteros. Manila normally handles about 30 per cent of the total export trade of the Philippine Republic, and more than 90 per cent of the imports.

With some 30 million tons of shipping entering and clearing annually, Singapore is one of the world's great ports. The functional pattern is similar to that of Manila. The modern port of Keppel Harbor handles most of the trade with the more distant parts of Asia and the rest of the world, and much of the entrepôt trade with South China and the rest of Southeast Asia is handled in the Roads. The political separation of Singapore from the Federation of Malaya complicates assessment of the trade of the port, since official statistics now exclude trade with the Federation; though it is not quite clear what proportion of Singapore's trade is conducted with the Federation. In 1951 the port handled 74 per cent of Malaya's imports and 67 per cent of the exports. Singapore shares with Bangkok the distinction of exporting more by value than it imports; the other ports all have an "unfavorable" trade balance. The great naval base, considerably enlarged since the war, is well removed from the commercial port; it lies on Johore Strait, some 17 miles from the city, almost as far distant as the Cavite base is from Manila.

Tanjoengpriok, the port of Jakarta, is of all the modern ports the farthest from the city center. Its construction some six miles northeast of the city was necessitated by the silting of the Tjiliwong, which has built up an expanse of mud flats along the coast more than a mile in width; the flats have, however, been put to productive use through the excavation of fishponds. The old harbor, connected with the modern port by the Antjol Canal, does not compare in importance with the Singapore River or the Pasig, nor does the rather large coastal and interisland trade have an independent harbor, as in Manila, though one of the Tanjoengpriok basins is used almost exclusively for this purpose. In the unrest that preceded the formation of the Indonesian Republic, the trade of Tanjoengpriok decreased greatly, but since 1950 recovery has been rapid. Some ground, however, has been lost to other ports: in 1951 Tanjoengpriok handled only 10 per cent of the exports of Indonesia, though its share of the imports was better maintained, with some 52 per cent of the national total.

Saigon is both a commercial and a naval port, though as a naval base it cannot rival Singapore or Cavite. It is approached by way of the Saigon

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504 361 River, which, though possessing adequate depth for vessels up to 30 feet in draft, has a sinuous channel, which prevents ships longer than 550 feet from ascending to the port. The strong scour of the semidiurnal tides reduces the necessity for dredging. The port occupies about three miles of the right bank of the river and is divided into three sections. Overseas trade is handled by the quays between the Arroyo Chinois and the Canal de Dérivation, in the Khan Hoi district; smaller vessels use the quays nearer the city; and the naval port lies farthest upstream, close to the Arroyo de l'Avalanche. Lighters convey cargoes from ships anchored in the river below the city to wharves along the Arroyo Chinois and the Canal de Dérivation, the twin waterways that link Saigon with Cholon. Before 1939, Saigon handled about 40 per cent of the total foreign trade of Indochina; rice formed about 50 per cent by weight of the exports. At the present time the military operations taking place in the country have greatly reduced the trade of Saigon, and the rice export is only some 100,000 tons a year.

Bangkok alone of all the ports is still inaccessible to large ocean-going vessels. A bar at the mouth of the Menam Chao Phraya prevents entry, and the terminal for large vessels has long been Gaw Si Kang, an island in the Gulf of Siam east of the river mouth. From Gaw Si Kang strings of lighters are drawn by tugs to the wharves of Bangkok, which extend for about six miles along the left bank below the Grand Palace. The dredging of the bar to allow ocean-going vessels to reach the port would have presented no great difficulties, but opposition from the lightering interests prevented anything from being done until shortly before the war, when work was begun on a new port at Klong Toi, about five miles below the city. It is now proposed, as part of a plan to expand rice cultivation in Thailand, to deepen the channel so that vessels of 26-foot draft can ascend to the port. Bangkok has an almost complete monopoly of the foreign trade of Thailand, and in a real sense it is the only port of the country.

Industrial Development

32 361 38 39 The five cities contain a large proportion of the total industrial capacity of their respective territories. Industry is well represented, though much of it is better described as processing than as manufacturing, and its range of activities is continually increasing. The primary processing of foodstuffs and raw materials is dominant; rice milling is particularly important, except in Singapore, but rubber, copra, sago, tapioca, hemp, sugar, and tobacco all assume considerable local significance. A beginning has been made with the higher stages of manufacturing, such as rubber products and even foam

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rubber, in Singapore; other manufactures are furniture, boats, footwear, glass, bricks and tiles, oils and soaps, electric batteries, and certain chemical products. Manufacturing industries proper use relatively little machinery and power and produce for the home market, in which there is a considerable element of local protection. Food and drink industries are well developed (including brewing and distilling); textiles are poorly developed. Heavy industry is confined to the repair and refitting of vessels. All the ports have forges and foundries for making minor repairs; Singapore and Jakarta, which have dry-dock facilities, can undertake more extensive work. Repair shops for maintenance of railway equipment are located in all the cities except Singapore; the assembly of imported motor vehicles is carried on in Manila, Jakarta, and Singapore. Industry relies largely on electric power, which is expensive because of the paucity of local coal supplies.

Small-scale industry is almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese; the larger undertakings are overwhelmingly European-owned, though there are some large Chinese industrial establishments. Only a small proportion of the inhabitants of the cities are engaged in industry: in Singapore, where industry is expanding rapidly, only 11 per cent of the adult working population were employed in industrial establishments in the census of 1947. This unduly low figure does not take account of the large employment in the establishments of the Armed Services, much of which was industrial.

The industrial areas lie close to the port or along the rivers and canals. They are surrounded by areas of high population density; for the relatively high cost and limited availability of public transport operate to retard the divorce of place of work and residence, which is so conspicuous a feature of the Western city. Newer industrial areas, however, are appearing on the margins of the cities, and as the range of industrial activity grows, industry is likely to become more widely dispersed.

Population

All the five cities would have probably reached the one-million level in a comparatively short period if the war had not intervened. During the Japanese occupation, population decreased in the cities because of the shortage of food, and the wartime dislocation that elsewhere in Asia resulted in a large influx of rural dwellers into the cities did not operate here. With the end of the war the tide set strongly in the opposite direction. The breakdown of effective administration in many parts of Southeast Asia following the Japanese surrender, armed insurrections against the central governments, the struggle for independence, the depredations of extreme

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162 factions, and the difficulty of protecting disliked minorities, particularly the
361 Chinese, all combined to attract many rural dwellers to the comparative
167 safety of the cities. This immigration of refugees was perhaps greatest in Saigon-Cholon: from a population of about 300,000 at the time of the Japanese occupation the twin cities have increased to an estimated 1,400,000. Jakarta has grown almost as spectacularly. At the census of 1930 the city of Batavia had a population of a little more than half a million; by 1950 the Indonesian government estimated Jakarta's population to be not less than two million; and at present the city may well contain nearer three million. Even on the most conservative estimate it is by far the most populous city in the whole of Southeast Asia.

In the census of 1948, Greater Manila had a population of 1,180,000; however, several separately recorded districts of Rizal Province are integral parts of the built-up area, and their inclusion raises the total to more than a million and a quarter. The 14 districts of the City of Manila proper showed a 58 per cent increase over the 1939 census figures. Singapore and Bangkok have been relatively unaffected by postwar immigration from the country. In the intercensal period 1931–1947 the population of the island of Singapore grew by some 68 per cent, owing to the gradual establishment of an equality in the sex composition of the Chinese population, together with a steady decline in the death rate; allowing for natural increase since the census, the population of Singapore Colony at present is about 1,100,000, of whom about 70 per cent reside in the municipal area. Before the war Bangkok was approaching 900,000, but in the census of 1947 the population was only 1,116,600;[9] hence the war may have somewhat retarded the city's growth.

The present rate of growth due to natural increase seems to be about 3 per cent a year in all the cities, which is much higher than the rate in their respective national territories. This will present many difficult problems of development. As might be expected, the already overcrowded districts have experienced the greatest increases; in Manila, for example, the districts of Tondo, Sampaloc, and Santa Cruz have increased their populations by 80 per cent or more since 1939. As compared with Western cities, densities in the poorest areas are extremely high; 1500 persons to an acre would not be excessive for the net density of the worst blocks.[10] On the other hand, density

[9] With Thonburi. According to the *Statistical Year Book of Thailand*, N.S., Vol. 1, 1952, recently received, the total for the two is 1,178,881.

[10] Net density is the average density of the population of a given residential area, which consists solely of the dwellings and one-half of the width of streets giving access thereto. The figure quoted here is an estimate by the Singapore Improvement Trust of the situation in the most overcrowded part of the city.

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development in the best residential districts is very low, frequently one or two houses to an acre, so that the cities sprawl widely.

From the beginning, Chinese immigrants have constituted an important element of the cities. At first encouraged, and later feared, by the authorities, the Chinese were confined to special quarters, such as the famous Parián of Manila, where they have tended to remain. Dislike of them has been a universal rallying point of numerous indigenous politicians, and the murder of many Chinese in the period following the Japanese collapse recalls the massacres of the early history of Manila and Batavia. Where immigration has been comparatively free, at least until fairly recent times, the Chinese have become a majority: Singapore is more than 77 per cent Chinese—the largest Chinese community outside China—and in Bangkok more than 60 per cent of the population are Chinese or of mixed Chinese-Thai ancestry. The lower proportions of Chinese in the other three cities are due to the earlier restrictions on immigration, together with an influx of indigenous peoples from rural areas in the postwar period. Events in China, however, have everywhere increased illegal Chinese immigration. The removal of many Chinese from rural Cochin China to the Saigon-Cholon area has raised the percentage of Chinese in Cholon to about 60, and it is probably not less than 30 in the combined cities. In Manila and Jakarta it is much lower, and the total number of Chinese is not easy to estimate; both cities contain more than 50,000, and the number of persons of mixed Chinese and indigenous blood is undoubtedly much larger. Despite many vicissitudes, the Chinese have proved indispensable, and their importance in the economic life of the cities can hardly be overstated.

Europeans constitute only a very small proportion of the population of the cities. Only in prewar Batavia did they amount to as much as 5 per cent of the total, and this was in part due to the inclusion of Eurasians as Europeans in the Dutch statistics. Of the other immigrant groups, the most numerous are Indians and Pakistanis, who in Singapore made up 7 per cent of the population in 1947. Jakarta has a small community of Arabs, engaged in shopkeeping or moneylending.

The indigenous peoples have a higher birth rate than the immigrant peoples, but also a higher death rate, so that the relative proportions of the two groups have tended to remain the same. Lately the migration of indigenous peoples to the cities, especially in the new independent states, has altered the balance somewhat, and the partly alien character of the cities may tend to decline. Simultaneously, restrictions have been placed on the economic activities of the Chinese in the Philippines and Thailand, but the outcome of these measures is unlikely to be that intended.

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The Future of the Cities

361 The future of the great cities remains problematic. They have attained their present size and pre-eminence through their role as intermediaries in the interchange of foodstuffs and raw materials with the manufactured products of the West, but this activity has been carried on entirely by aliens. So long as this economic pattern persists, the great port cities will continue to occupy a leading position in the life of Southeast Asia. But the pattern may not persist, and it is clear that the economic development of Southeast Asia will include an increasing attention to home production of both foodstuffs and manufactures. Southeast Asia may return to the political instability of precolonial times; it may become part of the Communist sphere; or it may succeed in maintaining neutrality between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. In any event, the great cities cannot escape some readjustment, and they may well lose ground to other centers. Already there is opposition to the dominant position of the great city in national affairs. If extremist elements prevail, it appears likely that other cities may come to the fore; just as Shanghai has been supplanted by a revived Peking, so the victory of Vietminh would be likely to confer supremacy on Tonkin. The future of Singapore is particularly difficult to forecast, since it is the only city that is not an administrative capital of a state. Its integration into the Federation of Malaya would give the immigrant Chinese numerical superiority and would be strongly resisted by the Malays of the peninsula. Political changes in China and Southeast Asia itself may make the entrepôt trade difficult to maintain, and as a center of world communications Singapore has already lost ground to Bangkok, which is better placed for trans-Asian and trans-Pacific air routes. Moreover, its utter dependence on outside sources for food,[11] and to some extent for water, must greatly limit its usefulness as a strategic base—problems that have already given rise to some concern. Of all the cities, only Bangkok appears to be without a potential rival, despite an attempt in 1945 to relocate the administrative capital.[12] It may well be that the great cities' brightest future lies in an increase in the range and pace of industrialization.

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[11] "Food Supplies for Singapore," Singapore, 1951.

[12] Bangkok's central position in Southeast Asia, equidistant from South and Far East Asia, is reflected in its selection as the headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

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THE GREAT CITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA[1]

NORTON S. GINSBURG

ABSTRACT

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A major characteristic of urbanization in Southeast Asia is the functional dominance, with two minor exceptions, of one great metropolis in each of the countries of the region. These cities have acted as the head-links between the West and the indigenous societies. They are in a state of rapid social change, associated with the granting of political autonomy to the former colonial nations, with the accelerated rise of nationalism, and the increasing centralization of political functions in the national capitals.

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Standards for defining urban populations differ, but it can be assumed safely that no more than 15 per cent of the 175 million people of Southeast Asia belong in an urban category.[2] In contrast, in the United States, with a population somewhat smaller than that of Southeast Asia as a whole, over 64 per cent of the population is classified as urban.

Estimates for 1952 indicate only 30 cities or urban agglomerations with populations of 100,000 or more.[3] In the United States, however, there are 160 such urban areas; in the Soviet Union, with a population of 200 millions, there are about 120; and in Japan, with one-half the population of Southeast Asia, there are 64. In Southeast Asia only an estimated 7 per cent of the total population lives in cities of 100,000 or more; less in Burma, Indochina, Thailand, and Indonesia; somewhat more in the Philippines. Only Malaya, including Singapore, departs

[1] Revised from a paper read before the Far Eastern Association in Spring, 1954.

[121] As used here, "urbanization" connotes not only mere numerical increases in the population of cities but also the development of an urban way of life and the accompanying changes in value orientation (cf. Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1938).

[2] Census data for Southeast Asia are notably incomplete. In Burma, Thailand, and the Associated States of Indochina the "urban" population is estimated to be little more than 10 per cent of the whole; in Indonesia still less; but in the Philippines some 24 per cent of the population is classified as urban; and in Malaya, including the Crown Colony of Singapore, about 35 per cent. Without Singapore, only 27 per cent of the Malayan population is classified as urban.

113 [3] *United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1952.*

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significantly from the norm, with 18 per cent of its population living in large urban clusters. In the United States, on the other hand, nearly 30 per cent of the population lives in such large cities.

Southeast Asia retains many characteristics of a frontier region, with large areas of sparse population, and so it seems paradoxical that its population density is 95 per square mile, as compared with 50 in the United States, 23 in the Soviet Union, and 617 in Japan. Clearly there is no single correlation between densities and urbanization. The explanation lies in the structure of the urban hierarchy within the region. Whereas in the United States there is a notable gradation of cities from larger to smaller, and only 18 per cent of the urban population lives in cities of one million population or more, in Southeast Asia the urban population is most clearly associated with the largest cities. For example, in Thailand, half of the urban population lives in one metropolis, Bangkok, and the rest is distributed among a large number of smaller cities and towns, the largest of which contains no more than 35,000 people. Bangkok, therefore, may be regarded as a true Primate City, that is, a city with many times the population of the next largest city and a multiplicity of functions and attractions which give it dominance.[4] The Primate City is characteristic of the so-called "great cities" in Southeast Asia, with few exceptions.[5] Such are, in

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[4] Mark Jefferson, "The Law of the Primate City," *Geographical Review*, April, 1939.

[5] For an excellent description of several of these great cities upon which this paper is based in part see D. W. Fryer, "The 'Million City' in Southeast Asia," *Geographical Review*, October, 1953.

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

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162 Burma, Rangoon; in Thailand, Bangkok; in
the Philippines, Manila; and in Malaya,
369 Singapore. In Indochina, however, there are
two major core regions, each with its region-
361 al capital, but Saigon is clearly dominant
over Hanoi, which for reasons of population
size alone must be regarded as a lesser city.[6]
In Indonesia densely populated Java has
two large cities, Jakarta and Surabaya, the
first only twice the size of the second, but
Jakarta is the Primate City, if less clearly
than Bangkok or Rangoon. In each case,
other than Indonesia, the Primate City is
from five to ten times as large as the next
largest city, and there is no such graded
hierarchy of urbanization as in the United
States and to a considerable degree in West-
ern European countries and Japan. Secon-
dary cities, such as Mandalay in Burma,
Makassar and Jogjakarta in Indonesia, and
Cebu in the Philippines, tend to be regional
capitals subordinate to a great metropolis.

178 The rapid population growth of the six
greatest metropolitan centers—Rangoon,
162 Bangkok, Saigon, Manila, Singapore, and
369 Jakarta—suggest that national urbanization
may be proceeding as rapidly in Southeast
361 Asia as in any other part of the world.[7] This
may be true, but it can be argued also that
the overwhelming dominance of the Primate
City inhibits the growth of lesser cities and
that the largest cities will expand more
rapidly than the lesser ones.[8] There are in
effect only a limited number of services to be
performed by cities within a predominantly
village and folk society, although it may be
industrializing slowly, and the great cities
continue to possess a virtual monopoly of
these services. Thus, even as a society
changes, new and increasingly complex func-
tions tend to be performed by institutions

[13] [6] According to the *Annuaire statistique du Viet-nam, 1949–50*, the population of Hanoi was 216,900 in 1950. Its port, Haiphong, had a population of 146,000. The total population of the two is only about one-fifth that of the twin cities of Saigon-Cholon.

[7] Between 1939 and 1948 the population of Greater Manila increased by 55 per cent. Between 1931 and 1947 the population of Singapore Town (now City) increased by 52.5 per cent.

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178 already established in the Primate cities. So, to a very large degree, in Southeast Asia growth is primarily in the great cities,[9] whereas in the United States in the last three decades at least growth has been more rapid in the small and intermediate cities.

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Although the rates of urbanization are high, being, in the case of the Philippines nearly twice the rate of population growth,[10] no sudden transformation to an urbanized society can be envisaged. The percentage of total population classified as urban is in general so low and the normal rates of population increase so high that the growth of urban population *as a percentage of total population* has not been spectacular. In the Philippines, for example, the urban population increased merely from 23.3 per cent in 1939 to 24.1 per cent in 1948, largely in the Manila area. The apparent positive correlation between social change and rates of urban population growth also is exceptionally high. To illustrate with a negative example, in Thailand, where recent social change has been minimal, the rapid population growth of Bangkok has been equaled and even exceeded by that of a number of rural *changwats* in the central and southeastern parts of the country. Under at least two conditions, however, the great cities have increased their populations enormously and at shocking rates: (1) where enlarged political functions have been acquired since the war and (2) where rural unrest and insecurity have

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[8] The only apparent major exception to this generalization is Singapore and Malaya, where the lesser towns have tended to increase their populations equally rapidly since 1931. This situation may be explained by the special political and economic status of Singapore, the entrepôt for much of archipelagic Southeast Asia, and the exceptional degree of commercialization in the Malayan economy as a whole (see M. V. del Tufo, *A Report on the 1947 Census of Population* [*Malaya, Comprising the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore*] [London, 1949]).

[9] E.g., Greater Manila accounted for 89 per cent of the 1939–48 growth of the seven largest cities in the Philippines.

[10] Between 1939 and 1948 the approximate rate of total population growth was 20 per cent; that of urban population growth, nearly 40 per cent.

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178 caused or hastened a flight to the relative
162 security of the city. These forces have been
369 operating in combination particularly in
361 Rangoon, Jakarta, Saigon, and Manila and largely are responsible for their extremely rapid postwar growth. Lesser cities in Java, for example, such as Surabaya, Jogjakarta, Semarang, and Surakarta, also have increased in population because of rural insecurity; and in Burma in several towns and cities up to 50 per cent of the population has been resident less than four years, for the same reasons. These migrations have not, however, necessarily been accompanied by greater employment opportunities and consequently cannot be regarded as indexes of more rapid urbanization and associated socioeconomic change.

184 The great cities of Southeast Asia possess
361 many features in common, not the least of
369 which is their youth. This quality they share also with several of the great cities of the United States, but there the resemblance
175 ceases.[11] In 1800 Rangoon, Saigon, and
178 Singapore did not yet exist in city form; Bangkok, the new capital of Thailand, was less than twenty years old; Manila and Batavia (Jakarta), though then about two hundred years old, were merely small coastal towns. They began to grow rapidly after the middle of the nineteenth century, as a consequence of the development of the treaty ports in China, the opening of Japan, the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown by the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, the opening of the

[11] For the most part the growth of the Southeast Asian cities was not associated with a total transformation of society but with a strong indigenous tradition, as in the case of Bangkok, or with the juxtaposition of a segment of a new civilization alongside the old, as in the case of Rangoon. In America the cities represented the culmination of a social transformation in a virtually unoccupied frontier region. The same is true of Manchuria, the northeastern frontier of pioneer settlement in China, which is more recently, and more highly, urbanized than any other part of China. In Manchuria, as in the United States, there is a quite regular gradation of city sizes, and the Primate City cannot be clearly identified.

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Suez Canal in 1869, and the consolidation of Western control, direct or indirect, over most of Southeast Asia in the 1890's, followed by American acquisition of the Philippines at the turn of the century.

More important, the great cities were, and to a large degree still are, foreign creations, essentially alien to the Southeast Asian landscape. Although several began as native settlements, they developed as foreign exclaves on the margins of Asia, in much the same way as did the plantation system and mining operations. With the exception of Bangkok, they represented and functioned as the overseas appendages of Western, not indigenous, interests, being what Spate has called "head-links"—the gates by which Western concepts entered to destroy and build and in which a new system of economic organization evolved.[12] Indeed, the concept of the Asian plural society was inspired by the contrast between the basically foreign great city and the indigenous agricultural village. The ties of the great city with its hinterland were primarily commercial and associated with foreign-controlled mining and plantation interests and with Chinese-dominated rice trade. Such direct political-administrative ties as did exist were restricted primarily to indigenous elites, small in number, which allied themselves with Western interests. Where the indigenous rural populations were affected by these urban-rural relations, it was primarily through the plantation or the mining system, both of which needed a large labor force, or through Indian or Chinese intermediaries.

On the other hand, the relations between an indigenous capital, like Bangkok in its earlier period, or Kyoto or Peking, and the agrarian society upon which it was based were of quite a different order. In these cases the capital represented the culmination of what might be termed a national *ethos*, the epitome of what Redfield has

[12] O. H. K. Spate, "Factors in the Development of Capital Cities," *Geographical Review*, October, 1942, p. 628.

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called the "Great Tradition" in an agrarian society.[13] 361

The links between country and city in this basically feudal relationship were clear, consecutive, and relatively simple to define. To be sure, the villager would regard the capital as a different world from his own, but it was nevertheless a largely comprehensible world, if associated with abstractions and refinements beyond his immediate ken.[14] 369 184 181

The modern great city of Southeast Asia, however, not only was different but was also incomprehensible to the child of the folk society, who came to regard it not merely as strange and foreign but also as hostile. The "foreignness" is reflected in their ethnic composition. Until the second World War at least the largest population group in Rangoon was Indian; Singapore is primarily a Chinese city; Bangkok is very largely Chinese, as is Saigon if Cholon, its twin city, is included; both Manila and Jakarta have large foreign and Chinese elements. To this extent the great city is more metropolitan than national. Each has its Chinese, European, and native quarters, for example, although in many instances the lines of division have become blurred, especially since the close of the war.[15] Furthermore, wherever Chinese populations are large, a predominant type of house is the so-called "shophouse," a two-or-more-story building with shops on the first floor, built to a standard width originally dictated by the length of the average fir-log lintel as used in South China, and with residential flats and 621 361 369 184 578 162 563 342 347 563 369 184

[13] See Robert Redfield and Milton Singer, "A Cultural Role of Cities," a working paper for the Conference on the Role of Cities in Economic Growth and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, May 24–26, 1954. [113]

[14] Cf. J. M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian City: Its Culture and Evolution," *Asia*, March, 1953.

[15] In Singapore the Chinese are localized according to the various so-called "clans," e.g., Hokkien, Cantonese, Tiuchiu, Hailama, and Hakka (see B. W. Hodder, "Racial Groupings in Singapore," *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, October, 1953).

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342 cubicles behind and above.[16] Usually con-
347 structed in continuous rows and back to
back, this type of tenement is among the
563 more conspicuous evils in Southeast Asian
cities. On the urban peripheries and wher-
369 ever interstices appear in the modern street
184 and housing pattern, slum villages appear
which consist of house clusters usually con-
structed of bamboo and *atap* palm, highly
inflammable and unsanitary.[17] These also
are found in and on the margins of the lesser
cities but are most striking in juxtaposition
to the sleek boulevards of Singapore, Bang-
kok, and Jakarta.

184 A further index of the cultural and eco-
369 nomic pluralism of the great cities is their
frequent division into old and new towns.
361 In China, especially in the treaty ports, this
distinction is usually between an old Chinese
and a modern foreign city. The same is true
of India. In Southeast Asia the contrast is
most often between an old and a modern
town both of Western origin, as in Jakarta,
Manila, Singapore, and Rangoon. To a not-
able degree each of these is also a planned
city. In Saigon the contrast is between pre-
dominantly Chinese Cholon and Saigon it-
self. In Bangkok, however, there are the old
Siamese castle town, a new town of indig-
enous origin, though of European design,
and a Chinese town or quarter nearly as old
as the castle town itself. Pluralism is seen
not merely in the division of a city into old
and new parts or into quarters but also in
the separation of the predominantly out-
ward-oriented great city from an up-coun-

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[16] For a description of the "shophouse" see R. H. Hughes, "Hong Kong: An Urban Study," *Geographical Journal*, March, 1951, pp. 9–10.

[17] These areas, the so-called "kampongs," are historically enclaves of the countryside within the city. They form small social cells which together cover most of the surface area in and on the margins of the great cities. Separately, they constitute the rural villages, which in the densely settled portions of Java, for example, are so closely spaced that they collectively exhibit population densities as high as those in many cities (see photographs in J. M. Fraser, "Town Planning and Housing in Singapore," *Town Planning Review*, January, 1953).

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184 try, indigenous, cultural or political sub-
369 center. Just as Shanghai had its Nanking
361 and Peking, so Rangoon has its Mandalay, Jakarta its Jogjakarta, Manila its Cebu, and, in a variant form, Singapore its Kuala Lumpur.

177 In the past these cities sited along the Asian littoral have been the funnels through
184 which produce from the interiors have reached tidewater and the world of com-
369 merce and Western manufactures have pen-
361 etrated. Through the increasingly metropolitan channels have flowed the ideas of the West as well as its material goods. In a sense they have acted both as a catalyst for social and economic change and as a cushion which modified the shock of the earlier cultural contacts.

361 With the exception of Singapore, the site of each of the great cities of Southeast Asia is an ill-drained riverine or coastal lowland strategically placed in relation to an exceptionally productive agricultural region. Again, with the exception of Singapore, none
[504] possesses a deep natural harbor suitable for modern ocean-going shipping. The three mainland ports are both river and ocean ports and must be reached through tortuous and shallow river channels. All are entrepôts. Jakarta and Manila are located on the most highly developed islands of the archipelagoes, for which they act as entrepôts. Only in Indonesia and Indochina are there major competitors for the two greatest ports —Haiphong, the outlet for the densely populated Tonkin delta, and Surabaya, the regional capital for the Great East of the Indies, itself an empire. Each great port vir-
[439] tually dominates the national import trade; all tend, however, to share some part of the
504 national export trade with lesser ports. In
361 spite of these great similarities, the nature and functions of the ports differ markedly. As Allen observes: "All ports are individual. History, geography, politics, and economics all contribute to making them as they are. Few universal principles apply, and attempts to force uniformity on ports which have grown up differently are bound to tail."[18] Singapore, for example, is one of the

504 world's great ports and the most Western of the great cities of Southeast Asia. A Crown
361 Colony, it is the only great city without a large administrative hinterland, although it is the seat of the British High Commissioner
[175] for Southeast Asia. Since its founding by Raffles in 1819, it has been a free port and an entrepôt for much of archipelagic Southeast Asia. About half of the 5.5 million tons of cargo that pass over Singapore's modern wharves originates outside of the Malayan peninsula, and it was not until 1924 that the island of Singapore was connected by causeway with the mainland. At the same time it handles two-thirds of Malaya's exports and about three-fourths of its imports by value. Increasingly, its interests have tended to focus upon Malaya itself, as its entrepôt functions have been cut into by the other great ports within the region, especially Jakarta. What has kept Singapore the largest port in Southeast Asia (over 20 million net tons of shipping entered in 1952) is its status as a free port and its strategic location at the western entrance to the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean basin. As a crossroad between the Pacific and Indian oceans, it attracts shipping from great distances. It
[508] also has become an important air center, and a new airfield is under construction north-
[368] east of the city. Finally, the concentration of banking, insurance, light industry, docking, repair, and outfitting facilities have fortified its dominant position.

361 Singapore City was originally laid out with due regard for ethnic quarters.[19] The
563 oldest section of the city, however, has become the business center, but the rest of the older town is a densely populated Chinese section, and much of the newer town to the northeast also is Chinese. Each of these areas is in turn divided on the basis of Chinese clan categories. The European residen-

[18] D. F. Allen, *Report on the Major Ports of Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1951), p. 128.

[19] For a general description of the city see E. H. G. Dobby, "Singapore: Town and Country," *Geographical Review*, January, 1940, and the *Colony of Singapore Annual Report*.

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tial area is primarily on higher ground in the northern part of the city. The University of Malaya is located in Singapore, though plans are being made to move it to Johore Baru on the Malayan mainland. Being largely a Chinese city, Singapore has come to act as a center for the Nan Yang expatriate Chinese, and the city has been chosen as the site of a new Chinese-language regional university.[20] Nevertheless, its air is not that of a Chinese city, nor, for that matter, is it English. Like all great cities, it is cosmopolitan, but it is also culturally rootless, perhaps more so than any of the other great cities of the region.

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At the other extreme is Bangkok, most indigenous of the great cities. Founded as the last of a series of "forward capitals"[21] by the Thai in 1783, after the destruction of Ayuthia by the Burmese, the city has never lost its native quality. The soaring rooftrees of *bot* and the spires of stupa stamp the Bangkok skyline with a character of its own. The city is located on the left bank of the Menam Chao Phya within the southernmost great bend of the river some twenty miles from its mouth. Exceptional problems of poor drainage plagued the city from the start, and its numerous *klongs* or canals have given it the rather misleading title of the "Venice of the East."

361 184 175 [364 312]

A Chinese city early appeared to the southeast of the original castle town and in time became part of the central business district. As the lesser *klongs* were filled in to become roads, the city continued to expand. A new city appeared on the northern outskirts of the old, a planned creation built in the reign of Rama VI with broad boulevards and buildings ranging from shocking Victorian variations on Italian Renaissance to more recent battleship modern. The contrast between the façade of modern buildings fronting these boulevards and the stilted, bamboo, thatch, and tin-roofed houses

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[20] Richard Butwell, "A Chinese University for Malaya," *Pacific Affairs*, December, 1953.

[21] See reference to Cornish in Spate, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

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Bang Kok

361 behind them is one of the most striking
34 demonstrations of cultural dualism in South-
184 east Asia.

Unlike the other great cities, Bangkok
175 originated as the capital of a land-oriented
361 agrarian state. Its proximity to tidewater
was accidental. In 1822 the ship bearing the
504 Crawfurd mission to the Thai court barely
177 was able to cross the bar at the mouth of the
Menam, then covered by only four feet of
178 water.[22] Its poor harbor and its remoteness from the major shipping routes of the South China Sea conspired to retard the development of the city as a port until the end of the nineteenth century and to retain it as an anachronism in Southeast Asia—a growing city, nearly great, surely primate, but indigenous rather than Western. Nevertheless, since it was through Bangkok that Western influences filtered into Thailand, it is a case of an indigenous capital acting as a revolutionary medium for socioeconomic change.

504 Bangkok is still the least convenient port
of the great cities in Southeast Asia. The bar
361 across the mouth of the Chao Phya was dredged through only in 1952, and port facilities are modest as compared with the other cities. Indeed, most vessels still anchor in the Bight of Bangkok in the lee of the island, Kao Hsi Kang, at the mouth of the Chao Phya and transship their cargoes to and from river barges and country boats which link the island with Bangkok. Surprisingly, the freight tonnage handled at Bangkok is about one-third that of Singapore, although the volume of shipping is only one-tenth as large. The explanation lies partly in the large bulk shipments of rice which form the main export. Partly, also, there is a lower load factor at Singapore, since much of the shipping which enters its harbor is as much dependent on the local complex of service facilities as on cargo potential. At Bangkok, peripheral as it is to the main trade routes, few vessels call without assurances of sizable cargoes.

[22] See J. Crawfurd, *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China* (London: H. Colburn & R. Bentley, 1830).

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Bangkok

On the other hand[1] changes in transportation have elevated Bangkok to a new importance. It lies astride the main air route between Europe and the Far East, and the Australia-Europe services also pass through it. It is now the leading international air center in Southeast Asia, with 42 international departures a week in 1953 as compared with Singapore's 27, and its airport is one of the larger commercial fields in the Orient.

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The role of the Southeast Asian great city has been modified by the Pacific war and the granting of independence to Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and partial independence to Vietnam. Five of the six great cities are now capitals of the independent states. Each of these merits the title "link capital"; that is, they are the media through which the newly independent states are linked with the outside world. At the same time, they have begun to assume an increasingly indigenous character. The substitution of Malay for Dutch names and street signs in Indonesia is only one evidence of cultural change. The in-migration of petty officials, tradesmen, and refugees from the beleaguered rural areas has given the urban populations a new and more homogeneous native cast. The fevers of nationalism have made the large minorities more cautious about flaunting their ethnic independence.

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[1] [i.e. as compared to the inconvenient port facilities -- Analyst]

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361 On the other hand, the war also brought in-
178 creased American influehce into the region,
631 and the ubiquitous Coca-Cola sign is one of
184 the symbols of change that sooner or later will be followed by changes in urban facilities and urban organization.

162 More important, the present period is as-
563 sociated with an increasing intensification of
171 the economic activities of government and a corresponding diminution of foreign enter-
369 prise. Political and administrative functions have become increasingly important since the war. Since the main governmental organs are concentrated in the largest centers, the direct influence of the great city upon the country in which it is primate is likewise increasing. Relations between nationalized city and an increasingly money-oriented countryside are becoming more intimate, and the formerly clear-cut cultural distinctiveness of city and country is rapidly becoming blurred. Therefore, the likelihood of the great city's leading a revival of ancient value systems, as some extreme ethnocentrists hope it will, is small. Only one prediction can be made: the days of the culturally alien and ethnically distinct urban center are numbered in Southeast Asia; and a city like Singapore becomes increasingly an anomalous relict of an age now past.

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on the average, or only between one-third and one-half of the average in Japan. 000

Moreover, in any comparison between South East Asia and the peasantry of Europe, quite apart from differences in the production of crops other than the staple grain, there is an important difference in the average size of the holdings worked. The South East Asian peasant has fewer acres than the peasantry of Europe. In France, a country of peasant agriculture, about 40 per cent of the total number of agricultural holdings in 1931 were less than 2½ acres apiece; the average size of this group of holdings was 1½ acres each. But about 45 per cent of the total holdings were between 2½ and 22½ acres, with an average of about 10 acres each. There are areas in South East Asia where the average size of peasant holdings is fairly large. In Cochin China, while 72 per cent of the landowners have holdings between 2½ and 12 acres, there are provinces where more than half of them have holdings above 12 acres in size. In Siam, too, the average peasant holding seems of tolerable size—4 acres or so in the south and north east, 5½ acres in the north, and 10½ acres in central Siam, where more than one-third of the rural families live. But in Java, in 1938, the average size of holdings was only just over 2 acres for all tax-paying landowners in the country. In the Tonkin delta of Indo-China, another large area of heavy concentration of peasantry, as much as 60 per cent of the peasants have been reckoned to own holdings of less than nine-tenths of an acre, and 90 per cent to have holdings of under 4½ acres apiece. It has been estimated that a peasant family needs for adequate support 2½ to 5 acres of land, cultivating it by 'wet rice' methods. Many sections of the farming population in Java and Indo-China, for instance, are obviously well below this critical level. Even though large-scale irrigation and very intensive land use, including double cropping of rice in the year and much use of secondary crops, may lower the critical figure considerably, the peasant in such conditions is always liable to have to seek work outside his holding or to put up with inadequate living standards, even in nutrition. 311 241 433 565 361

The difficulties of agriculture in such conditions are further increased by the fact that a man's holding is often not a single undivided farm, but a set of dispersed fields, some of very small size. This dispersion and fragmentation of holdings allows for some advantages in adapting crops to soil and water variations, and is some security against wholesale raids by pests, but it makes for technical difficulties in the use of implements and labour on any scale. Since the dispersion is due primarily to traditional customs of inheritance and marriage, efforts to secure consolidation are apt to be only of temporary benefit, though some success has attended administrative action against undue fragmentation.

The same comparatively low level of productivity is seen in fishing, which gives the one great source of animal protein to the South East Asian peasant's diet. Before the war a Malay peasant fisherman produced on the average 1½ tons of fish per head per annum and in 1947 nearly 1 ton per 433 226 565

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147 Pestiferous slums compel attention in the larger towns, but conditions
[362] may be worse in the smaller towns up-country where they escape notice; even the villages often suffer from congestion. Food is less abundant, because cultivation for export reduces the area under subsistence crops, and the greater pressure on this smaller area diminishes the outturn; the demands of western enterprise for labour
[146] have a similar effect. Often the people take to cheaper or to more palatable but less nutritious food; thus groundnut oil replaces sesamum oil, cassava replaces rice, polished rice spreads beri-beri; sometimes the food is adulterated with imported products as when for some years large quantities of mineral oil were imported into Burma to mix with native vegetable oils. The natural effect of the economic forces released in the course of development is to lower the standard of health.[1]

300 Again, with man, as with crops and cattle, there is an intimate link between material development and infection. The improvement of communications and the mass migration of labourers spread old diseases and bring in new diseases. In Africa 'diseases have been introduced to which the African was formerly a stranger, and fresh strains of parasites cause attacks to which he was formerly immune; further, Africans now contract diseases common to temperate zones, and it is possible that the intensity of these is increased owing to the lack of acquired immunity'. The spread of sleeping sickness 'must in many cases be associated with the opening of new communications and the development of trading facilities'. The conditions under which labour is employed foster venereal disease, which in modern Africa seems to have an incidence ranging from 50 to 90 %.[2]

759 For various reasons also native medical skill deteriorates. The patronage of native rulers encourages the most successful physicians, and helps to maintain traditions, in Burma reminiscent of the Hippocratic oath, that make for professional self-respect. Under western rule the native doctors lose their best and most remunerative clients.
278 Moreover the herbs, formerly gathered in the fields, come to be purchased in the market, and are liable to adulteration, so that the practitioner no longer knows what he prescribes. This applies also to modern substitutes for native drugs, such as cheap brands of quinine tabloids which, if they contain any quinine, are of little use except as marbles owing to the thickness of the coating; prac-

[1] *ISC*, 1, 21; Mills, p. 321; *RAB*, 1915–16, p. 30; 1918–19, p. 41.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1129, 1144–6, 1199.

tial area is primarily on higher ground in the 361
northern part of the city. The University of
Malaya is located in Singapore, though 563
plans are being made to move it to Johore
Baru on the Malayan mainland. Being 162
largely a Chinese city, Singapore has come
to act as a center for the Nan Yang expatri- 361
ate Chinese, and the city has been chosen as
the site of a new Chinese-language regional 184
university.[20] Nevertheless, its air is not that 563
of a Chinese city, nor, for that matter, is it
English. Like all great cities, it is cosmopoli-
tan, but it is also culturally rootless, perhaps
more so than any of the other great cities of
the region.

At the other extreme is Bangkok, most 361
indigenous of the great cities. Founded as
the last of a series of "forward capitals"[21] by 184
the Thai in 1783, after the destruction of 175
Ayuthia by the Burmese, the city has never
lost its native quality. The soaring rooftrees
of *bot* and the spires of stupa stamp the
Bangkok skyline with a character of its own.
The city is located on the left bank of the
Menam Chao Phya within the southern-
most great bend of the river some twenty
miles from its mouth. Exceptional prob- [364
lems of poor drainage plagued the city from 312]
the start, and its numerous *klongs* or canals
have given it the rather misleading title of
the "Venice of the East."

A Chinese city early appeared to the 361
southeast of the original castle town and in
time became part of the central business 34
district. As the lesser *klongs* were filled in to 184
become roads, the city continued to expand.
A new city appeared on the northern out-
skirts of the old, a planned creation built in
the reign of Rama VI with broad boulevards
and buildings ranging from shocking Vic-
torian variations on Italian Renaissance to
more recent battleship modern. The con-
trast between the façade of modern build-
ings fronting these boulevards and the stilt-
ed, bamboo, thatch, and tin-roofed houses

[20] Richard Butwell, "A Chinese University for Malaya," *Pacific Affairs*, December, 1953.

[21] See reference to Cornish in Spate, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

504 world's great ports and the most Western of
the great cities of Southeast Asia. A Crown
361 Colony, it is the only great city without a
large administrative hinterland, although it
is the seat of the British High Commissioner
[175] for Southeast Asia. Since its founding by
Raffles in 1819, it has been a free port and an
entrepôt for much of archipelagic Southeast
Asia. About half of the 5.5 million tons of
cargo that pass over Singapore's modern
wharves originates outside of the Malayan
peninsula, and it was not until 1924 that the
island of Singapore was connected by cause-
way with the mainland. At the same time it
handles two-thirds of Malaya's exports and
about three-fourths of its imports by value.
Increasingly, its interests have tended to
focus upon Malaya itself, as its entrepôt
functions have been cut into by the other
great ports within the region, especially
Jakarta. What has kept Singapore the larg-
est port in Southeast Asia (over 20 million
net tons of shipping entered in 1952) is its
status as a free port and its strategic location
at the western entrance to the South China
Sea and the Pacific Ocean basin. As a cross-
road between the Pacific and Indian oceans,
it attracts shipping from great distances. It
[508] also has become an important air center, and
a new airfield is under construction north-
[368] east of the city. Finally, the concentration
of banking, insurance, light industry, dock-
ing, repair, and outfitting facilities have for-
tified its dominant position.

361 Singapore City was originally laid out
with due regard for ethnic quarters.[19] The
563 oldest section of the city, however, has be-
come the business center, but the rest of the
older town is a densely populated Chinese
section, and much of the newer town to the
northeast also is Chinese. Each of these
areas is in turn divided on the basis of Chi-
nese clan categories. The European residen-

[18] D. F. Allen, *Report on the Major Ports of Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1951), p. 128.

[19] For a general description of the city see E. H. G. Dobby, "Singapore: Town and Country," *Geographical Review*, January, 1940, and the *Colony of Singapore Annual Report*.

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were almost exclusively Indian in personnel. In this way the multiplicity of peoples already in Burma was complicated by commercialisation and urbanisation based on Indians. 162

How the early Burmese pioneers of the newly opened rice areas of the deltas gradually lost their independent smallholdings and became tenant farmers has already been described. To complicate the issue, the hands into which the mortgaged lands fell were Indian, mostly of the Chettyar Indians, who became owners of half the Delta's agricultural lands by 1931. They were foreign, absentee non-agricultural landowners, which added to the Burmese farmers' economic difficulties the passion of racial animosity which had scarcely arisen while the immigration of foreigners was confined to the temporary agricultural labourer type. Thus, the Irrawaddy Delta was not only foreign to Burma in its agricultural system of cash crops; it was more concerned with overseas interests and overseas trade. The port of Rangoon was almost the sole entry and exit of the country; land on the Delta was largely in the hands of foreign Indian owners who encouraged still further cultivation by compatriot Indian labourers. This split Burma into the centripetal zone, the Dry Zone, essentially Burmese and poor, and the centrifugal zone, the wealthy Irrawaddy Delta and Rangoon, essentially foreign and mainly Indian, an exit rather than a nucleus of Burma. While, then, Burma's earlier history was one of a dead-end to Mongoloid migrations, the relative emptiness of the new most fertile part of the country made it a magnet for the impoverished, loose-footed peoples of congested eastern India. 426 427 563 184

Urban Centres

Only two places, Rangoon and Mandalay, can be called big towns; of the others, only Moulmein, Bassein and Akyab contain over 40,000 people. Towns may be classified as minor ports and estuarial rice centres, such as Akyab, Bassein, Moulmein and Tavoy. In addition there are river ports in a string from Henzada to Bhamo, lining the great Irrawaddy waterway, which is commercially navigable to 900 miles inland. Many small towns like Myingyan have the rural industries of oil pressing and cotton ginning. Yenangyaung and Namtu are garish and makeshift oil and mining towns. The railway and administration centres often have a long history, as is the case with Pegu, Shwebo and Toungoo. All these places have been described by Spate as little more 162 369 361

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162 than overgrown villages, sprawling vaguely round a few buildings
369 often of the "corrugated iron" period; they were pioneering
361 settlements in character, whatever their history.

Rangoon (half a million inhabitants in 1941) stands at a point where converge the Irrawaddy waterways, an overland route to the foothills of the Pegu Yoma and overseas steamship routes. Itself accessible by ocean-going steamers, Rangoon thus commands the approaches to Burma by both the Sittang and Irrawaddy waterways and valleys, as well as along the Pegu Yoma, which is a well-drained land route followed today by the railway. The town has the rectangular pattern common in pioneer towns and it had no local significance until external trade developed over the last century or so. Its prewar aspect was distinctly Indian though Burmanisation of the administration has gone on rapidly
[504] since Burmese governments were established there. In its function as chief port, Rangoon has handled over 4-5th of the country's external trade and been the gathering point of great numbers of Indian migrants with a seasonal volume of passenger traffic to and from India, which totalled over half a million annually for the period 1921–31. Overseas shipping and interests gave Rangoon a cosmopolitan air, the most modern and westernised town in the country. Though the port suffered to some extent by being off the general run of major ocean-going steamers, its international significance was increased when it became a halt on transcontinental airlines linking it to India and Europe, Bangkok and the Far East, and to Singapore and Australia. About one-third of a million Chinese had settled in the different ports of Lower Burma as traders, more resident than migrant. For a time the Rangoon-Lashio-Kunming route to wartime China produced a feverish activity among Chinese in Rangoon, but there is little postwar evidence that this route into inner China is likely to assume permanent value. There has arisen no serious movement to change the function of Rangoon as the administrative capital of Burma in its independence (1948). The city suffered more from war in the Far East than any other capital of Southeast Asia except Manila: its transport facilities were destroyed and this, together with the breakdown of internal organisation, paralysed trade which, despite greatly increased prices, was in 1946 valued at only 54 per cent of that in 1940.

Mandalay, historically associated with Burmese kings, is a much

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smaller and now war-scarred town which never ceased to be entirely Burmese in its tradition. It had less than 200,000 inhabitants, yet these had created a cultured and matured social atmosphere in the Oriental manner, with an elaborate and indigenous art, music and drama which was paralleled in few other parts of continental Southeast Asia, where pioneering has so far evolved little that is mature.

While the detailed geography of urban Burma will have suffered most from the two military campaigns fought through it in 1942 and 1944, the pattern of the countryside remains the same, with minimum effects on the subsistence farming areas of Central Burma and maximum effects in the commercialised deltaic fringes where not only has trading organisation been destroyed but also much of the migrant labour has ceased. The Indian population has changed considerably because over 600,000 Indians trekked through the Arakan Hills into Assam in 1942, a fact of special significance in the social and commercial structure of post-war Burma.

Regional Geography

Four relatively densely populated regions are the core of Burma's geography (Fig. 49):

1. *The Dry Zone*, whose dry climate, subsistence agriculture and exclusively Burmese tradition make it the most distinctive region, centring on Pagan and Mandalay. Its boundaries are partly the 40″ isohyet, emphasised by sharp marginal relief changes.
2. *The Lower Burma deltas*—where, centring on the Irrawaddy Delta, and spreading through the Sittang Delta, a commercialised agriculture based on rice, foreign trade and foreign labour has created a composite non-Burmese region whose evolution has given Burma a second and powerful focal point, Rangoon.
3. *The Arakan deltaic coast*, a minor paddy-growing area and historic line of Indian approach to Inner Burma, with less population than (1) and (2). Sharply confined to seaboard by "Pacific type" mountain ranges inland, it has tended in the last half century to be related commercially to Bengal rather than to Burma.
4. *The Tenasserim Coast* is a highly varied region of ranges, fringed by small cultivated lowlands hedged in by mangrove swamps

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL4

244 137 *na edulis* Ker), sweet potato (*Ipomoea batatas* Poir.), taro (*Colocasia esculenta* Schott), *Curcuma* species, Goa bean (*Psophocarpus tetragonolobus* DC.), bitter cucumber (*Momordica charantia* L.), snake gourd (*Trichosanthes anguina* L.), Lima bean (large) (*Phaseolus lunatus* L.), Goa potato (*Dioscorea aculeata* L.), wild yam (*Dioscorea hispida* Dennst.), and sweet yam (*Dioscorea alata* L.). The middle story contains taller-growing plants, such as cassava (*Manihot utilissima* Pohl), citrus varieties such as *Citrus nobilis* Lour. and *Citrus aurantifolia* Swingle, papaya (*Carica papaya* L.), banana (*Musa* species), rose apple (*Eugenia aquea* Burm.), and soursop (*Anona muricata* L.). The upper story is formed by tall fruit trees, such as coconut (*Cocos nucifera* L.), jackfruit (*Artocarpus integra* Merr.), sapodilla or chico (*Achras zapota* L.), pomelo (*Citrus maxima* Merr.), of which numerous forms, differing in size and color, are known in the Indies, *belinju* (*Gnetum gnemon* L.), mango (*Mangifera indica* L.), durian (*Durio zibethinus* Murr.), candlenut tree (*Aleurites moluccana* Willd.), tamarind (*Tamarindus indica* L.), *pete* (*Parkia speciosa* Hassk.), stinkbean tree (*Pithecellobium lobatum* Benth.), and *santol* (*Sandoricum koetjape* Merr.).

This list does not by any means include all the plants that appear in the gardens. The plants vary in number and type from region to region in accordance with differences in soil, climate (elevation), and the taste of the owners.

311 244 161 369 Estimates indicate that about 15 per cent of the cultivated land in Java and Madura is taken up by gardens. Unfortunately, there have been no detailed studies of garden culture outside of Java, although the products of the garden play an important role in the diet of all the peoples of Southeastern Asia. Terra, who compared garden culture in various districts of Java, found that the share of land allotted to gardens, together with the intensity of their cultivation, increases as the total amount of crop land per head decreases, down to the point where the average amount of crop land per head is only 0.15 hectare. Where the amount of land is even less than this the share of garden land decreases, although there is a tendency at first to increase the intensity of the garden culture. Close to the larger cities, the amount of crop land per person, together with the amount devoted to gardens and the intensity of the latter's cultivation, falls off to a minimum since the population here has supplementary sources of income.

With the development of a money economy appears a specialization that is directed toward the urban centers. There has always been some natural specialization inasmuch as some plants do not grow well everywhere. The coconut, for example, does best in the lowlands. But the new specialization depends not only upon such natural factors as soil and climate, but also upon economic factors such as marketing facilities and the development of communications. This specialization can be observed generally in Southeastern Asia.

146 244 Ochse and Terra found that in calories of food value the returns of the gardens proved to be slightly higher per hectare than those of the irri-

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000 The dualisms and pluralities of Southeast Asia society are relatively modern, becoming emphatic only over the past three hundred years, but plural societies and changing values within the units have been apparent in their changing political patterns. First there were the inland political nuclei; the kingdoms of Middle Burma, Upper Siam, Inner Cambodia were matched among the islands by principalities set in the mountains of Sumatra and Java. Then came the little powers related more to the sea than to the land; the Sailendra kingdoms using the Malacca Strait as their bond and artery, the Majapahit sea kingdom whose territories in Borneo, Celebes, Java and South Sumatra may be thought of as footholds for a sailing people, fringing rather than entrenched in the islands (Fig. 113). At a later phase the move of power centres was to the lower rivers of the continental edge, to Lower Burma and Lower Siam. In these historic patterns of political units may be seen operating the influences and traditions of widely differing human types, one rooted in the land, coming overland, depending on agriculture for its welfare and power; the other of seafaring people, many kinds and grades of them, coming to the lands of Southeast Asia by water, relatively mobile on their seaways, fishing and trading through the seas, and always peripheral to the land.

Dual National Foci

• 369 184 177 631 In most of the constituent political units of Southeast Asia there is thus a split of interest (Fig. 117). Burma has a focus at Mandalay and a commercial-administrative focus at Rangoon; the Philippines has a dual nodality round Manila and round the Visayan Islands; Malaya, which has only recently acquired clear internal focus, has two centres of different interest, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, the former exclusively peninsular, the latter as much involved with all Southeast Asia as with Malaya; Indochina has the double pull of the Tonkin (Hanoi) area and the Mekong Delta (Saigon); Java, its old internal focus at Jogjakarta, with Batavia acting as external point of attraction. Sumatra is in the strange position of having several inland nuclei plus the tendency to use Singapore as its outport and route to Batavia. Only Siam can claim to have no second focus, yet even there the channelling toward Bangkok is only natural for the Chao Praya Basin; the Korat Plateau topography leads human and commercial interests towards the Mekong and the border country towards the northwest was once focused on

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the historic kingdoms at Chiengmai. Borneo is laid out so far entirely under centrifugal influences, complicated by the split into British and Dutch zonations. 369 184

If this "balkanisation" be true of the individual political units, it is equally strong in the region as a whole, except that the intersection of major seaways and airways tends to make an internal regional focus on Singapore, a tendency diminished by India's economic pull on Burma and South China's pull on the people, trade and foods of Siam and Indochina. 177 631

To some extent these dual foci to each territory have been stimulated by the arrival of Western trading systems which pulled in one direction while the traditional interests pull in another, yet in a sense all these political units have been created by colonial powers administering as a unit territories not previously politically unified or previously using the present boundaries. Spain and the United States enforced unity upon what is now the Philippines and in practice had continued difficulty in keeping Mindanao, for example, within the unit. France has imposed a uniformity and a certain coherence upon Indochina which was novel to the constituent units. Malaya as it exists today is a British political creation. Before the Dutch colonial period of the present century, all the islands of the East Indies had never been controlled as one whole.

Environment and States

The continental political units, Burma, Siam and Indochina in some ways may be likened to little Egypts—nucleations of people within attractive, fertile valleys protected in these cases by the nearly empty space of forests and mountains. The combination of natural encouragement and natural protection conditioned major civilisations in Egypt and in Mesopotamia at one phase in history and appears to be equally encouraging in this tropical setting except for one difference, that although this environment on the southeastern fringe of Asia certainly suited the growth of states, its protective isolation was incomplete. In the north the growing riverine states were exposed to intruders. Thus in these riverside nurseries, states were environmentally encouraged to grow in a setting attractive as breeding grounds for nations, though the environment was not sufficiently isolating nor sufficiently protective to enable the nascent states to persist. So far as the main islands were concerned, on our maps they appear as more emphatic units 369 631 184

369 631 184 than their elongated forms, difficult interiors and cliffed, marsh or forest edges in fact justify. Rarely has any one of the major islands been the locale of a single people singly governed, homogeneous and integrated into an island-state. These large islands have been dispersive and fragmentive to the peoples in them.

Postwar Nationalism

186 The postwar effusion of nationalism in Southeast Asia is thus a paradox. It is a nationalism of plural societies and substantial minorities, without homogeneity inside the states, and without a nation, as understood in Europe, and very much a culmination of the insecurity and uncertainty produced by the divergent influences which have long been at work, breaking down old social integrations and their warm, human associations, substituting for them nothing but commerce and the new myth "economic man," cold, inexorable and not adequately or fully integrated with Southeast Asia people and their setting.

The devolution of Southeast Asia from colonial into nationalist units takes place at no propitious time. The cultivation of rice has been predatory, the accumulated effects of which are now showing in diminishing yields; new paddylands before the war were ceasing to be so easily available and the war threw a large proportion of the old lands out of cultivation. Rubber has found a competitor in synthetic rubber, and its production may repeat the history of sugar. Tin recovers from the war slowly because equipment has been lost. Plantation crops have lost labour, markets and opportunities. Yet Southeast Asia is still increasing its people faster than 161 the world average. Its increase, however, has gone on at a slower rate in the already congested areas and at a faster rate in what had been the emptier areas of South Sumatra (with Javanese migrants), in Mindanao (with Filipinos), in Johore (by Chinese immigrants), as well as in Laos, Dutch Borneo and Inner Siam, by local increases. Thus Southeast Asia has been filling up, though there is little prospect yet of an even distribution.

Devolution

000 The Southeast Asia population is expanding now as the trade systems which provided its first impetus to expansion shrink and lose coherence. The atmosphere is one of relinquishing colonies, but under circumstances when they are involved in an international

162 Standards for defining urban populations differ, but it can be assumed safely that no more than 15 per cent of the 175 million people of Southeast Asia belong in an urban category.[2] In contrast, in the United States, with a population somewhat smaller than that of Southeast Asia as a whole, over 64 per cent of the population is classified as urban.

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Estimates for 1952 indicate only 30 cities or urban agglomerations with populations of 100,000 or more.[3] In the United States, however, there are 160 such urban areas; in the Soviet Union, with a population of 200 millions, there are about 120; and in Japan, with one-half the population of Southeast Asia, there are 64. In Southeast Asia only an estimated 7 per cent of the total population lives in cities of 100,000 or more; less in Burma, Indochina, Thailand, and Indonesia; somewhat more in the Philippines. Only Malaya, including Singapore, departs

[1] Revised from a paper read before the Far Eastern Association in Spring, 1954.

[121] As used here, "urbanization" connotes not only mere numerical increases in the population of cities but also the development of an urban way of life and the accompanying changes in value orientation (cf. Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1938).

[2] Census data for Southeast Asia are notably incomplete. In Burma, Thailand, and the Associated States of Indochina the "urban" population is estimated to be little more than 10 per cent of the whole; in Indonesia still less; but in the Philippines some 24 per cent of the population is classified as urban; and in Malaya, including the Crown Colony of Singapore, about 35 per cent. Without Singapore, only 27 per cent of the Malayan population is classified as urban.

[113] [3] *United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1952.*

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significantly from the norm, with 18 per cent of its population living in large urban clusters. In the United States, on the other hand, nearly 30 per cent of the population lives in such large cities.

Southeast Asia retains many characteristics of a frontier region, with large areas of sparse population, and so it seems paradoxical that its population density is 95 per square mile, as compared with 50 in the United States, 23 in the Soviet Union, and 617 in Japan. Clearly there is no single correlation between densities and urbanization. The explanation lies in the structure of the urban hierarchy within the region. Whereas in the United States there is a notable gradation of cities from larger to smaller, and only 18 per cent of the urban population lives in cities of one million population or more, in Southeast Asia the urban population is most clearly associated with the largest cities. For example, in Thailand, half of the urban population lives in one metropolis, Bangkok, and the rest is distributed among a large number of smaller cities and towns, the largest of which contains no more than 35,000 people. Bangkok, therefore, may be regarded as a true Primate City, that is, a city with many times the population of the next largest city and a multiplicity of functions and attractions which give it dominance.[4] The Primate City is characteristic of the so-called "great cities" in Southeast Asia, with few exceptions.[5] Such are, in

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[4] Mark Jefferson, "The Law of the Primate City," *Geographical Review*, April, 1939.

[5] For an excellent description of several of these great cities upon which this paper is based in part see D. W. Fryer, "The 'Million City' in Southeast Asia," *Geographical Review*, October, 1953.

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

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162 Burma, Rangoon; in Thailand, Bangkok; in the Philippines, Manila; and in Malaya, 369 Singapore. In Indochina, however, there are two major core regions, each with its region- 361 al capital, but Saigon is clearly dominant over Hanoi, which for reasons of population size alone must be regarded as a lesser city.[6] In Indonesia densely populated Java has two large cities, Jakarta and Surabaya, the first only twice the size of the second, but Jakarta is the Primate City, if less clearly than Bangkok or Rangoon. In each case, other than Indonesia, the Primate City is from five to ten times as large as the next largest city, and there is no such graded hierarchy of urbanization as in the United States and to a considerable degree in Western European countries and Japan. Secondary cities, such as Mandalay in Burma, Makassar and Jogjakarta in Indonesia, and Cebu in the Philippines, tend to be regional capitals subordinate to a great metropolis.

178 The rapid population growth of the six greatest metropolitan centers—Rangoon, 162 Bangkok, Saigon, Manila, Singapore, and Jakarta—suggest that national urbanization 369 may be proceeding as rapidly in Southeast 361 Asia as in any other part of the world.[7] This may be true, but it can be argued also that the overwhelming dominance of the Primate City inhibits the growth of lesser cities and that the largest cities will expand more rapidly than the lesser ones.[8] There are in effect only a limited number of services to be performed by cities within a predominantly village and folk society, although it may be industrializing slowly, and the great cities continue to possess a virtual monopoly of these services. Thus, even as a society changes, new and increasingly complex functions tend to be performed by institutions

[13] [6] According to the *Annuaire statistique du Vietnam, 1949–50*, the population of Hanoi was 216,900 in 1950. Its port, Haiphong, had a population of 146,000. The total population of the two is only about one-fifth that of the twin cities of Saigon-Cholon.

[7] Between 1939 and 1948 the population of Greater Manila increased by 55 per cent. Between 1931 and 1947 the population of Singapore Town (now City) increased by 52.5 per cent.

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178 already established in the Primate cities. So, to a very large degree, in Southeast Asia
162 growth is primarily in the great cities,[9] whereas in the United States in the last
• 369 three decades at least growth has been more
361 rapid in the small and intermediate cities.

Although the rates of urbanization are high, being, in the case of the Philippines nearly twice the rate of population growth,[10] no sudden transformation to an urbanized society can be envisaged. The percentage of total population classified as urban is in general so low and the normal rates of population increase so high that the growth of urban population *as a percentage of total population* has not been spectacular. In the Philippines, for example, the urban population increased merely from 23.3 per cent in 1939 to 24.1 per cent in 1948, largely in the Manila area. The apparent positive correlation between social change and rates of urban population growth also is exceptionally high. To illustrate with a negative example, in Thailand, where recent social change has been minimal, the rapid population growth of Bangkok has been equaled and even exceeded by that of a number of rural *changwats* in the central and southeastern parts of the country. Under at least two conditions, however, the great cities have increased their populations enormously and at shocking rates: (1) where enlarged political functions have been acquired since the war and (2) where rural unrest and insecurity have

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[8] The only apparent major exception to this generalization is Singapore and Malaya, where the lesser towns have tended to increase their populations equally rapidly since 1931. This situation may be explained by the special political and economic status of Singapore, the entrepôt for much of archipelagic Southeast Asia, and the exceptional degree of commercialization in the Malayan economy as a whole (see M. V. del Tufo, *A Report on the 1947 Census of Population [Malaya, Comprising the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore]* [London, 1949]).

[9] E.g., Greater Manila accounted for 89 per cent of the 1939–48 growth of the seven largest cities in the Philippines.

[10] Between 1939 and 1948 the approximate rate of total population growth was 20 per cent; that of urban population growth, nearly 40 per cent.

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178 caused or hastened a flight to the relative
162 security of the city. These forces have been
369 operating in combination particularly in
361 Rangoon, Jakarta, Saigon, and Manila and largely are responsible for their extremely rapid postwar growth. Lesser cities in Java, for example, such as Surabaya, Jogjakarta, Semarang, and Surakarta, also have increased in population because of rural insecurity; and in Burma in several towns and cities up to 50 per cent of the population has been resident less than four years, for the same reasons. These migrations have not, however, necessarily been accompanied by greater employment opportunities and consequently cannot be regarded as indexes of more rapid urbanization and associated socioeconomic change.

184 The great cities of Southeast Asia possess
361 many features in common, not the least of
369 which is their youth. This quality they share also with several of the great cities of the United States, but there the resemblance
175 ceases.[11] In 1800 Rangoon, Saigon, and
178 Singapore did not yet exist in city form; Bangkok, the new capital of Thailand, was less than twenty years old; Manila and Batavia (Jakarta), though then about two hundred years old, were merely small coastal towns. They began to grow rapidly after the middle of the nineteenth century, as a consequence of the development of the treaty ports in China, the opening of Japan, the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown by the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, the opening of the

[11] For the most part the growth of the Southeast Asian cities was not associated with a total transformation of society but with a strong indigenous tradition, as in the case of Bangkok, or with the juxtaposition of a segment of a new civilization alongside the old, as in the case of Rangoon. In America the cities represented the culmination of a social transformation in a virtually unoccupied frontier region. The same is true of Manchuria, the northeastern frontier of pioneer settlement in China, which is more recently, and more highly, urbanized than any other part of China. In Manchuria, as in the United States, there is a quite regular gradation of city sizes, and the Primate City cannot be clearly identified.

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Suez Canal in 1869, and the consolidation of Western control, direct or indirect, over most of Southeast Asia in the 1890's, followed by American acquisition of the Philippines at the turn of the century.

More important, the great cities were, and to a large degree still are, foreign creations, essentially alien to the Southeast Asian landscape. Although several began as native settlements, they developed as foreign exclaves on the margins of Asia, in much the same way as did the plantation system and mining operations. With the exception of Bangkok, they represented and functioned as the overseas appendages of Western, not indigenous, interests, being what Spate has called "head-links"—the gates by which Western concepts entered to destroy and build and in which a new system of economic organization evolved.[12] Indeed, the concept of the Asian plural society was inspired by the contrast between the basically foreign great city and the indigenous agricultural village. The ties of the great city with its hinterland were primarily commercial and associated with foreign-controlled mining and plantation interests and with Chinese-dominated rice trade. Such direct political-administrative ties as did exist were restricted primarily to indigenous elites, small in number, which allied themselves with Western interests. Where the indigenous rural populations were affected by these urban-rural relations, it was primarily through the plantation or the mining system, both of which needed a large labor force, or through Indian or Chinese intermediaries.

On the other hand, the relations between an indigenous capital, like Bangkok in its earlier period, or Kyoto or Peking, and the agrarian society upon which it was based were of quite a different order. In these cases the capital represented the culmination of what might be termed a national *ethos*, the epitome of what Redfield has

[12] O. H. K. Spate, "Factors in the Development of Capital Cities," *Geographical Review*, October, 1942, p. 628.

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called the "Great Tradition" in an agrarian society.[13] 361

The links between country and city in this basically feudal relationship were clear, consecutive, and relatively simple to define. To be sure, the villager would regard the capital as a different world from his own, but it was nevertheless a largely comprehensible world, if associated with abstractions and refinements beyond his immediate ken.[14] The modern great city of Southeast Asia, however, not only was different but was also incomprehensible to the child of the folk society, who came to regard it not merely as strange and foreign but also as hostile. The "foreignness" is reflected in their ethnic composition. Until the second World War at least the largest population group in Rangoon was Indian; Singapore is primarily a Chinese city; Bangkok is very largely Chinese, as is Saigon if Cholon, its twin city, is included; both Manila and Jakarta have large foreign and Chinese elements. To this extent the great city is more metropolitan than national. Each has its Chinese, European, and native quarters, for example, although in many instances the lines of division have become blurred, especially since the close of the war.[15] Furthermore, wherever Chinese populations are large, a predominant type of house is the so-called "shophouse," a two-or-more-story building with shops on the first floor, built to a standard width originally dictated by the length of the average fir-log lintel as used in South China, and with residential flats and

369 184 181 631 361 369 184 578 162 563 342 347 563 369 184

[13] See Robert Redfield and Milton Singer, "A Cultural Role of Cities," a working paper for the Conference on the Role of Cities in Economic Growth and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, May 24–26, 1954. [113]

[14] Cf. J. M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian City: Its Culture and Evolution," *Asia*, March, 1953.

[15] In Singapore the Chinese are localized according to the various so-called "clans," e.g., Hokkien, Cantonese, Tiuchiu, Hailams, and Hakka (see B. W. Hodder, "Racial Groupings in Singapore," *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, October, 1953).

342 cubicles behind and above.[16] Usually con-
347 structed in continuous rows and back to
back, this type of tenement is among the
563 more conspicuous evils in Southeast Asian
cities. On the urban peripheries and wher-
● 369 ever interstices appear in the modern street
184 and housing pattern, slum villages appear
which consist of house clusters usually con-
structed of bamboo and *atap* palm, highly
inflammable and unsanitary.[17] These also
are found in and on the margins of the lesser
cities but are most striking in juxtaposition
to the sleek boulevards of Singapore, Bang-
kok, and Jakarta.

184 A further index of the cultural and eco-
nomic pluralism of the great cities is their
369 frequent division into old and new towns.
361 In China, especially in the treaty ports, this
distinction is usually between an old Chinese
and a modern foreign city. The same is true
of India. In Southeast Asia the contrast is
most often between an old and a modern
town both of Western origin, as in Jakarta,
Manila, Singapore, and Rangoon. To a not-
able degree each of these is also a planned
city. In Saigon the contrast is between pre-
dominantly Chinese Cholon and Saigon it-
self. In Bangkok, however, there are the old
Siamese castle town, a new town of indig-
enous origin, though of European design,
and a Chinese town or quarter nearly as old
as the castle town itself. Pluralism is seen
not merely in the division of a city into old
and new parts or into quarters but also in
the separation of the predominantly out-
ward-oriented great city from an up-coun-

[113]

[16] For a description of the "shophouse" see R. H. Hughes, "Hong Kong: An Urban Study," *Geographical Journal*, March, 1951, pp. 9–10.

[17] These areas, the so-called "kampongs," are historically enclaves of the countryside within the city. They form small social cells which together cover most of the surface area in and on the margins of the great cities. Separately, they constitute the rural villages, which in the densely settled portions of Java, for example, are so closely spaced that they collectively exhibit population densities as high as those in many cities (see photographs in J. M. Fraser, "Town Planning and Housing in Singapore," *Town Planning Review*, January, 1953).

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184 try, indigenous, cultural or political sub-
369 center. Just as Shanghai had its Nanking
361 and Peking, so Rangoon has its Mandalay, Jakarta its Jogjakarta, Manila its Cebu, and, in a variant form, Singapore its Kuala Lumpur.

177 In the past these cities sited along the Asian littoral have been the funnels through
184 which produce from the interiors have reached tidewater and the world of com-
369 merce and Western manufactures have pen-
361 etrated. Through the increasingly metropolitan channels have flowed the ideas of the West as well as its material goods. In a sense they have acted both as a catalyst for social and economic change and as a cushion which modified the shock of the earlier cultural contacts.

361 With the exception of Singapore, the site of each of the great cities of Southeast Asia is an ill-drained riverine or coastal lowland strategically placed in relation to an exceptionally productive agricultural region. Again, with the exception of Singapore, none
[504] possesses a deep natural harbor suitable for modern ocean-going shipping. The three mainland ports are both river and ocean ports and must be reached through tortuous and shallow river channels. All are entrepôts. Jakarta and Manila are located on the most highly developed islands of the archipelagoes, for which they act as entrepôts. Only in Indonesia and Indochina are there major competitors for the two greatest ports —Haiphong, the outlet for the densely populated Tonkin delta, and Surabaya, the regional capital for the Great East of the Indies, itself an empire. Each great port vir-
[439] tually dominates the national import trade; all tend, however, to share some part of the
504 national export trade with lesser ports. In
361 spite of these great similarities, the nature and functions of the ports differ markedly. As Allen observes: "All ports are individual. History, geography, politics, and economics all contribute to making them as they are. Few universal principles apply, and attempts to force uniformity on ports which have grown up differently are bound to tail."[18] Singapore, for example, is one of the

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Bangkok

On the other hand, changes in transportation have elevated Bangkok to a new importance. It lies astride the main air route between Europe and the Far East, and the Australia-Europe services also pass through it. It is now the leading international air center in Southeast Asia, with 42 international departures a week in 1953 as compared with Singapore's 27, and its airport is one of the larger commercial fields in the Orient. 361 508 369

The role of the Southeast Asian great city has been modified by the Pacific war and the granting of independence to Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and partial independence to Vietnam. Five of the six great cities are now capitals of the independent states. Each of these merits the title "link capital"; that is, they are the media through which the newly independent states are linked with the outside world. At the same time, they have begun to assume an increasingly indigenous character. The substitution of Malay for Dutch names and street signs in Indonesia is only one evidence of cultural change. The in-migration of petty officials, tradesmen, and refugees from the beleaguered rural areas has given the urban populations a new and more homogeneous native cast. The fevers of nationalism have made the large minorities more cautious about flaunting their ethnic independence. 361 178 184 162 563 177 631 369

! [i.e. as compared to the inconvenient port facilities -- Analyst]

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361 On the other hand, the war also brought in-
178 creased American influence into the region,
631 and the ubiquitous Coca-Cola sign is one of
184 the symbols of change that sooner or later
162 will be followed by changes in urban facili-
ties and urban organization.

More important, the present period is as-
563 sociated with an increasing intensification of
171 the economic activities of government and a
corresponding diminution of foreign enter-
• 369 prise. Political and administrative functions
have become increasingly important since
the war. Since the main governmental or-
gans are concentrated in the largest centers,
the direct influence of the great city upon
the country in which it is primate is likewise
increasing. Relations between nationalized
city and an increasingly money-oriented
countryside are becoming more intimate,
and the formerly clear-cut cultural distinc-
tiveness of city and country is rapidly be-
coming blurred. Therefore, the likelihood of
the great city's leading a revival of ancient
value systems, as some extreme ethnocen-
trists hope it will, is small. Only one predic-
tion can be made: the days of the culturally
alien and ethnically distinct urban center
are numbered in Southeast Asia; and a city
like Singapore becomes increasingly an
anomalous relict of an age now past.

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313 the resources of temperate forests show signs of exhaustion. The defects of tropical forest for a timber industry have been explained; it is not clear why no interest has been shown in a pulping industry based on tropical trees most of which have the advantage of relatively quick natural replacement. Pulping of tropical woods may yet solve the world paper shortage, especially as woody or fibrous tropical plants might be cropped for pulping instead of depending on predatory deforestation as is the case in the pulping industries of temperate areas today.

•372 374 The forests, however, supply the basic domestic fuel of the region. Apart from westernised suburbs of the town, charcoal and wood are the normal means of cooking, in which respect the domestic life continues today much as it did two or three centuries ago. Wealthier residences may use electricity which is mostly steam-generated from imported coals, but domestic coal-gas is uncommon. Domestic heating, of course, is a question which does not arise in these climates. For their illuminants the bulk of the people turn to their trees, to coconut oil, second to which is paraffin oil from within the region. Urban areas are electrically lit.

From Commodity Production to Local Processing

38 268 32 Because the production of primary agricultural commodities like rubber, copra, medicinal plants, and tapioca, all the basis of industrial processes elsewhere, has been the function of Southeast Asia territories over the first third of this century, culminating in an immediate prewar export valued at nearly $1,000 million per annum, processing and manufacturing of these commodities may cease to be done overseas and become the basis of industrialisation within Southeast Asia to make use of local power resources and of the margin of time available among rural populations. A tendency in this direction was very evident in Java where skill and incentive were present; rubber goods, textile printing, preparation of medicines, confectionary and refining essential oils had grown to significant proportions by 1941 and the enforced isolation of the war years should have intensified them, though a resumption of normal trading relations will oblige these industries to so organise that they meet the rival processed goods of zones as varied as India, Europe and the Far East. The influence of India as a source of manufactured goods was evident, particularly in textiles, before the war and could become even more prominent after India's

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industries derived from mining, but also regarding the general prospect of local industrialisation. While good qualities are mined in Tonkin, coals of most Southeast Asia territories are of inferior grade and ill-suited to major industrial uses. This is an obstruction to developing the extensive iron ore deposits because only Tonkin coal can be used for smelting. Mineral oil does not suit heavy industrial processes though diesel type heavy oil engines are widely used in existing local industries, and will probably be the source of power for any new dispersed industries.

Water power resources are huge and widely distributed. So far only minor harnessing of water has been done and it is remarkable that, although Southeast Asia people have evolved skilled techniques of using their water supplies for agriculture, they have shown little traditional interest in its use as power, even for textiles and rice-milling which might seem obvious needs. The high and fairly even rainfalls of the upland areas are assets for water power; only in the loose materials of volcanic flanks, as in Java, is there any great difficulty about the necessary damming. On the other hand, where the rivers have water enough and suitable relief, they are remote from the centres of greatest population concentration, where a labour corps is available. Hence of the 6½ million horse power estimated to be available from the waterways of the East Indies islands, hydro-electric stations with only a capacity of .2 million kilowatts had been installed and three-quarters of them were in Java. Outside the equatorial zone, the irregular régime of rivers renders them less suited for water power, and scarcely any hydraulic power is developed in Burma, Siam and Indochina. A single installation derived from a dam at Chenderoh across a major stream, the Perak River, motivates many tin mines of West Malaya. On the other hand, electrification (from imported coals) has become widespread throughout the urban centres of the whole region. It is possible that a dispersed industrialisation based on water power might rapidly develop on lines apparent in parts of Central Europe, and Southeast Asia might, by industrialising on water power and heavy oils, skip the phase of steam industrialisation through which both Europe and Eastern United States passed. On this basis the bauxites of Southeast Asia could come into full exploitation.

Apart from teak extraction, Southeast Asia forests have provided little international trade, which is more remarkable now that

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the resources of temperate forests show signs of exhaustion. The defects of tropical forest for a timber industry have been explained; it is not clear why no interest has been shown in a pulping industry based on tropical trees most of which have the advantage of relatively quick natural replacement. Pulping of tropical woods may yet solve the world paper shortage, especially as woody or fibrous tropical plants might be cropped for pulping instead of depending on predatory deforestation as is the case in the pulping industries of temperate areas today.

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additional expansion under the almost autarchic conditions of the war period. Political instability within India can, however, offset this advantage.

It is to be noted that the great markets for goods manufactured from Southeast Asia commodities so far have been in Europe and the United States. The little nations of Southeast Asia seem ill-prepared to absorb much of them for some years. Because food is produced in such large quantities in this typically agricultural zone, we may not overlook the possibilities of manufacturing foods in forms such as biscuits, jam and canned varieties. Hitherto the tight association with industrialised colonial powers has to some extent dissuaded intense application to the miscellany of industrial productions possible in Southeast Asia, yet the local nationalisms and the incentive to establish more balanced social and communal systems tend to encourage local industries. Burma, Siam and Indochina before the war were only lightly touched by these tendencies to manufacture.

From the point of view of the rest of the world, a re-orientation of the tremendous quantity of Southeast Asia's primary agricultural materials now handled by processing industries already established in Europe and the United States, would have major effects, not least on the ability of those industries to maintain their manufactured exports at levels which have been increasing over the last century. Thus, a nationalistic Southeast Asia driving towards self-sufficiency industrially is likely to diminish the international trade streams to and from this region, though it may progressively increase the occupational activities and living standards of Southeast Asia people.

Intra-Regional Trade

A total value of about $400 million was involved in the prewar interchange of goods and commodities between one part and another of the Southeast Asia region. This intra-regional trade was relatively small because the component units of the region produced much the same commodities and goods, by reason of which the countries tended to be rivals rather than customers of one another. An additional factor was the pull of several metropolitan areas, Britain, France, Holland and the United States, which acted to lessen intra-regional trade and to lessen the regularisation and rationalisation of production in Southeast Asia as a whole. Food

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504 River, which, though possessing adequate depth for vessels up to 30 feet in
361 draft, has a sinuous channel, which prevents ships longer than 550 feet from ascending to the port. The strong scour of the semidiurnal tides reduces the necessity for dredging. The port occupies about three miles of the right bank of the river and is divided into three sections. Overseas trade is handled by the quays between the Arroyo Chinois and the Canal de Dérivation, in the Khan Hoi district; smaller vessels use the quays nearer the city; and the naval port lies farthest upstream, close to the Arroyo de l'Avalanche. Lighters convey cargoes from ships anchored in the river below the city to wharves along the Arroyo Chinois and the Canal de Dérivation, the twin waterways that link Saigon with Cholon. Before 1939, Saigon handled about 40 per cent of the total foreign trade of Indochina; rice formed about 50 per cent by weight of the exports. At the present time the military operations taking place in the country have greatly reduced the trade of Saigon, and the rice export is only some 100,000 tons a year.

Bangkok alone of all the ports is still inaccessible to large ocean-going vessels. A bar at the mouth of the Menam Chao Phraya prevents entry, and the terminal for large vessels has long been Gaw Si Kang, an island in the Gulf of Siam east of the river mouth. From Gaw Si Kang strings of lighters are drawn by tugs to the wharves of Bangkok, which extend for about six miles along the left bank below the Grand Palace. The dredging of the bar to allow ocean-going vessels to reach the port would have presented no great difficulties, but opposition from the lightering interests prevented anything from being done until shortly before the war, when work was begun on a new port at Klong Toi, about five miles below the city. It is now proposed, as part of a plan to expand rice cultivation in Thailand, to deepen the channel so that vessels of 26-foot draft can ascend to the port. Bangkok has an almost complete monopoly of the foreign trade of Thailand, and in a real sense it is the only port of the country.

Industrial Development

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361 of their respective territories. Industry is well represented, though much of
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rubber, in Singapore; other manufactures are furniture, boats, footwear, glass, bricks and tiles, oils and soaps, electric batteries, and certain chemical products. Manufacturing industries proper use relatively little machinery and power and produce for the home market, in which there is a considerable element of local protection. Food and drink industries are well developed (including brewing and distilling); textiles are poorly developed. Heavy industry is confined to the repair and refitting of vessels. All the ports have forges and foundries for making minor repairs; Singapore and Jakarta, which have dry-dock facilities, can undertake more extensive work. Repair shops for maintenance of railway equipment are located in all the cities except Singapore; the assembly of imported motor vehicles is carried on in Manila, Jakarta, and Singapore. Industry relies largely on electric power, which is expensive because of the paucity of local coal supplies.

Small-scale industry is almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese; the larger undertakings are overwhelmingly European-owned, though there are some large Chinese industrial establishments. Only a small proportion of the inhabitants of the cities are engaged in industry: in Singapore, where industry is expanding rapidly, only 11 per cent of the adult working population were employed in industrial establishments in the census of 1947. This unduly low figure does not take account of the large employment in the establishments of the Armed Services, much of which was industrial.

The industrial areas lie close to the port or along the rivers and canals. They are surrounded by areas of high population density; for the relatively high cost and limited availability of public transport operate to retard the divorce of place of work and residence, which is so conspicuous a feature of the Western city. Newer industrial areas, however, are appearing on the margins of the cities, and as the range of industrial activity grows, industry is likely to become more widely dispersed.

Population

All the five cities would have probably reached the one-million level in a comparatively short period if the war had not intervened. During the Japanese occupation, population decreased in the cities because of the shortage of food, and the wartime dislocation that elsewhere in Asia resulted in a large influx of rural dwellers into the cities did not operate here. With the end of the war the tide set strongly in the opposite direction. The breakdown of effective administration in many parts of Southeast Asia following the Japanese surrender, armed insurrections against the central governments, the struggle for independence, the depredations of extreme

Chapter Twenty-four

INDUSTRY AND TRADE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

39 438 25 If "industry" be taken to include all activities connected with processing, then there is more industry in Southeast Asia than appears at first glance, though not much manufacturing in mechanised factories may be found. The territory is, however, overwhelmingly agricultural and in almost every part of the region it is subsistence agriculture which employs and sustains the largest number of people. Much manual processing is done by these subsistence agriculturists on their own little farms to prepare their production for their family consumption.

Cottage Industries

286 438 472 The tradition of being self-supporting in each territory, the national counterpart of individual subsistence farming, is very strong even today, finding expression in the widespread cottage industry of weaving and in that Southeast Asia custom of making a single length of span-broad, hand-made cloth the basis of a skirt-like dress—the *sarong*, *lungyi*, *panung* and so on. Today this domestic weaving, where it has managed to persist in spite of competition from cheap imported cloths, uses imported cotton yarn, although parts of Burma still weave homegrown silk, and Siam and Indochina continue home-weaving on the basis of Indochinese silk. Only in Java has the "cottage industry" become elaborated into a village factory industry for a more intensified and commercialised production of sarongs. Ninety-two per cent of Java's *batik sarongs* (printed cotton skirts worn by men and women alike) come from factories of less than 80 workers each; this specialised process of dyeing in patterns defined by wax is now done by the small factory working upon imported cotton cloth.

285 415 The other considerable domestic industry deriving from the subsistence tradition is that of making innumerable varieties of articles from plaited palm leaves. Containers of many sorts, hats, domestic utensils, house walls, mats, fish traps and agricultural

weaving factories in Java, were the leading developments in local 439
textile industries, but the bulk of cloth and even of raw cotton has 288
been brought in from abroad. Just before the war Southeast Asia was absorbing textiles to the value of well over $300 million per annum; much of it was cheap cloth from Europe, India and Japan, but there was a substantial need for the very finest cotton cloth produced anywhere and quite an exacting local standard of qualities. Should this huge demand for textiles stimulate local industry within the new nationalist units, Burma, Siam and Indochina may improve the quality and output of their present scanty and very inferior raw cotton.

Road and rail management, engineering maintenance and port 39
industries form a leading group of mechanical industries directly 40
affecting local techniques and introducing forms of industrialisation on western lines. The capital equipment for these activities is imported as are nearly all metal manufactures for other purposes. Manufactured goods form the largest single category of goods moving into Southeast Asia, to a total of nearly $500 million annually before the war. These manufactured imports chiefly went to urban consumers, yet simple farming tools and articles like needles and scissors went in large quantities far into every country. Although this category was broad, the components were very varied so that the value of each ranked comparatively low. Manufactured articles of western type showed little sign of being made locally, except in Java where successful attempts at making electric equipment had gone on for some years to supply the Southeast Asia markets with very cheap electrical goods like lamps and filaments, suggesting the possibility that Java may become industrialised on the Japanese pattern for mass production methods, and using part-time or women workers. In neighbouring territories, however, there are no such immediate prospects because labour has proved costly in proportion to its skill.

Mining Industries and Prospects

Mining industries of great value have developed in Malaya, 316
Burma, Sumatra, Borneo, the Philippines and the small islands 439
east of Sumatra. Tin and petroleum have been the region's specialities so far and these have assumed great importance, combining to be chiefly responsible for the prewar annual exports of about $650 million of mineral products from Southeast Asia

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The industrial areas lie close to the port or along the rivers and canals. They are surrounded by areas of high population density; for the relatively high cost and limited availability of public transport operate to retard the divorce of place of work and residence, which is so conspicuous a feature of the Western city. Newer industrial areas, however, are appearing on the margins of the cities, and as the range of industrial activity grows, industry is likely to become more widely dispersed.

Population

All the five cities would have probably reached the one-million level in a comparatively short period if the war had not intervened. During the Japanese occupation, population decreased in the cities because of the shortage of food, and the wartime dislocation that elsewhere in Asia resulted in a large influx of rural dwellers into the cities did not operate here. With the end of the war the tide set strongly in the opposite direction. The breakdown of effective administration in many parts of Southeast Asia following the Japanese surrender, armed insurrections against the central governments, the struggle for independence, the depredations of extreme

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Road and rail management, engineering maintenance and port 39
industries form a leading group of mechanical industries directly 40
affecting local techniques and introducing forms of industrialisation on western lines. The capital equipment for these activities is imported as are nearly all metal manufactures for other purposes. Manufactured goods form the largest single category of goods moving into Southeast Asia, to a total of nearly $500 million annually before the war. These manufactured imports chiefly went to urban consumers, yet simple farming tools and articles like needles and scissors went in large quantities far into every country. Although this category was broad, the components were very varied so that the value of each ranked comparatively low. Manufactured articles of western type showed little sign of being made locally, except in Java where successful attempts at making electric equipment had gone on for some years to supply the Southeast Asia markets with very cheap electrical goods like lamps and filaments, suggesting the possibility that Java may become industrialised on the Japanese pattern for mass production methods, and using part-time or women workers. In neighbouring territories, however, there are no such immediate prospects because labour has proved costly in proportion to its skill.

Mining Industries and Prospects

Mining industries of great value have developed in Malaya, 316
Burma, Sumatra, Borneo, the Philippines and the small islands 439
east of Sumatra. Tin and petroleum have been the region's specialities so far and these have assumed great importance, combining to be chiefly responsible for the prewar annual exports of about $650 million of mineral products from Southeast Asia

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

with sugar or tobacco grown under plantation management. But is the high fertility of the soil due to this crop rotation, or is it rather the result of the heavy application of commerical fertilizer and the thorough cultivation of the soil under Western management? 242 134 249

In no country of Southeastern Asia is there so great a variety or so intensive a use of commercial fertilizers as in Japan.[17] In general, the peasants of Southeastern Asia lack money for commercial fertilizers. In Indochina local phosphates are within reach of some of the Annamese, but the costs of imported fertilizers are prohibitive. In Java, although attempts to make possible the use of fertilizers through the agency of public credit institutions were successful in some special instances, not more than one per cent of the cultivated area received any commercial fertilizer in 1939. On the other hand, estimates indicate that more than 1,000,000 hectares of sawah have a phosphate deficiency and that a moderate application of phosphate would augment the yield by 25 to 50 per cent.[18] 242 [654]

The Agricultural Advisory Service was able to raise the productivity of wet-rice fields in West Java by about 10 per cent. It encouraged the peasants to use fertilizer on seedbeds, to sow rice more thinly on the beds (thus producing stronger seedlings), and to plant the seedlings in rows so that weeding could be done with a special instrument, the *landak* (Fig. 59).[1] This weeder was developed in Japan. During the years immediately preceding 1939, these improvements in West Java resulted in an increase in output of unhusked rice amounting to 300,000 quintals, or 30,000 metric tons, with a value of nearly 1,000,000 guilders. This shows that some improvements in cultivation may increase production without a great capital outlay.[19] 242 243 [412]

Java may be compared only with southern China and with Japan in the cleanness of its rice fields. The Filipino does not pay much attention to weeding. The Malayan, Thai, Cambodian, Cochinchinese, and Filipino rice farmers have more flooded riceland per capita at their disposal than the people of Java and can thus afford to cultivate their land less intensively. 243

Irrigation Problems

Peasant irrigation works usually take care of the fields of only one village or of a small group of people who have joined together for the specific purpose of building and maintaining an irrigation system. These works consequently are small and usually inadequate, but nevertheless they de- 312 [476] 243

[17] "The chief commercial fertilizers used in Japan are pressed herrings, pressed sardines, dried sardines, other fish cakes, bone meal, soybean cake, rapeseed cake, cottonseed cake, other vegetable-oil cakes, ammonium sulphate, calcium cyanamide, calcium phosphate, and potassium phosphate. Calcium phosphate and ammonium sulphate are probably the most representative chemical fertilizers."—Wickizer and Bennett: The Rice Economy, 1941, p. 252, footnote 33.

[18] Departement van Economische Zaken: Voedselproblemen, 1940, p. 28.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28.

[1] [See p. 117, category 116. -- Analyst]

18 Firth E-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

162 cent of the population. Malaya, of course, is exceptional, because of the
565 especially heavy concentration on the production of rubber and tin. Ac-
241 cording to the 1947 census of Malaya, about 34 per cent of the working
463 population were classed as cultivators and fishermen working on their own
32 account or as unpaid members of families. In all, I think one could reckon
462 that rather more than 100 million people in South East Asia can be regarded as peasantry.

[412] Throughout all this region, peasant technology is simple; skills, though
134 traditionally well adapted to the job in hand, are of limited range. Soils,
241 despite the richness of some of the swamps and river flood-plains, are generally of poor quality. The system of felling and burning the jungle, taking off crops for a few years, and then moving away to cultivate fresh clearings while the old ones revert to jungle, is still common in the mountain areas of Burma, Malaya, and Siam, in part of West Java, in much of Borneo, and in the outer islands of Indonesia. It is known as shifting cultivation or jungle-fallowing. Although regarded as extremely primitive, it is an economic use of land in areas of low population density, where plentiful land allows of long rotation of clearings and consequent restoration of soil fertility. But where population is dense, the system cannot provide the necessary volume of production without endangering the future soil capital, and that is one of the major problems of the area. In the more sedentary forms of agriculture, fertility is conserved with a great deal of care, by manuring, by water control, and so on. Sometimes there is very elaborate and spectacular terracing, as in parts of the Philippines or in Bali, where the native cultivator through his own efforts through generations has known how to make the best of the land with his available techniques. Yet many of these techniques are only of limited efficiency, and custom may be a barrier to improvement. For large masses of the Muslim peasantry of South East Asia, for instance, the pig, an excellent economic converter of resources, is taboo for religious reasons.

433 Productivity of the South East Asian peasant is apt to be low, whether
241 considered in terms of the margins required above subsistence to give him
565 and his family the range of goods and services they want, or by comparison with Western results. It is hard to make this last comparison significant because of the differing bases, but the following figures will give, perhaps rather superficially, some idea of the comparison. In terms of cwt. of cropping per acre, for instance, the rice crop of part of South East Asia can be compared roughly with the wheat crop of Western Europe. The figures are taken from different years, but they can be regarded as significant averages. Java at 12 cwt. of rice to the acre corresponds with France at 12 cwt. of wheat to the acre; Siam at 14 cwt. to the acre with the United Kingdom at 18 cwt. and Germany at a little less; Japan at 27 cwt. of rice per acre corresponds to Denmark with 27 cwt. of wheat per acre. Yet rice is supposed to be a crop of much higher yield. What is more significant is that productivity per acre in both Malaya and Indo-China is only 10 cwt. on the average, or only between one-third and one-half of the average in Japan.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

people of Tumposok where he first saw natives ploughing. The plough was of a very simple construction, serving rather to scratch the ground than to turn it over, was entirely of wood, and was drawn by a buffalo, and its action was the same as if a pointed stick had been dragged through the land to a depth of about four inches. After ploughing, they used a rough kind of harrow. 'I think this superior agriculture', says St John, 'is obviously a remnant of Chinese civilization.'[1]

Tangible evidence of Chinese contact with Sarawak is afforded by the 'sacred jars', undoubtedly of Chinese origin. The 'jar cult' played an important role not only in Borneo but also among the Moi of southern Indochina, in the Philippines, in Formosa, and various other parts of the Indonesian region. (Dr Heine-Geldern remarks that Professor Janse's recent discoveries in Indochina may help to solve the origin of this cult.) St John describes the several kinds of jars existing in Sarawak. The best known were the Gusi, the Rusa, and the Naga. The most valuable, the Gusi, was a green colour, about 18 inches in height, and was, from its medicinal properties, exceedingly sought after. One fetched at Tawaran the price of £400 to be paid in produce. The Naga was a jar two feet in height ornamented with Chinese dragons. This was at this time worth only £7–8; while the Rusa, covered with the figures of some kind of deer, was worth £15–16.[2] Another jar, the Ningkah, mentioned in another contemporary account, fetched $150.[3]

These jars were the principal commodity in the Chinese trade with Borneo and other islands. This trade may have been of the 'silent' variety, when Chinese junks, laden with silk, beads, iron,

[1] It is interesting to compare this description with that of a native plough of supposedly Chinese origin in the Philippines (see p. 613), and there is a reference to another plough not of local design in Malaya (see p. 314).

[2] Ling Roth, op. cit. ii. 284.

Every Dyak tribe possessed some jars according to their riches or importance, though, as one European lady remarks, 'no one would suppose from their appearance that they were worth more than the common earthenware water-pots we use in our bath-houses'. They were, in fact (to judge from examples in the Sarawak Museum), of as cheap a quality as the Chinese trader could persuade the natives to purchase. Examples of these jars are illustrated in Plate 159 of N. Ottema, *Ceramiek Handboek*, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam, J. H. de Bussy, 1946).

One special jar, owned by the Sultan of Brunei, was supposed to have magical qualities, and Bisayas used to come with presents for the Sultan to obtain in return a little water from the jar with which to sprinkle their rice-fields to ensure good crops.

[3] L. W. Helms, *Pioneering in the Far East* (W. H. Allen, London, 1882) p. 153, cited by Ling Roth, op. cit. ii. 280.

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 All Southeast Asia All

Chapter Twenty-four

INDUSTRY AND TRADE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

39 438 25 If "industry" be taken to include all activities connected with processing, then there is more industry in Southeast Asia than appears at first glance, though not much manufacturing in mechanised factories may be found. The territory is, however, overwhelmingly agricultural and in almost every part of the region it is subsistence agriculture which employs and sustains the largest number of people. Much manual processing is done by these subsistence agriculturists on their own little farms to prepare their production for their family consumption.

Cottage Industries

286 438 472 The tradition of being self-supporting in each territory, the national counterpart of individual subsistence farming, is very strong even today, finding expression in the widespread cottage industry of weaving and in that Southeast Asia custom of making a single length of span-broad, hand-made cloth the basis of a skirt-like dress—the *sarong*, *lungyi*, *panung* and so on. Today this domestic weaving, where it has managed to persist in spite of competition from cheap imported cloths, uses imported cotton yarn, although parts of Burma still weave homegrown silk, and Siam and Indochina continue home-weaving on the basis of Indochinese silk. Only in Java has the "cottage industry" become elaborated into a village factory industry for a more intensified and commercialised production of sarongs. Ninety-two per cent of Java's *batik sarongs* (printed cotton skirts worn by men and women alike) come from factories of less than 80 workers each; this specialised process of dyeing in patterns defined by wax is now done by the small factory working upon imported cotton cloth.

285 415 The other considerable domestic industry deriving from the subsistence tradition is that of making innumerable varieties of articles from plaited palm leaves. Containers of many sorts, hats, domestic utensils, house walls, mats, fish traps and agricultural

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

tools are all made by villagers using the palms and bamboos of 285
their setting. Boats, shoes and tools are made of wood by peasants, 415
mostly for their own use. While this type of industry usually secures no place in national statistics and has low monetary value, it plays a most important part in Southeast Asia life which may be described as still in the "Wood Age" so far as most peasant and rural life is concerned. Domestically-made cigars and 438
cigarettes supply local needs and rapidly displace the *areca* or 277
betel chewing habit. In Burma, the Philippines and Java cigar-making has become commercialised for trade and export; in Java some $9 million of hand-made cigarettes entered trade during 1937.

Throughout the region, too, are scattered remnants of a metal- 326
working industry, as in the beaten silver of Malaya and Java, the niello work of Siam, and the gold settings for precious stones in Burma.

But these domestic industries rank as small by external standards 438
and they play a negligible part in international trade. They must not be forgotten, however, because in the evolution of Southeast Asia we may see grow up forms of industrialisation originating in these domestic industries, as has been the case in the industrial evolution both of Europe and of the Far East. In these domestic industries little or no money is involved. At their simplest they are "subsistence industries" providing the family needs and scarcely anything more.

Thus most Southeast Asia people produce what food their 433
families need and what articles they need. Their requirements from outside are very small and in any case their way of life involves so little money that they have small means to buy anything outside their local subsistence ecology. That was the earlier condition everywhere in Southeast Asia before the industrial revolution in Europe, and it continues both in the simple form and in many variations even today, when there have evolved groups of people in Southeast Asia who are entirely dependent on wages to buy food and what other articles they need. The subsistence 434
principle is still strong in that very little money interchange goes on among the great majority of the population; some of them by doing part-time work earn wages, yet the money they earn has a very low average, indicated by the very low per capita revenues of the various states. Just before the war, Indochina revenue

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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of the new ladang be a poor one. After three days the same person returns, and if he finds that the offerings have been scattered a new location is chosen and a new attempt is made to get a favorable answer from the spirits. In case the betel leaves have been found undisturbed, all male members of the village have a meal on the chosen land. Then the area is divided among the villagers by the headman. Each individual appeals to the spirits by placing a betel leaf with lime and areca nut on the ladang that has been turned over to him. If the answer is unfavorable he tries again. The betel leaf may be placed three times. If the offering is disturbed each time, the headman turns over a part of his share, which is considerably larger than any of the others, to the less fortunate villager. Throughout the following agricultural year with its stages of clearing, planting, and harvesting, the peasant repeatedly requires the services of the dukun, or *shaman*, as well as the betel leaf.

In other regions details differ, but the essential fact remains that the social-religious life and thinking of the shifting cultivator is bound up with his characteristic form of cultivation.

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Shifting cultivators have no concept of private land ownership. The land belongs to the community, the tribe, or the village, and each member has the right to use as much land as he needs and can cultivate. The location of the land that he is to use may be decided upon by the village council or the headman. The person who clears the land and plants the crop gets the produce. Nobody has the right to plant a plot that has been cleared by someone else. As soon as the land is abandoned all rights are forfeited, except the right of the community. However, if trees have been planted, the ownership of the trees and their produce remains with the person who planted them, and he is given preference when the land has had a sufficient fallow period and can again be cultivated.

The Effect of Shifting Cultivation on the Land

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As has been stated above, ladangs decline in fertility after the first crop, and obnoxious grasses and weeds appear among the stooling tree stumps. As long as there is an abundance of forest land at his disposal the cultivator prefers to abandon the ladang. Under favorable conditions the grasses will, in turn, give way to second-growth forest. In the course of centuries this second-growth forest may develop into a climax forest, that is, a forest having the same composition as the primeval forest. In any case, when tall forest growth again occurs, the land will have had time to recover its original fertility.

Unfortunately, however, conditions are often not sufficiently favorable for a regeneration of soil fertility and the development of a good second-growth forest. As a matter of fact, the practice of shifting cultivation has altered the character of vegetation beyond recognition over wide areas in Southeastern Asia. Instead of a dense primeval rain-forest, we now find

J. Furnivall G-4,5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

426 of debt lies heavy on them. Indebtedness leads naturally to the transfer of land from peasants to large owners, and then to rack-renting. Protection accordingly takes two forms: one is to protect the people against the loss of land and excessive rents; the other is to protect them against debt.

423 In the tropics generally the western idea of property in land is a modern innovation. Landlords, so far as they existed, were also quasi-feudal lords over the people, and they were more concerned to multiply the number of their followers than the area of their estates. In western feudalism the people went with the land, but in the tropics the land went with the people, who did not pay rent to their overlord but a customary tribute and services. Where there were no landlords, the peasant might enjoy an hereditary title to individual occupation, subject usually to the interests of his whole family group and to the needs of the village or tribal unit. These conditions are inconsistent with economic development by native enterprise, and cultivation for the market gives land and its produce a new value. Cultivators, inspired by economic motives, borrow money in the hope of earning more, and lose their land to moneylenders and large landowners, often absentees. Landowners, old and new, inspired by economic motives, screw up the pitch of rents. Land alienation and rack-renting attract attention, partly because they are the most obvious symptoms of distress, partly because they foster discontent and political unrest, and, of course, to some extent from humanitarian sentiment. The matter first came prominently to notice in India, where there have been various attempts to restrict mortgage and transfer, 'but these measures are easy neither to frame nor to execute', and they seem to have had little success. Similar attempts have failed in Malaya.[1] Ordinarily they are based on the idea of protecting the cultivator against himself, whereas the real trouble is that he needs protection against the economic forces dominating the whole social life of a plural society. In Netherlands India the cultivator has been saved from the disaster that has overwhelmed his fellow in British India by regulations prohibiting the alienation of native land to foreigners and confirming the rule of native customary law in land transactions. This, however, is possible only where development by western enterprise allows or requires the preservation of native authority and native customs.

Where development by western enterprise is the prime object

[1] *African Survey*, p. 873; Mills, p. 251.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

Where development by western enterprise is the prime object of colonial policy, land alienation need present no problem, except as regards the lands actually taken up for western enterprise, and even debt may not be serious. Thus, in large parts of Africa, 'so far conditions have not favoured the growth of moneylending; the general restrictions imposed on the sale of native land to non-natives, as well as the limitations which some territories have placed on the giving of credit to natives by non-natives have militated against it'.[1] It is sometimes suggested in British publications that there is little indebtedness in Netherlands India. But that is a mistake. The Dutch have protected the native against the worst result of debt, the loss of land, but not against incurring debt. In the development of British India and Burma by native enterprise the merchant gave out advances to secure produce; in Java the planter gave advances to secure labour. The actual moneylender is usually a middleman, in the Tropical Far East mostly Indian or Chinese, who reaps some of the profit that would otherwise be divided between natives and Europeans, with a lion's share to the latter. In such circumstances exporters of produce have a common interest with cultivators. Moreover, as is conspicuously illustrated in Burma, the transfer of land to people whose sole interest is to exact the highest rent, tends to reduce the outturn. Thus everywhere in the Tropical Far East we find sympathy for the cultivators in the clutches of middlemen: in Indo-China 'the chetty is a plague', in the Dutch Indies 'the foreign asiatic is worse than ten epidemics', in Burma the wiles of both *chettyars* and Chinese were denounced so far back as the early eighties. Both practical and humanitarian considerations demand a solution for the problem of indebtedness.

The favourite remedy for debt is the encouragement of co-operative credit societies. But this is no cure for debt, and it may quite possibly aggravate the disease which is the chief cause of debt, the disintegration of society by economic forces. It is no cure for debt, because the success of co-operative credit requires a genuine acceptance of co-operative principles, and this is a slow process, while debt increases daily. It tends to aggravate disintegration, because the principles on which it rests are contrary to those which form the basis of native social life and, indeed, of social life in general. The suggestion that co-operative credit accords with native ideas as being communal in character is mistaken.[2] The village community embraces all the inhabitants of the village in a common bond for all the purposes

[1] *African Survey*, p. 872. [2] *Ib.* p. 1482.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

453 may give the people new opportunities of improving their condition, and, if well managed, may give some protection against economic
426 forces, which public works, even irrigation works for the benefit of native enterprise, do not attempt. For the relation between
474 the co-operative movement and State credit, we may find a parallel in the relation between economic services aiming to increase collective production and those aiming to increase individual production. We have noticed that ordinarily the former fail because it is impracticable to obtain collective action by a sufficient number over a sufficient area, whereas the latter may meet with some success. Yet even individuals who take advantage of the new opportunities to produce more, ordinarily receive no lasting benefit, because they are unable to withstand the economic pressure of the environment. Co-operative credit and State credit are alike intended to strengthen them against this pressure. Experience in Netherlands India suggests that State credit has better chances of success. But it is important to appreciate the conditions of success. The State banks in Netherlands India have achieved useful results because the land policy protects cultivators against the impact of the West, and not because the banks protect them against the natural consequences of this impact. Similarly the pawnshops have been useful because the State monopoly of pawnbroking protects the people against the action of economic forces, and not merely against their natural consequences. State credit has no virtue in itself. It may, as has been charged against State banks in Netherlands India, merely increase the volume of indebtedness, and it is liable to become just an instrument of economic progress instead of helping to promote welfare. As an instrument of welfare it is of value only so far as it is accompanied by other measures in a comprehensive welfare policy.

7. Western Enterprise and Labour

423 The problems arising out of tropical development by western enterprise have a different character, and are more readily apparent and more urgent. In some cases it may lead to agrarian distress, but this is found chiefly where lands available for native occupation have been curtailed by the grant of large estates for European settlement. Such conditions present special difficulties. Formerly in Burma waste lands were granted or leased for European enterprise, but this resulted in the oppression of the natives, both on the estates and in their neighbourhood, and the concessions remained uncultivated

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

long after the surrounding land had been brought under the plough by natives. That seems to be the general result. In Netherlands India the large estates, created at the beginning of the nineteenth century, were an endless source of trouble and unrest; much of the land long remained unworked, the owners were often absentees, aiming solely at profit and with no personal interest in the welfare of the occupants who were more grievously oppressed than elsewhere. Moreover, the grants tended to pass into the hands of foreign Europeans and orientals, and during the present century this stimulated the Government to adopt a policy of gradually resuming them. In Africa the difficulties arising out of western agricultural settlements are notorious, and European settlers, when faced by even a remote prospect of their eventual displacement by foreign orientals, have carried opposition to the point of threatening armed resistance.[1] The possibility of European settlement in the tropics, however, is confined to particular localities, and it presents, though with special characters, features common to development by western enterprise in general. The outstanding problem in regions developed by western enterprise is not directly concerned with land-holding and debt, but with the relations between western enterprise and native labour.

The first condition of the economic development of backward areas is an adequate supply of labour. Even native enterprise creates a new demand for labour, and we have seen in Burma how this demand has led to a seasonal supply and to the industrialization of agricultural production. But the expansion of native enterprise is gradual, and it can obtain much of its labour from customary sources and dispose of its produce along established routes. Western enterprise, whether in mines or plantations, being usually situated in thinly peopled tracts, requires a large volume of labour quickly, and also requires new and more rapid means of transport; there is a sudden and large demand for labour both on private enterprise and public works. The Government must provide this labour. The provision of labour is no longer necessary when free labour becomes available, but free labour needs protection. Then, as employers gradually realize that healthy and intelligent labour is less costly, attention is directed to improving the conditions of work. Thus in general, labour policy in tropical dependencies passes through three stages: the provision of labour; the protection of labour against abuse; and the promotion of labour welfare.

[1] *African Survey*, p. 165.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
Southeast Asia AL1

175 thus set a new stage -- the development of the natural
177 resources of the whole region.
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439 This change-over from a subsistence economy to a
648 commercial economy involved the large-scale expansion of traditional crops or the development of new commercial crops.
[436] It was stimulated by the introduction or expansion of a money
[489] economy, the flow of capital and the development of land and
[69] sea transport. It was supported by Western technology, methods of administration and systems of justice. This whole process greatly affected the traditional institution, up-
175 setting the balance of a medieval world. The free, indi-
177 vidualist spirit of Western rule and commerce cut at the
[59] roots of traditional social life, undermining the corporate
[423] strength of family and village. But the most serious direct
[426] threat of the new economic forces was to the peasant's owner-
[566] ship of land. Expanding economies, new money taxes and cheap imports meant better business than ever for the money lender. Many peasants became ruined by debt and lost their lands. Indebtedness and debt slavery were not new in Southeast Asia; the latter was fairly soon stamped out, but the former now became much more widespread than before, resulting in the creation of a landless proletariat.[16]

184 Characteristics of Current Southeast Asian Economy

In spite of all the differences among the countries of Southeast Asia in the natural environment, ethnic

16. Harrison, op. cit., p. 210.

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

Chinese

religion was no barrier between themselves and the Chinese; all were 563
Buddhists, though of differing sects. Chinese culture had long been 609
admired by the peoples of Farther India, and had influenced them. Moreover, the Chinese were regarded as distant and desirable relatives. With the advent, however, of Chinese women and the accelerated growth of Chinese nationalism after the first world war, intermarriage occurred less frequently (though it continued to be common in Burma and Cambodia), and the indigenous peoples had few social contacts with the Chinese in their midst. The cleavage between the ethnic groups was further widened in the British colonies by the official policy of representation of various communities on legislative and advisory bodies.

Economically, relations between the indigenous and the immigrant 464
peoples altered from a mosaic of non-conflicting occupations to one of 477
rapidly increasing competition. For years the native peoples had con- 178
tentedly seen the arrival of thousands of immigrants annually who were
able and willing to perform the hard labor for which they themselves had
neither inclination nor compulsion. Through much of the region, how- 425
ever, during the inter-war period an indigenous proletariat was develop- 177
ing as a result of the transfer of farm land from the indebted native
peasantry to non-agriculturists, often to alien moneylenders, and also because of the growth of a Western-inspired individualism which was weakening family ties once paramount. The trend was apparent chiefly in parts of Burma, Siam, and Indochina.

This development did not assume significant proportions until the 464
world economic depression, when considerable unemployment arose out 458
of the drop in prices and the curtailment of foreign markets for products
of Southeast Asia. The result was a swift increase in the number of 178
natives seeking to return to their villages and, on the other hand, of
those forced to seek part-time or full-time employment away from their villages in competition with immigrant laborers for work previously scorned as arduous, monotonous, and underpaid.

Meanwhile the native middle classes for the first time faced a serious 464
unemployment problem. Until the depression years, the opportunities 178
for desirable though moderately paid employment in government or business had seemed to exceed the number of qualified candidates. The depression made it clear that the saturation point had been reached, and each year an increasing number of educated youths would be thwarted in their expectation of employment or, if given a job, in their rise to higher positions. Thus two groups of economically frustrated natives developed simultaneously in numbers and in consciousness in the decade
prior to the second world war. 563

Nascent political factors became significant during that period. The 464
struggles of the Chinese against the Japanese and of Indians against Brit- 668
ish rule were reflected in the attitudes of the emigrants from those coun-

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese
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Sometimes they have been given a choice of activities. The Spanish, for example, wanted them as peasant agriculturists but tolerated them as traders. Similarly, in Indochina the French wanted them for opening up uncultivated lands, but, since the 'Red Lands' suitable for the cultivation of rubber and other profitable raw materials were barred to all aliens, the Chinese (although he might have been a peasant at home) refused the hard toil of the fields if he could obtain a position with a Chinese firm. In Java the Dutch found the Chinese useful as middlemen, and middlemen they became, accepting the penalty of the resentment of the Javanese that such a function entailed. The farming of the revenue was allotted to them as the highest bidders by the Spanish, the Dutch, and the British alike. Such occupations are labelled 'parasitic', but it must be remembered that they were the best methods of obtaining revenue available before the Governments felt themselves able to collect it for themselves. When they could do so, the farms were abolished. Also, it should be remembered, it was from the Chinese themselves that most of the revenue of the farms was collected. If we accept Mr Furnivall's epithet of 'parasitic' we must extend it to cover the British, Dutch, and French Governments also.

Given a large and improvident peasantry, as existed in Siam, Indonesia, Indochina, and the Philippines, there was a demand for credit with uncertain security or none at all. This credit was most naturally extended by the traders to whom they sold their produce, and it was most conveniently given in the form of goods and paid for in produce at the time of the harvest. Certainly this gave great power to the Chinese trader; the question is whether he abused it. A survey in Siam by Mr James M. Andrews (see p. 164) does not bear out the widespread belief that the Chinese are unconscionable usurers. 'The Thai farmer [says Mr Andrews], and especially his wife, is much more given to money-lending with the hope of high profits than the Chinese.' As regards alleged profiteering in the rice trade, the College of Agriculture at Los Baños in the Philippines (see p. 635) conducted a survey and found that 'the Chinese merchants are performing essential marketing services at a fairly low cost'. In Indonesia it is notorious that many Indonesian Hajis and Arabs are far greedier money-lenders than are the Chinese. In Malaya it is the chetty and the Sikh who are the money-lenders; not the Chinese. Cases in which Chinese

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Chinese
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figured as lenders were practically unknown.[1] The charge of 'unconscionable usury and profiteering' is, in the writer's opinion, not proved.

Professor Raymond Firth has gone into the question of Chinese middlemen in the Malayan fishing industry with considerable care. He says that in this role the Chinese performs important functions. He shoulders a great part of the market risks; he supplies considerable capital, in a liquid form, in consumer's goods, or in producer's goods; and he saves the fishermen much trouble in seeking buyers. On the other hand the same observer adds:

> The system obviously has great dangers. It gives him a monopoly, with little prospect of the fishermen reaping the advantages of the rising market, or of even getting much more than bare subsistence earnings, and it tends very often to place them firmly in his debt, with little chance of extricating themselves and building up their own capital.

Among the Malay fishermen this relationship with the Chinese is variously viewed. One group told Professor Firth that they liked it 'because they can get hold of cash easily'. In several other places, however, the fishermen complained of the low prices they received from the Chinese to whom they were bound to sell. Up to 1939 the attempt of the administration to meet the situation by encouraging co-operative Malay associations for fish-marketing had had only a moderate success.[2]

It should be added that the provision of credit on reasonable terms for productive enterprise is finally the responsibility of the Governments. Much progress has been made in some Southeast Asian countries in the establishment of landbanks, co-operative societies, &c., in the last half-century, but these advanced money only for 'productive' purposes, and in Indonesia the people have still to go to money-lenders to obtain money for wedding, funeral,

[1] A London solicitor who was for many years in Malaya, where he had a large practice, remarked to the writer on 10 February 1949, 'I have never known a money-lending Chinese.' Nor can the writer himself, who had considerable experience as a magistrate and as official assignee and liquidator of companies, recollect any such case.

The writer, on the other hand, has known Britons (of presumed respectability) lending money to Indian chetties at a minimum of 12–15 per cent., who in turn lent it to Malays, Chinese, and others at a rate of interest that can only be guessed!

[2] *Malay Fishermen: Their Peasant Economy*, pp. 14, 61.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese
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and other expenditure demanded by custom. Moreover, the money-lenders are willing to advance money without the security demanded by landbanks and co-operative societies.

In the matter of trade monopoly it is true that in Siam, Indochina, Indonesia, and the Philippines the Chinese have a virtual monopoly of the rice distribution and milling trades. The Governments of these countries have, to meet the popular agitation, passed legislation to restrict the Chinese share in this trade. The fact that the Chinese maintains his position in face of all this legislation and in face of competition, fair or unfair, is simply because he is so much more competent in the business. Florence Horn (see p. 634) points out that the Filipino politician who charged the Chinese with having half the retail business in their hands changed his ground completely when the reply was made that all the Filipino had to do was to open up a *tienda* on his own and put the Chinese out of business. He then said that the Chinese standard of living was deplorably low, he eats almost nothing and works day and night; therefore he subjects the Filipino to unfair competition! At the same time it must be admitted that the Chinese, having obtained virtual control of some trades, do their best to keep them in their hands and usually employ only their own countrymen. This is naturally galling to the native looking for an opening, but there is a sound business reason for it. They employ their own people because they are, on the whole, better at the job. No European merchant would maintain that a firm should be compelled to employ persons of inferior business capacity, thus exposing the firm to the danger of bankruptcy.

If the Governments of Southeast Asia wish to secure a greater share of the trade of their country for their nationals, they are entitled to legislate accordingly—provided, of course, that the law does not operate harshly or unjustly by depriving an alien of one source of livelihood before he has had a chance of acquiring another. (The economic effect on a country of discriminating against aliens who discharge some useful function is another matter.)

In *Fanny's First Play* Bernard Shaw pokes fun at the critics who will not give an opinion as to the merits of the play until they know 'Who wrote it?' The inference is that such a question is an irrelevance, and that the play should be judged on its own merits. But while we have, so far, attempted to consider the charges

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

dom was no natural growth but the exotic seed of a plural society, unable to protect itself. Usually the first stage in the transition from a policy of *laissez-faire* to one of constructive effort on behalf of native welfare can be recognized by attempts to protect the people against the economic forces liberated under western rule. As we have noticed, development by native enterprise and by western enterprise react differently on native social life. Each requires its appropriate method of protection. In the former case, with natives cultivating for the market, economic forces attack the native social structure from within, and the problem is to protect them in the produce market and to assure them of the fruits of their labour and suitable conditions of occupancy. In the latter case, with natives employed in capitalist enterprise, economic forces act in the first instance from without, and the problem is to protect them in the labour market and to secure for them sufficient wages and suitable conditions of employment.

6. Native Enterprise and the Land

In the course of development by native enterprise, one conspicuous feature is the growth of agricultural indebtedness; this is indeed a natural and almost inevitable consequence of native cultivation for the market. Rapid development demands that cultivators shall borrow money to take up land and hire labour, but circumstances encourage them to borrow more than they require and more than they can repay.[1] This is often ascribed to the shiftlessness of cultivators, or the wickedness of moneylenders, who deliberately entangle the cultivator in debt so as to leave him with no more than a bare subsistence.[2] It is true that the grant of easy credit to the limit of the security available is profitable to the moneylender, who has least trouble with large loans, but it is profitable also to the exporter, who can obtain steadier supplies at lower prices, to the importer, who can sell more goods to cultivators with more cash than they know how to use, and to the banks which finance the whole series of transactions. Easy credit greases all the wheels of the economic mechanism. We have seen the result in Burma. The indebtedness of cultivators in India is notorious. In the Philippines, Malaya, Fiji, Ceylon, Cyprus, Egypt, Zanzibar and other parts of Africa,[3] everywhere indeed where the people cultivate for sale rather than for the family, the burden

[1] *African Survey*, p. 885. [2] *ISC*, 1, 275.
[3] *African Survey*, p. 872; *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 25; Mills, p. 276.

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426 of debt lies heavy on them. Indebtedness leads naturally to the transfer of land from peasants to large owners, and then to rack-renting. Protection accordingly takes two forms: one is to protect the people against the loss of land and excessive rents; the other is to protect them against debt.

423 In the tropics generally the western idea of property in land is a modern innovation. Landlords, so far as they existed, were also quasi-feudal lords over the people, and they were more concerned to multiply the number of their followers than the area of their estates. In western feudalism the people went with the land, but in the tropics the land went with the people, who did not pay rent to their overlord but a customary tribute and services. Where there were no landlords, the peasant might enjoy an hereditary title to individual occupation, subject usually to the interests of his whole family group and to the needs of the village or tribal unit. These conditions are inconsistent with economic development by native enterprise, and cultivation for the market gives land and its produce a new value. Cultivators, inspired by economic motives, borrow money in the hope of earning more, and lose their land to moneylenders and large landowners, often absentees. Landowners, old and new, inspired by economic motives, screw up the pitch of rents. Land alienation and rack-renting attract attention, partly because they are the most obvious symptoms of distress, partly because they foster discontent and political unrest, and, of course, to some extent from humanitarian sentiment. The matter first came prominently to notice in India, where there have been various attempts to restrict mortgage and transfer, 'but these measures are easy neither to frame nor to execute', and they seem to have had little success. Similar attempts have failed in Malaya.[1] Ordinarily they are based on the idea of protecting the cultivator against himself, whereas the real trouble is that he needs protection against the economic forces dominating the whole social life of a plural society. In Netherlands India the cultivator has been saved from the disaster that has overwhelmed his fellow in British India by regulations prohibiting the alienation of native land to foreigners and confirming the rule of native customary law in land transactions. This, however, is possible only where development by western enterprise allows or requires the preservation of native authority and native customs.

Where development by western enterprise is the prime object

[1] *African Survey*, p. 873; Mills, p. 251.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

Where development by western enterprise is the prime object of colonial policy, land alienation need present no problem, except as regards the lands actually taken up for western enterprise, and even debt may not be serious. Thus, in large parts of Africa, 'so far conditions have not favoured the growth of moneylending; the general restrictions imposed on the sale of native land to non-natives, as well as the limitations which some territories have placed on the giving of credit to natives by non-natives have militated against it'.[1] It is sometimes suggested in British publications that there is little indebtedness in Netherlands India. But that is a mistake. The Dutch have protected the native against the worst result of debt, the loss of land, but not against incurring debt. In the development of British India and Burma by native enterprise the merchant gave out advances to secure produce; in Java the planter gave advances to secure labour. The actual moneylender is usually a middleman, in the Tropical Far East mostly Indian or Chinese, who reaps some of the profit that would otherwise be divided between natives and Europeans, with a lion's share to the latter. In such circumstances exporters of produce have a common interest with cultivators. Moreover, as is conspicuously illustrated in Burma, the transfer of land to people whose sole interest is to exact the highest rent, tends to reduce the outturn. Thus everywhere in the Tropical Far East we find sympathy for the cultivators in the clutches of middlemen: in Indo-China 'the chetty is a plague', in the Dutch Indies 'the foreign asiatic is worse than ten epidemics', in Burma the wiles of both *chettyars* and Chinese were denounced so far back as the early eighties. Both practical and humanitarian considerations demand a solution for the problem of indebtedness.

The favourite remedy for debt is the encouragement of co-operative credit societies. But this is no cure for debt, and it may quite possibly aggravate the disease which is the chief cause of debt, the disintegration of society by economic forces. It is no cure for debt, because the success of co-operative credit requires a genuine acceptance of co-operative principles, and this is a slow process, while debt increases daily. It tends to aggravate disintegration, because the principles on which it rests are contrary to those which form the basis of native social life and, indeed, of social life in general. The suggestion that co-operative credit accords with native ideas as being communal in character is mistaken.[2] The village community embraces all the inhabitants of the village in a common bond for all the purposes

[1] *African Survey*, p. 872. [2] *Ib.* p. 1482.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

in addition to the State banks. How far the State banks have been successful in solving the economic problem is a matter of debate. The successful working of such banks demands a restriction on private credit. In Netherlands India this is provided in some measure by the application of native customary law to native lands, which prevents their alienation for debt to foreign moneylenders. But apparently the banks, nominally for agriculturists, find most of their clients among townsfolk; and some critics allege that the people borrow as much from private moneylenders as before, in addition to what is borrowed from the banks. It would appear then that the restrictions on private moneylending in Netherlands India are inadequate, but the banks do at least provide facilities for individuals to obtain credit on sound lines.

The State pawnshops in Netherlands India provide similar facilities for individuals, mainly townsfolk, to obtain temporary accommodation on a small scale. These also were an outcome of the Ethical movement, originating with the same man who started the early co-operative credit movement. Formerly the pawnshops were in the hands of the Chinese, who managed them merely with a view to profit. The pawnbrokers were cunning in sharp practice; the terms for loans were exorbitant, and the arrangements for the safe custody of pledges were unsatisfactory, while the shops were widely believed to be used as opium dens. All this has been changed, and the shops are not only a public benefit but yield a handsome revenue.

Both State banks and pawnshops illustrate the fact that the promotion of welfare does not necessitate the introduction of foreign capital. In fact they require practically no capital as, by beginning on a small scale, they can provide the capital for further development. All they require is a knowledge of the people and their economic situation, the will to promote their welfare and, above all, patience. They differ from co-operative credit societies mainly in three points. They appeal merely to economic motives, common to all men, whereas the co-operative movement urges social ideals easier to preach than to practise. They meet the requirements of individuals as such, whereas co-operative societies only meet the individual requirements of those who are willing to combine for common action. And in meeting individual requirements they fulfil their purpose, whereas the co-operative movement requires common *social* action for common *economic* ends which are prejudicial to common social life and thereby hinder common social action. Credit institutions, like public works,

7: Furnivall G-4,5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

453 may give the people new opportunities of improving their condition, and, if well managed, may give some protection against economic 426 forces, which public works, even irrigation works for the benefit of native enterprise, do not attempt. For the relation between 474 the co-operative movement and State credit, we may find a parallel in the relation between economic services aiming to increase collective production and those aiming to increase individual production. We have noticed that ordinarily the former fail because it is impracticable to obtain collective action by a sufficient number over a sufficient area, whereas the latter may meet with some success. Yet even individuals who take advantage of the new opportunities to produce more, ordinarily receive no lasting benefit, because they are unable to withstand the economic pressure of the environment. Co-operative credit and State credit are alike intended to strengthen them against this pressure. Experience in Netherlands India suggests that State credit has better chances of success. But it is important to appreciate the conditions of success. The State banks in Netherlands India have achieved useful results because the land policy protects cultivators against the impact of the West, and not because the banks protect them against the natural consequences of this impact. Similarly the pawnshops have been useful because the State monopoly of pawnbroking protects the people against the action of economic forces, and not merely against their natural consequences. State credit has no virtue in itself. It may, as has been charged against State banks in Netherlands India, merely increase the volume of indebtedness, and it is liable to become just an instrument of economic progress instead of helping to promote welfare. As an instrument of welfare it is of value only so far as it is accompanied by other measures in a comprehensive welfare policy.

7. Western Enterprise and Labour

423 The problems arising out of tropical development by western enterprise have a different character, and are more readily apparent and more urgent. In some cases it may lead to agrarian distress, but this is found chiefly where lands available for native occupation have been curtailed by the grant of large estates for European settlement. Such conditions present special difficulties. Formerly in Burma waste lands were granted or leased for European enterprise, but this resulted in the oppression of the natives, both on the estates and in their neighbourhood, and the concessions remained uncultivated

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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175 thus set a new stage -- the development of the natural
177 resources of the whole region.
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439 This change-over from a subsistence economy to a
648 commercial economy involved the large-scale expansion of traditional crops or the development of new commercial crops.
[436] It was stimulated by the introduction or expansion of a money
[489] economy, the flow of capital and the development of land and
[69] sea transport. It was supported by Western technology, methods of administration and systems of justice. This whole process greatly affected the traditional institution, up-
175 setting the balance of a medieval world. The free, indi-
177 vidualist spirit of Western rule and commerce cut at the
[59] roots of traditional social life, undermining the corporate
[423] strength of family and village. But the most serious direct
[426] threat of the new economic forces was to the peasant's owner-
[566] ship of land. Expanding economies, new money taxes and cheap imports meant better business than ever for the money lender. Many peasants became ruined by debt and lost their lands. Indebtedness and debt slavery were not new in Southeast Asia; the latter was fairly soon stamped out, but the former now became much more widespread than before, resulting in the creation of a landless proletariat.[16]

184 Characteristics of Current Southeast Asian Economy

In spite of all the differences among the countries of Southeast Asia in the natural environment, ethnic

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16. Harrison, op. cit., p. 210.

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

been traditionally most dependent on imported labor and their prewar labor movements were the most highly developed of any throughout the region. 467 464

Nevertheless, the labor movements in these two countries have taken different paths. Burma is made up of one predominant race, overwhelmingly agricultural and guided by strong nationalist leadership. Development of solidarity among Malaya's laboring class has been retarded by the tripartite ethnic composition of its population and by the country's traditional dependence upon two export industries. Accordingly, Malaya's labor movement has developed schismatic tendencies bordering on mutual hostility and has been influenced by alien Asiatic leadership. While in both countries the British Government has not as yet formulated any policy toward immigrant workers and has thus played into the hands of labor, already in short supply, the effects in the two countries have been quite different. Because of Malaya's lack of a self-sufficient economy, its laborers are in a more favorable position to press their demands. At the same time they suffer from serious internal weaknesses not found in Burma. The government and private firms in Malaya—if the planting-mining economy is to survive—will have to make greater concessions in order to reconstitute an adequate labor force than will the analogous authorities in Burma and Siam.

The special composition of Malaya's population and the organization of its industries are probably responsible for the development of its labor movement from many small unions, organized by subdivisions within trades, into a central association. This pyramidal set-up has been turned upside down in Burma, where labor was at first organized on a very broad basis and then divided into smaller units. In both areas the British Government has been making a marked effort to foster labor unions and at the same time to divorce them from political programs and ideologies. But since the nationalists throughout the area have chosen the labor movement as their chief medium for the achievement of the socio-political revolution they desire, it is unlikely that this attempt will prove successful. The laborers of Southeast Asia still feel themselves to be, above all, members of their own national or ethnic communities and have only secondarily developed a consciousness of a class apart. The whole area is too little industrialized to be fertile ground for a labor movement, strictly speaking. When trade unionism is discussed in referring to the labor movements now budding in Southeast Asia, it should be borne in mind that little more than its nomenclature has been borrowed from Occidental labor organization. 467 [668] [565] [563]

Throughout Southeast Asia the various governments have begged two outstanding questions affecting local labor problems—agricultural indebtedness and land tenancy, and the control of Asiatic immigration. In regard to the former, nothing has been done thus far and one can 466 426 167

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167 426 466 [563] only surmise that a development of the cooperative movements will be furthered as the one policy free from international complications. As to the immigration of Indians and Chinese, the local governments seem unable to chart a course between the Scylla of indigenous nationalist sentiment and the Charybdis of demands from the governments of India and China. The latter today are in a far stronger position than before the war to insist that improved working conditions and greater political privileges be accorded to such of their nationals as they permit to emigrate to Southeast Asia.

466 167 563 Any restoration of the prewar planting-mining economy will depend upon the resumption of Asiatic immigration. But management will be forced to grant better working and living conditions and possibly the governments will have to concede a more privileged political position to immigrant Indian and Chinese laborers. On the other hand, native nationalists throughout the area will try to curtail such immigration and will oppose granting political privileges to alien Asiatics who, they believe, will continue to feel a primary loyalty to their homelands. These opposing forces have already locked horns on the citizenship clause embodied in the Malayan Union plan—the first postwar attempt to ameliorate the political position of alien Asiatics—and the British Government has not yet resolved the equally important immigration issue.

433 No matter what constitutional changes emerge from the current political crisis in Southeast Asia, the governments set up throughout the area will have to face the same labor and minority problems as did their predecessors. The urge toward industrialization received an impetus from the Japanese occupation, though the synchronous growth in the industries of China and India (not to mention Japan's continuing need for export markets) will offer sharper competition to the nascent industries of the region. Moreover, shortages of labor and fuel in most of Southeast Asia cannot but curtail the expansion of even light industries and may prevent any immediate and effective way of satisfying the desire of nationalists for the establishment of large-scale and heavy industries.

[439] The region seems destined to remain for some time predominantly a source of raw materials and a market for the industrial output of its neighbors. Before the war certain sections of these countries had entered the phase of commercialized agriculture and mining, and of processing the output—distinct advances over the traditional economies. This trend is now being accentuated, although it is influenced by such wartime developments as that of the synthetic-rubber industry. In any case the form of international organization set up to control production and sales will be different from that of the past, in which the colonial producer interests predominated. In the immediate postwar period, world shortages of the commodities produced by Southeast Asia have created a market eager for all its major output.

18; Firth E-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

427 But the alien planta-
565 tions and even alien smallholders have threatened to grasp at it, and the
177 advances of Western medicine, so beneficial in many ways, have only accelerated the rate of increase of the population which has to seek a livelihood from it. In most parts of South East Asia the peasant is the actual owner of the land he tills, often legally under some agreement with
426 the State. But his rights to the produce are often severely limited by a heavy burden of indebtedness. The real effects of this may be less than people sometimes think, because when the debts are spread among neighbours and kinsfolk interest may be waived, repayment is sometimes protracted or ignored, and the debt may be serviced by other than material means. But there is no doubt that the peasant producer is badly hampered by his debt load. It is most pressing when debt is contracted to a member of an alien ethnic group, an Indian or a Chinese, for whom the transaction is a purely commercial one.

563 The role of alien Asiatic ethnic groups is one of the most significant
565 features in the economic and political life of the peasantry of South East
177 Asia today. For many centuries, Indian and Chinese trading influences
178 have met in the South East Asian region, and Indian religious concepts
439 have penetrated deep into many of its social systems. But for more than four hundred years the dominant commercial and political note has tended to be sounded by Europeans. Now the balance is altering. Colonialism may have set the modern structure of South East Asian society, but the patterns will persist when the colonial Powers have withdrawn. To this new society the Chinese above all have the economic key. In Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, the Philippines, and Java, the Chinese have penetrated the economic system and taken over crucial functions. They have shared in much of the wholesale import trade, they have attained pre-eminence in retailing vital imported goods to the peasant, and they act as middlemen for the collection, storage, and processing of peasant export products. As part of this process they often finance the peasant producer by advances on his crop, gaining a double profit by giving part of these advances in goods, not cash. The Chinese achievement has been remarkable. They have been kept on the margin both of the peasant society with which they deal, and of the European society with which at a later stage their growing wealth would allow them to associate. Though lacking any formal political power, which in the Orient as elsewhere is so often the passport to success, they have built up a trading structure of extraordinary toughness, elasticity, and elaboration.

565 The wider political implications of this are not my concern here. But
609 it is important to note three points in connexion with the peasant theme.
186 One is the xenophobic reaction of the local urban dwellers and of peasants
578 too, which has periodically found expression against the Chinese, as traders or residents in South East Asia, in the form of riots and other disturbances.
563 Another is the reaction of the Chinese, whose economic strength has given
241 them confidence, and who are now prepared to stand by their claim to a

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

gated fields. One of the great advantages of garden culture over field culture is that there is always something ready to harvest from the former and therefore something to sell when money for daily household needs becomes scarce. Another advantage is that the garden supplies the family with a great variety of side dishes rich in vitamins; the vegetable proteins of the garden produce are also of high value. 146 244

As to the possibilities of improving garden culture, these two authors state: 000

> It is very evident that an improvement of the compound horticulture is a very difficult problem through the highly varied and dense planting of these compounds as a result of which they come to resemble a very complicated symbiosis. But for all this it must be possible by systematic investigation to improve not only the quality but also the quantity of the production. It may be said that the compounds with their story or layer formation superficially considered will find no favour in the eyes of western agriculture, but they are an essential link in the native production apparatus.[3]

The alarming decline in the welfare of the people of Java in the face of a mounting population prompted Netherlands Indies officials to examine every possibility of improving the peasants' condition. This accounts for the studies of Ochse and Terra. Lacking detailed studies outside Java, we are obliged to depend upon scattered references of uneven value. 654 241

Credner states that in Thailand practically every house has a few trees on the lot, and the villages are often hidden by tree clusters. The greatest intensification of garden culture is found on the right bank of the Mae Nam Chao Phraya (the Menam) in Bangkok Noi, just opposite Bangkok. Here irrigation is employed in garden culture, a technique not usually found in Southeastern Asia. The gardens are surrounded by walls 1 meter high and are traversed by trenches 2 meters apart. The beds between the trenches are elevated. The trenches work both as drains and as irrigation ditches. Small sluices control the water. In the gardens there is a great variety of fruit trees and palms which climbers, such as *Piper betle* L., use as supports. In the trenches the peasants grow lotus and water chestnut (*Trapa natans* L.).[4] Zimmerman, in his survey of rural Thailand, points out that in most regions the peasants rely too much on one crop, rice, and he recommends in several instances improvements in the cultivation of the home lots so that families may have a better supply of fruits and, above all, of vegetables. In the Khlong Rangsit section he observed that "on account of the lack of homestead and village sites among the people there is no gardening and home production of food."[5] This observation may be applied to Southeastern Asia in general. Wherever the dominant form of land tenure is tenancy the flimsy shack of the tenant has no mixed fruit and vegetable garden around it, for his status is much too uncertain. A tenant 244 312 [37] 244 427

[3] Ochse and Terra: *op. cit.*, pp. 371–372.
[4] Credner: Siam, 1935, p. 246.
[5] Zimmerman: Siam, 1931, p. 307.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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who does not know where he will be the next year cannot be expected to plant fruit trees. Under these conditions the diet is reduced to the simplest foods and is usually deficient.

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Zimmerman criticizes some of the characteristics of garden culture in the Thai part of the Malay Peninsula. The improvements that he recommends show that he has approached the gardens with a Western eye, looking for fruit trees "in rows at proper spaces, not scattered as is the case now." [6] He notices lack of tilling, an observation that could be duplicated in every country of Southeastern Asia. As a matter of fact, it is fortunate that the gardens—especially those that have many fruit trees and palms—are not clean-cultivated; otherwise erosion would have caused the same damage here that it has caused in the Westerners' rubber, tea, and coffee plantations—these were planted in rows and kept clean until the discovery was made that soil erosion is extremely severe under such conditions. Pendleton remarks:

> The average Occidental, accustomed as he is to clean cultivated orchards and vineyards in temperate zones, is inclined to keep a plantation in the tropics likewise cultivated. This is now quite generally recognized as a mistake. . . . Near Songkla [in southern Thailand] . . . are considerable plantings of fruit trees, planted as if they were forest trees. . . . Annually, before harvesting the fruit, the undergrowth is slashed and left on the ground, but there is no stirring of the soil or other cultivation. The results are excellent, and there is no soil deterioration, no catastrophic erosion, no expense for cultivation.[7]

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There is little literature on the importance of garden culture among the Malays of British Malaya. According to Grist,

> fruit cultivation is of little more than local importance. The total area under fruit, other than pineapples, is estimated to be 63,000 acres. . . . This area does not take into account the numerous small compounds surrounding Malay homesteads, in which a few fruit trees are planted and which, in the aggregate, must amount to a very considerable area. Although certain fruits acquire a reputation in particular localities, the distribution of the fruits is scattered throughout the country. For instance, North Johore is noted for its durians, Malacca for dukus [*Lansium domesticum* Jack], Penang for rambutans, but in point of fact, equally good quality fruit of these kinds can be found in other areas.[8]

Malaya lacks the detailed information about gardens and their economic importance that is found in Java, for instance, where the garden area of each village is known, because in Malaya there is no population pressure and therefore no need for exact field studies and careful inventories of the source of food supply.

The Philippines are like Malaya in respect to garden culture. Some districts around Manila Bay have specialized in such fruits as mangoes,

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 163.
[7] Pendleton: "Some Interrelations," 1939, p. 50.
[8] Grist: An Outline of Malayan Agriculture, 1936, p. 228.

18: Firth E-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

for his wife—but he is equally likely to put it into a piece of equipment or 433
to hire some land. To understand the position of the peasant one must 565
realize the structure of the economic system of which he is a part, and the 461
values of his social system.

The peasant economy must not be thought of as simply a subsistence 433
economy. It has a complex marketing structure which, even apart from 565
Western influences, had an elaborate series of middlemen for making possible the diffusion of cloth, salt, iron, dried fish, spices, and other goods. 439
The system of exchange has been intensified, and the reactions of different 177
types of producers made more sensitive by the influence of the West. On the one side are the Western markets for primary products—coffee, spices, tobacco, copra, kapok, and, above all, rubber—the quick response to which has demonstrated how alive the Asiatic peasant is to making money if the opportunity offers. On the other side are the Western types of consumer goods, novel, attractively presented, easy to use—ranging from lamp oil, imported cigarettes, and cornflour for babies, to electric torches, bicycles, and the cinema. Conservative in his techniques of production, the peasant has shown himself enterprising in his consumption. The result has been that at many points, almost without realizing it, the peasant has become geared to the Western economic system. In the early days of European contact, he had often to be pushed as well as tempted into producing for the Western market. The scathing book, *Max Havelaar*, by the author calling himself 'Multatuli'—later known to be Douwes Dekker—has shown the kind of abuses that resulted from pushing the peasant into an enforced relation to the Western market. But naturally many of these links have been of his own seeking. In the last resort, it is the peasant's own scheme of values, his degree of acceptance of the goods and services which the West offers and which he transmutes to some extent in receiving, which determines his economic destiny.

But for the most part, the peasant has been incapable of perceiving the processes at work. The field is too vast for his comprehension. His reactions to the crisis and depression of the nineteen-thirties were direct and rational as they came under his personal observation. When prices fell he increased production of the export crops to maintain his cash returns; when that failed he retired from the struggle to utilize his backlog of subsistence cropping. But like many a farmer elsewhere, he had not understood much more than the immediate market situation. The pressure of the West has provided the peasant with a new range of wants from which he cannot rid himself even should he wish, and markets for his labour and raw materials which are an inducement to him to modify his habits. A new administrative system has given him fresh legal framework for many of his acts. A new system of taxation, though often lighter than before, is more methodical in its pursuit of defaulters. His land, the foundation of his [427]
existence, has for the most part been preserved to him, and indeed the
security for his legal title to it has been much improved. But alien planta- 000

18: Firth E-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

427 But the alien planta-
565 tions and even alien smallholders have threatened to grasp at it, and the
177 advances of Western medicine, so beneficial in many ways, have only accelerated the rate of increase of the population which has to seek a livelihood from it. In most parts of South East Asia the peasant is the actual owner of the land he tills, often legally under some agreement with
426 the State. But his rights to the produce are often severely limited by a heavy burden of indebtedness. The real effects of this may be less than people sometimes think, because when the debts are spread among neighbours and kinsfolk interest may be waived, repayment is sometimes protracted or ignored, and the debt may be serviced by other than material means. But there is no doubt that the peasant producer is badly hampered by his debt load. It is most pressing when debt is contracted to a member of an alien ethnic group, an Indian or a Chinese, for whom the transaction is a purely commercial one.

563 The role of alien Asiatic ethnic groups is one of the most significant
565 features in the economic and political life of the peasantry of South East
177 Asia today. For many centuries, Indian and Chinese trading influences
178 have met in the South East Asian region, and Indian religious concepts
439 have penetrated deep into many of its social systems. But for more than four hundred years the dominant commercial and political note has tended to be sounded by Europeans. Now the balance is altering. Colonialism may have set the modern structure of South East Asian society, but the patterns will persist when the colonial Powers have withdrawn. To this new society the Chinese above all have the economic key. In Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, the Philippines, and Java, the Chinese have penetrated the economic system and taken over crucial functions. They have shared in much of the wholesale import trade, they have attained pre-eminence in retailing vital imported goods to the peasant, and they act as middlemen for the collection, storage, and processing of peasant export products. As part of this process they often finance the peasant producer by advances on his crop, gaining a double profit by giving part of these advances in goods, not cash. The Chinese achievement has been remarkable. They have been kept on the margin both of the peasant society with which they deal, and of the European society with which at a later stage their growing wealth would allow them to associate. Though lacking any formal political power, which in the Orient as elsewhere is so often the passport to success, they have built up a trading structure of extraordinary toughness, elasticity, and elaboration.

565 The wider political implications of this are not my concern here. But
609 it is important to note three points in connexion with the peasant theme.
186 One is the xenophobic reaction of the local urban dwellers and of peasants too, which has periodically found expression against the Chinese, as traders
578 or residents in South East Asia, in the form of riots and other disturbances.
563 Another is the reaction of the Chinese, whose economic strength has given
241 them confidence, and who are now prepared to stand by their claim to a

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648 theme of their spokesmen in the economic and social organs
185 of the United Nations. It is probably too early at this moment to speculate on the outcome of Southeast Asia's
000 determination to industrialize. Much can be said, however, about the element of urgency and speediness commonly attached to each project of industrial development envisaged by each of these countries. "For successful development," cautions Staley, "two things are necessary: a substantial and continued economic advance -- and a social and political outcome which produces self-reliant citizenship in a free society, stable and responsive democratic government, and cooperation with other free societies."[25] The same writer warns that if capital investment and material technology are puched energetically in an underdeveloped country while little or no attention is given to deliberate promotion of appropriate social and psychological change, the result is likely to be either a failure of the development process to "take" and become "self-generating" or creation of a menace to the free world.[26] Garner also gives similar warning, "People have to develop themselves before they can change their physical environment, and this is a slow process."[27]

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44 A most important factor that has kept Southeast Asia economically underdeveloped is the small size of market in

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25. Staley, op. cit., p. 202.

26. Ibid., p. 203.

27. Ibid., p. 203.

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43 each of the countries in the area, which is due to the low
44 level of their real income. This small size of market has
important effects on the volume of international trade,
on the pattern of foreign investment, and on the use of
domestic savings.

648 Because of their low level of productivity and
43 hence of low real purchasing power, the underdeveloped
44 agricultural countries play a minor part in world trade.
47 Business investment abroad has tended in the past to shy
away from industries working for the domestic market in the
underdeveloped areas and to concentrate instead on primary
production for export to the advanced industrial centers.
With special reference to Southeast Asia, most writers assign
the pattern to the commercial design of the colonial powers.
Nurkse, however, maintains that it does not reflect any
sinister conspiracy or deliberate policy, still less any
concerted attempt of the rich countries to exploit the poor.
"Exploitation there may have been," he said, "but this pat-
tern of foreign investment by itself does not constitute
any proof of it. This pattern can be readily accounted for
on obvious economic grounds. The explanation lies, on the
one hand, in the poverty of the local consumers in the under-
developed countries, and on the other, in the large and, in
the nineteenth century, vigorously expanding markets for pri-
mary products in the world's industrial centers."[28]

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28. Ragner Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Under-developed Countries (Oxford: A. T. Broome and Son, 1953), p. 25.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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Finally, the weakness of the market incentive for private investment in the domestic economy of the low-income countries can affect domestic as well as foreign capital. The first difficulty is that the volume of domestic saving is small, because of the low level of income. But then there is the further trouble that such saving as does take place tends to be used unproductively: it tends to be put into real estate, gold, jewelry, commodity hoards and hoards of foreign or domestic currency. While this unfortunate tendency is usually explained by reference to inadequate financial organization or lack of education, Nurkse suspects that the tendency may also reflect a more deep-seated economic condition -- the deficient inducement to invest due to the poverty of the domestic market.[29]

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Cultural Background of Thai Peasants

Benedict describes Thai characteristics as indolent, unwilling to labor for more than immediate needs, content with their lot, uninterested in money or economic advancement, conservative, and satisfied with a dependent status.[30] These characteristics have led to preference for agriculture, government service, and self-employment in general to other occupations.

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29. Ibid., p. 26.

30. Ruth Benedict, "Thai Culture and Behavior" (an unpublished war-time study dated September 1943, Data Paper number 4, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University. Ithaca: Department of Far Eastern Studies, 1952), pp. 34-45.

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tools are all made by villagers using the palms and bamboos of 285
their setting. Boats, shoes and tools are made of wood by peasants, 415
mostly for their own use. While this type of industry usually secures no place in national statistics and has low monetary value, it plays a most important part in Southeast Asia life which may be described as still in the "Wood Age" so far as most peasant and rural life is concerned. Domestically-made cigars and 438
cigarettes supply local needs and rapidly displace the *areca* or 277
betel chewing habit. In Burma, the Philippines and Java cigar-making has become commercialised for trade and export; in Java some $9 million of hand-made cigarettes entered trade during 1937.

Throughout the region, too, are scattered remnants of a metal- 326
working industry, as in the beaten silver of Malaya and Java, the niello work of Siam, and the gold settings for precious stones in Burma.

But these domestic industries rank as small by external standards 438
and they play a negligible part in international trade. They must not be forgotten, however, because in the evolution of Southeast Asia we may see grow up forms of industrialisation originating in these domestic industries, as has been the case in the industrial evolution both of Europe and of the Far East. In these domestic industries little or no money is involved. At their simplest they are "subsistence industries" providing the family needs and scarcely anything more.

Thus most Southeast Asia people produce what food their 433
families need and what articles they need. Their requirements from outside are very small and in any case their way of life involves so little money that they have small means to buy anything outside their local subsistence ecology. That was the earlier condition everywhere in Southeast Asia before the industrial revolution in Europe, and it continues both in the simple form and in many variations even today, when there have evolved groups of people in Southeast Asia who are entirely dependent on wages to buy food and what other articles they need. The subsistence 434
principle is still strong in that very little money interchange goes on among the great majority of the population; some of them by doing part-time work earn wages, yet the money they earn has a very low average, indicated by the very low per capita revenues of the various states. Just before the war, Indochina revenue

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additional expansion under the almost autarchic conditions of the war period. Political instability within India can, however, offset this advantage.

It is to be noted that the great markets for goods manufactured from Southeast Asia commodities so far have been in Europe and the United States. The little nations of Southeast Asia seem ill-prepared to absorb much of them for some years. Because food is produced in such large quantities in this typically agricultural zone, we may not overlook the possibilities of manufacturing foods in forms such as biscuits, jam and canned varieties. Hitherto the tight association with industrialised colonial powers has to some extent dissuaded intense application to the miscellany of industrial productions possible in Southeast Asia, yet the local nationalisms and the incentive to establish more balanced social and communal systems tend to encourage local industries. Burma, Siam and Indochina before the war were only lightly touched by these tendencies to manufacture.

From the point of view of the rest of the world, a re-orientation of the tremendous quantity of Southeast Asia's primary agricultural materials now handled by processing industries already established in Europe and the United States, would have major effects, not least on the ability of those industries to maintain their manufactured exports at levels which have been increasing over the last century. Thus, a nationalistic Southeast Asia driving towards self-sufficiency industrially is likely to diminish the international trade streams to and from this region, though it may progressively increase the occupational activities and living standards of Southeast Asia people.

Intra-Regional Trade

A total value of about $400 million was involved in the prewar interchange of goods and commodities between one part and another of the Southeast Asia region. This intra-regional trade was relatively small because the component units of the region produced much the same commodities and goods, by reason of which the countries tended to be rivals rather than customers of one another. An additional factor was the pull of several metropolitan areas, Britain, France, Holland and the United States, which acted to lessen intra-regional trade and to lessen the regularisation and rationalisation of production in Southeast Asia as a whole. Food

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disparity could be attributed to replacement of capital equipment, yet it may indicate the beginnings of a great change in the function of Southeast Asia in world trade. Postwar revival by 1950 had become most spectacular in Malaya which, though the smallest political unit of the region, had re-established its trade and was responsible for nearly half the total trade of the region. The Philippines also recovered quickly, to be involved in a quarter of the trade. 439

Convergence of Routes

This region stands at zones of convergence for transoceanic routes between the very densely populated areas of India and China, and also between those areas and Europe, Australia and North America, so that international shipping is likely to converge upon Southeast Asia independently of purely colonial considerations which have hitherto specially drawn the Philippines into the U.S. shipping circuits, the East Indies into the Dutch, and the rest of Southeast Asia into the British shipping streams. French shipping has been relatively little involved, certainly not more than Danish, Italian and German and far less than the Japanese. 131 439

The convergence of shipping routes has left a heritage of convergent air routes which are tending to follow closely the shipping lanes, making Southeast Asia the terminus of the air lanes from North America down through the belt of narrow seas along the West Pacific (linking the United States with Japan, China and Java population centres) and from Europe across the "Eurasian Mediterranean" of Southwest Asia and India, as well as a junction for lines to Australia, although the population and production of the latter scarcely justifies considering it in the long term as a major objective of airways in the way that India and China must continue to be.

Convergence of Interests

There is thus much to be coveted in Southeast Asia, the raw materials and the food it produces, the manufactured goods it needs, the commission on the coming and going involved, are all desirable and those who share or have shared in its $15,000 million 1950 trade turnover are inevitably defensive of their portion. Colonial powers have jealously divided up these assets in the past and it is to be expected that there will always be from India and 433

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China no less than from Europe and America, rivalry to share the trade of Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asia has been for a long time divided up by divergent colonialisms. Its prospect is to be divided within itself by divergent nationalisms which leave it only too open to the covetous from East and West, more particularly as Southeast Asia is the only zone providing a surplus of rice and the only zone likely to absorb even the shoddiest of cheap mass produced articles. From now on it is not only the western manufacturers who seek the great markets of Southeast Asia. The factories of India, China and Japan will be equally interested to enter this market—all of which suggests that the trading interests convergent upon Southeast Asia may increase rather than decrease.

Asia and Southeast Asia

In its relation to the rest of Asia, Southeast Asia has functioned chiefly as a source of food (rice from Burma, Siam and Indochina, and sugar from Java) and of money derived from Indian and Chinese remittances sent back to their homes by traders and labourers in the pioneer mining and planting zones. So far the region has been the only population and food "safety valve" for Asia, and the only "New World" for the teeming populations of India and China. Possibly it can continue to function in the same way for some time to come, but the food margin in Southeast Asia is decreasing. Other Eldorados of migration and food have in the past rapidly become overpopulated areas, needing imported foods—the rhythm of such a change-over may prove specially fast in a tropical region. Developments of the last century in Burma, Siam, Malaya and Java have certainly shown how rapidly changes can be brought about and how when certain types of pioneering and initiative are concerned, the people of these territories are capable of large-scale action. Directed into forms of cooperative rural and industrial activities aptly fitting their traditional subsistence farming and communal mutual assistance systems, their rate of industrialisation may prove as remarkable as their rate of commercialisation of agriculture over the last fifty years. Just as commercialised agriculture on its own has produced disruptions and breakdowns of many aspects of local life and reduced it to a degraded form, so also industrialisation without planning to fit in with the ecology of Southeast Asia may reproduce for long periods only the more

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sordid phases of industrialisation from which the West is just starting to emerge. Commercialised agriculture in Southeast Asia has led to rural slums; industry uncoordinated with this special environment may merely bring squalor and bad living conditions which it has taken years to eliminate from the older industrial centres, but which can easily go on for much longer in a more ruthless oriental setting.

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that the people have tolerated in the name of custom. Soon, however, there succeeds a second stage. So far as the people are released from customary inhibitions, economic forces are subject to no restraint but that of western law. In the West the law is an expression of social will, proceeding from the society itself and reinforcing custom, while adapting old customs to new circumstances. But in the tropics western law is imposed on society from outside, and, because it is not an expression of social will, it is powerless to restrain anti-social economic forces. These forces, liberated from the control of custom by the impact of the West, pursue their natural course, breaking down the social order, disintegrating native organic society into individual atoms, and, by thus depriving man of social protection against natural selfishness, operate more intensively, eliminating social values, and diffusing poverty. Let us then examine more closely the nature of their working; first, where the main object of colonial policy is development by native enterprise under direct rule, and then where it aims primarily at development by western enterprise under indirect rule.

Development by Native Enterprise. The development of native enterprise must be a chief object of policy in any dependency which is valued as a market for the products of the colonial power. If a subsistence economy prevails, it must be converted into a money economy by substituting money taxes for taxation in produce and labour. This compels the cultivator to sell his produce in order to pay his taxes, and he finds the best, and usually the only, market in crops suitable for export. The sale of his produce enables him to buy imported goods, and stimulates the desire for individual gain. Once this has been liberated from the control of custom, he needs little further inducement to concentrate on export crops, and wants more money so as to clear or buy land and hire labour; 'where crops are marketable, the ambition of owners is to plough as much land as possible'.[1] Exporters can best make certain of supplies by encouraging cultivators to borrow on the security of their crops; importers of western goods can sell more if the cultivators enjoy easy credit; and the more that cultivators borrow the greater is the profit of western banks which supply the fluid capital essential to the working of modern economic machinery. Thus exporters, importers and bankers all gain by the entanglement of the cultivator in debt, and, however much they may deplore the consequences, they must as men of business work on

[1] *African Survey*, p. 885.

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•433 business lines. Men lose their land for debt and work as tenants, and the tenant who can live most cheaply can pay the highest rent, so that a larger portion of the surplus is available for the purchase of foreign goods. Caste in India has been of no avail to protect the cultivator against this process. Irrigation works, undertaken in the name of welfare, serve merely to expedite insolvency. In the Canal colonies of the Punjab, we are told, there is 'a high standard of rural prosperity', but this has tended to 'increase the mass of debt...moreover the debt is largely unproductive; little of it is incurred for land improvement. The moneylender is not in the least concerned with the purpose of a loan; his policy is to entangle the debtor to an extent that will leave him with just enough of the produce of his labour for the bare subsistence of himself and his family.'[1] But it is nonsense to blame the moneylender. A moneylender who did not work on business lines would soon be in the miserable position of the cultivator. The whole process illustrates the unrestricted working of economic forces, largely impersonal; and exporters, importers and bankers alike are all involved in it. In Lower Burma, as we have seen, the whole agricultural system has been 'industrialized', so as to produce the maximum net yield from land supporting only the minimum population requisite to produce that yield. But Lower Burma is exceptional only as an extreme instance of agricultural development under free competition in a tropical region, newly opened up among a people where custom does not exert the binding force of caste. Agricultural debt and the alienation of land are common to tropical dependencies in general. Even in some of the newer dependencies in Africa, debt has already assumed formidable proportions,[2] and, as conditions there have some resemblance to those of Lower Burma, one may expect future development to follow a like course. Ordinarily, economic development links up the cultivator with exporter, importer and banker through middlemen who absorb a portion of the profits, and the next stage in its working, after the cultivator has been reduced to penury, is the elimination of the middleman. This usually involves some measure of Government control over development, and appears as one of the early stages in the transition from a policy of *laissez-faire* to one of construction.

464 Economic forces react on individual welfare in yet another way. By stimulating the concentration of production on a few export crops, they enable the people to buy more imported goods. These compete

[1] *ISC*, I, 275. [2] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 25.

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648 were revolutionized by the techniques and aims of the West.
175 After 1850, European-owned steamships began the gradual
177 process of taking over the bulk of the inter-port trade
648 from native sailing boats and Chinese junks. The opening
439 of the Suez Canal in 1869 made possible the great modern
505 expansion of Western rule and trade, and thereby brought about the economic and social revolution which has created the Southeast Asia of today. The year 1870 is the real dividing-line between medieval and modern in the history of Southeast Asia.[14]

175 Whereas during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eight-
177 eenth centuries the various European nations active in South-
433 east Asia had, on the whole, limited themselves to trading
439 and acquisition of high-priced nonbulky commodities, such
648 as spices, the economic policy of the nineteenth century called for large quantities of bulky goods, such as sugar, fibers, oil seeds, coffee, and copra. Since the peasantry of Southeast Asia, almost without exception, raised only subsistence crops and had only limited surplus, it became necessary for the colonial powers to increase agricultural production. This was done in two ways: through the application of pressure on the peasantry to produce for export, and through the development of large-scale plantation agriculture.[15] The shift of emphasis from trade to production

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14. Harrison, op. cit., p. 197.

15. Karl J. Pelzer, "The Resource Pattern of Southeast Asia," Southeast Asia in the World Today, ed. Phillips Talbot. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 109.

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175 thus set a new stage -- the development of the natural
177 resources of the whole region.
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439 This change-over from a subsistence economy to a
648 commercial economy involved the large-scale expansion of traditional crops or the development of new commercial crops.
[436] It was stimulated by the introduction or expansion of a money
[489] economy, the flow of capital and the development of land and
[69] sea transport. It was supported by Western technology, methods of administration and systems of justice. This whole process greatly affected the traditional institution, up-
175 setting the balance of a medieval world. The free, indi-
177 vidualist spirit of Western rule and commerce cut at the
[59] roots of traditional social life, undermining the corporate
[423] strength of family and village. But the most serious direct
[426] threat of the new economic forces was to the peasant's owner-
[566] ship of land. Expanding economies, new money taxes and cheap imports meant better business than ever for the money lender. Many peasants became ruined by debt and lost their lands. Indebtedness and debt slavery were not new in Southeast Asia; the latter was fairly soon stamped out, but the former now became much more widespread than before, resulting in the creation of a landless proletariat.[16]

184 Characteristics of Current Southeast Asian Economy

In spite of all the differences among the countries of Southeast Asia in the natural environment, ethnic

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16. Harrison, op. cit., p. 210.

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184 distribution, and aspects of Western colonial policy which have tended to increase the contrasts between parts of the region, there are certain considerations of broader nature and of far-reaching significance that give validity to the concept of Southeast Asia as a regional unit possessing certain common features which will be discussed in brief as follows:

a. Common heritage of colonialism.

b. Dual economy.

c. Plural society.

d. Dominance of the agricultural section.

e. High rate of population growth.

f. Determination to industrialize.

g. Small size of market and slow rate of capital formation.

• 433 648 The direction as well as the pace of economic development in the colonial or protected areas of Southeast Asia has been primarily determined by the overriding economic interests of the imperial powers. Even in Thailand, where political independence was preserved, economic dependence upon European capital resulted in the creation of a characteristically 'colonial' economy. This is exemplified by the following conditions: (1) producer of raw materials; (2) concentration on a few export products; and (3) lack of manufacturing industries. As a consequence, these countries are highly affected by substitution, price fluctuations, and changes in consumer demand. Furthermore, they are dependent on limited markets for export, and hence are adversely

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433 affected by these few importing countries' determination
648 to be self-sufficient in food.

181 A dual economy as a distinctive character of colonial
433 rule is a theory propounded by some Dutch economists who contend that in tropical dependencies there are two distinct systems of economy. In the Western sector economic forces act in strict accordance with the economic laws enunciated by the earlier classical economists; but in the Eastern sector these laws have no force, and Western economic principles are inapplicable. The Western sector is ultra-capitalist since economic forces act freely, not even subject to the social inhibitions which still restrain them in Europe or the Western world; the Eastern sector, on the other hand, is precapitalist, with prestige carrying more weight than profit and communal
433 influence restraining the individual desire of gain.[17] One
438 of the consequences of a dual economy is that it is difficult
439 to conduct business because the people will not trade on
648 Western lines. Inefficiency in trade leads to high operational cost and thus to social waste. Moreover, there is a likelihood of exploitation of indigenous people by Western traders as well as by foreigners of Asian origin who are free from social restraint.

563 One feature that has long been common to the countries of Southeast Asia and is so obvious that it could not fail

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17. J. S. Furnivall, "Cooperation, Competition, and Isolation," Southeast Asia in the World Today, ed. Phillips Talbot, op. cit., p. 71.

563 to impress even the most unreflecting sight-seer is the medley of ethnic groups. What is almost equally apparent
563 is that these ethnic groups do not mix. Each has its own
571 quarter, its own temple, its club or other meeting ground for social functions, its own forms and places of entertainment and recreation. They do not meet in these places but only in the market place to make money out of one another or perhaps with one another. They have no common link except in business. What is not quite obvious is that each ethnic group has its own special economic function. There is a plural society with its own distinctive and characteristic plural economy.

563 Typically, a plural society in Southeast Asia com-
565 prises three main sections: the Europeans, constituting an
• 433 upper class; the foreign orientals, Indian or Chinese, consti-
571 tuting a middle class; and the great mass of the native population in the lower class. The Europeans and foreign orientals are temporary residents, strangers to one another or at best casual acquaintances, and the native community is little more than a crowd of individuals. In the relations between the classes, there are no social ties to dull the edge of economic competition. Within each class, inherited traditions lose their force. Society as a whole is divided into groups; each group is merely a collection of individuals, and in each group life is simplified to an economic struggle for existence. Social life is reduced to its economic content, society is converted into a business concern, and only the

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563 foreign army of occupation has preserved it from disruption.
565 The essential and distinctive character of a plural society
433 is that it is dominated by economic forces, and, outside a
571 few partly sheltered oases, Southeast Asia illustrates the capitalist system in its purest form.[18]

162 Another common feature is the dominance of the agri-
171 cultural section of the population. The latest available
433 figures show the percentage proportions of population dependent
171 on agriculture in the area as follows: Burma, 68; Indonesia, 66; Philippines, 69; Thailand, 85.[19] The same source indicates the proportions for various regions of the world as follows: North America, 20; Oceania, 30; Europe, 33; South America, 60; Asia, 70; and Africa, 74.

171 With the prevailing techniques of production and the
433 consequent low productivity per man, dominance of agriculture
434 means low per capita national income. When countries are grouped by level of economic development on the basis of per capita national income as of 1950, all the six countries of Southeast Asia -- Burma, Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaya, Philippines, and Thailand -- fall in the underdeveloped
443 group.[20] Moreover, there is in Southeast Asia a true surplus
464 population on the land in the sense that even under the
161 present methods of cultivation a sizeable fraction of the

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18. Ibid., p. 77.

19. Food and Agriculture Organization, 1953 Yearbook, Vol. VII.

20. Eugene Staley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), pp. 16-17.

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161 man-power could be removed without significantly reducing
433 food output. Under this circumstance, not only the produc-
44 tivity of agriculture but also the opportunity for urban
47 industry to grow and flourish is hampered. A major obstacle to development of efficient manufacturing in underdeveloped countries is the small size of the market, which is in turn a consequence of the low purchasing power of the bulk of the people, most of whom get their living from the land.[21]

161 Southeast Asia has been characterized by its rapid growth in population. Broadly speaking, the region has been until recently one of very thin population. It seems probable that the whole of Southeast Asia in 1800 contained only about ten million people. Malaya then contained about a quarter million people, Java about four million, and Burma probably less than two million. It was, even at the end of the 18th century, a zone of labor shortage. But the last 150 years brought tremendous changes in population. It has been a period of tremendous population increases, causing people to swarm upon the more fertile areas, upon deltas and volcanic cones where people had not clustered before. By the quinquennium 1916-20, the total population of Southeast Asia had become 84 million, by 1936-40, 120 million, and by 1946-50 it was nearly 145 million.[22] This rapid population growth has been a great concern to students in economic

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21. Ibid., p. 253.

22. E. H. G. Dobby, Southeast Asia (London: University of London Press Ltd., 1951), p. 386.

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161 development who fear that these countries might not be able
433 to expand their production faster than population expands, in which case the result of economic development efforts will be a greater quantity of people with little or no gains in the quality of living conditions. In Zinkin's words, "The growth of population and the impact of the West have between them, in the last hundred years, so upset the delicate balance that most of the Asian countryside is now bankrupt . . . . The alarming feature of the peasant economy of Asia is not simply that it is desparately poor. It is that in recent decades, and in most countries of Asia, it has been growing poorer. It is a changing, dynamic economy. But it has been changing for the worse."[23]

433 Poverty is not new in Southeast Asia. What is new
829 is the awareness of poverty and the conviction that something
178 can be done about it. "A great change", reported Harold Butler, "is stirring Eastern society. The consciousness of misery has been created by the growing realization that it is not the inescapable lot of the poor and that chances
654 of better life now exist."[24] All of the countries in South-
648 east Asia have within the past decade set up official agen-
185 cies charged with planning and promoting economic development; and for international assistance to hasten it, is the constant

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23. Zinkin, op. cit., p. 34.

24. Harold Butler, Problems of Industry in the East (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1938, Studies and Reports, Series B, No. 29), pp. 65-66.

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727 together with the curtailment of alien Asiatic immigration, afforded
464 plenty of jobs for those who were willing, or were forced, to work for wages paid in inflated currency.

727 In the food-surplus countries—Burma, Siam, and Indochina—which were also those receiving the most favored political treatment at the hands of the Japanese, the areas under rice and allied crops declined.
433 The decrease in the number of draft animals through disease and Japa-
464 nese requisitioning; the lack of implements; and, above all, the loss of former export markets caused the local farmers to cultivate very little more than their families required, and there was a marked exodus from the agricultural communities to the cities or places of more remunerative employment. In the countries of food deficiency—Malaya and the Outer Islands of the East Indies—the Japanese made great efforts and probably succeeded in increasing the area under food-crop cultivation, but never to the point of self-sufficiency. The Japanese also arbitrarily prohibited certain industries as "nonessential" and shifted the workers to others accordingly.

727 Very little information is available as to the wages paid during the Japanese occupation. Where local labor was limited and native good-
465 will was sought, as in Siam, the Japanese seem to have paid high wages from the outset. In densely populated areas like Java, wages were reportedly decreased immediately after the occupation. In time, and with the ever greater need for additional labor services, the Japanese permitted successive wage rises. But nowhere did wage increases keep pace with the more rapidly rising cost of living and they had to be supplemented by allowances, medals, and words of praise. The groups that suffered most from this disparity were the Asiatic government-servant and white-collar class, whose numbers had always exceeded the demand and whose services were far less necessary to the Japanese than was manual labor.

727 Labor legislation was passed only in negative measures of regimenta-
tion and outlawing of strikes. Nevertheless, reports of strikes periodi-
466 cally filtered through the barrage of Japanese propaganda, particularly a few that took place in Indochina and Burma. Most of them registered
468 grievances against low pay, high living costs, and heavy taxation, but some were doubtless of a political character—difficult to distinguish from sabotage. Following one strike in 1943, the Cochin-China police arrested a number of "communists." In Malaya and Indonesia, control by the Japanese military and naval forces was not exercised through any native administration, and the strictness of their rule seems to have precluded any possible recourse to the strike weapon.

727 In Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia the Japanese set up a bewildering array of organizations into which the local peoples were regimented by
466 communal, occupational, religious, sex, and age groups. Not only did

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167 426 466 [563] only surmise that a development of the cooperative movements will be furthered as the one policy free from international complications. As to the immigration of Indians and Chinese, the local governments seem unable to chart a course between the Scylla of indigenous nationalist sentiment and the Charybdis of demands from the governments of India and China. The latter today are in a far stronger position than before the war to insist that improved working conditions and greater political privileges be accorded to such of their nationals as they permit to emigrate to Southeast Asia.

466 167 563 Any restoration of the prewar planting-mining economy will depend upon the resumption of Asiatic immigration. But management will be forced to grant better working and living conditions and possibly the governments will have to concede a more privileged political position to immigrant Indian and Chinese laborers. On the other hand, native nationalists throughout the area will try to curtail such immigration and will oppose granting political privileges to alien Asiatics who, they believe, will continue to feel a primary loyalty to their homelands. These opposing forces have already locked horns on the citizenship clause embodied in the Malayan Union plan—the first postwar attempt to ameliorate the political position of alien Asiatics—and the British Government has not yet resolved the equally important immigration issue.

• 433 No matter what constitutional changes emerge from the current political crisis in Southeast Asia, the governments set up throughout the area will have to face the same labor and minority problems as did their predecessors. The urge toward industrialization received an impetus from the Japanese occupation, though the synchronous growth in the industries of China and India (not to mention Japan's continuing need for export markets) will offer sharper competition to the nascent industries of the region. Moreover, shortages of labor and fuel in most of Southeast Asia cannot but curtail the expansion of even light industries and may prevent any immediate and effective way of satisfying the desire of nationalists for the establishment of large-scale and heavy industries.

[439] The region seems destined to remain for some time predominantly a source of raw materials and a market for the industrial output of its neighbors. Before the war certain sections of these countries had entered the phase of commercialized agriculture and mining, and of processing the output—distinct advances over the traditional economies. This trend is now being accentuated, although it is influenced by such wartime developments as that of the synthetic-rubber industry. In any case the form of international organization set up to control production and sales will be different from that of the past, in which the colonial producer interests predominated. In the immediate postwar period, world shortages of the commodities produced by Southeast Asia have created a market eager for all its major output.

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on the average, or only between one-third and one-half of the average in Japan.

Moreover, in any comparison between South East Asia and the peasantry of Europe, quite apart from differences in the production of crops other than the staple grain, there is an important difference in the average size of the holdings worked. The South East Asian peasant has fewer acres than the peasantry of Europe. In France, a country of peasant agriculture, about 40 per cent of the total number of agricultural holdings in 1931 were less than 2½ acres apiece; the average size of this group of holdings was 1½ acres each. But about 45 per cent of the total holdings were between 2½ and 22½ acres, with an average of about 10 acres each. There are areas in South East Asia where the average size of peasant holdings is fairly large. In Cochin China, while 72 per cent of the landowners have holdings between 2½ and 12 acres, there are provinces where more than half of them have holdings above 12 acres in size. In Siam, too, the average peasant holding seems of tolerable size—4 acres or so in the south and north east, 5½ acres in the north, and 10½ acres in central Siam, where more than one-third of the rural families live. But in Java, in 1938, the average size of holdings was only just over 2 acres for all tax-paying landowners in the country. In the Tonkin delta of Indo-China, another large area of heavy concentration of peasantry, as much as 60 per cent of the peasants have been reckoned to own holdings of less than nine-tenths of an acre, and 90 per cent to have holdings of under 4½ acres apiece. It has been estimated that a peasant family needs for adequate support 2½ to 5 acres of land, cultivating it by 'wet rice' methods. Many sections of the farming population in Java and Indo-China, for instance, are obviously well below this critical level. Even though large-scale irrigation and very intensive land use, including double cropping of rice in the year and much use of secondary crops, may lower the critical figure considerably, the peasant in such conditions is always liable to have to seek work outside his holding or to put up with inadequate living standards, even in nutrition.

The difficulties of agriculture in such conditions are further increased by the fact that a man's holding is often not a single undivided farm, but a set of dispersed fields, some of very small size. This dispersion and fragmentation of holdings allows for some advantages in adapting crops to soil and water variations, and is some security against wholesale raids by pests, but it makes for technical difficulties in the use of implements and labour on any scale. Since the dispersion is due primarily to traditional customs of inheritance and marriage, efforts to secure consolidation are apt to be only of temporary benefit, though some success has attended administrative action against undue fragmentation.

The same comparatively low level of productivity is seen in fishing, which gives the one great source of animal protein to the South East Asian peasant's diet. Before the war a Malay peasant fisherman produced on the average 1½ tons of fish per head per annum and in 1947 nearly 1 ton per

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433 The peasant economy of South East Asia uses abundant labour and has
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461 organization, one can point to a great amount of unused man-hours. Yet these features must not be over-stressed. It is common to blame the peasant for a *dolce far niente* attitude, and attribute his poverty to his idleness. What J. Johnston Abraham, the author of the well-known travel book, *Surgeon's Log*,[1] wrote forty years ago of the Malay is often quoted in essence still:

> The Malay . . . has the aristocratic contempt for toil . . . [he] is of all things a philosopher. He squats in the warm sun and chews betel contentedly. He sees the obvious foolishness of working in a country too hot for toil, when the earth is so prolific that a fortnight's leisurely labour will produce food for a year, and the water is so plentifully supplied with fish that an hour, in the cool of the evening with a net, will supply luxury for a fortnight.

Anyone who has lived among the Malay peasantry and has seen their back-breaking work of rice-planting, or their long hours at sea in the broiling sun hauling the nets for fish, will know what a parody this is. The working rhythm of the Asiatic peasant is different from that of the European. The economic system is not well enough geared to alternative employment when technical hitches occur in his ordinary occupation. But the peasant is not simply thriftless of his time and his money. He plans with care his ploughing, sowing, weeding, and harvesting; he is assiduous in searching for fodder for his animals, in watering his vegetable garden, in repairing his fishing-boat or his net. If he can scrape together some extra cash above the daily needs of his family, he may spend it on clothes for his child or jewellery

[1] London, Chapman & Hall (14th rev. ed., 19[illegible]), pp. 69–70.

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for his wife—but he is equally likely to put it into a piece of equipment or 433
to hire some land. To understand the position of the peasant one must 565
realize the structure of the economic system of which he is a part, and the 461
values of his social system.

The peasant economy must not be thought of as simply a subsistence 433
economy. It has a complex marketing structure which, even apart from 565
Western influences, had an elaborate series of middlemen for making possible the diffusion of cloth, salt, iron, dried fish, spices, and other goods. 439
The system of exchange has been intensified, and the reactions of different 177
types of producers made more sensitive by the influence of the West. On the one side are the Western markets for primary products—coffee, spices, tobacco, copra, kapok, and, above all, rubber—the quick response to which has demonstrated how alive the Asiatic peasant is to making money if the opportunity offers. On the other side are the Western types of consumer goods, novel, attractively presented, easy to use—ranging from lamp oil, imported cigarettes, and cornflour for babies, to electric torches, bicycles, and the cinema. Conservative in his techniques of production, the peasant has shown himself enterprising in his consumption. The result has been that at many points, almost without realizing it, the peasant has become geared to the Western economic system. In the early days of European contact, he had often to be pushed as well as tempted into producing for the Western market. The scathing book, *Max Havelaar*, by the author calling himself 'Multatuli'—later known to be Douwes Dekker—has shown the kind of abuses that resulted from pushing the peasant into an enforced relation to the Western market. But naturally many of these links have been of his own seeking. In the last resort, it is the peasant's own scheme of values, his degree of acceptance of the goods and services which the West offers and which he transmutes to some extent in receiving, which determines his economic destiny.

But for the most part, the peasant has been incapable of perceiving the processes at work. The field is too vast for his comprehension. His reactions to the crisis and depression of the nineteen-thirties were direct and rational as they came under his personal observation. When prices fell he increased production of the export crops to maintain his cash returns; when that failed he retired from the struggle to utilize his backlog of subsistence cropping. But like many a farmer elsewhere, he had not understood much more than the immediate market situation. The pressure of the West has provided the peasant with a new range of wants from which he cannot rid himself even should he wish, and markets for his labour and raw materials which are an inducement to him to modify his habits. A new administrative system has given him fresh legal framework for many of his acts. A new system of taxation, though often lighter than before, is more methodical in its pursuit of defaulters. His land, the foundation of his [427]
existence, has for the most part been preserved to him, and indeed the
security for his legal title to it has been much improved. But alien planta- 000

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167 incomes by work at home or in local workshops. The drawn-thread
591 and embroidery work engaged in by the girls and middle-aged women in their spare time earned them about twenty cents a day per person. Others wove cloth at small weaving-shops or sewed in tailors'-shops, earning about thirty cents a day. None of these occupations were, in fact, particularly remunerative. Older women were engaged in making joss-paper or in knitting fishing-nets. Apart from farming and trade, the men were engaged in relatively few occupations—there were coolies, barbers, carpenters, school-teachers, and fishermen.

167 We come now to the subject of remittances from the Nanyang
434 regarding which there has been much conflicting evidence. No
591 satisfactory estimate of these remittances has been made for South-east Asia as a whole, and in any case their value has varied greatly with the fluctuation in trade.[1] There had been a time when the ownership of a few rubber-trees had meant affluence, when Chinese importers in the Nanyang could undersell those of all other nationalities and still make a large profit, 'and when they had the native peasants so under control through indebtedness that they could sell them almost anything at any price'.[2]

[461] There had been times when labour was so scarce that Chinese coolies could in a few years accumulate savings enough to start in business, and when employees of Chinese retailers could force up wages to the point where it was more economical for the employer to take them in as partners. But by 1935 all this had changed. New immigration restrictions, motivated by the depression, had cut large numbers of Chinese labourers off from labour opportunities abroad while, at the same time, life had become, perhaps, a little more secure in this time of general débâcle for a certain privileged few—for example, the small retail traders already established in the Nanyang who had less competition to meet from their countrymen and who could circumvent the new head tax on males by bringing women and children from China to take the place of male assistants.

(This investigation, we must remember, dates from a time when Southeast Asia was only just beginning to recover from the trade depression of 1929–32.)

[1] In 1941 about SS$10 million was remitted to China from Malaya, but there is nothing to indicate how much of this was in the ordinary way of trade.

[2] This is placed in quotation marks to indicate that it represents the views of Dr Ta Chen.

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Dr Ta Chen gives a table (p. 83) of the sources of income of 100 emigrant families from October 1934 to September 1935 which shows that the average monthly remittance per family was 81·4 per cent. of the total income, ranging between 75·5 per cent. for incomes below $20 per mensem, and 84·1 per cent. for incomes between $125 and $250. This enabled the emigrant familiies to maintain a much higher standard of living as a whole than those families which had no source of assistance from abroad. 167 434 591

Apart from the purely economic effects of overseas migration upon these communities of east Kwangtung and south Fukien, there is evidence to show that intercourse with Southeast Asia was having a considerable modifying effect on the social institutions, religion, and general outlook both of the emigrants themselves and of the families in China whence they came and to which usually they eventually returned. 178 167 591

In China the social unit has immemorially been the family, and it remains so except to the extent that it has broken down in Communist areas under the influence of Communist ideology. The system which has as its object the perpetuation of the family tree, to a considerable extent subordinates the individual to its needs. But in these emigrant communities in China and in the Nanyang itself, it has had to undergo a great deal of modification to survive. Where resources permit, a dual family system has grown up, whereby one section lives in China and the other in the Nanyang. This dual, or joint family, takes a number of forms which may vary; in the case of a well-off family (to give an example) the head of the family aged 61 lives in Siam, his wife (aged 58) lives in the ancestral village in China and is the acting head of the family, the first concubine (56) is a Siamese and lives in Siam, the second concubine (44) is in the village, and the third and fourth concubines (both Chinese, aged 30 and 19) are also in Siam, and the children of the unions are, except for the son by the wife who is with his father in Siam, all with their mothers, either in Siam or in China. An example of a middle-class family is of a father aged 77 in the village, his son aged 50, the head of the family, in Singapore, and his wife (the acting head of the family) in the village in China. The head of the family had his concubine in Singapore, and the offspring, either of the head of the family or his brothers (who belong to the family) were either in Singapore or at home. A third case of a lower-class family is a more simple pattern with the head of

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the family in Siam, his wife (acting head of the family) in the village in China, and most of the children of the marriage in China.

Such arrangements obviously call for careful financing. The emigrant abroad, after deducting what he needs to meet his expenses, usually remits his savings periodically to his home in China for the support of the family there and to meet extraordinary expenses, such as of a marriage in the family. At the same time the family home in China is a kind of insurance for the emigrant, for he can always return there if he is unemployed.

The influence of the emigrant on the age-old ideas and customs of his home village has been great. If he has had much foreign experience he almost invariably condemns the traditional family arrangement. In the words of a returned tin-miner from Malaya:[1]

> The joint family is an obnoxious social institution. When a member of such a family earns money he is obliged to support all the rest of it and to carry a heavy economic burden. I have had a very bitter experience and always felt that I am virtually the slave of my family. They are of no help to me at all.

A critical attitude towards the family and marriage systems is very general among returned emigrants. They remark that living in the modern world is a complicated affair, and that the joint family is no longer practicable. Many of them felt (in 1935) that an early disintegration of the family in south China was inevitable. Moreover, many of the emigrants have seen what marriage may mean in modern Western life when love and courtship enter into the marriage preliminaries and the union is (or should be) based on affection. An emigrant inevitably contrasts this with the Chinese system wherein the husband and wife are often unknown to one another before marriage. Stubborn and resistant as the traditional family system is, there is evidence from all over the Nanyang that as regards marriage the traditional procedure is in retreat before the modern marriage, and that the joint family system is being strained in some cases almost to breaking-point. Again, in the Nanyang itself, the increased mobility of members of the family is a force threatening to loosen its bonds.

In spite of these tendencies, marriage custom among the Chinese in the Nanyang at the time of the outbreak of the war between Japan and the Allies in 1941 generally followed Chinese traditional

[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 142.

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tools are all made by villagers using the palms and bamboos of 285
their setting. Boats, shoes and tools are made of wood by peasants, 415
mostly for their own use. While this type of industry usually secures no place in national statistics and has low monetary value, it plays a most important part in Southeast Asia life which may be described as still in the "Wood Age" so far as most peasant and rural life is concerned. Domestically-made cigars and 438
cigarettes supply local needs and rapidly displace the *areca* or 277
betel chewing habit. In Burma, the Philippines and Java cigar-making has become commercialised for trade and export; in Java some $9 million of hand-made cigarettes entered trade during 1937.

Throughout the region, too, are scattered remnants of a metal- 326
working industry, as in the beaten silver of Malaya and Java, the niello work of Siam, and the gold settings for precious stones in Burma.

But these domestic industries rank as small by external standards 438
and they play a negligible part in international trade. They must not be forgotten, however, because in the evolution of Southeast Asia we may see grow up forms of industrialisation originating in these domestic industries, as has been the case in the industrial evolution both of Europe and of the Far East. In these domestic industries little or no money is involved. At their simplest they are "subsistence industries" providing the family needs and scarcely anything more.

Thus most Southeast Asia people produce what food their 433
families need and what articles they need. Their requirements from outside are very small and in any case their way of life involves so little money that they have small means to buy anything outside their local subsistence ecology. That was the earlier condition everywhere in Southeast Asia before the industrial revolution in Europe, and it continues both in the simple form and in many variations even today, when there have evolved groups of people in Southeast Asia who are entirely dependent on wages to buy food and what other articles they need. The subsistence 434
principle is still strong in that very little money interchange goes on among the great majority of the population; some of them by doing part-time work earn wages, yet the money they earn has a very low average, indicated by the very low per capita revenues of the various states. Just before the war, Indochina revenue

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 All Southeast Asia All

434 averaged below $2 per person per annum and revenues were of that low order for all Southeast Asia countries except Malaya, where it was about $70 per person, a sign that Malaya, of all these countries, was the one where work and activities centred on money and had moved farthest from the subsistence principle.

It has to be noted that the small amount of money involved in such ecologies does not mean poverty in the European sense : it represents only that margin of necessities which is outside the subsistence ecology. In addition to the little money it obtains, each family in general has both its food and its domestic equipment produced by itself, or in conjunction with helpers from the village community. This is a state of society long since outgrown in Europe though we have to allow for it in every phase of Southeast Asia industry and trade and to assume it will continue to play a part in future changes.

Agricultural Processing

256 249 Because Southeast Asia is so overwhelmingly agricultural its mechanical industries relate largely to agricultural processes. Rice mills, sugar mills, starch factories (from sago and tapioca) and sack factories, have all grown up in connection with agricultural processing in every one of these territories. In addition, rubber factories, oil presses and sugar mills have been established on western lines in association with European-style agricultural developments. The fabrication of rubber has not gone far within this region; tyres have been made in Java where also mass-produced rubber shoes were made for Southeast Asia markets. For the most part, mechanical processing industries are located peripherally to the countries concerned and they operate primarily for immediate export, though small rice, brick and sugar factories have spread inland away from coastal sites.

Textiles

439 388 Apart from food, the chief personal need of Southeast Asia people is cloth and the demand for textiles ranks as by far the greatest single item of fabricated goods. Most of the textiles recorded are imported; the domestic industry has tended to disappear except in the remoter districts, and textile factories have not been set up to any extent within Southeast Asia. Cotton spinning at Semarang, Tegal and Damak and some 200 small

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
Southeast Asia AL1

563 foreign army of occupation has preserved it from disruption.
565 The essential and distinctive character of a plural society
433
571 is that it is dominated by economic forces, and, outside a few partly sheltered oases, Southeast Asia illustrates the capitalist system in its purest form.[18]

162 Another common feature is the dominance of the agri-
171
433 cultural section of the population. The latest available
171 figures show the percentage proportions of population dependent on agriculture in the area as follows: Burma, 68; Indonesia, 66; Philippines, 69; Thailand, 85.[19] The same source indicates the proportions for various regions of the world as follows: North America, 20; Oceania, 30; Europe, 33; South America, 60; Asia, 70; and Africa, 74.

171 With the prevailing techniques of production and the
433 consequent low productivity per man, dominance of agriculture
434 means low per capita national income. When countries are grouped by level of economic development on the basis of per capita national income as of 1950, all the six countries of Southeast Asia -- Burma, Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaya, Philippines, and Thailand -- fall in the underdeveloped
443 group.[20] Moreover, there is in Southeast Asia a true surplus
464 population on the land in the sense that even under the
161 present methods of cultivation a sizeable fraction of the

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18. Ibid., p. 77.

19. Food and Agriculture Organization, 1953 Yearbook, Vol. VII.

20. Eugene Staley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), pp. 16-17.

18: Firth E-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

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[1] London, Chapman & Hall (14th rev. ed., 19[illegible]), pp. 69–70.

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Chinese

ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTES

113 *BEFEO* = *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient*
JASB = *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*
JBRS = *Journal of the Burma Research Society*
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128 CURRENCY

●435 The Spanish dollar varied in value, according to the price of silver, between 3*s*. 6*d*. and 4*s*. 6*d*. 4*s*. can be taken as a mean.

436 The rupee = 1*s*. 6*d*. sterling. On 1 April 1947 the currency of Burma ceased to be linked to that of India.

In 1906 the Straits Settlements dollar was fixed at 2*s*. 4*d*. The Straits Settlements dollar was later replaced by the Malayan dollar with the same value, but the sign SS$ is still sometimes used for convenience. M$ is now usual.

At parity there are 11 Siamese bahts (ticals) to the pound sterling.

The official buying rate of the Indochinese piastre in 1949 was 12·55 to the United States dollar.

The official rate of exchange for the guilder (Indonesia) is 10·691 guilders = one pound sterling.

The peso (Philippines) = 50 United States cents.

804 WEIGHTS

128 One picul = 133⅓ lb.[1]
One catty (kati) = 1⅓ lb.
One tahil (tael) = 1⅓ oz.

MEASURES

1 hectare = 2·471 acres.
1 mow = ⅙ of an acre.
1 orlong = (about) ⅔ of an acre.

[1] But the *Statesman's Year-Book* (to which reference should be made for up-to-date information regarding currency, weights and measures, &c.) states that in the Netherlands East Indies 1 picul = 136·16 lb. avoirdupois.

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In 1906 the Straits Settlements dollar was fixed at 2*s*. 4*d*. The Straits Settlements dollar was later replaced by the Malayan dollar with the same value, but the sign SS$ is still sometimes used for convenience. M$ is now usual.

At parity there are 11 Siamese bahts (ticals) to the pound sterling.

The official buying rate of the Indochinese piastre in 1949 was 12·55 to the United States dollar.

The official rate of exchange for the guilder (Indonesia) is 10·691 guilders = one pound sterling.

The peso (Philippines) = 50 United States cents.

804 WEIGHTS

128 One picul = 133⅓ lb.[1]
One catty (kati) = 1⅓ lb.
One tahil (tael) = 1⅓ oz.

MEASURES

1 hectare = 2·471 acres.
1 mow = ⅙ of an acre.
1 orlong = (about) ⅔ of an acre.

[1] But the *Statesman's Year-Book* (to which reference should be made for up-to-date information regarding currency, weights and measures, &c.) states that in the Netherlands East Indies 1 picul = 136·16 lb. avoirdupois.

175 thus set a new stage -- the development of the natural
177 resources of the whole region.
433
439 This change-over from a subsistence economy to a
648 commercial economy involved the large-scale expansion of traditional crops or the development of new commercial crops.
[436] It was stimulated by the introduction or expansion of a money
[487] economy, the flow of capital and the development of land and
[69] sea transport. It was supported by Western technology, methods of administration and systems of justice. This whole process greatly affected the traditional institution, up-
175 setting the balance of a medieval world. The free, indi-
177 vidualist spirit of Western rule and commerce cut at the
[59] roots of traditional social life, undermining the corporate
[ ] strength of family and village. But the most serious direct
[426] threat of the new economic forces was to the peasant's owner-
[566] ship of land. Expanding economies, new money taxes and cheap imports meant better business than ever for the money lender. Many peasants became ruined by debt and lost their lands. Indebtedness and debt slavery were not new in Southeast Asia; the latter was fairly soon stamped out, but the former now became much more widespread than before, resulting in the creation of a landless proletariat.[16]

184 Characteristics of Current Southeast Asian Economy

In spite of all the differences among the countries of Southeast Asia in the natural environment, ethnic

16. Harrison, op. cit., p. 210.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

243 [137] 242 134

rice takes up nitrogen in the form of ammonia, the value of green manures on wet-rice fields is apparent.[15] In the Indies, *Crotolaria* species are the most frequently used green manures, the favored one being *Crotolaria juncea* L.; but *Phaseolus lunatus* L., *Dolichos lablab* L., and *Pachyrrhizus erosus* Urban are also used. The peasants of the Red River delta in Tongking are in the habit of working into the ground the wilted matter of a number of legumes that have been grown primarily for seed. The peasants of the province of Nam Dinh have developed a technique that may be unique. They push handfuls of indigo branches into the ground between the rows of rice a few days after the latter has been transplanted, for they believe that indigo is superior to pig manure or human excreta. In Indochina rice-growers frequently cultivate green manure, especially *Crotolaria* species, on dry fields and carry it to the rice fields at the time when these fields are being prepared for the seedlings. A green manure used exclusively in a few districts of the delta land of Tongking is the small aquatic plant, *azolla*.[16] Certain villages, thanks to favorable circumstances, have specialized in the growing of azolla to sell to the surrounding country, while other villages reproduce the plant until sufficient quantities of green manure have been obtained to cover all needs. The life cycle of azolla is completed in the months from November to April or May. Only the villagers of LaVan know the secret of maintaining and multiplying the plant during the hot season. They guard this secret jealously since it is the basis of their livelihood.

[137] [438] [621]

Further studies are needed to establish which varieties of green-manure plants are best suited to the various environmental conditions. It is important to find plants that grow rapidly and can be sown when the rice is still on the field, just after the water has been drained off to allow the grain to ripen. Experiments should also be made in the timing of the application of green manure. Should it be early, or just before the transplanting of the seedlings? Should it be on dry or on wet land?

242 134 249

Crop rotation also has its place as a means of keeping up the fertility of wet-rice fields. This practice seems to be better developed and more prevalent in Java than in any other country of Southeastern Asia. Extensive areas of *sawah*, as the Javanese call their wet riceland, are planted with dry-field crops such as maize, legumes, and other vegetables during the dry season, a practice that has a beneficial effect upon the soil. This form of double cropping is probably better than raising two rice crops in one year, because—although a different variety of rice is chosen for each season—both make essentially the same demands upon the soil; whereas a peanut crop, for example, grown during the dry season will enlarge the nitrogen content of the soil. In some areas of Java lowland rice is rotated

[15] Imperial Bureau of Soil Science: Tropical Soils in Relation to Tropical Crops, 1936, p. 11.

[16] For a map showing the extent of the use of azolla, see Gourou: Les paysans, 1936, p. 392. For further discussion see Nguyên-cong-Tiêu: "L'azolle," 1930, B, pp. 335–350 (also in *Proc. Fourth Pacific Science Congress, Java, 1929*, Vol. 4, 1930, pp. 355–370).

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

Inshore Fishing

226 Inshore sea fishing is by far the most usual in Southeast Asia. The boats used are generally very small, often needing only a man and a boy to work them, indicating the small units of the industry. Land and sea breezes play a key part in the rhythm of activity, being the source of power to and from the shore. It is unusual for the boats to move more than a mile from shore and rarely do they lose sight of land. Much inshore fishing is done without boats at all. The beaches are netted by fishermen moving waist deep through water and, wherever fish are known to migrate along the coast, barriers of bamboo are built out, leading the fish into a square enclosure or trap from which they are periodically drawn up in a net by a fisherman who lives with his family on a platform above the trap. Probably three-quarters of Southeast Asia sea fishing is done where the sea is less than 10 ft. deep. The fish thus obtained tend to be of the small type and a large proportion are crustacea, much favoured in local diet. Huge quantities of crabs, shrimps and mussels are obtained, and squids are regularly netted in large numbers for local use. The shells of crustacea are ground to powder and used in conjunction with the areca nut as a favourite old-fashioned chew common to the whole region. Because coastal fishing takes place so close to the shore where breakers are violent, it is markedly seasonal in character, depending on aspect relative to the seasonal winds. This seasonality is a great incentive to preserve the fish to last through that season when the little fishing boats cannot cope with the heavy seas. Inshore fishing closely relates to the shallow waters of the Sunda Platform; where the coast drops away to great depths, the intensity of fishing diminishes.

Distribution of Fisheries

438 226 While fishing commands a wide interest, it is by no means uniformly developed through the region. Broadly, the coasts near densely populated areas are the most intensively fished and estuaries and deltas have major fishing developments, though neither at the Red River mouth nor the Irrawaddy mouth has fishing reached a high pitch of development. The Mekong, particularly at the seasons when the Tonle Sap water is discharging, has great attraction for fish and the whole coastal zone from the Mekong

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

round the Gulf of Siam to Singapore is well fished and is one of the few known tracks of fish migration in these seas, possibly relating to the southwesterly drift of the Mekong discharge. The Malacca Strait also has vigorous fishing industries, associated with the fishing at Bagansiapiapi and Pangkor which have been commercialised by Chinese. Along both sides of the Malacca Strait fish traps stand out from the coast almost continuously for mile after mile. Bagansiapiapi fish comes almost entirely from traps set across the creeks of the Rokan River. In the Philippines, themselves spread athwart the equatorial currents of the Pacific like a great trap, the annual catch of fish exceeds that of any other territory, yet the Philippines import much canned fish in addition.

For most Southeast Asia countries information about the significance of fishing activities is sketchy, although in every case fish ranks high in the basic foodstuffs. The total activity in fishing is enormous; probably 3 million people are engaged in Southeast Asia fishing and the amount of internal trade in fish must total far higher than so widely dispersed and so little commercialised an industry might at first suggest. There is always a substantial movement of fish in various forms from the coasts to the interiors and from one territory to another, as the following points indicate:

Burma.—That Burmese developed their tradition well in the interior may explain why it is only in Arakan and Tenasserim there has been intensive sea fishing. Within the Irrawaddy distributaries South Indians have taken to fishing and they deliver fish on ice to the rice farmers of Lower Burma, whose diet is more monotonously rice-and-fish than is the case towards the interior. The Buddhist tradition causes Burmese to disrespect fishermen on the grounds that they are responsible for the destruction of many living creatures. From Tenasserim and Arakan, surplus fish is exported to Malaya and India respectively, the total value (over 1935–40) being of the order $115,000 annually, of which Malaya takes over three-quarters. In net trade Burma is a fish-deficit area, importing over $3½ million of fish (about 12,000 tons), 60 per cent from India.

Malaya.—About 100,000 tons of fish were regularly landed on Malayan coasts by some 20,000 fishing boats (1950) chiefly on the coasts of Selangor, Perak, Trengganu, Pahang and Penang. At Singapore heavy prewar landings were accounted for by the deep-sea trawl-fishing done by Japanese crews working at long range

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among the remoter islands and off Borneo. In addition to this home production, over $9 million of fish (1947) was imported dry from the East Indies, Siam and Indochina, mainly as part of Singapore's entrepôt trade; only a small portion of this import was consumed in Malaya.

In Malaya and Burma pond cultivation has been negligible.

East Indies.—In Java intensive fishing is carried on, though its coast is small in proportion to its population and production has rapidly become inadequate, in contrast with the thinly-peopled coastlines of Sumatra, Celebes and Borneo. Java's fishing concentrates upon the northwest coast where 21,000 tons were caught in 1940; farther east along the north coast fishing diminishes. A large part of the catch moves to West Java and the Outer Islands for the plantation workers. Since 1900 the interest in fishing declined until Java became no longer self-supporting in fish and imported from Siam and Indochina which together supplied about 45,000 tons annually in the seasons 1938–40.

To establish commercialised fishing in the Outer Islands was no easy matter, but in Sumatra and Borneo a start had been made. At Bagansiapiapi about 12,000 Chinese had established a large fishery producing annually about 35,000 tons of fish which went to Java (60 per cent), Singapore, Penang and Malacca. To salt the fish nearly 20,000 tons of salt moved into Bagansiapiapi. In Borneo, Soekadana on the west and Pegaban and Kotabaru on the east were fishing centres, supplying the interior and exporting yearly about 4,000 tons of dried fish to Java; Macassar functions as a market for pearl and shell fishing and for the *abalone* (Holothuria) catch of the eastern seas besides exporting annually about 1,300 tons of *agar agar* (a seaweed for jellies).

To Java and Madoera just before the war 49,000 tons of cheap fish were imported from Siam and Indochina by way of Singapore, 46,000 tons from East Sumatra, and 8,000 tons from other Outer Islands. The home catch of sea fisheries totalled about 94,000 tons per annum, and fish weighing nearly 30,000 tons (1947) was obtained from ponds and rivers. Lake Tempe (South Celebes) has been intensively developed for inland fishing and 3,000 tons of dried and salted fish were exported from that district in 1946.

Indochina.—Although the physiography of the Indochina coast appears to favour sea fishing, yet coastal fishing interests local people less than the inland fisheries. A luminant oil for peasants

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is extracted from Indochinese fish. Salt water fishing produced 150,000 tons annually before the war. Only along the Annam coast, particularly near deeper waters round Tanh Hoa, is inshore fishing very active on the basis of trawling and seining, which are unusual styles for Southeast Asia. The Cambodian coast, meeting place of migrant fish from the Mekong mouth and the Siamese and Kra coasts, produces fish of exceptional size. The Mekong distributaries are also considerably fished to supply the Saigon and Cochinchina markets. Of the freshwater fishing that in Tonle Sap is the best known and most productive, but there are others well developed in the streams of Tonkin and along the Mekong, where oxbow lakes and artificial ponds are used for seasonal fish cultivation.

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Fish products rank high in Indochina's exports, though valued only at one per cent of the total exports. Shipments usually go to Malaya and averaged 37,000 tons per annum for the period 1939–41, but they were valued at $2 million in 1950.

Siam.—Every Siamese is said to eat some fish with every meal of rice. At any rate the Siamese consumption of fish is estimated to be larger than for any single Southeast Asia unit. Much of the fish comes from inland fisheries and the floods of the Chao Praya and the Nam Mun create natural ponds which last long enough to fatten many fish. These inland fisheries are not well documented. Fishing is taxed according to the implement used rather than in relation to the amount caught, yielding a revenue of $.9 million (1944). Siamese sea fishing provides that dried fish which is exported. Mackerel, sardine and pilchard types migrate along Siam's attenuated coast and they are exhaustively fished as a whole though individual fishing units are small and poorly organised. At certain seasons the sea offshore is almost solid with squid which are caught in large numbers for eating. Probably 43,000 tons of fish are annually salted on the coast for transport and trade, but poor organisation and careless salting with low-grade brine taken direct from the sea has given Siamese fish a low reputation; it ranks as the lowest grade of salt fish in Southeast Asia markets. The export usually ranks at about $2.5 million annually (100,000 tons 1941), going to Singapore, Penang and Hongkong, largely for re-export from those places. Because the local fish is inferior, higher grade fish are annually imported from surrounding areas to a value of some $1.5 million (1950). The fish

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trade was largely Chinese, but Japanese fishermen had pirated the coast for years, using large trawlers serving markets in Singapore and in Japan.

Philippines.—Fish is as important in Filipino diet as in that of peoples on the mainland, and it is likewise an inadequately documented phase of their activities. Only in 1939 was a census of fishing taken. The amount that went into inter-island trade was small compared with the catch and only 100 out of the 1,600 types of local edible fish were marketed. Filipino fishing resembles that elsewhere in Southeast Asia and both inshore and inland methods are used. In the last decade also, some deep fishing had developed and steam trawlers landed quantities of *bonito*. Deep-sea fishing centres on Batangas, Manila and Sulu, whereas the inshore types are most developed round Mindoro, Batangas and Bulacan. More than 90 per cent of inland fishing (from rivers, ponds and lakes) comes from Batangas, Bulacan, Laguna and Rizal. The Pampanga and Iloilo districts have many fish ponds. Pearl oysters are gathered sporadically round the Palawan and the Sulu Islands.

In 1939 about 180,000 Filipinos were fully engaged in fishing and another 200,000 fished part-time. The total catch was then valued at $150 million. Fish had no significance as an export and about 400,000 tons were imported in 1940.

Postwar Fishing

Casually organised and producing a poorly graded commodity Southeast Asia fishing has everywhere an important place in the diet of local people. The international trade in fish within the region has certain resemblances to the rice trade in direction, in variability from year to year, and in foreign monopolisation of the middleman function and trade organisation. On the other hand, the dispersed and loose organisation of Southeast Asia fishing proved an advantage in the war period. Its simplicity of operation, use of locally-made boats for fishing and bulk transport, and ease of replacement of locally-made equipment, meant it suffered lightly from the war.

The fish trade between Southeast Asia countries was, however, paralysed, owing to difficulties of procuring bulk salt supplies and of transport, but the rice-eating people in rural areas were not seriously deprived of their supplementary fish, so much of which was caught nearby. The large towns which once consumed fresh

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Chapter Twenty-four

INDUSTRY AND TRADE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

If "industry" be taken to include all activities connected with processing, then there is more industry in Southeast Asia than appears at first glance, though not much manufacturing in mechanised factories may be found. The territory is, however, overwhelmingly agricultural and in almost every part of the region it is subsistence agriculture which employs and sustains the largest number of people. Much manual processing is done by these subsistence agriculturists on their own little farms to prepare their production for their family consumption.

Cottage Industries

The tradition of being self-supporting in each territory, the national counterpart of individual subsistence farming, is very strong even today, finding expression in the widespread cottage industry of weaving and in that Southeast Asia custom of making a single length of span-broad, hand-made cloth the basis of a skirt-like dress—the *sarong*, *lungi*, *panung* and so on. Today this domestic weaving, where it has managed to persist in spite of competition from cheap imported cloths, uses imported cotton yarn, although parts of Burma still weave homegrown silk, and Siam and Indochina continue home-weaving on the basis of Indochinese silk. Only in Java has the "cottage industry" become elaborated into a village factory industry for a more intensified and commercialised production of sarongs. Ninety-two per cent of Java's *batik sarongs* (printed cotton skirts worn by men and women alike) come from factories of less than 80 workers each; this specialised process of dyeing in patterns defined by wax is now done by the small factory working upon imported cotton cloth.

The other considerable domestic industry deriving from the subsistence tradition is that of making innumerable varieties of articles from plaited palm leaves. Containers of many sorts, hats, domestic utensils, house walls, mats, fish traps and agricultural

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tools are all made by villagers using the palms and bamboos of their setting. Boats, shoes and tools are made of wood by peasants, mostly for their own use. While this type of industry usually secures no place in national statistics and has low monetary value, it plays a most important part in Southeast Asia life which may be described as still in the "Wood Age" so far as most peasant and rural life is concerned. Domestically-made cigars and cigarettes supply local needs and rapidly displace the *areca* or *betel* chewing habit. In Burma, the Philippines and Java cigar-making has become commercialised for trade and export; in Java some $9 million of hand-made cigarettes entered trade during 1937.

Throughout the region, too, are scattered remnants of a metal-working industry, as in the beaten silver of Malaya and Java, the niello work of Siam, and the gold settings for precious stones in Burma.

But these domestic industries rank as small by external standards and they play a negligible part in international trade. They must not be forgotten, however, because in the evolution of Southeast Asia we may see grow up forms of industrialisation originating in these domestic industries, as has been the case in the industrial evolution both of Europe and of the Far East. In these domestic industries little or no money is involved. At their simplest they are "subsistence industries" providing the family needs and scarcely anything more.

Thus most Southeast Asia people produce what food their families need and what articles they need. Their requirements from outside are very small and in any case their way of life involves so little money that they have small means to buy anything outside their local subsistence ecology. That was the earlier condition everywhere in Southeast Asia before the industrial revolution in Europe, and it continues both in the simple form and in many variations even today, when there have evolved groups of people in Southeast Asia who are entirely dependent on wages to buy food and what other articles they need. The subsistence principle is still strong in that very little money interchange goes on among the great majority of the population; some of them by doing part-time work earn wages, yet the money they earn has a very low average, indicated by the very low per capita revenues of the various states. Just before the war, Indochina revenue

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additional expansion under the almost autarchic conditions of the war period. Political instability within India can, however, offset this advantage.

It is to be noted that the great markets for goods manufactured from Southeast Asia commodities so far have been in Europe and the United States. The little nations of Southeast Asia seem ill-prepared to absorb much of them for some years. Because food is produced in such large quantities in this typically agricultural zone, we may not overlook the possibilities of manufacturing foods in forms such as biscuits, jam and canned varieties. Hitherto the tight association with industrialised colonial powers has to some extent dissuaded intense application to the miscellany of industrial productions possible in Southeast Asia, yet the local nationalisms and the incentive to establish more balanced social and communal systems tend to encourage local industries. Burma, Siam and Indochina before the war were only lightly touched by these tendencies to manufacture.

From the point of view of the rest of the world, a re-orientation of the tremendous quantity of Southeast Asia's primary agricultural materials now handled by processing industries already established in Europe and the United States, would have major effects, not least on the ability of those industries to maintain their manufactured exports at levels which have been increasing over the last century. Thus, a nationalistic Southeast Asia driving towards self-sufficiency industrially is likely to diminish the international trade streams to and from this region, though it may progressively increase the occupational activities and living standards of Southeast Asia people.

Intra-Regional Trade

A total value of about $400 million was involved in the prewar interchange of goods and commodities between one part and another of the Southeast Asia region. This intra-regional trade was relatively small because the component units of the region produced much the same commodities and goods, by reason of which the countries tended to be rivals rather than customers of one another. An additional factor was the pull of several metropolitan areas, Britain, France, Holland and the United States, which acted to lessen intra-regional trade and to lessen the regularisation and rationalisation of production in Southeast Asia as a whole. Food

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438 deficiencies of local people were largely met by intra-regional
439 trade, particularly the rice and fish movements from Burma, Siam and Indochina to the other territories. The layout of the whole region relative to transocean shipping routes drew much of the intra-regional trade to major foci like Singapore, from which point manufactured imports from other parts of the world were also distributed within the region. Singapore has functioned for a long time as entrepôt centre for the region and some two-thirds of its import values derived from Southeast Asia. Siam had a very balanced trade relation with its surroundings, over 40 per cent of both its imports and its exports being related to Southeast Asia territories.

Extra-Regional Trade

439 The overall trade movements from the region to the rest of the world were huge; annually over the quinquennium 1936-40 commodities valued at well over $2,000 million went overseas from Southeast Asia and some $1,200 million of goods moved into the region, quite apart from the intra-regional trade. The disparity of values moving in and out of Southeast Asia has for years been paralleled in the trade of each country, the disproportion being least in the case of the Philippines and greatest for Burma. The disparity went deeper; since the Southeast Asia output was of bulky, raw or partially-processed commodities, the outgoing tonnage far exceeded the incoming tonnage and the carriage involved made Southeast Asia one of the busiest oceanic shipping areas of the world, an activity swollen further by the great amount of coastwise shipping made necessary by the insular character of the region. It was largely the absence of this shipping which paralysed the region during the war years.

By 1947, re-establishment of trade flows was becoming apparent, though Indochina and the East Indies were still largely isolated. Southeast Asia commercial activity then showed a new pattern: about $3,500 million of goods went into the region as against $2,500 million passing out. While these figures included both intra- and extra-regional trade, they were mostly the latter; they involved an entirely new valuation of goods and a substantial addition could be added for "black" or unreported trade.

Nevertheless, the overall figures showed that Southeast Asia was absorbing far more in value than it was exporting. Part of the

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SOUTHEAST ASIA NUTRITION DENSITIES
(Average number of persons per rice-acre per annum)

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Quinquennium	*Burma*	*Indo-china*	*Siam*	*Java and Madoera*	*Philip-pines*	*Malaya*
1916–20	1.23	1.75	1.66	4.12	3.13	—
1921–25	1.19	1.67	1.57	4.27	2.67	5.61
1926–30	1.14	1.61	1.57	4.50	2.69	6.13
1931–35	1.19	1.64	1.63	4.60	2.76	6.42
1936–40	1.25	1.63	1.74	4.96	2.79	7.02
1946–50	2.0	2.1	1.6	5.9	3.9	7.2

Because population and the net production of food have increased *pari passu*, it is important to examine the "nutrition density" (persons per acre under rice) since the surplus for export depends on low internal consumption of the Southeast Asia staple and high internal production. The countries of Southeast Asia pre-war showed considerable differences in nutrition density, from Malaya (the plantation-mining specialist) with 7.2 persons per rice-acre, to Siam (the rice-surplus specialist) with 1.6. Malaya, Java and the Philippines had nutrition densities much higher than the rest of neighbouring countries and in the case of Malaya and Java the nutrition density had been steadily rising, whereas in Burma, Indochina and Siam it was fairly static. Over the same period, the domestic consumption of rice per person sharply dropped (by 20-25 per cent) in Burma, Siam and Java and rose about 10 per cent in Indochina, Philippines and Malaya. The postwar figures available show considerable increases of nutrition density everywhere except in Siam, yet these were changes of degree, not of pattern.

Changing Internal Emphasis

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Today the very crowded places are firstly, Middle and North Java, Lower Siam and the Red River Delta, where densities of over 1,500 people per square mile occur, with secondary crowdings in Lower Burma, the Lower Mekong, Central Luzon and the Visayas. These concentrations of people are pre-eminently in agricultural areas (Fig. 116), and they are in fact largely made possible by exceptional soil qualities within an area whose general soil fertility is low. These crowded areas have taken part in a commercialisation of local agriculture and their subsequent history has been firstly a

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

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

FIG. 116.—Distribution of People in Southeast Asia

rapid increase in people to a point where the new agricultural development ceased to be enough for the large population, leading to the second stage of slow migration and emphasis on commercial agriculture upon newer zones of similar type. Hence the change of emphasis from Tonkin to the Annam coastal plains and then to the Lower Mekong; from the Central Luzon area to Visayan Islands;

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from the plains of Java to the dangerous upper limits of the volcanic country; and from Dry Burma to the Irrawaddy Delta. Sometimes there has been a little agricultural migration—very largely this change has been brought about by different rates of growth rather than movement of people to new places. Everywhere commercialisation of agriculture has led to population increase, because the agricultural technique has not changed from the Southeast Asia tradition of manual work at every stage. The bringing of new areas into cultivation has been followed by an increase in the number of hands to do the cultivating, partly a response to the need and partly made possible by additional nourishment and an added vitality arising from lower disease rates natural to the less populated area, because human diseases are diffused more slowly where people are isolated from one another, as in new areas. Thus Southeast Asia has been the scene of intense pioneering by people seeking, developing and filling new agricultural areas, to create for a time the eldorado of rice-eating peoples and the one safeguard of Indians and Chinese against the vagaries of their own harvests and against the congestions of their home districts.

Minerals in turn have attracted external interest. There has been the pull of gold in the Philippines, of tin in Malaya and nearby islands, of petroleum in Sumatra and Borneo. These great gambles drew capital and pulled in crowds of labourers, wage-earners who were unavailable from local people so tightly held in their manual agricultural systems. Minerals drew millions of Chinese through the South China Sea in the tin rushes and oil rushes of the last hundred years.

Yet another form of commercialised agriculture developed, to provide the industrial raw materials of distant factories in Europe and America and based on crops entirely foreign to Southeast Asia. Sugar, coffee, hemp, rubber, oil palm proved highly successful in this terrain where they had never existed before. Large plantations of them were laid out, still more wage-earning labour was absorbed, a still greater production was obtained, drawing more and more people into virgin areas. Migrations from India and China were further stimulated to work upon the plantations whose uneven development, in successions of booms and depressions, alternately attracted migrants in the boom years and sent them home again in the depressions.

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Political Convergence

438 These local products for commerce not only stimulated export
174 trade; they stimulated import trades to feed the migrant peoples,
162 to dress them, and to dress the agriculturists so preoccupied that
they could no longer spare time to weave for themselves. And
166 trade itself drew external interests; Chinese and Indian traders came in to monopolise middleman functions and Europeans came in and worked out here the complex balancing of their own industrial systems far away. Britain stimulated the commercialisation of Burmese rice production as an assurance of cheap food for an industrialising, overpopulated India. The Dutch fanned out from Java into the adjoining islands. Not to be outdone, the French moved into Indochina as a base for their China trade. Germans for a time controlled the copra trade of the farther eastern islands. Thus all the major Western European powers had colonial interests in the expanding peoples, the expanding production and the expanding needs of Southeast Asia. And the major oriental powers, India, China and Japan, had equally direct interest in Southeast Asia (Fig. 117) as an outlet for their people, a source of rice, a source of raw materials for their industries, and finally as outlet for their own industrial products, India and Japan being mostly involved in this, the latest phase.

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Internal Divergences

The resulting pattern of people is one of unparalleled diversity in stages of evolution from subsistence to commerce, in densities of people, in ethnic types, in languages (Fig. 118). The similarity of setting, circumstance and products have disrupted Southeast Asia within itself by economic rivalry in producing similar commodities, and the divergencies of overseas connections with different colonial powers established divergent trade streams, currency differences, educational differences and political differences. Political and economic forces released in Europe and America had their repercussion within Southeast Asia, by means of which French protectionist policies virtually isolated Indochina from its neighbours and Filipinos turned their backs upon Asia. Siam has been wooed, ignored or bullied, depending on the fluctuation of Anglo-French relations in Europe and the opportunism of the U.S. in building up its bloc in East Asia. All sorts of colonial systems have been

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
Southeast Asia AL1

433 affected by these few importing countries' determination
648 to be self-sufficient in food.

181 A dual economy as a distinctive character of colonial
433 rule is a theory propounded by some Dutch economists who contend that in tropical dependencies there are two distinct systems of economy. In the Western sector economic forces act in strict accordance with the economic laws enunciated by the earlier classical economists; but in the Eastern sector these laws have no force, and Western economic principles are inapplicable. The Western sector is ultra-capitalist since economic forces act freely, not even subject to the social inhibitions which still restrain them in Europe or the Western world; the Eastern sector, on the other hand, is precapitalist, with prestige carrying more weight than profit and communal influence restraining the individual desire of gain.[17] One
433
438 of the consequences of a dual economy is that it is difficult
439 to conduct business because the people will not trade on
648 Western lines. Inefficiency in trade leads to high operational cost and thus to social waste. Moreover, there is a likelihood of exploitation of indigenous people by Western traders as well as by foreigners of Asian origin who are free from social restraint.

563 One feature that has long been common to the countries of Southeast Asia and is so obvious that it could not fail

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17. J. S. Furnivall, "Cooperation, Competition, and Isolation," Southeast Asia in the World Today, ed. Phillips Talbot, op. cit., p. 71.

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[438] One reason for this is economic advantage. The coming of rubber, in particular, has given to the Malay peasant of the west coast an income considerably higher, on the whole, than that of the east coast peasant.

177 565 [166] The effects of Westernization are profound. But they do not lie in crude physical displacement of the peasant or degradation of his living conditions. They lie in the widening of the gap between his expanding range of wants and his level of productivity, and in his inability to measure and in any way control the economic forces operating in his field. Westernization has meant for the peasant an enlargement of the social horizon—more knowledge, through better communications and education, of other places, of other peoples of kindred and dissimilar interests. It has created new ambitions: for different clothing, for new uses of leisure, for a better status for his children, for a position of power in the political scene. All this has disturbed the traditional patterns of peasant society. These patterns, and the class structure of South East Asian society of which they were a part, were probably never too satisfactory to the peasant. Anxiety and evasion must have often been the response to either too rigid or too elastic a rule—and the peasant seems often to have suffered from the exactions of his superior in the social scale. But the scope of the system was known, if not its precise implications. Nowadays the scope of the system has for the most part passed beyond the peasant's grasp, and much of it has become de-personalized.

To illustrate this by giving a more concrete analysis of some of the values in the peasant's life, let me take the area of Malaya and Indonesia where Islam is the major religion of the people.

181 177 565 602 776 779 671 182 In his daily life the Indonesian or Malay peasant is governed largely by the canons of behaviour, the ties of friendship and neighbourliness, the relations of work and social intercourse of his village community. So much is this so that in Java the *desa*, the village, was crystallized by the Dutch into an administrative and developmental unit, and its communal structure strengthened for welfare purposes. But as important as the village, and indeed often basic to its structure, are the family and larger kin organizations. From these a person gets his social status and much of his land and other property, and they have the primary role in his marriage and other crucial events in his progress through life.

Such domestic and local relationships also provide a framework for the peasant in his attempts to come to terms with the forces of nature and human destiny. His world of spirits is a local world. In Indonesia the ancestors do not play the predominant role which they do, for instance, in Annam. But the village, the seashore, the surrounding jungle, wells, trees, and stones are the home of many kinds of spirits, which afflict man with sickness or misfortune, or stand by him as his familiars to guard him. Basic in the religion of the Indonesian peasant is this local, essentially parochial, spirit element. All these values guide his economic and social conduct, and mean a great deal to him.

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Cash farming for rice is the only extension of a Southeast Asia subsistence farming crop into commercial farming on a large scale; only a negligible proportion of coconut-growing is for export, though this too, is an extension of Southeast Asia subsistence farming. It has been inevitable that subsistence farmers and the techniques they developed for rice have set the character of commercial rice farming which has been pioneered by local people and continues to be essentially a non-mechanised produce whose volume comes more from area and less from intensive farming. 243

RICE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
ANNUAL AVERAGES PER QUINQUENNIUM [439]

Period	*Million Acres Under Rice*	*Production Million Tons Clean Rice*	*Net Exports from SE.A. (Million Tons Clean)*	*Per Cap. Utilisation (kgms.)*	*Yield in Tons per Acre*
1916–20	38.3	13.5	3.9	119	.352
1921–25	43.6	15.3	4.6	137	.352
1926–30	47.5	16.5	4.7	131	.348
1931–35	49.6	16.7	5.2	117	.337
1936–40	51.4	17.5	5.0	118	.339
1946–50	48.1	15.6	1.9	98	.325

For 1951 *it is estimated that Southeast Asia sowed about* 50 *million acres of paddy, probably producing* 16 *million tons cleaned rice. The exports may total* 3 *million tons. These figures suggest the consumption had declined to below* 100 *kgms. per person, but this is not reliable since unreported dealings were going on and reported facts were not necessarily the true ones.*

Other Food Crops.—The other commercial food crops, sugar, coffee, tea, cinchona and oil palm total much smaller areas than rice farming. Broadly, these innovations were developed by European colonial planters opening up what were very largely virgin territories, normally in the form of large estates calling for a labour force which derived only in part from local people, the rest being obtained by introducing labour from outside. In the Philippines and in Java the first European essays in agriculture caused serious interactions on local land customs; in Siam an aristocratic feudal system enabled commercialisation to be introduced without external intervention. These crops tended to be perennial cultivations, taking advantage of the continuous growing season of the region. In due course this has led to a large production, causing the external price to drop, especially as there has 249

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243 small-scale water-control methods had in fact existed in this region before; the earlier technological interest was to expand rice production by increased water-control on specially fertile, generally volcanic, upland soils. The objective then and now was the same—to cultivate the most fertile areas; the difference was that the volcanic soils attracted local attention and were within the capacity of local people, considerably earlier than the deltaic soils.

[439]

SOUTHEAST ASIA RICE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
(million metric tons clean)

	Exporters			*Importers*		
	Burma	*Indochina*	*Siam*	*East Indies*	*Malaya*	*Philippines*
1915	2.12	1.09	1.0	.55	—	.22
1920	2.0	1.09	.25	.22	—	.07
1925	3.32	1.33	1.18	.50	.41	.10
1930	2.95	1.02	.93	.62	.60	.01
1935	2.93	1.52	1.38	.36	.48	nil
1940	2.50	1.40	2.00	.06	.70	.1
1950	1.17	.09	1.48	.28	.50	.16

A further process at work has been a decline in Southeast Asia consumption of rice per person over the last 30 years, which made possible the expanding exports of rice at a time when population was rapidly increasing. The declining consumption seems to be due to slight changes in diet habit; maize, potatoes and tapioca have steadily entered into local meals and the proportion of vegetables has increased, more especially as it has come to be realised that the dietetic value of meals exclusively based on rice, the custom in Southeast Asia for a long time, is low, as indicated by the small stature and delicate bones of Southeast Asia peoples.

245 Commercial agriculture has largely revolved round tree cultivation (arboriculture rather than agriculture) in which the continuous growing period produces maximum effects. In this tendency may be seen a return to the tree vegetation which is indigenous to equatorial Southeast Asia, and away from the annual and deciduous plants more suited to ecologies associated with the seasonal margins of the tropics. Labour difficulties too are eased to some extent by tree crops whose periodicity is better spread than in the case of annual crops. To the labour difficulty also is due the trend towards devolving arboriculture from plantation systems

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that about one-third of its prewar estate area was being tapped in 1947, representing two-thirds of the area tappable.

In the food crops, surplus margins were more slowly restored. Exports of Southeast Asia rice totalled about a million tons during 1946, as against a combined export of 5.7 million tons annually for 1936–40. The drop in production of this staple was greatest in the case of Burma because there the dislocation by war had been greatest, but by the 1946–47 season, about two-thirds of Lower Burma rice acreages were back in cultivation, as against half in 1945–46. In Cochinchina over 70 per cent of the rice area was being cultivated in 1946–47. Siam which was untouched by military campaigns reported 10.6 million acres under cultivation in rice for 1946–47 (22 per cent more than 1939–40)—the only territory to show a substantial increase of rice acreage in the immediate postwar years.

A postwar feature has been the general decline in rice yields, mostly an effect of loss of draught cattle, though to report low yields was a convenient cover for black market sales. The consequence of lost production in local food was felt more in places like Malaya which has specialised in non-food commercial agriculture, than in any other territories of Asia, which customarily needed to import only a small margin and not the majority of their rice. For the Philippines in 1947, the United Nations reported that *per capita* consumption of rice was actually higher than in 1939 by about 5 per cent.

Since labour shortage has been prominent as a factor operating against postwar commercial agriculture, the subsistence farmer and the diversified smallholder have assumed far greater significance than before. Over 55 per cent of Malaya's rubber production for 1946 was from smallholders, a proportion which had been as much as 85 per cent in the early months of that year, yet fell to 45 per cent in 1950 (cf. 39 per cent in 1940).

The vegetable oils soon came back into production and by early 1947 monthly production in Southeast Asia was not far short of 1941 production and now exceeds it.

The general lowering of food acreages and of yields, combined with the enforced reversion to subsistence agricultural forms, has a special significance for Southeast Asia food supplies over the next few years, because the restricted food supply comes at a time when population is rapidly increasing, at the rate of about 20

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434 averaged below $2 per person per annum and revenues were of that low order for all Southeast Asia countries except Malaya, where it was about $70 per person, a sign that Malaya, of all these countries, was the one where work and activities centred on money and had moved farthest from the subsistence principle.

It has to be noted that the small amount of money involved in such ecologies does not mean poverty in the European sense: it represents only that margin of necessities which is outside the subsistence ecology. In addition to the little money it obtains, each family in general has both its food and its domestic equipment produced by itself, or in conjunction with helpers from the village community. This is a state of society long since outgrown in Europe though we have to allow for it in every phase of Southeast Asia industry and trade and to assume it will continue to play a part in future changes.

Agricultural Processing

256 249 Because Southeast Asia is so overwhelmingly agricultural its mechanical industries relate largely to agricultural processes. Rice mills, sugar mills, starch factories (from sago and tapioca) and sack factories, have all grown up in connection with agricultural processing in every one of these territories. In addition, rubber factories, oil presses and sugar mills have been established on western lines in association with European-style agricultural developments. The fabrication of rubber has not gone far within this region; tyres have been made in Java where also mass-produced rubber shoes were made for Southeast Asia markets. For the most part, mechanical processing industries are located peripherally to the countries concerned and they operate primarily for immediate export, though small rice, brick and sugar factories have spread inland away from coastal sites.

Textiles

439 288 Apart from food, the chief personal need of Southeast Asia people is cloth and the demand for textiles ranks as by far the greatest single item of fabricated goods. Most of the textiles recorded are imported; the domestic industry has tended to disappear except in the remoter districts, and textile factories have not been set up to any extent within Southeast Asia. Cotton spinning at Semarang, Tegal and Damak and some 200 small

weaving factories in Java, were the leading developments in local 439
textile industries, but the bulk of cloth and even of raw cotton has 288
been brought in from abroad. Just before the war Southeast Asia was absorbing textiles to the value of well over $300 million per annum; much of it was cheap cloth from Europe, India and Japan, but there was a substantial need for the very finest cotton cloth produced anywhere and quite an exacting local standard of qualities. Should this huge demand for textiles stimulate local industry within the new nationalist units, Burma, Siam and Indochina may improve the quality and output of their present scanty and very inferior raw cotton.

Road and rail management, engineering maintenance and port 39
industries form a leading group of mechanical industries directly 40
affecting local techniques and introducing forms of industrialisation on western lines. The capital equipment for these activities is imported as are nearly all metal manufactures for other purposes. Manufactured goods form the largest single category of goods moving into Southeast Asia, to a total of nearly $500 million annually before the war. These manufactured imports chiefly went to urban consumers, yet simple farming tools and articles like needles and scissors went in large quantities far into every country. Although this category was broad, the components were very varied so that the value of each ranked comparatively low. Manufactured articles of western type showed little sign of being made locally, except in Java where successful attempts at making electric equipment had gone on for some years to supply the Southeast Asia markets with very cheap electrical goods like lamps and filaments, suggesting the possibility that Java may become industrialised on the Japanese pattern for mass production methods, and using part-time or women workers. In neighbouring territories, however, there are no such immediate prospects because labour has proved costly in proportion to its skill.

Mining Industries and Prospects

Mining industries of great value have developed in Malaya, 316
Burma, Sumatra, Borneo, the Philippines and the small islands 439
east of Sumatra. Tin and petroleum have been the region's specialities so far and these have assumed great importance, combining to be chiefly responsible for the prewar annual exports of about $650 million of mineral products from Southeast Asia

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316 439 to the rest of the world. Iron ore and bauxite occur in large quantities, but without location convenient to the power needed to develop them. Gold has had special significance in Philippines mining, yet though found at many points, it ranks low for the region as a whole. Both tin and petroleum give rise to processing industries of smelting and refining which take place close to the streams of international traffic, particularly associated with Singapore and Penang. They play little part in local life, employ few people and go on at isolated points.

These mineral industries (which employed less than 250,000 persons before 1941) suffered from the war both by destruction in denial action and by neglect, so that they practically started anew from 1945. Whether they will all return to their prewar status remains to be seen. Southeast Asia provides the most prolific source of petroleum accessible to the Indian and Far Eastern markets and the wells are rapidly re-opening under the international oil groups which own them (output 1949, 9.0 million tons). Tin is coming back into production again more slowly because it needs more capital equipment such as pumps and dredges, which cannot be readily obtained, and there are some doubts whether world need for tin is likely to continue as great as before. The length of life of Malayan tin mines, the main prewar source, has been questioned, yet the little-known islands just south of Malaya are thought to contain extensive deposits of untouched tin likely to come into production in due course, though carefully screened for the time being from prospectors by local authorities. By 1950 the total tin output of Southeast Asia was about 99,000 tons.

Labour and Power for Industrialisation

464 Whether intensified industrialisation of Southeast Asia on the basis of these minerals is possible, turns upon two factors. Labour continues to be scarce; many prewar mining labourers dispersed during the war years when mining stagnated, and any immediate diversion of labour from agriculture to mining, even if possible under the tight ecology of the prevailing subsistence farming, is likely to prejudice local food supplies which depend basically on hand-grown rice.

316 Furthermore, Southeast Asia has limited sources of mechanical power, a factor not only of consideration regarding expansion of

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additional expansion under the almost autarchic conditions of the war period. Political instability within India can, however, offset this advantage.

It is to be noted that the great markets for goods manufactured from Southeast Asia commodities so far have been in Europe and the United States. The little nations of Southeast Asia seem ill-prepared to absorb much of them for some years. Because food is produced in such large quantities in this typically agricultural zone, we may not overlook the possibilities of manufacturing foods in forms such as biscuits, jam and canned varieties. Hitherto the tight association with industrialised colonial powers has to some extent dissuaded intense application to the miscellany of industrial productions possible in Southeast Asia, yet the local nationalisms and the incentive to establish more balanced social and communal systems tend to encourage local industries. Burma, Siam and Indochina before the war were only lightly touched by these tendencies to manufacture.

From the point of view of the rest of the world, a re-orientation of the tremendous quantity of Southeast Asia's primary agricultural materials now handled by processing industries already established in Europe and the United States, would have major effects, not least on the ability of those industries to maintain their manufactured exports at levels which have been increasing over the last century. Thus, a nationalistic Southeast Asia driving towards self-sufficiency industrially is likely to diminish the international trade streams to and from this region, though it may progressively increase the occupational activities and living standards of Southeast Asia people.

Intra-Regional Trade

A total value of about $400 million was involved in the prewar interchange of goods and commodities between one part and another of the Southeast Asia region. This intra-regional trade was relatively small because the component units of the region produced much the same commodities and goods, by reason of which the countries tended to be rivals rather than customers of one another. An additional factor was the pull of several metropolitan areas, Britain, France, Holland and the United States, which acted to lessen intra-regional trade and to lessen the regularisation and rationalisation of production in Southeast Asia as a whole. Food

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438 deficiencies of local people were largely met by intra-regional
439 trade, particularly the rice and fish movements from Burma, Siam and Indochina to the other territories. The layout of the whole region relative to transocean shipping routes drew much of the intra-regional trade to major foci like Singapore, from which point manufactured imports from other parts of the world were also distributed within the region. Singapore has functioned for a long time as entrepôt centre for the region and some two-thirds of its import values derived from Southeast Asia. Siam had a very balanced trade relation with its surroundings, over 40 per cent of both its imports and its exports being related to Southeast Asia territories.

Extra-Regional Trade

439 The overall trade movements from the region to the rest of the world were huge; annually over the quinquennium 1936-40 commodities valued at well over $2,000 million went overseas from Southeast Asia and some $1,200 million of goods moved into the region, quite apart from the intra-regional trade. The disparity of values moving in and out of Southeast Asia has for years been paralleled in the trade of each country, the disproportion being least in the case of the Philippines and greatest for Burma. The disparity went deeper; since the Southeast Asia output was of bulky, raw or partially-processed commodities, the outgoing tonnage far exceeded the incoming tonnage and the carriage involved made Southeast Asia one of the busiest oceanic shipping areas of the world, an activity swollen further by the great amount of coastwise shipping made necessary by the insular character of the region. It was largely the absence of this shipping which paralysed the region during the war years.

By 1947, re-establishment of trade flows was becoming apparent, though Indochina and the East Indies were still largely isolated. Southeast Asia commercial activity then showed a new pattern: about $3,500 million of goods went into the region as against $2,500 million passing out. While these figures included both intra- and extra-regional trade, they were mostly the latter; they involved an entirely new valuation of goods and a substantial addition could be added for "black" or unreported trade.

Nevertheless, the overall figures showed that Southeast Asia was absorbing far more in value than it was exporting. Part of the

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disparity could be attributed to replacement of capital equipment, yet it may indicate the beginnings of a great change in the function of Southeast Asia in world trade. Postwar revival by 1950 had become most spectacular in Malaya which, though the smallest political unit of the region, had re-established its trade and was responsible for nearly half the total trade of the region. The Philippines also recovered quickly, to be involved in a quarter of the trade.

Convergence of Routes

This region stands at zones of convergence for transoceanic routes between the very densely populated areas of India and China, and also between those areas and Europe, Australia and North America, so that international shipping is likely to converge upon Southeast Asia independently of purely colonial considerations which have hitherto specially drawn the Philippines into the U.S. shipping circuits, the East Indies into the Dutch, and the rest of Southeast Asia into the British shipping streams. French shipping has been relatively little involved, certainly not more than Danish, Italian and German and far less than the Japanese.

The convergence of shipping routes has left a heritage of convergent air routes which are tending to follow closely the shipping lanes, making Southeast Asia the terminus of the air lanes from North America down through the belt of narrow seas along the West Pacific (linking the United States with Japan, China and Java population centres) and from Europe across the "Eurasian Mediterranean" of Southwest Asia and India, as well as a junction for lines to Australia, although the population and production of the latter scarcely justifies considering it in the long term as a major objective of airways in the way that India and China must continue to be.

Convergence of Interests

There is thus much to be coveted in Southeast Asia, the raw materials and the food it produces, the manufactured goods it needs, the commission on the coming and going involved, are all desirable and those who share or have shared in its $15,000 million 1950 trade turnover are inevitably defensive of their portion. Colonial powers have jealously divided up these assets in the past and it is to be expected that there will always be from India and

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

FIG. 113.—Historic Pattern of Southeast Asia during Indian Colonial Period

implements had not in any case developed far enough to deal with stone. Hence monumental evidence in Southeast Asia is so largely Indian, an introduction by foreigners using styles and techniques developed in their home settings, and most developed in the drier parts of this region, where stone is more accessible. On the clay lands, historic brick structures, also an Indian innovation, weather to nothing very quickly. At Angkor may be seen the power of quick-growing tropical trees to shatter and break down temples and palaces built of stone and lateritic blocks.

This, too, is a region of natural calamities, difficult though it is to pin-point them. Little kingdoms have been wiped out in a few hours by Javanese volcanoes, as in A.D. 1006 when the flourishing city of Dharmavamsa (a great king of Central Java) was reduced to ashes by "a great calamity," probably an explosion and lava outflow of the Merapi volcano. Settlements along rivers have been obliterated when huge mud-flows swept down from loose ashes on the flanks of new eruptions, possibly accounting for our ignorance of east Sumatran kingdoms. Coasts have altered through the years

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133 and deltas have changed; areas which once were shallow sea have
175 become sedimented to swamps, a process by which Cambodia has been cut off as the Lower Mekong built up mud-flats isolating Tonle Sap from contact with the sea. The evolution of new routes has caused some old centres of power to fade into mere fishing villages, evidenced in the decline of Takhola and Bandon after the sea route through the Straits of Malacca became more generally

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

FIG. 114.—Historic Pattern of Southeast Asia at the Islamisation Period

175 used than that across Kra. Plagues have laid waste whole cities, as
164 when Uthong in about 1350 was devastated by cholera and its population fled. The region is still one where malaria, dysentery, cholera and plague are endemic, more especially in the older, more congested territories like Java. These diseases have frequently flared up into appalling epidemics killing thousands of people, epidemics reflecting a relation between bacteria and the climate (which encourages bacterial reproduction), the population density, the difficulties of sewage disposal and social habits of indifference to hygiene (which has no ill effects among lonely settlements in the forest but becomes a social menace in towns). Fevers and virulent diseases have frequently ravaged the local people, debilitated them, and wiped out their settlements. The region is strewn with ruins of towns now abandoned, and with ruined groups of people who have degenerated physically by disease and under-nourishment. Southeast Asia proved capable of engulfing rather than enshrining those moving into it to live.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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Southeast Asia and World History

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175 At the present time the whole of Southeast Asia is obviously and dangerously entangled in world history. Often it is suggested that this is quite a new thing. Actually, there is nothing new in the entanglement of Southeast Asia in world history. After pointing out that the Southeast Asian states derived their civilization from India but fell within the political orbit of China, Professor Coedes summarizes the consequences:

> Most of these states have reacted to the great shocks that have disturbed the Indian peninsular and the Middle Kingdom. The conquests of Samudragupta in the Ganges Valley and South India in the 4th century and the expansionist policy of Chola emperors of Tanjore in the 11th century have had their repercussions on the other side of the Bay of Bengal. Even more markedly has the history of Further India been influenced by affairs in China. The Chinese have never looked favorably on the growth of strong powers in the southern seas, and it deserves notice that Funan, Cambodia, and the Javanese and Sumatran realms reached the zenith of their prosperity during just those epochs when the great dynasties of China were enfeebled. Also these countries are mutually linked together by numerous ties, geographic and economic, and every revolution in any one of them, by disturbing the whole region, has had repercussions on the others.[5]

Similarly, Krom suggests links between the course of events in India and the spread of Indian settlements over Southeast Asia.[6]

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439 In a talk on the Tropical Far East and world history at the Siam Society, Bangkok, Furnivall pointed to economic

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5. J. S. Furnivall, "The Tropical Far East and World History," Journal of the Siam Society, Volume 39, Part 2 (January 1952), pp. 120-21.

6. Ibid., p. 121.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
Southeast Asia AL1

648 geography for an explanation of the relations between South-
439 east Asia and the outer world. The history of the China trade and the spice trade, Furnivall indicated, had revealed that Southeast Asia was of minor importance in each trade route, but it was significant as a byway along both routes, and it was sensitive accordingly to convulsions affecting the course of trade along either route. In Furnivall's words:

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> For China there have always been two main lines of communication with the West: the land route across central Asia, and the sea route round the coast. Throughout the ages traders have followed whichever route seemed easier. Both routes, however, are liable to interruption. The land route is exposed to wild hordes in central Asia and to the results of political catastrophes in the Middle and Near East. The sea route can easily be blocked at its main gateway, the Straits of Malacca. Yet, when both these two main routes are blocked, there is still a byway. Traffic can still find a way down the great rivers of Southeast Asia -- the Irrawaddy, the Salween, the Mekong, and the Red River -- diverging when convenient to the shorter rivers, the Sittang and the Menam. Time and again these rivers, and especially the Irrawaddy, have played a part in history.
>
> For the trade in spices from the Moluccas, the Straits of Malacca are of supreme importance; there is only one main route. But this narrow channel can easily be held against outsiders. When it is blocked, however, there are two byways. One byway is through the Sunda Straits between Java and Sumatra; repeatedly throughout the course of history we find mention of Bantam under various names, and of places close to Bantam -- Jakarta or Batavia, and Benkulen. There is also a second byway, from various points along the western coast of Burma and Malaya cutting across the mainland to the Gulf of Siam or continuing further to the Mekong and Annam.[7]

Colonization, Old and New

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The search for gold following Vespasian's placing of an embargo on this precious metal from Rome during 69-79 A.D.

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7. Ibid., p. 121-22.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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175 was suggested by Furnivall as a cause of the foundation of
• 439 Indian trading centers at convenient sites along the coasts
648 and main rivers of Southeast Asia. The same author places the date of the first Indian colonization in the area at about 150 A.D.[8] Harrison, however, maintains that the first definite Indian settlements were established in the first century A.D.[9]

175 Indian settlements were typically colonial in the
177 old sense of foreign settlement without foreign rule. The
563 settlers came as traders, intermarried with the local people,
648 acquired wealth, and formed an aristocracy. Then, as new migration ceased, the Indian rulers and aristocracy were absorbed into the people. In the inscriptions, the language and written characters took on native forms, and the names of persons and places were no longer Indian but native. Similarly, in the religious monuments and other buildings a native style was superimposed on the earlier Indian models.

175 Most authors have credited these Indian settlers
177 with having brought Indian culture to Southeast Asia. Harrison,
648 for example, takes for granted that "Indians who voyaged overseas to Southeast Asia naturally brought with them the ideas and practices of Hinduism and Buddhism."[10] He further speculates that "traders, adventurers and craftsmen were followed by Brahman and Buddhist priests and teachers,

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8. Ibid., p. 127.

9. Brian Harrison, South-east Asia (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1954), p. 10.

10. Ibid., p. 12.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
Southeast Asia AL1

175 carrying the civilizing influence of Indian cultural and
177 spiritual life and implanting it in these new lands by
648 introducing the art of writing and the classical Sanskrit language and literature; bringing as well their own vernacular languages to enrich the vocabularies of Southeast Asia."[11] It may be argued, nevertheless, that since there is little
175 177 good evidence for any large Indian emigration to Southeast
439 Asia, much Indian culture could have been brought back by
648 cosmopolitanized Southeast Asian traders who often spent months in India waiting for the monsoons to change their direction.[12] It should be noted in this connection that during this time of early Indian colonization trade relations were also extended westward by Indonesians (who earlier reached Madagascar) and other Southeast Asians.

175 During the expansion of Islam, from 1350 to 1500,
648 Moslem colonization followed the Indian pattern. Thus we may say that formerly a colony was merely a settlement in a foreign land and the settler had little or no political
[797] connection with the home land. The Indian and Moslem became foreign rulers, but they did not establish foreign rule. Subsequently, the Portuguese and Spaniards came as royal agents and with a warrant from the Pope to undertake both
175 648 the conquest and conversion of the people. The old idea
563 of a colony as a settlement survived: there were grandees

11. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

12. The author is indebted to Professor Lauriston Sharp for the development of this idea.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
Southeast Asia AL1

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648 were revolutionized by the techniques and aims of the West.
175 After 1850, European-owned steamships began the gradual
177 process of taking over the bulk of the inter-port trade
648 from native sailing boats and Chinese junks. The opening
439 of the Suez Canal in 1869 made possible the great modern
505 expansion of Western rule and trade, and thereby brought about the economic and social revolution which has created the Southeast Asia of today. The year 1870 is the real dividing-line between medieval and modern in the history of Southeast Asia.[14]

175 Whereas during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eight-
177 eenth centuries the various European nations active in South-
433 east Asia had, on the whole, limited themselves to trading
439 and acquisition of high-priced nonbulky commodities, such
648 as spices, the economic policy of the nineteenth century called for large quantities of bulky goods, such as sugar, fibers, oil seeds, coffee, and copra. Since the peasantry of Southeast Asia, almost without exception, raised only subsistence crops and had only limited surplus, it became necessary for the colonial powers to increase agricultural production. This was done in two ways: through the application of pressure on the peasantry to produce for export, and through the development of large-scale plantation agriculture.[15] The shift of emphasis from trade to production

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14. Harrison, op. cit., p. 197.

15. Karl J. Pelzer, "The Resource Pattern of Southeast Asia," Southeast Asia in the World Today, ed. Phillips Talbot. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 109.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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175 thus set a new stage -- the development of the natural
177 resources of the whole region.
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• 439 This change-over from a subsistence economy to a
648 commercial economy involved the large-scale expansion of traditional crops or the development of new commercial crops.
[436] It was stimulated by the introduction or expansion of a money
[487] economy, the flow of capital and the development of land and
[67] sea transport. It was supported by Western technology, methods of administration and systems of justice. This whole process greatly affected the traditional institution, up-
175 setting the balance of a medieval world. The free, indi-
177 vidualist spirit of Western rule and commerce cut at the
[59] roots of traditional social life, undermining the corporate
[423] strength of family and village. But the most serious direct
[426] threat of the new economic forces was to the peasant's owner-
[566] ship of land. Expanding economies, new money taxes and cheap imports meant better business than ever for the money lender. Many peasants became ruined by debt and lost their lands. Indebtedness and debt slavery were not new in Southeast Asia; the latter was fairly soon stamped out, but the former now became much more widespread than before, resulting in the creation of a landless proletariat.[16]

184 Characteristics of Current Southeast Asian Economy

In spite of all the differences among the countries of Southeast Asia in the natural environment, ethnic

16. Harrison, op. cit., p. 210.

433 affected by these few importing countries' determination
648 to be self-sufficient in food.

181 A dual economy as a distinctive character of colonial
433 rule is a theory propounded by some Dutch economists who contend that in tropical dependencies there are two distinct systems of economy. In the Western sector economic forces act in strict accordance with the economic laws enunciated by the earlier classical economists; but in the Eastern sector these laws have no force, and Western economic principles are inapplicable. The Western sector is ultra-capitalist since economic forces act freely, not even subject to the social inhibitions which still restrain them in Europe or the Western world; the Eastern sector, on the other hand, is precapitalist, with prestige carrying more weight than profit and communal influence restraining the individual desire of gain.[17] One
433
438 of the consequences of a dual economy is that it is difficult
439 to conduct business because the people will not trade on
648 Western lines. Inefficiency in trade leads to high operational cost and thus to social waste. Moreover, there is a likelihood of exploitation of indigenous people by Western traders as well as by foreigners of Asian origin who are free from social restraint.

563 One feature that has long been common to the countries of Southeast Asia and is so obvious that it could not fail

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17. J. S. Furnivall, "Cooperation, Competition, and Isolation," Southeast Asia in the World Today, ed. Phillips Talbot, op. cit., p. 71.

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ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

ITS HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY AND DIPLOMATIC CLIMATE

John L. Christian

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AN apposite instance of the interdependence of geography and history is provided by the tense rivalry between Great Britain and France in Southeast Asia before 1910. This rivalry, which was essentially a problem in the historical geography and diplomatic climate of the times, had its origin in the astonishingly persistent belief that somewhere between the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea would be found a short route to the wealth and trade of interior China, particularly Yunnan and Szechwan.

Contemporaries regarded it as axiomatic that a Sino-French or Siamese-French war over French aggressions in Indochina would result in an Anglo-French war. Indeed, twice (in 1893 and 1896) the two countries were on the verge of battle for control of the Menam and Mekong routes to Yunnan. But geography and malaria were against the diplomats. These routes never have come into use; and the area where Burma, French Indochina, and Thailand now march in a common frontier is today one of the least-known regions of all Asia.

Largely because of the existence of close ties between the two countries since the maturing of the Entente Cordiale of 1904, it is easy to forget that they were in acrimonious rivalry in Southeast Asia for decades, particularly from 1862 to 1904, when Britain kept careful watch over French activities from Oman and Afghanistan in the Middle East to New Caledonia and the New Hebrides in the South Seas. In this instance certain historicogeographical aspects of the problem are basically more important than the usual facets of diplomacy and politics.

Beginnings of French and British Interests

Historically, French interest in the lands east of Suez began with the organization of the French East India Company, in 1604, the dispatch of the first French ships to the Orient, in 1611, and the beginnings of the French Oriental establishments, in the middle of the century. As early as 1631 the French regarded Madagascar as of particular value because of its favorable location for extending their trade to Southeast Asia.[1] By 1663 French priests were acquainted with coastal Burma, Siam, and Cambodia and in that year made their first crossing of the Malay Peninsula, near modern Tenasserim, while

[1] The Cambridge History of India. Vol. 5. British India, 1497–1858, edited by H. H. Dodwell. London, 1929. p. 62.

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en route to Siam.[2] Shortly thereafter the French, hard pressed on the mainland of India, proposed that their headquarters be moved to the Pegu coast. The French naval expedition of six ships that reached the Bay of Bengal in 1690 had as its object the establishment of commerce with Burma and Siam. In fact, the failure of the trade of the British East India Company in Burma and Siam in the seventeenth century was traced to the superiority of French influence in those states.[3]

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In the eighteenth century Dupleix was interested in Burma and Siam because of the abundance there of teakwood for shipbuilding, and he suggested to his superiors that they acquire a portion of the Burmese coast.[4] During Burma's internal strife that resulted in the establishment of the Alaungpaya dynasty in 1755, the French made the mistake of aiding the defeated Talaings, while the British aided the conquerors. As a result, Alaungpaya acquired a supply of French arms, including 1300 muskets and forty 24-pounders, together with 200 French gunners, with which Burma became the premier state in Southeast Asia. The French, meantime, evened the score by inciting the Burmese to destroy the British colony on Negrais Island.[5]

In the nineteenth century Britain sent to the native states of Southeast Asia numerous embassies that had as their primary or secondary purpose inquiry into the extent of French influence in these states. For example, the missions to Burma of Symes in 1795 and 1802 and of Canning in 1803 and 1809; that of Crawfurd in 1822 to Siam and in 1826 to Burma; that of Finlayson in 1821 and Crawfurd in 1830 to Cochinchina; and those of Captain Burney, Sir James Brooke, and Sir John Bowring to Siam in the first half of the century were all interested in British trade and French ambition.

The Indochinese Peninsula

Ever since the early merchant adventurers were forced to pass through the Strait of Malacca or the Sunda Strait to reach the China coast the great Indochinese peninsula has been of interest to Europeans, principally as an obstacle to a direct route to the Far East, as that term is generally understood. In the past century it became common knowledge among Europeans in the Orient that at one point, far above the head of navigation, the Yangtze flows within 600 miles of the northern reaches of the Bay of Bengal, whereas it is some 4300 miles by sea from Calcutta to Shanghai. It was only natural that

[2] Adrien Launay: Histoire générale de la Société des Missions-Étrangères, 3 vols., Paris, 1894; reference in Vol. 1, p. 74.

[3] D. G. E. Hall: Early English Intercourse with Burma (Rangoon Univ. Publs., No. 1), London, 1928, pp. 138–153.

[4] V. McL. Thompson: Dupleix and His Letters, New York, 1933, p. 721; and Alfred Martineau: Dupleix et l'Inde française, 1749–1754, Paris, 1927, p. 451.

[5] D. G. E. Hall: The Tragedy of Negrais, *Journ. Burma Research Soc.*, Vol. 21, 1931, pp. 1–133.

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FIG. 1

early cartographers and pioneers of commerce should assume that the most direct route to interior China would be along one of the great meridional rivers of the Indochinese peninsula to the Yangtze.[6] At one point, somewhat north of the present Burma Road, the Yangtze, Mekong, and Salween are compressed within a distance of 48 miles (separated by ridges reaching up to 8000 feet above the floor of the adjacent valley).[7] But the Irrawaddy, contrary to early beliefs, does not rise on the Tibetan plateau as do the other great meridional rivers[8]

[6] Bruno Hassenstein: Some Contributions to the Geographical and Cartographical Literature of the Indo-Chinese Frontier Territories. n. p., n. d., gives a useful list of the principal sources on the area before 1900. Reports of early British attempts to penetrate India's northeastern frontier are summarized in "Selections of Papers regarding the Hill Tracts between Assam and Burmah," 10 vols., Calcutta, 1873.

[7] For a photographic report see J. F. Rock: Through the Great River Trenches of Asia. *Natl. Geogr. Mag.*, Vol. 50, 1926, pp. 133–186.

[8] A fact first noted in Sir Henry Yule: A Narrative of the Mission Sent by the Governor-General of India to the Court of Ava in 1855. London, 1858, p. 272.

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and thus occupies a unique place among the rivers of Southeast Asia, as Professor L. Dudley Stamp has recently pointed out.[9]

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Geographical and historical knowledge of the area within 300 miles of the point where the frontiers of Thailand, French Indochina, and Burma now meet was extremely sketchy until the beginning of the present century. For example, Dupuis, in his study of Tongking in 1872, prepared a map that showed the Burmese possessions reaching to the Black River, within 200 miles of Hanoi, into territory concerning which King Mindon and his successor, Theebaw, had only the slightest knowledge and no jurisdiction.[10] Dupuis was perhaps willing to show extensive Burmese territory in the hope that France would inherit Mindon's holdings; but the map was later to plague the French, who, after the British annexation of Burma, in 1886, found it to their advantage to maintain that Burma had at no time extended even to the Mekong.

Garnier's Expedition

In 1858 France seized Saigon; in 1862 the Court of Hué signed a treaty that surrendered Cochinchina to France; and in 1867 Siam was forced to recognize the French as overlords of Cambodia. As a result of the treaty with Annam, Francis Garnier was appointed Inspector of Native Affairs in the new protectorate, with permission to travel on the Mekong. On June 5, 1866, the De Lagree–Garnier expedition left Saigon in the first organized European exploration of the hinterland of Indochina from the China side.[11] On April 29, 1867, the party reached Luang Prabang, a place seldom visited by Europeans since the Dutch trader Gerard van Wusthof arrived there in 1641.[12] By June the party had reached the point where Burma, Thailand, and French Indochina now meet. Garnier noted there the sale of British cotton goods in the bazaar of Kiang Sen; and De Lagree reported that tribes on the left bank of the Mekong were loyal to Siam. Both explorers observed the presence of Burmese agents with authority at the principal crossings of the Mekong. On August 23, 1867, De Lagree visited Keng Tung, in what was undoubtedly Burmese territory; and thereafter the British in Lower Burma were ever watchful of French designs on territory bordering the upper Mekong. The Frenchmen passed on to Kiang Hung town, which has been under Chinese sovereignty since the Sino-British boundary settlements and

[9] The Irrawaddy River, *Geogr. Journ.*, Vol. 95, 1940, pp. 329–356 (see note elsewhere in this number of the *Geographical Review*).

[10] J. Dupuis: L'ouverture du Fleuve Rouge au commerce et les événements du Tong-Kin, 1872–73, Paris, 1879.

[11] Hugh Clifford: Further India, London, 1904, pp. 129–254, gives a vivid account of the Garnier expedition. The basic source is Francis Garnier: Voyage d'exploration en Indo-Chine effectué pendant les années 1866, 1867 et 1868 . . . ; 2 vols. and atlas, Paris, 1873.

[12] Garnier seems to have been the first to make readily available a translation of Van Wusthof's diary. The translation, which was made for Garnier by M. P. Vœlkel, was printed, with Garnier's annotations, in the *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie*, Ser. 6, Vol. 2, 1871, pp. 249–289.

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treaties of 1894 and 1897, where they noted that both Burma and China had agents in the court. On March 2, 1868, the party left the Mekong, and they reached Talifu by a journey that took them directly across the route followed by British and Burmese trade to interior Yunnan. The Moslem Sultan of Tali ordered the Garnier party away from his territory. Garnier explained the action: The Sultan has mistaken us for Englishmen. After the death of De Lagree in Yunnan young Garnier took the party out by way of Hankow, whence they traveled on to Shanghai by the American steamer *Plymouth Rock*. The Garnier expedition touched the Mekong at no point above Kiang Hung, a city to which the Britisher Captain McLeod had preceded them by thirty years. McLeod made his remarkable journey from Moulmein to Kiang Hung with six elephants and was the first European to penetrate China by the Salween route for purposes of examining trade routes.

When once it had been reported[13] that Garnier intended to "strike the Irrawaddy at Bhamo" and that he was expected also at Keng Tung and Mandalay, British interest in French activities in Southeast Asia was keen. Major General Albert Fytche, Chief Commissioner of British Burma, proceeded to Mandalay and secured Mindon's signature to a treaty that compromised Burma's independence.[14] Extraterritoriality was secured (abandoned in 1879). British agents were permitted to sit in Burmese customhouses; and Burma's power to control commerce across her territory to China was further restricted. A Resident was authorized for Mandalay, and the Irrawaddy was opened for navigation by British steamers. Captain Strover was stationed as agent in Bhamo and traveled up in November, 1868, by the first British steamer to reach that river port 40 miles from the Chinese frontier.[15] He was not, however, provided with a gunboat, as had at first been suggested; nor did Britain assume control of Burma's foreign relations, as her officers in British Burma had urged.[16]

The Sladen and Browne Expeditions

After much patient work, General Fytche in 1868 obtained permission from the King of Burma and authorization from the government of India for the dispatch of an expedition from Bhamo to Tali. Colonel E. B. Sladen, Political Agent at Mandalay, set out[17] with a group of six Europeans and a guard of 50 sepoys toward the same

[13] The London *Times*, June 7, 1868.

[14] Albert Fytche: Burma, Past and Present, 2 vols. (in 1), London, 1878. See the Anglo-Burmese treaty of Oct. 25, 1867, in *British and Foreign State Papers, 1870–71*, pp. 61 and 1305–1308.

[15] J. G. Scott, assisted by J. P. Hardiman: Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States, 2 parts in 5 vols., Rangoon, 1900–1901; reference in Part I, Vol. 1, p. 64.

[16] Alexander Bowers: Bhamo Expedition: A Report on the Practicability of Re-opening the Trade Route between Burma and Western China, Rangoon, 1869, p. 100.

[17] The official account is E. B. Sladen: Narrative of the Expedition to Explore the Trade Routes to China via Bhamo, Rangoon, 1869.

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goal as the Garnier party that had left Saigon two years before. The Sladen party reached Momein (modern Tengyueh) in September, 1868, three months after Garnier's return to Saigon. Colonel Sladen could get no farther than Tengyueh, however, because of the disturbed state of the country as a result of the Panthay rebellion.[18]

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Eventually Lord Salisbury yielded to the fears of British commercial interests that the French would entirely absorb the markets of Yunnan and neighboring provinces and sent an expedition to reopen British trade routes (1875). Colonel Horace Browne, accompanied by the geographer Ney Elias, who is remembered for his journey through Mongolia and his survey of the Yellow River, succeeded in getting farther than Manwyne, to Serai, where they learned that Augustus Margary, who had gone on ahead, had been murdered (1875).[19] Browne's party thereupon returned to Bhamo as the last official British attempt to open a direct route to interior China. As a matter of fact, the reports of Grosvenor, Baber, and Davenport, who were sent from Hankow to Yunnan in connection with the British demand for reparation over the Margary affair, convinced the home government that the topographic difficulties of the route from Bhamo to Yunnan and Szechwan were too great for practical railway construction.[20]

Government of India's Lack of Interest

British officials in Burma frequently complained of the impossibility of getting the government of India to give any attention to the northeastern frontier. That government was wholly occupied with the northwestern frontier and the danger of Russian aggression through Afghanistan and the Khyber Pass. As early as the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1816–1818 Dr. Francis Buchanan, of laterite fame,[21] had advised the East India Company against "giving the Chinese any just reason for suspicion by forming pretensions to any part of the mountainous region which separates the two Empires."[22] Lord Lawrence, the Viceroy, had advised against the Sladen expedition: "His Excellency can hardly conceive any step more imprudent than for British merchants to settle in Bhamo or a British official to be stationed there for any purpose."[23] In the short viceroyalty of Lord

[18] This disturbance hindered the British and aided the French. Captain Strover reported that during his first three years in Bhamo "not a single consignment belonging to British firms had reached Bhamo."

[19] The resultant British demand for compensation gave rise to the famed Chefoo Convention, a recent study of which is S. T. Wang: The Margary Affair and the Chefoo Agreement, New York, 1940.

[20] Particularly E. Colborne Baber: Travels and Researches in the Interior of China, *Royal Geogr. Soc. Suppl. Papers*, Vol. 1, 1882–1885, pp. 1–201, especially pp. 154–192, "Notes on the Route Followed by Mr. Grosvenor's Mission through Western Yünnan," reprinted from *Parliamentary Rept., China, No. 3 (1878)*.

[21] See this number of the *Geographical Review*, p. 177.

[22] Papers respecting the Nepaul War, London, 1824, p. 45.

[23] Letter from the government of India to Fytche, dated Simla, July 18, 1867, in Sladen, *op. cit.*, appendix T.

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487 Mayo the government of India, even at the risk of losing control over
175 the trade routes to Yunnan, again stated its policy:[24] "The future
annexation of Burma, or any of its adjacent states, is not an event
439 which I . . . desire; . . . I should view with extreme regret . . .
648 the necessity of occupation, or of assuming, even in a temporary manner, the government of any of the states lying adjacent to the province now in your charge." In short, the official attitude of the government of India has been summarized as follows: "The condition of the Northeastern frontier caused no Governor-General a single sleepless night."[25]

Railways Suggested

496 Meantime, British commercial interests continued to demand
487 that the Indian government provide facilities for trade to western
175 China in order to forestall any French plans to acquire prior advan-
439 tages in Yunnan and Szechwan. The *Parliamentary Papers* alone
648 contain nearly twenty reports on expeditions and proposals with respect to trans-Burma trade with western China and the upper Mekong from 1824 to 1900. The most persistent advocates of British penetration of Yunnan, Szechwan, and Kwangsi from the Bay of Bengal were Captain Richard Sprye and his son, who for half a century (1840–1890) presented numerous proposals for railways and highways into western Siam, to the Shan and Laos States, and to southern China.

Perhaps the best-publicized effort was that by Archibald R. Colquhoun, a deputy commissioner in British Burma, and Holt S. Hallett, a civil engineer. Colquhoun, who was ardently anti-French, resigned his office when the government of Burma refused him leave to survey a railway route from Moulmein to Szemao by way of Chiengmai in Siam. He became a special correspondent for the London *Times*, traveled overland from Canton to Bhamo, and wrote voluminously against French designs on Southeast Asia.[26] The Colquhoun-Hallett railway plan suffered from a general suspicion that it was merely a means for "taking the King of Siam by the hand and leading him into the great British Indian family."[27] Although Colquhoun's line is actually the shortest practicable route from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnanfu (Kunming), it passes through sparsely settled country that is everywhere malarial below 4000 feet. There is not today a railway line, caravan route, or highway, British or French or Siamese, that anywhere follows the Colquhoun-Hallett survey.

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[24] Fytche, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 124–125 (letter from Lord Mayo).

[25] D. G. E. Hall, edit.: The Dalhousie-Phayre Correspondence, 1852–1856, London, 1932, p. xv.

[26] A. R. Colquhoun: Across Chrysê, 2 vols., 2nd edit., London, 1883; A. R. Colquhoun and H. S. Hallett: Report on the Railway Connexion of Burmah and China, London, 1887. See also H. S. Hallett: A Thousand Miles on an Elephant in the Shan States, Edinburgh and London, 1890.

[27] Philippe Lehault: France et Angleterre en Asie, Paris, 1892, p. 562.

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British Annexation of Upper Burma

French intrigue in Upper Burma, with its consequent danger to British commercial interests, was the principal reason for the annexation of independent Burma, in 1886.[28] Jules Ferry had pledged repeatedly that no French arms should be supplied Burma through Tongking. But British suspicions were aroused upon the discovery that a Franco-Burmese agreement had been signed providing for the construction of a railway, the establishment of a Bank of Burma with French capital, control of the Burmese postal system, and establishment of a line of French steamers on the Irrawaddy.[29] The die was cast when the British learned of a secret agreement to supply arms from Tongking after the signing of the Franco-Burmese treaty of January 15, 1885.[30]

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The Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, sent a message to the senior official in Lower Burma: "If, however, the present proceedings should eventuate in any serious attempt [by the French] to forestall us in Upper Burma I should not hesitate to annex the country."[31] After the publication of a "remarkably indiscreet" report by M. de Lanessan on the progress of French activities in Burma,[32] the Secretary of State on November 11, 1886, wired the Viceroy: "Please instruct General Prendergast to advance on Mandalay at once."[33]

British occupation of Upper Burma was followed by expeditions into the various Shan States tributary to King Theebaw. In 1890 a British party under Sir George Scott reached Keng Tung. Meantime both the French and the Siamese had asserted claims to parts of the former Burmese possessions. During the Franco-Burmese negotiations of 1885 Burma purported to cede part of Kiang Hung across the Mekong to the French. The British, as heirs to Theebaw's dominions, claimed the area but later awarded Kiang Hung to China on condition that it should never be ceded to another power.[34] However, the Chinese almost immediately gave part of Kiang Hung to the French.

Further difficulty arose over the substate of Mong Hsing, a trans-Mekong territory ruled by a junior branch of the governing family of Keng Tung. In March, 1894, Mr. Stirling of the Burma

[28] The British were fully aware of Burmese and French plans, which were reported in detail to the government of India. The Blue Book "Correspondence Relating to Burmah since the Accession of King Theebaw, in October, 1878," has 266 pages of dispatches. C. 4614 in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1886.

[29] Comte A. Mahé de la Bourdonnais: Un français en Birmanie, Paris, 1891. pp. 295–306.

[30] C. 4014 (*op. cit.*, footnote 28), No. 105.

[31] Sir Alfred Lyall: Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, 2 vols., London, 1905; reference in Vol. 2, p. 118.

[32] J. L. de Lanessan: Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée d'examiner le projet de loi portant approbation de la convention complémentaire de commerce, signée à Paris le 15 janvier 1885, entre la France et la Birmanie, Paris, 1885. Lanessan became an aggressive governor general of French Indochina (1891 to 1894).

[33] C. 4614 (*op. cit.*), No. 122.

[34] Sir Edward Hertslet: Hertslet's China Treaties, 3rd edit., revised by G. E. P. Hertslet, with the assistance of Edward Parkes, 2 vols., London, 1908; reference in Vol. 1, pp. 99–109.

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Commission visited Mong Hsing; and he was followed, on Christmas Day, 1894, by Sir George Scott and Mr. Wharry, Chinese Political Adviser to the government of Burma, in connection with the Anglo-French Mekong Commission. M. Pavie, the French commissioner, had sent the French flag to Mong Hsing before the arrival of the British party, and the sawbwa had hoisted the tricolor over his palace. Pavie, who reached Mong Hsing on New Year's Day, had intended to welcome Sir George Scott to French territory. However, Scott had the French flag lowered and ran up his own. For a few months the incident had all the possibilities of an Oriental Fashoda nearly five years before the famous incident on the Nile.[35] The London *Times* had columns about the Mong Hsing incident; and Pavie in private conversation with Scott doubted the validity of French claims to the bazaar town. On January 15, 1895, a telegraphic message from the Viceroy announced an agreement with France that set mid-channel of the Mekong as the boundary.[36] Thus Mong Hsing, which had flown the British flag and had had a British post office for a year, was acquired by France. Siam's claims were quieted by the Treaty of Chantabun, which transferred all Siamese rights east of the Mekong to France. The remainder of the subordinate state of Keng Cheng went first to Siam but was acquired by France in May, 1896. British interests with respect to the Mekong frontier suffered from frequent changes of policy: Lord Roseberry favored the buffer-state idea;[37] Lord Kimberley ordered the occupation of Mong Hsing; then Lord Salisbury, "without exception the worst Foreign Secretary we ever had for matters east of Suez,"[38] gave up the state to France. The French secured a strategic, natural frontier for their Indochinese holdings and had the "further gratification of having enlarged them beyond all expectation."[39]

Later Rivalries

Anglo-French rivalry continued in Yunnan along Burma's northern frontiers until well into the present century. Rival railway and mining claims were the most frequent causes of friction. Article XII of the Anglo-Chinese agreement of February 4, 1897, contemplated

[35] The Mong Hsing–Keng Cheng incident is treated definitively by Clarence Hendershot: The Conquest, Pacification, and Administration of the Shan States by the British, 1886–1897 (Diss., Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1936). The best French account is contained in "Mission [Auguste] Pavie Indo-Chine, 1879–1895: Géographie et Voyages," Vol. 5, Paris, 1902, pp. 264–284.

[36] "Livre Jaune: Affairs du Haute-Mekong et de Siam, 1893–1902." By Article IV of the declaration, the two governments agreed that all commercial and other advantages conceded in the two Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Szechwan either to France or to Great Britain by their respective conventions of March 1, 1894, and June 20, 1895, and future privileges should "be extended and rendered common to both powers."

[37] G. L. LaFuze: Great Britain, France, and the Siamese Question, 1885–1904 (Diss., Ph.D., Univ. of Illinois, 1935), discusses the various proposals for a buffer state.

[38] G. E. Mitton [Lady Scott], edit.: Scott of the Shan Hills, London, 1936, p. 166.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 215.

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railway construction in Yunnan and provided for connection with Burmese lines.[40] No development, however, took place and the British abandoned their surveys beyond Bhamo and Lashio. The agreement between France and China of April 10, 1898, authorized the French to construct a railway from the Tongking frontier to Yunnanfu.[41] This was carried out, but the plans for carrying the line farther were discarded. Activities of French explorers and missionaries in Yunnan along the Burma frontier were watched closely; the British in Burma were only mildly enthusiastic about the explorations of Prince Henry of Orleans from the Mekong to Assam across the top of Burma in 1895. The British were careful to open consulates in Szemao (Es-mok) and other inland treaty ports of Yunnan and Kwangsi that had little trans-Burma trade.

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Siam probably owed her independence to the desire of both her neighbors to have a buffer state between them, the British having decided that Burma was "too soft and pulpy" to serve in that capacity. As matters turned out, France got much the lion's share of territory shorn from Siam. There is not in Burma today any area that was for any length of time Siamese territory, a fact recognized by the present Thai minister to the United States, who issued a communiqué indicating that, in contrast with her present demands upon the French possessions, Thailand is entirely satisfied with her Burma frontier.[42]

British development of Singapore after 1819, introduction of steam navigation to the Orient, the opening of the Suez Canal and the American transcontinental railway in 1869 only heightened the rivalry for alternate short cuts to "the greatest market in the world." By 1882 French engineers had completed surveys of a proposed Kra canal; and on June 8, 1883, Ferdinand de Lesseps presented the completed plans to the King of Siam as "la route Français au Tonkin." That distinguished Frenchman spoke of Bangkok as "the beginning of the Menam route to Yunnan."[43]

By about 1910 the epic age of European imperialism had come to an end; and since that time there have been no considerable additions to the French and British empires east of the Red Sea. Yunnan and Kweichow, for which the rivalry was particularly acute, during the past decade were perhaps less subject to foreign influence than any other provinces of China proper. Lord Curzon (Viceroy of

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[40] J. V. A. MacMurray, edit.: Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China 1894–1919 (Publs. Carnegie Endowment for Internatl. Peace. Division of Internatl. Law, Washington), 2 vols., New York, 1921; reference in Vol. 1, pp. 96–97.

[41] *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 124.

[42] *The New York Times*, Oct. 6, 1940. Britain took compensation in the Malay states of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perak, which had been under loose Siamese protection before their cession to Britain in 1909.

[43] La Bourdonnais, *op. cit.*, pp. 232–241 and 265–284, discusses French interest in a Kra canal and contains a copy of De Lesseps' report.

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India from 1898 to 1905), for whom frontiers and imperialism in the grand manner had great fascination, forced the Iman of Muscat to renounce the lease of a coaling site to France,[44] saw the Hague Court decide in Britain's favor in 1905 the question of the grant of the French flag to Muscat dhows, carried on an intimate correspondence with King Chualalongkorn of Siam, and considered that country an outpost of the British Empire.[45] From the Olympian heights of Simla Lord Curzon took pride in Britannia's supremacy in Southeast Asia. The Indian Ocean was a British preserve: "At no point in the long stretches of British territory washed by its surf has the flag of any European rival ever been hoisted since the French colours were struck over Cuddalore in 1783."[46] Curzon dreamed of a grand trunk railway from Calais to Shanghai by way of British India and sent Major Davies to do the necessary survey work in Yunnan.[47] He believed mistakenly that India and China, the two most populous countries in the world, would in his time be joined by steel rails.

The great delusion that the Irrawaddy, the Salween, the Menam, or the Mekong would provide the entrepôt to interior China was the key to Anglo-French policy and rivalry in Southeast Asia for a century. The delusion died hard. Eventually, however, "loath as most Englishmen are to admit it," trade decided that none of these river valleys provided an economical entrance to China.[48] Likewise, it was at length realized that Indochina was not the path of empire. Both Britishers and Frenchmen, learning lessons from geography and history, agreed with Sir Henry Yule: At no time has a conqueror from India or Burma passed on to China, nor (with one minor exception) from China to India or Burma; nor did the conquests of any one of the great warriors of medieval Asia embrace any part of both countries.[49]

But the delusion was so persistent and complete that it amounted to a perfect case of mistaken identity. Meantime, "England annexed areas where she had interests to protect, France annexed areas where she *wished* to have interests to protect."[50]

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[44] Lovat Fraser: India under Curzon and After, New York, 1911, pp. 86–91, gives a convenient summary of French attempts to secure a base at the mouth of the Persian Gulf.

[45] Curzon wrote a brilliant defense of Britain's record in Siam (G. N. Curzon: The Siamese Boundary Question, *The Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 34, 1893, pp. 34–55).

[46] G. A. Ballard: Rulers of the Indian Ocean, London, 1927, p. 287.

[47] H. R. Davies: Yün-nan: The Link between India and the Yangtze, Cambridge, 1909. Davies urged construction, for political reasons, of a meter-gauge line from Burma to China at a cost of £20,000,000.

[48] Clifford (quoting Colborne Baber), *op. cit.*, p. 294. A governor general of French Indochina came to the same conclusion. "French Indochina cannot be considered as a country of commercial transit. Saigon can never compete with Singapore" (J. L. de Lanessan: L'Indo-Chine Française, Paris, 1889, p. 478).

[49] Yule's introduction to William Gill: The River of Golden Sand, 2 vols., London, 1880

[50] E. V. G. Kiernan: British Diplomacy in China, 1880–1885, London, 1939, p. 187.

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167 426 466 [563] only surmise that a development of the cooperative movements will be furthered as the one policy free from international complications. As to the immigration of Indians and Chinese, the local governments seem unable to chart a course between the Scylla of indigenous nationalist sentiment and the Charybdis of demands from the governments of India and China. The latter today are in a far stronger position than before the war to insist that improved working conditions and greater political privileges be accorded to such of their nationals as they permit to emigrate to Southeast Asia.

466 167 563 Any restoration of the prewar planting-mining economy will depend upon the resumption of Asiatic immigration. But management will be forced to grant better working and living conditions and possibly the governments will have to concede a more privileged political position to immigrant Indian and Chinese laborers. On the other hand, native nationalists throughout the area will try to curtail such immigration and will oppose granting political privileges to alien Asiatics who, they believe, will continue to feel a primary loyalty to their homelands. These opposing forces have already locked horns on the citizenship clause embodied in the Malayan Union plan—the first postwar attempt to ameliorate the political position of alien Asiatics—and the British Government has not yet resolved the equally important immigration issue.

433 No matter what constitutional changes emerge from the current political crisis in Southeast Asia, the governments set up throughout the area will have to face the same labor and minority problems as did their predecessors. The urge toward industrialization received an impetus from the Japanese occupation, though the synchronous growth in the industries of China and India (not to mention Japan's continuing need for export markets) will offer sharper competition to the nascent industries of the region. Moreover, shortages of labor and fuel in most of Southeast Asia cannot but curtail the expansion of even light industries and may prevent any immediate and effective way of satisfying the desire of nationalists for the establishment of large-scale and heavy industries.

[439] The region seems destined to remain for some time predominantly a source of raw materials and a market for the industrial output of its neighbors. Before the war certain sections of these countries had entered the phase of commercialized agriculture and mining, and of processing the output—distinct advances over the traditional economies. This trend is now being accentuated, although it is influenced by such wartime developments as that of the synthetic-rubber industry. In any case the form of international organization set up to control production and sales will be different from that of the past, in which the colonial producer interests predominated. In the immediate postwar period, world shortages of the commodities produced by Southeast Asia have created a market eager for all its major output.

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184 try, indigenous, cultural or political sub-
369 center. Just as Shanghai had its Nanking
361 and Peking, so Rangoon has its Mandalay, Jakarta its Jogjakarta, Manila its Cebu, and, in a variant form, Singapore its Kuala Lumpur.

177 In the past these cities sited along the Asian littoral have been the funnels through
184 which produce from the interiors have reached tidewater and the world of com-
369 merce and Western manufactures have pen-
361 etrated. Through the increasingly metropolitan channels have flowed the ideas of the West as well as its material goods. In a sense they have acted both as a catalyst for social and economic change and as a cushion which modified the shock of the earlier cultural contacts.

361 With the exception of Singapore, the site of each of the great cities of Southeast Asia is an ill-drained riverine or coastal lowland strategically placed in relation to an exceptionally productive agricultural region. Again, with the exception of Singapore, none
[504] possesses a deep natural harbor suitable for modern ocean-going shipping. The three mainland ports are both river and ocean ports and must be reached through tortuous and shallow river channels. All are entrepôts. Jakarta and Manila are located on the most highly developed islands of the archipelagoes, for which they act as entrepôts. Only in Indonesia and Indochina are there major competitors for the two greatest ports —Haiphong, the outlet for the densely populated Tonkin delta, and Surabaya, the regional capital for the Great East of the Indies, itself an empire. Each great port vir-
• [439] tually dominates the national import trade; all tend, however, to share some part of the
504 national export trade with lesser ports. In spite of these great similarities, the nature
361 and functions of the ports differ markedly. As Allen observes: "All ports are individual. History, geography, politics, and economics all contribute to making them as they are. Few universal principles apply, and attempts to force uniformity on ports which have grown up differently are bound to fail."[18] Singapore, for example, is one of the

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for his wife—but he is equally likely to put it into a piece of equipment or 433
to hire some land. To understand the position of the peasant one must 565
realize the structure of the economic system of which he is a part, and the 461
values of his social system.

The peasant economy must not be thought of as simply a subsistence 433
economy. It has a complex marketing structure which, even apart from 565
Western influences, had an elaborate series of middlemen for making possible the diffusion of cloth, salt, iron, dried fish, spices, and other goods. 439
The system of exchange has been intensified, and the reactions of different 177
types of producers made more sensitive by the influence of the West. On the one side are the Western markets for primary products—coffee, spices, tobacco, copra, kapok, and, above all, rubber—the quick response to which has demonstrated how alive the Asiatic peasant is to making money if the opportunity offers. On the other side are the Western types of consumer goods, novel, attractively presented, easy to use—ranging from lamp oil, imported cigarettes, and cornflour for babies, to electric torches, bicycles, and the cinema. Conservative in his techniques of production, the peasant has shown himself enterprising in his consumption. The result has been that at many points, almost without realizing it, the peasant has become geared to the Western economic system. In the early days of European contact, he had often to be pushed as well as tempted into producing for the Western market. The scathing book, *Max Havelaar*, by the author calling himself 'Multatuli'—later known to be Douwes Dekker—has shown the kind of abuses that resulted from pushing the peasant into an enforced relation to the Western market. But naturally many of these links have been of his own seeking. In the last resort, it is the peasant's own scheme of values, his degree of acceptance of the goods and services which the West offers and which he transmutes to some extent in receiving, which determines his economic destiny.

But for the most part, the peasant has been incapable of perceiving the processes at work. The field is too vast for his comprehension. His reactions to the crisis and depression of the nineteen-thirties were direct and rational as they came under his personal observation. When prices fell he increased production of the export crops to maintain his cash returns; when that failed he retired from the struggle to utilize his backlog of subsistence cropping. But like many a farmer elsewhere, he had not understood much more than the immediate market situation. The pressure of the West has provided the peasant with a new range of wants from which he cannot rid himself even should he wish, and markets for his labour and raw materials which are an inducement to him to modify his habits. A new administrative system has given him fresh legal framework for many of his acts. A new system of taxation, though often lighter than before, is more methodical in its pursuit of defaulters. His land, the foundation of his [427]
existence, has for the most part been preserved to him, and indeed the
security for his legal title to it has been much improved. But alien planta- 000

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427 But the alien planta-
565 tions and even alien smallholders have threatened to grasp at it, and the
177 advances of Western medicine, so beneficial in many ways, have only accelerated the rate of increase of the population which has to seek a livelihood from it. In most parts of South East Asia the peasant is the actual owner of the land he tills, often legally under some agreement with
426 the State. But his rights to the produce are often severely limited by a heavy burden of indebtedness. The real effects of this may be less than people sometimes think, because when the debts are spread among neighbours and kinsfolk interest may be waived, repayment is sometimes protracted or ignored, and the debt may be serviced by other than material means. But there is no doubt that the peasant producer is badly hampered by his debt load. It is most pressing when debt is contracted to a member of an alien ethnic group, an Indian or a Chinese, for whom the transaction is a purely commercial one.

563 The role of alien Asiatic ethnic groups is one of the most significant
565 features in the economic and political life of the peasantry of South East
177 Asia today. For many centuries, Indian and Chinese trading influences
178 have met in the South East Asian region, and Indian religious concepts
439 have penetrated deep into many of its social systems. But for more than four hundred years the dominant commercial and political note has tended to be sounded by Europeans. Now the balance is altering. Colonialism may have set the modern structure of South East Asian society, but the patterns will persist when the colonial Powers have withdrawn. To this new society the Chinese above all have the economic key. In Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, the Philippines, and Java, the Chinese have penetrated the economic system and taken over crucial functions. They have shared in much of the wholesale import trade, they have attained pre-eminence in retailing vital imported goods to the peasant, and they act as middlemen for the collection, storage, and processing of peasant export products. As part of this process they often finance the peasant producer by advances on his crop, gaining a double profit by giving part of these advances in goods, not cash. The Chinese achievement has been remarkable. They have been kept on the margin both of the peasant society with which they deal, and of the European society with which at a later stage their growing wealth would allow them to associate. Though lacking any formal political power, which in the Orient as elsewhere is so often the passport to success, they have built up a trading structure of extraordinary toughness, elasticity, and elaboration.

565 The wider political implications of this are not my concern here. But
609 it is important to note three points in connexion with the peasant theme.
186 One is the xenophobic reaction of the local urban dwellers and of peasants too, which has periodically found expression against the Chinese, as traders
578 or residents in South East Asia, in the form of riots and other disturbances.
563 Another is the reaction of the Chinese, whose economic strength has given
241 them confidence, and who are now prepared to stand by their claim to a

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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man-power could be removed without significantly reducing food output. Under this circumstance, not only the productivity of agriculture but also the opportunity for urban industry to grow and flourish is hampered. A major obstacle to development of efficient manufacturing in underdeveloped countries is the small size of the market, which is in turn a consequence of the low purchasing power of the bulk of the people, most of whom get their living from the land.[21]

Southeast Asia has been characterized by its rapid growth in population. Broadly speaking, the region has been until recently one of very thin population. It seems probable that the whole of Southeast Asia in 1800 contained only about ten million people. Malaya then contained about a quarter million people, Java about four million, and Burma probably less than two million. It was, even at the end of the 18th century, a zone of labor shortage. But the last 150 years brought tremendous changes in population. It has been a period of tremendous population increases, causing people to swarm upon the more fertile areas, upon deltas and volcanic cones where people had not clustered before. By the quinquennium 1916-20, the total population of Southeast Asia had become 84 million, by 1936-40, 120 million, and by 1946-50 it was nearly 145 million.[22] This rapid population growth has been a great concern to students in economic

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21. Ibid., p. 253.

22. E. H. G. Dobby, Southeast Asia (London: University of London Press Ltd., 1951), p. 386.

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648 theme of their spokesmen in the economic and social organs
185 of the United Nations. It is probably too early at this moment to speculate on the outcome of Southeast Asia's
000 determination to industrialize. Much can be said, however, about the element of urgency and speediness commonly attached to each project of industrial development envisaged by each of these countries. "For successful development," cautions Staley, "two things are necessary: a substantial and continued economic advance -- and a social and political outcome which produces self-reliant citizenship in a free society, stable and responsive democratic government, and cooperation with other free societies."[25] The same writer warns that if capital investment and material technology are puched energetically in an underdeveloped country while little or no attention is given to deliberate promotion of appropriate social and psychological change, the result is likely to be either a failure of the development process to "take" and become "self-generating" or creation of a menace to the free world.[26] Garner also gives similar warning, "People have to develop themselves before they can change their physical environment, and this is a slow process."[27]

43
44 A most important factor that has kept Southeast Asia economically underdeveloped is the small size of market in

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25. Staley, op. cit., p. 202.

26. Ibid., p. 203.

27. Ibid., p. 203.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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43 each of the countries in the area, which is due to the low
• 44 level of their real income. This small size of market has
important effects on the volume of international trade,
on the pattern of foreign investment, and on the use of
domestic savings.

648 Because of their low level of productivity and
43 hence of low real purchasing power, the underdeveloped
44 agricultural countries play a minor part in world trade.
47 Business investment abroad has tended in the past to shy
away from industries working for the domestic market in the
underdeveloped areas and to concentrate instead on primary
production for export to the advanced industrial centers.
With special reference to Southeast Asia, most writers assign
the pattern to the commercial design of the colonial powers.
Nurkse, however, maintains that it does not reflect any
sinister conspiracy or deliberate policy, still less any
concerted attempt of the rich countries to exploit the poor.
"Exploitation there may have been," he said, "but this pat-
tern of foreign investment by itself does not constitute
any proof of it. This pattern can be readily accounted for
on obvious economic grounds. The explanation lies, on the
one hand, in the poverty of the local consumers in the under-
developed countries, and on the other, in the large and, in
the nineteenth century, vigorously expanding markets for pri-
mary products in the world's industrial centers."[28]

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28. Ragner Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Under-developed Countries (Oxford: A. T. Broome and Son, 1953), p. 25.

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CHAPTER III

EMIGRATION TO THE 'NANYANG'

THE overseas Chinese are almost exclusively drawn from the southeastern provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Kwangsi—the great majority from the first two. This has mainly been due to population pressure and to the contiguity of these provinces to Southeast Asia.[1] This emigration was accentuated by internal troubles in China. In the Ming dynasty there had already been substantial emigration to the Nanyang, but a new wave was set up by the civil strife consequent on the change-over from the Ming to the Ch'ing, or Manchu, dynasty.[2] For example, the anti-Manchu pirate and patriot Koxinga, who had occupied Formosa, made descents on the coasts of Fukien in order to replenish his stores and at the same time embarrass the Manchu Government. Partly to cut off his supplies and partly to intimidate the population of these regions whose sympathies were anti-dynastic, the Manchus made the latter forsake a zone of country from about eight to thirty miles deep on the coasts of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Chekiang. This zone was denuded of its crops and its villages were burnt down. A reference was made to this in the reign of the first Manchu Emperor when governors were ordered to give houses and land to such persons who had moved into the interior 'so that they might be satisfied'. The harsh treatment they received was undoubtedly an encouragement to many in these parts of China to seek refuge overseas.

Contacts with Europeans were also a subsidiary encouragement to emigration. The first European efforts to trade were centred in Kwangtung. In 1516 Perestrello came from Malacca to China; in 1517 de Andrada arrived in Canton and received permission from the viceroy to trade. The attitude of the Portuguese soon aroused the hostility of the Chinese and their trading depot was attacked and destroyed in 1522. They retired to Lampa in Kwangtung where

[1] Population pressure in China, especially in the nineteenth century, is instructively dealt with by G. E. Tyler, 'The Taiping Rebellion, its economic background and social theory', *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. xvi (1933) pp. 545–614.

[2] See J. J. L. Duyvendak, 'Chinese in the Dutch East Indies', ibid. vol. xi. (1927) pp. 1–15.

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they maintained a trading post for the next fifty years. Another expedition reached the coast of Fukien in 1518 and established depots at Ch'üanchowfu, north of Amoy, at Foochow, and at Ningpo in Chekiang. Between 1545 and 1549 an imperial edict for the extermination of the Portuguese was enforced wherever possible. Nevertheless Macao was founded as a trading post in 1557. The Portuguese paid rent for the Macao Peninsula until 1849. During the eighteenth century Macao was the chief port for the Western trade in China. The Spanish next opened up direct relations with the Chinese, using Manila as their base, but the trade between the Philippines and Amoy was almost entirely in Chinese hands. The port of Amoy from 1730 to 1842 was closed to all foreigners except Spaniards. The Dutch made attempts to open up trade at Canton in 1604 and 1607 but were defeated by the Portuguese interests at Macao. Though they eventually occupied Formosa, they were driven out by Koxinga in 1661. Further efforts made by the Dutch to obtain recognition of their trade were without success, and it was not until 1762 that they were able to establish a factory at Canton. The English made their first essay to join in the trade in 1596, but it was a failure. They tried in 1647 to operate under Portuguese auspices, meeting, however, with little success. The East India Company renewed the attempt to trade with Canton in 1664 and 1674, but were foiled, mainly by the Portuguese. The Company did, however, succeed in 1667 and 1670 in trading at Amoy and Formosa, but their factory in the latter place was closed in 1681. In 1685 an imperial decree opened all the ports of China to foreign trade; but Canton and Amoy remained the principal trading entrepôts.

A circumstance which tended towards centring the foreign trade on Canton and eventually confining it to this one port was the establishment of a monopoly by the Chinese Government. In 1702 an official called a Hoppo, or emperor's merchant, was appointed at Canton and became the sole broker for all purchases and sales. Two years later the Hoppo had to admit certain other merchants into a share of his monopoly. Henceforth the trade increased in bulk and flourished, though subject to very severe restrictions and a rigorous disciplining of the foreign merchants, most of whom had to withdraw to Macao in the non-trading season. In 1757 an imperial edict prohibited all foreign trade at any port other than Canton. Attempts to improve the conditions of trade and to establish relations on a proper footing led to the sending of embassies to

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Peking by the Dutch and the British, but without concrete result. 175
The situation continued down to the First China War of 1839–42. 167

It will be seen, then, that Chinese contacts with foreign traders were practically confined to the Kwangtung and Fukien ports, 441
though the intercourse was even then a restricted one. It was not the policy of the Spanish or of the Dutch (except at the beginning) to attract the Chinese to their colonies; it was only after 1786, when the British began to make settlements in the Malay Peninsula, that the Chinese found an unqualified welcome. The capitalistic development of colonies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had not yet begun, and there was no demand for coolie labour on a large scale before then. The Americans first traded with Canton in 1784, but it was not until 1848 that the first Chinese immigrants arrived at San Francisco.[1]

Such were some of the circumstances which induced, or paved the way for, Chinese emigration to the Nanyang. Our task must now be to investigate the factors which discouraged this emigration.

Ancestor worship was a strong force in discouraging the Chinese 167
from emigrating. The spirits of the dead needed the constant attendance of the living to ensure their welfare, and those who deserted the vicinity of the graves of their ancestors and left their spirits without sacrificial offerings and ritual attention were guilty of unfilial conduct. Thus it was at all times that only those who were forced by dire necessity left their native villages, and they were regarded as outcasts and vagabonds. It was natural, therefore, that a great many refugees and criminals should have been included among the emigrants.[2]

Religion was reinforced by Government policy. The Emperors took the view that the loss of subjects was not a loss to be compensated for by any trade advantages. Under the Mings the law was not so strict as it became later under the Ch'ings (the Manchus were also more orthodox Confucians than the Mings—and aliens are frequently more orthodox and conservative than the people

[1] So it is commonly stated, but in the correspondence relating to a project to send Chinese to Trinidad in 1806 ('Notices of Pinang', *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, vol. vi (1852) pp. 145–72) it is mentioned that Chinese had already been taken to Nootka Sound in North America. The writer has so far been unable to discover the facts of this matter.

[2] H. Gottwaldt, *Die Uberseeische Auswanderung der Chinesen* (Bremen, Max Moessler, 1903), insists that 'only the scum of the Chinese go abroad'.

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and other expenditure demanded by custom. Moreover, the money-lenders are willing to advance money without the security demanded by landbanks and co-operative societies.

In the matter of trade monopoly it is true that in Siam, Indo-china, Indonesia, and the Philippines the Chinese have a virtual monopoly of the rice distribution and milling trades. The Governments of these countries have, to meet the popular agitation, passed legislation to restrict the Chinese share in this trade. The fact that the Chinese maintains his position in face of all this legislation and in face of competition, fair or unfair, is simply because he is so much more competent in the business. Florence Horn (see p. 634) points out that the Filipino politician who charged the Chinese with having half the retail business in their hands changed his ground completely when the reply was made that all the Filipino had to do was to open up a *tienda* on his own and put the Chinese out of business. He then said that the Chinese standard of living was deplorably low, he eats almost nothing and works day and night; therefore he subjects the Filipino to unfair competition! At the same time it must be admitted that the Chinese, having obtained virtual control of some trades, do their best to keep them in their hands and usually employ only their own countrymen. This is naturally galling to the native looking for an opening, but there is a sound business reason for it. They employ their own people because they are, on the whole, better at the job. No European merchant would maintain that a firm should be compelled to employ persons of inferior business capacity, thus exposing the firm to the danger of bankruptcy.

If the Governments of Southeast Asia wish to secure a greater share of the trade of their country for their nationals, they are entitled to legislate accordingly—provided, of course, that the law does not operate harshly or unjustly by depriving an alien of one source of livelihood before he has had a chance of acquiring another. (The economic effect on a country of discriminating against aliens who discharge some useful function is another matter.)

In *Fanny's First Play* Bernard Shaw pokes fun at the critics who will not give an opinion as to the merits of the play until they know 'Who wrote it?' The inference is that such a question is an irrelevance, and that the play should be judged on its own merits. But while we have, so far, attempted to consider the charges

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361 immigration, are also the site of a large Chinese immigrant com-
162 munity. Burma and Siam exhibit similar contrasts within themselves: between the densely settled delta of the Irrawaddy and the almost uninhabited Northern Shan States (where the Bawdwin mines are located), the two focuses of Chinese settlement in Burma; in Siam, between the thickly populated Menam delta and the Isthmus of Kra, almost empty until the advent of the Chinese.[1] In central Siam the Chinese live closely associated with the Siamese people by whom, until recent decades, they were completely absorbed within a few generations. In Siam about half the Chinese live in the lower delta of the Menam, in the neighbourhood of Bangkok; the remainder of the race are scattered through the country, living in villages and towns rather than rural communities and tending to concentrate in the more commercialized districts. A notable concentration of Chinese, consisting of the more recent immigrants, is to the southwest of Siam, where they work in the mines, on the rubber plantations, and as merchants in the villages.

162 Apart from the concentration in the Kra Isthmus region, the
● 442 chief occupations of the Chinese in Siam are the various forms of retail and wholesale trade. The Chinese, in fact, control most of
443 the retail trade in the country. In particular they have the lion's share in the rice distribution and milling, and there is scarcely a commodity from pepper to sugar in which they are not interested as middlemen. They also make up a large part of the class of skilled craftsmen.

167 Most of the Chinese in Siam originally came from Hainan, Mei Hsien, and Chao Chou (including the city of Swatow) in east Kwangtung. The last-named group is apparently in the majority, especially those from Chin Hai, Yao P'ing, Chi Yang, and Chao An.

162 In Malaya the Chinese have a special significance in that they are here the majority community and have been so since before 1941. In that year there were for the whole of Malaya 2,379,000 Chinese as compared with 2,279,000 Malays, though, excluding Singapore, which is virtually a Chinese city, the Malays still outnumbered them. By 1947 they had still further strengthened their position so that they accounted for 2,615,000 of the population, whereas the Malays were now 2,544,000. This outnumbering of the native population (though the Malays themselves have multiplied their numbers several fold within the last few decades by natural

[1] Unger, op. cit.

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Chinese

361 immigration, are also the site of a large Chinese immigrant com-
162 munity. Burma and Siam exhibit similar contrasts within themselves: between the densely settled delta of the Irrawaddy and the almost uninhabited Northern Shan States (where the Bawdwin mines are located), the two focuses of Chinese settlement in Burma; in Siam, between the thickly populated Menam delta and the Isthmus of Kra, almost empty until the advent of the Chinese.[1] In central Siam the Chinese live closely associated with the Siamese people by whom, until recent decades, they were completely absorbed within a few generations. In Siam about half the Chinese live in the lower delta of the Menam, in the neighbourhood of Bangkok; the remainder of the race are scattered through the country, living in villages and towns rather than rural communities and tending to concentrate in the more commercialized districts. A notable concentration of Chinese, consisting of the more recent immigrants, is to the southwest of Siam, where they work in the mines, on the rubber plantations, and as merchants in the villages.

162 Apart from the concentration in the Kra Isthmus region, the
442 chief occupations of the Chinese in Siam are the various forms of retail and wholesale trade. The Chinese, in fact, control most of
443 the retail trade in the country. In particular they have the lion's share in the rice distribution and milling, and there is scarcely a commodity from pepper to sugar in which they are not interested as middlemen. They also make up a large part of the class of skilled craftsmen.

167 Most of the Chinese in Siam originally came from Hainan, Mei Hsien, and Chao Chou (including the city of Swatow) in east Kwangtung. The last-named group is apparently in the majority, especially those from Chin Hai, Yao P'ing, Chi Yang, and Chao An.

162 In Malaya the Chinese have a special significance in that they are here the majority community and have been so since before 1941. In that year there were for the whole of Malaya 2,379,000 Chinese as compared with 2,279,000 Malays, though, excluding Singapore, which is virtually a Chinese city, the Malays still outnumbered them. By 1947 they had still further strengthened their position so that they accounted for 2,615,000 of the population, whereas the Malays were now 2,544,000. This outnumbering of the native population (though the Malays themselves have multiplied their numbers several-fold within the last few decades by natural

[1] Unger, op. cit.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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563 foreign army of occupation has preserved it from disruption.
565 The essential and distinctive character of a plural society
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571 is that it is dominated by economic forces, and, outside a few partly sheltered oases, Southeast Asia illustrates the capitalist system in its purest form.[18]

162 Another common feature is the dominance of the agri-
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433 cultural section of the population. The latest available
171 figures show the percentage proportions of population dependent on agriculture in the area as follows: Burma, 68; Indonesia, 66; Philippines, 69; Thailand, 85.[19] The same source indicates the proportions for various regions of the world as follows: North America, 20; Oceania, 30; Europe, 33; South America, 60; Asia, 70; and Africa, 74.

171 With the prevailing techniques of production and the
433 consequent low productivity per man, dominance of agriculture
434 means low per capita national income. When countries are grouped by level of economic development on the basis of per capita national income as of 1950, all the six countries of Southeast Asia -- Burma, Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaya, Philippines, and Thailand -- fall in the underdeveloped
443 group.[20] Moreover, there is in Southeast Asia a true surplus
464 population on the land in the sense that even under the
161 present methods of cultivation a sizeable fraction of the

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18. Ibid., p. 77.

19. Food and Agriculture Organization, 1953 Yearbook, Vol. VII.

20. Eugene Staley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), pp. 16-17.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese
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Sometimes they have been given a choice of activities. The Spanish, for example, wanted them as peasant agriculturists but tolerated them as traders. Similarly, in Indochina the French wanted them for opening up uncultivated lands, but, since the 'Red Lands' suitable for the cultivation of rubber and other profitable raw materials were barred to all aliens, the Chinese (although he might have been a peasant at home) refused the hard toil of the fields if he could obtain a position with a Chinese firm. In Java the Dutch found the Chinese useful as middlemen, and middlemen they became, accepting the penalty of the resentment of the Javanese that such a function entailed. The farming of the revenue was allotted to them as the highest bidders by the Spanish, the Dutch, and the British alike. Such occupations are labelled 'parasitic', but it must be remembered that they were the best methods of obtaining revenue available before the Governments felt themselves able to collect it for themselves. When they could do so, the farms were abolished. Also, it should be remembered, it was from the Chinese themselves that most of the revenue of the farms was collected. If we accept Mr Furnivall's epithet of 'parasitic' we must extend it to cover the British, Dutch, and French Governments also.

Given a large and improvident peasantry, as existed in Siam, Indonesia, Indochina, and the Philippines, there was a demand for credit with uncertain security or none at all. This credit was most naturally extended by the traders to whom they sold their produce, and it was most conveniently given in the form of goods and paid for in produce at the time of the harvest. Certainly this gave great power to the Chinese trader; the question is whether he abused it. A survey in Siam by Mr James M. Andrews (see p. 164) does not bear out the widespread belief that the Chinese are unconscionable usurers. 'The Thai farmer [says Mr Andrews], and especially his wife, is much more given to money-lending with the hope of high profits than the Chinese.' As regards alleged profiteering in the rice trade, the College of Agriculture at Los Baños in the Philippines (see p. 635) conducted a survey and found that 'the Chinese merchants are performing essential marketing services at a fairly low cost'. In Indonesia it is notorious that many Indonesian Hajis and Arabs are far greedier money-lenders than are the Chinese. In Malaya it is the chetty and the Sikh who are the money-lenders; not the Chinese. Cases in which Chinese

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
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figured as lenders were practically unknown.[1] The charge of 'unconscionable usury and profiteering' is, in the writer's opinion, not proved.

Professor Raymond Firth has gone into the question of Chinese middlemen in the Malayan fishing industry with considerable care. He says that in this role the Chinese performs important functions. He shoulders a great part of the market risks; he supplies considerable capital, in a liquid form, in consumer's goods, or in producer's goods; and he saves the fishermen much trouble in seeking buyers. On the other hand the same observer adds:

> The system obviously has great dangers. It gives him a monopoly, with little prospect of the fishermen reaping the advantages of the rising market, or of even getting much more than bare subsistence earnings, and it tends very often to place them firmly in his debt, with little chance of extricating themselves and building up their own capital.

Among the Malay fishermen this relationship with the Chinese is variously viewed. One group told Professor Firth that they liked it 'because they can get hold of cash easily'. In several other places, however, the fishermen complained of the low prices they received from the Chinese to whom they were bound to sell. Up to 1939 the attempt of the administration to meet the situation by encouraging co-operative Malay associations for fish-marketing had had only a moderate success.[2]

It should be added that the provision of credit on reasonable terms for productive enterprise is finally the responsibility of the Governments. Much progress has been made in some Southeast Asian countries in the establishment of landbanks, co-operative societies, &c., in the last half-century, but these advanced money only for 'productive' purposes, and in Indonesia the people have still to go to money-lenders to obtain money for wedding, funeral,

[1] A London solicitor who was for many years in Malaya, where he had a large practice, remarked to the writer on 10 February 1949, 'I have never known a money-lending Chinese.' Nor can the writer himself, who had considerable experience as a magistrate and as official assignee and liquidator of companies, recollect any such case.

The writer, on the other hand, has known Britons (of presumed respectability) lending money to Indian chetties at a minimum of 12–15 per cent., who in turn lent it to Malays, Chinese, and others at a rate of interest that can only be guessed!

[2] *Malay Fishermen: Their Peasant Economy*, pp. 14, 61.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
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and other expenditure demanded by custom. Moreover, the money-lenders are willing to advance money without the security demanded by landbanks and co-operative societies.

In the matter of trade monopoly it is true that in Siam, Indochina, Indonesia, and the Philippines the Chinese have a virtual monopoly of the rice distribution and milling trades. The Governments of these countries have, to meet the popular agitation, passed legislation to restrict the Chinese share in this trade. The fact that the Chinese maintains his position in face of all this legislation and in face of competition, fair or unfair, is simply because he is so much more competent in the business. Florence Horn (see p. 634) points out that the Filipino politician who charged the Chinese with having half the retail business in their hands changed his ground completely when the reply was made that all the Filipino had to do was to open up a *tienda* on his own and put the Chinese out of business. He then said that the Chinese standard of living was deplorably low, he eats almost nothing and works day and night; therefore he subjects the Filipino to unfair competition! At the same time it must be admitted that the Chinese, having obtained virtual control of some trades, do their best to keep them in their hands and usually employ only their own countrymen. This is naturally galling to the native looking for an opening, but there is a sound business reason for it. They employ their own people because they are, on the whole, better at the job. No European merchant would maintain that a firm should be compelled to employ persons of inferior business capacity, thus exposing the firm to the danger of bankruptcy.

If the Governments of Southeast Asia wish to secure a greater share of the trade of their country for their nationals, they are entitled to legislate accordingly—provided, of course, that the law does not operate harshly or unjustly by depriving an alien of one source of livelihood before he has had a chance of acquiring another. (The economic effect on a country of discriminating against aliens who discharge some useful function is another matter.)

In *Fanny's First Play* Bernard Shaw pokes fun at the critics who will not give an opinion as to the merits of the play until they know 'Who wrote it?' The inference is that such a question is an irrelevance, and that the play should be judged on its own merits. But while we have, so far, attempted to consider the charges

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

democracy corresponding to the *vergadering* of Java. In Burma the village has become merely an administrative unit, whereas in Java the village still appears to be mainly a social unit. And it would hardly be possible to find a more striking contrast than between the Village Act of Java, designed as an instrument of social uplift, and the Village Act of Burma, designed as an instrument of law and order and 'vigorously enforced' by fines on villages, villagers and headmen. Government schemes in Java, we are told, 'risk failure if they appeal to the individual economic instincts and have a fair chance of being comprehended and accepted, if they are based on a foundation of organic co-operation'.[1] 631

Indebtedness. Both in Burma and Java agricultural indebtedness has accompanied, and has indeed been a condition of, economic progress. It was through giving out advances that the planter in Java secured his land and labour, and that the miller in Burma made certain of getting an adequate supply of paddy at the lowest possible rate. The Dutch, with their State pawnshops and People's Banks, have done more than has been attempted in Burma to provide credit on sound lines, but they have by no means solved the problem of indebtedness; alongside the state institutions the private moneylender still flourishes. But the application of native customary law to land, and the prohibition against the alienation of land to foreigners have obviated the most pernicious social and political consequences of agricultural indebtedness, and it is not in the same measure as in Burma a cause of agricultural distress and political ill-will. 452

Litigation and Crime. Until quite recently litigation was as unusual in Burma as it still is in Java. But in Burma the people have been encouraged to settle their disputes by the processes of western law; whereas in Java, customary law and the practice of arbitration and the settlement of disputes by reasonable compromise have survived. 691

An even greater contrast is presented in respect of crime. In Java the death sentence is almost unknown; for the five years from 1935 to 1939, with a population for the whole of Netherlands India of nearly 70 million, only three persons were sentenced to death; in Burma, with a fifth of the population, the death sentence is passed on some two hundred a year and upwards of a hundred a year are hanged. It is difficult to compare sentences of imprisonment, but the position in Java is very different from that in Burma where, for some thirty years, the accommodation for convicts has failed to keep pace with 674 681

[1] Hart, p. 65.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

Where development by western enterprise is the prime object of colonial policy, land alienation need present no problem, except as regards the lands actually taken up for western enterprise, and even debt may not be serious. Thus, in large parts of Africa, 'so far conditions have not favoured the growth of moneylending; the general restrictions imposed on the sale of native land to non-natives, as well as the limitations which some territories have placed on the giving of credit to natives by non-natives have militated against it'.[1] It is sometimes suggested in British publications that there is little indebtedness in Netherlands India. But that is a mistake. The Dutch have protected the native against the worst result of debt, the loss of land, but not against incurring debt. In the development of British India and Burma by native enterprise the merchant gave out advances to secure produce; in Java the planter gave advances to secure labour. The actual moneylender is usually a middleman, in the Tropical Far East mostly Indian or Chinese, who reaps some of the profit that would otherwise be divided between natives and Europeans, with a lion's share to the latter. In such circumstances exporters of produce have a common interest with cultivators. Moreover, as is conspicuously illustrated in Burma, the transfer of land to people whose sole interest is to exact the highest rent, tends to reduce the outturn. Thus everywhere in the Tropical Far East we find sympathy for the cultivators in the clutches of middlemen: in Indo-China 'the chetty is a plague', in the Dutch Indies 'the foreign asiatic is worse than ten epidemics', in Burma the wiles of both *chettyars* and Chinese were denounced so far back as the early eighties. Both practical and humanitarian considerations demand a solution for the problem of indebtedness.

The favourite remedy for debt is the encouragement of co-operative credit societies. But this is no cure for debt, and it may quite possibly aggravate the disease which is the chief cause of debt, the disintegration of society by economic forces. It is no cure for debt, because the success of co-operative credit requires a genuine acceptance of co-operative principles, and this is a slow process, while debt increases daily. It tends to aggravate disintegration, because the principles on which it rests are contrary to those which form the basis of native social life and, indeed, of social life in general. The suggestion that co-operative credit accords with native ideas as being communal in character is mistaken.[2] The village community embraces all the inhabitants of the village in a common bond for all the purposes

[1] *African Survey*, p. 872. [2] *Ib.* p. 1482.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

452 474 of social life; the co-operative credit society includes only selected individuals who unite for specific economic ends. If a whole village were transformed into a co-operative credit society, it would at the same time be transformed from a village into a business concern. The spread of co-operative principles is much to be desired; it would encourage thrift and train the people in modern business methods, and mark a forward step towards the reintegration of native economy, the economic aspect of their social life. But, unless the limitations of the co-operative movement are appreciated, it is apt to be perverted from an instrument of native welfare into an instrument of economic progress. Ordinarily cultivators can borrow at a lower rate from a co-operative credit society than from a middleman. This should reduce the cost of production of native crops, and increase the margin between cost and yield. But competition in the market transfers the profit from the cultivators to the firms engaged in the export of tropical produce. Co-operative societies provide an attractive investment for banks and private individuals. The elimination of the middleman removes a possible competitor to western firms, and has political reactions by hindering the growth of a politically conscious middle class. In practice the multiplication of co-operative credit machinery usually outruns the spread of co-operative principles, and the co-operative credit service, established in the cause of native welfare, serves chiefly to promote the interests of western enterprise. This is the natural outcome of confounding two distinct problems: the social problem of training the people in modern business methods, and the economic problem of providing a remedy for agricultural debt.

452 474 453 In Netherlands India this distinction has been recognized, though by accident rather than design. One aspect of the Ethical movement was an attempt to foster co-operative credit. This made slow progress. The remedy for debt is to provide the cultivator with as much credit as he requires, and no more than he requires, at the lowest rate that economic conditions allow. The co-operative movement failed to solve this economic problem because the people, though quick to borrow money, were slow to accept new ideas. The Government held the view that the chief need of the cultivators was sound credit, and the co-operative societies were accordingly transformed into State banks of various types. This has been justified on the ground that if the economic problem can be solved, it will then be possible to foster co-operative credit as a social institution. Of recent years, therefore, co-operative societies have been established

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

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The State pawnshops in Netherlands India provide similar facilities 426
for individuals, mainly townsfolk, to obtain temporary accommodation on a small scale. These also were an outcome of the Ethical movement, originating with the same man who started the early co-operative credit movement. Formerly the pawnshops were in the hands of the Chinese, who managed them merely with a view to profit. The pawnbrokers were cunning in sharp practice; the terms for loans were exorbitant, and the arrangements for the safe custody of pledges were unsatisfactory, while the shops were widely believed to be used as opium dens. All this has been changed, and the shops are not only a public benefit but yield a handsome revenue.

Both State banks and pawnshops illustrate the fact that the pro- 453
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453 may give the people new opportunities of improving their condition, and, if well managed, may give some protection against economic
426 forces, which public works, even irrigation works for the benefit of native enterprise, do not attempt. For the relation between
474 the co-operative movement and State credit, we may find a parallel in the relation between economic services aiming to increase collective production and those aiming to increase individual production. We have noticed that ordinarily the former fail because it is impracticable to obtain collective action by a sufficient number over a sufficient area, whereas the latter may meet with some success. Yet even individuals who take advantage of the new opportunities to produce more, ordinarily receive no lasting benefit, because they are unable to withstand the economic pressure of the environment. Co-operative credit and State credit are alike intended to strengthen them against this pressure. Experience in Netherlands India suggests that State credit has better chances of success. But it is important to appreciate the conditions of success. The State banks in Netherlands India have achieved useful results because the land policy protects cultivators against the impact of the West, and not because the banks protect them against the natural consequences of this impact. Similarly the pawnshops have been useful because the State monopoly of pawnbroking protects the people against the action of economic forces, and not merely against their natural consequences. State credit has no virtue in itself. It may, as has been charged against State banks in Netherlands India, merely increase the volume of indebtedness, and it is liable to become just an instrument of economic progress instead of helping to promote welfare. As an instrument of welfare it is of value only so far as it is accompanied by other measures in a comprehensive welfare policy.

7. Western Enterprise and Labour

423 The problems arising out of tropical development by western enterprise have a different character, and are more readily apparent and more urgent. In some cases it may lead to agrarian distress, but this is found chiefly where lands available for native occupation have been curtailed by the grant of large estates for European settlement. Such conditions present special difficulties. Formerly in Burma waste lands were granted or leased for European enterprise, but this resulted in the oppression of the natives, both on the estates and in their neighbourhood, and the concessions remained uncultivated

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Finally, the weakness of the market incentive for private investment in the domestic economy of the low-income countries can affect domestic as well as foreign capital. The first difficulty is that the volume of domestic saving is small, because of the low level of income. But then there is the further trouble that such saving as does take place tends to be used unproductively: it tends to be put into real estate, gold, jewelry, commodity hoards and hoards of foreign or domestic currency. While this unfortunate tendency is usually explained by reference to inadequate financial organization or lack of education, Nurkse suspects that the tendency may also reflect a more deep-seated economic condition -- the deficient inducement to invest due to the poverty of the domestic market.[29]

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Cultural Background of Thai Peasants

Benedict describes Thai characteristics as indolent, unwilling to labor for more than immediate needs, content with their lot, uninterested in money or economic advancement, conservative, and satisfied with a dependent status.[30] These characteristics have led to preference for agriculture, government service, and self-employment in general to other occupations.

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29. Ibid., p. 26.

30. Ruth Benedict, "Thai Culture and Behavior" (an unpublished war-time study dated September 1943, Data Paper number 4, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University. Ithaca: Department of Far Eastern Studies, 1952), pp. 34-45.

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

466 legislation, workmen's compensation and the regulation of industrial relations. In Indochina, the Popular Front Government had begun to apply by stages metropolitan French labor legislation to various groups of the workers. In the Indies, between 1940 and 1942 detailed workmen's compensation laws were adopted, the system of employment under penal sanctions was brought to an end, compulsory road labor in the Outer Provinces was abolished, and in Java the whole wage structure was being changed to provide for a general minimum wage for the lowest ranks of workers.

464 Nevertheless, as Miss Thompson states in her first essay, there remained two major labor problems. The labor supply was unsatisfactory and there was no effective labor movement.

Labor migration enabled the employers to meet their immediate needs and in many cases, as between India and Malaya, was well-organized. In the circumstances of much of Southeast Asia, however, it has helped to absorb some of the surplus population rather than to improve living conditions. In times of economic prosperity there was more money in the villages; with the great depression the villages, more dependent on money, were poorer than ever, and those workers who kept their employment saw their wages drop almost or entirely to vanishing point. The skill of the rubber-tapper, the cigarette roller, the batik worker and of other workers in manual operations demanding delicacy of touch was considerable; the industriousness of the Chinese was even excessive; above all, peasant rice production in the wet lands was marked by the fullest use of available resources. But for modern production in industry, labor efficiency was low and in particular the availability of the skilled mechanical worker was in many areas rare and uncertain.

[458]

467 Miss Thompson shows the prewar weakness of the labor movements. In Java, the maximum number of organized workers appears to have been reached in 1941 when the membership of trade unions was estimated at 123,500. In the Philippine Islands, at the end of 1940 the total membership of the registered labor organizations was 96,877, and 190,000 workers were estimated to be organized in unregistered unions. There was little unity or continuity among the unions which existed. The Western governments feared the political interests of the labor movements. The seasonal character of much of the employment, labor migration and, in some cases, the racial diversity of the labor force, were other factors making trade union organization difficult.

000 All these problems still exist. An improved standard of living is one of the essentials for stability in Southeast Asia. Such improvement cannot be effected without economic developments, and although these developments will be hindered by labor which is cheap and inefficient, in the absence of much of the equipment of modern industry it will be long before standards of employment in Southeast Asia are comparable with

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Chinese

religion was no barrier between themselves and the Chinese; all were Buddhists, though of differing sects. Chinese culture had long been admired by the peoples of Farther India, and had influenced them. Moreover, the Chinese were regarded as distant and desirable relatives. With the advent, however, of Chinese women and the accelerated growth of Chinese nationalism after the first world war, intermarriage occurred less frequently (though it continued to be common in Burma and Cambodia), and the indigenous peoples had few social contacts with the Chinese in their midst. The cleavage between the ethnic groups was further widened in the British colonies by the official policy of representation of various communities on legislative and advisory bodies. 563 609

Economically, relations between the indigenous and the immigrant peoples altered from a mosaic of non-conflicting occupations to one of rapidly increasing competition. For years the native peoples had contentedly seen the arrival of thousands of immigrants annually who were able and willing to perform the hard labor for which they themselves had neither inclination nor compulsion. Through much of the region, however, during the inter-war period an indigenous proletariat was developing as a result of the transfer of farm land from the indebted native peasantry to non-agriculturists, often to alien moneylenders, and also because of the growth of a Western-inspired individualism which was weakening family ties once paramount. The trend was apparent chiefly in parts of Burma, Siam, and Indochina. 464 477 178 425 177

This development did not assume significant proportions until the world economic depression, when considerable unemployment arose out of the drop in prices and the curtailment of foreign markets for products of Southeast Asia. The result was a swift increase in the number of natives seeking to return to their villages and, on the other hand, of those forced to seek part-time or full-time employment away from their villages in competition with immigrant laborers for work previously scorned as arduous, monotonous, and underpaid. 464 458 178

Meanwhile the native middle classes for the first time faced a serious unemployment problem. Until the depression years, the opportunities for desirable though moderately paid employment in government or business had seemed to exceed the number of qualified candidates. The depression made it clear that the saturation point had been reached, and each year an increasing number of educated youths would be thwarted in their expectation of employment or, if given a job, in their rise to higher positions. Thus two groups of economically frustrated natives developed simultaneously in numbers and in consciousness in the decade prior to the second world war. 464 178 563

Nascent political factors became significant during that period. The struggles of the Chinese against the Japanese and of Indians against British rule were reflected in the attitudes of the emigrants from those coun- 464 668

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and other expenditure demanded by custom. Moreover, the money-lenders are willing to advance money without the security demanded by landbanks and co-operative societies.

In the matter of trade monopoly it is true that in Siam, Indochina, Indonesia, and the Philippines the Chinese have a virtual monopoly of the rice distribution and milling trades. The Governments of these countries have, to meet the popular agitation, passed legislation to restrict the Chinese share in this trade. The fact that the Chinese maintains his position in face of all this legislation and in face of competition, fair or unfair, is simply because he is so much more competent in the business. Florence Horn (see p. 634) points out that the Filipino politician who charged the Chinese with having half the retail business in their hands changed his ground completely when the reply was made that all the Filipino had to do was to open up a *tienda* on his own and put the Chinese out of business. He then said that the Chinese standard of living was deplorably low, he eats almost nothing and works day and night; therefore he subjects the Filipino to unfair competition! At the same time it must be admitted that the Chinese, having obtained virtual control of some trades, do their best to keep them in their hands and usually employ only their own countrymen. This is naturally galling to the native looking for an opening, but there is a sound business reason for it. They employ their own people because they are, on the whole, better at the job. No European merchant would maintain that a firm should be compelled to employ persons of inferior business capacity, thus exposing the firm to the danger of bankruptcy.

If the Governments of Southeast Asia wish to secure a greater share of the trade of their country for their nationals, they are entitled to legislate accordingly—provided, of course, that the law does not operate harshly or unjustly by depriving an alien of one source of livelihood before he has had a chance of acquiring another. (The economic effect on a country of discriminating against aliens who discharge some useful function is another matter.)

In *Fanny's First Play* Bernard Shaw pokes fun at the critics who will not give an opinion as to the merits of the play until they know 'Who wrote it?' The inference is that such a question is an irrelevance, and that the play should be judged on its own merits. But while we have, so far, attempted to consider the charges

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CHAPTER I · INTRODUCTION

I

LABOR SUPPLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

464 467 TWO MAJOR LABOR PROBLEMS, which have confronted Southeast Asia in the past and which remain unsolved, are the inadequacy and irregularity of labor supply and the dearth of organized labor movements having objectives like those of Occidental labor unions.

464 Except in such overpopulated areas as Java, the Tonkin delta, and Northern Annam, labor is generally inadequate in quantity and in quality to meet the requirements of large-scale enterprise. Where numerically adequate, the labor supply is either poorly distributed in relation to areas of employment or fails to respond to opportunities offered. The industrial development of the entire area suffers from lack of full-time services of skilled laborers. Some of the factory employees form the only stable, trained groups of workers. They comprise a small proportion of the population.

[874 461] Few facilities have existed for the training of skilled workers, and the association in Oriental minds of manual labor with the humblest social classes has limited wage-labor largely to those driven by economic necessity. Handicrafts are carried on principally by agriculturists in their [476] leisure time and by other "non-professionals." Farmers form the bulk of the workers. Only during the slack agricultural season or after a disastrous harvest are they willing to perform labor for others.

464 Supplementation of the inadequate labor force has been effected in various ways—some spontaneous, others planned. The starvation conditions chronic in south China and in India have caused emigration of 167 workers to the underpopulated but richer regions of Southeast Asia, whence they usually repatriate their savings and eventually their persons to the home country. With the exception of Burma, which by reason of its geographic and administrative relations with India formed a special category, the prosperity which prevailed at times in Southeast Asia was less a factor in stimulating this flow than were conditions in the homeland.

Accelerated by the boom in plantation industries during the early

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433 annum. Productivity in the British fishing industry was, and probably still
226 is, at least eight times as great per man. In the United States fishing in-
565 dustry it is much greater still. This immensely greater productivity per man is of course achieved only by a much heavier use of capital equipment. Technological investment, then, is an obvious method of trying to raise peasant production.

434 Peasant income in this region is thus low by most standards. Adequate
511 information about this is lacking, but there is no reason to doubt the indi-
565 cative character of what has been collected. For instance, an inquiry in Java in 1926 showed that over 60 per cent of the people had in cash and in kind incomes of less than £12 10s. a year (150 Dutch florins), and 80 per cent had incomes of less than £25 a year (300 florins). In Malaya in 1940 I calculated that the fishermen of the east coast earned on the average about £12 a year. This does not mean much without consideration of the prices of goods on which the income was spent. But any such comparison would soon make it clear that a man with such an income was hard put to it to keep his family in comfort. Cash incomes have risen steeply during and since the war, but so have the prices of consumer goods, and many peasants are probably rather worse off than before, unless they have been able to sell rice or other scarcity goods.

433 The peasant economy of South East Asia uses abundant labour and has
565 a low level of capital equipment. Even then, owing to lack of efficient
461 organization, one can point to a great amount of unused man-hours. Yet these features must not be over-stressed. It is common to blame the peasant for a *dolce far niente* attitude, and attribute his poverty to his idleness. What J. Johnston Abraham, the author of the well-known travel book, *Surgeon's Log*,[1] wrote forty years ago of the Malay is often quoted in essence still:

> The Malay . . . has the aristocratic contempt for toil . . . [he] is of all things a philosopher. He squats in the warm sun and chews betel contentedly. He sees the obvious foolishness of working in a country too hot for toil, when the earth is so prolific that a fortnight's leisurely labour will produce food for a year, and the water is so plentifully supplied with fish that an hour, in the cool of the evening with a net, will supply luxury for a fortnight.

Anyone who has lived among the Malay peasantry and has seen their back-breaking work of rice-planting, or their long hours at sea in the broiling sun hauling the nets for fish, will know what a parody this is. The working rhythm of the Asiatic peasant is different from that of the European. The economic system is not well enough geared to alternative employment when technical hitches occur in his ordinary occupation. But the peasant is not simply thriftless of his time and his money. He plans with care his ploughing, sowing, weeding, and harvesting; he is assiduous in searching for fodder for his animals, in watering his vegetable garden, in repairing his fishing-boat or his net. If he can scrape together some extra cash above the daily needs of his family, he may spend it on clothes for his child or jewellery

[1] London, Chapman & Hall (14th rev. ed., 1920), pp. 69–70.

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for his wife—but he is equally likely to put it into a piece of equipment or 433
to hire some land. To understand the position of the peasant one must 565
realize the structure of the economic system of which he is a part, and the 461
values of his social system.

The peasant economy must not be thought of as simply a subsistence 433
economy. It has a complex marketing structure which, even apart from 565
Western influences, had an elaborate series of middlemen for making possible the diffusion of cloth, salt, iron, dried fish, spices, and other goods. 439
The system of exchange has been intensified, and the reactions of different 177
types of producers made more sensitive by the influence of the West. On the one side are the Western markets for primary products—coffee, spices, tobacco, copra, kapok, and, above all, rubber—the quick response to which has demonstrated how alive the Asiatic peasant is to making money if the opportunity offers. On the other side are the Western types of consumer goods, novel, attractively presented, easy to use—ranging from lamp oil, imported cigarettes, and cornflour for babies, to electric torches, bicycles, and the cinema. Conservative in his techniques of production, the peasant has shown himself enterprising in his consumption. The result has been that at many points, almost without realizing it, the peasant has become geared to the Western economic system. In the early days of European contact, he had often to be pushed as well as tempted into producing for the Western market. The scathing book, *Max Havelaar*, by the author calling himself 'Multatuli'—later known to be Douwes Dekker—has shown the kind of abuses that resulted from pushing the peasant into an enforced relation to the Western market. But naturally many of these links have been of his own seeking. In the last resort, it is the peasant's own scheme of values, his degree of acceptance of the goods and services which the West offers and which he transmutes to some extent in receiving, which determines his economic destiny.

But for the most part, the peasant has been incapable of perceiving the processes at work. The field is too vast for his comprehension. His reactions to the crisis and depression of the nineteen-thirties were direct and rational as they came under his personal observation. When prices fell he increased production of the export crops to maintain his cash returns; when that failed he retired from the struggle to utilize his backlog of subsistence cropping. But like many a farmer elsewhere, he had not understood much more than the immediate market situation. The pressure of the West has provided the peasant with a new range of wants from which he cannot rid himself even should he wish, and markets for his labour and raw materials which are an inducement to him to modify his habits. A new administrative system has given him fresh legal framework for many of his acts. A new system of taxation, though often lighter than before, is more methodical in its pursuit of defaulters. His land, the foundation of his [427]
existence, has for the most part been preserved to him, and indeed the
security for his legal title to it has been much improved. But alien planta- 000

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

[p.3]

Chapter I

FROM HUNTING AND GATHERING TO AGRICULTURE

Hunting and Gathering

101 In Southeastern Asia today there are peoples of different cultural levels
174 carrying on some of the major economies that man has developed in the
222 course of time. The first people to invade the tropical forest regions around
105 the South China Sea were alithic, or prepalaeolithic, food gatherers,[1] who obtained their food by collecting edible wild plants and by hunting and fishing. Today geographically separated peoples are still living in a prepalaeolithic or palaeolithic food-gathering and hunting stage.[2] In Southeastern Asia they are represented by the Semang of the Malay Peninsula, the Andaman Islanders, and the Aeta of the Philippines—all of whom are Negritos, or dwarfed Negroids—the Kubu of Sumatra, the Sakai of the Malay Peninsula, the Toala of Celebes,[3] and the Punan of Borneo.[4]

222 The degree to which collecting, hunting, or fishing contributes to the
462 food supply varies with the season; it also varies with different peoples,
105 depending upon the resources of the region, the type of equipment the people may possess, and the skills they may have acquired. Food-gathering and hunting peoples have a division of labor under which the men hunt while the women and children gather vegetable matter and catch insects and small animals. The men may lend a helping hand, however, in digging up some of the very deep-growing yams. Men will also participate in the
621 picking of fruits, especially when it is necessary to climb tall trees. The food gatherers and hunters of Southeastern Asia are nomadic in the sense that they do not remain long in one place. However, they do not wander aimlessly through the jungle. Each group has its definite territory—among

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Note: The titles of the works here cited in footnotes have been abbreviated, whenever possible. The full titles may be found in the Bibliography, p. 269 ff.

[1] Nippold (Rassen- und Kulturgeschichte der Negrito-Völker, 1936, pp. 253–255 and 398–400) considers the alithic wood culture of the Negritos of Southeastern Asia to be older than palaeolithic culture. These people use wood rather than stone as raw material for their tools. Because of the perishable nature of wood, archaeologists and prehistorians have not yet been able, so far as I know, to go farther back than the palaeolithic age and therefore have not been able to confirm the hypothesis of an alithic age. Menghin (Weltgeschichte der Steinzeit, 1931, p. 91) believes that, from an archaeological point of view, an alithic wood culture may be regarded only as a possibility, but Kern (Die Anfänge der Weltgeschichte, 1933, p. 35), who compared pygmy culture with palaeolithic cultures, comes to the conclusion that alithic wood cultures probably preceded palaeolithic culture.

[2] By divesting the word "palaeolithic" of its specific chronological connotation the term may be used for present-day peoples who have a food-gathering and hunting culture.

[3] The racial affinities of the Kubu, the Sakai, and the Toala are not clear; by some they are called Veddoids, by others, Australoids.

[4] They are considered to be Proto-Malays.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia A4

During untold centuries in which they collected plant matter, women acquired an intimate knowledge of vegetable life. Eduard Hahn and others have therefore reasoned that women were the inventors of the cultivation of plants and hence were the first food producers. Hahn has given the name *Hackbau* (hoe culture or hoe tillage) to primitive cultivation, and maintains that the hoe is woman's implement; he draws a sharp distinction between Hackbau and more advanced cultivation, which he calls *Pflugbau* (plow culture or plow tillage) and ascribes to men.[9] It is indeed true that men generally farm with plows and that many examples may be cited of women using hoes; nevertheless, there are so many instances of male primitive cultivators employing hoes or similar instruments that Hahn's classification should be modified. While there seems to be no reason for abandoning his theory of the invention of plant cultivation by women, the classification of cultivation by tools, such as the hoe and the plow, ascribed to one sex or the other, is unsatisfactory. For, in spite of the fact that the collection of vegetable matter is almost exclusively the woman's task in the gathering economy, among primitive cultivators men either assist women in the cultivation of plants or entirely take over this activity whenever hunting or fishing become less important than soil tillage. Furthermore, many primitive cultivators do not use the hoe, but continue to employ the digging stick, characteristically used by the food-gathering women. From Formosa southward throughout the Malay Archipelago, as well as on the mainland of Southeastern Asia, the digging stick, also known as the dibble stick or planting stick, is frequently used by the primitive cultivator. On the other hand, there are advanced cultivators who till their land intensively with hoes; they use manure, rotate their crops, terrace fields that lie on slopes, and practice irrigation, yet they do not use plows drawn by draft animals (however, in some instances they have livestock). In other words, advanced agriculture does not depend upon the animal-drawn plow nor does primitive agriculture depend upon the hoe.

A more fundamental distinction between primitive and advanced agriculture may be made in terms of land use rather than of tools. Primitive cultivators, with the possible exception of those living in arid regions, raise one or two crops on a given plot of land, then abandon the plot and make a new field, preferably in the forest, so that the old plot lies fallow sometimes for many years and may itself revert to forest; in short, primitive cultivators shift the place of their agricultural activities with regularity. The crop land consists of small patches scattered throughout the forest; these patches are extremely ragged in appearance and do not look at all like fields. A primitive cultivator would never think of removing stumps and fallen trees; instead, he deliberately raises his crop among them. This kind of cultivation is best described as shifting-field, or shift-

[9] Hahn: Das Alter der wirtschaftlichen Kultur, 1905; idem: Die Entstehung der Pflugkultur, 1909; idem: Von der Hacke zum Pflug, 1914; Kolff: "Hahn's hypothese," 1926, pp. 884–907.

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[See pp. 35 ff., category 241 or 116. -- Analyst]

Chapter II

THE SHIFTING CULTIVATOR [p. 16]

241 361 311 The field of the shifting cultivator is known by various local terms. It is called *caiñgin* in the Philippines, *humah* in Java, *ladang* in the Indies as a whole and in Malaya, *taungya* in Burma, *tamrai* in Thailand, and *rây* in Indochina.[1] Practically without exception, it is a clearing in either primeval or second-growth forest. The use of grassland is so unusual that we shall limit the following discussion to shifting cultivation on forest land.

As his name indicates, the shifting cultivator does not use the same piece of land every year; instead, he kills or cuts down at regular intervals —every year, every other year, or every third year—the trees of a small forest patch. He burns as much of the woody growth as is possible or convenient. Among the charred stumps and half-burned tree trunks he plants his favorite crops, be they cereals such as millet, upland rice, or maize; or tubers such as yams or sweet potatoes (Figs. 4–10). The latter are planted extensively by the *caiñgero*, the shifting cultivator in the Philippines. In planting cereals it is usually the men who take the planting stick to make little holes and the women who drop in a few seeds, using their feet to cover the seed with soil (Figs. 11–13). As forest land is generally free from weeds or grasses and the soil is usually rich in humus and well supplied with the ash of burned plant matter after clearing, it produces a very good, or even excellent, first harvest; the second harvest begins to show a decline in yield, and thereafter the returns diminish rapidly.[2] Grasses and weeds invade the clearing. Rather than battle these, the peasant abandons his old ladang and cuts and burns a new patch of forest (Fig. 15). The old plot reverts, under favorable conditions, to second-growth forest, the so-called *blukar* of the Malays, and is not cleared again for a period, the length of which may vary from 8 to 15 years, or more.

[243 462] [134]

Shifting cultivation is characterized by a lack of tillage; the soil is hardly disturbed, as no plow turns it. There is less labor involved than in other methods of cultivation, and the work is more evenly spread over the year—an advantage where labor is relatively scarce. The tasks involved are cutting, burning, and planting; sometimes simple fencing of the field against animals, guarding—especially before the harvest and usually by women and children—and, finally, harvesting. In addition, there may be some weeding in the first year and certainly during the second.

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[1] In British India *jhum*, *kumri*, *dhya*, *bewar*, or *dullee*; in Ceylon *chena*; in Japan, Korea, and Formosa *haren* (a Japanese term); in Central America *milpa*; in parts of Africa *chitemene*.

[2] Danhof reports for parts of the Lampoeng Districts that a ladang will produce from 15 to 25 quintals of rice in the first year and approximately 5 in the second year. In areas where the second yield shows such a serious decline the peasants usually prefer to make a new ladang—Danhof: "Bijdrage," 1940, p. 199.

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THE PEASANTRY OF SOUTH EAST ASIA [1]

PROFESSOR RAYMOND FIRTH, F.B.A.

000 IF it is not wholly true that the social and economic reconstruction which is so necessary in Asia today must begin with the peasant, it is certain that no programmé which omits the peasant can be on firm foundations. The recent history of China is evidence enough for this. My concern, as a social anthropologist, is with the analysis and classification of social relations between people and groups of people, rather than with political or economic affairs as such, although inevitably I cannot dis-
128 regard them. So my aim is to show briefly some of the most important
121 aspects of the social organization of the South East Asian peasant communities, and of the values by which this organization works. Though the details in my paper refer mainly to Malaya and Indonesia, I think the generalizations have some value for the South East Asian region as a whole.

If the basic features of the peasant society are ignored, one can understand neither the peculiar tenacity which it still possesses in modern conditions, nor the reactions of its members to the increasing impact of ex-
121 ternal economic and political forces. The definition of a peasant is a
565 countryman—a man engaged in rural pursuits, primarily agriculture, with a comparatively simple technology and a special interest in the land he
463 works. In South East Asia one may extend the application of the term to
241 cover the majority of fishermen and even village craftsmen too. They are
226 of the same social class as the agriculturalists, and often members of the same families. As occupational groups, they may even be separable only
32 in theory, since many a peasant farmer is also a fisherman or craftsman by turns, as his seasonal cycle or his cash-needs influence him. What R. H. Tawney has said of agriculture—that it is at once a craft, a business, and a manner of life—can be applied more widely here; the problems of all these peasants alike are partly technical, partly financial and commercial, and partly cultural and social.

162 It is difficult to say just what proportion of the present population of
565 South East Asia may be classed as peasants. It would seem that in nearly
241 every South East Asian country two-thirds or more of the total population
463 is to be found in agricultural communities, tilling the soil. In 1930 the
32 census of Java and Madura in Indonesia gave about 70 per cent of the male workers as dependent for their livelihood on native agricultural output, and
462 about 75 per cent in the regions of Indonesia outside Java and Madura, while large numbers of women were engaged in home craft production. In Siam, in about 1930, almost 90 per cent of the population lived in agricultural communities, rice production providing the living of about 80 per

[1] Originally delivered at a meeting at Chatham House on 21 February 1950.

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162 cent of the population. Malaya, of course, is exceptional, because of the
565 especially heavy concentration on the production of rubber and tin. Ac-
241 cording to the 1947 census of Malaya, about 34 per cent of the working
463 population were classed as cultivators and fishermen working on their own
32 account or as unpaid members of families. In all, I think one could reckon
462 that rather more than 100 million people in South East Asia can be regarded as peasantry.

[412] Throughout all this region, peasant technology is simple; skills, though
134 traditionally well adapted to the job in hand, are of limited range. Soils,
241 despite the richness of some of the swamps and river flood-plains, are generally of poor quality. The system of felling and burning the jungle, taking off crops for a few years, and then moving away to cultivate fresh clearings while the old ones revert to jungle, is still common in the mountain areas of Burma, Malaya, and Siam, in part of West Java, in much of Borneo, and in the outer islands of Indonesia. It is known as shifting cultivation or jungle-fallowing. Although regarded as extremely primitive, it is an economic use of land in areas of low population density, where plentiful land allows of long rotation of clearings and consequent restoration of soil fertility. But where population is dense, the system cannot provide the necessary volume of production without endangering the future soil capital, and that is one of the major problems of the area. In the more sedentary forms of agriculture, fertility is conserved with a great deal of care, by manuring, by water control, and so on. Sometimes there is very elaborate and spectacular terracing, as in parts of the Philippines or in Bali, where the native cultivator through his own efforts through generations has known how to make the best of the land with his available techniques. Yet many of these techniques are only of limited efficiency, and custom may be a barrier to improvement. For large masses of the Muslim peasantry of South East Asia, for instance, the pig, an excellent economic converter of resources, is taboo for religious reasons.

433 Productivity of the South East Asian peasant is apt to be low, whether
241 considered in terms of the margins required above subsistence to give him
565 and his family the range of goods and services they want, or by comparison with Western results. It is hard to make this last comparison significant because of the differing bases, but the following figures will give, perhaps rather superficially, some idea of the comparison. In terms of cwt. of cropping per acre, for instance, the rice crop of part of South East Asia can be compared roughly with the wheat crop of Western Europe. The figures are taken from different years, but they can be regarded as significant averages. Java at 12 cwt. of rice to the acre corresponds with France at 12 cwt. of wheat to the acre; Siam at 14 cwt. to the acre with the United Kingdom at 18 cwt. and Germany at a little less; Japan at 27 cwt. of rice per acre corresponds to Denmark with 27 cwt. of wheat per acre. Yet rice is supposed to be a crop of much higher yield. What is more significant is that productivity per acre in both Malaya and Indo-China is only 10 cwt. on the average, or only between one-third and one-half of the average in Japan.

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CONCLUSION

162 198 It will have been observed that the Chinese of Southeast Asia are, in essence, the same people over the entire area, in spite of a considerable diversity in occupation and dialect, and variation in purity of blood. There is a concentration of Yunnanese in the Shan States, but this tribe does not occur in any numbers elsewhere, and the other tribes are unequally distributed. For example, the Hokkiens and persons of mixed race of Hokkien origin form the majority community in Malaya and Indonesia, being outnumbered by the Cantonese, however, in the Malay States. In Siam the Teochius and the Hakkas are more numerous than the Hokkiens, and Hailams are also a large community. In the Philippines three-quarters of the Chinese are Hokkiens, and most of the remainder Cantonese. In Indochina the Hokkiens, though numerically seeming to yield first place to the Cantonese, are the principal Chinese merchants: indeed they were the pioneering tribe in the Nanyang and they are still, on the whole, the wealthiest.

So much may be said to illustrate the diversity of the tribal distribution of these Chinese who, but for a few exceptions (such as a tiny freak pocket of Shantung people in North Borneo) originate from the southeast corner of China—a small bit of Marco Polo's 162 'Mangi'. Diversity of occupation again is very pronounced among 463 these emigrants. Hailams, for instance, tend to be pig and poultry rearers, small cultivators, and domestic servants; in Borneo the Hakkas are the most numerous community and here they are largely agriculturists. Cantonese and Hakkas supply most of the 181 Chinese labour for tin-mines and rubber estates. Nor should we accept the naïve statement that 'all Chinese are alike' (which is but an extension of the unobservant conclusion of the European tenderfoot that 'all Chinese *look* alike'). There is a notable psychological difference between, say, the volatile, nimble-witted Cantonese and the more phlegmatic Hokkien or Teochiu; the Hailams have usually quite distinct physical characteristics from other Chinese, being more delicately made and exhibiting marked cranial differences from their brethren from the mainland. As for the Hakkas, they are in some ways a people apart, of northern origin and later immigrants than the other tribes and deriving from islands of population surrounded by Cantonese or Hokkiens in

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S C 578 463 651 Sometimes they have been given a choice of activities. The Spanish, for example, wanted them as peasant agriculturists but tolerated them as traders. Similarly, in Indochina the French wanted them for opening up uncultivated lands, but, since the 'Red Lands' suitable for the cultivation of rubber and other profitable raw materials were barred to all aliens, the Chinese (although he might have been a peasant at home) refused the hard toil of the fields if he could obtain a position with a Chinese firm. In Java the Dutch found the Chinese useful as middlemen, and middlemen they became, accepting the penalty of the resentment of the Javanese that such a function entailed. The farming of the revenue was allotted to them as the highest bidders by the Spanish, the Dutch, and the British alike. Such occupations are labelled 'parasitic', but it must be remembered that they were the best methods of obtaining revenue available before the Governments felt themselves able to collect it for themselves. When they could do so, the farms were abolished. Also, it should be remembered, it was from the Chinese themselves that most of the revenue of the farms was collected. If we accept Mr Furnivall's epithet of 'parasitic' we must extend it to cover the British, Dutch, and French Governments also.

S 578 463 452 426 C 578 463 Given a large and improvident peasantry, as existed in Siam, Indonesia, Indochina, and the Philippines, there was a demand for credit with uncertain security or none at all. This credit was most naturally extended by the traders to whom they sold their produce, and it was most conveniently given in the form of goods and paid for in produce at the time of the harvest. Certainly this gave great power to the Chinese trader; the question is whether he abused it. A survey in Siam by Mr James M. Andrews (see p. 164) does not bear out the widespread belief that the Chinese are unconscionable usurers. 'The Thai farmer [says Mr Andrews], and especially his wife, is much more given to money-lending with the hope of high profits than the Chinese.' As regards alleged profiteering in the rice trade, the College of Agriculture at Los Baños in the Philippines (see p. 635) conducted a survey and found that 'the Chinese merchants are performing essential marketing services at a fairly low cost'. In Indonesia it is notorious that many Indonesian Hajis and Arabs are far greedier money-lenders than are the Chinese. In Malaya it is the chetty and the Sikh who are the money-lenders; not the Chinese. Cases in which Chinese

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figured as lenders were practically unknown.[1] The charge of 'unconscionable usury and profiteering' is, in the writer's opinion, not proved.

Professor Raymond Firth has gone into the question of Chinese middlemen in the Malayan fishing industry with considerable care. He says that in this role the Chinese performs important functions. He shoulders a great part of the market risks; he supplies considerable capital, in a liquid form, in consumer's goods, or in producer's goods; and he saves the fishermen much trouble in seeking buyers. On the other hand the same observer adds:

[426] 452 471 C 578 463

> The system obviously has great dangers. It gives him a monopoly, with little prospect of the fishermen reaping the advantages of the rising market, or of even getting much more than bare subsistence earnings, and it tends very often to place them firmly in his debt, with little chance of extricating themselves and building up their own capital.

Among the Malay fishermen this relationship with the Chinese is variously viewed. One group told Professor Firth that they liked it 'because they can get hold of cash easily'. In several other places, however, the fishermen complained of the low prices they received from the Chinese to whom they were bound to sell. Up to 1939 the attempt of the administration to meet the situation by encouraging co-operative Malay associations for fish-marketing had had only a moderate success.[2]

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It should be added that the provision of credit on reasonable terms for productive enterprise is finally the responsibility of the Governments. Much progress has been made in some Southeast Asian countries in the establishment of landbanks, co-operative societies, &c., in the last half-century, but these advanced money only for 'productive' purposes, and in Indonesia the people have still to go to money-lenders to obtain money for wedding, funeral,

463 452 453 426 C 578 463

[1] A London solicitor who was for many years in Malaya, where he had a large practice, remarked to the writer on 10 February 1949, 'I have never known a money-lending Chinese.' Nor can the writer himself, who had considerable experience as a magistrate and as official assignee and liquidator of companies, recollect any such case.

The writer, on the other hand, has known Britons (of presumed respectability) lending money to Indian chetties at a minimum of 12–15 per cent., who in turn lent it to Malays, Chinese, and others at a rate of interest that can only be guessed!

[2] *Malay Fishermen: Their Peasant Economy*, pp. 14, 61.

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and other expenditure demanded by custom. Moreover, the money-lenders are willing to advance money without the security demanded by landbanks and co-operative societies.

In the matter of trade monopoly it is true that in Siam, Indochina, Indonesia, and the Philippines the Chinese have a virtual monopoly of the rice distribution and milling trades. The Governments of these countries have, to meet the popular agitation, passed legislation to restrict the Chinese share in this trade. The fact that the Chinese maintains his position in face of all this legislation and in face of competition, fair or unfair, is simply because he is so much more competent in the business. Florence Horn (see p. 634) points out that the Filipino politician who charged the Chinese with having half the retail business in their hands changed his ground completely when the reply was made that all the Filipino had to do was to open up a *tienda* on his own and put the Chinese out of business. He then said that the Chinese standard of living was deplorably low, he eats almost nothing and works day and night; therefore he subjects the Filipino to unfair competition! At the same time it must be admitted that the Chinese, having obtained virtual control of some trades, do their best to keep them in their hands and usually employ only their own countrymen. This is naturally galling to the native looking for an opening, but there is a sound business reason for it. They employ their own people because they are, on the whole, better at the job. No European merchant would maintain that a firm should be compelled to employ persons of inferior business capacity, thus exposing the firm to the danger of bankruptcy.

If the Governments of Southeast Asia wish to secure a greater share of the trade of their country for their nationals, they are entitled to legislate accordingly—provided, of course, that the law does not operate harshly or unjustly by depriving an alien of one source of livelihood before he has had a chance of acquiring another. (The economic effect on a country of discriminating against aliens who discharge some useful function is another matter.)

In *Fanny's First Play* Bernard Shaw pokes fun at the critics who will not give an opinion as to the merits of the play until they know 'Who wrote it?' The inference is that such a question is an irrelevance, and that the play should be judged on its own merits. But while we have, so far, attempted to consider the charges

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APPENDIX V

INDIANS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE following note is appended to facilitate comparison between the Chinese and Indians in the area.[1] 162

Ethnic Indians in Southeast Asia

			1947
Burma	1,017,825 (1931)	887,000 (1941)	700,000
Siam	..	..	100,000
Indochina	..	..	5,000
Malaya	624,000 (1931)	744,000 (1941)	600,000
British Borneo	..	..	Few
Indonesia	..	..	30,000
Philippines	..	..	Very few
			1,435,000

Possibly because of the historic relations of ancient Hindu India with Southeast Asia, the prohibition of travel overseas imposed by the Hindu Shastras has not been taken to apply to Java, Sumatra, and Ceylon. 162 167 There were early Hindu settlements, too, in Malaya, but these disappeared long ago and Indian immigration into the region dates virtually from the nineteenth century.

The only country in Southeast Asia in which the Indians are more numerous than the Chinese is Burma. After India and Burma were separated in 1936 uncertainty as to their future status caused thousands of immigrants to return home to India. Indian landlords and moneylenders liquidated their Burma holdings wherever possible. In 1931 there were 1,018,000 Indians in Burma; in 1947, in spite of natural increases, their number was probably not over 900,000. They retained, however, much of their economic importance. In 1931, 200,000 of the Indians in Burma lived in the Arakan Division nearest India. Of the total 618,000 were born in India—566,000 were Hindus; 397,000 were Muslims; the remainder were Sikhs, Christians, and others. Parsees were prominent in the professions; chetties (chettiars) from South India were the leading bankers with a big hold on the peasantry; Muslims from the Madras Presidency ran restaurants; the Gujeratis and Muslim Chooliahs from Madras had a large share in the hardware trade; Hindus from Upper India were the principal jewellers. Most of the common labour was performed by Hindu Telegus or Tamils. [463]

[1] I am indebted to Mr Edwin Haward for most of the material utilized in this note. V. P.

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After Burma, the Indians in Southeast Asia are most numerous in Malaya, though here their numbers have dropped from 744,000 in 1941 to 600,000 in 1947. The great majority of them are Tamil labourers on the rubber estates, but there is also a considerable community of merchants and chetties who are the money-lenders of Malaya, lawyers, &c. The Sikhs number a few thousands and are agriculturists as well as watchmen and the like. Before the war Sikhs were more numerous in the Malayan Police than they had become by 1949. They made themselves exceedingly unpopular with the Chinese during the Japanese occupation.

I 167 S 167 464

In recent times Indian public opinion has been exceedingly critical of Indian emigration to Southeast Asia in the form of unskilled labour, alleging unfair conditions. The Indian Emigration Act of 1922 was amended in 1938 to give the Government of India power to prohibit even unassisted emigration (assisted emigration was that which took the place of indentured labour) for the purpose of unskilled work. The result has been the virtual drying-up of India as a source of supply for labour, and many Indians have also returned to their homes. During the Japanese occupation casualties among Tamils were especially heavy. But now that India is independent her policy may develop on different lines—the economic pressure of population on her soil may tend to make her less critical of emigration, and as the most powerful State in the Southeast Asia area she may find it expedient to resort to something like the pre-war 'imperialism' which the party now in power in India was, during its period in the wilderness, so concerned to condemn. But the whole turn of events in Southeast Asia is bound to be profoundly affected by the success of the Communists in China, and in the attempts to oppose or to compromise with them India is bound to be a factor of the greatest importance.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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It is significant that the provision of technical instruction has not been quite so disappointing in forms of production organized on western lines and mainly under western management. Even in this branch of economic life, however, the progress has been unsatisfactory. In most tropical dependencies western enterprise does not extend far beyond primary production and offers little scope for men with technical qualifications. In the Tropical Far East it has been built up on a basis of Eurasian, Chinese or Indian subordinates, thereby obstructing the employment of natives by a barrier which they cannot easily surmount. Even the trade-crafts are largely in foreign hands; the natives encounter similar difficulties in gaining an entrance, and sometimes meet with organized opposition, as when the Chinese master carpenters in Malaya declined to employ trained Malays.[1] In European concerns the higher posts have hitherto been reserved for Europeans, so that natives had no prospect of advancement. Moreover, where technical instruction has been provided, it has often, as for some years in Java, been debarred to natives because their 'academic' curriculum was not sufficiently advanced for them to profit by it. There is a popular belief that 'natives' prefer clerical employment as an easier, softer life, but this has frequently been disproved.[2] In most dependencies the failure of earlier attempts to encourage technical instruction has led to the appointment of committees of enquiry, and their reports have shown that there was little demand for men with technical qualifications. Even in Malaya, where the vast scale of western enterprise would seem especially propitious to the growth of technical instruction, a committee, largely composed of business men, reported in 1926 that 'the number of openings for technically trained men was limited, since the principal need of the country was unskilled manual labour, which was supplied by Chinese and Indian immigrants'.[3] So recently as 1938 a Commission on Higher Education in Malaya reported that the prospects of employment did not justify the establishment of an engineering school at Raffles College, and that training for the limited number of civil engineering posts could be given elsewhere.[4]

The slow progress of technical training in subjects bearing directly on material production is the more striking by its contrast with the

[1] Mills, p. 355.
[2] See e.g. Dr Van Mook, *J. Roy. African Society*, Oct. 1943, p. 180. Mills, p. 353.
[4] *Overseas Education*, 1939–40, April, p. 146.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

progress achieved in pedagogy. Ordinarily one finds that most of those receiving vocational instruction are being trained as teachers. Often, as at least formerly in Malaya, the pay and prospects of teachers are inferior to those of a clerk,[1] and the teaching profession is the last refuge of the semi-educated unemployed. Why, then, do so many seek to be trained as teachers? One reason is obvious. The demand for men in western enterprise and in the various specialist departments of Government service is soon met. But there is a general demand for lucrative employment, and consequently for schools to qualify men for employment, and therefore an almost unlimited demand for teachers. The Government can encourage the demand for trained teachers by imposing appropriate conditions on the grant of funds to schools. In agriculture and other special lines it is obviously waste of money to train men in excess of the demand, but there is little danger of an unemployable surplus of trained teachers, because in the teaching profession the Government fixes the demand that it supplies. Not until every school receiving grants from Government is fully staffed with trained teachers can the supply be in excess of the demand.

Whether the money spent on training-schools is well spent is another question. It seems plausible to argue that men will teach more efficiently if instructed in modern principles of teaching. But, in this matter as in others, the concept of efficiency is valid only in relation to the end proposed. Modern teaching methods have evolved out of educational experience in the homogeneous society of the West, where the school and the environment co-operate and teach the children at the same time how to live and how to make a living. But in the plural society of the tropics the children have a choice between attending schools, western or vernacular, where they may learn how to make a living, and native schools that still adhere to the tradition of teaching children how to live. Where children seek education in order 'to realize its manifold advantages as soon and as cheaply as possible',[2] a trained teacher should be better able to help them to qualify for 'a decent job' in the shortest time at the least possible expense. Within these narrow limits the certificated teacher should be more 'efficient'. But, in inculcating a higher, or at least different, point of view, he is no more likely to succeed than the many generations of devoted missionaries and educational enthusiasts in the past;

[1] Mills, p. 335.
[2] *RPI* (India), 1897–1902, p. 459.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

816 and the man who acquires a teaching certificate merely as a condition of employment, or as a qualification for higher pay, is unlikely to
874 recommend a different attitude to those he teaches. Moreover, in vernacular schools the great mass of the children do not remain long enough to acquire permanent literacy or even to get far beyond the alphabet. Often they attend irregularly when they are not wanted at home or in the fields. In such circumstances there is little advantage in scientific teaching, and it seems that teachers, after acquiring their certificates, tend to lapse into traditional methods of instruction; not without excuse, as their chief function is to keep the children out of mischief. In lay schools with certificated teachers, the great majority of the pupils get little if at all farther than in native religious schools such as the monastic schools of Burma, the Koran schools in Moslem lands or the bush schools under missionary auspices in Africa, while they do not enjoy the same moral background, and it may well be questioned whether, from a cultural standpoint, the lay schools are the more efficient. Thus, although the easiest way of spending money on vocational instruction is to multiply training schools for teachers, and such expenditure is less obviously wasteful than on other special types of school, it is not so easy to be certain whether the money is wisely spent, with a proportional return in social welfare or economic progress.

874 A further instance of the relation between economic demand and vocational education may be found in the contrast between the
463 numbers studying medicine and law. In the dispatch of 1854 one matter thought to demand attention was the provision of special facilities for training lawyers in India. Now, not only in India but in all parts of the tropics where lawyers can find employment, they are even too numerous. Governments no longer need provide facilities for those who want to practise law, but, as with teachers, can insist on adequate qualifications. Yet it is still necessary to encourage the study of medicine. The tropics need more doctors, and generally could do with fewer lawyers. Yet there are many lawyers and few doctors. That is a characteristic feature of plural economy. Every one, European, oriental immigrant or native, who has a case, whether criminal or civil in a western court wants a lawyer trained on western lines. They all want the same kind of lawyer. Demand creates supply and the supply multiplies in excess of the demand, with the result that the lawyers employ touts to seek for clients by fostering disputes, litigation increases, and legal practice

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

forsakes the honourable traditions that mitigate litigation in the West. On the other hand, each group in each community believes in its own system of medicine, and wants its own medical practitioners. There is no demand for western doctors except among Europeans or in Government service, so that natives trained in western medicine can find only a few openings with little prospect of high fees or good appointments. Naturally they prefer the Bar. Even with such unattractive prospects the supply of doctors is sometimes in excess of the demand and, as in the law, professional standards tend to deteriorate or, as in the Philippines, a considerable number of doctors and dentists are compelled to seek appointments as clerks.[1] Ordinarily, however, the training of medical students rests with the Government, which can adjust the supply to the probable demand. The tropics need doctors, but there is a demand for lawyers, and consequently there are many lawyers and few doctors.

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Here then we have the key to the slow growth of vocational and technical instruction in the tropics; it is hampered by the economic environment. But that is not a complete explanation. Other factors have contributed, and among them the tendency to regard economic progress as identical with native welfare. Educational policy looks to technical instruction as an instrument of native welfare, but educational practice encourages it as an instrument of progress. In many dependencies there have been repeated enquiries into the promotion of technical instruction, but these have been conducted largely from the standpoint of employers. The committee of 1926 in Malaya, for example, said, 'We fear that it is only too true that many of the youth of this country have a genuine distaste for hard and continuous manual labour'.[2] Clearly they regarded the youth of the country as merely so much labour, and this note, less crudely expressed perhaps, dominates most of such reports in most dependencies. Yet the report just cited has exceptional significance. The committee reported that there was little scope for technical instruction. But, just at that time, men were crowding into the motor industry and picking up the requisite technical skill where they could and how they could. That was happening throughout the tropics. One of the most striking developments of recent times is the rapid spread of the petrol engine and the introduction of motor transport in the native world. Men have learned to drive cars and lorries and taxis, and to do running repairs and even more difficult work, without special schools but through some form

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[1] Mills, p. 368. [2] *Ib.* p. 353.

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THE PEASANTRY OF SOUTH EAST ASIA [1]

PROFESSOR RAYMOND FIRTH, F.B.A.

000 IF it is not wholly true that the social and economic reconstruction which is so necessary in Asia today must begin with the peasant, it is certain that no programme which omits the peasant can be on firm foundations. The recent history of China is evidence enough for this. My concern, as a social anthropologist, is with the analysis and classification of social relations between people and groups of people, rather than with political or economic affairs as such, although inevitably I cannot dis-
128 regard them. So my aim is to show briefly some of the most important
121 aspects of the social organization of the South East Asian peasant communities, and of the values by which this organization works. Though the details in my paper refer mainly to Malaya and Indonesia, I think the generalizations have some value for the South East Asian region as a whole.

If the basic features of the peasant society are ignored, one can understand neither the peculiar tenacity which it still possesses in modern conditions, nor the reactions of its members to the increasing impact of ex-
121 ternal economic and political forces. The definition of a peasant is a
565 countryman—a man engaged in rural pursuits, primarily agriculture, with a comparatively simple technology and a special interest in the land he
463 works. In South East Asia one may extend the application of the term to
241 cover the majority of fishermen and even village craftsmen too. They are
226 of the same social class as the agriculturalists, and often members of the
32 same families. As occupational groups, they may even be separable only in theory, since many a peasant farmer is also a fisherman or craftsman by turns, as his seasonal cycle or his cash-needs influence him. What R. H. Tawney has said of agriculture—that it is at once a craft, a business, and a manner of life—can be applied more widely here; the problems of all these peasants alike are partly technical, partly financial and commercial, and partly cultural and social.

162 It is difficult to say just what proportion of the present population of
565 South East Asia may be classed as peasants. It would seem that in nearly
241 every South East Asian country two-thirds or more of the total population
463 is to be found in agricultural communities, tilling the soil. In 1930 the
32 census of Java and Madura in Indonesia gave about 70 per cent of the male
462 workers as dependent for their livelihood on native agricultural output, and about 75 per cent in the regions of Indonesia outside Java and Madura, while large numbers of women were engaged in home craft production. In Siam, in about 1930, almost 90 per cent of the population lived in agricultural communities, rice production providing the living of about 80 per

[1] Originally delivered at a meeting at Chatham House on 21 February 1950.

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162 cent of the population. Malaya, of course, is exceptional, because of the
565 especially heavy concentration on the production of rubber and tin. Ac-
241 cording to the 1947 census of Malaya, about 34 per cent of the working
463 population were classed as cultivators and fishermen working on their own
32 account or as unpaid members of families. In all, I think one could reckon
462 that rather more than 100 million people in South East Asia can be regarded as peasantry.

[412] Throughout all this region, peasant technology is simple; skills, though
134 traditionally well adapted to the job in hand, are of limited range. Soils,
241 despite the richness of some of the swamps and river flood-plains, are generally of poor quality. The system of felling and burning the jungle, taking off crops for a few years, and then moving away to cultivate fresh clearings while the old ones revert to jungle, is still common in the mountain areas of Burma, Malaya, and Siam, in part of West Java, in much of Borneo, and in the outer islands of Indonesia. It is known as shifting cultivation or jungle-fallowing. Although regarded as extremely primitive, it is an economic use of land in areas of low population density, where plentiful land allows of long rotation of clearings and consequent restoration of soil fertility. But where population is dense, the system cannot provide the necessary volume of production without endangering the future soil capital, and that is one of the major problems of the area. In the more sedentary forms of agriculture, fertility is conserved with a great deal of care, by manuring, by water control, and so on. Sometimes there is very elaborate and spectacular terracing, as in parts of the Philippines or in Bali, where the native cultivator through his own efforts through generations has known how to make the best of the land with his available techniques. Yet many of these techniques are only of limited efficiency, and custom may be a barrier to improvement. For large masses of the Muslim peasantry of South East Asia, for instance, the pig, an excellent economic converter of resources, is taboo for religious reasons.

433 Productivity of the South East Asian peasant is apt to be low, whether
241 considered in terms of the margins required above subsistence to give him
565 and his family the range of goods and services they want, or by comparison with Western results. It is hard to make this last comparison significant because of the differing bases, but the following figures will give, perhaps rather superficially, some idea of the comparison. In terms of cwt. of cropping per acre, for instance, the rice crop of part of South East Asia can be compared roughly with the wheat crop of Western Europe. The figures are taken from different years, but they can be regarded as significant averages. Java at 12 cwt. of rice to the acre corresponds with France at 12 cwt. of wheat to the acre; Siam at 14 cwt. to the acre with the United Kingdom at 18 cwt. and Germany at a little less; Japan at 27 cwt. of rice per acre corresponds to Denmark with 27 cwt. of wheat per acre. Yet rice is supposed to be a crop of much higher yield. What is more significant is that productivity per acre in both Malaya and Indo-China is only 10 cwt. on the average, or only between one-third and one-half of the average in Japan.

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167 incomes by work at home or in local workshops. The drawn-thread
591 and embroidery work engaged in by the girls and middle-aged women in their spare time earned them about twenty cents a day per person. Others wove cloth at small weaving-shops or sewed in tailors'-shops, earning about thirty cents a day. None of these occupations were, in fact, particularly remunerative. Older women were engaged in making joss-paper or in knitting fishing-nets. Apart from farming and trade, the men were engaged in relatively few occupations—there were coolies, barbers, carpenters, school-teachers, and fishermen.

167 We come now to the subject of remittances from the Nanyang
434 regarding which there has been much conflicting evidence. No satisfactory estimate of these remittances has been made for South-
591 east Asia as a whole, and in any case their value has varied greatly with the fluctuation in trade.[1] There had been a time when the ownership of a few rubber-trees had meant affluence, when Chinese importers in the Nanyang could undersell those of all other nationalities and still make a large profit, 'and when they had the native peasants so under control through indebtedness that they could sell them almost anything at any price'.[2]

[464] There had been times when labour was so scarce that Chinese coolies could in a few years accumulate savings enough to start in business, and when employees of Chinese retailers could force up wages to the point where it was more economical for the employer to take them in as partners. But by 1935 all this had changed. New immigration restrictions, motivated by the depression, had cut large numbers of Chinese labourers off from labour opportunities abroad while, at the same time, life had become, perhaps, a little more secure in this time of general débâcle for a certain privileged few—for example, the small retail traders already established in the Nanyang who had less competition to meet from their countrymen and who could circumvent the new head tax on males by bringing women and children from China to take the place of male assistants.

(This investigation, we must remember, dates from a time when Southeast Asia was only just beginning to recover from the trade depression of 1929–32.)

[1] In 1941 about SS$10 million was remitted to China from Malaya, but there is nothing to indicate how much of this was in the ordinary way of trade.

[2] This is placed in quotation marks to indicate that it represents the views of Dr Ta Chen.

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After Burma, the Indians in Southeast Asia are most numerous in Malaya, though here their numbers have dropped from 744,000 in 1941 to 600,000 in 1947. The great majority of them are Tamil labourers on the rubber estates, but there is also a considerable community of merchants and chetties who are the money-lenders of Malaya, lawyers, &c. The Sikhs number a few thousands and are agriculturists as well as watchmen and the like. Before the war Sikhs were more numerous in the Malayan Police than they had become by 1949. They made themselves exceedingly unpopular with the Chinese during the Japanese occupation.

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that about one-third of its prewar estate area was being tapped in 1947, representing two-thirds of the area tappable.

In the food crops, surplus margins were more slowly restored. Exports of Southeast Asia rice totalled about a million tons during 1946, as against a combined export of 5.7 million tons annually for 1936–40. The drop in production of this staple was greatest in the case of Burma because there the dislocation by war had been greatest, but by the 1946–47 season, about two-thirds of Lower Burma rice acreages were back in cultivation, as against half in 1945–46. In Cochinchina over 70 per cent of the rice area was being cultivated in 1946–47. Siam which was untouched by military campaigns reported 10.6 million acres under cultivation in rice for 1946–47 (22 per cent more than 1939–40)—the only territory to show a substantial increase of rice acreage in the immediate postwar years.

A postwar feature has been the general decline in rice yields, mostly an effect of loss of draught cattle, though to report low yields was a convenient cover for black market sales. The consequence of lost production in local food was felt more in places like Malaya which has specialised in non-food commercial agriculture, than in any other territories of Asia, which customarily needed to import only a small margin and not the majority of their rice. For the Philippines in 1947, the United Nations reported that *per capita* consumption of rice was actually higher than in 1939 by about 5 per cent.

Since labour shortage has been prominent as a factor operating against postwar commercial agriculture, the subsistence farmer and the diversified smallholder have assumed far greater significance than before. Over 55 per cent of Malaya's rubber production for 1946 was from smallholders, a proportion which had been as much as 85 per cent in the early months of that year, yet fell to 45 per cent in 1950 (cf. 39 per cent in 1940).

The vegetable oils soon came back into production and by early 1947 monthly production in Southeast Asia was not far short of 1941 production and now exceeds it.

The general lowering of food acreages and of yields, combined with the enforced reversion to subsistence agricultural forms, has a special significance for Southeast Asia food supplies over the next few years, because the restricted food supply comes at a time when population is rapidly increasing, at the rate of about 20

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316 to the rest of the world. Iron ore and bauxite occur in large
439 quantities, but without location convenient to the power needed to develop them. Gold has had special significance in Philippines mining, yet though found at many points, it ranks low for the region as a whole. Both tin and petroleum give rise to processing industries of smelting and refining which take place close to the streams of international traffic, particularly associated with Singapore and Penang. They play little part in local life, employ few people and go on at isolated points.

These mineral industries (which employed less than 250,000 persons before 1941) suffered from the war both by destruction in denial action and by neglect, so that they practically started anew from 1945. Whether they will all return to their prewar status remains to be seen. Southeast Asia provides the most prolific source of petroleum accessible to the Indian and Far Eastern markets and the wells are rapidly re-opening under the international oil groups which own them (output 1949, 9.0 million tons). Tin is coming back into production again more slowly because it needs more capital equipment such as pumps and dredges, which cannot be readily obtained, and there are some doubts whether world need for tin is likely to continue as great as before. The length of life of Malayan tin mines, the main prewar source, has been questioned, yet the little-known islands just south of Malaya are thought to contain extensive deposits of untouched tin likely to come into production in due course, though carefully screened for the time being from prospectors by local authorities. By 1950 the total tin output of Southeast Asia was about 99,000 tons.

Labour and Power for Industrialisation

464 Whether intensified industrialisation of Southeast Asia on the basis of these minerals is possible, turns upon two factors. Labour continues to be scarce; many prewar mining labourers dispersed during the war years when mining stagnated, and any immediate diversion of labour from agriculture to mining, even if possible under the tight ecology of the prevailing subsistence farming, is likely to prejudice local food supplies which depend basically on hand-grown rice.

316 Furthermore, Southeast Asia has limited sources of mechanical power, a factor not only of consideration regarding expansion of

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433 business lines. Men lose their land for debt and work as tenants, and the tenant who can live most cheaply can pay the highest rent, so that a larger portion of the surplus is available for the purchase of foreign goods. Caste in India has been of no avail to protect the cultivator against this process. Irrigation works, undertaken in the name of welfare, serve merely to expedite insolvency. In the Canal colonies of the Punjab, we are told, there is 'a high standard of rural prosperity', but this has tended to 'increase the mass of debt...moreover the debt is largely unproductive; little of it is incurred for land improvement. The moneylender is not in the least concerned with the purpose of a loan; his policy is to entangle the debtor to an extent that will leave him with just enough of the produce of his labour for the bare subsistence of himself and his family.'[1] But it is nonsense to blame the moneylender. A moneylender who did not work on business lines would soon be in the miserable position of the cultivator. The whole process illustrates the unrestricted working of economic forces, largely impersonal; and exporters, importers and bankers alike are all involved in it. In Lower Burma, as we have seen, the whole agricultural system has been 'industrialized', so as to produce the maximum net yield from land supporting only the minimum population requisite to produce that yield. But Lower Burma is exceptional only as an extreme instance of agricultural development under free competition in a tropical region, newly opened up among a people where custom does not exert the binding force of caste. Agricultural debt and the alienation of land are common to tropical dependencies in general. Even in some of the newer dependencies in Africa, debt has already assumed formidable proportions,[2] and, as conditions there have some resemblance to those of Lower Burma, one may expect future development to follow a like course. Ordinarily, economic development links up the cultivator with exporter, importer and banker through middlemen who absorb a portion of the profits, and the next stage in its working, after the cultivator has been reduced to penury, is the elimination of the middleman. This usually involves some measure of Government control over development, and appears as one of the early stages in the transition from a policy of *laissez-faire* to one of construction.

464 Economic forces react on individual welfare in yet another way. By stimulating the concentration of production on a few export crops, they enable the people to buy more imported goods. These compete

[1] *ISC*, I, 275. [2] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 25.

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more or less directly with local manufactures, and create unemployment among artisans and craftsmen. Some of these find employment in agriculture, and the enlarged supply of labour tends to reduce agricultural wages and to lower the cost of trade crops to the exporter, but to the prejudice of the agricultural labourer. For various reasons many will be unable to turn to agriculture and will be left without employment. Where, as in Lower Burma, agriculture develops along industrial lines, there grows up a mass of part-time labour, unable to find employment for about half of the year and with no other source of livelihood but crime. Thus the free action of economic forces tends to create unemployment and under-employment. 464

One feature of the encouragement of native enterprise in cultivation for export is the introduction of the rule of law. The rule of law is a foundation stone of western freedom, and should provide a far more secure basis for society than the rule of personal authority. But this is true only where the law is an expression of social will; in a tropical dependency it expresses the will of the colonial power, and is an instrument of economic development. The rule of law becomes in effect the rule of economic law. The ideas embodied in the western law of property and contract are foreign to the tropics. Even attempts to apply local law, or to embody local custom in legal codes, must fail if made in western courts according to western procedure by lawyers who, as was said formerly in Java, 'look on native law as a doctor looks on native medicine'.[1] Unwritten custom changes its character when formalized in law and legal decisions, and we have noticed how 'Buddhist law' has been applied in Burma. In India, Elphinstone remarked that Hindu law was 'as a whole beyond the knowledge of perhaps the most learned pundit, and every part beyond the knowledge of the people who live under it. . . . The uncertainty of decisions obtained from such sources must be obvious, especially when required for the guidance of a foreign judge both to the written law and to the usage which supplies its place.'[2] Indigenous law or custom administered in a foreign court is no less foreign than law proceeding directly from a foreign ruler. In either case one result is the encouragement of disputes and litigation, because people can appeal against the custom that all know to the law which no one knows. Law encroaches on custom, and the decay of custom encourages the resort to litigation. Moreover, as is notorious, for reasons already 671 691

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 218. [2] Cotton, p. 182.

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long after the surrounding land had been brought under the plough by natives. That seems to be the general result. In Netherlands India the large estates, created at the beginning of the nineteenth century, were an endless source of trouble and unrest; much of the land long remained unworked, the owners were often absentees, aiming solely at profit and with no personal interest in the welfare of the occupants who were more grievously oppressed than elsewhere. Moreover, the grants tended to pass into the hands of foreign Europeans and orientals, and during the present century this stimulated the Government to adopt a policy of gradually resuming them. In Africa the difficulties arising out of western agricultural settlements are notorious, and European settlers, when faced by even a remote prospect of their eventual displacement by foreign orientals, have carried opposition to the point of threatening armed resistance.[1] The possibility of European settlement in the tropics, however, is confined to particular localities, and it presents, though with special characters, features common to development by western enterprise in general. The outstanding problem in regions developed by western enterprise is not directly concerned with land-holding and debt, but with the relations between western enterprise and native labour.

The first condition of the economic development of backward areas is an adequate supply of labour. Even native enterprise creates a new demand for labour, and we have seen in Burma how this demand has led to a seasonal supply and to the industrialization of agricultural production. But the expansion of native enterprise is gradual, and it can obtain much of its labour from customary sources and dispose of its produce along established routes. Western enterprise, whether in mines or plantations, being usually situated in thinly peopled tracts, requires a large volume of labour quickly, and also requires new and more rapid means of transport; there is a sudden and large demand for labour both on private enterprise and public works. The Government must provide this labour. The provision of labour is no longer necessary when free labour becomes available, but free labour needs protection. Then, as employers gradually realize that healthy and intelligent labour is less costly, attention is directed to improving the conditions of work. Thus in general, labour policy in tropical dependencies passes through three stages: the provision of labour; the protection of labour against abuse; and the promotion of labour welfare.

[1] *African Survey*, p. 165.

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The Provision of Labour. The provision of labour by Government might seem to come under the head of economic rather than of social service. But, so long as it is necessary, it is usually regarded, not wholly without justification, as an instrument of welfare. 'To pierce the darkness shrouding entire populations in Africa', said Leopold II in 1876, 'would be a crusade worthy of this century of progress.'[1] At the beginning of the present century Chamberlain was a leading champion of this crusade. The native would not advance in civilization until he had been 'convinced of the necessity and dignity of labour'...'I think it is a good thing' he said, 'for the native to be industrious, and by every means in our power we have to teach them to work.'[2] For a quarter of a century this remained the keynote of British labour policy in the tropics. Even sympathetic officials acquiesced in compulsion, 'in the genuine belief that no advancement was possible unless the native accustomed himself to regular labour', and officers charged with a special care for native welfare have urged the educational value of compulsory labour on European enterprises.[3] It is true that, if tropical peoples are to live in the modern world, they must adapt themselves to the modern world. But it is true also that the use of compulsion to provide labour engenders abuse, and that the labour it provides is inefficient. It is pressed furthest and is most harmful where the Government has an economic interest in production, and in the Belgian Congo, as in the later days of the Culture system in Java, the use of compulsion to obtain labour defeated its own ends by killing off the supply of labourers.[4] General experience has shown that compulsion tends to reduce the labour supply and to furnish incompetent and unwilling labourers, yet employers, accustomed to obtaining labour through the State, prefer this easy though inefficient way of meeting their requirements and, long after the provision of labour has become unnecessary, continue to urge the educational value of labour as an argument for Government assistance in recruiting it. Now, however, that compulsion is no longer needed, it is condemned as generally as it was formerly supported. But the fact that, so long as compulsion was thought expedient, it was justified, like slavery, as an instrument of welfare suggests the need for cautious examination of measures now recommended on the same ground.

[1] MacDorell, J. de C., *King Leopold II* (1905), p. 184.
[2] Boulger, D. C., *The Reign of Leopold II* (1925), II, 121.
[3] *African Survey*, pp. 640ff. Frankel, p. 37.

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Official activity in the provision of labour assumes various forms; it embraces compulsion, direct and indirect, the recruitment of labour by the Government or with official support, and the inclusion of a penal sanction in labour contracts. Under all these heads much may be learned from Netherlands India, where the provision of labour for development by western enterprise dates from the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Direct compulsion has been little used except to provide labour for the State. At various times compulsion has been employed to recruit men for State economic enterprise, for the army and, chiefly, for public works. Where, as in Java under the Culture system and in Africa under the chartered companies, the Government is at once sovereign and merchant, it is naturally tempted to use political control for the advancement of its economic interests, and is not too rigid in restricting compulsory labour to purely administrative purposes.[1] The Culture system in Java is the classic example of compulsion on State enterprise. Van den Bosch justified compulsion on the ground that it would instil habits of industry among the people and, by increasing production, would enable them to earn more. For a time they did in fact make more money, but within a few years a series of famines devastated the tracts that were richest in natural resources, and the people, instead of being inured to industry, acquired the habit of working only under compulsion. Moreover, the system was inefficient because the officials charged with supervising production had not sufficient knowledge either of agriculture or of the people. What killed it, however, was neither its harshness nor its inefficiency, but the growth of private enterprise, and, when private enterprise was ready to take over production, public opinion was quick to appreciate the defects of State enterprise. The system was advocated as an instrument of welfare, it was applied as an instrument of progress, and finally condemned as both pernicious to native welfare and a barrier to progress. The compulsory recruitment of tropical peoples for military service has also been found uneconomic. Only a small proportion can stand the rigour of modern army life, and the withdrawal of large numbers from the labour market conflicts with the demands of private enterprise; 'in view of the shortage of men for internal development such a utilization of man-power would have the effect of economic self-annihilation'.[2]

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1314. [2] *Ib.* pp. 627, 1121.

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466 464 Ordinarily then, the main use of compulsory labour has been on public works. Throughout the tropics it was formerly the practice under native rule to obtain such labour as might be required for the common purposes of the tribe or village, or for the chieftains or the State, by calling on the people to supply it. 'It was perhaps natural that the early administrations should see in the use of this "communal" labour an easy method by which to provide for the making of roads or for the transport necessary for official purposes. It became, indeed, the usual method of securing labour for official or public needs.'[1] In Burma and other lands developed by native enterprise, compulsory labour was soon abandoned as interfering too greatly with cultivation. But in Java, as in other countries developed by western enterprise, it has been freely employed. One limitation on its use is the difficulty of securing by compulsion the volume of labour required for large capital works. In Java paid labour was first used on the harbour and defence works in Sourabaya in 1849, when modern Liberal ideas were in the air. It was found so much more efficient and economical that, in 1851, the use of paid labour on all public buildings was enjoined, and in 1857 this order was extended to all public works. In practice, however, it was still used to some extent, especially on irrigation works. Meanwhile Liberal sentiment in favour of free labour was gathering momentum, and was reinforced by the practical consideration that the use of compulsory labour on public works reduced the supply available for the rapidly growing demands of private enterprise. Attempts to restrict labour for the State to seasons when it was not required by private employers proved unsatisfactory, and at the end of the century the system of compulsion was abolished.

Experience during the nineteenth century in Java has been repeated during the present century in Africa. The various administrations used 'communal' labour for local road construction and also needed labour for other purposes, 'such as the construction of railways, or major roads for long distance transport, which were outside the range of even an extended definition of communal labour, more especially since they at times involved the absence of labourers from their homes for considerable periods'.[2] Imported labour was expensive, and the more costly because so many died. Ordinarily, for the improvement of communications, the use of impressed African labour was imperative, and was justified as a moral discipline and a source

[1] *African Survey*, p. 612. [2] *Ib.* p. 613.

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of future welfare. During the present century, under Dutch rule also, compulsory labour, though no longer necessary in Java, was freely used in the Outer Provinces as part of the Ethical policy of promoting native welfare; 'without strong rule, without order and security, no ethical policy'.[1] Compulsion was indeed used so freely as to provoke disorder and unrest. Of recent years, however, throughout tropical regions in general, there has been less need for direct compulsion to procure labour for public works, and now it is generally regarded with disfavour as both prejudicial to social welfare and also uneconomic.[2]

Although direct compulsion has been used chiefly for the State, indirect compulsion has frequently been adopted as a means of providing labour for private employment. The usual methods have been by the restriction of natives to reserves and by taxation. Both these expedients tend to reduce the supply of labour. The curtailment of native land discourages the growth of population, and taxation encourages migration. There are technical difficulties in imposing differential rates of taxation and 'the effect of a rigid flat rate is to drive the taxpaying male population to industrial and urban centres, and consequently to disorganize native society to such an extent that, on several occasions, governments have felt obliged to reduce the amount to be paid by men who are without resources other than their labour'. Moreover, men who are compelled to work merely in order to pay the tax, stop work as soon as they have earned enough to pay it, and they fail therefore to acquire efficiency as labourers. Experience shows that 'the shopkeeper probably provides a far greater incentive than the tax-gatherer'.[3] Indirect compulsion tends accordingly to follow direct compulsion into desuetude.

Compulsion, direct or indirect, is however less effective in providing a supply of labour than the employment of a special recruiting agency. In this, as in other problems, Netherlands India has led the way. Labour for private enterprise may be recruited by the State, either directly or through native chieftains, or by unofficial agents, with or without State assistance. Recruitment is often distinguished from compulsion, but 'a State agency for recruitment inevitably involves some degree of pressure', and is open to many of the objections brought against other forms of compulsion.[4] From the standpoint of employers, moreover, State intervention is undesirable as

[1] Gonggrijp, cited *Netherlands India*, p. 237.
[2] *African Survey*, p. 628.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 596, 648.
[4] *Ib.* p. 651.

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464 it is usually accompanied by unwelcome restrictions on the terms and conditions of employment. It was on these grounds that the Government of Burma formerly rejected proposals that it should revive the former practice of official recruitment, and fifty years later mill-owners protested against suggestions that the recruitment of labour should be supervised.[1] Even where recruitment is nominally free, private employers may utilize the assistance of native chieftains, and, during the Liberal regime in Java, when officials were no longer allowed to take part in the provision of labour, the planters commonly entered village headmen on the pay roll as servants of the estate in order to secure their influence in recruiting villagers. Usually, however, labour for western enterprise must be imported from some distant region where it is more plentiful, and in such circumstances special arrangements for recruiting are required. Naturally a private agent, dependent for his livelihood on the number of recruits, is less scrupulous than an official in his relations with both employers and labourers; he will supply employers with anyone whom they will take, and entice recruits with advances and specious promises. Although the substitution of private for official recruitment may supply more and cheaper labour, it is in some respects a change for the worse; the supply of labour is doubtful, the men engaged are often immature or weaklings, and the cost per head is high. Moreover, recruitment causes a local shortage in the area of supply; recruitment for South Africa causes a shortage in Rhodesia which has to be made good by recruitment for Rhodesia further inland, and so on.[2] This stimulates opposition among employers to the system of recruitment. Firms with large capital resources can make their own arrangements for obtaining labour, and thereby ensure a more regular supply of better labourers at less expense. Accordingly the strongest firms, best able to influence the policy of Government, add their weight to humanitarian protests against the evil of recruitment, and advocate stringent regulation.

464 The question of recruitment is closely linked up with the penal sanction, imposing a legal penalty for the breach of labour contracts. This protects the employer against strikes and desertion, and thereby reacts on the demand for labour. In Java such provisions originated in local police regulations dating from 1829, which were designed to ease the transition from servile to free labour in domestic service.

[1] *RAB*, 1880–1, p. 52; *RCLI*, x, Pt 1, p. 173.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 648ff.

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When similar provisions were embodied in the General Police Regulation of 1872, they attracted the attention of Liberals in the States-General, who obtained their cancellation in 1879. In Java the penal sanction was no longer required as there was by this time an abundant supply of wage labour, but the new tobacco plantations in Sumatra were dependent on labour imported under contract, and their needs were recognized by an Ordinance of 1880, providing for the imposition of penalties. The facilities thus granted were abused, and about 1900 an enquiry, held as the result of Socialist agitation exposed 'a general collapse of morality'.[1] An attempt to mend conditions by stricter enforcement of the law proved unavailing, as the legal effect of the penal sanction favoured employers. Accordingly labour policy, hitherto directed towards providing labour, turned gradually in the direction of protecting it. The means chiefly favoured were a closer supervision over recruitment, the gradual abolition of the penal sanction, and a more precise regulation of the duties of employers and employees, together with machinery for enforcing the regulations. The change may be dated from 1909 when official agents were appointed to recruit Chinese coolies from abroad, and rules were framed to control professional recruiting in Java. As the Government considered a penal sanction necessary to efficient management even on its own tin mines, its abolition was a slow process. But the closer supervision over private recruiting encouraged employers to take the matter into their own hands, and from 1915 various planters' associations established recruiting agencies. Employers came also to recognize the value of trained and voluntary labour; they tried to induce time-expired coolies to return for a further period of service after recruiting friends and followers in their villages. In this way plantation labour assumed a new character. By 1930 it was no longer mostly alien, temporary and recruited by irresponsible recruiting agents, but much of the labour was Javanese and exempt from penal liabilities, and the relations between employer and employed had become more permanent and human. A new Ordinance of 1931 aimed at encouraging these tendencies, and provided among other matters for a gradually increasing minimum of free labour, engaged on contracts without a penal sanction. Almost at the same time the Blaine amendment to the United States Tariff Law of 1930 prohibited the importation of the products of labour employed under a penal sanction, unless otherwise unobtainable in sufficient quantities. This threatened the

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 354; Vandenbosch, p. 282.

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464 686 Sumatra tobacco planters with the loss of a valuable market, and they announced their intention of recruiting all labour on a voluntary basis. As a moral gesture this was not very convincing since, owing to the depression, there was a surplus of labour on the estates, but it served the purpose of satisfying the customs regulations of the United States. At the same time, penal provisions were also renounced by Government in respect of the coolies, mostly Chinese, on its tin mines. Thanks to the Blaine amendment and the depression, the results attained under the Ordinance of 1931 were greater than had been contemplated and, when it came up for revision in 1936, a further advance was possible. By 1941, the penal sanction had practically disappeared, and on the revision of the Ordinance in that year it was finally abolished.[1]

In British India, where western enterprise has never been of such predominant importance as in Netherlands India, the Workman's Breach of Contract Act was repealed in 1926. But in most British territories in Africa, western enterprise is influential, and penal sanctions are attached to labour offences; though legislation of this type is less conspicuous in West Africa. The accepted view is that 'the complete disappearance of criminal penalties must await the evolution of social and economic conditions which will replace the sanctions which penalties supply'.[2] Conditions are less favourable for its abolition than in Netherlands India, but possibly a stimulus, such as that applied by the United States tariff to tobacco planters in Sumatra, might expedite the process.

466 But the abolition of the penal sanction need not, and ordinarily does not, improve the position of the labourer. Just as free recruitment needs regulation if it is not to lead to worse abuses than official recruitment, so free labour, unless protected, may be worse off than contract labour. The social and economic conditions which obviate the need for any legal sanction replace it by a more stringent economic sanction, for the legal sanction becomes unnecessary when the supply of labour is in excess of the demand. Javanese coolies working in Sumatra felt safer under a contract, even when it exposed them to penalties, than when working as free labourers. In Netherlands India it was the Blaine amendment that stimulated the tobacco planters to employ free labour, but their example was followed generally because, owing to the labour surplus resulting from the depression, employers 'were able, easily, and with a certain profit to themselves, to make

[1] *Vrij Nederland*, 22 Nov. 1941. [2] *African Survey*, pp. 659, 664.

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563 foreign army of occupation has preserved it from disruption.
565 The essential and distinctive character of a plural society
433 is that it is dominated by economic forces, and, outside a
591 few partly sheltered oases, Southeast Asia illustrates the capitalist system in its purest form.[18]

162 Another common feature is the dominance of the agri-
171 cultural section of the population. The latest available
433 figures show the percentage proportions of population dependent
171 on agriculture in the area as follows: Burma, 68; Indonesia, 66; Philippines, 69; Thailand, 85.[19] The same source indicates the proportions for various regions of the world as follows: North America, 20; Oceania, 30; Europe, 33; South America, 60; Asia, 70; and Africa, 74.

171 With the prevailing techniques of production and the
433 consequent low productivity per man, dominance of agriculture
434 means low per capita national income. When countries are grouped by level of economic development on the basis of per capita national income as of 1950, all the six countries of Southeast Asia -- Burma, Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaya, Philippines, and Thailand -- fall in the underdeveloped
443 group.[20] Moreover, there is in Southeast Asia a true surplus
464 population on the land in the sense that even under the
161 present methods of cultivation a sizeable fraction of the

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18. Ibid., p. 77.

19. Food and Agriculture Organization, 1953 Yearbook, Vol. VII.

20. Eugene Staley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), pp. 16-17.

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man-power could be removed without significantly reducing food output. Under this circumstance, not only the productivity of agriculture but also the opportunity for urban industry to grow and flourish is hampered. A major obstacle to development of efficient manufacturing in underdeveloped countries is the small size of the market, which is in turn a consequence of the low purchasing power of the bulk of the people, most of whom get their living from the land.[21]

Southeast Asia has been characterized by its rapid growth in population. Broadly speaking, the region has been until recently one of very thin population. It seems probable that the whole of Southeast Asia in 1800 contained only about ten million people. Malaya then contained about a quarter million people, Java about four million, and Burma probably less than two million. It was, even at the end of the 18th century, a zone of labor shortage. But the last 150 years brought tremendous changes in population. It has been a period of tremendous population increases, causing people to swarm upon the more fertile areas, upon deltas and volcanic cones where people had not clustered before. By the quinquennium 1916-20, the total population of Southeast Asia had become 84 million, by 1936-40, 120 million, and by 1946-50 it was nearly 145 million.[22] This rapid population growth has been a great concern to students in economic

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21. Ibid., p. 253.

22. E. H. G. Dobby, Southeast Asia (London: University of London Press Ltd., 1951), p. 386.

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466 legislation, workmen's compensation and the regulation of industrial relations. In Indochina, the Popular Front Government had begun to apply by stages metropolitan French labor legislation to various groups of the workers. In the Indies, between 1940 and 1942 detailed workmen's compensation laws were adopted, the system of employment under penal sanctions was brought to an end, compulsory road labor in the Outer Provinces was abolished, and in Java the whole wage structure was being changed to provide for a general minimum wage for the lowest ranks of workers.

464 Nevertheless, as Miss Thompson states in her first essay, there remained two major labor problems. The labor supply was unsatisfactory and there was no effective labor movement.

Labor migration enabled the employers to meet their immediate needs and in many cases, as between India and Malaya, was well-organized. In the circumstances of much of Southeast Asia, however, it has helped to absorb some of the surplus population rather than to improve living con-
[458] ditions. In times of economic prosperity there was more money in the villages; with the great depression the villages, more dependent on money, were poorer than ever, and those workers who kept their employment saw their wages drop almost or entirely to vanishing point. The skill of the rubber-tapper, the cigarette roller, the batik worker and of other workers in manual operations demanding delicacy of touch was considerable; the industriousness of the Chinese was even excessive; above all, peasant rice production in the wet lands was marked by the fullest use of available resources. But for modern production in industry, labor efficiency was low and in particular the availability of the skilled mechanical worker was in many areas rare and uncertain.

467 Miss Thompson shows the prewar weakness of the labor movements. In Java, the maximum number of organized workers appears to have been reached in 1941 when the membership of trade unions was estimated at 123,500. In the Philippine Islands, at the end of 1940 the total membership of the registered labor organizations was 96,877, and 190,000 workers were estimated to be organized in unregistered unions. There was little unity or continuity among the unions which existed. The Western governments feared the political interests of the labor movements. The seasonal character of much of the employment, labor migration and, in some cases, the racial diversity of the labor force, were other factors making trade union organization difficult.

000 All these problems still exist. An improved standard of living is one of the essentials for stability in Southeast Asia. Such improvement cannot be effected without economic developments, and although these developments will be hindered by labor which is cheap and inefficient, in the absence of much of the equipment of modern industry it will be long before standards of employment in Southeast Asia are comparable with

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

I

LABOR SUPPLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

464 467 TWO MAJOR LABOR PROBLEMS, which have confronted Southeast Asia in the past and which remain unsolved, are the inadequacy and irregularity of labor supply and the dearth of organized labor movements having objectives like those of Occidental labor unions.

464 Except in such overpopulated areas as Java, the Tonkin delta, and Northern Annam, labor is generally inadequate in quantity and in quality to meet the requirements of large-scale enterprise. Where numerically adequate, the labor supply is either poorly distributed in relation to areas of employment or fails to respond to opportunities offered. The industrial development of the entire area suffers from lack of full-time services of skilled laborers. Some of the factory employees form the only stable, trained groups of workers. They comprise a small proportion of the population.

[874 461] Few facilities have existed for the training of skilled workers, and the association in Oriental minds of manual labor with the humblest social classes has limited wage-labor largely to those driven by economic necessity. Handicrafts are carried on principally by agriculturists in their leisure time and by other "non-professionals." Farmers form the bulk of the workers. Only during the slack agricultural season or after a disastrous harvest are they willing to perform labor for others. [476]

464 167 Supplementation of the inadequate labor force has been effected in various ways—some spontaneous, others planned. The starvation conditions chronic in south China and in India have caused emigration of workers to the underpopulated but richer regions of Southeast Asia, whence they usually repatriate their savings and eventually their persons to the home country. With the exception of Burma, which by reason of its geographic and administrative relations with India formed a special category, the prosperity which prevailed at times in Southeast Asia was less a factor in stimulating this flow than were conditions in the homeland.

Accelerated by the boom in plantation industries during the early

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Chinese
Indians

464 years of the present century, the flow of immigration has been large and
167 comparatively steady except during the depression and the two world wars. Chinese and Indian immigrants usually could better their position soon after arrival because their industry and organization were superior to those of the indigenous peoples. Partly because of this, there were constantly new arrivals willing to do coolie work until they too could
[178] rise economically. Except for the large-scale repatriations to China and India caused by the depression, the flow of labor thus set into motion was adequate for the economy prevailing in the underpopulated areas until changing conditions created a growing class of landless proletariat and
[668] dissatisfaction among both the indigenous and immigrant peoples. This dissatisfaction often became associated with other motivations in nationalist movements.

Controlled migrations occurred only between regions under the same government or those held by governments of the same nationality, except for a limited migration of Javanese labor to Malaya (and to New Cale-
[166] donia). In the Netherlands Indies and in Indochina the governments endeavored to transplant groups of laborers from overpopulated to underpopulated areas, but in so doing they learned that the process required careful organization, was expensive, and raised serious economic, social, and psychological problems. Such movements could be effected successfully on a limited scale only. This fact obviated the possibility of their contributing substantially to solution of the problem of overpopulation. As labor supply, such migrations were only temporarily satisfactory, because social and religious ties inclined the workers to return to their home villages immediately upon the expiration of their contracts or even to desert. To stabilize this labor force some of the governments tried after the depression to obtain a better adjusted sex ratio in the migrant population by encouraging the immigration of workers' families and the establishment of agricultural villages—a program too recently initiated to make possible a definite appraisal of its comparative success or failure. In Malaya, with the exception of a few Javanese, planned immigration was confined to Indian laborers. It was arranged and operated jointly by the two British governments concerned. There, however, the depression, the growth in voluntary Indian immigration, and India's ban in 1938 on assisted emigration to Malaya tended to render many of the official controls unnecessary. The unplanned and uncontrolled movement of labor across the Burma-India frontier was the sole migration of its type in Southeast Asia.

563 The indigenous populations in general hold themselves socially aloof
609 from the alien Asiatics. To the Muslim Malays the Chinese were materialistic, pork-eating idolators; and the Indians, with the exception of the small Islamic minority, were similarly disdained, though regarded as less aggressive. To the sinicized Annamites, the Burmese, and the Siamese,

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Chinese

religion was no barrier between themselves and the Chinese; all were Buddhists, though of differing sects. Chinese culture had long been admired by the peoples of Farther India, and had influenced them. Moreover, the Chinese were regarded as distant and desirable relatives. With the advent, however, of Chinese women and the accelerated growth of Chinese nationalism after the first world war, intermarriage occurred less frequently (though it continued to be common in Burma and Cambodia), and the indigenous peoples had few social contacts with the Chinese in their midst. The cleavage between the ethnic groups was further widened in the British colonies by the official policy of representation of various communities on legislative and advisory bodies. 563 609

Economically, relations between the indigenous and the immigrant peoples altered from a mosaic of non-conflicting occupations to one of rapidly increasing competition. For years the native peoples had contentedly seen the arrival of thousands of immigrants annually who were able and willing to perform the hard labor for which they themselves had neither inclination nor compulsion. Through much of the region, however, during the inter-war period an indigenous proletariat was developing as a result of the transfer of farm land from the indebted native peasantry to non-agriculturists, often to alien moneylenders, and also because of the growth of a Western-inspired individualism which was weakening family ties once paramount. The trend was apparent chiefly in parts of Burma, Siam, and Indochina. 464 477 178 425 172

This development did not assume significant proportions until the world economic depression, when considerable unemployment arose out of the drop in prices and the curtailment of foreign markets for products of Southeast Asia. The result was a swift increase in the number of natives seeking to return to their villages and, on the other hand, of those forced to seek part-time or full-time employment away from their villages in competition with immigrant laborers for work previously scorned as arduous, monotonous, and underpaid. 464 458 178

Meanwhile the native middle classes for the first time faced a serious unemployment problem. Until the depression years, the opportunities for desirable though moderately paid employment in government or business had seemed to exceed the number of qualified candidates. The depression made it clear that the saturation point had been reached, and each year an increasing number of educated youths would be thwarted in their expectation of employment or, if given a job, in their rise to higher positions. Thus two groups of economically frustrated natives developed simultaneously in numbers and in consciousness in the decade prior to the second world war. 464 178 563

Nascent political factors became significant during that period. The struggles of the Chinese against the Japanese and of Indians against British rule were reflected in the attitudes of the emigrants from those coun- 464 668

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Chinese Indians

464 tries. Although this was truer of the immigrant Chinese than of the
668 immigrant Indians, the comparative inertia of the latter was compen-
563 sated for by a more aggressive championship of their cause on the part of their compatriots at home. In the case of Malaya, where the indigenous population was numerically weak and psychologically passive, the Central Indian Association of Malaya and the Congress Party leaders prodded the Government of India to exert pressure upon the officials at Singapore and Kuala Lumpur to grant greater economic and political
[167] privileges to the Indians in Malaya. The governments and planters of Malaya, however, with the curtailment in their labor needs resulting from the current cut in rubber export, felt free to resist this pressure, even at the price of the embargo placed in 1938 on emigration to Malaya of assisted Indian labor.

464 In the case of the Chinese the situation was different. Smaller num-
668 bers were employed in the rubber industry and larger ones in mining.
563 More of them were able to graduate from contract labor into other occupations, especially retail business, farming, and small trades. They
167 tended to stay longer because of the insecurity of enterprise in south China. Moreover, the home government was in a much weaker position than that of India to exert pressure on the governments of Malaya. These remained free to regulate at their pleasure the spontaneous flow of Chinese immigrants and to keep watch on the political activities of resident Chinese. In Burma, however, the British authorities were unable to keep the situation so well in hand. Serious anti-Indian rioting broke out in 1938, and the strength of the Burman nationalists in the government (especially after separation from India in 1937) enabled it to negotiate an agreement with India restricting the number of Indian immigrants and permitting the exercise of more control over those domiciled in the country.

In Indochina and the Netherlands Indies the governments were able to keep the immigrant problem from assuming intensity because of the smaller proportion of Chinese in relation to the native populations. In all these countries, however, Chinese laborers suffered somewhat from the bad reputation of those of their countrymen who as merchants and moneylenders had acquired an economic power which differed from that of other aliens in that it affected directly and visibly the welfare of large numbers.

464 All the governments, including that of Siam, were compelled by public
668 opinion to exert more control over the immigrant minorities. In so do-
563 ing, they faced unpleasant alternatives. The demand of Chinese and Indian laborers for better working conditions and improved political
167 status was accompanied by a threat to cut off entirely the flow of emigra-
468 tion. Encouraged by nationalist groups, they engaged in strikes and boycotts. If these succeeded, other demands would probably be made; and

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Chinese

Indians

the indigenous peoples were not sufficiently willing, numerous, or skilled 464
to replace the immigrant laborers. A higher wage scale, they feared, 668
might compel many firms either to go out of business or to install expen- 563
sive machinery. Already local nationalists, succumbing to the philosophy 167
of economic self-sufficiency, were demanding intensive programs of gov- 468
ernment-aided industrialization. If such demands were acceded to, the
industrialists and labor leaders in the home country could be expected to
protest strongly against the new competition.

In this complex situation, the colonial governments of Southeast Asia [664]
gradually yielded to the popular demands, although loath to abandon
their traditional function as instruments of capitalist planning in the
home countries. With the exception, however, of the embryonic and
ineffective industrial programs of the Siamese and Burmese governments
and the more constructive policy of the Netherlands Indies for a planned
industrialization, none of the countries did much in this direction. None
was forced as yet to consider very seriously that change in colonial rela-
tionship which would result from general economic development in the
world and specifically from the new role that China and India would
inevitably play before long in Southeast Asia. The Japanese invasion
interrupted the efforts of local governments toward a solution of these
labor problems. It also injected new elements into the situation.

2

LABOR ORGANIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

FOR VARIOUS REASONS an organized labor movement has never developed 467
in Southeast Asia to notable dimensions. In large part this was because 575
of the predominance of alien, transient, and illiterate labor forces, di- 563
vided—even when of the same nationality—by geographical and linguistic
differences. The Indians were further subdivided by caste and religious 668
sect. The Chinese had a far better family, guild, and secret-society
organization; but the antagonisms imported as an integral part of these
organizations provoked periodic violence. Later the political and gang-
ster elements which operated within their framework impelled all the
governments throughout Southeast Asia to control them severely.

National solidarity among the immigrant labor groups was further 166
broken up by the methods of recruitment and management. Agents and 167
foremen exploited their compatriots for their own personal gain, until
the governments concerned were gradually and reluctantly forced to
intervene. Asiatic agents behaved much as recruiting agents of emi-

3

LABOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION

JAPAN'S TREATMENT of labor throughout Southeast Asia varied according to the military situation, the political relations of Japan with the individual country, and the availability of manpower. Everywhere, however, labor suffered from dislocations, regimentation, and general deterioration in working conditions except for the limited amount of technical training dispensed by the Japanese to create a needed nucleus of skilled workers. The information required to draw a complete picture of the labor situation during the war in each of the countries of this region is not yet available, but from such data as exist—drawn chiefly from former enemy sources—the outlines are reasonably clear. 727 466

By mid-1943 their military position in the Pacific War led the Japanese to alter their policy in Southeast Asia. Labor in the area had not previously been regimented on a nation-wide basis, although attempts to register the available manpower and use it for individual projects had been made as the need arose. But the critical shipping situation, which prevented both exports from Southeast Asia to Japan and imports needed in those countries, of necessity changed the objective of Japanese policy from one of economic exploitation for the benefit of the homeland to maintaining Japanese troops in the area and achieving local self-sufficiency and defense.

In June 1943 new labor measures were widely introduced; these foreshadowed large-scale forced labor and indicated that the Japanese realized that patriotic as well as economic and prestige incentives had to be offered to secure native cooperation. Soon after, the transplanting of laborers from the most populous areas to those requiring workers for defense projects and economic development was systematically undertaken. This policy prevailed until V-J Day at a tempo which kept pace with the worsening military situation of Japan. [166]

Japan's political aims were reflected in marked differences in policy in each of the countries of eastern Asia, and also toward separate groups within each state. The comparatively good treatment meted out to the Siamese derived from Japan's need, for propaganda purposes, to maintain the fiction of Siam's voluntary alliance in the Greater East Asia war. Being unwilling, for political reasons, to coerce masses of Siamese workers, and for economic reasons to rely on their small, unskilled and re- 727 167 464

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727 167 464 luctant services, the Japanese imported prisoners of war and Javanese laborers for the construction of the Burma and Kra Isthmus railroads. Even after the pro-Japanese dictator, Pibul Songgram, had been ousted by a resistance government, the Japanese tolerated the change so long as they retained military and economic control over the country.

727 [464] 466 Malaya, on the other hand, received the least favored treatment. The only country in the area to which the Japanese did not promise "independence," it was earmarked as a Japanese colony. The Japanese were faced with a small, foreign labor supply whose special skills were adapted almost exclusively to the tin and rubber industries. Since they could utilize only a small proportion of the country's major produce, there occurred tremendous dislocation and unemployment of labor. The Chinese, as the largest, most skilled, and most hostile group, were subjected successively to brutal treatment, registration and regimentation, and transportation to farming colonies on the peninsula. The Indians were similarly organized along racial lines through the Japanese-sponsored Indian Independence Leagues and the Indian National Army. The Malays escaped the more rigorous forms of coercion because of their negligible importance as a source of labor.

[167] Despite the tight network of organization developed by the Japanese, Malaya's labor problem was never satisfactorily solved; guerilla ranks were strengthened by recalcitrants of all races and eventually the occupying forces had to import Japanese and Javanese workers in order to strengthen the defenses of that vitally strategic area.

727 466 Indochina, thanks to the survival of the French administration until the Japanese coup of March 1945, was treated only slightly less favorably than Siam. The Japanese found there a more abundant labor supply than in immediately neighboring countries but were hampered by the necessity of working indirectly through French officials, by the concentration of labor in the north, and its antipathy to furthering Japan's war aims. As in Malaya, the inadequacy and indifference of the local labor supply compelled the Japanese to import a few thousand Chinese and Malay coolies as well as some Japanese technicians and supervisors. A certain number of local laborers were conscripted to work on defense and industrial projects and an undetermined number of Tonkinese were transported to work on plantations in the south. Unemployment seems not to have become a major factor, although as the war progressed there was a marked shift of agricultural workers to the cities, only partially offset by the evacuation of some laborers from heavily bombed urban areas. In common with the other laborers of Southeast Asia, Indochinese workers suffered from coercion and inflation but apparently not from nation-wide regimentation or transportation to work outside their own country.

[167] [166] [464]

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Indians

Next to the Javanese, the Burmese endured the greatest hardships during the Japanese occupation. Burma was more completely devastated by military campaigns than any other country in the area, and its proximity to India made it Japan's frontier zone. The need to win Burmese cooperation led Japan to grant Burma "independence" on August 1, 1943, and thereafter the local intelligentsia were placated by a Burmanization of the administrative services. But the country's laborers were in a far worse plight than they had been under the British administration. The Indians, whose number in Burma had been halved during the 1942 campaign, were immediately thereafter exposed to persecution by the Burmese. Virtual pogrom conditions in the delta compelled them to flee to Rangoon for Japanese protection and employment. Indian coolies supplied the casual labor needed in the nation's capital, and most of the white-collar class was absorbed into the Indian Independence Leagues and Indian National Army. Burmese laborers, who had long agitated for a restriction of Indian immigration, now found themselves bearing the brunt of Japanese requisitioning, which was represented by the puppet native government as a patriotic service. They had to perform heavy manual labor far from home, for low wages, and under alien and often harsh supervision. They suffered, in addition, from the knowledge that their own fields were neglected and their homes unprotected. Burma was frequently praised by the Japanese for having supplied more cooperative labor service than any other area in the southern regions, but nevertheless Javanese workers had to be brought in. 727 563 [464] [466]

Java, with the greatest labor reservoir of the area, was inevitably the country whose manpower was most intensively exploited by the Japanese. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Javanese served as coolie labor for the construction of defense works and means of communication and also were trained by the Japanese for more technical work in shipyards and in factories. They were shipped by the thousands to areas outside their island as local needs and the exigencies of the military situation dictated. 727 466 167

Originally the Japanese planned to perpetuate, on a far vaster scale, Dutch colonization schemes in Sumatra; in this they not only encountered the same obstacles as had their predecessors, but they found they could exploit all of the island's resources they could use with the manpower and machinery locally available. In mid-1943 they seem to have transferred the plan to Borneo, where additional labor was required to develop such local industries as timber. Many hundreds of male Javanese workers were shipped to Borneo, while smaller groups were sent to other areas. 727 464 166

Unemployment during the Japanese occupation was serious only in Malaya. Elsewhere the defense and economic programs of the Japanese, 727 464

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727 together with the curtailment of alien Asiatic immigration, afforded
464 plenty of jobs for those who were willing, or were forced, to work for wages paid in inflated currency.

727 In the food-surplus countries—Burma, Siam, and Indochina—which were also those receiving the most favored political treatment at the hands of the Japanese, the areas under rice and allied crops declined.
433 The decrease in the number of draft animals through disease and Japa-
464 nese requisitioning; the lack of implements; and, above all, the loss of former export markets caused the local farmers to cultivate very little more than their families required, and there was a marked exodus from the agricultural communities to the cities or places of more remunerative employment. In the countries of food deficiency—Malaya and the Outer Islands of the East Indies—the Japanese made great efforts and probably succeeded in increasing the area under food-crop cultivation, but never to the point of self-sufficiency. The Japanese also arbitrarily prohibited certain industries as "nonessential" and shifted the workers to others accordingly.

727 Very little information is available as to the wages paid during the Japanese occupation. Where local labor was limited and native good-
465 will was sought, as in Siam, the Japanese seem to have paid high wages from the outset. In densely populated areas like Java, wages were reportedly decreased immediately after the occupation. In time, and with the ever greater need for additional labor services, the Japanese permitted successive wage rises. But nowhere did wage increases keep pace with the more rapidly rising cost of living and they had to be supplemented by allowances, medals, and words of praise. The groups that suffered most from this disparity were the Asiatic government-servant and white-collar class, whose numbers had always exceeded the demand and whose services were far less necessary to the Japanese than was manual labor.

727 Labor legislation was passed only in negative measures of regimentation and outlawing of strikes. Nevertheless, reports of strikes period-
466 ically filtered through the barrage of Japanese propaganda, particularly a few that took place in Indochina and Burma. Most of them registered
468 grievances against low pay, high living costs, and heavy taxation, but some were doubtless of a political character—difficult to distinguish from sabotage. Following one strike in 1943, the Cochin-China police arrested a number of "communists." In Malaya and Indonesia, control by the Japanese military and naval forces was not exercised through any native administration, and the strictness of their rule seems to have precluded any possible recourse to the strike weapon.

727 In Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia the Japanese set up a bewildering array of organizations into which the local peoples were regimented by
466 communal, occupational, religious, sex, and age groups. Not only did

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467 try, depending on the stage of development reached before the war, the quality of leadership during and after the Japanese occupation, and the degree of authority and stability achieved by the present governments.

While politics are the overwhelming preoccupation everywhere, Indochina and Indonesia have been the scenes of almost continuous warfare since V-J Day and have been unable—judging from the limited information available—to produce strong, cohesive labor movements. Siam, although not badly damaged by Allied bombing, has been absorbed in achieving administrative stability amid internal political rivalries and in maintaining its sovereign status internationally. The basic reasons which prevented the prewar labor movement in Siam from evolving beyond the embryonic stage remain valid. The greatest progress has been made in Burma and Malaya, where labor movements were comparatively well delineated before the war and where subsequent conditions have combined to further their growth.

467 Nowhere in the area has a labor movement developed without politi-
668 cal implications and inspiration. Nationalism, in the embrace of so-
186 cialism or communism, has been its guiding and dominating force. Political leaders have worked upon laborers as the only have-not group in an area where the majority of the inhabitants are cultivators who possess, or aspire to possess, their own land. It is not accidental that peasant unions have been organized only in Burma, the sole country of the region where absentee and non-agriculturist landlordism has flour-
[464] ished and where there is marked ethnic homogeneity. Labor shortages exist everywhere as a result of the wartime cessation of immigration and the depletion and displacement of existing labor forces, and are aggravated by the desire of business firms to resume their export trade as quickly as possible.

These factors have placed labor in a particularly favorable position. While laborers remain on the whole almost as inarticulate and as closely identified with the mass of the population as before the war, they have acquired a new political consciousness and a sense of their own indispensability, as well as a more aggressive leadership. Everywhere their economic grievances derive from the growing disparity between increasing wages and more rapidly rising living costs and from the absence of consumer goods and adequate housing in urban areas. Their political objectives are those assigned to them by nationalist or communist leaders, who are using labor as the best spearhead available locally for the achievement of their own goals.

467 At the present time Malaya and Burma have the only labor move-
ments in the area worthy of the name. Their prewar economies differed
464 widely—Malaya's resembling that of Sumatra more than Burma—but their metropolitan power is parallel and both are committed to a pro-labor policy. They are the two countries of Southeast Asia which have

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been traditionally most dependent on imported labor and their prewar labor movements were the most highly developed of any throughout the region. 467 464

Nevertheless, the labor movements in these two countries have taken different paths. Burma is made up of one predominant race, overwhelmingly agricultural and guided by strong nationalist leadership. Development of solidarity among Malaya's laboring class has been retarded by the tripartite ethnic composition of its population and by the country's traditional dependence upon two export industries. Accordingly, Malaya's labor movement has developed schismatic tendencies bordering on mutual hostility and has been influenced by alien Asiatic leadership. While in both countries the British Government has not as yet formulated any policy toward immigrant workers and has thus played into the hands of labor, already in short supply, the effects in the two countries have been quite different. Because of Malaya's lack of a self-sufficient economy, its laborers are in a more favorable position to press their demands. At the same time they suffer from serious internal weaknesses not found in Burma. The government and private firms in Malaya—if the planting-mining economy is to survive—will have to make greater concessions in order to reconstitute an adequate labor force than will the analogous authorities in Burma and Siam.

The special composition of Malaya's population and the organization of its industries are probably responsible for the development of its labor movement from many small unions, organized by subdivisions within trades, into a central association. This pyramidal set-up has been turned upside down in Burma, where labor was at first organized on a very broad basis and then divided into smaller units. In both areas the British Government has been making a marked effort to foster labor unions and at the same time to divorce them from political programs and ideologies. But since the nationalists throughout the area have chosen the labor movement as their chief medium for the achievement of the socio-political revolution they desire, it is unlikely that this attempt will prove successful. The laborers of Southeast Asia still feel themselves to be, above all, members of their own national or ethnic communities and have only secondarily developed a consciousness of a class apart. The whole area is too little industrialized to be fertile ground for a labor movement, strictly speaking. When trade unionism is discussed in referring to the labor movements now budding in Southeast Asia, it should be borne in mind that little more than its nomenclature has been borrowed from Occidental labor organization. 467 [668] [565] [563]

Throughout Southeast Asia the various governments have begged two outstanding questions affecting local labor problems—agricultural indebtedness and land tenancy, and the control of Asiatic immigration. In regard to the former, nothing has been done thus far and one can 466 426 167

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up with the natives through the large body of Indo-Europeans and in 1908 the railway staff, comprising all three groups, formed the first trade union. Before long purely native unions were formed, at first in Government service and from 1915 in private employment. By 1918 there were over twenty unions with upwards of 70,000 members, and by 1931 106 unions with 111,344 members, including 46 nation unions with over 85,000 members. In Africa 'natives are to a great extent debarred from forming unions to protect their interests, and legislation makes it an offence for contract natives to strike or withhold their services without giving notice of the termination of their contracts'.[1] Experience has shown that some collective means for the ventilation of grievances is desirable, as otherwise they may remain unknown to the authorities until disorders break out, but it has been questioned whether trade unions can serve any useful purpose in territories where the State has assumed a full responsibility for working conditions. The answer to this question depends on the extent to which the State discharges the responsibilities that it has assumed, and, in view of the lack of special machinery to enforce protective regulations, and the general ignorance of administrative officers regarding labour questions and conditions, there would seem to be a wide field in which the organization of labour could be useful.

In the West labour disputes turn chiefly on the point of wages. It may be assumed that better wages will enhance both efficiency and welfare, and that a standard minimum wage will ensure a reasonable level of subsistence. In the tropics the rewards of labour are governed by different considerations. Low wages seem to reduce the cost of production and, until recently, have been regarded as contributing to economic progress. In Burma the Government subsidized the importation of Indian coolies with a view to bringing down the rate of wages.[2] In Java, up to the end of the nineteenth century, low wages were considered one of the chief assets of the country, and a source of its prosperity. In Africa it is only of recent years that employers have tended to question 'the traditional view of the African labourer as crude man-power, which could be suitably remunerated by a low and undifferentiated scale of pay', and the conditions of development and the free use of pressure to provide labour have resulted in artificially low rates, approximating to the amount required for the support of an unmarried man.[3] Low wages attract capital and encourage

[1] *African Survey*, p. 698. [2] *RAB*, 1882–3, p. 141.
[3] *African Survey*, pp. 696, 710; Frankel, pp. 11, 12.

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465 economic development. But experience has shown that they hinder economic progress and destroy welfare. They destroy welfare because they leave the labourer no margin for maintaining his family at home, and thereby contribute in no small measure to the disorganization of social life; they hinder economic progress because they are too low for physical efficiency and discourage the introduction of machinery. Standard minimum rates have been suggested as a remedy. In Netherlands India minimum wages were fixed for the sugar estates of Java so far back as 1898, and for the plantations in Sumatra a few years later. In Malaya standard wages were fixed in certain districts in 1927, as an indirect outcome of the rise of nationalism in India.[1] Britain and other colonial powers have accepted the Geneva Convention of 1928 for the creation of wage-fixing machinery, and in Africa some Governments have been given the necessary powers, though they have been slow to act on them.[2] Regulations can make the best of existing economic conditions, but they cannot in themselves change the conditions. In Netherlands India wage rates have usually been above the standard rates, but in Africa it would probably be difficult to sanction any minimum wage that did not involve a general rise of wages. Moreover, opinion is divided as to the probable result of higher wages. Even in Europe higher wages do not always increase production or enhance welfare. In the tropics many hold that higher wages encourage labourers to do less work, as generally happens where employment is sought merely to pay taxes. There are also complaints that men who make good money tend to waste it on whatever takes their fancy instead of spending it on their food and families. Employers are naturally reluctant to raise wages if the result is that they lose their men, and, when paying good wages, they want the men to spend the money in ways that will make them more productive workers. There is much force in the argument that high wages do little to promote either development or welfare, but are chiefly beneficial to western manufacturers importing goods, often prejudicial to native economy and social life.

Moreover, there are great practical difficulties in raising wages. Far-sighted employers, actuated by enlightened self-interest may wish to pay good wages, but they cannot risk being undercut by employers who are less scrupulous or less intelligent. Also much of the labour is seasonal or casual. No single employer has any interest in raising the wages of the coolies huddled in the coolie barracks of

[1] Mills, pp. 227–9. [2] *African Survey*, p. 695.

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Rangoon on pay that is far below the level of subsistence. The agricultural labourer is in the worst case of all, for except so far as he may be protected by custom, which soon proves ineffective, he is exposed to the full blast of economic forces, and does not even enjoy the support of European labour. These conditions are inherent in the plural character of tropical economy. As Lord Hailey notes, 'the situation presents features essentially different from those of Europe', where economic development implies that 'new centres grow into organized wholes', and imposes responsibilities on the whole community where the labourers reside.[1] In the plural society of the tropics, however, employers and employees, even though living in the same locality, inhabit different worlds with no common social life. The 'iron law' still holds, and wage levels are determined by conditions in the reservoirs from which the labour supply is drawn. In Malaya any very great increase in wages must wait upon a similar rise in the reservoirs of over-abundant and, therefore, cheap labour in India and China.[2] Conditions in Bangkok and Saigon react on the wages of rice-mill coolies in Rangoon. Similar considerations apply to unskilled labour in Africa. Local action is almost impotent to raise the scale of pay, and any attempt in that direction encounters stiff opposition.

It is much easier to improve the conditions of working than to raise wages. Not even the most acute inspector can fathom the implications of a wages bill, but anyone can see housing, hospitals and schools. Good employers may lose their men by raising wages, but they can retain them by providing food and quarters. These things attract labour and make it more docile and contented. Firms which voluntarily provide amenities with a view to increased efficiency naturally support legislation to impose similar conditions on their competitors, and, as the provision of amenities is costly, such legislation favours big business at the expense of less substantial rivals and tends to limit competition. Also capital has often been invested on the assumption that labour would continue to be available at artificially low rates, thus creating vested interests 'likely to demand measures which would, in fact, ensure a supply of labour on these terms'.[3] Such conditions are especially prevalent in urban areas, where industries depend on the existence of a supply of relatively low-priced labour. This allows employers to claim plausibly that 'the contribution which the workers make to industry and through it to the financial prosperity of the

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 709, 1199.
[2] Frankel, p. 12.
[3] Mills, p. 249.

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466 cally filtered through the barrage of Japanese propaganda, particularly a few that took place in Indochina and Burma. Most of them registered
468 grievances against low pay, high living costs, and heavy taxation, but some were doubtless of a political character—difficult to distinguish from sabotage. Following one strike in 1943, the Cochin-China police arrested a number of "communists." In Malaya and Indonesia, control by the Japanese military and naval forces was not exercised through any native administration, and the strictness of their rule seems to have precluded any possible recourse to the strike weapon.

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/For remarks on changing labor standards in Southeast Asia, see Bruno Lasker's foreword to 25: Kurihara, pp. v-viii, category 116, file OA1 Philippines.--Analyst/

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182 replaced by squat hulks that have no advantage except as cheaper means of transport. Merely for carrying paddy the modern barges are the more commodious, but they add nothing to the beauty of the river scene or to the delight of the builders and the boatmen in their work, and on any reckoning that includes such items they are worse than useless. Everywhere throughout the tropics, apart from the buildings that advertise imperial power or mercantile prosperity, the process of natural selection by the survival of the cheapest operates to strip life of its amenities and reduce it to a struggle for bare subsistence.

Not only does this process impoverish the social life of the people, it imposes restrictions on their economic activities. For another aspect of the same process is the specialization of function by the division of labour. This was favoured by Adam Smith and his disciples as a corner-stone of the wealth of nations. Liberal economists in England could rightly insist on this principle because they could take the stability of social life for granted, but in a tropical dependency this basic assumption is invalid. The development of a tropical dependency as a market for imported goods leads to the elimination of local manufactures and a corresponding contraction in the range of economic activities and of social interest in the native community. We shall return to this point later; here it requires notice as illustrating how the horizon of the native world is narrowed not only by the elimination of non-economic values, but by restrictions on the content of their economic life.

Development by Western Enterprise. If we turn now to examine the alternative method of development through western enterprise, we find that along different lines it arrives at similar results. The great distinction between development by native and by western enterprise is that, as already noticed, with the former, economic forces dissolve native society by direct action from within, whereas with the latter, though gradually permeating native society, they attack it in the first instance from without.

182 466 The primary requirement of western enterprise in the tropics is cheap labour. This can be obtained most easily through native chieftains and accordingly, except where large tracts are set aside for European settlement, indirect rule tends to prevail. Netherlands India provides the classic illustration of tropical development by western enterprise. In Java at the beginning of the nineteenth century the people were unaccustomed to work for wages and, even if they

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could have been induced to do so, the Netherlands produced nothing that they would buy. 'All wise men' were agreed that the native would not respond to the desire of gain, and that he would work only under compulsion.[1] People were none the less sincere in this belief, because it suited them to believe it. Under the Culture system the Dutch used the authority of the native chieftains to obtain labour both for public works and for export crops for the Government. Subsequently under Liberal rule compulsory labour was still used for public works (despite the protests of Liberals who wanted more labour for private enterprise), and the planters employed the native chieftains as agents for recruiting labour. But paid labour was found more efficient than compulsory labour whether on public works or private enterprise, and the people became accustomed to working for wages. In Africa development by private capitalist enterprise has followed similar lines. 'The introduction of capitalist undertakings in Africa found a population that had little incentive to improve its subsistence by wage-earning, and, since it was inexperienced in the use of money it was slow to react to the stimulus of cash inducements.'[2] Moreover, there was 'a popular belief that the "collectivist" organization of African society implied the absence of those individual ambitions in the material sphere which are the mainspring of European development'. Custom supported the use of unpaid labour for the common purposes of the tribe, and this furnished a precedent for using compulsory labour on public works 'such as the construction of railways or major roads for long distance transport which were outside the range of even an extended definition of communal labour, more especially since they at times involved the absence of labour from their homes for considerable periods'. Here there is a significant contrast with Burma, where the object of policy was trade, and therefore of development by native enterprise; compulsory labour interfered with native enterprise and was soon abolished. But in Africa, although 'the wide use of impressed labour for railway construction...led to many incidents which reflected grave discredit on the administration',[3] it did not wholly cease until railway construction came to an end with the depression of the thirties. Again, in Africa as in Java, the people were accustomed under native rule to render tribute in kind or service to the local chieftains. This interferes with the supply of labour to private enterprise, and in Java measures to restrict it were among the

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 59.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 664, 694.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 613, 615.

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earliest fruits of Liberal reforms. In Tanganyika such tribute was commuted for a tax in money in 1926.[1]

Employers, while sympathizing with humanitarian protests against compulsion to obtain labour for Government or native chieftains, are not averse from measures which provide labour for private enterprise. In Africa, as in Java, 'if there is now little use of direct pressure by government in order to secure labour for private employment, this was a marked feature of policy in the past....A complete history of this aspect of labour development would comprise the use of means so various as slavery, direct statutory compulsion, the curtailment of native lands, assistance given by administrative officials to the efforts of private recruiters, and the use of chiefs to recruit their people as labourers.' Now in Africa, as long ago in Java, it is 'generally recognized that, apart from any grounds of equity or humanity, labour done under compulsion is uneconomic';[2] yet the use of compulsory labour appears to save trouble and money, and employers are reluctant to abandon it. With compulsory labour wages tend towards the minimum of bare subsistence for a man without a family. The conditions are worst where no single employer stands to gain by healthy labour, and the death roll in the coolie barracks of Rangoon is typical of the impoverishment which naturally results from the exposure of unskilled labour to the unmitigated action of economic forces.

Even where action is taken to protect the individual labourer, the mass recruitment of unskilled labour, especially if recruited through local chieftains, naturally disintegrates native social life. 'The most characteristic results which have followed from the introduction of capitalist enterprise (are) the depopulation of certain areas or the deterioration of local subsistence conditions owing to the migration of labour, the social evils due to the removal from their families of large numbers of adult males, and the difficult situations created by the aggregation of industrial population divorced from the traditional controls of tribal life.'[3] At the same time the use of native chieftains to provide land for concessions and labour to work the concessions conflicts with native custom, and weakens the authority of the chieftains as it makes them look for support to Government instead of standing on their own feet. Then, in a later stage, when an ample supply of labour is assured and the awakening of the desire of gain

[1] *African Survey*, p. 437.
[2] *Ib.* pp. 628, 635, 636.
[3] *Ib.* p. 699.

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allows the replacement of compulsion by wages, the effect on native society and welfare is much the same as when development proceeds by private enterprise.

General Course of Development. Thus, whether the method of development be through native enterprise working for the market, or through western enterprise employing native labour, 'the disintegration of social life is an almost inevitable result of the contact of primitive peoples with European civilization'. In either case the liberation of economic forces from the moral restraint imposed by social obligations is detrimental to social and individual welfare. During the first stage there may be, and usually is, a rise in the standard of individual welfare through the removal of the abuses normally inherent in native social life. For a still longer period there is an increase in production, by the exploitation of social welfare for material ends. But, as such forces gain in strength, they tend to restrict and even to reduce production, and thus defeat the hopes of gain which set them working. Forests are laid waste and valuable lodes of ore are buried beneath surface workings. Cultivation, as in the delta of Lower Burma, aims at the maximum net outturn by the smallest number necessary to produce it, instead of at the maximum gross outturn by the largest number that the land will maintain at the customary level of social life. Human resources are wasted by under-employment or by unemployment and, as in the Congo under Leopold, so many people may be killed off that capitalist enterprise is no longer profitable or even possible.[1] Both the two great East India companies went bankrupt, and the modern chartered companies had to surrender their concessions because they could no longer pay their way. Profit, progress and welfare, are all linked together on a single chain, and economic forces, unless controlled by social will, corrode the chain that links them. Man is a social animal, but economic forces tend to convert human society into a business concern. In tropical dependencies the outward and visible sign of this is the evolution of a plural society.

4. The Plural Society[2]

All tropical dependencies, and indeed all tropical countries, so far as they have been brought within the modern world, have in common certain distinctive characters in their social structure. In Dutch

[1] Frankel, pp. 36, 37.
[2] Furnivall, *Economic Journal*, 1910, pp. 23 ff; *JRCAS*, 1942, p. 195.

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The Provision of Labour. The provision of labour by Government might seem to come under the head of economic rather than of social service. But, so long as it is necessary, it is usually regarded, not wholly without justification, as an instrument of welfare. 'To pierce the darkness shrouding entire populations in Africa', said Leopold II in 1876, 'would be a crusade worthy of this century of progress.'[1] At the beginning of the present century Chamberlain was a leading champion of this crusade. The native would not advance in civilization until he had been 'convinced of the necessity and dignity of labour'...'I think it is a good thing' he said, 'for the native to be industrious, and by every means in our power we have to teach them to work.'[2] For a quarter of a century this remained the keynote of British labour policy in the tropics. Even sympathetic officials acquiesced in compulsion, 'in the genuine belief that no advancement was possible unless the native accustomed himself to regular labour', and officers charged with a special care for native welfare have urged the educational value of compulsory labour on European enterprises.[3] It is true that, if tropical peoples are to live in the modern world, they must adapt themselves to the modern world. But it is true also that the use of compulsion to provide labour engenders abuse, and that the labour it provides is inefficient. It is pressed furthest and is most harmful where the Government has an economic interest in production, and in the Belgian Congo, as in the later days of the Culture system in Java, the use of compulsion to obtain labour defeated its own ends by killing off the supply of labourers.[4] General experience has shown that compulsion tends to reduce the labour supply and to furnish incompetent and unwilling labourers, yet employers, accustomed to obtaining labour through the State, prefer this easy though inefficient way of meeting their requirements and, long after the provision of labour has become unnecessary, continue to urge the educational value of labour as an argument for Government assistance in recruiting it. Now, however, that compulsion is no longer needed, it is condemned as generally as it was formerly supported. But the fact that, so long as compulsion was thought expedient, it was justified, like slavery, as an instrument of welfare suggests the need for cautious examination of measures now recommended on the same ground.

[1] MacDonell, J. de C., *King Leopold II* (1905), p. 184.
[2] Boulger, D. C., *The Reign of Leopold II* (1925), II, 121.
[3] *African Survey*, pp. 640ff. [4] Frankel, p. 37.

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Official activity in the provision of labour assumes various forms; it embraces compulsion, direct and indirect, the recruitment of labour by the Government or with official support, and the inclusion of a penal sanction in labour contracts. Under all these heads much may be learned from Netherlands India, where the provision of labour for development by western enterprise dates from the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Direct compulsion has been little used except to provide labour for the State. At various times compulsion has been employed to recruit men for State economic enterprise, for the army and, chiefly, for public works. Where, as in Java under the Culture system and in Africa under the chartered companies, the Government is at once sovereign and merchant, it is naturally tempted to use political control for the advancement of its economic interests, and is not too rigid in restricting compulsory labour to purely administrative purposes.[1] The Culture system in Java is the classic example of compulsion on State enterprise. Van den Bosch justified compulsion on the ground that it would instil habits of industry among the people and, by increasing production, would enable them to earn more. For a time they did in fact make more money, but within a few years a series of famines devastated the tracts that were richest in natural resources, and the people, instead of being inured to industry, acquired the habit of working only under compulsion. Moreover, the system was inefficient because the officials charged with supervising production had not sufficient knowledge either of agriculture or of the people. What killed it, however, was neither its harshness nor its inefficiency, but the growth of private enterprise, and, when private enterprise was ready to take over production, public opinion was quick to appreciate the defects of State enterprise. The system was advocated as an instrument of welfare, it was applied as an instrument of progress, and finally condemned as both pernicious to native welfare and a barrier to progress. The compulsory recruitment of tropical peoples for military service has also been found uneconomic. Only a small proportion can stand the rigour of modern army life, and the withdrawal of large numbers from the labour market conflicts with the demands of private enterprise; 'in view of the shortage of men for internal development such a utilization of man-power would have the effect of economic self-annihilation'.[2]

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1314. [2] *Ib.* pp. 627, 1121.

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Ordinarily then, the main use of compulsory labour has been on public works. Throughout the tropics it was formerly the practice under native rule to obtain such labour as might be required for the common purposes of the tribe or village, or for the chieftains or the State, by calling on the people to supply it. 'It was perhaps natural that the early administrations should see in the use of this "communal" labour an easy method by which to provide for the making of roads or for the transport necessary for official purposes. It became, indeed, the usual method of securing labour for official or public needs.'[1] In Burma and other lands developed by native enterprise, compulsory labour was soon abandoned as interfering too greatly with cultivation. But in Java, as in other countries developed by western enterprise, it has been freely employed. One limitation on its use is the difficulty of securing by compulsion the volume of labour required for large capital works. In Java paid labour was first used on the harbour and defence works in Sourabaya in 1849, when modern Liberal ideas were in the air. It was found so much more efficient and economical that, in 1851, the use of paid labour on all public buildings was enjoined, and in 1857 this order was extended to all public works. In practice, however, it was still used to some extent, especially on irrigation works. Meanwhile Liberal sentiment in favour of free labour was gathering momentum, and was reinforced by the practical consideration that the use of compulsory labour on public works reduced the supply available for the rapidly growing demands of private enterprise. Attempts to restrict labour for the State to seasons when it was not required by private employers proved unsatisfactory, and at the end of the century the system of compulsion was abolished.

Experience during the nineteenth century in Java has been repeated during the present century in Africa. The various administrations used 'communal' labour for local road construction and also needed labour for other purposes, such as the construction of railways, or major roads for long distance transport, which were outside the range of even an extended definition of communal labour, more especially since they at times involved the absence of labourers from their homes for considerable periods'.[2] Imported labour was expensive, and the more costly because so many died. Ordinarily, for the improvement of communications, the use of impressed African labour was imperative, and was justified as a moral discipline and a source

[1] *African Survey*, p. 611. [2] *Ib.* p. 613.

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of future welfare. During the present century, under Dutch rule also, compulsory labour, though no longer necessary in Java, was freely used in the Outer Provinces as part of the Ethical policy of promoting native welfare; 'without strong rule, without order and security, no ethical policy'.[1] Compulsion was indeed used so freely as to provoke disorder and unrest. Of recent years, however, throughout tropical regions in general, there has been less need for direct compulsion to procure labour for public works, and now it is generally regarded with disfavour as both prejudicial to social welfare and also uneconomic.[2]

Although direct compulsion has been used chiefly for the State, indirect compulsion has frequently been adopted as a means of providing labour for private employment. The usual methods have been by the restriction of natives to reserves and by taxation. Both these expedients tend to reduce the supply of labour. The curtailment of native land discourages the growth of population, and taxation encourages migration. There are technical difficulties in imposing differential rates of taxation and 'the effect of a rigid flat rate is to drive the taxpaying male population to industrial and urban centres, and consequently to disorganize native society to such an extent that, on several occasions, governments have felt obliged to reduce the amount to be paid by men who are without resources other than their labour'. Moreover, men who are compelled to work merely in order to pay the tax, stop work as soon as they have earned enough to pay it, and they fail therefore to acquire efficiency as labourers. Experience shows that 'the shopkeeper probably provides a far greater incentive than the tax-gatherer'.[3] Indirect compulsion tends accordingly to follow direct compulsion into desuetude.

Compulsion, direct or indirect, is however less effective in providing a supply of labour than the employment of a special recruiting agency. In this, as in other problems, Netherlands India has led the way. Labour for private enterprise may be recruited by the State, either directly or through native chieftains, or by unofficial agents, with or without State assistance. Recruitment is often distinguished from compulsion, but 'a State agency for recruitment inevitably involves some degree of pressure', and is open to many of the objections brought against other forms of compulsion.[4] From the standpoint of employers, moreover, State intervention is undesirable as

[1] Gonggrijp, cited *Netherlands India*, p. 237.
[2] *African Survey*, p. 628.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 596, 648.
[4] *Ib.* p. 651.

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464 686 Sumatra tobacco planters with the loss of a valuable market, and they announced their intention of recruiting all labour on a voluntary basis. As a moral gesture this was not very convincing since, owing to the depression, there was a surplus of labour on the estates, but it served the purpose of satisfying the customs regulations of the United States. At the same time, penal provisions were also renounced by Government in respect of the coolies, mostly Chinese, on its tin mines. Thanks to the Blaine amendment and the depression, the results attained under the Ordinance of 1931 were greater than had been contemplated and, when it came up for revision in 1936, a further advance was possible. By 1941, the penal sanction had practically disappeared, and on the revision of the Ordinance in that year it was finally abolished.[1]

In British India, where western enterprise has never been of such predominant importance as in Netherlands India, the Workman's Breach of Contract Act was repealed in 1926. But in most British territories in Africa, western enterprise is influential, and penal sanctions are attached to labour offences; though legislation of this type is less conspicuous in West Africa. The accepted view is that 'the complete disappearance of criminal penalties must await the evolution of social and economic conditions which will replace the sanctions which penalties supply'.[2] Conditions are less favourable for its abolition than in Netherlands India, but possibly a stimulus, such as that applied by the United States tariff to tobacco planters in Sumatra, might expedite the process.

466 But the abolition of the penal sanction need not, and ordinarily does not, improve the position of the labourer. Just as free recruitment needs regulation if it is not to lead to worse abuses than official recruitment, so free labour, unless protected, may be worse off than contract labour. The social and economic conditions which obviate the need for any legal sanction replace it by a more stringent economic sanction, for the legal sanction becomes unnecessary when the supply of labour is in excess of the demand. Javanese coolies working in Sumatra felt safer under a contract, even when it exposed them to penalties, than when working as free labourers. In Netherlands India it was the Blaine amendment that stimulated the tobacco planters to employ free labour, but their example was followed generally because, owing to the labour surplus resulting from the depression, employers 'were able, easily, and with a certain profit to themselves, to make

[1] *Vrij Nederland*, 22 Nov. 1941. [2] *African Survey*, pp. 659, 664.

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good any deficiency in the coolie force by hiring free labourers, in regard to whom they were much less bound with respect to wages and working conditions than they had been in the case of the indentured coolies'.[1] Women are cheaper than men, and the relation between free labour and the rate of wages is illustrated by the fact that between 1930 and 1938 the proportion of female labour among Javanese coolies rose from one-third to one-half. Thus the conditions that allow the abolition of the penal sanction create a greater need for measures to protect labour.

Protection. Compulsory labour and the penal sanction were opposed to Liberal principles, and were especially repugnant to the humanitarian idealism which gave Liberal principles a moral basis. But *laissez-faire* could not provide the necessary labour or cure the evils that Liberal principles condemned, and humanitarian protests remained ineffective until reinforced by the growing power of Labour in European politics. This gave humanitarians the support of an organized party with a practical material interest in improving the conditions of labour in the tropics, especially in occupations competing with industry in Europe. Still more convincing was the logic of facts. Changes in the social structure made the natives more dependent upon wages, and they grew better accustomed to working for western enterprise.[2] Gradually the more far-sighted employers in the tropics came to recognise 'that an improvement in the efficiency of labour offers a possibility of effecting a reduction in the numbers required, and has an important bearing on the costs of production', and they even went ahead of official activities in the care for welfare.[3] But the original impulse came from Europe. It was the Labour Party in the Netherlands that, at the beginning of the century, demanded an enquiry into conditions in Sumatra, and since 1919 the International Labour Office has taken tropical labour under its wing.

The protection of labour demands suitable regulations and adequate machinery for enforcing them. Paper costs nothing, and in this as in other matters tropical administrations tend to proliferate reforms on paper, but as we have already had occasion to observe, one must scrutinize the extent to which reforms on paper are applied in practice.[4] In Netherlands India the scandals in Sumatra led to the appointment of an Inspector of Labour for that region, and in 1908 he was charged with the supervision of recruiting and the operation of the Coolie

[1] Boeke, p. 151.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 651, 655.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 696, 1194.
[4] *Ib.* p. 649.

466 Ordinances. Meanwhile the increase of factories in Java had led in 1905 to the introduction of a Factories Act. Out of these developments there has grown up an elaborate Labour Service. It is only natural that the need for such a service should first be felt in Netherlands India, where western enterprise has been so long established. In British colonies numerous regulations bear witness to the benevolent aspirations of Government; many of them 'have a common characteristic: they avoid laying down definite standards in regard to diet, housing, or medical attendance, and leave in these matters a considerable discretion to inspecting officers', so that their effect depends on the machinery for supervision. As Lord Hailey remarks, 'the efficacy of social legislation as a whole is dependent on the technical inspectorates which are the most significant creation of modern administrative activity.' Yet 'with the exception of Kenya, inspection for the most part has been left to administrative officers' and 'experience shows that their other duties do not always permit them to exercise that close supervision which is essential when large bodies of labour are employed'; they are liable to frequent transfer and know very little of what happens on the estates and mines; and they have an inadequate acquaintance with labour problems.[1] The regulations may be suitable, but there is no machinery to enforce them. It is instructive that in this, as in other aspects of care for labour, the larger enterprises would welcome closer supervision.

467 But suitable regulations and adequate machinery are not sufficient in themselves for the protection of labour. They have been useful in the West, but chiefly through the efforts of the labourers, organized in trade unions, either by their influence on legislation or by direct action. It has been generally held that tropical labour has little capacity for organization, and employers have reckoned this a merit. In Netherlands India, however, conditions favoured the growth of trade unions. The policy of segregating the people under their own chieftains and protecting them against the impact of the West, required the importation of Europeans of humble social status and on low pay to perform tasks for which under a different policy natives might have been trained. These men brought with them their labour politics and unionism. That was probably one reason why colonial problems attracted the attention of Socialists earlier in the Netherlands than elsewhere. It was certainly the reason why trade unionism reached the native world in Java. Europeans were linked

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 678–9.

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Rangoon on pay that is far below the level of subsistence. The agricultural labourer is in the worst case of all, for except so far as he may be protected by custom, which soon proves ineffective, he is exposed to the full blast of economic forces, and does not even enjoy the support of European labour. These conditions are inherent in the plural character of tropical economy. As Lord Hailey notes, 'the situation presents features essentially different from those of Europe', where economic development implies that 'new centres grow into organized wholes', and imposes responsibilities on the whole community where the labourers reside.[1] In the plural society of the tropics, however, employers and employees, even though living in the same locality, inhabit different worlds with no common social life. The 'iron law' still holds, and wage levels are determined by conditions in the reservoirs from which the labour supply is drawn. In Malaya any very great increase in wages must wait upon a similar rise in the reservoirs of over-abundant and, therefore, cheap labour in India and China.[2] Conditions in Bangkok and Saigon react on the wages of rice-mill coolies in Rangoon. Similar considerations apply to unskilled labour in Africa. Local action is almost impotent to raise the scale of pay, and any attempt in that direction encounters stiff opposition.

It is much easier to improve the conditions of working than to raise wages. Not even the most acute inspector can fathom the implications of a wages bill, but anyone can see housing, hospitals and schools. Good employers may lose their men by raising wages, but they can retain them by providing food and quarters. These things attract labour and make it more docile and contented. Firms which voluntarily provide amenities with a view to increased efficiency naturally support legislation to impose similar conditions on their competitors, and, as the provision of amenities is costly, such legislation favours big business at the expense of less substantial rivals and tends to limit competition. Also capital has often been invested on the assumption that labour would continue to be available at artificially low rates, thus creating vested interests 'likely to demand measures which would, in fact, ensure a supply of labour on these terms'.[3] Such conditions are especially prevalent in urban areas, where industries depend on the existence of a supply of relatively low-priced labour. This allows employers to claim plausibly that 'the contribution which the workers make to industry and through it to the financial prosperity of the

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 709, 1199.
[2] Mills, p. 249.
[3] Frankel, p. 12.

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466 country, carries with it an equivalent obligation for a recognition by the community of its social obligations towards them', or, in other words, that wages should be subsidized out of public revenue.[1] Although enterprises on a large scale with great capital resources can afford to provide amenities, other firms also want healthy, intelligent and efficient labour on low pay, and welcome State assistance in supplying it. Thus there is a general demand that private enterprise shall be subsidized at the public expense, and although, according to the generally accepted theory of colonial policy, economic development must be encouraged to provide funds for welfare, yet, in practice, funds must be provided for welfare in order to encourage economic development. Thus, with a growing demand for more efficient labour, the State has passed on from providing and protecting labour to promoting the welfare of labour, especially in regard to health and education.

[1] *African Survey*, p. 711.

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In this general problem of Southeast Asia, it would be dangerous to neglect the contributing problems of labor standards and labor policies. It is true that the population is predominantly peasant, that the wage earner usually comes from and returns to his land and that wage standards must remain low so long as peasant standards of living are low. Yet with all this, a social revolution was taking place during the colonial period and will spread if the expanding population is to live. In Southeast Asia, as in the rest of the world, this will involve an exodus from the country to the town and to a certain extent, from agriculture to industry. In the country, it will involve the acceleration of the change from subsistence to cash farming, an increase of wage earning as a normal means of making a living, and the penetration of the effects of employment to villages which are as yet remote. And neglect is more than possible. Whereas under colonial rule indigenous leaders were being increasingly associated in the political functions of government, their participation in and training for the complexities of modern production were hopelessly inadequate. Now, not only are the trained technicians scanty, but it is possible that the feudal, static traditions of the countries will leave local opinion indifferent to the lot of the men and women laboring outside the established practices.

Miss Virginia Thompson's studies on labor problems in Southeast Asia are therefore not merely of value to the labor expert and the sociologist; they are of political importance. Despite the difficulties of research when many of the detailed reports were unobtainable and few persons could be consulted on practical conditions, so that some of her statements may be open to question, she has been able to present a valuable synthesis of labor laws and of the problems confronting the administrations, managements and workers in Western undertakings. She has also sketched with skill the postwar developments which appear to be of greatest significance. Whether or not the future will bring out other changes than those she indicates, it seems certain that throughout the period of settlement there will be a close connection between political peace and progress and labor peace and progress. Therefore, that she has political opinions which color her judgment on labor conditions is not a criticism. Without political opinions, any survey of the labor situation would be merely academic.

As Miss Thompson indicates, in many respects the labor policies of the colonial powers were progressive. For some time attention was confined to the regulation of plantation and mining labor, but from the late thirties the importance of a comprehensive labor policy was receiving increased recognition. It could no longer be thought that the administrations' chief responsibility was for conditions of employment on the estates and mines in respect of which they controlled the labor supply. Problems of modern employment were being tackled through minimum wage

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466 legislation, workmen's compensation and the regulation of industrial relations. In Indochina, the Popular Front Government had begun to apply by stages metropolitan French labor legislation to various groups of the workers. In the Indies, between 1940 and 1942 detailed workmen's compensation laws were adopted, the system of employment under penal sanctions was brought to an end, compulsory road labor in the Outer Provinces was abolished, and in Java the whole wage structure was being changed to provide for a general minimum wage for the lowest ranks of workers.

464 Nevertheless, as Miss Thompson states in her first essay, there remained two major labor problems. The labor supply was unsatisfactory and there was no effective labor movement.

Labor migration enabled the employers to meet their immediate need and in many cases, as between India and Malaya, was well-organized. In the circumstances of much of Southeast Asia, however, it has helped to absorb some of the surplus population rather than to improve living con-
[458] ditions. In times of economic prosperity there was more money in the villages; with the great depression the villages, more dependent on money, were poorer than ever, and those workers who kept their employment saw their wages drop almost or entirely to vanishing point. The skill of the rubber-tapper, the cigarette roller, the batik worker and of other workers in manual operations demanding delicacy of touch was considerable; the industriousness of the Chinese was even excessive; above all, peasant rice production in the wet lands was marked by the fullest use of available resources. But for modern production in industry, labor efficiency was low and in particular the availability of the skilled mechanical worker was in many areas rare and uncertain.

467 Miss Thompson shows the prewar weakness of the labor movements. In Java, the maximum number of organized workers appears to have been reached in 1941 when the membership of trade unions was estimated at 123,500. In the Philippine Islands, at the end of 1940 the total membership of the registered labor organizations was 96,877, and 190,000 workers were estimated to be organized in unregistered unions. There was little unity or continuity among the unions which existed. The Western governments feared the political interests of the labor movements. The seasonal character of much of the employment, labor migration and, in some cases, the racial diversity of the labor force, were other factors making trade union organization difficult.

000 All these problems still exist. An improved standard of living is one of the essentials for stability in Southeast Asia. Such improvement cannot be effected without economic developments, and although these developments will be hindered by labor which is cheap and inefficient, in the absence of much of the equipment of modern industry it will be long before standards of employment in Southeast Asia are comparable with

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Chinese
Indians

the indigenous peoples were not sufficiently willing, numerous, or skilled 464
to replace the immigrant laborers. A higher wage scale, they feared, 668
might compel many firms either to go out of business or to install expen- 563
sive machinery. Already local nationalists, succumbing to the philosophy 167
of economic self-sufficiency, were demanding intensive programs of gov- 468
ernment-aided industrialization. If such demands were acceded to, the
industrialists and labor leaders in the home country could be expected to
protest strongly against the new competition.

In this complex situation, the colonial governments of Southeast Asia [664]
gradually yielded to the popular demands, although loath to abandon
their traditional function as instruments of capitalist planning in the
home countries. With the exception, however, of the embryonic and
ineffective industrial programs of the Siamese and Burmese governments
and the more constructive policy of the Netherlands Indies for a planned
industrialization, none of the countries did much in this direction. None
was forced as yet to consider very seriously that change in colonial rela-
tionship which would result from general economic development in the
world and specifically from the new role that China and India would
inevitably play before long in Southeast Asia. The Japanese invasion
interrupted the efforts of local governments toward a solution of these
labor problems. It also injected new elements into the situation.

2

LABOR ORGANIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

FOR VARIOUS REASONS an organized labor movement has never developed 467
in Southeast Asia to notable dimensions. In large part this was because 575
of the predominance of alien, transient, and illiterate labor forces, di- 563
vided—even when of the same nationality—by geographical and linguistic
differences. The Indians were further subdivided by caste and religious 668
sect. The Chinese had a far better family, guild, and secret-society
organization; but the antagonisms imported as an integral part of these
organizations provoked periodic violence. Later the political and gang-
ster elements which operated within their framework impelled all the
governments throughout Southeast Asia to control them severely.

National solidarity among the immigrant labor groups was further 466
broken up by the methods of recruitment and management. Agents and 167
foremen exploited their compatriots for their own personal gain, until
the governments concerned were gradually and reluctantly forced to
intervene. Asiatic agents behaved much as recruiting agents of emi-

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Chinese Indians

466 grants to the United States did in Europe until they were checked. They consistently misrepresented to prospective recruits the conditions of work that awaited them, herded them aboard ships and in lodgings under conditions of filth and crowding, and tried to crimp their competitors' labor forces. Immigrant Asiatic foremen also were similar to their prototypes among immigrant foremen in the United States. They were notorious for the "cuts" they took from their crews' wages, for their unscrupulous profiteering from the sale of food and other necessities to the workers, and for their brutality toward those recalcitrant under arbitrary rule. Nor were alien Asiatic employers liberal in their relations with compatriots among their labor forces. Small Chinese-owned estates and mines were regularly cited in the reports of independent labor inspectors as the most delinquent in their observance of health and safety regulations. Singapore Indian shop-owners were the object of unpleasant publicity regarding the long working days, irregular and inadequate wages, and general tyranny meted out to their compatriot assistants. Disinterested labor leadership or even employer paternalism was conspicuously absent among the immigrant groups.

466 Working conditions were not much better in the enterprises owned by indigenous employers; but they were less conspicuous than those of the immigrant employer's shop, as most of the native workers are farmers scattered over the land and cared for, when in need, by the traditional village and family organization. Little was done by the native governments, whenever they were in power, to better the lot of the small native farmer-artisan. The Siamese and Burmese governments falteringly attempted to introduce scientific agriculture, to improve cottage industries and to reduce the landless proletariat; but their efforts were directed more toward ousting foreigners who preyed on the people, particularly alien landowners and moneylenders, than toward improving labor conditions of those working for indigenous employers. The Siamese National Assembly, in 1938, turned down a proposal for labor legislation designed to set maximum hours and minimum wages and to restrict child labor. Its policy on labor organization was much the same as that of the colonial governments, that is, to keep the labor forces under control and to exhibit, at most, a certain indulgence toward the formation of unions in some trades or localities where this seemed advantageous.

[563 654]

Wherever labor legislation was introduced in Southeast Asia, the initiative came from the government and not from the workers. Originally it was the difficulties which European employers experienced in retaining their workers (at first domestic servants and later plantation laborers) that inspired legislation which imposed a penalty upon employees for their non-observance of agreements. Gradually, throughout the region, this penal sanction was abolished and more beneficial types of legislation were introduced to reduce the labor turnover. Considerations of

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health and welfare induced the governments throughout the region to legislate that laborers be recruited with full knowledge of, and with a physique adequate to, the conditions of their future work; that they receive medical care and compensation for illness and injury; that certain minimum wage standards and a maximum number of working hours be maintained, either by district or by industry; that women and children be not employed in tasks beyond their strength. Everywhere labor inspectorates were created to see that the labor laws were enforced, but because of budgetary limitations they were hardly ever equal to their task. Though these were undoubtedly steps in the right direction they were far from adequate. Much of the legislation in the colonies was taken over from that of the home country or other colonies and only partially adapted to local conditions. Often it was wholly inappropriate to the area where it was applied. Even where it was at first applicable, it did not necessarily remain so, because industries and occupations changed; and invariably it covered only a fraction of the total labor force in the country. Further, inspectors usually lacked the time and the authority to see that even the few laws on the statute books were enforced. More complete, more specifically focussed, and more generally applicable labor laws were needed. 466

Having enacted measures designed to keep order and protect the laborer's physical well-being and the proceeds of his toil, the governments of the region felt that they had few additional obligations toward their wage-earning population. Conditions in Southeast Asia were sufficiently better than those prevailing in southern India and in China to attract all the labor that was needed; and this lulled the governments into believing that even if the territories under their sway had not achieved a labor millennium, there was no urgent need to do more. However, on the eve of the Pacific War, certain of the governments became more active in projecting further labor codes and reforms, long held under consideration. [185]

Although embryonic associations of workers existed in each country of Southeast Asia, they did not grow and coalesce to become important economic entities. No genuine trade-union movement had developed before the war broke out in the Pacific. Such associations as formed invariably occurred first among transport workers, since railroads, tramways and harbor operations were the first industries created in the area and since they could most easily be held up by strikes and found it most difficult to replace their workers even when there was a large surplus supply of general laborers. Moreover, the workers in them were fairly well concentrated geographically. The delayed growth of unionism in others of the larger enterprises is explained by the extremely small minority of industrial workers amid the large and unassimilable blocs of foreign laborers, and by the indifference of the governments to the formation 467

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467 of unions in industries the operation of which did not directly affect the public order.

The employers' resistance to unionization derived naturally from their 467 desire to have available an abundant supply of cheap labor. They had on their side, as an argument that must weigh heavily with the govern- 668 ments, the involvement which such organizations as existed were believed to have with subversive political parties and leaders. Commu- 468 nism was reported to be rife among the Chinese labor groups. Indian Congress emissaries were supposed to be stirring up the traditionally docile Indian coolies. The growing wave of strikes and riots which occurred during the second part of the inter-war period, particularly in the middle and late 1930's, had the effect of modifying the opposition of the employer groups. Violence or work stoppages often took place without any formulation of demands or without the workers' support of the spokesman theoretically representing their views. At least some employers therefore began to see the advantage of dealing with responsible labor leaders and of forcing any subversive elements in the workers' associations out into the open.

466 Thus in Malaya, in 1939, legislation was introduced (but not enforced until 1941) authorizing and facilitating the functioning of unions. Em- 467 ployers in Indochina, who also had long opposed unionization, moved similarly in the latter part of the decade toward a recognition of the need for it. In the Netherlands Indies, membership in unions, after a setback in the early 1930's, slowly increased, although by far the largest unions were still composed of government officials and professional men. In [563] Burma, as in Siam, unionization was impeded by the presence of a predominantly alien body of workers to whose welfare the nationals of both countries were either hostile or indifferent. Such organizations as existed survived only insofar as the governments in each country favored them as useful aids in preventing curtailment of production. Their development, however, was controlled lest they harbor elements striving to overthrow the established order.

The loss of their colonies by the Western powers and anti-colonial Japanese propaganda naturally induced a greater consciousness on their part of the existence of labor problems that must be coped with if the larger economic and social programs are to succeed. From the resolutions passed at the International Labour Organization's conference at [648] Philadelphia in 1944,[1] it appears to have been generally recognized that the colonial governments could no longer rely on paternalistic measures or the voluntary cooperation of individual employers.

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[1] Bruno Lasker, "A Labor Code for Dependent Peoples," *Far Eastern Survey*, XIII, 12, June 14, 1944, pp. 103-10.

3

LABOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION

JAPAN'S TREATMENT of labor throughout Southeast Asia varied according to the military situation, the political relations of Japan with the individual country, and the availability of manpower. Everywhere, however, labor suffered from dislocations, regimentation, and general deterioration in working conditions except for the limited amount of technical training dispensed by the Japanese to create a needed nucleus of skilled workers. The information required to draw a complete picture of the labor situation during the war in each of the countries of this region is not yet available, but from such data as exist—drawn chiefly from former enemy sources—the outlines are reasonably clear. 727 466

By mid-1943 their military position in the Pacific War led the Japanese to alter their policy in Southeast Asia. Labor in the area had not previously been regimented on a nation-wide basis, although attempts to register the available manpower and use it for individual projects had been made as the need arose. But the critical shipping situation, which prevented both exports from Southeast Asia to Japan and imports needed in those countries, of necessity changed the objective of Japanese policy from one of economic exploitation for the benefit of the homeland to maintaining Japanese troops in the area and achieving local self-sufficiency and defense.

In June 1943 new labor measures were widely introduced; these foreshadowed large-scale forced labor and indicated that the Japanese realized that patriotic as well as economic and prestige incentives had to be offered to secure native cooperation. Soon after, the transplanting of laborers from the most populous areas to those requiring workers for defense projects and economic development was systematically undertaken. This policy prevailed until V-J Day at a tempo which kept pace with the worsening military situation of Japan. [166]

Japan's political aims were reflected in marked differences in policy in each of the countries of eastern Asia, and also toward separate groups within each state. The comparatively good treatment meted out to the Siamese derived from Japan's need, for propaganda purposes, to maintain the fiction of Siam's voluntary alliance in the Greater East Asia war. Being unwilling, for political reasons, to coerce masses of Siamese workers, and for economic reasons to rely on their small, unskilled and re- 727 167 464

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727 167 464 luctant services, the Japanese imported prisoners of war and Javanese laborers for the construction of the Burma and Kra Isthmus railroads. Even after the pro-Japanese dictator, Pibul Songgram, had been ousted by a resistance government, the Japanese tolerated the change so long as they retained military and economic control over the country.

727 [464] 466 Malaya, on the other hand, received the least favored treatment. The only country in the area to which the Japanese did not promise "independence," it was earmarked as a Japanese colony. The Japanese were faced with a small, foreign labor supply whose special skills were adapted almost exclusively to the tin and rubber industries. Since they could utilize only a small proportion of the country's major produce, there occurred tremendous dislocation and unemployment of labor. The Chinese, as the largest, most skilled, and most hostile group, were subjected successively to brutal treatment, registration and regimentation, and transportation to farming colonies on the peninsula. The Indians were similarly organized along racial lines through the Japanese-sponsored Indian Independence Leagues and the Indian National Army. The Malays escaped the more rigorous forms of coercion because of their negligible importance as a source of labor.

[167] Despite the tight network of organization developed by the Japanese, Malaya's labor problem was never satisfactorily solved; guerilla ranks were strengthened by recalcitrants of all races and eventually the occupying forces had to import Japanese and Javanese workers in order to strengthen the defenses of that vitally strategic area.

727 466 Indochina, thanks to the survival of the French administration until the Japanese coup of March 1945, was treated only slightly less favorably than Siam. The Japanese found there a more abundant labor supply than in immediately neighboring countries but were hampered by the necessity of working indirectly through French officials, by the concentration of labor in the north, and its antipathy to furthering Japan's war aims. As in Malaya, the inadequacy and indifference of the local labor supply compelled the Japanese to import a few thousand Chinese and Malay coolies as well as some Japanese technicians and supervisors. A certain number of local laborers were conscripted to work on defense and industrial projects and an undetermined number of Tonkinese were transported to work on plantations in the south. Unemployment seems not to have become a major factor, although as the war progressed there was a marked shift of agricultural workers to the cities, only partially offset by the evacuation of some laborers from heavily bombed urban areas. In common with the other laborers of Southeast Asia, Indochinese workers suffered from coercion and inflation but apparently not from nation-wide regimentation or transportation to work outside their own country.

[167] [166] [464]

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Indians

Next to the Javanese, the Burmese endured the greatest hardships during the Japanese occupation. Burma was more completely devastated by military campaigns than any other country in the area, and its proximity to India made it Japan's frontier zone. The need to win Burmese cooperation led Japan to grant Burma "independence" on August 1, 1943, and thereafter the local intelligentsia were placated by a Burmanization of the administrative services. But the country's laborers were in a far worse plight than they had been under the British administration. The Indians, whose number in Burma had been halved during the 1942 campaign, were immediately thereafter exposed to persecution by the Burmese. Virtual pogrom conditions in the delta compelled them to flee to Rangoon for Japanese protection and employment. Indian coolies supplied the casual labor needed in the nation's capital, and most of the white-collar class was absorbed into the Indian Independence Leagues and Indian National Army. Burmese laborers, who had long agitated for a restriction of Indian immigration, now found themselves bearing the brunt of Japanese requisitioning, which was represented by the puppet native government as a patriotic service. They had to perform heavy manual labor far from home, for low wages, and under alien and often harsh supervision. They suffered, in addition, from the knowledge that their own fields were neglected and their homes unprotected. Burma was frequently praised by the Japanese for having supplied more cooperative labor service than any other area in the southern regions, but nevertheless Javanese workers had to be brought in. 727 563 [464] [466]

Java, with the greatest labor reservoir of the area, was inevitably the country whose manpower was most intensively exploited by the Japanese. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Javanese served as coolie labor for the construction of defense works and means of communication and also were trained by the Japanese for more technical work in shipyards and in factories. They were shipped by the thousands to areas outside their island as local needs and the exigencies of the military situation dictated. 727 466 167

Originally the Japanese planned to perpetuate, on a far vaster scale, Dutch colonization schemes in Sumatra; in this they not only encountered the same obstacles as had their predecessors, but they found they could exploit all of the island's resources they could use with the manpower and machinery locally available. In mid-1943 they seem to have transferred the plan to Borneo, where additional labor was required to develop such local industries as timber. Many hundreds of male Javanese workers were shipped to Borneo, while smaller groups were sent to other areas. 727 464 166

Unemployment during the Japanese occupation was serious only in Malaya. Elsewhere the defense and economic programs of the Japanese, 727 464

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727 together with the curtailment of alien Asiatic immigration, afforded
464 plenty of jobs for those who were willing, or were forced, to work for wages paid in inflated currency.

727 In the food-surplus countries—Burma, Siam, and Indochina—which were also those receiving the most favored political treatment at the hands of the Japanese, the areas under rice and allied crops declined.
433 The decrease in the number of draft animals through disease and Japa-
464 nese requisitioning; the lack of implements; and, above all, the loss of former export markets caused the local farmers to cultivate very little more than their families required, and there was a marked exodus from the agricultural communities to the cities or places of more remunerative employment. In the countries of food deficiency—Malaya and the Outer Islands of the East Indies—the Japanese made great efforts and probably succeeded in increasing the area under food-crop cultivation, but never to the point of self-sufficiency. The Japanese also arbitrarily prohibited certain industries as "nonessential" and shifted the workers to others accordingly.

727 Very little information is available as to the wages paid during the Japanese occupation. Where local labor was limited and native good-
465 will was sought, as in Siam, the Japanese seem to have paid high wages from the outset. In densely populated areas like Java, wages were reportedly decreased immediately after the occupation. In time, and with the ever greater need for additional labor services, the Japanese permitted successive wage rises. But nowhere did wage increases keep pace with the more rapidly rising cost of living and they had to be supplemented by allowances, medals, and words of praise. The groups that suffered most from this disparity were the Asiatic government-servant and white-collar class, whose numbers had always exceeded the demand and whose services were far less necessary to the Japanese than was manual labor.

727 Labor legislation was passed only in negative measures of regimentation and outlawing of strikes. Nevertheless, reports of strikes periodi-
466 cally filtered through the barrage of Japanese propaganda, particularly a few that took place in Indochina and Burma. Most of them registered
468 grievances against low pay, high living costs, and heavy taxation, but some were doubtless of a political character—difficult to distinguish from sabotage. Following one strike in 1943, the Cochin-China police arrested a number of "communists." In Malaya and Indonesia, control by the Japanese military and naval forces was not exercised through any native administration, and the strictness of their rule seems to have precluded any possible recourse to the strike weapon.

727 In Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia the Japanese set up a bewildering array of organizations into which the local peoples were regimented by
466 communal, occupational, religious, sex, and age groups. Not only did

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many of these organizations overlap but they were assigned multiple and often identical tasks and all were subjected to Japanese "spiritual" indoctrination. Most of their members had to undergo military training and perform labor services, ranging from accompanying the Japanese army to look after supplies to washing clothes for Nipponese officers. Most of the forced labor, however, was required for the construction of defense works and communications. Some of those performing such services—lured into "volunteering" by the promise of uniforms, additional food, and the same treatment as was accorded to Japanese soldiers—were organized into picturesquely named *Heihos* and Sweat Army battalions. While these militarized groups probably suffered more than any others, the bulk of Southeast Asia's population, wherever they were, performed hard labor for the Japanese during a large part of the occupation period. 727 466

Had Japan's gamble in far-flung imperialism not been undertaken at so rapid a tempo, and against such overwhelming forces, the occupying authorities might have evolved some means of winning over the peoples of Southeast Asia before resorting to the harsh and unlimited exploitation they did. For where the Japanese seemed sincere in their encouragement of nationalist aspirations, as for a time they appeared to be in Burma, the people were far more cooperative than they were in such areas as Malaya, which from the outset were scheduled to become colonies of Japan.

The chief victims of the Japanese were undoubtedly those who were transplanted to work in foreign lands, most of whom will never return to relate their sufferings or to keep alive hatred of the Japanese. However, the people as a whole suffered in common from the same hardships and the same demands on their services and it cannot be concluded that laborers as a class developed any special consciousness as a result of their war experience. Their hours of work were probably longer, their pay less adequate to their needs and their masters more demanding than the Occidentals whom the invasion had displaced, but their grievances and aspirations had probably come to be identified with those of their compatriots and their status as laborers was neither more nor less advanced than before the war. [467]

4

POSTWAR LABOR DEVELOPMENTS

SINCE THE JAPANESE SURRENDER, labor movements throughout Southeast Asia have made significant advances in organization, solidarity, and political self-consciousness. Their progress varies from country to coun- 467

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been traditionally most dependent on imported labor and their prewar labor movements were the most highly developed of any throughout the region. 467 464

Nevertheless, the labor movements in these two countries have taken different paths. Burma is made up of one predominant race, overwhelmingly agricultural and guided by strong nationalist leadership. Development of solidarity among Malaya's laboring class has been retarded by the tripartite ethnic composition of its population and by the country's traditional dependence upon two export industries. Accordingly, Malaya's labor movement has developed schismatic tendencies bordering on mutual hostility and has been influenced by alien Asiatic leadership. While in both countries the British Government has not as yet formulated any policy toward immigrant workers and has thus played into the hands of labor, already in short supply, the effects in the two countries have been quite different. Because of Malaya's lack of a self-sufficient economy, its laborers are in a more favorable position to press their demands. At the same time they suffer from serious internal weaknesses not found in Burma. The government and private firms in Malaya—if the planting-mining economy is to survive—will have to make greater concessions in order to reconstitute an adequate labor force than will the analogous authorities in Burma and Siam.

The special composition of Malaya's population and the organization of its industries are probably responsible for the development of its labor movement from many small unions, organized by subdivisions within trades, into a central association. This pyramidal set-up has been turned upside down in Burma, where labor was at first organized on a very broad basis and then divided into smaller units. In both areas the British Government has been making a marked effort to foster labor unions and at the same time to divorce them from political programs and ideologies. But since the nationalists throughout the area have chosen the labor movement as their chief medium for the achievement of the socio-political revolution they desire, it is unlikely that this attempt will prove successful. The laborers of Southeast Asia still feel themselves to be, above all, members of their own national or ethnic communities and have only secondarily developed a consciousness of a class apart. The whole area is too little industrialized to be fertile ground for a labor movement, strictly speaking. When trade unionism is discussed in referring to the labor movements now budding in Southeast Asia, it should be borne in mind that little more than its nomenclature has been borrowed from Occidental labor organization. 467 [668] [565] [563]

Throughout Southeast Asia the various governments have begged two outstanding questions affecting local labor problems—agricultural indebtedness and land tenancy, and the control of Asiatic immigration. In regard to the former, nothing has been done thus far and one can 466 426 167

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167 426 466 [563]

only surmise that a development of the cooperative movements will be furthered as the one policy free from international complications. As to the immigration of Indians and Chinese, the local governments seem unable to chart a course between the Scylla of indigenous nationalist sentiment and the Charybdis of demands from the governments of India and China. The latter today are in a far stronger position than before the war to insist that improved working conditions and greater political privileges be accorded to such of their nationals as they permit to emigrate to Southeast Asia.

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Any restoration of the prewar planting-mining economy will depend upon the resumption of Asiatic immigration. But management will be forced to grant better working and living conditions and possibly the governments will have to concede a more privileged political position to immigrant Indian and Chinese laborers. On the other hand, native nationalists throughout the area will try to curtail such immigration and will oppose granting political privileges to alien Asiatics who, they believe, will continue to feel a primary loyalty to their homelands. These opposing forces have already locked horns on the citizenship clause embodied in the Malayan Union plan—the first postwar attempt to ameliorate the political position of alien Asiatics—and the British Government has not yet resolved the equally important immigration issue.

433

No matter what constitutional changes emerge from the current political crisis in Southeast Asia, the governments set up throughout the area will have to face the same labor and minority problems as did their predecessors. The urge toward industrialization received an impetus from the Japanese occupation, though the synchronous growth in the industries of China and India (not to mention Japan's continuing need for export markets) will offer sharper competition to the nascent industries of the region. Moreover, shortages of labor and fuel in most of Southeast Asia cannot but curtail the expansion of even light industries and may prevent any immediate and effective way of satisfying the desire of nationalists for the establishment of large-scale and heavy industries.

[439]

The region seems destined to remain for some time predominantly a source of raw materials and a market for the industrial output of its neighbors. Before the war certain sections of these countries had entered the phase of commercialized agriculture and mining, and of processing the output—distinct advances over the traditional economies. This trend is now being accentuated, although it is influenced by such wartime developments as that of the synthetic-rubber industry. In any case the form of international organization set up to control production and sales will be different from that of the past, in which the colonial producer interests predominated. In the immediate postwar period, world shortages of the commodities produced by Southeast Asia have created a market eager for all its major output.

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466 Ordinances. Meanwhile the increase of factories in Java had led in 1905 to the introduction of a Factories Act. Out of these developments there has grown up an elaborate Labour Service. It is only natural that the need for such a service should first be felt in Netherlands India, where western enterprise has been so long established. In British colonies numerous regulations bear witness to the benevolent aspirations of Government; many of them 'have a common characteristic: they avoid laying down definite standards in regard to diet, housing, or medical attendance, and leave in these matters a considerable discretion to inspecting officers', so that their effect depends on the machinery for supervision. As Lord Hailey remarks, 'the efficacy of social legislation as a whole is dependent on the technical inspectorates which are the most significant creation of modern administrative activity.' Yet 'with the exception of Kenya, inspection for the most part has been left to administrative officers' and 'experience shows that their other duties do not always permit them to exercise that close supervision which is essential when large bodies of labour are employed'; they are liable to frequent transfer and know very little of what happens on the estates and mines; and they have an inadequate acquaintance with labour problems.[1] The regulations may be suitable, but there is no machinery to enforce them. It is instructive that in this, as in other aspects of care for labour, the larger enterprises would welcome closer supervision.

467 But suitable regulations and adequate machinery are not sufficient in themselves for the protection of labour. They have been useful in the West, but chiefly through the efforts of the labourers, organized in trade unions, either by their influence on legislation or by direct action. It has been generally held that tropical labour has little capacity for organization, and employers have reckoned this a merit. In Netherlands India, however, conditions favoured the growth of trade unions. The policy of segregating the people under their own chieftains and protecting them against the impact of the West, required the importation of Europeans of humble social status and on low pay to perform tasks for which under a different policy natives might have been trained. These men brought with them their labour politics and unionism. That was probably one reason why colonial problems attracted the attention of Socialists earlier in the Netherlands than elsewhere. It was certainly the reason why trade unionism reached the native world in Java. Europeans were linked

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 678–9.

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up with the natives through the large body of Indo-Europeans and in 1908 the railway staff, comprising all three groups, formed the first trade union. Before long purely native unions were formed, at first in Government service and from 1915 in private employment. By 1918 there were over twenty unions with upwards of 70,000 members, and by 1931 106 unions with 111,344 members, including 46 nation unions with over 85,000 members. In Africa 'natives are to a great extent debarred from forming unions to protect their interests, and legislation makes it an offence for contract natives to strike or withhold their services without giving notice of the termination of their contracts'.[1] Experience has shown that some collective means for the ventilation of grievances is desirable, as otherwise they may remain unknown to the authorities until disorders break out, but it has been questioned whether trade unions can serve any useful purpose in territories where the State has assumed a full responsibility for working conditions. The answer to this question depends on the extent to which the State discharges the responsibilities that it has assumed, and, in view of the lack of special machinery to enforce protective regulations, and the general ignorance of administrative officers regarding labour questions and conditions, there would seem to be a wide field in which the organization of labour could be useful.

In the West labour disputes turn chiefly on the point of wages. It may be assumed that better wages will enhance both efficiency and welfare, and that a standard minimum wage will ensure a reasonable level of subsistence. In the tropics the rewards of labour are governed by different considerations. Low wages seem to reduce the cost of production and, until recently, have been regarded as contributing to economic progress. In Burma the Government subsidized the importation of Indian coolies with a view to bringing down the rate of wages.[2] In Java, up to the end of the nineteenth century, low wages were considered one of the chief assets of the country, and a source of its prosperity. In Africa it is only of recent years that employers have tended to question 'the traditional view of the African labourer as crude man-power, which could be suitably remunerated by a low and undifferentiated scale of pay', and the conditions of development and the free use of pressure to provide labour have resulted in artificially low rates, approximating to the amount required for the support of an unmarried man.[3] Low wages attract capital and encourage

[1] *African Survey*, p. 698. [2] *RAB*, 1882–3, p. 141.
[3] *African Survey*, pp. 696, 710; Frankel, pp. 11, 12.

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466 legislation, workmen's compensation and the regulation of industrial relations. In Indochina, the Popular Front Government had begun to apply by stages metropolitan French labor legislation to various groups of the workers. In the Indies, between 1940 and 1942 detailed workmen's compensation laws were adopted, the system of employment under penal sanctions was brought to an end, compulsory road labor in the Outer Provinces was abolished, and in Java the whole wage structure was being changed to provide for a general minimum wage for the lowest ranks of workers.

464 Nevertheless, as Miss Thompson states in her first essay, there remained two major labor problems. The labor supply was unsatisfactory and there was no effective labor movement.

Labor migration enabled the employers to meet their immediate needs and in many cases, as between India and Malaya, was well-organized. In the circumstances of much of Southeast Asia, however, it has helped to absorb some of the surplus population rather than to improve living con-
[458] ditions. In times of economic prosperity there was more money in the villages; with the great depression the villages, more dependent on money, were poorer than ever, and those workers who kept their employment saw their wages drop almost or entirely to vanishing point. The skill of the rubber-tapper, the cigarette roller, the batik worker and of other workers in manual operations demanding delicacy of touch was considerable; the industriousness of the Chinese was even excessive; above all, peasant rice production in the wet lands was marked by the fullest use of available resources. But for modern production in industry, labor efficiency was low and in particular the availability of the skilled mechanical worker was in many areas rare and uncertain.

467 Miss Thompson shows the prewar weakness of the labor movements. In Java, the maximum number of organized workers appears to have been reached in 1941 when the membership of trade unions was estimated at 123,500. In the Philippine Islands, at the end of 1940 the total membership of the registered labor organizations was 96,877, and 190,000 workers were estimated to be organized in unregistered unions. There was little unity or continuity among the unions which existed. The Western governments feared the political interests of the labor movements. The seasonal character of much of the employment, labor migration and, in some cases, the racial diversity of the labor force, were other factors making trade union organization difficult.

000 All these problems still exist. An improved standard of living is one of the essentials for stability in Southeast Asia. Such improvement cannot be effected without economic developments, and although these developments will be hindered by labor which is cheap and inefficient, in the absence of much of the equipment of modern industry it will be long before standards of employment in Southeast Asia are comparable with

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CHAPTER I · INTRODUCTION

I

LABOR SUPPLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

464 467 TWO MAJOR LABOR PROBLEMS, which have confronted Southeast Asia in the past and which remain unsolved, are the inadequacy and irregularity of labor supply and the dearth of organized labor movements having objectives like those of Occidental labor unions.

464 Except in such overpopulated areas as Java, the Tonkin delta, and Northern Annam, labor is generally inadequate in quantity and in quality to meet the requirements of large-scale enterprise. Where numerically adequate, the labor supply is either poorly distributed in relation to areas of employment or fails to respond to opportunities offered. The industrial development of the entire area suffers from lack of full-time services of skilled laborers. Some of the factory employees form the only stable, trained groups of workers. They comprise a small proportion of the population.

[874 461] Few facilities have existed for the training of skilled workers, and the association in Oriental minds of manual labor with the humblest social classes has limited wage-labor largely to those driven by economic necessity. Handicrafts are carried on principally by agriculturists in their [476] leisure time and by other "non-professionals." Farmers form the bulk of the workers. Only during the slack agricultural season or after a disastrous harvest are they willing to perform labor for others.

464 Supplementation of the inadequate labor force has been effected in various ways—some spontaneous, others planned. The starvation conditions chronic in south China and in India have caused emigration of 167 workers to the underpopulated but richer regions of Southeast Asia, whence they usually repatriate their savings and eventually their persons to the home country. With the exception of Burma, which by reason of its geographic and administrative relations with India formed a special category, the prosperity which prevailed at times in Southeast Asia was less a factor in stimulating this flow than were conditions in the homeland.

Accelerated by the boom in plantation industries during the early

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Chinese Indians

the indigenous peoples were not sufficiently willing, numerous, or skilled 464
to replace the immigrant laborers. A higher wage scale, they feared, 668
might compel many firms either to go out of business or to install expen- 563
sive machinery. Already local nationalists, succumbing to the philosophy 167
of economic self-sufficiency, were demanding intensive programs of gov- 468
ernment-aided industrialization. If such demands were acceded to, the
industrialists and labor leaders in the home country could be expected to
protest strongly against the new competition.

In this complex situation, the colonial governments of Southeast Asia [664]
gradually yielded to the popular demands, although loath to abandon
their traditional function as instruments of capitalist planning in the
home countries. With the exception, however, of the embryonic and
ineffective industrial programs of the Siamese and Burmese governments
and the more constructive policy of the Netherlands Indies for a planned
industrialization, none of the countries did much in this direction. None
was forced as yet to consider very seriously that change in colonial rela-
tionship which would result from general economic development in the
world and specifically from the new role that China and India would
inevitably play before long in Southeast Asia. The Japanese invasion
interrupted the efforts of local governments toward a solution of these
labor problems. It also injected new elements into the situation.

2

LABOR ORGANIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

FOR VARIOUS REASONS an organized labor movement has never developed 467
in Southeast Asia to notable dimensions. In large part this was because
of the predominance of alien, transient, and illiterate labor forces, di- 575
vided—even when of the same nationality—by geographical and linguistic 563
differences. The Indians were further subdivided by caste and religious
sect. The Chinese had a far better family, guild, and secret-society 668
organization; but the antagonisms imported as an integral part of these
organizations provoked periodic violence. Later the political and gang-
ster elements which operated within their framework impelled all the
governments throughout Southeast Asia to control them severely.

National solidarity among the immigrant labor groups was further 466
broken up by the methods of recruitment and management. Agents and
foremen exploited their compatriots for their own personal gain, until 167
the governments concerned were gradually and reluctantly forced to
intervene. Asiatic agents behaved much as recruiting agents of emi-

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health and welfare induced the governments throughout the region to legislate that laborers be recruited with full knowledge of, and with a physique adequate to, the conditions of their future work; that they receive medical care and compensation for illness and injury; that certain minimum wage standards and a maximum number of working hours be maintained, either by district or by industry; that women and children be not employed in tasks beyond their strength. Everywhere labor inspectorates were created to see that the labor laws were enforced, but because of budgetary limitations they were hardly ever equal to their task. Though these were undoubtedly steps in the right direction they were far from adequate. Much of the legislation in the colonies was taken over from that of the home country or other colonies and only partially adapted to local conditions. Often it was wholly inappropriate to the area where it was applied. Even where it was at first applicable, it did not necessarily remain so, because industries and occupations changed; and invariably it covered only a fraction of the total labor force in the country. Further, inspectors usually lacked the time and the authority to see that even the few laws on the statute books were enforced. More complete, more specifically focussed, and more generally applicable labor laws were needed. 466

Having enacted measures designed to keep order and protect the laborer's physical well-being and the proceeds of his toil, the governments of the region felt that they had few additional obligations toward their wage-earning population. Conditions in Southeast Asia were sufficiently better than those prevailing in southern India and in China to attract all the labor that was needed; and this lulled the governments into believing that even if the territories under their sway had not achieved a labor millennium, there was no urgent need to do more. However, on the eve of the Pacific War, certain of the governments became more active in projecting further labor codes and reforms, long held under consideration. [185]

Although embryonic associations of workers existed in each country of Southeast Asia, they did not grow and coalesce to become important economic entities. No genuine trade-union movement had developed before the war broke out in the Pacific. Such associations as formed invariably occurred first among transport workers, since railroads, tramways and harbor operations were the first industries created in the area and since they could most easily be held up by strikes and found it most difficult to replace their workers even when there was a large surplus supply of general laborers. Moreover, the workers in them were fairly well concentrated geographically. The delayed growth of unionism in others of the larger enterprises is explained by the extremely small minority of industrial workers amid the large and unassimilable blocs of foreign laborers, and by the indifference of the governments to the formation 467

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467 of unions in industries the operation of which did not directly affect the public order.

The employers' resistance to unionization derived naturally from their 467 desire to have available an abundant supply of cheap labor. They had on their side, as an argument that must weigh heavily with the govern- 668 ments, the involvement which such organizations as existed were believed to have with subversive political parties and leaders. Commu- 468 nism was reported to be rife among the Chinese labor groups. Indian Congress emissaries were supposed to be stirring up the traditionally docile Indian coolies. The growing wave of strikes and riots which occurred during the second part of the inter-war period, particularly in the middle and late 1930's, had the effect of modifying the opposition of the employer groups. Violence or work stoppages often took place without any formulation of demands or without the workers' support of the spokesman theoretically representing their views. At least some employers therefore began to see the advantage of dealing with responsible labor leaders and of forcing any subversive elements in the workers' associations out into the open.

466 Thus in Malaya, in 1939, legislation was introduced (but not enforced until 1941) authorizing and facilitating the functioning of unions. Em- 467 ployers in Indochina, who also had long opposed unionization, moved similarly in the latter part of the decade toward a recognition of the need for it. In the Netherlands Indies, membership in unions, after a setback in the early 1930's, slowly increased, although by far the largest unions were still composed of government officials and professional men. In [563] Burma, as in Siam, unionization was impeded by the presence of a predominantly alien body of workers to whose welfare the nationals of both countries were either hostile or indifferent. Such organizations as existed survived only insofar as the governments in each country favored them as useful aids in preventing curtailment of production. Their development, however, was controlled lest they harbor elements striving to overthrow the established order.

The loss of their colonies by the Western powers and anti-colonial Japanese propaganda naturally induced a greater consciousness on their part of the existence of labor problems that must be coped with if the larger economic and social programs are to succeed. From the resolutions passed at the International Labour Organization's conference at [648] Philadelphia in 1944,[1] it appears to have been generally recognized that the colonial governments could no longer rely on paternalistic measures or the voluntary cooperation of individual employers.

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[1] Bruno Lasker, "A Labor Code for Dependent Peoples," *Far Eastern Survey*, XIII, 12, June 14, 1944, pp. 103-10.

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many of these organizations overlap but they were assigned multiple and often identical tasks and all were subjected to Japanese "spiritual" indoctrination. Most of their members had to undergo military training and perform labor services, ranging from accompanying the Japanese army to look after supplies to washing clothes for Nipponese officers. Most of the forced labor, however, was required for the construction of defense works and communications. Some of those performing such services—lured into "volunteering" by the promise of uniforms, additional food, and the same treatment as was accorded to Japanese soldiers—were organized into picturesquely named *Heihos* and Sweat Army battalions. While these militarized groups probably suffered more than any others, the bulk of Southeast Asia's population, wherever they were, performed hard labor for the Japanese during a large part of the occupation period. 727 466

Had Japan's gamble in far-flung imperialism not been undertaken at so rapid a tempo, and against such overwhelming forces, the occupying authorities might have evolved some means of winning over the peoples of Southeast Asia before resorting to the harsh and unlimited exploitation they did. For where the Japanese seemed sincere in their encouragement of nationalist aspirations, as for a time they appeared to be in Burma, the people were far more cooperative than they were in such areas as Malaya, which from the outset were scheduled to become colonies of Japan.

The chief victims of the Japanese were undoubtedly those who were transplanted to work in foreign lands, most of whom will never return to relate their sufferings or to keep alive hatred of the Japanese. However, the people as a whole suffered in common from the same hardships and the same demands on their services and it cannot be concluded that laborers as a class developed any special consciousness as a result of their war experience. Their hours of work were probably longer, their pay less adequate to their needs and their masters more demanding than the Occidentals whom the invasion had displaced, but their grievances and aspirations had probably come to be identified with those of their compatriots and their status as laborers was neither more nor less advanced than before the war. [467]

4

POSTWAR LABOR DEVELOPMENTS

SINCE THE JAPANESE SURRENDER, labor movements throughout Southeast Asia have made significant advances in organization, solidarity, and political self-consciousness. Their progress varies from country to coun- 467

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467 try, depending on the stage of development reached before the war, the quality of leadership during and after the Japanese occupation, and the degree of authority and stability achieved by the present governments.

While politics are the overwhelming preoccupation everywhere, Indochina and Indonesia have been the scenes of almost continuous warfare since V-J Day and have been unable—judging from the limited information available—to produce strong, cohesive labor movements. Siam, although not badly damaged by Allied bombing, has been absorbed in achieving administrative stability amid internal political rivalries and in maintaining its sovereign status internationally. The basic reasons which prevented the prewar labor movement in Siam from evolving beyond the embryonic stage remain valid. The greatest progress has been made in Burma and Malaya, where labor movements were comparatively well delineated before the war and where subsequent conditions have combined to further their growth.

467 Nowhere in the area has a labor movement developed without politi-
cal implications and inspiration. Nationalism, in the embrace of so-
668 cialism or communism, has been its guiding and dominating force.
Political leaders have worked upon laborers as the only have-not group
186 in an area where the majority of the inhabitants are cultivators who possess, or aspire to possess, their own land. It is not accidental that peasant unions have been organized only in Burma, the sole country of the region where absentee and non-agriculturist landlordism has flour-
[464] ished and where there is marked ethnic homogeneity. Labor shortages exist everywhere as a result of the wartime cessation of immigration and the depletion and displacement of existing labor forces, and are aggravated by the desire of business firms to resume their export trade as quickly as possible.

These factors have placed labor in a particularly favorable position. While laborers remain on the whole almost as inarticulate and as closely identified with the mass of the population as before the war, they have acquired a new political consciousness and a sense of their own indispensability, as well as a more aggressive leadership. Everywhere their economic grievances derive from the growing disparity between increasing wages and more rapidly rising living costs and from the absence of consumer goods and adequate housing in urban areas. Their political objectives are those assigned to them by nationalist or communist leaders, who are using labor as the best spearhead available locally for the achievement of their own goals.

467 At the present time Malaya and Burma have the only labor move-
ments in the area worthy of the name. Their prewar economies differed
widely—Malaya's resembling that of Sumatra more than Burma—but
464 their metropolitan power is parallel and both are committed to a pro-labor policy. They are the two countries of Southeast Asia which have

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been traditionally most dependent on imported labor and their prewar labor movements were the most highly developed of any throughout the region. 467 464

Nevertheless, the labor movements in these two countries have taken different paths. Burma is made up of one predominant race, overwhelmingly agricultural and guided by strong nationalist leadership. Development of solidarity among Malaya's laboring class has been retarded by the tripartite ethnic composition of its population and by the country's traditional dependence upon two export industries. Accordingly, Malaya's labor movement has developed schismatic tendencies bordering on mutual hostility and has been influenced by alien Asiatic leadership. While in both countries the British Government has not as yet formulated any policy toward immigrant workers and has thus played into the hands of labor, already in short supply, the effects in the two countries have been quite different. Because of Malaya's lack of a self-sufficient economy, its laborers are in a more favorable position to press their demands. At the same time they suffer from serious internal weaknesses not found in Burma. The government and private firms in Malaya—if the planting-mining economy is to survive—will have to make greater concessions in order to reconstitute an adequate labor force than will the analogous authorities in Burma and Siam.

The special composition of Malaya's population and the organization of its industries are probably responsible for the development of its labor movement from many small unions, organized by subdivisions within trades, into a central association. This pyramidal set-up has been turned upside down in Burma, where labor was at first organized on a very broad basis and then divided into smaller units. In both areas the British Government has been making a marked effort to foster labor unions and at the same time to divorce them from political programs and ideologies. But since the nationalists throughout the area have chosen the labor movement as their chief medium for the achievement of the socio-political revolution they desire, it is unlikely that this attempt will prove successful. The laborers of Southeast Asia still feel themselves to be, above all, members of their own national or ethnic communities and have only secondarily developed a consciousness of a class apart. The whole area is too little industrialized to be fertile ground for a labor movement, strictly speaking. When trade unionism is discussed in referring to the labor movements now budding in Southeast Asia, it should be borne in mind that little more than its nomenclature has been borrowed from Occidental labor organization. 467 [668] [565] [563]

Throughout Southeast Asia the various governments have begged two outstanding questions affecting local labor problems—agricultural indebtedness and land tenancy, and the control of Asiatic immigration. In regard to the former, nothing has been done thus far and one can 466 426 167

SUPPLEMENT

NOTES ON LABOR DEVELOPMENTS IN 1946–47

121 A JOURNEY UNDERTAKEN by the author between December 1946 and June 1947 to some of the principal cities of Southeast Asia had for one of its objects the collection of information on the latest developments in the region's labor conditions and labor movements. Although it proved not yet possible to secure detailed statistical data on employment, wages, and other indices for the postwar period, this investigation helped to confirm the existence of certain trends previously observed and to open up, in a few instances, new vistas of a vigorous pursuit of progress, either on the part of a government or on that of organized labor.

467 727 On the whole, the period was found to be one of great uneasiness. There was throughout the region a sense of insecurity because of the distorted structure of its major export industries. There was a sense of insecurity also in circles which, unable to accept the radical change in political and economic power that had come over large parts of the world, feared any movement which might tend to increase the political orientation of organized labor. On the other hand, there was also the natural hesitation of those seriously devoted to the promotion of progressive and liberalizing labor legislation to promote or enact measures which, with the present disturbance of social relations, it might prove difficult to enforce. Organized labor itself reflected the cleavage, to be found at this time also in industrially more advanced parts of the world, between a leadership satisfied to do the best it could within the technical limits of traditional trade union practices and one primarily thinking in political terms and desiring the most rapid possible assimilation of the local labor forces to the revolutionary international labor movement.

121 Only a few illustrations can here be given of these various tendencies as the author observed them or heard of them from authoritative spokesmen for government, labor, and professional management. These notes are offered as carrying a little further into the uncertain future the picture presented in the major part of this book. They sketch a passing phase in one of the most dramatic developments of our time: the effort of an important section of the world's workers to raise their status from an age-old level of oppression and neglect to one of worthwhile human existence.

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Chinese
Indians

464 tries. Although this was truer of the immigrant Chinese than of the
668 immigrant Indians, the comparative inertia of the latter was compen-
563 sated for by a more aggressive championship of their cause on the part of their compatriots at home. In the case of Malaya, where the indigenous population was numerically weak and psychologically passive, the Central Indian Association of Malaya and the Congress Party leaders prodded the Government of India to exert pressure upon the officials at Singapore and Kuala Lumpur to grant greater economic and political
[167] privileges to the Indians in Malaya. The governments and planters of Malaya, however, with the curtailment in their labor needs resulting from the current cut in rubber export, felt free to resist this pressure, even at the price of the embargo placed in 1938 on emigration to Malaya of assisted Indian labor.

464 In the case of the Chinese the situation was different. Smaller num-
668 bers were employed in the rubber industry and larger ones in mining. More of them were able to graduate from contract labor into other occu-
563 pations, especially retail business, farming, and small trades. They tended to stay longer because of the insecurity of enterprise in south
167 China. Moreover, the home government was in a much weaker position than that of India to exert pressure on the governments of Malaya. These remained free to regulate at their pleasure the spontaneous flow of Chinese immigrants and to keep watch on the political activities of resident Chinese. In Burma, however, the British authorities were unable to keep the situation so well in hand. Serious anti-Indian rioting broke out in 1938, and the strength of the Burman nationalists in the government (especially after separation from India in 1937) enabled it to negotiate an agreement with India restricting the number of Indian immigrants and permitting the exercise of more control over those domiciled in the country.

In Indochina and the Netherlands Indies the governments were able to keep the immigrant problem from assuming intensity because of the smaller proportion of Chinese in relation to the native populations. In all these countries, however, Chinese laborers suffered somewhat from the bad reputation of those of their countrymen who as merchants and moneylenders had acquired an economic power which differed from that of other aliens in that it affected directly and visibly the welfare of large numbers.

464 All the governments, including that of Siam, were compelled by public
668 opinion to exert more control over the immigrant minorities. In so doing, they faced unpleasant alternatives. The demand of Chinese and
563 Indian laborers for better working conditions and improved political
167 status was accompanied by a threat to cut off entirely the flow of emigra-
468 tion. Encouraged by nationalist groups, they engaged in strikes and boycotts. If these succeeded, other demands would probably be made; and

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Chinese
Indians

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The loss of their colonies by the Western powers and anti-colonial Japanese propaganda naturally induced a greater consciousness on their part of the existence of labor problems that must be coped with if the larger economic and social programs are to succeed. From the resolutions passed at the International Labour Organization's conference at [648] Philadelphia in 1944,[1] it appears to have been generally recognized that the colonial governments could no longer rely on paternalistic measures or the voluntary cooperation of individual employers.

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[1] Bruno Lasker, "A Labor Code for Dependent Peoples," *Far Eastern Survey*, XIII, 12, June 14, 1944, pp. 103-10.

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727 together with the curtailment of alien Asiatic immigration, afforded
464 plenty of jobs for those who were willing, or were forced, to work for wages paid in inflated currency.

727 In the food-surplus countries—Burma, Siam, and Indochina—which were also those receiving the most favored political treatment at the
433 hands of the Japanese, the areas under rice and allied crops declined. The decrease in the number of draft animals through disease and Japa-
464 nese requisitioning; the lack of implements; and, above all, the loss of former export markets caused the local farmers to cultivate very little more than their families required, and there was a marked exodus from the agricultural communities to the cities or places of more remunerative employment. In the countries of food deficiency—Malaya and the Outer Islands of the East Indies—the Japanese made great efforts and probably succeeded in increasing the area under food-crop cultivation, but never to the point of self-sufficiency. The Japanese also arbitrarily prohibited certain industries as "nonessential" and shifted the workers to others accordingly.

727 Very little information is available as to the wages paid during the Japanese occupation. Where local labor was limited and native good-
465 will was sought, as in Siam, the Japanese seem to have paid high wages from the outset. In densely populated areas like Java, wages were reportedly decreased immediately after the occupation. In time, and with the ever greater need for additional labor services, the Japanese permitted successive wage rises. But nowhere did wage increases keep pace with the more rapidly rising cost of living and they had to be supplemented by allowances, medals, and words of praise. The groups that suffered most from this disparity were the Asiatic government-servant and white-collar class, whose numbers had always exceeded the demand and whose services were far less necessary to the Japanese than was manual labor.

727 Labor legislation was passed only in negative measures of regimentation and outlawing of strikes. Nevertheless, reports of strikes periodi-
466 cally filtered through the barrage of Japanese propaganda, particularly a few that took place in Indochina and Burma. Most of them registered
468 grievances against low pay, high living costs, and heavy taxation, but some were doubtless of a political character—difficult to distinguish from sabotage. Following one strike in 1943, the Cochin-China police arrested a number of "communists." In Malaya and Indonesia, control by the Japanese military and naval forces was not exercised through any native administration, and the strictness of their rule seems to have precluded any possible recourse to the strike weapon.

727 In Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia the Japanese set up a bewildering array of organizations into which the local peoples were regimented by
466 communal, occupational, religious, sex, and age groups. Not only did

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
Southeast Asia AL1

man-power could be removed without significantly reducing food output. Under this circumstance, not only the productivity of agriculture but also the opportunity for urban industry to grow and flourish is hampered. A major obstacle to development of efficient manufacturing in underdeveloped countries is the small size of the market, which is in turn a consequence of the low purchasing power of the bulk of the people, most of whom get their living from the land.[21]

Southeast Asia has been characterized by its rapid growth in population. Broadly speaking, the region has been until recently one of very thin population. It seems probable that the whole of Southeast Asia in 1800 contained only about ten million people. Malaya then contained about a quarter million people, Java about four million, and Burma probably less than two million. It was, even at the end of the 18th century, a zone of labor shortage. But the last 150 years brought tremendous changes in population. It has been a period of tremendous population increases, causing people to swarm upon the more fertile areas, upon deltas and volcanic cones where people had not clustered before. By the quinquennium 1916-20, the total population of Southeast Asia had become 84 million, by 1936-40, 120 million, and by 1946-50 it was nearly 145 million.[22] This rapid population growth has been a great concern to students in economic

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21. Ibid., p. 253.

22. E. H. G. Dobby, Southeast Asia (London: University of London Press Ltd., 1951), p. 386.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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43 each of the countries in the area, which is due to the low
44 level of their real income. This small size of market has important effects on the volume of international trade, on the pattern of foreign investment, and on the use of domestic savings.

648 Because of their low level of productivity and
43 hence of low real purchasing power, the underdeveloped
44 agricultural countries play a minor part in world trade.
47 Business investment abroad has tended in the past to shy away from industries working for the domestic market in the underdeveloped areas and to concentrate instead on primary production for export to the advanced industrial centers. With special reference to Southeast Asia, most writers assign the pattern to the commercial design of the colonial powers. Nurkse, however, maintains that it does not reflect any sinister conspiracy or deliberate policy, still less any concerted attempt of the rich countries to exploit the poor. "Exploitation there may have been," he said, "but this pattern of foreign investment by itself does not constitute any proof of it. This pattern can be readily accounted for on obvious economic grounds. The explanation lies, on the one hand, in the poverty of the local consumers in the underdeveloped countries, and on the other, in the large and, in the nineteenth century, vigorously expanding markets for primary products in the world's industrial centers."[28]

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28. Ragner Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries (Oxford: A. T. Broome and Son, 1953), p. 25.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

641 The essential nature of the overseas Chinese is, however, one thing: the traits of their character brought out by subjection to differing pressures and influences are another. In particular, the larger part of the area has for a long period been under the domination of European colonial Powers which, in spite of recent developments, to a considerable degree still maintain their hold. In the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, British Borneo, and Indochina the Chinese have been subordinated to the colonial policies of Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain, France, and the United States. In Siam, the solitary country to retain independence throughout (though she, too, was moulded by pressures from the West), the Chinese immigrants contributed to the well-being of the Siamese by their services and the admixture of their blood, but it was always the native aristocracy that held the power and, since 1932, the middle-class native revolutionaries. In post-liberation Burma the Chinese are a small minority who must leave the issues to be decided amongst the Burmese parties and communities; in Indonesia they are often uncomfortably at the point of impact of the opposing forces; in Indochina their plight is much the same. In Malaya the upshot of constitutional experiment and the campaign of Communist terrorists of their own race has placed them in a dilemma.

641 Throughout most of the period of our survey it has been a tenet of the Chinese that they should leave political policy and administration to the local Government, and this remains so in principle in spite of the increasing influence of nationalism and, latterly, of Communism in their midst. The outworn, but still, until recently, serviceable dictum that 'the Chinese don't mind who holds the cow so long as they milk it' has been true of all purely mercantile communities since the dawn of history, and virtually the same remark is indeed made by Communists of capitalism—that it does not mind who governs so long as it draws the profits. But with the growth of the Chinese communities in the Nanyang and the development within them of political awareness the saying has been becoming less and less true.

471 668

641 From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century the Chinese in Southeast Asia found themselves, first in the Philippines, next in Indonesia, then in Malaya, and finally in Indochina, called upon to adapt themselves to a superstructure of government devised by completely strange and alien nations. These nations

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Chinese
China AF1

figured as lenders were practically unknown.[1] The charge of 'unconscionable usury and profiteering' is, in the writer's opinion, not proved.

Professor Raymond Firth has gone into the question of Chinese middlemen in the Malayan fishing industry with considerable care. He says that in this role the Chinese performs important functions. He shoulders a great part of the market risks; he supplies considerable capital, in a liquid form, in consumer's goods, or in producer's goods; and he saves the fishermen much trouble in seeking buyers. On the other hand the same observer adds:

> The system obviously has great dangers. It gives him a monopoly, with little prospect of the fishermen reaping the advantages of the rising market, or of even getting much more than bare subsistence earnings, and it tends very often to place them firmly in his debt, with little chance of extricating themselves and building up their own capital.

Among the Malay fishermen this relationship with the Chinese is variously viewed. One group told Professor Firth that they liked it 'because they can get hold of cash easily'. In several other places, however, the fishermen complained of the low prices they received from the Chinese to whom they were bound to sell. Up to 1939 the attempt of the administration to meet the situation by encouraging co-operative Malay associations for fish-marketing had had only a moderate success.[2]

It should be added that the provision of credit on reasonable terms for productive enterprise is finally the responsibility of the Governments. Much progress has been made in some Southeast Asian countries in the establishment of landbanks, co-operative societies, &c., in the last half-century, but these advanced money only for 'productive' purposes, and in Indonesia the people have still to go to money-lenders to obtain money for wedding, funeral,

[1] A London solicitor who was for many years in Malaya, where he had a large practice, remarked to the writer on 10 February 1949, 'I have never known a money-lending Chinese.' Nor can the writer himself, who had considerable experience as a magistrate and as official assignee and liquidator of companies, recollect any such case.

The writer, on the other hand, has known Britons (of presumed respectability) lending money to Indian chetties at a minimum of 12–15 per cent., who in turn lent it to Malays, Chinese, and others at a rate of interest that can only be guessed!

[2] *Malay Fishermen: Their Peasant Economy*, pp. 14, 61.

7: Furnivall
642, 647, 648, 471

Southeast Asia ALl

[For a theoretical discussion of the necessity for granting political autonomy to the colonial dependencies of western states and the required changes in administrative practices and economic policy, see cat. 116, pp. 468-512; for discussion of the relationship between the colonies and the colonial powers in the modern world, and the author's proposal for international collaboration in preparing the colonies for eventual independence, see pp. 513-550.]

Chapter Twenty-four

INDUSTRY AND TRADE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

39 438 25 If "industry" be taken to include all activities connected with processing, then there is more industry in Southeast Asia than appears at first glance, though not much manufacturing in mechanised factories may be found. The territory is, however, overwhelmingly agricultural and in almost every part of the region it is subsistence agriculture which employs and sustains the largest number of people. Much manual processing is done by these subsistence agriculturists on their own little farms to prepare their production for their family consumption.

Cottage Industries

286 438 472 The tradition of being self-supporting in each territory, the national counterpart of individual subsistence farming, is very strong even today, finding expression in the widespread cottage industry of weaving and in that Southeast Asia custom of making a single length of span-broad, hand-made cloth the basis of a skirt-like dress—the *sarong*, *lungyi*, *panung* and so on. Today this domestic weaving, where it has managed to persist in spite of competition from cheap imported cloths, uses imported cotton yarn, although parts of Burma still weave homegrown silk, and Siam and Indochina continue home-weaving on the basis of Indochinese silk. Only in Java has the "cottage industry" become elaborated into a village factory industry for a more intensified and commercialised production of sarongs. Ninety-two per cent of Java's *batik sarongs* (printed cotton skirts worn by men and women alike) come from factories of less than 80 workers each; this specialised process of dyeing in patterns defined by wax is now done by the small factory working upon imported cotton cloth.

285 415 The other considerable domestic industry deriving from the subsistence tradition is that of making innumerable varieties of articles from plaited palm leaves. Containers of many sorts, hats, domestic utensils, house walls, mats, fish traps and agricultural

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

Where development by western enterprise is the prime object of colonial policy, land alienation need present no problem, except as regards the lands actually taken up for western enterprise, and even debt may not be serious. Thus, in large parts of Africa, 'so far conditions have not favoured the growth of moneylending; the general restrictions imposed on the sale of native land to non-natives, as well as the limitations which some territories have placed on the giving of credit to natives by non-natives have militated against it'.[1] It is sometimes suggested in British publications that there is little indebtedness in Netherlands India. But that is a mistake. The Dutch have protected the native against the worst result of debt, the loss of land, but not against incurring debt. In the development of British India and Burma by native enterprise the merchant gave out advances to secure produce; in Java the planter gave advances to secure labour. The actual moneylender is usually a middleman, in the Tropical Far East mostly Indian or Chinese, who reaps some of the profit that would otherwise be divided between natives and Europeans, with a lion's share to the latter. In such circumstances exporters of produce have a common interest with cultivators. Moreover, as is conspicuously illustrated in Burma, the transfer of land to people whose sole interest is to exact the highest rent, tends to reduce the outturn. Thus everywhere in the Tropical Far East we find sympathy for the cultivators in the clutches of middlemen: in Indo-China 'the chetty is a plague', in the Dutch Indies 'the foreign asiatic is worse than ten epidemics', in Burma the wiles of both *chettyars* and Chinese were denounced so far back as the early eighties. Both practical and humanitarian considerations demand a solution for the problem of indebtedness.

The favourite remedy for debt is the encouragement of co-operative credit societies. But this is no cure for debt, and it may quite possibly aggravate the disease which is the chief cause of debt, the disintegration of society by economic forces. It is no cure for debt, because the success of co-operative credit requires a genuine acceptance of co-operative principles, and this is a slow process, while debt increases daily. It tends to aggravate disintegration, because the principles on which it rests are contrary to those which form the basis of native social life and, indeed, of social life in general. The suggestion that co-operative credit accords with native ideas as being communal in character is mistaken.[2] The village community embraces all the inhabitants of the village in a common bond for all the purposes

[1] *African Survey*, p. 872. [2] *Ib.* p. 1482.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

452 474 of social life; the co-operative credit society includes only selected individuals who unite for specific economic ends. If a whole village were transformed into a co-operative credit society, it would at the same time be transformed from a village into a business concern. The spread of co-operative principles is much to be desired; it would encourage thrift and train the people in modern business methods, and mark a forward step towards the reintegration of native economy, the economic aspect of their social life. But, unless the limitations of the co-operative movement are appreciated, it is apt to be perverted from an instrument of native welfare into an instrument of economic progress. Ordinarily cultivators can borrow at a lower rate from a co-operative credit society than from a middleman. This should reduce the cost of production of native crops, and increase the margin between cost and yield. But competition in the market transfers the profit from the cultivators to the firms engaged in the export of tropical produce. Co-operative societies provide an attractive investment for banks and private individuals. The elimination of the middleman removes a possible competitor to western firms, and has political reactions by hindering the growth of a politically conscious middle class. In practice the multiplication of co-operative credit machinery usually outruns the spread of co-operative principles, and the co-operative credit service, established in the cause of native welfare, serves chiefly to promote the interests of western enterprise. This is the natural outcome of confounding two distinct problems: the social problem of training the people in modern business methods, and the economic problem of providing a remedy for agricultural debt.

452 474 453 In Netherlands India this distinction has been recognized, though by accident rather than design. One aspect of the Ethical movement was an attempt to foster co-operative credit. This made slow progress. The remedy for debt is to provide the cultivator with as much credit as he requires, and no more than he requires, at the lowest rate that economic conditions allow. The co-operative movement failed to solve this economic problem because the people, though quick to borrow money, were slow to accept new ideas. The Government held the view that the chief need of the cultivators was sound credit, and the co-operative societies were accordingly transformed into State banks of various types. This has been justified on the ground that if the economic problem can be solved, it will then be possible to foster co-operative credit as a social institution. Of recent years, therefore, co-operative societies have been established

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

in addition to the State banks. How far the State banks have been successful in solving the economic problem is a matter of debate. The successful working of such banks demands a restriction on private credit. In Netherlands India this is provided in some measure by the application of native customary law to native lands, which prevents their alienation for debt to foreign moneylenders. But apparently the banks, nominally for agriculturists, find most of their clients among townsfolk; and some critics allege that the people borrow as much from private moneylenders as before, in addition to what is borrowed from the banks. It would appear then that the restrictions on private moneylending in Netherlands India are inadequate, but the banks do at least provide facilities for individuals to obtain credit on sound lines.

The State pawnshops in Netherlands India provide similar facilities for individuals, mainly townsfolk, to obtain temporary accommodation on a small scale. These also were an outcome of the Ethical movement, originating with the same man who started the early co-operative credit movement. Formerly the pawnshops were in the hands of the Chinese, who managed them merely with a view to profit. The pawnbrokers were cunning in sharp practice; the terms for loans were exorbitant, and the arrangements for the safe custody of pledges were unsatisfactory, while the shops were widely believed to be used as opium dens. All this has been changed, and the shops are not only a public benefit but yield a handsome revenue.

Both State banks and pawnshops illustrate the fact that the promotion of welfare does not necessitate the introduction of foreign capital. In fact they require practically no capital as, by beginning on a small scale, they can provide the capital for further development. All they require is a knowledge of the people and their economic situation, the will to promote their welfare and, above all, patience. They differ from co-operative credit societies mainly in three points. They appeal merely to economic motives, common to all men, whereas the co-operative movement urges social ideals easier to preach than to practise. They meet the requirements of individuals as such, whereas co-operative societies only meet the individual requirements of those who are willing to combine for common action. And in meeting individual requirements they fulfil their purpose, whereas the co-operative movement requires common *social* action for common *economic* ends which are prejudicial to common social life and thereby hinder common social action. Credit institutions, like public works,

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

453 may give the people new opportunities of improving their condition, and, if well managed, may give some protection against economic 426 forces, which public works, even irrigation works for the benefit of native enterprise, do not attempt. For the relation between 474 the co-operative movement and State credit, we may find a parallel in the relation between economic services aiming to increase collective production and those aiming to increase individual production. We have noticed that ordinarily the former fail because it is impracticable to obtain collective action by a sufficient number over a sufficient area, whereas the latter may meet with some success. Yet even individuals who take advantage of the new opportunities to produce more, ordinarily receive no lasting benefit, because they are unable to withstand the economic pressure of the environment. Co-operative credit and State credit are alike intended to strengthen them against this pressure. Experience in Netherlands India suggests that State credit has better chances of success. But it is important to appreciate the conditions of success. The State banks in Netherlands India have achieved useful results because the land policy protects cultivators against the impact of the West, and not because the banks protect them against the natural consequences of this impact. Similarly the pawnshops have been useful because the State monopoly of pawnbroking protects the people against the action of economic forces, and not merely against their natural consequences. State credit has no virtue in itself. It may, as has been charged against State banks in Netherlands India, merely increase the volume of indebtedness, and it is liable to become just an instrument of economic progress instead of helping to promote welfare. As an instrument of welfare it is of value only so far as it is accompanied by other measures in a comprehensive welfare policy.

7. Western Enterprise and Labour

423 The problems arising out of tropical development by western enterprise have a different character, and are more readily apparent and more urgent. In some cases it may lead to agrarian distress, but this is found chiefly where lands available for native occupation have been curtailed by the grant of large estates for European settlement. Such conditions present special difficulties. Formerly in Burma waste lands were granted or leased for European enterprise, but this resulted in the oppression of the natives, both on the estates and in their neighbourhood, and the concessions remained uncultivated

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

with sugar or tobacco grown under plantation management. But is the high fertility of the soil due to this crop rotation, or is it rather the result of the heavy application of commerical fertilizer and the thorough cultivation of the soil under Western management? 242 134 249

In no country of Southeastern Asia is there so great a variety or so intensive a use of commercial fertilizers as in Japan.[17] In general, the peasants of Southeastern Asia lack money for commercial fertilizers. In Indochina local phosphates are within reach of some of the Annamese, but the costs of imported fertilizers are prohibitive. In Java, although attempts to make possible the use of fertilizers through the agency of public credit institutions were successful in some special instances, not more than one per cent of the cultivated area received any commercial fertilizer in 1939. On the other hand, estimates indicate that more than 1,000,000 hectares of sawah have a phosphate deficiency and that a moderate application of phosphate would augment the yield by 25 to 50 per cent.[18] 242 [654]

The Agricultural Advisory Service was able to raise the productivity of wet-rice fields in West Java by about 10 per cent. It encouraged the peasants to use fertilizer on seedbeds, to sow rice more thinly on the beds (thus producing stronger seedlings), and to plant the seedlings in rows so that weeding could be done with a special instrument, the *landak* (Fig. 59).[1] This weeder was developed in Japan. During the years immediately preceding 1939, these improvements in West Java resulted in an increase in output of unhusked rice amounting to 300,000 quintals, or 30,000 metric tons, with a value of nearly 1,000,000 guilders. This shows that some improvements in cultivation may increase production without a great capital outlay.[19] 242 243 [412]

Java may be compared only with southern China and with Japan in the cleanness of its rice fields. The Filipino does not pay much attention to weeding. The Malayan, Thai, Cambodian, Cochinchinese, and Filipino rice farmers have more flooded riceland per capita at their disposal than the people of Java and can thus afford to cultivate their land less intensively. 243

Irrigation Problems

Peasant irrigation works usually take care of the fields of only one village or of a small group of people who have joined together for the specific purpose of building and maintaining an irrigation system. These works consequently are small and usually inadequate, but nevertheless they de- 312 [476] 243

[17] "The chief commercial fertilizers used in Japan are pressed herrings, pressed sardines, dried sardines, other fish cakes, bone meal, soybean cake, rapeseed cake, cottonseed cake, other vegetable-oil cakes, ammonium sulphate, calcium cyanamide, calcium phosphate, and potassium phosphate. Calcium phosphate and ammonium sulphate are probably the most representative chemical fertilizers."—Wickizer and Bennett: The Rice Economy, 1941, p. 252, footnote 33.

[18] Departement van Economische Zaken: Voedselproblemen, 1940, p. 28.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28.

1 [See p. 117, category 116. -- Analyst]

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

CHAPTER I · INTRODUCTION

I

LABOR SUPPLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

464 467 TWO MAJOR LABOR PROBLEMS, which have confronted Southeast Asia in the past and which remain unsolved, are the inadequacy and irregularity of labor supply and the dearth of organized labor movements having objectives like those of Occidental labor unions.

464 Except in such overpopulated areas as Java, the Tonkin delta, and Northern Annam, labor is generally inadequate in quantity and in quality to meet the requirements of large-scale enterprise. Where numerically adequate, the labor supply is either poorly distributed in relation to areas of employment or fails to respond to opportunities offered. The industrial development of the entire area suffers from lack of full-time services of skilled laborers. Some of the factory employees form the only stable, trained groups of workers. They comprise a small proportion of the population.

[874 461] Few facilities have existed for the training of skilled workers, and the association in Oriental minds of manual labor with the humblest social classes has limited wage-labor largely to those driven by economic necessity. Handicrafts are carried on principally by agriculturists in their leisure time and by other "non-professionals." Farmers form the bulk of [476] the workers. Only during the slack agricultural season or after a disastrous harvest are they willing to perform labor for others.

464 167 Supplementation of the inadequate labor force has been effected in various ways—some spontaneous, others planned. The starvation conditions chronic in south China and in India have caused emigration of workers to the underpopulated but richer regions of Southeast Asia, whence they usually repatriate their savings and eventually their persons to the home country. With the exception of Burma, which by reason of its geographic and administrative relations with India formed a special category, the prosperity which prevailed at times in Southeast Asia was less a factor in stimulating this flow than were conditions in the homeland.

Accelerated by the boom in plantation industries during the early

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
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and other expenditure demanded by custom. Moreover, the money-lenders are willing to advance money without the security demanded by landbanks and co-operative societies.

In the matter of trade monopoly it is true that in Siam, Indochina, Indonesia, and the Philippines the Chinese have a virtual monopoly of the rice distribution and milling trades. The Governments of these countries have, to meet the popular agitation, passed legislation to restrict the Chinese share in this trade. The fact that the Chinese maintains his position in face of all this legislation and in face of competition, fair or unfair, is simply because he is so much more competent in the business. Florence Horn (see p. 634) points out that the Filipino politician who charged the Chinese with having half the retail business in their hands changed his ground completely when the reply was made that all the Filipino had to do was to open up a *tienda* on his own and put the Chinese out of business. He then said that the Chinese standard of living was deplorably low, he eats almost nothing and works day and night; therefore he subjects the Filipino to unfair competition! At the same time it must be admitted that the Chinese, having obtained virtual control of some trades, do their best to keep them in their hands and usually employ only their own countrymen. This is naturally galling to the native looking for an opening, but there is a sound business reason for it. They employ their own people because they are, on the whole, better at the job. No European merchant would maintain that a firm should be compelled to employ persons of inferior business capacity, thus exposing the firm to the danger of bankruptcy.

If the Governments of Southeast Asia wish to secure a greater share of the trade of their country for their nationals, they are entitled to legislate accordingly—provided, of course, that the law does not operate harshly or unjustly by depriving an alien of one source of livelihood before he has had a chance of acquiring another. (The economic effect on a country of discriminating against aliens who discharge some useful function is another matter.)

In *Fanny's First Play* Bernard Shaw pokes fun at the critics who will not give an opinion as to the merits of the play until they know 'Who wrote it?' The inference is that such a question is an irrelevance, and that the play should be judged on its own merits. But while we have, so far, attempted to consider the charges

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

Chinese

religion was no barrier between themselves and the Chinese; all were Buddhists, though of differing sects. Chinese culture had long been admired by the peoples of Farther India, and had influenced them. Moreover, the Chinese were regarded as distant and desirable relatives. With the advent, however, of Chinese women and the accelerated growth of Chinese nationalism after the first world war, intermarriage occurred less frequently (though it continued to be common in Burma and Cambodia), and the indigenous peoples had few social contacts with the Chinese in their midst. The cleavage between the ethnic groups was further widened in the British colonies by the official policy of representation of various communities on legislative and advisory bodies. 563 609

Economically, relations between the indigenous and the immigrant peoples altered from a mosaic of non-conflicting occupations to one of rapidly increasing competition. For years the native peoples had contentedly seen the arrival of thousands of immigrants annually who were able and willing to perform the hard labor for which they themselves had neither inclination nor compulsion. Through much of the region, however, during the inter-war period an indigenous proletariat was developing as a result of the transfer of farm land from the indebted native peasantry to non-agriculturists, often to alien moneylenders, and also because of the growth of a Western-inspired individualism which was weakening family ties once paramount. The trend was apparent chiefly in parts of Burma, Siam, and Indochina. 464 477 178 425 177

This development did not assume significant proportions until the world economic depression, when considerable unemployment arose out of the drop in prices and the curtailment of foreign markets for products of Southeast Asia. The result was a swift increase in the number of natives seeking to return to their villages and, on the other hand, of those forced to seek part-time or full-time employment away from their villages in competition with immigrant laborers for work previously scorned as arduous, monotonous, and underpaid. 464 458 178

Meanwhile the native middle classes for the first time faced a serious unemployment problem. Until the depression years, the opportunities for desirable though moderately paid employment in government or business had seemed to exceed the number of qualified candidates. The depression made it clear that the saturation point had been reached, and each year an increasing number of educated youths would be thwarted in their expectation of employment or, if given a job, in their rise to higher positions. Thus two groups of economically frustrated natives developed simultaneously in numbers and in consciousness in the decade prior to the second world war. 464 178 563

Nascent political factors became significant during that period. The struggles of the Chinese against the Japanese and of Indians against British rule were reflected in the attitudes of the emigrants from those coun- 464 668

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

be confessed, to what were often sorry ghettoes. Those who settled intermarried with the native women and laid the beginnings of a new race whose culture remained Chinese. Individuals rose to positions of eminence in the native courts, and one Chinese, Peja Jummeraad, was chief justice in seventeenth-century Siam. 167

It was the arrival of the Europeans, however, which created the conditions favourable to Chinese settlement on a larger scale. The Spanish, the Dutch, and the British subdued large areas and established the security necessary for profitable trade and a bearable life. Nevertheless, friction between themselves and the ruling race in the Philippines and later in Java resulted in Chinese rebellions and the large-scale massacre of this people, showing that the security was only provisional; but they were soon back again in their old numbers as if nothing had happened. Broadly speaking, the Chinese became the middlemen, the intermediaries between the Europeans and the native peoples. Their popularity with the ruling race fluctuated according as they were valued for their services or feared for their political or economic power; the nature of their function was such as to bring them increasingly under native suspicion.

It is here that we should refer briefly to the case of the Chinese in Burma which was apart from the main course of Chinese migration—apart, that is, before the maritime arrivals of the nineteenth century. The trade route by way of the Shan States had been open at least from the time of the Mongol dynasty. The staple import from China for centuries was silk, raw and manufactured, just as the staple import from Burma into China was cotton. The study of the commerce of this route is one of the most fascinating features of this survey, for the change in the nature of the commodities about the middle of last century is a striking index to the advance of the industrial West. Before this time China was the factory of Southeast Asia, and, indeed, of countries far remote. Chinese textiles, destined in great degree for Mexico, poured into the emporium of Manila: not only manufactured silk and cotton nankeens were loaded on to pack-mules and carrying-coolies for transport over the passes of Yunnan, but also iron *quallies*, or pots, and brassware. By the second half of the nineteenth century the flow of goods changes, and it is Manchester cottons, Bradford woollens, and Birmingham pots and pans which go to China, and the flow of nankeens and *quallies* the other way has practically ceased. It is 487 000

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

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

FIG. 113.—Historic Pattern of Southeast Asia during Indian Colonial Period

implements had not in any case developed far enough to deal with stone. Hence monumental evidence in Southeast Asia is so largely Indian, an introduction by foreigners using styles and techniques developed in their home settings, and most developed in the drier parts of this region, where stone is more accessible. On the clay lands, historic brick structures, also an Indian innovation, weather to nothing very quickly. At Angkor may be seen the power of quick-growing tropical trees to shatter and break down temples and palaces built of stone and lateritic blocks.

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This, too, is a region of natural calamities, difficult though it is to pin-point them. Little kingdoms have been wiped out in a few hours by Javanese volcanoes, as in A.D. 1006 when the flourishing city of Dharmavamsa (a great king of Central Java) was reduced to ashes by "a great calamity," probably an explosion and lava outflow of the Merapi volcano. Settlements along rivers have been obliterated when huge mud-flows swept down from loose ashes on the flanks of new eruptions, possibly accounting for our ignorance of east Sumatran kingdoms. Coasts have altered through the years

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5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

133 and deltas have changed; areas which once were shallow sea have
175 become sedimented to swamps, a process by which Cambodia has been cut off as the Lower Mekong built up mud-flats isolating Tonle Sap from contact with the sea. The evolution of new routes has caused some old centres of power to fade into mere fishing villages, evidenced in the decline of Takhola and Bandon after the sea route through the Straits of Malacca became more generally

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

FIG. 114.—Historic Pattern of Southeast Asia at the Islamisation Period

175 used than that across Kra. Plagues have laid waste whole cities, as
164 when Uthong in about 1350 was devastated by cholera and its population fled. The region is still one where malaria, dysentery, cholera and plague are endemic, more especially in the older, more congested territories like Java. These diseases have frequently flared up into appalling epidemics killing thousands of people, epidemics reflecting a relation between bacteria and the climate (which encourages bacterial reproduction), the population density, the difficulties of sewage disposal and social habits of indifference to hygiene (which has no ill effects among lonely settlements in the forest but becomes a social menace in towns). Fevers and virulent diseases have frequently ravaged the local people, debilitated them, and wiped out their settlements. The region is strewn with ruins of towns now abandoned, and with ruined groups of people who have degenerated physically by disease and under-nourishment. South-east Asia proved capable of engulfing rather than enshrining those moving into it to live.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
Southeast Asia AL1

648 geography for an explanation of the relations between South-
439 east Asia and the outer world. The history of the China trade and the spice trade, Furnivall indicated, had revealed that Southeast Asia was of minor importance in each trade route, but it was significant as a byway along both routes, and it was sensitive accordingly to convulsions affecting the course of trade along either route. In Furnivall's words:

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> For China there have always been two main lines of communication with the West: the land route across central Asia, and the sea route round the coast. Throughout the ages traders have followed whichever route seemed easier. Both routes, however, are liable to interruption. The land route is exposed to wild hordes in central Asia and to the results of political catastrophes in the Middle and Near East. The sea route can easily be blocked at its main gateway, the Straits of Malacca. Yet, when both these two main routes are blocked, there is still a byway. Traffic can still find a way down the great rivers of South-east Asia -- the Irrawaddy, the Salween, the Mekong, and the Red River -- diverging when convenient to the shorter rivers, the Sittang and the Menam. Time and again these rivers, and especially the Irrawaddy, have played a part in history.
>
> For the trade in spices from the Moluccas, the Straits of Malacca are of supreme importance; there is only one main route. But this narrow channel can easily be held against outsiders. When it is blocked, however, there are two byways. One byway is through the Sunda Straits between Java and Sumatra; repeatedly throughout the course of history we find mention of Bantam under various names, and of places close to Bantam -- Jakarta or Batavia, and Benkulen. There is also a second byway, from various points along the western coast of Burma and Malaya cutting across the mainland to the Gulf of Siam or continuing further to the Mekong and Annam.[7]

Colonization, Old and New

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The search for gold following Vespasian's placing of an embargo on this precious metal from Rome during 69-79 A.D.

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7. Ibid., p. 121-22.

9: Christian F, H-3 (no date) 1941 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

ITS HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY AND DIPLOMATIC CLIMATE

John L. Christian

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AN apposite instance of the interdependence of geography and history is provided by the tense rivalry between Great Britain and France in Southeast Asia before 1910. This rivalry, which was essentially a problem in the historical geography and diplomatic climate of the times, had its origin in the astonishingly persistent belief that somewhere between the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea would be found a short route to the wealth and trade of interior China, particularly Yunnan and Szechwan.

Contemporaries regarded it as axiomatic that a Sino-French or Siamese-French war over French aggressions in Indochina would result in an Anglo-French war. Indeed, twice (in 1893 and 1896) the two countries were on the verge of battle for control of the Menam and Mekong routes to Yunnan. But geography and malaria were against the diplomats. These routes never have come into use; and the area where Burma, French Indochina, and Thailand now march in a common frontier is today one of the least-known regions of all Asia.

Largely because of the existence of close ties between the two countries since the maturing of the Entente Cordiale of 1904, it is easy to forget that they were in acrimonious rivalry in Southeast Asia for decades, particularly from 1862 to 1904, when Britain kept careful watch over French activities from Oman and Afghanistan in the Middle East to New Caledonia and the New Hebrides in the South Seas. In this instance certain historicogeographical aspects of the problem are basically more important than the usual facets of diplomacy and politics.

Beginnings of French and British Interests

Historically, French interest in the lands east of Suez began with the organization of the French East India Company, in 1604, the dispatch of the first French ships to the Orient, in 1611, and the beginnings of the French Oriental establishments, in the middle of the century. As early as 1631 the French regarded Madagascar as of particular value because of its favorable location for extending their trade to Southeast Asia.[1] By 1663 French priests were acquainted with coastal Burma, Siam, and Cambodia and in that year made their first crossing of the Malay Peninsula, near modern Tenasserim, while

[1] The Cambridge History of India, Vol. 5, British India, 1497–1858, edited by H. H. Dodwell, London, 1929, p. 62.

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en route to Siam.[2] Shortly thereafter the French, hard pressed on the mainland of India, proposed that their headquarters be moved to the Pegu coast. The French naval expedition of six ships that reached the Bay of Bengal in 1690 had as its object the establishment of commerce with Burma and Siam. In fact, the failure of the trade of the British East India Company in Burma and Siam in the seventeenth century was traced to the superiority of French influence in those states.[3]

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In the eighteenth century Dupleix was interested in Burma and Siam because of the abundance there of teakwood for shipbuilding, and he suggested to his superiors that they acquire a portion of the Burmese coast.[4] During Burma's internal strife that resulted in the establishment of the Alaungpaya dynasty in 1755, the French made the mistake of aiding the defeated Talaings, while the British aided the conquerors. As a result, Alaungpaya acquired a supply of French arms, including 1300 muskets and forty 24-pounders, together with 200 French gunners, with which Burma became the premier state in Southeast Asia. The French, meantime, evened the score by inciting the Burmese to destroy the British colony on Negrais Island.[5]

In the nineteenth century Britain sent to the native states of Southeast Asia numerous embassies that had as their primary or secondary purpose inquiry into the extent of French influence in these states. For example, the missions to Burma of Symes in 1795 and 1802 and of Canning in 1803 and 1809; that of Crawfurd in 1822 to Siam and in 1826 to Burma; that of Finlayson in 1821 and Crawfurd in 1830 to Cochinchina; and those of Captain Burney, Sir James Brooke, and Sir John Bowring to Siam in the first half of the century were all interested in British trade and French ambition.

The Indochinese Peninsula

Ever since the early merchant adventurers were forced to pass through the Strait of Malacca or the Sunda Strait to reach the China coast the great Indochinese peninsula has been of interest to Europeans, principally as an obstacle to a direct route to the Far East, as that term is generally understood. In the past century it became common knowledge among Europeans in the Orient that at one point, far above the head of navigation, the Yangtze flows within 600 miles of the northern reaches of the Bay of Bengal, whereas it is some 4300 miles by sea from Calcutta to Shanghai. It was only natural that

[2] Adrien Launay: Histoire générale de la Société des Missions-Étrangères, 3 vols., Paris, 1894; reference in Vol. 1, p. 74.

[3] D. G. E. Hall: Early English Intercourse with Burma (Rangoon Univ. Publs., No. 1), London, 1928, pp. 138–153.

[4] V. McL. Thompson: Dupleix and His Letters, New York, 1933, p. 721; and Alfred Martineau: Dupleix et l'Inde française, 1749–1754, Paris, 1927, p. 451.

[5] D. G. E. Hall: The Tragedy of Negrais, *Journ. Burma Research Soc.*, Vol. 21, 1931, pp. 1–133.

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FIG. 1

early cartographers and pioneers of commerce should assume that the most direct route to interior China would be along one of the great meridional rivers of the Indochinese peninsula to the Yangtze.[6] At one point, somewhat north of the present Burma Road, the Yangtze, Mekong, and Salween are compressed within a distance of 48 miles (separated by ridges reaching up to 8000 feet above the floor of the adjacent valley).[7] But the Irrawaddy, contrary to early beliefs, does not rise on the Tibetan plateau as do the other great meridional rivers[8]

[6] Bruno Hassenstein: Some Contributions to the Geographical and Cartographical Literature of the Indo-Chinese Frontier Territories. n. p., n. d., gives a useful list of the principal sources on the area before 1900. Reports of early British attempts to penetrate India's northeastern frontier are summarized in "Selections of Papers regarding the Hill Tracts between Assam and Burmah," 10 vols., Calcutta, 1873.

[7] For a photographic report see J. F. Rock: Through the Great River Trenches of Asia, *Natl. Geog. Mag.*, Vol. 50, 1926, pp. 133–186.

[8] A fact first noted in Sir Henry Yule: A Narrative of the Mission Sent by the Governor-General of India to the Court of Ava in 1855. London, 1858, p. 272.

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and thus occupies a unique place among the rivers of Southeast Asia, as Professor L. Dudley Stamp has recently pointed out.[9] 487 175

Geographical and historical knowledge of the area within 300 miles of the point where the frontiers of Thailand, French Indochina, and Burma now meet was extremely sketchy until the beginning of the present century. For example, Dupuis, in his study of Tongking in 1872, prepared a map that showed the Burmese possessions reaching to the Black River, within 200 miles of Hanoi, into territory concerning which King Mindon and his successor, Theebaw, had only the slightest knowledge and no jurisdiction.[10] Dupuis was perhaps willing to show extensive Burmese territory in the hope that France would inherit Mindon's holdings; but the map was later to plague the French, who, after the British annexation of Burma, in 1886, found it to their advantage to maintain that Burma had at no time extended even to the Mekong. 439 648

Garnier's Expedition

In 1858 France seized Saigon; in 1862 the Court of Hué signed a treaty that surrendered Cochinchina to France; and in 1867 Siam was forced to recognize the French as overlords of Cambodia. As a result of the treaty with Annam, Francis Garnier was appointed Inspector of Native Affairs in the new protectorate, with permission to travel on the Mekong. On June 5, 1866, the De Lagree–Garnier expedition left Saigon in the first organized European exploration of the hinterland of Indochina from the China side.[11] On April 29, 1867, the party reached Luang Prabang, a place seldom visited by Europeans since the Dutch trader Gerard van Wusthof arrived there in 1641.[12] By June the party had reached the point where Burma, Thailand, and French Indochina now meet. Garnier noted there the sale of British cotton goods in the bazaar of Kiang Sen; and De Lagree reported that tribes on the left bank of the Mekong were loyal to Siam. Both explorers observed the presence of Burmese agents with authority at the principal crossings of the Mekong. On August 23, 1867, De Lagree visited Keng Tung, in what was undoubtedly Burmese territory; and thereafter the British in Lower Burma were ever watchful of French designs on territory bordering the upper Mekong. The Frenchmen passed on to Kiang Hung town, which has been under Chinese sovereignty since the Sino-British boundary settlements and

[9] The Irrawaddy River, *Geogr. Journ.*, Vol. 95, 1940, pp. 329–356 (see note elsewhere in this number of the *Geographical Review*).

[10] J. Dupuis: L'ouverture du Fleuve Rouge au commerce et les événements du Tong-Kin, 1872–73, Paris, 1879.

[11] Hugh Clifford: Further India, London, 1904, pp. 129–254, gives a vivid account of the Garnier expedition. The basic source is Francis Garnier: Voyage d'exploration en Indo-Chine effectué pendant les années 1866, 1867 et 1868 . . . ; 2 vols. and atlas, Paris, 1873.

[12] Garnier seems to have been the first to make readily available a translation of Van Wusthof's diary. The translation, which was made for Garnier by M. P. Vœlkel, was printed, with Garnier's annotations, in the *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie*, Ser. 6, Vol. 2, 1871, pp. 249–289.

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487 treaties of 1894 and 1897, where they noted that both Burma and
175 China had agents in the court. On March 2, 1868, the party left the
439 Mekong, and they reached Talifu by a journey that took them
648 directly across the route followed by British and Burmese trade to interior Yunnan. The Moslem Sultan of Tali ordered the Garnier party away from his territory. Garnier explained the action: The Sultan has mistaken us for Englishmen. After the death of De Lagree in Yunnan young Garnier took the party out by way of Hankow, whence they traveled on to Shanghai by the American steamer *Plymouth Rock*. The Garnier expedition touched the Mekong at no point above Kiang Hung, a city to which the Britisher Captain McLeod had preceded them by thirty years. McLeod made his remarkable journey from Moulmein to Kiang Hung with six elephants and was the first European to penetrate China by the Salween route for purposes of examining trade routes.

When once it had been reported[13] that Garnier intended to "strike the Irrawaddy at Bhamo" and that he was expected also at Keng Tung and Mandalay, British interest in French activities in Southeast Asia was keen. Major General Albert Fytche, Chief Commissioner of British Burma, proceeded to Mandalay and secured Mindon's signature to a treaty that compromised Burma's independence.[14] Extraterritoriality was secured (abandoned in 1879). British agents were permitted to sit in Burmese customhouses; and Burma's power to control commerce across her territory to China was further restricted. A Resident was authorized for Mandalay, and the Irrawaddy was opened for navigation by British steamers. Captain Strover was stationed as agent in Bhamo and traveled up in November, 1868, by the first British steamer to reach that river port 40 miles from the Chinese frontier.[15] He was not, however, provided with a gunboat, as had at first been suggested; nor did Britain assume control of Burma's foreign relations, as her officers in British Burma had urged.[16]

The Sladen and Browne Expeditions

After much patient work, General Fytche in 1868 obtained permission from the King of Burma and authorization from the government of India for the dispatch of an expedition from Bhamo to Tali. Colonel E. B. Sladen, Political Agent at Mandalay, set out[17] with a group of six Europeans and a guard of 50 sepoys toward the same

[13] The London *Times*, June 7, 1868.

[14] Albert Fytche: Burma, Past and Present, 2 vols. (in 1), London, 1878. See the Anglo-Burmese treaty of Oct. 25, 1867, in *British and Foreign State Papers, 1870–71*, pp. 61 and 1303–1308.

[15] J. G. Scott, assisted by J. P. Hardiman: Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States, 2 parts in 5 vols., Rangoon, 1900–1901; reference in Part I, Vol. 1, p. 64.

[16] Alexander Bowers: Bhamo Expedition: A Report on the Practicability of Re-opening the Trade Route between Burma and Western China, Rangoon, 1869, p. 100.

[17] The official account is E. B. Sladen: Narrative of the Expedition to Explore the Trade Routes to China via Bhamo, Rangoon, 1869.

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goal as the Garnier party that had left Saigon two years before. The Sladen party reached Momein (modern Tengyueh) in September, 1868, three months after Garnier's return to Saigon. Colonel Sladen could get no farther than Tengyueh, however, because of the disturbed state of the country as a result of the Panthay rebellion.[18]

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Eventually Lord Salisbury yielded to the fears of British commercial interests that the French would entirely absorb the markets of Yunnan and neighboring provinces and sent an expedition to reopen British trade routes (1875). Colonel Horace Browne, accompanied by the geographer Ney Elias, who is remembered for his journey through Mongolia and his survey of the Yellow River, succeeded in getting farther than Manwyne, to Serai, where they learned that Augustus Margary, who had gone on ahead, had been murdered (1875).[19] Browne's party thereupon returned to Bhamo as the last official British attempt to open a direct route to interior China. As a matter of fact, the reports of Grosvenor, Baber, and Davenport, who were sent from Hankow to Yunnan in connection with the British demand for reparation over the Margary affair, convinced the home government that the topographic difficulties of the route from Bhamo to Yunnan and Szechwan were too great for practical railway construction.[20]

Government of India's Lack of Interest

British officials in Burma frequently complained of the impossibility of getting the government of India to give any attention to the northeastern frontier. That government was wholly occupied with the northwestern frontier and the danger of Russian aggression through Afghanistan and the Khyber Pass. As early as the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1816–1818 Dr. Francis Buchanan, of laterite fame,[21] had advised the East India Company against "giving the Chinese any just reason for suspicion by forming pretensions to any part of the mountainous region which separates the two Empires."[22] Lord Lawrence, the Viceroy, had advised against the Sladen expedition: "His Excellency can hardly conceive any step more imprudent than for British merchants to settle in Bhamo or a British official to be stationed there for any purpose."[23] In the short viceroyalty of Lord

[18] This disturbance hindered the British and aided the French. Captain Stroyer reported that during his first three years in Bhamo "not a single consignment belonging to British firms had reached Bhamo."

[19] The resultant British demand for compensation gave rise to the famed Chefoo Convention, a recent study of which is S. T. Wang: The Margary Affair and the Chefoo Agreement, New York, 1940.

[20] Particularly E. Colborne Baber: Travels and Researches in the Interior of China, *Royal Geogr. Soc. Suppl. Papers*, Vol. 1, 1882–1885, pp. 1–201, especially pp. 154–192, "Notes on the Route Followed by Mr. Grosvenor's Mission through Western Yünnan," reprinted from *Parliamentary Rept., China, No. 3 (1878)*.

[21] See this number of the *Geographical Review*, p. 177.

[22] Papers respecting the Nepaul War, London, 1824, p. 45.

[23] Letter from the government of India to Fytche, dated Simla, July 18, 1867, in Sladen, *op. cit.*, appendix T.

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487 175 439 648 Mayo the government of India, even at the risk of losing control over the trade routes to Yunnan, again stated its policy:[24] "The future annexation of Burma, or any of its adjacent states, is not an event which I . . . desire; . . . I should view with extreme regret . . . the necessity of occupation, or of assuming, even in a temporary manner, the government of any of the states lying adjacent to the province now in your charge." In short, the official attitude of the government of India has been summarized as follows: "The condition of the Northeastern frontier caused no Governor-General a single sleepless night."[25]

Railways Suggested

496 487 175 439 648 Meantime, British commercial interests continued to demand that the Indian government provide facilities for trade to western China in order to forestall any French plans to acquire prior advantages in Yunnan and Szechwan. The *Parliamentary Papers* alone contain nearly twenty reports on expeditions and proposals with respect to trans-Burma trade with western China and the upper Mekong from 1824 to 1900. The most persistent advocates of British penetration of Yunnan, Szechwan, and Kwangsi from the Bay of Bengal were Captain Richard Sprye and his son, who for half a century (1840–1890) presented numerous proposals for railways and highways into western Siam, to the Shan and Laos States, and to southern China.

Perhaps the best-publicized effort was that by Archibald R. Colquhoun, a deputy commissioner in British Burma, and Holt S. Hallett, a civil engineer. Colquhoun, who was ardently anti-French, resigned his office when the government of Burma refused him leave to survey a railway route from Moulmein to Szemao by way of Chiengmai in Siam. He became a special correspondent for the London *Times*, traveled overland from Canton to Bhamo, and wrote voluminously against French designs on Southeast Asia.[26] The Colquhoun-Hallett railway plan suffered from a general suspicion that it was merely a means for "taking the King of Siam by the hand and leading him into the great British Indian family."[27] Although Colquhoun's line is actually the shortest practicable route from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnanfu (Kunming), it passes through sparsely settled country that is everywhere malarial below 4000 feet. There is not today a railway line, caravan route, or highway, British or French or Siamese, that anywhere follows the Colquhoun-Hallett survey.

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[24] Fytche, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 124–125 (letter from Lord Mayo).

[25] D. G. E. Hall, edit.: The Dalhousie-Phayre Correspondence, 1852–1856, London, 1932, p. xv.

[26] A. R. Colquhoun: Across Chrysê, 2 vols., 2nd edit., London, 1883; A. R. Colquhoun and H. S. Hallett: Report on the Railway Connexion of Burmah and China, London, 1887. See also H. S. Hallett: A Thousand Miles on an Elephant in the Shan States, Edinburgh and London, 1890.

[27] Philippe Lehault: France et Angleterre en Asie, Paris, 1892, p. 362.

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British Annexation of Upper Burma

French intrigue in Upper Burma, with its consequent danger to British commercial interests, was the principal reason for the annexation of independent Burma, in 1886.[28] Jules Ferry had pledged repeatedly that no French arms should be supplied Burma through Tongking. But British suspicions were aroused upon the discovery that a Franco-Burmese agreement had been signed providing for the construction of a railway, the establishment of a Bank of Burma with French capital, control of the Burmese postal system, and establishment of a line of French steamers on the Irrawaddy.[29] The die was cast when the British learned of a secret agreement to supply arms from Tongking after the signing of the Franco-Burmese treaty of January 15, 1885.[30]

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The Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, sent a message to the senior official in Lower Burma: "If, however, the present proceedings should eventuate in any serious attempt [by the French] to forestall us in Upper Burma I should not hesitate to annex the country."[31] After the publication of a "remarkably indiscreet" report by M. de Lanessan on the progress of French activities in Burma,[32] the Secretary of State on November 11, 1886, wired the Viceroy: "Please instruct General Prendergast to advance on Mandalay at once."[33]

British occupation of Upper Burma was followed by expeditions into the various Shan States tributary to King Theebaw. In 1890 a British party under Sir George Scott reached Keng Tung. Meantime both the French and the Siamese had asserted claims to parts of the former Burmese possessions. During the Franco-Burmese negotiations of 1885 Burma purported to cede part of Kiang Hung across the Mekong to the French. The British, as heirs to Theebaw's dominions, claimed the area but later awarded Kiang Hung to China on condition that it should never be ceded to another power.[34] However, the Chinese almost immediately gave part of Kiang Hung to the French.

Further difficulty arose over the substate of Mong Hsing, a trans-Mekong territory ruled by a junior branch of the governing family of Keng Tung. In March, 1894, Mr. Stirling of the Burma

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[28] The British were fully aware of Burmese and French plans, which were reported in detail to the government of India. The Blue Book "Correspondence Relating to Burmah since the Accession of King Theebaw, in October, 1878," has 266 pages of dispatches, C. 4614 in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1886.

[29] Comte A. Mahé de la Bourdonnais: Un français en Birmanie, Paris, 1891. pp. 295–306.

[30] C. 4614 (*op. cit.*, footnote 28), No. 105.

[31] Sir Alfred Lyall: Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, 2 vols., London, 1905; reference in Vol. 2, p. 118.

[32] J. L. de Lanessan: Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée d'examiner le projet de loi portant approbation de la convention complémentaire de commerce, signée à Paris le 15 janvier 1885, entre la France et la Birmanie, Paris, 1885. Lanessan became an aggressive governor general of French Indochina (1891 to 1894).

[33] C. 4614 (*op. cit.*), No. 122.

[34] Sir Edward Hertslet: Hertslet's China Treaties, 3rd edit., revised by G. E. P. Hertslet, with the assistance of Edward Parkes, 2 vols., London, 1908; reference in Vol. 1, pp. 99–109.

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487 175 439 648 Commission visited Mong Hsing; and he was followed, on Christmas Day, 1894, by Sir George Scott and Mr. Wharry, Chinese Political Adviser to the government of Burma, in connection with the Anglo-French Mekong Commission. M. Pavie, the French commissioner, had sent the French flag to Mong Hsing before the arrival of the British party, and the sawbwa had hoisted the tricolor over his palace. Pavie, who reached Mong Hsing on New Year's Day, had intended to welcome Sir George Scott to French territory. However, Scott had the French flag lowered and ran up his own. For a few months the incident had all the possibilities of an Oriental Fashoda nearly five years before the famous incident on the Nile.[35] The London *Times* had columns about the Mong Hsing incident; and Pavie in private conversation with Scott doubted the validity of French claims to the bazaar town. On January 15, 1895, a telegraphic message from the Viceroy announced an agreement with France that set mid-channel of the Mekong as the boundary.[36] Thus Mong Hsing, which had flown the British flag and had had a British post office for a year, was acquired by France. Siam's claims were quieted by the Treaty of Chantabun, which transferred all Siamese rights east of the Mekong to France. The remainder of the subordinate state of Keng Cheng went first to Siam but was acquired by France in May, 1896. British interests with respect to the Mekong frontier suffered from frequent changes of policy: Lord Roseberry favored the buffer-state idea;[37] Lord Kimberley ordered the occupation of Mong Hsing; then Lord Salisbury, "without exception the worst Foreign Secretary we ever had for matters east of Suez,"[38] gave up the state to France. The French secured a strategic, natural frontier for their Indochinese holdings and had the "further gratification of having enlarged them beyond all expectation."[39]

Later Rivalries

Anglo-French rivalry continued in Yunnan along Burma's northern frontiers until well into the present century. Rival railway and mining claims were the most frequent causes of friction. Article XII of the Anglo-Chinese agreement of February 4, 1897, contemplated

[35] The Mong Hsing–Keng Cheng incident is treated definitively by Clarence Hendershot: The Conquest, Pacification, and Administration of the Shan States by the British, 1886–1897 (Diss., Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1936). The best French account is contained in "Mission [Auguste] Pavie Indo-Chine, 1879–1895: Géographie et Voyages," Vol. 5, Paris, 1902, pp. 264–284.

[36] "Livre Jaune: Affairs du Haute-Mekong et de Siam, 1893–1902." By Article IV of the declaration, the two governments agreed that all commercial and other advantages conceded in the two Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Szechwan either to France or to Great Britain by their respective conventions of March 1, 1894, and June 20, 1895, and future privileges should "be extended and rendered common to both powers."

[37] G. L. LaFuze: Great Britain, France, and the Siamese Question, 1885–1904 (Diss., Ph.D., Univ. of Illinois, 1935), discusses the various proposals for a buffer state.

[38] G. E. Mitton [Lady Scott], edit.: Scott of the Shan Hills, London, 1936, p. 166.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 215.

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railway construction in Yunnan and provided for connection with Burmese lines.[40] No development, however, took place and the British abandoned their surveys beyond Bhamo and Lashio. The agreement between France and China of April 10, 1898, authorized the French to construct a railway from the Tongking frontier to Yunnanfu.[41] This was carried out, but the plans for carrying the line farther were discarded. Activities of French explorers and missionaries in Yunnan along the Burma frontier were watched closely; the British in Burma were only mildly enthusiastic about the explorations of Prince Henry of Orleans from the Mekong to Assam across the top of Burma in 1895. The British were careful to open consulates in Szemao (Es-mok) and other inland treaty ports of Yunnan and Kwangsi that had little trans-Burma trade.

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Siam probably owed her independence to the desire of both her neighbors to have a buffer state between them, the British having decided that Burma was "too soft and pulpy" to serve in that capacity. As matters turned out, France got much the lion's share of territory shorn from Siam. There is not in Burma today any area that was for any length of time Siamese territory, a fact recognized by the present Thai minister to the United States, who issued a communiqué indicating that, in contrast with her present demands upon the French possessions, Thailand is entirely satisfied with her Burma frontier.[42]

British development of Singapore after 1819, introduction of steam navigation to the Orient, the opening of the Suez Canal and the American transcontinental railway in 1869 only heightened the rivalry for alternate short cuts to "the greatest market in the world." By 1882 French engineers had completed surveys of a proposed Kra canal; and on June 8, 1883, Ferdinand de Lesseps presented the completed plans to the King of Siam as "la route Français au Tonkin." That distinguished Frenchman spoke of Bangkok as "the beginning of the Menam route to Yunnan."[43]

By about 1910 the epic age of European imperialism had come to an end; and since that time there have been no considerable additions to the French and British empires east of the Red Sea. Yunnan and Kweichow, for which the rivalry was particularly acute, during the past decade were perhaps less subject to foreign influence than any other provinces of China proper. Lord Curzon (Viceroy of

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[40] J. V. A. MacMurray, edit.: Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China 1894–1919 (Publs. Carnegie Endowment for Internatl. Peace, Division of Internatl. Law, Washington), 2 vols., New York, 1921; reference in Vol. 1, pp. 96–97.

[41] *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 124.

[42] *The New York Times*, Oct. 6, 1940. Britain took compensation in the Malay states of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perak, which had been under loose Siamese protection before their cession to Britain in 1909.

[43] La Bourdonnais, *op. cit.*, pp. 232–241 and 265–284, discusses French interest in a Kra canal and contains a copy of De Lesseps' report.

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India from 1898 to 1905), for whom frontiers and imperialism in the grand manner had great fascination, forced the Iman of Muscat to renounce the lease of a coaling site to France,[44] saw the Hague Court decide in Britain's favor in 1905 the question of the grant of the French flag to Muscat dhows, carried on an intimate correspondence with King Chualalongkorn of Siam, and considered that country an outpost of the British Empire.[45] From the Olympian heights of Simla Lord Curzon took pride in Britannia's supremacy in Southeast Asia. The Indian Ocean was a British preserve: "At no point in the long stretches of British territory washed by its surf has the flag of any European rival ever been hoisted since the French colours were struck over Cuddalore in 1783."[46] Curzon dreamed of a grand trunk railway from Calais to Shanghai by way of British India and sent Major Davies to do the necessary survey work in Yunnan.[47] He believed mistakenly that India and China, the two most populous countries in the world, would in his time be joined by steel rails.

The great delusion that the Irrawaddy, the Salween, the Menam, or the Mekong would provide the entrepôt to interior China was the key to Anglo-French policy and rivalry in Southeast Asia for a century. The delusion died hard. Eventually, however, "loath as most Englishmen are to admit it," trade decided that none of these river valleys provided an economical entrance to China.[48] Likewise, it was at length realized that Indochina was not the path of empire. Both Britishers and Frenchmen, learning lessons from geography and history, agreed with Sir Henry Yule: At no time has a conqueror from India or Burma passed on to China, nor (with one minor exception) from China to India or Burma; nor did the conquests of any one of the great warriors of medieval Asia embrace any part of both countries.[49]

But the delusion was so persistent and complete that it amounted to a perfect case of mistaken identity. Meantime, "England annexed areas where she had interests to protect, France annexed areas where she *wished* to have interests to protect."[50]

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[44] Lovat Fraser: India under Curzon and After, New York, 1911, pp. 86–91, gives a convenient summary of French attempts to secure a base at the mouth of the Persian Gulf.

[45] Curzon wrote a brilliant defense of Britain's record in Siam (G. N. Curzon: The Siamese Boundary Question, *The Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 34, 1893, pp. 34–55).

[46] G. A. Ballard: Rulers of the Indian Ocean, London, 1927, p. 287.

[47] H. R. Davies: Yün-nan: The Link between India and the Yangtze, Cambridge, 1909. Davies urged construction, for political reasons, of a meter-gauge line from Burma to China at a cost of £20,000,000.

[48] Clifford (quoting Colborne Baber), *op. cit.*, p. 294. A governor general of French Indochina came to the same conclusion. "French Indochina cannot be considered as a country of commercial transit. Saigon can never compete with Singapore" (J. L. de Lanessan: L'Indo-Chine Française, Paris, 1889, p. 478).

[49] Yule's introduction to William Gill: The River of Golden Sand, 2 vols., London, 1880

[50] E. V. G. Kiernan: British Diplomacy in China, 1880–1885, London, 1939, p. 187.

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175 thus set a new stage -- the development of the natural
177 resources of the whole region.
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439 This change-over from a subsistence economy to a
648 commercial economy involved the large-scale expansion of traditional crops or the development of new commercial crops.
[436] It was stimulated by the introduction or expansion of a money
[489] economy, the flow of capital and the development of land and
[69] sea transport. It was supported by Western technology, methods of administration and systems of justice. This whole process greatly affected the traditional institution, up-
175 setting the balance of a medieval world. The free, indi-
177 vidualist spirit of Western rule and commerce cut at the
[59] roots of traditional social life, undermining the corporate
[423] strength of family and village. But the most serious direct
[426] threat of the new economic forces was to the peasant's owner-
[566] ship of land. Expanding economies, new money taxes and cheap imports meant better business than ever for the money lender. Many peasants became ruined by debt and lost their lands. Indebtedness and debt slavery were not new in Southeast Asia; the latter was fairly soon stamped out, but the former now became much more widespread than before, resulting in the creation of a landless proletariat.[16]

184 Characteristics of Current Southeast Asian Economy

In spite of all the differences among the countries of Southeast Asia in the natural environment, ethnic

16. Harrison, op. cit., p. 210.

9: Christian F, H-3 (no date) 1941 All Southeast Asia All

487 Mayo the government of India, even at the risk of losing control over
175 the trade routes to Yunnan, again stated its policy:[24] "The future
annexation of Burma, or any of its adjacent states, is not an event
439 which I . . . desire; . . . I should view with extreme regret . . .
648 the necessity of occupation, or of assuming, even in a temporary manner, the government of any of the states lying adjacent to the province now in your charge." In short, the official attitude of the government of India has been summarized as follows: "The condition of the Northeastern frontier caused no Governor-General a single sleepless night."[25]

Railways Suggested

496 Meantime, British commercial interests continued to demand
487 that the Indian government provide facilities for trade to western
China in order to forestall any French plans to acquire prior advan-
175 tages in Yunnan and Szechwan. The *Parliamentary Papers* alone
439 contain nearly twenty reports on expeditions and proposals with
648 respect to trans-Burma trade with western China and the upper Mekong from 1824 to 1900. The most persistent advocates of British penetration of Yunnan, Szechwan, and Kwangsi from the Bay of Bengal were Captain Richard Sprye and his son, who for half a century (1840–1890) presented numerous proposals for railways and highways into western Siam, to the Shan and Laos States, and to southern China.

Perhaps the best-publicized effort was that by Archibald R. Colquhoun, a deputy commissioner in British Burma, and Holt S. Hallett, a civil engineer. Colquhoun, who was ardently anti-French, resigned his office when the government of Burma refused him leave to survey a railway route from Moulmein to Szemao by way of Chiengmai in Siam. He became a special correspondent for the London *Times*, traveled overland from Canton to Bhamo, and wrote voluminously against French designs on Southeast Asia.[26] The Colquhoun-Hallett railway plan suffered from a general suspicion that it was merely a means for "taking the King of Siam by the hand and leading him into the great British Indian family."[27] Although Colquhoun's line is actually the shortest practicable route from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnanfu (Kunming), it passes through sparsely settled country that is everywhere malarial below 4000 feet. There is not today a railway line, caravan route, or highway, British or French or Siamese, that anywhere follows the Colquhoun-Hallett survey.

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[24] Fytche, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 124–125 (letter from Lord Mayo).

[25] D. G. E. Hall, edit.: The Dalhousie-Phayre Correspondence, 1852–1856, London, 1932, p. xv.

[26] A. R. Colquhoun: Across Chryse, 2 vols., 2nd edit., London, 1883; A. R. Colquhoun and H. S. Hallett: Report on the Railway Connexion of Burmah and China, London, 1887. See also H. S. Hallett: A Thousand Miles on an Elephant in the Shan States, Edinburgh and London, 1890.

[27] Philippe Lehault: France et Angleterre en Asie, Paris, 1892, p. 562.

16: Fryer K-3 (no date)1953 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

361 it did not arise on a previous settlement. The modern development of the Malay Peninsula could not have been imagined by Raffles in 1819; he intended that his city should achieve pre-eminence by its policy of free trade, which would attract the Chinese entrepôt trade from Batavia. The site selected lay on the south coast of Singapore Island, where the mangrove-lined Singapore River discharged into the sea. Here was situated what was probably the best anchorage in the days of sail; for the roads between Tanjong Rhu and Tanjong Pagar gave good protection from all but southeast winds, and the force of these was broken by islands to the south.

The Old Towns

361 The great cities were developed on a plan, rather than allowed to grow
503 haphazardly, but it is hardly surprising that technological and sociological changes have defeated the aims of the early planners. The old towns represented the transplanting of the city forms of contemporary Europe to Southeast Asia. The walled city of Intramuros, the older section of Manila, was a replica of the fortified town of sixteenth-century Europe, as was the earlier Portuguese Malacca. Batavia was likewise a fortified city, but the low terrain and abundant water encouraged the Dutch to copy the characteristic features of the cities of Holland. Thus old Batavia, the *Benedenstad*, was constructed on both sides of the Tjiliwong, and canals on a rectangular pattern were excavated.

Nearness to water, yet with freedom from flooding, was the essential requirement of all the cities, but seasonal variations in precipitation and periodic torrential downpours continue from time to time to defeat even modern techniques of civil engineering. The Batavian canals were only partly successful: in the wet seasons they flooded, and in dry periods they degenerated into a "dismal succession of filthy bogs and stagnant pools."[5] Pollution of the canals and the extension of the coastal swamps due to sedimentation gave old Batavia an evil reputation for disease.

Bangkok and Saigon, on low alluvial plains, with great seasonal fluctuations in river levels, were confronted with difficult problems. Official buildings commanded the little higher ground that was available, and the great bulk of the population lived in wooden houses built on stilts or on pontoons. Early Bangkok had no street pattern. The Royal City, or "Grand Palace," was a self-contained walled city, about a square mile in area, with palaces, temples, and administrative buildings. A canal across the neck of the bend in the Chao Phraya converted the old city into an island, outside which

[5] J. J. Stockdale: Sketches of the Island of Java (London, 1811), p. 129.

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permanent buildings and roads did not exist and all communication was by boat along the canals, or "klongs."

Singapore possessed the advantage of greater topographic variety. Eminences of granite formed good sites for public buildings, and the city spread out over the land above flood level on both sides of the swampy Singapore River.

All the old towns, with the exception of the architecturally exotic Bangkok, have a gridiron layout, which has meant the maximum of congestion in modern times. Racial zonation, well marked in the old towns, has tended to persist. Europeans have long since abandoned their old quarters, but the Chinese have remained in strength; indigenous peoples, however, are significantly absent. In Manila and Bangkok the old cores have been retained intact and new business and financial quarters have been created away from the old cities. Though Intramuros has lost its military functions and most of its administrative ones, it still keeps, in part, those of a judicial and religious nature. Old Bangkok, however, has lost little of its earlier importance and is one of the greatest tourist attractions in Southeast Asia. In Singapore and Jakarta the old core has been reconstructed as the business district, but since this took place before the advent of the motor vehicle, congestion is still acute. Saigon, having no old core and therefore able to plan its development without encumbrances, nevertheless also adopted a gridiron layout, but it is not easy to suggest an alternative that would have made better use of the environment.

The Expansion of the Cities

The rapid growth of the cities in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries has been due to the investment of capital, largely from the mother country, in production for export; the consequent improvement of the ports and the creation of a communications network focusing on them; a considerable increase in the scope of administrative activities; and, more recently, the establishment of secondary industries. Though these have provided the impetus, expansion has been possible only through the application of new techniques of engineering (particularly in drainage and water supply) and preventive medicine, making the cities as healthy as those of the West.

The three centuries of stagnation in Manila is a remarkable historical record. Expansion beyond the walls of Intramuros began almost a century later than the growth of old Batavia, which too had suffered a period of stagnation in the seventeenth century. Even the short British occupation (1762–1764) and the revolt of the American colonies failed to arouse Spanish interest in the distant possession, and the growth of Manila in the latter half

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361 before. Manila and Jakarta, though located in populous countrysides, arose from minor settlements, and Saigon was nothing more than a village surrounding an Annamese imperial fortress. Bangkok illustrates the arbitrariness of city location dependent on the personal decision of the ruler; for though founded on the site of an earlier settlement, this possessed no particular geographical significance and was unoccupied by indigenous peoples at the time.

361 With the exception of Saigon, all the great cities were founded in the
504 days of sail, but, despite the unexacting requirements of sailing vessels, good harbors with safe anchorages, facilities for careening, and easy access into the interior were not readily found in Southeast Asia, where the modest tides of the shallow seas on the Sunda Shelf only occasionally bring deep water close inshore. It cannot be said that the sites selected by the Europeans were always the best. Silting has been a problem, and technological changes have necessitated almost everywhere the creation of virtually new ports close to the old towns to cope with the increasing size and draft of vessels, and to expedite the handling of new export commodities. It is not surprising, therefore, that the indigenous Bangkok has tended to lag behind.

Manila, the oldest of the five cities, is perhaps also the most interesting. It did not begin primarily as a port and commercial base, nor did its early start confer the usual advantages, in spite of the possession of what is probably the best natural harbor in the whole of Southeast Asia. Manila Bay, protected by the mountainous Bataan Peninsula, and with a relatively narrow entrance, gives shelter from the prevailing winds and the occasional typhoons that cross Luzon. Its north shore is formed by the swamps of the delta of the Pasag and Pampanga Rivers, but on the east a narrow strip of plain lies between it and the southern Sierra Madre. Part of this plain is occupied by the extensive but shallow Laguna de Bay, whose outlet is the short and meandering Pasig River. At its mouth were two stockaded Muslim settlements, from the southerly of which the present city takes its name. The potentialities of Manila as a fortress and administrative center were at once recognized, and its splendid harbor and nodality in relation to the productive plains gave it an ascendancy over the earlier Cebu city (1565). But in a colony that was itself a dependency of another colony, and separated from the homeland by two oceans, economic development was retarded.

361 The objective of Jan Pieterszoon Coen, the founder of Batavia, was the establishment of an economic base[4] that would free the Dutch East India

[4] B. H. M. Vlekke: Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago (Cambridge, Mass., 1943), pp. 122–123.

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361 of the nineteenth century was a reflection of the investment of foreign capital in the archipelago, stimulated by the opening of the Suez Canal. In 1863 relocation of the administrative area began, with the move of the Governor to the Malacañan Palace, north of the river, and in the last three decades of Spanish rule development on the north bank of the Pasig was rapid. [504] After the American occupation Manila grew quickly. A modern harbor was constructed on reclaimed land on the seaward side of Intramuros (1903), and the main development of the city was shifted south of the Pasig, where new [162] administrative and residential districts were created. Since World War II the city has again expanded, owing partly to an influx of population from the country, and partly to the use of reconstruction funds for development. The built-up area is now practically continuous from the swamps of the Bitas River mouth in the north to Parañaque in the south, a distance of about 10 miles. Northeast and southeast of the urban fringe, rice fields still cover the plain, and parts of the city itself are regularly flooded in the rainy season (April-October). Development has proceeded farthest inland on the higher ground between the coastal plain and the Marikina River, which drains southward to the Pasig. Here are the newer districts of Mandaluyong, San Juan del Monte, and Quezon City, the last virtually a satellite town, which is the new administrative center of the Republic.

341 As a result of its long history and changing administration, Manila has 361 a greater variety of architectural styles and street patterns than the other four cities. Old buildings of wood and adobe in the colonial style were found in Intramuros (which was largely destroyed in 1945) and occasionally outside, but in the main business district in Binondo and in the administrative quarter of Ermita modern steel-framed concrete buildings now predominate. Manila is not a city of skyscrapers. Good foundations are impossible in the alluvial sediments, and deep piling to reach the underlying granite or "floating" on enormous cellular rafts of concrete is necessary for large buildings in all the great cities. In the districts of earliest expansion, radiating plazas and boulevards are to be seen; elsewhere the gridiron layout of the typical American city has been adhered to, except in the newer areas to the east, where attempts have been made to relate development to 162 topography. Racial zonation is well marked. The Chinese community in- 361 habits the narrow streets north of the Escolta in the business quarter, and the principal indigenous residential areas lie north of the city in the crowded districts of Tondo, Sampaloc, and Santa Cruz. Europeans, Americans, and wealthy Filipinos reside on the higher ground in the districts of Ermita and Malate, south of the river.

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the Chao Phraya, and even now there has been little expansion in that direction. At the end of the nineteenth century the filling in of the klongs and their replacement by roads were begun. The main axis of development was to the southeast, along the "New Road," as well as along the river. The expansion of commerce necessitated a business district, which was created in the Bangrak area, south of the Chinese quarter of Sampeng, and the increase in government functions led to an expansion of administration into Samsen and Dusit, to the north, while new European residential districts arose in the southeast. The west bank of the river, however, where the high tower of Wat Arun forms the most conspicuous landmark in the city, long remained an indigenous area, with a large population living in boats. The port has lagged behind in adaptation to changed technologies, and improved facilities are long overdue.

Saigon is virtually a twentieth-century city, though the construction of a business quarter and a modern port was begun shortly after the French occupation, and, as in the case of Bangkok, growth has been linked with the rice export trade. However, administration has been relatively more important than in any of the other cities. Before the creation of Vietnam, Cochin China was a French colony, governed from Saigon by French officials exclusively, and the city alternated with Hanoi as the residence of the Governor General of Indochina. With the loss of effective control over most of Tonkin, Saigon has become the main French base and center of power in Indochina.

The direction of expansion of the city has been westward toward Cholon, but Saigon is much more compact than any of the other great cities. The main business district lies in the southern part, close to the Arroyo Chinois, which links the Saigon River with Cholon. The shopping and administrative areas, characterized by wide boulevards, are a little to the northwest, and the European residential area lies on the "Plateau" to the north, a few feet above sea level. Cholon is a complete contrast, and until the war it had a much larger population. Unlike Saigon, which has a rectangular pattern of broad streets, Cholon has grown haphazardly along its many waterways. In 1932 the two cities were combined in a special administrative area, but they have remained largely independent of each other. Saigon is mainly concerned with administration and port activities, whereas Cholon has developed as the principal industrial area of Indochina. As in Jakarta, the enormous postwar increase in population has resulted in a great expansion in the area occupied by temporary dwellings, around the city margins.

The founder of Singapore did not omit to provide his city with a plan

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361 north bank of the Pasig, and circulation is impeded by the bridges over the river; approach from the north is slowed by bottlenecks where narrow bridges span the many small canals, or *esteros*, which make the district virtually an island.

Administration is a main function of the five cities. So far as Jakarta and Singapore are concerned, it is highly likely that the gradual growth of a parliamentary democracy in the mother country, which necessitated an increase in the size of the colonial administration,[7] was a dominant factor in city growth; similar tendencies have been observed in the other cities, though the degree varies considerably. The administrative areas are distinct, but the enormous growth in official business in the last 25 years and the expansion of the cities have necessitated some decentralization of administrative functions. Only Singapore is not an official capital, but despite the creation of an administrative capital for the Federation of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur, Singapore is unlikely to suffer from this apparent loss of government business.[8]

The Ports and Their Functions

•504 361 In the cities of Southeast Asia, lacking the heavy industrialization that has accompanied the development of ports in the West, port functions are relatively more important. Nevertheless, in any great port a certain amount of industrialization is inevitable, and the cities already possess a considerable industrial variety.

Unlike the smaller ports of their respective territories, which serve mainly local needs, the five cities are international ports, with a commerce that is becoming more widespread as the ties of former colonies with the homeland are loosened. The ports handle a large proportion of the export trade of their territories, but an even larger proportion of the import trade; distribution is thus a principal function in the economic life of the cities.

The modern ports, constructed on reclaimed land, are entirely artificial, but nowhere, even in the tidal ports of Bangkok and Saigon, are enclosed basins necessary. The modern ports, however, have not completely succeeded in displacing the old harbors; the Pasig and Singapore Rivers continue to carry a heavy lighter traffic from vessels in the Roads, with a great saving in port dues.

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[7] Amry Vandenbosch: The Dutch East Indies (3rd edit., Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1942), p. 75.

[8] Nevertheless, Singapore still is, as it always was, an administrative center of the first importance. The Colony has its own government offices, and also those of the Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South-East Asia. It contains the headquarters of the Far Eastern Naval, Military, and Air Forces of the British Commonwealth, and many Commonwealth and foreign consular and diplomatic offices. Finally, the City of Singapore has its own Municipal Council, which is responsible for the administration of many public utilities.

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Manila is unusual in possessing two harbors, one north of the Pasig, which handles the large interisland traffic, and the main harbor for trans-oceanic vessels, south of the entrance to the river. The Pasig itself is dredged to a depth of 18 feet as far as Jones Bridge, and is lined with quays. Native craft carry a considerable traffic upstream and along the many esteros. Manila normally handles about 30 per cent of the total export trade of the Philippine Republic, and more than 90 per cent of the imports.

With some 30 million tons of shipping entering and clearing annually, Singapore is one of the world's great ports. The functional pattern is similar to that of Manila. The modern port of Keppel Harbor handles most of the trade with the more distant parts of Asia and the rest of the world, and much of the entrepôt trade with South China and the rest of Southeast Asia is handled in the Roads. The political separation of Singapore from the Federation of Malaya complicates assessment of the trade of the port, since official statistics now exclude trade with the Federation; though it is not quite clear what proportion of Singapore's trade is conducted with the Federation. in 1951 the port handled 74 per cent of Malaya's imports and 67 per cent of the exports. Singapore shares with Bangkok the distinction of exporting more by value than it imports; the other ports all have an "unfavorable" trade balance. The great naval base, considerably enlarged since the war, is well removed from the commercial port; it lies on Johore Strait, some 17 miles from the city, almost as far distant as the Cavite base is from Manila.

Tanjoengpriok, the port of Jakarta, is of all the modern ports the farthest from the city center. Its construction some six miles northeast of the city was necessitated by the silting of the Tjiliwong, which has built up an expanse of mud flats along the coast more than a mile in width; the flats have, however, been put to productive use through the excavation of fishponds. The old harbor, connected with the modern port by the Antjol Canal, does not compare in importance with the Singapore River or the Pasig, nor does the rather large coastal and interisland trade have an independent harbor, as in Manila, though one of the Tanjoengpriok basins is used almost exclusively for this purpose. In the unrest that preceded the formation of the Indonesian Republic, the trade of Tanjoengpriok decreased greatly, but since 1950 recovery has been rapid. Some ground, however, has been lost to other ports: in 1951 Tanjoengpriok handled only 10 per cent of the exports of Indonesia, though its share of the imports was better maintained, with some 52 per cent of the national total.

Saigon is both a commercial and a naval port, though as a naval base it cannot rival Singapore or Cavite. It is approached by way of the Saigon

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504 361 River, which, though possessing adequate depth for vessels up to 30 feet in draft, has a sinuous channel, which prevents ships longer than 550 feet from ascending to the port. The strong scour of the semidiurnal tides reduces the necessity for dredging. The port occupies about three miles of the right bank of the river and is divided into three sections. Overseas trade is handled by the quays between the Arroyo Chinois and the Canal de Dérivation, in the Khan Hoi district; smaller vessels use the quays nearer the city; and the naval port lies farthest upstream, close to the Arroyo de l'Avalanche. Lighters convey cargoes from ships anchored in the river below the city to wharves along the Arroyo Chinois and the Canal de Dérivation, the twin waterways that link Saigon with Cholon. Before 1939, Saigon handled about 40 per cent of the total foreign trade of Indochina; rice formed about 50 per cent by weight of the exports. At the present time the military operations taking place in the country have greatly reduced the trade of Saigon, and the rice export is only some 100,000 tons a year.

Bangkok alone of all the ports is still inaccessible to large ocean-going vessels. A bar at the mouth of the Menam Chao Phraya prevents entry, and the terminal for large vessels has long been Gaw Si Kang, an island in the Gulf of Siam east of the river mouth. From Gaw Si Kang strings of lighters are drawn by tugs to the wharves of Bangkok, which extend for about six miles along the left bank below the Grand Palace. The dredging of the bar to allow ocean-going vessels to reach the port would have presented no great difficulties, but opposition from the lightering interests prevented anything from being done until shortly before the war, when work was begun on a new port at Klong Toi, about five miles below the city. It is now proposed, as part of a plan to expand rice cultivation in Thailand, to deepen the channel so that vessels of 26-foot draft can ascend to the port. Bangkok has an almost complete monopoly of the foreign trade of Thailand, and in a real sense it is the only port of the country.

Industrial Development

32 361 38 39 The five cities contain a large proportion of the total industrial capacity of their respective territories. Industry is well represented, though much of it is better described as processing than as manufacturing, and its range of activities is continually increasing. The primary processing of foodstuffs and raw materials is dominant; rice milling is particularly important, except in Singapore, but rubber, copra, sago, tapioca, hemp, sugar, and tobacco all assume considerable local significance. A beginning has been made with the higher stages of manufacturing, such as rubber products and even foam

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184 try, indigenous, cultural or political sub-
369 center. Just as Shanghai had its Nanking
361 and Peking, so Rangoon has its Mandalay, Jakarta its Jogjakarta, Manila its Cebu, and, in a variant form, Singapore its Kuala Lumpur.

177 In the past these cities sited along the Asian littoral have been the funnels through
184 which produce from the interiors have reached tidewater and the world of com-
369 merce and Western manufactures have pen-
361 etrated. Through the increasingly metropolitan channels have flowed the ideas of the West as well as its material goods. In a sense they have acted both as a catalyst for social and economic change and as a cushion which modified the shock of the earlier cultural contacts.

361 With the exception of Singapore, the site of each of the great cities of Southeast Asia is an ill-drained riverine or coastal lowland strategically placed in relation to an exceptionally productive agricultural region.
[504] Again, with the exception of Singapore, none possesses a deep natural harbor suitable for modern ocean-going shipping. The three mainland ports are both river and ocean ports and must be reached through tortuous and shallow river channels. All are entrepôts. Jakarta and Manila are located on the most highly developed islands of the archipelagoes, for which they act as entrepôts. Only in Indonesia and Indochina are there major competitors for the two greatest ports —Haiphong, the outlet for the densely populated Tonkin delta, and Surabaya, the regional capital for the Great East of the Indies, itself an empire. Each great port vir-
[439] tually dominates the national import trade; all tend, however, to share some part of the
504 national export trade with lesser ports. In
361 spite of these great similarities, the nature and functions of the ports differ markedly. As Allen observes: "All ports are individual. History, geography, politics, and economics all contribute to making them as they are. Few universal principles apply, and attempts to force uniformity on ports which have grown up differently are bound to fail."[18] Singapore, for example, is one of the

504 world's great ports and the most Western of
361 the great cities of Southeast Asia. A Crown Colony, it is the only great city without a large administrative hinterland, although it is the seat of the British High Commissioner
[175] for Southeast Asia. Since its founding by Raffles in 1819, it has been a free port and an entrepôt for much of archipelagic Southeast Asia. About half of the 5.5 million tons of cargo that pass over Singapore's modern wharves originates outside of the Malayan peninsula, and it was not until 1924 that the island of Singapore was connected by causeway with the mainland. At the same time it handles two-thirds of Malaya's exports and about three-fourths of its imports by value. Increasingly, its interests have tended to focus upon Malaya itself, as its entrepôt functions have been cut into by the other great ports within the region, especially Jakarta. What has kept Singapore the largest port in Southeast Asia (over 20 million net tons of shipping entered in 1952) is its status as a free port and its strategic location at the western entrance to the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean basin. As a crossroad between the Pacific and Indian oceans, it attracts shipping from great distances. It
[508] also has become an important air center, and a new airfield is under construction north-
[368] east of the city. Finally, the concentration of banking, insurance, light industry, docking, repair, and outfitting facilities have fortified its dominant position.

361 Singapore City was originally laid out with due regard for ethnic quarters.[19] The
563 oldest section of the city, however, has become the business center, but the rest of the older town is a densely populated Chinese section, and much of the newer town to the northeast also is Chinese. Each of these areas is in turn divided on the basis of Chinese clan categories. The European residen-

[18] D. F. Allen, *Report on the Major Ports of Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1951), p. 128.

[19] For a general description of the city see E. H. G. Dobby, "Singapore: Town and Country," *Geographical Review*, January, 1940, and the *Colony of Singapore Annual Report*.

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Bang Kok

361 behind them is one of the most striking
34 demonstrations of cultural dualism in South-
184 east Asia.

Unlike the other great cities, Bangkok
175 originated as the capital of a land-oriented
agrarian state. Its proximity to tidewater
361 was accidental. In 1822 the ship bearing the
•504 Crawfurd mission to the Thai court barely
177 was able to cross the bar at the mouth of the
Menam, then covered by only four feet of
178 water.[22] Its poor harbor and its remoteness from the major shipping routes of the South China Sea conspired to retard the development of the city as a port until the end of the nineteenth century and to retain it as an anachronism in Southeast Asia—a growing city, nearly great, surely primate, but indigenous rather than Western. Nevertheless, since it was through Bangkok that Western influences filtered into Thailand, it is a case of an indigenous capital acting as a revolutionary medium for socioeconomic change.

504 Bangkok is still the least convenient port
of the great cities in Southeast Asia. The bar
361 across the mouth of the Chao Phya was dredged through only in 1952, and port facilities are modest as compared with the other cities. Indeed, most vessels still anchor in the Bight of Bangkok in the lee of the island, Kao Hsi Kang, at the mouth of the Chao Phya and transship their cargoes to and from river barges and country boats which link the island with Bangkok. Surprisingly, the freight tonnage handled at Bangkok is about one-third that of Singapore, although the volume of shipping is only one-tenth as large. The explanation lies partly in the large bulk shipments of rice which form the main export. Partly, also, there is a lower load factor at Singapore, since much of the shipping which enters its harbor is as much dependent on the local complex of service facilities as on cargo potential. At Bangkok, peripheral as it is to the main trade routes, few vessels call without assurances of sizable cargoes.

[22] See J. Crawfurd, *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China* (London: H. Colburn & R. Bentley, 1830).

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648 were revolutionized by the techniques and aims of the West.
175 After 1850, European-owned steamships began the gradual
177 process of taking over the bulk of the inter-port trade
648 from native sailing boats and Chinese junks. The opening
439 of the Suez Canal in 1869 made possible the great modern
• 505 expansion of Western rule and trade, and thereby brought about the economic and social revolution which has created the Southeast Asia of today. The year 1870 is the real dividing-line between medieval and modern in the history of Southeast Asia.[14]

175 Whereas during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eight-
177 eenth centuries the various European nations active in South-
433 east Asia had, on the whole, limited themselves to trading
439 and acquisition of high-priced nonbulky commodities, such
648 as spices, the economic policy of the nineteenth century called for large quantities of bulky goods, such as sugar, fibers, oil seeds, coffee, and copra. Since the peasantry of Southeast Asia, almost without exception, raised only subsistence crops and had only limited surplus, it became necessary for the colonial powers to increase agricultural production. This was done in two ways; through the application of pressure on the peasantry to produce for export, and through the development of large-scale plantation agriculture.[15] The shift of emphasis from trade to production

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14. Harrison, op. cit., p. 197.

15. Karl J. Pelzer, "The Resource Pattern of Southeast Asia," Southeast Asia in the World Today, ed. Phillips Talbot. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 109.

504 361 world's great ports and the most Western of the great cities of Southeast Asia. A Crown Colony, it is the only great city without a large administrative hinterland, although it is the seat of the British High Commissioner [175] for Southeast Asia. Since its founding by Raffles in 1819, it has been a free port and an entrepôt for much of archipelagic Southeast Asia. About half of the 5.5 million tons of cargo that pass over Singapore's modern wharves originates outside of the Malayan peninsula, and it was not until 1924 that the island of Singapore was connected by causeway with the mainland. At the same time it handles two-thirds of Malaya's exports and about three-fourths of its imports by value. Increasingly, its interests have tended to focus upon Malaya itself, as its entrepôt functions have been cut into by the other great ports within the region, especially Jakarta. What has kept Singapore the largest port in Southeast Asia (over 20 million net tons of shipping entered in 1952) is its status as a free port and its strategic location at the western entrance to the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean basin. As a crossroad between the Pacific and Indian oceans, it attracts shipping from great distances. It [508] also has become an important air center, and a new airfield is under construction north- [368] east of the city. Finally, the concentration of banking, insurance, light industry, docking, repair, and outfitting facilities have fortified its dominant position.

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Bangkok

On the other hand[1] changes in transportation have elevated Bangkok to a new importance. It lies astride the main air route between Europe and the Far East, and the Australia-Europe services also pass through it. It is now the leading international air center in Southeast Asia, with 42 international departures a week in 1953 as compared with Singapore's 27, and its airport is one of the larger commercial fields in the Orient.

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The role of the Southeast Asian great city has been modified by the Pacific war and the granting of independence to Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and partial independence to Vietnam. Five of the six great cities are now capitals of the independent states. Each of these merits the title "link capital"; that is, they are the media through which the newly independent states are linked with the outside world. At the same time, they have begun to assume an increasingly indigenous character. The substitution of Malay for Dutch names and street signs in Indonesia is only one evidence of cultural change. The in-migration of petty officials, tradesmen, and refugees from the beleaguered rural areas has given the urban populations a new and more homogeneous native cast. The fevers of nationalism have made the large minorities more cautious about flaunting their ethnic independence.

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[1] [i.e. as compared to the inconvenient port facilities -- Analyst]

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Chinese
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circumstances a handful of Chinese Communists, many of them uneducated youths with a strong professional bandit element as just mentioned, had almost complete freedom of action through the time-honoured weapons of intimidation and extortion. With this insidious pressure, and with little support or sympathy from the European Powers or the native peoples, the Chinese of Southeast Asia were indeed in a dilemma.

With the advent of militant Communism came a final complication to the lives of the overseas Chinese. The appeal of the Communists is to the idea of a society horizontally but not vertically divided—that is, divided into classes, but with a proletariat which cuts across racial and community divisions. So far this appeal had been listened to by only a small minority of the Chinese, and with the Malays and other races it had been an almost complete failure. But let no one underestimate the attraction it might have for the masses of Southeast Asia if they were simultaneously convinced of the sincerity of the Communist professions and of the bankruptcy of 'bourgeois' promises.

The only way to stem the advance of Communism in Southeast Asia is to raise the standard of living. The irony of such a course for the colonial Powers is that in promoting a rise in the standard of living they are hastening their own departure. Improved material welfare stimulates political awareness. Whereas in the grand old days of their trading companies they could lord it over a province with a garrison of a score of soldiers, to-day with armies of a hundred thousand they remain only on sufferance. It is of no use, however, their elder statesmen and administrators of a bygone age urging the Governments to 'go slow'. The idea of representative government came from the West, but the rate of approach to it is largely fixed by the peoples themselves. All that the colonial Powers can aim at is to leave their ex-dependencies able to decide their own future and not at the mercy of new imperialisms.

We take leave of the Chinese in Southeast Asia at a time when they are undergoing one of the greatest trials in their history. The whole of the Far East is disintegrating as it moves towards a new and mysterious synthesis. These emigrants belong to a race which for at least one hundred and twenty generations, through the rise, flowering, decline, and petrifaction of the Chinese culture, has preserved a unified attitude of mind towards life and reality, and they look towards their parent civilization and see it once more in

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and ours as a *babu*, a clerk, does emphasize a difference in vital principle. You try to keep a man from going wrong; we make it unpleasant for him if he does go wrong. You believe in protection and welfare; we believe in law—and liberty.'

Burmans, after so many years of British rule, would probably feel stifled in the hot-house atmosphere of Java, and Javanese would shiver in the bleaker, if not bracing, climate of Burma. But it must be admitted that the version of Dutch policy given above did not pass without protest. Everyone readily admits that the people are too fondly coddled. There have long been general complaints that they are treated as children who will never grow up; that 'a villager cannot scratch his head unless a district officer gives him permission and an expert shows him how to do it'. In a powerful article that met with wide approval, the late Professor Van Vollenhoven pressed home the point that, in exercising 'gentle pressure', officials are not hampered by an obsequious deference to law. But not many would accept the suggestion that their colonial practice encroaches on liberty. Possibly their attitude may be due in part to their heritage of Roman law. 'Its influence', remarks Sir Henry Slesser, 'in stimulating a disciplinary outlook in politics and study on the Continent has been incalculable.' Yet even continental students present a rather similar picture of Dutch practice.[1] Whatever criticisms may be levelled at British colonial policy, and whatever defects may be manifest in practice, both policy and practice are based on the principles of equal law and individual freedom. That is why, in the earlier stages, it is both successful and in many ways congenial to the people; it liberates them from arbitrary oppression by native chieftains or Government officials. And it is probably one reason why, in its later stages, it is found irksome and unpopular; it brings them under bondage to economic law.

Another point which our comparison has brought out is that neither Dutch nor English have solved the problem of enhancing native welfare. The Dutch, by strenuous endeavours, have succeeded in maintaining an astonishingly high level of material welfare, far above the level in those parts of India which are comparable in respect of population, and about the same level as in Burma with much fewer mouths to feed. Yet if the Dutch have protected the people against

[1] Slesser, Sir H., *The Judicial Office* (1943), p. 83; Bousquet, pp. 90ff.; *Netherlands India*, pp. 382, 390.

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511 those factors which have caused agrarian distress and fostered crime, corruption and clerical unrest in Burma, the price has had to be paid in other ways. For the problem of enhancing welfare, says Dr Boeke,

> 'a real solution can be found only by instilling into the masses of the people a rational view of sex relations and a dynamic view of production. This is the only conclusion that can be reached by those who desire to make actual a general, a mass-welfare policy. And it is striking to note how often writers on welfare policy for Oriental peoples finally come to the conclusion somewhat in the nature of a cry of despair, that the only hope of saving the situation lies in neo-Malthusianism. Unfortunately this has never proved to be a remedy for the very poorest; and Java is a country of the very poor. What is worse, it can never be counted upon as a means of enhancing prosperity in the Indies, because it is in itself a symptom, the sign of the dynamic spirit, of a new frame of mind not yet acquired by the people. This dynamic spirit is the crux of the matter—but how to arouse it?'[1]

Only with diffidence can one venture to question the views of a Dutch economist on the affairs of Java. Yet one cannot suppress the feeling that Dutch writers who do not know Burma and India tend to be over gloomy as to the poverty of the Javanese. And there is evidence that the people do not wholly lack the 'dynamic' spirit, the desire to improve their lot. Throughout the last half of the nineteenth century there was a steady flow of immigration to districts where new public works offered prospects of higher pay; practically all the crops now cultivated by natives are of foreign origin, and one finds now that the areas under cash crops, such as potatoes, rise and fall with prices. So far as it is true that the Javanese are lacking in initiative and that the outstanding problem is to provide food for more mouths, the cause would seem to lie in their past history and present environment. In any case it is difficult to accept the lack of a dynamic spirit as the crux of the matter. In Burma the colonization of the Delta is only one instance of the dynamic spirit of the Burmese, and the people have long taken with avidity to new and more profitable crops. And in the delta there is no pressure of population. On the contrary, although containing the richest agricultural land, it is more lightly populated than other settled tracts of Burma. Yet the great mass of the inhabitants are rack-rented tenants or landless labourers, unable

[1] Boeke, p. 164.

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to find work for a great part of the year—except when, as happens too frequently, they are in jail. If the population were denser one might be tempted to regard the numerous murders in modern Burma as nature's way of reducing a surplus population. But neither a dynamic spirit nor a thin population have assured welfare to the Burmese. We would seem then to be faced with the melancholy alternative of economic apathy or crime. Before we acquiesce in accepting one of these alternatives as the inevitable outcome of colonial practice, we would do well to enquire further why the benevolent aspirations of colonial policy are frustrated.

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654 241 it is obviously no easy matter to decide whether the extension of cultivation for the market is wise or unwise, and, in view of the generally inadequate acquaintance with native social and economic life and the deficiency and inaccuracy of tropical statistics, the material for a sound decision is unlikely to be available.

The foregoing remarks deal mainly with native agriculture, but this is the chief occupation in the tropics and has received most attention from colonial administrations. Similar considerations apply to other economic services intended to promote native enterprise. Undoubtedly native production grows, and often very rapidly, under western rule. But this is the natural result of greater security of life and property, and of the opening up of new markets, and in the past it has grown rapidly without the help of economic services, as the stimulus given by western rule to the desire of gain has been sufficient. The application of modern scientific methods to native enterprise should make it more efficient. That is the function of economic services. In practice, however, their contribution to the increase of production is confined within narrow limits. They can increase production only by making it more profitable to individuals and for various reasons, some of which we have noticed, this is rarely possible except in such matters as the introduction of new crops, which does not call for expert knowledge. Economic services can and do render much help to western enterprise, and they are useful instruments of progress; but they can do comparatively little to improve native enterprise. Thus the argument that development is necessary to provide funds for economic services in the interest of native enterprise is of doubtful validity and requires closer scrutiny than it usually receives.

4. Economic Services and Welfare

654 511 Unless economic services make native production more efficient, they obviously must be ineffective in enhancing welfare. But they may promote efficiency by increasing production or in other ways without contributing to native welfare, and may even have contrary results. In Malaya, so far as the agricultural service enabled cultivators to obtain a larger yield, it did not enable them to make a greater profit. One obstacle was a ring of Chinese mill owners.[1] 'The Malay had no option save to sell at the price offered by the middleman

[1] Mills, pp. 255, 261.

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who bought for delivery to the mills.' The Government accordingly built a rice mill in order to break the combine. (One cannot help noticing the contrast between the forceful action taken against a Chinese combine in Malaya and the tolerance of European combines in Burma.) But this touched only the fringe of the problem. From 40 to 90 % of the cultivators were not free to sell their crop in the open market because they were in debt either to Indian moneylenders or to Chinese shopkeepers. Similar conditions obtain generally throughout the tropics wherever the promotion of trade and native enterprise is a main object of policy.

We have seen how, in Africa, throughout the ages tropical peoples have been ready to accept new crops. But 'these early introductions were incorporated with the system of shifting cultivation and the staple diet became a form of rough porridge made from one or other of the grains or from cassava root, ground between stones or pounded into a mortar, and supplemented by a relish of vegetables, meat or milk'. Similarly 'the introduction of cassava and sweet potatoes by the Portuguese conferred an inestimable boon on many tribes by providing them with a famine crop which will flourish under conditions unfavourable to grain crops'.[1] The introduction of these new crops enriched native social life. But where native society has been brought into economic contact with the modern world, the introduction of new crops has a contrary result. In Burma the introduction of groundnut led to the substitution of groundnut oil for sesamum oil because, although less palatable, it is cheaper; cultivators sold their more valuable sesamum and used groundnut oil instead for cooking. Similarly in Java cassava tends to replace rice.[2] Native society has been unable to resist the economic process of natural selection by the survival of the cheapest, and the introduction of new crops has not enriched but has impoverished native life. One finds, of course, the same thing in the West, where potatoes have often displaced more nutritious edibles.

The purpose of economic services is to make production more efficient, and they tend accordingly to concentrate on export crops.[3] On the principle of the local division of function, the production of crops for export contributes to efficiency. Also it encourages trade and provides Government with revenue. But the profits from increased production go mostly to foreign middlemen and merchants; so far

[1] *African Survey*, p. 883. [2] *Netherlands India*, p. 321.
[3] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 23.

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654 511 as they remain with the natives, economic development may enrich a few but, unless kept under control, impoverishes the people in general and detracts from welfare by the disintegration of native social life. To seek a remedy by multiplying economic services is like casting out devils in the name of Satan, for they expedite the process, and, like public works, merely enhance the need for social services.

5. Social Services: Protection

000 Wherever economic forces have been released by the application of reason to the conduct of social life, it has been found necessary in the general interest to protect those who are adversely affected by the consequences. This is the key note of the long conflict between Capital and Labour. In the West Greece liberated reason from the restraint of custom; Rome substituted the stronger rule of law for the rule of custom; Christianity furnished a moral principle stronger than the rule of law for keeping rational activities within the bounds of social welfare. The happy fusion of these principles in the Renascence allowed a high degree of freedom without disorganizing society. It allowed the freer use of capital in the production of wealth, and there evolved the type of social organization often described as capitalist, or capitalism. But these terms are often loosely used, and it is important to be clear as to their meaning. Human labour applied to natural resources produces a surplus beyond what is needed for sustenance. This surplus, if stored, is wealth. Wealth applied to the production of more wealth is capital. Thus capital may be regarded as disembodied economic energy. Capitalism may be defined as the form of social organization in which economic forces are predominant or, at least, conspicuously prominent. Such a society may be defined as capitalist. But the term capitalist is used also to signify the owner or employer of capital, and is usually confined to those who own or employ capital on a large scale. Thus there may be a capitalist society in which economic forces are predominant without capitalists who are owners or employers of large capital; and there may be capitalists, owners or employers of capital, in a society which is not capitalist in its general character. The neglect of these distinctions often leads to confusion.

In Europe the principle of economic freedom grew out of social life, and a homogeneous society has been able by its inherent vitality, though not without much tribulation, to gain an ever-doubtful victory over the forces of disruption. In the tropics, however, economic free-

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Hailey, was rendered possible by the munificence of the Carnegie Trust. A substantial contribution towards the cost of a new Burmese dictionary has been made by the Leverhulme Trust. Even so wealthy a dependency as Malaya looked to the Rockefeller Foundation to provide funds for a campaign against hookworm, and to the same generosity it owes two chairs in its Medical School. The Leverhulme Trust makes grants to study economic conditions in Africa, and the Burma Oil Company provided the buildings for an Engineering School in Burma.[1] The two last instances should perhaps be classed with the expenditure incurred by intelligent employers with a view to conducting their affairs more efficiently and profitably.

It appears, then, that doles out of general revenue or by private charity relieve western enterprise of charges that it would otherwise have to incur on amenities in the interest of efficiency and profits, and go to promote economic progress rather than native welfare. In the preceding chapters we have seen that economic and social services, though an important factor in economic progress, do little to enhance welfare, except so far as it is necessary to economic progress. Now it appears that the contribution to public revenue by western enterprise is barely sufficient, and often insufficient, even to cover the additional administrative charges that it involves, and that the public revenue provides only a part, apparently a minor part, of the cost of social services. It is difficult to reconcile these facts with the theory that the provision of funds for greater welfare necessitates the encouragement of western enterprise.

It is equally difficult to reconcile this theory with the state of affairs in dependencies so prosperous as Java, Burma and Malaya. Java, under indirect rule, has been developed by western enterprise employing local labour. During thirty years of Liberal rule, with a rapid expansion of western enterprise, not only did the growing population 'gobble up the greater yield', but there was an actual fall in wages, nominal and real. Again, after another thirty years, with a constructive welfare policy based on ethical principles, and purporting to encourage economic development with a view to enhancing native welfare, economists are unable to assure us that the people are better off. Dr Boeke, whom we have already quoted, returns to the subject in his latest publication. With reference to irrigation, colonization, the clearing of fresh land, the increase of secondary crops and home-grown

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 1228, 1252; Mills, pp. 310, 316; Mayhew, *Colonial Empire*, pp. 120ff.; *Colonial Review*, Sept. 1944, p. 194.

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vegetables, he suggests that the race between welfare measures and population cannot be continued indefinitely; he 'cannot escape the conclusion that the standard of living of the masses becomes more and more reduced'.[1] If there is one thing on which all Dutch colonial authorities agree, it is that the cause of poverty in Java is over-population.

In Malaya under indirect rule—though somewhat differently interpreted—western enterprise has developed the country with foreign labour. There is no problem of over-population. But the immigrant coolies draw low wages, because 'any very great increase in the Malayan standard must wait upon a similar rise in the reservoirs of overabundant and therefore cheap labour' in India and China. The Malay, on the other hand, left aside by the main current of economic development, remains stagnating in a backwater, and the progress of the last sixty years has merely changed him 'from a poor man in a poor country to a poor man in a rich country'; relatively at least he is poorer than before.[2]

Burma provides another type of economic development—by native enterprise under direct rule. The population, in comparison with Java is scanty and, in the delta, the chief centre of modern economic activity, the density per acre cultivated is less than in other lowland districts; yet the cultivators have been transformed into a landless rural proletariat and the country as a whole is conspicuous for the growth of crime.

In all these countries, and throughout the Tropical Far East, recent enquiries suggest that the people are less well fed now than twenty years ago, despite the rapid economic progress during the same period.[3] The people grow more but they do not eat more. Java was developed by western enterprise; there was a demand for local labour, and the population has grown up to the limit that the soil will bear. Malaya also was developed by western enterprise; but foreign labour was available and the population adjusted itself to these conditions. Burma was developed by native enterprise. The demand was for cheap produce and not for cheap labour. Holdings, instead of growing smaller grew larger, until they reached the size that would give the maximum net outturn and not, as in Java, the maximum gross outturn; and, under a system of industrial agriculture, the growth of

[1] Gonggrijp, quoted *Netherlands India*, p. 214; N. de Wilde, *Asiatic Review*, 1934, p. 232; Boeke, pp. 163, 165.

[2] Mills, pp. 249, 329.

[3] Wickizer and Bennett, pp. 188ff.

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population was checked at the point of diminishing returns. In all these lands the growth of population has reflected the conditions of employment, but whether numerous or scanty, under different systems of rule and with different methods of development, the people remain poor. Economic development has failed to enhance material welfare.

The argument for economic development as an instrument of welfare further assumes that economic and social services are necessary for the provision of welfare. We have already seen that this is not the case. Cultivators adopt new crops and new methods of cultivation without the aid of economic services, and the people take to new foods without encouragement from dieticians. One of the outstanding victories over the tsetse fly in Africa was achieved by ordinary natives, under sympathetic leading, but with no expenditure on welfare services.[1] Most of the reforms most urgently needed in social life in most parts of the tropics need no expert knowledge, and could be introduced without any special staff (though a special staff *should*, of course, facilitate and expedite their introduction). Where the people can be induced to want new amenities they will pay for them, as they do for schooling in Uganda and elsewhere. Thus the inability to promote welfare in tropical dependencies cannot be ascribed to the limitation of economic and social services through lack of revenue or of funds from other sources, and we must seek another explanation.

3. The Measurement of Welfare

If we cannot accept the rapid economic progress of tropical dependencies as sufficient evidence of increasing welfare, we must look elsewhere for a yard-stick by which it may be measured. In social science as in physical science, only beginners and amateurs will conduct experiments without trying so far as possible to measure the results. Some of the older dependencies produce masses of statistics purporting to show the population revenue, and trade, and also matters of social interest, such as litigation, crime and the numbers at school or in jail. The statistics, however, are mostly compiled for administrative purposes and have little meaning or interest for outsiders; many figures are of doubtful accuracy and are frequently misleading, full of traps for the unwary (and even for those who compile them and use them in administration). One might expect at least the trade returns to be intelligible to the public, but anyone who has tried to work on them will endorse the comment of Lord Hailey that 'eccentricity, so in-

[1] Hinden, p. 202.

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433 annum. Productivity in the British fishing industry was, and probably still
226 is, at least eight times as great per man. In the United States' fishing in-
565 dustry it is much greater still. This immensely greater productivity per man is of course achieved only by a much heavier use of capital equipment. Technological investment, then, is an obvious method of trying to raise peasant production.

434 Peasant income in this region is thus low by most standards. Adequate
511 information about this is lacking, but there is no reason to doubt the indi-
565 cative character of what has been collected. For instance, an inquiry in Java in 1926 showed that over 60 per cent of the people had in cash and in kind incomes of less than £12 10s. a year (150 Dutch florins), and 80 per cent had incomes of less than £25 a year (300 florins). In Malaya in 1940 I calculated that the fishermen of the east coast earned on the average about £12 a year. This does not mean much without consideration of the prices of goods on which the income was spent. But any such comparison would soon make it clear that a man with such an income was hard put to it to keep his family in comfort. Cash incomes have risen steeply during and since the war, but so have the prices of consumer goods, and many peasants are probably rather worse off than before, unless they have been able to sell rice or other scarcity goods.

433 The peasant economy of South East Asia uses abundant labour and has
565 a low level of capital equipment. Even then, owing to lack of efficient
461 organization, one can point to a great amount of unused man-hours. Yet these features must not be over-stressed. It is common to blame the peasant for a *dolce far niente* attitude, and attribute his poverty to his idleness. What J. Johnston Abraham, the author of the well-known travel book, *Surgeon's Log*,[1] wrote forty years ago of the Malay is often quoted in essence still:

> The Malay . . . has the aristocratic contempt for toil . . . [he] is of all things a philosopher. He squats in the warm sun and chews betel contentedly. He sees the obvious foolishness of working in a country too hot for toil, when the earth is so prolific that a fortnight's leisurely labour will produce food for a year, and the water is so plentifully supplied with fish that an hour, in the cool of the evening with a net, will supply luxury for a fortnight.

Anyone who has lived among the Malay peasantry and has seen their back-breaking work of rice-planting, or their long hours at sea in the broiling sun hauling the nets for fish, will know what a parody this is. The working rhythm of the Asiatic peasant is different from that of the European. The economic system is not well enough geared to alternative employment when technical hitches occur in his ordinary occupation. But the peasant is not simply thriftless of his time and his money. He plans with care his ploughing, sowing, weeding, and harvesting; he is assiduous in searching for fodder for his animals, in watering his vegetable garden, in repairing his fishing-boat or his net. If he can scrape together some extra cash above the daily needs of his family, he may spend it on clothes for his child or jewellery

[1] London, Chapman & Hall (14th rev. ed., 1929), pp. 69–70.

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8. Education and Welfare

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Everywhere and always education has an economic aspect, for material welfare is one main concern of human life. The monastic schools in Burma aimed primarily at teaching the boys how to live as Burman Buddhists, but under their own kings they were also the chief means of advancement in Church and State. That was true also of education in medieval Europe. But in the modern world, when the application of rational criteria to social life reached the classroom, the economic aspect of education came into the foreground. In Europe this tendency has hitherto been kept within safe limits by the force of common social tradition but, in the plural society of tropical dependencies, there is no such tradition. It was because experience during the period of *laissez-faire* showed the need for some corrective that Curzon inaugurated the modern policy of providing a substitute for social tradition by teaching hygiene, thrift and morals.

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Hygiene, accordingly, is now often taught in schools. The teaching of hygiene can be enforced by attaching suitable conditions to the grant of funds, and teachers can be encouraged to obtain certificates as teachers of hygiene by the lure of better pay. But hygienic principles, as actually taught, are valid only for the examination hall. In Burma, one may find lessons on hygiene being given in a classroom thick with cobwebs. In western schools the teaching of hygiene survives only through compulsion, and in the vernacular schools it 'is a farce'.[1] Similarly in Malaya, as elsewhere, the teachers of hygiene sleep in unventilated rooms and neglect the most elementary precautions as to food and drink that they impress daily on their pupils.[2] In the teaching of hygiene 'success lies not in having the child learn facts about hygiene, but in having him learn hygienic habits'.[3] In this matter the Dutch, as usual, are very thorough. Each child is provided with a form in two parts. Every day on reaching school he must inspect the teeth, hands and nails of the child next him, and enter their condition on that child's form. The other part of the form, concerning his habits during the previous day in washing his hands, using the latrine, cleaning himself after defecation and so on he must fill in for himself. At the end of the month the forms are made over to a sanitary inspector, who visits sample

[1] *RPI*, 1927–32, p. 40; 1932–3, p. 17; 1932–7, p. 26.
[2] *RPI* (Malaya), 1938, p. 89.
[3] Hydrick, p. 59.

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homes to check the correctness of the entries. This system would seem unlikely to foster harmony in the classroom or the home, and one would hesitate to recommend it generally; and, except possibly in Java, the entries in the forms, whether made at home or in school, might be inaccurate and incomplete. But, even so, the Dutch recognize that it is useless to teach hygiene in school without raising the standard of hygiene among the parents.[1] In Burma, and probably elsewhere, men who have qualified as sanitary inspectors make a large part of their income by conniving at breaches of the health rules. Children may learn to pass examinations from text-books, but they learn to live from example and experience, and where the text-book teaches one thing and the environment another, it is the latter that prevails.

Again, the modern school is expected to inculcate thrift. In this matter also, in Malaya as elsewhere, teachers exhort the children to be thrifty while themselves notoriously in debt. Another agency for teaching thrift is the co-operative credit movement, but co-operative subordinates are no more solvent than subordinates in other services. The whole economic system of tropical dependencies favours and, one may even say, is based on, indebtedness among the cultivators and labourers; it is through advances to cultivators that exporters get cheap produce, and through advances to coolies that employers get cheap labour. One cannot cure this by teaching thrift in schools. Parents incur debt to provide a western education for their children, and men who have been taught thrift in school from the infant standard to the university do not learn to shun the moneylender. If the schools cannot teach cultivators to make more money, which they do want, they are unlikely to be more successful in teaching them western ideas of welfare which they do not want, and in great measure are precluded by the environment from adopting. Without fundamental changes in the economic environment, and in the climate of popular opinion, the idea that western ideas of material welfare can be taught in school is an illusion.

Very similar conditions apply to education as an instrument of moral welfare. Curzon deplored the lax discipline and low moral standards in the schools, and thought to provide a remedy by introducing moral primers and text-books of personal ethics, and by enforcing stricter supervision and control. We have noticed the sequel in Burma. When the new policy was first adopted, the moral standards

[1] Hydrick, pp. 13, 81.

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ize education'. Similarly, in Java, the progress of modern education has led to the decay of native schools. Formerly 'the children were entrusted to some village elder or religious leader for moral and social training, and also to learn simple arithmetic and reading and writing in a local script or in Arabic. These forms of teaching shrank to a simple religious teaching, and this process was quicker at first than the development of the new government education. Paradoxically therefore the creation of modern education increased the number of illiterates'.[1] The introduction of French education in Indo-China seems to have had a similar result. The decay of native education in the Tropical Far East is obvious because these schools, especially in Burma, had attained a comparatively high standard of instruction, but it has happened throughout the tropics from the Pacific Islands to Africa.

In Africa the native system of education was directed to character training and instruction in crafts. But the crafts are dead or dying. 'The African artistic genius has produced objects of singular beauty inspired by religious beliefs and social customs and the necessities of social and domestic life. These sources of inspiration are profoundly modified, if not destroyed by modern conditions, and there is evidence of a decline in artistic taste accelerated by the replacement of indigenous articles by those of European manufacture, the commercial exploitation of so-called native crafts, and lack of encouragement.' Everywhere 'native manufacture is undoubtedly on the decline: the smelting of iron is moribund; the ubiquitous petrol tin has made pottery almost a forgotten art; the handloom has nearly disappeared. It is a regrettable effect of European contacts in Africa that an increase of wealth should thus destroy rather than stimulate local craftsmanship.'[2] In Africa also, as in Burma and the tropics generally, the same process is visible in non-productive arts, in music, dancing and the drama, and also in native pastimes. 'The danger of the present time', it has been said, 'is that undue emphasis will be placed on economic welfare and mechanical progress, and that even leisure will be commercialized so that the true springs of artistic creation and enjoyment may have very little outlet.'[3] But that is nothing new, or peculiar to the present time. Despite benevolent aspirations in colonial policy, it has always been inherent in colonial practice. The decline of native arts and crafts and

[1] C. O. van der Plas, see Djajadiningrat, p. 65.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1207, 1290, 1420.
[3] *Mass Education*, p. 49.

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871 517 pastimes is merely one aspect of the elimination of non-economic values in the plural society of a tropical dependency, and native schools and native education decay because the ideas on which they rested lose their meaning.

II. Education and Instruction

871 Even in England it is often suggested that the ideas on which education has rested in the past are fading and must be recovered. Enthusiasts for education propound large claims as to what education might or ought to be, and what it might, should or must do. But they tend to overlook what education actually is and does, and confound education with instruction. Education is much wider than instruction, and much older. During the long ages of pre-history man survived because he was capable of learning, by example and experience, to adapt his way of life to his environment; succeeding generations learned new lessons in the school of life. Education dates from the emergence of mankind. Instruction, however, was of minor importance before the invention of the art of letters, which gave man a new and more efficient means of transmitting his social heritage and of communicating new ideas. But it was chiefly significant in giving a foremost place in education to mental discipline, the training of the mind. This helped man to understand his environment and made him better able, not merely to adapt his way of life to his environment, but to adapt his environment to his way of life. It gave him a key to progress. In the course of modern progress instruction has come to play a growing part in education. But it is not the whole of education; it is that part of education which consists in the formal training of the mind. Education is much wider; it is the sum of all the processes that equip the child for life in adult society.

The distinction between education and instruction is so obvious that it might seem a platitude if it were not so often overlooked. When advocates of education in the tropics say that 'education is, and is intended to be an instrument of change', or that 'the whole mass of the people must have a real share in education and some understanding of its meaning and purpose',[1] they show that they mistake its meaning, and are regarding it as something grafted on to life. The teacher of a training college in the Philippines tells us to 'think of tropical peoples as organisms having to adjust themselves to a physical and social environment which under modern conditions may embrace

[1] *Mass Education*, p. 4.

1l: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

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lk Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

A
DESCRIPTION OF THE CHINESE LOTTERY
KNOWN AS
HUA-HOEY.

525

HUA-HOEY* or the thirty-six Animals Lottery is so extensively played in the Straits Settlements, Burma, Siam and wherever the Chinese settle, that some description of its origin and of the way in which it is carried on here may prove not altogether uninteresting.

From a small book "On the Interpretation of Dreams with Illustrations of Hua Hoey" we learn that the game was invented in the time of the second Han dynasty. In this book there is a short sketch of the lives of the thirty-six mythical personages (who had previously existed as animals) and directions are given as to staking. The order in which the characters are described is different from that employed in the staking papers of which a specimen is given below.

King Thai Peng, being the most celebrated character, is placed first instead of being No. 26.

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* *Lit.* Play Society.

[P. 205. P 204 is blank]

lk Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

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1.—*Thai Peng* was, in a former state of existence, a dragon. He served in the Chow Kingdom under King Hooi Lian till it was conquered by the Chinese, when he escaped, and having raised an army under Generals Kun San (No. 9) and Chi Koh (No. 11), he proclaimed himself King, but he afterwards led such a dissolute life that Kun San put an end to his existence. Kun Giok (No. 22) was his sister.

Thai Peng was born again as Guan Kui. Stake on Thai Peng, Guan Kui, Kong Beng and the 5 dragons when you dream of the coronation of a sovereign, cash, or an execution.

ll: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
chinese

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2.—*Sam Wei* was formerly a monkey. He served Thai Peng as Prime Minister and became very wealthy. He had three sons Hap Hai (No. 7) Guan Kiat (No. 19) and Ban Kim (No. 32.)

Sam Wei was born again as Cheng Li. Stake on Sam Wei, Guan Kui and Cham Khoi when you dream of a wicked man, a man hanging himself, three ghosts, three stars, woods, or a performing monkey.

1k Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

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3.—*Kong Beng* was formerly a horse. He became a priest and was employed by Thai Peng as a political adviser, being gifted with supernatural powers. He was slain in battle with the Chinese.

Kong Beng was born again as Hong Chun. Stake on Kong Beng, Thai Peng, Hong Chun, Siang Chiow and Hoey Kwan when you dream of bright objects such as flames, brilliant pearls, lamps, or sunshine.

lk Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

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4.—*Kiu Kwan* was a hawk. He became a Mandarin and was very rich and married a princess of the Han dynasty. He had a younger brother named Hoey Kwan (No. 28.)

Kiu Kwan was born again as Kiat Pin. Stake on Kiu Kwan, Hoey Kwan, Kiat Pin and Cheng Sun when you dream of drinking samsu, riding, sleeping, sitting at leisure, water up to the shoulder, a dog biting a man or a coffin with a dead body.

1l: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

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5.—*Pan Kwi* was formerly a dragon. He took a high literary and military degree and was slain by the Chinese.

Pan Kwi was born again as Mow Lim. Stake on Pan Kwi, Guan Kwi, Mow Lim and the five dragons when you dream of picking flowers, a young man, witnessing a theatrical performance, climbing trees, or adopting a child.

Pan Kwi is usually called "The Shell."

ll: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

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6.—*Hong Chun* was once a peacock and was the brother of Eng Seng (No. 7). He took the first literary degree. His whole family were massacred by the Chinese. He married Siang Chiow (No. 23).

Hong Chun was born again as Kong Beng. Stake on Hong Chun, Kong Beng, Han Hun and Ban Kim when you dream of a flower, a man ploughing, a bambu shoot, geese or ducks, a marriage ceremony, a girl worshipping idols, or a buffalo.

1l: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

525

7.—*Eng Seng* was originally a goose. His mother was Kun Giok (No. 22). He took the same honours as his brother (No. 6).

Eng Seng was born again as Ban Kim. Stake on Eng Seng, Ban Kim and Hong Chun when you dream of drinking tea, killing poultry, an examination, selling spirits, a flea, a pen, a pair of candles, a water-lily, or giving an animal its life.

11: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 All Southeast Asia All
Chinese

525

8.—*Cham Khoi* was a white fish. He took the first military and literary degree and became judge of three provinces. He and his whole family. more than 300 in number, were slain by the Chinese.

Cham Khoi was born again as Chi Koh. Stake on Cham Khoi, Sam Wei, Chi Koh and Hong Chun when you dream of a white fish, a buffalo, a gantang of white rice, or 36 pigs.

1l; Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 All Southeast Asia All
Chinese

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9.—*Kun San* was originally a tiger. An intimate friend of Chi Koh (No. 11) he became so powerful as the chief of a band of robbers that the Imperial troops dared not attack him. He was afterwards one of Thai Peng's Generals.

Kun San was born again as Cheng Hun. Stake on Kun San, Cheng Hun, Jit San and Hok Sun when you dream of fighting or robbery, the sun rising, a yellow object, or a hill on fire.

ll: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

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10.—*Cheng Sun* was a pig. He served with Kun San (No. 9) as a General.

Cheng Sun was born again as Hap Hai. Stake on Cheng Sun, Pit Taik, Chit Taik, Siang Chiow and Kun San when you dream of a boat sailing on a river, a man in the water, sending a present, a wedding, a pig, sailing with a favourable wind in the first moon, a boat going with the current, or 300 cash.

1l: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

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14.—*Chi Koh* was once a lion. He was a native of Tong King and an intimate friend of Kun San (No. 9) and one of Thai Pêng's Generals.

Chi Koh was born again as Cham Khoi. Stake on Chi Koh, Kun San, Cham Khoi and Kiat Pin when you dream of ascending a height, a red face, a tall man, a youth, seeing the moon, a cool breeze, ascending a tower or stairs, an examination, or a lion fight.

ll: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

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12.—*Pit Taik* was a mouse. Although very powerful, he remained a ferryman till Kun San (No. 9) appointed him the sixth General under King Thai Peng.

Pit Taik was born again as Hok San. Stake on Pit Taik, Guat Poh, Hok Sun and Chi Taik when you dream of a blossom, a tiger, people in a boat, a mouse eating rice, demanding money, eating tortoise, finding an article of value on the road, letting go a snake, or two brothers quarrelling.

11: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

525

13.—*Guat Poh* was formerly a tortoise. His special duty was to guard the Imperial Palace. He had a son Han Hun (No. 14) and a daughter Beng Chu (No. 21).

Guat Poh was born again as Beng Chu. Stake on Guat Poh, Beng Chu, Han Hun and Pit Tack when you dream of a man with a hat but no coat, a woman preparing rice, vermicelli, red objects, money, or valuables.

ll: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

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14.—*Han Hun* was a buffalo. He was afterwards a Mandarin, and while guarding the sea coast was defeated, for which he was sentenced to be torn in pieces by five horses. His father was Guat Poh (No. 13) and his sister Beng Chu (No. 21).

Han Hun was born again as Cheng Guan. Stake on Han Hun, Cheng Guan, Cheng Hun and Hoey Kwan when you dream of a dead body, a hill on fire, a man killing a horse, or a cow.

1k Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

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15.—*Kang Su* was a dragon of the Southern Sea. He was a friend of Pit Taik and was killed by the Chinese.

Kang Su was born again as Thian Sin. Stake on Kang Su, Thian Sin and the five dragons when you dream of a ferry-boat, a vessel bound for a foreign port, being in the sea, or seeing vessels, things or persons there.

11; Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 All Southeast Asia All
Chinese

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16.—*Hok Sun* was a dog. He then kept a medical shop and was killed by a tiger when employed in gathering herbs on the woods.

Hok Sun was born again as Pit Taik. Stake on Hok Sun, Kiu Kwan, Pit Taik and Kun San when you dream of a woman crying or carrying a baby, planting, a tiger's roar, a dog's bite, eating dog's flesh, or a row in a medicine shop.

11: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

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17.—*Cheng Guan* was once a spider. He was a great spendthrift while at college and became a beggar. He then took to stealing fowls.

Cheng Guan was born again as Han Hun. Stake on Cheng Guan, Han Hun, Cheng Hun and Kong Beng when you dream of literary competition, herbs, a green coat, a green pear, eating fruit, a fish with a horn, a fowl stealer, or a scholar.

ll: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

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18.—*Guan Kwi* was once a prawn. He took to gambling and had a monkey which brought him in money by performing tricks.

Guan Kwi was born again as Thai Peng. Stake on Guan Kwi, Thai Peng, Sam Wei, Cheng Guan and Guan Kiat when you dream of a man singing about flowers, rice being dear, dear things, a beggar, a scholar in a ragged coat, a dog stealing rice carving mutton, a flag, a pomegranate, or a lame woman.

1l: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 All Southeast Asia All
Chinese

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19.—*Guan Kiat* was a sheep. He became a Mandarin and was reduced to beggary by being robbed on his way to see his friend Thian Liang.

Guan Kiat was born again as An Su. Stake on Guan Kiat, An Su, Kiat Pin and Thian Liang when you dream of a reception of a General, a great excitement, a fire, dirt, an offering, a new born child eating, a jar of spirits with fruit, or a clear view.

ll: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 All Southeast Asia All
Chinese

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20.—*Kiat Pin* was once a deer. He became very rich, but was reduced to poverty by the Chinese.

Kiat Pin was born again as Kiu Kwan. Stake on Kiat Pin, Kiu Kwan, Sam Wei, Ban Kim and Guan Kiat when you dream of three cups of spirit, three men, three eggs, an old man, or three objects.

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Chinese

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21.—*Beng Chu* was once a fish (usually called "The Stone"). She was the daughter of Guat Poh (No. 13) and the wife of Pan Kwi (No. 15) and the mother of Hong Chun (No. 6). She was a lady of the highest rank. The whole family were killed by the Chinese.

Beng Chu was born again as Guat Poh. Stake on Beng Chu, Guat Poh, Kong Beng and Hoey Kwan when you dream of anything red, spectacles, a women reading, wearing a gown, coming out of a door, or looking into a glass.

ll: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

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22.—*Kun Giok* or *Gin Giok* was a butterfly. She and her brother Thai Peng escaped from the conquering Chinese. When he became King he raised her to the second rank. Eng Seng (No. 7) was her son.

Kun Giok was born again as Hoey Kwan. Stake on Kun Giok, Hoey Kwan, Cheng Guan, Cheng Hun, Thai Peng and Mow Lim when you dream of a man eating meat, a woman combing her hair, a girl of loose character, a woman carrying a child or running.

1l: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

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23.—*Siang Chiow* was a swallow. When she was a girl she picked up on a mountain a book from which she learnt sorcery and was able to raise storms. Kun San (No. 9) regarded her as his sister. She married Hong Chun (No 6).

Siang Chiow was born again as Hap Tong. Stake on Siang Chiow, Kong Beng, Hap Tong and Kun San when you dream of meeting a Magistrate, a marriage ceremony, a woman riding, rain coming down, an amazon, or beating a drum.

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Chinese

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24.—*Hap Tong* was the name of a spirit-shop kept by two sisters-in-law Sit and Kiu. Chi Koh (No. 11) tried to force them to marry him and they jumped into a well and were drowned. They had previously existed as pigeons.

Hap Tong was born again as Siang Chiow. Stake on Hap Tong, Hap Hai, Kiu Kwan and Cheng Li when you dream of drinking milk and sleeping, an elder brother's wife and his younger sister walking together, a woman selling spirits, two persons under one covering, women drinking together, or two sisters marrying at the same time.

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Chinese

●525

25.—*Mow Lim* was a bee. He was poor and got his livelihood by charcoal burning.

Mow Lim was born again as Pan Kwi. Stake on Mow Lim Pan Kwi and Hoey Kwan when you dream of heavy rain, branches weighed down, a hill on fire, the sky darkened, a temple, bee's-nest, cutting grass, a priest, charcoal burning, a piece of timber or hail.

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Chinese

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26.—*Yu Li* was an elephant. He afterwards started a hotel and was a fisherman.

Yu Li was born again as Chit Taik. Stake on Yu Li, Chit Taik, Pit Taik and Cheng Li when you dream of cotton clothes, clearing jungle, making an oven, building a house, putting up beams, digging a grave, rearing ducks, an actor, ducks laying eggs, catching fish, paying money, or eating rice.

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Chinese

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27.—*Hap Hai* was originally a frog. He was the son of Sam Wei (No. 2) and brother to Guan Kiat (No. 19) and Ban Kim (No. 32). He was killed by the Chinese.

Hap Hai was born again as Cheng Sun. Stake on Hap Hai Hap Tong and Pit Taik when you dream of a foreign vessel at sea, a louse, or an inundation.

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Chinese

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28.—*Hoey Kwan* was a duck. His elder brother was Kiu Kwan (No. 4). He became a Judge. His whole family were massacred by the Chinese.

Hoey Kwan was born again as Kun Giok. Stake on Hoey Kwan, Kiu Kwan, Kun Giok, Eng Seng and Mow Lim when you dream of a coffin on fire, a house on fire, a Magistrate approaching, a kitchen fire, burning crackers, fighting, a Magistrate seeing blood, the light of a lantern, a burning corpse, or a person dressed in cotton.

1l: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 All Southeast Asia All
Chinese

525

29.—*Chit Taik* was once a dog. He became a pork-butcher and was slain by order of Chen Kwi.

Chit Taik was born again as Yu Li. Stake on Chit Taik, Yu Li, Pit Taik, Kiu Kwan and Cheng Sun when you dream of fortune-telling, murder and blood, a butcher's shop, chess playing, much meat, a pomegranate, pointing to a pork butcher, beating a gong or drum, or a man becoming a pig.

ll: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

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30.—*Thian Liang* was once an eel. He was a Sin Chei, but seeing he could rise no higher, he shaved his head and became a monk. He was employed by people to supplicate the gods to grant blessings, wealth and children.

Thian Liang was born again as Jit San. Stake on Thian Liang, Jit San, Thian Sin and Cheng Li when you dream of taking medicine, two men in the water, a large and small hat, digging a grave, a monk, rice, or an eel becoming a snake.

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Chinese

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31.—*Cheng Hun* was a stork. Owing to the intrigues of Chen Kwi he retired from Court and became a monk among the mountains.

Cheng Hun was born again as Kun San. Stake on Cheng Hun, Kun San and Cheng Guan when you dream of heavy rain, the death of a relative, meeting parents, smoke without flame, heavy clouds, a river with no means of crossing, acting, or a monk.

ll: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

525

32.—*Ban Kim* was formerly a snake. He was the son of Sam Wei (No. 2) and the younger brother of Hap Hai (No. 27) and Guan Kiat (No. 19). He led a retired life.

Ban Kim was born again as Eng Seng. Stake on Ban Kim, Eng Seng and the five dragons when you dream of a rich man, much money, collecting rent, a pair of gold flowers, a tortoise, a slave burning a coffin, or putting out a light.

11: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 All Southeast Asia All
Chinese

525

33.—*Cheng Li* was a turtle. His house of business having been burnt down he turned priest.

Cheng Li was born again as San Wei. Stake on Cheng Li, Sam Wei and Yu Li when you dream of being carried in a chair, a corpse in a well, cutting timber, creatures of the sea, murder and blood, a chair coolie, a marriage, a chair, baling water, a spirit-shop, a fire, or a turtle.

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Chinese

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31.—*An Su* previously existed as a fox. She was the wife of Guan Kwi (No. 18) and as her husband was poor, she shaved her head and became a nun.

An Su was born again as Guan Kiat. Stake on An Su, Kong Beng, Beng Chu, Guan Kiat and Guan Kwi when you dream of a happy nun, an old woman, a woman in man's attire, lighting joss sticks, meeting a raft, or a horse in motion.

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Chinese

525

35.—*Thian Sin* was originally a wild cat. Having served under King Siong Ki, he turned monk.

Thian Sin was born again as Kang Su. Stake on Thian Sin, Thian Liang, Kang-Su and Hoey Kwan when you dream of something in the sky, a water-pot, thunder, pointing to the sky, a horse running, or a woman without clothing.

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Chinese

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26.—*Jit San* was once a cock. He was extremely wealthy. but having been plundered by the Chinese he turned priest,

Jit San was born again as Thian Liang. Stake on Jit San, Thian Liang, Kun San and Eng Seng when you dream of wood and fire, going to school, the sun rising in the East and setting in the West, a man entering and coming out of a wood, a high hill or sunset.

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The accompanying diagram contains the names of all the thirty-six Hua-Hoey characters together with another Im Hoey not included in the ordinary lists. Each character is associated with a particular part of the human frame and this diagram is extensively used in interpreting dreams. Thus if you dream of ears you should stake on Thai Peng or Kun Giok, if of the neck on Jit San, and so on. The characters are here classified as follows :—

Four of the highest degree (Chong Guan), viz. :—

Tan Hong Chun, Tan Eng Seng, Tan Pan Kwi and Gaw Cham Khoi.

Seven Traders, viz. :—

Ang Yu Li, Chu Kong Beng, Chan Hok Sun, Liong Keng Su, Hong Mow Lim, Teh Pit Taik and Loh Chit Taik.

Four Priests, viz. :—

Low Cheng Li, Teh Thian Liang, Tan Jit San and Tioh Hoey Kwan.

Five Generals, viz. :—

Li Han Hun, Wi Kun San, Song Cheng Sun, Li Guat Poh and Wi Chi Koh.

Four Ladies, viz. :—

Siang Hap Tong, Beh Siang Chiow, Li Beng Chu and Lim Gin Giok.

Four Happy-lot, viz. :—

Lim Thai Peng, Tioh Kiu Kwan, Tioh Hap Hai and Tioh Sam Wei.

One Nun, viz. :—

Tan An Su.

Two Friars, viz. :—

Tioh Tian Sin and Chiu Cheng Hun.

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Chinese

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四狀元
吳占魁 白魚
陳攀桂 田螺
陳榮生 白鵝
陳逢春 孔雀

七生理
龍江祠 兆龍
田福孫 白狗
朱光明 白馬 軍師
翁有利 大象

羅只得 野猫
鄭必得 老鼠
方茂林 黃蜂

音光會明
上招福孫
坤山正順月寶
逢春江祠
吉品元貴
明珠
茂林

五虎將
黃志高 地龍 師傅
李月寶 兎
宋正順 猪
黃坤山 虎
李淇雲 牛

四夫人
林良玉 蚌螺
李明珠 玉石
馬上招 白燕
雙合同 白蛤

四好命
張三桃 猴子
張合海 蛤蟆
張九官 鴨鳥
林太平 龍

四和尚
張火官 龜
陳日山 鶏
鄭天良 蟒
劉井利 鯉

五乞食
徐元貴 蜈公
張萬金 大蛇
蘇青元 蜘蛛
張元吉 虎
陳吉品 羊

二道士
周青雲 白鶴
趙天申 金鯉
一師姑 猫
陳安士 林蛙

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Chinese
[R242B]

占魁	良玉
板桂	明珠
榮生	上招
逢春	合同
志高	三槐
月寶	合海
正順	九官
坤山	太平
漢雲	火官
江祠	日山
福孫	天良
光明	并利
有利	元貫
只得	萬金
必得	青元
茂林	元吉
青雲	吉品
天申	安士

音會

合共銀

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Chinese

525 Five Beggars, viz. :—

Tan Kiat Pin, Tioh Guan Kiat, So Cheng Guan, Tioh Ban Kim and Chi Guan Kwi.

The Lottery is thus conducted in the Straits :—A person wishing to open it, issues a notice that on a certain date he will open Hua-Hoey under a certain chop and that he will be responsible to all winners who stake up to such and such an amount either with him or his agents.

These Agents go round, and, according to agreement, are allowed to receive stakes up to a certain limit, say $2, but on their own account they may receive larger stakes. They carry what are usually termed *hongs*, *i. e.*, papers on which the stakes are entered. In case the staker is well known to the agent, no acknowledgment is given, but the staker may receive a ticket or scrap of paper, or else he writes down on a slip of paper, which he hands to the agent, the names of the animals he wishes to stake on and the amount. The accompanying is a specimen of the staking papers used in Hua-Hoey.

1	White fish—Cham Khoi
2	Shell or Dragon—Pan Kwi
3	Goose (White)—Eng Seng
4	Peacock—Hong Chun
5	Lion or Earth-worm—Chi Koh
6	Rabbit or Tortoise—Guat Poh
7	Pig—Cheng Sun
8	Tiger—Kun San
9	Buffalo—Han Hun
10	Alligator or Dragon—Kang Su
11	White Dog—Hok Sun
12	White Horse—Kong Beng
13	Elephant—Yu Li
14	White Cat or Dog—Chi Taik
15	Mouse—Pit Taik
16	Wasp or Bee—Mow Lim
17	Stork—Cheng Hun
18	Cat—Thian Sin

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19	Butterfly—Kun Giok
20	Stone or Cricket—Beng Chu
21	Swallow—Siang Chiow
22	Pigeon—Hap Tong
23	Monkey—Sam Wei
24	Frog—Hap Hai
25	Sea Hawk—Kim Kwan
26	Dragon—Thai Peng
27	Tortoise or Duck—Hoey Kwan
28	Cock—Jit San
29	Eel—Thian Liang
30	Turtle or Carp—Cheng Li
31	Lobster—Guan Kwi
32	Snake—Ban Kim
33	Spider—Cheng Guan
34	Sheep or Deer—Guan Kiat
35	Deer or Goat—Kiat Pin
36	Ghost or Fox—An Su

There are, it will be seen, thirty-six columns, at the head of each of which is the sign of one of the Hua-Hoey characters. The marks* (which have a conventional meaning) and figures (Chinese) represent the amount either cents or dollars staked on each animal and the last column is the total of stakes received. A person wishing to stake a large amount, say $5 or $10, on an animal will sometimes write the name on a piece of paper and seal it up, delivering it with the stake to the manager of the Hua-Hoey or an agent.

The lottery is opened twice a day, usually at noon and 6. P.M., and at the appointed hour the winning number (animal) is exhibited, and the result declared in the streets. Previously to this, the agents have brought in their staking papers. If the lottery is worked fairly, of course the manager who declares the winning number should be ignorant as to the amounts staked on the different animals. In China, the papers on which the stakes are entered are folded up in a packet and are not inspected till the winner has been declared, when the winning tickets are chopped and the owners of them are paid.

* Generally entered in pencil.

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In the Straits, these lotteries are not fairly worked, and the animal least favoured by the public is often the winner. Stakers receive thirty times their stake, less a small commission paid to the agent, from whom they receive their winnings, and this leaves a good margin of profit for the bank. A manager, for the sake of gain, or out of spite, has been known to stake by deputy a large amount with one of his agents on the animal which he means to declare as the winner. The agent is "broke" and those who have staked on the winning animal are defrauded of their gains. This is only one of the many ways of swindling practised in regard to these lotteries in the Straits.

It must not be supposed that it is only the Chinese who gamble at Hua-Hoey. The wealthy Baba, born in the Straits, the respectable trader, their wives and daughters, the petty shopkeeper and the coolie who works by the day, Klings and Malays, women and children, all alike are unable to resist the temptation to gamble. The Manila lottery is only drawn once a month. Manila is a long way off, and the chance of winning a prize is very remote, still it has its fascinations for the practical Englishman and even the cautious Scotchman has been known to invest his money in this speculation year after year. The Hua-Hoey lottery is drawn twice every day in different parts of the town and the excitement is ever fresh. An outlay of 10 cents, which is within the means of any coolie, may bring in $3.

Women are largely employed in the Hua-Hoey business, while their husbands are at the shop or sailing (as they appear to be very often). They spend their idle time in collecting stakes and staking themselves. They have diamonds and gold ornaments in profusion, and while any of these remain, they can gamble to their heart's content.* Those lower in the social scale, unblessed with diamonds or ready money, beg, borrow or steal in order that they may gamble.

Dreams play a great part in Hua-Hoey and the confirmed Hua-Hoey player gets to think of nothing else but the chance of his winning on the morrow. According to his dreams, he stakes.

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* A few days ago the wife of a trader in Penang having lost at Hua-Hoey ever $1,000 during his absence tried to commit suicide.—(Febuary, 1886.)

Il: Kynnersley U-3 (no date) 1885 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Chinese

525 It is no exaggeration to say that Hua-Hoey gambling corrupts and brings to ruin thousands of people—men, women and children but how to check it and minimise the evil is a very difficult question.

The common gaming houses in town are well known to the Police They are defended by strong iron barred doors, have ladders, trap-doors and escapes and are always ready for a raid by the Police. Premises have to be hired and fitted up for the purpose, and there is a certain amount of risk in the undertaking, but a Hua-Hoey lottery can be opened anywhere, in a shop, a private house or a Kampong. The result is not often declared at the same place and without a warrant the Police cannot enter a building. All kinds of artifices are practised when the winning number is exhibited in order to escape detection by the Police. Sometimes the character is marked on a piece of yam or sweet potato and swallowed if the Police appear: or it is written on the palm of the hand or on the sand and quickly rubbed out. Instead of the well known Hua-Hoey characters the numbers corresponding with them on the lottery papers are now frequently used and it is extremely difficult for the Police to procure satisfactory evidence against the principals engaged in the business.

The agents with their lottery papers, pencil and stakes collected are sometimes arrested and fined, but it has been held by a learned Judge that the possession of these "tickets," as they are called, is no offence. In Burma it was held by one high judicial functionary that the thirty-six animals game was not gambling within the meaning of the Act in force there.

The more respectable Chinese are fully alive to the widespread mischief caused by these Hua-Hoey lotteries and a memorial, printed as an Appendix to this paper, has been recently addressed to the Legislative Council by certain Chinese inhabitants of Penang praying that most stringent measures should be adopted for their suppression.

C. W. SNEYD KYNNERSLEY.

1 [omitted from file -- Analyst]

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[For information on the distribution of and variations in dramatic and attendant literary forms in Southeast Asia, and the distribution of Sanskirt drama and literature in Southeast Asia, see 21:Htin Aung, AP1 Burma, pp. 34-42; for information on the distribution of puppet and shadow plays in Southeast Asia and comparison to Burmese drama in particular, see 21:Htin Aung, AP1, Burma, pp. 144-149.]

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Southeast Asia AL1

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Whilst thus simplifying the situation, it must be concealed that the Chinese social organization overseas early revealed serious deficiencies. It was not a complete unit of China transplanted, but fragments from various settings placed together in one spot. Different tribes and classes were put into unwonted juxtaposition, and the criminal and unruly element was disproportionately strong (this last fact needs emphasis). Embryo communal or municipal systems were often taken charge of by the deadly Triad society which used them for its own purposes. At the same time, too rigid a distinction has been drawn between the 'benevolent' *kongsis* and the 'malevolent' *huis*, or secret societies: it seems that the two were not separated in this categorical fashion and in fact were sometimes distinct associations with benevolent functions and Triad societies at one and the same time.[1] The shortcomings of the system became very manifest at certain times, as in Java when Chinese secret societies plotted to seize power from the Dutch, and in the Straits Settlements when these societies under the Triad societies got much out of hand and caused riots and practised intimidation for many years, later extending their activities to Perak where they added to the existing disorder until it approached anarchy.

This, however, is a special aspect of Chinese society in the Nanyang and is by no means typical. By and large, the Chinese were very law-abiding and gave the ruling Powers little trouble. Schlegel was right when he said that the Chinese were 'easy to govern'. Indeed this quality has brought them, at times, into the contempt of rough European individualists who have dismissed this tractableness as the characteristic of 'sheep'.

Students of the Chinese language who have ploughed through the *Tsŭ Erh Chih*, Sir Francis Wade's Documentary Series, will remember a number of memorials in which prefects or intendants

[1] The writer, after extensive experience of secret societies and district and clan organization, is sceptical of many of the theories advanced by observers. Schlegel (as we have seen in the chapters on the Kongsis of Borneo) has definitely regarded the Kongsis as a transplanting of municipal organization necessary to the functioning of Chinese society. Yet they were certainly 'secret societies' under Triad or Heaven and Earth League control. Only when countries, such as Malaya, began to legislate to control these societies was a distinction made between 'good' and 'bad' societies: the former were granted registration; the latter, if they functioned without registration, were illegal and, of course, definitely 'secret societies'. The writer is of opinion that a great deal more research into the matter is called for. (W. L. Blythe, 'The Interplay of Chinese Secret and Political Societies in Malaya', in *Eastern World*, March and April 1950, adds considerably to our knowledge.)

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of circuit of the Manchu dynasty related the details of criminal cases. There was a common offence which did not seem to come under the specific provisions of the penal code but was nevertheless heavily penalized, and it was known as 'being involved'. It appeared that to 'be involved', even quite innocently, in the felonies and misdemeanours of others, was itself in the nature of a crime. Indeed this feeling of the blameworthiness of being mixed up in any offence, tragedy, or lawlessness went right through Chinese society. It was not altogether unusual to hear of a Chinese man or woman hanging him- or herself on the doorpost of someone against whom they had a grievance in order to 'involve' him (there would be a judicial inquiry which would, at least, cause the owner of the door great embarrassment), for 'responsibility' is a far-reaching principle in China. This convention was hostile to the growth of public spirit, for a Chinese who saw a crime being committed, or a person in danger or needing assistance, would very likely do nothing for fear of 'being involved'.

This characteristic has persevered down to the present day, and, coupled with a willingness to pay for a quiet life, has been responsible for many Chinese difficulties. Chinese secret societies were able to parcel out the towns and villages in the Nanyang and to exact 'protection money' from shopkeepers and others without effective protest; in a similar way the Chinese community as a whole was willing to conform to all the laws and regulations made by alien Western Governments (whether to them they made sense or not) in return for being left alone. It was the social wisdom of 'Brer Rabbit, he say nuffin''. It was only when regulations proved to be unbearably vexatious that there was an outburst of hysteria followed by calm. This arrangement, convenient to both sides, was responsible for the saying of Gustaaf Schlegel cited above. It is an irony that this very quality, so convenient to European administrators in the past, as we have seen has brought down so much criticism on the heads of the Chinese *Towkays* in Malaya who, unprotected from reprisals, have paid 'protection' money to the Communist terrorists of their own race.

It seems true to say, then, that at the beginning of the twentieth century the Governments of Southeast Asia were conscious of the Chinese as a 'useful' element in their economic systems, and though they had some unpleasant social peculiarities they in no way constituted a danger or a threat. Chinese labour was introduced

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

estation is not a discovery of Western-trained scientists but has long been practiced by certain groups in Southeastern Asia. It was the plan of the government to spread and enforce this practice of artificial reforestation wherever advisable. This practice, whereby the cultivator determines the vegetative cover during the fallow period instead of abandoning the ladang to chance growth, brings him to a transition stage between shifting cultivation and permanent cultivation. From there the step to permanent cultivation with crop rotation is but a short one.

Permanent cultivation requires repeated tilling and therefore more labor and tools than the shifting cultivator is accustomed to. Work animals are also desirable. An important obstacle to intensification of agriculture in wide areas of Southeastern Asia, however, is the fact that hill and mountain regions [up to about 1500 meters in elevation] are frequently infested with malaria so that the energy of the people is greatly reduced.[45] Moreover, the acquisition of such implements as plows, harrows, and hoes, and especially of work animals, calls for financial resources or credit, both of which the average shifting cultivator lacks. Some shifting cultivators do own livestock, such as cattle or carabaos, but utilize neither their labor nor their manure. Groups of the Mois in the mountains of Annam have carabaos, but they do not use the animals in their agricultural activities because they "cannot talk" to them.[46] On the Lesser Sunda Islands livestock is kept because it gives social prestige to the owner. Overstocking of the pasture areas on these islands has led to overgrazing and has cut into the forest area until there has developed a scarcity of land suitable for ladang cultivation. The same has happened in large areas in Africa. There it has been necessary to teach the native peasant the use of cattle and make him familiar with the plow. This was done successfully in northern Nigeria by combining the animal husbandry of the nomadic Fulani with the indigenous shifting cultivation of the Hausa peasant, thus developing "a system of permanent farming whereby a man with cattle of his own, say two working oxen and a few cows, can plough and maintain in fertility an area of land sufficient to supply all the requirements of himself and his family, and to obtain a surplus balance as a return for his labour. . . . Thus mixed farming represents a gradual evolution from the shifting methods of cultivation to a static type of agriculture, by the introduction of animal husbandry, and with the use of animal cultivation."[47] Above all, the peasant learns to preserve the animal manure and

a shade tree; *Dolichos lablab* L., a climbing herb which is valuable as a vegetable; *Crotolaria anagyroides* H.B. and K., a bush of vigorous growth which attains a height of from 12 to 14 feet and forms an excellent green manure; *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., low shrubs useful as green manures; and *Mimosa invisa* Mart., a leguminous creeper which suppresses grasses.

[45] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 181 and 350.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 354.

[47] King: "Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1939, p. 271. See also Faulkner and Mackie: West African Agriculture, 1933; and by the same authors: "The Introduction of Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1936, pp. 89–96.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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Chapter III

THE SEDENTARY CULTIVATOR

241 Sedentary, or permanent, cultivation of land is much more vital to the economy of the countries of Southeastern Asia than is shifting cultivation. The majority of peasant cultivators obtain their livelihood by tilling the same piece of land year after year. The continuously utilized arable land, however, is not all cultivated in the same way throughout Southeastern Asia. We may distinguish three main categories of arable land: garden land, surrounding the houses and villages; wet land; and dry land. These three classes of land are devoted to different crops and vary so much from one another in size and reliability of yields, and therefore in value that in Java, for example, the social status of a man depends upon the type of land that he cultivates. There are districts in Java where only those peasants who own wet land, houses, and garden land have the full rights of a villager.

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The Garden Plot

244 Garden culture on land surrounding peasant houses in Java is devoted to a large variety of crops, ranging from fruit trees to plants that are not required in large quantities but only to supplement the diet and add flavor to the daily rice meal. Ochse and Terra, who have made exhaustive studies of garden culture, are of the opinion that it is a remnant of "primitive grainless hoe culture," in which all the useful plants found in the forest were concentrated in plots near the dwellings. Originally, the number of plants grown in the garden was greater than it is today, for some plants have been taken out of this economy to be grown on a larger scale in fields. The origin of garden culture explains, according to Ochse and Terra, the truly amazing variety of plants that are found on garden land.[1] Sollewijn Gelpke, a leading expert on native agriculture in Java during the past century, remarked on the richness of the gardens:

> Whoever strolls around a compound and takes things in with a botanical eye will see before him a variety of plants of which the uninitiated can have no conception. . . . Such wealth of vegetation is still more impressive to him who approaches it from an economic point of view. He sees palms, bamboo, bananas, and other trees that resemble each other closely, bearing fruit and giving support to various climbing plants.[2]

244 137 Often one is able to distinguish three levels, or stories, in a garden. The ground story consists of low-growing plants, especially tuberous plants that tolerate shade, such as elephant yam (*Amorphophallus campanulatus* Bl.), white arrowroot (*Maranta arundinacea* L.), "purple arrowroot" (*Can-*

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1 Ochse and Terra: "Het onderzoek," 1934. See also Terra: "De voeding der bevolking," 1932, pp. 552–593.

2 Sollewijn Gelpke: Naar aanleiding, 1901, p. 203.

2:Purcell G-4 ([illegible]te) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
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this was a policy which the British neglected to pursue with any conviction, and the post-war experiment in this direction, the Malayan Union, was abandoned at the first sign of opposition. Unless a true 'Malayan citizenship' can be made effective, the ideal of a Malayan nation forming, as it were, a buffer State between China, Indonesia, and India, with bonds with all three but belonging to none, will remain a phantom.

In the present crisis the great and deplorable weakness of the Chinese in Southeast Asia is the absence of effective leadership (and the few notable exceptions to this generalization do not affect its truth). This is due in large part to the fact that there has grown up no Chinese middle class of sufficient proportions to provide disinterested, well-educated, and competent individuals in the numbers needed to guide their community through the reefs of politics towards a safe anchorage. The business leaders are so busy making money (or endeavouring not to lose it) that few of them have time to devote to public affairs even if they had the will and the knowledge. In Malaya, at least, the Indian stands in sharp contrast to the Chinese, and in Singapore Indian representation on the various bodies is vastly greater in proportion to their numbers than is the case with the much more numerous Chinese. This is not explicable solely by Chinese political pique but must be due largely to the training in politics and administration the Indians received in their own country during the British Raj. In Malaya, Indonesia, and Indochina the British, Dutch, and French have neglected to afford opportunities for the Chinese residents to acquire a knowledge of affairs. The penalty of this neglect is that now, when European control is loosening, the mass of the Chinese have few leaders to take control and to consolidate their community in face of the Communist advance. The lack of experience and education determines also the quality of the Communist leadership in these regions. Among the Malayan Communists are no Mao Tse-tungs or Chou En-lais and scarcely any individuals with more than the rudimentary mis-education obtainable in Chinese vernacular schools. The result is that the old professional bandit (always a feature of Malaya's jungle-fringe) is more prominent than he would otherwise be, and terrorism is unmitigated by constructive politics. Is it, therefore, strange that in 1949 the majority of Nanyang Chinese were 'sitting on the fence' awaiting the final upshot in China and its repercussions overseas? In such

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
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43: Jenks E-5 (1902-1903) 1905 OA1 Philippines
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½ [Cf. pp. 48(E)-48(H), category 116. -- Analyst]

The a′-to ceremonials of Chakong are held in the pa-ba-fu′-nan of neighboring a′-to, as in Sigichan, Pudpudchog, or Filig, and this seems partially to destroy the *esprit de corps* of the unfortunate a′-to.

Each a′to has a fa′-wi building—a structure greatly resembling to the pa-ba-fu′-nan, and impossible to be distinguished from it by one looking at the structure from the outside. The fa′-wi and pa-ba-fu′-nan are shown in Pls. XXX, XXXI, and XXXII. ½ Pl. XXIX shows a section of Sipaat a′-to with its fa′-wi and pa-ba-fu′-nan. The fa′-wi is the a′-to council house; as such it is more frequented by the old men than by the younger. The fa′-wi also shelters the skulls of human heads taken by the a′-to. Outside the pueblo, along certain trails, there are simple structures also called "fa′wi," shelters where parties halt for feasts, etc., while on various ceremonial journeys.

The fa′-wi and pa-ba-fu′-nan of each a′-to are near together, and in five they are under the same roof, though there is no doorway for intercommunication. What was said of the pa-ba-fu′-nan as a social center is equally true of the fa′-wi; each is the lounging place of men and boys, and the dormitory of unmarried males.

In Samoki each of the eight a′-to has only one public building, and that is known simply as "a′-to."

One is further convinced of an extensive early movement of the primitive Malayan from its pristine nest by the presence of institutions similar to the pa-ba-fu′-nan and fa′-wi over a vast territory of the Asiatic mainland as well as the Asiatic Islands and Oceania. That these widespread institutions sprang from the same source will be seen clearly in the quotations appearing in the footnote below.[1] The visible exponent of the institutions is a building forbidden to women, the functions of which are several; it is a dormitory for men—generally unmarried men—a council house, a guardhouse, a guest house for men, a center for ceremonials of the group, and a resting place for the trophies of the chase and war—a "head house."

[1] Major Godwin-Austen says of the Gāro hill tribes, Bengal, India:

"In every village is the 'bolbang,' or young men's house. * * * In this house all the unmarried males live, as soon as they attain the age of puberty, and in this any travelers are put up."—The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, vol. II, p. 393. See also op. cit., vol. XI, p. 199.

S. E. Peal says:

"Barracks for the unmarried young men * * * are common in and around Assam among non-Aryan races. The institution is here seen in various stages of decline or transition. In the case of 'head-hunters' the young men's barracks are invariably guard-houses, at the entrance to the village, and those on guard at night keep tally of the men who leave and return."—Op. cit., vol. XXII, p. 248.

Gertrude M. Godden writes at length of the young men's house of the Nāgā and other frontier tribes of northeast India: "Before leaving the Nāgā social customs one prominent feature of their village society must be noticed. This is the *dekha chang*, an institution in some respects similar to the bachelors' hall of the Melanesians, which again is compared with the *balai* and other public halls of the Malay Archipelago. This building, also called a *Morang*, was used for the double purpose of a sleeping place for the young men and as a guard or watch house for the village. The custom of the young men sleeping together is one that is constantly noticed in accounts of the Nāgā tribes, and a like custom prevailed in some, if not all, cases for the girls. * * *

43: Jenks E-5 (1902-1903) 1905 OA1 Philippines
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OLAG

The o'-lâg is the dormitory of the girls in an a'-to from the age of about 2 years until they marry. It is a small stone and mud-walled structure, roofed with grass, in which a grown person can seldom

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"The young men's hall is variously described and named. An article in the Journal of the Indian Archipelago, 1848, says that among the Nágás the bachelors' hall of the Dayak village is found under the name of 'Mooring.' In this all the boys of the age of 9 or 10 upward reside apart. In a report of 1854 the 'morungs' are described as large buildings generally situated at the principal entrances and varying in number according to the size of the village; they are in fact the main guardhouse, and here all the young unmarried men sleep. In front of the morung is a raised platform as a lookout, commanding an extensive view of all approaches, where a Nágá is always kept on duty as a sentry. * * * In the Morungs are kept skulls carried off in battle; these are suspended by a string along the wall in one or more rows over each other. In one of the Morungs of the Changuae village, Captain Brodie counted one hundred and thirty skulls. * * * Besides these there was a large basket full of broken pieces of skulls. Captain Holroyd, from whose memorandum the above is quoted, speaks later of the Morung as the 'hall of justice' in which the consultations of the clan council * * * are held. * * *

"The *'Morangs'* of another tribe, the 'Naked' Nágá, have recently been described as situated close to the village gate, and consist of a central hall, and back and front verandas. In the large front veranda are collected all the trophies of war and the chase, from a man's skull down to a monkey's. Along both sides of the central hall are the sleeping berths of the young men. * * *

"Speaking of the Mao and Muran tribes [continues Miss Godden], Dr. Brown says, 'the young men never sleep at home, but at their clubs, where they keep their arms always in a state of readiness.' * * *

"With the Aos at the present day the custom seems to be becoming obsolete; sleeping houses are provided for bachelors, but are seldom used except by small boys. Unmarried girls sleep by twos and threes in houses otherwise empty, or else tenanted by one old woman.

"The analogy between the *Dakha Chang*, or *Morang*, of the Nágás and the men's hall of the Melanesians is too close to be overlooked, and in view of the significance of all evidence concerning the corporate life of early communities a description of the latter is here quoted. I am aware of no recorded instance of the women's house, other than these Nágá examples. 'In all the Melanesian groups it is the rule that there is in every village a building of public character where the men eat and spend their time, the young men sleep, strangers are entertained; where as in the Solomon Islands the canoes are kept; where images are seen, and from which women are generally excluded; * * * and all these no doubt correspond to the *balai* and other public halls of the Malay Archipelago.'"—Op. cit., vol. XXVI, pp. 179-182.

Similar institutions appear to exist also in Sumatra.

In Borneo among the Land Dyaks "head houses," called "pangah," are found in each village Low says of them: "The Pangah is built by the united efforts of the boys and unmarried men of the tribe, who, after having attained the age of puberty, are obliged to leave the houses of the village; and do not generally frequent them after they have attained the age of 8 or 9 years."—Sir Hugh Low, Sarawak, Its Inhabitants and Productions (London, 1848), p. 280.

Lieutenant F. Elton writes of the natives of Solomon Islands: "In every village they have at least one so-called tamboo house of *tohe*, generally the largest building in the settlement. This is only for the men, it being death for a female to enter there. It is used as a public place and belongs to the community. Any stranger coming to the village goes to the tamboo house and remains there until the person he is in quest of meets him there."—The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, vol. XVII, p. 97.

Mr. H. O. Forbes writes of the tribes of Timor (islands between New Guinea and Australia) that they have a building called "Uma-lulik." He says: "The *lulik* can be at once recognized, were it by nothing else than by the buffalo crania with which it is decorated on the outside. An officer who holds one of the highest and certainly the most influential positions in the kingdom has charge of the building, and presides over the sacred rites which are conducted in them. * * * The building is cared for by some old person, sometimes by a man and his wife, but they must not both—being of opposite sex—stay all night."—Op. cit., XIII, pp. 411, 412.

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7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

type of education with their religious teaching did their resources permit'. Some, however, are suspicious of efficiency. '*Education*', wrote Bishop Weston, 'is in danger of killing Africans, soul and body. I view with great alarm the movement for educating Africans as quickly as possible.... Education is the right of Africa—but education as practised at present will be Africa's curse.'[1]

The restriction of official support to the more 'efficient' type of missionary school reacts on female education. In Africa since 1925, as in India since the time of Curzon, the importance of female education as a means of promoting social welfare has been emphasized. There was the same apprehension that was felt in Java as to Moslem reactions, but in 1936 experience was held to justify the reaffirmation of this principle with greater confidence, and female instruction went ahead—to the prejudice of female education. In the domestic education of women the missionaries were doing useful work. 'There are few stations where some girls or women are not receiving a valuable if limited training in the domestic sciences or in the care of children, in nursing or midwifery, or as teachers.'[2] This was education—learning a new way of life not from text-books but by example and experience in an appropriate environment; but it could not be tested by examinations, or easily be recognized by grants conditional on any mass criterion of efficiency, and financial limitations and the doctrine of efficiency are causing the withdrawal of official grants from most of such schools. In Burma the American Baptists have done similar work among the Karens, with the indirect result that, among all the native peoples, the Karen Christians show far the highest percentage of female literacy. But that is not all. Many Karen girls after passing through the high schools, or even the university, willingly return to domestic duties in the village and the home. It is different with the Burmese. Despite the tradition of female literacy, there was no systematic provision of instruction for the girls. The women do most of the petty trade and, when the British Government opened schools to them, the girls in towns hastened to take advantage of their new opportunities. But it is only of late years that many have sought more advanced education in western schools, and these seem to be actuated by the same motive as their brothers, the desire to get 'a decent job'.[3] Whether female 'education' among westernized Burmese

[1] Maynard Smith, H., *Frank, Bishop of Zanzibar* (1926), p. 257.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1229, 1231, 1255.
[3] *RPI*, 1927–32, p. 25.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

871 will produce better mothers, or birth control and cheaper typists, 562 is a question for the future.

9. Vernacular Education

872 So far we have been dealing in the main with western education, and have seen that the prospect of gain is sufficient to crowd the schools beyond capacity, but only so far, and in such directions, as they lead to a remunerative certificate; and that all values, other than examination values, are at a discount. Primary vernacular education provides the obverse of this picture because, in general, it does not pay; it is merely an instrument of human welfare. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century the diffusion of general enlightenment in India through primary instruction has been a main objective of humanitarian sympathy; this principle was adopted and placed in the forefront of official policy from the middle of the century, and it was reaffirmed by Curzon at its close. Yet the progress achieved 'is shown by statistics admitted by the highest educational authorities to be thoroughly unsatisfactory',[1] and in Burma, which started the nineteenth century under native rule with a literate male population, the picture of primary instruction after a hundred years of British rule is 'one of almost unrelieved gloom'.[2] For over a hundred years there has been general agreement in India that primary instruction is the most effective instrument of material and moral welfare, yet, so far as there has been any progress under either head since the time of Wilberforce and Carey, it certainly cannot be attributed to the spread of primary instruction. This has not spread because there has been no demand for it. Now that it is again proclaimed with new insistence as the chief aim of modern educational policy in the tropics generally, some examination of the grounds on which it has been advocated seems expedient. Apart from humanitarian considerations they fall under two heads, political and economic.

872 Many have urged the spread of vernacular instruction on grounds 21 of political convenience. Curzon cited with approval the dictum that 'among all sources of administrative difficulty and political danger, few are so serious as the ignorance of the people'.[3] This view is still widely held. Mass education is recommended as a safeguard against explosive temper liable to produce a social upheaval. One is told that 'an increase of literacy makes the people easier to control and govern',

[1] Mayhew, *India*, p. 226. [2] *CVV*, p. 156.
[3] *RPI* (India), 1897–1902, p. 462; *Mass Education*, p. 7; Mayhew, *India*, p. 226.

113, 563, 575 Southeast Asia AL1

[For information on the origin of the Thien-Ti-Hui Society and the traditional happenings on which the ceremonies are based, see 39: Pickering, AN1 Malaya, category 116. --Analyst]

113, 648, 721, 175, 563 Southeast Asia AL1

[For information on the history of the distribution of peoples and political entities in Southeast Asia, and for the history of relations amongst the states of Southeast Asia and the relations between the French in Indochina and the states of Southeast Asia, see 115: Le Boulanger, AM1, Indochina, category, 116. --Analyst]

113, 563, 575 Southeast Asia AL1

[For information on the initiation ceremony and meeting house of the Ghee Hin Society in Singapore, see 41: Pickering, AN1 Malaya, Cat. 116. --Analyst]

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

Trade in Fish

228 Apart from that fish eaten fresh on the coasts, the bulk is preserved for commerce and for storing during seasons when the sea is too violent, by sun-drying, salting or by conversion into one of the highly-spiced, partly-fermented fish sauces widely admired by Southeast Asia people (i.e. *blachan* in Malaya, *trassie* in Java, *nuoc mam* in Indochina, *kapi* in Siam, *ngapi* in Burma). Huge quantities of fish in these forms move inland within each country and there has developed a considerable movement of preserved fish between the different Southeast Asia territories, to supply the plantation and industrial workers. From Siam and Indochina alone preserved fish to the value of about $12 million was exported each year before the war. That fish preserving is widely practised even for local use means that the activity is very largely buffered from the alternations of glut and scarcity which are common in fishing industries. The transport of the preserved fish both internally and externally tends to be by sea for cheapness, a paramount consideration in a food for peasants, and because there are few alternatives. Only in a few areas is there a speedy land service able to deliver fresh fish to inland urban centres.

563 228 Commercialisation of fishing has brought in foreign personnel. Whenever fishing is carried on for export as cash sales, Chinese are frequently the principal fishermen, as at Bagansiapiapi (Sumatra) and Pangkor (Malaya), in the deep-sea fishing centred on Singapore (once associated with the Japanese) and even in the cultivation of fish in Javanese ponds. Moreover, Chinese are strongly represented as the middlemen who handle the trade from the actual fisherman to the ultimate consumer, and they are generally responsible for processing the wet fish into transportable forms.

Freshwater Fishing

226 While the absence of deep-sea and mechanical mass fishing methods is one peculiarity of Southeast Asia, equally remarkable is the emphasis on freshwater fishing. Very largely the methods of freshwater fishing—traps and small nets—have established the styles used for inshore sea fishing. For the most part the value of this freshwater production cannot be gauged though it has major importance in local diet. Two variations of freshwater fishing

5; Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

have exceptional interest. In Indochina the Tonle Sap fisheries represent the most productive of the natural fresh fisheries, and in Java has been developed a large cultivation of fish in ponds. 226

From Tonle Sap over 25 tons of fish are produced annually from each square mile of its surface, a productivity ten times greater than that of the well-fished North Sea of Europe, and unique in its intensity. This exceptional production is possible because the large area covered from early June by shallow floods enables fish to spawn profusely in about 3,000 square miles of inundated forest, where abundance of vegetable matter makes the fish grow larger than those in any of the neighbouring rivers. Over 30,000 persons are normally fishing this lake and the full-time fishermen live in villages of pile dwellings scattered round it; of these lake-side fishing villages Snoc Trou is the most important. A considerable number of migrant fishermen, Annamese, Chinese and Malay, move into this area temporarily for the peak fishing season from October to January. Over 135,000 tons of fish are obtained annually and half of this is dried before leaving the region; some fish are sent alive towards the estuary of the Mekong in floating cages of bamboo enclosing what is virtually an artificial shoal moving through the water to the market, an ingenious device for transporting live fish. The commercial side of this fishing is almost entirely Chinese. Over-fishing has been going on in recent years and controls are becoming necessary. 228 563

In Java two types of pond fishing have been evolved. Near Batavia, Sourabaya and Semarang where the demand for fish is great, mangrove swamps are partially enclosed to control the tidal water and into the enclosures are placed, between April and July, the spawn and young sea fish gathered among bundles of leaves which fishermen have previously placed in the open sea for the purpose. The spawn and young fish are carried to the fishponds in jars and there left to fatten on algae and water weeds cultivated for them. The milkfish (Chanos chanos) is popular for this purpose and reaches marketable size within a year. Elsewhere inland artificial freshwater ponds have been built, covering a total area estimated at over 100,000 acres, in which fish of the carp type are bred and fattened all the year round; 65,000 tons of fish are obtained every year by this means. Freshwater fisheries are now encouraged in every little tank or pond as a form of mosquito control. 228

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
Southeast Asia AL1

175 was suggested by Furnivall as a cause of the foundation of
439 Indian trading centers at convenient sites along the coasts
648 and main rivers of Southeast Asia. The same author places the date of the first Indian colonization in the area at about 150 A.D.[8] Harrison, however, maintains that the first definite Indian settlements were established in the first century A.D.[9]

175 Indian settlements were typically colonial in the
177 old sense of foreign settlement without foreign rule. The
563 settlers came as traders, intermarried with the local people,
648 acquired wealth, and formed an aristocracy. Then, as new migration ceased, the Indian rulers and aristocracy were absorbed into the people. In the inscriptions, the language and written characters took on native forms, and the names of persons and places were no longer Indian but native. Similarly, in the religious monuments and other buildings a native style was superimposed on the earlier Indian models.

175 Most authors have credited these Indian settlers
177 with having brought Indian culture to Southeast Asia. Harrison,
648 for example, takes for granted that "Indians who voyaged overseas to Southeast Asia naturally brought with them the ideas and practices of Hinduism and Buddhism."[10] He further speculates that "traders, adventurers and craftsmen were followed by Brahman and Buddhist priests and teachers,

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8. Ibid., p. 127.

9. Brian Harrison, South-east Asia (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1954), p. 10.

10. Ibid., p. 12.

175 carrying the civilizing influence of Indian cultural and
177 spiritual life and implanting it in these new lands by
648 introducing the art of writing and the classical Sanskrit language and literature; bringing as well their own vernacular languages to enrich the vocabularies of Southeast Asia.[11]

175 It may be argued, nevertheless, that since there is little
177 good evidence for any large Indian emigration to Southeast
439 Asia, much Indian culture could have been brought back by
648 cosmopolitanized Southeast Asian traders who often spent months in India waiting for the monsoons to change their direction.[12] It should be noted in this connection that during this time of early Indian colonization trade relations were also extended westward by Indonesians (who earlier reached Madagascar) and other Southeast Asians.

175 During the expansion of Islam, from 1350 to 1500,
648 Moslem colonization followed the Indian pattern. Thus we may say that formerly a colony was merely a settlement in a foreign land and the settler had little or no political
[797] connection with the home land. The Indian and Moslem became foreign rulers, but they did not establish foreign rule. Subsequently, the Portuguese and Spaniards came as royal agents and with a warrant from the Pope to undertake both
175 the conquest and conversion of the people. The old idea
648
563 of a colony as a settlement survived: there were grandees

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11. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

12. The author is indebted to Professor Lauriston Sharp for the development of this idea.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
Southeast Asia AL1

175 with large estates, permanent immigrants of lower rank who
648 married native women, and priests spending a lifetime in
• 563 their parishes. But the colonies were ruled by Governors from Europe. They were both settlers and rulers. The Dutch came merely as traders, but they could obtain tropical produce only in the form of tribute; economic circumstances required them to accept sovereignty on behalf of the home company and to rule the people indirectly through native chieftains, and also to settle permanently, though on a comparatively small scale, to supervise native cultivation. They were primarily rulers and were settlers only by force of circumstance. In the 19th century the English carried the process a stage further. Through the industrial revolution they had goods to sell, and the object of their policy was not tribute but trade. This required direct rule, but not settlement, except in the ports. Finally, with the growth of capitalism and the opening of the Suez Canal, the typical system of colonial development was by foreign capital with European management and imported Asian labor. Thus there was a process of development from the old colonial system of foreign settlement without foreign rule to a new system of foreign rule without settlement.[13]

Impact of the Changing Trend of Trade with the West

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648 In the nineteenth century, the age-old means of communication between the different parts of Southeast Asia

13. Furnivall, op. cit.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
Southeast Asia AL1

433 affected by these few importing countries' determination
648 to be self-sufficient in food.

181 A dual economy as a distinctive character of colonial
433 rule is a theory propounded by some Dutch economists who contend that in tropical dependencies there are two distinct systems of economy. In the Western sector economic forces act in strict accordance with the economic laws enunciated by the earlier classical economists; but in the Eastern sector these laws have no force, and Western economic principles are inapplicable. The Western sector is ultra-capitalist since economic forces act freely, not even subject to the social inhibitions which still restrain them in Europe or the Western world; the Eastern sector, on the other hand, is precapitalist, with prestige carrying more weight than profit and communal influence restraining the individual desire of gain.[17] One
433 of the consequences of a dual economy is that it is difficult
438 to conduct business because the people will not trade on
439 Western lines. Inefficiency in trade leads to high operational cost and thus to social waste. Moreover, there is a likelihood of exploitation of indigenous people by Western traders as well as by foreigners of Asian origin who are free from social restraint.
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563 One feature that has long been common to the countries of Southeast Asia and is so obvious that it could not fail

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17. J. S. Furnivall, "Cooperation, Competition, and Isolation," Southeast Asia in the World Today, ed. Phillips Talbot, op. cit., p. 71.

563 to impress even the most unreflecting sight-seer is the medley of ethnic groups. What is almost equally apparent
563 is that these ethnic groups do not mix. Each has its own
571 quarter, its own temple, its club or other meeting ground for social functions, its own forms and places of entertainment and recreation. They do not meet in these places but only in the market place to make money out of one another or perhaps with one another. They have no common link except in business. What is not quite obvious is that each ethnic group has its own special economic function. There is a plural society with its own distinctive and characteristic plural economy.

563 Typically, a plural society in Southeast Asia com-
565 prises three main sections: the Europeans, constituting an
433 upper class; the foreign orientals, Indian or Chinese, consti-
571 tuting a middle class; and the great mass of the native population in the lower class. The Europeans and foreign orientals are temporary residents, strangers to one another or at best casual acquaintances, and the native community is little more than a crowd of individuals. In the relations between the classes, there are no social ties to dull the edge of economic competition. Within each class, inherited traditions lose their force. Society as a whole is divided into groups; each group is merely a collection of individuals, and in each group life is simplified to an economic struggle for existence. Social life is reduced to its economic content, society is converted into a business concern, and only the

563 foreign army of occupation has preserved it from disruption.
565 The essential and distinctive character of a plural society
433
571 is that it is dominated by economic forces, and, outside a few partly sheltered oases, Southeast Asia illustrates the capitalist system in its purest form.[18]

162 Another common feature is the dominance of the agri-
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433 cultural section of the population. The latest available
171 figures show the percentage proportions of population dependent on agriculture in the area as follows: Burma, 68; Indonesia, 66; Philippines, 69; Thailand, 85.[19] The same source indicates the proportions for various regions of the world as follows: North America, 20; Oceania, 30; Europe, 33; South America, 60; Asia, 70; and Africa, 74.

171 With the prevailing techniques of production and the
433 consequent low productivity per man, dominance of agriculture
434 means low per capita national income. When countries are grouped by level of economic development on the basis of per capita national income as of 1950, all the six countries of Southeast Asia -- Burma, Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaya, Philippines, and Thailand -- fall in the underdeveloped
443 group.[20] Moreover, there is in Southeast Asia a true surplus
464 population on the land in the sense that even under the
161 present methods of cultivation a sizeable fraction of the

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18. Ibid., p. 77.

19. Food and Agriculture Organization, 1953 Yearbook, Vol. VII.

20. Eugene Staley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), pp. 16-17.

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Chinese
Indians

464 years of the present century, the flow of immigration has been large and
167 comparatively steady except during the depression and the two world wars. Chinese and Indian immigrants usually could better their position soon after arrival because their industry and organization were superior to those of the indigenous peoples. Partly because of this, there were constantly new arrivals willing to do coolie work until they too could
[178] rise economically. Except for the large-scale repatriations to China and India caused by the depression, the flow of labor thus set into motion was adequate for the economy prevailing in the underpopulated areas until changing conditions created a growing class of landless proletariat and
[668] dissatisfaction among both the indigenous and immigrant peoples. This dissatisfaction often became associated with other motivations in nationalist movements.

Controlled migrations occurred only between regions under the same government or those held by governments of the same nationality, except for a limited migration of Javanese labor to Malaya (and to New Cale-
[166] donia). In the Netherlands Indies and in Indochina the governments endeavored to transplant groups of laborers from overpopulated to underpopulated areas, but in so doing they learned that the process required careful organization, was expensive, and raised serious economic, social, and psychological problems. Such movements could be effected successfully on a limited scale only. This fact obviated the possibility of their contributing substantially to solution of the problem of overpopulation. As labor supply, such migrations were only temporarily satisfactory, because social and religious ties inclined the workers to return to their home villages immediately upon the expiration of their contracts or even to desert. To stabilize this labor force some of the governments tried after the depression to obtain a better adjusted sex ratio in the migrant population by encouraging the immigration of workers' families and the establishment of agricultural villages—a program too recently initiated to make possible a definite appraisal of its comparative success or failure. In Malaya, with the exception of a few Javanese, planned immigration was confined to Indian laborers. It was arranged and operated jointly by the two British governments concerned. There, however, the depression, the growth in voluntary Indian immigration, and India's ban in 1938 on assisted emigration to Malaya tended to render many of the official controls unnecessary. The unplanned and uncontrolled movement of labor across the Burma-India frontier was the sole migration of its type in Southeast Asia.

• 563 The indigenous populations in general hold themselves socially aloof
609 from the alien Asiatics. To the Muslim Malays the Chinese were materialistic, pork-eating idolators; and the Indians, with the exception of the small Islamic minority, were similarly disdained, though regarded as less aggressive. To the sinicized Annamites, the Burmese, and the Siamese,

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Chinese

religion was no barrier between themselves and the Chinese; all were Buddhists, though of differing sects. Chinese culture had long been admired by the peoples of Farther India, and had influenced them. Moreover, the Chinese were regarded as distant and desirable relatives. With the advent, however, of Chinese women and the accelerated growth of Chinese nationalism after the first world war, intermarriage occurred less frequently (though it continued to be common in Burma and Cambodia), and the indigenous peoples had few social contacts with the Chinese in their midst. The cleavage between the ethnic groups was further widened in the British colonies by the official policy of representation of various communities on legislative and advisory bodies. 563 609

Economically, relations between the indigenous and the immigrant peoples altered from a mosaic of non-conflicting occupations to one of rapidly increasing competition. For years the native peoples had contentedly seen the arrival of thousands of immigrants annually who were able and willing to perform the hard labor for which they themselves had neither inclination nor compulsion. Through much of the region, however, during the inter-war period an indigenous proletariat was developing as a result of the transfer of farm land from the indebted native peasantry to non-agriculturists, often to alien moneylenders, and also because of the growth of a Western-inspired individualism which was weakening family ties once paramount. The trend was apparent chiefly in parts of Burma, Siam, and Indochina. 464 477 178 425 177

This development did not assume significant proportions until the world economic depression, when considerable unemployment arose out of the drop in prices and the curtailment of foreign markets for products of Southeast Asia. The result was a swift increase in the number of natives seeking to return to their villages and, on the other hand, of those forced to seek part-time or full-time employment away from their villages in competition with immigrant laborers for work previously scorned as arduous, monotonous, and underpaid. 464 458 178

Meanwhile the native middle classes for the first time faced a serious unemployment problem. Until the depression years, the opportunities for desirable though moderately paid employment in government or business had seemed to exceed the number of qualified candidates. The depression made it clear that the saturation point had been reached, and each year an increasing number of educated youths would be thwarted in their expectation of employment or, if given a job, in their rise to higher positions. Thus two groups of economically frustrated natives developed simultaneously in numbers and in consciousness in the decade prior to the second world war. 464 178 563

Nascent political factors became significant during that period. The struggles of the Chinese against the Japanese and of Indians against British rule were reflected in the attitudes of the emigrants from those coun- 464 668

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Chinese Indians

464 tries. Although this was truer of the immigrant Chinese than of the
668 immigrant Indians, the comparative inertia of the latter was compen-
563 sated for by a more aggressive championship of their cause on the part of their compatriots at home. In the case of Malaya, where the indigenous population was numerically weak and psychologically passive, the Central Indian Association of Malaya and the Congress Party leaders prodded the Government of India to exert pressure upon the officials at
[167] Singapore and Kuala Lumpur to grant greater economic and political privileges to the Indians in Malaya. The governments and planters of Malaya, however, with the curtailment in their labor needs resulting from the current cut in rubber export, felt free to resist this pressure, even at the price of the embargo placed in 1938 on emigration to Malaya of assisted Indian labor.

464 In the case of the Chinese the situation was different. Smaller num-
668 bers were employed in the rubber industry and larger ones in mining.
563 More of them were able to graduate from contract labor into other occupations, especially retail business, farming, and small trades. They
167 tended to stay longer because of the insecurity of enterprise in south China. Moreover, the home government was in a much weaker position than that of India to exert pressure on the governments of Malaya. These remained free to regulate at their pleasure the spontaneous flow of Chinese immigrants and to keep watch on the political activities of resident Chinese. In Burma, however, the British authorities were unable to keep the situation so well in hand. Serious anti-Indian rioting broke out in 1938, and the strength of the Burman nationalists in the government (especially after separation from India in 1937) enabled it to negotiate an agreement with India restricting the number of Indian immigrants and permitting the exercise of more control over those domiciled in the country.

In Indochina and the Netherlands Indies the governments were able to keep the immigrant problem from assuming intensity because of the smaller proportion of Chinese in relation to the native populations. In all these countries, however, Chinese laborers suffered somewhat from the bad reputation of those of their countrymen who as merchants and moneylenders had acquired an economic power which differed from that of other aliens in that it affected directly and visibly the welfare of large numbers.

464 All the governments, including that of Siam, were compelled by public
668 opinion to exert more control over the immigrant minorities. In so do-
563 ing, they faced unpleasant alternatives. The demand of Chinese and Indian laborers for better working conditions and improved political
167 status was accompanied by a threat to cut off entirely the flow of emigra-
468 tion. Encouraged by nationalist groups, they engaged in strikes and boycotts. If these succeeded, other demands would probably be made; and

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Chinese Indians

the indigenous peoples were not sufficiently willing, numerous, or skilled 464
to replace the immigrant laborers. A higher wage scale, they feared, 668
might compel many firms either to go out of business or to install expen- 563
sive machinery. Already local nationalists, succumbing to the philosophy
of economic self-sufficiency, were demanding intensive programs of gov- 167
ernment-aided industrialization. If such demands were acceded to, the 468
industrialists and labor leaders in the home country could be expected to
protest strongly against the new competition.

In this complex situation, the colonial governments of Southeast Asia [664]
gradually yielded to the popular demands, although loath to abandon
their traditional function as instruments of capitalist planning in the
home countries. With the exception, however, of the embryonic and
ineffective industrial programs of the Siamese and Burmese governments
and the more constructive policy of the Netherlands Indies for a planned
industrialization, none of the countries did much in this direction. None
was forced as yet to consider very seriously that change in colonial rela-
tionship which would result from general economic development in the
world and specifically from the new role that China and India would
inevitably play before long in Southeast Asia. The Japanese invasion
interrupted the efforts of local governments toward a solution of these
labor problems. It also injected new elements into the situation.

2

LABOR ORGANIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

For various reasons an organized labor movement has never developed 467
in Southeast Asia to notable dimensions. In large part this was because 575
of the predominance of alien, transient, and illiterate labor forces, di- 563
vided—even when of the same nationality—by geographical and linguistic
differences. The Indians were further subdivided by caste and religious 668
sect. The Chinese had a far better family, guild, and secret-society
organization; but the antagonisms imported as an integral part of these
organizations provoked periodic violence. Later the political and gang-
ster elements which operated within their framework impelled all the
governments throughout Southeast Asia to control them severely.

National solidarity among the immigrant labor groups was further 166
broken up by the methods of recruitment and management. Agents and 167
foremen exploited their compatriots for their own personal gain, until
the governments concerned were gradually and reluctantly forced to
intervene. Asiatic agents behaved much as recruiting agents of emi-

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Chinese
Indians

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grants to the United States did in Europe until they were checked. They consistently misrepresented to prospective recruits the conditions of work that awaited them, herded them aboard ships and in lodgings under conditions of filth and crowding, and tried to crimp their competitors' labor forces. Immigrant Asiatic foremen also were similar to their prototypes among immigrant foremen in the United States. They were notorious for the "cuts" they took from their crews' wages, for their unscrupulous profiteering from the sale of food and other necessities to the workers, and for their brutality toward those recalcitrant under arbitrary rule. Nor were alien Asiatic employers liberal in their relations with compatriots among their labor forces. Small Chinese-owned estates and mines were regularly cited in the reports of independent labor inspectors as the most delinquent in their observance of health and safety regulations. Singapore Indian shop-owners were the object of unpleasant publicity regarding the long working days, irregular and inadequate wages, and general tyranny meted out to their compatriot assistants. Disinterested labor leadership or even employer paternalism was conspicuously absent among the immigrant groups.

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Working conditions were not much better in the enterprises owned by indigenous employers; but they were less conspicuous than those of the immigrant employer's shop, as most of the native workers are farmers scattered over the land and cared for, when in need, by the traditional village and family organization. Little was done by the native governments, whenever they were in power, to better the lot of the small native farmer-artisan. The Siamese and Burmese governments falteringly attempted to introduce scientific agriculture, to improve cottage industries and to reduce the landless proletariat; but their efforts were directed more toward ousting foreigners who preyed on the people, particularly alien landowners and moneylenders, than toward improving labor conditions of those working for indigenous employers. The Siamese National Assembly, in 1938, turned down a proposal for labor legislation designed to set maximum hours and minimum wages and to restrict child labor. Its policy on labor organization was much the same as that of the colonial governments, that is, to keep the labor forces under control and to exhibit, at most, a certain indulgence toward the formation of unions in some trades or localities where this seemed advantageous.

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Wherever labor legislation was introduced in Southeast Asia, the initiative came from the government and not from the workers. Originally it was the difficulties which European employers experienced in retaining their workers (at first domestic servants and later plantation laborers) that inspired legislation which imposed a penalty upon employees for their non-observance of agreements. Gradually, throughout the region, this penal sanction was abolished and more beneficial types of legislation were introduced to reduce the labor turnover. Considerations of

[686]

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467 of unions in industries the operation of which did not directly affect the public order.

The employers' resistance to unionization derived naturally from their 467 desire to have available an abundant supply of cheap labor. They had on their side, as an argument that must weigh heavily with the govern- 668 ments, the involvement which such organizations as existed were believed to have with subversive political parties and leaders. Commu- 468 nism was reported to be rife among the Chinese labor groups. Indian Congress emissaries were supposed to be stirring up the traditionally docile Indian coolies. The growing wave of strikes and riots which occurred during the second part of the inter-war period, particularly in the middle and late 1930's, had the effect of modifying the opposition of the employer groups. Violence or work stoppages often took place without any formulation of demands or without the workers' support of the spokesman theoretically representing their views. At least some employers therefore began to see the advantage of dealing with responsible labor leaders and of forcing any subversive elements in the workers' associations out into the open.

466 Thus in Malaya, in 1939, legislation was introduced (but not enforced until 1941) authorizing and facilitating the functioning of unions. Em- 467 ployers in Indochina, who also had long opposed unionization, moved similarly in the latter part of the decade toward a recognition of the need for it. In the Netherlands Indies, membership in unions, after a setback in the early 1930's, slowly increased, although by far the largest unions were still composed of government officials and professional men. In [563] Burma, as in Siam, unionization was impeded by the presence of a predominantly alien body of workers to whose welfare the nationals of both countries were either hostile or indifferent. Such organizations as existed survived only insofar as the governments in each country favored them as useful aids in preventing curtailment of production. Their development, however, was controlled lest they harbor elements striving to overthrow the established order.

The loss of their colonies by the Western powers and anti-colonial Japanese propaganda naturally induced a greater consciousness on their part of the existence of labor problems that must be coped with if the larger economic and social programs are to succeed. From the resolutions passed at the International Labour Organization's conference at [648] Philadelphia in 1944,[1] it appears to have been generally recognized that the colonial governments could no longer rely on paternalistic measures or the voluntary cooperation of individual employers.

[1] Bruno Lasker, "A Labor Code for Dependent Peoples," *Far Eastern Survey*, XIII, 12, June 14, 1944, pp. 103-10.

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Indians

Next to the Javanese, the Burmese endured the greatest hardships during the Japanese occupation. Burma was more completely devastated by military campaigns than any other country in the area, and its proximity to India made it Japan's frontier zone. The need to win Burmese cooperation led Japan to grant Burma "independence" on August 1, 1943, and thereafter the local intelligentsia were placated by a Burmanization of the administrative services. But the country's laborers were in a far worse plight than they had been under the British administration. The Indians, whose number in Burma had been halved during the 1942 campaign, were immediately thereafter exposed to persecution by the Burmese. Virtual pogrom conditions in the delta compelled them to flee to Rangoon for Japanese protection and employment. Indian coolies supplied the casual labor needed in the nation's capital, and most of the white-collar class was absorbed into the Indian Independence Leagues and Indian National Army. Burmese laborers, who had long agitated for a restriction of Indian immigration, now found themselves bearing the brunt of Japanese requisitioning, which was represented by the puppet native government as a patriotic service. They had to perform heavy manual labor far from home, for low wages, and under alien and often harsh supervision. They suffered, in addition, from the knowledge that their own fields were neglected and their homes unprotected. Burma was frequently praised by the Japanese for having supplied more cooperative labor service than any other area in the southern regions, but nevertheless Javanese workers had to be brought in. 727 563 [464] [466]

Java, with the greatest labor reservoir of the area, was inevitably the country whose manpower was most intensively exploited by the Japanese. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Javanese served as coolie labor for the construction of defense works and means of communication and also were trained by the Japanese for more technical work in shipyards and in factories. They were shipped by the thousands to areas outside their island as local needs and the exigencies of the military situation dictated. 727 466 167

Originally the Japanese planned to perpetuate, on a far vaster scale, Dutch colonization schemes in Sumatra; in this they not only encountered the same obstacles as had their predecessors, but they found they could exploit all of the island's resources they could use with the manpower and machinery locally available. In mid-1943 they seem to have transferred the plan to Borneo, where additional labor was required to develop such local industries as timber. Many hundreds of male Javanese workers were shipped to Borneo, while smaller groups were sent to other areas. 727 464 166

Unemployment during the Japanese occupation was serious only in Malaya. Elsewhere the defense and economic programs of the Japanese, 727 464

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been traditionally most dependent on imported labor and their prewar labor movements were the most highly developed of any throughout the region. 467 464

Nevertheless, the labor movements in these two countries have taken different paths. Burma is made up of one predominant race, overwhelmingly agricultural and guided by strong nationalist leadership. Development of solidarity among Malaya's laboring class has been retarded by the tripartite ethnic composition of its population and by the country's traditional dependence upon two export industries. Accordingly, Malaya's labor movement has developed schismatic tendencies bordering on mutual hostility and has been influenced by alien Asiatic leadership. While in both countries the British Government has not as yet formulated any policy toward immigrant workers and has thus played into the hands of labor, already in short supply, the effects in the two countries have been quite different. Because of Malaya's lack of a self-sufficient economy, its laborers are in a more favorable position to press their demands. At the same time they suffer from serious internal weaknesses not found in Burma. The government and private firms in Malaya—if the planting-mining economy is to survive—will have to make greater concessions in order to reconstitute an adequate labor force than will the analogous authorities in Burma and Siam.

The special composition of Malaya's population and the organization of its industries are probably responsible for the development of its labor movement from many small unions, organized by subdivisions within trades, into a central association. This pyramidal set-up has been turned upside down in Burma, where labor was at first organized on a very broad basis and then divided into smaller units. In both areas the British Government has been making a marked effort to foster labor unions and at the same time to divorce them from political programs and ideologies. But since the nationalists throughout the area have chosen the labor movement as their chief medium for the achievement of the socio-political revolution they desire, it is unlikely that this attempt will prove successful. The laborers of Southeast Asia still feel themselves to be, above all, members of their own national or ethnic communities and have only secondarily developed a consciousness of a class apart. The whole area is too little industrialized to be fertile ground for a labor movement, strictly speaking. When trade unionism is discussed in referring to the labor movements now budding in Southeast Asia, it should be borne in mind that little more than its nomenclature has been borrowed from Occidental labor organization. 467 [668] [565] [563]

Throughout Southeast Asia the various governments have begged two outstanding questions affecting local labor problems—agricultural indebtedness and land tenancy, and the control of Asiatic immigration. In regard to the former, nothing has been done thus far and one can 466 426 167

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only surmise that a development of the cooperative movements will be furthered as the one policy free from international complications. As to the immigration of Indians and Chinese, the local governments seem unable to chart a course between the Scylla of indigenous nationalist sentiment and the Charybdis of demands from the governments of India and China. The latter today are in a far stronger position than before the war to insist that improved working conditions and greater political privileges be accorded to such of their nationals as they permit to emigrate to Southeast Asia.

Any restoration of the prewar planting-mining economy will depend upon the resumption of Asiatic immigration. But management will be forced to grant better working and living conditions and possibly the governments will have to concede a more privileged political position to immigrant Indian and Chinese laborers. On the other hand, native nationalists throughout the area will try to curtail such immigration and will oppose granting political privileges to alien Asiatics who, they believe, will continue to feel a primary loyalty to their homelands. These opposing forces have already locked horns on the citizenship clause embodied in the Malayan Union plan—the first postwar attempt to ameliorate the political position of alien Asiatics—and the British Government has not yet resolved the equally important immigration issue.

No matter what constitutional changes emerge from the current political crisis in Southeast Asia, the governments set up throughout the area will have to face the same labor and minority problems as did their predecessors. The urge toward industrialization received an impetus from the Japanese occupation, though the synchronous growth in the industries of China and India (not to mention Japan's continuing need for export markets) will offer sharper competition to the nascent industries of the region. Moreover, shortages of labor and fuel in most of Southeast Asia cannot but curtail the expansion of even light industries and may prevent any immediate and effective way of satisfying the desire of nationalists for the establishment of large-scale and heavy industries.

The region seems destined to remain for some time predominantly a source of raw materials and a market for the industrial output of its neighbors. Before the war certain sections of these countries had entered the phase of commercialized agriculture and mining, and of processing the output—distinct advances over the traditional economies. This trend is now being accentuated, although it is influenced by such wartime developments as that of the synthetic-rubber industry. In any case the form of international organization set up to control production and sales will be different from that of the past, in which the colonial producer interests predominated. In the immediate postwar period, world shortages of the commodities produced by Southeast Asia have created a market eager for all its major output.

11: Kynnersley
563, 773, 787

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[For information concerning mythical beings, and the role of dream interpretation in relation to "a description of the Chinese lottery known as Hua-Hoey", see category 116, the entire source.]

called the "Great Tradition" in an agrarian society.[13] 361

The links between country and city in this basically feudal relationship were clear, consecutive, and relatively simple to define. To be sure, the villager would regard the capital as a different world from his own, but it was nevertheless a largely comprehensible world, if associated with abstractions and refinements beyond his immediate ken.[14] 369 184 181

The modern great city of Southeast Asia, however, not only was different but was also incomprehensible to the child of the folk society, who came to regard it not merely as strange and foreign but also as hostile. The "foreignness" is reflected in their ethnic composition. Until the second World War at least the largest population group in Rangoon was Indian; Singapore is primarily a Chinese city; Bangkok is very largely Chinese, as is Saigon if Cholon, its twin city, is included; both Manila and Jakarta have large foreign and Chinese elements. To this extent the great city is more metropolitan than national. Each has its Chinese, European, and native quarters, for example, although in many instances the lines of division have become blurred, especially since the close of the war.[15] Furthermore, wherever Chinese populations are large, a predominant type of house is the so-called "shophouse," a two-or-more-story building with shops on the first floor, built to a standard width originally dictated by the length of the average fir-log lintel as used in South China, and with residential flats and 621 361 369 184 578 162 563 342 347 563 369 184

[13] See Robert Redfield and Milton Singer, "A Cultural Role of Cities," a working paper for the Conference on the Role of Cities in Economic Growth and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, May 24–26, 1954. [113]

[14] Cf. J. M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian City: Its Culture and Evolution," *Asia*, March, 1953.

[15] In Singapore the Chinese are localized according to the various so-called "clans," e.g., Hokkien, Cantonese, Tiuchiu, Hailams, and Hakka (see B. W. Hodder, "Racial Groupings in Singapore," *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, October, 1953).

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342 cubicles behind and above.[16] Usually con-
347 structed in continuous rows and back to back, this type of tenement is among the more conspicuous evils in Southeast Asian
● 563 cities. On the urban peripheries and wher-
369 ever interstices appear in the modern street
184 and housing pattern, slum villages appear which consist of house clusters usually constructed of bamboo and *atap* palm, highly inflammable and unsanitary.[17] These also are found in and on the margins of the lesser cities but are most striking in juxtaposition to the sleek boulevards of Singapore, Bangkok, and Jakarta.

184 A further index of the cultural and eco-
369 nomic pluralism of the great cities is their frequent division into old and new towns.
361 In China, especially in the treaty ports, this distinction is usually between an old Chinese and a modern foreign city. The same is true of India. In Southeast Asia the contrast is most often between an old and a modern town both of Western origin, as in Jakarta, Manila, Singapore, and Rangoon. To a notable degree each of these is also a planned city. In Saigon the contrast is between predominantly Chinese Cholon and Saigon itself. In Bangkok, however, there are the old Siamese castle town, a new town of indigenous origin, though of European design, and a Chinese town or quarter nearly as old as the castle town itself. Pluralism is seen not merely in the division of a city into old and new parts or into quarters but also in the separation of the predominantly outward-oriented great city from an up-coun-

[113] [16] For a description of the "shophouse" see R. H. Hughes, "Hong Kong: An Urban Study," *Geographical Journal*, March, 1951, pp. 9–10.

[17] These areas, the so-called "kampongs," are historically enclaves of the countryside within the city. They form small social cells which together cover most of the surface area in and on the margins of the great cities. Separately, they constitute the rural villages, which in the densely settled portions of Java, for example, are so closely spaced that they collectively exhibit population densities as high as those in many cities (see photographs in J. M. Fraser, "Town Planning and Housing in Singapore," *Town Planning Review*, January, 1953).

504 world's great ports and the most Western of
the great cities of Southeast Asia. A Crown
361 Colony, it is the only great city without a
large administrative hinterland, although it
is the seat of the British High Commissioner
[175] for Southeast Asia. Since its founding by
Raffles in 1819, it has been a free port and an
entrepôt for much of archipelagic Southeast
Asia. About half of the 5.5 million tons of
cargo that pass over Singapore's modern
wharves originates outside of the Malayan
peninsula, and it was not until 1924 that the
island of Singapore was connected by cause-
way with the mainland. At the same time it
handles two-thirds of Malaya's exports and
about three-fourths of its imports by value.
Increasingly, its interests have tended to
focus upon Malaya itself, as its entrepôt
functions have been cut into by the other
great ports within the region, especially
Jakarta. What has kept Singapore the larg-
est port in Southeast Asia (over 20 million
net tons of shipping entered in 1952) is its
status as a free port and its strategic location
at the western entrance to the South China
Sea and the Pacific Ocean basin. As a cross-
road between the Pacific and Indian oceans,
it attracts shipping from great distances. It
[508] also has become an important air center, and
a new airfield is under construction north-
[368] east of the city. Finally, the concentration
of banking, insurance, light industry, dock-
ing, repair, and outfitting facilities have for-
tified its dominant position.

361 Singapore City was originally laid out
with due regard for ethnic quarters.[19] The
● 563 oldest section of the city, however, has be-
come the business center, but the rest of the
older town is a densely populated Chinese
section, and much of the newer town to the
northeast also is Chinese. Each of these
areas is in turn divided on the basis of Chi-
nese clan categories. The European residen-

[18] D. F. Allen, *Report on the Major Ports of Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1951), p. 128.

[19] For a general description of the city see E. H. G. Dobby, "Singapore: Town and Country," *Geographical Review*, January, 1940, and the *Colony of Singapore Annual Report*.

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tial area is primarily on higher ground in the 361
northern part of the city. The University of
Malaya is located in Singapore, though 563 ●
plans are being made to move it to Johore
Baru on the Malayan mainland. Being 162
largely a Chinese city, Singapore has come
to act as a center for the Nan Yang expatri- 361
ate Chinese, and the city has been chosen as
the site of a new Chinese-language regional 184
university.[20] Nevertheless, its air is not that 563
of a Chinese city, nor, for that matter, is it
English. Like all great cities, it is cosmopoli-
tan, but it is also culturally rootless, perhaps
more so than any of the other great cities of
the region.

At the other extreme is Bangkok, most 361
indigenous of the great cities. Founded as 184
the last of a series of "forward capitals"[21] by
the Thai in 1783, after the destruction of 175
Ayuthia by the Burmese, the city has never
lost its native quality. The soaring rooftrees
of *bot* and the spires of stupa stamp the
Bangkok skyline with a character of its own.
The city is located on the left bank of the
Menam Chao Phya within the southern-
most great bend of the river some twenty
miles from its mouth. Exceptional prob- [364
lems of poor drainage plagued the city from 312]
the start, and its numerous *klongs* or canals
have given it the rather misleading title of
the "Venice of the East."

A Chinese city early appeared to the 361
southeast of the original castle town and in
time became part of the central business 34
district. As the lesser *klongs* were filled in to 184
become roads, the city continued to expand.
A new city appeared on the northern out-
skirts of the old, a planned creation built in
the reign of Rama VI with broad boulevards
and buildings ranging from shocking Vic-
torian variations on Italian Renaissance to
more recent battleship modern. The con-
trast between the façade of modern build-
ings fronting these boulevards and the stilt-
ed, bamboo, thatch, and tin-roofed houses

[20] Richard Butwell, "A Chinese University for Malaya," *Pacific Affairs*, December, 1953.

[21] See reference to Cornish in Spate, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

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Bangkok

On the other hand[1] changes in transportation have elevated Bangkok to a new importance. It lies astride the main air route between Europe and the Far East, and the Australia-Europe services also pass through it. It is now the leading international air center in Southeast Asia, with 42 international departures a week in 1953 as compared with Singapore's 27, and its airport is one of the larger commercial fields in the Orient.

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The role of the Southeast Asian great city has been modified by the Pacific war and the granting of independence to Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and partial independence to Vietnam. Five of the six great cities are now capitals of the independent states. Each of these merits the title "link capital"; that is, they are the media through which the newly independent states are linked with the outside world. At the same time, they have begun to assume an increasingly indigenous character. The substitution of Malay for Dutch names and street signs in Indonesia is only one evidence of cultural change. The in-migration of petty officials, tradesmen, and refugees from the beleaguered rural areas has given the urban populations a new and more homogeneous native cast. The fevers of nationalism have made the large minorities more cautious about flaunting their ethnic independence.

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1 [i.e. as compared to the inconvenient port facilities -- Analyst]

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361 On the other hand, the war also brought in-
178 creased American influence into the region,
and the ubiquitous Coca-Cola sign is one of
631 the symbols of change that sooner or later
184 will be followed by changes in urban facili-
ties and urban organization.

162 More important, the present period is as-
0563 sociated with an increasing intensification of
the economic activities of government and a
171 corresponding diminution of foreign enter-
369 prise. Political and administrative functions
have become increasingly important since
the war. Since the main governmental or-
gans are concentrated in the largest centers,
the direct influence of the great city upon
the country in which it is primate is likewise
increasing. Relations between nationalized
city and an increasingly money-oriented
countryside are becoming more intimate,
and the formerly clear-cut cultural distinc-
tiveness of city and country is rapidly be-
coming blurred. Therefore, the likelihood of
the great city's leading a revival of ancient
value systems, as some extreme ethnocen-
trists hope it will, is small. Only one predic-
tion can be made: the days of the culturally
alien and ethnically distinct urban center
are numbered in Southeast Asia; and a city
like Singapore becomes increasingly an
anomalous relict of an age now past.

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Chinese

427 But the alien planta-
565 tions and even alien smallholders have threatened to grasp at it, and the
177 advances of Western medicine, so beneficial in many ways, have only accelerated the rate of increase of the population which has to seek a livelihood from it. In most parts of South East Asia the peasant is the actual owner of the land he tills, often legally under some agreement with
426 the State. But his rights to the produce are often severely limited by a heavy burden of indebtedness. The real effects of this may be less than people sometimes think, because when the debts are spread among neighbours and kinsfolk interest may be waived, repayment is sometimes protracted or ignored, and the debt may be serviced by other than material means. But there is no doubt that the peasant producer is badly hampered by his debt load. It is most pressing when debt is contracted to a member of an alien ethnic group, an Indian or a Chinese, for whom the transaction is a purely commercial one.

●563 The role of alien Asiatic ethnic groups is one of the most significant
565 features in the economic and political life of the peasantry of South East
177 Asia today. For many centuries, Indian and Chinese trading influences
178 have met in the South East Asian region, and Indian religious concepts
439 have penetrated deep into many of its social systems. But for more than four hundred years the dominant commercial and political note has tended to be sounded by Europeans. Now the balance is altering. Colonialism may have set the modern structure of South East Asian society, but the patterns will persist when the colonial Powers have withdrawn. To this new society the Chinese above all have the economic key. In Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, the Philippines, and Java, the Chinese have penetrated the economic system and taken over crucial functions. They have shared in much of the wholesale import trade, they have attained pre-eminence in retailing vital imported goods to the peasant, and they act as middlemen for the collection, storage, and processing of peasant export products. As part of this process they often finance the peasant producer by advances on his crop, gaining a double profit by giving part of these advances in goods, not cash. The Chinese achievement has been remarkable. They have been kept on the margin both of the peasant society with which they deal, and of the European society with which at a later stage their growing wealth would allow them to associate. Though lacking any formal political power, which in the Orient as elsewhere is so often the passport to success, they have built up a trading structure of extraordinary toughness, elasticity, and elaboration.

565 The wider political implications of this are not my concern here. But
609 it is important to note three points in connexion with the peasant theme.
186 One is the xenophobic reaction of the local urban dwellers and of peasants
578 too, which has periodically found expression against the Chinese, as traders or residents in South East Asia, in the form of riots and other disturbances.
563 Another is the reaction of the Chinese, whose economic strength has given
241 them confidence, and who are now prepared to stand by their claim to a

18: Firth E-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Malaya

real stake in the countries of the Nan Yang, as settled members of the local 565
society, and not as aliens. The third point is that the Chinese community 609
has never been one of middlemen only; there has always been a fair pro- 186
portion of cultivators within it. The poor peasantry of South East Asia 578
now includes a Chinese as well as an indigenous element. The 1947 census 563
of Malaya shows 45,000 Chinese engaged in rice growing, and another 241
100,000 in market gardening and fishing, essentially peasant pursuits.

The pressure to which the South East Asian peasant has been subjected 177
by the combination of Western and other alien influences has been severe. 565
But we must beware lest we misinterpret it. In a recent book which gives a 166
comparative analysis of the agrarian situation in the countries of South East Asia, appears a striking statement about Malaya—that development of mining and rubber industries has pushed the native Malay population more and more towards the east, into the areas of the former Unfederated Malay States: 'The Malays', it is said, 'considered the east as safe from Western penetration, and therefore preferred this undeveloped area to the irrigated lands on the western coast, mainly because there they could get only temporary land licences, since a complete survey of all potential tin-bearing regions had not yet been made'.[1]

It is true that the eastern States are predominantly Malay in population, and that the greater part of the vast immigrant population of Malaya is densely settled on the western side of the peninsula, where the resources are richer and access easier than on the eastern side. It is also true that there has been some lack of enthusiasm among Malay peasants to colonize the new Government-developed irrigation areas, for complex reasons, including lack of capital in the past, and disinclination to move from their ancestral homes. But it is quite incorrect to put these facts together and to argue that the Malay has been pushed by alien pressure over from the west to the east of the peninsula. Apart from some seasonal movement for rice harvesting or fishing, the internal migration of Malays is inconsiderable, despite the rapid development of communications in recent years. Both the 1931 and the 1947 census show that whatever movement takes place—well under 10 per cent—is almost wholly from one State to another, either on the west coast or on the east coast, or to Singapore. Hardly any movement at all occurs from the west to the east. Moreover, the 1947 census shows that between 1931 and 1947 the Malay population of the western States increased by about one-third, at a rate slightly higher than that of the eastern States. The proportion of Malays in these western States, in terms of the total population of all ethnic groups, also increased slightly during this period, due primarily to the decline of Indians and Indonesians. In other words, though foreign economic penetration has immersed the western Malay in a flood of alien elements, it has not driven him away. On the contrary, he has preferred to stay and await events.

[1] Erich H. Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia* (New York, Colombia University Press, 1949) p. 113.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese
China AF1

this was a policy which the British neglected to pursue with any conviction, and the post-war experiment in this direction, the Malayan Union, was abandoned at the first sign of opposition. Unless a true 'Malayan citizenship' can be made effective, the ideal of a Malayan nation forming, as it were, a buffer State between China, Indonesia, and India, with bonds with all three but belonging to none, will remain a phantom.

In the present crisis the great and deplorable weakness of the Chinese in Southeast Asia is the absence of effective leadership (and the few notable exceptions to this generalization do not affect its truth). This is due in large part to the fact that there has grown up no Chinese middle class of sufficient proportions to provide disinterested, well-educated, and competent individuals in the numbers needed to guide their community through the reefs of politics towards a safe anchorage. The business leaders are so busy making money (or endeavouring not to lose it) that few of them have time to devote to public affairs even if they had the will and the knowledge. In Malaya, at least, the Indian stands in sharp contrast to the Chinese, and in Singapore Indian representation on the various bodies is vastly greater in proportion to their numbers than is the case with the much more numerous Chinese. This is not explicable solely by Chinese political pique but must be due largely to the training in politics and administration the Indians received in their own country during the British Raj. In Malaya, Indonesia, and Indochina the British, Dutch, and French have neglected to afford opportunities for the Chinese residents to acquire a knowledge of affairs. The penalty of this neglect is that now, when European control is loosening, the mass of the Chinese have few leaders to take control and to consolidate their community in face of the Communist advance. The lack of experience and education determines also the quality of the Communist leadership in these regions. Among the Malayan Communists are no Mao Tse-tungs or Chou En-lais and scarcely any individuals with more than the rudimentary mis-education obtainable in Chinese vernacular schools. The result is that the old professional bandit (always a feature of Malaya's jungle-fringe) is more prominent than he would otherwise be, and terrorism is unmitigated by constructive politics. Is it, therefore, strange that in 1949 the majority of Nanyang Chinese were 'sitting on the fence' awaiting the final upshot in China and its repercussions overseas? In such

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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175 thus set a new stage -- the development of the natural
177 resources of the whole region.
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439 This change-over from a subsistence economy to a
648 commercial economy involved the large-scale expansion of traditional crops or the development of new commercial crops.
[436] It was stimulated by the introduction or expansion of a money
[489] economy, the flow of capital and the development of land and
[69] sea transport. It was supported by Western technology, methods of administration and systems of justice. This whole process greatly affected the traditional institution, up-
175 setting the balance of a medieval world. The free, indi-
177 vidualist spirit of Western rule and commerce cut at the
[59] roots of traditional social life, undermining the corporate
[423] strength of family and village. But the most serious direct
[426] threat of the new economic forces was to the peasant's owner-
[566] ship of land. Expanding economies, new money taxes and cheap imports meant better business than ever for the money lender. Many peasants became ruined by debt and lost their lands. Indebtedness and debt slavery were not new in Southeast Asia; the latter was fairly soon stamped out, but the former now became much more widespread than before, resulting in the creation of a landless proletariat.[16]

184 Characteristics of Current Southeast Asian Economy

In spite of all the differences among the countries of Southeast Asia in the natural environment, ethnic

16. Harrison, op. cit., p. 210.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
Southeast Asia AL1

563 to impress even the most unreflecting sight-seer is the
medley of ethnic groups. What is almost equally apparent
565 is that these ethnic groups do not mix. Each has its own
571 quarter, its own temple, its club or other meeting ground
for social functions, its own forms and places of entertainment and recreation. They do not meet in these places but only in the market place to make money out of one another or perhaps with one another. They have no common link except in business. What is not quite obvious is that each ethnic group has its own special economic function. There is a plural society with its own distinctive and characteristic plural economy.

563 Typically, a plural society in Southeast Asia com-
565 prises three main sections: the Europeans, constituting an
433 upper class; the foreign orientals, Indian or Chinese, consti-
571 tuting a middle class; and the great mass of the native population in the lower class. The Europeans and foreign orientals are temporary residents, strangers to one another or at best casual acquaintances, and the native community is little more than a crowd of individuals. In the relations between the classes, there are no social ties to dull the edge of economic competition. Within each class, inherited traditions lose their force. Society as a whole is divided into groups; each group is merely a collection of individuals, and in each group life is simplified to an economic struggle for existence. Social life is reduced to its economic content, society is converted into a business concern, and only the

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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foreign army of occupation has preserved it from disruption. The essential and distinctive character of a plural society is that it is dominated by economic forces, and, outside a few partly sheltered oases, Southeast Asia illustrates the capitalist system in its purest form.[18]

Another common feature is the dominance of the agricultural section of the population. The latest available figures show the percentage proportions of population dependent on agriculture in the area as follows: Burma, 68; Indonesia, 66; Philippines, 69; Thailand, 85.[19] The same source indicates the proportions for various regions of the world as follows: North America, 20; Oceania, 30; Europe, 33; South America, 60; Asia, 70; and Africa, 74.

With the prevailing techniques of production and the consequent low productivity per man, dominance of agriculture means low per capita national income. When countries are grouped by level of economic development on the basis of per capita national income as of 1950, all the six countries of Southeast Asia -- Burma, Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaya, Philippines, and Thailand -- fall in the underdeveloped group.[20] Moreover, there is in Southeast Asia a true surplus population on the land in the sense that even under the present methods of cultivation a sizeable fraction of the

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18. Ibid., p. 77.

19. Food and Agriculture Organization, 1953 Yearbook, Vol. VII.

20. Eugene Staley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), pp. 16-17.

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

been traditionally most dependent on imported labor and their prewar labor movements were the most highly developed of any throughout the region. 467 464

Nevertheless, the labor movements in these two countries have taken different paths. Burma is made up of one predominant race, overwhelmingly agricultural and guided by strong nationalist leadership. Development of solidarity among Malaya's laboring class has been retarded by the tripartite ethnic composition of its population and by the country's traditional dependence upon two export industries. Accordingly, Malaya's labor movement has developed schismatic tendencies bordering on mutual hostility and has been influenced by alien Asiatic leadership. While in both countries the British Government has not as yet formulated any policy toward immigrant workers and has thus played into the hands of labor, already in short supply, the effects in the two countries have been quite different. Because of Malaya's lack of a self-sufficient economy, its laborers are in a more favorable position to press their demands. At the same time they suffer from serious internal weaknesses not found in Burma. The government and private firms in Malaya—if the planting-mining economy is to survive—will have to make greater concessions in order to reconstitute an adequate labor force than will the analogous authorities in Burma and Siam.

The special composition of Malaya's population and the organization of its industries are probably responsible for the development of its labor movement from many small unions, organized by subdivisions within trades, into a central association. This pyramidal set-up has been turned upside down in Burma, where labor was at first organized on a very broad basis and then divided into smaller units. In both areas the British Government has been making a marked effort to foster labor unions and at the same time to divorce them from political programs and ideologies. But since the nationalists throughout the area have chosen the labor movement as their chief medium for the achievement of the socio-political revolution they desire, it is unlikely that this attempt will prove successful. The laborers of Southeast Asia still feel themselves to be, above all, members of their own national or ethnic communities and have only secondarily developed a consciousness of a class apart. The whole area is too little industrialized to be fertile ground for a labor movement, strictly speaking. When trade unionism is discussed in referring to the labor movements now budding in Southeast Asia, it should be borne in mind that little more than its nomenclature has been borrowed from Occidental labor organization. 467 [668] [565] [563]

Throughout Southeast Asia the various governments have begged two outstanding questions affecting local labor problems—agricultural indebtedness and land tenancy, and the control of Asiatic immigration. In regard to the former, nothing has been done thus far and one can 466 426 167

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THE PEASANTRY OF SOUTH EAST ASIA [1]

PROFESSOR RAYMOND FIRTH, F.B.A.

000 IF it is not wholly true that the social and economic reconstruction which is so necessary in Asia today must begin with the peasant, it is certain that no programme which omits the peasant can be on firm foundations. The recent history of China is evidence enough for this. My concern, as a social anthropologist, is with the analysis and classification of social relations between people and groups of people, rather than with political or economic affairs as such, although inevitably I cannot dis-
128 regard them. So my aim is to show briefly some of the most important
121 aspects of the social organization of the South East Asian peasant communities, and of the values by which this organization works. Though the details in my paper refer mainly to Malaya and Indonesia, I think the generalizations have some value for the South East Asian region as a whole.

If the basic features of the peasant society are ignored, one can understand neither the peculiar tenacity which it still possesses in modern conditions, nor the reactions of its members to the increasing impact of ex-
121 ternal economic and political forces. The definition of a peasant is a
565 countryman—a man engaged in rural pursuits, primarily agriculture, with
463 a comparatively simple technology and a special interest in the land he works. In South East Asia one may extend the application of the term to
241 cover the majority of fishermen and even village craftsmen too. They are
226 of the same social class as the agriculturalists, and often members of the
32 same families. As occupational groups, they may even be separable only in theory, since many a peasant farmer is also a fisherman or craftsman by turns, as his seasonal cycle or his cash-needs influence him. What R. H. Tawney has said of agriculture—that it is at once a craft, a business, and a manner of life—can be applied more widely here; the problems of all these peasants alike are partly technical, partly financial and commercial, and partly cultural and social.

162 It is difficult to say just what proportion of the present population of
565 South East Asia may be classed as peasants. It would seem that in nearly
241 every South East Asian country two-thirds or more of the total population
463 is to be found in agricultural communities, tilling the soil. In 1930 the
32 census of Java and Madura in Indonesia gave about 70 per cent of the male
462 workers as dependent for their livelihood on native agricultural output, and about 75 per cent in the regions of Indonesia outside Java and Madura, while large numbers of women were engaged in home craft production. In Siam, in about 1930, almost 90 per cent of the population lived in agricultural communities, rice production providing the living of about 80 per

[1] Originally delivered at a meeting at Chatham House on 21 February 1950.

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162 cent of the population. Malaya, of course, is exceptional, because of the
565 especially heavy concentration on the production of rubber and tin. Ac-
241 cording to the 1947 census of Malaya, about 34 per cent of the working
463 population were classed as cultivators and fishermen working on their own
32 account or as unpaid members of families. In all, I think one could reckon
462 that rather more than 100 million people in South East Asia can be regarded as peasantry.

[412] Throughout all this region, peasant technology is simple; skills, though
134 traditionally well adapted to the job in hand, are of limited range. Soils,
241 despite the richness of some of the swamps and river flood-plains, are generally of poor quality. The system of felling and burning the jungle, taking off crops for a few years, and then moving away to cultivate fresh clearings while the old ones revert to jungle, is still common in the mountain areas of Burma, Malaya, and Siam, in part of West Java, in much of Borneo, and in the outer islands of Indonesia. It is known as shifting cultivation or jungle-fallowing. Although regarded as extremely primitive, it is an economic use of land in areas of low population density, where plentiful land allows of long rotation of clearings and consequent restoration of soil fertility. But where population is dense, the system cannot provide the necessary volume of production without endangering the future soil capital, and that is one of the major problems of the area. In the more sedentary forms of agriculture, fertility is conserved with a great deal of care, by manuring, by water control, and so on. Sometimes there is very elaborate and spectacular terracing, as in parts of the Philippines or in Bali, where the native cultivator through his own efforts through generations has known how to make the best of the land with his available techniques. Yet many of these techniques are only of limited efficiency, and custom may be a barrier to improvement. For large masses of the Muslim peasantry of South East Asia, for instance, the pig, an excellent economic converter of resources, is taboo for religious reasons.

433 Productivity of the South East Asian peasant is apt to be low, whether
241 considered in terms of the margins required above subsistence to give him
565 and his family the range of goods and services they want, or by comparison with Western results. It is hard to make this last comparison significant because of the differing bases, but the following figures will give, perhaps rather superficially, some idea of the comparison. In terms of cwt. of cropping per acre, for instance, the rice crop of part of South East Asia can be compared roughly with the wheat crop of Western Europe. The figures are taken from different years, but they can be regarded as significant averages. Java at 12 cwt. of rice to the acre corresponds with France at 12 cwt. of wheat to the acre; Siam at 14 cwt. to the acre with the United Kingdom at 18 cwt. and Germany at a little less; Japan at 27 cwt. of rice per acre corresponds to Denmark with 27 cwt. of wheat per acre. Yet rice is supposed to be a crop of much higher yield. What is more significant is that productivity per acre in both Malaya and Indo-China is only 10 cwt. on the average, or only between one-third and one-half of the average in Japan.

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on the average, or only between one-third and one-half of the average in Japan.

Moreover, in any comparison between South East Asia and the peasantry of Europe, quite apart from differences in the production of crops other than the staple grain, there is an important difference in the average size of the holdings worked. The South East Asian peasant has fewer acres than the peasantry of Europe. In France, a country of peasant agriculture, about 40 per cent of the total number of agricultural holdings in 1931 were less than 2½ acres apiece; the average size of this group of holdings was 1½ acres each. But about 45 per cent of the total holdings were between 2½ and 22½ acres, with an average of about 10 acres each. There are areas in South East Asia where the average size of peasant holdings is fairly large. In Cochin China, while 72 per cent of the landowners have holdings between 2½ and 12 acres, there are provinces where more than half of them have holdings above 12 acres in size. In Siam, too, the average peasant holding seems of tolerable size—4 acres or so in the south and north east, 5½ acres in the north, and 10½ acres in central Siam, where more than one-third of the rural families live. But in Java, in 1938, the average size of holdings was only just over 2 acres for all tax-paying landowners in the country. In the Tonkin delta of Indo-China, another large area of heavy concentration of peasantry, as much as 60 per cent of the peasants have been reckoned to own holdings of less than nine-tenths of an acre, and 90 per cent to have holdings of under 4½ acres apiece. It has been estimated that a peasant family needs for adequate support 2½ to 5 acres of land, cultivating it by 'wet rice' methods. Many sections of the farming population in Java and Indo-China, for instance, are obviously well below this critical level. Even though large-scale irrigation and very intensive land use, including double cropping of rice in the year and much use of secondary crops, may lower the critical figure considerably, the peasant in such conditions is always liable to have to seek work outside his holding or to put up with inadequate living standards, even in nutrition.

The difficulties of agriculture in such conditions are further increased by the fact that a man's holding is often not a single undivided farm, but a set of dispersed fields, some of very small size. This dispersion and fragmentation of holdings allows for some advantages in adapting crops to soil and water variations, and is some security against wholesale raids by pests, but it makes for technical difficulties in the use of implements and labour on any scale. Since the dispersion is due primarily to traditional customs of inheritance and marriage, efforts to secure consolidation are apt to be only of temporary benefit, though some success has attended administrative action against undue fragmentation.

The same comparatively low level of productivity is seen in fishing, which gives the one great source of animal protein to the South East Asian peasant's diet. Before the war a Malay peasant fisherman produced on the average 1½ tons of fish per head per annum and in 1947 nearly 1 ton per

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433 annum. Productivity in the British fishing industry was, and probably still
226 is, at least eight times as great per man. In the United States' fishing in-
565 dustry it is much greater still. This immensely greater productivity per man is of course achieved only by a much heavier use of capital equipment. Technological investment, then, is an obvious method of trying to raise peasant production.

434 Peasant income in this region is thus low by most standards. Adequate
511 information about this is lacking, but there is no reason to doubt the indi-
565 cative character of what has been collected. For instance, an inquiry in Java in 1926 showed that over 60 per cent of the people had in cash and in kind incomes of less than £12 10s. a year (150 Dutch florins), and 80 per cent had incomes of less than £25 a year (300 florins). In Malaya in 1940 I calculated that the fishermen of the east coast earned on the average about £12 a year. This does not mean much without consideration of the prices of goods on which the income was spent. But any such comparison would soon make it clear that a man with such an income was hard put to it to keep his family in comfort. Cash incomes have risen steeply during and since the war, but so have the prices of consumer goods, and many peasants are probably rather worse off than before, unless they have been able to sell rice or other scarcity goods.

433 The peasant economy of South East Asia uses abundant labour and has
565 a low level of capital equipment. Even then, owing to lack of efficient
461 organization, one can point to a great amount of unused man-hours. Yet these features must not be over-stressed. It is common to blame the peasant for a *dolce far niente* attitude, and attribute his poverty to his idleness. What J. Johnston Abraham, the author of the well-known travel book, *Surgeon's Log*,[1] wrote forty years ago of the Malay is often quoted in essence still:

> The Malay . . . has the aristocratic contempt for toil . . . [he] is of all things a philosopher. He squats in the warm sun and chews betel contentedly. He sees the obvious foolishness of working in a country too hot for toil, when the earth is so prolific that a fortnight's leisurely labour will produce food for a year, and the water is so plentifully supplied with fish that an hour, in the cool of the evening with a net, will supply luxury for a fortnight.

Anyone who has lived among the Malay peasantry and has seen their back-breaking work of rice-planting, or their long hours at sea in the broiling sun hauling the nets for fish, will know what a parody this is. The working rhythm of the Asiatic peasant is different from that of the European. The economic system is not well enough geared to alternative employment when technical hitches occur in his ordinary occupation. But the peasant is not simply thriftless of his time and his money. He plans with care his ploughing, sowing, weeding, and harvesting; he is assiduous in searching for fodder for his animals, in watering his vegetable garden, in repairing his fishing-boat or his net. If he can scrape together some extra cash above the daily needs of his family, he may spend it on clothes for his child or jewellery

[1] London, Chapman & Hall (14th rev. ed., 1920), pp. 69–70.

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for his wife—but he is equally likely to put it into a piece of equipment or 433
to hire some land. To understand the position of the peasant one must 565
realize the structure of the economic system of which he is a part, and the 461
values of his social system.

The peasant economy must not be thought of as simply a subsistence 433
economy. It has a complex marketing structure which, even apart from 565
Western influences, had an elaborate series of middlemen for making pos- 439
sible the diffusion of cloth, salt, iron, dried fish, spices, and other goods. 177
The system of exchange has been intensified, and the reactions of different
types of producers made more sensitive by the influence of the West. On the one side are the Western markets for primary products—coffee, spices, tobacco, copra, kapok, and, above all, rubber—the quick response to which has demonstrated how alive the Asiatic peasant is to making money if the opportunity offers. On the other side are the Western types of consumer goods, novel, attractively presented, easy to use—ranging from lamp oil, imported cigarettes, and cornflour for babies, to electric torches, bicycles, and the cinema. Conservative in his techniques of production, the peasant has shown himself enterprising in his consumption. The result has been that at many points, almost without realizing it, the peasant has become geared to the Western economic system. In the early days of European contact, he had often to be pushed as well as tempted into producing for the Western market. The scathing book, *Max Havelaar*, by the author calling himself 'Multatuli'—later known to be Douwes Dekker—has shown the kind of abuses that resulted from pushing the peasant into an enforced relation to the Western market. But naturally many of these links have been of his own seeking. In the last resort, it is the peasant's own scheme of values, his degree of acceptance of the goods and services which the West offers and which he transmutes to some extent in receiving, which determines his economic destiny.

But for the most part, the peasant has been incapable of perceiving the processes at work. The field is too vast for his comprehension. His reactions to the crisis and depression of the nineteen-thirties were direct and rational as they came under his personal observation. When prices fell he increased production of the export crops to maintain his cash returns; when that failed he retired from the struggle to utilize his backlog of subsistence cropping. But like many a farmer elsewhere, he had not understood much more than the immediate market situation. The pressure of the West has provided the peasant with a new range of wants from which he cannot rid himself even should he wish, and markets for his labour and raw materials which are an inducement to him to modify his habits. A new administrative system has given him fresh legal framework for many of his acts. A new system of taxation, though often lighter than before, is more methodical in its pursuit of defaulters. His land, the foundation of his [427]
existence, has for the most part been preserved to him, and indeed the
security for his legal title to it has been much improved. But alien planta- 000

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Chinese

427 But the alien planta-
●565 tions and even alien smallholders have threatened to grasp at it, and the
177 advances of Western medicine, so beneficial in many ways, have only accelerated the rate of increase of the population which has to seek a livelihood from it. In most parts of South East Asia the peasant is the actual owner of the land he tills, often legally under some agreement with
426 the State. But his rights to the produce are often severely limited by a heavy burden of indebtedness. The real effects of this may be less than people sometimes think, because when the debts are spread among neighbours and kinsfolk interest may be waived, repayment is sometimes protracted or ignored, and the debt may be serviced by other than material means. But there is no doubt that the peasant producer is badly hampered by his debt load. It is most pressing when debt is contracted to a member of an alien ethnic group, an Indian or a Chinese, for whom the transaction is a purely commercial one.

563 The role of alien Asiatic ethnic groups is one of the most significant
565 features in the economic and political life of the peasantry of South East
177 Asia today. For many centuries, Indian and Chinese trading influences
178 have met in the South East Asian region, and Indian religious concepts
439 have penetrated deep into many of its social systems. But for more than four hundred years the dominant commercial and political note has tended to be sounded by Europeans. Now the balance is altering. Colonialism may have set the modern structure of South East Asian society, but the patterns will persist when the colonial Powers have withdrawn. To this new society the Chinese above all have the economic key. In Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, the Philippines, and Java, the Chinese have penetrated the economic system and taken over crucial functions. They have shared in much of the wholesale import trade, they have attained pre-eminence in retailing vital imported goods to the peasant, and they act as middlemen for the collection, storage, and processing of peasant export products. As part of this process they often finance the peasant producer by advances on his crop, gaining a double profit by giving part of these advances in goods, not cash. The Chinese achievement has been remarkable. They have been kept on the margin both of the peasant society with which they deal, and of the European society with which at a later stage their growing wealth would allow them to associate. Though lacking any formal political power, which in the Orient as elsewhere is so often the passport to success, they have built up a trading structure of extraordinary toughness, elasticity, and elaboration.

565 The wider political implications of this are not my concern here. But
609 it is important to note three points in connexion with the peasant theme.
186 One is the xenophobic reaction of the local urban dwellers and of peasants too, which has periodically found expression against the Chinese, as traders
578 or residents in South East Asia, in the form of riots and other disturbances.
563 Another is the reaction of the Chinese, whose economic strength has given
241 them confidence, and who are now prepared to stand by their claim to a

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real stake in the countries of the Nan Yang, as settled members of the local 565
society, and not as aliens. The third point is that the Chinese community 609
has never been one of middlemen only; there has always been a fair pro- 186
portion of cultivators within it. The poor peasantry of South East Asia 598
now includes a Chinese as well as an indigenous element. The 1947 census 563
of Malaya shows 45,000 Chinese engaged in rice growing, and another 241
100,000 in market gardening and fishing, essentially peasant pursuits.

The pressure to which the South East Asian peasant has been subjected 177
by the combination of Western and other alien influences has been severe. 565
But we must beware lest we misinterpret it. In a recent book which gives a 166
comparative analysis of the agrarian situation in the countries of South East Asia, appears a striking statement about Malaya—that development of mining and rubber industries has pushed the native Malay population more and more towards the east, into the areas of the former Unfederated Malay States: 'The Malays', it is said, 'considered the east as safe from Western penetration, and therefore preferred this undeveloped area to the irrigated lands on the western coast, mainly because there they could get only temporary land licences, since a complete survey of all potential tin-bearing regions had not yet been made'.[1]

It is true that the eastern States are predominantly Malay in population, and that the greater part of the vast immigrant population of Malaya is densely settled on the western side of the peninsula, where the resources are richer and access easier than on the eastern side. It is also true that there has been some lack of enthusiasm among Malay peasants to colonize the new Government-developed irrigation areas, for complex reasons, including lack of capital in the past, and disinclination to move from their ancestral homes. But it is quite incorrect to put these facts together and to argue that the Malay has been pushed by alien pressure over from the west to the east of the peninsula. Apart from some seasonal movement for rice harvesting or fishing, the internal migration of Malays is inconsiderable, despite the rapid development of communications in recent years. Both the 1931 and the 1947 census show that whatever movement takes place—well under 10 per cent—is almost wholly from one State to another, either on the west coast or on the east coast, or to Singapore. Hardly any movement at all occurs from the west to the east. Moreover, the 1947 census shows that between 1931 and 1947 the Malay population of the western States increased by about one-third, at a rate slightly higher than that of the eastern States. The proportion of Malays in these western States, in terms of the total population of all ethnic groups, also increased slightly during this period, due primarily to the decline of Indians and Indonesians. In other words, though foreign economic penetration has immersed the western Malay in a flood of alien elements, it has not driven him away. On the contrary, he has preferred to stay and await events.

[1] Erich H. Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia* (New York, Colombia University Press, 1949) p. 113.

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[438] One reason for this is economic advantage. The coming of rubber, in particular, has given to the Malay peasant of the west coast an income considerably higher, on the whole, than that of the east coast peasant.

177 565 [166] The effects of Westernization are profound. But they do not lie in crude physical displacement of the peasant or degradation of his living conditions. They lie in the widening of the gap between his expanding range of wants and his level of productivity, and in his inability to measure and in any way control the economic forces operating in his field. Westernization has meant for the peasant an enlargement of the social horizon—more knowledge, through better communications and education, of other places, of other peoples of kindred and dissimilar interests. It has created new ambitions: for different clothing, for new uses of leisure, for a better status for his children, for a position of power in the political scene. All this has disturbed the traditional patterns of peasant society. These patterns, and the class structure of South East Asian society of which they were a part, were probably never too satisfactory to the peasant. Anxiety and evasion must have often been the response to either too rigid or too elastic a rule—and the peasant seems often to have suffered from the exactions of his superior in the social scale. But the scope of the system was known, if not its precise implications. Nowadays the scope of the system has for the most part passed beyond the peasant's grasp, and much of it has become de-personalized.

To illustrate this by giving a more concrete analysis of some of the values in the peasant's life, let me take the area of Malaya and Indonesia where Islam is the major religion of the people.

181 177 565 602 776 779 671 182 In his daily life the Indonesian or Malay peasant is governed largely by the canons of behaviour, the ties of friendship and neighbourliness, the relations of work and social intercourse of his village community. So much is this so that in Java the *desa*, the village, was crystallized by the Dutch into an administrative and developmental unit, and its communal structure strengthened for welfare purposes. But as important as the village, and indeed often basic to its structure, are the family and larger kin organizations. From these a person gets his social status and much of his land and other property, and they have the primary role in his marriage and other crucial events in his progress through life.

Such domestic and local relationships also provide a framework for the peasant in his attempts to come to terms with the forces of nature and human destiny. His world of spirits is a local world. In Indonesia the ancestors do not play the predominant role which they do, for instance, in Annam. But the village, the seashore, the surrounding jungle, wells, trees, and stones are the home of many kinds of spirits, which afflict man with sickness or misfortune, or stand by him as his familiars to guard him. Basic in the religion of the Indonesian peasant is this local, essentially parochial, spirit element. All these values guide his economic and social conduct, and mean a great deal to him.

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But the situation is complex, even in village life. The system of rules governing domestic and local relations—marriage, adoption, inheritance, rights over land, succession to local office, rules of etiquette, and behaviour to superiors—is generally known as the *adat*, the custom. The nature of this custom, and what should be its relation to a more fully developed legal system, have been elaborately studied by the Dutch in Indonesia. At times indeed they have seemed to give the *adat* almost a mystical connotation. Alongside this body of custom, which of course varies from one peasant area to another, is the *shari'a*, the religious rule of Islam. On the one hand this is a unifying force, extra-village and extra-national in character, linking even the remotest mountain farmer spiritually or emotionally with the farmer or townsman of other Muslim communities in South East Asia, and far beyond. On the other hand, the Muslim religious law blends into the field of the *adat*, laying down rules about marriage, inheritance, and other family matters. Then there are the Western rules of law and administrative procedure, laying down just how land is to be acquired, held, and transferred, giving regulations for village management, and imposing penalties for certain kinds of breach of good relations. Yet the Western system offers also inducement to use the law, to protect one's interests firmly, to take advantage of situations where the *adat* has left rights undefined. So three factors—the custom, the Muslim religious rule, and the Western system of law—interact even in the heart of peasant society.

The result is a complex set of forces in dynamic operation, with the peasant being pressed by one or other of them or championing one or other as circumstances arise. In Negri Sembilan, for instance, there has come to be what is almost now a classic case of this interaction. In former times the valuable lands were for the most part those on which 'wet rice' could be cultivated. By the matrilineal system ancestrally operative in that area, these lands were handed down in the female line, from mother to daughter, or from aunt to niece. They were also cultivated largely by women. As rubber came to be developed, however, other lands on the hill-sides, previously of much less value, came to have worth too. For the most part these had to be cleared before being planted in rubber, and this clearing was a task that only men could do properly. Hence men came to have a more direct interest in this land. When questions of inheritance began to arise, divergent views became manifest. Some argued for treating new lands like the old, and handing them down in the female line like the rice lands. Yet there was a strong case for not including these rubber lands in the category of ancestral land, but for letting them be transmitted from a father to his children and through the male line in general. This principle of male inheritance is in line with the emphasis of the Muslim law. This not only gives guidance of the patrilineal kind for distribution of the property of the deceased in cases of dispute, but in all its provisions tends to stress the status of the male against that of the female.

Within the peasant society itself the potential clash of the two systems,

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181 local custom and religious rule, had been present for centuries. But there
177 was little in the economic situation to sharpen it, and the Muslim leaders
565 themselves were often so steeped in the local ways that they allowed as the
602 religious law what was, in fact, the local custom. With the growth of
776 Western processes, the perception of new economic advantages tended to
779 change the equilibrium of the two principles. The advance of education
671 and heightened consciousness of Islam as a world faith also tended to make
182 the religious leaders themselves much more keenly aware of any divergence. Wealthy men who want to leave property to their sons, men with a strong religious sense, men who regard themselves as progressive, or who are in revolt against their clan leaders, therefore tend to be protagonists of the Muslim law. The conservatives, those who see in the custom a defence for women, those who see in it a symbol of an essentially Malay way of life, argue for the retention of the custom. Contact with the West, they say, is changing the structure of the peasant society enough already. The issue has also entered the modern political scene, since the search for factors to increase Malay integration tends to stress the national and extra-national character of Islam at the expense of the more local qualities of the *adat*. Here too it is growing Westernization which has sharpened the issue.

184 In a general discussion such as this, one may be allowed to refer to the
565 peasantry of South East Asia as a body. But they are not uniform in ethnic composition, in national interests, in language, in religion, or in general culture. Moreover, within any local community, there are competing, even conflicting, interests and opinions. The peasant may be unable to face up to the general issues which affect his life so deeply, but in so far as he understands his own interests he is very alive to them and capable of exercising keen judgement in them. It is the small scale of his organization for the most part which renders him so vulnerable.

000 What is likely to be the future of South East Asia from the peasant angle? Prediction is not worth much, since so many elements in the situation are imperfectly known, but there are a few which seem to be significant.

565 The peasant has no native middle class, of the same society as himself,
185 to give a lead to his development and stability in any wider economic
656 organizations that may be set up for his benefit. To improve his economic lot, and in particular to give him a larger fraction of his product through control of marketing, co-operative societies have often been proposed and sometimes tried. Their success has been only limited, partly because the peasant has not been fully persuaded of their attractions as against what the alien middleman can offer, and partly because of the difficulty of securing adequate technical supervision and administration at a sufficiently low official level. Much is now apt to be made of the colonial or semi-colonial status of the South East Asian peasant as a drag upon his development. There is no doubt that colonialism, as a specific form of political control of under-developed territories by a metropolitan Power, is

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nearing the end of its historical phase. How far it is likely to be replaced by a more insidious form of satellitism is not relevant here. But to talk about political emancipation of South East Asia being the prime requirement for the solution of the problems of the peasantry must not obscure the economic factors involved. Nor is fresh capital all that is needed. For the economy of the peasant to attain a relative stability a great development of technical and administrative skills in the commercial field is necessary. The building of a native professional class would seem to be an important element in the construction of a more integrated economic and political system. To concentrate attention on the political factors alone is to overlook the fact that most of the sinews of the economic organism are now provided by the one group which does not have overt political power—the Chinese.

What remains of the traditional class structure in South East Asian society is not of much avail as a defence of the peasant from alien exploitation. In any case, though the rulers and traditional nobility still command much respect, and provide symbols for the unity of the people, there are stirrings of resentment among the people against the perpetuation of a system in which these aristocrats do not perform recognizable services at commensurate incomes. But such resentment does not mean that the peasantry are dry tinder for the spark of Communism to set alight. Communism as yet does not seem to have any great attraction for the mass of the local peasantry of the South East Asian region. The lack of popular response to the Malayan insurrection has shown this. It is presumably true to say that the interest of the peasant can always be secured in any movement which promises to give him greater control of the land—more land more secure tenure, freedom from land debt, and better returns for his produce. But to most of the Indonesian peasants these aims are likely to be sought in nationalism, which can be largely given both an ethnic base and the religious sanctions of Islam. The person to whom the cry for a solution of the land problem is likely to make a most definite appeal, especially in Malaya, is not the Indonesian but the Chinese peasant, who sees himself as excluded from full participation in the land rights of the country folk. Over and over again one hears the cry, ill-founded as it is, that the Chinese have not been allowed to grow rice in Malaya.

Here may well come one of the acute pressure points in the South East Asian scene. The analysis might go as follows. Nationalism is a powerful political force because of its appeal to the individual in a projected, enlarged form of his desires and strivings. But by itself it is an aggressive rather than a constructive force. It lacks a coherent theory for the use of the resources at its control. An ideology containing such theory, and an equally ardent emotional charge on the part of many of its adherents, is provided by Communism. If Communism can work through nationalism it has a most powerful combination. Yet Communism in South East Asia lacks organization of any scale. The optimum conditions for its success are

563 to impress even the most unreflecting sight-seer is the
medley of ethnic groups. What is almost equally apparent
563 is that these ethnic groups do not mix. Each has its own
• 571 quarter, its own temple, its club or other meeting ground
for social functions, its own forms and places of entertainment and recreation. They do not meet in these places but only in the market place to make money out of one another or perhaps with one another. They have no common link except in business. What is not quite obvious is that each ethnic group has its own special economic function. There is a plural society with its own distinctive and characteristic plural economy.

563 Typically, a plural society in Southeast Asia com-
565 prises three main sections: the Europeans, constituting an
433 upper class; the foreign orientals, Indian or Chinese, consti-
571 tuting a middle class; and the great mass of the native population in the lower class. The Europeans and foreign orientals are temporary residents, strangers to one another or at best casual acquaintances, and the native community is little more than a crowd of individuals. In the relations between the classes, there are no social ties to dull the edge of economic competition. Within each class, inherited traditions lose their force. Society as a whole is divided into groups; each group is merely a collection of individuals, and in each group life is simplified to an economic struggle for existence. Social life is reduced to its economic content, society is converted into a business concern, and only the

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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foreign army of occupation has preserved it from disruption. The essential and distinctive character of a plural society is that it is dominated by economic forces, and, outside a few partly sheltered oases, Southeast Asia illustrates the capitalist system in its purest form.[18]

Another common feature is the dominance of the agricultural section of the population. The latest available figures show the percentage proportions of population dependent on agriculture in the area as follows: Burma, 68; Indonesia, 66; Philippines, 69; Thailand, 85.[19] The same source indicates the proportions for various regions of the world as follows: North America, 20; Oceania, 30; Europe, 33; South America, 60; Asia, 70; and Africa, 74.

With the prevailing techniques of production and the consequent low productivity per man, dominance of agriculture means low per capita national income. When countries are grouped by level of economic development on the basis of per capita national income as of 1950, all the six countries of Southeast Asia -- Burma, Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaya, Philippines, and Thailand -- fall in the underdeveloped group.[20] Moreover, there is in Southeast Asia a true surplus population on the land in the sense that even under the present methods of cultivation a sizeable fraction of the

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18. Ibid., p. 77.

19. Food and Agriculture Organization, 1953 Yearbook, Vol. VII.

20. Eugene Staley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), pp. 16-17.

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[For information on the origin of the Thien-Ti-Hui Society and the traditional happenings on which the ceremonies are based, see 39: Pickering, AN1 Malaya, category 116. --Analyst]

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[For information on the initiation ceremony and meeting house of the Ghee Hin Society in Singapore, see 41: Pickering, AN1 Malaya, Cat. 116. --Analyst]

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Whilst thus simplifying the situation, it must be concealed that the Chinese social organization overseas early revealed serious deficiencies. It was not a complete unit of China transplanted, but fragments from various settings placed together in one spot. Different tribes and classes were put into unwonted juxtaposition, and the criminal and unruly element was disproportionately strong (this last fact needs emphasis). Embryo communal or municipal systems were often taken charge of by the deadly Triad society which used them for its own purposes. At the same time, too rigid a distinction has been drawn between the 'benevolent' *kongsis* and the 'malevolent' *huis*, or secret societies: it seems that the two were not separated in this categorical fashion and in fact were sometimes distinct associations with benevolent functions and Triad societies at one and the same time.[1] The shortcomings of the system became very manifest at certain times, as in Java when Chinese secret societies plotted to seize power from the Dutch, and in the Straits Settlements when these societies under the Triad societies got much out of hand and caused riots and practised intimidation for many years, later extending their activities to Perak where they added to the existing disorder until it approached anarchy.

This, however, is a special aspect of Chinese society in the Nanyang and is by no means typical. By and large, the Chinese were very law-abiding and gave the ruling Powers little trouble. Schlegel was right when he said that the Chinese were 'easy to govern'. Indeed this quality has brought them, at times, into the contempt of rough European individualists who have dismissed this tractableness as the characteristic of 'sheep'.

Students of the Chinese language who have ploughed through the *Tsŭ Erh Chih*, Sir Francis Wade's Documentary Series, will remember a number of memorials in which prefects or intendants

[1] The writer, after extensive experience of secret societies and district and clan organization, is sceptical of many of the theories advanced by observers. Schlegel (as we have seen in the chapters on the Kongsis of Borneo) has definitely regarded the Kongsis as a transplanting of municipal organization necessary to the functioning of Chinese society. Yet they were certainly 'secret societies' under Triad or Heaven and Earth League control. Only when countries, such as Malaya, began to legislate to control these societies was a distinction made between 'good' and 'bad' societies: the former were granted registration; the latter, if they functioned without registration, were illegal and, of course, definitely 'secret societies'. The writer is of opinion that a great deal more research into the matter is called for. (W. L. Blythe, 'The Interplay of Chinese Secret and Political Societies in Malaya', in *Eastern World*, March and April 1950, adds considerably to our knowledge.)

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of circuit of the Manchu dynasty related the details of criminal cases. There was a common offence which did not seem to come under the specific provisions of the penal code but was nevertheless heavily penalized, and it was known as 'being involved'. It appeared that to 'be involved', even quite innocently, in the felonies and misdemeanours of others, was itself in the nature of a crime. Indeed this feeling of the blameworthiness of being mixed up in any offence, tragedy, or lawlessness went right through Chinese society. It was not altogether unusual to hear of a Chinese man or woman hanging him- or herself on the doorpost of someone against whom they had a grievance in order to 'involve' him (there would be a judicial inquiry which would, at least, cause the owner of the door great embarrassment), for 'responsibility' is a far-reaching principle in China. This convention was hostile to the growth of public spirit, for a Chinese who saw a crime being committed, or a person in danger or needing assistance, would very likely do nothing for fear of 'being involved'.

This characteristic has persevered down to the present day, and, coupled with a willingness to pay for a quiet life, has been responsible for many Chinese difficulties. Chinese secret societies were able to parcel out the towns and villages in the Nanyang and to exact 'protection money' from shopkeepers and others without effective protest; in a similar way the Chinese community as a whole was willing to conform to all the laws and regulations made by alien Western Governments (whether to them they made sense or not) in return for being left alone. It was the social wisdom of 'Brer Rabbit, he say nuffin''. It was only when regulations proved to be unbearably vexatious that there was an outburst of hysteria followed by calm. This arrangement, convenient to both sides, was responsible for the saying of Gustaaf Schlegel cited above. It is an irony that this very quality, so convenient to European administrators in the past, as we have seen has brought down so much criticism on the heads of the Chinese *Towkays* in Malaya who, unprotected from reprisals, have paid 'protection' money to the Communist terrorists of their own race.

It seems true to say, then, that at the beginning of the twentieth century the Governments of Southeast Asia were conscious of the Chinese as a 'useful' element in their economic systems, and though they had some unpleasant social peculiarities they in no way constituted a danger or a threat. Chinese labour was introduced

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

Chinese Indians

the indigenous peoples were not sufficiently willing, numerous, or skilled 464
to replace the immigrant laborers. A higher wage scale, they feared, 668
might compel many firms either to go out of business or to install expen- 563
sive machinery. Already local nationalists, succumbing to the philosophy 167
of economic self-sufficiency, were demanding intensive programs of gov- 468
ernment-aided industrialization. If such demands were acceded to, the
industrialists and labor leaders in the home country could be expected to
protest strongly against the new competition.

In this complex situation, the colonial governments of Southeast Asia [664]
gradually yielded to the popular demands, although loath to abandon
their traditional function as instruments of capitalist planning in the
home countries. With the exception, however, of the embryonic and
ineffective industrial programs of the Siamese and Burmese governments
and the more constructive policy of the Netherlands Indies for a planned
industrialization, none of the countries did much in this direction. None
was forced as yet to consider very seriously that change in colonial rela-
tionship which would result from general economic development in the
world and specifically from the new role that China and India would
inevitably play before long in Southeast Asia. The Japanese invasion
interrupted the efforts of local governments toward a solution of these
labor problems. It also injected new elements into the situation.

2

LABOR ORGANIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

FOR VARIOUS REASONS an organized labor movement has never developed 467
in Southeast Asia to notable dimensions. In large part this was because 575
of the predominance of alien, transient, and illiterate labor forces, di- 563
vided—even when of the same nationality—by geographical and linguistic
differences. The Indians were further subdivided by caste and religious 668
sect. The Chinese had a far better family, guild, and secret-society
organization; but the antagonisms imported as an integral part of these
organizations provoked periodic violence. Later the political and gang-
ster elements which operated within their framework impelled all the
governments throughout Southeast Asia to control them severely.

National solidarity among the immigrant labor groups was further 466
broken up by the methods of recruitment and management. Agents and 167
foremen exploited their compatriots for their own personal gain, until
the governments concerned were gradually and reluctantly forced to
intervene. Asiatic agents behaved much as recruiting agents of emi-

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

homes to check the correctness of the entries. This system would seem unlikely to foster harmony in the classroom or the home, and one would hesitate to recommend it generally; and, except possibly in Java, the entries in the forms, whether made at home or in school, might be inaccurate and incomplete. But, even so, the Dutch recognize that it is useless to teach hygiene in school without raising the standard of hygiene among the parents.[1] In Burma, and probably elsewhere, men who have qualified as sanitary inspectors make a large part of their income by conniving at breaches of the health rules. Children may learn to pass examinations from text-books, but they learn to live from example and experience, and where the text-book teaches one thing and the environment another, it is the latter that prevails.

Again, the modern school is expected to inculcate thrift. In this matter also, in Malaya as elsewhere, teachers exhort the children to be thrifty while themselves notoriously in debt. Another agency for teaching thrift is the co-operative credit movement, but co-operative subordinates are no more solvent than subordinates in other services. The whole economic system of tropical dependencies favours and, one may even say, is based on, indebtedness among the cultivators and labourers; it is through advances to cultivators that exporters get cheap produce, and through advances to coolies that employers get cheap labour. One cannot cure this by teaching thrift in schools. Parents incur debt to provide a western education for their children, and men who have been taught thrift in school from the infant standard to the university do not learn to shun the moneylender. If the schools cannot teach cultivators to make more money, which they do want, they are unlikely to be more successful in teaching them western ideas of welfare which they do not want, and in great measure are precluded by the environment from adopting. Without fundamental changes in the economic environment, and in the climate of popular opinion, the idea that western ideas of material welfare can be taught in school is an illusion.

Very similar conditions apply to education as an instrument of moral welfare. Curzon deplored the lax discipline and low moral standards in the schools, and thought to provide a remedy by introducing moral primers and text-books of personal ethics, and by enforcing stricter supervision and control. We have noticed the sequel in Burma. When the new policy was first adopted, the moral standards

[1] Hydrick, pp. 13, 81.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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of the western schools in Burma were considered satisfactory; but religious training, ethical instruction and closer supervision were of no avail to check the decline of school discipline and morals until, within a quarter of a century, they had deteriorated to much the same level as in India. In India itself a tacit admission of the failure of the new policy to attain its end is apparent in the latest report on educational progress, which contains no reference to religion or religious education, and only 'one depressing and colourless paragraph is devoted to moral instruction'.[1] In Africa again, when the need for a constructive educational policy was realized, 'the greatest importance was to be attached to religious teaching and moral instruction'. It seems, however, that the adoption of this formula was partly due to the need for conciliating missionary bodies that provided nine-tenths of the instruction, and in practice moral training fights a losing battle against efficiency. Many of the missionary schools are regarded as unsatisfactory in respect of secular instruction, and Governments, hard-pressed for funds, demand efficiency, with visible and measurable results. Thus 'it may well be felt that the time has come when the state should show greater discrimination in the support it gives to the smaller mission school'. The larger mission schools also feel the strain of reconciling religion and efficiency. As standards of instruction rise with the demand for higher and more valuable certificates, the maintenance of schools becomes more costly, and the missions feel the pinch already, while their prospects of financial expansion are remote.[2] Educational policy pays homage to morals and religion, but economic forces govern practice and oust morals and religion from the schools. As the people want cheap qualifications quickly the Government has their support in cultivating efficiency. 'It is the desire for school-teaching rather than any doubts about his own faith which is often the chief inducement for the native to bring his children to the missionary', and native opinion is beginning to show itself impatient of missionary control.[3] The missionaries themselves recognize the utility of secular instruction and, although there are some 'with whom the impulse to effect conversions has seemed to outweigh all other considerations, it would be far from true to say that this spirit has been characteristic of missionary endeavour as a whole'; many 'would wish to combine a more effective

[1] *Overseas Education*, 1940–1, Oct. p. 75.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1229, 1235, 1237, 1242, 1284.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 1216, 1235, 1242.

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in quantity into the colonial possessions and received the praise that is reserved for an efficient and well-oiled machine. But a movement was already incubating which was to change the whole attitude towards the Chinese of Europeans and indigenous peoples alike. The birth of Chinese nationalism coincided with the numbers of the Chinese emigrants reaching a new high level.

Sun Yat-sen in his *Three Principles of the People* said (as Mazzini had said long before him) that 'nationalism must precede internationalism'. Continuing the passage on race already quoted in part earlier in this chapter he went on:

> But the Chinese have no national spirit; they only know the family and clan groups. Thus China is only a loose sheet of sand. Our position is extremely perilous—if we do not promote nationalism and weld together our four hundred million into a nation, we face a tragedy—the loss of our country and the destruction of our race.[1]

This warning was taken very much to heart by Young China, though the process towards national consciousness had already gone a long way before Sun Yat-sen crystallized the sentiment in these words. The effect of the intense nationalist campaign coupled with an education drive was to make the Chinese everywhere conscious of their separateness as a race and nation, and, in Southeast Asia, to render the peoples among whom they lived aware that they regarded themselves as a race and nation apart. Almost simultaneously the seed of nationalism had been sown in the hearts of the other races and they were beginning to feel that they, in their turn, faced a tragedy—unless they, too, promoted nationalism and welded themselves into a nation, they might suffer the loss of their country and the destruction of their race.

The simultaneous growth of two such sentiments within one country meant that the communities grew nationalistic spines which when they were erected pricked their neighbours painfully. It was like Schopenhauer's definition of human beings as 'hedgehogs nestling together for warmth'. And the 'warmth' they sought in common (if such a metaphor can properly be used of countries sweltering in intense tropical heat) was the livelihood that Southeast Asia had, so far, abundantly afforded. But with large-scale immigration came competition, and the growth of economic rivalry between the races was coincident with the growth of nationalism.

[1] Lecture 1.

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In the course of this survey have been quoted numerous opinions on the merits or demerits of the Chinese as colonists in Southeast Asia. Many of these views have been highly critical and unfavourable. Yet they are more than offset in the minds of those of us who feel this bias by the recollection of tributes paid to the community by persons well qualified to make them—as, for example, the European ex-internee whom the writer met in Syme Road internment camp, Singapore, at the time of the Japanese surrender and who exclaimed to him, 'After this I shall *swear* by the Chinese.' (He referred to the many acts of kindness rendered by the Chinese to internees, to persons escaping from the Japanese, and others at the risk of their lives.) Again the writer, at the very moment that this paragraph was written, received a letter from an administrator of long standing in North Borneo in which he declared that 'the Chinese of North Borneo are, generally speaking, the salt of the earth'. Apart from enthusiastic tributes of this kind there are many just appreciations of the value of this people in the writings and reports of past administrators. Francis Light, the founder of Penang, said, 'The Chinese constitute the most valuable part of our inhabitants'; John Crawfurd regarded them as 'an intelligent, active, and commercial people'; Raja James Brooke of Sarawak said, 'Without the Chinese we can do nothing'; the Superintendent of the 1931 Census of North Borneo exclaims jubilantly in his report, 'the one bright spot . . . is the increase that is still shown in the numbers of the Chinese who can fairly be regarded as the mainstay of the commercial and industrial population'. And these examples could be greatly multiplied.

But the fact remains that a great deal of criticism has been levelled against the Chinese by persons, mostly Europeans, which can be boiled down to a few specific charges. The Chinese, it is alleged, are 'greedy', 'materialistic', 'parasitic', 'unconscionably usurious and profiteering', 'have a stranglehold on retail trade', 'have built up a wall against the admission of natives to their trade monopolies', 'form combinations obstructive to government', and 'create enclaves of Chinese nationalism within the countries they inhabit'.

Let us consider whether these charges have any weight.

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The Chinese in the Nanyang have never been in political control; they have therefore never had any political responsibility. The laws have been made by others. They have merely performed the functions the Governments have allowed them to perform.

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S C 578 463 651 Sometimes they have been given a choice of activities. The Spanish, for example, wanted them as peasant agriculturists but tolerated them as traders. Similarly, in Indochina the French wanted them for opening up uncultivated lands, but, since the 'Red Lands' suitable for the cultivation of rubber and other profitable raw materials were barred to all aliens, the Chinese (although he might have been a peasant at home) refused the hard toil of the fields if he could obtain a position with a Chinese firm. In Java the Dutch found the Chinese useful as middlemen, and middlemen they became, accepting the penalty of the resentment of the Javanese that such a function entailed. The farming of the revenue was allotted to them as the highest bidders by the Spanish, the Dutch, and the British alike. Such occupations are labelled 'parasitic', but it must be remembered that they were the best methods of obtaining revenue available before the Governments felt themselves able to collect it for themselves. When they could do so, the farms were abolished. Also, it should be remembered, it was from the Chinese themselves that most of the revenue of the farms was collected. If we accept Mr Furnivall's epithet of 'parasitic' we must extend it to cover the British, Dutch, and French Governments also.

S 578 463 452 426 C 578 463 Given a large and improvident peasantry, as existed in Siam, Indonesia, Indochina, and the Philippines, there was a demand for credit with uncertain security or none at all. This credit was most naturally extended by the traders to whom they sold their produce, and it was most conveniently given in the form of goods and paid for in produce at the time of the harvest. Certainly this gave great power to the Chinese trader; the question is whether he abused it. A survey in Siam by Mr James M. Andrews (see p. 164) does not bear out the widespread belief that the Chinese are unconscionable usurers. 'The Thai farmer [says Mr Andrews], and especially his wife, is much more given to money-lending with the hope of high profits than the Chinese.' As regards alleged profiteering in the rice trade, the College of Agriculture at Los Baños in the Philippines (see p. 635) conducted a survey and found that 'the Chinese merchants are performing essential marketing services at a fairly low cost'. In Indonesia it is notorious that many Indonesian Hajis and Arabs are far greedier money-lenders than are the Chinese. In Malaya it is the chetty and the Sikh who are the money-lenders; not the Chinese. Cases in which Chinese

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figured as lenders were practically unknown.[1] The charge of 'unconscionable usury and profiteering' is, in the writer's opinion, not proved.

Professor Raymond Firth has gone into the question of Chinese middlemen in the Malayan fishing industry with considerable care. He says that in this role the Chinese performs important functions. He shoulders a great part of the market risks; he supplies considerable capital, in a liquid form, in consumer's goods, or in producer's goods; and he saves the fishermen much trouble in seeking buyers. On the other hand the same observer adds:

> The system obviously has great dangers. It gives him a monopoly, with little prospect of the fishermen reaping the advantages of the rising market, or of even getting much more than bare subsistence earnings, and it tends very often to place them firmly in his debt, with little chance of extricating themselves and building up their own capital.

Among the Malay fishermen this relationship with the Chinese is variously viewed. One group told Professor Firth that they liked it 'because they can get hold of cash easily'. In several other places, however, the fishermen complained of the low prices they received from the Chinese to whom they were bound to sell. Up to 1939 the attempt of the administration to meet the situation by encouraging co-operative Malay associations for fish-marketing had had only a moderate success.[2]

It should be added that the provision of credit on reasonable terms for productive enterprise is finally the responsibility of the Governments. Much progress has been made in some Southeast Asian countries in the establishment of landbanks, co-operative societies, &c., in the last half-century, but these advanced money only for 'productive' purposes, and in Indonesia the people have still to go to money-lenders to obtain money for wedding, funeral,

[1] A London solicitor who was for many years in Malaya, where he had a large practice, remarked to the writer on 10 February 1949, 'I have never known a money-lending Chinese.' Nor can the writer himself, who had considerable experience as a magistrate and as official assignee and liquidator of companies, recollect any such case.

The writer, on the other hand, has known Britons (of presumed respectability) lending money to Indian chetties at a minimum of 12–15 per cent., who in turn lent it to Malays, Chinese, and others at a rate of interest that can only be guessed!

[2] *Malay Fishermen: Their Peasant Economy*, pp. 14, 61.

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and other expenditure demanded by custom. Moreover, the money-lenders are willing to advance money without the security demanded by landbanks and co-operative societies.

In the matter of trade monopoly it is true that in Siam, Indochina, Indonesia, and the Philippines the Chinese have a virtual monopoly of the rice distribution and milling trades. The Governments of these countries have, to meet the popular agitation, passed legislation to restrict the Chinese share in this trade. The fact that the Chinese maintains his position in face of all this legislation and in face of competition, fair or unfair, is simply because he is so much more competent in the business. Florence Horn (see p. 634) points out that the Filipino politician who charged the Chinese with having half the retail business in their hands changed his ground completely when the reply was made that all the Filipino had to do was to open up a *tienda* on his own and put the Chinese out of business. He then said that the Chinese standard of living was deplorably low, he eats almost nothing and works day and night; therefore he subjects the Filipino to unfair competition! At the same time it must be admitted that the Chinese, having obtained virtual control of some trades, do their best to keep them in their hands and usually employ only their own countrymen. This is naturally galling to the native looking for an opening, but there is a sound business reason for it. They employ their own people because they are, on the whole, better at the job. No European merchant would maintain that a firm should be compelled to employ persons of inferior business capacity, thus exposing the firm to the danger of bankruptcy.

If the Governments of Southeast Asia wish to secure a greater share of the trade of their country for their nationals, they are entitled to legislate accordingly—provided, of course, that the law does not operate harshly or unjustly by depriving an alien of one source of livelihood before he has had a chance of acquiring another. (The economic effect on a country of discriminating against aliens who discharge some useful function is another matter.)

In *Fanny's First Play* Bernard Shaw pokes fun at the critics who will not give an opinion as to the merits of the play until they know 'Who wrote it?' The inference is that such a question is an irrelevance, and that the play should be judged on its own merits. But while we have, so far, attempted to consider the charges

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made against the Chinese 'on their own merits', we do not regard it as at all an irrelevant question to ask 'Who made them?' Apart from a late King of Siam, the persons who have taken it on themselves to indict the Chinese for their alleged shortcomings are nearly all Europeans. Some are administrators, or ex-administrators with even more settled prejudices, some are merchants (though these tend, through greater contact with and therefore greater knowledge of the Chinese, to be fairer to them than the first-named), and some (including the most vitriolic) are mere tourists. The author would say that he has never encountered a European qualified by an adequate knowledge of the language and customs of the Chinese and by long experience of them who delivered himself of downright judgements or sweeping condemnation of that race. Indeed knowledge of the Chinese almost invariably induces a sympathy for them and their difficulties, however much it may be tempered by momentary exasperation or by realization of some personal or collective shortcoming. A reason for the anti-Chinese bias is often that the speaker has identified himself completely with some native race afraid of the Chinese and thus he shares and intensifies the natives' fears and resentments. Another common reason, no doubt, for the charges is that the vices ascribed to the Chinese—shrewdness, foresight, business acumen, keeping one's own counsel—are counted as virtues in the City of London, in Amsterdam, Paris, or New York, and that the indictment of the Chinese race is unconsciously inspired by fear of successful competition.

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But when all these counts are disposed of there remain two which, on the face of them, are much more plausible and which deserve careful scrutiny. One is the charge of 'forming combinations obstructive to government' and of 'creating enclaves of Chinese nationalism in the countries they inhabit'.

There is no doubt that the Chinese have a strong protective clannishness which has kept them intact as a community. This in the past, however, did no particular harm to the communities around them and indeed insulated the latter from Chinese internal conflicts. Moreover their intermarriage with the native population meant that the absorption of their descendants into the native community was only a matter of time. But with the advent of Nationalism the position began to change rapidly. An almost physical wall began to raise itself between the Chinese and the native community.

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S native community. The Chinese National Government manifested
578 an increasing solicitude for the *Hua Ch'iao*, the overseas Chinese,
668 whom it regards almost as its children; it instructed its consular
[871] officials to register all the Chinese within their jurisdiction, and
C they sent missions to inspect every activity of overseas Chinese
578 life. What is more, the Chinese Government took upon itself to
648 direct the education of Chinese in the Nanyang, laying down the
668 curriculum to be followed, and even introducing a system of grants-in-aid in competition with that of the local Government. It often happened that remote officials in Nanking or Chungking, very likely originating from one of the northern provinces and completely out of touch and sympathy with the Chinese of the Nanyang, claimed the right to direct their affairs. Even ethnically speaking the overseas Chinese might be nearer to the Siamese or Burmese, or (by intermarriage) to the Indonesians, than to a Chinese from Honam or Kansu. It was no wonder that Siam, Malaya, and the other countries of Southeast Asia saw an *imperium in imperio* growing up in their midst and began to fear for their
S own eventual safety.

578 This development, then, we are constrained to regard as in
668 many ways a misfortune for the overseas Chinese and for the
177 countries in which they had made their home or wherein they
C were sojourners. It arrested assimilation and erected a racial wall.
578 At the same time the simultaneous growth of local nationalism
668 encouraged the Chinese to look to their own country for pro-
648 tection—a protection, it turned out, it was, because of its own internal division and weakness as a Power, in no position to give.
171 Nor did the authorities in the one country of Southeast Asia where the Chinese now were the majority community offer any real encouragement to the local-born Chinese to regard Malaya as their own country and to resist the claims to control their destinies by a remote Government in a country they had never seen. The chance to extend the teaching of English to the community was lost and for thousands the only means of receiving an education of any sort was in the Chinese Nationalist schools; the doors of the Malayan civil service were opened to Malays but not to Chinese; the whole policy of Federated and Unfederated Malay States was, and is still, pro-Malay. It was surely no wonder that the Malayan-born Chinese who, while proud of their Chinese ancestry and culture, wished to identify themselves and their

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children's future with Malaya alone, were attracted to, or forced into, the Nationalist camp.

Malaya has for long been the 'test case' of Chinese affairs and a focus of interest in Southeast Asia. The situation as it was tending was very clearly described by a distinguished traveller many years ago; Professor Arnold Toynbee records the impression of his visit to the Straits Settlements in these words:

> And China is not only enormous already; it is rapidly getting more enormous (if logically that adjective can be put in the comparative degree). When I touched at the Straits Settlements on my way out east I realized that British Malaya is destined, by 'peaceful penetration', to become a Chinese province, and I fancy, from what I have heard, that the same destiny may be in store for Burma, Siam, French Indo-China, Dutch Indonesia, and the Philippines. In the end the current of Chinese expansion in the Tropics will meet the current of Hindu expansion over the submerged heads of the smaller and weaker and less efficient peoples in between, who are already fast going under. And, after what has happened, I surmise that the new frontier between China and India will tend, slowly but surely, to travel westward at India's expense and in China's favour.

What happened in Malaya, we cannot too frequently remind ourselves, was not the result of military conquest, not the territorial spoils of a Kublai Khan, but because the British had welcomed the immigration of a couple of million Chinese. For long after the intervention in the Malay States it had been found difficult to attract the British capital needed for the opening up of the country: it was not until a plentiful supply first of Indian and then of Chinese labour was assured that such capital was forthcoming, and it was not until the end of the 1920s that there was any control at all of Chinese immigration.

The British Colonial Office and the Malayan Governments must have seen that the admission of Chinese in such numbers that they would eventually be the majority community was bound to create a problem of tremendous magnitude. Even the degree of assimilation taking place in Siam and Indochina was out of the question because of the barrier of the Mohammedan religion. The only hope now for the future of Malaya in the interest of its diverse peoples was to promote a feeling of common Malayan citizenship to counter the claim, tacit or express, of Chinese Nationalism to consider Malaya as a new province of China. In the pre-war years

called the "Great Tradition" in an agrarian society.[13] 361

The links between country and city in this basically feudal relationship were clear, consecutive, and relatively simple to define. To be sure, the villager would regard the capital as a different world from his own, but it was nevertheless a largely comprehensible world, if associated with abstractions and refinements beyond his immediate ken.[14] 369 184 181

The modern great city of Southeast Asia, however, not only was different but was also incomprehensible to the child of the folk society, who came to regard it not merely as strange and foreign but also as hostile. The "foreignness" is reflected in their ethnic composition. Until the second World War at least the largest population group in Rangoon was Indian; Singapore is primarily a Chinese city; Bangkok is very largely Chinese, as is Saigon if Cholon, its twin city, is included; both Manila and Jakarta have large foreign and Chinese elements. To this extent the great city is more metropolitan than national. Each has its Chinese, European, and native quarters, for example, although in many instances the lines of division have become blurred, especially since the close of the war.[15] Furthermore, wherever Chinese populations are large, a predominant type of house is the so-called "shophouse," a two-or-more-story building with shops on the first floor, built to a standard width originally dictated by the length of the average fir-log lintel as used in South China, and with residential flats and 631 361 369 184 578 162 563 342 347 563 369 184

[13] See Robert Redfield and Milton Singer, "A Cultural Role of Cities," a working paper for the Conference on the Role of Cities in Economic Growth and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, May 24–26, 1954. [113]

[14] Cf. J. M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian City: Its Culture and Evolution," *Asia*, March, 1953.

[15] In Singapore the Chinese are localized according to the various so-called "clans," e.g., Hokkien, Cantonese, Tiuchiu, Hailams, and Hakka (see B. W. Hodder, "Racial Groupings in Singapore," *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, October, 1953).

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18. Firth E-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
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427 But the alien planta-
565 tions and even alien smallholders have threatened to grasp at it, and the
177 advances of Western medicine, so beneficial in many ways, have only accelerated the rate of increase of the population which has to seek a livelihood from it. In most parts of South East Asia the peasant is the actual owner of the land he tills, often legally under some agreement with
426 the State. But his rights to the produce are often severely limited by a heavy burden of indebtedness. The real effects of this may be less than people sometimes think, because when the debts are spread among neighbours and kinsfolk interest may be waived, repayment is sometimes protracted or ignored, and the debt may be serviced by other than material means. But there is no doubt that the peasant producer is badly hampered by his debt load. It is most pressing when debt is contracted to a member of an alien ethnic group, an Indian or a Chinese, for whom the transaction is a purely commercial one.

563 The role of alien Asiatic ethnic groups is one of the most significant
565 features in the economic and political life of the peasantry of South East
177 Asia today. For many centuries, Indian and Chinese trading influences
178 have met in the South East Asian region, and Indian religious concepts
439 have penetrated deep into many of its social systems. But for more than four hundred years the dominant commercial and political note has tended to be sounded by Europeans. Now the balance is altering. Colonialism may have set the modern structure of South East Asian society, but the patterns will persist when the colonial Powers have withdrawn. To this new society the Chinese above all have the economic key. In Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, the Philippines, and Java, the Chinese have penetrated the economic system and taken over crucial functions. They have shared in much of the wholesale import trade, they have attained pre-eminence in retailing vital imported goods to the peasant, and they act as middlemen for the collection, storage, and processing of peasant export products. As part of this process they often finance the peasant producer by advances on his crop, gaining a double profit by giving part of these advances in goods, not cash. The Chinese achievement has been remarkable. They have been kept on the margin both of the peasant society with which they deal, and of the European society with which at a later stage their growing wealth would allow them to associate. Though lacking any formal political power, which in the Orient as elsewhere is so often the passport to success, they have built up a trading structure of extraordinary toughness, elasticity, and elaboration.

565 The wider political implications of this are not my concern here. But
609 it is important to note three points in connexion with the peasant theme.
186 One is the xenophobic reaction of the local urban dwellers and of peasants too, which has periodically found expression against the Chinese, as traders
●578 or residents in South East Asia, in the form of riots and other disturbances.
563 Another is the reaction of the Chinese, whose economic strength has given
241 them confidence, and who are now prepared to stand by their claim to a

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real stake in the countries of the Nan Yang, as settled members of the local 565
society, and not as aliens. The third point is that the Chinese community 609
has never been one of middlemen only; there has always been a fair pro- 186
portion of cultivators within it. The poor peasantry of South East Asia 578
now includes a Chinese as well as an indigenous element. The 1947 census 563
of Malaya shows 45,000 Chinese engaged in rice growing, and another 241
100,000 in market gardening and fishing, essentially peasant pursuits.

The pressure to which the South East Asian peasant has been subjected 177
by the combination of Western and other alien influences has been severe. 565
But we must beware lest we misinterpret it. In a recent book which gives a 166
comparative analysis of the agrarian situation in the countries of South East Asia, appears a striking statement about Malaya—that development of mining and rubber industries has pushed the native Malay population more and more towards the east, into the areas of the former Unfederated Malay States: 'The Malays', it is said, 'considered the east as safe from Western penetration, and therefore preferred this undeveloped area to the irrigated lands on the western coast, mainly because there they could get only temporary land licences, since a complete survey of all potential tin-bearing regions had not yet been made'.[1]

It is true that the eastern States are predominantly Malay in population, and that the greater part of the vast immigrant population of Malaya is densely settled on the western side of the peninsula, where the resources are richer and access easier than on the eastern side. It is also true that there has been some lack of enthusiasm among Malay peasants to colonize the new Government-developed irrigation areas, for complex reasons, including lack of capital in the past, and disinclination to move from their ancestral homes. But it is quite incorrect to put these facts together and to argue that the Malay has been pushed by alien pressure over from the west to the east of the peninsula. Apart from some seasonal movement for rice harvesting or fishing, the internal migration of Malays is inconsiderable, despite the rapid development of communications in recent years. Both the 1931 and the 1947 census show that whatever movement takes place—well under 10 per cent—is almost wholly from one State to another, either on the west coast or on the east coast, or to Singapore. Hardly any movement at all occurs from the west to the east. Moreover, the 1947 census shows that between 1931 and 1947 the Malay population of the western States increased by about one-third, at a rate slightly higher than that of the eastern States. The proportion of Malays in these western States, in terms of the total population of all ethnic groups, also increased slightly during this period, due primarily to the decline of Indians and Indonesians. In other words, though foreign economic penetration has immersed the western Malay in a flood of alien elements, it has not driven him away. On the contrary, he has preferred to stay and await events.

[1] Erich H. Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia* (New York, Colombia University Press, 1949) p. 113.

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nearing the end of its historical phase. How far it is likely to be replaced 565
by a more insidious form of satellitism is not relevant here. But to talk 185
about political emancipation of South East Asia being the prime require- 656
ment for the solution of the problems of the peasantry must not obscure the economic factors involved. Nor is fresh capital all that is needed. For the economy of the peasant to attain a relative stability a great development of technical and administrative skills in the commercial field is necessary. The building of a native professional class would seem to be an important element in the construction of a more integrated economic and political system. To concentrate attention on the political factors alone is to overlook the fact that most of the sinews of the economic organism are now provided by the one group which does not have overt political power—the Chinese.

What remains of the traditional class structure in South East Asian 565
society is not of much avail as a defence of the peasant from alien exploita- 578
tion. In any case, though the rulers and traditional nobility still command 668
much respect, and provide symbols for the unity of the people, there are 186
stirrings of resentment among the people against the perpetuation of a system in which these aristocrats do not perform recognizable services at commensurate incomes. But such resentment does not mean that the peasantry are dry tinder for the spark of Communism to set alight. Communism as yet does not seem to have any great attraction for the mass of the local peasantry of the South East Asian region. The lack of popular response to the Malayan insurrection has shown this. It is presumably true to say that the interest of the peasant can always be secured in any movement which promises to give him greater control of the land—more land more secure tenure, freedom from land debt, and better returns for his produce. But to most of the Indonesian peasants these aims are likely to be sought in nationalism, which can be largely given both an ethnic base and the religious sanctions of Islam. The person to whom the cry for a solution of the land problem is likely to make a most definite appeal, especially in Malaya, is not the Indonesian but the Chinese peasant, who sees himself as excluded from full participation in the land rights of the country folk. Over and over again one hears the cry, ill-founded as it is, that the Chinese have not been allowed to grow rice in Malaya.

Here may well come one of the acute pressure points in the South East 000
Asian scene. The analysis might go as follows. Nationalism is a powerful political force because of its appeal to the individual in a projected, enlarged form of his desires and strivings. But by itself it is an aggressive rather than a constructive force. It lacks a coherent theory for the use of the resources at its control. An ideology containing such theory, and an equally ardent emotional charge on the part of many of its adherents, is provided by Communism. If Communism can work through nationalism it has a most powerful combination. Yet Communism in South East Asia lacks organization of any scale. The optimum conditions for its success are

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this was a policy which the British neglected to pursue with any conviction, and the post-war experiment in this direction, the Malayan Union, was abandoned at the first sign of opposition. Unless a true 'Malayan citizenship' can be made effective, the ideal of a Malayan nation forming, as it were, a buffer State between China, Indonesia, and India, with bonds with all three but belonging to none, will remain a phantom.

In the present crisis the great and deplorable weakness of the Chinese in Southeast Asia is the absence of effective leadership (and the few notable exceptions to this generalization do not affect its truth). This is due in large part to the fact that there has grown up no Chinese middle class of sufficient proportions to provide disinterested, well-educated, and competent individuals in the numbers needed to guide their community through the reefs of politics towards a safe anchorage. The business leaders are so busy making money (or endeavouring not to lose it) that few of them have time to devote to public affairs even if they had the will and the knowledge. In Malaya, at least, the Indian stands in sharp contrast to the Chinese, and in Singapore Indian representation on the various bodies is vastly greater in proportion to their numbers than is the case with the much more numerous Chinese. This is not explicable solely by Chinese political pique but must be due largely to the training in politics and administration the Indians received in their own country during the British Raj. In Malaya, Indonesia, and Indochina the British, Dutch, and French have neglected to afford opportunities for the Chinese residents to acquire a knowledge of affairs. The penalty of this neglect is that now, when European control is loosening, the mass of the Chinese have few leaders to take control and to consolidate their community in face of the Communist advance. The lack of experience and education determines also the quality of the Communist leadership in these regions. Among the Malayan Communists are no Mao Tse-tungs or Chou En-lais and scarcely any individuals with more than the rudimentary mis-education obtainable in Chinese vernacular schools. The result is that the old professional bandit (always a feature of Malaya's jungle-fringe) is more prominent than he would otherwise be, and terrorism is unmitigated by constructive politics. Is it, therefore, strange that in 1949 the majority of Nanyang Chinese were 'sitting on the fence' awaiting the final upshot in China and its repercussions overseas? In such

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circumstances a handful of Chinese Communists, many of them uneducated youths with a strong professional bandit element as just mentioned, had almost complete freedom of action through the time-honoured weapons of intimidation and extortion. With this insidious pressure, and with little support or sympathy from the European Powers or the native peoples, the Chinese of Southeast Asia were indeed in a dilemma.

With the advent of militant Communism came a final complication to the lives of the overseas Chinese. The appeal of the Communists is to the idea of a society horizontally but not vertically divided—that is, divided into classes, but with a proletariat which cuts across racial and community divisions. So far this appeal had been listened to by only a small minority of the Chinese, and with the Malays and other races it had been an almost complete failure. But let no one underestimate the attraction it might have for the masses of Southeast Asia if they were simultaneously convinced of the sincerity of the Communist professions and of the bankruptcy of 'bourgeois' promises.

The only way to stem the advance of Communism in Southeast Asia is to raise the standard of living. The irony of such a course for the colonial Powers is that in promoting a rise in the standard of living they are hastening their own departure. Improved material welfare stimulates political awareness. Whereas in the grand old days of their trading companies they could lord it over a province with a garrison of a score of soldiers, to-day with armies of a hundred thousand they remain only on sufferance. It is of no use, however, their elder statesmen and administrators of a bygone age urging the Governments to 'go slow'. The idea of representative government came from the West, but the rate of approach to it is largely fixed by the peoples themselves. All that the colonial Powers can aim at is to leave their ex-dependencies able to decide their own future and not at the mercy of new imperialisms.

We take leave of the Chinese in Southeast Asia at a time when they are undergoing one of the greatest trials in their history. The whole of the Far East is disintegrating as it moves towards a new and mysterious synthesis. These emigrants belong to a race which for at least one hundred and twenty generations, through the rise, flowering, decline, and petrifaction of the Chinese culture, has preserved a unified attitude of mind towards life and reality, and they look towards their parent civilization and see it once more in

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the family in Siam, his wife (acting head of the family) in the village in China, and most of the children of the marriage in China.

Such arrangements obviously call for careful financing. The emigrant abroad, after deducting what he needs to meet his expenses, usually remits his savings periodically to his home in China for the support of the family there and to meet extraordinary expenses, such as of a marriage in the family. At the same time the family home in China is a kind of insurance for the emigrant, for he can always return there if he is unemployed.

The influence of the emigrant on the age-old ideas and customs of his home village has been great. If he has had much foreign experience he almost invariably condemns the traditional family arrangement. In the words of a returned tin-miner from Malaya:[1]

> The joint family is an obnoxious social institution. When a member of such a family earns money he is obliged to support all the rest of it and to carry a heavy economic burden. I have had a very bitter experience and always felt that I am virtually the slave of my family. They are of no help to me at all.

A critical attitude towards the family and marriage systems is very general among returned emigrants. They remark that living in the modern world is a complicated affair, and that the joint family is no longer practicable. Many of them felt (in 1935) that an early disintegration of the family in south China was inevitable. Moreover, many of the emigrants have seen what marriage may mean in modern Western life when love and courtship enter into the marriage preliminaries and the union is (or should be) based on affection. An emigrant inevitably contrasts this with the Chinese system wherein the husband and wife are often unknown to one another before marriage. Stubborn and resistant as the traditional family system is, there is evidence from all over the Nanyang that as regards marriage the traditional procedure is in retreat before the modern marriage, and that the joint family system is being strained in some cases almost to breaking-point. Again, in the Nanyang itself, the increased mobility of members of the family is a force threatening to loosen its bonds.

In spite of these tendencies, marriage custom among the Chinese in the Nanyang at the time of the outbreak of the war between Japan and the Allies in 1941 generally followed Chinese traditional

[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 142.

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custom.[1] All this ceremonial was very expensive and involved the family in a burden of debt. 167

One result of the Revolution in China was to initiate a changing attitude towards family institutions. Books IV and V of the Civil Code of the Republic of China deal with the family and succession. The law was promulgated on 26 December 1930 and came into force on 5 May 1931. Polygamy was abolished, and though concubinage in many cases continued, the concubine was now a mistress without legal rights.[2] According to the new law the parties to a marriage were empowered to make the marriage agreement of their own accord, the sole restrictions being that a man who had not completed his eighteenth year and a woman not yet sixteen must obtain the consent of their parents or guardian. No registration of marriage was provided for. 178 582 593

In the Straits Settlements a Chinese Marriage Committee, appointed in 1925 by the Government, recommended that there should be registration for both new- and old-style marriages.[3] The old-style marriage would be valid if the marriage ceremony was carried out with all the essentials required by custom in the district of China from which the bridegroom and bride or their ancestors came, or by such modified custom as was observed by the Chinese residents of the Colony for that district. The committee found it impossible to submit proposals for legislation as to what forms or ceremonies should constitute marriage, because the evidence disclosed the fact that there were no essentials for Chinese marriages in the old style common to all the districts of south China or to the locally born descendants of emigrants from these districts, while the new style of marriage did not require any particular form.

The evidence taken by the committee revealed a practically unanimous opposition among Chinese residents in the Straits Settlements to any divorce legislation.[4]

[1] For a description of these customs see G.B., Colonial Office, *Report of the Commission on Mui Tsai in Hong Kong and Malaya*, Colonial no. 125 (1937), and Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, pp. 148–50.

[2] cf. M. H. van der Valk, 'The New Chinese Criminal Code', *Pacific Affairs* (1936) pp. 76, 77. Under the new Chinese Criminal Code which became operative in July 1935 husband and wife are equally liable to a year's imprisonment for committing adultery, and moreover the person with whom the adultery is committed incurs the same punishment. Complaint can be laid only by the injured spouse.

[3] *Chinese Marriage Committee*, Singapore 1926.

[4] The position in the Federated Malay States, however, was temporarily revolutionized by the Secretary for Chinese Affairs Enactment which was passed

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167 The new-style marriage, based on the consent of the parties, and
178 often arranged by themselves, has gradually been spreading in popularity among the better educated. The cost of the wedding
582 and its preliminaries has also been much reduced. This is a con-
593 sequence, too, of the growing equality between the sexes.

871 *Education*. It was only by dint of continual defeat at the hands of
212 foreign Powers that China realized that her traditional literary sys-
167 tem of education, which had endured for over a thousand years, did not fit her to withstand the assaults of her enemies. At long last she decided to adopt an educational system on modern lines. The greatest obstacle in doing this was the classical language. The literary language in which all education was conducted had become completely divorced from the spoken language, and it needed many years of study before a student could obtain anything like command of it. Whilst it remained, a democratic system of education was out of the question.[1] So it was that in 1917 there occurred the most revolutionary happening in the history of Chinese education, the initiation of the *pai hua* movement.[2]

Pai hua, or written vernacular, had existed in China for centuries. Most popular novels were written in it, but it had never obtained the recognition of the literati. Corresponding, as it did, to the spoken language, it was much more easily learnt than *wen li*, the Chinese literary language, though it was clumsier and more discursive. So when Dr Hu Shih maintained that the literary language should be abolished in schools and that *pai hua* should be elevated to the rank of a literary medium, the proposal was considered as threatening the very foundations of Chinese culture. But the movement obtained powerful political support and in January 1920, the Minister of Education ordered that the spoken language should be used in the teaching of Chinese in primary schools. The form of *pai hua* approved for this purpose became known as *Kuo Yü*, or the National Language.[3]

in 1899 and repealed in 1932. By this enactment the Secretary for Chinese Affairs had powers to decide the custody and guardianship of women and children, and to order divorce, separation, adoption, and betrothal.

[1] Dr W. A. P. Martin estimated about 1880 that the proportion of Chinese who could read and understand what they read was about one in twenty.

[2] For a full exposition of the subject see Victor Purcell, *Problems of Chinese Education* (London, Kegan Paul, 1936).

[3] See Hu Shih, *The Chinese Renaissance*. The Haskell Lectures, 1933 (University of Chicago Press, 1934).

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175 thus set a new stage -- the development of the natural
177 resources of the whole region.
433
439 This change-over from a subsistence economy to a
648 commercial economy involved the large-scale expansion of traditional crops or the development of new commercial crops.
[436] It was stimulated by the introduction or expansion of a money
[489] economy, the flow of capital and the development of land and
[69] sea transport. It was supported by Western technology, methods of administration and systems of justice. This whole process greatly affected the traditional institution, up-
175 setting the balance of a medieval world. The free, indi-
177 vidualist spirit of Western rule and commerce cut at the
[59] roots of traditional social life, undermining the corporate
[423] strength of family and village. But the most serious direct
[426] threat of the new economic forces was to the peasant's owner-
[566] ship of land. Expanding economies, new money taxes and cheap imports meant better business than ever for the money lender. Many peasants became ruined by debt and lost their lands. Indebtedness and debt slavery were not new in Southeast Asia; the latter was fairly soon stamped out, but the former now became much more widespread than before, resulting in the creation of a landless proletariat.[16]

184 Characteristics of Current Southeast Asian Economy

In spite of all the differences among the countries of Southeast Asia in the natural environment, ethnic

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16. Harrison, op. cit., p. 210.

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[p.39]

CHAPTER IV

SPECIAL ASPECTS OF CHINESE SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MOST readers of this survey will be acquainted, at least in a general way, with the problems of China itself and with the direction in which the people of that country have moved in the last fifty years. What will be attempted in this chapter will be to illustrate the way in which the Chinese of Southeast Asia have in some respects deviated from the central pattern under the influence of local conditions. We shall select for this purpose the special aspects of the family, marriage, religion, and education, with some remarks on the opium question. As regards politics, Chapter XXXI, dealing with Chinese political organization in Malaya, brings out the developments which are typical of the area as a whole, and to this the reader is referred should he wish to gain a general impression of the matter before proceeding to the separate country studies.

The Family. An excellent starting-point for our chapter is the work of Dr Ta Chen, who, in 1934 and 1935 was in charge of a group of investigators studying the emigrant communities in eastern Kwangtung and southern Fukien under the auspices of the International Research Committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations.[1] The area selected for study was a region from which many of the emigrants to the Nanyang originated and where their families mostly live. It is on the sea coast of the two southernmost maritime provinces and consists of ten *hsien* (counties). Roughly speaking, it includes a long strip of territory beginning at Chao An (formerly Chao Chou), passing through Swatow on the Kwangtung border, and through Amoy, and ending at Chuan Chou (Ch'üan-chow) in Fukien. It is an area of a little less than 5,000 square miles with a total population of a little over 4·6 million in 1935.[2]

[1] Ta Chen (the name is properly Chen Ta, Chen being the surname, and it is thus given in some library catalogues), *Emigrant Communities in South China: a Study of Overseas Migration and its Influence on Standards of Living and Social Change*, English ed. by Bruno Lasker (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940).

[2] Though all the *hsien* have sent emigrants to the Nanyang the area does not constitute the sole source of emigration to the south, even from these two provinces. For example, Mei Hsien and vicinity, the principal home of the Hakkas and the largest source of Hakka emigration, is not included in this area.

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Here two distinct aggregations of Chinese live side by side—the non-emigrant and the emigrant community—from which a large proportion of the emigrants to the Nanyang are drawn and the income of whose families is (except under unusual circumstances such as the later war with Japan) augmented by remittances from their menfolk overseas. These two communities in a clear way illustrate many of the differences that distinguish the stay-at-home Chinese from those who have sought their fortunes abroad.

Judged from the natural and socio-economic facts, the non-emigrant community was (at the time of Dr Ta Chen's investigations) typical of farm life in south China. The principal occupation was the cultivation of rice, and this was supplemented by many subsidiary occupations, including poultry raising and fruit growing. After the harvest, men and women of the poorer classes picked up fuel and burned charcoal in the mountains for sale in the village market. It was a simple pattern of livelihood not differing in any essential from that of thousands of villages in any other part of rural China. The emigrant community, too, had a variety of occupations, but these did not yield them sufficient income to maintain their present style of living. To quote an experienced physician with Western training who had for many years resided in such a community: 'The children of the well-to-do emigrant families are well fed and clothed. They are easy-going and usually without a definite occupation. If by mischance the family's business in the Nanyang should be bankrupt, these people will be obliged to support themselves by begging.'[1] This statement was thought to be something of an exaggeration, but to bring out the variable factor in the life of an emigrant community. (There were, of course, also families with no sons abroad living in the emigrant community. In these families the pattern of livelihood was much the same as that in a non-emigrant community.)

Before proceeding with a summary comparison of these two sets of families, it is appropriate to remark that those who emigrated from China usually did so to improve their social status. They were, on the whole, therefore, drawn from the less prosperous families, and the process to be described was not merely that of subjecting identical social material to different influences.

In the non-emigrant community, out of 725 families studied, 650 were engaged in growing rice. One hundred and thirty of these owned

[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. pp. 59, 60.

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167 incomes by work at home or in local workshops. The drawn-thread
591 and embroidery work engaged in by the girls and middle-aged women in their spare time earned them about twenty cents a day per person. Others wove cloth at small weaving-shops or sewed in tailors'-shops, earning about thirty cents a day. None of these occupations were, in fact, particularly remunerative. Older women were engaged in making joss-paper or in knitting fishing-nets. Apart from farming and trade, the men were engaged in relatively few occupations—there were coolies, barbers, carpenters, school-teachers, and fishermen.

167 We come now to the subject of remittances from the Nanyang
434 regarding which there has been much conflicting evidence. No
591 satisfactory estimate of these remittances has been made for South-east Asia as a whole, and in any case their value has varied greatly with the fluctuation in trade.[1] There had been a time when the ownership of a few rubber-trees had meant affluence, when Chinese importers in the Nanyang could undersell those of all other nationalities and still make a large profit, 'and when they had the native peasants so under control through indebtedness that they could sell them almost anything at any price'.[2]

[464] There had been times when labour was so scarce that Chinese coolies could in a few years accumulate savings enough to start in business, and when employees of Chinese retailers could force up wages to the point where it was more economical for the employer to take them in as partners. But by 1935 all this had changed. New immigration restrictions, motivated by the depression, had cut large numbers of Chinese labourers off from labour opportunities abroad while, at the same time, life had become, perhaps, a little more secure in this time of general débâcle for a certain privileged few—for example, the small retail traders already established in the Nanyang who had less competition to meet from their countrymen and who could circumvent the new head tax on males by bringing women and children from China to take the place of male assistants.

(This investigation, we must remember, dates from a time when Southeast Asia was only just beginning to recover from the trade depression of 1929–32.)

[1] In 1941 about SS$10 million was remitted to China from Malaya, but there is nothing to indicate how much of this was in the ordinary way of trade.

[2] This is placed in quotation marks to indicate that it represents the views of Dr Ta Chen.

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Dr Ta Chen gives a table (p. 83) of the sources of income of 100 emigrant families from October 1934 to September 1935 which shows that the average monthly remittance per family was 81·4 per cent. of the total income, ranging between 75·5 per cent. for incomes below $20 per mensem, and 84·1 per cent. for incomes between $125 and $250. This enabled the emigrant familiies to maintain a much higher standard of living as a whole than those families which had no source of assistance from abroad. 167 434 591

Apart from the purely economic effects of overseas migration upon these communities of east Kwangtung and south Fukien, there is evidence to show that intercourse with Southeast Asia was having a considerable modifying effect on the social institutions, religion, and general outlook both of the emigrants themselves and of the families in China whence they came and to which usually they eventually returned. 178 167 591

In China the social unit has immemorially been the family, and it remains so except to the extent that it has broken down in Communist areas under the influence of Communist ideology. The system which has as its object the perpetuation of the family tree, to a considerable extent subordinates the individual to its needs. But in these emigrant communities in China and in the Nanyang itself, it has had to undergo a great deal of modification to survive. Where resources permit, a dual family system has grown up, whereby one section lives in China and the other in the Nanyang. This dual, or joint family, takes a number of forms which may vary; in the case of a well-off family (to give an example) the head of the family aged 61 lives in Siam, his wife (aged 58) lives in the ancestral village in China and is the acting head of the family, the first concubine (56) is a Siamese and lives in Siam, the second concubine (44) is in the village, and the third and fourth concubines (both Chinese, aged 30 and 19) are also in Siam, and the children of the unions are, except for the son by the wife who is with his father in Siam, all with their mothers, either in Siam or in China. An example of a middle-class family is of a father aged 77 in the village, his son aged 50, the head of the family, in Singapore, and his wife (the acting head of the family) in the village in China. The head of the family had his concubine in Singapore, and the offspring, either of the head of the family or his brothers (who belong to the family) were either in Singapore or at home. A third case of a lower-class family is a more simple pattern with the head of

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the family in Siam, his wife (acting head of the family) in the village in China, and most of the children of the marriage in China.

Such arrangements obviously call for careful financing. The emigrant abroad, after deducting what he needs to meet his expenses, usually remits his savings periodically to his home in China for the support of the family there and to meet extraordinary expenses, such as of a marriage in the family. At the same time the family home in China is a kind of insurance for the emigrant, for he can always return there if he is unemployed.

The influence of the emigrant on the age-old ideas and customs of his home village has been great. If he has had much foreign experience he almost invariably condemns the traditional family arrangement. In the words of a returned tin-miner from Malaya:[1]

> The joint family is an obnoxious social institution. When a member of such a family earns money he is obliged to support all the rest of it and to carry a heavy economic burden. I have had a very bitter experience and always felt that I am virtually the slave of my family. They are of no help to me at all.

A critical attitude towards the family and marriage systems is very general among returned emigrants. They remark that living in the modern world is a complicated affair, and that the joint family is no longer practicable. Many of them felt (in 1935) that an early disintegration of the family in south China was inevitable. Moreover, many of the emigrants have seen what marriage may mean in modern Western life when love and courtship enter into the marriage preliminaries and the union is (or should be) based on affection. An emigrant inevitably contrasts this with the Chinese system wherein the husband and wife are often unknown to one another before marriage. Stubborn and resistant as the traditional family system is, there is evidence from all over the Nanyang that as regards marriage the traditional procedure is in retreat before the modern marriage, and that the joint family system is being strained in some cases almost to breaking-point. Again, in the Nanyang itself, the increased mobility of members of the family is a force threatening to loosen its bonds.

In spite of these tendencies, marriage custom among the Chinese in the Nanyang at the time of the outbreak of the war between Japan and the Allies in 1941 generally followed Chinese traditional

[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 142.

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Chinese

the family in Siam, his wife (acting head of the family) in the village in China, and most of the children of the marriage in China.

Such arrangements obviously call for careful financing. The emigrant abroad, after deducting what he needs to meet his expenses, usually remits his savings periodically to his home in China for the support of the family there and to meet extraordinary expenses, such as of a marriage in the family. At the same time the family home in China is a kind of insurance for the emigrant, for he can always return there if he is unemployed.

The influence of the emigrant on the age-old ideas and customs of his home village has been great. If he has had much foreign experience he almost invariably condemns the traditional family arrangement. In the words of a returned tin-miner from Malaya:[1]

> The joint family is an obnoxious social institution. When a member of such a family earns money he is obliged to support all the rest of it and to carry a heavy economic burden. I have had a very bitter experience and always felt that I am virtually the slave of my family. They are of no help to me at all.

A critical attitude towards the family and marriage systems is very general among returned emigrants. They remark that living in the modern world is a complicated affair, and that the joint family is no longer practicable. Many of them felt (in 1935) that an early disintegration of the family in south China was inevitable. Moreover, many of the emigrants have seen what marriage may mean in modern Western life when love and courtship enter into the marriage preliminaries and the union is (or should be) based on affection. An emigrant inevitably contrasts this with the Chinese system wherein the husband and wife are often unknown to one another before marriage. Stubborn and resistant as the traditional family system is, there is evidence from all over the Nanyang that as regards marriage the traditional procedure is in retreat before the modern marriage, and that the joint family system is being strained in some cases almost to breaking-point. Again, in the Nanyang itself, the increased mobility of members of the family is a force threatening to loosen its bonds.

In spite of these tendencies, marriage custom among the Chinese in the Nanyang at the time of the outbreak of the war between Japan and the Allies in 1941 generally followed Chinese traditional

[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 142.

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custom.[1] All this ceremonial was very expensive and involved the family in a burden of debt. 167

One result of the Revolution in China was to initiate a changing attitude towards family institutions. Books IV and V of the Civil Code of the Republic of China deal with the family and succession. The law was promulgated on 26 December 1930 and came into force on 5 May 1931. Polygamy was abolished, and though concubinage in many cases continued, the concubine was now a mistress without legal rights.[2] According to the new law the parties to a marriage were empowered to make the marriage agreement of their own accord, the sole restrictions being that a man who had not completed his eighteenth year and a woman not yet sixteen must obtain the consent of their parents or guardian. No registration of marriage was provided for. 178 582 593

In the Straits Settlements a Chinese Marriage Committee, appointed in 1925 by the Government, recommended that there should be registration for both new- and old-style marriages.[3] The old-style marriage would be valid if the marriage ceremony was carried out with all the essentials required by custom in the district of China from which the bridegroom and bride or their ancestors came, or by such modified custom as was observed by the Chinese residents of the Colony for that district. The committee found it impossible to submit proposals for legislation as to what forms or ceremonies should constitute marriage, because the evidence disclosed the fact that there were no essentials for Chinese marriages in the old style common to all the districts of south China or to the locally born descendants of emigrants from these districts, while the new style of marriage did not require any particular form.

The evidence taken by the committee revealed a practically unanimous opposition among Chinese residents in the Straits Settlements to any divorce legislation.[4]

[1] For a description of these customs see G.B., Colonial Office, *Report of the Commission on Mui Tsai in Hong Kong and Malaya*, Colonial no. 125 (1937), and Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, pp. 148–50.

[2] cf. M. H. van der Valk, 'The New Chinese Criminal Code', *Pacific Affairs* (1936) pp. 76, 77. Under the new Chinese Criminal Code which became operative in July 1935 husband and wife are equally liable to a year's imprisonment for committing adultery, and moreover the person with whom the adultery is committed incurs the same punishment. Complaint can be laid only by the injured spouse.

[3] *Chinese Marriage Committee*, Singapore 1926.

[4] The position in the Federated Malay States, however, was temporarily revolutionized by the Secretary for Chinese Affairs Enactment which was passed

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167 The new-style marriage, based on the consent of the parties, and
178 often arranged by themselves, has gradually been spreading in
582 popularity among the better educated. The cost of the wedding
593 and its preliminaries has also been much reduced. This is a consequence, too, of the growing equality between the sexes.

871 *Education.* It was only by dint of continual defeat at the hands of
212 foreign Powers that China realized that her traditional literary sys-
167 tem of education, which had endured for over a thousand years, did not fit her to withstand the assaults of her enemies. At long last she decided to adopt an educational system on modern lines. The greatest obstacle in doing this was the classical language. The literary language in which all education was conducted had become completely divorced from the spoken language, and it needed many years of study before a student could obtain anything like command of it. Whilst it remained, a democratic system of education was out of the question.[1] So it was that in 1917 there occurred the most revolutionary happening in the history of Chinese education, the initiation of the *pai hua* movement.[2]

Pai hua, or written vernacular, had existed in China for centuries. Most popular novels were written in it, but it had never obtained the recognition of the literati. Corresponding, as it did, to the spoken language, it was much more easily learnt than *wen li*, the Chinese literary language, though it was clumsier and more discursive. So when Dr Hu Shih maintained that the literary language should be abolished in schools and that *pai hua* should be elevated to the rank of a literary medium, the proposal was considered as threatening the very foundations of Chinese culture. But the movement obtained powerful political support and in January 1920, the Minister of Education ordered that the spoken language should be used in the teaching of Chinese in primary schools. The form of *pai hua* approved for this purpose became known as *Kuo Yü*, or the National Language.[3]

in 1899 and repealed in 1932. By this enactment the Secretary for Chinese Affairs had powers to decide the custody and guardianship of women and children, and to order divorce, separation, adoption, and betrothal.

[1] Dr W. A. P. Martin estimated about 1880 that the proportion of Chinese who could read and understand what they read was about one in twenty.

[2] For a full exposition of the subject see Victor Purcell, *Problems of Chinese Education* (London, Kegan Paul, 1936).

[3] See Hu Shih, *The Chinese Renaissance*. The Haskell Lectures, 1933 (University of Chicago Press, 1934).

121 The exclusive emphasis on marriage as a causative factor
114 in kinship terminology, found both in Rivers and Aginsky though in different form, appears to be losing ground steadily; cf. the excellent studies by Tax, Eggan, McAllister, Opler, and Gilbert (in Eggan, 1937) and Opler (1937).

121 No use has been made of the terms "classificatory" and
128 "descriptive", each of which has acquired so wide a range of
601 connotations as to have lost all preciseness. The term "analytical" is used in its basic linguistic sense, e.g. "father's brother" is an analytical term, whereas "uncle" is a primary term. Note that a term may be only partly analytical, e.g. "uncle's son", where the fully analytical term would be "father's brother's son" or "mother's brother's son".

Three types of terminological equations are distinguished, as follows:

1. Categorical equation: equation of members of the two different categories of kin (consanguineal and affinal), e.g. "mother's brother" = "father-in-law".

2. Lineal equation: equation of members of two different lines of descent, e.g. "brother" = "father's sister's son", "son" = "brother's son".

3. Serial equation: equation of members of two different generations, e.g. "son" = "grandson".

These terms are to be regarded as convenient tags of some use in describing patterns of nomenclature, e.g. the Omaha and Crow types are characterized by serial equations in the cross collateral lines. The equation may rest on the extension

121 of a term through analogy or teknonymy, e.g. "grandfather" =
128 "father-in-law" (teknonymy) or on the merging of the referents,
601 e.g. "mother's brother" = "father-in-law" in a group practising cross-cousin marriage. One's explanation of a given system of nomenclature depends in large measure on his analysis of these factors, and one must guard against a premature assumption in either direction. Other equation categories can be established, e.g. the equation of elder and younger siblings, but those cited above have proved to be the most useful.

A final word remains to be said with regard to the system of notation employed. For each language considered in detail, a table of terms is drawn up, with those referring to female kin on the left, those referring to male kin on the right, and those without sex specification (neuter) in the center. This simple arrangement permits of rapid inspection of the table, and is more convenient than the charts of which kinship theorists are so fond. In the notation itself an attempt has been made to get away from the "bastard algebra of kinship", to use Malinowski's phrase (p. 19). Primary English terms are represented by capital letters, and English categorical terms by small letters. Since terms such as "aunt", "uncle", and "cousin" are often found in our sources, these have been retained in our notation. The letter N is used for "nephew, niece" (i.e. neuter), Ne for "nephew", Ni for "niece", and the cousin terms are formed analogically, viz. C "cousin (neuter)", Ce "cousin (male)", Ci "cousin (female)". Cf. also the parallelism in Si "sister" (S "son").

Kinship Notation

121 A aunt
128 B brother
197 C cousin
601 Ce cousin (male)
Ci cousin (female)
Ch child
D daughter
(ds) (different sex from speaker's)
F father
g grand-
l -in-law
M mother
N nephew or niece
Ne nephew
Ni niece
(os) (older than speaker)
p parallel
P parent
S son
Sb sibling
Si sister
Sp spouse
(ss) (same sex as speaker's)
U uncle
x cross
(ys) (younger than speaker)

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193 fixed word order: subject + object + verb. The verbal prefix apparatus, which is especially prominent in Tibetan and Kachin, consisted of "subjective" prefixes m-, b-, and "directive" prefixes d-, g-, r-, l-, s-. The s- prefix often appears as a true causative morpheme, as in Kachin in the form ǰa, dǰa, e.g. bra "to be scattered", ǰa-bra "to scatter"; k'rit "to fear", dǰa-k'rit "to frighten", and in Burmese, in which the initial of the transitive form has been aspirated by the loss of prefixed s-, e.g. pran "to be full", p'ran "to fill"; lwat "to be free", hlwat "to set free". Prefixed m- is "stative" (neutral), as in Tib. mnam-pa "to smell, stink", mt'o-ba "to be high", often with reflexive force, as in Tib. mnab-pa "to put on garments, dress oneself". This prefix seems to represent an ancient demonstrative pronoun, which still functions independently in Meithei (Manipuri) and can be traced elsewhere. It often imparts substantival value, e.g. *m-ǰin (Tib. mtǰ'in) "liver' "its-bitter (ǰin)-part" (see the discussion in Benedict, 1939), Kachin pyen "to fly", ma-pyen "wings" < "its-flying", rut "to rub", ma-rut "a grater" < "its-rubbing". In many instances prefixes occuring with substantival forms cannot be analyzed, e.g. *r-mei "tail", *d-gu "9", while occasionally there is fluctuation in prefix usage, e.g. *l-nga or *b-nga "5".

●601 The existence of the m- pronominal prefix discussed
193 above is of some importance in the analysis of kinship terms in Tibeto-Burman. Kinship terms, like words for parts of the

body, are especially susceptible to prefixation of this type. Thus Meithei has ma-pa "father", ma-ma "mother" just as it has ma-sa "body", ma-mei "tail", ma-hau "fat", ma-hei "fruit", etc. The most widespread prefix of this type is the prefix a-, as in Tib. ʾa-p'a "father", ʾa-ma "mother", Lepcha a-bo "father", a-mo "mother", Kachin a-wa "father", a-nu " mother", Burmese a-p'a "father, a-ma ʾ "mother". As Laufer has shown, this a- prefix usage extends even into Chinese. In Tibetan this prefix is used only with kinship terms, but in Kachin, Burmese, and some of the Kukish languages it has retained its old pronominal function in its use with words for parts of the body, e.g. Southern Chin a-miʾ "eye", a-ho "tooth" along with a-po "father", a-nü "mother", and Lhota Naga o-k'a "hand", o-pok "belly" along with o-po "father, o-pvü "mother" (Lhota o < a). Wolfenden (1929, pp. 177 and ff.) sought to distinguish between pronominal and non-pronominal usages of this prefix, but failed to note its use with parts of the body in Kachin (e.g. a-mun "hair of the body", a-nu "brain") and in Burmese (e.g. a-mwe^3 "hair of the body", a-mri^3 "tail"), hence his argument must be discarded <u>in toto</u>. A third prefix of pronominal origin, k- or ka-, is also used with relationship terms, e.g. Kachin ka-wa "(his) father" along with n-wa "(your) father" and a-wa "(its) father" and wa "father", Thado (Khongzai dialect) ka-pa "father, ka-nu "mother". In the separate discussions that follow, pronominal prefixes of this type will be enclosed within parentheses, e.g. Tib. (ʾa-)p'a "father".

601 In striking contrast to this rather elaborate prefix
193 apparatus Tibeto-Burman shows almost no true morphological suffixation. A characteristic "final dental morphology", however, appears in Tibetan, Kachin and elsewhere and undoubtedly must be postulated for the parent speech. In this series Tibetan has -n, -d, and -s, the latter in some instances derived from -ds. Cf. the following examples: Tib. za-ba, gza-ba "to eat", gzan-pa "to eat, devour, gnaw", bzan "food of animals, pasturage", zan "pap, fodder", zas "food, nourishment", and Kachin ǎ "to eat", ǎt "boiled rice", i.e. "food"; Tib. bgo-ba "to put on clothes", gon-pa "to put on clothes; clothing", gos "garment"; Tib. dro-ba "to be warm, warm, warmth", dro, dros "the hot part of the day", dros-pa "heated", dron-mo "warm", drod "warmth, heat". As indicated by the above series, these derivatives in -n, -d, -s are often substantival, the typical formation being of the type na-ba "to be ill", nad "disease". The connection between the verbal root and the derived form with final dental is not always clear, especially in languages in which this morphology no longer functions, e.g. Burmese na "to be ill", nat "demon" < "spirit of disease" (see the discussion in Benedict, 1939). The importance of this morphology in connection with kinship terminology will be made clear in the discussion of the Tibetan system.

197 The classification of the Tibeto-Burman languages presents a number of serious problems which admit of no solution at the present time. The general picture is much

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17. Review of Tibeto-Burman

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The present section has been written with a two-fold view in mind, viz. a provisional reconstruction of the archaic Tibeto-Burman kinship nomenclature and a synthesis of material bearing on the general problem of the factors that have produced changes in this archaic system. It is of course impossible to realize either of these goals in any complete sense. The reconstruction of a set of kinship terms differs very little from the reconstruction of any other group of terms, e.g. those for animals. In each case certain phonetic generalizations must be followed, and in each case original meanings must be assigned to roots on the basis of a series of fluctuating connotations. The difficult problem of "partial equations", in which a given root has a limited distribution, arises here precisely as in any other linguistic field (for a good recent discussion, vide Scherer, 1941). A distinction between the two types of reconstruction can be drawn, however, in the fact that kinship terms constitute a definite system whereas those for animals, parts of the body, or the like, do not constitute such a system. It is fairly evident that, within kinship nomenclature, a semantic shift at one point is likely to be reflected at another, or, in sociological terms, a single factor, e.g. cross-cousin marriage, is likely to produce a series of interrelated changes, whereas this in general does not hold true within other linguistic spheres. In this respect a kinship nomenclature might be compared with

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a phonemic system, in which similar integration appears. The point is not worth elaborating, since the fact that a kinship terminology does constitute a system hardly relieves us of the task of investigating each element of that system, both independently and correlatively.

In any piece of historical reconstruction, linguistic or other, the natural tendency is to make the prototype unduly complex. The writer has often been struck by the complexities shown by hypothetical reconstructed languages as compared with their actual living descendants, as though linguistic evolution always proceeded in the direction of simplification. The number of distinct roots assigned to these reconstructed languages is sometimes of staggering magnitude, and no ingenuity is spared in augmenting this lexicographical harvest. In the present study it would be easy to reconstruct an archaic nomenclature with two or more terms for most relationships, yet such a procedure patently would be futile. It is far better to determine, firstly, which elements are relatively certain, and, secondly, which elements are based largely on "partial equations" and must thus be held in reserve until a basic framework has been set up. Nine roots, eight of which are applied to consanguineal relatives, stand out in our complete Tibeto-Burman series as culled from the foregoing review. These roots constitute the following systems

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Tibeto-Burman Terms

*p'i gN		*p'u gF
*na N		*p'a F
*ni FN1		*k'u NB
	*mna yCb	
	*ma Ch	
		*mak S1

The forms given above can be accepted with some confidence as fair approximations of the archaic Tibeto-Burman roots. All except the affixal term *mak have vocalic finals, and it was on the basis of finals or "rhymes" (medial vowel + final consonant), especially of vocalic finals, that Shafer and the writer were able to work out the main features of Tibeto-Burman phonology. Earlier writers had in general attacked the problem from the most difficult angle, that of initials and tones. Thus, no less a scholar than Laufer is responsible for the following absurd dictum:

> Prefixes as well as final consonants....are of minor importance in the comparative study of Indo-Chinese languages.... the staff of comparison remains the initial consonant and the tone conditioned by it. (TP 17, p. 115).

Prefixes have shown to be of basic importance, while both the initials and the tones have been so influenced by the prefixes that our analysis of them still lags far behind our analysis of the finals. In the above set of terms, however, the only problems in re initials concern the aspiration or lack of aspiration, voicing or unvoicing, of the stop initials of *p'i, *p'u, *p'a, and *k'u. Kukish has *pi gV and *pu gF,

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but initial aspiration is not well preserved in this group. Mikir has p'i gK, p'u gF, ku < *k'u NB, but po < *pa F. Meithei, which ordinarily preserves aspiration, has pu gF, pa F, and ku F1 (< NB). Kachin has ku NF (< NB) rather than the anticipated *k'u, and Burmese has (sta-)kui oS rather than *k'ui. Tibetan has p'yi gK, p'a F, and k'u FB (< NB), while both Tibetan and Kachin have p'u oS (< gF). It may be that one or more of these roots had a sonant rather than a surd initial. Initial g-, a rare element in our comparative material, is perhaps indicated for the NB root (*gu ~ *g'u), but at present nothing definite can be said on this point.

Only one of the above terms is uncertain as regards final, viz. *ni FS1. Classical Tibetan has no rather than *ni, and Meithei has nem ~ ne rather than *ni, both of which point to an archaic form *nei rather than *ni. The weight of evidence, however, speaks in favor of the reconstruction *ni, from which *nei may have been developed as a doublet root; cf. Kukish *nau y5h, *nou "young, tender", which tend to be confused (vide pt. 15).

The basic gF terms *p'i and *p'u are found together in Garish, Mikir, Meithei, Mru, Kukish, and Durmish-Loloish (but p'e^{3} gqF < *p'i in Burmese itself, which has a new term [p'wa^{3}] for gK). The root *p'i is further retained in its basic meaning in Tibetan, Kanauri (perhaps Tibetan loan-word), Bahing, and Vayu, while Chang has retained it in the meaning "gF". In northern TB groups the root *p'u has been applied

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to oB, viz. in Tibetan, Limbu, Newari (only in combination), Digaro, and Kachin. This semantic interchange also appears in Burmish-Loloish, viz. Moso p'u gF, bu oB, Nyi bu gF, bu oB. The interplay of surd and sonant initials in these Moso and Nyi forms indicates that doublets are involved. In Barish the root *p'i gM (in the form bi) has been applied to oSi, both in the Bodo-Dimasa and Garo divisions of this group, and also retained in its basic meaning. It is clear that these usages are connected with the especial position held by oSb, and that the gP terms function here simply as honorifics. Other TB roots, less widely distributed than the above, show the same type of semantic shift (vide infra). In societies with a patrilineal bias it is only natural that the role of oB should be of more significance than that of oSi, thus perhaps accounting for the relative stability of *p'i as compared with *p'u. It can hardly be without significance that in the single matrilineal group encountered (Barish) the term *p'i gM should have been applied to oSi, in contrast to all other TB groups.

Of the two basic P terms *p'a F and *ma M, the former is the most widely distributed and shows fewer variations. The following groups have this root (*p'a): Tibetan, Kanauri, Byangsi, Bahing, Vayu, Newari, Lepcha, Miri, Dhimal, Burmish-Loloish, Konyak, Barish, Mikir, Meithei, Mru, and Kukish. This root commonly appears as a masculine affix, but no instance of a transference to "oB" has been uncovered. The

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root *ma M appears in Tibetan, Kanauri, Bahing, Vayu, Newari, Lepcha, Dhimal, Burmish-Loloish, Barish, and Meithei. In Burmese itself it is retained only in the terms ma' SI and a-ma' "feminine suffix", and in the closely-related Maru only in the meaning "MSi". Kru has preserved this root only in the feminine suffix -ma. A transference to the meaning "oSi" is found in the contiguous North Assam groups Dafla and Aka. In Kachin and the extensive Kukish group this root appears to have vanished without leaving a trace.

The two PSb terms *ni and *k'u are also unequally represented in Tibeto-Burman. The root *ni FBi is of almost universal occurrence. In its basic meaning it appears in Tibetan, Gyarung, Kanauri, Thebor, Vayu, Newari, Abor-Miri, Mung, Burmish-Loloish (but not in Burmese itself), Konyak, Barish, Mikir, Meithei, and Kukish. Kachin has retained it only in the affinal meaning "WM". Aka, if we can trust our inadequate sources, has applied this root to M, while Limbu has applied it to oSi. Replacement by the term for "oSi" is seen in Dafla, Sho, Changki (Ao), and probably Kadu, while Mongsen (Ao) shows replacement by the term for "oSb". The Dafla material indicates that this is an analytical development ("oSi of F"). Lepcha equates FBi with WBi in the term nyu ~ nyo, applied to female relatives in the uterine line. This unusual equation also appears in Bahing, which has mo-mo MSi,FSi (from mo < *ma M), and po-po FB (from po < *pa F), yet has ku-ku MB. Distinct terms have been

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developed in Kachin (mci), which preserves *ni as an affinal term (WM), and in Burmese (ni³), but *ni is retained in the closely related Maru. The Dimasa term de-de FBl (be-de MB) is likewise distinct.

The much more restricted root *k'u MB is found in its primary meaning in Bahing, Vayu, Abor-Miri, Dafla, Digaro, Mung, Mikir, and Ao. Tibetan has k'u FB, but skud < *k'u Fl,Bl. Himalayish and Lepcha also have k'u FB, probably because of Tibetan influence. Kachin, Meithei, Ntenyi Rengma, and Anyo Rengma have retained the term in the affinal meaning "HF" (Meithei Fl), and Sema in the affinal meaning "FSiH". Chang (Konyak) has the form ko MB, which cannot with certainty be connected with this root. In the Burmish-Loloish group we can cite only Burmese kui "prefix used with names of persons older or of higher rank than the speaker, or politely of his equals" (ate-kui oB), Akha a-kö B, Ahi kö-pu-li ySiH, and Moso a-gu Bl. The Moso usage is paralleled in the Barish group, where we find Bodo gu-mai, Garo gu-ma Bl. This root cannot be traced in the Kuki languages proper, yet can be reconstructed for Kukish on the basis of the Naga terms (supra), and for Kukie in general on the basis of the Mikir and Meithei terms.

The root *nau ySb, occasionally applied either to yS or ySi alone, also to Ch, is well represented in Tibeto-Burman. It appears in the following groups: Tibetan (nu ∼ no), Byangsi (yS), Limbu, Lepcha, Aka, Kachin, Konyak, Barish (ySi), Meithei, Mru (yS), and Kukish (ySb ∼ Ch). The most conspicuous gaps are those in Abor-Miri-Dafla, Mung, and Burmish-Loloish.

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The eighth and last of the basic consanguineal terms is *sa Gh, which is found in Tsangla, Magari, Miju, Aka, Kachin, Kadu, Nung (za-ni D), Pyu, Burmish-Loloish, Konyak, Barish, Mikir, Meithei, Mru, and Kukish (rarely used for ySb, as in Poeron and Kyow). Lepcha has a-so < *sa ggF, a-son gCh (with suffixed -n). This root is conspicuously absent in Tibetan and its dialects (but present in Tsangla, a Bodish language), Himalayish, and Kiranti, i.e. the northern or northwestern band of Tibeto-Burman languages, as well as in the Abor-Miri-Dafla group.

The affinal term *mak Sl appears in Tibetan, Lepcha (< *smak), Dhimal (< *smak), Miri, Kachin (da-ma < *da-mak), Burmese (sa-mak), Meithei, Mru, and Kukish, with an additional uncertain occurrence in Byengsi. In view of our generally inadequate data on affinal nomenclatures (e.g. we do not have the term for "Sl" in Nung, where we should expect to find this root), the widespread distribution of this root is of increased significance. It would appear that the root is lacking in Himalayish, Mikir, Konyak, and Barish.

The above set of basic terms is supplemented by a series of roots of restricted distribution. Some of these serve mainly as replacements for the basic roots, while others are functionally more independent. Since our set of basic terms is not complete, we must assume that some of these roots represent archaic Tibeto-Burman elements, but this point is best discussed after the various secondary roots have been analyzed.

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The gF roots *p'i gM and *p'u gF have no serious rivals in Tibeto-Burman. A curious link between Tibetan and Southern Naki is suggested by the following set of terms: Tib. po ~ spo gF (literary or dialectical), rme gM (literary), and Sho a-pŏ ~ a-pŏk gF, Chinbon kh-mo gM, Yindu kn-mo gF. A possible root *si is indicated by Balti as-si (= a-si) ggF, Bung a-si gM, Khami a-um-si gF, and Kadu a-si MSi (i-si "woman"), Yindu kn-si FSi, Sho a-si FSi,oSi (cf. the roots *ta and *tei, infra). In general, gF terms show more variation than do F terms; thus, Kachin has developed distinct terms for both gM (woi) and gF (ji), and note forms such as Byangsi ti-ti gF, Bahing and Vayu ki-ki gF.

The most conspicuous of the secondary F roots is *nu M, which appears in Kachin, Mi ju, Sak, Konyak, Nukish, and perhaps Nikir and Meithei (in combination). The root *pui "mother, female" is restricted to Nikir and Nukish. The Nukish feminine affix *la, used especially of young females, seems to have given rise to Mongsen-Changki (Ao) a-la M, Ntenyi Rengma a-la ggM, Anyo Rengma a-la gM, and cf. Byangsi la-la gM, Sunwari a-la Si. The same root (*la) appears in Kachin, Burmish-Lolo ish, and elsewhere as a masculine affix. The Tibeto-Burman root *wa "male" serves to explain both Bunan and Kachin wa, Kadu a-wa, Garo (dialects of A type) a-wa F (Mechang and Bamseng wa F probably through Kachin influence), Aka au < *a-wa F, Burmese wa-kri[3] "term of address to old man" (Arakanese dialect), and Lepcha a-vo < *wa, Meithei (ma-)wa, Nukish wa H; cf. also Digaro ma-wa "male".

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Dhimal -wa "masculine suffix", Bodo hwa "male". Some of these forms, however, may have resulted from a phonetic development from *p'a F (probably via *ba).

A root *mei or *me appears sporadically in Tibeto-Burman, sometimes with a dental suffix. This root is parallel to, but distinct from, TB *ma M. The following forms belong here: Tibetan -med "woman" (in bud-med < *bu-med, paralleling bu-smed), Gyarung to-mi ~ to-me "woman", Kanauri -med (suffix in "D" and "Ml"), Chamba Lahuli me "bitch", Limbu met W, Lepcha a-mit "woman", Kadu a-me M, Mung a-me M (cf. Mung a-p'e F), Burmese a-mi^3 ~ a-me M, and Garo me-cik "woman, wife". Note also the series formed by Burmese sa-mi^3, Aka sa-mi, Mung za-mi D (from *ma Ch). Garo ga-me Bl, Mikir me SiH correspond phonetically but can scarcely be fitted in otherwise.

In addition to the above, there are traces of a set of roots *ya and *yu, both applied to female relatives. The former is better attested than the latter; cf. Himalayish (Manchati, Kanashi, Chamba Lahuli) ya M, Abor-Miri and Dafla yo < *ya gM (but in Pagri Miri used for "M" in address), Tableng (Konyak group) ya M, Naga *ya M, also Kanauri yas, Rai (Kiranti) me-ya, Burmese ma-ya^3 W, Digaro mi-ya "woman", ha-mi-ya W. The root *yu is represented only by Kanauri yu-med, Khambu (Kiranti) yuh, Lepcha a-yu W, Lepcha tʰ-yu "woman", and perhaps Tibetan yu-mo "female of a stag".

Nothing has yet been said of oSb terms, which show a wide variety of forms contrasting with the standard ySb root (*mau)

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Much of the material in this connection is of a scattered nature from which it is difficult to draw any conclusions. Thus, Byangsi hya, Bahing ya oB, Meithei ya-ma oB, Chawte (Old Kuki) a-ya B, ai-ya oSi, and Khami ya-at ~ ya-ā oB suggest an archaic root *ya oB, yet this same element appears in another setting (supra). Burmese ats-kui < *ik-kui oB, Mikir ik oB lack cognates elsewhere, as do Maru pai oSi, Chonbok pai oSi(ws), unless the latter pair be connected with Burmese a-pai "madam" and perhaps Mikir pei ~ pe M. The characteristic Kukish root u oSb (Central, Northern, and Old Kuki groups only) does not appear elsewhere in this setting, yet appears to be identical to Sho ū M, Taungtha u W, Mru u M, and Burmese u^3 MB (prefixed to names of men considerably older than the speaker), perhaps also Tangkhul a-wŏ gF,MB.

Three or four roots, however, stand out more prominently than the above lot and deserve especial consideration. Tibetan c'e oSi(ws) has been compared with Himalayish *c'e "female" as represented by Kanauri c'ets "female, woman", Kanashi c'ets W (with diminutive suffix -ts) and with the Byangsi-Chaudangsi term c'e xC, as well as with Johar a-ce F. The above terms all point to a TB root *c'ei. A similar root, but apparently with unaspirated initial (*cei), is represented by Konyak jei ~ cei oSb ~ oB, Meithei ce oSi, Tangkhul cei oSb, Western Kuki *cei oSb, Anyo Rengma a-ce oSb. The Tibetan term appears to be etymologically connected with the word c'e-ba "great", from which the respectful term gcen-po oB has been developed.

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A root *ma oSi appears in Maruni, Vayu, Kachin, Andro, and Konyak, while the Aluppe and Abor-Miri-Dafla groups have *ma M, and Lahher has the vocative term i-ma M. Tibetan mna Dl perhaps also belongs here, though it may be of periphrastic origin (< mna "oath").

The Tibeto-Burman root *ta (often in the form da) is consistently applied to relatives older than Ego, if one regards the Rabing-Vayu root *ta GR as of distinct origin. The following terms can be grouped with this root: Tibetan 'a-ta F (dialectical), oB (Eastern Tibet), Tsangla a-ta oB, Gyarung a-ta-ta F, Johar a-ta oSi, Byangsi ta-ta oSi, Newari ta-ta oSi, Miri and Dafla a-te < *ta gF, Digaro ta gF, da oB, Burmese t'a^{3}-t'a^{3} F (dialectical), Akha a-ta F, Independent Lolo a-da F, Sho a-ta oB, Chinbon (ha-)t'a oB, Lhota a-ta oSb, Changki (Ao) a-ta FSi,oSi, Naong Rongma a-da FoB. Doublet forms are found only in Digaro (ta gF, da oB). Unlike *p'a gF,oB this root has also been applied to F in some languages (Tibetan, Gyarung, Burmese, Akha). Desgodins describes the Tibetan term 'a-ta as a "children's word" (vox puerorum), and in Independent Lolo a distinction is made between a-ta F (used by children) and a-bu ~ a-bo F (used by adults).

Maruni te-te gF, a-te oB are clearly of a type paralleling that described above. The suggested TB root is *tai, with which can be grouped Byangsi te-te xC(ss), Dafla tĕ-tĕ FyB,oB (in different sources), Kadu a-te oSi, Banpara a-tai oB, Mikir te oSi(ws), Meithei i-tei-ma oSil, and Bru a-tai BW.

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An objection might be raised to the above discussion on the ground that forms such as *na, *ta, and *tai (te) are of "nursery word" type and should not be regarded as representing actual TB roots. The writer himself originally ascribed to this general point of view, but the collection of material on which this study is based has led him to discard it. Thus, ta F appears both in the West Tibetan dialects (Balti, Purik) and in the nomad dialects of Eastern Tibet, as well as in the aberrant Gyarung language, whence we can safely infer a Bodish root *ta F. The term na oSi appears in five distinct languages representing two different foci (Murmi-Vayu and Kachin-Andro-Konyak), and na N in two isolated groups (Almora and Abor-Miri-Dafla). Distributions of this type are scattered, to be sure, yet not entirely random. The cluster of connotations (gP,P,oSb) around these roots is also not without significance.

The majority of the terms for Sb(ds) are of limited distribution. Tibetan sring-mo Si(ms), dialectically used for ySi, appears also in Himalayish (Si) and Byangsi (ySi), with an additional possible occurrence in Dhimal-Toto (Si). Kachin jan < *jar Si(ms), often used for ySi, is directly related to Kukish *dzar Si(ms), which in Western Kuki is used for ySi, and to Maithei i-cal ~ i-can ySi, Kadu san, Sengmai cal ySi. Kachin yung B(ws) has been compared with the Garo-Dimasa root *yung yB. The tendency to equate Sb(ds) with ySb is reflected in all three roots.

The roots *nau ySb and *za Ch are of almost universal occurrence and have no serious rivals. The former is

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conspicuously absent in Burmish-Loloish, which has a root *nyi (ní), comparable with Lepcha nyi-t'i gCh. A root *nga is suggested by Murmi and Gurung a-nga ySi, Miri ǎng-ǎ ySb, Dafla ang-a Ch, Naga *nga Ch. Isolated roots *a Ch and *ka Ch are represented by Digaro a, Abor-Miri e < a Ch, and Newari ka, Abor-Miri ko < *ka Ch, respectively.

It will be noted that the set of basic terms presented above lacks all collateral terms as well as a gCh term. Our data on collateral terms are incomplete for many groups, so that negative evidence here is of relatively little value, but it would seem that no root or roots for xC have been developed. The only root of any extension here is *ning, which appears in Kachin (xCe,ws), Chang (xC), Mikir BW(ws), and perhaps Garo (Sbl). The Mikir and Garo affinal meanings can be explained in terms of cross-cousin marriage.

Three or perhaps four TB roots show a tendency to equate N with gCh. Tibetan ts'a Ne (probably SiS,ms),gCh furnishes an example of this tendency. Bahing and Newari have this root (*ts'a) in the meaning "gS", but in the Kiranti languages in general it is used for "S" (see the discussion in pt. 4). Kanauri e'ad Sl (with suffixed -d) has been brought into comparison via SiS(ms), equated with Sl under cross-cousin marriage. Kachin ta'a MB,MBS(ws) can be explained only on the basis of a reciprocal development from SiS(ms). Mikir o-sa SiS(ms),Sl shows an ideal agreement on the semantic side, but the comparison is phonetically dubious. The root *ts'a appears to be lacking in other groups.

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The roots *su and *tu have distributions which are almost, if not quite, mutually exclusive. *Su gCh appears in Kachin, Bodo, Mikir, and Meithei, while *tu appears in Nung (N), Burmish-Loloish (xN), and Kukish (FSiCh,SiCh,ms,gCh). Anu, a Southern Kuki language, has su xC,ySi(ws),SiCh(ws),gCh, and a-su-lai SiCh(ms), covering much the same ground as Kukish *tu. The roots *su and *tu must be regarded as distinct on general phonetic grounds, and this view is strengthened by the evidence from Meithei, which has i-su gCh as well as (ma-)tu W (cf. the Kuki use of *tu in the meaning "Sl", through cross-cousin marriage). The root *su is perhaps also represented in the Naga languages, in much the same setting as Anu su, viz. Angami cu ~ tsu FSiS,ySiS(ms),gS, Nzong Rengma a-cu-gü, Ntenyi Rengma a-zu-wa, Anyo Rengma a-zü FSiCh,SiCh(ms),gCh, but our knowledge of Naga phonology is not sufficiently advanced to establish this comparison.

A fourth root of the same general type is *ma-li, which is found in Nung (gCh), Burmish-Loloish (gCh), Pyu (gCh), Chang (xN), Garo (SiS,ms), Mikir (xN, probably BCh,ws), and has an additional cognate in Kachin (ma-li "young man"). This root is in general lacking in Kukish, but may be represented by Taungtha lwi Ne,Ni and Yindu (ka-)li BD(ws). It cannot be traced in Tibetan or any of the northern languages.

The affinal root corresponding to *mak Sl is perhaps *nam Dl, but the evidence for the latter root is not altogether satisfactory. Lepcha has nyom < *snam Dl paralleling myok < *smak Sl, and s- prefixed forms are also represented by

SA Kanauri stem < *snem (probably for snăm) D1, and Barish
601 *snam D1 (based on Dimasa ba-ham, Garo nam). Cf. also
193 Gyarung snom < *snam S1, Burmese hnam < *snam ySi(ms)
197 (inferred from mong-hnam "H and W", where mong means "yB,wa"),
ST Lashi tu-nam D1, nam-mo ySi(ms), Nyi nŏ-mo < *nam-mo ySi(ms),
601 and Lushei hnăm < *snăm "clan". The unprefixed form appears
193 in Syangsi nam-sia D1, Kachin nam D1,ySi1, and Nung nam Sb,
197 while Lepcha has both nyom < *snam D1 and nom < *nam oSi.
Magari ar-năm "girl" also belongs in this series.

Of more restricted distribution are the roots *mou D1, represented by Kukish mou (Lushei mo), Meithei i-mau, and perhaps Tibetan mo "woman", and *k'rwi S1, represented by Kachin k'ri S1,SiCh(ms), Burmese k'rwe^{3}-ma^{1} < *k'rwi^{3}-ma^{1}, Lisu c'i-ma D1 (with feminine suffix -ma), and perhaps Lepcha tă-gri "male". The original meanings of these roots may have been simply "female" and "male", respectively.

There remain for consideration a few poorly represented roots connected primarily with the PSb nomenclature. Nung a-tsim MSi is comparable with Tsangla a-zim, id., and Nung a-wang FB with Garo a-wang FyB, also Lashi vang-mo HF,FoSiH, Maru vung ~ vun HF,FSiH (but the Lashi and Maru terms suggest a meaning "MB" rather than "FB"). The *wang series is perhaps connected with Tibetan 'a-bang FSiH,MSiH (literary), Limbu (am-)pang-a "uncle", Vayu pong-pong < *pang-pang FB.

Tibetan sru MSi has been compared with Kanauri and Chamba Lahuli ru F1, Pyu sru "relatives", and the reconstructed

SA Lolo root *ru MB. If these terms actually constitute a true
● 601 series, we must reconstruct a root *sru ~ *ru "mother's
193 relatives" (neuter), whence Kanauri ru F1 < MB through cross-
197 cousin marriage, paralleling Kanauri c'ad S1 < S1S(ms). The
ST presence of this root in Pyu, at approximately the year
601 A.D. 1000, lends some weight to this view.
193 The fourth Tibetan PSb term, viz. ʾa-žang MB, is found
197 in this form in Thebor and Lepcha, where it must be regarded as a loan-word, but not elsewhere. This form can be derived from an original *zrang and thus compared with Mru ta-rang FS1H,HF, Kukish ta-rang~ ma-rang, id., and probably Lhota o-nrã, Changki (Ao) (kŭ-)hram B1(ws). Burmese a-hrang < *srang (archaic spelling is a-hsyang) "lord, master" also perhaps belongs here rather than with sring-mo S1 (supra). The writer has long suspected that Tibetan initial ž- and š- have in many instances been derived from zr- and sr-, respectively, partly because of the general instability of these clusters in Tibetan (cf. srab-srib ~ hrab-hrib ~ [illegible]rib "dim, obscure"), and partly on the basis of comparative material, viz. Tib. šig "louse", Bunan šrig, Lushei hrik < *srik; Tib. žag "day (24 hours)", Burmese rak, id.; Tib. šags "joke, jest" (in sense of "ridicule"), Bunan šrag "shame", Burmese hrak < *srak "to be ashamed". The root *-rang (prefixed) must have had a generalized honorific force (still retained in Burmese), and thus was admirably suited as a periphrastic term either for MB or for FS1H,HF (= MB under cross-cousin marriage).

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Having completed our review of Tibeto-Burman kinship roots, we are now faced with the problem of fixing the basic pattern of nomenclature for this linguistic family. The terms designating relatives in the central line of descent naturally form the most stable segment of the nomenclature, while the collateral terms show an intermediate, and the affinal terms a maximum, amount of variation.

Within this stable core of nomenclature we are able to distinguish two primary gP terms (gM and gF), two primary P terms (M and F), a neuter yBb term, and a neuter Ch term. The two neuter terms are often employed in a masculine sense (yB and B), with sex affixes used in forming the corresponding feminine terms (yBi and D), e.g. Tibetan bu B, bu-mo D, Burmese sa^3 B, $sa-mi^3$ D. No neuter P terms have been uncovered, but Chang has a neuter gP term (a-pi < ap'i gM) used only in address, and a neuter gP term is also found in Sema (a-pu-za), and in the Southern Kuki languages Sho (a-pŏ) and Ayaing Khami (a-um-si). Three Southern Kuki languages (Chinbok, Yindu, Anu) make a distinction between FM and MM, but have a single term for gF (Anu FM < M, MM < gM). Four gP terms appear only in rare instances, and are never all primary. Both Tibetan and Kanauri show traces of three or four gP terms, but Kanauri has probably borrowed one or more of its gP terms from Tibetan, and the Tibetan material itself can be interpreted in more than one way. Kachin seems to employ four gP terms, perhaps because of Shan influence, but has only two primary terms (ji gF and woi gM). Garo distinguishes

SA between "gP" (= FF) and "gM" (= FM), and "my gF" (= MF) and
601 "my gM" (= MM), if we can trust our sources for this language.
193 In view of the fact that the Garo are a matrilineal group,
197 this point is of some interest. Chang, which uses the neuter
ST term a-pi gP in address, employs four terms in reference, the
601 FF and FM terms being formed through affixed sex elements,
193 and the MF and MM terms through analysis. Finally, Laiyo,
197 which has an almost exclusively analytical nomenclature, employs four analytical gP terms.

A number of different arrangements of Sb terms have been encountered. Age distinctions appear everywhere and are, in general, more prominent than sex distinctions. Despite this, however, it would appear that the basic pattern has two primary terms for oB and oSi, contrasting with the single neuter ySb term (*nau). As has been shown above, the widespread tendency to equate oB and oSi with terms for relatives of ascending generations has obscured the general picture here and has made analysis almost impossible. The simplest possible arrangement (oSb and ySb) has been found only in Khami (Ayaing and Awa) and Anyo Rengma. A single primary term for oSb appears also in Kuki proper (u) and in Burmese (ate-), but Burmish-Loloish in general has two primary oSb terms. Nzong Rengma shows a complete reversal of the ordinary pattern, with terms for oSb, yB, and ySi. Tibetan, Lepcha, Dafla, Kachin, Aka, Lisu, Chang, Chinbon, Ao and probably other less accurately recorded languages have what appears to be the basic arrangement, viz. oB, oSi, and ySb (three primary

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terms). The Bariah languages in general employ the root *nau ySb in the meaning "ySi" and have developed a new term for yB (perhaps connected with the Kachin term for B,ws), while Meithei reverses this process in employing *nau for "yB" and the Kukish root *dzar·Si(ms) for ySi. Simple terms for either B or Si are almost entirely lacking in Tibeto-Burman. Abor-Miri has terms for B and Si based on a root *buir (cf. a-buir "friend"), while in Dafla the cognate form *bŏr is used as the root for ySb, but note that Abor-Miri also possesses especial terms for oSb and ySb. Nikir kor Sb, like Abor-Miri buir, also has the more general meaning "friend".

Though the principle of age distinctions can be established as a basic feature of Tibeto-Burman kinship terminology, the status of sex-of-speaker distinctions is not so readily settled. We are handicapped here by the fact that most of our sources can not be depended upon in showing non-European distinctions of this type, and that negative evidence is therefore of little value. Distinct terms for Si(ms) and B(ws) are found in Tibetan, Kachin, Lushei and Lakher (and probably other Kuki languages), and Angami. Lushei and Lakher also have a distinct term (of periphrastic origin) for Si(ws). In Burmese and Nyi the distinction is applied only to ySb, viz. Burmese yB(ms), yB(ws),ySi(ws),ySi(ms), Nyi ySb(ms),yB(ws),ySi(ms), and Maru, in the same linguistic group, has a distinct term for yB(ws). Nikir distinguishes between oSi(ms) and oSi(ws), and has a distinct term for B(ws). Chinbok and Yindu, in the Southern

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Bahi group have a full set of eight Sh terms, showing complete distinctions both for age and for sex-of-speaker. The Chinbok system can be reduced to five primary terms, viz. pai cBi(ws), pau cB(ms), nau yBh(ss), be Bi(ms), and baug B(ws), i.e. the Tibetan-Kachin arrangement. Sex of speaker appears not to be distinguished in Kanauri, Abor-Miri, Dafla, Garish, Meithei, and some other languages, but our sources, as mentioned above, are not of the most dependable sort. In view of the weight of evidence above, from such key languages as Tibetan, Kachin, Burmese, Mikir, and Lushei, the writer is inclined to regard the sex-of-speaker distinction as an archaic Tibeto-Burman feature.

Despite the fact that no single gCh root can with certainty be reconstructed for Tibeto-Burman, one can surely regard the presence of a primary gCh term as a basic feature for this linguistic family. Aside from the tendency to equate gCh with N or C (vide infra), it can be stated that most Tibeto-Burman languages have a distinct, usually primary, term for gCh, e.g. Kachin ǰu, Burmese mrə̰, Byangai k'we, Kanauri c'ay, Lepcha a-ɕoŋ, Chang ǰi, Garo and Mikir su, Meithei i-ɕu. If a single gCh root must be predicated, TB *ɕu must be regarded as the most likely selection. Equations of gCh other than with N are exceptional, but note Sema a-ɕu gCh= Ch(< TB *nau yBh).

The above discussion is resumed in the following diagram:

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Tibeto-Burman Basic Pattern

gM (*p'i)		gF (*p'u)
M (*ma)		F (*p'a)
oSi(ws)		oS(ms)
Si(ms)	yBb (*nau)	B(ws)
	Ch (*za)	
	gCh	

It would be a rather hazardous undertaking to attempt any general explanation of the pattern outlined above in terms of sociological factors. A broad theory of this type must be based on a comprehensive comparative survey of Tibeto-Burman with a number of other groups, and as such lies outside the scope of the present study. Many of the variations from this pattern are undoubtedly significant, but they involve those elusive cultuno-linguistic intangibles which do not lend themselves to arm-chair analysis. It is only in the collateral and affinal nomenclatures that obvious cultural correlations are available, and it is these that the writer proposes to consider in some detail.

The distinction between cross (FSi and MSi) and parallel (FB and MSi) PSb terms is almost universal in Tibeto-Burman. No instances of an equation of FB with MB have been encountered, but FSi and MSi are equated in Bahing, Lepcha, and Chinbon, if we can trust our sources. Note that Lepcha also equates xC with pC, and that cross-cousin marriage is forbidden in this tribe.

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The parallel FB and MSi terms are usually either equated with the F and M terms (as in Chang, Lushei, Angami, Sema) or are based on these terms, with the addition of elements meaning "big" and "little" or the like. In other words, age distinctions are made in the parallel FSb terms precisely as in the Sb terms, though with categorical rather than primary elements. By way of contrast, the cross FSb terms seldom show these age distinctions, but note Burmese u^3-ri^3 HoB (cf. a-ri^3 FSi), u^3-$mang^3$ HyB, Chinbok pu-$\check{r}$ŏ HoB (= gF), pu-ko HyB (these distinctions are typical of Southern Kuki in general). Some of the more characteristic examples of age distinctions in FB terms are listed below:

Language	FoB	FyB
Balti	a-ta ts'ar-ma	a-ta tsun-tso
Lepcha	a-bo-tim	a-bo-cum
Kachin	wa-di	wa-doi
Burmese	p'ŭ-kri^3	p'ŭ-t'we^3
Nyi	a-ba-giá	a-ba-χɔ
Haka	pa-u	pa-mun
Siyin	pa-lien	pa-nc
Chinbon	pa k-dŏm	pa k-eui
Tangkhul	a-va k'ŭ-rar	a-va ka-tui
Lhota	o-po-ra-mo	o-po-ro

One occasionally encounters what seem to be primary terms for FB or MSi, but most of these can be explained on the basis of ellipsis, e.g. Maru t'ong HyBi but mya-t'ang HyBi,

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p'a-t'ang FyB in the closely related Lashi language; Bodo a-yong FoB and a-doi FyB, but ma-gong MoSi and ma-doi MySi; Nsong Rengma a-nyo FyB (nyo Ch), and perhaps Changki (Ao) a-sa FyB < *za Ch. Kanauri has a curious diminutive formation, viz. a-mats MSi < a-ma, and a-pats FB < a-pa. Tibetan and Nung, however, appear to have four true PSb terms. The Nung terms a-tsim MSi and a-wang FB have been compared with Tsangla a-sim MSi and Garo a-wang FyB, respectively. The Tibetan term sru MSi seems to have been derived from a root with the generalized meaning "mother's relatives", or "member of mother's clan, first ascending generation". Tibetan k'u FB, it can now be stated, has been developed from the TB root *k'u MB, and the Himalayish and Lepcha employment of this term in its Tibetan setting must be credited to Tibetan influence, which is conspicuous in both of these areas. Tibetan skud < *k'u Fl,Bl is to be explained in terms of xC marriage and the equation of WB with WF, as elsewhere in Tibeto-Burman. Tibetan 'a-ne FSi,MBF further fits into this picture. In Himalayish, Kanauri ru Fl < *sru MSb, and c'ed Sl < *ts'a SiS(ms) suggest a like reconstruction. We have some material on xC marriage in the Tibetan area, but the term skud itself is, for the writer, the most significant single piece of evidence. Those who minimize the value of linguistic "fossils" in general might well take note of this term.

The semantic shift FB < MB in the Tibetan term k'u still requires explanation. Elsewhere in Tibeto-Burman the term has

SA been demoted to affinal rank or dropped altogether, but
●601 nowhere else has it been applied to FB. Now there is but
193 one marital feature in which the Tibetan area (including
197 the Kanauri group of Himalayish) significantly differs from
ST the remaining Tibeto-Burman area, viz. polyandry. Fraternal
601 polyandry of Tibetan type is practised by the Kanauri, almost
193 certainly through Tibetan influence, since this custom is
197 explicitly stated to be absent among the Almora peoples (Byangsi, Chaudangsi, Johar). Among the Lepcha polyandry is an abnormal trait and can unhesitatingly be assigned a Tibetan origin. Among other Tibeto-Burman group for which we have any record, polyandry either is said to be lacking or is simply not mentioned. Since Tibetan polyandry is of fraternal type, the importance of FB can readily be understood. It would seem that the MB term, which is unstable in most TB groups, was first replaced by the honorific term ʾa-ǰang and later applied to FB. The collective term skud-po F1,B1, having already been semantically specialized in an affinal sense, was naturally retained.

Primary cross PSb terms are basic TB features, and are represented by the roots *ni FSi and *k'u MB. The first of these two terms, however, is much more stable than the second, and significantly so (if statistically treated). Thus, Tibetan has transferred the MB term to FB and used an honorific for MB; Burmish-Loloish has retained the MB term only as an honorific applied to oB (in Burmese) or as an affinal term

SA (Ahi, Moso) and has developed new terms for MB (Burmese u^3,
601 Lolo *ru); the Kuki languages proper have dropped the MB term
193 altogether and equated MB with gF; in the Naga group the MB
197 term has been preserved in its original setting only in Ao,
ST while in Rengma and Sema it has been retained only in the
601 affinal nomenclature. All of these groups, however, have the
193 root *ni FSi in its original setting. Burmese (but not
197 Burmish-Loloish) has replaced both the FSi and MB terms and dropped the former altogether, while Kachin has retained both terms only in its affinal nomenclature. The relatively greater stability of the FSi term is also evident in the borrowings made by various TB groups (infra).

This "differential variability" in the FSi and MB terms must be viewed in connection with the affinal application of these terms and the whole problem of cross-cousin marriage. Under bilateral xC marriage MB becomes Fl, and FSi becomes Ml, and it is not unlikely that honorific terms should become associated with these socially "pivotal" relationships. The fact that the MB=Fl term is more susceptible to this process than is the FSi=Ml term merely reflects the general patrilineal bias of Tibeto-Burman societies. The equation of MB with gP, which plays so prominent a role in Kukish, represents one aspect of this whole development, but teknonymy may also be a factor here ("Fl" designated as "gF of my son"). Teknonymy is hardly typical of Tibeto-Burman yet does occasionally occur. Lepcha, for example, employs a-bo F for Fl

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where the couple are childless, but t'i-kung gF after the birth of a child, and the descriptive term a-fyut Fl has been derived from an original *aput, which in turn represents a morphological development from the TB root *p'u gF. Vayu sa-k'i Fl appears to be a combination of sa < *sa Ch and ki-ki gF. Lahu, in the Southern Lolo group, has a-p'u gF = Fl, a-p'i gM = Ml, and Ahi, in the Northern Lolo group, has su-p'o WF, also "paternal ancestor". The Chang Sbl terms are of teknonymous origin, e.g. hau-ko Bl(ms) = "his MB", but the Chang Fl terms are simply Fl = MB and Ml = FSi. Chinbon equates WF with gF, and WM with gM (rather than with MB and MBW, as in most Kuki languages), but retains the Kuki pattern in the HM and HF terms (HF = FSi, and especial term for HF), i.e. the teknonymous (or honorific) terms are employed only by the husband. The Mirish languages (Abor, Miri, Dafla) afford the best illustration of teknonymy. In Miri the terms a-bu and a-nu are used for F and M, respectively, but in the closely related Abor language these terms are applied to gF and gM, though ta-ta (Miri ta-to gF) is retained as the vocative term for gF. In this instance the child has taken over his parents' terms ("reverse teknonymy") rather than the parent his childrens' terms. Abor also uses the vocative gF term (ta-ta) for Fl, while Miri equates Fl either with gF or with MB, and Ml either with gM or with FSi (the equations with MB and FSi are probably only descriptive, though this is not stated in our sources). Dafla equates Ml with gM, probably also Fl with gF.

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Under a system of bilateral xC marriage we should expect to find both WF and HF equated with MB, and both WM and HM equated with FSi. This condition is fulfilled in Byangsi and Abor-Miri, where this type of marriage is in vogue. The terminological equation also appears, however, in Nung, Chang, Sema, Nzong Rengma, and Lhota, for all of which preferential MBD marriage is indicated, and in Tangkhul and Angami, for which xC marriage cannot be established.

A system of unilateral xC marriage with MBD should lead to the equation of WF with MB, HM with FSi, and separate terms for HF and WM, as well as distinctions between FSiH and MB, MBW and FSi. Kachin fulfills all these conditions admirably, with unilateral xC marriage coupled with the terminological equations indicated above. The same can be said for the Kuki pattern, as illustrated in Lakher, Thado, Chawte, Tarau, as well as in Mru and Khami, viz. WF = MB, WM = MBW, HM = FSi, HF = FSiH. Unilateral MBD marriage is found among the Thado, Chiru, Anal, Aimol, Purum, and probably the Anal, Sho, and Khami. In Thado this nomenclature is employed only where MBD marriage has actually occurred, P terms being employed under other conditions.

Ntenyi and Anyo Rengma have an intermediate type, with M1 = FSi but WF = MB and a distinct term for HF, but in both languages the MB term is sometimes applied to HF as well as to WF. The closely related Nzong Rengma has a single term for F1 (WF, HF = MB), but retains a distinct term for FSiH. Sema has the same scheme as Nzong Rengma. The Sema term for FSiH,

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furthermore, is cognate with the Ntenyi and Anyo Rengma term for HF, and in Ao the same term appears in its original setting (MB). This Naga material thus shows various stages of the transformation of the affinal terminology through the development of unilateral xC marriage. The discrepancies found in Nung, Chang, and Lhota are perhaps more apparent than real, and in the case of Nung and Lhota, at any rate, our sources may be faulty. Even in these affinal features, however, we must expect to find a certain amount of dissociation, for we must allow for linguistic "lag", i.e. the simple scheme of equating Fl with MB and Ml with FSi tends to be perpetuated even where the development of a unilateral "skew" has rendered it theoretically illogical. This general point has been raised many times before, but will bear repetition in view of the fact that a number of modern theoreticians seem to object to this sort of reasoning.

It is fairly evident that the abandonment of xC marriage as an instutionalized norm has in several different groups resulted in the disappearance of categorical equations. In Tibetan and Kanauri we have only the "fossilized" terms skud-po and ru, respectively, which require comparative studies for a full appraisal of their significance. In Lahul, however, where we have a hint of xC marriage, the equations Fl= MB and Ml= FSi are in evidence. In Burmese itself categorical equations are lacking, and here also we have no evidence of xC marriage, but the situation is reversed in Arakanese (Chaungtha).

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Maru and Lashi, which are of Burmese stock, equate M1 with FSi, WF with MB, and have a distinct term for FSiH, HF (as in Maong and Anyo Rengma). Kachin influence perhaps plays a role here, yet the Kachin distinguish between WM and HM, as is consistent with their unilateral xC marriage practice. Nyi, in the Northern Lolo group, has derived its terms for WF and WM from the terms for MB and FSi, respectively, plus the element mo "old", acting here as an honorific, while the Burmish-Loloish affinal root *yok is employed in the terms for HM and HF. Ahi seems to reverse this scheme, to judge from our faulty data on this language. For Lisu we have only what appear to be the vocative terms for F1 and M1 (ma-ma < a-ma M, ba-ba < a-ba F), and hence are not in a position to interpret this Lolo material. The use of respectful designations may be a complicating factor here; cf. Lushei pu-zon WF, pi-zon WM, conforming to the Kuki pattern (from pu MB and pi MBW plus an added element -zon), but pa HF (= F) and nu HM (= M), i.e. a woman equates her husband's relatives with her own blood kin.

Categorical equations in the P1 terms are present elsewhere, but our sources are often incomplete. Garo equates M1 with FSi, MBW, but has a distinct term for F1 (a-bu-di, perhaps "little gF"). Mikir equates WF with MB, WM with FSi (with or without the addition of an honorific suffix), and has a distinct term for HF. If we assume that HM (not given in our sources) is also equated with FSi, this system can be compared with that found in Rengma and Maru. Both Garo and Mikir have

SA preferential MBD marriage. Meithei equates Ml with FSi, and
601 has i-ku Fl < TB *k'u MB (the MB term is not known for sure,
193 but may be the Indic loan-word māmā); the Meithei are not
197 known to practice xC marriage.

ST The rest of the collateral terminology (C and N terms)
601 is even more poorly known than the PSb terminology, and
193 presents even more serious problems. In view of the presence
197 of basic TB roots for MB (*k'u) and FSi (*ni) one might expect to find one or more roots for xC, but such is hardly the case. The extension of Sb terms to include pC is practically universal and need not be examined in detail. The lack of especial xC terms is probably associated with the lack of xC marriage, but there are too many lacunae in our data to permit of any final judgment here. Tibetan apparently fails to distinguish between pC and xC, but Burmese perhaps has a distinct xC term (sa-mi^3-mrok-sa^3, lit. "D's spouse"!). By way of contrast, Chaungtha, one of the Arakanese dialects, has yauk-pa Bl,xC corresponding to Burmese yok-p'a' Bl(ms), in conformity with its equation of Fl with MB and Ml with FSi, i.e. an affinal term has "invaded" the consanguineal nomenclature.

Terms for xCe and xCi in conjunction with xC marriage are found in Byangsi-Chaudangsi, Abor-Miri, Lisu, and Chang, while Dafla has this terminological pattern but without data on xC marriage. Chang appears to have preferential MBD marriage, but the bilateral type is found among the others.

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Byangsi-Chaudangsi makes a sex-of-speaker distinction, viz. xCi(ms), xCe(ws), xC(ss), and Abor-Miri makes an age distinction. None of the terms involved is associated with a PSb term or a N term. The Abor-Miri terms show "invasion" from the affinal terminology, as in Chaungtha, e.g. mag-bo xCe(os) = oBl,Sl, from TB *mak Sl. Note that in Byangsi-Chaudangsi, Abor-Miri, and Chang this xC pattern is associated with the simple Pl = PSb categorical equations (for Lisu we lack full information on the Pl terms).

Cross-cousin terminologies of Omaha type are found in two primary foci, viz. Kachin and Kukish. The correlation between the Omaha nomenclature and patrilineal descent, one of the few widely accepted anthropological generalizations, obtains both among the Kachin and the various Kuki and Naga tribes. Of the Tibeto-Burman peoples only the Garo and Mabha, in the Barish group, are known to have matrilineal descent, and unfortunately we know nothing of the cousin terminology in use among these tribes. There is a hint of the Crow type of terminology in Bodo, also in the Barish group, but we cannot be sure that the Bodo reckon descent in the matrilineal line. Bodo (nang-)a-doi "(thy) oBCh", (a-)doi FyB show reciprocity, as has already been pointed out, but Bodo nam-ba-noi "(thy) SiS", (nang-)a-noi "(thy) SiD", and a-noi FSi cannot be explained on this basis and suggest rather the Crow pattern. It is greatly to be regretted that our Garo sources fail us at this critical point.

SA The Kachin system, which is quite distinct from that found
●601 in Kukish, merits especial examination. The key terms are as
193 follows:
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Kachin Omaha Pattern

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(Consanguineal)

601 moi FSi — ts'a MB,MBS(ws)
193 ning xCi(ws) — k'au xCe(ms)
197 k'ri FSiD(ms),SiCh(ms)
rat MBD(oms)
nam MBD(yms),BCh(ws)

(Affinal)

ni WM,MBW,WBW — ku HF,FSiH,HoB,oSiH(ws)
moi HM — ts'a WF,BWB(ws)
ning HSi,BW(ws) — k'au WB,SiH(ms)
nam Dl,WySi,yBW(ms),WBCh — k'ri Sl,HSiCh,FSiHSi
rat WoSi,ySiH(ws),oBW(ms),HyB

The main features of this system have already been discussed in pt. 7. It will be observed that the lineal equations characteristic of the Omaha pattern appear only in the terms for non-marriageable cross-cousins under the Kachin unilateral xC marriage arrangement, i.e. a man equates his (non-marriageable) FSiD with his SiCh, while a woman equates her (non-marriageable) MBS with her MB. The terms applied by a woman to her (marriageable) FSiS are not known, but a man equates his (marriageable) MBD with his WSi. Distinct terms are used by speakers of each sex for xC(ss).

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On the basis of comparative material, the terms nam and k'ri must be regarded as originally affinal (Dl and Sl, respectively). Both terms have "invaded" the consanguineal nomenclature via the categorical equations Dl=BD(ws) and Sl=SiS(ms), as are consistent with the practice of MBD marriage. Note that both terms have become neuter in the course of this transformation. We must next enquire of the fate of the original xN terms thus displaced. The terms moi FSi and ts'a MB can be called upon at this point. We lack comparative material on moi, but Tibetan has ts'a SiS(ms) corresponding to the Kachin term, and we can therefore interpret Kachin ts'a MB as a product of reciprocal usage. We have conclusive support for this view in the term k'ri HSiCh,FSiHSi, which at first puzzled the writer. Under the Kachin tripartite organization, as described by Gilhodes, FSiHSi becomes MBW, and MBW ~ HSiCh are reciprocal terms. Since moi FSi closely parallels ts'a MB, we are justified in interpreting this term analogically as a reciprocal development from BD(ws).

To continue our analysis, moi and ts'a have displaced the original cross PSb terms ni and ku, which are retained in the affinal nomenclature. An original system of bilateral xC marriage must be postulated to account for ni WW,MBW < FSi, and ku HF,FSiH < MB. The categorical equations shown by ning xCi(ws)=Sil(ws) and k'au xCe(ms)=Bl(ms) also call for this type of marriage.

To complete our reconstruction, the terms ning, k'au, and rat must be regarded as originally consanguineal rather

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than affinal. We have comparative material only for ning, which is represented by Chang (Konyak) nyŭng < *ning xC, Nikir neng < *ning BW(ws). We must further reconstruct rat as the term for xC(ds), i.e. the marriageable xC under the original bilateral xC marriage arrangement. This yields the theoretical categorical equations xCi(ms)=Sil(ms) and xCe(ws)=Bl(ws). Under the conventional type of levirate, which is found among the Kachin, a distinction must be made between the (marriageable) oBW and the (non-marriageable) yBW. In Kachin this distinction is made, in the case of a man, by equating yBW with Dl (nam) and in retaining the term rat for oBW, and, in the case of a woman, by equating HoB with HF (ku) and in retaining the term rat for HyB. Since a man marries his MBD, the distinction between rat MBD(oms) and nam MBD(yms) is the natural result of that described above. It is a fair inference that the missing terms for FSiS(ws) are ku FSiS(ows) and rat FSiS(yws). Note that the equation of MBD(yms) with BCh(ws) is a by-product, so to speak, and is not to be taken as a 'Crow' feature.

We are now in a position to evaluate the Omaha features of the Kachin system. It has been demonstrated that the Kachin have developed a unilateral xC marriage system from an original bilateral arrangement, and that this shift has produced a profound transformation in the kinship terminology. The equating of MBS(ws) with MB, and of FSiD(ms) with SiCh(ms) serves to distinguish the non-marriageable from the marriageable

SA 601 193 197 cross-cousins. These equations closely parallel those already noted in the Sbl terminology, and appear to form part of the same pattern. If this inference be correct, we must regard the institution of the levirate as a contributing factor here.

ST 601 193 197 The Kachin terminology under the original bilateral xC marriage system can be reconstructed as follows:

Reconstructed Kachin System

(Consanguineal)

ni FSi	ku MB
ning xCi(ws)	k'au xCe(ms)
rat xC(ds)	
moi BD(ws)	ts'a SiS(ms)

(Affinal)

ni MBW,Ml	ku FSiH,Fl
ning Sil(ss)	k'au Bl(ss)
rat Sbl(ds)	
nam Dl	k'ri Sl

Maru and Lashi, which are of Burmese stock, show Omaha features of Kachin type, e.g. Lashi so-ok FSiD(ms),SiCh(ms) and zo-auk Sl (a variant of so-ok), directly comparable with the Kachin term k'ri. Our material here is too uncertain to justify any further investigation of this point, and we have no data on the Maru and Lashi marriage practices. Both tribes are closely identified with the Kachin, and have even incorporated Kachin loan-words into their kinship nomenclatures, so that direct Kachin influence must be reckoned with in this

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matter. To judge from what little we know of the collateral terms of other Burmish-Loloish languages, Omaha features are not present. There is some evidence suggesting that the root *tu is applied both to N and C in Lisu and in Ulu (Northern Lolo), but the Lisu material is inconsistent and the Ulu material is not precise

The Omaha nomenclatures found among the Kukish tribes are quite distinct in type from the Kachin nomenclature. The Kuki tribes proper, including Southern Kuki and Tangkhul, employ the following basic scheme (in many varieties):

<u>Kuki Omaha Pattern</u>

(Consanguineal)

pi gM,MBD pu gF,MB,MBS

ni FSi

tu FSiCh,SiCh(ms),gCh

(Affinal)

pi MBY,YI,YSi pu YF,YB

ni HM -rang FSiH,HF

mou DI,BW(ws) mak SI,SiH(ws)

Lushei has an especial term for BCh(ws), viz. va' (apparently connected with the root *wa H), and Yindu has an especial term for BD(ws), viz. (ka-)li, which has been compared with the root *ma-li gCh (Burmese, Mung), xN (Akir). In Siyin and Chavte, however, BCh(ws) is equated with Ch. The analyzing development in Laiyo has entirely obliterated all traces of the Omaha system, yet the term tu FSiCh is

SA retained. Haka has both (k-)tu FSiCh and the analytical term
● 601 (k-)ni fa as an alternative. Lakher applies Sb terms (in
193 address) to FSiCh and occasionally to MBCh, and both Thado
197 and Aimol sometimes apply the oSb term to FSiCh(os). Chinbok
ST employs an analytical term for MBS, but equates MBD with MySi.
601 Thado resembles Chinbok in equating MBD with MSi, but elsewhere
193 the regular equation is with MBW = gM. Chinbok is further
197 aberrant in equating FSiS with SiS(ms) but having a distinct term for gS. Yindu equates DS with SiS,FSiS, but employs an analytical term for SS. Yindu has distinct terms for MBCh, and Kyaw has distinct terms both for MBCh and FSiCh(i.e. Omaha features are lacking). Aimol, if we can trust our sources, has reversed the Kuki pattern, with (ka-)pu FSiS and (ka-)tu-pa MBS. Chinbon has MoBS = MyB, MyBS = WB, reflecting the stress placed on age distinctions in Southern Kuki. Our Chawte material, which is not reliable, indicates a distinction between FSiS(ws) and FSiD(ms), and the equation of SiCh(mws) with gCh. The affinal term mak Sl is commonly replaced by the consanguineal term tu SiS(ms), as in Haka, Chawte, and Sho, and the reverse process whereby an affinal term "invades" the consanguineal nomenclature (as in Kachin) is illustrated by Kyaw sa-mǎk SiCh(ms) = Sl, and Ayaing Khasi mok-sa FSiCh,SiCh(ms) = Sl, both from the root *mak Sl. The latter language has retained the root *tu, however, in the term (ka-)tu FSiCh(ws),gS.

It is evident from the above citations that this Omaha pattern is extremely susceptible to variation at all points.

SA Nothing approaching the specific Kachin variety has been
●601 encountered, however, and the two systems seem to have little
193 in common. In the Kuki system the equations FSiCh=SiCh(ms)
197 and MBS=MB obtain regardless of the sex or speaker, there are
ST additional equations of MB with gF and SiCh(ms) with gCh,
601 and ni FSi is retained as a consanguineal term. In addition,
193 distinct terms for xC(ss) and Sbl are lacking. The historical
197 developments of the two systems have been quite different, if
we are permitted to draw inferences from comparative data.
The terms pi and pu are the original gP terms (TB *p'i gM, *p'u gF), and the term -rang (prefixed) can be regarded as the original term for MB, cognate with Tibetan ʾa-ʒang < *zrang MB (cf. Kachin ku HF, FSiH=MB). The term tu occasions some difficulty, since we have only the Burmish-Loloish root *tu and the Nung term pa-du, both applied to N (xN in Burmese) for comparison. In view of the parallelism in the equations MB=gF and xN=gCh, however, we must fix the original meaning of tu as "gCh" rather than "xN". The clue to these equations seems to be teknonymy in conjunction with xC marriage, i.e. we must suppose that a man applied the teknonymous terms pu gF and pi gM to his wife's parents, whereas a woman applied the consanguineal terms ni FSi and -rang MB. With the development of unilateral marriage with MBD, a feature found in the Kuki area as well as in Kachin, the two sets of Pl terms were fully differentiated in function, and the term pu Pl=gF replaced the consanguineal term -rang MB, with pi coming into

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use for MBW. The equation of SiCh(ms) with gCh was the natural result of the above development. Since the term ni FSi was retained in its original setting, no comparable term was developed for the reciprocal relationship BCh(ws). The evidence for the use of teknonymous terms in Tibeto-Burman in general has been resumed above and need not be discussed at this point. Within the Kuki group, note Chinbon (ka-)mo-pauk WH=gF and (ka-)mu-bok MoB (probably a variant of the foregoing), (ka-)mo WM= gM and (ka-)mok MoBW (probably a variant of the foregoing), but (ka-)ze HF (analysis uncertain), (ka-)zi HM=FSi. Chinbon thus makes use of teknonymous terms precisely as suggested above for the Kuki group in general.

We are still faced with the problem of explaining the equations MBS= MB, MBD= MBW (or MSi), and FSiCh=SiCh(ms). Here again we must take into account the affinal setting of these terms under a system of unilateral xC marriage with MBD. The fundamental equation seems to have been that between WF and WB (pu) rather than between MB and MBS, i.e. these kin were identified because of the similarity of their roles as wife's father and brother rather than as mother's brother and mother's brother's son. In other terms, the especial position of MB and MBS among the Kuki groups seems in large measure to have arisen through xC marriage. The equation of FSiCh with SiCh(ms) reflects the equation of MBS with MB, just as the equation of SiCh(ms) with gCh reflects the equation of MB with gF.

It is possible to conceive of the Kuki development without recourse to teknonymy simply by assuming that pu gF was

SA applied to MB and MBS in an honorific sense, with tu gCh
●601 SiCh(ms)=FSiCh as a complementary equation. In any event,
193 the equation in the MB line must be regarded as the primary
197 one, and the equation in the FSi line as complementary. The
ST same situation was found to obtain among the Kachin (supra).
601 The Naga languages, which make up the northern division
193 of the Kukish group, also reveal Omaha features, which are of
197 Kuki rather than Kachin type. MBD is equated with MSi or MySi rather than with gM=MBW. In Ao (all three dialects) the terms for gF (o-pu) and gCh (sam-cir) are distinct, i.e. there is no teknonymy, the TB root *k'u is retained in the consanguineal nomenclature (o-k'u MB,MBS) while MBD is equated with MySi, and the affinal terms for Sl (a-nok) and Dl (a-mu) are applied to FSiS,SiS(ms) and FSiD,SiD(ms), respectively, precisely as in Ayaing Khami. Sema has a distinct term for gF (neuter) and equates gCh with Ch, but has developed a new root for MB,MBS (a-ngu) and has retained the root *k'u only in the affinal meaning "FSiH" (a-ci). Thus both Ao and Sema show full Omaha features without distinction of sex of speaker (as in Kuki) but also without teknonymy (as in Kachin). The Angami, Rengma, and Lhota systems, however, all show teknonymous features. Rengma (all three dialects) equates MB,MBS(os) with gF (ggF in Nzong), and FSiCh,SiCh(ms) with gCh. Lhota shows a partial equation of MB,MBS with gF (o-mo and o-mo-tsü) and at least similar terms for FSiS,SiS(ms) and gS (o-hro and o-hre). Angami equates FSiS,ySiS(ms) with gS, but distinguishes between

SA gF and MB, yet the term for the latter (mi) is connected with
●601 the Rengma term for gF,MB (a-mi ~ a-mui) and the Lhota term
193 for MB (o-mo) and gF (o-mo-tsü). We can thus interpret Angami
197 mi MB as the original term for gF,MB and in this way explain
ST the lack of symmetry in the Angami nomenclature as it now
601 stands (a man calls his sister's child "gCh", but a child
193 calls his mother's brother "uncle"). Angami lacks the Omaha
197 traits on one side, since MBCh is addressed or described by name, or analytically if the need arises. The Rengma equations on the MB side appear only in the vocative nomenclature, and only when the cousin (MBS or MBD) addressed is older than speaker.

As noted in pt. 16, Majumder attempted to explain some of the features of the Sema nomenclature in terms of marriage with F's widow, after the fashion instituted by Rivers. Almost no instances of marriages of this type have been encountered in the Tibeto-Burman area, however, and the writer fails to see how Rivers' theories are of any relevancy in the present situation. The most curious form of marriage noted is the Lisu marriage with FSi cited by Fraser, and this is not reflected in the Lisu nomenclature. Omaha features among the Omaha and Miwok are perhaps based on WBD marriage, but for the American evidence there is no unanimity of opinion, and at least three recent writers on the subject (White, Gifford, Tax) have attacked this as a general explanation. Of this trio White alone suggests a general explanation, viz. that the Omaha type

SA is developed from the Dakota-Iroquois type (pC=Sb, xC distinct
● 601 term) under the influence of a mature and vigorous patrilineal
193 clan system. Gifford has successfully attacked this view on
197 the basis of the American material, and the same general
ST strictures are applicable in the Tibeto-Burman field, where
601 no correlation can be established between strong patrilineal
193 clans and the Omaha type of terminology.
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The Kuki equation of xN with gCh is also encountered in Miri (ä < o-i "child below") and Tibetan (ts'a). Miri has retained the TB root *k'u MB (a-kü), but does apply teknonymous terms to F1 and M1 (= MB and FSi under the Miri bilateral xC marriage system). In Tibetan, however, teknonymy has been found only in the dialect of Bathang (eastern Tibet) as recorded by Desgodins, who cites rmo-rmo M1=MM (hence a man's term for his WM). Abor shows reverse teknonymy in the shifts a-bu gF < F and a-nä gM < M, reflected in the equation o Ch= N=gCh (Abor, like Miri, applies teknonymous terms to F1 and M1).

SA We are perhaps not justified in concluding that all
601 equations of xN with gCh are based on teknonymy involving the
ST affinal nomenclature (gF> F1=MB), but no better general
601 explanation can be suggested. The general thesis outlined above conforms to the basic Tibeto-Burman sociological pattern of cross-cousin marriage, and thus enjoys an initial advantage over any alternative theories of a more an hoc nature.

Reciprocal terminology has already been mentioned in connection with Kachin ts'a MB < SiCh(ms), k'ri HSiCh,FSiHSi,

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and Bodo a-doi FyB, nang-a-doi oBCh. This phenomenon is not typical of Tibeto-Burman but can be traced in a few languages. Newari ni-ni FSi, i-ni D1 (< BD,ws) is comparable with Kachin ts'a. The following instances of grandparental reciprocity have been noted: Lepcha a-so ggF ∾ a-son gCh (with -n suffix); Bodo a-bau gF,gCh, Moran a-lu gF,gCh (as cited by Gurdon); Lisu a-lì ggF, lì-pa gS (and perhaps a-za gM, za S), which are not strictly reciprocal. Note also Lushei t'laʾ "a descendant, posterity", t'laʾ-tu "an ancestor, progenitor" (apparently formed with the root *tu gCh), Siyin tu-k'an ta-k'an "descendant; ancestor", based on tu < *tu gCh and ta < *za Ch. Lisu also has the combined terms pa-la "F and Ch", ma-la "M and Ch", and pi-li "gF and gCh", all used in a collective sense. Kanauri spats gCh seems to have been derived from a-pa F, with the diminutive suffix -ts as in a-pats FB and the s- prefix as in Tib. p'a-spad "F and Ch" (collective).

To resume the foregoing discussion, we have reconstructed for the Tibeto-Burman peoples a sociological pattern of bilateral xC marriage and a corresponding linguistic pattern with primary terms for MB and FSi, for S1, and perhaps for D1, but with the affinal nomenclature in general based on categorical equations. In the Lowie system this pattern would be designated "bifurcate merging". The breakdown of the xC marriage pattern is shown to have directly influenced the affinal nomenclature but to have exerted little effect on the consanguineal nomenclature. The development of unilateral xC

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marriage with MBD in Kachin and the Kuki and Naga tribes is associated with the presence of two sets of F1 terms and of Omaha features in the collateral terminology. This association naturally has no statistical significance, yet fits very well into the general picture.

The practice of unilateral xC marriage with MBD is to be interpreted in terms of asymmetric reckoning of descent, as has been brilliantly pointed out by B. Z. Seligman with especial reference to River's Pentecost material. The Pentecost society has matri-moieties with three patri-sections in each, and the Pentecost terminology shows Crow features, viz. ratahina W,MSi,FSi,FSiD, and nituna MBCh,Ch. The Pentecost pattern is thus the reverse of the Kachin-Kuki-Naga.

The Tibeto-Burman evidence is surprising, perhaps, in failing to suggest a basic pattern of dual organization. Rivers regarded xC marriage as the result of dual organization, and Radcliffe-Brown has expressed the belief that the "Dravidian-Australian" kinship system (xC marriage) is in some way correlated with dual organization. The latter point of view is perhaps that shared by the majority of anthropologists. In the Tibeto-Burman area, however, dual organization has been recorded only for some of the Old Kuki groups and for Garo and Rabha, with additional evidence from the Naga group. Bose (1934) has collected much material bearing on this point, but largely from inadequate sources and in wholly uncritical fashion. In a later article (1937) the same writer places

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emphasis rather on the tri-clan arrangement as found among at least some sections of the Garo, and suggests that an originally matrilineal people had been submerged in a wave of patrilineal peoples coming from the north, and that the restriction against a woman's marrying into her mother's clan is a reflection of this matrilineal substratum. Another Indian ethnologist, Das (1935), postulates a mixture of a patrilineal people with dual organization and a matrilineal people. The Khasi are typically matrilineal, and hence one can easily envisage an archaic Khasi-Mon matrilineal substratum in the Assam-Burma area. The Tibeto-Burman peoples, on the other hand, were and are patrilineal, though practising xC marriage. The Garo, Rabha, and probably other members of the Barish linguistic stock are matrilineal, however, apparently through direct Khasi influence. The theory of a miscegenation between patrilineal and matrilineal peoples, as advocated by Bose and Das, is therefore likely enough, and serves as well as any other as a partial explanation of the development of the asymmetric mode of reckoning descent. It does not explain, however, why the Kachin, living in the upper Irrawaddy valley, should have adopted this feature, nor, inversely, why the Mikir, in close contact with the Khasi, should not have adopted it.

In the present study no effort can be made to follow through the historical and other implications raised by the postulation of an early Tibeto-Burman-speaking population with patrilineal descent and xC marriage. It is difficult to see

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any historical connection with the "Dravidian-Australian" system suggested by Radcliffe-Brown (see also the articles by Hodson and Rivers), inasmuch as an intervening population of matrilineal Mon-Khmer-speaking peoples must also be postulated. From another point of view, the writer is unable to suggest any striking correlation between xC marriage and other cultural traits. According to the view expressed by Kroeber in a recent article (1938), this form of marriage could form part of the "secondary pattern" and would be (ultimately) referable to factors of residence or other elements of the "basic pattern". The argument seems to be that one must live somewhere, but can live without exogamic groupings, totems, and the like - that one must have kin, but not clans. It is equally true, however, that one must marry someone, and that his choice must lie either within the kin group or without, just as residence must be either patrilocal, matrilocal, or neither, with various combinations possible. This point of view seems to be implied in Seligman's (1929) discussion of incest and descent factors.

It is perhaps of some interest to point out that pre-marital sexual promiscuity and the institution of a bachelor's house or its equivalent are characteristic Tibeto-Burman traits. The writer has not collected data on either of these specific points, yet has been impressed by the almost universal distribution of these features. It is primarily among acculturated groups such as the Tibetans or Burmese that these traits are in abeyance. Contrast, for example, the primitive Ahmara

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group with xC marriage and a type of bachelor's house with their immediate neighbors, the Tibetans, who practise polyandry rather than xC marriage (traces of the latter persist) and have nothing suggesting a bachelor's house. The same type of contrast is presented by the primitive Arakanese with xC marriage and premarital sexual freedom (Hutchinson, p. 113) and the sophisticated Burmese, who lack xC marriage and whose courtship pattern had become highly formalized even in medieval times (vide the interesting account by Kin). It is not suggested that xC marriage and premarital sexual laxity are necessarily correlated in any way, but, in the area under consideration, both appear to belong to the same general cultural stratum.

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The present study is of limited scope and comparative material has therefore been eliminated. The parallelism between the Kuki Omaha pattern and that found among the BaThonga and Hama Hottentot of South Africa, however, is too attractive to be omitted. The Hama Hottentot (Schapera, pp. 230 and ff.) employ the terms //náob gF,MB; //náos gM,MBW (but MB is now called omeb < Dutch oom "uncle", and MBW is now called mugis < Dutch moekie "little mother"); //núrib xCe,SiS(ms),gS; //núris xCi,SiD(ms),gD. This system can be converted into the Kuki type by limiting //núrib and //núris to FSiCh and applying //náob and //náos to MBCh. Schapera describes xC marriage of bilateral type, but notes that among

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some tribes of the Nama marriage with MBD "is said to have been far more common" (p. 244). For the replacement of the MB term by the Dutch loan-word (omeb < oom), cf. the widespread Tibeto-Burman borrowing of the Indic term mama MB (infra).

The BaThonga evidence (Junod, pp. 216 and ff.) is complicated by the existence of dialectical differences. The regular MB term is malume (Zulu malume MB), applied, also to MBS. The Northern BaThonga, however, have kokwana gF, MB, MDS, ntuknlu SiS(ms), gS. The BaRonga clans are in a neatly transitional stage, with alternative sets of terms. Radcliffe-Brown (1924) has made an illuminating analysis of the BaThonga material, in which the significance of the terms malume ("male mother") and rarana ("female father") is pointed out (cf. also Firth's discussion of the FBi as "male father" in Tikopia). The BaThonga do not practice xC marriage, according to Junod, and the parallelism with Kuki thus breaks down at this point. Since the application of kokwana gF to MB is apparently of late origin here, the teknonymy principle is of no avail in this instance, and we must accept Radcliffe-Brown's mode of reasoning. Note that neither the Nama nor the BaThonga system is of true Omaha type.

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Loan-words appear in many of the Tibeto-Burman kinship terminologies, and include terms of Indic, Chinese, and Shan origin, as well as of Tibeto-Burman origin. Indic loan-words are found in a string of languages extending from Baltistan

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and Kanawur in the northwest to the Garo Hills in the southeast, all exposed to direct Indian influence. The extent of borrowing in kinship nomenclature is in general correlated with the rate of borrowing in general, but this is not necessarily so, e.g. Magari has preserved a large proportion of its original TB vocabulary yet has retained only a single kinship term (za Ch), if we can trust our sources. The tendency to borrow terms for male kin rather than female kin has been observed in Balti, Kanauri, Newari (less well marked), Miri, and Barish. Terms for relatives older than speaker are also more likely to be borrowed than those for relatives younger than speaker. Probably both points can be explained on the basis of the honorific connotations associated with loan-words in general, which go to make up the "respectable" idiom as opposed to the vulgar. The term mama MB has been borrowed by Balti, Kanauri, Dhimal, Bodo, Garo, and perhaps Meithei, whereas the Indic FSi term has been borrowed only once (Dhimal).

The most prominent instances of borrowings made within Tibeto-Burman are those of Lepcha from Tibetan, and Atsi from Kachin. To illustrate the vagaries in the borrowing process, Atsi borrows its MB and FSi terms from Kachin but retains its native FB and MSi terms, whereas Byangsi (Almora group) borrows from Indic (Khasiya) its terms for FoB and FyB but employs a native term for MB. The borrowing of a term in a specialized sense only is exemplified by the following curious series: Kanauri mak-pa "Sl living in Fl's house" (from Tibetan); Lepcha km-mok, id. (from Tibetan); Kachin

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luk-k'i, id. (from Shan). All three languages have distinct Sl terms applied under normal conditions. Contrast Garo nok-rong "Sl living in Fl's house" (native term), cowari "Sl other than above" (from Indic); note that among the Garo the nok-rong is a formalized institution in a matrilineal society. It would be difficult to find a more ideal illustration of the mirroring of sociological features in linguistic phenomena.

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1 [For abbreviations see this source in Cat, 113, ALl Southeast Asia ALl -- Analyst]

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[438] One reason for this is economic advantage. The coming of rubber, in particular, has given to the Malay peasant of the west coast an income considerably higher, on the whole, than that of the east coast peasant.
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[166] The effects of Westernization are profound. But they do not lie in crude physical displacement of the peasant or degradation of his living conditions. They lie in the widening of the gap between his expanding range of wants and his level of productivity, and in his inability to measure and in any way control the economic forces operating in his field. Westernization has meant for the peasant an enlargement of the social horizon—more knowledge, through better communications and education, of other places, of other peoples of kindred and dissimilar interests. It has created new ambitions: for different clothing, for new uses of leisure, for a better status for his children, for a position of power in the political scene. All this has disturbed the traditional patterns of peasant society. These patterns, and the class structure of South East Asian society of which they were a part, were probably never too satisfactory to the peasant. Anxiety and evasion must have often been the response to either too rigid or too elastic a rule—and the peasant seems often to have suffered from the exactions of his superior in the social scale. But the scope of the system was known, if not its precise implications. Nowadays the scope of the system has for the most part passed beyond the peasant's grasp, and much of it has become de-personalized.

To illustrate this by giving a more concrete analysis of some of the values in the peasant's life, let me take the area of Malaya and Indonesia where Islam is the major religion of the people.

181 In his daily life the Indonesian or Malay peasant is governed largely
177 by the canons of behaviour, the ties of friendship and neighbourliness, the
565 relations of work and social intercourse of his village community. So much is this so that in Java the *desa*, the village, was crystallized by the Dutch
602 into an administrative and developmental unit, and its communal struc-
776 ture strengthened for welfare purposes. But as important as the village,
779 and indeed often basic to its structure, are the family and larger kin or-
671 ganizations. From these a person gets his social status and much of his land and other property, and they have the primary role in his marriage
182 and other crucial events in his progress through life.

Such domestic and local relationships also provide a framework for the peasant in his attempts to come to terms with the forces of nature and human destiny. His world of spirits is a local world. In Indonesia the ancestors do not play the predominant role which they do, for instance, in Annam. But the village, the seashore, the surrounding jungle, wells, trees, and stones are the home of many kinds of spirits, which afflict man with sickness or misfortune, or stand by him as his familiars to guard him. Basic in the religion of the Indonesian peasant is this local, essentially parochial, spirit element. All these values guide his economic and social conduct, and mean a great deal to him.

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But the situation is complex, even in village life. The system of rules governing domestic and local relations—marriage, adoption, inheritance, rights over land, succession to local office, rules of etiquette, and behaviour to superiors—is generally known as the *adat*, the custom. The nature of this custom, and what should be its relation to a more fully developed legal system, have been elaborately studied by the Dutch in Indonesia. At times indeed they have seemed to give the *adat* almost a mystical connotation. Alongside this body of custom, which of course varies from one peasant area to another, is the *shari'a*, the religious rule of Islam. On the one hand this is a unifying force, extra-village and extra-national in character, linking even the remotest mountain farmer spiritually or emotionally with the farmer or townsman of other Muslim communities in South East Asia, and far beyond. On the other hand, the Muslim religious law blends into the field of the *adat*, laying down rules about marriage, inheritance, and other family matters. Then there are the Western rules of law and administrative procedure, laying down just how land is to be acquired, held, and transferred, giving regulations for village management, and imposing penalties for certain kinds of breach of good relations. Yet the Western system offers also inducement to use the law, to protect one's interests firmly, to take advantage of situations where the *adat* has left rights undefined. So three factors—the custom, the Muslim religious rule, and the Western system of law—interact even in the heart of peasant society.

The result is a complex set of forces in dynamic operation, with the peasant being pressed by one or other of them or championing one or other as circumstances arise. In Negri Sembilan, for instance, there has come to be what is almost now a classic case of this interaction. In former times the valuable lands were for the most part those on which 'wet rice' could be cultivated. By the matrilineal system ancestrally operative in that area, these lands were handed down in the female line, from mother to daughter, or from aunt to niece. They were also cultivated largely by women. As rubber came to be developed, however, other lands on the hill-sides, previously of much less value, came to have worth too. For the most part these had to be cleared before being planted in rubber, and this clearing was a task that only men could do properly. Hence men came to have a more direct interest in this land. When questions of inheritance began to arise, divergent views became manifest. Some argued for treating new lands like the old, and handing them down in the female line like the rice lands. Yet there was a strong case for not including these rubber lands in the category of ancestral land, but for letting them be transmitted from a father to his children and through the male line in general. This principle of male inheritance is in line with the emphasis of the Muslim law. This not only gives guidance of the patrilineal kind for distribution of the property of the deceased in cases of dispute, but in all its provisions tends to stress the status of the male against that of the female.

Within the peasant society itself the potential clash of the two systems,

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181 local custom and religious rule, had been present for centuries. But there
177 was little in the economic situation to sharpen it, and the Muslim leaders
565 themselves were often so steeped in the local ways that they allowed as the religious law what was, in fact, the local custom. With the growth of
602 Western processes, the perception of new economic advantages tended to
776 change the equilibrium of the two principles. The advance of education
779 and heightened consciousness of Islam as a world faith also tended to make the religious leaders themselves much more keenly aware of any divergence.
671 Wealthy men who want to leave property to their sons, men with a strong
182 religious sense, men who regard themselves as progressive, or who are in revolt against their clan leaders, therefore tend to be protagonists of the Muslim law. The conservatives, those who see in the custom a defence for women, those who see in it a symbol of an essentially Malay way of life, argue for the retention of the custom. Contact with the West, they say, is changing the structure of the peasant society enough already. The issue has also entered the modern political scene, since the search for factors to increase Malay integration tends to stress the national and extra-national character of Islam at the expense of the more local qualities of the *adat*. Here too it is growing Westernization which has sharpened the issue.

184 In a general discussion such as this, one may be allowed to refer to the
565 peasantry of South East Asia as a body. But they are not uniform in ethnic composition, in national interests, in language, in religion, or in general culture. Moreover, within any local community, there are competing, even conflicting, interests and opinions. The peasant may be unable to face up to the general issues which affect his life so deeply, but in so far as he understands his own interests he is very alive to them and capable of exercising keen judgement in them. It is the small scale of his organization for the most part which renders him so vulnerable.

000 What is likely to be the future of South East Asia from the peasant angle? Prediction is not worth much, since so many elements in the situation are imperfectly known, but there are a few which seem to be significant.

565 The peasant has no native middle class, of the same society as himself,
185 to give a lead to his development and stability in any wider economic
656 organizations that may be set up for his benefit. To improve his economic lot, and in particular to give him a larger fraction of his product through control of marketing, co-operative societies have often been proposed and sometimes tried. Their success has been only limited, partly because the peasant has not been fully persuaded of their attractions as against what the alien middleman can offer, and partly because of the difficulty of securing adequate technical supervision and administration at a sufficiently low official level. Much is now apt to be made of the colonial or semi-colonial status of the South East Asian peasant as a drag upon his development. There is no doubt that colonialism, as a specific form of political control of under-developed territories by a metropolitan Power, is

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hostility to the Military Administration and, after it, to the civil 668
Governments of the Malayan Union and Singapore which succeeded it.

Before the war, the Kuomintang had found its chief support in the mercantile class of Chinese. During the Japanese occupation of the Nanyang this class, being urban and static, was an easy prey for Japanese exactions and for this reason its members, after the liberation, were denounced by the Communists as 'collaborators'. They, themselves, had either remained underground and unnoticed because of their lack of property or, in Malaya, in the case of about 3,000–4,000 only out of a total population of over two million, had become guerrillas in the jungle. The post-liberation result of the situation in this country was that many of the old leaders of the Chinese community were, at least temporarily, discredited and the Communists claimed credit for all resistance to the Japanese. After a while, however, the Kuomintang and the San Min Chu I Youth began to reassert themselves, but they had lost much of their pre-war vigour. The course of the civil war in China and the deterioration of the National Government's position had much to do with the change.

In Indonesia and Indochina, where the purely proletarian ele- 609
ment among the Chinese was much smaller, the developments after 186
the Japanese had surrendered placed the Chinese in an unenviable 668
position. In Indonesia the 'middleman' nature of so much of the Chinese activity had made them unpopular with the natives, and during the periods after 1945 when the Dutch were in conflict with the Indonesian Republic neither side was able to afford them adequate protection from the aggression of local communities. Uncontrolled elements in the population (often soldiers) massacred the Chinese in considerable numbers. They were, in particular, accused of espionage for the Dutch. It seems, however, that it was the Dutch who afforded them the best protection and with whom, generally speaking, Chinese sympathies therefore lay. In Indochina, where there was also a considerable animus against the Chinese trader and money-lender (i.e. goods-lender), the community suffered greatly in the disorders and in the civil war which was still continuing in 1949. The French, to afford them protection, and to suit their own strategic dispositions, concentrated them in a few centres, notably in Saigon-Cholon where there was much overcrowding. At the same time many other Chinese

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668 moved to Vietminh-controlled areas, and the Vietminh could
•609 claim a considerable number of supporters among the younger Chinese.

186 The advances of militant nationalism in some others of the Southeast Asian countries had made the widespread fear of Chinese economic encroachment a ready source of political capital. In both Siam and the Philippines measures to diminish the Chinese share of the retail trade which had been initiated before the war were now intensified and an anti-Chinese plank was inevitable in the platform of every political party. Chinese Communists were said meanwhile to be actively assisting the Hukbalahaps, the agrarian insurgents in Luzon.

668 This was the dilemma in which the Chinese still found them-
669 selves in the fourth year after the Japanese defeat. But in one country, Malaya, their difficulties as a community became most acute when the Malayan Communist Party, consisting itself mostly of Chinese, decided in June 1948 to start an active terrorist campaign against the British. The constitutional experiment of the Malayan Union followed by that of the Federation of Malaya had left the Chinese generally in a state of political apathy (since the new constitution greatly favoured the Malays at their expense). When the terrorists, who were largely the old guerrillas of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, struck, it was the Chinese themselves who provided most of the casualties on both sides. Many *Towkays* (Chinese business men) were intimidated into contributing to the Communists' funds or supplying them with goods and, being largely isolated, were not in a position to resist these demands. This in turn brought them into conflict with the British authorities. The Chinese squatter community, too, being on the fringe of the jungle was readily utilized by the terrorists and suffered accordingly when British troops and police took reprisals against their villages, burning down their houses and destroying their crops. Many squatters were banished to China. The great
000 danger the British ran was that harsh measures might antagonize large sections of the population, for the government of a great majority by a small minority must ultimately depend upon the consent of the governed. Large-scale measures of varying success were in progress against the terrorists in 1949 when the defeat of the Chinese Nationalist armies by those of the Communists in China and the collapse of the Kuomintang Government gave new

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Billiton, among the bauxite deposits of the Rhio Archipelago off Singapore, and finally among the oil wells of Palembang in Sumatra. 167 162

The Chinese of the Philippines form a group somewhat isolated from the main body, so to speak. They have traded with and emigrated to these islands for some centuries and they persevered

The Hakkas often inhabit the same areas as the Cantonese, Hokkien, and other tribes.

The following authorities, among others, have been followed: (1) Linguistic Map of China, *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cii, no. 2 (August 1943) p. 5; (2) Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 23; (3) W. J. Cator, *The Economic Position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1936) p. 28 (map).

in their intercourse in spite of the intermittent severity and grudging tolerance of the Spanish. When, however, in 1898 the Americans assumed control of the islands, they extended to them the exclusion laws against Chinese immigration which were already in force in the United States. When the Filipinos took over the administration of their own country the term 'exclusion' (which had been subject at least to some liberal exceptions under the Americans) was more and more literally interpreted. But although 609 167 162

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609 their numbers are at present not very great in comparison with the
167 Filipinos, the economic position of the Chinese in the Philippines based, as ever, on their control of trade (they owned, before 1941
162 at least, three-quarters of the rice-mills), has been maintained in the face of determined attempts by Filipino Nationalists to oust them from it.

121 So much will serve as a general introductory survey of the distribution of the Chinese in Southeast Asia: in the first chapter of each country study contained in the successive parts of this survey, the subject will be dealt with in much greater detail.

167 The sketch-map of the principal places of origin in China of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, reproduced on p. 9, has been de-
162 signed by the author and executed by Geographia Ltd., and is subject to the following considerations. The shading indicates roughly the distribution in China of the several tribes represented overseas, but in the case of the Hakkas, of whom small communities are to be found throughout Kwangtung intermingled with the Cantonese,[1] only the areas most densely populated by them are shown in the map. Nor must it be assumed that the overseas Chinese come equally from all over the shaded areas. The fact (as Dr Ta Chen has pointed out) is that the communities from which the emigrants are drawn exist side by side with non-emigrant communities, and enjoy a higher standard of living than the latter.

[1] See L. Richard, *Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese Empire and Dependencies* (Shanghai, Tu-se-wei Press, 1908) p. 207.

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Chinese
Indians

464 years of the present century, the flow of immigration has been large and
167 comparatively steady except during the depression and the two world wars. Chinese and Indian immigrants usually could better their position soon after arrival because their industry and organization were superior to those of the indigenous peoples. Partly because of this, there were constantly new arrivals willing to do coolie work until they too could
[178] rise economically. Except for the large-scale repatriations to China and India caused by the depression, the flow of labor thus set into motion was adequate for the economy prevailing in the underpopulated areas until changing conditions created a growing class of landless proletariat and
[668] dissatisfaction among both the indigenous and immigrant peoples. This dissatisfaction often became associated with other motivations in nationalist movements.

Controlled migrations occurred only between regions under the same government or those held by governments of the same nationality, except for a limited migration of Javanese labor to Malaya (and to New Cale-
[166] donia). In the Netherlands Indies and in Indochina the governments endeavored to transplant groups of laborers from overpopulated to underpopulated areas, but in so doing they learned that the process required careful organization, was expensive, and raised serious economic, social, and psychological problems. Such movements could be effected successfully on a limited scale only. This fact obviated the possibility of their contributing substantially to solution of the problem of overpopulation. As labor supply, such migrations were only temporarily satisfactory, because social and religious ties inclined the workers to return to their home villages immediately upon the expiration of their contracts or even to desert. To stabilize this labor force some of the governments tried after the depression to obtain a better adjusted sex ratio in the migrant population by encouraging the immigration of workers' families and the establishment of agricultural villages—a program too recently initiated to make possible a definite appraisal of its comparative success or failure. In Malaya, with the exception of a few Javanese, planned immigration was confined to Indian laborers. It was arranged and operated jointly by the two British governments concerned. There, however, the depression, the growth in voluntary Indian immigration, and India's ban in 1938 on assisted emigration to Malaya tended to render many of the official controls unnecessary. The unplanned and uncontrolled movement of labor across the Burma-India frontier was the sole migration of its type in Southeast Asia.

563 The indigenous populations in general hold themselves socially aloof
● 609 from the alien Asiatics. To the Muslim Malays the Chinese were materialistic, pork-eating idolators; and the Indians, with the exception of the small Islamic minority, were similarly disdained, though regarded as less aggressive. To the sinicized Annamites, the Burmese, and the Siamese,

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religion was no barrier between themselves and the Chinese; all were Buddhists, though of differing sects. Chinese culture had long been admired by the peoples of Farther India, and had influenced them. Moreover, the Chinese were regarded as distant and desirable relatives. With the advent, however, of Chinese women and the accelerated growth of Chinese nationalism after the first world war, intermarriage occurred less frequently (though it continued to be common in Burma and Cambodia), and the indigenous peoples had few social contacts with the Chinese in their midst. The cleavage between the ethnic groups was further widened in the British colonies by the official policy of representation of various communities on legislative and advisory bodies. 563 609

Economically, relations between the indigenous and the immigrant peoples altered from a mosaic of non-conflicting occupations to one of rapidly increasing competition. For years the native peoples had contentedly seen the arrival of thousands of immigrants annually who were able and willing to perform the hard labor for which they themselves had neither inclination nor compulsion. Through much of the region, however, during the inter-war period an indigenous proletariat was developing as a result of the transfer of farm land from the indebted native peasantry to non-agriculturists, often to alien moneylenders, and also because of the growth of a Western-inspired individualism which was weakening family ties once paramount. The trend was apparent chiefly in parts of Burma, Siam, and Indochina. 464 477 178 425 172

This development did not assume significant proportions until the world economic depression, when considerable unemployment arose out of the drop in prices and the curtailment of foreign markets for products of Southeast Asia. The result was a swift increase in the number of natives seeking to return to their villages and, on the other hand, of those forced to seek part-time or full-time employment away from their villages in competition with immigrant laborers for work previously scorned as arduous, monotonous, and underpaid. 464 458 178

Meanwhile the native middle classes for the first time faced a serious unemployment problem. Until the depression years, the opportunities for desirable though moderately paid employment in government or business had seemed to exceed the number of qualified candidates. The depression made it clear that the saturation point had been reached, and each year an increasing number of educated youths would be thwarted in their expectation of employment or, if given a job, in their rise to higher positions. Thus two groups of economically frustrated natives developed simultaneously in numbers and in consciousness in the decade prior to the second world war. 164 178 563

Nascent political factors became significant during that period. The struggles of the Chinese against the Japanese and of Indians against British rule were reflected in the attitudes of the emigrants from those coun- 464 668

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Chinese

427 But the alien planta-
565 tions and even alien smallholders have threatened to grasp at it, and the
177 advances of Western medicine, so beneficial in many ways, have only accelerated the rate of increase of the population which has to seek a livelihood from it. In most parts of South East Asia the peasant is the actual owner of the land he tills, often legally under some agreement with
426 the State. But his rights to the produce are often severely limited by a heavy burden of indebtedness. The real effects of this may be less than people sometimes think, because when the debts are spread among neighbours and kinsfolk interest may be waived, repayment is sometimes protracted or ignored, and the debt may be serviced by other than material means. But there is no doubt that the peasant producer is badly hampered by his debt load. It is most pressing when debt is contracted to a member of an alien ethnic group, an Indian or a Chinese, for whom the transaction is a purely commercial one.

563 The role of alien Asiatic ethnic groups is one of the most significant
565 features in the economic and political life of the peasantry of South East
177 Asia today. For many centuries, Indian and Chinese trading influences
178 have met in the South East Asian region, and Indian religious concepts
439 have penetrated deep into many of its social systems. But for more than four hundred years the dominant commercial and political note has tended to be sounded by Europeans. Now the balance is altering. Colonialism may have set the modern structure of South East Asian society, but the patterns will persist when the colonial Powers have withdrawn. To this new society the Chinese above all have the economic key. In Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, the Philippines, and Java, the Chinese have penetrated the economic system and taken over crucial functions. They have shared in much of the wholesale import trade, they have attained pre-eminence in retailing vital imported goods to the peasant, and they act as middlemen for the collection, storage, and processing of peasant export products. As part of this process they often finance the peasant producer by advances on his crop, gaining a double profit by giving part of these advances in goods, not cash. The Chinese achievement has been remarkable. They have been kept on the margin both of the peasant society with which they deal, and of the European society with which at a later stage their growing wealth would allow them to associate. Though lacking any formal political power, which in the Orient as elsewhere is so often the passport to success, they have built up a trading structure of extraordinary toughness, elasticity, and elaboration.

565 The wider political implications of this are not my concern here. But
● 609 it is important to note three points in connexion with the peasant theme.
186 One is the xenophobic reaction of the local urban dwellers and of peasants
578 too, which has periodically found expression against the Chinese, as traders or residents in South East Asia, in the form of riots and other disturbances.
563 Another is the reaction of the Chinese, whose economic strength has given
241 them confidence, and who are now prepared to stand by their claim to a

18; Firth E-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl
Malaya

real stake in the countries of the Nan Yang, as settled members of the local society, and not as aliens. The third point is that the Chinese community has never been one of middlemen only; there has always been a fair proportion of cultivators within it. The poor peasantry of South East Asia now includes a Chinese as well as an indigenous element. The 1947 census of Malaya shows 45,000 Chinese engaged in rice growing, and another 100,000 in market gardening and fishing, essentially peasant pursuits.

The pressure to which the South East Asian peasant has been subjected by the combination of Western and other alien influences has been severe. But we must beware lest we misinterpret it. In a recent book which gives a comparative analysis of the agrarian situation in the countries of South East Asia, appears a striking statement about Malaya—that development of mining and rubber industries has pushed the native Malay population more and more towards the east, into the areas of the former Unfederated Malay States: 'The Malays', it is said, 'considered the east as safe from Western penetration, and therefore preferred this undeveloped area to the irrigated lands on the western coast, mainly because there they could get only temporary land licences, since a complete survey of all potential tin-bearing regions had not yet been made'.[1]

It is true that the eastern States are predominantly Malay in population, and that the greater part of the vast immigrant population of Malaya is densely settled on the western side of the peninsula, where the resources are richer and access easier than on the eastern side. It is also true that there has been some lack of enthusiasm among Malay peasants to colonize the new Government-developed irrigation areas, for complex reasons, including lack of capital in the past, and disinclination to move from their ancestral homes. But it is quite incorrect to put these facts together and to argue that the Malay has been pushed by alien pressure over from the west to the east of the peninsula. Apart from some seasonal movement for rice harvesting or fishing, the internal migration of Malays is inconsiderable, despite the rapid development of communications in recent years. Both the 1931 and the 1947 census show that whatever movement takes place—well under 10 per cent—is almost wholly from one State to another, either on the west coast or on the east coast, or to Singapore. Hardly any movement at all occurs from the west to the east. Moreover, the 1947 census shows that between 1931 and 1947 the Malay population of the western States increased by about one-third, at a rate slightly higher than that of the eastern States. The proportion of Malays in these western States, in terms of the total population of all ethnic groups, also increased slightly during this period, due primarily to the decline of Indians and Indonesians. In other words, though foreign economic penetration has immersed the western Malay in a flood of alien elements, it has not driven him away. On the contrary, he has preferred to stay and await events.

[1] Erich H. Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia* (New York, Colombia University Press, 1949) p. 113.

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[p.3]

Chapter I

FROM HUNTING AND GATHERING TO AGRICULTURE

Hunting and Gathering

101 174 222 105 In Southeastern Asia today there are peoples of different cultural levels carrying on some of the major economies that man has developed in the course of time. The first people to invade the tropical forest regions around the South China Sea were alithic, or prepalaeolithic, food gatherers,[1] who obtained their food by collecting edible wild plants and by hunting and fishing. Today geographically separated peoples are still living in a prepalaeolithic or palaeolithic food-gathering and hunting stage.[2] In Southeastern Asia they are represented by the Semang of the Malay Peninsula, the Andaman Islanders, and the Aeta of the Philippines—all of whom are Negritos, or dwarfed Negroids—the Kubu of Sumatra, the Sakai of the Malay Peninsula, the Toala of Celebes,[3] and the Punan of Borneo.[4]

222 462 105 The degree to which collecting, hunting, or fishing contributes to the food supply varies with the season; it also varies with different peoples, depending upon the resources of the region, the type of equipment the people may possess, and the skills they may have acquired. Food-gathering and hunting peoples have a division of labor under which the men hunt while the women and children gather vegetable matter and catch insects and small animals. The men may lend a helping hand, however, in digging up some of the very deep-growing yams. Men will also participate in the 621 picking of fruits, especially when it is necessary to climb tall trees. The food gatherers and hunters of Southeastern Asia are nomadic in the sense that they do not remain long in one place. However, they do not wander aimlessly through the jungle. Each group has its definite territory—among

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Note: The titles of the works here cited in footnotes have been abbreviated, whenever possible. The full titles may be found in the Bibliography, p. 269 ff.

[1] Nippold (Rassen- und Kulturgeschichte der Negrito-Völker, 1936, pp. 253–255 and 398–400) considers the alithic wood culture of the Negritos of Southeastern Asia to be older than palaeolithic culture. These people use wood rather than stone as raw material for their tools. Because of the perishable nature of wood, archaeologists and prehistorians have not yet been able, so far as I know, to go farther back than the palaeolithic age and therefore have not been able to confirm the hypothesis of an alithic age. Menghin (Weltgeschichte der Steinzeit, 1931, p. 91) believes that, from an archaeological point of view, an alithic wood culture may be regarded only as a possibility, but Kern (Die Anfänge der Weltgeschichte, 1933, p. 35), who compared pygmy culture with palaeolithic cultures, comes to the conclusion that alithic wood cultures probably preceded palaeolithic culture.

[2] By divesting the word "palaeolithic" of its specific chronological connotation the term may be used for present-day peoples who have a food-gathering and hunting culture.

[3] The racial affinities of the Kubu, the Sakai, and the Toala are not clear; by some they are called Veddoids, by others, Australoids.

[4] They are considered to be Proto-Malays.

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241 787 of the new ladang be a poor one. After three days the same person returns, and if he finds that the offerings have been scattered a new location is chosen and a new attempt is made to get a favorable answer from the spirits. In case the betel leaves have been found undisturbed, all male members of the village have a meal on the chosen land. Then the area is divided among the villagers by the headman. Each individual appeals to the spirits by placing a betel leaf with lime and areca nut on the ladang that has been turned over to him. If the answer is unfavorable he tries again. The betel leaf may be placed three times. If the offering is disturbed each time, the headman turns over a part of his share, which is considerably larger than any of the others, to the less fortunate villager. Throughout the following agricultural year with its stages of clearing, planting, and harvesting, the peasant repeatedly requires the services of the dukun, or *shaman*, as well as the betel leaf.

In other regions details differ, but the essential fact remains that the social-religious life and thinking of the shifting cultivator is bound up with his characteristic form of cultivation.

423 241 621 Shifting cultivators have no concept of private land ownership. The land belongs to the community, the tribe, or the village, and each member has the right to use as much land as he needs and can cultivate. The location of the land that he is to use may be decided upon by the village council or the headman. The person who clears the land and plants the crop gets the produce. Nobody has the right to plant a plot that has been cleared by someone else. As soon as the land is abandoned all rights are forfeited, except the right of the community. However, if trees have been planted, the ownership of the trees and their produce remains with the person who planted them, and he is given preference when the land has had a sufficient fallow period and can again be cultivated.

The Effect of Shifting Cultivation on the Land

241 134 311 As has been stated above, ladangs decline in fertility after the first crop, and obnoxious grasses and weeds appear among the stooling tree stumps. As long as there is an abundance of forest land at his disposal the cultivator prefers to abandon the ladang. Under favorable conditions the grasses will, in turn, give way to second-growth forest. In the course of centuries this second-growth forest may develop into a climax forest, that is, a forest having the same composition as the primeval forest. In any case, when tall forest growth again occurs, the land will have had time to recover its original fertility.

Unfortunately, however, conditions are often not sufficiently favorable for a regeneration of soil fertility and the development of a good second-growth forest. As a matter of fact, the practice of shifting cultivation has altered the character of vegetation beyond recognition over wide areas in Southeastern Asia. Instead of a dense primeval rain-forest, we now find

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Chapter III

THE SEDENTARY CULTIVATOR

241 Sedentary, or permanent, cultivation of land is much more vital to the economy of the countries of Southeastern Asia than is shifting cultivation. The majority of peasant cultivators obtain their livelihood by tilling the same piece of land year after year. The continuously utilized arable land, however, is not all cultivated in the same way throughout Southeastern Asia. We may distinguish three main categories of arable land: garden land, surrounding the houses and villages; wet land; and dry land. These three classes of land are devoted to different crops and vary so much from one another in size and reliability of yields, and therefore in value that in Java, for example, the social status of a man depends upon the type of land that he cultivates. There are districts in Java where only those peasants who own wet land, houses, and garden land have the full rights of a villager.

554 621

The Garden Plot

244 Garden culture on land surrounding peasant houses in Java is devoted to a large variety of crops, ranging from fruit trees to plants that are not required in large quantities but only to supplement the diet and add flavor to the daily rice meal. Ochse and Terra, who have made exhaustive studies of garden culture, are of the opinion that it is a remnant of "primitive grainless hoe culture," in which all the useful plants found in the forest were concentrated in plots near the dwellings. Originally, the number of plants grown in the garden was greater than it is today, for some plants have been taken out of this economy to be grown on a larger scale in fields. The origin of garden culture explains, according to Ochse and Terra, the truly amazing variety of plants that are found on garden land.[1] Sollewijn Gelpke, a leading expert on native agriculture in Java during the past century, remarked on the richness of the gardens:

> Whoever strolls around a compound and takes things in with a botanical eye will see before him a variety of plants of which the uninitiated can have no conception. . . . Such wealth of vegetation is still more impressive to him who approaches it from an economic point of view. He sees palms, bamboo, bananas, and other trees that resemble each other closely, bearing fruit and giving support to various climbing plants.[2]

244 137 Often one is able to distinguish three levels, or stories, in a garden. The ground story consists of low-growing plants, especially tuberous plants that tolerate shade, such as elephant yam (*Amorphophallus campanulatus* Bl.), white arrowroot (*Maranta arundinacea* L.), "purple arrowroot" (*Can-*

[1] Ochse and Terra: "Het onderzoek," 1934. See also Terra: "De voeding der bevolking," 1932, pp. 552–593.

[2] Sollewijn Gelpke: Naar aanleiding, 1901, p. 203.

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243 [137] 242 134

rice takes up nitrogen in the form of ammonia, the value of green manures on wet-rice fields is apparent.[15] In the Indies, *Crotolaria* species are the most frequently used green manures, the favored one being *Crotolaria juncea* L.; but *Phaseolus lunatus* L., *Dolichos lablab* L., and *Pachyrrhizus erosus* Urban are also used. The peasants of the Red River delta in Tongking are in the habit of working into the ground the wilted matter of a number of legumes that have been grown primarily for seed. The peasants of the province of Nam Dinh have developed a technique that may be unique. They push handfuls of indigo branches into the ground between the rows of rice a few days after the latter has been transplanted, for they believe that indigo is superior to pig manure or human excreta. In Indochina rice-growers frequently cultivate green manure, especially *Crotolaria* species, on dry fields and carry it to the rice fields at the time when these fields are being prepared for the seedlings. A green manure used exclusively in a few districts of the delta land of Tongking is the small aquatic plant, *azolla*.[16] Certain villages, thanks to favorable circumstances, have specialized in the growing of azolla to sell to the surrounding country, while other villages reproduce the plant until sufficient quantities of green manure have been obtained to cover all needs. The life cycle of azolla is completed in the months from November to April or May. Only the villagers of LaVan know the secret of maintaining and multiplying the plant during the hot season. They guard this secret jealously since it is the basis of their livelihood.

[37] [438] [621]

Further studies are needed to establish which varieties of green-manure plants are best suited to the various environmental conditions. It is important to find plants that grow rapidly and can be sown when the rice is still on the field, just after the water has been drained off to allow the grain to ripen. Experiments should also be made in the timing of the application of green manure. Should it be early, or just before the transplanting of the seedlings? Should it be on dry or on wet land?

242 134 249

Crop rotation also has its place as a means of keeping up the fertility of wet-rice fields. This practice seems to be better developed and more prevalent in Java than in any other country of Southeastern Asia. Extensive areas of *sawah*, as the Javanese call their wet riceland, are planted with dry-field crops such as maize, legumes, and other vegetables during the dry season, a practice that has a beneficial effect upon the soil. This form of double cropping is probably better than raising two rice crops in one year, because—although a different variety of rice is chosen for each season—both make essentially the same demands upon the soil; whereas a peanut crop, for example, grown during the dry season will enlarge the nitrogen content of the soil. In some areas of Java lowland rice is rotated

[15] Imperial Bureau of Soil Science: Tropical Soils in Relation to Tropical Crops, 1936, p. 11.

[16] For a map showing the extent of the use of azolla, see Gourou: Les paysans, 1936, p. 392. For further discussion see Nguyên-cong-Tiêu: "L'azolle," 1930, B, pp. 335–350 (also in *Proc. Fourth Pacific Science Congress, Java, 1929*, Vol. 4, 1930, pp. 355–370).

called the "Great Tradition" in an agrarian society.[13] 361

The links between country and city in this basically feudal relationship were clear, consecutive, and relatively simple to define. To be sure, the villager would regard the capital as a different world from his own, but it was nevertheless a largely comprehensible world, if associated with abstractions and refinements beyond his immediate ken.[14] 369 184 181

The modern great city of Southeast Asia, however, not only was different but was also incomprehensible to the child of the folk society, who came to regard it not merely as strange and foreign but also as hostile. The "foreignness" is reflected in their ethnic composition. Until the second World War at least the largest population group in Rangoon was Indian; Singapore is primarily a Chinese city; Bangkok is very largely Chinese, as is Saigon if Cholon, its twin city, is included; both Manila and Jakarta have large foreign and Chinese elements. To this extent the great city is more metropolitan than national. Each has its Chinese, European, and native quarters, for example, although in many instances the lines of division have become blurred, especially since the close of the war.[15] Furthermore, wherever Chinese populations are large, a predominant type of house is the so-called "shophouse," a two-or-more-story building with shops on the first floor, built to a standard width originally dictated by the length of the average fir-log lintel as used in South China, and with residential flats and 631 361 369 184 578 162 563 342 347 563 369 184

[13] See Robert Redfield and Milton Singer, "A Cultural Role of Cities," a working paper for the Conference on the Role of Cities in Economic Growth and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, May 24–26, 1954. [113]

[14] Cf. J. M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian City: Its Culture and Evolution," *Asia*, March, 1953.

[15] In Singapore the Chinese are localized according to the various so-called "clans," e.g., Hokkien, Cantonese, Tiuchiu, Hailams, and Hakka (see B. W. Hodder, "Racial Groupings in Singapore," *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, October, 1953).

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000 The dualisms and pluralities of Southeast Asia society are relatively modern, becoming emphatic only over the past three hundred years, but plural societies and changing values within the units have been apparent in their changing political patterns. First there were the inland political nuclei; the kingdoms of Middle Burma, Upper Siam, Inner Cambodia were matched among the islands by principalities set in the mountains of Sumatra and Java. Then came the little powers related more to the sea than to the land; the Sailendra kingdoms using the Malacca Strait as their bond and artery, the Majapahit sea kingdom whose territories in Borneo, Celebes, Java and South Sumatra may be thought of as footholds for a sailing people, fringing rather than entrenched in the islands (Fig. 113). At a later phase the move of power centres was to the lower rivers of the continental edge, to Lower Burma and Lower Siam. In these historic patterns of political units may be seen operating the influences and traditions of widely differing human types, one rooted in the land, coming overland, depending on agriculture for its welfare and power; the other of seafaring people, many kinds and grades of them, coming to the lands of Southeast Asia by water, relatively mobile on their seaways, fishing and trading through the seas, and always peripheral to the land.

Dual National Foci

369 184 177 631 In most of the constituent political units of Southeast Asia there is thus a split of interest (Fig. 117). Burma has a focus at Mandalay and a commercial-administrative focus at Rangoon; the Philippines has a dual nodality round Manila and round the Visayan Islands; Malaya, which has only recently acquired clear internal focus, has two centres of different interest, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, the former exclusively peninsular, the latter as much involved with all Southeast Asia as with Malaya; Indochina has the double pull of the Tonkin (Hanoi) area and the Mekong Delta (Saigon); Java, its old internal focus at Jogjakarta, with Batavia acting as external point of attraction. Sumatra is in the strange position of having several inland nuclei plus the tendency to use Singapore as its outport and route to Batavia. Only Siam can claim to have no second focus, yet even there the channelling toward Bangkok is only natural for the Chao Praya Basin; the Korat Plateau topography leads human and commercial interests towards the Mekong and the border country towards the northwest was once focused on

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the historic kingdoms at Chiengmai. Borneo is laid out so far entirely under centrifugal influences, complicated by the split into British and Dutch zonations. 369 184

If this "balkanisation" be true of the individual political units, it is equally strong in the region as a whole, except that the intersection of major seaways and airways tends to make an internal regional focus on Singapore, a tendency diminished by India's economic pull on Burma and South China's pull on the people, trade and foods of Siam and Indochina. 177 631

To some extent these dual foci to each territory have been stimulated by the arrival of Western trading systems which pulled in one direction while the traditional interests pull in another, yet in a sense all these political units have been created by colonial powers administering as a unit territories not previously politically unified or previously using the present boundaries. Spain and the United States enforced unity upon what is now the Philippines and in practice had continued difficulty in keeping Mindanao, for example, within the unit. France has imposed a uniformity and a certain coherence upon Indochina which was novel to the constituent units. Malaya as it exists today is a British political creation. Before the Dutch colonial period of the present century, all the islands of the East Indies had never been controlled as one whole.

Environment and States

The continental political units, Burma, Siam and Indochina in some ways may be likened to little Egypts—nucleations of people within attractive, fertile valleys protected in these cases by the nearly empty space of forests and mountains. The combination of natural encouragement and natural protection conditioned major civilisations in Egypt and in Mesopotamia at one phase in history and appears to be equally encouraging in this tropical setting except for one difference, that although this environment on the southeastern fringe of Asia certainly suited the growth of states, its protective isolation was incomplete. In the north the growing riverine states were exposed to intruders. Thus in these riverside nurseries, states were environmentally encouraged to grow in a setting attractive as breeding grounds for nations, though the environment was not sufficiently isolating nor sufficiently protective to enable the nascent states to persist. So far as the main islands were concerned, on our maps they appear as more emphatic units 369 631 184

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369 than their elongated forms, difficult interiors and cliffed, marsh or
631 forest edges in fact justify. Rarely has any one of the major islands
184 been the locale of a single people singly governed, homogeneous and integrated into an island-state. These large islands have been dispersive and fragmentive to the peoples in them.

Postwar Nationalism

186 The postwar effusion of nationalism in Southeast Asia is thus a paradox. It is a nationalism of plural societies and substantial minorities, without homogeneity inside the states, and without a nation, as understood in Europe, and very much a culmination of the insecurity and uncertainty produced by the divergent influences which have long been at work, breaking down old social integrations and their warm, human associations, substituting for them nothing but commerce and the new myth "economic man," cold, inexorable and not adequately or fully integrated with Southeast Asia people and their setting.

The devolution of Southeast Asia from colonial into nationalist units takes place at no propitious time. The cultivation of rice has been predatory, the accumulated effects of which are now showing in diminishing yields; new paddylands before the war were ceasing to be so easily available and the war threw a large proportion of the old lands out of cultivation. Rubber has found a competitor in synthetic rubber, and its production may repeat the history of sugar. Tin recovers from the war slowly because equipment has been lost. Plantation crops have lost labour, markets and opportunities. Yet Southeast Asia is still increasing its people faster than
161 the world average. Its increase, however, has gone on at a slower rate in the already congested areas and at a faster rate in what had been the emptier areas of South Sumatra (with Javanese migrants), in Mindanao (with Filipinos), in Johore (by Chinese immigrants), as well as in Laos, Dutch Borneo and Inner Siam, by local increases. Thus Southeast Asia has been filling up, though there is little prospect yet of an even distribution.

Devolution

000 The Southeast Asia population is expanding now as the trade systems which provided its first impetus to expansion shrink and lose coherence. The atmosphere is one of relinquishing colonies, but under circumstances when they are involved in an international

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642 [liberal] conventional practice, an ambition to obtain greater influence within the Realm on affairs of the Realm as a whole'.[1] In Burma the constitution formally embodies those rights that the Javanese demand, but, because the form has no substance in political realities, it is a source of discontent rather than of satisfaction, and the people make still further demands.

631 As regards self-government in local affairs, urban administration in Java is in many ways a model of efficiency, contrasting very favourably with municipal administration in Burma. But it is largely run by Europeans for Europeans and, in the provision of amenities such as houses for the people, it aims at European standards. The Regency Councils, corresponding roughly to District Councils in Burma, seem to reflect in great measure the personality of the Regent, but one does not hear the charges of gross inefficiency and corruption, ordinarily levied against western institutions of local self-government in Burma.

Western self-government however hardly touches the mass of the people, either in Burma or Java. These live in villages. In Burma western self-government has been constructed, in accordance with western ideas, on the basis of individual rights. The Dutch system was built up on the basis of the village, and aimed to bring the village into organic relation with higher units of popular self-government. But the preponderance of local officials among those elected suggests general indifference, due perhaps to the device of indirect election. Yet in Burma we find a similar indifference, and the lack of any local ties between members and their constituencies has often been deplored; politicians can easily secure votes by appealing to the natural dislike of foreign rule, but they know and care little for their constituencies, and the villagers know and care little about what happens in the legislature.

In Burma as in Java local interest does not extend beyond local affairs, but there is a striking difference between them in village administration. In Java the Dutch have tried to conserve both the form and content of traditional self-government while adapting it to the requirements of the modern world; in Burma a contrary policy has been pursued. In Java the intricate complexity of the native political organization has been simplified, but the regency and village have been retained. In Burma the organic unit, the circle, has been replaced by the purely official township, and the country has been broken up into villages, while there is no organ of oriental

[1] Hart, p. 29.

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democracy corresponding to the *vergadering* of Java. In Burma the village has become merely an administrative unit, whereas in Java the village still appears to be mainly a social unit. And it would hardly be possible to find a more striking contrast than between the Village Act of Java, designed as an instrument of social uplift, and the Village Act of Burma, designed as an instrument of law and order and 'vigorously enforced' by fines on villages, villagers and headmen. Government schemes in Java, we are told, 'risk failure if they appeal to the individual economic instincts and have a fair chance of being comprehended and accepted, if they are based on a foundation of organic co-operation'.[1]

Indebtedness. Both in Burma and Java agricultural indebtedness has accompanied, and has indeed been a condition of, economic progress. It was through giving out advances that the planter in Java secured his land and labour, and that the miller in Burma made certain of getting an adequate supply of paddy at the lowest possible rate. The Dutch, with their State pawnshops and People's Banks, have done more than has been attempted in Burma to provide credit on sound lines, but they have by no means solved the problem of indebtedness; alongside the state institutions the private moneylender still flourishes. But the application of native customary law to land, and the prohibition against the alienation of land to foreigners have obviated the most pernicious social and political consequences of agricultural indebtedness, and it is not in the same measure as in Burma a cause of agricultural distress and political ill-will.

Litigation and Crime. Until quite recently litigation was as unusual in Burma as it still is in Java. But in Burma the people have been encouraged to settle their disputes by the processes of western law; whereas in Java, customary law and the practice of arbitration and the settlement of disputes by reasonable compromise have survived.

An even greater contrast is presented in respect of crime. In Java the death sentence is almost unknown; for the five years from 1935 to 1939, with a population for the whole of Netherlands India of nearly 70 million, only three persons were sentenced to death; in Burma, with a fifth of the population, the death sentence is passed on some two hundred a year and upwards of a hundred a year are hanged. It is difficult to compare sentences of imprisonment, but the position in Java is very different from that in Burma where, for some thirty years, the accommodation for convicts has failed to keep pace with

[1] Hart, p. 65.

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theme of complaint. But in India and other tropical dependencies, they form the framework of a huge western superstructure over native life, wholly foreign to the people. Not only is there less self-government, but less government than before, because the machinery is too vast and complex to be informed by human will. 647

The multiplication of native officials is, therefore, no measure of the progress of self-government, but rather the reverse. In Europe the public services provide what the people want, and a comparatively small staff suffices to give them what they want; but in the tropics the much larger staff necessary to obtain the compliance of the people with innovations that they do not want constitutes a hindrance to self-government.

The inverse relation between self-government and the multiplication of native officials is illustrated by the system of indirect rule. Under this system there is a much greater measure of self-government than under direct rule, and one of its advantages is that it does not require so large a staff. During the nineteenth century in Java, when the Regents and villages managed their own affairs, few officials were employed. But, with economic progress, and the influx of foreign elements, there is a demand for the introduction of western law and western amenities, and accordingly far more judges and magistrates and the multiplication of special services. Thus, as native officials become more numerous, native self-government decays. On the other hand, as happened in Siam, an independent country can employ a large number of European officials without ceasing to be self-governing. So long as the Government remains an instrument of foreign rule, the increasing association of natives in every branch of tropical administration is no index to the progress of self-government.

II. Machinery: Local Government

Together with the increasing association of natives in the administration, Liberals placed their faith in the 'gradual development of self-governing institutions'. Local self-government is, of course, no new thing in the tropics. From very early times tropical rulers have allowed foreign traders in the ports to settle their own affairs in their own way according to their own laws. It was in accordance with this principle of 'like over like' that Europeans in India and other parts of the tropics were allowed, and required, to maintain order among their own community. But modern self-government on a western pattern is the child of sanitation. It was owing to trouble over town conservancy 631

7: Furnivall G-4,5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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that, in 1687, the East India Company obtained from James II a charter constituting a new civil government for Madras on an English model with a mayor, aldermen and burgesses empowered to levy taxes for such matters as seemed 'convenient for the honour, interest, ornaments, security and defence' of the corporation and inhabitants; their powers included the constitution of a court for the trial of both civil and criminal issues.[1] Similar corporations were subsequently established in the other Presidency towns, but the extension of municipal administration to the interior is comparatively recent.

Local self-government in the interior had its origin, as in the city of Madras, in the urgent need to find some more efficient way of dealing with the problem of sanitation. But the situation was very different. In Madras an effective majority of the chief inhabitants wanted better conservancy, and of their own motion they obtained a charter so that they might better be able to do what they wanted to have done. In the interior it was the local officials and not the people who wanted better sanitation. So long as nothing could be done without the sanction of the central Government in India or Europe, local officials could not help themselves; some measure of deconcentration of authority was needed to invest them with the requisite powers and to enable them to raise the necessary funds.[2] Municipal administration provided the machinery. In Madras, as in Europe, western self-governing institutions enabled the townsfolk, or the dominant class among them, to do what they wanted; in the interior Government could provide the machinery of local self-government, but the people did not want to use it.

The outcome of the first essay in municipal legislation was ominous. In 1842 an Act for Bengal enabled 'the inhabitants of any place of public resort or residence to make better provision for purposes connected with health or convenience'. But so far were the people from wanting better provision that in the first town to which it was applied they prosecuted the collector for trespass. This killed the Act, and little more was attempted until the Report of the Royal Army Sanitary Commission in 1863 attributed the bad health of the troops largely to the insanitary condition of the towns. This report may be taken to mark the beginning of both modern sanitation and modern local self-government in India. During the next five years the various Provinces were equipped with municipal legislation. But even so far as the people wanted better sanitation, they did not want, and could not

[1] *IG*, IV, 284. [2] *ISC*, I, 301.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

use, western municipal machinery. We have noticed that in Burma the townsfolk were beginning to adapt their social life to the new environment, and could make their own arrangements for conservancy without western machinery or help from Government. In Madras, also, there were voluntary associations in some towns for sanitation and other social ends. Modern sanitation was *needed*, and in some degree was *wanted*; a social demand for sanitation was emerging. This might have served as the basis for a gradual organic development, but it seemed easier and quicker to turn out western municipal machinery by mass production. Yet the western machinery did not meet the emerging social demand, and, because it answered no demand, it was inefficient in providing for the need. The Acts of 1864 to 1868 did something to improve urban sanitation, but they marked little progress towards self-government. In 1870 the Provinces were for the first time given some control over their own revenues and were allowed to raise taxes if the fixed grant from central revenues did not suffice. The Resolution of 1870, introducing this new system, emphasized the importance of engaging local interest in the management of funds allotted to education, sanitation, medical charity and local works, and between 1871 and 1874 a new set of Municipal Acts provided for popular representation on local bodies. Only in the Central Provinces, one of the most backward territories, was popular representation regarded as successful; possibly because the people were too backward to question the wisdom and authority of the executive officers who presided over the committees.

So far, despite Liberal aspirations, efficiency had been the main theme and object of local self-government, and local organs had been provided in the towns, where better sanitation was urgently needed in the new environment consequent on economic progress. But in 1881 the Liberal Viceroy, Lord Ripon, struck a new note by emphasizing the value of local self-government as a means of political and popular education. Accordingly, in 1883–4, for the third time within twenty years, all the provinces were fitted out with new Municipal Acts.[1] These purported to introduce a more democratic principle. Former legislation had enabled the Government to get the people to do what it thought necessary; now the people were given powers to do, of their own accord, what Government thought necessary.

That was not the only reason for the inefficiency of local self-government. There was very little that, taken as a whole, the people did

[1] *IG*, IV, 164, 286, 287.

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631 want. Even in India, with a comparatively homogeneous population, 'the violent sectional antagonism between Hindus and Mohammedans, or Brahmins and non-Brahmins has certainly impaired the efficiency of local bodies'. In other tropical dependencies, with a more strongly plural character, self-government on western lines is impossible because, as we have noticed in Burma with its mixed population of Burmans, Indians and Chinese, and in the larger towns Europeans, the people lack 'the sense of common citizenship which the necessary basis for healthy civic life'. It is not only in Burma that the various communities have little common interest except in resisting proposals for enhanced taxation, or that the membership of local bodies largely consists of men who seek official favour or hope to line their pockets. In India the Statutory Commission noticed 'a number of cases of corruption and certain instances where very large sums had been expended in order to obtain seats on local government authorities, suggesting that those who expended such large amounts expected to be able to recoup themselves from illicit gains'.[1]

Most of the functions imposed on local bodies were things that needed doing, and the local bodies helped to get them done. If the inhabitants will not or cannot make the necessary adjustments for themselves, others must perform the task. Ordinarily it has devolved on the local official in charge of general administration. The forms of local self-government help him to discharge his functions more effectively by providing him with funds and by bringing him closer to the people. But form does not give rise to function. He was merely 'carrying out the will of his official superiors. He was just as much the eyes, ears and arms of the provincial Government as when functioning as revenue officer or district magistrate. Local self-government was just one of his many activities.' In India, forty years after the introduction of the forms of self-government through the Liberal enthusiasm of Lord Ripon, it was reported that 'the custom of the country, force of habit, apathy, and lack of desire to assume responsibility among those elected—together with the natural reluctance of an overworked official, desirous of efficiency, to consume much time in getting things done badly which he felt he could himself do well—combined to prevent real and substantial progress being made in political and popular education in the art of self-government'.[2] The view current among officials was that 'certainly Indians of the political class have not shone greatly in the

[1] *ISC*, I, 314.

[2] *ISC*, I, 301.

7: Furnivall G-4,5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

sphere of local self-government during the last thirty years, although of course they blame everything but themselves'. With wider powers 'many will weary and again blame anything rather than their own lack of perseverance'.[1] These remarks suggest that Indians were not alone in looking beyond themselves to find a scapegoat for the failure of self-government, and they are illuminating as to its effect on causing friction between officials and the people. But such recriminations serve merely to divert attention from the real cause of its failure.

Under indirect rule local self-government follows a like course. With the growth of a western element in social life, it becomes necessary to replace native self-government by western self-governing machinery. In Netherlands India urban self-government on western lines was first introduced under the Decentralization Law of 1903. This was intended to promote efficiency by deconcentrating administrative activity, and also to provide an element of popular co-operation in the task of government. In the large towns self-government proved efficient, partly because it was based on the Dutch rather than the English model with an official *burgomaster* instead of a non-official as Chairman, but chiefly because the large towns contain a stronger European community than in British India, and in effect self-government was government by the European section. Elsewhere, however, it had a different result, and promoted executive efficiency rather than self-government.

Economic progress requires a readjustment of social life to new conditions; most rapidly and urgently in the towns, less obviously but no less inevitably in the villages. Under Lord Ripon the forms of western self-governing machinery were applied to rural areas. Here they were even more unreal than in the towns. For some towns did at least possess economic unity, whereas the districts and their subdivisions were merely artificial units devised for administrative convenience and with no organic cohesion. The natural effect was to expedite the decay of organic self-government in the villages. Under indirect rule, also, the readjustment of social conditions in rural areas comes, if less rapidly than under direct rule, to demand attention. In Netherlands India the Village Act of 1906 was intended to provide western machinery for consolidating village life, and for lifting the community to a higher level. But 'autonomy and progress do not go together', and after twenty years 'precious little autonomy remained', and the western machinery, having no organic relation to

[1] Curtis, p. 33.

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native life, ceased to function as soon as the hand of Government was withdrawn. Similarly, in British territories under indirect rule,

'the varied responsibilities now placed on native authorities demand the exercise of close and continuous supervision by the administration.... Many observers have questioned whether the traditional native authorities, or at all events a large number of the weaker units, will not be strained beyond their powers by the tasks now laid on them. Everywhere the supervision now exercised over them must bring home to the people that the sanction for their authority is no longer the good will of their own people, but the recognition accorded to them by the administration.'[1]

And under indirect rule, as under direct rule, native social units are continually readjusted and are often amalgamated for the sake of convenience or economy into large artificial administrative units with no traditional sanction, in which administrative methods can be applied according to a standard plan. Under Dutch rule as under British rule, and under direct rule as under indirect rule, local self-government fights a losing battle against efficiency.

12. Machinery: Central Government

In the machinery of the central government in tropical dependencies, one can trace a similar conflict between the contrary ideals of efficiency and autonomy. From very early days both the British and Dutch East India Companies furnished their representatives in the East with the assistance of a council. In British India, under the rule of law during the nineteenth century, this council took on a new character. From 1833 the Council of the Governor-General was gradually enlarged for the purpose of legislation, and in 1861 the Indian Councils Act provided for the addition to the Central Legislative Councils of non-officials, including Indians, and also for the constitution of Provincial Councils on similar lines. But these councils were merely 'committees by means of which the executive Government obtained advice and assistance in their legislation, and the public derived the advantage of publicity at every stage of the law-making process'.[2] Gradually the councils came to exercise an increasing influence over the conduct of affairs, and there was a growing deference to the opinions of important classes. This became more marked when the Indian Councils Act of 1892 enlarged the Provincial Councils and gave partial recognition to

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 538–9; Field, M. J., *Man*, 1943, p. 90.
[2] *ISC*, I, 114–16.

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On the other hand[1] changes in transportation have elevated Bangkok to a new importance. It lies astride the main air route between Europe and the Far East, and the Australia-Europe services also pass through it. It is now the leading international air center in Southeast Asia, with 42 international departures a week in 1953 as compared with Singapore's 27, and its airport is one of the larger commercial fields in the Orient. 361 508 369

The role of the Southeast Asian great city has been modified by the Pacific war and the granting of independence to Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and partial independence to Vietnam. Five of the six great cities are now capitals of the independent states. Each of these merits the title "link capital"; that is, they are the media through which the newly independent states are linked with the outside world. At the same time, they have begun to assume an increasingly indigenous character. The substitution of Malay for Dutch names and street signs in Indonesia is only one evidence of cultural change. The in-migration of petty officials, tradesmen, and refugees from the beleaguered rural areas has given the urban populations a new and more homogeneous native cast. The fevers of nationalism have made the large minorities more cautious about flaunting their ethnic independence. 361 178 184 162 563 177 631 369

[1] [i.e. as compared to the inconvenient port facilities -- Analyst]

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361 On the other hand, the war also brought in-
178 creased American influence into the region,
631 and the ubiquitous Coca-Cola sign is one of
184 the symbols of change that sooner or later
162 will be followed by changes in urban facili-
563 ties and urban organization.
171 More important, the present period is as-
369 sociated with an increasing intensification of the economic activities of government and a corresponding diminution of foreign enterprise. Political and administrative functions have become increasingly important since the war. Since the main governmental organs are concentrated in the largest centers, the direct influence of the great city upon the country in which it is primate is likewise increasing. Relations between nationalized city and an increasingly money-oriented countryside are becoming more intimate, and the formerly clear-cut cultural distinctiveness of city and country is rapidly becoming blurred. Therefore, the likelihood of the great city's leading a revival of ancient value systems, as some extreme ethnocentrists hope it will, is small. Only one prediction can be made: the days of the culturally alien and ethnically distinct urban center are numbered in Southeast Asia; and a city like Singapore becomes increasingly an anomalous relict of an age now past.

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Another safeguard against corruption is the Regent. In Burma no one stays long enough in one place to ascertain in what quarters and to what extent corruption may prevail; still less is it possible to work up and carry through proceedings against those who are corrupt. In Java the Regent is permanent. His position and his high pay protect him against the temptation to accept petty bribes, and concern for his own authority and prestige makes him jealous of the influence of corrupt subordinates. These cannot practise corruption long or effectively without attracting the attention of the Regent, who can see that the offender is brought to account. If, then, the administration is so free from corruption as one is told, the credit is probably due in great part to the Regent.

Authority and Law. It must be admitted then that, in all those matters which stand out conspicuously as abuses under British rule in Burma, Dutch rule in Java presents a favourable contrast. Yet there is another side to the picture. The Government has employed 'gentle pressure' to protect the village community against dissolution, and to promote welfare; yet 'gentle pressure' may be debilitating rather than a stimulant, making the patient less able and not more able to stand alone. And it is difficult to reconcile gentle pressure, however well-intentioned, with the principles of liberty and law. In an address to a Dutch audience interested in colonial problems, the present writer endeavoured to illustrate this point.[1]

'One of your subordinate native officers described his work. "I improved sanitation. I got the people to found schools, and build bazaars, and provide a polyclinic. And I would not allow bamboo bazaars; if they could not afford wooden walls, I took care that the posts were of substantial timber and that the roof was sound. I even planted flower gardens, a thing that practically no one else has done; and it was all my own idea, without pressure from above." I have heard your European officers described as social engineers and your native civil servants as welfare officers, and the terms are justified. As I went round your villages and saw the infinite pains you take to conserve village society and build up social welfare, I found myself humming a tune. It was a hymn tune. Gradually the words came back to me: "Can a mother's tender care, Cease towards the child she bare? Yes, she may forgetful be, Yet will I remember thee." I thought of the hours and days we spend on the Bench, listening to advocates (trying to mislead us), laboriously taking down evidence (much of it false evidence), and sending poor unfortunates to jail, and I was filled with envy and admiration of your officers who have the privilege of giving

[1] Furnivall, *Asiatic Review*, 1935, pp. 655 ff.

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Chinese

641 The essential nature of the overseas Chinese is, however, one thing: the traits of their character brought out by subjection to differing pressures and influences are another. In particular, the larger part of the area has for a long period been under the domination of European colonial Powers which, in spite of recent developments, to a considerable degree still maintain their hold. In the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, British Borneo, and Indochina the Chinese have been subordinated to the colonial policies of Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain, France, and the United States. In Siam, the solitary country to retain independence throughout (though she, too, was moulded by pressures from the West), the Chinese immigrants contributed to the well-being of the Siamese by their services and the admixture of their blood, but it was always the native aristocracy that held the power and, since 1932, the middle-class native revolutionaries. In post-liberation Burma the Chinese are a small minority who must leave the issues to be decided amongst the Burmese parties and communities; in Indonesia they are often uncomfortably at the point of impact of the opposing forces; in Indochina their plight is much the same. In Malaya the upshot of constitutional experiment and the campaign of Communist terrorists of their own race has placed them in a dilemma.

641 Throughout most of the period of our survey it has been a tenet of the Chinese that they should leave political policy and administration to the local Government, and this remains so in principle in spite of the increasing influence of nationalism and, latterly, of Communism in their midst. The outworn, but still, until recently, serviceable dictum that 'the Chinese don't mind who holds the cow so long as they milk it' has been true of all purely mercantile communities since the dawn of history, and virtually the same remark is indeed made by Communists of capitalism—that it does not mind who governs so long as it draws the profits. But with the growth of the Chinese communities in the Nanyang and the development within them of political awareness the saying has been becoming less and less true.

641 From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century the Chinese in Southeast Asia found themselves, first in the Philippines, next in Indonesia, then in Malaya, and finally in Indochina, called upon to adapt themselves to a superstructure of government devised by completely strange and alien nations. These nations

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Chinese

were almost entirely uninterested in them except as traders, labourers, or agents for dealing with the native peoples. In the last capacity the Chinese were very useful, for they had a knowledge of native ways which the Europeans lacked and in any case had no leisure to gain, being occupied so much of their time in warfare among themselves. The Chinese, in their turn, were interested in these white barbarians only to the extent that it was expedient to know their peculiarities. They showed themselves, however, much more adaptable to learning about the white race than the Europeans did to learning about them, for, generally speaking, the Spanish, the Dutch, the British, and the French were almost completely ignorant of the Chinese language and *mores*, and the Chinese were happy that it should be so. Another reason for the failure of Europeans to acquire any real knowledge of the people among whom they lived was that for the European life in the tropics—at any rate from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth century—was short, and he either returned home with a competence within a few years or else perished. Thus it was found convenient by the Company and early colonial Governments to leave the conduct of their community affairs to the Chinese headmen, except in the more serious cases, and this gave the Chinese much liberty of action. Unfortunately the fears of the tiny minority such as were the Europeans, especially in face of the increasing numbers of the Chinese, put them in a very anxious and suspicious frame of mind. The Chinese ethos, usually so serene, was subject to occasional social squalls or typhoons when the community was seized with mass hysteria. This was really only a means of dispersal of an accumulation of real or imaginary grievances and the trouble subsided, if handled with reason and tolerant firmness, almost as quickly as it had arisen. But in the minds of the Europeans with their tiny garrisons the outbreaks were often interpreted as signs of rebellion. Indeed in some cases they were rightly so interpreted, and there can be no doubt that when fear and distrust had dried up relationship into a tinder a spark would fire it into a rebellion, as was the case in Manila on St Francis's Eve 1603, when things had gone so far that it was either the Chinese or the Spanish who had to be destroyed. It is equally certain that a greater degree of understanding on either side would have averted this and later disasters.

Whilst thus simplifying the situation, it must be conceded that

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Chinese

PART I

THE AREA AS A WHOLE

CHAPTER I

THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

162 At the present time the number of persons regarding themselves as of Chinese race in Southeast Asia—Burma, Siam, Indochina, Malaya, British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines—probably exceeds 8½ million in a total population of about 157 million. This means that the Chinese account for only 5 or 6 per cent. of the total, but, as will appear from the following pages, their importance, economically and politically, is out of all proportion to their numbers and is likely to be increasingly great.

The table on p. 2 represents the distribution of the Chinese in this area with what is thought to be a fair degree of probability.[1]

Having committed ourselves to this table, we should now try to justify it. There has been a great deal of loose statement regarding the number of Chinese in Southeast Asia, especially in Siam and the Philippines, which has been due to political motivation as well as to misapprehension. The validity of our arguments in attempting to arrive at something near the real figure will depend rather on a general knowledge of what has been happening in the area in the last few years and a feeling for the probabilities than on an application of demographic equations to statistics of varying value.

The first difficulty arises from the definition of 'Chinese'; the second from the up-to-dateness or otherwise of the censuses or enumerations.

The census officials in Burma, Malaya, British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines have always apparently regarded 'Chinese' in an ethnographical sense, or rather, any person regarding him or herself as a Chinese, or who is so regarded by the head of the household or the enumerator completing the return, is so accounted for
•641 in the census. In Siam and Indochina, however, persons born in
162 the country have been regarded as citizens of the country unless

[1] But see discussion in Postscript.

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Chinese

641 The essential nature of the overseas Chinese is, however, one thing: the traits of their character brought out by subjection to differing pressures and influences are another. In particular, the larger part of the area has for a long period been under the domination of European colonial Powers which, in spite of recent developments, to a considerable degree still maintain their hold. In the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, British Borneo, and Indochina the Chinese have been subordinated to the colonial policies of Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain, France, and the United States. In Siam, the solitary country to retain independence throughout (though she, too, was moulded by pressures from the West), the Chinese immigrants contributed to the well-being of the Siamese by their services and the admixture of their blood, but it was always the native aristocracy that held the power and, since 1932, the middle-class native revolutionaries. In post-liberation Burma the Chinese are a small minority who must leave the issues to be decided amongst the Burmese parties and communities; in Indonesia they are often uncomfortably at the point of impact of the opposing forces; in Indochina their plight is much the same. In Malaya the upshot of constitutional experiment and the campaign of Communist terrorists of their own race has placed them in a dilemma.

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Chinese

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Whilst thus simplifying the situation, it must be conceded that

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In the course of this survey have been quoted numerous opinions on the merits or demerits of the Chinese as colonists in Southeast Asia. Many of these views have been highly critical and unfavourable. Yet they are more than offset in the minds of those of us who feel this bias by the recollection of tributes paid to the community by persons well qualified to make them—as, for example, the European ex-internee whom the writer met in Syme Road internment camp, Singapore, at the time of the Japanese surrender and who exclaimed to him, 'After this I shall *swear* by the Chinese.' (He referred to the many acts of kindness rendered by the Chinese to internees, to persons escaping from the Japanese, and others at the risk of their lives.) Again the writer, at the very moment that this paragraph was written, received a letter from an administrator of long standing in North Borneo in which he declared that 'the Chinese of North Borneo are, generally speaking, the salt of the earth'. Apart from enthusiastic tributes of this kind there are many just appreciations of the value of this people in the writings and reports of past administrators. Francis Light, the founder of Penang, said, 'The Chinese constitute the most valuable part of our inhabitants'; John Crawfurd regarded them as 'an intelligent, active, and commercial people'; Raja James Brooke of Sarawak said, 'Without the Chinese we can do nothing'; the Superintendent of the 1931 Census of North Borneo exclaims jubilantly in his report, 'the one bright spot . . . is the increase that is still shown in the numbers of the Chinese who can fairly be regarded as the mainstay of the commercial and industrial population'. And these examples could be greatly multiplied.

But the fact remains that a great deal of criticism has been levelled against the Chinese by persons, mostly Europeans, which can be boiled down to a few specific charges. The Chinese, it is alleged, are 'greedy', 'materialistic', 'parasitic', 'unconscionably usurious and profiteering', 'have a stranglehold on retail trade', 'have built up a wall against the admission of natives to their trade monopolies', 'form combinations obstructive to government', and 'create enclaves of Chinese nationalism within the countries they inhabit'.

Let us consider whether these charges have any weight.

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The Chinese in the Nanyang have never been in political control; they have therefore never had any political responsibility. The laws have been made by others. They have merely performed the functions the Governments have allowed them to perform.

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children's future with Malaya alone, were attracted to, or forced into, the Nationalist camp.

Malaya has for long been the 'test case' of Chinese affairs and a focus of interest in Southeast Asia. The situation as it was tending was very clearly described by a distinguished traveller many years ago; Professor Arnold Toynbee records the impression of his visit to the Straits Settlements in these words:

> And China is not only enormous already; it is rapidly getting more enormous (if logically that adjective can be put in the comparative degree). When I touched at the Straits Settlements on my way out east I realized that British Malaya is destined, by 'peaceful penetration', to become a Chinese province, and I fancy, from what I have heard, that the same destiny may be in store for Burma, Siam, French Indo-China, Dutch Indonesia, and the Philippines. In the end the current of Chinese expansion in the Tropics will meet the current of Hindu expansion over the submerged heads of the smaller and weaker and less efficient peoples in between, who are already fast going under. And, after what has happened, I surmise that the new frontier between China and India will tend, slowly but surely, to travel westward at India's expense and in China's favour.

What happened in Malaya, we cannot too frequently remind ourselves, was not the result of military conquest, not the territorial spoils of a Kublai Khan, but because the British had welcomed the immigration of a couple of million Chinese. For long after the intervention in the Malay States it had been found difficult to attract the British capital needed for the opening up of the country: it was not until a plentiful supply first of Indian and then of Chinese labour was assured that such capital was forthcoming, and it was not until the end of the 1920s that there was any control at all of Chinese immigration.

The British Colonial Office and the Malayan Governments must have seen that the admission of Chinese in such numbers that they would eventually be the majority community was bound to create a problem of tremendous magnitude. Even the degree of assimilation taking place in Siam and Indochina was out of the question because of the barrier of the Mohammedan religion. The only hope now for the future of Malaya in the interest of its diverse peoples was to promote a feeling of common Malayan citizenship to counter the claim, tacit or express, of Chinese Nationalism to consider Malaya as a new province of China. In the pre-war years

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this was a policy which the British neglected to pursue with any conviction, and the post-war experiment in this direction, the Malayan Union, was abandoned at the first sign of opposition. Unless a true 'Malayan citizenship' can be made effective, the ideal of a Malayan nation forming, as it were, a buffer State between China, Indonesia, and India, with bonds with all three but belonging to none, will remain a phantom.

In the present crisis the great and deplorable weakness of the Chinese in Southeast Asia is the absence of effective leadership (and the few notable exceptions to this generalization do not affect its truth). This is due in large part to the fact that there has grown up no Chinese middle class of sufficient proportions to provide disinterested, well-educated, and competent individuals in the numbers needed to guide their community through the reefs of politics towards a safe anchorage. The business leaders are so busy making money (or endeavouring not to lose it) that few of them have time to devote to public affairs even if they had the will and the knowledge. In Malaya, at least, the Indian stands in sharp contrast to the Chinese, and in Singapore Indian representation on the various bodies is vastly greater in proportion to their numbers than is the case with the much more numerous Chinese. This is not explicable solely by Chinese political pique but must be due largely to the training in politics and administration the Indians received in their own country during the British Raj. In Malaya, Indonesia, and Indochina the British, Dutch, and French have neglected to afford opportunities for the Chinese residents to acquire a knowledge of affairs. The penalty of this neglect is that now, when European control is loosening, the mass of the Chinese have few leaders to take control and to consolidate their community in face of the Communist advance. The lack of experience and education determines also the quality of the Communist leadership in these regions. Among the Malayan Communists are no Mao Tse-tungs or Chou En-lais and scarcely any individuals with more than the rudimentary mis-education obtainable in Chinese vernacular schools. The result is that the old professional bandit (always a feature of Malaya's jungle-fringe) is more prominent than he would otherwise be, and terrorism is unmitigated by constructive politics. Is it, therefore, strange that in 1949 the majority of Nanyang Chinese were 'sitting on the fence' awaiting the final upshot in China and its repercussions overseas? In such

7: Furnivall
642, 647, 648, 471

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[For a theoretical discussion of the necessity for granting political autonomy to the colonial dependencies of western states and the required changes in administrative practices and economic policy, see cat. 116, pp. 468-512; for discussion of the relationship between the colonies and the colonial powers in the modern world, and the author's proposal for international collaboration in preparing the colonies for eventual independence, see pp. 513-550.]

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PREFACE

121 642 THIS book originated in a request from the Government of Burma at the end of 1942 for my views on reconstruction, with particular reference to features of colonial rule in Netherlands India that might suitably be adopted in Burma. One cannot transplant administrative machinery without reference to the environment; in a new environment it may work better or worse, but it certainly will not work in the same way. It was necessary therefore to emphasize the fact that British and Dutch colonial policy are founded on different traditions. Two basic principles of British colonial policy are the rule of law and economic freedom, whereas Dutch colonial policy has aimed at imposing restraints on economic forces by strengthening personal authority and by conserving the influence of custom.

121 642 182 In modern Burma under British rule there were five notorious evils: the failure of western self-governing institutions; the growth of debt and agrarian distress; the multiplication of litigation and crime; the rise of disaffection and unrest among the Buddhist clergy; and widespread corruption in the judicial and administrative services. I suggested that these can all be traced to a common cause: the disintegration of social life through the inadequacy of law to control the working of anti-social economic forces. Although in other respects Dutch rule is open to criticism which does not apply to Burma, yet in all these matters Netherlands India presents a notable contrast. We would not, even if we could, abandon what is valuable in the traditions of British rule, and in any case we cannot break suddenly with old traditions, or escape the consequences of the past. But the contrast indicates that we ought to incorporate in our policy the principle of controlling economic forces in the interest of social welfare. I tried accordingly to show how, by adapting certain devices of Dutch administrative machinery, this principle might be applied to cure the ills of modern Burma, and to lay the basis of a new and constructive policy.

121 While formulating these proposals it occurred to me that the comparison between Burma and Netherlands India might be of somewhat more general interest. In presenting it to a wider public there was,

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generous comments and criticisms, and also for allowing me to use his unpublished extracts from the records of early British rule in Arakan. 114

The book was written during the late war, and completed early in 1945. The delay in publication has been due partly to the difficulties of the present time, partly to imperfections in the original script; and in this connection I must gratefully acknowledge the help and patience of the University Press. During the interval there have been great changes but, as the Japanese invasion of the Tropical Far East must certainly mark a turning-point in colonial rule, and subsequent events are still too close to be reviewed in due perspective, it seemed expedient merely to revise the tense in references to the war. 000

One change however calls for comment. Britain has granted Burma independence. On both parts this may seem bold even to the point of rashness. Some contend that we have been too ready to throw off the responsibilities of Government and Burmans over-ready to assume them. It is a tumbled house that they inherit, and there is urgent need to repair the damage, moral and material, inflicted on Burma in a war during which it was twice invaded. Exports have fallen by two-thirds of the pre-war figure of £37 million. The annual revenue covers only one-third of the current expenditure, and the national debt of over £110 million, about seven times the revenue, is rapidly increasing. Despite the general inexperience of Burmans in modern industry and commerce, their new leaders must enable Burma, so far as national interest allows, to make a due contribution to world welfare by the development of its resources. Moreover, in a country where the tradition of military service has long been suffered to decay, they must train the people to defend their freedom. Now also it will fall on them to deal with problems long-standing and hitherto insoluble: to adapt western institutions to an eastern people, provide remedies for agricultural debt and land alienation, reduce litigation and crime to healthy proportions, restore order among the Buddhist clergy, and purify the administration of corruption. In a troubled world, though less acquainted with affairs than their old rulers, they face a situation far more difficult. In these circumstances it is impossible to contemplate the future without misgivings, and we may well regret that in the past more was not done to equip the people and their leaders for the responsibilities of independence. 727 642

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Some advocate Dominion status as an alternative.[1] But, for countries such as Burma, Dominion status is an unmeaning formula. The British Dominions are countries potentially able to stand alone but preferring to be associated on equal terms with the other major partners in the Commonwealth. Burma is not in that position. The racial divisions and sharp conflict of interest and sentiment, which weakened the former Government, would still continue and are incompatible with Dominion status. On the other hand, if the Burman leaders had accepted it, they would have split their party, strengthened their rivals, especially the so-called Communists, and conferred on the prevalent dacoity the halo of patriotism and the semblance of civil war. It is lamentable that we failed to capture the imagination of the people so as to inspire an instinctive loyalty to the British connection, but we cannot escape the consequences of the past. In purporting to grant Dominion status, we would have been promising something that we could not give in return for support that the leaders of the people were unable to command. Once again we would have been committed to the ungrateful task of pacification; more difficult now, and far more costly, than after the wars of 1852 and 1885 when we could employ Indian troops.

I hold then that on both parts the decision in favour of independence was as wise as it was bold, not only in their interest but in ours. Nothing less than independence could transform nationalism from a destructive fever into a creative force. Yet national independence is not a cause or guarantee of welfare. Burmans still need help, and by our long connection we can do most to give the help they need. But we can help them only on terms acceptable to both parties. If we can help Burmans to stand alone securely, we may perhaps look forward to a time when they will welcome a more intimate association. However that may be, we can at least feel that we have done our best to meet whatever difficulties lie ahead by responding boldly to the challenge of a new age.

J. S. FURNIVALL

24 October 1947

1 [i.e. to unqualified independence — Analyst.]

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Exchange and Market; a capitalist structure, with the business concern as subject, far more typical of Capitalism than one can imagine in the so-called "capitalist lands" which have grown slowly out of the past and are still bound to it by a hundred roots'. He was writing with special reference to the European element, but his remarks apply with equal force to the Chinese element, and to the growing number of natives 'who have adopted a western mentality as their own, and who possess and use those qualities which modern capitalism requires of its representatives'.[1] Dr Boeke and other Dutch economists tend to contrast this rationalist material attitude of western enterprise with the disregard of economic values that they regard as characteristic of the native element. That will need further consideration; here it will suffice to note that during the present century, up to the depression of the thirties, the foreign elements were growing more numerous and more powerful, and that political reforms did nothing to check this process. On these points Netherlands India resembles Burma; what is distinctive of the social order in Netherlands India is that, for good or ill, the native community has largely been cut off from and protected against the working of economic forces, which in other tropical regions, as in Burma, have been allowed free play.

13. Netherlands India and Burma

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In the foregoing pages I we have tried to bring out some of the more important points of similarity and contrast between Java and Burma. In both there has been rapid progress; both countries have been thrown freely open to the modern world under the policy of the 'open door', and both now make a valuable contribution to the material resources of the world. In both alike the process of development under foreign rule has resulted in a racially mixed community in which economic forces are abnormally active, and in both a nationalist movement voices a reaction against foreign rule.

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We have seen, however, that in the principles and machinery of administration a superficial resemblance conceals a profound difference. British rule in Burma rests on the principles of economic freedom and equality before the law, and there is a single uniform system of direct rule in which the administrative officers are essentially servants of the law. Dutch rule in Java rests on the principle of 'like over like', and there is a dual administration

[1] Boeke, cited *Netherlands India*, pp. 452, 457.

I [See category 116, pp. 23–264 for description of colonial policy and administration in Java and Burma — Analyst]

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642 in which European and native officials have different functions but are both alike agents of a policy directed towards 'the spontaneous and autonomous promotion of the interests of land and people'.[1] In pursuance of this policy the Dutch have aimed at the conservation of the village and of village customary law, and at the retention of native land in native hands; in Burma, on the contrary, under the rule of law, the policy of Government has been to allow the people to pursue their individual interests within the limits of the law. We have seen that the system adopted in Burma has allowed the emergence of certain notorious abuses; self-government is generally regarded as a failure; agricultural debt has assumed vast proportions and is only one symptom of agrarian distress; there has been a formidable growth in litigation and, what is worse, in serious crime, and this has been accompanied by increasing clerical unrest, while the whole administration is riddled with corruption. It may be useful to examine rather more closely how these matters stand in Java.

Self-government. For many reasons it is difficult to make any fair comparison between Java and Burma in respect of self-government on western lines. In Java the problem of westernized self-government is simplified to some extent by the presence of a much larger and more stable European element, especially in the towns and even in small towns in the interior; in Burma, outside the main ports, and, one may say, outside Rangoon, the European element in the population, if any, is negligible. One would naturally expect self-government on western lines to run more smoothly where Europeans take part in running it. Europeans form a stabilizing element both in the Volksraad and provincial councils, and, moreover, these have not been granted such extensive powers as the corresponding organs in Burma. It is significant that, as soon as the Volksraad was entrusted with a share in the Government under the constitution of 1925, the association parties broke up into their racial elements. 'This is the last Association-Volksraad', said the Chairman in his final speech to the first Volksraad under the new constitution. 'Henceforth each group will pursue its own interests, keenly and without reserve.'[2] The Dutch recognize that 'at least in that still comparatively thin upper stratum of the Indonesian community which is conscious of political and other problems' there is 'a desire for further extension of political rights and suffrage, for formal embodiment in the constitution of

[1] Van Vollenhoven, cited *Netherlands India*, p. 91.
[2] Visman, I, 88.

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642 [liberal] conventional practice, an ambition to obtain greater influence within the Realm on affairs of the Realm as a whole'.[1] In Burma the constitution formally embodies those rights that the Javanese demand, but, because the form has no substance in political realities, it is a source of discontent rather than of satisfaction, and the people make still further demands.

631 As regards self-government in local affairs, urban administration in Java is in many ways a model of efficiency, contrasting very favourably with municipal administration in Burma. But it is largely run by Europeans for Europeans and, in the provision of amenities such as houses for the people, it aims at European standards. The Regency Councils, corresponding roughly to District Councils in Burma, seem to reflect in great measure the personality of the Regent, but one does not hear the charges of gross inefficiency and corruption, ordinarily levied against western institutions of local self-government in Burma.

Western self-government however hardly touches the mass of the people, either in Burma or Java. These live in villages. In Burma western self-government has been constructed, in accordance with western ideas, on the basis of individual rights. The Dutch system was built up on the basis of the village, and aimed to bring the village into organic relation with higher units of popular self-government. But the preponderance of local officials among those elected suggests general indifference, due perhaps to the device of indirect election. Yet in Burma we find a similar indifference, and the lack of any local ties between members and their constituencies has often been deplored; politicians can easily secure votes by appealing to the natural dislike of foreign rule, but they know and care little for their constituencies, and the villagers know and care little about what happens in the legislature.

In Burma as in Java local interest does not extend beyond local affairs, but there is a striking difference between them in village administration. In Java the Dutch have tried to conserve both the form and content of traditional self-government while adapting it to the requirements of the modern world; in Burma a contrary policy has been pursued. In Java the intricate complexity of the native political organization has been simplified, but the regency and village have been retained. In Burma the organic unit, the circle, has been replaced by the purely official township, and the country has been broken up into villages, while there is no organ of oriental

[1] Hart, p. 29.

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Another safeguard against corruption is the Regent. In Burma no one stays long enough in one place to ascertain in what quarters and to what extent corruption may prevail; still less is it possible to work up and carry through proceedings against those who are corrupt. In Java the Regent is permanent. His position and his high pay protect him against the temptation to accept petty bribes, and concern for his own authority and prestige makes him jealous of the influence of corrupt subordinates. These cannot practise corruption long or effectively without attracting the attention of the Regent, who can see that the offender is brought to account. If, then, the administration is so free from corruption as one is told, the credit is probably due in great part to the Regent.

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Authority and Law. It must be admitted then that, in all those matters which stand out conspicuously as abuses under British rule in Burma, Dutch rule in Java presents a favourable contrast. Yet there is another side to the picture. The Government has employed 'gentle pressure' to protect the village community against dissolution, and to promote welfare; yet 'gentle pressure' may be debilitating rather than a stimulant, making the patient less able and not more able to stand alone. And it is difficult to reconcile gentle pressure, however well-intentioned, with the principles of liberty and law. In an address to a Dutch audience interested in colonial problems, the present writer endeavoured to illustrate this point.[1]

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'One of your subordinate native officers described his work. "I improved sanitation. I got the people to found schools, and build bazaars, and provide a polyclinic. And I would not allow bamboo bazaars; if they could not afford wooden walls, I took care that the posts were of substantial timber and that the roof was sound. I even planted flower gardens, a thing that practically no one else has done; and it was all my own idea, without pressure from above." I have heard your European officers described as social engineers and your native civil servants as welfare officers, and the terms are justified. As I went round your villages and saw the infinite pains you take to conserve village society and build up social welfare, I found myself humming a tune. It was a hymn tune. Gradually the words came back to me: "Can a mother's tender care, Cease towards the child she bare? Yes, she may forgetful be, Yet will I remember thee." I thought of the hours and days we spend on the Bench, listening to advocates (trying to mislead us), laboriously taking down evidence (much of it false evidence), and sending poor unfortunates to jail, and I was filled with envy and admiration of your officers who have the privilege of giving

[1] Furnivall, *Asiatic Review*, 1935, pp. 655 ff.

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642 their life to constructive social work as missionaries of western civilization. ...Your Regent can look round his Regency and say, "*si monumentum requiris, circumspice.*" Our energetic township officer reviewing his work would take you to his record room and point to Alps and Himalayas of completed cases; here, he would say, "*si monumentum requiris, circumspice*".

'In your offices of equal standing I found no such mountains of proceedings. There would not have been room for them. I remember visiting a native subordinate. A broad drive through a walled park of several acres took us to a roomy house with a spacious audience hall. In one corner of the park were two outhouses. One was a garage; the smaller one I took to be a bicycle shed. But it was not a bicycle shed; it was his office. I do not wish to guarantee the details of this picture, but it represents correctly the general impression that I gathered everywhere.... Things are changing, but until within the last few years, you had large houses and little offices; in Burma we have large offices and little houses. Your system is, or has been, personal: ours, mechanical....

'(Yet), by a quasi-natural process, by the play of supply and demand, we arrive at very much the same results as you—with very much less work and worry. But the principle is not the same, the method is not the same, and the results are not quite the same. Your policy is, professedly, ethical; ours, practical. These are not mere catchwords. You try to give the people what they ought to want; we are content to give them what they will pay for. Your method is one of personal influence, *zachte dwang, parentah aloes*; we rely on the economic motive, the desire for gain, working within the limits of the law. The results, I admit, are not quite the same. Our villages compare very badly with yours in respect of hygiene and roads; it is hardly an exaggeration to say that, outside the larger towns, until the coming of the motor-car, we had no roads. People do not want disease, and they would rather go dry-foot than through mud. But no one can make money out of hygiene and roads, and not much can be done by a private individual in respect of either. The want for these, and for many other things, is a social want. On the ethical system you aim at organizing social demand; on the practical system we neglect such wants until they threaten to create a public nuisance. Your system works very differently from ours....

'Let me recapitulate the main points of difference. Our officers are magistrates; yours are policemen and welfare officers. Our methods are repressive; yours are preventive. Our procedure is formal and legal; yours, informal and personal. Our civil service is an administrative machine; yours is an instrument of Government. Our aim is negative—to suppress disorder; yours is positive—to maintain order. Order—it is a word we both use frequently, but with a significant difference of context. We talk of "law and order" and you of "*rust en orde*"; but in the absence of a social conscience it is difficult to distinguish between law and the letter of the law, and between *rust* and the placidity of a good baby in its perambulator. The caricature which depicts your system as a *baboe*, a nursemaid,

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and ours as a *babu*, a clerk, does emphasize a difference in vital principle. You try to keep a man from going wrong; we make it unpleasant for him if he does go wrong. You believe in protection and welfare; we believe in law—and liberty.' 642

Burmans, after so many years of British rule, would probably feel stifled in the hot-house atmosphere of Java, and Javanese would shiver in the bleaker, if not bracing, climate of Burma. But it must be admitted that the version of Dutch policy given above did not pass without protest. Everyone readily admits that the people are too fondly coddled. There have long been general complaints that they are treated as children who will never grow up; that 'a villager cannot scratch his head unless a district officer gives him permission and an expert shows him how to do it'. In a powerful article that met with wide approval, the late Professor Van Vollenhoven pressed home the point that, in exercising 'gentle pressure', officials are not hampered by an obsequious deference to law. But not many would accept the suggestion that their colonial practice encroaches on liberty. Possibly their attitude may be due in part to their heritage of Roman law. 'Its influence', remarks Sir Henry Slesser, 'in stimulating a disciplinary outlook in politics and study on the Continent has been incalculable.' Yet even continental students present a rather similar picture of Dutch practice.[1] Whatever criticisms may be levelled at British colonial policy, and whatever defects may be manifest in practice, both policy and practice are based on the principles of equal law and individual freedom. That is why, in the earlier stages, it is both successful and in many ways congenial to the people; it liberates them from arbitrary oppression by native chieftains or Government officials. And it is probably one reason why, in its later stages, it is found irksome and unpopular; it brings them under bondage to economic law.

Another point which our comparison has brought out is that neither Dutch nor English have solved the problem of enhancing native welfare. The Dutch, by strenuous endeavours, have succeeded in maintaining an astonishingly high level of material welfare, far above the level in those parts of India which are comparable in respect of population, and about the same level as in Burma with much fewer mouths to feed. Yet if the Dutch have protected the people against 511

[1] Slesser, Sir H., *The Judicial Office* (1943), p. 83; Bousquet, pp. 90ff.; *Netherlands India*, pp. 382, 390.

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CHAPTER VIII

COLONIAL POLICY

1. The Study of Colonial Relations

642 From this brief outline of the course of events in Burma and Netherlands India some facts stand out clearly. Under native rule they both presented typical and not unfavourable examples of tropical society, held together by religion and personal authority in a complex of customary social obligations. Both achieved an elaborate civilization, with many valuable and pleasant features, but their political organization was unstable, and, when challenged by the superior moral and material forces of the modern West, neither was able to preserve its independence. The British in Burma and the Dutch in Java represented the western principle of social order, resting on reason, impersonal law and individual rights, which Europe inherits from Greece, Rome and Palestine. From the beginning of the nineteenth century their policy has been directed towards furthering economic progress and promoting native welfare, but they have employed different methods. The British in Burma adopted the system of direct rule, and the Dutch in Java the system of indirect rule.

In colonial literature the distinction between direct and indirect rule is familiar, and the choice between these systems is sometimes regarded as determined by the national philosophy of rule accepted in the colonial power; it is suggested that indirect rule will be preferred where the goal of policy is to allow the native to attain independence along his own lines, and direct rule where the objective is to find a place for the native in a society of which the principal institutions are European in character. It is true that, so far as colonial administration is directed towards inducing native opinion to accept innovations which it does not actively demand, indirect rule will be favoured by those who prefer genuine acceptance and slow development, and direct rule by those who prefer mere compliance and rapid development. But the theory that the preference for direct or indirect rule depends on colonial policy in respect of native evolution does not cover all the facts. It cannot, for instance, easily be reconciled with the adoption of direct rule in India and the Philippines. Moreover, there is no sharp line between direct and indirect rule, and we find the same

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power adopting different systems in the same place at different times, and in different places at the same time. But the chief defect of the theory is that it does not sufficiently recognize the connection between colonial policy and economic circumstances. Colonial policy is only one aspect of national policy, and national policy is not directed solely by economic considerations. Similarly a man's business is only one aspect of his life, and his life is larger than his business; yet his business will suffer if he does not run it on business lines. Colonial relations are primarily economic and, although pronouncements on colonial policy will be framed in terms congenial to national traditions, colonial practice is conditioned by the economic environment, and it is this, rather than any national philosophy of empire, which determines the choice between direct and indirect rule.[1]

When Europeans started trading in the tropics they had to gain the favour of the local rulers. In order to acquire influence at court the usual plan has been to support the weaker among rival claimants to the throne. If the object of policy be merely to prevent border troubles, he may be allowed a nominal independence, but ordinarily such a subordinate alliance leads gradually and naturally to indirect rule. Indirect rule through a local chieftain is the simplest and cheapest way by which a western power can obtain economic control. So long as its main economic objective is to obtain tropical produce at low rates, the local ruler can do most to help it. Similarly, with development by western enterprise, though large-scale transactions must be regulated on western lines, land and labour can be provided most readily and cheaply by the local ruler, governing his people on traditional lines, and there tends to evolve a dual system of administration, half western, half tropical, with the natives governed on the principle of indirect rule. But where the dependency is chiefly valued as a market for the sale of western goods to natives, and is opened up through native enterprise, with natives growing crops for sale, even native transactions must be regulated in the ordinary way of business according to western law and procedure, and a system of direct rule is indicated. Where, however, any considerable area of the dependency is taken up for European settlement, direct rule must be applied within that area, and may also be extended to the natives.

Few regions are developed solely as markets or solely as sources of tropical produce. A dependency which is originally opened up as

[1] Hailey, *African Survey*, pp. 130ff., 528ff.

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642 a market may acquire importance as a scene of western enterprise, as has happened recently in Burma with the development of oil, tin and other minerals, and rubber. Similarly a dependency, originally valued as a source of tropical produce, will almost certainly, like Java, become important as a market. The economic character of a dependency gradually changes, and so also, and more or less contemporaneously, does the system of rule. Indirect rule is slowly adapted to western requirements, and the western element in the administration becomes more pronounced; or else direct rule on western lines comes to include a popular element. In either case the distinction between direct and indirect rule tends to lose its sharpness.

It is not suggested that the choice between direct and indirect rule is governed solely by economic conditions. Where there is a strong local chieftain, direct rule may be impossible. Where, on the contrary, there is no outstanding local chieftain with authority over a wide area and able to comply with the requirements of the colonial power, direct rule may be unavoidable and is likely to encounter less opposition. In such cases the traditions of rule in the colonial power will carry weight. At the beginning of the present century the Dutch in Java had a long tradition of succcessful indirect rule. On extending active administration to the Outer Provinces they found some tracts where a multiplicity of petty chieftains was an obstacle to indirect rule, but they tried so far as possible to follow their traditional system by creating artificial units. On the other hand, the British had a long tradition of direct rule in India, and there was a tendency at first to adopt this system also in Africa.[1] But in some parts of Africa conditions necessitated indirect rule, and the success of this system encouraged its adoption even where it might at first appear less suitable. (As explained below, in British administration indirect rule is strongly coloured by the older tradition of direct rule.) Apart from such exceptions, economic considerations prevail and, unless the conditions require or justify the more costly and troublesome system of direct rule, one finds indirect rule, with a dual system where western interests require the application of direct rule to certain regions or races.

The connection between economic circumstances and principles of rule gives a special interest to the comparison between Burma and Java. British rule was extended to Burma when the Industrial Revolution was first impelling British manufacturers to seek new markets

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 133, 536.

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in the tropics, and just when Indian administration had been reorganized on a system of direct rule. Naturally this system was extended to the parts of Burma then acquired. At that time, and until the end of the century, western enterprise took no part in exploiting the natural resources of Burma, except, on a comparatively small scale, its teak; Burma was developed as a market, and its progress depended solely on the response of Burman enterprise to the stimulus of economic freedom. This method of development necessitated the introduction of direct rule on western lines, as in India. But the conditions were different in Burma and India. India was protected against the disruptive forces of economic freedom by the institution of caste, and it had long been under, or in touch with, British rule; modern India grew up with modern Europe. Burmans were quite different from Indians in their ideas and ways of life; caste was unknown and their social and economic organization exposed them in an exceptional degree to the impact of economic forces.[1] They knew nothing of the modern world. Yet they were governed from India; no one in India knew anything of Burma, and the local governors were mostly transient officials from India with neither the opportunity, the knowledge or the stimulus to adapt Indian administration and the rule of western law to the requirements of the people. Thus Burma represents in its purest form the process of economic development by native enterprise under a system of direct rule. In Java, on the contrary, the Dutch had nothing to sell, and they valued Java only as a source of tropical produce to be obtained as cheaply as possible. This required indirect rule through native chieftains who could furnish the necessary produce and labour. Java accordingly came to represent the purest type of indirect rule. Up to the end of the nineteenth century native enterprise for export was negligible; but western enterprise developed and with it the need, within the western sphere of the social economy, for direct rule on western lines. This led to a dual system of administration, with the natives under indirect rule, and the Europeans under direct rule. Burma and Java, then, are typical examples respectively of direct and indirect rule.

In both countries the policy of Government has had a two-fold objective: economic progress and native welfare. In both countries economic development has made remarkable, astounding, progress; in both there has evolved a social structure comprising distinct racial

[1] Census, 1911, p. 304.

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642 sections with an elaborate western superstructure over native life; in both native welfare has lagged behind economic progress, and, in both, during the present century, a growing impatience of western rule has found expression in a nationalist movement. These features are characteristic of tropical dependencies in general. Since Burma and Java furnish extreme types of direct and indirect rule, and of development by native and by western enterprise, the comparison between them would seem to furnish a useful starting point for a more general enquiry into colonial policy and practice. Such an enquiry is indeed necessary if we are to understand the problems of either Burma or Java or of any tropical dependency, for it is only against a background of general principles that the phenomena of western rule in any region of the tropics assume their due proportions, and that we can reasonably anticipate finding a satisfactory solution for the many weighty problems of colonial policy and practice. The enquiry may well seem, and is indeed, beyond the competence of any single student, whose intimate acquaintance with practical administration must of necessity be limited. But one conclusion to which the following enquiry points is the need for better knowledge of the facts and better understanding of their implications, and to the urgency of international co-operation in the comparative study of colonial affairs.

2. Survey of Colonial Policy

175 Of late years there has been a growing interest in colonial policy and colonial relations. To this many factors have contributed. Prominent among them are unrest in the tropics, consequent on the rise of modern nationalism, and the jealousy of non-colonial powers. Thus colonial policy has a double aspect, domestic and international. These are interrelated, for, while the advantages accruing to colonial powers from their dependencies arouse envy, and stimulate other powers to assert their claims by force of arms, tropical unrest serves as a pretext and a tool for intervention. The international aspect of colonial relations will require attention in due place, but it is convenient first to discuss the relations between colonial powers and their dependencies.

Discussions of this matter often contrast the high aspirations of modern colonial policy with the selfish exploitation of the past. Thus, according to Lord Hailey, 'the imperialist sentiment which animated much of our public policy in the latter part of the last century led us along paths some of which we should not be inclined to follow

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647 current practice, but the great scientific achievements come from research in pure science, which revolutionizes practice by attacking old problems along new lines. Similarly the elaboration of welfare 657 machinery can have no appreciable effect on welfare, and still less can it promote autonomy. It will not give them what they want 654 unless they want what it can give, and the promotion of welfare must 177 be approached from a new angle by a revolution in method. The machinery is not only defective, but is applied on a wrong principle.

But, in the modern world, how is it possible for tropical peoples to get what they want? For the environment has changed, and not the people; they still, if left to themselves, would try to reproduce their old environment. But they have been brought into contact with the modern world and cannot get away from it. All the king's horses and all the king's men cannot set the clock back. They can get what they want only if they want what in the conditions of the modern world they *must* want. A fundamental problem of autonomy is to change the people so that they shall come to want, or at least voluntarily to accept, those conditions which the welfare of the modern world requires. Some light should be thrown upon this problem from an examination of attempts already made to introduce self-government among dependent peoples in various projects of colonial autonomy.

9. Autonomy

642 Colonial autonomy is closely linked with the Liberal tradition, which had two aspects. On the economic side it stood for economic freedom, freedom of person, property and trade; on the political side it stood for freedom of thought, speech and religion. Political freedom was regarded as the natural fruit of economic freedom. In the nineteenth century Liberalism was in the air. British and Dutch colonial statesmen alike claimed Liberal ideals though interpreting them differently; French Liberals recognized their colonial subjects as citizens of France, and Liberalism in Spain, suppressed at home, took refuge in the Spanish territories overseas.

During a great part of the century Liberals in Britain thought colonies a burden, and often cited Turgot's dictum comparing them to fruit that would fall from the parent tree when ripe. Men looked forward to the day when India should be able to stand alone as the proudest day in the story of British rule. Practical administrators like Sir Thomas Munro argued that when Indians were sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for themselves, it would

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'probably be best for both countries that the British control over India should be gradually withdrawn'.[1] From that time onwards the vision of self-government in India, though often veiled behind the clouds of more immediate problems, has never wholly been obscured. The attainment of virtual independence by the great dominions furnished a succession of encouraging precedents, and the rise of Nationalism in the East transformed the question of self-government from a vague and remote prospect into a live political issue. Indians came to demand variously self-government, dominion status and independence, and their example has been followed in other dependencies. Britain responded by formally accepting self-government within the empire as the professed goal of its colonial policy.

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But, as the prospect of self-government grew less remote, its meaning required clearer definition. Mr Curtis, in his book on *Dyarchy*, remarks that on his visit to India in 1916 'self-government was discussed in official as well as in Indian society, as the one conceivable goal of British policy'.[2] But he found no less than four different interpretations, none of them agreeing with his own. To some British officials it meant no more than the emancipation of the Government of India from the control of Parliament and the Secretary of State, coupled with the devolution of specified powers and revenues to the provincial Governments. To others it meant the repartition of India into native states. To some Indians it implied merely the progressive substitution of Indian for British officials. Others thought that executives in India could be left responsible to the Secretary of State, and yet be rendered dependent for the exercise of their powers on Indian electorates and elected legislatures. His own interpretation was that executives should be 'responsible' to elective legislatures. Still another interpretation of self-government is possible; for there is no necessary connection between self-government and the elective principle, and a dependency, recognizing allegiance to the Crown but otherwise independent, would be self-governing, even if the ruler were an autocrat. Shortly after his visit self-government was identified with responsible government in the pronouncement in Parliament in August 1917, and was more exactly defined in the preamble to the Government of India Act, 1919: 'It is the declared policy of Parliament to provide for the increasing association of Indians in every branch of Indian administration, and for the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in

[1] Gleig, p. 316. [2] Curtis, p. 357.

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642 British India as an integral part of the Empire.' The same doctrine has since been extended to other dependencies; formerly they were regarded as held on trust, but now they are to be admitted to 'partnership'.

In this formula one may distinguish three separate elements: men, machinery and will; a self-governing personnel, self-governing institutions, and self-determination. These are often regarded as necessary and logical successive stages on the road leading to self-government, and they have in fact marked the political advance of Burma, as of the rest of India. This line of advance, however, would seem to be associated particularly with the system of direct rule. Direct rule signifies the acceptance of western principles of rule, and self-government implies therefore the training of men to apply them, the construction of institutions to work them, and the education of the people to adopt them. The approach to self-government along this line assumes that in tropical society western forms of self-government will, at least in time, come to function in the same manner as in the West. It attempts to adapt tropical society to western principles of government, much as the scientific expert in agriculture or hygiene too often tries to adapt native life to scientific principles.

We have noticed that when the Dutch regained their eastern territories in 1816, they were full of enthusiasm for 'all that is brave and liberal'. Van den Bosch claimed to be applying Liberal principles when he left the Regents and villages, 'the little republics', in Java free to govern their people on their own lines. Indirect rule purports to conserve the self-governing personnel and self-governing institutions that are already in existence and, so far as it is used as an instrument of political advancement, implies the adaptation of western principles of government to tropical society. But most Dutch Liberals of 1816 would have ranked with the more backward British 'Tories'; even the more orthodox Liberals of a later generation, when introducing Liberal reforms on a mid-Victorian pattern, expressly disavowed the idea of governing Java on British principles with a view to political emancipation. Yet circumstances compelled the Netherlands to follow the same path as Britain. The expansion of private enterprise under Liberal rule led to the multiplication of administrative activities, and economy dictated the recruitment of a native personnel. With the growth of the western element in the plural society, administrative efficiency required the introduction of western self-governing institutions in local government. Then,

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during the present century, the convergence of Liberal, Ethical and Nationalist ideas, together with considerations of practical convenience, led in 1918 to the creation of the Volksraad, introducing western institutions in the central government. The new Dutch constitution of 1922 recognized the autonomy of Netherlands India in principle, and, as subsequently formulated in 1942, Dutch policy looked forward to the reconstruction of the kingdom 'on a solid foundation of complete partnership' among all the members.[1] Thus circumstances have dragged the Dutch, for long almost reluctantly, along the track blazed by the British. In Dutch as in British dependencies, colonial policy has sought to make the people capable of self-government by substituting natives for Europeans in the administration and by the construction of western self-governing institutions, and in both alike partnership has come to be recognized as the goal of policy.

10. Personnel

The application of Liberal principles to tropical administration may be dated from the revision of the charter of the East India Company in 1813. Liberal orthodoxy expected Government to confine its activities so far as possible to the maintenance of law and order. On that view it was not illogical to hold that the substitution of Indians for Europeans in the law courts would take India a long way towards self-government. Merely of necessity this process was already making great strides forward. The system of direct rule, inaugurated by Warren Hastings, was completed when Cornwallis took over civil and criminal jurisdiction from native authorities. It soon appeared that the Company could not afford to entertain a sufficient European staff, and Lord Hastings considered various expedients, including the revival of *panchayats*, for dealing with the pressure of business. The easiest and cheapest solution was to train natives as magistrates and judges. They were employed in courts of first instance and, under Lord Amherst, in appellate courts. By 1827 over 90% of the original suits in civil cases were tried by native judicial officers. Thus the employment of Indians was 'rendered imperative by the cost of a purely English administration'. But it was also regarded as 'a great moral duty'.[2] 'With what grace', asked Munro, 'can we talk of our paternal government, if we exclude them from

[1] *Netherlands India*, pp. 82, 84, 109, 160; Broek, J. D. M., *Pacific Affairs*, 1943, p. 338.

[2] Ross, p. 202; Boulger, pp. 60, 64, 67; *IG*, IV, 45.

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631 native life, ceased to function as soon as the hand of Government was withdrawn. Similarly, in British territories under indirect rule,

> 'the varied responsibilities now placed on native authorities demand the exercise of close and continuous supervision by the administration.... Many observers have questioned whether the traditional native authorities, or at all events a large number of the weaker units, will not be strained beyond their powers by the tasks now laid on them. Everywhere the supervision now exercised over them must bring home to the people that the sanction for their authority is no longer the good will of their own people, but the recognition accorded to them by the administration.'[1]

And under indirect rule, as under direct rule, native social units are continually readjusted and are often amalgamated for the sake of convenience or economy into large artificial administrative units with no traditional sanction, in which administrative methods can be applied according to a standard plan. Under Dutch rule as under British rule, and under direct rule as under indirect rule, local self-government fights a losing battle against efficiency.

12. Machinery: Central Government

642 In the machinery of the central government in tropical dependencies, one can trace a similar conflict between the contrary ideals of efficiency and autonomy. From very early days both the British and Dutch East India Companies furnished their representatives in the East with the assistance of a council. In British India, under the rule of law during the nineteenth century, this council took on a new character. From 1833 the Council of the Governor-General was gradually enlarged for the purpose of legislation, and in 1861 the Indian Councils Act provided for the addition to the Central Legislative Councils of non-officials, including Indians, and also for the constitution of Provincial Councils on similar lines. But these councils were merely 'committees by means of which the executive Government obtained advice and assistance in their legislation, and the public derived the advantage of publicity at every stage of the law-making process'.[2] Gradually the councils came to exercise an increasing influence over the conduct of affairs, and there was a growing deference to the opinions of important classes. This became more marked when the Indian Councils Act of 1892 enlarged the Provincial Councils and gave partial recognition to

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 538–9; Field, M. J., *Man*, 1943, p. 90.
[2] *ISC*, 1, 114–16.

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the elective system. Yet there was no change in the constitutional position of the councils; the object of the Act was that 'each important class shall have the opportunity of making its wishes known in Council through the mouth of some member specially acquainted with them'.[1] The Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 were a further advance in the same direction; they created larger councils with numerous non-officials elected either by local authorities, large landowners, trade associations, or universities. But the authors of these reforms expressly repudiated the suggestion that they would lead 'directly or indirectly to the establishment of a parliamentary system in India'.[2] Thus all these successive changes in the form of government were intended to increase its efficiency and not to transfer the responsibility for government from the British Parliament to the Indian people.

On the other hand, however, they went a long way towards local autonomy by strengthening the Provincial Governments against the Central Government, and the Central Government against Whitehall. In all the various councils the predominant influence was that of western industry and commerce. We have noticed that, in Burma, agrarian reforms were pressed on the Provincial Government by the Government of India, and at first not without response. Later, with the enlargement of the Legislative Council, capitalist influence was strong enough to defeat them. In some matters there may be a cleavage of opinion between officials and non-official Europeans, but usually these two classes, from their common origin and upbringing, if for no other reason, tend to adopt the same point of view, and in India from about 1870 onwards, with the growth of western enterprise after the opening of the Suez Canal, there was an increasing tendency towards capitalist autonomy, which became more Indian in colour during the present century, as Indian capital grew more powerful and Nationalism more clamorous and better organized.

Yet, up to the outbreak of the war of 1914–18, the Liberal doctrine of training India for political emancipation had made no impression on the machinery of the Central Government. The Government aimed to promote the welfare of the people, and was amenable to the influence of the Indian public so far as this was vocal. But Nationalists wanted more than influence; they wanted power. The first stirrings of modern Nationalism were directly inherited from the Liberal tradition, but by the end of the nineteenth century it derived most of its strength from a blind reaction, seditious and destructive, against both foreign rule and

[1] *ISC*, 1, 183. [2] *ISC*, 1, 119.

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western civilization. The Japanese victory over Russia inspired new hopes of freedom and a more constructive attitude. Nationalists came to look on western education, western science and western political institutions as instruments by which India might achieve a place among the nations of the modern world. The Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 aimed to appease rather than to satisfy these new demands, and only when Britain, having drawn the sword to defend the liberty of the small nations of Europe, invited help from India, was the doctrine of self-determination extended to the tropics. Indians demanded self-government and, in reply to their demand, the pronouncement of 1917 held up responsible government within the Empire as the goal of British policy. The substitution of responsible government for self-government is significant. Responsible government was intended to imply a Government accountable to the people, and in England therefore had the whole weight of Liberal tradition to back it. In India it appealed both to those Europeans who held that the strength of British rule lay in the well-merited affection of the masses, who would outweigh the disaffected Nationalists, and also to Indians who looked to the Liberal principle of counting heads as ensuring a majority for Indians in the conduct of Indian affairs.

The reforms that followed this pronouncement 'struck at the essentials of the previous system. Authority, instead of being concentrated at the Centre, was to be in large measure devolved on the provinces; the opportunities of the Central Legislature for influencing the Government of India were to be increased; the control of Parliament over the whole of Indian government was to be modified by marking out a portion of the provincial field in which it would be no longer exercised'.[1] This system came to be known as Dyarchy because the British Parliament remained supreme in certain matters, while transferring control over others to Indian ministers, chosen by the people and responsible to a popular electorate. Forms of parliamentary government were devised in the expectation, or the hope, that they would function in the same manner as in England. But conditions in England and India were very different. In England there was a strongly homogeneous society; in all parts of India (and especially in Burma) there was a much divided plural society. In England the franchise has been extended to new classes as they have gained economic power, and voting power, the numerical majority, is a rough measure of economic and military power; in India generally

[1] *ISC*, I, 122.

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(and especially in Burma) the numerical majority lies with that section of the community which has least economic and military power. In England the whole people accept the standards of the modern world; in India only a very small minority lives in the modern world. These conditions, which are general throughout tropical dependencies, are incompatible with parliamentary government in the form which has gradually been worked out in England, and, if attempts be made to introduce western democratic forms, they necessitate the adoption of safeguards to prevent the collapse of government.

In India various safeguards were devised. The executive was empowered to override the legislature, if necessary. Apart from matters expressly transferred to popular control, the executive still remained responsible to the British Parliament. The special representation of particular interests and classes made for a balance of power in the legislatures. The legislatures included an official block, speaking and voting in accordance with the views of the executive. And, possibly the most effective safeguard against unwelcome legislation, the pay and patronage enjoyed by ministers weakened party solidarity among the Nationalist opposition. Responsible government, so far as it makes for better representation, helps Government to know what needs doing, but so far as it involves a system of balance, blocks and bribery, it prevents the Government from doing anything. In India dyarchy failed to gain the approval of the Nationalists, who attributed its shortcomings to the safeguards. But, in fact, it merely brought to light and aggravated the conditions which made India unsuitable to self-government on British lines. The reforms gave new point to Hindu-Moslem competition, and communal tension grew more acute.[1] Similarly in Burma western democratic forms have fostered ill-will and strife between Burmans, Indians, Chinese and Europeans. In Netherlands India likewise the first Volksraad to have an actual share in government was the last 'association-Volksraad', and each racial group began to look to its own interests. Self-government on a popular basis requires the existence of a common social will, but the reforms engendered communal ill-will. In the tropics people in general do not want what the conditions of the modern world necessitate, and self-government consequently does not give them what they want. It does not even give them what they need, for a legislature representing a photographic portrait of a plural society in all its detail of conflicting social and economic interests cannot pass difficult and contentious legislation,

[1] *ISC*, 1, 29.

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and its composition effectually hinders it from doing what is necessary to counterbalance the play of economic forces; social will is paralysed and anti-social forces become more active than before. Thus in a plural society the forms of responsible government not only prevent self-government but make constructive government impossible, and allow greater freedom to economic forces.

It is not only by intensifying sectional and communal differences that the machinery of responsible government tends to hinder progress towards self-government. In India 'while the experienced member of the Services will admit the benefit of British Raj and realize the difficulties in the way of complete self-government; while the member of a minority community, putting the safety of his community first, will stipulate for safeguards; and while the moderate will look askance at extremist methods which he will denounce; all alike are in sympathy with the demand for equal status with the European and proclaim their belief in self-determination for India'.[1] When nationalist aspirations conflict with capitalist activities, Europeans are usually associated with the latter. In India, where Indians own much of the capital, this is not so marked as in Burma and most other dependencies. In Burma, the Indians and Chinese share with Burmans an inferiority complex; they all want equality of status with Europeans. Yet, at every point of divergence between national interest and economic development, the Indians and Chinese tend to line up behind the Europeans, who stand out in the legislature as the protagonists of capital. But the Government is a European government, and the ill-feeling centring on Europeans is focussed on the Government and accordingly on Britain. A dependency cannot obtain self-government peacefully except by co-operation based on mutual good-will between the people aspiring to autonomy and the colonial power attempting to confer it on them, but this is weakened and not strengthened by the introduction of democratic institutions along western lines.

Thus, although Europeans inheriting the Liberal tradition of democratic government will sympathize with democratic aspirations, both general considerations and practical experience suggest that premature experiments in introducing western institutions hinder rather than help towards the attainment of independence, and prejudice rather than promote the growth of popular government and the ultimate achievement of democracy.

[1] *ISC*, I, 408.

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CONCEPTIONS OF STATE AND KINGSHIP IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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121 643 AT A time when the whole political system of Southeast Asia seems to be on the verge of complete reshapement and when a new cycle of development, dominated by native forces, may be expected to emerge from the present turmoil, an inquiry into the ideological foundations of native government will not be out of place and, perhaps, will even be of more than purely theoretical interest. What were the religious and philosophical conceptions which underlay and shaped the states of Southeast Asia? Are they still living forces with which we have to count or are they dead and gone? Is it possible to inoculate new ideas into old traditions, thereby avoiding a complete break with the past, a dangerous uprooting of oriental thought and culture?

In view of the limited space I shall confine myself to a discussion of some fundamental conceptions of state and kingship in those parts of Southeast Asia where Hindu-Buddhist civilization prevailed.

MACROCOSMOS AND MICROCOSMOS

772 643 The primary notion with which we shall have to deal is the belief in the parallelism between Macrocosmos and Microcosmos, between the universe and the world of men. According to this belief humanity is constantly under the influence of forces emanating from the directions of the compass and from stars and planets. These forces may produce welfare and prosperity or work havoc, according to whether or not individuals and social groups, above all the state, succeed in bringing their lives and activities in harmony with the universe. Individuals may attain such harmony by following the indications offered by astrology, the lore of lucky and unlucky days and many other minor rules Harmony between the empire and the universe is achieved by organizing the former as an image of the latter, as a universe on a smaller scale.

171 772 643 It is well known that this astrological or cosmo-magic principle, as we may call it, originated somewhere in the Near East. It was well established in Babylonia in the 3rd millennium B.C. and there are indications that it may go back there at least as far as the middle of the 4th millennium, and possibly farther. Again, we have indications that it existed in Northwest India in the

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171 first half of the 3rd millennium. It influenced Europe in various ways and at
772 various times, specially during the periods of Hellenism and of the Roman
643 empire and in the Middle Ages. It is difficult to tell when it first reached China. Anyway it had developed there into a highly specialized system during the Chou and Han periods. It came to Southeast Asia by way of India as well as of China, and this double influence may account for its prominence there and for the strong hold it had on the minds of the peoples of Farther India and Indonesia. Its long life-span and its spread over vast regions with divergent cultures, and even more so the fact that it had to adapt itself to the locally dominant religions, to various forms of paganism as well as to Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism, and occasionally even to Christianity and to Islam, naturally resulted in the development of numerous variants with often widely differing traits. It is with the special aspect of the cosmo magic principle as expressed in the organization of Hindu and Buddhist king doms in Southeast Asia (and to some extent in their Mohammedan successors in Malaya and Indonesia), that we are here concerned.

RELATION BETWEEN STATE AND UNIVERSE

772 Whereas speculations pertaining to the relation between state and uni-
643 verse formed an important subject of ancient Chinese literature, we would look in vain for a theoretical treatise on this topic in the various literatures of Southeast Asia.[1] Yet, there is overwhelming evidence of the cosmological basis of state and kingship in this area. This evidence is found in numerous passages in literature and inscriptions, in the titles of kings, queens and officials, in the "cosmic" numbers of queens, ministers, court priests, provinces, etc., in rites and customs, in works of art, in the lay-out and structure of capital cities, palaces and temples. One need only put these various items together to obtain a relatively clear picture. This picture will be more complete in continental Southeast Asia, where the old forms of Buddhist state and kingship survived into very recent times. It will be hazier in the Archipelago as a result of Mohammedan and European influences.

According to Brahmanic doctrine the world consists of a circular central continent, Jambūdvīpa, surrounded by seven annular oceans and seven annular continents. Beyond the last of the seven oceans the world is closed by an enormous mountain range. In the center of Jambudvīpa, and thus in the center of the world, rises Mount Meru, the cosmic mountain around which sun, moon and stars revolve. On its summit lies the city of the gods sur-

[1] However, it must be taken into account that Burmese, Mon and Thai literatures are still very imperfectly known.

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rounded by the abodes of the eight Lokapālas or guardian gods of the world. 772

In the Buddhist system, too, Mount Meru forms the center of the universe. It is surrounded by seven mountain ranges separated from each other by seven annular seas. Beyond the last of these mountain chains extends the Ocean and in it lie four continents, one in each of the cardinal directions. The continent south of Mount Meru is Jambūdvīpa, the abode of men. Here, too, the universe is surrounded by an enormous wall of rocks, the Chakravāla range. On the slopes of Mount Meru lies the lowest of the paradises, that of the four Great Kings or guardians of the world, on its summit the second paradise, that of the thirty-three gods with Sudarśana, the city of the gods, where Indra reigns as king. Above Mount Meru tower one above the other the rest of the heavenly abodes.[2] 643

It will be seen that the Brahman and the Buddhist systems, in spite of differences in detail, agree in fundamental traits: their circular form and the arrangement in concentric zones around Mount Meru. An abbreviated image of either of them thus has the same symbolic meaning for devotees of both faiths.

THE CAPITAL AS THE MAGIC CENTER OF EMPIRE

In Southeast Asia, even more than in Europe, the capital stood for the whole country. It was more than the nation's political and cultural center: it was the magic center of the empire. The circumambulation of the capital formed, and in Siam and Cambodia still forms, one of the most essential parts of the coronation ritual. By this circumambulation the king takes possession not only of the capital city but of the whole empire. Whereas the cosmological structure of the country at large could be expressed only by the number and location of provinces and by the functions and emblems of their governors, the capital city could be shaped architecturally as a much more "realistic" image of the universe, a smaller microcosmos within that microcosmos, the empire. The remains of some of the ancient cities clearly testify to the cosmological ideas which pervaded the whole system of government. Fortunately, a number of inscriptions and some passages in native chronicles may help us in interpreting archaeological evidence. 361 772 643

As the universe, according to Brahman and Buddhist ideas, centers around Mount Meru, so that smaller universe, the empire, was bound to have a Mount Meru in the center of its capital which would be if not in the coun-

[2] There usually are twenty-six heavens in all, including those on Mount Meru, but the number occasionally varies.

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try's geographical, at least in its magic center. It seems that at an early period natural hillocks were by preference selected as representatives of the celestial mountain. This was still the case in Cambodia in the 9th century A.D. Yaśodharapura, the first city of Angkor, founded towards 900 A.D., formed an enormous square of about two and a half miles on a side, with its sides facing the cardinal points and with the Phnom Bakheng, a small rocky hill, as center. An inscription tells us that this mountain in the center of the capital with the temple on its summit was "equal in beauty to the king of mountains," i.e. to Mount Meru.[3] The temple on Phnom Bakheng contained a Lingam, the phallic symbol of Śiva, representing the Devarāja, the "God King," i.e. the divine essence of kingship which embodied itself in the actual king. More frequently the central mountain was purely artificial, being represented by a temple only. This was quite in accordance with prevailing ideas, practically every temple in Southeast Asia, whether Hindu or Buddhist, whether built of stone, brick or wood, being considered as the image of a mountain, usually, though not invariably, of Mount Meru. In ancient Cambodia a temple was quite ordinarily referred to as "giri," mountain, and the many-tiered temples of Bali are still called Meru. The Cambodian inscriptions are very explicit with regard to such identifications. Thus, to give an example, one of them says that King Udayādityavarman II (11th century) "seeing that the Jambudvīpa had in its center a mountain of gold, provided for his capital city, too, to have a golden mountain in its interior. On the summit of this golden mountain, in a celestial palace resplendent with gold, he erected a lingam of Śiva."

THE LAY-OUT OF ANGKOR THOM

The actual ruins of Angkor Thom are the remains of the latest city on this site, built by king Jayavarman VII in the second half of the 12th century A.D. As Jayavarman was an adherent of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the central "mountain" in this case was a temple not of Śiva, but of the Bodhisatva Lokeśvara, the "Lord of the World," whose four faces adorn its numerous towers. The city was surrounded with a wall and moat forming a square almost two miles on each side, its sides being directed towards the four cardinal points. There are gates in the middle of each side and a fifth one on the East leading to the entrance of the royal palace. The towers above the gates are crowned with the same four-fold faces of Lokeśvara as those of the central

[3] Although Brahman and Buddhist cosmologies usually ascribe to the world a circular shape, the "cosmic" cities of Southeast Asia, with rare exceptions, affect the square form. It would take too long to explain this apparent, but not very important discrepancy.

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temple. Thus, that smaller world, the city of Angkor, and through its means the whole Khmer empire were both put under the protection of the "Lord of the Universe." The cosmic meaning of the city was further emphasized by a curious device. The balustrades of the causeways leading over the moat to the city gates were formed by rows of giant stone figures, partly gods, partly demons, holding an enormous nine-headed serpent. The whole city thus became a representation of the churning of the primeval milk ocean by gods and demons, when they used the serpent king Vāsuki as a rope and Mount Meru as churning stick.[4] This implies that the moat was meant to symbolize the ocean, and the Bayon, the temple in the center of the city, on which all the lines of churning gods and demons converged, Mount Meru itself.

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THE CAPITALS OF BURMA

Burmese chronicles say that Śrīkshetra (Old Prome) on the lower Irrawaddy, the capital city of the ancient kingdom of the Pyu, was built by the gods themselves with Indra at their head, built as an image of Indra's city Sudarśana on the summit of Mount Meru, with thirty-two main gates and a golden palace in its center. The remains of the city show in fact a decided attempt at a circular lay-out though complete regularity has not been achieved. It seems to have been an old custom in Burma that each of the capital's gates corresponded to one of the empire's provinces or vassal states. Thirty-two vassals or heads of provinces with the king as thirty-third in the center would of course correspond to the thirty-three gods who reside on the summit of Meru and among whom Indra is king. Thus not only the capital city but the whole empire of the Pyu must have been organized as an image of the heavenly realm of Indra.

In later capitals of Burma the square form was substituted for the circular one though the cosmological principle as such was retained. It will suffice to say a few words about Mandalay, the last capital of independent Burma, built by king Mindon in 1857 A.D. The inner city was surrounded by a wall and moat forming a square of more than a mile on each side, its sides facing the cardinal points. The royal palace, which occupied the center of the city, and more specifically the seven-tiered tower over the throne in the great audience hall, was identified with Mount Meru. There were three gates on each side of the city, twelve in all, and they were marked with the signs of the zodiak, thereby indicating that the city was meant to be an image of heaven with its stars spread out around the celestial mountain in its center.

[4] In the original myth Mount Mandara is used as churning stick. In Southeast Asiatic variants of the myth Mount Meru usually takes its place.

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COSMIC ROLES OF KING, COURT AND GOVERNMENT

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Thus the stage was set for the enacting of the cosmic roles of king, court and government. We may choose Burma as an example. There, the king was supposed to have four principal queens and four queens of secondary rank whose titles, "Northern Queen of the Palace," "Queen of the West," "Queen of the Southern Apartment," etc., show that they originally corresponded to the four cardinal points and the four intermediary directions. There are indications that at an earlier period their chambers actually formed a circle around the hall of the king, thereby emphasizing the latter's role as center of the universe and as representative of Indra, the king of the gods in the paradise on the summit of Mount Meru. Sir James George Scott's observation that king Thibaw's (the last Burmese king) failure to provide himself with the constitutional number of queens caused more concern to decorous, law-abiding people than the massacre of his blood relations, shows how important this cosmic setting was considered to be.[4] There were four chief ministers each of whom, in addition to their functions as ministers of state, originally had charge of one quarter of the capital and of the empire. They obviously corresponded to the four Great Kings or Lokapālas, the guardian deities of the four cardinal points in the Buddhist system. However, the task of representing the four Lokapālas had been delegated to four special officers, each of whom had to guard one side of the palace and of the capital. They had flags in the colors attributed to the corresponding sides of Mount Meru, the one representing Dhattarattha, the Lokapāla of the East, a white one, the officer representing Kubera, the Lokapāla of the North, a yellow flag, etc. The cosmological principle was carried far down through the hierarchy of officialdom, as revealed by the numbers of office bearers. Thus, there were four under-secretaries of state, eight assistant secretaries, four heralds, four royal messengers, etc.

Very much the same kind of organization existed in Siam, Cambodia and Java. Again and again we find the orthodox number of four principal queens and of four chief ministers, the "four pillars" as they were called in Cambodia. In Siam, as in Burma, they originally governed four parts of the kingdom lying toward the four cardinal points.

There are indications that in ancient times the cosmological structure of the state was carried even farther. I have already mentioned the probability that the old kingdom of the Pyu in Burma had thirty-two provinces or vassal states, their governors together with the king having corresponded to the

[4] Similarly, H. G. Quaritch Wales comments on the bad impression created among the people by the abolition of the harem system by king Rama VI of Siam.

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thirty-three gods of the paradise on the summit of Mount Meru. Similarly the kingdom of Pegu in the 14th century had thirty-two provinces. The principality of Keng Tung, one of the largest Shan States, significantly is called "The Thirty-two Towns of the Khün," the Khün being the ruling tribe in that state. A passage in the New History of the T'ang Dynasty indicates that the kingdom of Java in the 9th century was divided into twenty-eight provinces, their governors together with the four ministers again having numbered thirty-two high officials. This may have been a somewhat older form of the same system, in which the provinces corresponded to constellations, the twenty-eight "Houses of the Moon," and the four ministers to the guardian gods of the cardinal points. It is clear that in all these cases the empire was conceived as an image of the heavenly world of stars and gods.

Throughout the kingdoms of Farther India the system based on the compass was largely supplemented and modified by the division into offices of the right and left hand, right and left in this case referring to the place on the side of the king due to the respective office bearer on ceremonial occasions. As the king, when sitting on the throne, always faced the East, right corresponded to the South and left to the North. In Siam, for instance, there were a major and a lesser queen each of the right and of the left. Civilian officers had their places on the left of the king, officers of the army on his right, i.e. "in the South," because the planet Mars, connected with war, was considered to be the planet of the South. Indeed, the population of Siam was divided into the two classes of the right (South) and of the left (North). The former had to render military and the latter civilian services.

INFLUENCE ON CORONATION RITUAL

The cosmic and divine role of the king was and still is specially emphasized in the coronation ritual. In Burma the structure erected for this purpose was significantly called Thagya-nan, "Indra's Palace."[6] Even in the Buddhist kingdoms of Farther India the ritual is conducted by Brahmans. One of its principal features consists in the king sitting on a throne representing Mount Meru and being surrounded by eight Brahmans as representatives of the eight Lokapālas, the guardian gods of the eight directions in the Brahman world system. Moreover, four maids of honor, representing the four cardinal points, render homage to the king.

An official document published on the occasion of the coronation of king Sisowath of Cambodia in 1906 gives a slightly different explanation of the cosmic role of the king. According to this document the king is identified

[6] Thagya is the Burmese form of Sanskrit Śakra, the Buddhist designation for Indra.

643 772 with Mount Meru itself, his right eye representing the sun, his left eye the moon, his arms and legs the four cardinal points, the six-tiered umbrella above his head the six lower heavens, his pointed crown the spire of Indra's palace on the summit of the Meru and his slippers the earth. This means that the king is identified with the axis of the universe. The same idea seems to be expressed by the title Paku Buwono, "Nail of the World," of the Susuhunan of Solo in Java. However, the identification of the king with the Meru is in no way incompatible with that with Indra. Plural symbolism is very frequent in Buddhist Farther India. Thus in Burma, where the king has all the attributes of Indra, he was also identified with Viśvakarma, the divine architect and shaper of the world. Moreover, there is strong evidence of his having been identified also with the sun.

THE COSMIC STATE AND THE DIVINE KING

771 643 The cosmic state, as it existed in Southeast Asia, was intimately bound up with the idea of divine kingship. The divinity of kings was conceived in various ways according to the prevailing religion. Where Hinduism prevailed the king was considered to be either an incarnation of a god or a descendant from a god or both. Mostly it was Śiva who was thought to incarnate himself in kings or to engender dynasties. Thus in a Cham inscription of the 9th century Uroja, the founder of the royal dynasty, is said to have been a son of Śiva. The Javanese poem Nāgarakrtāgama (14th century) says bluntly that all kings are incarnations of Śiva. The same poem tells us more specially that king Rājasanagara of Majapahit (1350–1389 A.D.), as proved by various portents which occurred about the time of his birth, among others a volcanic eruption, was an incarnation of Bhatāra Girinātha, i.e. Śiva as "Lord of the Mountain." In the Javanese chronicle Pararaton king Krtajaya of Kadiri (13th century) on one occasion even shows himself in the superhuman form of Śiva with four arms and a third eye in the middle of the forehead and floating in the air. In ancient Cambodia and Champa the monarchy was intimately bound up with the cult of a lingam which was considered the seat of the divine essence of kingship. As we have seen, in Cambodia this lingam, representing the Devarāja, the "God King," was adored in the temple in the center of the capital. The actual king was considered to be a manifestation of the divine power of the Devarāja and therefore, as the latter's visible form, the lingam, implies, obviously of Śiva himself.

However, Śiva was not the only god to incarnate himself in kings. King Airlangga of Java (11th century) considered himself an incarnation of Vishnu. His memorial monument shows him in the form of Vishnu riding on

the latter's man-eagle Garuda. Another noteworthy example of an incarnation of Vishnu was king Sūryavarman II of Cambodia (12th century) who erected his own memorial monument as a gigantic temple of Vishnu: the famous Angkor Vat. We find further the idea of plural incarnation, also known from ancient India. Thus the Pararaton tells us that Angrok (13th century), the founder of the dynasty of Singasari and ancestor of the kings of Majapahit, was an incarnation of Vishnu, begotten by Brahmā from a mortal woman, and at the same time a son of Śiva. King Krtarājasa (died 1316 A.D.), the founder of the empire of Majapahit, is immortalized by a statue representing him as Harihara, a compound of Vishnu and Śiva. Even the simultaneous incarnation of Hindu and Mahāyāna Buddhist deities occurs. Thus, to quote only one example, the Javanese king Krtanagara (killed 1292 A.D.) was considered as an incarnation of Śiva as well as of the Dhyāni Buddha Akshobhya. Accordingly, he became known in Javanese tradition under the name of Śiva-Buddha.

It may be added that the theory of divine incarnation could be used not only as a means to exalt the position of the legitimate king, but equally well as a justification for usurpation of the throne. Thus the above mentioned Angrok, the founder of the kingdom of Singasari, was an usurper with a long criminal career as embezzler, robber and murderer. Yet, in spite of his criminal past, he became king, according to the Pararaton, because he was an incarnation of the gods.

The theory of divine incarnation as found in Hinduism and Mahāyāna Buddhism is incompatible with the doctrine of the Buddhism of the Hīnayāna. This difference in tenets is clearly expressed even in the lay-out of capital cities. In ancient Cambodia a temple formed the center of the capital and thus the Mount Meru of city and empire. In Burma the center of the capital is invariably occupied by the royal palace, and it is this latter which is identified with Mount Meru. In ancient Cambodia either Śiva in his form as Devarāja, the eternal essence of kingship, or the Bodhisatva Lokeśvara, the "Lord of the Universe," inhabited the "central mountain" and from there pervaded the empire. Hīnayānist Buddhism does not recognize an eternal deity. Indra is but the king of one of the lowest heavens, the second one from the earth. He is as little exempt from death and rebirth as any human being, except that his life lasts longer. The same may be said of the inhabitants of the higher heavens. All these "gods" of Hīnayāna Buddhism should more appropriately be called angels. They have no temples and no cults. Thus it is easy to understand why in Burma no temple could be set in the center of the capital city. The adaptation to cosmological principles and

361 the deification of the king here had to be attempted by other means. By erect-
771 ing the palace in the center of the city and by identifying it with Mount
Meru, the lord of the palace, i.e. the king, became automatically the repre-
● 643 sentative of Indra. We might even say that he was "the Indra" of this smaller
184 universe, the Burmese empire but he held his place only by the magic of
772 parallelism and he was no incarnation of the real Indra as the ancient Javanese and Cambodian kings had been incarnations of Śiva and Vishnu.[7] This scheme explains the great sanctity in which the royal palace was held in the Buddhist empires of Farther India. The palace was the symbol of the celestial mountain, nay, more than a mere symbol: it was "the Mount Meru" of the microcosmos Burma, or Siam, or Cambodia. Anybody nearing the palace had to show his reverence by dismounting from his horse, by shutting his parasol, by bowing to the palace spire or even kneeling down. Attempts to exact the same expressions of reverence from British envoys led to endless negotiations and frictions as the latter refused to comply with a demand which they
643 considered humiliating. "King of the Golden Palace" was one of the most
771 important titles of Burmese monarchs. Yet, the fact that the king "was Indra" and therefore ruler of the country only as possessor of the empire's Meru, the palace, involved great dangers. It worked as a constant temptation for would-be usurpers, be it from the ranks of the royal family or outsiders, as the occupation of the palace might be achieved by a coup-de-main with relatively small forces and usually meant the conquest of the whole empire. Many Burmese and Siamese kings therefore were virtual prisoners in their palace which they did not dare to leave for fear it might be seized by an usurper. The last king of Burma, Thibaw, preferred even to forego the important coronation ritual of the circumambulation of the capital to offering one of his relatives a chance to make himself master of the palace while he was away.

In Hīnayāna Buddhism the idea of divine incarnation as justification of kingship is replaced by that of rebirth and of religious merit. It is his good karma, his religious merit acquired in previous lives, which makes a man be born a king or makes him acquire kingship during his lifetime, be it even by rebellion and murder. A typical instance is that of king Nyaung-u Sawrahan (10th century) as told in the Glass Palace Chronicle of the Kings of Burma. Nyaung-u Sawrahan, a farmer, kills the king who has trespassed on his garden and whom he had not recognized. Thereupon he is himself made king against his wish. So strong is his karma that, when one of the ministers ob-

[7] However, strong traces of the belief that Śiva and Vishnu incarnate themselves in the king survive in the coronation rituals of Siam and Cambodia.

14: Heine-Geldern E-4 (no date) 1942 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

jects to his installation, the stone statue of a guardian deity at the palace door becomes alive and kills the minister. The chronicle's comment is significant: "Although in verity king Sawrahan should have utterly perished, having killed a king when he was yet a farmer, he attained even to kingship simply by strong karma of his good acts done in the past." But the moment the karma of his past good acts is exhausted, that same stone statue which formerly had killed his adversary becomes alive again and hurls him from the palace terrace.

No merit could exceed that of a service rendered to the Buddha himself. Thus the Glass Palace Chronicle tells us that the ogre-guardian of a mountain, who had shielded the Buddha from the sun with three leaves, had received from the latter a prophecy that he would thrice become king of Burma. In the 10th century he is reborn in lowly surroundings as Saleh Ngahkwe, who later becomes king by murdering his predecessor and, "being reborn from the state of an ogre, was exceeding wrathful and haughty," indulging in gluttony and sadistic murder, till he is at last killed by his own ministers. One should think that the merit of having shaded the Buddha would have been exhausted by a life full of crimes. However, according to the Burmese chronicle, this is not so. The former mountain spirit is reborn in the 12th century as prince Narathu who becomes king by murdering his father and brother and throughout his reign excells by bloody deeds, and in the 13th century as king Narathihapate. This leads us to a very characteristic conception of historical events as based on the enormous importance attributed to prophecies and portents. Indeed, one could say that, especially as far as alleged prophecies of the Buddha are concerned, in the view of Burmese historians events are not prophesied because they will happen, but they happen because they have been prophesied. The "discovery" of ancient prophecies and the "observation" of contemporary portents was a generally used expedient in Burmese politics and still forms a potent factor in what we may call political folk-lore.

The whole idea and outward form of kingship in Southeast Asia, and specially in the Buddhist kingdoms of Farther India, was of course based on the conception of the Chakravartin, the Universal Monarch. Now it is known that a Chakravartin is the worldly alternative to a Bodhisatva, a future Buddha. Under these circumstances the theory of rebirth and of karma was bound to induce monarchs with a very high idea of their religious merits to consider themselves as Bodhisatvas. Thus, Oung Zaya, the founder of the last dynasty of Burma, took as king the name Alaungpaya which designated him as an Embryo Buddha. His son, king Bodawpaya (1782–1819), claimed outright to be the Bodhisatva Maitreya. However, his claim was rejected by the clergy

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643 771 and he dropped it. A similar claim was put forth by king Taksin of Siam (1767–1782).

The theory of vocation to kingship either on the basis of divine incarnation, as in Java and ancient Cambodia, or by karma acquired in former lives, as in Burma, Siam and modern Cambodia, did not deprive that of the heredity of the right to the crown of its importance. Again and again usurpers have striven for a semblance of legitimacy by construing genealogies linking themselves either to the dynasty they had overthrown or to a dynasty which at an earlier period had governed the country. Occasionally, phantastic genealogies were constructed deriving native Southeast Asiatic dynasties from some famous dynasty of ancient India. The best known case is that of the recent kings of Cambodia who claim descent from the ancient kings of Indraprastha (Delhi). The last Burmese dynasty, founded by a village headman in the 18th century, claimed descent from the Sakya kings of Kapilavatthu, a claim which would have made them blood relatives of the Buddha himself. One type of such fictitious genealogies deserves special attention as it has a deeper meaning than merely to serve the glorification of the dynasty. The kings of Funan (3rd to 7th centuries A.D.) and those of ancient Cambodia were said to descend from a Brahman who had come from India and from the daughter of the serpent king of the country. The legend is still alive in Cambodia, the Brahman being replaced in the modern version by a prince of Indraprastha. It seems that similar dynastic legends existed in most parts of Southeast Asia. The meaning is clear. The Nāgas, the serpent demons, are the original masters of the soil. By his descent from the daughter of the Nāga king the monarch had a legitimate claim to the soil of his kingdom which, in theory at least, thereby became his personal property. A Chinese report tells us that in the 13th century the people of Cambodia believed that the king nightly cohabited with the serpent goddess of the soil who visited him in his palace in human form. Obviously he was thought thereby to renew the connection between himself and the soil of his kingdom. Thus the king in ancient Cambodia, as an incarnation of the Devarāja and as a descendant and at the same time spouse of the goddess of the soil, formed a real magic center linking the empire to the divine forces of the heavens as well as of the earth.

643 772 Any account of the conceptions of state and kingship in Southeast Asia would be incomplete without at least mentioning the great importance of the regalia. Some of these, as the umbrella and the crown, have cosmological meaning as noted above. Moreover, the umbrella was thought to be the seat of a protective genius who favored the king with his advice and who in critical moments might even actively intervene on behalf of the dynasty. Other

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regalia are thought to be possessed of magic forces, such as the royal sword of Cambodia which, it is believed, if drawn from its scabbard without the prescribed ritual, would bring disaster upon the country. This magical character of the regalia is even more stressed in the Malay Peninsula and in Indonesia. It culminates in the curious conception prevalent among the Bugis and Makassarese of Celebes, according to which it is really the regalia which reign, the prince governing the state only in their name. 643 772

The deification of the king, while raising him to an almost unbelievably exalted position with regard to his subjects, has in no way succeeded in stabilizing government, rather the contrary. As explained above, the theory of divine incarnation, and even more so that of rebirth and of karma, provided an easy subterfuge for usurpers. The fact that the relatively easy task of seizing the palace, as in Burma and Siam, of or seizing the regalia, as in certain parts of Indonesia, often sufficed to be accepted as king by the whole nation, was bound to act as an additional incitement to rebellion. Moreover, the immense power and the lack of restrictions which the king enjoyed invited to abuses which in the end made the monarch obnoxious to his subjects and hastened his downfall. To this came the vagueness of the rules of succession. Sometimes the king himself chose his successor. Sometimes the ministers appointed a prince as king. Then again the queens unofficially but efficiently exercised their influence in favor of a prince of their choice. Often the crown simply fell to the prince who was the quickest to seize the palace and to execute his brothers. Under these circumstances it is no wonder that the empires of Southeast Asia from the very beginning were torn by frequent rebellion, often resulting in the overthrow of kings or even dynasties. The earliest reports we have, those from Chinese sources on the kingdom of Funan, reveal such conditions to have existed as early as the 3rd century A.D. If there was a long period of oppression and unrest, rebellion and its concomitant, dacoity, could become practically a popular tradition which it was difficult to eradicate. Such was the case, for instance, in Burma during the 18th and 19th centuries, and it is in the light of such a past that recent events in that country ought to be seen. 643 771

SURVIVAL OF TRADITIONS

In order to realize how deeply the populations of Farther India were affected by the cosmological structure of the state one need only think of the division of the Siamese people into the classes of the right and of the left which, not long ago, determined the services each person was obliged to render to the state. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the cosmomagic 643 772

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643 principle as applied to the state really forms only part of a much wider com-
772 plex and resulted from a conception of the universe and of human existence which regulated, and to a large extent still regulates, also the private lives of individuals. When in Siam and Cambodia people wore cloths of different color on different days of the week according to the color ascribed to the planet for whom the day is named, or when in Burma before any important undertaking they examine their horoscope and the lore of lucky and unlucky days, or when they kneel down for prayer on that side of the pagoda which in the cosmological system corresponds to the planet of the weekday on which they were born, they act on the same principle which governed the structure of their empires, their ideas of kingship and the ritual of their royal courts. It is clear then that the cosmomagic ideas, until a very recent past, had an extremely strong hold on the minds of the people.

Is all this a crumbling structure, giving way under the impact of modern civilization or may it still influence the political activities of the peoples concerned? The question is not easily answered. Information on this point is scarce. There are, however, a few indications.

669 We have it on the authority of H. G. Quaritch Wales that the people of
643 Siam, around 1930, still held the ancient state ceremonies in high esteem, those
772 ceremonies which to a large extent are governed by cosmological ideas. One may ask oneself, how much of this old tradition may have been at the bottom of the royalist rebellion of 1933.

In Burma the following cases may be considered as significant. In 1897, twelve years after the annexation of Upper Burma by the British, a Buddhist monk, U Kelatha, fell in love with a princess of the dethroned dynasty who promised to marry him if he became king of Burma. There followed the usual dreams or visions which revealed to him that in a former life he had been a Burmese prince and, moreover, that he would be king the moment he sat on the throne of the palace in Mandalay. With eighteen followers, all armed with swords only, he rushed through the city gates and tried to reach the royal palace, at that time seat of the English club. A few English officers armed with hunting rifles made an end to his attempt. The incident proves the extreme vividness of cosmomagic ideas at the close of the 19th century. As we have seen, whoever held the palace, the Mount Meru of the Burmese empire, thereby became the representative of Indra and king. It is completely in accord with the cosmomagic way of thinking that U Kelatha and his followers believed the mere occupation of the throne would make him automatically lord of the whole empire.

Unfortunately, very little authentic information is available on the Burmese

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rebellion of 1930–31. However, the following detail, as revealed at the time by newspaper dispatches, is significant. One of the first actions of Saya San, the leader of the rebellion, was to build a "palace," in reality a bamboo hut somewhere in the jungle, with an inscription designating it as the "Palace of the Buddhist King." It is, of course, very easy to ridicule such pretensions, but it is more important to understand them. We have seen how inseparable king and palace were according to Burmese ideas. No kingdom could exist without a palace representing Mount Meru and forming its magic center, and the king, the "Lord of the Golden Palace," was king in the first line by his possession of the palace. Saya San's action in building a palace, a magic center for his embryonic empire, therefore corresponds closely to that of U Kelatha when he wanted to seat himself on the throne of the palace in Mandalay. 643 772 669

The story of the Myinmu rebellion of 1910, as told by Paul Edmonds in his book *Peacocks and Pagodas*, if it does not directly contribute to our knowledge of cosmomagic ideas, at least gives a significant instance of the power of the belief in rebirth, prophecies and portents. A young man of eighteen years, Maung Than, was returning from work in the fields smoking a cigar. Some people who passed him thought they saw smoke issuing from his arms. They talked about it in the village and the rumour reached some elders who were familiar with an old tradition according to which a former king of Burma, Chanyeiktha, would be reborn in the shape of a youth who had the power of making smoke issue from his arms. "Other signs and portents were looked for. Needless to say, they were forthcoming. The griffins at the foot of an old pagoda were seen to shake; gold showers fell on another pagoda; and everywhere omens multiplied which pointed to young Maung Than as the long-foretold reincarnation of king Chanyeiktha." Maung Than entered into the spirit of the game and put forth the usual claims of being invulnerable and of possessing the power to make himself invisible. With a crowd of a thousand followers armed with swords and spears he attacked the police station at Myinmu but was repulsed and eventually captured.

These incidents may suffice to show how lively the ideas of cosmic state and kingship, of rebirth and prophecy still are in Burma. I have little doubt that they played a role in the events accompanying the Japanese invasion. It can easily be predicted that whatever government will exist in Burma after the war, will have to reckon with these ideas and with the possibility of similar outbreaks as those mentioned above, perhaps even on a larger scale owing to the emotions stirred up by the present turmoil.

While certain dangers for peace and order inherent in the cosmomagic conception thus must be said to persist, one may ask whether there is any 000

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

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their births have been registered with the consulates of their country of origin (in Indochina there was no Chinese consulate before 1935 and in Siam before 1946). In Burma the census report for 1931 stated that for some years it had been the custom for the male offspring of unions between Chinese men and Burmese women to assume the race of the father and for the female offspring to assume the race of the mother, so that, if we are to regard all offspring of the second generation of mixed marriages as Chinese, a considerable compensation has here to be made to the existing figures.

Ethnic[1] *Chinese in Southeast Asia*

Census figures in ordinary type: estimates in italics

	Chinese				Total population (all races)	
	1921 or circa	*1931 or circa*	*1937 or circa*	*1947*		*1947*[2]
Burma	149,000	194,000	..	*300,000*	16,824,000 (1941)	*17,000,000*
Siam	260,000[3] (1919)	445,000[3] (1929)	524,000[3]	*2,500,000*	14,464,000 (1937)	*17,359,000*
Indochina	293,000[3]	418,000[3]	326,000[3] *467,000* (1940)	*850,000*	23,030,000 (1937)	*27,000,000*
Malaya	1,172,000	1,704,000	2,379,000 (1941)	2,615,000[4]	5,849,000[5] (1947)	5,849,000
British Borneo[6]	..	..	..	*220,000*	..	*878,000*
Indonesia	809,000 (1920)	1,233,000 (1930)	..	*1,900,000*	60,727,000 (1930)	*69,000,000*
Philippines	44,000 (1918)	*72,000* (1933)	117,487 (1939)	*120,000*[7]	*18,846,800*[8] (1946)	*19,511,000*
			Total: Ethnic Chinese	*8,505,000* (say *8,500,000*)	All races	*156,597,000* (say *160,000,000*)

[1] Except where marked 3 (see below).

[2] In this column all the totals by countries, except for Malaya where the 1947 census is followed, are those of the United Nations Statistical Office for mid-1947, cited at p. 13 of *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1948* (Lake Success, United Nations, 1949).

[3] 'Legal' Chinese (i.e. according to local law), i.e. Chinese citizens, or 'Immigrants from China'.

[4] Federation of Malaya 1,885,000; Colony of Singapore 730,000.

[5] Federation of Malaya 4,908,000; Colony of Singapore 941,000.

[6] 1921 census for North Borneo gave only 38,000; 1931 census gave North Borneo 48,000, Brunei 3,000, Labuan 2,000; an enumeration in 1939 gave 124,000 Chinese for Sarawak; 1947 census gave Sarawak 145,000. (Labuan was returned to North Borneo in 1946. 1941 estimate gave North Borneo Chinese 59,000.)

[7] An estimate of the Immigration Bureau (1948) gave 101,000 but 120,000 is here given to allow for illegal immigration, &c. (see text below).

[8] Estimate of Immigration Bureau.

Let us now consider the situation country by country.

In Malaya, at the census of 1947, 2,615,000 Chinese were counted. In this country 'Chinese' is more ethnographically exact than in any other country of Southeast Asia because since large-scale immigration from China began over half a century ago there has been

7: Furnivall
642, 647, 648, 471

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[For a theoretical discussion of the necessity for granting political autonomy to the colonial dependencies of western states and the required changes in administrative practices and economic policy, see cat. 116, pp. 468-512; for discussion of the relationship between the colonies and the colonial powers in the modern world, and the author's proposal for international collaboration in preparing the colonies for eventual independence, see pp. 513-550.]

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Enquiry' by Wellenstein, a technique has been developed for turning to the best account such statistics as have any bearing on native welfare.[1] 803

Lord Hailey has remarked that in Africa the existing statistics might be considerably improved without additional expense, and that a comparatively small expenditure would make them much more useful. That remark applies also to Burma and probably to most other tropical dependencies. Unsatisfactory as the statistics for Netherlands India are in some respects, they do at least serve to illuminate many corners that are left dark elsewhere, and the general neglect to provide means for judging how far the benevolent aspirations expressed in statements of colonial policy bear fruit in practice, naturally affords a handle for critics of colonial administration to suggest that it is more keenly interested in economic progress than in native welfare. It is not enough that material should be available for measuring individual welfare. The analysis of welfare demands a suitable technique for measuring social welfare by presenting accurate and intelligible information regarding debt, civil litigation, crime, health, education and other matters that find no place in individual budgets of income and expenditure. There would still remain imponderable elements, those cultural and religious aspects of social life in the tropics which are the first to suffer from the economic struggle for survival of the cheapest consequent on the impact of the West. But this is no reason for neglecting to carry so far as possible the objective scientific measurement of welfare.

4. The Machinery of Welfare

The deficiency of statistical material is a notable defect in the machinery of welfare. But it is not the only, and not the chief, defect. It may seem that no special machinery is necessary, that the care for welfare may be left to the local official charged with the maintenance of order. That is very largely true. Any European official can tell the people that dirt breeds disease, or explain the benefit of vaccination, or advise them to destroy mosquitoes and rats, or bring to their knowledge new and more profitable crops, or suggest new breeds of cattle, or inculcate the advantages of thrift and the danger of getting entangled with money-lenders. None of the most urgent reforms in the daily life of tropical peoples calls for special scientific equipment beyond the stock of knowledge common to educated Europeans. Natives have frequently 657 654 177 647

[1] Furnivall, *Economic Journal of India*, 1934, p. 295.

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adopted of their own accord innovations which appeal to them, and it would seem possible for European officials to recommend European standards of hygiene and other reforms with little or no expenditure on welfare services. It is true that modern science has done much and can do more for the welfare of tropical peoples. The connection between rats and plague and between mosquitoes and malaria are recent scientific discoveries, and scientists have traced the origin of hookworm and beri-beri. There is unbounded scope for research, and useful expenditure on it is limited only by the funds available. But it is well to remember that research does not bear fruit until it is applied to daily life; its practical application depends on the efficiency of the machinery of welfare.

It is true also that administrative officials should be better able to promote welfare if they have the assistance of departmental specialists. But departmental specialists will usually need the help of administrative officials if they are to get into touch with the people in their daily life. The departmental specialist is probably an expert in his own line, but one can hardly expect him also to be expert in native economy and customs or to be proficient in native languages. It is useless for the medical officer to advocate shoes for hookworm if the people cannot afford to buy shoes, or for the sanitary department to devise modern latrines which the people will not use, or for the agriculturist to recommend crops which local conditions of labour or water supply do not allow the people to grow. Although the specialist may try to adapt native life to scientific principles, the administrative official should be capable of adapting scientific principles to native life. Thus the welfare specialist must ordinarily work in double harness with the administrative official by his side. But the administrative official can do little to promote welfare unless he knows the locality, and what needs doing; has influence that will lead the people to attend to his advice; and remains among them long enough to make certain that they act on it. All these conditions must be fulfilled if welfare work is to succeed.

The machinery ordinarily employed differs according as the system of rule is direct or indirect. In the adoption of direct rule one object was to promote greater welfare through liberating the people from arbitrary oppression by their own chieftains. On this plan all the administrative officials, European and native, became servants of the law, charged with administering equal law to all. When it became apparent that the law, while liberating the people from arbitrary will,

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subjected them to mechanical economic forces, attempts were made to protect them against the action of these forces. That is the distinctive character of welfare machinery under direct rule; it allows free play within the law to economic forces, but attempts to mitigate their consequences. This is directly contrary to the method of indirect rule, systematized by Van den Bosch in Java, which tries to soften the impact of economic forces by leaving the people under their own chieftains and their own customs, while aiming to protect them against arbitrary oppression. Direct rule attempts to mitigate the action of economic forces; indirect rule aims at providing a buffer against their action. There is a corresponding difference in the machinery of welfare.

(*a*) *Direct Rule.* It is often suggested or implied that the promotion of welfare in the tropics requires nothing more than the provision of funds for the services of experts. But this view disregards the conditions limiting their activities. The application of science to the affairs of daily life is quite a novel idea even in Europe; each generation of doctors regards its predecessors as unscientific, and in agriculture, hygiene, dietetics and other studies, what is held for true to-day may be out of date to-morrow. But the tropics are still almost virgin lands in science; experience in Europe may be misleading and conclusions based on it invalid. Conditions are different or even contrary. Cultivation requires a cool soil instead of a warm soil; natives apparently maintain good health on a diet that, according to western science, is defective; plague and malaria were spread by measures intended to prevent them. The application of modern science to tropical problems requires long and patient research, and continuity of experiment. But tropical life is adverse to continuity; men go on leave or are transferred for administrative convenience. Lack of continuity nullified experiments on rice cultivation in Malaya, and official transfers hampered the researches of Ross on malaria. Moreover, any single problem may, and often does, require a whole staff of experts for its solution. In agriculture the investigation of a single crop disease may need the collaboration of agricultural experts, botanists, entomologists and so on. The same principle applies in almost all departments of economic and social life. If the agricultural expert, by patient research breeds a more productive variety of some generally grown crop, the people may be unable to take advantage of it because of difficulties in the supply of labour, water or credit; his work raises new problems for a wide circle of other departmental specialists and it will be wasted without their co-operation.

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It is easy, given the funds, to multiply economic and social services. But the multiplication of service tends to defeat its own ends, and greater expenditure gives worse results through excessive departmentalism. Each specialist looks at life through departmental blinkers. The agriculturist sees nothing but the crops, the veterinary expert only the cattle; to the sanitary inspector the latrine is more important than the home, and the policeman would guarantee security more confidently if the whole population were in jail. Often the experts are at issue. The agriculturist advocates grazing reserves to provide fodder, while the veterinary officer wants to close them to prevent infection; the fishery officer advises the people to breed fish, and the medical officer drains the ponds to kill mosquitoes. Everywhere the specialist inclines to a narrow view of life, but in the tropics departmentalism has peculiar dangers; in Europe the expert looks at a familiar world, but in the tropics, owing to his ignorance of native life, the field is out of focus. In Europe the expert understands the public and the public understands the expert, because they have a common background, but in the tropics it is only the European community in the towns and western enterprise that has a mutual understanding with the expert and values his assistance. Thus the natives in towns prefer to live in the native quarter, where they can escape the unwelcome attentions of the sanitary inspector, 'whose unreasonable prejudice against picturesque filth is never understood';[1] and plantation coolies, on returning home, lapse into their old comfortable ways. Moreover in Europe there is an organic community, living its own life, which can decide for itself what it wants most; but in the tropics, where innovations are pressed on the people from outside, there naturally ensues a lack of co-ordination between the competing and often contrary activities of the departmental specialists; too many cooks, as usual, spoil the broth. The confusion may be mitigated on the Dutch plan by grouping allied services in large departments under a single head. But this device alone is insufficient. What an organic community does by the dynamic force of its inherent vitality must in the tropics be entrusted to some official personifying, as it were, the common social will. There must be someone to co-ordinate the activities of departmental specialists and to foster a demand among the people for their services.

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Under direct rule the District officer, the local civil servant in charge

[1] Burns, p. 306.

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of general administration, is expected to discharge these functions, and to act as a link between the experts and the people. One condition of success is that he should have an intimate acquaintance with tropical economy. So far as he is assisted by native subordinates, they should so far as possible understand these principles of western social life which they are expected to spread among the people. In both these matters Dutch standards are far higher than the British.[1] It seems that training for the British Colonial Service has lagged behind that given by Holland, France and Belgium. Yet the Colonial Service can claim to be ahead of the Sudan and Indian, as well as of the Home Civil Service in this respect. The British system of training administrative officials is a survival from the days of *laissez-faire* when an officer was expected to do little more than try cases and collect the revenue. Tropical administration has never been regarded, like law and medicine, as a profession requiring vocational instruction. European officials while on probation undergo a short course which does not give them any background for their work, and in Burma and probably elsewhere, native subordinates receive no training whatever—a university degree or proficiency as a clerk is regarded as sufficient qualification for administrative work. In Netherlands India, on the contrary, European civil servants are given a five years' course designed to help them to understand the East, and native civil servants a three years' course designed to give them an understanding of the West. Moreover, Dutch officials in Java, for some twelve years after their arrival in the country, have no judicial or executive authority, whereas British officials from their earliest days are primarily magistrates and collectors of revenue; they have neither the training, nor the practical experience, nor the time to acquire the general understanding of native life that is necessary if they are to help departmental specialists to turn their activities to the best account.

But the most thorough preliminary education in tropical economy will avail little without local knowledge, local influence and opportunity to exercise effective supervision. For all these continuity of tenure is essential. Under direct rule, however, there is no permanent element in the administration. In Africa an officer in Kenya was posted to as many as eleven different districts within six years, and the problem of frequent transfers exists possibly in a more acute form in West Africa. This is characteristic of tropical administration in

[1] *African Survey*, p. 224; O'Malley, p. 255. Furnivall, *JRCAS*, July 1939 *Koloniaal Tijdschrift*, May 1938, p. 273; 1946, Cmd. Col. 198, p. 22.

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general, and is found also in Dutch, French and Belgian dependencies.[1] A contrast is often suggested between modern conditions and the 'good old days'. Yet in Burma, though the numerous transfers were deplored sixty years ago, no remedy has yet been found. In India, in the placid days before the Mutiny, the normal period of service in any one post seems to have been eight or nine months, and that was the case also in Burma under the East India Company, right back to the first years of British rule.[2] Lack of continuity is universal and inveterate.

'Universal experience shows that lack of continuity in the administrative services produces one inevitable result—the decay of the factor of personality and the substitution of a mechanical routine of administration.'[3] One symptom of routine is that everything must be reduced to writing, and as far back as we can go we find this symptom of the disease; and always, so great is the lack of continuity in tropical administration, we find it, as at present, deplored as something new. Eighty years ago in Burma officers were complaining that, if reports continued to multiply, officials might be found to write them, but no one would have time to read them. In 1830 the East India Company framed rules to reduce correspondence. Still earlier Munro complained that 'unless we contrive to reduce the quantity of reading the members of Government will have no time for giving consideration to matters of general importance'.[4] We have no time to think, says the harassed official of the present day, but his predecessors have always made the same complaint, since the time of Sir John Shore (Lord Teignmouth) in 1790: 'The members comprising it (the British Government in India) are in a constant state of fluctuation and the period of their residence often expires before experience can be acquired or reduced to practice. Official forms necessarily occupy a large portion of time, and the constant pressure of business leaves little leisure for study and reflection.'[5] What is new in modern administration is that more is attempted, and the machinery is therefore more elaborate and more obvious. Specialization multiplies departments and concentrates co-ordination in the secretariat, which functions as a clearing house for departmental activities. That is a mark of Dutch administration as much as of British administration, perhaps even more deeply imprinted because the Dutch system is more intensive. Dutch officials, like

[1] Bousquet, p. 109; *African Survey*, pp. 231, 237, 243.
[2] *RAB*, 1880–1, p. 8; *RRA*, 1899–1900, p. 53; Bright, I, 101.
[3] *African Survey*, p. 231.
[4] Gleig, p. 321; *Corr. TD*, pp. 2, 85.
[5] *5th Report Select Committee*, 1812, p. 11; O'Malley, p. 193.

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their British fellows, deplore the concentration of authority in the secretariat, and complain that they spend the first fortnight of each year reporting what during the past year they have seen, done—and reported. Nowadays there is more machinery, but the administration has always functioned mechanically because there has always been a lack of continuity and it must needs function mechanically unless informed by human will.

Transient officials cannot possibly acquire the local knowledge that is necessary for promoting welfare. The District officer must know the district of which he is in charge. Natural forces, such as erosion, operate continually but gradually. So also do economic forces, leading to indebtedness and land alienation, to the disappearance of communal land in villages and to overcrowding and disease in towns. Sometimes remedial action might be possible in the early stages, but officials come and go, and they notice these things, if at all, only when they can do nothing to cure them.

A knowledge of the district is of little avail without a knowledge of the people. The British tradition of colonial rule may undervalue the study of tropical economy as academic, unpractical, but it recognizes, at least in theory, the importance of an acquaintance with the local inhabitants; it portrays the District officer as 'the father and mother' of his people. Yet where officials follow one another at intervals of a few weeks or months, it takes a wise child to know its father; and the father cannot have any close acquaintance with his family or families, the bewildering succession of adopted foundlings.

Unless the District officer knows the people he cannot exercise personal influence. The need for personal influence was recognized in the recent proposals for mass education:

> 'Guidance and leadership are clearly of the first importance. The effective guidance given by governments will depend on the vigour and sincerity with which those responsible for government face their task and recognise their responsibility, not only towards the people as a whole, but as inspiring leaders of the agencies which the Governments themselves directly or indirectly control. Of these agencies the district officers have a crucial part to perform. Their close and varied contact with the lives of the people affords unique opportunities for fruitful guidance. In effect they can largely make or mar the efforts of welfare workers and other departmental officers.'[1]

But, as we have seen, although the contact of district officers with the people may be varied, it can hardly be described as close. Under the

[1] *Mass Education*, p. 9.

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system of direct rule the only people with whom the ordinary district officer becomes acquainted, outside his court and office, are those who push themselves forward in the hope of a decoration or a job; he may meet people in the villages, but he has no time or leisure to make friends among them, and appears to them as an official rather than as a man.

In order to acquire the personal influence needed for the promotion of welfare among a backward people, sympathy is essential; one must share their feelings. Yet one cannot share the feelings of people whom one does not know, or knows merely in the mass and not as individuals; sympathy requires more than mere acquaintance through official intercourse during a few months. Moreover, under direct rule the official is primarily a magistrate and tax collector, and that has long been recognized as a barrier to sympathy. As Munro observed, a man posted to judicial duties 'learns forms before he learns things. He becomes full of the respect due to the Court but knows nothing of the people. He has little opportunity of seeing them except in court. He sees only the worst of them and under the worst shapes; he sees them only as plaintiffs or defendants or as criminals, and the unfavourable opinion with which he too often enters among them, in place of being removed by experience, is every day strengthened and increased.'[1] It is a common complaint that under indirect rule, in Java or Malaya, officials coddle the people, treat them as children; but under direct rule they are apt to treat them as naughty children.

Without sympathy for the people among officials, there can be no confidence in officials among the people; they will not confide in one unless they know him as a man. In Burma the mistrust of officials is accepted as a fact, and is often ascribed to the native tradition that Government is one of the five enemies of the common man. It is more comfortable to attribute this mistrust to the character of the people rather than to defects in the administrative machinery; but one finds the same mistrust in India, where the people have known British rule for longer even than in the maritime provinces of Lower Burma. While writing these pages an instance comes to hand. 'It is pathetic', remarks an observer of the recent famine in Bengal, 'to see the crowds of destitute lying on the Calcutta pavements rise and scatter when they are approached by anyone who looks like an official'[2]—not neces-

[1] Gleig, p. 27.
[2] *Daily Telegraph*, 2 Nov. 1943.

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sarily, of course, a European official. The same report tells of an official who was lynched by the peasants whom he was trying to provide with food. That is not the atmosphere in which a constructive welfare policy can flourish. 'It is significant', says Lord Hailey, 'that a sentiment of alienation or estrangement has rarely shown itself in the earlier days of British administration.'[1] But there must be something wrong with the machinery of welfare if people like it worse as they get to know it better, and one defect certainly is the lack of continuity in the administrative services.

Even if an official can gain sufficient influence to induce the people to accept reforms, his work is incomplete. He must remain long enough to see that they adopt the reforms, not merely because they trust him but because they recognize their value or come to accept them as a habit. Take, for instance, the matter of erosion. An official who knows his district may detect it in an early stage; if he has influence among the people he may induce them to abstain from the cultivation or wood-cutting that is causing the erosion. The cultivators may promise to allow the scrub to grow, but some years must elapse before there is any noticeable difference, and all the time they will be subject to the lure of making a small addition to their income. One or two will succumb, and others will follow their example. If an official who is keen on sanitation tries to enforce housing rules that will improve living conditions but reduce rents, the owners of house property know that they need only bide their time, because he will soon be replaced by some new official with other interests. Successive officials may be zealous for education, for co-operative credit or for sanitation; but, as each one leaves the district, nothing remains of his enthusiasm but a new layer on the dust-heap of abortive projects. Not unnaturally, many lose their early enthusiasm and lapse into cynical indifference, content just to carry on. But, while successive welfare projects fade and are forgotten, anti-social forces, natural and economic, hold the field.

It is comparatively easy for officials to promote economic progress. If an official begins to build a road, although it may and often does relapse into jungle after his departure, a successor, if so minded, can easily go on with it. But in the promotion of welfare, as for example by founding schools or promoting co-operative credit, continued personal influence is indispensable and, as the Dutch remark, when this is withdrawn, everything sinks back into the mire.

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 36.

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•647 It is easy likewise to promote reforms that are immediately and demonstrably profitable to individuals; these indeed require little recommendation. Good wine needs no bush. But the reforms most urgently needed for promoting welfare impose unwelcome restrictions on the people and offer distant and doubtful benefits; such reforms require close and constant supervision if they are to be adopted into native custom. The District officer, like the departmental specialist, can do something to further economic progress, but the conditions under which he works make it almost impossible for him to promote native welfare.

Under direct rule, which implies the rule of law, the District officer is further hindered in promoting welfare by the fact that all his actions must be kept within the law. In the promotion of welfare as in the collection of revenue, he is as closely bound by legal procedure as in the trial of cases in court when sitting as a magistrate or judge, and he must be prepared to defend his acts against trained advocates who will insist on the letter of the law.[1] The same rule applies to all departmental subordinates. They are liable to legal penalties if they exceed their functions, but are exposed to little risk, and, as we have seen in Burma, may add appreciably to their income, if they fall short of them. It is improbable that in this matter Burma is exceptional. Under inadequate supervision the multiplication of welfare services means the multiplication of corruption, and the subordinate who takes a small gratuity to condone the breach of welfare regulations acquires merit with the public at the same time that he fills his pocket. Hence the expenditure of revenue on social services may even promote corruption rather than welfare, and impose new burdens instead of conferring new benefits. Every elaboration of the machinery of welfare calls for closer supervision by the District officer and, at the same time, increases the difficulty of supervision. Unless the District officer knows the district and the people, he can rarely penetrate the conspiracy of silence which conceals such irregularities, and if he hears of them he does not hold charge long enough to punish them. Under the rule of law, suspected offences must be proved according to forms of law, which operate to protect offenders. Moreover, the difficulty of action by the District officer is enhanced because he has little or no authority over departmental subordinates, as these are directly responsible to their departmental superiors. Thus, although it may seem that specialist services should assist the District officer to promote welfare, they are often, in

[1] O'Malley, p. 96.

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fact, of very little use. The most urgent welfare measures require no more than common sense. If the District officer has sufficient local knowledge and influence he can induce the people to accept them and, without this knowledge and influence, the multiplication of subordinates is a hindrance rather than a help. Thus the machinery of direct rule, which served originally to mitigate oppression in the native world, does not fulfil the conditions essential to the promotion of welfare in the modern world.

(*b*) *Indirect Rule.* Under the system of indirect rule the promotion of welfare is approached from a different angle. This system accepts the position that western rule in the tropics liberates anti-social economic forces from the control of custom, and thereby produces changes that are detrimental to native social life. 'So far as deliberate policy can affect the issue', writes Lord Hailey with reference to Africa, 'it is clear that in the interests of the African himself, it should seek to moderate the pace of change, and allow full scope for the innate characteristics of the people to assert themselves in the conflict of forces that must ensue.'[1] That may be claimed as the principle underlying the policy of indirect rule. The functions and limitations of the departmental specialist are the same under indirect rule as under direct rule, and on both systems the officer in charge of general administration serves to link up departmental specialists with the people. But on the system of indirect rule some native authority, assumed to represent the people, can exercise personal influence among them and is more or less permanent. Indirect rule would seem, therefore, to comply better than direct rule with the conditions for promoting welfare.

As already noticed, there is a wide difference between the Dutch and British interpretations of indirect rule. On the original Dutch model, which still dominates their conception, the 'recognized or appointed heads' were regarded as native chieftains, and, so long as they maintained order and complied with Government requirements for produce and services, they were left to govern the people according to native law and custom with no interference from European officials. Since then western law has been adopted for all classes in criminal proceedings, and taxation along western lines has replaced the customary dues and services, but the officials of the administrative service in Java, whether European or native, try no cases (with insignificant exceptions), and have no formal connection with either magisterial or revenue work. British colonial

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1280.

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administration, however, even under indirect rule, derives its inspiration from the tradition of equality before the law that took shape under direct rule in British India. European administrative officials do not, like those in Dutch territories, approximate to the character of the Resident in a Native State, but take an active part in judicial and revenue work, while even the native chieftains tend to be converted into western magistrates and tax-collectors. The system of indirect rule as thus interpreted differs little from direct rule, because the native officials are, in effect, subordinate to Europeans, who supervise the revenue collections and hear cases on appeal from native courts or transfer cases from native courts to their own courts.

Although indirect rule is advocated as an instrument of welfare, the choice between direct or indirect rule has, in practice, been governed by convenience rather than by principle. In general, as we have seen, direct rule has tended to prevail where the colony was regarded primarily as a market to be developed by native enterprise, and indirect rule where it was chiefly valued as a source of raw materials to be developed by western enterprise. This coincidence between the economic interest of the colonial power and the system of rule adopted, suggests a need for caution in accepting the claims advanced for indirect rule as an instrument of welfare. Although now advocated as a means of moderating the pace of change, it won favour originally as a means of expediting change, by facilitating the supply of land and labour through native chieftains. Moreover, few would desire to protect the people wholly from the impact of the West, to segregate them and preserve them as museum pieces in native innocence and ignorance. In order to reconcile progress and welfare, tropical peoples should be brought as rapidly as possible into fertilizing contact with the principles that western civilization derives from Greece, Rome and Christianity, while given protection against the anti-social forces that its impact on the tropics liberates. Indirect rule, however, strictly applied and as originally conceived, has a contrary effect; it cuts the people off from western civilization and keeps them backward without giving them adequate protection against economic forces. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that this is largely responsible for the helplessness of the Javanese which strikes foreign observers[1] so forcibly and is deplored also by the Dutch, and which contrasts so notably with the vigorous enterprise that has impelled Burmans to colonize the delta, even if it also helps to fill the jails.

[1] Bousquet, p. 86.

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The older negative conception of indirect rule, however, has given place generally to a positive conception of its value as a means of inducing people to accept innovations intended to raise their standard of living. Here again, one cannot disregard the fact that the acceptance of this new interpretation coincided with the recognition by western enterprise that it required more efficient labour, healthier and more intelligent, and by western labour that its interests were endangered by the competition of cheap tropical labour. These practical considerations added weight to human sympathy, and European officials began to force the pace of welfare, using the native authorities merely as agents to obtain compliance with measures regarded, for the time being, as desirable. Thus the system of indirect rule becomes infected with the disease characteristic of direct rule: the infirmity of will and vacillation of policy consequent on frequent transfers. Moreover, every new use of native authorities to introduce unwelcome reforms strains their authority, on which the system of indirect rule is founded. And unless the native authorities themselves wholeheartedly accept new measures, they will not enforce them when the Government changes its policy, or the officer who recommends them leaves the district, so that compliance is superficial and impermanent. Usually, too, indirect rule is born a weakling. For the native chieftain recognized by the colonial power is the weaker among rival claimants, who seeks or accepts outside support because unable to stand alone. With the help of the colonial power he may be strong enough to place land and labour at its disposal, but this does not strengthen his position among his subjects. More and more, as time goes on, he derives authority from the Government rather than from the people, and it is the form rather than the reality of native institutions that indirect rule preserves.

Even under Dutch rule European officials have in fact interfered in native administration whenever convenient. During the period of the Culture system 'they did not debate whether action would prejudice village autonomy; they acted'. Under the Liberal system they bypassed the Regents in order to protect the people against oppression. Under the Ethical system, intended to strengthen the corporate village, Europeans, zealous for uplift, used the village administration as 'welfare apparatus' until 'precious little autonomy remained'. The conservation of village life and custom has always been a fundamental principle of Dutch administration; departures from this principle have been regarded as unorthodox and have been followed by a reaction to

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647 the old tradition, but the temptation to intervene has repeatedly proved irresistible. Under the tradition of direct rule in British India, and with a greater veneration for the rule of law, British officials are less disposed to resist the temptation, so that, in British practice, indirect rule loses its virtue and vitality, and tends to become little better than a sham, differing from direct rule chiefly in the name. The Dutch who tried intervention for some twenty years during the Ethical period were finally disillusioned, and came to recognize that it was mistaken. There seems little reason to anticipate better success under British rule.

Yet the principle underlying indirect rule is valuable. A native authority whom the people accept as representing them personifies their common social will. He has great influence to recommend reforms in which he himself believes, and he remains permanently among the people to supervise their application until they have been adopted into customary social life. But he can do this only so long and so far as he is the prime mover and has the chief direction in affairs. A leading Dutch civilian has suggested that whereas, during the Ethical period and earlier, the European official was the 'elder brother' or overlord of the native official by his side, it has become necessary for the European to accept the position of 'younger brother', as adviser and assistant rather than a chief executive. On this plan the chief defect of colonial administration, lack of continuity, becomes a virtue. The native authority is permanent, but of necessity cannot be in immediate and continual close contact with the modern world, and a succession of European officials can put before him various new points of view and make suggestions among which he can choose those that are congenial and seem feasible. This process, however, works slowly, and requires that the native authority shall be at home in the western world. Some form of pressure or compulsion seems easier and quicker.

5. Compulsory Welfare

656 It does not require an extensive acquaintance with contemporary colonial literature to note a growing tenderness towards compulsion as an instrument of welfare. There are demands for compulsory education, for the compulsory destruction of diseased crops and cattle, for campaigns against disease by operations, scientifically planned and humanely conducted, but military in spirit and thoroughness. For the common welfare men living in society must accept restrictions on individual freedom. In tropical society the people under their own rulers

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177 welfare, and it seems not unreasonable to assume that similar results will follow in the tropics. Schools, sanitary regulations, the improvement of agriculture, and so on, appeal to humanitarians as likely to improve individual welfare, and by making for economy in administration and business, they appeal to reason as well as to sentiment. Naturally colonial governments conceive of welfare on western lines, and administrative practice is concentrated on enhancing the welfare of the people as individuals.

These attempts to promote welfare are effective only so far as the people will respond to them. The West may scatter pearls, or what it takes for pearls, about the tropics, but the people will not pick them up unless they appreciate their value. Scientific agriculture, modern schools, western medicine and sanitary regulations may not conduce to, and frequently conflict with, what the people regard as welfare, but if they cannot get what they want they must take what they can get. Agricultural and other economic services may enable them to earn more as individuals; modern schools may provide their youngsters with 'a decent job'; they may adopt some western foods or remedies for illness, and they may, perhaps, go to hospitals to be cured of their complaints. But these are all individual benefits, and have no relation to welfare as a social good. Welfare consists essentially in harmony between the individual and the environment; the environment must allow him to obtain both what he knows he wants and also what he wants without being [illegible]re of it. Economic progress enlarges the possibility of welfare by increasing the command of man over material resources, but it profits the native as an individual only so far as he participates in the larger surplus, and it enhances his welfare only so far as it contributes, directly or indirectly, to the enrichment of his social life.

8. Welfare and Autonomy

647 There is, as we have noticed, a growing recognition of the complexity
657 of welfare problems. 'The problems of development touch upon the
654 work of officers in various departments, such as administrative officers, both at headquarters and in the districts, and the technical officers in the agricultural, veterinary, medical and other services. There is need for machinery to provide complete co-ordination between these separate
177 departmental staffs.'[1] The health officer finds that he must seek assistance from the chemist and entomologist, and the veterinary officer

[1] 1940, Cmd. 6175, p. 7; *African Survey*, p. 1612.

7: Furnivall G-4,5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

looks to the forest officer to provide grazing for the stock. As experts come more and more to recognize the need for special knowledge outside their own branch of study, there is an increasing demand for the creation of new services, and welfare work is distributed among departmental officials who are unable to see life as a whole. At the same time there is a growing recognition that all aspects of life are closely interrelated. In Malaya the improvement of paddy is found to require co-ordinated action by the agricultural irrigation, co-operative credit, education and other services.[1] In Nyasaland the Welfare Committee comprises representatives of the Medical, Agricultural and Public Works Department together with non-officials. In Southern Rhodesia there is a Director of Native Development in charge of all native affairs.[2] The Dutch in Netherlands India minimize sectionalism by grouping the various services in large departments and, further, link up some of the departments by liaison officers. All these expedients may improve the co-ordination of the welfare machinery. But it still remains machinery, and acts mechanically on the people taken in the mass as an aggregate of individuals. Each group of specialists takes snapshots of the people from its own angle, but the composite photograph obtained by fitting the results together bears as little relation to the native world as a Hollywood film to life. It shows native life from an alien western standpoint and, however lifelike, it never comes to life. The more elaborate the machinery, the more mechanically it functions, driven by economic forces and not by human will. Improvements in the administrative machinery merely effect reforms which adapt the people better to the economic forces that dominate life in tropical dependencies. Evolution along this line leads to a dead end. It is the type of evolution characteristic of the lower forms of life which have survived by adapting their way of life to their environment; to adapt his environment to his way of life is the prerogative of man, and reforms adapting him to an uncongenial environment produce not harmony but discontent. The impact of the West has liberated forces which were formerly kept under control by custom; for the enhancement of welfare it is necessary that the people shall be enabled to regain control over these forces, that they shall regain their former autonomy. That a higher standard of welfare is a condition of autonomy is alleged as one ground for the elaboration of welfare machinery. But improvements in welfare machinery resemble improvements in applied science. Research in applied science may increase the efficiency of

[1] Mills, pp. 255, 262.

[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1197, 1227, 1230.

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647 current practice, but the great scientific achievements come from research in pure science, which revolutionizes practice by attacking old problems along new lines. Similarly the elaboration of welfare 657 machinery can have no appreciable effect on welfare, and still less 654 can it promote autonomy. It will not give them what they want unless they want what it can give, and the promotion of welfare must 177 be approached from a new angle by a revolution in method. The machinery is not only defective, but is applied on a wrong principle.

But, in the modern world, how is it possible for tropical peoples to get what they want? For the environment has changed, and not the people; they still, if left to themselves, would try to reproduce their old environment. But they have been brought into contact with the modern world and cannot get away from it. All the king's horses and all the king's men cannot set the clock back. They can get what they want only if they want what in the conditions of the modern world they *must* want. A fundamental problem of autonomy is to change the people so that they shall come to want, or at least voluntarily to accept, those conditions which the welfare of the modern world requires. Some light should be thrown upon this problem from an examination of attempts already made to introduce self-government among dependent peoples in various projects of colonial autonomy.

9. Autonomy

642 Colonial autonomy is closely linked with the Liberal tradition, which had two aspects. On the economic side it stood for economic freedom, freedom of person, property and trade; on the political side it stood for freedom of thought, speech and religion. Political freedom was regarded as the natural fruit of economic freedom. In the nineteenth century Liberalism was in the air. British and Dutch colonial statesmen alike claimed Liberal ideals though interpreting them differently; French Liberals recognized their colonial subjects as citizens of France, and Liberalism in Spain, suppressed at home, took refuge in the Spanish territories overseas.

During a great part of the century Liberals in Britain thought colonies a burden, and often cited Turgot's dictum comparing them to fruit that would fall from the parent tree when ripe. Men looked forward to the day when India should be able to stand alone as the proudest day in the story of British rule. Practical administrators like Sir Thomas Munro argued that when Indians were sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for themselves, it would

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during the present century, the convergence of Liberal, Ethical and Nationalist ideas, together with considerations of practical convenience, led in 1918 to the creation of the Volksraad, introducing western institutions in the central government. The new Dutch constitution of 1922 recognized the autonomy of Netherlands India in principle, and, as subsequently formulated in 1942, Dutch policy looked forward to the reconstruction of the kingdom 'on a solid foundation of complete partnership' among all the members.[1] Thus circumstances have dragged the Dutch, for long almost reluctantly, along the track blazed by the British. In Dutch as in British dependencies, colonial policy has sought to make the people capable of self-government by substituting natives for Europeans in the administration and by the construction of western self-governing institutions, and in both alike partnership has come to be recognized as the goal of policy.

10. Personnel

The application of Liberal principles to tropical administration may be dated from the revision of the charter of the East India Company in 1813. Liberal orthodoxy expected Government to confine its activities so far as possible to the maintenance of law and order. On that view it was not illogical to hold that the substitution of Indians for Europeans in the law courts would take India a long way towards self-government. Merely of necessity this process was already making great strides forward. The system of direct rule, inaugurated by Warren Hastings, was completed when Cornwallis took over civil and criminal jurisdiction from native authorities. It soon appeared that the Company could not afford to entertain a sufficient European staff, and Lord Hastings considered various expedients, including the revival of *panchayats*, for dealing with the pressure of business. The easiest and cheapest solution was to train natives as magistrates and judges. They were employed in courts of first instance and, under Lord Amherst, in appellate courts. By 1827 over 90% of the original suits in civil cases were tried by native judicial officers. Thus the employment of Indians was 'rendered imperative by the cost of a purely English administration'. But it was also regarded as 'a great moral duty'.[2] 'With what grace', asked Munro, 'can we talk of our paternal government, if we exclude them from

[1] *Netherlands India*, pp. 82, 84, 109, 160; Broek, J. D. M., *Pacific Affairs*, 1943, p. 338.

[2] Ross, p. 202; Boulger, pp. 60, 64, 67; *IG*, IV, 45.

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647 every important office?'[1] The great Liberal reformer, Bentinck, was heartily in favour of the employment of Indians, and, on the renewal of the Company's charter in 1833, this view found expression in the memorable pronouncement that no one should be excluded from any appointment in India by reason only of his colour, creed or race. This principle has always since then been 'adopted by the Government and people of England as a cardinal point in their Indian policy'. It may be claimed that it has been steadily applied. By the end of the century there were Indian judges on various provincial High Courts, while 'the European element in the government was confined within the limits essential for efficiency and guidance', and was employed chiefly where special knowledge or requirements were needed, or where 'as in the case of the Police, a large measure of European control was essential'.[2] But although the administrative personnel was so largely manned by Indians, India was no nearer to self-government. In this matter there was still, says Mr Curtis, 'almost everything to be done. You will not have done it, or begun to do it, merely by substituting Indian for English officials from the Viceroy downwards.' Such a Government might even be further from self-government, because an English Viceroy, merely by the circumstances of his birth and upbringing, is better able to treat with members of the Home Government as one of themselves on equal terms.

Indians were indeed less capable of self-government at the end of the century than at the beginning. In the early years of the nineteenth century India was merely a geographical expression; politically it was a congeries of native states and British territories; the former were self-governing and in the latter the machinery of government was little more complex than in native states. But, with economic progress, the administrative system was unified and centralized at Calcutta, while the machinery of government grew more complex and the art of government more intricate and difficult. As soon as a Government wants to do anything beyond maintaining law and order, it needs experts who can do these things: engineers for the roads and railways, irrigation and drainage; geologists and mining engineers; agricultural and veterinary officials; doctors and schoolmasters. It needs a larger staff, and especially a much larger staff of native subordinates. The multiplication of special services leads to departmentalism. Even in Europe, where the public services have grown up in response to social demand, the delays and obstructions of bureaucracy are a common

[1] Gleig, p. 307. [2] *IG*, IV, 45.

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theme of complaint. But in India and other tropical dependencies, they form the framework of a huge western superstructure over native life, wholly foreign to the people. Not only is there less self-government, but less government than before, because the machinery is too vast and complex to be informed by human will.

The multiplication of native officials is, therefore, no measure of the progress of self-government, but rather the reverse. In Europe the public services provide what the people want, and a comparatively small staff suffices to give them what they want; but in the tropics the much larger staff necessary to obtain the compliance of the people with innovations that they do not want constitutes a hindrance to self-government.

The inverse relation between self-government and the multiplication of native officials is illustrated by the system of indirect rule. Under this system there is a much greater measure of self-government than under direct rule, and one of its advantages is that it does not require so large a staff. During the nineteenth century in Java, when the Regents and villages managed their own affairs, few officials were employed. But, with economic progress, and the influx of foreign elements, there is a demand for the introduction of western law and western amenities, and accordingly far more judges and magistrates and the multiplication of special services. Thus, as native officials become more numerous, native self-government decays. On the other hand, as happened in Siam, an independent country can employ a large number of European officials without ceasing to be self-governing. So long as the Government remains an instrument of foreign rule, the increasing association of natives in every branch of tropical administration is no index to the progress of self-government.

II. Machinery: Local Government

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Together with the increasing association of natives in the administration, Liberals placed their faith in the 'gradual development of self-governing institutions'. Local self-government is, of course, no new thing in the tropics. From very early times tropical rulers have allowed foreign traders in the ports to settle their own affairs in their own way according to their own laws. It was in accordance with this principle of 'like over like' that Europeans in India and other parts of the tropics were allowed, and required, to maintain order among their own community. But modern self-government on a western pattern is the child of sanitation. It was owing to trouble over town conservancy

113, 648, 721, 175, 563 Southeast Asia AL1

[For information on the history of the distribution of peoples and political entities in Southeast Asia, and for the history of relations amongst the states of Southeast Asia and the relations between the French in Indochina and the states of Southeast Asia, see 115: Le Boulanger, AM1 , Indochina, category, 116. --Analyst]

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
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POSTSCRIPT

An article in *Ta Kung Pao*, the Shanghai newspaper, of 28 January 1950 was taken as adumbrating the future policy of the People's Government towards Chinese overseas and the governments of Southeast Asia. It began by saying:

> Now that the People's Republic of China has been established and diplomatic relations have been opened between the Central People's Government and a number of other countries, the more than 10,000,000 overseas Chinese shall and must not be subjected to further abuse.

The article pointed out that it was clearly stipulated in Article 58 of the Common Programme that 'the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China shall do its utmost to protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad'. In pursuance of this principle, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had lodged strong protests with the French and Thai authorities against the abuse of Chinese nationals. The article was particularly concerned to attack the Thai and French governments. 'The Fascist elements in Thailand [it said] have a long record of outrageous action in the persecution of Chinese nationals, and for years Thailand has been a veritable hell to the overseas Chinese there.' Malaya received only incidental mention. 'But [the article continued] going back a little, we find that countless numbers of Chinese have been murdered in the Dutch East Indies during the past few years. All in all, the annals of the struggles of the overseas Chinese may be considered to be written in blood. It must be evident that it is impossible for overseas Chinese to live in peace under imperialistic rule. . . . We know full well that the indiscriminate bombing of Shanghai together with the persecution of Chinese nationals in Thailand, Indochina, and Malaya, are all part of an imperialist plot for both direct and indirect attack against the Chinese people.'

Peking radio thereafter systematically attacked the Southeast Asian governments for their alleged ill treatment of the overseas Chinese. In the case of Malaya it was noticeable that direct mention of the terrorist campaign was avoided in the ensuing months.

The diplomatic position in August 1950 was that Burma and Indonesia had recognized the People's Government of China and representatives were being exchanged, Britain had also recognized the People's Government but negotiations for the terms on which representatives would be exchanged were still in dilatory progress, while France, Thailand, and the Philippines still recognized the Nationalist Government which was then taking refuge in Formosa.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese
China AF1
Burma API

A visit to Southeast Asia during the third quarter of 1950 after an absence of nearly three years brought home to the writer the accelerated tempo of the change that the countries were undergoing, and, in particular, the dominant role which the politics of China were playing therein. As a tailpiece to this survey he has recorded the impressions of his visit, bringing the account as nearly up to date as the exigencies of publishing would allow. The observations are set down in the order in which the countries were visited.

In his many discussions with statesmen, diplomats, officials, business men, and others in these Southeast Asian countries, the writer became aware of a considerable disagreement among them regarding the number of Chinese in the area. There was, in the case of Siam and Indochina in particular, no figure that was generally accepted. The definition of 'Chinese' was an initial difficulty (as it has so often been in the course of this survey) for many Chinese appeared to possess a dual racial character, discarding one aspect and assuming the other as circumstances suggested.[1] It seemed also that that clandestine immigration into Siam, Indochina, and the Philippines and (perhaps) Indonesia within the last two or three years, had been very considerable, for during this period the immigration laws had been greatly tightened. The writer was compelled, therefore, to revise the estimates he had made in the demographic chapters of the survey to suit the probable facts of 1950 and to adopt a total not very far short of 10 million ethnic Chinese for the whole of Southeast Asia. This estimate, however, does not materially alter the ratio of Chinese to other races in the area and has no very important bearing on the general political and economic considerations which have been described in the text.

Burma. In July 1950 the Chinese Nationalist ambassador had left Burma, and one other official of the embassy had also gone away, but the remainder of both the embassy and consular staff had agreed to serve under the People's Government of China which was now recognized by the Burmese Government. Two of the staff had already been summoned to Peking for indoctrination. The new ambassador, Dr Yu, was expected to arrive in Rangoon in August. In the meantime the staffs were not being paid and the only income available was that derived from the sale of (Nationalist) passports.

At this time an incident in the Burmese Shan State of Keng-tung near Siam was the subject of a number of rumours. A force of Chinese

[1] Thus in Siam, the President of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, of very obvious Chinese race or extraction but with a Thai name, denounced vehemently the tactics of business men of acknowledged Chinese nationality in their dealings with the Thais.

7: Furnivall
642, 647, 648, 471

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[For a theoretical discussion of the necessity for granting political autonomy to the colonial dependencies of western states and the required changes in administrative practices and economic policy, see cat. 116, pp. 468-512; for discussion of the relationship between the colonies and the colonial powers in the modern world, and the author's proposal for international collaboration in preparing the colonies for eventual independence, see pp. 513-550.]

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Some advocate Dominion status as an alternative.[1] But, for countries such as Burma, Dominion status is an unmeaning formula. The British Dominions are countries potentially able to stand alone but preferring to be associated on equal terms with the other major partners in the Commonwealth. Burma is not in that position. The racial divisions and sharp conflict of interest and sentiment, which weakened the former Government, would still continue and are incompatible with Dominion status. On the other hand, if the Burman leaders had accepted it, they would have split their party, strengthened their rivals, especially the so-called Communists, and conferred on the prevalent dacoity the halo of patriotism and the semblance of civil war. It is lamentable that we failed to capture the imagination of the people so as to inspire an instinctive loyalty to the British connection, but we cannot escape the consequences of the past. In purporting to grant Dominion status, we would have been promising something that we could not give in return for support that the leaders of the people were unable to command. Once again we would have been committed to the ungrateful task of pacification; more difficult now, and far more costly, than after the wars of 1852 and 1885 when we could employ Indian troops.

I hold then that on both parts the decision in favour of independence was as wise as it was bold, not only in their interest but in ours. Nothing less than independence could transform nationalism from a destructive fever into a creative force. Yet national independence is not a cause or guarantee of welfare. Burmans still need help, and by our long connection we can do most to give the help they need. But we can help them only on terms acceptable to both parties. If we can help Burmans to stand alone securely, we may perhaps look forward to a time when they will welcome a more intimate association. However that may be, we can at least feel that we have done our best to meet whatever difficulties lie ahead by responding boldly to the challenge of a new age.

J. S. FURNIVALL

24 October 1947

1 [i.e. to unqualified independence — Analyst.]

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Southeast Asia and World History

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At the present time the whole of Southeast Asia is obviously and dangerously entangled in world history. Often it is suggested that this is quite a new thing. Actually, there is nothing new in the entanglement of Southeast Asia in world history. After pointing out that the Southeast Asian states derived their civilization from India but fell within the political orbit of China, Professor Coedes summarizes the consequences:

> Most of these states have reacted to the great shocks that have disturbed the Indian peninsular and the Middle Kingdom. The conquests of Samudragupta in the Ganges Valley and South India in the 4th century and the expansionist policy of Chola emperors of Tanjore in the 11th century have had their repercussions on the other side of the Bay of Bengal. Even more markedly has the history of Further India been influenced by affairs in China. The Chinese have never looked favorably on the growth of strong powers in the southern seas, and it deserves notice that Funan, Cambodia, and the Javanese and Sumatran realms reached the zenith of their prosperity during just those epochs when the great dynasties of China were enfeebled. Also these countries are mutually linked together by numerous ties, geographic and economic, and every revolution in any one of them, by disturbing the whole region, has had repercussions on the others.[5]

Similarly, Krom suggests links between the course of events in India and the spread of Indian settlements over Southeast Asia.[6]

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In a talk on the Tropical Far East and world history at the Siam Society, Bangkok, Furnivall pointed to economic

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5. J. S. Furnivall, "The Tropical Far East and World History," Journal of the Siam Society, Volume 39, Part 2 (January 1952), pp. 120-21.

6. Ibid., p. 121.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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648 geography for an explanation of the relations between South-
439 east Asia and the outer world. The history of the China trade and the spice trade, Furnivall indicated, had revealed that Southeast Asia was of minor importance in each trade route, but it was significant as a byway along both routes, and it was sensitive accordingly to convulsions affecting the course of trade along either route. In Furnivall's words:

175 For China there have always been two main lines
439 of communication with the West: the land route across
487 central Asia, and the sea route round the coast.
648 Throughout the ages traders have followed whichever route seemed easier. Both routes, however, are liable to interruption. The land route is exposed to wild hordes in central Asia and to the results of political catastrophes in the Middle and Near East. The sea route can easily be blocked at its main gateway, the Straits of Malacca. Yet, when both these two main routes are blocked, there is still a byway. Traffic can still find a way down the great rivers of South-east Asia -- the Irrawaddy, the Salween, the Mekong, and the Red River -- diverging when convenient to the shorter rivers, the Sittang and the Menam. Time and again these rivers, and especially the Irrawaddy, have played a part in history.

For the trade in spices from the Moluccas, the Straits of Malacca are of supreme importance; there is only one main route. But this narrow channel can easily be held against outsiders. When it is blocked, however, there are two byways. One byway is through the Sunda Straits between Java and Sumatra; repeatedly throughout the course of history we find mention of Bantam under various names, and of places close to Bantam -- Jakarta or Batavia, and Benkulen. There is also a second byway, from various points along the western coast of Burma and Malaya cutting across the mainland to the Gulf of Siam or continuing further to the Mekong and Annam.[7]

Colonization, Old and New

175 The search for gold following Vespasian's placing
439 of an embargo on this precious metal from Rome during 69-79 A.D.
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7. Ibid., p. 121-22.

175 was suggested by Furnivall as a cause of the foundation of
439 Indian trading centers at convenient sites along the coasts
• 648 and main rivers of Southeast Asia. The same author places the date of the first Indian colonization in the area at about 150 A.D.[8] Harrison, however, maintains that the first definite Indian settlements were established in the first century A.D.[9]

175 Indian settlements were typically colonial in the
177 old sense of foreign settlement without foreign rule. The
563 settlers came as traders, intermarried with the local people,
648 acquired wealth, and formed an aristocracy. Then, as new migration ceased, the Indian rulers and aristocracy were absorbed into the people. In the inscriptions, the language and written characters took on native forms, and the names of persons and places were no longer Indian but native. Similarly, in the religious monuments and other buildings a native style was superimposed on the earlier Indian models.

175 Most authors have credited these Indian settlers
177 with having brought Indian culture to Southeast Asia. Harrison,
648 for example, takes for granted that "Indians who voyaged overseas to Southeast Asia naturally brought with them the ideas and practices of Hinduism and Buddhism."[10] He further speculates that "traders, adventurers and craftsmen were followed by Brahman and Buddhist priests and teachers,

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8. Ibid., p. 127.

9. Brian Harrison, South-east Asia (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1954), p. 10.

10. Ibid., p. 12.

175 carrying the civilizing influence of Indian cultural and
177 spiritual life and implanting it in these new lands by
648 introducing the art of writing and the classical Sanskrit language and literature; bringing as well their own vernacular languages to enrich the vocabularies of Southeast Asia.[11] It may be argued, nevertheless, that since there is little
175 177 good evidence for any large Indian emigration to Southeast
439 Asia, much Indian culture could have been brought back by
648 cosmopolitanized Southeast Asian traders who often spent months in India waiting for the monsoons to change their direction.[12] It should be noted in this connection that during this time of early Indian colonization trade relations were also extended westward by Indonesians (who earlier reached Madagascar) and other Southeast Asians.

175 During the expansion of Islam, from 1350 to 1500,
648 Moslem colonization followed the Indian pattern. Thus we may say that formerly a colony was merely a settlement in a foreign land and the settler had little or no political
[797] connection with the home land. The Indian and Moslem became foreign rulers, but they did not establish foreign rule. Subsequently, the Portuguese and Spaniards came as royal agents and with a warrant from the Pope to undertake both
175 the conquest and conversion of the people. The old idea
648 563 of a colony as a settlement survived: there were grandees

11. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

12. The author is indebted to Professor Lauriston Sharp for the development of this idea.

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175 with large estates, permanent immigrants of lower rank who
648 married native women, and priests spending a lifetime in
569 their parishes. But the colonies were ruled by Governors from Europe. They were both settlers and rulers. The Dutch came merely as traders, but they could obtain tropical produce only in the form of tribute; economic circumstances required them to accept sovereignty on behalf of the home company and to rule the people indirectly through native chieftains, and also to settle permanently, though on a comparatively small scale, to supervise native cultivation. They were primarily rulers and were settlers only by force of circumstance. In the 19th century the English carried the process a stage further. Through the industrial revolution they had goods to sell, and the object of their policy was not tribute but trade. This required direct rule, but not settlement, except in the ports. Finally, with the growth of capitalism and the opening of the Suez Canal, the typical system of colonial development was by foreign capital with European management and imported Asian labor. Thus there was a process of development from the old colonial system of foreign settlement without foreign rule to a new system of foreign rule without settlement.[13]

Impact of the Changing Trend of Trade with the West

175 In the nineteenth century, the age-old means of com-
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648 munication between the different parts of Southeast Asia

13. Furnivall, op. cit.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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648 were revolutionized by the techniques and aims of the West.
175 After 1850, European-owned steamships began the gradual
177 process of taking over the bulk of the inter-port trade
648 from native sailing boats and Chinese junks. The opening
439 of the Suez Canal in 1869 made possible the great modern
505 expansion of Western rule and trade, and thereby brought about the economic and social revolution which has created the Southeast Asia of today. The year 1870 is the real dividing-line between medieval and modern in the history of Southeast Asia.[14]

175 Whereas during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eight-
177 eenth centuries the various European nations active in South-
433 east Asia had, on the whole, limited themselves to trading
439 and acquisition of high-priced nonbulky commodities, such
648 as spices, the economic policy of the nineteenth century called for large quantities of bulky goods, such as sugar, fibers, oil seeds, coffee, and copra. Since the peasantry of Southeast Asia, almost without exception, raised only subsistence crops and had only limited surplus, it became necessary for the colonial powers to increase agricultural production. This was done in two ways: through the application of pressure on the peasantry to produce for export, and through the development of large-scale plantation agriculture.[15] The shift of emphasis from trade to production

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14. Harrison, op. cit., p. 197.

15. Karl J. Pelzer, "The Resource Pattern of Southeast Asia," Southeast Asia in the World Today, ed. Phillips Talbot. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 109.

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thus set a new stage -- the development of the natural resources of the whole region.

This change-over from a subsistence economy to a commercial economy involved the large-scale expansion of traditional crops or the development of new commercial crops. It was stimulated by the introduction or expansion of a money economy, the flow of capital and the development of land and sea transport. It was supported by Western technology, methods of administration and systems of justice. This whole process greatly affected the traditional institution, upsetting the balance of a medieval world. The free, individualist spirit of Western rule and commerce cut at the roots of traditional social life, undermining the corporate strength of family and village. But the most serious direct threat of the new economic forces was to the peasant's ownership of land. Expanding economies, new money taxes and cheap imports meant better business than ever for the money lender. Many peasants became ruined by debt and lost their lands. Indebtedness and debt slavery were not new in Southeast Asia; the latter was fairly soon stamped out, but the former now became much more widespread than before, resulting in the creation of a landless proletariat.[16]

Characteristics of Current Southeast Asian Economy

In spite of all the differences among the countries of Southeast Asia in the natural environment, ethnic

16. Harrison, op. cit., p. 210.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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184 distribution, and aspects of Western colonial policy which have tended to increase the contrasts between parts of the region, there are certain considerations of broader nature and of far-reaching significance that give validity to the concept of Southeast Asia as a regional unit possessing certain common features which will be discussed in brief as follows:

a. Common heritage of colonialism.
b. Dual economy.
c. Plural society.
d. Dominance of the agricultural section.
e. High rate of population growth.
f. Determination to industrialize.
g. Small size of market and slow rate of capital formation.

433 The direction as well as the pace of economic develop-
• 648 ment in the colonial or protected areas of Southeast Asia has been primarily determined by the overriding economic interests of the imperial powers. Even in Thailand, where political independence was preserved, economic dependence upon European capital resulted in the creation of a characteristically 'colonial' economy. This is exemplified by the following conditions: (1) producer of raw materials; (2) concentration on a few export products; and (3) lack of manufacturing industries. As a consequence, these countries are highly affected by substitution, price fluctuations, and changes in consumer demand. Furthermore, they are dependent on limited markets for export, and hence are adversely

433 affected by these few importing countries' determination
648 to be self-sufficient in food.

181 A dual economy as a distinctive character of colonial
433 rule is a theory propounded by some Dutch economists who contend that in tropical dependencies there are two distinct systems of economy. In the Western sector economic forces act in strict accordance with the economic laws enunciated by the earlier classical economists; but in the Eastern sector these laws have no force, and Western economic principles are inapplicable. The Western sector is ultra-capitalist since economic forces act freely, not even subject to the social inhibitions which still restrain them in Europe or the Western world; the Eastern sector, on the other hand, is precapitalist, with prestige carrying more weight than profit and communal influence restraining the individual desire of gain.[17] One
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438 of the consequences of a dual economy is that it is difficult
439 to conduct business because the people will not trade on
648 Western lines. Inefficiency in trade leads to high operational cost and thus to social waste. Moreover, there is a likelihood of exploitation of indigenous people by Western traders as well as by foreigners of Asian origin who are free from social restraint.

563 One feature that has long been common to the countries of Southeast Asia and is so obvious that it could not fail

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17. J. S. Furnivall, "Cooperation, Competition, and Isolation," Southeast Asia in the World Today, ed. Phillips Talbot, op. cit., p. 71.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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161 development who fear that these countries might not be able
433 to expand their production faster than population expands, in which case the result of economic development efforts will be a greater quantity of people with little or no gains in the quality of living conditions. In Zinkin's words, "The growth of population and the impact of the West have between them, in the last hundred years, so upset the delicate balance that most of the Asian countryside is now bankrupt . . . . The alarming feature of the peasant economy of Asia is not simply that it is desparately poor. It is that in recent decades, and in most countries of Asia, it has been growing poorer. It is a changing, dynamic economy. But it has been changing for the worse."[23]

433 Poverty is not new in Southeast Asia. What is new
829 is the awareness of poverty and the conviction that something
178 can be done about it. "A great change", reported Harold Butler, "is stirring Eastern society. The consciousness of misery has been created by the growing realization that it is not the inescapable lot of the poor and that chances
654 of better life now exist."[24] All of the countries in South-
648 east Asia have within the past decade set up official agen-
185 cies charged with planning and promoting economic development; and for international assistance to hasten it, is the constant

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23. Zinkin, op. cit., p. 34.

24. Harold Butler, Problems of Industry in the East (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1938, Studies and Reports, Series B, No. 29), pp. 65-66.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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648 theme of their spokesmen in the economic and social organs
185 of the United Nations. It is probably too early at this moment to speculate on the outcome of Southeast Asia's
000 determination to industrialize. Much can be said, however, about the element of urgency and speediness commonly attached to each project of industrial development envisaged by each of these countries. "For successful development," cautions Staley, "two things are necessary: a substantial and continued economic advance -- and a social and political outcome which produces self-reliant citizenship in a free society, stable and responsive democratic government, and cooperation with other free societies."[25] The same writer warns that if capital investment and material technology are puched energetically in an underdeveloped country while little or no attention is given to deliberate promotion of appropriate social and psychological change, the result is likely to be either a failure of the development process to "take" and become "self-generating" or creation of a menace to the free world.[26] Garner also gives similar warning, "People have to develop themselves before they can change their physical environment, and this is a slow process."[27]

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44 A most important factor that has kept Southeast Asia economically underdeveloped is the small size of market in

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25. Staley, op. cit., p. 202.

26. Ibid., p. 203.

27. Ibid., p. 203.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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43 each of the countries in the area, which is due to the low
44 level of their real income. This small size of market has important effects on the volume of international trade, on the pattern of foreign investment, and on the use of domestic savings.

648 Because of their low level of productivity and
43 hence of low real purchasing power, the underdeveloped
44 agricultural countries play a minor part in world trade.
47 Business investment abroad has tended in the past to shy away from industries working for the domestic market in the underdeveloped areas and to concentrate instead on primary production for export to the advanced industrial centers. With special reference to Southeast Asia, most writers assign the pattern to the commercial design of the colonial powers. Nurkse, however, maintains that it does not reflect any sinister conspiracy or deliberate policy, still less a concerted attempt of the rich countries to exploit the poor. "Exploitation there may have been," he said, "but this pattern of foreign investment by itself does not constitute any proof of it. This pattern can be readily accounted for on obvious economic grounds. The explanation lies, on the one hand, in the poverty of the local consumers in the underdeveloped countries, and on the other, in the large and, in the nineteenth century, vigorously expanding markets for primary products in the world's industrial centers."[28]

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28. Ragner Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries (Oxford: A. T. Broome and Son, 1953), p. 25.

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ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

ITS HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY AND DIPLOMATIC CLIMATE

John L. Christian

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AN apposite instance of the interdependence of geography and history is provided by the tense rivalry between Great Britain and France in Southeast Asia before 1910. This rivalry, which was essentially a problem in the historical geography and diplomatic climate of the times, had its origin in the astonishingly persistent belief that somewhere between the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea would be found a short route to the wealth and trade of interior China, particularly Yunnan and Szechwan.

Contemporaries regarded it as axiomatic that a Sino-French or Siamese-French war over French aggressions in Indochina would result in an Anglo-French war. Indeed, twice (in 1893 and 1896) the two countries were on the verge of battle for control of the Menam and Mekong routes to Yunnan. But geography and malaria were against the diplomats. These routes never have come into use; and the area where Burma, French Indochina, and Thailand now march in a common frontier is today one of the least-known regions of all Asia.

Largely because of the existence of close ties between the two countries since the maturing of the Entente Cordiale of 1904, it is easy to forget that they were in acrimonious rivalry in Southeast Asia for decades, particularly from 1862 to 1904, when Britain kept careful watch over French activities from Oman and Afghanistan in the Middle East to New Caledonia and the New Hebrides in the South Seas. In this instance certain historicogeographical aspects of the problem are basically more important than the usual facets of diplomacy and politics.

Beginnings of French and British Interests

Historically, French interest in the lands east of Suez began with the organization of the French East India Company, in 1604, the dispatch of the first French ships to the Orient, in 1611, and the beginnings of the French Oriental establishments, in the middle of the century. As early as 1631 the French regarded Madagascar as of particular value because of its favorable location for extending their trade to Southeast Asia.[1] By 1663 French priests were acquainted with coastal Burma, Siam, and Cambodia and in that year made their first crossing of the Malay Peninsula, near modern Tenasserim, while

[1] The Cambridge History of India, Vol. 5, British India, 1497–1858, edited by H. H. Dodwell, London, 1929, p. 62.

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en route to Siam.[2] Shortly thereafter the French, hard pressed on the mainland of India, proposed that their headquarters be moved to the Pegu coast. The French naval expedition of six ships that reached the Bay of Bengal in 1690 had as its object the establishment of commerce with Burma and Siam. In fact, the failure of the trade of the British East India Company in Burma and Siam in the seventeenth century was traced to the superiority of French influence in those states.[3]

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In the eighteenth century Dupleix was interested in Burma and Siam because of the abundance there of teakwood for shipbuilding, and he suggested to his superiors that they acquire a portion of the Burmese coast.[4] During Burma's internal strife that resulted in the establishment of the Alaungpaya dynasty in 1755, the French made the mistake of aiding the defeated Talaings, while the British aided the conquerors. As a result, Alaungpaya acquired a supply of French arms, including 1300 muskets and forty 24-pounders, together with 200 French gunners, with which Burma became the premier state in Southeast Asia. The French, meantime, evened the score by inciting the Burmese to destroy the British colony on Negrais Island.[5]

In the nineteenth century Britain sent to the native states of Southeast Asia numerous embassies that had as their primary or secondary purpose inquiry into the extent of French influence in these states. For example, the missions to Burma of Symes in 1795 and 1802 and of Canning in 1803 and 1809; that of Crawfurd in 1822 to Siam and in 1826 to Burma; that of Finlayson in 1821 and Crawfurd in 1830 to Cochinchina; and those of Captain Burney, Sir James Brooke, and Sir John Bowring to Siam in the first half of the century were all interested in British trade and French ambition.

The Indochinese Peninsula

Ever since the early merchant adventurers were forced to pass through the Strait of Malacca or the Sunda Strait to reach the China coast the great Indochinese peninsula has been of interest to Europeans, principally as an obstacle to a direct route to the Far East, as that term is generally understood. In the past century it became common knowledge among Europeans in the Orient that at one point, far above the head of navigation, the Yangtze flows within 600 miles of the northern reaches of the Bay of Bengal, whereas it is some 4300 miles by sea from Calcutta to Shanghai. It was only natural that

[2] Adrien Launay: Histoire générale de la Société des Missions-Étrangères. 3 vols., Paris, 1894; reference in Vol. 1, p. 74.

[3] D. G. E. Hall: Early English Intercourse with Burma (Rangoon Univ. Publs., No. 1), London, 1928, pp. 138–153.

[4] V. McL. Thompson: Dupleix and His Letters, New York, 1933, p. 721; and Alfred Martineau: Dupleix et l'Inde française, 1749–1754, Paris, 1927, p. 451.

[5] D. G. E. Hall: The Tragedy of Negrais, *Journ. Burma Research Soc.*, Vol. 21, 1931, pp. 1–133.

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FIG. 1

early cartographers and pioneers of commerce should assume that the most direct route to interior China would be along one of the great meridional rivers of the Indochinese peninsula to the Yangtze.[6] At one point, somewhat north of the present Burma Road, the Yangtze, Mekong, and Salween are compressed within a distance of 48 miles (separated by ridges reaching up to 8000 feet above the floor of the adjacent valley).[7] But the Irrawaddy, contrary to early beliefs, does not rise on the Tibetan plateau as do the other great meridional rivers[8]

[6] Bruno Hassenstein: Some Contributions to the Geographical and Cartographical Literature of the Indo-Chinese Frontier Territories, n. p., n. d., gives a useful list of the principal sources on the area before 1900. Reports of early British attempts to penetrate India's northeastern frontier are summarized in "Selections of Papers regarding the Hill Tracts between Assam and Burmah," 10 vols., Calcutta, 1873.

[7] For a photographic report see J. F. Rock: Through the Great River Trenches of Asia, *Natl. Geogr. Mag.*, Vol. 50, 1926, pp. 133–186.

[8] A fact first noted in Sir Henry Yule: A Narrative of the Mission Sent by the Governor-General of India to the Court of Ava in 1855. London, 1858, p. 272.

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and thus occupies a unique place among the rivers of Southeast Asia, as Professor L. Dudley Stamp has recently pointed out.[9] 487 175

Geographical and historical knowledge of the area within 300 miles of the point where the frontiers of Thailand, French Indochina, and Burma now meet was extremely sketchy until the beginning of the present century. For example, Dupuis, in his study of Tongking in 1872, prepared a map that showed the Burmese possessions reaching to the Black River, within 200 miles of Hanoi, into territory concerning which King Mindon and his successor, Theebaw, had only the slightest knowledge and no jurisdiction.[10] Dupuis was perhaps willing to show extensive Burmese territory in the hope that France would inherit Mindon's holdings; but the map was later to plague the French, who, after the British annexation of Burma, in 1886, found it to their advantage to maintain that Burma had at no time extended even to the Mekong. 439 648

Garnier's Expedition

In 1858 France seized Saigon; in 1862 the Court of Hué signed a treaty that surrendered Cochinchina to France; and in 1867 Siam was forced to recognize the French as overlords of Cambodia. As a result of the treaty with Annam, Francis Garnier was appointed Inspector of Native Affairs in the new protectorate, with permission to travel on the Mekong. On June 5, 1866, the De Lagree–Garnier expedition left Saigon in the first organized European exploration of the hinterland of Indochina from the China side.[11] On April 29, 1867, the party reached Luang Prabang, a place seldom visited by Europeans since the Dutch trader Gerard van Wusthof arrived there in 1641.[12] By June the party had reached the point where Burma, Thailand, and French Indochina now meet. Garnier noted there the sale of British cotton goods in the bazaar of Kiang Sen; and De Lagree reported that tribes on the left bank of the Mekong were loyal to Siam. Both explorers observed the presence of Burmese agents with authority at the principal crossings of the Mekong. On August 23, 1867, De Lagree visited Keng Tung, in what was undoubtedly Burmese territory; and thereafter the British in Lower Burma were ever watchful of French designs on territory bordering the upper Mekong. The Frenchmen passed on to Kiang Hung town, which has been under Chinese sovereignty since the Sino-British boundary settlements and

[9] The Irrawaddy River, *Geogr. Journ.*, Vol. 95, 1940, pp. 329–356 (see note elsewhere in this number of the *Geographical Review*).

[10] J. Dupuis: L'ouverture du Fleuve Rouge au commerce et les événements du Tong-Kin, 1872–73, Paris, 1879.

[11] Hugh Clifford: Further India, London, 1904, pp. 129–254, gives a vivid account of the Garnier expedition. The basic source is Francis Garnier: Voyage d'exploration en Indo-Chine effectué pendant les années 1866, 1867 et 1868 . . . ; 2 vols. and atlas, Paris, 1873.

[12] Garnier seems to have been the first to make readily available a translation of Van Wusthof's diary. The translation, which was made for Garnier by M. P. Vœlkel, was printed, with Garnier's annotations, in the *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie*, Ser. 6, Vol. 2, 1871, pp. 249–289.

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treaties of 1894 and 1897, where they noted that both Burma and China had agents in the court. On March 2, 1868, the party left the Mekong, and they reached Talifu by a journey that took them directly across the route followed by British and Burmese trade to interior Yunnan. The Moslem Sultan of Tali ordered the Garnier party away from his territory. Garnier explained the action: The Sultan has mistaken us for Englishmen. After the death of De Lagree in Yunnan young Garnier took the party out by way of Hankow, whence they traveled on to Shanghai by the American steamer *Plymouth Rock*. The Garnier expedition touched the Mekong at no point above Kiang Hung, a city to which the Britisher Captain McLeod had preceded them by thirty years. McLeod made his remarkable journey from Moulmein to Kiang Hung with six elephants and was the first European to penetrate China by the Salween route for purposes of examining trade routes.

When once it had been reported[13] that Garnier intended to "strike the Irrawaddy at Bhamo" and that he was expected also at Keng Tung and Mandalay, British interest in French activities in Southeast Asia was keen. Major General Albert Fytche, Chief Commissioner of British Burma, proceeded to Mandalay and secured Mindon's signature to a treaty that compromised Burma's independence.[14] Extraterritoriality was secured (abandoned in 1879). British agents were permitted to sit in Burmese customhouses; and Burma's power to control commerce across her territory to China was further restricted. A Resident was authorized for Mandalay, and the Irrawaddy was opened for navigation by British steamers. Captain Strover was stationed as agent in Bhamo and traveled up in November, 1868, by the first British steamer to reach that river port 40 miles from the Chinese frontier.[15] He was not, however, provided with a gunboat, as had at first been suggested; nor did Britain assume control of Burma's foreign relations, as her officers in British Burma had urged.[16]

The Sladen and Browne Expeditions

After much patient work, General Fytche in 1868 obtained permission from the King of Burma and authorization from the government of India for the dispatch of an expedition from Bhamo to Tali. Colonel E. B. Sladen, Political Agent at Mandalay, set out[17] with a group of six Europeans and a guard of 50 sepoys toward the same

[13] The London *Times*, June 7, 1868.

[14] Albert Fytche: Burma, Past and Present, 2 vols. (in 1), London, 1878. See the Anglo-Burmese treaty of Oct. 25, 1867, in *British and Foreign State Papers, 1870–71*, pp. 61 and 1305–1308.

[15] J. G. Scott, assisted by J. P. Hardiman: Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States, 2 parts in 5 vols., Rangoon, 1900–1901; reference in Part I, Vol. 1, p. 64.

[16] Alexander Bowers: Bhamo Expedition: A Report on the Practicability of Re-opening the Trade Route between Burma and Western China, Rangoon, 1869, p. 100.

[17] The official account is E. B. Sladen: Narrative of the Expedition to Explore the Trade Routes to China via Bhamo, Rangoon, 1869.

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goal as the Garnier party that had left Saigon two years before. The Sladen party reached Momein (modern Tengyueh) in September, 1868, three months after Garnier's return to Saigon. Colonel Sladen could get no farther than Tengyueh, however, because of the disturbed state of the country as a result of the Panthay rebellion.[18]

Eventually Lord Salisbury yielded to the fears of British commercial interests that the French would entirely absorb the markets of Yunnan and neighboring provinces and sent an expedition to reopen British trade routes (1875). Colonel Horace Browne, accompanied by the geographer Ney Elias, who is remembered for his journey through Mongolia and his survey of the Yellow River, succeeded in getting farther than Manwyne, to Serai, where they learned that Augustus Margary, who had gone on ahead, had been murdered (1875).[19] Browne's party thereupon returned to Bhamo as the last official British attempt to open a direct route to interior China. As a matter of fact, the reports of Grosvenor, Baber, and Davenport, who were sent from Hankow to Yunnan in connection with the British demand for reparation over the Margary affair, convinced the home government that the topographic difficulties of the route from Bhamo to Yunnan and Szechwan were too great for practical railway construction.[20]

Government of India's Lack of Interest

British officials in Burma frequently complained of the impossibility of getting the government of India to give any attention to the northeastern frontier. That government was wholly occupied with the northwestern frontier and the danger of Russian aggression through Afghanistan and the Khyber Pass. As early as the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1816–1818 Dr. Francis Buchanan, of laterite fame,[21] had advised the East India Company against "giving the Chinese any just reason for suspicion by forming pretensions to any part of the mountainous region which separates the two Empires."[22] Lord Lawrence, the Viceroy, had advised against the Sladen expedition: "His Excellency can hardly conceive any step more imprudent than for British merchants to settle in Bhamo or a British official to be stationed there for any purpose."[23] In the short viceroyalty of Lord

[18] This disturbance hindered the British and aided the French. Captain Strover reported that during his first three years in Bhamo "not a single consignment belonging to British firms had reached Bhamo."

[19] The resultant British demand for compensation gave rise to the famed Chefoo Convention, a recent study of which is S. T. Wang: The Margary Affair and the Chefoo Agreement. New York, 1940.

[20] Particularly E. Colborne Baber: Travels and Researches in the Interior of China, *Royal Geogr. Soc. Suppl. Papers*, Vol. 1, 1882–1885, pp. 1–201, especially pp. 154–192, "Notes on the Route Followed by Mr. Grosvenor's Mission through Western Yünnan," reprinted from *Parliamentary Rept., China, No. 3 (1878)*.

[21] See this number of the *Geographical Review*, p. 177.

[22] Papers respecting the Nepaul War, London, 1824, p. 45.

[23] Letter from the government of India to Fytche, dated Simla, July 18, 1867, in Sladen, *op. cit.*, appendix T.

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487 Mayo the government of India, even at the risk of losing control over
175 the trade routes to Yunnan, again stated its policy:[24] "The future
annexation of Burma, or any of its adjacent states, is not an event
439 which I . . . desire; . . . I should view with extreme regret . . .
648 the necessity of occupation, or of assuming, even in a temporary manner, the government of any of the states lying adjacent to the province now in your charge." In short, the official attitude of the government of India has been summarized as follows: "The condition of the Northeastern frontier caused no Governor-General a single sleepless night."[25]

Railways Suggested

496 Meantime, British commercial interests continued to demand
487 that the Indian government provide facilities for trade to western
175 China in order to forestall any French plans to acquire prior advan-
439 tages in Yunnan and Szechwan. The *Parliamentary Papers* alone
648 contain nearly twenty reports on expeditions and proposals with respect to trans-Burma trade with western China and the upper Mekong from 1824 to 1900. The most persistent advocates of British penetration of Yunnan, Szechwan, and Kwangsi from the Bay of Bengal were Captain Richard Sprye and his son, who for half a century (1840–1890) presented numerous proposals for railways and highways into western Siam, to the Shan and Laos States, and to southern China.

Perhaps the best-publicized effort was that by Archibald R. Colquhoun, a deputy commissioner in British Burma, and Holt S. Hallett, a civil engineer. Colquhoun, who was ardently anti-French, resigned his office when the government of Burma refused him leave to survey a railway route from Moulmein to Szemao by way of Chiengmai in Siam. He became a special correspondent for the London *Times*, traveled overland from Canton to Bhamo, and wrote voluminously against French designs on Southeast Asia.[26] The Colquhoun-Hallett railway plan suffered from a general suspicion that it was merely a means for "taking the King of Siam by the hand and leading him into the great British Indian family."[27] Although Colquhoun's line is actually the shortest practicable route from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnanfu (Kunming), it passes through sparsely settled country that is everywhere malarial below 4000 feet. There is not today a railway line, caravan route, or highway, British or French or Siamese, that anywhere follows the Colquhoun-Hallett survey.

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[24] Fytche, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 124–125 (letter from Lord Mayo).

[25] D. G. E. Hall, edit.: The Dalhousie-Phayre Correspondence, 1852–1856, London, 1932, p. xv.

[26] A. R. Colquhoun: Across Chrysé, 2 vols., 2nd edit., London, 1883; A. R. Colquhoun and H. S. Hallett: Report on the Railway Connexion of Burmah and China, London, 1887. See also H. S. Hallett: A Thousand Miles on an Elephant in the Shan States, Edinburgh and London, 1890.

[27] Philippe Lehault: France et Angleterre en Asie, Paris, 1892, p. 562.

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British Annexation of Upper Burma

French intrigue in Upper Burma, with its consequent danger to British commercial interests, was the principal reason for the annexation of independent Burma, in 1886.[28] Jules Ferry had pledged repeatedly that no French arms should be supplied Burma through Tongking. But British suspicions were aroused upon the discovery that a Franco-Burmese agreement had been signed providing for the construction of a railway, the establishment of a Bank of Burma with French capital, control of the Burmese postal system, and establishment of a line of French steamers on the Irrawaddy.[29] The die was cast when the British learned of a secret agreement to supply arms from Tongking after the signing of the Franco-Burmese treaty of January 15, 1885.[30]

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The Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, sent a message to the senior official in Lower Burma: "If, however, the present proceedings should eventuate in any serious attempt [by the French] to forestall us in Upper Burma I should not hesitate to annex the country."[31] After the publication of a "remarkably indiscreet" report by M. de Lanessan on the progress of French activities in Burma,[32] the Secretary of State on November 11, 1886, wired the Viceroy: "Please instruct General Prendergast to advance on Mandalay at once."[33]

British occupation of Upper Burma was followed by expeditions into the various Shan States tributary to King Theebaw. In 1890 a British party under Sir George Scott reached Keng Tung. Meantime both the French and the Siamese had asserted claims to parts of the former Burmese possessions. During the Franco-Burmese negotiations of 1885 Burma purported to cede part of Kiang Hung across the Mekong to the French. The British, as heirs to Theebaw's dominions, claimed the area but later awarded Kiang Hung to China on condition that it should never be ceded to another power.[34] However, the Chinese almost immediately gave part of Kiang Hung to the French.

Further difficulty arose over the substate of Mong Hsing, a trans-Mekong territory ruled by a junior branch of the governing family of Keng Tung. In March, 1894, Mr. Stirling of the Burma

[28] The British were fully aware of Burmese and French plans, which were reported in detail to the government of India. The Blue Book "Correspondence Relating to Burmah since the Accession of King Theebaw, in October, 1878," has 266 pages of dispatches, C. 4614 in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1886.

[29] Comte A. Mahé de la Bourdonnais: Un français en Birmanie, Paris, 1891, pp. 295–306.

[30] C. 4614 (*op. cit.*, footnote 28), No. 105.

[31] Sir Alfred Lyall: Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, 2 vols., London, 1905; reference in Vol. 2, p. 118.

[32] J. L. de Lanessan: Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée d'examiner le projet de loi portant approbation de la convention complémentaire de commerce, signée à Paris le 15 janvier 1885, entre la France et la Birmanie, Paris, 1885. Lanessan became an aggressive governor general of French Indochina (1891 to 1894).

[33] C. 4614 (*op. cit.*), No. 122.

[34] Sir Edward Hertslet: Hertslet's China Treaties, 3rd edit., revised by G. E. P. Hertslet, with the assistance of Edward Parker, 2 vols., London, 1908; reference in Vol. 1, pp. 99–109.

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Commission visited Mong Hsing; and he was followed, on Christmas Day, 1894, by Sir George Scott and Mr. Wharry, Chinese Political Adviser to the government of Burma, in connection with the Anglo-French Mekong Commission. M. Pavie, the French commissioner, had sent the French flag to Mong Hsing before the arrival of the British party, and the sawbwa had hoisted the tricolor over his palace. Pavie, who reached Mong Hsing on New Year's Day, had intended to welcome Sir George Scott to French territory. However, Scott had the French flag lowered and ran up his own. For a few months the incident had all the possibilities of an Oriental Fashoda nearly five years before the famous incident on the Nile.[35] The London *Times* had columns about the Mong Hsing incident; and Pavie in private conversation with Scott doubted the validity of French claims to the bazaar town. On January 15, 1895, a telegraphic message from the Viceroy announced an agreement with France that set mid-channel of the Mekong as the boundary.[36] Thus Mong Hsing, which had flown the British flag and had had a British post office for a year, was acquired by France. Siam's claims were quieted by the Treaty of Chantabun, which transferred all Siamese rights east of the Mekong to France. The remainder of the subordinate state of Keng Cheng went first to Siam but was acquired by France in May, 1896. British interests with respect to the Mekong frontier suffered from frequent changes of policy: Lord Roseberry favored the buffer-state idea;[37] Lord Kimberley ordered the occupation of Mong Hsing; then Lord Salisbury, "without exception the worst Foreign Secretary we ever had for matters east of Suez,"[38] gave up the state to France. The French secured a strategic, natural frontier for their Indochinese holdings and had the "further gratification of having enlarged them beyond all expectation."[39]

Later Rivalries

Anglo-French rivalry continued in Yunnan along Burma's northern frontiers until well into the present century. Rival railway and mining claims were the most frequent causes of friction. Article XII of the Anglo-Chinese agreement of February 4, 1897, contemplated

[35] The Mong Hsing–Keng Cheng incident is treated definitively by Clarence Hendershot: The Conquest, Pacification, and Administration of the Shan States by the British, 1886–1897 (Diss., Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1936). The best French account is contained in "Mission [Auguste] Pavie Indo-Chine, 1879–1895: Géographie et Voyages," Vol. 5, Paris, 1902, pp. 264–284.

[36] "Livre Jaune: Affairs du Haute-Mekong et de Siam, 1893–1902." By Article IV of the declaration, the two governments agreed that all commercial and other advantages conceded in the two Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Szechwan either to France or to Great Britain by their respective conventions of March 1, 1894, and June 20, 1895, and future privileges should "be extended and rendered common to both powers."

[37] G. L. LaFuze: Great Britain, France, and the Siamese Question, 1885–1904 (Diss., Ph.D., Univ. of Illinois, 1935), discusses the various proposals for a buffer state.

[38] G. E. Mitton [Lady Scott], edit.: Scott of the Shan Hills, London, 1936, p. 166.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 215.

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railway construction in Yunnan and provided for connection with Burmese lines.[40] No development, however, took place and the British abandoned their surveys beyond Bhamo and Lashio. The agreement between France and China of April 10, 1898, authorized the French to construct a railway from the Tongking frontier to Yunnanfu.[41] This was carried out, but the plans for carrying the line farther were discarded. Activities of French explorers and missionaries in Yunnan along the Burma frontier were watched closely; the British in Burma were only mildly enthusiastic about the explorations of Prince Henry of Orleans from the Mekong to Assam across the top of Burma in 1895. The British were careful to open consulates in Szemao (Es-mok) and other inland treaty ports of Yunnan and Kwangsi that had little trans-Burma trade.

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Siam probably owed her independence to the desire of both her neighbors to have a buffer state between them, the British having decided that Burma was "too soft and pulpy" to serve in that capacity. As matters turned out, France got much the lion's share of territory shorn from Siam. There is not in Burma today any area that was for any length of time Siamese territory, a fact recognized by the present Thai minister to the United States, who issued a communiqué indicating that, in contrast with her present demands upon the French possessions, Thailand is entirely satisfied with her Burma frontier.[42]

British development of Singapore after 1819, introduction of steam navigation to the Orient, the opening of the Suez Canal and the American transcontinental railway in 1869 only heightened the rivalry for alternate short cuts to "the greatest market in the world." By 1882 French engineers had completed surveys of a proposed Kra canal; and on June 8, 1883, Ferdinand de Lesseps presented the completed plans to the King of Siam as "la route Français au Tonkin." That distinguished Frenchman spoke of Bangkok as "the beginning of the Menam route to Yunnan."[43]

By about 1910 the epic age of European imperialism had come to an end; and since that time there have been no considerable additions to the French and British empires east of the Red Sea. Yunnan and Kweichow, for which the rivalry was particularly acute, during the past decade were perhaps less subject to foreign influence than any other provinces of China proper. Lord Curzon (Viceroy of

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[40] J. V. A. MacMurray, edit.: Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China 1894–1919 (Publs. Carnegie Endowment for Internatl. Peace, Division of Internatl. Law, Washington), 2 vols., New York, 1921; reference in Vol. 1, pp. 96–97.

[41] *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 124.

[42] *The New York Times*, Oct. 6, 1940. Britain took compensation in the Malay states of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perak, which had been under loose Siamese protection before their cession to Britain in 1909.

[43] La Bourdonnais, *op. cit.*, pp. 232–241 and 265–284, discusses French interest in a Kra canal and contains a copy of De Lesseps' report.

3: Christian F. H-3 (no date) 1941 ALL Southeast Asia ALL

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India from 1898 to 1905), for whom frontiers and imperialism in the grand manner had great fascination, forced the Iman of Muscat to renounce the lease of a coaling site to France,[44] saw the Hague Court decide in Britain's favor in 1905 the question of the grant of the French flag to Muscat dhows, carried on an intimate correspondence with King Chualalongkorn of Siam, and considered that country an outpost of the British Empire.[45] From the Olympian heights of Simla Lord Curzon took pride in Britannia's supremacy in Southeast Asia. The Indian Ocean was a British preserve: "At no point in the long stretches of British territory washed by its surf has the flag of any European rival ever been hoisted since the French colours were struck over Cuddalore in 1783."[46] Curzon dreamed of a grand trunk railway from Calais to Shanghai by way of British India and sent Major Davies to do the necessary survey work in Yunnan.[47] He believed mistakenly that India and China, the two most populous countries in the world, would in his time be joined by steel rails.

The great delusion that the Irrawaddy, the Salween, the Menam, or the Mekong would provide the entrepôt to interior China was the key to Anglo-French policy and rivalry in Southeast Asia for a century. The delusion died hard. Eventually, however, "loath as most Englishmen are to admit it,[48] trade decided that none of these river valleys provided an economical entrance to China.[49] Likewise, it was at length realized that Indochina was not the path of empire. Both Britishers and Frenchmen, learning lessons from geography and history, agreed with Sir Henry Yule: At no time has a conqueror from India or Burma passed on to China, nor (with one minor exception) from China to India or Burma; nor did the conquests of any one of the great warriors of medieval Asia embrace any part of both countries.[50]

But the delusion was so persistent and complete that it amounted to a perfect case of mistaken identity. Meantime, "England annexed areas where she had interests to protect, France annexed areas where she *wished* to have interests to protect."[51]

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[44] Lovat Fraser: India under Curzon and After, New York, 1911, pp. 86–91, gives a convenient summary of French attempts to secure a base at the mouth of the Persian Gulf.

[45] Curzon wrote a brilliant defense of Britain's record in Siam (G. N. Curzon: The Siamese Boundary Question, *The Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 34, 1893, pp. 34–55).

[46] G. A. Ballard: Rulers of the Indian Ocean, London, 1927, p. 287.

[47] H. R. Davies: Yün-nan: The Link between India and the Yangtze. Cambridge, 1909. Davies urged construction, for political reasons, of a meter-gauge line from Burma to China at a cost of £20,000,000.

[48] Clifford (quoting Colborne Baber), *op. cit.*, p. 294. A governor general of French Indochina came to the same conclusion. "French Indochina cannot be considered as a country of commercial transit. Saigon can never compete with Singapore" (J. L. de Lanessan: L'Indo-Chine Française, Paris, 1889, p. 478).

[49] Yule's introduction to William Gill: The River of Golden Sand, 2 vols., London, 1880

[50] E. V. G. Kiernan: British Diplomacy in China, 1880–1885, London, 1939, p. 187.

10; Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

177 part of Southeast Asia for even short periods, new forces may fill it, while avoiding the responsibilities of government provided by the colonial system. The new or re-established nations cannot avoid contact with the old and the new forces. The tools, the experience and perhaps the doctrines they need are to be found abroad, for the vast increase in their peoples has added to the problem of poverty so that it can only be solved by the increasing use of perfected forms of production in agriculture and in industry.

177 648 The independence of the Philippine Republic, the preparations for independence in Indonesia, the recognition of Viet Nam, the constitutional progress of Burma, thus not only mark a local epoch; they are of worldwide significance. In many cases, they represent a change of national policies. Internationally, in Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter, countries responsible for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories have undertaken "to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions." Events in Southeast Asia and the course of discussions at the General Assembly of the United Nations suggest that the general principles of Chapter XI cannot be relegated to the future as pious aspirations. For good or for insufficient reasons, the pattern of past colonial rule has been broken, and the trend of world policy presupposes the relaxation of the political controls established by the Western powers in Southeast Asia and the rapid emergence of new sovereign states.

Even so, the basic problem of Southeast Asia in relation to world affairs is not the passing of the colonial stage of government. It is the broader problem of the evolution towards self-reliance of communities which in the past were largely controlled by outside forces in their economic and social, as well as in their political life, and which at present must seek some adjustment with these and other world forces. The political aspects of the problem are narrowing. They mainly relate to the detailed questions of when, where and how political autonomy will be established. On the other hand, Southeast Asia may long remain under foreign domination in matters of economic and social policy, with the danger that indirect control will be established without responsibility and that the next center of world rivalries will be found in the region.

The countries of Southeast Asia will be unable to play their part in the peace and prosperity of the world without drastic improvements in the economic and social life of their peoples. Poverty, unbalanced economic development, ill health, ignorance, labor difficulties and the exploitation of the weak by the strong, which were problems during the period of European control, will not be abolished by the abolition of such control. The change is that the countries will need economic and social assistance which can aid their political evolution.

467 of unions in industries the operation of which did not directly affect the public order.

The employers' resistance to unionization derived naturally from their 467 desire to have available an abundant supply of cheap labor. They had on their side, as an argument that must weigh heavily with the govern- 668 ments, the involvement which such organizations as existed were believed to have with subversive political parties and leaders. Commu- 468 nism was reported to be rife among the Chinese labor groups. Indian Congress emissaries were supposed to be stirring up the traditionally docile Indian coolies. The growing wave of strikes and riots which occurred during the second part of the inter-war period, particularly in the middle and late 1930's, had the effect of modifying the opposition of the employer groups. Violence or work stoppages often took place without any formulation of demands or without the workers' support of the spokesman theoretically representing their views. At least some employers therefore began to see the advantage of dealing with responsible labor leaders and of forcing any subversive elements in the workers' associations out into the open.

466 Thus in Malaya, in 1939, legislation was introduced (but not enforced until 1941) authorizing and facilitating the functioning of unions. Em- 467 ployers in Indochina, who also had long opposed unionization, moved similarly in the latter part of the decade toward a recognition of the need for it. In the Netherlands Indies, membership in unions, after a setback in the early 1930's, slowly increased, although by far the largest unions were still composed of government officials and professional men. In [563] Burma, as in Siam, unionization was impeded by the presence of a predominantly alien body of workers to whose welfare the nationals of both countries were either hostile or indifferent. Such organizations as existed survived only insofar as the governments in each country favored them as useful aids in preventing curtailment of production. Their development, however, was controlled lest they harbor elements striving to overthrow the established order.

The loss of their colonies by the Western powers and anti-colonial Japanese propaganda naturally induced a greater consciousness on their part of the existence of labor problems that must be coped with if the larger economic and social programs are to succeed. From the resolutions passed at the International Labour Organization's conference at [648] Philadelphia in 1944,[1] it appears to have been generally recognized that the colonial governments could no longer rely on paternalistic measures or the voluntary cooperation of individual employers.

[1] Bruno Lasker, "A Labor Code for Dependent Peoples," *Far Eastern Survey*, XIII, 12, June 14, 1944, pp. 103-10.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
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S C 578 463 651 Sometimes they have been given a choice of activities. The Spanish, for example, wanted them as peasant agriculturists but tolerated them as traders. Similarly, in Indochina the French wanted them for opening up uncultivated lands, but, since the 'Red Lands' suitable for the cultivation of rubber and other profitable raw materials were barred to all aliens, the Chinese (although he might have been a peasant at home) refused the hard toil of the fields if he could obtain a position with a Chinese firm. In Java the Dutch found the Chinese useful as middlemen, and middlemen they became, accepting the penalty of the resentment of the Javanese that such a function entailed. The farming of the revenue was allotted to them as the highest bidders by the Spanish, the Dutch, and the British alike. Such occupations are labelled 'parasitic', but it must be remembered that they were the best methods of obtaining revenue available before the Governments felt themselves able to collect it for themselves. When they could do so, the farms were abolished. Also, it should be remembered, it was from the Chinese themselves that most of the revenue of the farms was collected. If we accept Mr Furnivall's epithet of 'parasitic' we must extend it to cover the British, Dutch, and French Governments also.

S 578 463 452 426 C 578 463 Given a large and improvident peasantry, as existed in Siam, Indonesia, Indochina, and the Philippines, there was a demand for credit with uncertain security or none at all. This credit was most naturally extended by the traders to whom they sold their produce, and it was most conveniently given in the form of goods and paid for in produce at the time of the harvest. Certainly this gave great power to the Chinese trader; the question is whether he abused it. A survey in Siam by Mr James M. Andrews (see p. 164) does not bear out the widespread belief that the Chinese are unconscionable usurers. 'The Thai farmer [says Mr Andrews], and especially his wife, is much more given to money-lending with the hope of high profits than the Chinese.' As regards alleged profiteering in the rice trade, the College of Agriculture at Los Baños in the Philippines (see p. 635) conducted a survey and found that 'the Chinese merchants are performing essential marketing services at a fairly low cost'. In Indonesia it is notorious that many Indonesian Hajis and Arabs are far greedier money-lenders than are the Chinese. In Malaya it is the chetty and the Sikh who are the money-lenders; not the Chinese. Cases in which Chinese

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mand respect and admiration for the ingenuity displayed.[20] "The serious imperfections which characterize native irrigation works and make rice culture uncertain, particularly in the plains, can assuredly not be charged to the account of these who constructed them." [21] The weirs, by means of which the peasants raise the water of small rivers, are especially weak. The construction material consists of bamboo, trunks of coconut and other trees, and boulders. At times great bamboo baskets are filled with heavy stones and placed in the river, or large stones are laid loosely across the channel. Where the rivers are wide the people drive two rows of tree trunks into the river bed and fill the space between the rows with whatever debris they have at hand. These weirs frequently break because of river floods as they have no provision for allowing passage of flood waters; yet repair is often impossible for the duration of the rainy season, so that the crop is ruined. Another constructional disadvantage is the open intakes. During floods large quantities of water flow through these and cause an excessive soaking of the fields and damage to the canals. Wherever a canal has to cross a depression, a road, or another watercourse, bamboo or hollowed tree trunks are used to carry the water overhead. This often leads to large losses of water, especially during floods. Poor drainage is another weakness of peasant irrigation systems.

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Scientifically trained engineers have come to the aid of peasant communities in Southeastern Asia and have designed irrigation systems based on technological principles and free from the weaknesses of peasant irrigation works. One of these technical irrigation systems may take care of tens of thousands of hectares of riceland belonging to hundreds of villages. In many instances the engineers have improved existing peasant irrigation works; more often they have made irrigation possible where peasant communities did not have the financial and technical resources to overcome natural obstacles. Technical irrigation works are usually government-financed.

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In the Philippines most of the wet-rice fields are dependent exclusively upon the rain that falls directly on them. One centimeter of rain a day is said to be necessary for a healthy rice growth. But there is always the possibility that, particularly in the months of May and June, there may be so little rain that the peasants cannot prepare their fields. A shortage of rain in October is also dangerous as it may seriously damage, or even destroy, the crop, even though the precipitation during the rainy season may have been enough for the production of a satisfactory crop. To guard against an insufficiency of water for the wet-rice crop, therefore, the fields should be supplied by irrigation systems. The Philippines, however, do

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P [616]

[20] The *subaks* of Bali are agricultural cooperative societies that have been formed to construct, maintain, and administer irrigation systems. The achievements of the Balinese subaks are very remarkable in a number of ways. Thus, the men of certain villages are especially skillful builders of irrigation works and are able to construct long canals and even tunnels of considerable length. These men are hired by the subaks and help them to solve their irrigation problems.

[21] Van der Meulen: "Irrigation in the Netherlands Indies," 1940, p. 146.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

on the contrary, welfare is a condition of progress. If, therefore, colonial powers would enhance welfare in their dependencies, they must aim directly at promoting welfare instead of expecting it as a sequel of economic development. 000

Here we encounter a preliminary difficulty in defining the concept of welfare. If we define welfare as consisting in harmony between the individual and his environment, colonial policy must aim at reconciling them. They can be reconciled in two ways: by submission to the environment, or by mastering it. The former might be consistent with material welfare if men were no more than cattle, but it fails because men are not merely cattle. It is true that men must accept the facts of their environment if they are to master it, and that tropical peoples, when brought into contact with the modern world, must come to terms with western civilization in order to achieve harmony with their environment, but they alone can promote their own welfare, and whereas modern colonial policy regards welfare as a condition of autonomy, we are led to the conclusion that, on the contrary, autonomy is a condition of welfare.

Colonial autonomy is a heritage from the Liberal tradition. But in the past it has been attempted through mechanical reconstruction by the introduction of a native personnel into the administration, and the imitation of western political institutions in local and central government. Such attempts to adapt tropical society to western forms of self-government are based on the fallacy that form gives birth to function, and they serve merely to facilitate the working of economic forces, destructive both of welfare and autonomy. If we would promote autonomy, and thereby welfare, we must aim at adapting western institutions to tropical society, on the principle that function will devise appropriate forms of government.

These in brief are the considerations that will engage our attention in the present chapter. They lead on to the conclusion that what is needed is not mechanical reconstruction, but a creative impulse, strong enough to solve the problem of restoring unity to a disintegrated social order, and strong enough also to surmount the obstacles arising from considerations of profit and prestige.

2. Welfare and Revenue

Under western rule, tropical dependencies produce more. Because people must grow more in order to eat more, it is natural to assume that they eat more because they grow more. But this assumption 657 652

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

is invalid. Public works and economic services increase the productivity of western enterprise. They may also, within limits, increase native production, but without any corresponding enhancement of welfare. Such devices indeed, by allowing freer play to anti-social economic forces, tend to prejudice rather than promote native welfare, and create a need for social services to mitigate their deleterious effects. Yet the services intended to furnish the necessary protection function mainly to make production more efficient, and the services intended to promote welfare directly by improving health and education have a similar result; though designed as instruments of human welfare they are perverted into instruments of economic progress.

When the machinery for enhancing welfare proves ineffective, a remedy is sought in more and more elaborate and costly machinery. For the promotion of welfare, it is argued, economic and social services are needed; these cost money and require larger revenue; larger revenue can come only through economic development, and economic development depends on western enterprise and capital. Therefore western enterprise and capital are needed to provide the revenue for economic and social services that will enhance welfare. This is the proposition that we must now examine.

It is true that western enterprise and capital are effective agents of development; but so also is native enterprise. Both under direct rule and, though less conspicuously, under indirect rule, the maintenance of order and the opening up of new markets have sufficed to call forth native enterprise without the importation of western capital. It is true also that economic development provides more revenue. But at the same time it raises the cost of administration. This rises even with development by native enterprise, because expenditure must be incurred on law and order and on communications. But it rises far more rapidly and further with development by western enterprise. 'The most superficial observer must be struck by the difference which the existence of a resident European community makes in the standards of government expenditure.'[1] The European community demands better provision for its own amenities in respect of health, education and so on, and also demands better provision for natives so that they may furnish more efficient labour or more abundant produce. Some of the services incidental on development become indispensable. But usually the revenue from tropical dependencies barely suffices for urgent expenditure on the maintenance of order and the improvement

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1463.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

of communications. Not infrequently debts incurred to the Home Government have had to be remitted, and in most dependencies the financial position is one of constant stringency, while the inadequacy of the surplus available for economic and social services forms a recurrent burden of complaint both among officials and the representatives of western enterprise.

The argument that western enterprise is needed to provide the funds for social services assumes that the revenue derived from it more than covers the extra cost of administration consequent on economic development. But 'whether the local administrations have yet taken a sufficient share of the profits of foreign enterprise is a matter of some debate....It must be admitted that a number of administrations have shown reluctance to utilise fully their powers to impose taxation on the profits of companies or firms working in their territory, or have done so only in response to pressure from the Home Government'.[1] In practice, there is a deficit, which is met partly by imposing new obligations in services or taxation on the natives, and partly from private contributions, native and foreign.

It is indeed generally recognized that, in the course of economic development, excessive burdens have often been imposed upon the natives, either in taxation or compulsory labour, to meet the charges of general administration and the additional expenditure consequent on economic development, and even for the direct benefit of western enterprise.[2] Especially in the improvement of communications by road and rail, there have been serious abuses. In Africa, moreover, railway construction has mostly been unprofitable, constituting a charge on general revenue and cramping economic and social services so narrowly as to keep them below the standard required even for economic progress.

Another very considerable contribution to the cost of essential services comes from private sources. Among these one may reckon contributions from western enterprise otherwise than through taxation. As already mentioned, the great experimental stations in Netherlands India, which have done so much for the science of tropical agriculture, were until recently maintained by the planters' associations without Government assistance; they were intended to make production more profitable for those who supplied the funds, but their benefit radiated throughout the tropics and beyond, sometimes to the

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 22.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 613, 635, 1549, 1565.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

657 detriment of local interests as in teaching India and Japan how to grow sugar. In all parts of the tropics, in Asia as well as in Africa, the more enlightened employers provide good quarters, medical attention and 652 schools, and make their employees comply with modern sanitary requirements; such amenities make production more efficient and profitable. Employers will provide such services as they deem profitable, and on humanitarian grounds may carry this principle to the farthest limit or possibly beyond, but they are not disinclined to be relieved of the expense by the Government or private charity.

741 Private charity, indeed, together with the voluntary contributions and exertions of the inhabitants, seems to bear most of the cost of social service in the tropics. The assistance rendered by missionary organizations to educational and medical services is a matter of common knowledge. We have already noticed their large part in the provision of hospitals and schools. From the accounts of one mission in Uganda it appears that the public revenue furnished only £22,420—less than one-third of its charges—while the natives contributed £13,333 in gifts and £17,667 in school fees, and a grant from Europe provided £17,987.[1] This suggests that educational progress should be ascribed to Christianity rather than to western capital. If the encouragement of western enterprise is necessary to provide funds for economic and social services, one would expect the greatest progress in education where western enterprise penetrates most deeply. This is notoriously contradicted by the facts. As we have seen, during the nineteenth century education made far more rapid progress in Burma with development by native enterprise than in Java with development by western enterprise. Experience in Africa corroborates this view. The total expenditure of Government may be taken as an index to economic progress, and the expenditure on the education of non-natives is an index to the degree of western penetration. Such figures as are available under these heads suggest that the percentage of expenditure on native education is lowest where western enterprise is most conspicuous.[2]

Other facts point in the same direction. The first comprehensive enquiry into African education was financed by the Phelps-Stokes Fund in America, and American funds contributed largely to the foundation of the Jeanes schools that were established as one result of the enquiry. The monumental *African Survey*, conducted by Lord

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1306.
[2] *Ib.* p. 1309, and Table XI.

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CHAPTER IX

WELFARE: LAND AND LABOUR

1. The Instruments of Welfare

From the foregoing survey of colonial policy it should be evident that the promotion of welfare in tropical dependencies is not a new idea; what is new is the recognition that this requires a constructive policy with appropriate instruments of welfare. The instruments devised to promote welfare fall under two heads: economic and social. Measures under the former head aim directly at increasing production, which should enhance welfare indirectly; measures under the latter head aim directly at enhancing welfare, which should increase production indirectly. The machinery for increasing production comprises public works for the development of material resources, *la richesse naturelle*, and economic services for the development of human resources, *la richesse humaine*. The machinery of social welfare comprises services intended to protect the land and labour of tropical peoples against the adverse influence of economic forces, and services to promote health and education. It is often taken for granted that activities under all these various heads are effective in raising the standard of welfare above its native level; the next stage in our enquiry is to examine the validity of this assumption. We must try to ascertain how far public works and economic services do, in fact, increase native production; how far any such increase in production enhances native welfare; to what extent social services are effective in protecting land and labour; and how far the health and education services endow the people with new powers in body and mind. These are the questions that will engage our attention in this chapter and the next.

2. Public Works

Colonial rule is often judged by its achievements in respect of public works, such as ports, railways and irrigation, and colonial powers, in justifying their claim to exercise dominion, point to such things as proof of their beneficent activities. But it is necessary to distinguish between public works as instruments of progress and as instruments of welfare. Railways are the chief item under the head of public works, and in Africa they account for about three-quarters of the total

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loans raised by governments of British territories.[1] Some were constructed for strategic ends and some mainly to facilitate administration, but the usual object was to open up the interior to trade. In dependencies chiefly valued as markets for European goods, the populous districts usually lie along great rivers, and development requires little expenditure, because the waterways suffice without railways or even, as we have seen in Burma, without roads. The case is different, however, where local products are developed by western enterprise, as this prefers more sparsely peopled regions; plantations require large tracts of vacant land, and mineral deposits are mostly found in barren hilly regions. In such circumstances the cost of transport by carts or porters to remove the produce of enterprise or to supply its needs may be so formidable as to preclude development; in West Africa it was estimated in 1926 that porterage cost 2*s.* 6*d.* a ton-mile as compared with 2*d.* by rail.[2] In such circumstances, if the resources of backward regions are to be made available to the outside world, communications must be improved, and western enterprise demands the construction of railways. This opens up new and wider prospects of gain, and provides employment for western capital and labour in the colonial power. Inevitably there is a tendency to overestimate the advantages that improved communications confer upon dependent peoples, and to overlook the disadvantages. It is usually assumed that roads and railways act as an instrument of civilization and promote welfare by bringing the people into contact with the modern world, but negro slavery was formerly defended on the same grounds. Whether closer contact is beneficial depends upon its nature and the results, and where as has happened sometimes on railway construction large numbers die, or where as also has happened, a whole people fades away, it can be regarded as beneficial to them only on the ground that they are better dead.

The construction of railways was part of the campaign against slavery, and against porterage with which slavery was closely linked. The Uganda Railway, for instance, was approved by Parliament on the ground that activities against the slave trade must be extended to the interior.[3] Porterage is not only costly, but it is wasteful of labour, deadly; it is costly both in money and human life, and modern forms of transport have been acclaimed as an immense benefit to the peoples whom they free from the scourge of porterage.[4] But the matter is not quite so simple. Under native conditions, un-

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1657. [2] *Ib.* p. 1540. [3] *Ib.* pp. 1538, 1582. [4] *Ib.* p. 1539.

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touched by modern commerce, there was little need for porters, and slavery was in general merely a form of domestic or agricultural service that, under the conditions then obtaining, best provided for the welfare of the labourer.[1] It was the impact of the West, and the consequent liberation of economic forces from the restraining influence of custom, that changed the character of slavery and multiplied the evils of porterage. In Africa 'during the early days of European occupation large demands were made on the population for the supply of porters, with the inevitable result of much suffering and a large loss of life; and it is further clear that the extensive use of human porterage was responsible for the spread of forms of disease which had hitherto been local in their incidence'.[2] So far as economic progress renders slavery and porterage unnecessary, it is removing evils for which in great part it has been responsible. Moreover, it is notorious that road building and railway construction have, at least for the time being, aggravated the abuse of compulsory labour. 'The wide use of impressed labour for railway construction in Africa has, in the past, led to many incidents which have reflected great discredit on the administration', and quite recently the death rate on such work has been 'exceedingly high'. A French writer, commenting on the heavy burden of compulsory labour imposed on the current generation in improving communications, offers the consolation that future generations will be freed from compulsion.[3] But the benefits to future generations are remote and doubtful. As Mr Frankel notes, railway construction 'will be justified on economic grounds only if, after the line has been built, the efforts of the population as a whole, including that of the porters, can be so redirected as to yield sufficient quantities of additional or more valuable goods, of a kind which can enter trade and bear the cost of railway transport'.[4] The completion of a line sets free a large volume of labour for employment on adjacent capitalist enterprises, but there remains a still larger surplus which can no longer find work, even as porters, and this opens up new problems.

Where railways are not needed to replace porters, their advantage to the native population is still more questionable. Liberals had no doubt on this point because they regarded progress as a guarantee of welfare. Now we have come to recognize that railways tend to meet the demand for export products at the expense of subsistence products.

[1] Burns, p. 209.
[2] *African Survey*, p. 1538.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 615, 628.
[4] Frankel, p. 6.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

653 Of recent years the construction of railways, like other projects of economic development, has usually been advocated on the ground that they would provide funds for welfare services. How far they have promoted welfare indirectly through opening up new fields for commerce and industry we must examine later, but here it is relevant to note that, except where they have served mining enterprise, they have usually been unremunerative and have 'made a serious reduction in the resources available for general expenditure'.[1] Some forms of expenditure on public works are not, like railways, open to the criticism that they deprive people of employment; irrigation, for instance, creates a new and permanent demand for native labour. But general experience shows that, as we have noticed in the Punjab, it tends to increase the mass of debt, leaving the peasant with a bare subsistence and, at best, no wealthier than before.

There is, indeed, no necessary connection for good or ill between public works and native welfare. We have seen that economic development, unless kept under control, is on the balance prejudicial to the welfare of the people; that is one reason for the modern departure from the Liberal doctrine of *laissez-faire*. Public works in general, whether roads, railways, airways, ports or irrigation, serve to expedite development, and thereby enhance the difficulty of protecting natives against its evil consequences. It would, for instance, be difficult to argue that railway construction in the Belgian Congo under Leopold improved the well-being of the natives. In Malaya we are told of a 'once flourishing Sakai village [which] has, since the road touched it, plainly deteriorated, physically and morally.'[2] Even irrigation works must be regarded as a failure from the standpoint of welfare if they merely enable more people to live more miserably. Thus the general belief in the intrinsic value of roads, railways and other forms of public works as instruments of native welfare must be dismissed as an illusion; only too often they do more harm than good to those whom they are supposed to benefit. Public works are instruments of economic progress, of world welfare, not of native welfare; sometimes in some ways they may improve the common lot, but they extend and intensify the action of economic forces and, without protection against these, they do not promote native welfare but enhance the need of measures to protect welfare.

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies* p. 23; *African Survey*, pp. 1316, 1606.
[2] Malaya Census, 1931; [illegible]

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recuperate quickly when the area is again allowed to revert to bush."[38]

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Several of the forest services of Southeastern Asia have made a rather successful use of the shifting cultivator in their endeavor to reforest the land. They have combined shifting culture and silviculture by hiring shifting cultivators to cut mature trees and to sow or plant new trees on cut-over or burned-over land. For this the cultivators are paid a small wage. In addition they are allowed to grow their own crops for one or two years between the rows of young trees. This system, known as the "taungya forestry system," was developed in 1856 by the German forester, Dietrich Brandis, while he was Superintendent of Forests in Pegu, Burma.[39] It is ingenious in that it recognizes the habits of the shifting cultivator and fits them into a modern forest economy instead of persecuting the cultivator and forcing him to give up his traditional culture. This system has been used in the teak forests of Java since 1871. The forest service makes a contract[40] with the peasants of Java according to which the peasants are to prepare the land and plant and take care of teak trees (*Tectona grandis* L.) in return for a small sum of money and the right to plant such crops as maize and red pepper (*Capsicum annuum* L.) between the rows of teak. The cultivation of upland rice is discouraged, and the planting of cassava, peanuts, castor beans, and tobacco usually is not allowed (Figs. 40, 41). 1/A

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The taungya forestry system is an excellent way of getting pure stands of commercial timber. The typical forest of the tropics is expensive to exploit because of the large variety of trees which it contains, many of which have little or no commercial value.[41]

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As important as reforestation is soil erosion control. Where shifting cultivation is practiced in mountainous regions it often causes such acceleration in the rate of erosion that the rivers are choked with sediment and periodically do great flood damage. Flood control could be achieved in most cases by completely closing the headwaters and watershed areas to cultivators. On more gentle slopes the clearings should be rather narrow, should parallel the contours, and be separated by belts of forest. If at the same time the forest uphill were protected by fireguards, the clearings would have a chance to close quickly again so that the soil would be

[38] Worthington: Science in Africa, 1938, pp. 378–379.

[39] *Taungya* is the Burmese term for the temporary field of the shifting cultivator, a term that the foresters have adopted. E. P. Stebbing in his work, The Forests of India, Vol. 1, 1922, p. 376, writes:

"Brandis, moreover, recognized that the very system which, till then, had destroyed teak forests might be utilized to produce them, . . . and as early as 1856 an attempt was made in Prome district to sow teak in regular rows, together with the rice scattered by the toungya [*sic*] cutters. Twenty years afterwards this attempt had grown into a regular system, by which areas were being annually stocked with teak at a cost far below that of regular plantations." See also *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, 1926, pp. 415–428.

[40] Becking: "De djaticultuur op Java," 1928, pp. 50–52.

[41] Heske: "Der tropische Wald," 1939, p. 414. Heske's article gives an excellent short account of the forests of Southeastern Asia and points out that they are on the whole much easier to exploit than are the forests of tropical America because of the abundance of cheap labor.

1/A [See p. 41, cat 111 -- Anthy 1]

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185 134 133 protected against abnormal erosion. Terracing would be the most effective method of checking soil erosion, but this requires a good deal of labor, which is scarce in areas of shifting cultivation.

654 134 185 133 The Forestry Service of the Indies started an interesting soil-erosion experiment near Tjiwidej in the mountains south of Bandoeng at an elevation of 1800 meters. Two adjacent parcels of forest land, lying on rather steep slopes, are drained separately—out of each parcel comes a little brook—and thus form separate drainage units. Both parcels were used by shifting cultivators who had cut and burned the forest. In one case the slope was left undisturbed; in the other the slope was terraced. At the foot of each slope catch basins were constructed to retain the sediment that was washed down by rain water and transported by the brooks. The amount of water that drains out of each unit was measured and the sediment weighed. The purpose of this experiment was to get quantitative measurements of the amount of erosion that is caused by shifting cultivation and to study the effect of terracing in reducing soil loss. During the first year both parcels lost very little soil, because the humus layer protected it; but in the second year the unterraced parcel lost 5.065 kg. of silt per square meter whereas the terraced parcel lost only one-half as much, or 2.524 kg.[42] (Figs. 42–45). 1

Under the conditions that we have discussed so far, no radical change in the system of cultivation is required. If, however, the population increases to such an extent that there is no longer enough available land to allow for a sufficiently long rotation cycle, more drastic remedies are necessary.

654 185 245 134 Such a situation arose in parts of the Outer Islands and attracted the attention of government specialists. Legal experts familiar with Indonesian customary law, foresters, and agricultural advisers collaborated to seek a solution.[43] Realizing that shifting cultivators are usually reluctant to give up their traditional form of land use, the specialists approached the ladang problem by searching for means of reforesting ladangs quickly. Experiments were made with the planting of quick-growing leguminous and non-leguminous trees, bushes, and shrubs to shorten the fallow period, restore the humus, protect the soil against accelerated erosion, eliminate the grasses, and, in the case of leguminous species, improve the soil by adding nitrogen.[44] We have already seen, however, that artificial refor-

[42] I was able to visit the Tjiwidej experiment with Mr. L. Gonggrijp, under whose supervision the work was carried out. For a detailed report on the project see Gonggrijp: "Het erosie-onderzoek," 1941, pp. 200–220.

[43] H. J. Friedericy of the Department of the Interior and H. Vonk and E. J. Wind of the Department of Economic Affairs, for example, worked together on the problem of ladang culture in the residency of Palembang.

[137] [44] Experimental plantings included, among others, *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., a light-loving tree which is typical in Southeastern Asia of dry, rather open climax forests and of second-growth forests; *Hibiscus tiliaceus* L.; *Albizzia falcata* Backer, one of the fastest-growing trees of Southeastern Asia, used widely as a shade tree on coffee plantations; *Aleurites moluccana* Willd., a tree at home in the drier parts of the East Indies; *Leucaena glauca* Benth.; *Pterocarpus indicus* Willd., a large tree frequently used along roadsides as

1 [see p. 42, category 116 -- Analyst]

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estation is not a discovery of Western-trained scientists but has long been practiced by certain groups in Southeastern Asia. It was the plan of the government to spread and enforce this practice of artificial reforestation wherever advisable. This practice, whereby the cultivator determines the vegetative cover during the fallow period instead of abandoning the ladang to chance growth, brings him to a transition stage between shifting cultivation and permanent cultivation. From there the step to permanent cultivation with crop rotation is but a short one.

Permanent cultivation requires repeated tilling and therefore more labor and tools than the shifting cultivator is accustomed to. Work animals are also desirable. An important obstacle to intensification of agriculture in wide areas of Southeastern Asia, however, is the fact that hill and mountain regions [up to about 1500 meters in elevation] are frequently infested with malaria so that the energy of the people is greatly reduced.[45] Moreover, the acquisition of such implements as plows, harrows, and hoes, and especially of work animals, calls for financial resources or credit, both of which the average shifting cultivator lacks. Some shifting cultivators do own livestock, such as cattle or carabaos, but utilize neither their labor nor their manure. Groups of the Mois in the mountains of Annam have carabaos, but they do not use the animals in their agricultural activities because they "cannot talk" to them.[46] On the Lesser Sunda Islands livestock is kept because it gives social prestige to the owner. Overstocking of the pasture areas on these islands has led to overgrazing and has cut into the forest area until there has developed a scarcity of land suitable for ladang cultivation. The same has happened in large areas in Africa. There it has been necessary to teach the native peasant the use of cattle and make him familiar with the plow. This was done successfully in northern Nigeria by combining the animal husbandry of the nomadic Fulani with the indigenous shifting cultivation of the Hausa peasant, thus developing "a system of permanent farming whereby a man with cattle of his own, say two working oxen and a few cows, can plough and maintain in fertility an area of land sufficient to supply all the requirements of himself and his family, and to obtain a surplus balance as a return for his labour. . . . Thus mixed farming represents a gradual evolution from the shifting methods of cultivation to a static type of agriculture, by the introduction of animal husbandry, and with the use of animal cultivation."[47] Above all, the peasant learns to preserve the animal manure and

a shade tree; *Dolichos lablab* L., a climbing herb which is valuable as a vegetable; *Crotolaria anagyroides* H.B. and K., a bush of vigorous growth which attains a height of from 12 to 14 feet and forms an excellent green manure; *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., low shrubs useful as green manures; and *Mimosa invisa* Mart., a leguminous creeper which suppresses grasses.

[45] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 181 and 350.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 354.

[47] King: "Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1939, p. 271. See also Faulkner and Mackie: West African Agriculture, 1933; and by the same authors: "The Introduction of Mixed Farming in Northern Nigeria," 1936, pp. 89–96.

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gated fields. One of the great advantages of garden culture over field culture is that there is always something ready to harvest from the former and therefore something to sell when money for daily household needs becomes scarce. Another advantage is that the garden supplies the family with a great variety of side dishes rich in vitamins; the vegetable proteins of the garden produce are also of high value. 146 244

As to the possibilities of improving garden culture, these two authors state: 000

> It is very evident that an improvement of the compound horticulture is a very difficult problem through the highly varied and dense planting of these compounds as a result of which they come to resemble a very complicated symbiosis. But for all this it must be possible by systematic investigation to improve not only the quality but also the quantity of the production. It may be said that the compounds with their story or layer formation superficially considered will find no favour in the eyes of western agriculture, but they are an essential link in the native production apparatus.[3]

The alarming decline in the welfare of the people of Java in the face of a mounting population prompted Netherlands Indies officials to examine every possibility of improving the peasants' condition. This accounts for the studies of Ochse and Terra. Lacking detailed studies outside Java, we are obliged to depend upon scattered references of uneven value. 654 241

Credner states that in Thailand practically every house has a few trees on the lot, and the villages are often hidden by tree clusters. The greatest intensification of garden culture is found on the right bank of the Mae Nam Chao Phraya (the Menam) in Bangkok Noi, just opposite Bangkok. Here irrigation is employed in garden culture, a technique not usually found in Southeastern Asia. The gardens are surrounded by walls 1 meter high and are traversed by trenches 2 meters apart. The beds between the trenches are elevated. The trenches work both as drains and as irrigation ditches. Small sluices control the water. In the gardens there is a great variety of fruit trees and palms which climbers, such as *Piper betle* L., use as supports. In the trenches the peasants grow lotus and water chestnut (*Trapa natans* L.).[4] Zimmerman, in his survey of rural Thailand, points out that in most regions the peasants rely too much on one crop, rice, and he recommends in several instances improvements in the cultivation of the home lots so that families may have a better supply of fruits and, above all, of vegetables. In the Khlong Rangsit section he observed that "on account of the lack of homestead and village sites among the people there is no gardening and home production of food."[5] This observation may be applied to Southeastern Asia in general. Wherever the dominant form of land tenure is tenancy the flimsy shack of the tenant has no mixed fruit and vegetable garden around it, for his status is much too uncertain. A tenant 244 312 [137] 244 427

[3] Ochse and Terra: *op. cit.*, pp. 371–372.
[4] Credner: Siam, 1935, p. 246.
[5] Zimmerman: Siam, 1931, p. 307.

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lanzones, papayas, and chicos, which find a good market in Manila, but on the whole we rarely meet in the Philippines such intensive garden culture as in Java. The diet of the average Filipino is not well balanced and is particularly deficient in fruits and vegetables. In recognition of this fact the Bureau of Education and the Bureau of Plant Industry have both done much to impress the peasants with the need for fruit and vegetable gardens. Although the situation has improved during the past forty years and a large variety of fruits is now produced, the country still depends upon imports, whereas with a little effort most of the imported fruits could be produced locally and would furnish an additional source of income. It would be well to encourage the peasants to grow more fruits and to advise them on the most suitable varieties. In the other countries of Southeastern Asia, also, with the possible exception of Java, such advice would be valuable.

The published material available on the importance of gardens in Indochina is similarly limited in quantity. Even Gourou in his study of land utilization restricts himself chiefly to listing the fruits and vegetables found in the gardens and to stating that certain districts are renowned for the quality of their garden fruits. Gourou's list of fruits and vegetables is as varied and extensive, however, as similar lists for any of the other countries of Southeastern Asia.

Wet Fields

Throughout the countries bordering the South China Sea most of the cultivated land is used for the growing of lowland, or wet, rice. For this purpose the fields must be leveled and surrounded by earth dams to impound rain water during the rainy season or to confine the water that is carried to the fields through irrigation canals or lifted to the fields by mechanical means. If a field is properly leveled the surrounding dyke will keep the water everywhere at the same depth. The size of the wet-rice, or paddy, fields, and the amount of labor that is required to make them, depend upon the topography of the region. In the lowlands, where no terracing is required, there is relatively little labor involved in the making of paddies, which are frequently large. A hilly, or mountainous, terrain necessitates terracing, which demands greater effort and reduces the size of individual fields; the steeper the slope, the narrower the paddies. We have only to see the rice terraces of the mountains of northern Luzon, southern Bali, the Preanger districts of West Java, or Sumatra's West Coast in order to realize how much effort has been expended in building these terraces and how much energy must be devoted to their upkeep. The terraces, as well as the wet-rice fields of the plains, represent the accumulated efforts of generations of peasants, each of which has helped to extend the area devoted to the cultivation of wet rice (Figs. 50–58).[1]

Not all people show the same skill in the making of paddies. According to Credner, the Thai are quite helpless on sloping land that requires terracing before wet rice may be planted. They would prefer to migrate to a

[1] [See pp. 115 ff. cuto gorv 116. -- Analyst]

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region where level land is available rather than undertake the terracing of a hillside; on the other hand, they have been successful in building innumerable canals to tap rivers and spread the water over the plains.[9] However, they do not seem to be able to fight great floods. In contrast, the Annamese of Tongking have built huge dykes against destructive floods and the attack of the sea.

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The problems presented by the cultivation of wet, or lowland, rice change from country to country, from region to region, and sometimes even from village to village. Lowland rice demands a soil thoroughly soaked with water and worked into "a fine soft mud by hoeing, plowing, trampling, or harrowing, and . . . free from weeds." [10] The field must remain under water until the ears of rice begin to fill and harvest time approaches. The amount of water required to grow lowland rice depends upon the variety of rice, the length of its growing period, and the nature of the soil. There are innumerable varieties of lowland rice. One way of grouping them is according to the number of days they take to mature, which ranges from 60 to 300 days. In the Philippines varieties that require less than 150 days are considered early maturing, those that need from 150 to 190 days medium-late maturing, and those needing more than 190 days late maturing.[11] The longer the growing period, the greater the water requirements and, generally, the higher the yields. Normally the water covering the field has a depth of from 10 to 15 centimeters. But "floating rice" can keep pace with a slowly rising flood and reach the amazing height of 4 meters or more. The stems settle on the mud when the water recedes, and new roots start at the upper nodes, while the lower parts of the stems rot away. Floating rice is especially well known in Cochinchina, and I have seen it in the Philippines. In 1939 the Department of Economic Affairs in Batavia sent a rice expert to Cochinchina to study floating rice and the possibility of introducing it into southern Borneo.

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Lowland rice can be grown on many types of soil as long as a heavy clay subsoil is present to prevent the loss of water through percolation. Copeland states that lowland rice does best in heavy soils that hold water securely, and he adds that it is desirable "that there be, at a depth below the reach of the roots, but not too much further down, an impervious substratum-subsoil or hard-pan." [12] We distinguish between two main types of wet-rice fields: those that depend exclusively upon the rain that is impounded by their dykes, and those that are supplied by an irrigation system and are therefore no longer subject to the irregularities of rainfall.[13]

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[9] Credner: Siam, 1935, pp. 203 and 217.

[10] Wickizer: "Rice and Wheat," 1941, p. 272.

[11] University of the Philippines: Handbook of Philippine Agriculture, 1939, pp. 7–11.

[12] Copeland: Rice, 1924, p. 45.

[13] An important variation of the second type is the cultivation of wet riceland that has been flooded by rivers rising above their natural levels. This mode of cultivation, which is found especially in the residency of Palembang in Sumatra, in southeastern Borneo, in Thailand, and in Indochina, is not so dependable as irrigation because of the irregularities of the river floods.

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Irrigation systems also fall into two categories: peasant irrigation works and technical irrigation works. The former have existed throughout Southeastern Asia for more than a thousand years. In recent times scientifically trained engineers have designed large-scale systems with concrete weirs and locks. Fields solely dependent upon impounded rain water produce one rice crop a year, whereas irrigated fields often yield two crops. If even with irrigation only one crop can be produced, yet the irrigation system assures proper water control, whereas without it irregularities in the course of the rainy season may damage, or destroy, the crop. 243 312 [177]

Wet fields are protected against erosion by leveling, terracing, and dyking. But how does continued cropping affect the fertility of wet-rice fields? Diverse environments and cultural practices in Southeastern Asia create considerable differences in this respect. Much of the paddy land of the Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, and Burma has lost a good deal of its original fertility because the peasants have not used manures, fertilizers, or crop rotation. In many instances, however, soil fertility has been preserved by the mineral matter dissolved in the irrigation water and by the silt deposited on those fields that are supplied with irrigation water coming from streams. The value of the water and silt depends, of course, upon the nature of the parent material from which it is derived. Rivers from a young volcanic region supply much richer water and silt than do those that drain a mountain region consisting of sedimentary rock or granite. For this reason, the Irrigation Service of the Netherlands Indies before making final plans for a new irrigation system takes samples of water and silt carried by rivers at different times of the year. The samples are analyzed in order to determine their influence upon the soil to be irrigated. A river found to be carrying water and silt that would lower the value of paddy land would be eliminated as a source of irrigation water, or its use would be limited as much as possible. 243 134 312 [654]

Irrigated fields of which the water supply does not contain minerals in quantities necessary for continuous satisfactory plant growth and paddy land that depends exclusively upon rain, both require other techniques for maintaining fertility. In many regions cultivators cut the rice stems just far enough below the ear to allow bundling. This practice makes possible the return of the rest of the plant matter to the soil. From this it is only one more step to work household refuse into the ground together with ashes of burned rubbish, rice husks, leaves, and manure.

As stable manure is not available in adequate quantities, intensive studies of the application of green manures to the cultivation of rice have been made in a number of countries of Southeastern Asia. A recent article by W. Bally reviews the results of these studies.[14] In a few rice-growing regions the peasants, on their own initiative, have learned to use legumes to improve rice soil. In wet fields the decomposition of green manure takes place under anaerobic conditions, and the final product is ammonia. Since 243 134 242

[14] Bally: "The Employment of Green Manures," 1936, pp. T10–T31.

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with sugar or tobacco grown under plantation management. But is the high fertility of the soil due to this crop rotation, or is it rather the result of the heavy application of commerical fertilizer and the thorough cultivation of the soil under Western management? 242 134 249

In no country of Southeastern Asia is there so great a variety or so intensive a use of commercial fertilizers as in Japan.[17] In general, the peasants of Southeastern Asia lack money for commercial fertilizers. In Indochina local phosphates are within reach of some of the Annamese, but the costs of imported fertilizers are prohibitive. In Java, although attempts to make possible the use of fertilizers through the agency of public credit institutions were successful in some special instances, not more than one per cent of the cultivated area received any commercial fertilizer in 1939. On the other hand, estimates indicate that more than 1,000,000 hectares of sawah have a phosphate deficiency and that a moderate application of phosphate would augment the yield by 25 to 50 per cent.[18] 242 [654]

The Agricultural Advisory Service was able to raise the productivity of wet-rice fields in West Java by about 10 per cent. It encouraged the peasants to use fertilizer on seedbeds, to sow rice more thinly on the beds (thus producing stronger seedlings), and to plant the seedlings in rows so that weeding could be done with a special instrument, the *landak* (Fig. 59).[1] This weeder was developed in Japan. During the years immediately preceding 1939, these improvements in West Java resulted in an increase in output of unhusked rice amounting to 300,000 quintals, or 30,000 metric tons, with a value of nearly 1,000,000 guilders. This shows that some improvements in cultivation may increase production without a great capital outlay.[19] 242 243 [412]

Java may be compared only with southern China and with Japan in the cleanness of its rice fields. The Filipino does not pay much attention to weeding. The Malayan, Thai, Cambodian, Cochinchinese, and Filipino rice farmers have more flooded riceland per capita at their disposal than the people of Java and can thus afford to cultivate their land less intensively. 243

Irrigation Problems

Peasant irrigation works usually take care of the fields of only one village or of a small group of people who have joined together for the specific purpose of building and maintaining an irrigation system. These works consequently are small and usually inadequate, but nevertheless they de- 312 [476] 243

[17] "The chief commercial fertilizers used in Japan are pressed herrings, pressed sardines, dried sardines, other fish cakes, bone meal, soybean cake, rapeseed cake, cottonseed cake, other vegetable-oil cakes, ammonium sulphate, calcium cyanamide, calcium phosphate, and potassium phosphate. Calcium phosphate and ammonium sulphate are probably the most representative chemical fertilizers."—Wickizer and Bennett: The Rice Economy, 1941, p. 252, footnote 33.

[18] Departement van Economische Zaken: Voedselproblemen, 1940, p. 28.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28.

[1] [See p. 117, category 116. -- Analyst]

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land. An example is *mongo* (*Phaseolus mungo* L.), grown in Pangasinan and Batangas. Alarmed by the poor rice crops in 1940 and the difficulty of importing rice from Indochina and Thailand, the Philippine Bureau of Plant Industry, early in 1941, started to distribute seed of quick-growing dry-field crops, especially maize and legumes, in order to supplement the nation's rice bowl. But the average Filipino farmer is reluctant to accept this new practice, because "it is not the custom"—a powerful argument not to be easily overcome. [249] [654] 241

Dry-Field Crops Cultivated by Plantations

The discussion thus far has been limited to the native cultivation of dry land and to annual crops. However, extensive areas of non-irrigated land are occupied by perennial crops that are grown on plantations owned by Westerners. The crops produced include tea, coffee, cacao, quinine, rubber, palm oil, coconuts, kapok, sisal, and other fibre plants. Some of these crops were cultivated for a long time without the proper measures being taken to protect the soil against accelerated erosion. Although the detrimental effects of plantation agriculture in Ceylon and southern India are notorious in the plantation history of southern Asia, results were just as disastrous in Malaya and in the Netherlands Indies. Westerners, accustomed to clean cultivation or clean weeding in the temperate zone, carried this practice over into the tropics, with the result that soil erosion was very severe on steep slopes and led to great losses in soil fertility. Today, however, these mistakes have been recognized; there is hardly a plantation that has not adopted measures to protect sloping land against erosion and level land against soil exhaustion. The planters of Java were the pioneers in this field, introducing or developing most of the protective measures. These measures include contour drains, silt pits, contour ridges, terraces, hedges, shade trees, and especially cover crops. The use of these measures varies according to the crop, or crops, produced and according to climate, soil, and slope; but the purpose of all of them is to encourage an effective ground cover and to check the rate of water run-off. The financial depression of the 1930's—resulting in the need for very strict economy and a decrease in production costs—has helped considerably to reduce the amount of clean weeding and to convince conservative planters of the value of preserving a ground cover, litter, and mulch. Such measures help not only to retard erosion but also to enrich the soil. The first Western planter who broke away from the custom of keeping the ground of his plantation free from weeds was L. M. Tyl, who in the years 1890–96 developed the "weed-system" and thus introduced the idea of a ground cover into plantation circles of Southeastern Asia. But it took many years before his idea was generally accepted. It is interesting to note here that the Asiatic-owned plantations and the small holdings producing perennial crops, such as rubber, usually did not practice clean weeding. This, in the early days, was regarded by European observers as a sign of laziness and

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poor management, but, as has been so often the case, the Westerners were finally forced to admit the soundness of Oriental cultivation practices.

As we have seen, there are two principal means of protecting the soil between tree crops: by allowing the growth of indigenous plants or weeds (in other words the development of a natural mixed cover), or by establishing a pure cover of leguminous plants, many of which came originally from the New World. Rubber planters in Malaya seem to have had more success with the first method, which has been called "the forestry method of cultivation" or "rubber forestry." [67] Of course, the growth of indigenous plants or weeds must be controlled, and this is done by slashing the undergrowth from time to time. Frequently it is necessary to practice selective weeding in order to suppress undesirable plants and encourage more valuable ones.

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Much research has been directed toward the study of leguminous cover crops which supply nitrogen, as well as foliage for green manure. This research was started in 1910 in the Botanical Garden at Buitenzorg. Some of the cover crops that have proved especially valuable and are widely used on modern plantations are *Calopogonium mucunoides* Desv., *Centrosema pubescens* Benth., *Centrosema plumierii* Benth., *Desmodium* species, *Tephrosia candida* DC. and *Tephrosia vogelii* Hook., *Mimosa invisa* Mart., *Cassia* species, and *Vigna oligosperma* Backer.[68] Several of these have already been mentioned in the foregoing discussion on the use of green manure crops in native agriculture.

Because a number of perennials such as tea, coffee, and cacao are commonly grown under shade trees, many writers seem to believe that these plants need shade. This may be true in part, but more important is the fact that the shade trees protect the soil against excessive losses of moisture and undesirable changes in soil composition, texture, and structure and thus prevent a reduction of the quantity of humus in the soil. Most of the commonly used shade trees are legumes which, in addition to shade, supply litter and nitrogen and help to increase the moisture-holding capacity of the soil, thus reducing the danger of erosion. *Erythrina micropteryx* Poepp., *Erythrina lithosperma* Miq., *Leucaena glauca* Benth., *Albizzia moluccana* Miq., *Albizzia chinensis* Merr., *Albizzia falcata* Backer, *Pithecellobium dulce* Benth., or Manila tamarind, and *Peltophorum pterocarpum* Backer are especially useful in this respect.

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[67] Haines: "The Uses and Control of Natural Undergrowth," 1934.

[68] For a very extensive list of cover crops, green manures, and shade trees, see Heyne: De nuttige planten van Nederlandsch-Indië, Vol. 3, 1927. See also International Institute of Agriculture: *op. cit.*

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3. Economic Services and Production

Economic services, intended to improve the human factor in production, have somewhat the same character as public works intended to improve material resources. Like public works, they are primarily instruments of economic progress, world welfare, with native welfare as, potentially, a by-product. Like public works also, they often originate in the need for preventing the spoliation and exploitation characteristic of unregulated economic activities. Humanitarian sentiment condemned porterage, but it was the waste of human life and high cost of labour that stimulated railway construction. Similarly, in Burma as in the tropics generally, it was the devastation of the forests by free capitalist enterprise that created the need for a forestry service. Rich mineral deposits are often buried beneath the refuse of surface workings. In South Africa ostrich farming nearly committed suicide by killing off the ostriches.[1] One natural consequence of the improvement of communications in the process of economic development is the spread of diseases among crops and cattle. In all these and in other ways economic development creates a need for economic services. There is, however, one notable difference between economic service and public works. Whereas public works are mostly intended to promote general economic progress, economic services may be particularly directed towards promoting the economic progress of the natives.

Not infrequently it is assumed that all expenditure on economic services goes to native enterprise. Much of it, however, is incurred solely on behalf of western enterprise, and does not contribute towards increasing native production. Mineral deposits are worked almost exclusively by Europeans, and it is they who profit by the geological survey and mines service. Ordinarily, as in Africa, Europeans hold most of the commercial forests, to which the activities of the forestry service are mainly directed; it may, by reafforestation or in other ways, assist native cultivation, but protective forestry receives less attention, partly because it is less directly remunerative and partly because it lacks the support of native public opinion.[2] The economic services which touch native life most closely are those concerned with agriculture, veterinary care and irrigation, and even in these western enterprise commands a share, and sometimes the chief share, of

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 985, 993, 1313, 1492, 1499, 1528; Frankel, p. 65n.
[2] *African Survey*, p. 987.

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654 their attention. When, therefore, economic development is advocated on the ground that it provides funds for economic services, it is well to enquire how far these services are concerned with native rather than with western enterprise, and how far they do in fact make native enterprise more efficient. Information on such matters is not readily obtainable, but some light is thrown on them by a recent study of Malaya.

243 654 Formerly the natives of British Malaya cultivated little but rice. Conditions did not favour the growth of a large export market such as stimulated cultivators in other parts of Indo-China to extend their holdings, and the Government tried to encourage the cultivation of rice by regulations making it compulsory. In the early years of the present century, when the doctrine of efficiency was beginning to replace the principle of *laissez-faire* as the motto of colonial rule, an agricultural service was created. This included a paddy experimental station, but no one was appointed to specialize in rice, and experiments in the improvement of rice cultivation were discontinuous. About the same time plantation rubber was coming into favour, and the agricultural experts 'gave most of their time to the European and Chinese rubber planters'. Malays also found rubber profitable, and tended to substitute rubber for rice. Thus, with the influx of many hundred thousand coolies to the mines and plantations, the country became increasingly dependent on imported rice. When the war of 1914 and post-war developments stopped these imports, the Government had to import rice and lost £42 million on the transaction, while the estates and mines also lost heavily on importing rice for their coolies. 'The result of this experience was the decision that rice cultivation must be increased and more attention paid to native agriculture.'[1]

Accordingly the regulations for compulsory rice cultivation were enforced more stringently, and experiments were undertaken with a view to make it more profitable by improving the yield. Under the latter head progress was slow, as frequent changes in the agricultural staff hindered continuity of policy. By about 1925, however, the agricultural department claimed to have discovered new varieties that would enhance the yield by 30 %. This had little effect on extending cultivation, and in 1930 a committee was appointed to examine the situation. It estimated that the area under rice could be more than doubled by the addition of some 600,000 to 1,000,000 acres of potential rice land, but 'there was no one way of making paddy growing

[1] Mills, pp. 250ff.

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profitable and bringing about its extension. The problem must be attacked simultaneously through drainage and irrigation, agricultural betterment and the co-operative department.' One outcome of its recommendations was the reconstitution of the irrigation department in 1932, and the investigations of the new department confirmed the previous impression that 'all over the country padi lands were steadily going out of cultivation.... Even in the fine padi plain of Province Wellesley, ...conditions were steadily deteriorating, the cultivators in debt, and their *kampongs* (villages) often indicating a state verging on poverty.' During the next few years upwards of 40,000 acres were added to the existing irrigation schemes.[1] At the same time, under the influence of the depression there was a fall in the price of rubber, and by 1934 the area under rice had grown by over 100,000 acres. In the following year, however, with a rise in the price of rubber, the area under rice fell by 35,000 acres. Thus although there was a wide area available for extending the cultivation of rice, and the fall in the price of rubber consequent on the depression encouraged cultivators to prefer rice cultivation, which at the same time was stimulated by compulsion, by extensive new irrigation and by the discovery of more productive strains, yet, with a population that increased between 1926 and 1936 by 29 %, the area under rice expanded by only 11 %.[3]

Area under rice[2]

	(acres, 000)
1924–5	654
1929–30	657
1933–4	767
1937–8	726

This brief survey of the attempts to foster and improve rice cultivation in Malaya suggests that neither compulsion nor the efforts of the agricultural service to enhance production met with much success, and it contains many lessons of general application regarding the relation between economic services and the increase of production. The failure of agricultural experts to increase native production is often explained on the ground that it is difficult 'to persuade a conservative and easy-going peasantry to improve their methods',[4] and that the economic motive, the desire of gain, does not appeal to 'natives'. This is the easiest and most comfortable explanation of all failures to enhance native welfare; it is their fault and not ours. But it is inconsistent with the facts. While the Malayan was reluctant to grow more rice, he was taking readily to growing rubber. All over the Tropical Far East, native rubber has expanded rapidly, sometimes in the face of opposition. Similarly in Java the opposition of planters and

[1] Mills, pp. 262, 272, 274.
[2] Wickizer and Bennett, p. 314.
[3] *Ib.* p. 195.
[4] Mills, pp. 251, 259.

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of some officials could not stop the people from cultivating sugar instead of the less profitable rice.[1] In Africa as in Asia the people are only too ready to substitute commercial crops for food crops, and in parts of the Gold Coast and Tanganyika the farmers are coming to depend on the market for their food.[2] Everywhere the acreage of new crops under native cultivation rises and falls with the demand. The adoption of new crops is nothing new. In Netherlands India, of all the produce now cultivated by natives, only the coconut, soya and the spices are indigenous, and even rice is an immigrant. All the staple crops have come in from abroad over a period of many centuries, and that is true also of Burma. In Africa bananas, rice, wheat, and sugar were introduced by the Arabs in the seventh century, and the sweet potato, cassava and maize are attributed to the Portuguese. In the most notable modern developments of native production, agricultural services have played a very minor role. In Burma the two outstanding innovations in agricultural practice, the introduction of hard rice for the European market and, later, of groundnut, both preceded the creation of an agricultural department. So also did the substitution of transplanting for broadcasting in rice cultivation, which became general when the price of paddy rose sufficiently to justify the extra cost. In Africa 'the production of cacao in the Gold Coast and of groundnuts in Northern Nigeria are examples of the development of new industries almost without aid, when the African has been satisfied that production is possible and within his capacity...(and)...this wide adoption of maize and other crops, which are comparatively recent introductions is further evidence of capacity of adaptation'.[3] Where new crops or methods of cultivation are profitable, compulsion and expert assistance are unnecessary; where they are unprofitable, compulsion and expert assistance are of no avail.

General experience shows that even if tropical peoples fail to evince a desire of gain before contact with the West, this is one of the earliest lessons which they learn. For the introduction of new and more profitable crops it is not even necessary that the cultivators themselves should make the profit. Where economic development leads to land alienation and rack-renting, or wherever rents are fixed by competition, the land goes to tenants who can pay the highest rent, and cultivators are compelled therefore to adopt new and more productive crops, or cheaper methods of cultiva-

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 321.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 864–7, 961.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 883, 886.

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tion, even though the profit goes to the moneylender or the landlord. If an agricultural service can make the cultivation of any crop more profitable either to cultivators or landowners it will increase production; if it does not increase production, the presumption is that it has not enabled cultivators, working under local conditions and with the means at their disposal, to get a better return.

Even in Europe the application of modern science to agriculture is comparatively recent, and practical agriculturists are apt to view the suggestions of experts with suspicion not always unjustified. But the scientific study of tropical agriculture is still in its infancy, and experts must be cautious in their recommendations, for, if they base suggestions on experience in Europe, they are liable to make mistakes. For example, in Europe cultivators prize a warm soil and in the tropics a cool soil, and in other ways conditions are reversed, but specialists are not always capable of adapting to a tropical environment what they have been taught in Europe. In Burma deep ploughing was recommended to rice cultivators, until experience showed that this breaks up the hard pan which holds the water. The early rubber leases in Burma required planters to grow at least 400 trees to the acre, whereas the optimum number was about 80. Western planters condemned the neglect of natives to weed their rubber holdings until the recent depression, by precluding expenditure on the weeding of plantations, taught them that it reduced the yield of sap. Mistakes are accepted as inevitable by western planters, but shake the confidence of native cultivators in western science. There is no doubt that modern science can do much to improve agriculture in the tropics. It has already done much in Netherlands India, where the 'great cultures' have been built up on a scientific basis. But it is European agriculture that chiefly benefits from the modern science of the agricultural service. Naturally agricultural experts can do more for planters who believe in them, seek their help and employ methods of cultivation with which they are familiar, than for peasants who have no faith in modern science and believe, often not unjustly, that they know most about their own job; and just as naturally, where, as formerly in Malaya, there is a choice between helping the planter or the peasant, agricultural officials tend to do the work that is more obviously useful, and prefer to help the planter rather than the peasant.

But the immaturity of scientific agriculture in the tropics, the lack of continuity in policy and experiment, and the prior claims of planters

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to assistance are matters of comparatively small importance. A far more serious obstacle to the success of agricultural experts is their ignorance of tropical economy. Everywhere production is a social function. In Europe we are apt to overlook this fact because our methods of production grow out of our established social life, and, because we do not notice it in Europe, we tend to disregard it in the tropics. The agricultural official is usually an expert in scientific agriculture, but one cannot expect him to have an expert knowledge of native social life. That is not his business; he is an agriculturist and not an economist. Consequently he tries to adapt native life to scientific principles instead of adapting scientific principles to native life, and, if the people do not accept his suggestions, he regards them as unreasonable. Under experimental conditions some new crop or new method of cultivation may seem profitable, but under the conditions of village life it must fit in with the established rotation of crops and with the available supplies of water and labour. In Malaya, for instance, if the new strain of paddy, said by the agricultural service to increase the yield by 30 %, had given corresponding results in practical experience, it is difficult to believe that during the next five years the area under rice would have remained practically constant. In Burma at one time there was a suggestion that sugar palms should be cut down or taxed out of existence, the demand on fuel for sugar boiling was considered uneconomic; fortunately before much harm had been done, it was discovered that palm trees were a stand-by of the cultivator against famine, because drought does not affect the yield until the following year. Similarly, in Africa, 'agricultural experts are becoming more chary of introducing sudden changes in African agricultural technique, for, they say, Europeans lack knowledge of local conditions, and the indiscriminate application of European technique, such as the use of the plough, has in some places had disastrous results'.[1] 'An examination of the present methods used by natives to produce food or cash crops will reveal a planned effort, the balance of which may easily be upset by ill-considered innovations....Such a system is of proved value in native eyes, and is peculiarly adapted to native conditions of life; it needs careful study before improvements can be recommended which are not only sound in themselves but will appeal to the cultivators.'[2] These things lie outside the province of agricultural science, and are not within the competence of experts.

[1] Wilson, p. 118.

[2] *African Survey*, p. 960.

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In other matters not only the agricultural expert but the individual cultivator is helpless, and even the whole village, working as a common unit, can do nothing. Production is a social function that extends beyond the village. In Malaya, as we have noticed, it has been recognized that the problem of making rice cultivation profitable requires the co-operation of numerous departments. (This raises the question of departmentalism, which we shall have to examine more generally.) Another illustration of the wide range of what may appear simple agricultural problems may be found in the marketing of crops. In Burma groundnut, and new varieties of beans and onions spread rapidly, without instigation from the agricultural service, because they found a market and were profitable. But attempts by the agricultural service to introduce chickpea, chillies and tomatoes where there was no market, met with failure, and the cultivators lost their time and labour. Tomatoes are widely grown and in one district cultivators were induced to grow a more productive variety. They obtained larger crops but could not sell them, because the flavour did not appeal to the Burman palate, and there was no local European market. Again, millers wanted a special variety of paddy. The agricultural experts produced a variety to meet their wants, and found cultivators to grow it. But it needed a special adaptation of the milling machinery, and this was impracticable unless the new variety was available in quantities requiring the co-operation of many cultivators over a wide area, so that those who grew it had to accept a lower rate and not, as they had been led to expect, a higher rate for their produce. Every such misadventure shakes confidence.

For these and other reasons the possibility of increasing native agricultural production through the assistance of an agricultural service are very limited. Similar obstacles beset the veterinary and other services. In general, economic services can increase production only where they appeal to the desire of gain by enabling the people *as individuals* to make more money; even this, as will appear below, does not always imply greater welfare. Many improvements, however, as we have seen, are profitable to individuals only through co-operative or collective action, and many, though possibly tending to increase the total volume of production, are prejudicial to the peoples as individuals. In such cases it is necessary either to appeal to some motive other than the desire of gain, or to employ compulsion. An appeal to social welfare requires conditions that are not easily fulfilled, and becomes more difficult with the increasing 'atomization'

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654 of native social life; ordinarily therefore a remedy is sought in compulsion.

The resort to compulsion for improving output raises new difficulties. Where the expert aims at helping the cultivator to earn more, both have a common object, and the results are readily apparent and can be measured by the standard of profit, which both recognize. If the expert tells the cultivator that some new variety will give a larger yield or fetch a better price, the results soon test the value of his counsel. It is a different matter when experts recommend measures that may possibly improve production in general over a long period, but require time to test their value and, in the first instance, entail trouble or loss to individuals.[1] If they advocate the eradication of dangerous weeds, the use of chemicals for spraying, the destruction of diseased crops, the cutting down of oil palms to protect the market the inoculation of cattle at the risk of death, the castration of undesirable sires, or the slaughter of cattle to prevent infection, the benefits are distant and uncertain, and the disadvantages immediate and obvious. In such matters they cannot expect the co-operation of the people, but must rely on inspection by a costly staff of numerous subordinates on low pay, ignorant and probably corrupt. Under indirect rule they may enlist the help of native chieftains, but this, like all attempts to employ the chieftains as agents of western policy, tends to undermine traditional authority. Finally, the success of measures of this kind depends not on blind obedience but on genuine acceptance through a recognition of their value. If the regulations intended to promote efficiency are sound, one would expect Europeans to comply with them more readily than natives, yet it seems that in some matters there is least progress on European estates, 'where control is much more difficult to exercise'.[2]

654 241 Measures to make production more profitable may gain acceptance if in the long run they show a profit to individuals, even though entailing a temporary loss; it is true also that, so long as a communal sentiment survives, individuals may acquiesce in personal loss for the benefit of the community. In time, if possibly a long time, the value of such measures can be demonstrated, and assessed in terms of money. But it is a different matter to increase the production of unprofitable crops. In such cases the agricultural service and the cultivators have no common standard. If it is difficult and dangerous to interfere in native economy where output and profit, debt and land

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 912, 934, 937. [2] *Ib.* p. 970.

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alienation provide comparatively simple tests of the results, the objections are much stronger where experts run counter to the profit motive, and where their recommendations are based, not on agricultural or veterinary science, but on western views as to the nature and purpose of tropical economy. The attempt has often been made and often, perhaps invariably, failed. In Java in the reaction against the Culture system 'officials were so zealous in promoting the cultivation of rice rather than export crops as to insist on the cultivation of long-lived paddy, even where the soil or water supply was unsuitable'.[1] In Malaya, rice land was found to be going out of cultivation although regulations enforcing the cultivation of rice had been imposed for over thirty years. To-day history is repeating itself in Africa. 'The expansion in the growth of marketable crops has seemed to be leading to a dangerous reduction in subsistence crops', and 'there is to-day a much clearer recognition of the need for organizing subsistence production.' Accordingly provisions for the encouragement of subsistence crops have been framed in Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika and Uganda.[2] Whether they will have greater success in Africa than in Java or Malaya time will show. They are unlikely to strengthen the authority of the native dignitaries enforcing them, or to foster affection towards the western Government responsible for preventing cultivators from turning their labours to the most profitable account; nor are they likely to make the agricultural service popular or to facilitate its work in other matters.

Moreover, in directing economic activities along these lines, it is hard to escape bias, and still harder to escape the suspicion of bias. When Europeans try to 'prevent the unwise extension of the growth of economic crops',[3] they are inevitably exposed to the unpleasant suggestion that they are chiefly considering western interests. We have seen that, in Malaya, it was the loss sustained by Government and the planters through the neglect of subsistence crops, that stimulated activity in promoting rice cultivation. In Africa interest in food crops grew with the need for healthy labour. Measures to encourage subsistence crops may easily be interpreted as meant to discourage unwelcome competition, and the more so because at various times the planting interest has, in fact, opposed the native cultivation of sugar, rubber and coffee. Even with the best intentions

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 167.
[2] *African Survey*, p. 631; *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 23.
[3] *African Survey*, pp. 635, 887, 978.

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654 241 it is obviously no easy matter to decide whether the extension of cultivation for the market is wise or unwise, and, in view of the generally inadequate acquaintance with native social and economic life and the deficiency and inaccuracy of tropical statistics, the material for a sound decision is unlikely to be available.

The foregoing remarks deal mainly with native agriculture, but this is the chief occupation in the tropics and has received most attention from colonial administrations. Similar considerations apply to other economic services intended to promote native enterprise. Undoubtedly native production grows, and often very rapidly, under western rule. But this is the natural result of greater security of life and property, and of the opening up of new markets, and in the past it has grown rapidly without the help of economic services, as the stimulus given by western rule to the desire of gain has been sufficient. The application of modern scientific methods to native enterprise should make it more efficient. That is the function of economic services. In practice, however, their contribution to the increase of production is confined within narrow limits. They can increase production only by making it more profitable to individuals and for various reasons, some of which we have noticed, this is rarely possible except in such matters as the introduction of new crops, which does not call for expert knowledge. Economic services can and do render much help to western enterprise, and they are useful instruments of progress; but they can do comparatively little to improve native enterprise. Thus the argument that development is necessary to provide funds for economic services in the interest of native enterprise is of doubtful validity and requires closer scrutiny than it usually receives.

4. Economic Services and Welfare

654 71 Unless economic services make native production more efficient, they obviously must be ineffective in enhancing welfare. But they may promote efficiency by increasing production or in other ways without contributing to native welfare, and may even have contrary results. In Malaya, so far as the agricultural service enabled cultivators to obtain a larger yield, it did not enable them to make a greater profit. One obstacle was a ring of Chinese mill owners.[1] 'The Malay had no option save to sell at the price offered by the middleman

[1] Mills, pp. 255, 261.

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who bought for delivery to the mills.' The Government accordingly built a rice mill in order to break the combine. (One cannot help noticing the contrast between the forceful action taken against a Chinese combine in Malaya and the tolerance of European combines in Burma.) But this touched only the fringe of the problem. From 40 to 90 % of the cultivators were not free to sell their crop in the open market because they were in debt either to Indian moneylenders or to Chinese shopkeepers. Similar conditions obtain generally throughout the tropics wherever the promotion of trade and native enterprise is a main object of policy.

We have seen how, in Africa, throughout the ages tropical peoples have been ready to accept new crops. But 'these early introductions were incorporated with the system of shifting cultivation and the staple diet became a form of rough porridge made from one or other of the grains or from cassava root, ground between stones or pounded into a mortar, and supplemented by a relish of vegetables, meat or milk'. Similarly 'the introduction of cassava and sweet potatoes by the Portuguese conferred an inestimable boon on many tribes by providing them with a famine crop which will flourish under conditions unfavourable to grain crops'.[1] The introduction of these new crops enriched native social life. But where native society has been brought into economic contact with the modern world, the introduction of new crops has a contrary result. In Burma the introduction of groundnut led to the substitution of groundnut oil for sesamum oil because, although less palatable, it is cheaper; cultivators sold their more valuable sesamum and used groundnut oil instead for cooking. Similarly in Java cassava tends to replace rice.[2] Native society has been unable to resist the economic process of natural selection by the survival of the cheapest, and the introduction of new crops has not enriched but has impoverished native life. One finds, of course, the same thing in the West, where potatoes have often displaced more nutritious edibles.

The purpose of economic services is to make production more efficient, and they tend accordingly to concentrate on export crops.[3] On the principle of the local division of function, the production of crops for export contributes to efficiency. Also it encourages trade and provides Government with revenue. But the profits from increased production go mostly to foreign middlemen and merchants; so far

[1] *African Survey*, p. 883.
[2] *Netherlands India*, p. 321.
[3] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 23.

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as they remain with the natives, economic development may enrich a few but, unless kept under control, impoverishes the people in general and detracts from welfare by the disintegration of native social life. To seek a remedy by multiplying economic services is like casting out devils in the name of Satan, for they expedite the process, and, like public works, merely enhance the need for social services.

5. Social Services. Protection

Wherever economic forces have been released by the application of reason to the conduct of social life, it has been found necessary in the general interest to protect those who are adversely affected by the consequences. This is the key note of the long conflict between Capital and Labour. In the West Greece liberated reason from the restraint of custom; Rome substituted the stronger rule of law for the rule of custom; Christianity furnished a moral principle stronger than the rule of law for keeping rational activities within the bounds of social welfare. The happy fusion of these principles in the Renascence allowed a high degree of freedom without disorganizing society. It allowed the freer use of capital in the production of wealth, and there evolved the type of social organization often described as capitalist, or capitalism. But these terms are often loosely used, and it is important to be clear as to their meaning. Human labour applied to natural resources produces a surplus beyond what is needed for sustenance. This surplus, if stored, is wealth. Wealth applied to the production of more wealth is capital. Thus capital may be regarded as disembodied economic energy. Capitalism may be defined as the form of social organization in which economic forces are predominant or, at least, conspicuously prominent. Such a society may be defined as capitalist. But the term capitalist is used also to signify the owner or employer of capital, and is usually confined to those who own or employ capital on a large scale. Thus there may be a capitalist society in which economic forces are predominant without capitalists who are owners or employers of large capital; and there may be capitalists, owners or employers of capital, in a society which is not capitalist in its general character. The neglect of these distinctions often leads to confusion.

In Europe the principle of economic freedom grew out of social life, and a homogeneous society has been able by its inherent vitality, though not without much tribulation, to gain an ever-doubtful victory over the forces of disruption. In the tropics, however, economic free-

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Enquiry' by Wellenstein, a technique has been developed for turning to the best account such statistics as have any bearing on native welfare.[1] 803

Lord Hailey has remarked that in Africa the existing statistics might be considerably improved without additional expense, and that a comparatively small expenditure would make them much more useful. That remark applies also to Burma and probably to most other tropical dependencies. Unsatisfactory as the statistics for Netherlands India are in some respects, they do at least serve to illuminate many corners that are left dark elsewhere, and the general neglect to provide means for judging how far the benevolent aspirations expressed in statements of colonial policy bear fruit in practice, naturally affords a handle for critics of colonial administration to suggest that it is more keenly interested in economic progress than in native welfare. It is not enough that material should be available for measuring individual welfare. The analysis of welfare demands a suitable technique for measuring social welfare by presenting accurate and intelligible information regarding debt, civil litigation, crime, health, education and other matters that find no place in individual budgets of income and expenditure. There would still remain imponderable elements, those cultural and religious aspects of social life in the tropics which are the first to suffer from the economic struggle for survival of the cheapest consequent on the impact of the West. But this is no reason for neglecting to carry so far as possible the objective scientific measurement of welfare.

4. The Machinery of Welfare

The deficiency of statistical material is a notable defect in the machinery of welfare. But it is not the only, and not the chief, defect. It may seem that no special machinery is necessary, that the care for welfare may be left to the local official charged with the maintenance of order. That is very largely true. Any European official can tell the people that dirt breeds disease, or explain the benefit of vaccination, or advise them to destroy mosquitoes and rats, or bring to their knowledge new and more profitable crops, or suggest new breeds of cattle, or inculcate the advantages of thrift and the danger of getting entangled with money-lenders. None of the most urgent reforms in the daily life of tropical peoples calls for special scientific equipment beyond the stock of knowledge common to educated Europeans. Natives have frequently 651 654 177 647

[1] Furnivall, *Economic Journal of India*, 1934, p. 295.

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adopted of their own accord innovations which appeal to them, and it would seem possible for European officials to recommend European standards of hygiene and other reforms with little or no expenditure on welfare services. It is true that modern science has done much and can do more for the welfare of tropical peoples. The connection between rats and plague and between mosquitoes and malaria are recent scientific discoveries, and scientists have traced the origin of hookworm and beri-beri. There is unbounded scope for research, and useful expenditure on it is limited only by the funds available. But it is well to remember that research does not bear fruit until it is applied to daily life; its practical application depends on the efficiency of the machinery of welfare.

It is true also that administrative officials should be better able to promote welfare if they have the assistance of departmental specialists. But departmental specialists will usually need the help of administrative officials if they are to get into touch with the people in their daily life. The departmental specialist is probably an expert in his own line, but one can hardly expect him also to be expert in native economy and customs or to be proficient in native languages. It is useless for the medical officer to advocate shoes for hookworm if the people cannot afford to buy shoes, or for the sanitary department to devise modern latrines which the people will not use, or for the agriculturist to recommend crops which local conditions of labour or water supply do not allow the people to grow. Although the specialist may try to adapt native life to scientific principles, the administrative official should be capable of adapting scientific principles to native life. Thus the welfare specialist must ordinarily work in double harness with the administrative official by his side. But the administrative official can do little to promote welfare unless he knows the locality, and what needs doing; has influence that will lead the people to attend to his advice; and remains among them long enough to make certain that they act on it. All these conditions must be fulfilled if welfare work is to succeed.

The machinery ordinarily employed differs according as the system of rule is direct or indirect. In the adoption of direct rule one object was to promote greater welfare through liberating the people from arbitrary oppression by their own chieftains. On this plan all the administrative officials, European and native, became servants of the law, charged with administering equal law to all. When it became apparent that the law, while liberating the people from arbitrary will,

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subjected them to mechanical economic forces, attempts were made to protect them against the action of these forces. That is the distinctive character of welfare machinery under direct rule; it allows free play within the law to economic forces, but attempts to mitigate their consequences. This is directly contrary to the method of indirect rule, systematized by Van den Bosch in Java, which tries to soften the impact of economic forces by leaving the people under their own chieftains and their own customs, while aiming to protect them against arbitrary oppression. Direct rule attempts to mitigate the action of economic forces; indirect rule aims at providing a buffer against their action. There is a corresponding difference in the machinery of welfare.

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(*a*) *Direct Rule.* It is often suggested or implied that the promotion of welfare in the tropics requires nothing more than the provision of funds for the services of experts. But this view disregards the conditions limiting their activities. The application of science to the affairs of daily life is quite a novel idea even in Europe; each generation of doctors regards its predecessors as unscientific, and in agriculture, hygiene, dietetics and other studies, what is held for true to-day may be out of date to-morrow. But the tropics are still almost virgin lands in science; experience in Europe may be misleading and conclusions based on it invalid. Conditions are different or even contrary. Cultivation requires a cool soil instead of a warm soil; natives apparently maintain good health on a diet that, according to western science, is defective; plague and malaria were spread by measures intended to prevent them. The application of modern science to tropical problems requires long and patient research, and continuity of experiment. But tropical life is adverse to continuity; men go on leave or are transferred for administrative convenience. Lack of continuity nullified experiments on rice cultivation in Malaya, and official transfers hampered the researches of Ross on malaria. Moreover, any single problem may, and often does, require a whole staff of experts for its solution. In agriculture the investigation of a single crop disease may need the collaboration of agricultural experts, botanists, entomologists and so on. The same principle applies in almost all departments of economic and social life. If the agricultural expert, by patient research breeds a more productive variety of some generally grown crop, the people may be unable to take advantage of it because of difficulties in the supply of labour, water or credit; his work raises new problems for a wide circle of other departmental specialists and it will be wasted without their co-operation.

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It is easy, given the funds, to multiply economic and social services. But the multiplication of service tends to defeat its own ends, and greater expenditure gives worse results through excessive departmentalism. Each specialist looks at life through departmental blinkers. The agriculturist sees nothing but the crops, the veterinary expert only the cattle; to the sanitary inspector the latrine is more important than the home, and the policeman would guarantee security more confidently if the whole population were in jail. Often the experts are at issue. The agriculturist advocates grazing reserves to provide fodder, while the veterinary officer wants to close them to prevent infection; the fishery officer advises the people to breed fish, and the medical officer drains the ponds to kill mosquitoes. Everywhere the specialist inclines to a narrow view of life, but in the tropics departmentalism has peculiar dangers; in Europe the expert looks at a familiar world, but in the tropics, owing to his ignorance of native life, the field is out of focus. In Europe the expert understands the public and the public understands the expert, because they have a common background, but in the tropics it is only the European community in the towns and western enterprise that has a mutual understanding with the expert and values his assistance. Thus the natives in towns prefer to live in the native quarter, where they can escape the unwelcome attentions of the sanitary inspector, 'whose unreasonable prejudice against picturesque filth is never understood';[1] and plantation coolies, on returning home, lapse into their old comfortable ways. Moreover in Europe there is an organic community, living its own life, which can decide for itself what it wants most; but in the tropics, where innovations are pressed on the people from outside, there naturally ensues a lack of co-ordination between the competing and often contrary activities of the departmental specialists; too many cooks, as usual, spoil the broth. The confusion may be mitigated on the Dutch plan by grouping allied services in large departments under a single head. But this device alone is insufficient. What an organic community does by the dynamic force of its inherent vitality must in the tropics be entrusted to some official personifying, as it were, the common social will. There must be someone to co-ordinate the activities of departmental specialists and to foster a demand among the people for their services.

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Under direct rule the District officer, the local civil servant in charge

[1] Burns, p. 306.

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177 welfare, and it seems not unreasonable to assume that similar results will follow in the tropics. Schools, sanitary regulations, the improvement of agriculture, and so on, appeal to humanitarians as likely to improve individual welfare, and by making for economy in administration and business, they appeal to reason as well as to sentiment. Naturally colonial governments conceive of welfare on western lines, and administrative practice is concentrated on enhancing the welfare of the people as individuals.

These attempts to promote welfare are effective only so far as the people will respond to them. The West may scatter pearls, or what it takes for pearls, about the tropics, but the people will not pick them up unless they appreciate their value. Scientific agriculture, modern schools, western medicine and sanitary regulations may not conduce to, and frequently conflict with, what the people regard as welfare, but if they cannot get what they want they must take what they can get. Agricultural and other economic services may enable them to earn more as individuals; modern schools may provide their youngsters with 'a decent job'; they may adopt some western foods or remedies for illness, and they may, perhaps, go to hospitals to be cured of their complaints. But these are all individual benefits, and have no relation to welfare as a social good. Welfare consists essentially in harmony between the individual and the environment; the environment must allow him to obtain both what he knows he wants and also what he wants without being aware of it. Economic progress enlarges the possibility of welfare by increasing the command of man over material resources, but it profits the native as an individual only so far as he participates in the larger surplus, and it enhances his welfare only so far as it contributes, directly or indirectly, to the enrichment of his social life.

8. Welfare and Autonomy

647 There is, as we have noticed, a growing recognition of the complexity
657 of welfare problems. 'The problems of development touch upon the work of officers in various departments, such as administrative officers, both at headquarters and in the districts, and the technical officers in the
654 agricultural, veterinary, medical and other services. There is need for machinery to provide complete co-ordination between these separate
177 departmental staffs.'[1] The health officer finds that he must seek assistance from the chemist and entomologist, and the veterinary officer

[1] 1940, Cmd. 6175, p. 7; *African Survey*, p. 1612.

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looks to the forest officer to provide grazing for the stock. As experts come more and more to recognize the need for special knowledge outside their own branch of study, there is an increasing demand for the creation of new services, and welfare work is distributed among departmental officials who are unable to see life as a whole. At the same time there is a growing recognition that all aspects of life are closely interrelated. In Malaya the improvement of paddy is found to require co-ordinated action by the agricultural irrigation, co-operative credit, education and other services.[1] In Nyasaland the Welfare Committee comprises representatives of the Medical, Agricultural and Public Works Department together with non-officials. In Southern Rhodesia there is a Director of Native Development in charge of all native affairs.[2] The Dutch in Netherlands India minimize sectionalism by grouping the various services in large departments and, further, link up some of the departments by liaison officers. All these expedients may improve the co-ordination of the welfare machinery. But it still remains machinery, and acts mechanically on the people taken in the mass as an aggregate of individuals. Each group of specialists takes snapshots of the people from its own angle, but the composite photograph obtained by fitting the results together bears as little relation to the native world as a Hollywood film to life. It shows native life from an alien western standpoint and, however lifelike, it never comes to life. The more elaborate the machinery, the more mechanically it functions, driven by economic forces and not by human will. Improvements in the administrative machinery merely effect reforms which adapt the people better to the economic forces that dominate life in tropical dependencies. Evolution along this line leads to a dead end. It is the type of evolution characteristic of the lower forms of life which have survived by adapting their way of life to their environment; to adapt his environment to his way of life is the prerogative of man, and reforms adapting him to an uncongenial environment produce not harmony but discontent. The impact of the West has liberated forces which were formerly kept under control by custom; for the enhancement of welfare it is necessary that the people shall be enabled to regain control over these forces, that they shall regain their former autonomy. That a higher standard of welfare is a condition of autonomy is alleged as one ground for the elaboration of welfare machinery. But improvements in welfare machinery resemble improvements in applied science. Research in applied science may increase the efficiency of

[1] Mills, pp. 255, 262. [2] *African Survey*, pp. 1197, 1227, 1230.

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current practice, but the great scientific achievements come from research in pure science, which revolutionizes practice by attacking old problems along new lines. Similarly the elaboration of welfare machinery can have no appreciable effect on welfare, and still less can it promote autonomy. It will not give them what they want unless they want what it can give, and the promotion of welfare must be approached from a new angle by a revolution in method. The machinery is not only defective, but is applied on a wrong principle.

But, in the modern world, how is it possible for tropical peoples to get what they want? For the environment has changed, and not the people; they still, if left to themselves, would try to reproduce their old environment. But they have been brought into contact with the modern world and cannot get away from it. All the king's horses and all the king's men cannot set the clock back. They can get what they want only if they want what in the conditions of the modern world they *must* want. A fundamental problem of autonomy is to change the people so that they shall come to want, or at least voluntarily to accept, those conditions which the welfare of the modern world requires. Some light should be thrown upon this problem from an examination of attempts already made to introduce self-government among dependent peoples in various projects of colonial autonomy.

9. Autonomy

Colonial autonomy is closely linked with the Liberal tradition, which had two aspects. On the economic side it stood for economic freedom, freedom of person, property and trade; on the political side it stood for freedom of thought, speech and religion. Political freedom was regarded as the natural fruit of economic freedom. In the nineteenth century Liberalism was in the air. British and Dutch colonial statesmen alike claimed Liberal ideals though interpreting them differently; French Liberals recognized their colonial subjects as citizens of France, and Liberalism in Spain, suppressed at home, took refuge in the Spanish territories overseas.

During a great part of the century Liberals in Britain thought colonies a burden, and often cited Turgot's dictum comparing them to fruit that would fall from the parent tree when ripe. Men looked forward to the day when India should be able to stand alone as the proudest day in the story of British rule. Practical administrators like Sir Thomas Munro argued that when Indians were sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for themselves, it would

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161 development who fear that these countries might not be able
433 to expand their production faster than population expands, in which case the result of economic development efforts will be a greater quantity of people with little or no gains in the quality of living conditions. In Zinkin's words, "The growth of population and the impact of the West have between them, in the last hundred years, so upset the delicate balance that most of the Asian countryside is now bankrupt . . . . The alarming feature of the peasant economy of Asia is not simply that it is desparately poor. It is that in recent decades, and in most countries of Asia, it has been growing poorer. It is a changing, dynamic economy. But it has been changing for the worse."[23]

433 Poverty is not new in Southeast Asia. What is new
829 is the awareness of poverty and the conviction that something
178 can be done about it. "A great change", reported Harold Butler, "is stirring Eastern society. The consciousness of misery has been created by the growing realization that it is not the inescapable lot of the poor and that chances
654 of better life now exist."[24] All of the countries in South-
648 east Asia have within the past decade set up official agen-
185 cies charged with planning and promoting economic development; and for international assistance to hasten it, is the constant

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23. Zinkin, op. cit., p. 34.

24. Harold Butler, Problems of Industry in the East (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1938, Studies and Reports, Series B, No. 29), pp. 65-66.

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648 theme of their spokesmen in the economic and social organs
185 of the United Nations. It is probably too early at this moment to speculate on the outcome of Southeast Asia's
000 determination to industrialize. Much can be said, however, about the element of urgency and speediness commonly attached to each project of industrial development envisaged by each of these countries. "For successful development," cautions Staley, "two things are necessary: a substantial and continued economic advance -- and a social and political outcome which produces self-reliant citizenship in a free society, stable and responsive democratic government, and cooperation with other free societies."[25] The same writer warns that if capital investment and material technology are puched energetically in an underdeveloped country while little or no attention is given to deliberate promotion of appropriate social and psychological change, the result is likely to be either a failure of the development process to "take" and become "self-generating" or creation of a menace to the free world.[26] Garner also gives similar warning, "People have to develop themselves before they can change their physical environment, and this is a slow process."[27]

43 A most important factor that has kept Southeast Asia
44 economically underdeveloped is the small size of market in

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25. Staley, op. cit., p. 202.

26. Ibid., p. 203.

27. Ibid., p. 203.

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Chinese
Indians

the indigenous peoples were not sufficiently willing, numerous, or skilled 464
to replace the immigrant laborers. A higher wage scale, they feared, 668
might compel many firms either to go out of business or to install expen- 563
sive machinery. Already local nationalists, succumbing to the philosophy 167
of economic self-sufficiency, were demanding intensive programs of gov- 468
ernment-aided industrialization. If such demands were acceded to, the
industrialists and labor leaders in the home country could be expected to
protest strongly against the new competition.

In this complex situation, the colonial governments of Southeast Asia [654]
gradually yielded to the popular demands, although loath to abandon
their traditional function as instruments of capitalist planning in the
home countries. With the exception, however, of the embryonic and
ineffective industrial programs of the Siamese and Burmese governments
and the more constructive policy of the Netherlands Indies for a planned
industrialization, none of the countries did much in this direction. None
was forced as yet to consider very seriously that change in colonial rela-
tionship which would result from general economic development in the
world and specifically from the new role that China and India would
inevitably play before long in Southeast Asia. The Japanese invasion
interrupted the efforts of local governments toward a solution of these
labor problems. It also injected new elements into the situation.

2

LABOR ORGANIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

For various reasons an organized labor movement has never developed 467
in Southeast Asia to notable dimensions. In large part this was because 575
of the predominance of alien, transient, and illiterate labor forces, di- 563
vided—even when of the same nationality—by geographical and linguistic
differences. The Indians were further subdivided by caste and religious 668
sect. The Chinese had a far better family, guild, and secret-society
organization; but the antagonisms imported as an integral part of these
organizations provoked periodic violence. Later the political and gang-
ster elements which operated within their framework impelled all the
governments throughout Southeast Asia to control them severely.

National solidarity among the immigrant labor groups was further 166
broken up by the methods of recruitment and management. Agents and 167
foremen exploited their compatriots for their own personal gain, until
the governments concerned were gradually and reluctantly forced to
intervene. Asiatic agents behaved much as recruiting agents of emi-

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Chinese Indians

466 grants to the United States did in Europe until they were checked. They
167 consistently misrepresented to prospective recruits the conditions of work that awaited them, herded them aboard ships and in lodgings under conditions of filth and crowding, and tried to crimp their competitors' labor forces. Immigrant Asiatic foremen also were similar to their prototypes among immigrant foremen in the United States. They were notorious for the "cuts" they took from their crews' wages, for their unscrupulous profiteering from the sale of food and other necessities to the workers, and for their brutality toward those recalcitrant under arbitrary rule. Nor were alien Asiatic employers liberal in their relations with compatriots among their labor forces. Small Chinese-owned estates and mines were regularly cited in the reports of independent labor inspectors as the most delinquent in their observance of health and safety regulations. Singapore Indian shop-owners were the object of unpleasant publicity regarding the long working days, irregular and inadequate wages, and general tyranny meted out to their compatriot assistants. Disinterested labor leadership or even employer paternalism was conspicuously absent among the immigrant groups.

466 Working conditions were not much better in the enterprises owned by indigenous employers; but they were less conspicuous than those of the immigrant employer's shop, as most of the native workers are farmers scattered over the land and cared for, when in need, by the traditional village and family organization. Little was done by the native governments, whenever they were in power, to better the lot of the small native
[563 farmer-artisan. The Siamese and Burmese governments falteringly at-
654] tempted to introduce scientific agriculture, to improve cottage industries and to reduce the landless proletariat; but their efforts were directed more toward ousting foreigners who preyed on the people, particularly alien landowners and moneylenders, than toward improving labor conditions of those working for indigenous employers. The Siamese National Assembly, in 1938, turned down a proposal for labor legislation designed to set maximum hours and minimum wages and to restrict child labor. Its policy on labor organization was much the same as that of the colonial governments, that is, to keep the labor forces under control and to exhibit, at most, a certain indulgence toward the formation of unions in some trades or localities where this seemed advantageous.

Wherever labor legislation was introduced in Southeast Asia, the initiative came from the government and not from the workers. Originally
[686] it was the difficulties which European employers experienced in retaining their workers (at first domestic servants and later plantation laborers) that inspired legislation which imposed a penalty upon employees for their non-observance of agreements. Gradually, throughout the region, this penal sanction was abolished and more beneficial types of legislation were introduced to reduce the labor turnover. Considerations of

647 the old tradition, but the temptation to intervene has repeatedly proved irresistible. Under the tradition of direct rule in British India, and with a greater veneration for the rule of law, British officials are less disposed to resist the temptation, so that, in British practice, indirect rule loses its virtue and vitality, and tends to become little better than a sham, differing from direct rule chiefly in the name. The Dutch who tried intervention for some twenty years during the Ethical period were finally disillusioned, and came to recognize that it was mistaken. There seems little reason to anticipate better success under British rule.

Yet the principle underlying indirect rule is valuable. A native authority whom the people accept as representing them personifies their common social will. He has great influence to recommend reforms in which he himself believes, and he remains permanently among the people to supervise their application until they have been adopted into customary social life. But he can do this only so long and so far as he is the prime mover and has the chief direction in affairs. A leading Dutch civilian has suggested that whereas, during the Ethical period and earlier, the European official was the 'elder brother' or overlord of the native official by his side, it has become necessary for the European to accept the position of 'younger brother', as adviser and assistant rather than a chief executive. On this plan the chief defect of colonial administration, lack of continuity, becomes a virtue. The native authority is permanent, but of necessity cannot be in immediate and continual close contact with the modern world, and a succession of European officials can put before him various new points of view and make suggestions among which he can choose those that are congenial and seem feasible. This process, however, works slowly, and requires that the native authority shall be at home in the western world. Some form of pressure or compulsion seems easier and quicker.

5. Compulsory Welfare

656 It does not require an extensive acquaintance with contemporary colonial literature to note a growing tenderness towards compulsion as an instrument of welfare. There are demands for compulsory education, for the compulsory destruction of diseased crops and cattle, for campaigns against disease by operations, scientifically planned and humanely conducted, but military in spirit and thoroughness. For the common welfare men living in society must accept restrictions on individual freedom. In tropical society the people under their own rulers

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accepted such restrictions in the name of custom, but they welcome their removal. That was the strong point of British rule in former days; it brought, or seemed to bring, freedom. Now one finds suggestions of regret that compulsion is 'repugnant to the spirit of British administration', and that 'our traditions have not allowed us to contemplate the general use of regulation for the medical "cleaning-up" of disease-ridden areas'.[1] This tendency is often justified on the ground that we ourselves increasingly accept regulations that our more individualist fathers would have flouted, and that we must 'ask ourselves whether in dealing with the Dependencies, we are performing the function of a modern State'.[2] But the regulations in which we acquiesce, not without grumbling, proceed from ideas in which we share; although we recognize the need for penal sanctions to enforce them on a recalcitrant minority, public opinion is the most effective sanction. In tropical dependencies welfare measures proceed from the foreign Government and find no response among the great body of the people; on the contrary, they run counter to public opinion. We have already noted that in such circumstances the efficacy of compulsion is limited, but the relation between compulsion and welfare is so important that it deserves further examination.

In a city with a large European population it is possible to insist on modern hygienic precautions, at least within the European quarter. On western enterprises under European control the management can require their staff to accept western medical attention, and to comply with sanitary regulations; they can insist on these things as a condition of employment, and their hands are strengthened if they have the backing of the law. But in rural areas one may accept the estimate of Dr Hydrick, already cited, that compulsory measures are effective only where they have the support and the co-operation of at least nine-tenths of the people. No compulsion is required to encourage the people to attend secondary schools or to seek instruction of any type that improves their prospects or their status. People readily, too readily, submit to injections for the cure of venereal disease. But they do not, in general, believe in primary instruction or in western sanitation or western medicine. Their apathy is a subject of general complaint, but compulsion is no cure for apathy; rather it induces a reaction and transforms apathy into hostility. If the people do not accept innovations, the remedy is not compulsion but the demonstration

[1] Mills, p. 317; *Britain and her Dependencies*, p. 31.
[2] Hailey, Lord, quoted *Colonial Review*, 1942, p. 155.

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of their value by example and experience. Apathy betokens the failure of welfare measures, and the resort to compulsion is not only a sign but a confession of their failure. When measures that would really promote welfare fail, the explanation must be sought in some defect in the machinery of welfare, and as we have seen, this is defective because it works mechanically in response to the will of Government and not as an expression of organic social will. Compulsion can, within limits, be exercised effectively in the interest of economic progress, but to raise the standard of living among people in general it is necessary to organize a demand for welfare. Where an effective majority demands welfare measures, compulsion by penal regulations will give strength to their demand; beyond that, except so far as such measures are needed for the health of Europeans or the efficiency of western enterprise, attempts to promote welfare by compulsion almost certainly do more harm than good.

6. The Relation between Progress and Welfare

Indirect rule as we have noticed, although originally adopted for convenience, has been justified as a means of softening the impact of Europe on the tropics by leaving the people under their own rulers, laws and customs, and thereby moderating the pace of change so that they can adapt themselves to their new environment. Indirect rule does, in fact, provide machinery which should enhance welfare, and we may find cases where it has been effective. But the machinery often fails because the motive principle is unsound; it is applied to further progress rather than welfare. The growing tenderness towards legal compulsion under a penal correction is a tacit confession that, even under the stimulus of gentle pressure, adjustment fails to keep pace with the ever-increasing rate of change. Despite aspirations to moderate the rate of change in the interest of human welfare, there is constant pressure to hasten it for the sake of economic progress. 'A striking feature of most European economic enterprise in Africa has been the constant effort of Governments, companies and individuals to achieve specific developments in particular directions as rapidly as possible.'[1] That is true of modern colonial expansion in general. Governments are expected to bring new territories to a state of financial independence as soon as may be; the numerous departmental heads call for reports on this, that and the other sub-

[1] Frankel, p. 10.

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181 local custom and religious rule, had been present for centuries. But there
177 was little in the economic situation to sharpen it, and the Muslim leaders
565 themselves were often so steeped in the local ways that they allowed as the
602 religious law what was, in fact, the local custom. With the growth of
776 Western processes, the perception of new economic advantages tended to
779 change the equilibrium of the two principles. The advance of education
671 and heightened consciousness of Islam as a world faith also tended to make
182 the religious leaders themselves much more keenly aware of any divergence. Wealthy men who want to leave property to their sons, men with a strong religious sense, men who regard themselves as progressive, or who are in revolt against their clan leaders, therefore tend to be protagonists of the Muslim law. The conservatives, those who see in the custom a defence for women, those who see in it a symbol of an essentially Malay way of life, argue for the retention of the custom. Contact with the West, they say, is changing the structure of the peasant society enough already. The issue has also entered the modern political scene, since the search for factors to increase Malay integration tends to stress the national and extra-national character of Islam at the expense of the more local qualities of the *adat*. Here too it is growing Westernization which has sharpened the issue.

184 In a general discussion such as this, one may be allowed to refer to the
565 peasantry of South East Asia as a body. But they are not uniform in ethnic composition, in national interests, in language, in religion, or in general culture. Moreover, within any local community, there are competing, even conflicting, interests and opinions. The peasant may be unable to face up to the general issues which affect his life so deeply, but in so far as he understands his own interests he is very alive to them and capable of exercising keen judgement in them. It is the small scale of his organization for the most part which renders him so vulnerable.

000 What is likely to be the future of South East Asia from the peasant angle? Prediction is not worth much, since so many elements in the situation are imperfectly known, but there are a few which seem to be significant.

565 The peasant has no native middle class, of the same society as himself,
185 to give a lead to his development and stability in any wider economic
656 organizations that may be set up for his benefit. To improve his economic lot, and in particular to give him a larger fraction of his product through control of marketing, co-operative societies have often been proposed and sometimes tried. Their success has been only limited, partly because the peasant has not been fully persuaded of their attractions as against what the alien middleman can offer, and partly because of the difficulty of securing adequate technical supervision and administration at a sufficiently low official level. Much is now apt to be made of the colonial or semi-colonial status of the South East Asian peasant as a drag upon his development. There is no doubt that colonialism, as a specific form of political control of under-developed territories by a metropolitan Power, is

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nearing the end of its historical phase. How far it is likely to be replaced 565
by a more insidious form of satellitism is not relevant here. But to talk 185
about political emancipation of South East Asia being the prime require- 656 ●
ment for the solution of the problems of the peasantry must not obscure the economic factors involved. Nor is fresh capital all that is needed. For the economy of the peasant to attain a relative stability a great development of technical and administrative skills in the commercial field is necessary. The building of a native professional class would seem to be an important element in the construction of a more integrated economic and political system. To concentrate attention on the political factors alone is to overlook the fact that most of the sinews of the economic organism are now provided by the one group which does not have overt political power—the Chinese.

What remains of the traditional class structure in South East Asian 565
society is not of much avail as a defence of the peasant from alien exploita- 578
tion. In any case, though the rulers and traditional nobility still command 668
much respect, and provide symbols for the unity of the people, there are 186
stirrings of resentment among the people against the perpetuation of a system in which these aristocrats do not perform recognizable services at commensurate incomes. But such resentment does not mean that the peasantry are dry tinder for the spark of Communism to set alight. Communism as yet does not seem to have any great attraction for the mass of the local peasantry of the South East Asian region. The lack of popular response to the Malayan insurrection has shown this. It is presumably true to say that the interest of the peasant can always be secured in any movement which promises to give him greater control of the land—more land more secure tenure, freedom from land debt, and better returns for his produce. But to most of the Indonesian peasants these aims are likely to be sought in nationalism, which can be largely given both an ethnic base and the religious sanctions of Islam. The person to whom the cry for a solution of the land problem is likely to make a most definite appeal, especially in Malaya, is not the Indonesian but the Chinese peasant, who sees himself as excluded from full participation in the land rights of the country folk. Over and over again one hears the cry, ill-founded as it is, that the Chinese have not been allowed to grow rice in Malaya.

Here may well come one of the acute pressure points in the South East 000
Asian scene. The analysis might go as follows. Nationalism is a powerful political force because of its appeal to the individual in a projected, enlarged form of his desires and strivings. But by itself it is an aggressive rather than a constructive force. It lacks a coherent theory for the use of the resources at its control. An ideology containing such theory, and an equally ardent emotional charge on the part of many of its adherents, is provided by Communism. If Communism can work through nationalism it has a most powerful combination. Yet Communism in South East Asia lacks organization of any scale. The optimum conditions for its success are

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on the contrary, welfare is a condition of progress. If, therefore, colonial powers would enhance welfare in their dependencies, they must aim directly at promoting welfare instead of expecting it as a sequel of economic development.

Here we encounter a preliminary difficulty in defining the concept of welfare. If we define welfare as consisting in harmony between the individual and his environment, colonial policy must aim at reconciling them. They can be reconciled in two ways: by submission to the environment, or by mastering it. The former might be consistent with material welfare if men were no more than cattle, but it fails because men are not merely cattle. It is true that men must accept the facts of their environment if they are to master it, and that tropical peoples, when brought into contact with the modern world, must come to terms with western civilization in order to achieve harmony with their environment, but they alone can promote their own welfare, and whereas modern colonial policy regards welfare as a condition of autonomy, we are led to the conclusion that, on the contrary, autonomy is a condition of welfare.

Colonial autonomy is a heritage from the Liberal tradition. But in the past it has been attempted through mechanical reconstruction by the introduction of a native personnel into the administration, and the imitation of western political institutions in local and central government. Such attempts to adapt tropical society to western forms of self-government are based on the fallacy that form gives birth to function, and they serve merely to facilitate the working of economic forces, destructive both of welfare and autonomy. If we would promote autonomy, and thereby welfare, we must aim at adapting western institutions to tropical society, on the principle that function will devise appropriate forms of government.

These in brief are the considerations that will engage our attention in the present chapter. They lead on to the conclusion that what is needed is not mechanical reconstruction, but a creative impulse, strong enough to solve the problem of restoring unity to a disintegrated social order, and strong enough also to surmount the obstacles arising from considerations of profit and prestige.

2. Welfare and Revenue

Under western rule, tropical dependencies produce more. Because people must grow more in order to eat more, it is natural to assume that they eat more because they grow more. But this assumption

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is invalid. Public works and economic services increase the productivity of western enterprise. They may also, within limits, increase native production, but without any corresponding enhancement of welfare. Such devices indeed, by allowing freer play to anti-social economic forces, tend to prejudice rather than promote native welfare, and create a need for social services to mitigate their deleterious effects. Yet the services intended to furnish the necessary protection function mainly to make production more efficient, and the services intended to promote welfare directly by improving health and education have a similar result; though designed as instruments of human welfare they are perverted into instruments of economic progress.

When the machinery for enhancing welfare proves ineffective, a remedy is sought in more and more elaborate and costly machinery. For the promotion of welfare, it is argued, economic and social services are needed; these cost money and require larger revenue; larger revenue can come only through economic development, and economic development depends on western enterprise and capital. Therefore western enterprise and capital are needed to provide the revenue for economic and social services that will enhance welfare. This is the proposition that we must now examine.

It is true that western enterprise and capital are effective agents of development; but so also is native enterprise. Both under direct rule and, though less conspicuously, under indirect rule, the maintenance of order and the opening up of new markets have sufficed to call forth native enterprise without the importation of western capital. It is true also that economic development provides more revenue. But at the same time it raises the cost of administration. This rises even with development by native enterprise, because expenditure must be incurred on law and order and on communications. But it rises far more rapidly and further with development by western enterprise. 'The most superficial observer must be struck by the difference which the existence of a resident European community makes in the standards of government expenditure.'[1] The European community demands better provision for its own amenities in respect of health, education and so on, and also demands better provision for natives so that they may furnish more efficient labour or more abundant produce. Some of the services incidental on development become indispensable. But usually the revenue from tropical dependencies barely suffices for urgent expenditure on the maintenance of order and the improvement

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1463.

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of communications. Not infrequently debts incurred to the Home Government have had to be remitted, and in most dependencies the financial position is one of constant stringency, while the inadequacy of the surplus available for economic and social services forms a recurrent burden of complaint both among officials and the representatives of western enterprise.

The argument that western enterprise is needed to provide the funds for social services assumes that the revenue derived from it more than covers the extra cost of administration consequent on economic development. But 'whether the local administrations have yet taken a sufficient share of the profits of foreign enterprise is a matter of some debate....It must be admitted that a number of administrations have shown reluctance to utilise fully their powers to impose taxation on the profits of companies or firms working in their territory, or have done so only in response to pressure from the Home Government'.[1] In practice, there is a deficit, which is met partly by imposing new obligations in services or taxation on the natives, and partly from private contributions, native and foreign.

It is indeed generally recognized that, in the course of economic development, excessive burdens have often been imposed upon the natives, either in taxation or compulsory labour, to meet the charges of general administration and the additional expenditure consequent on economic development, and even for the direct benefit of western enterprise.[2] Especially in the improvement of communications by road and rail, there have been serious abuses. In Africa, moreover, railway construction has mostly been unprofitable, constituting a charge on general revenue and cramping economic and social services so narrowly as to keep them below the standard required even for economic progress.

Another very considerable contribution to the cost of essential services comes from private sources. Among these one may reckon contributions from western enterprise otherwise than through taxation. As already mentioned, the great experimental stations in Netherlands India, which have done so much for the science of tropical agriculture, were until recently maintained by the planters' associations without Government assistance; they were intended to make production more profitable for those who supplied the funds, but their benefit radiated throughout the tropics and beyond, sometimes to the

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 22.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 613, 635, 1549, 1565.

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detriment of local interests as in teaching India and Japan how to grow sugar. In all parts of the tropics, in Asia as well as in Africa, the more enlightened employers provide good quarters, medical attention and schools, and make their employees comply with modern sanitary requirements; such amenities make production more efficient and profitable. Employers will provide such services as they deem profitable, and on humanitarian grounds may carry this principle to the farthest limit or possibly beyond, but they are not disinclined to be relieved of the expense by the Government or private charity.

Private charity, indeed, together with the voluntary contributions and exertions of the inhabitants, seems to bear most of the cost of social service in the tropics. The assistance rendered by missionary organizations to educational and medical services is a matter of common knowledge. We have already noticed their large part in the provision of hospitals and schools. From the accounts of one mission in Uganda it appears that the public revenue furnished only £22,420—less than one-third of its charges—while the natives contributed £13,333 in gifts and £17,667 in school fees, and a grant from Europe provided £17,987.[1] This suggests that educational progress should be ascribed to Christianity rather than to western capital. If the encouragement of western enterprise is necessary to provide funds for economic and social services, one would expect the greatest progress in education where western enterprise penetrates most deeply. This is notoriously contradicted by the facts. As we have seen, during the nineteenth century education made far more rapid progress in Burma with development by native enterprise than in Java with development by western enterprise. Experience in Africa corroborates this view. The total expenditure of Government may be taken as an index to economic progress, and the expenditure on the education of non-natives is an index to the degree of western penetration. Such figures as are available under these heads suggest that the percentage of expenditure on native education is lowest where western enterprise is most conspicuous.[2]

Other facts point in the same direction. The first comprehensive enquiry into African education was financed by the Phelps-Stokes Fund in America, and American funds contributed largely to the foundation of the Jeanes schools that were established as one result of the enquiry. The monumental *African Survey*, conducted by Lord

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1306.
[2] *Ib.* p. 1309, and Table XI.

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Hailey, was rendered possible by the munificence of the Carnegie Trust. A substantial contribution towards the cost of a new Burmese dictionary has been made by the Leverhulme Trust. Even so wealthy a dependency as Malaya looked to the Rockefeller Foundation to provide funds for a campaign against hookworm, and to the same generosity it owes two chairs in its Medical School. The Leverhulme Trust makes grants to study economic conditions in Africa, and the Burma Oil Company provided the buildings for an Engineering School in Burma.[1] The two last instances should perhaps be classed with the expenditure incurred by intelligent employers with a view to conducting their affairs more efficiently and profitably.

It appears, then, that doles out of general revenue or by private charity relieve western enterprise of charges that it would otherwise have to incur on amenities in the interest of efficiency and profits, and go to promote economic progress rather than native welfare. In the preceding chapters we have seen that economic and social services, though an important factor in economic progress, do little to enhance welfare, except so far as it is necessary to economic progress. Now it appears that the contribution to public revenue by western enterprise is barely sufficient, and often insufficient, even to cover the additional administrative charges that it involves, and that the public revenue provides only a part, apparently a minor part, of the cost of social services. It is difficult to reconcile these facts with the theory that the provision of funds for greater welfare necessitates the encouragement of western enterprise.

It is equally difficult to reconcile this theory with the state of affairs in dependencies so prosperous as Java, Burma and Malaya. Java, under indirect rule, has been developed by western enterprise employing local labour. During thirty years of Liberal rule, with a rapid expansion of western enterprise, not only did the growing population 'gobble up the greater yield', but there was an actual fall in wages, nominal and real. Again, after another thirty years, with a constructive welfare policy based on ethical principles, and purporting to encourage economic development with a view to enhancing native welfare, economists are unable to assure us that the people are better off. Dr Boeke, whom we have already quoted, returns to the subject in his latest publication. With reference to irrigation, colonization, the clearing of fresh land, the increase of secondary crops and home-grown

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 1228, 1252; Mills, pp. 310, 316; Mayhew, *Colonial Empire*, pp. 120ff.; *Colonial Review*, Sept. 1944, p. 194.

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population was checked at the point of diminishing returns. In all these lands the growth of population has reflected the conditions of employment, but whether numerous or scanty, under different systems of rule and with different methods of development, the people remain poor. Economic development has failed to enhance material welfare. 511

The argument for economic development as an instrument of welfare further assumes that economic and social services are necessary for the provision of welfare. We have already seen that this is not the case. Cultivators adopt new crops and new methods of cultivation without the aid of economic services, and the people take to new foods without encouragement from dieticians. One of the outstanding victories over the tsetse fly in Africa was achieved by ordinary natives, under sympathetic leading, but with no expenditure on welfare services.[1] Most of the reforms most urgently needed in social life in most parts of the tropics need no expert knowledge, and could be introduced without any special staff (though a special staff *should*, of course, facilitate and expedite their introduction). Where the people can be induced to want new amenities they will pay for them, as they do for schooling in Uganda and elsewhere. Thus the inability to promote welfare in tropical dependencies cannot be ascribed to the limitation of economic and social services through lack of revenue or of funds from other sources, and we must seek another explanation. 657

3. The Measurement of Welfare

If we cannot accept the rapid economic progress of tropical dependencies as sufficient evidence of increasing welfare, we must look elsewhere for a yard-stick by which it may be measured. In social science as in physical science, only beginners and amateurs will conduct experiments without trying so far as possible to measure the results. Some of the older dependencies produce masses of statistics purporting to show the population revenue, and trade, and also matters of social interest, such as litigation, crime and the numbers at school or in jail. The statistics, however, are mostly compiled for administrative purposes and have little meaning or interest for outsiders; many figures are of doubtful accuracy and are frequently misleading, full of traps for the unwary (and even for those who compile them and use them in administration). One might expect at least the trade returns to be intelligible to the public, but anyone who has tried to work on them will endorse the comment of Lord Hailey that 'eccentricity, so in- 803

[1] Hinden, p. 202.

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Enquiry' by Wellenstein, a technique has been developed for turning to the best account such statistics as have any bearing on native welfare.[1] 803

Lord Hailey has remarked that in Africa the existing statistics might be considerably improved without additional expense, and that a comparatively small expenditure would make them much more useful. That remark applies also to Burma and probably to most other tropical dependencies. Unsatisfactory as the statistics for Netherlands India are in some respects, they do at least serve to illuminate many corners that are left dark elsewhere, and the general neglect to provide means for judging how far the benevolent aspirations expressed in statements of colonial policy bear fruit in practice, naturally affords a handle for critics of colonial administration to suggest that it is more keenly interested in economic progress than in native welfare. It is not enough that material should be available for measuring individual welfare. The analysis of welfare demands a suitable technique for measuring social welfare by presenting accurate and intelligible information regarding debt, civil litigation, crime, health, education and other matters that find no place in individual budgets of income and expenditure. There would still remain imponderable elements, those cultural and religious aspects of social life in the tropics which are the first to suffer from the economic struggle for survival of the cheapest consequent on the impact of the West. But this is no reason for neglecting to carry so far as possible the objective scientific measurement of welfare.

4. The Machinery of Welfare

The deficiency of statistical material is a notable defect in the machinery of welfare. But it is not the only, and not the chief, defect. It may seem that no special machinery is necessary, that the care for welfare may be left to the local official charged with the maintenance of order. That is very largely true. Any European official can tell the people that dirt breeds disease, or explain the benefit of vaccination, or advise them to destroy mosquitoes and rats, or bring to their knowledge new and more profitable crops, or suggest new breeds of cattle, or inculcate the advantages of thrift and the danger of getting entangled with money-lenders. None of the most urgent reforms in the daily life of tropical peoples calls for special scientific equipment beyond the stock of knowledge common to educated Europeans. Natives have frequently

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[1] Furnivall, *Economic Journal of India*, 1934, p. 295.

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adopted of their own accord innovations which appeal to them, and it would seem possible for European officials to recommend European standards of hygiene and other reforms with little or no expenditure on welfare services. It is true that modern science has done much and can do more for the welfare of tropical peoples. The connection between rats and plague and between mosquitoes and malaria are recent scientific discoveries, and scientists have traced the origin of hookworm and beri-beri. There is unbounded scope for research, and useful expenditure on it is limited only by the funds available. But it is well to remember that research does not bear fruit until it is applied to daily life; its practical application depends on the efficiency of the machinery of welfare.

It is true also that administrative officials should be better able to promote welfare if they have the assistance of departmental specialists. But departmental specialists will usually need the help of administrative officials if they are to get into touch with the people in their daily life. The departmental specialist is probably an expert in his own line, but one can hardly expect him also to be expert in native economy and customs or to be proficient in native languages. It is useless for the medical officer to advocate shoes for hookworm if the people cannot afford to buy shoes, or for the sanitary department to devise modern latrines which the people will not use, or for the agriculturist to recommend crops which local conditions of labour or water supply do not allow the people to grow. Although the specialist may try to adapt native life to scientific principles, the administrative official should be capable of adapting scientific principles to native life. Thus the welfare specialist must ordinarily work in double harness with the administrative official by his side. But the administrative official can do little to promote welfare unless he knows the locality, and what needs doing; has influence that will lead the people to attend to his advice; and remains among them long enough to make certain that they act on it. All these conditions must be fulfilled if welfare work is to succeed.

The machinery ordinarily employed differs according as the system of rule is direct or indirect. In the adoption of direct rule one object was to promote greater welfare through liberating the people from arbitrary oppression by their own chieftains. On this plan all the administrative officials, European and native, became servants of the law, charged with administering equal law to all. When it became apparent that the law, while liberating the people from arbitrary will,

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subjected them to mechanical economic forces, attempts were made to protect them against the action of these forces. That is the distinctive character of welfare machinery under direct rule; it allows free play within the law to economic forces, but attempts to mitigate their consequences. This is directly contrary to the method of indirect rule, systematized by Van den Bosch in Java, which tries to soften the impact of economic forces by leaving the people under their own chieftains and their own customs, while aiming to protect them against arbitrary oppression. Direct rule attempts to mitigate the action of economic forces; indirect rule aims at providing a buffer against their action. There is a corresponding difference in the machinery of welfare.

(*a*) *Direct Rule.* It is often suggested or implied that the promotion of welfare in the tropics requires nothing more than the provision of funds for the services of experts. But this view disregards the conditions limiting their activities. The application of science to the affairs of daily life is quite a novel idea even in Europe; each generation of doctors regards its predecessors as unscientific, and in agriculture, hygiene, dietetics and other studies, what is held for true to-day may be out of date to-morrow. But the tropics are still almost virgin lands in science; experience in Europe may be misleading and conclusions based on it invalid. Conditions are different or even contrary. Cultivation requires a cool soil instead of a warm soil; natives apparently maintain good health on a diet that, according to western science, is defective; plague and malaria were spread by measures intended to prevent them. The application of modern science to tropical problems requires long and patient research, and continuity of experiment. But tropical life is adverse to continuity; men go on leave or are transferred for administrative convenience. Lack of continuity nullified experiments on rice cultivation in Malaya, and official transfers hampered the researches of Ross on malaria. Moreover, any single problem may, and often does, require a whole staff of experts for its solution. In agriculture the investigation of a single crop disease may need the collaboration of agricultural experts, botanists, entomologists and so on. The same principle applies in almost all departments of economic and social life. If the agricultural expert, by patient research breeds a more productive variety of some generally grown crop, the people may be unable to take advantage of it because of difficulties in the supply of labour, water or credit; his work raises new problems for a wide circle of other departmental specialists and it will be wasted without their co-operation.

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It is easy, given the funds, to multiply economic and social services. But the multiplication of service tends to defeat its own ends, and greater expenditure gives worse results through excessive departmentalism. Each specialist looks at life through departmental blinkers. The agriculturist sees nothing but the crops, the veterinary expert only the cattle; to the sanitary inspector the latrine is more important than the home, and the policeman would guarantee security more confidently if the whole population were in jail. Often the experts are at issue. The agriculturist advocates grazing reserves to provide fodder, while the veterinary officer wants to close them to prevent infection; the fishery officer advises the people to breed fish, and the medical officer drains the ponds to kill mosquitoes. Everywhere the specialist inclines to a narrow view of life, but in the tropics departmentalism has peculiar dangers; in Europe the expert looks at a familiar world, but in the tropics, owing to his ignorance of native life, the field is out of focus. In Europe the expert understands the public and the public understands the expert, because they have a common background, but in the tropics it is only the European community in the towns and western enterprise that has a mutual understanding with the expert and values his assistance. Thus the natives in towns prefer to live in the native quarter, where they can escape the unwelcome attentions of the sanitary inspector, 'whose unreasonable prejudice against picturesque filth is never understood';[1] and plantation coolies, on returning home, lapse into their old comfortable ways. Moreover in Europe there is an organic community, living its own life, which can decide for itself what it wants most; but in the tropics, where innovations are pressed on the people from outside, there naturally ensues a lack of co-ordination between the competing and often contrary activities of the departmental specialists; too many cooks, as usual, spoil the broth. The confusion may be mitigated on the Dutch plan by grouping allied services in large departments under a single head. But this device alone is insufficient. What an organic community does by the dynamic force of its inherent vitality must in the tropics be entrusted to some official personifying, as it were, the common social will. There must be someone to co-ordinate the activities of departmental specialists and to foster a demand among the people for their services.

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Under direct rule the District officer, the local civil servant in charge

[1] Burns, p. 306.

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177 welfare, and it seems not unreasonable to assume that similar results will follow in the tropics. Schools, sanitary regulations, the improvement of agriculture, and so on, appeal to humanitarians as likely to improve individual welfare, and by making for economy in administration and business, they appeal to reason as well as to sentiment. Naturally colonial governments conceive of welfare on western lines, and administrative practice is concentrated on enhancing the welfare of the people as individuals.

These attempts to promote welfare are effective only so far as the people will respond to them. The West may scatter pearls, or what it takes for pearls, about the tropics, but the people will not pick them up unless they appreciate their value. Scientific agriculture, modern schools, western medicine and sanitary regulations may not conduce to, and frequently conflict with, what the people regard as welfare, but if they cannot get what they want they must take what they can get. Agricultural and other economic services may enable them to earn more as individuals; modern schools may provide their youngsters with 'a decent job'; they may adopt some western foods or remedies for illness, and they may, perhaps, go to hospitals to be cured of their complaints. But these are all individual benefits, and have no relation to welfare as a social good. Welfare consists essentially in harmony between the individual and the environment; the environment must allow him to obtain both what he knows he wants and also what he wants without being aware of it. Economic progress enlarges the possibility of welfare by increasing the command of man over material resources, but it profits the native as an individual only so far as he participates in the larger surplus, and it enhances his welfare only so far as it contributes, directly or indirectly, to the enrichment of his social life.

8. Welfare and Autonomy

647 There is, as we have noticed, a growing recognition of the complexity of welfare problems. 'The problems of development touch upon the
● 657 work of officers in various departments, such as administrative officers, both at headquarters and in the districts, and the technical officers in the
654 agricultural, veterinary, medical and other services. There is need for machinery to provide complete co-ordination between these separate
177 departmental staffs.'[1] The health officer finds that he must seek assistance from the chemist and entomologist, and the veterinary officer

[1] 1940, Cmd. 6175, p. 7; *African Survey*, p. 1612.

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looks to the forest officer to provide grazing for the stock. As experts come more and more to recognize the need for special knowledge outside their own branch of study, there is an increasing demand for the creation of new services, and welfare work is distributed among departmental officials who are unable to see life as a whole. At the same time there is a growing recognition that all aspects of life are closely interrelated. In Malaya the improvement of paddy is found to require co-ordinated action by the agricultural irrigation, co-operative credit, education and other services.[1] In Nyasaland the Welfare Committee comprises representatives of the Medical, Agricultural and Public Works Department together with non-officials. In Southern Rhodesia there is a Director of Native Development in charge of all native affairs.[2] The Dutch in Netherlands India minimize sectionalism by grouping the various services in large departments and, further, link up some of the departments by liaison officers. All these expedients may improve the co-ordination of the welfare machinery. But it still remains machinery, and acts mechanically on the people taken in the mass as an aggregate of individuals. Each group of specialists takes snapshots of the people from its own angle, but the composite photograph obtained by fitting the results together bears as little relation to the native world as a Hollywood film to life. It shows native life from an alien western standpoint and, however lifelike, it never comes to life. The more elaborate the machinery, the more mechanically it functions, driven by economic forces and not by human will. Improvements in the administrative machinery merely effect reforms which adapt the people better to the economic forces that dominate life in tropical dependencies. Evolution along this line leads to a dead end. It is the type of evolution characteristic of the lower forms of life which have survived by adapting their way of life to their environment; to adapt his environment to his way of life is the prerogative of man, and reforms adapting him to an uncongenial environment produce not harmony but discontent. The impact of the West has liberated forces which were formerly kept under control by custom; for the enhancement of welfare it is necessary that the people shall be enabled to regain control over these forces, that they shall regain their former autonomy. That a higher standard of welfare is a condition of autonomy is alleged as one ground for the elaboration of welfare machinery. But improvements in welfare machinery resemble improvements in applied science. Research in applied science may increase the efficiency of

[1] Mills, pp. 255, 26[illegible].

[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1197, 1227, 1230.

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current practice, but the great scientific achievements come from research in pure science, which revolutionizes practice by attacking old problems along new lines. Similarly the elaboration of welfare machinery can have no appreciable effect on welfare, and still less can it promote autonomy. It will not give them what they want unless they want what it can give, and the promotion of welfare must be approached from a new angle by a revolution in method. The machinery is not only defective, but is applied on a wrong principle.

But, in the modern world, how is it possible for tropical peoples to get what they want? For the environment has changed, and not the people; they still, if left to themselves, would try to reproduce their old environment. But they have been brought into contact with the modern world and cannot get away from it. All the king's horses and all the king's men cannot set the clock back. They can get what they want only if they want what in the conditions of the modern world they *must* want. A fundamental problem of autonomy is to change the people so that they shall come to want, or at least voluntarily to accept, those conditions which the welfare of the modern world requires. Some light should be thrown upon this problem from an examination of attempts already made to introduce self-government among dependent peoples in various projects of colonial autonomy.

9. Autonomy

Colonial autonomy is closely linked with the Liberal tradition, which had two aspects. On the economic side it stood for economic freedom, freedom of person, property and trade; on the political side it stood for freedom of thought, speech and religion. Political freedom was regarded as the natural fruit of economic freedom. In the nineteenth century Liberalism was in the air. British and Dutch colonial statesmen alike claimed Liberal ideals though interpreting them differently; French Liberals recognized their colonial subjects as citizens of France, and Liberalism in Spain, suppressed at home, took refuge in the Spanish territories overseas.

During a great part of the century Liberals in Britain thought colonies a burden, and often cited Turgot's dictum comparing them to fruit that would fall from the parent tree when ripe. Men looked forward to the day when India should be able to stand alone as the proudest day in the story of British rule. Practical administrators like Sir Thomas Munro argued that when Indians were sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for themselves, it would

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were such as to develop their worse rather than their better qualities. Our methods might have done very well for Europe; they may have been suitable in India, where the people are protected against economic forces by the ties of caste, but they did not suit the Burman. 'It was the best butter', said the Hatter; but it spoiled the watch. 674

Clerical Unrest. In Burma the turbulence prevalent among the monks is one of the more recent features of social disorder and unrest, but it is merely one aspect of the dissolution of society indicated by the growth of crime. In Java there is nothing of the kind. As already noticed, causes relating to religion are tried in special Moslem courts, instead of, as in Burma, coming before the ordinary lay court; and the law applied is Moslem ecclesiastical law as interpreted by native Moslem judges, whereas in Burma the rule of decision is looked for in the *dhammathats* as interpreted on the principles of western law. The procedure in Java does not weaken but fosters corporate authority in the religious establishment. Moreover, the village clerics are appointed by or with the approval of the Regent, whereas in Burma the Government has held aloof from all concern with promoting the establishment, while actively breaking it down by the transfer of religious causes to the civil courts. The Dutch have with good reason tried to conciliate Moslem sentiment and, even if they have not been wholly successful, there is nothing in Java corresponding to the clerical unrest in Burma.[1] 692

Corruption. We have had to notice the prevalence of corruption in Burma. By all accounts it is practically unknown in Java. The absence of judicial corruption can easily be understood. Petty cases are settled by arbitration either out of court, or before a bench of notables with a senior and well-paid official as chairman; or they go before a civil servant or judicial officer with long service and on high pay. Moreover, the penalties imposed are so trivial that it is cheaper to be punished than to bribe a policeman or magistrate to escape punishment. Serious matters go before a bench containing at least three high judicial officers as well as laymen of good standing. It would be difficult and dangerous to bribe the whole bench. In civil cases the decision purports to follow customary law, and the people can know whether it is right; the court must justify itself to popular opinion and not to higher judicial authority. In these circumstances there is little scope for bribery. 696

But that corruption should be unknown in general administration, 661

[1] Bousquet, pp. 51 ff.; *Vrij Nederland*, 27 Nov. 1943.

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661 with a Government intervening so actively in every branch of social life, seems almost incredible. That, however, is certainly the general opinion. For example, the People's Banks, in dealing with applications for loans, depend largely on reports from the village headman as to the character and circumstances of the applicants. This would seem to provide a ready means by which the headman might supplement his income. In Burma it was regarded as natural and not improper that the headman should charge applicants for loans from Government a fee for making his report. In Java a suggestion to this effect met with the response, 'But there would be a complaint!', and that was taken as a sufficient and final answer. So far as the general opinion as to the absence of corruption is well-founded, there would seem to be two explanations: one is the tradition of 'complaints'; the other, the permanence of the Regent.

694 661 As already explained, it has been a tradition from the early days of Liberal rule that the Controleur, without actually instigating complaints, should encourage the people to complain of any oppressive act. The Liberals prided themselves on relieving the people from the oppression by their native chieftains that had been one feature of the Culture system, and one chief duty of the Controleur, as he moved among the people, was to detect and bring to light oppression by encouraging them to complain, so that the 'complaint' has become a word of magic. In Burma anyone may petition the local magistrate; but the petition must bear a court fee stamp; in practice it is written by a legal practitioner or by a licensed petition writer; it must be presented in open court, and must disclose some matter in respect of which the law entitles the petitioner to relief. It is an application to an officer of the law for some action according to the law. In Java anyone may complain, orally or in writing, at any time, on any matter; no stamp or court fee is required; there are no licensed petition writers, and anyone may write the complaint. Even diehards recognized one good feature in the nationalist movement: that the nationalist leaders encouraged the people to formulate complaints. The tradition goes back far beyond the Liberal period; it dates from the principle adopted in 1803 that Government should act 'more like a father studying to promote the welfare of his family than a ruler governing his subjects'; the Liberals merely devised machinery for making the tradition more effective. Thus the 'complaint' has come to take a place alongside 'gentle pressure' as a distinctive feature of Dutch colonial practice.

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Another safeguard against corruption is the Regent. In Burma no one stays long enough in one place to ascertain in what quarters and to what extent corruption may prevail; still less is it possible to work up and carry through proceedings against those who are corrupt. In Java the Regent is permanent. His position and his high pay protect him against the temptation to accept petty bribes, and concern for his own authority and prestige makes him jealous of the influence of corrupt subordinates. These cannot practise corruption long or effectively without attracting the attention of the Regent, who can see that the offender is brought to account. If, then, the administration is so free from corruption as one is told, the credit is probably due in great part to the Regent.

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Authority and Law. It must be admitted then that, in all those matters which stand out conspicuously as abuses under British rule in Burma, Dutch rule in Java presents a favourable contrast. Yet there is another side to the picture. The Government has employed 'gentle pressure' to protect the village community against dissolution, and to promote welfare; yet 'gentle pressure' may be debilitating rather than a stimulant, making the patient less able and not more able to stand alone. And it is difficult to reconcile gentle pressure, however well-intentioned, with the principles of liberty and law. In an address to a Dutch audience interested in colonial problems, the present writer endeavoured to illustrate this point.[1]

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'One of your subordinate native officers described his work. "I improved sanitation. I got the people to found schools, and build bazaars, and provide a polyclinic. And I would not allow bamboo bazaars; if they could not afford wooden walls, I took care that the posts were of substantial timber and that the roof was sound. I even planted flower gardens, a thing that practically no one else has done; and it was all my own idea, without pressure from above." I have heard your European officers described as social engineers and your native civil servants as welfare officers, and the terms are justified. As I went round your villages and saw the infinite pains you take to conserve village society and build up social welfare, I found myself humming a tune. It was a hymn tune. Gradually the words came back to me: "Can a mother's tender care, Cease towards the child she bare? Yes, she may forgetful be, Yet will I remember thee." I thought of the hours and days we spend on the Bench, listening to advocates (trying to mislead us), laboriously taking down evidence (much of it false evidence), and sending poor unfortunates to jail, and I was filled with envy and admiration of your officers who have the privilege of giving

[1] Furnivall, *Asiatic Review*, 1935, pp. 655 ff.

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Chinese

000 Asiatic nations, and as early as the time of the Russo-Japanese War the Annamites had planted lotuses in their fields in her honour. With the Annamites, the Siamese, and the Indonesians the movements were internal and did not at this stage threaten conflict with adjacent peoples of a similar mind. But with the Chinese it was different. They were living in the midst of native peoples, holding fast to economic power and at the same time creating a nationalistic *imperium in imperio*. Hitherto through the centuries there had been no special problem of the Chinese (even though their functions had aroused resentment) and within three generations Chinese settlers had been absorbed into the native community. Now it was otherwise. The increase in immigration, the improved means of transport between China and the Nanyang, the approach to equalization in the sex ratio (more Chinese women were accompanying their men) were key factors in the change. Intermarriage, so far a guarantee of absorption, was decreasing; in Malaya it had practically ceased for more than a generation so that the barrier between the races was complete. It was no wonder that there was now a Chinese problem.

Nor was the problem limited to a single clear-cut issue. Communism had come to China early in the twenties, and its adherents had formed the left wing of the Kuomintang. After the purge of that party by Chiang Kai-shek in 1927 they had split off into their own organizations. Southeast Asia had, besides its merchants and traders, a large proletarian community of Chinese for whom Communism had a promise and an appeal. Wages (though much higher than in China) were low; conditions were far from ideal; trade-union organization was rudimentary and machinery for bargaining barely existent. In Malaya, in particular, land-hungry Chinese squatters with no security of tenure were ready to support any movement which would guarantee them the possession of this land. A determined minority of fanatics, such as the real Communists were, had a great field to exploit.

● 668 Before the Second World War, Communism in Southeast Asia had been kept in effective check by the Governments; but during the Japanese occupation of the countries of Southeast Asia, Chinese Communists took part in resistance movements, notably in Malaya where they formed guerrilla units. As such, they became the temporary allies of the South East Asia Command, but directly after the Japanese surrender they demonstrated their intransigent

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hostility to the Military Administration and, after it, to the civil 668 Governments of the Malayan Union and Singapore which succeeded it.

Before the war, the Kuomintang had found its chief support in the mercantile class of Chinese. During the Japanese occupation of the Nanyang this class, being urban and static, was an easy prey for Japanese exactions and for this reason its members, after the liberation, were denounced by the Communists as 'collaborators'. They, themselves, had either remained underground and unnoticed because of their lack of property or, in Malaya, in the case of about 3,000–4,000 only out of a total population of over two million, had become guerrillas in the jungle. The post-liberation result of the situation in this country was that many of the old leaders of the Chinese community were, at least temporarily, discredited and the Communists claimed credit for all resistance to the Japanese. After a while, however, the Kuomintang and the San Min Chu I Youth began to reassert themselves, but they had lost much of their pre-war vigour. The course of the civil war in China and the deterioration of the National Government's position had much to do with the change.

In Indonesia and Indochina, where the purely proletarian element among the Chinese was much smaller, the developments after the Japanese had surrendered placed the Chinese in an unenviable position. In Indonesia the 'middleman' nature of so much of the Chinese activity had made them unpopular with the natives, and during the periods after 1945 when the Dutch were in conflict with the Indonesian Republic neither side was able to afford them adequate protection from the aggression of local communities. Uncontrolled elements in the population (often soldiers) massacred the Chinese in considerable numbers. They were, in particular, accused of espionage for the Dutch. It seems, however, that it was the Dutch who afforded them the best protection and with whom, generally speaking, Chinese sympathies therefore lay. In Indochina, where there was also a considerable animus against the Chinese trader and money-lender (i.e. goods-lender), the community suffered greatly in the disorders and in the civil war which was still continuing in 1949. The French, to afford them protection, and to suit their own strategic dispositions, concentrated them in a few centres, notably in Saigon-Cholon where there was much overcrowding. At the same time many other Chinese

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668 moved to Vietminh-controlled areas, and the Vietminh could
609 claim a considerable number of supporters among the younger Chinese.

186 The advances of militant nationalism in some others of the Southeast Asian countries had made the widespread fear of Chinese economic encroachment a ready source of political capital. In both Siam and the Philippines measures to diminish the Chinese share of the retail trade which had been initiated before the war were now intensified and an anti-Chinese plank was inevitable in the platform of every political party. Chinese Communists were said meanwhile to be actively assisting the Hukbalahaps, the agrarian insurgents in Luzon.

668 This was the dilemma in which the Chinese still found them-
669 selves in the fourth year after the Japanese defeat. But in one country, Malaya, their difficulties as a community became most acute when the Malayan Communist Party, consisting itself mostly of Chinese, decided in June 1948 to start an active terrorist campaign against the British. The constitutional experiment of the Malayan Union followed by that of the Federation of Malaya had left the Chinese generally in a state of political apathy (since the new constitution greatly favoured the Malays at their expense). When the terrorists, who were largely the old guerrillas of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, struck, it was the Chinese themselves who provided most of the casualties on both sides. Many *Towkays* (Chinese business men) were intimidated into contributing to the Communists' funds or supplying them with goods and, being largely isolated, were not in a position to resist these demands. This in turn brought them into conflict with the British authorities. The Chinese squatter community, too, being on the fringe of the jungle was readily utilized by the terrorists and suffered accordingly when British troops and police took reprisals against their villages, burning down their houses and destroying
000 their crops. Many squatters were banished to China. The great danger the British ran was that harsh measures might antagonize large sections of the population, for the government of a great majority by a small minority must ultimately depend upon the consent of the governed. Large-scale measures of varying success were in progress against the terrorists in 1949 when the defeat of the Chinese Nationalist armies by those of the Communists in China and the collapse of the Kuomintang Government gave new

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their native country; moreover they have a stubbornness of disposition which distinguishes them from their fellow Chinese. (It is worthy of note that the most numerous among the early Communists in the Nanyang were the Hailams and Hakkas.)[1]

Sun Yat-sen said: 'The Chinese people are of the Han or Chinese race with common blood, common language, common religion, and common customs—a single race.' As regards 'blood' in any scientific sense this is manifestly untrue; on the contrary,

> The modern Chinese people is an amalgamation of many elements originally different from one another. . . . In colour; in stature, above all in cephalic indices, about 42 per cent are mesocephalic and about 43 per cent are brachycephalic, and about 15 per cent dolichocephalic. Even these classes are distinctly subdivided into dolicho-leptorrhinic and dolicho-platyrrhinic. There is also a low-headed type, and, in the South, a trace of a dwarf element. . . . Prehistory points to a race already mixed in the basin of the Yellow River. . . .[2]

In spite, however, of a number of modifications and reservations, the remainder of the statement of the Father of the Revolution, especially regarding religion and customs, could be convincingly maintained. Allowing for the numerous variations which have been suggested above, the Chinese of Southeast Asia, drawn mostly from Fukien and Kwangtung, are quite remarkably homogeneous. Not only have they marked physical characteristics in common; their customs, their religion, their attitude of mind have an almost uncanny similarity. What Clement Williams remarked of their shops in Bhamo on the Yunnan-Burma frontier nearly ninety years ago—'the likeness of one Burmese to another is striking, but the absolute sameness of one Chinese shop to another is truly wonderful'—is equally true of the 'sameness' of Chinese temples, houses, ornaments, customs, methods of mining and agriculture, and handicrafts all over the Southeast Asian area, from the city of Cholon to a remote *tienda* in Mindanao, or from the tin-fields of Larut to the pepper plantations of Cambodia. Nor is this merely a superficial impression (such as 'all Chinese look alike'); it derives from their common steeping in Chinese culture, even though the latter's springs of inspiration have ceased to well up from the depths and it has been for long (as Professor Toynbee says) in a state of petrification.

[1] See p. 370 regarding the Japanese identification of Hailams with Communism.

[2] *China Year Book* [illegible]

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641 The essential nature of the overseas Chinese is, however, one thing: the traits of their character brought out by subjection to differing pressures and influences are another. In particular, the larger part of the area has for a long period been under the domination of European colonial Powers which, in spite of recent developments, to a considerable degree still maintain their hold. In the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, British Borneo, and Indochina the Chinese have been subordinated to the colonial policies of Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain, France, and the United States. In Siam, the solitary country to retain independence throughout (though she, too, was moulded by pressures from the West), the Chinese immigrants contributed to the well-being of the Siamese by their services and the admixture of their blood, but it was always the native aristocracy that held the power and, since 1932, the middle-class native revolutionaries. In post-liberation Burma the Chinese are a small minority who must leave the issues to be decided amongst the Burmese parties and communities; in Indonesia they are often uncomfortably at the point of impact of the opposing forces; in Indochina their plight is much the same. In Malaya the upshot of constitutional experiment and the campaign of Communist terrorists of their own race has placed them in a dilemma.

641 Throughout most of the period of our survey it has been a tenet of the Chinese that they should leave political policy and administration to the local Government, and this remains so in principle in spite of the increasing influence of nationalism and, latterly, of Communism in their midst. The outworn, but still, until recently, serviceable dictum that 'the Chinese don't mind who holds the cow so long as they milk it' has been true of all purely mercantile communities since the dawn of history, and virtually the same remark is indeed made by Communists of capitalism—that it does not mind who governs so long as it draws the profits. But with the growth of the Chinese communities in the Nanyang and the development within them of political awareness the saying has been becoming less and less true.

641 From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century the Chinese in Southeast Asia found themselves, first in the Philippines, next in Indonesia, then in Malaya, and finally in Indochina, called upon to adapt themselves to a superstructure of government devised by completely strange and alien nations. These nations

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of circuit of the Manchu dynasty related the details of criminal cases. There was a common offence which did not seem to come under the specific provisions of the penal code but was nevertheless heavily penalized, and it was known as 'being involved'. It appeared that to 'be involved', even quite innocently, in the felonies and misdemeanours of others, was itself in the nature of a crime. Indeed this feeling of the blameworthiness of being mixed up in any offence, tragedy, or lawlessness went right through Chinese society. It was not altogether unusual to hear of a Chinese man or woman hanging him- or herself on the doorpost of someone against whom they had a grievance in order to 'involve' him (there would be a judicial inquiry which would, at least, cause the owner of the door great embarrassment), for 'responsibility' is a far-reaching principle in China. This convention was hostile to the growth of public spirit, for a Chinese who saw a crime being committed, or a person in danger or needing assistance, would very likely do nothing for fear of 'being involved'.

This characteristic has persevered down to the present day, and, coupled with a willingness to pay for a quiet life, has been responsible for many Chinese difficulties. Chinese secret societies were able to parcel out the towns and villages in the Nanyang and to exact 'protection money' from shopkeepers and others without effective protest; in a similar way the Chinese community as a whole was willing to conform to all the laws and regulations made by alien Western Governments (whether to them they made sense or not) in return for being left alone. It was the social wisdom of 'Brer Rabbit, he say nuffin''. It was only when regulations proved to be unbearably vexatious that there was an outburst of hysteria followed by calm. This arrangement, convenient to both sides, was responsible for the saying of Gustaaf Schlegel cited above. It is an irony that this very quality, so convenient to European administrators in the past, as we have seen has brought down so much criticism on the heads of the Chinese *Towkays* in Malaya who, unprotected from reprisals, have paid 'protection' money to the Communist terrorists of their own race.

It seems true to say, then, that at the beginning of the twentieth century the Governments of Southeast Asia were conscious of the Chinese as a 'useful' element in their economic systems, and though they had some unpleasant social peculiarities they in no way constituted a danger or a threat. Chinese labour was introduced

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in quantity into the colonial possessions and received the praise that is reserved for an efficient and well-oiled machine. But a movement was already incubating which was to change the whole attitude towards the Chinese of Europeans and indigenous peoples alike. The birth of Chinese nationalism coincided with the numbers of the Chinese emigrants reaching a new high level.

Sun Yat-sen in his *Three Principles of the People* said (as Mazzini had said long before him) that 'nationalism must precede internationalism'. Continuing the passage on race already quoted in part earlier in this chapter he went on:

> But the Chinese have no national spirit; they only know the family and clan groups. Thus China is only a loose sheet of sand. Our position is extremely perilous—if we do not promote nationalism and weld together our four hundred million into a nation, we face a tragedy—the loss of our country and the destruction of our race.[1]

This warning was taken very much to heart by Young China, though the process towards national consciousness had already gone a long way before Sun Yat-sen crystallized the sentiment in these words. The effect of the intense nationalist campaign coupled with an education drive was to make the Chinese everywhere conscious of their separateness as a race and nation, and, in Southeast Asia, to render the peoples among whom they lived aware that they regarded themselves as a race and nation apart. Almost simultaneously the seed of nationalism had been sown in the hearts of the other races and they were beginning to feel that they, in their turn, faced a tragedy—unless they, too, promoted nationalism and welded themselves into a nation, they might suffer the loss of their country and the destruction of their race.

The simultaneous growth of two such sentiments within one country meant that the communities grew nationalistic spines which when they were erected pricked their neighbours painfully. It was like Schopenhauer's definition of human beings as 'hedgehogs nestling together for warmth'. And the 'warmth' they sought in common (if such a metaphor can properly be used of countries sweltering in intense tropical heat) was the livelihood that Southeast Asia had, so far, abundantly afforded. But with large-scale immigration came competition, and the growth of economic rivalry between the races was coincident with the growth of nationalism.

[1] Lecture 1.

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made against the Chinese 'on their own merits', we do not regard it as at all an irrelevant question to ask 'Who made them?' Apart from a late King of Siam, the persons who have taken it on themselves to indict the Chinese for their alleged shortcomings are nearly all Europeans. Some are administrators, or ex-administrators with even more settled prejudices, some are merchants (though these tend, through greater contact with and therefore greater knowledge of the Chinese, to be fairer to them than the first-named), and some (including the most vitriolic) are mere tourists. The author would say that he has never encountered a European qualified by an adequate knowledge of the language and customs of the Chinese and by long experience of them who delivered himself of downright judgements or sweeping condemnation of that race. Indeed knowledge of the Chinese almost invariably induces a sympathy for them and their difficulties, however much it may be tempered by momentary exasperation or by realization of some personal or collective shortcoming. A reason for the anti-Chinese bias is often that the speaker has identified himself completely with some native race afraid of the Chinese and thus he shares and intensifies the natives' fears and resentments. Another common reason, no doubt, for the charges is that the vices ascribed to the Chinese—shrewdness, foresight, business acumen, keeping one's own counsel—are counted as virtues in the City of London, in Amsterdam, Paris, or New York, and that the indictment of the Chinese race is unconsciously inspired by fear of successful competition.

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But when all these counts are disposed of there remain two which, on the face of them, are much more plausible and which deserve careful scrutiny. One is the charge of 'forming combinations obstructive to government' and of 'creating enclaves of Chinese nationalism in the countries they inhabit'.

There is no doubt that the Chinese have a strong protective clannishness which has kept them intact as a community. This in the past, however, did no particular harm to the communities around them and indeed insulated the latter from Chinese internal conflicts. Moreover their intermarriage with the native population meant that the absorption of their descendants into the native community was only a matter of time. But with the advent of Nationalism the position began to change rapidly. An almost physical wall began to raise itself between the Chinese and the native community.

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S native community. The Chinese National Government manifested
578 an increasing solicitude for the *Hua Ch'iao*, the overseas Chinese,
668 whom it regards almost as its children; it instructed its consular
[871] officials to register all the Chinese within their jurisdiction, and
C they sent missions to inspect every activity of overseas Chinese
578 life. What is more, the Government took upon itself to
648 direct the education of Chinese in the Nanyang, laying down the
668 curriculum to be followed, and even introducing a system of grants-in-aid in competition with that of the local Government. It often happened that remote officials in Nanking or Chungking, very likely originating from one of the northern provinces and completely out of touch and sympathy with the Chinese of the Nanyang, claimed the right to direct their affairs. Even ethnically speaking the overseas Chinese might be nearer to the Siamese or Burmese, or (by intermarriage) to the Indonesians, than to a Chinese from Honam or Kansu. It was no wonder that Siam, Malaya, and the other countries of Southeast Asia saw an *imperium in imperio* growing up in their midst and began to fear for their
S own eventual safety.

578 This development, then, we are constrained to regard as in
668 many ways a misfortune for the overseas Chinese and for the
177 countries in which they had made their home or wherein they
C were sojourners. It arrested assimilation and erected a racial wall.
578 At the same time the simultaneous growth of local nationalism
668 encouraged the Chinese to look to their own country for pro-
648 tection—a protection, it turned out, it was, because of its own internal division and weakness as a Power, in no position to give.
171 Nor did the authorities in the one country of Southeast Asia where the Chinese now were the majority community offer any real encouragement to the local-born Chinese to regard Malaya as their own country and to resist the claims to control their destinies by a remote Government in a country they had never seen. The chance to extend the teaching of English to the community was lost and for thousands the only means of receiving an education of any sort was in the Chinese Nationalist schools; the doors of the Malayan civil service were opened to Malays but not to Chinese; the whole policy of Federated and Unfederated Malay States was, and is still, pro-Malay. It was surely no wonder that the Malayan-born Chinese who, while proud of their Chinese ancestry and culture, wished to identify themselves and their

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children's future with Malaya alone, were attracted to, or forced into, the Nationalist camp.

Malaya has for long been the 'test case' of Chinese affairs and a focus of interest in Southeast Asia. The situation as it was tending was very clearly described by a distinguished traveller many years ago; Professor Arnold Toynbee records the impression of his visit to the Straits Settlements in these words:

> And China is not only enormous already; it is rapidly getting more enormous (if logically that adjective can be put in the comparative degree). When I touched at the Straits Settlements on my way out east I realized that British Malaya is destined, by 'peaceful penetration', to become a Chinese province, and I fancy, from what I have heard, that the same destiny may be in store for Burma, Siam, French Indo-China, Dutch Indonesia, and the Philippines. In the end the current of Chinese expansion in the Tropics will meet the current of Hindu expansion over the submerged heads of the smaller and weaker and less efficient peoples in between, who are already fast going under. And, after what has happened, I surmise that the new frontier between China and India will tend, slowly but surely, to travel westward at India's expense and in China's favour.

What happened in Malaya, we cannot too frequently remind ourselves, was not the result of military conquest, not the territorial spoils of a Kublai Khan, but because the British had welcomed the immigration of a couple of million Chinese. For long after the intervention in the Malay States it had been found difficult to attract the British capital needed for the opening up of the country: it was not until a plentiful supply first of Indian and then of Chinese labour was assured that such capital was forthcoming, and it was not until the end of the 1920s that there was any control at all of Chinese immigration.

The British Colonial Office and the Malayan Governments must have seen that the admission of Chinese in such numbers that they would eventually be the majority community was bound to create a problem of tremendous magnitude. Even the degree of assimilation taking place in Siam and Indochina was out of the question because of the barrier of the Mohammedan religion. The only hope now for the future of Malaya in the interest of its diverse peoples was to promote a feeling of common Malayan citizenship to counter the claim, tacit or express, of Chinese Nationalism to consider Malaya as a new province of China. In the pre-war years

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this was a policy which the British neglected to pursue with any conviction, and the post-war experiment in this direction, the Malayan Union, was abandoned at the first sign of opposition. Unless a true 'Malayan citizenship' can be made effective, the ideal of a Malayan nation forming, as it were, a buffer State between China, Indonesia, and India, with bonds with all three but belonging to none, will remain a phantom.

In the present crisis the great and deplorable weakness of the Chinese in Southeast Asia is the absence of effective leadership (and the few notable exceptions to this generalization do not affect its truth). This is due in large part to the fact that there has grown up no Chinese middle class of sufficient proportions to provide disinterested, well-educated, and competent individuals in the numbers needed to guide their community through the reefs of politics towards a safe anchorage. The business leaders are so busy making money (or endeavouring not to lose it) that few of them have time to devote to public affairs even if they had the will and the knowledge. In Malaya, at least, the Indian stands in sharp contrast to the Chinese, and in Singapore Indian representation on the various bodies is vastly greater in proportion to their numbers than is the case with the much more numerous Chinese. This is not explicable solely by Chinese political pique but must be due largely to the training in politics and administration the Indians received in their own country during the British Raj. In Malaya, Indonesia, and Indochina the British, Dutch, and French have neglected to afford opportunities for the Chinese residents to acquire a knowledge of affairs. The penalty of this neglect is that now, when European control is loosening, the mass of the Chinese have few leaders to take control and to consolidate their community in face of the Communist advance. The lack of experience and education determines also the quality of the Communist leadership in these regions. Among the Malayan Communists are no Mao Tse-tungs or Chou En-lais and scarcely any individuals with more than the rudimentary mis-education obtainable in Chinese vernacular schools. The result is that the old professional bandit (always a feature of Malaya's jungle-fringe) is more prominent than he would otherwise be, and terrorism is unmitigated by constructive politics. Is it, therefore, strange that in 1949 the majority of Nanyang Chinese were 'sitting on the fence' awaiting the final upshot in China and its repercussions overseas? In such

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circumstances a handful of Chinese Communists, many of them uneducated youths with a strong professional bandit element as just mentioned, had almost complete freedom of action through the time-honoured weapons of intimidation and extortion. With this insidious pressure, and with little support or sympathy from the European Powers or the native peoples, the Chinese of Southeast Asia were indeed in a dilemma.

With the advent of militant Communism came a final complication to the lives of the overseas Chinese. The appeal of the Communists is to the idea of a society horizontally but not vertically divided—that is, divided into classes, but with a proletariat which cuts across racial and community divisions. So far this appeal had been listened to by only a small minority of the Chinese, and with the Malays and other races it had been an almost complete failure. But let no one underestimate the attraction it might have for the masses of Southeast Asia if they were simultaneously convinced of the sincerity of the Communist professions and of the bankruptcy of 'bourgeois' promises.

The only way to stem the advance of Communism in Southeast Asia is to raise the standard of living. The irony of such a course for the colonial Powers is that in promoting a rise in the standard of living they are hastening their own departure. Improved material welfare stimulates political awareness. Whereas in the grand old days of their trading companies they could lord it over a province with a garrison of a score of soldiers, to-day with armies of a hundred thousand they remain only on sufferance. It is of no use, however, their elder statesmen and administrators of a bygone age urging the Governments to 'go slow'. The idea of representative government came from the West, but the rate of approach to it is largely fixed by the peoples themselves. All that the colonial Powers can aim at is to leave their ex-dependencies able to decide their own future and not at the mercy of new imperialisms.

We take leave of the Chinese in Southeast Asia at a time when they are undergoing one of the greatest trials in their history. The whole of the Far East is disintegrating as it moves towards a new and mysterious synthesis. These emigrants belong to a race which for at least one hundred and twenty generations, through the rise, flowering, decline, and petrifaction of the Chinese culture, has preserved a unified attitude of mind towards life and reality, and they look towards their parent civilization and see it once more in

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POSTSCRIPT

An article in *Ta Kung Pao*, the Shanghai newspaper, of 28 January 1950 was taken as adumbrating the future policy of the People's Government towards Chinese overseas and the governments of Southeast Asia. It began by saying:

> Now that the People's Republic of China has been established and diplomatic relations have been opened between the Central People's Government and a number of other countries, the more than 10,000,000 overseas Chinese shall and must not be subjected to further abuse.

The article pointed out that it was clearly stipulated in Article 58 of the Common Programme that 'the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China shall do its utmost to protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad'. In pursuance of this principle, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had lodged strong protests with the French and Thai authorities against the abuse of Chinese nationals. The article was particularly concerned to attack the Thai and French governments. 'The Fascist elements in Thailand [it said] have a long record of outrageous action in the persecution of Chinese nationals, and for years Thailand has been a veritable hell to the overseas Chinese there.' Malaya received only incidental mention. 'But [the article continued] going back a little, we find that countless numbers of Chinese have been murdered in the Dutch East Indies during the past few years. All in all, the annals of the struggles of the overseas Chinese may be considered to be written in blood. It must be evident that it is impossible for overseas Chinese to live in peace under imperialistic rule. . . . We know full well that the indiscriminate bombing of Shanghai together with the persecution of Chinese nationals in Thailand, Indochina, and Malaya, are all part of an imperialist plot for both direct and indirect attack against the Chinese people.'

Peking radio thereafter systematically attacked the Southeast Asian governments for their alleged ill treatment of the overseas Chinese. In the case of Malaya it was noticeable that direct mention of the terrorist campaign was avoided in the ensuing months.

The diplomatic position in August 1950 was that Burma and Indonesia had recognized the People's Government of China and representatives were being exchanged, Britain had also recognized the People's Government but negotiations for the terms on which representatives would be exchanged were still in dilatory progress, while France, Thailand, and the Philippines still recognized the Nationalist Government which was then taking refuge in Formosa.

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A visit to Southeast Asia during the third quarter of 1950 after an absence of nearly three years brought home to the writer the accelerated tempo of the change that the countries were undergoing, and, in particular, the dominant role which the politics of China were playing therein. As a tailpiece to this survey he has recorded the impressions of his visit, bringing the account as nearly up to date as the exigencies of publishing would allow. The observations are set down in the order in which the countries were visited.

In his many discussions with statesmen, diplomats, officials, business men, and others in these Southeast Asian countries, the writer became aware of a considerable disagreement among them regarding the number of Chinese in the area. There was, in the case of Siam and Indochina in particular, no figure that was generally accepted. The definition of 'Chinese' was an initial difficulty (as it has so often been in the course of this survey) for many Chinese appeared to possess a dual racial character, discarding one aspect and assuming the other as circumstances suggested.[1] It seemed also that that clandestine immigration into Siam, Indochina, and the Philippines and (perhaps) Indonesia within the last two or three years, had been very considerable, for during this period the immigration laws had been greatly tightened. The writer was compelled, therefore, to revise the estimates he had made in the demographic chapters of the survey to suit the probable facts of 1950 and to adopt a total not very far short of 10 million ethnic Chinese for the whole of Southeast Asia. This estimate, however, does not materially alter the ratio of Chinese to other races in the area and has no very important bearing on the general political and economic considerations which have been described in the text.

Burma. In July 1950 the Chinese Nationalist ambassador had left Burma, and one other official of the embassy had also gone away, but the remainder of both the embassy and consular staff had agreed to serve under the People's Government of China which was now recognized by the Burmese Government. Two of the staff had already been summoned to Peking for indoctrination. The new ambassador, Dr Yu, was expected to arrive in Rangoon in August. In the meantime the staffs were not being paid and the only income available was that derived from the sale of (Nationalist) passports.

At this time an incident in the Burmese Shan State of Keng-tung near Siam was the subject of a number of rumours. A force of Chinese

[1] Thus in Siam, the President of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, of very obvious Chinese race or extraction but with a Thai name, denounced vehemently the tactics of business men of acknowledged Chinese nationality in their dealings with the Thais.

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Chinese
Indians

464 years of the present century, the flow of immigration has been large and
167 comparatively steady except during the depression and the two world wars. Chinese and Indian immigrants usually could better their position soon after arrival because their industry and organization were superior to those of the indigenous peoples. Partly because of this, there were constantly new arrivals willing to do coolie work until they too could
[178] rise economically. Except for the large-scale repatriations to China and India caused by the depression, the flow of labor thus set into motion was adequate for the economy prevailing in the underpopulated areas until changing conditions created a growing class of landless proletariat and
[668] dissatisfaction among both the indigenous and immigrant peoples. This dissatisfaction often became associated with other motivations in nationalist movements.

Controlled migrations occurred only between regions under the same government or those held by governments of the same nationality, except for a limited migration of Javanese labor to Malaya (and to New Cale-
[166] donia). In the Netherlands Indies and in Indochina the governments endeavored to transplant groups of laborers from overpopulated to underpopulated areas, but in so doing they learned that the process required careful organization, was expensive, and raised serious economic, social, and psychological problems. Such movements could be effected successfully on a limited scale only. This fact obviated the possibility of their contributing substantially to solution of the problem of overpopulation. As labor supply, such migrations were only temporarily satisfactory, because social and religious ties inclined the workers to return to their home villages immediately upon the expiration of their contracts or even to desert. To stabilize this labor force some of the governments tried after the depression to obtain a better adjusted sex ratio in the migrant population by encouraging the immigration of workers' families and the establishment of agricultural villages—a program too recently initiated to make possible a definite appraisal of its comparative success or failure. In Malaya, with the exception of a few Javanese, planned immigration was confined to Indian laborers. It was arranged and operated jointly by the two British governments concerned. There, however, the depression, the growth in voluntary Indian immigration, and India's ban in 1938 on assisted emigration to Malaya tended to render many of the official controls unnecessary. The unplanned and uncontrolled movement of labor across the Burma-India frontier was the sole migration of its type in Southeast Asia.

563 The indigenous populations in general hold themselves socially aloof
609 from the alien Asiatics. To the Muslim Malays the Chinese were materialistic, pork-eating idolators; and the Indians, with the exception of the small Islamic minority, were similarly disdained, though regarded as less aggressive. To the sinicized Annamites, the Burmese, and the Siamese,

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Chinese

religion was no barrier between themselves and the Chinese; all were Buddhists, though of differing sects. Chinese culture had long been admired by the peoples of Farther India, and had influenced them. Moreover, the Chinese were regarded as distant and desirable relatives. With the advent, however, of Chinese women and the accelerated growth of Chinese nationalism after the first world war, intermarriage occurred less frequently (though it continued to be common in Burma and Cambodia), and the indigenous peoples had few social contacts with the Chinese in their midst. The cleavage between the ethnic groups was further widened in the British colonies by the official policy of representation of various communities on legislative and advisory bodies. 563 609

Economically, relations between the indigenous and the immigrant peoples altered from a mosaic of non-conflicting occupations to one of rapidly increasing competition. For years the native peoples had contentedly seen the arrival of thousands of immigrants annually who were able and willing to perform the hard labor for which they themselves had neither inclination nor compulsion. Through much of the region, however, during the inter-war period an indigenous proletariat was developing as a result of the transfer of farm land from the indebted native peasantry to non-agriculturists, often to alien moneylenders, and also because of the growth of a Western-inspired individualism which was weakening family ties once paramount. The trend was apparent chiefly in parts of Burma, Siam, and Indochina. 464 477 178 425 177

This development did not assume significant proportions until the world economic depression, when considerable unemployment arose out of the drop in prices and the curtailment of foreign markets for products of Southeast Asia. The result was a swift increase in the number of natives seeking to return to their villages and, on the other hand, of those forced to seek part-time or full-time employment away from their villages in competition with immigrant laborers for work previously scorned as arduous, monotonous, and underpaid. 464 458 178

Meanwhile the native middle classes for the first time faced a serious unemployment problem. Until the depression years, the opportunities for desirable though moderately paid employment in government or business had seemed to exceed the number of qualified candidates. The depression made it clear that the saturation point had been reached, and each year an increasing number of educated youths would be thwarted in their expectation of employment or, if given a job, in their rise to higher positions. Thus two groups of economically frustrated natives developed simultaneously in numbers and in consciousness in the decade prior to the second world war. 464 178 563

Nascent political factors became significant during that period. The struggles of the Chinese against the Japanese and of Indians against British rule were reflected in the attitudes of the emigrants from those coun- 464 668

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Chinese Indians

464 tries. Although this was truer of the immigrant Chinese than of the immigrant Indians, the comparative inertia of the latter was compensated for by a more aggressive championship of their cause on the part of their compatriots at home. In the case of Malaya, where the indigenous population was numerically weak and psychologically passive, the Central Indian Association of Malaya and the Congress Party leaders prodded the Government of India to exert pressure upon the officials at Singapore and Kuala Lumpur to grant greater economic and political privileges to the Indians in Malaya. The governments and planters of Malaya, however, with the curtailment in their labor needs resulting from the current cut in rubber export, felt free to resist this pressure, even at the price of the embargo placed in 1938 on emigration to Malaya of assisted Indian labor.

668 563 [167]

464 In the case of the Chinese the situation was different. Smaller numbers were employed in the rubber industry and larger ones in mining. More of them were able to graduate from contract labor into other occupations, especially retail business, farming, and small trades. They tended to stay longer because of the insecurity of enterprise in south China. Moreover, the home government was in a much weaker position than that of India to exert pressure on the governments of Malaya. These remained free to regulate at their pleasure the spontaneous flow of Chinese immigrants and to keep watch on the political activities of resident Chinese. In Burma, however, the British authorities were unable to keep the situation so well in hand. Serious anti-Indian rioting broke out in 1938, and the strength of the Burman nationalists in the government (especially after separation from India in 1937) enabled it to negotiate an agreement with India restricting the number of Indian immigrants and permitting the exercise of more control over those domiciled in the country.

668 563 167

In Indochina and the Netherlands Indies the governments were able to keep the immigrant problem from assuming intensity because of the smaller proportion of Chinese in relation to the native populations. In all these countries, however, Chinese laborers suffered somewhat from the bad reputation of those of their countrymen who as merchants and moneylenders had acquired an economic power which differed from that of other aliens in that it affected directly and visibly the welfare of large numbers.

464 All the governments, including that of Siam, were compelled by public opinion to exert more control over the immigrant minorities. In so doing, they faced unpleasant alternatives. The demand of Chinese and Indian laborers for better working conditions and improved political status was accompanied by a threat to cut off entirely the flow of emigration. Encouraged by nationalist groups, they engaged in strikes and boycotts. If these succeeded, other demands would probably be made; and

668 563 167 468

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Chinese
Indians

the indigenous peoples were not sufficiently willing, numerous, or skilled 464
to replace the immigrant laborers. A higher wage scale, they feared, 668
might compel many firms either to go out of business or to install expen- 563
sive machinery. Already local nationalists, succumbing to the philosophy 167
of economic self-sufficiency, were demanding intensive programs of gov- 468
ernment-aided industrialization. If such demands were acceded to, the industrialists and labor leaders in the home country could be expected to protest strongly against the new competition.

In this complex situation, the colonial governments of Southeast Asia [664]
gradually yielded to the popular demands, although loath to abandon their traditional function as instruments of capitalist planning in the home countries. With the exception, however, of the embryonic and ineffective industrial programs of the Siamese and Burmese governments and the more constructive policy of the Netherlands Indies for a planned industrialization, none of the countries did much in this direction. None was forced as yet to consider very seriously that change in colonial relationship which would result from general economic development in the world and specifically from the new role that China and India would inevitably play before long in Southeast Asia. The Japanese invasion interrupted the efforts of local governments toward a solution of these labor problems. It also injected new elements into the situation.

2

LABOR ORGANIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

For various reasons an organized labor movement has never developed 467
in Southeast Asia to notable dimensions. In large part this was because 575
of the predominance of alien, transient, and illiterate labor forces, di- 563
vided—even when of the same nationality—by geographical and linguistic 668
differences. The Indians were further subdivided by caste and religious sect. The Chinese had a far better family, guild, and secret-society organization; but the antagonisms imported as an integral part of these organizations provoked periodic violence. Later the political and gangster elements which operated within their framework impelled all the governments throughout Southeast Asia to control them severely.

National solidarity among the immigrant labor groups was further 466
broken up by the methods of recruitment and management. Agents and 167
foremen exploited their compatriots for their own personal gain, until the governments concerned were gradually and reluctantly forced to intervene. Asiatic agents behaved much as recruiting agents of emi-

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467 of unions in industries the operation of which did not directly affect the public order.

The employers' resistance to unionization derived naturally from their 467 desire to have available an abundant supply of cheap labor. They had on their side, as an argument that must weigh heavily with the govern- •668 ments, the involvement which such organizations as existed were believed to have with subversive political parties and leaders. Commu- 468 nism was reported to be rife among the Chinese labor groups. Indian Congress emissaries were supposed to be stirring up the traditionally docile Indian coolies. The growing wave of strikes and riots which occurred during the second part of the inter-war period, particularly in the middle and late 1930's, had the effect of modifying the opposition of the employer groups. Violence or work stoppages often took place without any formulation of demands or without the workers' support of the spokesman theoretically representing their views. At least some employers therefore began to see the advantage of dealing with responsible labor leaders and of forcing any subversive elements in the workers' associations out into the open.

466 Thus in Malaya, in 1939, legislation was introduced (but not enforced until 1941) authorizing and facilitating the functioning of unions. Em- 467 ployers in Indochina, who also had long opposed unionization, moved similarly in the latter part of the decade toward a recognition of the need for it. In the Netherlands Indies, membership in unions, after a setback in the early 1930's, slowly increased, although by far the largest unions were still composed of government officials and professional men. In [563] Burma, as in Siam, unionization was impeded by the presence of a predominantly alien body of workers to whose welfare the nationals of both countries were either hostile or indifferent. Such organizations as existed survived only insofar as the governments in each country favored them as useful aids in preventing curtailment of production. Their development, however, was controlled lest they harbor elements striving to overthrow the established order.

The loss of their colonies by the Western powers and anti-colonial Japanese propaganda naturally induced a greater consciousness on their part of the existence of labor problems that must be coped with if the larger economic and social programs are to succeed. From the resolutions passed at the International Labour Organization's conference at [648] Philadelphia in 1944,[1] it appears to have been generally recognized that the colonial governments could no longer rely on paternalistic measures or the voluntary cooperation of individual employers.

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[1] Bruno Lasker, "A Labor Code for Dependent Peoples," *Far Eastern Survey*, XIII, 12, June 14, 1944, pp. 103-10.

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467 try, depending on the stage of development reached before the war, the quality of leadership during and after the Japanese occupation, and the degree of authority and stability achieved by the present governments.

While politics are the overwhelming preoccupation everywhere, Indochina and Indonesia have been the scenes of almost continuous warfare since V-J Day and have been unable—judging from the limited information available—to produce strong, cohesive labor movements. Siam, although not badly damaged by Allied bombing, has been absorbed in achieving administrative stability amid internal political rivalries and in maintaining its sovereign status internationally. The basic reasons which prevented the prewar labor movement in Siam from evolving beyond the embryonic stage remain valid. The greatest progress has been made in Burma and Malaya, where labor movements were comparatively well delineated before the war and where subsequent conditions have combined to further their growth.

467 Nowhere in the area has a labor movement developed without politi-
668 cal implications and inspiration. Nationalism, in the embrace of so-
186 cialism or communism, has been its guiding and dominating force. Political leaders have worked upon laborers as the only have-not group in an area where the majority of the inhabitants are cultivators who possess, or aspire to possess, their own land. It is not accidental that peasant unions have been organized only in Burma, the sole country of the region where absentee and non-agriculturist landlordism has flour-
[464] ished and where there is marked ethnic homogeneity. Labor shortages exist everywhere as a result of the wartime cessation of immigration and the depletion and displacement of existing labor forces, and are aggravated by the desire of business firms to resume their export trade as quickly as possible.

These factors have placed labor in a particularly favorable position. While laborers remain on the whole almost as inarticulate and as closely identified with the mass of the population as before the war, they have acquired a new political consciousness and a sense of their own indispensability, as well as a more aggressive leadership. Everywhere their economic grievances derive from the growing disparity between increasing wages and more rapidly rising living costs and from the absence of consumer goods and adequate housing in urban areas. Their political objectives are those assigned to them by nationalist or communist leaders, who are using labor as the best spearhead available locally for the achievement of their own goals.

467 At the present time Malaya and Burma have the only labor move-
464 ments in the area worthy of the name. Their prewar economies differed widely—Malaya's resembling that of Sumatra more than Burma—but their metropolitan power is parallel and both are committed to a pro-labor policy. They are the two countries of Southeast Asia which have

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been traditionally most dependent on imported labor and their prewar labor movements were the most highly developed of any throughout the region. 467 464

Nevertheless, the labor movements in these two countries have taken different paths. Burma is made up of one predominant race, overwhelmingly agricultural and guided by strong nationalist leadership. Development of solidarity among Malaya's laboring class has been retarded by the tripartite ethnic composition of its population and by the country's traditional dependence upon two export industries. Accordingly, Malaya's labor movement has developed schismatic tendencies bordering on mutual hostility and has been influenced by alien Asiatic leadership. While in both countries the British Government has not as yet formulated any policy toward immigrant workers and has thus played into the hands of labor, already in short supply, the effects in the two countries have been quite different. Because of Malaya's lack of a self-sufficient economy, its laborers are in a more favorable position to press their demands. At the same time they suffer from serious internal weaknesses not found in Burma. The government and private firms in Malaya—if the planting-mining economy is to survive—will have to make greater concessions in order to reconstitute an adequate labor force than will the analogous authorities in Burma and Siam.

The special composition of Malaya's population and the organization of its industries are probably responsible for the development of its labor movement from many small unions, organized by subdivisions within trades, into a central association. This pyramidal set-up has been turned upside down in Burma, where labor was at first organized on a very broad basis and then divided into smaller units. In both areas the British Government has been making a marked effort to foster labor unions and at the same time to divorce them from political programs and ideologies. But since the nationalists throughout the area have chosen the labor movement as their chief medium for the achievement of the socio-political revolution they desire, it is unlikely that this attempt will prove successful. The laborers of Southeast Asia still feel themselves to be, above all, members of their own national or ethnic communities and have only secondarily developed a consciousness of a class apart. The whole area is too little industrialized to be fertile ground for a labor movement, strictly speaking. When trade unionism is discussed in referring to the labor movements now budding in Southeast Asia, it should be borne in mind that little more than its nomenclature has been borrowed from Occidental labor organization. 467 [668] [565] [563]

Throughout Southeast Asia the various governments have begged two outstanding questions affecting local labor problems—agricultural indebtedness and land tenancy, and the control of Asiatic immigration. In regard to the former, nothing has been done thus far and one can 466 426 167

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nearing the end of its historical phase. How far it is likely to be replaced 565
by a more insidious form of satellitism is not relevant here. But to talk 185
about political emancipation of South East Asia being the prime require- 656
ment for the solution of the problems of the peasantry must not obscure the economic factors involved. Nor is fresh capital all that is needed. For the economy of the peasant to attain a relative stability a great development of technical and administrative skills in the commercial field is necessary. The building of a native professional class would seem to be an important element in the construction of a more integrated economic and political system. To concentrate attention on the political factors alone is to overlook the fact that most of the sinews of the economic organism are now provided by the one group which does not have overt political power—the Chinese.

What remains of the traditional class structure in South East Asian 565
society is not of much avail as a defence of the peasant from alien exploita- 578
tion. In any case, though the rulers and traditional nobility still command 668
much respect, and provide symbols for the unity of the people, there are 186
stirrings of resentment among the people against the perpetuation of a system in which these aristocrats do not perform recognizable services at commensurate incomes. But such resentment does not mean that the peasantry are dry tinder for the spark of Communism to set alight. Communism as yet does not seem to have any great attraction for the mass of the local peasantry of the South East Asian region. The lack of popular response to the Malayan insurrection has shown this. It is presumably true to say that the interest of the peasant can always be secured in any movement which promises to give him greater control of the land—more land more secure tenure, freedom from land debt, and better returns for his produce. But to most of the Indonesian peasants these aims are likely to be sought in nationalism, which can be largely given both an ethnic base and the religious sanctions of Islam. The person to whom the cry for a solution of the land problem is likely to make a most definite appeal, especially in Malaya, is not the Indonesian but the Chinese peasant, who sees himself as excluded from full participation in the land rights of the country folk. Over and over again one hears the cry, ill-founded as it is, that the Chinese have not been allowed to grow rice in Malaya.

Here may well come one of the acute pressure points in the South East 000
Asian scene. The analysis might go as follows. Nationalism is a powerful political force because of its appeal to the individual in a projected, enlarged form of his desires and strivings. But by itself it is an aggressive rather than a constructive force. It lacks a coherent theory for the use of the resources at its control. An ideology containing such theory, and an equally ardent emotional charge on the part of many of its adherents, is provided by Communism. If Communism can work through nationalism it has a most powerful combination. Yet Communism in South East Asia lacks organization of any scale. The optimum conditions for its success are

668 moved to Vietminh-controlled areas, and the Vietminh could
609 claim a considerable number of supporters among the younger Chinese.

186 The advances of militant nationalism in some others of the Southeast Asian countries had made the widespread fear of Chinese economic encroachment a ready source of political capital. In both Siam and the Philippines measures to diminish the Chinese share of the retail trade which had been initiated before the war were now intensified and an anti-Chinese plank was inevitable in the platform of every political party. Chinese Communists were said meanwhile to be actively assisting the Hukbalahaps, the agrarian insurgents in Luzon.

668 This was the dilemma in which the Chinese still found them-
669 selves in the fourth year after the Japanese defeat. But in one country, Malaya, their difficulties as a community became most acute when the Malayan Communist Party, consisting itself mostly of Chinese, decided in June 1948 to start an active terrorist campaign against the British. The constitutional experiment of the Malayan Union followed by that of the Federation of Malaya had left the Chinese generally in a state of political apathy (since the new constitution greatly favoured the Malays at their expense). When the terrorists, who were largely the old guerrillas of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, struck, it was the Chinese themselves who provided most of the casualties on both sides. Many *Towkays* (Chinese business men) were intimidated into contributing to the Communists' funds or supplying them with goods and, being largely isolated, were not in a position to resist these demands. This in turn brought them into conflict with the British authorities. The Chinese squatter community, too, being on the fringe of the jungle was readily utilized by the terrorists and suffered accordingly when British troops and police took reprisals against their villages, burning down their houses and destroying their crops. Many squatters were banished to China. The great
000 danger the British ran was that harsh measures might antagonize large sections of the population, for the government of a great majority by a small minority must ultimately depend upon the consent of the governed. Large-scale measures of varying success were in progress against the terrorists in 1949 when the defeat of the Chinese Nationalist armies by those of the Communists in China and the collapse of the Kuomintang Government gave new

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

were almost entirely uninterested in them except as traders, labourers, or agents for dealing with the native peoples. In the last capacity the Chinese were very useful, for they had a knowledge of native ways which the Europeans lacked and in any case had no leisure to gain, being occupied so much of their time in warfare among themselves. The Chinese, in their turn, were interested in these white barbarians only to the extent that it was expedient to know their peculiarities. They showed themselves, however, much more adaptable to learning about the white race than the Europeans did to learning about them, for, generally speaking, the Spanish, the Dutch, the British, and the French were almost completely ignorant of the Chinese language and *mores*, and the Chinese were happy that it should be so. Another reason for the failure of Europeans to acquire any real knowledge of the people among whom they lived was that for the European life in the tropics—at any rate from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth century—was short, and he either returned home with a competence within a few years or else perished. Thus it was found convenient by the Company and early colonial Governments to leave the conduct of their community affairs to the Chinese headmen, except in the more serious cases, and this gave the Chinese much liberty of action. Unfortunately the fears of the tiny minority such as were the Europeans, especially in face of the increasing numbers of the Chinese, put them in a very anxious and suspicious frame of mind. The Chinese ethos, usually so serene, was subject to occasional social squalls or typhoons when the community was seized with mass hysteria. This was really only a means of dispersal of an accumulation of real or imaginary grievances and the trouble subsided, if handled with reason and tolerant firmness, almost as quickly as it had arisen. But in the minds of the Europeans with their tiny garrisons the outbreaks were often interpreted as signs of rebellion. Indeed in some cases they were rightly so interpreted, and there can be no doubt that when fear and distrust had dried up relationship into a tinder a spark would fire it into a rebellion, as was the case in Manila on St Francis's Eve 1603, when things had gone so far that it was either the Chinese or the Spanish who had to be destroyed. It is equally certain that a greater degree of understanding on either side would have averted this and later disasters.

Whilst thus simplifying the situation, it must be conceded that

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Chinese
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Whilst thus simplifying the situation, it must be conceded that the Chinese social organization overseas early revealed serious deficiencies. It was not a complete unit of China transplanted, but fragments from various settings placed together in one spot. Different tribes and classes were put into unwonted juxtaposition, and the criminal and unruly element was disproportionately strong (this last fact needs emphasis). Embryo communal or municipal systems were often taken charge of by the deadly Triad society which used them for its own purposes. At the same time, too rigid a distinction has been drawn between the 'benevolent' *kongsis* and the 'malevolent' *huis*, or secret societies: it seems that the two were not separated in this categorical fashion and in fact were sometimes distinct associations with benevolent functions and Triad societies at one and the same time.[1] The shortcomings of the system became very manifest at certain times, as in Java when Chinese secret societies plotted to seize power from the Dutch, and in the Straits Settlements when these societies under the Triad societies got much out of hand and caused riots and practised intimidation for many years, later extending their activities to Perak where they added to the existing disorder until it approached anarchy.

This, however, is a special aspect of Chinese society in the Nanyang and is by no means typical. By and large, the Chinese were very law-abiding and gave the ruling Powers little trouble. Schlegel was right when he said that the Chinese were 'easy to govern'. Indeed this quality has brought them, at times, into the contempt of rough European individualists who have dismissed this tractableness as the characteristic of 'sheep'.

Students of the Chinese language who have ploughed through the *Tsŭ Erh Chih*, Sir Francis Wade's Documentary Series, will remember a number of memorials in which prefects or intendants

[1] The writer, after extensive experience of secret societies and district and clan organization, is sceptical of many of the theories advanced by observers. Schlegel (as we have seen in the chapters on the Kongsis of Borneo) has definitely regarded the Kongsis as a transplanting of municipal organization necessary to the functioning of Chinese society. Yet they were certainly 'secret societies' under Triad or Heaven and Earth League control. Only when countries, such as Malaya, began to legislate to control these societies was a distinction made between 'good' and 'bad' societies: the former were granted registration; the latter, if they functioned without registration, were illegal and, of course, definitely 'secret societies'. The writer is of opinion that a great deal more research into the matter is called for. (W. L. Blythe, 'The Interplay of Chinese Secret and Political Societies in Malaya', in *Eastern World*, March and April 1950, adds considerably to our knowledge.)

14; Heine-Geldern E-4 (no date) 1942 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

643 principle as applied to the state really forms only part of a much wider com-
772 plex and resulted from a conception of the universe and of human existence which regulated, and to a large extent still regulates, also the private lives of individuals. When in Siam and Cambodia people wore cloths of different color on different days of the week according to the color ascribed to the planet for whom the day is named, or when in Burma before any important undertaking they examine their horoscope and the lore of lucky and unlucky days, or when they kneel down for prayer on that side of the pagoda which in the cosmological system corresponds to the planet of the weekday on which they were born, they act on the same principle which governed the structure of their empires, their ideas of kingship and the ritual of their royal courts. It is clear then that the cosmomagic ideas, until a very recent past, had an extremely strong hold on the minds of the people.

Is all this a crumbling structure, giving way under the impact of modern civilization or may it still influence the political activities of the peoples concerned? The question is not easily answered. Information on this point is scarce. There are, however, a few indications.

669 We have it on the authority of H. G. Quaritch Wales that the people of
643 Siam, around 1930, still held the ancient state ceremonies in high esteem, those
772 ceremonies which to a large extent are governed by cosmological ideas. One may ask oneself, how much of this old tradition may have been at the bottom of the royalist rebellion of 1933.

In Burma the following cases may be considered as significant. In 1897, twelve years after the annexation of Upper Burma by the British, a Buddhist monk, U Kelatha, fell in love with a princess of the dethroned dynasty who promised to marry him if he became king of Burma. There followed the usual dreams or visions which revealed to him that in a former life he had been a Burmese prince and, moreover, that he would be king the moment he sat on the throne of the palace in Mandalay. With eighteen followers, all armed with swords only, he rushed through the city gates and tried to reach the royal palace, at that time seat of the English club. A few English officers armed with hunting rifles made an end to his attempt. The incident proves the extreme vividness of cosmomagic ideas at the close of the 19th century. As we have seen, whoever held the palace, the Mount Meru of the Burmese empire, thereby became the representative of Indra and king. It is completely in accord with the cosmomagic way of thinking that U Kelatha and his followers believed the mere occupation of the throne would make him automatically lord of the whole empire.

Unfortunately, very little authentic information is available on the Burmese

14: Heine-Geldern E-4 (no date) 1942 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

rebellion of 1930–31. However, the following detail, as revealed at the time by newspaper dispatches, is significant. One of the first actions of Saya San, the leader of the rebellion, was to build a "palace," in reality a bamboo hut somewhere in the jungle, with an inscription designating it as the "Palace of the Buddhist King." It is, of course, very easy to ridicule such pretensions, but it is more important to understand them. We have seen how inseparable king and palace were according to Burmese ideas. No kingdom could exist without a palace representing Mount Meru and forming its magic center, and the king, the "Lord of the Golden Palace," was king in the first line by his possession of the palace. Saya San's action in building a palace, a magic center for his embryonic empire, therefore corresponds closely to that of U Kelatha when he wanted to seat himself on the throne of the palace in Mandalay. 643 772 669

The story of the Myinmu rebellion of 1910, as told by Paul Edmonds in his book *Peacocks and Pagodas*, if it does not directly contribute to our knowledge of cosmomagic ideas, at least gives a significant instance of the power of the belief in rebirth, prophecies and portents. A young man of eighteen years, Maung Than, was returning from work in the fields smoking a cigar. Some people who passed him thought they saw smoke issuing from his arms. They talked about it in the village and the rumour reached some elders who were familiar with an old tradition according to which a former king of Burma, Chanyeiktha, would be reborn in the shape of a youth who had the power of making smoke issue from his arms. "Other signs and portents were looked for. Needless to say, they were forthcoming. The griffins at the foot of an old pagoda were seen to shake; gold showers fell on another pagoda; and everywhere omens multiplied which pointed to young Maung Than as the long-foretold reincarnation of king Chanyeiktha." Maung Than entered into the spirit of the game and put forth the usual claims of being invulnerable and of possessing the power to make himself invisible. With a crowd of a thousand followers armed with swords and spears he attacked the police station at Myinmu but was repulsed and eventually captured.

These incidents may suffice to show how lively the ideas of cosmic state and kingship, of rebirth and prophecy still are in Burma. I have little doubt that they played a role in the events accompanying the Japanese invasion. It can easily be predicted that whatever government will exist in Burma after the war, will have to reckon with these ideas and with the possibility of similar outbreaks as those mentioned above, perhaps even on a larger scale owing to the emotions stirred up by the present turmoil.

While certain dangers for peace and order inherent in the cosmomagic conception thus must be said to persist, one may ask whether there is any 000

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

more or less directly with local manufactures, and create unemployment among artisans and craftsmen. Some of these find employment in agriculture, and the enlarged supply of labour tends to reduce agricultural wages and to lower the cost of trade crops to the exporter, but to the prejudice of the agricultural labourer. For various reasons many will be unable to turn to agriculture and will be left without employment. Where, as in Lower Burma, agriculture develops along industrial lines, there grows up a mass of part-time labour, unable to find employment for about half of the year and with no other source of livelihood but crime. Thus the free action of economic forces tends to create unemployment and under-employment.

One feature of the encouragement of native enterprise in cultivation for export is the introduction of the rule of law. The rule of law is a foundation stone of western freedom, and should provide a far more secure basis for society than the rule of personal authority. But this is true only where the law is an expression of social will; in a tropical dependency it expresses the will of the colonial power, and is an instrument of economic development. The rule of law becomes in effect the rule of economic law. The ideas embodied in the western law of property and contract are foreign to the tropics. Even attempts to apply local law, or to embody local custom in legal codes, must fail if made in western courts according to western procedure by lawyers who, as was said formerly in Java, 'look on native law as a doctor looks on native medicine'.[1] Unwritten custom changes its character when formalized in law and legal decisions, and we have noticed how 'Buddhist law' has been applied in Burma. In India, Elphinstone remarked that Hindu law was 'as a whole beyond the knowledge of perhaps the most learned pundit, and every part beyond the knowledge of the people who live under it....The uncertainty of decisions obtained from such sources must be obvious, especially when required for the guidance of a foreign judge both to the written law and to the usage which supplies its place.'[2] Indigenous law or custom administered in a foreign court is no less foreign than law proceeding directly from a foreign ruler. In either case one result is the encouragement of disputes and litigation, because people can appeal against the custom that all know to the law which no one knows. Law encroaches on custom, and the decay of custom encourages the resort to litigation. Moreover, as is notorious, for reasons already

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 218. [2] Cotton, p. 182.

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[438] One reason for this is economic advantage. The coming of rubber, in particular, has given to the Malay peasant of the west coast an income considerably higher, on the whole, than that of the east coast peasant.
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[166] The effects of Westernization are profound. But they do not lie in crude physical displacement of the peasant or degradation of his living conditions. They lie in the widening of the gap between his expanding range of wants and his level of productivity, and in his inability to measure and in any way control the economic forces operating in his field. Westernization has meant for the peasant an enlargement of the social horizon—more knowledge, through better communications and education, of other places, of other peoples of kindred and dissimilar interests. It has created new ambitions: for different clothing, for new uses of leisure, for a better status for his children, for a position of power in the political scene. All this has disturbed the traditional patterns of peasant society. These patterns, and the class structure of South East Asian society of which they were a part, were probably never too satisfactory to the peasant. Anxiety and evasion must have often been the response to either too rigid or too elastic a rule—and the peasant seems often to have suffered from the exactions of his superior in the social scale. But the scope of the system was known, if not its precise implications. Nowadays the scope of the system has for the most part passed beyond the peasant's grasp, and much of it has become de-personalized.

To illustrate this by giving a more concrete analysis of some of the values in the peasant's life, let me take the area of Malaya and Indonesia where Islam is the major religion of the people.

181 In his daily life the Indonesian or Malay peasant is governed largely
177 by the canons of behaviour, the ties of friendship and neighbourliness, the relations of work and social intercourse of his village community. So much
565 is this so that in Java the *desa*, the village, was crystallized by the Dutch
602 into an administrative and developmental unit, and its communal struc-
776 ture strengthened for welfare purposes. But as important as the village,
779 and indeed often basic to its structure, are the family and larger kin or-
671 ganizations. From these a person gets his social status and much of his land and other property, and they have the primary role in his marriage
182 and other crucial events in his progress through life.

Such domestic and local relationships also provide a framework for the peasant in his attempts to come to terms with the forces of nature and human destiny. His world of spirits is a local world. In Indonesia the ancestors do not play the predominant role which they do, for instance, in Annam. But the village, the seashore, the surrounding jungle, wells, trees, and stones are the home of many kinds of spirits, which afflict man with sickness or misfortune, or stand by him as his familiars to guard him. Basic in the religion of the Indonesian peasant is this local, essentially parochial, spirit element. All these values guide his economic and social conduct, and mean a great deal to him.

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But the situation is complex, even in village life. The system of rules governing domestic and local relations—marriage, adoption, inheritance, rights over land, succession to local office, rules of etiquette, and behaviour to superiors—is generally known as the *adat*, the custom. The nature of this custom, and what should be its relation to a more fully developed legal system, have been elaborately studied by the Dutch in Indonesia. At times indeed they have seemed to give the *adat* almost a mystical connotation. Alongside this body of custom, which of course varies from one peasant area to another, is the *shari'a*, the religious rule of Islam. On the one hand this is a unifying force, extra-village and extra-national in character, linking even the remotest mountain farmer spiritually or emotionally with the farmer or townsman of other Muslim communities in South East Asia, and far beyond. On the other hand, the Muslim religious law blends into the field of the *adat*, laying down rules about marriage, inheritance, and other family matters. Then there are the Western rules of law and administrative procedure, laying down just how land is to be acquired, held, and transferred, giving regulations for village management, and imposing penalties for certain kinds of breach of good relations. Yet the Western system offers also inducement to use the law, to protect one's interests firmly, to take advantage of situations where the *adat* has left rights undefined. So three factors—the custom, the Muslim religious rule, and the Western system of law—interact even in the heart of peasant society.

The result is a complex set of forces in dynamic operation, with the peasant being pressed by one or other of them or championing one or other as circumstances arise. In Negri Sembilan, for instance, there has come to be what is almost now a classic case of this interaction. In former times the valuable lands were for the most part those on which 'wet rice' could be cultivated. By the matrilineal system ancestrally operative in that area, these lands were handed down in the female line, from mother to daughter, or from aunt to niece. They were also cultivated largely by women. As rubber came to be developed, however, other lands on the hill-sides, previously of much less value, came to have worth too. For the most part these had to be cleared before being planted in rubber, and this clearing was a task that only men could do properly. Hence men came to have a more direct interest in this land. When questions of inheritance began to arise, divergent views became manifest. Some argued for treating new lands like the old, and handing them down in the female line like the rice lands. Yet there was a strong case for not including these rubber lands in the category of ancestral land, but for letting them be transmitted from a father to his children and through the male line in general. This principle of male inheritance is in line with the emphasis of the Muslim law. This not only gives guidance of the patrilineal kind for distribution of the property of the deceased in cases of dispute, but in all its provisions tends to stress the status of the male against that of the female.

Within the peasant society itself the potential clash of the two systems,

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181 local custom and religious rule, had been present for centuries. But there
177 was little in the economic situation to sharpen it, and the Muslim leaders
themselves were often so steeped in the local ways that they allowed as the
565 religious law what was, in fact, the local custom. With the growth of
602 Western processes, the perception of new economic advantages tended to
776 change the equilibrium of the two principles. The advance of education
779 and heightened consciousness of Islam as a world faith also tended to make
the religious leaders themselves much more keenly aware of any divergence.
671 Wealthy men who want to leave property to their sons, men with a strong
182 religious sense, men who regard themselves as progressive, or who are in revolt against their clan leaders, therefore tend to be protagonists of the Muslim law. The conservatives, those who see in the custom a defence for women, those who see in it a symbol of an essentially Malay way of life, argue for the retention of the custom. Contact with the West, they say, is changing the structure of the peasant society enough already. The issue has also entered the modern political scene, since the search for factors to increase Malay integration tends to stress the national and extra-national character of Islam at the expense of the more local qualities of the *adat*. Here too it is growing Westernization which has sharpened the issue.

184 In a general discussion such as this, one may be allowed to refer to the
565 peasantry of South East Asia as a body. But they are not uniform in ethnic composition, in national interests, in language, in religion, or in general culture. Moreover, within any local community, there are competing, even conflicting, interests and opinions. The peasant may be unable to face up to the general issues which affect his life so deeply, but in so far as he understands his own interests he is very alive to them and capable of exercising keen judgement in them. It is the small scale of his organization for the most part which renders him so vulnerable.

000 What is likely to be the future of South East Asia from the peasant angle? Prediction is not worth much, since so many elements in the situation are imperfectly known, but there are a few which seem to be significant.

565 The peasant has no native middle class, of the same society as himself,
185 to give a lead to his development and stability in any wider economic
656 organizations that may be set up for his benefit. To improve his economic lot, and in particular to give him a larger fraction of his product through control of marketing, co-operative societies have often been proposed and sometimes tried. Their success has been only limited, partly because the peasant has not been fully persuaded of their attractions as against what the alien middleman can offer, and partly because of the difficulty of securing adequate technical supervision and administration at a sufficiently low official level. Much is now apt to be made of the colonial or semi-colonial status of the South East Asian peasant as a drag upon his development. There is no doubt that colonialism, as a specific form of political control of under-developed territories by a metropolitan Power, is

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Whilst thus simplifying the situation, it must be conceded that the Chinese social organization overseas early revealed serious deficiencies. It was not a complete unit of China transplanted, but fragments from various settings placed together in one spot. Different tribes and classes were put into unwonted juxtaposition, and the criminal and unruly element was disproportionately strong (this last fact needs emphasis). Embryo communal or municipal systems were often taken charge of by the deadly Triad society which used them for its own purposes. At the same time, too rigid a distinction has been drawn between the 'benevolent' *kongsis* and the 'malevolent' *huis*, or secret societies: it seems that the two were not separated in this categorical fashion and in fact were sometimes distinct associations with benevolent functions and Triad societies at one and the same time.[1] The shortcomings of the system became very manifest at certain times, as in Java when Chinese secret societies plotted to seize power from the Dutch, and in the Straits Settlements when these societies under the Triad societies got much out of hand and caused riots and practised intimidation for many years, later extending their activities to Perak where they added to the existing disorder until it approached anarchy.

This, however, is a special aspect of Chinese society in the Nanyang and is by no means typical. By and large, the Chinese were very law-abiding and gave the ruling Powers little trouble. Schlegel was right when he said that the Chinese were 'easy to govern'. Indeed this quality has brought them, at times, into the contempt of rough European individualists who have dismissed this tractableness as the characteristic of 'sheep'.

Students of the Chinese language who have ploughed through the *Tsŭ Erh Chih*, Sir Francis Wade's Documentary Series, will remember a number of memorials in which prefects or intendants

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of circuit of the Manchu dynasty related the details of criminal cases. There was a common offence which did not seem to come under the specific provisions of the penal code but was nevertheless heavily penalized, and it was known as 'being involved'. It appeared that to 'be involved', even quite innocently, in the felonies and misdemeanours of others, was itself in the nature of a crime. Indeed this feeling of the blameworthiness of being mixed up in any offence, tragedy, or lawlessness went right through Chinese society. It was not altogether unusual to hear of a Chinese man or woman hanging him- or herself on the doorpost of someone against whom they had a grievance in order to 'involve' him (there would be a judicial inquiry which would, at least, cause the owner of the door great embarrassment), for 'responsibility' is a far-reaching principle in China. This convention was hostile to the growth of public spirit, for a Chinese who saw a crime being committed, or a person in danger or needing assistance, would very likely do nothing for fear of 'being involved'.

This characteristic has persevered down to the present day, and, coupled with a willingness to pay for a quiet life, has been responsible for many Chinese difficulties. Chinese secret societies were able to parcel out the towns and villages in the Nanyang and to exact 'protection money' from shopkeepers and others without effective protest; in a similar way the Chinese community as a whole was willing to conform to all the laws and regulations made by alien Western Governments (whether to them they made sense or not) in return for being left alone. It was the social wisdom of 'Brer Rabbit, he say nuffin''. It was only when regulations proved to be unbearably vexatious that there was an outburst of hysteria followed by calm. This arrangement, convenient to both sides, was responsible for the saying of Gustaaf Schlegel cited above. It is an irony that this very quality, so convenient to European administrators in the past, as we have seen has brought down so much criticism on the heads of the Chinese *Towkays* in Malaya who, unprotected from reprisals, have paid 'protection' money to the Communist terrorists of their own race.

It seems true to say, then, that at the beginning of the twentieth century the Governments of Southeast Asia were conscious of the Chinese as a 'useful' element in their economic systems, and though they had some unpleasant social peculiarities they in no way constituted a danger or a threat. Chinese labour was introduced

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Indebtedness. Both in Burma and Java agricultural indebtedness has accompanied, and has indeed been a condition of, economic progress. It was through giving out advances that the planter in Java secured his land and labour, and that the miller in Burma made certain of getting an adequate supply of paddy at the lowest possible rate. The Dutch, with their State pawnshops and People's Banks, have done more than has been attempted in Burma to provide credit on sound lines, but they have by no means solved the problem of indebtedness; alongside the state institutions the private moneylender still flourishes. But the application of native customary law to land, and the prohibition against the alienation of land to foreigners have obviated the most pernicious social and political consequences of agricultural indebtedness, and it is not in the same measure as in Burma a cause of agricultural distress and political ill-will. 452

Litigation and Crime. Until quite recently litigation was as unusual in Burma as it still is in Java. But in Burma the people have been encouraged to settle their disputes by the processes of western law; whereas in Java, customary law and the practice of arbitration and the settlement of disputes by reasonable compromise have survived. 691

An even greater contrast is presented in respect of crime. In Java the death sentence is almost unknown; for the five years from 1935 to 1939, with a population for the whole of Netherlands India of nearly 70 million, only three persons were sentenced to death; in Burma, with a fifth of the population, the death sentence is passed on some two hundred a year and upwards of a hundred a year are hanged. It is difficult to compare sentences of imprisonment, but the position in Java is very different from that in Burma where, for some thirty years, the accommodation for convicts has failed to keep pace with 674 681

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674 681 the number sent to prison, and one reads year after year of overcrowded jails. In Burma whipping is freely used in addition to, or as a substitute for, imprisonment, and is a regular feature of jail discipline, whereas in Netherlands India whipping has been abolished as a judicial penalty and, though still permissible for unruly convicts, is in practice never used. In Burma, in addition to those convicted of offences, upwards of two thousand people a year may be placed on security, imprisoned or restricted under the ordinary Criminal Procedure Code, and another five hundred under the more rigorous provision of the Habitual Offenders Restriction Act.[1] In Netherlands India action along these lines seems to form no part of the ordinary processes of law. After the revolutionary outbreak of 1926–7 in Netherlands India, upwards of a thousand people were interned and deported by executive authority; but this was an exceptional measure to counter an emergency. In Burma, however, the Village Act provides for deportation as part of the recognized machinery of administration, and under this Act over twelve hundred were deported in connection with the rebellion of 1931.[2] In Burma collective penalties are imposed over large areas under the Police Act by quartering on them punitive police, of which the inhabitants must defray the cost; collective penalties may also be imposed on villages under two distinct sections of the Village Act. In the police courts of Burma a fine of less than Rs. 5 is unusual; in Java the penalty rarely seems to exceed half a guilder.

674 Yet in Burma, despite this vigorous enforcement of the law, crime continues to increase, whereas in Java the registers of the police stations seem mostly to be filled with charges as to the use of an unduly severe bit, riding a horse without a saddle, or something of that order.[3] In Netherlands India the whole system of administration is directed to preventing crime by removing its causes; in Burma the Government has been content to aim at maintaining law and order through legal penalties. In Lower Burma up to 1880 the proportion of Burman convicts was far lower than among other sections of the population, and up to 1910 Upper Burma was comparatively free of crime. These facts sufficiently dispose of a general indictment against the people as normally and naturally criminal, and the only possible conclusion would seem to be that the principles on which the administration of Burma has been conducted

[1] *RAB*, 1926–7, p. 23. [2] *RAB*, 1931–2, p. 77.
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were such as to develop their worse rather than their better qualities. Our methods might have done very well for Europe; they may have been suitable in India, where the people are protected against economic forces by the ties of caste, but they did not suit the Burman. 'It was the best butter', said the Hatter; but it spoiled the watch. 674

Clerical Unrest. In Burma the turbulence prevalent among the monks is one of the more recent features of social disorder and unrest, but it is merely one aspect of the dissolution of society indicated by the growth of crime. In Java there is nothing of the kind. As already noticed, causes relating to religion are tried in special Moslem courts, instead of, as in Burma, coming before the ordinary lay court; and the law applied is Moslem ecclesiastical law as interpreted by native Moslem judges, whereas in Burma the rule of decision is looked for in the *dhammathats* as interpreted on the principles of western law. The procedure in Java does not weaken but fosters corporate authority in the religious establishment. Moreover, the village clerics are appointed by or with the approval of the Regent, whereas in Burma the Government has held aloof from all concern with promoting the establishment, while actively breaking it down by the transfer of religious causes to the civil courts. The Dutch have with good reason tried to conciliate Moslem sentiment and, even if they have not been wholly successful, there is nothing in Java corresponding to the clerical unrest in Burma.[1] 692

Corruption. We have had to notice the prevalence of corruption in Burma. By all accounts it is practically unknown in Java. The absence of judicial corruption can easily be understood. Petty cases are settled by arbitration either out of court, or before a bench of notables with a senior and well-paid official as chairman; or they go before a civil servant or judicial officer with long service and on high pay. Moreover, the penalties imposed are so trivial that it is cheaper to be punished than to bribe a policeman or magistrate to escape punishment. Serious matters go before a bench containing at least three high judicial officers as well as laymen of good standing. It would be difficult and dangerous to bribe the whole bench. In civil cases the decision purports to follow customary law, and the people can know whether it is right; the court must justify itself to popular opinion and not to higher judicial authority. In these circumstances there is little scope for bribery. 696

But that corruption should be unknown in general administration, 661

[1] Bousquet, pp. 51ff.; *Vrij Nederland*, 27 Nov. 1943.

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691 indicated, education tends to flood the land with lawyers, who foster litigation for their living. The growth of litigation in India has long been deplored. In Burma there was little litigation until rapid economic development began in 1870, and so late as 1886 it could still be said that Burmans were not litigious. That is no longer true. We find the same plague of lawyers in Indo-China and the Philippines, and in Africa litigation has been described as the curse of the country. 674 The law breeds litigation and this, married to poverty by agrarian distress, breeds crime. Here again Burma is exceptional, but it appears that of the four countries in the world with the highest proportionate jail population, three are British dependencies.[1] All this is nothing new. In Burma, as far back as 1883, dacoit bands flourished just outside the capital. So they did in Java in 1830, when the introduction of western law by Raffles created a 'proletariat who go about and steal'. Still earlier in Madras, on the introduction of the rule of law from Bengal at the end of the eighteenth century, 'the same results', says Munro, 'followed here which had occurred elsewhere; justice ceased in great measure to be administered and the increase of crime was appalling'.[2] These words might have been taken from any report on the administration of Burma from the eighties onwards.

696 Under native rule disputes are usually settled by arbitration. Under European rule it is at first only in cases with foreigners that natives come to court. Naturally Europeans best understand their own laws, and the middlemen and moneylenders learn it in the course of business, but the cultivator neither understands the law nor how it works and, as a rule, is least able to afford a skilful advocate. The decision usually goes in favour of the longer purse. Men who lose their case against a wealthier opponent and without understanding that a decision, apparently arbitrary and in their view unjust, may none the less be good law, naturally attribute the result to bribery, and this is the readiest excuse given by their advocate for his failure. Nothing is so favourable to judicial corruption as a belief that it is general. That is a principle which works in Africa as in Asia.[3] It seems, indeed, to be generally true in tropical dependencies that western law encourages litigation, crime and corruption.

182 The substitution of the rule of law for the rule of custom naturally expedites the disintegration of the customary social structure. But it also reacts more directly on the social structure. The former native

[1] Barnes, L., *Skeleton of the Empire* (1937), p. 60.
[2] Gleig, pp. 221–2. [3] *Colonial Review*, 1944, June, p. 170.

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464 it is usually accompanied by unwelcome restrictions on the terms and conditions of employment. It was on these grounds that the Government of Burma formerly rejected proposals that it should revive the former practice of official recruitment, and fifty years later mill-owners protested against suggestions that the recruitment of labour should be supervised.[1] Even where recruitment is nominally free, private employers may utilize the assistance of native chieftains, and, during the Liberal regime in Java, when officials were no longer allowed to take part in the provision of labour, the planters commonly entered village headmen on the pay roll as servants of the estate in order to secure their influence in recruiting villagers. Usually, however, labour for western enterprise must be imported from some distant region where it is more plentiful, and in such circumstances special arrangements for recruiting are required. Naturally a private agent, dependent for his livelihood on the number of recruits, is less scrupulous than an official in his relations with both employers and labourers; he will supply employers with anyone whom they will take, and entice recruits with advances and specious promises. Although the substitution of private for official recruitment may supply more and cheaper labour, it is in some respects a change for the worse; the supply of labour is doubtful, the men engaged are often immature or weaklings, and the cost per head is high. Moreover, recruitment causes a local shortage in the area of supply; recruitment for South Africa causes a shortage in Rhodesia which has to be made good by recruitment for Rhodesia further inland, and so on.[2] This stimulates opposition among employers to the system of recruitment. Firms with large capital resources can make their own arrangements for obtaining labour, and thereby ensure a more regular supply of better labourers at less expense. Accordingly the strongest firms, best able to influence the policy of Government, add their weight to humanitarian protests against the evil of recruitment, and advocate stringent regulation.

464 686 The question of recruitment is closely linked up with the penal sanction, imposing a legal penalty for the breach of labour contracts. This protects the employer against strikes and desertion, and thereby reacts on the demand for labour. In Java such provisions originated in local police regulations dating from 1829, which were designed to ease the transition from servile to free labour in domestic service.

[1] *RAB*, 1880–1, p. 52; *RCLI*, x, Pt 1, p. 173.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 648ff.

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When similar provisions were embodied in the General Police Regulation of 1872, they attracted the attention of Liberals in the States-General, who obtained their cancellation in 1879. In Java the penal sanction was no longer required as there was by this time an abundant supply of wage labour, but the new tobacco plantations in Sumatra were dependent on labour imported under contract, and their needs were recognized by an Ordinance of 1880, providing for the imposition of penalties. The facilities thus granted were abused, and about 1900 an enquiry, held as the result of Socialist agitation exposed 'a general collapse of morality'.[1] An attempt to mend conditions by stricter enforcement of the law proved unavailing, as the legal effect of the penal sanction favoured employers. Accordingly labour policy, hitherto directed towards providing labour, turned gradually in the direction of protecting it. The means chiefly favoured were a closer supervision over recruitment, the gradual abolition of the penal sanction, and a more precise regulation of the duties of employers and employees, together with machinery for enforcing the regulations. The change may be dated from 1909 when official agents were appointed to recruit Chinese coolies from abroad, and rules were framed to control professional recruiting in Java. As the Government considered a penal sanction necessary to efficient management even on its own tin mines, its abolition was a slow process. But the closer supervision over private recruiting encouraged employers to take the matter into their own hands, and from 1915 various planters' associations established recruiting agencies. Employers came also to recognize the value of trained and voluntary labour; they tried to induce time-expired coolies to return for a further period of service after recruiting friends and followers in their villages. In this way plantation labour assumed a new character. By 1930 it was no longer mostly alien, temporary and recruited by irresponsible recruiting agents, but much of the labour was Javanese and exempt from penal liabilities, and the relations between employer and employed had become more permanent and human. A new Ordinance of 1931 aimed at encouraging these tendencies, and provided among other matters for a gradually increasing minimum of free labour, engaged on contracts without a penal sanction. Almost at the same time the Blaine amendment to the United States Tariff Law of 1930 prohibited the importation of the products of labour employed under a penal sanction, unless otherwise unobtainable in sufficient quantities. This threatened the

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 354; Vandenbosch, p. 282.

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464 Sumatra tobacco planters with the loss of a valuable market, and they
686 announced their intention of recruiting all labour on a voluntary basis. As a moral gesture this was not very convincing since, owing to the depression, there was a surplus of labour on the estates, but it served the purpose of satisfying the customs regulations of the United States. At the same time, penal provisions were also renounced by Government in respect of the coolies, mostly Chinese, on its tin mines. Thanks to the Blaine amendment and the depression, the results attained under the Ordinance of 1931 were greater than had been contemplated and, when it came up for revision in 1936, a further advance was possible. By 1941, the penal sanction had practically disappeared, and on the revision of the Ordinance in that year it was finally abolished.[1]

In British India, where western enterprise has never been of such predominant importance as in Netherlands India, the Workman's Breach of Contract Act was repealed in 1926. But in most British territories in Africa, western enterprise is influential, and penal sanctions are attached to labour offences; though legislation of this type is less conspicuous in West Africa. The accepted view is that 'the complete disappearance of criminal penalties must await the evolution of social and economic conditions which will replace the sanctions which penalties supply'.[2] Conditions are less favourable for its abolition than in Netherlands India, but possibly a stimulus, such as that applied by the United States tariff to tobacco planters in Sumatra, might expedite the process.

466 But the abolition of the penal sanction need not, and ordinarily does not, improve the position of the labourer. Just as free recruitment needs regulation if it is not to lead to worse abuses than official recruitment, so free labour, unless protected, may be worse off than contract labour. The social and economic conditions which obviate the need for any legal sanction replace it by a more stringent economic sanction, for the legal sanction becomes unnecessary when the supply of labour is in excess of the demand. Javanese coolies working in Sumatra felt safer under a contract, even when it exposed them to penalties, than when working as free labourers. In Netherlands India it was the Blaine amendment that stimulated the tobacco planters to employ free labour, but their example was followed generally because, owing to the labour surplus resulting from the depression, employers 'were able, easily, and with a certain profit to themselves, to make

[1] *Vrij Nederland*, 22 Nov. 1941. [2] *African Survey*, pp. 659, 664.

10: Thompson S-4 (no date)1947 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

Chinese Indians

466 grants to the United States did in Europe until they were checked. They consistently misrepresented to prospective recruits the conditions of work 167 that awaited them, herded them aboard ships and in lodgings under conditions of filth and crowding, and tried to crimp their competitors' labor forces. Immigrant Asiatic foremen also were similar to their prototypes among immigrant foremen in the United States. They were notorious for the "cuts" they took from their crews' wages, for their unscrupulous profiteering from the sale of food and other necessities to the workers, and for their brutality toward those recalcitrant under arbitrary rule. Nor were alien Asiatic employers liberal in their relations with compatriots among their labor forces. Small Chinese-owned estates and mines were regularly cited in the reports of independent labor inspectors as the most delinquent in their observance of health and safety regulations. Singapore Indian shop-owners were the object of unpleasant publicity regarding the long working days, irregular and inadequate wages, and general tyranny meted out to their compatriot assistants. Disinterested labor leadership or even employer paternalism was conspicuously absent among the immigrant groups.

466 Working conditions were not much better in the enterprises owned by indigenous employers; but they were less conspicuous than those of the immigrant employer's shop, as most of the native workers are farmers scattered over the land and cared for, when in need, by the traditional village and family organization. Little was done by the native governments, whenever they were in power, to better the lot of the small native [563 654] farmer-artisan. The Siamese and Burmese governments falteringly attempted to introduce scientific agriculture, to improve cottage industries and to reduce the landless proletariat; but their efforts were directed more toward ousting foreigners who preyed on the people, particularly alien landowners and moneylenders, than toward improving labor conditions of those working for indigenous employers. The Siamese National Assembly, in 1938, turned down a proposal for labor legislation designed to set maximum hours and minimum wages and to restrict child labor. Its policy on labor organization was much the same as that of the colonial governments, that is, to keep the labor forces under control and to exhibit, at most, a certain indulgence toward the formation of unions in some trades or localities where this seemed advantageous.

Wherever labor legislation was introduced in Southeast Asia, the initiative came from the government and not from the workers. Originally [686] it was the difficulties which European employers experienced in retaining their workers (at first domestic servants and later plantation laborers) that inspired legislation which imposed a penalty upon employees for their non-observance of agreements. Gradually, throughout the region, this penal sanction was abolished and more beneficial types of legislation were introduced to reduce the labor turnover. Considerations of

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
Southeast Asia AL1

175 thus set a new stage -- the development of the natural
177 resources of the whole region.
433
439 This change-over from a subsistence economy to a
648 commercial economy involved the large-scale expansion of traditional crops or the development of new commercial crops.
[436] It was stimulated by the introduction or expansion of a money
[489] economy, the flow of capital and the development of land and
[69] sea transport. It was supported by Western technology, methods of administration and systems of justice. This whole process greatly affected the traditional institution, up-
175 setting the balance of a medieval world. The free, indi-
177 vidualist spirit of Western rule and commerce cut at the
[59] roots of traditional social life, undermining the corporate
[423] strength of family and village. But the most serious direct
[426] threat of the new economic forces was to the peasant's owner-
[565] ship of land. Expanding economies, new money taxes and cheap imports meant better business than ever for the money lender. Many peasants became ruined by debt and lost their lands. Indebtedness and debt slavery were not new in Southeast Asia; the latter was fairly soon stamped out, but the former now became much more widespread than before, resulting in the creation of a landless proletariat.[16]

184 Characteristics of Current Southeast Asian Economy

In spite of all the differences among the countries of Southeast Asia in the natural environment, ethnic

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16. Harrison, op. cit., p. 210.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

democracy corresponding to the *vergadering* of Java. In Burma the village has become merely an administrative unit, whereas in Java the village still appears to be mainly a social unit. And it would hardly be possible to find a more striking contrast than between the Village Act of Java, designed as an instrument of social uplift, and the Village Act of Burma, designed as an instrument of law and order and 'vigorously enforced' by fines on villages, villagers and headmen. Government schemes in Java, we are told, 'risk failure if they appeal to the individual economic instincts and have a fair chance of being comprehended and accepted, if they are based on a foundation of organic co-operation'.[1]

Indebtedness. Both in Burma and Java agricultural indebtedness has accompanied, and has indeed been a condition of, economic progress. It was through giving out advances that the planter in Java secured his land and labour, and that the miller in Burma made certain of getting an adequate supply of paddy at the lowest possible rate. The Dutch, with their State pawnshops and People's Banks, have done more than has been attempted in Burma to provide credit on sound lines, but they have by no means solved the problem of indebtedness; alongside the state institutions the private moneylender still flourishes. But the application of native customary law to land, and the prohibition against the alienation of land to foreigners have obviated the most pernicious social and political consequences of agricultural indebtedness, and it is not in the same measure as in Burma a cause of agricultural distress and political ill-will.

Litigation and Crime. Until quite recently litigation was as unusual in Burma as it still is in Java. But in Burma the people have been encouraged to settle their disputes by the processes of western law; whereas in Java, customary law and the practice of arbitration and the settlement of disputes by reasonable compromise have survived.

An even greater contrast is presented in respect of crime. In Java the death sentence is almost unknown; for the five years from 1935 to 1939, with a population for the whole of Netherlands India of nearly 70 million, only three persons were sentenced to death; in Burma, with a fifth of the population, the death sentence is passed on some two hundred a year and upwards of a hundred a year are hanged. It is difficult to compare sentences of imprisonment, but the position in Java is very different from that in Burma where, for some thirty years, the accommodation for convicts has failed to keep pace with

[1] Hart, p. 65.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

more or less directly with local manufactures, and create unemployment among artisans and craftsmen. Some of these find employment in agriculture, and the enlarged supply of labour tends to reduce agricultural wages and to lower the cost of trade crops to the exporter, but to the prejudice of the agricultural labourer. For various reasons many will be unable to turn to agriculture and will be left without employment. Where, as in Lower Burma, agriculture develops along industrial lines, there grows up a mass of part-time labour, unable to find employment for about half of the year and with no other source of livelihood but crime. Thus the free action of economic forces tends to create unemployment and under-employment.

One feature of the encouragement of native enterprise in cultivation for export is the introduction of the rule of law. The rule of law is a foundation stone of western freedom, and should provide a far more secure basis for society than the rule of personal authority. But this is true only where the law is an expression of social will; in a tropical dependency it expresses the will of the colonial power, and is an instrument of economic development. The rule of law becomes in effect the rule of economic law. The ideas embodied in the western law of property and contract are foreign to the tropics. Even attempts to apply local law, or to embody local custom in legal codes, must fail if made in western courts according to western procedure by lawyers who, as was said formerly in Java, 'look on native law as a doctor looks on native medicine'.[1] Unwritten custom changes its character when formalized in law and legal decisions, and we have noticed how 'Buddhist law' has been applied in Burma. In India, Elphinstone remarked that Hindu law was 'as a whole beyond the knowledge of perhaps the most learned pundit, and every part beyond the knowledge of the people who live under it.... The uncertainty of decisions obtained from such sources must be obvious, especially when required for the guidance of a foreign judge both to the written law and to the usage which supplies its place.'[2] Indigenous law or custom administered in a foreign court is no less foreign than law proceeding directly from a foreign ruler. In either case one result is the encouragement of disputes and litigation, because people can appeal against the custom that all know to the law which no one knows. Law encroaches on custom, and the decay of custom encourages the resort to litigation. Moreover, as is notorious, for reasons already

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 218. [2] Cotton, p. 182.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

691 indicated, education tends to flood the land with lawyers, who foster litigation for their living. The growth of litigation in India has long been deplored. In Burma there was little litigation until rapid economic development began in 1870, and so late as 1886 it could still be said that Burmans were not litigious. That is no longer true. We find the same plague of lawyers in Indo-China and the Philippines, and in Africa litigation has been described as the curse of the country. 674 The law breeds litigation and this, married to poverty by agrarian distress, breeds crime. Here again Burma is exceptional, but it appears that of the four countries in the world with the highest proportionate jail population, three are British dependencies.[1] All this is nothing new. In Burma, as far back as 1883, dacoit bands flourished just outside the capital. So they did in Java in 1830, when the introduction of western law by Raffles created a 'proletariat who go about and steal'. Still earlier in Madras, on the introduction of the rule of law from Bengal at the end of the eighteenth century, 'the same results', says Munro, 'followed here which had occurred elsewhere; justice ceased in great measure to be administered and the increase of crime was appalling'.[2] These words might have been taken from any report on the administration of Burma from the eighties onwards.

696 Under native rule disputes are usually settled by arbitration. Under European rule it is at first only in cases with foreigners that natives come to court. Naturally Europeans best understand their own laws, and the middlemen and moneylenders learn it in the course of business, but the cultivator neither understands the law nor how it works and, as a rule, is least able to afford a skilful advocate. The decision usually goes in favour of the longer purse. Men who lose their case against a wealthier opponent and without understanding that a decision, apparently arbitrary and in their view unjust, may none the less be good law, naturally attribute the result to bribery, and this is the readiest excuse given by their advocate for his failure. Nothing is so favourable to judicial corruption as a belief that it is general. That is a principle which works in Africa as in Asia.[3] It seems, indeed, to be generally true in tropical dependencies that western law encourages litigation, crime and corruption.

182 The substitution of the rule of law for the rule of custom naturally expedites the disintegration of the customary social structure. But it also reacts more directly on the social structure. The former native

[1] Barnes, L., *Skeleton of the Empire* (1937), p. 60.
[2] Gleig, pp. 221–2. [3] *Colonial Review*, 1944, June, p. 170.

7: Furnivall G-4.5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

were such as to develop their worse rather than their better qualities. Our methods might have done very well for Europe; they may have been suitable in India, where the people are protected against economic forces by the ties of caste, but they did not suit the Burman. 'It was the best butter', said the Hatter; but it spoiled the watch. 674

Clerical Unrest. In Burma the turbulence prevalent among the monks is one of the more recent features of social disorder and unrest, but it is merely one aspect of the dissolution of society indicated by the growth of crime. In Java there is nothing of the kind. As already noticed, causes relating to religion are tried in special Moslem courts, instead of, as in Burma, coming before the ordinary lay court; and the law applied is Moslem ecclesiastical law as interpreted by native Moslem judges, whereas in Burma the rule of decision is looked for in the *dhammathats* as interpreted on the principles of western law. The procedure in Java does not weaken but fosters corporate authority in the religious establishment. Moreover, the village clerics are appointed by or with the approval of the Regent, whereas in Burma the Government has held aloof from all concern with promoting the establishment, while actively breaking it down by the transfer of religious causes to the civil courts. The Dutch have with good reason tried to conciliate Moslem sentiment and, even if they have not been wholly successful, there is nothing in Java corresponding to the clerical unrest in Burma.[1] 692

Corruption. We have had to notice the prevalence of corruption in Burma. By all accounts it is practically unknown in Java. The absence of judicial corruption can easily be understood. Petty cases are settled by arbitration either out of court, or before a bench of notables with a senior and well-paid official as chairman; or they go before a civil servant or judicial officer with long service and on high pay. Moreover, the penalties imposed are so trivial that it is cheaper to be punished than to bribe a policeman or magistrate to escape punishment. Serious matters go before a bench containing at least three high judicial officers as well as laymen of good standing. It would be difficult and dangerous to bribe the whole bench. In civil cases the decision purports to follow customary law, and the people can know whether it is right; the court must justify itself to popular opinion and not to higher judicial authority. In these circumstances there is little scope for bribery. 696

But that corruption should be unknown in general administration, 661

[1] Bousquet, pp. 51 ff.; *Vrij Nederland*, 27 Nov. 1943.

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661 with a Government intervening so actively in every branch of social life, seems almost incredible. That, however, is certainly the general opinion. For example, the People's Banks, in dealing with applications for loans, depend largely on reports from the village headman as to the character and circumstances of the applicants. This would seem to provide a ready means by which the headman might supplement his income. In Burma it was regarded as natural and not improper that the headman should charge applicants for loans from Government a fee for making his report. In Java a suggestion to this effect met with the response, 'But there would be a complaint!', and that was taken as a sufficient and final answer. So far as the general opinion as to the absence of corruption is well-founded, there would seem to be two explanations: one is the tradition of 'complaints'; the other, the permanence of the Regent.

694 661 As already explained, it has been a tradition from the early days of Liberal rule that the Controleur, without actually instigating complaints, should encourage the people to complain of any oppressive act. The Liberals prided themselves on relieving the people from the oppression by their native chieftains that had been one feature of the Culture system, and one chief duty of the Controleur, as he moved among the people, was to detect and bring to light oppression by encouraging them to complain, so that the 'complaint' has become a word of magic. In Burma anyone may petition the local magistrate; but the petition must bear a court fee stamp; in practice it is written by a legal practitioner or by a licensed petition writer; it must be presented in open court, and must disclose some matter in respect of which the law entitles the petitioner to relief. It is an application to an officer of the law for some action according to the law. In Java anyone may complain, orally or in writing, at any time, on any matter; no stamp or court fee is required; there are no licensed petition writers, and anyone may write the complaint. Even diehards recognized one good feature in the nationalist movement: that the nationalist leaders encouraged the people to formulate complaints. The tradition goes back far beyond the Liberal period; it dates from the principle adopted in 1803 that Government should act 'more like a father studying to promote the welfare of his family than a ruler governing his subjects'; the Liberals merely devised machinery for making the tradition more effective. Thus the 'complaint' has come to take a place alongside 'gentle pressure' as a distinctive feature of Dutch colonial practice.

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[2] Gleig, pp. 221–2. [3] *Colonial Review*, 1944, June, p. 170.

175 carrying the civilizing influence of Indian cultural and
177 spiritual life and implanting it in these new lands by
648 introducing the art of writing and the classical Sanskrit language and literature; bringing as well their own vernacular languages to enrich the vocabularies of Southeast Asia.[11]

175 It may be argued, nevertheless, that since there is little
177 good evidence for any large Indian emigration to Southeast
439 Asia, much Indian culture could have been brought back by
648 cosmopolitanized Southeast Asian traders who often spent months in India waiting for the monsoons to change their direction.[12] It should be noted in this connection that during this time of early Indian colonization trade relations were also extended westward by Indonesians (who earlier reached Madagascar) and other Southeast Asians.

175 During the expansion of Islam, from 1350 to 1500,
648 Moslem colonization followed the Indian pattern. Thus we may say that formerly a colony was merely a settlement in a foreign land and the settler had little or no political
[797] connection with the home land. The Indian and Moslem became foreign rulers, but they did not establish foreign rule. Subsequently, the Portuguese and Spaniards came as royal agents and with a warrant from the Pope to undertake both
175 the conquest and conversion of the people. The old idea
648
563 of a colony as a settlement survived: there were grandees

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11. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

12. The author is indebted to Professor Lauriston Sharp for the development of this idea.

113, 648, 721, 175, 563 Southeast Asia AL1

[For information on the history of the distribution of peoples and political entities in Southeast Asia, and for the history of relations amongst the states of Southeast Asia and the relations between the French in Indochina and the states of Southeast Asia, see 115: Le Boulanger, AM1 , Indochina, category, 116. --Analyst]

727

727 AFTERMATH OF COMBAT--number and nature of casualties; treatment of own casualties (e.g., retrieving and disposal of dead, care of wounded); treatment of enemy casualties (e.g., despoiling, mutilation, killing); taking of trophies; treatment of captives and prisoners (e.g., slaughter, torture, mutilation, release, exchange, holding for ransom, adoption, enslavement, sacrifice); punishment of enemy leaders; military occupation and military government; homecoming after war (e.g., return trip, reception of returning warriors); home reactions to victory and defeat; victory celebrations (e.g., dances, feasts, memorials); demobilization; resumption of normal life; reconstruction of war damage; etc. See also:

Commemorative statues and monuments 211
Cannibalism 266
Mutilation 304
War dances 535
Slavery 567
Colonial administration 636
Prisons 697
Mortuary practices 784

1: Pelzer ALl Southeast Asia ALl
166, 727

/For author's recommendations regarding post-World War II rehabilitation and reconstruction in Southeast Asia and particularly regarding future agricultural colonization schemes, see category 116, pp. 232-242./

7: Furnivall . G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

generous comments and criticisms, and also for allowing me to use his unpublished extracts from the records of early British rule in Arakan. 114

The book was written during the late war, and completed early in 1945. The delay in publication has been due partly to the difficulties of the present time, partly to imperfections in the original script; and in this connection I must gratefully acknowledge the help and patience of the University Press. During the interval there have been great changes but, as the Japanese invasion of the Tropical Far East must certainly mark a turning-point in colonial rule, and subsequent events are still too close to be reviewed in due perspective, it seemed expedient merely to revise the tense in references to the war. 000

One change however calls for comment. Britain has granted Burma independence. On both parts this may seem bold even to the point of rashness. Some contend that we have been too ready to throw off the responsibilities of Government and Burmans over-ready to assume them. It is a tumbled house that they inherit, and there is urgent need to repair the damage, moral and material, inflicted on Burma in a war during which it was twice invaded. Exports have fallen by two-thirds of the pre-war figure of £37 million. The annual revenue covers only one-third of the current expenditure, and the national debt of over £110 million, about seven times the revenue, is rapidly increasing. Despite the general inexperience of Burmans in modern industry and commerce, their new leaders must enable Burma, so far as national interest allows, to make a due contribution to world welfare by the development of its resources. Moreover, in a country where the tradition of military service has long been suffered to decay, they must train the people to defend their freedom. Now also it will fall on them to deal with problems long-standing and hitherto insoluble: to adapt western institutions to an eastern people, provide remedies for agricultural debt and land alienation, reduce litigation and crime to healthy proportions, restore order among the Buddhist clergy, and purify the administration of corruption. In a troubled world, though less acquainted with affairs than their old rulers, they face a situation far more difficult. In these circumstances it is impossible to contemplate the future without misgivings, and we may well regret that in the past more was not done to equip the people and their leaders for the responsibilities of independence. 727 642

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Some advocate Dominion status as an alternative.[1] But, for countries such as Burma, Dominion status is an unmeaning formula. The British Dominions are countries potentially able to stand alone but preferring to be associated on equal terms with the other major partners in the Commonwealth. Burma is not in that position. The racial divisions and sharp conflict of interest and sentiment, which weakened the former Government, would still continue and are incompatible with Dominion status. On the other hand, if the Burman leaders had accepted it, they would have split their party, strengthened their rivals, especially the so-called Communists, and conferred on the prevalent dacoity the halo of patriotism and the semblance of civil war. It is lamentable that we failed to capture the imagination of the people so as to inspire an instinctive loyalty to the British connection, but we cannot escape the consequences of the past. In purporting to grant Dominion status, we would have been promising something that we could not give in return for support that the leaders of the people were unable to command. Once again we would have been committed to the ungrateful task of pacification; more difficult now, and far more costly, than after the wars of 1852 and 1885 when we could employ Indian troops.

I hold then that on both parts the decision in favour of independence was as wise as it was bold, not only in their interest but in ours. Nothing less than independence could transform nationalism from a destructive fever into a creative force. Yet national independence is not a cause or guarantee of welfare. Burmans still need help, and by our long connection we can do most to give the help they need. But we can help them only on terms acceptable to both parties. If we can help Burmans to stand alone securely, we may perhaps look forward to a time when they will welcome a more intimate association. However that may be, we can at least feel that we have done our best to meet whatever difficulties lie ahead by responding boldly to the challenge of a new age.

J. S. FURNIVALL

24 *October* 1947

1 [i.e. to unqualified independence — Analyst.]

3

LABOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION

JAPAN'S TREATMENT of labor throughout Southeast Asia varied according to the military situation, the political relations of Japan with the individual country, and the availability of manpower. Everywhere, however, labor suffered from dislocations, regimentation, and general deterioration in working conditions except for the limited amount of technical training dispensed by the Japanese to create a needed nucleus of skilled workers. The information required to draw a complete picture of the labor situation during the war in each of the countries of this region is not yet available, but from such data as exist—drawn chiefly from former enemy sources—the outlines are reasonably clear. 727 466

By mid-1943 their military position in the Pacific War led the Japanese to alter their policy in Southeast Asia. Labor in the area had not previously been regimented on a nation-wide basis, although attempts to register the available manpower and use it for individual projects had been made as the need arose. But the critical shipping situation, which prevented both exports from Southeast Asia to Japan and imports needed in those countries, of necessity changed the objective of Japanese policy from one of economic exploitation for the benefit of the homeland to maintaining Japanese troops in the area and achieving local self-sufficiency and defense.

In June 1943 new labor measures were widely introduced; these foreshadowed large-scale forced labor and indicated that the Japanese realized that patriotic as well as economic and prestige incentives had to be offered to secure native cooperation. Soon after, the transplanting of laborers from the most populous areas to those requiring workers for defense projects and economic development was systematically undertaken. This policy prevailed until V-J Day at a tempo which kept pace with the worsening military situation of Japan. [166]

Japan's political aims were reflected in marked differences in policy in each of the countries of eastern Asia, and also toward separate groups within each state. The comparatively good treatment meted out to the Siamese derived from Japan's need, for propaganda purposes, to maintain the fiction of Siam's voluntary alliance in the Greater East Asia war. Being unwilling, for political reasons, to coerce masses of Siamese workers, and for economic reasons to rely on their small, unskilled and re- 727 167 464

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727 167 464 luctant services, the Japanese imported prisoners of war and Javanese laborers for the construction of the Burma and Kra Isthmus railroads. Even after the pro-Japanese dictator, Pibul Songgram, had been ousted by a resistance government, the Japanese tolerated the change so long as they retained military and economic control over the country.

127 [464] 466 Malaya, on the other hand, received the least favored treatment. The only country in the area to which the Japanese did not promise "independence," it was earmarked as a Japanese colony. The Japanese were faced with a small, foreign labor supply whose special skills were adapted almost exclusively to the tin and rubber industries. Since they could utilize only a small proportion of the country's major produce, there occurred tremendous dislocation and unemployment of labor. The Chinese, as the largest, most skilled, and most hostile group, were subjected successively to brutal treatment, registration and regimentation, and transportation to farming colonies on the peninsula. The Indians were similarly organized along racial lines through the Japanese-sponsored Indian Independence Leagues and the Indian National Army. The Malays escaped the more rigorous forms of coercion because of their negligible importance as a source of labor.

[167] Despite the tight network of organization developed by the Japanese, Malaya's labor problem was never satisfactorily solved; guerilla ranks were strengthened by recalcitrants of all races and eventually the occupying forces had to import Japanese and Javanese workers in order to strengthen the defenses of that vitally strategic area.

127 466 Indochina, thanks to the survival of the French administration until the Japanese coup of March 1945, was treated only slightly less favorably than Siam. The Japanese found there a more abundant labor supply than in immediately neighboring countries but were hampered by the necessity of working indirectly through French officials, by the concentration of labor in the north, and its antipathy to furthering Japan's war aims. As in Malaya, the inadequacy and indifference of the local labor supply compelled the Japanese to import a few thousand Chinese and Malay coolies as well as some Japanese technicians and supervisors. A certain number of local laborers were conscripted to work on defense and industrial projects and an undetermined number of Tonkinese were transported to work on plantations in the south. Unemployment seems not to have become a major factor, although as the war progressed there was a marked shift of agricultural workers to the cities, only partially offset by the evacuation of some laborers from heavily bombed urban areas. In common with the other laborers of Southeast Asia, Indochinese workers suffered from coercion and inflation but apparently not from nation-wide regimentation or transportation to work outside their own country.

[167] [166] [464]

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Indians

Next to the Javanese, the Burmese endured the greatest hardships during the Japanese occupation. Burma was more completely devastated by military campaigns than any other country in the area, and its proximity to India made it Japan's frontier zone. The need to win Burmese cooperation led Japan to grant Burma "independence" on August 1, 1943, and thereafter the local intelligentsia were placated by a Burmanization of the administrative services. But the country's laborers were in a far worse plight than they had been under the British administration. The Indians, whose number in Burma had been halved during the 1942 campaign, were immediately thereafter exposed to persecution by the Burmese. Virtual pogrom conditions in the delta compelled them to flee to Rangoon for Japanese protection and employment. Indian coolies supplied the casual labor needed in the nation's capital, and most of the white-collar class was absorbed into the Indian Independence Leagues and Indian National Army. Burmese laborers, who had long agitated for a restriction of Indian immigration, now found themselves bearing the brunt of Japanese requisitioning, which was represented by the puppet native government as a patriotic service. They had to perform heavy manual labor far from home, for low wages, and under alien and often harsh supervision. They suffered, in addition, from the knowledge that their own fields were neglected and their homes unprotected. Burma was frequently praised by the Japanese for having supplied more cooperative labor service than any other area in the southern regions, but nevertheless Javanese workers had to be brought in. 727 563 [464] [466]

Java, with the greatest labor reservoir of the area, was inevitably the country whose manpower was most intensively exploited by the Japanese. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Javanese served as coolie labor for the construction of defense works and means of communication and also were trained by the Japanese for more technical work in shipyards and in factories. They were shipped by the thousands to areas outside their island as local needs and the exigencies of the military situation dictated. 727 466 167

Originally the Japanese planned to perpetuate, on a far vaster scale, Dutch colonization schemes in Sumatra; in this they not only encountered the same obstacles as had their predecessors, but they found they could exploit all of the island's resources they could use with the manpower and machinery locally available. In mid-1943 they seem to have transferred the plan to Borneo, where additional labor was required to develop such local industries as timber. Many hundreds of male Javanese workers were shipped to Borneo, while smaller groups were sent to other areas. 727 464 166

Unemployment during the Japanese occupation was serious only in Malaya. Elsewhere the defense and economic programs of the Japanese, 727 464

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727 together with the curtailment of alien Asiatic immigration, afforded
464 plenty of jobs for those who were willing, or were forced, to work for wages paid in inflated currency.

In the food-surplus countries—Burma, Siam, and Indochina—which
727 were also those receiving the most favored political treatment at the hands of the Japanese, the areas under rice and allied crops declined.
433 The decrease in the number of draft animals through disease and Japa-
464 nese requisitioning; the lack of implements; and, above all, the loss of former export markets caused the local farmers to cultivate very little more than their families required, and there was a marked exodus from the agricultural communities to the cities or places of more remunerative employment. In the countries of food deficiency—Malaya and the Outer Islands of the East Indies—the Japanese made great efforts and probably succeeded in increasing the area under food-crop cultivation, but never to the point of self-sufficiency. The Japanese also arbitrarily prohibited certain industries as "nonessential" and shifted the workers to others accordingly.

727 Very little information is available as to the wages paid during the Japanese occupation. Where local labor was limited and native good-
465 will was sought, as in Siam, the Japanese seem to have paid high wages from the outset. In densely populated areas like Java, wages were reportedly decreased immediately after the occupation. In time, and with the ever greater need for additional labor services, the Japanese permitted successive wage rises. But nowhere did wage increases keep pace with the more rapidly rising cost of living and they had to be supplemented by allowances, medals, and words of praise. The groups that suffered most from this disparity were the Asiatic government-servant and white-collar class, whose numbers had always exceeded the demand and whose services were far less necessary to the Japanese than was manual labor.

727 Labor legislation was passed only in negative measures of regimentation and outlawing of strikes. Nevertheless, reports of strikes periodi-
466 cally filtered through the barrage of Japanese propaganda, particularly a few that took place in Indochina and Burma. Most of them registered
468 grievances against low pay, high living costs, and heavy taxation, but some were doubtless of a political character—difficult to distinguish from sabotage. Following one strike in 1943, the Cochin-China police arrested a number of "communists." In Malaya and Indonesia, control by the Japanese military and naval forces was not exercised through any native administration, and the strictness of their rule seems to have precluded any possible recourse to the strike weapon.

727 In Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia the Japanese set up a bewildering array of organizations into which the local peoples were regimented by
466 communal, occupational, religious, sex, and age groups. Not only did

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many of these organizations overlap but they were assigned multiple and often identical tasks and all were subjected to Japanese "spiritual" indoctrination. Most of their members had to undergo military training and perform labor services, ranging from accompanying the Japanese army to look after supplies to washing clothes for Nipponese officers. Most of the forced labor, however, was required for the construction of defense works and communications. Some of those performing such services—lured into "volunteering" by the promise of uniforms, additional food, and the same treatment as was accorded to Japanese soldiers—were organized into picturesquely named *Heihos* and Sweat Army battalions. While these militarized groups probably suffered more than any others, the bulk of Southeast Asia's population, wherever they were, performed hard labor for the Japanese during a large part of the occupation period.

Had Japan's gamble in far-flung imperialism not been undertaken at so rapid a tempo, and against such overwhelming forces, the occupying authorities might have evolved some means of winning over the peoples of Southeast Asia before resorting to the harsh and unlimited exploitation they did. For where the Japanese seemed sincere in their encouragement of nationalist aspirations, as for a time they appeared to be in Burma, the people were far more cooperative than they were in such areas as Malaya, which from the outset were scheduled to become colonies of Japan.

The chief victims of the Japanese were undoubtedly those who were transplanted to work in foreign lands, most of whom will never return to relate their sufferings or to keep alive hatred of the Japanese. However, the people as a whole suffered in common from the same hardships and the same demands on their services and it cannot be concluded that laborers as a class developed any special consciousness as a result of their war experience. Their hours of work were probably longer, their pay less adequate to their needs and their masters more demanding than the Occidentals whom the invasion had displaced, but their grievances and aspirations had probably come to be identified with those of their compatriots and their status as laborers was neither more nor less advanced than before the war.

4

POSTWAR LABOR DEVELOPMENTS

SINCE THE JAPANESE SURRENDER, labor movements throughout Southeast Asia have made significant advances in organization, solidarity, and political self-consciousness. Their progress varies from country to coun-

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SUPPLEMENT

NOTES ON LABOR DEVELOPMENTS IN 1946–47

121 A JOURNEY UNDERTAKEN by the author between December 1946 and June 1947 to some of the principal cities of Southeast Asia had for one of its objects the collection of information on the latest developments in the region's labor conditions and labor movements. Although it proved not yet possible to secure detailed statistical data on employment, wages, and other indices for the postwar period, this investigation helped to confirm the existence of certain trends previously observed and to open up, in a few instances, new vistas of a vigorous pursuit of progress, either on the part of a government or on that of organized labor.

467 727 On the whole, the period was found to be one of great uneasiness. There was throughout the region a sense of insecurity because of the distorted structure of its major export industries. There was a sense of insecurity also in circles which, unable to accept the radical change in political and economic power that had come over large parts of the world, feared any movement which might tend to increase the political orientation of organized labor. On the other hand, there was also the natural hesitation of those seriously devoted to the promotion of progressive and liberalizing labor legislation to promote or enact measures which, with the present disturbance of social relations, it might prove difficult to enforce. Organized labor itself reflected the cleavage, to be found at this time also in industrially more advanced parts of the world, between a leadership satisfied to do the best it could within the technical limits of traditional trade union practices and one primarily thinking in political terms and desiring the most rapid possible assimilation of the local labor forces to the revolutionary international labor movement.

121 Only a few illustrations can here be given of these various tendencies as the author observed them or heard of them from authoritative spokesmen for government, labor, and professional management. These notes are offered as carrying a little further into the uncertain future the picture presented in the major part of this book. They sketch a passing phase in one of the most dramatic developments of our time: the effort of an important section of the world's workers to raise their status from an age-old level of oppression and neglect to one of worthwhile human existence.

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

FIG. 113.—Historic Pattern of Southeast Asia during Indian Colonial Period

implements had not in any case developed far enough to deal with 174
stone. Hence monumental evidence in Southeast Asia is so largely 177
Indian, an introduction by foreigners using styles and techniques 211
developed in their home settings, and most developed in the drier
parts of this region, where stone is more accessible. On the clay 175
lands, historic brick structures, also an Indian innovation, weather
to nothing very quickly. At Angkor may be seen the power of
quick-growing tropical trees to shatter and break down temples and
palaces built of stone and lateritic blocks.

This, too, is a region of natural calamities, difficult though it is [731]
to pin-point them. Little kingdoms have been wiped out in a few
hours by Javanese volcanoes, as in A.D. 1006 when the flourishing 133
city of Dharmavamsa (a great king of Central Java) was reduced to 175
ashes by "a great calamity," probably an explosion and lava out-
flow of the Merapi volcano. Settlements along rivers have been
obliterated when huge mud-flows swept down from loose ashes on
the flanks of new eruptions, possibly accounting for our ignorance
of east Sumatran kingdoms. Coasts have altered through the years

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FIG. 7.—The Borneo Bank and the Great Sunda Barrier Reef on the East of the Sunda Platform

similar extensive developments on the western side of the continental shelf are prevented by slight upwellings of water produced behind offshore currents.

Within the 'mediterranean seas', the occurrences of coral are less extensive at any one point but they show much greater variety of form. Atolls, barriers and reefcaps at varying levels above, below and inclined to present sea levels and in varying degrees of symmetry to existing islands, may be found in this zone where there has been steady and repeated displacement of the geanticlines which form the chains of islands.

Several theories have been devised to account for the formation of coral. All of them start from the environmental requirements of the live polyp, which is eulittoral, and go on to account for the shape and extent of the accumulations of skeletons by some change of water level. In the Southeast Asia seas may be found examples to support those coral formation theories stressing sea level or eustatic change, a dominant process on the Sunda Platform, and also examples of corals associated with secular changes of the earth's crust, the chief physical factor operating among islands of the 'mediterranean seas' and the basis of theories attributing coral formations to submarine tectonic changes.

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657 detriment of local interests as in teaching India and Japan how to grow sugar. In all parts of the tropics, in Asia as well as in Africa, the more
652 enlightened employers provide good quarters, medical attention and schools, and make their employees comply with modern sanitary requirements; such amenities make production more efficient and profitable. Employers will provide such services as they deem profitable, and on humanitarian grounds may carry this principle to the farthest limit or possibly beyond, but they are not disinclined to be relieved of the expense by the Government or private charity.

741 Private charity, indeed, together with the voluntary contributions and exertions of the inhabitants, seems to bear most of the cost of social service in the tropics. The assistance rendered by missionary organizations to educational and medical services is a matter of common knowledge. We have already noticed their large part in the provision of hospitals and schools. From the accounts of one mission in Uganda it appears that the public revenue furnished only £22,420—less than one-third of its charges—while the natives contributed £13,333 in gifts and £17,667 in school fees, and a grant from Europe provided £17,987.[1] This suggests that educational progress should be ascribed to Christianity rather than to western capital. If the encouragement of western enterprise is necessary to provide funds for economic and social services, one would expect the greatest progress in education where western enterprise penetrates most deeply. This is notoriously contradicted by the facts. As we have seen, during the nineteenth century education made far more rapid progress in Burma with development by native enterprise than in Java with development by western enterprise. Experience in Africa corroborates this view. The total expenditure of Government may be taken as an index to economic progress, and the expenditure on the education of non-natives is an index to the degree of western penetration. Such figures as are available under these heads suggest that the percentage of expenditure on native education is lowest where western enterprise is most conspicuous.[2]

Other facts point in the same direction. The first comprehensive enquiry into African education was financed by the Phelps-Stokes Fund in America, and American funds contributed largely to the foundation of the Jeanes schools that were established as one result of the enquiry. The monumental *African Survey*, conducted by Lord

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1306.
[2] *Ib.* p. 1309, and Table XI.

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Hailey, was rendered possible by the munificence of the Carnegie Trust. A substantial contribution towards the cost of a new Burmese dictionary has been made by the Leverhulme Trust. Even so wealthy a dependency as Malaya looked to the Rockefeller Foundation to provide funds for a campaign against hookworm, and to the same generosity it owes two chairs in its Medical School. The Leverhulme Trust makes grants to study economic conditions in Africa, and the Burma Oil Company provided the buildings for an Engineering School in Burma.[1] The two last instances should perhaps be classed with the expenditure incurred by intelligent employers with a view to conducting their affairs more efficiently and profitably.

It appears, then, that doles out of general revenue or by private charity relieve western enterprise of charges that it would otherwise have to incur on amenities in the interest of efficiency and profits, and go to promote economic progress rather than native welfare. In the preceding chapters we have seen that economic and social services, though an important factor in economic progress, do little to enhance welfare, except so far as it is necessary to economic progress. Now it appears that the contribution to public revenue by western enterprise is barely sufficient, and often insufficient, even to cover the additional administrative charges that it involves, and that the public revenue provides only a part, apparently a minor part, of the cost of social services. It is difficult to reconcile these facts with the theory that the provision of funds for greater welfare necessitates the encouragement of western enterprise.

It is equally difficult to reconcile this theory with the state of affairs in dependencies so prosperous as Java, Burma and Malaya. Java, under indirect rule, has been developed by western enterprise employing local labour. During thirty years of Liberal rule, with a rapid expansion of western enterprise, not only did the growing population 'gobble up the greater yield', but there was an actual fall in wages, nominal and real. Again, after another thirty years, with a constructive welfare policy based on ethical principles, and purporting to encourage economic development with a view to enhancing native welfare, economists are unable to assure us that the people are better off. Dr Boeke, whom we have already quoted, returns to the subject in his latest publication. With reference to irrigation, colonization, the clearing of fresh land, the increase of secondary crops and home-grown

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 1228, 1252; Mills, pp. 310, 316; Mayhew, *Colonial Empire*, pp. 120ff.; *Colonial Review*, Sept. 1944, p. 194.

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758 attracting listeners. Where, as under direct rule, the people want education in order to get jobs, missionaries have provided schools.
797 Where, as under indirect rule, education has had less market value, they have provided hospitals. Missionaries have sought patients in the cause of welfare, hoping that by saving life they might rescue souls. Moreover the demand for patients has not been wholly altruistic. On western enterprise employers have come to recognize the economic value of providing medical attention for their labourers, in the hope that by improving health they might save labour. In Java under the Culture system the Government produce depended on the well-being of the plantation coolies and, in the forties, when the pressure on the labour supply led to famine and depopulation, it could no longer be disregarded. Thus, so early as 1851, a start was made in the training of natives in western medicine. In the same year Protestant missionaries were admitted. In Burma, developed by native enterprise under direct rule, missionaries have specialized in education, but in Java, developed by western enterprise under indirect rule, medical work presented a more favourable opening.

It is true, of course, that medical missions have looked on the provision of medical care as a good thing in itself, apart from ulterior motives, and that administrations and employers have been actuated by human sentiment in providing and extending medical facilities. Ordinarily the chief factor in stimulating humanitarian impulse has been the shock occasioned by a sensational outbreak of disease. In Siam the modern medical service dates from an epidemic of cholera in the early eighties; the ravages of sleeping sickness in 1901–2 focussed British attention on Uganda; shortly afterwards the outbreak of plague advertized the need for medical care in India and the Tropical Far East. But humanitarian considerations have been reinforced by the practical requirements of western enterprise, and it is
758 in regions developed by western enterprise that medical work has made most progress. Of the hospitals in Java, other than dispen-
743 saries, about two-thirds are private institutions, and in the Outer Provinces nine-tenths.[1] In Malaya, before the late war, the tin and rubber companies were maintaining 232 hospitals. In Ceylon about three times as many were provided by companies managing estates, and there were about an equal number of Government dispensaries together with 93 State hospitals.[2] But Asiatic owners and

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 380.
[2] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, pp. 29, 30.

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managers often have little faith in western medicine and are reluctant to incur expenditure that they think of doubtful value, and Europeans, to protect their own interests, demand legislation to bring such estates up to their own levels.[1] On the other hand, some regions, where western enterprise is backward or unprofitable, are very scantily supplied with hospitals.

743 758

In these circumstances, though policy may be inspired by humanitarian zeal for human welfare, the spread of western medicine is dominated in practice by economic factors. The Government must provide first for its European staff and for natives in its own service, civil or military, for convicts in jail and for the requirements of criminal administration, and for Europeans engaged in economic development. Efficiency and the numerous other demands on public revenue require that such services should be rendered at as little cost as possible. Often, as in Burma and in parts of Africa, the easiest and cheapest way is to import foreign medical subordinates and menials.[2] These conditions tend to stress the importance of hospital discipline rather than to encourage human sympathy; as Lord Hailey remarks, 'It must need a great deal of skill and personal sympathy on the part of the European staff to overcome the impression left on the African by the discipline and isolation from friends which is the rule in many of the British hospitals.' We have noticed that in Burma the people regard the hospitals 'with fear and mistrust'. In Malaya the cult of efficiency and economy has led to the building of large central hospitals to which patients can easily be brought by ambulance, but where they are cut off from their friends. Similarly in Africa much money has been spent on imposing buildings that alarm rather than attract the people.[3] Even in England hospital discipline is often irksome, but the patient accepts it as necessary; to tropical peoples the need for discipline is less apparent, and it is exercised more rigorously. A tradition of human sympathy is characteristic of the healing art in Europe and also in great measure among native medical practitioners,[4] and a good bedside manner is a valuable asset to the private practitioner, whether of modern western or traditional native medicine. But kindliness is less important to native medical subordinates who regard medicine as one branch, and not the most highly esteemed or best-paid branch, of Government service, and it is easier to teach them

[1] Mills, p. 309. [2] *African Survey*, p. 1183.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 1195–6; Mills, p. 308; *CBC*, p. 33.
[4] Landon, p. 115.

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758 743 things required for their examinations than to inspire them with professional traditions.

758 Medical science, then, serves to further economic progress rather than to promote native welfare. Economy forbids that Government shall spend more on medical assistance than will meet the demand at the least expense, and the demand is limited even more closely by economic factors. Employers who recognize that sickness involves a costly waste of labour can provide medical assistance,[1] and can insist as a condition of employment that their employees shall accept it. Personal interest in the well-being of their staff often induces them to press this doctrine to its farthest limits, but they must submit to the test of annual accounts to shareholders, and they cannot sacrifice efficiency to welfare without risking the loss of business to their competitors. Although missionaries can take more altruistic views, they find most scope for their activities in providing Government and western enterprise with medical facilities for their employees, and Christianity is enlisted in the cause of commerce.

It is not the case, therefore, that economic development is necessary as a condition of providing funds for medical services to the people, but medical services are necessary as a condition of economic development. The progress of medical science *as an instrument of welfare* depends on the organization of a demand for it among the people. 757 How far tropical peoples voluntarily avail themselves of western medical assistance is uncertain; in Burma, as in Africa, they are readier to believe in western surgery which shows results than in western medicine of which the results are slower and less obvious. In general, western medical science has found little favour.[2] Burmans, we are told, 'don't care for English medicine'. In Siam western medicine has been encouraged since 1880, by their own King and not by foreign rulers, but 'in 1939 the old style doctor was still the one to whom the people ordinarily turn in times of sickness'. In Java, where natives have been trained to practise western medicine for nearly a hundred years, the people still have greater confidence in their own system, and in the general hospitals 40 % of the beds are empty because the people do not realize the benefits of western medicine.

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1194.

[2] *CISM*, pp. 1, 22; Leeuw, H. de, *Cross Roads of the Java Sea* (1931), p. 109. Fischer, Dr I. A., *Bulletin*, Colonial Institute, Amsterdam, 1939, p. 24; Landon, p. 114; *Rural Hygiene in Indo-China* (1937), pp. 11, 50.

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157 This hinders the progress of medical science and therefore hinders economic progress. To popularize western medicine 'it is not enough to multiply facilities (however good in themselves) for the treatment of such as apply for relief'.[1] In homogeneous western societies the improvement of medical facilities is a problem of supply; the demand for better medical care is almost unlimited, and the extension of medical relief depends upon the provision of larger funds and a better organization for meeting the demand. But in the plural society of the tropics the problem is one of demand; it is a waste of money to provide medical assistance for which there is no demand. Apart from compulsion, it is first necessary to organize the demand. That is a difficult matter. The appreciation of western medicine, as of co-operative principles, must ordinarily spread slowly, but disease, like debt, spreads daily. The machinery of co-operative credit without the spirit has proved useless or worse than useless, but the machinery of medical attention may seem to offer more scope for compulsion. Tropical diseases are a mass affliction, and their rapid elimination is necessary both to native welfare and to economic progress. Hence it is argued that the treatment 'to be effective must partake to some extent the character of an operation, scientifically planned and humanly conducted, but military in its spirit and in the thoroughness with which it establishes itself in the area which it has occupied'. Thus the provision of medical assistance tends to be transformed from the promotion of *individual* welfare, requiring voluntary co-operation, into the promotion of *social* welfare by compulsion, the method which is characteristic of hygiene.

3. Hygiene

794 Even in Europe it was only during the last half of the nineteenth century that men came to regard the state as responsible for public health and for the prevention of disease, and a growing volume of welfare legislation marked the earlier stages of the transition from a policy of *laissez-faire* to one of efficiency and social justice. The new trend of opinion naturally reacted on colonial policy. In India, although the growth of towns consequent on the development of trade had long compelled attention to conservancy, sanitation was not treated seriously until 1863, when a Royal Commission showed that the insanitary condition of urban areas was intimately connected with ill-

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 1115, 1196; *Social Policy in Dependent Territories* (1944), p. 6.

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health in the army.[1] Even then the action taken was not every effective, and in rural areas practically nothing was attempted. In Netherlands India the Dutch, with their tradition of civic cleanliness, had been more active from very early days, and the first police regulations, framed for Sourabaya in 1829, required every one to tidy up his compound daily, and twice a day if along a public road. Van den Bosch extended these rules over the whole of Java, and it has been stated that a regular health service existed from the middle of the century.[2] The cleanliness of the villages in Java, as compared with the tropics generally, has often attracted favourable comment from visitors. But under Dutch rule, as elsewhere in the tropics, it is only during the present century that the care for public health has been placed on a scientific basis. Naturally it was in the larger towns with a considerable European population that the new concern for hygiene first took effect. The outbreak of plague in India and the Tropical Far East stimulated greater activity, though for the most part this did not extend beyond the towns. Gradually with the growth of western enterprise a new factor intervened, for the mines and plantations were situated in the interior, and attracted attention to the need for improving rural hygiene.

In Burma the epidemic of plague was the immediate occasion for the appointment of a Sanitary Commissioner and the creation of a Public Health Department, but, as in Java and Africa, the earlier measures to prevent plague tended on the contrary to spread infection. In Burma western enterprise is comparatively insignificant, and the activities of the Department have not been extended to the villages. In Malaya, however, where western enterprise dominates economic life, the public health service made greater progress, and, for various reasons, the course of affairs in Malaya is especially instructive. The Straits Settlements have been business centres for over a hundred years and suffered from the former disregard of public health, so that in Singapore 'immense sums have had to be spent to undo the damage caused by the *laissez-faire* policy of the nineteenth century'.[3] But the Malay States remained almost untouched by western enterprise during the nineteenth century:

'Their economic development and rapid increase of population roughly coincided with the growing realization of the necessity for public health measures. About the same time came the series of discoveries of the cause

[1] *IG*, iv, 286, 467.
[2] Hydrick, p. 7
[3] Mills, p. 298.

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744 and prevention of tropical disease which revolutionized or rather created the science of tropical medicine. The Malay States were able to take advantage of this situation without having first to spend large sums in remedying the effects of previous indifference. Tin, and later, rubber provided revenue on a scale which many older colonies lacked; and the administration was generous and far-sighted in its expenditure.'[1]

Moreover, in comparison with many tropical dependencies, the area of the Malay States is small, and the population, though not dense, is mainly concentrated in certain areas, and therefore the people as a whole are readily accessible. The local Sultans are men educated on modern lines, who can appreciate western medicine and can use their influence to recommend it to their people. Probably there is no region in the tropics where conditions are so favourable to the improvement of public health as in the Malay States.

744 164

As we have noticed, the rural population is said formerly to have enjoyed general good health. Tuberculosis was almost unknown until fostered by the congestion in the towns consequent on economic development. Similarly venereal diseases have multiplied with the mass importation of male coolies. The rice plains, in which most of the people lived and worked, 'were practically free from malaria'.[2] But when mines and rubber land were opened up to western enterprise, malaria was a formidable obstacle. Klang, the station at the coastal end of the railway to the mines, was very malarious, and the adjacent shipping centre, Port Swettenham, was so deadly that the Government directed its abandonment. But campaigns against malaria proved successful at both these places, and were extended to other towns.[3] At that time rubber plantations were being laid out, and malaria took a heavy toll among both Europeans and coolies, 'as high as one-fifth of the labour force'. Measures for the prevention of malaria were accordingly extended from the towns to rural areas. In 1910 a separate Health Branch of the Medical Departments was established to supervise anti-malarial and other health work in the interior, but its operations were hindered by the lack of adequate control over labour conditions. In 1912 accordingly the numerous separate ordinances for different classes of immigrants were consolidated in a Labour Code, which has since then regulated the conditions of labour on the plantations and mines. 'In earlier years some managers opposed the "interference" of the Health Branch, and failed to realize the

[1] Mills, p. 298.
[2] *Ib.* p. 301.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 299ff., 328.

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economic value of maintaining their labourers in good health.' The opposition, however, had some justification, as the measures that had proved efficacious in preventing malaria in the towns, had a contrary effect on the plantations, and 'resulted merely in heavy expenditure and increased mortality'. Patient research discovered and removed the defects, and by 1935 the protection against malaria was as complete on the larger estates as in the towns.[1] Another disease that has received special attention is hookworm. This is generally prevalent, and a special element of contagion exists in the Indian estate labourers, among whom a high percentage are infected, despite the treatment given to immigrants at the quarantine stations. It is not serious in itself, but it causes physical and mental fatigue, and consequently reduces the efficiency of labour. Strict provisions in the Labour Code regulated sanitary conditions on the plantations, but they were sometimes disregarded, especially on Indian properties. A campaign against the disease from 1926 to 1929, partly financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, effected a temporary improvement, but probably its chief permanent value was to direct renewed attention to the importance of rural sanitation. The Government decided accordingly to enlarge the health service, to enforce the Labour Code more strictly on estates, to provide sanitary latrines in rural schools and other Government buildings, and to persuade the villagers to build latrines and wear shoes.[2]

The beneficent activities of the public health service have gained the confidence of European employers, who now recognize its value in improving the health and enhancing the efficiency of their employees, and many provide hospitals and other amenities in excess of official requirements. But 'many Asiatic-owned plantations frequently evade the regulations, and have to be closely supervised by the Health Branch. They are a menace to their neighbours who have obeyed the regulations'. Yet the chief difficulty has been among the villagers, who 'are the worst offenders against the anti-malarial and other health measures and require constant supervision'.[3] They can be compelled or encouraged to build latrines, but, as has been found also in Java and Ceylon, they cannot be compelled to use them. In the towns shoes are a sign of higher social status, and every one wears them who can afford the money, but Government pressure has met with little success in inducing the villagers to wear shoes, which

[1] Mills, pp. 225, 234, 299, 300.
[2] *Ib.* 234, 316, 17.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 234, 316–17; *Netherlands India*, p. 363.

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744 indeed are hardly suited to the cultivation of rice in mud and water. Much of the expenditure incurred in improving conditions on western enterprise is wasted if the adjacent villages continue to be sources of infection. But 'the Health Branch has to contend against the dead weight of a naturally indifferent and insanitary population' that, perversely, enjoyed 'general good health' without their attentions. Constant inspection is costly, and penalties are apt to raise the pitch of corruption rather than the standard of health. Even in a wealthy dependency with conditions so generally favourable as in Malaya, it has not been possible to do much towards improving the health of the ordinary villager.[1]

744 165 Yet one finds Malaya cited as 'one instance where the whole population benefited from medical and health organization assisted by economic development',[2] and it may be well to examine the evidence more closely. According to the Census Report on Malaya for 1931 the death-rate for Malaysians was 22·4 per 1000, for Chinese 24·3 and for Indians 29·8.[3] Since Malaysians receive least attention from the health service, it would seem that its activities play a minor part in reducing the bills of mortality. In Burma for the same year the provincial death-rate was returned as 17·36 and for rural areas, where western medicine and hygiene are practically inoperative, the death-rate, according to the official returns, was only 15·87.[4] But in Burma the apparently low death-rate was explained as due in part to 'slackness in registration', and this probably holds true also of Malaysians. It has been claimed that, in Malaya, 'the fall in infantile mortality is one of the best indications of what has been accomplished'.[5] Of recent years there has indeed been a marked downward trend in the figures, and this has coincided with greater activity in welfare work. In the Federated Malay States, the recorded death-rate for infants under twelve months fell from 218 per 1000 births in 1917 to 147 in 1937, and in the Straits Settlements during the same period it fell from 267 per 1000 to 156. But the first result of greater attention to vital statistics is an improvement in registration, and 'there is unfortunately no doubt that, even in such an area as Singapore Municipality, registration of births has up to quite recent years been very far from complete, and that even to-day it leaves a good deal to be desired'. The failure in registration in Singapore was estimated

[1] Mills, pp. 314–16, 320. [2] *Social Policy in Dependent Territories* (1944), p. 6.
[3] Malaya Census, 1931, p. 10.
[4] *RAB*, 1931–2, p. 130. [5] Mills, p. 328.

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at 10 % in 1931, over 20 % in 1921 and over 35 % in 1911; yet 'the relevant statistics for Singapore are probably the best available'.[1] Death registration, however, is far more complete than birth registration, and it is certain that no inconsiderable part of the apparent decline of infantile mortality must be ascribed to the more accurate registration of births rather than to the attention to child welfare. Here, again, the figures for Burma are suggestive. In 1931 child welfare work did not extend beyond the towns, but the infantile mortality rate in rural areas was returned as 178 per 1000, whereas the corresponding figure for urban areas was 277. These figures may not prove that most children die where they receive most attention, but they do at least suggest a need for caution in accepting the figures for infantile mortality in Malaya as proof of the benefits accruing from the health service. If those figures are 'the best indication of what has been accomplished', it is unsound, in the face of evidence to the contrary, to conclude that the whole population has benefited.

In Malaya attention was directed to public health by the needs of private enterprise, and by the spread of disease as a result of economic development. European employers often go beyond the official minimum, and expenditure on the enforcement of regulations, as distinct from the provision of amenities, is chiefly incurred on western enterprises managed by non-Europeans, who cannot afford to comply with them or do not believe in them. Experience shows that the problem of improving the standard of health and the efficiency of labour on mines and plantations is ultimately linked up with the improvement of health among the people in general. But an improvement in the general standard of health among the people would seem to require that they shall comply with regulations in which they have no faith, and voluntarily accept rules which they are unable to obey and which the government is equally unable to enforce. In Singapore, as in Rangoon, conditions preclude the enforcement of the housing by-laws.[2] Where ill-health is the direct result of economic circumstances, the remedy lies not in legislation but in changing the environment. To most reforms, however, the chief obstacle is apathy. Without a change of attitude, expenditure on a health service as an instrument of welfare, or even as an instrument of economic progress, is largely wasted; given a change of attitude, most of the urgent reforms could be effected without spending large sums on a public health service, because common sense is sufficient to recommend

[1] Malaya Census, 1931, pp. 106, 108.

[2] Mills, p. 321 n.

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them. Where improvements call for more than common sense, experts insufficiently acquainted with tropical hygiene as applied to local conditions are apt to make mistakes, as in the first attempts to prevent malaria in rural areas and to combat plague, and such failures tend to confirm people in their apathy.

Although Malaya has features of special interest, experience in Asia generally points to similar conclusions, and so it does likewise in Africa. The growth of modern views in Europe on the relation between environment and disease, and on the responsibility of the State for public health, 'coincided with the very general recognition that measures which lead to an improvement in health and an increase in population are likely to have a direct influence on African economics'.[1] The larger industrial concerns have in some areas anticipated recognition by the administrations of the need for extending public health measures. 'They have realized that, low paid as the African may be, an ailing and inefficient employee is expensive and wasteful.' 'Experience has shown that efficiency is closely linked with health conditions, and the more important organizations have now adopted, with satisfactory results, the practice of giving a period of "acclimatization" by medical treatment and dieting before the recruit begins active work.' This expenditure could be avoided if the people in general enjoyed better health. Moreover, owing to the generally low standard of health, labour was not only inefficient but deficient. Attention has frequently been drawn to 'the wastage of labour due to ill-health', and a recent committee in Tanganyika suggested that 'with the elimination of waste there is ample man-power for the needs of the territory, both for wage-earning and in the growing of economic crops'.[2] But in most regions much of the labour comes from a long distance, and a solution for the problem of making it more efficient 'lies not merely in attention to the health conditions of employed labour, but in intensive medical work and the promotion of improved standards of subsistence cultivation in the areas from which labour is drawn'. 'In some areas concentration on economic exploitation has resulted in enormous labour migrations which have not only drained the native reserves of the menfolk, needed for subsistence agriculture and a balanced life, but at the other end have brought into existence a dingy, discontented, "atomized" black proletariat which, on any standard of ultimate human values, represents a regression from traditional tribal standards.'[3] In Africa as in Asia, unregulated

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 697, 1194. [2] *Ib.* pp. 693, 697. [3] Huxley, p. 121.

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economic development tends to spread disease and foster ill-health; the more enlightened employers recognize the need for measures to improve the health of their labourers, and support the Government in taking steps to enforce similar measures on other employers; and attempts to raise the standard of health on western enterprise bring to light the need to raise the standard of health among the great mass of the people.

One aspect of this problem is nutrition. It is now recognized that in lands developed by native enterprise, cultivation for export tends to grow at the expense of cultivation for food, and it seems that during recent years, even where food grains constitute the staple export, less has been available for local consumption.[1] Moreover, the expansion of cultivation deprives the people of spontaneous products of the waste, formerly used to supplement their diet. Naturally problems of nutrition engage most attention where the profits of western enterprise are closely linked with the supply of food. We have noticed that in Malaya the loss to the Government and employers occasioned by the shortage of rice after the war of 1914 led to renewed insistence on the compulsory cultivation of rice. Especially in Africa the inefficiency of native labour is regarded as largely due to inadequate or unsuitable diet, and so 'nutritional problems are now much in the minds of administrations: whether the African eats enough food and, if he does, whether it is the right kind, and whether the attack on nutrition may not be the most important factor in reducing disease'. In the past Africans have adopted new kinds of food, but whether they will be so willing to accept the advice of dieticians would seem doubtful. In Malaya where the polished rice that has recently gained favour is regarded as a cause of beri-beri, attempts to induce the people to revert to roughly husked rice appear to have had little more success than the propaganda for standard bread in England, and it is unlikely that the African will be more responsive. It is unlikely also that the African will be able to afford more nutritious food, if it is more costly; normally, as we have noticed, in the process of economic development, cheap food drives out good food. Moreover, dietetics is a new science, and 'some African tribes seem to maintain physical fitness on food which is, according to nutritionists, wanting in certain constituents essential to health'.[2] Caution would seem necessary, therefore, in introducing innovations, and in any case no one can force the people to eat proper food.

[1] Wickizer and Bennett, p. 188. [2] *African Survey*, pp. 1122, 1194.

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Yet in this matter, as in others, one may notice a growing tendency to use compulsion as a means of promoting welfare. Welfare is an attribute of social life and, for the common welfare, men living in society must accept restrictions on individual freedom. In tropical society they accept such restrictions in the name of custom, but welcome their removal under a policy of *laissez-faire*, allowing them at least the illusion of freedom. Welfare measures limit freedom. Men who value the common good voluntarily accept measures which they think likely to promote it. But in tropical dependencies, economic forces disintegrate society and foster a disregard for social welfare, while the people do not understand the measures that, rightly or wrongly, are expected to promote it. In such circumstances compulsion is attractive because it is easy to issue orders; but it is important to recognize the limits within which they can be enforced.

Compulsion may be *negative*, by penalizing breaches of regulations; that is the method typical of *laissez-faire* and the rule of law. Or compulsion may be *positive*, through pressure exercised to induce the people to adopt new habits, grow certain crops, eat special food and so on; that is the method typical of indirect rule through personal authority. The law, for example, may require that every house shall be provided with a latrine and, with an adequate and honest inspecting staff, and with a sufficient magistracy imposing deterrent penalties, such a law can be enforced. But it is impossible by legal methods to make the people use the latrines. The promotion of welfare through the law multiplies offences and administrative corruption. To make the people use the latrines is possible only by persuasion. And in this comparatively simple matter even the Dutch have failed. With a national tradition of public hygiene, and with the use of 'gentle pressure', on a scale almost beyond belief, through administrative machinery built up on customary authority and far more powerful than may be found in any British dependency, the death-rate in Java has remained almost constant during the last twenty years, 'having fluctuated around 1·9 % annually—about 1 % higher than in the Netherlands'.[1] In a recent brochure Dr Hydrick, of the Netherlands India Health Service, comparing the efficacy of curative medicine with the use of pressure and compulsion for improving hygiene, remarks that the provision of latrines is no more effective as propaganda for hygiene than the hospital as propaganda for western medicine. In a city compulsory hygiene may be possible and necessary, but he insists,

[1] Boeke, p. 163.

[i.e. Nutrition — Analyst]

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with all the emphasis of italics, in rural areas '*the jails are not large enough to make the use of force possible*'. Moreover, coercion cannot give permanent results, and, after a failure due to the use of coercion, it is more difficult to secure the co-operation of the people. It should, he suggests, be used 'only to carry out measures which have already secured the support and the co-operation of at least 90 % of the people of that area'.[1] The use of gentle pressure to improve hygiene was a characteristic of the former Ethical policy in Netherlands India. But experience brought disillusionment. Modern British colonial policy follows the Dutch Ethical policy, in aiming to encourage hygiene by lavish expenditure on social services, and by recourse to legal compulsion or pressure. But compulsion in the interest of public health creates more problems, and more difficult problems, than it solves; the essential factor is human, not mechanical. Hygienic customs in the tropics have grown up slowly as a condition of survival in a tropical environment. Even so far as they suited the environment they reflected the general backwardness of tropical peoples, inviting European intervention which entailed the disintegration of tropical society and the collapse of social customs, good and bad alike. Many customs, indeed, that formerly were useful, now became harmful. Modern conditions require the observance of new restrictions on individual liberty. It is possible to enforce these so far as they are requisite to economic development, and the expenditure of funds on social services has done much to promote economic efficiency, though not to the full extent needed by economic progress. But that is very different from enhancing welfare, in which little can be done until the people themselves or their leaders are conscious of a need for betterment.[2] This change of attitude is usually expected to result from education.

4. Education: Types of Schools

In modern colonial policy few subjects have been so voluminously discussed as education. Apologists for colonial rule cite the expenditure on education as proof of its beneficence; critics complain that the expenditure is inadequate and that the methods of education are unsound. There is nothing new in this emphasis on education in tropical dependencies; it is an old tradition dating back to the Papal Bull of 1493. Education has always been regarded as a main instrument

[1] Hydrick, pp. 18ff.

[2] *African Survey*, p. 1206.

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CHAPTER X

WELFARE: HEALTH AND EDUCATION

1. Health and Progress

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GOOD HEALTH is a condition of both human welfare and economic progress. Most people would agree that, if there is one sphere of human life in which the West can promote greater material welfare in the tropics, it is in the conquest of disease. For whereas western medicine rests on modern science and, by applying reason to the cure and prevention of disease, daily performs new miracles, the native medicine of the tropics is pre-scientific. Its practitioners inherit a traditional knowledge of herbs and rules of healing, and probably acquire some skill from clinical experience; even in Africa not all those who practise native medicine can be dismissed as witch-doctors,[1] but native medical practice is empirical, and its sovereign remedy is faith. Not infrequently it cures where western science fails because western medicine still calls, as it has always done, for faith, and the people trust their own doctors rather than Europeans. But if medical treatment in the tropics is to reach a higher standard, the empirical methods of native practitioners must be corrected, supplemented or replaced by methods based on scientific principles. This is the more urgent because economic development, unless kept under control, fosters unhealthy conditions, spreads disease and makes for the deterioration of native medical practice.

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Doubtless under native rule the standard of health varied greatly from one place to another according to the climate, soil and native social customs, and the good physique and healthiness of tropical peoples have often attracted favourable comment. In Burma Europeans have been puzzled to reconcile the sparse population with the robust constitution of the Burmese. In Malaya 'the general good health and freedom from tuberculosis'[2] have been attributed to the fact that the villagers usually choose a site where air, light and water are abundant and build their houses in a manner that ensures good ventilation. In Africa 'early European travellers speak of the magnificent physique of the Ngoni warriors and their amazing feats of endurance'.[3] Economic development changes the environment.

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1198. [2] Mills, p. 320. [3] Read, p. 21.

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titioners and patients do not know the difference and buy the cheapest.[1]

These probably are among the chief reasons why 'the systems of oriental medicine have fallen into decay'. The task of improving the standard of health in the tropics is aggravated by the fact that western medical science usually reaches the people as one aspect of economic penetration, and must first be applied towards repairing and preventing the mischief naturally consequent on the process of development. A solution of the problem has been attempted along two lines: the provision of medical assistance; and the introduction of modern hygiene. It is important to notice the essential difference between these alternatives. Medical assistance aims to promote *individual* welfare, and ordinarily requires the voluntary co-operation of the patient; hygiene aims to promote *social* welfare, and necessarily involves a certain measure of compulsion.

2. Medicine

Ordinarily the introduction of western medicine in the tropics originates in the needs of Europeans. From very early days the East India Company arranged with the Apothecaries Company for the supply of barber-surgeons to their ships and settlements. In Africa likewise the various administrations at first confined the provision of medical services to the needs of their own establishments. But administrative establishments are partly native, and non-officials in commerce and industry require medical attention. In Burma the earliest members of the general public to receive the benefits of western medical skill were the convicts in jail, and the expansion of medical services in the interior has been closely bound up with the growth of crime. It is only natural that generally throughout the tropics the provision of medical assistance has developed with the economic demand for doctors, and has been organized so as to cost no more than necessary.

But the spread of western medicine in the tropics has not been due solely to the growing demand for doctors; it has been due in part to the demand for patients. Medical missionaries look for patients. It is true that missionary organizations need doctors to preserve the lives of missionaries. But they have also recognized in western medicine an instrument for extending their influence among the people. To deliver their message they must find some method of

[1] *RPI* (India), 1897–1902, p. 245; *CISM*, pp. 13, 15, 23.

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758 743 things required for their examinations than to inspire them with professional traditions.

758 Medical science, then, serves to further economic progress rather than to promote native welfare. Economy forbids that Government shall spend more on medical assistance than will meet the demand at the least expense, and the demand is limited even more closely by economic factors. Employers who recognize that sickness involves a costly waste of labour can provide medical assistance,[1] and can insist as a condition of employment that their employees shall accept it. Personal interest in the well-being of their staff often induces them to press this doctrine to its farthest limits, but they must submit to the test of annual accounts to shareholders, and they cannot sacrifice efficiency to welfare without risking the loss of business to their competitors. Although missionaries can take more altruistic views, they find most scope for their activities in providing Government and western enterprise with medical facilities for their employees, and Christianity is enlisted in the cause of commerce.

It is not the case, therefore, that economic development is necessary as a condition of providing funds for medical services to the people, but medical services are necessary as a condition of economic development. The progress of medical science *as an instrument of welfare* depends on the organization of a demand for it among the people. 757 How far tropical peoples voluntarily avail themselves of western medical assistance is uncertain; in Burma, as in Africa, they are readier to believe in western surgery which shows results than in western medicine of which the results are slower and less obvious. In general, western medical science has found little favour.[2] Burmans, we are told, 'don't care for English medicine'. In Siam western medicine has been encouraged since 1880, by their own King and not by foreign rulers, but 'in 1939 the old style doctor was still the one to whom the people ordinarily turn in times of sickness'. In Java, where natives have been trained to practise western medicine for nearly a hundred years, the people still have greater confidence in their own system, and in the general hospitals 40 % of the beds are empty because the people do not realize the benefits of western medicine.

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1194.

[2] *CISM*, pp. 1, 22; Leeuw, H. de, *Cross Roads of the Java Sea* (1931), p. 109. Fischer, Dr I. A., *Bulletin*, Colonial Institute, Amsterdam, 1939, p. 24; Landon, p. 114; *Rural Hygiene in Indo-China* (1937), pp. 11, 50.

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The usual explanation of the general reluctance to accept medical science is ignorance and conservatism. Yet the people readily accept new remedies that they find helpful. They are easily convinced, for example, of the value of quinine, and, as just noticed, will buy cheap imitations that are ineffective. Still more striking is the rapid spread of the new treatment of yaws and venereal diseases by injections.[1] These give speedy and obvious results, and quacks find ready patronage for cheap courses, long enough to cure the symptoms, if not to restore health. We have noticed that Burmans were quick to adopt inoculation as a prophylactic against smallpox, but slow to accept vaccination because inoculation gave results, and vaccination, administered by Indian subordinates with defective lymph, was not infrequently a failure. Natives will not admit the superiority of western medicine unless it effects cures where their own doctors fail, and they often find greater benefit from native treatment.[2] Modern science is no substitute for sympathy and understanding. A French doctor in Indo-China, who accompanied his treatment by tattooing his patients with charms in iodine, is said to have had great success.[3] But ordinarily western medicine is presented to the people as part of the apparatus of foreign rule and western enterprise. In Burma until recently the subordinate medical staff was almost wholly Indian, and the patients in small up-country hospitals were mostly sent there by the police. Yet it was possible to find Indian doctors with a gift of sympathy, whose hospitals, despite the barrier of race and language, were continually overcrowded with voluntary patients. But that was exceptional. The people generally do not want western medicine because they have no faith in it. Economic development multiplies the number of hospitals and doctors, but so far as their only patients are those required by administrative or estate rules to submit to western treatment, they have no bearing on welfare; they merely serve efficiency. If western medicine is to be an instrument of welfare, the people must be induced to want it. It is not enough for them to want it; there must be an economic demand for it. Very few can afford to pay the fees necessary to recompense a western practitioner for his long and costly training. So long as the people do not want and cannot afford western medical attention, the supply of hospitals and doctors is conditioned and limited by the demand arising out of the need for greater efficiency in business and administration.

[1] Mills, p. 315; *African Survey*, p. 1145; Landon, pp. 123, 125, 127.
[2] Teeling, pp. 19–21. [3] Thompson, V., *French Indo-China* (1937), p. 283.

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757 This hinders the progress of medical science and therefore hinders economic progress. To popularize western medicine 'it is not enough to multiply facilities (however good in themselves) for the treatment of such as apply for relief'.[1] In homogeneous western societies the improvement of medical facilities is a problem of supply; the demand for better medical care is almost unlimited, and the extension of medical relief depends upon the provision of larger funds and a better organization for meeting the demand. But in the plural society of the tropics the problem is one of demand; it is a waste of money to provide medical assistance for which there is no demand. Apart from compulsion, it is first necessary to organize the demand. That is a difficult matter. The appreciation of western medicine, as of co-operative principles, must ordinarily spread slowly, but disease, like debt, spreads daily. The machinery of co-operative credit without the spirit has proved useless or worse than useless, but the machinery of medical attention may seem to offer more scope for compulsion. Tropical diseases are a mass affliction, and their rapid elimination is necessary both to native welfare and to economic progress. Hence it is argued that the treatment 'to be effective must partake to some extent the character of an operation, scientifically planned and humanly conducted, but military in its spirit and in the thoroughness with which it establishes itself in the area which it has occupied'. Thus the provision of medical assistance tends to be transformed from the promotion of *individual* welfare, requiring voluntary co-operation, into the promotion of *social* welfare by compulsion, the method which is characteristic of hygiene.

3. HYGIENE

744 Even in Europe it was only during the last half of the nineteenth century that men came to regard the state as responsible for public health and for the prevention of disease, and a growing volume of welfare legislation marked the earlier stages of the transition from a policy of *laissez-faire* to one of efficiency and social justice. The new trend of opinion naturally reacted on colonial policy. In India, although the growth of towns consequent on the development of trade had long compelled attention to conservancy, sanitation was not treated seriously until 1863, when a Royal Commission showed that the insanitary condition of urban areas was intimately connected with ill-

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 1115, 1196; *Social Policy in Dependent Territories* (1944), p. 6.

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titioners and patients do not know the difference and buy the cheapest.[1]

These probably are among the chief reasons why 'the systems of oriental medicine have fallen into decay'. The task of improving the standard of health in the tropics is aggravated by the fact that western medical science usually reaches the people as one aspect of economic penetration, and must first be applied towards repairing and preventing the mischief naturally consequent on the process of development. A solution of the problem has been attempted along two lines: the provision of medical assistance; and the introduction of modern hygiene. It is important to notice the essential difference between these alternatives. Medical assistance aims to promote *individual* welfare, and ordinarily requires the voluntary co-operation of the patient; hygiene aims to promote *social* welfare, and necessarily involves a certain measure of compulsion.

2. Medicine

Ordinarily the introduction of western medicine in the tropics originates in the needs of Europeans. From very early days the East India Company arranged with the Apothecaries Company for the supply of barber-surgeons to their ships and settlements. In Africa likewise the various administrations at first confined the provision of medical services to the needs of their own establishments. But administrative establishments are partly native, and non-officials in commerce and industry require medical attention. In Burma the earliest members of the general public to receive the benefits of western medical skill were the convicts in jail, and the expansion of medical services in the interior has been closely bound up with the growth of crime. It is only natural that generally throughout the tropics the provision of medical assistance has developed with the economic demand for doctors, and has been organized so as to cost no more than necessary.

But the spread of western medicine in the tropics has not been due solely to the growing demand for doctors; it has been due in part to the demand for patients. Medical missionaries look for patients. It is true that missionary organizations need doctors to preserve the lives of missionaries. But they have also recognized in western medicine an instrument for extending their influence among the people. To deliver their message they must find some method of

[1] *RPI* (India), 1897–1902, p. 243; *CISM*, pp. 13, 15, 23.

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attracting listeners. Where, as under direct rule, the people want education in order to get jobs, missionaries have provided schools. Where, as under indirect rule, education has had less market value, they have provided hospitals. Missionaries have sought patients in the cause of welfare, hoping that by saving life they might rescue souls. Moreover the demand for patients has not been wholly altruistic. On western enterprise employers have come to recognize the economic value of providing medical attention for their labourers, in the hope that by improving health they might save labour. In Java under the Culture system the Government produce depended on the well-being of the plantation coolies and, in the forties, when the pressure on the labour supply led to famine and depopulation, it could no longer be disregarded. Thus, so early as 1851, a start was made in the training of natives in western medicine. In the same year Protestant missionaries were admitted. In Burma, developed by native enterprise under direct rule, missionaries have specialized in education, but in Java, developed by western enterprise under indirect rule, medical work presented a more favourable opening.

It is true, of course, that medical missions have looked on the provision of medical care as a good thing in itself, apart from ulterior motives, and that administrations and employers have been actuated by human sentiment in providing and extending medical facilities. Ordinarily the chief factor in stimulating humanitarian impulse has been the shock occasioned by a sensational outbreak of disease. In Siam the modern medical service dates from an epidemic of cholera in the early eighties; the ravages of sleeping sickness in 1901–2 focussed British attention on Uganda; shortly afterwards the outbreak of plague advertized the need for medical care in India and the Tropical Far East. But humanitarian considerations have been reinforced by the practical requirements of western enterprise, and it is in regions developed by western enterprise that medical work has made most progress. Of the hospitals in Java, other than dispensaries, about two-thirds are private institutions, and in the Outer Provinces nine-tenths.[1] In Malaya, before the late war, the tin and rubber companies were maintaining 232 hospitals. In Ceylon about three times as many were provided by companies managing estates, and there were about an equal number of Government dispensaries together with 93 State hospitals.[2] But Asiatic owners and

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 380.
[2] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, pp. 29, 30.

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managers often have little faith in western medicine and are reluctant to incur expenditure that they think of doubtful value, and Europeans, to protect their own interests, demand legislation to bring such estates up to their own levels.[1] On the other hand, some regions, where western enterprise is backward or unprofitable, are very scantily supplied with hospitals.

In these circumstances, though policy may be inspired by humanitarian zeal for human welfare, the spread of western medicine is dominated in practice by economic factors. The Government must provide first for its European staff and for natives in its own service, civil or military, for convicts in jail and for the requirements of criminal administration, and for Europeans engaged in economic development. Efficiency and the numerous other demands on public revenue require that such services should be rendered at as little cost as possible. Often, as in Burma and in parts of Africa, the easiest and cheapest way is to import foreign medical subordinates and menials.[2] These conditions tend to stress the importance of hospital discipline rather than to encourage human sympathy; as Lord Hailey remarks, 'It must need a great deal of skill and personal sympathy on the part of the European staff to overcome the impression left on the African by the discipline and isolation from friends which is the rule in many of the British hospitals.' We have noticed that in Burma the people regard the hospitals 'with fear and mistrust'. In Malaya the cult of efficiency and economy has led to the building of large central hospitals to which patients can easily be brought by ambulance, but where they are cut off from their friends. Similarly in Africa much money has been spent on imposing buildings that alarm rather than attract the people.[3] Even in England hospital discipline is often irksome, but the patient accepts it as necessary; to tropical peoples the need for discipline is less apparent, and it is exercised more rigorously. A tradition of human sympathy is characteristic of the healing art in Europe and also in great measure among native medical practitioners,[4] and a good bedside manner is a valuable asset to the private practitioner, whether of modern western or traditional native medicine. But kindliness is less important to native medical subordinates who regard medicine as one branch, and not the most highly esteemed or best-paid branch, of Government service, and it is easier to teach them

[1] Mills, p. 309.
[2] *Ib.* pp. 1195–6; Mills, p. 308; *CBC*, p. 33.
[3] *African Survey*, p. 1183.
[4] Landon, p. 115.

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things required for their examinations than to inspire them with professional traditions.

Medical science, then, serves to further economic progress rather than to promote native welfare. Economy forbids that Government shall spend more on medical assistance than will meet the demand at the least expense, and the demand is limited even more closely by economic factors. Employers who recognize that sickness involves a costly waste of labour can provide medical assistance,[1] and can insist as a condition of employment that their employees shall accept it. Personal interest in the well-being of their staff often induces them to press this doctrine to its farthest limits, but they must submit to the test of annual accounts to shareholders, and they cannot sacrifice efficiency to welfare without risking the loss of business to their competitors. Although missionaries can take more altruistic views, they find most scope for their activities in providing Government and western enterprise with medical facilities for their employees, and Christianity is enlisted in the cause of commerce.

It is not the case, therefore, that economic development is necessary as a condition of providing funds for medical services to the people, but medical services are necessary as a condition of economic development. The progress of medical science *as an instrument of welfare* depends on the organization of a demand for it among the people. How far tropical peoples voluntarily avail themselves of western medical assistance is uncertain; in Burma, as in Africa, they are readier to believe in western surgery which shows results than in western medicine of which the results are slower and less obvious. In general, western medical science has found little favour.[2] Burmans, we are told, 'don't care for English medicine'. In Siam western medicine has been encouraged since 1880, by their own King and not by foreign rulers, but 'in 1939 the old style doctor was still the one to whom the people ordinarily turn in times of sickness'. In Java, where natives have been trained to practise western medicine for nearly a hundred years, the people still have greater confidence in their own system, and in the general hospitals 40 % of the beds are empty because the people do not realize the benefits of western medicine.

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1194.

[2] *CISM*, pp. 1, 22; Leeuw, H. de, *Cross Roads of the Java Sea* (1931), p. 109. Fischer, Dr I. A., *Bulletin* Colonial Institute, Amsterdam, 1939, p. 24; Landon, p. 114; *Rural Hygiene in Indo-China* (1937), pp. 11, 50.

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147 [362] Pestiferous slums compel attention in the larger towns, but conditions may be worse in the smaller towns up-country where they escape notice; even the villages often suffer from congestion. Food is less abundant, because cultivation for export reduces the area under subsistence crops, and the greater pressure on this smaller area diminishes the outturn; the demands of western enterprise for labour [146] have a similar effect. Often the people take to cheaper or to more palatable but less nutritious food; thus groundnut oil replaces sesamum oil, cassava replaces rice, polished rice spreads beri-beri; sometimes the food is adulterated with imported products as when for some years large quantities of mineral oil were imported into Burma to mix with native vegetable oils. The natural effect of the economic forces released in the course of development is to lower the standard of health.[1]

300 Again, with man, as with crops and cattle, there is an intimate link between material development and infection. The improvement of communications and the mass migration of labourers spread old diseases and bring in new diseases. In Africa 'diseases have been introduced to which the African was formerly a stranger, and fresh strains of parasites cause attacks to which he was formerly immune; further, Africans now contract diseases common to temperate zones, and it is possible that the intensity of these is increased owing to the lack of acquired immunity'. The spread of sleeping sickness 'must in many cases be associated with the opening of new communications and the development of trading facilities'. The conditions under which labour is employed foster venereal disease, which in modern Africa seems to have an incidence ranging from 50 to 90 %.[2]

759 For various reasons also native medical skill deteriorates. The patronage of native rulers encourages the most successful physicians, and helps to maintain traditions, in Burma reminiscent of the Hippocratic oath, that make for professional self-respect. Under western rule the native doctors lose their best and most remunerative clients. 278 Moreover the herbs, formerly gathered in the fields, come to be purchased in the market, and are liable to adulteration, so that the practitioner no longer knows what he prescribes. This applies also to modern substitutes for native drugs, such as cheap brands of quinine tabloids which, if they contain any quinine, are of little use except as marbles owing to the thickness of the coating; prac-

[1] *ISC*, 1, 21; Mills, p. 321; *RAB*, 1915–16, p. 30; 1918–19, p. 41.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1129, 1144–6, 1199.

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The adoption of *Kuo Yü* as a medium of instruction in schools is about one-half of the story of education in China under the Kuomintang: the other half is the adoption in 1928 of the Three Principles of the People of Dr Sun Yat-sen as the foundation of the education system.

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The overseas Chinese of the Nanyang adopted with fervour the new style of education which the Revolution had brought into being. They started and ran their own schools, and the resultant rise of Nationalist feeling made the Governments of the several countries more and more apprehensive of the creation of an *imperium in imperio* in their midst.[1] Such was particularly the case in Malaya and Siam, and the crux of the friction between the China-born Chinese and the local administration has been their differences regarding the aim and control of this education. This will emerge in the course of the individual country studies of our survey.

The majority of the emigrants had little or no schooling before going abroad. It is reasonably certain that until quite recently the average emigrant was not a man of education at all, or at most he had had a very inadequate schooling before emigrating.

Religion. On going overseas to the Nanyang the Chinese took with them their religious beliefs. Be the principle of Buddhism, Taoism, or Confucianism effective or ossified, there can be no doubt at all that the world of spirits, demons, gods, and heroes is still a very real thing to the majority of Chinese and goes with them wherever they go. Dr Ta Chen notes that among the items of household expenditure other than food, clothing, and shelter, that for religious practices predominates over all others both in the emigrant and non-emigrant families of east Kwangtung and south Fukien. ('These expenditures', he says, 'are a good index of the prevalence of religious concern.') Scepticism has assuredly grown with the advance of education, but for the majority it would seem that 'keeping in' with the Great Unseen was as much a matter of insurance as of piety and ethics.

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Broadly speaking, the religion of the villagers of south China consists of the worship of Shen, Fu, and Yao in addition to the cult of their own ancestors. Shen and Fu are spirits from Buddhism and Taoism (especially the popular, corrupted, and confused aspects of

[1] See Cyrus H. Peake, *Nationalism and Education in Modern China* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1932).

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the two religious systems); whereas Yao, a ghost, is from primitive ancestor worship via Confucianism. In one emigrant community in south Fukien Dr Ta Chen's investigators found that of 224 persons questioned, 154 expressed belief in Shen and Fu, 60 had no religious preferences, 5 believed in Christianity, and 5 seemed to be wavering between acceptance and rejection of Shen and Fu. Comparative popularity would, we may be sure, depend largely on results; for, like the Roman gods, a Chinese god is expected to render a return for respect accorded and the offerings made to him. A Roman observed his rites with scrupulous adherence to the letter of the law, expecting that if he did not the gods would make it an excuse to wriggle out of the bargain, and the Chinese regard their gods in much the same spirit.[1]

Amongst the most popular goddesses in the Buddhist pantheon both in China and overseas is Kwan Yin, the goddess of mercy, 'she who hears the sounds (prayers) of mortals—she who looks down on the world and hears its cries'. She is the counterpart of the Taoist goddess T'ien Hou Sheng Mu, Holy Mother, queen of heaven, and she is credited with attributes similar to those of the Virgin Mary. Kwan Yin was originally the Buddhist male god, Avalokiteswara, who changed his sex to female some centuries after his arrival in China.

Another popular god among the overseas Chinese is Kwan Ti, the god of war.

Each craft or guild has its own patron saint—Wu Ku Lao Yeh for farmers, Chiao Sheng Lao Yeh (whose festival is on the 7th of the 5th moon) for carpenters, Shui Hsin Lao Yeh for incense-stick makers, Kwan Ti, the god of war, in his capacity of god of wealth, for tradesmen, and T'ien Hou Sheng Mu, the Taoist queen of heaven, for fishermen and sailors (but overseas her name is changed to Ma Tsu (Ma Chew Poh)), which is also popular in Amoy. In many Cantonese houses the image of the household god of the earth, T'o Yei Shan or Tei Chu, is placed *underneath* a table! The god is not worshipped in Hokkien households.

In addition to the worship of the standard deities of the Buddhist and Taoist cults, the Chinese of the Nanyang have special deities

[1] See Ta Chen, op. cit. chap. x, and Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, chap. vi. There is an instructive article, 'Chinese Contemporary Cults', by Clarence Burton Day in the *Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. vi, no. 3 (May 1947), which covers a number of the gods and heroes worshipped in south China and the Nanyang.

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of their own which are worshipped by them only overseas or in the emigrant communities from which they sprang. The outstanding examples are Sam Po Tai Shan for the Shen, and Toh Peh Kong (Hokkien), Ta Pai Kung (Mandarin), or Tai Pak Kung (Cantonese) for the Fu.

Sam Po Tai Shan is none other than the spirit of the famous Grand Eunuch Cheng Ho of the Ming dynasty who visited Malacca in the early years of the fifteenth century.[1] He is particularly worshipped in Malacca. Crawfurd remarks, 'Sam Po Kung (Sam Po Tai Shan) is evidently a name to be conjured with among the illiterate classes. The miracles which he performed to save his countrymen from the perils of their travels in unknown lands are among the marvels of romance, illustrating, in a striking way, one of the factors in a genesis of a myth.'

Toh Peh Kong, however, is the most popular hero among the overseas Chinese. But one may search for him in vain in the standard books on Chinese religion.[2] In Siam he is known as Pan Tou Kung. He probably derives from Tu Ti (earth god), but overseas he is primarily the spirit of the pioneers. The Chinese pioneers of the early days suffered terrible hardships and were honoured in memory by those who came after them. Toh Peh Kong seems to be the personification of the pioneer spirit generally and is not the deification of a special person as Sam Po Tai Shan is of Cheng Ho.

A worship of very long standing in Malaya is that of Wang Yeh, who has the spiritual function of visiting the universe as the representative of heaven. The early settlers brought the worship with them from Fukien province.[3]

Opium and other narcotics. The use of the poppy and coca leaf goes back to time immemorial.[4] In 1783 Warren Hastings pro-

[1] See pp. 22, 23.

[2] In particular the monumental work by Henri F. S. Doré, *Recherches sur les superstitions en Chine* (Shanghai, Tu-se-wei Press, 1911–38).

[3] Wang Yeh was worshipped from early days but the Wang Kang Festival in Malacca wherein five images of this deity were carried does not seem to have originated until 1886.

Chinese Mohammedan[illegible]t in the Shan States and in Indonesia, though in the latter country their nu[illegible]ers are not great. Chinese Christians are not very numerous in Southeast Asia, though in Malaya, for example, they increased between 1901 and 1931 by one-half (50·2 per cent.) to 30,738, while during the same period the Chinese population increased by only 45·5 per cent. Among the Churches the Roman Catholic Church has the strongest hold.

[4] Opium comes from a certain variety of the poppy plant grown principally

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643 772 with Mount Meru itself, his right eye representing the sun, his left eye the moon, his arms and legs the four cardinal points, the six-tiered umbrella above his head the six lower heavens, his pointed crown the spire of Indra's palace on the summit of the Meru and his slippers the earth. This means that the king is identified with the axis of the universe. The same idea seems to be expressed by the title Paku Buwono, "Nail of the World," of the Susuhunan of Solo in Java. However, the identification of the king with the Meru is in no way incompatible with that with Indra. Plural symbolism is very frequent in Buddhist Farther India. Thus in Burma, where the king has all the attributes of Indra, he was also identified with Viśvakarma, the divine architect and shaper of the world. Moreover, there is strong evidence of his having been identified also with the sun.

THE COSMIC STATE AND THE DIVINE KING

●771 643 The cosmic state, as it existed in Southeast Asia, was intimately bound up with the idea of divine kingship. The divinity of kings was conceived in various ways according to the prevailing religion. Where Hinduism prevailed the king was considered to be either an incarnation of a god or a descendant from a god or both. Mostly it was Śiva who was thought to incarnate himself in kings or to engender dynasties. Thus in a Cham inscription of the 9th century Uroja, the founder of the royal dynasty, is said to have been a son of Śiva. The Javanese poem Nāgarakrtāgama (14th century) says bluntly that all kings are incarnations of Śiva. The same poem tells us more specially that king Rājasanāgara of Majapahit (1350–1389 A.D.), as proved by various portents which occurred about the time of his birth, among others a volcanic eruption, was an incarnation of Bhatāra Girinātha, i.e. Śiva as "Lord of the Mountain." In the Javanese chronicle Pararaton king Krtajaya of Kadiri (13th century) on one occasion even shows himself in the superhuman form of Śiva with four arms and a third eye in the middle of the forehead and floating in the air. In ancient Cambodia and Champa the monarchy was intimately bound up with the cult of a lingam which was considered the seat of the divine essence of kingship. As we have seen, in Cambodia this lingam, representing the Devarāja, the "God King," was adored in the temple in the center of the capital. The actual king was considered to be a manifestation of the divine power of the Devarāja and therefore, as the latter's visible form, the lingam, implies, obviously of Śiva himself.

However, Śiva was not the only god to incarnate himself in kings. King Airlangga of Java (11th century) considered himself an incarnation of Vishnu. His memorial monument shows him in the form of Vishnu riding on

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the latter's man-eagle Garuda. Another noteworthy example of an incarnation of Vishnu was king Sūryavarman II of Cambodia (12th century) who erected his own memorial monument as a gigantic temple of Vishnu: the famous Angkor Vat. We find further the idea of plural incarnation, also known from ancient India. Thus the Pararaton tells us that Angrok (13th century), the founder of the dynasty of Singasari and ancestor of the kings of Majapahit, was an incarnation of Vishnu, begotten by Brahmā from a mortal woman, and at the same time a son of Śiva. King Krtarājasa (died 1316 A.D.), the founder of the empire of Majapahit, is immortalized by a statue representing him as Harihara, a compound of Vishnu and Śiva. Even the simultaneous incarnation of Hindu and Mahāyāna Buddhist deities occurs. Thus, to quote only one example, the Javanese king Krtanagara (killed 1292 A.D.) was considered as an incarnation of Śiva as well as of the Dhyāni Buddha Akshobhya. Accordingly, he became known in Javanese tradition under the name of Śiva-Buddha. 771 643

It may be added that the theory of divine incarnation could be used not only as a means to exalt the position of the legitimate king, but equally well as a justification for usurpation of the throne. Thus the above mentioned Angrok, the founder of the kingdom of Singasari, was an usurper with a long criminal career as embezzler, robber and murderer. Yet, in spite of his criminal past, he became king, according to the Pararaton, because he was an incarnation of the gods.

The theory of divine incarnation as found in Hinduism and Mahāyāna Buddhism is incompatible with the doctrine of the Buddhism of the Hīnayāna. This difference in tenets is clearly expressed even in the lay-out of capital cities. In ancient Cambodia a temple formed the center of the capital and thus the Mount Meru of city and empire. In Burma the center of the capital is invariably occupied by the royal palace, and it is this latter which is identified with Mount Meru. In ancient Cambodia either Śiva in his form as Devarāja, the eternal essence of kingship, or the Bodhisatva Lokeśvara, the "Lord of the Universe," inhabited the "central mountain" and from there pervaded the empire. Hīnayānist Buddhism does not recognize an eternal deity. Indra is but the king of one of the lowest heavens, the second one from the earth. He is as little exempt from death and rebirth as any human being, except that his life lasts longer. The same may be said of the inhabitants of the higher heavens. All these "gods" of Hīnayāna Buddhism should more appropriately be called angels. They have no temples and no cults. Thus it is easy to understand why in Burma no temple could be set in the center of the capital city. The adaptation to cosmological principles and 3161 771 643 184 772

361 the deification of the king here had to be attempted by other means. By erect-
●771 ing the palace in the center of the city and by identifying it with Mount
Meru, the lord of the palace, i.e. the king became automatically the repre-
643 sentative of Indra. We might even say that he was "the Indra" of this smaller
184 universe, the Burmese empire but he held his place only by the magic of
772 parallelism and he was no incarnation of the real Indra as the ancient Javanese and Cambodian kings had been incarnations of Śiva and Vishnu.[7] This scheme explains the great sanctity in which the royal palace was held in the Buddhist empires of Farther India. The palace was the symbol of the celestial mountain, nay, more than a mere symbol: it was "the Mount Meru" of the microcosmos Burma, or Siam, or Cambodia. Anybody nearing the palace had to show his reverence by dismounting from his horse, by shutting his parasol, by bowing to the palace spire or even kneeling down. Attempts to exact the same expressions of reverence from British envoys led to endless negotiations and frictions as the latter refused to comply with a demand which they
643 considered humiliating. "King of the Golden Palace" was one of the most
771 important titles of Burmese monarchs. Yet, the fact that the king "was Indra" and therefore ruler of the country only as possessor of the empire's Meru, the palace, involved great dangers. It worked as a constant temptation for would-be usurpers, be it from the ranks of the royal family or outsiders, as the occupation of the palace might be achieved by a coup-de-main with relatively small forces and usually meant the conquest of the whole empire. Many Burmese and Siamese kings therefore were virtual prisoners in their palace which they did not dare to leave for fear it might be seized by an usurper. The last king of Burma, Thibaw, preferred even to forego the important coronation ritual of the circumambulation of the capital to offering one of his relatives a chance to make himself master of the palace while he was away.

In Hīnayāna Buddhism the idea of divine incarnation as justification of kingship is replaced by that of rebirth and of religious merit. It is his good karma, his religious merit acquired in previous lives, which makes a man be born a king or makes him acquire kingship during his lifetime, be it even by rebellion and murder. A typical instance is that of king Nyaung-u Sawrahan (10th century) as told in the Glass Palace Chronicle of the Kings of Burma. Nyaung-u Sawrahan, a farmer, kills the king who has trespassed on his garden and whom he had not recognized. Thereupon he is himself made king against his wish. So strong is his karma that, when one of the ministers ob-

[7] However, strong traces of the belief that Śiva and Vishnu incarnate themselves in the king survive in the coronation rituals of Siam and Cambodia.

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jects to his installation, the stone statue of a guardian deity at the palace door becomes alive and kills the minister. The chronicle's comment is significant: "Although in verity king Sawrahan should have utterly perished, having killed a king when he was yet a farmer, he attained even to kingship simply by strong karma of his good acts done in the past." But the moment the karma of his past good acts is exhausted, that same stone statue which formerly had killed his adversary becomes alive again and hurls him from the palace terrace.

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No merit could exceed that of a service rendered to the Buddha himself. Thus the Glass Palace Chronicle tells us that the ogre-guardian of a mountain, who had shielded the Buddha from the sun with three leaves, had received from the latter a prophecy that he would thrice become king of Burma. In the 10th century he is reborn in lowly surroundings as Saleh Ngahkwe, who later becomes king by murdering his predecessor and, "being reborn from the state of an ogre, was exceeding wrathful and haughty," indulging in gluttony and sadistic murder, till he is at last killed by his own ministers. One should think that the merit of having shaded the Buddha would have been exhausted by a life full of crimes. However, according to the Burmese chronicle, this is not so. The former mountain spirit is reborn in the 12th century as prince Narathu who becomes king by murdering his father and brother and throughout his reign excells by bloody deeds, and in the 13th century as king Narathihapate. This leads us to a very characteristic conception of historical events as based on the enormous importance attributed to prophecies and portents. Indeed, one could say that, especially as far as alleged prophecies of the Buddha are concerned, in the view of Burmese historians events are not prophesied because they will happen, but they happen because they have been prophesied. The "discovery" of ancient prophecies and the "observation" of contemporary portents was a generally used expedient in Burmese politics and still forms a potent factor in what we may call political folk-lore.

The whole idea and outward form of kingship in Southeast Asia, and specially in the Buddhist kingdoms of Farther India, was of course based on the conception of the Chakravartin, the Universal Monarch. Now it is known that a Chakravartin is the worldly alternative to a Bodhisatva, a future Buddha. Under these circumstances the theory of rebirth and of karma was bound to induce monarchs with a very high idea of their religious merits to consider themselves as Bodhisatvas. Thus, Oung Zaya, the founder of the last dynasty of Burma, took as king the name Alaungpaya which designated him as an Embryo Buddha. His son, king Bodawpaya (1782–1819), claimed outright to be the Bodhisatva Maitreya. However, his claim was rejected by the clergy

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and he dropped it. A similar claim was put forth by king Taksin of Siam (1767–1782).

The theory of vocation to kingship either on the basis of divine incarnation, as in Java and ancient Cambodia, or by karma acquired in former lives, as in Burma, Siam and modern Cambodia, did not deprive that of the heredity of the right to the crown of its importance. Again and again usurpers have striven for a semblance of legitimacy by construing genealogies linking themselves either to the dynasty they had overthrown or to a dynasty which at an earlier period had governed the country. Occasionally, phantastic genealogies were constructed deriving native Southeast Asiatic dynasties from some famous dynasty of ancient India. The best known case is that of the recent kings of Cambodia who claim descent from the ancient kings of Indraprastha (Delhi). The last Burmese dynasty, founded by a village headman in the 18th century, claimed descent from the Sakya kings of Kapilavatthu, a claim which would have made them blood relatives of the Buddha himself. One type of such fictitious genealogies deserves special attention as it has a deeper meaning than merely to serve the glorification of the dynasty. The kings of Funan (3rd to 7th centuries A.D.) and those of ancient Cambodia were said to descend from a Brahman who had come from India and from the daughter of the serpent king of the country. The legend is still alive in Cambodia, the Brahman being replaced in the modern version by a prince of Indraprastha. It seems that similar dynastic legends existed in most parts of Southeast Asia. The meaning is clear. The Nāgas, the serpent demons, are the original masters of the soil. By his descent from the daughter of the Nāga king the monarch had a legitimate claim to the soil of his kingdom which, in theory at least, thereby became his personal property. A Chinese report tells us that in the 13th century the people of Cambodia believed that the king nightly cohabited with the serpent goddess of the soil who visited him in his palace in human form. Obviously he was thought thereby to renew the connection between himself and the soil of his kingdom. Thus the king in ancient Cambodia, as an incarnation of the Devarāja and as a descendant and at the same time spouse of the goddess of the soil, formed a real magic center linking the empire to the divine forces of the heavens as well as of the earth.

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Any account of the conceptions of state and kingship in Southeast Asia would be incomplete without at least mentioning the great importance of the regalia. Some of these, as the umbrella and the crown, have cosmological meaning as noted above. Moreover, the umbrella was thought to be the seat of a protective genius who favored the king with his advice and who in critical moments might even actively intervene on behalf of the dynasty. Other

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regalia are thought to be possessed of magic forces, such as the royal sword of Cambodia which, it is believed, if drawn from its scabbard without the prescribed ritual, would bring disaster upon the country. This magical character of the regalia is even more stressed in the Malay Peninsula and in Indonesia. It culminates in the curious conception prevalent among the Bugis and Makassarese of Celebes, according to which it is really the regalia which reign, the prince governing the state only in their name. 643 772

The deification of the king, while raising him to an almost unbelievably exalted position with regard to his subjects, has in no way succeeded in stabilizing government, rather the contrary. As explained above, the theory of divine incarnation, and even more so that of rebirth and of karma, provided an easy subterfuge for usurpers. The fact that the relatively easy task of seizing the palace, as in Burma and Siam, of or seizing the regalia, as in certain parts of Indonesia, often sufficed to be accepted as king by the whole nation, was bound to act as an additional incitement to rebellion. Moreover, the immense power and the lack of restrictions which the king enjoyed invited to abuses which in the end made the monarch obnoxious to his subjects and hastened his downfall. To this came the vagueness of the rules of succession. Sometimes the king himself chose his successor. Sometimes the ministers appointed a prince as king. Then again the queens unofficially but efficiently exercised their influence in favor of a prince of their choice. Often the crown simply fell to the prince who was the quickest to seize the palace and to execute his brothers. Under these circumstances it is no wonder that the empires of Southeast Asia from the very beginning were torn by frequent rebellion, often resulting in the overthrow of kings or even dynasties. The earliest reports we have, those from Chinese sources on the kingdom of Funan, reveal such conditions to have existed as early as the 3rd century A.D. If there was a long period of oppression and unrest, rebellion and its concomitant, dacoity, could become practically a popular tradition which it was difficult to eradicate. Such was the case, for instance, in Burma during the 18th and 19th centuries, and it is in the light of such a past that recent events in that country ought to be seen. 643 771

SURVIVAL OF TRADITIONS

In order to realize how deeply the populations of Farther India were affected by the cosmological structure of the state one need only think of the division of the Siamese people into the classes of the right and of the left which, not long ago, determined the services each person was obliged to render to the state. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the cosmomagic 643 772

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CONCEPTIONS OF STATE AND KINGSHIP IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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121 643 AT A time when the whole political system of Southeast Asia seems to be on the verge of complete reshapement and when a new cycle of development, dominated by native forces, may be expected to emerge from the present turmoil, an inquiry into the ideological foundations of native government will not be out of place and, perhaps, will even be of more than purely theoretical interest. What were the religious and philosophical conceptions which underlay and shaped the states of Southeast Asia? Are they still living forces with which we have to count or are they dead and gone? Is it possible to inoculate new ideas into old traditions, thereby avoiding a complete break with the past, a dangerous uprooting of oriental thought and culture?

In view of the limited space I shall confine myself to a discussion of some fundamental conceptions of state and kingship in those parts of Southeast Asia where Hindu-Buddhist civilization prevailed.

MACROCOSMOS AND MICROCOSMOS

772 643 The primary notion with which we shall have to deal is the belief in the parallelism between Macrocosmos and Microcosmos, between the universe and the world of men. According to this belief humanity is constantly under the influence of forces emanating from the directions of the compass and from stars and planets. These forces may produce welfare and prosperity or work havoc, according to whether or not individuals and social groups, above all the state, succeed in bringing their lives and activities in harmony with the universe. Individuals may attain such harmony by following the indications offered by astrology, the lore of lucky and unlucky days and many other minor rules Harmony between the empire and the universe is achieved by organizing the former as an image of the latter, as a universe on a smaller scale.

171 772 643 It is well known that this astrological or cosmo-magic principle, as we may call it, originated somewhere in the Near East. It was well established in Babylonia in the 3rd millennium B.C. and there are indications that it may go back there at least as far as the middle of the 4th millennium, and possibly farther. Again, we have indications that it existed in Northwest India in the

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171 first half of the 3rd millennium. It influenced Europe in various ways and at
●772 various times, specially during the periods of Hellenism and of the Roman
643 empire and in the Middle Ages. It is difficult to tell when it first reached China. Anyway it had developed there into a highly specialized system during the Chou and Han periods. It came to Southeast Asia by way of India as well as of China, and this double influence may account for its prominence there and for the strong hold it had on the minds of the peoples of Farther India and Indonesia. Its long life-span and its spread over vast regions with divergent cultures, and even more so the fact that it had to adapt itself to the locally dominant religions, to various forms of paganism as well as to Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism, and occasionally even to Christianity and to Islam, naturally resulted in the development of numerous variants with often widely differing traits. It is with the special aspect of the cosmo magic principle as expressed in the organization of Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms in Southeast Asia (and to some extent in their Mohammedan successors in Malaya and Indonesia), that we are here concerned.

RELATION BETWEEN STATE AND UNIVERSE

772 Whereas speculations pertaining to the relation between state and uni-
643 verse formed an important subject of ancient Chinese literature, we would look in vain for a theoretical treatise on this topic in the various literatures of Southeast Asia.[1] Yet, there is overwhelming evidence of the cosmological basis of state and kingship in this area. This evidence is found in numerous passages in literature and inscriptions, in the titles of kings, queens and officials, in the "cosmic" numbers of queens, ministers, court priests, provinces, etc., in rites and customs, in works of art, in the lay-out and structure of capital cities, palaces and temples. One need only put these various items together to obtain a relatively clear picture. This picture will be more complete in continental Southeast Asia, where the old forms of Buddhist state and kingship survived into very recent times. It will be hazier in the Archipelago as a result of Mohammedan and European influences.

According to Brahmanic doctrine the world consists of a circular central continent, Jambūdvīpa, surrounded by seven annular oceans and seven annular continents. Beyond the last of the seven oceans the world is closed by an enormous mountain range. In the center of Jambudvīpa, and thus in the center of the world, rises Mount Meru, the cosmic mountain around which sun, moon and stars revolve. On its summit lies the city of the gods sur-

[1] However, it must be taken into account that Burmese, Mon and Thai literatures are still very imperfectly known.

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rounded by the abodes of the eight Lokapālas or guardian gods of the world. 772 643

In the Buddhist system, too, Mount Meru forms the center of the universe. It is surrounded by seven mountain ranges separated from each other by seven annular seas. Beyond the last of these mountain chains extends the Ocean and in it lie four continents, one in each of the cardinal directions. The continent south of Mount Meru is Jambūdvīpa, the abode of men. Here, too, the universe is surrounded by an enormous wall of rocks, the Chakravāla range. On the slopes of Mount Meru lies the lowest of the paradises, that of the four Great Kings or guardians of the world, on its summit the second paradise, that of the thirty-three gods with Sudarśana, the city of the gods, where Indra reigns as king. Above Mount Meru tower one above the other the rest of the heavenly abodes.[2]

It will be seen that the Brahman and the Buddhist systems, in spite of differences in detail, agree in fundamental traits: their circular form and the arrangement in concentric zones around Mount Meru. An abbreviated image of either of them thus has the same symbolic meaning for devotees of both faiths.

THE CAPITAL AS THE MAGIC CENTER OF EMPIRE

In Southeast Asia, even more than in Europe, the capital stood for the whole country. It was more than the nation's political and cultural center: it was the magic center of the empire. The circumambulation of the capital formed, and in Siam and Cambodia still forms, one of the most essential parts of the coronation ritual. By this circumambulation the king takes possession not only of the capital city but of the whole empire. Whereas the cosmological structure of the country at large could be expressed only by the number and location of provinces and by the functions and emblems of their governors, the capital city could be shaped architecturally as a much more "realistic" image of the universe, a smaller microcosmos within that microcosmos, the empire. The remains of some of the ancient cities clearly testify to the cosmological ideas which pervaded the whole system of government. Fortunately, a number of inscriptions and some passages in native chronicles may help us in interpreting archaeological evidence. 361 772 643

As the universe, according to Brahman and Buddhist ideas, centers around Mount Meru, so that smaller universe, the empire, was bound to have a Mount Meru in the center of its capital which would be if not in the coun-

[2] There usually are twenty-six heavens in all, including those on Mount Meru, but the number occasionally varies.

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try's geographical, at least in its magic center. It seems that at an early period natural hillocks were by preference selected as representatives of the celestial mountain. This was still the case in Cambodia in the 9th century A.D. Yaśodharapura, the first city of Angkor, founded towards 900 A.D., formed an enormous square of about two and a half miles on a side, with its sides facing the cardinal points and with the Phnom Bakheng, a small rocky hill, as center. An inscription tells us that this mountain in the center of the capital with the temple on its summit was "equal in beauty to the king of mountains," i.e. to Mount Meru.[3] The temple on Phnom Bakheng contained a Lingam, the phallic symbol of Śiva, representing the Devarāja, the "God King," i.e. the divine essence of kingship which embodied itself in the actual king. More frequently the central mountain was purely artificial, being represented by a temple only. This was quite in accordance with prevailing ideas, practically every temple in Southeast Asia, whether Hindu or Buddhist, whether built of stone, brick or wood, being considered as the image of a mountain, usually, though not invariably, of Mount Meru. In ancient Cambodia a temple was quite ordinarily referred to as "giri," mountain, and the many-tiered temples of Bali are still called Meru. The Cambodian inscriptions are very explicit with regard to such identifications. Thus, to give an example, one of them says that King Udayādityavarman II (11th century) "seeing that the Jambudvīpa had in its center a mountain of gold, provided for his capital city, too, to have a golden mountain in its interior. On the summit of this golden mountain, in a celestial palace resplendent with gold, he erected a lingam of Śiva."

THE LAY-OUT OF ANGKOR THOM

The actual ruins of Angkor Thom are the remains of the latest city on this site, built by king Jayavarman VII in the second half of the 12th century A.D. As Jayavarman was an adherent of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the central "mountain" in this case was a temple not of Śiva, but of the Bodhisatva Lokeśvara, the "Lord of the World," whose four faces adorn its numerous towers. The city was surrounded with a wall and moat forming a square almost two miles on each side, its sides being directed towards the four cardinal points. There are gates in the middle of each side and a fifth one on the East leading to the entrance of the royal palace. The towers above the gates are crowned with the same four-fold faces of Lokeśvara as those of the central

[3] Although Brahman and Buddhist cosmologies usually ascribe to the world a circular shape, the "cosmic" cities of Southeast Asia, with rare exceptions, affect the square form. It would take too long to explain this apparent, but not very important discrepancy.

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temple. Thus, that smaller world, the city of Angkor, and through its means the whole Khmer empire were both put under the protection of the "Lord of the Universe." The cosmic meaning of the city was further emphasized by a curious device. The balustrades of the causeways leading over the moat to the city gates were formed by rows of giant stone figures, partly gods, partly demons, holding an enormous nine-headed serpent. The whole city thus became a representation of the churning of the primeval milk ocean by gods and demons, when they used the serpent king Vāsuki as a rope and Mount Meru as churning stick.[4] This implies that the moat was meant to symbolize the ocean, and the Bayon, the temple in the center of the city, on which all the lines of churning gods and demons converged, Mount Meru itself.

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THE CAPITALS OF BURMA

Burmese chronicles say that Śrīkshetra (Old Prome) on the lower Irrawaddy, the capital city of the ancient kingdom of the Pyu, was built by the gods themselves with Indra at their head, built as an image of Indra's city Sudarśana on the summit of Mount Meru, with thirty-two main gates and a golden palace in its center. The remains of the city show in fact a decided attempt at a circular lay-out though complete regularity has not been achieved. It seems to have been an old custom in Burma that each of the capital's gates corresponded to one of the empire's provinces or vassal states. Thirty-two vassals or heads of provinces with the king as thirty-third in the center would of course correspond to the thirty-three gods who reside on the summit of Meru and among whom Indra is king. Thus not only the capital city but the whole empire of the Pyu must have been organized as an image of the heavenly realm of Indra.

In later capitals of Burma the square form was substituted for the circular one though the cosmological principle as such was retained. It will suffice to say a few words about Mandalay, the last capital of independent Burma, built by king Mindon in 1857 A.D. The inner city was surrounded by a wall and moat forming a square of more than a mile on each side, its sides facing the cardinal points. The royal palace, which occupied the center of the city, and more specifically the seven-tiered tower over the throne in the great audience hall, was identified with Mount Meru. There were three gates on each side of the city, twelve in all, and they were marked with the signs of the zodiak, thereby indicating that the city was meant to be an image of heaven with its stars spread out around the celestial mountain in its center.

[4] In the original myth Mount Mandara is used as churning stick. In Southeast Asiatic variants of the myth Mount Meru usually takes its place.

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COSMIC ROLES OF KING, COURT AND GOVERNMENT

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Thus the stage was set for the enacting of the cosmic roles of king, court and government. We may choose Burma as an example. There, the king was supposed to have four principal queens and four queens of secondary rank whose titles, "Northern Queen of the Palace," "Queen of the West," "Queen of the Southern Apartment," etc., show that they originally corresponded to the four cardinal points and the four intermediary directions. There are indications that at an earlier period their chambers actually formed a circle around the hall of the king, thereby emphasizing the latter's role as center of the universe and as representative of Indra, the king of the gods in the paradise on the summit of Mount Meru. Sir James George Scott's observation that king Thibaw's (the last Burmese king) failure to provide himself with the constitutional number of queens caused more concern to decorous, law-abiding people than the massacre of his blood relations, shows how important this cosmic setting was considered to be.[1] There were four chief ministers each of whom, in addition to their functions as ministers of state, originally had charge of one quarter of the capital and of the empire. They obviously corresponded to the four Great Kings or Lokapālas, the guardian deities of the four cardinal points in the Buddhist system. However, the task of representing the four Lokapālas had been delegated to four special officers, each of whom had to guard one side of the palace and of the capital. They had flags in the colors attributed to the corresponding sides of Mount Meru, the one representing Dhattarattha, the Lokapāla of the East, a white one, the officer representing Kubera, the Lokapāla of the North, a yellow flag, etc. The cosmological principle was carried far down through the hierarchy of officialdom, as revealed by the numbers of office bearers. Thus, there were four under-secretaries of state, eight assistant secretaries, four heralds, four royal messengers, etc.

Very much the same kind of organization existed in Siam, Cambodia and Java. Again and again we find the orthodox number of four principal queens and of four chief ministers, the "four pillars" as they were called in Cambodia. In Siam, as in Burma, they originally governed four parts of the kingdom lying toward the four cardinal points.

There are indications that in ancient times the cosmological structure of the state was carried even farther. I have already mentioned the probability that the old kingdom of the Pyu in Burma had thirty-two provinces or vassal states, their governors together with the king having corresponded to the

[1] Similarly, H. G. Quaritch Wales comments on the bad impression created among the people by the abolition of the harem system by king Rama VI of Siam.

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thirty-three gods of the paradise on the summit of Mount Meru. Similarly the kingdom of Pegu in the 14th century had thirty-two provinces. The principality of Keng Tung, one of the largest Shan States, significantly is called "The Thirty-two Towns of the Khün," the Khün being the ruling tribe in that state. A passage in the New History of the T'ang Dynasty indicates that the kingdom of Java in the 9th century was divided into twenty-eight provinces, their governors together with the four ministers again having numbered thirty-two high officials. This may have been a somewhat older form of the same system, in which the provinces corresponded to constellations, the twenty-eight "Houses of the Moon," and the four ministers to the guardian gods of the cardinal points. It is clear that in all these cases the empire was conceived as an image of the heavenly world of stars and gods.

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Throughout the kingdoms of Farther India the system based on the compass was largely supplemented and modified by the division into offices of the right and left hand, right and left in this case referring to the place on the side of the king due to the respective office bearer on ceremonial occasions. As the king, when sitting on the throne, always faced the East, right corresponded to the South and left to the North. In Siam, for instance, there were a major and a lesser queen each of the right and of the left. Civilian officers had their places on the left of the king, officers of the army on his right, i.e. "in the South," because the planet Mars, connected with war, was considered to be the planet of the South. Indeed, the population of Siam was divided into the two classes of the right (South) and of the left (North). The former had to render military and the latter civilian services.

INFLUENCE ON CORONATION RITUAL

The cosmic and divine role of the king was and still is specially emphasized in the coronation ritual. In Burma the structure erected for this purpose was significantly called Thagya-nan, "Indra's Palace."[6] Even in the Buddhist kingdoms of Farther India the ritual is conducted by Brahmans. One of its principal features consists in the king sitting on a throne representing Mount Meru and being surrounded by eight Brahmans as representatives of the eight Lokapālas, the guardian gods of the eight directions in the Brahman world system. Moreover, four maids of honor, representing the four cardinal points, render homage to the king.

An official document published on the occasion of the coronation of king Sisowath of Cambodia in 1906 gives a slightly different explanation of the cosmic role of the king. According to this document the king is identified

[6] Thagya is the Burmese form of Sanskrit Śakra, the Buddhist designation for Indra.

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643 with Mount Meru itself, his right eye representing the sun, his left eye the
772 moon, his arms and legs the four cardinal points, the six-tiered umbrella above his head the six lower heavens, his pointed crown the spire of Indra's palace on the summit of the Meru and his slippers the earth. This means that the king is identified with the axis of the universe. The same idea seems to be expressed by the title Paku Buwono, "Nail of the World," of the Susuhunan of Solo in Java. However, the identification of the king with the Meru is in no way incompatible with that with Indra. Plural symbolism is very frequent in Buddhist Farther India. Thus in Burma, where the king has all the attributes of Indra, he was also identified with Viśvakarma, the divine architect and shaper of the world. Moreover, there is strong evidence of his having been identified also with the sun.

THE COSMIC STATE AND THE DIVINE KING

771 The cosmic state, as it existed in Southeast Asia, was intimately bound up
643 with the idea of divine kingship. The divinity of kings was conceived in various ways according to the prevailing religion. Where Hinduism prevailed the king was considered to be either an incarnation of a god or a descendant from a god or both. Mostly it was Śiva who was thought to incarnate himself in kings or to engender dynasties. Thus in a Cham inscription of the 9th century Uroja, the founder of the royal dynasty, is said to have been a son of Śiva. The Javanese poem Nāgarakrtāgama (14th century) says bluntly that all kings are incarnations of Śiva. The same poem tells us more specially that king Rājasanagara of Majapahit (1350–1389 A.D.), as proved by various portents which occurred about the time of his birth, among others a volcanic eruption, was an incarnation of Bhatāra Girinātha, i.e. Śiva as "Lord of the Mountain." In the Javanese chronicle Pararaton king Krtajaya of Kadiri (13th century) on one occasion even shows himself in the superhuman form of Śiva with four arms and a third eye in the middle of the forehead and floating in the air. In ancient Cambodia and Champa the monarchy was intimately bound up with the cult of a lingam which was considered the seat of the divine essence of kingship. As we have seen, in Cambodia this lingam, representing the Devarāja, the "God King," was adored in the temple in the center of the capital. The actual king was considered to be a manifestation of the divine power of the Devarāja and therefore, as the latter's visible form, the lingam, implies, obviously of Śiva himself.

However, Śiva was not the only god to incarnate himself in kings. King Airlangga of Java (11th century) considered himself an incarnation of Vishnu. His memorial monument shows him in the form of Vishnu riding on

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the latter's man-eagle Garuda. Another noteworthy example of an incarnation of Vishnu was king Sūryavarman II of Cambodia (12th century) who erected his own memorial monument as a gigantic temple of Vishnu: the famous Angkor Vat. We find further the idea of plural incarnation, also known from ancient India. Thus the Pararaton tells us that Angrok (13th century), the founder of the dynasty of Singasari and ancestor of the kings of Majapahit, was an incarnation of Vishnu, begotten by Brahmā from a mortal woman, and at the same time a son of Śiva. King Krtarājasa (died 1316 A.D.), the founder of the empire of Majapahit, is immortalized by a statue representing him as Harihara, a compound of Vishnu and Śiva. Even the simultaneous incarnation of Hindu and Mahāyāna Buddhist deities occurs. Thus, to quote only one example, the Javanese king Krtanagara (killed 1292 A.D.) was considered as an incarnation of Śiva as well as of the Dhyāni Buddha Akshobhya. Accordingly, he became known in Javanese tradition under the name of Śiva-Buddha. 771 643

It may be added that the theory of divine incarnation could be used not only as a means to exalt the position of the legitimate king, but equally well as a justification for usurpation of the throne. Thus the above mentioned Angrok, the founder of the kingdom of Singasari, was an usurper with a long criminal career as embezzler, robber and murderer. Yet, in spite of his criminal past, he became king, according to the Pararaton, because he was an incarnation of the gods.

The theory of divine incarnation as found in Hinduism and Mahāyāna Buddhism is incompatible with the doctrine of the Buddhism of the Hīnayāna. This difference in tenets is clearly expressed even in the lay-out of capital cities. In ancient Cambodia a temple formed the center of the capital and thus the Mount Meru of city and empire. In Burma the center of the capital is invariably occupied by the royal palace, and it is this latter which is identified with Mount Meru. In ancient Cambodia either Śiva in his form as Devarāja, the eternal essence of kingship, or the Bodhisatva Lokeśvara, the "Lord of the Universe," inhabited the "central mountain" and from there pervaded the empire. Hīnayānist Buddhism does not recognize an eternal deity. Indra is but the king of one of the lowest heavens, the second one from the earth. He is as little exempt from death and rebirth as any human being, except that his life lasts longer. The same may be said of the inhabitants of the higher heavens. All these "gods" of Hīnayāna Buddhism should more appropriately be called angels. They have no temples and no cults. Thus it is easy to understand why in Burma no temple could be set in the center of the capital city. The adaptation to cosmological principles and 3161 771 643 184 772

361 the deification of the king here had to be attempted by other means. By erect-
771 ing the palace in the center of the city and by identifying it with Mount
Meru, the lord of the palace, i.e. the king, became automatically the repre-
643 sentative of Indra. We might even say that he was "the Indra" of this smaller
184 universe, the Burmese empire but he held his place only by the magic of
772 parallelism and he was no incarnation of the real Indra as the ancient Javanese and Cambodian kings had been incarnations of Śiva and Vishnu.[7] This scheme explains the great sanctity in which the royal palace was held in the Buddhist empires of Farther India. The palace was the symbol of the celestial mountain, nay, more than a mere symbol: it was "the Mount Meru" of the microcosmos Burma, or Siam, or Cambodia. Anybody nearing the palace had to show his reverence by dismounting from his horse, by shutting his parasol, by bowing to the palace spire or even kneeling down. Attempts to exact the same expressions of reverence from British envoys led to endless negotiations and frictions as the latter refused to comply with a demand which they
643 considered humiliating. "King of the Golden Palace" was one of the most
771 important titles of Burmese monarchs. Yet, the fact that the king "was Indra" and therefore ruler of the country only as possessor of the empire's Meru, the palace, involved great dangers. It worked as a constant temptation for would-be usurpers, be it from the ranks of the royal family or outsiders, as the occupation of the palace might be achieved by a coup-de-main with relatively small forces and usually meant the conquest of the whole empire. Many Burmese and Siamese kings therefore were virtual prisoners in their palace which they did not dare to leave for fear it might be seized by an usurper. The last king of Burma, Thibaw, preferred even to forego the important coronation ritual of the circumambulation of the capital to offering one of his relatives a chance to make himself master of the palace while he was away.

In Hīnayāna Buddhism the idea of divine incarnation as justification of kingship is replaced by that of rebirth and of religious merit. It is his good karma, his religious merit acquired in previous lives, which makes a man be born a king or makes him acquire kingship during his lifetime, be it even by rebellion and murder. A typical instance is that of king Nyaung-u Sawrahan (10th century) as told in the Glass Palace Chronicle of the Kings of Burma. Nyaung-u Sawrahan, a farmer, kills the king who has trespassed on his garden and whom he had not recognized. Thereupon he is himself made king against his wish. So strong is his karma that, when one of the ministers ob-

[7] However, strong traces of the belief that Śiva and Vishnu incarnate themselves in the king survive in the coronation rituals of Siam and Cambodia.

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643 771 and he dropped it. A similar claim was put forth by king Taksin of Siam (1767–1782).

The theory of vocation to kingship either on the basis of divine incarnation, as in Java and ancient Cambodia, or by karma acquired in former lives, as in Burma, Siam and modern Cambodia, did not deprive that of the heredity of the right to the crown of its importance. Again and again usurpers have striven for a semblance of legitimacy by construing genealogies linking themselves either to the dynasty they had overthrown or to a dynasty which at an earlier period had governed the country. Occasionally, phantastic genealogies were constructed deriving native Southeast Asiatic dynasties from some famous dynasty of ancient India. The best known case is that of the recent kings of Cambodia who claim descent from the ancient kings of Indraprastha (Delhi). The last Burmese dynasty, founded by a village headman in the 18th century, claimed descent from the Sakya kings of Kapilavatthu, a claim which would have made them blood relatives of the Buddha himself. One type of such fictitious genealogies deserves special attention as it has a deeper meaning than merely to serve the glorification of the dynasty. The kings of Funan (3rd to 7th centuries A.D.) and those of ancient Cambodia were said to descend from a Brahman who had come from India and from the daughter of the serpent king of the country. The legend is still alive in Cambodia, the Brahman being replaced in the modern version by a prince of Indraprastha. It seems that similar dynastic legends existed in most parts of Southeast Asia. The meaning is clear. The Nāgas, the serpent demons, are the original masters of the soil. By his descent from the daughter of the Nāga king the monarch had a legitimate claim to the soil of his kingdom which, in theory at least, thereby became his personal property. A Chinese report tells us that in the 13th century the people of Cambodia believed that the king nightly cohabited with the serpent goddess of the soil who visited him in his palace in human form. Obviously he was thought thereby to renew the connection between himself and the soil of his kingdom. Thus the king in ancient Cambodia, as an incarnation of the Devarāja and as a descendant and at the same time spouse of the goddess of the soil, formed a real magic center linking the empire to the divine forces of the heavens as well as of the earth.

643 772 Any account of the conceptions of state and kingship in Southeast Asia would be incomplete without at least mentioning the great importance of the regalia. Some of these, as the umbrella and the crown, have cosmological meaning as noted above. Moreover, the umbrella was thought to be the seat of a protective genius who favored the king with his advice and who in critical moments might even actively intervene on behalf of the dynasty. Other

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regalia are thought to be possessed of magic forces, such as the royal sword of Cambodia which, it is believed, if drawn from its scabbard without the prescribed ritual, would bring disaster upon the country. This magical character of the regalia is even more stressed in the Malay Peninsula and in Indonesia. It culminates in the curious conception prevalent among the Bugis and Makassarese of Celebes, according to which it is really the regalia which reign, the prince governing the state only in their name. 643 772

The deification of the king, while raising him to an almost unbelievably exalted position with regard to his subjects, has in no way succeeded in stabilizing government, rather the contrary. As explained above, the theory of divine incarnation, and even more so that of rebirth and of karma, provided an easy subterfuge for usurpers. The fact that the relatively easy task of seizing the palace, as in Burma and Siam, of or seizing the regalia, as in certain parts of Indonesia, often sufficed to be accepted as king by the whole nation, was bound to act as an additional incitement to rebellion. Moreover, the immense power and the lack of restrictions which the king enjoyed invited to abuses which in the end made the monarch obnoxious to his subjects and hastened his downfall. To this came the vagueness of the rules of succession. Sometimes the king himself chose his successor. Sometimes the ministers appointed a prince as king. Then again the queens unofficially but efficiently exercised their influence in favor of a prince of their choice. Often the crown simply fell to the prince who was the quickest to seize the palace and to execute his brothers. Under these circumstances it is no wonder that the empires of Southeast Asia from the very beginning were torn by frequent rebellion, often resulting in the overthrow of kings or even dynasties. The earliest reports we have, those from Chinese sources on the kingdom of Funan, reveal such conditions to have existed as early as the 3rd century A.D. If there was a long period of oppression and unrest, rebellion and its concomitant, dacoity, could become practically a popular tradition which it was difficult to eradicate. Such was the case, for instance, in Burma during the 18th and 19th centuries, and it is in the light of such a past that recent events in that country ought to be seen. 643 771

SURVIVAL OF TRADITIONS

In order to realize how deeply the populations of Farther India were affected by the cosmological structure of the state one need only think of the division of the Siamese people into the classes of the right and of the left which, not long ago, determined the services each person was obliged to render to the state. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the cosmomagic 643 772

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643 principle as applied to the state really forms only part of a much wider com-
772 plex and resulted from a conception of the universe and of human existence which regulated, and to a large extent still regulates, also the private lives of individuals. When in Siam and Cambodia people wore cloths of different color on different days of the week according to the color ascribed to the planet for whom the day is named, or when in Burma before any important undertaking they examine their horoscope and the lore of lucky and unlucky days, or when they kneel down for prayer on that side of the pagoda which in the cosmological system corresponds to the planet of the weekday on which they were born, they act on the same principle which governed the structure of their empires, their ideas of kingship and the ritual of their royal courts. It is clear then that the cosmomagic ideas, until a very recent past, had an extremely strong hold on the minds of the people.

Is all this a crumbling structure, giving way under the impact of modern civilization or may it still influence the political activities of the peoples concerned? The question is not easily answered. Information on this point is scarce. There are, however, a few indications.

669 We have it on the authority of H. G. Quaritch Wales that the people of
643 Siam, around 1930, still held the ancient state ceremonies in high esteem, those
772 ceremonies which to a large extent are governed by cosmological ideas. One may ask oneself, how much of this old tradition may have been at the bottom of the royalist rebellion of 1933.

In Burma the following cases may be considered as significant. In 1897, twelve years after the annexation of Upper Burma by the British, a Buddhist monk, U Kelatha, fell in love with a princess of the dethroned dynasty who promised to marry him if he became king of Burma. There followed the usual dreams or visions which revealed to him that in a former life he had been a Burmese prince and, moreover, that he would be king the moment he sat on the throne of the palace in Mandalay. With eighteen followers, all armed with swords only, he rushed through the city gates and tried to reach the royal palace, at that time seat of the English club. A few English officers armed with hunting rifles made an end to his attempt. The incident proves the extreme vividness of cosmomagic ideas at the close of the 19th century. As we have seen, whoever held the palace, the Mount Meru of the Burmese empire, thereby became the representative of Indra and king. It is completely in accord with the cosmomagic way of thinking that U Kelatha and his followers believed the mere occupation of the throne would make him automatically lord of the whole empire.

Unfortunately, very little authentic information is available on the Burmese

14: Heine-Geldern E-4 (no date) 1942 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

rebellion of 1930–31. However, the following detail, as revealed at the time by newspaper dispatches, is significant. One of the first actions of Saya San, the leader of the rebellion, was to build a "palace," in reality a bamboo hut somewhere in the jungle, with an inscription designating it as the "Palace of the Buddhist King." It is, of course, very easy to ridicule such pretensions, but it is more important to understand them. We have seen how inseparable king and palace were according to Burmese ideas. No kingdom could exist without a palace representing Mount Meru and forming its magic center, and the king, the "Lord of the Golden Palace," was king in the first line by his possession of the palace. Saya San's action in building a palace, a magic center for his embryonic empire, therefore corresponds closely to that of U Kelatha when he wanted to seat himself on the throne of the palace in Mandalay. 643 772 669

The story of the Myinmu rebellion of 1910, as told by Paul Edmonds in his book *Peacocks and Pagodas*, if it does not directly contribute to our knowledge of cosmomagic ideas, at least gives a significant instance of the power of the belief in rebirth, prophecies and portents. A young man of eighteen years, Maung Than, was returning from work in the fields smoking a cigar. Some people who passed him thought they saw smoke issuing from his arms. They talked about it in the village and the rumour reached some elders who were familiar with an old tradition according to which a former king of Burma, Chanyeiktha, would be reborn in the shape of a youth who had the power of making smoke issue from his arms. "Other signs and portents were looked for. Needless to say, they were forthcoming. The griffins at the foot of an old pagoda were seen to shake; gold showers fell on another pagoda; and everywhere omens multiplied which pointed to young Maung Than as the long-foretold reincarnation of king Chanyeiktha." Maung Than entered into the spirit of the game and put forth the usual claims of being invulnerable and of possessing the power to make himself invisible. With a crowd of a thousand followers armed with swords and spears he attacked the police station at Myinmu but was repulsed and eventually captured.

These incidents may suffice to show how lively the ideas of cosmic state and kingship, of rebirth and prophecy still are in Burma. I have little doubt that they played a role in the events accompanying the Japanese invasion. It can easily be predicted that whatever government will exist in Burma after the war, will have to reckon with these ideas and with the possibility of similar outbreaks as those mentioned above, perhaps even on a larger scale owing to the emotions stirred up by the present turmoil.

While certain dangers for peace and order inherent in the cosmomagic conception thus must be said to persist, one may ask whether there is any 000

11: Kynnersley
563, 773, 787

ALl Southeast Asia ALl

[For information concerning mythical beings, and the role of dream interpretation in relation to "a description of the Chinese lottery known as Hua-Hoey", see category 116, the entire source.]

18. Firth E-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

[438] One reason for this is economic advantage. The coming of rubber, in particular, has given to the Malay peasant of the west coast an income considerably higher, on the whole, than that of the east coast peasant.

177 565 [166] The effects of Westernization are profound. But they do not lie in crude physical displacement of the peasant or degradation of his living conditions. They lie in the widening of the gap between his expanding range of wants and his level of productivity, and in his inability to measure and in any way control the economic forces operating in his field. Westernization has meant for the peasant an enlargement of the social horizon—more knowledge, through better communications and education, of other places, of other peoples of kindred and dissimilar interests. It has created new ambitions: for different clothing, for new uses of leisure, for a better status for his children, for a position of power in the political scene. All this has disturbed the traditional patterns of peasant society. These patterns, and the class structure of South East Asian society of which they were a part, were probably never too satisfactory to the peasant. Anxiety and evasion must have often been the response to either too rigid or too elastic a rule—and the peasant seems often to have suffered from the exactions of his superior in the social scale. But the scope of the system was known, if not its precise implications. Nowadays the scope of the system has for the most part passed beyond the peasant's grasp, and much of it has become de-personalized.

To illustrate this by giving a more concrete analysis of some of the values in the peasant's life, let me take the area of Malaya and Indonesia where Islam is the major religion of the people.

181 177 565 602 776 779 671 182 In his daily life the Indonesian or Malay peasant is governed largely by the canons of behaviour, the ties of friendship and neighbourliness, the relations of work and social intercourse of his village community. So much is this so that in Java the *desa*, the village, was crystallized by the Dutch into an administrative and developmental unit, and its communal structure strengthened for welfare purposes. But as important as the village, and indeed often basic to its structure, are the family and larger kin organizations. From these a person gets his social status and much of his land and other property, and they have the primary role in his marriage and other crucial events in his progress through life.

Such domestic and local relationships also provide a framework for the peasant in his attempts to come to terms with the forces of nature and human destiny. His world of spirits is a local world. In Indonesia the ancestors do not play the predominant role which they do, for instance, in Annam. But the village, the seashore, the surrounding jungle, wells, trees, and stones are the home of many kinds of spirits, which afflict man with sickness or misfortune, or stand by him as his familiars to guard him. Basic in the religion of the Indonesian peasant is this local, essentially parochial, spirit element. All these values guide his economic and social conduct, and mean a great deal to him.

18: Firth E-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

But the situation is complex, even in village life. The system of rules governing domestic and local relations—marriage, adoption, inheritance, rights over land, succession to local office, rules of etiquette, and behaviour to superiors—is generally known as the *adat*, the custom. The nature of this custom, and what should be its relation to a more fully developed legal system, have been elaborately studied by the Dutch in Indonesia. At times indeed they have seemed to give the *adat* almost a mystical connotation. Alongside this body of custom, which of course varies from one peasant area to another, is the *shari'a*, the religious rule of Islam. On the one hand this is a unifying force, extra-village and extra-national in character, linking even the remotest mountain farmer spiritually or emotionally with the farmer or townsman of other Muslim communities in South East Asia, and far beyond. On the other hand, the Muslim religious law blends into the field of the *adat*, laying down rules about marriage, inheritance, and other family matters. Then there are the Western rules of law and administrative procedure, laying down just how land is to be acquired, held, and transferred, giving regulations for village management, and imposing penalties for certain kinds of breach of good relations. Yet the Western system offers also inducement to use the law, to protect one's interests firmly, to take advantage of situations where the *adat* has left rights undefined. So three factors—the custom, the Muslim religious rule, and the Western system of law—interact even in the heart of peasant society.

The result is a complex set of forces in dynamic operation, with the peasant being pressed by one or other of them or championing one or other as circumstances arise. In Negri Sembilan, for instance, there has come to be what is almost now a classic case of this interaction. In former times the valuable lands were for the most part those on which 'wet rice' could be cultivated. By the matrilineal system ancestrally operative in that area, these lands were handed down in the female line, from mother to daughter, or from aunt to niece. They were also cultivated largely by women. As rubber came to be developed, however, other lands on the hill-sides, previously of much less value, came to have worth too. For the most part these had to be cleared before being planted in rubber, and this clearing was a task that only men could do properly. Hence men came to have a more direct interest in this land. When questions of inheritance began to arise, divergent views became manifest. Some argued for treating new lands like the old, and handing them down in the female line like the rice lands. Yet there was a strong case for not including these rubber lands in the category of ancestral land, but for letting them be transmitted from a father to his children and through the male line in general. This principle of male inheritance is in line with the emphasis of the Muslim law. This not only gives guidance of the patrilineal kind for distribution of the property of the deceased in cases of dispute, but in all its provisions tends to stress the status of the male against that of the female.

Within the peasant society itself the potential clash of the two systems,

18: Firth E-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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671 and heightened consciousness of Islam as a world faith also tended to make
182 the religious leaders themselves much more keenly aware of any divergence. Wealthy men who want to leave property to their sons, men with a strong religious sense, men who regard themselves as progressive, or who are in revolt against their clan leaders, therefore tend to be protagonists of the Muslim law. The conservatives, those who see in the custom a defence for women, those who see in it a symbol of an essentially Malay way of life, argue for the retention of the custom. Contact with the West, they say, is changing the structure of the peasant society enough already. The issue has also entered the modern political scene, since the search for factors to increase Malay integration tends to stress the national and extra-national character of Islam at the expense of the more local qualities of the *adat*. Here too it is growing Westernization which has sharpened the issue.

184 In a general discussion such as this, one may be allowed to refer to the
565 peasantry of South East Asia as a body. But they are not uniform in ethnic composition, in national interests, in language, in religion, or in general culture. Moreover, within any local community, there are competing, even conflicting, interests and opinions. The peasant may be unable to face up to the general issues which affect his life so deeply, but in so far as he understands his own interests he is very alive to them and capable of exercising keen judgement in them. It is the small scale of his organization for the most part which renders him so vulnerable.

000 What is likely to be the future of South East Asia from the peasant angle? Prediction is not worth much, since so many elements in the situation are imperfectly known, but there are a few which seem to be significant.

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656 organizations that may be set up for his benefit. To improve his economic lot, and in particular to give him a larger fraction of his product through control of marketing, co-operative societies have often been proposed and sometimes tried. Their success has been only limited, partly because the peasant has not been fully persuaded of their attractions as against what the alien middleman can offer, and partly because of the difficulty of securing adequate technical supervision and administration at a sufficiently low official level. Much is now apt to be made of the colonial or semi-colonial status of the South East Asian peasant as a drag upon his development. There is no doubt that colonialism, as a specific form of political control of under-developed territories by a metropolitan Power, is

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1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
1 [See pp 37ff., category 241 or 116.--
Analyst]

Shifting cultivation, the most primitive type of agriculture, may be briefly defined as an economy of which the main characteristics are rotation of fields rather than of crops; clearing by means of fire; absence of draft animals and of manuring; use of human labor only; employment of the dibble stick or hoe; short periods of soil occupancy alternating with long fallow periods. Other terms for shifting cultivation are field-forest economy and field-forest rotation. 241 361 311

Shifting cultivators prefer flat land, but in Formosa, the Philippines, Indochina, and Thailand they have been forced back into the hills and mountains and must often be content with fields on steep slopes (Figs. 16, 17). This has led some observers to believe that shifting cultivation is exclusively practiced in hilly or mountainous regions, or that such regions are preferred in this economy. However, in the Outer Islands[3] of the Netherlands Indies, one frequently finds ladangs in flat country (Fig. 18). If the ladang is very steep it is rarely used for more than one crop, so that new clearings must be made every year.

Many shifting cultivators no longer change their dwellings when they turn to new land; they have become sedentary at least as far as their houses are concerned. They may build a hut in the ladang if it is too far away from their village and may occasionally live in such a shelter, especially at the time when the ripening crop has to be guarded against animals, but they will return with the harvest to their permanent houses in the village (Figs. 10, 19–21).

Ladang culture, as is frequently true of any form of agriculture, is intricately interwoven with religion. Magic practices and sacrificial offerings must accompany every step in the culture, even if the people are no longer pagans but, for example, Mohammedans. Friedericy has made a careful study of these magical-religious customs in the Ponre mountains at the head of the Gulf of Bone in southern Celebes.[4] In this region the people live in small permanent villages. Whenever they are in need of new ladangs—every second year—the heads of the families meet to choose new locations. At this stage they try to find out from the spirits if these agree to the clearing of the land that was selected. For this purpose the village headman (*dukun*), or somebody else who is familiar with magic, is sent out to the part of the forest that has been chosen. Here the delegate places betel leaves (*Piper betle* L.), each with a small slab of lime and a piece of areca nut (*Areca catechu* L.), under a tree and expresses the desire of his community to cut the trees and to use the soil. He ends with the wish that the betel leaves and the areca nuts be scattered should the choice 241 787• [361] [824]

[3] I have used the term "Outer Islands" to denote all the islands of the Netherlands Indies not comprised in the jurisdiction of Java and Madura (Madoera). The Dutch administrative term is *Buitengewesten*.

[4] Friedericy: "Ponre," 1932, pp. 1–34; idem: "De taak van het bestuur," 1937, pp. 488–501. For an excellent description of the magical-religious rites that are associated with the agricultural efforts of the Bemba of Northern Rhodesia, see Richards: Land, Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia, 1939, pp. 351–380.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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of the new ladang be a poor one. After three days the same person returns, and if he finds that the offerings have been scattered a new location is chosen and a new attempt is made to get a favorable answer from the spirits. In case the betel leaves have been found undisturbed, all male members of the village have a meal on the chosen land. Then the area is divided among the villagers by the headman. Each individual appeals to the spirits by placing a betel leaf with lime and areca nut on the ladang that has been turned over to him. If the answer is unfavorable he tries again. The betel leaf may be placed three times. If the offering is disturbed each time, the headman turns over a part of his share, which is considerably larger than any of the others, to the less fortunate villager. Throughout the following agricultural year with its stages of clearing, planting, and harvesting, the peasant repeatedly requires the services of the dukun, or *shaman*, as well as the betel leaf.

In other regions details differ, but the essential fact remains that the social-religious life and thinking of the shifting cultivator is bound up with his characteristic form of cultivation.

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Shifting cultivators have no concept of private land ownership. The land belongs to the community, the tribe, or the village, and each member has the right to use as much land as he needs and can cultivate. The location of the land that he is to use may be decided upon by the village council or the headman. The person who clears the land and plants the crop gets the produce. Nobody has the right to plant a plot that has been cleared by someone else. As soon as the land is abandoned all rights are forfeited, except the right of the community. However, if trees have been planted, the ownership of the trees and their produce remains with the person who planted them, and he is given preference when the land has had a sufficient fallow period and can again be cultivated.

The Effect of Shifting Cultivation on the Land

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As has been stated above, ladangs decline in fertility after the first crop, and obnoxious grasses and weeds appear among the stooling tree stumps. As long as there is an abundance of forest land at his disposal the cultivator prefers to abandon the ladang. Under favorable conditions the grasses will, in turn, give way to second-growth forest. In the course of centuries this second-growth forest may develop into a climax forest, that is, a forest having the same composition as the primeval forest. In any case, when tall forest growth again occurs, the land will have had time to recover its original fertility.

Unfortunately, however, conditions are often not sufficiently favorable for a regeneration of soil fertility and the development of a good second-growth forest. As a matter of fact, the practice of shifting cultivation has altered the character of vegetation beyond recognition over wide areas in Southeastern Asia. Instead of a dense primeval rain-forest, we now find

11: Kynnersley
563, 773, 787

ALl Southeast Asia ALl

[For information concerning mythical beings, and the role of dream interpretation in relation to "a description of the Chinese lottery known as Hua-Hoey", see category 116, the entire source.]

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 ALl Southeast Asia ALi

titioners and patients do not know the difference and buy the cheapest.[1]

These probably are among the chief reasons why 'the systems of oriental medicine have fallen into decay'. The task of improving the standard of health in the tropics is aggravated by the fact that western medical science usually reaches the people as one aspect of economic penetration, and must first be applied towards repairing and preventing the mischief naturally consequent on the process of development. A solution of the problem has been attempted along two lines: the provision of medical assistance; and the introduction of modern hygiene. It is important to notice the essential difference between these alternatives. Medical assistance aims to promote *individual* welfare, and ordinarily requires the voluntary co-operation of the patient; hygiene aims to promote *social* welfare, and necessarily involves a certain measure of compulsion.

2. Medicine

Ordinarily the introduction of western medicine in the tropics originates in the needs of Europeans. From very early days the East India Company arranged with the Apothecaries Company for the supply of barber-surgeons to their ships and settlements. In Africa likewise the various administrations at first confined the provision of medical services to the needs of their own establishments. But administrative establishments are partly native, and non-officials in commerce and industry require medical attention. In Burma the earliest members of the general public to receive the benefits of western medical skill were the convicts in jail, and the expansion of medical services in the interior has been closely bound up with the growth of crime. It is only natural that generally throughout the tropics the provision of medical assistance has developed with the economic demand for doctors, and has been organized so as to cost no more than necessary.

But the spread of western medicine in the tropics has not been due solely to the growing demand for doctors; it has been due in part to the demand for patients. Medical missionaries look for patients. It is true that missionary organizations need doctors to preserve the lives of missionaries. But they have also recognized in western medicine an instrument for extending their influence among the people. To deliver their message they must find some method of

[1] *RPI* (India), 1897–1902, p. 245; *CISM*, pp. 13, 15, 23.

7: Furnivall G-4,5 (no date) 1948 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

758 attracting listeners. Where, as under direct rule, the people want education in order to get jobs, missionaries have provided schools. •797 Where, as under indirect rule, education has had less market value, they have provided hospitals. Missionaries have sought patients in the cause of welfare, hoping that by saving life they might rescue souls. Moreover the demand for patients has not been wholly altruistic. On western enterprise employers have come to recognize the economic value of providing medical attention for their labourers, in the hope that by improving health they might save labour. In Java under the Culture system the Government produce depended on the well-being of the plantation coolies and, in the forties, when the pressure on the labour supply led to famine and depopulation, it could no longer be disregarded. Thus, so early as 1851, a start was made in the training of natives in western medicine. In the same year Protestant missionaries were admitted. In Burma, developed by native enterprise under direct rule, missionaries have specialized in education, but in Java, developed by western enterprise under indirect rule, medical work presented a more favourable opening.

It is true, of course, that medical missions have looked on the provision of medical care as a good thing in itself, apart from ulterior motives, and that administrations and employers have been actuated by human sentiment in providing and extending medical facilities. Ordinarily the chief factor in stimulating humanitarian impulse has been the shock occasioned by a sensational outbreak of disease. In Siam the modern medical service dates from an epidemic of cholera in the early eighties; the ravages of sleeping sickness in 1901–2 focussed British attention on Uganda; shortly afterwards the outbreak of plague advertized the need for medical care in India and the Tropical Far East. But humanitarian considerations have been reinforced by the practical requirements of western enterprise, and it is 758 in regions developed by western enterprise that medical work has 743 made most progress. Of the hospitals in Java, other than dispensaries, about two-thirds are private institutions, and in the Outer Provinces nine-tenths.[1] In Malaya, before the late war, the tin and rubber companies were maintaining 232 hospitals. In Ceylon about three times as many were provided by companies managing estates, and there were about an equal number of Government dispensaries together with 93 State hospitals.[2] But Asiatic owners and

[1] *Netherlands India*, p. 380.
[2] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, pp. 29, 30.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

population was checked at the point of diminishing returns. In all these lands the growth of population has reflected the conditions of employment, but whether numerous or scanty, under different systems of rule and with different methods of development, the people remain poor. Economic development has failed to enhance material welfare.

The argument for economic development as an instrument of welfare further assumes that economic and social services are necessary for the provision of welfare. We have already seen that this is not the case. Cultivators adopt new crops and new methods of cultivation without the aid of economic services, and the people take to new foods without encouragement from dieticians. One of the outstanding victories over the tsetse fly in Africa was achieved by ordinary natives, under sympathetic leading, but with no expenditure on welfare services.[1] Most of the reforms most urgently needed in social life in most parts of the tropics need no expert knowledge, and could be introduced without any special staff (though a special staff *should*, of course, facilitate and expedite their introduction). Where the people can be induced to want new amenities they will pay for them, as they do for schooling in Uganda and elsewhere. Thus the inability to promote welfare in tropical dependencies cannot be ascribed to the limitation of economic and social services through lack of revenue or of funds from other sources, and we must seek another explanation.

3. The Measurement of Welfare

If we cannot accept the rapid economic progress of tropical dependencies as sufficient evidence of increasing welfare, we must look elsewhere for a yard-stick by which it may be measured. In social science as in physical science, only beginners and amateurs will conduct experiments without trying so far as possible to measure the results. Some of the older dependencies produce masses of statistics purporting to show the population revenue, and trade, and also matters of social interest, such as litigation, crime and the numbers at school or in jail. The statistics, however, are mostly compiled for administrative purposes and have little meaning or interest for outsiders; many figures are of doubtful accuracy and are frequently misleading, full of traps for the unwary (and even for those who compile them and use them in administration). One might expect at least the trade returns to be intelligible to the public, but anyone who has tried to work on them will endorse the comment of Lord Hailey that 'eccentricity, so in-

[1] Hinden, p. 202.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

803 teresting in social life, loses its charm when applied to trade statistics'.[1] The revenue statistics often seem designed to furnish the least information at the greatest length. The trade and revenue statistics and the figures for population, so far as they are available, accurate and comprehensible, may throw some light on economic progress, but as an index to welfare they are of little or no value.

In India many attempts have been made to arrive at estimates of welfare by calculating the national income, but in the plural society of the tropics the conception of a national income is invalid because there is no homogeneous nation. For the same reason estimates of welfare based on trade returns are meaningless. It has been suggested that in Africa the value of imports retained for consumption provides a basis for measuring economic conditions.[2] But, as a criterion of welfare in a plural society, this has no significance. The import of machinery for constructing mills or factories may increase the profits of western enterprise, but it will not raise the prices paid for raw materials to cultivators. Similarly the export figures tell us nothing about the economic progress of the natives unless they show the native contribution to the exports. Trade statistics do throw some light on the relation between economic progress and native welfare because they usually reveal a large export surplus, often attributed to 'invisible imports' but due in part to quasi-monopolist profits of western enterprise for which no services are rendered. In general, however, statistics afford no criterion of welfare in a plural society unless they furnish information separately for each important section of the community.

That is a matter which has received great attention from the Dutch. The inadequacy of the trade and other statistics came to notice in the 'Enquiry into Diminishing Welfare' held at the beginning of the century; subsequent enquiries of the same kind, official and non-official, have stimulated attempts to give a more precise content to the figures. In some matters the statistics for Netherlands India are less complete and less accurate than those for Burma, but they are notable for the endeavour to differentiate racial sections. There are separate figures according to racial status for production by western and native enterprise, for income-tax assessments, for housing, for the ownership of motor cars and even for the use made of the post office. Moreover, in special enquiries, such as that of Meyer-Ranneft and Huender into the pressure of taxation, and in the 'Little Welfare

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1353. [2] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 27.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

Enquiry' by Wellenstein, a technique has been developed for turning to the best account such statistics as have any bearing on native welfare.[1] 803

Lord Hailey has remarked that in Africa the existing statistics might be considerably improved without additional expense, and that a comparatively small expenditure would make them much more useful. That remark applies also to Burma and probably to most other tropical dependencies. Unsatisfactory as the statistics for Netherlands India are in some respects, they do at least serve to illuminate many corners that are left dark elsewhere, and the general neglect to provide means for judging how far the benevolent aspirations expressed in statements of colonial policy bear fruit in practice, naturally affords a handle for critics of colonial administration to suggest that it is more keenly interested in economic progress than in native welfare. It is not enough that material should be available for measuring individual welfare. The analysis of welfare demands a suitable technique for measuring social welfare by presenting accurate and intelligible information regarding debt, civil litigation, crime, health, education and other matters that find no place in individual budgets of income and expenditure. There would still remain imponderable elements, those cultural and religious aspects of social life in the tropics which are the first to suffer from the economic struggle for survival of the cheapest consequent on the impact of the West. But this is no reason for neglecting to carry so far as possible the objective scientific measurement of welfare.

4. The Machinery of Welfare

The deficiency of statistical material is a notable defect in the machinery of welfare. But it is not the only, and not the chief, defect. It may seem that no special machinery is necessary, that the care for welfare may be left to the local official charged with the maintenance of order. That is very largely true. Any European official can tell the people that dirt breeds disease, or explain the benefit of vaccination, or advise them to destroy mosquitoes and rats, or bring to their knowledge new and more profitable crops, or suggest new breeds of cattle, or inculcate the advantages of thrift and the danger of getting entangled with money-lenders. None of the most urgent reforms in the daily life of tropical peoples calls for special scientific equipment beyond the stock of knowledge common to educated Europeans. Natives have frequently

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[1] Furnivall, *Economic Journal of India*, 1934, p. 295.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTES

113 *BEFEO* = *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient*
JASB = *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*
JBRS = *Journal of the Burma Research Society*
JRAS = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*
JRASSB = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Straits Branch*
JRASMB = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Malayan Branch*
JRASNCB = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, North China Branch*
JRGS = *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*

The *Journal of the Indian Archipelago* is sometimes referred to as *Logan's Journal*.

128 CURRENCY

435 The Spanish dollar varied in value, according to the price of silver, between 3*s*. 6*d*. and 4*s*. 6*d*. 4*s*. can be taken as a mean.

436 The rupee = 1*s*. 6*d*. sterling. On 1 April 1947 the currency of Burma ceased to be linked to that of India.

In 1906 the Straits Settlements dollar was fixed at 2*s*. 4*d*. The Straits Settlements dollar was later replaced by the Malayan dollar with the same value, but the sign SS$ is still sometimes used for convenience. M$ is now usual.

At parity there are 11 Siamese bahts (ticals) to the pound sterling.

The official buying rate of the Indochinese piastre in 1949 was 12·55 to the United States dollar.

The official rate of exchange for the guilder (Indonesia) is 10·691 guilders = one pound sterling.

The peso (Philippines) = 50 United States cents.

804 WEIGHTS

128 One picul = 133⅓ lb.[1]
One catty (kati) = 1⅓ lb.
One tahil (tael) = 1⅓ oz.

MEASURES

1 hectare = 2·471 acres.
1 mow = ⅙ of an acre.
1 orlong = (about) ⅔ of an acre.

[1] But the *Statesman's Year-Book* (to which reference should be made for up-to-date information regarding currency, weights and measures, &c.) states that in the Netherlands East Indies 1 picul = 136·16 lb. avoirdupois.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
1 [See pp 37 ff., category 241 or 116, -- Analyst]

Shifting cultivation, the most primitive type of agriculture, may be briefly defined as an economy of which the main characteristics are rotation of fields rather than of crops; clearing by means of fire; absence of draft animals and of manuring; use of human labor only; employment of the dibble stick or hoe; short periods of soil occupancy alternating with long fallow periods. Other terms for shifting cultivation are field-forest economy and field-forest rotation. 241 361 311

Shifting cultivators prefer flat land, but in Formosa, the Philippines, Indochina, and Thailand they have been forced back into the hills and mountains and must often be content with fields on steep slopes (Figs. 16, 17). This has led some observers to believe that shifting cultivation is exclusively practiced in hilly or mountainous regions, or that such regions are preferred in this economy. However, in the Outer Islands[3] of the Netherlands Indies, one frequently finds ladangs in flat country (Fig. 18). If the ladang is very steep it is rarely used for more than one crop, so that new clearings must be made every year.

Many shifting cultivators no longer change their dwellings when they turn to new land; they have become sedentary at least as far as their houses are concerned. They may build a hut in the ladang if it is too far away from their village and may occasionally live in such a shelter, especially at the time when the ripening crop has to be guarded against animals, but they will return with the harvest to their permanent houses in the village (Figs. 10, 19–21).

Ladang culture, as is frequently true of any form of agriculture, is intricately interwoven with religion. Magic practices and sacrificial offerings must accompany every step in the culture, even if the people are no longer pagans but, for example, Mohammedans. Friedericy has made a careful study of these magical-religious customs in the Ponre mountains at the head of the Gulf of Bone in southern Celebes.[4] In this region the people live in small permanent villages. Whenever they are in need of new ladangs—every second year—the heads of the families meet to choose new locations. At this stage they try to find out from the spirits if these agree to the clearing of the land that was selected. For this purpose the village headman (*dukun*), or somebody else who is familiar with magic, is sent out to the part of the forest that has been chosen. Here the delegate places betel leaves (*Piper betle* L.), each with a small slab of lime and a piece of areca nut (*Areca catechu* L.), under a tree and expresses the desire of his community to cut the trees and to use the soil. He ends with the wish that the betel leaves and the areca nuts be scattered should the choice 241 787 [361] [824]

[3] I have used the term "Outer Islands" to denote all the islands of the Netherlands Indies not comprised in the jurisdiction of Java and Madura (Madoera). The Dutch administrative term is *Buitengewesten*.

[4] Friedericy: "Ponre," 1932, pp. 1–34; idem: "De taak van het bestuur," 1937, pp. 488–501. For an excellent description of the magical-religious rites that are associated with the agricultural efforts of the Bemba of Northern Rhodesia, see Richards: Land, Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia, 1939, pp. 351–380.

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their native country; moreover they have a stubbornness of disposition which distinguishes them from their fellow Chinese. (It is worthy of note that the most numerous among the early Communists in the Nanyang were the Hailams and Hakkas.)[1]

Sun Yat-sen said: 'The Chinese people are of the Han or Chinese race with common blood, common language, common religion, and common customs—a single race.' As regards 'blood' in any scientific sense this is manifestly untrue; on the contrary,

> The modern Chinese people is an amalgamation of many elements originally different from one another. . . . In colour; in stature, above all in cephalic indices, about 42 per cent are mesocephalic and about 43 per cent are brachycephalic, and about 15 per cent dolichocephalic. Even these classes are distinctly subdivided into dolicho-leptorrhinic and dolicho-platyrrhinic. There is also a low-headed type, and, in the South, a trace of a dwarf element. . . . Prehistory points to a race already mixed in the basin of the Yellow River. . . .[2]

In spite, however, of a number of modifications and reservations, the remainder of the statement of the Father of the Revolution, especially regarding religion and customs, could be convincingly maintained. Allowing for the numerous variations which have been suggested above, the Chinese of Southeast Asia, drawn mostly from Fukien and Kwangtung, are quite remarkably homogeneous. Not only have they marked physical characteristics in common; their customs, their religion, their attitude of mind have an almost uncanny similarity. What Clement Williams remarked of their shops in Bhamo on the Yunnan-Burma frontier nearly ninety years ago—'the likeness of one Burmese to another is striking, but the absolute sameness of one Chinese shop to another is truly wonderful'—is equally true of the 'sameness' of Chinese temples, houses, ornaments, customs, methods of mining and agriculture, and handicrafts all over the Southeast Asian area, from the city of Cholon to a remote *tienda* in Mindanao, or from the tin-fields of Larut to the pepper plantations of Cambodia. Nor is this merely a superficial impression (such as 'all Chinese look alike'); it derives from their common steeping in Chinese culture, even though the latter's springs of inspiration have ceased to well up from the depths and it has been for long (as Professor Toynbee says) in a state of petrification.

[1] See p. 370 regarding the Japanese identification of Hailams with Communism.

[2] *China Year Book* 1932.

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in quantity into the colonial possessions and received the praise that is reserved for an efficient and well-oiled machine. But a movement was already incubating which was to change the whole attitude towards the Chinese of Europeans and indigenous peoples alike. The birth of Chinese nationalism coincided with the numbers of the Chinese emigrants reaching a new high level.

Sun Yat-sen in his *Three Principles of the People* said (as Mazzini had said long before him) that 'nationalism must precede internationalism'. Continuing the passage on race already quoted in part earlier in this chapter he went on:

> But the Chinese have no national spirit; they only know the family and clan groups. Thus China is only a loose sheet of sand. Our position is extremely perilous—if we do not promote nationalism and weld together our four hundred million into a nation, we face a tragedy—the loss of our country and the destruction of our race.[1]

This warning was taken very much to heart by Young China, though the process towards national consciousness had already gone a long way before Sun Yat-sen crystallized the sentiment in these words. The effect of the intense nationalist campaign coupled with an education drive was to make the Chinese everywhere conscious of their separateness as a race and nation, and, in Southeast Asia, to render the peoples among whom they lived aware that they regarded themselves as a race and nation apart. Almost simultaneously the seed of nationalism had been sown in the hearts of the other races and they were beginning to feel that they, in their turn, faced a tragedy—unless they, too, promoted nationalism and welded themselves into a nation, they might suffer the loss of their country and the destruction of their race.

The simultaneous growth of two such sentiments within one country meant that the communities grew nationalistic spines which when they were erected pricked their neighbours painfully. It was like Schopenhauer's definition of human beings as 'hedgehogs nestling together for warmth'. And the 'warmth' they sought in common (if such a metaphor can properly be used of countries sweltering in intense tropical heat) was the livelihood that Southeast Asia had, so far, abundantly afforded. But with large-scale immigration came competition, and the growth of economic rivalry between the races was coincident with the growth of nationalism.

[1] Lecture 1.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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161 development who fear that these countries might not be able
433 to expand their production faster than population expands, in which case the result of economic development efforts will be a greater quantity of people with little or no gains in the quality of living conditions. In Zinkin's words, "The growth of population and the impact of the West have between them, in the last hundred years, so upset the delicate balance that most of the Asian countryside is now bankrupt . . . . The alarming feature of the peasant economy of Asia is not simply that it is desparately poor. It is that in recent decades, and in most countries of Asia, it has been growing poorer. It is a changing, dynamic economy. But it has been changing for the worse."[23]

433 Poverty is not new in Southeast Asia. What is new
829 is the awareness of poverty and the conviction that something
178 can be done about it. "A great change", reported Harold Butler, "is stirring Eastern society. The consciousness of misery has been created by the growing realization that it is not the inescapable lot of the poor and that chances
654 of better life now exist."[24] All of the countries in South-
648 east Asia have within the past decade set up official agen-
185 cies charged with planning and promoting economic development; and for international assistance to hasten it, is the constant

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23. Zinkin, op. cit., p. 34.

24. Harold Butler, Problems of Industry in the East (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1938, Studies and Reports, Series B, No. 29), pp. 65-66.

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167 The new-style marriage, based on the consent of the parties, and
178 often arranged by themselves, has gradually been spreading in
582 popularity among the better educated. The cost of the wedding
593 and its preliminaries has also been much reduced. This is a consequence, too, of the growing equality between the sexes.

871 *Education.* It was only by dint of continual defeat at the hands of
212 foreign Powers that China realized that her traditional literary sys-
167 tem of education, which had endured for over a thousand years, did not fit her to withstand the assaults of her enemies. At long last she decided to adopt an educational system on modern lines. The greatest obstacle in doing this was the classical language. The literary language in which all education was conducted had become completely divorced from the spoken language, and it needed many years of study before a student could obtain anything like command of it. Whilst it remained, a democratic system of education was out of the question.[1] So it was that in 1917 there occurred the most revolutionary happening in the history of Chinese education, the initiation of the *pai hua* movement.[2]

Pai hua, or written vernacular, had existed in China for centuries. Most popular novels were written in it, but it had never obtained the recognition of the literati. Corresponding, as it did, to the spoken language, it was much more easily learnt than *wen li*, the Chinese literary language, though it was clumsier and more discursive. So when Dr Hu Shih maintained that the literary language should be abolished in schools and that *pai hua* should be elevated to the rank of a literary medium, the proposal was considered as threatening the very foundations of Chinese culture. But the movement obtained powerful political support and in January 1920, the Minister of Education ordered that the spoken language should be used in the teaching of Chinese in primary schools. The form of *pai hua* approved for this purpose became known as *Kuo Yü*, or the National Language.[3]

in 1899 and repealed in 1932. By this enactment the Secretary for Chinese Affairs had powers to decide the custody and guardianship of women and children, and to order divorce, separation, adoption, and betrothal.

[1] Dr W. A. P. Martin estimated about 1880 that the proportion of Chinese who could read and understand what they read was about one in twenty.

[2] For a full exposition of the subject see Victor Purcell, *Problems of Chinese Education* (London, Kegan Paul, 1936).

[3] See Hu Shih, *The Chinese Renaissance*. The Haskell Lectures, 1933 (University of Chicago Press, 1934).

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The adoption of *Kuo Yü* as a medium of instruction in schools is about one-half of the story of education in China under the Kuomintang: the other half is the adoption in 1928 of the Three Principles of the People of Dr Sun Yat-sen as the foundation of the education system.

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The overseas Chinese of the Nanyang adopted with fervour the new style of education which the Revolution had brought into being. They started and ran their own schools, and the resultant rise of Nationalist feeling made the Governments of the several countries more and more apprehensive of the creation of an *imperium in imperio* in their midst.[1] Such was particularly the case in Malaya and Siam, and the crux of the friction between the China-born Chinese and the local administration has been their differences regarding the aim and control of this education. This will emerge in the course of the individual country studies of our survey.

The majority of the emigrants had little or no schooling before going abroad. It is reasonably certain that until quite recently the average emigrant was not a man of education at all, or at most he had had a very inadequate schooling before emigrating.

Religion. On going overseas to the Nanyang the Chinese took with them their religious beliefs. Be the principle of Buddhism, Taoism, or Confucianism effective or ossified, there can be no doubt at all that the world of spirits, demons, gods, and heroes is still a very real thing to the majority of Chinese and goes with them wherever they go. Dr Ta Chen notes that among the items of household expenditure other than food, clothing, and shelter, that for religious practices predominates over all others both in the emigrant and non-emigrant families of east Kwangtung and south Fukien. ('These expenditures', he says, 'are a good index of the prevalence of religious concern.') Scepticism has assuredly grown with the advance of education, but for the majority it would seem that 'keeping in' with the Great Unseen was as much a matter of insurance as of piety and ethics.

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Broadly speaking, the religion of the villagers of south China consists of the worship of Shen, Fu, and Yao in addition to the cult of their own ancestors. Shen and Fu are spirits from Buddhism and Taoism (especially the popular, corrupted, and confused aspects of

[1] See Cyrus H. Peake, *Nationalism and Education in Modern China* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1932).

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S 578 668 [811] C 578 648 668 native community. The Chinese National Government manifested an increasing solicitude for the *Hua Ch'iao*, the overseas Chinese, whom it regards almost as its children; it instructed its consular officials to register all the Chinese within their jurisdiction, and they sent missions to inspect every activity of overseas Chinese life. What is more, the Chinese Government took upon itself to direct the education of Chinese in the Nanyang, laying down the curriculum to be followed, and even introducing a system of grants-in-aid in competition with that of the local Government. It often happened that remote officials in Nanking or Chungking, very likely originating from one of the northern provinces and completely out of touch and sympathy with the Chinese of the Nanyang, claimed the right to direct their affairs. Even ethnically speaking the overseas Chinese might be nearer to the Siamese or Burmese, or (by intermarriage) to the Indonesians, than to a Chinese from Honam or Kansu. It was no wonder that Siam, Malaya, and the other countries of Southeast Asia saw an *imperium in imperio* growing up in their midst and began to fear for their own eventual safety.

S 578 668 177 C 578 668 648 177 This development, then, we are constrained to regard as in many ways a misfortune for the overseas Chinese and for the countries in which they had made their home or wherein they were sojourners. It arrested assimilation and erected a racial wall. At the same time the simultaneous growth of local nationalism encouraged the Chinese to look to their own country for protection—a protection, it turned out, it was, because of its own internal division and weakness as a Power, in no position to give. Nor did the authorities in the one country of Southeast Asia where the Chinese now were the majority community offer any real encouragement to the local-born Chinese to regard Malaya as their own country and to resist the claims to control their destinies by a remote Government in a country they had never seen. The chance to extend the teaching of English to the community was lost and for thousands the only means of receiving an education of any sort was in the Chinese Nationalist schools; the doors of the Malayan civil service were opened to Malays but not to Chinese; the whole policy of Federated and Unfederated Malay States was, and is still, pro-Malay. It was surely no wonder that the Malayan-born Chinese who, while proud of their Chinese ancestry and culture, wished to identify themselves and their

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with all the emphasis of italics, in rural areas '*the jails are not large enough to make the use of force possible*'. Moreover, coercion cannot give permanent results, and, after a failure due to the use of coercion, it is more difficult to secure the co-operation of the people. It should, he suggests, be used 'only to carry out measures which have already secured the support and the co-operation of at least 90 % of the people of that area'.[1] The use of gentle pressure to improve hygiene was a characteristic of the former Ethical policy in Netherlands India. But experience brought disillusionment. Modern British colonial policy follows the Dutch Ethical policy, in aiming to encourage hygiene by lavish expenditure on social services, and by recourse to legal compulsion or pressure. But compulsion in the interest of public health creates more problems, and more difficult problems, than it solves; the essential factor is human, not mechanical. Hygienic customs in the tropics have grown up slowly as a condition of survival in a tropical environment. Even so far as they suited the environment they reflected the general backwardness of tropical peoples, inviting European intervention which entailed the disintegration of tropical society and the collapse of social customs, good and bad alike. Many customs, indeed, that formerly were useful, now became harmful. Modern conditions require the observance of new restrictions on individual liberty. It is possible to enforce these so far as they are requisite to economic development, and the expenditure of funds on social services has done much to promote economic efficiency, though not to the full extent needed by economic progress. But that is very different from enhancing welfare, in which little can be done until the people themselves or their leaders are conscious of a need for betterment.[2] This change of attitude is usually expected to result from education.

4. Education: Types of Schools

In modern colonial policy few subjects have been so voluminously discussed as education. Apologists for colonial rule cite the expenditure on education as proof of its beneficence; critics complain that the expenditure is inadequate and that the methods of education are unsound. There is nothing new in this emphasis on education in tropical dependencies; it is an old tradition dating back to the Papal Bull of 1493. Education has always been regarded as a main instrument

[1] Hydrick, pp. 18ff.

[2] *African Survey*, p. 1206.

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of welfare; what is distinctively modern is a new conception of welfare. Formerly attention was concentrated on welfare in the next world, but now few look beyond this world. Education is expected to help the people to produce more, and to teach them thrift and business principles; to improve their health and inculcate modern ways of life, and, finally, to guide them to self-government. On these objectives, despite controversy as to methods, colonial powers in general agree. It seems also that in tropical dependencies in general educational policy has developed along similar lines, has produced similar types of schools, has encountered similar difficulties, and has had similar results. And repeatedly these results have been directly contrary to the ends proposed. At each setback educational enthusiasts elaborate new projects, but with no better success. For the repeated failures there would seem to be one sufficient explanation: they disregard the environment. Educationists frame their projects with reference to conditions in the homogeneous society of the West and attempt to show what education might be and ought to do, but they do not pause to consider what education actually is and does and can do, and accordingly in the plural society of tropical dependencies, their plans miscarry.[1]

The common tradition of western civilization is that education should teach the children how to live as members of the community. This tradition is not merely western but worldwide. It is the tradition of Hindus and Moslems, and was formerly well illustrated in the monastic schools of Burma, which aimed at teaching the boys how to live as Burman Buddhists. The African likewise has 'his own methods of education in the form of character training and instruction in crafts or, in the case of girls, in the duties of domestic life. . . . Social obligation forms the core of all teaching given by tribal elders, and the system is directed to fitting the youth to take his place in the traditional life of his group.'[2] But the old systems of education, whether elaborate as in Burma or primitive as in Africa, do not equip the child for life in the modern world, and modern education aims at teaching a new way of life. In the tropics 'education is, and is intended to be, an instrument of change'.

Naturally then the educational activities of colonial powers have depended on their desire to change the outlook of their subjects and to diffuse new ways of life among them. Educational policy accord-

[1] Furnivall, *Economic Review*, 1912; *Proc. Anglo-Netherlands Society*, 1944–5, p. 7.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1207, 1279.

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ingly reflects both the evolution of political ideas in Europe, and the course of changes in the relations between Europe and the tropics, so that, in broad outline, it has followed much the same course everywhere. Not infrequently missionaries have preceded, and indeed paved the way for foreign intervention, and have included education in their sphere of work. Ordinarily, however, in the earliest stage the Government has made such provision as might seem necessary for educating Europeans and has laid the foundation of modern European schools, but has left native education to the people. Then humanitarians, and especially missionaries, with the support of Liberal opinion, have obtained permission to provide schools for natives. This leads to a third stage in which practical considerations induce colonial powers to encourage native education. All these three stages, though distinct, have a common feature, that the prevailing attitude to education is one of *laissez-faire*: although in the third stage they provide funds and supervise expenditure, they abstain so far as possible from intervention and leave native education to private enterprise. Then, with the transition from a policy of *laissez-faire* to one of active construction, there succeeds a fourth stage in which the colonial administration assumes responsibility for the promotion, direction and control of education.

The process thus briefly summarized may be traced most clearly in the older British and Dutch dependencies; elsewhere the various stages have been telescoped, but we may recognize its operation in the evolution of four different types of schools. For children recognized as Europeans, there are *European schools* which aim at giving an education similar to, if not identical with, the corresponding course in Europe. The schools provided by missionaries have developed along two lines. In some the instruction is based on the appropriate European language, and in others on the vernacular. Both kinds of school are western in type, because directed by Europeans in accordance with western ideas, but it is convenient to distinguish those based on a European language as *Western schools*, and those of the other class as *Vernacular schools*. This classification applies equally to schools maintained wholly or in part from private sources and those managed by the Government. The western schools are intended for the westernized native; sometimes policy has inclined towards making them different from European schools, but the general tendency now is to make the course and conditions in western schools as much like those in European schools as

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•871 circumstances allow, but with an adaptation to local culture. The vernacular schools are intended for children who will ordinarily remain within the native sphere of life, but in some degree of contact with the western world. The *Native schools*, mostly religious and often confining formal instruction to little more than the elements of religion, are a survival from an older world, and provide for that section of the people which still looks backward to the past. Thus almost everywhere we find these four types of school: European, Western, Vernacular, and Native.

The evolution of the same types of school under different colonial powers in widely distant regions of the tropics suggests that the course of progress has been directed by the force of circumstances rather than by deliberate policy, and it is significant that in respect of each type educational policy has been frustrated by the force of circumstances. Until quite recently policy has aimed at marking off the European schools by refusing the admission of natives or restricting it within such narrow limits as not to imperil their predominantly western character. But it has rarely been possible for long wholly to exclude natives, or even to maintain western standards of instruction. Now, at least under British rule, the tendency is to draw the line between European and western schools less sharply. Of still greater interest is the contrast between policy and practice in respect of western and vernacular schools. The policy has been to exercise restraint over the growth of western education and to encourage vernacular education. Yet everywhere western schools are vigorous and have multiplied even to excess, especially under the system of direct rule; one great problem of educational administration has indeed been to keep these schools within limits that the revenue can afford. On the other hand, it has often been easier to provide vernacular schools than to get children to fill them. So far as in some countries vernacular education has made progress, it is for the same reason that has made western education generally popular, namely, that it provides the means to make a living. Similarly, attempts to foster native schools have failed; their curriculum has grown more narrow, and the attendance has declined.

5. Education and Laissez-faire

Any examination of educational policy and practice in tropical dependencies must start from India, for this has led the way. We have glanced at education in India when reviewing educational progress

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in Burma, but it requires closer study. Formerly in India, as in Burma, the native schools aimed at teaching the children how to live, and, where this is the end of education, the more who go to school the better. At the end of the eighteenth century missionaries, aspiring to teach a better way of life, arrived. Despite the sympathy of some liberally-minded men, including the Governor-General, Lord Hastings, who in 1815 expressed a wish for some system of public instruction,[1] they had a long struggle against official discouragement and popular apathy. Their prime object was to elevate the masses, dispel ignorance and superstition, and spread Christianity, and with this object in view they gave instruction both in the vernacular and English. The latter soon proved its utility. So early as 1833 we find an Indian parent instructing his son that, although Sanskrit literature contained all that was really valuable, yet 'for secular purposes, for gaining a livelihood, a knowledge of the English language was absolutely necessary'.[2] These early missionary efforts had a most important influence in fostering the demand for English education. They taught the natives that English was a profitable acquisition, and the Government that English-speaking natives were profitable servants. The four stages of tolerance, approval, and encouragement of private enterprise, and finally of State control over education are marked by four outstanding official pronouncements.

In 1835 a Resolution decided unequivocally on preferring western education over the native system. The foundations of the modern educational system were laid in a dispatch from the Court of Directors in 1854, which recognized it as 'a sacred duty to confer upon the natives of India those vast moral and material blessings which flow from the general diffusion of useful knowledge'. This dispatch stressed the importance of primary instruction for the masses. 'If any portion of the orders can be pronounced characteristic and distinctive, it was education for the great mass of the people.' When a commission was appointed in 1882 to report progress, the instructions required that it 'should specially bear in mind the great importance which the Government attaches to the subject of primary education'. Its report, which guided educational policy for the remainder of the century, was based on the principle of encouraging private enterprise and abstaining so far as possible from official competition. The review by Lord Curzon in his Resolution of 1904 was the fourth of these

[1] *IG*, IV, 409ff. [2] McCully, p. 44.

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871 landmarks in educational policy, 'the special obligation of the Government towards the vernacular education of the masses, which was declared by the Court of Directors in 1854, was endorsed by the Education Commission of 1882, and has been reaffirmed by the Government of India whenever it has reviewed the progress of education'.[1]

But the masses did not want primary instruction, whereas the middle classes wanted jobs and the Government wanted 'to create a supply of public servants'. There was an economic demand among the public for western schooling, and an economic demand in the administration and in western enterprise for the product of western schools. In these schools missionaries preached the Christian virtues, and educational authorities stressed cultural values, but with the people nothing counted but examination results. Boys crowded the schools, and parents demanded more schools. Missionaries and schoolmasters, zealous in their calling, but not insensible to the lure of larger grants, made room for more and more boys, and educational authorities, also from mixed motives, provided more and more schools. Where schools teach children how to live, the more who go to school the better; but when they teach them merely how to make a living, the more who go to school the less they earn. There was a demand for clerks; and the more clerks, the cheaper. Competition raised the standard of qualification for the various appointments. When the market for school graduates at any standard of attainment became saturated, the boys pressed on to higher standards, and higher education was little more than an euphemism for more valuable qualifications. The results were surveyed by Lord Curzon in his Resolution of 1904. Contrary to the hopes of early enthusiasts, education had become an economic rather than a cultural asset; the desire of Indians 'to realise the manifold advantages as soon and as cheaply as possible, tended to prevent both schools and colleges from filling their proper function as places of liberal education'. There was a keen demand for schools and schooling, but practically none for school graduates except in clerical employment and the law. Thus the schools produced a surplus of unemployable and discontented men, whose intellectual attainments were bounded by the 'literary' syllabus prescribed for their examinations, and whose character had not been strengthened by moral discipline. On the other hand, the primary

[1] Indian Education Commission, 1882, Report, pp. 24, 112, 625; *RPI* (India), 1897–1902, pp. 457 ff; *IG*, iv, p. 417.

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instruction of the masses had made practically no progress. The early pioneers of education looked forward to raising the masses, dispelling superstition, spreading Christianity and fostering an attachment to British rule. But a hundred years of educational endeavour left the masses ignorant, stimulated aggressive Hinduism, and provided a focus for seditious agitation. The Resolution of 1904 accordingly marks the turning-point from a policy of *laissez-faire* to one of constructive effort and control.

In Burma and Malaya similar conditions, complicated by the supply of Indian and Chinese candidates for employment, had similar results, though rather later. In Netherlands India educational progress was slower, chiefly because under indirect rule and the Culture system there was a smaller demand for clerks. But the course of development was essentially the same. On the restoration of Dutch rule in 1816 the Government provided schools for Europeans, but in Java it expected the Regents to encourage native education. Missionaries were admitted to the Outer Provinces, though excluded from Java through fear of Moslem sensibilities. With the Liberal reaction against the Culture system, the Government recognized its responsibility 'for spreading light in India'. The adoption of this policy dates, as in British India, from 1854. Missionaries were admitted to Java at about the same time, but, as there was still some fear of Moslem reaction to Christian schools and there was as yet little demand for educated natives, they paid more attention to medical work. The European schools provided the subordinates required for clerical employment, and, except for a very few members of the upper classes who were admitted to the European schools, the natives had no facilities for learning Dutch, though in the towns some attended vernacular schools. From about 1900, however, the rapid economic development created a demand for more subordinates than the European schools supplied; the Ethical leaders emphasized the moral and material value of education and, before long, they found support in the growth of a Nationalist movement. In 1907 Dutch was introduced in some vernacular schools; in 1911 these were converted into western schools, preparing boys for the Clerkship Examination; and in 1914 facilities were given for further study. (The village schools established from 1907 will call for notice in connection with vernacular instruction.) Western education rapidly developed along the same lines as in British India. A junior clerk could earn fifteen to thirty times as much as an ordinary labourer, and the western school became 'the

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principal gateway to higher social rank and better opportunities of earning money'. Within a little over ten years from 1914, there was a surplus of unemployable school graduates, and diehards were criticizing western education as breeding unemployment, discontent and political agitation.[1] Similarly, under French rule in Indo-China, an educational policy claiming to diffuse the high ideals of French civilization had similar results, and was subjected to the same criticism.

If we turn to Africa we find educational progress following much the same lines. Here, as elsewhere, the pioneers of modern education, western and vernacular, were missionaries, with little support or supervision from the Government. In regions under indirect rule, so long as native chieftains were left to govern on their own lines, there was little demand for men from modern schools and, as in Java, western education made little progress. In Nigeria there was no Government school until 1899 and, when the country was taken over from the Niger Company in 1900, 'the first problem that presented itself to the newly formed administration was the lack of a clerical staff.... In these circumstances the various governments, and to a less degree the trading firms, were only too anxious to employ anyone who could read and write, and, as the country developed, the demand increased far more rapidly than the supply.' Education was a profitable economic asset and naturally 'the demand for any form of education was tremendous'.[2] 'At the mines, the trading stores and on European estates, the English speaking native can often command a better position and a higher wage.' The people wanted education 'not only for its use as a medium of approach to the administration and in commerce and industrial relations, but as the symbol of a higher status'. In Africa as in India the competition for well-paid appointments pushed up the standard of qualifications required to secure employment and, for lack of local facilities, natives with sufficient means went on to European or American universities, though 'the resultant efflux was socially and intellectually undesirable'. Thus, within a generation, we find in Africa the same complaints as in India and the Tropical Far East. The curriculum was criticized for 'bookishness', as being 'academic', 'literary'; there was the same 'cult of the certificate' and, although under indirect rule lawyers were not

[1] Creutzberg, Dr K. F., *Asiatic Review*, 1934, p. 119; Freytag, p. 69; Schrieke (*see* Bradley, p. 275).

[2] Burns, pp. 263–4.

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so numerous as in India, the superfluity of 'preachers and editors' was criticized from very early days. By about 1925 the conditions which had inspired Curzon to formulate a new educational policy for India in 1904 had arisen also in Africa, and here also education policy took a turn in the direction of control.[1]

6. Constructive Education

When Curzon reviewed education in India the high hopes of early enthusiasts had faded, and the system of public instruction was generally regarded, not only in India but in other British dependencies and under French and Dutch rule, as a horrible example of what not to do. Criticism was chiefly directed against two points. The curriculum was condemned as academic, useless; and the study of English history and of the British constitution was held to be largely responsible for political agitation. Both criticisms were mistaken. The curriculum was, in fact, narrowly utilitarian, adapted to meeting the economic demand for clerks and subordinate officials; and political agitation was far more advanced and effective in the Philippines under Spanish rule than in India where the pupils studied Burke and Mill. Both ideas, however, were shared by Curzon, and he set about providing remedies. He directed that vocational and technical instruction should have a preference over 'academic' subjects; he wished to encourage higher moral standards by ethical teaching, stricter discipline and closer supervision and, especially, by stressing female education; and he reaffirmed the urgent importance of primary vernacular instruction. Through these reforms he expected to further economic progress by enabling cultivators to produce more, and also by providing capitalist enterprise with a larger supply of skilled labour and of more intelligent unskilled labour; he thought also to enhance individual welfare by teaching the people how to earn more, and social welfare by instructing them in modern hygiene; and he hoped to quiet political agitation by providing new openings for the unemployable intelligentsia. 'We have done our part,' he said, 'it rests with the people themselves to make a wise use of the opportunities that are now offered to them, and to realize that education in the true sense means something more than the mere passing of examinations, that it aims at the progressive and orderly development of all the faculties of the mind, that it should form character and teach right conduct—that it is, in fact, a preparation for the business of life.'

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 1219, 1232, 1244, 1258, 1279, 1285.

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During the present century the course of economic, social and political evolution has given a similar trend to educational policy throughout the tropics and especially in the direction of giving the system of instruction a more 'practical' character. In Burma, Malaya, Netherlands India, Indo-China and the Philippines, there have been repeated attempts to foster more assiduously vocational and technical instruction; from 1925 a series of pronouncements on policy in Africa almost re-echo the words of Curzon. Advanced education should be 'of a definitely utilitarian type' and mainly directed to 'the improvement of agriculture, animal husbandry and health'. The money spent on it 'would return to primary education in the form of teachers, to health in the form of doctors and to economic production in the form of agricultural, veterinary and forest officers'. It was thought that 'there is little danger of creating a class of educated unemployed as there is a growing need for the services of educated Africans'. There was 'general agreement that education cannot be confined to the few, but must progressively extend to the mass of the people', and there must be 'a drastic improvement in primary education'. At the same time 'the greatest importance was to be attached to religious teaching and moral instruction', and female education was to be encouraged—with such caution as might be necessary in view of Moslem prejudices. Also 'the need for closer inspection and control by government' has been accepted.[1]

That everywhere the current of educational policy should have turned in the same direction at about the same time is remarkable; what is still more striking is that it has been reinforced by the rising tide of nationalism. Between foreign Governments and Nationalist politicians there are many points of acute difference, but all agree on the importance of education and, in general, on the lines that it should take. Official and Nationalist views are not wholly identical. Official policy tends to regard education as an instrument of individual welfare and Nationalists regard it as a means of national advancement.[2] Although Nationalists admit the desirability of general primary instruction, they tend in practice to lay more stress on higher education with a view to political and economic emancipation. Nationalists whole-heartedly endorse the official view as to the importance of technical instruction. There is still another feature common to the educational policy of Nationalists and officials. All alike

[1] *African Survey*, pp. 1229, 1233, 1281, 1290.
[2] *Ib.* pp. 1281, 1286.

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throughout the tropics recognize the *need* for well-educated natives in all lines of life; but they tend to overlook the fact that there is a very small *demand* for them.

7. Education and Progress

It is in the sphere of vocational and technical instruction, bearing directly on economic progress, that one would expect to find the need for education most intimately connected with demand. Throughout the tropics agriculture is the chief, and almost the sole, occupation of the people, and it is conducted on traditional lines without the help of modern science. There should, then, be great scope for improving agricultural methods by instruction. That appeared obvious to Curzon and, in his project of giving a practical bias to education, he assigned the first place to agriculture. In other dependencies the same plausible argument has seemed convincing. Yet in India, Burma, Java and the Philippines attempts to teach the people better cultivation have proved unsuccessful. General experience shows that the courses fail to attract farmers and that the students look for posts under Government or on western enterprise, or else seek non-agricultural employment in the towns. In Malaya, when an agricultural school was opened in 1931, 'there had long been a serious need for it'. There was a serious need but a very small demand. 'A disappointingly high percentage do not intend to manage their own land, but want positions under Government or on estates. Here the experience tallies with that of agricultural schools in Java and the Philippines. The agricultural department is now pretty well staffed, so that the number of vacancies is declining.' The school helped the plantations by turning out cheap overseers, but even these were mostly Chinese, whom the employers preferred to Malays. Although the intention was to promote Malay welfare, the result was chiefly to profit western enterprise.[1] Much the same thing has happened in Africa. In the Transkei agricultural training has been provided since 1904, and there have been special schools since 1914. The men found employment as demonstrators and not as farmers, and in the former capacity their services were in demand so far off as the Belgian Congo. 'There is some fear however that it may not be possible to keep up these schools; the demand for agricultural demonstrators is, for various reasons, already slackening, and shows signs of decreasing still further.'[2]

[1] Mills, pp. 355–6.

[2] *African Survey*, p. 1222.

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The expectation that technical instruction would provide a substitute for academic instruction has clearly proved fallacious. On the contrary, academic instruction has developed more rapidly than before. For this the insistence on technical instruction is in part responsible. Technical instruction is based on modern science, and requires a higher standard of general education than most pupils in the ordinary western schools attain. In Netherlands India technical instruction dates from 1901, when the growth of western enterprise was creating a demand for locally trained assistants. The technical institutes were open to natives, but were inaccessible because at that time only European schools equipped their pupils to receive technical training. That is still the position in many tropical dependencies. Few pupils study natural science, and only a small proportion reach a stage which equips them to receive technical instruction. Technical instruction does not take the place of general education, but stimulates the further development of general education. But the chief reason for the continued and more rapid growth of ordinary secondary and higher education is the modern expansion of western enterprise and commerce. This has created a greater demand for clerks and for a better knowledge of the appropriate European language. In Burma the growth of private enterprise in teaching English compelled the Government to accede to the teaching of English in vernacular schools. In Java the people insist on learning Dutch, and in Indo-China French. In some parts of Africa 'native life is so closely bound up with a dominant white civilization, that the native is not adequately equipped to meet the conditions with which he has to contend unless he knows a European language'.[1] For nearly half a century colonial education policy everywhere has been directed to giving a technical, utilitarian bent to the system of instruction, but has been unable to prevail against the economic forces creating a demand for (more strictly utilitarian) 'academic' courses. Curzon looked to his new policy to train the people in the business of life, but in practice the new policy, like the old, does no more than train them for a life of business. Under the new constructive policy as under the former policy of *laissez-faire*, education in the plural society of a tropical dependency is an instrument of economic progress, dominated by economic forces, and a powerful factor in converting the social order into a business concern.

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1286.

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8. Education and Welfare

Everywhere and always education has an economic aspect, for material welfare is one main concern of human life. The monastic schools in Burma aimed primarily at teaching the boys how to live as Burman Buddhists, but under their own kings they were also the chief means of advancement in Church and State. That was true also of education in medieval Europe. But in the modern world, when the application of rational criteria to social life reached the classroom, the economic aspect of education came into the foreground. In Europe this tendency has hitherto been kept within safe limits by the force of common social tradition but, in the plural society of tropical dependencies, there is no such tradition. It was because experience during the period of *laissez-faire* showed the need for some corrective that Curzon inaugurated the modern policy of providing a substitute for social tradition by teaching hygiene, thrift and morals.

Hygiene, accordingly, is now often taught in schools. The teaching of hygiene can be enforced by attaching suitable conditions to the grant of funds, and teachers can be encouraged to obtain certificates as teachers of hygiene by the lure of better pay. But hygienic principles, as actually taught, are valid only for the examination hall. In Burma, one may find lessons on hygiene being given in a classroom thick with cobwebs. In western schools the teaching of hygiene survives only through compulsion, and in the vernacular schools it 'is a farce'.[1] Similarly in Malaya, as elsewhere, the teachers of hygiene sleep in unventilated rooms and neglect the most elementary precautions as to food and drink that they impress daily on their pupils.[2] In the teaching of hygiene 'success lies not in having the child learn facts about hygiene, but in having him learn hygienic habits'.[3] In this matter the Dutch, as usual, are very thorough. Each child is provided with a form in two parts. Every day on reaching school he must inspect the teeth, hands and nails of the child next him, and enter their condition on that child's form. The other part of the form, concerning his habits during the previous day in washing his hands, using the latrine, cleaning himself after defecation and so on he must fill in for himself. At the end of the month the forms are made over to a sanitary inspector, who visits sample

[1] *RPI*, 1927–32, p. 40; 1932–3, p. 17; 1932–7, p. 26.
[2] *RPI* (Malaya), 1938, p. 89.
[3] Hydrick, p. 59.

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homes to check the correctness of the entries. This system would seem unlikely to foster harmony in the classroom or the home, and one would hesitate to recommend it generally; and, except possibly in Java, the entries in the forms, whether made at home or in school, might be inaccurate and incomplete. But, even so, the Dutch recognize that it is useless to teach hygiene in school without raising the standard of hygiene among the parents.[1] In Burma, and probably elsewhere, men who have qualified as sanitary inspectors make a large part of their income by conniving at breaches of the health rules. Children may learn to pass examinations from text-books, but they learn to live from example and experience, and where the text-book teaches one thing and the environment another, it is the latter that prevails.

Again, the modern school is expected to inculcate thrift. In this matter also, in Malaya as elsewhere, teachers exhort the children to be thrifty while themselves notoriously in debt. Another agency for teaching thrift is the co-operative credit movement, but co-operative subordinates are no more solvent than subordinates in other services. The whole economic system of tropical dependencies favours and, one may even say, is based on, indebtedness among the cultivators and labourers; it is through advances to cultivators that exporters get cheap produce, and through advances to coolies that employers get cheap labour. One cannot cure this by teaching thrift in schools. Parents incur debt to provide a western education for their children, and men who have been taught thrift in school from the infant standard to the university do not learn to shun the moneylender. If the schools cannot teach cultivators to make more money, which they do want, they are unlikely to be more successful in teaching them western ideas of welfare which they do not want, and in great measure are precluded by the environment from adopting. Without fundamental changes in the economic environment, and in the climate of popular opinion, the idea that western ideas of material welfare can be taught in school is an illusion.

Very similar conditions apply to education as an instrument of moral welfare. Curzon deplored the lax discipline and low moral standards in the schools, and thought to provide a remedy by introducing moral primers and text-books of personal ethics, and by enforcing stricter supervision and control. We have noticed the sequel in Burma. When the new policy was first adopted, the moral standards

[1] Hydrick, pp. 13, 81.

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of the western schools in Burma were considered satisfactory; but religious training, ethical instruction and closer supervision were of no avail to check the decline of school discipline and morals until, within a quarter of a century, they had deteriorated to much the same level as in India. In India itself a tacit admission of the failure of the new policy to attain its end is apparent in the latest report on educational progress, which contains no reference to religion or religious education, and only 'one depressing and colourless paragraph is devoted to moral instruction'.[1] In Africa again, when the need for a constructive educational policy was realized, 'the greatest importance was to be attached to religious teaching and moral instruction'. It seems, however, that the adoption of this formula was partly due to the need for conciliating missionary bodies that provided nine-tenths of the instruction, and in practice moral training fights a losing battle against efficiency. Many of the missionary schools are regarded as unsatisfactory in respect of secular instruction, and Governments, hard-pressed for funds, demand efficiency, with visible and measurable results. Thus 'it may well be felt that the time has come when the state should show greater discrimination in the support it gives to the smaller mission school'. The larger mission schools also feel the strain of reconciling religion and efficiency. As standards of instruction rise with the demand for higher and more valuable certificates, the maintenance of schools becomes more costly, and the missions feel the pinch already, while their prospects of financial expansion are remote.[2] Educational policy pays homage to morals and religion, but economic forces govern practice and oust morals and religion from the schools. As the people want cheap qualifications quickly the Government has their support in cultivating efficiency. 'It is the desire for school-teaching rather than any doubts about his own faith which is often the chief inducement for the native to bring his children to the missionary', and native opinion is beginning to show itself impatient of missionary control.[3] The missionaries themselves recognize the utility of secular instruction and, although there are some 'with whom the impulse to effect conversions has seemed to outweigh all other considerations, it would be far from true to say that this spirit has been characteristic of missionary endeavour as a whole'; many 'would wish to combine a more effective

[1] *Overseas Education*, 1940–1, Oct. p. 75.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1229, 1235, 1237, 1242, 1284.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 1216, 1235, 1242.

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type of education with their religious teaching did their resources permit'. Some, however, are suspicious of efficiency. '*Education*', wrote Bishop Weston, 'is in danger of killing Africans, soul and body. I view with great alarm the movement for educating Africans as quickly as possible....Education is the right of Africa—but education as practised at present will be Africa's curse.'[1]

The restriction of official support to the more 'efficient' type of missionary school reacts on female education. In Africa since 1925, as in India since the time of Curzon, the importance of female education as a means of promoting social welfare has been emphasized. There was the same apprehension that was felt in Java as to Moslem reactions, but in 1936 experience was held to justify the reaffirmation of this principle with greater confidence, and female instruction went ahead—to the prejudice of female education. In the domestic education of women the missionaries were doing useful work. 'There are few stations where some girls or women are not receiving a valuable if limited training in the domestic sciences or in the care of children, in nursing or midwifery, or as teachers.'[2] This was education—learning a new way of life not from text-books but by example and experience in an appropriate environment; but it could not be tested by examinations, or easily be recognized by grants conditional on any mass criterion of efficiency, and financial limitations and the doctrine of efficiency are causing the withdrawal of official grants from most of such schools. In Burma the American Baptists have done similar work among the Karens, with the indirect result that, among all the native peoples, the Karen Christians show far the highest percentage of female literacy. But that is not all. Many Karen girls after passing through the high schools, or even the university, willingly return to domestic duties in the village and the home. It is different with the Burmese. Despite the tradition of female literacy, there was no systematic provision of instruction for the girls. The women do most of the petty trade and, when the British Government opened schools to them, the girls in towns hastened to take advantage of their new opportunities. But it is only of late years that many have sought more advanced education in western schools, and these seem to be actuated by the same motive as their brothers, the desire to get 'a decent job'.[3] Whether female 'education' among westernized Burmese

[1] Maynard Smith, H., *Frank, Bishop of Zanzibar* (1926), p. 257.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1229, 1231, 1255.
[3] *RPI*, 1927–32, p. 25.

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871 562 will produce better mothers, or birth control and cheaper typists, is a question for the future.

9. Vernacular Education

872 So far we have been dealing in the main with western education, and have seen that the prospect of gain is sufficient to crowd the schools beyond capacity, but only so far, and in such directions, as they lead to a remunerative certificate; and that all values, other than examination values, are at a discount. Primary vernacular education provides the obverse of this picture because, in general, it does not pay; it is merely an instrument of human welfare. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century the diffusion of general enlightenment in India through primary instruction has been a main objective of humanitarian sympathy; this principle was adopted and placed in the forefront of official policy from the middle of the century, and it was reaffirmed by Curzon at its close. Yet the progress achieved 'is shown by statistics admitted by the highest educational authorities to be thoroughly unsatisfactory',[1] and in Burma, which started the nineteenth century under native rule with a literate male population, the picture of primary instruction after a hundred years of British rule is 'one of almost unrelieved gloom'.[2] For over a hundred years there has been general agreement in India that primary instruction is the most effective instrument of material and moral welfare, yet, so far as there has been any progress under either head since the time of Wilberforce and Carey, it certainly cannot be attributed to the spread of primary instruction. This has not spread because there has been no demand for it. Now that it is again proclaimed with new insistence as the chief aim of modern educational policy in the tropics generally, some examination of the grounds on which it has been advocated seems expedient. Apart from humanitarian considerations they fall under two heads, political and economic.

872 21 Many have urged the spread of vernacular instruction on grounds of political convenience. Curzon cited with approval the dictum that 'among all sources of administrative difficulty and political danger, few are so serious as the ignorance of the people'.[3] This view is still widely held. Mass education is recommended as a safeguard against explosive temper liable to produce a social upheaval. One is told that 'an increase of literacy makes the people easier to control and govern',

[1] Mayhew, *India*, p. 226. [2] *CVV*, p. 156.
[3] *RPI* (India), 1897–1902, p. 462; *Mass Education*, p. 7; Mayhew, *India*, p. 226.

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872 believe this will send their children to vernacular schools so that they can earn more, just as in the past they have sent their children, often at great sacrifice, to western schools, and with the same result, but on a vastly wider scale, of producing discontent when the supply of those who can read and write is in excess of the demand. If vernacular education be recommended to the people as a means of individual advancement, it may provide more intelligent and more economic labour, but it will be perverted, like western education, from an instrument of welfare into an instrument of progress and its expansion will be governed by the demand for labour. The problem is to find some non-economic motive sufficient to induce parents to send their children to school. If such a motive can be found, then the more who go to school the better.

10. Native Education

871 While vernacular instruction has languished, native education has declined. It was formerly the strength of native education that it was based on ideas transcending the economic sphere. It taught them how to live. Now that the world in which it taught them how to live has vanished, the native schools decay. In Burma the monastic schools have lost much of their social value through the drainage of their wealthier and brighter pupils into western schools. In towns they have suffered also from the competition of lay schools, feeding the western schools, providing candidates for subordinate vernacular appointments, and attracting others who for various reasons are content with secular instruction. It has been the policy of the Government to adapt them to the modern world. 'The method of translating the policy into practice varied from time to time, but the variations played on a single theme—the secularization of the curriculum and methods of the monastic school.'[1] The monastic schools sufficed to provide magistrates and judges, so long as no other schools were available, but they did not fit into a scheme based on the assumption that efficiency in education could be tested by the acquisition of certificates qualifying for appointments, and they could not compete with the better lay schools in getting boys quickly through their examinations. Thus they were driven into the backwoods. There was no need to secularize western education, though it was largely in the hands of missionaries, for missionary schools, no less than lay schools, are dominated by the cult of the certificate, and now, as we have noted, the problem is 'how to spiritual-

[1] *CVV*, p. 131.

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ize education'. Similarly, in Java, the progress of modern education has led to the decay of native schools. Formerly 'the children were entrusted to some village elder or religious leader for moral and social training, and also to learn simple arithmetic and reading and writing in a local script or in Arabic. These forms of teaching shrank to a simple religious teaching, and this process was quicker at first than the development of the new government education. Paradoxically therefore the creation of modern education increased the number of illiterates'.[1] The introduction of French education in Indo-China seems to have had a similar result. The decay of native education in the Tropical Far East is obvious because these schools, especially in Burma, had attained a comparatively high standard of instruction, but it has happened throughout the tropics from the Pacific Islands to Africa.

In Africa the native system of education was directed to character training and instruction in crafts. But the crafts are dead or dying. 'The African artistic genius has produced objects of singular beauty inspired by religious beliefs and social customs and the necessities of social and domestic life. These sources of inspiration are profoundly modified, if not destroyed by modern conditions, and there is evidence of a decline in artistic taste accelerated by the replacement of indigenous articles by those of European manufacture, the commercial exploitation of so-called native crafts, and lack of encouragement.' Everywhere 'native manufacture is undoubtedly on the decline: the smelting of iron is moribund; the ubiquitous petrol tin has made pottery almost a forgotten art; the handloom has nearly disappeared. It is a regrettable effect of European contacts in Africa that an increase of wealth should thus destroy rather than stimulate local craftsmanship.'[2] In Africa also, as in Burma and the tropics generally, the same process is visible in non-productive arts, in music, dancing and the drama, and also in native pastimes. 'The danger of the present time', it has been said, 'is that undue emphasis will be placed on economic welfare and mechanical progress, and that even leisure will be commercialized so that the true springs of artistic creation and enjoyment may have very little outlet.'[3] But that is nothing new, or peculiar to the present time. Despite benevolent aspirations in colonial policy, it has always been inherent in colonial practice. The decline of native arts and crafts and

[1] C. O. van der Plas, see Djajadiningrat, p. 65.
[2] *African Survey*, pp. 1207, 1290, 1420.
[3] *Mass Education*, p. 49.

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pastimes is merely one aspect of the elimination of non-economic values in the plural society of a tropical dependency, and native schools and native education decay because the ideas on which they rested lose their meaning.

II. Education and Instruction

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Even in England it is often suggested that the ideas on which education has rested in the past are fading and must be recovered. Enthusiasts for education propound large claims as to what education might or ought to be, and what it might, should or must do. But they tend to overlook what education actually is and does, and confound education with instruction. Education is much wider than instruction, and much older. During the long ages of pre-history man survived because he was capable of learning, by example and experience, to adapt his way of life to his environment; succeeding generations learned new lessons in the school of life. Education dates from the emergence of mankind. Instruction, however, was of minor importance before the invention of the art of letters, which gave man a new and more efficient means of transmitting his social heritage and of communicating new ideas. But it was chiefly significant in giving a foremost place in education to mental discipline, the training of the mind. This helped man to understand his environment and made him better able, not merely to adapt his way of life to his environment, but to adapt his environment to his way of life. It gave him a key to progress. In the course of modern progress instruction has come to play a growing part in education. But it is not the whole of education; it is that part of education which consists in the formal training of the mind. Education is much wider; it is the sum of all the processes that equip the child for life in adult society.

The distinction between education and instruction is so obvious that it might seem a platitude if it were not so often overlooked. When advocates of education in the tropics say that 'education is, and is intended to be an instrument of change', or that 'the whole mass of the people must have a real share in education and some understanding of its meaning and purpose',[1] they show that they mistake its meaning, and are regarding it as something grafted on to life. The teacher of a training college in the Philippines tells us to 'think of tropical peoples as organisms having to adjust themselves to a physical and social environment which under modern conditions may embrace

[1] *Mass Education*, p. 4.

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more or less of indigenous and alien elements'. That is true. But he goes on to argue that 'education is the process by which they gain the best adaptation',[1] and obviously is thinking merely of instruction. In Burma, 'the major task of education is to help towards the establishment of economic security and the improvement of living conditions in the village'.... 'The task', says an optimistic expert in educational technique, 'can be undertaken *by reconstructing the curricula of the schools*.'[2] Educationalists, in claiming that education should or must promote the good life, or change the social order, or soften the impact of western civilization, overlook the fact that education is not something given in the school or by way of formal instruction, but is the operation of the whole environment. They will readily admit that the school can play only a minor part in education, but underlying the high ideals that find expression in educational policy is the tacit assumption that these lofty aspirations can be realized in practice by instruction for a few years, during a few hours a day in certain subjects as set forth in text-books through teachers who often do not believe in what they teach.

In the West the tendency to identify education with instruction is not unnatural, for the school is the product of and is conditioned by the environment, and the instruction given there is reinforced by and reinforces the social environment outside the school. The education of the child proceeds on the same lines inside and outside the school, and it is convenient to distinguish by the name of education that which is given in the school. But in the tropics 'the school itself is largely exotic in character, and so is often unable really to reflect and interpret the society which it is intended to serve'.[3] The schools are expected to promote welfare, but much of the teaching in school runs counter to and is countered by the social environment outside the school. Europeans are quick to impress on nationalist politicians the folly of trying to create industries by training men to practise them, but the project of creating welfare by training men to teach it is no wiser. Instruction *seems* important, far more important than it is, for whereas we are conscious of instruction, other educational processes are largely unconscious. We know when we are being taught, but often fail to recognize until long afterwards, if ever, that we are learning and, in comparison with the pressure exerted by the environment, school teaching is negligible.

[1] Keesing, p. 43.
[2] *CVV*, p. 195 (my italics).
[3] *Mass Education*, p. 6.

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811 The tropics have learned much from Europe; but very little from schools or school-books. Their first lesson is that spears and bows and arrows are no match for bayonets and machine-guns. More is taught by the wrath of the tiger than by the horses of instruction. It is significant that they do not grasp the meaning even of this lesson. They learn from experience the greater efficiency of western arms, but experience does not teach them the secret of moral discipline that has gone to the perfection of western military power. Even the Japanese, whose social tradition was strong enough to provide the necessary moral discipline, overrated the importance of military power and did not fathom the secret of its limitations. Schools, teachers and text-books may try to sow the seed of western civilization, but the pupils are content to pluck the fruit. They see the fruit; they see that export crops are more profitable than food crops; that the motor-car is speedier and more comfortable than the bullock cart; and, among other things, both good and bad, they learn that 'education' is a way to make a living—not from pronouncements on educational policy, but from practical experience both inside and outside the school. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, missionaries and humanitarians have expected education in the tropics to change the character of the environment, but in the event the environment has changed the character of education. The schools meet the demand for officials and subordinates in administration and western enterprise and produce a supply in excess of the demand. In Burma there is 'waste of effort and money on instruction that is making but little, if any, impression on the illiteracy of the masses at one extreme, and adding to the gravity of the already grave problem of the unemployed graduate and product of the secondary schools at the other'.[1] This picture of the results attained in Burma after a hundred years of British rule applies to tropical dependencies in general, but it is a poor return for the labours of so many generations of zealous and devoted teachers, missionaries and laymen.

Western schools produce a surplus of clerical skill, and mass education may produce a surplus of educated unskilled labour. So far as it goes, the instruction given in the schools is good, useful. It enables those, or some of those, who receive it, to earn more money than they would otherwise, and helps western administration and enterprise to function more efficiently and cheaply. Both these things are desirable. But they are not the things that humanitarians have in view

[1] *CVV*, p. 183.

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when pleading the cause of education. The advocates of education look on instruction as a key to western civilization and the modern world, and so it is. So long, however, as the people have no books to read, the door is not only locked, but barred and bolted.

Primary instruction teaches the people to read. But if they have no occasion for reading, they tend to forget what they have learned in school and to lapse into illiteracy. A modern environment, with moneylenders, law courts and a postal service, creates a demand for reading as a useful accomplishment; in a literate environment people do not forget their alphabet so readily. But it does not supply them with books or create a habit of reading. If their religion has its scriptures, there will be a demand for religious books, as in Burma, where there has been a demand for such books from the first introduction of printing, though for show rather than for use. Both in Burma and Netherlands India, when the reading public was still very small, it was thought necessary to take action against pornographic literature.[1] That was what the public wanted. Under the stimulus of nationalism, newspapers may achieve a modest circulation, if sufficiently critical of Government. But it is more difficult than it may seem to provide books in the vernacular that open a door into the modern world, and still more difficult to get the people to want to read such books. We have seen that the Dutch have gone some way to solve the problem, and something has been done by private associations in Africa. The crux of the problem is to organize a demand for books, and, if this can be accomplished, it is comparatively easy to supply reading matter.

Western instruction might seem more effective as an instrument of civilization than vernacular instruction, because a European language in itself provides a gateway to the modern world. But the progress of western instruction is conditioned by the economic environment. This places limits on the numbers who receive it, and restricts its scope to attainments with a market value. One distinctive feature of the modern world is the importance of natural science in the affairs of daily life. But in the tropics, so long as the demand for men with a western education is confined to administrative and clerical employment, scientific studies are at a discount. Only when, and so far as, the growth of western enterprise creates a demand for men with technical qualifications, is there a demand for the teaching of natural science. If tropical peoples are to be brought into closer contact with the modern

[1] Freytag, p. 71; *RAB*, 1914–15, p. 101.

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world and to contribute as fully as possible to world welfare, it is desirable that colonial administrations should do what they can to foster a demand for western education (including vernacular education on western lines) and for the enlargement of its scope. That is not a problem for educational authorities, though often left to them. How best to meet an actual demand for western studies is an educational problem, but to organize a demand for more men with a western education and for education with a wider scope are matters that lie outside the province of the educational authorities and the schoolmaster.

The people seek western education for its economic value and they wish 'to realize its manifold advantages as soon and as cheaply as possible'. If they are to appreciate its cultural value, and use it as an introduction to the modern world, there must be some inducement sufficient to encourage them to understand the modern world, its material achievements and the spiritual foundations on which its material achievements rest. But just as the western man of business only earns his living in the tropics while his real life is in the West, so likewise the people live in the native world and only earn their living in the western sphere. That is the environment which conditions education, and it is impossible to change the environment through the schools, because the schools supply what the environment demands; if, however, we can change the environment, the schools will reflect the new environment, and it is only thus that we can transform mere instruction into education.

Western education, then, is necessary if the people are to become citizens of the modern world, but the present system of instruction is precluded from performing this function by the environment in which it functions and which it reflects. Among Europeans concerned with education, though some reconcile themselves to a purely utilitarian view of their activities and some lapse into cynical indifference, many and probably most do their best to instil cultural values. But Europeans come into close and direct contact with only a comparatively small number of students, usually in the higher standards. Most of the teachers are natives, often men who have failed to find more lucrative employment, and ordinarily, like the students, they care for little but examination results. Some teachers may inspire some pupils with ideals, but 'idealism is easy in the class-room' and rarely survives contact with the outer world. It is true that western education under British, Dutch and French rule,

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has produced a few men who are at home in the modern world and some who have achieved an international reputation. But most of these have drunk the waters of modern civilization at the fountain head in Europe, and it is noteworthy that among them the men who believe most fervently in education found schools like the *asrams* of Gandhi and Tagore, or the *Tamansiswo* schools in Java, which repudiate the whole material basis on which public instruction rests. This is in striking contrast with the early native educationists such as Ram Mohur Roy and Miss Kartini, who looked to western education as a means of spreading light in Asia. It is in contrast also with the general attitude among modern nationalists. These have founded Nationalist schools partly with a view to attaining the same results as Government and mission schools, but more rapidly and cheaply, and partly with a view to national advancement by using western learning as a means to rid themselves of western rule. Often such schools are tempted by the lure of grants to succumb to the environment, and become merely inferior imitations of the Government schools, so that nationalists succeed no better than missionaries in transforming instruction into education. Thus humanitarians, missionaries, nationalists and statements of official policy present education as an instrument of culture, according to the common tradition of Europe and the tropics; but in practice, it becomes an instrument of economic development, and even as such is less effective than it would be in a more congenial environment.

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to find remunerative work. Discontent was rife among the educated classes, led by the older and more ambitious who, relying on the promises of 1833, had qualified themselves in Europe for positions of responsibility and, on returning, found themselves disappointed of their hopes. Meanwhile public instruction had failed to reach the common people who were still buried in superstition. Christianity had made some headway among outcasts on whom it conferred a higher status, and in a Christian environment the school was a valuable instrument of culture. But many prominent Indians in their reaction against Western individualism were lighting new fires to their old gods and finding tinderwood among the masses. Missionaries and humanitarians had expected to transform the social environment through the school, and the environment had changed; but it had been changed by economic forces and not by education; and the new environment had transformed the school from a social into an economic institution. Modern principles of education, which had proved their value in the West, worked differently in India where they had no Western background. In the Tropical Far East they gave very similar results.

Burma

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the expansion of the British and Burman empires brought them into political contact along a common frontier; and at the same time the growth of British trade brought them into economic contact. Burma was a mediaeval State suddenly brought up against the modern world. Failing reformation from within, foreign intervention was inevitable. Continual friction led to a succession of wars. The first ended in 1826 with the cession of two maritime provinces: Arakan, bordering on Bengal; and Tenasserim, reaching down to Malaya. The second war in 1852 linked up the earlier possessions through the occupation of Pegu and brought the whole of Lower Burma under British rule. In 1886, after a third war, the absorption of the country within the Indian Empire was completed by the annexation of Upper Burma. Until 1937 Burma remained a province of the Indian Empire

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871 The earlier officials in Burma held the liberal views then generally prevalent. A proclamation by the first civil governor of Burma announced his intention to rule the country "on the most liberal and equitable principles." He was interested in education, but that given in the monasteries seemed to him "of little practical use," and he hoped "to offer the people the means of acquiring a knowledge of the English language, and more useful learning than could be gained under their own system of instruction."[7] Roman Catholics had been working in the country with little intermission since 1719 and about 1800 had a school in Rangoon with sixty to seventy boys, including some natives. Baptists, at first English and then American, had been in Burma since 1807 but did little or no educational work before the arrival of the English. In 1825 they opened a school in Tenasserim but about the same time turned their attention to a backward heathen tribe, the Karens.[8] An attempt to enlist their help proved unsuccessful, but the Government needed English-speaking clerks and between 1835 and 1844 opened three Anglo-vernacular schools, one in each of the three chief towns.[9] Economic progress however was slow. So late as 1870, apart from barracks, jails and law-courts, built mostly with Indian immigrant or convict labor, the public works consisted of little more than five incomplete roads.[10] There was little demand therefore for lads from Western schools. Moreover, the Buddhist monastic schools, though unaided and unrecognized and often decried as impractical, met the needs not only of the people in their home life but also of the Administration for the supply of public servants. Even the judges had "little other education than that which they received as boys in some Buddhist monastery."[11] Meanwhile the missionaries were devoting practically all their attention to the Karens, from whom they met a ready welcome. In 1864 the

[7] Furnivall, J. S., *The Fashioning of Leviathan* (Rangoon, 1941), pp. 6, 81.

[8] *Census of Burma*, 1891, p. 79; Luce, Rev. E., *The Catholic Mission in Southern Burma* (1904), p. 17.

[9] Campbell, A., *Report of the Vernacular and Vocational Reorganization Committee*, 1936, p. 129.

[10] *Report on the Administration of British Burma, 1861-62*, p. viii.

[11] *Ibid.*, 1868-69, p. 61.

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Government still maintained three schools, and various missionary societies maintained 24 middle or special schools, 170 village schools and 10 schools for girls. Of just over five thousand children in these schools only one thousand were Burmese.[12] But the officials were now being required to study the law codes and to pass examinations, though "they did not understand what they learned and had little power of applying it." The Government was therefore beginning to recruit youths who had "received some smattering of education in a government or mission school to the exclusion of the old class of hereditary and highly influential men."[13] This naturally reacted unfavorably on the monastic schools, which lost the brighter and wealthier lads. Almost from the beginning of the British occupation the decay of these schools was regretted. How far the deterioration proceeded is uncertain. According to the first Census, taken in 1872, only 32 per cent of the males were literate, and among over two million families only 12,300 were literate. Yet the corresponding figures for the jail population were 60 and 10 per cent, and, as the Census Report suggests, it is "hardly probable that the criminal classes were better instructed than the general population."[14]

That was roughly the position when the educational impulse of the sixties spread from India to Burma. In 1865 the then head of the Province, Sir Arthur Phayre, who knew the country intimately, put forward a plan based on the monastic schools. He proposed gradually to establish Anglo-vernacular schools in the chief towns and to have no other lay schools, but to encourage the monastic schools to improve their curriculum by providing them with books on arithmetic, land-measurement, and geography. But his plan never had a fair trial. In 1866 a Director of Public Instruction was appointed. "The Director spoke little Burmese, the clergy spoke no English; the Director had no staff and the clergy no central authority."[15] Phayre had recognized that to obtain the cooperation of the Buddhist monks

[12] Campbell, A., *Report of the Vernacular and Vocational Reorganization Committee, 1936*, p. 129; *Administration Report, 1861-62*, p. 19.

[13] *Administration Report, 1868-69*, p. 61.

[14] *Census Report, 1872*, p. 25.

[15] Harvey, G. E., *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. VI, p. 444.

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871 "would require very great tact, judgment and discretion," and these were lacking. By 1871 only 141 monasteries had accepted the scheme. Even in remote villages there was an almost universal cry for English, and it was suggested that Phayre's plan would be more attractive if English were taught in selected monastic schools; but the proposal was vetoed as the boys would not acquire a correct English accent.[16] Phayre's plan would have based the whole of vernacular instruction on a national traditional basis and, especially with the inclusion of English, might have breathed new life into the monastic schools. But progress was too slow, and it was decided to recognize lay schools which were expected to prove more efficient. Even a little more patience might have justified Phayre's hopes; by 1873 the number of monastic schools on the registers had risen to 801 against 112 lay schools.

By this time the opening of the Suez Canal had stimulated rapid economic progress with a corresponding growth of the demand for Anglo-vernacular instruction, and this occupied the chief attention of the Department. Vernacular education however, was gradually passing more under Government supervision, and just before the annexation of Upper Burma in 1886 the departmental registers included close on four thousand monastic schools and rather more than six hundred lay schools. The annexation was followed by a swing in the direction of "efficiency". By the end of the century the number of monastic schools on the registers in Lower Burma had fallen to 1171 against 523 lay vernacular schools; during the same period in Upper Burma the number of registered monastic schools after rising to 2998, dropped to 1804—as against 557 lay vernacular schools.[17] According to the Census Report for 1901, the registered primary schools, monastic and lay, numbered 4091, with 127,638 pupils; and there were 13,118 unregistered monastic schools with 147,682 pupils.[18] By this time Anglo-vernacular instruction had made considerable progress: there were 388 secondary schools with 31,616 students and 2 high schools with

[16] *Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1928-29*, p. 11.
[17] For annual figures see Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 136.
[18] Cited in *Census Report*, 1911, p. 166.

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140 students. Out of a total population of 10.5 million, there were some 275,000 children at school, including about 27,000 girls, mostly in "boys" schools. The proportion of male literates was 37.8 per cent and of female literates about 4.5 per cent. The figures for literacy were reduced by Indian immigration; in the central basin of Upper Burma, where they were few Indians, the percentage of literacy among males was 45.6. Thus it was largely to the unregistered monasteries that the supremacy of Burma among Indian provinces was due. Female literacy was higher in Lower Burma and notable among the Christian Karens.

In the first years after the Annexation, some Buddhist monks in Upper Burma welcomed the introduction of new studies and even encouraged the teaching of English in the monastic schools. "There is perhaps no more hopeful sign of the future of the country," says the Census Report for 1891, "than the admirable foresight which the *pongyis* (monks) in Lower Burma have shown before, and which is shown at the present day by the *pongyis* of Upper Burma. The worst service the conquerors of Burma could render the conquered is to take away their religion and give them instead nothing but a smattering of English and a Calcutta degree."[19] From the beginning of British rule in 1826 the Government repeatedly expressed sympathy with the monastic school. But this was fighting a losing battle against economic forces and against departmental regulations intended to promote efficiency. A smattering of English conferred social status and had economic value. The lay school was more useful to the petty trader, increasing in number in the towns, and to the lad who would go on to an Anglo-vernacular school. Some lay schools attempted "surreptitiously" to teach English.[20] Formerly the general diffusion of English had been viewed with favor, and English was the usual medium of instruction in Anglo-vernacular schools, where indeed many of the teachers, European and Indian, could not speak Burmese. But in 1891 it was ruled that in Anglo-vernacular schools instruction up to Standard VII should be in the vernacular, but

[19] *Census Report, 1891*, p. 139.
[20] Harvey, G. E., *op. cit.*, p. 445.

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the wishes were disregarded and English continued as the medium of instruction until 1900.[21]

Standards I to IV were classed as Primary, V to VII as Middle School, and VIII to X as High School; and schools were classed according to the highest standard taught, even though going down to the lowest standard. Of the two high schools one was a government institution; of the secondary schools three were managed by Government and seventeen by local bodies. All the other schools of these grades were under private management, almost entirely missionary. All the primary schools were under private management.[22] Thus the control of Government over education was for the most part exercised only through grants to recognized institutions, calculated almost exclusively on the results of examinations, and about half the children were in monastic schools wholly independent of Government control. As in India, the system of public instruction, despite the high ideals of missionaries and educational authorities, had become a factory for the production of clerks, and the Eastern Schools, struggling to maintain a different tradition, were deteriorating and falling into the background. As yet, however, there were no such problems as perturbed the Government in India. No Burman had returned from studies in Europe; even lads who failed to reach the VIIth standard could easily find employment, and the Buddhist clergy still acquiesced in their supersession by lay teachers; there was no trouble in the country and the boys were well conducted in the schools.

British Malaya

British Malaya includes the Straits Settlements, four Federated Malay States and five Unfederated Malay States. The Straits Settlements, consisting of Singapore, Penang and Malacca with their immediate environs, were acquired between 1786 and 1824; the two former had been under native rule, but Malacca had belonged successively to the Portuguese and Dutch. They were under the East India Company until 1857 and under the India Office until 1867, when they became a Crown

[21] *Administration Report, 1891-92*, p. 128.
[22] *Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1899-1900.*

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Colony under the Colonial Office. The four Federated States accepted British protection at various dates between 1874 and 1889, and in 1896 were constituted a Federation under a Resident-General. Of the Unfederated States four were taken over from Siam in 1909 and the fifth, Johore, formally accepted British protection in 1914. The headquarters of government is in Singapore, where the Governor-General is also High Commissioner for the Malay States.

The long connection between the Straits Settlements and the East India Company gave an Indian bias to the administrative system, and this in turn influenced the administrative system of the Malay States. But the great distance between Calcutta and Singapore, the difference between Indians and Malays, and the primary significance of the Straits Settlements as ports raised special problems affecting all aspects of the administration, including public instruction. The Straits Settlements were almost exclusively commercial centers with a mixed population in which Malays rapidly sank into the background, giving place to Chinese and Indians. In early days, especially under Raffles, Liberal views prevailed, schools were opened for all classes. But these soon abandoned vernacular instruction and concentrated on an English course that would furnish the necessary subordinates for government and trade. So great was the demand for English that these government schools were soon supplemented by private schools, mostly established by missionaries. Few of the pupils were Malays, and little was attempted for the vernacular instruction of Malays. As shown below, the pupils in English schools were three times as numerous in 1872 as those in vernacular schools.

In Malaya as elsewhere a new interest in education coincided with the opening of the Suez Canal, and in 1870 a Committee was appointed to examine the position. It found that boys from the lower standards could easily obtain jobs, and therefore left school with a very imperfect knowledge of English; that the vernacular schools had done "little or no good," and the education of girls was very unsatisfactory.[23] The defects of the Eng-

[23] Special Reports on Educational Subjects, 1905 (Cd. 2379); "The Systems of Education in the Straits Settlement," p. 138.

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871 lish course were ascribed to the short time spent in school and to the lack of a preliminary grounding in the vernacular. The Committee recommended the appointment of a director to supervise and coordinate education, and the encouragement of vernacular schools, apparently to provide a firmer basis for English education. In 1872 an Education Department was created and an Inspector of Schools appointed; the English schools were left mainly to private enterprise, supervised and assisted by Government, but the Government encouraged vernacular education among the Malays by providing free instruction in State village schools. In the English schools the medium of instruction continued to be English. These principles governed educational policy in the Colony up to the end of the century.

The assumption of control over the Malay States raised a new problem. It was thought impolitic to encourage missionary enterprise among a Moslem population newly brought under British rule, and for some time English as well as vernacular education was under the direct control of the Government; towards the end of the century missionaries were invited to take over some of the English schools that the Government had opened. Vernacular instruction was provided on the same lines as in the Colony. Each State had its own inspector, but in 1898 a federal officer was appointed to exercise the functions of a director. From 1891 one State introduced compulsory attendance and the others followed its example. Thus by the end of the century vernacular instruction had made notable progress, though in the Colony there were still more pupils in the English than in vernacular schools.

PROGRESS OF EDUCATION IN BRITISH MALAYA[24]

	(a) No. of Schools Straits Settlements				(b) No. of Pupils Federated Malay States			
Year	*English*		*Vernacular*		*English*		*Vernacular*	
	(*a*)	(*b*)	(*a*)	(*b*)	(*a*)	(*b*)	(*a*)	(*b*)
1872	19	2,641	28	818	..	..	..	..
1900	39	7,528	171	7,404	24	1,629	234	6,494

[24] *Ibid.*, ". . . Straits Settlements," p. 134; ". . . Federated Malay States," p. 8.

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The complete English course up to the VIIth standard corresponded in intention to that of an elementary school in England, though falling short of it in practice. To the ordinary non-European it represented a "higher" education [25] and very few went further. To encourage the brighter lads to remain at school annual scholarships, known later as "Queen's Scholarships", were instituted in 1886, enabling the successful candidates to proceed to an English University. With the same object the Cambridge Local Examinations were introduced in 1891; but in 1900 only some two hundred were receiving a secondary education and practically all these were from the Colony. Not many stayed at school up to the VIIth standard, as their one object was to acquire enough English to become a clerk and they could achieve this after the IVth standard.

The vernacular course comprised four standards covering the three R's and a little very elementary geography; from about 1894 the pupils were taught the Roman as well as the Arabic characters. To improve the teaching a training school was opened in 1878, but the teachers were still unsatisfactory as they did not practice the virtues that they learned and taught. The chief problem however was to obtain the cooperation of the parents, who were "apathetic, jealous of the loss of their children's services, and distrustful of secular teaching."[26] They voluntarily sent their children to the Moslem schools for their spiritual welfare or to English schools for their material welfare, but the official vernacular schools offered them nothing in this world or the next. The use of the schools as centers for distributing quinine and other medicines did something to dispel the prejudice. From 1888 pupils were encouraged to complete the course by the grant of a free education in an English school to those few who did so. Gentle pressure was exercised through the chieftains and headmen and, as mentioned above, compulsory attendance was gradually introduced. In these various ways vernacular instruction made headway; and in 1900 it was estimated that about two-thirds of the Malay boys of

[25] *Ibid.*, ". . . Federated Malay States," p. 7.

[26] *Annual Report on Education in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States, 1938*, p. 18.

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•871 school age attended school, though mostly for no longer than a year or two. Female education was still unpopular; in the States only about 250 girls attended vernacular schools, and those in English schools, about the same number, were Europeans or Eurasians. In the Colony the Malay girls' schools were few and very ill-attended.[27] There were few vernacular schools except for Malays as it was felt that to provide schools for foreign Asiatics "would be committing the fatal error of encouraging them in the idea that China or India is their home."[28]

Thus by the end of the century English education was firmly established on an economic basis. There was no unemployment among school graduates and no discontent; on the contrary, there were bitter complaints both from Government and commercial firms at the high salaries that had to be paid for incompetent clerks. The Government has succeeded in getting a considerable proportion of the younger boys into the vernacular schools, but not for long enough to acquire literacy, and it had failed to organize a demand among the people in general for primary instruction.

Netherlands India

One of the indirect consequences of the French Revolution was the collapse of the Dutch East India Company, which went bankrupt and was taken over by the home government. Dutch rule was still concentrated in Java, which, between 1808 and 1815, passed successively to the French and English. Raffles (1811-15) believed fervently in the new Liberal principles of equal law and economic freedom, and replaced the Dutch system of indirect rule by the system of direct rule, then recently adopted in India. Liberal ideas prevailed among the Dutch when they regained possession, and they tried to reconstruct their rule on the foundations laid by Raffles. But free trade, though profitable to the English manufacturer, was unprofitable to the Dutch, who had no manufactures. Gradually they reverted to the older plan of obtaining tribute by indirect

[27] *Special Reports, loc. cit.*, "Federated Malay States," p. 8; ". . . Straits Settlements," p. 141.

[28] *Ibid.*, ". . . Federated Malay States," p. 11.

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rule. This developed in 1830 into the Culture System under which the whole of Java became one huge agricultural enterprise, run by the Government untrammelled by parliamentary control. In 1848 the Liberals came into power and, under a parliamentary system, gradually substituted private enterprise for State enterprise. Although the growth of manufactures in the Netherlands gave Java some importance as a market, it was chiefly valuable throughout the nineteenth century as a source of agricultural products under European management, and for this the system of indirect rule was most expedient. The possessions outside Java were neglected, except that from about 1870 European enterprise spread to the East Coast of Sumatra. In British India the encouragement of trade under direct rule gave, or seemed to give, the natives an outlet to the modern world, whereas in the Netherlands Indies dependence upon tribute under a system of indirect rule shut up the natives in their own world. On the other hand the British system gave few openings to Europeans except as high officials and employers, whereas the Dutch system required a large establishment of European subordinates. These different characteristics of the respective systems required a corresponding divergence in educational policy.

The Constitutional Regulation of 1818, in which the Dutch expounded their future policy, was colored by the prevalent Liberalism and recognized the principle of providing instruction for both European and non-European inhabitants. The considerable and growing number of Europeans and Eurasians (juridically Europeans) needed European schools; to these schools natives were cautiously admitted. Under the Culture System a primary course sufficed to equip the lads for such posts as were available. After 1870, Europeans grew rapidly in number: the work in administration and on the plantations grew more complex and required better educated men; and, as Europeans and their families passed more freely to and fro between Java and the Netherlands, they demanded that the schools in Java should be on the same level as those at home. Until 1890 home politics precluded State aid to denominational institutions, and public instruction was mainly in

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871 State schools. In 1900 all the secondary schools and almost all the primary schools were managed by the State, and of the few private schools only nine were helped from public funds. It should be noted that all these schools were meant for Europeans in contrast to the English in Malaya which were open to all classes; they corresponded to the English schools as distinct from Anglo-vernacular schools in India and Burma. This appears clearly in the table below.

EUROPEAN SCHOOLS AND PUPILS, 1900[29]

	Secondary			Primary		
Management	*Schools*	*Pupils*	*Non-Europeans*	*Schools*	*Pupils*	*Non-Europeans*
Government.	7	1,139	19	130	15,642	1,870
Private.....	..	..	..	21	3,270	51

The course in these schools was mostly academic. Apart from two training schools for teachers there was no provision for vocational instruction. Towards the end of the century the growing use of machinery on the sugar estates called into existence engineering classes; and a demand for skilled "European" workmen was met by trade classes provided for destitute Europeans by charitable organizations.

As regards native education, an inquiry held in accordance with the Regulation of 1818 did not lead to action. Missionaries, admitted since 1814, were restricted to the eastern archipelago, where the people were heathen or already Christian and there was no fear of inflaming Moslem sentiment. In the Netherlands, Liberal enthusiasm waned, and in the Netherlands Indies the reversion to indirect rule obviated the need for a large staff of native assistants. A few members of leading families were sent to learn Dutch in European homes or schools, and some Dutch officials, as office work increased, made private arrangements for training clerks. But under the Culture System there was no economic demand for native education, and the Malays under Dutch rule were as apathetic as were the Malays and Burmans under British rule.

The first acknowledgment that native subordinates required Western education came in 1848 when the Government sanc-

[29] *Jaarcijfers, 1900.*

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tioned an annual grant of f.25,000 for schools among the Javanese "especially with a view to the training of officials."[30] This measure was strictly utilitarian, but with the revival of Liberalism, more generous views were making headway and found an eloquent exponent in Baron van Hoevell, a Dutch pastor who left Java in 1848 to enter the States-General as an ally of the Liberal statesman Thorbecke. In 1851 the ban on missionary work in Java was withdrawn, and in 1854 a new Constitutional Law for India recommended native education to the special care of Government. "It is our task, our duty," said Thorbecke, "to spread light in India."[31]

But, as elsewhere, the humanitarians were ahead of the times. Ten years elapsed before the measure even began to take effect. Then in 1864 Eurasians and natives were made eligible for the higher administrative posts; the Dutch schools, closed to natives since 1848, were reopened to them; the limit of f.25,000 for native education was removed, and an Inspector of Native Education was appointed. In 1867 there followed the creation of a Department of Education, Religion and Industry. The Suez Canal gave a new impetus to commerce and educa-

NON-EUROPEAN SCHOOLS AND PUPILS, 1900[32]

	First Class		Others			
	State		*State*		*Private*	
	Schools	*Pupils*	*Schools*	*Pupils*	*Schools*	*Pupils*
Natives.....	4	208	539	88,235	840	58,132
Foreign.....	..	..	..	..	696	13,349
Orientals.....	..	..	..	..	..	..

tion, and the schools for natives grew in number and in the scope of the curriculum. This became too cumbrous for most pupils. A new "First Class School" was therefore created, primarily for officials; the old schools were retained under the name of Second Class Schools for natives who would remain within the eastern world. The original intention was that native education should be dominated by the State, but financial stringency rendered this impossible, and private enterprise

[30] Hollandsch-Inlandsch Onderwijs-Commissie (1931), *Resumé*, p. 1.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[32] *Jaarcijfers, 1900.*

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871 played an increasing part, especially after 1890 when religious bodies became eligible for grants.[33] Alongside vernacular schools for natives, there also grew up schools for other Orientals.

In addition to these schools there were five schools for the training of teachers and one for training medical subordinates. The ordinary native school served the same purpose as elsewhere in providing townsfolk with an elementary education suitable to their requirements; but in the Netherlands-Indies it did more than this, as it was practically the sole avenue for natives to employment under Government and this was its chief attraction. The training and medical schools also led to comparatively well paid official posts and the students were partly recruited from men with no interest in or intention to practice teaching or medicine, but who could not afford or obtain any other form of instruction.

Indo-China

Aspirations in the Far East brought the French into conflict with Annam in 1858. In that year they took Saigon, and between 1862 and 1867 the rest of Cochin-China. For some time Norodom, King of Cambodia, had been at issue with both Siam and Annam, and in 1863 he accepted French protection; Siamese claims over Cambodia were renounced in 1867 except for two provinces, Battambang and Angkor, which did not come under French rule until 1907. In 1884 the French made further progress by extending suzerainty over Annam; the northern province, Tonkin, came under direct rule, and Annam proper remained a Protectorate. Friction with Siam led to the constitution of a French Protectorate over Laos in 1885-86. In 1898 the French obtained from China a lease of Kwangchouwan in Kwangtung.

In Cambodia and Laos there was an Indian civilization similar to that of Burma and Siam, but the other peoples derived their civilization mainly from China. In all these countries there were native schools. In the sphere of Indian influence there were monastic schools as in other Buddhist lands. In the regions under Chinese influence there was a comprehensive

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

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system of education based on the Chinese classics. It was essentially philosophic and religious; and, though many of the people learned to read and write, few went further. But the schools differed from those in Buddhist countries in being formally linked up with the civil administration, and the members of the civil service were recruited from boys who began their education in the village schools and passed by a series of examinations through more advanced schools.

The French on their arrival in Cochin-China needed interpreters and not philosophers. Although the native system provided "a solid basis of Moral education," it seemed of little value "pour les besoins de la vie pratique." [34] In any case the French could not take over the system, as it broke down when the Emperor of Annam, on ceding Cochin-China, recalled all the officials, including educational officials. Under British and Dutch rule, long years of contact had built up a tradition that officials should be conversant with the native tongue, but few French were able to speak Annamese, and it seemed easier to teach the people French. This agreed with the prevailing colonial doctrine of assimilation. According to the instructions to the first civil Governor, "no sacrifices could be more useful and fruitful than those which the colony should make to familiarize the Annamese with French ideas on morality, science and economics." [35] But educational policy was closely entangled in home politics; the French tradition of a centralized administration tied the colonial government with red tape to Paris; anti-clericalists were jealous of missionary enterprise, and many people were critical of imperialist expansion.

Until 1879 Cochin-China was governed by a succession of admirals. When the southern provinces of Cochin-China were ceded to the French in 1862 stipends were granted to natives who would attend the missionary Ecole d'Adran in Saigon to be trained as teachers in Franco-vernacular schools. This raised the problem of writing Annamese. The current use of Chinese characters enhanced the difficulty of the language and the Government decided to adopt a system, known as *quoc ngu,* devised

[34] Gourdon, H., *op. cit.*, p. 219.
[35] Cited by Wyndham, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

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by missionaries in the seventeenth century for writing Annamese in Roman characters. In 1864 Franco-vernacular schools were opened in the larger centers. But the Annamese though zealous for the traditional learning, remained indifferent or hostile to the new secular schools. Even stipends failed to attract pupils, and schooling was regarded as a corvée, the whole village subscribing to indemnify those who would send their sons to school. Gradually however the people learned that the school led to promotion, and even before the introduction of civil rule the schools were crowded with the sons of notables. Meanwhile the older village schools were disappearing, and attempts to replace them with Western schools were unsuccessful. Thus the admirals "had unwittingly destroyed the traditional education . . . and the problem of mass education was totally untouched." [36]

The civil Governor appointed in 1879 had a special mission to promote assimilation. "On paper schools were established in each village and canton," [37] but for some years the scheme was not translated into practice. By the end of the century there were about ten to twenty thousand children in village schools learning *quoc ngu* and a little arithmetic, and about five thousand in the Franco-vernacular schools. There were also a few hundred children in schools reserved for European and Eurasians; these could acquire a primary diploma but it was not recognized in France. With a view to promoting assimilation a few native students had been sent to absorb French culture in Paris, but some of them had come back disaffected to French rule. The general result of educational progress in Cochin-China by 1900 was summarized by the Lieutenant Governor. "A few hundred natives could speak French adequately. A few thousand could gabble it well enough to earn a living, as servants, cooks, coolies and so on, and the rest were more illiterate than their fathers had been before the French occupation. Meanwhile the curves of crime and European education rose concurrently." [38]

[36] Thompson, Virginia, *op. cit.*, p. 285.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 286.
[38] Harmand, Jules, *Domination et Colonisation* (1910), p. 264.

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Outside Cochin-China Western instruction made slower progress. In Cambodia French rule was merely nominal, and there was no attempt to change the monastic system of education. In Annam the position was very similar. But Tonkin was brought under French administration and, as in Cochin-China, the French officials depended on native intermediaries in their relations with the villagers. An attempt was made to spread French rapidly and widely, so that no Frenchman traveling anywhere should fail to find some one to whom he could convey his meaning. The people however preferred their children to be taught classical Chinese. The French therefore founded Franco-vernacular schools for training native subordinates and by the end of the century there were some 1500 pupils in these schools.[39] But here, as in Cochin-China the standard attained was far below a complete primary course. Western instruction did not penetrate beyond the provincial capitals and some prefectures, and the native system continued to function in the villages.

The Philippines

The troubles of Spain during the nineteenth century were necessarily reflected in the Philippines. In colonial history the outstanding event was the secession of Mexico in 1823. Until then the Philippines had been governed from Mexico and tied to it commercially and financially, but now they were brought into direct relations with the homeland. Spaniards with the new Liberal ideas arrived in larger numbers, and Filipinos began to send their sons to Europe. The impact of Liberalism and modern progress shook the old concept of education as the handmaid of religion and, though the friars continued to give primary instruction in the vernacular, the University of Manila began to produce graduates with Liberal views. In 1855 a Commission was appointed to consider the improvement of education and, especially, the extension of Spanish. During the 'sixties the Liberal movement made great headway; an Education Code was promulgated in 1863, and two years later the Jesuits opened a Normal School. In 1870 steamers began to

[39] Brenier, H., *Essai d'Atlas Statistique* (1914).

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87/ arrive directly from Barcelona by the Suez Canal, and the immediate sequel was a rapid growth of trade, accompanied, despite a clerical reaction, by a corresponding growth of education with a multiplication of schools and pupils. The conflict between a clerical government and Liberal Filipinos came to a head with the Revolution of 1896, which lasted until the United States defeated first Spain and then the rebels.

The Education Code of 1863 directed that at the headquarters of every township (*pueblo*) there should be at least one primary school for boys and one for girls; in large towns there were to be extra schools for each five thousand of the population. Attendance was to be compulsory and, for the poor, free. (Before resorting to compulsion, however, the parish priest was to exhort the mothers on the spiritual and material benefits of education.) The course would comprise three classes with two grades in the top class. The teachers would be recruited from a normal school maintained by the Jesuits. The parish priests would be *ex officio* inspectors, and the supreme direction was vested in Provincial Boards under the local prelates and a Superior Commission with the Archbishop as President. After five years no Filipino would be eligible for a salaried post under Government without a knowledge of Spanish; after fifteen years a knowledge of Spanish would be required for local offices and for exemption from labor dues. The accompanying Regulations prescribed the primary syllabus: Christian doctrine and sacred history, reading and writing in the vernacular, arithmetic, elementary Spanish and the general history and geography of Spain, practical agriculture, deportment, and vocal music. In the girls' schools domestic training was to replace Spanish geography and history and agriculture.[40] The progress of primary instruction is indicated in the following table, though the figures are only approximately correct.

By the end of Spanish rule the number of schools had risen to 2,167. (The figure 200,000, sometimes given as the total attendance at that time, would seem to refer to boys only.)

There were a few secondary schools, some dating from the early days of Spanish rule and intended originally for Euro-

[40] *Census, 1903*, Vol. III, p. 576.

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peans but later opened to natives. The complete course lasted five years, leading up to the baccalaureate; it consisted mainly of Latin and philosophy and neglected natural science. Three of the secondary schools for boys, including the Municipal Athenaeum of Manila, were official institutions but under clerical control, and there were 41 private schools, of which 14 were in Manila. Of the schools for girls two dated from the

NUMBER OF SCHOOLS AND PUPILS[41]

	1866	*1892*
Boys' Schools		
Number	840	1,087
Pupils	136,108	..
Girls' Schools		
Number	783	1,050
Pupils	9,608	..

seventeenth century, and some half dozen were founded in the last half of the nineteenth century; all these were maintained by religious bodies. The secondary schools comprised normal schools for men and women, a college of medicine and pharmacy, a nautical school, a school of painting, an agricultural school, founded in 1887, and about six seminaries for theological training.

Higher education was given in five provincial seminaries in the University of Manila. This was founded in 1619 as the College of St. Thomas and in 1645 was recognized by the Pope as a university with the right to grant degrees in theology and philosophy; also, from 1734, in canon and civil law. In 1785 chairs of literature, Roman law, medicine and mathematics were founded, but the two last were unoccupied for lack of pupils. In 1865 the university was reorganized on modern lines and partly secularized; it produced about three hundred graduates annually. The growth of commerce created a demand for lawyers; in 1883-84 there were 232 students of jurisprudence against 68 taking theology and medicine. At about the same time the students of medicine and pharmacy rose suddenly from 60 to 200.[42] Thus, although education remained under

[41] *Ibid.*, III, p. 593. Other sources give slightly different figures.
[42] *Ibid.*, III, p. 626.

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clerical control, the students were turning increasingly to secular careers, and especially the pursuit of law.

From this brief summary it is clear that by the end of the nineteenth century the Philippines were far ahead of any country in the Tropical Far East in respect of educational facilities. They stood alone also in female education. Nor was there any dependency where so many natives had been to Europe for their studies; and among these were the two outstanding figures of the struggle against Spain, Rizal and Aguinaldo.

Thailand

The European invasion of the Tropical Far East during the nineteenth century brought Western influence in due course to Thailand, then still known as Siam. Here the system of education, as of economic, social and political organization in general, closely resembled that of Burma. In every village there was a monastic school attended by all the boys. But Thailand was fortunate in its situation and its kings. The mutual jealousy of France and Britain favored its independence as a buffer State, and though it lost outlying provinces inhabited by Cambodians and Malays, the Thai region was preserved intact under its own rulers, who enlisted the cooperation of Europeans of divers nationalities in transforming the country from a mediaeval into a modern State.

The first step in this direction was taken when King Mongkut (1851-68) engaged an English governess for his heir, and allowed American missionaries to teach the ladies of his court. His successor, Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), visited Java, India and Europe, and not only sent his sons to study abroad but encouraged his nobles to follow his example. He came to look on the monastic schools as inadequate to modern needs, and in 1891-92 tried to effect an improvement by incorporating them in a system of general public instruction under a Ministry of Education. Provision was made in the capital, Bangkok, for instructing officials, and members of the upper classes in the English language and Western learning, and youths were sent in larger numbers for higher studies abroad; but up to the end

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of the century the mass of the people depended on the monastery for their schooling. 871

Outside the schools, however, they were already gaining a far wider education in general experience. There was an Italian as instructor of the army; the navy was commanded by a Dane, with Danish and Norwegian officers, and the police, under a Dane, included English police officers from Burma; the Director of Railways was a German, and Germans were also in charge of the Posts and Telegraphs; an Englishman superintended the Forests, and Frenchmen the Medical and Engineering Departments; the Adviser on Foreign Affairs was successively a Belgian and an American, and there was an English Adviser on Finance. But alongside these foreign officials there were Siamese of high rank, gaining experience, and the subordinates were not foreigners, European, Indian or Chinese, as in some other parts of the Tropical Far East, but very largely natives. From these men, serving under foreign officials, and from the students sent to Europe, Thailand was gradually acquiring a modern education and a modern point of view far more effectively than through the schools, and a wider experience than in dependencies where the higher officials were all of one race and servants of the ruling power rather than of the local people.

Review

In this brief survey of the trend of educational progress in the Tropical Far East during the nineteenth century one outstanding feature is the striking synchronism of its course in the component regions. At the beginning of the century in all the countries under European rule we find humanitarian aspirations for the spread of education as a cultural asset: in the Charter of the English East India Company in 1813; in the Constitutional Regulation of 1818 for Netherlands India; under Raffles in Malaya; in the early days of civil rule in Burma; and in the dawn of Liberalism under Spanish rule in the Philippines. Humanitarian sentiment created a new atmosphere and gave a new color to policy, but had little practical effect until economic circumstances were propitious. Then in 1854

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the East India Company laid the foundations of modern public instruction in India; in the same year a new Constitutional Law provided for native education under Dutch rule; in 1855 a Commission of Enquiry in the Philippines made regulations that took effect in a Code of Public Instruction in 1863; an Education Department was established in Burma in 1866, in Netherlands India in 1867, and in British Malaya as the result of a committee appointed in 1870. That year the opening of the Suez Canal led everywhere to a rapid growth of trade and a corresponding development of public instruction.

Again, we find all over the Tropical Far East a wide divergence between humanitarian ideals and practical achievements. From 1854 the Government of India gave the first place in its educational policy to raising the cultural level of the masses; Thorbecke wanted to spread light in Java; Phayre in Burma hoped to build up general instruction in the monastic school; the Malayan Government was chiefly concerned to promote the interests of the Malays; the Spaniards wanted every one to learn Spanish; and the French sought to create a new France in Asia. But everywhere the people failed to respond to these advances.

The most obvious failure was in respect of primary vernacular instruction. The natives voluntarily sent their children to the monastic schools, the Koran schools or the schools teaching the Chinese classics; but they were indifferent or hostile to the new secular State schools, except in so far as these promoted individual material advancement. Lay vernacular instruction made slow progress in the towns, where it was of value to the growing class of traders and artisans, but in a preponderantly agricultural society it failed to reach the countryside. The peoples continued in their ancient prejudices and superstitions, unenlightened by the learning of the West, and at the same time in those countries with an old educational tradition, the native schools were losing their pupils and their influence.

On the other hand, Western letters were making rapid headway among the official classes. Schools teaching the appropriate and most useful European language enabled the pupils to earn good pay, conferred a social status and prospects of advance-

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ment; and these schools were overcrowded with lads seeking instruction, or at any rate a diploma, as a means of livelihood. But almost the only opening for them was as clerks or subordinates in government or commercial service, and the training in school, though nominally literary and academic, was in fact narrowly vocational. The more ambitious and intelligent men who went to Europe for higher studies but could find no suitable employment on their return, became centers of discontent. Practically the only profession freely open to large numbers of natives was the law, and lawyers multiplied exceedingly wherever there was a demand for them. All this was very different from the roseate hues of the early dawn of Liberalism. The advocates of education had expected to promote Christianity and Western culture, and to forge new links between the Western rulers and their Eastern subjects. But they had created enemies and a reaction against Western rule.

How far was this reaction caused by the ideas implanted by Western education, and how far did it result from the limitation of economic circumstances under which education labored? In their educational policy the colonial powers had not only possessed like aims but common principles. They accepted the fundamental postulates of Liberalism that economic progress is best forwarded by leaving every one to pursue his private interest without interference by the State, and that economic progress is the key to general welfare. On these principles they assumed that economic progress would make for enlightenment; and they thought to spread enlightenment by promoting economic progress. They placed economic progress first and gave enlightenment the second place, looking on it as a by-product of progress. In their primary aim they were successful, to the enrichment of the world and their own material advantage. How far the great mass of the dependent peoples profited materially is questionable, but there is general agreement that on the spiritual plane they were impoverished; the Eastern schools decayed and with them native culture and religion. Western statesmen had looked to transform oriental society by education; they brought into existence a new society, not however by education but by economic forces; and this new

87/ society transformed the character of education. While the leaders of the people learned in school that the whole duty of man was to get on in the world, the mass of the people remained untouched by Western culture, and beneath the surface the fires of reaction against the Western world were smouldering.

EQUIVALENCE OF LOCAL GRADES AND STANDARDS

V = Vernacular; *E-V* = European-Vernacular; *E* = European

Norm	*Burma*(a)		*Neth. Indies*(b)		*Formosa*		*Indo-China*	*Malaya*	*Philippines*	*Thailand*
							Elementary, *V*	Malay *V*		
							I	I		
							II	II		
							III	III		
								IV		
Primary	Primary		Lower		Primary		Primary	Primary *E*	Primary	Primary
	V	*E-V*	*V*	*E-V*	*V*	*E*	Lower	Lower Class	*E*	*V*
	I				I		*E-V* & *E*	Upper Class	1	1
I	II	1	I		II		1	1	2	2
II	III	2	II	1	III	1	2	Middle	3	3
III	IV	3	III	2	IV	2	3	2	4	4
		4	IV	3	V	3	Upper	3	Intermediate	Secondary
	Secondary	5	V	4	VI	4	4	4		Lower
V			VI	5	Link	5	5	5	5	5
VI		6	VII	6	Link	6	6		6	6
VII		7	Link	7			7		7	7
Secondary	High	8	Mulo-Link		Middle		Secondary	Secondary	High	Secondary
		9	Mulo	8		7	8	6	8	Upper
VIII		10		9		8	9	7	9	8
IX	Univ.	1		10		9	10	Junior	10	9
X		2	Middle	11		10		Senior		10
XI				12		11		College		College
XII				13				3 Yrs.		1
XIII										2
Higher	Univ. 3 to 6 Yrs.		High School 4 to 6 Yrs.		Univ. 7 Yrs.		Univ. 3 to 5 Yrs.		Univ. 4 to 6 Yrs.	Univ. 3 to 6 Yrs.

(a) In Burma and Netherlands India the Vernacular Course continues to the Xth standard, but has no further link with the European-vernacular, though in Burma any one who has passed the Xth Vernacular may sit for the Xth Anglo-vernacular in English only. In Indo-China and Malaya the Vernacular goes on up to Standard VI.

(b) Pupils in Dutch schools go straight from Standard 7 to Standard 8; pupils from Standard 7 in other schools must spend a year in a preparatory class (Mulo-link) before going into Mulo proper in Standard 8.

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CHAPTER IV

EFFICIENCY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, 1900-1940

By the end of the nineteenth century Europe no longer granted the two main postulates of Liberal political philosophy. Experience had shown that unrestricted freedom of private enterprise is not the best method of promoting economic progress, and that economic progress is not in itself a sufficient guarantee of general welfare. In the interests of both efficiency and social justice, progress and welfare, there was a growing tendency to look for State aid to private enterprise and for State control over private enterprise on behalf of public welfare.

This new trend of thought reacted on colonial policy. In Britain it found expression in the doctrine of "the white man's burden" which "involved a new philosophy of politics and an ethical standard, serious and not ignoble"[1]; colonial statesmen in the Netherlands preached the "ethical" policy; and in French colonial theory "association" replaced "assimilation." At about the same time two new colonial powers emerged in the Tropical Far East; in 1895 Japan acquired Formosa, and in 1898 the United States took over the Philippines from Spain; and both framed their colonial policy in accordance with the new ideas, though applying them in different ways. Both aspects of the new policy implied a change of attitude to education which was regarded as a main instrument both of economic progress and human welfare; and once again, as in the early days of Liberalism, humanitarians and men of business joined forces in giving a new impulse to educational progress.

In the various countries of the Tropical Far East education, under the direction of a long series of transitory officials, had got into a rut. In India it was still held that "important benefits would be likely to accrue to Government and education by the

[1] Buchan, J., *Memory Hold-the-Door* (1942), p. 125.

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871 relaxation of control," and less thought and vigilance was bestowed on the difficult and delicate problems of education than on problems of administration. In Indo-China "no one worried about such speculations." In Java a project of general public instruction put forward by a regent was waved aside as Utopian. "Qu'était l'enseignement aux indigènes dans la plupart des colonies et possessions d'outre-mer?" asked M. Louwers; and he replied "Bien peu de chose."[2] The system of instruction supplied the necessary subordinates for administration and commerce, and a generation that no longer felt the glow of early Liberal enthusiasm asked nothing more of it.

Yet forces, similar to those turning minds in Europe to ideas of efficiency and social justice, were at work below the surface in the East, threatening to ruffle this sluggish complacency. In some parts unemployment or insufficient pay or narrow prospects were fomenting discontent among the educated classes; in some cheap immigrant labor was stirring up resentment among the lower classes; everywhere debt was a growing burden on the peasant. Economic forces were loosening the bonds of social order and sapping the religious foundations of oriental life. All the material of political unrest was available for leaders with the skill to use it, and these were found among men who had learned the technique of party politics in Europe. Some merely wanted better jobs. Others were more dangerous because they did not want to get anything out of Government but wanted Government to get out, and could stimulate the dormant antipathy of the masses to foreign ways of life by appealing to religion; Tilak in India, Ky-dong in Annam, Rizal and Aglipay and Aguinaldo in the Philippines all used a Western education to proclaim a challenge to the West. Thus when colonial governments were being urged from Europe to move forward, smouldering fires beneath the surface were making their seats uncomfortably warm.

Idealism and a genuine feeling for the common man played their part in the new policy. At the same time common sense

[2] Chirol, V., *Indian Unrest* (1910) pp. 212, 238; Harmand, *op. cit.*, p. 256; Bert, J. Chailley, *Java et ses Habitants* (1900), p. 300; Institut Colonial International, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

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suggested that if funds spent on training unemployables and agitators were diverted to enlighten the people by primary instruction, they would be more docile and contented, and better able to cooperate in the plans of a benevolent government for their well being, and the appeal to religious sentiment would lose its sting. Other factors were turning educational policy in this direction. Economic forces were making for the industrialization of the East, and also for a new development of its agricultural and mineral resources along capitalist lines. Vast quantities of cheap labor, local or imported, were available, but modern methods of production required labor that was reasonably intelligent as well as cheap. Primary instruction, it was hoped, would sharpen the laborer's intelligence and make him able and willing to work harder and more continuously and to have greater regard for the sanctity of contract[3]—the only saint in the Calendar of Mammon. Capitalist enterprise also required cheap technical subordinates; and technical instruction was expected to supply these, and also to make for prosperity and contentment by providing employment for the surplus of school graduates and by promoting better cultivation. The cultural and social defects of the system of public instruction were also gaining recognition, and remedies were sought in the encouragement of female education and in ethical and religious teaching.

Here then are the main features of the new educational policy that took shape at the beginning of the present century. It aimed especially at developing primary and technical instruction, it regarded literary and academic studies with disfavor, but laid great stress on the education of girls and at promoting high moral standards in the schools. But before this policy was well under way, all the combustible material, long ready to take fire, burst suddenly into flame with the victory of Japan over Russia. This did much to give a new stimulus and a new aspect to the growing impatience of foreign rule; hitherto it had been for the most part critical, seditious, destructive, but now it was inspired by a new constructive patriotism. Formerly

[3] Chirol, V., *op. cit.*; *Mayhew, Education of India*, p. 226; Mayhew, *Education in the Colonial Empire* (1938), pp. 94, 141, 143.

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Orientals had despised Western learning except for its bread and butter value; now they sought it as an instrument of liberation. The nationalists urged the importance of the vernaculars as a vehicle of the nationalist spirit, pressed for more scientific and technical instruction with a view to mastering the magic of the West, and demanded religious instruction in the schools as a prophylactic against the solvent influence of Western individualism. Superficially the nationalist policy in education had much in common with the official program. Nationalists and officials were in general agreement about educational machinery, but they wanted to use it for different purposes. Let us examine how it worked, and with what results.

Burma

In 1900 Burma was still a province of India, where Curzon (1898-1905), a fervent apostle of the doctrine of efficiency, devoted special attention to the problems of education. He appointed a committee to consider them and in 1904 published a Resolution expounding his new policy.[4] This recognized that education had come to be of economic rather than of cultural value. "In India, far more than in England, the majority of students who frequent the higher schools and universities are there for the purpose of qualifying themselves to earn an independent livelihood" . . . and the desire "to realize the manifold advantages as soon and as cheaply as possible tends to prevent both schools and colleges from filling their proper position as places of liberal education." As regards primary instruction Lord Curzon cited with approval the dictum that "among all the sources of administrative difficulty and political danger, few were so serious as the ignorance of the people"; from the economic standpoint, moreover, ignorance placed the cultivator at a disadvantage in commercial transactions and hampered welfare projects. He directed therefore that elementary vernacular instruction should be made a leading charge on provincial revenues, and "its encouragement should be a primary obligation." In secondary schools the course was "too literary in character." Hitherto technical instruction had been "mainly

[4] Annexed to the *Report on the Progress of Education in India*, 1892-1902.

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directed to the higher forms of technical instruction required to train men for government service"; the pupils in the few industrial schools looked chiefly to qualify for clerical employment at less cost than in the ordinary schools; and, though agriculture was the chief occupation, some provinces, including Burma made no attempt to teach it, and in others the schools had failed either to produce experts or to attract agriculturists. Now there was a need of technical instruction for the development of Indian industries, especially those resting on Indian capital, and special heed should be given to agricultural instruction; further, after the example of Japan and Siam, men should be sent abroad for higher technical studies. With a view to emphasizing the cultural rather than the economic aspect of education, he encouraged the provision of extra funds for female education, as by this "a far greater proportional impulse is imparted to the educational and moral tone of the people than through the education of men." He also alluded to the general belief that "an education modelled upon European principles and, so far as concerned government institutions, purely secular in character, had stimulated tendencies unfavourable to discipline and encouraged a spirit of irreverence." For a remedy he suggested the provision of "moral textbooks and primers of personal ethics" and a stricter departmental supervision over schools and pupils.

In this Resolution Lord Curzon had in mind Indian problems rather than those of Burma. In Burma the proportion of literate males was three times and that of females five times the proportion in Madras, Bombay or Bengal; hardly any one had been to Europe for higher studies, and although a few students had obtained Calcutta degrees there was no local university; the output from Western schools was still inadequate to the demand for clerks, and there was no unemployment and no unrest; industrial development had not yet begun, and it could be claimed that Burma "stands high in respect of discipline and moral training."[5] Thus the new educational program could be drawn up on a blank sheet.

Burma had its own problems. One was the strength of the

[5] *Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1899-1900*, p. 7.

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87 indigenous system of monastic schools. These could neither be incorporated in a secular State system nor disregarded; they gave Burma its high standard of literacy and were the only means of education in more than two-thirds of the villages, but they were not amenable to departmental regulations, their curriculum was limited and their method of teaching out of date. Another problem was that of the Indian immigrant. Burma had been conquered and governed from India. Indians, through long association with the British, were accustomed to modern business methods and, with a lower standard of living, would accept lower wages. With these advantages they had secured a stranglehold on commercial and industrial life and pushed Burmans out into the jungle where they had an advantage over the Indians as cultivators. In commerce the clerks were mostly Indians, and even in government service Indians filled the posts requiring technical qualifications. Naturally, when the Japanese victory over Russia bore fruit in nationalism, one of the demands of Burman nationalists was that places filled by Indians should be given to Burmans. In other respects the nationalist education policy in Burma followed the usual lines: Burmans pressed for scientific, vocational and technical instruction; they advocated, though with less zeal, primary education and urged that it should be made compulsory; they wanted Burmese to find a larger place in the Anglo-vernacular curriculum, and English to be taught in the vernacular schools; they insisted also that facilities should be given for instruction in the Buddhist faith. For a time there was a move to cut loose from the official educational system on the ground that it fostered a "slave mentality," and National Schools were founded which in their early days refused government assistance. But all this was a later development. In the early days of the new official policy at the beginning of the century nothing of this kind was anticipated.

The doctrine of efficiency through closer State control was emphasized by the local Government in official Resolutions[6] by the Director of Public Instruction in 1906.[7]

[6] *Ibid., 1897-1902,* Resolution.
[7] Cited by Campbell, *op. cit.,* p. 133.

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"Educationally the axis of the Province has been shifting. *Laissez faire* principles, which preferred to leave the guidance and practical management of education to private bodies or persons more or less irresponsible and with very varying views of the needs of the educated and the ends of education, have been tempered by a fuller sense of the State's obligations in the matter. In effect these obligations have a two-fold relation: they concern the State itself on the one hand, and on the other those whom for the State's sake and their own it is necessary to educate. As thus conceived education is not the necessary accident of a religious propaganda nor the provision of careers in life for various sections of the community. It is rather a vital and essential element in the organic life of the State itself."

In future education was to place first the welfare of the State, and next the welfare of the child, while religion as an element in education was an unnecessary accident. This view found expression in a less sympathetic attitude towards the monastic school, where most of the children learned their letters, and thereby hampered the campaign for extending primary instruction. The Director, while still claiming to base vernacular work on the monastic school, described the monks as "very ignorant, or very bigoted, or both."[8] By 1906 the lay schools (2,899) outnumbered the monastic schools (2,369), and ten years later there were 5,066 against 3,418.[9] In the following year, 1917, vernacular education was made over to local bodies, which had not sufficient funds to maintain all the schools and struck the less efficient off the register. Again in 1921 a new Director from India opened another campaign against inefficiency. The effect of these measures was to reduce the number of recognized monastic schools to 1,434 in 1921, though the schools struck off the registers went on working as before.

The decline caused some perturbation, and in 1924 the question of vernacular education was studied by a special committee. Its report is interesting as an index to the official conception of efficiency. It suggests that "the school's existence should be that of efficiency. . . . The efficiency of the schools

[8] *Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1897-1902*, p. 41.

[9] For these and subsequent figures see Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

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871 should be tested yearly by the results of a first public examination, as well as by other tests, if necessary, and those that fail to reach the desired level should be removed from the register or suffer such other penalty as may be laid down."[10] A further inquiry into vernacular education was held in 1936; the committee held that the monastic schools were of little value as institutions for secular education, and all expedients to bend them to secular purposes had failed. In 1933 there were 4,967, lay schools with 364,669 pupils but the number of registered monastic schools had fallen to 928 with 79,135 pupils; it was estimated that there were some 17,000 to 18,000 unregistered monastic schools with 200,000 pupils. The progress since 1900 is summarized in the following table.

PROGRESS OF EDUCATION, 1900-1940[11]

Year	a. No. of pupils at all recognized institutions.	b. Per cent of population	a. No. of pupils at unrecognized institutions.*	b. Per cent of population	Literacy per cent a. Male	b. Female	c. Both
	a	*b*	*a*	*b*	*a*	*b*	*c*
1900.....	159,394	1.72	147,682	1.62	37.6	6.1	22.1
1940.....	613,938	3.64	213,294	1.26	56.0	16.5	36.8

*Figures for unrecognized institutions are only approximate.

Figures for "literacy" must needs be somewhat arbitrary; probably many more, if pressed, could write their names and spell out simple notices. Female literacy is highest among Christian Karens (in 1921) with 27.7 per cent as against 12.2 per cent for Burmese Buddhist women, and 4.9 for Buddhist Karens. Despite the progress during the present century the Committee of 1936 put the figure for children of school-going age (6-11) at 1.6 million with 0.4 million at recognized institutions, and 1.0 million not at any school.[12] Moreover, of the pupils in registered schools 75 per cent did not go beyond Standard I and 87 per cent failed to complete the IV standard,

[10] Cited by Campbell, *op. cit.*, 141

[11] *Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1900-01; Statesman's Yearbook, 1941.*

[12] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

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reckoned as the minimum for permanent literacy.[13] It would seem therefore that only a small proportion of the registered schools produce much better results from the scholastic standpoint than the unregistered schools, while these still turn out men who, with no other schooling, may rise to be magistrates.

One recommendation of the Committee of 1924 was that 250 lay schools should be opened annually for five years in the poorer districts. The actual number opened in accordance with this plan was 1231.[14] But the results were deemed incommensurate with the cost, "the difficulty was to create a demand for the school," and opinion turned towards compulsory education. This was urged by some nationalist leaders and found support among educational authorities. A bill was drafted in 1928 and after consideration laid before the Legislature in 1932, but the cost was regarded as excessive and the difficulties as insuperable. The Committee of 1936 expressed the opinion that "the child cannot be left indefinitely to the mismanagement of ignorant parents"[15] and, deprecating criticism for its "excess of caution," recommended compulsory attendance up to the end of Standard II, for all children voluntarily enrolled in a recognized school. The proposal however was deemed premature; experience in other provinces of India had shown the difficulty of enforcing compulsion except against a recalcitrant minority, and before any such measure could be effective it would be necessary to educate "ignorant parents" to send their children for instruction.

The great obstacle was the lack of demand. The vernacular schools led nowhere. There was a "bridge" from Standard IV in Vernacular schools to Standard III in Anglo-vernacular schools, but of the few students eligible for "bridge scholarships"—some 250 a year—only about one half received them, and after 1934-35 only a quarter.[16] From 1927-28 those who passed the Xth Standard Vernacular were eligible for an Anglo-vernacular certificate on passing in English only. Otherwise the

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 151, 153.

[14] *Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1928-29*, p. 13; *ibid., 1927-32*, p. 20.

[15] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 190; *Report on the Administration of Burma, 1931-32*, p. 145; *Report on Public Instruction, Burma, 1933-37*, p. 23.

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87/ vernacular pupil had no prospects except as teacher in a vernacular school.[17] The recognition of English as a second language in the early 'twenties reduced wastage in the lower standards in those few schools that could comply with the conditions, and the closing of the lower standards in government Anglo-vernacular schools forced some children into the vernacular schools.[18] But in general the lay vernacular school outside the towns taught the child neither a better way of life nor a better means of living and, without endorsing the description of primary vernacular instruction given by the Committee of 1936 as a picture of "almost unrelieved gloom,"[19] it may be said that progress had certainly come far short of the objective set up at the beginning of the century.

In respect of more advanced instruction there was a still more striking contrast between intentions and results. "The accepted principles," said a Resolution of 1900, "are that Provincial Funds should devote proportionally more money to primary and less to secondary instruction."[20] But in 1937, as compared with 1900, there were 8 times as many pupils in the middle standards (V-VII), 25 times as many in the higher standards (VIII-X), and 15 times as many in the colleges. Meanwhile most money had been spent on the most advanced instruction by the establishment, in 1920, of the University of Rangoon.

PUPILS IN VARIOUS STAGES, 1900 and 1937[21]

	1900			*1937*	
Middle	*High*	*Collegiate*	*Middle*	*High*	*Collegiate*
4,997	556	140	41,719	14,249	2,165

These Anglo-vernacular schools were situated in the towns. Of the total secondary school population 30 per cent were concentrated in Rangoon.[22] The course trained the pupils for urban life, and there were not sufficient openings for their employment. Thus by the force of economic circumstances there came

[17] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 156.
[18] *Report on Public Instruction, Burma, 1927-32*, p. 21; *ibid., 1933-37*, p. 20.
[19] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 156.
[20] *Report on Public Instruction, Burma, 1897-1902*, p. 3.
[21] *Ibid., 1900-01* and *1933-37*.
[22] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

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into existence the surplus of educated unemployables which Government had foreseen and which the new educational policy had been intended to prevent. On that policy technical rather than academic studies were to be encouraged for pupils in the higher grades. In 1900 there were no organized institutions for technical instruction and, "strictly speaking, no technical education."[23] There was a class for lawyers attached to Rangoon College, but doctors had to go to India for training, though nurses and midwives could be trained in Burma. "It is a popular cry" wrote the Director in 1900, "that technical education should be more largely introduced, and this form of education is spoken of as the great means of reforming the country."[24] At that time only the European community was vocal, but with the growth of Nationalism Burmans added their voice to the cry for technical instruction. Experiments were discouraging. In one town a technical school was founded with public subscriptions; costly buildings were erected and classes in various subjects were arranged, but pupils could not be attracted without stipends, and the school was finally closed as useless because there were no industries.[25] So far as a demand existed students were forthcoming, as for a weaving institute and technical classes for mechanics, etc., in Rangoon. But advantage of these opportunities was chiefly taken by Indians who were cheaper than Burmans to employ, and had fewer openings on the land and in the administrative services.

The problem of technical instruction was examined by a committee in 1927. This criticized the ordinary school curriculum as "divorced from realities" and made proposals for expanding technical instruction, but these remained ineffective for lack of funds.[26] By this time the output of the schools was catching up with the demand for clerks, and the unemployment of school graduates was beginning to attract attention. The matter was re-examined, together with vernacular education, by another committee in 1936, but this did little more

[23] *Report on Public Instruction, Burma, 1897-1902*, p. 29.
[24] *Ibid., 1899-1900*, p. 4.
[25] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 392.
[26] *Report on Public Instruction, Burma, 1927-32*, p. 23.

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871 than lay down two principles: one that vocational education should not begin until the pupil has completed a sound "liberal" education; and the other that the provision of vocational education should be related to an actual demand for specific technical qualifications.[27] During a discussion in the Legislature it was suggested that "only criminals and defectives could obtain technical education in Burma." The Director accepted the criticism as "in the main true as regards school children,"[28] but for other persons thought the provision not inconsiderable for an agricultural country. There is, in fact, provision for instruction in medicine, law, forestry, veterinary science, teaching, engineering, industry, commerce, and art. But the total number receiving instruction under all these heads in 1937 was only 2,488, which is not very adequate for a population of over 16 million; and of these 1,269 were training as teachers and 613 were in commercial schools, leaving only 559 under all other heads. The separate figures are given in the table below. It seems that among students of university standing only 32 out

NUMBER OF TECHNICAL STUDENTS, 1937

	In Colleges	*In Schools*
Law	79	..
Medicine	147	103
Education	141	1,128
Engineering	54	75
Industrial	..	39
Veterinary	..	17
Forestry	..	47
Commerce	..	613
Art	..	45

of 79 in the law school were Burmese Buddhists, in Medicine 23 out of 147, in Education 55 out of 141 and in Engineering 16 out of 54. In the schools they were better represented, but these led only to subordinate appointments. In Medicine there were 42 Burman Buddhists out of 103, in Engineering 52 out of 75, in Education 880 out of 1,128, in Forestry 28 out of 47, and in Commerce 344 out of 613. But as Burmans form some 85 per cent of the population these figures are not very

[27] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 391.
[28] *Report on Public Instruction, Burma, 1927-32*, p. 29.

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satisfactory to Nationalists. The only schools classed under Vocation and Special Education in which Burmans preponderated were the Reformatories, where they numbered 308 out of 342, still less satisfactory, and giving some point to the gibe in the Legislature.

One subject is conspicuously absent from the above list, and that the most important—agriculture. Lord Curzon, in laying down the new policy, noted the absence of agricultural instruction in Burma. In 1924 an Agricultural College was opened but did not attract cultivators and closed in 1932 when recruitment for the department ceased. A vernacular school for cultivators, maintained by the American Baptist Mission, had at one time over sixty pupils,[29] and was well spoken of, but is not mentioned in recent departmental reports. From time to time great stress has been laid on the educational value of school gardens. But they were never popular with the pupils or their parents and were only maintained by schools "for the purpose of getting grants. When the grants ceased the gardens disappeared," and between 1933 and 1937 the number of school gardens fell from 395 to 19.[30] Thus "the all pervading bookishness and the dissociation of education generally from life and occupation" are still, as in 1900, among the chief defects of the system of instruction; it is not designed for a farmer's country, its whole bias is literary."[31] But it meets the economic demand, and the unsatisfactory progress of technical instruction, as of primary instruction, is due to the difficulty of organizing a demand for it. More perhaps might have been done for the teaching of natural science in schools, as this is the basis of most technical or vocational instruction. But this found a place in the curriculum only of recent years and on a very modest scale. In 1936 ten Anglo-vernacular High Schools gave teaching in chemistry and physics, and one only, a girls' school, in botany and zoology; eleven vernacular High Schools professed to teach "General Science," but the course included no laboratory

[29] *Indian Statutory Commission, 1930*, Vol. XI, p. 509.
[30] *Report on Public Instruction, Burma, 1933-37*, p. 37.
[31] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 2; *Report on Public Instruction, Burma, 1933-37*, p. 28.

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871 work.[32] The suggestion of Lord Curzon that students should be sent to Europe for higher technical studies was disregarded for some years, but just before the depression of the 'thirties the number sent averaged eight a year. The scheme was then suspended for three years, and on its revival seventeen in all were sent in two years.[33] But not a few of those sent abroad failed to find employment on their return.

The progress of female education has been much more satisfactory. The figures for the number of girls in each stage of instruction are compared in the table for 1900 and 1937. In the latter year nearly one third of the children in school were girls. The university and the village schools are co-educational, and so are many of the Middle and High Schools. The proportion of girls who do not get beyond the two lowest stand-

FEMALE EDUCATION[34]

	1900	*1937*
College	4	403
High School	63	2,436
Middle School	554	9,376
Upper Primary	1,103	34,367
Lower Primary	4,089	171,429
Total	5,813	218,011

ards, however, is higher even than for boys. Those who continue their studies further look very largely to the teaching profession, and their enthusiasm was dampened when access to this was restricted.

"What beacon of light," asks an Inspectress, "can we hold up to induce girls to seek education in higher departments when the only profession open to educated women has been almost killed by abolishing the teachers' training classes?"[35] Karen and Burmese Christians, however, seem to place a higher value on education as a cultural asset. There has always been a tradition of female education in Burma. It may be a pious fiction that

[32] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

[33] *Report on Public Instruction, Burma, 1927-32*, p. 28; *ibid., 1933-37*, p. 29; see also *1928-29*, p. 18.

[34] *Ibid., 1933-37*, p. 24. Other figures suggest a rather different total.

[35] *Ibid., 1927-32*.

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during the great age of Burma, about the time of the Norman conquest of England, the girls used to study the Pali scriptures over their cooking pots, but the legend has colored social life.[36] As already noticed, a tenth of the female prisoners were returned as literate in the Census of 1872. There has always been a potential demand for female education, and the growth of trade, which is largely in the hands of the women, has enhanced the value of the schools. Under Burmese rule girls had no access to the monastic schools; only under British rule have they have been given facilities for schooling, and they have taken good advantage of them. Even in monastic schools the prejudice against co-education is breaking down, and of the 8,114 Burman Buddhist girls attending unrecognized institutions in 1937 probably the great majority were in monastic schools.

One reason for the stress laid on female education in 1900 was that it would impart an impulse to the educational and moral tone of the people. In respect of discipline and moral training the schools in Burma were regarded as satisfactory, but new directions were given for the voluntary provision of religious instruction in all the schools. Most lay vernacular schools already included "religious instruction" in their syllabus, but this might signify nothing beyond the teaching of the Burmese alphabet. In the mission school the pupils were expected to take part in the general devotional exercises and to attend the classes in religious instruction. Many lads passed from one school to another. As small boys in the monastery they would be taught the vanity of human wishes; then in a Roman school they would be exhorted to avoid the heresies of Wyclif and Huss; if they went on to a Protestant school, the class would start the day with a prayer for success in the forthcoming examination; and they would probably end their school life in a government institution, where success in the examination was the only thing that mattered. With the growth of Nationalism the practice of imparting Christian instruction to Buddhist boys gave agitators a weapon for attacking a Govern-

[36] See, for example, the Census Report for 1872, which describes Burma as "a country where female education was a reality, before Oxford was founded."

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871 ment which, if not Christian, was at any rate not Buddhist. In response to the agitation, Government introduced a "conscience clause," of which not many parents took advantage.[37] When the political reforms placed education under a Burmese Minister, the instruction of Buddhist pupils in their own religion, formerly encouraged, was made compulsory in all Government and lay schools.[38]

Meanwhile the schools were losing their high moral tone. "The morals of the school boys were constantly under discussion." And, what was more disconcerting, the district with the best record for education was equally conspicuous for crime, and was also the center of the most serious rebellion that has ever troubled British rule. On this matter there were two schools of thought. Burmese opinion favored a good knowledge of the Buddhist Scriptures as an antidote to all moral evils, whereas educational officials trusted more to closer supervision, football, physical training, and the boy-scout movement.[39] Cleanliness was the next best thing to Godliness, and much easier for inspecting officers to assess, but teachers who preached hygiene seldom practiced it.[40] Neither religious instruction nor football restored the earlier high standards. In five years, 1932-37, there were over thirty school strikes. It was a common practice for schools to obtain grants in ways that would have been fraudulent if not condoned by the department.[41] For seventy years Government had been trying to secularize the monastic schools; now it seemed that "how to spiritualize education was the real problem."[42]

From this brief review of progress under the various heads of the new policy laid down by Lord Curzon, it seems clear that it had not achieved the results anticipated. On the contrary, although in Burma it began with a clean sheet, yet in the next generation education in Burma followed along much the same lines as under the old policy in India and produced the

[37] *Ibid., 1928-29*, p. 24.
[38] *Ibid., 1927-32*, p. 37.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 37.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 40.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 17; *Report of the Bribery and Corruption Committee, 1941*, p. 34.
[42] *Report on Public Instruction, Burma* [illegible] 37, p. 40.

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same unsatisfactory results that the new policy was intended to prevent. We shall be in a better position to inquire into the reasons when we have examined the course of educational progress elsewhere.

Malaya[43]

At the end of the nineteenth century conditions in Malaya had much in common with conditions in Burma. The Malays had been left behind by the course of progress, and industry and commerce were dominated by Europeans and foreign Asiatics. Although there was no unrest or unemployment, and the output from the schools was still inadequate to the demand. the system of public instruction was criticized on much the same grounds as in India. It was said to be "unpractical, to make the people litigious, to inspire a distaste for manual and technical work, and to create a class of literary malcontents, useless to their communities and a source of trouble to the Empire."[44] The remedies proposed were also very similar; closer State control, and the encouragement of vernacular and technical instruction.

A more active policy in education was indicated by the appointment in 1901 of a Director of Public Instruction for the whole of the Straits Settlements. To promote "a due measure of uniformity in administration and educational aims,"[45] his charge was extended in 1906 to cover the Federated States. One feature of this appointment deserves special notice. The Director has always been a member of the Civil Service and not of the Education Service. To foster education among an illiterate people is an administrative rather than an educational problem and requires an intimate knowledge of the people rather than scholastic experience; and the fact that in Malaya education has been directed by men acquainted with the people in their homes and not only with the children in school probably goes far to account for the measure of success attained. Further evi-

[43] The statistical and other information in this paragraph does not cover the Unfederated States, which it has not been found practicable to include.

[44] Wilkinson, R. J., *The Education of Asiatics*, Special Report, 1902 (cd. 835).

[45] *Education Report*, 1938, p. 8.

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dence of the renewed interest in education at the turn of the century appeared in the appointment, in 1902, of a Commission to examine the existing system.

Vernacular instruction among the Malays had already made considerable progress, but parents were still reluctant to send their children to school even though buildings, quarters, staff, equipment and books all cost them nothing, and in 1908 the provisions for compulsory attendance, already applied in the States, were extended to the Colony. By this time Malay rulers were looking to modern education as a means whereby their people could withstand Chinese and Indian competition; and their influence, together with the growth of national feeling among the Malays, did much to reconcile the people to secular instruction. But the vernacular schools still led nowhere; even the boys who became eligible for free education in an English school by completing the vernacular course were usually too old to profit by the concession. In 1918 it was made conditional on their having completed the course before their eleventh birthday, and boys admitted under this scheme were given an intensive course in English. This effective link with the English schools made the vernacular schools more attractive. Thus by a combination of gentle pressure and good prospects vernacular education made such progress that now compulsion is almost superfluous and the difficulty now is to find accommodations for all who wish to enter. At the Census of 1931 there were returned as literate 35.5 per cent of the men and 7.6 per cent of the women, with 24.1 per cent for both sexes together, while of the rising generation 80 per cent of the boys and 20 per cent of the girls were said to be attaining literacy.[46] The details of those at school are given below.

A new feature of the present century has been the provision of vernacular schools for non-Malays. Formerly this was deprecated as tending to keep them foreigners; but such considerations lost their force in the new zeal for economic efficiency, and in 1902 it was "decided to open Government schools for Tamils . . . with the object of making the Federated Malay States, from the point of view of the Indian immigrant, an out-

[46] *Census Report, 1931*, p. 91.

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lying portion of India, like Ceylon."[47] With the development of rubber, Indian coolies were wanted in large numbers; the provision of Tamil schools was found to encourage immigration, and planters came to recognize the advantage of opening schools on their estates.

That a large alien population has political and economic disadvantages is, however, already evident in regard to Chinese immigration. The Chinese have always predominated in the English schools, and have also arranged for the instruction of boys outside the English schools. The creation of the Chinese Republic stimulated them to new zeal in founding schools to give their children a modern education in their own tongue. From 1920, *kuo yu*, the "national language," was adopted as the basis of their system, and the textbooks were found to contain much political and anti-foreign matter. These were banned both in Malaya and in Netherlands India, and the publishers arranged to avoid further loss by printing special books for European dependencies. Better control over Chinese schools was obtained by the introduction, in 1924, of a system of grants-in-aid to approved schools, though few took advantage of it before the great depression.[48] Another recent development tending to improve the relations of the Chinese schools with the Government has been the introduction of English as a second language. The basis of control over these and other schools however, rests on the Registration of Schools Ordinance of 1920, requiring the registration of all secular schools attended by ten or more pupils.[49]

As regards the English schools the position has entirely changed since the beginning of the century. Then any one with a smattering of English could get a job, and employers complained bitterly of having to pay high wages to lads who were clerks "neither in *esse* nor in *posse*."[50] The supply of clerks gradually caught up with the demand and, with the depression of the 'thirties, overtook it; now, highly qualified men cannot

[47] Special Report (Cd. 2379), *Federated Malay States*, p. 11 n.
[48] Mills, Lennox A., *British Rule in Eastern Asia* (1942), p. 358 n.
[49] *Education Report, 1938*, p. 23.
[50] Special Report (Cd. 2379), p. 21.

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find employment. This threatens "economic disorganization and social unrest," and "one of the gravest problems of today is to devise types of instruction fitting the youth of Malaya for such careers as the country offers." Attempts to reduce the output from schools under Government control merely had the effect of sending more boys to private schools run solely for profit. The table shows that, despite the rapid progress of Malay vernacular schools, the English schools went ahead still faster, and in these schools the Malays lag far behind. Above the Malay classes for students from vernacular schools the Primary Grade in English schools comprises a Lower and Upper Primary Class and Standard I; next comes the Middle Grade (Standards II to V), and then the Secondary Grade with Standards VI and VII and a Junior and Senior Certificate class; one or two schools have a Post-Certificate or High School class.

NUMBER OF PUPILS, 1900 and 1938[81]

	1900	*1938*	
Type of School		*Boys*	*Girls*
Vernacular			
Malay	13,898	59,383	22,984
Chinese	..	66,645	24,889
Indian	..	17,484	8,222
English	9,157	44,323	18,541
Total	23,055	187,835	74,636

The surplus of school graduates has revived interest in technical education. One of the questions examined by the Commission of 1902 was how to give the system of instruction a more practical bent. Further inquiries were made in 1917, 1918 and 1926. The Commission of 1902 reported that there was no demand for commercial or technical training, but recommended that instruction should be provided in lieu of scholarships to Europe, and suggested the inclusion of science in the school curriculum. The scholarships were reduced in number and in 1910-11 abolished; but this discouraged students from going beyond the VIIIth standard, and they had to be restored. A science master was appointed to one school until the war

[81] *Education Report, 1938*, pp. 77, 80, 81, 82. Other figures suggest a rather different total.

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took him away and temporarily extinguished the teaching of science. In 1926 the Committee regarded the circumstances as still unpropitious for technical instruction. In industry "the principal need of the country is unskilled manual labour, which is supplied by the Chinese and Indian immigrants." "We fear," they said, "that many of the youth of this country have a genuine distaste for hard and continuous manual labour"—shared, not improbably, by most members of the Committee.

PROPORTION OF PUPILS IN ENGLISH AND VERNACULAR SCHOOLS[52]

	Per cent		
	S. S.	*F. M. S.*	*Malaya*
English	8.2	4.1	6.6
Malay	7.3	18.2	11.7
Chinese	70.9	49.0	62.0
Indian	12.5	28.0	18.8
Others	1.1	0.7	0.9

For technicians the number of openings was limited,[53] and most of the skilled workmen were Chinese, so that Indians and Malays, and even local-born Chinese, had little chance of employment. In the Committee's opinion "the most important educational need of the moment" was an agricultural school.

For some years the Agricultural Department had been recruiting Asiatics, and since 1924 had made provision for instructing them. In private enterprise also there was a limited demand for local men with some knowledge of agriculture. An Agricultural School was opened in 1931, providing a choice of elementary or advanced courses, but stipends had to be granted to attract Malays. The ensuing depression enlarged the field for employment, as Asiatics were wanted in place of Europeans whom the estates could no longer afford to entertain. But the planters preferred Chinese and, though the Agricultural Department gave a preference to Malays, its demands were limited. Very little success seems to have been attained in enabling cultivators to work their land more profitably.

As regards industry, the 1926 Committee seems to have looked at technical instruction too much from the standpoint

[52] *Education Report, 1938.*
[53] Cited, Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 368.

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811 of big business. For, as elsewhere in the East, the petrol engine has given the local people a fresh start at less disadvantage with their competitors. Not only did Malays come forward to train as fitters and mechanics in European workshops, but many started their own small establishments or set up as taxi drivers. A Trade School was started in 1926 to help them and was so successful that tailoring, carpentry and furniture making were added, though the last two gave less favorable results, as most of the employers are Chinese and refuse to entertain Malay labor.

The Queens' Scholarships were restored in 1923 in the Colony and 1931 in the States—two to each, with one in the States reserved for Malays. Many private students, especially Chinese, go abroad for study. In 1938 students from the Colony numbered 73 in Britain, 47 in Hongkong, 1 in China, 10 in India, 9 in the United States, and 5 elsewhere; figures for the Federated States are not available. The teaching of science was resumed about 1925 and is now popular in the few schools where it is provided.

Professional education began with the opening of a Medical School at the instance of the Chinese community in 1905. Originally it aimed merely at training medical subordinates and "local practitioners in racial sympathy with the peoples of Malaya,"[54] but so rapid was its progress that in 1916 its degrees were recognized by the British General Medical Council. The planters recognized the value of medical attention to their coolies and in 1939, 40 per cent of the graduates were in private practice.[55] The great obstacle, however, is the difficulty of educating the people to appreciate Western medicine, despite strenuous propaganda. For a higher education in other branches of arts and science Raffles College was founded in 1928. It aims at giving a diploma equivalent to the pass degree of a university. Up to 1939, 48 per cent of the entrants failed to obtain diplomas, and of those who succeeded 82 per cent of the men and all the women took to teaching; 11 per cent obtained posts under Government, and only 3 per cent commer-

[54] *Education Report, 1938*, p. 15.
[55] Mills *op. cit.*, p. 368.

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cial posts. Of recent years, however, the surplus of would-be clerks has made a commercial training valuable, and some schools in Singapore prepare candidates for the examinations of the London Chamber of Commerce. In this matter, as in all branches of vocational and technical instruction, demand is the condition of progress, and it is because demand is lacking that progress is so slow. Details are given in the table. There are

NUMBER OF STUDENTS RECEIVING TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION, 1938

	High School	*Technical School*
Education	160	469
Medicine	176	..
Engineering and Industry	154	640
Commerce	..	827
Agriculture	58	..

also 963 students in evening classes. Malays constitute the bulk of the students in education and make a good show in the trade schools but are less than ten per cent of the students of commerce.

In female education there has been marvellously rapid progress. In 1900 there were only some five hundred girls at schools in the States, and the Malay girls' schools in the Colony were "very few and very ill-attended." "There is," said the Director, "no more absolutely ignorant, prejudiced and super-

FEMALE EDUCATION, 1938[56]

Schools	Number of Students *S. S.*	*F. M. S.*
Vernacular		
Malay	6,324	16,660
Chinese	12,794	12,095
Indian	1,201	7,985
English	8,113	5,449
Private	4,988	

stitious class of people in the world than the Straits-born Chinese woman. Almost the same may be said of Malay women and of a majority of the Eurasians."[57] But the Chinese were converted by the Revolution and their experience during the War,

[56] Special Reports (Cd. 2379). *Straits Settlements*, pp. 141, 148.
[57] *Education Report, 1938*, p. 77.

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and their example kindled enthusiasm among the Malays, which developed rapidly from about 1928 and ten years later "the flood of applications for the admission of girls could not be stemmed."[58]

The policy in respect of religious and moral training is much the same as in other British dependencies. Religious instruction is given out of school hours; hostels are regarded as nurseries of virtue, and great importance is attached to school games, which are generally regarded as part of the curriculum popular with the Malays, though some Chinese who "want to learn in order to make money" are apt to grudge the time for recreation. It is doubtful how far the religious and ethical instruction is effective. Non-Christians often "take" religious knowledge in examinations under the impression that it is a soft option, and choose Paley's *Evidences of Christianity* at Cambridge for the same reason. Teachers of hygiene sleep in unventilated rooms and neglect the most elementary precautions as to food and drink that they impress daily on their pupils. Similarly they preach thrift though notoriously in debt. As the Director remarks, until they practice what they preach, their teaching is not likely to be successful.[59]

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 77. Other figures suggest a rather different total.

[59] *Education Report, 1938*, pp. 89, 96; Special Report (Cd. 2379), Federated Malay States.

CHAPTER V

EFFICIENCY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, 1900-1940 871
(*Continued*)

Netherlands India

Under Dutch rule the reaction against Liberalism in the direction of greater State activity to promote efficiency and social justice came to be known as the "ethical" policy. Moral uplift required firm government, so also did capitalist enterprise; and between 1900 and 1910 effective administration was rapidly extended over the Outer Provinces, hitherto neglected. The aim of the ethical policy was to readjust native society to the Western world; this involved the diffusion of vernacular and technical instruction and the provision of facilities for secondary instruction, such as had long been available to natives under British rule.

A prospect of the new policy in its educational and economic aspects was drafted at the request of Government by Fock, a Liberal who had long practiced as an advocate in Java. In 1907, as Colonial Minister, he included in his budget a comprehensive scheme for vernacular and technical instruction. He proposed to open a large number of Second Class Schools. These schools, known later as Standard Schools, are still the usual native schools in towns and resemble the urban vernacular school of Burma. But they were too costly for the villages, and Van Heutsz, the Governor-General, devised a simpler school, teaching the bare rudiments of the three R's, towards the cost of which the village and the parents should contribute. The chief obstacle was the reluctance of the parents to send their children to school. To bring the Department into closer touch with the people, the Director was given the help of an Adviser and Assistant-Adviser from the Civil Service[1] and, by the remission of fees, and by "gentle pressure" through the na-

[1] *Regeerings-Almanak*, 1930, I, p. 350.

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871 tive officials who, on the Dutch system of indirect rule, retain much of their inherited authority, the prejudice was in part dispelled. There still remained the difficulty that these schools led nowhere. The same objection attached to the Standard Schools, though with less force, as these were helpful to petty traders and artisans. Dutch was the only avenue to social and material advancement. (Later, in 1922, by way of making the vernacular schools more attractive, "link" schools were to be established by which the pupils could find access to a new type of school where they might learn Dutch.)

In 1903, in accordance with "ethical" principles, natives were re-admitted into European schools, where they could qualify as clerks. The consequent influx of natives threatened to destroy the European character of these schools, and, to relieve the pressure, Dutch was added to the curriculum of the First Class School. But the natives "valued Dutch only when it led to a Diploma."[2] The First Class Schools did not prepare students for the Clerkship (K. A.) Examination, and they remained unpopular, while the pressure on the European schools continued.

By this time nationalism was becoming a political force. The Chinese were the first to respond, and they began to modernize their schools and to introduce the teaching of English. This was prejudicial to Dutch political and economic interests, and it was arranged that Dutch-Chinese Schools should give much the same course as the European schools and enjoy the same privileges. A similar device was adopted for the First Class Schools, and the natives were thus enabled to obtain a complete primary education through the medium of Dutch. In 1914 the First Class Schools were re-classified as Dutch-Vernacular Schools, which involved no change in the curriculum but paved the way for fitting them into a comprehensive scheme for higher studies.

The new scheme involved the creation of schools where secondary education could be given. In the first instance the de-

[2] H.-I. Onderwijs-Commissie, *Résumé*, p. 7.

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mand was met by providing schools for More Extended Lower Instruction (M. U. L. O.), or Mulo Schools. These were open to pupils from all schools on a Western basis, Dutch, Dutch-Chinese and Dutch-vernacular, but pupils from the Dutch-Chinese and Dutch-vernacular schools were placed in a preparatory class. The Mulo diploma corresponds approximately to Matriculation in British India. Some Mulo graduates wanted to go further and in 1919 their requirements were met by the creation of General Middle Schools, taking them up to the standard required for admission to a university in the Netherlands —approximately that of the Intermediate Examination in British India. Some Mulo graduates go on to vocational instruction, and some leave school; in 1926 the Mulo course was revised to provide suitably for all three types of student. Similarly, the General Middle School has three sections: Mathematics and General Science; Western Letters; and Oriental Letters.

Two features of the system deserve special notice. One is that in the Mulo Schools the pupils learn not only Dutch but also English and German, and thus have access to a wider field of Western learning than in British India, where few study any Western language except English. The other is the high standard of education. Generally throughout the East the high goal of study is the diploma and not the attainments that it represents, and this drags standards downwards. But in Netherlands India many European children will go to a university in Europe, and their parents demand instruction well up to the necessary standard; attainments are as important as diplomas. The whole system indeed is throughout linked up with that of the home schools. At every stage children in the Dutch schools in Netherlands India must be up to the work of the corresponding standard in Europe, when their parents are at home on leave, and at every stage children in the mixed schools must be able to enter the corresponding standard in a Dutch school. Thus the demand of European parents for a high level of education is diffused through all classes. The proportion of literacy is shown in the table below.

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NUMBERS AT SCHOOL, 1900 and 1938[a]

Type and Grade of School	1900	1938			
	Total	Native	Foreign Asiatic	European	Total
Vernacular					
Rural	..	1,826,906	12,480	..	1,839,386
Urban	146,575	276,052	2,163	2	278,217
Chinese	13,349	65	2,200	..	2,265
Primary					
Dutch-Native	..	77,173	1,681	506	79,360
Dutch-Chinese	..	2,100	22,350	396	24,846
European	18,192(a)	5,236	1,436	39,015	45,687
Secondary					
Mixed	..	7,968	2,612	3,571	14,151
European	1,139(b)	724	838	4,845	6,407
Total	179,255	2,196,224	45,760	48,335	2,290,319

(a) Includes 1,921 non-Europeans; (b) Includes 19 non-Europeans.

LITERACY, 1930

Region	Percent		
	Natives	Chinese	All Races
Java			
Male	9.7	47.5	10.7
Female	1.4	16.0	1.9
Total	5.5	33.3	6.2
Outer Provinces			
Male	13.4	33.2	14.5
Female	4.0	7.7	4.2
Total	8.7	24.7	9.5
Netherlands India			
Male	10.8	39.5	11.9
Female	2.2	12.4	2.6
Total	6.4	28.9	7.2

It will be noticed that among natives the percentage of literacy is lower in Java than in the Outer Provinces which, although more backward from the economic standpoint, include districts, such as Menado and the Moluccas, that have long been active centers of missionary effort and contain a large proportion of Christians. Among the Chinese on the other hand the proportion is lower in the Outer Provinces, where coolies are numerous; in Java nearly one-half of the male Chinese are literate.

[a] *Jaarcijfers, 1900; Statistical Abstract, 1940.*

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Despite the growth of education the population has grown even faster, and in 1930 the number of children not at any recognized school was larger than in 1900. Moreover, the figures give an unduly favorable impression, as they do not reveal the wastage. It seems that of the children in the vernacular schools only about one-third complete the course, and of those entering the Dutch-vernacular schools only 45.5 per cent obtain a Primary Diploma, and not more than 14 per cent survive to the end of the Secondary course.[4] On the other hand, some 400,000 children in Koran schools[5] do not appear in the above statement, and there are a few thousand in the "wild" schools, with a nationalist bias and independent of the official system. Some of these have been doing useful work, notably the *Taman-siswo* schools, but many are poor imitations of the State schools. The emergence of these schools has led to a change in educational policy. Formerly European schools had to be registered, but native schools, then unimportant, were exempt. The growth of native education during the present century changed the position; and, when the "wild" schools sprang up, native schools were subjected to the same restrictions as European schools. This occasioned some controversy, and under new regulations of 1932 both Europeans and natives were allowed to teach on merely giving notice of their intention, though for teaching European pupils a diploma was required.

With the growth of education there has been a steady drift of school graduates to the large towns, where they can best profit from their attainments.[6] As the numbers of those who hold diplomas have increased, the values of the diplomas have fallen. Since 1900, about half of those with the Clerkship (K. A.) diploma have found employment under Government. In 1928 the number obtaining the diploma was 6,559, and the average number of vacancies annually was 447.[7] As elsewhere, the overproduction of school graduates has revived interest in technical instruction. At the beginning of the century there were no technical schools, and the few technical classes were

[4] *Résumé, op. cit.*, p. 32. However, conclusions based on 1930 figures are probably much less valid today.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 72. [6] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

[7] H.-I. Onderwijs-Commissie, *Eind-Rapport*, p. 45.

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a preserve for Europeans. The first technical school was established in 1901 and, with subsequent foundations, provided technical subordinates for the rapidly expanding European enterprise. The war of 1914-18 gave a new impetus to industrial development and caused a shortage of engineers from Europe, and in 1919 the Bandoeng Engineering College was founded by private capitalists. Natives were not excluded except by financial limitations and because their demand for technical instruction was slight; but technical instruction remained largely a preserve for Europeans.

One aim of the ethical policy was to promote industrial development among the natives. Fock attacked the problem along three lines. He hoped to train natives for technical posts under Government, for employment in private industry, and for the creation of native industry. The first objective was not difficult, as the growing extension of State activities opened a field for employment, and the gradual improvement of academic education supplied men with the necessary basis for technical instruction. In all Departments now, the lower and middle grades are mainly recruited from local men with a specialized training of a primary or secondary standard. In private enterprise there has been an increasing demand for skilled labor and technical assistants. In 1910 three trade schools were opened, and the men readily found work. The war, and the relations between Capital and Labor after the war, enhanced the demand for men of this type. New schools were opened at other centers, and also branch schools with a shorter course. But until the depression of the 'thirties enforced rigid economy, only very subordinate positions were open to local men.

Fock's third aim was more ambitious. He hoped to train artisans who would raise the standard of native industry and develop new occupations. But there was no demand for such men in the native world before the introduction of motors and bicycles. Now many men trained in government shops set up as cycle smiths or in various branches of the motor business, and some men find work in the very few native industries. From about 1929 the Government made a serious attempt to develop native weaving, not merely as an interesting craft but as a

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modern business. They turned the nationalist movement for home products to good account and had considerable success in improving not only weaving but also the ancillary crafts of dyeing, and carpentry for the manufacture of looms. This came in useful when cheap goods from Japan threatened the cotton market, as not only Dutch cottons, but also native cottons were prejudiced. Further experience has shown that the simple hand loom can compete successfully with machinery. The manufacture of hats was encouraged in a similar way. It is still more remarkable that persistent efforts and many experiments seem to have had some success in attracting cultivators to agricultural schools. The secret of this seems to be a close study of agricultural economy, which has made it possible to adapt scientific principles to native practice, instead of trying to adapt native methods to scientific principles.

In higher education, vocational and cultural, progress has been much slower. The leaders of the ethical movement favored sending men to Europe, holding that higher studies could flourish only in a congenial environment.[8] That had never been the Dutch policy, and in 1900 there were only five native students in Europe. For a few years they were sent more freely, and by 1908 the number had risen to 23. Most of them looked for appointments in the higher branches of the government service; but there was some hesitation in admitting them, and the consequent discontent among the students, fanned by the growth of Nationalism, threatened dangerous political reactions. An experiment in sending some of the hereditary native officials was also thought unsuccessful, and the opinion made headway that it was better for Orientals to remain at home.

This implied the provision of facilities for higher studies in Netherlands India for those few with a sufficiently good general education. But the large European population and the high pitch of European enterprise had attracted European professional men who did not relish native competition; the lawyers resisted the opening of a Law School in 1909, and the Medical Association protested against a new Medical School

[8] Schrieke, J. B. O., in Bradley, E., *The University Outside Europe* (1939), p. 267.

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87 in 1913. On the other hand, the shortage of engineers, caused by the war, induced European men of business to take an active part in promoting technical studies and, as mentioned above, to found an Engineering College in 1919. This was taken over by the Government in 1924; a Law College was founded in the same year, and a Medical College in 1926. All these colleges give a full course of the same standard as a university in Europe. The present war gave a new impetus to local industry, and by cutting off the Indies from Holland, made it desirable to provide industrial training in the East. Other colleges have therefore been added, and the whole complex has been grouped together as the University of Batavia. The following table shows the number of students enrolled.[9]

NUMBER OF COLLEGE STUDENTS, 1935-36

Faculty	Europeans		Natives		Chinese		Total	
	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.
Engineering	66	3	49	1	31	..	146	4
Law	61	6	204	7	50	9	315	22
Medicine	88	16	243	12	159	16	490	44

The above table shows that women are beginning to seek a career in the professions. The pioneer of female education was Miss Kartini, the daughter of a high Javanese official, who looked on education, and especially the education of women, as an instrument for the advancement of her people. "Educate the women," she said, "and you will find sturdy cooperators in the splendid and gigantic task of civilizing millions." She found a friend in the Director of Education, a leader of the ethical movement, and about 1900 opened a school for the daughters of officials. By 1928 nearly 20 per cent of the native children in the primary and lower schools were girls, and in the missionary centers, Menado and the Moluccas, over a third. In schools teaching Dutch the proportion of girls rose during the same period from about 15 per cent to 30 per cent. The growth of female education among the Chinese is still more remarkable. In 1928, of the total number in all schools, 37.19

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 274.

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were girls, and in schools teaching Dutch the percentage had risen from about 11 per cent to 40 per cent.[10]

A notable educational invention is the People's Library. When rural education first started in 1907 the Dutch realized that it was of little use to teach people to read if they had no books, and that the first difficulty was to create the reading habit. Children taught to find a pleasure in reading might continue to read after they left school, and might borrow books even if they would not buy them. Libraries were therefore established in connection with the schools; children may borrow books without payment, but adults pay a small fee. At first all the books were in the vernacular, but later it was found that there was a demand for Dutch books also. By 1937 there were 2,528 vernacular libraries and 158 Dutch libraries lending out some three million books. The books are mostly publications of the Bureau—either indigenous stories rewritten or Western works adapted or translated, both fiction and non-fiction. Now the people are buying the books, which are sent around in vans, and some agents can sell books to the value of fl.1,000 a month. The remuneration of the author or compiler depends partly on the sales, and a technique for translation and adaptation has thus been worked out. The example has been followed on a modest scale in Malaya and Indo-China.

Indo-China

Nowhere in the Tropical Far East was the educational system so keenly criticized at the beginning of the century as in Indo-China. It was blamed both for what it had done and for what it had left undone; in Cochin-China it had sapped authority and broken down the social order; in Annam on the other hand it had taken no hold upon the people. By this time the generous ideal of inspiring the Annamese with French culture had lost much of its attraction. "It was not for its beauty that subject peoples learned the French language, but for its utility"; the study was not so profitable as they had expected, and the bitterest enemies of the French were among those who knew the language best.[11]

[10] *Résumé*, p. 27.
[11] Harmand, *op. cit.*, pp. 265, 281.

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871 The new doctrine of efficiency was brought to Indo-China by Doumer (1897-1902), but he was preoccupied with administrative and economic problems, and did little for public instruction beyond suggesting principles and founding a trade school in each of the three capitals. It was his successor, Paul Beau, who laid the foundations of the modern educational system. Harmand, writing in 1910, summarized the current French doctrine.[12] Purely native schools should be encouraged, but the teaching of French confined to towns where it would be of practical use, and Western learning extended cautiously. Vocational training was desirable because the Government, planters, industrialists and merchants all wanted cheap assistants, and it would be hopeless to introduce machinery if there were no one to run it or effect simple repairs. But such instruction could be better given in workshops than in schools. Secondary and higher instruction should look to utility and form technicians rather than savants.

The instrument devised by Beau for reorganizing public instruction was the *Conseil de Perfectionnement de l'Enseignement Indigène*, created in 1906, which played a great part in the educational reforms of the next few years. The central idea of the new system was that natives should begin their education in the vernacular schools, and the more intelligent should pass on through French-vernacular primary schools to the secondary stage. At the bottom of the ladder was the Elementary or Village School in which Chinese characters were used, though *quoc-ngu* might also be taught. This led on to the Primary Vernacular School at the headquarters of the canton (township), in which both Chinese characters and *quoc-ngu* were compulsory, and French was optional. A few went on to the Complementary (or secondary) Vernacular School. Western science was added to the curriculum in deference to nationalist wishes, and normal schools were founded to provide teachers and to improve the standard of teaching.[13] The system was first introduced in Tonkin and Annam, and in 1909-10 was extended to Cochin-China. By 1913 there were 49,399

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 272 ff.
[13] Brenier, *op. cit.*, p. 119; Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

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pupils in the elementary stage, and 12,103 in the primary stage. 87%
But many remained outside. In Tonkin and Annam there was still a preference for private education, and in Cambodia and Laos there were only the monastic schools. In these the monks were encouraged to adopt modern textbooks, and in 1912 a public examination was introduced for pupils from monastic schools, with an Elementary Certificate for those who passed.[14] The plan was much like that proposed by Phayre in Burma. Like many other projects, not only in education, nor in Indo-China alone, it was introduced with enthusiasm, reported on favorably for a few years—and then forgotten.

The Elementary Certificate in the village schools also gave admission to the French-vernacular Primary Schools, which had been opened in Cochin-China since 1879 and in the other provinces between 1904 and 1906.[15] In these schools the medium of instruction was French, which pupils from the elementary school could not understand. A Preparatory Course was therefore introduced, laying special stress on French but using the vernacular as the medium of instruction. In 1913 there were 19,267 pupils in the Preparatory Schools and 17,628 in the Primary Schools. Pupils were expected to complete the primary course by the age of 14, when they became eligible for the secondary schools, where they worked alongside French students.

Meanwhile a course for French students had grown up to meet the needs of the European population. This comprised a Primary Course, with Lower and Upper Grades, and a Secondary Course, with only a Lower Grade—until 1912, when an Upper Grade was opened in one school, which acquired recognition as a Lycée. The total number of French students in 1913 was 1,193 of whom 172 were in the Lycée, together with 84 natives.[16]

The war gave a new stimulus to cultural assimilation and educational progress. In 1915 the competitive examinations for the mandarinate, in which the Chinese classics figure largely, were abolished in Tonkin, "and this was the death sentence for

[14] Brenier, *loc. cit.*
[15] *Ibid., loc. cit.*
[16] *Ibid., loc. cit.*

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traditional culture."[17] On the other hand, Sarraut (1917-19) compiled a Code of Public Instruction, emphasizing the importance of French, and attempted to amalgamate the elementary and primary schools by taking over the village schools and introducing into them the teaching of French. He also gave new facilities for secondary and higher education. The postwar years saw a reaction against Liberal ideas, typified by Merlin (1923-25), with his "rather negative dread of higher education";[18] and even more sympathetic rulers like Varenne could not resist the current of opinion in favor of primary instruction rather than higher studies.[19] It has however been found necessary to abandon Sarraut's project of taking over primary instruction by the State; it was too costly, and it was also impracticable to provide instruction for everyone in French. In 1924 the division into vernacular and French-vernacular schools was restored; in the former the medium of instruction is the vernacular, with French as an optional subject. Progress was still slow, and in 1926 villages that could not be provided with State schools were allowed to open village schools at their own expense, but subject to official approval and supervision. In Cambodia the monastic schools were still functioning as village schools, and in 1924 a new attempt was made to incorporate them in the official system. Suitable textbooks were prepared, and monks were encouraged to volunteer for training. The experiment promised success, and in 1930 the King "signed a Royal Ordinance . . . to revive everywhere the Pagoda schools."[20] By 1936-37 over a thousand monks had been approved as teachers, and there were 813 pagoda schools with 34,462 boys and 121 girls.[21] (In Burma 928 recognized monastic schools with 79,135 pupils.)

In order to improve the teaching in these schools there are *"Formations de pénétration scolaire,"* which send itinerant teachers around to the pagoda and other village schools. In

[17] Thompson, *loc. cit.*, p. 291.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 293.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 295
[20] Keesing, *Education in Pacific Countries*, pp. 78, 79.
[21] *Annuaire Statistique, 1936-37* (Hanoi, 1938). Other figures for that year are from the same source.

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1936-37 there were 3,740 schools under this scheme, with 155,933 boys and 8,115 girls. The Elementary schools in the same year numbered 2,496, with 135,306 boys and 31,315 girls; and there were 59,399 boys and 16,541 girls in the elementary department of schools of higher standing. The course lasts three years and includes the three R's, some notions of local history and geography, and in some schools a little French.

NUMBER OF STUDENTS, 1936-37

	Native		*French*	
Grade	*Public*	*Private*	*Public*	*Private*
Elementary	406,669	62,423(a)		
Primary				
Lower	55,025	22,986	4,759	2,078
Upper	4,611	5,422(b)	449	587
Secondary	41		1,485(c)	
University	612	..	..	..
Technical	1,889	..	..	..

(a) Includes Chinese schools but not Malay or Burman.
(b) Includes Chinese Lycée.
(c) Includes 675 Natives and Chinese.

In the Village and Pagoda schools the same course is followed so far as practicable, but the aim is to replace them with State Elementary schools. At the end of the course there is an examination for the Elementary Certificate; in 1936-37 only 47,293 were successful and of these 11,804 passed the test in French, and 5,621 in Chinese.

Successful candidates are eligible for the Primary School with two grades, Lower and Upper, lasting three and four years respectively. The Lower Grade schools (*écoles de plein exercice*) have elementary departments. The medium of instruction in the Primary Grade is French, but the aim is to give the oriental equivalent of a modern classical education. The curriculum is based on the local vernacular, French and a classical language, Chinese, Pali or Sanskrit, and it comprises the usual school subjects, including Elementary Science in the Lower Grade and Chemistry and Physics in the Upper Grade. The Lower Grade leads up to the Certificate of Franco-vernacular Primary studies, and is a qualification for some minor appointments, including that of Assistant Teacher, and also qualifies

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for promotion to the Upper Primary course. This has two branches, one for general students and one for teachers, comprising agriculture, psychology and practical teaching. In 1936-37 there were eighteen Upper Primary schools. Successful candidates receive the Diplomas of Primary Franco-vernacular studies.

In the Primary Grade the education of French children is usually separate from that of natives, but follows along the same lines. In the Secondary Grade both follow the same course and largely in the same schools. In 1936-37 there were four native secondary schools, and of the three lycées two admitted natives. As the native candidates far exceed the vacancies in number, there is a stiff competitive examination for entrance. The course carries on the attempt made in the primary school to give a modern general education on the basis of oriental culture. It lasts three years, and the baccalaureate examination at the end qualifies the student for admission to a university in France as well as to that at Hanoi.

Alongside the public schools there are also private schools. Most of these follow the ordinary course; they comprise both lay and mission schools, with 36,010 pupils in lay schools, mostly Franco-vernacular, and 41,711 in mission schools, mostly vernacular. Missionary work had been hampered by anti-clericalism and was badly hit by the war of 1914-18; since then the annual arrivals have been reduced by two-thirds. The lay schools, about half Chinese and half Annamese, represent progressive Nationalism and aim at combining Western science with Eastern culture. There are also purely Chinese schools—with 13,110 pupils, including 156 in a lycée, and some small Burmese and Malay schools with about 500 pupils. The birth of Nationalism was contemporaneous with the reforms of Beau, and in its early stages found expression in associations for promoting Western learning and modernizing literature, and also, rather later, in a long succession of school strikes, beginning in 1909.[22] Before long Chinese textbooks began to spread dangerous thoughts even in public schools, and unsuitable works were banned. The Chinese and Annamese replied by opening private

[22] Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

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schools. These multiplied rapidly and, with the rise of Communism in post-war China, were regarded as centers of infection. In 1924 the Annamese schools were required to comply with "regulations for scholastic hygiene"[23]—moral, presumably, rather than physical. In 1930 the regulations were extended to Chinese, Malay and Burman schools. The curriculum in these schools is much the same as in the official schools.

The apex of the whole system is the University of Hanoi. This was founded by Beau in 1907 as a concession to the new spirit of Nationalism, and to give ambitious students a local alternative to Japan or Hongkong. But the growth of a more assertive Nationalism caused a reaction, and the university was closed in 1908 and not reopened until 1917, when Sarraut tried to kill Nationalism with kindness. It was reorganized in 1925, with schools of Law, Medicine, Fine Arts, Education, Commerce, Public Works, and Agriculture and Forestry; all but the first three, however, were closed in 1931 as a result of the depression. The course lasts from three to five years. In 1936-37 there were 359 students of Law, 202 of Medicine, and 51 of Fine Arts (painting and architecture); they include some fifty French. Some students go on to universities in France. Official policy has varied greatly, from encouragement to discouragement, according as the students have been regarded as hostages to French culture or as potential rebels, but not a few who have studied in France have achieved notable success.

Female education is backward. In 1913 there were no more than 3,230 girls at school, and in 1936-37, although the number had risen to 63,918 in public schools, 55,971 were in the elementary grade; in the pagoda schools the girls are much fewer than in the corresponding schools in Burma.

Vocational and technical education is also backward. The excessive number of lawyers has been described as "a menace to social equilibrium."[24] The Government has tried to maintain close relations with capitalist enterprise in the provision of "apprentices and qualified workers," and to preserve a strict correlation between the requirements of industry and the out-

[23] *Teaching in French Indo-China*, p. 14.
[24] Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

87 put of the schools; annually local officials report the number of openings available, and admissions into the schools are regulated accordingly.[25] According to a report of 1931 there were three technical schools giving instruction in the handling of iron, wood and electrical apparatus; these were linked up with the navy, marine, and military aviation respectively. "Electricity and mechanics applied to machines and motors (and above all repairs and driving of automobiles) have developed spontaneously and attract the largest number of students."[26] Another group comprised schools of applied art. In a third group there were two schools of apprenticeship and industrial planning. In 1936-37 there were 11 technical schools in all, a school for the blind, and 20 technical departments attached to primary schools; the total number of pupils was 1889, including 314 girls.

No account of French education would be complete without a tribute to the work done in oriental science, literature and art by the *Ecole de l'Extrême Orient*, Hanoi and the Buddhist School at Pnom Penh. As can be seen above, much has been done to promote Western art, and the present writer cannot forget the large number of Annamese in the audience at the Opera House in Saigon. The Dutch have encouraged painting and so, of recent years and on a smaller scale, have the British, but in the cultivation of artistic sensibility, the French unquestionably lead the way.

The Philippines

During the last half of the nineteenth century the conflict in the Philippines between clerical rule and Liberal ideas grew tenser. It came to a head in 1896 with the execution of Rizal, which was the signal for a general rebellion. By 1898 the insurgents were pressing on Manila, when war broke out between Spain and the United States. The war ended in December with the cession of the Philippines to America, and the Filipinos, who had welcomed the Americans as allies, found themselves

[25] *Teaching in French Indo-China*, p. 12. Keesing, *Education in Pacific Countries*, p. 135; Ennis, T. E., *French Policy and Developments in Indo-China* (1936), p. 175.

[26] *Teaching in French Indo-China*, p. 13.

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American subjects. Although organized resistance dragged on until the surrender of Aguinaldo in 1901, the forms of civil government were introduced in 1900, by a Philippine Comission with Judge W. H. Taft as its presiding officer. In the following year he was appointed Governor-General, and three Filipinos were nominated to the Commission. From the outset American rule was inspired by two ideas: the doctrine of efficiency in the interests of economic progress, and the principle of self-government by the introduction of American institutions. At the beginning of the American regime only 15 per cent of Philippine exports went to the United States, but of recent years 75 per cent of all the trade was with the United States;[27] thus there has been a radical transformation of the economic environment. With the growth of American business interests there has sometimes been a trend towards giving the first place to efficiency. But the claims to independence urged by the Filipinos found much sympathy among the large mass of Americans traditionally opposed to Imperialism, and also increasing support from sugar growers and dairy farmers in the United States, averse to the importation of Filipino products at privileged rates, and from labor leaders apprehensive of danger to American standards of living. Out of this conflict of ideas and interests was born the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, constituting the Commonwealth of the Philippines with a promise of complete independence in 1946.

The Spaniards came to the Philippines doubly armed with swords and missals; the Americans came with rifles and school primers.[28] The army leaders held that no measure would so quickly promote the pacification of the islands as the introduction of the American school system. In each new stretch of country occupied, officers were detailed as school superintendents and private soldiers as teachers; altogether the military commanders opened about a thousand schools, for which the General selected and ordered textbooks. The civil government showed no less zeal and imported civilian teachers to replace the soldiers. By 1902 there were 926 American school teachers, but

[27] Keesing, F. M., *The Philippines* (1937), p. 85.
[28] *Census, 1903*, III, p. 638.

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87 since then the number has declined, and in 1939 out of nearly 40,000 teachers only 80 were Americans. The Government regarded English as the best instrument for inculcating the principles of modern progress, and the Filipinos recognized it as the best means of getting on in the world.[29] English was therefore adopted as the medium of instruction, and, indeed with a large crowd of teachers, ignorant alike of Spanish and the native languages, no other course was practicable.

The teachers were full of missionary zeal to implant the gospel of equality, democracy and love of country, and they succeeded the friars as the general guides and guardians of the people. "Almost without exception they joined the Filipino leaders in spreading the doctrine of Filipino nationality and patriotism";[30] portraits of the national heroes adorned the school-room walls, their lives were related in the textbooks, and the Filipino national anthem was sung daily in all the schools. Through all the phases of American policy the zeal for education has been unabated, and the primary function of the system has been "to facilitate progress along the road to democratic self-government."[31] The Filipinos are no less zealous than the Americans, and even the children take their schooling seriously. The table below gives some indication of the progress achieved.

PROGRESS OF EDUCATION, 1903-1938[32]

Type of School	*Standard*	*No. of Pupils* 1903	1938
Primary			
Elementary....	1— 4	261,615	1,408,652
Intermediate...	5— 7		250,503
Secondary			
High School...	8—11	4,747	76,084
Collegiate.....	..	436	3,629
University.....	..		7,711
Private.....	..	89,567	129,591

Criticism follows much the same lines as elsewhere: the system is charged with being wasteful and unpractical, and some are

[29] *Ibid.*, III, p. 647.
[30] Hayden, J. R., *The Philippines, a Study in National Development*, pp. 515-6.
[31] *Census, 1903*, III, p. 671; *Statesman's Yearbook, 1941*.
[32] Hayden, *op. cit.*, p. 467.

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uneasy at its secular character. Of more particular application to the Philippines are the complaints that more regard has been paid to quantity than to quality, that the system is excessively directed to political education, and that the use of a foreign language was a mistake. A somewhat unfavorable picture was given by an American Commission in 1925. Their report, known usually as the Monroe Survey, gives the average period of school attendance as less than three years; 82 per cent did not go beyond the 4th grade, took five years to do it, and even then were only on the same level as pupils after the 2nd standard in the United States. From recent figures it seems that 48 per cent survive to complete the 4th standard,[33] which compares favorably with results in countries with a much smaller proportion at school. The political bent, regarded as excessive, would seem to have been a chief factor in getting so many to school and keeping them at school, judged by the standards of the Tropical Far East, so long. But it does not seem to have been very effective in pressing home the idea of democracy; for what has emerged is a one-party government—democratic possibly, but not at all like that intended.

The advantages of English as a medium of instruction were debated until the foundation of the Commonwealth. The chief reason for adopting it in the first instance was practical; in no other language could education be rapidly pushed forward. It has helped to diffuse Western ideas among the people and has given larger numbers chances of employment. But it has never struck home; the pupils, parents and even the teachers seldom use English out of school. In school "both teachers and pupils function in an atmosphere of book-learning,"[34] and in the administration the use of English tends to divorce the officials from the people. As a second language it is likely to survive, but the Commonwealth Government has adopted for official use a modified form of Tagalog, one of the chief native dialects.

The secular character of the system of public instruction has not aroused appreciable opposition. Under Spanish rule the Liberals advocated secular instruction as part of the reaction

[33] [illegible], p. 472.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 118.

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against the clericalism of the Government, and some of the lay schools which they founded still survive. So far as secular instruction was distrusted, hostility was mitigated by the fact that both Americans and Filipinos professed Christianity. But there were some who still valued religion as a basis of education and preferred their old Church schools. These now provide for about 100,000 of the 130,000 pupils at private schools. The old University of St. Thomas has not only survived but has grown lustily; now it numbers 4,000 students and "combines with modern literary and professional training, classical scholarship and the cultural values inherent in that form of learning." Other institutions on the contrary reflect the values inherent in education regarded as an economic asset, and one difficulty has been to prevent them from exploiting the general eagerness for diplomas. Many were eliminated by the recognition only of diplomas awarded by approved schools, and in 1936 the regulations were tightened by prohibiting the opening of any school or college without permission.[35] Most of the reputable institutions follow much the same course as the public schools. The Elementary Grade comprises the Primary Schools with four standards and Intermediate Schools with three standards. Above these come the High Schools with four standards. Graduates from these may proceed either to Collegiate education, vocational in character, in Standards 12 to 14, or to the University with courses of four to six years according to the faculty.

We have seen that under Spanish rule female education had already made considerable progress, with practically as many schools for girls as for boys. American policy was definitely coeducational and encouraged girls to share the privileges of their brothers. One indication of their progress is the foundation of a women's university by a woman who took a prominent part in the struggle against Spain for independence.

Criticism of the system as unpractical hardly does justice to the persistent efforts to promote vocational instruction. From the first the American Government was zealous in the cause of industrial and, especially, agricultural training. A Bureau of Agriculture was established, which in 1910 was placed under

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 555.

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the Education Department. Gardening was made part of the school course. In 1902 a trade school was opened in Manila to give instruction in carpentry, plumbing and telegraphy. The Nautical School, taken over from the Spanish Government, was given a more practical charcter, and commercial instruction was provided. Other trade schools were opened at minor centers, and all pupils were required to take a vocational course involving manual training.[36] So far was this carried that at one time the school system became one of the chief industrial enterprises in the country; but few of the boys found jobs on leaving school. It is still, however, a character of the system to combine practical and academic instruction. In Standard IV gardening is introduced; in the Intermediate Grade some schools are specialized as farm schools; in the High School Grade, in addition to the academic and general schools, there are others that specialize as normal schools, rural high schools or trade schools, and some teach domestic economy. After leaving school the student has a choice of training in normal, trade or nautical colleges, or may study a profession at the university. The State University of the Philippines, founded in 1908, had in 1938, 7,711 students with two branches outside Manila. In addition to academic instruction in the humanities it offers courses in law, medicine, pharmacy, veterinary science, education, commerce, music and the fine arts.

Despite the abundant provision for vocational instruction, this remains unpopular, and the academic course is overcrowded, though the value of its diplomas continually declines. In 1905 any boy from the 4th standard could get a job; in 1912 he had to reach the 7th standard, and in 1925 he required a high school diploma. The Monroe Survey criticized the vocational training as "not suited to the immediate needs of the country,"[37] and recommended every endeavor to attract boys to rural high schools. Another inquiry, in 1930, found that some courses still gave a training for which there was no demand, and that "only a small proportion of the students in the specialized courses in agriculture and the industrial arts later

[36] *Census, 1903.*
[37] Roosevelt, Nicholas, *The Philippines* (1927), p. 194.

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●87 entered the vocations for which they were trained."[38] In 1938, of 76,000 pupils in the high schools, only 9,000 were in the trade schools and 4,600 in the agricultural schools, and "it is a matter of common knowledge that a large proportion of the students attending them are there not because they wish to take the vocational work offered, but because the vocational schools are free and in some cases provide opportunities for self-support."[39] Only the prospect of starvation will drive them, discontented, back to the land.[40] The fact is that industrial education has "operated in a vacuum";[41] business is still largely in the hands of foreigners, and the only openings for Filipinos are in administration, the office and the law. The Philippines, it has been said, are overrun with lawyers.

In respect of foreign travel the Filipinos have had much greater advantages than the people in most tropical dependencies. From the early nineteenth century they were studying in Spain and other parts of Europe. When the United States first took over the islands one method of inculcating American ideas was to send a hundred boys from fifteen to twenty-one years old to school in California, with homes in "pleasant private families."[42] It is said that since then thousands have studied in America, and more than five thousand have gone elsewhere. In addition to these some ten thousand have gained a wider experience of the world in America and Hawaii.[43] The Filipinos also gained practical experience in administration not merely as subordinates but in responsible positions. Already in 1921 many were heads or acting heads of departments, and practically all the assistant chiefs were Filipinos.[44]

The recognition of the Commonwealth has given a great stimulus to education. Since then the school population has risen by over 600,000. Another recent feature of the national effort to raise the general standard of intelligence is a nation-

[38] Hayden, *op. cit.*, pp. 520-21.
[39] *Ibid., loc. cit.*
[40] Keesing, *The Philippines*, p. 90.
[41] Hayden, *op. cit.*, p. 523.
[42] *Census, 1903*, III, p. 669.
[43] Malcolm, G. H., *The Commonwealth of the Philippines* (1936), pp. 357, 376, 380, 381.
[44] Keesing, *The Philippines*, p. 97.

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wide organization for adult education.[45] The movement made little headway until taken in hand in 1932 by the Bureau of Education, which enlisted the support of the Y. W. C. A. and similar institutions. In 1936 an Office of Adult Education was constituted and by 1940 there were over six thousand adult schools manned by fifty thousand volunteers, with half a million students enrolled in adult classes; and two and a half million educational publications were distributed. The enthusiasm to which these impressive figures bear witness may subside, but hardly without leaving some permanent impression on the people. But until quite recently the country was ill provided with books and other reading matter. The total circulation of the daily papers was only 200,000,[46] and the only public library was in Manila; even the University had no adequate library. The Filipinos were not a reading people. Now the Manila Library has branches in all the chief towns. The new enthusiasm for adult education is closely associated with the prospect of early independence. From Spanish times education has been entangled in politics, and under American rule no educational problem could be considered without reference to its political bearing, "independence rather than education was at stake." In the University issues were clouded by personal rather than by national politics. But a friendly critic suggests that in the long run professional educationists may find greater difficulties in dealing with a popular electorate than they have found hitherto in their relations with the representatives of American authority.[47]

Formosa

From 1662 until 1895 Formosa was under Chinese rule. Chinese immigrants pushed back the aborigines and during the nineteenth century rapidly increased in numbers. But the administration was slack; and the immigrants, mostly of the lower classes, were in general illiterate. In the last half of the century missionaries opened schools, and after Formosa was constituted

[45] Hayden, *op. cit.*, p. 531.
[46] Malcolm, *op. cit.*, p. 333.
[47] Hayden, *op. cit.*, p. 510.

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a separate province in 1886 the Provincial Government began to take steps to educate the aborigines. But material development and education were alike backward when the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1894. When Formosa was ceded to Japan in the following year, the people, mainly of Chinese birth or origin, attempted armed resistance, proclaiming a Republic, but this was suppressed before the end of 1895. The country remained under military rule until the appointment of the first civil Governor-General in 1918.

The Japanese theory of colonial policy is that "the economic development of the country must come first. Education and the raising of the standards of the people will follow. Afterwards political development may be possible,"[48] but as an integral part of the Japanese Empire. The progress that has been achieved in both economic development and education is astonishing, but what chiefly strikes the observer is the zeal and pertinacity displayed in linking up the economic and cultural life of the country and people with those of Japan.

ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF FORMOSA, 1897-1937[49]

Population (000)					*Imports*		*Exports*	
Year	*Formosan*	*Japanese*	*Year*	*Expenditure (£000)*	*Total (£000)*	*Japanese*	*Total (£000)*	*To Japan*
1904...	2,916	53	1897	1,049	1,276	210	1,266	372
1938...	5,393	310	1937	15,644	32,212	24,114	44,016	35,363

Yen at rate of ¥10 = 1£.

The picture of economic progress given by the table above finds a companion in the progress of education. In the early days schools were opened to provide interpreters but met with violent resistance; teachers were murdered and schools burned down. The Japanese reopened the schools under military protection as language schools, where volunteers gave an intensive course in Japanese. Active resistance subsided, and in 1898 systematic public instruction was started with the opening of village schools, with Japanese as the chief subject and as the

[48] Hayden, R., "Japan's New Policy in Korea and Formosa," *Foreign Affairs*, II, p. 474.

[49] Figures for 1897: Rutter, Owen, *Through Formosa* (1925), pp. 280, 282; for 1904: *Census, 1904*, cited, Wyndham, *op. cit.*, p. 150; for 1937-38: *Far Eastern Yearbook, 1941*.

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medium of instruction.[50] The Formosans "looked upon the education offered by the Japanese with suspicion; they had no desire for their children to learn to read and write Japanese, and consequently refused to send them to school." But they "gradually came to see the advantages of securing a good education for their offspring, and of course other subjects besides Japanese were taught. In many of the schools not only was education free, but the students' living expenses were paid as well . . . schools were, to begin with, only established in areas where the consent of the inhabitants had been obtained. At the same time a large number of old-fashioned Chinese schools were allowed to continue."[51] By 1904 considerable progress had been made in overcoming Formosan antipathy, and there were 153 schools, with 23,178 pupils, of whom 2,655 were girls.[52] The Japanese victory over Russia enhanced Formosan respect for Japan, and the subsequent China renascence stimulated them to seek modern education in the only form available. Numerous associations sprang up to promote Formosan interests, economic, cultural and political, and, within limits, the treatment of such aspirations seems to have been not unsympathetic, though any one transgressing those rather narrow limits soon found that the Government knew how to discourage dangerous thoughts.[53] At the same time, a strong formative influence was exercised by the predominantly Japanese administrative and economic environment, and the system of public instruction was directed to reinforcing this environment by cultural training.

In all the schools, from the lowest standard, the medium of instruction is Japanese. As the Formosans do not speak Japanese at home, they cannot attend the same primary schools as Japanese children. In the Primary Grade there are two sections, each with three standards. The Lower Primary School, such as is found in most villages, concentrates on Japanese, and goes only to Standard III. In the Upper Primary School the curriculum includes elementary science and may include agricul-

[50] Wyndham, *op. cit.*, p. 150.
[51] Rutter, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
[52] Wyndham, *op. cit.*, p. 151.
[53] Rutter, *op. cit.*, p. 150; Wyndham, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

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NUMBER OF SCHOLARS, 1939[54]

Class of School	No. of Pupils Japanese	Others
Kindergarten and Primary	49,028	569,308
Middle		
Boys	5,123	4,129
Girls	5,312	2,558
Vocational		
Two years	1,822	5,751
Full course	3,342	2,626
Normal	1,788	..
Higher		
Academic	192	91
Vocational	600	141
Private and Special	..	5,644

ture, commerce, and English; Chinese is optional. After the Primary course the native still requires two years' study before he is fit for the Middle Grade and even so is backward in comparison with the Japanese who has been using his own language. Thus Japanese children have an advantage in the examination qualifying for admission to the Middle School. The children are eligible for this school from the age of twelve. The ordinary course lasts five years for boys and four years in the corresponding school for girls, known as the Girls' High School. The curriculum includes physics, chemistry, law, economics, and English, French or German. In the girls' schools it is adapted to their special requirements. The figures given above indicate the notable progress of female education; doubtless Japanese example has had great influence in this matter. Some Middle Schools have a High School Department, with a course of three years in preparation for the University. The Imperial University was founded in 1929 and provides courses in literature, science, and politics; there are also vocational schools of university standing. The full course at the university takes seven years; but for students who have taken the preparatory course at school, four years is sufficient.

After completing the primary course students may go on to vocational or technical schools instead of going to the Middle School. One feature of the Japanese system is the high propor-

[54] *Far Eastern Yearbook, 1941.*

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tion of vocational students in comparison with those in the Middle School. Most of them take a short two years' course, with a wide choice of subjects and this is especially favored by the Formosans, who presumably find, that even with longer training, it is difficult to make headway where commerce and industry are dominated by the Japanese. The same explanation would account for the large number studying agriculture, but the figures under this head are of interest as suggesting that the Japanese have made some progress towards a solution of the difficult problem of relating agricultural instruction with practical agriculture. The comparatively small number of Formosans in the University and High Schools may be due partly to the Japanese policy of encouraging them to seek for higher education in Japan, but more probably reflects the Japanese predominance in the direction of industry and commerce.

NUMBER OF STUDENTS RECEIVING VOCATIONAL INSTRUCTION[55]

Grade and Kind	Students: Japanese	Students: Others
Middle School		
Short Course	1,822	5,751
Full course		
Agriculture	588	1,432
Industry	963	468
Commerce	1,791	726
Education	1,788	..
High School		
Agriculture	181	5
Industry	201	28
Commerce	238	26
Medicine	80	82

Private education plays an insignificant part in the system of instruction, and the missionaries, who were the pioneers of Western education in Formosa, suffered a grievous blow when the growth of public instruction enabled the Japanese to order the closure of the elementary department in missionary schools. In recent years practically the whole system worked towards strengthening the process of assimilation, for life in a society with a considerable Japanese element and wholly Japanese in its economic environment. The progress of education under

[55] *Ibid.*

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87/ Japanese rule is certainly a remarkable achievement, and one would like to know how it has been accomplished. *Fas est et ab hoste doceri.* But we have a picture of their system among the aborigines, and it is not one that people who still enjoy a democratic heritage are likely to adopt. Education is not compulsory, but the parents are encouraged to entrust their children to the Japanese. The teacher is a policeman, and the school is sometimes in the police station. When after five years the children are allowed to return home, they have been transformed from wild aborigines into civilized Japanese.[56] That is not education but "conditioning." How far gentle pressure has been carried to the same lengths among the Formosans is not clear. And whether the Japanese, even if they escaped disaster in the present war, will attain their goal of assimilating the Formosans may well be questioned. A sympathetic critic summarizes the results of twenty-five years of Japanese rule as "law and order, economic prosperity, elevated standards of living, widespread education and rising political discontent."[57]

Thailand

Chulalongkorn, though working to remould his land on modern lines, maintained the tradition of personal rule until 1895, when he created a Legislative Council; but this rarely met, and exercised no influence. In 1925, however, King Prajadhipok on his accession appointed a Supreme Council of State as an advisory body, and in 1927 formed a Committee of the Privy Council. But these bodies merely represented the hereditary aristocracy, and the Crown retained its full traditional and legal powers, while the actual administration was controlled by the various foreign departmental heads or advisers. As Siamese who had studied abroad grew in years and numbers, they became impatient alike of an autocratic tradition that they thought out of date, and of foreign control that seemed no longer necessary. In 1932 some of their leaders formed a People's Party and induced the king to accept a constitutional form of government. A Popular Assembly was convened, and this gave a small body of

[56] Rutter, *op. cit.*, p. 218.
[57] Hayden, *loc. cit.* For another view see note, p. 112 below.

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military leaders and progressive civilians, acting in the name of the People's Party, the opportunity to seize power. A royalist insurrection failed, and early in 1934 the king left for Sumatra on the plea of ill health. The party leaders remained in full control of the government, and in 1935 the king abdicated and was succeeded by a ten-year-old son, then at school in Switzerland; in fact, however, there is a one-party government under party leaders who allow no free political discussion. Under the monarchy, though the higher aristocracy were wealthy, the control of economic life rested with Europeans and Chinese. There was a strong Chinese community and, in the south, a large body of unassimilated Malays. One feature of the new government has been an attempt to promote the economic development of the people, especially in agriculture, and to bring the economic life of the country under national control.

The progress of public instruction in Thailand has features of special interest. In subject countries attempts by the government to improve education have been suspect as inimical to national progress, and similar attempts by nationalists have been regarded as subversive. In Thailand there has been no such conflict. The educational system, as modernized by Chulalongkorn, survived with little change, though in 1921-22 all children from seven to fourteen years of age were required to attend school. (In 1935 the age limits were changed to eight to fifteen.) Of recent years, however, it has been replaced by a new system on Western lines.

The new system recognizes four classes of schools:

(a) Local, or Village, Schools, maintained by the government;
(b) Municipal Schools, in urban areas with public corporations;
(c) Government Schools, as models of progressive education;
(d) Private Schools, mostly missionary institutions.

So far as practicable the monastic schools were incorporated in the system as local schools, but in many villages they were supplemented by schools which, though housed in monastic buildings, followed the official curriculum under lay management. In 1934 out of 9,001 local schools, 6,519 were monastic precincts, though only 1,219 were monastic schools. The table

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below shows the distribution of pupils at the various schools. Although the introduction of compulsory education was not immediately effective, in the course of ten years provision had been made for 90 per cent of the districts, and in 1937 there was said to be a school available everywhere for children of the primary grade.

NUMBER OF PUPILS IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF SCHOOL, 1939[58]

Class of School	Number of Pupils Boys	Girls
Local	714,521	611,379
Municipal	30,410	28,182
Government	42,180	19,117
Private	78,037	43,928

Primary instruction comprises four standards (*pratome*). In 1934-35 there were 801,571 children in the two lowest standards and 248,640 in the next two. The teachers are largely *pratome* graduates, employing the old-fashioned methods of instruction of the monastic schools. In the secondary course there are six standards (*matyome*), divided into a lower and upper section, each of three standards. In the upper section there is a choice of two courses, linguistic and scientific. The total number of secondary students in 1934-35 was 44,784. On completing the secondary course the student is eligible for admission to the Preparatory or Intermediate College at Bangkok. As appears from the above table, there are almost as many girls as boys at school. The system is not intentionally co-educational, but the country cannot afford separate schools for girls, and the parents do not want them to be separated in the primary grade. Boys and girls are usually separated in the secondary schools but meet again in the university.[59]

In theory the primary grade, and each section of the secondary grade, should end with two years' vocational instruction on an appropriate level. In 1934-35 however, only 5,058 were in the vocational grades. Some local schools offer carpentry, hat-making, agriculture and "hand-work." The Government schools comprise normal, agricultural and trade schools with a wide

[58] *Statesman's Yearbook, 1941.*
[59] Landon, K. P., *Siam in Transition* (1939), p. 101.

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range of courses: building, carpentry, tailoring, printing, domestic science, and almost every other form of activity from secretarial to silver work. Private schools offer instruction in foreign languages, pedagogy and hand-work, and the press advertises numerous courses in commerce, dress-making, and so on. In 1934 a School for National Song and Music was established by the Department of Fine Arts.

Higher education dates back to 1880-81 when a cholera epidemic induced Chulalongkorn to start a movement for a modern hospital. Funds were collected and plans drawn up. Then in 1886 one Siriraja died. Tradition required an imposing cremation with elaborate booths. The king directed that these should be made of good timber, so as to be serviceable afterwards, and they were used to build the Siriraja Hospital. At first this taught both the Siamese and Western systems of medicine, with the natural result that the better system gradually replaced the old. The course was at first for three years and aimed at producing medical assistants, but it has been extended to six years, and the first M. B. was granted in 1931. Up to 1940 it had produced 142 graduates, and the total number of Western doctors was barely 500. In course of time other institutions were founded to train men for administration, law, public works and survey, the agricultural service and the army. There

NUMBER OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, 1936-37

Arts and Science	473
Medicine	106
Nursing	166
Pharmacy	1
Engineering	94
Architecture	32

were also three schools, known as the Royal Pages' College, to train children of good birth for service at the Court and in the higher administration.[60] In 1917 the medical and administrative schools were amalgamated as the Chulalongkorn University. In 1937 the old Law School was remodeled as the University of Moral and Political Science, with a view to training "men

[60] Graham, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 253.

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87 capable of taking part in the conduct of affairs to whom the voters might grant their confidence."[61]

As already noticed, Thailand has been able to draw on all the countries of the modern world to gain administrative experience, and it has had the like good fortune in education. In 1934-35 there were 410 foreign teachers in private schools. Of these 74 came from the modern West including 30 Americans, 20 French, 11 English. The foreign Asiatics included 291 Chinese, 3 Japanese, and 31 Indians. Thailand has been fortunate also in its freedom of choice in sending students abroad. In 1937-38 there were said to be some 600, with 200 in Japan, 200 in the Philippines, 100 in England, 50 in France, 50 in America and 20 in Germany. Many of these were private students, but the State scholars numbered 12 in Japan, 11 in the Philippines, 32 in England, 10 in France, 11 in America, 2 in Germany and 1 each in India and Indo-China. The budget allotment under this head was B.482,000 (£44,000). Formerly State scholars were chosen by influence, but of late years they have been selected after a stiff competitive examination.

The modern system of public instruction is wholly secular, or rather, wholly nationalist. Inspectors, hankering after modern progress, report unfavorably on the monastic schools that still survive, and these are, it seems, gradually to be replaced by official schools. Even where the official schools are within monastic precincts, the monks take no part in the instruction and are no longer an important factor in the school. Many regret this departure from tradition, and there is a movement to found private schools on modern lines but with a religious background. In 1934 the Premier, when opening a normal school for monks, expressed the view that the Law of the Buddha is the best instrument of education, and to impart it no one is more worthy than the monk. In the private schools maintained by missionaries it seems that the Government imposes no restrictions on religious teaching.

Outside the schools various organizations promote social education. The Boy Scout movement was taken up as far back as 1911 by King Rama VI, who founded a Siamese branch

[61] *Siam Chronicle*, June 10, 1937, cited Landon, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

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under the title of the "Tiger Cubs Association," which has spread into every village. The Cub-leader is usually a school teacher, and most of the members are his pupils. The aim of the whole movement is to strengthen nationalist ideas and to foster a national spirit. There are about ninety thousand members. Another movement that has much the same impulse is the Junior Red Cross, started in 1922-23, with a view to training young people to become effective members of the adult Red Cross Society. It now has about a hundred thousand members.

The chief instrument of adult education is the correspondence department of the University. One feature of this is that the course ends with about fifteen days in residence, during which the students live in camp under quasi-military conditions, and combine lectures and sightseeing with physical and military exercises. One obstacle to the spread of a modern attitude to life has been the lack of books and the absence therefore of the habit of reading. Of late years there have been attempts to encourage translations into Siamese by men who have studied abroad, and "regular book stores have been opened in the larger centers with a good supply of books on law, medicine, agriculture, politics, foreign affairs and so on."[62] The only library on any considerable scale is that in Bangkok, though one or two provincial towns have made a beginning, and school libraries are not unknown. The Chinese seem to be taking a lead in this matter. "Every small village where Chinese congregate has its Chinese reading room. And every small town is visited periodically by the Chinese bookseller."[63] There are many Chinese newspapers, and novels, magazines and newspapers in Siamese are beginning to attract a considerable public.

Review

In our review of educational progress during the nineteenth century we noticed that, in general, public instruction in the various countries of the region derived from a common impulse, developed through approximately contemporaneous stages along much the same lines, encountered similar problems,

[62] Landon, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. 99.

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and led generally to much the same results, which were very different from those anticipated. During the present century likewise all Governments adopted much the same policy, and the lines of progress have been roughly parallel; in some matters all have failed, but in others a varying measure of success has been attained. Before venturing on an explanation of the facts it may be well to summarize them.

The main objective was to diffuse primary instruction. The figures for the number of children now at school are certainly impressive; as one half or more leave school before attaining permanent literacy and even from the lowest standards they give too favorable a picture, but they will serve for a comparison between the various countries. From the tables on pages (pp. 111-112) it seems that generally most children are at school where the largest proportion of the revenue is spent on education; but it is uncertain whether more children go to school because more money is spent, or whether more money is spent because more children go to school. The first table does show however, that the Philippines, Formosa and Thailand stand out in a separate class.

In the *Philippines* nine-tenths of the children at school are in public schools. There is only one system of public instruction, and the medium throughout is English. The percentage of the population at school is 11.54.

In *Formosa* practically all the children at school are in public schools. The medium of instruction is Japanese, but there are two separate primary courses, one for the Japanese and one for natives. Promotion to the secondary grade is by a competitive examination in Japanese in which the natives are at a disadvantage. Even in order to be eligible for this examination the natives must study for two years longer than the Japanese. Despite these obstacles the proportion at school is 11.36 per cent.

In *Thailand* nine-tenths of the children at school are in public schools. There is only one system of instruction, and the teaching is mainly in the vernacular, with no language barrier against promotion to the highest class. Education was made compulsory in 1921-22, but for some years the rules were in-

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effective. Including private schools the proportion at school is 10.65 per cent. 871

Among the second group *Malaya* leads the way. There are two systems of instruction, one with English and the other with the vernacular as the medium of instruction. The Malay vernacular schools are public schools and others are largely private. There is a formidable language barrier between the vernacular and English schools; and, though a bridge has been set up to help Malays across the gap, comparatively few can do so. Compulsory instruction was introduced locally in the last century and has been gradually extended, but it has not been rigorously enforced, and compulsion is no longer necessary. The percentage at school is 7.76, but this figure excludes the more recently incorporated and backward Unfederated States.

Burma has three distinct systems of instruction: English, Anglo-vernacular and vernacular. In the first, English is the medium of instruction; in the second Burmese is used in the lower standards, and in the vernacular schools the local language. The great majority of the schools are maintained by local authorities, by private institutions, mainly religious, or by individuals, and the Government exercises control over them by grants. Anglo-vernacular schools are freely open to all who can afford the fees, and a few boys from the vernacular schools obtain bridge scholarships enabling them to pursue their studies in Anglo-vernacular schools. In the university, where the teaching is in English, and in public examinations conducted in English, boys from English schools naturally have an advantage. The percentage of the population in recognized institutions is 3.92, but the monastic schools are, on the whole, as good as many lay village schools in Burma or elsewhere and, including these, the percentage rises to 5.45. This figure however excludes the Shan States.

In *Netherlands India* there are three systems: Dutch, Dutch-vernacular, and vernacular. In the two former, instruction is in Dutch. Private institutions, mainly religious, play a useful part in Dutch and Dutch-vernacular education, the latter chiefly managed by local authorities under the control of Government. Language operates as a barrier against both Dutch-vernacular

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871 and vernacular pupils; the former require a preparatory year before entering on the secondary grade, and vernacular pupils in the "link schools" require an extra year to reach the level of those in Dutch-vernacular schools. The unrecognized institutions are mainly Koran-schools, where mental discipline is far below that in Buddhist monastic schools; excluding these the percentage of the population at school is 3.35.

In *Indo-China* there are three systems of instruction: French, French-vernacular and vernacular; in the two former the medium of instruction is French. All natives must start in the vernacular schools and, unless they drop out on the way, end in a French school or in a French-vernacular school with an identical curriculum. The native takes seven years to reach the standard attained by French pupils in four years, and before admission to the secondary grade has to succeed in a competitive examination. French and French-vernacular instruction is partly managed, under State supervision, by private institutions, mostly religious, but vernacular schools are under the direct control of the State or local authority. Including private institutions the percentage of the population at school is 2.47.

Female education was another objective. The table below gives figures to the nearest thousand for the boys and girls at school, so far as this information is available. In the Philippines and Formosa the figures seem to be in much the same proportion as in Thailand. In Malaya the former prejudice against

NUMBER OF CHILDREN AT SCHOOL BY SEXES

	In Thousands	
	Boys	*Girls*
Burma	498	218
Malaya	193	76
Indo-China	511	56
Thailand	866	702

female education has been so largely overcome that now it is difficult to provide accommodation for the girls, but this dates only from about 1928. In 1928 a fifth of the native children in the primary and lower schools in Netherlands India were girls, but the proportion has probably risen since then. Co-education

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is a matter of policy only in the Philippines, but elsewhere it is general for children below twelve and in the universities.

In respect of higher academic instruction the Philippines are far ahead. But here it has been encouraged, whereas elsewhere more regard has been had to restricting the surplus of educated unemployables. Despite this there has been a general increase in secondary and higher instruction, and universities have been founded everywhere except in Malaya. The high figure for secondary students in Formosa is largely due to the inclusion of 10,435 Japanese; elsewhere Burma, with 14,969 students, and Malaya, with 15,066, have the largest number in proportion to the population.

One great object of policy was to encourage scientific, vocational and technical instruction. This was also a leading feature of nationalist policy. Yet the results are disappointing. Two different methods have been applied. In the Philippines, and to some extent in Thailand and Malaya, there has been an attempt to combine vocational with general instruction; elsewhere vocational and technical instruction have been given in special schools or classes. Not much detailed information is available as to the progress made in teaching science; but few reach a stage where it can usefully be studied, and it has little practical value where scientific vocations are so backward. Despite numerous enquiries and experiments, technical instruction has made little progress, and only in Netherlands India has there been even moderate success in the attempts to teach agriculture to prospective cultivators.

There remains the last, but in some respects the most important item in educational policy as it took shape at the beginning of the century, the attempt to reinforce social order by giving a religious and ethical color to a secular system of instruction. As the inadequacy of moral textbooks and primers of personal ethics became more apparent, interest tended to shift from moral to physical training. The "white man's burden" became "an almost meaningless phrase"[64] except to scoffers, and in the Netherlands Indies the most ardent supporters of native progress were among the first to react against the

[64] Buchan, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

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"ethical" policy.[65] A review of the latest Education Report for India notes the "complete absence of any reference to religion or religious education" and the single "depressing and colourless paragraph" devoted to "moral instruction."[66] Provision for religious instruction seems to have had little effect, and the problem of reconciling secular education with religion has proved even more difficult than that of reconciling religious institutions to secular instruction. Cleanliness comes next to godliness and is easier to inspect, but the teachers themselves do not practise the lessons they teach in hygiene and thrift. One feature of the present century has been the growing popularity of team games, and especially of football, and also of the Boy Scout movement. These have struck root among the people but, though good in themselves, the frequent reports of school strikes suggest that they have not been effectual in promoting discipline and a respect for authority. The main problem is still, as at the beginning of the century, "how to spiritualize" a secular system of instruction.

Lord Curzon ends his Resolution on educational policy with a characteristic specimen of his practiced eloquence. After pointing out all that had been done "to elevate the standard of education in India and inspire it with higher ideals," he goes on to invite the cooperation of Indians. "It rests," he said, "with the people themselves to make a wise use of the opportunities that are offered to them, and to realize that education in the true sense means something more than the acquisition of so much positive knowledge, something higher than the mere passing of examinations, that it aims at the progressive and orderly development of all the faculties of the mind, that it should form character and teach right conduct—that it is, in fact, a preparation for the business of life."[67] In this eloquent appeal he is thinking, like so many others, of what education might or should be. In fact, in the Tropical Far East, education, or rather instruction, is not a preparation for the business of life, but preparation for a life of business; and it does not rest with the

[65] Boeke, J. H., *The Structure of Netherlands Indian Economy* (1942), p. 102.
[66] Mayhew, A., *Overseas Education, 1941*, p. 75.
[67] *Progress of Education in India, 1897-1902*, p. 475.

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people themselves to give it a wider content. The schools, the people and the governments are subject to the control of economic forces.

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POPULATION AND SCHOOL ENROLMENT

	Burma	Neth. India	Formosa	Indo-China	Malaya	Philippines	Thailand
Year	*1936-37*	*1938*	*1938*	*1936-37*	*1938*	*1938*	*1939*
Population, millions....	13.10	68.41	5.75	23.00	3.46	16.25	14.90
Private or unrecognized..	201,307	450,000	12,088	93,649	60,265	129,591	121,965
Primary							
Elementary and							
Lower, 1–4..	*458,148*			*466,453*		*1,408,652*	
Upper, 5–7..	*40,700*			*5,160*		*250,503*	
Total....	498,848	2,269,761	611,559	471,613	189,631	1,659,144	1,442,780
Secondary							
Lower, 8–10.	*13,734*				*14,679*	*76,984*	
Upper.....	*1,235*				*587*	*3,629*	
Total....	14,969	20,558	17,093	1,890	15,966	79,713	(a)
Higher							
Academic...	509	(b)	282	612	(b)	7,711	872
Total Recognized schools only.....	514,326	2,299,319	641,022	474,145	208,279	1,746,568	1,443,652
Including Private, etc..	715,633	2,740,319	653,110	567,641	268,544	1,876,159	1,568,617
Per cent of population							
Recognized schools.....	3.92	3.35	11.16	2.06	6.02	10.75	9.69
All schools..	5.45	4.01	11.36	2.47	7.76	11.54	10.65
Vocational							
Technical...	2,067	33,085	13,311	2,630	3,093	13,311	(c)
Higher.....	421	1,101	2,629	366	759	2,629	(c)

Sources. Burma: *Report on Public Instruction, 1932-37.* (Figures exclude Shan States): Netherlands India: *Indisch Verslag*, Pt. II, 1938; Formosa: Yearbook of Far East, 1941; Indo-China: *Annuaire Statistique, 1936-37*; Malaya: *Malayan Yearbook and Education Report, 1938* (Figures exclude Unfederated States). Philippines and Thailand: Population, *Statistical Yearbook, League of Nations, 1940*: Education figures from *Statesman's Yearbook, 1941.*

(a) Included under Primary. (b) Included under Higher Vocational (c) Included under General.

Notes. In Netherlands India the private schools are mostly Koran schools; in Burma the monastic schools and elsewhere private schools in general are on much the same level as public schools. For comparison the "recognized school" figures should be taken for Netherlands India and "all school" figures elsewhere. Higher professional training is classed sometimes on Academic, sometimes on Vocational.

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COMPARATIVE SURVEY, EDUCATION AND FINANCE

	Burma	Neth. India	Formosa	Indo-China	Malaya	Philippines	Thailand
Year	*1938-39*	*1938*	*1937-38*	*1936-37*	*1937*	*1938*	*1939-40*
Population (mil.)...	15.96	68.40	5.50	23.50	5.29	16.25	14.90
Imports (£mil.)....	15.57	56.89	32.21	11.62	82.18	31.32	17.70
Exports (£mil.)....	36.39	81.60	44.02	20.48	106.47	34.59	19.66
Expenditure (£mil.)	11.54	74.15	15.64	12.10	17.98	16.40	11.28
Percentage spent on Education.....	6	6	11	12	5	20	11

Local currencies converted at rate of £1.00=Rs. 13.3; Fl. 8.75; ¥.10.00; Piastre 8.35; Singapore dollar, 8.50; Peso 8.50; Baht, 11.00.

Figures for percentage of expenditure on education from *Annuaire Statistique* for Indo-China, *Statesman's Yearbook* for Thailand, and for Netherlands India, Formosa, Malaya and Philippines from *Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia*, pp. 67, 84, 90, 105, 116.

Populations as at December 31, 1938 from *Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations, 1940.*

Other figures based on *Statesman's Yearbook, 1941.*

Supplementary Note

Up-to-date information on education in Formosa is not easily obtainable in Western languages and most Western writers have not been able to make any very critical analysis of the Japanese-language reports and statistics on education. A recent exception to this statement is Mr. Andrew J. Grajdanzev whose book *Formosa Today* (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1942) contains a section on education based on the Japanese sources. Because his information is more detailed and because his conclusions are more critical than those of the sources cited above (pp. 95-100), some of his paragraphs are here reproduced in an Appendix below (pp. 175-179). *Editor.*

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CHAPTER VI

EDUCATIONAL SUPPLY AND DEMANDS

We set forth on this inquiry into the progress of education in the Tropical Far East in the hope that it might furnish suggestions as to the function of education in tropical countries that have been brought into economic contact with the modern world. We remarked that, despite widely different views as to the aims of education, most people look on it as a most potent influence in moulding society, and have high ideals as to what education should or might do, but at the same time are perplexed and uncertain as to the efficacy of existing systems and as to the right lines for future development. Our inquiry serves to explain the perplexity, for everywhere we have found a wide divergence between intentions and results, and sometimes results quite contrary to those intended. During the Liberal period humanitarians were disappointed in their hopes, and the nineteenth century ended with a general restatement of educational policy. Yet the new policy has been little more successful than the old. One new factor, the nationalist movement, has emerged, but the nationalist educational program has had much in common with official policy, yet neither governments nor nationalists nor both together have managed to get what they wanted. They have wanted more and better schools of various types for various purposes. They have advocated or experimented in compulsory primary instruction; but, under any form of rule congenial to Western democratic traditions, compulsion is of no avail except against a recalcitrant minority. They have founded schools and classes for technical instruction, but the facilities provided have been neglected or abused. The one condition for the success of an educational policy is not what government or a nationalist party may want, and not merely what the community in general may vaguely want, but what people want, or can be made to want, so urgently that they will

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pay for it either individually or as a community to the extent at least of going to school or sending their children to school. The crucial factor in matters of education is the economic demand for schooling or instruction. Let us look at educational policy from the standpoint of demand.

Where progress in primary instruction has been slow, the general complaint is that the people do not want it. In all these countries the parents have long sent their boys to the village school, Koran, Monastic or Confucian, to learn the way of life and be equipped as members of society, but they do not want to send them to the modern public school. Why should they? Certain grounds on which primary instruction has been advocated may immediately be ruled out as irrelevant. It is suggested that an instructed population will be more docile and contented, that schools are cheaper than machine guns, or, in the words of Lord Curzon, that there is no greater danger to the State than an ignorant people. That may or may not be true. Of the political exiles from Java nearly three quarters had been to school; in Burma most of the rebels of 1931 were literate, and the district with the best record for education holds also the worst record for crime; in Cochin-China the curves of crime and Western education rise concurrently.[1] So far as it is true that education makes subjects easier to govern, there is reason for teaching them but none for them to learn. Nor will parents send children to school to make them work harder, more continuously and with a keener sense of the sanctity of contract. Again, it is argued that a literate people will be better able to cooperate in the benevolent plans of Government for its welfare, will be more ready to welcome model latrines and sanitary slaughter-houses. But that argument will not appeal to parents ignorant and careless of modern hygiene; until they have been educated in its principles, they will not send children to school to learn them.

On material grounds there is only one argument to which parents will respond. They soon learn that a child profits by learning the language of the ruling power, and stint themselves

[1] Keesing, *Education in Pacific Countries*, p. 70; *Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1927-32.*

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and borrow money to give their children this advantage; and they will be just as ready to send their children to the village school if this will give them a better start in life. It is often suggested that the school will help cultivators to make more money, or to escape the clutches of the moneylender. But is this true? Townsfolk in Burma need more arithmetic than is taught in monastic schools, and in the towns and larger villages both boys and girls are sent to school, and nearly as many girls as boys. In the recognized primary schools (Standards I-IV) there are 201 thousand girls to 257 thousand boys; but the public school hardly touches the rural area, and in three quarters of the villages the only school is in the monastery. Attempts to provide public schools for rural areas show that there is little demand for them. The cultivator takes readily to new crops and new methods as soon as he learns by example and experience that they are profitable, but the boy who is taught agriculture in school looks for a job in town. The man who knows how to write no longer makes his mark on the moneylender's promissory note; but he is just as ready to sign his name. The Burman is conspicuous for literacy but equally conspicuous for debt, and the most literate districts are the most heavily indebted. One will not easily induce parents to send their children to the public school on the grounds of material advantage, for the benefit of universal primary instruction is social rather than individual.

But the people soon learn that knowledge of a European language may be profitable, and do their utmost to send their children to a school where they may learn it. Even a smattering of the language confers social prestige. The supply of school graduates overtakes the demand, and there accrues a surplus of educated unemployables. But that is no deterrent; it is on the contrary a stimulus to further effort. When boys can no longer get jobs from the IVth standard, they work on to the VIIth standard, so as to have a better chance, and so on upwards to matriculation and university degrees. They do not want learning but diplomas, but with every raising of the standard, diplomas lose their value and larger numbers of students are thrown on to the scrap heap. The diplomas are subject to the law of diminishing returns which, translated into human

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values, is the law of increasing discontent; but so long as education, or rather instruction, is dominated by economic forces, boys will press on to higher and still higher standards in the hope of finding jobs; if the worst comes to the worst, they can become lawyers.

But why lawyers, rather than doctors or engineers? Which do the tropics need most, lawyers or doctors? Doctors. Which profession, medicine or the law, does the State most encourage? Medicine. And what do we find? Too many lawyers and too few doctors. The Philippines are overrun with lawyers; in Indo-China the annual output of lawyers is "a menace to social equilibrium"; under British rule the plague of lawyers is a general complaint; under Dutch rule, for special reasons, lawyers have been less numerous but now seem to be increasing. Everywhere on the other hand there is a shortage of doctors. In Burma for a population of thirteen million in 1921 there were little more than a thousand modern doctors, and these were in government service or in towns where Europeans congregate. In Siam, with fourteen million people, there are barely five hundred doctors, and, outside the capital, practically all are in government employ.[2] Why are there so many lawyers? One explanation is obvious and seems sufficient. All classes of the community, European, foreign, Asiatics and natives, must bring their causes before Western courts and need the help of Western lawyers. There is a demand for Western lawyers, and the supply tends to exceed the demand, lowering standards of legal practice, until it becomes synonymous with sharp practice. Matters are different with medicine. Everywhere the people prefer their native healers. "Burmans don't care for English medicine"; a few years back the foremost Burmese official expressed his content with Burmese midwifery. In Java, though native medical training goes back nearly a century, people are still doubtful of European methods. In Siam "the old style doctor was still in 1939 the one to whom the masses of the people in the country ordinarily turned in time of sickness."[3] The native

[2] *Report on the Indigenous System of Medicine* (1931), p. 21; Landon, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

[3] *Report on the Indigenous System of Medicine*, p. 22; Leeuw, H. De, *Crossroads of the Java Seas* (1931), p. 109; Landon, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

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does not want the Western practitioner and cannot afford the fees that the cost of Western medical training makes it necessary to charge. The European on the other hand prefers a doctor of his own race. Thus, outside government service there is practically no demand for native doctors qualified in Western medicine. The East needs doctors, but there is a demand for lawyers, and lawyers are many and doctors few.

Similarly there is a very limited demand for engineers and other technicians. In the construction of village buildings, roads, bridges, irrigation works and so on, Western methods are no more demonstrably successful or economic than they are in native agriculture. With the exceptions, already noticed, of bicycles and the petrol engine, the demand for technicians hardly extends beyond the Western element in the community. Western enterprise has preferred to recruit its superior staff from Europe, so that local men had had no prospects of high advancement. Even subordinate positions have often been difficult of access to natives. In Malaya attempts to encourage agricultural instruction among Malays have been hindered by the preference of planters for Chinese assistants. Carpenters from the technical schools have been unable to get work because Chinese master carpenters would employ only members of the hereditary guild. In Burma Indians enjoy the doubtful advantage of a lower standard of living. Everywhere technical instruction for natives comes up against barriers raised by established interests and economic forces. The native cannot expect technical or vocational instruction to be remunerative in comparsion with the prospects open to him in other lines and, naturally, does not join a technical school unless he can be tempted by free tuition or a stipend to attend the school for its incidental advantages and without meaning to exercise the special skill it teaches. There is no economic demand for technical instruction.

It seems then that all educational effort in the tropics is conditioned by the economic environment; the Western school in the tropics does not teach children how to live, but how to make a living. And the environment reacts, not on the Western school only, but on the native Eastern school. The Eastern schools lose much of their educational and social value through the drain-

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age of their wealthier and brighter pupils to the Western schools, but that is not the only nor the most serious damage they sustain. Their end has been, not to teach the children how to make a living, but to teach them how to live. Now the mediaeval world in which they taught them how to live has vanished and the schools lose their meaning and decay. It is no wonder that in Burma the yellow robe is coming to be a symbol of hostility to the Western world and Western values.

Not a few advocates of Western education, perplexed and uncertain at the frustration of their efforts and reversal of their values, will sympathize with the protest of the Buddhist monk. When undertaking this inquiry we noted a tendency to identify education with instruction, and remarked that this suggested a disregard of the difference in environment between East and West. That suggestion our inquiry seems to confirm. Modern education in the West has three features: it is commonly identified with instruction; it is dissociated from any form of religion except Nationalism; and it teaches the means of living and not the way of life. But these distinctive features are recent developments, superficial, and the school functions in an atmosphere of old tradition, inherited values and a common social life. We can transplant the school and system of instruction to the East, but not the atmosphere in which it functions. In the modern tropics economic forces have free play. They are not as a rule counteracted effectively even by Nationalism, for Nationalism in the plural society of the modern tropics is a misnomer for sectionalism, and there is no common social will by which economic forces may be restrained. Education has not produced this environment, but it has taken color from the environment, and instruction is sought merely as a means of individual material advantage. It is a preparation for the life of business; how can we convert it into a preparation for the business of life? How can we liberate the school from economic bondage, so that it may once again teach children how to live?

This has been done in the past. The early Europeans, and especially the Spaniards, got the children into schools which made no attempt to promote material welfare; but they did this by giving them a Christian environment. The Moslems

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did the same thing by surrounding the school with an atmosphere of Islam. We see the same thing happening at the present day with Christian missionaries and their converts; the children of the converts go to school not to learn how to make money but to be confirmed in their new faith, and it is among native Christians that we find the largest proportion of children at school and the largest proportion of female literates. Even the highly educated Karen Christian woman, we are told, goes back to her home, while the Burmese women with a higher education wants a job. If we look rather more closely at the progress of primary instruction we can see the same thing happening on a larger scale.

Leaving aside Formosa, the two countries which show the greatest progress in primary instruction are the Philippines and Thailand. In both there have been specially favorable circumstances, and in both the adoption of a single system of instruction has opened a career to talent. But in both countries the chief impulse to the progress of primary instruction has been the nationalist drive behind it. In the other countries foreign governments have inevitably been critical of nationalist enthusiasm, and nationalist leaders have had less zeal for primary instruction then for higher education, which, as they hope, will equip them for handling national affairs. In these countries primary instruction has made less progress, but a comparison between them is suggestive. Malaya presents features of special interest. There was no tradition of literacy or education; secular education was distrusted, and the women of all races were "absolutely ignorant, prejudiced and superstitious." Except for those few who could cross the barrier into the English school, vernacular education led nowhere and offered no material reward. Yet, within little more than a generation, we find boys and girls elbowing their way into the schools. How, under a foreign government, can we explain this miracle? Compulsion has been gradually extended, but seems to have had little effect until it was no longer necessary. One, possibly the determinant, factor has been the new Chinese enthusiasm for learning that has been a high note of Chinese Nationalism. This has given an example and a stimulus. But it has been turned to good ac-

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count by a happy co-operation between British and Malay authorities. The Chinese in Malaya are conspicuous not only for their zeal for learning but also for their success in industry and commerce, and the Malays have been stirred up to emulation. The British Government has always taken up the position that it has a special duty to the Malays and, with the growth of the Chinese in numbers and economic power, has become more actively solicitous for Malay interest. Educational propaganda among a backward and suspicious people is a task for the administrator with a knowledge of the people rather than for the expert in educational technique, and one reason for the progress in Malaya may be the appointment of a civil servant rather than an education official as Director of Public Instruction; moreover for some years the head of the department was outstanding in his knowledge of Malay life, language and literature. He was able to impress on Malays the need for education if they were not to be driven further into the background by Chinese and Indians. Again, on the Malay side, he was not confronted with a crowd of unorganized individuals. When Phayre tried to improve monastic education in Burma he had to deal separately with each school, as there was no centre of clerical authority. But in Malaya there were the Sultans, men able to appreciate the Director's arguments; one is a barrister, and all know English. At the same time, under a system nominally at least, of indirect rule, they could use their influence to induce people to send their children to school, not with a view to their individual advantage but for the welfare of the Malay people as a whole.

Netherlands India suggests much the same reflections as Malaya. Here also there was a language bar, and the great mass of the people could hope for little profit from the vernacular school. It was not until 1907 that, under the "ethical" impulse, the Government tried to spread primary instruction widely; and, considering that it was forty years behind the British Government in Malaya, the progress has been little less remarkable even if the present figures for attendance are less striking. And it has been achieved by similar means. The Head of the Education Department was given the assistance of an Adviser and As-

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sistant Adviser from the European Civil Service for the promotion of rural education, and native officers with hereditary influence have used "gentle pressure" to encourage the people to support the schools. One important function of officers in the lower ranks of the Native Civil Service is to act as school-attendance inspectors.

In Burma no such machinery has been available, and the care of education has rested primarily with departmental officers, largely concerned with the numerous and urgent problems connected with the rapid growth of Anglo-vernacular education. Thus, in comparison with other countries, primary instruction has made less progress and it is the unrecognized monastic school which has enabled Burma to retain a leading place in the record of literacy. In Indo-China the language barrier is more formidable than in Burma, and education is in general less attractive because the higher posts are much less freely open to natives than under British rule. The French, moreover, possibly through their tradition of assimilation, seem less sympathetic than the British to nationalist aspirations. If economic advantage and nationalist sentiment are the two main factors in the spread of primary instruction, it is not strange that Indo-China should occupy the lowest place.

Yet the progress in Formosa warns us against too readily accepting any simple formula for encouraging primary instruction. Here there is a single system of instruction, and the child entering the lowest standard has no further language barrier to cross because, as in the Philippines, he must struggle across it at the beginning. But the prospects of material advancement are remote, and the Japanese system is based on the suppression of nationalism. Yet Formosa stands among the highest in the proportion of the people at school. Presumably the example set by the large Japanese contingent in sending all their children to school provokes emulation among their subjects. The strongly Japanese character of the economic environment may be another factor in furthering the study of Japanese. It seems, too, that the Formosans were so taken with the Chinese zest for learning that they welcomed it even through the medium of Japanese. And the Japanese method of "conditioning" the

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aborigines suggests that they carry "gentle pressure" to its extreme limits. One would certainly like to know more about education in Formosa, but the progress made there does not necessarily invalidate the conclusion suggested from experience elsewhere that, where the economic motive is inadequate, the cultivation of national sentiments and aspirations is the best method of getting the children into school. In general the great obstacle to primary instruction is that illiterate parents do not want their children taught to read and write. They want them brought up in their religion, and to be taught their letters so far as this is incidental to their religious training. But secular instruction will bring the children no material advantage, and they can appreciate no other reason for sending them to school. Before we can instruct the children, we must educate the parents, and nationalist propaganda is one way, and apparently the only way of educating them.

Nationalism, like other religions, takes education out of the sphere of economics and supplies a motive that is superior to economic considerations; but although it transcends economic laws it cannot dodge them. It may induce parents to send their children to school where they can learn to read and write, but it will not automatically create a reading habit. For that it is necessary to provide books. This may seem a simple matter, but it raises difficulties, both technical and economic, that deserve examination. All these countries have their literature, but they have no books. In England, in living contact with the modern world and in the center of world affairs, upwards of 15,000 books are published every year. But in Burma, dependent almost entirely upon books for contact with the cultural aspects of the modern world, barely a hundred books a year are published, and most of these belong, not to the modern but to the mediaeval world. Of the comparatively small number of people who read English only a few have access to the one public library in Rangoon, and that is very inadequate to the requirements of a modern capital. Even in Rangoon it has not yet been found possible to establish permanently a modern bookshop. Nor are the people better off for newspapers. In 1930 the total

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circulation of Burmese daily papers was less than 10,000.[4] Elsewhere conditions are generally similar. It seems that in the Philippines quite recently the total circulation of daily papers in all languages for a mixed population of fifteen millions was only about 200,000. If people have no books they will lapse into illiteracy, and the money spent on providing them with schools will have been wasted. The older literature is largely religious, poetical, conventional and hardly intelligible to the ordinary man. If the people are to read they must be given books that they *can* read, and the written language must be modernized, as was found necessary in China. That is a difficult and, except under a national government, a delicate task. But that is not the chief difficulty. It may seem easy to put, say, into Burmese a popular handbook to modern science, such as sell by the hundred thousand in Europe. These, however, are written for a more or less sophisticated public. Huxley wrote popular works for an unscientific generation. But the science in his books is out of date and the modern handbook assumes that the general reader has assimilated Huxley's teaching. A popular handbook for Burmans at the present day must explain modern science to readers whose science is that of ancient Grece. Even a Huxley could hardly manage that. Again, it has been said that those who know Burmese know nothing else, and that those who know anything else know no Burmese. The graduate in science can write English but he is a poor hand at writing his own language intelligibly. Apart from these and other technical difficulties there are economic difficulties in selling books at a price that the people can afford and that will yet remunerate writers and publishers. In Burma it was held that there was no demand for translations as there was no reading public for such matter,[5] but in Netherlands India there has been an attempt, largely successful, to organize a demand for books both vernacular and in Dutch. Make the people want to read, and they will want to learn to read and will pay for schools where reading may be learned, as part of their education for life in an adult society which has acquired the reading habit. But to build schools and

[4] *Indian Statutory Commission, 1930,* XI, p. 272.
[5] *Ibid.,* p. 296.

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pay teachers to instruct children in reading for which they will have no use on leaving school is waste of money. Here again it is the environment that makes the school, and the instruction has no meaning apart from the environment.

Similar considerations apply to all welfare projects. Local authorities may frame rules that meat stalls shall be protected by fly-proof doors and windows and can provide suitable stalls in public markets. But butchers prefer to keep the windows open to see what they are buying, and no army of inspectors will be large enough to enforce the regulations until the people have been educated to want clean meat. Model latrines can be provided, but it is impossible to keep them clean until the people have been educated to use them properly. But you will not educate them in these matters by making the children learn "hygiene" in school from teachers who neither believe in it nor practice it. Get the people to want these things, and the new environment will change the schools, and the lessons in hygiene will be useful. But the first essential is the education of the parents.

In the light of these considerations let us look once more at the problem of technical instruction. The view now generally accepted offers no solution. The demand is limited, so runs the argument, over-production will be a waste of money and, still worse, of men; therefore we must limit the supply in accordance with the demand. We must accept the environment; it is *kismet, dhamma.* But that is the argument of the dodo and the dinosaur and of the beasts that perish. And it is unsound. Take for example the report of the Malayan Committee of 1926 that there was no opening for a training in mechanics. At that very time the petrol engine was creating a demand for mechanics in the native world. In Netherlands India the sea fisherman learned by example and experience that new methods were profitable, and began to demand instruction. Instead of limiting supply there is the alternative of organizing the demand, and that is the solution that is being attempted by the nationalist governments in the Philippines and in Siam. In order to work out a solution of the problem of technical instruction along those lines it is necessary to educate, not the people, but those responsible for policy and for directing Western enterprise.

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The principle of Nationalism would seem then a means of liberating education from its economic bondage. For all its limitations as compared with world religions, it does not, like those, appeal solely to those of the same religious faith. If the Scotsman says that he drinks whiskey rather than water because it is his national beverage we may not believe him, but we politely accept his statement as an explanation. In the expanding circle of human relationships the nation, like the family, seems to have its natural place in a world wide civilization, and among most people of the modern democratic West, Nationalism, although they may be keenly sensible of its dangers, will strike a responsive chord.

It is notorious that Nationalism has its dangers; in an acute form it may be regarded as a disease, a fever of the body politic, striving to throw off some foreign matter that endangers its constitution. It may rise superior to economic motives and drive out the money changers and the hosts of Mammon, but it will pass its children through the fire to Moloch, and thrives on hatred rather than on charity. And it is true that it has often exercised an unfortunate influence on education; in the Philippines under American rule it hindered educational reform: "independence rather than education was at stake." In a tropical dependency a Government, aiming first to preserve the imperial connection and seeming at least to be closely linked with capitalist interests, cannot easily come to terms with a movement directed to make the people capable of independence. Moreover, in the Tropical Far East the working of economic forces has brought into existence a plural society. In every country a medley of Europeans, Indians and Chinese constitute foreign enclaves, and nationalism tends to degenerate into sectionalism. This has been abundantly illustrated in clashes between Annamese and Chinese, Siamese and Chinese, Burmans and both Indians and Chinese; and in Java the popular nationalist movement arose out of a demonstration against the Chinese. Yet we have seen in Malaya that national or racial sentiment can be turned to good account by provoking the Malays to emulate the Chinese in education, and an instructed Nationalism should fit into a world-wide civilization so that the people should learn

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to be at once citizens of their own country and of the modern world.

But what has all this to do with education? Much, every way. We set out to ascertain the function of education in the Tropical Far East, and I would suggest that we have found an answer. Education we have defined as the sum of all the processes that equip the child for life in adult society. The school is merely one among many other factors. Life in the modern tropics is dominated by economic forces, and that is the environment for which their education equips the children. Here is the reason why primary and technical instruction make slow progress, why diplomas depreciate in value, why the schools flood the land with clerks and lawyers, why in sum, the modern school merely teaches pupils how to make a living; and the more who go to school the less they earn. It is one reason also why Eastern schools, intended to train pupils for a different environment, decay. Enthusiasts for "education" may proclaim lofty ideals as to the function of the school, but "idealism is comparatively easy in the class room."[6] The teacher, whether modern schoolmaster or Buddhist monk, cannot shut out the environment by shutting his eyes to it. He may instill ideas that will inspire some pupil to challenge circumstance, and do a little, a very little, towards providing him with the necessary tools, but he cannot directly through the school change the environment. That is the function, not of the schoolmaster, but of the statesman. In the West the modern school teaches the pupils how to live, as formerly did the Eastern school. So far as the school succeeds in that, the more who go to school the better. So far as the school in the modern tropics fails in that, the fault lies not in the school or system of instruction, but in the world in which they function. If we want better schools, we must create a better world.

[6] Mayhew, *Education in the Colonial Empire*, p. 35.

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CHAPTER VII

POST-WAR EDUCATION

Here perhaps we might stop. We have carried our inquiry beyond the limits of the classroom into the world outside. But we have not done with education. We have come to see it as a social rather than an individual process, and this will be more than ever important when we come to rebuild society in the post-war world. It seems that to get the children into school we must educate the parents; and we must educate the parents also before we can effectively instruct the children in hygiene and other matters of social welfare. We must make the parents want them, organize a demand for them. Similarly, if we are to extend technical instruction, we must organize a demand for it. Educational activities have been fettered by economic forces, because the society in which they function is only in economic contact with the modern world; we can not disregard economic forces, but we can control them in the interests of society and human welfare. If we would give greater freedom to the school, we must bring the people into cultural contact with the modern world. To do this does not lie within the province of the teacher, but it is a matter in which he has a vital interest. The problem of education in the tropics is then primarily a problem of adult education, including of course, all the paraphernalia of modern adult education, books, lectures and, still more, broadcasting, the cinema and so on, but with special reference to tropical society. It is a problem of social education. Obviously that is a matter of profound complexity, but our inquiries do seem to suggest certain lines on which, among others, it might be tackled.

Consider, for example, hygiene. For the prevention of epidemics it is necessary to world welfare that tropical peoples shall attain a minimum standard of modern hygienic knowledge and practice. Hygiene has no immediate and obvious cash value, and

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it is pre-eminently a sphere in which no man liveth to himself alone; it is of value to the community rather than to the individual, and it requires common or corporate action. To raise the standard of hygiene we must appeal to some motive other than and superior to the economic motive, the prospect of individual advantage, and must devise some machinery other than the economic machinery of unorganized supply and demand. But that is true also of primary instruction. Yet, under the impulse of nationalism, we have seen primary instruction spread throughout whole peoples, both for boys and girls, within a single generation. And we have seen much the same thing under foreign rule in Malaya and Netherlands India by a happy combination of European and native authority. Let us look at the machinery that has been employed.

If we analyze the machinery of social education in the tropics we find four distinct elements: the expert with a special knowledge of scientific principles in relation to his own subject; then, some one who by origin and upbringing is at home in Western thought, and by training and environment is sufficiently acquainted with the tropics to adapt scientific principles to native life; then, some one who by origin and upbringing is at home in native society but has sufficient knowledge of the West to carry the process of adaptation a stage further to the local circumstances of the particular people whom it is to benefit; and fourthly, some one with sufficient local influence to encourage the adoption of new methods. It is possible of course that one person may combine two or more of these qualifications. But it is rare that the scientific expert is also an expert in native life. Europeans in the tropics are transient and rarely have sufficient local knowledge or personal influence to do without a local coadjutor. Natives of the tropics who are really at home in the Western world are apt to lose touch with their own world. But the exact form of the machinery is indifferent so long as some machinery exists capable of the functions that we have just enumerated.

Hitherto such functions, so far as they have not been neglected, have devolved on members of the general administrative

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service. If in future they are to be more efficiently performed it will be necessary to provide a suitable training for the civil service. In the past colonial policy in this matter has differed widely. In Britain the policy has been to select men with a high standard of general education and to give them a year's training of a practical character, closely related to their work as magistrates and collectors of revenue. In France there has been a longer course—of three years, with a break during which the probationers were sent abroad for a short experience of colonial life. The Dutch system is based on a different conception of tropical administration; it is regarded as a profession requiring vocational training of university standard.[1] The Dutch administration in Netherlands India has two branches, one European and one Native. The European, who inherits an understanding of the West, has a five years' course in language, law, including customary law, tropical economy, anthropology and so on, designed to give him a knowledge of the East. The native, who inherits an understanding of the East, has a three years' course, designed to give him a knowledge of the West. Thus the two between them are able to place the scientific knowledge of experts in hygiene, agriculture and other matters at the disposal of the people. Moreover in the native civil service there is a strong hereditary element which increases its influence among the villagers. The Dutch system is, naturally, a product of gradual evolution in response to local circumstances, and could not be transplanted. But it aims at producing "social engineers" and, if the peoples of the tropics are to be brought into cultural contact with the Western world, a service of social engineers would seem to be essential. At the head there might well be, as Professor Julian Huxley has suggested, a Commissioner for Native Development, who would be responsible for the general education of the people, with, as one of his chief assistants, the Director of Public Instruction, to help him as regards the schools.

Other suggestions also emerge from our inquiry. It seems

[1] Furnivall, J. S., "The Training for Civil Administration in Netherlands India," *Journal, Royal Central Asian Society*, 1934, p. 415.

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87 to have been greatly to the advantage of Thailand that it could draw on expert assistance from many different countries, and that it could choose freely among all countries in sending youths abroad for higher studies. The Philippines also have benefited in the same way, though to a less extent, by the double connection with Spain and the United States. In general however youths from a tropical dependency go to the colonial power, and the higher administrators are drawn from that power instead of from many different countries. And in sending youth abroad, it seems especially desirable that they should go to other countries of the Tropical Far East, where so many of the problems are so similar.

And here we come to what is perhaps the point of chief importance that our inquiry has made clear. We have seen that during the nineteenth century the progress of education followed much the same course in all these countries, and with much the same results. This has continued during the present century. It opened with a renewed interest in education and a new statement of policy that everywhere was very much the same. Since then the problem of educated unemployables in all these countries has grown more urgent. In each country there have been numerous inquiries into technical and agricultural instruction, and the reports in any one country might serve for any other; they reveal much the same facts, come to much the same conclusions, and make much the same recommendations. There have also been numerous experiments with much the same results. In general there have been similar vacillations of policy as to sending men abroad for higher studies, and everywhere provision for higher studies has been made in universities: the University of the Philippines since 1908; the Chulalongkorn University, founded in 1917, and the University of Hanoi, reopened in the same year; the Bandoeng College of Engineering, established in 1919 and followed a few years later by Colleges of Law and Medicine; the University of Rangoon, dating from 1929; Raffles College, with a course aiming at the standard of a pass degree, founded in 1928, and the Imperial University in Formosa in 1929. In all the dependencies of colonial powers the nationalist movement has followed much

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the same course, giving rise first to associations to cooperate with government in promoting education, then breaking away to found nationalist schools, that in due course have accepted government assistance and adopted a curriculum very similar to that of the official system. We find again, generally and at much the same time, new regulations to tighten up control over private instruction by requiring the registration of schools. With all these and many other questions arising from the polyglot character of the plural society common to all these countries, it seems essential that there should be some permanent international committee to deal, not merely with education in the narrow sense of schooling and instruction, but with superintending and promoting native development, and stirring up emulation in well-doing between the different communities in each country and between the several countries and peoples. Here we would seem to have a means of promoting harmonious relations between the different communities in each country so as to foster a common social life, and between the different countries so as to foster an instructed nationalism that might be as valuable a force in world civilization as the family in national life. If, by thus pooling our knowledge and experience, we could devise a means of social education, training the people of these countries as members of the great human family, citizens of the modern world, then the education of the child would necessarily equip him for life in such a social order, and the school, helping him to look beyond the narrow limits of his village and his people, would again have its traditional character, that in the West it has never wholly lost, of giving the children life more abundantly and teaching them how to live.

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871 562 will produce better mothers, or birth control and cheaper typists, is a question for the future.

9. Vernacular Education

872 So far we have been dealing in the main with western education, and have seen that the prospect of gain is sufficient to crowd the schools beyond capacity, but only so far, and in such directions, as they lead to a remunerative certificate; and that all values, other than examination values, are at a discount. Primary vernacular education provides the obverse of this picture because, in general, it does not pay; it is merely an instrument of human welfare. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century the diffusion of general enlightenment in India through primary instruction has been a main objective of humanitarian sympathy; this principle was adopted and placed in the forefront of official policy from the middle of the century, and it was reaffirmed by Curzon at its close. Yet the progress achieved 'is shown by statistics admitted by the highest educational authorities to be thoroughly unsatisfactory',[1] and in Burma, which started the nineteenth century under native rule with a literate male population, the picture of primary instruction after a hundred years of British rule is 'one of almost unrelieved gloom'.[2] For over a hundred years there has been general agreement in India that primary instruction is the most effective instrument of material and moral welfare, yet, so far as there has been any progress under either head since the time of Wilberforce and Carey, it certainly cannot be attributed to the spread of primary instruction. This has not spread because there has been no demand for it. Now that it is again proclaimed with new insistence as the chief aim of modern educational policy in the tropics generally, some examination of the grounds on which it has been advocated seems expedient. Apart from humanitarian considerations they fall under two heads, political and economic.

872 212 Many have urged the spread of vernacular instruction on grounds of political convenience. Curzon cited with approval the dictum that 'among all sources of administrative difficulty and political danger, few are so serious as the ignorance of the people'.[3] This view is still widely held. Mass education is recommended as a safeguard against explosive temper liable to produce a social upheaval. One is told that 'an increase of literacy makes the people easier to control and govern',

[1] Mayhew, *India*, p. 226. [2] *CVV*, p. 156.
[3] *RPI* (India), 1897–1902, p. 462; *Mass Education*, p. 7; Mayhew, *India*, p. 226.

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and that 'it is pleasanter and cheaper to mould a literate population by appropriate and intelligent methods of education than to suppress an illiterate mob by machine guns'. There is very little evidence for such assertions, and certainly experience in Netherlands India and Burma contradicts them. The Dutch, when ruling an illiterate people through their native chieftains, had less difficulty in preserving *rust en orde*, and in moulding the people to their will, than in recent years when literacy has been making rapid progress. In the serious outbreak of 1926, though few of the rebels were highly educated, many had gone far beyond the common man in schooling. In Burma, with a high proportion of literates, there has been greater difficulty than in Java in maintaining law and order, and in obtaining a ready compliance with Government policy; on the contrary, districts conspicuous for literacy are also conspicuous for crime, and of the rebels in 1931 most would have passed for highly educated men in Africa. The early Liberals believed that education would automatically strengthen the ties between India and Britain; Curzon, finding this belief mistaken, tried to stimulate loyalty by hanging up portraits of the King in schools. In Burma there were attempts during the war of 1914–18 to use the schools for spreading 'the imperial idea', and 'to foster a sense of personal attachment to the King-Emperor'.[1] In French dependencies the schools try to evoke an admiration of France, and in Belgian dependencies an affection for Belgium.[2] But those who learn to read find little reading matter except newspapers, described in Netherlands India as 'cheap and nasty—like other things intended for tropical consumption', and often disaffected towards Government. Both in Burma and Java, long before the rise of modern Nationalism, the earliest native newspapers were critical of foreign rule, and the figures already given show that in Burma the circulation of periodicals varies directly with the violence of their attacks on Government. Under indirect rule the people learn from the newspapers to criticize not only the foreign Government but their own chieftains. There would seem little reason, therefore, to expect that the spread of primary instruction will increase docility, and even if it were true that primary instruction makes a people easier to control and govern, this would not induce illiterate parents who do not value education to send their children to the schools.

Others hold out a more tempting bait. They argue that undeveloped minds are incapable of political activities, and that 'in order to pro-

[1] *CII*, p. 5. [2] Mayhew, *Colonial Empire*, p. 143.

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gress towards self-government in the modern world colonial peoples must learn to read, and to understand, not only their own local affairs but those of wider import'.[1] Primary instruction is advocated as a first step towards 'responsible government', and therefore a condition of autonomy. But in the early nineteenth century, literacy was far more widely diffused in Burma than in Britain, yet this did not secure its independence. Even now the comparatively greater literacy of Burma does not seem to make it apter for western political institutions than Java, whereas Siam, with a smaller proportion of literates, has managed to remain independent. In Netherlands India, despite the spread of primary instruction during the past generation, it has been estimated that 167 years must elapse before the last illiterate is dragged to school, and in the Gold Coast, the most forward dependency in Africa in respect of education, the period has been put at 600 years.[2] Prospects of self-government at so remote a date are unlikely to kindle much enthusiasm for primary instruction, and critics have not unnaturally enquired whether its advocates wish to diffuse enlightenment or to delay self-government.

The recent project of mass education looks to the elimination of illiteracy in Africa within some thirty years.[3] That project, though optimistic, is not impossible if the people can be induced to want primary instruction. The prospect of self-government is an inducement; but it is also an illusion. 'Self-government' suggests that they will be free to do what they may want to do. But unless they want to do what, in the conditions of the modern world they must do, they will not be free, or even able to do it. To change their wants is much harder than to teach them letters and, without that, literacy may help them to express their dissatisfaction at not getting what they want, but it will make government more difficult and will raise a new obstacle to self-government. Literacy in itself is nothing. If it were possible to make the whole of Africa as literate to-morrow as Burma is to-day, it would be no more capable than Burma of managing western democratic institutions. Literacy may be an instrument of good or evil and, if tropical peoples are induced to acquire letters on the ground that this implies self-government, they will use the power of letters to vent their disappointment on those who have deceived them. Their profit will be that they know how to curse. Primary instruction, if recommended as

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 7; *Mass Education*, p. 14.
[2] *African Survey*, p. 1235; *HIOC*, Résumé, p. 76.
[3] *Mass Education*, pp. 10, 11.

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a step towards self-government, is more likely to cause than to cure an explosive temper and a social upheaval. It may not be impossible to teach tropical peoples their alphabet within a generation, but 'if means must be found and found quickly whereby the people as a *community* can understand and appreciate the forces which have changed and are changing their lives so radically' and 'to call out the ability and will to share in the direction and control of the social, economic and political forces', this end is more likely to be attained by educating the leaders of the community rather than through the mass education of individuals who, taken in the mass, are chiefly concerned, in Africa as elsewhere, with getting their daily bread, and do not hope or wish to meddle in matters that are too high for them. In this matter nationalist opinion, which insists on the education of leaders, is guided by a sound instinct, and the emphasis of colonial powers on primary instruction, however well intended, makes nationalists suspect that leaders are not wanted.

Among the advocates of primary instruction on economic grounds one can also hear two voices. Those who are chiefly concerned with economic progress urge that it will make the native more profitable as a coolie. 'If he is to work harder, longer and more continuously, education must inculcate the ideas of sanctity of contract and of ordinary honesty to his employers.'[1] This appeal to the sanctity of contract—the only saint in the Calendar of Mammon—suggests that the coincidence between the modern emphasis on primary instruction and the discovery that unintelligent labour is uneconomic is not wholly fortuitous. In Malaya the project of opening special schools for immigrants was formerly regarded as a 'fatal error' creating a plural society by 'tending to keep them aliens and encouraging them in the idea that China or India is their home'. But shortly afterwards, the Government decided to open Tamil schools 'with the object of making the F.M.S. from the point of view of the Indian immigrant, an outlying province of India, like Ceylon'.[2] These schools, though recognized as detrimental to social welfare, were created in the interest of economic progress. Experience has shown that Tamil education 'is of value not only as an incentive to recruiting labour for the rubber estates, but as a means of keeping the Tamil labourer happy and contented',[3] and many plantations now have schools for

[1] Mayhew, *Colonial Empire*, p. 141.
[2] 1905, Cmd. 2379, p. 11, and 11 n.
[3] Sir George Maxwell, quoted Sidney, p. 203; Mills, pp. 340, 34[illegible]

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coolies. In Africa some western enterprises support schools under the right kind of missionary and although, so far, employers in general have displayed little interest in the matter, it is thought that 'shortage of labour in some African areas may dispose them to offer facilities for education, in addition to provisions for general welfare, as an inducement to workers to stay in one place and become more efficient'.[1] Doubtless human sympathy plays a large part in the establishment of schools on western enterprise, but economic interest stimulates this sympathy, and the substantial contributions from Government and from missionary bodies towards the cost of education help to reduce the cost of wages. Education in the name of welfare becomes an instrument of economic progress even to the detriment of social welfare, as with the fostering of communal separation in Malaya. In any case the diffusion of primary instruction among the general public depends not on the demand of employers for more intelligent labour, but on the demand of parents for more schools, and they will not send their children to school in order that they may 'work harder, longer and more continuously' on western enterprise.

Most advocates of primary instruction, however, state the case, more persuasively, on grounds of native welfare. Curzon held that it would help the cultivator in his transactions with moneylenders, merchants and officials. Many claim that it will not only help the cultivators in their business but will enable officials to teach them better agricultural methods, the principles of co-operative credit and modern hygiene.[2] 'Every health measure, every improvement of agricultural methods, the co-operative machinery for production and distribution, the establishment of secondary industries—all these will make increasing demands upon the people and they will be able to respond only if they have had some educational opportunities.'[3] This sounds plausible, and some hold that it is proved. 'So far in the British Colonies we have acted on the assumption that people would eventually adopt improved methods of agriculture, hygienic surroundings and western medical ideas without learning to read and write....It has been proved that the attainment of literacy makes people aware of the need for social and economic improvements, and therefore they will co-operate more readily with welfare and other agencies working on these lines.'[4] It would be difficult to find another

[1] *Mass Education*, p. 27. [2] Mayhew, *India*, p. 226.
[3] Colonial Secretary, House of Commons, 13 July 1943.
[4] *Mass Education*, p. 14.

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example of so many fallacies in so few words. It is not true that we have acted on this assumption, and it is not true that literacy entails better living. On the other hand people take to better living without literacy, for they will take over from the West anything that they find profitable, even education. But education when sought as a means of individual profit is not an instrument of welfare, not even of individual welfare, because it injures social welfare. The assumption is against all probability, and, as will appear below, is contradicted by the facts.

It is certainly not the case that we have tried to improve the condition of the people before teaching them to read and write. In India the diffusion of primary instruction had been a main object of policy for half a century before the promotion of hygiene and other objects of social welfare received serious attention. Since about 1900 it has been advocated as a means of improving hygiene. But the people, in general, have been no more responsive to the efforts to encourage primary instruction than to the efforts to promote hygiene. They did not want to learn to read and write because it would not pay.

Again, the suggestion that literacy leads to better living will not stand the most cursory examination. Doubtless in Singapore the proportion of literacy is higher among the Chinese who live in palaces than among the Chinese of the slums: but the former do not live in palaces because they are literate, they are literate because they can live in palaces. Literacy is often expected to encourage thrift. But if a man wants to borrow money he will sign his name as readily as he will make his mark, though, as a signature is less easy to repudiate, the transaction is really more imprudent. When he sells his crops, literacy will not raise the price fixed by a ring of buyers. In Burma debt is most burdensome in tracts with the highest proportion of literates, and in these tracts co-operative credit was the greatest failure. All over the Tropical Far East literacy under native rule was far more widely diffused than in India or Africa, but it has not kept the people out of debt. Also if so much is expected from vernacular literacy, one would expect more from the higher standard of literacy attained by those acquainted with a European language. Yet in Burma, and probably elsewhere, we find clerks in Government service and commercial firms heavily indebted to illiterate menials. Similarly indebtedness prevails among subordinate officials, including judges and magistrates. In Java one hears of Regents in the clutches of Chinese moneylenders. In the Philippines, for all the efforts of the

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American Government to promote literacy, agricultural debt seems worse than in Malaya, and even candidates for the local representative assembly, who are presumably among the more highly educated, readily incur insolvency in their electoral campaigns.[1] For the promotion of thrift and better business methods, the attainment of literacy in itself is nothing, nor has literacy enabled administrations to promote thriftiness. Create an environment that puts a premium on thrift, imbue the people with a spirit of thriftiness, and literacy, though unessential, will be helpful.

But if literacy can do so little in helping the people to improve their economic position and get the things they value, no one can expect it to be more effective in changing their standard of values, in leading them voluntarily to accept the restrictions on personal liberty, involved in modern western hygiene. We have noticed that even the teachers of hygiene do not practise what they preach, and those who give and receive these lessons are all literate. Where a comparatively high degree of literacy has such poor results, universal primary instruction is unlikely to be more effective. If, as is commonly believed, people will not 'adopt improved methods of agriculture, a more nutritious diet, hygienic surroundings and western medical ideas without learning to read and write', they will not adopt them the more readily merely for being taught their alphabet.

In point of fact, however, this common belief is wrong. It is untrue that people must learn to read and write in order to attain greater welfare. We have noticed that throughout the tropics in both Africa and Asia, cultivators, literate or illiterate, have taken to new crops and new kinds of food. In Java, despite illiteracy, the standard of rural hygiene, unsatisfactory as it may seem to the Dutch, has long presented a striking contrast with conditions in most parts of the tropics. If people can be induced to want social and economic improvements they will value literacy, both in itself and as an instrument of other aspects of social advance, but in itself literacy will not inspire them with new wants.

Literacy is one sign of civilization. The Burmese are literate, and stand on a higher plane of civilization than the surrounding hill tribes; but they are more literate because they are more civilized, and not more civilized because they are more literate. Some of these hill tribes are Karens. Missionary work has made great progress among the Karens, and among Christian Karens there is a higher standard

[1] Mills, p. 276; Malcolm, pp. 171, 212, 220.

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of literacy, and a far higher standard of female literacy than among the Burmese. But the Karens did not learn to read and write in order to become Christians; they learned to read and write because they had become Christians. Social progress led to economic progress, and both social and economic progress are reflected in their literacy. Similarly the Burmese are not Buddhists because they learn to read and write, but they learn to read and write because they are Buddhists Literacy is a sign and not a cause of social progress. Inspire tropical peoples with a desire for western standards of social life and they will want, among other things, to read and write; but the ability to read and write will not inspire them with a desire for social or economic progress. It is true that in Russia and China there has recently been great progress both in literacy and in the general standard of living, but that is because a new spirit has descended on them. In Malaya the people remained apathetic in respect of schooling until 'the Malay rulers turned to education to equip their subjects to hold their own against the educated Indian and the intellectual and energetic Chinese'.[1] Similarly in Java the modern growth of literacy has been stimulated by the appeal to patriotism. But, without a complete transformation of the social and economic environment, literacy alone will help the people no better than it has helped the Burmese. 'Even if popular education were made universal and compulsory throughout the dependencies, it would not in itself produce a revolution in social outlook such as seems, for instance to have been effected in Soviet Russia and to some extent in China.'[2]

The easiest way to diffuse primary instruction is to make it pay. That is the way in which western instruction spread. Where, as frequently in urban areas, literacy has an economic value, or where it confers a higher social standing, many lads will pick up reading and writing without special facilities and without encouragement. We can see this in Africa, where 'in some areas a number of them have had a smattering of education, often quite unrelated to their environment and to the possibilities of employment. But this smattering, which includes the three R's, represents the intention of their parents that their children shall have *some* education, and expresses an almost pathetic belief in the inherent value of learning to read and write'.[3] Yet mere literacy has no intrinsic value; it has a scarcity value, and enables those who can read and write to earn more. Parents who

[1] *RPI* (Malaya), 1938, p. 8.
[2] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 33.
[3] *Mass Education*, p. 18.

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872 believe this will send their children to vernacular schools so that they can earn more, just as in the past they have sent their children, often at great sacrifice, to western schools, and with the same result, but on a vastly wider scale, of producing discontent when the supply of those who can read and write is in excess of the demand. If vernacular education be recommended to the people as a means of individual advancement, it may provide more intelligent and more economic labour, but it will be perverted, like western education, from an instrument of welfare into an instrument of progress and its expansion will be governed by the demand for labour. The problem is to find some non-economic motive sufficient to induce parents to send their children to school. If such a motive can be found, then the more who go to school the better.

10. Native Education

871 While vernacular instruction has languished, native education has declined. It was formerly the strength of native education that it was based on ideas transcending the economic sphere. It taught them how to live. Now that the world in which it taught them how to live has vanished, the native schools decay. In Burma the monastic schools have lost much of their social value through the drainage of their wealthier and brighter pupils into western schools. In towns they have suffered also from the competition of lay schools, feeding the western schools, providing candidates for subordinate vernacular appointments, and attracting others who for various reasons are content with secular instruction. It has been the policy of the Government to adapt them to the modern world. 'The method of translating the policy into practice varied from time to time, but the variations played on a single theme—the secularization of the curriculum and methods of the monastic school.'[1] The monastic schools sufficed to provide magistrates and judges, so long as no other schools were available, but they did not fit into a scheme based on the assumption that efficiency in education could be tested by the acquisition of certificates qualifying for appointments, and they could not compete with the better lay schools in getting boys quickly through their examinations. Thus they were driven into the backwoods. There was no need to secularize western education, though it was largely in the hands of missionaries, for missionary schools, no less than lay schools, are dominated by the cult of the certificate, and now, as we have noted, the problem is 'how to spiritual-

[1] *CVV*, p. 131.

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throughout the tropics recognize the *need* for well-educated natives in all lines of life; but they tend to overlook the fact that there is a very small *demand* for them. 871

7. Education and Progress

It is in the sphere of vocational and technical instruction, bearing directly on economic progress, that one would expect to find the need for education most intimately connected with demand. Throughout the tropics agriculture is the chief, and almost the sole, occupation of the people, and it is conducted on traditional lines without the help of modern science. There should, then, be great scope for improving agricultural methods by instruction. That appeared obvious to Curzon and, in his project of giving a practical bias to education, he assigned the first place to agriculture. In other dependencies the same plausible argument has seemed convincing. Yet in India, Burma, Java and the Philippines attempts to teach the people better cultivation have proved unsuccessful. General experience shows that the courses fail to attract farmers and that the students look for posts under Government or on western enterprise, or else seek non-agricultural employment in the towns. In Malaya, when an agricultural school was opened in 1931, 'there had long been a serious need for it'. There was a serious need but a very small demand. 'A disappointingly high percentage do not intend to manage their own land, but want positions under Government or on estates. Here the experience tallies with that of agricultural schools in Java and the Philippines. The agricultural department is now pretty well staffed, so that the number of vacancies is declining.' The school helped the plantations by turning out cheap overseers, but even these were mostly Chinese, whom the employers preferred to Malays. Although the intention was to promote Malay welfare, the result was chiefly to profit western enterprise.[1] Much the same thing has happened in Africa. In the Transkei agricultural training has been provided since 1904, and there have been special schools since 1914. The men found employment as demonstrators and not as farmers, and in the former capacity their services were in demand so far off as the Belgian Congo. 'There is some fear however that it may not be possible to keep up these schools; the demand for agricultural demonstrators is, for various reasons, already slackening, and shows signs of decreasing still further.'[2] 874

[1] Mills, pp. 355–6.

[2] *African Survey*, p. 1222.

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It is significant that the provision of technical instruction has not been quite so disappointing in forms of production organized on western lines and mainly under western management. Even in this branch of economic life, however, the progress has been unsatisfactory. In most tropical dependencies western enterprise does not extend far beyond primary production and offers little scope for men with technical qualifications. In the Tropical Far East it has been built up on a basis of Eurasian, Chinese or Indian subordinates, thereby obstructing the employment of natives by a barrier which they cannot easily surmount. Even the trade-crafts are largely in foreign hands; the natives encounter similar difficulties in gaining an entrance, and sometimes meet with organized opposition, as when the Chinese master carpenters in Malaya declined to employ trained Malays.[1] In European concerns the higher posts have hitherto been reserved for Europeans, so that natives had no prospect of advancement. Moreover, where technical instruction has been provided, it has often, as for some years in Java, been debarred to natives because their 'academic' curriculum was not sufficiently advanced for them to profit by it. There is a popular belief that 'natives' prefer clerical employment as an easier, softer life, but this has frequently been disproved.[2] In most dependencies the failure of earlier attempts to encourage technical instruction has led to the appointment of committees of enquiry, and their reports have shown that there was little demand for men with technical qualifications. Even in Malaya, where the vast scale of western enterprise would seem especially propitious to the growth of technical instruction, a committee, largely composed of business men, reported in 1926 that 'the number of openings for technically trained men was limited, since the principal need of the country was unskilled manual labour, which was supplied by Chinese and Indian immigrants'.[3] So recently as 1938 a Commission on Higher Education in Malaya reported that the prospects of employment did not justify the establishment of an engineering school at Raffles College, and that training for the limited number of civil engineering posts could be given elsewhere.[4]

The slow progress of technical training in subjects bearing directly on material production is the more striking by its contrast with the

[1] Mills, p. 355.
[2] See e.g. Dr Van Mook, *J. Roy. African Society*, Oct. 1943, p. 180. Mills, p. 353.
[4] *Overseas Education*, 1939–40, April, p. 146.

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progress achieved in pedagogy. Ordinarily one finds that most of those receiving vocational instruction are being trained as teachers. Often, as at least formerly in Malaya, the pay and prospects of teachers are inferior to those of a clerk,[1] and the teaching profession is the last refuge of the semi-educated unemployed. Why, then, do so many seek to be trained as teachers? One reason is obvious. The demand for men in western enterprise and in the various specialist departments of Government service is soon met. But there is a general demand for lucrative employment, and consequently for schools to qualify men for employment, and therefore an almost unlimited demand for teachers. The Government can encourage the demand for trained teachers by imposing appropriate conditions on the grant of funds to schools. In agriculture and other special lines it is obviously waste of money to train men in excess of the demand, but there is little danger of an unemployable surplus of trained teachers, because in the teaching profession the Government fixes the demand that it supplies. Not until every school receiving grants from Government is fully staffed with trained teachers can the supply be in excess of the demand.

Whether the money spent on training-schools is well spent is another question. It seems plausible to argue that men will teach more efficiently if instructed in modern principles of teaching. But, in this matter as in others, the concept of efficiency is valid only in relation to the end proposed. Modern teaching methods have evolved out of educational experience in the homogeneous society of the West, where the school and the environment co-operate and teach the children at the same time how to live and how to make a living. But in the plural society of the tropics the children have a choice between attending schools, western or vernacular, where they may learn how to make a living, and native schools that still adhere to the tradition of teaching children how to live. Where children seek education in order 'to realize its manifold advantages as soon and as cheaply as possible',[2] a trained teacher should be better able to help them to qualify for 'a decent job' in the shortest time at the least possible expense. Within these narrow limits the certificated teacher should be more 'efficient'. But, in inculcating a higher, or at least different, point of view, he is no more likely to succeed than the many generations of devoted missionaries and educational enthusiasts in the past;

[1] Mills, p. 335.
[2] *RPI* (India), 1897–1902, p. 459.

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816 and the man who acquires a teaching certificate merely as a condition of employment, or as a qualification for higher pay, is unlikely to
• 874 recommend a different attitude to those he teaches. Moreover, in vernacular schools the great mass of the children do not remain long enough to acquire permanent literacy or even to get far beyond the alphabet. Often they attend irregularly when they are not wanted at home or in the fields. In such circumstances there is little advantage in scientific teaching, and it seems that teachers, after acquiring their certificates, tend to lapse into traditional methods of instruction; not without excuse, as their chief function is to keep the children out of mischief. In lay schools with certificated teachers, the great majority of the pupils get little if at all farther than in native religious schools such as the monastic schools of Burma, the Koran schools in Moslem lands or the bush schools under missionary auspices in Africa, while they do not enjoy the same moral background, and it may well be questioned whether, from a cultural standpoint, the lay schools are the more efficient. Thus, although the easiest way of spending money on vocational instruction is to multiply training schools for teachers, and such expenditure is less obviously wasteful than on other special types of school, it is not so easy to be certain whether the money is wisely spent, with a proportional return in social welfare or economic progress.

874 A further instance of the relation between economic demand and vocational education may be found in the contrast between the
463 numbers studying medicine and law. In the dispatch of 1854 one matter thought to demand attention was the provision of special facilities for training lawyers in India. Now, not only in India but in all parts of the tropics where lawyers can find employment, they are even too numerous. Governments no longer need provide facilities for those who want to practise law, but, as with teachers, can insist on adequate qualifications. Yet it is still necessary to encourage the study of medicine. The tropics need more doctors, and generally could do with fewer lawyers. Yet there are many lawyers and few doctors. That is a characteristic feature of plural economy. Every one, European, oriental immigrant or native, who has a case, whether criminal or civil in a western court wants a lawyer trained on western lines. They all want the same kind of lawyer. Demand creates supply and the supply multiplies in excess of the demand, with the result that the lawyers employ touts to seek for clients by fostering disputes, litigation increases, and legal practice

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forsakes the honourable traditions that mitigate litigation in the West. On the other hand, each group in each community believes in its own system of medicine, and wants its own medical practitioners. There is no demand for western doctors except among Europeans or in Government service, so that natives trained in western medicine can find only a few openings with little prospect of high fees or good appointments. Naturally they prefer the Bar. Even with such unattractive prospects the supply of doctors is sometimes in excess of the demand and, as in the law, professional standards tend to deteriorate or, as in the Philippines, a considerable number of doctors and dentists are compelled to seek appointments as clerks.[1] Ordinarily, however, the training of medical students rests with the Government, which can adjust the supply to the probable demand. The tropics need doctors, but there is a demand for lawyers, and consequently there are many lawyers and few doctors.

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Here then we have the key to the slow growth of vocational and technical instruction in the tropics; it is hampered by the economic environment. But that is not a complete explanation. Other factors have contributed, and among them the tendency to regard economic progress as identical with native welfare. Educational policy looks to technical instruction as an instrument of native welfare, but educational practice encourages it as an instrument of progress. In many dependencies there have been repeated enquiries into the promotion of technical instruction, but these have been conducted largely from the standpoint of employers. The committee of 1926 in Malaya, for example, said, 'We fear that it is only too true that many of the youth of this country have a genuine distaste for hard and continuous manual labour'.[2] Clearly they regarded the youth of the country as merely so much labour, and this note, less crudely expressed perhaps, dominates most of such reports in most dependencies. Yet the report just cited has exceptional significance. The committee reported that there was little scope for technical instruction. But, just at that time, men were crowding into the motor industry and picking up the requisite technical skill where they could and how they could. That was happening throughout the tropics. One of the most striking developments of recent times is the rapid spread of the petrol engine and the introduction of motor transport in the native world. Men have learned to drive cars and lorries and taxis, and to do running repairs and even more difficult work, without special schools but through some form

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[1] Mills, p. 368. [2] *Ib.* p. 353.

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of apprenticeship or through learning from one another. As with legal training, the demand common to all communities of the plural society has created a supply even without expenditure or encouragement by Government. It is noteworthy also that, so far as the student demands qualifications for employment in the western sphere rather than the ability to exercise his calling in the native sphere, there is the same tendency to the deterioration of standards as in other professions, and the boy claiming to be qualified as an 'engineer' may be employable only as a mechanic's mate or a road ganger.[1] The encouragement of technical instruction without regard to the demand for men with technical qualifications implied that it is possible to create industries by training men to practise them. This idea still survives in nationalist circles, though it has been abandoned by educational authorities. For the encouragement of technical instruction it is not sufficient to found training-schools and institutions or to train men for employment in the western sphere; it is necessary to create and organize a demand for it in the native sphere of tropical economy, by extending the native sphere to comprehend the whole content of modern economic life.

Naturally the cult of the certificate has extended to the domain of commerce. Formerly in Malaya there were great complaints at the salary required by anyone who could read and write a European language, even very imperfectly; 'youths who were neither good clerks *in esse* or *in posse*' could command high pay.[2] With the multiplication of schools employers get better value for their money, and employees find their certificates less valuable. When a child enters the education stakes in the infant class, his parents may look to matriculation as a standard that will insure them a competence in their old age but, by the time that he matriculates, nothing less than a university degree will command an adequate salary. The commercial school provides a less costly alternative, and of late years the number of commercial schools has multiplied rapidly. These are mostly private enterprises run solely for profit, with no encouragement from the State. But of the students receiving vocational or technical instruction, the number in commercial schools usually ranks second only to the number in teachers' training institutes. Yet normal and commercial schools do not give the kind of technical instruction that was contemplated at the beginning of the century, when the authorities were seeking an alternative to an 'academic' and 'literary' curriculum.

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1234. [2] 1905, Cmd. 2379, p. 21.

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The expectation that technical instruction would provide a substitute for academic instruction has clearly proved fallacious. On the contrary, academic instruction has developed more rapidly than before. For this the insistence on technical instruction is in part responsible. Technical instruction is based on modern science, and requires a higher standard of general education than most pupils in the ordinary western schools attain. In Netherlands India technical instruction dates from 1901, when the growth of western enterprise was creating a demand for locally trained assistants. The technical institutes were open to natives, but were inaccessible because at that time only European schools equipped their pupils to receive technical training. That is still the position in many tropical dependencies. Few pupils study natural science, and only a small proportion reach a stage which equips them to receive technical instruction. Technical instruction does not take the place of general education, but stimulates the further development of general education. But the chief reason for the continued and more rapid growth of ordinary secondary and higher education is the modern expansion of western enterprise and commerce. This has created a greater demand for clerks and for a better knowledge of the appropriate European language. In Burma the growth of private enterprise in teaching English compelled the Government to accede to the teaching of English in vernacular schools. In Java the people insist on learning Dutch, and in Indo-China French. In some parts of Africa 'native life is so closely bound up with a dominant white civilization, that the native is not adequately equipped to meet the conditions with which he has to contend unless he knows a European language'.[1] For nearly half a century colonial education policy everywhere has been directed to giving a technical, utilitarian bent to the system of instruction, but has been unable to prevail against the economic forces creating a demand for (more strictly utilitarian) 'academic' courses. Curzon looked to his new policy to train the people in the business of life, but in practice the new policy, like the old, does no more than train them for a life of business. Under the new constructive policy as under the former policy of *laissez-faire*, education in the plural society of a tropical dependency is an instrument of economic progress, dominated by economic forces, and a powerful factor in converting the social order into a business concern.

[1] *African Survey*, p. 1286.

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CHAPTER I · INTRODUCTION

I

LABOR SUPPLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

464 467 TWO MAJOR LABOR PROBLEMS, which have confronted Southeast Asia in the past and which remain unsolved, are the inadequacy and irregularity of labor supply and the dearth of organized labor movements having objectives like those of Occidental labor unions.

464 Except in such overpopulated areas as Java, the Tonkin delta, and Northern Annam, labor is generally inadequate in quantity and in quality to meet the requirements of large-scale enterprise. Where numerically adequate, the labor supply is either poorly distributed in relation to areas of employment or fails to respond to opportunities offered. The industrial development of the entire area suffers from lack of full-time services of skilled laborers. Some of the factory employees form the only stable, trained groups of workers. They comprise a small proportion of the population.

[874 461] Few facilities have existed for the training of skilled workers, and the association in Oriental minds of manual labor with the humblest social classes has limited wage-labor largely to those driven by economic necessity. Handicrafts are carried on principally by agriculturists in their leisure time and by other "non-professionals." Farmers form the bulk of the workers. Only during the slack agricultural season or after a disastrous harvest are they willing to perform labor for others. [476]

464 167 Supplementation of the inadequate labor force has been effected in various ways—some spontaneous, others planned. The starvation conditions chronic in south China and in India have caused emigration of workers to the underpopulated but richer regions of Southeast Asia, whence they usually repatriate their savings and eventually their persons to the home country. With the exception of Burma, which by reason of its geographic and administrative relations with India formed a special category, the prosperity which prevailed at times in Southeast Asia was less a factor in stimulating this flow than were conditions in the homeland.

Accelerated by the boom in plantation industries during the early

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progress achieved in pedagogy. Ordinarily one finds that most of those receiving vocational instruction are being trained as teachers. Often, as at least formerly in Malaya, the pay and prospects of teachers are inferior to those of a clerk,[1] and the teaching profession is the last refuge of the semi-educated unemployed. Why, then, do so many seek to be trained as teachers? One reason is obvious. The demand for men in western enterprise and in the various specialist departments of Government service is soon met. But there is a general demand for lucrative employment, and consequently for schools to qualify men for employment, and therefore an almost unlimited demand for teachers. The Government can encourage the demand for trained teachers by imposing appropriate conditions on the grant of funds to schools. In agriculture and other special lines it is obviously waste of money to train men in excess of the demand, but there is little danger of an unemployable surplus of trained teachers, because in the teaching profession the Government fixes the demand that it supplies. Not until every school receiving grants from Government is fully staffed with trained teachers can the supply be in excess of the demand.

Whether the money spent on training-schools is well spent is another question. It seems plausible to argue that men will teach more efficiently if instructed in modern principles of teaching. But, in this matter as in others, the concept of efficiency is valid only in relation to the end proposed. Modern teaching methods have evolved out of educational experience in the homogeneous society of the West, where the school and the environment co-operate and teach the children at the same time how to live and how to make a living. But in the plural society of the tropics the children have a choice between attending schools, western or vernacular, where they may learn how to make a living, and native schools that still adhere to the tradition of teaching children how to live. Where children seek education in order 'to realize its manifold advantages as soon and as cheaply as possible',[2] a trained teacher should be better able to help them to qualify for 'a decent job' in the shortest time at the least possible expense. Within these narrow limits the certificated teacher should be more 'efficient'. But, in inculcating a higher, or at least different, point of view, he is no more likely to succeed than the many generations of devoted missionaries and educational enthusiasts in the past;

[1] Mills, p. 335.
[2] *RPI* (India), 1897–1902, p. 459.

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816 and the man who acquires a teaching certificate merely as a condition of employment, or as a qualification for higher pay, is unlikely to
874 recommend a different attitude to those he teaches. Moreover, in vernacular schools the great mass of the children do not remain long enough to acquire permanent literacy or even to get far beyond the alphabet. Often they attend irregularly when they are not wanted at home or in the fields. In such circumstances there is little advantage in scientific teaching, and it seems that teachers, after acquiring their certificates, tend to lapse into traditional methods of instruction; not without excuse, as their chief function is to keep the children out of mischief. In lay schools with certificated teachers, the great majority of the pupils get little if at all farther than in native religious schools such as the monastic schools of Burma, the Koran schools in Moslem lands or the bush schools under missionary auspices in Africa, while they do not enjoy the same moral background, and it may well be questioned whether, from a cultural standpoint, the lay schools are the more efficient. Thus, although the easiest way of spending money on vocational instruction is to multiply training schools for teachers, and such expenditure is less obviously wasteful than on other special types of school, it is not so easy to be certain whether the money is wisely spent, with a proportional return in social welfare or economic progress.

874 A further instance of the relation between economic demand and vocational education may be found in the contrast between the
463 numbers studying medicine and law. In the dispatch of 1854 one matter thought to demand attention was the provision of special facilities for training lawyers in India. Now, not only in India but in all parts of the tropics where lawyers can find employment, they are even too numerous. Governments no longer need provide facilities for those who want to practise law, but, as with teachers, can insist on adequate qualifications. Yet it is still necessary to encourage the study of medicine. The tropics need more doctors, and generally could do with fewer lawyers. Yet there are many lawyers and few doctors. That is a characteristic feature of plural economy. Every one, European, oriental immigrant or native, who has a case, whether criminal or civil in a western court wants a lawyer trained on western lines. They all want the same kind of lawyer. Demand creates supply and the supply multiplies in excess of the demand, with the result that the lawyers employ touts to seek for clients by fostering disputes, litigation increases, and legal practice